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              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Monday, February 1, 2021, Vol. 23, No. 17

                            Headlines

ACADIA HEALTHCARE: Loses Bid to Dismiss St. Clair Securities Suit
AER ELECTRONICS: Ruling on Woodie's Arbitration Agreement Reversed
AL BARAKA INVESTMENT: Plaintiffs' Bid for Class Certification Nixed
ALABAMA: Cert. of Class Seeking Monetary Relief in Parks Reversed
ALLIANCE FUNDING: Vandenberg Bid to Certify Class Partly Granted

AMAZON.COM INC: Weinberger Sues Over Abuse of Monopoly Power
ARKEMA INC: Fifth Cir. Vacates Class Certification Order in Prantil
AUTOVEST LLC: Bid to Remand Reifenberger Suit to State Court Denied
BAE SYSTEMS: Cordova Class Suit Stayed Pending Settlement Talks
BANK OF AMERICA: Willrich Sues Over Failure to Safeguard Benefits

BLUE CROSS: Adjustment to Class Certification Deadlines Sought
C&D SECURITY: Davis Must File Class Certification Bid by Feb. 1
CHANGE HEALTHCARE: PSRs Class in Ealy-Simon Conditionally Certified
CIRCLE 2: Esedebe Suit Wins Conditional Class Certification
CLOROX COMPANY: Gudgel Class Suit Dismissed With Leave to Amend

COLLECTION PROFESSIONALS: Class Action Dismissed with Prejudice
COSTCO WHOLESALE: Court Vacates March 11 Class Status Hearing
COSTCO WHOLESALE: March 24 Deadline for Class Cert. Filing Sought
COVINGTON SPECIALTY: Class Status Bid Filing Due Nov. 5
CREE INC: Deadline to File Class Certification Set for Feb. 26

CRICKET WIRELESS: Thomas' Bid for Leave to Amend Complaint Granted
CUYAHOGA CTY: State of Ohio Files Petition for Mandamus
DEKALB COUNTY: T.H. "IDEA" Suit Gets Class Certification Status
DESTIN FIRE: Firefighters Win Conditional Certification Status
DNF ASSOCIATES: Court Certifies Two Classes in Viernes FDCPA Suit

DRAPER AND KRAMER: Vazquez Suit Moved From N.D. to C.D. California
EAGLE BANCORP: New York Class Action Stayed Pending Mediation
EASYSAVER REWARDS: Perryman's Counsel Awarded $805K in Atty's Fees
ED BROWN: Paguada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
EURO HOMECARE: Gorzkowska Suit Wins Conditional Class Certification

FLAGSTAR BANCORP: Dubose Must File Class Status Bid by June 21
GA DEPARMENT OF CORRECTIONS: Brown Files Suit in N.D. Georgia
GOOGLE LLC: Sweepstakes' Bid to Consolidate Hearing Moved to Feb. 4
GREAT SOUTHERN: Court Dismisses DeAngelis Class Suit With Prejudice
H & EDP: Williams Sues Over Deprivation of Overtime Compensation

HARKINS ADMINISTRATIVE: Final Judgment Issued in Garcia Suit
HFM INC: Certification of Equity Memberships Owners Class Sought
HOME DEPOT: Moshtagh Suit Seeks to Certify Two Subclasses
HSBC BANK: Court Directs Cheng to File Class Status Bid by March 2
ICELANDIC PROVISIONS: Mantini Sues Over Mislabeled Dairy Products

ILLINOIS: Kelly Seeks Stay of Class Status Bid Briefing
INDIVIOR INC: Court Approves Notice to Direct Purchaser Class
INNATE INTELLIGENCE: Court Denies Bid to Compel in Levine Suit
JASON LENGRICH: Judge Endorses Denial of Thompson Class Status Bid
JERSEY FIRESTOP: Asks Court to Junk Conditional Certification Bid

KANSAS: M.B. Can File Under Seal Exhibits to Welch Declaration
KELLER WILLIAMS: Request to Stay Ruling on Class Status Bid OK'd
KHOSROW SADEGHIAN: Court's Class Status Recommendation Withdrawn
LAWRENCE O'TOOLE: Seeks Extension of Class Status Filing to April 1
LLPD LLC: $283.5K Settlement in White Suit Over Unpaid Wages Okayed

MAINE: Magistrate Judge Recommends Denial of TRO in Swain vs. DOC
MARATHON PETROLEUM: April 26 Deadline to File Class Cert. Sought
MARS WRIGLEY: Lyons Sues Over Mislabelled Mixed Berries Products
MARY WASHINGTON: Gatewood FDCPA Suit Seeks to Certify Two Classes
MDL 2455: Notice to Direct Purchaser Class in Antitrust Suit Okayed

MDL 2504: Saldana Case Stayed Pending Class Cert. Ruling in Trevino
MDL 2670: Bid for Leave to File Sur-Reply in Antitrust Suit Denied
MDL 2670: Jan. 28 Hearing on DPPs' Bid for Set Aside Order Vacated
MDL 2875: MMWA Claims in 3 Master Complaints Tossed With Prejudice
MERCURY GENERAL: MAO-MSO Suit Seeks to Certify Two Classes

MICHIGAN: Settlement Gets Initial Approval in Flint Water Cases
MIDLAND CREDIT: Court Junks Collins Class Action with Prejudice
MR. T'S: Rice Gets Conditional Class Status for Exotic Dancers
NINTENDO OF AMERICA: Deadline Extension for Class Cert. Bid Sought
NORTON HEALTHCARE: Ky. App. Affirms Summary Judgment in Davis Suit

NOVA SOUTHEASTERN: Bid to Extend Class Cert. Filing Deadline OK'd
NOVITEX ENTERPRISES: Must File Joint Report on Settlement Deal
NUCO2 LLC: Court Tosses FDUTPA Class Status Reconsideration Bid
OH MY GREEN: Class Cert. Hearing in "Kastler" Continued to July 15
OPENSIDED MRI: Brust Suit Seeks to Certify Class

PENNSYLVANIA HIGHER: Shay Sues Over Unauthorized Recordings
PERSONNEL STAFFING: Review of Class Cert. Denial in Pruitt Denied
PHILLIPS & COHEN: Haston Suit Seeks to Certify Class
PIZZA TO YOU: Waters Suit Gets Certification of Drivers Class
PLANNED LIFESTYLE: Tesfai Sues Over Unpaid Compensations

PTT LLC: Two Classes Certified, Initial Injunction Denied in Wilson
ROSEN HOTELS: Turner Sues Over Failure to Provide Advance Notice
RSCR CALIFORNIA: Must File Joint Settlement Report by Feb. 22
SACHS ELECTRIC: Stay on Drive Time Claims in Durham Suit Lifted
SERVICE KING: Class Status Hearing Continued to April 22

SLACK TECHNOLOGIES: Katz Challenges Merger Deal With Salesforce
SOUTHERN VALLEY: Farmworkers Seek Initial Settlement Approval
SPECTRA ENERGY: Delaware Supreme Court Flips Morris Suit Dismissal
ST. ELIZABETH: Class Cert. Filing Deadline Stayed Pending Discovery
STARBUCKS CORP: Adams Must File Class Certification Bid by March 29

STATE FARM: Bordlemay Insurance Suit Removed to D. New Mexico
STEVENS INSTITUTE: Mitelberg Seeks Tuition Refunds Due to COVID-19
SUNRISE SENIOR: Audrey Heredia Seeks to Certify Class
SWEET HOME: Smith Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Compensation
TERRA TECH: Facing Stanley Putative Nationwide Class Suit

TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL: Bid to Dismiss Israeli Law Claims Denied
TOTAL TRUCKING: Isaacs Seeks FLSA Collective Action Status
U.S. BANK: Deadline for Class Status-Related Bid Set for August 20
UNITED STATES: Bid to Extend Response to Class Cert. Bid Stayed
UNITED STATES: Dean Volks Seeks to Certify Class of Inmates

UNITED STATES: Dorsey Hunt Seeks to Certify Class of Inmates
UNITED STATES: Henry Richards Seeks to Certify Class of Inmates
UNITED STATES: Henry Rodriguez Seeks to Certify Class of Inmates
UNITED STATES: Hernandez-Sierra Seeks to Certify Class of Inmates
UNITED STATES: Lou Mejia Seeks to Certify Class of Inmates

UNITED STATES: Peltier Suit Seeks to Certify Settlement Class
UNITED STATES: Sheldon Palmer Seeks to Certify Class of Inmates
VOYAGER THERAPEUTICS: Faces Karp Suit Over 23.21% Stock Price Drop
VXI GLOBAL: Court Junks Bufford Class Action
WALMART INC: FLSA Class in Fortney Suit Conditionally Certified

WASHINGTON: Fowler Suit Gets Clarification of Class Definition
WELLS FARGO: Bid to Compel Arbitration in Marselian Suit Granted
WELLS FARGO: Cora Seeks to Certify Class of Operation Employees
WOODMAN'S FOOD: Hunter Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime for Store Staff
YRC INC: Alvarez Appeals Ruling in Labor Suit to 9th Circuit


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ACADIA HEALTHCARE: Loses Bid to Dismiss St. Clair Securities Suit
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In the case, ST. CLAIR COUNTY EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similar, Plaintiff v.
ACADIA HEALTHCARE COMPANY, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No.
3:18-cv-00988 (M.D. Tenn.), Judge William L. Campbell, Jr., of the
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, Nashville
Division, denied the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

Lead Plaintiffs, New York Hotel Trades Council and Hotel
Association of New York City, Inc. Pension Fund and the Chicago
Laborers' Pension Fund, filed the securities fraud class action on
behalf of purchasers of Acadia securities between April 30, 2014,
and Nov. 15, 2018, against Acadia, Joey A. Jacobs, former Chairman
of Acadia's Board of Directors and its CEO; Brent Turner, Acadia's
President; and David Duckworth, Acadia's CFO, alleging violations
of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5.

Acadia is a for-profit healthcare company that operates inpatient
psychiatric facilities, residential treatment centers, and other
facilities providing outpatient behavioral healthcare services in
the United States, the United Kingdom and Puerto Rico.  The
Consolidated Complaint, filed on April 1, 2019, alleges that,
throughout and before the Class Period, the Defendants engaged in a
scheme to defraud and mislead investors concerning patient care,
staffing levels, and legal compliance issues, as well as Acadia's
U.K. operations.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants falsely represented that
Acadia provided high-quality services, adequately staffed its
facilities, and complied with applicable laws and regulations.  It
was quality care, the Defendants repeatedly emphasized, that drove
new patients to Acadia facilities, created the demand necessary to
grow its existing facilities, and was key to improving the
performance and operations at the facilities Acadia acquired to
fuel its growth.  In reality, Acadia achieved growth by
inadequately staffing facilities and cutting costs to extract
higher profits at the expense of patient care and safety, and ran
facilities rife with violence, sexual assault, and
counter-therapeutic policies and practices.

Additionally, the Plaintiffs allege the Defendants falsely
represented that Acadia's $2.2 billion acquisition of The Priory
Group, the U.K.'s largest chain of behavioral health centers, would
contribute to positive financial growth.  The Defendants repeatedly
assured investors throughout 2017 that Acadia was on track to meet
its financial targets and that the Company would experience margin
improvement in the U.K. when, in fact, Acadia was not on track to
meet its U.K. financial targets because of weakened patient census
and increased labor costs that the Defendants concealed.

The Defendants' fraud was revealed through a series of partial
disclosures.  The first occurred on Oct. 24, 2017, when Acadia
revealed that deteriorating performance in the U.K. had caused the
Company to miss its 3Q17 revenue and earnings targets and
substantially reduce its guidance for the remainder of the year,
causing Acadia's stock price to drop 30%.  The second occurred on
Oct. 11, 2018, when Aurelius Value published a report and released
a video documenting systemic patient abuse and neglect at dozens of
Acadia facilities caused primarily by understaffing.  Following the
news, Acadia's stock price declined by more than 11%.

Finally, on Nov. 16, 2018, Seeking Alpha published an article
entitled, "Acadia Healthcare: Very Scary Findings From A 14-Month
Investigation," which revealed that the Company's rapid growth, as
well as its revenue and margin increases, were attributed to
cost-cutting and "reducing the quality of care."  On that news,
Acadia's stock price declined by 26%.

On May 31, 2019, the Defendants filed the pending motion to dismiss
pursuant Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state claim.

To state a securities fraud claim under Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5(b), a plaintiff must allege: (1) a
material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2)
scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or
omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon
the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss
causation.

Through their pending motion to dismiss, the Defendants challenge
the sufficiency of the Complaint's allegations as to the first and
second elements.  As to the first element, the Defendants argue
that the Complaint fails to allege an actionable misstatement or
omission because (1) the challenged forward-looking statements fall
within the PSLRA's Safe Harbor, (2) the challenged "quality care"
statements were not misleading or material, and (3) the challenged
statement regarding substantial compliance with laws and
regulations was not misleading.

Judge Cambell is unable to determine whether the challenged
forward-looking statements were accompanied by sufficient
cautionary statements in ruling on the pending motion to dismiss.
But he finds that the Complaint sufficiently alleges that (i)
"quality care" statements were false or misleading, and (ii) the
Defendants' statement about substantial regulatory compliance was
false or misleading.  And, viewing the Complaint in the light most
favorable to the Plaintiffs, the Judge finds that a reasonable
juror could conclude that the Defendants' statements regarding
staffing levels and the quality of care at Acadia's facilities were
material misrepresentations.

As to the second element, through their motion to dismiss, the
Defendants appear to argue that an inference of their innocence is
stronger than the competing inference of scienter.

In response, the Plaintiffs argue that a compelling inference of
actual knowledge or recklessness disregard of the alleged scheme
and the falsity of the Defendants' misrepresentations can be
derived from the allegations that, among other things, before the
misconduct was revealed, the Individual Defendants and one of
Acadia's founders unloaded more than $600 million in Acadia stock
while its price was inflated by fraud; the Defendants installed
compensation structures designed solely to reward short-term profit
at the expense of patient care; and shortly after Defendants' fraud
was revealed, Acadia's CEO and President were abruptly fired or
resigned with no notice under highly unusual circumstances.

When the factual allegations are considered collectively, the Judge
finds that there is an inference that the Defendants acted with
actual knowledge or reckless disregard for the misleading nature of
their statements that is at least as compelling as the innocence
inference advanced by them.

For these foregoing reasons, Judge Campbell denied the Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss.  An appropriate order will be entered.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 20, 2021 Memorandum is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y3e4ryd6 from Leagle.com.


AER ELECTRONICS: Ruling on Woodie's Arbitration Agreement Reversed
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In the case, RAYMOND WOODIE, Plaintiff and Appellant v. AER
ELECTRONICS, INC., et al., Defendants and Respondents, Case No.
A159317 (Cal. App.), the Court of Appeals of California for the
First District, Division Three, reversed the trial court's order
denying the Plaintiff's motion to declare his arbitration agreement
with former employer AER Electronics void and unenforceable.

Mr. Woodie filed a putative class action against AER Electronics,
AER Worldwide Holdings, LLC, and AER Management Services, Inc.,
under the unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, Section 17200
et seq.) ("UCL"), alleging numerous violations of California wage
and hour laws.  In response, AER moved to compel arbitration
pursuant to the Agreement.

Following procedural twists and turns not relevant to the appeal,
Woodie moved the trial court to declare the Agreement unenforceable
because it contains a nonseverable class action waiver that
unlawfully waived his right to bring an action under the Labor Code
Private Attorneys General Act of 2004.

The class action waiver provision states: "There will be no right
or authority for any dispute to be brought, heard or arbitrated as
a class, collective or representative action or as a class member
in any purported class, collective action or representative
proceeding ("Class Action Waiver").  Notwithstanding any other
clause contained in this Agreement, the preceding sentence will not
be severable from this Agreement in any case in which the dispute
to be arbitrated is brought as a class, collective or
representative action."

The trial court rejected Woodie's contention that the waiver
encompassed PAGA claims.  It held that because the Arbitration
Agreement does not mention PAGA, it is at worst ambiguous whether
the phrase 'representative action' is intended to encompass qui tam
actions brought under PAGA.  Given an ambiguity, it found that an
interpretation which gives effect is preferred to one which makes
void.  The court therefore construed the class action waiver to
exclude PAGA actions and ruled that the clause and, with it, the
Agreement were enforceable.

The appeal is timely.

The Court of Appeals opines that the only question for it is
whether the court erred when it found that PAGA claims are not
within the scope of AER's class action waiver.  Since the parties
presented no conflicting extrinsic evidence on the meaning of the
class action waiver, the Court of Appeals independently reviews the
contractual language to determine whether it encompasses PAGA
claims.  Although the provision does not specifically identify or
name claims brought under PAGA, it expressly encompasses "any
dispute" that is brought "as a class, collective or representative
action."

The Appellate Court explains that by their very nature, actions
brought under PAGA are representative actions.  The Supreme Court
in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.
4th 348, and, more recently, the Fourth Appellate District in Kec
v. Superior Court (2020) 51 Cal. App. 5th 972, 978, recognized that
waivers of "representative actions" encompass actions brought under
PAGA.  So even though the class action waiver in the case "does not
mention PAGA," as AER observes, its attempted waiver of any
"representative action" encompasses PAGA claims.  Interpreted in
accord with standard rules of contract interpretation, the
Agreement is not ambiguous on that point.

Alternatively, AER cites Iskanian, and Marenco v. DirecTV LLC
(2015) 233 Cal. App. 4th 1409, to argue the Agreement is
enforceable as to Woodie's UCL claims even if the waiver provision
is unlawful to the extent it encompasses PAGA claims.  If a
representative action waiver is unlawful, they maintain, Iskanian
and Marenco would have found the arbitration agreements
unenforceable in total.  Because they did not, representative
action waivers are enforceable and Woodie's arguments to the
contrary are without merit.

The Court of Appeals opines that the argument overlooks a critical
distinction.  Unlike the arbitration agreements in Iskanian and
Marenco, AER's Agreement explicitly prohibits severance of the
class and representative action waiver from the arbitration
agreement.  Selective enforcement of the class waiver provision to
nullify its application to representative PAGA actions but not to
Woodie's UCL claims would "amount to an attempt to unilaterally
modify the contract provision by allowing its severance" in
violation of the clear contractual language.  The trial court in
effect did just that and erred when it construed "representative"
actions to exclude representative actions brought under PAGA.

Judge Peter Siggins, writing for the Court of Appeals, reversed the
trial court's order.  The matter is remanded, and the superior
court is directed to enter a new order granting Woodie's motion to
declare the Agreement void and unenforceable.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 20, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/y6j6ps97 from Leagle.com.


AL BARAKA INVESTMENT: Plaintiffs' Bid for Class Certification Nixed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit re: TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11,
2001, captioned as Estate of John P. O'Neill, Sr. v. Al Baraka
Investment and Development Corporation, et al., Case No.
1:04-cv-01923-GBD-SN (S.D.N.Y.), the Hon. Magistrate Judge Sarah
Netburn recommended that the Court:

   1. deny the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification;

   2. grant the motion to add John F. O'Neill's estate as a
      plaintiff;

   3. grant the Plaintiffs' motion to substitute Dorothy A.
      O'Neill with Christine O'Neill, as personal representative
      to the Estate of Dorothy A. O'Neill; and

   4. deny without prejudice Plaintiffs' motion for leave to
      amend the First Consolidated Complaint.

Judge Netburn says, "While Plaintiffs have demonstrated the
Proposed Class satisfies certain elements of Rule 23, I find that
Plaintiffs have failed to prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that class certification is proper under Rule 23." HE
adds that without indication of the number or identity of the
specific individuals or estates Plaintiffs seek to add as parties
to this case, the Court cannot properly assess whether leave to
amend should be granted under the standards of the Federal Rules --
i.e., whether and to what degree delay or prejudice would result.
As such, I recommend denying without prejudice Plaintiffs' request
for leave to amend the complaint. The Plaintiffs should address
such discrepancies in a motion for leave to amend supported by a
memorandum of law and a proposed Second Consolidated Complaint.
This will allow the O'Neill Defendants to evaluate the proposed
amendments and the Court to evaluate the effect of adding the
proposed parties to the litigation at this stage.

A copy of the Court's report and recommendation dated Jan. 22, 2020
is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3iYXbNT at no
extra charge.[CC]

ALABAMA: Cert. of Class Seeking Monetary Relief in Parks Reversed
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In the case, Kelly Butler, in his official capacity as Alabama
Director of Finance, and Chris Roberts, in his official capacity as
Director of the Alabama Office of Indigent Defense Services v. Will
J. Parks III and Claire Porter, Case No. 1190043 (Ala.), the
Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the portion of the trial court's
order certifying the class seeking retrospective monetary relief.

Attorneys Will J. Parks III and Claire Porter accepted an
appointment in 2016 to represent an indigent defendant who had been
charged with murder.  After the defendant pleaded guilty to
manslaughter, the State of Alabama paid the Attorneys $4,000 each
for the legal services they had provided to the defendant--which is
the maximum amount Section 15-12-21(d) allows for that defendant's
crime.  Parks then submitted a bill to the court for $17,731, and
Porter submitted a bill for $6,398.

The trial court certified both fee submissions as reasonable to the
best of its knowledge, but it noted that its certification was "not
an approval of the amounts submitted by" the Attorneys.  Office of
Indigent Defense Services ("OIDS") refused to pay either of the
additional fee submissions.  The Attorneys did not pursue the
administrative remedy set forth in r. 355-9-1-.05 regarding the
rejection of their additional fee submissions.

The Attorneys then sued, in their official capacities, Butler, the
Alabama Director of Finance, and Chris Roberts, the Director of
OIDS in the Montgomery Circuit Court.  The Attorneys sought a
judgment declaring that the omission of the good-cause exception in
the 2011 amendment to Section 15-12-21 was a drafting error, which
they say can be "cured" by reading that exception back into the
statute, and that trial judges have inherent authority to order
payment of fees to satisfy constitutional requirements.
Alternatively, they asserted that the lack of a good-cause
exception in Section 15-12-21 violates the federal and state
constitutions by, among other things, depriving indigent defendants
of their rights to a fair trial and effective assistance of
counsel.

The Attorneys also asserted class claims and sought to certify
three classes of Plaintiffs: (1) attorneys who submitted bills that
OIDS refused to pay because the bills exceeded the payment caps;
(2) attorneys who reduced their bills due to the payment caps; and
(3) attorneys whose pending or future bills might be denied because
they exceed the payment caps.

The trial court certified the first and third classes.  In doing
so, it held that State immunity did not bar attorneys in the first
class from seeking retrospective monetary relief.  And because no
other exception to State immunity applies, State immunity bars this
claim for retrospective monetary relief.

The Officials raise two issues on appeal.  First, they argue that
State immunity bars the Attorneys from obtaining monetary relief
for fees in excess of the payment caps that OIDS has refused to pay
in past cases.  Thus, they say, the trial court lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction and erred by certifying the first
class.  Second, the Officials argue that the Attorneys lack
third-party standing to assert indigent defendants' rights to a
fair trial and effective assistance of counsel and, therefore,
cannot make those arguments with respect to either class that the
trial court certified.

The Supreme Court of Alabama agrees with the Officials on both
points.  First, it holds that state immunity bars the Attorneys
from recovering retrospective monetary relief based on those
arguments.  And, because no other exception to State immunity
applies, State immunity bars this claim for retrospective monetary
relief.  Second, the Attorneys' claims on behalf of the first class
are effectively claims against the State.  Thus, State immunity
bars the Attorneys' claims for retrospective monetary relief, and
the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to certify the
first class.  Finally, the Attorneys have not shown a hindrance to
indigent defendants' seeking an appellate or postconviction remedy.
Hence, the Attorneys do not have third-party standing to argue
that unidentified indigent defendants' rights to a fair trial and
effective assistance of counsel have been violated.

The Supreme Court of Alabama concludes that because State immunity
bars the Attorneys from recovering retrospective monetary relief,
the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to certify the
first class.  Additionally, the Attorneys lack third-party standing
to claim that indigent defendants, as a general group, have been or
will be deprived of their constitutional rights to a fair trial and
effective assistance of counsel.  It, therefore, reversed the
portion of the trial court's order certifying the class seeking
retrospective monetary relief, and remanded the case for further
proceedings consistent with its decision.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 22, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/y69cbq9r from Leagle.com.


ALLIANCE FUNDING: Vandenberg Bid to Certify Class Partly Granted
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as VANDENBERG & SONS
FURNITURE, INC., v. ALLIANCE FUNDING GROUP, et al., Case No.
1:15-cv-01255-GJQ-RSK (W.D. Mich.), the Hon. Judge Gordon J. Quist
entered an order:

   1. granting in part and denying in part the Plaintiff's
      motion to certify class;

      The class is:

      "all persons or entities, identified in the WestFax opt-
      out list for Defendant, who were successfully sent the
      same or similar fax as Exhibit A to the Complaint from
      December 3, 2011 to December 3, 2015;"

   2. appointing Ross M. Good, Ryan M. Kelly, Wallace C.
      Solberg, and Brian J. Wanca of Anderson & Wanca as class
      counsel; and

   3. directing the Plaintiff's counsel, within 28 days of this
      Order, to file a proposed notification form that complies
      with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) and a statement describing
      the method by which the notice will be provided to class
      members.

Vandenberg offers home furnishings styles for living room, dining
room, family room, home office, and bedroom.

Alliance Funding Group provides equipment financing. The Company
provides equipment leases and business loans to the IT,
manufacturing, and agriculture sectors.

A copy of the Court's order dated Jan. 22, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/36pidQE at no extra charge.[CC]

AMAZON.COM INC: Weinberger Sues Over Abuse of Monopoly Power
------------------------------------------------------------
Bonnie Weinberger on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. AMAZON.COM, INC., Case No. 1:21-cv-00615 (S.D.N.Y.,
Jan. 22, 2021), seeks injunctive relief and monetary recovery under
the Clayton Act for all overcharges incurred and due to the
Defendants abuse of monopoly power in violation of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act.

Amazon's co-conspirators include HarperCollins Publishers L.L.C.,
Simon & Schuster, Inc. and Simon & Schuster Digital Sales, Inc.,
Macmillan Publishing Group, LLC, Hachette Book Group and Penguin
Random House LLC ("Co-conspirators"). These are the five largest
publishers in the United States, sometimes known collectively as
the "Big Five." These Big Five publishers make "trade books," a
term of art referring to "general interest fiction and non-fiction
books," as "distinguished from 'non-trade' books such as academic
textbooks, reference materials, and other texts." Collectively, the
Big Five's books account for about 80% of the trade books sold in
the United States.

According to the complaint, Amazon and the Big Five agreed to
restrain competition by controlling the prices paid for eBooks
purchased from the Big Five through retail platforms other than
Amazon.com. This caused Plaintiff and the class to overpay for
eBooks. Amazon's agreement with its Co-conspirators is an
unreasonable restraint of trade that prevents competitive pricing
and causes the Plaintiff and other consumers to overpay when they
purchase eBooks from the Big Five through an eBook retailer that
competes with Amazon.

Amazon has obtained monopoly power in the U.S. retail trade eBook
market, where it accounts for 90% of all eBook sales. Through its
conspiracy with the Big Five Co-conspirators, Defendant Amazon has
willfully acquired its monopoly power in the U.S. retail trade
eBook market through anti-competitive conduct, fixing the retail
prices of trade eBooks and causing supra-competitive prices for
eBooks sold by or through Amazon's eBook retailer rivals. Such
conduct is an abuse of monopoly power in violation of Section 2 of
the Sherman Act, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff is a consumer and direct purchaser of electronic
books (eBooks) published by the five largest publishers in the
United States.

Amazon.com, Inc. operates the Amazon.com website, which, among
other things, is the largest retail eBooks seller in the United
States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory B. Linkh, Esq.
          Brian P. Murray, Esq.
          Lee Albert, Esq.
          GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
          230 Park Avenue, Suite. 530
          New York, NY 10169
          Phone: (212) 682-5340
          Facsimile: (212) 884-0988
          Email: bmurray@glancylaw.com
                 glinkh@glancylaw.com
                 lalbert@glancylaw.com

               - and -

          Eugene A. Spector, Esq.
          Jeffrey J. Corrigan, Esq.
          Jeffrey L. Spector, Esq.
          Diana J. Zinser, Esq.
          SPECTOR ROSEMAN & KODROFF, P.C.
          2001 Market Street, Suite 3420
          Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103
          Phone: (215) 496-0300
          Email: jcorrigan@srkattorneys.com
                 jspector@srkattorneys.com
                 dzinser@srkattorneys.com

               - and -

          Michael J. Boni, Esq.
          Joshua D. Snyder, Esq.
          John E. Sindoni, Esq.
          BONI, ZACK & SNYDER LLC
          15 St. Asaphs Road
          Bala Cynwyd, PA 19004
          Phone: (610) 822-0200
          Email: mboni@bonizack.com
                 jsnyder@bonizack.com
                 jsindoni@bonizack.com

               - and -

          David P. McLafferty, Esq.
          MCLAFFERTY LAW FIRM, P.C.
          923 Fayette Street
          Conshohocken, PA 19428
          Phone: (610) 940-4000 ext. 12
          Email: dmclafferty@mclaffertylaw.com



ARKEMA INC: Fifth Cir. Vacates Class Certification Order in Prantil
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, COREY PRANTIL; RONALD WHATLEY; BETTY WHATLEY; BRET
SIMMONS; PHYLLIS SIMMONS; GREG NASON; LARRY ANDERSON; TANYA
ANDERSON; KEITH LYONS; BEVERLY FLANNEL; ROLAND FLANNEL,
Plaintiffs-Appellees v. ARKEMA INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellant,
Case No. 19-20723 (5th Cir.), Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the district
court's order granting class certification, and remanded the case
for further proceedings under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Arkema's facility in Crosby, Texas, produces Luperox, a liquid
organic peroxide used to make plastics and composites.  Luperox is
a volatile compound that decomposes and combusts unless
refrigerated.  The Crosby facility sits in a flood plain near the
Gulf Coast, leaving it vulnerable to the approach of Hurricane
Harvey.  By Aug. 24, 2017, it was clear that Harvey would make
landfall and likely stall over Texas.  Arkema continued production
at Crosby until Aug. 25, 2017, before implementing the facility's
hurricane preparedness plan.

Several days of heavy rain and rising flood waters at Crosby forced
the facility's "ride-out" team to move nearly 350,000 pounds of
combustible materials to refrigerated trailers set on higher
ground.  But the floodwaters' continued rise eventually threatened
the trailers' cooling systems as well, and on Aug. 29, 2017, Arkema
alerted local authorities that a combustion event was imminent.

The authorities responded by establishing a 1.5-mile evacuation
zone around the facility.  Between August 31 and September 4, nine
refrigerated trailers burned in three separate ignitions, the last
of which was a controlled burn by emergency personnel.  Further,
two of the facility's wastewater tanks overflowed, dispersing
contaminated water and bringing the count to five total emissions
events.  Shortly afterward, local residents saw clouds of white
smoke and accumulating ash on their properties, and persons inside
and outside of the established 1.5-mile evacuation zone reported
physical symptoms including bodily rashes, headaches, eye
irritation, blisters, and respiratory difficulty.

The Plaintiffs are local property owners who seek to represent a
class of all property owners within a seven-mile radius of the
Crosby facility to pursue injunctive relief and damages against
Arkema.  They claim to have suffered adverse health effects,
property damage, or both, because of Arkema's emissions. They bring
claims against Arkema under the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act, and the common-law doctrines of negligence,
trespass, and public nuisance.

After extended oral argument on the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification and Akrema's motions to exclude certain experts, the
district court granted Arkema's motion to exclude the Plaintiffs'
damages expert, but it credited three of the Plaintiffs' experts
and granted the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.  In
granting certification, the district court held that the proposed
class met the elements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and
that it should be certified as a damages class under Rule 23(b)(3)
because common issues would predominate in the resolution of the
class claims and that a class action was the superior method for
adjudicating the dispute.  It also certified an injunctive-relief
class under Rule 23(b)(2) because the actions alleged apply broadly
to the entire class, and the injunctive relief sought will commonly
address the injury.

The Fifth Circuit granted leave to appeal on Oct. 17, 2019.

Arkema urges four arguments on appeal: (1) that the district court
did not conduct the rigorous analysis required by Fifth Circuit and
Supreme Court precedent, to ensure that the individual claims can
be fairly and effectively adjudicated in a class action; (2) that
the district court erred when it determined that the proposed class
met Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement and Rule 23(b)(2)'s
cohesiveness requirement; (3) that the benefits realized by
classwide adjudication of common questions would be lost in the
necessary sifting through individualized evidence on the causation
and injury elements in addition to the intractably individualized
nature of the damages and injunction inquiries; and (4) that the
district court erred by relying on certain expert opinions in its
certification decision without first ensuring those opinions would
be admissible at trial under the Daubert standard.

The Fifth Circuit reviews the district court's decision to certify
a class for abuse of discretion.  It begins with the standard
applicable to expert evidence at the class-certification stage.  It
then addresses the predominance of common questions in the Rule
23(b)(3) damages class and the cohesiveness of the Rule 23(b)(2)
injunctive-relief class.

First, the Fifth Circuit holds that the Daubert hurdle must be
cleared when scientific evidence is relevant to the decision to
certify.  Thus, if an expert's opinion would not be admissible at
trial, it should not pave the way for certifying a proposed class.
The district court's analysis of the expert reports reflect
hesitation to apply Daubert's reliability standard with full
force.

The district court began its discussion of the expert reports by
observing that whether a full Daubert analysis at the class
certification stage is required is unclear.  When discussing the
Plaintiffs' evidence of chemical contamination, the district court
observed that while it certainly would have been better for Dr.
Kaltofen additionally to include the background levels, it was not
necessary under Daubert at the class certification stage, implying
that Daubert is less applicable to evidence used for
certification.

In its certification order, the district court was not as searching
in its assessment of the expert reports' reliability as it would
have been outside the certification setting.  The Appellate Court
does not suggest that the remaining reports should be excluded;
some of Arkema's objections may only affect the weight of the
reports without undermining their fundamental reliability.  In sum,
it holds that an assessment of the reliability of the Plaintiffs'
scientific evidence for certification cannot be deferred.

Second, the Fifth Circuit finds that much of the district court's
predominance analysis proceeded from its view that "all injuries
resulted from [a] single course of conduct," and thus "the focus
will be on Defendant's actions."  Of course, a case may be
relatively more suitable for class treatment where only one
defendant and one course of conduct are at issue.  But what is
needed in the case is discussion of how proof of Arkema's conduct
will affect trial.  Absent such analysis, the Court is unable to
judge whether the common issues relating to Arkema's conduct in the
leadup to Hurricane Harvey are relatively more complex such that
they can be expected to predominate over individualized issues.
Future certification proceedings would benefit from detailing the
evidence the parties may use to prove or defend against liability
and its commonality to all the class members.

The Appellate Court does not exhaustively catalogue the matters
deserving consideration under Rule 23(b)(3) on remand.  And it does
not suggest that Arkema is entitled to prevail on its
counterarguments to certification.  It holds only that the relative
balance of concededly common claim elements to contested elements
of causation and injury warrants closer attention.

Finally, the Fifth Circuit holds that there is stronger evidence
that through its response to a specific event, Hurricane Harvey,
Arkema acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to
the class.  The current record does not compel the conclusion that
the Plaintiffs' medical and property injuries are incapable of
being addressed by classwide injunctions.  Still, the Court is
sensitive to the challenges inherent in crafting appropriate
injunctions.  As Arkema notes, there is some uncertainty as to what
symptoms or conditions will be medically monitored for all class
members, whether individual health considerations need to be
addressed for relief to be adequate.

Concerning property, the certification order leaves the Appellate
Court uncertain as to how the extent of necessary property
remediation can be determined, and whether a responsive injunction
can be fashioned to account for Arkema's past remediation efforts.
If the district court intends to wholly adopt one or another
proposal from the Plaintiffs' experts, it must say so and explain
how that proposal overcomes Arkema's concerns.  Despite the present
uncertainty concerning the propriety of classwide injunctive
relief, the Court is confident that by evaluating the particulars
of each injunction on remand, both the parties and the district
court will arrive at a nuanced assessment of whether the
Plaintiffs' claims for relief can be effectively addressed in a
class action.

The Fifth Circuit does not limit the tools necessary to the
district court's management of complex litigation, such as the
oft-deployed bifurcation of liability and damages.  The reality of
Rule 23 is that it depends upon the management skills of its able
district courts.  It only sets the boundaries of the field on which
their discretion is applied.

For these reasons, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's
order certifying the proposed class and remanded the case for
further proceedings including certification of the class.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 22, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y3xnonrx from Leagle.com.


AUTOVEST LLC: Bid to Remand Reifenberger Suit to State Court Denied
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled JAMES REIFENBERGER, Plaintiff v. AUTOVEST
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 2:20-CV-571-DAK-JCB (D. Utah), the U.S.
District Court for the District of Utah issued a Memorandum
Decision and Order:

   -- denying Plaintiff James Reifenberger's Motion to Remand for
      Lack of Diversity Jurisdiction;

   -- granting Defendant Autovest LLC's Motion to Compel
      Arbitration;

   -- denying Autovest's Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff's
      Opposition to Motion to Compel; and

   -- granting Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File an Overlength
      Motion or, in the Alternative, Leave to File a Corrected
      Brief in Compliance with DUCivR 7-1.

The Plaintiff entered into a Retail Installment Contract and
Security Agreement ("RICSA") to purchase and finance a vehicle with
West Auto Sales. On that same date, the Plaintiff signed an
Arbitration Agreement that referenced and stated it was
incorporated into the RICSA. The Arbitration Agreement provides
that it is applicable to any claim relating to the purchase and
financing of the vehicle upon the election of either party. The
Plaintiff defaulted on his payments for the vehicle. The RICSA and
Arbitration Agreement were assigned to GFC Lending LLC, who in turn
assigned its rights to Autovest. Autovest, through Utah counsel,
filed a state court lawsuit to collect the amounts the Plaintiff
owed under the RICSA. The Plaintiff failed to appear in that
action, and the state court entered judgment in Autovest's favor in
the amount of $21,577.

After receiving the state court judgment, Autovest garnished the
Plaintiff's wages in the amount of $256. The Plaintiff then brought
the present class action against Autovest, alleging that Autovest
was required to obtain a license before filing the state court
lawsuit or engaging in other efforts to collect the amount the
Plaintiff and others owed.

The Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Autovest's Motion to
Compel Arbitration exceeded the 10-page limit under local rule
DUCivR 7-1 because the Plaintiff's counsel erroneously believed the
25-page limit for motions filed under Rule 12 and 56 applied. Due
to that mistaken belief, the Plaintiff did not initially seek leave
to file an overlength memorandum prior to filing his opposition.
Autovest, therefore, brought a Motion to Strike the excess portion
of the Plaintiff's opposition, and the Plaintiff filed a motion
requesting retroactive leave to file the overlength memorandum.

While the Plaintiff should have requested leave to file an
overlength memorandum before filing it, based on the admitted
mistake, the Court grants the Plaintiff retroactive leave to file
the overlength memorandum. Accordingly, Autovest's Motion to Strike
is denied and the Plaintiff's Motion for Leave is granted.

On August 7, 2020, Autovest removed the present action from Utah
state court to the Court based on diversity jurisdiction. The
Plaintiff concedes that diversity of citizenship exists but moves
the Court to remand the case to state court because he claims that
the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000.

In the case, the Plaintiff's class action Complaint alleges state
law claims against Autovest for operating as a collection agency
without the required license under Utah Code Annotated Section
12-1-1 ("UCAA"). The Plaintiff seeks damages against Autovest for
unlawful collection practices under the Utah Consumer Sales
Practices Act ("UCSPA") and unjust enrichment and requests
declaratory and injunctive relief precluding Autovest from
enforcing allegedly void judgments.

Autovest's Notice of Removal alleges that the total relief the
Plaintiff claims puts more than $75,000 at issue even though the
Plaintiff's Complaint does not specifically state that much is
requested. The Notice of Removal then outlines that $75,000 is at
issue in this action because the Plaintiff's Complaint seeks: 1) a
declaration that the $20,150 judgment Autovest received against him
is unenforceable and uncollectable; 2) a declaration that Autovest
is not entitled to the assistance of any Utah court to enforce the
principle amount due under any judgment Autovest obtained
improperly; 3) $2,000 in statutory damages under the UCSPA; 4) a
return of all payments Plaintiff and others made in connection with
judgments entered against them and in favor of Autovest when
Autovest did not have a license; 5) a declaration that Autovest
cannot operate as a debt collector in Utah without obtaining a
license under the UCAA; 6) an order that Autovest disgorge all sums
it collected while it allegedly acted as a collection agency
without a license; and 7) an award of attorney's fees.

The Plaintiff asserts that Autovest cannot include the amounts of
the debts he seeks to have declared uncollectable or disgorged for
purposes of the amount in controversy because Autovest only needs
to obtain the proper license before collecting on those debts.
Autovest alleges that those debts are well over a million dollars.
But the Plaintiff claims that the cost of compliance is only the
costs associated with licensure and the refiling of the lawsuits,
which the Plaintiff calculates to be only $1,892.

The Plaintiff's arguments, however, limit the alleged damages to
only those associated with him, not the entire class, and appears
to recharacterize the claims in his Complaint, District Judge Dale
A. Kimball notes. In the briefing of the Motion, the Plaintiff
refers to his case as a very simple individual case whereas his
Complaint clearly alleges a class action. The Plaintiff's Complaint
alleges that, according to public records, Autovest has improperly
engaged in collection activities in more than 100 state lawsuits
against Utah consumers and that these consumers would qualify as
class members.

The Plaintiff's Complaint then asks the Court to declare all of
those state court judgments unenforceable and require Autovest to
disgorge any amounts collected on those judgments. Judge Kimball
holds that these allegations plainly put the enforceability, and
thus, the amounts of the judgments, in controversy. Moreover, even
if Autovest had only collected $250 on each of the 100 class
members, as is the case with the Plaintiff, the amount of requested
disgorgement would be $25,000.

The Court says it does not have a clear picture of how much is at
issue with the requested disgorgement, but the requested statutory
damages for the class members are clear. The Plaintiff's Complaint
alleges that each class members is entitled to statutory damages of
$2,000. The statutory damages alone for 100 class members amount to
$200,000, which is well above the $75,000 jurisdictional
requirement. The Court, therefore, need not even address the
parties' dispute regarding the potential amount of attorney's fees
in this case.

Judge Kimball notes that the Defendants may remove a case to
federal court, and the Court must analyze that removal, based on
the allegations of the Complaint. At the time of removal of this
case, the Plaintiff had put at issue well over $75,000. Judge
Kimball points out that it is not a reasonable reading of the
Plaintiff's Complaint to contend that he is only seeking statutory
damages for himself and attorney's fees. He specifically requested
statutory damages for all class members and identified 100
potential class members.

The Court, therefore, concludes that Autovest has demonstrated by a
preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy in
this action exceeds the $75,000 jurisdictional requirement.
Moreover, the Plaintiff has not demonstrated by a legal certainty
that his damages, if successful, would be less than $75,000.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that it has jurisdiction over this
case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(a)(1). The Court,
therefore, denies Plaintiff's motion to remand.

Autovest moves to compel arbitration based on an Arbitration
Agreement the Plaintiff signed at the same time he entered into the
RICSA to purchase and finance his vehicle. The Plaintiff opposes
Autovest's Motion to Compel Arbitration, arguing that Autovest
waived its right to arbitrate by filing the prior debt collection
action in state court to collect on his outstanding debt. The
Plaintiff also challenges whether Autovest was ever actually
assigned rights to the Arbitration Agreement.

The Court will address Plaintiff's second argument -- whether
Autovest has the right to compel arbitration under the Arbitration
Agreement -- first. Autovest has submitted evidence that it
obtained all right, title, and interest in Reifenberger's account
and that all rights under the RICSA were assigned to Autovest. The
Arbitration Agreement is part of and incorporated into the RICSA.
Moreover, the Arbitration agreement states that "any purchaser,
assignee, or servicer" of the RICSA is covered under the
Arbitration Agreement. Therefore, there is no basis for the
Plaintiff's argument that Autovest cannot enforce the terms of the
Arbitration Agreement.

Next, therefore, is whether Autovest waived its right to seek
arbitration in the case. The Judge notes that there is a strong
federal policy "favoring arbitration when the parties contract for
that mode of dispute resolution," citing Preston v. Ferrer, 552
U.S. 346, 349 (2008).

Judge Kimball finds that the Plaintiff entered into a broadly
worded Arbitration Agreement that applied to any claim, dispute, or
controversy arising from or related to the RICSA, the sale of the
vehicle, the relationships resulting from the RICSA, and the
collection of amounts owed. The Plaintiff does not dispute that he
entered into the Arbitration Agreement and that the agreement is
broad enough to encompass the present dispute.

The Plaintiff, however, argues that Autovest waived its right to
pursue arbitration of the present dispute because it elected to
bring a state court action to collect his outstanding debt under
the RICSA. The parties dispute whether state or federal law applies
to the waiver issue. However, under either state or federal law,
the plain language of the Arbitration Agreement would control.

Autovest's motion to compel arbitration in the action, despite
resorting to litigation in state court for the prior debt
collection action, is not acting in a manner inconsistent with its
contractual rights, the Judge states. The claims at issue in the
case were not at issue in the state debt collection action. And,
most importantly, Autovest's request to compel arbitration in the
subsequent lawsuit is expressly allowed in the parties' agreement.

Autovest's collection claims in state court were separate and
distinct from the claims the Plaintiff raises in the case, Judge
Kimball notes. Therefore, there is no basis for finding that
Autovest waived its right to seek arbitration on the Plaintiff's
claims. Accordingly, the Court grants Autovest's Motion to Compel
Arbitration.

Based on these reasons, Plaintiff James Reifenberger's Motion to
Remand for Lack of Diversity Jurisdiction is denied, Defendant
Autovest's Motion to Compel Arbitration is granted, Autovest's
Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion to
Compel is denied, and the Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File an
Overlength Motion or, in the Alternative, Leave to File a Corrected
Brief in Compliance with DUCivR 7-1 is granted. The action is
stayed and administratively closed pending arbitration.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum Decision and Order dated
Jan. 21, 2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/y2r59b86 from
Leagle.com.


BAE SYSTEMS: Cordova Class Suit Stayed Pending Settlement Talks
---------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California
grants the Parties' joint motion to stay pending mediation in the
lawsuit captioned AIMEE CORDOVA, individually and on behalf of
other members of the public similarly situated, Plaintiff v. BAE
SYSTEMS, INC.; BAE SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS & SERVICES, INC.;
and DOES 1-10, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 20-CV-2425 JLS (MDD)
(S.D. Cal.).

In their Motion, the Parties assert that granting the stay will
allow them to make a substantive attempt at resolution of the
putative class action by engaging in informal discovery and
spending a full-day attempting to resolve the action in its
entirety after fully assessing the potential exposure in the
putative class action.

Good cause appearing, the Court grants the Joint Motion, stays the
case until and through July 1, 2021, and vacates all pending
deadlines in the matter. The Parties will file a joint status
report detailing the results of the mediation within seven days of
the conclusion of the stay or within seven days after the date of
the mediation, whichever is earlier.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Jan. 21, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y3zg4fa2 from Leagle.com.


BANK OF AMERICA: Willrich Sues Over Failure to Safeguard Benefits
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Willrich, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., and DOES 1-20, inclusive, Case
No. 3:21-cv-00547 (N.D. Cal., Jan. 22, 2021), is brought against
the Defendant Bank of America, N.A., who violated the California
Consumer Privacy Act, California's Unfair Competition Law, and
Regulation E of the federal Electronic Funds Transfer Act by
failing to safeguard state benefits from fraud, failing to detect
the fraud as it was happening, and failing so spectacularly at
resolving the issues caused by these failures.

Faced with the economic devastation of the CoViD-19 pandemic,
millions of Californians now rely on unemployment insurance and
other benefits issued by the California Employment Development
Department ("EDD"). For unemployed Californians struggling to
survive, these EDD benefits provide a lifeline that allows them to
pay for basic necessities until they find that next job. Allegedly,
despite the critical importance of EDD benefits, Bank of America,
the financial institution with the exclusive contract to administer
them, is either unwilling or unable to stop criminals from
breaching their systems and controls, and from siphoning off
millions of dollars of EDD benefits one account at a time. Day
after day, there are new stories of yet another EDD benefits
recipient with a Bank of America EDD prepaid debit card (an "EDD
cardholder") who went to use their card only to discover that all
the money in their Bank of America EDD account ("EDD account") was
suddenly gone.

The complaint says, according to its own EDD cardholder agreement,
Bank of America has a "Zero Liability" policy for cardholders in
precisely this kind of situation. But contrary to that binding
policy, Bank of America has failed to assist or even communicate
with many of the countless defrauded EDD cardholders. Bank of
America's ineffectual response to the rampant fraud has taken
various forms, including not answering the customer service phone
lines it advises EDD debit cardholders to call; opening claims and
then closing them so soon thereafter such that a full review could
not have been done; crediting funds and then later debiting them
without notice to the EDD cardholder; failing to extend provisional
credit to EDD cardholders as required by law; and freezing EDD
accounts unaffected by fraud. Pursuant to its exclusive agreement
with the State of California, Bank of America is solely responsible
for the administration of EDD benefits, and the EDD has no ability
to intervene in the company's procedures.

As many people familiar with the situation say, the widespread
fraud could easily have been prevented if Bank of America had acted
according to industry security standards by securing the private
financial information of EDD cardholders and accounts, and by
issuing EDD cards with "EMV chips," rather than issuing cards with
only outdated, fraud-prone "magnetic stripe" technology. Since 2014
Bank of America has used the small, metallic EMV chips in its
consumer debit cards, touting the technology as "an important tool
in increasing card security." Rather than using chips in its EDD
cards, however, according to the complaint, Bank of America opted
to issue hundreds of thousands of EDD cards with magnetic stripe
technology, which when used at payment terminals openly transmit
sensitive card and account information and leave cardholders
vulnerable to fraud.

By failing to safeguard state benefits from fraud, failing to
detect the fraud as it was happening, and failing so spectacularly
at resolving the issues caused by these failures, Bank of America
has violated the California Consumer Privacy Act, California's
Unfair Competition Law, and Regulation E of the federal Electronic
Funds Transfer Act; has breached its contract with EDD cardholders;
has negligently failed to warn EDD cardholders about the risks
associated with its EDD cards and accounts; and has negligently
performed its contract with the California EDD, among other
violations of law. Bank of America's unlawful conduct has resulted
in significant harm to recipients of EDD benefits, depriving them
of their financial lifeline in the midst of a pandemic and
full-blown economic crisis, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff is a hospitality professional who found himself out
of work during the CoViD-19 Pandemic and has applied for and
received EDD unemployment benefits.

Bank of America, N.A., is one of the largest banking associations
in the United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Natasha N. Serino, Esq.
          Shannon F. Nocon, Esq.
          SCHACK LAW GROUP
          16870 West Bernardo Drive, Suite 400
          San Diego, CA 92127
          Phone: (858) 485-6535
          Fax: (858) 485-0608
          Email: natashaserino@schacklawgroup.com
                 shannonnocon@schacklawgroup.com


BLUE CROSS: Adjustment to Class Certification Deadlines Sought
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as BRENT S. and ANGIE S.,
J.B., R.B., A.F., C.S. and H.S., individually and as
representatives of the class of similarly situated individuals, v.
BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF MASSACHUSETTS, INC., ET AL., Case No.
1:17-cv-11569-ADB (D. Mass.), the Plaintiffs move the Court for an
order adjusting certain deadlines in this case as follows:

        Event              Current Date      Proposed New Date
                                             (60 day extension)

   Last day to serve       Jan. 4, 2021       No change
   requests for                               requested
   production of
   documents and
   interrogatories

   Last day to file a      Feb. 12, 2021      Apr. 13, 2021
   motion for class
   certification:

   Deadline for            60 days after      60 days after
   opposition to           motion filed       motion  filed
   motion for class        (Apr. 13, 2021     (June 14, 2021
   certification:          is latest)         is latest)

   Deadline for            21 days after      21 days after
   reply brief in          opposition filed   opposition filed
   support of motion       (May 4, 2021       (July 6, 2021
   for class               is latest)         is latest)
   certification:

   Last day to complete    Mar. 25, 2021       May 24, 2021
   all discovery

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion dated Jan. 22, 2020 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/36qiu5R at no extra
charge.[CC]

Counsel for the Plaintiffs and the Putative Classes, are:

          Sean K. Collins, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF SEAN K. COLLINS
          184 High Street, Suite 503
          Boston, MA 02110
          Telephone: (855) 693-9256
          Facsimile: (617) 227-2843

               - and -

          Jonathan M. Feigenbaum, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF JONATHAN M. FEIGENBAUM
          184 High Street, Suite 503
          Boston, MA 02110
          Telephone: (617) 357-9700
          Facsimile: (617) 227-2843
          E-mail: jonathan@erisaattorneys.com

               - and -

          Mala M. Rafik, Esq.
          ROSENFELD & RAFIK, P.C.
          184 High Street, Suite 503
          Boston, MA 02110
          Telephone: (617) 723-7470
          Facsimile: (617) 227-2843
          E-mail: mmr@rosenfeld.com

               - and -

          Brian S. King, Esq.
          336 South 300 East, Suite 200
          Salt Lake City, UT 84111
          Telephone: (801) 532-1739
          Facsimile: (801) 532-1936
          E-mail: brian@briansking.com

               - and -

          Ex Kano S. Sams II, Esq.
          GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
          1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 201-9150
          Facsimile: (310) 201-9160
          E-mail: esams@glancylaw.com

C&D SECURITY: Davis Must File Class Certification Bid by Feb. 1
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as HOPE DAVIS, on behalf of
Herself and on behalf of all Others similarly situated, v. C&D
Security Management, Inc. d/b/a/ Allied Universal Security
Services, and Universal Protection Services, LLC d/b/a Allied
Universal Security Services, LLC, Case No. 2:20-cv-01758-MMB (E.D.
Pa.), the Hon. Judge Michael M. Baylson entered an order granting
the Plaintiff's unopposed motion to extend the deadline for her to
file her motion for class certification by two and one-half
additional weeks.

The deadline for Plaintiff to file her motion for class
certification is extended by two weeks and therefore re-set to
February 12, 2021. No other deadlines are adjusted, the Court
says.

C&D Security provides integrated security solutions.

A copy of the Court's order dated Jan. 22, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3ajRG8j at no extra charge.[CC]

CHANGE HEALTHCARE: PSRs Class in Ealy-Simon Conditionally Certified
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CATHERINE EALY-SIMON and KRISTIN WILSON, individually
and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals,
Plaintiffs v. CHANGE HEALTHCARE OPERATIONS, LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 3:20-cv-00521 (M.D. Tenn.), Judge Eli Richardson of the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, Nashville
Division, granted in part the Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional
Certification of the case as a Collective Action.

Plaintiffs Ealy-Simon and Wilson brought the action individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated pursuant to the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. Section 201 et seq.

The Defendant provides call center services and operates an
outsourced call center for large physician groups, hospitals, and
health systems.  It employs hourly call center employees, known as
Patient Service Representatives ("PSRs"), in multiple call center
facilities throughout the United States, including in Port St.
Lucie, Florida.  Aerotek, a nonparty which provides recruiting and
staffing services, hired and employed Plaintiff Ealy-Simon and
assigned her to work as a PSR at the Defendant's call center in
Port St. Lucie.  The Defendant hired and directly employed
Plaintiff Wilson as a PSR at the facility in Port St. Lucie.  It
requires its PSRs to work a full schedule and overtime, but it does
not compensate them for all hours worked.

PSRs are required to perform compensable work tasks before and
after their shifts and during meal periods inasmuch as they are
required to turn on their computers, launch the computer networks,
software programs, applications and phone systems required to take
calls.  The pre-shift startup and log-in process typically takes
10-20 minutes.  PSRs have one unpaid 30-minute meal period each
shift, but PSRs must end their meal period early in order to unlock
their computers and log in to the needed programs, which takes
around 5-10 minutes.  After the end of a shift, logging out and
shutting down a computer takes approximately 5 minutes.  Despite
these log-in and log-out procedures, PSRs are paid only for the
time they are connected to the Defendant's phone system and are
available to make and take phone calls.

The Complaint asserts three counts: (1) a collective action for
violation of the FLSA for failure to pay overtime wages, (2) a
nationwide class action for breach of contract under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23, and (3) a nationwide class action for unjust enrichment
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.

The Motion relates to the first Count only.  Via the Motion, the
Plaintiffs seek to conditionally certify a class of allegedly
similarly situated workers allegedly denied unpaid overtime wages
under the FLSA.  In support of the Motion, the Plaintiffs filed
declarations from each of the two Plaintiffs and two proposed
putative opt-in Plaintiffs.

The Plaintiffs ask the Court (1) to conditionally certify the case
as a FLSA collective action under 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b) on
behalf of similarly situated employees; (2) to require the
Defendant to identify all putative FLSA Collective members by
providing a list of names and contact information within 10 days of
the Court's decision; (3) to permit the Plaintiffs' Counsel to send
notice via mail, email, and text message, and (4) to approve a
60-day opt-in period from the date notice is sent, with a reminder
postcard and email sent 30 days into the notice period to those who
have not opted in.

In support of its opposition, the Defendant filed several
declarations.  It protests that the proposed notice and consent
form are overbroad and misleading and that the method for
distributing notice is overreaching.

The Motion involves the first (notice) stage and seeks only
conditional, not final, certification.  The proposed class
comprises: All similarly situated current and former Patient
Service Representatives and similar job titles who work or have
worked for Change Healthcare Operations, LLC (Defendant) at any of
its call center facilities at any time during the three years
preceding the filing of the Complaint through judgment.

Judge Richardson opines that the Plaintiffs have satisfied their
burden of making a modest factual showing that they and the
putative class members are similarly situated.  If discovery later
shows the claims in the case to be so individualized as to render a
collective action unmanageable, the Defendant may move to decertify
the collective action at the second stage of the certification
proceedings.  And thus the Judge certifies the proposed class.

In regards to notice, Judge Richardson directs the parties to meet
and confer regarding the substance of the notice and the notice and
consent protocol, and then submit a joint report to the Court no
later than 14 days after the date of the accompanying Order.  If
the parties cannot agree on a protocol, or the language of the
notice, then by that same date (1) the Plaintiffs will file their
proposed notice and consent protocol, and (2) the Defendant will
separately file specific objections as to points of disagreement.
If this occurs, the Plaintiffs may respond to the Defendant's
objections within five days.  The Court will consider extending
this time frame if requested.

While explicitly opposing some aspects of the Plaintiffs' requested
notice procedures (i.e., the supplying of certain categories of
information and the form of a reminder notice), the Defendant does
not indicate whether it opposes, or otherwise respond to, other
aspects of the Plaintiffs' request (i.e., whether there should be a
reminder notice, the appropriateness of a 60-day notice period, the
availability of electronic consent to join forms).  Because the
Defendant has not briefed all aspects of the Plaintiffs' request,
the Judge defers ruling on the areas the Defendant has briefed
(such as limiting the method of notice to regular mail and limiting
the production of information to names and addresses only) until
the parties have had an opportunity to meet and confer regarding
the other aspects of notice.

Additionally, the Judge defers setting a deadline for the Defendant
to identify the potential class members (which the Plaintiffs
requested to be 10 days after entry of the accompanying Order)
until after the parties have had an opportunity to meet and confer
regarding notice procedures and the categories of information that
should be provided by the Defendant.  Any issues the parties are
not able to resolve will be brought to the Court's attention via
briefing filed by the date(s) outlined (and in the accompanying
Order).

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Richardson granted in part the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional Class Certification.  He
conditionally certified the matter as a collective action
consisting of all similarly situated current and former PSRs and
similar job titles who work or have worked for Change Healthcare
Operations, LLC at any of its call center facilities at any time
during the three years preceding the filing of the Complaint
through judgment.

In addition, the parties will meet and confer regarding the
substance of the notice and the notice and consent protocol within
the timeline set forth in the Memorandum and the accompanying
Order.  The Judge deferred ruling on the substance of the notice
and the proposed notice and consent protocol until the parties have
conferred and filed their joint or separate briefing.

An appropriate order will be entered.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 22, 2021 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y4zvfsbp from Leagle.com.


CIRCLE 2: Esedebe Suit Wins Conditional Class Certification
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as SONYA ESEDEBE, et al., V.
CIRCLE 2, INC., et al., Case No. 3:20-cv-00008-HEH (E.D. Va.), the
Hon. Judge Henry E, Hudson entered an order:

   1. denying the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss;

   2. granting the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Conditional
      Class;

      -- The conditional class shall consist of two subclasses:
         one for entertainers and one for managers.

   3. appointing the Plaintiffs' counsel as class counsel; and

   4. approving the Plaintiffs' Proposed Notice of Lawsuit,
      Proposed Publication Notice, and Proposed Opt-in Form with
      the following modification: the "look-back" period shall
      extend no longer than three years.

   5. directing the Plaintiffs to send the modified Notice of
      Lawsuit and Opt-In Form via first-class mail and email;

   6. directing the Defendants to publish the Publication Notice
      at their places of business; and

   7. directing the Defendants, within 14 days, to produce a
      list of potential opt-in plaintiffs consisting of current
      and prior employees for the past three years;

      -- This list must include the employees' names, job
         titles, last known addresses, email addresses, and
         telephone numbers.

A copy of the Court's order the Plaintiff's motion to certify class
dated Jan. 22, 2020 is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://bit.ly/3pvZRVy at no extra charge.[CC]


CLOROX COMPANY: Gudgel Class Suit Dismissed With Leave to Amend
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled SHANA GUDGEL, Plaintiff v. THE CLOROX
COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 20-cv-05712-PJH (N.D. Cal.), the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California grants the
Defendant's motion to dismiss with leave to amend.

The lawsuit is a product labeling case, brought as a putative class
action, arising out of Clorox's "Splash-less Bleach" product. The
Plaintiff's central allegation is that the product's packaging and
marketing would lead a reasonable consumer to believe that the
product is suitable for disinfecting, and because the product is
not suitable for that purpose, its packaging and marketing are
misleading.

On August 14, 2020, the Plaintiff filed the suit on behalf of
herself and a putative class, asserting five causes of action
against Clorox: (1) violation of the California Consumers Legal
Remedies Act ("CLRA") Section 1750; (2) violation of California
Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"); (3) violation of California False
Adverting Law ("FAL"); (4) negligent misrepresentation; and (5)
unjust enrichment.

The Plaintiff alleges that, shortly after the World Health
Organization declared COVID-19 a pandemic on March 11, 2020, she
purchased a 116 fl. oz. container of Clorox Splash-less Liquid
Bleach for $3.99. She alleges that she bought the product on the
belief that it would be suitable for disinfecting surfaces as a way
to control the spread of the coronavirus. She alleges that, after
she bought the product, she learned that the splash-less product is
not actually suitable for disinfecting. The splash-less formula
contains only 1-5% of sodium hypochlorite (the active ingredient in
bleach), whereas she alleges that a minimum of 5% sodium
hypochlorite is needed to be an effective disinfecting agent.

The Plaintiff alleges that she was misled by Clorox's labeling and
advertising into believing that the splash-less product would be
effective for disinfecting. She contends that, "only on the back of
the label, in small print, does the company disclose" that the
product is not to be used for disinfecting.

The Plaintiff defines the putative class as "all persons residing
in the United States who purchased Splash-Less Clorox during the
applicable statute of limitations." She seeks compensatory damages
and "an injunction or other appropriate equitable relief requiring
defendant to refrain from engaging in the deceptive practices"
alleged in the suit.

Clorox moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim, under Rule 9(b) for
failure to "allege with particularity the averments of fraud
underlying her claim," and under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of standing
to pursue injunctive relief.

Clorox's central argument is that the Plaintiff "does not identify
a valid theory of deception, because she alleges no facts showing
an affirmative misrepresentation or fraudulent omission." Clorox
argues that the label makes no statement or suggestion that the
product at issue is suitable for sanitization or disinfection. It
further points out that the product's back label specifically
states: "Not for sanitization or disinfection." Thus, Clorox
contends that a reasonable consumer would not be misled, and as a
result, the Plaintiff's statutory claims should be dismissed.

The Court concludes that there is no affirmative misrepresentation
or deception on the product's label. In the case, there is no
deceptive act to be dispelled, nor any omission that would have
deceived a reasonable consumer, District Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton
opines.

The Plaintiff further argues that the alleged misrepresentations
are actionable "when viewed in their totality," even if not
actionable individually. However, the Court finds no support for
the argument that the challenged statements, even when viewed in
their totality, would lead a reasonable consumer to believe that
the product had sanitizing and disinfecting capabilities. Nor does
the use of the "Clorox" brand name automatically imply that the
product must contain sanitizing or disinfecting capabilities.

In sum, the Court finds no basis for the Plaintiff's argument that
there were any misrepresentations or that any misrepresentations
"led plaintiff and reasonable consumers to believe that Clorox
Splash-less Bleach is suitable for disinfecting during the
pandemic."

Accordingly, the Court finds that the Plaintiff's claims under the
CLRA, UCL, and FAL must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
The Court need not reach the Defendant's alternative arguments
regarding standing to seek injunctive relief and Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 9(b)'s heightened pleading requirements.

In the context of the reasonable consumer test, the Plaintiff has
not identified any misrepresentation or deception on the product's
label, Judge Hamilton notes. Accordingly, the Plaintiff cannot meet
element of a negligent misrepresentation claim, "the
misrepresentation of a past or existing material fact." As a
result, the Plaintiff's negligent misrepresentation claim must be
dismissed.

As to unjust enrichment, Clorox argues that the Plaintiff "does not
identify any independent theory of unjust enrichment" that does not
rise or fall with her statutory claims. The Court agrees, and finds
that the Plaintiff's failure to identify an actionable deception in
the context of the "reasonable consumer" test also requires the
dismissal of her unjust enrichment claim.

For these reasons, Clorox's motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's
complaint is granted. Because Clorox's product packaging would not
change in an amended complaint, and because the Plaintiff
articulated no additional facts that would be added to any amended
complaint, the Court is skeptical that the complaint can be amended
to state a claim.

However, out of an abundance of caution, the Court grants the
Plaintiff leave to amend her complaint. The Plaintiff will file any
amended complaint within 21 days of the date of the order. No new
parties or causes of action may be pleaded without leave of court
or the agreement of the Defendant. Any amended complaint must
specify where the Plaintiff purchased the product at issue. Any
amended complaint must also identify the source of the phrase "it's
the same Clorox product you love, now with more power per drop"
allegedly used in Clorox's marketing materials, if the Plaintiff
intends to proceed with that allegation, and must also allege
whether she saw or read that phrase and relied upon it.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Jan. 21, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y2yvwcpt from Leagle.com.


COLLECTION PROFESSIONALS: Class Action Dismissed with Prejudice
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as DOUGLAS I. HAYE, on behalf
of himself and all others similarly situated, v. COLLECTION
PROFESSIONALS, INC., Case No. 1:20-cv-00153-NDF (D. Wyo.), the Hon.
Judge Nancy D. Freudenthal entered an order:

   1. granting the Defendant's motion for judgment on the
      pleadings;

   2. dismissing the complaint with prejudice;

      -- The Plaintiff has leave to amend the complaint within
         21 days after the entry of this order, if he is able to
         state facts that address the deficiency; and

   3. denying without prejudice to refiling if Plaintiff timely
      amends the Plaintiff's Motion to Certify the Class, now
      moot in light of this ruling;

      -- If Plaintiff does not timely amend his complaint,
         judgment will enter against Plaintiff without further
         notice.

The Court concludes that CPI's alleged violation occurred when CPI
served the Plaintiff with the state court complaint. Because the
Plaintiff did not file his Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA) claim until more than one year later, it is barred as
untimely. The complaint, therefore, fails to state a claim for
which relief may be granted.

Collection Professionals is a Wyoming based collection company.

A copy of the Court's order dated Jan. 22, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3cnBmpL at no extra charge.[CC]


COSTCO WHOLESALE: Court Vacates March 11 Class Status Hearing
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Rough v. Costco Wholesale
Corporation, Case No. 2:19-cv-01340 (E.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge
Morrison C. England, Jr entered an order vacating the March 11,
2021 hearing on the Motion to Certify Class.

The opposition or statement of non-opposition and reply due dates
shall be filed in accordance with the original motion hearing date.
If the Court determines that oral argument is needed it will be
scheduled at a later date. Any outstanding request for telephonic
appearance is denied as moot, the Court says.

The nature of suit states Labor -- Other Labor Litigation involving
employment discrimination.

Costco Wholesale Corporation is an American multinational
corporation which operates a chain of membership-only warehouse
clubs.[CC]

COSTCO WHOLESALE: March 24 Deadline for Class Cert. Filing Sought
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MEGAN ROUGH, individually
and on and former employees of behalf of all similarly situated
current and former employees of the DEFENDANTS in the State of
California, v. COSTCO WHOLESALE CORPORATION, Delaware corporation;
and DOES 1-50, inclusive, Case No. 2:19-cv-01340 (E.D. Cal.), the
Plaintiff Megan Rough's files an ex parte application for an order
to reopen further discovery and modifying the scheduling order to
continue the dates associated with class certification.

The Plaintiff contends that the request is not moot, and her
request is based on 47 Individuals with discoverable information
were identified by the Defendant on December 18, 2020, the Court
ordered deadline for non-expert discovery completion. As a result,
the Plaintiff was denied the opportunity to conduct discovery
regarding these individuals to ascertain what information they have
and to test the veracity of the statements would provide in support
of the Defendant's opposition to class certification.

The Plaintiff requests the following modifications to the Court's
scheduling order:

                             Present Date     Proposed New Date

   Class Certification       Dec. 18, 2020      March 22, 2021
   Discovery Cut-Off

   Deadline for Plaintiff    Jan. 19, 2021      March 24, 2021
   to File for Class
   Certification:

   Deadline for Defendant    Feb. 16, 2021      April 28, 2021
   to Oppose Class
   Certification:

   Deadline for Reply        Mar.5, 2021        May 12, 2021
   Briefing:

Costco Wholesale Corporation is an American multinational
corporation which operates a chain of membership-only warehouse
clubs.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion dated Jan. 22, 2020 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at http://bit.ly/3t476X7at no  
extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Graham S.P. Hollis, Esq.
          Nathan Reese, Esq.
          GRAHAMHOLLIS APC
          3555 Fifth Avenue Suite 200
          San Diego, CA 92103
          Telephone: (619) 692-0800
          Facsimile: (619) 692-0822
          E-mail: ghollis@grahamhollis.com
                  nreese@grahamhollis.com

COVINGTON SPECIALTY: Class Status Bid Filing Due Nov. 5
-------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as TILL METRO ENTERTAINMENT,
v. COVINGTON SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Case No.
4:20-cv-00255-GKF-JFJ (N.D. Okla.), the Hon. Judge Gregory K.
Frizzell entered the class certification scheduling order as
follows:

                Event                                Date

   1. Initial disclosure Under Federal            Feb. 15, 2021
      Procedure 26(a)(1):

   2. Motions for joinder of additional           Feb. 25, 2021
      parties &/or amendment to the pleadings:

   3. Exchange of preliminary witness lists       Apr. 10, 2021
      and exhibits:

   4. Plaintiff's expert identification           Aug. 20, 2021
      & reports Under Federal Rule Civil
     Procedure 26(a)(2):

   5. Defendant's expert identification           Oct. 6 2021
      & reports Under Federal Rule Civil
      Procedure 26(a)(2):

   6. Discovery cutoff (Interrogatories           Oct. 1 2021
      and Rule 34 requests must be made
      30 days in advance of this date):

   7. Settlement conference requested after:      Oct. 1, 2021

   8. Plaintiff's class certification motion:     Nov. 5, 2021

   9. Defendant's response to class               Dec. 10, 2021
      certification motion:

  10. Plaintiff's reply in support of             Jan. 10, 2022
      class certification motion:

  11. Defendant's surreply                        Feb. 4, 2022

Covington Specialty Insurance Company operates as an insurance
company.

A copy of the Court's order dated Jan. 22, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3cptFj6 at no extra charge.[CC]

CREE INC: Deadline to File Class Certification Set for Feb. 26
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as STEPHANIE WEDRA, on behalf
of herself and all others similarly situated, v. CREE, INC., Case
No. 7:19-cv-03162-VB (S.D.N.Y.), the Hon. Judge Vincent Briccette
entered the Civil Case Discovery Plan and Scheduling Order after
consultation with counsel and any unrepresented parties, pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 and 26(f), as follows:

-- Class Certification:

   a. Deadline to file class certification motion and
      Plaintiff's Expert Disclosures Related to Class
      Certification: February 26, 2021.

   b. Deadline to file opposition to class certification,
      including Daubert challenges relevant to class
      certification and Defendant's disclosures related to class
      certification: April 30, 2021.

   c. Deadline to file reply in support of class certification
      and response to Daubert challenges relevant to class
      certification and Plaintiff's rebuttal expert disclosures
      related to class certification: June 5, 2021.

-- Expert Discovery

   a. The parties agree that discovery deadlines may need to be
      reconsidered and adjusted following the Court's ruling on
      the Plaintiff's motion for class certification, and agree
      to meet and confer with respect to discovery deadlines and
      additional expert disclosures within 14 days of the
      Court's ruling on the Plaintiff's motion for class
      certification.

   b. All expert discovery, including expert depositions, shall
      be completed by 105 days after the Court's ruling on class
      certification. The Plaintiff's expert disclosures pursuant
      to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2) shall be made by 42 days after
      the Court's ruling on class certification.

   c. The Defendant's expert disclosures pursuant to Fed. R.
      Civ. P. 26(a)(2) shall be made by 84 days after the
      Court's ruling on class certification.

   d. The Plaintiffs rebuttal expert disclosures pursuant to
      Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2) shall be made by 98 days after
      the Court's ruling on class certification.

A copy of the Court's order dated Jan. 22, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3r2AM50 at no extra charge.[CC]

CRICKET WIRELESS: Thomas' Bid for Leave to Amend Complaint Granted
------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
grants the Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend in the lawsuit
titled JERMAINE THOMAS, et al., Plaintiff v. CRICKET WIRELESS, LLC,
Case No. 19-cv-07270 (N.D. Cal.).

In the putative consumer class action, the Plaintiffs seek leave to
amend the complaint to remove certain plaintiffs and add others.
Defendant wireless service provider does not oppose amending but
moves to dismiss with prejudice certain plaintiffs, who did not sit
for depositions as ordered. The Defendant also seeks either to
enforce that order or to impose evidentiary sanctions.

The Plaintiffs allege that Cricket Wireless falsely advertised
"unlimited 4G/LTE" services throughout the United States, without
being able to deliver on its promise of faster cellular service.
They bring the action under various state false advertising laws as
well as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act
("RICO"). They additionally allege negligence and unjust
enrichment.

The action has already seen prior proposed amendments to the
original complaint, as well as numerous discovery disputes. At a
status conference held November 4, 2020, the parties disputed a
demand to depose current and proposed plaintiffs regarding their
status as Cricket customers and recruitment strategies used by the
Plaintiffs' counsel.

The parties disagreed over whether the eight Plaintiffs seeking to
withdraw should be ordered to sit for depositions, as well as
whether they would be dismissed with or without prejudice. A
November 5 order ruled that both the Plaintiffs seeking to withdraw
and those seeking to be added must sit for a 90-minute Zoom
deposition by the end of November 2020. That order further
specified that "upon notice of the completion of this process to
the Court, the Plaintiffs may file their proposed amended
complaint, which will dismiss certain named Plaintiffs without
prejudice.

Cricket has since deposed eight: Plaintiffs Lysha Encarnacion, Lani
Hale, Felicia Reddick, Alfredo Sanchez, Melizza Weaver who seek to
withdraw and proposed Plaintiffs Beverly Addison, Christina Allaer,
and Mary Porter. Since the November 5 order, previously proposed
Plaintiff, Laura Dozier, has decided not to continue her
involvement in the action. The Plaintiffs' counsel have been unable
to maintain consistent communication with or provide the
availability of Plaintiffs Tiara Cromwell, Clarissa Kelly, and
Kamilah Riddick and previously proposed Plaintiff, Laura Dozier.
So, the defense counsel have been denied an opportunity to depose
those four.

On December 15, the Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for leave
to amend the complaint. The Plaintiffs seek to withdraw Plaintiffs
Kamilah Riddick (Virginia), Lysha Encarnacion (Florida), Tiara
Cromwell (Maryland), Felicia Reddick (Michigan), Lani Hale (New
York), Melizza Weaver (New Jersey), Alfredo Sanchez (Texas), and
Clarissa Kelly (Georgia). Original Plaintiffs Jermaine Miller,
Jamie Postpichal, and Sarah Waters remain parties to this action,
as does Robert Ellison who was added to the first amended
complaint. Jermaine Thomas, another Plaintiff named in the original
complaint, also remains named but has been ordered to arbitrate his
dispute with Cricket.

The Plaintiffs wish to add plaintiffs Maishia Johnson (Texas and
Virginia) and Ursula Freitas (Washington). The addition of Johnson
preserves claims in Texas and Virginia which would otherwise be
lost with Sanchez and Riddick's dismissal. Freitas would add a new
claim for relief under the Washington Consumer Protection Act.

Cricket does not oppose amendment in general, but by its own
motion, it seeks dismissal with prejudice of the claims of
Cromwell, Kelly, and Riddick for failure to comply with the order
dated November 5. Because of their interrelated nature, the order
addresses both the motion for leave to amend and the motion to
dismiss the claims of Cromwell, Kelly, and Riddick with prejudice
and to enforce the November 5 order or, in the alternative, to
impose evidentiary sanctions.

District Judge William Alsup notes that the Order follows full
briefing and oral argument (held telephonically due to the ongoing
pandemic) as to the motion for leave to amend on January 21, 2021.
There is no longer a need for the hearing set for February 4, 2020,
so that hearing is vacated.

According to the Order, the ordinary liberal amendment standard of
Rule 15 arguably does not apply to "adding" new plaintiffs. The
addition of parties is not just an amendment. It's also an
intervention by new parties with their own claims for relief. But
the Defendant has no objection other than to obtain a dismissal
with prejudice as to those who failed to show up for their
depositions as ordered. Hence, the amendment for intervention will
be allowed.

By participating in the action, Plaintiffs Cromwell, Kelly, and
Riddick have put at issue their status as Cricket customers, the
circumstance of their recruitment, and their involvement in and
understanding of the case. Judge Alsup notes that those Plaintiffs
had ample time to sit for deposition, yet failed not only to comply
with the order, but even to communicate with counsel at all. The
Plaintiff counsel's argument that "withdrawing plaintiffs seek
dismissal without prejudice so that they may participate as absent
class members should a class be certified" rather than to "file
their claims elsewhere" does not support the conclusion that their
failure to abide by the order should be excused, Judge Alsup
opines.

Hence, leave to amend is granted. Plaintiffs Cromwell, Kelly, and
Riddick will be dismissed with prejudice. If a class is ever
certified in the case, Laura Dozier will be excluded by name as a
class member, but her claims survive Thomas v. Cricket Wireless,
LLC, 19-cv-07270-WHA.

The Order finds that the defense counsel's request to depose all
withdrawing Plaintiffs and Dozier or to impose evidentiary
sanctions is disproportionate to the needs of the case. Cricket
will be allowed to subpoena one withdrawing Plaintiff, Riddick, in
order to depose him for a 90-minute Zoom deposition. The motion for
evidentiary sanctions is denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Jan. 21, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yxgz2x2u from Leagle.com.


CUYAHOGA CTY: State of Ohio Files Petition for Mandamus
-------------------------------------------------------
State of Ohio on behalf of Lou Bucci, Dorniece D. Carson, Byron
Chavers, Lisa Evans, Jane Fina, Tamara Mazina Laurie Mickey, Joseph
Pina, Gail Ward, Sarah Watkins, Pamela Whatley, Relators, on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated v. CUYAHOGA CTY.
PERSONNEL REVIEW COMMISSION, Respondent, Case No. CV 21 943203
(Ohio Ct. Common Pleas, Jan. 22, 2021), is brought in mandamus to
compel the Personnel Review Commission ("PRC") to entertain and
adjudicate their claims relating to the 35-to-40 hour extension.

The Relators each worked for Cuyahoga County in 2012, when the
County lengthened their workweek from 35 to 40 hours without
providing any additional compensation. This action constituted an
impermissible reduction in pay without disciplinary cause under
Section 124.34 of the Ohio Revised Code. The Relators originally
filed two separate class actions against the County seeking
compensation for this violation. After the cases were consolidated,
the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas certified the litigation
as a class action. The Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the decision to certify the class
in the two lawsuits. It did so despite finding that employees had
"their hourly pay rate reduced" when the County imposed the
uncompensated five-hour extension upon their workweek. The Court
held, however, that R.C. 124.34 required them to seek redress for
this offense before the County's Personnel Review Commission (PRC),
the administrative agency that handles civil-service employment
matters. Under the circumstances, the class action in court could
not continue.

In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court specifically held
that courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over claims alleged
under R.C. 124.34. While employees must go to the PRC for
substantive relief under the statute, courts still retain authority
to adjudicate issues collateral to such claims. The Supreme Court
decision expressly acknowledges the procedure for implementing an
administrative suit under R.C. 124.34. In particular, the County
must "serve the employee with a copy of the order of reduction" in
pay, which must "state the reasons for the action." Employees then
have ten days to file their case before the PRC.

According to the complaint, Cuyahoga County never provided its
employees with any "order" notifying them that the unpaid extension
of their workweek would reduce their hourly rate of pay. As a
result, employees did not receive a bona fide opportunity to press
their claims under R.C. 124.34 in an administrative forum. Unless
County employees now have the chance to litigate their claims under
R.C. 124.34 before the PRC, they will have no potential remedy for
the unlawful pay cut effected by the uncompensated five-hour
extension of their workweek.

After the Supreme Court issued its ruling, Cuyahoga County publicly
expressed its view that employees cannot now administratively
pursue claims under R.C. 124.34 because too much time has lapsed
since the 35-to-40-hour switch was implemented. The County takes
this position even though it never provided employees notice of the
corresponding reduction in pay that would have commenced their
10-day window to assert a claim. Employees have no adequate remedy
at law if the PRC refuses to recognize their current right to sue
under R.C. 124.34. The Supreme Court confirmed the Court's
jurisdiction to prevent this miscarriage of justice from taking
place, says the complaint.

The Plaintiffs worked for the Defendants before the County adopted
its Charter.

The Personnel Review Commission (PRC) was established by the
Cuyahoga County Charter in 2010.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joshua R. Cohen, Esq.
          Ellen M. Kramer, Esq.
          COHEN ROSENTHAL & KRAMER LLP
          One Clinton Place
          3208 Clinton Avenue
          Cleveland, Ohio 44113
          Phone/Facsimile: (216) 815-9500)
          Email: jcohen@crklaw.com

               - and -

          Kevin T. Roberts, Esq.
          88 Salem Road
          Lyme, Connecticut 06371
          Phone: (216) 965-6158
          Email: ktr@kevinrobertslaw.com


DEKALB COUNTY: T.H. "IDEA" Suit Gets Class Certification Status
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as T.H. as next friend T.B.,
et al., v. DEKALB COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Case No.
1:19-cv-03268-TWT (N.D. Ga.), the Hon. Judge Thomas W.
Thrashenteredd an order certifying the following Class
and Subclass:

   -- Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) Class:

      "All youth detained at the Dekalb County Jail with a
      disability, as defined by the IDEA;" and

   -- Discrimination Subclass:

      "All members of the IDEA Class who are qualified
      individuals with a disability, as defined by the ADA or
      Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act."

The Court says that the Plaintiffs have satisfied all requirements
for certifying their proposed class and subclass.

The Plaintiffs allege that T.H and J.B. did not receive the special
education services to which they were entitled during periods of
incarceration at the DeKalb County Jail. The Plaintiffs brought
this suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, seeking "to
compel Defendants to create a system to identify, evaluate, a
provide a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to qualifying
youth with disabilities in the Jail."

The DeKalb County School District is a school district
headquartered at 1701 Mountain Industrial Boulevard in
unincorporated DeKalb County, Georgia.

A copy of the Court's opinion and order dated Jan. 22, 2020 is
available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3iXGlPs at no
extra charge.[CC]


DESTIN FIRE: Firefighters Win Conditional Certification Status
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as RYAN JENSEN, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. DESTIN FIRE
CONTROL DISTRICT, Case No. 3:20-cv-05661-RV-HTC (N.D. Fla.), the
Hon. Judge Roger Vinson entered an order:

   1. approving conditional certification of a class of:

      "all employees covered by the collective bargaining
      agreement (CBA) and all similarly situated individuals
      employed by the defendant within the three year period
      immediately preceding the filing of this case";

   2. approving the Notice of this case to be provided to all
      past and present employees covered by the CBA and all
      similarly situated firefighters;

   3. directing the defendant to disclose to the plaintiff the
      names, mailing addresses, cell-phone numbers and email
      addresses of all past and present employees covered by the
      CBA and all similarly situated firefighters employed by
      the defendant within the three year period immediately
      preceding the filing of this action so that the Notice may
      be forwarded to them;

   4. directing the defendant to post a copy of the Notice in
      each of its firehouses in a conspicuous place where
      notices of wage and hour, workers' compensation,
      Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and
      other similar notices are posted; and

   5. giving any similarly situated employees covered by the CBA
      and similarly situated firefighters 90 days from the date
      the notice is mailed, to submit their opt-in forms to join
      this case.

A copy of the Court's order dated Jan. 22, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/36rUO13 at no extra charge.[CC]

DNF ASSOCIATES: Court Certifies Two Classes in Viernes FDCPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as RONALD VIERNES, and all
others similarly situated, v. DNF ASSOCIATES, LLC, Case No.
1:19-cv-00316-JMS-KJM (D. Haw.), the Hon. Judge J. Michael
Seabright entered an order:

   1. granting the Plaintiff's Motion to Certify a Class, as to
      the Plaintiff's proposed Fair Debt Collection Practices
      Act (FDCPA) Class and Hawaii Class:

      The classes are defined as follows:

      -- FDCPA Class

         "(a) All Hawaii residents; (b) who were subjected to
         debt collection lawsuits by DNF; (c) while DNF was
         unlicensed as a debt collector in Hawaii; (d) to
         collect a “debt” as defined by the FDCPA; (e) that DNF

         bought while the debt was in default; and (f) where the
         collection lawsuit, letters, or calls occurred
         within the one (1) year period immediately preceding
         the filing of this complaint;"

      -- Hawaii Class

         "(a) All Hawaii "consumers" as defined by H.R.S. § 480-
         1; (b) who were subjected to debt collection lawsuits
         by DNF; (c) while DNF was unlicensed as a debt
         collector in Hawaii; (d) to collect a "debt" as defined
         by H.R.S. section 443B-1; (e) where DNF was assigned
         the debt; and (f) where the collection lawsuit
         commenced within the four year period immediately
         preceding the filing of this complaint;"

   2. appointing the Plaintiff Ronald Viernes as class
      representative to proceed on behalf of both foregoing
      classes for the Defendant's alleged violations of the
      FDCPA and Hawaii's law governing collection agencies; and

   3. appointing Justin A. Brackett, Esq., and Brian L.
      Bromberg, Esq., as class counsel under Federal Rule of
      Civil Procedure 23(g).

DNF Associates is a debt collection company.

A copy of the Court's order dated Jan. 22, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2NT6CD1 at no extra charge.[CC]

DRAPER AND KRAMER: Vazquez Suit Moved From N.D. to C.D. California
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOSE VASQUEZ, Plaintiff v. DRAPER AND KRAMER MORTGAGE
CORP., Defendant, Case No. 20-cv-06635-YGR (N.D. Cal.), Judge
Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California granted the Defendant's motion to transfer
venue to the Central District of California.

Plaintiff Jose Vasquez brings the putative collective and class
action against Defendant Draper and Kramer Mortgage Corp. ("D&K")
for (1) failure to pay straight, overtime, and minimum wages for
all hours worked and to maintain records in violation of the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"); (2) failure to pay wages due upon
termination in violation of the California Labor Code ("CLC"); (3)
failure to pay all wages owed in violation of the CLC; (4) failure
to provide rest periods in violation of the CLC; (5) failure to
provide meal periods in violation of the CLC; (6) failure to
reimburse business expenses in violation of the CLC; and (7) unfair
business practices in violation of the California Unfair
Competition Law.

The Defendant is the residential mortgage division of Draper and
Kramer, a full-service real estate and financial firm incorporated
in Delaware with principal executive offices in Illinois.  Vasquez
alleges that the Defendant regularly conducts business in
California, has nine offices in California, and employs loan
officers in those California offices.  Vasquez, currently residing
in Santa Barbara, California, was employed by the Defendant as a
loan officer from September 2018 to July 2020 and performed his
work in Santa Barbara.

With respect to his first cause of action under the FLSA, Vasquez
seeks to represent a nationwide class of current and former
employees of the Defendant who worked as a loan officer or home
mortgage consultant.  With respect to the remaining six state law
causes of action, he seeks to represent a California-wide class of
same.

Mr. Vasquez alleges that loan officers perform their duties either
at their employer's office or in their own home offices.  They
spend a minimal amount of time outside these fixed sites in the
field meeting with clients and such work is rare and sporadic, not
customary, nor regular.  He and other loan officers allegedly did
not receive any sort of compensation other than commissions
promised in the employment agreement.  While the Plaintiff alleges
that no known exemption, under California law or the FLSA, applies
to the work performed by him and the other loan officers, the
Defendant asserts, among other affirmative defenses, an exemption
for outside sales employees.

According to Vasquez, venue is proper because he and other loan
officers "did business and executed contracts with" the Defendant
in the District, for which services it has "failed to pay wages due
for said labor, and thus the District is where a substantial part
of the events giving rise to the present claims under 28 U.S.C.
Section 1406(a) occurred.  In a footnote, he alleges that he had
"sourced, originated, and 'cleared to close reviewed'" a home
mortgage loan "in the amount of $510,000 on a homeowner's property
in Kensington, California (within the jurisdiction of the Northern
District of California), earning the Plaintiff wages due in the
amount of $8,166.40."  Vasquez further alleges that as of the date
of his separation from the Defendant, he is owed "the amount of
$146,292.84 in commission wages payable to him upon funding."

Now before the Court is the Defendant's motion to transfer venue to
the Central District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section
1404(a).  It argues that transfer is appropriate because the
Plaintiff's choice of forum should not control, and the 1404(a)
factors weigh in favor of transfer to the Central District of
California.

Judge Rogers examines these relevant factors.  While many of the
factors weigh neutrally between the Northern and Central
California, she finds that the more important factors, namely, the
convenience of the parties and witnesses and local interest, weigh
heavily in favor of the Central District of California.  No factor
weighs in favor of the Northern District of California other than
the relative court congestion.  Thus, the Judge reluctantly
concludes that the Central District of California is the more
appropriate venue.  Had there been more than a tenuous connection
to the District, she would not feel compelled to further burden her
colleagues to the south.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Rogers granted the motion to
transfer venue to the Central District of California.  The Clerk of
Court is directed to transfer the matter to the U.S. District Court
for the Central District of California.  The Order terminates
Docket Number 20.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 22, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y5c3zda7 from Leagle.com.


EAGLE BANCORP: New York Class Action Stayed Pending Mediation
-------------------------------------------------------------
Eagle Bancorp, Inc. said in its Form 8-K filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission filed on January 25, 2021, that
the previously disclosed putative securities class action against
the Company and certain of its current and former officers and
directors remains outstanding.

However, on December 23, 2020, the securities class action
plaintiffs and defendants filed a stipulation to stay the class
action litigation pending a non-binding mediation in the spring of
2021, on a date to be determined. The SDNY so-ordered the
stipulation on December 24, 2020. There can be no assurance,
however, that the Class Action litigation will be settled.

Eagle Bancorp, Inc. operates as the bank holding company for
EagleBank that provides commercial and consumer banking services
primarily in the United States.  It accepts business and personal
checking, NOW, tiered savings, and money market accounts, as well
as individual retirement, certificate of deposit, and investment
sweep accounts; and time deposits.  Eagle Bancorp, Inc. was founded
in 1997 and is headquartered in Bethesda, Maryland.

EASYSAVER REWARDS: Perryman's Counsel Awarded $805K in Atty's Fees
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE EASYSAVER REWARDS LITIGATION, Case No.
09-cv-02094-BAS-WVG (S.D. Cal.), Judge Cynthia Bashant of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of California granted
Objector Brian Perryman's motion seeking $805,000 in attorney's
fees and a $2,500 incentive award.

The case is a consumer class action where the Court approved a
settlement with two components.  First, the settlement provided for
class members to receive credits with a total face value of $25.5
million.  Second, the settlement established a $12.5 million common
fund for paying refunds to class members, attorney's fees,
litigation costs, incentive awards, and settlement administration
expenses.  Any funds left over will be distributed to several cy
pres beneficiaries.

In 2013, the Court approved the Plaintiffs' counsel's request for
$8.7 million in attorney's fees.  After subtracting the award and
the other items from the common fund, about $3 million remained for
the cy pres distribution.

Perryman objected.  He argued the cy pres award was improper and
the attorney's fee award did not comply with the Class Action
Fairness Act's requirements for coupon settlements.  The Court
rejected Objector's challenges, and he appealed.  The Ninth Circuit
vacated the settlement approval and remanded for further
proceedings in light of its then-recent decision in In re Online
DVD-Rental Antitrust Litigation, 779 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2015),
which addresses what qualifies as a "coupon" under CAFA.

On remand, the Court determined that it was unnecessary to apply
CAFA's requirements for coupon settlements.  It then reapproved the
$8.7 million attorney's fee award.

Objector again appealed to challenge the attorney's fee award and
cy pres component.  As to the fee award, he argued the Court erred
in not applying CAFA's coupon settlement provisions.  The Ninth
Circuit agreed and vacated the fee award and remanded for the award
to "be recalculated in a manner that treats the credits as coupons
under CAFA."  Thus, the Ninth Circuit otherwise affirmed the
settlement approval.

Upon remand, the Plaintiffs filed a new motion for attorney's fees.
They asked for the same fees as before--$8.7 million.  The Objector
opposed on several grounds.  The Court found some of his objections
had merit and ultimately bifurcated the fee award.  Specifically,
the Court permitted the Plaintiffs to resubmit a request for
attorney's fees based on only the non-coupon portion of the
settlement--i.e., the $12.5 million cash fund--and then later seek
an additional fee award based on the value of the coupons redeemed
by the class members.

Around this time, bankruptcy-related events unfolded that further
muddled the case.  Eventually, the Court addressed a renewed fee
motion from the Plaintiffs based "solely on the cash fund"
component of the settlement.  The Plaintiffs sought a reduced fee
award of $5.7 million under the lodestar method, and the Objector
again opposed.  He argued, among other things, that the requested
award would disproportionately benefit the class counsel at the
expense of the class.

By this time, considering the bankruptcy developments, the Court
valued the cash fund at $10.5 million--instead of $12.5 million.
It agreed that awarding the Plaintiffs' counsel $5.7 million for
recovering $10.5 million would be unreasonable.  After applying the
lodestar method, the Court found it appropriate to adjust the $5.7
million lodestar with a 0.6 multiplier.  That adjustment reduced
the $5.7 million lodestar to $3.42 million, which is approximately
32.5% of the $10.5 million fund.

In short, after two appeals and multiple rounds of motions in the
Court, the Objector succeeded in convincing the Court to reduce the
class counsel's fee award from $8.7 million to $3.42 million.
After accounting for other developments, the cy pres beneficiaries
are expected to now receive $3.23 million more from the
settlement.

The Objector asks the Court to award 25% of the $3.23 million
increase in the cy pres benefit as attorney's fees for his counsel,
which equals about $805,000.  He also asks for a $2,500 incentive
award.  The Plaintiffs file a one-page response.  They
"respectfully leave the determination of what fee, if any, Mr.
Perryman's counsel, Ted Frank, should ultimately receive to the
discretion of the Court."

Judge Bashant finds that the Objector is entitled to fees.
Although he did not prevail on many of his challenges to the
settlement, he did succeed in convincing the Court to significantly
reduce the class counsel's fee award.  That indirect benefit is now
much greater due to the Objector's efforts.  Hence, awarding fees
to his counsel is appropriate.

The Judge now turns to calculating a reasonable fee award.  The
Objector's attorneys submit a lodestar that includes 847 hours of
attorney time.  Given the history of the case, the Judge finds
these hours are the amount "reasonably expended on the litigation."
She also finds that the Objector's counsel's proposed rates are
appropriate, which are comparable to those the Court approved for
the Plaintiffs' counsel.  She thus adopts the Objector's proposed
lodestar of $496,116.

Accordingly, the Objector's request for $805,000 in fees under the
percentage method implies a lodestar multiplier of about 1.62
($805,000/$496,116 = ~ 1.62).  The multiplier is "within the range
of multipliers applied in common fund cases."  The lodestar method
confirms the reasonableness of the fee award determined under the
percentage method.  Consequently, the Judge grants the Objector's
request for $805,000 in fees.

Finally, the Objector seeks a modest incentive award of $2,500,
which is significantly less than the incentive awards approved for
the class representatives.  Given Objector's participation in the
case, the Judge finds the modest award to be appropriate.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Bashant granted the Objector's
motion.  She awarded the Objector's counsel $805,000 in attorney's
fees and Objector Perryman a $2,500 service award from the
settlement's common fund component.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 22, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yyuyq73w from Leagle.com.


ED BROWN: Paguada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Ed Brown Products,
Inc. The case is styled as Dilenia Paguada, on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated v. Ed Brown Products, Inc., Case
No. 1:21-cv-00562 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 21, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Ed Brown Products -- https://www.edbrown.com/ -- is the leading
custom manufacturer of high-end custom performance handguns and
parts for the 1911 and Fueled M&P.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: marskhaimovlaw@gmail.com


EURO HOMECARE: Gorzkowska Suit Wins Conditional Class Certification
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MARIA GORZKOWSKA, MARIA
DRWIEGA, PATRYCJA MARTINEZ, and BARBARA DRELICHOWSKI, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. EURO HOMECARE
LLC and ELZBIETA DARMOROS, Case No. 3:19-cv-01773-VAB (D. Conn.),
the Hon. Judge Victor A. Bolden entered an order:

   1. granting the Plaintiffs' motion for conditional
      certification and notice to potential plaintiffs:

      -- The Court grants conditional certification for "all
         current and former employees of the Defendants who
         provided live-in caregiver and/or companion services to
         the Defendants' clients at any time between November 7,
         2016 and present", finding that Plaintiffs has made the
         factual showing required to infer that these employees
         were subject to a common policy or plan that violated
         the law.

      -- The Court orders that the notice to potential opt-in
         plaintiffs (1) be provided in both English and Polish;
         (2) include contact information for both Plaintiffs’
         and Defendants’ counsel; (3) provide notice of possible

         litigation requirements for opt-in plaintiffs; and (4)
         provide a one hundred and twenty (120)-day opt-in
         period. This notice shall be mailed and sent by e-mail
         to potential opt-in plaintiffs. The Court will not
         require the posting of the notice at the Euro Homecare
         offices.

   2. directing the parties to confer and revise the notice and
      consent form consistent with this Order and submit a final
      version for the Court's approval by February 5, 2021; and

   3. directing the Defendants to disclose to the Plaintiffs'
      counsel the names, dates of employment, last known home

      addresses, e-mail addresses, and telephone numbers of Euro
      Homecare employees within the proposed opt-in plaintiff
      class by February 22, 2021, within 30 days of this Order.

      -- At this time, the Court declines to order the
         disclosure of social security numbers and dates of
         birth.

Euro Homecare offers non-medical home care, cooking, housekeeping
and companionship services.

A copy of the Court's order dated Jan. 22, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2NOpiDX at no extra charge.[CC]

FLAGSTAR BANCORP: Dubose Must File Class Status Bid by June 21
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ALVIA DUBOSE individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. FLAGSTAR
BANCORP, INC., Case No. 1:20-cv-03841-SCJ-WEJ (N.D. Ga.), the Hon.
Judge Walter E. Johnson entered a scheduling order as follows:

   1. The discovery in this case be bifurcated:

      -- Phase one of discovery shall focus on class
         certification issues and phase two shall focus on the
         merits of the claims and damages.

      -- For phase one, this case is assigned to a four-month
         discovery track beginning January 22, 2021 and ending
         May 22, 2021.

      -- The Parties with discovery disputes are directed to
         contact the Chambers of the undersigned before filing
         any Motion.

      -- The Court prefers to handle such disputes via telephone
         conference where possible.

   2. The motions under Local Rule 7.1(A)(2), including motions
      to amend pleadings, must be filed no later than February
      22, 2021.

   3. The plaintiff shall file any class certification motion no
      later than June 21, 2021:

      -- The Defendant shall respond to the motion within 30
         days, and any reply by the plaintiff shall be due 14
         days later.

   4. The parties must submit a proposed scheduling order for
      phase two of discovery no later than 10 days after the
      Court rules on any class certification motion.

The Court said, "The filing of a motion for extension of time for
doing an action permitted or required by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or the Local Rules of this Court shall be filed prior to
the deadline of the action. Absent prior leave granted by the Court
on the basis of a timely filed motion, no party may file a brief in
support or opposition of a motion that exceeds the page limitations
set forth in Local Rule 7.1(D). The parties are reminded to comply
with the spacing and type requirements of Local Rules 5.1(B)-(C)
and 7.1(D) in all filings with the Court to which these rules
apply. Parties should note whether opposing counsel consents to any
motion filed."

Flagstar Bank is a bank headquartered in Michigan. It is the
primary subsidiary of Flagstar Bancorp, Inc., a bank holding
company.

A copy of the Court's order dated Jan. 22, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3cljIDj at no extra charge.[CC]

GA DEPARMENT OF CORRECTIONS: Brown Files Suit in N.D. Georgia
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Georgia Department of
Corrections, et al. The case is styled as Wesley Brown, Franklin
Simmons, Donald Futch, Georgia State Conference of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated v. Georgia Department of
Corrections, Timothy C. Ward (in his official capacity as
Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Corrections), CoreCivic,
Inc., Steve Upton (in his official capacity as Warden of Coffee
Correctional Facility), Case No. 1:21-cv-00354-WMR-CCB (N.D. Ga.,
Jan. 21, 2021).

The nature of suit is stated as Prison Condition for Prisoner Civil
Rights.

The Georgia Department of Corrections --
http://www.dcor.state.ga.us/-- protects the public by operating
safe and secure facilities through the development of professional
staff and effective offender management.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Emmet J. Bondurant, II, Esq.
          Michael Brandon Jones, Esq.
          BONDURANT MIXSON & ELMORE, LLP
          1201 West Peachtree Street, N.W.
          3900 One Atlantic Center
          Atlanta, GA 30309-3417
          Phone: (404) 881-4126
          Email: bondurant@bmelaw.com
                 jones@bmelaw.com


GOOGLE LLC: Sweepstakes' Bid to Consolidate Hearing Moved to Feb. 4
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SWEEPSTAKES TODAY, LLC, Individually and on Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff v. GOOGLE LLC, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 4:20-cv-08984-HSG, Judge Haywood S. Gilliam,
Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California, Oakland Division, denied the Plaintiff's Administrative
Motion for an Earlier Hearing Date on its Motion to Consolidate,
and rescheduled the hearing previously set for April 8, 2021, to
Feb. 4, 2021, at 2:00 p.m. (PST).

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 20, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y3rxb9rn from Leagle.com.


GREAT SOUTHERN: Court Dismisses DeAngelis Class Suit With Prejudice
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Chief District Judge Susan O. Hickey of the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Arkansas, Hot Springs Division, dismissed
the case, KRISTOFOR DEANGELIS, Individually and on behalf of all
others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff v. GREAT SOUTHERN
WOOD-GLENWOOD, INC. and WOOD PRESERVING, INCORPORATED, Defendants,
Case No. 6:20-cv-6103 (W.D. Ark.), with prejudice.

In their Joint Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice, the parties
stipulated that they have resolved all claims in the lawsuit and
that the case should be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1).  The instant stipulation
of dismissal is signed by the Plaintiff and the Defendants.  Thus,
the Plaintiff's claims against the Defendants were effectively
dismissed when the parties filed the instant stipulation.

The Order is issued for purposes of maintaining the docket.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 20, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y4u3b9qh from Leagle.com.


H & EDP: Williams Sues Over Deprivation of Overtime Compensation
----------------------------------------------------------------
Dontay Williams, Torian Hopkins and Laquita Long, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated v. H & EDP MANAGEMENT
LLC, and HARRY PARKER, Case No. 3:21-cv-00087 (S.D. Ill., Jan. 22,
2021), is brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
Illinois Minimum Wage Law because of the Defendants' unlawful
deprivation of their rights to overtime compensation.

The Plaintiffs worked over 40 hours a week almost every week of
their employment. The Plaintiffs regularly worked approximately
50-55 hours, or more, per workweek. However, the Defendants failed
to compensate the Plaintiffs for all hours worked over 40 in a
workweek at one and one half times their regular rate of pay, says
the complaint.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants as hourly-paid cooks
at Gulf Shores Restaurant and Grill in Edwardsville, Illinois.

H & EDP Management LLC, doing business as Gulf Shores Restaurant
and Grill, is a Missouri corporation with its principal office in
Illinois. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Russell C. Riggan, Esq.
          Samuel W. Moore, Esq.
          RIGGAN LAW FIRM LLC
          130 West Monroe Avenue
          Kirkwood, Missouri 63122
          Phone: (314) 835-9100
          Email: russ@rigganlawfirm.com
                 smoore@rigganlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Molly A. Elkin, Esq.
          Sarah M. Block, Esq.
          McGILLIVARY STEELE ELKIN LLP
          1101 Vermont Ave., N.W.. Suite 1000
          Washington, DC 20005
          Phone: (202) 833-8855
          Email: mae@mselaborlaw.com
                 smb@mselaborlaw.com


HARKINS ADMINISTRATIVE: Final Judgment Issued in Garcia Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
issued a final judgment in the lawsuit titled ADAN GARCIA,
individually, on a representative basis, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. HARKINS ADMINISTRATIVE
SERVICES, INC., an Arizona Corporation, and DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 5:18-cv-2314 MCS (JEMx) (C.D.
Cal.).

The Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of the Class Action
Settlement as to the Stipulated Settlement Agreement and Release of
Claims was heard on November 2, 2020, in the Court. On January 4,
2021, the Court entered an Order Granting Final Approval of the
Settlement.

District Judge Mark C. Scarsi ordered that judgment is entered in
accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement and Final
Order.

The Action is ordered dismissed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Final Judgment dated Jan. 21, 2021,
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yyda9lc2 from Leagle.com.


HFM INC: Certification of Equity Memberships Owners Class Sought
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as STEVEN BRIGATI, GARY
CANTRELL, THOMAS MAYRIDES, DENNIS PAYNE, AND T. MICHAEL PAYNE, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, v. HFM,
INC., a Florida for profit corporation, and WORCESTER POLYTECHNIC
INSTITUTE, a Massachusetts nonprofit corporation, Case No.
2:20-cv-14208-JEM (S.D. Fla.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court for an
order:

   1. certifying a class consisting of:

      "all owners of equity memberships at the Legacy Golf &
      Tennis Club, Inc., which formerly was known as The Reserve
      Golf & Tennis Club, Inc.;

   2. appointing themselves to serve as class representatives;
      and

   3. appointing their counsel as class counsel.

The Plaintiffs own equity golf and tennis memberships in the Legacy
Golf and Tennis Club in Port St. Lucie, Florida ("the Club"). The
Plaintiffs seek to enforce their rights, and the rights of other
similarly situated equity members of the Club, to own and operate
the Club in accord with the Plan for the Offering of Memberships in
the Legacy Golf and Tennis Club, Inc. dated September 1, 1996 (the
"Plan").

The Plaintiffs estimate that the class exceeds 425 members. On
behalf of the class, the Plaintiffs request:

   a. a declaration that all turnover requirements have been met
      or excused and HFM is now contractually obligated to turn
      the Club over to the equity members in accord with the
      Plan;

   b. an injunction requiring HFM and WPI to sell the Club to
      the equity members in accord with the Plan; and

   c. a judgment requiring HFM and WPI to return to the Club the
      $1.5 million in "gifts" HFM gave WPI from the Club's
      coffers, as well as all sums that HFM has spent on its or
      WPI's expenses since the Turnover Date.

The Plaintiffs contend that the Defendants' breach of the Plan's
turnover provisions uniformly harms a specific class of people --
all equity members of the Club. Such conduct falls squarely within
the ambit of Rule 23(b)(2). The injuries apply uniformly to the
entire class. The Plaintiffs requested a remedy that both will
provide relief to the entire class and satisfies the strictures of
Rule 65(d).

The Defendant WPI owns HFM, Inc., and HFM owns the Club. Through
HFM, WPI controls the Club.

The sole purpose of the Club is to operate a private club for the
exclusive pleasure and recreation of its members. Every person who
has purchased a membership in the Club since September 1, 1996 was
required to sign a Subscription Agreement, which cannot be revoked
unless the application is denied, and which obligates the applicant
to comply with all terms of the Plan and exhibits to the Plan. As
the Club's owner, HFM promised applicants and members that it would
operate the Club in accord with the Plan, says the complaint.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class dated Jan. 22,
2020 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2YpzLI3
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Elaine Johnson James, Esq.
          ELAINE JOHNSON JAMES P.A.
          P.O. Box 31512
          Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33420
          Telephone: (561) 245-1144
          Facsimile: (561) 244-9580
          E-mail: ejames@elainejohnsonjames.com
                  ejjames50@icloud.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Noel R. Boeke, Esq.
          Charles Wachter, Esq.
          Holland & Knight LLP
          100 North Tampa Street, Suite 4100
          Tampa, FL 33602
          E-mail: noel.boeke@hklaw.com
                  charles.wachter@hklaw.com

               - and -

          Jennifer L. Chunias, Esq.
          Courtney L. Hayden, Esq.
          GOODWIN PROCTER LLP
          100 Northern Avenue
          Boston, MA 02210
          E-mail: jchunias@goodwinlaw.com
                  chayden@goodwinlaw.com

HOME DEPOT: Moshtagh Suit Seeks to Certify Two Subclasses
---------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as STEVE MOSHTAGH, an
individual, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, v.
THE HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC. a Delaware Corporation, Case No.
2:19-cv-01205-RSM (W.D. Wash.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an
order:

   1. certify his proposed classes:

      -- Hourly Store Employee Subclass

        "all hourly, non-exempt Home Depot employees who worked
        in a Home Depot retail store in Washington and had money
        deducted from their paychecks for The Homer Fund, at any
        time within the period beginning three years prior to
        the filing of this Complaint to the date of
        certification of the class;" and

     -- Post-Closing Shift-End Subclass

        "all hourly, non-exempt Home Depot employees who worked
        at least one shift in a Home Depot retail store in
        Washington that ended after the store closed to the
        public at any time within the period beginning three       

        years prior to the filing of this Complaint to the date
        of certification of the class;"

   2. appointing him as class representative;

   3. appointing the law firms of Stutheit Kalin LLC and HKM
      Employment Attorneys LLP as class counsel; and

   4. directing that notice be distributed to the class.

Former Home Depot employee Steve Moshtagh seeks certification of
two classes arising from wage and hour practices that Home Depot
concedes are uniform and statewide.

On behalf of the Hourly Store Employee Subclass, the Plaintiff
alleges that Homer Fund deductions violate WAC 296-126-028, which
governs wage deductions during ongoing employment. On behalf of the
Post-Closing Shift-End Subclass, the Plaintiff alleges that time
spent waiting for the front stores to be unlocked is compensable
under Washington law. For both classes he seeks unpaid minimum,
regular and overtime wages, double damages, interest and attorneys'
fees.

The Plaintiff also brings a derivative claim for violations of the
Washington Consumer Protection Act.

Home Depot operates an employee-assistance fund called The Homer
Fund, which distributes emergency funding to qualifying Home Depot
employees.

Home Depot is the largest home improvement retailer in the United
States, supplying tools, construction products, and services. The
company is headquartered in incorporated Cobb County, Georgia, with
an Atlanta mailing address.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated Jan. 21,
2020 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2Nu8qlB
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jason A. Rittereiser, Esq.
          Donald W. Heyrich, Esq.
          Rachel M. Emens, Esq.
          HKM EMPLOYMENT ATTORNEYS LLP
          Henry Brudney, WSBA No. 52602
          600 Stewart Street, Suite 901
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 838-2504
          Facsimile: (206) 260-3055
          E-mail: dheyrich@hkm.com
                  jrittereiser@hkm.com
                  remens@hkm.com
                  hbrudney@hkm.com

               - and -

          Peter Stutheit, Esq.
          STUTHEIT KALIN LLC
          SW Columbia, Suite 1850
          Portland, OR 97258
          Telephone: (503) 493-7488
          Facsimile: (503) 715-5670
          E-mail: peter@stutheikalin.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          D. Michael Reilly, Esq.
          John S. Devlin III, Esq.
          LANE POWELL PC
          1420 Fifth Avenue, Suite 4200
          PO Box 91302
          Seattle, WA, WA 981011
          Telephone: (206) 223-7000
          Facsimile: 206-223-7107
          E-mail: reillym@lanepowell.com
                  devlinj@lanepowell.com

               - and -

          Dorothy F. Kaslow, Esq.
          Donna M. Mezias, Esq.
          Allison S. Papadopoulos, Esq.
          AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP
          580 California St., 15th Fl.
          San Francisco, CA 98104
          Telephone: (415) 765-9500
          Facsimile: (415) 765-9501
          E-mail: dkaslow@akingump.com
                  dmezias@akingump.com
                  apapadopoulos@akingump.com

HSBC BANK: Court Directs Cheng to File Class Status Bid by March 2
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Cheng v. HSBC Bank USA,
N.A., Case No. 1:20-cv-01551 (E.D.N.Y.), the Hon. Judge Brian M.
Cogan entered an order:

   1. directing the Plaintiff to file its motion for class
      certification by March 2, 2021; and

   2. directing the defendant to file its motion for summary
      judgment by March 2, 2021.

The suit alleges violation of the ruth in Lending Act.

HSBC Bank USA, National Association, an American subsidiary of
UK-based HSBC, is a bank with its operational head office in New
York City and its nominal head office in McLean, Virginia.[CC]

ICELANDIC PROVISIONS: Mantini Sues Over Mislabeled Dairy Products
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Kayla Mantini and Michele Trezza, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Icelandic Provisions, Inc., Case No.
7:21-cv-00618-PMH (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 22, 2021) alleges that the
Defendant's marketing and advertising of the Icelandic Provisions
dairy product brand gives consumers the impression it is made in
Iceland, including its front label representations of "Traditional
Icelandic Skyr," "Icelandic Provisions" and the image of the
Icelandic countryside with a snow covered backdrop.

According to the complaint, the product is not made in Iceland but
in upstate New York. In marketing and advertising its product to
give the impression it is made in Iceland, the Defendant
understands that today's consumers are faced with a dizzying area
of products and choices, the complaint asserts.

Skyr is a traditional "Icelandic cultured dairy product," with "the
consistency of Greek yogurt, but a milder flavor." The word skyr is
related to the word shear (to cut), referring to how the dairy is
split into the liquid whey and the thick skyr.

Unlike regular yogurts made with one cup of milk, a cup of skyr
requires four cups. Skyr is essentially fat free (0.6 grams of fat
per 100 grams), has approximately one-third less sugar than
standard yogurts and is high in protein without the need for added
ingredients. Skyr also contains unique probiotics, which are
thought to be a result of the Icelandic dairy cows that produce the
milk used as the raw material.

Icelandic Provisions, Inc. markets, manufactures, labels,
distributes, promotes and sells the traditional Icelandic dairy
product -- "skyr" - under the Icelandic Provisions brand.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Spencer Sheehan, Esq.
          SHEEHAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 Cutter Mill Rd Ste 409
          Great Neck, NY 11021-3104
          Telephone: (516) 268-7080
          E-mail: spencer@spencersheehan.com

               - and -

          Michael R. Reese, Esq.
          REESE LLP
          100 W 93rd St., Fl. 16
          New York NY 10025-7524
          Telephone: (212) 643-0500
          E-mail: mreese@reesellp.com

ILLINOIS: Kelly Seeks Stay of Class Status Bid Briefing
--------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as TOMMY MCFARLAND v. BRENDAN
KELLY, in his official capacity as Director of the Illinois State
Police, Case No. 2:20-cv-02334-CSB-EIL (C.D. Ill.), Defendant
Brendan Kelly asks the Court for an order staying briefing on the
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification for 90 days.

Director Kelly moves the Court to stay her deadline to respond to
the Plaintiff's motion to April 22, 2021, so as to allow the
parties to conduct discovery. She says that the Plaintiff does not
oppose her motion.

The Plaintiff filed a motion for class certification on January 8,
2021 and the Court set an automatic date of January 22, 2021 to
respond.

The Illinois State Police is the state police force of Illinois.
Officially established in 1922, the Illinois State Police have over
3,000 personnel and 21 districts. The main facilities of the
Illinois State Police Academy, which were constructed in 1968, are
located in Springfield.

A copy of the Defendant's motion dated Jan. 22, 2020 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3tjlj2y at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Michael T. Dierkes, Esq.
          Hal Dworkin, Esq.
          OFFICE OF THE ILLINOIS ATTORNEY GENERAL
          GENERAL LAW BUREAU
          100 West Randolph Street, 13th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 814-3672

INDIVIOR INC: Court Approves Notice to Direct Purchaser Class
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as STATE OF WISCONSIN v.
INDIVIOR INC. f/k/a RECKITT BENCKISER PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., et
al., Case No. 16-cv-5073 (E.D. Pa.), the Hon. Judge Goldberg, J.
entered a memorandum granting the Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs'
(DPPs) motion to approve the form and manner of notice to the
direct purchaser class.

The proposed Notice, under the heading of "What is this lawsuit
about?", states the following:

   Direct Purchaser Class Plaintiffs allege that Defendant
   violated federal antitrust laws by engaging in unlawful
   conduct to delay and impair competition by generic
   bioequivalent versions of Suboxone (TM) tablets. Direct
   Purchaser Class Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant engaged
   in an unlawful, multifaceted scheme to destroy demand for
   Suboxone (TM) tablets and over to Reckitt's new Suboxone (TM)
   film product, in order to force Direct Purchaser Class
   Plaintiffs and members of the Class to purchase branded
   Suboxone (TM) film instead of generic bioequivalent versions
   of Suboxone (TM) tablets (which Plaintiffs allege were less
   expensive), once they became available on the market. Direct
   Purchaser Class Plaintiffs also allege that, in order to give
   itself more time to destroy demand for Suboxone (TM) tablets
   and move sales over to Suboxone (TM) film, the Defendant
   delayed the market entry of generic Suboxone tablets by
   manipulating FDA's Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy
   process. Direct Purchaser Class Plaintiffs allege that they
   and the other members of the Class were injured by being
   overcharged because of losing the opportunity to purchase
   less expensive, generic bioequivalent versions of Suboxone
   (TM) tablets in place of the more expensive branded Suboxone
   (TM) tablets and film, and by paying higher prices for
   Suboxone (TM) tablets.

   The Defendant denies these allegations, and denies that any
   Class member is entitled to damages or other relief.
   Defendant also denies that any of its conduct violated any
   applicable law or regulation. No trial has been held.

The Defendant contends that the Notice's failure to state its
defenses beyond a generic denial is contrary to the requirements of
Rule 23(c)(2)(B)(iii) and "harmful to [Defendant] (though inherent
to the class certification process) that DPPs' false and unproven
accusations will be circulated, under the imprimatur of a federal
court, to all of [Defendant's] direct customers." The Defendant,
therefore, requests that the "Defendant denies" paragraph be
replaced with the following:

   Indivior states that Suboxone (TM) Film possesses innovative
   product attributes that led the overwhelming majority of
   patients and physicians to prefer Film over tablet products.
   It is Indivior's view that Film became successful because of
   these product attributes and because Film was offered at
   affordable and reasonable prices. Indivior denies that it
   coerced anyone to take, prescribe, or pay for Film. Indivior
   therefore denies Plaintiffs' allegations of unlawful
   activity, and denies that any Class member is entitled to
   damages or other relief. No trial has been held.

Judge Goldberg said, "Such an addition is unnecessary. Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2)(B)(iii) requires only that the notice
"clearly and concisely state in plain, easily understood language
the class claims, issues, or defenses." "The amount of information
on defenses that must be presented is minimal: 'A general statement
that the defendants have denied liability will suffice or it may be
more detailed and specific, which is especially suitable when
affirmative defenses have been presented.'" "The Rule itself does
not explicitly require the notice to include a description of the
defenses." ("The direction that class-certification notice be
couched in plain, easily understood language is a reminder of the
need to work unremittingly at the difficult task of communicating
with class members."). Guided by these principles, I find that the
Defendant's proposed "counterbalancing" statement is neither
required nor warranted here. Indeed, the Rule's demand for a
"clear[] and concise[] statement of the case in "plain, easily
understood" language counsels away from including such language.
Accordingly, I will grant the DPPs' Motion to Approve the Form and
Manner of Notice to the Direct Purchaser Class."

The Defendant Reckitt Benckiser, Inc. manufactures Suboxone, a drug
commonly used to combat opioid addiction. Suboxone previously came
in tablet form, but in 2010, citing safety concerns, the Defendant
effectuated a change in the administration of this drug, switching
from tablet to sublingual film. Various purchasers/consumers of
Suboxone claimed that this switch was anticompetitive and solely
designed to maintain Defendant's market exclusivity -- a scheme
known as a "product hop." These claims have resulted in
multi-district, antitrust litigation before this Court, as well as
the certification of a class of DPPs.

A copy of the Court's memorandum dated Jan. 21, 2020 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3ce6EQ5 at no extra
charge.[CC]

INNATE INTELLIGENCE: Court Denies Bid to Compel in Levine Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri denies
the Plaintiff's motion to compel in the lawsuit styled LEVINE HAT
CO., on behalf of itself and all other similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. INNATE INTELLIGENCE, LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No.
4:16-cv-01132 SNLJ (E.D. Mo.).

Plaintiff Levine Hat filed the putative class action lawsuit
against numerous Defendants alleging violations of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act.

The Plaintiff seeks an order compelling Defendant ProFax, Inc., to
produce certain financial documents. The parties had been in
settlement negotiations for some time before active litigation
resumed in the fall of 2020. Before the parties' settlement, the
Plaintiff had propounded certain discovery requests on ProFax
regarding ProFax's financial condition. When the parties resumed
discovery, they negotiated ProFax's response to the same variety of
questions.

The Plaintiff now seeks an order compelling ProFax to respond to
Interrogatory No. 19 and Request for Production No. 67, and to
include copies of Defendant Profax's tax returns for the period of
March 1, 2017, until the present. The discovery requests read as
follows:

   -- Interrogatory 19: List YOUR total annual revenue, net
      operating expenses, net profit, assets and liabilities for
      the RELEVANT TIME PERIOD; and

   -- Request for Production 67: Financial statements or other
      DOCUMENTS showing YOUR income, net income, revenue, profit,
      operating expenses, assets, liabilities and cash on hand
      for the RELEVANT TIME PERIOD.

ProFax responds that it has provided a comprehensive set of
ProFax's confidential profit and loss statements for the entirety
of the years 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, and through the third
quarter of 2020. ProFax contends that it has satisfied its
obligations with respect to Interrogatory 19 and Request 67 and
that it should not be required to produce tax returns.

The Plaintiff contends that ProFax must supply its tax returns
because the profit and loss statements it produced are unsworn
summaries. In a surreply, to address that concern, ProFax states it
provided its accountant-verified supplemental answers to the
discovery requests. ProFax argues that the verified answers render
the Plaintiff's argument moot on that point. ProFax adds that the
profit and loss statements provide ProFax's annual income, income
by channel, total operating expenses, operating expenses by
category, gross profits, net income, and liabilities.

ProFax has explained that it does not file its own tax returns.
Instead, its parent company, nonparty CyberData, files a
consolidated tax return each year.

The tax returns for ProFax's parent CyberData are relevant only
with regard to the information they disclose regarding ProFax's
financial condition. The Court does not, however, see any
"compelling need" for their disclosure because the information the
Plaintiff seeks has been conveyed as verified financial
statements.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's motion to compel is denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum and Order dated Jan. 21,
2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/y3qbvs9o from
Leagle.com.


JASON LENGRICH: Judge Endorses Denial of Thompson Class Status Bid
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as LARRY ALLEN THOMPSON v.
JASON LENGRICH, WARDEN, BUENA VISTA CORR. FAC., JENNIFER HANSEN,
BVCF SECURITY SVC. CAPTAIN, and WILLIAM CATTELL, BVCF EAST UNIT
SUPERVISOR, Case No. 1:18-cv-00588-RM-KMT (D. Colo.), Magistrate
Judge Kathleen M. Tafoya recommends:

   1. granting part and denying in part the Defendants' "Motion
      to Dismiss Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)";

      -- The Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Lengerich, in
         his official capacity, should be DENIED as moot;

   2. denying as moot the Plaintiff's requests for injunctive
      relief;

   3. dismissing the Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims against
      the Defendant Lengerich, in his individual capacity, which
      were premised upon overcrowding and understaffing, for
      failure to sufficiently allege personal participation;

   4. dismissing the Plaintiff's remaining Eighth Amendment
      claims for failure to state a claim.

   5. dismissing the Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment equal
      protection claims for failure to state a claim;

   6. proceeding the Plaintiff's remaining Fourteenth Amendment
      bodily privacy claims against Defendants Cattell, Hansen,
      and Lengerich;

   7. denying as moot the Plaintiff's "Motion for Declaratory
      Judgment Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 2201(a) and Fed. R.
      Civ. P. 57"; and

   8. denying the Plaintiff's "Motion for 'Class of One' Class
      Action Certification Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2),
      23(c)(1)(B), 23(c)(4), and 23(g)(1)."

Judge Tafoya says that Thompson does not identify any similarly
situated individuals that he seeks to represent in this lawsuit.
Nor does the Amended Complaint charge, or allege, that this is a
class action case. As such, the Plaintiff cannot maintain a class
action claim. For that reason, the Plaintiff's request for "class
of one" class action certification should also be denied.

Pro se Plaintiff Larry Allen Thompson, an inmate in the custody of
the Colorado Department of Corrections [CDOC], brings this action
under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, alleging that he was subjected to
unconstitutional conditions of confinement while incarcerated at
the CDOC's Buena Vista Correctional Facility [BVCF]. Thompson
alleges, specifically, that BVCF is overcrowded and understaffed,
and that these conditions, along with the prison's shower
conditions and policies, violated his rights under the Fourth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

A copy of the Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge dated Jan. 22,
2020 is available from PacerMonitor.com at  https://bit.ly/3r5eAXS
at no extra charge.[CC]

JERSEY FIRESTOP: Asks Court to Junk Conditional Certification Bid
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ORBIN COVACHUELA,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
JERSEY FIRESTOP, LLC, DANIEL HINOJOSA, and DAVID HINOJOSA, Case No.
3:20-cv-08806-AET-TJB (D.N.J.), the Defendants ask the Court for an
order denying the Plaintiff's motion for conditional certification
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in all respects and
for such other and further relief as this Court deems just and
proper.

The Defendants contend that the plaintiff has failed to meet his
burden for conditional certification. The Plaintiff does admit that
the Defendants paid him the proper minimum wage during his entire
employment. The Plaintiff also admits the Defendants paid him the
proper overtime rate for Saturday work. The Plaintiff also fails to
Provide the morning and afternoon times he was
allegedly required to work.

Jersey Firestop is a complete full-service mechanical insulation
company and certified firestop contractor.

A copy of the Defendants' memorandum dated Jan. 22, 2020 is
available from PacerMonitor.com at http://bit.ly/2L2Eigtat no
extra charge.[CC]

Attorneys for the Defendants Jersey Firestop, LLC, Daniel Hinojosa,
and David Hinojosa, are:

          David S. Halsband, Esq.
          HALSBAND LAW OFFICES
          Court Plaza South
          21 Main Street, East Wing, 3rd Fl.
          Hackensack, New Jersey 07601
          Telephone: (201) 487-6249
          Facsimile: (201) 487-3176
          E-mail: david@halsbandlaw.com

KANSAS: M.B. Can File Under Seal Exhibits to Welch Declaration
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, M.B. and S.E. through their next friend Katharyn
McIntyre, et al., Plaintiffs v. Laura Howard in her official
capacity as Kansas Department for Children and Families Secretary,
et al., Defendants, Case No. 18-2617-DDC-GEB (D. Kan.), Judge
Daniel D. Crabtree of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Kansas granted the Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Leave to File
Documents Under Seal.

The Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Leave seeks to file under seal
certain exhibits attached to the Declaration of Leecia Welch, filed
in support of their Summary of and Responses to Submissions
Received in Response to Proposed Class Action Settlement.

The case presents highly sensitive and personal issues.  The
Complaint asserts that Kansas Department for Children and Families
subjected children in foster care to extreme housing disruption and
failed to treat mental health concerns adequately.

The Plaintiffs ask the Court for leave to file under seal exhibits
from various stakeholders that include information directly or
indirectly revealing personally identifying information of minor
children who are or have been in the foster care system.  They
state that many of these comments also include sensitive
information relating to children's trauma and abuse histories,
involvement in the child welfare system, and medical and mental
health treatment.

The Plaintiffs have attached the exhibits they believe qualify for
sealing and have highlighted the proposed redactions.  They already
have filed publicly available versions of these exhibits with
certain portions redacted from public view consistent with the
proposed redactions.

The proposed redactions contain (1) personally identifying
information of minor children who are or have been in the foster
care system and/or (2) information concerning adults or other
matters that could be used to personally identify minor children
who are or have been in the foster care system.

Judge Crabtree recognizes the sensitive nature of these proceedings
and the substantial interest in protecting the minor children
involved.  He finds that the Plaintiffs have met their substantial
burden to show a compelling interest exists in protecting
children's identities and have limited their redactions to that
interest.  He notes that a vast majority of the information remains
publicly accessible after redacting the protected information.

The Judge, thus, granted the Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Leave
to File Under Seal.  Consistent with his ruling, he ordered the
Plaintiffs, within seven days from the date of his Order, to file
under seal and without redactions, their Declaration of Leecia
Welch and exhibits.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 20, 2021 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y279qtcf from Leagle.com.


KELLER WILLIAMS: Request to Stay Ruling on Class Status Bid OK'd
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Becker v. Keller Williams
Realty, Inc., et al., Case No. 9:19-cv-81451 (S.D. Fla.), the Hon.
Judge Raag Singhal entered an order:

   1. granting Williams Realty motion for extension of time to
      file responses to defendant's motion for summary judgment;

      -- The Response is due by February 5, 2021; and

   2. granting the Defendant's motion to stay ruling on motion
      for class certification;

The nature of suit states Other Statutes - Other Statutory
Actions.

Keller Williams Realty is an American technology and international
real estate franchise with headquarters in Austin, Texas.[CC]

KHOSROW SADEGHIAN: Court's Class Status Recommendation Withdrawn
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as BILLY MARQUIS, et al., v.
KHOSROW SADEGHIAN and AMY JO SADEGHIAN, Case No.
4:19-cv-00626-RWS-KPJ (E.D. Tex.), the Hon. Judge Kimberly C.
Priest Johnson entered an order:

   1. withdrawing the Court's Report and Recommendation dated
      January 4, 2021 in light of the recent Swales opinion;

   2. overruling as moot the Defendants' Objections to the
      Report and Recommendation.

   3. directing the parties to appear via videoconference to
      discuss the Plaintiff's Amended Motion for Conditional
      Certification of Collective Action and the Swales opinion
      on Thursday, January 28, 2021, at 2:00 p.m.

      -- The parties should be prepared to argue whether the
         Plaintiffs and putative collective action members are
         employees or independent contractors, and whether
         sufficient discovery has been made to determine this
         threshold question.

      -- The Court refers the parties to the Court's Standing
         Order Regarding Scheduled Hearings by Telephone or
         Videoconference in Civil Cases.

On January 4, 2021, the Court entered a Report and Recommendation,
wherein the Court recommended the Plaintiff's Amended Motion for
Conditional Certification of Collective Action be granted. The
Report based its recommendation on the two-stage approach
articulated in Lusardi v. Xerox Corporation, 118 F.R.D. 351 (D.N.J.
1987), the standard most frequently used in the Eastern District of
Texas. See Tice v. AOC Senior Home Health Corp., 826 F. Supp. 2d
990, 994 (E.D. Tex. 2011).

On January 12, 2021, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit entered its opinion in Swales v. KLLM Transport
Services, L.L.C., No. 19-60847, 2021 WL 98229, F.3d (5th Cir.
2021). In Swales, the Fifth Circuit rejected the two-step analysis
articulated in Lusardi. The Fifth Circuit clarified that district
courts must address "potentially dispositive, threshold matters,"
"like whether the plaintiffs are 'employees' such that they can
bring an FLSA claim" first. Thereafter, district courts must
"identify, at the outset of the case, what facts and legal
considerations will be material to determining whether a group of
'employees' is 'similarly situated.'" "And then [the district
court] should authorize preliminary discovery accordingly. The
amount of discovery necessary to make that determination will vary
case by case."

A copy of the Court's order dated Jan. 21, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3iR9n33 at no extra charge.[CC]

LAWRENCE O'TOOLE: Seeks Extension of Class Status Filing to April 1
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ALICIA STREET, et al., v.
LT. COL. LAWRENCE O'TOOLE, et al., Case No. 4:19-cv-02590-CDP
(E..D. Mo.), the Plaintiffs and defendants move the Court to extend
Plaintiffs' deadline to file a motion for class certification.

The parties have been conducting extensive discovery in related
cases arising out of the events at issue in this cause. The scope
of that discovery and limitations related to the coronavirus
pandemic have limited the parties' ability to conduct class
discovery in this cause, including depositions. In order to allow
the parties additional time to conduct this discovery, the parties
jointly request that the Court extend Plaintiffs' deadline to file
a motion for class certification to April 1, 2021.

The current deadlines under the amended Stipulated Order for
Preliminary Schedule and Procedure, as amended, require the
Plaintiffs to file a motion for class certification by January 31,
2021. The Defendants filed four motions to dismiss on March 16,
2020. Those motions remain pending. The future course of
proceedings will be affected by the Court's ruling on those
motions. The parties do not seek the extension for any improper
purpose.

A copy of the joint motion to extend the deadline to file motion
for class certification dated Jan. 22, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3albE2y at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Javad M. Khazaeli, Esq.
          James R. Wyrsch, Esq.
          Kiara N. Drake, Esq.
          KHAZAELI WYRSCH LLC
          911 Washington Avenue, Suite 211
          St. Louis, MO 63101
          Facsimile: (314) 288-0777
          E-mail: javad.khazaeli@kwlawstl.com
                  james.wyrsch@kwlawstl.com
                  kiara.drake@kwlawstl.com

               - and -

          Alicia Campbell, Esq.
          CAMPBELL LAW LLC
          3407 Jefferson Avenue
          St. Louis, MO 63118
          Telephone: (888) 588-5043
          Facsimile: (314) 588-9188
          E-mail: alicia@campbelllawllc.com

LLPD LLC: $283.5K Settlement in White Suit Over Unpaid Wages Okayed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TINA M. WHITE, et al., Plaintiffs v. LLPD, LLC, et
al., Defendants, Case No. DLB-18-2900 (D. Md.), Magistrate Judge
Deborah L. Boardman of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Maryland granted the Joint Motion to Approve Settlement Agreement
and General Release and Establish a Schedule for the Dismissal of
the Case with Prejudice.

The parties dispute whether the Defendants owe the Plaintiffs
unpaid minimum wages and overtime wages and the amount of any owed
wages.  The Plaintiffs worked at Broadway Diner as non-exempt
employees at all relevant times.

Ms. White filed the collective action on behalf of herself and
other similarly situated against their employers, LLPD and Pete
Koroneos.  The Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants failed to pay
them minimum wages and overtime pay in violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA"), the Maryland Wage and Hour Law ("MWHL"),
and the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law ("MWPCL").

Kathryn Uroza (also known as Kathryn Chaput), Simone Zielinski,
Nicole Merchant, Michael Garcia Vasquez, Louise Marquard, Dimitrios
Karaoulanis, Megan Douglass (also known as Megan Zakaria), Gail
Webster, Larisa Dillinger, Cynthia Velten, Marisol Gartrell, Teresa
Eads, Felicia Wager, and Anais Garro opted into the lawsuit as
Plaintiffs.

On Dec. 31, 2020, the parties filed a Joint Motion to Approve
Settlement Agreement and General Release and Establish a Schedule
for the Dismissal of the Case with Prejudice.  The Settlement
Agreement releases and discharges the Defendants from and of all
claims, demands, actions, causes of action, suits, damages, losses,
and expenses, of any and every nature whatsoever, known or unknown,
as a result of actions or omissions occurring from the beginning of
time through the Effective Date of the Agreement.  The gross
settlement amount of the Agreement is $283,500, which includes
attorneys' fees and costs.

Magistrate Judge Boardman finds the settlement to be fair and
reasonable.  First, the parties completed discovery, including
depositions, and "fully exchanged information, including payroll
and hour of work records."  Second, both parties filed substantive
motions before the settlement conference.  Third, there is no
evidence of fraud or collusion in the settlement.  Fourth, the
parties are represented by competent and experienced counsel.
Fifth, regarding the probability of the Plaintiffs' success on the
merits and the amount of the settlement in relation to the
potential recovery, the parties agree that the $283,500 settlement
amount, including $133,500 in attorneys' fees and costs, is fair
and reasonable.

As to the attorneys' fees, the Plaintiffs were represented by
Bradford Warbasse, who has been practicing for 35 years and billed
at a rate of $400 per hour in the case, and Howard Hoffman, who has
been practicing for 21 years and billed at a rate of $400 per hour.
In light of the extensive work performed on the case and the
significant reduction in the amount sought, the Magistrate Judge
finds that the attorneys' fees and costs are fair and reasonable.

For the reasons she stated, Magistrate Judge Boardman granted the
Joint Motion as the terms of the Settlement Agreement and General
Release, the Payment Plan, and the Confessed Judgment Promissory
Note are fair and reasonable, considering the facts and issues in
controversy.  After the Plaintiffs and their counsel have received
all of the required payments for Month One, the parties will file a
stipulation of dismissal with prejudice.  The case will be
dismissed 30 days after receipt of the stipulation of dismissal.

The Magistrate Judge denied as moot (i) the Defendants' Motion for
an Extension of Time; (ii) the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment with respect to whether Koroneos is an employer
under the FLSA and MWHL; and (iii) the Defendants' Motion to
Decertify Collective Action.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 20, 2021 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yyw83sxs from
Leagle.com.


MAINE: Magistrate Judge Recommends Denial of TRO in Swain vs. DOC
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge John C. Nivison of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Maine recommends that the Court denies without
prejudice the motions for a temporary restraining order and a
preliminary injunction in the lawsuit entitled ZACHARY SWAIN, et
al., Plaintiffs v. MAINE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 1:20-cv-00449-JDL (D. Me.).

In the action, the Plaintiffs, inmates at the Maine State Prison,
allege they have been diagnosed with serious mental health
conditions, which have been exacerbated by their conditions of
confinement, including their improper placement in segregation. One
of the Plaintiffs, Nicholas Gladu, on behalf of the Plaintiffs, has
moved for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary
injunction.

In support of the request for injunctive relief, Plaintiff Gladu
asserts that the Plaintiffs have suffered severe psychological harm
and decompensated due to their placement in segregation. The
Plaintiffs ask the Court to enjoin the Defendants, who are
employees of the Maine Department of Corrections and of the medical
provider at the prison, "from continuing the acts and omissions set
forth" in the complaint.

The law permits individuals, who are not licensed to practice law
to represent their interests in federal court. An unlicensed
individual, however, cannot represent other individuals in court,
Judge Nivison states. Plaintiff Gladu is not licensed to practice
law in Maine and, therefore, cannot obtain relief on behalf of the
other plaintiffs.

Judge Nivison notes that to the extent Plaintiff Gladu maintains
that as a member of an alleged class he can assert claims or
arguments on behalf of the class, he cannot maintain a class action
on behalf of other individuals subject to the Defendants' custody.

Plaintiff Gladu alleges that he has requested, but been denied
placement in a mental health unit rather than segregation, that
placement in segregation has deprived him of access to basic
hygiene and mental health treatment, that he has been subject to
unhealthy temperatures and been provided inadequate food, and that
he has not received mail and certain publications to which he
subscribed.

Through his submissions, Plaintiff Gladu requests both a temporary
restraining order and a preliminary injunction. Generally, the
distinction between the two forms of injunctive relief is that the
former can be awarded without notice to the other party and an
opportunity to be heard.

Regardless of whether Plaintiff Gladu could satisfy any of the
requirements for injunctive relief, he has not demonstrated that he
has provided notice to the Defendants of his request for immediate
injunctive relief, nor has he shown that he would suffer immediate
and irreparable harm before the Defendants could be heard in
opposition to his request, Judge Nivison opines. Plaintiff Gladu,
therefore, is not entitled to a temporary restraining order or a
preliminary injunction at this stage of the proceedings.

Based on the Court's analysis, Judge Nivison recommends the Court
denies Plaintiff Gladu's motions for a temporary restraining order
and a preliminary injunction without prejudice to the Plaintiff's
ability to request injunctive relief with notice to and an
opportunity to be heard by the Defendants.

A party may file objections to those specified portions of a
magistrate judge's report or proposed findings or recommended
decisions entered pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(B) for
which de novo review by the district court is sought, together with
a supporting memorandum, within 14 days of being served with a copy
thereof. A responsive memorandum will be filed within 14 days after
the filing of the objection.

Failure to file a timely objection will constitute a waiver of the
right to de novo review by the district court and to appeal the
district court's order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Decision dated Jan. 21, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yytdxgkl from Leagle.com.


MARATHON PETROLEUM: April 26 Deadline to File Class Cert. Sought
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as CLEMENT GRAY,
individually, and on behalf of others similarly situated, v.
MARATHON PETROLEUM LOGISTICS SERVICES, LLC, a limited liability
company; MARATHON PETROLEUM COMPANY, LP; a limited partnership;
ANDEAVOR LOGISTICS, LP, a limited partnership; TESORO REFINING &
MARKETING COMPANY, LLC, a limited liability company; and DOES 1
through 50, inclusive, Case No. 2:20-cv-07865-JFW-JC (C.D. Cal.),
the Plaintiff asks the Court for an order continuing the deadline
for her to file his motion for class certification pursuant to
Local Rule 23-3, from January 25, 2021, to April 26, 2021.

Because the deadline for Plaintiff to file his motion for class
certification pursuant to the Court's November 30, 2020 order is
January 25, 2021, extraordinary relief is necessary. Only one
previous extension of the deadline to file for class certification
has been requested and was granted. The request was made by
stipulation between the parties to accommodate Defendants' briefing
schedule for their Partial Motion to Dismiss, which overlapped with
the class certification deadline and the Christmas and New Year
holidays. It should be noted that until the Court's January 12,
2021 ruling on the Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss, the
pleadings in this matter remained unsettled. This is the first
request solely by Plaintiff for an extension of a filing deadline,
says the complaint.

Marathon Petroleum is an American petroleum refining, marketing,
and transportation company headquartered in Findlay, Ohio. Tesoro
Refining And Marketing Company LLC refines and markets petroleum
products.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion dated Jan. 21, 2020 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at http://bit.ly/3qZnQg2at no extra
charge.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff Clement Gray individually, and on
behalf of others similarly situated, are:

          Matthew J. Matern, Esq.
          Tagore O. Subramaniam, Esq.
          Sydney A. Adams, Esq.
          MATERN LAW GROUP, PC
          1230 Rosecrans Avenue, Suite 200
          Manhattan Beach, CA 90266
          Telephone: (310) 531-1900
          Facsimile: (310) 531-1901
          E-mail: matern@maternlawgroup.com
                  tagore@maternlawgroup.com
                  sadams@maternlawgroup.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Sheryl L. Skibbe, Esq.
          Hyun B. Lee, Esq.
          Mike W Kopp, Esq.
          SEYFARTH SHAW LLP
          2029 Century Park East, Suite 3500
          Los Angeles, CA 90067-3021
          Telephone: (310) 277-7200
          Facsimile: (310) 201-5291
          E-mail: sskibbe@seyfarth.com
                  mhlee@seyfarth.com
                  mkopp@seyfarth.com

MARS WRIGLEY: Lyons Sues Over Mislabelled Mixed Berries Products
----------------------------------------------------------------
Richard Lyons, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Mars Wrigley Confectionery US, LLC, Case No.
7:21-cv-00620 (Jan. 23, 2021) alleges that the Defendant
misrepresented the Dove mixed berries product through affirmative
statements, half-truths, and omissions.

According to the complaint, the representations of "Real Mixed
Berries," "Made with Real Fruit" and pictures of a strawberry,
cranberry and blueberry being "dipped in silk smooth dark
chocolate" give consumers the impression the product will consist
of what it promises -- without more. Chocolate-covered fruit is a
simple, tasty food which reasonable consumers expect to contain
only those ingredients identified on the front label -- chocolate
and fruit.

The Plaintiff contends that though the front of the package
identifies only chocolate and "real fruit," the actual fruit used
in the product contains more than just fruit. As a result of the
false and misleading labeling, the product is sold at a premium
price, approximately no less than $2.79 per 17 OZ, excluding tax,
compared to other similar products represented in a non-misleading
way and higher than the price of the product if it was to be
represented in a non-misleading way, he added.

The Plaintiff further alleges that he purchased the product within
his district and/or State in reliance on its representations and
omissions. He bought the product on one or more occasions within
the statute of limitations from one or more locations, including in
January 2020 from ShopRite, 278 Tuckahoe Rd, Yonkers, New York.

Mr. Lyons is a citizen of Yonkers, Westchester County, New York.

Mars Wrigley manufactures, distributes, markets, labels and sells
mixed berries covered in chocolate under the "Dove" brand
("Product"). The Defendant is a Delaware limited liability company
with a principal place of business in Hackettstown, New Jersey,
Warren County. The Defendant is one of the nation's largest
producers of chocolate and confectionery products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Spencer Sheehan, Esq.
          SHEEHAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 Cutter Mill Rd Ste 409
          Great Neck, NY 11021-3104
          Telephone: (516) 268-7080
          E-mail: spencer@spencersheehan.com

MARY WASHINGTON: Gatewood FDCPA Suit Seeks to Certify Two Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as LARRY GATEWOOD, on behalf
of himself and all others similarly situated, v. MARY WASHINGTON
HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC. d/b/a ODC RECOVERY SERVICES, Case No.
3:20-cv-00588-HEH (E.D. Va.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an
order:

   1. certifying two classes of individuals with claims against
      the Defendant Mary Washington Healthcare under the Fair
      Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), defined as:

      -- Letter Class:

         "all individuals with a Virginia address to whom the
         Defendant sent an initial collection letter based on
         the Letter Template, between July 30, 2019 and July 30,
         2020, and in connection with the collection of a debt;"
         and

      -- Envelope Class:

         "all individuals with a Virginia address to whom the
         Defendant sent a collection letter in an envelope using
         the Envelope Template, between July 30, 2019 and July
         30, 2020, and in connection with the collection of a
         debt.

   2. appointing him as class representative; and

   3. appointing his counsel -- Russell S. Thompson, IV and
      Amorette C. Rinkleib -- as class counsel.

On March 22, 2019, Mr. Gatewood received medical services from Mwmg
Dermatology -- specifically, a cosmetic, in-office medical
procedure involving the removal of facial skin tags. On March 22,
2019, Mr. Gatewood paid the Defendant $150 for the procedure. After
submitting a claim to Mr. Gatewood's insurance, the Defendant
sought to collect an unpaid balance of $136.97.

In connection with the collection of the Debt, the Defendant sent
Mr. Gatewood a written communication dated September 18, 2019 (the
Letter). The Letter was from "ODC Recovery Services" -- a
fictitious name registered with the Virginia Secretary of State.
The Letter lists the balance of the Debt as $136.97 and purports to
contain the notices required in an initial communication by 15
U.S.C. section 1692g(a). The Letter states, in relevant part:
"Unless you notify this office in writing within 30 days after
receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of this debt or
any portion thereof, this office will assume this debt is valid."

The Plaintiff alleges the Defendant's Letter falsely states that
Mr. Gatewood's dispute must be in writing to avoid the Defendant
from assuming the validity of the Debt, in violation of Section
1692g(a)(3) of the FDCPA. The Defendant's September 18, 2019 letter
is based on a template used to send written communications to
consumers. The Defendant used the Letter Template to send written
communications to over 40 individuals in Virginia between July 30,
2019 and July 30, 2020, the Plaintiff adds.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated Jan. 22,
2020 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3agaDc6
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James E. Bowman, II, Esq.
          Russell S. Thompson, IV, Esq.
          Amorette Rinkleib, Esq.
          THOMPSON CONSUMER LAW
          P.O. Box 2081
          Ashland, VA 23005
          Telephone: (804) 977-2753
          Facsimile: (866) 317-2674
          E-mail: jbowman@ThompsonConsumerLaw.com
                  rthompson@ThompsonConsumerLaw.com
                  arinkleib@ThompsonConsumerLaw.com

MDL 2455: Notice to Direct Purchaser Class in Antitrust Suit Okayed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE SUBOXONE (BUPRENORPHINE HYDROCHLORIDE AND
NALOXONE) ANTITRUST LITIGATION. THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO:
Wisconsin, et al. v. Indivior Inc. et al. Case No. 16-cv-5073.
STATE OF WISCONSIN By Attorney General Brad D. Schimel, et al.
Plaintiffs v. INDIVIOR INC. f/k/a RECKITT BENCKISER
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., et al., Defendants, MDL No. 2445, No.
13-MD-2445, CIV. A. No. 16-5073 (E.D. Pa.), Judge Mitchell S.
Goldberg of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania:

    (i) denied the Defendant's Motion to Disqualify named
        Plaintiff Rochester Drug Co-Operative as a class
        representative; and

   (ii) granted Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs' ("DPPs") Motion to
        Approve the Form and Manner of Notice to the Direct
        Purchaser Class.

Defendant Reckitt Benckiser manufactures Suboxone, a drug commonly
used to combat opioid addiction. Suboxone previously came in tablet
form, but in 2010, citing safety concerns, it effectuated a change
in the administration of the drug, switching from tablet to
sublingual film.  Various purchasers/consumers of Suboxone claimed
that the switch was anticompetitive and solely designed to maintain
Defendant's market exclusivity--a scheme known as a "product hop."
These claims have resulted in multi-district, antitrust litigation
before the Court.

On Sept. 27, 2019, Judge Goldberg certified a class of DPPs in thes
antitrust litigation.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit affirmed that decision on July 28, 2020.

On Aug. 24, 2020, the DPPs sought an order approving the form and
manner of notice to the Direct Purchaser Class informing them of
the pendency of the class action.  The Defendant opposed the DPPs'
Motion.  Along with that opposition, it moved to disqualify
Rochester as a class representative based, in part, upon
Rochester's March 22, 2020 initiation of Chapter 11 bankruptcy
proceeding.  The Defendant also requested disqualification of
Rochester's counsel, Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP, as the class counsel
because the firm would no longer be retained by any named class
representative.

Judge Goldberg thereafter directed the parties to submit a joint
update regarding the status of Rochester's bankruptcy proceedings.
According to that Dec. 14, 2020 update, Rochester filed its Amended
Chapter 11 Plan and accompanying Amended Disclosure Statement on
Dec. 8, 2020.  The Amended Plan calls for Rochester's assets,
including the "Antitrust Actions" to vest in a Liquidating Trust,
and for Rochester to wind up its affairs and liquidate its assets
"as expeditiously as reasonably possible."

The Liquidating Trustee is then granted the authority to commence
and prosecute Antitrust Actions and, without further supervision or
approval of the Bankruptcy Court and free of any restrictions of
the Bankruptcy Code or Bankruptcy Rules, assign, transfer,
compromise, and settle such actions.

Under the current schedule, the Bankruptcy Court held a hearing on
Jan. 15, 2021, to approve the Amended Disclosure Statement.  A
Confirmation Hearing is currently scheduled for Feb. 26, 2021.

In response to the Defendant's Motion to Disqualify, the DPPs
respond that, at present, Rochester remains a debtor-in-possession
working to maximize the value of its assets.  It further notes that
out of Rochester's $96 million in current liabilities to over 2,000
creditors, Rochester owes the Defendant only $135,567, making the
Defendant a minor creditor.  Finally, it contends that Rochester's
deferred prosecution agreement has no bearing on Rochester's
adequacy as a class representative or the litigation.

While Judge Goldberg recognizes that Rochester's precarious
financial situation is not ideal for a class representative, he
nonetheless remains confident that Rochester's established history
of prosecuting antitrust class actions, its strong interest--both
as a debtor-in-possession and as class representative--in pursuing
the antitrust claims, the involvement of other class
representatives, and the relatively minimal conflict resulting from
Rochester's unsecured debt to the Defendant weigh against
disqualification of Rochester as a class representative.

Alternatively, even given the pending bankruptcy proceedings, the
Judge finds that the criminal action against Rochester does not
render it an inadequate class representative.  Although credibility
and honest dealing in litigation may inform a proposed class
representative's adequacy, the adequacy requirement should "be
assessed in light of the class representative's conduct in the or
previous litigation, not based on a subjective evaluation of their
personal qualifications as allegedly and tenuously evidenced by
their prior criminal record.  The conduct raised in the DPA has no
bearing on the antitrust allegations pressed in the current suit.

For all of the foregoing reasons, Judge Goldberg denied the
Defendant's Motion to Disqualify Rochester as a class
representative.

The Judge then considers the Plaintiff's Motion to Approve the Form
and Manner of Notice to the Direct Purchaser Class.  The Notice is
to be sent to all potential members of the certified Direct
Purchaser Class informing them of the pendency of the class action.
The DPPs attach the proposed form of Notice and indicate that the
Notice is to be sent by U.S. First Class mail by RG/2 Claims
Administration LLC, an experienced claims administrator.

The Defendant objects to the form of Notice on two grounds: (1) the
Notice lists Rochester as a class representative, and (2) the
proposed Notice sets out the DPPs' allegations in great detail, but
does not state Defendant's defenses beyond a generic denial.

Having already determined that Rochester is an adequate class
representative, the Judge focuses solely on the Defendant's second
argument--that the proposed Notice fails to state the Defendant's
defenses.  He finds that the Defendant's proposed
"counterbalancing" statement is neither required nor warranted.
Indeed, the Rule's demand for a clear and concise statement of the
case in "plain, easily understood" language counsels away from
including such language.  Accordingly, he granted the DPPs' Motion
to Approve the Form and Manner of Notice to the Direct Purchaser
Class.

An appropriate Order follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 20, 2021 Memorandum is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yx9dmokc from Leagle.com.


MDL 2504: Saldana Case Stayed Pending Class Cert. Ruling in Trevino
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Saldana, et al. v.
Amazon.com, LLC, et al., Case No. 3:14-cv-00290-DJH (W.D. Ky.),
(re: RE: AMAZON.COM, INC., FULFILLMENT CENTER FAIR LABOR STANDARDS
ACT (FLSA) AND WAGE AND HOUR LITIGATION), the Hon. Judge David J.
Hale entered an order staying case pending the class-certification
decision in "Trevino."

Judge Hale says that the parties must promptly notify the Court
upon resolution of that issue. This matter is currently on appeal
following entry of summary judgment in favor of Defendants
Amazon.com, LLC and Golden State FC, LLC. While the appeal was
pending, the parties reached a class-action settlement agreement
and moved for preliminary approval of that settlement. The
plaintiffs in Trevino v. Golden State FC LLC, Case No.
1:18-cv-00120-DAD-BAM (E.D. Calif.), moved to intervene to oppose
preliminary approval, urging the Court to stay this action pending
the class-certification decision in Trevino.

Despite the age of this case, the Court concludes that a stay will
serve the interest of judicial economy. Deferring consideration of
the proposed settlement will ultimately allow the Court to make a
more informed decision and facilitate resolution of the Trevino
case.

A copy of the Court's order dated Jan. 22, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/36mYkJN at no extra charge.[CC]


MDL 2670: Bid for Leave to File Sur-Reply in Antitrust Suit Denied
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE PACKAGED SEAFOOD PRODUCTS ANTITRUST LITIGATION.
This document relates to: DIRECT PURCHASER CLASS ACTION, Case No.
3:15-md-02670-JLS-MDD (S.D. Cal.), Judge Janis L. Sammartino of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California denied
the Motion for Leave to File Surreply in Further Opposition to
DPPs' Motion for Set Aside filed by non-parties Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co., Inc., and C&S Wholesale Grocers, Inc.

The Motion is based on the contention that the Direct Purchaser
Class ("DPPs") made new arguments and alleged "factual
misstatements" in the reply brief filed in support of the motion
for a set-aside order.  The Court is informed that Defendants
StarKist Co., Dongwon Industries Co. Ltd., and Lion Capital
(Americas), Inc. also intend to file a similar motion.

Judge Sammartino holds that the Court will not consider any matters
raised for the first time in a reply brief.  It is inappropriate to
raise new matters in the reply because it deprives the opposing
party of an opportunity to respond.  Accordingly, the pending
Sur-reply Motion is denied.  The Court will not entertain any other
motions for leave to file a sur-reply relative to DPPs' motion for
a set-aside order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 22, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y5hwsa44 from Leagle.com.


MDL 2670: Jan. 28 Hearing on DPPs' Bid for Set Aside Order Vacated
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: PACKAGED SEAFOOD PRODUCTS ANTITRUST LITIGATION.
This Document Relates To: DIRECT PURCHASER CLASS ACTION, Case No.
15-MD-2670 JLS (MDD) (S.D. Cal.), Judge Janis L. Sammartino of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California vacated
the hearing on the motion for a set aside order filed by Direct
Purchaser Plaintiff class scheduled for Jan. 28, 2021.

The motion has been fully briefed.  The Judge deemed the matter
submitted without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule
7.1(d).

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 22, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yywyonul from Leagle.com.


MDL 2875: MMWA Claims in 3 Master Complaints Tossed With Prejudice
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE VALSARTAN, LOSARTAN, AND IRBESARTAN PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LITIGATION. This Document Relates To All Actions, MDL No.
2875 (RBK-JS) (D.N.J.), Judge Robert K. Kugler of the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Jersey, Camden Vicinage, resolved the
arguments relating to claims for breach of express warranties, and
for breach of implied warranties and for violation of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act in the three Master Complaints.

The MDL involves the generic active pharmaceutical ingredient,
Valsartan, and the finished drugs produced with it, collectively
termed here valsartan-containing drugs or VCDs.  VCDs are
universally prescribed drugs to lower blood pressure and/or treat
heart failure.

In the summer of 2018, the U.S. Federal Drug Administration and
several of its counterparts in Europe and Canada discovered that
certain batches of generic Valsartan contained nitrosamines, known
carcinogens, in amounts above what the FDA considered allowable,
that is above 96 nanograms per day.

By late August 2018, the Plaintiffs had begun filing personal
injury individual complaints.  By October 2018, individual
plaintiffs and third-party payors who had paid for individual
plaintiffs' prescriptions of the contaminated Valsartan, filed
several class actions alleging economic losses.  Consumers also
filed a medical monitoring class action alleging "cellular damage,
genetic harm, and/or an increased risk of developing cancer" as a
result of exposure to the human carcinogens in the VCDs.  Lastly,
personal injury claims were filed on behalf of consumers who
alleged they had developed cancer as a result of taking the
contaminated VCDs.

On Feb. 14, 2019, the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation
consolidated all of the individual filings into the MDL, No. 2875.
On June 17, 2019, three Master Complaints were filed with the
Court: The Economic Loss Master Complaint ("ELMC"), the Personal
Injury Master Complaint ("PIMC"); and the Medical Monitoring Master
Complaint ("MMMC").  Since then, the MDL has advanced
significantly, both in terms of filings and in the management of
the litigation through various discovery phases.  Currently, with
over 700 pending filings, the MDL is well into the discovery phase
of intensive document production; and, depositions of individuals
and under Rule 30(b)(6) are proceeding.

Before the Court are three Motions to Dismiss ("MTDs").

Since these MTDs seek dismissal of several claims for each set of
plaintiffs, the Court is issuing a series of opinions to resolve
the MTDs.  Each opinion is numbered in the series, the instant
Opinion being the third in the series.  The Opinion 3 resolves the
arguments relating to claims for breach of express warranties, and
for breach of implied warranties and for violation of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.  An Order 3 of same date accompanies
the Opinion 3.

Each MTD was brought by a different category of defendant, which is
at a separate level in the drug supply chain.  The defendant
categories are:

      1. The manufacturers, which include the manufacturers of the
Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient ("API Mfrs") and the manufacturers
that make the finished Valsartan drug product ("Finished Mfrs");

      2. the business entities in the U.S. that obtain the finished
drug product from the Mfrs ("Wholesalers"); and distribute it to
retail businesses in the U.S.; and

      3. the retail businesses in the U.S. from which individuals
can obtain the finished drug ("Pharmacies").

Each MTD seeks dismissal of claims in all three Master Complaints.
These include:

      1. The ELMC filed June 17, 2019 by individual plaintiffs and
plaintiff business entities that paid for and/or insured the VCDs
at issue taken by individual plaintiffs and alleges economic
damages;

      2. The Amended PIMC filed June 17, 2019 by those individual
plaintiffs who ingested the VCDs at issue and who were personally
injured, including those who developed cancers or had cellular or
bodily injury as a result; and

      3. The MMMC filed June 17, 2019 by those individual
plaintiffs who ingested the VCDs at issue and therefore bear an
increased risk of developing cancer and consequently seek a fund to
finance continued medical monitoring of that risk.

All three categories of Defendants seek:

      1. For lack of Standing: dismissal of the ELMC and the MMMC
Complaints primarily because of a deficiency in pleading an injury
in fact, which issue has been resolved in the Opinion 2;

      2. a. For Preemption by federal law and Primary Jurisdiction:
Under preemption by the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act: all 3
categories of defendant seek dismissal of any claim in the Master
Complaints for negligence per se, strict liability design defect,
breach of express warranty, fraudulent and negligent misstatement,
and state consumer protection acts;

         b. Under preemption by the Drug Supply Chain Security Act:
Wholesales and Pharmacies seek dismissal of any claim in the Master
Complaints Under primary jurisdiction: defendants seek dismissal OR
alternatively a stay of any claim for breach of implied warranty,
strict liability, failure to warn, negligence and manufacturing
defect until the U.S. Food & Drug Administration [FDA] completes
its pending agency action relating to VCDs,which issues have been
resolved in Opinion 1;

      3. For Subsumption: dismissal of all claims by New Jersey
plaintiffs for common law and state law consumer protection
violation as these claims are subsumed by the New Jersey Products
Liability Act ("NJPLA") as well as a dismissal of all similar
claims by plaintiffs of other states having statutes similar to the
NJPLA; and

      4. For Deficiencies In Specific Claims: a dismiss OR
alternatively a stay of most of the enumerated claims in the Master
Complaints, including fraud, unjust enrichment, negligence per se,
punitive damages.

Judge Kugler has reviewed the parties' submissions relating to
Express Warranties, Implied Warranties, and Warranties under the
MMWA.  He ruled as follows:

     1. As for the Breach of Express Warranty Claims:

          a. Against Mfr defendants: the Court denied the Mfr
defendants' motion to dismiss the breach of express warranty claims
against them in all three Master Complaints;

          b. Against the Wholesaler defendants and the Pharmacy
defendants: the Court granted the Wholesaler defendants' and the
Pharmacy defendants' motions to dismiss the claims for breach of
express warranty against them in all three Master Complaints and
dismisses these claims without prejudice.

       The Plaintiffs may file a motion for leave to amend all
three Master Complaints as to the breach of express warranty claims
against the Wholesaler defendants and the Pharmacies defendants,
according to the deadlines set in the accompanying Order.

     2. As for Breach of Implied Warranty Claims:

          a. Against Mfr defendants and Wholesaler defendants as to
the Personal Injury Master Complaint: the Court granted the Mfr
defendants' and the Wholesaler defendants' motions to dismiss those
claims in the Personal Injury Master Complaint for breach of
implied warranty which arise under the law of Kentucky or Wisconsin
and dismissed these claims without prejudice; and the Court denied
the Mfrs defendants' and the Wholesaler defendants' motions dismiss
those claims in the Personal Injury Master Complaint for breach of
implied warranty which arise under the law of any of the remaining
states in the United States and including the District of Columbia
and Puerto Rico.

       The Plaintiffs may file a motion for leave to amend these
dismissed claims in the Personal Injury Master Complaint, according
to the deadlines set in the accompanying Order.

          b. Against the Mfr defendants as to the Economic Loss and
the Medical Monitoring Master Complaints: the Court granted the Mfr
defendants' motion to dismiss those claims in the Economic Loss
Master Complaint and in the Medical Monitoring Master Complaint for
breach of implied warranty which arise under the law of: Alabama,
Arizona, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah, or Wisconsin and dismissed these
claims without prejudice; and the Court denied the Mfr defendants
motion to dismiss those claims in the Economic Loss Master
Complaint and in the Medical Monitoring Master Complaint for breach
of implied warranty which arise under the law of any of the
remaining states in the United States and including the District of
Columbia and Puerto Rico.

       The Plaintiffs may file a motion for leave to amend the
dismissed claims in the Economic Loss Master Complaint and the
Medical Monitoring Master Complaint Master, according to the
deadlines set in the accompanying Order.

          c. Against the Wholesalers as to the Economic Loss and
the Medical Monitoring Master Complaints: the Court granted the
Wholesaler defendants' motion to dismiss those claims in the
Economic Loss Master Complaint and in the Medical Monitoring Master
Complaint for breach of implied warranty which arise under the law
of Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Michigan, New York, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, or
Wisconsin and dismissed these claims without prejudice; and the
Court denied the Wholesaler defendants' motion to dismiss those
claims in the Economic Loss Master Complaint and in the Medical
Monitoring Master Complaint for breach of implied warranty which
arise under the law of any of the remaining states of the United
States and including the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico.

       The Plaintiffs may file a motion for leave to amend these
dismissed claims in the Economic Loss Master Complaint and the
Medical Monitoring Master Complaint against the Wholesaler
defendants, according to the deadlines set in the accompanying
Order.

          d. Against the Pharmacy defendants in all three Master
Complaints: the Court granted the Pharmacy defendants' motion to
dismiss those claims in all three Master Complaints for breach of
implied warranty which arise under the laws of: Alabama, Arizona,
Arkansas, California, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West
Virginia, or Wisconsin; and the Court denied the Pharmacy
defendants' motion to dismiss those claims in all three Master
Complaints for a breach of implied warranty which arise under the
law of Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, or Vermont.

       The Plaintiffs may file a motion for leave to amend all
three Master Complaints as to the breach of implied warranty claims
against the Pharmacy defendants, according to the deadlines set in
the accompanying Order.

     3. As for Violation of the MMWA: The Court granted the motions
to dismiss the claims in all three Master Complaints for violation
of the MMWA and dismissed the plaintiffs' claims in all three
Master Complaints with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 22, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/yy4z725v from Leagle.com.


MERCURY GENERAL: MAO-MSO Suit Seeks to Certify Two Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MAO-MSO RECOVERY II, LLC a
Delaware entity; MSP RECOVERY CLAIMS, SERIES LLC, a Delaware
entity; MSPA CLAIMS 1, LLC, a Florida entity, v. MERCURY GENERAL, a
California company, its subsidiaries and affiliates, Case No.
2:17-cv-02557-AB-AFM (C.D. Cal.), the Plaintiffs will move the
Court on March 26, 2021, for an order:

   1. certify the proposed Classes pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
      23:

      -- The No-Fault Class:

         "All non-governmental organizations (including, but not
         limited to MAOs, first-tier entities, and downstream
         entities) or their assignees, that provided benefits
         under Medicare Part C in the United States of America
         and its territories and made accident-related payments
         on behalf of Medicare beneficiaries, who also were
         insured under a Mercury first-party insurance policy
         that provided coverage for medical benefits;" and

      -- The Settlement Class:

         "All non-governmental organizations (including, but not
         limited to MAOs, first-tier entities, and downstream
         entities) or their assignees, that provided benefits
         under Medicare Part C in the United States of America
         and its territories and made accident-related payments
         on behalf of a Medicare beneficiary, who made a claim
         against a Mercury third-party insurance policy that
         provided coverage for medical benefits;"

   2. appointing the Plaintiffs as the class representatives;
      and

   3. appointing the Plaintiff's Counsel as class counsel to
      represent the interests of the Class.

Mercury issues automobile policies throughout the country and is
the fourth largest private passenger automobile insurer in
California, with more than $5.9 billion in 20 total assets.

A copy of the Plaintiff's notice of motion to certify class dated
Jan. 22, 2020 is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://bit.ly/3cn2e9u at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Charles E. Whorton, Esq.
          RIVERO MESTRE LLP
          2525 Ponce de Leon, Blvd. Suite 1000
          Miami, FL 33134
          Telephone: (305) 445-2500
          Facsimile: (305) 445-2505
          E-mail: cwhorton@riveromestre.com

               - and -

          Christopher L. Coffin, Esq.
          Tracy L. Turner, Esq.
          Courtney L. Stidham, Esq.
          PENDLEY, BAUDIN, & COFFIN
          2505 Energy Center
          1100 Poydras Street
          New Orleans, LA 70163
          Telephone: (504) 355-0086
          E-mail: ccoffin@pbclawfirm.com
                  tturner@pbclawfirm.com
                  cstidham@pbclawfirm.com

               - and -

          R. Brent Wisner, Esq.
          Michael L. Baum, Esq.
          Adam M. Foster, Esq.
          BAUM HEDLUND ARISTEI & GOLDMAN, P.C.
          10940 Wilshire Blvd., 17th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90024
          Telephone: (310) 207-3233
          Facsimile: (310) 820-7444
          E-mail: rbwisner@baumhedlundlaw.com
                  mbaum@baumhedlundlaw.com
                  afoster@baumhedlundlaw.com

MICHIGAN: Settlement Gets Initial Approval in Flint Water Cases
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit re Flint Water Cases, Case No.
5:16-cv-10444-JEL-MKM (E.D. Mich.), the Hon. Judge Judith E. Levy
entered an order:

   1. granting preliminary approval of the Master Settlement
      Agreement (MSA) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23;

   2. granting Preliminary approval of the Settlement Allocation
      set forth in the MSA and plan of distribution;

   3. appointing the firms serving as Interim Co-Lead Counsel,
      Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, and Pitt McGehee
      Palmer Bonanni & Rivers, PC, and the Executive Committee,
      as Class Counsel under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
      23(g) to represent the Settlement Class;

   4. granting Conditional certification of the Settlement Class
      and Subclasses as follows for the purposes of Settlement:

      Settlement Class:

      "all persons or entities who are or could be claiming
      personal injury, property damage, business economic loss,
      unjust enrichment, breach of contract, or seeking any
      other type of damage or relief because at any time during
      the Exposure Period they: (1) were an Adult who owned or
      lived in a residence that received water from the Flint
      Water Treatment Plant or were legally liable for the
      payment of such water; (2) owned or operated a business
      including income earning real property and any other
      businesses, that received water from the Flint Water
      Treatment Plant or were legally liable for the payment for
      such water; or (3) were an Adult during the Exposure
      Period and who ingested or came into contact with water
      received from the Flint Water Treatment Plant;"

      Excluded from the Settlement Class are: (1) Defendants;
      (2) the judicial officers to whom this case is assigned in
      the Federal Court, Genesee County Circuit Court, and the
      Michigan Court of Claims, their staff, and the members of
      their immediate families; (3) all Individual Plaintiffs;
      and (4) all persons who timely and validly elect to opt
      out of the Settlement Class;

      Adult Exposure Subclass:

      "all persons who were Adults during the Exposure Period
      and who ingested or came into contact with water received
      from the Flint Water Treatment Plant at any time during
      the Exposure Period and who are claiming or could claim a
      resulting personal injury;"

      Business Economic Loss Subclass:

      "all individuals or entities who owned or operated a
      business, including income-earning real property and any
      other businesses, that received water from the Flint Water
      Treatment Plant at any time during the Exposure Period and
      who are claiming or could claim a resulting business
      economic loss;"

      Excluded from the Business Economic Loss Subclass are all
      local, state, or federal government offices or entities
      and any individual or entity listed on Exhibit 1 to the
      Settlement Agreement.

      Property Damage Subclass:

      "all Adults or entities who owned or were the lessee of
      residential real property that received water from the
      Flint Water Treatment Plant, or were legally liable for
      the payment for such water, at any time during the
      Exposure Period;" and

      Excluded from the Property Damage Subclass are all local,
      state, or federal government entities which own real
      property and any individual or entity listed on Exhibit 1
      to the Settlement Agreement.

   5. appointing Settlement Subclass Representatives as
      representatives of the Settlement Class as
      follows:

      -- Rhonda Kelso, Barbra and Darrell Davis, Tiantha
         Williams, and Michael Snyder, as personal
         representative of the Estate of John Snyder, as
         representatives of the Adult Exposure Subclass;

      -- Elnora Carthan and David Munoz as representatives of
         the Property Damage Subclass;

      -- 635 Saginaw LLC; Frances Gilcreast; and Neil Helmkay
         as representatives of the Business Economic Loss
         Subclass;

   6. approving the plan of notice presented in the Declaration
      of Cameron Azari in Support of the Plaintiffs’ Motion:

   7. appointing Epiq Class Action & Claims Solutions, Inc.
      as the Notice Administrator;

   8. appointing ARCHER Systems as the Claims Administrator and
      QSF Administrator;

   9. appointing Deborah Greenspan as the Special Master
      under the MSA;

  10. appointing ARCHER SYSTEMS, LLC and MASSIVE as Lien
      Resolution Administrator;

  11. appointing Forge Consulting, LLC as the Settlement
      Planning Administrator;

  12. approving the proposed Registration Form and Claim Form;

  13. approving and establishing the process and procedures
      for handling claims by Minors and LIIs as set forth in
      Article XXI-Minors and LIIs of the MSA;

  14. directing the Plaintiffs to pay the cost of implementing
      the plan of notice from the Settlement Fund in an amount
      not to exceed $500,000; and

  15. adopting the form motion for approval of wrongful
      death settlement for the sole purposes of registering and
      pursuing a claim for recovery under the MSA to the
      Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary approval of wrongful
      death claims.

  16. setting the Fairness Hearing for Monday, July 12, 2021, a
      minimum of 45 days after the Motion for final approval is
      filed.

The Court grants preliminary approval of this settlement. This
approval will trigger a period of time in which minors, adults,
property owners/renters, and commercial entities may decide whether
to participate in the settlement. If a qualifying person or entity
chooses to register as a participant, they may then formally object
to aspects of the settlement and set forth any reasons why it
should not be afforded final approval. Participants may also
proceed with their litigation against the non-settling Defendants
and, if summary judgment is sought and denied, be heard in front of
a jury, says the Court.

The events that resulted in this large-scale municipal water
contamination are now known as the Flint Water Crisis. In their
lawsuits, both the putative class members and Individual Plaintiffs
allege that the Defendants caused, prolonged, concealed, ignored,
or downplayed the risks of the Plaintiffs' exposure to the City's
water, which injured Plaintiffs and damaged their property and
commercial interests.

The Plaintiffs are thousands of children, adults, property owners,
and business owners who allege they were exposed to lead,
legionella, and other contaminants from the City of Flint's
municipal water supply.

The Settling Defendants include the State of Michigan and its
individual officials; the City of Flint, three Emergency Managers,
and several City employees; the "McLaren Defendants," which are
McLaren Health Care Corporation, McLaren Regional Medical Center,
and McLaren Flint Hospital; and Rowe Professional Services Company.
It does not resolve all of the Flint Water Cases, and the first
round of bellwether trials against the non-settling Defendants are
currently set for June 4, 2021.

A copy of the Court's order dated Jan. 21, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/36iNFAa at no extra charge.[CC]

MIDLAND CREDIT: Court Junks Collins Class Action with Prejudice
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as COURTNEY COLLINS v.
MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC., Case No. 2:20-cv-03453-MAK (E.D.
Pa.), the Hon. Judge J. Kearney entered an order

   1. denying without prejudice as withdrawn the Plaintiff's
      Motion for class certification;

   2. dismissing this action with prejudice under Local Rule
      41.1(b); and

   3. directing the Clerk of Court to mark this matter closed.

The Court said, "Upon confirming the Plaintiff is withdrawing her
motion for class certification, and counsel, through Judge
Heffley's efforts, resolved the individual Plaintiff's claim under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e) and Plaintiff's counsel does not seek to
substitute a new class representative nor preserve a right to
appeal, the claims do not appear to be inherently transitory
tending to evade review, and the parties now seek to dismiss
all of the Plaintiff's individual claims."

Established in 1953, MCM, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Encore
Capital Group, Inc., is a specialty finance company providing debt
recovery solutions for consumers across a broad range of assets.

A copy of the Court's order dated Jan. 21, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3iU8wPc at no extra charge.[CC]

MR. T'S: Rice Gets Conditional Class Status for Exotic Dancers
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as SHAKEENA RICE,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, et
al., v. MR. T'S, INC., et al., Case No. 3:20-cv-05695-TKW-EMT (N.D.
Cal.), the Hon. Judge T. Kent Wetherell, II entered an order:

   1. granting the Plaintiffs' motion as to the requests for
      conditional certification and approval of the notice to
      potential class members, and denying as to the request for
      equitable tolling;

   2. approving the Plaintiffs' proposed notice and consent;

   3. directing the Defendants to produce to the Plaintiffs'
      counsel on or before February 2, 2021, a list of the
      exotic dancers who have worked for the Defendants' adult
      entertainment business at any point during the period of
      July 29, 2017, to the date of this Order;

      -- The list shall include the dancers' full names, known
         aliases, last-known mailing addresses, telephone
         numbers, email addresses, work locations, copies of
         driver's license, and dates of performing at the
         Defendants' establishment.

   4. directing the Defendants to conspicuously post the notice   

      and consent forms on their website, Instagram account, and
      Facebook Page, and at the business establishments in the
      exotic dancers' dressing room(s) and on the door(s) where
      the dancers typically enter and leave the establishment;

      -- The notices posted at the establishment shall be
         laminated on brightly colored paper. All these notices  
         shall remain posted for the duration of the opt-in  
         period.

   3. directng the Counsel for Plaintiffs to contact the listed
      exotic dancers via email, text message, and U.S. Mail
      using these court-approved forms;

   4. directing the Plaintiffs to mail, email, or text one
      reminder to any exotic dancers who have not yet opted in
      within 45 days of the first notice mailing; and

      -- No other recruitment, solicitation, or contact is
         permitted; and

   5. setting the opt-in deadline which is 90 days from the date
      of this Order (April 21, 2021), and any consent forms from
      exotic dancers who desire to opt-in as additional
      plaintiffs in this case shall be filed by that date.

The Court said, "This case is still in the first stage, however.
The Plaintiffs seek to bring this action individually and on behalf
of:

   "all exotic dancers who have worked for the Defendants'
   business and whose alleged misclassification as independent
   contractors has led to FLSA violations."

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have moved for conditional
certification to provide potential plaintiffs notice and the
ability to opt in. Through detailed allegations and declarations,
the Plaintiffs have met their burden under the lenient standard for
conditional certification under section 216(b). As a result, the
motion for conditional certification is due to be granted."

The Plaintiffs were exotic dancers who performed in the Defendants'
adult entertainment business. They allege that Defendants violated
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and its implementing
regulations by misclassifying them as contractors instead of
employees, failing to pay them minimum and overtime wages, and
requiring them to pay house fees and to pool their tips with
employees in positions not usually tipped such as club security
personnel and floor workers. The Defendants deny these
allegations.

A copy of the Court's order dated Jan. 22, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2NG5D92 at no extra charge.[CC]

NINTENDO OF AMERICA: Deadline Extension for Class Cert. Bid Sought
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as A.C., a minor by and
through his guardian, MARIA CARBAJAL, v. NINTENDO OF AMERICA, INC.,
Case No. 2:20-cv-01694-TSZ (W.D. Wash.), the Plaintiff asks the
Court for an order: granting her unopposed motion for extension of
deadline to file motion for class certification and extending her
deadline to move for class certification.

The Plaintiff further requests that the Court allow her 15 days
following the decision by the Court on Nintendo's responsive motion
to propose a new deadline for Plaintiff's motion for class
certification.

The discovery necessary to support and oppose a class certification
motion will require significantly more time than contemplated by
the current May 16, 2021 deadline under LCR 23(i)(3). Thus, there
is good cause to relieve the Plaintiff of the current May 16, 2021
class certification brief deadline (including the Defendant's
subsequent deadline with respect to any opposition) under LCR
23(i)(3). This matter, therefore, requires exemption from LCR
23(i)(3). The Plaintiff represents that he has not made this motion
for purposes of delay, and he has not previously sought an
extension of the class certification briefing deadline, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiff A.C., by and through his guardian, Maria Carbajal,
filed his initial complaint on November 17, 2020. On December 9,
2020, the Parties filed a Stipulation and [Proposed] Order
Regarding Briefing Schedule to extend the deadlines for the
Defendant to respond to Plaintiff's Complaint. The Court entered a
Minute Order on December 11, 2020 adopting the Parties' proposed
briefing schedule. The Defendant's responsive pleading or motion
will be due on January 29, 2021. Any responsive motion shall be
noted for March 22, 2021, any opposition thereto shall be filed by
March 1, 2021, and any reply shall be filed by the noting date.

On January 15, 2021, in response to a joint request from the
Parties, the Court extended the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(f) deadline to April 19, 2021, and extended the deadlines for
the exchange of Initial Disclosures and the filing of a Joint
Status Report to May 3, 2021. LCR 23(i)(3) requires the Plaintiff
to file a motion for class certification within 180 days after the
filing of their initial complaint commencing this class action,
i.e., by May 16, 2021.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion dated Jan. 21, 2020 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3a5pCFH at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kim D. Stephens, Esq.
          Jason T. Dennett, Esq.
          Kaleigh N.B. Powell, Esq.
          TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS PLLC
          1700 Seventh Avenue, Suite 2200
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 682-5600
          Facsimile: (206) 682-2992
          E-mail: kstephens@tousley.com
                  jdennett@tousley.com
                  kpowell@tousley.com

               - and -

          Benjamin F. Johns, Esq.
          Samantha E. Holbrook, Esq.
          Andrew W. Ferich, Esq.
          Alex M. Kashurba, Esq.
          CHIMICLES SCHWARTZ KRINER
          & DONALDSON-SMITH LLP
          361 W. Lancaster Avenue
          Haverford, PA 19041
          Telephone: (610) 642-8500
          E-mail: bfj@chimicles.com
                  awf@chimicles.com
                  amk@chimicles.com

NORTON HEALTHCARE: Ky. App. Affirms Summary Judgment in Davis Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOHNATHAN DAVIS, Appellant v. NORTON HEALTHCARE, INC.,
Appellee, Case No. 2020-CA-0151-MR (Ky. App.), the Court of Appeals
of Kentucky affirmed the opinion and order granting summary
judgment in favor of Norton entered on Jan. 23, 2020, by the
Jefferson Circuit Court.

On July 27, 2014, Davis was injured in a motor vehicle accident
("MVA"), following which he sought medical treatment at Norton's
Leatherman Spine Center.  Davis hired Attorney T. Scott Abell to
represent him in the MVA litigation.

On Nov. 19, 2015, Abell sent a letter to Norton's medical records
custodian requesting a certified copy of Davis's updated medical
records and expenses from the Leatherman Spine Center.  Abell
enclosed an authorization signed by Davis to release protected
healthcare information pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act ("HIPAA") and state law.  The HIPAA
authorization stated, "I hereby authorize the FREE copy of the
patient's medical records pursuant to KRS3 422.317 be sent."  On
Jan. 7, 2016, Norton provided Abell a certified copy of Davis's
medical records, accompanied by an invoice in the amount of $50 for
processing and notary fees of $25 each.

On July 12, 2016, Abell issued payment for the invoice, and less
than one month later, on Aug. 10, 2016, he filed the instant
lawsuit on behalf of Davis.  Davis claims Norton violated KRS
64.300 by charging an excessive notary fee and violated KRS 422.317
by charging a processing fee when he was entitled to one free copy
of his medical records.

On Sept. 28, 2016, Norton responded with a motion to dismiss,
primarily alleging that Davis lacked standing to sue since he
neither requested his medical records nor paid the invoice for
them.  In October 2016, Davis' wife issued a check to reimburse
Abell's payment of Norton's invoice.

On March 3, 2017, the trial court entered an order denying Norton's
motion to dismiss.  The trial court found Davis had standing but
made no ruling on whether KRS 64.300 was applicable to the case
herein or whether Norton had violated KRS 422.317.

On May 17, 2018, Davis filed an amended complaint, alleging Norton
violated the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act ("KCPA") contained in
KRS Chapter 367, et seq., and seeking a permanent injunction
prohibiting such charges in the future.  Afterward, Norton moved
the trial court for summary judgment.

Following full briefing and oral arguments, the trial court granted
Norton's motion for summary judgment finding: recovery under KRS
422.317 unavailable due to the voluntary payment doctrine; no
privity under the KCPA; KRS 64.300 inapplicable; and injunctive
relief moot.  The appeal followed.

First, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky notes that it was evident
to all parties involved, through actual or constructive knowledge,
that the charges should not be permitted under Kentucky law, and
there was no duress to pay the invoice (the medical records were
provided, and Norton did not pursue payment in the months following
issuance of the invoice).  Davis' arguments concerning hypothetical
harm scenarios in which refusal to pay would place Abell on a
"black list" and/or harm his credit are insufficient to create
genuine issues of material fact on the issue.  Consequently, the
Appellate Court declines to depart from Kentucky's voluntary
payment doctrine in favor of applying any of the varying approaches
used in other jurisdictions.

Next, the Appellate Court opines that the first element which must
be proven in any negligence claim is the existence of a duty.  It
is unaware of any Kentucky cases which indicate such a duty.  A
review of cases from the Sixth Circuit also reveals the absence of
any authority imposing such a duty.  Failure to establish the
existence of a duty is fatal to Davis' claims.  Even so, the trial
court also alluded that Norton's conduct was not a substantial
factor in causing Davis's damages under the voluntary payment
doctrine.  The Court of Appeals agrees for the reasons it
discussed.

The Court of Appeals then examines Davis' allegation that Norton
may be liable under KRS 64.300 as part of a concert of action
theory. Davis cites Farmer v. City of Newport, 748 S.W.2d 162, 164
(Ky. App. 1988), quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Section 876
(AM. LAW INST. 1979), in support of his argument.  However, this
theory fails for reasons the Court previously.  For a negligence
claim, it is incumbent that Davis establish that Norton owed him a
duty.  He has failed to do so.  Therefore, the trial court
correctly dismissed his claim.

The Appellate Court also finds that the trial court did not err in
its determination that Norton was entitled to summary judgment on
Davis' KCPA claims.  Although Davis received medical treatment from
the Leatherman Spine Center, there was no privity of contract
between Davis and Norton concerning the request for his medical
records made by Abell or the payment of the resulting invoice paid
by Abell.  The Court is not at liberty to add to, subtract from, or
otherwise alter the KCPA to forgo the privity requirement.  Because
Davis failed to establish the required privity of contract with
Norton to sustain these claims, the trial court properly disposed
of them as a matter of law.

Finally, the Appellate Court opines that because the trial court
correctly found that Davis's rights were not violated, it
appropriately denied his request for injunctive relief.  CR 65
governs injunctive relief in Kentucky.  Injunctive relief may be
granted if it is clearly shown that a party's rights are being, or
will be, violated and the party will suffer immediate and
irreparable harm.  Hence, the trial court denied Davis' request for
injunctive relief as moot because Davis had no viable claims
against Norton, citing Estate of Goodin v. Knox County, Kentucky,
No. CIV. 12-18-GFVT, 2014 WL 2719816, (E.D. Ky. June 16, 2014).

In light of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals of Kentucy affirmed
the order entered by the Jefferson Circuit Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 22, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/y4jh5869 from Leagle.com.

T. Scott Abell, Joshua T. Rose, Louisville, Kentucky, Briefs for
Appellant.

V. Brandon McGrath -- brandon.mcgrath@dentons.com -- Jason T. Ams
-- jason.ams@dentons.com -- Rachel A. Washburn --
rachel.washburn@dentons.com -- in Louisville, Kentucky, Brief for
Appellee.


NOVA SOUTHEASTERN: Bid to Extend Class Cert. Filing Deadline OK'd
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Ferretti v. Nova
Southeastern University, Inc., Case No. 0:20-cv-61431 (S.D. Fla.),
the Hon. Judge Rodolfo A. Ruiz, II entered an order granting the
Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time for Relief from
the Impending Deadline for Class Certification.

Judge Ruiz says that the Plaintiff is relieved of his obligation to
file a motion for class certification by January 28, 2021. Should
the Court deny the Defendant's Motion to Strike the Class Action
Allegations in the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff's First Amended
Complaint, the parties shall meet-and-confer within 10 days of the
Court's order and propose a revised schedule.

The nature of suit states Contract - Other Contract.

Nova Southeastern University offers undergraduate, graduate, and
professional degree programs for students.[CC]

NOVITEX ENTERPRISES: Must File Joint Report on Settlement Deal
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Sandoval v. Novitex
Enterprise Solutions, Inc., et al., Case No. 3:17-cv-01573 (D.
Conn.), the Hon. Judge Michael P. Shea entered an order directing
the parties to file a joint status report discussing their progress
in negotiating and drafting the settlement agreement and making
preparations to file the anticipated class certification motion
pursuant to Rule 23(e) by February 5, 2021.

The status report should lay out at least a tentative schedule for
the class settlement process, assuming settlement discussions are
still on track. Nothing in the order should be read to prohibit the
parties from filing the settlement papers before February 5, 2021,
says Judge Shea.

The suit alleges violation of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act.

Novitex provides outsourced document services such as copying,
laminating, binding and mailing.[CC]

NUCO2 LLC: Court Tosses FDUTPA Class Status Reconsideration Bid
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as TOWNHOUSE RESTAURANT OF
OVIDEO, INC., et al., v. NuCO2, LLC, Case No. 2:19-cv-14085-RLR
(S.D. Fla.), the Hon. Judge Robin L. Rosenberg entered an order
denying the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration on the Court's
denial of the nationwide Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade
Practices Act (FDUTPA) class certification.

This is a case brought under the FDUTPA. Distilled down, it is the
Plaintiffs' contention that the Defendant uses deceptive and unfair
practices through its calculation of certain fees and charges which
in turn stem from the transportation of carbonation.

A copy of the Court's order dated Jan. 22, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/39BjBBT at no extra charge.[CC]

OH MY GREEN: Class Cert. Hearing in "Kastler" Continued to July 15
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ANNE KASTLER,
individually, and on behalf of other members of the general public
similarly situated. v. OH MY GREEN, INC., an unknown business
entity; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Case No.
4:19-cv-02411-HSG (N.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Haywood S. Gilliam,
Jr. entered an order that:

   1. The parties have until February 2, 2021 to select a
      mediator and file a revised Stipulation and [Proposed]
      Order Selecting  Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
      Process;

   2. the parties have to file a joint status report of no more
      than two pages within 48 hours of the completion of their
      mediation session (which must occur no later than March 9,
      2021) describing the results of the mediation and the
      status of settlement discussions. In the event this matter
      does not settle at mediation, the deposition of the
      Defendant's Person(s) Most Knowledgeable shall be two
      weeks after any such mediation, but in no event later
      than: March 24, 2021;

   3. The deadline for the Defendant to file its opposition
      shall be 28 days thereafter: on or before May 28, 2021;

   4. The deadline for the Plaintiff to file her reply shall be
      14 days thereafter: on or before June 11, 2021;

   5. The deadline to Exchange Opening Expert Reports is
      continued to September 17, 2021;

   6. The deadline to Exchange Rebuttal Expert Reports is
      continued to October 15, 2021;

   7. The Close of Fact Discovery is continued to December 17,
      2021; and

   8. The hearing on the Plaintiff's Motion for Class
      Certification shall be continued to July 15, 2021 at 2:00
      p.m.

Oh My Green, Inc. provides healthy food and wellness services.

A copy of the Court's order dated Jan. 20, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at http://bit.ly/3ojYuruat no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Graham B. LippSmith, Esq.
          Celene Chan Andrews, Esq.
          LIPPSMITH LLP
          555 S. Flower Street, Suite 4400
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 344-1820
          Facsimile: (213) 513-2495
          E-mail: g@lippsmith.com
                  cca@lippsmith.com

               - and -

          Edwin Aiwazian, Esq.
          Arby Aiwazian, Esq.
          Jenay Younger, Esq.
          Kenyon Harbison, Esq.
          LAWYERS for JUSTICE, PC
          410 Arden Avenue, Suite 203
          Glendale, CA 91203
          Telephone: (818) 265-1020
          Facsimile: (818) 265-1021
          E-mail: edwin@ calljustice.com
                  arby@ calljustice.com
                  jenay@calljustice.com
                  kenyon@calljustice.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          David R. Ongaro, Esq.
          Cara R. Sherman, Esq.
          Amanda S. Gianninoto, Esq.
          ONGARO PC
          1604 Union Street
          San Francisco, CA 94123
          Telephone: (415) 433-3900
          Facsimile: (415) 433-3950
          E-mail: dongaro@ongaropc.com
                  csherman@ongaropc.com
                  agianninoto@ongaropc.com

OPENSIDED MRI: Brust Suit Seeks to Certify Class
------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as DOUGLAS PHILLIP BRUST,
D.C., P.C. and ALAN PRESSWOOD, D.C., P.C., individually and on
behalf of all others similarly-situated, v. OPENSIDED MRI OF ST.
LOUIS L.L.C., OPENSIDED MRI OF ST. LOUIS II LLC, PAUL EUGENE
SCHWETZ, MATTHEW RUYLE and JOHN DOES 1-10, Case No.
4:21-cv-00089-SEP (Mo. Cir., St. Louis Cty.), the Plaintiffs ask
the Court for an order:

   1. certifying a class defined as:

      "all persons who (1) on or after four years prior to the
      filing of this action, (2) were sent by or on behalf of
      the Defendants any telephone facsimile transmissions of
      material making known the commercial existence of, or
      making qualitative statements regarding any property,
      goods, or services (3) with respect to whom the Defendants
      cannot provide evidence of prior express permission or
      invitation for the sending of such faxes, (4) with whom
      the Defendants does not have an established business
      relationship or (5) which were sent an advertisement by
      fax which did not display a proper opt out notice;"

   2. granting statutory injunctive relief prohibiting the
      Defendants from sending advertising materials via fax to
      members of the class;

   3. appointing the Plaintiffs as Class Representatives;

   4. appoint their attorneys as Class Counsel; and

   5. allowing them additional time, for completion of discovery
      related to class certification issues, to file an Amended
      Class Certification Motion and Memorandum of Law; and for
      such other and further relief as the Court deems
      appropriate under the circumstances.

In the alternative, if the Court determines that this class
certification motion be dismissed without prejudice as being
premature, the Plaintiff requests that the Court issue an order
that the Defendant not be allowed to make an offer of judgment or a
settlement offer until the Court sets a scheduling order and the
Plaintiffs are allowed time to conduct discovery and file a future
class certification motion pursuant to the Court's scheduling order
and that the future class certification motion will relate back to
the filing of the original class certification motion.

The Defendants operate chiropractor clinics in Saint Louis,
Missouri.

OpenSided MRI is a diagnostic testing facility in St Louis,
Missouri.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class dated Jan. 22,
2020 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2MelACY
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Max G. Margulis, Esq.
          MARGULIS LAW GROUP
          28 Old Belle Monte Rd.
          Chesterfield, MO 63017
          Telephone: (636) 536-7022
          E-mail: MaxMargulis@MargulisLaw.com

               - and -

          Brian J. Wanca, Esq.
          ANDERSON + WANCA
          3701 Algonquin Road, Suite 500
          Rolling Meadows, IL 60008
          Telephone: (847) 368-1500
          Facsimile: (847) 368-1501
          E-mail: bwanca@andersonwanca.com

PENNSYLVANIA HIGHER: Shay Sues Over Unauthorized Recordings
-----------------------------------------------------------
Daniel Shay, individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated v. Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency, Case
No. 3:21-cv-00135-JM-KSC (S.D. Cal., Jan. 22, 2021), is brought
against the Defendants damages and injunctive relief against the
Defendant and its present, former, or future direct and indirect
parent companies, subsidiaries, affiliates, agents, related
entities for unauthorized recordings of conversations with the
Plaintiff without any notification or warning to the Plaintiff in
violation of the California Penal Code.

The California State Legislature passed CIPA in 1967 to protect the
right of privacy of the people of California, replacing prior laws,
which permitted the recording of telephone conversations with the
consent of one party to the conversation. The California Penal Code
is very clear in its prohibition against unauthorized recording
without the consent of the other person to the conversation.

Prior to 2020, the Plaintiff incurred student loan debt that was
later assigned, transferred, or sold to the Defendant. The
Defendant then began calling the Plaintiff's cellular phone
attempting to collect. When placing a call, the first thing
Defendant should say is that the call is recorded, but allegedly,
it does not. According to the complaint, at the inception of the
call, the Defendant did not advise te Plaintiff that the call was
being recorded, and te Plaintiff did not consent to the call being
recorded. At no point did the Defendant inform the Plaintiff that
the call was being recorded until Plaintiff asked at the end of the
call. Nonetheless, the Defendant was in fact surreptitiously
recording the entirety of the approximately one-minute-long
conversation between the Plaintiff and the Defendant.

The Defendant covertly recorded a telephone call with Plaintiff, in
which the Plaintiff proffered personal information, all the while
the Defendant did not provide any disclosure to the Plaintiff
regarding its recording. The Plaintiff was personally affected by
the Defendant's aforementioned conduct because the Plaintiff was
troubled and distressed that the Defendant recorded a telephone
conversation with the Plaintiff without the Plaintiff's knowledge
or consent, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff is a natural person and resident of the State of
California, County of San Diego.

The Defendant conducted business in the State of California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joshua B. Swigart (SBN 225557)
          Juliana G. Blaha, Esq.
          SWIGART LAW GROUP, APC
          2221 Camino Del Rio South, Suite 308
          San Diego, CA 92108
          Phone: 866-219-3343
          Fax: 866-219-8344
          Email: josh@swigartlawgroup.com
                 juliana@swigartlawgroup.com


PERSONNEL STAFFING: Review of Class Cert. Denial in Pruitt Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DERELL PRUITT and RONALD PETERSON, on behalf of
themselves and other similarly situated laborers, Plaintiffs v.
PERSONNEL STAFFING GROUP, LLC d/b/a MVP, THE SEGERDAHL CORP.,
VISUAL PAK COMPANY, MEDLINE INDUSTRIES, INC., and METROPOLITAN
GRAPHICS ARTS, INC., Defendants, Case No. 16-cv-5079 (N.D. Ill.),
Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, denied the
Plaintiffs motion to reconsider the Court's order granting the
Defendants' motions to deny class certification.

The Plaintiffs' purported class action against staffing agency MVP
and the companies that use its temporary workers has gone through
several iterations since its filing on May 9, 2016, the most recent
of which is a second amended class action complaint filed on Jan.
13, 2017.  The Defendants moved to deny class certification,
arguing that the two remaining named Plaintiffs--Pruitt and
Peterson--were not adequate class representatives.

The Defendants' motion to deny class certification made two
relevant arguments.  First, they asserted that Peterson's Title VII
claims are time-barred because he filed the EEOC charge more than
300 days after he sought work from MVP.  Second, they argued that
Peterson's Section 1981 claims are time-barred because the two-year
statute of limitations for pre-contract-formation claims applies
and the case was filed more than two years after Peterson sought
work from MVP.

After the parties briefed the motion and filed 13 exhibits totaling
approximately 1,000 pages, the Court, in an order dated June 8,
2020, determined that Pruitt and Peterson were not adequate class
representatives, granted the motions to deny class certification,
and ordered Pruitt and Peterson to file a status report stating
whether they intended to pursue individual claims.

The Plaintiffs then filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that (1)
the Court's June 8, 2020 order mistakenly said that they did not
address the statute of limitations issue, which, correctly
analyzed, does not bar Peterson from serving as a class
representative; (2) the Court's order failed to consider certain
evidence in the record that bears on Pruitt and Peterson's adequacy
as class representatives; and (3) reconsideration is warranted by
the negative impact that denying class certification would have on
the absent class members.

Judge Dow acknowledges an error in the Court's analysis of the
statute of limitations issue, which he corrects now, but which does
not change the outcome of the June 8, 2020 order.  First, by
failing to respond to the Defendants' argument on the Title VII
statute of limitations, the Judge holds the Plaintiffs forfeited
the argument.  Second, Peterson is arguably subject to a two-year
statute of limitations on the Section 1981 claims, if that is the
limitations period that applies.  But which is the correct
limitations period to apply--the two-year period for
pre-contract-formation claims or the four-year period for
post-contract-formation claims--is not clear at this point in the
litigation.  Because he resolves the motion on other grounds, and
because the issue may come up if Peterson pursues individual
claims, the Judge declines to further opine the statutes of
limitations with regard to Section 1981 claims.

Other than that correction, the Judge opines that the Plaintiffs'
motion does not establish any manifest error in the Court's
previous order that warrants reconsideration.  The Plaintiffs do
not argue that the Court misunderstood the evidence, nor do they
present newly discovered evidence.  Instead, the Plaintiffs
primarily point to evidence in the record that they did not cite in
briefing the motion to deny class certification, a move that
neither supports reconsideration nor, if the substance of the
evidence were considered, would change the Court's conclusions.

Finally, the Judge holds that the argument regarding the absent
class members does not make the Plaintiffs into adequate class
representatives.  It may be a meritorious case, but the system does
not allow the Plaintiffs' counsel to act as private attorneys
general and prosecute Defendants on their own; cases require real
plaintiffs, and class actions require adequate class
representatives.  Likelihood of success on the merits is no
substitute for those requirements.

In fact, the Judge notes that having a good case may be all the
more reason to have good class representatives.  Even if the
members of the proposed class would benefit from the case going
forward, that does not give the Court license to ignore the
requirements of Rule 23, and the Plaintiffs' argument fails to
persuade him that he should declare Pruitt and Peterson to be
adequate class representatives when the record indicates they are
not.

For the reasons he explained, Judge Dow denied the Plaintiffs'
motion for reconsideration.  The Plaintiffs are given until Feb.
15, 2021, to file a status report stating whether they intend to
dismiss the case or proceed individually.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 20, 2021 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yxzl2avz from
Leagle.com.


PHILLIPS & COHEN: Haston Suit Seeks to Certify Class
----------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as TIMOTHY HASTON,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
PHILLIPS & COHEN ASSOCIATES LTD., Case No. 2:20-cv-01069-WSS (W.D.
Pa.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an order:

   1. certify the class defined as:

      "all individuals who, within the applicable statute of
      limitations, received a letter from PCA that stated in
      some form that PCA would assume the debt at issue in the
      letter was valid unless the consumer sent a written
      dispute to PCA;"

   2. appointing himself as class representative; and

   3. appointing his counsel as class counsel.

Phillips & Cohen provides collections and financial recovery
services.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated Jan. 22,
2020 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/39t7uqn
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kevin Abramowicz, Esq.
          Kevin Tucker, Esq.
          EAST END TRIAL GROUP LLC
          186 42nd Street
          P.O. Box 40127
          Pittsburgh, PA 15201
          Telephone: (412) 223-5740
          E-mail: kabramowicz@eastendtrialgroup.com
                  ktucker@eastendtrialgroup.com

               - and -

          Eugene D. Frank, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF EUGENE D. FRANK, P.C.
          3202 McKnight East Drive
          Pittsburgh, PA 15237
          Telephone: (412) 366-4276
          E-mail: efrank@edf-law.com

PIZZA TO YOU: Waters Suit Gets Certification of Drivers Class
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Kirk Waters, et al., v.
Pizza to You, LLC, et al., Case No. 3:19-cv-00372-TMR (S.D. Ohio),
the Hon. Judge Thomas M. Rose entered an order:

   1. certifying this action as a class action under Rule 23;

   2. appointing the plaintiff Kirk Waters as class
      representative;

   3. appointing counsel Biller & Kimble, LLC as lead counsel;

   4. approving the Plaintiff's proposed notice to be delivered
      to class members by mail and email; and

   5. granting the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class
      consisting of:

      "all non-owner, non-employer delivery drivers who worked
      at any of the Jets Pizza locations owned/operated by Pizza
      to You, L.L.C., Pizza to You 2, L.L.C., Pizza to You 3,
      L.L.C., Pizza to You 4, LLC, Pizza to You 5, LLC, PRM
      Management LLC, Peter Marrocco, and/or Rosemary Marrocco
      in Ohio at any time from November 22, 2016 to present".

There is no device that can resolve these matters as efficiently
and fairly as a class action. Finally, no major difficulty is
likely to arise in management of the class action as the putative
class is a defined size. Class certification here promotes
consistent results, giving the Defendants "the benefit of finality
and repose." Adjudicating this matter as a class action is the most
efficient manner of resolving these
claims, the Court says.

Plaintiff Kirk Waters worked for the Defendants at one of their
five Jets Pizza locations in the Dayton, Ohio area. The Plaintiff
alleges that the Defendants' Jets stores employ delivery drivers
according to the same basic compensation terms, and that those
compensation terms result in a violation of Ohio wage and hour law
and unjustly enrich Defendants.

The Defendants require their delivery drivers to provide
automobiles to use to deliver the Defendants' pizzas. The
Defendants do not track or keep records of the delivery drivers'
actual or estimated vehicle expenses. The Defendants reimburse
their delivery drivers for their vehicles' expenses at a set
per-delivery rate ($1.00 per delivery until July 2019, and $1.25
per delivery since then). The Defendants pay each of their delivery
drivers an hourly wage rate at or close to minimum wage.

The Defendants employed Kirk Waters as a pizza delivery driver at
their Jets Pizza location in Springboro, Ohio from approximately
September 2019 to February 2020. He filed this action on November
22, 2019.

A copy of the Court's order dated Jan. 22, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3oynYBR at no extra charge.[CC]

PLANNED LIFESTYLE: Tesfai Sues Over Unpaid Compensations
--------------------------------------------------------
Semira Tesfai, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated individuals v. PLANNED LIFESTYLE SERVICES, INC., Case No.
1:21-cv-00191 (D.D.C., Jan. 21, 2021), is brought seeking unpaid
wages, back-pay, restitution, liquidated damages, reasonable
attorney's fees and costs, and all related penalties and damages
under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the D.C. Wage Payment and Wage
Collection Act, the D.C. Minimum Wage Act Revision Act, the
Maryland Wage Hour Law, and the Maryland Wage Payment Collection
Law.

The Plaintiff customarily worked 36-56 or more hours per week. The
Defendant had actual knowledge of all hours the Plaintiff worked
each week including knowledge of overtime the Plaintiff worked over
40 hours per week. Allegedly, the Defendant implemented and
enforced a payroll practice or policy that deducted minutes and
hours the Plaintiff worked per shift exceeding 8 hours. This policy
reduced the Plaintiff down to 8 or less hours per shift,
notwithstanding that the Plaintiff regularly and customarily worked
more than 8 hours per shift.

As a result of the Defendant's class-wide payroll policies and
practices, the Defendant failed to pay the Plaintiff all
time-and-one-half overtime wages due and owing for all compensable
overtime worked over 40 hours per week. The Defendants has
willfully violated the statutory wage payment rights of the
Plaintiff and the Class Plaintiffs under the FLSA, District of
Columbia law, and Maryland law resulting in damages now owed by
Defendant, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant to perform concierge
and/or front desk employee duties for the benefit of the
Defendant.

The Defendant has operated as a business entity providing concierge
and/or front desk employee staffing for apartment buildings
condominiums, and other properties in the District of Columbia, the
State of Maryland, and several other states and jurisdictions in
the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregg C. Greenberg, Esq.
          ZIPIN, AMSTER & GREENBERG, LLC
          8757 Georgia Avenue, Suite 400
          Silver Spring, MD 20910
          Phone: (301) 587-9373
          Email: GGreenberg@ZAGFirm.com



PTT LLC: Two Classes Certified, Initial Injunction Denied in Wilson
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as SEAN WILSON, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. PTT, LLC, d/b/a
HIGH 5 GAMES, LLC, Case No. 3:18-cv-05275-RSL (W.D. Wash.), the
Hon. Judge Robert S. Lasnik entered an order:

   1. granting the plaintiff's motion for class certification;

   2. certifying a 'Damages Class' pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
      23(a) and 23(b)(3):

      "all individuals in Washington who purchased virtual
      casino chips on either High 5 Casino or High 5 Vegas after
      April 9, 2014;"

   3. certifying an 'Injunctive Class' pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
      P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2):

      "all individuals in Washington who played either High 5
      Casino or High 5 Vegas after April 9, 2014;"

   4. appointing Plaintiff Sean Wilson as representatives of the
      class;

   5. designating the Plaintiff's counsel as class counsel; and

   6. denying the Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary
      injunction.

Ptt LLC was founded in 1995. The company's line of business
includes providing computer programming services.

A copy of the Court's order dated Jan. 21, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3osDdfo at no extra charge.[CC]


ROSEN HOTELS: Turner Sues Over Failure to Provide Advance Notice
----------------------------------------------------------------
Yolanda Turner, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. ROSEN HOTELS AND RESORTS, INC., Case No.
6:21-cv-00161-CEM-GJK (M.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2021), is brought for
collection of unpaid wages and benefits for 60 calendar days
pursuant to the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act
of 1988 (the "WARN Act") and for the failure to provide the
Plaintiff at least 60 days' advance written notice of the layoffs
exceeding 6 months, as required by the WARN Act.

The Plaintiff was an employee of the Defendant until she was laid
off longer than 6 months as part of, or as a result of a mass
layoff and/or plant closing ordered by the Defendant. As such, the
Defendant is liable under the WARN Act for the failure to provide
the Plaintiff at least 60 days' advance written notice of the
layoffs exceeding 6 months, as required by the WARN Act. In
addition, the Defendant failed to pay the Plaintiff their
respective wages, salary, commissions, bonuses, accrued holiday pay
and accrued vacation for 60 days following their respective layoffs
exceeding 6 months and failed to make 401(k) contributions and
provide them with health insurance coverage and other employee
benefits, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was an employee who was employed by Defendant and
worked at or reported to the Rosen Inn.

The Defendant was a Florida corporation with facilities throughout
Florida. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brandon J. Hill, Esq.
          Luis A. Cabassa, Esq.
          WENZEL FENTON CABASSA, P.A.
          1110 North Florida Ave., Suite 300
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Main Number: 813-224-0431
          Facsimile: 813-229-8712
          Email: lcabassa@wfclaw.com
                 bhill@wfclaw.com

               - and -

          Stuart J. Miller, Esq.
          Johnathan Miller, Esq.
          LANKENAU & MILLER, LLP
          100 Church Street, 8th Floor
          New York, NY 10007
          Phone: (212) 581-5005
          Fax: (212) 581-2122
          Email: chad@getjusticeforjustice.com

               - and -

          Mary E. Olsen, Esq.
          M. Vance McCrary, Esq.
          THE GARDNER FIRM, PC
          182 St. Francis Street, Suite 103
          Mobile, AL 36602
          Phone: (251) 433-8100
          Fax: (251) 433-8181


RSCR CALIFORNIA: Must File Joint Settlement Report by Feb. 22
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as CHRISTINE ANDERSON,
individually, and on behalf of other members of the general public
similarly situated, v. RSCR CALIFORNIA, INC., a Delaware
corporation; RES-CARE CALIFORNIA, INC. WHICH WILL DO BUSINESS IN
CALIFORNIA AS RCCA SERVICES, a Delaware corporation; and DOES 1
through 10, inclusive, Case No. 5:18-cv-02474-JAK-KK (C.D. Cal.),
the Hon. Judge John A. Kronstadt entered an order:

   1. vacating the January 25, 2021 hearing on the Motion for
      Class Certification; and

   2. directing the parties, on or before February 22, 2021, to
      file a joint report stating their respective and/or
      collective views, as to whether they have completed the
      documentation of the proposed settlement, as well as when
      the anticipated Motion for Preliminary Approval will be
      filed.

RSCR California was founded in 2007. The company's line of business
includes providing employment services.

A copy of the Court's order dated Jan. 22, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2MgYwne at no extra charge.[CC]

SACHS ELECTRIC: Stay on Drive Time Claims in Durham Suit Lifted
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as WILLIAM DURHAM, et al., v.
SACHS ELECTRIC COMPANY, et al., Case No. 5:18-cv-04506-BLF (N.D.
Cal.), the Hon. Judge Beth Labson Freeman entered an order:

   1. lifting the stay on the "drive time" claims;

      -- staying "drive time" claims pending resolution of the
         appeal in Griffin v. Sachs Electric Company, et al.,
         Case No. 17-cv-03778-BLF;

   2. directing the Plaintiff to file a motion for class
      certification on the "drive time" claims within 30 days;

      -- The opening and opposition brief SHALL be no more than
         ten pages; and

      -- The reply brief shall be no more than five pages;

   3. scheduling case trial on September 2021; and

   4. directing the parties to monitor the trial date in light
      of the ongoing briefing

      -- The Court is currently scheduling trials for mid-2023.

Sachs Electric is a national electrical contracting,
communications, instrumentation, and engineering company serving
the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico.

A copy of the Court's order dated Jan. 21, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2Mq7b6x at no extra charge.[CC]

SERVICE KING: Class Status Hearing Continued to April 22
--------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ERICA MONIZ, as an
individual and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
SERVICE KING, INC., a California Corporation; SERVICE KING PAINT &
BODY, LLC, a Texas Limited Liability Company; and DOES 1 through
100, Case No. 5:18-cv-07372-EJD (N.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge entered
an order granting stipulation to continue class certification
briefing schedule as follows:

      Event                 Current Deadline   New Proposed Date

   Defendant's Opposition      Jan. 29, 2021      Feb. 19, 2021
   to Class Certification:

   Plaintiffs' Reply to        Mar. 5, 2021       Mar. 26, 2021
   Defendant's Opposition
   to Class Certification:

   Hearing on Motion           Apr. 22, 2021      Apr. 22, 2021
   for Class Certification:

   Case Management Statement:  May 17, 2021       May 17, 2021

   Case Management             May 27, 2021       May 27, 2021
   Conference  

Service King is a national automotive collision repair company.

A copy of the Court's order dated Jan. 21, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2MxF9G7 at no extra charge.[CC]

SLACK TECHNOLOGIES: Katz Challenges Merger Deal With Salesforce
---------------------------------------------------------------
STEVEN KATZ, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. SLACK TECHNOLOGIES, INC., STEWART BUTTERFIELD, ANDREW
BRACCIA, EDITH COOPER, SARAH FRIAR, SHEILA JORDAN, MIKE MCNAMARA,
JOHN O'FARRELL and GRAHAM SMITH, Case No. 3:21-cv-00555 (N.D. Cal.,
Jan. 22, 2021) is a class action complaint brought by the Plaintiff
on behalf of himself and the other public holders of the common
stock of Slack Technologies against the Company and the members of
the Company's board of directors for their violations of Sections
14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, in
connection with the proposed merger between Slack and
Salesforce.com, Inc.

On December 1, 2020, the Board caused the Company to enter into an
agreement and plan of merger ("Merger Agreement"), pursuant to
which the Company's shareholders stand to receive $26.79 in cash
and 0.0776 shares of Salesforce common stock for each share of
Slack stock they own (the "Merger Consideration").

According to the complaint, on December 23, 2020, in order to
convince Slack shareholders to vote in favor of the Proposed
Transaction, the Board authorized the filing of a materially
incomplete and misleading Form S-4 (the "S-4") with the Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), in violation of Sections 14(a) and
20(a) of the Exchange Act. The materially incomplete and misleading
preliminary S-4 violates both Regulation G and SEC Rule 14a-22 9,
each of which constitutes a violation of Sections 14(a) and 20(a)
of the Exchange Act, the suit says.

While touting the fairness of the Merger Consideration to the
Company's shareholders in the S-4, the Defendants have allegedly
failed to disclose certain material information that is necessary
for shareholders to properly assess the fairness of the Proposed
Transaction, thereby violating SEC rules and regulations and
rendering certain statements in the S-4 materially incomplete and
misleading, the Plaintiff contends. In particular, the S-4 contains
materially incomplete and misleading information 4 concerning the
financial projections for the Company that were prepared by the
Company and relied on by the Defendants in recommending that Slack
shareholders vote in favor of the Proposed Transaction, the suit
adds.

The Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the Defendants from holding the
shareholder vote on the Proposed Transaction and taking any steps
to consummate the Proposed Transaction unless, and until, the
material information is disclosed to Slack shareholders
sufficiently in advance of the vote on the Proposed Transaction or,
in the event the Proposed Transaction is consummated, to recover
damages resulting from the Defendants' violations of the Exchange
Act.

The Plaintiff is, and at all relevant times has been, a holder of
Slack common stock.

Slack is a channel-based messaging platform that offers a secure,
enterprise-grade scalable environment for people to work together
more effectively, connect all their other software tools and
services and find the information they need to do their work. The
Company's common stock trades on the NYSE under the ticker symbol
"WORK." The Individual Defendants are directors of the
company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Benjamin Heikali, Esq.
          Nadeem Faruqi, Esq.
          James M. Wilson, Jr., Esq.
          FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
          10866 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1470
          Los Angeles, CA 90024
          Telephone: (424) 256-2884
          Facsimile: (424) 256-2885
          E-mail: bheikali@faruqilaw.com
                  nfaruqi@faruqilaw.com
                  jwilson@faruqilaw.com

SOUTHERN VALLEY: Farmworkers Seek Initial Settlement Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JESUS BEJINES-GONZALEZ,
ABRAHAAM SAYAGO-HERNANDEZ, MARGARITO OSORIO-JIMENEZ, and LOIDA
OSORIO-JIMENEZ and all others similarly situated, v. SOUTHERN
VALLEY FRUIT & VEGETABLE, INC.; HAMILTON GROWERS, INC.; KENT
HAMILTON; HAMILTON FARMS MEX, L.P.; HAMILTON PRODUCE, L.P.; KENDA
PROPERTIES, L.P.; WK HOLDINGS, LLC; WK MEX PROPERTIES, L.P.; and
WKW, LLC, Case No. 7:19-cv-00055-HL (M.D. Ga.), the Plaintiffs ask
the Court for an order:

   1. certifying for settlement purposes a Settlement Class
      defined as:

      "Farmworkers who came to Georgia from Mexico through the
      Defendants' use of the federal H-2A visa program to work
      in the Defendants' packing shed operations, or are non-H2A
      workers who were employed in similar positions under the
      terms of an H-2A clearance order;"

   2. appointing class representatives, class counsel, and a
      Settlement Administrator;

   3. approving the settlement in this case as fair, reasonable
      and adequate, and approving the Class Notice and the
      method for distribution of Class Notice;

   4. directing the Settlement Administrator to provide notice
      to class members as set forth in the parties' Settlement
      Agreement; and

   5. setting a date for a final approval hearing in this case.

The Settlement Terms:

   1. The Defendants shall pay a total gross settlement amount
      of $880,000 in settlement of all claims.

   2. The Plaintiffs' Counsel will request an award of up to
      $237,600, or 27% of the Fund as an all-inclusive award of
      attorneys’ fees, and request an award of up to $20,000 for

      out-of-pocket costs and expenses.

   3. The Settlement Administrator Atticus Administration, LLC
      shall establish and administer an account to hold and
      distribute the Fund, and shall be paid from the Fund an
      amount estimated at no more than $25,000.

   4. The Plaintiffs will request the Court award up to $10,000
      each as additional compensation in addition to any payment
      they may otherwise receive as Settlement Class Members:

      -- The Plaintiffs Loida Osorio-Jimenez and Margarito
         OsorioJimenez ("Retaliation Plaintiffs") request
         $10,000 and $7,000 respectively as compensation for
         their FLSA retaliation claims.

     -- Each opt-in Plaintiffs will request $1,500 in additional
         compensation for their claims.

   5. The Plaintiffs Loida Osorio-Jimenez and Margarito Osorio-
      Jimenez will to be offered employment under the terms of
      an H-2A job order of at least eight months duration during
      the 2021 calendar year or 2022 calendar year.

   6. Jesus Bejines-Gonzalez, Abraham Sayago-Hernandez, Loida
      Osorio-Jimenez, Margarito Osorio-Jimenez and all Opt-in
      Plaintiffs will release Defendants, from all wage claims
      and employment claims (including retaliation claims)
      through the date of the Agreement which arise from their
      employment with the Defendants, with the exception that
      bodily injury torts, worker's compensation, and industrial
      injury claims will not be released.

   7. Class members will release the Defendants from all causes
      of action, claims, losses, damages, and wages that were
      asserted in this action or which arise out of the factual
      allegations in the operative complaint, but not such
      claims that may not be waived under applicable state and
      federal including but not limited to claims arising from
      an industrial injury.

   8. Any remaining funds, after redistribution to class
      members, will not revert to the Defendants and will go to
      a cy pres recipient, the Migrant Clinicians Network, Inc.,
      which works with farmworkers to improve access to health
      care.

In April 2019, Mr. Bejines-Gonzalez and Mr. Sayago-Hernandez filed
the instant lawsuit alleging that they and other similarly-situated
employees had not been paid overtime or properly reimbursed for
travel expenses when they worked for the Defendants.

Southern Valley Fruit & Vegetable, Inc. produces crops for food
consumption. The Company offers a variety of vegetables and
fruits.

A copy of Plaintiff's motion dated Jan. 22, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3r1ndTmat no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Dawson Morton, Esq.
          DAWSON MORTON, LLC
          1003 Freedom Blvd.
          Watsonville, CA 95076
          Telephone: 404-590-1295
          E-mail: dawson@dawsonmorton.com

               - and -

          Patricia Kakalec, Esq.
          KAKALEC LAW PLLC
          195 Montague Street, 16th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Telephone: 212-705-8730
          E-mail: patricia@kakaleclaw.com

SPECTRA ENERGY: Delaware Supreme Court Flips Morris Suit Dismissal
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PAUL MORRIS, on behalf of all similarly situated
unitholders of SPECTRA ENERGY PARTNERS, L.P., Plaintiff Below,
Appellant v. SPECTRA ENERGY PARTNERS (DE) GP, LP, Defendant Below,
Appellee, Case No. 489, 2019 (Del.), the Supreme Court of Delaware
reversed the Court of Chancery's judgment granting Spectra Energy
Partners (DE) GP, LP's motion to dismiss, and remanded for further
proceedings.

With limited exceptions, a merger extinguishes an equity owner's
standing to pursue a derivative claim against the target entity's
directors or controller.  But the same plaintiff has standing to
pursue a post-closing suit if they challenge the validity of the
merger itself as unfair because the controller failed to secure the
value of a material asset--like derivative claims that pass to the
acquirer in the merger.  Given the difficulties of pursuing such
claims, not the least of which is proof that the equity owner
received an unfair merger price for their ownership interest, the
plaintiff might not prevail on the merits, but they have
sufficiently alleged a direct claim to survive a motion to dismiss
for lack of standing.

After a $3.3 billion "roll up" of minority-held units involving a
merger between Enbridge, Inc. and Spectra Energy Partners L.P.
("SEP"), Morris, a former SEP minority unitholder, lost standing to
litigate an alleged $661 million derivative suit on behalf of SEP
against its general partner, Spectra Energy Partners (DE) GP, LP
("SEP GP").  Morris reprised the derivative claim dismissal by
filing a new class action complaint that alleged the Enbridge/SEP
merger exchange ratio was unfair because SEP GP agreed to a merger
that did not reflect the material value of his derivative claims.

The Court of Chancery granted SEP GP's motion to dismiss the new
complaint for lack of standing.  The court held that, to have
standing to bring a post-merger claim, Morris had to allege a
viable and material derivative claim that the buyer would not
assert and provided no value for in the merger.  Focusing on the
materiality requirement, it first discounted the $661 million
recovery to $112 million to reflect the public unitholders'
beneficial interest in the derivative litigation recovery.  Then,
it discounted the $112 million further to $28 million to reflect
what the court estimated was a one in four chance of success in the
litigation.  After the discounting, the $28 million--less than 1%
of the merger consideration--was immaterial to a $3.3 billion
merger.

On appeal, Morris argues that the court should not have dismissed
his direct claims for lack of standing because he pled in detail a
direct claim that satisfied the factors in In re Primedia, Inc.
Shareholders Litigation.  The parties and the court agreed that the
derivative claim was viable because it had survived a motion to
dismiss.  They also agreed that Enbridge would not assert the claim
and provided no value for the claim in the exchange ratio.  And, as
Morris alleged, the $112 million potential recovery was material to
the $3.3 billion transaction.  According to Morris, if the Court of
Chancery had accepted his well-pleaded factual allegations as true
and drawn all reasonable inferences in his favor, it would not have
discounted the potential value of the claim such that it became
immaterial to the merger value.

The Defendants counter that Morris supposedly did not challenge the
fairness of the exchange ratio, undermining the claim that SEP GP
did not negotiate fair consideration for the public unitholders'
SEP units.  For the litigation discount issue, the Defendants
contend that Morris conceded in the Court of Chancery that the
derivative claim should be discounted for litigation risk.  They
also argue that discounting for litigation risk is consistent with
prior cases.  And, according to the Defendants, the "fraud
exception to the continuous ownership rule" is the proper method to
assess the Plaintiff's standing to assert post-merger claims.

The Supreme Court of Delaware reviews de novo the Court of
Chancery's finding that the Plaintiff lacked standing to pursue his
post-merger claims challenging the fairness of the merger
consideration for failure to recoup some or all of the value of the
derivative claims.  It agrees with Morris and finds that, on a
motion to dismiss for lack of standing, Morris has sufficiently
pled a direct claim attacking the fairness of the merger itself for
SEP GP's failure to secure value for his pending derivative
claims.

The Supreme Court finds two errors in the court's materiality
analysis at the motion to dismiss stage of the proceedings.

First, the court must accept Morris's factual allegations as true
and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor.  In its prior
decision the court found that Morris's complaint "made adequate
allegations showing that under reasonably conceivable circumstances
a facially unreasonable gap in consideration exists sufficient to
infer subjective bad faith."  Thus, "it was reasonably conceivable
that the General Partner acted in subjective bad faith."  It was
also reasonably conceivable that, had Morris succeeded in the
derivative suit challenging the reverse drop down transaction, the
recovery could have been at least $660 million.  Applying a further
litigation risk discount at the pleading stage was inconsistent
with the court's standard of review on a motion to dismiss for lack
of standing.

Second, even if it was proper to discount the $660 million in
damages alleged in the complaint to reflect the public unitholders'
interest in the derivative recovery, to maintain equivalence, the
court should have compared the $112 million pro rata interest in
the derivative claim recovery to the public unitholders'
proportional interest in the merger consideration.  The public
unitholders had a 17% interest in SEP.  The merger consideration
was valued at $3.3 billion.  An apples-to-apples comparison would
have compared $112 million to $561 million.  Under this
calculation, the derivative claim was material at the motion to
dismiss stage.

In any event, on a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, the
Supreme Court of Delaware is not addressing the likelihood of
success on a preliminary injunction record.  A percentage-based
risk reduction should not be applied at this stage of the
proceedings.  If the plaintiff has alleged a viable derivative
claim, where it is reasonably conceivable that the claim is
material when compared to the merger consideration and could result
in the damages pled in the complaint, the plaintiff has satisfied
the materiality requirement at the motion to dismiss stage for
standing purposes.  Morris has met this standard and his claims
should not be dismissed for lack of standing.

The Supreme Court of Delaware concludes that standing is concerned
"only with the question of who is entitled to mount a legal
challenge and not with the merits of the subject matter in
controversy."  If the court finds that the plaintiff has standing,
on the defendant's motion the court should also consider a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim.

For the first time on appeal, SEP GP has asked the Court to
consider its motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
Because the record is complex and it is not clear what has been
incorporated by reference, the Supreme Court of Delaware thinks
that the Court of Chancery should consider the motion first.  It
also might be a better use of the court's scarce resources to
consider a motion for summary judgment, after the completion of
discovery, rather than a motion to dismiss.  But the Supreme Court
of Delaware leaves it to the Court of Chancery's discretion.

Accordingly, writing for the Supreme Court of Delaware, Chief
Justice Collins J. Seitz, Jr., reversed the Court of Chancery's
judgment and remanded for further proceedings.  Jurisdiction is not
retained.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 22, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yyy5qkb4 from Leagle.com.

Michael J. Barry -- mbarry@gelaw.com -- and Michael T. Manuel --
mmanuel@gelaw.com -- of GRANT & EISENHOFER P.A., Wilmington,
Delaware; Peter B. Andrews -- pandrews@andrewsspringer.com -- and
Craig J. Springer -- cspringer@andrewsspringer.com -- of ANDREWS &
SPRINGER LLC, in Wilmington, Delaware; OF COUNSEL: Jeremy Friedman
-- jfriedman@ljbpc.com -- Spender Oster -- soster@fotpllc.com --
and David Tejtel -- dtejtel@fotpllc.com -- of FRIEDMAN OSTER &
TEJTEL PLLC, in New York City, Attorneys for Plaintiff.

Robert S. Saunders -- rob.saunders@skadden.com -- Ronald N. Brown,
III -- ron.brown@skadden.com -- and of SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE,
MEAGHER & FLOM LLP, in Wilmington, Delaware; OF COUNSEL: Noelle M.
Reed -- noelle.reed@skadden.com -- Daniel S. Mayerfeld --
daniel.mayerfeld@skadden.com -- and Alston L. Walker, 1440 New York
Ave. Nw, Washington, DC 20005-2111 of SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER
& FLOM LLP, in Houston, Texas, Attorneys for Defendant.


ST. ELIZABETH: Class Cert. Filing Deadline Stayed Pending Discovery
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Walkinshaw, et al., v.
Saint Elizabeths Regional Medical Center, Case No. 4:19-cv-03012
(D. Neb), the Hon. Magistrate Judge Susan M. Bazis entered an
order:

   1. The Defendants shall produce the full list of collective
      members as set out in Judge Buescher's December 17, 2020
      order:

      -- Specifically, the collective members set shall include
         the 660 nurses listed in Defendants' answers to
         interrogatories.

      -- The collective members set shall also include the
         nurses in the departments listed in the on-call
         policies if they are not already listed within the 660
         nurses to be disclosed.

      -- The list shall include the nurses' personal email
         addresses if Defendants have that information.
         Defendants shall produce this information by January
         28, 2021.

   2. The parties shall meet and confer regarding the class
      notice.

   3. The Plaintiff is reminded to look at Judge Buescher's
      order and comply with the order as to the notice and
      website.

   4. The Defendants shall answer Request for Production Nos. 1,
      45 and 46.

   5. The Court will not order further electronically stored
      information (ESI) at this time. Once the Defendants
      produce additional information to the Plaintiffs, the
      parties shall meet and confer to discuss what additional
      ESI discovery is necessary.

   6. The Defendants do not need to produce additional record
      retention information, with the exception of providing
      this information for the remainder of facilities.

   7. The Court will not order the Defendants to produce the
      archived email data of Michael Hopkins. However, the
      parties shall meet and confer to determine custodians from
      whom this information may be able to be obtained.

   8. By January 28, 2021, the Defendants shall supplement their
      responses to Request for Production Nos. 37, 42, and 44 to
      indicate whether Defendants are, or are not, withholding
      responsive documents based on their objections.

   9. The deadline for Plaintiffs to file their motion for class
      certification of their non-Fair Labor Standards Act claims
      is stayed pending their receipt of discovery from
      Defendants.

  10. The parties shall submit a report as to the status of
      discovery by March 8, 2021. Ordered by Magistrate Judge
      Susan M. Bazis.

The nature of suit states Torts -- Personal Injury -- Other
Personal Injury involving Fair Labor Standards Act.

St. Elizabeth's Regional Medical Center is a hospital located at
555 South 70th Street in Lincoln, Nebraska, United States.[CC]

STARBUCKS CORP: Adams Must File Class Certification Bid by March 29
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as TERESA ADAMS, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. STARBUCKS
CORPORATION, a Washington corporation, and DOES 1-20, inclusive,
Case No. 8:20-cv-00225-MCS-KES (C.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Mark C.
Scarsi entered an order that:

   1. The Plaintiff's motion for class certification will be
      filed and class certification expert disclosures made on
      March 29, 2021;

   2. The Defendant's opposition to class certification will be
      filed and class certification expert disclosures made on
      May 17, 2021;

   3. The Plaintiff's reply in support of class certification
      will be filed and rebuttal expert disclosures re class
      certification made on June 28, 2021;

   4. The hearing on the Plaintiff's motion for class
      certification will be held on July 12, 2021 at 9:00 a.m.;
      and

   5. The deadlines set forth in the August 4, 2020, Scheduling
      Order are taken off calendar and will be reset following a
      ruling on Plaintiff's motion for class certification.

Starbucks is an American multinational chain of coffeehouses and
roastery reserves headquartered in Seattle, Washington.

A copy of the Court's order dated Jan. 21, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3a7q72a at no extra charge.[CC]

STATE FARM: Bordlemay Insurance Suit Removed to D. New Mexico
-------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled DOUGLAS BORDLEMAY, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated vs. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY, Case No. D-202-CV-2020-06318, was removed from
the New Mexico Second Judicial District Court for the County of
Bernalillo to the U.S. District Court for the District of New
Mexico on January 7, 2021.

The Clerk of Court for the District of New Mexico assigned Case No.
1:21-cv-00019-WJ-LF to the proceeding.

The Plaintiff, for himself and an asserted class of New Mexico
State Farm policyholders who have its underinsured motor vehicle
(UIM) coverage, alleges that State Farm breached its contractual
and good faith obligations and violated New Mexico law by selling
"illusory" minimal limits UIM coverage and denying claims for the
benefits of that coverage.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company operates as an
insurance company. The Company offers vehicle, auto, accident,
homeowners, condo owners, renters, life and annuities, fire and
casualty, health, disability, flood, business, and boat insurance
products and services.[BN]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Terry R. Guebert, Esq.
          Elizabeth M. Piazza, Esq.
          David S. Ketai, Esq.
          GUEBERT GENTILE & PIAZZA P.C.  
          P.O. Box 93880
          Albuquerque, NM 87199-3880
          Telephone: (505) 823-2300
          E-mail: tguebert@guebertlaw.com
                  epiazza@guebertlaw.com
                  dketai@guebertlaw.com

STEVENS INSTITUTE: Mitelberg Seeks Tuition Refunds Due to COVID-19
------------------------------------------------------------------
LEAH MITELBERG, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. STEVENS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, Case No.
2:21-cv-01043-SDW-MAH (D.N.J., Jan. 22, 2021) is a class action
lawsuit on behalf of all people who paid tuition and fees for the
Spring 2020 academic semester at Stevens, and who, because of the
Defendant's response to the Novel Coronavirus Disease 2019
(COVID-19) pandemic, lost the benefit of the education for which
they paid, and/or the services for which their fees paid, without
having their tuition and fees refunded to them.

The Plaintiff and Class Members entered into a contractual
agreement with Stevens where the Plaintiff would provide payment in
the form of tuition and fees, and Defendant, in exchange, would
provide in-person educational services, experiences, opportunities,
and other related services to the Plaintiff and Class Members. The
terms of the contractual agreement were set forth in publications
from Stevens Institute of Technology, including Stevens Institute
of Technology's Spring Semester 2020 Course Catalog.

The Plaintiff alleges that she and the putative class did not enter
into an agreement with Stevens for online education, but rather
sought to receive an in-person education from Stevens. They are
therefore entitled to a refund of tuition and fees for in-person
educational services, facilities, access and/or opportunities that
the Defendant has not provided. Even if the Defendant did not have
a choice in canceling in-person classes, it nevertheless has
improperly retained funds for services it did not provide, the suit
says.

The Plaintiff seeks, for herself and Class members, the Defendant's
disgorgement of the pro-rated portion of tuition and fees,
proportionate to the amount of time that remained in the Spring
Semester 2020 when classes moved online and campus services ceased
being provided. The Plaintiff seeks a return of these amounts on
behalf of herself and the Class.

On March 12, 2020, Stevens announced that because of the global
COVID-19 classes would be held only in online format until at least
April 5, 2020. On March 17, 2020, Stevens announced that all
classes would continue in online format through the end of the
Spring 2020 semester.

Ms. Mitelberg is an undergraduate student at Stevens. Ms. Mitelberg
paid Defendant approximately $31,671 in tuition and fees for Spring
Semester 2020. Ms. Mitelberg is pursuing a degree in Cyber Security
at Stevens. The Cyber Security program at Stevens relies
extensively on in-person instruction, laboratory access, meaningful
student presentations, peer collaboration, and access to other
university facilities. None of these resources are available to Ms.
Mitelberg while in-person classes are suspended. Ms. Mitelberg did
not sign up for any online courses. Although Stevens has provided a
partial refund of housing costs, Stevens has not provided Ms.
Mitelberg any refund of tuition or other mandatory fees, despite
the fact that in-person classes have not been held since March 11,
2020. The fees Plaintiff paid for include a $710 General Services
Fee and a $230 Student Activity Fee.

The Plaintiff and Class members are individuals who paid the cost
of tuition and other mandatory fees for the Spring 2020 Semester at
Stevens. Spring Semester 2020 classes at Stevens began on or about
January 21, 2020. Classes and final exams for the semester are
scheduled for end on or around May 18, 2020.

Stevens Institute of Technology is a private research university
with its principal place of business at 1 Castle Point Terrace,
Hoboken, New Jersey. Stevens is one of this country's oldest
technological universities with an enrollment of over 6,000
students. Stevens's campus is located in Hoboken, New Jersey, and
is comprised of four academic schools: the Charles V. Schaefer, Jr.
School of Engineering and Science, the School of Systems and
Enterprises, the School of Business and the College of Arts and
Letters. Stevens offers roughly 29 undergraduate majors as well as
22 Ph.D. programs, master's programs, and 122 certificate
programs.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Philip L. Fraietta, Esq.
          Alec M. Leslie, Esq.
          Sarah N. Westcot, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          888 Seventh Avenue
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (646) 837-7150
          Facsimile: (212) 989-9163
          E-mail: pfraietta@bursor.com
                  aleslie@bursor.com
                  swestcot@bursor.com

SUNRISE SENIOR: Audrey Heredia Seeks to Certify Class
-----------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Audrey Heredia, et al. v.
Sunrise Senior Living LLC, Case No. 8:18-cv-01974 (C.D. Cal.), the
Plaintiff asks the Court for an order granting her motion to
certify class.

The motion is set for hearing on Jan. 29, 2021 at 10:30 AM before
Hon. Judge Josephine L. Staton.

The nature of Suit states Other Statutes - Other Statutory
Actions.

Sunrise Senior is an American operator of retirement homes and
other housing for senior citizens. As of 2017, it operates over 320
assisted living facilities throughout the United States, Canada and
the United Kingdom.[CC]

SWEET HOME: Smith Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Compensation
--------------------------------------------------------
Jaylon Smith, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. SWEET HOME HEALTHCARE OF OHIO, LLC, Case No.
1:21-cv-00183 (N.D. Ohio, Jan. 22, 2021), is brought to challenge
the Defendant's practice by which it willfully violated the Fair
Labor Standards Act as well as the Ohio Constitution, the Ohio
overtime compensation statute and Ohio's Prompt Pay Act.

The Defendant failed to pay the Plaintiff for all of the hours they
were suffered or permitted to work. The Defendant knew that this
work was being performed by the Plaintiff but nevertheless failed
to pay him for those hours in violation of the FLSA and Ohio law.
Even though the Plaintiff submitted his hours on his weekly
timesheets, the Defendant, in violation of the FLSA and Ohio law,
failed to pay the Plaintiff for all of the hours he recorded and
worked. As a result of these practices the Plaintiff was deprived
of overtime pay, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant as a direct support
professional from late-October 2020 until December 4, 2020.

Sweet Home Healthcare of Ohio, LLC is a domestic limited liability
company that provides live-in and live-out home healthcare, skilled
healthcare, companion care, and pharmacy services at facilities
located within this district and division, as well as other
locations throughout Ohio.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Scott D. Perlmuter, Esq.
          4106 Bridge Avenue
          Cleveland, OH 44113
          Phone: 216-308-1522
          Fax: 888-604-9299
          Email: scott@tittlelawfirm.com

               - and -

          Joshua B. Fuchs, Esq.
          THE FUCHS FIRM
          14717 South Woodland Road
          Shaker Heights, OJ 44120
          Phone and Fax: 216-505-7500
          Email: josh@fuchsfirm.com


TERRA TECH: Facing Stanley Putative Nationwide Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
Terra Tech Corp. said in its Form 8-K filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission filed on January 25, 2021, that
the company is a named defendant in a putative, nationwide class
action suit entitled, Stanley, et al. v Terra Tech Corp., et al.

On January 6, 2021, a putative, nationwide class action for
violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (the TCPA),
captioned as Stanley, et al. v Terra Tech Corp., et al., Civil
Action No. 8:21-cv00022, was filed against Terra Tech and MediFarm
LLC in the United States District Court for the Central District of
California.

In the TCPA Action, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated the
TCPA by sending text messages to them and other persons without
consent.

Plaintiffs seek, on behalf of themselves and other purportedly
similarly situated-persons, an unspecified amount of actual and
statutory damages for each alleged violation, declaratory and
injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees and costs.

Terra said, "Although the TCPA Action is at its inception and there
can be no assurance as to the ultimate disposition of the TCPA
Action, Defendants intend to vigorously defend themselves and
oppose class treatment."

Terra Tech Corp. operates as a vertically integrated
cannabis-focused agriculture company. The Company was founded in
2010 and is headquartered in Irvine, California.

TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL: Bid to Dismiss Israeli Law Claims Denied
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE TEVA SECURITIES LITIGATION. THIS DOCUMENT
RELATES TO, Case Nos. 3:17-cv-558 (SRU), 3:19-cv-192 (SRU),
3:19-cv-449 (SRU), 3:19-cv-513 (SRU), 3:19-cv-543 (SRU),
3:19-cv-655 (SRU), 3:19-cv-656 (SRU), 3:19-cv-657 (SRU),
3:19-cv-923 (SRU), 3:19-cv-1167 (SRU), 3:19-cv-1173 (SRU),
3:20-cv-83 (SRU), 3:20-cv-588 (SRU) (D. Conn.), Judge Stefan R.
Underhill of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Connecticut granted the Repose Defendants' partial motion to
dismiss on repose grounds, and denied the Israeli Law Defendants'
partial motion to dismiss Israeli law claims.

Numerous plaintiffs have sued Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd.
("Teva"), and several current and former employees and officers of
that company.  The Plaintiffs allege that Teva violated federal
securities laws by misrepresenting the reasons for its financial
success.  More specifically, they allege that Teva publicly
attributed its success to good business decisions when, in fact,
Teva was thriving because it was artificially and collusively
inflating the prices of certain generic drugs that it
manufactured.

Judge Underhill has consolidated the over two-dozen cases pending
before me related to the same subject matter.  The consolidated
case consists of four putative class actions consolidated for all
purposes and 21 "direct" actions consolidated for all pre-trial
purposes, in which the Plaintiffs have indicated that they will
"opt out" of any class eventually certified.  Although there is
substantial overlap, there is not total overlap of the Defendants
named and claims raised in all the actions.

The Defendants in 12 of the Direct Actions have made limited
motions to dismiss.  More specifically, the Defendants in those 12
Direct Actions ask the Court to dismiss two groups of claims: (1)
those that fall outside applicable statutes of repose, and (2)
those that assert claims under Israeli law.

Motion to Dismiss on Repose Grounds

The Plaintiffs in the nine Direct Actions targeted by the Repose
Defendants' motion to dismiss on repose grounds all filed
complaints between Feb. 7, 2019, and April 29, 2020.  These Repose
Plaintiffs and the Plaintiffs in the lead matter rely on mostly the
same misstatements and omissions.  The earliest misstatement or
omission on which any plaintiff relies--both in the lead matter and
among the Repose Plaintiffs--occurred on Feb. 6, 2014.  The
Exchange Act contains a five-year statute of repose applicable to
claims brought pursuant to Section 10(b).  At issue is whether the
Repose Plaintiffs' Section 10(b) claims, to the extent that they
are based on misstatements or omissions that occurred more than
five years before the Repose Plaintiffs filed their complaints,
should be dismissed.

The Repose Defendants seek to dismiss the Repose Plaintiffs' claims
under the Exchange Act and the Pennsylvania Securities Act of 1972
(the "PSA") "that are based on alleged misstatements or omissions
outside those statutes' five-year repose periods."  They argue that
statutes of repose are not subject to equitable tolling and thus
provide a hard and certain deadline for the filing of claims.  They
note that both the Exchange Act and PSA include five-year statutes
of repose.  They also note that statutes of repose "begin to run
from the date of the alleged misrepresentation or omission."

Thus, the Repose Defendants cite numerous cases in which, they
claim, district courts in the Circuit "dismiss Exchange Act claims
based on alleged misrepresentations or omissions outside the
five-year repose period.  Likewise, they cite cases in which courts
"dismiss or otherwise reject PSA claims that are not brought within
the five-year repose period that applies to claims for civil
liability under the PSA."  Given all that, the Repose Defendants
request that the Court dismisses--as set forth in Appendix A--the
Repose Plaintiffs' Exchange Act and PSA claims insofar as those
claims are premised on untimely-pled misstatements or omissions.

The Repose Plaintiffs see things differently.  The Repose
Plaintiffs agree that the relevant statute of repose limits their
claims to those based on Exchange Act violations that have taken
place less than five years before their complaints were filed.
However, they argue that a "violation" of the Exchange Act occurs
only on the date of a defendant's "last culpable act or omission."
They thus argue that, when a plaintiff alleges that a defendant
violated Section 10(b) through a series of misstatements and
omissions, the Repose Clock begins running only at the last alleged
misstatement or omission.  Thus, a plaintiff can bring a Section
10(b) claim against a defendant based on misstatements and
omissions that occurred more than five years before a complaint's
filing date so long as the most recent misstatement or omission
occurred within the repose period (i.e., more recently than five
years ago).

For several reasons, Judge Underhill holds that the Repose
Plaintiffs have not alleged a claim for "scheme liability" under
Rule 10b-5(a) and (c).  The Repose Plaintiffs have not attempted to
allege a scheme liability claim.  Their equitable arguments are not
enough to contravene what appears to be clear congressional intent.
They do not separately address the Repose Defendants' arguments
regarding the PSA and, instead, focus their arguments solely on the
Exchange Act claims.  Implicitly, then, the Repose Plaintiffs
concede that the Judge's ruling with respect to federal law should
determine the outcome of their state law claims.

Indeed, the Judge's ruling regarding federal law determines the
outcome of the Repose Plaintiffs' PSA claims because both the
respective claims and the applicable statutes of repose appear
identical in the important respects.  First, the plain language of
both Section 504(a) and Section 1658(b)(2) imposes a five-year
statute of repose that runs from a "violation" of the relevant
securities law.  Second, the relevant, substantive law of the PSA
is closely related to Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule
10b-5.  Third, the Judge is aware of no court that has applied the
two statutes of repose in a disparate manner.  Thus, his discussion
of Section 1658(b)(2) with respect to the Repose Plaintiff's
Section 10(b) Exchange Act claims applies equally to Section 504(a)
with respect to the Repose Plaintiffs' PSA claims.

For those reasons, the Judge Underhill grants the Repose
Defendants' partial motion to dismiss on repose grounds.
Accordingly, the Repose Plaintiffs' Exchange Act and PSA claims are
limited temporally as set forth in Appendix A to his Opinion.

Motion to Dismiss Israeli Law Claims

The DAPs in 10 Direct Actions have brought claims under the Israeli
Securities Law, 1968 ("ISL, 1968") in addition to claims under
federal securities laws (and, in some cases, Pennsylvania state
laws).  Judge Underhill refers to those plaintiffs as the "Israeli
Law Plaintiffs."  The Defendants in those 10 actions--the Israeli
Law Defendants--have made a partial motion to dismiss the Israeli
Law Plaintiffs' complaints insofar as they allege violations of
Israeli law.  The Israeli Law Defendants argue that the Court
should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims
brought under Israeli law or, in the alternative, dismiss the
Israeli law claims on forum non conveniens grounds.

The Israeli Law Plaintiffs include a claim under the ISL, 1968
because Teva sells its shares both as American Depositary Shares
("ADS") on the New York Stock Exchange and also as common stock on
the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange ("TASE").  They bought both ADS and
common stock.  Their ISL, 1968 claims are attempts to recover for
the losses they endured on common stock purchased on the TASE.
Initially, the putative class action complaint in the lead matter
in the case contained such an Israeli law claim.  In the SAC,
though, the putative class dropped the Israeli law claim.

The Israeli Law Plaintiffs argue that the Israeli Law Defendants
should be judicially estopped from pursuing their current argument
because they have already successfully argued that the United
States--and, particularly, the District of Connecticut--is a proper
forum to litigate the Israeli law claims at issue.  The Israeli Law
Defendants disagree; they say that they have not taken any
contradictory positions.

Although the Israeli Law Defendants' prior positions are relevant
to aspects of his supplemental jurisdiction and forum non
conveniens analysis, Judge Underhill does not judicially estop the
Israeli Law Defendants from arguing their position because the
elements of judicial estoppel, in his view, have not been met.  He
cannot apply judicial estoppel to bar the Israeli Law Defendants'
argument regarding supplemental jurisdiction because that is a
question of subject matter jurisdiction, an issue he is "required
to consider."  He also does not apply judicial estoppel to bar the
Israeli Law Defendants' argument regarding forum non conveniens.
First, because applying judicial estoppel is "strong medicine," and
it is well within his discretion not to do so.  Second, in his
view, the Israeli Law Defendants' arguments have not been, strictly
speaking, inconsistent.

The Israeli Law Defendants argue that--even if Israeli securities
law closely mirrors or incorporates United States law--the Judge
should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
Israeli law claims because they are simply piggybacked onto an
American securities fraud case.  The Israeli Law Plaintiffs claim
that the Judge should exercise supplemental jurisdiction because no
provision of Section 1367(c) counsels otherwise, and neither do the
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966),
factors.

Judge Underhill exercises supplemental jurisdiction over the
Israeli Law Plaintiffs' Israeli law claims, and would not dismiss
them on the grounds of forum non conveniens.  Put simply, the
Israeli Law Plaintiffs' federal securities law and Israeli
securities law claims seem to him, in every important respect,
identical.  The Israeli Law Defendants' concerns are, essentially,
phantom concerns: The Israeli Law Defendants have not identified a
serious possibility that any significant issue might arise that
would counsel against exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the
Israeli law claims.

Because the Israeli Law Defendants have already acknowledged the
secondary status of the Israeli law claims in the case, it is
difficult to see how the Israeli Law Defendants would be so
prejudiced from having to litigate the claims in the same forum,
the Judge holds.  The issue of comity--whether considered as a part
of the public-interest factors under a forum non conveniens
analysis or an "exceptional circumstance" under Section
1367(c)(4)--does not counsel against exercising jurisdiction over
the Israeli law claims.

Put simply, courts require a strong showing of inconvenience to
dismiss a claim based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens.  In
the case, Judge Underhill concludes that the Israeli Law Defendants
have not come close to clearing that high bar.

For the foregoing reasons, the Repose Defendants' partial motion to
dismiss on repose grounds is granted and the Israeli Law
Defendants' partial motion to dismiss Israeli law claims is denied.
As Judge Underhill has already ordered, the Defendants in all the
Direct Actions will answer or otherwise respond to the operative
complaints in the Direct Actions by 120 days from today, which is
May 24, 2021.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 22, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y44gvlcc from Leagle.com.


TOTAL TRUCKING: Isaacs Seeks FLSA Collective Action Status
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JAMES ISAACS, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. TOTAL TRUCKING,
INC., Case No. 5:20-cv-00996-J (W.D. Okla.), the Parties ask the
Court for an order:

   1. granting conditional certification of the following class
      pursuant to 29 U.S.C. section 216(b):

      "Current and former hourly employees of Total Trucking,
      Inc., who were paid "straight time for overtime" at any
      point from October 1, 2017, to the present."

The Parties agree that, by Total Trucking, Inc.'s agreement to
conditional certification of the FLSA class, Total Trucking, Inc.
does not waive its right to argue that the FLSA class should be
decertified, nor to advance any defenses that it may have to the
substantive claims in this lawsuit.

The Parties have further agreed to and propose the following
schedule:

          DEADLINE                         SUBJECT

10 days from order      The Defendant to provide to Plaintiff's
approving notice to     counsel in Excel (.xlsx) format the
Potential Class         following information regarding all
Members:                Putative Class Members: full name; last
                        known addresses with city, state, and
                        zip Code; last known e-mail addresses
                        (non-company address if applicable);
                        last known telephone numbers; beginning
                        dates of employment; and ending dates of
                        employment (if applicable).

20 days from order      the Plaintiff's counsel shall send a
approving notice to     copy of the Court-approved Notice and
Potential Class         Consent Form to the Putative
Members:                Class Members by first class US Mail,
                        email, and text message. The Plaintiff's
                        counsel may follow-up the mailed Notice
                        and Consent Forms with contact by
                        telephone of former employees or those
                        Putative Class Members whose mailed or
                        emailed contact information is not
                        valid.

60 days from mailing    The Putative Class Members shall have 60
of Notice and Consent   days to return their signed Consent
Forms  to Potential     forms to the Plaintiff's counsel for
Class Members:          filing with the Court.

20 days from mailing    The Plaintiff's counsel is authorized
of Notice and Consent   to mail, email, and text message a
Forms to Potential      second, identical copy of the Notice
Class Members:          and Consent Form to the Putative Class
                        Members reminding them of the deadline
                        for the submission of the Consent forms.

Total Trucking is located in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma and is part of
the Trucking Industry.

A copy of the Parties' Joint motion to certify class dated Jan. 22,
2020 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3coF9mY
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew S. Parmet, Esq.
          PARMET PC
          3 Riverway, Ste. 1910
          Houston, TX 77056
          Telephone: (713) 999 5228
          E-mail: matt@parmet.law

The Defendant is represented by:

          Mark W. Osby, Esq.
          WHEATLEY, SGLER & OSBY, LLC
          501 W. Main
          Yukon, OK 73099
          Telephone: (405) 354-5276
          Facsimile: (405) 350-0537
          E-mail: mosby@yukonlaw.net

U.S. BANK: Deadline for Class Status-Related Bid Set for August 20
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Atefeh YOUSEFI, as an
individual and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. U.S.
BANK NATIONAL ASSOC., et al., Case No. 3:20-cv-01770-BAS-AGS (S.D.
Cal.), the Hon. Judge Andrew G. Schopler entered the scheduling
order, regulating discovery and other pretrial proceedings, as
follows:

   1. Counsel shall refer to the Standing Order for Civil Cases
      for the Honorable Cynthia Bashant, which is accessible via
      the Court’s website at www.casd.uscourts.gov.

   2. Any motion to join other parties, to amend the pleadings,
      or to file additional pleadings shall be filed by June 11,
      2021.

   3  Any motion for class certification must be filed by August
      20, 2021.

   4. The Court defers issuing the remainder of the pretrial
      schedule until the Court has ruled on the motion for class
      certification. Within three days of a ruling on the class
      certification motion, the parties shall contact Judge
      Schopler's chambers to set all remaining deadlines.

US Bank operates as a bank. The Company offers products and
services such as internet and mobile banking, internet bill pay,
credit cards, options for paying bills, online statements, savings
accounts, mortgages, and home loans.

A copy of the Court's order dated Jan. 22, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3pslu9j at no extra charge.[CC]

UNITED STATES: Bid to Extend Response to Class Cert. Bid Stayed
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as DAVIS, et al. v. UNITED
STATES PAROLE COMMISSION, et al., Case No. 1:20-cv-02897 (D.D.C.),
the Hon. Judge Amit P. Mehta entered an order that the Motion for
Extension of Time to Answer Defendants' deadline in filing a
response to Plaintiffs' motion for class certification remains
stayed.

The nature of suit states Prisoner Petitions -- Habeas Corpus -
Mandamus and Other.

The United States Parole Commission is the parole board responsible
for granting or denying parole to, and supervising the parole
releases of, incarcerated individuals who fall under its
jurisdiction.[CC]

UNITED STATES: Dean Volks Seeks to Certify Class of Inmates
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Dorsey Hunt, Henry
Rodriguez, Bryan Hernandez-Sierra, Dean Volks, Henry Richards, Lou
Mejia, Sheldon Palmer, And all others similarly situated, v. Eric
Bradley, Warden USP Canaan, Case No. 3:21-cv-00058-RDM-CA (M.D.
Pa.), the Petitioner Dean Volks asks the Court for an order:

   1. certifying a class of pursuant to Fed.R.Civ. P. 23(b)(2),
      comprising:

      "all current inmates of USP Canaan, and all current
      inmates who are in custody within the Commonwealth of
      Pennsylvania who share the Middle District of Pennsylvania
      as their court of jurisdiction, who have made a request or
      been approved by the Warden of their institution to be
      transferred to home confinement under the CARES Act, but
      were later denied by Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
      staff, other than their Warden;" and

   2. appointing counsel pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(g).

The Petitioners bring this action to challenge the statutory
construction of title 18 United States Code section which pertains
to home confinement placement. The Petitioners allege that the BOP
Central Office has usurped the role of Congress by adding an
additional gatekeeper, and process, to the home confinement
determination. Currently, per statute, the Warden at each
institution is delegated by Congress to determine which inmates in
their custody may be transferred via furlough to home confinement.
Once the Warden approves an inmate for home confinement, then this
information is sent to the Regional Re-Entry Manager in the
inmate's release community for a date of transfer.

The CARES Act of 2020 which passed in response to the current
health pandemic expanded the amount of time that each Warden could
designate inmates to home confinement. The period of time by
statute was 10% of a sentence to a maximum period of 6 months, the
changes enacted by the CARES Act eliminated the maximum period but
kept all other aspects of 18 USC section 3624 intact. The
Petitioners allege that BOP Central Office has violated their Fifth
and Eighth Amendment rights by denying Petitioners' request for
home confinement placement after the Warden had previously approved
their requests. The Petitioners go on to assert that there is no
role for BOP Central Office to play in the home confinement
determination process, per statute, and as a result the Warden's
approval should stand. They seek injunctive and declaratory relief;
no damages are sought, the complaint says.

The Petitioners are prisoners at the Satellite Camp at USP Canaan
in Waymart, Pennsylvania.

The United States Penitentiary, Canaan is a high-security United
States federal prison for male inmates, with a satellite prison
camp for minimum-security male inmates. It is operated by the
Federal Bureau of Prisons, a division of the United States
Department of Justice.

A copy of the Petitioner Dean Volks' motion to certify class dated
Jan. 21, 2020 is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://bit.ly/3qYRqCn at no extra charge.[CC]

UNITED STATES: Dorsey Hunt Seeks to Certify Class of Inmates
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Dorsey Hunt, Henry
Rodriguez, Bryan Hernandez-Sierra, Dean Volks, Henry Richards, Lou
Mejia, Sheldon Palmer, And all others similarly situated, v. Eric
Bradley, Warden USP Canaan, Case No. 3:21-cv-00055-RDM-CA (M.D.
Pa.), the Petitioner Dorsey Hunt asks the Court for an order:

   1. certifying a class of pursuant to Fed.R.Civ. P. 23(b)(2),
      comprising:

      "all current inmates of USP Canaan, and all current
      inmates who are in custody within the Commonwealth of
      Pennsylvania who share the Middle District of Pennsylvania
      as their court of jurisdiction, who have made a request or
      been approved by the Warden of their institution to be
      transferred to home confinement under the CARES Act, but
      were later denied by Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
      staff, other than their Warden;" and

   2. appointing counsel pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(g).

The Petitioners bring this action to challenge the statutory
construction of title 18 United States Code section which pertains
to home confinement placement. The Petitioners allege that the BOP
Central Office has usurped the role of Congress by adding an
additional gatekeeper, and process, to the home confinement
determination. Currently, per statute, the Warden at each
institution is delegated by Congress to determine which inmates in
their custody may be transferred via furlough to home confinement.
Once the Warden approves an inmate for home confinement, then this
information is sent to the Regional Re-Entry Manager in the
inmate's release community for a date of transfer.

The CARES Act of 2020 which passed in response to the current
health pandemic expanded the amount of time that each Warden could
designate inmates to home confinement. The period of time by
statute was 10% of a sentence to a maximum period of 6 months, the
changes enacted by the CARES Act eliminated the maximum period but
kept all other aspects of 18 USC section 3624 intact. The
Petitioners allege that BOP Central Office has violated their Fifth
and Eighth Amendment rights by denying Petitioners' request for
home confinement placement after the Warden had previously approved
their requests. The Petitioners go on to assert that there is no
role for BOP Central Office to play in the home confinement
determination process, per statute, and as a result the Warden's
approval should stand. They seek injunctive and declaratory relief;
no damages are sought, the complaint says.

The Petitioners are prisoners at the Satellite Camp at USP Canaan
in Waymart, Pennsylvania.

The United States Penitentiary, Canaan is a high-security United
States federal prison for male inmates, with a satellite prison
camp for minimum-security male inmates. It is operated by the
Federal Bureau of Prisons, a division of the United States
Department of Justice.

A copy of the Petitioner Dorsey Hunt's motion to certify class
dated Jan. 21, 2020 is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://bit.ly/2M7Qr4b at no extra charge.[CC]

UNITED STATES: Henry Richards Seeks to Certify Class of Inmates
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Dorsey Hunt, Henry
Rodriguez, Bryan Hernandez-Sierra, Dean Volks, Henry Richards, Lou
Mejia, Sheldon Palmer, And all others similarly situated, v. Eric
Bradley, Warden USP Canaan, Case No. 3:21-cv-00059-RDM-CA (M.D.
Pa.), the Petitioner Henry Richards asks the Court for an order:

   1. certifying a class of pursuant to Fed.R.Civ. P. 23(b)(2),
      comprising:

      "all current inmates of USP Canaan, and all current
      inmates who are in custody within the Commonwealth of
      Pennsylvania who share the Middle District of Pennsylvania
      as their court of jurisdiction, who have made a request or
      been approved by the Warden of their institution to be
      transferred to home confinement under the CARES Act, but
      were later denied by Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
      staff, other than their Warden;" and

   2. appointing counsel pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(g).

The Petitioners bring this action to challenge the statutory
construction of title 18 United States Code section which pertains
to home confinement placement. The Petitioners allege that the BOP
Central Office has usurped the role of Congress by adding an
additional gatekeeper, and process, to the home confinement
determination. Currently, per statute, the Warden at each
institution is delegated by Congress to determine which inmates in
their custody may be transferred via furlough to home confinement.
Once the Warden approves an inmate for home confinement, then this
information is sent to the Regional Re-Entry Manager in the
inmate's release community for a date of transfer.

The CARES Act of 2020 which passed in response to the current
health pandemic expanded the amount of time that each Warden could
designate inmates to home confinement. The period of time by
statute was 10% of a sentence to a maximum period of 6 months, the
changes enacted by the CARES Act eliminated the maximum period but
kept all other aspects of 18 USC section 3624 intact. The
Petitioners allege that BOP Central Office has violated their Fifth
and Eighth Amendment rights by denying Petitioners' request for
home confinement placement after the Warden had previously approved
their requests. The Petitioners go on to assert that there is no
role for BOP Central Office to play in the home confinement
determination process, per statute, and as a result the Warden's
approval should stand. They seek injunctive and declaratory relief;
no damages are sought, the complaint says.

The Petitioners are prisoners at the Satellite Camp at USP Canaan
in Waymart, Pennsylvania.

The United States Penitentiary, Canaan is a high-security United
States federal prison for male inmates, with a satellite prison
camp for minimum-security male inmates. It is operated by the
Federal Bureau of Prisons, a division of the United States
Department of Justice.

A copy of the Petitioner Henry Richards' motion to certify class
dated Jan. 21, 2020 is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://bit.ly/3popzLA at no extra charge.[CC]

UNITED STATES: Henry Rodriguez Seeks to Certify Class of Inmates
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Dorsey Hunt, Henry
Rodriguez, Bryan Hernandez-Sierra, Dean Volks, Henry Richards, Lou
Mejia, Sheldon Palmer, And all others similarly situated, v. Eric
Bradley, Warden USP Canaan, Case No. 3:21-cv-00056-RDM-CA (M.D.
Pa.), the Petitioner Rodriguez asks the Court for an order:

   1. certifying a class of pursuant to Fed.R.Civ. P. 23(b)(2),
      comprising:

      "all current inmates of USP Canaan, and all current
      inmates who are in custody within the Commonwealth of
      Pennsylvania who share the Middle District of Pennsylvania
      as their court of jurisdiction, who have made a request or
      been approved by the Warden of their institution to be
      transferred to home confinement under the CARES Act, but
      were later denied by Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
      staff, other than their Warden;" and

   2. appointing counsel pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(g).

The Petitioners bring this action to challenge the statutory
construction of title 18 United States Code section which pertains
to home confinement placement. The Petitioners allege that the BOP
Central Office has usurped the role of Congress by adding an
additional gatekeeper, and process, to the home confinement
determination. Currently, per statute, the Warden at each
institution is delegated by Congress to determine which inmates in
their custody may be transferred via furlough to home confinement.
Once the Warden approves an inmate for home confinement, then this
information is sent to the Regional Re-Entry Manager in the
inmate's release community for a date of transfer.

The CARES Act of 2020 which passed in response to the current
health pandemic expanded the amount of time that each Warden could
designate inmates to home confinement. The period of time by
statute was 10% of a sentence to a maximum period of 6 months, the
changes enacted by the CARES Act eliminated the maximum period but
kept all other aspects of 18 USC section 3624 intact. The
Petitioners allege that BOP Central Office has violated their Fifth
and Eighth Amendment rights by denying Petitioners' request for
home confinement placement after the Warden had previously approved
their requests. The Petitioners go on to assert that there is no
role for BOP Central Office to play in the home confinement
determination process, per statute, and as a result the Warden's
approval should stand. They seek injunctive and declaratory relief;
no damages are sought, the complaint says.

The Petitioners are prisoners at the Satellite Camp at USP Canaan
in Waymart, Pennsylvania.

The United States Penitentiary, Canaan is a high-security United
States federal prison for male inmates, with a satellite prison
camp for minimum-security male inmates. It is operated by the
Federal Bureau of Prisons, a division of the United States
Department of Justice.

A copy of Mr. Rodriguez's motion to certify class dated Jan. 21,
2020 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3ab6c2c
at no extra charge.[CC]

UNITED STATES: Hernandez-Sierra Seeks to Certify Class of Inmates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Dorsey Hunt, Henry
Rodriguez, Bryan Hernandez-Sierra, Dean Volks, Henry Richards, Lou
Mejia, Sheldon Palmer, And all others similarly situated, v. Eric
Bradley, Warden USP Canaan, Case No. 3:21-cv-00057-RDM-CA (M.D.
Pa.), the Petitioner Bryan Hernandez-Sierra asks the Court for an
order:

   1. certifying a class of pursuant to Fed.R.Civ. P. 23(b)(2),
      comprising:

      "all current inmates of USP Canaan, and all current
      inmates who are in custody within the Commonwealth of
      Pennsylvania who share the Middle District of Pennsylvania
      as their court of jurisdiction, who have made a request or
      been approved by the Warden of their institution to be
      transferred to home confinement under the CARES Act, but
      were later denied by Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
      staff, other than their Warden;" and

   2. appointing counsel pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(g).

The Petitioners bring this action to challenge the statutory
construction of title 18 United States Code section which pertains
to home confinement placement. The Petitioners allege that the BOP
Central Office has usurped the role of Congress by adding an
additional gatekeeper, and process, to the home confinement
determination. Currently, per statute, the Warden at each
institution is delegated by Congress to determine which inmates in
their custody may be transferred via furlough to home confinement.
Once the Warden approves an inmate for home confinement, then this
information is sent to the Regional Re-Entry Manager in the
inmate's release community for a date of transfer.

The CARES Act of 2020 which passed in response to the current
health pandemic expanded the amount of time that each Warden could
designate inmates to home confinement. The period of time by
statute was 10% of a sentence to a maximum period of 6 months, the
changes enacted by the CARES Act eliminated the maximum period but
kept all other aspects of 18 USC section 3624 intact. The
Petitioners allege that BOP Central Office has violated their Fifth
and Eighth Amendment rights by denying Petitioners' request for
home confinement placement after the Warden had previously approved
their requests. The Petitioners go on to assert that there is no
role for BOP Central Office to play in the home confinement
determination process, per statute, and as a result the Warden's
approval should stand. They seek injunctive and declaratory relief;
no damages are sought, the complaint says.

The Petitioners are prisoners at the Satellite Camp at USP Canaan
in Waymart, Pennsylvania.

The United States Penitentiary, Canaan is a high-security United
States federal prison for male inmates, with a satellite prison
camp for minimum-security male inmates. It is operated by the
Federal Bureau of Prisons, a division of the United States
Department of Justice.

A copy of Petitioner Bryan Hernandez-Sierra's motion to certify
class dated Jan. 21, 2020 is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://bit.ly/2Yeuh2C at no extra charge.[CC]

UNITED STATES: Lou Mejia Seeks to Certify Class of Inmates
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Dorsey Hunt, Henry
Rodriguez, Bryan Hernandez-Sierra, Dean Volks, Henry Richards, Lou
Mejia, Sheldon Palmer, And all others similarly situated, v. Eric
Bradley, Warden USP Canaan, Case No. 3:21-cv-00060-RDM-CA (M.D.
Pa.), the Petitioner Lou Mejia asks the Court for an order:

   1. certifying a class of pursuant to Fed.R.Civ. P. 23(b)(2),
      comprising:

      "all current inmates of USP Canaan, and all current
      inmates who are in custody within the Commonwealth of
      Pennsylvania who share the Middle District of Pennsylvania
      as their court of jurisdiction, who have made a request or
      been approved by the Warden of their institution to be
      transferred to home confinement under the CARES Act, but
      were later denied by Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
      staff, other than their Warden;" and

   2. appointing counsel pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(g).

The Petitioners bring this action to challenge the statutory
construction of title 18 United States Code section which pertains
to home confinement placement. The Petitioners allege that the BOP
Central Office has usurped the role of Congress by adding an
additional gatekeeper, and process, to the home confinement
determination. Currently, per statute, the Warden at each
institution is delegated by Congress to determine which inmates in
their custody may be transferred via furlough to home confinement.
Once the Warden approves an inmate for home confinement, then this
information is sent to the Regional Re-Entry Manager in the
inmate's release community for a date of transfer.

The CARES Act of 2020 which passed in response to the current
health pandemic expanded the amount of time that each Warden could
designate inmates to home confinement. The period of time by
statute was 10% of a sentence to a maximum period of 6 months, the
changes enacted by the CARES Act eliminated the maximum period but
kept all other aspects of 18 USC section 3624 intact. The
Petitioners allege that BOP Central Office has violated their Fifth
and Eighth Amendment rights by denying Petitioners' request for
home confinement placement after the Warden had previously approved
their requests. The Petitioners go on to assert that there is no
role for BOP Central Office to play in the home confinement
determination process, per statute, and as a result the Warden's
approval should stand. They seek injunctive and declaratory relief;
no damages are sought, the complaint says.

The Petitioners are prisoners at the Satellite Camp at USP Canaan
in Waymart, Pennsylvania.

The United States Penitentiary, Canaan is a high-security United
States federal prison for male inmates, with a satellite prison
camp for minimum-security male inmates. It is operated by the
Federal Bureau of Prisons, a division of the United States
Department of Justice.

A copy of Petitioner Mejia's motion to certify class dated Jan. 21,
2020 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2M8x6Qf
at no extra charge.[CC]

UNITED STATES: Peltier Suit Seeks to Certify Settlement Class
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as LESLIE ANN WILKIE PELTIER,
et al., v. SCOTT DE LA VEGA, ACTING SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, et
al., Case No. 1:20-cv-03775-TFH (D.D.C.), the Plaintiffs ask the
Court for an order:

   1. certifying plaintiff class pursuant to fed. r. civ. p.
      23(b)(3) for settlement purposes only, defined as follows:

      "a) all Original Individual Beneficiaries, defined as: (i)
      the 21,268 individuals determined by Interior, pursuant to
      the 1971 Distribution Act and its implementing
      regulations, to be eligible to share in the 1964 Award;
      and, (ii) the 33,584 individuals determined by Interior,
      pursuant to the 1982 Distribution Act and its implementing
      regulations, to be eligible to share in the 1980 Award; b)
      all Legal Representatives of Settlement Class Members,
      defined as persons or entities selected by Settlement
      Class Members or appointed, retained or approved under
      applicable federal, state, or tribal law to represent the
      Settlement Class member, for purposes of any matter
      relating to this Class Action; c) all First-Line Heirs,
      defined as, in the absence of applicable federal, state or
      tribal law to the contrary, the living spouse, if any, of
      a deceased Original Individual Beneficiary, and if there
      is no living spouse, the oldest living child of the
      deceased Original Individual Beneficiary; and d) all
      Second-Line Heirs, defined as, in those instances in which
      there are no First-Line Heirs, a next closest living heir
      of a deceased Original Individual Beneficiary as
      determined in accordance with applicable federal, state,
      or tribal law and as designated by the Settlement
      Administrator;"

      The Settlement Agreement further provides that "Settlement
      Class Members" shall mean all Individual Plaintiffs in the
      Settlement Class who do not Exclude/Opt-out, as defined
      in the Settlement Agreement, of the Settlement Class.

   2. appointing class representatives and class counsel;

   3. preliminarily approving the settlement agreement;

   4. appointing a settlement administrator; and

   5. approving notices and a claim form.

The Settlement Agreement:

   a. The total amount of Settlement Proceeds, $59 million, is
      preliminarily allocated as follows:

      -- The total amount allocated for Settlement Class Members
         is $40,987,112, which includes:

         $1,063,400 for Settlement Class Members who shared
         in the 1964 Award;

         $33,748,992 for Settlement Class Members who shared
         in the 1980 Award as members of a Tribal beneficiary;
         and

         $6,174,720 for Members who shared in the 1980 Award
         as members of the NMLDs group.

   b. These preliminary allocations in turn result in the
      following minimum Settlement Proceeds payments as follows:

      -- $50.00 for each Settlement Class Member who shared in
         the 1964 Award ($1,063,400 ÷ 21,268);

      -- $1,152.00 for each Settlement Class Member who shared
         in the 1980 Award as a member of a Tribal beneficiary
         ($33,748,992 ÷ 29,296); and

      -- $1,440.00 for each Settlement Class Member who shared
         in the 1980 Award as a member of the NMLDs group
         ($6,174,720 ÷ 4,288).

   c. These estimated payments to individual Settlement Class
      Members are minimum amounts which could increase due to
      Exclusions / Opt-outs.

   d. The total amount allocated to the Tribal Plaintiffs in the
      CFC Companion Case is $8,437,376.00, which includes:

      -- $987,047.11 for the Chippewa Cree Tribe;

      -- $6,580,723.39 for the Turtle Mountain Band;

      -- $541,550.27 for the Little Shell Tribe; and

      -- $328,055.23 for the White Earth Band.

   e. The total amount allocated for Class Representative
      Service Awards is $170,000.00 ($2,000 for each of the
      eighty-five Class Representatives or Named Representatives
      who are serving or have served in this action or in the
      CFC Companion Case).

   f. The total amount allocated for Class Counsel Fees,
      Expenses and Costs is $6,405,512.00.

   g. The total amount allocated for the Settlement
      Administrator's Fees, Expenses and Costs is $3,000,000.

As set forth in the First Amended Complaint, this is an action to
redress breaches of trust by the Defendants with respect to two
Judgment Awards of the Indian Claims Commission (ICC), for claims
brought in the ICC by the Pembina Band of Chippewa Indians. The
first Judgment Award was made in 1964 (1964 Award), and the second
in 1978 (1980 Award), and they are known commonly and collectively
as the "Pembina Judgment Fund" (PJF). The Defendants are the
trustee for the PJF.

The Plaintiffs are the more than 38,000 individuals, as determined
by the Defendant the U.S. Department of the Interior, to be
beneficiaries of the PJF. Due to the Defendants' breaches of trust,
including failure to account for and mismanagement of the PJF. The
Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief and money damages in amounts
less than $10,000 per individual beneficiary claimant's share.

The Department of the Interior (DOI) conserves and manages the
Nation's natural resources and cultural heritage for the benefit
and enjoyment of the American people, provides scientific and other
information about natural resources and natural hazards to address
societal challenges and create opportunities for the to help them
prosper.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class dated Jan. 22,
2020 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/39sWER9
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs represented by:

          Melody L. McCoy, Esq.
          Kim Jerome Gottschalk, Esq.
          Native American Rights Fund
          1506 Broadway
          Boulder, CO 80302
          Telephone: (720) 647-9691
          Facsimile: (303) 443-7776
          E-mail: mmccoy@narf.org
                  jeronimo@narf.org

UNITED STATES: Sheldon Palmer Seeks to Certify Class of Inmates
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Dorsey Hunt, Henry
Rodriguez, Bryan Hernandez-Sierra, Dean Volks, Henry Richards, Lou
Mejia, Sheldon Palmer, And all others similarly situated, v. Eric
Bradley, Warden USP Canaan, Case No. 3:21-cv-00061-RDM-CA (M.D.
Pa.), the Petitioner Sheldon Palmer asks the Court for an order:

   1. certifying a class of pursuant to Fed.R.Civ. P. 23(b)(2),
      comprising:

      "all current inmates of USP Canaan, and all current
      inmates who are in custody within the Commonwealth of
      Pennsylvania who share the Middle District of Pennsylvania
      as their court of jurisdiction, who have made a request or
      been approved by the Warden of their institution to be
      transferred to home confinement under the CARES Act, but
      were later denied by Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
      staff, other than their Warden;" and

   2. appointing counsel pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(g).

The Petitioners bring this action to challenge the statutory
construction of title 18 United States Code section which pertains
to home confinement placement. The Petitioners allege that the BOP
Central Office has usurped the role of Congress by adding an
additional gatekeeper, and process, to the home confinement
determination. Currently, per statute, the Warden at each
institution is delegated by Congress to determine which inmates in
their custody may be transferred via furlough to home confinement.
Once the Warden approves an inmate for home confinement, then this
information is sent to the Regional Re-Entry Manager in the
inmate's release community for a date of transfer.

The CARES Act of 2020 which passed in response to the current
health pandemic expanded the amount of time that each Warden could
designate inmates to home confinement. The period of time by
statute was 10% of a sentence to a maximum period of 6 months, the
changes enacted by the CARES Act eliminated the maximum period but
kept all other aspects of 18 USC section 3624 intact. The
Petitioners allege that BOP Central Office has violated their Fifth
and Eighth Amendment rights by denying Petitioners' request for
home confinement placement after the Warden had previously approved
their requests. The Petitioners go on to assert that there is no
role for BOP Central Office to play in the home confinement
determination process, per statute, and as a result the Warden's
approval should stand. They seek injunctive and declaratory relief;
no damages are sought, the complaint says.

The Petitioners are prisoners at the Satellite Camp at USP Canaan
in Waymart, Pennsylvania.

The United States Penitentiary, Canaan is a high-security United
States federal prison for male inmates, with a satellite prison
camp for minimum-security male inmates. It is operated by the
Federal Bureau of Prisons, a division of the United States
Department of Justice.

A copy of the Petitioner Sheldon Palmer's motion to certify class
dated Jan. 21, 2020 is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://bit.ly/3omhPZd at no extra charge.[CC]

VOYAGER THERAPEUTICS: Faces Karp Suit Over 23.21% Stock Price Drop
------------------------------------------------------------------
SELWYN KARP, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. VOYAGER THERAPEUTICS, INC., STEVEN M. PAUL, G. ANDRE
TURENNE, JANE HENDERSON, ALLISON DORVAL, DINAH SAH, and OMAR
KHWAJA, Case No. 1:21-cv-00381 (E.D.N.Y., Jan. 22, 2021) is a
federal securities class action on behalf of a class consisting of
all persons other than the Defendants who purchased or otherwise
acquired Voyager securities between June 1, 2017 and November 9,
2020, both dates inclusive (the "Class Period"), seeking to recover
damages caused by the Defendants' violations of the federal
securities laws and to pursue remedies under Sections 10(b) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, against the Company
and certain of its top officials.

Voyager, a clinical-stage gene therapy company, focuses on the
development of treatments for patients suffering from severe
neurological diseases. Included in the Company's preclinical
programs is VY-HTT01 for Huntington's Disease. Voyager represent
that VY-HTT01 is intended to work by knocking down HTT expression
in neurons and astrocytes in the striatum and cortex (discrete
regions in the brain that can be targeted with adeno-associated
virus ("AAV") gene therapy delivered directly into the brain),
thereby reducing the level of toxicity associated with mutated
protein in these brain regions, and slowing the progression of
cognitive and motor symptoms.

According to the complaint, on June 1, 2017, Voyager issued a press
release announcing that it had selected VY-HTT01 as a lead clinical
candidate for the treatment of Huntington's disease. The press
release also indicated that, "[p]reclinical pharmacology and
toxicology studies [were] underway with VY-HTT01 to support filing
of an investigational new drug (IND) application in 2018." In
September 2020, Voyager submitted an investigational new drug
("IND") application for VY-HTT01 for the treatment of Huntington's
disease to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration ("FDA").

Throughout the Class Period, the Defendants allegedly made
materially false and misleading statements regarding the Company's
business, operational and compliance policies. Specifically,
Defendants made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose that the Company's VY-HTT01 IND submission to the FDA
lacked key information regarding certain chemistry, manufacturing
and controls ("CMC") matters, including drug-device compatibility
and drug substance and product characterization, the suit says.

On October 12, 2020, Voyager issued a press release disclosing that
it "has received feedback from the FDA on the IND submission for
VY-HTT01 for the treatment of Huntington's disease." Specifically,
Voyager advised investors that it "has been notified that the IND
was placed on clinical hold pending the resolution of certain
chemistry, manufacturing and controls (CMC) matters."

Then, on November 9, 2020, Voyager issued a press release
announcing the Company's third quarter 2020 financial results and
corporate updates. In the press release, the Company disclosed
that, with respect to its IND application for VY-HTT01, "Voyager
recently received written feedback from the FDA requesting
additional information on specific CMC topics, including
drug-device compatibility and drug substance and product
characterization."

On this news, Voyager's stock price fell $2.60 per share, or
23.21%, to close at $8.60 per share on November 10, 2020. As a
result of Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the
precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's
securities, the Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered
significant losses and damages, the complaint added.

The Plaintiff acquired Voyager securities at artificially inflated
prices during the Class Period and was damaged upon the revelation
of the alleged corrective disclosures.

Voyager was founded in 2013 and is headquartered in Cambridge,
Massachusetts. Voyager's securities trade on the NASDAQ under the
ticker symbol "VYGR." The Individual Defendants are former officers
of the company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
          J. Alexander Hood II, Esq.
          Patrick V. Dahlstrom, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 661-1100
          Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
          E-mail: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                  ahood@pomlaw.com
                  pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          Shaye Fuchsm Esq.
          37 Arrowhead Lane
          Lawrence, NY 11559
          Telephone: (516) 509-8755
          E-mail: sfuchsesq@aol.com

VXI GLOBAL: Court Junks Bufford Class Action
--------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Ayana Bufford v. VXI
Global Solutions LLC, Case No. 4:20-cv-00253-RCC (D. Ariz.), the
Hon. Judge Raner C. Collins entered an order:

   1. granting the Defendant VXI VXI Motion to Dismiss and
      Compel Arbitration;

   2. denying Plaintiff Ayana Bufford's Motion for
      Conditional Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) Class
      Certification and to Authorize Notice to Similarly
      Situated Persons Under 29 U.S.C. section 6 216(b) and for
      Expedited Discovery;

   3. directing the Clerk of Court to docket accordingly and
      close the case file in this matter.

The Court says that it will not permit collective certification or
notification and will dismiss this action because the Plaintiff and
opt-in Plaintiffs are not capable of representing the class because
the claims are wholly subject to arbitration. The Plaintiffs have
no interest in the outcome of a collective lawsuit because their
individual claims cannot be litigated. So, despite the lenient
first-stage standard for certification, based on the facts before
the Court. The Court cannot conclude that there is any evidence
that any putative opt-in Plaintiff would not be subject to the same
Delegation Provision as Plaintiffs Bufford, Dugan, and Grayson. To
provide notice to potential opt-in litigants at this time would put
the proverbial cart in front of the horse and allow Bufford, Dugan,
and Grayson -- who cannot litigate their claims in this Court
represent the collective -- to notice individuals who, based on the
practices of VXI and the allegations contained in the affidavits in
this case, will also be subject to arbitration. Allowing this would
not serve the interests of judicial economy. On balance, the Court
will deny Bufford's motion to certify and provide notice.

A copy of the Court's order dated Jan. 22, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3t6bhSh at no extra charge.[CC]

WALMART INC: FLSA Class in Fortney Suit Conditionally Certified
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DAVID FORTNEY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. WALMART, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-4209 (S.D. Ohio), Judge Sarah D.
Morrison of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio, Eastern Division, granted in part and denied in part the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional Certification, Expedited Opt-In
Discovery, and Court-Supervised Notice to Potential Opt-In
Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs Fortney and Eli Triplett have styled the suit as a
collective action brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, 29 U.S.C. Section 201, et seq., as amended ("FLSA"), and as a
Rule 23 class action under Ohio's wage and hour laws.  The
Plaintiffs are both former hourly-paid, non-exempt employees of
Walmart.

Walmart, an Arkansas company, owns and operates more than 3,000
retail store locations in the United States, many of which offer
automotive maintenance and mechanic services.  For at least a
portion of their employment, the Plaintiffs worked as automotive
technicians at the Walmart store in Cambridge, Ohio.

The Plaintiffs allege that Walmart has a policy of requiring work
(responding to work related text messages, Facebook messages, phone
calls, and other communications) while its employees are on unpaid
meal breaks.  According to them, an employee on their meal break is
required to respond to work-related inquiries, but is not paid any
wages for the work done during a meal break—including overtime
wages, to the extent the meal-time work causes the employee to work
more than 40 hours.

The Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on Sept. 21, 2019.  Thirteen
individuals later filed consent forms seeking to join the action as
an opt-in party plaintiff.

The Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion on March 13, 2020,
requesting conditional certification of the following FLSA
collective class: All individuals employed at Walmart Tire & Auto
locations in positions, job titles, job codes, job classifications
of Automotive Technician and all other similar nomenclature
(including, but not limited to, Tire & Lube Specialists and other
positions in Walmart Tire & Auto Locations) performing
substantially identical functions and/or duties, currently or
formerly employed by Defendant Walmart, Inc. and/or its
predecessors or successors in interest in the United States between
3 years prior to the filing of this suit and the date of final
judgment in this matter. This includes all Walmart Tire & Auto
employees who are subject to Defendant Walmart's meal break
policy.

The Plaintiffs' Motion is supported by declarations from each of
the consenting individuals, which represent that the declarant was:
(i) employed by Walmart as an automotive technician; (ii) docked
pay each day for a meal period; (iii) frequently interrupted during
unpaid meal periods by other Walmart employees calling, texting, or
asking questions regarding the status of ongoing automotive service
projects, the location of parts or supplies in the shop, or how to
perform certain automotive services and what services to perform;
and (iv) not compensated for all time worked, including overtime.

Thereafter, the parties jointly moved for two extensions of time to
permit Walmart to conduct limited depositions of Mr. Fortney, Mr.
Triplett, and Chad Palmer, one of the opt-in plaintiffs.  Walmart
agreed to toll the statute of limitations on FLSA claims due to the
delay in conducting the limited discovery.  It filed portions of
those depositions, along with the declaration of its employee Kevin
Scott McCarter and copies of certain Walmart policies in support of
its Memorandum in Opposition.

Judge Morrison finds that the Plaintiffs have met their burden for
conditional certification of the proposed FLSA class.  First,
despite Walmart's assertion to the contrary, the Plaintiffs have
indeed alleged a national practice connecting the proposed class:
that Walmart required its automotive technicians to be responsive
to work-related inquiries during unpaid meal periods, resulting in
unpaid overtime work.  The Plaintiff is not required to show that
the "single, FLSA-violating policy" is in writing.  Second, and
relatedly, Walmart's formal written policies prohibiting meal
period interruptions or off-the-clock work do not prevent
conditional certification.  Finally, Walmart's argument that the
proposed class is unmanageable, by virtue of its size and failure
to distinguish between part-time and full-time employees, is
premature.

Next, the Plaintiffs move the Court to approve their proposed
notice to class members and to order expedited opt-in discovery.

The Judge declines to do either.  As to the proposed notice,
Walmart notes that the Plaintiffs have not provided several details
relevant to the notice—including, importantly, how it will be
sent and the length of the notice period.  Walmart further notes
several objections to the notice contents, including to the
description of the claims.  The Plaintiffs did not address
Walmart's objections in their Reply.  The Judge ordered the parties
to submit a joint proposed notice, along with a plan for
distributing such notice, within 14 days of the date of her Order.

Further, Walmart has agreed to toll the statute of limitations on
FLSA claims resulting from delays in producing information
responsive to the Plaintiffs' opt-in discovery request.  An
expedited response is, therefore, unnecessary.  The Judge ordered
Walmart to respond to the Plaintiffs' discovery request within 30
days of the date of her Order.  If the plan to distribute the
notice does not include delivery by email, Walmart may then move
the Court to modify the Plaintiffs' opt-in discovery request to
exclude extraneous contact information.

Lastly, the Judge notes that the Plaintiffs filed Objections to the
Magistrate Judge's Dec. 8, 2020 Opinion and Order, in which Walmart
was granted leave to amend its answer.  The Plaintiffs' Objections
were filed on Dec. 23, 2020--15 days after the Magistrate Judge's
order was entered.  The Judge declines to consider them and
overruled the Plaintiffs' Objections as untimely.  She holds that
the Plaintiffs' Objections were not timely, and they did not move
to extend the deadline to file or seek leave to file untimely
objections.

For the reasons she set forth, Judge Morrison granted in part and
denied in part the Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional
Certification, Expedited Opt-In Discovery, and Court-Supervised
Notice to Potential Opt-In Plaintiffs.  She granted the Motion to
the extent it seeks conditional certification of the proposed FLSA
class.  She otherwise denied the Motion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 22, 2021 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yypqe5vu from Leagle.com.


WASHINGTON: Fowler Suit Gets Clarification of Class Definition
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MICKEY FOWLER, LESIA
MAURER, and a class of similarly situated individuals, v. TRACY
GUERIN, Director of the Washington State Department of Retirement
Systems, Case No. 3:15-cv-05367-BHS (W.D. Wash.), the Hon. Judge
Benjamin H. Settle entered an order:

   1. denying the Plaintiffs' motion for permanent injunction
      without prejudice;

   2. granting the Plaintiffs' motion to clarify or modify class
      definition; and

   3. granting the Director's motion for leave to amend answer.

The Plaintiffs are public school teachers who participate in
Washington's Teachers' Retirement System (TRS), a public retirement
system managed by the Washington State Department of Retirement
Services (DRS). The TRS is comprised of three separate retirement
plans: Plan 1, Plan 2, and Plan 3. The Plaintiffs are current
members of Plan 3 and former members of Plan 2. As members of Plan
2, the Plaintiffs made contributions to their Plan 2 accounts from
each paycheck. DRS tracked the contributions and accumulated
interest in individual accounts. All contributions were transferred
to a state-managed comingled trust fund for investment purposes.
The Plaintiffs' contributions to Plan 2 accrued interest at a rate
specified by DRS -- 5.5%, compounded quarterly. DRS used the
quarter's ending balance to calculate interest. In February 2009,
the Plaintiffs challenged DRS's method of calculating interest on
funds transferred between TRS accounts in state court, continuing
litigation initiated in 2005 by another plaintiff who settled with
DRS.

The Plaintiffs request that the Court clarify that these teachers
are included in the class definition or modify the class definition
to state "the class is defined to include all teachers who
transferred from TRS Plan 2 to TRS Plan 3 prior to January 20,
2002." The Director responds that, in the parties' data exchanges,
she has excluded data relative to "inactive" teachers because the
class definition includes only "active and retired" teachers and
she “could not agree to disclose personal information regarding
teachers outside the class definition." However, the Director does
not oppose modifying the class definition or providing the relevant
data following the modification. The Director proposes using "all
persons” rather than "all active and retired TRS members" and
using "during the class period (January 1, 1996 to January 20, 5
2002)" rather than "prior to January 20, 2002" to avoid any
ambiguity.

The Court takes the Director at her word that she does not object
to modifying the class definition. The Court understands the
parties' dispute about the prior proceedings to be part of their
broader dispute about the scope of the Ninth Circuit's mandate
rather than critical to deciding Plaintiffs' motion to clarify or
modify the class definition. As it appears that the Director's
proposed phrase identifying participants is broader than
Plaintiffs', the Court understands the parties to be in agreement
about the narrower phrase. The Director also suggests using "during
the class period (January 1, 1996 to January 20, 2002)," but does
not explain why this modification is necessary, and the Plaintiffs'
proposed phrase "prior to January 20, 2002" is consistent with the
definition the Court previously approved. Therefore, the
Plaintiffs' motion is granted and the class definition is modified
to:"[a]ll teachers who transferred from TRS Plan 2 to TRS Plan 3v
prior to January 20, 2002," the Court says.

A copy of the Court's order dated Jan. 22, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3pDtmoG at no extra charge.[CC]

WELLS FARGO: Bid to Compel Arbitration in Marselian Suit Granted
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SETO MARSELIAN, et al., Plaintiffs v. WELLS FARGO AND
COMPANY, et al., Defendants, Case No. 20-cv-03166-HSG (N.D. Cal.),
Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California granted the motion to compel
arbitration filed by Defendants Wells Fargo & Co. and Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A.

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress enacted the
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No.
116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (Mar. 27, 2020) ("CARES Act").  As relevant
to these two cases, the CARES Act amended the Small Business Act
("SBA"), and established the Paycheck Protection Program ("PPP") to
help small businesses meet payroll and cover expenses.  Under the
PPP, participating lenders were authorized to make loans to
eligible small businesses, and the loans, in turn, were guaranteed
by the SBA. See id.

Plaintiff Marselian filed the putative class action against the
Defendants.  He alleges that (1) he submitted a PPP loan
application to the Defendants; and (2) at least at the time he
filed the complaint, he had not received PPP loan proceeds from
them.   
The Plaintiff alleges that the delay was due to the Defendants'
decision to "prioritize loan applications from larger companies
seeking higher loan amounts," rather than processing them "on a
first-come, first-served basis."  Doing so, he alleges, benefited
the Defendants who could "maximize" their commissions if they
"processed the largest dollar value loans" first.  But when the
Defendants announced their participation in the PPP, they allegedly
"represented that they would focus their efforts on nonprofits and
businesses with fewer than 50 employees.

The Plaintiff explains that had the Defendants disclosed how they
were actually processing the PPP loans, he would have submitted PPP
applications to other financial institutions.  He further alleges
that as a result of Wells Fargo's unfair business practices,
thousands of small businesses that were entitled to loans under the
PPP did not receive the critical loan proceeds they needed while
most at risk.

Based on these facts, the Plaintiff asserts causes of action for
violation of California Civil Code Section 1710; violation of
California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"); violation of
California's False Advertising Law; unjust enrichment; and
accounting.

The Plaintiff also seeks to represent a class defined as all
individuals and small businesses in the United States that met the
criteria for receiving a loan under the PPP and who timely applied
for a PPP loan through Wells Fargo, but whose applications were not
processed and/or who were not issued loans by Wells Fargo.

The Defendants now move to compel arbitration, or in the
alternative to dismiss the claims under Rule 12(b)(6).

The Court held a hearing on Dec. 10, 2020.

In support of the motion to compel arbitration, the Defendants
contend that the Plaintiff signed a Wells Fargo Business Account
Application, and in doing so, agreed to be bound by the Wells Fargo
account agreement that includes the Arbitration Agreement.  They
also provided him with a "New Account Kit," that includes the
account agreement and arbitration agreement.

The Plaintiff's response is twofold.  First, he challenges that he
entered into an arbitration agreement at all.  The Plaintiff
contends that the Defendant Wells Fargo & Co., a holding company,
is not a signatory to the arbitration agreement, and as a separate
entity cannot compel arbitration.  And he urges that in any event,
the Defendants have not established that he had notice of the
arbitration agreement.  Second, the Plaintiff contends that the
arbitration agreement is not otherwise enforceable.

Judge Gilliam holds that the contractual nature of the Business
Account Application is obvious on its face and its language is
clear.  On page five of the agreement, it states in bold that the
Plaintiff "confirms his receipt of, and agreement to be bound by,
the Bank's applicable account agreement that includes the
Arbitration Agreement."  The Defendants have therefore established
that the parties formed an agreement to arbitrate. And because the
arbitrability of the dispute is itself a question for an
arbitrator, it is neither necessary nor appropriate for the Judge
to consider the parties' positions regarding the scope and validity
of the arbitration agreement.

Accordingly, Judge Gilliam granted the motion to compel arbitration
and stayed the case pending completion of arbitration.  He directed
the parties to file a joint status report regarding the status of
the arbitration proceeding 120 days from the date of his Order and
every 120 days thereafter unless otherwise ordered.  The clerk is
directed to administratively close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 20, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y367wft8 from Leagle.com.


WELLS FARGO: Cora Seeks to Certify Class of Operation Employees
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as TONIKA NADINE CORA,
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., a national association; WELLS FARGO &
COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,
Case No. 5:19-cv-00109-TJH-SP (C.D. Cal.), the Plaintiff will move
the Court on April 12, 2021, for an order:

   1. certifying a class of:

      "all individuals employed by WELLS FARGO in hourly-paid or
      non-exempt positions of Operations Processor 2 or
      Collector 3 in California at any time since December 3,
      2014, to the date the Court grants certification of any
      claim in this matter".

      Excluded from the Class are all unique individuals who
      signed arbitration agreements and unique individuals who
      have not signed severance agreements containing general
      releases.;

   2. appointing herself as representative of the proposed
      classes or later proposed and approved by the Court and
      any other sub-class the Court may devise;

   3. appointing Kane Moon and H. Scott Leviant of Moon & Yang,
      APC, as Class Counsel pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g);
      and

   4. issuing such other Orders as necessary to effectuate the
      Court’s certification Order.

This is wage and hour class action lawsuit involving roughly 314
hourly employees that worked at Wells Fargo debt collection call
centers in California, in the automotive lending division. The
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants pressured employees to enter
scheduled time on the time reports to avoid paying overtime and
pressured employees to falsely record compliant meal periods when
call center operations interfered with timely and compliant meal
periods.

Wells Fargo & Company is an American multinational financial
services company with corporate headquarters in San Francisco,
California, operational headquarters in Manhattan, and managerial
offices throughout the United States and overseas.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated Jan. 22,
2020 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/36pJpyH
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kane Moon, Esq.
          H. Scott Leviant, Esq.
          MOON & YANG, APC
          1055 W. Seventh St., Suite 1880
          Los Angeles, CA 90017
          Telephone: (213) 232-3128
          Facsimile: (213) 232-3125
          E-mail: kane.moon@moonyanglaw.com
                  scott.leviant@moonyanglaw.comc

WOODMAN'S FOOD: Hunter Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime for Store Staff
-----------------------------------------------------------------
MARY HUNTER, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated
v. WOODMAN'S FOOD MARKET, INC. Case No. 2:21-cv-00094 (E.D. Jan.
22, 2021) is a collective and class action brought by the Plaintiff
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and the
Wisconsin's Wage Payment and Collection Laws for unpaid overtime
compensation, unpaid agreed upon wages, liquidated damages, costs,
attorneys' fees, declaratory and/or injunctive relief, and/or any
such other relief the Court may deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff contends that Defendant operated (and continues to
operate) an unlawful compensation system that deprived and failed
to compensate her and all other current and former hourly-paid,
non-exempt employees for all hours worked and work performed each
workweek, including at an overtime rate of pay for each hour worked
in excess of 40 hours in a workweek, by shaving time (via
electronic time-clock rounding) from her and all other hourly-paid,
non-exempt employees' weekly timesheets for pre-shift and in-shift
hours worked and/or work performed, to their detriment and to the
benefit of the Defendant.

During the three year period immediately preceding the filing of
this Complaint, the Plaintiff worked as an hourly-paid, non-exempt
employee in the position of stocker at the Defendant's Madison,
Wisconsin store.

Woodman's Food is a privately owned grocery store chain
headquartered in Janesville, Wisconsin. The Defendant owned,
operated, and managed multiple physical stores in the States of
Illinois and Wisconsin.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James A. Walcheske, Esq.
          Scott S. Luzi, Esq.
          David M. Potteiger, Esq.
          WALCHESKE & LUZI, LLC
          235 N. Executive Drive, Suite 240
          Brookfield, Wisconsin 53005
          Telephone: (262) 780-1953
          Facsimile: (262) 565-6469
          E-mail: jwalcheske@walcheskeluzi.com
                  sluzi@walcheskeluzi.com
                  dpotteiger@walcheskeluzi.com

YRC INC: Alvarez Appeals Ruling in Labor Suit to 9th Circuit
------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Felipe Alvarez filed an appeal from a court ruling
entered in the lawsuit entitled FELIPE ALVAREZ, et al. v. YRC,
INC., et al., Case No. 2:12-cv-01374-TJH-E, in the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California, Los Angeles.

Plaintiffs Felipe Alvarez and Jerald Schroeder were employed by YRC
at YRC's Tracey, California, terminal. On December 14, 2011,
Alvarez filed a putative class action against YRC, asserting
various wage and hour claims. On June 7, 2016, Schroeder filed a
second putative class action against YRC alleging claims under
California's Unfair Competition Law and claims for violations of
the California Labor Code.

Mr. Alvarez is seeking an appeal to review the Court's order dated
November 17, 2020, denying his and Schroeder's motion for partial
summary judgment. It is further ordered that YRC's motion for
summary judgment be, and hereby is, granted as to all of Alvarez's
claims and as to Schroeder's claims for second meal break and third
rest break violations.

The appellate case is captioned as Felipe Alvarez, et al. v. YRC
Inc., et al., Case No. 20-56350, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Dec. 18, 2020.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Appellant Felipe Alvarez Mediation Questionnaire was due on
December 28, 2020;

   -- Transcript shall be ordered by January 15, 2021;

   -- Transcript is due on February 16, 2021;

   -- Appellant Felipe Alvarez opening brief is due on March 26,
2021;

   -- Appellees YRC Inc., YRC Worldwide Inc. and Yellow Roadway
Corporation answering brief is due on April 26, 2021; and

  -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after service
of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant FELIPE ALVAREZ, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, is represented by:

          Jordan Domingo Bello, Esq.
          Joseph Lavi, Esq.
          LAVI & EBRAHIMIAN LLP
          8889 W. Olympic Blvd.
          Beverly Hills, CA 90211
          Telephone: (323) 653-0086
          E-mail: jbello@lelawfirm.com
                  jlavi@lelawfirm.com  

               - and -

          David M. Derubertis, Esq.
          THE DERUBERTIS LAW FIRM, APC
          4219 Coldwater Canyon Avenue
          Studio City, CA 91604
          Telephone: (818) 761-2322
          E-mail: david@derubertislaw.com   

               - and -

          David Mara, Esq.
          Jill Marie Vecchi, Esq.
          MARA LAW FIRM PC
          2650 Camino Del Rio North, Suite 205
          San Diego, CA 92108
          Telephone: (619) 234-2833
          E-mail: dmara@maralawfirm.com
                  jvecchi@maralawfirm.com

Defendants-Appellees YRC INC., DBA YRC Freight, YRC WORLDWIDE INC.,
and YELLOW ROADWAY CORPORATION are represented by:

          Lyn Agre, Esq.
          KASOWITZ BENSON TORRES LLP
          101 California Street, Suite 3000
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 421-6140
          E-mail: lagre@kasowitz.com

               - and -

          Ellen M. Bronchetti, Esq.
          DLA PIPER LLP (US)
          555 Mission Street
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Telephone: (415) 615-6052
          E-mail: ebronchetti@mwe.com

               - and -

          Pankit Doshi, Esq.
          Ronald J. Holland, Esq.
          MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY
          415 Mission Street, Suite 5600
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Telephone: (628) 218-3812
          E-mail: pdoshi@mwe.com
                  rjholland@mwe.com   

               - and -

          Alexandra Howard Hemenway, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
          2425 East Camelback Road
          Phoenix, AZ 85016
          Telephone: (602) 474-3652
          E-mail: ahemenway@littler.com  

               - and -

          Daniel Saunders, Esq.
          KASOWITZ BENSON TORRES LLP
          2029 Century Park East, Suite 2000
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (424) 288-7904   
          E-mail: dsaunders@kasowitz.com


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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania,
USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2021. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The CAR subscription rate is $775 for six months delivered via
e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each. For subscription information, contact
Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.

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