/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/210505.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Wednesday, May 5, 2021, Vol. 23, No. 84

                            Headlines

AMDOCS LTD: Glover Files Suit Over Share Price Drop
ASPEN AMERICAN: Bid to Certify Questions in Marler Suit Denied
BALTIMORE COUNTY, MD: Conditional Cert. of FLSA Collective Sought
BANKERS TRUST: Faces Plutzer ERISA Class Action
BETHANY NORTH: Ill. App. Affirms Summary Judgment in Wolff Suit

CALVIN WILSON: Court Certifies Catchings Settlement Class
CANOO INC: Faces Tyler Suit Over Securities Act Breach
CAPITAL ONE: Class Settlement in Porteous Suit Wins Prelim. Okay
CINCINNATI INSURANCE: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Rye Ridge Suit
CITIZENS INSURANCE: Washington Court Joins Walker & Caballero Suits

COLGATE-PALMOLIVE CO: 3 Consumer Classes Certified in de Lacour
EINSTEIN HEALTHCARE: Faces Katz Suit for Failure to Safeguard PHI
EL POBLANO: Faces Osorto Suit for Failure to Pay Minimum & OT Wages
EQUIFAX INFORMATION: Court Narrows Claims in Hafez Class Suit
FACEBOOK INC: Max Martialis Seeks to Certify Class

GENERAL MOTORS: Court Consolidates Hammerschmidt and Jackson Suits
GENERAL MOTORS: Wisconsin Court Dismisses Brame Suit With Prejudice
GOOGLE LLC: N.D. California to Approve Settlement in Profile Suit
HAVE A HEART: Court Lifts Stay of Proceedings in Levitt TCPA Suit
HAYNES INVESTMENTS: Brice Suit Wins Class Certification

ICHPAT & FAM: Conditional Certification of Collective Action Sought
ILLINOIS INSTITUTE: Amended Hernandez Suit Dismissed W/o Prejudice
JOSHUA J. ENTERPRISE: Conditional Cert. of FLSA Class Sought
LLR INC: Appeal From Arbitration Order in Sperring Suit Dismissed
LLR INC: Katie Van Seeks to Certify Class

LUXFER HOLDINGS: Takes $1.1M Charge to Settle Labor Class Suit
MAJOR LEAGUE: Cody Sedlock Seeks to Certify Rule 23 Class
MCKINSEY & CO: Faces Scott County Suit Over Opioid Problem
MESSERLI KRAMER: Valadez Files Bid for Class Certification
MIDLAND CREDIT: Medeiros Sues Over Disclosure of Confidential Info

MONTGOMERY, NY: Supplemental Bid for Final OK of Settlement Filed
NCEP LLC: Court Sets Initial Pretrial Conference Order in Hou-Seye
NIKE RETAIL: Rodriguez Seeks Initial OK of Class Action Settlement
PANASONIC CORP: $49MM Deal in Lithium Ion Antitrust Suit Affirmed
QUALITY CARRIERS: Salter Appeals Class Cert. Denial to 9th Cir.

ROSELLA PIZZA: Failed to Pay Minimum & OT Wages, Angel Suit Says
SCIENTIFIC GAMES: Bid to Stay Discovery in Tonkawa Suit Denied
STAT TRANSCRIPTION: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
STRADA SERVICES: Reyes Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
SUPERIOR CAFE: Kim Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Minimum & OT Wages

TD AMERITRADE: Eighth Cir. Flips Class Certification in Ford Suit
TOPA INSURANCE: Caribe Restaurant Appeals Insurance Case Dismissal
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Singh Suit Seeks to Certiy Class of Drivers
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA: Ruling for Regents in Gomez Suit Affirmed
US STEEL: Prolenski, Paceley Sue Over Unlawful Pension Scheme

VALLEY PROTEINS Conditional Cert. of FLSA Collective Sought
WASTE CONNECTIONS: MDE Sues Over Unlawful Overcharging Schemes
WERNER ENTERPRISES: Bid to Dismiss 3rd Amended Midgett Suit Denied
WESTERN REFINING: Schmidtberger Seeks to Certify Rule 23 Class
WHITEPAGES INC: Court Denies Arbitration/Transfer Bid in Lukis Suit


                            *********

AMDOCS LTD: Glover Files Suit Over Share Price Drop
---------------------------------------------------
EVERETT GLOVER, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, v. AMDOCS LIMITED, JOSHUA SHEFFER and TAMAR
RAPAPORT-DAGIM, Case No. 4:21-cv-00418 (E.D. Mo., April 9, 2021)
seeks to recover compensatory damages as well as reasonable costs
and expenses on behalf of purchasers of the common stock of Amdocs
between January 29, 2021 and March 30, 2021, inclusive ("Class
Period"), under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The Plaintiff alleges that Defendants participated in a fraudulent
scheme and course of conduct that operated as a fraud or deceit on
purchasers of Amdocs' common stock by disseminating materially
false and misleading statements and/or concealing material adverse
facts. Specifically, the scheme:(i) deceived the investing public
regarding Amdocs' business, operations and management and the
intrinsic value of Amdocs securities; and (ii) caused plaintiff and
members of the Class (defined herein) to purchase Amdocs common
stock at artificially inflated prices, asserts the complaint.

The complaint relates, among other things, that on December 14,
2020, Amdocs filed with the SEC its fiscal year 2020 (FY20) annual
financial report on Form 20-F for the period ended September 30,
2020. The FY20 20-F claimed that Amdocs had achieved operating
income of approximately $4.2 million during FY20, $4 million in
2019, $4 million in 2018, $3.9 million in 2017 and $3.7 million in
2016. The FY20 20-F further stated that Amdocs had had zero debt
outstanding as of September 30, 2019.

However, the complaint says materially false and misleading
statements where made because Defendants misrepresented and failed
to disclose the following adverse facts which were known to
Defendants or recklessly disregarded by them: (a) that Amdocs had
been losing customers and that its U.S. business in particular had
been declining; (b) that Amdocs had been borrowing undisclosed sums
in the past in order to meet its capital needs but concealing that
borrowing from investors; (c) that Amdocs was concealing the
restrictions on the cash it held; (d) that Amdocs had been
overstating its operating profits by up to 50%; and (e) as a result
of the foregoing, defendants lacked a reasonable basis for their
positive statements about the Company, its prospects and revenue
growth rate.

When the truth about Amdocs' misconduct was revealed, the value of
Amdocs common stock declined precipitously as the prior artificial
inflation no longer propped up the common stock price.
Plaintiff and other members of the Class who purchased or otherwise
acquired Amdocs common stock relying upon the integrity of the
market price of Amdocs common stock and market information relating
to Amdocs, have been damaged thereby, notes the complain.

Defendant Amdocs provides global software and services to the
communications, cable and satellite, entertainment, and media
industry service providers.  Amdocs had more than 131.5 million
shares of its common stock issued and outstanding as of December
31, 2020, which trade on the NASDAQ National Market under the
ticker symbol "DOX." [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          MICHAEL J. FLANNERY, Esq.
          CUNEO GILBERT & LADUCA, LLP
          500 North Broadway, Suite 1450
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 226-1015
          Facsimile: (202) 789-1813
          E-mail: mflannery@cuneolaw.com

               - and -

          SAMUEL H. RUDMAN, Esq.
          MARY K. BLASY, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          58 South Service Road, Suite 200
          Melville, NY 11747
          Telephone: (631) 367-7100
          Facsimile: (631) 367-1173
          E-mail: srudman@rgrdlaw.com
                  mblasy@rgrdlaw.com

               - and -

          MICHAEL I. FISTEL, JR., Esq.
          JOHNSON FISTEL, LLP
          40 Powder Springs Street
          Marietta, GA 30064
          Telephone: (470) 632-6000
          Facsimile: (770) 200-3104
          E-mail: michaelf@johnsonfistel.com


ASPEN AMERICAN: Bid to Certify Questions in Marler Suit Denied
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Barbara J. Eothstein of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington, Seattle, denies the Motion to
Certify Questions to the Washington State Supreme Court filed in
the cases, WADE K. MARLER, DDS, et al., Plaintiffs v. ASPEN
AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. KARA McCULLOCH DMD MSD PLLC,
et al., Plaintiffs, v. VALLEY FORGE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.,
Defendants. CARLOS O. CABALLERO DDS MS PS, et al., Plaintiffs v.
MASSACHUSETTS BAY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. MARIO D. CHORAK DMD
PS, et al., Plaintiffs v. HARTFORD CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, et
al., Defendants. PACIFIC ENDODONTICS, P.S., et al., Plaintiffs, v.
OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., Defendants. JENNIFER B.
NGUYEN, et al., Plaintiffs v. TRAVELERS CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants. LA COCINA DE OAXACA LLC, Plaintiff
v. TRI-STATE INSURANCE COMPANY OF MINNESOTA, Defendant. MARK
GERMACK DDS, individually and on behalf of all similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. THE DENTISTS INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. CADECEUS
LLC d/b/a CARE RACER, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. SCOTTSDALE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant. HT-SEATTLE OWNER LLC, Plaintiff v. AMERICAN GUARANTEE
AND LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, Case Nos.
2:20-cv-00616-BJR, 2:20-cv-00809-BJR, 3:20-cv-05437-BJR,
2:20-cv-00627-BJR, 2:20-cv-00620-BJR, 2:20-cv-00597-BJR,
2:20-cv-01176-BJR, 2:20-cv-00661-BJR, 2:21-cv-00050-BJR,
2:21-cv-00048-BJR (W.D. Wash.).

In what is now a common story, thousands of businesses across the
country have filed suit against their insurance companies seeking
coverage for income lost during the COVID-19 pandemic.  The
District has chosen to refer all such litigation to Judge Eothstein
who has consolidated several of these matters according to
insurance company parent group.  The Court then ordered coordinated
briefing to address common questions of coverage and exclusions
through dispositive motions, which are now also pending before the
Court.  Other cases, including as relevant to the Order Cadeceus
and HT-Seattle, were filed after consolidation, but have chosen to
track the course of litigation laid out for the consolidated
cases.

The Motion to Certify seeks to refer two questions central to
interpreting the insurance contracts at issue to the Washington
State Supreme Court.  Specifically, these questions, as phrased by
the Plaintiffs, include:

     a. Does being physically deprived of the ability to use
covered property directly as a result of the Governor's shut-down
orders constitute a direct physical loss of such property?

     b. Does Washington's efficient proximate cause rule require a
factual determination of the predominant cause of an individual
business' loss, before a virus (or other) exclusion may be applied
to bar coverage?

The first question refers to the fact that all of the insurance
contracts at issue utilize the phrase "direct physical loss," or
some variation thereof, to trigger coverage.

The second question refers to an argument raised by several of the
Plaintiffs in opposition to the currently-pending Motions to
Dismiss.  Specifically, several of the insurance contracts in
question include a Virus Exclusion provision, which purports to
exclude losses sustained as a result of a virus.  The Plaintiffs'
argument in opposition (paraphrased) is that, under Washington
State's efficient proximate cause rule, the Governor's closure
orders in response to the COVID-19 pandemic are the cause of their
losses, not the virus itself, and, therefore, the Virus Exclusion
provisions do not control or, at the least, determination of the
true cause is a factual question which may not be resolved at the
Motion to Dismiss phase.

The Plaintiffs argue that the Washington Supreme Court has not yet
addressed the question of whether COVID-19 and its resulting
business closures and limitations causes "direct physical loss" to
an insured property.  They highlight the pervasiveness of the term
and the broad-reaching effect construction of its scope will have
on nearly every business in the State.  They, therefore, urge that
rather than engaging in predicting how the Supreme Court would
rule, the Court should defer to the Washington Supreme Court and
have that court determine the issue.

This, Judge Eothstein declines to do.  She determines that the
proposed questions, while new, substantial, and not yet addressed
by the Washington Supreme Court, do not present such unique and
exceptional issues as to warrant certification.  Furthermore, the
additional delay and cost that would be incurred counsels against
certification.  In the exercise of her discretion, Judge Eothstein
denies the Motion for Certification and retains the matter in
federal court.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 23, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/2nm4cujn from Leagle.com.


BALTIMORE COUNTY, MD: Conditional Cert. of FLSA Collective Sought
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Michael A. Scott On behalf
of himself and others similarly situated v. Baltimore County, Case
No. 1:21-cv-00034-SAG (D. Md.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to
enter an order conditionally certifying a collective action
pursuant to the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and
granting approval and facilitation of notice to potential class
members.

This case was filed as a collective action under the FLSA, by
Michael A. Scott who alleges that he performed work for the
Defendant Baltimore County's Department of Public Works, Bureau of
Solid Waste ("DPW") in Cockeysville, Maryland while incarcerated in
a Baltimore County facility.

The Plaintiff Scott alleges that he and other similarly situated
workers, who were incarcerated in Baltimore County but permitted to
perform work detail at a DPW recycling program in Cockeysville,
Maryland were covered by the FLSA.

As a result, the Plaintiff seeks unpaid statutory minimum wages and
liquidated damages on behalf of himself and similarly situated DPW
performing work for Baltimore County through a work detail
program.

Baltimore County is the third-most populous county located in the
U.S. state of Maryland and is part of the Baltimore metropolitan
area. Baltimore County is part of the Northeast megalopolis, which
stretches from Northern Virginia northward to Boston.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated April 23,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3xEQirU
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Howard B. Hoffman, Esq.
          Jordan S, Liew, Esq.
          HOFFMAN EMPLOYMENT LAW, LLC
          600 Jefferson Plaza, Suite 204
          Rockville, MD 20852
          Telephone: (301) 251-3752
                      hhoffman@hoholaw.com
                      jliew@hoholaw.com

               - and -

          Bradford W. Warbasse, Esq.
          WARBASSE LAW
          P. O. Box 1284
          Brooklandville, MD 21022
          Telephone: (443) 862-0062
          E-mail: warbasselaw@gmail.com

               - and -

          Stephen J. Springer, Esq.
          Rittenhouse Plaza
          1901 Walnut Street, Unit 4A
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 732-8229
          E-mail: springerlaw@masn.com

BANKERS TRUST: Faces Plutzer ERISA Class Action
------------------------------------------------
EDWARD PLUTZER, on behalf of the Tharanco Group, Inc. Employee
Stock Ownership Plan, and on behalf of a class of all other persons
similarly situated v. BANKERS TRUST COMPANY OF SOUTH DAKOTA, a
South Dakota Limited Liability Corporation, HARESH T. THARANI,
MICHAEL J. SETOLA, SCOTT KANE, and MANU MIRCHANDANI, Case
1:21-cv-03632 (S.D.N.Y., April 23, 2021) is a suit brought under
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) for
losses suffered by the Employee Stock Ownership Plan (Plan) and its
participants caused by Bankers Trust Company (BTC) when it caused
the Plan to buy shares of Tharanco for more than fair market value
in 2015, and other relief.

The complaint alleges that the Plan has been injured and its
participants have been deprived of hard-earned retirement benefits
resulting from Defendants' violations of ERISA.

Tharanco was a privately-held company and was the Plan's sponsor
and administrator. Tharanco adopted the Plan effective Oct. 21,
2014. On April 27, 2015, the Plan purchased from the Selling
Shareholders 100% of the outstanding stock of Tharanco for
$133,430,000, which was financed by Tharanco in a fully leveraged
transaction with a loan bearing interest at 2.47% that was to be
payable over forty equal annual installments of principal and
accrued interest on December 31 of each year, except for the first
installment of $200,000 of principal made in April 2015 and the
second installment of $2,811,571 of principal made in December 2015
(ESOP Transaction). At that time, Tharanco became an employee-owned
company. BTC represented the Plan and its participants as Trustee
in the ESOP Transaction. It had sole and exclusive authority to
negotiate the terms of the ESOP Transaction on the Plan's behalf,
the complaint relates.

The ESOP Transaction allowed the Selling Shareholders to unload
their interests in Tharanco above fair market value and saddle the
Plan with tens of millions of dollars of debt payable over a
40-year repayment period to finance the Transaction. BTC failed to
fulfill its ERISA duties, as Trustee and fiduciary, to the Plan and
its participants, including Plaintiff. The Selling Shareholders are
parties in interest who sold shares in the ESOP Transaction. The
Selling Shareholders are liable under ERISA for participating in
prohibited transactions and BTC's breaches of fiduciary duty under
ERISA, asserts the complaint.

Plaintiff Edward Plutzer has been a Plan participant. Plaintiff
resides in Great Neck, New York. He was Vice President of Sales at
Tharanco's Scarlett Dress Division. He was employed at a
predecessor that ultimately became part of Tharanco since January
1994, and was employed at Tharanco on the date of its
incorporation, October 20, 2014, and continued to be employed there
until June 2018. Plaintiff received an allocation of Tharanco stock
to his individual Plan account at the end of the first, shortened
Plan Year on April 30, 2015, and in subsequent Plan Years. He was
vested in shares of Tharanco in his Plan account.

Defendant Bankers Trust Company of South Dakota is a South Dakota
Limited Liability Corporation. BTC's headquarters is at 5032 S. Bur
Oak Place, Suite 131, Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108.

Defendant Haresh T. Tharani is and was at the time of the ESOP
Transaction the founder, Chairman of the Board of Directors, and
Chief Executive Officer of Tharanco. He was a selling shareholder
in the ESOP Transaction. Tharani was a party in interest under
ERISA at the time of the ESOP Transaction as a 10 percent or more
shareholder of Tharanco, directly or indirectly; and/or as a
Tharanco director; and/or as an officer of Tharanco.

Defendant Michael J. Setola is and was at the time of the ESOP
Transaction a Director and Vice President of Tharanco, and the
President and Chief Executive Officer of Tharanco Lifestyles LLC,
an operating division of Tharanco whose employees are covered by
the Plan. On information and belief, he was a selling shareholder
in the ESOP Transaction.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory Y. Porter, Esq.
          Ryan T. Jenny, Esq.
          BAILEY & GLASSER LLP
          1055 Thomas Jefferson Street, NW, Suite 540
          Washington, DC 20007
          Telephone: (202) 463-2101
          Facsimile: (202) 463-2103
          E-mail: gporter@baileyglasser.com
                  rjenny@baileyglasser.com


BETHANY NORTH: Ill. App. Affirms Summary Judgment in Wolff Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHELLE WOLFF, as Executor of the ESTATE OF MARJORIE
HAMILTON, individually and as the representative of a class of
similarly situated persons, Plaintiff-Appellant v. BETHANY NORTH
SUBURBAN GROUP, d/b/a CHESTNUT SQUARE AT THE GLEN ASSOCIATION,
Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 1-19-1858 (Ill. App.), the Appellate
Court of Illinois, First District, Sixth Division, affirms the
order of the circuit court of Cook County that granted summary
judgment in favor of the Defendant and denied the Plaintiff's
partial motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff Wolff, as Executor of the Estate of Marjorie Hamilton,
individually and as the representative of a class of similarly
situated persons, appeals from an order of the circuit court of
Cook County that granted summary judgment in favor of Bethany and
denied her partial motion for summary judgment.

The Plaintiff, as representative of a class of similarly situated
persons, sought damages from Bethany for violations of the Security
Deposit Interest Act (765 ILCS 710/1, et seq. (West 2014)) and the
Security Deposit Return Act (765 ILCS 715/1, et seq. (West 2014)).
She also sought individual damages for consumer fraud under the
Consumer Fraud Act (815 ILCS 505/1, et seq. (West 2014)) and breach
of contract.

The circuit court did not find any evidence that Bethany breached
the Agreement.  After concluding that there was no genuine issue of
material fact on either claim, the circuit court granted summary
judgment as to the individual claims as well.

The Plaintiff's timely notice of appeal was filed on Sept. 12,
2019.  The Plaintiff raises the following issues on appeal: (1)
whether the circuit court erred in granting Bethany's motion for
summary judgment on both the class claims and her individual
claims, and (2) whether the circuit court erred in denying her
motion for partial summary judgment on the class claims.  She
contends that the circuit court erred in granting Bethany's motion
for summary judgment on all counts and denying her motion for
partial summary judgment on the class claims.

The Appellate Court's review of the record reveals that there was
no evidence of any genuine issue of material fact or showing that
Bethany was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Nor has
the Plaintiff raised any issue of material fact on appeal.

First, the Appellate Court's review of the record reveals no
evidence that would support classification of the entrance fee as a
security deposit.  The entrance fee was not held to secure the
payment of rent or as compensation for damage to property; instead,
per the Agreement, it was held to cover the resident's continued
residency and the various services provided by Bethany during such
occupancy, regardless of whether the resident was able to pay the
monthly services fee.

Moreover, it finds that the Agreement expressly stated that
Chestnut Square would pay interest on the initial deposit at the
passbook savings rate established by Bank One.  The initial
deposit, along with interest that accrued on it, was applied to the
entrance fee.  Deposition testimony of one of Bethany's employees,
Vera, indicated that Hamilton was allowed to "spend down" part of
her entrance fee on medical expenses.  The Appellate Court
concludes, as a matter of law, that the entrance fee was not a
security deposit, and that summary judgment was properly granted in
Bethany's favor on those class claims.

Second, with respect to the individual claims, the Appellate Court
finds that it is clear that there was no genuine issue of material
fact as to whether Bethany's refund policy violated the Consumer
Fraud Act, but only a dispute as to the interpretation of the
facts.  That is, it is undisputed that the parties signed the
Agreement which contained certain provisions, but the parties
disagree as to how the agreement should be interpreted: fraudulent
or not.  Thus, it concludes that the circuit court properly granted
summary judgment on the Plaintiff's consumer fraud claim.

The Appellate Court also finds that the Plaintiff does not allege
that Bethany breached any parts of the Agreement as written.  There
is also no issue regarding construction of the contract where we
must determine the intent of the parties.  Nor does the Plaintiff
allege any issue of material fact regarding her claim for breach of
contract; only the dispute concerning her interpretation of the
facts in the case.  Such argument is insufficient to establish that
an issue of material fact exists or that the Plaintiff is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law to overcome summary judgment.
Accordingly, summary judgment was properly granted in favor of
Bethany on the Plaintiff's breach of contract claim.

In summary, the Appellate Court concludes that the circuit court
properly granted summary judgment in favor of Bethany on the class
claims as a matter of law where the Agreement was not a lease
subject to the provisions of the Interest Act or Deposit Return
Act.  Additionally, where the record fails to disclose any disputed
issues of material fact in the case, and the Plaintiff has not
established that Bethany was not entitled to judgment as a matter
of law on her individual claims, summary judgment was proper.

For the foregoing reasons, the Appellate Court affirms the judgment
of the circuit court of Cook County.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 23, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/c34d6vu4 from Leagle.com.


CALVIN WILSON: Court Certifies Catchings Settlement Class
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as SEDRIC CATCHINGS et al.,
v. CALVIN WILSON et al., Case No. 1:21-cv-00428-TSE (D. Md.), the
Hon. Judge T.S. Ellis entered an order:

   1. certifying Settlement Class for settlement purposes only,
      pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), defined

      as:

      "All current and future detainees/residents at the Chesapeake

      Detention Facility and all current and future
      detainees/residents transferred from CDF to the Health
      Monitoring Facility at the Jail Industries Building, from the

      Effective Date of the Settlement Agreement to the Termination

      Date of the Settlement Agreement;" and

   2. appointing the Plaintiffs Sedric Catchings, Charles Couser,
      Collin Davis, Allen Lamin, Sirron Little, Taiwo Moultrie, and

      Joseph Speed as class representatives of the Settlement
      Class.

A copy of the Court's order dated April 23, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3vE2Lu1 at no extra charge.[CC]


CANOO INC: Faces Tyler Suit Over Securities Act Breach
------------------------------------------------------
JEFF TYLER, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, v. CANOO INC., TONY AQUILA, ULRICH KRANZ, and PAUL
BALCIUNAS, Case No. 2:21-cv-03080 (C.D. Cal., April 9, 2021) seeks
to recover damages pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
on behalf of all persons and entities who purchased or otherwise
acquired publicly-traded Canoo common stock or warrants from August
18, 2020, through and including March 29, 2021, (the Class
Period).

During an August 18, 2020 conference call with investors,
Defendants touted three streams of revenue for the Company. In
addition to business to business (B2B) sales, the Company touted
its engineering services business and a subscription-based consumer
vehicle service business. The Company touted how its engineering
services revenue would "reduce the Company's overall execution
risk." Defendants also touted the subscription-based business model
-- how this was superior to leasing, and how this would be "more
profitable & resilient."

However, the complaint alleges that these statements were
materially false and misleading and failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, the Defendants misled investors by
misrepresenting and/or failing to disclose that: (i) the Company's
engineering services was not a viable business, would not provide
meaningful revenue in 2021, and would not reduce
operational risk; (ii) that the Company would no longer be focused
on its subscription-based business model; and (iii) as a result,
the Company’s public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times.

On March 29, 2021, after the market closed, Canoo issued a press
release (Q4 Release) reporting its fourth quarter and full year
2020 results. During the Q4 Call, the Company revealed that "it was
decided by our Board to de-emphasize the originally stated contract
engineering services line."

In response to this news, shares of Canoo fell $2.50 (or $21.2%)
from a March 29, 2021 close of $11.80 per share to close at $9.30
per share on March 30, 2021, on heavy volume.

Plaintiff purchased shares of Canoo common stock and has been
damaged thereby, asserts the complaint.

Canoo Inc. operates as an electric vehicle company specializing in
cars, mini buses, and commercial vehicles for rental and sharing
services. Canoo serves customers in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jennifer Pafiti, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          1100 Glendon Avenue, 15th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90024
          Telephone: 310-405-7190
          E-mail: jpafiti@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          Corey D. Holzer, Esq.
          HOLZER & HOLZER, LLC           
          211 Perimeter Center Parkway, Suite 1010          
          Atlanta, GA 30346          
          Telephone: (770) 392-0090          
          Facsimile: (770) 392-0029          
          E-mail: cholzer@holzerlaw.com


CAPITAL ONE: Class Settlement in Porteous Suit Wins Prelim. Okay
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, NATASHA PORTEOUS, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CAPITAL ONE SERVICES II, LLC; and
DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
2:17-CV-02866-JCM-GWF (D. Nev.), Judge James C. Mahan of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Nevada grants the Application
for Preliminary Approval of a Class Action Settlement.

Judge Mahan preliminary approval of the Settlement and the
Settlement Class based upon the terms set forth in the Joint
Stipulation of Settlement and Release between the Plaintiff and the
Defendant.  He finds that the Settlement appears to be fair,
adequate and reasonable to the Class.  The Settlement also falls
within the range of reasonableness and appears to be presumptively
valid, subject only to any objections that may be raised at the
final fairness hearing and final approval by the Court.

A final fairness hearing on the question of whether the proposed
Settlement, attorneys' fees to the Class Counsel, and the Class
Representative Enhancement Award should be finally approved as
fair, reasonable and adequate as to the members of the Class is
scheduled in accordance with the Implementation Schedule.

Judge Mahan approves, as to form and content, the Notice of
Pendency of Class Action and Request for Exclusion Form.  He
approves the procedure for Class Members to participate in, to opt
out of and to object to, the Settlement as set forth in the Notice
of Pendency of Class Action.

The Judge directs the mailing of the Notice of Pendency of Class
Action by first class mail to the Class Members in accordance with
the Implementation Schedule.  He finds the dates selected for the
mailing and distribution of the Notice, as set forth in the
Implementation Schedule, meet the requirements of due process and
provide the best notice practicable under the circumstances and
will constitute due and sufficient notice to all persons entitled
thereto.

It is ordered that the Settlement Class is preliminarily certified
for settlement purposes only.

The Judge confirms Plaintiff Natasha Porteous as the Class
Representative; Thierman Buck, LLP as the Class Counsel; and
Simpluris as the Claims Administrator.

To facilitate administration of the Settlement pending final
approval, Jude Mahan enjoins the Plaintiff and all the Class
Members from filing or prosecuting any claims, suits or
administrative proceedings regarding claims released by the
Settlement unless and until such Class Members have filed valid
Requests for Exclusion with the Claims Administrator and the time
for filing claims with the Claims Administrator has elapsed.

The Judge orders the following Implementation Schedule for further
proceedings:

      a. Deadline for the Defendant to Submit Class Member
Information to Claims Administrator - May 7, 2021 [14 calendar days
after Order granting Preliminary Approval]

      b. Deadline for Claims Administrator to Mail the Notice to
Class Members - May 17, 2021 [10 calendar days after receipt of
Class information from the Defendant]

      c. Deadline for the Class Members to Postmark Requests for
Exclusions - June 16, 2021 [30 calendar days after initial mailing
of the Notice to Class Members]

      d. Deadline for Receipt by the Court and the Counsel of any
Objections to Settlement - June 16, 2021 [30 calendar days after
initial mailing of the Notice to Class Members]

      e. Deadline for the Class Counsel to file Motion for Final
Approval of Settlement, Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Enhancement
Award - June 23, 2021 [7 calendar days before Final Approval
Hearing]

      f. Deadline for the Class Counsel to File Declaration from
Claims Administrator of Due Diligence and Proof of Mailing -  June
23, 2021 [7 calendar days before Final Approval Hearing]

      g. Final Fairness Hearing - June 30, 2021 at 10:30 a.m.

      h. Deadline for the Defendant to Fund Settlement Account
maintained by Claims Administrator - July 21, 2021 [21 calendar
days after Effective Date]

      i. Deadline for the Claims Administrator to wire transfer the
Attorneys' Fees to the Class Counsel - July 26, 2021 [5 calendar
days after Defendant and Costs (if Funds Settlement Account]
Settlement is Effective)

      j. Deadline for the Claims Administrator to mail the
Settlement Awards to the Class Members - July 31, 2021  [10 days
after the Defendant Funds the Settlement Account]

      k. Claims Administrator to File Proof of Payment of
Settlement Awards, Enhancement Award, Attorneys' Fees and Costs (if
Settlement is Effective) - Sept. 28, 2021 [90 calendar days after
Effective Date]

      l. Deadline checks paid to the Claimants will remain valid
and negotiable - Oct. 29, 2021 [90 calendar days from the date of
issuance]

      m. Deadline for Settlement Administrator to pay uncashed
funds to the cy pres beneficiary - Jan. 1, 2022

A full-text copy of the Court's April 23, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/yskev4zw from Leagle.com.

THIERMAN BUCK, LLP Mark R. Thierman -- mark@thiermanbuck.com --
Joshua D. Buck -- josh@thiermanbuck.com -- Leah L. Jones --
leah@thiermanbuck.com -- in Reno, Nevada, Attorneys for
Plaintiffs.

OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C. Anthony L. Martin --
anthony.martin@ogletree.com -- Suzanne L. Martin --
suzanne.martin@ogletree.com -- in Las Vegas, Nevada, Attorneys for
Defendant Capital One Services, II, LLC.


CINCINNATI INSURANCE: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Rye Ridge Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RYE RIDGE CORP., ET AL., Plaintiffs v. THE CINCINNATI
INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 20 Civ. 7132 (LGS)
(S.D.N.Y.), Judge Lorna G. Schofield of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York granted the Defendant's motion to
dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim.

Plaintiffs Rye Ridge and Haromar, Inc., bring the putative class
action to seek insurance payments for business losses allegedly
resulting from COVID-19 and government restrictions during the
COVID-19 pandemic.  The Plaintiffs assert claims for breach of
contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
deceptive business practices under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law Section 349,
et seq., unfair trade practices under Conn. Gen. Stat. Section
42-110a, et seq., and declaratory relief.

Plaintiff Rye Ridge owns and conducts business as a restaurant
called Rye Ridge Deli, in Rye Brook, New York.  Plaintiff Haromar
owns and conducts business as another restaurant called Rye Ridge
Deli, in Stamford, Connecticut.  The Rye Ridge Delis purchased
insurance policies from the Defendant. The Policies provide
coverage from Dec. 2, 2019, to Dec. 2, 2022, and are identical in
material terms.

The Policies provide "Business Income" coverage for certain income
losses sustained due to direct "accidental physical loss or
accidental physical damage," subject to various exclusions and
limitations not relevant in the case.  The Policies also provide
"Extra Expense" coverage for expenses sustained following physical
loss or physical damage and until the premises are restored.  They
provide "Civil Authority" coverage when property other than the
Plaintiffs' property suffers damage that leads to an action of
civil authority prohibiting access to the Plaintiffs' property.
And, they provide "Ingress and Egress" coverage if Plaintiffs are
unable to access ingress or egress at their property due to
physical damage or physical loss at a neighboring property and
there is no prohibition of access by civil authority.

From March 2020 onwards, the Plaintiffs suspended business
operations following orders issued by the States of New York and
Connecticut, which initially required restaurants to close their
dine-in facilities and permitted operation only for take-out and
delivery orders.  The Civil Orders were later modified to permit
limited outdoor dining and then limited indoor dining. Plaintiffs
suffered business losses as a result.

The Plaintiffs each made claims for coverage from the Defendant for
the losses resulting from, and additional expenses related to, the
COVID-19 pandemic.  The Defendant denied coverage on both claims.

The Defendant moves to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a
claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Judge Schofield opines that the Complaint fails to allege that
there was a breach of contract because it does not make any factual
allegations that the Plaintiffs' property or any other property
suffered physical loss or damage.  She finds that the Policies
provide coverage for expenses and loss of income sustained during
the suspension of business due to accidental physical loss or
accidental physical damage to property.  The key word in the
Policies is "physical," which in this context is unambiguous.  The
Complaint makes conclusory allegations that the Plaintiffs'
properties experienced physical loss and/or physical damage from
the presence of COVID-19.  But the Complaint alleges no facts to
suggest that the Plaintiffs' properties suffered any physical loss
or damage.  Without physical loss or damage, the Judge holds that
the Policies do not provide coverage, and denial of coverage is not
a breach of contract.

The Judge assumes that leave to amend would be futile because the
Plaintiffs presumably would have pleaded facts showing physical
loss or damage had they been able to do so.  Nevertheless, if they
have additional facts that they believe would cure the deficiencies
identified in her Opinion, they will file a letter to the Court
seeking leave to replead and file a proposed amended complaint
marked to show changes from the current Complaint, no later than
May 7, 2021.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Schofield granted the Defendant's
motion to dismiss.  The Plaintiffs' request for oral argument is
denied as moot.  The Plaintiffs may, but need not, seek leave to
replead as set forth.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 23, 2021 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/huw2br3z from Leagle.com.


CITIZENS INSURANCE: Washington Court Joins Walker & Caballero Suits
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Barbara J. Rothstein of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington, Seattle, consolidated the case,
WALKER & KRAUS, D.D.S., P.L.L.C., individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CITIZENS INSURANCE COMPANY
OF AMERICA, Defendant, Case No. 2:21-cv-00345-BJR (W.D. Wash.),
with the matter of Carlos O. Caballero, DDS, MS, PS v.
Massachusetts Bay Insurance Company, No. 3:20-cv-05437-BJR.

Plaintiff Walker, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, and the Defendant, through their undersigned
counsel, submit their stipulated motion to consolidate the action,
for pending pretrial motions only, with Caballero, including
adoption of the pending briefing on the Rule 12 Motions Against
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint and the Motion to Certify
Questions filed in that action.

Massachusetts Bay Insurance Co. and Citizens Insurance Company of
America are separate insurance companies and both owned indirectly
by The Hanover Insurance Group, Inc.

On Jan. 15, 2021, Massachusetts Bay filed Rule 12 Motions Against
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in the Caballero matter.  The
Plaintiff in the Caballero matter filed a Motion to Certify
Questions to the Washington State Supreme Court on Feb. 18, 202.
Massachusetts Bay's Rule 12 Motions were fully briefed as of March
5, 2021.

On March 12, 2021, Plaintiff Walker filed the new putative Class
Action Complaint ("Walker Class Complaint") against Citizens.  On
March 25, 2021, Massachusetts Bay joined in the filing of an
omnibus opposition to the Motion to Certify Questions.  Walker is
represented by the same counsel that represents Caballero and
Defendant Citizens is represented by the same counsel that
represents Massachusetts Bay in the Caballero matter.

The Parties believe that consolidation of the action with the
Caballero matter, for purposes only of the pending Rule 12 Motions
and Motion to Certify Questions filed in that action, would aid in
the efficient administration of justice.  Therefore, they move the
Court to consolidate the action, for purposes of the pending Rule
12 Motions and Motion to Certify only, with the Caballero matter,
including adoption of the pending briefing on the Rule 12 Motions
and the Motion to Certify Questions filed in that action.

For purposes of the pending Rule 12 Motions and Motion to Certify
Questions in Caballero, the claims set forth in the Walker putative
Class Complaint should be treated as if they had been asserted in
the Caballero putative Class Complaint.  Upon consolidation, the
Parties agree that Court's ruling on the pending Rule 12 Motions
and the Motion to Certify Questions in the Caballero matter may be
entered in the Walker Class Complaint.

Having reviewed the parties' stipulation, and finding that good
cause exists for the requested relief, Judge Rothstein grants the
stipulation.  She consolidated the matter with Caballero for the
limited purpose of the pending Rule 12 Motions and the pending
Motion to Certify Questions filed in that action, including
adoption of the pending briefing on both motions.  For purposes of
the pending Rule 12 Motions and the Motion to Certify Questions in
the Caballero matter, the claims set forth in the action will be
treated as if they had been asserted in the Caballero putative
class action complaint.  The Parties in the action agree that the
rulings of the Court on the pending Rule 12 Motions and the Motion
to Certify Questions filed in the Caballero matter may be entered
in the matter.

The Clerk of the Court is hereby notified of the limited
consolidation.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 23, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/fjexjra6 from Leagle.com.


COLGATE-PALMOLIVE CO: 3 Consumer Classes Certified in de Lacour
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANNE DE LACOUR, ANDREA WRIGHT, and LOREE MORAN
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. COLGATE-PALMOLIVE CO., and TOM'S OF MAINE INC.,
Defendants, Case No. 16-CV-8364 (KMW) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge Kimba M.
Wood of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs' renewed
motion to certify a nationwide class of consumers of Tom's of Maine
products.

Plaintiffs Anne de Lacour, Andrea Wright, and Loree Moran bring the
putative consumer class action against Tom's of Maine, Inc. and its
parent company, Colgate-Palmolive.  The Plaintiffs assert several
causes of action concerning the Defendants' use of the word
"natural" on the labels and packages of their deodorant and/or
toothpaste products.  They allege that these products are not
"natural" because they contain "synthetic and highly chemically
processed ingredients."

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants breached an
express warranty and violated several state consumer protection
laws by falsely and misleadingly advertising their products.  The
Plaintiffs filed a complaint on Oct. 27, 2016 and the First Amended
Complaint on Dec. 9, 2016.

The First Amended Complaint sought both injunctive relief and
damages based on breach of express warranty; violation of
California consumer protection statutes, including California's
Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civil Code Sections 1750, et
seq., California's False Advertising Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
Sections 17500 et seq., and California's Unfair Competition Law,
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Sections 17200 et seq.; violation of
Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat.
Sections 501.201 et seq.; and violation of New York's Deceptive
Acts or Practices and False Advertising laws, New York Gen. Bus.
Law Sections 349, 350.  On Jan. 27, 2017, the Defendants filed an
answer.

On Sept. 10, 2018, the Plaintiffs moved to certify, pursuant to
Federal Rules 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3), a nationwide class consisting
of "all persons in the United States who purchased Tom's of Maine
deodorant and/or toothpaste products on or after Sept. 24, 2015,"
as well as three subclasses for class members who purchased the
relevant Tom's of Maine products in New York, California, and
Florida.

On Sept. 12, 2019, the Court denied the Plaintiffs' motion.  It
held that the Plaintiffs had not met their burden, pursuant to Rule
23(b)(3), of establishing that common questions "predominate" over
individual issues, in particular with respect to the certification
of a nationwide class alleging breach of express warranty.

On Feb. 21, 2020, the Plaintiffs filed the instant renewed motion
for class certification.  They no longer seek to certify a
nationwide class, nor do they seek injunctive relief pursuant to
Rule 23(b)(2).  Rather, the Plaintiffs seek certification of three
narrowed classes, defined as follows: (1) New York Class: All
persons who purchased Tom's of Maine deodorant and/or toothpaste
products on or after Sept. 24, 2015 in the state of New York
excluding persons who purchased for purpose of resale; (2)
California Class: All persons who purchased Tom's of Maine
deodorant and/or toothpaste products on or after Sept. 24, 2015 in
the state of California excluding persons who purchased for purpose
of resale; and (3) Florida Class: All persons who purchased Tom's
of Maine deodorant and/or toothpaste products on or after Sept. 24,
2015 in the state of Florida excluding persons who purchased for
purpose of resale.

In addition, the Plaintiffs seek the appointment of Bursor &
Fisher, P.A. as the class counsel, and the appointment of named
Plaintiffs Anne de Lacour, Andrea Wright, and Loree Moran as the
class representatives.

Judge Wood holds that (i) each named Plaintiff has class standing
with respect to the 17 deodorant products and 34 toothpaste
products identified in the list of products included in the action;
(ii) the Plaintiffs have demonstrated, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that Rule 23(a)'s forth four prerequisites to class
certification -- numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy
-- have been met; and (iii) individual questions predominate, and
the Plaintiffs' claims of breach of express warranty pursuant to
New York law are thus inappropriate for class treatment.

The Judge further holds that (i) the Plaintiffs have provided
sufficient evidence, for class certification purposes, that the
predominance inquiry is satisfied for the claims pursuant to
California's express warranty law, the UCL, FAL, and CLRA; (ii) for
the same reasons that the predominance requirement is satisfied for
the New York Class's GBL Section 349 and 350 claims, that
requirement also is satisfied for the Florida Class; (iii) the
Plaintiffs have sufficiently demonstrated that their proposed model
is consistent with their theory of liability and attempts to
isolate and measure the price premium effect of Tom's of Maine's
claim that their products are "natural"; and (iv) considering the
factors set forth in Rule 23(b)(3), a class action is superior to
other available methods for adjudicating the Plaintiffs' claims.

For the reasons he set forth, Judge Wood granted in part and denied
in part the Plaintiffs' renewed motion for class certification.
The motion to certify the New York Class is granted with respect to
the claims for relief pursuant to GBL Sections 349 and 350, and
denied with respect to the claims for relief pursuant to alleged
breach of express warranty.

The motions to certify the California Class and the Florida Class
are granted.  The Judge certified the following classes:

   a. All persons who purchased Tom's of Maine deodorant and/or
      toothpaste products, as identified in Exhibit 1 to the
      Westcot Declaration, on or after Sept. 24, 2015 in the
      state of New York excluding persons who purchased for
      purpose of resale;

   b. All persons who purchased Tom's of Maine deodorant and/or
      toothpaste products, as identified in Exhibit 1 to the
      Westcot Declaration, on or after Sept. 24, 2015 in the
      state of California excluding persons who purchased for
      purpose of resale; and

   c. All persons who purchased Tom's of Maine deodorant and/or
      toothpaste products, as identified in Exhibit 1 to the
      Westcot Declaration, on or after Sept. 24, 2015 in the
      state of Florida excluding persons who purchased for
      purpose of resale.

The Judge appointed (i) Plaintiffs Moran, Wright, and de Lacour as
the class representatives for the New York, California, and Florida
Classes respectively; and (ii) Bursor & Fisher, P.A. as the class
counsel.

The counsel will confer as to the appropriate next steps in the
litigation.  By May 28, 2021, the parties will file a joint letter
that addresses all case management issues going forward, including
(but not limited to) proposed notice to absent class members and
any necessary discovery regarding the merits of Plaintiffs' claims.
To the extent the parties disagree on any case management issues,
the joint letter will explain the parties' respective positions on
such issues.

By May 28, 2021, the Plaintiffs will also file a letter brief
addressing why their proposals for notice are consistent with the
requirements of Rule 23 and due process.

The Defendants' request for oral argument is denied.

The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the
motions at ECF Nos. 101, 115.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 23, 2021 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/bhkwarwh from Leagle.com.


EINSTEIN HEALTHCARE: Faces Katz Suit for Failure to Safeguard PHI
-----------------------------------------------------------------
NANETTE KATZ, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated v. EINSTEIN HEALTHCARE NETWORK, Case no. 210402045 (Ct. of
Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, April 23, 2021) arises from the
Defendant's failure to properly secure and safeguard protected
health information (PHI), medical information, and other personally
identifiable information, including without limitation names, dates
of birth, Social Security numbers, medical record and patient
account numbers, health insurance information, diagnoses,
medication information, treatment providers, types of treatment,
and treatment locations.

According to the complaint, on October 9, 2020, Einstein announced
a security incident -- a Data Breach -- that occurred in August
2020, involving patient PHI. The security incident was widereaching
and compromised the PHI of at least 353,616 individuals, according
to the submission Einstein's made to the U.S. Secretary of Health
and Human Services at the Office for Civil Rights.

As a result of Einstein's failure to implement and follow basic
security procedures, Plaintiff's and Class Members' PHI is now in
the hands of criminals. Plaintiff and Class Members now and will
forever face a substantial increased risk of identity theft.
Consequently, Plaintiff and Class Members have had to spend, and
will continue to spend, significant time and money in the future to
protect themselves due to Einstein's failures, the complaint
asserts.

Plaintiff Nanette Katz is a citizen and resident of Blue Bell,
Pennsylvania. Plaintiff was a patient of Einstein, whose PHI was
disclosed without authorization to an unknown third party as a
result of the Data Breach.

Einstein is a leading private, not-for-profit Pennsylvania
healthcare system with its principal address at 5501 Old York Road,
Philadelphia, PA 19144. Einstein cares for patients through a
network of hospitals, primary and specialty care practices, and
outpatient services located in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
Due to the nature of these services, Einstein acquires and
electronically stores patient PHI.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kevin Clancy Boylan, Esq.
          Morgan & Morgan Philadelphia, PLLC
          2005 Market Street, Suite 350
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 446-9795
          Fax: (215) 446-9799 (FAX)
          E-mail: cboylan@forthepeople.com

                    - and -

          Linda P. Nussbaum, Esq.
          Bart D. Cohen, Esq.
          NUSSBAUM LAW GROUP, P.C.
          1211 Avenue of the Americas, 40th Fl.
          New York, NY 10036
          Telephone: (917) 438-9102
          Facsimile: (212) 753-0396
          E-mail: lnussbaum@nussbaumpc.com
                  bcohen@nussbaumpc.com

                    - and -  

          Jean S. Martin, Esq.
          Franceska Kester, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN
          COMPLEX LITIGATION GROUP
          201 N. Franklin Street, 7th Floor
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 223-5505
          Facsimile: (813) 223-5402
          E-mail: jeanmartin@forthepeople.com
                  fkester@forthepeople.com

                    - and -

          Michael E. Criden, Esq.
          CRIDEN & LOVE, P.A.
          7301 SW 57th Court, Suite 515
          South Miami, FL 33143
          Telephone: (305) 357-9000
          Facsimile: (305) 357-9050
          E-mail: mcriden@cridenlove.com

EL POBLANO: Faces Osorto Suit for Failure to Pay Minimum & OT Wages
-------------------------------------------------------------------
MARY OSORTO, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated v. EL POBLANO MEXICAN REST INC. (D/B/A EL POBLANO BAR &
GRILL), PEDRO FIERRO HERNANDEZ, and DIANA BECERRA, Case No.
7:21-cv-03640 (S.D.N.Y, April 23, 2021) is a class action against
the Defendants for unpaid minimum and overtime wages pursuant to
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and for violations of the N.Y.
Labor Law, and the "spread of hours" and overtime wage orders of
the New York Commissioner of Labor codified at N.Y. COMP. CODES R.
& REGS., including applicable liquidated damages, interest,
attorneys' fees and costs.

The complaint states that Plaintiff Osorto was ostensibly employed
as a waitress. However, she was required to spend a considerable
part of her work day performing non-tipped duties, including but
not limited to cleaning the bathroom and restaurant, stocking beers
in restaurant, taking out the trash, wrapping forks and knives,
cleaning cups and stands, preparing regular and alcoholic drinks
and packing delivery sauces, chips and utensils. Osorto worked for
Defendants in excess of 40 hours per week, without appropriate
minimum wage, overtime, and spread of hours compensation for the
hours that she worked. However, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff
Osorto appropriately for any hours worked either at the straight
rate of pay or for any additional overtime premium. Furthermore,
Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff Osorto the required "spread of
hours" pay for any day in which she had to work over 10 hours a
day.

Plaintiff Osorto is a former employee of Defendants El Poblano
Mexican Rest Inc. (d/b/a El Poblano Bar & Grill), Pedro Fierro
Hernandez, and Diana Becerra.

El Poblano Mexican Rest Inc. is a domestic corporation organized
and existing under the laws of the State of New York

Individual Defendants Pedro Fierro Hernandez and Diana Becerra,
serve or served as owners, managers, principals, or agents of
Defendant Corporation and, through this corporate entity, operate
or operated the restaurant as a joint or unified enterprise.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317-1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317-1620


EQUIFAX INFORMATION: Court Narrows Claims in Hafez Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ALIA HAFEZ, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES, LLC,
et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 20-9019 (SDW) (LDW) (D.N.J.),
Judge Susan D. Wigenton of the U.S. District Court for the District
of New Jersey granted in part and denied in part the Defendants'
motions to dismiss.

The Defendants filed Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff's Class Action
Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6).

The instant dispute involves alleged noncompliance with the Fair
Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), 15 U.S.C. Section 1681, et seq., as
amended by the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act
("CARES Act"), Pub. L. No. 116-136, Section 4021, 134 Stat. 281
(2020), which provided temporary relief on the accrual of interest
for eligible federal student loan borrowers.

Alia Hafez brings the action individually and on behalf of those
similarly situated against Equifax, Trans Union, LLC, and
VantageScore Solutions, LLC for their alleged "failure to adopt
reasonable procedures to ensure the accuracy of consumer credit
reports" in violation of the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. Section 1681e(b).

The Plaintiff is a New Jersey resident with federal student loans
serviced by Navient that were suspended under the CARES Act.
Navient erroneously reported her loans in "forbearance" instead of
as "current."  Consequently, her credit score, as reported by
Equifax and TransUnion on the Plaintiff's May 11, 2020 consumer
credit report, fell by 97 points.  Thereafter, Navient removed the
"forbearance" remark and notified the Defendants that the
Plaintiff's credit report contained the inaccuracy.  Subsequently,
the Plaintiff's credit report noted that a prior "forbearance"
remark from "US Dept. of ED/Navient" was removed.

According to the Amended Complaint, the Defendants are CRAs that
compile and maintain files on consumers on a nationwide basis.
Equifax and TransUnion jointly own Vantage and developed a
credit-scoring model called Vantage Score.  "Vantage Score" uses an
algorithm to produce a numeric score using data from a consumer's
credit report.  Based on the algorithm, certain "credit events"
such as credit payments and defaulted payments will positively or
negatively impact a consumer's credit score.  Equifax and
TransUnion allegedly control the Vantage Score algorithm and sell
consumer credit reports containing Vantage Scores to persons and
entities for evaluative purposes.  Because Equifax and TransUnion
continue to implement, develop, and modify the Vantage Score
algorithm, they purportedly share consumers' credit information
with each other and operate under policies to ensure consumers'
data and Vantage Scores are consistent.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Vantage Score algorithm did not
adjust to account for the CARES Act due to the Defendants'
"antiquated systems and automated processes," including their
failure to review information from furnishers.  Accordingly, the
Defendants' algorithm treated the suspension of federal student
loan payments as negative credit events, causing a drop in student
borrowers' credit scores, including the Plaintiff.  The Plaintiff
avers that her reduced credit score generated by the Defendants'
credit-scoring model "creates a materially misleading impression"
of her "creditworthiness."  Her inaccurate credit report was given
to third parties on May 13, 2020, May 20, 2020, and Aug. 25, 2020.
The Crossings at One denied the Plaintiff's housing application
based on her inaccurate credit report from Equifax, dated Aug. 25,
2020.

The Plaintiff maintains that the Defendants acted negligently,
willfully, and recklessly because they knew or should have known
that under the CARES Act, federal student loans, including those
serviced by Navient, should have been reported as "current."  She
raises one count in the Amended Complaint for alleged violation of
15 U.S.C. Section 1681e(b), and seeks injunctive relief, actual
damages, statutory damages, and punitive damages for "ongoing" harm
to her credit as well as "other financial harm."

The Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss.  The Plaintiff
opposed each motion and the Defendants replied.

TransUnion argues that the Plaintiff lacks constitutional standing
because she cannot establish an injury in fact.  It also disputes
whether it is causally connected to the Plaintiff's injury because
she alleges two separates defendants (TransUnion and Equifax)
produced a single credit report for Plaintiff on May 11, 2020 and
fails to attribute any credit report solely to TransUnion.  Equifax
and Vantage similarly argue that they are not causally connected to
the Plaintiff's lowered credit score and her denial of housing.

Judge Wigenton opines that the Plaintiff squarely alleges that her
housing application was rejected based on an inaccurate credit
report from Equifax, and that Equifax produces a Vantage Score in
its consumer reports.  She sasy while the pleadings scarcely
demonstrate how TransUnion and Equifax purportedly caused --
through their development and oversight of the Vantage Score
algorithm -- the Plaintiff's credit score to drop based on the
processing of Navient's forbearance remark, the Judge denies the
Defendants' motions to dismiss for lack of standing.  Nonetheless,
she holds that if the Plaintiff chooses to file an amended
complaint, the Plaintiff should provide more facts to support how
each of her allegedly inaccurate credit reports are causally
connected to one or more Defendants.

With respect to FCRA claim, the Judge opines that the Plaintiff's
claim is fatal because she does not sufficiently allege an
inaccuracy in her credit reports.  The Plaintiff does not state
whether her federal student loans were current prior to the CARES
Act or whether she received an accommodation of any sort during the
covered period.  In addition, the Plaintiff maintains that a single
credit report from May 11, 2020 was produced by both Equifax and
TransUnion, which she alleges are separate entities.  It is unclear
whether Equifax and TransUnion allegedly produced the credit report
jointly, whether they each provided separate reports, or whether
one entity furnished the May 11, 2020 credit report.

Finally, although the Plaintiff maintains that TransUnion and
Equifax sell consumer credit reports to third parties, the Judge
finds that there are no similar allegations regarding Vantage's
business model apart from merely devising a credit-scoring
algorithm.  In addition, the Plaintiff's conclusory allegation that
Vantage is a CRA pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Section 1681a(p) differs
from her argument in opposition that Vantage is a CRA as defined
under 15 U.S.C. Section 1681a(f).

For the reasons she set forth, Judge Wigenton granted in part and
denied in part the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss.  The Plaintiff
may amend her complaint within 30 days to the extent she can cure
the pleading deficiencies outlined.  An appropriate order follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 23, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/js45ptt9 from Leagle.com.


FACEBOOK INC: Max Martialis Seeks to Certify Class
--------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as DZ Reserve and Cain
Maxwell (d/b/a Max Martialis), individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, v. FACEBOOK, INC., Case No. 3:18-cv-04978-JD
(N.D. Calif.), the Plaintiff will move the Court on June 10, 2021
to enter an order:

   1. certifying the following class:

      "All United States residents (including natural persons and
      incorporated entities) who, from August 15, 2014, to the
      present ("Class Period"), paid for the placement of at least

      one advertisement on Facebook's platforms, including the
      Facebook and Instagram platforms, which was purchased through

      Facebook's Ads Manager or Power Editor;"

      Excluded from the class are: (1) advertisements purchased
      pursuant to agreements other than Facebook's Terms of Service

      or Statement of Rights and Responsibilities; (2)
      advertisements purchased using only non-lookalike Custom
      Audiences as the criteria; (3) advertisements purchased using

      Reach and Frequency buying; (4) advertisements purchased with

      the objectives of canvas app engagement, canvas app installs,

      offer claims, event responses, page likes, or external; and
      (5) advertisements for which Facebook provided a Potential
      Reach lower than 1000.

      Also excluded from the Class are the Defendant, any entity in

      which Defendant has a controlling interest, and Defendant's
      officers, directors, legal representatives, successors,
      subsidiaries, and assigns. Further excluded from the Class is

      any judge, justice, or judicial officer presiding over this
      matter and the members of their immediate families and
      judicial staff; and

   2. appointing DZ Reserve and Cain Maxwell (d/b/a Max Martialis)

      as class representatives and current interim class counsel
      Geoffrey Graber of Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC as
      class counsel for the proposed class under Fed. R. Civ. P.
      23(g).

Facebook is an American technology conglomerate based in Menlo
Park, California.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated April 23,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at  https://bit.ly/3aXY5Yc
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew N. Friedman, Esq.
          Geoffrey Graber, Esq.
          Julia Horwitz, Esq.
          Karina G. Puttieva, Esq.
          Eric Kafka, Esq.
          COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL PLLC
          1100 New York Ave. NW, Fifth Floor
          Washington, DC 20005
          Telephone: (202) 408-4600
          Facsimile: (202) 408-4699
          E-mail: afriedman@cohenmilstein.com
                  ggraber@cohenmilstein.com
                  jhorwitz@cohenmilstein.com
                  kputtieva@cohenmilstein.com
                  ekafka@cohenmilstein.com

The Counsel for the Plaintiffs and Proposed Class are:

          Charles Reichmann, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF CHARLES REICHMANN
          16 Yale Circle
          Kensington, CA 94708-1015
          Telephone: (415) 373-8849
          E-mail: Charles.reichmann@gmail.com

GENERAL MOTORS: Court Consolidates Hammerschmidt and Jackson Suits
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Donovan W. Frank of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Minnesota consolidated the case, Joseph Hammerschmidt,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. General Motors LLC, Defendant, with Jackson v. General
Motors LLC, Case No. 21-cv-987 (DWF/BRT), for pre-trial proceedings
and trial before Judge Frank and Magistrate Judge Becky R.
Thorson.

The matter came before the Court on the parties' stipulation and
joint motion to consolidate the related actions of Hammerschmidt
and Jackson, and to grant leave for Plaintiffs Hammerschmidt and
Jackson to file a Consolidated Class Action Complaint, to set a
briefing schedule for the Defendant's anticipated motions to
dismiss and strike relating thereto, and to take off calendar the
Defendant's pending motions to dismiss and to strike.

Judge Frank granted the parties' stipulation and joint motion.  The
cases of Hammerschmidt and Jackson are consolidated for pre-trial
proceedings and trial before Judge Frank and Magistrate Judge
Thorson.

To give full effect to the consolidation of related proceedings,
Judge Frank further ordered that:

      a. The first-filed case, Hammerschmidt v. General Motors LLC,
Case No. 20-cv-1773 (DWF/BRT), will serve as the lead case of these
consolidated matters;

      b. All future filings for these related proceedings will be
filed in the lead case;

      c. All future filings in the lead case will be considered
filed in the relevant related case; filings should not be
separately docketed in the related cases and all previous filings
in the related cases need not be re-filed in the lead case;

      d. The Clerk of Court is directed to add all parties and
attorneys of record from the related cases to the lead case. All
pro hac vice admissions in the related cases are valid for the lead
case; and

      e. The Clerk of Court is directed to administratively close
case numbers (specifically list all cases that should be closed).

The Plaintiffs will file a Consolidated Class Action Complaint
within 21 days of the Court's order granting the Stipulation and
joint motion.  The Defendant will file its anticipated motions to
dismiss and to strike the Plaintiffs' Consolidated Class Action
Complaint within 42 days of the filing of the Plaintiffs'
Consolidated Class Action Complaint.  The Plaintiffs' response to
the Defendant's anticipated motions is due within 42 days after the
motions have been filed.  The Defendant's reply in support of those
motions is due within 21 days after the filing of the Plaintiffs'
response.

The Defendant's pending motions to dismiss and to strike in
Hammerschmidt, currently set for hearing on May 21, 2021, will be
terminated and removed from the Court's calendar.  The Defendant's
motions to dismiss and strike in Jackson will be terminated and
removed from the Court's calendar.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 23, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/yn87cfaa from Leagle.com.


GENERAL MOTORS: Wisconsin Court Dismisses Brame Suit With Prejudice
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GARY BRAME, JASON JAGER, and GLEN EVANS, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v.
GENERAL MOTORS LLC, Defendant, Case No. 20-C-1775 (E.D. Wis.),
Judge Lynn Delman of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin granted GM's motion to dismiss the complaint
and dismissed the action with prejudice.

Three Plaintiffs, Gary Brame, Jason Jager, and Glen Evans, allege
that they purchased vehicles manufactured by GM that consume
excessive oil.  They contend that this problem relates to a design
defect that affects engines used in many of the vehicles GM
manufactured in model years 2010 to 2014.  Each Plaintiff purchased
a GM vehicle fitted with GM's Generation IV 5.3 Liter V8 Vortec
5300 LC9 engine.  The Plaintiffs propose to represent class of all
current and former owners and lessees who purchased or leased
affected vehicles in Wisconsin.

The Plaintiffs allege that GM knew about the oil consumption defect
but failed to disclose it to them through its advertising and other
statements about the quality of the vehicles.  They allege that
this failure to disclose renders GM liable for fraudulent
misrepresentation.  Finally, the Plaintiffs allege that GM's
conduct resulted in unjust enrichment.

GM has moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.  It contends that the Plaintiffs'
express warranty claims must be dismissed because the Limited
Warranty does not cover the alleged defect and because they did not
provide GM with notice of the alleged breach of warranty.  GM
contends that the Plaintiffs' claims for fraudulent
misrepresentation must be dismissed because, among other reasons,
they are barred by the economic loss doctrine.  Finally, GM
contends that the Plaintiffs' claims for unjust enrichment must be
dismissed for several reasons: Because an equitable claim for
unjust enrichment cannot lie when the parties' relationship is
governed by a contract, when the Plaintiff has adequate legal
remedies, or when the Plaintiff has not conferred a benefit
directly on the Defendant.

Judge Delman holds that because the Plaintiffs have not alleged
that they asked GM to repair their vehicles during the warranty
period, they have not alleged that GM breached the Limited Warranty
by failing to fix a defect.  Thus, their claims for breach of
express warranty must be dismissed.  Further, even if the
Plaintiffs had alleged a breach, their claims would have to be
dismissed for failure to give pre-suit notice of the alleged
breach.

The Judge also holds that the fraud in the inducement exception
cannot apply because the alleged fraud relates to "the quality and
characteristics of the product in question and is thus not
extraneous to the contract."  She says the Plaintiffs allege that
GM engaged in fraud by touting the quality of the vehicles and
their engines without disclosing that the engines consume excessive
amounts of oil.  The alleged fraud is thus related to the quality
and characteristics of the product and not extraneous to the
contract. Accordingly, the fraud in the inducement exception does
not save the Plaintiffs' claims for fraudulent misrepresentation.

The Judge further holds that the Plaintiffs received something in
return for the benefits they supposedly conferred on GM: The
vehicles that GM manufactured.  Of course, the Plaintiffs allege
that the vehicles did not meet their expectations.  But the sales
of the vehicles were subject to whatever terms and conditions the
Plaintiffs agreed to at the time of sale or that were supplied by
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code.  The Judge finds that if
the vehicles did not meet expectations, the Plaintiffs were
entitled to pursue their contract remedies against their dealers
(or against GM if an express warranty existed).  Thus, even if the
vehicles did not meet expectations, the Plaintiffs received
something in exchange for the benefit they conferred -- the
vehicles plus the legal remedies available to them against either
the dealer or GM (or both).  It is not unjust to limit disappointed
product purchasers to their legal remedies.  Accordingly, the
Plaintiffs' claims for unjust enrichment will be dismissed.

Lastly, the Judge holds that it is conceivable that the Plaintiffs
could plead that, before they commenced the suit, they each asked
GM to repair the oil consumption defect within the warranty period
and that, when GM failed to do so, they notified GM that they
considered its failure to be a breach.  However, if the Plaintiffs
could have made these allegations consistently with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11, they likely would already have done so or have
offered, in their brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss, to
amend their complaint to include the allegations.  For this reason,
the Judge concludes that it would be futile to grant the Plaintiffs
leave to amend for the purpose of pleading facts showing that,
before filing the suit, each Plaintiff personally notified GM that
he considered his vehicle defective and considered GM's failure to
repair the defect to amount to a breach of the Limited Warranty.
Accordingly, the Judge will dismiss the action with prejudice.

For the reasons she stated, Judge Delman granted GM's motion to
dismiss the complaint and dismissed the action with prejudice.  The
Clerk of Court will enter final judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 23, 2021 Decision & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/5wytcxed from Leagle.com.


GOOGLE LLC: N.D. California to Approve Settlement in Profile Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE GOOGLE PLUS PROFILE LITIGATION, Case No.
5:18-cv-06164-EJD (N.D. Cal.), Judge Edward J. Davila of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California, San Jose
Division, grants the parties' joint motion for indicative ruling
and indicates approval of settlement with Objector Steven Davis.

On Jan. 25, 2021, the Court granted final approval of class
settlement in the action.  Shortly thereafter, pro se Objector
Davis filed notice of appeal to the Ninth Circuit.  On April 23,
2021, the parties filed a joint motion requesting an indicative
ruling as to whether, upon remand from the Ninth Circuit, the Court
will approve a stipulation and agreement of settlement reached
between them.

The parties indicate that under the proposed settlement agreement,
the Class Counsel and the Plaintiffs have agreed to (1) write a
letter to the Northern District of California's Local Rules
committee proposing certain modifications to the class action
settlement guidelines; (2) adjust the attorneys' fees award based
on time spent on the mediation and settlement; and (3) pay Mr.
Davis's costs on appeal. If the agreement is approved, Mr. Davis
would agree to dismiss his appeal with prejudice.

Having reviewed the parties' joint motion and proposed settlement
agreement, Judge Davila finds that the settlement would be in the
best interest of the previously-approved Settlement Class.  He
finds that the settlement was reached through arms'-length
negotiations as a result of a mediation process, will prevent
further expenditures on appeal at the expense of the Settlement
Class, and will expedite payment to the Settlement Class.
Therefore, the Judge anticipates that he would grant a motion to
approve the settlement if the Ninth Circuit remands the action for
that purpose.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 23, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/j5yw2vzy from Leagle.com.


HAVE A HEART: Court Lifts Stay of Proceedings in Levitt TCPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Barbara Jacobs Rothstein of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington, Seattle, lifts the stay of the
proceedings in the case, ANNE LEVITT, individually and on behalf of
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. HAVE A HEART COMPASSION
CARE, INC. d/b/a A CANNABIS STOREY, Defendant, Case No.
2:20-CV-01154-BJR (W.D. Wash.).

The matter is before the Court on the parties' joint motion to lift
the stay of proceedings in the case.  As directed by the Court,
both parties have also provided the Court with their views on
whether adjustments to the case schedule are warranted.

In the putative class action, the Plaintiff alleges the Defendant
violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C.
Section 227, et seq.  The existing case schedule includes an expert
report deadline of Aug. 16, 2021, a discovery deadline of Sept. 15,
2021, and a dispositive motions deadline of Oct. 15, 2021.  The
trial date is set for March 14, 2022.  The current case schedule
does not set a deadline for the Plaintiff to file a motion for
class certification.

The Court stayed proceedings at the parties' request on March 18,
2021, pending the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Facebook, Inc.
v. Duguid, 141 S.Ct. 1163 (2021).  The Supreme Court issued a
decision in the case on April 1, 2021.  The Supreme Court's
decision interpreted the meaning of the term "automatic telephone
dialing system" (also known as an "autodialer") under the TCPA.

The Defendant suggests that the case should be bifurcated to
provide for discovery, motions practice, and a ruling solely
limited to the issue of whether the Defendant used an "autodialer"
within the meaning of the TCPA.  The Plaintiff opposes the
Defendant's proposal to bifurcate.

Judge Rothstein declines to order bifurcation of the case as
proposed by the Defendant.  However, she expects the parties will
proceed diligently to complete discovery on the issue of whether
the Defendant used an "autodialer" within the meaning of the TCPA.
Because the case was stayed for approximately one month, the Judge
extends the deadlines for expert reports, completion of discovery,
and filing dispositive motions by one month.  She also sets a
deadline for the Plaintiff to file a motion for class
certification.

Therefore, Judge Rothstein lifts the stay of proceedings.  The
deadline for reports from expert witnesses under FRCP 26(a)(2) is
extended to Sept. 15, 2021.  The deadline for completing discovery
is extended to Oct. 15, 2021.  The deadline for dispositive motions
is extended to Nov. 15, 2021.  The deadline for the Plaintiff to
file a class certification motion is Nov. 15, 2021.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 23, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/yrxsahtu from Leagle.com.


HAYNES INVESTMENTS: Brice Suit Wins Class Certification
-------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Judge William H. Orrick entered an order in two related
cases filed by Kimetra Brice, et al., certifying the following
class:

   "All individuals who resided in California at the time he or
   she: (I) obtained a loan(s) from Great Plains Lending, or (ii)
   obtained a loan(s) from Plain Green prior to June 1, 2016."

The Plaintiffs have met each of the required showings under Rule
23. The parties shall meet and confer and agree to a Notice Plan or
submit any disputes regarding Notice for my determination through a
five-page joint letter identifying their differences, on or before
May 11, 2021, says Judge Orrick.

The parties are intimately familiar with the factual background of
these cases. The Plaintiffs and proposed named class
representatives Kimetra Brice, Earl Browne, and Jill Novorot are
(or for 28 part of the class period were) California residents who
took out short term loans (Loan Agreements) with allegedly
illegally high rates of interest from Great Plains Lending, LLC
and/or Plain Green, LLC. The remaining defendants in these cases
are alleged to be founders, funders, and/or owners of now-defunct
Think Finance, LLC, 1 which was the entity through which the
allegedly illegal "Tribal Lending Scheme" was organized, financed,
and run. As part of the settlement of the claims asserted against
Think Finance in the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
Texas and of claims asserted by classes of consumers in the Eastern
District of Virginia, in In re Think Finance, LLC, Case No.
17-33964 and Gibbs, et al. v. Plain Green, LLC, et al., Case No.
3:17-cv-495 (E.D. Va.), plaintiffs have access through Settlement
Administrator RSM US LLP (RSM) to underlying consumer-level account
data from Think Finance for loans made to consumers in the names of
Great Plains Lending LLC and Plain Green LLC. Through that data,
plaintiffs argue both that the California class members covered by
the class definitions can be identified and that the alleged
aggregate damages are adequately supported for purposes of class
certification.

The two cases are captioned as:

   KIMETRA BRICE, et al., v. HAYNES INVESTMENTS, LLC., et al.,
Case
   No. 18-cv-01200-WHO (N.D. Calif.); and

   KIMETRA BRICE, et al., v. MIKE STINSON, et al., Case No. 19-cv-
   01481-WHO (N.D. Calif.).

A copy of the Court's order dated April 23, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3xIyV9I at no extra charge.[CC]


ICHPAT & FAM: Conditional Certification of Collective Action Sought
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JESSICA VALDEZ, on behalf
of herself, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly-situated, v. ICHPAT & FAM, LLC, d/b/a DAIRY QUEEN GRILL &
CHILL RESTAURANT, and PATRICIA NAPPO, a/k/a PATRICIA DEMINT,
individually, Case No. 2:20-cv-02570-AMD-AKT (E.D.N.Y.), the
Plaintiff will move the Court to enter an order:

   1. conditionally certifying this case as a collective action
      with respect to the following:

      "Current and former employees, who from the opening of the
      Defendants' Dairy Queen restaurant until March 1, 2020,
      performed any work for Defendants and who were paid on an
      hourly basis as "crew" members, and/or assistant managers,
      and/or managers, and who consent to file a claim to recover
      damages for unpaid overtime compensation and liquidated
      damages that are legally due to them;

   2. certifying the sixth and seventh claims for relief in
      Plaintiff's complaint as a class action with respect to the
      following:

      "Current and former employees, who from the opening of
      Defendants' Dairy Queen restaurant until March 1, 2020,
      performed any work for Defendants in New York as "crew"
      members, and/or assistant managers, and/or managers, and who

      were paid on an hourly, bi-weekly basis";

   3. requiring the Defendants MichPat & Fam, LLC and Patricia
      Nappo, within 14 days of the Court's Order, to produce a
      computer-readable data file containing the names, last known

      mailing addresses, all known home and mobile telephone
      numbers, all known email addresses, rates of pay, and dates
      of employment of all potential collective and class action
      members who worked for the Defendants at any point from
      December 1, 2017 to March 1, 2020;

   4. permitting the Plaintiff to disseminate notice of this action

      via regular mail, e-mail, and text message, as applicable,
      and permitting a sixty-day notice period;

   5. directing the Defendants to post the Notice at their Medford,

      New York, Dairy Queen restaurant, in that location's office,

      employee locker room, and outdoor garbage area where the
      potential collective action members routinely report, meet,
      or take breaks, in locations at each that are visible to all

      of the potential collective action members, and provide an
      affidavit attesting to their compliance and swearing that the

      Notice will remain posted and unobstructed during the entire

      notice period;

   6. tolling the statute of limitations for all putative members'

      Fair Labor Standards Act claims from March 26, 2021 until
      such time as the Court resolves this motion; and

   7. granting any other further relief that the Court deems just
      and proper.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated April 23,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/33cvs53
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael R. Minkoff, Esq.
          Alexander T. Coleman, Esq.
          Michael J. Borrelli, Esq.
          BORRELLI & ASSOCIATES, P.L.L.C.
          910 Franklin Avenue, Suite 200
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: (516) 248-5550
          Facsimile: (516) 248-6027

ILLINOIS INSTITUTE: Amended Hernandez Suit Dismissed W/o Prejudice
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, OMAR HERNANDEZ, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ILLINOIS INSTITUTE of
TECHNOLOGY, Defendant, Case No. 20-cv-3010 (N.D. Ill.), Judge
Franklin U. Valderrama of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, Eastern Division, granted the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint.

COVID-19 is a novel coronavirus that has affected nearly every
aspect of everyday life.  From mask wearing to social distancing,
it has changed the way people live and interact with each other.
Not surprisingly, the upheaval caused by COVID-19 extended to
education.

Plaintiff Hernandez was enrolled at IIT as a student for the Spring
2020 semester. However, mid-way through the Spring 2020 semester,
as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, IIT suspended all in-person
classes, transitioned to an online-only format and closed all
non-essential campus, student, and recreational facilities.  IIT
required students to vacate the campus.  It refused to issue
refunds to students for the Spring 2020 semester.

Mr. Hernandez subsequently brought the lawsuit, individually and as
a class action suit against IIT, alleging state law claims of
breach of contract, unjust enrichment (in the alternative), and
breach of implied contract (in the alternative).  He seeks refunds
of the amount he and members of the proposed classes are owed on a
pro-rata basis, along with other damages.

The operative complaint is the five-count Amended Complaint,
consisting of two classes. Count I alleges breach of contract
(Tuition Class); Count II asserts an unjust enrichment claim in the
alternative (Tuition Class); Count III asserts a breach of implied
contract in the alternative (Tuition Class); Count IV alleges a
breach of contract (Fees Class); and Count V asserts unjust
enrichment in the alternative (Fees Class).

IIT moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Analysis

IIT advances three arguments in support of dismissal.  First, it
maintains that Hernandez seeks damages for academic malpractice, a
claim not recognized under Illinois law. Second, even if
Hernandez's academic malpractice is a recognized cause of action,
IIT contends that Hernandez fails to allege a breach of contract.
Third, Hernandez does not and cannot establish that IIT was
unjustly enriched or breached an implied contract.

I. Educational Malpractice

Judge Valderrama opines that a fair reading of Hernandez's Amended
Complaint reveals that at bottom, Hernandez is complaining that he
and IIT had a contract pursuant to which he paid tuition and fees
to IIT to attend in-person classes and participate in in-person
activities and that IIT breached that agreement by moving to online
classes and shuttering the campus, while refusing to return a
portion of Hernandez's tuition and fees.  In short, this is a
classic breach of contract case. Hernandez's Amended Complaint does
not require the Court to engage in an analysis regarding the
quality of the education Hernandez received at IIT.  Accordingly,
IIT's attempt to recast Hernandez's claim as one for educational
malpractice fails.

Having determined that Hernandez does not allege a noncognizable
claim for educational malpractice, Judge Valderrama addresses
whether he has sufficiently alleged breach of contract, unjust
enrichment, and breach of implied contract claims.

II. Breach of Contract

In Counts I and IV, Hernandez claims a breach of contract.
Hernandez brings Count I on behalf of the Tuition Class and alleges
that in exchange for tuition, IIT would enroll the students and
grant them full access to campus activities and live, in-person
instruction.  According to Hernandez, IIT breached this contract
when it moved to online-only instruction and refused to refund
members of the Tuition Class a pro-rata share of the tuition.
Hernandez brings Count IV on behalf of the Fees Class and alleges
that students paid IIT certain fees in exchange for certain
on-campus services and activities, and IIT breached that contract
by failing to refund them a pro-rata share of fees paid.

Judge Valderrama finds, in viewing the allegations of the Amended
Complaint in the light most favorable to Hernandez, that the
Amended Complaint fails to sufficiently plead a breach of contract
action based on the payment of tuition or mandatory fees.

Mr. Hernandez points out that when students formally accept their
offers for enrollment in the on-campus program, they are directed
to visit the admitted students page on IIT's website.  The webpage,
however, can hardly be said to contain a promise of in-person
instruction.

Judge Valderrama can discern no promise at all by IIT in this
passage.  Instead, IIT is merely touting the experience that
students can expect to gain at IIT.  Accordingly, IIT's Motion to
Dismiss Counts I and IV is granted.

III. Unjust Enrichment

In Counts II and V, Hernandez asserts claims for unjust enrichment
in the alternative to his breach of contract claims.  To state an
unjust enrichment cause of action under Illinois law, Hernandez
must allege that IIT has unjustly retained a benefit to his
detriment and that IIT's retention of the benefit violates the
fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good conscience.
IIT argues that Hernandez's claim for unjust enrichment cannot
stand in the presence of an express contract governing the same
subject matter.

Judge Valderrama agrees.  Like Hernandez's breach of contract
claims, nearly identical unjust enrichment claims have been
considered and dismissed by other courts in this District because
-- like Hernandez's claim -- each unjust enrichment claim was
premised on the defendant-university's failure to fulfill
contractual terms.  So too must Judge Valderrama dismiss Counts II
and V.

IV. Breach of Implied Contract

Finally, in Count III, Hernandez asserts claims for breach of
implied contract, again in the alternative to his breach of
contract claims. The elements of both an implied and express
contract are the same under Illinois law: Offer, acceptance, and
consideration.

As an initial matter, Judge Valderrama is not convinced that a
cause of action for a breach of an implied contract can stand in
the educational setting.  IIT does not raise the educational
setting issue, but rather argues that, like his unjust enrichment
claims, Hernandez's implied contract claim cannot survive because
an express contract governs the same subject matter.  Hernandez
does not allege that he or members of the Tuition Class provided a
form of consideration to IIT different from that provided under the
express contract.  On the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint,
the Judge cannot find an implied contract concerning subject matter
different from that of the express contract between the parties.
As such, Count III must also be dismissed.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Valderrama granted the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss.  The Amended Complaint is dismissed without
prejudice.  Hernandez is granted leave to file a Second Amended
Complaint consistent with the Order by May 14, 2021.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 23, 2021 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yjhs3r84 from
Leagle.com.


JOSHUA J. ENTERPRISE: Conditional Cert. of FLSA Class Sought
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as CARRIE SINCLAIR On Behalf
of Herself and All Other Similarly Situated Individuals, v. JOSHUA
J. ENTERPRISE, INC. D/B/A ANGELS GENTLEMEN'S CLUB, Case No.
1:21-cv-00159-PLM-RSK (W.D. Mich.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to
enter an order:

   1. conditionally certifying this action and for
court-authorized
      notice pursuant to section 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards

      Act (FLSA);

   2. approving the proposed notice of this action and the consent

      and opt-in forms;

   3. directing a production of names, last known mailing
      addresses, last-known cell phone numbers, email addresses,
      and dates of employment of all putative plaintiffs within 15

      days of the Order;

   4. allowing the plaintiff to distribute the Notice and Opt-in
      Form via first class mail, text message, and email to all
      putative plaintiffs of the conditionally certified
      collective, with a reminder mailing to be sent 30-days after

      the initial mailing to all non-responding putative
      plaintiffs; and

   5. requiring the Defendant to post the Notice and Consent Form
      in a conspicuous location within the dressing room at the
      Angels Gentlemen's Club for the full 60-day Notice period.

Angels Gentlemen's Club is an adult nightclub in Western Michigan.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated April 23,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3eK7Zh4
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregg C. Greenberg, Esq.
          ZIPIN, AMSTER & GREENBERG, LLC
          8757 Georgia Avenue, Suite 400
          Silver Spring, Maryland 20910
          Telephone: (301) 587-9373
          E-mail: ggreenberg@zagfirm.com

               - and -

          Matthew Conklin, Esq.
          CONYBEARE LAW OFFICE
          519 Main Street
          St. Joseph, MI 49085
          Telephone: (269) 983-0561
          E-mail: Matt@conybearelaw.com

The Attorneys for the Defendant are:

          Patrick C. Lannen, Esq.
          PLUNKETT COONEY
          38505 Woodward Avenue, Suite 100
          Bloomfield Hills, MI 48304
          Telephone: (248) 901-4027
          E-mail: plannen@plunkettcooney.com

LLR INC: Appeal From Arbitration Order in Sperring Suit Dismissed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TABITHA SPERRING, PAISLIE MARCHANT, SALLY POSTON,
individually and on behalf of similarly situated persons,
Plaintiffs-Appellants v. LLR, INC., a Wyoming corporation; LULAROE,
LLC, a California limited liability company; LENNON LEASING, LLC, a
Wyoming limited liability company; MARK A. STIDHAM, an individual;
DEANNE BRADY, an individual; DOES, 1-30, inclusive,
Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 19-56295 (9th Cir.), the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal from the
district court's order compelling arbitration of the Plaintiffs'
putative class action against LLR, LuLaRoe, Lennon, Stidham and
Brady for lack of jurisdiction.

The Appellants, all consultants for LLR, LuLaRoe, Lennon; Stidham;
and Brady (collectively "LuLaRoe"), alleged that LuLaRoe operated
an illegal endless-chain pyramid scheme in violation of California
and federal law.

LuLaRoe moved the district court to compel arbitration under the
agreement each consultant had signed with LuLaRoe.  The district
court compelled arbitration and stayed proceedings pending
arbitration.

The Appellants then filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss the case
with prejudice so they could "immediately appeal" the court's order
compelling arbitration, noting that "the Order had so damaged their
case that seeing their cases through the arbitration process would
be a waste of resources for" Appellants.  The district court
granted the voluntary dismissal, and the Appellants filed the
instant appeal.

The Ninth Circuit holds that the courts of appeals will have
jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district
courts of the United States." It had long held that Section 1291
gave it jurisdiction over appeals of interlocutory orders following
a plaintiff's voluntary dismissal with prejudice.  However, in
Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S.Ct. 1702, 1715 (2017), the Supreme
Court reversed our judgment, holding that the voluntary-dismissal
tactic does not yield an appealable final judgment in the class
certification context.  Recently, in Langere v. Verizon Wireless
Services, LLC, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Omstead v. Dell,
Inc., 594 F.3d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 2010), which had upheld
appellate jurisdiction in the compelled arbitration context, "has
been effectively overruled by the Court's decision in Microsoft."
Therefore, it held that "the voluntary dismissal of claims
following an order compelling arbitration does not create appellate
jurisdiction."

The Ninth Circuit opines that the Appellants voluntarily dismissed
their action with prejudice in an attempt to obtain an appealable
final judgment following an order compelling arbitration.  This
tactic, it says, no longer "creates appellate jurisdiction."
Contrary to the Appellants' contention, it is of no consequence
that they moved for a court order dismissing their action under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2).

The Appellants' additional contention that Langere is inapplicable
because we have jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. Section 16(a)(3) is
without merit.  Section 16(a)(3) allows an appeal from "a final
decision with respect to an arbitration that is subject to" the
Federal Arbitration Act. 9 U.S.C. Section 16(a)(3).  Whether a
voluntary dismissal with prejudice constitutes an appealable "final
decision" under either Section 16 or 28 U.S.C. Section 1291 is the
very question the Ninth Circuit confronted in Langere and answered
in the negative.  Therefore, under its clear holding in Langere,
the Ninth Circuit lacks appellate jurisdiction.

The Ninth Circuit therefore dismissed the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 23, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/6jr926f4 from Leagle.com.

Justin P. Karczag -- jkarczag@foleybezek.com -- Encore Law Group
LLP, Los Angeles, California; Kevin D. Gamarnik --
kgamarnik@foleybezek.com -- Foley Bezek Behle & Curtis LLP, Costa
Mesa, California; Aaron L. Arndt -- aarndt@foleybezek.com -- Foley
Bezek Behle & Curtis LLP, in Santa Barbara, California; for
Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Steven T. Graham -- sgraham@swlaw.com -- William S. O'Hare,
Elizabeth M. Weldon -- eweldon@swlaw.com -- , Todd E. Lundell, and
Jing (Jenny) Hua -- jhua@swlaw.com -- Snell & Wilmer LLP, in Costa
Mesa, California, for Defendants-Appellees.


LLR INC: Katie Van Seeks to Certify Class
-----------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as KATIE VAN, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. LLR, INC. d/b/a
LuLaRoe, and LULAROE, LLC, Case No. 3:18-cv-00197-HRH (D. Alaska),
the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order :

   1. certifying the following class:

      "All persons who paid "tax" on a purchase of LuLaRoe
products
      and whose purchase was delivered into a location in Alaska
      that does not assess a sales or use tax on the clothing that

      LuLaRoe sells;"

      Excluded from the class are the Defendants, their past and
      present officers, employees, agents or affiliates; counsel
      for the Plaintiff and the Defendants; and any judge who
      presides over this action;

   2. appointing herself as the representative of the Class;

   3. appointing Kelly K. Iverson of Carlson Lynch, LLP, and
      Goriune Dudukgian of Northern Justice Project, LLC, as co-
      lead counsel for the Class; and

   4. certifying the following common claim for the Class: Alaska
      Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act.

LLR Partners operates as a private equity firm.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated April 23,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3ecmGdK
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

         Kelly K. Iverson, Esq.
         CARLSON LYNCH, LLP
         1133 Penn Avenue, 5th Floor
         Pittsburgh, PA 15222
         Telephone: (412) 322-9243
         Facsimile: (412) 231-0246
         E-mail: kiverson@carlsonlynch.com

              - and -

         James J. Davis, Jr., Esq.
         Goriune Dudukgian, Esq.
         NORTHERN JUSTICE PROJECT, LLC
         406 G Street, Suite 207
         Anchorage, AK 99501
         Telephone: (907) 308-3395
         Facsimile: (866) 813-8645
         E-mail: gdudukgian@njp-law.com
                 jdavis@njp-law.com

LUXFER HOLDINGS: Takes $1.1M Charge to Settle Labor Class Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Luxfer Holdings PLC disclosed in its Form 10-Q report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period
ended on March 28, 2021, that the Company incurred $1.1 million in
other charges during the period.   

Luxfer explained the other charges in the first quarter of 2021
relates to the settlement of a class-action lawsuit in the "Gas
Cylinders segment in relation to an alleged historic violation of
the Californian Labor Code, concerning a Human Resources
administration matter."

Luxfer has not provided additional information on the lawsuit.

Luxfer Holdings PLC operates as a holding company. The Company,
through its subsidiaries, designs, manufactures and supplies
engineering materials including commercial casting alloys, sheet,
plate, and extruded products. Luxfer also offers recycling services
and magnesium powders to its customers worldwide.


MAJOR LEAGUE: Cody Sedlock Seeks to Certify Rule 23 Class
---------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as AARON SENNE, et al.,
Individually and on Behalf of All Those Similarly Situated , v.
OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF BASEBALL, an unincorporated
association doing business as MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL; et al.; Case
No. 3:14-cv-00608-JCS (N.D. Calif.), the Plaintiff Cody Sedlock
will moves the Court on June 25, 2021 to enter an order:

   1. certifying a proposed Rule 23(b)(2) class of:

      "Any person who is or will in the future be signed to a
Minor
      League Uniform Player Contract and performs services pursuant

      to that contract in Florida, Arizona, or California."

      Excluded from the Class are Defendants and their officers,
      directors, and successors; any person who has a controlling
      interest in Defendants; any judge presiding over this action

      and members of the immediate family of any such judge; and
      counsel for Plaintiffs; and

   2. appointing Korein Tillery LLC and Pearson, Simon & Warshaw,
      LLP as Co-Lead Class Counsel for the class.

Mr. Sedlock is a minor league pitcher in the Baltimore Orioles
organization. In June 2016, he was drafted by the Orioles in Major
League Baseball's amateur draft, and signed the same seven-season
Uniform Player Contract that all minor leaguers must sign with a
team and MLB. As an employee of MLB, Mr. Sedlock seeks
certification of a class of current players on whose behalf he will
seek injunctive and declaratory relief against MLB, as well as the
other twenty-two Franchise Defendants.

Major League Baseball is an American professional baseball
organization and the oldest of the major professional sports
leagues in the United States and Canada. A total of 30 teams play
in Major League Baseball: 15 teams in the National League and 15 in
the American League.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated April 23,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3nJvWci
at no extra charge.[CC]

Counsel for Cody Sedlock and Rule 23(b)(3) Class Counsel are:

          Stephen M. Tillery, Esq.
          Garrett R. Broshuis, Esq.
          Robert L. King, Esq.
          Jamie L. Boyer, Esq.
          KOREIN TILLERY, LLC
          505 North 7th Street, Suite 3600
          St. Louis, MO 63101
          Telephone: (314) 241-4844
          Facsimile: (314) 241-3525
          E-mail: stillery@koreintillery.com
                  gbroshuis@koreintillery.com
                  rking@koreintillery.com
                  jboyer@koreintillery.com

               - and -

          Clifford H. Pearson, Esq.
          Daniel L. Warshaw, Esq.
          Thomas J. Nolan, Esq.
          Bobby Pouya, Esq.
          Benjamin E. Shiftan, Esq.
          PEARSON, SIMON & WARSHAW, LLP
          15165 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 400
          San Francisco, CA 94103
          Telephone: (818) 788-8300
          Facsimile: (818) 788-8104
          E-mail: cpearson@pswlaw.com
                  dwarshaw@pswlaw.com
                  bpouya@pswlaw.com
                  tnolan@pswlaw.com
                  bshiftan@pswlaw.com

MCKINSEY & CO: Faces Scott County Suit Over Opioid Problem
----------------------------------------------------------
SCOTT COUNTY, INDIANA, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF
INDIANA, BY AND THRU ITS BOARD OF COMMISSIONER v. MCKINSEY &
COMPANY, INC.; MCKINSEY & COMPANY, INC. UNITED STATES; and MCKINSEY
& COMPANY, INC. WASHINGTON D.C., Case No. 4:21-cv-00056-TWP-DML
(S.D. Ind., April 9, 2021) is a class action arising from the
Defendants' violations of the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act
by allegedly causing or contributing to the public nuisance of
opioid abuse, addiction, morbidity and mortality in Scott County,
Indiana.

The Plaintiff brings this action against McKinsey for the
consulting services it provided to opioid companies in connection
with designing the companies' marketing plans and programs that
helped cause and contributed to the opioid crisis. McKinsey sold
its ideas to OxyContin maker Purdue Pharma, L.P. for more than 15
years, from 2004 to 2019, including before and after Purdue's 2007
guilty plea for felony misbranding. McKinsey advised Purdue and
other manufacturers to target prescribers who write the most
prescriptions, for the most patients, and thereby make the most
money for McKinsey's Clients.

The Plaintiff is responsible for the public health, safety and
welfare of their citizens. The suit says that in Scott County,
Indiana, opioid abuse, addiction, morbidity and mortality has
created a serious public health and safety crisis, is a public
nuisance, and the Defendant's actions have caused and contributed
to this public nuisance.

According to the complaint, Plaintiff has sustained economic
damages as a direct and proximate result of Defendant's conduct.
Categories of past and continuing damages include, but are not
limited to; (1) costs associated with law enforcement and public
safety relating to the opioid epidemic: (2) costs for providing
emergency services, medical care, therapeutic care, and other
treatments for patients suffering from opioid-related addiction or
disease, including overdoses and deaths; (3) costs for prescription
drug purchases; and (4) such other costs as may be proven in this
litigation.

McKinsey & Company, Inc. is a management consulting firm offering
services to various industries such as electronic, aerospace,
automotive, chemical, financial, oil and gas, public sector, and
healthcare. McKinsey & Company serves clients worldwide.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Robert L. Houston, Esq.
          HOUSTON, THOMPSON and LEWIS, PC
          49 E. Wardell Street
          Scottsburg, IN 47170
          Telephone: (812) 752-5920
          Facsimile: (812) 752-6989
          E-mail: rhouston@htllawyers.com

               - and -

          Frank C. Dudenhefer, Esq.
          THE DUDENHEFER LAW FIRM, L.L.C.
          2721 Saint Charles. Avenue, Suite 2A
          New Orleans, Louisiana 70130
          Telephone: (504) 616-5226
          E-mail: fcdlaw@aol.com


MESSERLI KRAMER: Valadez Files Bid for Class Certification
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Whitney Valadez,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, v.
Messerli Kramer P.A., et al., Case No. 2:21-cv-520 (E.D. Wisc.),
the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order certifying the class
described in the complaint, and further requests that the Court
both stay the motion for class certification and to grant Plaintiff
(and Defendants) relief from the Local Rules setting automatic
briefing schedules and requiring briefs and supporting material to
be filed with the motion.

The Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, left
open the possibility that a defendant facing a class action
complaint could moot a class representative's case by depositing
funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the plaintiff's
individual claim with the court and having the court enter judgment
in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a class
certification motion. Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663,
672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion. Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896
(7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class.
Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., 860 F.3d 541, 545-46 (7th Cir.
2017). One defendant has attempted a similar tactic by sending a
certified check to the proposed class representative. Bonin v. CBS
Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D. Wis.).

The Plaintiff also asks the Court enter an order appointing the
Plaintiff as class representative, and appointing Stein Saks PLLC
as Class Counsel, and for such other and further relief as the
Court may deem appropriate.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated April 23,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3urruSp
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yaakov Saks, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Telephone: (201) 282-6500
          Facsimile: (201) 282-6501
          E-mail: ysaks@steinsakslegal.com

MIDLAND CREDIT: Medeiros Sues Over Disclosure of Confidential Info
------------------------------------------------------------------
RENATA MEDEIROS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC., a Kansas corporation,
Case 1:21-cv-21587 (S.D. Fla., April 23, 2021) arises from the
Defendant's violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
and the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act.

According to the complaint, Plaintiff allegedly incurred a debt
concerning a consumer credit account issued by a nationally
recognized credit card company. Thereafter, the Debt was sold,
assigned, and transferred, along with numerous other consumer
debts, to Midland Funding, LLC. At a time better known to
Defendant, Midland Funding, LLC engaged Defendant in order to
direct debt collection efforts in connection with the Debt toward
Plaintiff. Defendant made the affirmative business decision to
communicate with Plaintiff about the collection of the Debt via
written correspondence. However, rather than preparing and mailing
written collection correspondence on its own, Defendant sent
information regarding Plaintiff and the Debt to a third-party
vendor in order to outsource the process.

Defendant disclosed to the Vendor, among other things: (i)
Plaintiff's status as a debtor; (ii) the fact that Plaintiff
allegedly owed monies for a debt; (iii) the fact the Debt concerned
consumer credit account; and (iv) other highly personal pieces of
information. The Vendor then populated some or all of this
information into a pre-written template, printed, and mailed the
collection letter to Plaintiff's residence in Florida. Plaintiff
never consented to having her personal and confidential
information, concerning the Debt or otherwise, shared with anyone
else, the complaint says.

Plaintiff is a natural person, a resident of Miami-Dade County,
Florida.

Midland Credit Management, Inc. is a Kansas corporation with a
primary business address located at 350 Camino De La Reina, Suite
300, San Diego, CA 92108. Defendant is a debt collector in that it
uses postal mail, an instrumentality of interstate commerce, across
state lines into Florida for its business, the principal purpose of
which is the collection of debts, and/or it regularly collects or
attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or
asserted to be owed or due another.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Christopher Legg, Esq.
          CHRISTOPHER W. LEGG, P.A.
          499 E. Palmetto Park Rd., Ste. 228
          Boca Raton, FL 33432
          Telephone: 954-235-3706
          E-mail: Chris@theconsumerlawyers.com


MONTGOMERY, NY: Supplemental Bid for Final OK of Settlement Filed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as PERRY HILL and JAMES
RODGERS, on behalf of a Certfied Class of Other Similarly Situated
Plaintiffs, v. THE COUNTY OF MONTGOMERY, et. al., Case No.
9:14-cv-00933-BKS-DJS (N.D.N.Y.), Plaintiffs' Attorney Elmer Robert
Keach, III filed supplemental submission in support of final
approval of class action settlement.

Class counsel seeks an award of attorneys' fees of $ 300,000, or
thirty percent of the common fund created, and litigation expenses
totaling $17,083.22, for a total of $ 317,083.22. Migliaccio and
Rathod seeks $5,659.88 in expenses; the Keach Law Firm seeks
$11,423.34.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' counsel motion dated April 23, 2021 is
available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3ugIVou at no
extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Elmer Robert Keach, III, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF ELMER ROBERT
          KEACH, III, PC
          One Pine West Plaza, Suite 109
          Albany, NY 12205
          Telephone: (518) 434-1718
          E-mail: bobkeach@keachlawfirm.com

NCEP LLC: Court Sets Initial Pretrial Conference Order in Hou-Seye
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JOB HOU-SEYE, v. NCEP,
LLC, et al., Case No. 3:21-cv-00154-jdp (W.D. Wisc.), the Hon.
Judge Stephen L. Crocker entered an order setting preliminary
pretrial conference order as follows:

   1. Motions & Briefs To Certify/Decertify Classes: October 8,
      2021

      This is the deadline for plaintiffs to seek certification of

      a Rule 23 class or for defendant to seek decertification of a

      conditional FLSA class.

      Responses: October 29, 2021
      Replies: November 8, 2021

   2. Disclosure of experts:

      Plaintiff: February 25, 2022
      Defendants: April 8, 2022

   3. Deadline for filing dispositive motions: May 27, 2022

      Discovery Cutoff: June 24, 2022

   4. Settlement Letters: October 28, 2022

   5. Rule 26(a)(3) Disclosures and all motions in limine:
November
      4, 2022

      Objections: November 18, 2022

   6. Final Pretrial Conference: November 30, 2022 at 4:00 p.m.

   7. Trial: December 5, 2022 at 9:00 a.m.

A copy of the Court's order dated April 23, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3vGSCNs at no extra charge.[CC]

NIKE RETAIL: Rodriguez Seeks Initial OK of Class Action Settlement
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ISAAC RODRIGUEZ, as an
individual and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. NIKE
RETAIL SERVICES, INC., an Oregon corporation; and DOES 1 through
50, inclusive, Case No. 5:14-cv-01508-BLF (N.D. Cal.), the
Plaintiff will move the Court on September 30, 2021 to enter an
order:

   1. granting preliminary approval for the proposed class action
      settlement;

   2. granting certification of the proposed Settlement Class, for
      settlement purposes only, comprised of:

      "all current and former non-exempt/hourly retail store
      employees of Defendant who worked in California at any time
      during the period from February 25, 2010, through and
      including November 15, 2019;

   3. authorizing the mailing of the proposed notice to the class
      of the settlement; and

   4. scheduling a "fairness hearing," i.e., a hearing on the final

      approval of the settlement.

The Settlement Agreement provides for a total settlement sum of
$8,250,000.00, inclusive of payments to Settlement Class Members,
payment of the Service Award to Plaintiff, Class Counsel fees and
costs, and Settlement Administrator Expenses.

Pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the Net
Settlement Amount (after deduction of attorneys' fees in the amount
of up to $2,750,000.00, costs up to $250,000.00, the Service Award
in the amount of up to $15,000.00, and costs of settlement
administration in the amount of approximately $69,750.00 is
approximately $5,165,250.00).

As provided in the Settlement Agreement, 80 percent of Individual
Settlement Payments will be allocated as penalties and will not be
subject to withholdings, 10 percent of Individual Settlement
Payments will be considered wages and will be subject to all
applicable withholdings, and 10 percent of Individual Settlement
Payments will be allocated to interest and will not be subject to
withholdings.

The Plaintiff was hired by the Defendant to work as a non-exempt
employee at the Defendant's retail outlet store located in Gilroy,
California. The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant until in or
about January 2012. In this lawsuit, the Plaintiff alleges that, as
with all other non-exempt retail store employees of the Defendant
in the State of California, he was instructed and required to
undergo off-the-clock security checks and/or visual inspections (in
the event that he did was not carrying a bag) before exiting the
store at any time. Plaintiff claims that although said security
checks and visual inspections were required after clocking out and
before leaving the store, Defendant did not pay the Plaintiff and
other non-exempt employees any applicable minimum and overtime
wages in connection with the time spent waiting for security checks
and visual inspections, and the time spent undergoing said
inspections.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated April 23,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/339G6K7
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Certified Class are:

          Larry W. Lee, Esq.
          Kristen Agnew, Esq.
          Nicholas Rosenthal, Esq.
          Max W. Gavron, Esq.
          Kwanporn "Mai" Tulyathan, Esq.
          DIVERSITY LAW GROUP
          515 S. Figueroa St., Suite 1250
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 488-6555
          Facsimile: (213) 488-6554
          E-mail: lwlee@diversitylaw.com
                  kagnew@diversitylaw.com
                  nrosenthal@diversitylaw.com
                  mgavron@diversitylaw.com
                  ktulyathan@diversitylaw.com

               - and -

          William L. Marder, Esq.
          POLARIS LAW GROUP
          E-mail: bill@polarislawgroup.com
          501 San Benito Street, Suite 200
          Hollister, CA 95023
          Telephone: (831) 531-4214
          Facsimile: (831) 634-0333

               - and -

          Dennis S. Hyun, Esq.
          HYUN LEGAL, APC
          515 S. Figueroa St., Suite 1250
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 488-6555
          Facsimile: (213) 488-6554
          E-mail: dhyun@hyunlegal.com

PANASONIC CORP: $49MM Deal in Lithium Ion Antitrust Suit Affirmed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, In re: LITHIUM ION BATTERIES ANTITRUST LITIGATION.
INDIRECT PURCHASER PLAINTIFFS, Plaintiff-Appellee v. CHRISTOPHER
ANDREWS, Objector-Appellant v. PANASONIC CORPORATION, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 19-16803 (9th Cir.), the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirms the district court's
approval of the third and final round of settlements in an
antitrust action by Indirect Purchaser Plaintiffs.

The IPPs asserts claims for price-fixing of lithium-ion batteries
by Defendant electronics companies.

The district court granted class certification for a nationwide
settlement class and approved a $49 million settlement, allocating
90% to the class members in Illinois Brick repealer states and 10%
to the class members in non-repealer states.  Pro se objector
Christopher Andrews appeals the district court's approval of the
third and final round of settlements.

The Ninth Circuit reviews certification of a settlement class and
approval of a class action settlement for abuse of discretion.  The
Ninth Circuit affirms.

First, the Ninth Circuit holds that the Named Plaintiffs have
standing.  Contrary to Andrews' contentions, representative
plaintiffs need only allege standing at the class certification
stage.  And although Andrews argues that named plaintiffs and the
class members in non-repealer states lack standing, the
non-repealer class members' ability to recover under federal
antitrust law does not affect the Ninth Circuit's subject matter
jurisdiction.

Second, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding
that named plaintiffs fairly and adequately represented the class
in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 23(a)(4).
A serious conflict of interest between the interests of class
representatives and members of the class can impair adequate
representation.  Although the inclusion of both the repealer and
the non-repealer class members in the settlement class in the case
created a potential conflict of interest between the class members
with claims of differing values, this conflict, according to the
Ninth Circuit, was mitigated by the district court's differential
allocation of the settlement fund to the class members in the
repealer and the non-repealer states.  Furthermore, there is no
indication that named Plaintiffs in either repealer or non-repealer
states lacked incentive to vigorously prosecute the case on behalf
of the class.

Third, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that the class counsel fairly and adequately
represented the class in accordance with FRCP 23(a)(4) and
23(g)(4).  The Ninth Circuit holds that a conflict undermining
adequate representation by counsel may be evidenced where a
settlement is "driven by fees" or where attorney's fees are
disproportionately large.  The district court mitigated concerns
that the settlement agreement might be driven by attorney's fees by
awarding fees separately from the settlement agreement, and the 30%
attorney's fee award here is not a disproportionate distribution of
the total settlement fund.  Beyond conflict-free representation,
the district court's finding that counsel had litigated vigorously
on behalf of the class by conducting extensive discovery and
motions practice over more than six years of litigation is not
clearly erroneous.

Fourth, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
approving service awards for named Plaintiffs.  Service awards do
not necessarily create an impermissible conflict of interest.   The
district court appropriately took into account the length of the
litigation, the time and resources class representatives expended
litigating the case, the ultimate recovery, and comparable
settlements in deciding to approve the service awards.  The awards
were not conditioned on support of the settlement, nor was there
any service award agreement prior to litigation.  Moreover, the
service awards of $10,000 for individual named Plaintiffs and
$25,000 for the two governmental entities were not disproportionate
to the $49 million settlement.

Fifth, the Ninth Circuit holds that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in finding the distribution plan fair,
reasonable, and adequate under FRCP 23(e)(2).  It reviews the
district court's analysis to determine (1) whether it meets the
high procedural bar for pre-certification settlement and (2)
whether the district court abused its discretion in finding that
the settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate.  It finds that
the district court here met its pre-class certification procedural
burden by considering the recovery in comparison to the strength of
the case, the stage of litigation, the risk of further litigation,
and any indications of potential collusion.

Furthermore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
finding that the agreement was substantively fair.  For the reasons
it has already discussed, the Ninth Circuit finds that the class
was adequately represented by the class representatives and the
counsel.  The settlement is the third in the action and followed
multiple mediation sessions, and Andrews does not contend that it
was not negotiated at arm's length.  The district court considered
the adequacy of the relief, "taking into account the costs, risks,
and delay of trial and appeal," and permissibly found the $49
million award robust.  And finally, the district court permissibly
found that the differential allocation of the settlement between
the class members in the repealer and the non-repealer states was
equitable because, although their claims were less valuable, the
class members in the non-repealer states were still active
litigants entitled to minimal recovery.

Sixth, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding
that the notice program was adequate under FRCP 23(c)(2).  The
Ninth Circuit holds that the notice was not inadequate merely
because every class member was not directly mailed or because the
counsel did not obtain more unnamed class member emails.  The IPPs
appropriately focused on the means most likely to notify the class
members, including through traditional and technological means and
publication.  Nor was the content of the notice otherwise
deficient.  The notice appropriately included the information
required by FRCP 23(c)(2)(B).

Finally, the Ninth Circuit finds that the settlement agreement is
not otherwise legally deficient.  First, there is no discrepancy
between the execution date and the date of the last defense counsel
signature on the Toshiba Settlement Agreement.  Second, although
Andrews argues that a variety of claims procedures are missing from
the settlement agreement, he provides no authority requiring that
any of this information be included.

The Appellant's Motion to Stay the Decision, filed March 29, 2021,
is denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 23, 2021 Memorandum is
available at https://tinyurl.com/64y9ema8 from Leagle.com.


QUALITY CARRIERS: Salter Appeals Class Cert. Denial to 9th Cir.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Clayton Salter filed an appeal from a court ruling
entered in the lawsuit entitled CLAYTON SALTER, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. QUALITY
CARRIERS INC., an Illinois Corporation; et al., Defendants, Case
No. 2:20-cv-00479-JFW-JPR, in the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the case
challenges an employer's misclassification of employees as
independent contractors. The employer in this case, a trucking
company named Quality Carriers, initially classified its truck
drivers as employees. To save money, however, Quality Carriers
started classifying some of its drivers as independent contractors
instead. The drivers' jobs stayed much the same. But their wages
changed significantly: Once the drivers were reclassified, the
company started passing along its business expenses to the drivers
in violation of California's wage-and-hour laws.

The misclassified workers, represented by one of the drivers,
Clayton Salter, sued Quality Carriers to recover lost wages. All of
the drivers' claims flow from the same theory of liability -- that
Quality illegally classified them as independent contractors, the
Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff pursues claims described in his First Amended
Complaint for failure to provide meal and rest breaks; failure to
pay wages owed upon termination; failure to provide accurate,
itemized wage statements; failure to reimburse business expenses;
illegal wage deductions, and unfair and unlawful business practices
under California law against the Defendants.

The Plaintiff now seeks a review of the Court's Order dated April
9, 2021, denying his motion for class certification pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3) consisting of:

   "All current and former drivers of the defendants who were
   domiciled at the defendants' California terminals and were
   classified as independent contractors and drove under the
   defendants' authority within four years prior to, and up
   until the resolution of, this lawsuit."

The appellate case is captioned as Clayton Salter v. Quality
Carriers, Inc., et al., Case No. 21-80038, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, filed on April 23,
2021.[BN]

Plaintiff-Petitioner CLAYTON SALTER, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Daniel Joseph Bass, Esq.
          Taras Kick, Esq.
          THE KICK LAW FIRM
          815 Moraga Drive
          Los Angeles, CA 90049
          Telephone: (310) 395-2988
          E-mail: daniel@kicklawfirm.com
                  taras@kicklawfirm.com  

               - and -

          Jennifer D. Bennett, Esq.
          GUPTA WESSLER
          100 Pine Street, Suite 1250
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 573-0336
          E-mail: jennifer@guptawessler.com

               - and -

          Matthew W.H. Wessler, Esq.
          GUPTA WESSLER PLLC
          1900 L Street, NW, Suite 312
          Washington, DC 20036
          Telephone: (607) 316-1499
          E-mail: matt@guptawessler.com

Defendants-Respondents QUALITY CARRIERS, INC., an Illinois
Corporation, and QUALITY DISTRIBUTION, INC., a Florida Corporation,
are represented by:

          Christopher James Eckhart, Esq.
          Elizabeth Ashley Paynter, Esq.
          SCOPELITIS, GARVIN, LIGHT, HANSON & FEARY, P.C.
          10 West Market Street
          Indianapolis, IN 46204
          Telephone: (317) 637-1777
          E-mail: ceckhart@scopelitis.com  
                  apaynter@scopelitis.com

               - and -

          Christopher Chad McNatt, Jr., Esq.
          SCOPELITIS, GARVIN, LIGHT, HANSON & FEARY, LLP
          2 North Lake Avenue
          Pasadena, CA 91101
          Telephone: (626) 795-4700
          E-mail: cmcnatt@scopelitis.com

ROSELLA PIZZA: Failed to Pay Minimum & OT Wages, Angel Suit Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
JORGE LEON ANGEL, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated v. ROSELLA PIZZA, INC. (D/B/A ROSELLA'S PIZZERIA),
FRANCESCO LAPUMA and FLAVIO MORALES, Case No. 1:21-cv-03648
(S.D.N.Y., April 23, 2021) is a class action brought against the
Defendants for unpaid minimum and overtime wages pursuant to the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and for violations of the N.Y.
Labor Law, and the "spread of hours" and overtime wage orders of
the New York Commissioner of Labor codified at N.Y. COMP. CODES R.
& REGS, including applicable liquidated damages, interest,
attorneys' fees and costs.

The complaint states that Plaintiff Angel was ostensibly employed
as a delivery worker. However, he was required to spend a
considerable part of his work day performing non-tipped duties,
including but not limited to preparing dough, sauce, pizza, cutting
cheese, cutting sausage, cutting pepperoni and other vegetables for
the pizza, mopping, dishwashing and packing food for deliveries.

The complaint alleges that Angel worked for Defendants in excess of
40 hours per week, without appropriate minimum wage, overtime, and
spread of hours compensation for the hours that he worked.
Defendants failed to maintain accurate record-keeping of the hours
worked and failed to pay the Plaintiff appropriately for any hours
worked, either at the straight rate of pay or for any additional
overtime premium. Defendants also failed to pay Plaintiff the
required "spread of hours" pay for any day in which he had to work
over 10 hours a day, the complaint asserts.

Plaintiff Angel was employed by Defendants at Rosella's Pizzeria
from approximately 2009 until on or about April 2, 2021.

Rosella Pizza, Inc. (d/b/a Rosella's Pizzeria) is a domestic
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of
New York.

Francesco Lapuma is sued individually in his capacity as owner,
officer and/or agent of Defendant Corporation. Lapuma possesses
operational control over Defendant Corporation, an ownership
interest in Defendant Corporation, and controls significant
functions of Defendant Corporation.

Flavio Morales is sued individually in his capacity as a manager of
Defendant Corporation. Morales possesses operational control over
Defendant Corporation and controls significant functions of
Defendant Corporation. He determines the wages and compensation of
the employees of Defendants, including Plaintiff Leon, establishes
the schedules of the employees, maintains employee records, and has
the authority to hire and fire employees.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317-1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317-1620


SCIENTIFIC GAMES: Bid to Stay Discovery in Tonkawa Suit Denied
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Tonkawa Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma, et al.,
Plaintiffs v. Scientific Games Corporation, et al., Defendants,
Case No. 2:20-cv-01637-GMN-BNW (D. Nev.), Magistrate Judge Brenda
Weksler of the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada:

    (i) denied the Defendants' motion to stay discovery;

   (ii) denied without prejudice the Defendants' motion for a
        protective order;

  (iii) granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs' motion
        to compel; and

   (iv) denied the parties proposed discovery plan and scheduling
        order.

The case is a putative class action brought by certain Plaintiff
casinos.  The Plaintiffs have been harmed by the Defendants'
monopolization of the sale of automatic card shuffling machines.
The Defendants filed multiple sham litigations to enforce invalid
patents (that were obtained by committing a fraud on the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office).  The conduct resulted in the
Defendants' unlawful monopoly of the automatic card shuffling
market.  The Plaintiffs purchased card shuffling machines from the
Defendants at increased, monopoly-based prices and thus were harmed
by the Defendants' conduct.  As a result, the Plaintiffs filed the
suit.

The Defendants have since moved to dismiss the case.  They argue
that the case should be dismissed because the statute of
limitations has run.  Alternatively, they move to compel
arbitration, arguing that the parties contracted to arbitrate
disputes such as this.  The Defendants also argue that if the case
is not dismissed or moved to arbitration, it should be transferred
to the Northern District of Illinois.  The Plaintiffs oppose the
Defendants' motion to dismiss, arbitrate, or transfer venue.

The Plaintiffs also moved for partial summary judgment.  Generally,
the Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants are collaterally estopped
from relitigating whether they unlawfully monopolized the automatic
card shuffling market, as this issue was decided against Defendants
in another case.  The Defendants disagree and oppose this motion.

In light of the Defendants' pending motion to dismiss and the
Plaintiffs' pending motion for partial summary judgment, the
Defendants moved to stay discovery.  The Plaintiffs opposed this
request.  The parties reiterated their dispute about whether
discovery should proceed in their proposed discovery plan and
scheduling order.  Additionally, the Plaintiffs propounded
discovery on the Defendants, and the Defendants moved for a
protective order based on their pending motion to stay discovery
and other specific objections they have to the Plaintiffs'
discovery requests.  The Plaintiffs opposed this motion and filed a
motion to compel responses to their discovery requests.  The
Defendants oppose this motion to compel.

I. Motion to Stay Discovery

The Defendants requested a stay of discovery because they have a
potentially dispositive motion pending, and the Plaintiffs have a
potentially partially dispositive motion pending.

Magistrate Judge Weksler reviewed the parties' briefs on the motion
to stay discovery and took a preliminary peek at their dispositive
motions.  Having conducted this preliminary peek, she is not
convinced that the Plaintiffs will be unable to proceed with their
claims in the Court.  The Judge is neither convinced that the
Defendants will succeed on their statute of limitations defense at
this point in the litigation nor is it convinced that all the
Plaintiffs' claims are subject to arbitration.  She is also not
convinced that the case should or will be transferred to the
Northern District of Illinois.  She will not, however, provide an
in-depth analysis of its evaluation of the motion to dismiss.  In
her broad discretion, she will order the parties to proceed with
discovery because she is not convinced the Defendants will succeed
on their dispositive motion.

II. Motion for a Protective Order

The Defendants move for a protective order because they have a
motion to stay discovery pending and because they have certain
specific objections to the Plaintiffs' discovery requests.

Magistrate Judge Weksler will deny the Defendants' motion to a
protective order without prejudice because she is denying their
motion to stay discovery and because it is not clear her that the
parties have fully met and conferred on the Defendants' specific
objections to Plaintiffs' discovery requests.  Furthermore, she
finds that the Defendants state in their responses and objections
to the Plaintiffs' discovery requests that they will amend their
responses within 15 days of a ruling on the Defendants' motions.
Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge will order the Defendants to
amend their responses within 15 days of her order.  To the extent
the parties disagree about the propriety of the Defendants'
responses and objections, they must meet and confer about each
specific discovery request.  If they cannot resolve their disputes,
either party may file an appropriate motion.

III. Motion to Compel

The Plaintiffs move to compel the Defendants to respond to their
discovery requests.

Magistrate Judge Weksler will grant the Plaintiffs' motion in part
and deny it in part.  She holds that the Plaintiffs' motion to
compel is granted to the extent that she will order the Defendants
to respond to the Plaintiffs' discovery requests, given that the
she is denying the Defendants' motion to stay discovery and motion
for a protective order.  The Plaintiffs' motion is denied to the
extent it requests that the Defendants be required to produce all
responsive documents within 15 days.  The Judge agrees with the
Defendants that 15 days is not a reasonable period within which to
require them to produce all responsive documents.  She also agrees
with the Defendants that it is reasonable for the parties to meet
and confer about when they will begin producing documents.

Accordingly, and as previously stated, the Defendants must amend
their responses to the Plaintiffs' discovery requests within 15
days.  The parties must then meet and confer about any disputes
over the Defendants' responses and a reasonable time frame within
which the Defendants will begin producing documents.

IV. Proposed Discovery Plan and Scheduling Order

Magistrate Judge Weksler reviewed the parties' proposed discovery
plan and scheduling order.  In her broad discretion to control
discovery, she will deny both the parties' proposed discovery
plans.  Given the Court's ruling on the motion to stay discovery
and the amount of time that has lapsed since the filing of the
proposed discovery plan and scheduling order, the Judge does not
believe that either parties' proposed discovery plans are
appropriate or feasible.  Accordingly, she will order the parties
to submit a new proposed discovery plan and scheduling order by May
6, 2021.  The parties are advised that the Court does not believe
that bifurcated discovery (wherein the parties only conduct
discovery on the Defendants' statute of limitations defense first)
is best for the case.  This is so because the Judge is far from
convinced that the Defendants' statute of limitations defense will
be decided in the Defendants' favor on a motion for summary
judgment.  And in the absence of this outcome, the case will take
an extraordinary amount of time to conclude.

Additionally, the parties are advised that the Court hopes the
parties can, at a minimum, agree on the "events" (e.g., completion
of fact discovery, motion for class certification, etc.) they seek
deadlines for (even if they do not agree on what the deadlines
should be).  In the absence of such an agreement, the Court will
choose or create its own discovery plan and scheduling order.

Based on the foregoing, Magistrate Judge Weksler denied the
Defendants' motion to stay discovery.  She denied without prejudice
the Defendants' motion for a protective order.  She granted in part
and denied in part the Plaintiffs' motion to compel in part as
specified in the Order.

The Defendants must amend their responses to the Plaintiffs'
discovery requests within 15 days.  The parties must then meet and
confer about any disputes over the Defendants' responses and a
reasonable time frame within which the Defendants will begin
producing documents.

The Judge denied the parties proposed discovery plan and scheduling
order.

The parties must file a new proposed discovery plan and scheduling
order by May 6, 2021.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 23, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/kf3nfk74 from Leagle.com.


STAT TRANSCRIPTION: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ERIC B. FROMER
CHIROPRACTIC, INC., a California corporation, individually and as
the representative of a class of similarly-situated persons, v.
STAT TRANSCRIPTION SERVICES INC., a Michigan corporation, Case No.
2:21-cv-10916-DML-CI (E.D. Mich.), the Plaintiff filed a
"placeholder" motion for class certification in order to prevent
against a "buy-off" attempt, a tactic class-action defendants
sometimes use to attempt to prevent a case from proceeding to a
decision on class certification by attempting to "moot" the named
plaintiff's claims by tendering the plaintiff individual (but not
class-wide) relief.

In Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016), the
Supreme Court held "an unaccepted settlement offer or offer of
judgment does not moot a plaintiff's case," and "a would-be class
representative with a live claim of her own must be accorded a fair
opportunity to show that certification is warranted." The Sixth
Circuit applied Campbell-Ewald in an unreported opinion in Family
Health Chiropractic, Inc. v. MD On-Line Sols., Inc., No. 15-3508,
2016 WL 384823, (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 2016).

In Wilson v. Gordon, 822 F.3d 934, 949-50 (6th Cir. 2016), the
Sixth Circuit held that, even where "[t]he parties [did] not
dispute that all eleven named plaintiffs' individual claims became
moot before the district court certified the class," the
"picking-off" exception applied and allowed the named plaintiffs
with moot individual claims to pursue class certification, which
would "relate back" to the filing of the complaint, applying
Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980). The
Sixth Circuit held this ruling was consistent with Campbell-Ewald,
136 S. Ct. at 672, which refused to put defendants "in the driver's
seat" on class certification.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated April 23,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3eLQEVa
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ryan M. Kelly, Esq.
          ANDERSON + WANCA
          3701 Algonquin Road, Suite 500
          Rolling Meadows, IL 60008
          Telephone: (847) 368-1500
          Facsimile: (847) 368-1501
          E-mail: rkelly@andersonwanca.com

STRADA SERVICES: Reyes Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
------------------------------------------------------------------
RICHARD REYES, individually and On behalf of all others similarly
situated v. STRADA SERVICES INC. d/b/a Strada Electric and
Security, Case No: 8:21-cv-00976 (M.D. Fla., April 23, 2021) seeks
to recover from Defendant overtime compensation, liquidated
damages, prejudgment interest, and costs and reasonable attorney's
fees under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Plaintiff Richard Reyes worked for Defendant from January 2019
through April 2021 from Defendant's Port Richey, Florida office as
an "electrician," and/or Electrical Installer.

The complaint alleges that Defendant has maintained a scheme to
avoid its obligations to pay overtime wages to its non-exempt,
labor workers and employees in order to save millions of dollars in
labor costs and maximize profits all to the detriment of its
employees. Defendant shaves or edits overtime hours from the
employees' time records and also permits laborers and non-exempt
employees to suffer to work off the clock, it adds.

Defendant also discourages and takes actions to intimidate and
prevent full and accurate reporting of all work hours for all
piecework workers and labors, such as Plaintiff and "Helpers," a
job title which may not be formal but is the name referred to for a
certain class of workers and position to describe the laborer who
rides along with the Installer/electrician to all work sites and on
work orders, asserts the complaint.

Strada is a for profit corporation with principal place of business
in Sanford, Florida. Defendant owns and does business under the
Florida registered fictitious business name of Strada Electric and
Security, and operates 22 offices throughout Florida where
similarly situated present and former employees worked from or
reported to. Defendant operates a Statewide electrical contracting
and Security Services Company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mitchell L. Feldman, Esq.
          FELDMAN LEGAL GROUP
          6940 W. Linebaugh Ave, #101
          Tampa, FL 33625
          Tel: 813-639-9366
          Fax: 813-639-9376
          E-mail: Mfeldman@flandgatrialattorneys.com


SUPERIOR CAFE: Kim Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Minimum & OT Wages
------------------------------------------------------------------
Chul Kyu Kim, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated in
the proposed FLSA Collective Action v. Superior Cafe Corp., 1490
Superior Foods Corp., Rasam Almontaser, Mustaf "Doe," Jammut "Doe,"
and Laji "Doe," Case No. :21-cv-03620 (S.D.N.Y., April 23, 2021) is
a lawsuit seeking recovery against Defendants' violations of the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and violations of Articles 6 and
19 of the New York State Labor Law (NYLL) and their supporting New
York State Department of Labor regulations.

The complaint asserts pursuant to the FLSA and the NYLL that Kim
(and similarly situated individuals) is entitled to recover from
the Defendants: (1) unpaid overtime wage compensation, (2)
liquidated damages, (3) spread of hours pay, (4) up to $5,000 for
Defendants' failure to provide a Time of Hire Notice detailing
rates of pay on each pay day, pursuant to the New York State Wage
Theft Prevention Act (WTPA), (5) up to $5,000 for Defendants'
failure to provide a pay stub that accurately and truthfully lists
the employee's hours along with the name, employer's name,
employer's address and telephone number, employee's rate or rates
of pay, any deductions made from employee's wages, any allowances
claimed as part of the minimum wage, and the employee's gross and
net wages for each pay day, pursuant to the WTPA,(6) prejudgment
and post-judgment interest; and (7) attorneys' fees and costs.

Plaintiff Kim was employed as a cook at Defendants' restaurant
located at 1490 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10029 from April
20, 2015 through and including June 2020.

Defendant Superior Cafe Corp. is a domestic corporation organized
and existing under the laws of the State of New York. Superior Cafe
(i) has had and continues to have employees engaged in commerce or
in the production of goods and services for commerce and handling,
selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials that have been
moved in or produced for commerce by any person and (ii) has had
and continues to have an annual gross volume of sales of not less
than $500,000.

Defendant 1490 Superior Foods Corp. is a domestic corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the State of New York.

Defendant Rasam Almontaser is sued individually and in his capacity
as an owner, officer and/or agent of the Corporate Defendants.
Almontaser possesses or possessed operational control over the
Corporate Defendants, or controlled significant functions of the
Corporate Defendants.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joshua Levin-Epstein, Esq.
          Levin-Epstein & Associates, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4700
          New York, NY 10165
          Tel: (212) 792-0046
          E-mail: Joshua@levinepstein.com


TD AMERITRADE: Eighth Cir. Flips Class Certification in Ford Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reverses the
district court's order certifying a class in the case, Roderick
Ford, Plaintiff-Appellee v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corporation; TD
Ameritrade, Inc.; Frederic J. Tomczyk, Defendants-Appellants.
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association; Chamber of
Commerce of the United States of America, Amici on Behalf of
Appellants, Better Markets, Inc., Amicus on Behalf of Appellee,
Case No. 18-3689 (8th Cir.).

A customer of TD Ameritrade sued the company and two other
Defendants for securities fraud in the District of New Jersey.  He
purported to sue on behalf of himself and all similarly-situated
customers of TD Ameritrade.  The district court in New Jersey later
appointed Roderick Ford as the Lead Plaintiff, and the court then
transferred the action to the District of Nebraska.  The district
court in Nebraska certified a class under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(3), and the Defendants appeal that order.

TD Ameritrade offers brokerage services to retail investors.  The
company is the nation's third largest discount brokerage, serving
over six million clients.  TD Ameritrade customers can trade stocks
by submitting orders through the company's online platform.  The
company itself does not execute customer orders, but instead routes
orders to trading venues (such as a stock exchange) for
fulfillment.  The company generally transmits orders using a
computerized routing system.

Mr. Ford was appointed in 2014 as the Lead Plaintiff for a group of
investors who purchased and sold securities through TD Ameritrade
between 2011 and 2014.  He alleges that TD Ameritrade's order
routing practices violate the company's "duty of best execution" by
systematically sending customer orders to trading venues that pay
the company the most money, rather than to venues that provide the
best outcome for customers.  The duty of best execution requires
that brokers "use reasonable efforts to maximize the economic
benefit to the client in each transaction."

Mr. Ford maintains that TD Ameritrade caused customers to suffer
economic loss by leaving orders unfilled, filling orders at a
sub-optimal price, and filling orders in a manner that adversely
affected performance after execution.  The complaint asserts that
TD Ameritrade, its parent company, and its chief executive officer,
Frederic J. Tomczyk, violated Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. Section 78j(b), and the Securities
and Exchange Commission's Rule 10b-5. 17 C.F.R. Section 240.10b-5.
The complaint also asserts that Tomcyzk is jointly and severally
liable as a "controlling person" of the company under Section 20(a)
of the Act. 15 U.S.C. Section 78t(a).

Mr. Ford moved for class certification in 2017.  A magistrate judge
concluded that the proposed class did not satisfy the requirements
of Rule 23(b)(3) and recommended denying certification.  The judge
reasoned that determining whether each TD Ameritrade customer
suffered economic loss as a result of the company's order routing
practices would entail an order-by-order inquiry, and that common
issues thus did not predominate over individual questions.

On review of the recommendation, however, the district court
determined that Ford's expert had developed an algorithm that could
solve the predominance problem by making automatic determinations
of economic loss for each customer.  The court certified a class
consisting of "all clients of TD Ameritrade between Sept. 15, 2011
and Sept. 15, 2014 who placed orders that did not receive best
execution, in connection with which TD Ameritrade received either
liquidity rebates or payment for order flow, and who were thereby
damaged."

The parties' experts disagree about which transactions should be
excluded.  Ford argues that the disagreement is unresolved only
because TD Ameritrade successfully moved to limit discovery of
class-wide trading data.  Once discovery is complete, he contends,
he will be able to identify all necessary exclusions.

The Eighth Circuit granted the Defendants permission to appeal the
class certification order.  It reviews the order for abuse of
discretion.  It concludes that despite advances in technology,
individual evidence and inquiry is still required to determine
economic loss for each class member.  Advanced computing power can
expedite that determination, but it cannot change its underlying
nature by converting individual evidence into common evidence.  In
the case, the prevalence of these individualized inquiries
precludes class certification under Rule 23(b)(3).

Another concern with predominance is the nature of the trading
conduct at issue.  Measuring economic loss in the case is a more
complex task, and the individual questions preclude a conclusion
that common issues predominate.  Because economic loss cannot be
presumed, ascertaining which class members have sustained injury
means individual issues predominate over common ones.  The district
court therefore abused its discretion in certifying a class under
Rule 23(b)(3). C.

There is an independent problem with the class as defined by the
district court: It is an impermissible "fail-safe class."  The
definition incorporates two contested elements of liability --
failure to seek best execution and economic loss.  By defining the
class to include only those customers who were harmed by TD
Ameritrade's alleged failure to seek best execution, the district
court certified a class in which membership depends upon having a
valid claim on the merits.

Such a class is impermissible because it allows putative class
members to seek a remedy but not be bound by an adverse judgment.
The Eighth Circuit holds that fail-safe classes are unmanageable
because it cannot know to whom notice should be sent.  If a
fail-safe class is certified as a means of avoiding a predominance
problem under Rule 23(b)(3), its independent shortcomings are an
alternative basis to reverse class certification.

For the foregoing reasons, the Eighth Circuit concludes that the
proposed class does not satisfy the requirements of Rule 23, and it
therefore reverses the district court's order certifying a class
and remands for further proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 23, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/kkhnczn4 from Leagle.com.


TOPA INSURANCE: Caribe Restaurant Appeals Insurance Case Dismissal
------------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Caribe Restaurant & Nightclub, Inc. filed an appeal from
a court ruling entered in the lawsuit styled CARIBE RESTAURANT &
NIGHTCLUB, INC., individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. TOPA INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, Case No.
2:20-cv-03570-ODW-MRW, in the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California, Los Angeles.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on April 22, 2021, Judge
Otis D. Wright, II, of the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California granted Topa's Motion to Dismiss Caribe's
First Amended Complaint without leave to amend.

Plaintiff Caribe initiated the class action against Defendant Topa
alleging breach of contract and seeking declaratory judgment for
insurance coverage. Caribe owns and operates La Luz Ultralounge, a
restaurant and nightclub located in Bonita, California. Caribe
purchased an insurance policy from Topa for the policy period of
May 18, 2019, through May 18, 2020.

In March 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the State of
California and County of San Diego ordered "the closure of bars"
and "banned onsite dining." In May 2020, San Diego County
"permitted the resumption of onsite dining" subject to
restrictions. Caribe alleges that, as a result of these civil
authority orders, it was forced to "suspend or reduce business" at
La Luz. Caribe also alleges that COVID-19 "impaired Caribe's
property by making it unusable in the way that it had been used
before."

Caribe alleges that its losses are covered under the Policy and
identifies four specific provisions: "Business Income"; "Extra
Expense"; "Civil Authority"; and "Duties in the Event of Loss"
("Sue and Labor" provision). Caribe filed claims for coverage under
these provisions, which Topa denied.  Accordingly, Caribe commenced
the litigation against Topa asserting that denial of coverage was a
breach of contract and seeking declaratory judgment. Topa's motion
to dismiss followed.

The Plaintiff now seeks a review of the Court's Order dismissing
Caribe's First Amended Complaint without leave to amend.

The appellate case is captioned as Caribe Restaurant & Nightclub v.
Topa Insurance Company, Case No. 21-55405, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Appellant Caribe Restaurant and Nightclub, Inc. Mediation
Questionnaire is due on May 30, 2021;

   -- Appellant Caribe Restaurant and Nightclub, Inc. opening brief
is due on June 22, 2021;

   -- Appellee Topa Insurance Company answering brief is due on
July 22, 2021; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after service
of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant CARIBE RESTAURANT AND NIGHTCLUB, INC.,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, is
represented by:

          Freya Kirsten Bowen, Esq.
          Jeff J. Bowen, Esq.
          BURNS BOWEN BAIR LLP
          1 S. Pinckney Street, Suite 930
          Madison, WI 53703
          Telephone: (608) 286-2037
          E-mail: fbowen@bbblawllp.com
                  jbowen@bbblawllp.com   

               - and -

          Moze Cowper, Esq.
          COWPER LAW LLP
          10880 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1840
          Los Angeles, CA 90024
          Telephone: (877) 529-3707
          E-mail: mcowper@cowperlaw.com

               - and -

          Douglas A. Daniels, Esq.
          DANIELS & TREDENNICK LLP
          6363 Woodway, Suite 965
          Houston, TX 77057
          Telephone: (713) 917-0024
          E-mail: doug.daniels@dtlawyers.com

               - and -

          Mark A. DiCello, Esq.
          DICELLO LEVITT GUTZLER LLC
          7556 Mentor Avenue
          Mentor, OH 44060
          Telephone: (440) 953-8888
          E-mail: madicello@dicellolevitt.com  

               - and -

          Daniel R. Ferri, Esq.
          Adam J. Levitt, Esq.
          DICELLO LEVITT & CASEY LLC
          Ten North Dearborn Street, Eleventh Floor
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 214-7900
          E-mail: dferri@dicellolevitt.com
                  alevitt@dicellolevitt.com   

               - and -

          Mark Lanier, Esq.
          THE LANIER LAW FIRM, P.C.
          10940 W. Sam Houston Parkway N., Suite 100
          Houston, TX 77064   
          Telephone: (713) 659-5200
          E-mail: mark.lanier@lanierlawfirm.com

Defendant-Appellee TOPA INSURANCE COMPANY is represented by:

          Gordon Alan Greenberg, Esq.
          Jason D. Strabo, Esq.
          MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY LLP
          2049 Century Park East, Suite 3200
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 277-4110
          E-mail: ggreenberg@mwe.com
                  jstrabo@mwe.com

UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Singh Suit Seeks to Certiy Class of Drivers
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JASWINDER SINGH,
individually and on behalf of all those similarly situated, v. UBER
TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Case No. 3:16-cv-03044-FLW-DEA (D.N.J.), the
Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order:

   1. certifying, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1), or in the
      alternative Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) or Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)
      (3), a single-issue Rule 23(c)(4) class, consisting of:

      "Uber rideshare drivers who worked in New Jersey at any time

      since Defendant began operations in New Jersey (around
      November of 2013) to the present, to resolve the single issue

      of whether the class to which such drivers belong engages in

      interstate commerce such that their contracts with Uber are
      exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act pursuant to 9 U.S.C.

      section 1."

   2. In the alternative to paragraph 1 of this motion, certifying

      pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1), a single-issue Rule
      23(c)(4) class, consisting of:

      "Uber rideshare drivers who worked in the United States since

      2010, to resolve the single issue of whether the class to
      which such drivers belong engages in interstate commerce such

      that their contracts with Uber are exempt from the Federal
      Arbitration Act pursuant to 9 U.S.C. section 1."

   3. appointing the Plaintiff Singh as the class representative;
      and

   4. appointing Swartz Swidler, LLC as class counsel pursuant to
      Rule 23(g).

      "Uber Technologies is an American technology company. Its
      services include ride-hailing, food delivery, package
      delivery, couriers, freight transportation, and, through a
      partnership with Lime, electric bicycle and motorized scooter

      rental.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated April 23,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3ugbMsX
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin L. Swidler, Esq.
          Matthew D. Miller, Esq.
          Joshua S. Boyette, Esq.
          SWARTZ SWIDLER, LLC
          1101 Kings Highway N, Ste. 402
          Cherry Hill, NJ 08034
          Telephone: (856) 685-7420
          E-mail: jswidler@swartz-legal.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Paul C. Lantis, Esq.
          William J. Simmons, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
          Three Parkway
          1601 Cherry Street, Suite 1400
          Philadelphia, PA 19102

               - and -

          Theane Evangelis, Esq.
          Samuel Eckman, Esq.
          Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP
          333 South Grand Avenue
          Los Angeles, CA 90071

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA: Ruling for Regents in Gomez Suit Affirmed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GUIVINI GOMEZ, Plaintiff and Appellant v. THE REGENTS
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, Defendant and Respondent, Case No.
D077181 (Cal. App.), the Court of Appeals of California, Fourth
District, Division One, affirms the superior court's order
sustaining the Regents' demurrer without leave to amend and
entering judgment in their favor.

Ms. Gomez is a former employee of the Regents of the University of
California.  She sued the Regents, as the named Plaintiff in a
purported class action, claiming the Regents failed to pay her the
required minimum wage for all hours she worked.  However, she does
not allege that the Regents set her hourly wage below the minimum
wage as established by California law.  Instead, she contends the
Regents' time-keeping procedures of rounding hours and
automatically deducting 30-minute meal breaks resulted in her not
receiving the minimum wage for all hours she actually worked.  In
addition to claiming the Regents did not pay her the minimum wage,
Gomez also sought penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act
of 2004, Labor Code section 2698 et seq. (PAGA).

The Regents demurred to the complaint, arguing the first cause of
action for failure to pay minimum wage for all hours worked was
barred as a matter of law because the Regents are exempt from
statutes and regulations that govern wages and benefits of public
employees.  The Regents further contended Gomez's claim under PAGA
was barred because: (1) it is derivative of the minimum wages
claim; (2) the Labor Code only applies to employees in the private
sector unless the provision specifically states it applies to
public employees; and (3) the Regents are exempt under Government
Code section 818.

Ms. Gomez opposed the demurrer, asserting that minimum wage laws
apply to all workers employed in California, without limitation,
and such laws are an exercise of the state's police powers and
concern a matter of statewide concern.  In so arguing, Gomez urged
the superior court to follow Marquez v. City of Long Beach (2019)
32 Cal.App.5th 552.  She also maintained that PAGA applied to the
Regents, and Government Code section 818 did not provide the
Regents any exemption from civil penalties.

The superior court sustained the Regents' demurrer without leave to
amend.  In doing so, the court found that the instant matter was
analogous to Kim v. Regents of University of California (2000) 80
Cal.App.4th 160, in which the appellate court concluded the Regents
could not be liable for failing to pay their employees overtime
pay.  The superior court observed: "There is no reasonable or
meaningful distinction between overtime and minimum wage
requirements that would support a diversion from the holding in
Kim."  It further found the Regents were exempt from PAGA under
Government Code section 818.

Ms. Gomez timely appealed the amended judgment.  Gomez argues that
the superior court erred in concluding that the minimum wage laws
do not apply to the Regents and that she could not seek penalties
against the Regents under PAGA as a matter of law.

Discussion

A. Demurrer

I. The Minimum Wage Claim

Ms. Gomez's first cause of action involves allegations that the
Regents' time-keeping procedures of rounding hours worked and
automatically deducting 30-minute meal breaks resulted in her
receiving less than minimum wage for all the hours that she worked.
She claims the Regents violated sections 11944 and 1197.  Although
the complaint only mentions wage orders in general, on appeal,
Gomez makes clear she believes Wage Order No. 4-2001 applies to the
Regents.  Underlying Gomez's first cause of action is her assertion
that minimum wage laws apply to the Regents.

Ms. Gomez devotes a substantial amount of her opening brief
attempting to distinguish Kim.  To this end, she points out that
overtime wages are different than minimum wages.  Gomez observes
that Wage Order No. 4 expressly excludes public employees from
overtime wage requirements.  Thus, according to Gomez, the court in
Kim had clear statutory guidance that the overtime wage
requirements did not apply to the Regents.

However, the Court of Appeals opines that Gomez's argument
overlooks the fact the plaintiff in Kim argued the subject wage
order did not apply to her because she was not employed directly by
the state.  Rather, the plaintiff argued that her employer, the
Regents, were a different type of entity altogether.  Thus, the
court in Kim did not address whether Wage Order No. 4 applied to
the Regents but, instead, followed the reasoning of Labor Council
and Aubry in determining the plaintiff did not have a valid state
law claim against the Regents.

Ms. Gomez is urging the Court of Appeals to expand the holding of
Marquez and apply it beyond charter cities to a completely
different type of public entity.  However, she has not provided any
case wherein a court applied the four-part test set forth in
California Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1991)
54 Cal.3d 1 to an entity other than a charter city.

In short, on the unique facts before it, the COurt of Appeals
declines to extend Marquez and Sheppard v. North Orange County
Regional Occupational Program (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 289, to the
claims Gomez alleged against the Regents.  It finds that Gomez has
not alleged the Regents set her hourly pay below the minimum wage.
Instead, she challenged certain time-keeping procedures the Regents
employ.  In light of California courts' consistent deference to the
Regents regarding the setting of wages and benefits for employees,
the Court of Appeals concludes the superior court did not err in
sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend as to the first
cause of action.  The Regents' time-keeping procedures are matters
of internal affairs of the university that do not come within any
of the exceptions to the Regents' constitutional immunity.

B. PAGA

Having concluded that the superior court did not err in sustaining
the Regents' demurrer as to the first cause of action, the Court of
Appelas turns to Gomez's second cause of action wherein she sought
penalties under PAGA.  As it explains post, Gomez's claim under
PAGA is derivative of her first cause of action.  Because the first
cause of action cannot stand against the Regents, Gomez's PAGA
claim necessarily fails.

An employee may only seek civil penalties under PAGA if he or she
is aggrieved. An "aggrieved employee" is "any person who was
employed by the alleged violator and against whom one or more of
the alleged violations was committed."  Because the Court of
Appeals has determined that Gomez cannot maintain her first cause
of action against the Regents, the Regents cannot be considered a
violator under PAGA, and Gomez is not the victim of any violation.
Therefore, the second cause of action under PAGA fails.

Disposition

The judgment is affirmed.  The Regents are entitled to their costs
on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 23, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/bd2t572s from Leagle.com.

Law Office of Kevin T. Barnes, Kevin T. Barnes, Gregg Lander --
Lander@kbarnes.com; Sansanowicz Law Group, Leonard H. Sansanowicz
-- leonard@law-slg.com; Davtyan Law Firm and Emil Davtyan for
Plaintiff and Appellant.

Reed Smith, Raymond A. Cardozo -- rcardozo@reedsmith.com -- and
Brian A. Sutherland -- bsutherland@reedsmith.com -- for Defendant
and Respondent.


US STEEL: Prolenski, Paceley Sue Over Unlawful Pension Scheme
-------------------------------------------------------------
JOSHUA PROLENSKI and DENNIS PACELEY, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated v. UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION,
TRANSTAR, LLC, GARY RAILWAY COMPANY, and UNION RAILROAD COMPANY,
LLC, Case 2:21-cv-00545-WSH (W.D. Pa., April 23, 2021) arises from
the Defendants' violations of of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act.

The complaint alleges that in 2013, the U.S. Steel Defendants
created and implemented a discriminatory scheme which targeted
employees who were participants of the United States Steel
Corporation Plan for Employee Pension Benefits (Revision of 2003)
("Carnegie Pension"). The scheme was part of a plan known as the
Carnegie Way, which was a grand attempt by the U.S. Steel
Defendants to transform the companies during a downturn in the
steel industry. The Carnegie Way has since become the focus of
numerous lawsuits, all of which depict the plan as nothing more
than a charade. It now appears that the Carnegie Way was simply a
cover for extreme, cost-cutting measures which allowed the U.S.
Steel Defendants to reduce debt and expenses by any means possible,
adds the complaint.

Plaintiff Joshua Prolenski is an adult individual who resides in
West Mifflin, Pennsylvania.

Plaintiff Dennis Paceley is an adult individual who resides in
Portage, Indiana.

United States Steel Corporation is a corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the State of Delaware with its principal
place of business located in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

Transtar, LLC is a holding company organized as a corporation and
existing under the laws of the State of Delaware with its principal
place of business located in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Transtar is
comprised of seven railroad entities: Delray Connecting Railroad
Company, Fairfield Southern Company, Gary Railway Company, Lorain
Northern Company, Texas & Northern Railway Company, The Lake
Terminal Railroad Company, and Union Railroad Company.

Union Railroad Company, LLC is a corporation organized and existing
under the laws of the State of Delaware and shares the same
principal place of business as Transtar in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania.

Gary Railway Company is a corporation organized and existing under
the laws of the State of Delaware. Gary Railway has listed a
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania address used by Transtar and Union
Railroad as its principal place of business in the articles of
incorporation it filed with the Indiana Secretary of State.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Sammy Y. Sugiura, Esq.
          COHEN & GRACE, LLC
          105 Braunlich Drive Suite 300
          Pittsburgh, PA 15237
          Telephone: (412) 847-0300
          Facsimile: (412) 847-0304
          E-mail: ssugiura@cohengrace.com



VALLEY PROTEINS Conditional Cert. of FLSA Collective Sought
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as CHRISTOPHER HOLLIS, HERMAN
PURVIS, and VERAKA STURDIVANT, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, v. VALLEY PROTEINS, INC., Case No.
3:21-cv-00112-FDW-DSC (W.D.N.C.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to
enter an order:

   1. conditionally certifying this action and for
court-authorized
      notice pursuant to section 216(B) of the Fair Labor Standards

      Act (FLSA);

   2. approving the proposed FLSA notice of this action and the
      consent form;

   3. directing a production of names, last known mailing
      addresses, last-known cell phone numbers, email addresses,
      work locations, and dates of employment of all putative
      plaintiffs within 15 days of the Order; and

   4. allowing the Plaintiffs the ability to distribute the Notice

      and Opt-in Form via first class mail, email, and text message

      to all putative plaintiffs of the conditionally certified
      collective, with a reminder mailing to be sent 45-days after

      the initial mailing to all non-responding putative
      plaintiffs.

Valley Proteins provides rendering and recycling of animal
by-products. The Company offers animal fats and oils, feed fat,
yellow grease, poultry fat, and biofuel.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class dated April 23,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3uesg4N
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Gilda A. Hernandez, Esq.
          Charlotte Smith, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF GILDA A.
          HERNANDEZ, PLLC
          1020 Southhill Dr., Ste. 130
          Cary, NC 27513
          Telephone: (919) 741-8693
          Facsimile: (919) 869-1853
          E-mail: ghernandez@gildahernandezlaw.com
                  csmith@gildahernandezlaw.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Andrew J. Henson, Esq.
          TROUTMAN PEPPER HAMILTON SANDERS LLP
          1001 Haxall Point, Suite 1500
          Richmond, VA 23219
          Telephone: (804) 697-1390
          Facsimile: (804) 697-1339
          E-mail: andrew.henson@troutman.com

               - and -

          Ashley Z. Hager, Esq.
          Emily E. Schifter, Esq.
          TROUTMAN PEPPER HAMILTON SANDERS LLP
          Bank of America Plaza
          700 Peachtree Street, NE, Suite 3000
          Atlanta, GA 30308
          Telephone: (404) 885-3000
          Facsimile: (404) 885-3900
          E-mail: ashley.hager@troutman.com
                  emily.schifer@troutman.com

WASTE CONNECTIONS: MDE Sues Over Unlawful Overcharging Schemes
--------------------------------------------------------------
MDE WITH R&R PEST CONTROL INC. v. WASTE CONNECTIONS US, INC., and
WASTE CONNECTIONS PALMETTO, INC., Case No. 7:21-cv-01207-DCC
(D.S.C., April 23, 2021) is a class action arising from the
Defendants' widespread and systematic practice of overcharging its
customers through two separate, but related coordinated schemes:
charging unlawful and excessive "fuel surcharges" and price
increases.

According to the complaint, Waste Connections is one of the largest
solid waste disposal companies in the United States, with nearly $5
billion in annual revenue. For years, it entered into standardized
form agreements with small businesses like Plaintiff across the
country. These agreements establish that Waste Connections will
provide solid waste disposal service for a fixed price over a
course of years. The uniform language at issue in these agreements
specifies that Waste Connections may increase this fixed price, but
only to pass-through specific increases in costs it might incur in
providing services. Waste Connections has breached the contract it
entered into with every class member by overcharging them through
two separate, but related, courses of conduct, the complaint
asserts.

First, the uniform contractual language present in every class
member's contract establishes that Waste Connections may only
"proportionately" pass through increases in fuel and material costs
to customers. And Waste Connections purportedly does so through a
fee it calls a "Fuel & Material Surcharge." In truth, this fee is
wholly unrelated to any such increased costs and does not approach
"proportionately" assessing such costs to customers. Second, the
contractual language at issue provides that Waste Connections may
increase rates "to adjust for increases in the Consumer Price
Index," a common measure of inflation. But, again, in blatant
violation of this contractual limitation, Waste Connections has
deliberately and repeatedly overcharged customers through automated
price increases that far out-strip CPI, the complaint alleges.

Plaintiff MDE Pest Services is a South Carolina entity with its
principal place of business in Spartanburg County, South Carolina.
Plaintiff entered into a form contract with Waste Connections in
2019. Plaintiff was subsequently invoiced and paid multiple "Fuel &
Material Surcharges" to Waste Connections within the statutory
period while under the form contract.

Waste Connections US, Inc., and Waste Connections Palmetto, Inc.
are Delaware corporations with their principal place of business in
Texas. Defendants, and their related entities, operate as a single
organization with regard to the conduct at issue in the lawsuit.
Waste Connections US, Inc. shares management structure and
financial accounting with its subsidiaries and parent company,
Waste Connections, Inc., and any legal distinction between these
entities and its subsidiaries is a fiction designed to limit
liability. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          T. Ryan Langley, Esq.
          HODGE & LANGLEY, PC
          229 Magnolia Street
          PO Box 2765
          Spartanburg, SC 29304
          Phone: 864-585-3873
          E-mail: rlangley@hodgelawfirm.com

                    - and -

          Paul S. Landis, Esq.
          FAYSSOUX & LANDIS ATTORNEYS AT LAW, P.A.
          209 East Washington Street
          Greenville, SC 29601
          Phone: 864.233.0445
          Fax: 864.233.4781
          E-mail: paul@fayssouxlandis.com

                    - and -

          Oscar M. Price, IV, Esq.
          Nicholas W. Armstrong, Esq.
          Garrett Owens, Esq.
          PRICE ARMSTRONG, LLC
          2421 2nd Avenue North, Suite 1
          Birmingham, AL 35203
          Phone: 205.208.9588
          Fax: 205.208.9598
          E-mail: oscar@pricearmstrong.com
                  nick@pricearmstrong.com
                  garrett@pricearmstrong.com



WERNER ENTERPRISES: Bid to Dismiss 3rd Amended Midgett Suit Denied
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHRISTOPHER MIDGETT, individually and on behalf of
similarly situated persons, Plaintiff v. WERNER ENTERPRISES, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 8:18CV238 (D. Neb.), Judge Joseph F. Bataillon
of the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska denied
Werner's motion to dismiss the third amended complaint.

The case is conditional collective class action under the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and a putative Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 class-action suit for violations of the Nebraska Wage
Payment and Hour Act ("NWHA").  In Plaintiff Midgett's Third
Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges in Count I that Defendant
Werner improperly classified him and other similarly situated
truckdrivers as independent contractors rather than employees and
failed to pay minimum and overtime wages in violation of the FLSA
and the NWHA.  Jurisdiction over Count I is premised on 29 U.S.C.
Section 216(b) and 28 U.S.C. Section 1331 (federal question
jurisdiction) and jurisdiction over Count II is premised on 28
U.S.C. Section 1367 as a pendent claim.

The Court conditionally certified a collective class under the FLSA
on behalf of:

      (1) all current and former drivers classified as independent
contractors who transported Defendant's truckload shipments anytime
between May 30, 2015, and May 30, 2019, using trucks they purchased
from Defendant; and

      (2) all current and former drivers classified as independent
contractors who transported Defendant's truckload shipments any
time between Nov. 12, 2016, through May 30, 2019, using trucks they
leased or purchased from a person or entity other than Defendant.

All current and former drivers who own or owned more than one truck
at a time or who employed drivers to drive their trucks are
excluded from both classes.

The Plaintiff also sought certification of a class under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23 with respect to the Nebraska claim.  The Court denied
the motion without prejudice to reassertion, finding that the
"prudent course at this point is to deny the motion for Rule 23
class certification until the time for persons to "opt in" to the
collective action has closed."  Midgett alleges that he worked
"across the country."

The Defendant moves to dismiss the NWHA claim for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), contending that
the Plaintiff does not have standing to assert the claim.  It
argues that Midgett does not have standing because he concedes he
is a Georgia resident and does not allege that he worked in
Nebraska.  It asserts that the NWHA does not apply to a
non-resident who does not work in Nebraska.

In opposition to the motion, the Plaintiff submits deposition
testimony, the Werner owner-operator agreement, excerpts from the
Werner owner-operator handbook excerpts, and a compilation of
owner-operator settlement statements.  The evidence shows that the
Plaintiff made trips in Nebraska. The record also shows that
Werner's headquarters are located in Nebraska.  Werner's senior
management is located in Nebraska.  The computer system that Werner
uses to calculate owner-operators' pay is located in Nebraska.  All
data concerning drivers is housed in servers in Nebraska.
Defendant Werner issues 1099s to owner operators from Nebraska.
Owner-Operators receive their pay from Werner's headquarters in
Nebraska; and truck routes are dispatched to drivers from Nebraska.
The Werner Owner Operator Agreement states that the agreement is
governed by the law of Nebraska.

Judge Bataillon finds that Werner's motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction should be denied.  There is no dispute
that the Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the federal
claim.  Werner's argument with respect to the state law claim is
based on an assumption—that Midgett never worked in
Nebraska—that turns out to be incorrect.  The record shows, by
way of Werner's own documents, that Midget did work in Nebraska.
He is party to a contract that specifies the choice of law is the
law of Nebraska. He has contracted with a firm headquartered I
Nebraska, with its principal base of operation in the state.  There
are records indicating that Midgett originated trips and delivered
to Nebraska. Midgett has standing to prosecute his Nebraska law
claim.  The facts in the case are far from those in cases that have
found standing lacking due to an absence of any connection to the
state.

In response to the Defendant's motion, Midgett has presented
evidence that satisfies the prerequisites of standing.  He alleges
a concrete injury caused by the Defendants' actions that will be
redressed should he prevail.  As the named Plaintiff, Judge
Batailon holds Midgett has standing to prosecute the action as a
class action.  It is premature to consider other issues related to
Rule 23 class action certification at the present time.  Those
issues can properly be addressed at the Rule 23 class certification
stage of the proceedings.  Because the same discovery and evidence
are relevant to both the federal and state claims, it makes no
difference to the parties that the determination be made at this
point.  Also, the FLSA claim has been conditionally certified and
any concerns can be addressed at the point of final collective
class certification.

Accordingly, Judge Bataillon denied Werner's motion to dismiss.
The Defendant will answer or otherwise plead within two weeks of
the date of the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 23, 2021 Memorandum & Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/27azhewp from Leagle.com.


WESTERN REFINING: Schmidtberger Seeks to Certify Rule 23 Class
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as DELMAR SCHMIDTBERGER,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
WESTERN REFINING RETAIL, LLC, a Delaware corporation; and DOES 1
through 10, inclusive, Case No. 2:19-cv-04300-VAP-SK (C.D. Calif.),
the Plaintiff will move the Court on September 27, 2021 to enter an
order:

   1. certifying the following class pursuant to Federal Rules of
      Civil Procedure, Rule 23, subdivisions (a) and (b)(3):

      "all persons who worked for the defendant Western Refining
      Retail, LLC as non-exempt employees at its retail stores in
      California at any time from July 1, 2017, through the date of

      the order granting class certification, who worked alone one

      or more shifts alone;"

   2. In the alternative, certifying the following subclasses:

      Meal Break Class:

      "all persons who worked for Defendant as non-exempt employees

      at its retail stores in California at any time from July 1,
      2017, through the date of the order granting class
      certification, who took one or more on-duty meal periods
      while working alone;"

      Rest Break Class

      "all persons who worked for Defendant as non-exempt employees

      at its retail stores in California at any time from July 1,
      2017, through the date of the order granting class
      certification, who worked alone on one or more shifts over
      3.5 hours;"

   3. certifying the derivative claims for failure to furnish
      accurate itemized wage statements and unfair business
      practices;

   4. appointing the Plaintiff as class representative; and

   5. appointing Matthew J. Matern and Launa Adolph of Matern Law
      Group, PC, as class counsel.

The Plaintiff Schmidtberger seeks to represent all non-exempt
employees who worked alone at defendant Western Refining's gas
station convenience stores in California since July 1, 2017.

Throughout the class period, Western failed to relinquish control
and relieve employees of all duty during their meal and rest
breaks. Western often schedules one employee per location,
including during the overnight shift. When employees work alone,
they are not provided duty-free meal and rest breaks; instead, they
are required to remain on premises and be available to assist
customers, the lawsuit says.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated April 23,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3ebKkqE
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew J. Matern, Esq.
          Launa Adolph, Esq.
          MATERN LAW GROUP, PC
          1230 Rosecrans Avenue, Suite 200
          Manhattan Beach, CA 90266
          Telephone: (310) 531-1900
          Facsimile: (310) 531-1901
          E-mail: mmatern@maternlawgroup.com
                  ladolph@maternlawgroup.com


WHITEPAGES INC: Court Denies Arbitration/Transfer Bid in Lukis Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, STEPHANIE LUKIS, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. WHITEPAGES INCORPORATED,
Defendant, Case No. 19 C 4871 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Gary Feinerman of
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division, entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order:

    (i) denying Whitepages' motion to compel arbitration or
        transfer the suit;

   (ii) granting Lukis' motion to amend the complaint;

  (iii) denying Whitepages' motion to strike the complaint's
        class allegations and Lukis' attorneys as the putative
        class counsel is denied, though it may renew its
        arguments in opposition to Lukis' recently filed class
        certification motion;

   (iv) granting Lukis' motion to compel discovery;

    (v) granting in part and denying in part Whitepages' motion
        to compel discovery; and

   (vi) granting Lukis' motion to extend fact discovery is
        granted.

Whitepages operates a website that sells background reports on
people.  Searching the website for a person's name reveals free
information tied to that name.  Whitepages also offers more
detailed reports for a fee, which it promotes by inviting users to
purchase them when viewing a free preview.

Lukis brought the putative class action against Whitepages in the
Circuit Court of Cook County, alleging violations of the Illinois
Right of Publicity Act ("IRPA"), 765 ILCS 1075/1, et seq.  The
complaint alleges that Whitepages violated the IRPA by using Lukis'
identity to promote Whitepages' services.

Whitepages removed the suit under the diversity jurisdiction.  The
court has denied Whitepages's motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim and lack of personal jurisdiction, and its motions
for reconsideration, leave to appeal, and summary judgment.  
Six fully briefed motions are before the court.  First, Whitepages
moves to dismiss the suit -- though, properly styled, the motion is
to compel arbitration and stay the suit, see Halim v. Great
Gatsby's Auction Gallery, Inc., 516 F.3d 557, 561 (7th Cir. 2008)
("As the Court has noted on numerous occasions, the proper course
of action when a party seeks to invoke an arbitration clause is to
stay the proceedings rather than to dismiss outright") -- or
transfer it to the Western District of Washington based on an
arbitration provision and forum selection clause in the terms of
use on the Whitepages website.  Second, Lukis moves to amend her
complaint to add two new putative class representatives.  Third,
Whitepages moves to strike the complaint's class allegations and
Lukis' attorneys as the putative class counsel.  The other three
motions relate to discovery: Each side moves to compel discovery
from the other side, and Lukis moves to extend the fact discovery
deadline.

Discussion

I. Whitepages's Motion to Compel Arbitration or Transfer the Suit

Whitepages premises its motion to compel arbitration or transfer
the suit on certain dispute resolution provisions set forth in the
terms of use on its website.

A. Motion to Compel Arbitration

Judge Feinerman opines that although it appears that Whitepages did
not deliberately delay filing is motion to compel arbitration until
after its summary judgment motion was denied, its delay did waive
its right to seek arbitration of Lukis' claim.  Whitepages
inexplicably neglected to investigate by searching its own records
until October 20, after it replied in support of its summary
judgment motion.  That course of action does not come close to
showing that Whitepages "did all it could reasonably have been
expected to do to make the earliest feasible determination of
whether to proceed judicially or by arbitration."

In addition, the Judge holds that to now enforce the arbitration
provision based on Lukis' visits to the website, after Whitepages'
repeated and unexcused failures to assert the provision's existence
or applicability, would improperly accord the provision a special
status that the court would not give to other contractual
provisions.  Whitepages could and should have followed that
procedure.  Whitepages acknowledges that it was pondering the
arbitration issue as soon as the complaint was filed, and the
complaint all but admitted that Lukis had visited the website.  It
could have immediately raised the issue by motion, and the parties
could have focused on the arbitration question before broaching
substantive issues in the case.  Instead, Whitepages filed and the
court expended considerable resources deciding two dispositive
motions concerning the merits of the suit.

B. Motion to Transfer

In the alternative to moving to compel arbitration, Whitepages
moves under 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a) to transfer the suit to the
Western District of Washington based on the forum selection clause
in the terms of use.

Judge Feinerman opines that Whitepages' forum selection clause by
its own terms does not apply.  First, the suit is not a "Dispute"
as defined in the terms of use.  A second and independent reason
that the forum selection clause does not apply is that neither of
its preconditions has been satisfied.  The clause is triggered
either when "the arbitrator determines" that the dispute resolution
provisions are invalid or when "the class action waiver clause is
determined to be illegal or unenforceable."  No arbitrator has
determined anything, and the court has not even addressed, let
alone held unenforceable, the class action waiver clause.  The
motion to transfer is denied for that reason as well.

II. Lukis' Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint

On Nov. 9, 2020, less than two weeks after Whitepages moved to
compel arbitration, Lukis moved "to amend her complaint to add
additional putative class representatives whose claims are not
subject to arbitration."  The proposed first amended complaint adds
two new plaintiffs/putative class representatives -- Mantas
Norvaisas and Shawn Brown -- and allegations concerning Whitepages'
commercial use of their identities.  The amendment otherwise leaves
the complaint unchanged.

Judge Feinerman finds Whitepages' contrary arguments unpersuasive.
First, the Court has already concluded that the existing complaint
does state a claim.  Second, arbitrability is akin to an
affirmative defense, which complaints need not anticipate.  Lastly,
it is the timing of the Defendant's invocation of an arbitration
clause that matters, not the Plaintiff's first inkling of a
possible issue that the Defendant might choose to raise.

III. Whitepages' Motion to Strike Class Allegations and Counsel

In moving to strike the complaint's class allegations and putative
class counsel, Whitepages argues that Lukis' testimony at her
January 2021 deposition shows that she is an inadequate class
representative,and that Beaumont Costales is inadequate class
counsel because it chose Lukis as a named Plaintiff, inadvertently
bound her to arbitrate her claims, and has not kept her apprised of
the litigation.  In addition, Whitepages argues that the class
definition fails because it does not exclude individuals who have
agreed to arbitrate their claims against Whitepages.

Judge Feinerman finds Whitepages' motion to strike fails because
its arguments go beyond the pleadings.  But there is no need to
definitively so hold.  Lukis moved for class certification in early
March 2021.  At the presentment hearing, Whitepages asked that
briefing on that motion be postponed pending resolution of its
motion to compel arbitration.  Now that the motion to compel
arbitration has been denied, Whitepages may press in its opposition
to Lukis' class certification motion all the points raised in its
motion to strike, unclouded by the procedural question of whether a
motion to strike may look beyond the pleadings.  It is thus prudent
to deny Whitepages' motion to strike, without prejudice to
Whitepages's reasserting any of its arguments in opposition to
class certification.

IV. Lukis's Motion to Compel

Ms. Lukis moves to compel Whitepages to disclose information,
documents, and testimony concerning the non-party entities with
which Whitepages contracts to obtain data for its free previews and
background reports.  There is no question that those agreements
exist.  Rohn Ramon, Whitepages's Director of Strategy, testified
that all data is sourced from data sources and they do not scrape
the internet or anything like that to collect their data, so it
comes from other data sources.  In response to Lukis' motion to
compel, Whitepages has abandoned its position that the
confidentiality agreements bar discovery on those issues.

Judge Feinerman holds that (i) Whitepages' motions to compel
arbitration and to strike class allegations should be granted, so
the motion to compel remains a live issue; (ii) the direct
connection to Whitepages' defense establishes the relevance of the
information, documents, and testimony that Lukis seeks; (iii) there
is no need to decide here whether Whitepages' repeated objections
and instructions not to answer crossed that line, but Whitepages
certainly prevented Lukis from obtaining the information she seeks
in this motion; (iv) there is nothing advisory about the court's
granting Lukis' motion to compel and ordering Whitepages to produce
the information, documents, and testimony in question; and (v)
Lukis was not dilatory in filing her motion.

V. Whitepages's Motion to Compel

Whitepages moves to compel Lukis to produce 18 items: (1) the
Craigslist advertisement that Beaumont Costales posted soliciting
potential plaintiffs for this suit; (2) documents related to
Lukis's use of four credit reporting agencies; (3) her cell phone
contracts with two companies; (4) her applications to work at four
specific employers; her account history and profiles at (5)
Craigslist, (6) eBay, (7) Amazon, (8) Uber, (9) MySpace, (10)
YouTube, (11) Google, (12) Google+, and (13) FamilyTreeNow.com;
(14) her "privacy settings on all relevant Web sites"; (15) all
browser history and other documentation of her visits to
Whitepages.com; (16) an unredacted copy of her engagement letter
with Beaumont Costales; (17) the transcript of a deposition that
she gave in another case; and (18) a privilege log for any
documents she has withheld on the basis of privilege.  Whitepages
asks that Lukis search for documents responsive to these requests
on at least nine designated devices and accounts.

Judge Feinerman opines the December 22 oral consultation concerned
only items (9), (10), (12), (15), and (18).  None of the other
items has been discussed at a Rule 37.2 conference.  Items (1)
through (8) and (11) appeared for the first time in Whitepages'
counsel's January 11 letter.  Items (13), (14), and (17) appeared
for the first time in the motion to compel itself.  As for item
(16), the Beaumont Costales engagement letter, the counsel did
discuss that issue on December 22.  But Lukis produced the letter,
with two out of 11 paragraphs redacted.  The motion to compel seeks
to remove the redactions, but there has been no oral discussion
between counsel of the redaction issue.

So narrowed, the Judge grants the motion with respect to items (9),
(10), and (12).  The motion is also granted as to item (15), which
concerns browser history and other documentation of Lukis's visits
to the Whitepages website.  Document Request 13 sought records of
Lukis's visits to the website, and Request 14 sought records of
Lukis's counsel's visits.  Accordingly, Lukis must supplement her
responses to Document Requests 13 and 14.  Finally, item (18) seeks
a privilege log identifying any documents Lukis withheld claiming
privilege and explaining why she redacted large portions of her
Facebook production.   Whitepages disagrees with Lukis' decision to
redact based on relevance, but a privilege log would not address
that concern.

VI. Lukis's Motion to Extend the Discovery Deadline

Ms. Lukis moves to extend the Feb. 1, 2021 discovery deadline.

The Judge opines that Lukis acted with adequate diligence in
bringing her motion to compel, and he has ordered Whitepages to
produce further discovery.  The Judge has also ordered Lukis to
produce certain information to Whitepages.  Fact discovery has not
previously been extended.  The Judge finds that there is good cause
to amend the schedule and extend the fact discovery deadline to
June 22, 2021.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Judge Feinerman denied Whitepages' motion
to compel arbitration or transfer the suit. He geanted Lukis'
motion to amend the complaint is granted.  Lukis will file her
amended complaint as a separate docket entry.

Whitepages' motion to strike is denied without prejudice to its
presenting its arguments in opposition to Lukis's pending class
certification motion.

Ms. Lukis' motion to compel is granted.  Whitepages will allow its
witnesses to testify regarding its non-party data providers,
including their identities and its contractual relationships with
them; make Ramon available for a second deposition regarding those
subjects; and produce complete responses to Lukis's Interrogatories
3 and 4, Document Request 2, and Dec. 28, 2020 supplemental
document request.

Whitepages's motion to compel is granted in part and denied in
part.  Lukis will produce the same kinds of data from her MySpace,
YouTube, and Google+ accounts that she produced from her Facebook
account, and also will supplement her responses to Whitepages'
Document Requests 13 and 14.  The parties will make their
supplemental productions by May 10, 2021, and will schedule the
depositions as expeditiously as possible.

Ms. Lukis' motion to extend the fact discovery deadline is granted.
The new fact discovery deadline is June 22, 2021.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 23, 2021 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/4ybxsexc from
Leagle.com.



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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