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              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Friday, May 28, 2021, Vol. 23, No. 101

                            Headlines

3D SYSTEMS: Kumar Files Securities Suit Over Share Price Drop
3M COMPANY: Westrich Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams
ATLAS FIELD: Deadline Extension to File Class Certification Tossed
ATONOMI LLC: Hunichen 'Tokens' Suit Seeks to Certify Class Action
BADGER BROTHERS: $70K Class Settlement in Neeck Suit Wins Final OK

BAR 20: Class Settlement in Maciel Suit Gets Final Approval
BAYER AG: Court Sets Page Limits on Briefing for Dismissal Bid
COMMUNITY HEALTH: Faces Kirk Suit for Breach Fiduciary Duties
CONOPCO INC: Eighth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Schulte Class Suit
D&A SERVICES: Southern District of New York Tosses Kahn FDCPA Suit

FACEBOOK INC: Court Approves Class Settlement in Adkins Suit
FAIR COLLECTIONS: Hudson Suit Seeks Damages for FDCPA Violations
FCI SCHUYLKILL: Fudge's Bid for Writ of Habeas Corpus Denied
FIRSTENERGY CORP: Bid for Protective Order in Smith Suit Granted
FRITO-LAY INC: Settlement in Sanchez Class Suit Gets Final Nod

HAIN CELESTIAL: Sued Over Non-disclosure of Toxins in Baby Food
HEALTH ACCESS: Munera Seeks Unpaid Wages, Hits Missed Breaks
IOWA: Supreme Court Affirms Dismissal of Rilea Suit v. IDOT
JUST BRANDS: Court Dismisses First Amended Rodriguez Complaint
KPM LLC: $250K Class Settlement in Hampton Suit Wins Final Approval

LCA VISION: Conditional Certification of FLSA Collective Sought
MID ATLANTIC STORAGE: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, Kauffman Says
MISSISSIPPI: Black Race Discrimination Suit vs. MDRS Dismissed
MOLSON COORS: Williams Hits Vitamin C Content in Seltzer Drink
NABRIVA THERAPEUTICS: $3M Class Deal in Enriquez Suit Has Final OK

NATIONAL DEBT: Denial of Arbitration Bid in Sues Suit Vacated
NCAA: Taylor Sues Over Health Issues From Football Injuries
NORTH AMERICAN: McGhee Bid for Class Cert. Tossed w/o Prejudice
PEOPLECONNECT INC: Can't Compel Arbitration in Callahan Class Suit
PREMIERE CREDIT: Goodwin Files FDCPA Suit in S.D. Texas

PRITCHARD INDUSTRIES: Bid for Appeal Cert. in Hernandez Suit Denied
REALPAGE INC: Wins Bid for Partial Summary Judgment in Kelly Suit
SAN FRANCISCO, CA: Seeks Initial OK of Settlement in Zayas Suit
SAROJ & MANJU: Class Settlement in Wood Suit Wins Final Approval
SCHELL & KAMPETER: Loses Bid to Dismiss Classick Class Suit

SENTINEL INSURANCE: W.D. Washington Fuses Spektor Suit With Chorak
THC-ORANGE COUNTY: Court Enters Final Judgment in Bouzelev Suit
TOGETHER CREDIT: $164K in Attorneys' Fees Awarded in Chambers Suit
TOGETHER CREDIT: $525K Chambers Suit Class Settlement Has Final OK
UNDER ARMOUR: Maryland Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Securities Suit

UNITED STATES: E.D. New York Narrows Claims in N-N vs. USCIS
WESTERN UNION: Bid to Compel Discovery in Radulescu Granted in Part
WHITE PINES INC: Dancers Seek Minimum and Overtime Wages

                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Burlington Northern Still Faces Exposure Claims
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Colfax Incurs $0.9MM in Asbestos-Related Costs
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Colgate-Palmolive Defends 147 Individual Cases
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Corning Inc. Has $96MM Asbestos Claims Reserve
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Crane Co. Defends 29,407 Claims as of March 31

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Flowserve Corp. Still Faces PI Lawsuits
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Goodyear Tire Faces 38,700 PI Claimants
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Ingersoll Rand Has $129.2MM Litigation Reserve
ASBESTOS UPDATE: International Paper Reports $114MM Liability
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Johnson Controls Subsidiaries Faces PI Suits

ASBESTOS UPDATE: U.S. Steel Faces 895 Active Cases at March 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: W.W. Grainger Still Faces Exposure Claims


                            *********

3D SYSTEMS: Kumar Files Securities Suit Over Share Price Drop
--------------------------------------------------------------
RAMESH KUMAR, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. 3D SYSTEMS CORPORATION, VYOMESH I. JOSHI, TODD A.
BOOTH, JEFFREY A. GRAVES, WAYNE PENSKY, and JAGTAR NARULA, Case No.
1:21-cv-02383 (E.D.N.Y., April 29, 2021) is a class action on
behalf of all persons and entities who purchased the publicly
traded securities of 3D Systems from May 7, 2020 to March 1, 2021.
The Plaintiff seeks to recover compensable damages caused by
Defendants' violations of the federal securities laws under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The complaint alleges that the statements made in the company's
quarterly reports filed on May 6, 2020, August 5, 2020, and
November 5, 2020 were materially false and/or misleading because
they misrepresented and failed to disclose the adverse facts
pertaining to the company's business, operations, and financial
results, which were known to Defendants or recklessly disregarded
by them. Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that:(i) 3D Systems lacked
proper internal controls over financial reporting; and (ii) as a
result, 3D Systems' public statements were materially false and/or
misleading at all relevant times.

The complaint adds that on March 2, 2021, 3D Systems filed an NT
10-K with the Securities and Exchange Commission, stating that
their 10-K filing would be delayed for the reasons listed in their
March 1, 2021 press release. On this news, 3D Systems' stock price
fell $7.62 per share, or more than 19.6%, from closing at $38.79
per share on March 1, 2021 to close at $31.17 per share on March 2,
2021, damaging investors. As a result of Defendants' wrongful acts
and omissions, and the precipitous decline in the market value of
the Company's securities, Plaintiff and other Class members have
suffered significant losses and damages, adds the complaint.

Plaintiff Kumar purchased 3D Systems' securities during the Class
Period.

Defendants Booth, et al., are corporate officers of Defendant 3D
Systems, which provides comprehensive 3D printing and digital
manufacturing solutions, including 3D printers for plastics and
metals, materials, software, on demand manufacturing services, and
digital design tools.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
          J. Alexander Hood II, Esq.
          James M. LoPiano, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          600 Third Avenue
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 661-1100
          Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
          E-mail: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                  ahood@pomlaw.com
                  jlopiano@pomlaw.com

3M COMPANY: Westrich Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Geoffrey Lynn Westrich, and those similarly situated v. 3M COMPANY
(f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS
AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA,
INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION;
CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.;
CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA,
INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC.; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a
DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND
COMPANY; KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL
COMPANY; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE
PRODUCTS LP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED
TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION,
INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.), Case No. 2:21-cv-01386-RMG
(D.S.C., May 7, 2021), is brought for damages for personal injury
resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming foams ("AFFF")
containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as per and
polyfluoroalkyl substances ("PFAS"). PFAS includes, but is not
limited to, perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and perfluorooctane
sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals including those that
degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS.

The Defendants collectively designed, marketed, developed,
manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced
instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or otherwise released
into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge that it contained
highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which would expose end users
of the product to the risks associated with PFAS. Further, the
Defendants designed, marketed, developed, manufactured,
distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional
materials, promoted, sold and/or otherwise handled and/or used
underlying chemicals and/or products added to AFFF which contained
PFAS for use in firefighting.

PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the
material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to
their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and
body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals. The Defendants knew, or should have known, that PFAS
remain in the human body while presenting significant health risks
to humans.

The Defendants' PFAS-containing AFFF products were used by the
Plaintiff in their intended manner, without significant change in
the products' condition. The Plaintiff was unaware of the dangerous
properties of the Defendants' AFFF products and relied on the
Defendants' instructions as to the proper handling of the products.
The Plaintiff regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to,
AFFF in training and to extinguish fires during his working career
as a military and/or civilian firefighter and was diagnosed with
kidney cancer as a result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF
products, asserts the complaint.

The Defendants are designers, marketers, developers, manufacturers,
distributors, releasers, instructors, promotors and sellers of
PFAS-containing AFFF products or underlying PFAS containing
chemicals used in AFFF production.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue South
          Birmingham, AL 35205
          Phone: 205-328-9200
          Facsimile: 205-328-9456

               - and -

          J. Edward Bell, Esq.
          Gabrielle Anna Sulpizio, Esq.
          BELL LEGAL GROUP
          219 Ridge Street
          Georgetown, SC 25442
          Phone: 843-546-2408
          Facsimile: 843-546-9604


ATLAS FIELD: Deadline Extension to File Class Certification Tossed
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as HOMER DANIEL and CHARLES
STUCKER, individually and on behalf of themselves and a class of
similarly situated individuals, v. ATLAS FIELD SERVICES, LLC, a
Texas Limited Liability Company, and CRAIG TAYLOR, and DOES 1–20,
Case No. 3:20-cv-04415-WHA (N.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge William
Alsup entered an order denying the motion to continue the deadline
to move for class certification.

The Plaintiffs must prosecute this action on an individual basis,
says the Court.

The Plaintiffs Homer Daniel and Charles Stucker worked for
defendants through October 2019 and March 2020, respectively, as
"consulting utility forester[s], performing assessments of trees
and vegetation around powerlines and fire risk analysis." In August
2020, plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint against their
former employers, Atlas Field Services, LLC, and Craig Taylor, in
his alleged role as a managing member of defendant LLC.

Briefly, the plaintiffs allege that defendants failed to pay
plaintiffs contractual wages owed; overtime wages owed; minimum
wages owed; failed to provide meal periods or compensation in lieu
thereof; failed to provide rest periods or compensation in lieu
thereof; and failed to reimburse plaintiffs for necessary business
expenditures. The Plaintiffs bring claims under the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, and various provisions of California's Labor
Code.

A copy of the Court's order dated May 6, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3fgpBm4 at no extra charge.[CC]


ATONOMI LLC: Hunichen 'Tokens' Suit Seeks to Certify Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Chris Hunichen,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
Atonomi LLC, a Delaware LLC, CENTRI Technology, Inc., a Delaware
Corporation, Vaughan Emery, David Fragale, Rob Strickland, Kyle
Strickland, Don Deloach, Wayne Wisehart, Woody Benson, Michael
Mackey, James Salter, and Luis Paris, Case No.
2:19-cv-00615-RAJ-SKV (W.D. Wash.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to
enter an order:

  1. certifying this case as a class action;

  2. appointing Hunichen as Class Representative; and

  3. appointing Joel Ard of Ard Law Group PLLC, Angus Ni of AFN
Law
     PLLC, and William Restis of The Restis Firm, P.C. as Class
     Counsel pursuant to Rule 23(g).

The Plaintiff seeks certification of the following Class or such
Class or subclass as the Court deems appropriate:

   "All persons who purchased ATMI tokens via a Series 1 or Series
   2 Simple Agreement for Future Tokens (SAFT) with Atonomi, LLC
in
   2018."

Excluded from the Class are Defendants and persons or entities
directly affiliated with any Defendant, and persons who
affirmatively assented to the Atonomi "Terms of Token Sale."

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated May 7, 2021
is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3uiRkqA at no
extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joel B. Ard, Esq.
          ARD LAW GROUP PLLC
          P.O. Box 11633
          Bainbridge Island, WA 98110
          Telephone: (206) 701-9243
          E-mail: Joel@Ard.law

               - and -

          Angus F. Ni, Esq.
          AFN LAW PLLC
          506 2nd Ave, Suite 1400
          Seattle, WA 98104
          Telephone: (646) 543-7294

               - and -

          William R. Restis, Esq.
          The Restis Law Firm, P.C
          402 West Broadway, Suite 1520
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 270-8383
          E-mail: william@restislaw.com

BADGER BROTHERS: $70K Class Settlement in Neeck Suit Wins Final OK
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CONNOR NEECK and ISAIAH WEST, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. BADGER
BROTHERS MOVING, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-834-wmc (W.D.
Wis.), Judge William M. Conley of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Wisconsin grants the Plaintiffs' unopposed
motions for final approval of class action settlement and for class
counsel's costs and attorneys' fees.

Named Plaintiffs and class representatives Connor Neeck and Isaiah
West brought collective and class action claims against Defendant
Badger, seeking to recover unpaid overtime wages due to them and
other similarly-situated workers.

In the lawsuit, the Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendant failed to
pay them and similarly-situated employees overtime wages in
violation of state law and the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"),
29 U.S.C. Section 203.  The court previously accepted the parties'
stipulated motion for consideration certification of an FLSA
collective action, which resulted in 11 FLSA collective action
members.

On Sept. 4, 2020, the parties also submitted a stipulation for
class certification, and the Plaintiffs submitted an unopposed
motion for preliminary approval of settlement agreement, which the
Court granted.  The class in the case is defined as "all persons
who have been or are currently employed by Badger Brothers Moving
LLC as laborers and/or crew leads in the state of Wisconsin between
October 9, 2017, and May 4, 2020."  The class consists of
approximately 96 individuals.

The parties have reached a settlement.  As detailed in the Court's
prior order preliminarily approving the settlement, the settlement
creates a common fund of $70,000 to be used to pay participating
class members claims, costs, attorneys' fees, and an enhancement
payment to each of the named Plaintiffs.

Under the terms of the settlement, class members will receive 80%
of their maximum fully-liquidated claim value.  The calculations
took into account the number of hours worked, the number of shifts
worked, the pay rate or rates used, the amount of wages paid for
each work week to each class member, and accounted for the
liquidated damages available for the FLSA opt-in plaintiffs.  The
settlement amounts range from a guaranteed minimum of $20 to
$4,258.26, with the average amount of $465.28.  Additionally, the
settlement proposes an incentive award of $1,000 to be paid to each
of the class representatives Connor Neeck and Isaiah West.
Moreover, the class counsel seeks an award of attorneys' fees and
costs in the total amount of $23,333.33 -- representing one third
of the settlement fund.

After certifying the class for settlement purposes and approving
the settlement preliminarily, the class counsel sent a notice to
the 96 class members via electronic and U.S. mail on Feb. 22, 2021.
At the close of the notice period, no class members had objected
to the settlement and only two class members requested exclusion.

In support of their petition for attorneys' fees and costs, and as
directed by the Court, the class counsel submitted their time
records and hourly rates, reflecting that they completed 133.35
hours of work on the case, amount to fees of $42,197.50.  The class
counsel also submitted a record of out-of-pocket costs totaling
$635.05.

Based on his findings and representations made by the parties'
counsel during the May 13, 2021, fairness hearing, as well as in
the parties' written submissions and the larger record in the case,
Judge Conley concludes that the parties' settlement is fair,
reasonable and adequate pursuant to Rule 23(e) and as required
under the FLSA.  He also finds that the Plaintiffs' requested
$1,000 fee for each of the names Plaintiffs is reasonable.
Finally, he finds that the resolution of the entire case is in the
best interest of the class members, including the attorneys' fees
and costs in the total amount of $23,333.33, noting that no class
member objected to the fee request.

For these reasons, Judge Conley grants the Plaintiffs' unopposed
motion for final approval of the settlement agreement.  The parties
are directed to carry out its terms.  The enhancement payments to
Connor Neeck and Isaiah West in the amount of $1,000 each are
approved.  The class counsel's unopposed motion for costs and
attorneys' fees is granted in the requested amount of $23,333.33.
The Settlement payments as defined in the Section 4 of the
Settlement Agreement and as calculated in Appendix C are approved.

The Judge dismissed the action on the merits with prejudice.  The
Court expressly retains jurisdiction to enforce the terms of
settlement, including directing additional efforts to be made to
distribute the proceeds of settlement funds to class members, even
after the 90-day deadline for cashing check, before they are
allowed to revert to the Defendant.  Accordingly, the parties are
directed to notify the Court if more than five checks to class
members are not cashed at the end of the 90-day period.

Consistent with the above, the Clerk of the Court is directed to
close the case subject to reopening upon good cause shown.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 14, 2021 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2dnaespc from Leagle.com.


BAR 20: Class Settlement in Maciel Suit Gets Final Approval
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JOSE MACIEL and ELVIS
BONILLA, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
and as "aggrieved employees" on behalf of other "aggrieved
employees" under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, v. BAR
20 DAIRY, LLC, a California limited liability company; and DOES 1
through 50, inclusive, Case No. 1:17-cv-00902-DAD-SKO (E.D.
Calif.), the Hon. Judge Dale A. Drozd entered an order that:

   1. The Plaintiffs' motion for final approval of the class
action
      settlement is granted and the court approves the settlement
      as fair, reasonable, and adequate;

   2. The Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees and costs and
      incentive awards 2 is granted, and the court awards the
      following sums:

      a. Class counsel shall receive $150,000.00 in attorneys'
fees
         and $21,859.44 in expenses;

      b. Plaintiff Maciel shall receive $6,500.00 as an incentive
         payment;

      c. Plaintiff Bonilla shall receive $5,000.00 as an incentive

         payment; and

      d. Simpluris Inc. shall receive $10,890.00 in settlement
         administration costs and expenses;

   3. The parties are directed to effectuate all terms of the
      settlement agreement and any deadlines or procedures for
      distribution set forth therein;

   4. This action is dismissed with prejudice in accordance with
      the terms of the parties' fifth amended settlement agreement,

      with the court specifically retaining jurisdiction over this

      action for the purpose of enforcing the parties' settlement
      agreement; and

   5. he Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case.

The following class of an estimated 315 individuals (the "Class
Members") s certified for settlement purposes:

   "[A]ll current and former non-exempt employees of Defendant
   during the period of February 11, 2011 through May 11, 2016
   ("Class Period") in the following departments and/or job
   categories: Breeders, Calf, Corral Maintenance, Feed Push,
   Feeders, Fresh Cow, Hospital, Maintenance, Waste Management,
   Maternity, Milkers, Farm Tractor and Equipment Drivers, Farm
   Irrigators, and Farm."

A copy of the Court's order dated May 6, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3bOYEUI at no extra charge.[CC]

BAYER AG: Court Sets Page Limits on Briefing for Dismissal Bid
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SHEET METAL WORKERS' NATIONAL PENSION FUND and
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS LOCAL NO. 710 PENSION FUND,
individually and as Lead Plaintiffs on behalf of all others
similarly situated, and INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS
PENSION FUND OF EASTERN PENNSYLVANIA AND DELAWARE, individually and
as Named Plaintiff, on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. BAYER AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT, WERNER BAUMANN, WERNER
WENNING, LIAM CONDON, JOHANNES DIETSCH, and WOLFGANG NICKL,
Defendants, Case No. 3:20-cv-04737-RS (N.D. Cal.), Magistrate Judge
Richard Eborg of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California granted the parties' stipulation regarding page
limits for briefing on the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the
Amended Complaint.

On Nov. 30, 2020, the Court entered the stipulated briefing
schedule on the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

On Jan. 19, 2021, the Lead Plaintiffs filed the Amended Class
Action Complaint.

On March 22, 2021, the Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss the
Amended Complaint.

The Lead Plaintiffs have requested an additional five pages for
their memorandum in opposition to the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
for a total of 30 pages in length.  The Defendants do not oppose
this request provided they receive the same five additional pages
for their reply memorandum for a total of 20 pages in length.

Therefore, the parties stipulated that the Lead Plaintiffs'
opposition brief will not exceed a combined 30 pages in length; and
the Defendants' reply brief will not exceed a combined 20 pages in
length.

Pursuant to stipulation and for good cause shown, Judge Eborg so
ordered.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 14, 2021 Stipulation & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/bjp5cnpy from Leagle.com.

Carol V. Gilden -- cgilden@cohenmilstein.com -- (admitted pro hac
vice), Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Chicago, IL.

Nicole Lavallee -- nlavallee@bermantabacco.com -- Jeffrey Miles --
jmiles@bermantabacco.com -- BERMAN TABACCO, in San Francisco,
California, Attorneys for Lead Plaintiffs and Additional Named
Plaintiff.

William Savitt -- cgilden@cohenmilstein.com -- (pro hac vice), John
F. Lynch -- JLynch@wlrk.com -- (pro hac vice), Noah B. Yavitz --
NBYavitz@wlrk.com -- (pro hac vice), John R. Rady --
JRRady@wlrk.com -- (pro hac vice), WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ,
in New York City.

Jordan Eth -- jeth@mofo.com -- Mark R.S. Foster -- mfoster@mofo.com
-- MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, in San Francisco, California, Attorneys
for Defendants UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
CALIFORNIA SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION.


COMMUNITY HEALTH: Faces Kirk Suit for Breach Fiduciary Duties
-------------------------------------------------------------
Becky Kirk, Perry Ayoob, and Dawn Karzenoski, as representatives of
a class of similarly situated persons, and on behalf of the
CHS/Community Health Systems, Inc. Retirement Savings Plan v.
Retirement Committee of CHS/Community Health Systems, Inc.,
CHS/Community Health Systems, Inc., John and Jane Does 1-20,
Principal Life Insurance Company, Principal Management Corporation,
and Principal Global Investors, LLC, Case No. 4:21-cv-00134-SMR-CFB
(M.D. Tenn., April 29, 2021) is brought against the Defendants for
breaching their fiduciary duties through their disloyal and
imprudent management of the employee pension benefit plan and its
investments, to the detriment of participants. Plaintiffs seeks to
recover the losses caused by Defendants' fiduciary breaches,
disgorge the profits earned by Principal as a result of these
breaches, prevent further mismanagement of the Plan and its
investments, and obtain equitable and other relief as provided by
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.

The complaint alleges that the CHS Defendants breached their
fiduciary duties by maintaining excessively expensive and poorly
performing index funds in the Plan that were managed by Principal.
The marketplace for index funds is highly competitive, with several
companies offering index fund products that track benchmark indices
with a high degree of precision, while charging very low fees.
However, the CHS Defendants did not give any serious consideration
to these competitive index fund offerings in the marketplace, and
instead used Principal's proprietary index funds, despite fees that
were several times higher than marketplace alternatives that
tracked the exact same index. Not only were the Principal index
funds far more expensive, they were also of significantly lower
quality. Compared to marketplace alternatives, Principal's index
funds deviated further from the benchmark index, and consistently
had the worst performance even on a pre-fee basis. Given the high
fees and history of poor performance of Principal's index funds, a
prudent fiduciary acting in the best interests of the Plan's
participants would have removed these index funds from the Plan and
replaced them with more competitive marketplace alternatives. The
CHS Defendants' failure to do so has cost participants millions of
dollars in excessive fees and lost investment returns. In addition,
the CHS Defendants failed to properly monitor Principal, and failed
to appropriately address its conflicts of interest in managing the
Plan's target date funds (TDF), the complaint asserts.

Plaintiffs Kirk, Ayoob, and Karzenoski are former participants of
the Plan.

Defendant CHS is the "plan sponsor" and it has ultimate
decision-making authority with respect to the management and
administration of the Plan and the Plan's investments.

Defendant Principal Life Insurance Company is the investment
manager for TDF separate accounts in the Plan and the underlying
proprietary investments in those separate accounts.

Defendant Principal Global Investors, LLC is a registered
investment adviser, and served as the investment sub-adviser of the
Principal separate accounts in the Plan from approximately January
2017 to the present.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Jerry Martin, Esq.
          David Garrison, Esq.
          BARRETT JOHNSTON MARTIN & GARRISON, LLC
          Philips Plaza
          414 Union Street, Suite 900
          Nashville, TN 37219
          Telephone: (615) 244-2202
          Facsimile: (615) 252-3798
          E-mail: jmartin@barrettjohnston.com

                    - and -

          Kai H. Richter, Esq.
          Paul J. Lukas, Esq.
          Carl F. Engstrom, Esq.
          Brock J. Specht, Esq.
          Jacob T. Schutz, Esq.
          NICHOLS KASTER, PLLP
          4600 IDS Center
          80 S 8th Street
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: 612-256-3200
          Facsimile: 612-338-4878
          E-mail: krichter@nka.com
                  lukas@nka.com
                  cengstrom@nka.com
                  bspecht@nka.com
                  jschutz@nka.com


CONOPCO INC: Eighth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Schulte Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
district court's dismissal of the case, Karen Schulte, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated Plaintiff-Appellant
v. Conopco, Inc., doing business as Unilever Defendant-Appellee;
Walgreen Co., Defendant; CVS Pharmacy, Inc.; Walmart, Inc.; Target
Corporation; Schnuck Markets, Inc.; Dierbergs Markets, Inc.,
Defendants-Appellees; Does 1-10 Defendants, Case No. 20-2696 (8th
Cir.).

Plaintiff Schulte sued numerous companies for violating the
Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (MMPA) through their marketing
of men's and women's antiperspirants.  The district court
dismissed.

Schulte argues Conopco, doing business as Unilever, discriminates
based on gender in pricing two Dove product lines.  One line is
"Men + Care," primarily marketed to men.  The other is "Advanced
Care," marketed to women, though more subtly.  The antiperspirants
in each line have similar, but not identical, ingredients.  Each
line has distinct scents: Advanced Care has at least 15 "feminine"
scents, while Men + Care has about five "masculine" scents.  The
Men + Care brand comes in a 2.7-ounce size, while the Advanced care
is only 2.6 ounces.  The two lines have distinct packaging and
labels.

Ms. Schulte purchased an Advanced Care antiperspirant stick from
each of the six Defendant retailers.  She alleges their price was
higher than the comparable Men + Care sticks, from 40 cents to $1
per stick.  Schulte filed a class action suit, alleging that the
Dove manufacturers and sellers were discriminating against women in
their pricing, a "pink tax."  She alleges this violates the MMPA.
The district court dismissed the complaint.

Ms. Schulte argues the MMPA bans gender discrimination in pricing.
She stresses Missouri cases suggesting that whether a practice is
unfair can be a factual issue -- Murphy v. Stonewall Kitchen, LLC,
503 S.W.3d 308, 312 (Mo. App. 2016); Jackson v. Hazelrigg Auto.
Serv. Ctr., Inc., 417 S.W.3d 886, 895 (Mo. App. 2014).

The Eight Circuit finds that Schulte mistakes gender-based
marketing for gender discrimination.  She ignores that the
different scents, packaging, and labels make the products
potentially attractive to different customers with different
preferences.

Ms. Schulte argues at length that the MMPA bans gender
discrimination in pricing, based on a plain language analysis, the
Missouri regulation, public policy, and FTC guidance.  Assuming
that the MMPA bans gender discrimination in pricing, the Eight
Circuit holds that she cannot plausibly allege it using only
retail-price differences without plausibly alleging that the only
difference between the products is the gender of the purchaser.

Ms. Schulte also conflates marketing targeted to women with
enforced point-of-sale pricing by gender.  The Judge finds that
women are not required to purchase Advanced Care products, nor are
men required to purchase Men + Care: both have an equal opportunity
to buy.  As Schulte puts it, "men and women are able to purchase a
product marketed to the opposite sex."  Ironically, her claim
assumes all men and all women must purchase products marketed to
their gender, in her words, "due to social conditioning and
societal expectations regarding what is 'feminine' and
'masculine.'"  If Schulte's primary concern is price, she is free
to purchase the Men + Care antiperspirant.  Her choice not to
illustrate a difference in demand based on product preferences, not
the purchaser's gender.  As Schulte says in her brief, she prefers
the scents in the Advanced Care line because she does not want to
"smell like a man."  She just does not want to pay extra for her
preference.  Because preference-based pricing is not necessarily an
unfair practice, the MMPA does not prohibit the Defendants'
pricing.

For these reasons, the Eight Circuit affirmed the judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 18, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/2skf5frv from Leagle.com.


D&A SERVICES: Southern District of New York Tosses Kahn FDCPA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LEVI KAHN, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. D&A SERVICES, LLC, and John Does
1-25, Defendants, Case No. 20 CV 4792 (VB) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge
Vincent L. Briccetti of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York granted D&A's motion to dismiss pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6).

Plaintiff Kahn brings the putative class action against the
Defendants, alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. Sections 1692 et seq.  According
to the complaint, D&A sent the Plaintiff a debt collection letter
dated March 9, 2020.  The letter, which is attached to the
complaint, stated the Plaintiff owed $7,628.70 to Bank of America,
N.A.

The Plaintiff alleges the letter violates Sections 1692e(10) and
1692g(b) of the FDCPA.  Specifically, the Plaintiff claims the
following language in the letter misleadingly suggests the
Plaintiff's oral dispute of the debt will cause D&A to suspend debt
collection efforts: "If you dispute the debt, or any part thereof,
or request the name and address of the original creditor in writing
within the thirty-day period, the law requires our firm to suspend
our efforts to collect the debt until we mail the requested
information to you."

Now pending are D&A's motions to dismiss the complaint pursuant to
(i) Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and (ii)
Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

Discussion

I. Standing

D&A argues the Plaintiff lacks standing under Article III of the
Constitution to bring the action.

Judge Briccetti disagrees.  In Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct.
1540, 1547 (2016), to satisfy the "irreducible constitutional
minimum of standing, the plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury
in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of
the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a
favorable judicial decision."

The Judge holds that Spokeo does not categorically preclude
violations of statutorily mandated procedures from qualifying as
concrete injuries supporting standing, citing Cohen v. Rosicki,
Rosicki & Assocs., P.C., 897 F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 2018).  Indeed,
after Spokeo, the Second Circuit has held that Sections 1692e and
1692g protect an individual's concrete interests, so that an
alleged violation of these provisions satisfies the injury-in-fact
requirement of Article III.  The Plaintiff alleges violations of
Sections 1692e and 1692g.  Accordingly, the Plaintiff has standing
to pursue the case.

II. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

D&A also argues the Plaintiff fails to allege the debt collection
letter violated Sections 1692e and 1692g because the letter does
not misrepresent the FDCPA's dispute process.

Judge Briccetti agrees.  He finds that nowhere does the letter "say
that any type of dispute, even a dispute made orally, can trigger
cessation of debt collection efforts."  Simply put, if the least
sophisticated consumer reads the letter in its entirety, as he
must, it is clear that both a dispute of the debt and a request for
the original creditor's name and address must be done in writing.
For the same reason, the Plaintiff also does not plausibly allege
the disputed sentence is a false, deceptive, or misleading
representation in violation of Section 1692e(10).

Nor has the Plaintiff plausibly alleged Section 1692e(10) is
violated because the disputed sentence is open to more than one
reasonable interpretatio, the Judge holds.  Although a "collection
notice can be deceptive if it is open to more than one reasonable
interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate," citing Clomon
v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1319 (2d Cir. 1993), the plaintiff's
idiosyncratic interpretation cannot be credited as reasonable.
Neither the use of commas around "or any part thereof" nor the
second "or" splits the sentence into two.  Rather, the phrase "or
any part thereof," which is offset by commas, is simply a modifier
for the preceding word, "debt."  And the second "or" properly
identifies two distinct actions that must be done in writing to
take effect.

Accordingly, both the Section 1692g(b) and Section 1692e(10) claims
must be dismissed.

Conclusion

Judge Briccetti denied the motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1) and granted the motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6).  The Clerk is instructed to terminate the motions (Docs.
##8, 18) and close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 14, 2021 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/eybbr3yc from Leagle.com.


FACEBOOK INC: Court Approves Class Settlement in Adkins Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as STEPHEN ADKINS v.
FACEBOOK, INC., Case No. 3:18-cv-05982-WHA (N.D. Calif.), the Hon.
Judge William Alsup entered an order approving final settlement and
granting in part class counsel's fees motion as to entitlement of
class counsel (and class counsel only), but denying as to amount.

According to the complaint, what Facebook did wrong was a coding
mistake, not an attempt to sell users' private information. Most
claims got dismissed. No damages class got certified. What survived
for trial was a negligence claim and a claim for declaratory and
injunctive relief.

The settlement implicates limited aspects of Facebook's overall
data security responsibilities -- those related to access tokens --
and provides neither monetary damages nor individualized credit
monitoring for class members. In light of the thinness of the
surviving claims and limited class certification obtained, the
settlement itself is understandably thin as well but acceptable in
view of the probable merits, but the benefit achieved in this case
for the class is modest.

Class counsel waxed poetic about the complexity, technicality, and
novelty of the data 20 security issues presented in this case, but
note well the settlement calls for only pocket change to the
monitor who will ensure that Facebook abides by the settlement
terms. That amount is merely $15,000 over five years. This is
further evidence of a cosmetic settlement.

Facebook is an American technology conglomerate based in Menlo
Park, California.

A copy of the Court's order dated May 6, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2TkVP7v at no extra charge.[CC]


FAIR COLLECTIONS: Hudson Suit Seeks Damages for FDCPA Violations
----------------------------------------------------------------
DARNELL HUDSON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Fair Collections & Outsourcing, Inc. and JOHN DOES
1-25, Case No. 1:21-cv-00162 (N.D. Ind., April 29, 2021) seeks
damages and declaratory relief for Defendant's deceptive and
misleading statement in violation of the Fair Debt Collections
Practices Act.

According to the complaint, some time prior to May 15, 2020, an
obligation was allegedly incurred to Willowood East 6653 Elon
Property. The Willowood Property obligation arose out of
transactions for services allegedly received by Plaintiff which
were incurred primarily for personal, family or household purposes.
Creditor Willowood East 6653 Elon Property contracted with the
Defendant to collect the alleged debt.

The complaint alleges that on May 15, 2020, Plaintiff received a
collection letter from Defendant. The Letter states a balance of
$310.21 and states "This Office agrees to accept 40% off the amount
due as settlement in full! Pay $186.13 of your debt and it is gone!
Call by 10/31/17 to take advantage of this offer." The Plaintiff
asserts that the statement is deceptive and misleading on its face
because the settlement offer expires on 10/31/17 which is before
the date of the letter (letter is dated 5/15/2020). It is therefore
impossible for Plaintiff to actually accept the settlement.

This is merely a deceptive tactic to coerce a rushed payment from
Defendant, asserts the complaint. As a result of Defendant's
deceptive and misleading statement, Plaintiff has been harmed, the
complaint adds.

Defendant Fair Collections & Outsourcing is a "debt collector"
located in Beltsville, Maryland.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Raphael Deutsch, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: 201-282-6500
          Fax: 201-282-6501
          E-mail: rdeutsch@steinsakslegal.com

FCI SCHUYLKILL: Fudge's Bid for Writ of Habeas Corpus Denied
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LAWRENCE FUDGE, Petitioner v. SCOTT J. FINLEY, et al.,
Respondents, Case No. 1:21-cv-00386 (M.D. Pa.), Judge Yvette Kane
of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
denied Fudge's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

The petition challenges the conditions of confinement at the
Federal Correctional Institution at Schuylkill related to the
COVID-19 pandemic.

Before the Court is the April 28, 2021 Report and Recommendation of
Magistrate Judge Carlson, recommending that the Court denies
Petitioner Fudge's petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. Section 2241.

Magistrate Judge Carlson recommends that the Court denies the
petition because: (1) the Petitioner has failed to exhaust
administrative remedies; (2) the Petitioner's request for home
confinement is within the sole discretion of the Bureau of Prisons;
and (3) any Eighth Amendment claim raised by the petition fails
where the Petitioner has fully recovered from a COVID-19 infection
and has specifically declined to be vaccinated as a precaution
against further COVID-19 infection.  In addition, Magistrate Judge
Carlson recommends that the Court denies the Petitioner's request
for certification of a class action on behalf of his fellow
prisoners.

No objections to the Report and Recommendation have been filed.

Accordingly, Judge Kane, upon independent review of the record and
the applicable law, adopts the Report and Recommendation of
Magistrate Judge Carlson.  He denied the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus.  A certificate of appealability will not be issued.
The Clerk of Court is directed to close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 18, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/fxeuzptp from Leagle.com.


FIRSTENERGY CORP: Bid for Protective Order in Smith Suit Granted
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JACOB SMITH, Plaintiff v. FIRSTENERGY CORP., et al.,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 2:20-cv-3755 (S.D. Ohio), Magistrate
Judge Kimberly A. Jolson of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, granted the
Defendants' Motions for Protective Order and for Entry of Order
Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 502(d).

The case is a civil conspiracy and corruption case stemming from
the alleged criminal actions of the former Speaker of the Ohio
House of Representatives, Larry Householder, and his alleged
co-conspirators (the Householder Enterprise).  According to the
Complaint, the Householder Enterprise and Defendants FirstEnergy
Corp. and FirstEnergy Service Co. (collectively, FirstEnergy)
participated in an illegal bribery scheme, lasting from 2017-2020
(the Criminal Action).

At base, the alleged scheme was a quid pro quo. The Householder
Enterprise received $60 million from FirstEnergy to further their
political and personal interests.  In exchange, the Householder
Enterprise coordinated the passage of House Bill 6 (HB6), a
billion-dollar energy bailout that purportedly saved two failing
Ohio nuclear power plants, both affiliated with FirstEnergy.  As
part of the bailout, Ohio residents and businesses will soon see
monthly surcharges on their electric bills.

The Plaintiffs, Ohio residents and businesses allegedly injured by
these surcharges, brought the putative class action, along with
seven related cases, in July 2020.  The Court consolidated the
cases on Sept. 29, 2020, and the Plaintiffs filed their
Consolidated Class Action Complaint the next month.  Broadly
speaking, the Plaintiffs allege that FirstEnergy, along with
numerous individual Defendants, including, for example First
Energy's CEO, CFO, and President, violated the federal Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), as well as the
Ohio Corrupt Activity Act (OCRA).

On April 21, 2021, the Defendants filed the instant Motions for
Protective Order and for Entry of Order Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid.
502(d).  The Court expedited briefing, with no reply permitted
without leave of Court.  On April 28, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed
their Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motions, arguing that a
protective order is not needed.

Discussion

A. Protective Order

Consistent with the Local Rules, the parties met and conferred to
try to resolve their disputes.  During those discussions, the
Plaintiff agreed to the entry of the One-Tier Form Protective Order
provided on the Court's website.  Still, the Defendants assert that
the One-Tier Protective Order is insufficient, and the Court should
instead enter their edited two-tier Protective Order.  Given these
representations, the heart of the parties' dispute is whether the
protective order in the case should include the opportunity to
designate documents for Attorney's Eyes Only ("AEO").  The parties
also disagree as to whether discovery should be shared in other
pending litigation.

Judge Jolson first must determine whether "good cause" exists to
enter a protective order in the case.  The Defendants represent
that because discovery in the case "will involve production of
documents and information of a sensitive or confidential nature,
including their proprietary business and customer information," a
protective order is needed.  Disclosure of this information,
Defendants say, "would result in substantial competitive harm" to
them and their customers.  Given the issues at stake in the case,
Judge Jolson agrees that it is likely that documents warranting the
confidentiality designation will be produced.  Also, "good cause"
has been shown for entry of a protective order.

Beyond demonstrating "good cause" for entry of a protective order,
the Defendants must also show why their proposed order should be
adopted.  The Defendants argue that a two-tier protective order,
which includes both "confidential" and AEO designations, is
necessary.  To achieve that goal, the Defendants propose the use of
the Court's Form Two-Tier Protective Order with modifications.
Although most of the modifications are light, the parties dispute
whether an AEO designation is necessary and whether discovery in
these actions and the shareholder actions should be coordinated.

Judge Jolson finds that "good cause" exists for entering the
two-tier protective order, including both "confidential" and AEO
designations.  Still, she cautions the parties not to abuse the AEO
designation.  If a party designates a document as AEO and then
loses a challenge to that designation, the Undersigned will
consider awarding fees to the prevailing party for having to bring
the challenge.

The Defendants began with the Court's form two-tier protective
order and made modifications to it that they have classified as
cosmetic, organizational, and clarifying.  At a high level, the
Judge agrees with these labels and concludes that the modifications
are appropriate.  She holds that the cosmetic, organizational, and
clarifying modifications are reasonable and adopts them.

Finally, while she finds some merit in the Plaintiffs' request for
coordination, the Judge finds that the shareholder action is
currently stayed, and discovery in the matter must proceed now.  To
allow the case to move along, she adopts the Defendants'
limitations on discovery sharing.  But, if any portion of the stay
is lifted in the shareholder actions, she will convene the parties
to discuss whether discovery should be coordinated.  Then, if
necessary, this portion of the Protective Order will be vacated and
amended to conform to the changed circumstances.

Accordingly, in exercising her discretion under Rule 26(c) and for
good cause shown, Judge Jolson granted the Defendants' Motion for
Protective Order.  The Clerk is directed to docket Doc. 52-2 as the
protective order in the case.

B. Rule 502(d) Order (Doc. 53)

In the second Motion at issue, the Defendants move the Court for
the entry of an order under Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d).  Rule
502 applies "to disclosure of a communication or information
covered by the attorney-client privilege or work-product
protection."  The Rule was designed "to provide a predictable,
uniform set of standards under which parties can determine the
consequences of a disclosure of a communication or information
covered by the attorney-client privilege or work product
protection."  Those standards provide basic protections limiting
the consequences of inadvertent disclosure of privileged
information.

Defendants argue that such an order is necessary here as they
"expect that discovery will likely involve many protected
communications, including those relating to ongoing government
investigations, internal investigations, and prior legal
proceedings."  The Plaintiffs were given an opportunity to oppose
the Motion but did not do so.  Accordingly, and for good cause
shown, the Defendants' Motion for Entry of Order Pursuant to Fed.
R. Evid. 502(d) is granted.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Jolson granted the Defendants'
Motions.  The Clerk is directed to docket Doc. 52-2 as the
protective order in the case and Doc. 53-1 as an Order Pursuant to
Fed. R. Evid. 502(d).

A full-text copy of the Court's May 14, 2021 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3w2yvz2c from Leagle.com.


FRITO-LAY INC: Settlement in Sanchez Class Suit Gets Final Nod
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ELIAZAR SANCHEZ, on behalf
of himself and all others similarly situated, v. FRITO-LAY, INC.,
Case No. 1:14-cv-00797-DAD-BAM (E.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Dale A.
Drozd entered an order that:

   1. the Plaintiff's motion for final approval of the class
action
      settlement is granted, and the court approves the settlement

      as fair, reasonable, and adequate;

   2. the Plaintiff's motion for an award of attorneys' fees and
      costs, a class action representative incentive award, and
      settlement administrator costs is granted, and the court
      awards the following sums:

      a. Class counsel shall receive $177,618.33 in attorneys' fees

         and $20,000 in expenses;

      b. Plaintiff Sanchez shall receive $7,500.00 as an incentive

         payment; and

      c. ILYM Group, Inc., shall receive $10,000.00 in settlement
         administration costs;

   3. The parties are directed to effectuate all terms of the
      settlement agreement and any deadlines or procedures for
      distribution set forth therein;

   4. This action is dismissed with prejudice in accordance with
      the terms of the parties' amended settlement agreement, with

      the court specifically retaining jurisdiction over this
      action for the purpose of enforcing the parties' settlement
      agreement; and

   5. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case.

Frito-Lay is an American subsidiary of PepsiCo that manufactures,
markets, and sells corn chips, potato chips, and other snack
foods.

A copy of the Court's order dated May 6, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/34cFhk4 at no extra charge.[CC]

HAIN CELESTIAL: Sued Over Non-disclosure of Toxins in Baby Food
---------------------------------------------------------------
Nicole Tipton, Emily Orsak, Hannah Dempsey, Kathleen Hood, and
Julie Chatagnier, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. Hain Celestial Group, Inc., Gerber
Products Company, Beech-Nut Nutrition Company and Plum, PBC,
Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-02887 (E.D. N.Y., May 21, 2021), seeks
injunctive relief resulting from negligent misrepresentation,
fraud, unjust enrichment, breaches of express warranty, implied
warranty of merchantability and for violation of the Kansas
Consumer Protection Act.

Defendants package, label, market, advertise, formulate,
manufacture and distribute infant food throughout the United
States.

This action derives its claim from a recent report by the U.S.
House of Representatives' Subcommittee on Economic and Consumer
Policy, Committee on Oversight and Reform revealing that certain
brands of commercial baby food (including Hain Celestial Group,
Inc., Gerber Products Company, Beech-Nut Nutrition Company and
Plum, PBC) products made with ingredients such as rice flour, sweet
potatoes, certain juices, certain juice concentrates, and carrots,
among other ingredients) are tainted with significant and dangerous
levels of toxic heavy metals, including arsenic, lead, cadmium and
mercury saying that exposure to toxic heavy metals causes permanent
decreases in IQ and endangers neurological development and
long-term brain function, among numerous other deleterious alarming
conditions and problems.

Plaintiffs seek full disclosure of all such substances and
ingredients in Defendants' marketing, advertising and labeling;
requiring testing of all ingredients and final products for such
substances. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Mark S. Reich, Esq.
      Courtney E. Maccarone, Esq.
      LEVI & KORSINSKY, LLP
      55 Broadway, 10th Floor
      New York, NY 10006
      Telephone: (212) 363-7500
      Facsimile: (212) 363-7171
      Email: mreich@zlk.com
             cmaccarone@zlk.com


HEALTH ACCESS: Munera Seeks Unpaid Wages, Hits Missed Breaks
------------------------------------------------------------
Sully Munera and Vanessa Zamudio, individually on behalf of all
others similarly situated Plaintiffs, v. Health Access For All Inc.
and Does 1 through 25, Inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 21STCV19259
(Cal. Super., May 21, 2021), seeks redress for Defendant's failure
to authorize or permit required meal periods, statutory penalties
for failure to provide accurate wage statements, waiting time
penalties in the form of continuation wages for failure to timely
pay employees all wages due upon separation of employment, failure
to maintain time-keeping records, injunctive relief and other
equitable relief, reasonable attorney's fees, costs and interest
under California Labor Code.

Health Access for All Inc. does business as "Angeles Community
Health Center," a health care provider with locations in Los
Angeles, Huntington Park and Gardena. Zamudio and Munera were
employed as hourly non-exempt employees. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Troy C. Skinner, Esq.
      SKINNER LAW CORPORATION
      333 Washington Blvd. #363
      Marina Del Rey, CA 90292
      Telephone: (310) 295-2549
      Facsimile: (213) 277-2068
      Email: Troy@Skinnerlawcorp.com


IOWA: Supreme Court Affirms Dismissal of Rilea Suit v. IDOT
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RICKIE RILEA, Appellant v. STATE OF IOWA, IOWA
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, DAVID LORENZEN, in his Official
Capacity of Director of the Iowa Department of Transportation Motor
Vehicle Enforcement Division, MARK LOWE, in his Official Capacity
as the Director of the Iowa Department of Transportation Motor
Vehicle Division, and PAUL TROMBINO III, in his Official Capacity
as Director of the Iowa Department of Transportation, Appellees,
Case No. 20-0710 (Iowa), the Supreme Court of Iowa affirms the
dismissal of Rilea's petition.

In 2016, Rickie Rilea received a ticket for speeding in a
construction zone issued by an Iowa Department of Transportation
(IDOT) Motor Vehicle Enforcement officer.  He pleaded guilty to the
charge and paid the $465 associated fine.  He later filed a lawsuit
challenging the legal authority of IDOT officers to issue traffic
citations.  On appeal of that issue, the Supreme Court held that
IDOT officers at the time lacked authority to stop vehicles and
issue citations for offenses unrelated to operating authority,
registration, size, weight, and load.

In the same lawsuit, Rilea sued the State of Iowa, the IDOT, and
several individual IDOT officials contesting the payments the State
collected (prior to a law change in May 2017) from fines resulting
from convictions on unauthorized IDOT-issued citations.  In this
aspect of his case now before the Supreme Court, Rilea contends
that the Defendants improperly reaped the benefit of fines from
these tickets, and that he and others like him should have their
payments returned to them.  His petition includes a request to
certify the matter for class-action relief to address the thousands
of citations that IDOT officers issued without authority for
decades.  In this count of his lawsuit, he pleads his cause of
action against the defendants as one of unjust enrichment.

The Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that (1) they
were entitled to sovereign immunity, (2) the Defendants were not
unjustly enriched, and (3) Rilea's claim was barred as an improper
collateral attack on his speeding ticket conviction.  The district
court resolved the first issue in Rilea's favor, holding that
sovereign immunity didn't apply.  On the second issue, it held as a
matter of law that no claim for unjust enrichment could lie against
any Defendants except the State of Iowa.  And on the third issue,
the district court held that the unjust enrichment claim was indeed
an improper collateral attack on Rilea's conviction, thus,
warranting dismissal of Rilea's lawsuit.

Mr. Rilea appeals, challenging only the third issue -- whether his
unjust enrichment claim is an improper collateral attack on his
speeding ticket conviction.

The Supreme Court reviews rulings on motions for summary judgment
to correct legal error.  The circumstances of Rilea's unjust
enrichment claim for the return of his criminal fine payment arises
in the context of a criminal prosecution and, more particularly, a
criminal conviction.  Rilea's guilty plea to the speeding charge
gave rise to the associated fine.  Rilea paid the fine borne of his
conviction.

The Supreme Court finds that Rilea is entitled to the return of
money he paid if what he paid belonged to him and not to the State.
But the money Riley paid was owed to the State as court debt
because Rilea was adjudicated guilty in state district court.  And
court debt is "owed and payable to the clerk of the district
court."  The fine is separate from the underlying citation.  The
payment Rilea made was a product of a court's adjudication.

In addition, Rilea doesn't claim a speeding conviction didn't
occur; the court made an adjudication that Rilea committed the
crime.  Rilea, in this very case, has admitted again that he
committed the charged traffic offense.  The fact has been
indisputably established.  The State, in receiving payment of
Rilea's fine, was "only doing what it was entitled to do based on a
final and firm judgment."

As the district court correctly held, the State's retention of
Rilea's payment of the fine would only become unlawful if the
underlying conviction were overturned.  Rilea concedes, as he must,
that a conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction ordinarily
isn't subject to collateral attack except through a postconviction
relief challenge under the procedures in Iowa Code chapter 822.
Rilea's conviction has never been challenged, let alone overturned.
By now, any motions he might file in his criminal case would be
untimely, and even the three-year statutory period to file an
application for postconviction relief has expired.

Finally, Rilea's unjust enrichment claim launches no attack on, and
thus leaves intact, the criminal conviction that created the fine
that he now wants returned to him.  Yet the undisturbed conviction
requires the Supreme Court to leave undisturbed too the State's
lawful receipt of the fine that accompanied it.

Because the district court correctly dismissed Rilea's cause of
action for unjust enrichment against the State as an unlawful
collateral attack on his criminal conviction, the Supreme Court
affirms the dismissal of his petition.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 14, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/5x5w9uxe from Leagle.com.

Brandon Brown -- bbrown@parrishlaw.com -- and Jessica Donels --
jdonels@parrishlaw.com -- of Parrish Kruidenier Dunn Gentry Brown
Bergmann & Messamer L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, David S. Gorham, Special
Assistant Attorney General, and Robin G. Formaker, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellees.


JUST BRANDS: Court Dismisses First Amended Rodriguez Complaint
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, on behalf of Case 2116 himself and
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JUST BRANDS USA, INC., JUST
BRANDS, INC., and SSGI FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., Defendants, Case
No. 2:20-CV-04829-ODW (PLAx) (C.D. Cal.), Judge Otis D. Wright of
the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the First Amended
Complaint.

The Defendants sell cannabidiol ("CBD") products under the brand
"JustCBD," which includes CBD-infused "compounds, tinctures, and
edibles."  On Oct. 2, 2018, and March 17, 2019, the Plaintiff
purchased JustCBD vape cartridges, gummies, and dog treats after
reviewing and relying on the "product packaging, which promised
specific quantities of CBD."

The Plaintiff claims that he later discovered, through independent
lab testing commissioned by counsel, that JustCBD products
contained between 10% and 100% less CBD content than promised on
its labels.  Accordingly, he complains that he paid a substantial
premium due to the false and misleading CBD claims and did not
receive the benefit of his bargain.

The Plaintiff commenced the putative class action on May 29, 2020,
against the Defendants collectively as the manufacturers,
distributors, and sellers of JustCBD products, each responsible for
its "advertising, marketing, and packaging."  He asserts seven
causes of action against them for: (1) breach of express warranty;
(2) unjust enrichment; (3) fraud; (4) violation of the California
Consumers Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"), California Civil Code
sections 1750, et seq.; (5) violation of California's Unfair
Competition Law ("UCL"), California Business & Professions Code
sections 17200, et seq.; (6) violation of California's False
Advertising Law ("FAL"), California Business & Professions Code
sections 17500, et seq.; and (7) violation of Florida's Deceptive &
Unfair Practices Act ("FDUTPA"), Florida Statutes Annotated
sections 501.201, et seq.

Now, the Defendants move to stay the case under the primary
jurisdiction doctrine or, alternatively, to dismiss the First
Amended Complaint.

Discussion

I. Motion to Stay

Judge Wright addresses the Defendants' Motion to Stay under the
primary jurisdiction doctrine, pending regulatory guidance from the
FDA.  The Defendants contend that each relevant factor is met
because (1) the FDA has regulatory authority over CBD products
under the Agricultural Improvement Act of 2018 ("2018 Farm Bill"),
Public Law No. 115-334; (2) pending FDA guidelines are necessary to
resolve a material issue because the FDA is developing "validated
testing to support the manufacturing of safe and consistent CBD
products"; and (3) there is a need for uniform application of
forthcoming FDA guidelines on CBD products.  In opposition, the
Plaintiff contends that the Court is competent to resolve this
matter without the pending FDA guidelines.

The Plaintiff is correct, the Judge holds.  The case is not within
the "limited set of circumstances" under which primary jurisdiction
applies.  The Court need not rely on the pending FDA guidelines to
determine whether the Defendants may misrepresent the CBD content
in its products.  Thus, the Motion to Stay is denied.

II. Motion to Dismiss

Judge Wright now turns to the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.  The
Defendants move to dismiss the Plaintiff's claims for lack of
standing under Rule 12(b)(1), lack of personal jurisdiction under
Rule 12(b)(2), and failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

A. Rule 12(b)(1) - Standing

The Defendants raise two arguments related to standing.  First,
they argue that the Plaintiff lacks standing to assert claims for
any JustCBD products that he did not purchase because he was not
injured by those products.  Second, they claim that the Plaintiff
lacks standing to seek injunctive relief because he fails to show
actual or imminent future harm.

Judge Wright finds that the Plaintiff alleges sufficient similarity
between the purchased and unpurchased products.  While it may be
true that ingredients and CBD contents vary across JustCBD's
products, such variance alone is not dispositive.  However, the
Judge also finds that the Plaintiff's claim that "he may purchase
the CBD products in the future" is not enough to satisfy Article
III standing.  The Plaintiff alleges only a possibility of future
injury, not an injury that is "certainly impending."  He thus lacks
standing to seek injunctive relief.  This deficiency could be
overcome by an amendment, however; thus, the Plaintiff's prayer for
injunctive relief is dismissed with leave to amend.

B. Rule 12(b)(2) - Personal Jurisdiction

Next, the Defendants challenge the Court's personal jurisdiction
over them with respect to claims brought by class members who are
not California residents.  They challenge personal jurisdiction
with respect to claims brought by out-of-state class members
because those class members "did not suffer injury in the forum
state."

Judge Wright explains that in a class action, the claims of the
unnamed class members are irrelevant to the personal jurisdiction
analysis.  The Court requires only that "personal jurisdiction
requirements be satisfied for each and every named plaintiff.  In
the case, the named Plaintiff is a California resident and his
claims against the Defendants arise out of purchases made in
California.  Thus, the Court has personal jurisdiction over
Defendants in the action, and the Defendants fail to offer a valid
reason to dismiss on this basis.

C. Rule 12(b)(6) - Failure to State a Claim

The Defendants argue that: (1) the FAC is a "shotgun pleading" that
fails to allege specifically as to each Defendant; (2) the
Plaintiff's common law claims are defective for failure to allege
the governing state law; and (3) the Plaintiff fails to establish
claims for equitable relief by failing to allege inadequate
remedies at law.

Judge Wright holds that the FAC is not a "shotgun pleading" such
that the Defendants cannot "know exactly what they are accused of
doing wrong."  Thus, they fail to offer a valid reason to dismiss
on this basis.

With respect to the common law claims, the Judge finds that the
Plaintiff is a California resident who purchased JustCBD products
in California, so all claims based on any other state's laws are
subject to dismissal.  The Plaintiff fails to allege the governing
state law for his express warranty, unjust enrichment, and fraud
claims.  Thus, dismissal is appropriate.  Furthermore, although an
amendment could cure the Plaintiff's breach of express warranty and
fraud claims, the same cannot be said for his unjust enrichment
claim.

Thus, the Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim does not constitute a
proper cause of action, and an amendment would be futile.
Accordingly, to the extent the Plaintiff asserts unjust enrichment
as a standalone cause of action, that claim is dismissed with
prejudice, while the Plaintiff's claims for breach of express
warranty and fraud are dismissed with leave to amend.

Lastly, the Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege it lacks an
adequate remedy at law for restitution beyond the damages it
already seeks through its other claims.  Although he attempts to
seek equitable relief merely in the alternative to actual damages,
"legal and equitable claims based on the same factual predicates
are not true alternative theories of relief but rather are
duplicative."  Because the Plaintiffs' CLRA, UCL, and FAL claims
are all based on the same factual predicates (namely, the
underfilling of CBD content), he cannot maintain claims for
restitution under the UCL and FAL.  Nor does the law permit
Plaintiff to seek actual damages through such claims. Indeed, no
amendment could cure these deficiencies.  Thus, to the extent the
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages through the UCL and FAL, such
claims are dismissed with prejudice.  To be clear, the Plaintiff
may still amend such claims to the extent they seek injunctive
relief.

Conclusion

In summary, Judge Wright denied the Motion to Stay.  He granted the
Motion to Dismiss.  The Plaintiff's first and third causes of
action (breach of contract; fraud) are dismissed with leave to
amend.  The Plaintiff's second and seventh causes of action (unjust
enrichment; FDUTPA) are dismissed with prejudice.  The Plaintiff's
fourth and fifth causes of action (UCL; FAL) are dismissed with
limited leave to amend, as explained.

The Plaintiff may file a Second Amended Complaint curing the
deficiencies identified above within 21 days of the date of the
Order.  If the Plaintiff files an amended complaint, the Defendants
must file their response(s) in accordance with Rule 15(a)(3).
Failure by the Plaintiff to timely amend will result in dismissal
of all claims with prejudice and closing of the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 18, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/8kedkkvp from Leagle.com.


KPM LLC: $250K Class Settlement in Hampton Suit Wins Final Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KENNETH HAMPTON, GABRIELLE HARRIS, and ALISA BROGDEN,
Plaintiff v. KPM LLC, HILLANDALE NORTH LLC, 2052 LLC d/b/a
CLAIRMONT AT BRIER CREEK, 1752 LLC d/b/a CLAIRMONT AT PERRY CREEK,
Defendants, Case No. 5:18-cv-485-D (E.D.N.C.), Judge James C.
Dever, III, of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina, Western Division, grants:

    (i) Plaintiffs Kenneth Hampton, Gabrielle Harris, and Alisa
        Brogden's unopposed motion for final approval of class
        action settlement; and

   (ii) the Class Counsel's fee application and request for
        approval of service awards.

The class action was originally filed in the General Court of
Justice, Superior Court Division, County of Wake, North Carolina,
filed by Plaintiff Kenneth Hampton, Gabrielle Harris, and Alisa
Brogden against Defendants KPM LLC, Hillandale North LLC, 2052 LLC,
and 1752 LLC.  The Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendants
unlawfully charged eviction-related fees and unlawfully threatened
to charge eviction-related fees.  They sought monetary and
declaratory relief for violation of the North Carolina Residential
Rental Agreements Act, North Carolina Debt Collection Act, and
North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act.

The Defendants filed a Notice of Removal and the case was removed
to the Court.  They answered the complaint, denied any and all
wrongdoing of any kind whatsoever, and moved for judgment on the
pleadings, arguing that their charging of eviction-related fees was
lawful.  The Court granted the Defendants' motion for judgment on
the pleadings.

The Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.  While the appeal was pending,
the parties conducted a mediation session with Frank Laney, Esq., a
Fourth Circuit mediator.  Thereafter, the parties reached a
settlement now before the Court on final approval.

In Order dated Dec. 28, 2020, the Court preliminarily approved the
Settlement Agreement, the proposed notice plan, and the Settlement
Classes.  Pursuant to the plan approved by the Court, notice was
disseminated to the classes.  As of May 3, 2021, no Settlement
Class members have opted out of the settlement and no Settlement
Class Member has objected to the settlement, the proposed award of
fees and expenses to the Class Counsel, or the proposed service
awards to the class representatives.  The deadline to opt out or
object to the settlement was April 11, 2021.

In broad brush, the Settlement Agreement establishes a settlement
fund of $250,000, and provides for non-monetary relief.  Each
Settlement Class member is a member of one or two classes.  The
Collection Letter Class is defined as "all natural persons, at any
point between July 20, 2014 and June 25, 2018, resided in any of
the Defendants' properties in North Carolina and received a written
communication from the Defendants or their affiliates threatening
to charge Eviction Fees or claiming that such Eviction Fees were
then owed."  The Eviction Fee Class is defined as "all natural
persons who, during the Class Period: (a) resided in any of the
Defendants' Properties; (b) was charged Eviction Fees by the
Defendants or their affiliates; and (c) actually paid such Eviction
Fees."

Collection Letter Class members may obtain $25 per letter sent to
them by the Defendants up to $75.  Eviction Fee Class members were
eligible to file claims to receive an estimated $519.  They may
also be Collection Letter Class members and file claims for such
benefits.

Under the settlement, all costs of notice and claims administration
have been paid by the Defendants out of the settlement fund.
Court-approved fees and expenses for the Class Counsel and service
awards for the Class Representatives will be paid by the Defendants
out of the settlement fund.

In addition, the Settlement Class members were eligible to request
non-monetary relief in the form of a Consent Motion to Set Aside
Judgment for Possession Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5) and Stipulation
of Dismissal.  The consent motion allows the Settlement Class
members to set aside judgments entered against them by Defendants
for possession of the rental property; however, they have the
obligation of filing the motion.

The Settlement Classes have been notified of the settlement
pursuant to the plan approved by the Court.  After having reviewed
the Post-Notice Declarations of the Settlement Administrator, which
was responsible for carrying out the notice program, Judge Dever
finds that the notice was accomplished in accordance with the
Court's directive and that the notice program constituted the best
practicable notice to the Settlement Classes under the
circumstances and fully satisfies the requirements of due process,
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, and 28 U.S.C. Section 1715.

Judge Dever also finds that the parties' settlement is fair,
reasonable and adequate in accordance with Rule 23; was reached at
arm's length without collusion or fraud; and satisfies all of the
requirements for final approval.  The settlement is finally
approved and the parties are directed to consummate the settlement
in accordance with its terms.

The Judge certifies the Collection Letter Class and the Eviction
Fee Class.  The Collection Letter Class is defined as "all natural
persons, at any point between July 20, 2014 and June 25, 2018,
resided in any of the Defendants' properties in North Carolina and
received a written communication from the Defendants or their
affiliates threatening to charge Eviction Fees or claiming that
such Eviction Fees were then owed."  The Eviction Fee Class is
defined as "all natural persons who, during the Class Period: (a)
resided in any of the Defendants' Properties; (b) was charged
Eviction Fees by the Defendants or their affiliates; and (c)
actually paid such Eviction Fees."

The Judge finally appoints Scott C. Harris and Patrick M. Wallace
of Whitfield Bryson LLP, and Edward H. Maginnis and Karl S.
Gwaltney of Maginnis Law, PLLC, as the Class counsel.  He appoints
Kenneth Hampton, Gabrielle Harris, and Alisa Brogden as the Class
Representatives.

The Judge finds that the parties' agreement with regard to the
payment of fees and expenses was not negotiated while they were
negotiating the other terms of the Settlement Agreement, and that
the agreement was not the product of collusion or fraud.  Instead,
the amount of attorneys' fees to be paid by the Defendants was
proposed after the other terms of the settlement had been agreed
upon.

The Class Counsel have provided declarations specifying that they
have incurred $1,669.07 in the prosecution of the litigation on
behalf of the classes.  The Judge finds their expenses were
reasonably and necessarily incurred and, as a result, the Class
Counsel are entitled to reimbursement for their expenses, in
addition to the $82,500 fee award.

The Settlement Agreement provides that the Defendant, subject to
Court approval, will pay $2,500 each to Kenneth Hampton, Gabrielle
Harris, and Alisa Brogden (total of $7,500) for their service as
Class Representatives.  The Judge finds that payment of the service
awards is appropriate in the case in light of their work on behalf
of the Settlement Classes and that no Settlement Class member has
objected to the service awards.  He approves the service award,
which will be paid consistent with the parties' Settlement
Agreement.

In the event that Settlement Class members fail to cash their
checks within six months of mailing and remaining funds are left
over, as provided in the Settlement Agreement, such that the
Settlement Fund has a positive balance, all remaining amounts in
the Settlement Fund will be equally divided and disbursed to the
approved cy pres recipient: Legal Aid of North Carolina.  The
Claims Administrator is ordered to provide a report to the Class
Counsel of all money in the Settlement Fund left undisbursed within
15 calendar days after the six-month period has elapsed.

A judgment will be entered contemporaneously with the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 14, 2021 Final Order & Judgment
is available at https://tinyurl.com/3tpmdkd2 from Leagle.com.


LCA VISION: Conditional Certification of FLSA Collective Sought
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MIKE PIECZYNSKI,
Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, v. LCA
VISION, INC. d/b/a LASIKPLUS, Case No. 6:20-cv-01457-CEM-DCI (M.D.
Fla.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order pursuant to
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), conditionally certifying a
collective of, and permitting Court-supervised notice to:

   "all similarly situated Center Directors, Center Leaders,
Center
   Managers and employees in similar positions with different job
   titles (collectively, "CDs") classified as exempt who worked for

   Defendant LCA Vision, at any location in the United States
   during the period between August 12, 2017 through the date of
   the Court's Order on this Motion (the FLSA Collective)."

Mr. Pieczynski worked for LasikPlus as a CD from August 2017 to
November 2017 at a LasikPlus location in Altamonte Springs,
Florida.

The Defendant "provides refractive surgery services under the brand
name LasikPlus." LasikPlus surgery centers are generally staffed by
CDs, whom Defendant uniformly classifies as exempt from overtime.
The Plaintiff contends that LasikPlus has employed approximately 38
such CDs, including Plaintiffs, between August 12, 2017 and the
present.

A copy of the the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated May 7,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3fh29oJ
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

           Gregg I. Shavitz, Esq.
           Paolo C. Meireles, Esq.
           Logan A. Pardell, Esq.
           SHAVITZ LAW GROUP, P.A.
           951 Yamato Road, Suite 285
           Boca Raton, FL 33431
           Telephone: (561) 447-8888
           Facsimile: (561) 447-8831
           E-mail: gshavitz@shavitzlaw.com
                   pmeirels@shavitzlaw.com
                   lpardell@shavitzlaw.com

MID ATLANTIC STORAGE: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, Kauffman Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
MICHAEL KAUFFMAN, individually and on behalf of others
similarly-situated v. MID ATLANTIC STORAGE SYSTEMS, INC, Case No.
1:21-cv-00775-JEJ (M.D. Pa., April 29, 2021) arises from the
Defendant's unlawful failure to pay plaintiff and other
similarly-situated individuals employed in the position of Laborer
(Class Plaintiffs), overtime compensation pursuant to the
requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the
Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act (PMWA).

The complaint alleges that during the course of their employment,
Plaintiff and Class Plaintiffs regularly worked more than 40 hours
per week, but were not properly compensated for their work in that
Plaintiff and Class Plaintiffs were not paid an overtime premium at
1.5 times their regular rate of pay for each hour worked in excess
of 40 hours in a workweek. In this regard, Plaintiff contends that
Defendant unlawfully failed to pay him and Class Plaintiffs
overtime compensation for certain compensable travel time in
violation of the FLSA and PMWA.

Defendant Mid-Atlantic Storage Systems, Inc., is a business
corporation with headquarters and office address in Ohio where
Plaintiff worked as a Laborer.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Murphy, Esq.
          Michael Groh, Esq.
          Eight Penn Center, Suite 2000
          1628 John F. Kennedy Blvd.
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          TEL: 267-273-1054
          FAX: 215-525-0210
          E-mail: murphy@phillyemploymentlawyer.com
                  mgroh@phillyemploymentlawyer.com


MISSISSIPPI: Black Race Discrimination Suit vs. MDRS Dismissed
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KENISHA BLACK, SONDRA GATHINGS, GWENDOLYN GRAY, CLELL
O. McCURDY, MELODY LAURY, and LAVONDA HART, Plaintiffs v.
MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION SERVICES, Defendant, Civil
Action No. 3:20-CV-00643-KHJ-LGI (S.D. Miss.), Judge Kristi H.
Johnson of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Mississippi, Northern Division, grants the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss.

Plaintiffs Kenisha Black, Sondra Gathings, Gwendolyn Gray, Clell O.
McCury, Melody Laury, and Lavonda Hart bring claims of race
discrimination against MDRS under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. Section 1981.  Besides their individual
claims of race discrimination, the Plaintiffs "allege a direct
pattern of systematic discrimination against Black employees in
general and Black females in particular by Defendant MDRS in terms
and conditions of their employment with it."

Analysis

Before the Court is Defendant MDRS's Motion to Dismiss.  It asks
the Court to dismiss all claims of race discrimination under Title
VII for which the Plaintiffs did not file an Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") Charge for failure to
administratively exhaust.  It also contends the Plaintiffs
otherwise fail to state a claim for a pattern or practice of race
discrimination under Title VII.

A. Exhaustion

MDRS argues the Plaintiffs exhausted their Title VII claims only as
to the allegations in their respective EEOC Charges.  It contends
the following discrete claims of discrimination under Title VII are
before the Court: (1) Black and Gathings' claim about Elrod's
promotion to Office of Vocational Rehabilitation Program Regional
Training Team ("OVR") Director of Client Services; (2) Gray and
McCurdy's claim that MDRS paid them less than Williamson; (3)
Hart's claim that MDRS promoted Bishop over her; and (4) Laury's
disparate wage claim compared to an unidentified white coworker.
The only other allegations in the Second Amended Complaint are
Black's and Gathings' allegations unrelated to MDRS's promotion of
Elrod.  The Plaintiffs argue the Court can consider all their
allegations as a continuing violation.

Judge Johnson finds that neither Black nor Gathings presented any
claims to the EEOC about discriminatory acts other than Elrod's
promotion.  Though the Plaintiffs contend MDRS's discriminatory
conduct is actionable under Title VII as a continuing violation,
this doctrine applies only to hostile work environment claims,
which "are different in kind from discrete acts because their very
nature involves repeated conduct.  The Plaintiffs do not allege
that they experienced a hostile work environment in violation of
Title VII, and therefore cannot include any discriminatory conduct
against Black or Gathings unrelated to Elrod's promotion under
their Title VII claims of race discrimination.  The Judge grants
MDRS' motion on this issue.

B. Title VII Pattern or Practice of Discrimination Claim

MDRS also argues the Plaintiffs failed to allege facts to support
their Title VII claim for "a direct pattern of systematic
discrimination."  The Plaintiffs state they are seeking class
relief and that their individual allegations are enough to show a
pattern of discrimination.

Judge Johnson first notes the Plaintiffs do not plead an action on
behalf of any purported class.  Instead, the Plaintiffs are six
individuals bringing claims of discrimination on their own behalf
and seeking relief for themselves, not for any purported class of
similarly-situated individuals.  Any arguments that the Plaintiffs
seek class relief are unavailing.  Nor do the Plaintiffs have
standing to bring individual Title VII claims for a pattern or
practice of discrimination. Pattern-or-practice claims under Title
VII can be brought only in a suit by the government or in a class
action suit.  Because the Plaintiffs are not the Government and do
not bring a class action against MDRS, the Judge finds their
pattern-or-practice claim under Title VII must fail.  She grants
MDRS' motion as to this claim.

Conclusion

Judge Johnson has considered all the arguments the parties set
forth.  Those arguments not addressed would not have changed the
outcome of her decision.  For these reasons, the Jduge grants MDRS'
Motion to Dismiss.  The Plaintiffs' pattern-and-practice claim
under Title VII and any Title VII claim brought by Plaintiffs
Kenisha Black and Sondra Gathings for actions unrelated to MDRS'
promotion of Carol Elrod are dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 14, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/2ad7csx9 from Leagle.com.


MOLSON COORS: Williams Hits Vitamin C Content in Seltzer Drink
--------------------------------------------------------------
Darren Williams, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Molson Coors Beverage Company, Defendant,
Case No. 21-cv-50207 (N.D. Ill., May 22, 2021), seeks to recover
actual damages, statutory damages, attorney fees and costs for
breaches of express warranty, implied warranty of merchantability
and for violation of the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act and New York
General Business Law.

Molson Coors Beverage Company manufactures, labels and sells hard
seltzer with Vitamin C under the "Vizzy brand." The product's
Vitamin C content is promoted alongside pictures of fresh fruit,
which give consumers the impression the Product is a
nutritionally-equivalent source of the nutrients found in these
fruits. Williams disputes Defendant's misrepresentation as "with
Vitamin C" because the nutrient content claim is contrary to the
FDA's fortification policy, which prohibits addition of nutrients
to foods such as carbonated and alcoholic beverages. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Spencer Sheehan, Esq.
      SHEEHAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
      60 Cutter Mill Rd., Ste. 409
      Great Neck NY 11021-3104
      Tel: (516) 268-7080
      Fax: (516) 234-7800
      Email: spencer@spencersheehan.com


NABRIVA THERAPEUTICS: $3M Class Deal in Enriquez Suit Has Final OK
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Victor Marrero of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York issued Final Order and Judgment in the case,
LARRY ENRIQUEZ, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff v. NABRIVA THERAPEUTICS PLC, TED SCHROEDER,
GARY SENDER, and JENNIFER SCHRANZ, Defendants, Case No. 19 Civ.
4183 (VM) (S.D.N.Y.).

The matter came before the Court for hearing on May 14, 2021,
pursuant to the Preliminary Approval Order entered Jan. 28, 2021,
on the application of the Parties for final approval of the
Settlement as set forth in the Stipulation of Settlement.  Judge
Marrero has heard all Persons properly appearing and requesting to
be heard, read and considered the motions and supporting papers,
and found good cause appearing.

On May 14, 2021, the Court held a Final Approval Hearing, after due
and proper notice, to consider the fairness, reasonableness and
adequacy of the proposed Settlement.  In reaching its decision in
the Action, the Court considered the Parties' Stipulation, the
Court file in the case, and the presentations by the Co-Lead
Counsel on behalf of the Lead Plaintiff and the Settlement Class
and the counsel for Defendants in support of the fairness,
reasonableness, and adequacy of the Settlement.

The Judge finally certifies the Action as a class action for
purposes of Settlement, pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of a Settlement Class
consisting of: All Persons and entities that purchased or otherwise
acquired Nabriva common stock during the period from Jan. 4, 2019
through April 30, 2019, both dates inclusive, and who were damaged
thereby.

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for
the purposes of the Settlement only, the Lead Plaintiff is
certified as the class representative on behalf of the Settlement
Class and the Co-Lead Counsel previously selected by the Lead
Plaintiff and appointed by the Court are appointed as the Class
Counsel for the Settlement Class.

The Judge has determined that the Settlement is fair, reasonable,
and adequate and is finally approved in all respects.

The Settlement provides that Defendants will cause $3 million in
cash to be paid into a Settlement Fund for the benefit of the
Settlement Class.  Among other things, the recovery of an
individual Class Member depends on the number of Nabriva shares
that the Class Member purchased and sold, and the prices at which
other Class Members who filed claims purchased and sold those
shares.

The Judge has considered, separately from its consideration of the
fairness, reasonableness and adequacy of the Settlement reflected
in the Stipulation as a whole, the Plan of Allocation proposed by
the Plaintiff's Counsel.  He finds that the proposed Plan of
Allocation is fair, just, reasonable, and adequate, and is finally
approved in all respects.  The Action and all claims contained
therein, as well as all of the Released Claims, are dismissed with
prejudice as against the Defendants and the Released Parties.  The
Parties are to bear their own costs, except as otherwise provided
in the Stipulation.

Separate from its consideration of the Settlement set forth in the
Stipulation, the Judge awards the Co-Lead Counsel attorneys' fees
of $1 million, plus reimbursement of their expenses in the amount
of $95,393.68, together with the interest earned thereon for
$95,393.68 the same time period and at the same rate as that earned
on the Gross Settlement Fund until paid.  The foregoing amounts
will be paid from the Settlement Fund pursuant to the terms of the
Stipulation, and the Released Parties will have no liability or
responsibility for this payment.

Separate from its consideration of the Settlement set forth in the
Stipulation, the Judge awards the Lead Plaintiff a reimbursement
award pursuant to Section 78u-4(a)(4) of the PSLRA in the amount of
$5,000.  The foregoing amount will be paid from the Settlement Fund
pursuant to the terms of the Stipulation, and the Released Parties
will have no liability or responsibility for this payment.

Except as otherwise provided herein or in the Stipulation, all
funds held by the Escrow Agent will be deemed to be in custodia
legis and will remain subject to the jurisdiction of the Court
until such time as the funds are distributed or returned pursuant
to the Stipulation and/or further order of the Court.

The Judge finds under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) that
there is no just reason to delay the entry of the Judgment, and the
Clerk is expressly directed to enter Judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 14, 2021 Order & Final Judgment
is available at https://tinyurl.com/2xnrvx5n from Leagle.com.


NATIONAL DEBT: Denial of Arbitration Bid in Sues Suit Vacated
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CLEOFE SUES, and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Appellee v. NATIONAL DEBT RELIEF LLC,
Defendant-Appellant, Case No. CAAP-19-0000376 (Haw. App.), the
Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawai'i vacates the Circuit Court
of the First Circuit's order denying NDR's motion to compel
arbitration.

On Jan. 8, 2019, Sues filed an Amended Class Action Complaint
alleging that NDR is a for-profit debt adjuster conducting business
in Hawai'i in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) Section
446-2 (2013 Repl.).  The Complaint alleges that Sues hired NDR as a
debt adjuster to help her manage her debts with three creditors,
and from Jan. 30, 2017 to Feb. 1, 2018, she deposited a certain
amount with NDR each month to adjust her debts.  The Complaint
further alleges that only one of Sues' three accounts was settled
by NDR, and when one of the remaining two creditors filed a lawsuit
against Sues, NDR left her without assistance.  The Complaint
asserts that NDR "violated HRS Section 446-2's prohibition against
debt adjusting without proper exemption as identified under HRS
Section 446-3," and "therefore, NDR engaged in commercial conduct
that violates public interest and constitutes a per se violation of
HRS Section 480-13."

NDR filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the
arbitration clause contained in the Agreement.  In opposing the
motion to compel arbitration, Sues argued that the Agreement is
unenforceable and void pursuant to HRS Section 446-2, and thus the
arbitration clause contained in the Agreement cannot be enforced.
In reply, NDR argued that the validity of the Agreement as a whole
and the validity of the arbitration clause must be considered
separately, and that Sues failed to show that the arbitration
clause is unenforceable.

The Circuit Court heard NDR's motion to compel arbitration on April
17, 2019.  After hearing argument from both sides, the court denied
the motion, stating that "HRS Section 446-2 makes it clear that any
contract for debt adjusting entered into with a person engaged in
the business for a profit  will be void and unenforceable," and,
therefore, the court "cannot find that there is an unenforceable
agreement to arbitrate."  The court subsequently issued the Order
Denying Arbitration.

On appeal, NDR contends that the Circuit Court erred in denying
NDR's motion to compel arbitration.  It asserts that in refusing to
compel arbitration, the Circuit Court improperly addressed "the
enforceability of the Agreement as a whole" rather than "the
arbitration clause standing alone."

Given Sues' arguments on appeal -- that the entire Agreement is
void and severance of the arbitration provision is not appropriate
-- the Circuit Court's focus is on whether an arbitration agreement
exists between the parties.  In Gabriel v. Island Pacific Academy,
Inc., 140 Haw. 325, 334, 400 P.3d 526, 535 (2017), a court
determines the validity and enforceability of an arbitration
agreement based on three elements: "(1) it must be in writing; (2)
it must be unambiguous as to the intent to submit the dispute to
arbitration; and (3) there must be bilateral consideration."

The Circuit Court opines that there is no dispute that the Gabriel
elements are met in the case: the arbitration provision is in
writing, there is an unambiguous intent to submit the dispute to
arbitration, and there is bilateral consideration.  The arbitration
clause in the Agreement expressly states in part: "In the event of
any controversy, claim, or dispute between the parties arising out
of or relating to this Agreement, the parties agree to resolve all
issues solely through the use of Binding Arbitration, governed by
the rules of the American Arbitration Association ("AAA")."

The crux of the appeal is whether HRS Section 446-2, which voids
"any contract for debt adjusting entered into with a person engaged
in the business for a profit," voids the arbitration provision in
the Agreement.  Because Sues' argument is not a specific challenge
to the validity of the arbitration provision, the Court of Appeals
concludes that under the prevailing case law, the Circuit Court
erred in failing to sever and enforce the arbitration clause.

The Court of Appeals recently discussed the prevailing case law in
Inoue v. Harbor Legal Group, No. CAAP-19-0000589, 2021 WL 1700940,
at *1 (Haw. App. Apr. 29, 2021) (Mem. Op.), where it affirmed the
trial court's order compelling arbitration in similar
circumstances.  Given the prevailing case authority and Sues'
failure to challenge the arbitration provision itself, the Court of
Appeals concludes that the Circuit Court erred in not severing the
arbitration clause from the rest of the Agreement and enforcing the
agreement to arbitrate.  Accordingly, the Circuit Court erred in
denying NDR's motion to compel arbitration.

For these reasons, the Court of Appeals vacates the June 4, 2019
"Order Denying Defendant NDR's Motion to Compel Arbitration, to
Stay Proceedings, or, in the Alternative, to Dismiss the Amended
Class Action Complaint, Filed on January 8, 2019, Filed March 13,
2019," entered in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit.  The case
is remanded to the Circuit Court with instructions to enter an
order granting NDR's motion to compel arbitration.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 14, 2021 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yrn22pce from Leagle.com.

Andrew J. Lautenbach -- alautenbach@starnlaw.com -- and John H.
Pelzer -- john.pelzer@gmlaw.com -- and Beth-Ann E. Krimsky --
beth-ann.krimsky@gmlaw.com -- (Pro Hac Vice), for
Defendant-Appellant.

Justin A. Brackett -- justinbrackettlaw@gmail.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellee.


NCAA: Taylor Sues Over Health Issues From Football Injuries
-----------------------------------------------------------
Johnnie Taylor III, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA), Defendants, Case No. 21-cv-01282 (S.D. Ind.,
May 21, 2021), seeks economic, monetary, actual, consequential,
compensatory, and punitive damages, past, present and future
medical expenses, other out-of-pocket expenses, lost time and
interest, lost future earnings, litigation and attorney fees,
prejudgment and post-judgment interest, injunctive and/or
declaratory relief and such other and further relief resulting from
negligence, fraudulent concealment, breach of express contract,
breach of implied contract, breach of third-party express contract
and unjust enrichment.

Taylor played football at the New Jersey City University from 2002
to 2003, as a wide receiver. He suffered from numerous concussions,
as well as countless sub-concussive hits as part of routine
practice and gameplay. Taylor now suffers from issues including,
but not limited to, short term memory loss, depression, and
suicidal thoughts.

NCAA is an unincorporated association with its principal office
located at 700 West Washington Street, Indianapolis, Indiana 46206.
The NCAA is the governing body of collegiate athletics that
oversees twenty-three college sports and over 400,000 students who
participate in intercollegiate athletics. Taylor alleges NCAA knew
about the debilitating long-term dangers of concussions,
concussion-related injuries and sub-concussive injuries that
resulted from playing college football, but did nothing.[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jeff Raizner, Esq.
     RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
     2402 Dunlavy Street
     Houston, TX 77006
     Tel: (713) 554-9099
     Fax: (713  554-9098
     Email: efile@raiznerlaw.com

            - and -

     Jay Edelson, Esq.
     Benjamin H. Richman, Esq.
     EDELSON PC
     350 North LaSalle Street, 14th Floor
     Chicago, IL 60654
     Tel: (312) 589-6370
     Fax: (312) 589-6378
     Email: jedelson@edelson.com
            brichman@edelson.com

            - and -

     Rafey S. Balabanian, Esq.
     EDELSON PC
     123 Townsend Street, Suite 100
     San Francisco, CA 94107
     Tel: (415) 212-9300
     Fax: (415) 373-9435
     Email: rbalabanian@edelson.com


NORTH AMERICAN: McGhee Bid for Class Cert. Tossed w/o Prejudice
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as GERALD MCGHEE, an
individual, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
v. NORTH AMERICAN BANCARD LLC, Case No. 3:17-cv-00586-AJB-KSC (S.D.
Calif.), the Hon. Judge Anthony J. Batagllia entered an order:

   1. denying without prejudice the Plaintiff's motion for class
      certification;

   2. directing the parties to contact Judge Crawford's chambers
      within 14 days of this order to set a process for final
      scheduling of the case.

The Court said, "The Plaintiff argues that Defendant relies on
documents in its opposition that were not timely produced to
Plaintiff, despite these documents being responsive to
Plaintiff’s
3 previous discovery requests. Plaintiff also objects to the
declaration based on lack of foundation. However, because the Court
need not rely on any of the disputed evidence to come to its
conclusion, the objections are overruled as moot."

This action arises out of what Plaintiff characterizes as a "bait
and switch" case. The theory of Plaintiff's case is that Defendant
promised its customers a specific pay-as-you-go service, yet failed
to deliver on its promise by eventually assessing fees. Defendant
owns and sells "PayAnywhere" -- a mobile payments solution that
provides nationwide customers, including individuals, small
business owners, and merchants, "convenient, low cost point of sale
credit card payment processing services, including credit card
readers that can be connected to mobile devices." PayAnywhere was
advertised as a no-out-of-pocket or pay-as-you-go service. To
obtain the credit card processing services, merchants must submit
an application on the website, www.payanywhere.com.

A copy of the Court's order dated May 6, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3fLF9NF at no extra charge.[CC]

PEOPLECONNECT INC: Can't Compel Arbitration in Callahan Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MEREDITH CALLAHAN, et al., Plaintiffs v.
PEOPLECONNECT, INC., Defendant, Case No. 20-cv-09203-EMC (N.D.
Cal.), Judge Edward M. Chen of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California denies PeopleConnect's motion to
compel arbitration.

Plaintiffs Meredith Callahan and Lawrence Geoffrey Abraham have
filed a class action against Defendant PeopleConnect.  According to
the Plaintiffs, PeopleConnect misappropriated their names,
photographs, and likenesses and used the same in advertising its
products and services, "including reprinted yearbooks and
subscription memberships to the website Classmates.com."

PeopleConnect is a company that collects yearbooks, scans the
yearbooks, and extracts information from the yearbooks (such as
names, photographs, schools attended, and so forth) to be put into
a database.  Through a website that it owns and operates --
Classmates.com -- PeopleConnect "provides free access to some of
the personal information in its database in order to [1] drive
users to purchase its two paid products and [2] gather registered
users, from whom they profit by selling targeted ads."
PeopleConnect's two paid products are (1) "reprinted yearbooks that
retail for up to $99.95, and [(2)] a monthly subscription to
Classmates.com that retails for up to $3 per month.  It "did not
ask consent from, give notice to, or provide compensation to
individuals before using their names, photographs, and biographical
information."

The Plaintiffs allege that by misappropriating and misusing
millions of Californian's names, photographs, and likenesses
without consent, PeopleConnect has harmed them by denying them the
economic value of their likenesses, violating their legally
protected rights to exclusive use of their likenesses, and
violating their right to seclusion.  PeopleConnect has also earned
ill-gotten profits and been unjustly enriched.

The Plaintiffs have asserted the following claim for relief:

     (1) Violation of California Civil Code Section 3344 (i.e., the
right of publicity) -- Cal. Civ. Code Section 3344(a) (providing
that [a]ny person who knowingly uses another's name, voice,
signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in
products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or
selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods
or services, without such person's prior consent will be liable).

     (2) Violation of California Business & Professions Code
Section 17200 (both the unlawful and unfair prongs).

     (3) Intrusion upon seclusion.

     (4) Unjust enrichment.

In the case at bar, PeopleConnect argues that the dispute should be
compelled to arbitration because, in investigating the Plaintiffs'
case, the Plaintiffs' counsel -- i.e., their agent --

      (1) used the Classmates.com website and thus became bound by
the Terms of Service (TOS) which include an arbitration provision
(testifying that the TOS is accessible to each user of
Classmates.com via a hyperlink in the website's persistent footer
and on the non-registered user homepage), and

      (2) registered for two accounts on Classmates.com and, to
create these accounts, had to agree to the TOS (testifying that
counsel created two accounts on Dec. 6, 2020 -- about two weeks
before filing the instant lawsuit -- using the user names John Doe
and John Smith); (testifying that, when a person registers for an
account, he or she sees the following screen which includes the
following: By clicking Submit, you agree to the Terms of Service
and Privacy Policy and the phrase 'Terms of Service' is hyperlinked
to a copy of the current TOS); (testifying that certain screenshots
in the Plaintiffs' complaint could only have been accessed after
the website user agreed to the Classmates.com TOS).

On the first page of the TOS, there is a section titled
"Introduction" and then a section titled "Acceptance of Terms."
The Acceptance of Terms includes the arbitration provisions.

Analysis

A. Who Decides Motion to Compel Arbitration: Court or Arbitrator

As an initial matter, Judge Chen holds that the Court must consider
whether it or an arbitrator should decide the issues raised in
PeopleConnect's motion to compel arbitration.  The Court is
required to decide at least part of the motion.  PeopleConnect
agrees that contract formation is a decision for the Court to
address.

B. Nonsignatory-Principal and Signatory-Agent

Judge Chen finds that in the instant case, there is no real dispute
that the Plaintiffs' counsel is, in fact, their agent.  However,
the scope of counsel's authority is contested -- i.e., did counsel
have the authority to enter into the arbitration agreement on the
Plaintiffs' behalf?  It is PeopleConnect's burden to prove the
scope of counsel's authority.

There is no indication that the Plaintiffs expressly authorized
their counsel to enter into the arbitration agreement.  In fact, at
the hearing, counsel stated that he did not have express
authorization; PeopleConnect did not dispute such.  Nor is there
any suggestion that the Plaintiffs, after the fact, ratified the
agreement to arbitrate.  This leaves implied actual authority and
apparent authority.  The distinction PeopleConnect seeks to draw as
to the precise timing of the registration has no logical basis.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Chen denies the motion to compel
arbitration.  He further sets the remaining issues raised in the
motion to dismiss and strike and motion to stay for hearing on June
24, 2021, at 1:30 p.m.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 18, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/4thduy9r from Leagle.com.


PREMIERE CREDIT: Goodwin Files FDCPA Suit in S.D. Texas
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Premiere Credit of
North America, LLC, et al. The case is styled as Kamisha Goodwin,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
Premiere Credit of North America, LLC, John Does 1-25, Case No.
4:21-cv-01659 (S.D. Tex., May 20, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Premiere Credit of North America, LLC --
https://premierecredit.com/ -- offers financial services. The
Company provides accounts receivable management service.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Raphael Deutsch, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: rdeutsch@steinsakslegal.com



PRITCHARD INDUSTRIES: Bid for Appeal Cert. in Hernandez Suit Denied
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GUSTAVO ROJAS HERNANDEZ, MARIA JUAREZ BENAVIDES,
Plaintiffs v. PRITCHARD INDUSTRIES (SOUTHWEST), LLC, PRITCHARD.
INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendants, Case No. SA-20-CV-00508-XR (W.D.
Tex.), Judge Xavier Rodriguez of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Texas, San Antonio Division, denied the
Defendants' motion to certify the order granting class
certification for interlocutory appeal.

The case arises out of the alleged failure by the Defendants to pay
their employees a proper overtime rate under the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA").  Plaintiffs Gustavo Rojas Hernandez and
Maria Juarez Benavides are former employees of the Defendants.

The Defendants operate an office and building janitorial service in
Texas.  The Plaintiffs allege they were employed with the
Defendants for approximately 10 years and were paid on an hourly
basis. They allege that they frequently worked over 40 hours per
workweek, but the Defendants knowingly did not pay them the regular
overtime rate required by the FLSA.  They assert the same for other
similarly situated employees "in the cleaner role."  The Plaintiffs
further assert that they complained about these alleged FLSA
violations to their supervisor but were terminated two weeks
later.

On March 25, 2021, the Court granted the Plaintiffs' motion to
certify a class action.  In that order, the Court ordered that
notice be sent to "all current and former hourly employees whose
job duties include janitorial and cleaning services, and who
received only their regular rate of pay for any hours worked over
40 during one or more workweeks."

The Defendants then filed the instant motion to certify an
interlocutory appeal and seek to prevent the issuance of notice
until after the appeal has been adjudicated.

The Defendants make two arguments in favor of certification for an
interlocutory appeal.  First, that the first and third elements are
satisfied because "if the Fifth Circuit determines that the
allegations in this case are not susceptible of collective
treatment, then the matter will proceed quickly to termination
based on the individual claims of the two named Plaintiffs."
Second, that there is substantial ground for difference of opinion
because "the Court was one of the first to address certification
under the Fifth Circuit's new standard as announced in Swales, and
thus necessarily operated in an area of legal uncertainty," citing
Swales v. KLLM Transp. Servs., No. 19-60847, 2021 WL 98229 (5th
Cir. 2021)).

The Plaintiffs counter that discrepancies in the amount of
uncompensated overtime--a key focal point in the Defendants'
argument that this order contains a controlling question of
law--are insufficient to defeat certification of a class.  They
further respond that "simply because a court is the first to rule
on a question or counsel disagrees on applicable precedent does not
qualify the issue as one over which there is substantial
disagreement."  They finally argue that the only way that
interlocutory appeal would materially advance the litigation would
be if the Fifth Circuit overturns the Court's ruling and requires
the case to proceed solely on the claims of the named Plaintiffs.
This would make the case cheaper and quicker than proceeding on a
class-wide basis.

Judge Rodriguez explains that three elements must be met for a
district court to certify an interlocutory issue for appeal: "(1)
The district court's order must involve a controlling issue of law;
(2) there must be substantial grounds for difference of opinion;
and, (3) an immediate appeal from the order will materially advance
the ultimate termination of the litigation," citing Hopkins v.
Cornerstone Am., 4:05-CV-332-Y, 2007 WL 9772306, at *2 (N.D. Tex.
Aug. 1, 2007) (citing White v. Nix, 43 F.3d 374, 377 (8th Cir.
1994)).

Judge Rodriguez declines to certify its order for interlocutory
appeal.  The Defendants' argument boils down to a disagreement with
the Court's order.  The order only involves a controlling issue of
law insofar as it applies the Fifth Circuit's recent ruling in
Swales.  However, the thrust of the Defendants' argument is that
the Court's order granting class certification misidentifies a
common issue applicable to all members of the class--whether a
payroll code error resulted in the janitor receiving less overtime
pay than that to which he/she was entitled.  The Judge holds that
this amounts to a disagreement over the application of the
controlling law, not an issue with the controlling law itself.

Further, the Defendants have not shown a substantial ground for
difference of opinion.  They assert that the novelty of the Swales
decision, coupled with one pre-Swales decision that is similar to
their preferred outcome, evidences a substantial likelihood of
disagreement among the courts.  It does not.  The Judge finds that
the Defendants have not met their burden of showing a substantial
ground for difference of opinion.

Finally, an immediate appeal of the Court's order will not
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.  In
fact, the Court finds that the interlocutory appeal is more likely
to delay the proceedings than it is to expedite them.  In
evaluating this factor, the "district court is to examine whether
an immediate appeal would (1) eliminate the need for trial, (2)
eliminate complex issues so as to simplify the trial, or (3)
eliminate issues to make discovery easier and less costly."  Even
if the Defendants have their way, the case would still need a trial
on the named Plaintiffs' surviving FLSA claims.

Likewise, the trial would not be simplified because the ultimate
questions would remain the same regardless of the number of
employees involved in the litigation -- were the Plaintiffs subject
to a policy that resulted in the employees being underpaid?
Certainly the appeal has the potential to make discovery easier and
less costly, but only if the Fifth Circuit overturns the Court's
order.  However, the Fifth Circuit is unlikely to review the
decision even if the Court certifies it for an interlocutory appeal
for the same reasons outlined.  the Judge finds that this factor
has not been satisfied.

For the reasons stated, Judge Rodriguez denied the Defendants'
motion to certify for interlocutory appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 14, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/nxfhx46v from Leagle.com.


REALPAGE INC: Wins Bid for Partial Summary Judgment in Kelly Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KEVIN JOSEPH KELLY, et al., Plaintiffs v. REALPAGE,
INC. d/b/a On-Site, et al., Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-01706-JDW
(E.D. Pa.), Judge Joshua D. Wolson of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania grants RealPage's motion for
partial summary judgment as to the Plaintiffs' claims of willful
violation of the FCRA.

RealPage is a consumer reporting agency ("CRA") that operates
tenant screening businesses, including RP On-Site LLC.  When a
landlord requests a report from RealPage, RealPage provides a
screening report, which is a type of "consumer report" under the
FCRA.  Landlords and property managers use the tenant screening
reports to determine whether they should approve or decline
prospective tenants' lease applications.  RealPage creates these
reports by obtaining from private vendors, such as LexisNexis and
Hygenics, public record information about issues such as criminal
records and evictions. It then assembles that information and sells
it to landlords and property managers.

Messrs. Kelly's and Bey's prospective landlords obtained reports
from RealPage when each of them applied to lease an apartment.
Because RealPage's reports contained incorrect information, Messrs.
Kelly and Bey requested a copy of their respective files from
RealPage. RealPage's disclosure identified sources (i.e. the court
system) for public records in each file, but it did not identify
the third-party vendors that obtained those records.

Messrs. Kelly and Bey filed the action in April 2019.  In their
Complaint, they claim that when RealPage failed to disclose the
vendor source information for the public records RealPage
attributed to them, it violated the FCRA.  They asserted a
class-wide claim for violation of Section 1681g(a)(2). T hey each
also assert individual claims for violations of Section 1681e(b)
and Section 1681i.

On July 10, 2020, Messrs. Kelly and Bey filed a Motion to Certify
Class.  The Court denied that motion.

Prior to the close of discovery, RealPage filed a Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment.  The Court denied that Motion, without
prejudice, due to the Plaintiffs' contention that under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(d) more discovery was necessary.

After the close of discovery, on Jan. 8, 2021, RealPage filed the
motion for partial summary judgment addressing the Plaintiffs'
claim of a willful violation under Section 1681g(a)2.  It argues
that summary judgment is warranted because it adopted a reasonable
reading of the statute and thus did not act willfully by failing to
disclose third-party vendor source information.  Messrs. Kelly and
Bey oppose summary judgment arguing, among other things, that in
light of previous litigation, RealPage acted knowingly.

Judge Wolson notes that sometimes, despite its best intentions,
Congress writes a statute that is not clear.  When it does, those
subject to the statute have to do their best to comply while they
wait for clarity from Congress, regulators, or the courts.  The
question before the Court is when a private party's interpretation
of a statute becomes so unreasonable that it constitutes a knowing
violation of the statute.

While there might not be hard-and-fast rules to answer that
question, the Judge holds that the facts of the case are not
subject to dispute: RealPage and its subsidiary RP On-Site did not
knowingly violate the Fair Credit Reporting Act.  RealPage adopted
an interpretation of the statute with which Kevin Kelly and Karriem
Bey disagree and that is at odds with a settlement in a separate
case.  But it is an interpretation that is at least consistent with
the statutory language.

Because the facts are not in dispute, and because the inquiry is an
objective one, rather than an inquiry into RealPage's subjective
views, Judge Wolson grants RealPage's motion for partial summary
judgment as to the Plaintiffs' claims of a willful violation of the
FCRA.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 14, 2021 Memorandum is
available at https://tinyurl.com/5dd4zrjd from Leagle.com.


SAN FRANCISCO, CA: Seeks Initial OK of Settlement in Zayas Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as CANDIDO ZAYAS, RUBEN SOTO,
ALFREDO RUIZ, JOSE POOT, MILTON LECLAIRE, NIGEL HENRY, RALPH
DOMINGUEZ, MATTHEW BRUGMAN, MICHAEL BROWN, KISHAWN NORBERT, MARK
EDWARD HILL, and JAMES CLARK on behalf of themselves individually
and others similarly situated, as a class and Subclass, v. SAN
FRANCISCO COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN
FRANCISCO, SAN FRANCISCO SHERIFF VICKI HENNESSEY; UNDER SHERIFF
MATHEW FREEAN; CHIEF SHERIFF PAUL MIYAMOTO; CAPTAIN JASON JACKSON,
SARGEANT DOLLY and John & Jane DOEs, Nos. 1-50, Case No.
3:18-cv-06155-JCS (N.D. Cal.), the Parties ask the Court to enter
an order:

   1. granting preliminary approval of the Class Action Settlement
      and directing notice to the Class under 5 Fed. R. Civ. P.
      23(e)(1);

   2. appointing Settlement Class Counsel and Class Representatives

      under Fed. 6 R. Civ. P. 23(g)(3);

   3. approving the Settlement Claims Administrator; and

   4. scheduling a final approval hearing under Fed. R. Civ. P.
      23(e)(2).

Pursuant to Agreement, the Defendants will provide a total of
$2,100,000 to fully settle all the  claims. The class is divided
into three sub-classes.

   -- Sub-class A are those individuals who experienced direct
      sewage floods in the cell they were incarcerated in, and did

      file grievances.

   -- Sub-class B are 11 those individuals who experienced direct
      sewage floods in the cell they were incarcerated in, and did

      not filed grievances.

   -- Sub-class C are those individuals who experienced indirect
      sewage spill impacts including prolonged periods of water
      shut-off and lack of access to toilets.

The San Francisco Sheriff's Office, officially the City and County
of San Francisco Sheriff's Office, is the sheriff's office for the
City and County of San Francisco. The department has 850 deputized
personnel, and support staff.

A copy of the Parties' motion to certify class dated May 7, 2021 is
available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2RIRTgc at no
extra charge.[CC]

Lead Counsel for Plaintiffs and Settlement Class are:

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Yolanda Huang, Esq.
          Fulvio Cajina, Esq.
          Stan Goff, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF YOLANDA HUANG
          PO Box 5475
          Berkeley, CA 94705-0475
          Telephone: (510) 329-2140
          Facsimile: (510) 580-9410
          E-mail: yhuang.law@gmail.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Dennis J. Herrera, Esq.
          City Attorney, San Francisco
          Meredith B. Osborn, Esq.
          Chief Trial Deputy
          Kaitlyn Murphy, Esq.
          Deputy City Attorney

SAROJ & MANJU: Class Settlement in Wood Suit Wins Final Approval
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHAEL WOOD, Plaintiff v. SAROJ & MANJU INVESTMENTS
PHILADELPHIA LLC d/b/a/PAPA JOHN'S, et al., Defendants, Civil
Action No. 19-2820-KSM (E.D. Pa.), Judge Karen Spencer Marston of
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
granted the Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for Final Approval of the
Collective/Class Action Settlement and the Plaintiff's Motion to
Approve an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses
to Class Counsel, and a Service Award to Class Representative.

The Fairness Hearing was held on April 14, 2021.

Judge Marston certifies the following settlement class pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3): "All delivery
drivers who worked for Defendants during the period dating back to
three years prior to December 28, 2020."

Judge Marston also certifies the following settlement FLSA
collective: "All delivery drivers who worked for Defendants during
the period dating back to three years prior to December 28, 2020."

The Settlement Agreement is approved as fair and reasonable
resolution of a bona fide dispute over FLSA provisions.

The Judge approves the payment to the class counsel of $83,333 as
attorneys' fees and $8,564.90 in out-of-pocket expenses and awards
$2,500 as an incentive award to the Named Plaintiff.

She approves the Community Legal Services of Philadelphia as cy
pres recipient of any unclaimed funds from the parties' Rule 23
Class Settlement Fund.

The matter is dismissed with prejudice.  The Court will maintain
jurisdiction over the enforcement of the settlement.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 14, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/nu5jczv6 from Leagle.com.


SCHELL & KAMPETER: Loses Bid to Dismiss Classick Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RICHARD DAVID CLASSICK, JR., individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. SCHELL &
KAMPETER, INC. d/b/a DIAMOND PET FOODS, Defendant, Case No.
2:18-cv-02344-JAM-AC (E.D. Cal.), Judge John A. Mendez of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of California denied the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Fourth Amended Complaint.

Plaintiff Classick, the owner of a Blue Nose American Pitbull named
Otis, purchased Taste of the Wild(R) dog food for his loyal
companion until he discovered it contains undisclosed levels of
heavy metals, BPA, pesticides, acrylamides and regrinds.  He
brought a putative class action against the Defendant, the company
that manufactures, markets, and sells Taste of the Wild(R) dog
food.

From approximately 2017 to 2018, the Plaintiff purchased Taste of
the Wild(R) Grain Free High Prairie Canine Formula Roasted Bison
and Roasted Venison Dry Dog Food from Amazon.com.  He reviewed the
nutritional claims and labels displayed on Amazon's website prior
to purchasing the dog food.  From what he read on Amazon's website,
he believed that he was feeding Otis a premium dog food that was
healthy and nutritious.

The Defendant markets the Taste of the Wild(R) brand as a "premium"
dog food that is as "nature intended" and "based on your pet's
ancestral diet."  The Taste of the Wild(R) dog food also purports
to use "the best nutrition available" and is "processed under
strict human-grade standards to ensure purity."

What the Plaintiff did not know was that the dog food contains some
amount of heavy metals (including mercury, lead, arsenic, and
cadmium), bisphenol A ("BPA"), pesticides, acrylamide, and
regrinds.  That information is not included on the packaging.  The
Plaintiff, therefore, alleges that the Defendant misleadingly
assures consumers that its dog food undergoes stringent testing and
quality controls and wrongfully fails to disclose to consumers the
presence of contaminants.  He alleges that the Defendant's actions
and omissions amount to negligent misrepresentation, violation of
the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"), and breach of
the express warranty.

The Defendant moves to dismiss the 4AC in its entirety, arguing,
among other things, that the Plaintiff does not adequately plead
actual or reasonable reliance and fails to allege a direct
transaction.  The Plaintiff opposes the motion.

Opinion

A. Request for Judicial Notice

The Defendant requests that the Court takes judicial notice of a
copy of the Food and Drug Administration's ("FDA") Draft Guidance
for Industry #245, Hazard Analysis and Risk-Based Preventive
Controls for Food for Animals (Jan. 2018).  The Plaintiff opposes
this request.

Judge Mendez holds that a publicly available FDA guidance document,
is properly subject to judicial notice.  Accordingly, he granted
the Defendant's request for judicial notice.  The Court takes
judicial notice of the document's existence.  It does not take
judicial notice of any disputed or irrelevant facts within the
document.

B. Reasonable Reliance

The Defendant's leading argument is that all three of the
Plaintiff's claims fail because he has not pled facts supporting
actual and reasonable reliance, a necessary element of each.  It
argues that the Plaintiff has not satisfied the "reasonable
consumer standard," which requires that he "shows that members of
the public are likely to be deceived."  The Defendant contends that
some of the marketing claims the Plaintiff identifies are
non-actionable puffery; the Plaintiff does not allege other claims
are inherently false; and the Plaintiff has failed to allege a
concealment claim with particularity.

First, with regard to the statements allegedly relied upon from
Amazon.com, Judge Mendez holds that the Plaintiff has not
identified what those statements or claims are. The 4AC merely
references "statements on Amazon.com." or "labels, packaging, and
advertising on Amazon.com."  The Plaintiff has filed four
complaints and has yet to identify specific statements from
Amazon.com that are separate and apart from the statements on the
dog food packaging.  Thus, only the alleged affirmative
misrepresentations found of Taste of the Wild(R) packaging will be
considered by the Court.

Those are limited to the following: (i) the balanced diet that
nature intended; (ii) the best nutrition available today; and (iii)
processed under strict human-grade standards to ensure purity,
providing optimal health and vitality, supporting optimal cellular
health and overall good health, and helpful in maintaining the
sleek condition of good health.

Second, the Judge finds that the Plaintiff specifically alleges
that the dog food does not provide a balanced diet because it
contains heavy metals, pesticides, acrylamide, BPA, and regrinds,
all of which are associated with a variety of health risks.  The
same is true for the claim that the dog food constitutes "the best
nutrition available today."  The Judge says it is a measurable
claim that the Plaintiff seeks to prove false through this very
suit.  Thus, neither statement is non-actionable puffery.  Both
support the Plaintiff's claims sounding in fraud.

Third, finds that lone claim that the Plaintiff takes issue with in
his 4AC, that the Defendant argues has not been alleged as false,
is the claim that the dog food is "processed under strict
human-grade standards to ensure purity."  Again, the Defendant
focuses on the wrong portion of the claim.  It asserts that the
Plaintiff never alleged the dog food was not "processed under
strict human-grade standards," but conveniently ignores the "to
ensure purity."  The Plaintiff has alleged that the dog food is not
pure because it contains harmful heavy metals, pesticides,
acrylamide, BPA, and regrinds.  Thus, the Plaintiff has pled with
sufficient particularity "what is false or misleading about a
statement, and why it is false."

Finally, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiff's claims fail to
the extent he alleges to have reasonably relied on a nondisclosure.
The Judge holds that the issues are in dispute and are
inappropriate for resolution at the motion to dismiss stage.  The
Plaintiff has provided an actionable theory why the dog food is
unsafe and why the labels are misleading; whether the Plaintiff can
prove his theory is a separate question that the Court cannot
resolve at this stage.

C. Negligent Misrepresentation

The Defendant makes two additional arguments regarding the
Plaintiff's claim of negligent misrepresentation.  It argues: (1)
the 4AC contains no facts showing Defendant should have known any
representation on its dog food packaging was false at the time it
was made; and (2) the claim is barred by the economic-loss rule.

Turning first to the economic-loss rule, the Court previously held
that it does not bar the Plaintiff's negligent misrepresentation
claim because his claim "sounds far more in fraud than breach of
contract or negligence."  The Defendant's somewhat new, but mostly
redundant, argument does not affect that finding.  As for the
Defendant's argument that the Plaintiff failed to plead any facts
suggesting it reasonably should have known any statements on its
packaging were false at the time they were made, that is simply not
true.  Whether the packaging claims are in fact misleading are
disputable facts that may or may not be true; but the Plaintiff has
sufficiently alleged facts to put the Defendant on notice of the
circumstances giving rise to his claims.

D. CLRA Claim

Lastly, the Defendant asserts that the Plaintiff's CLRA claim fails
because he did not allege a direct transaction and the CLRA
"requires direct dealings between the consumer and the defendant."

Judge Mendez holds that the Plaintiff is unquestionably the
consumer.  The Plaintiff purchased the dog food.  That he purchased
it from Amazon.com, and not directly from the Defendant, is of no
consequence.  The Judge agrees with the many courts that have held
that the CLRA does not require a direct transaction between
plaintiffs -- the consumer -- and defendants -- the manufacturer or
producer of the goods.  The Plaintiff purchased the Defendant's dog
food.  He is a consumer with a right to sue under the CLRA.

Order

For all the reasons he set forth, Judge Mendez denied the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 18, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/j6c9ppe7 from Leagle.com.


SENTINEL INSURANCE: W.D. Washington Fuses Spektor Suit With Chorak
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, M.D. SPEKTOR D.D.S. PLLC, and SPEKTOR D.D.S., P.S.,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. SENTINEL INSURANCE COMPANY, LIMITED, Defendant, Case
No. 2:21-cv-00544-BJR (W.D. Wash.), Judge Barbara J. Rothstein of
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington,
Seattle, granted the Parties' motion to consolidate the action for
pretrial proceedings with the actions consolidated under the
matter, Chorak, et al. v. Hartford Casualty Insurance Co., et al.,
No. 2:20-cv-00627-BJR.

The Parties, through their undersigned counsel, submit the
stipulated motion to consolidate the action with the consolidated
matter, Chorak, et al. v. Hartford Casualty Insurance Co., et al.,
No. 2:20-cv-00627-BJR, including adoption of the pending briefing
on the Motion to Dismiss and for Judgment on the Pleadings and the
Court's decision on the Motion to Certify Questions to the
Washington State Supreme Court filed in that action.

On Nov. 10, 2020, the U.S. District Court for the Western District
of Washington ordered that the cases then pending in the District
involving COVID-19-related business interruption insurance coverage
claims against Hartford Casualty Insurance Co., Hartford Fire
Insurance Company, and Sentinel Insurance Co., Limited be
consolidated for pretrial proceedings under the matter, Chorak, et
al. v. Hartford Casualty Insurance Co., et al., No.
2:20-cv-00627-BJR (ECF No. 38);

On Nov. 20, 2020, Plaintiffs Mario D. Chorak, DMD, P.S.; Lina Kim,
DDS, P.S.; Arnell Prato, DDS, PLLC; Andrew Lee, DDS, Glow Medispa,
LLC; KCJ Studios LLC, doing business as Barre3 Ballard Exercise
Studio; Humble Warrior LLC, doing business as Barre3 Roosevelt and
Capitol Hill; ALELG, LLC dba Barre3 Felida; and Andrew Lee, DDS
filed a Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint ("Chorak Class
Complaint").

On Jan. 15, 2021, Hartford filed a Motion to Dismiss and for
Judgment on the Pleadings in the consolidated Chorak matter.

Hartford's Motion to Dismiss and for Judgment on the Pleadings in
the consolidated Chorak matter was fully briefed as of March 5,
2021.

On Feb. 18, 2021, the Plaintiffs in the consolidated Chorak matter
filed a Motion to Certify Questions to the Washington State Supreme
Court.  After full briefing, the Court denied the Motion to Certify
Questions to the Washington State Supreme Court in the consolidated
Chorak matter on April 23, 2021.

On April 22, 2021, the Spektor Plaintiffs filed the new Class
Action Complaint against Sentinel as Defendant.  The Spektor
Plaintiffs are represented by the same counsel that represents the
Plaintiffs in the Chorak Class Complaint and Defendant Sentinel is
represented by the same counsel that represents Hartford in the
Chorak matter.

The Parties believe that consolidation of the action with the
consolidated Chorak matter, including adoption of the pending
briefing on the Motion to Dismiss and for Judgment on the Pleadings
and the Court's decision on the Motion to Certify Questions in that
action, would aid in the efficient administration of justice;

The Parties move the Court to consolidate the action for pretrial
proceedings with the actions consolidated under the matter, Chorak,
et al. v. Hartford Casualty Insurance Co., et al., No.
2:20-cv-00627-BJR, including adoption of the pending briefing on
the Motion to Dismiss and for Judgment on the Pleadings and the
Court's decision on the Motion to Certify Questions filed in that
action.  For purposes of the pending Motion to Dismiss in Chorak,
the claims set forth in the Spektor Class Complaint should be
treated as if they had been asserted in the Chorak Class Complaint.
Upon consolidation, the Parties agree to be bound by the rulings
of the Court on the pending Motion to Dismiss and for Judgment on
the Pleadings and the Court's decision on the Motion to Certify
Questions in the consolidated Chorak matter.

Having reviewed the parties' stipulation, and finding that good
cause exists for the requested relief, Judge Rothstein granted the
motion.  The matter is consolidated with the Chorak Class
Complaint, including adoption of the pending briefing on the Motion
to Dismiss and for Judgment on the Pleadings and the Court's
decision on the Motion to Certify Questions in that action.

For purposes of the pending Motion to Dismiss in the Chorak matter,
the claims set forth in the instant action will be treated as if
they had been asserted in the consolidated amended Chorak class
action complaint.  The Parties in the action will be bound by the
rulings of the Court on the pending Motion to Dismiss and for
Judgment on the Pleadings and the Court's decision on the Motion to
Certify Questions in the consolidated Chorak matter.

The Clerk of the Court is notified of the consolidation.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 18, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/hssjdcrn from Leagle.com.


THC-ORANGE COUNTY: Court Enters Final Judgment in Bouzelev Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Fernando M. Olguin of the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California issued Final Judgment in the case, YURIY
BOUZELEV, an individual, on behalf of himself and others (DFMx)
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. THC - ORANGE COUNTY, LLC, et al.
Defendants, Case No. SA CV 19-01846-DMG (C.D. Cal.).

The settlement of the class action on the terms set forth in the
Parties' Stipulation for Class Action Settlement, with exhibits and
any amendments thereto, and definitions included therein, signed on
Nov. 23, 2020 and filed with the Court, is finally approved.

The following class is granted final certification for settlement
purposes only under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3): "All
applicants for employment in the United States for whom Defendant
THC-Orange County, LLC procured a consumer report for purposes of
employment from September 26, 2014 through July 2, 2019,
inclusive."

Judge Olguin finds that Rachel Herelle, identified in the
Declaration of Jarrod Salinas for Simpluris Inc., the Settlement
Administrator, and filed with the Court, has submitted a timely and
valid request for exclusion from the FCRA Class and is therefore
not bound by the Final Judgment and accompanying Final Order.  All
other members of the FCRA Class are bound by the terms and
conditions of the Settlement Agreement, the Final Judgment, and the
accompanying Final Order.

The claims in the Action are dismissed on the merits and with
prejudice according to the terms (including the Release) set forth
in the Settlement Agreement and in the Court's Final Order
Approving Class Action Settlement, without costs to any party
except as provided in the Final Approval Order.

The Class Counsel will be awarded $94,635.00 in attorneys' fees and
$10,005.25 in costs, which amount is approved as fair and
reasonable, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h) and is in accordance
with the terms of the Settlement Agreement.

The Class Representative will be awarded $5,000 as a service award
in his capacity as a representative Plaintiff in the Action.

The Court will retain continuing jurisdiction over the Action for
the reasons and purposes set forth in the Court's Final Approval
Order.

There are no objection(s) to the Stipulation of Settlement, the
Service Award, and Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 14, 2021 Final Judgment is
available at https://tinyurl.com/65mtbju5 from Leagle.com.


TOGETHER CREDIT: $164K in Attorneys' Fees Awarded in Chambers Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LEON CHAMBERS, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. TOGETHER CREDIT UNION, Defendants,
Case No. 19-CV-00842-SPM (S.D. Ill.), Judge Stephen P. McGlynn of
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois
granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Approval of Attorneys' Fees,
Expenses, and Service Award.

Plaintiff Class Representative Chambers filed the class action
against Together Credit Union, formerly known as Anheuser-Busch
Employees' Credit Union and doing business as American Eagle Credit
Union, on Aug. 2, 2019.  After fully briefing a motion to dismiss
and engaging in discovery, the parties reached a proposed class
action Settlement.

Under the terms of the Settlement, the Defendant agreed to pay
$525,000 into a Settlement Fund for the benefit of the Settlement
Class and for payment of fees, expenses, and other Court-approved
payments.  The Class Counsel reported that this amount represents
nearly 60% of estimated damages that were determined by an expert
who examined Defendant's records.

The Court preliminarily approved the Settlement on Feb. 3, 2021,
certified a Settlement Class, directed notice to the Settlement
Class, and set a final approval hearing to consider final approval
of the Settlement and any application for attorneys' fees,
expenses, and service awards from the Settlement Fund before it is
distributed to the Class Members.

As directed in the Preliminary Approval Order, 15 days after notice
was sent to the Settlement Class, the Plaintiff filed the Motion
for Approval of Attorneys' Fees, Expenses, and Service Award, which
was posted to the Settlement website where the Class Members could
access it for free and choose whether to opt-out of, or object to,
the Settlement before the deadline had passed.  In conjunction with
final approval, the Court heard argument on the motion.

Discussion

I. Attorneys' Fees

The Class Counsel seeks an award of attorneys' fees in the amount
of one-third of the Settlement Fund, after deducting the costs of
notice and administration, which amounts to a fee of $163,909.33.
Rule 23(h) expressly authorizes the Court to "award reasonable
attorney's fees" from a common fund in a class action case.

Judge McGlynn finds that attorneys' fees of one-third of the
Settlement Fund (after deduction of costs of notice and
administration) is appropriate and reasonable in the case.

II. Reimbursement of Litigation Expenses

The Class Counsel has requested reimbursement of expenses of
$2,322.37, which consists of ordinary litigation expenses, such as
filing fees and deposition transcripts.  The Class Counsel advanced
these expenses at the risk of not recovering them if the lawsuit
was unsuccessful and therefore had incentive to ensure money was
spent wisely and not frivolously.  Judge McGlynn finds that the
requested expenses are reasonable.

III. Class Representative Service Award

Finally, in recognition that a class representative has taken his
own time and has achieved a settlement that benefits the many other
absent class members, the Plaintiff requests payment of a class
representative service award of $7,500.

Judge McGlynn holds that without the Class Representative, there
would have been no recovery at all.  Before and during the
litigation and settlement, the Class Representative regularly
consulted with the Class Counsel in prosecuting the lawsuit,
provided documents and information for the suit, and participated
in the decision to accept the proposed settlement, overall taking
his own valuable time to represent the interests of the Class,
which ultimately resulted in the Settlement that is substantial and
will benefit all Class Members.  The Judge finds that the requested
class representative fee is reasonable.

Conclusion

For these reasons, Judge McGlynn granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Approval of Attorneys' Fees, Expenses, and Service Award.  The
Class Counsel is awarded attorneys' fees from the Settlement Fund
in the amount of $163,909.33, the Class Counsel is awarded
reimbursement of expenses from the Settlement fund in the amount of
$2,322.37, the Class Representative is awarded a class
representative service award from the Settlement Fund in the amount
of $7,500, and the Settlement Administrator is authorized and
ordered to make these payments from the Settlement Fund in
compliance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement.  The
remainder of the Settlement Fund willbe distributed pursuant to the
terms of the Settlement and further order of the Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 14, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/3dkp4ttx from Leagle.com.


TOGETHER CREDIT: $525K Chambers Suit Class Settlement Has Final OK
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LEON CHAMBERS, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. TOGETHER CREDIT UNION, Defendants,
Case No. 19-CV-00842-SPM (S.D. Ill.), Judge Stephen P. McGlynn of
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois
grants the Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval of Class Action
Settlement.

Plaintiff Chambers and Defendant Together Credit Union, by their
respective counsel, entered into the Settlement Agreement and
Release.  The Settlement provides, in exchange for a release of the
Defendant, for the Defendant to pay $525,000 into a Settlement Fund
for the benefit of the Class.

The Plaintiff moved pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure for an order preliminarily approving the proposed
Settlement and approving the form and plan of notice and
distribution set forth in the Settlement Agreement.  On Feb. 3,
2021, the Court entered a Memorandum and Orde, which granted
preliminary approval to the Settlement, determined the settlement
was "fair, reasonable and adequate" on a preliminary basis,
certified a settlement Class on a preliminary basis, directed
notice of the Settlement be distributed to the members of the
settlement Class, and set deadlines for Class members to object to
or opt-out of the Settlement, and set a hearing to consider final
approval.

In accordance with the Preliminary Approval Order the Settlement
Administrator caused notice to be sent to the members of the Class
informing them of the terms of the Settlement and their rights to
opt out, object, or do nothing and participate in the Settlement.
No member of the Class objected to the Settlement and only two
members (joint accountholders) opted out of the Settlement.

On May 13, 2021, the Court held a final approval hearing under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) to consider whether the
Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and whether the Class
can be certified for purposes of entering judgment on the
Settlement.

Based upon the foregoing, having heard the statements of the Class
Counsel and the Counsel for the Defendant, having considered all of
the files, records, and proceedings in the Lawsuit, the benefits to
the Class under the Settlement, and the risks, complexity, expense,
and probable duration of further litigation, and being fully
advised, Judge McGlynn concludes that the class action settlement
is fair, reasonable, and adequate.  Accordingly, he grants final
approval.

Because he finds that the requirements for certification under
Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3) are met, the Judge certifies the following
Class for purposes of final approval and judgment: All members of
Defendant who were assessed Multiple NSF Fees.  Excluded from the
Class are Miles E. and Celestine A. Murdock who submitted a timely
request for exclusion.

The Judge appoints Cohen & Malad, LLP; Branstetter, Stranch &
Jennings, PLLC; Kaliel PLLC; The Johnson Firm; and Carey Danis &
Lowe as the Class Counsel for the Settlement Class; and appoints
Plaintiff as the Class Representative.

The Judge approves approves the distribution plan for the
Settlement Fund set forth in the Settlement, and the Class Counsel
and the Settlement Administrator are authorized to implement that
distribution after deductions for fees as approved by the Court by
separate order.

The Order is a final judgment because it disposes of all claims
against all parties to the Lawsuit.  No other attorney fees or
costs to any of the Parties will be awarded other than as provided
for in the Settlement Agreement.  The Settling Parties are directed
to take the necessary steps to effectuate the terms of the
Settlement Agreement.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 14, 2021 Final Approval Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/nn8cbyjp from Leagle.com.


UNDER ARMOUR: Maryland Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Securities Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, In re UNDER ARMOUR SECURITIES LITIGATION, Civil Action
No. RDB-17-388 (D. Md.), Judge Richard D. Bennett of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Maryland denied the Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss.

As the Court noted in its Memorandum Opinion of Jan. 22, 2020 (ECF
No. 139), the basic allegation in the punitive class action is that
the Defendants Under Armour and its former CEO, Kevin Plank,
misrepresented the level of demand for Under Armour products.
Plaintiff Brian Breece filed a class action Complaint against Under
Armour, Plank, and another executive of the company, Lawrence
Molloy on Feb. 10, 2017.

After consolidation with other suits filed against Under Armour,
Plank, and numerous other Defendants, the Court dismissed the
Plaintiffs' Consolidated Amended Complaint.  On Nov. 16, 2018, the
Lead Plaintiff filed a Consolidated Second Amended Complaint for
violations of the federal securities laws, naming only Under Armour
and Plank as Defendants.  That Second Amended Complaint alleged
that between Sept. 16, 2015 and Jan. 30, 2017, the Defendants
issued a series of false and misleading statements about demand for
Under Armour products and the company's financial condition.

Previously, the Court has dismissed the Plaintiffs' claims under
Sections 10(b), 20(a), and 20A of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as well as Sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933.
Nevertheless, during the pendency of an appeal to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the Wall Street Journal published
two articles reporting that Under Armour was the subject of
investigations by the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Based on this new evidence, the Court conducted a hearing and
ultimately granted a Motion for Relief from its earlier rulings
upon a remand from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit.  The Fourth Circuit accordingly remanded the case.  After
having reviewed the submissions of the parties and heard argument
of counsel during a telephonic hearing on Sept. 14, 2020, the Court
granted motions for consolidation and allowed the filing of a Third
Amended Complaint.

Accordingly, on Oct. 14, 2020, Lead Plaintiff Aberdeen City Council
as Administrating Authority for the North East Scotland Pension
Fund and Plaintiffs Monroe County Employees' Retirement System and
KBC Asset Management, filed the Consolidated Third Amended
Complaint for violations of the federal securities laws ("TAC")
against Defendants Under Armour and Plank.

On Dec. 4, 2020, the Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, to which
the Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition.  On May 3, 2021,
while that motion remained pending, the SEC entered an Order
instituting cease-and-desist proceedings against Under Armour for
violations of various federal securities laws and ordering Under
Armour to pay a $9 million civil penalty.  The Plaintiffs have
aptly noted authority of the Court to take judicial notice of the
SEC Order in its consideration of the pending Motion to Dismiss.

Judge Bennett holds that the allegations are sufficient to state a
plausible claim that the Defendants "omitted to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances in which they were made, not misleading."  The
SEC Order and the TAC together "specify each statement alleged to
have been misleading" and "the reason or reasons why the statement
is misleading."

The Judge is also satisfied that the Plaintiffs have adequately
alleged their claims under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  Further,
the Plaintiffs have alleged that they purchased Under Armour stock
during the Class Period contemporaneously with Plank's trades when
he was allegedly in possession of material, non-public information
concerning Under Armour's suspect sales and accounting practices,
as required for a Section 20A claim.  For these reasons, the
Plaintiffs have stated a plausible claim for relief under Section
20(a) and Section 20A.

In sum, Judge Bennett is satisfied that taking judicial notice of
the SEC's Order in the case is appropriate.  The Plaintiffs'
allegations in the TAC, read in light of and in combination with
the allegations set forth in the SEC's Order, adequately allege
violations of federal securities laws.  Accordingly, the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 18, 2021 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/48mju7jz from Leagle.com.


UNITED STATES: E.D. New York Narrows Claims in N-N vs. USCIS
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, N-N, et al., Plaintiffs v. ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 19-CV-5295(EK) (E.D.N.Y.), Judge Eric Komitee
of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York
granted in part and denied in part the Defendants' motion to
dismiss.

The Plaintiffs are petitioners for "U nonimmigrant status," which
is available to victims of certain types of crimes who assist U.S.
law enforcement.  They bring suit against the Secretary of Homeland
Security, the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
("USCIS"), and others, challenging agency delays in adjudicating
their visa applications and associated applications for employment
authorization.

The Plaintiffs seek declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus relief
directing USCIS to adjudicate their requests for employment
authorization, adjudicate their eligibility for U visas, and issue
interim employment authorization documents to those who submitted
applications before Jan. 17, 2017.

The USCIS currently administers two paths to employment
authorization: receipt of a U visa or, in the agency's discretion,
placement on the waitlist.  The Plaintiffs challenge USCIS'
administration of this scheme on various grounds.

First, the Plaintiffs request that USCIS open a third path to
employment authorization -- at Stage Two.  They contend, in these
counts, that the Defendants are obligated to ascertain whether a U
visa application is "bona fide" and, on that basis, adjudicate
their pre-waitlist EAD applications pursuant to 8 U.S.C. Section
1184(p)(6).  They claim that in failing to make the "bona fide"
determination, Defendants have unlawfully withheld agency action
under the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA").

The Plaintiffs also contend, in Count I, that the Defendants have
violated the APA by failing to make waitlist determinations (and
thus employment authorization documents ("EAD") decisions) within a
reasonable time, despite their "nondiscretionary obligation" to do
so under 8 C.F.R. Section 214.14(d)(2).  In Count IV, they ask the
Court to issue a writ of mandamus compelling the Defendants to
adjudicate petitioners' admission to the U visa waitlist sooner.
By placing "individuals on the waiting list only once it is clear
they will soon receive U visa status," the Plaintiffs contend, the
Defendants have unreasonably (and unlawfully) delayed agency
action.

Finally, the Plaintiffs claim in Counts III and VI of the Complaint
that the petitioners who applied for EADs prior to Jan. 17, 2017,
are entitled to immediate work authorization because USCIS failed
to meet the ninety-day deadline that existed under the version of 8
C.F.R. Section 274a.13(d) that was effective when they applied.
They argue that the Defendants unlawfully withheld agency action by
failing to comply with their own regulation, and seek a writ of
mandamus directing the agency to issue EADs now.

The Defendants move to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) (lack of jurisdiction), 12(b)(3) (improper
venue), and 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim).  They contend that
certain Plaintiffs' claims have been mooted by agency action
following the filing of the case; that the Eastern District of New
York is no longer the proper venue for the action; and that the
remaining causes of action should be dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and/or failure to state a claim.  They also
request that, should the Court decline to dismiss for improper
venue, it exercises discretion to transfer the case to the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia.

Discussion

First, the Defendants argue that Plaintiffs N-N and G-V-R no longer
present a live case or controversy because their U visa petitions
have been adjudicated in the time since the Complaint was filed.
Both N-N and G-V-R have been placed on the U visa waitlist and
received employment authorization.  The Plaintiffs argue that N-N
and G-V-R should remain named Plaintiffs because they are putative
class representatives.

First, Judge Komitee holds that the claims of Plaintiffs N-N and
G-V-R are moot because their visa applications have been
adjudicated.  In general, potential class representatives must have
individual standing at the time the class is certified.  Only after
a class is certified will the plaintiff's status as class
representative preserve an otherwise moot claim -- allowing that
plaintiff to continue to represent the interests of others even
after there is no prospect of individual recovery.  Further, while
the mootness of the claims of some class representatives does not
moot a class action itself, courts may dismiss individual class
representatives whose personal claims have been mooted.

Second, the Defendants contend that the Eastern District of New
York is no longer a proper venue for the action because the claims
of Plaintiff N-N -- the only named Plaintiff residing in the
District -- are moot, and the action has no other meaningful
connection to this forum.

Judge Komitee holds that venue remains proper in the District
despite the dismissal of N-N and G-V-R, and transfer is not
warranted.  Venue was proper at the time the case was filed because
it was brought in the venue in which Plaintiff N-N resided and
venue is determined on the facts at the time a complaint is filed.
While deference to their choice is "reduced" in a putative class
action where "members of the class are dispersed throughout the
nation," it is nonetheless a factor that weighs against transfer.
The Defendants have not demonstrated by clear and convincing
evidence that a transfer of venue from New York to D.C. would
advance the convenience of the parties or the interest of justice.

Third, Judge Komitee holds that the Court lacks jurisdiction to
review the claim that the Defendants have failed to comply with 8
U.S.C. Section 1184(p)(6) (Counts II and V).

There is simply insufficient definitional content in the phrase
"bona fide" to compel agency action in the context of a statute
that is framed, on its face, as discretionary.  While a U visa
application is pending, but before it is adjudicated, the Secretary
of Homeland Security has authority to issue the applicant an EAD if
the application is determined to be "bona fide" -- it is Stage Two
in the taxonomy.  Because the agency has no court-enforceable duty
to determine the "bona fide" status of pending applications, Counts
II and V must be dismissed.

Fourth, the Plaintiffs argue that even if the pre-waitlist
assessment of an application's "bona fide" status is committed to
agency discretion, the agency's ultimate adjudication of the U visa
petition itself is not.  They contend that the agency has an
obligation to complete the actual adjudication of U visa petitions
for placement on the waitlist more quickly than it is currently
doing.

Judge Komitee holds that the Plaintiffs have failed to state a
claim that USCIS unlawfully withheld agency action in violation of
8 C.F.R. Section 214.14(d)(2) (Counts I and IV).  He says the duty
to adjudicate petitioners' eligibility for placement on the
waitlist is non-discretionary, and the Court thus has jurisdiction
to review it.  Nevertheless, the Plaintiffs have not stated a claim
that such action has been unlawfully delayed.

Fifth, certain Plaintiffs -- a proposed sub-class -- also seek to
compel the Defendants to adjudicate their EAD applications pursuant
to a previous version of 8 C.F.R. Section 274a.13(d).  Until Jan.
17, 2017, Section 274a.13(d) had set a specific deadline for USCIS
to adjudicate EAD requests, and had obligated the agency to issue
interim EADs if it failed to meet the deadline.

The government makes two arguments in response -- first, that the
former regulation, even while it was in effect, did not compel the
agency to issue EADs to petitioners before their U visa eligibility
had been determined.  And second, the Defendants argue that the
newer, post-Jan. 17, 2017 rule should be applied retroactively --
i.e., to EAD applications that were pending when it came into
effect.

Judge Komitee concludes that the Plaintiffs whose petitions had
been pending for more than ninety days as of Jan. 17, 2017 have
stated a valid claim to relief under the former regulation, and
therefore deny in part the motion to dismiss.  The Plaintiffs were
entitled to resolution of their EAD applications within ninety days
of applying.  The motion to dismiss Counts III and VI of the
Complaint must be denied as to all the Plaintiffs in that sub-class
except O-D-B, whose claims on these counts are dismissed because
her application had been pending for fewer than ninety days when
the revised rule went into effect.

Conclusion

For the reasons he set forth, Judge Komitee granted the Defendants'
motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' First, Second, Fourth and Fifth
Causes of Action.  He denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' Third and Sixth Causes of Action, except that Plaintiff
O-D-B's claims under the Third and Sixth Causes of Action are
dismissed.  The claims of N-N and G-V-R are also dismissed as moot.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to substitute the
following Defendants in the case caption: Alejandro Mayorkas for
Kevin McAleenan; Tracy Renaud for Kenneth Cuccinelli; Connie Nolan
for Donald Neufeld; and Merrick Garland for William Barr.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 18, 2021 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/k7u76m2v from Leagle.com.


WESTERN UNION: Bid to Compel Discovery in Radulescu Granted in Part
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IBOLYA RADULESCU, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. THE WESTERN UNION COMPANY,
and WESTERN UNION FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., Defendants, Civil
Action No. 19-cv-03009-CMA-SKC (D. Colo.), Magistrate Judge S. Kato
Crews of the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado
granted in part and denied in part the Motion to Compel Discovery.

The Plaintiff seeks to certify a class of Western Union customers
who sent money transfers from the United States and who were not
notified within 60 days that their money transfer was not redeemed,
as required by a settlement agreement in a prior class action,
Tennille v. Western Union, 1:09-cv-00938-JLK (D. Colo. 2009).  The
Tennille settlement applied to a class of customers who sent
unredeemed money transfers on or before Jan. 3, 2013.

In accordance with the settlement, Western Union began issuing
Tennille Notifications to its customers automatically starting July
1, 2013.  This time gap -- from Jan. 3, 2013, to July 1, 2013 --
was not included in the Tennille settlement and resulted in over
175,000 customers who sent unredeemed money transfers using Western
Union and who were not sent a notification within 60 days of the
funds remaining unredeemed.  The Plaintiff contends these 175,000
customers (or customer transactions) are "undisputedly part of the
case."

The Plaintiff's Motion to Compel seeks to compel discovery from the
Western Union Defendants for post-July 1, 2013 customer
transactions.  The Plaintiff argues: "It cannot be denied that
post-July 1, 2013 transactions are highly relevant to the
Plaintiff's case.  Moreover, it cannot be denied that post-July
2013 customers to whom no notification was sent within 60 days
after their money transfers were not redeemed are, by definition,
members of the Plaintiff's putative class."

Western Union argues the opposite: "Because all U.S. senders who
sent an unredeemed money transfer after July 1, 2013, were
automatically sent a notification that their money transfer was
unredeemed after 60 days, by definition, they cannot be members of
the putative class in this case."  According to the Plaintiff, "The
issue in dispute and what is being sought by this motion is
evidence whether after July 1, 2013, Western Union did in fact send
notification to all customers whose transactions were not redeemed
within 60 days. Having a policy is one thing; carrying out that
policy is quite another.  It is this latter component of Western
Union's obligation about which Plaintiff seeks discovery."

District Judge Arguello referred the Motion to the magistrate
judge.  The Court held a hearing on the Motion on Dec. 2, 2020.  At
that time, the Court ruled on the portion of the parties' dispute
over training videos and took the remainder under advisement.

The Court then issued the following Minute Order at #64: "MINUTE
ORDER re: 56 MOTION to Compel Discovery and Extension of Time for
Class Certification Discovery filed by Ibolya Radulescu.
Yesterday, December 2, 2020, the Court held oral argument on
Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Discovery and Extension of Time for
Class Certification Discovery (Motion), which was referred to the
magistrate judge.  The Court will stay ruling on the Motion pending
the following: (1) Plaintiff is ORDERED to provide the names of the
six to ten customers it identified through its social media search
to Defendants by no later than December 10, 2020; (2) Defendants
are ORDERED to investigate those names to determine whether a
Tennille Notice was ever sent to each individual, and will inform
Plaintiff and the Court of the results of that search by no later
than December 21, 2020; (3) Defendants are FURTHER ORDERED to
determine whether they maintain logs or data of customers who
contacted Defendants to complain about unredeemed funds (after the
60-day period but before the escheat period), and will inform
Plaintiff and the Court of the results of that inquiry by no later
than December 10, 2020. The latter pertains to the period after
July 1, 2013.  If Defendants determine they do maintain such data,
the update they provide Plaintiff and the Court will include
information concerning the burden, if any, on Defendants to collect
that data. SO ORDERED by Magistrate Judge S. Kato Crews on
12-3-2020. Text Only Entry (skclc2). (Entered: 12/03/2020)"

The parties then submitted reports and briefing resulting from the
Minute Order.  The Court held another hearing on the Motion on May
12, 2021, considering the resulting reports and briefing.

Analysis

1. Discovery of Post-July 1, 2013 Transactions

Western Union claims it began to comply with providing the required
Tennille Notice on July 1, 2013.  These notices are sent to
customers automatically, and the Plaintiff can point to no facts
suggesting the contrary, according to Western Union.  Therefore,
Western Union posits that the Plaintiff's discovery requests for
all post-July 1, 2013 money transfers and notifications sent to
customers whose money went unredeemed is a fishing expedition.  Of
note, Western Union does not keep a record of customers who were
not sent Tennille Notification, or of customers who did not
receive, or complained about not receiving, notification.  This is
because its system automatically sends the required notification
after the 60-day unredeemed period.  Therefore, no data is readily
available to Western Union to identify which customers, if any
(post-July 1, 2013), were not sent Tennille Notification.

The Plaintiff describes the proposed class and sub-class as
follows: "Plaintiff filed this class action to recover for herself
and a class of customers whose money transactions were not redeemed
and who were not notified by Defendants within 60 days.
Plaintiff's proposed class/sub-classes defined in the complaint is
not limited to a period of time before July 1, 2013.  Rather,
Plaintiff's proposed class/sub-classes includes all Western Union
customers, regardless of when they sent their money, who were not
notified by Defendants their money had not been picked up within 60
days, and who were not part of the Tennille settlement."

Based on the proposed class, Judge Crews finds that the information
concerning post-July 1, 2013 customers whose transactions were
unredeemed and who were sent Tennille Notification are not relevant
to the Plaintiff's claims.  Thus, the Plaintiff's arguments to
compel Western Union to produce all transactions for customers who
were notified are to no avail.  And because Western Union does not
maintain a list or data of customers who were not sent
notification, there is nothing for the court to compel in this
regard.  For these reasons, the Motion to Compel is denied.

2. Extension of Class Certification Deadlines

The Plaintiff also seeks a 90-day extension of the class
certification deadline to complete discovery related to
class-certification.  The Plaintiff seeks to issue subpoenas to
Nordis Technologies and RevSpring (vendors used by Western Union
for sending notices) regarding who did and did not receive Tennille
Notifications within the 60-day period.

Judge Crews denies this request for reasons similar to those
stated.  Further, he understands Western Union engages these
vendors for the specific purpose of providing numerous notices to
its customers, including Tennille Notifications.  It is not
logically apparent these vendors would maintain lists or data
regarding notices they failed to send when their entire function is
to send notices -- the Plaintiff has not provided evidence or
information to suggest these vendors possess information evidencing
Tennille Notifications they did not send.  And to the extent the
subpoenas seek other data involving customers who were sent
notices, that information is not relevant to the Plaintiff's claims
or its proposed class or sub-class.

The Judge also is not convinced of the Plaintiff's diligence in
seeking discovery from these vendors.  Although the Plaintiff
states she only learned of these vendors in September 2020, Western
Union offers evidence to suggest these vendors were disclosed and
known to her in March 2020.  The Judge does, however, find good
cause to extend the deadline for filing the Plaintiff's motion for
class certification.  The Plaintiff's motion will be filed within
30-days of the date of the Order.

Order

Judge Crews granted in part the Motion to Compel insofar as he
extends the deadline for the filing of the Plaintiff's motion for
class certification.  He denied it in all other respects.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 18, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/rxza6rd2 from Leagle.com.


WHITE PINES INC: Dancers Seek Minimum and Overtime Wages
--------------------------------------------------------
Alethia Tyler, Danielle Williams and Chardae Mosley, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. White
Pines, Inc., Kenny Edwards, Doe Managers 1 through 3 and Does 4
through 10, inclusive, Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-00410, (E.D. Va.,
May 21, 2021) seeks redress for the denial of the mandatory minimum
wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
illegally absconding with their tips and demanding illegal
kickbacks including in the form of "House Fees."

White Pines operates as "L.A.'s Night Club" and "L.A.'s Gentlemen's
Club," an adult-oriented entertainment facility located in Virginia
Beach VA where Plaintiffs worked as dancers/entertainers at various
times between 2016 and January, 2021. They claim to be denied
minimum wage payments and denied overtime being misclassified as
independent contractors. Plaintiffs were compensated exclusively
through tips from customers but were required to share their tips
with other non-service employees who do not customarily receive
tips, including disk jockeys and security personnel without their
knowledge, asserts the complaint. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      David A.C. Long, Esq.
      Suzanne S. Long, Esq.
      MEYER BALDWIN LONG & MOORE, LLP
      5600 Grove Avenua
      Richmond, VA 23226
      Telephone: (804) 285-3888
      Fax: (804) 285-7779
      Email: slong@meyerbaldwin.com
             dlong@meyerbaldwin.com

             - and -

      John P. Kristensen, Esq.
      KRISTENSEN LLP
      12540 Beatrice Street, Suite 200
      Los Angeles, CA 90066
      Telephone: (310) 507-7924
      Fax: (310) 507-7906
      Email: john@kristensenlaw.com

             - and -

      Jarrett L. Ellzey, Esq.
      HUGHES ELLZEY
      1105 Milford Street
      Houston, TX
      Telephone: (713) 554-2377
      Fax: (888) 995-3335
      Email: jarrett@hughesellzey.com


                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Burlington Northern Still Faces Exposure Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
Burlington Northern Santa Fe, LLC (BNSF), is a party to asbestos
claims by employees and non-employees who may have been exposed to
asbestos, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "Because of the relatively finite exposed
population, the Company has recorded an estimate for the full
amount of probable exposure. This is determined through an
actuarial analysis based on estimates of the exposed population,
the number of claims likely to be filed, the number of claims that
will likely require payment, and the cost per claim. Estimated
filing and dismissal rates and average cost per claim are
determined utilizing recent claim data and trends.

"BNSF's personal injury liability includes the cost of claims for
employee work-related injuries, third-party claims, and asbestos
claims. BNSF records a liability for asserted and unasserted claims
when the expected loss is both probable and reasonably estimable.
Because of the uncertainty of the timing of future payments, the
liability is undiscounted. Defense and processing costs, which are
recorded on an as-reported basis, are not included in the recorded
liability. Expense accruals and adjustments are classified as
materials and other in the Consolidated Statements of Income.

"Personal injury claims by BNSF Railway employees are subject to
the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)
rather than state workers' compensation laws. Resolution of these
cases under the FELA's fault-based system requires either a finding
of fault by a jury or an out of court settlement. Third-party
claims include claims by non-employees for compensatory damages and
may, from time to time, include requests for punitive damages or
treatment of the claim as a class action.

"BNSF estimates its personal injury liability claims and expense
using standard actuarial methodologies based on the covered
population, activity levels and trends in frequency, and the costs
of covered injuries. The Company monitors actual experience against
the forecasted number of claims to be received, the forecasted
number of claims closing with payment, and expected claim payments
and records adjustments as new events or changes in estimates
develop."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3fIbx43






ASBESTOS UPDATE: Colfax Incurs $0.9MM in Asbestos-Related Costs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Colfax Corporation, during the three months ended April 2, 2021 and
April 3, 2020, has recorded $0.9 million and $1.4 million,
respectively, of asbestos-related costs, net of tax, according to
the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission.

Colfax Corporation states, "The Company retained certain
asbestos-related contingencies and insurance coverages from
divested businesses for which it did not retain an interest in the
ongoing operations subject to the contingencies.

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3u5teiQ


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Colgate-Palmolive Defends 147 Individual Cases
---------------------------------------------------------------
Colgate-Palmolive Company, as of March 31, 2021, is a defendant of
147 individual cases pending in the state and federal courts
throughout the United States, as compared to 137 cases as of
December 31, 2020, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "Most of these actions involve a number of
co-defendants from a variety of different industries, including
suppliers of asbestos and manufacturers of products that, unlike
the Company's products, were designed to contain asbestos. During
the three months ended March 31, 2021, 14 new cases were filed and
three cases were resolved by voluntary dismissal. In addition,
during the three months ended March 31, 2021, the Company won an
appeal in one case that, in 2019, resulted in a jury verdict in
favor of the Company and, since all of the plaintiff's appeals have
been exhausted, the case is now closed. There were no settlements
of pending cases in the three months ended March 31, 2021.

"A significant portion of the Company's costs incurred in defending
and resolving these claims has been, and the Company believes a
portion of such costs will continue to be, covered by insurance
policies issued by several primary, excess and umbrella insurance
carriers, subject to deductibles, exclusions, retentions, policy
limits and insurance carrier insolvencies.

"While the Company and its legal counsel believe that these cases
are without merit and intend to challenge them vigorously, there
can be no assurances regarding the ultimate resolution of these
matters. With the exception of one case where the Company received
an adverse jury verdict in the second quarter of 2019 that the
Company has appealed, the range of reasonably possible losses in
excess of accrued liabilities disclosed above does not include any
amount relating to these cases because the amount of any possible
losses from such cases currently cannot be reasonably estimated."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3wwTOTT


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Corning Inc. Has $96MM Asbestos Claims Reserve
---------------------------------------------------------------
Corning Incorporated is a defendant in certain cases alleging
injuries from asbestos, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "At March 31, 2021 and December 31, 2020, the
amount of the reserve for these asbestos claims was estimated to be
$96 million and represented the undiscounted projection of claims
and related legal fees for the estimated life of the litigation."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3bOS28Q




ASBESTOS UPDATE: Crane Co. Defends 29,407 Claims as of March 31
---------------------------------------------------------------
Crane Co., as of March 31, 2021, is a defendant of 29,407 pending
claims filed in numerous state and federal courts alleging injury
or death as a result of exposure to asbestos, according to the
Company's Form 8-K filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission.

The Company states, "Of the 29,407 pending claims, approximately
18,000 claims were pending in New York of which approximately
16,000 are non-malignancy claims that were filed over 15 years ago
and have been inactive under New York court orders.

"We have tried several cases resulting in defense verdicts by the
jury or directed verdicts for the defense by the court. We further
have pursued appeals of certain adverse jury verdicts that have
resulted in reversals in favor of the defense. We have also tried
several other cases resulting in plaintiff verdicts which we paid
or settled after unsuccessful appeals.

"The gross settlement and defense costs incurred (before insurance
recoveries and tax effects) by us for the three months ended March
31, 2021 and 2020 totaled $9.1 million and $12.6 million,
respectively. In contrast to the recognition of settlement and
defense costs, which reflect the current level of activity in the
tort system, cash payments and receipts generally lag the tort
system activity by several months or more, and may show some
fluctuation from period to period. Cash payments of settlement
amounts are not made until all releases and other required
documentation are received by us, and reimbursements of both
settlement amounts and defense costs by insurers may be uneven due
to insurer payment practices, transitions from one insurance layer
to the next excess layer and the payment terms of certain
reimbursement agreements. Our total pre-tax payments for settlement
and defense costs, net of funds received from insurers, for the
three months ended March 31, 2021 and, 2020 totaled $10.8 million
and $11.7 million, respectively. Detailed below are the comparable
amounts for the periods indicated.

"Cumulatively through March 31, 2021, we have resolved (by
settlement or dismissal) approximately 142,000 claims. The related
settlement cost incurred by us and our insurance carriers is
approximately $684 million, for an average settlement cost per
resolved claim of approximately $4,800. The average settlement cost
per claim resolved during the years ended December 31, 2020, 2019
and 2018 was $13,900, $15,800, and $11,300, respectively. Because
claims are sometimes dismissed in large groups, the average cost
per resolved claim, as well as the number of open claims, can
fluctuate significantly from period to period. In addition to large
group dismissals, the nature of the disease and corresponding
settlement amounts for each claim resolved will also drive changes
from period to period in the average settlement cost per claim.
Accordingly, the average cost per resolved claim is not considered
in our periodic review of our estimated asbestos liability."

A full-text copy of the Form 8-K is available at
https://bit.ly/3wy81Qw


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Flowserve Corp. Still Faces PI Lawsuits
--------------------------------------------------------
Flowserve Corporation is a defendant in a substantial number of
lawsuits that seek to recover damages for personal injury allegedly
caused by exposure to asbestos-containing products manufactured
and/or distributed by our heritage companies in the past, according
to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "Typically, these lawsuits have been brought
against multiple defendants in state and federal courts. While the
overall number of asbestos-related claims in which we or our
predecessors have been named has generally declined in recent
years, there can be no assurance that this trend will continue, or
that the average cost per claim to us will not further increase.
Asbestos-containing materials incorporated into any such products
were encapsulated and used as internal components of process
equipment, and we do not believe that significant emission of
asbestos fibers occurred during the use of this equipment.

"Our practice is to vigorously contest and resolve these claims,
and we have been successful in resolving a majority of claims with
little or no payment, other than legal fees.

"During the three months ended March 31, 2021 and 2020, the Company
incurred expenses (net of insurance) approximately $2.7 million and
$4.3 million, respectively, to defend, resolve or otherwise dispose
of outstanding claims, including legal and other related expenses.
These expenses are included within SG&A in our condensed
consolidated statements of income.

"The Company had cash (inflows)/outflows (net of insurance and/or
indemnity) to defend, resolve or otherwise dispose of outstanding
claims, including legal and other related expenses of approximately
$1.6 million and $1.4 million during the periods ending March 31,
2021 and 2020, respectively.

"Historically, a high percentage of resolved claims have been
covered by applicable insurance or indemnities from other
companies, and we believe that a substantial majority of existing
claims should continue to be covered by insurance or indemnities,
in whole or in part.

"We believe that our reserve for asbestos claims and the receivable
for recoveries from insurance carriers that we have recorded for
these claims reflects reasonable and probable estimates of these
amounts. Our estimate of our ultimate exposure for asbestos claims,
however, is subject to significant uncertainties, including the
timing and number and types of new claims, unfavorable court
rulings, judgments or settlement terms and ultimate costs to
settle. Additionally, including the continued viability of
carriers, may also impact the amount of probable insurance
recoveries. We believe that these uncertainties could have a
material adverse impact on our business, financial condition,
results of operations and cash flows, though we currently believe
the likelihood is remote.
Additionally, we have claims pending against certain insurers that,
if resolved more favorably than reflected in the recorded
receivables, would result in discrete gains in the applicable
quarter."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3oNk2ig


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Goodyear Tire Faces 38,700 PI Claimants
--------------------------------------------------------
The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company is a defendant in approximately
38,700 claimants alleging various asbestos-related personal
injuries purported to result from alleged exposure to asbestos in
certain products manufactured by the Company or present in certain
of its facilities, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "During the first three months of 2021,
approximately 300 new claims were filed against us and
approximately 300 were settled or dismissed. The amounts expended
on asbestos defense and claim resolution by us and our insurers
during the first quarter of 2021 was $4 million.

"Typically, these lawsuits have been brought against multiple
defendants in state and federal courts. To date, we have disposed
of approximately 154,500 claims by defending, obtaining the
dismissal thereof, or entering into a settlement. The sum of our
accrued asbestos-related liability and gross payments to date,
including legal costs, by us and our insurers totaled approximately
$566 million through March 31, 2021 and $563 million through
December 31, 2020.

"We periodically, and at least annually, review our existing
reserves for pending claims, including a reasonable estimate of the
liability associated with unasserted asbestos claims, and estimate
our receivables from probable insurance recoveries. We recorded
gross liabilities for both asserted and unasserted claims,
inclusive of defense costs, totaling $148 million and $149 million
at March 31, 2021 and December 31, 2020, respectively. In
determining the estimate of our asbestos liability, we evaluated
claims over the next ten-year period. Due to the difficulties in
making these estimates, analysis based on new data and/or a change
in circumstances arising in the future may result in an increase in
the recorded obligation, and that increase could be significant.

"We maintain certain primary and excess insurance coverage under
coverage-in-place agreements, and also have additional excess
liability insurance with respect to asbestos liabilities. After
consultation with our outside legal counsel and giving
consideration to agreements with certain of our insurance carriers,
the financial viability and legal obligations of our insurance
carriers and other relevant factors, we determine an amount we
expect is probable of recovery from such carriers. We record a
receivable with respect to such policies when we determine that
recovery is probable and we can reasonably estimate the amount of a
particular recovery.

"We recorded an insurance receivable related to asbestos claims of
$89 million and $90 million at March 31, 2021 and December 31,
2020, respectively. We expect that approximately 60% of asbestos
claim related losses would be recoverable through insurance during
the ten-year period covered by the estimated liability. Of these
amounts, $13 million was included in Current Assets as part of
Accounts Receivable at both March 31, 2021 and December 31, 2020.
The recorded receivable consists of an amount we expect to collect
under coverage-in-place agreements with certain primary and excess
insurance carriers as well as an amount we believe is probable of
recovery from certain of our other excess insurance carriers.

With respect to both asserted and unasserted claims, it is
reasonably possible that we may incur a material amount of cost in
excess of the current reserve; however, such amounts cannot be
reasonably estimated. Coverage under insurance policies is subject
to varying characteristics of asbestos claims including, but not
limited to, the type of claim (premise vs. product exposure),
alleged date of first exposure to our products or premises and
disease alleged. Recoveries may also be limited by insurer
insolvencies or financial difficulties. Depending upon the nature
of these characteristics or events, as well as the resolution of
certain legal issues, some portion of the insurance may not be
accessible by us."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2SrYHyB




ASBESTOS UPDATE: Ingersoll Rand Has $129.2MM Litigation Reserve
---------------------------------------------------------------
Ingersoll Rand Inc. has recorded a total litigation reserve of
$129.2 million and $131.4 million as of March 31, 2021 and December
31, 2020, respectively, with regards to potential liability arising
from the its asbestos-related litigation, according to the
Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission.

The Company states, "Asbestos related defense costs are excluded
from the asbestos claims liability and are recorded separately as
services are incurred. In the event of unexpected future
developments, it is possible that the ultimate resolution of these
matters may be material to the Company's consolidated financial
position, results of operation or liquidity.

"The Company has entered into a series of agreements with certain
of its or its predecessors' legacy insurers and certain potential
indemnitors to secure insurance coverage and/or reimbursement for
the costs associated with the asbestos and silica-related lawsuits
filed against the Company. The Company has an insurance recovery
receivable for probable asbestos related recoveries of
approximately $133.4 million and $132.1 million as of March 31,
2021 and December 31, 2020, respectively, which was included in
"Other assets" in the Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets. The
amounts recorded by the Company for asbestos-related liabilities
and insurance recoveries are based on currently available
information and assumptions that the Company believes are
reasonable based on an evaluation of relevant factors. The actual
liabilities or insurance recoveries could be higher or lower than
those recorded if actual results vary significantly from the
assumptions.

"The Company believes that the pending and future asbestos and
silica-related lawsuits are not likely to, in the aggregate, have a
material adverse effect on its consolidated financial position,
results of operations or liquidity."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3fBMXBy


ASBESTOS UPDATE: International Paper Reports $114MM Liability
-------------------------------------------------------------
International Paper Company has been named as a defendant in
various asbestos-related personal injury litigation, in both state
and federal court, primarily in relation to the prior operations of
certain companies previously acquired by International Paper,
according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "As of March 31, 2021, the Company's total
recorded liability with respect to pending and future
asbestos-related claims was $114 million, net of estimated
insurance recoveries. While it is reasonably possible that the
Company may incur losses in excess of its recorded liability with
respect to asbestos-related matters, we do not believe additional
material losses are probable."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2SqZwYN


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Johnson Controls Subsidiaries Faces PI Suits
-------------------------------------------------------------
Johnson Controls International plc and certain of its subsidiaries,
along with numerous other third parties, are named as defendants in
personal injury lawsuits based on alleged exposure to asbestos
containing materials, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "These cases have typically involved product
liability claims based primarily on allegations of manufacture,
sale or distribution of industrial products that either contained
asbestos or were used with asbestos containing components.

"As of March 31, 2021, the Company's estimated asbestos-related net
liability recorded on a discounted basis within the Company's
consolidated statements of financial position was $93 million. The
net liability within the consolidated statements of financial
position was comprised of a liability for pending and future claims
and related defense costs of $470 million, of which $49 million was
recorded in other current liabilities and $421 million was recorded
in other noncurrent liabilities. The Company also maintained
separate cash, investments and receivables related to insurance
recoveries within the consolidated statements of financial position
of $377 million, of which $22 million was recorded in other current
assets, and $355 million was recorded in other noncurrent assets.
Assets included $11 million of cash and $304 million of
investments, which have all been designated as restricted. In
connection with the recognition of liabilities for asbestos-related
matters, the Company records asbestos-related insurance recoveries
that are probable; the amount of such recoveries recorded at March
31, 2021 was $62 million. As of September 30, 2020, the Company's
estimated asbestos-related net liability recorded on a discounted
basis within the Company's consolidated statements of financial
position was $115 million. The net liability within the
consolidated statements of financial position was comprised of a
liability for pending and future claims and related defense costs
of $483 million, of which $49 million was recorded in other current
liabilities and $434 million was recorded in other noncurrent
liabilities. The Company also maintained separate cash, investments
and receivables related to insurance recoveries within the
consolidated statements of financial position of $368 million, of
which $39 million was recorded in other current assets, and $329
million was recorded in other noncurrent assets. Assets included $9
million of cash and $291 million of investments, which have all
been designated as restricted. In connection with the recognition
of liabilities for asbestos-related matters, the Company records
asbestos-related insurance recoveries that are probable; the amount
of such recoveries recorded at September 30, 2020 was $68 million.

"The Company's estimate of the liability and corresponding
insurance recovery for pending and future claims and defense costs
is based on the Company's historical claim experience, and
estimates of the number and resolution cost of potential future
claims that may be filed and is discounted to present value from
2068 (which is the Company's reasonable best estimate of the
actuarially determined time period through which asbestos-related
claims will be filed against Company affiliates). Asbestos-related
defense costs are included in the asbestos liability. The Company's
legal strategy for resolving claims also impacts these estimates.
The Company considers various trends and developments in evaluating
the period of time (the look-back period) over which historical
claim and settlement experience is used to estimate and value
claims reasonably projected to be made through 2068. At least
annually, the Company assesses the sufficiency of its estimated
liability for pending and future claims and defense costs by
evaluating actual experience regarding claims filed, settled and
dismissed, and amounts paid in settlements. In addition to claims
and settlement experience, the Company considers additional
quantitative and qualitative factors such as changes in
legislation, the legal environment, and the Company's defense
strategy. The Company also evaluates the recoverability of its
insurance receivable on an annual basis. The Company evaluates all
of these factors and determines whether a change in the estimate of
its liability for pending and future claims and defense costs or
insurance receivable is warranted.

"The amounts recorded by the Company for asbestos-related
liabilities and insurance-related assets are based on the Company's
strategies for resolving its asbestos claims, currently available
information, and a number of estimates and assumptions. Key
variables and assumptions include the number and type of new claims
that are filed each year, the average cost of resolution of claims,
the identity of defendants, the resolution of coverage issues with
insurance carriers, amount of insurance, and the solvency risk with
respect to the Company's insurance carriers. Many of these factors
are closely linked, such that a change in one variable or
assumption will impact one or more of the others, and no single
variable or assumption predominately influences the determination
of the Company's asbestos-related liabilities and insurance-related
assets. Furthermore, predictions with respect to these variables
are subject to greater uncertainty in the later portion of the
projection period. Other factors that may affect the Company's
liability and cash payments for asbestos-related matters include
uncertainties surrounding the litigation process from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction and from case to case, reforms of state or federal
tort legislation and the applicability of insurance policies among
subsidiaries. As a result, actual liabilities or insurance
recoveries could be significantly higher or lower than those
recorded if assumptions used in the Company's calculations vary
significantly from actual results."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3fgxFTS


ASBESTOS UPDATE: U.S. Steel Faces 895 Active Cases at March 31
--------------------------------------------------------------
United States Steel Corporation, as of March 31, 2021, was a
defendant in approximately 895 active cases involving approximately
2,485 plaintiffs, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "The vast majority of these cases involve
multiple defendants. About 1,550, or approximately 62 percent, of
these plaintiff claims are currently pending in a jurisdiction
which permits filings with massive numbers of plaintiffs. At
December 31, 2020, U. S. Steel was a defendant in approximately 855
cases involving approximately 2,445 plaintiffs. Based upon U. S.
Steel's experience in such cases, it believes that the actual
number of plaintiffs who ultimately assert claims against U. S.
Steel will likely be a small fraction of the total number of
plaintiffs.

"The amount U. S. Steel accrues for pending asbestos claims is not
material to U. S. Steel's financial condition. However, U. S. Steel
is unable to estimate the ultimate outcome of asbestos-related
claims due to a number of uncertainties, including: (1) the rates
at which new claims are filed, (2) the number of and effect of
bankruptcies of other companies traditionally defending asbestos
claims, (3) uncertainties associated with the variations in the
litigation process from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, (4)
uncertainties regarding the facts, circumstances and disease
process with each claim, and (5) any new legislation enacted to
address asbestos-related claims.
Further, U. S. Steel does not believe that an accrual for
unasserted claims is required. At any given reporting date, it is
probable that there are unasserted claims that will be filed
against the Company in the future. In 2020 and 2019, the Company
engaged an outside valuation consultant to assist in assessing its
ability to estimate an accrual for unasserted claims. This
assessment was based on the Company's settlement experience,
including recent claims trends. The analysis focused on settlements
made over the last several years as these claims are likely to best
represent future claim characteristics. After review by the
valuation consultant and U. S. Steel management, it was determined
that the Company could not estimate an accrual for unasserted
claims."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2SqQ6wo



ASBESTOS UPDATE: W.W. Grainger Still Faces Exposure Claims
----------------------------------------------------------
W.W. Grainger, Inc., from time to time, has been been named, along
with numerous other non-affiliated companies, as a defendant in
litigation in various states involving asbestos and/or silica,
according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "These lawsuits typically assert claims of
personal injury arising from alleged exposure to asbestos and/or
silica as a consequence of products manufactured by third parties
purportedly distributed by the Company. While several lawsuits have
been dismissed in the past based on the lack of product
identification, if a specific product distributed by the Company is
identified in any pending or future lawsuits, the Company will seek
to exercise indemnification remedies against the product
manufacturer to the extent available. In addition, the Company
believes that a substantial number of these claims are covered by
insurance. The Company has entered into agreements with its major
insurance carriers relating to the scope, coverage and the costs of
defense, of lawsuits involving claims of exposure to asbestos. The
Company believes it has strong legal and factual defenses and
intends to continue defending itself vigorously in these lawsuits.
While the Company is unable to predict the outcome of these
proceedings, it believes that the ultimate resolution will not
have, either individually or in the aggregate, a material adverse
effect on the Company's consolidated financial condition or results
of operations."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3bT8x3v



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