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              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Friday, December 18, 2020, Vol. 22, No. 253

                            Headlines

3M COMPANY: AFFF Products Contaminate Groundwater, Suit Alleges
5TH & TAYLOR: To File Amended Complaint, Drops Class Status Bid
A CAB: Court Denies Murray's Petition for Writ of Prohibition
ALASKA AIRLINES: Clarkson's Request for Document Subpoena Denied
ALIBABA GROUP: Faces Romnek Securities Suit Over ADS Price Drop

AMERICAN HONDA: Schepler, et al. Seek to Certify Classes
AMNEAL PHARMA: Rhodes Class Action Proceedings Remain Stayed
AMNEAL PHARMA: Xyrem(R) Related Suits Transferred to New Jersey
AMNEAL PHARMACEUTICALS: Summary Judgment Bids in Opana Suit Pending
ASPEN MANAGEMENT: Property Managers Class Conditionally Certified

BEYOND MEAT: Bid to Dismiss Tran Putative Class Suit Granted
BEYOND MEAT: California Court Dismisses Securities Class Action
BIGLARI HOLDINGS: Shareholders' Class Suit Concluded
BOILERMAKER-BLACKSMITH: Ordered to Show Docs of Deal in Matrix Suit
BOLLA OPERATING: Dismissal of Benitez Suit Over Unpaid Wage Upheld

CALIFORNIA: Court Dismisses Polk Class Suit with Prejudice
CALL-A-HEAD CORP: $7.14M Settlement in Vargas Has Final Approval
CALL-A-HEAD CORP: Claims of Esquivel in Vargas Suit Dismissed
CANADA: Toronto Police Responds to G20 Class Action Settlement
CCBCC INC: Wachtelhausen Sues Over Unpaid Wages for Laborers

CENTERRA GROUP: Williams ERISA Suit Claims Breach of Fiduciary Duty
CHAMPION PETFOODS: Denial of Class Cert. in Reitman Suit Upheld
CHICAGO TEACHERS: 7th Cir. Affirms Summary Judgment in Ocol Suit
CHURCHILL DOWNS: Court Resolves Fleming Matter re Kater Suit Deal
CLAL INSURANCE: Participates in Petition for Class Action Cert.

COFFMAN SPECIALTIES: Refugio Suit Moved to San Diego County Court
CRICKET WIRELESS: Wins Bid to Compel Thomas to Arbitrate Claims
CROWN BATTERY: Tallman Sues Over Manufacturing Staff's Unpaid Wages
CVS HEALTH: Court Seeks Supplemental Briefing on Perez Settlement
CVS HEALTH: Trial in Corcoran Class Suit to Start in 2021

DARKTRACE INC: $76,800 Settlement in Der-Hacopian Wins Final Nod
DELAWARE, OH: Loses Bid to Stay Discovery in Seattle House Suit
ECOLAB INC: OxyCide Causes Injury to Hospital Staff, Adams Alleges
ECOLAB INC: OxyCide Causes Injury to Hospital Staff, Anderson Says
ECOLAB INC: OxyCide Causes Injury to Hospital Staff, Baugh Alleges

ECOLAB INC: OxyCide Causes Injury to Hospital Staff, Bielefeld Says
ECOLAB INC: OxyCide Causes Injury to Hospital Staff, Broussard Says
ECOLAB INC: OxyCide Causes Injury to Hospital Staff, Burton Alleges
ECOLAB INC: OxyCide Causes Injury to Hospital Staff, Hernandez Says
ECOLAB INC: OxyCide Causes Injury to Hospital Staff, Howard Alleges

ECOLAB INC: OxyCide Causes Injury to Hospital Staff, Hubbard Says
ECOLAB INC: OxyCide Causes Injury to Hospital Staff, McMullan Says
ECOLAB INC: OxyCide Causes Injury to Hospital Staff, Neal Alleges
ECOLAB INC: OxyCide Causes Injury to Hospital Staff, Rios Alleges
ECOLAB INC: OxyCide Causes Injury to Hospital Staff, Sonneborn Says

ECOLAB INC: OxyCide Causes Injury to Hospital Staff, Tilley Alleges
ECOLAB INC: OxyCide Causes Injury to Hospital Staff, Walker Alleges
ECOLAB INC: OxyCide Causes Injury to Hospital Staff, Yasurek Says
ECOLAB INC: OxyCide Cleaners Injure Hospital Staff, McCullough Says
EQUITY BANCSHARES: N.Y. Court Dismisses Securities Class Action

EVOLUS INC: Faces Shareholder Class Action Over Jeuveau
FACEBOOK INC: Faces Klein Suit Over Social Network Market Monopoly
FLAGSTAR BANK: Must Pay $8.1-Mil. in Restitution to Kivett Class
FLEX LTD: Wins Bid to Dismiss Kipling Securities Class Suit
GOOGLE LLC: Discovery in Digital Advertising Antitrust Suit Stayed

GREENSKY INC: Appeal in Consolidated Putative Class Suit Pending
GTS TRANSPORTATION: Wins Dismissal of Plestsov Underpaid Wage Suit
HALLSONS OF LEBANON: Neal Withdraws Bid to Send Notice to Class
HAMILTON BEACH: Stockholder Class Action Voluntarily Dismissed
HERTZ GLOBAL: Appeal in Ramirez Suit Still Stayed

HF FOODS GROUP: Consolidated Mendoza Class Action Underway
HOUSTON NW: S.D. Texas Remands Riley ERISA Suit to State Court
HYCROFT MINING: Delaware Putative Class Action Settled
IOU GENERAL: Class Certification Denial in Premier Paving Reversed
JACKSON COUNTY, MO: Whitworth Bid to Certify Class Denied as Moot

KEYSTONE RV: Loses Bid to Sever Misjoined Plaintiffs in Cole Suit
KFORCE INC: $790K Settlement in Smith Suit Has Prelim. Approval
LABOR SOURCE: BluSky Loses Partial Bid to Dismiss Murphy Suit
LAKEVIEW LOAN: Court Dismisses Austin's Claims Against LoanCare
LANDCARE USA: Disqualification of 2 Law Firms in Cortez Reversed

LANNETT CO: To Respond to Doc Request Nos. 16-19 in Utesch Suit
LOGICBIO THERAPEUTICS: Lead Plaintiff Bid in Afinowicz Suit Pending
LORAC COSMETICS: Williams ADA Suit Dismissed Without Prejudice
M/Y LIONESS: Lindsay Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages for Seafarers
MARVEL & MALONEY: Faces Ryniec Suit Over Unlawful Debt Collection

MAUSER USA: Court Extends Stay of Valenzuela Suit for 120 Days
MCCARTHY BURGESS: Florida Court Strikes Martin's Class Action
MEDICAL MANAGEMENT: Settlement in Metzler FLSA Suit Gets Partial OK
MERCEDES DIAZ: Faces Legaspi Suit Over Unlawful Labor Practices
MERIT ENERGY: Little Land Sues Over Non-Payment of Gas Royalties

MYLAN NV: New York Securities Class Action Underway
MYLAN NV: PERS Mississippi Putative Class Suit Ongoing
NATIONAL CREDIT: Settlement in Cortes Suit Wins Final Approval
NATIONWIDE CREDIT: Faces Reno FDCPA Class Suit in D. New Jersey
NCAA: Manassa Sues Over Discrimination of Black Student-Athletes

NIKOLA CORPORATION: UCL Violations-Related Suits Underway
OCALA, FL: Court Grants McArdle's Bid for Production of Documents
OKLAHOMA: Court Dismisses Without Prejudice White Prisoner Suit
PATENAUDE & FELIX: Lindsey Sues Over Illegal Debt Collection
PELOTON INTERACTIVE: Deaf Can't Access Fitness App, Sullivan Says

PENSKE TRUCK: Zamora Sues Over Unpaid Wages for Auto Technicians
PHOENIX, AZ: Motion for Class Certification Denied as Moot
PRATT LLC: Faces Mowry Employment Suit in Calif. State Court
PRAXAIR INC: Garcia Seeks to Certify Settlement Class
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS: S.C. Asks Fed. Gov't.'s Take on ERISA Suit

ROBINHOOD FINANCIAL: Pinchasov Class Suit Removed to S.D. Florida
SANTANDER HOLDINGS: Bid to Nix Ruf-Tepper Class Suit Pending
SANTANDER HOLDINGS: Dismissal of Ponsa-Rabell Suit Under Appeal
SANTANDER HOLDINGS: Jan. 12 Final Settlement Approval Hearing  
SELANGOR: Class Action Mulled v. Water Agencies Over Water Cuts

SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING: Wenzel Sues Over Drop in Share Price
SERCO INC: Faces 401(k) Plan Class Action
SERENITY TRANSPORTATION: $50K SCI Settlement in Johnson Suit OK'd
SPLUNK INC: Faces Pavlova-Coleman Suit Over Share Price Drop
STATE FARM: Motion to Dismiss Class Action Claim Partly Denied

STERLING BANCORP: Bid to Nix Okla. Police Retirement Suit Pending
STILLMAN LAW: Lahu Files Suit in D.N.J. Over Violation of FDCPA
SUPER BREAD: FLSA Class Conditionally Certified in Fuentes Suit
SWITCH INC: Hearing on Bid to Dismiss Suit Set for January 2021
SYNCHRONOSS TECHNOLOGIES: Class Suit by ERS Hawaii Underway

TEXAS: Denial of Bid to Certify Class in J.A. v. TEA Recommended
TRN MILWAUKEE: Smith Seeks Unpaid OT for Nurses Under FLSA & WWPCL
TURQUOISE HILL: Faces Lio Securities Suit Over Drop in Share Price
TWITTER INC: Consolidated Securities Suit Tossed; Amendment OK'd
TWO BROS SCRAP: Further Depositions of Plaintiffs Allowed in Molina

UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Court Wants Driver to File Amended Suit
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Misleads Investors in IPO, Messinger Suit Says
UGI STORAGE: Albrecht Appeals Ruling to Penn. Supreme Court
UNITED STATES: Treasury, IRS Ordered to Send Stimulus Checks
UNITI GROUP: Bid to Dismiss Putative Securities Class Suit Pending

USA TECHNOLOGIES: Court Grants Bid for Final Settlement Approval
USA TECHNOLOGIES: Shareholder Suit Ongoing in Chester County Court
VAIL RESORTS: Faces Quint Labor Suit Over Unpaid Wages & Overtime
VERRICA PHARMACEUTICALS: Potter Suit Ongoing in Pennsylvania
VIACOMCBS INC: Bid to Dismiss CBS Merger-Related Suit Pending

VIACOMCBS INC: Bid to Toss CalPERS Suit Pending
VIACOMCBS INC: Construction Laborers Pension Trust Suit Underway
WAITR HOLDINGS: Class Certification Hearing Set for July 2021
WAITR HOLDINGS: Welch and Bates Suits Consolidated
WALGREEN CO: Mejia Class Has 60 Days to Reply to Approval of Deal

WELLS FARGO: Ohio Court Narrows Claims in Tanner Mortgage Suit
WINNING CONNECTIONS: Faces Weisberg Suit Over Unsolicited Messages
WYNN RESORTS: Bid to Dismiss Ferris Putative Class Action Pending
ZEBRA TECHNOLOGIES: Averts Securities Class Action
ZYNERBA PHARMACEUTICALS: Bid to Nix Zygel Related Suit Pending


                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Ampco-Pittsburgh Has 5,868 Claims at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Ashland Global Had 49,000 Open Claims at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Hercules LLC Had 12,000 Open Claims at Sept. 30


                            *********

3M COMPANY: AFFF Products Contaminate Groundwater, Suit Alleges
---------------------------------------------------------------
SYBRAND R. VANDER DUSSEN and JENISE KAY VANDER DUSSEN, d/b/a RAJEN
DAIRY; RAJEN DAIRY, LLC; SYBRAND J. VANDER DUSSEN; JONATHAN E.
VANDER DUSSEN; and DANIEL W. VANDER DUSSEN, v. THE 3M COMPANY,
f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., et al., Case No.
2:20-cv-04191-RMG (D.S.C., Dec. 3, 2020), arises from the alleged
foreseeable contamination of groundwater by the use of aqueous
film-forming foam (AFFF) products that contained per- and
poly-fluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), including perfluorooctane
sulfonate (PFOS) and perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA).

The Plaintiffs also bring this action against the United States of
America, the United States Department of Defense, and the United
States Air Force to recover past and future damages caused by the
improper disposal of contaminants and hazardous substances at
Cannon Air Force Base (CAFB), which has contaminated and polluted
public and private water sources for area residents, including
Plaintiffs, with PFAS, including but not limited to PFOA and PFOS.
CAFB is a United States Air Force Air Combat Command installation
located in Curry County, New Mexico.

The Plaintiffs allege negligence, nuisance, trespass, failure to
warn, and inverse condemnation to recover just compensation as
authorized under the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution as a result of the United States’ unlawful taking of
Plaintiffs' property through its unlawful conduct at CAFB. As a
result of the United States' improper conduct, the Plaintiffs'
property, including the soil and drinking water, has been
contaminated with PFAS, which has rendered their property and dairy
business worthless. The Plaintiffs have been significantly damaged
in their business and property as a direct and proximate result of
the Defendants' conduct.

PFOS and PFOA are fluorosurfactants that repel oil, grease, and
water. PFOS, PFOA, and/or their chemical precursors, are or were
components of AFFF products, which are firefighting suppressant
agents used in training and firefighting activities for fighting
Class B fires. Class B fires include fires involving hydrocarbon
fuels such as petroleum or other flammable liquids.

PFOS and PFOA are mobile, persist indefinitely in the environment,
bioaccumulate in individual organisms and humans, and biomagnify up
the food chain. PFOS and PFOA are also associated with multiple and
significant adverse health effects in humans, including but not
limited to kidney cancer, testicular cancer, high cholesterol,
thyroid disease, ulcerative colitis, and pregnancy-induced
hypertension.

According to the complaint, at various times from the 1960s through
today, the Defendants designed, manufactured, marketed,
distributed, and/or sold AFFF products containing PFOS, PFOA,
and/or their chemical precursors, and/or designed, manufactured,
marketed, distributed, and/or sold the fluorosurfactants and/or
perfluorinated chemicals (PFCs) contained in AFFF (collectively,
AFFF/Component Products), says the complaint.

Since its creation in the 1960s, AFFF designed, manufactured,
marketed, distributed, and/or sold by Defendants, and/or that
contained fluorosurfactants and/or PFCs designed, manufactured,
marketed, distributed, and/or sold by the Defendants, used as
directed and intended by the Defendants, and subsequently released
into the environment during fire protection, training, and response
activities, resulting in widespread PFAS contamination, the
Plaintiffs contend.

The Vander Dussen case is being consolidated in MDL 2873, RE:
AQUEOUS FILM-FORMING FOAMS PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION.

The Defendants include AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC., AMEREX
CORPORATION, ARKEMA INC., individually and as successor in interest
to Atofina S.A., ARCHROMA MANAGEMENT LLC, BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT
COMPANY, CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION, individually and as successor
in interest to Kidde-Fenwal, Inc., CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS INC.,
CHEMGUARD INC. CHEMICALS, INC., CLARIANT CORPORATION, individually
and as successor in interest to Sandoz Chemical Corporation,
CORTEVA, INC., individually and as successor in interest to DuPont
Chemical Solutions Enterprise, DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC., DUPONT DE
NEMOURS INC., individually and as successor in interest to DuPont
Chemical Solutions Enterprise, DYNAX CORPORATION, E. I. DUPONT DE
NEMOURS AND COMPANY, individually and as successor in interest to
DuPont Chemical Solutions Enterprise, KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.,
individually and as successor in interest to Kidde Fire Fighting,
Inc., NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY, THE CHEMOURS COMPANY,
individually and as successor in interest to DuPont Chemical
Solutions Enterprise, THE CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC, individually
and as successor in interest to DuPont Chemical Solutions
Enterprise, TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS, LP, individually and as successor
in interest to The Ansul Company, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, and UNITED STATES AIR FORCE.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Paul J. Napoli, Esq.
          Andrew W. Croner, Esq.
          Patrick J. Lanciotti, Esq.
          NAPOLI SHKOLNIK PLLC
          360 Lexington Avenue, 11th
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 397-1000
          E-mail: pnapoli@napolilaw.com
                  acroner@napolilaw.com
                  planciotti@napolilaw.com

               - and -

          Pete Domenici, Esq.
          DOMENICI LAW FIRM, PC
          320 Gold Avenue, SW, Ste. 1000
          Albuquerque, NM 87102

5TH & TAYLOR: To File Amended Complaint, Drops Class Status Bid
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as KAYLEIGH WALDER, ANDREA
LARSON, KAITLIN WRIGHT and EMILY OWENS, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, v. 5TH & TAYLOR, L.L.C., Case No.
3:20-cv-00828 (M.D. Tenn.), the Hon. Judge Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr.
entered an order:

   1. approving the filing of an Amended Complaint;

   2. granting the Plaintiff's Notice of Withdrawal of Their
      Motion for Conditional Class Certification and for the
      Issuance of Court-Supervised Notice and Their Memorandum
      of Law in Support of this Motion; and

   3. denying as moot the Joint Motion to Extend Deadlines for
      filing a responsive pleading.

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 9, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3gH98qn at no extra charge.[CC]

A CAB: Court Denies Murray's Petition for Writ of Prohibition
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Supreme Court of Nevada issued an order denying petition for
writ of prohibition or mandamus in the lawsuit entitled MICHAEL
MURRAY; MICHAEL RENO; GERRIE WEAVER; MARCO BAKHTIARI; AND MICHAEL
BRAUCHLE, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
Petitioners v. THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF
NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE KATHLEEN
E. DELANEY, DISTRICT JUDGE, Respondents, and JASMINKA DUBRIC; A
CAB, LLC; A CAB SERIES LLC; EMPLOYEE LEASING COMPANY; AND CREIGHTON
J NADY, Real Parties in Interest, Case No. 82126 (Nev.).

The original petition for a writ of prohibition seeks to enjoin the
district court in the underlying Minimum Wage Act action, Dubric v.
A-Cab, et al, Case No. A-15-721063-C, from proceeding with any NRCP
23 class action settlement of claims that were already granted
class action certification and proceeded to final judgment in a
separate case, Michael Murray v. A Cab Taxi Service LLC and A Cab
LLC, Case No. A-12-669926-C.

The Petitioners also seek a writ of mandamus directing the district
court to allow their counsel to opt out of Dubric on behalf of all
Murray class members. They have moved to stay the district court
proceedings pending the Supreme Court's consideration of this writ
petition, real parties in interest have filed oppositions thereto,
and petitioners filed a reply. Real parties in interest have filed
answers to the petition for a writ of prohibition or mandamus, as
directed by the Supreme Court.

Having reviewed the petition, answers, accompanying appendices, and
affidavit from the Petitioners' counsel regarding the continuance
of the final fairness hearing, the Supreme Court concludes that its
extraordinary intervention is not warranted at this time, citing
Pan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d 840,
844 (2004).

The Supreme Court rules that the Petitioners will be allowed to
participate in the final fairness hearing, and if aggrieved, the
Petitioners may appeal from any judgment following that hearing.

Accordingly, the petition for writ of prohibition or mandamus is
denied. In light of this decision, the Petitioners' motion for a
stay is denied as moot.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Dec. 10, 2020, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y8wal8ct from Leagle.com.


ALASKA AIRLINES: Clarkson's Request for Document Subpoena Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CASEY CLARKSON, Plaintiff v. ALASKA AIRLINES, INC.,
HORIZON AIR INDUSTRIES, INC., and ALASKA AIRLINES PENSION/BENEFITS
ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-CV-0005-TOR
(E.D. Wash.), Judge Thomas O. Rice of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Washington (i) denied the Plaintiff's
Motion Requesting a Document Subpoena, and (ii) denied as moot the
Plaintiff's Amended Motion for Protective Order.

The matter arises from Plaintiff Clarkson's class action filed
against the Defendants on Jan. 7, 2019.  The Amended Complaint
alleges, inter alia, that the Defendants' employment policies
regarding military leave violated the Uniformed Services Employment
and Reemployment Rights Act.  Specifically, Count IV alleges that
the Defendants failed to pay regular wages to employees who take
short-term military leave while continuing to pay regular wages to
employees who take other forms of short-term leave.

With respect to Count IV, the Court certified a Paid Leave Class on
Aug. 4, 2020, and defined the Paid Leave Class (Count IV Only) as
follows:

     All current or former Alaska or Horizon pilots who have
     taken short-term military leave from October 10, 2004
     through the date of the judgment.

The Plaintiff has not identified how many members are in the Class.
The motion now before the Court seeks a judge-signed subpoena
ordering the disclosure of United States military records for
members of the Paid Leave Class in order to calculate the pay
differentials alleged in Count IV.  The Amended Motion for
Protective Order seeks to allow the parties to share information
with the U.S. Federal Government, the Internal Revenue Service, and
the state tax authorities.

Plaintiff Clarkson moves the Court for a Rule 45 subpoena signed by
a judge pursuant to 5 U.S.C. Section 522a of the Privacy Act to
obtain agency records held by the United States Department of
Defense and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service.  His
proposed subpoena seeks United States military records from an
unspecified number of Paid Leave Class members to estimate the
Defendants' liability as to Count IV.

Specifically, the Plaintiff requests the class members' military
entry dates, branches of service, their Point Credit Accounting
Record System information, their W-2s, periods of military service
based on military ranks, military pay charts, and dates of military
duty.  He asserts the information is necessary to determine the
difference in pay that the class members received while on
short-term military leave compared to the pay they allegedly should
have received.  The Defendants do not oppose the motion.
Judge Rice agrees the information may be relevant to the
Plaintiff's claims at some point but does not find the request from
a third party proportional at this time.  The Plaintiff has access
to Casey Clarkson's military history and related information but
has not explained why the information is insufficient at this stage
in the litigation for estimating the pay differential.  The
Plaintiff also has access to the Paid Leave Class members' contact
information, but has not explained whether he has attempted to
contact those individuals directly to obtain the requested
information or why contacting them directly is unfeasible.  The
Plaintiff's relative access to the relevant information and his
available resources weigh against ordering disclosure.

Judge Rice says that it is also unclear at this stage how many
members of the Class will be moving forward with the litigation
because the Plaintiff has not submitted any names or even a raw
number of how many members are included the Class.  It appears the
putative class members still may opt out of the case.  Instead, the
Plaintiff merely states that an exhibit listing each member's
first, middle, and last name, date of birth, and social security
number will accompany the subpoena.  The Judge is not inclined to
order disclosure of records for individuals who choose not to move
forward with the litigation; their information would not be
important in resolving the liability issue of Count IV.  Having
considered the applicable proportionality factors, the Judge finds
that the Plaintiff cannot meet the relevancy standard under Rule
26.

Likewise, the Judge finds that the Plaintiff cannot meet the
heightened standard under Perry v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
which requires him to demonstrate that his need for the information
outweighs the potential harm to the subjects of the disclosure.
The Plaintiff's request triggers legitimate privacy concerns,
particularly where some of the subjects of the disclosure may not
be parties to this case.  The Plaintiff has not persuaded the Court
that his need for the information outweighs these concerns at this
time.

Accordingly, Judge Rice denied the Plaintiff's Motion Requesting a
Document Subpoena, and denied as moot his Amended Motion for
Protective Order.  The District Court Executive is directed to
enter the Order and furnish copies to the counsel.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 9, 2020 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y84skhhq from Leagle.com.


ALIBABA GROUP: Faces Romnek Securities Suit Over ADS Price Drop
---------------------------------------------------------------
ROBERT ROMNEK, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. ALIBABA GROUP HOLDING LIMITED, DANIEL ZHANG, and MAGGIE
WU, Case No. 1:20-cv-10267 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 4, 2020) is a federal
securities class action on behalf of a class consisting of all
persons and entities that purchased or otherwise acquired Alibaba
securities between July 20, 2020 and November 3, 2020, inclusive,
pursuing claims against the the Defendants under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.

Throughout the Class period, the Defendants made materially false
and/or misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose
material adverse facts about the Company’s business, operations,
and prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to
investors that Ant Group did not meet listing qualifications or
disclosure requirements for certain material matters, says the
complaint.

On July 20, 2020, Ant Group announced that it had begun the process
of a concurrent initial public offering on the Shanghai and Hong
Kong stock exchanges. On October 26, 2020, Ant Group priced its IPO
and was set to raise $34.5 billion, making it the largest public
offering in history.

On November 2, 2020, Financial Times reported that Chinese
regulators had met with Ant Group's controller Jack Ma, executive
chairman Eric Jing, and Chief Executive Officer Simon Hu. The
article stated that, though regulators did not provide details,
"the Chinese word used to describe the interview -- yuetan --
generally indicates a dressing down by authorities." The article
also included a statement from Ant Group that it will "implement
the meeting opinions in depth."

On November 3, 2020, the IPO was suspended because Ant Group "may
not meet listing qualifications or disclosure requirements due to
material matters" related to the meeting with regulators the
previous day and "the recent changes in the Fintech regulatory
environment."

On this news, Alibaba's American Depository Share (ADS) price fell
$25.27 per share, or 8%, to close at $285.57 per share on November
3, 2020, on unusually heavy trading volume.

As a result of Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the
precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's
securities, Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered
significant losses and damages.

The Plaintiff purchased Alibaba securities during the Class period,
and suffered damages as a result of the alleged federal securities
law violations and false and/or misleading statements and/or
material omissions, the suit says.

Alibaba is an online and mobile commerce company. Alibaba owns a
33% equity interest in Ant Small and Micro Financial Services Group
Co., Ltd. (Ant Group), a financial technology company that is best
known for operating Alipay, one of the largest mobile and online
payments platforms. The Individual Defendants are officers and
directors of the company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
          J. Alexander Hood II, Esq.
          Patrick V. Dahlstrom, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          600 Third Avenue
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 661-1100
          Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
          E-mail: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                  ahood@pomlaw.com
                  pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          Peretz Bronstein, Esq.
          BRONSTEIN, GEWIRTZ &
          GROSSMAN, LLC
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4600
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 697-6484
          Facsimile: (212) 697-7296
          E-mail: peretz@bgandg.com

AMERICAN HONDA: Schepler, et al. Seek to Certify Classes
--------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as BILL SCHEPLER and ADRIAN
GARCIA, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., Case No.
2:18-cv-06043-GW-AFM (C.D. Cal., Filed July 11, 2018), the
Plaintiffs will move the Court on June 14, 2021, to enter an
order:

   1. certifying these Classes and naming Plaintiffs as
      Class representatives for their respective Classes:

      Illinois Class (Represented by Mr. Schepler):

           "All current owners and lessees of a 2017 or 2018
            model year Honda CR-Vs 1 in Illinois;"

      California Classes (Represented by Mr. Garcia):

           "All current owners and lessees of a 2017 or 2018
           model year Honda CR-Vs in California;" and

      California Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) Sub-Class:

           "All members of the California Class who are
           "consumers" within the meaning of California Civil
           Code section 1761(d)."

           Excluded from all of the above Classes are the
           following individuals and/or entities: the Court, and
           all Court personnel involved in the handling of his
           case; Defendant, American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
           ("AHM" or "Defendant") and its parent company,
           subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, directors, and
           any entity in which AHM has a controlling interest;
           all individuals who timely elect to be excluded from
           this proceeding using the correct protocol for opting
           out; and any attorneys or other employees of any law
           firms hired, retained, and/or appointed by or on
           behalf of the named Plaintiffs to represent them
           and/or any proposed Class members or proposed Class
           in this lawsuit.; and

   2. appointing Shepherd, Finkelman, Miller & Shah, LLP, the
      Murphy Law Firm, and The Frasher Law Firm, P.C., as Class
      Counsel.

Mr. Schepler asserts claims for breach of express warranty under
Illinois law on behalf of the Illinois Class; and violation of the
Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act
(ICFA), on behalf of the Illinois Class. Mr. Garcia asserts claims
for breach of express warranty under California law, (b) violations
of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL), and the False Advertising Law,
on behalf of the California Class; and violations of the CLRA, on
behalf of the California CLRA Sub-Class.

American Honda is a North American subsidiary of the Honda Motor
Company, Ltd. It was founded in 1959.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' renewed motion for class certification
dated Dec. 8, 2020 is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://bit.ly/3abZJG9 at no extra charge.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class, are:

          Kolin Tang, Esq.
          James C. Shah, Esq.
          Natalie Finkelman Bennett, Esq.
          SHEPHERD, FINKELMAN, MILLER & SHAH, LLP
          1401 Dove Street, Suite 540
          Newport Beach, CA 92660
          Telephone: (323) 510-4060
          Facsimile: (866) 300-7367
          E-mail: ktang@sfmslaw.com
                  jshah@sfmslaw.com
                  nfinkelman@sfmslaw.com

               - and -

          Robert W. Murphy, Esq.
          MURPHY LAW FIRM
          1212 SE 2nd Ave.
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33316
          Telephone (954) 763-8660
          Facsimile: (854) 763-8607
          E-mail: rwmurphy@lawfirmmurphy.com

               - and -

          Ryan R. Frasher, Esq.
          THE FRASHER LAW FIRM, P.C.
          3209 W. Smith Valley Road, Ste. 253
          Greenwood, IN 46142
          Telephone (317) 300-8844
          Facsimile: (317) 218-4501
          E-mail: rfrasher@frasherlaw.com

AMNEAL PHARMA: Rhodes Class Action Proceedings Remain Stayed
------------------------------------------------------------
Amneal Pharmaceuticals, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 6, 2020,
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2020, that all
activity in the class action suit entitled, Rhodes, et al., v.
Rhodes Technologies, Inc., et al., No. 3:19-cv-00885, had been
stayed by order of the multi-district litigation court.

In October 2019, the Company, Amneal, Amneal Pharmaceuticals of New
York, LLC, and Impax were served with a putative class action
complaint, which also names as defendants numerous manufacturers of
opioid products (and certain corporate officers thereof), filed in
the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Tennessee by several individuals who allegedly purchased
prescription opioid medication in cash and/or with an insurance
co-payment (Rhodes, et al., v. Rhodes Technologies, Inc., et al.,
No. 3:19-cv-885).

Plaintiffs claim that they would not have purchased these
prescription opioid products had defendants not allegedly
misrepresented the products' "addiction propensities," and thereby
suffered economic loss.

Plaintiffs purport to represent a nationwide class of all
individuals who directly or indirectly purchased prescription
opioid medication from January 2008 to the present in 31 different
states, allege causes of action for violations of those states'
antitrust laws and consumer protection statutes (and unjust
enrichment), and seek, in addition to class certification,
unspecified monetary damages (including actual, statutory, and
punitive or treble damages) and equitable relief, including
declaratory judgment and restitution.

On February 13, 2020, this case was transferred to the MDL. All
activity in the case is stayed by order of the MDL court.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Amneal Pharmaceuticals, Inc., together with its subsidiaries,
develops, licenses, manufactures, markets, and distributes generic
and specialty pharmaceutical products for various dosage forms and
therapeutic areas. It operates through two segments, Generics and
Specialty. Amneal Pharmaceuticals, Inc. was founded in 2002 and is
based in Bridgewater, New Jersey.

AMNEAL PHARMA: Xyrem(R) Related Suits Transferred to New Jersey
---------------------------------------------------------------
Amneal Pharmaceuticals, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 6, 2020,
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2020, that court
denied motions to consolidate the cases related to Xyrem(R) and
transferred them to the District of New Jersey, where the
underlying patent suits regarding Xyrem(R) were litigated.

Amneal has been named as a defendant, along with Jazz
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and numerous other manufacturers of generic
versions of Jazz's Xyrem(R) (sodium oxybate) product, in several
putative class action lawsuits filed in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California on behalf of a
regional health plan primarily providing prescription drug coverage
for New York residents (New York State Teamsters Council Health and
Hospital Fund v. Jazz Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al., No.
5:20-cv-04056 (filed June 18, 2020)), and two national health plans
providing coverage for federal employees and retirees (Government
Employees Health Association, Inc. v. Jazz Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
et al., No. 3:20-cv-04671 (filed July 13, 2020) and Blue Cross and
Blue Shield Association v. Jazz Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al., No.
4:20-cv-04667 (filed July 13, 2020)), and an individual Xyrem(R)
user (Hollman v. Jazz Pharmaceuticals PLC, et al., No.
3:20-cv-06491 (filed September 16, 2020)), as well as in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York on
behalf of an Alabaman self-insured health and welfare benefit plan
(A.F. of L.—A.G.C. Building Trades Welfare Plan v. Jazz
Pharmaceuticals plc, et al., No. 7:20-cv-06003 (filed July 31,
2020)) and a Californian Joint Powers Authority (Self-Insured
Schools of California v. Jazz Pharmaceuticals PLC, et al., No.
7:20-cv-06495 (filed August 14, 2020)). All of the lawsuits allege
that the generic manufacturers (including Amneal) entered into
anticompetitive agreements with Jazz in connection with settling
patent litigation related to Xyrem(R) (sodium oxybate), in
violation of state and federal antitrust and competition laws.

In addition to class certification, plaintiffs seek, among other
things, unspecified monetary damages (including treble damages and
civil penalties), as well as equitable relief, including
disgorgement and restitution.

On October 16, 2020, the N.D. Cal. court denied motions to
consolidate the cases and transfer them to the District of New
Jersey (where the underlying patent suits regarding Xyrem(R) were
litigated) without prejudice pending a decision by the JPML on a
motion requesting consolidation of the cases in an MDL (which is
expected to be heard during the JPML's December 2020 calendar).

Amneal said, "The Company believes it has substantial meritorious
defenses to the claims asserted with respect to the litigation.
However, any adverse outcome could negatively affect the Company
and could have a material adverse effect on the Company's results
of operations, cash flows and/or overall financial condition."

Amneal Pharmaceuticals, Inc., together with its subsidiaries,
develops, licenses, manufactures, markets, and distributes generic
and specialty pharmaceutical products for various dosage forms and
therapeutic areas. It operates through two segments, Generics and
Specialty. Amneal Pharmaceuticals, Inc. was founded in 2002 and is
based in Bridgewater, New Jersey.

AMNEAL PHARMACEUTICALS: Summary Judgment Bids in Opana Suit Pending
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Amneal Pharmaceuticals, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 6, 2020,
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2020, that the MDL
court issued a minute entry indicating that it was taking the
motions for summary judgment under consideration and would advise
the parties if oral argument was needed.

From June 2014 to April 2015, 14 complaints styled as class actions
on behalf of direct purchasers and indirect purchasers (also known
as end-payors) and several separate individual complaints on behalf
of certain direct purchasers were filed against the manufacturer of
the brand drug Opana ER(R) and Impax.

The direct purchaser plaintiffs comprise Value Drug Company and
Meijer Inc.

The end-payor plaintiffs comprise the Fraternal Order of Police,
Miami Lodge 20, Insurance Trust Fund; Wisconsin Masons' Health Care
Fund; Massachusetts Bricklayers; Pennsylvania Employees Benefit
Trust Fund; International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 138
Welfare Fund; Louisiana Health Service & Indemnity Company d/b/a
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Louisiana; Kim Mahaffay; and Plumbers
& Pipefitters Local 178 Health & Welfare Trust Fund.

The opt-out plaintiffs comprise Walgreen Co.; The Kroger Co.;
Safeway, Inc.; HEB Grocery Company L.P.; Albertson's LLC; Rite Aid
Corporation; Rite Aid Hdqtrs. Corp.; and CVS Pharmacy, Inc.

On December 12, 2014, the United States Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation ordered the pending class actions
transferred to the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois for coordinated pretrial proceedings, as In
Re: Opana ER Antitrust Litigation (MDL No. 2580). (Actions
subsequently filed in other jurisdictions also were transferred by
the JPML to the N.D. Ill. to be coordinated or consolidated with
the coordinated proceedings, and the District Court likewise has
consolidated the opt-out plaintiffs' actions with the direct
purchaser class actions for pretrial purposes.)

In each case, the complaints allege that Endo engaged in an
anticompetitive scheme by, among other things, entering into an
anticompetitive settlement agreement with Impax to delay generic
competition of Opana ER® and in violation of state and federal
antitrust laws. Plaintiffs seek, among other things, unspecified
monetary damages and equitable relief, including disgorgement and
restitution.

On March 25, 2019, plaintiffs filed motions for class certification
and served opening expert reports. Defendants' oppositions to class
certification and rebuttal expert reports were filed and served on
August 29, 2019. On November 5, 2019, plaintiffs filed reply briefs
in further support of their motions for class certification.  

On January 17, 2020, defendants filed a motion for leave to file
joint surreply briefs in response thereto; plaintiffs filed
responses on January 24, 2020. On February 5, 2020, the court
granted defendants' motion for leave, and entered a case schedule
to which the parties jointly stipulated, setting a trial date of
March 15, 2021, which the MDL court later re-set for June 7, 2021
in light of COVID-19 pandemic-related delays.

On April 15, 2020, defendants filed motions for summary judgment.
On August 19, 2020, the MDL court issued a minute entry indicating
that it was taking the motions under consideration and would advise
the parties if oral argument was needed.

Amneal said, "The Company believes it has substantial meritorious
defenses to the claims asserted with respect to the litigation.
However, any adverse outcome could negatively affect the Company
and could have a material adverse effect on the Company's results
of operations, cash flows and/or overall financial condition."

Amneal Pharmaceuticals, Inc., together with its subsidiaries,
develops, licenses, manufactures, markets, and distributes generic
and specialty pharmaceutical products for various dosage forms and
therapeutic areas. It operates through two segments, Generics and
Specialty. Amneal Pharmaceuticals, Inc. was founded in 2002 and is
based in Bridgewater, New Jersey.

ASPEN MANAGEMENT: Property Managers Class Conditionally Certified
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MARIAN DOUGLAS, v. ASPEN
MANAGEMENT USA, LLC, Case No. 2:19-cv-05568-ALM-KAJ (S.D. Ohio),
the Hon. Judge Algenon L. Marbley entered an order:

   1. conditionally certifying the Fair Labor Standards Act
      Collective Action Class, consisting of:

      "all current and former hourly paid Property Managers
      employed by the Defendant who, during the past three
      years, received a bonus or other non-discretionary pay";

   2. approving the form and substance of the Notice to
      the Class;

   3. approving the form and substance of the "Consent to Join"
      form;

   4. authorizing a Notice Packet to be sent to putative
      members of the collective action, and authorizing a 45-day
      period for individuals to return the Consent Forms from
      the date the Notices are sent;

   5. directing the Defendant to provide to Plaintiff the full
      name, last known mailing address, last known e-mail
      addresses, and dates of employment, in Microsoft Excel
      format. The Defendants shall provide this information no
      later than fourteen days from the date of this Order.
      During the notice period, the Plaintiffs' counsel shall
      only use this list to communicate with putative class
      members.;

   6. directing the Plaintiff's Counsel to send to putative
      class members the Notice Packet as approved by the Court
      and shall send nothing further;

   7. directing the Plaintiff's Counsel to send the Notice
      Packet by mail within seven days of receiving the putative
      class members' contact information from the Defendant; and

   8. directing the Plaintiff's Counsel to verify the date of
      postmark with the Defendant's Counsel within one business
      day of mailing.

A copy of Court's order dated Dec. 10, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3nbR3Db at no extra charge.[CC]

BEYOND MEAT: Bid to Dismiss Tran Putative Class Suit Granted
------------------------------------------------------------
Beyond Meat, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 9, 2020, for the
quarterly period ended September 26, 2020, that the United States
District Court for the Central District of California granted the
company's motion to dismiss the putative class action suit
initiated by Larry Tran.

On January 30, 2020, Larry Tran, a purported shareholder of Beyond
Meat, filed a putative securities class action lawsuit in the
United States District Court for the Central District of California
against Beyond Meat and two of the Company's executive officers,
the Company's President and CEO, Ethan Brown, and the Company's
Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer, Mark Nelson.

The lawsuit asserts claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Exchange Act and is premised on allegedly false or misleading
statements, and alleged non-disclosure of material facts, related
to the Company's public disclosures regarding the Company's ongoing
litigation with Don Lee Farms during the proposed class period of
May 2, 2019 to January 27, 2020.

The Court appointed a lead plaintiff and lead counsel on May 18,
2020, and a First Amended Complaint was filed on July 1, 2020. The
FAC names the same defendants, proposes the same class period, and
similarly asserts claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Exchange Act premised on allegedly false or misleading statements,
and alleged non-disclosure of material facts, related to the
Company's public disclosures regarding the Company's ongoing
litigation with Don Lee Farms.

The Company filed a motion to dismiss on behalf of all defendants
on July 31, 2020. On October 8, 2020, the Court entered an opinion
and order granting defendants' motion to dismiss with leave to
amend. Plaintiffs did not file an amended complaint by the deadline
set by the Court.

As a result, on October 27, 2020, the Court entered an order
dismissing the action with prejudice, except for the class
allegations of absent putative class members, which were dismissed
without prejudice. The dismissal is final pending appeal.

The Company believes the claims are without merit and intends to
vigorously defend all claims asserted.

Beyond Meat, Inc., a Delaware corporation, is one of the
fastest-growing food companies in the United States, offering a
portfolio of revolutionary plant-based meats. The company is based
in El Segundo, California.

BEYOND MEAT: California Court Dismisses Securities Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------------
Shearman & Sterling LLP, in an article for Lexology, reports that
on October 8, 2020, Judge Michael W. Fitzgerald of the United
States District Court for the Central District of California
dismissed a putative class action asserting claims under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 against a food company and certain
of its executives. Larry Tran v. Beyond Meat, Inc., et al., No.
20-CV-00963-MWF-AFM, slip op. (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2020). Plaintiffs
alleged that the company made misleading statements in public
filings falsely suggesting that litigation brought against the
company by a supplier, after the company had terminated a
manufacturing agreement with that supplier, was meritless. The
Court held that plaintiffs failed to adequately allege an
actionable misstatement or omission.

Plaintiffs contended that the company made two allegedly false
statements in its SEC filings: (i) first, its denial of the
supplier's claims; and (ii) second, that the company believed it
was justified in terminating the manufacturing agreement, did not
misappropriate the supplier's trade secrets, and was not liable for
the fraud or negligent misrepresentation alleged by the supplier.
Slip op. at 11.

The Court held that the challenged statements were statements of
opinion and that plaintiffs had not made the required showing to
allege any facts calling into question the basis of the opinions.
Id. at 11-12. In particular, the Court emphasized that plaintiffs'
allegations were largely drawn from the "unproven allegations" from
the supplier's litigation, and that plaintiffs did not even have
access to the agreement on which the supplier's complaint was
based. Id. at 12-13. The Court rejected plaintiffs' argument that
the underlying evidence was in the company's possession, explaining
that "the Court cannot just accept at face value [the supplier's]
characterization of the underlying evidence supposedly implicating
[the company]." Id. at 13. The Court further noted that, even if
plaintiffs' allegations were deemed to have a factual basis, they
would fail for the independent reason that plaintiffs must point to
information "in the issuer's possession at the time" in order to
plead falsity under an omissions theory. Id. at 14.

In addition, the Court observed that it was "far from clear that a
more-detailed disclosure of the risks posed by the [supplier's]
litigation was required." Id. at 14. The Court noted that, under
Ninth Circuit precedent, a "complaint must specify the reason or
reasons why the statements made by the [company] were misleading or
untrue, not simply incomplete." Id. at 14 (citing Brody v.
Transitional Hosps. Corp., 280 F.3d 997, 1006 (9th Cir. 2002)). The
Court emphasized that while the company stated that it did not
believe it was liable in the supplier's litigation, it also
"offered no assurances that it would not be found liable." Beyond
Meat, slip op. at 15. Indeed, the company stated that it "cannot
assure you that [the supplier] will not prevail in all or some of
[its] claims," and further that, if found liable, the company could
be required to pay damages and potentially lose some portion of
ownership over its intellectual property. Id. The Court concluded
that these statements gave investors "sufficient notice of the
potential risks" of the supplier's litigation, and that plaintiffs
failed to demonstrate that those statements were "inconsistent with
the true state of affairs." Id.

While noting that the Court was uncertain that further amendment
could "rescue" plaintiffs' claims, the Court nevertheless granted
plaintiffs one "final opportunity" to amend. Id. at 18. [GN]


BIGLARI HOLDINGS: Shareholders' Class Suit Concluded
----------------------------------------------------
Biglari Holdings Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 9, 2020, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2020, that a consolidated
putative shareholder class action suit has been concluded.

On January 29, 2018, a shareholder of the Company filed a purported
class action complaint against the Company and the members of its
Board of Directors in the Superior Court of Hamilton County,
Indiana.

The shareholder generally alleges claims of breach of fiduciary
duty by the members of the company's Board of Directors and unjust
enrichment to Sardar Biglari as a result of the dual-class
structure.

On March 26, 2018, a shareholder of the Company filed a purported
class action complaint against the Company and the members of its
Board of Directors in the Superior Court of Hamilton County,
Indiana.

This shareholder generally alleges claims of breach of fiduciary
duty by the members of the company's Board of Directors. This
shareholder sought to enjoin the shareholder vote on April 26, 2018
to approve the dual-class structure. On April 16, 2018, the
shareholder withdrew the motion to enjoin the shareholder vote on
April 26, 2018.

On May 17, 2018, the shareholders who filed the January 29, 2018
complaint and the March 26, 2018 complaint filed a new,
consolidated complaint against the Company and the members of its
Board of Directors in the Superior Court of Hamilton County,
Indiana.

The shareholders generally allege claims of breach of fiduciary
duty by the members of the company's Board of Directors and unjust
enrichment to Mr. Biglari arising out of the dual-class structure,
including the ability to vote the Company's shares that are
eliminated for financial reporting purposes.

The shareholders seek, for themselves and on behalf of all other
shareholders as a class, a declaration that the defendants breached
their duty to the shareholders and the class, and to recover
unspecified damages, pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, and
an award of their attorneys' fees and other costs.

On December 14, 2018, the judge of the Superior Court of Hamilton
County, Indiana issued an order granting the Company's motion to
dismiss the shareholders' lawsuits.

On January 11, 2019, the shareholders filed an appeal of the
judge's order dismissing the lawsuits. On December 4, 2019, the
Indiana Court of Appeals issued a unanimous decision affirming the
trial court's decision to dismiss the shareholder litigation.

On January 20, 2020, the shareholders filed a petition to transfer
with the Indiana Supreme Court seeking review of the decision of
the Court of Appeals. The Company opposed the petition.  On April
7, 2020, the Indiana Supreme Court denied the petition to transfer.


All of the cases referenced above are completed and each case was
concluded in the Company's favor.

Biglari Holdings Inc., through its subsidiaries, primarily operates
and franchises restaurants in the United States. The company owns,
operates, and franchises restaurants under the Steak n Shake and
Western Sizzlin names. The company was formerly known as The Steak
n Shake Company and changed its name to Biglari Holdings Inc. in
April 2010. Biglari Holdings Inc. was founded in 1934 and is based
in San Antonio, Texas.

BOILERMAKER-BLACKSMITH: Ordered to Show Docs of Deal in Matrix Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, THOMAS ALLEN PHILLIPS, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
BOILERMAKER-BLACKSMITH NATIONAL PENSION TRUST, et al., Defendants,
Case No. 19-2402-DDC-KGG (D. Kan.), Judge Kenneth G. Gale of the
U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas granted the
Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel the Defendants to produce production
of a settlement agreement in the case of Boilermaker-Blacksmith
Nat'l Pension Tr. v. Matrix N. Am. Constr., Inc., Case No.
19-CV-2370-JAR-TJJ (D. Kan. July 9, 2019).

The Plaintiffs and the putative class members in the class action
lawsuit are participants in the Boilermaker-Blacksmith National
Pension Trust.  Defendant Plan is an employee benefit plan under
the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974.  

The Plaintiffs allege in their Amended Class Action Complaint that
the Defendants violated the ERISA by denying retirement benefits
based on re-defined eligibility rules.  They also allege violations
of multiple provisions of ERISA including breaches of fiduciary
duty, violations of ERISA's prohibited transaction prohibitions and
violations of ERISA's anti-alienation rules.

The Defendants generally deny the Plaintiffs' allegations.

The Plaintiffs seek an order compelling the Defendants to produce
the settlement agreement entered in the Matrix lawsuit, which the
Defendants filed shortly before the Plaintiffs filed the present
matter.  It is uncontroverted that the Defendants identified the
settlement agreement as responsive to the Plaintiffs' Request for
Production No. 39, seeking documents pertaining to lawsuits filed
by the Defendants seeking reimbursement of any pension benefits
paid to Class Members.  The Plaintiff contends that the Matrix
lawsuit and terms of settlement are clearly relevant as they
involved the same issues and interpretation of the same Plan
provisions that are at issue in the case.

The parties participated in an informal, pre-motion with the Court,
via telephone, to discuss the discoverability of the settlement
agreement.  Although the parties continued to communicate following
the informal conference, they were unable to reach a
mutually-agreeable resolution.

Judge Gale finds that the Plaintiff's arguments in favor of the
motion to compel generally focus on the relevance of the document
requested.  He agrees with the Plaintiff that the document is
facially relevant and proportionate to the case.  As such, the
Defendants have the burden to support their objections.

The Defendants respond that the settlement agreement would not
assist the parties in determining the validity of the separation
from service rule.  On the other hand, they admit that the
separation from service rule plays a part in resolving the claims
in the Matrix litigation, albeit a "small" one.  The remainder of
the arguments in the Defendants' brief do not diminish the
relevance and discoverability of the settlement agreement, which
the Defendants have conceded.  The Plaintiff's motion is,
therefore, granted and the document will be produced within two
weeks of the date of the Order, subject to an "attorneys' eyes
only" confidentiality designation, rules the Court.

The Defendants also request the Court conducts an in camera review
of the settlement agreement if it has concerns about the relevance
of its terms.  The Judge does not have relevance concerns,
particularly because the Defendants have conceded the relevance of
the document.  Further, they have made no effort to discuss how an
in camera inspection would benefit the discovery process in the
case.  The briefing of the parties has adequately described the
settlement agreement and the nature of the information contained
therein.  Judge Gale has no need to review the document.  As such,
he overruled the Defendants' request.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 14, 2020 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y3oqlc9p from Leagle.com.

BOLLA OPERATING: Dismissal of Benitez Suit Over Unpaid Wage Upheld
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second
Department, affirmed the Dec. 19, 2018 order of the Supreme Court,
Nassau County, issued in the lawsuit titled WALTER HERNANDEZ
BENITEZ, ETC., Appellants v. BOLLA OPERATING LI CORP., ETC., ET
AL., Respondents, 2019-01671, Case No. 605760/18 (N.Y. App. Div.).

The Order (i) granted the Defendants' cross motion to dismiss the
complaint pursuant to Rule 3211(a)(7) of the New York Consolidated
Laws, Civil Practice Law and Rules, and (ii) denied, as academic,
the Plaintiff's motion for class action certification.

The Plaintiff was formerly employed by the Defendants.  According
to him, the Defendants own and operate a chain of gas stations,
delis, and convenience stores known as Bolla Market.  Although not
every Bolla Market location has a deli inside of it, the Plaintiff
allegedly worked at the deli counter as a deli worker at more than
one Bolla Market location.

The Plaintiff commenced the putative class action on behalf of
himself and a proposed class composed of other deli workers and
clerks who were employed by the Defendants, seeking to recover,
inter alia, unpaid "spread-of-hours" compensation pursuant to the
Hospitality Industry Wage Order promulgated by the Commissioner of
the Department of Labor.

The Plaintiff moved for class action certification.  The Defendants
opposed and cross-moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a cause of action.  In an order
entered Dec. 19, 2018, Judge Thomas Feinman of the Supreme Court
granted the Defendants' cross motion to dismiss the complaint for
failure to state a cause of action, and denied, as academic, the
Plaintiff's motion for class action certification.  The Plaintiff
appealed.

The Court holds that the evidentiary material submitted by the
Defendants conclusively established that the Plaintiff had no cause
of action.  The Defendants conclusively established that the Bolla
Market locations where the Plaintiff worked were not "restaurants"
under the definition set forth in the Hospitality Industry Wage
Order because those locations did not offer food or beverage for
human consumption either on their premises or by such service as
catering, banquet, box lunch, curb service or counter service.

As the Supreme Court determined, the presence of a bench outside of
a Bolla Market or a parking lot adjacent to a Bolla Market does not
demonstrate that food or beverage was offered for consumption on
premise.  The Appellate Court notes that there is also no
significant dispute that any tables existed inside the Bolla Market
locations where the Plaintiff worked.  Further, contrary to the
Plaintiff's contention, there is no significant dispute as to
whether he was entitled to spread-of-hours pay on the theory that
the Bolla Market locations where he worked were fast food
establishments.

The Defendants established that the Plaintiff's allegations that
Bolla Market's primary purpose is serving food or drink items and
that the Bolla Market locations where the Plaintiff worked were
part of an "integrated enterprise" which owns or operates 30 or
more such establishments in the aggregate nationally were not facts
at all, and that, therefore, the Plaintiff has no cause of action
based on these allegations.

Accordingly, the Appellate Court agreed with the Supreme Court's
determination to grant the Defendants' cross motion pursuant to
CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint.  Consequently, it also
agreed with the Court's determination to deny the Plaintiff's
motion for class action certification as academic.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 9, 2020 Decision & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yd4mdv5x from Leagle.com.

Kessler Matura P.C., Melville, NY (Garrett Kaske and Troy L.
Kessler of counsel), for Appellant.

Kaufman Dolowich & Voluck, LLP, Woodbury, NY (Keith Gutstein --
kgutstein@kdvlaw.com -- and Aaron N. Solomon -- asolomon@kdvlaw.com
-- of counsel), for Respondents.


CALIFORNIA: Court Dismisses Polk Class Suit with Prejudice
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DELORES POLK, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BETTY YEE, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-2900-KJM-KJN (E.D. Cal.), Judge
Kimberly J. Mueller of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California dismissed all of the Plaintiffs' claims with
prejudice.

On April 19, 2019, the Court heard two motions to dismiss in the
putative class action based on 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.  The motions
were brought by Defendants Betty Yee, State Controller of
California, and SEIU Local 2015.  After hearing, the Court
submitted the motions.

On Aug. 24, 2020, the Court granted the Defendants' motions to
dismiss with leave to amend claims one and two, subject to the
pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Procedure 11.  One month
later, the Plaintiffs have requested the Court issue an appealable
final judgment, noting they do not intend to amend their First
Amended Complaint, but rather intend to appeal its dismissal.

Having considered the Plaintiffs' request, Judge Mueller finds good
cause to issue a final judgment.  Accordingly, she dismissed all of
the Plaintiffs' claims with prejudice.  She ordered the Clerk of
Court to enter final judgment in the action.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 14, 2020 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y3tu89ds from Leagle.com.


CALL-A-HEAD CORP: $7.14M Settlement in Vargas Has Final Approval
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JUAN VARGAS, individually, and on behalf of all Others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CHARLES W. HOWARD and CALL-A-HEAD
CORP., Defendants, Case No. 15-CV-5101 (DCF) (S.D. N.Y.),
Magistrate Judge Debra C. Freeman of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York granted the Plaintiff Class
Representatives' (i) Motion for Certification of the Settlement
Class, Final Approval of the Class Action Settlement, and Approval
of the FLSA Settlement, and (ii) Motion for Approval of Attorneys'
Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses.

On Sept. 29, 2020, Plaintiff Class Representatives Vargas, Ricardo
Whittaker, Edward Kubinski, Peter Fowler, and Gerolamo Genova,
filed their Motion for Fees, Expenses and Service Awards and Motion
for Final Approval.  After due deliberation and for good cause,
Magistrate Judge Freeman finds that the Settlement Agreement is
fair, reasonable and adequate and should be approved on a final
basis.  The Settlement will ensure payment to Class and FLSA
Collective Members and avoid the risk and expense of continued
litigation.  Accordingly, she granted final approval of the Class
Action Settlement.

Make the Road, New York, is appointed as the cy pres recipient.  

The requested Service Awards in the amount of $10,000 to each of
the five Class Representatives, and $3,000 each to Class Members
Jeury Marte and Carlos Velazquez for their service and assistance
in the prosecution of the litigation, are approved.

The Class Counsel's request for attorneys' fees of $2.38 million is
approved.  Accordingly: 1) The Marlborough Law Firm, P.C. is hereby
awarded $833,000 to be paid to the Seventh Amendment Qualified
Settlement Fund in trust for the Marlborough Law Firm, P.C.; and 2)
Slater Slater Schulman is hereby awarded $1.547 million  in
attorneys' fees. The total attorneys' fees awarded amount to
one-third of the $7.14 million Gross Settlement Fund.  

Slater, Slater Schulman's request for reimbursement of expenses and
costs is granted.  The firm is awarded $77,834.50 in litigation
costs and expenses.

Magistrate Judge Freeman awarded Angeion Group, the Court appointed
administrator, for the Settlement for its actual costs and fees in
connection with the administration of the Settlement estimated by
Angeion to be $170,000.  The Settlement Claims Administrator will
distribute the Settlement Checks, including the Service Awards, and
the Class Counsel's Fees and Costs in accordance with the terms of
the Settlement Agreement.  The Settlement Claims Administrator is
ordered to provide verification to the Class Counsel and the
Defendants' Counsel of each distribution of Settlement Checks and
withholdings information, and to retain copies of all endorsed
Settlement Checks.

The Litigation is dismissed with prejudice as to all the Class
Members, as are all Released State Law Claims asserted in the
Litigation, including the claims of all Class Members who did not
opt out.  The Order will have res judicata and collateral estoppel
effect with respect to all Released State Law Claims.

The Court will issue a separate Order concerning the settlement of
non-Class Member Marvin Esquivel.

Magistrate Judge Freeman finds, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b),
that there is no just reason for delay, and directed the Clerk to
enter the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 14, 2020 Final Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y3ogudke from Leagle.com.

CALL-A-HEAD CORP: Claims of Esquivel in Vargas Suit Dismissed
-------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Debra Freeman of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York dismissed the claims of FLSA opt-in
Plaintiff Marvin Esquivel in the case, JUAN VARGAS, individually,
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
CHARLES W. HOWARD and CALL-A-HEAD CORP., Defendants, Case No.
15-cv-05101 (DF) (S.D. N.Y.).

In the action under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and the
New York Labor Law, which is before the Court on the consent of the
parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(c), the parties have
negotiated a class-action settlement, which, by separate Order, the
Court has approved as fair, reasonable, and adequate.  The parties
determined, however, that FLSA opt-in Plaintiff Esquivel was not a
member of the certified class, and that his duties and
circumstances differed from those of other class members.

Upon concluding that Mr. Esquivel's claims therefore should not be
covered by the class settlement, the counsel separately negotiated
a settlement agreement resolving Mr. Esquivel's FLSA and NYLL
claims, and the parties to that agreement have placed it before the
Court for approval.  The parties have also submitted a letter to
the Court, explaining why they believe the proposed settlement of
Mr. Esquivel's claims is also fair, reasonable, and adequate.

Magistrate Judge Freeman has reviewed the parties' submission in
order to determine whether the proposed agreement represents a
reasonable compromise of Mr. Esquivel's asserted claims, and, in
light of the totality of the relevant circumstances, she finds that
the terms of the proposed settlement agreement for Mr. Esquivel are
fair, reasonable, and adequate, both to redress his claims in the
action and to compensate his counsel for their legal fees.  She
therefore approved the agreement.

Magistrate Judge Freeman notes that the proposed settlement
agreement for Mr. Esquivel expressly contemplates that the Court
will retain jurisdiction over the action for purposes of
enforcement of the agreement.  In light of that, and in order to
effectuate the evident intent of the parties, the Court will retain
jurisdiction over the matter for the purpose of enforcing the
settlement agreement.

As a result of the Court's approval of the executed settlement
agreement, the claims of opt-in Plaintiff Esquivel are discontinued
with prejudice and without costs or fees to any party, rules the
Court.  In light of the Court's separate Order granting final
approval of the class-action settlement of the remaining
Plaintiffs' claims, the Clerk of Court is directed to close the
case on the Docket of the Court.

A full-text copy of Magistrate Judge Freeman's Oct. 14, 2020 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y3rw4sl5 from Leagle.com.

CANADA: Toronto Police Responds to G20 Class Action Settlement
--------------------------------------------------------------
Lucas Casaletto, writing for The Canadian Press, reports that
Toronto police have released a statement in which the force said
'we regret that mistakes were made' during the G20 summit in 2010.

In April of this year, a $16.5-million settlement was reached in a
class-action lawsuit over mass arrests at the 2010 G20 summit that
was held on the weekend of June 26 and June 27.

The settlement comes after 10 years of court proceedings and
negotiations between the Toronto Police Services Board and
representatives for over 1,000 people who were arrested during the
summit.

Under the settlement, those arrested were awarded compensation
between $5,000 and $24,700, depending on their experiences.

"That weekend saw many Canadians exercising their Charter rights of
freedom of expression in peaceful demonstrations. At the same time,
several people chose to use that occasion to engage in incidents of
vandalism, lawbreaking and public disorder," Toronto police said in
a release issued on Oct. 19.

"We understand and acknowledge that in attempting to preserve peace
and safety during those two days, there were times when matters
were not addressed in the way they should have been and many
hundreds of member of the public were detained or arrested when
they should not have been and were held in detention in conditions
that were unacceptable."

"We regret that mistakes were made," it reads.

In August of 2010, a woman named Sherry Good launched the lawsuit
against the police force for "breach of civil and personal rights",
as the Class Representative for all those who had been mass
arrested and detained.

The Toronto Police Service initially objected to the class-action
proceedings in court, and the class-action status was not finalized
until November 2016.

Many public demonstrations were organized to address issues like
climate change, globalization and poverty.

Thousands of protestors demonstrated peacefully, but some protests
were accompanied by deliberate vandalism.

"Reaching an agreement and an understanding of what worked and what
did not work during that weekend are important developments that
will help everyone move forward," Toronto police said.

"We have and will continue to take meaningful steps, through our
ongoing modernization process, to significantly enhance and improve
our community engagement and all of our relationships to enable us
to continue to keep our city safe for everyone." [GN]


CCBCC INC: Wachtelhausen Sues Over Unpaid Wages for Laborers
------------------------------------------------------------
GRANT WACHTELHAUSEN, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. CCBCC, INC., Case No. 2:20-cv-06234-SDM-CMV (S.D. Ohio,
Dec. 4, 2020) asserts claims against the Defendant's practice and
policy of not paying the Plaintiff and other similarly situated for
all time worked and all overtime compensation earned at a rate of
one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours
worked over 40 each workweek in violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the Ohio Revised Code.

The Plaintiff and others similarly situated are employed as
non-exempt, hourly laborers whose work includes building pallets.
As part of their jobs, the Plaintiff and others similarly situated
use various electronic machinery such as forklifts and pallet
jacks. The Plaintiff and others similarly situated are required to
arrive to work approximately 60 minutes before their shift-start
time in order to perform compensable work such as finding a pallet
jack and charging it if necessary. This compensable work is
integral and indispensable to the work that Plaintiff and others
similarly situated were hired to do. This work constituted the
first principle activity of their workday. They cannot perform the
rest of their shift without first ensuring their forklifts and
pallet jacks are available and charged, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff contends that the Defendant does not pay him and
others similarly situated for this pre-shift compensable work. He
adds that there are no practical administrative difficulty of
recording this unpaid work of him and other similarly situated
employees. It could have been precisely recorded for payroll
purposes simply by allowing them to clock in when they performed
the pre-shift work.

The Defendant manufactures and bottles various beverages.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Robi J. Baishnab, Esq.
          Hans A. Nilges, Esq.
          Shannon M. Draher, Esq.
          NILGES DRAHER LLC
          34 N. High St., Ste. 502
          Columbus, OH 43215
          Telephone: (614) 824-5770
          Facsimile: (330) 754-1430
          E-mail: rbaishnab@ohlaborlaw.com
                  hans@ohlaborlaw.com
                  sdraher@ohlaborlaw.com

CENTERRA GROUP: Williams ERISA Suit Claims Breach of Fiduciary Duty
-------------------------------------------------------------------
SHAWN WILLIAMS, DAVID GREEN, JAMIE COOMES, MALCUM KENNER, AND
ANDREW BARRETT, individually and as representatives of a class of
participants and beneficiaries on behalf of the Centerra Group, LLC
401(k) Plan (nka the Constellis 401(k) Plan) v. CENTERRA GROUP,
LLC, THE BENEFIT PLAN COMMITTEE OF THE CENTERRA GROUP, LLC, THE
INVESTMENT COMMITTEE OF THE CENTERRA GROUP, LLC, AON HEWITT
INVESTMENT CONSULTING, INC. (NKA AON INVESTMENTS USA, INC.), PAUL
P. DONAHUE, DEBORAH F. RICCI, MARCIA ALDRICH, AND JOHN DOES 1–10,
Case No. 1:20-cv-04220-MGL (D.S.C., Dec. 4, 2020) is a class action
complaint brought on behalf of the Plaintiffs and on behalf of the
class of participants and beneficiaries of the Centerra Group, LLC
401(k) Plan against the Defendants for breach of fiduciary duties
and prohibited transactions under ERISA.

The Plaintiffs contend that as Plan fiduciaries, the Defendants
were obligated to act for the exclusive benefit of Plan
participants and beneficiaries and to ensure that Plan expenses are
reasonable and Plan investments are prudent. These duties are the
"highest known to the law", and must be discharged with "an eye
single to the interests of the participants and beneficiaries."
Instead of acting in the exclusive best interest of participants,
Aon Hewitt acted in its own interest by causing the Plan to invest
in Aon Hewitt's proprietary collective investment trusts, which
benefitted Aon Hewitt at the expense of Plan participants'
retirement savings. The Centerra Defendants also failed to use the
Plan's bargaining power to negotiate reasonable recordkeeping fees,
which caused unreasonable recordkeeping expenses to be charged to
Plan participants.

Prior to January 1, 2019, the Centerra Group, LLC 401(k) Plan was a
defined contribution, individual account, employee pension benefit
plan under 29 U.S.C. section 1002(2)(A) and section 1002(34) in
which substantially all of the employees of the Centerra Group, LLC
and affiliated employers may participate. As of December 31, 2013,
the Plan then called G4S Government Solutions, Inc. 401(k) and
Retirement Plan had $273 million in net assets and 4,161
participants with account balances.

The Plaintiffs are current employees of Centerra.

Centera Group LLC provides military services. The Company offers
safety, security, space administration, construction, critical
infrastructure, fleet services, logistics, explosive devices,
department of state, and federal protective services. G4S
Government Solutions serves customers in the United States. The
Individual Defendants are officers of the company.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Beth Burke Richardson, Esq.
          ROBINSON GRAY STEPP & LAFFITTE, LLC
          1310 Gadsden Street
          Post Office Box 11449
          Columbia, SC 29211
          Telephone: (803) 929-1400
          Facsimile: (803) 929-0300
          E-mail: brichardson@robinsongray.com

               - and -

          Jerome J. Schlichter, Esq.
          Michael A. Wolff, Esq.
          Kurt C. Struckhoff, Esq.
          Nathan H. Emmons, Esq.
          SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON LLP
          100 South Fourth Street, Suite 1200
          St. Louis, MO, 63102
          Telephone: (314) 621-6115
          Facsimile: (314) 621-5934
          E-mail: jschlichter@uselaws.com
                  mwolff@uselaws.com
                  kstruckhoff@uselaws.com
                  nemmons@uselaws.com

CHAMPION PETFOODS: Denial of Class Cert. in Reitman Suit Upheld
---------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's denial of class certification in the case,
JENNIFER REITMAN; et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants v. CHAMPION
PETFOODS USA, INC.; CHAMPION PETFOODS LP, Defendants-Appellees,
Case No. 19-56467 (9th Cir.).

The Plaintiffs-Appellants filed the putative class action on behalf
of themselves and other consumers in California who purchased
allegedly mislabeled dog food products sold by the
Defendants-Appellees.  They appeal the district court's denial of
their motion for class certification.

The district court concluded that Reitman had failed to satisfy
Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirements.  Specifically, it found
that, although all dog food packages may have a common message,
whether that message is misleading could only be determined by
separately examining each bag because the packaging of each bag
contains different information.  Reitman argues that the district
court erred by focusing its predominance analysis only on
affirmative misrepresentations and failing to consider allegedly
uniform and material omissions from the dog food bag packaging.

The Ninth Circuit disagrees.  The Ninth Circuit holds that the
district court's conclusion that individualized inquiries requiring
bag-to-bag determinations predominate over common questions applies
whether the misrepresentations are based on affirmative statements
on, or omissions from, the packaging.  The Ninth Circuit notes that
Reitman does not explain how creating subclasses based on diets
would cure the need for individualized bag-to-bag inquiries.
Accordingly, the district court correctly held that the
predominance requirement had not been satisfied and that creating
subclasses would be futile.

The Ninth Circuit also agrees that the district court also properly
found that Reitman's damages models failed to satisfy the standard
set out in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (2013).  Reitman's
"price premium" model failed to measure the price difference
attributable to misleading statements on, or omissions from, the
packaging.  In other words, the model measured only the differing
customer expectations based on various corrective statements in the
abstract and failed to measure the difference between what the
Plaintiff paid and the value of what the Plaintiff received.

Moreover, the Appellate Court finds that the district court
correctly found that a full refund model was inappropriate for
Reitman's proposed pentobarbital subclass because there were
potential class members who never purchased bags with contaminant.
Additionally, a full refund may be available when the Plaintiffs
prove the product had no value to them.  Thus, Reitman's failure to
explain why a risk of contamination renders the product completely
valueless for even those class members who did purchase a
contaminated bag was a sufficient basis for rejecting the subclass
they posited.

Finally, the Ninth Circuit opines that the district court applied
the correct standard in denying Reitman's request to create a
liability-only class or issue classes under Rule 23(c)(4).  The
district court concluded, while acknowledging that predominance was
not required for certifying a class under Rule 23(c)(4), that
numerous individualized issues affecting determinations of
liability make Rule 23(c)(4) certification inefficient.  Because
Reitman failed to show that Rule 23(c)(4) certification was
"appropriate," the district court did not abuse its discretion when
it denied certification.

The Appellate Court has considered the remainder of Reitman's
arguments and finds them to be without merit.  Thus, the district
court's denial of class certification is affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 9, 2020 Memorandum is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ybr9uftv from Leagle.com.


CHICAGO TEACHERS: 7th Cir. Affirms Summary Judgment in Ocol Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOSEPH OCOL, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant v. CHICAGO TEACHERS UNION,
et al., Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 20-1668 (7th Cir.), the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's order dismissing or granting summary judgment to all the
Defendants.

Plaintiff Ocol is a math teacher at Earle STEM Elementary School
and was a member of the Chicago Teachers Union from 2005 through
2016.  According to his complaint, in September 2016, he was
expelled from the Union after refusing to participate in a one-day
strike on April 1, 2016.  He did, however, remain obligated to pay
so-called "fair-share fees" to the Union under the portion of the
Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act, 115 ILCS 5/1-5/21,
authorizing unions and public employers to include in their
collective bargaining agreements a fair share clause requiring
employees covered by the agreement who are not members of the
organization to pay the organization a fair share fee for services
rendered.

Mr. Ocol continued paying the required fair-share fees until 2018,
when the Supreme Court in Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S.Ct.
2448 (2018) ("Janus I") overruled Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), and concluded that extraction of
such fees from non-union members violated those employees' First
Amendment rights.  The district court then dismissed the state
defendants on their motion.

The Union Defendants moved for summary judgment, but the parties
agreed to stay consideration of the motion until after the Seventh
Circuit resolved Janus I on remand.  In that appeal, the Court
considered and rejected Mark Janus' argument that he was entitled
to a refund for some or all of the fair-share fees he had paid
under protest ("Janus II").  Ocol then conceded defeat on his
Section 1983 claim for a refund of his fair-share payments as well
as his First Amendment challenge to exclusive representation.  The
district court, thus, granted the Union Defendants' motion for
summary judgment.

On appeal, Ocol renews his constitutional challenges to his past
payment of fair-share fees to the Chicago Teachers Union and to its
designation as exclusive representative of both union and non-union
members alike under Illinois law.  He admits, however, that both
claims are squarely foreclosed by precedent and requests that we
summarily affirm judgment in the Defendants' favor so that Ocol may
appeal to the Supreme Court.

As Ocol recognizes, the Seventh Circuit's holding in Janus II
precludes his argument that he is entitled to a refund of his past
compulsory fair-share payments.  The plaintiff in Janus I, who,
like Ocol, had paid fair-share fees under protest to a union
designated as the representative of his employee unit (the Illinois
Department of Healthcare and Family Services), sought recovery of
his past payments.  The Court held that a private party acting
under color of state law for Section 1983 purposes was entitled to
a good-faith defense, which applied to the union's collection of
fair-share fees before the Supreme Court's decision.  The Court,
thus, concluded that Janus was limited to declaratory and
injunctive relief, and a future free of any association with a
public union.  As Ocol admits, the exact same rationale applies to
bar his claim for repayment of past fair-share fees from the
Chicago Teachers Union.

Likewise, Ocol's constitutional challenge to the Union's exclusive
representation goes nowhere.  The Illinois Educational Labor
Relations Act governs labor relations between public educational
employers and employees through a system of exclusive
representation allowing the representative union to negotiate
employment conditions, resolve disputes, and select employee
representatives pursuant to collective bargaining agreements.  Ocol
argues that the Act's exclusive representation provisions violate
the First Amendment by restricting his right to bargain as an
individual for the terms and conditions of his employment.

Again, as Ocol himself acknowledges, precedent forecloses his
claim.  Specifically, in Minnesota State Board for Community
Colleges v. Knight, the Supreme Court rejected a First Amendment
challenge to a similar exclusive representation provision
applicable to state colleges in Minnesota.  More recently in Janus
I, the Court gave no indication that its ruling on fair-share fees
necessarily undermined the system of exclusive representation.  As
Ocol recognizes, Knight and its progeny firmly establish the
constitutionality of exclusive representation, and the Supreme
Court is the proper forum for challenging that rule.  The Court,
thus, grants his request for summary affirmance so that he may seek
a petition for certiorari to pursue his arguments there.

For these reasons, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 9, 2020 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/ybalmc2a from Leagle.com.


CHURCHILL DOWNS: Court Resolves Fleming Matter re Kater Suit Deal
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHERYL KATER and SUZIE KELLY, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CHURCHILL
DOWNS INCORPORATED and BIG FISH GAMES, INC., Defendants, Cause No.
C15-0612RSL (W.D. Wash.), Judge Robert S. Lasnik of the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Washington has issued an
order resolving third-party Jeffrey E. Fleming's (i) motion to
quash a subpoena seeking information regarding his Google account,
and (ii) the motion for an order directing Plaintiffs and their
attorneys to cease all efforts to contact him regarding the
lawsuit.

In response to Mr. Fleming's motions, the Plaintiffs have taken
steps to ensure that his information will not be included in
Google's production in response to the subpoena and will make best
reasonable efforts to ensure that he is not included in the class
lists used by the Claims Administrator.  The Plaintiffs oppose
entry of a cease and desist order as unnecessary, however, and
argue that quashing the subpoena served on Google will upend the
class action settlement procedures.

Having reviewed the submissions of Mr. Fleming and the Plaintiffs,
Judge Lasnik interprets Mr. Fleming's objections to the production
of his Google account information as an indication that he does not
want to be part of the settlement class in the matter.  The Court,
therefore, finds that he has opted out of the settlement process
and will not participate in any allocation of the settlement
funds.

With regards to the specific relief requested by Mr. Fleming, the
Judge is satisfied that his information was not (or will not be)
included in Google's data production.  If, however, his information
has been produced to the Plaintiffs, they will delete the
information from their files, refrain from making any attempt to
contact him regarding the litigation in the future, and ensure that
the Claims Administrator does not contact him.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 14, 2020 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y3f2dj22 from Leagle.com.


CLAL INSURANCE: Participates in Petition for Class Action Cert.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Patrini, writing for Global Legal Chronicle, reports that
Gornitzky advised Clal and The Phoenix on the  dismissal of a
petition for the certification of an action as a class action.

Clal and The Phoenix participated in a Petition for the
Certification of an Action as a Class Action, in which it was
claimed that the insurance companies market and sell to the insured
parties health insurance policies that provide coverage that is
already included in the supplemental health services of the HMOs,
thereby causing the insured parties to purchase excess insurance
coverage, which factors in double insurance and the payment of
excess premiums, in the scope of NIS 4.5 billion.

The Gornitzky team was led by partner Noam Ronen (Picture) and Adv.
Daniel Barlev.

Involved fees earner: Daniel Barlev - Gornitzky & Co.; Noam Ronen -
Gornitzky & Co.;

Law Firms: Gornitzky & Co.;

Clients: Clal Insurance Enterprises Holdings Ltd.; Phoenix
Insurance; [GN]


COFFMAN SPECIALTIES: Refugio Suit Moved to San Diego County Court
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned JOSE REFUGIO GONZALEZ QUIROZ, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. COFFMAN
SPECIALTIES, INC., Case No. 20-CV-1779-CAB-AHG (S.D. Cal.),
District Judge Cathy Ann Bencivengo grants the Plaintiff's motion
to remand his case to the Superior Court of the State of California
for the County of San Diego County.

Defendant Coffman Specialties, Inc. ("CSI") removed the putative
wage and hour class action from San Diego County Superior Court
asserting subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1331
on the grounds that the Plaintiff's complaint includes claims that
are completely preempted by federal law under Section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"). A week later, CSI moved to
dismiss the operative first amended complaint ("FAC") arguing that
the Plaintiff is required to resolve his claims in accordance with
a grievance and arbitration procedure contained in a collective
bargaining agreement under which the Plaintiff was employed by CSI.
In opposition to the motion, the Plaintiff argues in part that the
removal was improper because his claims are not preempted under
section 301 of the LMRA, and that the Court must remand the case to
state court.

Upon consideration of the FAC, the notice of removal, and the
jurisdictional arguments contained in the briefing on the
Defendant's motion to dismiss, the Court agrees with the Plaintiff
that his claims are were not subject to removal pursuant to Section
301. Accordingly, the case is remanded to San Diego County Superior
Court.

Background

Plaintiff Gonzalez Quiroz is a non-exempt employee of CSI, which is
a California corporation involved in the construction business and
specializing in large public and government projects. On July 1,
2020, he filed a complaint in San Diego County Superior Court
asserting six wage and hour claims under the California labor code
and a claim for violation of California's unfair competition law
("UCL"), California Business and Professions Code Section 17200, on
behalf of a putative class consisting of all current and former
non-exempt California CSI employees within four years of filing of
the complaint.

On Aug. 31, 2020, the Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint
("FAC") in state court asserting the same seven claims as in the
original complaint along with an additional claim for violation of
California's Private Attorney General Act ("PAGA"), California
Labor Code Section 2698, et seq. Neither complaint makes any
mention of a collective bargaining agreement or of any other
contract governing the Plaintiff's employment relationship with
CSI.

On Sept. 10, 2020, CSI removed the lawsuit to the Court, asserting
subject matter jurisdiction based on a federal question under 28
U.S.C. Section 1331 because the FAC includes claims that require
interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") and
thus is completely preempted by federal law under Section 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA").

According to the notice of removal, CSI is a member of the
Associated General Contractors of America San Diego Chapter, Inc.
("AGC"), and that since at least 2007, CSI has assigned its
collective bargaining rights to the AGC and thereby agreed to be
bound by the terms and conditions in a CBA known as the Master
Labor Agreement ("MLA") between the International Union of
Operating Engineers, Local 12 and the AGC. The notice of removal
also attaches the current MLA, which covers the period of July 1,
2019, through June 30, 2022. CSI contends that because of the
complete preemption doctrine, the fact that the FAC does not
reference the MLA does not preclude removal. The Plaintiff argues
that removal was improper, and the Court must remand the case.

CSI contends that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction under
section 301 of the LMRA. The Ninth Circuit has identified two
guidelines from the Supreme Court to aid in the determination of
the line of demarcation between preempted claims and those that
survive section 301's reach.

According to the Order, the FAC does not mention the MLA, or any
other CBA or contract whatsoever. The only rights the FAC claims
were violated are those created by California statutes. Thus, the
suit obviously does not have as its 'purpose or object' violation
of any contract. To the contrary, the Plaintiff solely seeks to
enforce rights that he claims he and the putative class have under
the California labor code. The legal character of the claims in the
FAC are all for violation of state law rights independent of any
rights under the MLA. Further, the FAC does not "artfully plead"
around alleging a claim for breach of the MLA.

To that end, CSI is not arguing that the FAC states a claim for
violation of the MLA without actually labeling it as a breach of
contract claim; rather, CSI argues, based on evidence outside of
the complaint (namely, the MLA itself), that California state laws
under which the Plaintiff seeks relief do not apply to him because
of the MLA. Because the rights asserted in the FAC inhere in state
law, the Burnside factor does not support removal under Section
301, Judge Bencivengo notes.

The other Burnside factor also does not establish application of
Section 301 to support removal, Judge Bencivengo says. The FAC
alleges only that CSI violated California labor laws with respect
to the payment of overtime, the provision of meal and rest periods,
the provision of accurate wage statements, payment of wages upon
discharge, and reimbursement of expenses. It does not allege that
the terms of the MLA violate state law or raise any dispute as to
the interpretation of the MLA. Thus, resolution of these claims
does not require interpreting the MLA, meaning the second Burnside
factor is not satisfied either.

Judge Bencivengo also notes that the Plaintiff does not allege that
the terms of the MLA violate state law; he simply alleges that CSI
has violated rights he has under the California Labor Code.

Conclusion

The FAC does not assert any claims based on rights under the MLA or
that require interpretation of the MLA, Judge Bencivengo says.
CSI's reliance on the MLA for its defense to the Plaintiff's claims
does not make removal under Section 301 proper. Accordingly, the
case is remanded to San Diego County Superior Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Dec. 10, 2020, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ydggksyq from Leagle.com.


CRICKET WIRELESS: Wins Bid to Compel Thomas to Arbitrate Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled JERMAINE THOMAS, JEREMAIN MILLER, JAMIE
POSTPICHAL, RONALD ELLISON, SARAH WATERS, KAMILAH RIDDICK, FELICIA
REDDICK, TIARA CROMWELL, LYSHA ENCARNACION, LANIE HALE, MELIZZA
WEAVER, ALFREDO SANCHEZ, and CLARISSA KELLY, on behalf of
themselves and other similarly situated v. CRICKET WIRELESS, LLC,
Case No. C 19-07270 WHA (N.D. Cal.), District Judge William Alsup
issued an order granting in part and denying in part the
Defendant's motion to compel arbitration.

In the putative class action arising out of the Defendant's alleged
false advertising of its wireless services, the Defendant moves to
compel arbitration of three of the named Plaintiffs. One of the
Plaintiff has since voluntarily dismissed herself from the action.
Accordingly, Judge Alsup considers the Defendant's motion only as
to the other two Plaintiffs, Thomas and Waters.

At all relevant times, Defendant Cricket Wireless sold wireless
telephone service as well as cellular telephones to consumers.  The
Plaintiffs allege that, between 2012 to 2014, Cricket advertised
that it offered "unlimited 4G/LTE" services throughout the United
States and required consumers to purchase a 4G/LTE-capable phone
from Cricket to access those services. They allege that Cricket did
not actually have the capability to provide "unlimited" and
"nationwide" 4G/LTE services, however. Accordingly, they brought
the action, alleging that Cricket's conduct violated various state
false advertising laws, as well as the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organization Act. They also bring claims for unjust
enrichment and negligence.

In Barraza v. Cricket Wireless LLC, (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2015),
Cricket contended that when the plaintiffs there began using its
wireless services, they accepted the terms and conditions set forth
in the "Quick Start Guide," including the arbitration provision.
The plaintiffs argued that they never agreed to a contract with
Cricket because they lacked notice of the terms and condition in
the "Quick Start Guide." They submitted declarations in support of
their contentions. Applying Missouri law, Judge Alsup denied
Cricket's motion to compel arbitration, finding that a summary
trial was necessary under Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act
to determine whether the parties had formed a contract.  

In the instant case, in its current motion to compel arbitration,
Cricket contends that rather than relitigate Barraza and put the
parties and the Court to the burden of a jury trial in the case,
Cricket limits its motion to the two Plaintiffs whose circumstances
are readily distinguishable from the ones at issue in Barraza.
Unlike Cricket, Thomas and Waters do not submit any evidence.  They
argue that Cricket has failed to meet its burden to show that they
have agreed to arbitrate their claims, and the submission of
evidence on their part is thus unnecessary.

Unlike in Barraza, Cricket contends that, under Missouri law,
Thomas' continued use of its services after he received two text
messages with a hyperlink to its updated terms and services
constituted his acceptance of the updated agreement, which
contained an arbitration provision. Thomas disagrees saying he does
not dispute that Missouri law governs. Instead, he argues that
Cricket has not adduced any evidence that silence by a reasonable
person in [his] position demonstrates that the person was aware
that Cricket believed a contract existed and action was needed to
avoid being bound.

Judge Alsup opines that Plaintiff Thomas formed a valid agreement
to arbitrate his claims against Cricket. Cricket sent two text
messages to Thomas, which notified him of Crickets' updated
agreement. At the very least, therefore, Thomas had constructive
notice of Cricket's terms, if not actual, Judge Alsup states,
citing Major v. McCallister, 302 S.W.3d 227, 230 (Mo. Ct. App.
2009).  Importantly, despite opportunity to do so, Thomas does not
submit a declaration disclaiming that he received the text messages
and/or that he read their contents.

Plaintiff Thomas' continued use and payment for Cricket's wireless
services after he received notice of Cricket's terms manifested his
acceptance to those terms, Judge Alsup holds. Accordingly, the
Judge grants Cricket's motion to compel arbitration of Thomas'
claims against it.

Plaintiff Waters does not dispute that she formed valid agreements
with AT&T Mobility in 2018 and 2019 when she signed AT&T's terms of
service, which contained arbitration clauses. Rather, the issue is
whether or not Cricket can enforce someone else's arbitration
clauses and whether the claims asserted herein fall within the
clauses' aegis.

While the Judger finds that Cricket -- an affiliate of AT&T
Mobility at the time of the agreements -- may enforce the
arbitration agreements, and that Waters' claims against it fall
within their scope, he holds that said arbitration agreements are
unenforceable. More specifically, the Order finds that the scope of
AT&T Mobility's arbitration clause is inoperably broad and,
thereby, unconscionable.

Accordingly, Cricket's motion to compel arbitration as to Thomas is
granted, and its motion to compel arbitration as to Waters is
denied. Pursuant to Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act, the
action is stayed as to Thomas only, pending the outcome of his
arbitration.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Dec. 10, 2020, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ybec8dak from Leagle.com.


CROWN BATTERY: Tallman Sues Over Manufacturing Staff's Unpaid Wages
-------------------------------------------------------------------
MATTHEW TALLMAN, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. CROWN BATTERY MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Case No.
3:20-cv-02712-JJH (N.D. Ohio, Dec. 4, 2020) is a collective action
instituted by the Plaintiff as a result of Defendant's practices
and policies of not paying its non-exempt employees, including
Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees, for all hours
worked, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the
Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act (OMFWSA).

The Plaintiff contends that he and other similarly situated
manufacturing employees were only paid for work performed between
their scheduled start and stop times, and were not paid for the
following work performed before and after their scheduled start and
stop time: a) changing into and out of their personal protective
equipment, including but not limited to a shirt, pants, shoes, a
respirator, gloves and/or safety glasses; b) getting tools and
equipment that were necessary to perform their manufacturing work;
c) walking to their assigned area of the manufacturing floor;
and/or d) performing their manufacturing work.

The Defendant employed Plaintiff between February 2018 and August
2019 as a manufacturing employee at its Fremont, Ohio manufacturing
facility. Other similarly situated employees were employed as
manufacturing employees at the Defendant's Fremont, Ohio
manufacturing facility.

The Defendant manufacturers batteries at its manufacturing facility
in Fremont, Ohio.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lori M. Griffin, Esq.
          Anthony J. Lazzaro, Esq.
          Chastity L. Christy, Esq.
          THE LAZZARO LAW FIRM, LLC
          The Heritage Bldg., Suite 250
          34555 Chagrin Boulevard
          Moreland Hills, OH 44022
          Telephone: 216-696-5000
          Facsimile: 216-696-7005
          E-mail: lori@lazzarolawfirm.com
                  chastity@lazzarolawfirm.com
                  anthony@lazzarolawfirm.com

CVS HEALTH: Court Seeks Supplemental Briefing on Perez Settlement
-----------------------------------------------------------------
District Judge Dale A. Drozd issued an order requiring supplemental
briefing in the lawsuit captioned FELIX PEREZ, an individual, on
his own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
CVS HEALTH CORPORATION, et al., Case No. 1:19-cv-00449-DAD-BAM
(E.D. Cal.).

The matter is before the Court on the assigned magistrate judge's
findings and recommendations recommending that the unopposed
renewed motion for preliminary approval of a class action
settlement filed on behalf of Plaintiff Perez be granted.

In conducting its de novo review of the pending motion pursuant to
28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(C), Judge Drozd has identified some
potential deficiencies with the parties' proposed class notice.
Accordingly, he orders the parties to provide supplemental briefing
addressing the Court's concerns and provide clarification.

The parties are directed to jointly file a brief responsive to the
issues identified within 10 days from the issuance of the Order.

The issues are:

     1. In the pending motion, the Plaintiff asserts that he would
seek an award of settlement administration costs for his proposed
settlement administrator, ILYM Group, Inc., and that those costs
are reasonable because ILYM will mail notice packets to the class,
maintain a website which has information about the Settlement and
links to the settlement documents, and keep track of objections and
requests for exclusion from the Settlement. However, the proposed
class notice does not mention a website or provide a URL or website
address. In addition, Sean Hartranft, the Senior Vice President of
Sales for IYLM, has provided a declaration outlining the duties
ILYM will perform if appointed by the court to serve as the
settlement administrator-maintenance of a website is not among
those listed duties. Accordingly, the parties are directed to
clarify whether there will be a website in connection with the
administration of this settlement and, if not, whether the proposed
costs for the settlement administrator are still reasonable.

     2. Relatedly, if there will be a website, then the parties are
directed to file a revised version of the class notice that
includes the website information, and the fact that the settlement
agreement can be viewed on that website.

     3. If there will not be a website by which class members can
view the settlement agreement, then the Court has concerns about
the adequacy of the class notice in providing the class members a
meaningful opportunity to object or decide to opt out, particularly
given that: (i) the notice does not provide any specifics regarding
the amounts that the Plaintiff will seek for awards of attorneys'
fees, litigation costs, the service enhancement, and settlement
administration costs; (ii) the notice does not provide any
information about how the class members can view a copy of the full
settlement agreement to otherwise inform themselves of those
amounts; and (iii) the notice does not provide any estimate or
approximate range of what the average individual payment might be
for the class members. Accordingly, the parties are directed to
clarify how the proposed class notice is adequate. Alternatively,
they may file a revised class notice that addresses the Court's
concerns.

     4. In the pending motion, the Plaintiff states that his
counsel will seek an award of $616,666.67, which is one-third of
the gross settlement amount of $1.85 million. While the Plaintiff
states that his counsel will submit a motion for attorneys' fees to
substantiate the requested fee award in connection with his motion
for final approval, his pending motion for preliminary approval
does not address the reasonableness of the fee request at all.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff is directed to provide some information
or argument regarding the reasonableness of their fee request so
that the Court can better assess whether the settlement agreement
as a whole is potentially fair, reasonable, and adequate.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Dec. 10, 2020, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y7xe4nog from Leagle.com.


CVS HEALTH: Trial in Corcoran Class Suit to Start in 2021
---------------------------------------------------------
CVS Health Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 6, 2020, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2020, that the trial in the
case, Corcoran et al. v. CVS Health Corporation., is scheduled to
occur in 2021.

Corcoran et al. v. CVS Health Corporation (U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California) and Podgorny et al. v. CVS
Health Corporation (U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois).

These putative class actions were filed against the Company in July
and September 2015. The cases were consolidated in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California.

Plaintiffs seek damages and injunctive relief under the consumer
protection statutes of certain states on behalf of a class of
consumers who purchased certain prescription drugs.

Several third-party payors filed similar putative class actions on
behalf of payors captioned Sheet Metal Workers Local No. 20 Welfare
and Benefit Fund v. CVS Health Corp. and Plumbers Welfare Fund,
Local 130 v. CVS Health Corporation (both pending in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Rhode Island) in February and
August 2016.

In all of these cases the plaintiffs allege the Company overcharged
for certain prescription drugs by not submitting the price
available to members of the CVS Health Savings Pass program as the
pharmacy's usual and customary price. In the Corcoran case, the
U.S. District Court granted summary judgment to the Company on
plaintiffs' claims in their entirety and certified certain
subclasses in September 2017.

In June 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed the U.S. District Court's grant of summary judgment and
reversed the U.S. District Court's narrowing of the requested
class.

The Corcoran case is proceeding to a trial on a six-state class
basis, and trial is scheduled to occur in 2021.

The Sheet Metal Workers plaintiffs have amended their complaint to
assert a claim under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO") premised on an alleged conspiracy
between the Company and other pharmacy benefit managements (PBMs).

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

CVS Health Corporation, incorporated on August 22, 1996, together
with its subsidiaries, is an integrated pharmacy healthcare
company. The Company provides pharmacy care for the senior
community through Omnicare, Inc. (Omnicare) and Omnicare's
long-term care (LTC) operations, which include distribution of
pharmaceuticals, related pharmacy consulting and other ancillary
services to chronic care facilities and other care settings. It
operates through three segments: Pharmacy Services, Retail/LTC and
Corporate. The company is based in Woonsocket, Rhode Island.

DARKTRACE INC: $76,800 Settlement in Der-Hacopian Wins Final Nod
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled NICHOLAS DER-HACOPIAN v.
DARKTRACE, INC., Case No. 18-cv-06726-HSG (N.D. Cal.), District
Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr., issued an order granting motion for
final approval of class action settlement, and granting in part and
denying in part motion for attorneys' fees and incentive award.

The Plaintiff brings the consumer class action against Defendant
Darktrace, alleging that the Defendant violated the Fair Credit
Reporting Action. He alleges that as part of the Defendant's
employment application process, it requires consumer reports, known
as background checks, to evaluate prospective employees. According
to the Plaintiff, the Defendant (1) included a release of future
liability in the authorization that it required employment
applicants to sign authorizing a background check; and (2) used the
background checks to make adverse employment decisions without
timely providing the prospective employee with a copy of the report
and a summary of his or her rights under the FCRA.

Under the Parties' Settlement Agreement, the Settlement Class is
defined as:

     All applicants for employment with and employees of
     DarkTrace from whom DarkTrace obtained the individual's
     consent to procure a consumer report using a form document
     substantially similar to the authorization form signed by
     Plaintiff; and procured or caused to be procured a consumer
     report, as defined by the FCRA, between November 5, 2016 and
     the date the Final Judgment and Order approving this
     Settlement Agreement is entered by the Court.

The Parties have agreed to both non-monetary and monetary relief.
The settlement amount is approximately $76,800. Moving forward, the
Defendant will comply with the disclosure, authorization, and
notice practices relating to obtaining consumer reports and the
provision of consumer reports and summaries of rights referenced in
the FCRA. Additionally, the Defendant will pay each class member
$300 in a settlement check mailed via regular mail to each class
member. The checks will become void 60 days after the date of
mailing.

All settlement class members will release, among other things, any
and all claims the Class Member Releasing Parties have under 15
U.S.C. Section 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) and/or 15 U.S.C. Sections
1681b(b)(3)(A)(i) and 16818b(b)(3)(A)(ii).

The Court grants attorneys' fees and costs totaling $150,000. The
Court recognizes that the Class Counsel obtained significant
results for the class. Moreover, no class member objected to the
settlement or requested exclusion, suggesting strong support for
the settlement's outcome.

The Class Counsel also requests an incentive award of $15,000 for
the named Plaintiff. The Court has concerns about the requested
incentive award in the case where the amount the named Plaintiff
would receive is disproportionate to the monetary award that other
class members would receive. The Class Counsel requests an
incentive award for named Plaintiff that is 50 times more than the
settlement award other class members would receive. Nevertheless,
given the benefit the Plaintiff helped obtain for the class, the
Court finds an award of $1,500 to be adequate and appropriate. It,
accordingly, grants in part the request for an incentive award.

The parties and settlement administrator are directed to implement
the Final Order and the settlement agreement in accordance with the
terms of the settlement agreement. The parties are further directed
to file a short stipulated final judgment of two pages or less
within 21 days from the date of the Order. The judgment need not,
and should not, repeat the analysis in the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Dec. 10, 2020, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y8kmkqny from Leagle.com.


DELAWARE, OH: Loses Bid to Stay Discovery in Seattle House Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers denies the
Defendant's Motion to Stay Discovery in the lawsuit styled SEATTLE
HOUSE, LLC v. CITY OF DELAWARE, OHIO, Case No. 2:20-cv-03284 (S.D.
Ohio).

Plaintiff Seattle House filed a Class Action Complaint on June 29,
2020, against the City arising from the City's collection of
allegedly illegal impact fees. According to the Complaint, under
the guise of 'capacity fees,' the City purports to charge fees to
defray the cost of each new development's use of the City's water
and sewer systems.

The Plaintiff, on behalf of itself and class members, asserts
federal claims for a violation of the Fair Housing Act of 1968
("FHA"), denial of equal protection under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983,
and deprivation of substantive due process under 42 U.S.C. Section
1983. It also asserts state law claims for unjust enrichment, a
violation of Article XVIII, Section 4 of the Ohio Constitution; and
seeks a declaratory judgment for a violation of the city Code.

On Sept. 9, 2020, the City filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings. The motion was accompanied by the current motion to stay
discovery. The City contends that a stay is necessary for two
reasons. The City asserts that Seattle House has failed to plead a
cognizable federal claim. Further, the City contends that the
burden of discovery is excessive and far outweighs any prejudice
Seattle House may suffer as a result of the stay.

Judge Deavers concludes that the City has failed to demonstrate
that a stay of discovery is justified. The case does not present a
question of immunity nor is the Complaint obviously frivolous such
that the Court could conclude that the motion for judgment on the
pleadings is likely to be granted. Rather, as noted, the essence of
the City's argument is that discovery should be stayed because its
motion for judgment on the pleadings is addressed to threshold
jurisdictional issues of standing and heightened pleading
requirements. Despite the City's effort to distinguish the nature
of its motion, its argument fails for several reasons.

The Judge notes that only the FHA claim is the focus of the City's
jurisdictional and heightened pleading standard challenges. The
City argues that Seattle House's Section 1983 claims are
insufficiently pled. Moreover, there is no heightened pleading
standard applicable to Section 1983 claims, citing Gambrel v. Knox
Cty., Ky., No. CV 17-184-DLB (E.D. Ky. Mar. 23, 2018).
Additionally, the Plaintiff's state law claims are not at issue. In
short, setting aside the City's challenges to the Plaintiff's FHA
claim, the City's motion falls within the realm of most
garden-variety motions.

At the same time, even if the City's motion turned solely on a
jurisdictional issue, that alone does not necessarily weigh in
favor of granting a stay, Judge Deavers opines. This is so even if
the jurisdictional challenge is directed to the issue of standing,
citing Boddie v. PNC Bank, NA, No. 2:12-CV-158 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 31,
2013).  Judge Deavers adds, among other things, that the City has
not demonstrated that discovery will be particularly burdensome in
the case.

The Judge also is not convinced that the particular status of the
case as a putative nationwide class action weighs in favor of a
complete stay. As Seattle House notes, the City's motion is not
directed to the state law claims. Consequently, even if the City's
motion for judgment on the pleadings is successful, those claims
will remain and the case will proceed somewhere. This additional
circumstance supports the conclusion that the City has not shown
that a stay of discovery is appropriate in the case.

For these reasons, Judge Deavers finds that the Defendant has not
carried its burden to show that a stay of discovery is appropriate
under the circumstances presented in the case. He, therefore,
concludes that a stay pending resolution of the Defendant's Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings is not warranted. The Defendant's
Motion to Stay Discovery is denied. The Defendant is ordered to
respond to the Plaintiff's outstanding discovery requests by Jan.
11, 2021, unless the parties agree to a different date.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion and Order dated Dec. 10,
2020, is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybjq6b3c from
Leagle.com.


ECOLAB INC: OxyCide Causes Injury to Hospital Staff, Adams Alleges
------------------------------------------------------------------
LATAVIA ADAMS v. ECOLAB INC. and DOES 1-100 inclusive, Case No.
0:20-cv-02436 (D. Minn., Dec. 2, 2020), is a complaint brought on
behalf of the Plaintiff and on behalf of all other similarly
situated seeking judgment against the Defendants for personal
injuries sustained by the Plaintiff and the class from the
Defendants' defective and unreasonably dangerous cleaning products,
OxyCide Daily Disinfectant Cleaner and OxyCide Dilution Management
System.

Since early 2013, when Ecolab first distributed its OxyCide
cleaning products to over 500 hospitals nationwide, hospital
workers have consistently and repeatedly reported serious physical
injuries associated with the use of Ecolab's OxyCide cleaning
products. These included burning eyes, nose, and throat, nasal
problems, cough, headache, dizziness, nausea, nose bleeds,
asthma-like symptoms, respiratory irritation, skin burns, rashes
and other reactions affecting their pulmonary and respiratory
functions, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff contends that despite advance notices of
complications arising from OxyCide cleaning products nationwide,
Ecolab refused to take affirmative action to analyze, test, study,
and/or recall their products. Instead, Ecolab is content with
endangering countless lives as Ecolab's products continue to be
sold. In addition, despite advance notice of adverse health issues
from OxyCide, Defendants continue to distribute OxyCide to
hospitals nationwide.

Plaintiff Latavia Adams has been severely harmed by Ecolab's toxic
and hazardous OxyCide cleaning products. The Plaintiff works as an
Environmental Service (EVS) technician at the University of Chicago
Medicine in Chicago, Illinois.

The Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, ordering the Defendants to
stop producing OxyCide and/or to properly and adequately warn of
the toxic chemicals in OxyCide cleaning products, as well as the
significant risks of injury with exposure to the product.

The Plaintiff further seeks that the warning be directed to
hospitals, healthcare professionals, employees, and/or the general
public at risk of exposure to the OxyCide cleaning products. The
Plaintiff also seeks compensatory and actual damages for the harm
suffered due to the foreseeable exposure to OxyCide cleaning
products.

Ecolab researches, designs, tests, inspects, manufactures,
develops, produces, assembles, services, installs, distributes,
markets, advertises, and/or sells a variety of water, hygiene,
cleaning, and energy products globally. The Defendants DOES 1-50
are the manufacturers, suppliers, distributors, trademark owners,
re-packagers, and/or and joint ventures of defective and toxic
chemical products and machines/equipment, including acetic acid and
hydrogen peroxide-based products or PAA products to which Plaintiff
was exposed which were substantial factors in causing her serious
and other consequential injuries.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Timothy Becker, Esq.
          Jacob Rusch, Esq.
          JOHNSON BECKER, PLLC
          444 Cedar St., Ste. 1800
          St. Paul, MN 55101
          Telephone: (612) 436-1800
          Facsimile: (612) 436-1801
          E-mail: tbecker@johnsonbecker.com
                  jrusch@johnsonbecker.com

               - and -

          Michele M. Vercoski, Esq.
          Richard D. McCune, Esq.
          Tuan Q. Nguyen, Esq.
          MCCUNE WRIGHT AREVALO LLP
          18565 Jamboree Road, Suite 550
          Irvine, CA 92612
          Telephone: (909) 557-1250
          Facsimile: (909) 557-1275
          E-mail: mmv@mccunewright.com
                  rdm@mccunewright.com
                  tqn@mccunewright.com

ECOLAB INC: OxyCide Causes Injury to Hospital Staff, Anderson Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
JUSTIN ANDERSON v. ECOLAB INC. and DOES 1-100 inclusive, Case No.
0:20-cv-02422 (D. Minn., Dec. 1, 2020), is a complaint brought on
behalf of the Plaintiff and on behalf of all other similarly
situated seeking judgment against the Defendants for personal
injuries sustained by the Plaintiff and the class from the
Defendants' defective and unreasonably dangerous cleaning products,
OxyCide Daily Disinfectant Cleaner and OxyCide Dilution Management
System.

Since early 2013, when Ecolab first distributed its OxyCide
cleaning products to over 500 hospitals nationwide, hospital
workers have consistently and repeatedly reported serious physical
injuries associated with the use of Ecolab's OxyCide cleaning
products. These included burning eyes, nose, and throat, nasal
problems, cough, headache, dizziness, nausea, nose bleeds,
asthma-like symptoms, respiratory irritation, skin burns, rashes
and other reactions affecting their pulmonary and respiratory
functions, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff contends that despite advance notices of
complications arising from OxyCide cleaning products nationwide,
Ecolab refused to take affirmative action to analyze, test, study,
and/or recall their products. Instead, Ecolab is content with
endangering countless lives as Ecolab's products continue to be
sold. In addition, despite advance notice of adverse health issues
from OxyCide, Defendants continue to distribute OxyCide to
hospitals nationwide.

The OxyCide cleaning products were manufactured, designed,
formulated, tested, packaged, labeled, produced, created, made,
constructed, assembled, marketed, advertised, promoted,
distributed, and/or sold by the Defendants.

Plaintiff Justin Anderson has been severely harmed by Ecolab's
toxic and hazardous OxyCide cleaning products. The Plaintiff worked
as a housekeeper at St. Luke’s Hospital, Monroe Campus in
Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania.

Ecolab researches, designs, tests, inspects, manufactures,
develops, produces, assembles, services, installs, distributes,
markets, advertises, and/or sells a variety of water, hygiene,
cleaning, and energy products globally. The Defendants DOES 1-50
are the manufacturers, suppliers, distributors, trademark owners,
re-packagers, and/or and joint ventures of defective and toxic
chemical products and machines/equipment, including acetic acid and
hydrogen peroxide-based products or PAA products to which Plaintiff
was exposed which were substantial factors in causing her serious
and other consequential injuries.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Timothy Becker, Esq.
          Jacob Rusch, Esq.
          JOHNSON BECKER, PLLC
          444 Cedar St., Ste. 1800
          St. Paul, MN 55101
          Telephone: (612) 436-1800
          Facsimile: (612) 436-1801
          E-mail: tbecker@johnsonbecker.com
                  jrusch@johnsonbecker.com

               - and -

          Michele M. Vercoski, Esq.
          Richard D. McCune, Esq.
          Tuan Q. Nguyen, Esq.
          MCCUNE WRIGHT AREVALO LLP
          18565 Jamboree Road, Suite 550
          Irvine, CA 92612
          Telephone: (909) 557-1250
          Facsimile: (909) 557-1275
          E-mail: mmv@mccunewright.com
                  rdm@mccunewright.co m
                  tqn@mccunewright.com

ECOLAB INC: OxyCide Causes Injury to Hospital Staff, Baugh Alleges
------------------------------------------------------------------
CHERRY BAUGH v. ECOLAB INC. and DOES 1-100 inclusive, Case No.
0:20-cv-02421 (D. Minn., Dec. 1, 2020), is a complaint brought on
behalf of the Plaintiff and on behalf of all other similarly
situated seeking judgment against the Defendants for personal
injuries sustained by the Plaintiff and the class from the
Defendants' defective and unreasonably dangerous cleaning products,
OxyCide Daily Disinfectant Cleaner and OxyCide Dilution Management
System.

Since early 2013, when Ecolab first distributed its OxyCide
Cleaning Products to over 500 hospitals nationwide, hospital
workers have consistently and repeatedly reported serious physical
injuries associated with the use of Ecolab's OxyCide Cleaning
Products. These included burning eyes, nose, and throat, nasal
problems, cough, headache, dizziness, nausea, nose bleeds,
asthma-like symptoms, respiratory irritation, skin burns, rashes
and other reactions affecting their pulmonary and respiratory
functions, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff contends that despite advance notices of
complications arising from OxyCide Cleaning Products nationwide,
Ecolab refused to take affirmative action to analyze, test, study,
and/or recall their products. Instead, Ecolab is content with
endangering countless lives as Ecolab's products continue to be
sold. In addition, despite advance notice of adverse health issues
from OxyCide, Defendants continue to distribute OxyCide to
hospitals nationwide.

Plaintiff Cherry Baugh has been severely harmed by Ecolab's toxic
and hazardous OxyCide Cleaning Products. The Plaintiff works as an
Environmental Service (EVS) technician at MercyOne Hospital in
Mason City, Iowa.

The Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, ordering the Defendants to
stop producing OxyCide and/or to properly and adequately warn of
the toxic chemicals in OxyCide Cleaning Products, as well as the
significant risks of injury with exposure to the product. The
Plaintiff seeks that the warning be directed to hospitals,
healthcare professionals, employees, and/or the general public at
risk of exposure to the OxyCide Cleaning Products. The Plaintiff
also seeks compensatory and actual damages for the harm suffered
due to the foreseeable exposure to OxyCide Cleaning Products.

Ecolab researches, designs, tests, inspects, manufactures,
develops, produces, assembles, services, installs, distributes,
markets, advertises, and/or sells a variety of water, hygiene,
cleaning, and energy products globally. The Defendants DOES 1-50
are the manufacturers, suppliers, distributors, trademark owners,
re-packagers, and/or and joint ventures of defective and toxic
chemical products and machines/equipment, including acetic acid and
hydrogen peroxide-based products or PAA products to which Plaintiff
was exposed which were substantial factors in causing her serious
and other consequential injuries.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Timothy Becker, Esq.
          Jacob Rusch, Esq.
          JOHNSON BECKER, PLLC
          444 Cedar St., Ste. 1800
          St. Paul, MN 55101
          Telephone: (612) 436-1800
          Facsimile: (612) 436-1801
          E-mail: tbecker@johnsonbecker.com
                  jrusch@johnsonbecker.com

               - and -

          Michele M. Vercoski, Esq.
          Richard D. McCune, Esq.
          Tuan Q. Nguyen, Esq.
          MCCUNE WRIGHT AREVALO LLP
          18565 Jamboree Road, Suite 550
          Irvine, CA 92612
          Telephone: (909) 557-1250
          Facsimile: (909) 557-1275
          E-mail: mmv@mccunewright.com
                  rdm@mccunewright.com
                  tqn@mccunewright.com

ECOLAB INC: OxyCide Causes Injury to Hospital Staff, Bielefeld Says
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DEBRA BIELEFELD v. ECOLAB INC. and DOES 1-100 inclusive, Case No.
0:20-cv-02425 (D. Minn., Dec. 1, 2020), is a complaint brought on
behalf of the Plaintiff and on behalf of all other similarly
situated seeking judgment against the Defendants for personal
injuries sustained by the Plaintiff and the class from the
Defendants' defective and unreasonably dangerous cleaning products,
OxyCide Daily Disinfectant Cleaner and OxyCide Dilution Management
System.

Since early 2013, when Ecolab first distributed its OxyCide
cleaning products to over 500 hospitals nationwide, hospital
workers have consistently and repeatedly reported serious physical
injuries associated with the use of Ecolab's OxyCide cleaning
products. These included burning eyes, nose, and throat, nasal
problems, cough, headache, dizziness, nausea, nose bleeds,
asthma-like symptoms, respiratory irritation, skin burns, rashes
and other reactions affecting their pulmonary and respiratory
functions, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff contends that despite advance notices of
complications arising from OxyCide cleaning products nationwide,
Ecolab refused to take affirmative action to analyze, test, study,
and/or recall their products. Instead, Ecolab is content with
endangering countless lives as Ecolab's products continue to be
sold. In addition, despite advance notice of adverse health issues
from OxyCide, Defendants continue to distribute OxyCide to
hospitals nationwide.

Plaintiff Debra Bielefeld has been severely harmed by Ecolab's
toxic and hazardous OxyCide cleaning products. The Plaintiff worked
as an Environmental Service (EVS) technician at MeryOne Hospital in
Mason City, Iowa.

The Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, ordering the Defendants to
stop producing OxyCide and/or to properly and adequately warn of
the toxic chemicals in OxyCide cleaning products, as well as the
significant risks of injury with exposure to the product. The
Plaintiff seeks that the warning be directed to hospitals,
healthcare professionals, employees, and/or the general public at
risk of exposure to the OxyCide cleaning products. The Plaintiff
also seeks compensatory and actual damages for the harm suffered
due to the foreseeable exposure to OxyCide cleaning products.

Ecolab researches, designs, tests, inspects, manufactures,
develops, produces, assembles, services, installs, distributes,
markets, advertises, and/or sells a variety of water, hygiene,
cleaning, and energy products globally. The Defendants DOES 1-50
are the manufacturers, suppliers, distributors, trademark owners,
re-packagers, and/or and joint ventures of defective and toxic
chemical products and machines/equipment, including acetic acid and
hydrogen peroxide-based products or PAA products to which Plaintiff
was exposed which were substantial factors in causing her serious
and other consequential injuries.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Timothy Becker, Esq.
          Jacob Rusch, Esq.
          JOHNSON BECKER, PLLC
          444 Cedar St., Ste. 1800
          St. Paul, MN 55101
          Telephone: (612) 436-1800
          Facsimile: (612) 436-1801
          E-mail: tbecker@johnsonbecker.com
                  jrusch@johnsonbecker.com

               - and -

          Michele M. Vercoski, Esq.
          Richard D. McCune, Esq.
          Tuan Q. Nguyen, Esq.
          MCCUNE WRIGHT AREVALO LLP
          18565 Jamboree Road, Suite 550
          Irvine, CA 92612
          Telephone: (909) 557-1250
          Facsimile: (909) 557-1275
          E-mail: mmv@mccunewright.com
                  rdm@mccunewright.com
                  tqn@mccunewright.com


ECOLAB INC: OxyCide Causes Injury to Hospital Staff, Broussard Says
-------------------------------------------------------------------
NARESIANA BROUSSARD v. ECOLAB INC. and DOES 1-100 inclusive, Case
No. 0:20-cv-02430-SRN-ECW (D. Minn., Dec. 1, 2020), is a complaint
brought on behalf of the Plaintiff and on behalf of all other
similarly situated seeking judgment against the Defendants for
personal injuries sustained by the Plaintiff and the class from the
Defendants' defective and unreasonably dangerous cleaning products,
OxyCide Daily Disinfectant Cleaner and OxyCide Dilution Management
System.

Since early 2013, when Ecolab first distributed its OxyCide
cleaning products to over 500 hospitals nationwide, hospital
workers have consistently and repeatedly reported serious physical
injuries associated with the use of Ecolab's OxyCide cleaning
products. These included burning eyes, nose, and throat, nasal
problems, cough, headache, dizziness, nausea, nose bleeds,
asthma-like symptoms, respiratory irritation, skin burns, rashes
and other reactions affecting their pulmonary and respiratory
functions, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff contends that despite advance notices of
complications arising from OxyCide cleaning products nationwide,
Ecolab refused to take affirmative action to analyze, test, study,
and/or recall their products. Instead, Ecolab is content with
endangering countless lives as Ecolab's products continue to be
sold. In addition, despite advance notice of adverse health issues
from OxyCide, Defendants continue to distribute OxyCide to
hospitals nationwide.

Plaintiff Naresiana Broussard has been severely harmed by Ecolab's
toxic and hazardous OxyCide cleaning products. The Plaintiff worked
as an Environmental Service (EVS) technician at Baylor Scott &
White Hospital in Baylor, Texas through a company called Aramark
Cleaning Services.

The Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, ordering the Defendants to
stop producing OxyCide and/or to properly and adequately warn of
the toxic chemicals in OxyCide cleaning products, as well as the
significant risks of injury with exposure to the product.

The Plaintiff seeks that the warning be directed to hospitals,
healthcare professionals, employees, and/or the general public at
risk of exposure to the OxyCide cleaning products. The Plaintiff
also seeks compensatory and actual damages for the harm suffered
due to the foreseeable exposure to OxyCide cleaning products.

Ecolab researches, designs, tests, inspects, manufactures,
develops, produces, assembles, services, installs, distributes,
markets, advertises, and/or sells a variety of water, hygiene,
cleaning, and energy products globally. The Defendants DOES 1-50
are the manufacturers, suppliers, distributors, trademark owners,
re-packagers, and/or and joint ventures of defective and toxic
chemical products and machines/equipment, including acetic acid and
hydrogen peroxide-based products or PAA products to which Plaintiff
was exposed which were substantial factors in causing her serious
and other consequential injuries.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Timothy Becker, Esq.
          Jacob Rusch, Esq.
          JOHNSON BECKER, PLLC
          444 Cedar St., Ste. 1800
          St. Paul, MN 55101
          Telephone: (612) 436-1800
          Facsimile: (612) 436-1801
          E-mail: tbecker@johnsonbecker.com
                  jrusch@johnsonbecker.com

               - and -

          Michele M. Vercoski, Esq.
          Richard D. McCune, Esq.
          Tuan Q. Nguyen, Esq.
          MCCUNE WRIGHT AREVALO LLP
          18565 Jamboree Road, Suite 550
          Irvine, CA 92612
          Telephone: (909) 557-1250
          Facsimile: (909) 557-1275
          E-mail: mmv@mccunewright.com
                  rdm@mccunewright.com
                  tqn@mccunewright.com

ECOLAB INC: OxyCide Causes Injury to Hospital Staff, Burton Alleges
-------------------------------------------------------------------
TONIA BURTON v. ECOLAB INC. and DOES 1-100 inclusive, Case No.
0:20-cv-02440-SRN-ECW (D. Minn., Dec. 2, 2020), is a complaint
brought on behalf of the Plaintiff and on behalf of all other
similarly situated seeking judgment against the Defendants for
personal injuries sustained by the Plaintiff and the class from the
Defendants' defective and unreasonably dangerous cleaning products,
OxyCide Daily Disinfectant Cleaner and OxyCide Dilution Management
System.

Since early 2013, when Ecolab first distributed its OxyCide
cleaning products to over 500 hospitals nationwide, hospital
workers have consistently and repeatedly reported serious physical
injuries associated with the use of Ecolab's OxyCide cleaning
products. These included burning eyes, nose, and throat, nasal
problems, cough, headache, dizziness, nausea, nose bleeds,
asthma-like symptoms, respiratory irritation, skin burns, rashes
and other reactions affecting their pulmonary and respiratory
functions, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff contends that despite advance notices of
complications arising from OxyCide cleaning products nationwide,
Ecolab refused to take affirmative action to analyze, test, study,
and/or recall their products. Instead, Ecolab is content with
endangering countless lives as Ecolab's products continue to be
sold. In addition, despite advance notice of adverse health issues
from OxyCide, Defendants continue to distribute OxyCide to
hospitals nationwide.

Plaintiff Tonia Burton has been severely harmed by Ecolab's toxic
and hazardous OxyCide cleaning products. Plaintiff works as an
Environmental Service (EVS) technician at Taylor Hospital in Ridley
Park, Pennsylvania.

The Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, ordering the Defendants to
stop producing OxyCide and/or to properly and adequately warn of
the toxic chemicals in OxyCide cleaning products, as well as the
significant risks of injury with exposure to the product.

The Plaintiff seeks that the warning be directed to hospitals,
healthcare professionals, employees, and/or the general public at
risk of exposure to the OxyCide cleaning products. The Plaintiff
also seeks compensatory and actual damages for the harm suffered
due to the foreseeable exposure to OxyCide cleaning products.

Ecolab researches, designs, tests, inspects, manufactures,
develops, produces, assembles, services, installs, distributes,
markets, advertises, and/or sells a variety of water, hygiene,
cleaning, and energy products globally. The Defendants DOES 1-50
are the manufacturers, suppliers, distributors, trademark owners,
re-packagers, and/or and joint ventures of defective and toxic
chemical products and machines/equipment, including acetic acid and
hydrogen peroxide-based products or PAA products to which Plaintiff
was exposed which were substantial factors in causing her serious
and other consequential injuries.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Timothy Becker, Esq.
          Jacob Rusch, Esq.
          JOHNSON BECKER, PLLC
          444 Cedar St., Ste. 1800
          St. Paul, MN 55101
          Telephone: (612) 436-1800
          Facsimile: (612) 436-1801
          E-mail: tbecker@johnsonbecker.com
                  jrusch@johnsonbecker.com

               - and -

          Michele M. Vercoski, Esq.
          Richard D. McCune, Esq.
          Tuan Q. Nguyen, Esq.
          MCCUNE WRIGHT AREVALO LLP
          18565 Jamboree Road, Suite 550
          Irvine, CA 92612
          Telephone: (909) 557-1250
          Facsimile: (909) 557-1275
          E-mail: mmv@mccunewright.com
                  rdm@mccunewright.com
                  tqn@mccunewright.com

ECOLAB INC: OxyCide Causes Injury to Hospital Staff, Hernandez Says
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DANNY HERNANDEZ v. ECOLAB INC. and DOES 1-100 inclusive, Case No.
0:20-cv-02416 (D. Minn., Dec. 1, 2020), is a complaint brought on
behalf of the Plaintiff and on behalf of all other similarly
situated seeking judgment against the Defendants for personal
injuries sustained by the Plaintiff and the class from the
Defendants' defective and unreasonably dangerous cleaning products,
OxyCide Daily Disinfectant Cleaner and OxyCide Dilution Management
System.

Since early 2013, when Ecolab first distributed its OxyCide
cleaning products to over 500 hospitals nationwide, hospital
workers have consistently and repeatedly reported serious physical
injuries associated with the use of Ecolab's OxyCide cleaning
products. These included burning eyes, nose, and throat, nasal
problems, cough, headache, dizziness, nausea, nose bleeds,
asthma-like symptoms, respiratory irritation, skin burns, rashes
and other reactions affecting their pulmonary and respiratory
functions, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff contends that despite advance notices of
complications arising from OxyCide cleaning products nationwide,
Ecolab refused to take affirmative action to analyze, test, study,
and/or recall their products. Instead, Ecolab is content with
endangering countless lives as Ecolab's products continue to be
sold. In addition, despite advance notice of adverse health issues
from OxyCide, Defendants continue to distribute OxyCide to
hospitals nationwide.

Plaintiff Danny Hernandez has been severely harmed by Ecolab's
toxic and hazardous OxyCide cleaning products. The Plaintiff worked
as a Lead Environmental Service (EVS) technician at Pomona Valley
Hospital in Pomona, California.

The Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, ordering the Defendants to
stop producing OxyCide and/or to properly and adequately warn of
the toxic chemicals in OxyCide cleaning products, as well as the
significant risks of injury with exposure to the product.

The Plaintiff seeks that the warning be directed to hospitals,
healthcare professionals, employees, and/or the general public at
risk of exposure to the OxyCide cleaning products. The Plaintiff
also seeks compensatory and actual damages for the harm suffered
due to the foreseeable exposure to OxyCide cleaning products.

Ecolab researches, designs, tests, inspects, manufactures,
develops, produces, assembles, services, installs, distributes,
markets, advertises, and/or sells a variety of water, hygiene,
cleaning, and energy products globally. The Defendants DOES 1-50
are the manufacturers, suppliers, distributors, trademark owners,
re-packagers, and/or and joint ventures of defective and toxic
chemical products and machines/equipment, including acetic acid and
hydrogen peroxide-based products or PAA products to which Plaintiff
was exposed which were substantial factors in causing her serious
and other consequential injuries.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Timothy Becker, Esq.
          Jacob Rusch, Esq.
          JOHNSON BECKER, PLLC
          444 Cedar St., Ste. 1800
          St. Paul, MN 55101
          Telephone: (612) 436-1800
          Facsimile: (612) 436-1801
          E-mail: tbecker@johnsonbecker.com
                  jrusch@johnsonbecker.com

               - and -

          Michele M. Vercoski, Esq.
          Richard D. McCune, Esq.
          Tuan Q. Nguyen, Esq.
          MCCUNE WRIGHT AREVALO LLP
          18565 Jamboree Road, Suite 550
          Irvine, CA 92612
          Telephone: (909) 557-1250
          Facsimile: (909) 557-1275
          E-mail: mmv@mccunewright.com
                  rdm@mccunewright.com
                  tqn@mccunewright.com


ECOLAB INC: OxyCide Causes Injury to Hospital Staff, Howard Alleges
-------------------------------------------------------------------
FRANCES HOWARD v. ECOLAB INC. and DOES 1-100 inclusive, Case No.
0:20-cv-02442 (D. Minn., Dec. 2, 2020), is a complaint brought on
behalf of the Plaintiff and on behalf of all other similarly
situated seeking judgment against the Defendants for personal
injuries sustained by the Plaintiff and the class from the
Defendants' defective and unreasonably dangerous cleaning products,
OxyCide Daily Disinfectant Cleaner and OxyCide Dilution Management
System.

Since early 2013, when Ecolab first distributed its OxyCide
cleaning products to over 500 hospitals nationwide, hospital
workers have consistently and repeatedly reported serious physical
injuries associated with the use of Ecolab's OxyCide cleaning
products. These included burning eyes, nose, and throat, nasal
problems, cough, headache, dizziness, nausea, nose bleeds,
asthma-like symptoms, respiratory irritation, skin burns, rashes
and other reactions affecting their pulmonary and respiratory
functions, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff contends that despite advance notices of
complications arising from OxyCide cleaning products nationwide,
Ecolab refused to take affirmative action to analyze, test, study,
and/or recall their products. Instead, Ecolab is content with
endangering countless lives as Ecolab's products continue to be
sold. In addition, despite advance notice of adverse health issues
from OxyCide, Defendants continue to distribute OxyCide to
hospitals nationwide.

Plaintiff Frances Howard has been severely harmed by Ecolab's toxic
and hazardous OxyCide cleaning products. The Plaintiff worked as an
Environmental Service (EVS) technician at Atrium Health in
Charlotte, North Carolina.

The Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, ordering the Defendants to
stop producing OxyCide and/or to properly and adequately warn of
the toxic chemicals in OxyCide Cleaning Products, as well as the
significant risks of injury with exposure to the product.

The Plaintiff seeks that the warning be directed to hospitals,
healthcare professionals, employees, and/or the general public at
risk of exposure to the OxyCide cleaning products. The Plaintiff
also seeks compensatory and actual damages for the harm suffered
due to the foreseeable exposure to OxyCide cleaning products.

Ecolab researches, designs, tests, inspects, manufactures,
develops, produces, assembles, services, installs, distributes,
markets, advertises, and/or sells a variety of water, hygiene,
cleaning, and energy products globally. The Defendants DOES 1-50
are the manufacturers, suppliers, distributors, trademark owners,
re-packagers, and/or and joint ventures of defective and toxic
chemical products and machines/equipment, including acetic acid and
hydrogen peroxide-based products or PAA products to which Plaintiff
was exposed which were substantial factors in causing her serious
and other consequential injuries.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Timothy Becker, Esq.
          Jacob Rusch, Esq.
          JOHNSON BECKER, PLLC
          444 Cedar St., Ste. 1800
          St. Paul, MN 55101
          Telephone: (612) 436-1800
          Facsimile: (612) 436-1801
          E-mail: tbecker@johnsonbecker.com
                  jrusch@johnsonbecker.com

               - and -

          Michele M. Vercoski, Esq.
          Richard D. McCune, Esq.
          Tuan Q. Nguyen, Esq.
          MCCUNE WRIGHT AREVALO LLP
          18565 Jamboree Road, Suite 550
          Irvine, CA 92612
          Telephone: (909) 557-1250
          Facsimile: (909) 557-1275
          E-mail: mmv@mccunewright.com
                  rdm@mccunewright.com
                  tqn@mccunewright.com

ECOLAB INC: OxyCide Causes Injury to Hospital Staff, Hubbard Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
LANA HUBBARD v. ECOLAB INC. and DOES 1-100 inclusive, Case No.
0:20-cv-02413-SRN-ECW (D. Minn., Dec. 1, 2020), is a complaint
brought on behalf of the Plaintiff and on behalf of all other
similarly situated seeking judgment against the Defendants for
personal injuries sustained by the Plaintiff and the class from the
Defendants' defective and unreasonably dangerous cleaning products,
OxyCide Daily Disinfectant Cleaner and OxyCide Dilution Management
System.

Since early 2013, when Ecolab first distributed its OxyCide
cleaning products to over 500 hospitals nationwide, hospital
workers have consistently and repeatedly reported serious physical
injuries associated with the use of Ecolab's OxyCide cleaning
products. These included burning eyes, nose, and throat, nasal
problems, cough, headache, dizziness, nausea, nose bleeds,
asthma-like symptoms, respiratory irritation, skin burns, rashes
and other reactions affecting their pulmonary and respiratory
functions, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff contends that despite advance notices of
complications arising from OxyCide cleaning products nationwide,
Ecolab refused to take affirmative action to analyze, test, study,
and/or recall their products. Instead, Ecolab is content with
endangering countless lives as Ecolab's products continue to be
sold. In addition, despite advance notice of adverse health issues
from OxyCide, Defendants continue to distribute OxyCide to
hospitals nationwide.

Plaintiff Lana Hubbard has been severely harmed by Ecolab's toxic
and hazardous OxyCide cleaning products. The Plaintiff worked as an
Environmental Service (EVS) technician at Mercy Hospital in Cedar
Rapides, Iowa.

The Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, ordering the Defendants to
stop producing OxyCide and/or to properly and adequately warn of
the toxic chemicals in OxyCide cleaning products, as well as the
significant risks of injury with exposure to the product.

The Plaintiff further asserts that the warning be directed to
hospitals, healthcare professionals, employees, and/or the general
public at risk of exposure to the OxyCide cleaning products. The
Plaintiff also seeks compensatory and actual damages for the harm
suffered due to the foreseeable exposure to OxyCide cleaning
products.

Ecolab researches, designs, tests, inspects, manufactures,
develops, produces, assembles, services, installs, distributes,
markets, advertises, and/or sells a variety of water, hygiene,
cleaning, and energy products globally. The Defendants DOES 1-50
are the manufacturers, suppliers, distributors, trademark owners,
re-packagers, and/or and joint ventures of defective and toxic
chemical products and machines/equipment, including acetic acid and
hydrogen peroxide-based products or PAA products to which Plaintiff
was exposed which were substantial factors in causing her serious
and other consequential injuries.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Timothy Becker, Esq.
          Jacob Rusch, Esq.
          JOHNSON BECKER, PLLC
          444 Cedar St., Ste. 1800
          St. Paul, MN 55101
          Telephone: (612) 436-1800
          Facsimile: (612) 436-1801
          E-mail: tbecker@johnsonbecker.com
                  jrusch@johnsonbecker.com

               - and -

          Michele M. Vercoski, Esq.
          Richard D. McCune, Esq.
          Tuan Q. Nguyen, Esq.
          MCCUNE WRIGHT AREVALO LLP
          18565 Jamboree Road, Suite 550
          Irvine, CA 92612
          Telephone: (909) 557-1250
          Facsimile: (909) 557-1275
          E-mail: mmv@mccunewright.com
                  rdm@mccunewright.com
                  tqn@mccunewright.com

ECOLAB INC: OxyCide Causes Injury to Hospital Staff, McMullan Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
ROMEL MCMULLAN v. ECOLAB INC. and DOES 1-100 inclusive, Case No.
0:20-cv-02428-SRN-ECW (D. Minn., Dec. 1, 2020), is a complaint
brought on behalf of the Plaintiff and on behalf of all other
similarly situated seeking judgment against the Defendants for
personal injuries sustained by the Plaintiff and the class from the
Defendants' defective and unreasonably dangerous cleaning products,
OxyCide Daily Disinfectant Cleaner and OxyCide Dilution Management
System.

Since early 2013, when Ecolab first distributed its OxyCide
cleaning products to over 500 hospitals nationwide, hospital
workers have consistently and repeatedly reported serious physical
injuries associated with the use of Ecolab's OxyCide cleaning
products. These included burning eyes, nose, and throat, nasal
problems, cough, headache, dizziness, nausea, nose bleeds,
asthma-like symptoms, respiratory irritation, skin burns, rashes
and other reactions affecting their pulmonary and respiratory
functions, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff contends that despite advance notices of
complications arising from OxyCide cleaning products nationwide,
Ecolab refused to take affirmative action to analyze, test, study,
and/or recall their products. Instead, Ecolab is content with
endangering countless lives as Ecolab's products continue to be
sold. In addition, despite advance notice of adverse health issues
from OxyCide, Defendants continue to distribute OxyCide to
hospitals nationwide.

Plaintiff Romel McMullan has been severely harmed by Ecolab's toxic
and hazardous OxyCide cleaning products. The Plaintiff worked as an
Environmental Service (EVS) technician at University of Michigan
Hospital in Ann Arbor, Michigan.

The Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, ordering the Defendants to
stop producing OxyCide and/or to properly and adequately warn of
the toxic chemicals in OxyCide cleaning products, as well as the
significant risks of injury with exposure to the product.

The Plaintiff further asserts that the warning be directed to
hospitals, healthcare professionals, employees, and/or the general
public at risk of exposure to the OxyCide cleaning products. The
Plaintiff also seeks compensatory and actual damages for the harm
suffered due to the foreseeable exposure to OxyCide cleaning
products.

Ecolab researches, designs, tests, inspects, manufactures,
develops, produces, assembles, services, installs, distributes,
markets, advertises, and/or sells a variety of water, hygiene,
cleaning, and energy products globally. The Defendants DOES 1-50
are the manufacturers, suppliers, distributors, trademark owners,
re-packagers, and/or and joint ventures of defective and toxic
chemical products and machines/equipment, including acetic acid and
hydrogen peroxide-based products or PAA products to which Plaintiff
was exposed which were substantial factors in causing her serious
and other consequential injuries.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Timothy Becker, Esq.
          Jacob Rusch, Esq.
          JOHNSON BECKER, PLLC
          444 Cedar St., Ste. 1800
          St. Paul, MN 55101
          Telephone: (612) 436-1800
          Facsimile: (612) 436-1801
          E-mail: tbecker@johnsonbecker.com
                  jrusch@johnsonbecker.com

               - and -

          Michele M. Vercoski, Esq.
          Richard D. McCune, Esq.
          Tuan Q. Nguyen, Esq.
          MCCUNE WRIGHT AREVALO LLP
          18565 Jamboree Road, Suite 550
          Irvine, CA 92612
          Telephone: (909) 557-1250
          Facsimile: (909) 557-1275
          E-mail: mmv@mccunewright.com
                  rdm@mccunewright.com
                  tqn@mccunewright.com

ECOLAB INC: OxyCide Causes Injury to Hospital Staff, Neal Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------------
RASHONDA NEAL v. ECOLAB INC. and DOES 1-100 inclusive, Case No.
0:20-cv-02429 (D. Minn., Dec. 1, 2020), is a complaint brought on
behalf of the Plaintiff and on behalf of all other similarly
situated seeking judgment against the Defendants for personal
injuries sustained by the Plaintiff and the class from the
Defendants' defective and unreasonably dangerous cleaning products,
OxyCide Daily Disinfectant Cleaner and OxyCide Dilution Management
System.

Since early 2013, when Ecolab first distributed its OxyCide
cleaning products to over 500 hospitals nationwide, hospital
workers have consistently and repeatedly reported serious physical
injuries associated with the use of Ecolab's OxyCide cleaning
products. These included burning eyes, nose, and throat, nasal
problems, cough, headache, dizziness, nausea, nose bleeds,
asthma-like symptoms, respiratory irritation, skin burns, rashes
and other reactions affecting their pulmonary and respiratory
functions, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff contends that despite advance notices of
complications arising from OxyCide cleaning products nationwide,
Ecolab refused to take affirmative action to analyze, test, study,
and/or recall their products. Instead, Ecolab is content with
endangering countless lives as Ecolab's products continue to be
sold. In addition, despite advance notice of adverse health issues
from OxyCide, Defendants continue to distribute OxyCide to
hospitals nationwide.

Plaintiff Rashonda Neal has been severely harmed by Ecolab's toxic
and hazardous OxyCide cleaning products. The Plaintiff works as an
Environmental Service (EVS) technician at Taylor Hospital in Ridley
Park, Pennsylvania.

The Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, ordering the Defendants to
stop producing OxyCide and/or to properly and adequately warn of
the toxic chemicals in OxyCide cleaning products, as well as the
significant risks of injury with exposure to the product.

The Plaintiff further seeks that the warning be directed to
hospitals, healthcare professionals, employees, and/or the general
public at risk of exposure to the OxyCide cleaning products. The
Plaintiff also seeks compensatory and actual damages for the harm
suffered due to the foreseeable exposure to OxyCide cleaning
products.

Ecolab researches, designs, tests, inspects, manufactures,
develops, produces, assembles, services, installs, distributes,
markets, advertises, and/or sells a variety of water, hygiene,
cleaning, and energy products globally. The Defendants DOES 1-50
are the manufacturers, suppliers, distributors, trademark owners,
re-packagers, and/or and joint ventures of defective and toxic
chemical products and machines/equipment, including acetic acid and
hydrogen peroxide-based products or PAA products to which Plaintiff
was exposed which were substantial factors in causing her serious
and other consequential injuries.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Timothy Becker, Esq.
          Jacob Rusch, Esq.
          JOHNSON BECKER, PLLC
          444 Cedar St., Ste. 1800
          St. Paul, MN 55101
          Telephone: (612) 436-1800
          Facsimile: (612) 436-1801
          E-mail: tbecker@johnsonbecker.com
                  jrusch@johnsonbecker.com

               - and -

          Michele M. Vercoski, Esq.
          Richard D. McCune, Esq.
          Tuan Q. Nguyen, Esq.
          MCCUNE WRIGHT AREVALO LLP
          18565 Jamboree Road, Suite 550
          Irvine, CA 92612
          Telephone: (909) 557-1250
          Facsimile: (909) 557-1275
          E-mail: mmv@mccunewright.com
                  rdm@mccunewright.com
                  tqn@mccunewright.com

ECOLAB INC: OxyCide Causes Injury to Hospital Staff, Rios Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------------
YOLANDA RIOS v. ECOLAB INC. and DOES 1-100 inclusive, Case No.
0:20-cv-02438-SRN-ECW (D. Minn., Dec. 2, 2020), is a complaint
brought on behalf of the Plaintiff and on behalf of all other
similarly situated seeking judgment against the Defendants for
personal injuries sustained by the Plaintiff and the class from the
Defendants' defective and unreasonably dangerous cleaning products,
OxyCide Daily Disinfectant Cleaner and OxyCide Dilution Management
System.

Since early 2013, when Ecolab first distributed its OxyCide
cleaning products to over 500 hospitals nationwide, hospital
workers have consistently and repeatedly reported serious physical
injuries associated with the use of Ecolab's OxyCide cleaning
products. These included burning eyes, nose, and throat, nasal
problems, cough, headache, dizziness, nausea, nose bleeds,
asthma-like symptoms, respiratory irritation, skin burns, rashes
and other reactions affecting their pulmonary and respiratory
functions, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff contends that despite advance notices of
complications arising from OxyCide cleaning products nationwide,
Ecolab refused to take affirmative action to analyze, test, study,
and/or recall their products. Instead, Ecolab is content with
endangering countless lives as Ecolab's products continue to be
sold. In addition, despite advance notice of adverse health issues
from OxyCide, Defendants continue to distribute OxyCide to
hospitals nationwide.

Plaintiff Yolanda Rios has been severely harmed by Ecolab's toxic
and hazardous OxyCide cleaning products. Plaintiff works as an
Environmental Service (EVS) technician at Pomona Valley Hospital in
Pomona, California.

The Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, ordering the Defendants to
stop producing OxyCide and/or to properly and adequately warn of
the toxic chemicals in OxyCide cleaning products, as well as the
significant risks of injury with exposure to the product.

The Plaintiff seeks that the warning be directed to hospitals,
healthcare professionals, employees, and/or the general public at
risk of exposure to the OxyCide cleaning products. The Plaintiff
also seeks compensatory and actual damages for the harm suffered
due to the foreseeable exposure to OxyCide cleaning products.

Ecolab researches, designs, tests, inspects, manufactures,
develops, produces, assembles, services, installs, distributes,
markets, advertises, and/or sells a variety of water, hygiene,
cleaning, and energy products globally. The Defendants DOES 1-50
are the manufacturers, suppliers, distributors, trademark owners,
re-packagers, and/or and joint ventures of defective and toxic
chemical products and machines/equipment, including acetic acid and
hydrogen peroxide-based products or PAA products to which Plaintiff
was exposed which were substantial factors in causing her serious
and other consequential injuries.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Timothy Becker, Esq.
          Jacob Rusch, Esq.
          JOHNSON BECKER, PLLC
          444 Cedar St., Ste. 1800
          St. Paul, MN 55101
          Telephone: (612) 436-1800
          Facsimile: (612) 436-1801
          E-mail: tbecker@johnsonbecker.com
                  jrusch@johnsonbecker.com

               - and -

          Michele M. Vercoski, Esq.
          Richard D. McCune, Esq.
          Tuan Q. Nguyen, Esq.
          MCCUNE WRIGHT AREVALO LLP
          18565 Jamboree Road, Suite 550
          Irvine, CA 92612
          Telephone: (909) 557-1250
          Facsimile: (909) 557-1275
          E-mail: mmv@mccunewright.com
                  rdm@mccunewright.com
                  tqn@mccunewright.com


ECOLAB INC: OxyCide Causes Injury to Hospital Staff, Sonneborn Says
-------------------------------------------------------------------
MARJORIE SONNEBORN v. ECOLAB INC. and DOES 1-100 inclusive, Case
No. :20-cv-02457 (D. Minn., Dec. 3, 2020), is a complaint brought
on behalf of the Plaintiff and on behalf of all other similarly
situated seeking judgment against the Defendants for personal
injuries sustained by the Plaintiff and the class from the
Defendants' defective and unreasonably dangerous cleaning products,
OxyCide Daily Disinfectant Cleaner and OxyCide Dilution Management
System.

Since early 2013, when Ecolab first distributed its OxyCide
cleaning products to over 500 hospitals nationwide, hospital
workers have consistently and repeatedly reported serious physical
injuries associated with the use of Ecolab's OxyCide cleaning
products. These included burning eyes, nose, and throat, nasal
problems, cough, headache, dizziness, nausea, nose bleeds,
asthma-like symptoms, respiratory irritation, skin burns, rashes
and other reactions affecting their pulmonary and respiratory
functions, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff contends that despite advance notices of
complications arising from OxyCide cleaning products nationwide,
Ecolab refused to take affirmative action to analyze, test, study,
and/or recall their products. Instead, Ecolab is content with
endangering countless lives as Ecolab's products continue to be
sold. In addition, despite advance notice of adverse health issues
from OxyCide, Defendants continue to distribute OxyCide to
hospitals nationwide.

Plaintiff Marjorie Sonneborn has been severely harmed by Ecolab's
toxic and hazardous OxyCide cleaning products. The Plaintiff works
as a housekeeper at Community Medical Center in Missoula, Montana.

The Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, ordering the Defendants to
stop producing OxyCide and/or to properly and adequately warn of
the toxic chemicals in OxyCide cleaning products, as well as the
significant risks of injury with exposure to the product.

The Plaintiff further seeks that the warning be directed to
hospitals, healthcare professionals, employees, and/or the general
public at risk of exposure to the OxyCide cleaning products. The
Plaintiff also seeks compensatory and actual damages for the harm
suffered due to the foreseeable exposure to OxyCide cleaning
products.

Ecolab researches, designs, tests, inspects, manufactures,
develops, produces, assembles, services, installs, distributes,
markets, advertises, and/or sells a variety of water, hygiene,
cleaning, and energy products globally. The Defendants DOES 1-50
are the manufacturers, suppliers, distributors, trademark owners,
re-packagers, and/or and joint ventures of defective and toxic
chemical products and machines/equipment, including acetic acid and
hydrogen peroxide-based products or PAA products to which Plaintiff
was exposed which were substantial factors in causing her serious
and other consequential injuries.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Timothy Becker, Esq.
          Jacob Rusch, Esq.
          JOHNSON BECKER, PLLC
          444 Cedar St., Ste. 1800
          St. Paul, MN 55101
          Telephone: (612) 436-1800
          Facsimile: (612) 436-1801
          E-mail: tbecker@johnsonbecker.com
                  jrusch@johnsonbecker.com

               - and -

          Michele M. Vercoski, Esq.
          Richard D. McCune, Esq.
          Tuan Q. Nguyen, Esq.
          MCCUNE WRIGHT AREVALO LLP
          18565 Jamboree Road, Suite 550
          Irvine, CA 92612
          Telephone: (909) 557-1250
          Facsimile: (909) 557-1275
          E-mail: mmv@mccunewright.com
                  rdm@mccunewright.com
                  tqn@mccunewright.com

ECOLAB INC: OxyCide Causes Injury to Hospital Staff, Tilley Alleges
-------------------------------------------------------------------
KATINA TILLEY v. ECOLAB INC. and DOES 1-100 inclusive, Case No.
0:20-cv-02456 (D. Minn., Dec. 3, 2020), is a complaint brought on
behalf of the Plaintiff and on behalf of all other similarly
situated seeking judgment against the Defendants for personal
injuries sustained by the Plaintiff and the class from the
Defendants' defective and unreasonably dangerous cleaning products,
OxyCide Daily Disinfectant Cleaner and OxyCide Dilution Management
System.

Since early 2013, when Ecolab first distributed its OxyCide
cleaning products to over 500 hospitals nationwide, hospital
workers have consistently and repeatedly reported serious physical
injuries associated with the use of Ecolab's OxyCide cleaning
products. These included burning eyes, nose, and throat, nasal
problems, cough, headache, dizziness, nausea, nose bleeds,
asthma-like symptoms, respiratory irritation, skin burns, rashes
and other reactions affecting their pulmonary and respiratory
functions, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff contends that despite advance notices of
complications arising from OxyCide cleaning products nationwide,
Ecolab refused to take affirmative action to analyze, test, study,
and/or recall their products. Instead, Ecolab is content with
endangering countless lives as Ecolab's products continue to be
sold. In addition, despite advance notice of adverse health issues
from OxyCide, Defendants continue to distribute OxyCide to
hospitals nationwide.

Plaintiff Katina Tilley has been severely harmed by Ecolab's toxic
and hazardous OxyCide cleaning products. The Plaintiff worked as an
Environmental Service (EVS) supervisor at Mercy Hospital in Cedar
Rapids, Iowa and an EVS technician at Virginia Gay Hospital in
Vinton, Iowa.

The Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, ordering the Defendants to
stop producing OxyCide and/or to properly and adequately warn of
the toxic chemicals in OxyCide cleaning products, as well as the
significant risks of injury with exposure to the product.

The Plaintiff seeks that the warning be directed to hospitals,
healthcare professionals, employees, and/or the general public at
risk of exposure to the OxyCide cleaning products. The Plaintiff
also seeks compensatory and actual damages for the harm suffered
due to the foreseeable exposure to OxyCide cleaning products.

Ecolab researches, designs, tests, inspects, manufactures,
develops, produces, assembles, services, installs, distributes,
markets, advertises, and/or sells a variety of water, hygiene,
cleaning, and energy products globally. The Defendants DOES 1-50
are the manufacturers, suppliers, distributors, trademark owners,
re-packagers, and/or and joint ventures of defective and toxic
chemical products and machines/equipment, including acetic acid and
hydrogen peroxide-based products or PAA products to which Plaintiff
was exposed which were substantial factors in causing her serious
and other consequential injuries.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Timothy Becker, Esq.
          Jacob Rusch, Esq.
          JOHNSON BECKER, PLLC
          444 Cedar St., Ste. 1800
          St. Paul, MN 55101
          Telephone: (612) 436-1800
          Facsimile: (612) 436-1801
          E-mail: tbecker@johnsonbecker.com
                  jrusch@johnsonbecker.com

               - and -

          Michele M. Vercoski, Esq.
          Richard D. McCune, Esq.
          Tuan Q. Nguyen, Esq.
          MCCUNE WRIGHT AREVALO LLP
          18565 Jamboree Road, Suite 550
          Irvine, CA 92612
          Telephone: (909) 557-1250
          Facsimile: (909) 557-1275
          E-mail: mmv@mccunewright.com
                  rdm@mccunewright.com
                  tqn@mccunewright.com

ECOLAB INC: OxyCide Causes Injury to Hospital Staff, Walker Alleges
-------------------------------------------------------------------
CHRISTINE WALKER v. ECOLAB INC. and DOES 1-100 inclusive, Case No.
0:20-cv-02420-SRN-ECW (D. Minn., Dec. 1, 2020), is a complaint
brought on behalf of the Plaintiff and on behalf of all other
similarly situated seeking judgment against the Defendants for
personal injuries sustained by the Plaintiff and the class from the
Defendants' defective and unreasonably dangerous cleaning products,
OxyCide Daily Disinfectant Cleaner and OxyCide Dilution Management
System.

Since early 2013, when Ecolab first distributed its OxyCide
cleaning products to over 500 hospitals nationwide, hospital
workers have consistently and repeatedly reported serious physical
injuries associated with the use of Ecolab's OxyCide cleaning
products. These included burning eyes, nose, and throat, nasal
problems, cough, headache, dizziness, nausea, nose bleeds,
asthma-like symptoms, respiratory irritation, skin burns, rashes
and other reactions affecting their pulmonary and respiratory
functions, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff contends that despite advance notices of
complications arising from OxyCide cleaning products nationwide,
Ecolab refused to take affirmative action to analyze, test, study,
and/or recall their products. Instead, Ecolab is content with
endangering countless lives as Ecolab's products continue to be
sold. In addition, despite advance notice of adverse health issues
from OxyCide, Defendants continue to distribute OxyCide to
hospitals nationwide.

Plaintiff Christine Walker has been severely harmed by Ecolab's
toxic and  hazardous OxyCide cleaning products. The Plaintiff works
as an Environmental Service (EVS) technician at Crozer-Keystone
Medical in Ridley Park, Pennsylvania.

The Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, ordering the Defendants to
stop producing OxyCide and/or to properly and adequately warn of
the toxic chemicals in OxyCide cleaning products, as well as the
significant risks of injury with exposure to the product.

The Plaintiff further seeks that the warning be directed to
hospitals, healthcare professionals, employees, and/or the general
public at risk of exposure to the OxyCide cleaning products. The
Plaintiff also seeks compensatory and actual damages for the harm
suffered due to the foreseeable exposure to OxyCide cleaning
products.

Ecolab researches, designs, tests, inspects, manufactures,
develops, produces, assembles, services, installs, distributes,
markets, advertises, and/or sells a variety of water, hygiene,
cleaning, and energy products globally. The Defendants DOES 1-50
are the manufacturers, suppliers, distributors, trademark owners,
re-packagers, and/or and joint ventures of defective and toxic
chemical products and machines/equipment, including acetic acid and
hydrogen peroxide-based products or PAA products to which Plaintiff
was exposed which were substantial factors in causing her serious
and other consequential injuries.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Timothy Becker, Esq.
          Jacob Rusch, Esq.
          JOHNSON BECKER, PLLC
          444 Cedar St., Ste. 1800
          St. Paul, MN 55101
          Telephone: (612) 436-1800
          Facsimile: (612) 436-1801
          E-mail: tbecker@johnsonbecker.com
                  jrusch@johnsonbecker.com

               - and -

          Michele M. Vercoski, Esq.
          Richard D. McCune, Esq.
          Tuan Q. Nguyen, Esq.
          MCCUNE WRIGHT AREVALO LLP
          18565 Jamboree Road, Suite 550
          Irvine, CA 92612
          Telephone: (909) 557-1250
          Facsimile: (909) 557-1275
          E-mail: mmv@mccunewright.com
                  rdm@mccunewright.com
                  tqn@mccunewright.com


ECOLAB INC: OxyCide Causes Injury to Hospital Staff, Yasurek Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
LISA YASUREK v. ECOLAB INC. and DOES 1-100 inclusive, Case No.
0:20-cv-02437-SRN-ECW (D. Minn., Dec. 2, 2020), is a complaint
brought on behalf of the Plaintiff and on behalf of all other
similarly situated seeking judgment against the Defendants for
personal injuries sustained by the Plaintiff and the class from the
Defendants' defective and unreasonably dangerous cleaning products,
OxyCide Daily Disinfectant Cleaner and OxyCide Dilution Management
System.

Since early 2013, when Ecolab first distributed its OxyCide
cleaning products to over 500 hospitals nationwide, hospital
workers have consistently and repeatedly reported serious physical
injuries associated with the use of Ecolab's OxyCide cleaning
products. These included burning eyes, nose, and throat, nasal
problems, cough, headache, dizziness, nausea, nose bleeds,
asthma-like symptoms, respiratory irritation, skin burns, rashes
and other reactions affecting their pulmonary and respiratory
functions, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff contends that despite advance notices of
complications arising from OxyCide cleaning products nationwide,
Ecolab refused to take affirmative action to analyze, test, study,
and/or recall their products. Instead, Ecolab is content with
endangering countless lives as Ecolab's products continue to be
sold. In addition, despite advance notice of adverse health issues
from OxyCide, Defendants continue to distribute OxyCide to
hospitals nationwide.

Plaintiff Lisa Yasurek has been severely harmed by Ecolab's toxic
and hazardous OxyCide cleaning products. The Plaintiff works as a
housekeeper at Excela Health Latrobe Hospital in Latrobe,
Pennsylvania.

The Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, ordering the Defendants to
stop producing OxyCide and/or to properly and adequately warn of
the toxic chemicals in OxyCide cleaning products, as well as the
significant risks of injury with exposure to the product.

The Plaintiff seeks that the warning be directed to hospitals,
healthcare professionals, employees, and/or the general public at
risk of exposure to the OxyCide cleaning products. The Plaintiff
also seeks compensatory and actual damages for the harm suffered
due to the foreseeable exposure to OxyCide cleaning products.

Ecolab researches, designs, tests, inspects, manufactures,
develops, produces, assembles, services, installs, distributes,
markets, advertises, and/or sells a variety of water, hygiene,
cleaning, and energy products globally. The Defendants DOES 1-50
are the manufacturers, suppliers, distributors, trademark owners,
re-packagers, and/or and joint ventures of defective and toxic
chemical products and machines/equipment, including acetic acid and
hydrogen peroxide-based products or PAA products to which Plaintiff
was exposed which were substantial factors in causing her serious
and other consequential injuries.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Timothy Becker, Esq.
          Jacob Rusch, Esq.
          JOHNSON BECKER, PLLC
          444 Cedar St., Ste. 1800
          St. Paul, MN 55101
          Telephone: (612) 436-1800
          Facsimile: (612) 436-1801
          E-mail: tbecker@johnsonbecker.com
                  jrusch@johnsonbecker.com

               - and -

          Michele M. Vercoski, Esq.
          Richard D. McCune, Esq.
          Tuan Q. Nguyen, Esq.
          MCCUNE WRIGHT AREVALO LLP
          18565 Jamboree Road, Suite 550
          Irvine, CA 92612
          Telephone: (909) 557-1250
          Facsimile: (909) 557-1275
          E-mail: mmv@mccunewright.com
                  rdm@mccunewright.com
                  tqn@mccunewright.com

ECOLAB INC: OxyCide Cleaners Injure Hospital Staff, McCullough Says
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DORA MCCULLOUGH v. ECOLAB INC. and DOES 1-100 inclusive, Case No.
0:20-cv-02423 (D. Minn., Dec. 1, 2020), is a complaint brought on
behalf of the Plaintiff and on behalf of all other similarly
situated seeking judgment against the Defendants for personal
injuries sustained by the Plaintiff and the class from the
Defendants' defective and unreasonably dangerous cleaning products,
OxyCide Daily Disinfectant Cleaner and OxyCide Dilution Management
System.

Since early 2013, when Ecolab first distributed its OxyCide
cleaning products to over 500 hospitals nationwide, hospital
workers have consistently and repeatedly reported serious physical
injuries associated with the use of Ecolab's OxyCide cleaning
products. These included burning eyes, nose, and throat, nasal
problems, cough, headache, dizziness, nausea, nose bleeds,
asthma-like symptoms, respiratory irritation, skin burns, rashes
and other reactions affecting their pulmonary and respiratory
functions, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff contends that despite advance notices of
complications arising from OxyCide cleaning products nationwide,
Ecolab refused to take affirmative action to analyze, test, study,
and/or recall their products. Instead, Ecolab is content with
endangering countless lives as Ecolab's products continue to be
sold. In addition, despite advance notice of adverse health issues
from OxyCide, Defendants continue to distribute OxyCide to
hospitals nationwide.

Plaintiff Dora McCullough has been severely harmed by Ecolab's
toxic and hazardous OxyCide cleaning products. The Plaintiff works
as an Environmental Service (EVS) technician at Cape Fear Valley
Medical Center in Fayetteville, North Carolina.

The Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, ordering the Defendants to
stop producing OxyCide and/or to properly and adequately warn of
the toxic chemicals in OxyCide cleaning products, as well as the
significant risks of injury with exposure to the product.

The Plaintiff further asserts that the warning be directed to
hospitals, healthcare professionals, employees, and/or the general
public at risk of exposure to the OxyCide cleaning products. The
Plaintiff also seeks compensatory and actual damages for the harm
suffered due to the foreseeable exposure to OxyCide cleaning
products.

Ecolab researches, designs, tests, inspects, manufactures,
develops, produces, assembles, services, installs, distributes,
markets, advertises, and/or sells a variety of water, hygiene,
cleaning, and energy products globally. The Defendants DOES 1-50
are the manufacturers, suppliers, distributors, trademark owners,
re-packagers, and/or and joint ventures of defective and toxic
chemical products and machines/equipment, including acetic acid and
hydrogen peroxide-based products or PAA products to which Plaintiff
was exposed which were substantial factors in causing her serious
and other consequential injuries.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Timothy Becker, Esq.
          Jacob Rusch, Esq.
          JOHNSON BECKER, PLLC
          444 Cedar St., Ste. 1800
          St. Paul, MN 55101
          Telephone: (612) 436-1800
          Facsimile: (612) 436-1801
          E-mail: tbecker@johnsonbecker.com
                  jrusch@johnsonbecker.com

               - and -

          Michele M. Vercoski, Esq.
          Richard D. McCune, Esq.
          Tuan Q. Nguyen, Esq.
          MCCUNE WRIGHT AREVALO LLP
          18565 Jamboree Road, Suite 550
          Irvine, CA 92612
          Telephone: (909) 557-1250
          Facsimile: (909) 557-1275
          E-mail: mmv@mccunewright.com
                  rdm@mccunewright.com
                  tqn@mccunewright.com

EQUITY BANCSHARES: N.Y. Court Dismisses Securities Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------------
Shearman & Sterling LLP, in an article for Lexology, reports that
on October 14, 2020, Judge Alison J. Nathan of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed with
prejudice a putative class action asserting claims under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 against a lending company and
certain of its executives. Burr v. Equity Bancshares, Inc., No.
19-cv-4346 (AJN), slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2020). Plaintiffs
alleged that the company failed to disclose problems with its
largest credit relationship -- involving two companies that
ultimately declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy -- and that its loan loss
reserves in its disclosures to the SEC were false and misleading.
The Court held that plaintiffs failed to adequately allege any
actionable misstatement or omission.

With respect to allegations regarding the loan loss reserves, the
Court explained that a company's estimate of necessary loan loss
reserves is a statement of opinion. Therefore, such statements can
be actionable under the securities laws only if they are
subjectively false or if omitted factual information makes the
statement misleading to a reasonable investor; such statements are
not misleading, however, simply because a lender fails to disclose
facts that cut against its assessment. Id. at 8. The Court held
that plaintiffs failed to adequately allege subjective falsity,
because there was another explanation for the company's statements
that was at least as plausible—that the company truly believed it
would recoup the value of its loans through liquidation of the
companies' assets. Id. at 9. The Court also observed that the
company had received meaningful concessions from the borrowers (in
the form of individual promissory notes) that supported a belief
that the loan value would be recouped. Id. at 9-10. The Court
further concluded that the company's loan loss reserves did not
imply specific facts about the company's knowledge or the
borrowers' cashflow, and that the company's disclosures described
an open-ended process involving various factors management could
consider in setting loss reserves. As a result, a reasonable
investor would understand that management might determine a loan
was not impaired even if the borrower had cashflow problems because
other factors might cause management to believe that repayment was
likely. Id. at 10-11.

Plaintiffs also complained about statements that the company made
suggesting it would never compromise its "financial integrity," or
that it "set the standard for best practices in risk management
techniques." However, the Court determined these statements were
vague non-actionable puffery, because they merely touted the
company's business philosophy or performance in the most general
terms. Id. at 12.

Finally, the Court rejected plaintiffs' argument that it was
misleading for the company to state on an earnings call that it had
downgraded a credit relationship to "watch" and "substandard" for
unspecified $19 million and $9 million loans, without specifically
stating that the downgrade related to the company's "largest single
credit relationship" and that the borrowers had entered Chapter 11
bankruptcy. Id. at 13.The Court held these omissions did not render
the company's statement misleading, noting that details disclosed
in the company's annual report, such as the amount of its
classified and unclassified loans, could have allowed an investor
to determine how large a share the newly downgraded loans were of
the corporation's unclassified, classified, or total loans. Id. The
Court also concluded that the company's statement was not
misleading for not specifically referencing the bankruptcy
proceeding, particularly as the company stated that it did not
anticipate a credit impairment because the borrower was working to
restructure or liquidate its business. Id. at 13.

As plaintiffs had already amended their complaint once and failed
to show how further amendment could cure the defects in the
complaint, the Court concluded that any further effort to amend
would be futile and dismissed the action with prejudice. Id. at
14-15. [GN]


EVOLUS INC: Faces Shareholder Class Action Over Jeuveau
-------------------------------------------------------
Holly Barker, writing for Bloomberg Law, reports that Evolus Inc.
and three of its officers misled investors about the commercial
viability of Jeuveau, the medical aesthetics company's sole
FDA-approved product, a would-be class action in the Southern
District of New York alleges.

Jeuveau earned the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's approval for
temporarily reducing or eliminating frown lines in 2019, and was
introduced as a cheaper alternative to Allergan's well-known
cosmetic injectable, Botox.

The shareholder lawsuit, brought by Armin Malakouti, alleges Evolus
concealed the "real weight of evidence presented against it" in
legal challenges brought by Allergan and its Korea-based partner
Medytox.

COURT: S.D.N.Y
TRACK DOCKET: No. 1:20-cv-08647
COMPANY INFO: Evolus Inc. [GN]


FACEBOOK INC: Faces Klein Suit Over Social Network Market Monopoly
------------------------------------------------------------------
MAXIMILIAN KLEIN and SARAH GRABERT, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. FACEBOOK, INC., a Delaware
corporation headquartered in California, Case No. 5:20-cv-08570
(N.D. Cal., Dec. 3, 2020) claims relief for the Defendant's
monopolization of social network market in violation of the Sherman
Antitrust Act.

According to the complaint, Facebook has willfully acquired and
maintained monopoly power in the relevant social network market.
There are no reasonably interchangeable products that would
effectively constrain, or have effectively constrained, Facebook
from imposing and profitably sustaining during the relevant period
a significant artificial decrease in compensation to consumers for
their user information and attention paid to advertisements.

Facebook also has the power to impose and profitably sustain lower
levels of data privacy protections and social media network quality
than would occur in a world where Facebook had not illegally
monopolized the social network market. Facebook has the power to
control prices and exclude competition in the market.

The Plaintiffs contend that Facebook's monopolistic conduct
violates the antitrust laws and harms consumers. Facebook is
dominant in the social network market and the social media market,
and has engaged in predatory and exclusionary conduct in order to
monopolize, causing the Plaintiffs and Class members to suffer
substantial economic injury as a result of Facebook's
competition-reducing violations of law. This action seeks recovery
for consumers' losses and Facebook's unlawful gains, and it seeks
other appropriate equitable relief to prevent Facebook from
continuing to destroy competition and harm consumers.

Plaintiff Klein created a Facebook account in 2006, maintains an
active account, and regularly uses Facebook. Plaintiff Grabert
created a Facebook account prior to 2007, maintains an active
account, and regularly uses Facebook.

Founded in 2004 by Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook is a social media
company that provides online services to more than 3.14 billion
users.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Stephen A. Swedlow, Esq.
          Kevin Y. Teruya, Esq.
          Adam B. Wolfson, Esq.
          Brantley I. Pepperman, Esq.
          QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP
          191 N. Wacker Drive, Suite 2700
          Chicago, IL 60606-1881
          Telephone: (312) 705-7400
          E-mail: stephenswedlow@quinnemanuel.com
                  kevinteruya@quinnemanuel.com
                  adamwolfson@quinnemanuel.com
                  brantleypepperman@quinnemanuel.com

               - and -

          Warren Postman, Esq.
          Ashley Keller, Esq.
          Jason Ethridge, Esq.
          Benjamin Whiting, Esq.
          KELLER LENKNER LLC
          1300 I Street, N.W., Suite 400E
          Washington, DC 20005
          Telephone: (202) 918-1123
          E-mail: wdp@kellerlenkner.com
                  ack@kellerlenkner.com
                  jason.ethridge@kellerlenkner.com
                  ben.whiting@kellerlenkner.com

FLAGSTAR BANK: Must Pay $8.1-Mil. in Restitution to Kivett Class
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled WILLIAM KIVETT and BERNARD and
LISA BRAVO, individually, and on behalf of others similarly
situated v. FLAGSTAR BANK, FSB, a federal savings bank, Case No. C
18-05131 WHA (N.D. Cal.), District Judge William Alsup grants the
Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.

The lawsuit is a certified class action against Defendant Bank for
non-payment of interest on escrows for California borrowers, as
required under Section 2954.8(a) of California's Civil Code,
brought under Section 17200 of California's Business and
Professions Code. The Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment,
requesting restitution and injunctive relief.

Judge Alsup notes that a prior order already determined the Bank's
liability, finding it in violation of Section 2954.8(a) and,
thereby, liable under the "unlawful" prong of Section 17200. He
grants the Plaintiffs' request for restitution of accrued and
outstanding interest on escrows that the Bank failed to pay to
class members. Because its violations of Section 2954.8(a) are
ongoing with respect to a subclass of the class members whose loans
it continues to service, he certifies a subclass under Rule
23(b)(2), appoints subclass representatives, and grants injunctive
relief thereunder. To the extent stated in the Order, therefore,
the Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is granted.

The Plaintiffs are awarded $8,101,175 in restitution for accrued
and unpaid interest on escrow ("IOE") to the class through Dec. 31,
2019, as well as prejudgment interest of two percent thereon. They
should calculate the account-by-account allotment to each class
member -- with IOE and prejudgment interest stated separately --
and file a form of judgment with the class members' names that
gives exact recovery. The injunction is limited to the subclass.

Class and Subclass

On Jan. 2, 2020, the parties submitted a joint stipulation and
proposed order, which slightly altered the previous class
definition and included the details of the parties' proposed form
of notice to the class. An order then entered the proposed order,
approving the parties' notice plan, and redefined the class as
follows:

     All persons who at any time on or after April 18, 2014
     through Sept. 30, 2019 had mortgage loans serviced by
     Flagstar Bank, FSB (Flagstar) on 1-4 unit residential
     properties in California and paid Flagstar money in advance
     to hold in escrow for the payment of taxes and assessments
     on the property, for insurance, or for other purposes
     relating to the property, but did not receive interest on
     the amounts held by Flagstar in their escrow accounts
     (excluding, however, any such persons (a) whose mortgage
     loans originated on or before July 21, 2010 or (b) who would
     be owed less than $1 in interest-on-escrow as of Sept. 30,
     2019 if the Plaintiffs' allegations are proven)(the Class).

Notice was effected. Out of the 139,923 class members, four opted
out.

The Judge certifies a subclass (under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure) of class members whose loans Flagstar
currently services. The Court also appoints Bernard and Lisa Bravo
as subclass representatives, in order to seek injunctive relief on
behalf of the subclass.

Injunctive Relief

The Bravos and the subclass of current Flagstar customers seek a
permanent injunction enjoining Flagstar from its unlawful business
practice. The Judge finds that such relief is appropriate under
Section 17203 of the California Business and Professions Code, and
necessary to prevent further harm to current Flagstar customers.
The Effective Date will be Jan. 1, 2020.

The following subclass-wide relief is, therefore, ordered:

   1. Flagstar will credit subclass members' escrow accounts for
      any IOE that may have accrued after Jan. 1, 2020.
      Consistent with its current practices and with Section
      2954.8(a) itself, Flagstar will do so at the end of each
      calendar year for escrow accounts that remain active. For
      example, Flagstar will credit the escrow accounts of
      subclass members for any IOE that has already accrued and
      will accrue in 2020 on Jan. 1, 2021. That process shall
      continue each year thereafter;

   2. For class members whose loans (a) Flagstar serviced in
      2020; (b) did not pay IOE on; (c) whose escrow accounts
      were subsequently closed after Jan. 1, 2020, but before
      the issuance of this order, Flagstar will retroactively
      pay those class members their accrued IOE, if at all, for
      the relevant time period. Flagstar will do so by
      Jan. 29, 2021;

   3. Similarly, going forward, subclass members whose loans
      Flagstar will stop servicing for whatever reason before the
      end of a calendar year, will be paid their accrued IOE, if
      at all, at the point where Flagstar closes their escrow
      accounts; and

   4. Consistent with Section 2954.8(a), the amount of IOE
      Flagstar pays will be at least two percent.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Dec. 10, 2020, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ycn2x9xa from Leagle.com.


FLEX LTD: Wins Bid to Dismiss Kipling Securities Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Lucy H. Koh of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California grants the Defendants' motion to dismiss
with prejudice the lawsuit captioned as DAVID KIPLING, et al. v.
FLEX LTD., et al., Case No. 18-CV-02706-LHK (N.D. Cal.).

Lead Plaintiff National Elevator Industry Pension Fund,
individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated,
alleges that Defendants Flex, Michael M. McNamara, Christopher E.
Collier, Michael C. Dennison, and Kevin Kessel, violated federal
securities laws. The Plaintiff, a multiemployer pension plan as
defined in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
purchased Flex securities and was allegedly damaged by the
Defendants' misrepresentations and omissions.

The Plaintiff seeks to represent a class "of all persons and
entities who, during the period from Jan. 26, 2017 to Oct. 25,
2018, inclusive, purchased the publicly traded common stock of Flex
Ltd."

The Plaintiff alleges two causes of action: (1) violation of
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5
against all Defendants; and (2) violation of Section 20(a) of the
Exchange Act against Defendants McNamara, Collier, Dennison, and
Kessel.

On Dec. 4, 2019, the Defendants moved to dismiss the consolidated
class action complaint. The Court granted the motion to dismiss
without prejudice on May 29, 2020. As relevant in the instant
matter, the Court's prior order reached three key holdings: (1) the
Court held that Statement 5 is nonactionable corporate puffery; (2)
the Court held that the confidential witnesses' ("CWs'") statements
were not indicative of the falsity of the Defendants' Statements 1,
5-11, and 14; and (3) the Court held that the Plaintiff failed to
plead particularized facts that Statements 2-4, 12, and 13 were
false.

Specifically, as to Statements 2 through 4, the Plaintiff again
failed to plead more than the "mere existence of operational
problems." As to Statement 12 -- Defendant McNamara's statement
that Nike design content was "the key thing" Flex needed for
profitability -- the Statement was not false because it was
"plainly distinct from saying that new design content was the only
thing Flex needed to achieve profitability." As for Statement 13,
the complaint actually supported the veracity of the statement that
Nike products were "beginning to ramp in mass production."

In granting the instant Motion, District Judge Koh opines that: (i)
the Plaintiff fails to adequately allege that the Defendants
violated Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, and (ii)
the Plaintiff's derivative claim under Section 20(a) of the
Exchange Act falls with the Plaintiff's claim under Section 10(b)
of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5.

She notes that as the Court previously held, Statement 5 is
nonactionable corporate puffery. The Judge states that the
Plaintiff misapplies the prior Order in two ways: first, the
Plaintiff is incorrect to ask the Court to reconsider its ruling on
Statement 5, and second, Statement 5 was and still is nonactionable
puffery.

Statement 5 was made by Defendant Dennison at Flex's May 10, 2017
Investor Day.  Specifically, Defendant Dennison said in prepared
remarks on the Nike contract that "we have to drive significant
volume, which we're doing today. This has been a great solution for
us, a great story for us." Judge Koh holds that the Statement is
non-actionable because when valuing corporations, investors do not
rely on vague statements of optimism like 'good,' 'well-regarded,'
or other feel good monikers, citing In re Cutera, 610 F.3d at
1111).

The Plaintiff also fails to adequately plead the falsity of any
Statement, Judge Koh says. Specifically, the Plaintiff fails to
adequately plead that the Profitability Statements (Statements 1,
6-8, 11, and 14) are false, and that the other, non-profitability
Statements (Statements 2-5, 9, 10, 12, and 13) are false.

Accordingly, the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's
Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint in its entirety is
granted with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Dec. 10, 2020, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ybac86ct from Leagle.com.


GOOGLE LLC: Discovery in Digital Advertising Antitrust Suit Stayed
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE GOOGLE DIGITAL ADVERTISING ANTITRUST LITIGATION,
Case No. 20-cv-03556-BLF (N.D. Cal.), Judge Beth Labson Freeman of
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California,
San Jose Division, granted Google's Motion to Stay Discovery.

The case is a putative class action antitrust lawsuit brought by
Plaintiffs Hanson Law Firm, PC, Surefreight Global, LLC, doing
business as Prana Pets, and Vitor Lindo, against Defendant Google
on May 27, 2020.  The First Amended Complaint alleges that Google
leveraged its monopoly in online search and search advertising to
acquire an illegal monopoly in brokering display advertising--the
placement of advertisements on other companies' websites.

The FAC alleges two causes of actions for: (1) violation of section
2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act for acquiring and maintaining a
monopoly; and (2) violations of the Unfair Competition Law.

On Nov. 9, 2020, Google filed a motion to stay discovery pending
resolution of the motion to dismiss.  First, it argues that the
Plaintiffs fail to allege (a) the possession of monopoly power in
the relevant market; (b) the willful acquisition or maintenance of
that power; and (c) causal antitrust injury.  These defects are
similarly fatal to the Plaintiffs' UCL claim according to Google.
Second, Google argues that discovery is not necessary to resolve
the motion to dismiss because the motion is based solely on
allegations in the Complaint.  Finally, Google argues that it would
be a waste of resources to allow discovery to proceed, and that the
Plaintiffs will not be prejudiced by a stay because discovery is
not necessary for the Court to rule on the motion to dismiss.

The Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that the production they
seek is narrowly tailored and will further the litigation, that
courts in the district disfavor blanket discovery stays in these
circumstances, and that there would be minimal burden for Google to
produce the Texas Attorney General report.  They also argue that
even assuming the pendency of a potentially dispositive motion to
dismiss, the Court may allow discovery even if both prongs of the
stay test are met.  The Plaintiffs oppose the request to the extent
it bars them from obtaining a discrete set of approximately 100,000
pages of documents that Google produced to the Texas Attorney
General concerning Google's business practices in the relevant
digital advertising markets.

Judge Freeman finds that Google has satisfied its burden to obtain
a limited stay of discovery.  Indeed, as the Supreme Court has
recognized, staying discovery may be particularly appropriate in
antitrust cases, where discovery tends to be broad, time-consuming
and expensive.  While Google asks the Court to stay discovery until
it has ruled on the forthcoming motion to dismiss, (stipulating
that Google will file a motion to dismiss the FAC by Jan. 15,
2021), the Judge finds that it is more appropriate to stay
discovery until Google answers the amended complaint or the motion
to dismiss hearing date, whichever is earliest.  At the motion to
dismiss hearing, Google may orally request an extension of the stay
of discovery if appropriate.

To put the limited stay in context, discovery will be stayed for
several months.  Although the trial date in the matter has not yet
been set, the Court's schedule requires that the trial be set for
no earlier than the middle of 2023, over two years from now.  The
limited stay of discovery, therefore, does not unduly prejudice the
Plaintiffs and allows all parties to commence discovery with a
better understanding of which claims, if any, they must answer.

For the reasons she set forth, Judge Freeman granted Google's
motion to stay discovery.  Discovery in the case is stayed until
Google either answers the amended complaint or the motion to
dismiss hearing date, whichever is earliest.

A copy of the Court's Dec. 8, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yarm4pam from Leagle.com.


GREENSKY INC: Appeal in Consolidated Putative Class Suit Pending
----------------------------------------------------------------
GreenSky, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 9, 2020, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2020, that a notice of appeal
has been filed in the consolidated putative class action suit
entitled, In Re GreenSky, Inc. Securities Litigation, Index No.
655626/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.).

The Company, together with certain of its officers and directors
and one of its former directors (the Individual Defendants) and
certain underwriters of the Company's initial public offering, were
named in six putative class actions filed in the Supreme Court of
the State of New York, all of which actions have been consolidated
(In Re GreenSky, Inc. Securities Litigation (Consolidated Action),
Index No. 655626/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), and in two putative class
actions filed in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, both of which actions also have been
consolidated (In Re GreenSky, Inc. Securities Litigation
(Consolidated Action), Case No. 1:2018-cv-11071-AKH (S.D.N.Y.). The
plaintiffs in the Consolidated Cases generally assert on behalf of
certain purchasers in the IPO claims under Sections 11, 12(a)(2)
and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933.

The Company and Individual Defendants filed motions to dismiss in
each of the Consolidated Cases. The District Court denied the
motion to dismiss the Federal Case, and discovery in the Federal
Case is ongoing.

On June 1, 2020, the District Court certified a class of
shareholders who purchased GreenSky Class A common stock pursuant
and/or traceable to the Registration Statement and Prospectus
issued in connection with the IPO.

On April 22, 2020, the Supreme Court of the State of New York
dismissed the State Case in its entirety and without leave to
amend. On August 13, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a notice of
appeal.

GreenSky, Inc., a technology company, provides point-of-sale
financing and payment solutions to merchants, consumers, and banks.
It offers a proprietary technology infrastructure that support the
full transaction lifecycle, including credit application,
underwriting, real-time allocation to bank partners, document
distribution, funding, settlement, and servicing functions. The
company was incorporated in 2017 and is headquartered in Atlanta,
Georgia.

GTS TRANSPORTATION: Wins Dismissal of Plestsov Underpaid Wage Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Manish S. Shah of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, Eastern Division, granted the Defendants'
motion to dismiss the case, ALEXEI PLESTSOV, DENIS NAZAROV, and
ROMAN KALABAYDA, Plaintiffs, v. GTS TRANSPORTATION CORP. and TOMAS
STIRBYS, Defendants, Case No. 20 CV 1847 (N.D. Ill.).

Truck drivers lestsov, Nazarov, and Kalabayda filed a class action
complaint against their former employer, GTS and its owner Tomas
Stirbys, for violations of the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection
Act.  In the alternative, the Plaintiffs seek relief under
quasi-contract theories.  GTS is a trucking company owned by Tomas
Stirbys that delivers goods across states.   

Nazarov and Kalabayda are residents of Illinois. According to the
complaint, a named Plaintiff is a citizen of Oregon.  GTS is
incorporated in Illinois and does business in Illinois.   Stirbys
is a citizen of Illinois.

Plestsov and Kalabayda orally agreed to work in exchange for a
percentage of each load hauled minus certain expenses.  Nazarov
orally agreed to be paid per mile.  The terms included that each
driver would be paid in full and on time.  Plestsov, Nazarov, and
Kalabayda also signed a document they didn't fully understand
because of language barriers.

GTS and Stirbys exercised significant control over the Plaintiffs,
including their assignments, instructions and timeframe for
delivery, hours worked, and vehicles used.  They also tracked
drivers, mandated insurance and recordkeeping, conducted background
checks and drug tests, and controlled compensation policies and
practices.

The Plaintiffs allege that Stirbys and GTS forged the billing
documents for each load hauled and altered the mileage formula,
resulting in underpayment for truck drivers paid per load or per
mile.  They also allege that the defendants took improper
deductions from their paychecks or failed to reimburse them -- for
costs like repairs and operational expenses—and did not pay them
for extra work and/or issue their final paycheck.

Based on these wrongs, Plestsov alleges $29,734.74 in damages and
Kalabayda alleges $65,532.88.  These figures exclude the cost of
underpayment based on load miscalculations.  Nazarov alleges
$6,467.37 in damages.  The Plaintiffs approximate 500 truck drivers
were similarly incorrectly compensated per mile or per load and
that at least two thirds of the class members are citizens of
states other than Illinois.  Within the class, at least ten percent
of the deliveries were made in Illinois, meaning the truck drivers
spent at least 20% to 30% of their time commuting through
Illinois.

Plestsov, Nazarov, and Kalabayda filed the class action lawsuit in
federal court, claiming GTS and Stirbys violated the Illinois Wage
Payment and Collection Act by misclassifying them and similarly
situated drivers as independent contractors, failing to pay them in
a timely manner, failing to issue final paychecks, failing to
reimburse, taking improper deductions, and failing to notify them
of their true rate of pay.  They plead in the alternative,
incorporating all their factual allegations, that the Defendants
were unjustly enriched from the deductions they took -- for costs
like highway taxes, fuel, and repairs -- and the compensation they
improperly withheld.

Judge Shah finds that the Plaintiffs' allegations of citizenship
are a little sloppy.  They do, however, sufficiently plead a
CAFA-sized class.  The Defendants do not assert any concrete fact
to contest the number of class members alleged.  And the
Plaintiffs' allegation that there are 500 drivers in the class is
plausible.  GTS is an interstate trucking company founded in 2009.
The statute of limitations for IWPCA claims is at least 5 years.
The Plaintiffs worked for GTS for approximately 5 or 18 months.
Drawing all reasonable inferences in the Plaintiffs' favor, a high
employee turnover rate over multiple years reasonably suggest that
GTS employed 500 truck drivers during the applicable limitations
period.

GTS and Stirbys also fail to show that the home-state or local
exception under CAFA applies.  The Plaintiffs' allegation that at
least two-thirds of the proposed class members are citizens of a
state other than Illinois is plausible and not conjecture.  
Approximately 90% of GTS cargo is delivered outside of Illinois,
and drivers spend approximately 70% to 80% of their time commuting
outside of Illinois.  Given the nature of the trucking business and
these geographic requirements, it is reasonable to assume GTS hires
a significant number of drivers domiciled outside of Illinois.
While some of the Defendants' jurisdictional arguments fail, the
Plaintiffs have leave to file an amended complaint to properly
allege diversity jurisdiction under CAFA.

GTS and Stirbys also move to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claim for
unjust enrichment and quantum meruit.  Recovery under
quasi-contractual theories is unavailable where the conduct at
issue is the subject of an express contract.  Because the
deductions and compensation at issue derived from a valid contract,
and the Plaintiffs incorporate those allegations into their
equitable claims, Count II fails to state a claim.  Count II is
dismissed without prejudice.

In light of the foregoing, Judge Shah granted the Defendants'
motion to dismiss.  Any amended complaint should have been filed by
Nov. 4, 2020, and the parties were ordered to file a joint status
report last Nov. 12, 2020, with a proposal for a case schedule and
a deadline for the Defendants to respond to the amended complaint.
If no amended complaint is filed, the clerk will enter final
judgment dismissing the case without prejudice for lack of
jurisdiction.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 14, 2020 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y6t7rdmg from
Leagle.com.


HALLSONS OF LEBANON: Neal Withdraws Bid to Send Notice to Class
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Michele Neal, On behalf of
herself and those similarly situated, v. Hallsons of Lebanon, Inc.,
et al.;, Case No. 1:20-cv-00672-MRB (S.D. Ohio, Filed Aug. 27,
2020), the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order withdrawing
her Motion to Send Notice to Similarly Situated Employees.

The Plaintiff seeks to withdraw her Motion without prejudice so she
can file a renewed motion if necessary. Counsel for Plaintiff and
Defendants have already been in discussions as to the status of the
case and data to be provided for negotiations and potential
settlement of this matter, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff's Counsel contacted the Defendants' Counsel regarding
this Motion and Defendants are unopposed to the Motion to
Withdraw.

A copy of the Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion to Withdraw Plaintiff's
Motion to Send Notice to Similarly Situated Employees dated Dec. 8,
2020 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2W5ToDR
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew R. Biller, Esq.
          Andrew P. Kimble, Esq.
          Philip J. Krzeski, Esq.
          Nathan B. Spencer, Esq.
          BILLER & KIMBLE, LLC
          4200 Regent Street, Suite 200
          Columbus, OH 43219
          Telephone: (614) 604-8759
          Facsimile: (614) 340-4620
          E-mail: abiller@billerkimble.com
                  akimble@billerkimble.com
                  pkrzeski@billerkimble.com
                 nspencer@billerkimble.com

HAMILTON BEACH: Stockholder Class Action Voluntarily Dismissed
--------------------------------------------------------------
Hamilton Beach Brands Holding Company (HBBHC)said in its Form 10-Q
Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
November 9, 2020, for the quarterly period ended September 30,
2020, that on September 25, 2020, an owner of HBBHC class A common
stock who had filed a class action complaint against HBBHC and the
Company's Chief Executive and Chief Financial officers in the US
District Court for the Eastern District of New York in May 2020
asserting claims under Section 10(b) and 20 of the Securities
Exchange Act, voluntarily dismissed the complaint without
prejudice.

Hamilton Beach Brands Holding Company is an operating holding
company for Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc. a designer, marketer and
distributor of branded small electric household and specialty
housewares appliances, as well as commercial products for
restaurants, fast food chains, bars and hotels. The company is
based in Glen Allen, Virginia.

HERTZ GLOBAL: Appeal in Ramirez Suit Still Stayed
-------------------------------------------------
Hertz Global Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 9, 2020, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2020, that the appeal as to
the Company in the purported shareholder class action suit
entitled, Pedro Ramirez, Jr. v. Hertz Global Holdings, Inc., et
al., remains stayed.

In November 2013, a purported shareholder class action, Pedro
Ramirez, Jr. v. Hertz Global Holdings, Inc., et al., was commenced
in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey naming
Old Hertz Holdings and certain of its officers as defendants and
alleging violations of the federal securities laws.

The complaint alleged that Old Hertz Holdings made material
misrepresentations and/or omissions of material fact in certain of
its public disclosures in violation of Section 10(b) and 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder.

The complaint sought an unspecified amount of monetary damages on
behalf of the purported class and an award of costs and expenses,
including counsel fees and expert fees.

The complaint, as amended, was dismissed with prejudice on April
27, 2017 and on September 20, 2018, the Third Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of the complaint with prejudice. On February 5, 2019, the
plaintiffs filed a motion asking the federal district court to
exercise its discretion and allow the plaintiffs to reinstate their
claims to include additional allegations from the administrative
order agreed to by the SEC and the Company in December 2018, which
was supplemented by reference to the Company's subsequently filed
litigation against former executives.

On September 30, 2019, the federal district court of New Jersey
denied the plaintiffs' motion for relief from the April 27, 2017
judgment and a related motion to allow the filing of a proposed
fifth amended complaint.

On October 30, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal as to
the district court's latest denial with the U. S. Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit. The parties fully briefed the appeal and
oral argument had been scheduled for June 19, 2020.

As a result of the Company's bankruptcy, the appeal was stayed as
to the Company, but the plaintiffs advocated that the appeal could
proceed against the individual defendants.

On October 13, 2020, the Third Circuit affirmed the District
Court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' motion for relief since the
motion was not timely filed and the appeal as to the Company
remains stayed.

Hertz Global Holdings, Inc., together with its subsidiaries,
provides airport and off-airport vehicle rental and leasing
services. It operates through three segments: U.S. RAC,
International RAC, and All Other Operations. Hertz Global Holdings,
Inc. was founded in 1918 and is headquartered in Estero, Florida.

HF FOODS GROUP: Consolidated Mendoza Class Action Underway
----------------------------------------------------------
HF Foods Group Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 9, 2020, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2020, that the company
continues to defend a consolidated class action suit entitled,
Mendoza v. HF Foods Group Inc., et al.

On March 29, 2020, plaintiff Jesus Mendoza (Mendoza) filed a
putative shareholder securities class action lawsuit in the United
States District Court for the Central District of California
against the Company and certain of its present and former officers
for alleged violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 styled Mendoza v. HF Foods Group
Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 2:20-CV-2929-ODW-JPR (C.D. Cal.).

On April 30, 2020, plaintiff Walter Ponce-Sanchez filed a
substantially similar putative shareholder securities class action
lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California against the same defendants named in the
Class Action Lawsuit styled Ponce-Sanchez v. HF Foods Group Inc.,
et al., Civil Action No. 2:20-CV-3967-ODW-JPR (C.D. Cal.).

The Ponce-Sanchez Lawsuit has now been consolidated with the
Mendoza Class Action Lawsuit and both cases will proceed under the
Class Action Lawsuit docket.

The complaints both allege that the Defendants made materially
false and (or) misleading statements that caused losses to
investors.

Additionally, the complaints both allege that the Defendants failed
to disclose in public statements that the Company engaged in
certain related party transactions, that insiders and related
parties were enriching themselves by misusing shareholder funds,
and that the Company masked the true number of free-floating
shares.

Neither complaint quantifies any alleged damages, but, in addition
to attorneys' fees and costs, they seek to recover damages on
behalf of themselves and other persons who purchased or otherwise
acquired Company stock during the putative class period from August
23, 2018 through March 23, 2020 at allegedly inflated prices and
purportedly suffered financial harm as a result.

On October 13, 2020, the Court appointed Yun F. Yee as lead
plaintiff and approved Mr. Yee's counsel as lead counsel in the
Class Action Lawsuit. On October 28, 2020, the Court entered a
scheduling order setting December 4, 2020 as the deadline for lead
plaintiff to file the Consolidated Amended Complaint and setting a
schedule for Defendants' anticipated motion to dismiss. The Class
Action Lawsuit does not quantify any alleged damages. The Company
disputes these allegations and intends to defend the consolidated
actions vigorously.

On June 15, 2020, Mendoza filed a shareholder derivative lawsuit on
behalf of the Company as a nominal defendant in the United States
District Court for the Central District of California against
certain of the Company's present and former directors and officers
styled Mendoza v. Zhou Min Ni, et al., Civil Action No.
2:20-CV-5300-ODW-JPR (C.D. Cal.).

The complaint in the Mendoza Derivative Lawsuit is based largely on
the same allegations as set forth in the Class Action Lawsuit
discussed above and alleges violations of Sections 10(b), 14(a),
and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, breach of
fiduciary duties, unjust enrichment, abuse of control, gross
mismanagement, and waste of corporate assets.

The Mendoza Derivative Lawsuit does not quantify any alleged
damages, but, in addition to attorneys' fees and costs, Mendoza
seeks to recover damages on behalf of the Company for purported
financial harm and to have the court order changes in the Company's
corporate governance.

The Mendoza Derivative Defendants and the Company dispute these
allegations and intend to defend the Mendoza Derivative Lawsuit
vigorously.

On July 8, 2020, the Court ordered that all proceedings in the
Mendoza Derivative Lawsuit be stayed until such time as the Court
has finally resolved the Mendoza Defendants' anticipated motion to
dismiss the Class Action Lawsuit.

HF Foods said, "At this stage, the Company is unable to determine
whether a future loss will be incurred due to the consolidated
Class Action Lawsuit or the Mendoza Derivative Lawsuit, or estimate
a range of loss, if any; accordingly, no amounts have been accrued
in the Company's financial statements as of September 30, 2020."

HF Foods Group Inc. markets and distributes fresh produces, frozen
and dry food, and non-food products to primarily Asian restaurants
and other foodservice customers throughout the Southeast, Pacific
and Mountain West regions region of the United States. The company
is based in City of Industry, California.

HOUSTON NW: S.D. Texas Remands Riley ERISA Suit to State Court
--------------------------------------------------------------
Chief District Judge Lee H. Rosenthal grants the Plaintiff's motion
for remand in the lawsuit entitled AISHA RILEY v. HOUSTON NW.
OPERATING CO., L.L.C. d/b/a HCA HOUSTON HEALTHCARE NW. d/b/a
HOUSTON NW. MED. CTR., GULF COAST DIV., INC. d/b/a HCA HOUSTON
HEALTHCARE, Case No. H-20-2767 (S.D. Tex.).

The case challenges charges billed for emergency room visits. Riley
sued Houston Northwest Operating Company, L.L.C. and Gulf Coast for
adding an "Evaluation and Management Services Fee" to her hospital
bill, allegedly without informing her beforehand or obtaining her
consent. It is the second time a federal court has encountered
Riley's claims. Riley dismissed her first case after the Court
expressed concern about its subject-matter jurisdiction. Riley
refiled in the 157th District Court of Harris County, Texas.

The Defendants timely removed the case to the District Court,
alleging jurisdiction under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act and the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. Riley moved to
remand, and the parties exchanged briefs.

The Defendants argue that Riley could have asserted her claims
under Section 502(a)(1)(B) or Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA. Section
502(a)(1)(B) allows a civil action "by a participant or
beneficiary" to "recover benefits due under the terms of his plan,
to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify
his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan." Section
501 (a)(3) of ERISA allows a civil action "by a participant,
beneficiary, or fiduciary" to (a) "enjoin any act or practice which
violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan"
or (b) "obtain other equitable relief (i) to redress such
violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or
the terms of the plan."

Judge Rosenthal opines that the Defendants' arguments are
unpersuasive. Riley is not challenging a coverage decision made by
her health plan. Her allegations and claims focus on the
Defendants' policy of adding an allegedly undisclosed fee to
emergency patients' hospital bills. Key to her case is the
allegation that the Defendants impose the hidden fee on all
emergency room patients, regardless of their insurance coverage.

The Defendants' cited cases establish that ERISA preemption applies
if the Court must interpret or apply the terms of a plaintiff's
ERISA-governed health insurance plan to resolve the Plaintiff's
claims. That principle is inapplicable, Judge Rosenthal opines.
Riley's claims, and the claims of her proposed class members, are
independent of the health insurance plan they may have. Riley's
claim would be the same even if she lacked a health insurance
policy. Riley's state-law claims could not have been brought under
Section 502(a)(1)(B) or Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA, Judge Rosenthal
adds, among other things.

Accordingly, Riley's motion for remand is granted. Remand is
entered by separate order. Any outstanding motions are denied as
moot.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum and Opinion dated Dec.
10, 2020, is available at https://tinyurl.com/ycyszyuu from
Leagle.com.


HYCROFT MINING: Delaware Putative Class Action Settled
------------------------------------------------------
Hycroft Mining Holding Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 9,
2020, for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2020, that the
purported class action suit filed in the Court of Chancery of the
State of Delaware initiated by a purported holder of the Company's
warrants, has been settled and a $0.1 million mootness fee was paid
on September 8, 2020.

On February 7, 2020, a purported class action complaint was filed
by a purported holder of the Company's warrants, in the Court of
Chancery of the State of Delaware against the Company and Mudrick
Capital Acquisition Corporation (MUDS).

The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the
Recapitalization Transaction constitutes a "Fundamental Change"
under the terms of the Seller Warrant Agreement and thereby
requiring that Seller Warrants be assumed by MUDS as part of the
Recapitalization Transaction, in addition to asserting claims for:
(1) breach or anticipatory breach of contract against Seller; (2)
breach or anticipatory breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing against Seller; and (3) tortious interference with
contractual relations against MUDS.

The complaint sought unspecified money damages and also sought an
injunction enjoining the Company and MUDS from consummating the
Recapitalization Transaction.

On February 26, 2020, MUDS and Seller entered into an amendment to
the Purchase Agreement whereby the Company's liabilities and
obligations under the Seller Warrant Agreement were included as a
Parent Assumed Liability under the Purchase Agreement.

On March 27, 2020, MUDS and Seller filed motions to dismiss the
complaint. On May 15, 2020, a hearing was held and the complaint
was dismissed.

On May 21, 2020, Plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend the
Court's order in order to retain jurisdiction in order to file
application for a mootness fee, to which MUDS and Seller, while
disputing factual assertions and characterizations, did not oppose.


On June 30, 2020, the motion was granted and the Court retained
jurisdiction over the action to hear any mootness fee application.
The matter was settled and a $0.1 million mootness fee was paid on
September 8, 2020.

Based in Denver, Colorado, Hycroft Mining Holding Corporation
operates as a blank check company. The Company aims to acquire one
and more businesses and assets, via a merger, capital stock
exchange, asset acquisition, stock purchase, and reorganization.

IOU GENERAL: Class Certification Denial in Premier Paving Reversed
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PREMIER PAVING GP, INC. et al., v. IOU CENTRAL, INC.,
A20A1867 (Ga. App.), the Court of Appeals of Georgia for the Fourth
Division reversed in part and vacated in part the trial court's
denial of Premier Paving's motion for class certification and the
dismissal of Premier Paving's class-action counterclaim in IOU
Central's lawsuit against it for breach of a promissory note.

IOU Central filed suit against Premier Paving to collect upon a
promissory note in the principal amount of $277,500, to be paid
over a 12-month period.  Specifically, IOU Central alleged that
Premier Paving failed to make the agreed upon payments as they came
due, resulting in default and Premier Paving owing $132,668.51 in
principal, interest at 14.25%, and different fees in the amounts of
$18,708.40 and $75.

Premier Paving answered IOU Central's complaint and asserted a
class-action counterclaim.  In doing so, Premier Paving sought to
sue IOU Central on behalf of itself and "all borrowers who took out
a loan from the Plaintiff from 20 years prior to the filing of the
counterclaim until such time as the class is certified where the
average monthly rate of interest on the useable money for borrowers
exceeded 5% per month in any month of the loan's period."  As a
defense to IOU Central's action, Premier Paving asserted that the
loan at issue was usurious, illegal, and uncollectible under the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated or OCGA Section 7-4-18 and OCGA
Section 7-4-3.

Thereafter, IOU Central moved to dismiss Premier Paving's
class-action counterclaim, arguing that because OCGA Section 7-4-3
did not apply to the loan at issue, the class-action counterclaim
should be dismissed.  Further, IOU Central contended that even if
the statute applied, the loan was still not usurious under Georgia
law.  Premier Paving proceeded by filing a motion for class
certification.

The trial court ruled upon the competing motions in a single order,
concluding that the principal amount of the loan exceeded $250,000
and, thus, OCGA Section 7-4-18 (a) did not apply.  Instead, it
determined that OCGA Section 7-4-2(a)(1)(B) applied to the loan.
It also noted that even if OCGA Section 7-4-18(a) applied, the
relevant interest rate was still under 5%.

As a result, the trial court granted IOU Central's motion to
dismiss the class-action counterclaim and denied Premier Paving's
motion for class certification.  IOU Central then moved for summary
judgment, and that motion remains pending after Premier Paving
filed its notice of appeal.  The appeal follows.

Premier Paving argues that the trial court's order--dismissing its
class-action counterclaim and denying its motion for class
certification--is based on two erroneous conclusions: (1) OCGA
Section 7-4-18 only applies to loans of less than $250,000; and (2)
because the loan at issue could have been for 12 months, all
interest charges should be spread over a 12-month period.

While it is certainly appropriate to consider the merits of the
action sought to be certified to the degree necessary to determine
whether the requirements of OCGA Section 9-11-23 have been
satisfied, the Appellate Court finds that these merits questions
may be considered to the extent--but only to the extent--that they
are relevant to determining whether the prerequisites for class
certification are satisfied.  As a result, any assertion that the
named plaintiff cannot prevail on her claims does not comprise an
appropriate basis for denying class certification.

According to the Opinion, in the instant case, that is precisely
what occurred when the trial court found, in effect, that the OCGA
Section 9-11-23 requirements were moot because there was no merit
to the action.  Thus, because the trial court did not make the
necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law, there is nothing
in the order for the Appellate Court to evaluate.

Accordingly, for all these reasons, the judgment of the trial court
is reversed to the extent it denied the motion for class-action
certification by looking solely to the merits of the counterclaim.
To the extent the trial court failed to properly analyze the
requirements of OCGA Section 9-11-23(a)(1)-(4), the trial court's
judgment is vacated.  The case is remanded for entry of a more
detailed order addressing these and any other requirements.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 9, 2020 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y9whsgku from Leagle.com.


JACKSON COUNTY, MO: Whitworth Bid to Certify Class Denied as Moot
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as DARTANYON J. WHITWORTH, on
behalf of himself and all similarly situated class v. JACKSON
COUNTY, Case No. 20-00661-CV-W-FJG (W.D. Mo., Filed July 9, 2020),
the Hon. Judge Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr. entered an order:

   1. granting the plaintiff's Motion to Remand; and

   2. denying as moot the plaintiff's Motion to Certify Class,
      the defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Stay and the
      plaintiff's Motion for an Extension of Time to Respond to
      defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

On July 9, 2020, the plaintiff filed the class action in the
Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri alleging that Jackson
County had collected fines in excess of the statutory maximums,
which violated plaintiff and other individuals' rights to due
process. The Plaintiff asserted two counts in his petition: the
second of which was a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. sections 1983
and 1988.

On August 17, 2020, the defendant Jackson County removed the case
to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. On
September 4, 2020, the plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint
removing the second cause of action which sought relief under 42
U.S.C. sections 1983 and 1988. The same day plaintiff filed a
Motion to Remand stating because the federal claims have now been
removed, the case should be remanded to state court. Jackson
County's response to the motion to remand was due on or before
September 18, 2020, but no response was filed.

Jackson County is located in the western portion of the U.S. state
of Missouri. As of the 2010 census, the population was 674,158.

A copy of Court's order dated Dec. 8, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3gIIOvY at no extra charge.[CC]

KEYSTONE RV: Loses Bid to Sever Misjoined Plaintiffs in Cole Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JUDITH COLE, et. al., Plaintiffs, v. KEYSTONE RV
COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. C18-5182TSZ (W.D. Wash.), Judge Thomas
S. Zilly of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Tacoma, denied Defendant Keystone's Motion to Sever
Misjoined Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs Cole, Louis Michael, and David Johnson each purchased
new or used Keystone recreational vehicles from Keystone dealers.
All three claim they were not effectively warned of the risk of
injury resulting from the ordinary use of their RVs; specifically,
the effects of prolonged occupancy on indoor air quality due to
moisture, mold, and formaldehyde.

They sued in 2018, asserting claims under the Washington Auto
Dealers Practice Act ("ADPA"), the Consumer Protection Act, and the
UCC.  The Plaintiffs sought to represent a class of similarly
situated Keystone purchasers damaged by Keystone's failure to warn
of the dangers of prolonged occupancy in their Keystone RVs.  They
seek economic damages for the difference between the value as
represented and the actual value of the RVs they purchased.

In August 2018, the Court dismissed the ADPA claims as time-barred,
and provided the Plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their UCC
claims to make them plausible, which they did not do.  It also
denied Keystone's Rule 20 Motion to Sever the Plaintiffs' remaining
CPA claims, determining they were "charitably" read as an assertion
of a series of common occurrences and that they presented common
issues of fact and law.

In July 2020, the Court denied the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification.  It determined that while they met the "numerosity"
requirement, they could not meet Rule 23(a)'s "commonality" and
Rule 23(b)(3)'s "predominance" requirements.  It also determined
that the named Plaintiffs' claims were not "typical" of the
proposed class, and that class resolution was not "superior" to
individual litigation.  It concluded that the three Plaintiffs'
individual claims were triable, but not as a class action.

Keystone now argues that the three individual claims should be
tried separately.  It argues they do not arise from the same
transaction and that any common questions are outweighed by
individual factual and legal inquiries.

The Plaintiffs argue that the Court has already rejected Keystone's
argument for severance, notwithstanding the denial of class
certification.  They argue that their claims arise from the same
series of transactions -- their respective purchases of Keystone
RVs without adequate warnings about the dangers of prolonged
occupancy.  They argue persuasively that their expert witnesses'
(Buscher, Gill, and Walker) testimony will be similar, if not
identical, in each trial.  They argue that judicial economy would
be served by a single trial with one jury and much of the same
evidence, rather than three overlapping trials.  They claim they
would be prejudiced by severance at this late date.

Judge Zilly agrees.  He said it is true that the case involves
three separate, if similar, transactions, and the facts surrounding
the three plaintiffs' RV purchase are not identical.  Each will
have to testify about what they were told, how they used and
maintained their Keystone RVs, and the like.  But the expert
testimony about the adequacy of warnings, the effects of mold and
formaldehyde and the impact on the RVs' value, will be the same.
The jury instructions are likely to be identical.  Judicial economy
would not be served by conducting three essentially identical
trials, particularly when trial time is scarce.

Judge Zilly concludes that separate trials would prejudice the
Plaintiffs, and they would put an unnecessary strain on the Court.
Hence, he denied Defendant Keystone's Motion to Sever Misjoined
Plaintiffs.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 14, 2020 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y3aku3uo from Leagle.com.

KFORCE INC: $790K Settlement in Smith Suit Has Prelim. Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MAURCUS SMITH, ALVIN HODGE and DAVID KORTRIGHT, on
behalf of themselves and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. KFORCE INC., a Florida profit corporation,
Defendant, Case No. 8:19-cv-02068-CEH-CPT (M.D. Fla.), Judge
Charlene Edwards Honeywell of the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, granted the parties'
Amended Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement and
Notice to Settlement Class.

Under the terms of the settlement agreement, each Class Member, who
timely submits a claim, is anticipated to receive an award of
$68.50 from a common fund of $790,000.

On Feb. 14, 2020, the parties notified the Court a settlement had
been reached, pending completion of a comprehensive settlement
agreement.  The parties filed a Joint Motion for Preliminary
Approval of Settlement and Notice to Settlement Class on April 23,
2020.  A hearing on that motion was held on June 18, 2020.  On Oct.
22, 2020, the parties filed an Amended Joint Motion for Preliminary
Approval of Settlement and Notice to Settlement Class.

In accordance with the parties' Joint Stipulation of Class
Settlement, Jude Honeywell certified, for settlement purposes, a
class defined as: All natural persons residing within the United
States and its Territories not subject to an arbitration agreement
or class waiver, with respect to whom, within the two years
preceding the filing of the Action and extending through the
resolution of the Action, KFORCE procured or caused to be procured
a consumer report for employment purposes based on the disclosure
form used for the Plaintiffs.

The issues before the Court are (a) whether to approve the
Agreement on a preliminary basis, and (b) whether to approve the
Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement for distribution to the
members of approximately a 18,000-member Class.

Based on review of the record, the manner of negotiation, and
settlement agreement, the Judge finds the settlement to be fair,
adequate, and reasonable.  The parties' negotiations, and in turn
the settlement, were based on realistic, independent assessments of
the merits of the claims and defenses in the case.

The Court notes that the attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of
33.33% of the common fund for which the Class Counsel will seek
approval is within the reasonable range.  Based on the parties'
good faith basis for the settlement, set forth in the Amended Joint
Motion for Preliminary Approval, the Judge finds that the
Settlement Agreement should be approved preliminarily.

Similarly, Judge Honeywell finds that the Notice of Proposed Class
Action Settlement meets the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 23(c)(2)(B) and (e)(1) and comports with due process by
clearly notifying class members of their rights, as well as a
reasonable timeframe within which to exercise those rights.  Thus,
Judge Honeywell approved the proposed notice plan and the language
of the Notice proposed by the parties.

The Judge set the case for hearing for final approval of the
settlement on April 16, 2021, at 11:00 a.m.  The parties are
directed to include the hearing date, time and location in the
Notice to be sent pursuant to the notice plan.

The Settlement Administrator will mail the Notice on Jan. 11, 2021
and will set up the Settlement Website.  The Deadline for Motion
for Attorney's Fees and Costs, Class Settlement Administration
Costs is Feb. 12, 2021.  The Deadline for Objections is March 11,
2021.  The Deadline for Opt Outs (Exclusion March 11, 2021
Requests) is March 11, 2021.  The Deadline for Motion for Final
Approval is March 26, 2021.  The Fairness Hearing is set for April
16, 2021, at 11:00 a.m.  The Deadline for Filing Claim is March 11,
2021.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 9, 2020 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/ychuk58s from Leagle.com.


LABOR SOURCE: BluSky Loses Partial Bid to Dismiss Murphy Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARCQUISE MURPHY and RATANYA ROGERS, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. LABOR
SOURCE, LLC d/b/a Catstaff d/b/a One Source Staffing and Labor, and
BLUSKY RESTORATION CONTRACTORS, LLC, Defendants, Civil File No.
19-1929 (MJD/ECW) (D. Minn.), Judge Michael J. Davis of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Minnesota denied Defendant
BluSky Restoration Contractors, LLC's Partial Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint.

BluSky is a non-Minnesota limited liability company, with its
principal place of business in Colorado.  It provides labor
services for restoration, renovation, roofing, and environmental
projects around the United States.  One Source is a non-Minnesota
limited liability company, with its principal place of business in
Olathe, Kansas.  It is a staffing company that provides workers to
perform work throughout the United States, including in Minnesota
and Illinois.  It operates in multiple states and recruits and
assigns workers to perform work for other companies.  BluSky
contracted with One Source to provide manual laborers for BlueSky's
restoration projects at worksites in various states.  

Plaintiff Murphy is an Illinois resident who was employed by both
the Defendants from August 2017 to October 2017 as a laborer and
noncommercial driver in Minnesota and Illinois.  He drove the
Defendants' workers from Chicago to a jobsite in St. Paul,
Minnesota.  Plaintiff Rogers is an Illinois resident who was
employed by both the Defendants between approximately August and
November 2017 as a laborer in Minnesota.  Opt-in Plaintiff
DeAntwone Norris was employed by both the Defendants as a laborer
and non-commercial driver, and then as a team lead.  He worked on
more than one project for BluSky, including on projects in
Minnesota and Missouri.  Norris claims that, during his employment
as a team lead, he learned that Defendants implemented the same
policies and practices giving rise to wage and hour violations on
their project in Minnesota as on their projects nationwide,
including but not limited to worksites in Minnesota, Illinois,
Missouri, Nebraska, Wisconsin, and Michigan.

In addition to Norris, four more opt-in Plaintiffs have joined the
lawsuit: Devin Pettis (manual laborer and non-commercial driver in
Illinois and Minnesota from August 2017 to September 2017); Cynthia
Hodo (manual laborer in Minnesota from August 2017 to February
2018); Ledon Brown (manual laborer and non-commercial driver in
Minnesota from August 2017 to February 2018); and Laquon Blackmon
(manual laborer in Illinois and Minnesota from May 2017 to June
2017).

The Plaintiffs assert that the Defendants employed non-exempt
workers and failed to pay them the applicable minimum wage, failed
to pay them for all hours worked, failed to pay them for
appropriate overtime premiums, and failed to reimburse them for
business expenses they incurred on the Defendants' behalf.  They
further allege that the Defendants failed to keep records required
under Minnesota law, fabricated time sheets, failed to provide
adequate wage statements, and failed to timely pay wages.

On July 23, 2019, Plaintiffs Murphy and Rogers filed the action
against the Defendantsin the Court.  The Defendants filed a partial
motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction and
failure to state a claim.  On April 26, 2020, the Court issued an
Order adopting in part and modifying in part the Report and
Recommendation and granting in part and denying in part the partial
motion to dismiss.  It also granted the Plaintiffs leave to amend.

On May 7, 2020, the Plaintiffs filed the FAC against BluSky and One
Source.  The FAC asserts: (A) First Cause of Action: Count I: Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") - Overtime Violations (on behalf of
the Collective Members); Count II: FLSA - Minimum Wage Violations
(on behalf of the Collective Members); (B) Second Cause of Action:
Count I; Minnesota Fair Labor Standards Act ("MFLSA") - Minimum
Wage Violations (on behalf of the Minnesota Class); Count II: MFLSA
- Overtime Violation (On Behalf of the Minnesota Class); Count III:
MFLSA - Expense Reimbursement (On Behalf of the Minnesota Class);
Count IV: MFLSA - Payroll Card Account Violation (On Behalf of the
Minnesota Class); Count V: MFLSA - Failure to Keep Accurate Records
(On Behalf of the Minnesota Class); (C) Third Cause of Action:
Failure to Pay for All Hours Worked Under Minnesota Law (On Behalf
of the Minnesota Class); (IV) Fourth Cause of Action: Count I:
Minnesota Payment of Wages Act ("MPWA") - Failure to Pay Wages
Promptly (On Behalf of the Minnesota Class); Count II: MPWA - Wage
Statement Violation (On Behalf of the Minnesota Class).

The FAC asserts a collective and class action on behalf of the
Plaintiffs and the following similarly situated individuals: (1)
those who have worked for BluSky anywhere in the United States as
hourly, non-exempt employees performing restoration, renovation,
environmental, roofing, or other construction work, including but
not limited to laborers, non-exempt team leads, non-commercial
drivers, technicians, carpenters, apprentices, cleaning crew,
plumbers, welders, and other laborers with similar job duties, and
(2) those hourly, non-exempt laborers who have worked for One
Source on any BluSky projects in the State of Minnesota.  The
Plaintiffs assert claims on behalf of themselves, a National
Collective, a Minnesota Collective, and a Minnesota Class under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

The National Collective is defined as: "All current and former
hourly, non-exempt employees including, but not limited to,
laborers, non-exempt team leads, non-commercial drivers,
technicians, carpenters, apprentices, cleaning crew, plumbers,
welders, and other laborers with similar job duties employed by
Defendant BluSky throughout the United States, within three years
prior to the action's filing date through the final disposition of
the action."

BluSky now brings a motion to dismiss addressing only the First
Cause of Action, comprised of two FLSA counts.  It seeks dismissal
with prejudice of the Plaintiffs' collective claims in those counts
as to employees outside Minnesota.  In the alternative, it requests
that the Court dismisses all claims against BluSky outside of the
Minnesota and Missouri projects or all claims against BlueSky
outside of joint ventures with One Source.

As for the National FLSA Collective, Judge Davis concludes that, at
the motion to dismiss stage, the Plaintiffs have sufficiently
alleged facts to support their claim of similarly situated
individuals throughout the United States.  He notes that discovery
has not yet occurred and that the evidence regarding these issues
may properly be addressed at the conditional certification,
decertification, or summary judgment stages.  He concludes that,
under the motion to dismiss standard, the Plaintiffs have alleged
facts giving rise to a plausible inference that there are similarly
situated employees of BluSky nationwide.  Based on the FAC, it is
plausible that BluSky implemented its policies and practices
nationwide, which caused systematic violations of the FLSA
throughout the United States.

As for the Defendants' joint ventures, Judge Davis concludes that,
at this early pleading stage, the Plaintiffs' collective claims
need not be limited to employees who worked for BluSky-One Source
joint ventures.  The Plaintiffs point out that the National
Collective's claims are asserted against BluSky alone, not because
they admit that One Source failed to commit FLSA violations outside
of Minnesota, but because the Court concluded that only BluSky is
subject to its Court's general jurisdiction.

The fact that BluSky allegedly violated the FLSA in concert with
another Defendant who cannot be held liable in the Court for
actions taken outside Minnesota due to lack of personal
jurisdiction does not absolve BluSky of liability.  And the FAC
does allege that BluSky acted jointly and/or individually and that
BluSky's actions were the same on projects that did not involve One
Source.  Additionally, at this early pleadings stage, Judge Davis
concludes that simply because the Plaintiffs assert that both the
Defendants took actions in violation of the FLSA in Minnesota,
Illinois, Missouri, Nebraska, Wisconsin, and Michigan, does not
limit the Plaintiffs' claims to only projects jointly managed by
both the Defendants.

Accordingly, based upon the foregoing, Judge Davis denied BluSky's
Partial Motion to Dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 14, 2020 Memorandum of Law &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y4ubt3rg from
Leagle.com.

Carolyn Hunt Cottrell -- ccottrell@schneiderwallace.com -- Ori
Edelstein -- oedelstein@schneiderwallace.com -- and William M. Hogg
-- whogg@schneiderwallace.com -- Schneider Wallace Cottrell Konecky
LLP, and E. Michelle Drake, Berger & Montague, P.C., Counsel for
Plaintiffs.

Elizabeth S. Gerling -- Elizabeth.Gerling@jacksonlewis.com -- and
Eric R. Magnus -- Eric.Magnus@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis
P.C., Counsel for Defendant BluSky Restoration Contractors, LLC.

LAKEVIEW LOAN: Court Dismisses Austin's Claims Against LoanCare
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned KIMBERLY AUSTIN v. LAKEVIEW LOAN
SERVICING, LLC, and LOANCARE, LLC, Case No. RDB-20-1296 (D. Md.),
District Judge Richard D. Brennett entered a Memorandum Opinion
granting LoanCare's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
and dismissing with prejudice all claims against LoanCare.

Plaintiff Austin brings the putative class action against
Defendants Lakeview and LoanCare, alleging two violations of the
Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act ("MCDCA"); a violation of the
Maryland Consumer Protection Act ("MCPA"); breach of contract; and
unjust enrichment. Specifically, Austin claims that the Defendants
violated state law and breached the uniform terms of borrowers'
mortgages by charging and collecting processing fees when borrowers
made their monthly mortgage payments by phone or online.

On Oct.7, 2016, the Plaintiff obtained a mortgage loan from First
Home Mortgage Co., a lender approved by the Federal Housing
Administration ("FHA"), and secured the loan with her home in
Abingdon, Maryland. The loan was also insured by the FHA. At some
point, Defendant Lakeview acquired the servicing rights to the
Plaintiff's loan. LoanCare subserviced the Plaintiff's mortgage
loan. Therefore, the Plaintiff made her monthly mortgage payments
to LoanCare. Austin alleges that she made timely mortgage payments
and was never in default under the terms of the Mortgage
Agreement.

When the Plaintiff made her monthly payments, she had options with
respect to her payment method: pay by mail, pay by telephone, an
automated telephone payment system, or online. However, if she
chose one of these latter three methods, the Defendants would
charge her a processing fee, here referred to as "Pay-to-Pay Fees."
The Plaintiff states that she makes her loan payments online, and
that each time she does, the Defendants charge her a Pay-to-Pay Fee
of $5.

The Plaintiff alleges that the practice of collecting Pay-to-Pay
Fees was in violation of the MCDCA (Count I) and the MCPA (Count
II); represents a breach of the terms of the Mortgage Agreement
(Count III); and that the Defendants were unjustly enriched through
these transactions (Count IV).

Count I of the Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that the Defendant
violated two sections of the MCDCA, specifically Md. Code Ann.,
Com. Law SectionSection 14-202(8) and 14-202(11), which prohibits
"collectors" from claiming, attempting, or threatening to enforce a
right with knowledge that the right does not exist.  Section
14-202(11) also makes it illegal to violate Sections 804-812 of the
federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA").

Judge Brennett opines that the Plaintiff fails to state a claim
under either of these sections because the Plaintiff has failed to
allege that LoanCare was engaging in debt collection. Even if the
Plaintiff adequately alleged that LoanCare was engaged in debt
collection, her claims under Sections 14-202(8) and 14-202(11)
still fail to state plausible claims for relief, Judge Brennett
adds.

The Plaintiff also fails to state a claim for violation of the MCPA
(Count II). Therefore, because the Plaintiff fails to allege a
violation of the MCDCA, the Plaintiff also fails to allege a
violation of the MCPA, and this claim must be dismissed, the Court
says.

Judge Brennett also holds that the Plaintiff fails to allege a
claim for breach of contract (Count III). He says that the
Plaintiff has not adequately alleged that LoanCare owes her a
contractual obligation. The Plaintiff does not allege that LoanCare
is a signatory or a party to the Mortgage Agreement, which she
alleges the Defendants breached. She instead makes the conclusory
claim that LoanCare became "bound" as an assignee to the Mortgage
Agreement when it became the subservicer of the mortgage loan. The
Judge says the Plaintiff has not alleged facts to suggest LoanCare
was a party to the Mortgage Agreement, and, therefore, LoanCare
cannot be held liable for breach of that contract.

The Plaintiff fails to state a claim for unjust enrichment (Count
IV), Judge Brennett states. The Plaintiff has failed to allege
facts that suggest such a situation exists. He adds that the
Plaintiff fails to allege that LoanCare retained a benefit
conferred by the Plaintiff under circumstances in which it was
inequitable for it to do so.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum Opinion dated Dec. 10,
2020, is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9s79obx from
Leagle.com.


LANDCARE USA: Disqualification of 2 Law Firms in Cortez Reversed
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of California, Second District, Division
Seven, reverses the trial court's order granting the Plaintiffs'
motion to disqualify two law firms in the class action lawsuit
titled ISMAEL CORTEZ, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents v.
LANDCARE USA, LLC et al., Defendants and Appellants, Case No.
B298044 (Cal. App.).

Cortez filed the action against his former employer, LandCare and
his former supervisor, Ivan Tovar, asserting a cause of action
under the Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA") on behalf of
himself and similarly situated employees. In his complaint, Cortez
alleges that LandCare did not allow him and other employees to take
rest breaks and did not pay him and other employees for all hours
worked. Cortez asserted a single cause of action under PAGA to
recover civil penalties and underpaid wages on behalf of himself
and other similarly situated employees.

The counsel for Cortez, The Green Law Group, asked the counsel for
LandCare, Rosen Saba LLP, to provide the contact information for
five potentially aggrieved LandCare employees. Rosen Saba told
Green Law that Rosen Saba also represented the five employees.

When the trial court learned of Rosen Saba's statement and
expressed concern that Rosen Saba represented both LandCare and
potentially aggrieved employees, Rosen Saba retracted its statement
and told Green Law it did not represent the employees. A different
law firm, Schwartz Semerdjian Cauley & Moot, now Schwartz
Semerdjian Cauley & Evans, subsequently informed Green Law it
represented two of the five potentially aggrieved employees,
Octavio Aguilera and Raphael Diaz Valdivia.

Cortez filed a motion to disqualify Rosen Saba from representing
LandCare and to disqualify Schwartz Semerdjian from representing
the employees. The trial court granted the motion and disqualified
both law firms. LandCare, Aguilera, and Valdivia appeal.

The Appellate Court holds that the trial court erred in
disqualifying Rosen Saba. It agrees that Rosen Saba's statements
that it represented the potentially aggrieved employees were not
substantial evidence of an attorney-client relationship, and
rejects Cortez's argument they were judicial admissions. Rosen
Saba's statements did not show the aggrieved employees intended to
retain Rosen Saba as their attorneys, that Rosen Saba obtained
confidential information from the employees, or that Rosen Saba
provided legal advice to the employees.

According to the Appellate Court's Opinion, Rosen Saba did not make
a court appearance or file anything on behalf of the aggrieved
employees. Because Rosen Saba was not appearing on behalf of the
employees, its statement that it represented the employees did not
raise a presumption the employees knew of or had authorized Rosen
Saba to make the statement. The Appellate Court, hence, states that
the trial court erred in ruling that the statements showed Rosen
Saba represented the potentially aggrieved employees and that such
representation required disqualification.

The Appellate Court also opines that the trial court erred in
disqualifying Schwartz Semerdjian. It inferred, and Aguilera and
Valdivia have admitted on appeal, that LandCare is paying Schwartz
Semerdjian to represent them. On appeal the parties disagree
whether LandCare's payment of Schwartz Semerdjian's fees, without
more, requires Schwartz Semerdjian's disqualification. It does not,
the Appellate Court says.

The trial court did not find Schwartz Semerdjian failed to obtain
Aguilera's and Valdivia's informed written consent to the
representation; nor did the trial court find, or does Cortez argue,
LandCare took any specific action that interfered with Schwartz
Semerdjian's independent professional judgment or its
representation of Aguilera and Valdivia, the Appellate Court notes.
Instead, the trial court ruled that, because Schwartz Semerdjian
previously represented LandCare, and because LandCare was a party
to an action in which Aguilera and Valdivia stood to recover if
Cortez prevailed, it was not reasonable to expect Schwartz
Semerdjian to exercise independent professional judgment when
representing Aguilera and Valdivia.

But contrary to the trial court's ruling and Cortez's assertion,
that LandCare is paying Schwartz Semerdjian's fees does not
establish as a matter of law Schwartz Semerdjian cannot exercise
independent professional judgment in representing Aguilera,
Valdivia, or other employees, the Appellate Court states. The
Appellate Court adds, among other things, that Cortez provided no
evidence LandCare has done anything to influence or interfere with
Schwartz Semerdjian's representation of Aguilera and Valdivia, and
that disqualifying Schwartz Semerdjian would be unfair to Aguilera
and Valdivia.

Accordingly, the trial court's order is reversed. LandCare USA,
Tovar, Aguilera, and Valdivia, are to recover their costs on
appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion dated Dec. 10, 2020, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yamap3hy from Leagle.com.

The Green Law Group and Matthew T. Bechtel --
matthew@thegreenlawgroup.com -- for Plaintiff and Respondent Ismael
Cortez.

Ryan D. Saba -- rsaba@rosensaba.com -- and Elizabeth L. Bradley --
ebradley@rosensaba.com -- of Rosen Saba LLP, for Defendants and
Appellants LandCare USA, LLC and Ivan Tovar.

Dick A. Semerdjian -- das@sscelaw.com -- Sarah Brite Evans --
sarah@sscelaw.com -- and Danielle L. Macedo, of Schwartz Semerdjian
Cauley & Moot; Schwartz Semerdjian Cauley & Evans, for Defendants
and Appellants Octavio Aguilera and Raphael Diaz Valdivia.


LANNETT CO: To Respond to Doc Request Nos. 16-19 in Utesch Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOHN UTESCH, Plaintiff v. LANNETT COMPANY, INC.,
ARTHUR P. BEDROSIAN AND MARTIN P. GALVAN, Defendants, Civil Action
No. 16-5932 (E.D. Pa.), Judge Wendy Beetlestone of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ordered the
Defendants to produce all relevant, non-protected documents
responsive to Request Nos. 16, 17, 18, and 19 within 30 days of the
Opinion.

The case is a securities fraud class action in which the Plaintiffs
allege that the Defendants misled investors by claiming that price
increases by Defendant Lannett on various generic drugs were due to
strong market competition and other legitimate market factors,
rather than anti-competitive conduct within the generic drug
industry.  The Plaintiffs also allege that the Defendants made
material misrepresentations concerning Lannett's internal
investigation into potential antitrust violations and the
likelihood that Lannett would be implicated in broader price-fixing
prosecutions.

On July 8, 2014, The New York Times published an article about
rapid price increases in the generic drug industry.  The article
focused on significant price increases for digoxin, a
cardiovascular drug sold primarily by Lannett and two other
pharmaceutical manufacturers, Global Pharma and Par Pharmaceutical.
Shortly thereafter, Lannett received a subpoena from the
Connecticut Attorney General ("Connecticut AG") requesting
documents in connection with an investigation into price fixing and
market allocation relating to the sale of generic drugs.

On July 16, 2014, Lannett disclosed in a Securities and Exchange
Commission filing that it received the Connecticut AG's subpoena
concerning price fixing and market allocation with respect to
digoxin.  In November 2014, Lannett disclosed that the Department
of Justice ("DOJ") had served the company with a subpoena seeking
documents regarding the sale of generic prescription medications.
The DOJ served Lannett with a second subpoena the following month.
Lannett continued to deny any wrongdoing.

During a Nov. 3, 2016 earnings call, an analyst from Deutsche Bank
asked Defendants Arthur P. Bedrosian, and Martin P. Galvan for some
detail as to what Bedrosian and the Board did to look into the
matter, referring to the "probe into potentially collusive behavior
within the generic drug industry.  In response, Bedrosian
referenced the "thorough" internal review.  They were convinced
that there was no wrongdoing on the part of any of his employees at
the Company.

Lead Plaintiff University of Puerto Rico Retirement System
("UPRRS") alleges that the public statements misled investors about
the timing, scope, and completion of Lannett's internal
investigation, and that the Defendants recklessly reassured
investors based on the results of the internal investigation and
Fox Rothschild's report to Lannett's Board of Directors.

UPRRS has filed a motion to compel Defendants Lannett, Bedrosian,
and Galvan to produce documents in response to its Amended First
Request for the Production of Documents.  Specifically, it to
compel discovery relating to alleged misrepresentations concerning
the scope, substance, and results of Lannett's internal
investigation.

On May 4, the Defendants served their Responses and Objections to
these requests.  They objected to Request No. 16 ("All Documents
dated from July 1, 2014 to Nov. 3, 2016 concerning Lannett's
internal review focused on the Company's generic drug pricing
practices, as referenced in paragraph 96, 135 and 158 of the
Complaint"); Request No. 17 ("All Documents that the Defendants
will rely upon to support their denials in paragraphs 89, 93, 101,
104, 109, 115, 121, 126, 133, 136, 142, 148, and 154 of their
Answer that the Defendants misled investors with respect to the
extent to which Lannett investigated whether the Company engaged
in, or was aware of, any unlawful anticompetitive conduct that
might implicate the Company in a regulatory action or have a
negative impact on Lannett's business operations and financial
results or prospects"); Request No. 18 ("All Documents that the
Defendants will rely upon to support their denial in paragraph 97
of their Answer that the Defendants' statements regarding the
results of its internal investigation were misleading because they
misrepresented the risk that Lannett faced of being implicated in
the investigation and legal action being conducted by the
Connecticut Attorney General"); and, Request No. 19 ("All Documents
that the Defendants will rely upon to support their denials
regarding Lannett's internal investigation in paragraphs 137,
157-59, 164 and 168 of their Answer").  In short, the Defendants
object to UPRRS' requests for documents pertaining to the internal
investigation.

The question before the Court is whether, and to what extent,
certain documents concerning the internal review are protected from
discovery by the attorney-client privilege or work-product
doctrine.

Judge Beetlestone opines that the Defendants' anticipation of
future litigation was objectively reasonable, given that internal
investigations into alleged corporate wrongdoing are often "shaped
by the specter of litigation," such as future securities and
derivative suits premised on the alleged misconduct.  Indeed,
courts regularly find investigation materials entitled to work
product protection despite being prepared prior to the case at
hand, as UPRRS's own authority demonstrates.  Thus, investigatory
materials generated by Fox Rothschild during the course of the
internal investigation--such as, for instance, the firm's
memoranda, summaries, and reports--are protected from disclosure
under the work product doctrine.

The Judge then opines documents concerning the factual
circumstances of the relationship between Fox Rothschild and
Lannett are discoverable.  The engagement letter(s) and similar
documents concerning the factual circumstances surrounding the
attorney-client relationship between Lannett and Fox Rothschild are
not privileged.  The Defendants will produce such documents to
UPRRS, redacted as necessary to protect material that, in
accordance with the principles set forth supra, is otherwise
privileged.

The Judge also opines that the materials prepared in connection
with Fox Rothschild's investigatory interviews of current or former
Lannett employees need not be produced at this time.  While UPRRS
urges that it is not seeking those portions of the interviews or
notes that reveal counsel's impressions or legal assessments, it
nevertheless contends that it is entitled to the "underlying facts"
contained within these documents--in other words, Fox Rothschild's
fact work product.  Not so, the Judge holds.  To obtain work
product, UPRRS bears the burden of establishing both that it has a
substantial need for the protected material and that it cannot
obtain the material elsewhere without incurring undue hardship.  It
does not even attempt to make such a showing.

The Judge further opines that UPRRS fails to meet its burden of
establishing implied waiver as to the investigatory report(s)
prepared by Fox Rothschild and presented to Lannett's Board of
Directors.  The finding is, however, made without prejudice to
UPRRS raising the issue again in the future, should the Defendants
choose to rely on the investigatory report(s)--or any other
specific communication or work product relating to the internal
review--in support of their defense.

For these reasons, Judge Beetlestone ordered the Defendants to
produce the engagement letter(s) and any other responsive documents
concerning the factual circumstances of the attorney-client
relationship between Lannett and Fox Rothschild, within the
parameters she outlined.  The Defendants need not at this time
produce any investigatory report(s) prepared by Fox Rothschild for
Lannett's Board of Directors or the contents of Fox Rothschild's
interviews with current or former Lannett employees.

The Defendants must produce all relevant, non-protected documents
responsive to Request Nos. 16, 17, 18, and 19 within 30 days of the
Opinion.  The Defendants will provide UPRRS with a privilege log at
the time of production for all investigatory materials withheld.
Such log will describe the nature of the documents, communications,
or tangible things not produced or disclosed in such a manner that,
without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will
enable other parties to assess the claim.  The parties will
continue to comply with the Court's procedures in any future
discovery disputes.

An appropriate order follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 9, 2020 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y7rkcqaz from Leagle.com.


LOGICBIO THERAPEUTICS: Lead Plaintiff Bid in Afinowicz Suit Pending
-------------------------------------------------------------------
LogicBio Therapeutics, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 9, 2020, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2020, that a motion for
appointment as lead plaintiff in John R. Afinowicz v. LogicBio
Therapeutics, Inc., remains outstanding.

On March 18, 2020, a purported shareholder class action, John R.
Afinowicz v. LogicBio Therapeutics, Inc., et al., No.
2:20-cv-03009, was filed in the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey, naming the company and certain of its
officers as defendants.

The lawsuit alleges that the company made material
misrepresentations and/or omissions of material fact relating to
the company's Investigational New Drug submission for LB-001 in its
public disclosures, in violation of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder.

The complaint seeks certification of a class of purchasers of the
company's common stock during the period from December 3, 2018
through February 10, 2020.

The plaintiff seeks unspecified monetary damages on behalf of the
putative class and an award of costs and expenses, including
attorney's fees.

On May 13, 2020, the defendants moved to transfer the action from
the District of New Jersey to the District of Massachusetts, and on
May 18, 2020, shareholder John R. Afinowicz moved for appointment
as lead plaintiff.  

The Court granted Defendants' motion to transfer on June 2, 2020,
and the case was transferred to the District of Massachusetts (No.
1:20-cv-11158) on June 18, 2020.  The motion for appointment as
lead plaintiff remains outstanding.

LogicBio said, "We believe that this action is without merit and
intend to defend it vigorously. At this time, no assessment can be
made as to the likely outcome of this lawsuit or whether the
outcome will be material to us."

LogicBio Therapeutics, Inc. operates as a biotechnology company.
The Company develops therapeutic gene therapy vectors for the
treatment of genetic and infectious diseases. LogicBio Therapeutics
serves patients in the State of Massachusetts. The company is based
in Cambridge Massachusetts.

LORAC COSMETICS: Williams ADA Suit Dismissed Without Prejudice
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Robbie Abrams of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York dismissed without prejudice the case, PAMELA
WILLIAMS, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. LORAC COSMETICS, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 20-CV-1741
(RA) (S.D. N.Y.).

Plaintiff Williams brings the putative class action against Lorac
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act.  The Plaintiff
filed her Complaint on Feb. 27, 2020.  

On March 9, 2020, the Court ordered that, within 30 days of service
of the summons and complaint, the parties must meet and confer for
at least one hour in a good-faith attempt to settle the action.  It
further ordered that within 15 additional days (i.e., within 45
days of service of the summons and complaint), the parties must
submit a joint letter requesting that the Court either (1) refer
the case to mediation or a magistrate judge (and indicate a
preference between the two options), or (2) schedule an initial
status conference in the matter.  The Plaintiff filed an affidavit
of service averring that the Defendant was served on March 20,
2020.  The Defendant's answer was then due April 10, 2020.

After the Defendant failed to file a timely answer, the Court
instructed the Plaintiff on June 19, 2020 that if she intended to
move for default judgment, she must do so by July 2, 2020.  She did
not do so.  On July 14, 2020, the Court extended the deadline to
July 17, 2020.  The Plaintiff was informed at this time that if she
does not move for a default judgment or respond to the order, the
Court will dismiss the action for failure to prosecute under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).  Again, she did neither.

On July 24, 2020, the Court extended the Plaintiff's deadline until
July 28, 2020.  Again, it informed her that if she does not move
for a default judgment or respond to the order, the Court will
dismiss the action for failure to prosecute under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 41(b).  On July 27, 2020, the Plaintiff filed a
proposed certificate of default, and on Aug. 11, 2020, filed a
motion for default judgment.

On Aug. 19, 2020, the Court instructed the Plaintiff to serve on
the Defendant a copy of the default judgment motion and any
supporting papers no later than Aug. 28, 2020.  She did not do so.
On Sept. 14, 2020, the Court extended the deadline to Sept. 18,
2020, informing her that failure to comply with the order may
result in sanctions including involuntary dismissal for failure to
prosecute.  The Plaintiff did not meet that deadline.  On Sept. 25,
2020, the Court extended the deadline to Oct. 2, 2020, again
informing her that failure to serve the documents may result in
dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Rule
41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

To date, the Plaintiff has not served the Defendant with the motion
for default judgment as required by the Court's August 19,
September 14, and September 25 Orders.

Judge Abrams holds that several factors weigh in favor of
dismissing the action under Rule 41(b).  First, the duration of the
Plaintiff's non-compliance is significant.  She has not complied
with the Court's orders for two months, despite the Court issuing
three orders directing her to do so and granting her multiple
extensions of time to comply.  Second, the Plaintiff was on notice
that her failure to comply would result in dismissal.  In both the
Sept. 14, 2020 Order and its Sept. 25, 2020 Order, the Court
explicitly warned the Plaintiff that the action may be dismissed if
she failed to respond.  

Third, Plaintiff has been given multiple opportunities to be heard,
as witnessed by the Court's repeated extensions of filing deadlines
for Plaintiff's benefit.  And fourth, the case has been pending for
approximately eight months, and the Court has an obligation to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action and proceeding.

Because there is some countervailing evidence, however, Judge
Abrams concludes that a "less drastic" sanction than dismissal with
prejudice is appropriate in the case.  Primarily, the action has
not substantially burdened the Court's docket, as the Court has not
yet decided any substantive motions, held any hearings, presided
over any discovery, or scheduled trial.  Moreover, given that the
Defendant here has failed to appear or comply with any filing
deadlines, Judge Abrams cannot conclude that the Defendant would
suffer any prejudice if the litigation were allowed to continue.
Accordingly, he finds that dismissal without prejudice is the
appropriate sanction for the Plaintiff's failure to comply with the
Court's orders.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Abrams dismissed the action
without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(b).  The Clerk of Court is directed to close the case, and to
mail the Order to the Defendant.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 14, 2020 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y3kmybcj from Leagle.com.

M/Y LIONESS: Lindsay Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages for Seafarers
----------------------------------------------------------------
GEORGINA LINDSAY, on her own behalf and on behalf of all other
similarly situated seafarers working aboard M/Y LIONESS v. M/Y
LIONESS V, a 2006 Azimut Benetti motor yacht bearing IMO No.
1007990, Official No. 71291, her engines, tackle, rigging, boilers,
apparel, appurtenances, dinghies, furniture, etc., in rem, and
GLOBAL YACHT HOLDINGS LTD., a foreign corporation, as owner of the
M/Y LIONESS V, Case No. 1:20-cv-24975-XXXX (S.D. Fla., Dec. 5,
2020), involves a seafarers' preferred maritime lien for unpaid
wages of the crew of the M/Y LIONESS V.

The Plaintiff brings this action under the special rule for seamen
to sue for wages without security and prepayment of fees under 28
U.S.C. section 1916. Ms. Lindsay asserts that the the crew members
of the M/Y LIONESS V have not been paid their full earned and due
wages since March 2020.

The Plaintiff was and is a citizen of the United Kingdom, employed
as a seafarer aboard the M/Y LIONESS V. She has not been paid the
wages earned and due to her in an amount of approximately $25,000,
and growing.

Defendant M/Y LIONESS V, in rem (the Vessel), is a 2006 208-foot
Azimut Benetti motor yacht bearing IMO No. 1007990, Official No.
71291, registered in the Marshall Islands.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Adria G. Notari, Esq.
          NOTARI LAW, P.A.
          1820 SW 14th Court
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33312
          Telephone: (954) 257-9028
          E-mail: anotari@NotariLaw.com

MARVEL & MALONEY: Faces Ryniec Suit Over Unlawful Debt Collection
------------------------------------------------------------------
THOMAS RYNIEC, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. MARVEL & MALONEY, A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION and JOHN
DOES 1-25, Case No. 2:20-cv-18062 (D.N.J., Dec. 4, 2020) is
state-wide class action brought on behalf of the Plaintiff and on
behalf of all New Jersey consumers and their successors in
interest, who were sent debt collection letters and/or notices from
the Defendant, in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act (FDCPA).

According to the complaint, the Defendants caused to be delivered
to the Plaintiff a letter dated November 10, 2020,
which was addressed to Plaintiff and sought a balance of $3,217.49
on the RIVERVIEW MEDICAL obligation. The November 10, 2020 letter
stated in part:

   Unless you notify us in writing within 30 days after your
   receipt of this letter that you dispute the validity of this
   debt or any portion thereof, we will assume that the debt is
   valid.

The Plaintiff contends that the Defendant's letter requires that
all disputes made by him and others similarly situated be in
writing rather than verbal. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. section
1692g(a)(3), a consumer may effectively make a dispute to a debt
collector over the telephone (verbally), including notifying the
debt collector that the consumer is the victim of identity theft.
He was confused by the Defendant's requirement that disputes made
under 15 U.S.C. section 1692g(a)(3) had to be in writing to be
effective. Marvel & Maloney knew or should have known that its
actions violated the FDCPA, he added.

Marvel & Maloney is a law firm in Neptune, New Jersey.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ben A. Kaplan, Esq.
          CHULSKY KAPLAN LLC
          280 Prospect Ave. 6G
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Telephone: (877) 827-3395
          Facsimile: (877) 827-3394
          E-mail: ben@chulskykaplanlaw.com

MAUSER USA: Court Extends Stay of Valenzuela Suit for 120 Days
--------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of California extended the stay of the case,
RAMON VALENZUELA, Plaintiff, v. MAUSER USA, LLC, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 1:20-cv-00094-NONE-SAB (E.D. Cal.), 120 days
to finalize settlement.

The Plaintiff on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, filed the action in Merced Superior Court on Nov. 6,
2019, against Mauser USA, BWAY Corp., and Mauser Packaging
Solutions.  On Jan. 17, 2020, Defendants Mauser USA and BWAY
removed the matter to the Eastern District of California alleging
original and diversity jurisdiction exists.  On March 10, 2020, the
Court granted the parties' stipulation to stay all proceedings
pending the completion of mediation.

On Sept. 30, 2020, the parties attended mediation and reached an
agreement regarding resolution of the action.  The parties proffer
that they have executed a memorandum of understanding regarding a
global resolution of the Plaintiff's class action asserted in the
action as well as his representative claims pursuant to the
California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act, asserted in a
separate action pending in the Superior Court for the County of San
Bernardino captioned Valenzuela v. Mauser USA, LLC, San Bernardino
Superior Court Case No. CIVDS2001207.

The parties are currently drafting long-form settlement documents
that will likely include provisions to: (1) amend the Plaintiff's
state court action to add the class claims currently pending in the
action; (2) seek approval of the global settlement in the San
Bernardino Superior Court; and (3) to seek dismissal of the action
with prejudice.

The parties request the Court set a deadline to file another joint
status report within 120 days to permit the parties to finalize the
long-form settlement documents, amend the state court action
complaint, and initiate or complete the process of seeking
preliminary approval of a settlement in the state court action.

Magistrate Judge Boone finds good cause to approve the parties'
stipulated request.  Therefore, she extended the stay of the matter
120 days from the date of entry of the Order.  The parties will
file a joint status report within 120 days of entry of the Order
informing the Court of the status of settlement and resolution of
the action and the related state court action.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 14, 2020 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yyahbeq9 from Leagle.com.


MCCARTHY BURGESS: Florida Court Strikes Martin's Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANNETTE MARTIN, Plaintiff v. McCARTHY, BURGESS &
WOLFF, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 3:20-cv-1382-J-34JRK
(M.D. Fla.), Judge Marcia Morales Howard of the U.S. District Court
for the Middle District of Florida struck the Plaintiff's Class
Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial.

The Plaintiff initiated the instant action on Dec. 8, 2020, by
filing a two-count Class Action Complaint.

Upon review, Judge Howard finds that the Complaint constitutes an
impermissible "shotgun pleading."  She explains that a shotgun
complaint contains multiple counts where each count adopts the
allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count
to carry all that came before and the last count to be a
combination of the entire complaint.  As a result, most of the
counts contain irrelevant factual allegations and legal
conclusions.  Consequently, in ruling on the sufficiency of a
claim, the Court is faced with the onerous task of sifting out
irrelevancies in order to decide for itself which facts are
relevant to a particular cause of action asserted.  In the case,
Count II of the Complaint incorporates by reference all allegations
of the preceding count.

Judge Howard notes that in the Eleventh Circuit, shotgun pleadings
of this sort are "altogether unacceptable."  When faced with the
burden of deciphering a shotgun pleading, it is the trial court's
obligation to strike the pleading on its own initiative, and force
a plaintiff to replead to the extent possible under Rule 11,
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Accordingly, Judge Howard struck the Class Action Complaint and
Demand for Jury.  The Plaintiff will file a corrected complaint
consistent with the directives of the Order by Dec. 30, 2020.
Failure to do so may result in a dismissal of the action.  The
Defendants will respond to the corrected complaint in accordance
with the requirements of Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 9, 2020 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yb3ufhcx from Leagle.com.


MEDICAL MANAGEMENT: Settlement in Metzler FLSA Suit Gets Partial OK
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MEREDITH METZLER, DIANA BELICH, BLEAN TAYE, and STEVEN
BRUNO, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. MEDICAL MANAGEMENT INTERNATIONAL, INC., A CARING
DOCTOR (MINNESOTA), PA, A CARING DOCTOR (TEXAS), PC, A CARING
DOCTOR (NEW JERSEY), PC, XYZ CORPORATIONS 1-45, all collectively
d/b/a BANFIELD PET HOSPITAL, Defendants, Case No.
8:19-cv-2289-T-33CPT (M.D. Fla.), Judge Virginia M. Hernandez
Covington of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Florida, granted in part the parties' Joint Motion for Approval of
Settlement.

The Named Plaintiffs filed the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA")
case against their former employer, Medical Management on Sept. 13,
2019.  They amended their complaint on Jan. 7, 2020, adding several
other Defendants, all doing business as Banfield Pet Hospital.  The
Defendants then filed an answer to the amended complaint on Jan.
21, 2020.

On Jan. 21, 2020, the Named Plaintiffs sought to conditionally
certify an FLSA collective action and authorize notice to potential
collective members.  The Court conditionally certified the FLSA
collective action on March 4, 2020.  In addition to the four Named
Plaintiffs, nine Plaintiffs opted-in before notice was authorized
and 198 Plaintiffs joined the suit after notice was issued,
totaling 211 current and former employees in the collective
action.

On Jan. 24, 2020, the Court entered its Case Management and
Scheduling Order.  On July 20, 2020, the parties notified the Court
that they had reached a settlement agreement.  On Sept. 8, 2020,
the parties filed the Motion for Approval of Settlement.  

On Sept. 15, 2020, the Court directed the parties to provide more
information as to the attorneys' billing records.  The parties
provided such information on Sept. 23, 2020.  On Oct. 1, 2020, the
Court directed the parties to file supplemental briefing on the
issue of whether service awards are lawful under recent Eleventh
Circuit precedent. The parties filed a joint supplemental brief on
Oct. 5, 2020.

The parties reached a settlement wherein it was agreed that the
Plaintiffs would receive $410,000 in damages, inclusive of service
wards.  The terms of the settlement agreement provide for $373,250
in damages to be paid to all members of the collective action,
distributed pro rata based on workweeks during the three years
preceding the litigation.  The average amount payable to each
member is $1,174.  Additionally, 50% of the payment to each
Participating Member will be treated as back wages and 50% of such
payment will be treated as interest, any applicable penalties,
liquidated damages and other non-wage relief.

The settlement agreement also provides for $36,750 in service
awards, known as incentive or enhancement awards, to the Named
Plaintiffs and the Pre-Notice Opt-In Plaintiffs.  In addition to
damages, the Defendants have agreed to pay $350,000 in attorneys'
fees and $35,000 in costs.

In line with Campbell v. Pincher's Beach Bar Grill Inc., Case No.
2:15-cv-695-FtM-99MRM (M.D. Fla.), and a number of similar cases in
the District and given that discovery in the instant case is
incomplete, Judge Covington finds that final certification is not
required before approving the settlement.

Turning to the settlement agreement, the Plaintiffs allege that the
Defendants violated the overtime provisions of the FLSA.  Pursuant
to Bonetti v. Embarq Management Company, (M.D. Fla. 2009), and
other governing law, Judge Covington approves in part the
compromise reached by the parties in an effort to amicably settle
the case.  However, in light of recent Eleventh Circuit precedent
and a possible rehearing en banc, she denies approval of the
requested service awards at this juncture.  And, although she finds
the attorneys' hourly rates and hours billed excessive for the
region, at this juncture, the Judge will not set aside that aspect
of the settlement, which was agreed upon by competent, experienced
counsel, and which compensates the Plaintiffs in full.  

Therefore, Judge Covington finds that the settlement as to the
$373,250 in damages, $350,000 in attorneys' fees, and $35,000 in
costs is fair, representing a reasonable compromise of the parties'
dispute.  However, she refrains from approving the service awards
at this time.

Accordingly, the parties' Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement
is granted in part.  The Judge approved the award of $373,250 in
damages, to be distributed pro rata, $350,000 in attorneys' fees,
and $35,000 in costs.  She denied approval of $36,750 in service
awards.

The case is dismissed with prejudice as to the approved damages,
attorneys' fees, and costs in accordance with the terms set forth
in the parties' executed settlement agreement.

The Court declined to retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement
agreement.  It will retain jurisdiction for the limited purpose of
revisiting the denial of service awards if the Eleventh Circuit
holds a rehearing en banc in Johnson v. NPAS Sols., LLC. and
reverses its decision.  The parties may then move for
reconsideration upon such a reversal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. Oct. 9, 2020 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y2bgql84 from Leagle.com.

MERCEDES DIAZ: Faces Legaspi Suit Over Unlawful Labor Practices
---------------------------------------------------------------
BRITTNEY LEGASPI, as an individual and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. MERCEDES DIAZ HOMES, INC., a California
Corporation, MDH SPECIALIZED CARE HOMES 1, a California
Corporation, MDH SPECIALIZED CARE HOMES 2, a California
Corporation, MDH SPECIALIZED CARE HOMES 3, a California Corporation
and DOES 1 through 100, Case No. 20STCV45683 (Cal. Super., Los
Angeles Cty., Nov. 30, 2020) is a representative action for
recovery civil penalties under California Labor Code.

According to the complaint, the Defendants have committed several
Labor Code violations against Plaintiff and other similarly
aggrieved employees by failing to pay overtime compensation,
failing to pay the statutory minimum wage, failing to provide meal
and rest periods, failing to reimburse all necessary work expenses,
failing to pay all wages earned, failing to furnish with accurate
wage statements, failing to timely pay all final wages, failing to
maintain accurate records, and failing to respond to requests to
inspect and/or copy employment records.

The Plaintiff was employed by Defendants in the non-exempt position
of direct support professional from approximately 2011 until her
separation on July 24, 2020, although she was working in a modified
duty position beginning in approximately May 2019. Plaintiff worked
directly at assisted living facilities.

The Defendants provide in-home health care and hospice services to
elderly and disabled persons throughout California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Paul K. Haines, Esq.
          Fletcher W. Schmidt, Esq.
          Matthew K. Moen, Esq.
          Mossamat N. Karim, Esq.
          HAINES LAW GROUP, APC
          2155 Campus Drive, Suite 180
          El Segundo, CA 90245
          Telephone: (424) 292-2350
          Facsimile: (424) 292-2355
          E-mail: phaines@haineslawgroup.com
                  fschmidt@haineslawgroup.com
                  mmoen@haineslawgroup.com
                  nkarim@haineslaewgroup.com

MERIT ENERGY: Little Land Sues Over Non-Payment of Gas Royalties
----------------------------------------------------------------
LITTLE LAND COMPANY, L.P., on behalf of itself and all others
similarly situated v. MERIT ENERGY COMPANY, LLC, Case No.
6:20-cv-00451-KEW (E.D. Okla., Dec. 4, 2020) asserts claims against
Merit concerning its alleged actual, knowing, and willful
underpayment or non-payment of royalties on gas produced from
Oklahoma wells through improper accounting methods and by failing
to account for and pay royalties on gas used off the lease.

According to the complaint, the acts charged in this complaint as
having been done by Merit were authorized, ordered, or done by its
officers, agents, affiliates, employees, or representatives, while
actively engaged in the conduct or management of Merit’s business
or affairs, and within the scope of their employment or agency with
Merit.

Little Land owns mineral interests and engages in other lawful
activities from its principal place of business in Madill,
Oklahoma. Little Land owns royalty interests in one or more wells
in the Northeast Purdy Hart Sand Unit in Garvin County, Oklahoma,
including but not limited to the NEPHU W31 (Day No. 5) well. The
Northeast Purdy Hart Sand Unit is subject to order number 40625
issued by the Oklahoma Corporation Commission on October 2, 1959.
Merit was the operator of the Northeast Purdy Hart Sand Unit and
paid royalty to Little Land for part of the relevant time period.

Defendant Merit is in the business of producing and marketing
oil-and-gas constituent products from the wells in which the
Plaintiff and the members of the Class and Subclass hold
interests.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Rex A. Sharp, Esq.
          Ryan C. Hudson, Esq.
          Barbara C. Frankland, Esq.
          SHARP LAW, LLP
          5301 W. 75th Street
          Prairie Village, KS 66208
          Telephone: (913) 901-0505
          Facsimile: (913) 901-0419
          E-mail: rsharp@midwest-law.com
                  rhudson@midwest-law.com
                  bfrankland@midwest-law.com

MYLAN NV: New York Securities Class Action Underway
---------------------------------------------------
Mylan N.V. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on November 6, 2020, for the quarterly
period ended September 30, 2020, that the company continues to
defend a class action suit in the Southern District of New York
(SDNY).

Purported class action complaints were filed in October 2016
against Mylan N.V., Mylan Inc. and certain of their current and
former directors and officers in the Southern District of New York
on behalf of certain purchasers of securities of Mylan N.V. and/or
Mylan Inc. on the NASDAQ.

The complaints alleged that defendants made false or misleading
statements and omissions of purportedly material fact, in violation
of federal securities laws, in connection with disclosures relating
to Mylan N.V. and Mylan Inc.'s classification of their EpiPen(R)
Auto-Injector as a non-innovator drug for purposes of the Medicaid
Drug Rebate Program ("MDRP").

The complaints sought damages, as well as the plaintiffs' fees and
costs.

On March 20, 2017, a consolidated amended complaint was filed,
alleging substantially similar claims and seeking substantially
similar relief, but adding allegations that defendants made false
or misleading statements and omissions of purportedly material fact
in connection with allegedly anticompetitive conduct with respect
to EpiPen(R) Auto-Injector and certain generic drugs, and alleging
violations of both federal securities laws (on behalf of a
purported class of certain purchasers of securities of Mylan N.V.
and/or Mylan Inc. on the NASDAQ) and Israeli securities laws (on
behalf of a purported class of certain purchasers of securities of
Mylan N.V. on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange).

On March 28, 2018, the defendants' motion to dismiss the
consolidated amended complaint was granted in part (including the
dismissal of claims arising under Israeli securities laws) and
denied in part.

On July 6, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint,
including certain current and former directors and officers and
additional allegations in connection with purportedly
anticompetitive conduct with respect to EpiPen(R) Auto-Injector and
certain generic drugs. On August 6, 2018, the defendants filed a
motion to dismiss the second amended complaint, which was granted
in part and denied in part on March 29, 2019.

On June 17, 2019, plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint,
including certain current and former directors and
employees/officers and additional allegations in connection with
purportedly anticompetitive conduct with respect to certain generic
drugs. On July 31, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss
certain of the claims in the third amended complaint, which was
granted in part and denied in part on April 6, 2020.

On August 30, 2019, plaintiffs filed a motion for class
certification, which was granted on April 6, 2020. The certified
class covers all persons or entities that purchased Mylan common
stock between February 21, 2012 and May 24, 2019 excluding
defendants, current and former officers and directors of Mylan,
members of their immediate families and their legal
representatives, heirs, successors or assigns, and any entity in
which defendants have or had a controlling interest.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Mylan N.V., together with its subsidiaries, develops, licenses,
manufactures, markets, and distributes generic, branded-generic,
brand-name, and over-the-counter (OTC) pharmaceutical products in
North America, Europe, and internationally. The company was founded
in 1961 and is headquartered in Canonsburg, Pennsylvania.

MYLAN NV: PERS Mississippi Putative Class Suit Ongoing
------------------------------------------------------
Mylan N.V. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on November 6, 2020, for the quarterly
period ended September 30, 2020, that the company continues to
defend a putative class action complaint filed by the Public
Employees Retirement System of Mississippi.

On June 26, 2020, a putative class action complaint was filed by
the Public Employees Retirement System of Mississippi against Mylan
N.V. and certain of its directors and officers in the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania on behalf of certain
purchasers of securities of Mylan N.V.

The complaint alleges that defendants made false or misleading
statements and omissions of purportedly material fact, in violation
of federal securities laws, in connection with disclosures relating
to Mylan's Morgantown manufacturing plant and inspections at the
plant by the Food and Drug Administration.

The complaint alleges that Mylan N.V.’s stock traded at
artificially inflated prices as a result of the allegedly
misleading statements and omissions.

Plaintiff seeks certification of a class of purchasers of Mylan
N.V. securities between February 16, 2016 and May 7, 2019.

The complaint seeks damages, as well as the plaintiff's fees and
costs.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Mylan N.V., together with its subsidiaries, develops, licenses,
manufactures, markets, and distributes generic, branded-generic,
brand-name, and over-the-counter (OTC) pharmaceutical products in
North America, Europe, and internationally. The company was founded
in 1961 and is headquartered in Canonsburg, Pennsylvania.

NATIONAL CREDIT: Settlement in Cortes Suit Wins Final Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MIKE CORTES, on Behalf of
Himself and all Others Similarly Situated, v. NATIONAL CREDIT
ADJUSTERS, L.L.C., Case No. 2:16-cv-00823-MCE-JDP (E.D. Cal.), the
Hon. Judge Morrison C. England, Jr. entered an order:

   1. granting final approval of the parties' settlement and
      certifying the settlement class on a final basis,
      consisting of two subclasses:

      (a) Certified Class:

          "all persons within the United States who: (a) are
          current or former subscribers of the Call Management
          applications; (b) and received one or more calls; (c)
          on his or her cellular telephone line; (d) made by or
          on behalf of Defendant; (e) for whom Defendant had no
          record of prior express written consent; (f) and such
          phone call was made with the use of an artificial or
          prerecorded voice or with the use of an automatic
          telephone dialing system as defined under the
          Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) (g) at any
          point that begins April 21, 2012 until and including
          August 2, 2017"; and

      (b) 2016 California Class:

          "all persons (a) in California; (b) called by or on
          behalf of Defendant; (c) between January 1, 2016
          through December 31, 2016; (d) regarding a purported
          debt owed; (e) using an artificial or prerecorded
          voice or an automatic telephone dialing system as
          defined under the TCPA."

   2. designating the Plaintiff as representative of the
      Settlement Class; and

   3. appointing the law firm of Bursor & Fisher, P.A. as
      counsel for the Class.

Specifically excluded from the Settlement Class are all persons who
have filed a timely Request for Exclusion from the Class.

The Court finds that the Settlement Class fully satisfies all the
applicable requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 and due process.

The salient terms of the Settlement are:

-- The Defendant shall create a $1,800,000 non-reversionary
    settlement fund, which will be used to pay all attorney's
    fees, expenses and costs, notice and administrative
    expenses, Plaintiff's service award, and pay cash awards to
    all Settlement Class Members that could be identified.

-- After the deduction of attorney's fees, expenses and costs,
    notice and administrative expenses, the Plaintiff's service
    award, Settlement Class Members shall receive the balance of
    $1,800,000 to be distributed on a pro rata basis.

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 7, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3nbRMEf at no extra charge.[CC]

NATIONWIDE CREDIT: Faces Reno FDCPA Class Suit in D. New Jersey
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Nationwide Credit,
Inc., et al. The case is captioned as JOHNNY T. RENO, on behalf of
himself and those similarly situated v. NATIONWIDE CREDIT, INC.,
and JOHN DOES 1 through 10, Case No. 2:20-cv-17538-SDW-LDW (D.N.J.,
Nov. 30, 2020).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

The case is assigned to Judge Susan D. Wigenton.

Nationwide Credit, Inc. provides customer relationship and accounts
receivable management services. The Company offers outsourcing,
including contingency collections, first and third party, customer
relationship management, attorney network, and skip program
services. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yongmoon Kim, Esq.
          KIM LAW FIRM LLC
          411 Hackensack Ave Ste 701
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Telephone: (201) 273-7117
          Facsimile: (201) 273-7117
          E-mail: ykim@kimlf.com

NCAA: Manassa Sues Over Discrimination of Black Student-Athletes
----------------------------------------------------------------
TROYCE MANASSA, AUSTIN DASENT, and J'TA FREEMAN, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE NATIONAL
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION and THE DIVISION I BOARD OF
DIRECTORS OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, Case No.
1:20-cv-03172-JRS-MJD (S.D. Ind., Dec. 10, 2020) arises from the
conduct of National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) of
discriminating against Black student-athletes and teams at
Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) through
implementation of its so-called academic reforms.

Most recently, the NCAA designed and implemented the Academic
Performance Program (APP), which penalizes a team if it does not
meet or exceeds a threshold number of points based on the team
members' academic performance and other indicators. Highest tier
penalties include banning a team from postseason competition. The
formula on which the APP is based includes metrics that the NCAA
knew would discriminate against Black student-athletes at HBCUs.

According to the complaint, the NCAA's design and implementation of
the APP perpetuates a system that punishes African-Americans
student-athletes at HBCUs because of the HBCUs' unique and
historical role in the education of Blacks within the systemic
vestiges of discrimination. In fact, the NCAA has admitted that "a
higher proportion of HBCU teams have been subject to APP penalties"
than Predominantly White Institutions. Further, the NCCA's adoption
and continued enforcement of the APP, including its penalty
structure and postseason access bans, together with the NCAA's
prior academic propositions and reforms, represent a pattern or
practice of intentional discrimination against Black
student-athletes at HBCUs on the basis of race.

The Plaintiffs are African-Americans who were or are NCAA
student-athletes at HBCUs on teams that were or are at risk of
being banned from postseason competition because of the APP.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a nonprofit
organization that regulates student athletes from up to 1,268 North
American institutions and conferences. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          William N. Riley, Esq.
          Russell B. Cate, Esq.
          RILEYCATE, LLC
          11 Municipal Drive, Suite 200
          Fishers, IN 46038
          Telephone: (317) 588-2866
          Facsimile: (317) 458-1785
          E-mail: wriley@rileycate.com
                  rcate@rileycate.com

               - and -

          Elizabeth A. Fegan, Esq.
          FEGAN SCOTT LLC
          150 S. Wacker Dr., 24th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 741-1019
          Facsimile: (312) 264-0100
          E-mail: beth@feganscott.com

               - and -

          Jessica H. Meeder, Esq.
          FEGAN SCOTT LLC
          1200 G St., N.W., Suite 800
          Washington, D.C. 20005
          Telephone: (202) 921-6007
          Facsimile: (312) 264-0100
          E-mail: jessica@feganscott.com

               - and -

          LaRuby May, Esq.
          Je Yon Jung, Esq.
          MAY LIGHTFOOT PLLC
          3200 Martin Luther King Jr. Ave.
          S.E. Third Floor
          Washington, D.C. 20032
          Telephone: (202) 918-1824
          Facsimile: (202) 918-1010
          E-mail: lmay@maylightfootlaw.com
                  jjung@maylightfootlaw.com

NIKOLA CORPORATION: UCL Violations-Related Suits Underway
---------------------------------------------------------
Nikola Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 9, 2020, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2020, that the company
continues to defend putative class action suits related to its
violations of the Unfair Competition Law under California law.

Beginning on September 15, 2020, five putative class action
lawsuits were filed against the Company and certain of its current
and former officers and directors, asserting violations of federal
securities laws under Section 10(b) and Section 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and, in one case, violations of the
Unfair Competition Law under California law.

The complaints generally allege that the Company and certain of its
officers and directors made false and/or misleading statements in
press releases and public filings regarding the Company's business
plan and prospects.

The actions are: Borteanu v. Nikola Corporation, et al. (Case No.
2:20-cv-01797-JZB), filed by Daniel Borteanu in the United States
District Court of the District of Arizona on September 15, 2020;
Salem v. Nikola Corporation, et al. (Case No. 1:20-cv-04354), filed
by Arab Salem in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York on September 16, 2020; Wojichowski v. Nikola
Corporation, et al. (Case No. 2:20-cv-01819-DLR), filed by John
Wojichowski in the United States District Court for the District of
Arizona on September 17, 2020; Malo v. Nikola Corporation, et al.
(Case No. 5:20-cv-02168), filed by Douglas Malo in the United
States District Court for the Central District of California on
October 16, 2020; and Holzmacher, et al. v. Nikola Corporation, et
al. (Case No. 2:20-cv-2123-JJT), filed by Albert Holzmacher,
Michael Wood and Tate Wood in the United States District Court for
the District of Arizona on November 3, 2020.

On October 14, 2020 and October 21, 2020, respectively,
stipulations by and among the parties to extend the time for
defendants to respond to the complaints until a lead plaintiff,
lead counsel, and an operative complaint are identified were
entered as orders in the Wojichowski and Salem actions.

Plaintiffs seek an unspecified amount in damages, attorneys' fees,
and other relief.

The Company intends to vigorously defend against the foregoing
complaints. The Company is unable to estimate the potential loss or
range of loss, if any, associated with these lawsuits.

Nikola Corporation a vertically integrated zero emissions
transportation systems provider that designs and manufactures state
of the art battery electric and hydrogen electric vehicles,
electric vehicle drivetrains, energy storage systems, and hydrogen
fueling stations. The company is based in Phoenix, Arizona.

OCALA, FL: Court Grants McArdle's Bid for Production of Documents
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Philip P. Lammens of the U.S. District Court for
the Middle District of Florida grants the Plaintiffs' motion to
compel production of certain documents in the lawsuit titled
PATRICK McARDLE, COURTNEY RAMSEY and ANTHONY CUMMINGS v. CITY OF
OCALA, FL, Case No. 5:19-cv-461-Oc-30PRL (M.D. Fla.).

Plaintiffs McArdle, Ramsey, and Cummings filed the action against
the City of Ocala arising from alleged constitutional violations by
the City. The Plaintiffs allege that because they do not have
access to fixed, regular, and adequate housing, they have no choice
but to sleep or rest in outdoor areas in the City. According to
them, they have been illegally prosecuted and harmed by various
City policies, which were allegedly implemented to drive homeless
individuals out of the City, including the "broken windows"
policing policy, where Ocala Police Department officers actively
identify and arrest homeless individuals for municipal ordinance
violations.

Although filed as a putative class action, the District Judge
recently denied the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification. So,
the case is proceeding on the claims of the individual Plaintiffs.

The instant motion focuses on OPD's undisputed efforts in early
2019 to seek enhanced penalties for "habitual" offenders of
municipal ordinances. Specifically, the Plaintiffs seek to compel:
(1) personal notes kept by Mayor Guinn concerning conversations he
had with Marion County Judges about classifying those with multiple
municipal ordinance violations as "habitual" offenders; and (2)
additional emails the City may have in its possession related to
the classification of habitual offenders of municipal ordinances.

The specific requests for production are as follows:

   * Request No. 15 of the Plaintiffs' First Request for
Production:

     All documents and communications related to the City's
     efforts to label persons arrested for quality of life
     offenses as habitual offenders; and

   * Request No. 45 of the Plaintiffs' Third Request for
Production:

     Any documents and communications reflecting the City's
     collaboration, discussions, or work with the State
     Attorney's Office about enforcing City ordinances, including
     documents and communications that are reflective of efforts
     to label individuals as habitual offenders for violations of
     City ordinances.

Generally, Magistrate Judge Lammens notes, parties are entitled to
discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to
any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the
case, considering various factors. In order to determine the scope
of discovery the Courts and the parties must consider and evaluate
the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in
controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information,
the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in
resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.

Because there is no dispute that OPD had the subject policy, and
only one of the named Plaintiffs -- McArdle -- was ever designated
as a "habitual" offender, the Magistrate Judge is unpersuaded that
the broad requested discovery is proportional to the needs of the
case. The Plaintiffs are only entitled to discovery directly
connected to McArdle and his claims in this regard. According to
the Plaintiffs, such discovery would include Mayor Guinn's notes,
because he testified at his deposition that he spoke with the
judges before whom McArdle appeared, including the judge that
McArdle appeared before during the First Appearance Hearing on his
"Habitual" open lodging charge. The Plaintiffs argue that the City
should also be ordered to search emails specific to McArdle and
produce any mentions of him as a repeat or "habitual offender," or
communications about his "habitual" cases with the State Attorney's
Office.

Accordingly, the motion to compel is granted to the extent that
within 10 days of the Order the City will:

   (1) search and produce any emails specific to McArdle that
       mention him as a repeat or habitual offender, or
       communications about his habitual case with the State
       Attorney's Office; and

   (2) produce any portion of Mayor Guinn's notes that relate to
       discussions with Judge Robert E. Landt, the Judge before
       whom McArdle appeared during his First Appearance on his
       habitual open lodging charge.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Dec. 10, 2020, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y787ezoa from Leagle.com.


OKLAHOMA: Court Dismisses Without Prejudice White Prisoner Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Ronald A. White of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Oklahoma dismissed without prejudice the case, RICKEY
WHITE, Plaintiff v. KEVIN BUCKLORTH, Defendant, Case No. CIV
20-262-RAW-SPS (E.D. Okla.).

The Plaintiff is a pro se state prisoner in the custody of the
Oklahoma Department of Corrections who is incarcerated at Oklahoma
State Penitentiary in McAlester, Oklahoma.  Proceeding in forma
pauperis, he filed the civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983, seeking monetary damages and relief regarding his
life sentence.  The sole Defendant is Bucklorth, Director of the
Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board.

The Plaintiff apparently is alleging that the Pardon and Parole
Board changed the guidelines for calculating the execution of his
sentence, thereby, creating a significant risk of lengthening his
imprisonment.  He also contends this alleged change violated the Ex
Post Facto Clause.

The Plaintiff has raised three grounds for relief: (i) the
retroactive application of Parole Board amended rule changing
frequency of required reconsideration hearing for petition serving
life sentence from every one-year to every three years; (ii)
expunge the life sentence because it no number and hundred years
benefit of a legal punishment presumption that the guidelines
sentence should apply on a capital case; and (iii) the one-third
law sentence guidelines do constrain the discretion of district
courts and it do have legal effect on the petition sentence.

As an initial matter, the Plaintiff has written "Class Action" on
his complaint form.  While he, a pro se litigant, has the right to
appear on his own behalf, he may not represent another pro se
plaintiff in federal court.  Therefore, to the extent the Plaintiff
is requesting class status, the request is denied.

Although the Plaintiff has filed a civil rights complaint, his
arguments and request for relief with regard to his sentence
actually are claims that should be presented in a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2241, Judge
White notes. Further, to the extent the Plaintiff seeks
compensatory damages for his alleged unconstitutional
incarceration, he first must prove his conviction or sentence has
been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,
declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such
determination, or called into question by a federal court's
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.  The Plaintiff has not made
this showing, Judge White says.

Accordingly, Judge White dismissed without prejudice the action for
the Plaintiff's failure to state a claim on which relief may be
granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  Judge
White denied as moot all pending motions.  The dismissal will count
as a "Prior Occasion" or "Strike," pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section
1915(g).

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 9, 2020 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yboouzb2 from Leagle.com.


PATENAUDE & FELIX: Lindsey Sues Over Illegal Debt Collection
------------------------------------------------------------
ALEKSIA LINDSEY, on behalf of herself and those similarly situated
v. PATENAUDE & FELIX, APC., on behalf of itself and those similarly
situated, Case No. 5:20-cv-02537 (C.D. Cal., Dec. 8, 2020) arises
from the Defendant's unlawful debt collection practices in
violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

The Plaintiff seeks to represent, who continue to suffer damages
and losses directly and proximately caused by Patenaude's and other
similarly situated debt collectors' unsafe, unsound, and
unconscionable debt collection practices on behalf of a California
Corporation -- i.e. Transworld Systems, Inc.

According to the complaint, Transworld is not licensed as a
law-firm but enters into standard and uniform contract(s) with
Patenaude and other similar debt collectors which require it, as a
non-law firm and non-attorney, to improperly direct and control the
debt collection activities of the Named Defendant and Defendants'
Class members in debt collection litigation throughout the country
and California commenced to collect alleged consumer debts claimed
to be owned by others.

As a direct and proximate result of Patenaude and the Defendants'
Class members' attempts to collect consumer debts from them, Named
Plaintiff and the Plaintiffs' Class members have been damaged and
harmed by Patenaude and the Defendants' Class members' each: (i)
permitting Transworld to borrow their law licenses and filling
collection actions at the direction and control of Transworld; (ii)
Patenaude and the Defendants' Class members' claiming, threatening,
and seeking sums Transworld did not have a right to seek and were
not owed; and (iii) using Transworld's court documents and forms in
connection with a legal proceeding without any ability to review
and correct inaccuracies presented to the courts. In addition,
Named Plaintiff and the Plaintiffs' Class members are entitled to
statutory damages for Patenaude and the Defendants' Class members'
actions.

Patenaude & Felix, A.P.C. is a debt collection law firm
incorporated in California and with offices in San Diego,
California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Scott C. Borison, Esq.
          1900 S. Norfolk St. Suite 350
          San Mateo, CA 94403
          Telephone: (301) 620-1016
          E-mail: Scott@borisonfirm.com

               - and -

          Monica Hartsock, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF MONICA HARTSOCK
          4562 Hastings Ct.
          Chino, CA 91710
          Telephone: (909) 536-1773
          E-mail: Monica@Hartsocklawfirm.com

PELOTON INTERACTIVE: Deaf Can't Access Fitness App, Sullivan Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
PHILLIP SULLIVAN, JR., on behalf of himself and the Class v.
PELOTON INTERACTIVE, INC., Case No. 160744/2020 (N.Y. Sup., New
York Cty., Dec. 10, 2020) is a civil rights class action against
the Defendant for failing to design, construct, and/or own or
operate the Peloton App in a manner that is reasonably accessible
to, and independently usable by, deaf and hard-of-hearing people,
including the Plaintiff, in violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, the New York State Human Rights Law and the New
York City Human Rights Law.

The Plaintiff contends that the Defendant has denied, and continues
to deny him equal access to the same goods, services, and benefits
it provides to non-disabled individuals through its Peloton
application software, which is available to individuals who
purchase a Peloton membership. Specifically, the Defendant's
Peloton App fails to provide closed captioning for its workout
videos, virtual classes, and fitness-related advice they purchase
from the Defendant.

The complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief to correct
Defendant's policies and practices, which includes but is not
necessarily limited to implementing the necessary measures to
ensure that the Peloton App is in compliance with state law, the
continued monitoring of such measures and to update and remove
accessibility barriers on the Peloton App to conform to standards
such that Plaintiff and all other similarly situated deaf and
hard-of-hearing individuals will be able to reasonably access the
videos posted on the Peloton App.

Peloton Interactive, Inc. provides recreational facilities and
services. The Company offers workout bikes for indoor cycling, as
well as other fitness related instruments. Peloton Interactive
serves customers in the United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          C.K. Lee, Esq.
          LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
          148 West 24th Street, Eighth Floor
          New York, NY 10011
          Telephone: (212) 465-1188
          Facsimile: (212) 465-1181

PENSKE TRUCK: Zamora Sues Over Unpaid Wages for Auto Technicians
----------------------------------------------------------------
ANGEL ZAMORA, GABRIEL LOAIZA and JORGE GUILLEN, on behalf of the
State of California, as private attorney generals v. PENSKE TRUCK
LEASING CO., L.P., a Limited Partnership; and DOES 1 through 50,
inclusive, Case No. 2Q5TOV46359 (Cal. Super., Los Angeles Cty.,
Nov. 30, 2020) arises from the Defendants' unlawful labor practices
in violations of the California Business and Professions Code and
the California Labor Code.

According to the complaint, the Defendants violated the state laws
due to their failure to pay overtime compensation, failure to pay
minimum wages, failure to provide required meal and rest periods,
failure to provide accurate itemized statements, failure to
reimburse employees for required expenses, and failure to pay wages
when due.

The Plaintiffs bring this action against the Defendant seeking only
to recover California's Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act
(PAGA) civil penalties for themselves, and on behalf of all current
and former aggrieved employees.

Plaintiff Zamora was employed by the Defendant as a technician from
November of 2018 to January of 2020.

Plaintiff Loaiza has been working for the Defendant from January of
2017 as a technician.

Plaintiff Guillen has been employed by the Defendant from March of
2016 as a technician.

Penske Truck Leasing Co., L.P. operates a truck rental and leasing
company. The Company offers complete fleet management services,
including full service leasing, logistics, truck rentals, used
trucks for sale, and fleet services for utility & transit
companies. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Norman B. Blumenthal, Esq.
          Kyle R. Nordrehaug, Esq.
          Aparajit Bhowmik, Esq.
          Nicholas J. De Blouw, Esq.
          BLUMENTHAL NORDREHAUG BHOWMIK DE BLOUW LLP
          2255 Calle Clara
          La Jolla, CA 92037
          Telephone: (858) 551-1223
          Facsimile: (858) 551-1232

PHOENIX, AZ: Motion for Class Certification Denied as Moot
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Poder in Action, et al.,
v. City of Phoenix, Case No. 2:20-cv-01429-DWL (D. Ariz.), the Hon.
Judge Dominic W. Lanza entered an order:

   1. granting in part and denying in part the Plaintiffs'
      motion for permanent injunction and declaratory judgment,
      as as follows:

           The Court declares that the Persona Responsibility
           and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) does
           not prohibit unqualified aliens from receiving
           benefits via the Program and that the City's choice
           to exclude unqualified aliens from the Program is
           preempted by federal law and invalid.;

   2. denying as moot the City's motions to exclude the opinions
      of Mr. Jay Young and Professor David Super; and

   3. denying as moot the Plaintiffs' motion for class
      certification;

   4. dismissing Count Two of the amended complaint without
      prejudice.

   5. directing the Clerk of Court to enter judgment accordingly
      and terminate this action.

The Court declined to issue a permanent injunction. The City has
consistently asserted that its decision to exclude unqualified
aliens from the Program was based solely on its interpretation of
PRWORA, as opposed to a policy decision, and the City has indicated
that it will begin allowing unqualified aliens to participate in
the Program upon the issuance of the declaratory judgment.
Injunctions are extraordinary remedies and the Court concludes that
such an extraordinary remedy is unnecessary under these
circumstances, Judge Lanza said.

A copy of Court's order dated Dec. 9, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3oMmrZk at no extra charge.[CC]

PRATT LLC: Faces Mowry Employment Suit in Calif. State Court
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Pratt (Lathrop
Corrugating) LLC. The case is captioned as Jacob Mowry,
individually, and on behalf of other members of the general public
similarly situated v. Pratt (Lathrop Corrugating) LLC, a Delaware
Company, Case No. STK-CV-UOE-2020-0009988 (Cal. Super., San Joaquin
Cty., Nov. 30, 2020).

The case arises from employment-related issues.

A case management conference is set for June 7, 2021 before Judge
Carter Holly.

Pratt (Lathrop Corrugating) LLC is a manufacturer based in
California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Douglas Han, Esq.
          JUSTICE LAW CORPORATION
          751 N Fair Oaks Ave, Ste 101
          Pasadena, CA 91103-3069
          Telephone: (818) 230-7502
          Facsimile: (818) 230-7259
          E-mail: dhan@justicelawcorp.com

PRAXAIR INC: Garcia Seeks to Certify Settlement Class
-----------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as RITA GARCIA, individually,
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. PRAXAIR, INC., a
Delaware corporation; PRAXAIR DISTRIBUTION, INC., a Delaware
corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Case No.
2:18-cv-08170-JAK-AFM (C.D. Cal.), the Plaintiff will move the
Court on January 11, 2021, to enter an order:

   1. approving the terms of the parties' Settlement Agreement
      as fair, reasonable and adequate under Rule 23(e) of the
      Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including the amount
      of the settlement; the amount of distributions to class
      members; and the amounts allocated to the enhancement
      payments and attorney's fees and costs;

   2. certify for settlement purposes the Settlement Class
      defined as:

      "all persons who worked for Defendant PDI in California as
      an hourly paid, non-exempt employee at any time, excluding
      truck drivers, during the Class Period (from May 18, 2014,
      through Preliminary Approval);"

   3. appointing herself as representative for the Settlement
      Class;

   4. appointing her counsel, Moon & Yang, APC, as Class
      Counsel;

   5. approving the use of ILYM Group, Inc. as the settlement
      administrator; and

   6. authorizing distributions from the common fund.

Praxair is an American worldwide industrial gases company. It was
the largest industrial gases company in North and South America,
and the third-largest worldwide by revenue.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion for certification of settlement
class dated Dec. 10, 2020 is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://bit.ly/3gH4wk2 at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kane Moon, Esq.
          H. Scott Leviant, Esq.
          Allen Feghali, Esq.
          MOON & YANG, APC
          1055 W. Seventh St., Suite 1880
          Los Angeles, CA 90017
          Telephone: (213) 232-3128
          Facsimile: (213) 232-3125
          E-mail: kane.moon@moonyanglaw.com
                  scott.leviant@moonyanglaw.com
                  allen.feghali@moonyanglaw.com


PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS: S.C. Asks Fed. Gov't.'s Take on ERISA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Law360 reports that the U.S. Supreme Court asked for the federal
government's take on Oct. 19 on whether it should review the Second
Circuit's holding that PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP retirees could
receive money damages in a 14-year old ERISA case. [GN]



ROBINHOOD FINANCIAL: Pinchasov Class Suit Removed to S.D. Florida
-----------------------------------------------------------------
SHTERNA PINCHASOV, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ROBINHOOD FINANCIAL LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 2020-023866-CA-01, was removed from the Circuit
Court of the 11th Judicial Circuit of Florida in and for Miami-Dade
County to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Florida on Nov. 30, 2020.

The Clerk of Court for the Southern District of Florida assigned
Case No. 1:20-cv-24897-CMA to the proceeding.

The Plaintiff purports to represent a class of "all former and
current customers of Robinhood in the United States and its
territories who were affected by Robinhood's failure to prevent
customers from using its interface for stocks which were subject to
a T1 Halt at any time within four years preceding the filing of the
lawsuit."

Robinhood Financial LLC operates as an institutional brokerage
company. The Company provides online and mobile application-based
discount stock brokerage solutions that allows users to invests in
publicly-traded companies and exchange-traded funds. Robinhood
Financial serves clients worldwide. [BN]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Grace Mead, Esq.
          STEARNS WEAVER MILLER
          Museum Tower
          150 West Flagler Street Suite 2200
          Miami, FL 33130
          Telephone: (305) 789-3559
          E-mail: gmead@stearnsweaver.com

               - and -

          Maeve L. O'Connor, Esq.
          Elliot Greenfield, Esq.
          DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP
          919 Third Avenue
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 909-6000
          E-mail: mloconnor@debevoise.com
                  egreenfield@debevoise.com

SANTANDER HOLDINGS: Bid to Nix Ruf-Tepper Class Suit Pending
------------------------------------------------------------
Santander Holdings USA, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 6, 2020,
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2020, that the motion
to dismiss the putative class action suit entitled, Daniel and
Rebecca Ruf-Tepper v. Santander Bank, N.A., is pending.

Santander Bank, N.A. is a defendant in a putative class action
lawsuit in the United States District Court, Southern District of
New York, captioned Daniel and Rebecca Ruf-Tepper v. Santander
Bank, N.A., No. 20-cv-00501.

The Tepper Lawsuit, filed in January 2020, alleges that the Bank is
obligated to pay interest on mortgage escrow accounts pursuant to
state law.

Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint and the Bank has filed a
motion to dismiss.

Santander Holdings USA, Inc. operates as the holding company for
Santander Bank, National Association that provides various banking
products and services primarily in the Mid-Atlantic and
Northeastern United States. The company was founded in 1984 and is
headquartered in Boston, Massachusetts. Santander Holdings USA,
Inc. is a subsidiary of Banco Santander, S.A.


SANTANDER HOLDINGS: Dismissal of Ponsa-Rabell Suit Under Appeal
---------------------------------------------------------------
Santander Holdings USA, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 6, 2020,
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2020, that plaintiffs
have appealed the order of dismissal of Jorge Ponsa-Rabell, et. al.
v. SSLLC, Civ. No. 3:17-cv-02243, to the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit.

Santander Securities LLC (SSLLC), Santander BanCorp (SBC), Banco
Santander Puerto Rico (BSPR), the Company and Santander are
defendants in a putative class action alleging federal securities
and common law claims relating to the solicitation and purchase of
more than $180.0 million of Puerto Rico bonds and $101 million of
Closed-end funds (CEFs) during the period from December 2012 to
October 2013.

The case is pending in the United States District Court for the
District of Puerto Rico and is captioned Jorge Ponsa-Rabell, et.
al. v. SSLLC, Civ. No. 3:17-cv-02243.

The amended complaint alleges that defendants acted in concert to
defraud purchasers in connection with the underwriting and sale of
Puerto Rico municipal bonds, CEFs and open-end funds.

In May 2019, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended
complaint.

On July 22, 2020, the District Court dismissed the complaint.

Plaintiffs have appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit.

Santander Holdings USA, Inc. operates as the holding company for
Santander Bank, National Association that provides various banking
products and services primarily in the Mid-Atlantic and
Northeastern United States. The company was founded in 1984 and is
headquartered in Boston, Massachusetts. Santander Holdings USA,
Inc. is a subsidiary of Banco Santander, S.A.

SANTANDER HOLDINGS: Jan. 12 Final Settlement Approval Hearing  
---------------------------------------------------------------
Santander Holdings USA, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 6, 2020,
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2020, that the final
settlement approval hearing in Deka Investment GmbH et al. v.
Santander Consumer USA Holdings Inc. et al., No. 3:15-cv-2129-K, is
set for January 12, 2021.

Santander Consumer USA Inc. is a defendant in a purported
securities class action lawsuit in the United States District
Court, Northern District of Texas, captioned Deka Investment GmbH
et al. v. Santander Consumer USA Holdings Inc. et al., No.
3:15-cv-2129-K.

The Deka Lawsuit, which was filed in August 2014, was brought
against SC, certain of its current and former directors and
executive officers and certain institutions that served as
underwriters in SC's initial public offering (IPO), including
Santander Investment Securities Inc. (SIS), on behalf of a class
consisting of those who purchased or otherwise acquired SC
securities between January 23, 2014 and June 12, 2014.

The complaint alleges, among other things, that the IPO
registration statement and prospectus and certain subsequent public
disclosures violated federal securities laws by containing
misleading statements concerning SC's ability to pay dividends and
the adequacy of SC'fs compliance systems and oversight.

In December 2015, SC and the individual defendants moved to dismiss
the lawsuit, which was denied. In December 2016, the plaintiffs
moved to certify the proposed classes.

In July 2017, the court entered an order staying the Deka Lawsuit
pending the resolution of the appeal of a class certification order
in In re Cobalt Int'l Energy, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. H-14-3428, 2017
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91938 (S.D. Tex. June 15, 2017).

In October 2018, the court vacated the order staying the Deka
Lawsuit and ordered that merits discovery in the Deka Lawsuit be
stayed until the court ruled on the issue of class certification.

On July 28, 2020, the Company entered into a Stipulation of
Settlement with the plaintiffs in the Deka Lawsuit that fully
resolves all of the plaintiffs' claims, for a cash payment of $47
million.

On August 13, 2020, the Court entered an order preliminarily
approving the settlement and providing for notice, setting the
final settlement hearing for January 12, 2021.

Santander Holdings USA, Inc. operates as the holding company for
Santander Bank, National Association that provides various banking
products and services primarily in the Mid-Atlantic and
Northeastern United States. The company was founded in 1984 and is
headquartered in Boston, Massachusetts. Santander Holdings USA,
Inc. is a subsidiary of Banco Santander, S.A.

SELANGOR: Class Action Mulled v. Water Agencies Over Water Cuts
---------------------------------------------------------------
Ho Kit Yen, writing for Free Malaysia Today, reports that PKR's
Wangsa Maju MP Tan Yee Kew said that her office is mulling a class
action suit against water agencies in Selangor, in seeking remedies
over the frequent water cuts that affect the livelihood of Klang
Valley residents.

However, getting residents to come on board in filing the action
suit has been slowed down by the conditional movement control order
(CMCO).

"We are unable to organise big group briefings to inform residents
about our initiative but we have enlisted help from grassroots
leaders and RAs (resident associations) to speak to the local
communities.

"We are targeting 500 people to join this class action suit and we
are extending the period in getting people to join us until the end
of November," she said to FMT, adding that this initiative had
started in September.

Tan said five legal firms -- Messrs Calvin Khoo, Messrs Fithril
Rahim & Co, Messrs Wun, Lee & Partners, Saha & Associates, and
Preakas & Partners -- are assisting the residents in this civil
action.

"They are young lawyers, and not any 'big names'. They are willing
to provide their legal services on a pro bono basis.

"Once they collect 500 names to join this suit, they will file it
in court," she said, adding that there are over 100 individuals who
have joined the action suit so far.

Tan said individuals who are interested to join the class action
suit need to pay RM20 as a "special fee", while the fees for
hawkers and shop owners are RM50 and RM100, respectively.

"I started this exercise to tell the agencies to buck up in
performing their public duties to ensure clean water supplies to
residents.

"For the past one year, in Wangsa Maju alone, we experienced water
disruption seven times and we really need to put a stop to it," she
said.

Tan added agencies such as the Department of Environment, Selangor
Water Management Authority (LUAS) and National Water Services
Commission (SPAN) should place more preventive measures against
pollution.

On queries regarding the "difficulties" in holding the agencies
liable through the legal action, she said there are differing views
on whether the public can take such action.

"We have to see how the courts look into the case and whether they
want to give a chance for residents to be heard.

"We are now making the first move to show the agencies that not
only polluters should be held responsible, but the authorities also
need to play a part in protecting the rivers," she said.

On Oct. 19, LUAS said four water treatment plants had to be shut
down after odour pollution was detected in Sungai Selangor.

The latest pollution affected 1,292 areas in Kuala Lumpur,
Petaling, Klang, Shah Alam, Kuala Selangor, Hulu Selangor, Gombak
and Kuala Langat, disrupting supply to 1.19 million users. [GN]


SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING: Wenzel Sues Over Drop in Share Price
-----------------------------------------------------------------
LEE WENZEL, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
(SMIC), ZIXUE ZHOU, HAIJUN ZHAO, and MONG SONG LIANG, Case No.
2:20-cv-11219 (C.D. Cal., Dec. 10, 2020) seeks to recover
compensable damages under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
arising from the Defendants' issuance of false and misleading
statements resulting to the precipitous decline in the market value
of the Company's securities.

The lawsuit is brought on behalf of the Plaintiff and all persons
or entities who purchased or otherwise acquired publicly traded
Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation securities
between April 23, 2020 and September 26, 2020, inclusive.

The Plaintiff alleges that the statements in the Company's annual
reports were materially false and/or misleading because they
misrepresented and failed to disclose the adverse facts pertaining
to the Company's business, operational and financial results, which
were known to Defendants or recklessly disregarded by them.
Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (1) there was an "unacceptable
risk" that equipment supplied to SMIC would be used for military
purposes; (2) SMIC was foreseeably at risk of facing U.S.
restrictions; (3) as a result of restrictions by the U.S.
Department of Commerce, certain of SMIC's suppliers would need
"difficult-to-obtain' individual export licenses; and (4) as a
result, Defendants' public statements were materially false and/or
misleading at all relevant times.

In September 2020, Reuters published an article entitled "U.S.
tightens exports to China's chipmaker SMIC, citing risk of military
use" which states that: "The United States has imposed restrictions
on exports to China's biggest chip maker SMIC after concluding
there is an "unacceptable risk" equipment supplied to it could be
used for military purposes. Suppliers of certain equipment to
Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation 0981.HK will
now have to apply for individual export licenses, according to a
letter from the Commerce Department dated Friday and seen by
Reuters."

On this news, SMIC's American depositary receipt (ADR) price fell
$0.57 per ADR, or 4.7%, to close at $11.47 per ADR on September 28,
2020, the next trading day, the suit says.

Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation purports to
be an investment holding company principally engaged in the
computer-aided design, manufacture, testing, packaging and trading
of integrated circuits, as well as the provision of other
semiconductor services. The Company is also involved in the design
and manufacture of semiconductor masks and various types of wafers.
The Company distributes its products in China and to overseas
markets, such as the Europe and the United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Laurence M. Rosen, Esq.
          THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
          355 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2450
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 785-2610
          Facsimile: (213) 226-4684
          E-mail: lrosen@rosenlegal.com

SERCO INC: Faces 401(k) Plan Class Action
-----------------------------------------
Jacklyn Wille, writing for Bloomberg Law, reports that a
participant in Serco Inc.'s 401(k) plan who is challenging the
plan's fees and investment options asked a Virginia federal judge
to certify his case as a class action covering nearly 10,000
people.

Robert Glasscock's motion seeks certification of a class of all
participants and beneficiaries in the technology services company's
$335 million 401(k) plan. Glasscock's lawsuit accuses the company
of mismanaging the plan in violation of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act.

According to Glasscock, 21 of the 30 mutual funds offered by the
plan could have been obtained at a lower cost. [GN]



SERENITY TRANSPORTATION: $50K SCI Settlement in Johnson Suit OK'd
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley grants motions for
approval of settlement and to withdraw as counsel in the lawsuit
entitled CURTIS JOHNSON, et al. v. SERENITY TRANSPORTATION, INC.,
et al., Case No. 15-cv-02004-JSC (N.D. Cal.).

Before the Court is the Plaintiffs' motion to approve a Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA") settlement and release of the Plaintiffs'
FLSA and other wage and hour claims against Defendants SCI
California Funeral Services, Inc. and Service Corporation
International ("SCI") ("SCI Defendants"), as well as a motion for
leave to withdraw as counsel for Plaintiff Anthony Aranda.

Johnson and 16 Opt-In Plaintiffs ("SCI California Plaintiffs") have
reached a settlement with the SCI Defendants to resolve their wage
and hour claims against the company. The Plaintiffs are mortuary
drivers, who filed suit against their employer, Serenity
Transportation, its owner David Friedel, as well as the SCI
Defendants, alleging that they were misclassified as independent
contractors and denied the benefits of California and federal wage
and hour laws.

The Settlement provides that the SCI Defendants will pay $50,000 in
resolution of the SCI California Plaintiffs' claims, inclusive of
attorneys' fees and costs. Each SCI California Plaintiff will
receive an amount proportional to the number of relevant shifts
they performed for SCI California; payments to the SCI California
Plaintiffs totals $21,547.54, and the remaining $28,452.46 is
allocated for attorneys' fees and costs.

In exchange for the settlement, the SCI California Plaintiffs will
release wage and hour claims they may have against the SCI
Defendants and its affiliates, including claims under the FLSA.

Peter Rukin, Jessica Riggin, Valerie Brender, and Rukin Hyland &
Riggin LLP (collectively, "RHR") seek to withdraw as counsel for
SCI California Plaintiff Anthony Aranda. The Court grants RHR's
motion.

The Court finds good cause exists for RHR's withdrawal as counsel
of record for Mr. Aranda. RHR has attempted to reach Mr. Aranda by
"telephone, email, phone call, and letter" nearly one dozen times
in the past three months, and has not received any communication
from him in over two years. The Court rules that RHR must
additionally provide Mr. Aranda with notice, to fullest extent
possible, that papers will continue to be served on counsel for
forwarding purposes. Accordingly, the motion to withdraw as counsel
is granted subject to the conditions imposed by Civil Local Rule
11-5(b).

Civil Local Rule 11-5(b) states that when withdrawal by an attorney
from an action is not accompanied by simultaneous appearance of
substitute counsel or agreement of the party to appear pro se,
leave to withdraw may be subject to the condition that papers may
continue to be served on counsel for forwarding purposes, unless
and until the client appears by other counsel or pro se.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Dec. 10, 2020, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ybh539et from Leagle.com.


SPLUNK INC: Faces Pavlova-Coleman Suit Over Share Price Drop
------------------------------------------------------------
TATIANA PAVLOVA-COLEMAN, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. SPLUNK INC., DOUGLAS MERRITT, and JASON
CHILD, Case No. 3:20-cv-08600 (N.D. Cal., Dec. 4, 2020), is a
federal securities class action on behalf of all investors who
purchased or otherwise acquired Splunk Inc. common stock between
October 21, 2020 and December 2, 2020, inclusive, seeking to
recover damages caused by the Defendants' violations of the federal
securities laws and to pursue remedies under Sections 10(b) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

According to its most recent Annual Report filed on Form 10-K with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Splunk "provides
innovative software solutions that ingest data from different
sources including systems, devices and interactions, and turn that
data into meaningful business insights across the organization."
Splunk states that its "Data-to-Everything platform enables users
to investigate, monitor, analyze and act on data regardless of
format or source."

On October 21, 2020, just ten days before the close of Splunk's
2021 third fiscal quarter, Splunk held a call with several analysts
at the Virtual Analyst & Investor Session. On this call, Splunk
assured investors that everything was on track for its third
quarter 2021 financial results.

Throughout the Class period and in violation of the Exchange Act,
the Defendants made materially false and/or misleading statements,
as well as failed to disclose material adverse facts to investors.


After the markets closed on December 2, 2020, Splunk announced its
financial results for its third fiscal quarter for 2021, ended
October 31, 2020. In this announcement, Splunk reported total
revenues of $559 million, down 11% year-over-year and which missed
estimates by nearly $60 million.

The Company also held an earnings call with analysts on December 2,
2020. On that call, the Defendant Merritt admitted that despite the
Company having reiterated their 2021 third quarter guidance just
ten days before the close of the quarter, that these results fell
"certainly short of both our expectations and our communication of
those expectations."

This development stunned the market, leading analyst JPMorgan to
write that it was "blindsided by the magnitude of too many large
deals slipping in the final days of October." On this news, shares
of Splunk common stock plummeted, closing at just $158.03 per share
on December 3, 2020, down over 23% from the December 2, 2020
closing price of $205.91 per share.

As a result of Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the
precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's
securities, Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered
significant losses and damages.

Plaintiff Tatiana Pavlova-Coleman acquired shares of Splunk common
stock at artificially inflated prices, and has been damaged.

Splunk common stock trades on the NASDAQ stock exchange under the
ticker symbol "SPLK." The Company is headquartered in San
Francisco, CA. The Defendant Douglas Merritt has been Splunk's
President, Chief Executive Officer, and a member of the Company's
Board of Directors since 2015. The Defendant Jason Child has been
Splunk's Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer since
May 2019.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Whitney E. Street, Esq.
          BLOCK & LEVITON LLP
          100 Pine Street, Suite 1250
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 968-1852
          Facsimile: (617) 507-6020
          E-mail: whitney@blockleviton.com

               - and -

          Jacob A. Walker, Esq.
          BLOCK & LEVITON LLP
          260 Franklin St., Suite 1860
          Boston, MA 02110
          Telephone: (617) 398-5600
          Facsimile: (617) 507-6020
          E-mail: jake@blockleviton.com

STATE FARM: Motion to Dismiss Class Action Claim Partly Denied
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ELEGANT MASSAGE, LLC d/b/a
LIGHT STREAM SPA, on behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY and
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Case No.
2:20-cv-00265-RAJ-LRL (E.D. Va.), the Hon. Judge Raymond A. Jackson
entered an order denying in part and granting in part the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the class action claim under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

The Court said, "For Plaintiff to establish a Covered Cause of Loss
under the Policy, the claim must both constitute an 'accidental
direct physical loss to' Covered Property and it must not be
explicitly excluded by the Policy. Here, the Plaintiff has pled
sufficient facts to state a claim to allow this Court to draw
reasonable inferences that relief is plausible on its face for
Counts II and III. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Also, since the Defendants failed to show that any of the Policy's
Exclusions clearly apply, Plaintiff's claims may proceed."

On May 27, 2020, the Plaintiff filed the Class Action complaint for
Declaratory Judgement (Count I) and Breach of Contract (Count II)
against the Defendants, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1),
23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) on behalf of themselves and all members of
the proposed class and sub-class. On July 13, 2020, the Plaintiff
filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) stating that it is bringing
Counts I and II on behalf of itself and the proposed class and
sub-class, as well as adding a claim for Breach of Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing (Count III). On August 11, 2020, the
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Count II. The Plaintiff
responded in opposition and the Defendants replied.

As a result of the policies on social distancing and restrictions
on its business, the Plaintiff voluntarily closed Light Stream Spa
on March 16, 2020 and remained closed through May 15, 2020.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff suffered a complete loss of income since
closing on March 16, 2020.

On March 16, 2020, Plaintiff submitted a claim for loss of business
income and extra expenses under the Policy. On March 26, 2020, the
Defendants denied Plaintiffs claim (Denial Letter). The Denial
Letter stated that the grounds for denial were because the
Plaintiff voluntarily closed their business on March 16, 2020,
there was no civil order to close the business, there was no known
damage to the business space or property resulting from COVID-19,
and the Loss of Income Coverage excludes coverage for loss caused
by virus.

A copy of the Court's memorandum, opinion and order dated Dec. 9,
2020 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/34cJIMi
at no extra charge.[CC]

STERLING BANCORP: Bid to Nix Okla. Police Retirement Suit Pending
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Sterling Bancorp, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 9, 2020, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2020, that the motion to
dismiss the class action suit entitled, Oklahoma Police Pension and
Retirement System v. Sterling Bancorp, Inc., et al., Case No.
5:20-cv-10490-JEL-EAS, is still pending.

The Company, certain of its current and former officers and
directors, and other parties have been named as defendants in a
shareholder class action captioned Oklahoma Police Pension and
Retirement System v. Sterling Bancorp, Inc., et al., Case No.
5:20-cv-10490-JEL-EAS, filed on February 26, 2020 in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.

The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on July 2, 2020. This
action alleges violations of the federal securities laws, primarily
with respect to disclosures concerning the Bank's residential
lending practices that were made in the Company's registration
statement and prospectus for its initial public offering, in
subsequent press releases, in periodic and other filings with the
SEC, and during earnings calls.

The Company filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint with
the court on September 22, 2020.

The Company intends to vigorously defend this and any related
actions.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Sterling Bancorp, Inc. is a unitary thrift holding company
headquartered in Southfield, Michigan and its primary business is
the operation of its wholly-owned subsidiary, Sterling Bank.
Through Sterling Bank, the offers a range of loan products to the
residential and commercial markets, as well as retail banking
services.

STILLMAN LAW: Lahu Files Suit in D.N.J. Over Violation of FDCPA
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Stillman Law Office,
LLC, et al. The case is styled as VALBONA LAHU, on behalf of
herself and those similarly situated v. STILLMAN LAW OFFICE, LLC,
STUART LEBENBOM, MICHAEL STILLMAN, and JOHN DOES 1 to 10, Case No.
2:20-cv-17541-WJM-MF (D.N.J., Nov. 30, 2020).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

The case is assigned to Judge William J. Martini.

Stillman Law Office, LLC is a law firm based in Michigan. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yongmoon Kim, Esq.
          KIM LAW FIRM LLC
          411 Hackensack Ave Ste 701
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Telephone: (201) 273-7117
          Facsimile: (201) 273-7117
          E-mail: ykim@kimlf.com

SUPER BREAD: FLSA Class Conditionally Certified in Fuentes Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DIONICIA FUENTES, et al., Plaintiffs v. SUPER BREAD II
CORP., et al., Defendants, Case No. 18-6736 (ES) (CLW) (D.N.J.),
Judge Esther Salas of the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey granted in part and denied in part Fuentes' motion for
conditional certification under the Fair Labor Standards Act and
class certification under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Plaintiffs Fuentes, Leonardo Rodriguez, Ezequiel Chiozza, Candido
Peralta Rodriguez, Angel Perez, Fernando Facal, Dreilyn Santos,
Kelvin Taveras and Christopher Vargas Garcias, commenced the
putative collective action under the FLSA and class action under
the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law ("NJWHL") to recover unpaid
overtime wages on behalf of themselves and current and former
employees of Super Bread; Super Cakes Corp.; Roxo3, LLC; Jose
Martins; and Caterina Martins.

Specifically, Fuentes brings her FLSA and NJWHL claims on behalf of
"all persons who worked for the Defendants as product assistants
preparing, producing and packaging breads and cake products any
time after April 13, 2016, to entry of judgment in the case."  The
other eight Plaintiffs bring their claims on behalf of "all persons
who worked for the Defendants as a truck driver any time after
Sept. 7, 2016, to entry of judgment in the case."

The Plaintiffs generally allege that the Defendants willfully
failed to pay them overtime compensation at rates not less than one
and one-half times the regular rate of pay for each hour worked in
excess of forty hours in a workweek, which constitutes a violation
of the FLSA and the NJWHL.

Fuentes filed the instant motion for conditional certification
under the FLSA and class certification under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23.  The Defendants filed an opposition, to which Fuentes
replied.  The Defendants also filed a letter seeking to file a
sur-reply, to which Fuentes objected.

As a preliminary matter, Judge Salas notes that Fuentes fails to
properly define a proposed class or a proposed collective.  In the
Third Amended Complaint, Fuentes seeks to bring her FLSA claims on
behalf of "all persons who are currently or were formerly employed
by Defendants as a Production Assistant of baked goods during the
Claims period, April 13, 2015 to present."  A "Production
Assistant" is further defined as "a former or current employee of
the Defendants who was or is a non-exempt laborer paid an hourly
rate who worked in some capacity producing baked goods."  Fuentes
also seeks to bring her state claims on behalf of "all persons who
worked for Defendants as Production Assistants preparing, producing
and packaging breads and cake products any time after April 13,
2016, to entry of judgment in the case."

Thus, the proposed collective and the proposed class, as defined in
the Third Amended Complaint, are different in that they reflect
different time frames--while the FLSA claims date back to April 13,
2015, the time limitation for the NJWHL claims is a year later on
April 13, 2016.  The distinction is explained in Fuentes' moving
brief, where she states that unlike the FLSA, which has a
three-year statute of limitations assuming a willful violation, the
NJWHL as a two-year statute of limitations.

However, Fuentes refers to the proposed collective and the proposed
class as the "Production Assistant Class" interchangeably
throughout her briefs.  But "Production Assistant Class" is not
defined anywhere in the briefs, the proposed order, or the proposed
notice.  The "Production Assistant Class" is apparently defined in
the Third Amended Complaint as "Plaintiff Fuentes and the
Collective and Class of workers as Production Assistants," which
fails identify the proposed collective and the proposed class with
the requisite specificity.

Moreover, Fuentes' Third Amended Complaint and her submissions in
support of the motion include various iterations of the proposed
collective or the proposed class that are inconsistent.  For
example, with regard to the FLSA claims, Fuentes apparently seeks
to conditionally certify of a collective of: "All persons who work
or worked as Production Assistants for Defendants from April 13,
2015 through the entry of judgment performing tasks including but
not limited to mixing ingredients, loading dough in machines,
putting flavor on products, cutting bread, packaging bread and
operating Defendants' ovens and machines in the process of
producing bread and cake products."

For her NJWHL claims, Fuentes seeks to certify a class of
"Production Assistants," who are former or current employees of the
Defendants (from April 13, 2016 to present) who were or are
non-exempt laborers paid an hourly rate who worked in some capacity
producing baked goods.  The Defendants have identified these
persons as packers, production assistants, machine operators, oven
operators, pastry chef helpers and manager assistants. But Fuentes'
proposed notice is addressed to: All persons who are or were
employed as a Production Assistant by Super Bread II, Corp. and/or
Super Cakes Corp. in any of its New Jersey locations on or after
April 13, 2015, who were paid an hourly rate of pay, and not paid
overtime compensation (time and one-half your regular hourly rate)
for each hour worked beyond 40 in a work week.

The Proposed Notice also states that the Class consists of all
current and former Production Assistants employed by Super Cakes
and/or Super Bread who worked over 40 hours in a workweek at one of
the Super Cakes and/or Super Bread locations in New Jersey in at
least one workweek from April 13, 2015 to the present.

According to the Court's Opinion, among the various versions of the
apparent proposed collective and proposed class definitions, one
version requires that class members worked over 40 hours per
workweek, another version requires that the class members worked
over forty hours per workweek and were not paid time and one-half
for each hour worked beyond 40; and yet other versions do not
require that the class members worked overtime or were
insufficiently compensated at all--all that is required is that
they worked in certain positions during the relevant time periods.
It is, thus, unclear to the Judge what Fuentes' proposed collective
and proposed class definitions are.

In the Rule 23 context, if the class is overly broad and devoid of
reasonable specificity, there is significant potential that
unfairness will befall the class members bound by the judgment.  In
any event, regardless of which definitions the Judge adopts,
Fuentes fails to satisfy Rule 23's requirements for class
certification.

In light of the poorly defined proposed class and the lack of
sufficient evidence regarding the alleged class size, the Judge
finds that Fuentes has failed to satisfy her burden of
affirmatively demonstrating by a preponderance of evidence that the
numerosity requirement is met.  Because a failure to meet the
numerosity requirement is dispositive of Fuentes's motion to
certify a class, the Court will not address the other three
requirements under Rule 23(a)--namely, commonality, typicality, and
adequacy of representation--or the requirement under Rule 23(b).
Fuentes's motion for class certification under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 is denied.

Because of the FLSA's opt-in requirement, which does not bind the
collective members until they affirmatively join the collective,
the Judge will assume for purposes of conditional certification
that Fuentes' proposed collective involves collective members (i)
who worked over forty hours in a workweek; and (ii) who were paid
overtime compensation at less than one and one-half times the
regular hourly rate.  Based on this assumption, she finds that
Fuentes has made the "modest showing" required for conditional
certification.

For these reasons, Judge Salas granted Fuentes' motion for
conditional certification under the FLSA and denied without
prejudice Fuentes' motion for class certification under Rule 23.
Because she finds that the parties' submissions are sufficient, the
Judge denied the Defendants' request to file a sur-reply.  An
appropriate Order accompanies the Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 9, 2020 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/y7d5kz5k from Leagle.com.


SWITCH INC: Hearing on Bid to Dismiss Suit Set for January 2021
---------------------------------------------------------------
Switch, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on November 9, 2020, for the quarterly
period ended September 30, 2020, that the hearing on the motion to
dismiss the putative consolidated class action suit currently
pending before the Eighth Judicial District of Nevada, is scheduled
on January 2021.

Four substantially similar putative class action complaints,
captioned Martz v. Switch, Inc. et al. (filed April 20, 2018);
Palkon v. Switch, Inc. et al. (filed April 30, 2018); Chun v.
Switch, Inc. et al. (filed May 11, 2018); and Silverberg v. Switch,
Inc. et al. (filed June 6, 2018), were filed in the Eighth Judicial
District of Nevada, and subsequently consolidated into a single
case (the State Court Securities Action).

Additionally, on June 11, 2018, one putative class action complaint
captioned Cai v. Switch, Inc. et al. was filed in the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey and subsequently
transferred to the Eighth Judicial District of Nevada in August
2018 and the federal court appointed Oscar Farach lead plaintiff.

These lawsuits were filed against Switch, Inc., certain current and
former officers and directors and certain underwriters of Switch,
Inc.'s initial public offering (IPO) alleging federal securities
law violations in connection with the IPO.

These lawsuits were brought by purported stockholders of Switch,
Inc. seeking to represent a class of stockholders who purchased
Class A common stock in or traceable to the IPO, and seek
unspecified damages and other relief.

With respect to the Federal Court Securities Action, in July 2019,
the federal court granted Switch, Inc.'s motion to dismiss in part,
which narrowed the scope of the plaintiff's case. In December 2019,
Switch, Inc. filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and in
July 2020, the federal court entered a judgment in favor of Switch,
Inc.

In October 2020, Switch, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss in the
State Court Securities Action, and a hearing is scheduled for
January 2021.

Switch, Inc. believes that these lawsuits are without merit and
intends to continue to vigorously defend against them.

Switch, Inc., through its subsidiary, Switch, Ltd., provides
colocation space and related services primarily to technology and
digital media companies in the United States. It develops and
operates data centers in Nevada and Michigan. Switch, Inc. was
founded in 2000 and is headquartered in Las Vegas, Nevada.

SYNCHRONOSS TECHNOLOGIES: Class Suit by ERS Hawaii Underway
-----------------------------------------------------------
Synchronoss Technologies said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 9, 2020, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2020, that the company
continues to defend a consolidated putative class action suit
headed by the Employees' Retirement System of the State of Hawaii.

On May 1, 2017, May 2, 2017, June 8, 2017 and June 14, 2017, four
putative class actions were filed against the Company and certain
of its current and former officers and directors in the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey.

After these cases were consolidated, the court appointed as lead
plaintiff Employees' Retirement System of the State of Hawaii,
which filed, on November 20, 2017, a consolidated complaint
purportedly on behalf of purchasers of the Company's common stock
between February 3, 2016 and June 13, 2017.

On February 2, 2018, the defendants moved to dismiss the
consolidated complaint in its entirety, with prejudice. Before that
motion was decided, on August 24, 2018, lead plaintiff filed a
consolidated amended complaint purportedly on behalf of purchasers
of the Company's common stock between October 28, 2014 and June 13,
2017.

On June 28, 2019, the Court granted defendants' motion to dismiss
the consolidated amended complaint in its entirety, without
prejudice, allowing lead plaintiff leave to amend its complaint.

On August 14, 2019, lead plaintiff filed a second amended
complaint. The second amended complaint asserts claims under
Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended, and it alleges, among other things, that the defendants
made false and misleading statements of material information
concerning the Company's financial results, business operations,
and prospects.

On October 4, 2019, the defendants moved to dismiss the second
amended complaint in its entirety, with prejudice.

On May 29, 2020, the court granted in part and denied in part
defendants' motion to dismiss the second amended complaint without
prejudice.

The Company believes that the asserted claims lack merit and
intends to defend against all of the claims vigorously.

The plaintiff seeks unspecified damages, fees, interest, and costs.
Due to the inherent uncertainties of litigation, the Company cannot
predict the outcome of the actions at this time and can give no
assurance that the asserted claims will not have a material adverse
effect on its financial position or results of operations.

Synchronoss Technologies, Inc. provides cloud, digital, messaging,
and Internet of Things (IoT) platforms, products, and solutions in
North America, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and
the Asia Pacific. Synchronoss Technologies, Inc. was founded in
2000 and is headquartered in Bridgewater, New Jersey.

TEXAS: Denial of Bid to Certify Class in J.A. v. TEA Recommended
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, J.A. B/N/F ALREDO ALVAREZ and on behalf of other
persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. TEXAS EDUCATION AGENCY,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-CV-921-RP (W.D. Tex.), Magistrate Judge
Susan Hightower of the U.S. District Court for the Western District
of Texas, Austin Division, recommended that the Court denies (i)
the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class, Appoint Class Counsel and
Other Orders Commensurate with Such Action, and (ii) the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Orders.

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") offers
federal funds to States in exchange for a commitment to furnish a
free appropriate public education ("FAPE") to all children with
certain physical or intellectual disabilities.  Under the IDEA, an
individualized education program ("IEP") serves as the primary
vehicle for providing each child with the promised FAPE and spells
out a personalized plan to meet all of the child's educational
needs.

J.A. is a student in the Corpus Christi Independent School District
("CCISD") who has been diagnosed with Attention Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD"), learning disabilities, fetal
alcohol syndrome, and significant cognitive impairments.  J.A.'s
impairments made him eligible to receive special education services
under the IDEA.  J.A.'s IEP permitted his father, Alfredo Alvarez,
to make decisions on J.A.'s behalf and participate in his regularly
scheduled Admission, Review & Dismissal ("ARD") Committee Meetings,
even after J.A. turned 18 years old.

On May 14, 2019, when J.A. was 18 years old, Alvarez filed a
request for a due process hearing with the Texas Education Agency
("TEA"), arguing that CCISD had failed to provide J.A. with a FAPE
as required under the IDEA.  He also requested that the TEA hearing
officer appoint him as J.A.'s next friend under Texas Rule of Civil
Procedure 44.

CCISD filed a motion to dismiss the due process proceeding, arguing
that Alvarez did not have the legal authority or standing to
prosecute the action because J.A. had turned 18 and only J.A. had
the authority to bring such an action.  The hearing officer agreed
with CCISD and dismissed the proceeding for lack of standing.  The
hearing officer also denied Alvarez's request to appoint him as
J.A.'s next friend.  Alvarez did not file an administrative appeal
of the hearing officer's decision.

On Sept. 19, 2019, Plaintiffs J.A. and Alvarez filed the action on
behalf of J.A. and a proposed unnamed class of similarly situated
individuals. They allege that TEA has discriminated against J.A.
and the proposed class because of their disabilities, in violation
of the IDEA, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.  The Plaintiffs also assert
constitutional claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  They
seek declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages,
attorneys' fees, and costs.

On Dec. 18, 2019, TEA moved to dismiss all of the Plaintiffs'
claims under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6).  On June 21, 2020, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report
and Recommendation recommending that the District Court grants the
Motion to Dismiss as to the Plaintiff's claims under Section 1983,
but denies the Motion as to all other claims.  The District Court
adopted the Report and Recommendation on Sept. 3, 2020.

In their Motion to Certify, the Plaintiffs now ask the Court to
certify the Proposed Class, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(c)(1).  In their First Amended Class Action Complaint,
the Plaintiffs ask the Court to certify the Proposed Class "of all
persons who have reached the age of majority, receive special
education services under the IDEA, do not have the capacity to
execute a viable power of attorney and their parent(s) has not
sought a guardianship for their child but require legal
representation in all IDEA proceedings, both formal and informal."
TEA opposes the motion.

While the Plaintiffs attempt to assert some arguments in support of
their Motion to Certify in their Reply, Magistrate Judge Hightower
finds that they have not met their burden under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(a) to certify the Proposed Class.  The
Plaintiffs have not come forward with any evidence to support any
of the Rule 23(a) factors.  They have failed to sustain their
burden of proof to show that class certification is proper.

Even if the Plaintiffs had met the four requirements of Rule 23(a),
the Magistrate Judge finds that they have not met the additional
requirement for certification: that the class action fits into at
least one of three specified categories set forth in Rule 23(b).
In their Motion to Certify, the Plaintiffs do not even argue that
the case fits into any of the categories under Rule 23(b).

Because Plaintiffs have failed to sustain their burden under Rule
23 for class certification, the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify
should be denied.

In addition, the Plaintiffs have filed a Motion asking the Court to
issue "Temporary Orders" related to allowing parents to represent
students who are unable to sign an educational power of attorney
but are not incapacitated in educational matters.  They seek a
preliminary injunction on behalf of the Proposed Class, asking the
Court to order: (1) that any student who has reached the age of
majority under State law, who has not be determined to be
incompetent may continue to be represented by the parent or persons
who represented the student before they turned eighteen in all
educational matters; (2) that any student who does not to have the
ability to provide informed consent with respect to their own
educational program; the Principal at the Student's current school
or the Student's Admission, ARD Committee can make the
determination that the Student does not have the ability to provide
informed consent for their own educational matters, thus permitting
the parent or other person who was representing the student before
they turned eighteen (18) years old to continue to do so; and (3)
that a parent or other person who was representing a student with a
disability before they turned eighteen (18) and who wants to file a
Request For Due Process Hearing with the TEA on behalf of the
Student may do so.

TEA opposes the motion.  TEA argues that the Plaintiffs have failed
to sustain their burden to obtain the preliminary injunction.

The Magistrate Judge agrees.  Her analysis begins and ends with the
finding that the Plaintiffs have not met their burden to show that
they will be irreparably harmed in the absence of an injunction.
The Plaintiffs filed the case on Sept. 18, 2019, but did not seek a
preliminary injunction until Oct. 28, 2020, more than a year later.
The Magistrate Judge holds that their unjustified delay in seeking
the preliminary injunction is fatal to their request.  Accordingly,
absent a showing of irreparable harm, the Plaintiffs are not
entitled to the requested preliminary injunction, and their Motion
for Temporary Orders should be denied.

Based on the foregoing, Magistrate Judge Hightower recommended that
the District Court denies (i) the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify
Class, and (ii) the Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Orders.  She
ordered that the case be removed from her docket and returned to
the docket of the Judge Robert Pitman.  The parties may file
objections to the Report and Recommendation within 14 days after
the party is served with a copy of the Report.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 9, 2020 Report &
Recommendation is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9joeks6 from
Leagle.com.


TRN MILWAUKEE: Smith Seeks Unpaid OT for Nurses Under FLSA & WWPCL
------------------------------------------------------------------
DIAMOND SMITH, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. TRN MILWAUKEE, LLC, Case No. 2:20-cv-01799 (E.D. Wis.,
Dec. 4, 2020) is a collective and class action brought pursuant to
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938  and the Wisconsin's Wage
Payment and Collection Laws against TRN Milwaukee for unpaid
overtime compensation, liquidated damages, costs, attorneys' fees,
declaratory and/or injunctive relief, and/or any such other relief
the Court may deem appropriate.

According to the complaint, the Defendant operated (and continues
to operate) an unlawful compensation system that deprived the
Plaintiff and all other hourly-paid, non-exempt employees of their
wages earned for all compensable work performed each workweek,
including at an overtime rate of pay for each hour worked in excess
of 40 hours in a workweek.

In approximately June 2019, the Defendant hired Plaintiff as an
hourly-paid, non-exempt employee in the position of Certified
Nursing Assistant. Plaintiff, Diamond Smith, with a post office
address of 5749 N. 62nd Street, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

TRN Milwaukee is an entity doing business in the State of Wisconsin
with a principal address of 5151 Church Street, Skokie, Illinois.
The Defendant does business in the State of Wisconsin as "BRIA of
Trinity Village," which is a skilled nursing facility located at
7500 West Dean Avenue, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James A. Walcheske, Esq.
          Scott S. Luzi, Esq.
          WALCHESKE & LUZI, LLC
          235 N. Executive Drive, Suite 240
          Brookfield, WI 53005
          Telephone: (262) 780-1953
          Facsimile: (262) 565-6469
          E-mail: jwalcheske@walcheskeluzi.com
                  sluzi@walcheskeluzi.com

TURQUOISE HILL: Faces Lio Securities Suit Over Drop in Share Price
------------------------------------------------------------------
NICHOLAS LION, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. TURQUOISE HILL RESOURCES LTD., ULF QUELLMANN, BRENDAN
LANE, LUKE COLTON, RIO TINTO PLC, RIO TINTO LIMITED, RIO TINTO
INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LIMITED, JEAN-SEBASTIEN JACQUES, and ARNAUD
SOIRAT, Case No. 1:20-cv-10198 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 3, 2020) is a
federal securities class action on behalf of a class consisting of
all persons and entities other than Defendants that purchased or
otherwise acquired Turquoise Hill securities from July 17, 2018 to
July 31, 2019, seeking to recover compensable damages under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 arising from the Defendants'
issuance of false and misleading statements resulting to the
precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's
securities.

During the Class Period, the Defendants made materially false and
misleading statements and omitted to disclose material facts
regarding the Company's business and operations. Specifically, the
Defendants made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose that the progress of underground development of Oyu Tolgoi
was not proceeding as planned.

After the Class Period, on July 2, 2020, Turquoise Hill and Rio
Tinto announced that the revised feasibility study for the Oyu
Tolgoi project had been completed. The study recommended a new
design for the portion of the mine undergoing development, with the
addition of structural pillars and other changes, resulting in a
reduction to the estimated mineral reserves for the mine. Turquoise
Hill's press release also warned that the Oyu Tolgoi team was
engaged in "re-design studies" for other portions of the
underground mine. Turquoise Hill estimated that there would be an
increase in capital costs of $1.5 billion, "subject to further
studies and any additional scheduling delays or increases in
capital costs arising from the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic."

Also, on September 10, 2020, Turquoise Hill and Rio Tinto announced
that they had entered into a non-binding Memorandum of
Understanding under which they would seek to "reprofile Oyu
Tolgoi's existing debt" and raise an additional $500 million
through debt financing, plus up to $3.6 billion in equity --
thereby diluting Turquoise Hill's public shareholders.

As a result of the Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the
precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's
securities, the Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered
significant losses and damages, the suit says.

Turquoise Hill is an international mining company focused on the
operation and development of the Oyu Tolgoi copper-gold mine in
Southern Mongolia (Oyu Tolgoi), which is the Company's principal
and only material resource property. Turquoise Hill's subsidiary,
Oyu Tolgoi LLC, holds a 66% interest in Oyu Tolgoi, and the
remainder is held by the Government of Mongolia.

Rio Tinto plc and Rio Tinto Limited are operated and managed
together as single economic unit and engage in mining and metals
operations in approximately thirty-five countries. Through their
subsidiaries, Rio Tinto owns 50.8% of Turquoise Hill. A Rio Tinto
subsidiary, Rio Tinto International Holdings, Inc. ("Rio Tinto
International" or "RTIH"; and collectively with Rio Tinto plc and
Rio Tinto Limited, "Rio Tinto"), is also the manager of the Oyu
Tolgoi project, including having responsibility for its development
and construction.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by

          Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
          J. Alexander Hood II, Esq.
          Patrick V. Dahlstrom, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          600 Third Avenue
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 661-1100
          Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
          E-mail: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                  ahood@pomlaw.com
                  pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          Peretz Bronstein, Esq.
          BRONSTEIN, GEWIRTZ &
          GROSSMAN, LLC
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4600
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 697-6484
          Facsimile: (212) 697-7296
          E-mail: peretz@bgandg.com

TWITTER INC: Consolidated Securities Suit Tossed; Amendment OK'd
----------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
grants the Defendants' motion to dismiss with leave to amend the
consolidated class action complaint in the lawsuit entitled IN RE
TWITTER, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION, Case No. 19-CV-07149-YGR (N.D.
Cal.).

Lead Plaintiffs the Weston Family Partnership LLLP and the Twitter
Investor Group bring the consolidated securities class action
litigation alleging false and misleading statements and omissions
between July 26, 2019, and Oct. 23, 2019 against Defendants
Twitter, CEO Jack Dorsey, and CFO Ned Segal. Specifically, the
Plaintiffs raise two causes of action, namely, violation of (1)
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act ("Exchange Act") and
Rule 10b-5 against all Defendants, and (2) Section 20(a) of the
Exchange Act against the Individual Defendants.

All the Defendants move to dismiss pursuant to Rules 9(b) and
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"). The Defendants
challenge the Plaintiffs' Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claim on
three grounds: The Plaintiffs fail to (i) allege statements that
are materially false or misleading, or otherwise actionable; (ii)
establish a strong inference of scienter; and (iii) establish loss
causation. Without a primary violation of Section 10(b), the
Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs' Section 20(a) claim similarly
fails.

With respect to their Section 10(b) claim, the Plaintiffs point to
seven specific statement, which fall into the following categories
of fraudulent statements or omissions: (a) the Defendants' July
2019 statements about Mobile Application Promotion ("MAP") progress
and revenue prediction while reporting Twitter's financial results
for the quarter ending June 30, 2019 (Statements 1-4); (b)
Twitter's August 2019 announcement about software bugs primarily
affecting MAP (Statement 5); and (c) Segal's September 2019
statements about MAP progress and Asia's historical focus on MAP
during an investor conference following the MAP bug announcement
(Statements 6-7).

The Plaintiffs challenge Twitter's statements about its progress on
improving MAP and projected revenues therefrom made at the end of
July in the Q2 2019 Shareholder Letter, on the earnings call with
investors. Allegedly, these statements are materially false and
misleading because at the time they were made, they created the
misimpression that the Defendants' work to improve MAP was on track
and would lead to increased revenue. The Plaintiffs proffer that
because software bugs were causing glitches to MAP, the Defendants'
work on an improved MAP product was, in fact, "delayed" and
"[d]efendants had no reasonable basis to represent that MAP revenue
would increase."

District Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers states that the Plaintiffs'
theory fail for three reasons. First, given the allegations of the
Plaintiffs' Consolidated Class Action Complaint ("CCAC"), she finds
the Defendants' vaguely optimistic statements to fall within the
category that is understood by reasonable investors as puffery,
citing Wozniak v. Align Tech., Inc., (N.D. Cal. 2012). Second, the
PSLRA provides a safe harbor with respect to forward-looking
statements, so long as those statements are accompanied by
"meaningful cautionary statements," or are "immaterial," or were
not made "with actual knowledge" of the falsity or misleading
nature of the statement. Third, the CCAC lacks any plausible
allegation to suggest that the statements were, in fact, false or
misleading.

The Plaintiffs do not allege that Twitter was not working on
improving MAP; nor do they allege that the Defendants had committed
to any specific timetable for the improved MAP product, Judge
Rogers notes. The CCAC, therefore, fails to allege any
inconsistency created by the Defendants' statements.

Judge Rogers also opines that given the chronology, the Plaintiffs
cannot plausibly allege that, at the time the risk disclosure was
made on July 31, 2019, the Defendants' decision to stop sharing
user data six days later on Aug. 5, 2019, was already affecting
Twitter's revenue. The shutdown of data sharing would not have
caused demand for MAP advertising to decline until August 5
(assuming an instantaneous reaction by advertising customers).
Thus, the Plaintiffs do not allege how Twitter could have failed to
disclose in July that which had not happened until August at the
earliest. Accordingly, the risk disclosures were not misleading
because the potential risks stated therein were not false according
to the allegations in the CCAC.

Although she has determined that the Plaintiffs' pleading of false
statements or omissions is deficient, the Judge next reviews
whether the allegations as a whole adequately plead scienter. The
Plaintiffs allege that Dorsey and Segal received key metrics
summary emails that included cost per ad engagement ("CPE") at
least once per day. Thus, Defendants Dorsey and Segal received
constant updates and had access to the Company's key metrics,
including CPE, on a daily basis throughout the Class Period that
showed demand for MAP ads was materially declining which meant
Twitter was receiving materially less MAP advertising revenue.

The Judge finds that these allegations are insufficient to draw a
strong inference of scienter because they do not describe with
particularity the specific contents of these daily summaries and
periodic reviews of key metrics. Without more detail, the
Plaintiffs' allegation that the reports showed demand for MAP ads
was materially declining which meant Twitter was receiving
materially less MAP revenue, is not sufficiently specific for the
Court to infer that the contents of the reports were inconsistent
with any of defendants' public statements, Judge Rogers says.

Even viewing the scienter allegations holistically, she does not
find a strong inference of scienter on these allegations.  There is
nothing in the totality, much less any "smoking gun" or ulterior
motive, which provides a strong inference of scienter.

In light of her analysis, Judge Rogers need not address loss
causation issues. Based on her analysis, she grants the Defendants'
motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' Section 10(b) claims. While it is
not apparent that the Plaintiffs can amend, out of an abundance of
caution, the Judge provides leave to amend.

By Jan. 15, 2021, the Plaintiffs must file an amended complaint or
the CCAC will be deemed dismissed. If an amended pleading is filed,
the Defendants will respond within 21 days of filing. The Order
terminates Docket Number 53.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Dec. 10, 2020, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y8rfwpdw from Leagle.com.


TWO BROS SCRAP: Further Depositions of Plaintiffs Allowed in Molina
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, VALENTIN GARCIA MOLINA, ETC., ET AL., Respondents v.
TWO BROS. SCRAP METAL, INC., ET AL., Appellants, 2018-08596, Case
No. 604691/16 (N.Y. App. Div.), the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court of New York modified in part and affirmed in part the
order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, entered May 17, 2018,
denying the Defendants' motion to dismiss the class action claims
and to compel further depositions of the Plaintiffs.

The Plaintiffs, Molina and Roger M. Guerrero, commenced the instant
action on their behalf and on behalf of a putative class to recover
damages for violations of Labor Law articles 6 and 19 for unpaid
overtime and other unpaid wages.  The Plaintiffs and the putative
class members were employed by the Defendants and allegedly were
required to work more than 40 hours per week without overtime
compensation.

During depositions conducted during preclass certification
discovery, the Defendants' counsel attempted to question the
Plaintiffs about their immigration status, their eligibility to
work in the United States, the identities of their current
employers, and their payment of taxes, but the Plaintiffs' attorney
objected to those lines of questioning and would not permit the
Plaintiffs to answer those questions.  The Defendants then moved to
compel further depositions of the Plaintiffs regarding these
matters.  They also moved to dismiss the class action claims on the
ground that the Plaintiffs could not serve as class
representatives.  The Supreme Court denied the Defendants' motion
in its entirety.  The Defendants appealed.

The Appellate Court holds that the determination of whether a
plaintiff's claims for overtime wage compensation are barred by the
federal Immigration Reform and Control Act is dependent upon the
existence of evidence that the plaintiff's employer was induced to
hire the plaintiff based on the submission of false documentation.
Therefore, in the case, information concerning the Plaintiffs'
immigration and residency status, social security numbers, and
personal information presented to the defendants to secure
employment is relevant and discoverable.

Accordingly, the Appellate Court opines that the Supreme Court
should not have denied that branch of the Defendants' motion which
was to compel further depositions of the Plaintiffs concerning
their immigration status and the documentation, if any, they
tendered to secure employment.  However, contrary to the
Defendants' contention, information concerning whether Guerrero
paid taxes, whether Guerrero gave identification to the police when
he was detained, and the identities of the Plaintiffs' current
employers, is not relevant or discoverable. The Defendants'
remaining contentions are without merit.

Based on the foregoing, the Appellate Court, on the Court's own
motion, the notice of appeal from so much of the order as denied,
deemed that branch of the Defendants' motion which was to compel
further depositions of the Plaintiffs to be an application for
leave to appeal from that portion of the order, and granted leave
to appeal.

The Appellate Court modified the order, on the law, by deleting the
provision thereof denying that branch of the Defendants' motion
which was to compel further depositions of the Plaintiffs with
respect to questions concerning their immigration and residency
status, social security numbers, and personal information presented
to the Defendants to secure employment, and substituting therefor a
provision granting that branch of the motion.  As so modified, it
affirmed the order insofar as appealed from, without costs or
disbursements.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 9, 2020 Decision & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ydfub667 from Leagle.com.

Scott Lockwood, Deer Park, NY, for Appellants.

Leeds Brown Law, P.C., Carle Place, NY (Michael A. Thompkins of
counsel), for Respondents.


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Court Wants Driver to File Amended Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as KENT HASSELL, v. UBER
TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Case No. 20-cv-04062-PJH (N.D. Cal.), the Hon.
Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton entered an order:

   1. granting Uber Eat's motion to dismiss class allegations
      with leave to amend; and

   2. denying as moot its alternative request to strike.

The Court explained, "The defendant fails to show why the plaintiff
could not remedy the factual deficiencies in his predicate claims
for failure to reimburse business expenses, pay overtime or minimum
wage, and provide accurate wage statements. Accordingly, the court
will permit plaintiff leave to amend those claims and,
incidentally, the California Business & Professions Code section
17200 claim that rests on them. In any amended pleading, the
plaintiff must identify which clause of the definition of 'hours
worked' in Wage Order (or any other Wage Order he contends is
applicable) serves as the basis for his alleged 'hours worked.' He
must also identify the authority that he relies on to support his
position that the time spent waiting between deliveries qualifies
as compensable."

The Defendant, a division of Uber Technologies, Inc., provides food
delivery services through its "Uber Eats" mobile phone application.


Hassell worked as an Uber Eats driver since January 2020. He seeks
to certify a class comprising "all Uber Eats drivers who have
worked in California."

A copy of the Court's order granting motion to dismiss dated Dec.
7, 2020 is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://bit.ly/3oLjfwT at no extra charge.[CC]

UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Misleads Investors in IPO, Messinger Suit Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DAVID MESSINGER, GERALD ASHFORD, IRVING S. AND JUDITH BRAUN, ELLIE
MARIE TORONTO ESA, VARGHESE PALLATHU, JOSEPH CIANCI, and JOHNNY
RAMEY, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated
v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., et al., Case No. 3:20-cv-08610 (N.D.
Cal., Dec. 5, 2020) is a class action complaint under the
Securities Act of 1933 against: (i) Uber; (ii) each of Uber's
senior officers and directors who signed the Registration
Statement; and (iii) each of the investment banks that acted as
underwriters for the initial public offerings (IPO).

According to the complaint, the IPO Registration Statement and
Prospectus that Uber and the other Defendants used to conduct the
IPO were materially false, misleading, and incomplete and omitted
to disclose material adverse facts about the Company and its
business.

On May 13, 2019, Uber conducted one of the most anticipated U.S.
initial public offerings in recent years, raising over $8 billion
(after deducting underwriting discounts and 16 commissions and
estimated offering expenses) by selling over 180 million shares of
the Company's Class A common stock to the public at the IPO
offering price of $45.00 per share.

The Plaintiffs purchased shares of the Company's Class A common
stock that were issued pursuant and traceable to the Registration
Statement and IPO and was damaged thereby.

Defendant Uber purports to be a technology company that is
primarily in the business of facilitating access to rides and meals
on demand. Uber is based in San Francisco, California, but operates
globally on six continents and in 700+ cities around the world. The
Individual Defendants are officers and directors of Uber. The
Underwriter Defendants were also instrumental in soliciting
investors and in making the Uber shares that were offered and sold
in the IPO available to the members of the Class.

The Defendants include DARA KHOSROWSHAHI, NELSON CHAI, GLEN
CEREMONY, RONALD SUGAR, URSULA BURNS, GARRETT CAMP, MATT COHLER,
RYAN GRAVES, ARIANNA HUFFINGTON, TRAVIS KALANICK, WAN LING
MARTELLO, H.E. YASIR AL-RUMAYYAN, JOHN THAIN, DAVID TRUJILLO,
MORGAN STANLEY & CO. LLC, GOLDMAN SACHS & CO. LLC, MERRILL LYNCH,
PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH INCORPORATED, BARCLAYS CAPITAL INC.,
CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS INC., ALLEN & COMPANY LLC, RBC CAPITAL
MARKETS, LLC, SUNTRUST ROBINSON HUMPHREY, INC., DEUTSCHE BANK
SECURITIES INC., HSBC SECURITIES (USA) INC., SMBC NIKKO SECURITIES
AMERICA, INC., MIZUHO SECURITIES USA LLC, NEEDHAM & COMPANY, LLC,
LOOP CAPITAL MARKETS LLC, SIEBERT CISNEROS SHANK & CO., L.L.C.,
ACADEMY SECURITIES, INC., BTIG, LLC, CANACCORD GENUITY LLC,
CASTLEOAK SECURITIES, L.P., COWEN AND COMPANY, LLC, EVERCORE GROUP
L.L.C., JMP SECURITIES LLC, MACQUARIE CAPITAL (USA) INC., MISCHLER
FINANCIAL GROUP, INC., OPPENHEIMER & CO. INC., RAYMOND JAMES &
ASSOCIATES, INC., WILLIAM BLAIR & COMPANY, L.L.C., THE WILLIAMS
CAPITAL GROUP, L.P., and TPG CAPITAL BD, LLC.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          John T. Jasnoch, Esq.
          Hal D. Cunningham, Esq.
          William C. Fredericks, Esq.
          Jonathan M. Zimmerman, Esq.
          SCOTT+SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP
          600 W. Broadway, Suite 3300
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 233-4565
          Facsimile: (619) 233-0508
          E-mail: jjasnoch@scott-scott.com
                  hcunningham@scott-scott.com
                  wfredericks@scott-scott.com
                  jzimmerman@scott-scott.com

               - and -

          James I. Jaconette, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          665 West Broadway, Suite 1900
          San Diego, CA 92101-8498
          Telephone: (619) 231-1058
          Facsimile: (619) 231-7423
          E-mail: jamesj@rgrdlaw.com

               - and -

          Joseph W. Cotchett, Esq.
          Mark C. Molumphy, Esq.
          Gina Stassi, Esq.
          Tyson Redenbarger, Esq.
          COTCHETT, PITRE & McCARTHY, LLP
          San Francisco Airport Office Center
          840 Malcolm Road, Suite 200
          Burlingame, CA 94010
          Telephone: (650) 697-6000
          Facsimile: (650) 697-0577
          E-mail: jcotchett@cpmlegal.com
                  mmolumphy@cpmlegal.com
                  gstassi@cpmlegal.com
                  tredenbarger@cpmlegal.com

               - and -

          Francis A. Bottini, Jr., Esq.
          Albert Y. Chang, Esq.
          Yury A. Kolesnikov, Esq.
          BOTTINI & BOTTINI, INC.
          7817 Ivanhoe Avenue, Suite 102
          La Jolla, CA 92037
          Telephone: (858) 914-2001
          Facsimile: (858) 914-2002
          E-mail: fbottini@bottinilaw.com
                  achang@bottinilaw.com
                  ykolesnikov@bottinilaw.com

               - and -

          Stephen J. Oddo, Esq
          Brian J. Robbins, Esq
          ROBBINS LLP
          5040 Shoreham Place
          San Diego, CA 92122
          Telephone: (619) 525-3990
          Facsimile: (619) 525-3991
          E-mail: soddo@robbinsllp.com
                  brobbins@robbinsllp.com

               - and -

          Marion C. Passmore, Esq.
          W. Scott Holleman, Esq.
          BRAGAR EAGEL & SQUIRE, P.C.
          101 California Street, Suite 2710
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 365-7149
          E-mail: passmore@bespc.com
                  holleman@bespc.com

               - and -

          Ari Y. Basser, Esq.
          Jordan L. Lurie, Esq.
          Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
          J. Alexander Hood II, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          1100 Glendon Avenue, 15th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90024
          Telephone: (310) 432-8492
          E-mail: abasser@pomlaw.com
                  jllurie@pomlaw.com
                  jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                  ahood@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          Brian J. Schall, Esq.
          THE SCHALL LAW FIRM
          1880 Century Park E, Suite 404
          Los Angeles, CA 90067-1604
          Telephone: (310) 301-3335
          Facsimile: (310) 388-0192
          E-mail: brian@schallfirm.com

               - and -

          David W. Hall, Esq.
          HEDIN HALL LLP
          Four Embarcadero Center, Suite 1400
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 766-3534
          Facsimile: (415) 402-0058
          E-mail: dhall@hedinhall.com

               - and -

          Curtis V. Trinko, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF CURTIS V. TRINKO, LLP
          39 Sintsink Drive West, 1st Floor
          Port Washington, NY 11050
          Telephone: (516) 883-1437
          E-mail: ctrinko@trinko.com

UGI STORAGE: Albrecht Appeals Ruling to Penn. Supreme Court
-----------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff John Albrecht filed an appeal from a court ruling issued
in the lawsuit styled John Albrecht v. UGI Storage Company, Case
No. 454 CD 2019, in the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, UGI Storage
Company filed an application with the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission in 2009 seeking to operate underground natural gas
storage facilities, including a gas storage field (the Meeker
Storage Field). UGI further sought to delineate a 2,980 acre
protective buffer zone (Meeker Buffer Zone) around the Meeker
Storage Field. On October 10, 2010, FERC granted UGI's application
to operate the Meeker Storage Field and certified portions of the
Meeker Buffer Zone for those areas to which UGI had property
rights.

On November 5, 2015, John Albrecht, on behalf of himself and a
class of similarly-situated individuals, filed a Class Action
Petition with the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County for the
appointment of a Board of Viewers pursuant to Section 502 of the
Pennsylvania Eminent Domain Code (Code). On November 13, 2015, Carl
F. Hughes, Ellen B. Hughes, h/w, and Bruce D. Hughes and Margaret
K. Hughes, h/w, filed an Amended Petition for the appointment of a
Board of Viewers pursuant to the Code. All parties alleged that UGI
effected a de facto taking of certain subsurface mineral rights
within a buffer zone surrounding UGI's Meeker Storage Field -- a
buffer zone for which UGI sought certification and that was
partially certified by FERC.

After UGI failed to timely file preliminary objections to either
Petition, the trial court entered Orders for both matters on
January 6, 2016, affirmatively finding that UGI effected a de facto
taking of the oil, gas, and mineral rights at issue, and appointing
a Board of Viewers. UGI thereafter filed preliminary objections for
both matters on January 14, 2016, asserting that the Petitions
should be dismissed on grounds that UGI does not have the power of
eminent domain and Appellants did not establish a de facto taking
occurred.

On April 4, 2016 the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County
sustained UGI's preliminary objections, dismissed both the Class
Action Petition and Amended Petition for the Appointment of a Board
of Viewers and vacated the January 6, 2016 Orders appointing a
Board of Viewers.

The Plaintiff is now seeking an appeal to review the Commonwealth
Court's order affirming the March 25, 2019 order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Tioga County, which sustained the preliminary
objections of UGI Storage Company and dismissed Appellants'
respective petitions for appointment of a board of viewers pursuant
to Section 502(c) of the Eminent Domain Code, 26 Pa.C.S. Section
502(c).

The appellate case is captioned as John Albrecht, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Petitioner v. UGI
Storage Company, Respondent, Case No. 687 MAL 2020, in the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania. [BN]

Plaintiff-Petitioner John Albrecht, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Nicholas E. Chimicles, Esq.
          Andrew William Ferich, Esq.
          Benjamin F. Johns, Esq.
          CHIMICLES SCHWARTZ KRINER &
           DONALDSON-SMITH LLP
          361 W Lancaster Ave
          Haverford, PA 19041
          Telephone: (610) 642-8500
          E-mail: nick@chimicles.com
                  andrewferich@chimicles.com
                  benjohns@chimicles.com  

               - and -  

          Tiffany L. Cummings, Esq.
          118 Main St.
          District Attorney's Office
          Wellsboro, PA 16901
          Telephone: (570) 662-2668

               - and -

          Pace Reich, Esq.
          726 Meetinghouse Rd
          Elkins Park, PA 19027
          Telephone: (215) 887-0130

Defendant-Respondent UGI Storage Company is represented by:

          J. David Smith, Esq.
          MCCORMICK LAW FIRM
          835 W 4th St
          Williamsport, PA 17701-6326
          Telephone: (570) 326-5131

               - and -

          Kathleen Jones Goldman, Esq.
          Stanley Yorsz, Esq.
          BUCHANAN INGERSOLL & ROONEY PC
          501 Grant St Ste 200
          Pittsburgh, PA 15219
          Telephone: (412) 562-1401  

UNITED STATES: Treasury, IRS Ordered to Send Stimulus Checks
------------------------------------------------------------
Michelle Singletary, writing for Washington Post, reports that at
first, the IRS said inmates were eligible for stimulus payments up
to $1,200.

Then the agency walked back that decision, telling correctional
facilities to intercept stimulus checks that the agency had already
issued. Spouses of the incarcerated were told they had to return
the part of relief money intended for incarcerated individuals.

The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (Cares) Act
provides economic impact payments or stimulus payments of up to
$1,200 for individuals and $2,400 for taxpayers filing a joint tax
return. There was nothing in the law prohibiting prisoners from
receiving stimulus payments.

A class-action lawsuit was filed on behalf of incarcerated
individuals in local, state and federal facilities arguing that the
IRS actions were unlawful. Judge Phyllis Hamilton of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California agreed,
saying the decision to withhold the stimulus payments was
"arbitrary and capricious." Hamilton ordered the Treasury
Department and the IRS to send the relief money and to do so within
certain deadlines.

Still not chastened, the Trump administration appealed. Hamilton
again smacked away efforts by the government to stop the
distribution of the payments, entering a final summary judgment.
And the judge is making the IRS give incarcerated individuals
additional time to claim their stimulus money, moving an initial
Oct. 30 deadline to Nov. 4.

The judge also ordered that the IRS send out a notice that
correctional facilities officials should give to incarcerated
individuals about the court's decision. The agency would also need
to mail blank 1040 forms for inmates and instructions on how to
fill out the paper return to ensure that every eligible person in
each facility has a packet in time to file a claim, said Kelly
Dermody, a partner with San Francisco-based Lieff Cabraser Heimann
& Bernstein, one of the law firms representing the plaintiffs and
class-action members.

The plaintiffs are also represented by the nonprofit Equal Justice
Society, which advocates against inequities in the criminal justice
system.

"Hopefully this is the last of it," Dermody said. "They have
already wasted a lot of taxpayer money chasing after checks that
were previously properly issued, misleading correctional
authorities about eligibility, and filing brief after brief in
court trying to stop our fellow Americans from getting stimulus
money."

Incarcerated individuals who filed a 2018 or 2019 tax return,
received Social Security benefits or Railroad Retirement benefits
in 2019, or previously registered with the IRS through the
non-filers portal should get an automatic payment in the mail or by
direct deposit.

Because incarcerated individuals are generally not allowed access
to a computer, they will have to fill out and postmark a simplified
Form 1040 federal return by Nov. 4.

For those capable of going online, there's more time to claim a
stimulus payment. The deadline to use the agency's online
non-filers tool at irs.gov was Nov. 21.

The economic impact payment is an advance credit for 2020. Under
the Cares Act, payments must be made by Dec. 31. If people don't
receive a payment by then, they won't receive their stimulus funds
until they file a 2020 federal return next year.

By Nov. 9, the government had to confirm the number and amount of
stimulus payments distributed as a result of the court order.

"The covid relief funds will mean that incarcerated people, who are
among those in our society most endangered and harmed by covid, can
purchase hygiene products and can pay for the services needed to
communicate with their families at a time when fulfilling these
most basic of human needs is most critical," Mona Tawatao, legal
director for the Equal Justice Society, said in a statement
following the latest court ruling.

If you have questions about the recent order, the most helpful
information can be found in an FAQ at caresactprisoncase.org.
Particularly useful is a link to a sample Form 1040 with
highlighted instructions on how to fill out a 2019 return,
including writing "EIP 2020" on the top of the form and where, if
the person is still in a correctional facility, to add the personal
corrections number to make sure the stimulus check is sent to the
right location and person.

If you still have questions -- and you should read the entire FAQ
-- there's a contact form to get additional assistance from
attorneys working on the class-action case. [GN]


UNITI GROUP: Bid to Dismiss Putative Securities Class Suit Pending
------------------------------------------------------------------
Uniti Group Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 9, 2020, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2020, that the motion to
dismiss filed in the consolidated putative class action suit
entitled, In re Uniti Group Inc. Securities Litigation, is
pending.

Beginning on October 25, 2019, several purported shareholders filed
separate putative class actions in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Arkansas against the Company and certain of its
officers, alleging violations of the federal securities laws, based
on claims similar to those asserted in the action initiated by SLF
Holdings, LLC.  

On March 12, 2020, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Arkansas consolidated the Shareholder Actions and appointed lead
plaintiffs and lead counsel in the consolidated cases under the
caption In re Uniti Group Inc. Securities Litigation.

On May 11, 2020, lead plaintiffs filed a consolidated amended
complaint in the consolidated Shareholder Actions.  

The consolidated amended complaint seeks to represent investors who
acquired the Company's securities between April 20, 2015 and
February 15, 2019. The Shareholder Actions assert claims under
Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder, alleging that the Company made materially
false and misleading statements by allegedly failing to disclose,
among other things, the risk that the Spin-Off and entry into the
Master Lease violated certain debt covenants of Windstream and/or
the risk that the Master Lease purportedly could be recharacterized
as a financing instead of "true lease."

The Shareholder Actions seek class certification, unspecified
monetary damages, costs and attorneys' fees and other relief.  

On July 10, 2020, defendants moved to dismiss the consolidated
amended complaint.  Briefing on that motion is complete, but no
decision has been issued.

Uniti said, "We intend to defend this matter vigorously, and,
because it is still in its preliminary stages, we have not yet
determined what effect this lawsuit will have, if any, on our
financial position or results of operations. As of the date of this
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q, we are unable to estimate a
reasonably possible range of loss and therefore have not recorded
any liabilities associated with these claims in our Condensed
Consolidated Balance Sheet."

Uniti Group Inc. operates as a real estate investment trust. The
Company provides wireless infrastructure solutions for
communications industry. Uniti Group serves customers in the United
States and Latin America. The company is based in Little Rock,
Arkansas.

USA TECHNOLOGIES: Court Grants Bid for Final Settlement Approval
----------------------------------------------------------------
USA Technologies, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 6, 2020, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2020, that the court granted
the motion for final settlement approval.

On September 11, 2018, Stephane Gouet filed a putative class action
complaint against the Company, Stephen P. Herbert, the then-current
Chief Executive Officer, and Priyanka Singh, the then-current Chief
Financial Officer, in the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey.

The class was defined as purchasers of the Company's securities
from November 9, 2017 through September 11, 2018. The complaint
alleged that the Company disclosed on September 11, 2018 that it
was unable to timely file its Annual Report on Form 10-K for the
fiscal year ended June 30, 2018, and that the Audit Committee of
the Company's Board of Directors was in the process of conducting
an internal investigation of current and prior period matters
relating to certain of the Company's contractual arrangements,
including the accounting treatment, financial reporting and
internal controls related to such arrangements.

The complaint alleged that the defendants disseminated false
statements and failed to disclose material facts and engaged in
practices that operated as a fraud or deceit upon Gouet and others
similarly situated in connection with their purchases of the
Company's securities during the proposed class period. The
complaint alleged violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder.

Two additional class action complaints, containing substantially
the same factual allegations and legal claims, were filed against
the Company, Herbert and Singh in the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey.

On September 13, 2018, David Gray filed a putative class action
complaint, and on October 3, 2018, Anthony E. Phillips filed a
putative class action complaint. Subsequently, multiple
shareholders moved to be appointed lead plaintiff, and on December
19, 2018, the Court consolidated the three actions, appointed a
lead plaintiff, and appointed lead counsel for the consolidated
actions.

On February 28, 2019, the Court approved a Stipulation agreed to by
the parties in the Consolidated Action for the filing of an amended
complaint within fourteen days after the Company filed its 2018
Form 10-K. On January 22, 2019, the Company and Herbert filed a
motion to transfer the Consolidated Action to the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

On February 5, 2019, the Lead Plaintiff filed its opposition to the
Motion to Transfer.  On August 12, 2019, the University of Puerto
Rico Retirement System ("UPR") filed a putative class action
complaint in the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey against the Company, Herbert, Singh, the Company's
Directors at the relevant time (Steven D. Barnhart, Joel Books,
Robert L. Metzger, Albin F. Moschner, William J. Reilly and William
J. Schoch) (the "Independent Directors"), and the investment
banking firms who acted as underwriters for the May 2018 follow-on
public offering of the Company: William Blair & Company; LLC;
Craig-Hallum Capital Group, LLC; Northland Securities, Inc.; and
Barrington Research Associates, Inc.

The class was defined as purchasers of the Company's shares
pursuant to the registration statement and prospectus issued in
connection with the Public Offering. Plaintiff sought to recover
damages caused by Defendants' alleged violations of the Securities
Act of 1933, and specifically Sections 11, 12 and 15 thereof. The
complaint generally sought compensatory damages, rescissory damages
and attorneys' fees and costs. The UPR complaint was consolidated
into the Consolidated Action and the UPR docket was closed.

On September 30, 2019, the Court granted the motion to transfer and
transferred the Consolidated Action to the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Docket No.
19-cv-04565.

On November 20, 2019, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint that
asserted claims under both the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act.
Defendants filed motions to dismiss on February 3, 2020.

Before briefing on the motions was completed, the parties
participated in a private mediation on February 27, 2020, which
ultimately resulted in a settlement. On May 29, 2020, the
plaintiffs filed documents with the Court seeking preliminary
approval of the settlement, with the defendants supporting approval
of the settlement.

On June 9, 2020, the Court granted preliminary approval of the
settlement and issued a scheduling order for further action on the
settlement. The settlement provides for a payment of $15.3 million
which includes all administrative costs and plaintiffs' attorneys'
fees and expenses.

The Company's insurance carriers paid approximately $12.7 million
towards the settlement and the Company paid approximately $2.6
million towards the settlement. The settlement payments were
deposited into an escrow account in July 2020.

Only one putative class member submitted an objection to the
settlement.

On October 30, 2020, the Court held a hearing on the motion for
final settlement approval and granted approval.

Under the settlement, payment of plaintiffs' counsel's fees and
expenses may be distributed within three business days of approval
(subject to being returned if the settlement is reversed based on
any appeal).

USA Technologies said, "Once the final settlement approval order is
no longer at risk of being reversed or revised on appeal,
administration of the remaining settlement proceeds to claimants
will begin. Should the settlement approval be reversed for any
reason, the parties will resume litigation of the claims."

USA Technologies, Inc. provides wireless networking, cashless
transactions, asset monitoring, and other value-added services in
the United States and internationally. USA Technologies, Inc. was
founded in 1992 and is headquartered in Malvern, Pennsylvania.

USA TECHNOLOGIES: Shareholder Suit Ongoing in Chester County Court
------------------------------------------------------------------
USA Technologies, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 6, 2020, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2020, that the company
continues to defend a shareholder class action suit in the Court of
Common Pleas, Chester County, Pennsylvania.

A putative shareholder class action complaint was filed against the
Company, its chief executive officer and chief financial officer at
the relevant time, its directors at the relevant time, and the
Underwriters, in the Court of Common Pleas, Chester County,
Pennsylvania.

The complaint alleged violations of the 1933 Act. As also
previously reported, on September 20, 2019 the Court granted the
defendants' Petition for Stay and stayed the Chester County action
until the Consolidated Action reaches a final disposition. On
October 18, 2019, plaintiff filed an appeal to the Pennsylvania
Superior Court from the Order granting defendants' Petition for
Stay, Docket No. 3100 EDA 2019.

On December 6, 2019, the Pennsylvania Superior Court issued an
Order stating that the Stay Order does not appear to be final or
otherwise appealable and directed plaintiff to show cause as to the
basis of the Pennsylvania Superior Court's jurisdiction.

The plaintiff filed a Response to the Order to Show Cause on
December 16, 2019, and the defendants filed an Application to Quash
Appeal on December 26, 2019. On February 20, 2020, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court quashed the appeal.

USA Technologies said, "Absent further action by the Chester County
Court, this action will remain stayed until the Consolidated Action
reaches final disposition."

USA Technologies, Inc. provides wireless networking, cashless
transactions, asset monitoring, and other value-added services in
the United States and internationally. USA Technologies, Inc. was
founded in 1992 and is headquartered in Malvern, Pennsylvania.

VAIL RESORTS: Faces Quint Labor Suit Over Unpaid Wages & Overtime
-----------------------------------------------------------------
RANDY DEAN QUINT, JOHN LINN, and MARK MOLINA, Individually and On
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. VAIL RESORTS, INC., a
Delaware Corporation, Case No. 1:20-cv-03569 (D. Colo., Dec. 3,
2020) is a class and collective action asserting claims for Vail
Resorts' violations of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, the laws of the States of Colorado, California, Utah,
Minnesota, Wisconsin, Washington, New York, Vermont and Michigan,
and common law.

According to the complaint, despite representing to job applicants,
returning employees and competitors that Vail Resorts pays its
employees a set base rate per hour worked, Vail Resorts willfully
and systematically fails to pay its hourly employees for all hours
worked at the hourly wage specified in employment agreements. For
example, pursuant to Company policy, Vail Resorts generally pays
ski and snowboard instructors at their regular rate for shifts of
6.5-7.25 hours per day. However, Vail Resorts supervisors and
managers know that Snow Sport Instructors typically work more than
9 hours per day, including compensable time working while traveling
on Company buses, donning and doffing indispensable uniforms and
equipment, training, and "off the clock" work performed prior to
and after shifts. All told, Vail Resorts fails to pay Snow Sport
Instructors for more than 2.5 hours of work per day in violation of
the FLSA and applicable state law.

The Plaintiffs seek recompense for unpaid wages, overtime and other
benefits wrongly withheld from them and all other similarly
situated current and former Vail Resort employees.

Vail Resorts claims to be the world's "premier mountain resort
company" and "a leader in luxury, destination-based travel at
iconic locations." Vail Resort’s "Mountain" business segment
comprises thirty-seven resorts and regional ski areas with
ancillary services including ski lifts, lift ticket sales, ski and
snowboard schools, equipment rental, retail merchandise sales,
dining and retail establishments, and luxury hotels. These resorts
include Vail, Beaver Creek, Breckenridge, Keystone and Crested
Butte in Colorado; Park City in Utah; Heavenly, Northstar and
Kirkwood in the Lake Tahoe area of California and Nevada; Wilmot
Mountain in Wisconsin; Afton Alps in Minnesota; and Mt. Brighton in
Michigan. Vail Resorts employs approximately 7,000 year-round
employees and approximately 36,000 seasonal employees.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Edward P. Dietrich, Esq.
          EDWARD P. DIETRICH, APC
          9595 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 900
          Beverly Hills, CA 90212
          Telephone: (310) 300-8450
          Facsimile: (310) 300-8401
          E-mail: edward@dstlegal.com

               - and -

          Benjamin Galdston, Esq.
          BENJAMIN GALDSTON
          12544 High Bluff Drive, Suite 340
          San Diego, CA 92130
          Telephone: (858) 539-9767
          E-mail: benjamin@galdston.com

VERRICA PHARMACEUTICALS: Potter Suit Ongoing in Pennsylvania
-------------------------------------------------------------
Verrica Pharmaceuticals Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 9, 2020,
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2020, that the company
continues to defend a putative class action suit entitled, Potter
v. VerricaPharmaceuticals Inc.

On July 14, 2020, plaintiff Isaiah Potter, or Potter, filed a
putative class action complaint captioned Potter v. Verrica
Pharmaceuticals Inc., in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania against the Company and certain of its
executive officers, or the Defendants.  

The complaint alleges that Defendants violated federal securities
laws by, among other things, failing to disclose certain supposed
safety risks attendant to the VP-102 drug-device and likely delays
to regulatory approval of VP-102.  

The complaint seeks unspecified compensatory damages on behalf of
Potter and all other persons and entities that purchased or
otherwise acquired our securities between September 16, 2019 and
June 29, 2020.  

The Company disputes these claims and intends to defend the matter
vigorously.  

The Company cannot estimate the reasonably possible loss or range
of loss that may result from this action, if any.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Verrica Pharmaceuticals Inc. is a dermatology therapeutics company
committed to the development and commercialization of novel
treatments that provide meaningful benefit for people living with
skin diseases. The company is based in West Chester, Pennsylvania.

VIACOMCBS INC: Bid to Dismiss CBS Merger-Related Suit Pending
-------------------------------------------------------------
ViacomCBS Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 6, 2020, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2020, that the defendants'
motion to dismiss the putative class action suit headed by Bucks
County Employees' Retirement Fund and International Union of
Operating Engineers of Eastern Pennsylvania and Delaware, is
pending.

On December 4, 2019, Viacom Inc. merged with and into CBS
Corporation, with CBS continuing as the surviving company. At the
effective time of the Merger, the combined company changed its name
to ViacomCBS Inc. The Merger has been accounted for as a
transaction between entities under common control as National
Amusements, Inc. ("NAI") was the controlling stockholder of each of
CBS and Viacom (and remains the controlling stockholder of
ViacomCBS). Upon the closing of the Merger, the net assets of
Viacom were combined with those of CBS at their historical carrying
amounts and the companies have been presented on a combined basis
for all periods presented.

Beginning on February 20, 2020, three purported CBS stockholders
filed separate derivative and/or putative class action lawsuits in
the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware.

On March 31, 2020, the Court consolidated the three lawsuits and
appointed Bucks County Employees' Retirement Fund and International
Union of Operating Engineers of Eastern Pennsylvania and Delaware
as co-lead plaintiffs for the consolidated action.

On April 14, 2020, the lead plaintiffs filed a Verified
Consolidated Class Action and Derivative Complaint against Shari E.
Redstone, NAI, Sumner M. Redstone National Amusements Trust,
members of the CBS Board of Directors (comprised of Candace K.
Beinecke, Barbara M. Byrne, Gary L. Countryman, Brian Goldner,
Linda M. Griego, Robert N. Klieger, Martha L. Minow, Susan Schuman,
Frederick O. Terrell and Strauss Zelnick), former CBS President and
Acting Chief Executive Officer Joseph Ianniello and nominal
defendant ViacomCBS Inc.

The Complaint alleges breaches of fiduciary duties to CBS
stockholders in connection with the negotiation and approval of the
Agreement and Plan of Merger dated as of August 13, 2019, as
amended on October 16, 2019.

The Complaint also alleges waste and unjust enrichment in
connection with Mr. Ianniello's compensation. The Complaint seeks
unspecified damages, costs and expenses, as well as other relief.

On June 5, 2020, the defendants filed motions to dismiss.

ViacomCBS said, "We believe that the claims are without merit and
we intend to defend against them vigorously. We are currently
unable to determine a range of potential liability, if any.
Accordingly, no accrual for this matter has been made in our
consolidated financial statements."

ViacomCBS Inc., a media and entertainment, creates content and
experiences for audiences worldwide. The company operates in four
segments: Entertainment, Cable Networks, Publishing, and Local
Media. The company was formerly known as CBS Corporation and
changed its name to ViacomCBS Inc. in December 2019. ViacomCBS Inc.
was founded in 1986 and is based in New York, New York.

VIACOMCBS INC: Bid to Toss CalPERS Suit Pending
-----------------------------------------------
ViacomCBS Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 6, 2020, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2020, that the motion to
dismiss the putative class action suit headed by the California
Public Employees' Retirement System ("CalPERS"), remains pending.

Beginning on November 25, 2019, four purported Viacom stockholders
filed separate putative class action lawsuits in the Court of
Chancery of the State of Delaware.

On January 23, 2020, the Court consolidated the four lawsuits. On
February 6, 2020, the Court appointed CalPERS as lead plaintiff for
the consolidated action. On February 28, 2020, CalPERS, together
with Park Employees' and Retirement Board Employees' Annuity and
Benefit Fund of Chicago and Louis M. Wilen, filed a First Amended
Verified Class Action Complaint (as used in this paragraph, the
Complaint) against National Amusements, Inc. (NAI), NAI
Entertainment Holdings LLC, Shari E. Redstone, the members of the
Viacom special transaction committee of the Viacom Board of
Directors (comprised of Thomas J. May, Judith A. McHale, Ronald L.
Nelson and Nicole Seligman) and the company's President and Chief
Executive Officer and director, Robert M. Bakish. The Complaint
alleges breaches of fiduciary duties to Viacom stockholders in
connection with the negotiation and approval of the Merger
Agreement.

The Complaint seeks unspecified damages, costs and expenses, as
well as other relief.

On May 22, 2020, the defendants filed motions to dismiss.

ViacomCBS said, "We believe that the claims are without merit and
we intend to defend against them vigorously. We are currently
unable to determine a range of potential liability, if any.
Accordingly, no accrual for this matter has been made in our
consolidated financial statements."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

ViacomCBS Inc., a media and entertainment, creates content and
experiences for audiences worldwide. The company operates in four
segments: Entertainment, Cable Networks, Publishing, and Local
Media. The company was formerly known as CBS Corporation and
changed its name to ViacomCBS Inc. in December 2019. ViacomCBS Inc.
was founded in 1986 and is based in New York, New York.

VIACOMCBS INC: Construction Laborers Pension Trust Suit Underway
----------------------------------------------------------------
ViacomCBS Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 6, 2020, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2020, that the company
continues to defend a consolidated putative class action suit
headed by Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern
California.

On August 27, 2018 and on October 1, 2018, Gene Samit and John
Lantz, respectively, filed putative class action suits in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, for claims
that are similar to those alleged in the amended complaint. On
November 6, 2018, the Court entered an order consolidating the two
actions.

On November 30, 2018, the Court appointed Construction Laborers
Pension Trust for Southern California as the lead plaintiff of the
consolidated action. On February 11, 2019, the lead plaintiff filed
a consolidated amended putative class action complaint against CBS,
certain current and former senior executives and members of the CBS
Board of Directors. The consolidated action is stated to be on
behalf of purchasers of CBS Class A Common Stock and Class B Common
Stock between September 26, 2016 and December 4, 2018.

This action seeks to recover damages arising during this time
period allegedly caused by the defendants' purported violations of
the federal securities laws, including by allegedly making
materially false and misleading statements or failing to disclose
material information, and seeks costs and expenses as well as
remedies under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.

On April 12, 2019, the defendants filed motions to dismiss this
action, which the Court granted in part and denied in part on
January 15, 2020.

With the exception of one statement made by Mr. Leslie Moonves at
an industry event in November 2017, in which he allegedly was
acting as the agent of CBS, all claims as to all other allegedly
false and misleading statements were dismissed.

ViacomCBS said, "We believe that the remaining claims are without
merit and we intend to defend against them vigorously. We are
currently unable to determine a range of potential liability, if
any. Accordingly, no accrual for this matter has been made in our
consolidated financial statements."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

ViacomCBS Inc., a media and entertainment, creates content and
experiences for audiences worldwide. The company operates in four
segments: Entertainment, Cable Networks, Publishing, and Local
Media. The company was formerly known as CBS Corporation and
changed its name to ViacomCBS Inc. in December 2019. ViacomCBS Inc.
was founded in 1986 and is based in New York, New York.

WAITR HOLDINGS: Class Certification Hearing Set for July 2021
-------------------------------------------------------------
Waitr Holdings Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 9, 2020, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2020, that hearing for class
certification in Bobby's Country Cookin', et al v. Waitr, is
currently scheduled for July 2021.

In April 2019, the Company was named as a defendant in a class
action complaint filed by certain current and former restaurant
partners, captioned Bobby's Country Cookin', et al v. Waitr, which
is currently pending in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Louisiana.

Plaintiffs allege, among other things, claims for breach of
contract, violation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and
unjust enrichment, and seek recovery on behalf of themselves and
two separate classes.

Based on the current class definitions, as many as 10,000
restaurant partners could be members of the two separate classes
that the representative plaintiffs are attempting to certify.  

The hearing for class certification is currently scheduled for July
2021.

Waitr believes that the underlying allegations and claims lack
merit, and that the classes, as pled, are incapable of
certification. Waitr intends to vigorously defend the suit.

Waitr Holdings Inc. operates an online food ordering and delivery
platform, connecting local restaurants with hungry diners in cities
across the United States. The company is based in Lafayette,
Louisiana.

WAITR HOLDINGS: Welch and Bates Suits Consolidated
--------------------------------------------------
Waitr Holdings Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 9, 2020, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2020, that the putative class
action suits initiated by Walter Welch and Kelly Bates, have been
consolidated.

In September 2019, Christopher Meaux, David Pringle, Jeff Yurecko,
Tilman J. Fertitta, Richard Handler, Waitr Holdings Inc. f/k/a
Landcadia Holdings Inc., Jefferies Financial Group, Inc. and
Jefferies, LLC were named as defendants in a putative class action
lawsuit entitled Walter Welch, Individually and on Behalf of all
Others Similarly Situated vs. Christopher Meaux, David Pringle,
Jeff Yurecko, Tilman J. Fertitta, Richard Handler, Waitr Holdings
Inc. f/k/a Landcadia Holdings Inc., Jefferies Financial Group, Inc.
and Jefferies, LLC.  The case was filed in the Western District of
Louisiana, Lake Charles Division.  

In the lawsuit, the plaintiff asserts putative class action claims
alleging, inter alia, that various defendants made false and
misleading statements in securities filings, engaged in fraud, and
violated accounting and securities rules.

A similar putative class action lawsuit, entitled Kelly Bates,
Individually and on Behalf of all Others Similarly Situated vs.
Christopher Meaux, David Pringle, Jeff Yurecko, Tilman J. Fertitta,
Richard Handler, Waitr Holdings Inc. f/k/a Landcadia Holdings Inc.,
Jefferies Financial Group, Inc. and Jefferies, LLC, was filed in
that same court in November 2019.

These two cases were recently consolidated, and an amended
complaint was filed in October 2020.

Waitr believes that this lawsuit lacks merit and that it has strong
defenses to all of the claims alleged. Waitr intends to vigorously
defend this lawsuit.

Waitr Holdings Inc. operates an online food ordering and delivery
platform, connecting local restaurants with hungry diners in cities
across the United States. The company is based in Lafayette,
Louisiana.

WALGREEN CO: Mejia Class Has 60 Days to Reply to Approval of Deal
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LUCAS MEJIA, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. WALGREEN CO., an Illinois
Corporation; WALGREEN CO./ILL., a business entity unknown; and DOES
1 to 100, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-00218 WBS AC
(E.D. Cal.), Judge William B. Shubb of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of California gave the class members 60 days
from the date that the settlement administrator mails the notice
packets to request exclusion, object to the settlement, and/or
indicate their intention to appear at the final fairness hearing.

The Judge has read and considered the Joint Stipulation for Request
for Clarification and/or Amendment to the Court's Nov. 24, 2020
Memorandum and Order Re: Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class
Action Settlement.

The notice packets will instruct any person, who is interested in
attending the final fairness hearing to contact the Plaintiff's
counsel no later than 60 days from the date that the settlement
administrator mails the notice packets to obtain instructions for
gaining access via Zoom.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 9, 2020 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/ydg65vwh from Leagle.com.


WELLS FARGO: Ohio Court Narrows Claims in Tanner Mortgage Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio grants in
part and denies in part the Defendant's motion to dismiss the
lawsuit titled AMY S. TANNER v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Case No.
1:20-cv-01104 (N.D. Ohio).

Pending before the Court is the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the
Plaintiff's second amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds that the
complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief is granted.

Tanner, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated
seeks to recover alleged damages and civil penalties arising from
her mortgage with Wells Fargo. On May 20, 2020, the Plaintiff filed
a two-count class action complaint in the Court alleging violations
of 12 C.F.R. Section 1024.36(d) and Section 1024.35(e), and 12
U.S.C. Section 2605(e) and Section 2605(k), and breach of
contract.

The Plaintiff filed an amended class action complaint, on July 17,
2020, adding a claim for breach of covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and
violations of 12 C.F.R. Section 1024.36(d) and Section 1024.35(e),
and 12 U.S.C. Section 2605(e) and Section 2605(k). On July 24,
2020, the Court instructed the Plaintiff to file a second amended
complaint that clearly articulates the Plaintiff's revised theory
of the case.

On Aug. 6, 2020, the Plaintiff filed her second amended class
action Complaint. She brings her Complaint on behalf of a class and
subclass of similarly situated individuals and entities, and
alleges the following: 1) breach of contract, 2) breach of covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, 3) negligent misrepresentation, 4)
breach of fiduciary duty, and 4) violations of 12 C.F.R. Section
1024.36(d) and Section 1024.35(e), and 12 U.S.C. Section 2605(e)
and Section 2605(k).

Background

On Jan. 14, 2014, the Plaintiff executed a mortgage to secure
payment of a note in the amount of $108,498. Every residential loan
that is insured by the Federal Housing Administration ("FHA"),
including the Plaintiff's loan with Wells Fargo, requires lenders
to comply with the rules and regulations promulgated by the
Secretary of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
("HUD"). The Plaintiff defaulted on her loan and entered into FHA's
Home Affordable Modification Program ("FHA HAMP") around September
2017 with Wells Fargo (the "First Loan Modification").

At some point between September 2017 and April 2019, the Plaintiff
defaulted on the terms of her First Loan Modification. On March 12,
2019, Wells Fargo sent a letter to the Plaintiff responding to her
request for assistance and detailing her eligibility for a short
sale. It informed her that she was not eligible for the FHA HAMP
Loan Modification due to her having reached the allowable numbers
of modifications ("Plaintiff's Initial Loss Mitigation Denial").

On April 19, 2019, Wells Fargo initiated foreclosure proceedings
against the Plaintiff. On Sep. 16, 2020, the Plaintiff submitted a
request to Wells Fargo, as an attempt to secure another
modification under FHA HAMP, stating that 24 months have lapsed
since the Plaintiff's First Loan Modification ("Plaintiff's Request
#1"). In response to the Plaintiff's request, Wells Fargo wrote to
her, on September 20, 2019, telling her that she was not eligible
to be reviewed for assistance.

The Plaintiff later learned, after the lawsuit was filed, that the
basis for her denial was that her request was incomplete, but Wells
Fargo never requested any supplemental information from Plaintiff
that would be required to complete her request. Due to the alleged
deficiencies in Wells Fargo's denial notice and statement regarding
the Plaintiff reaching the allowable numbers of modifications, the
Plaintiff interpreted Wells Fargo's denial notice to mean that she
would no longer qualify for any loss mitigation option, regardless
of what documentation she submitted.

Discussion

Due to Wells Fargo's alleged failure to review the Plaintiff's
Request #1, as required by the rules and regulations promulgated by
the Secretary of HUD as incorporated into Paragraph (9) of the
Mortgage, the Plaintiff contends that Wells Fargo breached the
Mortgage contract. The Court is unpersuaded.

As Wells Fargo correctly notes, the failure to comply with HUD
regulations, even when incorporated into a mortgage contract, does
not provide a basis for a breach of contract claim or a private
right of action, District Judge Dan Aaron Polster opines, citing
HSBC Bank USA, Natl. Tr. Co. v. Teagarden, (Ohio Ct. App. 2013).

While the Court is persuaded that a regulation incorporated into a
contract may create a private right of action when Congress
intended to create a private right of action, there is no evidence
in the record that suggests a HUD regulation may create a private
right of action when incorporated into a contract where Congress
did not create such right.

The Court explains that while Ohio law recognizes that every
contract contains an implied duty for the parties to act in good
faith and to deal fairly with each other, this duty is part of a
breach of contract claim and does not stand alone, citing Lucarell
v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., (Ohio 2018). Because the Court
dismisses the Plaintiff's breach of contract claim, the Plaintiff's
claim for breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing is
dismissed because such a claim cannot stand alone.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff pled sufficient facts in the
record from which a reasonable juror could conclude that Wells
Fargo supplied affirmative false information through its responses
to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff's Complaint further supports the
conclusion that Wells Fargo knew that its representations were
being transmitted directly to the Plaintiff, and, therefore, were
not made to an unlimited class of persons.

As such, the Plaintiff pled sufficient facts in her Complaint to
satisfy the requisite lower standard for negligent srepresentation
-- that Wells Fargo failed to exercise reasonable care or
competence in communicating information about the Plaintiff's loss
mitigation options. Moreover, there is sufficient evidence that
would allow a jury to reasonably conclude that these communications
were made in the course of a transaction in which Wells Fargo had a
pecuniary interest.

Accordingly, upon reviewing the record, taking the allegations of
the Complaint as true, the Plaintiff has stated a claim for
negligent misrepresentation.

The Court also finds, among other things, that the Plaintiff fails
to allege sufficient facts, if reasonably construed, that would
support a finding that the Plaintiff had a special relationship
with Wells Fargo simply because the Mortgage incorporated HUD
regulations. Accordingly, because there is no fact-specific inquiry
that would cure this defect, Count 4 of the Plaintiff's Complaint
is dismissed. Count 5 of the Plaintiff's Complaint is also
dismissed because the Plaintiff fails to point to any applicable
provision of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act.

The Court, therefore, grants the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss as
to Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5 but denies the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss as to Count 3 (negligent misrepresentation).

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion and Order dated Dec. 10,
2020, is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7sj4sdl from
Leagle.com.


WINNING CONNECTIONS: Faces Weisberg Suit Over Unsolicited Messages
------------------------------------------------------------------
DAVID WEISBERG, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. WINNING CONNECTIONS, INC., and DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive, and each of them. Case No. 2:20-cv-10983 (C.D. Cal.,
Dec. 3, 2020) is a class action complaint for damages, injunctive
relief, and any other available legal or equitable remedies,
resulting from the alleged illegal actions of the Defendant, in
negligently contacting the Plaintiff on Plaintiff's cellular
telephone, in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act,
thereby invading the Plaintiff's privacy.

The Plaintiff contends that in June of 2018, he received an
unsolicited text message from the Defendant on his cellular
telephone, number ending in -0740. During this time, the Defendant
began to use his cellular telephone for the purpose of sending
Plaintiff spam advertisements and/or promotional offers, via text
messages, including a text message sent to and received by him on
or about June 4, 2018 from the Defendant's phone number, (858)
943-3870.

The Plaintiff was never a customer of the Defendant's and never
provided his cellular telephone number Defendant for any reason
whatsoever. Accordingly, the Defendant and their agent never
received the Plaintiff's prior express consent to receive
unsolicited text messages.

Winning Connections was founded in 1996. The company's line of
business includes providing business consulting services on a
contract or fee basis.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Meghan E. George, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF
          TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: (323) 306-4234
          Facsimile: (866) 633-0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                  mgeorge@toddflaw.com
                  abacon@toddflaw.com

WYNN RESORTS: Bid to Dismiss Ferris Putative Class Action Pending
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Wynn Resorts Limited said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 9, 2020, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2020, that the motion to
dismiss filed in the putative securities class action suit
initiated by John V. Ferris and Joann M. Ferris, is pending

On February 20, 2018, a putative securities class action was filed
against the Company and certain current and former officers of the
Company in the United States District Court, Southern District of
New York (which was subsequently transferred to the United States
District Court, District of Nevada) by John V. Ferris and Joann M.
Ferris on behalf of all persons who purchased the Company's common
stock between February 28, 2014 and January 25, 2018.

The complaint alleges, among other things, certain violations of
federal securities laws and seeks to recover unspecified damages as
well as attorneys' fees, costs and related expenses for the
plaintiffs.

On April 15, 2019, the Company filed a motion to dismiss, which the
court granted on May 27, 2020, with leave to amend.

On July 1, 2020, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. On
August 14, 2020, the Company filed a motion to dismiss the amended
complaint, which is pending decision from the court.

The defendants in these actions will vigorously defend against the
claims pleaded against them.

Wynn said, "These actions are in preliminary stages and management
has determined that based on proceedings to date, it is currently
unable to determine the probability of the outcome of these actions
or the range of reasonably possible loss, if any."

Wynn Resorts Limited, owns and operates destination casino resorts.
The company was founded in 2002 and is based in Las Vegas, Nevada.

ZEBRA TECHNOLOGIES: Averts Securities Class Action
--------------------------------------------------
David McAfee, writing for Bloomberg Law, reports that Zebra
Technologies Corp. and its top executives convinced an Illinois
federal court that a lack of fraudulent statements meant a
securities class action should be dismissed in connection with the
integration of a Motorola business unit acquired for $3.4 billion.

Zebra announced in 2014 that it had completed the acquisition of
Motorola Solutions' Enterprise business, a deal the CEO said at the
time created "one company with unparalleled capabilities and
leading global brands." Zebra uses technology to connect workers
and data, according to its website. [GN]



ZYNERBA PHARMACEUTICALS: Bid to Nix Zygel Related Suit Pending
--------------------------------------------------------------
Zynerba Pharmaceuticals, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 9, 2020,
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2020, that the motion
to dismiss the putative class action suit related to product
candidate Zygel ("ZYN002"), is still pending.

On October 23, 2019, a putative class action complaint was filed
against the Company and certain of its current officers in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, with an amended complaint filed on March 9, 2020.

This action was purportedly brought on behalf of a putative class
of Zynerba investors who purchased the Company's publicly traded
securities between March 11, 2019 and September 17, 2019. The
complaint alleges that Defendants made certain material
misstatements and omissions relating to product candidate Zygel in
alleged violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder, and Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act.  

Specifically, plaintiff claims that Defendants made false
statements or failed to disclose that: (i) Zygel was proving unsafe
and not well-tolerated in the BELIEVE 1 clinical trial; (ii) that
the foregoing created a foreseeable, heightened risk that Zynerba
would fail to secure the necessary regulatory approvals for
commercializing Zygel for the treatment of developmental and
epileptic encephalopathies in children and adolescents, and (iii)
as a result the Company's public statements and public filings were
materially false and misleading to investors.

The Company's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint is
currently pending.

On April 23, 2020, the Company and the individual defendants filed
a motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice. On April 24,
2020, a stockholder derivative complaint, captioned Philip
Quartararo v. Armando Anido, et al., was filed against the Company,
its current and former directors (Armando Anido, John P. Butler,
Warren D. Cooper, William J. Federici, Thomas L. Harrison, Daniel
L. Kisner, Kenneth I. Moch, and Pamela Stephenson), and its Chief
Financial Officer, James E. Fickenscher.  

The complaint generally alleges breach of fiduciary duty, corporate
waste and violations of Section 14 (a) of the Exchange Act in
connection with the Company's disclosures around the BELIEVE I
clinical trial. These proceedings are currently stayed pending
resolution of the Company's motion to dismiss in the putative class
action.

Zynerba Pharmaceuticals, Inc. provides pharmaceutically-produced
transdermal cannabinoid therapies for rare and near-rare
neuropsychiatric disorders. The company is committed to improving
the lives of patients and their families living with severe,
chronic health conditions including Fragile X syndrome, or FXS,
autism spectrum disorder, or ASD, 22q11.2 deletion syndrome, or
22q, and a heterogeneous group of rare and ultra-rare epilepsies
known as developmental and epileptic encephalopathies, or DEE. The
company is based in Devon, Pennsylvania.

                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Ampco-Pittsburgh Has 5,868 Claims at Sept. 30
--------------------------------------------------------------
Ampco-Pittsburgh Corporation has 5,868 asbestos-related claims
pending at September 30, 2020, according to the Company's Form 10-Q
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2020.

The Company also disclosed that in the nine months ended September
30, 2020, there were 769 new claims served, 725 claims dismissed
and 278 claims settled.

The Company states, "Claims have been asserted alleging personal
injury from exposure to asbestos-containing components historically
used in some products manufactured by predecessors of Air & Liquid
("Asbestos Liability").  Air & Liquid, and in some cases the
Corporation, are defendants (among a number of defendants) in cases
filed in various state and federal courts.

"Included as "open claims" are 711 and 729 claims in 2020 and 2019,
respectively, classified in various jurisdictions as "inactive" or
transferred to a state or federal judicial panel on multi-district
litigation, commonly referred to as the MDL.

"A substantial majority of the settlement and defense costs was
reported and paid by insurers.  Because claims are often filed and
can be settled or dismissed in large groups, the amount and timing
of settlements, as well as the number of open claims, can fluctuate
significantly from period to period."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/OWDOmI


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Ashland Global Had 49,000 Open Claims at Sept. 30
------------------------------------------------------------------
Ashland Global Holdings Inc. had 49,000 open claims related to
asbestos matters at September 30, 2020, according to the Company's
Form 10-K filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2020.  The number of claims
excludes asbestos matters relating to wholly-owned subsidiary
Hercules LLC.

The Company states, "Ashland has insurance coverage for certain
litigation defense and claim settlement costs incurred in
connection with its asbestos claims, and coverage-in-place
agreements exist with the insurance companies that provide
substantially all of the coverage that will be accessed.

"For the Ashland asbestos-related obligations, Ashland has
estimated the value of probable insurance recoveries associated
with its asbestos reserve based on management's interpretations and
estimates surrounding the available or applicable insurance
coverage, including an assumption that all solvent insurance
carriers remain solvent.  Substantially all of the estimated
receivables from insurance companies are expected to be due from
domestic insurers, all of which are solvent.

"At September 30, 2020, Ashland's receivable for recoveries of
litigation defense and claim settlement costs from insurers
amounted to US$103 million (excluding the Hercules receivable for
asbestos claims).  Receivables from insurers amounted to US$123
million at September 30, 2019.  During 2020, the annual update of
the model used for purposes of valuing the asbestos reserve and its
impact on valuation of future recoveries from insurers, was
completed.  This model update resulted in a US$1 million increase
in the receivable for probable insurance recoveries."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://is.gd/lAjHZW


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Hercules LLC Had 12,000 Open Claims at Sept. 30
----------------------------------------------------------------
Ashland Global Holdings Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-K filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year
ended September 30, 2020, that wholly-owned subsidiary Hercules LLC
still faces 12,000 open claims related to asbestos matters at
September 30.

The Company states, "For the Hercules asbestos-related obligations,
certain reimbursement obligations pursuant to coverage-in-place
agreements with insurance carriers exist.  As a result, any
increases in the asbestos reserve have been partially offset by
probable insurance recoveries.  Ashland has estimated the value of
probable insurance recoveries associated with its asbestos reserve
based on management's interpretations and estimates surrounding the
available or applicable insurance coverage, including an assumption
that all solvent insurance carriers remain solvent.  The estimated
receivable consists exclusively of solvent domestic insurers.

"As of September 30, 2020 and 2019, the receivables from insurers
amounted to US$47 million and US$49 million, respectively.  During
2020, the annual update of the model used for purposes of valuing
the asbestos reserve and its impact on valuation of future
recoveries from insurers was completed.  This model update resulted
in a US$2 million decrease in the receivable for probable insurance
recoveries."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://is.gd/lAjHZW



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania,
USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2020. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

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