/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/201029.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Thursday, October 29, 2020, Vol. 22, No. 217

                            Headlines

58TH BAKERY: Flores Sues Over Unpaid Wages for Restaurant Staff
ABC PHONES: Court Disapproves $1.7MM Deal in O'Bryant FLSA Suit
ABSOPURE WATER: Fails to Pay Proper OT to Delivery Staff, Guy Says
ADIENT US: Underpays Manufacturing Employees, Butler Suit Claims
AIR METHODS: Settlement in Toolajian Class Suit Gets Final Approval

ALLIANCE ENTERTAINMENT: Fails to Timely Pay Wages, Carrington Says
ALTERRA MOUNTAIN: Bursor and Dovel Firms Named Counsel in Kramer
AMERICAN ELECTRIC: Rosen Law Reminds of Class Action
AMERICAN HONDA: Dismissal of State-Law Claims in Floyd Suit Vacated
AR RESOURCES: Court Narrows Claims in Wright FDCPA Suit

ARKA GRILL: Fails to Pay Proper Wages to Servers, Fazzino Claims
ASPEN CONSTRUCTION: Class in Arroyo Suit Conditionally Certified
ATLANTIC CREDIT: Cooper Remanded for Lack of Jurisdiction Dismissal
ATM COLLECTION: Blind Users Can't Access Web Site, Romero Claims
AURORA CANNABIS: Bragar Eagel Announces Class Action

AVIS BUDGET: Denial of Arbitration Bid in Celestin Suit Upheld
B2C JEWELS: Blind Users Can't Access Web Site, Romero Claims
BAIDU INC: Vincent Wong Reminds of Class Action
BAYER HEALTHCARE: Bid to Dismiss First Amended Prescott Suit Denied
BIOMARIN PHARMA: Gross Law Firm Announces Class Action

BIOMARIN PHARMA: Howard G. Smith Reminds of Nov. 24 Deadline
BLINK CHARGING: Pomerantz Law Firm Reminds of Class Action
BRASKEM SA: Zhang Investor Law Reminds of Class Action
BRIGHT FLOORING: Faces Cedeno FLSA Suit Over Abrupt Termination
BUDGET VAN: Loses Bid to Dismiss Caplan TCPA Class Action

CANADIAN MEDICAL: Byer Clinic et al. Sue Over Unsolicited Fax Ads
CARVERTISE INC: Faces Kostakis Suit Over Unsolicited Text Messages
CDM FEDERAL: Faces Ali Suit Over Failure to Pay Overtime Wages
CDM FEDERAL: Fails to Pay Proper OT to Staff, Batiste Suit Says
CELL NATION: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Aribou et al. Claim

COLONIAL PARKING: $1.95MM Deal in Abraha Gets Prelim. Approval
COMCAST CORP: Faces Be ERISA Suit Over Denied Insurance Claim
CONTRACTED MEDICAL: Court Denies Class Certification of Snyder Suit
COPPERAS COVE: Cox Sues Over Unpaid Overtime for Nursing Aides
COSTCO WHOLESALE: Consolidated Opioid-Related Litigation Ongoing

COSTCO WHOLESALE: Continues to Defend Martinez Class Action
COSTCO WHOLESALE: Decision to Remand Nevarez Suit Appealed
COSTCO WHOLESALE: Soulek Putative Class Action Ongoing
CREDIT ACCEPTANCE: Kahn Swick Reminds of Dec. 1 Deadline
DELORES & WILLIAM: Website Inaccessible to Disabled, Sarwar Claims

DIGITAL MEDIA: Hooper Sues Over Unsolicited Text Messages
DNF ASSOCIATES: Loses Summary Judgment Bid in Viernes Class Action
EASTMAN KODAK: Hagens Berman Reminds of Class Action
EIGHT SLEEP: Website Inaccessible to Blind, Romero Suit Claims
ENVISION PHYSICIAN: Weller Sues Over Unsolicited Text Messages

FAST GRILL: Fails to Properly Pay Overtime Wages, Pichardo Claims
FIDELITY NATIONAL: Faces Colmone Suit Alleging WARN Act Violations
FIRST UNION: Faces Fabricant Suit Over Unsolicited Marketing Calls
FREEDOM MORTGAGE: 4th Cir. Revives Lawsuit
G4S SECURE: Fails to Timely Pay Overtime, Melendez et al. Claim

GATES CORP: Bid to Strike 13 Opt-Ins from Lundine FLSA Suit Denied
GLENCORE PLC: Court Dismisses Church's Amended Securities Suit
GOLAR LNG: Rosen Law Reminds of Nov. 23 Deadline
GRACE 365: Faces Cortes Suit Over Failure to Pay Proper Wages
GREENE COUNTY, MO: $750,000 Deal in Voorhis Gets Final Approval

HARBORSIDE INC: Rosen Law Reminds of November 9 Deadline
HAVENLOCK INC: Website Inaccessible to Blind Users, Jaquez Claims
HERB & LOU'S: Website Inaccessible to Blind, Jaquez Suit Says
IDEXX DISTRIBUTION: Bid to Dismiss Howard Labor Suit Denied as Moot
IES RESIDENTIAL: Ajpaccaja Sues Over Unpaid OT for Electricians

INDIVIOR INC: Class Certification in Suboxone Antitrust Suit Upheld
INTERSTATE BROKERS: Parks Sues Over Unsolicited Telephone Calls
INVESTMENTS MANAGEMENT: Alfonso Sues Over Unpaid OT, Retaliation
IPSOS PUBLIC: Faces Orlando TCPA Suit Over Unsolicited Phone Calls
KAISER FOUNDATION: Court Modifies July 13 Opinion in Futterman Suit

KEMPER SPORTS: Agras Sues Over Illegal Background Check
KENAN ADVANTAGE: Underpays Dispatchers, Burns Suit Claims
LENDINGCLUB CORP: Bid to Strike Class Claims in Erceg Suit Denied
LYFE PRODUCTIVES: Faces Fuller Wage-and-Hour Suit in California
MANTEI & ASSOCIATES: Black Suit Remanded to Lexington County Court

MARS PETCARE: Dismissal of Moore's California State Claims Reversed
MDL 2047: Court Orders Depositions in Chinese Drywall Suit
MDL 2047: Knauf Entities Win Partial Summary Judgment v Steve Binns
MDL 2047: Knauf Entities Win Summary Judgment vs. Amuso Claims
MDL 2047: Knauf Entities Win Summary Judgment vs. Arrowhead Claims

MDL 2047: Knauf Wins Dismissal of Gaspard Claims in Drywall Suit
MDL 2323: Langfitt Garner to Get 60% of Counsel Fees in NFL Suit
MICHIGAN: Two Classes of Non-citizen Detainees in Malam Certified
MIELE INCORPORATED: Williams Suit Moved From S.D.N.Y. to N.D. Cal.
MONDELEZ GLOBAL: Court Dismisses Harris Suit with Prejudice

MONTANA: Summary Judgment Order in Brooke Suit Affirmed
MOUNTAIRE FARMS: Interlocutory Appeal Cert. in Cuppels Suit Refused
MRS BPO: Faces Pugh TCPA Suit Over Unsolicited Telephone Calls
NEWREZ LLC: Court Denies Dismissal of Labrecque RESPA Suit
NIKOLA CORP: Kessler Topaz Reminds of Nov. 16 Deadline

NIKOLA CORPORATION: Johnson Fistel Reminds of Nov. 16 Deadline
NMG LONG: Faces Jones TCPA Suit Over Unsolicited Text Messages
NORTH CENTRAL: Compton Sues Over Drivers' Unreimbursed Expenses
OHIO STATE TEACHERS: Dismissal of Amended Dennis Suit Recommended
OHIOHEALTH CORP: Underpays Services Officers, Melgard Suit Claims

OLD NORTHERN: Underpays Restaurant Servers, Giapitzaki Suit Says
ONESPAN INC: Pomerantz Law Reminds of Class Action
P.A.M. TRANSPORT: $16.5MM Settlement in Browne Gets Final Approval
PARKOFF OPERATING: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Amended Quinn Suit
PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Sites WVCCPA Suit Removed to S.D. West Virginia

PROCTER & GAMBLE: Bid to Dismiss Davis Suit Denied as Moot
PROGENITY INC: Johnson Fistel Reminds of Oct. 27 Deadline
PUCKS EXPRESS: Underpays Delivery Drivers, Reese Suit Alleges
QUTOUTIAO INC: Gross Law Announces Class Action
QUTOUTIAO INC: Pomerantz Law Firm Reminds of Class Action

ROCKLINE INDUSTRIES: Fails to Pay Proper OT Wages, King Claims
ROSETTA STONE: Harrison Challenges Proposed Sale to Cambium Holding
RUMPKE WASTE: Gambrell Sues Over Unpaid Overtime for Welders
S.W.O.R.N. PROTECTION: Buckley Sues Over Managers' Unpaid Overtime
SAFESPEED LLC: Court Refuses to Dismiss Marso ADA Class Action

SAM GILDERSLEEVE: Becker Sues Over Failure to Pay OT to Laborers
SAN JOSE: Fails to Provide Accurate Wage Statements, Flores Claims
SDM HOSPITALITY: Fails to Pay Proper OT to Cooks, Hardy Suit Says
SEALIFT HOLDINGS: Bond Posted for Llagas Claims Reduced to $42,000
SK FOODS: Status Conference in Cliffstar Case Moved to December

SK FOODS: Status Conference in DFSI Case Moved to Dec. 10
SK FOODS: Status Conference in Four in One Case Moved to December
SODEXO INC: Underpays Hospital Staff, Nodal Suit Alleges
SONIC CORP: Faces Collins TCPA Suit Over Unsolicited Text Messages
ST. DAVID'S: Court Partially Grants Motion to Dismiss Mock's Action

STAAR SURGICAL: Pomerantz Law Firm Reminds of Class Action
STARKEY LABORATORIES: Court Narrows Claims in Beck ERISA-RICO Suit
SUMMIT HEALTH: Braunshtein Remanded to L.A. County Superior Court
TACTILE SYSTEMS: Gainey McKenna Reminds of Nov. 30 Deadline
THOMAS P. GOHAGAN: Can Compel Arbitration in Saperstein Class Suit

TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS: Denial of Arbitration Bid in Landry Affirmed
TTOTTAL BUSINESS: Viera Sues Over Unpaid Overtime and Retaliation
UMTH LAND: Court Narrows Claims in Fannin Class Suit
UNITED AMERICAN: Can Compel Hardy to Arbitrate Claims in Jones Suit
UPMC: Court Denies Remand of Doe Privacy Suit to State Court

V.F. CORP: Website Inaccessible to Blind Users, Paguada Claims
WALDORF ASTORIA: Perez Sues Over Unpaid Overtime for Housekeepers
WELLS FARGO: Faces Popal Suit Over Denied Sick Leave Benefits
ZIMMER BIOMET: Class of Sales Associates in Karl Suit Certified

                            *********

58TH BAKERY: Flores Sues Over Unpaid Wages for Restaurant Staff
---------------------------------------------------------------
GUILLERMO MORENO FLORES, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. 58TH BAKERY INC d/b/a ALL ABOUT
FOOD, ALIAGED DINING INC d/b/a AGED, ALIFINE DINING INC d/b/a
NANKING, OMSAI FOODS INC. d/b/a NANKING ROCKAWAY, TULIP NYC INC
d/b/a NANKING HILTON, ALIMADE LLC d/b/a DELI PLUS, AKBARALI B
HIMANI, and NICHOLAS VITHOULKAS, Defendants, Case No. 1:20-cv-08855
(S.D.N.Y., October 22, 2020) is a class action against the
Defendants for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
New York Labor Law including failure to pay appropriate minimum
wages due to invalid tip credit deductions, failure to pay overtime
premium for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek,
failure to pay spread of hours premium, and failure to provide
proper wage notice and wage statements.

The Plaintiff worked at All About Food restaurant in New York as a
delivery person in or around January 2008 to August 2018.

58th Bakery Inc. is an owner and operator of a restaurant under the
name All About Food, located at 16 East 58th Street New York, New
York.

Aliaged Dining Inc. is an owner and operator of a restaurant under
the name Aged, located at 107-02 70th Road Forest Hills, New York.

Alifine Dining Inc. is an owner and operator of a restaurant under
the name Nanking, located at 2056 Hillside Ave. New Hyde Park, New
York.

Omsai Foods Inc. is an owner and operator of a restaurant under the
name Nanking Rockaway, located at 13-407 Rockaway Blvd. South Ozone
Park, New York.

Tulip NYC Inc. is an owner and operator of a restaurant under the
name Nanking Hilton, located at 598 Broad Hollow Rd. Melville, New
York.

Alimade LLC is an owner and operator of a restaurant under the name
Deli Plus, located at 2 West 45th Street New York, New York. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
                  
         CK Lee, Esq.
         Anne Seelig, Esq.
         LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
         148 West 24th Street, Eight Floor
         New York, NY 10011
         Telephone: (212) 465-1124
         Facsimile: (212) 465-1181

ABC PHONES: Court Disapproves $1.7MM Deal in O'Bryant FLSA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JACOB O'BRYANT and MARK BRANDON BAKER, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. ABC
PHONES OF NORTH CAROLINA, INC., d/b/a VICTRA, f/d/b/a A WIRELESS,
Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-02378 (W.D. Tenn.), Judge Samuel H.
Mays, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Tennessee, Western Division:

   (a) denied (i) the Joint Motion for Settlement Approval brought
by Plaintiffs O'Bryant and MBaker and Defendant VICTRA; and (ii)
the parties' Joint Motion for Approval of First Amendment to
Settlement and Release Agreement to Provide Further Benefits to the
Store Manager and Non-Manager Classes; and

   (b) denied without prejudice the (i) putative intervenors Ron
Hardney, Manuel Panngasiri, Michelle Salway, and other named
persons' Motion to Intervene; (ii) putative intervenor James
Baggott's Motion to Intervene; and (iii) putative intervenors
Priscilla Solorio and Mariano Diaz's Motion to Intervene.

The dispute arises from VICTRA's alleged failure to pay overtime
compensation to certain employees.  VICTRA sells Verizon-compatible
phones, Verizon data plans, and cellular phone accessories through
VICTRA-branded locations.  It sets wage and hour policies,
including employees' overtime pay, commission pay, and overtime
rates.  It compensates its retail associates by paying an hourly
rate plus bonuses and commissions, which are paid according to
frequently adjusted formulas.  The commission payments and/or
non-discretionary bonuses are not included in the employees'
regular rate when overtime payments are calculated.

On June 10, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in the Initial
Complaint.  In their Initial Complaint, the Plaintiffs, VICTRA
retail sales associates employed on an hourly-plus-commission
basis, alleged that VICTRA employed a uniform payment structure for
its retail sales associates that violated the Fair Labor Standards
Act ("FLSA").  They alleged that VICTRA's payment scheme calculated
the amount of overtime due by using the employees' base hourly rate
rather than the regular rate as defined by 29 C.F.R. Section
778.114, which required including commission payments and
non-discretionary bonuses when calculating overtime.

The collective action description in the Initial Complaint was: All
current and former retail employees of ABC Phones of North
Carolina, Inc. or any of its subsidiaries doing business as VICTRA,
who were paid an hourly wage plus commission, and who were employed
in the United States at any time during the applicable limitations
period covered by this Collective Action Complaint (i.e. two years
for FLSA violations and, three years for willful FLSA violations)
up to and including the date of final judgment in the matter, and
who are Named Plaintiffs or elect to opt-in to the action pursuant
to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b).

On Sept. 9, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint
("FAC").  In the FAC, the Plaintiffs amended, inter alia, Baker's
job description from "retail sales person" to "store manager."  The
FAC adds an additional collective description, stating a separate
retail "manager" subcollective in addition to the Initial
Complaint's retail "employee" collective: All current and former
retail managers of ABC Phones of North Carolina, Inc. or any of its
subsidiaries doing business as VICTRA, who were paid an hourly wage
plus commission, and who were employed in the United States at any
time during the applicable limitations period covered by this
Collective Action Complaint (i.e. two years for FLSA violations
and, three years for willful FLSA violations) up to and including
the date of final judgment in the matter, and who are Named
Plaintiffs or elect to opt-in to this action pursuant to the FLSA,
29 U.S.C. Section 216(b).

The FAC also alleges an additional violation of the FLSA: VICTRA's
failure to pay its retail managers for work performed
"off-the-clock."  The Plaintiffs allege that VICTRA converted its
salaried store managers to hourly paid employees but did not
substantially alter the work that such store managers, including
Baker, were required to perform outside of their shifts; that store
managers were not told that they should or could clock-in to
complete work performed off-premises; that these tasks included
"participating in mandatory conference calls scheduled outside of
manager's shifts; responding to employee calls after work, before
work, and on days off; responding to employee text messages;
routinely checking and responding to issues brought up in group.me;
and that these tasks were performed "in excess of an hour per week.
The FAC alleges that the Plaintiffs are aware of another putative
collective action addressing the retail manager "off-the-clock"
allegation.

Also on Sept. 9, 2019, the parties filed the Motion for Settlement
Approval.  The parties ask the Court to approve their proposed
Settlement Agreement, and to dismiss the case with prejudice.  They
represent that, at a mediation on Aug. 21, 2019, they were able to
settle the managers' "off-the-clock" claims.  The parties represent
that in the weeks after the Mediation, they were able to reach an
agreement to settle the retail employees' "payment scheme"
violations.

On July 3, 2020, the parties filed a joint motion for Approval of
First Amendment to Settlement and Release Agreement to Provide
Further Benefits to the Store Manager and Non-Manager Classes.
They represent that they have amended the Settlement Agreement to
add $190,888 to the Gross Settlement Amount to address the time
period that has elapsed since the Settlement Agreement was filed in
September 2019.  The parties also represent that they have amended
the Settlement Agreement to make clear that, consistent with
California law, the Settlement Agreement does not intend to release
any claims under the California Private Attorneys General Act of
2004 ("PAGA").

The relevant terms of the First Amended Settlement Agreement are
summarized:

  (a) The Plaintiffs and the Potential Opt-In Plaintiffs are
      current and former non-exempt employees of VICTRA who worked
      as store managers and non-manager retail employees who
worked
      in any VICTRA-owned store in the United States at any time
      between June 10, 2016, and May 30, 2020.  There are 779
      individuals in the Store Manager Class, 17,284 individuals
      in the Non-Manager Class, and 3,011 individuals that overlap

      between both classes for certain periods of time.

  (b) The total settlement amount is $ $1,715,888.  The Gross
      Settlement Amount, after payments of service awards of
      $10,000 to both O'Bryant and Baker, will be divided into
      two sub-funds: (1) $1,092,827 for the Store Manager Class
      (Manager Fund); and (2) $603,061 for the Non-Manager Class
      (Non-Manager Fund) (collectively, the Settlement Funds).

  (c) The Gross Settlement Amount is allegedly attributable to
      50% backpay and 50% liquidated damages.  The Plaintiffs'
      counsel seeks an amount not to exceed $292,500 from the
      Manager Fund and $149,750 from the Non-Manager Fund for
      attorneys' fees and costs.  The Individual settlement
      payment amounts for the Opt-In Plaintiffs will be
      calculated pursuant to a point-allocation formula based
      on their job positions and the number of weeks they worked
      during the relevant timeframe.

  (d) The parties ask the Court to appoint a Settlement
      Administrator to be selected by VICTRA.  VICTRA agrees to
      pay the expenses associated with the Settlement
      Administrator and those expenses will not affect the
      Gross Settlement Amount.  The Settlement Administrator
      will prepare and send, from a list provided by VICTRA,
      each Potential Opt-In Plaintiff a Notice of FLSA Settlement
      form, along with a check for the amount of their individual
      settlement, calculated pursuant to the point-allocation
      formula, at least 30 days after the Court grants final
      settlement approval.

  (e) The Notice of FLSA Settlement form will explain how the
      Gross Settlement Amount is allocated.  It will also notify
      each Potential Opt-In Plaintiff of how to obtain further
      information about the settlement of the case.  On cashing
      the check, the Potential Opt-In Plaintiff will become an
      Opt-In Plaintiff under the terms of the Settlement
      Agreement.  The settlement checks will state that they
      may be deposited for cash for 90 days from the date
      reflected on the check.

  (f) If the Potential Opt-In Plaintiff does not cash the check
      within the 90-day period and there is no request for a new
      check within 30 days, the amount of the check will revert to
      VICTRA.  Any Potential Opt-In Plaintiffs who do not cash
      their checks within the 90-day period or request a new check
      within 30 days will not release any claims against VICTRA.

  (g) The Settlement Agreement describes the release of claims as
      follows: The Plaintiffs (including Named Plaintiffs and
Opt-In
      Plaintiffs) on behalf of themselves and each of their
      respective spouses, heirs, assigns, administrators,
executors,
      beneficiaries, conservators, successors, insurers, and
      attorneys, voluntarily agree to fully waive, release and
      forever discharge Victra, including its predecessors,
      successors, and assigns, and each of their respective
parents,
      subsidiaries, affiliates, divisions, and all of their
      respective present and former officers, directors,
      shareholders, employees, insurers, lawyers, and agents
      (collectively, the Released Parties) from any and all known
      and unknown claims arising under federal and/or applicable
      state and local law relating in any way to the payment or
      non-payment of regular or overtime wages or compensation or
      compliance with wage or hour laws, regulations, or
ordinances
      that accrued during the Applicable Class Period.  Consistent
      with California law, nothing therein is intended to release
      any of the Plaintiffs' claims under the Private Attorneys
      General Act, as provided in Cal. Labor Code Section 2699,
      et seq.

On Sept. 27, 2019, Putative Intervenors Hardney, Panngasiri, and
Salway, along with the 37 other Store Managers who have opted into
the case styled Hardney, et. al. v. ABC Phones of North Carolina,
Inc., Case No. 1:19-cv-12722, in the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey  filed the Hardney Motion.  They argue,
inter alia, that they have a substantial legal interest in the case
because the reach of the proposed settlement encompasses and could
possibly release "off-the-clock" FLSA-violation claims they are
bringing against VICTRA in another putative collective and class
action.  VICTRA responded in opposition on Oct. 7, 2019.

On Feb. 24, 2020, Baggott, a former VICTRA store manager, filed the
Baggott Motion for the limited purpose of filing a written
objection to the proposed settlement.  VICTRA and the Plaintiffs
responded in opposition on March 9, 2020.

On July 1, 2020, Solorio and Diaz, store managers who worked in
California and assert wage and hour claims under California law in
a different putative class action and represent the State of
California in a law enforcement proceeding under PAGA, filed the
Solorio and Diaz Motion to object to the FLSA settlement in the
case.  VICTRA and the Plaintiffs also responded in opposition on
July 15, 2020.

Judge Mays construes the parties' Motion for Settlement Approval to
ask the Court to approve: (1) that the Plaintiffs and Potential
Opt-In Plaintiffs are similarly situated; (2) the structure of the
First Amended Settlement Agreement, including the process for
opting into the suit and the issuance of Notice of FLSA Settlement
to the Potential Opt-In Plaintiffs; (3) the Gross Settlement
Amount; (4) the Named-Plaintiffs' service awards; and (5) the
attorneys' fees and costs awards.

Judge Mays finds structural and substantive problems with the First
Amended Settlement Agreement such that he cannot conclude that the
settlement is a fair and reasonable resolution of a bona fide
dispute.  There are justiciability problems with the First Amended
Settlement Agreement that do not comport with Article III.  The
form of the settlement calls into question its fairness.  

Among the deficiencies are the following:

    (i) although the Plaintiffs and the Potential Opt-In Plaintiffs
may be similarly situated, the proposed Notice of Settlement
Agreement is fatally flawed;

   (ii) the failure of the First Amended Settlement Agreement to
satisfy the statutory mandates of Section 216(b) is fatal to its
approval as to any Plaintiffs who wish to opt into the litigation;

  (iii) the information the parties provide is insufficient for the
Court to determine whether the total Gross Settlement Amount is a
fair and reasonable settlement of any potential recovery amount;

   (iv) the proposed Release is overbroad, unreasonable, and unfair
because it goes far beyond the FLSA claims and purports to release
claims that do not share the factual predicates of the claims pled
in the FAC; and

    (v) First Amended Settlement Agreement contains reversionary
provisions governing unclaimed settlement funds.

For these reasons stated, Judge Mays denied the parties' Motion for
Settlement Approval and Motion for Approval of First Amendment to
Settlement.

Turning to the Motions to Intervene, the Judge holds that the
Hardney Intervenors, Baggott, and Solorio and Diaz may not
intervene as a matter of right because their ability to protect
their legal interests will not be impaired by their inability to
intervene.  Assuming without deciding that they have substantial
legal interests in this case, none of those assumed legal interests
would be impaired by denying intervention at this time.  To the
extent that they have brought the same or substantially similar
claims in different actions, and that their claims in those actions
could be barred by the Court's approval of the First Amended
Settlement Agreement, the Court has declined to approve that
Agreement.  There is no present possibility that any legal rights
would be barred.

Judge Mays has denied the parties' Motion for Settlement Approval.
Because the Hardney Intervenors, Baggott, and Solorio and Diaz
represent that their purpose in seeking to intervene is to object
to the parties' First Amended Settlement Agreement, and because the
Court has denied the parties' Motion for Settlement Approval, the
Judge exercises the discretion not to allow permissive intervention
at this time.  Accordingly, the Judge also denied without prejudice
the Motions to Intervene.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Aug. 4, 2020 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yynzvv35 from Leagle.com.


ABSOPURE WATER: Fails to Pay Proper OT to Delivery Staff, Guy Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
JUSTIN GUY, individually and on behalf of those similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. ABSOPURE WATER COMPANY, LLC, a domestic limited
liability company, Defendant, Case No. 2:20-cv-12734-MAG-EAS (E.D.
Mich., October 8, 2020) is a collective action complaint brought
against the Defendant for its alleged violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

The Plaintiff worked for the Defendant from approximately September
2018 to January 2020 as a non-exempt, hourly-paid local delivery
driver.

The Plaintiff claims that despite working in excess of 40 hours in
various work weeks throughout the duration of his employment with
the Defendant, he was not properly compensated by the Defendant at
a rate of one and one-half times of his regular rate for all his
overtime hours worked. Additionally, the Defendant failed to
maintain accurate records of the Plaintiff and the class members'
work hours in accordance with the law.

Absopure Water Company, LLC produces Mountain Valley Spring Water,
Maxwell House Coffee products, Green Mountain Coffee products,
Starbucks products, and Folger's products. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael N. Hanna, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
          2000 Town Center, Suite 1900
          Southfield, MI 48075
          Tel: (313) 251-1399
          E-mail: mhanna@forthepeople.com


ADIENT US: Underpays Manufacturing Employees, Butler Suit Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
KELLY BUTLER, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. ADIENT US LLC, Defendant, Case No.
3:20-cv-02365-JJH (N.D. Ohio, October 16, 2020) brings this
collective action complaint against the Defendant for its alleged
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Ohio Minimum Fair
Wage Standards Act.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant between March and
September 2019 as a manufacturing employee at its Northwood, Ohio
manufacturing facility.

The Plaintiff claims that the Defendant classified him and other
similarly situated manufacturing employees as non-exempt employees.
However, although they frequently worked over 40 hours per week,
the Defendant did not pay them proper overtime pay for their time
spent before and after their scheduled start and stop time, which
are integral and indispensable part of their principal activities.

Adient US, LLC manufactures automotive seating and operates
manufacturing facilities throughout the U.S. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lori M. Griffin, Esq.
          Anthony J. Lazzaro, Esq.
          Chastity L. Christy, Esq.
          THE LAZZARO LAW FIRM, LLC
          The Heritage Bldg., Suite 250
          34555 Chagrin Boulevard
          Moreland Hills, OH 44022
          Tel: (216) 696-5000
          Fax: (216) 696-7005
          E-mail: lori@lazzarolawfirm.com
                  chastity@lazzarolawfirm.com
                  anthony@lazzarolawfirm.com


AIR METHODS: Settlement in Toolajian Class Suit Gets Final Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, EVAN TOOLAJIAN on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated; Plaintiff, v. AIR METHODS CORPORATION, a
Delaware corporation, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants,
Case No. 3:18-cv-06722-AGT (N.D. Cal.), Magistrate Judge Alex G.
Tse of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Francisco Division, granted the Plaintiff's Motions
For (1) Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, and (2)
Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Class Representative Service Award as
Modified.

Magistrate Judge Tse granted final approval of the Settlement
Agreement because it meets the criteria for final settlement
approval. The Settlement falls within the range of possible
approval as fair, adequate and reasonable, appears to be the
product of arm's-length and informed negotiations, and treats all
members of the Class fairly, the Court finds.

Solely for purposes of effectuating the Settlement, the Court
certified the class is defined as follows:  All current and former
Pilots employed by Air Methods Corp. in California at any time
during Sept. 20, 2014 to April 24, 2020.

The Court approved the Settlement and the Released Claims and other
terms set forth in the Settlement Agreement. The Parties and the
Settlement Administrator are directed to perform in accordance with
the terms set forth in the Settlement Agreement.

Except as to any individual member of the Class who has validly and
timely opted out of the Settlement, all of the claims asserted in
the Action are dismissed with prejudice.  The Parties are to bear
their own attorneys' fees and costs, except as otherwise provided
in the Settlement Agreement and the Order.

The Action is dismissed on the merits and with prejudice.

Distribution of the Net Settlement Amount will be done in
accordance with the terms outlined in the Notice and Settlement
Agreement.

The Courtordered the appointment of (i) Plaintiff Evan Toolajian as
the Class Representative for the Class, and (ii) Hunter Pyle of
Hunter Pyle Law and Monique Olivier and Katharine Chao of Olivier
Schreiber & Chao LLP as the Class Counsel for purposes of
settlement.

The Settlement Administrator will pay from the Gross Settlement
Amount: (i) the Settlement Administrator for its reasonable fees
for its services; and (ii) the Service Award to the Class
Representative to reimburse him for his valuable services to the
Settlement Class.  

The Court also approved the payment of (i) the settlement
administration costs in the amount of $7,000 to Simpluris, Inc.,
and (ii) the Service Award to the Class Representative in the
amount of $10,000.  The Settlement Administrator is directed to
make the foregoing payments in accordance with the terms of the
Settlement Agreement.

The Court further awarded to the Class Counsel the amount of
$490,000 for attorneys' fees, and the amount of $12,406.54 for
costs.  The Settlement Administrator is ordered to wire these funds
to the Class Counsel in accordance with the terms of the Settlement
Agreement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 31, 2020 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y2vs6fo6 from Leagle.com.

HUNTER PYLE -- hunter@hunterpylelaw.com -- KATHERINE FIESTER --
kfiester@hunterpylelaw.com -- HUNTER PYLE LAW, Oakland,
California.

MONIQUE OLIVIER -- monique@osclegal.com -- KATHARINE CHAO --
kathy@osclegal.com -- OLIVIER SCHREIBER & CHAO LLP, San Francisco,
California, Attorneys for Plaintiff EVAN TOOLAJIAN and the Proposed
Class.


ALLIANCE ENTERTAINMENT: Fails to Timely Pay Wages, Carrington Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
CHRIS CARRINGTON, individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ALLIANCE ENTERTAINMENT LLC and
MECCA ELECTRONICS INDUSTRIES, INC., jointly and severally,
Defendants, Case No. 1:20-cv-05054 (E.D.N.Y., October 21, 2020) is
a class and collective action complaint brought against the
Defendants for their alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards
Act and the New York Labor Law.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as a warehouse worker
from in or around March 2010 until in or around July 2020.

The Plaintiffs asserts these claims:

     -- The Defendants paid him below the statutory minimum wage
from in or around January 2018 until in or around July 2020;

     -- The Defendants failed to pay him overtime premium pay for
all the hours he worked in excess of 40 in a single work week;

     -- The Defendants paid him the same hourly rate for all hours
worked in a week, regardless of the total number of hours he worked
per week;

     -- The Defendants did not pay him for the first week he worked
within each pay period within 7 days; and

     -- The Defendants failed to provide him and other similarly
situated warehouse workers with a written wage statement with any
wage payment, and the notice and acknowledgement of payrate and
payday.
    
Alliance Entertainment LLC and Mecca Electronics Industries, Inc.
are American electronic distribution companies. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Douglas B. Lipsky, Esq.
          Alfons D'Auria, Esq.
          LIPSKY LOWE LLP
          420 Lexington Ave., Suite 1830
          New York, NY 10170-1830
          Tel: (212) 392-4772
          Fax: (212) 444-1030
          E-mail: doug@lipskylowe.com
                  alfons@lipskylowe.com


ALTERRA MOUNTAIN: Bursor and Dovel Firms Named Counsel in Kramer
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ROBERT STEPHEN KRAMER, Individually and On Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. ALTERRA MOUNTAIN
COMPANY and IKON PASS INC., Defendants, Civil Action No.
20-cv-01057-RM-SKC, Consolidated for Pretrial: No.
20-cv-01158-RM-SKC, Nos. 20-cv-01175-RM-SKC, 20-cv-01186-RM-SKC,
20-cv-01254-RM-SKC, 20-cv-01347-RM-SKC, 20-cv-01520-RM-SKC,
20-cv-01583-RM-SKC, 20-cv-01691-RM-SKC, 20-cv-01699-RM-SKC,
20-cv-02021-RM-SKC (D. Colo.), Judge Raymond P. Moore of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Colorado granted the Kramer and
Steijn Plaintiffs' Joint Motion to Appoint Bursor & Fisher and
Dovel & Luner Interim Co-Lead Class Counsel.

The Plaintiffs and the putative class members purchased "Ikon
Passes" for the 2019-2020 ski season from the Defendants.  On March
15, 2020, the Defendants suspended operations of their ski resorts
in North America due to the COVID-19 pandemic.  Eleven putative
class actions have been filed under various theories because the
Defendants have allegedly refused to refund the unused value of the
Ikon Passes.  The Court has consolidated these actions for pretrial
purposes.  In accordance with the Court's order, various parties
have filed motions for their counsel to be appointed as interim
lead counsel, interim co-lead counsel, or liaison counsel.

The issues before the Court are whom it should appoint as interim
lead/co-lead counsel and whom, if anyone, it should appoint as
liaison counsel.  The motions before the Court for consideration on
these issues are (i) the Joint Motion of Plaintiffs Eckert and
Cleaver to Appoint Robert B. Carey of Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro
LLP and James Evangelista of Evangelista Worley LLC as Interim Lead
Counsel Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g); (ii) the Motion of
Phillip Werner, Ryan Collins, Bradley Briar, Erik Ernstrom, Robert
Lombardini, Jaycelle Marshall, Kim Kurpjuweit, Shannon Mcnamara,
Jeffrey Farrell, James Sutcliffe, Eric Gifford, Erick Mcquillin,
Aaron Batt, Linh Bui, Christopher Reed, Douglas Fuller, W. Walter
Layman, Callan Kofoid, and Keri Reid to Appoint Hellmuth & Johnson,
PLLC as Interim Lead Class Counsel; (iii) the Motion for
Appointment of Interim Lead Counsel and Liaison Counsel ("Farmer
Motion"); and (iv) the Kramer and Steijn Motion.

Judge Moore has not only carefully considered the Motions but also
examined the record for other filings made by the moving parties,
such as the complaints, in deciding whom to appoint as the interim
lead counsel.  His review shows that each counsel has demonstrated
he/she would fairly and adequately represent the interests of the
putative class.  The question then is whom among the adequate group
of applicants the Judge should appoint that would best be able to
represent the interests of all of the parties on their side.

In the case, in the exercise of his discretion, the Judge appoints
Bursor & Fisher and Dovel & Luner as the Interim Co-Lead Class
Counsel.  He does so for essentially two reasons.  First, these law
firms were the first and second to file.  Thus, where the question
is a close one, this method serves as an objective basis for
choosing among highly qualified counsel and their law firms.  And,
second, because the Kramer and Steijn Motion identified in greater
detail the specific substantive investigation, research, and
analysis already conducted to support and prosecute the claims on
behalf of putative class members.  Accordingly, these two law firms
are appointed the interim co-lead class counsel.

As he indicated during the status conference held on June 18, 2020,
the Judge did not believe that liaison counsel was necessary in the
case.  Except for Mr. Farmer, all the other movants in the Motions
agree separate liaison counsel is not needed as interim
lead/co-lead counsel can perform the administrative matters
generally handled by liaison counsel.  The Judge agrees.  Upon
review of the nature of the case, the limited number of actions
filed, and the record as a whole, efficiency and economy can be
achieved without jeopardizing fairness to the parties by having the
interim co-lead class counsel appointed perform all of such tasks.


Accordingly, Judge Moore granted the Kramer and Steijn Motion, and
appointed Bursor & Fisher and Dovel & Luner as the Interim Co-Lead
Class Counsel.  The Order will apply to all related actions which
have been or will be consolidated with the action.

The Judge denied the following motions: (1) the Eckert and Cleaver
Motion; (2) the Werner Motion; and (3) the Farmer Motion.

The Order Referring Case to Magistrate Judge S. Kato Crews will
apply to all consolidated actions.

Within 35 days of the date of the Order, the Plaintiffs will file
their Consolidated Amended Complaint.  Within 15 days after the
Plaintiffs file their Consolidated Amended Complaint, the parties
will meet, confer, and file a joint proposed pre-trial schedule
addressing the timing for the Defendants' anticipated motion to
dismiss the Consolidated Amended Complaint and setting the
scheduling conference required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 16.  The parties
will jointly email the Chambers of Magistrate Judge S. Kato Crews
at Crews_Chambers@cod.uscourts.gov to coordinate a date for the
scheduling conference.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 31, 2020 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y38fd4ra from Leagle.com.


AMERICAN ELECTRIC: Rosen Law Reminds of Class Action
----------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, reminds
purchasers of the securities of American Electric Power Company,
Inc. (NYSE: AEP) between November 2, 2016 and July 24, 2020,
inclusive (the "Class Period"), of the important October 19, 2020
lead plaintiff deadline in the securities class action commenced by
the firm. The lawsuit seeks to recover damages for AEP investors
under the federal securities laws.

To join the AEP class action, call Phillip Kim, Esq. toll-free at
866-767-3653 or email or for information on the class action.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) AEP covertly participated in the "the largest public
corruption case in Ohio history"; (2) AEP secretly funneled
substantial funds to Ohio political organizations and politicians
to bribe politicians to pass Ohio House Bill 6, which benefitted
the Company and its coal-fired generation assets; (3) AEP partially
funded a massive, misleading advertising campaign in support of HB6
and in opposition to a ballot initiative to repeal HB6 by passing
substantial sums through a web of dark money entities and front
companies in order to conceal AEP's involvement; (4) AEP aided in
subverting a citizens' ballot initiative to repeal HB6; (5) as a
result of the foregoing, defendants' Class Period statements
regarding AEP's regulatory and legislative efforts were materially
false and misleading; (6) as a result of the foregoing, the Company
would face increased scrutiny; (7) AEP was subject to undisclosed
risk of reputational, legal and financial harm; (8) the bribery
scheme would jeopardize the benefits the Company sought by HB6; (9)
as opposed to AEP's repeated public statements regarding a move to
clean energy, it sought a dirty energy bailout; (10) as opposed to
AEP's repeated public statements regarding protection of its
customers' interests, the Company sought an extra and
state-mandated surcharge on its customers' bills; and (11) as a
result of the foregoing, defendants' statements about its business,
operations, and prospects, were materially false and misleading
and/or lacked a reasonable basis at all relevant times. When the
true details entered the market, the lawsuit claims that investors
suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than October
19, 2020 . A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on
behalf of other class members in directing the litigation. If you
wish to join the litigation, go to [To enable links contact MENAFN]
or to discuss your rights or interests regarding this class action,
please contact Phillip Kim, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll free at
866-767-3653 or via e-mail at or .

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe,
concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm was Ranked No. 1
by ISS Securities Class Action Services for number of securities
class action settlements in 2017. The firm has been ranked in the
top 3 each year since 2013. Rosen Law Firm has achieved the largest
ever securities class action settlement against a Chinese Company.
Rosen Law Firm's attorneys are ranked and recognized by numerous
independent and respected sources. Rosen Law Firm has secured
hundreds of millions of dollars for investors. Attorney
Advertising. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. [GN]

AMERICAN HONDA: Dismissal of State-Law Claims in Floyd Suit Vacated
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, HEATHER FLOYD; JODY SCHUTTE; KATE ZAIGER, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., a
California Corporation; HONDA NORTH AMERICA, INC., a Delaware
Corporation, Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 18-55957 (9th Cir.),
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part
and vacated in part the district court's order of dismissal of the
Plaintiffs' Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ("MMWA") claim, and their
state-law claims for express and implied warranty against Honda,
and remanded the case for proceedings.

In the putative class action, the Plaintiffs raise warranty claims
arising out of crashes or injuries caused by the alleged "rollaway
effect" of certain Honda Civic vehicles.  The Plaintiffs are owners
or lessors of 2016, 2017, and 2018 models of Honda Civic vehicles
who experienced a "rollaway effect" of the vehicle's continuously
variable transmission that, on occasion, failed to activate the
electric parking brake automatically.

The Plaintiffs allege that Honda's reliance on visual feedback in
the absence of tactile feedback in the affected vehicles caused
them to be unable to determine whether the parking brake had been
properly engaged, which resulted in vehicles unintentionally
rolling away and sometimes causing crashes or injuries.  They
allege that the transmission is inherently defective and that Honda
failed to disclose the defect.

In December 2017, Plaintiff Floyd, a citizen of Tennessee, filed a
putative class action in the district court raising a federal claim
under the MMWA and a variety of state-law claims.  An amended
complaint joined Jody Schutte, a citizen of Wisconsin, and Kate
Zaiger, a citizen of California, as Plaintiffs, added Wisconsin and
California subclasses, and alleged additional state-law claims.

The district court dismissed the First Amended Complaint, holding
that the MMWA claim was not cognizable due to the complaint's
failure to name 100 Plaintiffs.  Noting that the Plaintiffs had
invoked supplemental jurisdiction over their state-law claims, the
district court declined to exercise jurisdiction over those claims
in light of its dismissal of the only federal claim.  The district
court, however, did not separately address whether jurisdiction
existed over the state-law claims under CAFA.

The Plaintiffs did not amend the First Amended Complaint and
instead filed their notice of appeal on July 12, 2018, while final
disposition of the district-court case was pending.  The district
court terminated the case on July 26, 2018 with a final order after
the Plaintiffs failed to file an amended complaint.  The
Plaintiffs' notice of appeal was not amended after the
termination.

The question for decision is whether the Class Action Fairness Act
overrides the MMWA's requirement to name 100 plaintiffs.  The
parties dispute whether the district court's order granting the
motion to dismiss without stating whether it was granted with or
without prejudice, and without explicitly granting leave to amend,
constituted a final disposition of the action under 28 U.S.C.
Section 1291.  The Plaintiffs argue that we have jurisdiction
because the district court intended its dismissal to be final and
appealable.  Honda, on the other hand, argues that the district
court never intended the order dismissing the action to be final,
because the district court did not file its final order until two
weeks after the Plaintiff's notice of appeal and six weeks after
issuance of the order to dismiss.

The Ninth Circuit finds that the Plaintiffs filed a notice of
appeal a month after the dismissal of their claims but two weeks
before the district-court case was closed.  Whether the Plaintiffs'
notice of appeal was premature or not, the final disposition of the
case by the district court cures any timeliness defects of their
appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(2), and
the Ninth Circuit has jurisdiction to review it under 28 U.S.C.
Section 1291.

Next, the text is clear that a requirement for an MMWA class action
in federal court is at least 100 named plaintiffs.  The Plaintiffs
name only three individuals, but argue that, by satisfying CAFA
requirements, they are relieved of the MMWA's obligation to name at
least 100 plaintiffs.  The Plaintiffs therefore posit a conflict
between the two statutes and argue that CAFA has impliedly repealed
MMWA's numerosity requirements.  However, repeals by implication
are disfavored, and when two statutes are capable of co-existence,
it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed
congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as
effective.

The Plaintiffs' arguments of policy and of implied repeal do not
outweigh the clear statutory language establishing the requirements
for federal jurisdiction under the MMWA.  Construing CAFA to
provide jurisdiction over MMWA claims despite the Plaintiffs'
failure to satisfy the plain-language requirement of at least 100
named plaintiffs would have the effect of overriding a part of the
MMWA.  But the legislature's intent to repeal a statute must be
"clear and manifest."  Therefore, CAFA may not be used to evade or
override the MMWA's specific numerosity requirement, and the Ninth
Circuit affirms the district court's dismissal of the MMWA claim.

Turning to the dismissal of the Plaintiffs' state-law claims, the
Ninth Circuit opines that the district court erred in not
considering whether the Plaintiffs' state-law claims met the
diversity requirements of CAFA even if the MMWA claim failed.  The
Plaintiffs did not need to allege that their state-law claims were
supplemental to jurisdiction under CAFA, because they had already
generally alleged original jurisdiction over the entire action.

The district court should have considered jurisdiction under CAFA
entirely independently of the MMWA claim.  If the district court
then found that the requirements for CAFA were not satisfied, it
would not have jurisdiction over state-law claims except under
Section 1367 and the action could be dismissed.  But if the
Plaintiffs satisfied CAFA, the court would have had original
jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' state-law claims.  The district
court therefore improperly dismissed the Plaintiffs' state-law
claims based only on lack of supplemental jurisdiction.  The Ninth
Circuit therefore vacates the dismissal of the Plaintiffs'
state-law claims and remands for consideration consistent with its
Opinion.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Danny J. Boggs, writing for the
Ninth Circuit, affirmed in part and vacated in part the district
court's order of dismissal, and remanded the case for proceedings.
Each side will bear its own costs and fees on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's July 28, 2020 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y5e79q6d from Leagle.com.

Gregory F. Coleman (argued), Adam A. Edwards , Mark E. Silvey ,
Lisa A. White, and Rachel Soffin, Greg Coleman Law PC, Knoxville,
Tennessee; Robert R. Ahdoot -- rahdoot@ahdootwolfson.com -- and
Theodore W. Maya -- tmaya@ahdootwolfson.com -- Ahdoot & Wolfson PC,
Los Angeles, California; for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Eric Y. Kizirian (argued) -- eric.kizirian@lewisbrisbois.com -- and
Michael Grimaldi, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Los Angeles,
California; Jeffry A. Miller, and Brittany B. Sutton, Lewis
Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, San Diego, California; for
Defendants-Appellees.


AR RESOURCES: Court Narrows Claims in Wright FDCPA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JAVONTAE WRIGHT, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. AR RESOURCES, INC.,
PREMIUM ASSET RECOVERY CORP., and JOHN DOES 1-25, Defendants, Case
No. 8:20-cv-985-T-33CPT (M.D. Fla.), Judge Virginia M. Hernandez
Covington of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Florida, Tampa Division, (i) granted Defendant Premium Asset
Recovery Corp. ("PARC")'s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint;
and (ii) granted in part and denied in part Defendant AR Resources
("ARR")'s Motion to Dismiss Complaint.

On April 29, 2020, Javontae Wright initiated the putative class
action lawsuit against the Defendants for violations of the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA").  According to the
complaint, Wright allegedly incurred a debt to "the EMA of Tampa
Bay - St. Joes North."  Wright alleges that PARC is the current
owner of the debt and an alleged debt collector under the FDCPA.
PARC then contracted with ARR, also allegedly a debt collector, to
collect the debt.

To that end, on May 8, 2019, ARR sent Wright an initial collection
letter.  The May 8 letter, which Wright attached to her complaint,
stated the balance of the debt, explained that the debt had been
sold to PARC, and that ARR had been contracted to collect the
outstanding balance.

After explaining the ways in which Wright could pay the balance,
the letter stated: "Please be advised that our client is a credit
reporting client.  Your credit report may have a negative impact if
we do not hear from you."

According to Wright, the language about a potential negative impact
on her credit report "completely overshadows" the rest of the
notice by scaring the Plaintiff into making payment immediately to
avoid a 'negative impact' credit reporting instead of exercising
his statutory right to dispute the debt as provided by the FDCPA.
In addition, Wright alleges that the "negative impact" language
"coerces payment," and is "deceptive and misleading" as well as
"confusing and threatening."

Based on these allegations, Wright claims that the Defendants have
violated the FDCPA, specifically 15 U.S.C. Section 1692e (Count I)
and 15 U.S.C. Section 1692g (Count II).  

Wright also purports to bring these claims on behalf of the
following class, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23:
All individuals with addresses in the state of Florida, to whom
Defendant ARR sent a collection letter attempting to collect a
consumer debt, on behalf of Defendant PARC, that included deceptive
threats regarding negative impact of the credit report, which
letter was sent on or after a date one year prior to the filing of
the action and on or before a date 21 days after the filing of the
action.

The Defendants have now each filed Motions to Dismiss the
complaint, to which Wright has responded.  

To succeed on a claim under the FDCPA, the Plaintiff must establish
that (1) the Plaintiff has been the object of collection activity
arising from consumer debt, (2) the Defendant is a debt collector
as defined by the FDCPA, and (3) the Defendant has engaged in an
act or omission prohibited by the FDCPA.  

Neither party disputes that Wright has been the object of
collection activity, but PARC argues that Wright has insufficiently
pled its status as a debt collector under the FDCPA because the
allegations on that point are "conclusory and formulaic recitations
of the FDCPA's statutory language.  For its part, ARR concedes for
purposes of the Motion that it is a debt collector but argues that
it has not violated the FDCPA.  Specifically, ARR argues that cases
from other Circuits demonstrate that the "credit reporting"
language in the May 8 letter does not overshadow a debtor's
understanding of his rights or violate the FDCPA under the
prevailing least-sophisticated-consumer standard.

Wright alleges in the complaint that PARC is a debt collector under
the FDCPA and is a company that uses the mail, telephone, and
facsimile and regularly engages in business the principal purpose
of which is to attempt to collect debts alleged to be due another.
Judge Covington finds it a conclusory language that merely tracks
the language of the statute.  The complaint contains no factual
content that would enable the Court to make the inferential leap
that PARC is a debt collector.  As such, it is insufficient.

The Judge takes no position on whether the principal purpose of
PARC's business is in fact the collection of debts.  That is a
factual matter best left for another day.  However, under the
prevailing pleading standards, Wright must allege something more
than conclusory and formulaic recitations of the statute to survive
PARC's motion to dismiss.  He must allege some factual content that
would allow the Court to make the reasonable inference that PARC is
a "debt collector" under the language of the FDCPA.  Accordingly,
PARC's motion to dismiss should be granted.  However, because she
believes that the deficiency is capable of being remedied, Wright
will be given leave to file an amended complaint.  

Next, Wright alleges that the May 8, 2019, letter violates Section
1692e because it is "open to more than one reasonable
interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate" and violates
Section 1692e(10) by making a false and misleading representation.
The complaint makes clear that the credit-reporting language is at
the heart of both Wright's Section 1692e and Section 1692g claim.

The Judge fails to discern how the language is false, deceptive, or
misleading.  Wright does not allege that the Defendants would not,
in fact, potentially report non-payment to credit reporting
agencies or that consumers' credit reports would not be impacted by
such non-payment.  Wright has failed to plausibly allege that the
least sophisticated consumer would be confused, misled, or deceived
by the letter's negative-credit-reporting language.  Thus, Count I
should be dismissed without prejudice.  The Jude grants Wright
leave to amend the claim.

Wright then alleges that the Defendants violated Section 1692g by
threatening negative credit reporting, which overshadows the notice
language and coerces the consumer not to exert its rights under the
FDCPA.  The Judge finds that the language requiring that the
consumer contact the debt collector on receipt or face full
collection efforts is akin to the language of immediacy.  Upon
reading the letter at issue in the case, a least sophisticated
consumer would not be misled or confused into thinking she had to
pay the debt immediately or face adverse credit consequences before
her 30-day statutory validation period expired.   She concludes as
a matter of law that the language in the May 8 letter warning the
consumer that their "credit report may have a negative impact if we
do not hear from you" did not overshadow the required Section 1692g
notice.  Therefore, Wright's Section 1692g claim should be
dismissed with prejudice.

Accordingly, Judge Covington (i) granted PARC's Motion to Dismiss
Complaint, and (ii) granted in part and denied in part ARR's Motion
to Dismiss Complaint.  Count I of the complaint is dismissed
without prejudice and with leave to amend.  Count II of the
complaint is dismissed with prejudice.  Wright may file an amended
complaint without delay. The Defendants will then have the
opportunity to file responses to any amended complaint filed.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 31, 2020 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y4o3aeaf from Leagle.com.


ARKA GRILL: Fails to Pay Proper Wages to Servers, Fazzino Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
JANICE FAZZINO, on behalf of herself and those similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. ARKA GRILL COMPANY LLC d/b/a KALUZ RESTAURANT, a
Florida Limited Liability Company, Defendant, Case No.
0:20-cv-62116-BB (S.D. Fla., October 16, 2020) brings this class
action complaint against the Defendant for its alleged violation of
the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant from approximately
December 2018 through February 2019 as an hourly paid server at the
Defendant's Kaluz location in Fort Lauderdale, Florida.

According to the complaint, the Defendant paid the Plaintiff and
other similarly situated servers an hourly wage less than federal
minimum wage plus the tip credit. However, the Defendant required
them to share their tips with non-tipped employees, specifically
the silverware rollers who had little or no customer contact. As a
result of the Defendant's failure to properly compensate the
Plaintiff and other similarly situated servers for one or more
weeks of work, the Plaintiff and similarly situated servers have
been damaged in the loss of minimum wages for one or more weeks of
work with the Defendant.

Arka Grill Company LLC operates a restaurant. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Carlos V. Leach, Esq.
          Bruce A. Mount, Esq.
          THE LEACH FIRM, P.A.
          631 S. Orlando Ave., Suite 300
          Winter Park, FL 32789
          Tel: (407) 574-8778
          Fax: (407) 960-4789
          E-mail: cleach@theleachfirm.com
                  bmount@theleachfirm.com
                  yhernandez@theleachfirm.com


ASPEN CONSTRUCTION: Class in Arroyo Suit Conditionally Certified
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, WILLIAM ARROYO, Plaintiff, v. ASPEN CONSTRUCTION
SERVICES, INC., et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 19-5317 (E.D.
Pa.), Judge Joel H. Slomsky of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted the Plaintiff's Motion for
Conditional Certification and Facilitation of Court-Authorized
Notice but with modifications.

On Nov. 12, 2019, Arroyo filed a complaint on behalf of himself and
those whom he believes are similarly situated to himself for unpaid
overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").  The
Plaintiff is a mason/laborer who was employed by Defendant Aspen
and Defendant Krzysztof Kaczmarczyk, President of Aspen and paid on
an hourly basis.

The Plaintiff filed the action against the Defendants on behalf of
himself and others seeking to obtain unpaid overtime wages.
Defendant Aspen does masonry work as one of their construction
services.  The Plaintiff alleges that he and other similarly
situated mason/laborers are owed unpaid wages for their overtime
hours based on the Defendants' improper payment during the period
leading up to the lawsuit.

In his Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants failed
to compensate him for overtime wages from March 2016 to October
2018.  Plaintiff avers that during this time, the Defendants
knowingly made improper cash payments without including overtime
pay or making required deductions.  The Plaintiff states that he
and other masons/laborers regularly worked over 40 hours in a
seven-day period, and the Defendants' payment system either failed
to properly compensate the overtime pay or was done by cash
payments to avoid the payment of taxes and overtime.  

The Plaintiff claims that his Declaration, along with his verified
Complaint and the attached cash pay stubs he and other
mason/laborers received from the Defendants, are sufficient to show
that he and the others are similarly situated to qualify for
conditional class certification.

Before the Court is the Plaintiff's Motion for Conditional
Certification and Facilitation of Court-Authorized Notice.  In his
Motion, the Plaintiff requests that the Court conditionally
certifies as a class the employees who he contends were entitled to
overtime pay and approve a form of a notice to employees about the
potential claim.  

The Plaintiff also requests that the Court authorizes notice of the
lawsuit to be sent to employees who did not received overtime pay
of their right to join in the lawsuit as putative Plaintiffs.  He
asks the Court to approve the content of the Notice as drafted by
him.  Further, he requests authorization of a "follow-up notice"
via email to the putative Plaintiffs, that the mailed and posted
Notice be in English and Spanish.  

The Defendants deny that the Plaintiff was not paid for any
overtime hours and that any other employees were subject to
unlawful pay policies.  They claim that employees either
self-reported their hours to them or confirmed the hours they
worked, and the payments to all employees were consistent with
hours reported.  The Defendants also claim that the Plaintiff is
not similarly situated to members of the purported class.

In support of that claim, Defendant Kaczmarczyk has submitted an
Affidavit in which he states that the Plaintiff made a request to
be paid in cash for "personal reasons."  Furthermore, the
Defendants contend that the Plaintiff's allegations in the
Complaint and in his Declaration are merely conclusory and are
insufficient to support a conditional certification of the class.

The Defendants also request that, should conditional certification
be approved, the proposed Notice be amended.  Specifically, they
claim that notice by mail, without any follow-up email, is
sufficient, and that information identifying the putative
Plaintiffs should be reasonably tailored to include only the
information necessary within a two-year statute of limitations.
Finally, the argue that there are no grounds to prohibit Defendants
from having contact with the putative class members.

Judge Slomsky finds that the Plaintiff has met his burden for
conditional certification at this stage of the proceeding.  The
Plaintiff has met his burden to show that he and the potential
putative Plaintiffs are similarly situated to warrant conditional
certification.  The Plaintiff need only make a "modest factual
showing" to satisfy this burden.  The Plaintiff's allegations in
the Complaint and the documents submitted in support of these
allegations show, beyond pure speculation, the factual nexus
between the Defendants' policy regarding overtime pay and the
manner in which it affected the putative Plaintiffs.

The Plaintiff requests the three-year statute of limitations apply
here because the Defendants willfully violated the FLSA.  As such,
he seeks that the Notice be sent to the putative Plaintiffs who
worked in the mason/laborer position from Nov. 11, 2016 to the date
the Complaint was filed, Nov. 12, 2019.  The Defendants rebut the
allegations of "willfulness" and respond that the two-year statute
of limitations is adequate.

The Judge finds that the Plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to
warrant notice based on a three-year statute of limitations,
although he will not determine whether the Defendant's actions were
"willful" at this time.  Further, the date of commencement of the
action for a putative Plaintiff will be the date the Consent form
to opt-in as a Plaintiff is filed with the Court.

The Plaintiff requests that the Defendants' contact with the
putative Plaintiff class in matters regarding the litigation be
limited by the Court.  The Judge denies this request of the
Plaintiff.  He finds that the Plaintiff does not make any
presentation of a clear record showing the need for any limitation
of communication between the Defendants and the putative Plaintiff
class.  He makes no specific allegation showing abusive
communication or misleading or coercive statements from the
Defendants.  Moreover, no Court-Authorized Notice has issued, nor
have any putative Plaintiffs "opted-in."

Next, the parties disagree as to (1) the Plaintiff's request for
information regarding the putative Plaintiffs, and (2) the content
of the Notice.  The Plaintiff asks that the Defendants produce
within fourteen days of the Court's Order a list that includes the
following: To be presented in electronic format (1) name, (2)
current or last known mailing address, (3) current or last known
email address, (4) current or last known telephone number, (5)
dates of employment, (6) employee identification number, if any,
and (7) the last four digits of their social security number.  

The Plaintiff also asks for job title and date of birth of the
putative Plaintiffs. He also claims that a follow-up email is
appropriate where putative plaintiffs do not respond to the initial
mailing.  

As an initial matter, Judge Slomsky grants the Plaintiff's request
for information regarding the putative Plaintiffs.  The Judge also
allows the Plaintiff's request to send a follow-up notice email to
the putative Plaintiffs who by the 14-day prior to close of
Court-Authorized Notice period do not respond to his initial
mailing.  

Second, the parties will meet and confer to finalize the language
of the Notice and Consent form.  The Plaintiff has submitted a
proposed Notice of Lawsuit, Second and Final Notice of Lawsuit, and
Consent to Join Collective Action.  In their Response, Defendants
do not contest the propriety of the documents.  After the
conference, the parties will submit the revised documents to the
Court for review before dissemination, after which the Court will
order the dissemination of the Notice.

Additionally, the Plaintiff requests that the potential putative
Plaintiff class be notified by first class mail, by posting the
Notice at each of the Defendants' locations where mason/laborer
putative Plaintiffs are employed, and by follow-up notice via
email.  The Judge grants the Plaintiff's request for Service of the
Notice via first class mail, posting of the Notice, and follow-up
notice via email.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Slomsky (i) granted the
Plaintiff's Motion for Conditional Certification, and (ii) granted
in part and denied in part the Plaintiff's Motion for Court
Facilitation of Court-Authorized Notice.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 31, 2020 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y3t5atgk from Leagle.com.


ATLANTIC CREDIT: Cooper Remanded for Lack of Jurisdiction Dismissal
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ERICA COOPER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ATLANTIC CREDIT
& FINANCE INC, a Virginia corporation, MIDLAND FUNDING LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company, Defendants-Appellees, Case No.
19-12177 (11th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit (i) vacated the dismissal of Cooper's class action
complaint against the Defendants-Appellees for failure to state a
claim; and (ii) remanded for the district court to dismiss the case
without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Cooper alleges that the Appellees violated the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act ("FDCPA") when they sent a second collection letter
that improperly "overshadowed" and/or "contradicted" the
statutorily required validation notice contained in the first
letter and that this constituted the use of unfair and
unconscionable means to collect a debt.  

In October 2017, Atlantic and Midland sent Cooper two letters as
part of their efforts to collect a debt Cooper owed on a credit
card issued by Synchrony Bank, which she used to pay for dental
services.  On Oct. 3, 2017, the Appellees sent the first letter,
which contained a FDCPA-required "validation notice."  Under the
FDCPA, a debt collector must include, within five days after the
initial communication with a consumer in connection with the
collection of any debt, a written notice of the consumer's right to
dispute the validity of the debt within 30 days after receipt of
the notice.  If the consumer exercises this right, the debt
collector must suspend its collection efforts pending a response to
the request for verification of the debt.  Also, during the 30-day
validation period, a debt collector may not engage in any
collection activities or communications which "overshadow" or are
inconsistent with the disclosure of the consumer's right to dispute
the debt.

Before the 30-day validation period expired, on Oct. 13, the
Appellees sent Cooper a second letter, telling her that Midland was
considering forwarding her account to an attorney in her state for
possible litigation.  The second letter gave her two payment
options to resolve the debt: (1) a one-time reduced repayment due
Oct. 31, 2017; and (2) biweekly payments as low as $25 until the
balance was paid in full.  The second letter said the payment
opportunities do not alter or amend her validation rights as
described in the previous letter to her.

In August 2018, Cooper filed the action.  The complaint alleged
that Atlantic and Midland violated 15 U.S.C. Section 1692g(b) by
sending the second letter, which improperly "overshadowed" and/or
"contradicted" the validation notice contained in the first letter,
and that their conduct constituted the use of "unfair" and
"unconscionable" means to collect a debt in violation of 15 U.S.C.
Section 1692f.  It further alleged that Atlantic and Midland's
conflicting collection demands left Cooper confused about her
statutory rights to dispute the debt and seek validation, as well
as whether she had the full 30 days to dispute the debt and demand
validation.

The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
claim under both provisions, but did not address whether Cooper had
Article III standing to bring suit, an issue that Atlantic and
Midland had not raised.  The timely appeal follows.

After careful review, the Eleventh Circuit finds that Cooper has
not alleged an injury-in-fact sufficient to confer standing.  The
essence of her injury, according to the complaint, is that Atlantic
and Midland's alleged violations of Sections 1692g and 1692f left
her "confused about her statutory rights to dispute the debt and
seek validation, as well as whether she had the full 30 days to
dispute the debt and demand validation. However, under the Court's
precedent, these allegations, absent something more, are
insufficient to establish that Cooper had standing to bring her
claim.

The Eleventh Circuit also finds that Cooper's alleged injuries are
just as inchoate, if not more so.  Cooper does not allege that,
without the purportedly confusing language in the second letter,
she would have disputed the debt or sought validation of the debt
within the 30-day validation period, that she had any doubt
regarding the validity of the debt, or that she would have accepted
one of the payment options in the second letter.  Nor does she
allege that she suffered any harm beyond the alleged statutory
violations, or that Atlantic and Midland ever made any further
attempts to collect the debt at issue any time after the Oct. 13,
2017 second letter, prior to the filing of the complaint in August
2018.  Indeed, Cooper talks only of her confusion without any
possible financial or legal consequences.

Further, Cooper's injury is much more attenuated.  Cooper does not
allege that her confusion about her statutory rights resulted in
her not disputing the debt, that her confusion would have resulted
in her utilizing one of the payment options in the second letter
despite the debt being invalid, that her confusion would have
resurrected any previously invalid debt, or that the confusion
would have resulted in any other negative consequences.

In short, Cooper does not allege any particularized injury; she
simply does not say she was affected in any meaningful way by the
letter.  All Cooper says, at most, is that she was confused, but in
this context, her asserted injury of confusion was "conjectural" or
"hypothetical," because she has not alleged any actual harms that
arose from her confusion. Without more, this asserted injury is
insufficient to confer standing.

The Eleventh Circuit is also unpersuaded by Cooper's argument that
because she is suing under the FDCPA, what she calls a private
attorney general statute, it should lower the standard she must
meet to demonstrate a concrete injury.  Cooper concedes that few
Courts considering Article III standing challenges for claims
brought pursuant to the FDCPA and other private attorney general
statutes recognize the significance of this.  In fact, Cooper has
not cited any controlling authority even hinting that "private
attorneys general" statutes require a reduced showing of Article
III injury.  Indeed, Spokeo itself involved a statute, the Fair
Credit Reporting Act of 1970, which courts have described as making
use of the "private attorneys general" concept.

Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's
holding to the extent it dismisses the complaint on the merits for
failure to state a claim, and remanded with instructions that the
district court reenters an order dismissing the case for want of
jurisdiction.

A full-text copy of the Eleventh Circuit's July 28, 2020 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yy5s4wph from Leagle.com.


ATM COLLECTION: Blind Users Can't Access Web Site, Romero Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
JOSUE ROMERO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. ATM COLLECTION INC., Defendant, Case No.
1:20-cv-07852-PGG (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 23, 2020), alleges violation of
the Americans with Disabilities Act.

The Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that the Defendant's Web
site, www.atmcollection.com, is not fully or equally accessible to
blind and visually-impaired consumers in violation of the ADA. The
Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a change in the
Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and procedures so that
the Defendant's website will become and remain accessible to blind
and visually-impaired consumers, including the Plaintiff.

ATM Collection Inc. is a full lifestyle collection of luxurious
sportswear for men and women. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

         Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
         COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
         300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Fl.
         Brooklyn, NY 11201
         Telephone: (929) 575-4175
         Facsimile: (929) 575-4195
         E-mail: Joseph@cml.legal


AURORA CANNABIS: Bragar Eagel Announces Class Action
----------------------------------------------------
Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C., a nationally recognized shareholder
rights law firm, announces that a class action lawsuit has been
filed in the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey on behalf of investors that purchased Aurora Cannabis, Inc.
(NYSE: ACB) securities between February 13, 2020 and September 4,
2020 (the "Class Period"). Investors have until December 1, 2020 to
apply to the Court to be appointed as lead plaintiff in the
lawsuit.

Aurora is headquartered in Edmonton, Canada. The Company produces
and distributes medical cannabis products worldwide. It is
vertically integrated and horizontally diversified across various
segments of the cannabis value chain, including facility
engineering and design, cannabis breeding, genetics research,
production, derivatives, high value-add product development, home
cultivation, wholesale, and retail distribution.

In 2018, the Canadian government approved the Cannabis Act, which
legalized and regulated the use of recreational cannabis. In
response to the statute's approval, and the corresponding surge of
the recreational cannabis industry, Aurora completed a series of
acquisitions to expand the Company's presence and increase its
distribution, including the Company's all-share purchase of the
Canadian medical cannabis producer MedReleaf for total
consideration of 3.2 billion Canadian dollars. Like many other
companies in the cannabis industry, however, the Company
encountered a variety of difficulties as the industry surged,
including, inter alia, overproduction, regulatory delays, and
competition from the black market.

On February 6, 2020,shortly before the start of the Class Period,
Aurora issued a press release announcing, inter alia, a "business
transformation plan," to "better align the business financially
with the current realities of the cannabis market in Canada while
maintaining a sustainable platform for long-term growth."
Specifically, the press release touted that the plan was "expected
to include significant and immediate decreases in selling, general
& administrative ("SG&A") expenses and capital investment plans."

On September 8, 2020, Aurora issued a press release "announc[ing]
an update on its business operations along with certain unaudited
preliminary fiscal fourth quarter 2020 results." Among other
things, Aurora announced that the Company expected to record up to
$1.8 billion in goodwill impairment charges in the fourth quarter
of 2020. The Company also announced that "previously announced
fixed asset impairment charges[ were] now expected to be up to $90
million, due to production facility rationalization, and a charge
of approximately $140 million in the carrying value of certain
inventory, predominantly trim, in order to align inventory on hand
with near term expectations for demand."

On this news, Aurora's stock price fell $0.99 per share, or 11.63%,
to close at $7.52 per share on September 8, 2020.

The complaint, filed on October 2, 2020, alleges that throughout
the Class Period defendants made materially false and misleading
statements regarding the Company's business, operational and
compliance policies. Specifically, defendants made false and/or
misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i) Aurora
had significantly overpaid for previous acquisitions and
experienced degradation in certain assets, including its production
facilities and inventory; (ii) the Company's purported "business
transformation plan" and cost reset failed to mitigate the
foregoing issues; (iii) accordingly, it was foreseeable that the
Company would record significant goodwill and asset impairment
charges; and (iv) as a result, the Company's public statements were
materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

If you purchased Aurora securities during the Class Period on an
American Exchange and suffered a loss, have information, would like
to learn more about these claims, or have any questions concerning
this announcement or your rights or interests with respect to these
matters, please contact Brandon Walker, Melissa Fortunato, or
Marion Passmore by email at investigations@bespc.com, telephone at
(212) 355-4648, or by filling out this contact form. There is no
cost or obligation to you.

                  About Bragar Eagel & Squire

Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C. is a nationally recognized law firm
with offices in New York and California. The firm represents
individual and institutional investors in commercial, securities,
derivative, and other complex litigation in state and federal
courts across the country. [GN]

AVIS BUDGET: Denial of Arbitration Bid in Celestin Suit Upheld
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANTHONY CELESTIN, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. AVIS BUDGET
GROUP, INC. and BUDGET RENT A CAR SYSTEM, INC.,
Defendants-Appellants, Case No. A-1279-19T1 (N.J. Super. App.
Div.), a two-judge panel of the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Appellate Division, affirmed the trial court's Oct. 30, 2019 order
denying the Defendants' motion to compel arbitration and stay the
Plaintiff's individual claims.

On Nov. 25, 2017, Plaintiff Celestin rented a car from Avis Budget
at a facility located in Allentown, Pennsylvania.  He lives in New
Jersey and the rental agreement stated that he would return the car
that same day to Budget's facility in Trenton, New Jersey.

Before the Plaintiff rented the car, he was shown a one-page rental
agreement, which he initialed and signed.  The agreement set forth
the estimated charges for the rental, which was $70.66.  At the
bottom of the rental agreement it stated he agrees the charges
listed are estimates and that he has reviewed and agreed to notices
and terms here and in the rental jacket.

After he signed the rental agreement, the Plaintiff was given a
rental jacket that contained a copy of the one-page rental
agreement and a multi-page document entitled, "Rental Terms and
Conditions."  That second document contained 32 paragraphs.
Paragraph 29 was labeled "Arbitration" and stated all disputes
between the Plaintiff and Budget, except as noted, would be
resolved in binding arbitration through the American Arbitration
Association.  The arbitration agreement is subject to the Federal
Arbitration Act.

It is undisputed that no representative of Budget reviewed the
terms and conditions or the arbitration provision with the
Plaintiff.  The Plaintiff also did not sign the terms and
conditions.  Indeed, there was no place for him to sign the terms
and conditions or the arbitration provision contained in those
terms and conditions.

The Plaintiff used the rental car for approximately three hours,
drove it to New Jersey, and dropped it off at Budget's facility in
Trenton.  Budget charged plaintiff $340.66, which included a $250
cleaning fee for smoking in the car.  The Plaintiff claimed he did
not smoke in the car and disputed that charge.  Budget, however,
would not remove the charge.

In January 2019, the Plaintiff filed a complaint in New Jersey
against the Defendants.  Thereafter, he amended his complaint and
asserted various claims, including breach of contract, and claims
under the Consumer Fraud Act, and the Truth-in-Consumer Contract,
Warranty and Notice Act.  In addition, the Plaintiff proposed that
his claims should be certified as a class action.

The Defendants responded by moving to compel arbitration and stay
the litigation.  They argued that Pennsylvania law governed the
question whether the parties had entered into a binding arbitration
agreement and whether the terms and conditions, including the
arbitration provision, were incorporated into the rental
agreement.

After hearing oral argument, on Oct. 30, 2019, the trial court
denied the Defendants' motion, explaining its ruling on the record
and issuing a memorializing order.  It held that there was no
conflict between New Jersey and Pennsylvania law and the
arbitration provision was not incorporated into the rental
agreement under the law of either state.  The court also reasoned
that, even if there was a conflict, New Jersey law governed and
under New Jersey law the arbitration provision was not incorporated
into the rental agreement.  Accordingly, the court held that there
was no mutually enforceable agreement to arbitrate and denied the
Defendants' motion.

On appeal, the Defendants make three arguments, contending that (1)
under New Jersey law, the arbitration provision was incorporated
into the rental agreement; (2) if there is a conflict, Pennsylvania
law governs; and (3) under Pennsylvania law, the Plaintiff agreed
to arbitrate because the arbitration provision was incorporated
into the rental agreement.

The Appellate Division rejects these arguments and holds that there
was no enforceable agreement to arbitrate.  It finds that there is
no substantive difference between Pennsylvania and New Jersey law
concerning incorporation by reference.  Applying either New Jersey
or Pennsylvania law to the material facts of the case, the terms
and conditions, including the arbitration provision, were not
incorporated into the rental agreement.  Accordingly, New Jersey
law governs.

The Appellate Division also holds that under Pennsylvania law, the
arbitration provision was not incorporated by reference into the
rental agreement that the Plaintiff signed.  To be incorporated by
reference under Pennsylvania law, the document must be reasonably
clear and ascertainable.  The Defendants did not identify or
describe the arbitration provision before handing it to the
Plaintiff after he signed the rental agreement.  Accordingly, the
arbitration provision was not reasonably clear or ascertainable
because it was never identified, reviewed, or explained to or by
the Plaintiff.

Finally, the Appellate Division holds that New Jersey law governs
the issue of whether there was a valid arbitration agreement and
whether the arbitration provision was incorporated into the rental
agreement.  The contract at issue was entered into in Pennsylvania,
but there were no negotiations.  The contract was then performed
both in Pennsylvania and in New Jersey when the Plaintiff drove the
rental car into New Jersey.  In that regard, the rental agreement
expressly recognized that the Plaintiff would return the car in
Trenton, New Jersey.  The Plaintiff is a citizen of New Jersey and
both the Defendants are incorporated in Delaware.  The key
determination, however, is that New Jersey has a strong interest in
protecting its consumers and has well-developed policies concerning
the enforceability of arbitration agreements.

In light of the foregoing, the Appellate Court affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Appellate Court's July 28, 2020 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yyl6f4p8 from Leagle.com.

Kim M. Watterson -- kwatterson@reedsmith.com -- (Reed Smith LLP) of
the Pennsylvania bar, admitted pro hac vice, argued the cause for
appellants (Reed Smith LLP, attorneys; Mark Fidanza --
mfidanza@reedsmith.com -- Kim M. Watterson, Jason E. Hazlewood --
jhazlewood@reedsmith.com -- (Reed Smith LLP) of the Pennsylvania
bar, admitted pro hac vice, and M. Patrick Yingling --
mpyingling@reedsmith.com -- (Reed Smith LLP) of the Pennsylvania
and Illinois bars, admitted pro hac vice, on the briefs).

Joseph A. Osefchen argued the cause for respondent (De Nittis
Osefchen and Prince PC, attorneys; Joseph A. Osefchen, Stephen P.
De Nittis and Shane T. Prince, on the brief).


B2C JEWELS: Blind Users Can't Access Web Site, Romero Claims
------------------------------------------------------------
JOSUE ROMERO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. B2C JEWELS, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:20-cv-07858-KPF (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 23, 2020), alleges violation of
the Americans with Disabilities Act.

The Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that the Defendant's Web
site, www.b2cjewels.com, is not fully or equally accessible to
blind and visually-impaired consumers in violation of the ADA. The
Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a change in the
Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and procedures so that
the Defendant's Web site will become and remain accessible to blind
and visually-impaired consumers, including the Plaintiff.

B2C Jewels, LLC is an online jewelry and diamond retailer. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

         Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
         COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
         300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Fl.
         Brooklyn, NY 11201
         Telephone: (929) 575-4175
         Facsimile: (929) 575-4195
         E-mail: Joseph@cml.legal


BAIDU INC: Vincent Wong Reminds of Class Action
-----------------------------------------------
The Law Offices of Vincent Wong announce that a class action has
commenced on behalf of certain shareholders of Baidu, Inc. If you
suffered a loss you have until the lead plaintiff deadline to
request that the court appoint you as lead plaintiff. There will be
no obligation or cost to you.

Baidu, Inc. (NASDAQ:BIDU)

If you suffered a loss, contact us at:
http://www.wongesq.com/pslra-1/baidu-inc-loss-submission-form-2?prid=9774&wire=1
Lead Plaintiff Deadline: October 19, 2020
Class Period: April 8, 2016 - August 13, 2020

Allegations against BIDU include that: (1) Baidu misrepresented the
financial and business condition of iQIYI; (2) iQIYI had inadequate
controls; and (3) as a result, Defendants' public statements were
materially false and/or misleading at all relevant times.

To learn more contact Vincent Wong, Esq. either via email
vw@wongesq.com or by telephone at 212.425.1140.

Vincent Wong, Esq. is an experienced attorney who has represented
investors in securities litigations involving financial fraud and
violations of shareholder rights. Attorney advertising. Prior
results do not guarantee similar outcomes. [GN]

BAYER HEALTHCARE: Bid to Dismiss First Amended Prescott Suit Denied
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, STEVEN PRESCOTT et al., Plaintiffs, v. BAYER
HEALTHCARE LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 20-cv-00102-NC (N.D.
Cal.), Magistrate Judge Nathanael M. Cousins of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California denied Defendants
Bayer HealthCare and Beiersdorf, Inc.'s motion to dismiss
Plaintiffs Prescott and Mike Xavier's first amended complaint.

In the putative class action lawsuit, the Plaintiffs accuse the
Defendants of misleading consumers by labeling their sunscreens as
"mineral-based" when the sunscreens contain active chemical
ingredient.  Defendants Bayer HealthCare and Beiersdorf
manufacture, market, label, and sell sunscreen lotions, including
the four products challenged in the lawsuit. Those products are the
Coppertone Water Babies Mineral-Based Sunscreen Lotion, Coppertone
Water Babies Mineral-Based Sunscreen Stick, Coppertone Kids
Mineral-Based Sunscreen Lotion, and the Coppertone Sport Face
Mineral-Based Sunscreen Lotion.  The front face of each sunscreen's
label claims that it is "mineral-based."

"Mineral-based" sunscreens are distinguished from "chemical-based"
sunscreens through the compounds used to absorb or deflect
ultraviolet radiation.  Some compounds commonly used as active
ingredients in sunscreens, such as zinc oxide and titanium dioxide,
are considered inorganic minerals.  Other common compounds commonly
used as active ingredients in sunscreens, such as octisalate and
octocrylene, are considered chemicals.  Each of the four challenged
products contain both mineral active ingredients and chemical
active ingredients.

Concerned about potential adverse health effects of chemical active
ingredients, Plaintiffs Prescott and Xavier sought out
"mineral-based" sunscreens.  Prescott purchased the Sports Lotion
after reading its "mineral-based" label and believing that the
sunscreen contained only mineral active ingredients.  Xavier
purchased both the Sports Lotion and the Kids Lotion for the same
reasons.  Both Prescott and Xavier allege that they would not have
purchased either product if they had known the products contained
chemical ingredients.

On May 15, 2020, the Plaintiffs filed their first amended class
action complaint alleging claims for (1) unlawful and unfair
business acts and practices; (2) deceptive advertising practices;
(3) violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act; (4) breach of
express warranty; and (5) unjust enrichment.

The Defendants now move to dismiss and to strike the nationwide
class allegations.  They first argue that the Food, Drugs, and
Cosmetics Act ("FDCA") expressly preempts the Plaintiffs' claims.
In Astiana v. Hain Celestial Group, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held
that the FDCA does not preempt state laws that allow consumers to
sue cosmetics manufacturers that label or package their products in
violation of federal standards.

The Plaintiffs' claims allege deception as a result of advertising
statements that contradicted the true ingredients listed on the
FDA-mandated label."  In particular, they contend that the
Defendants' use of the phrase "mineral-based" is contradicted by
the presence of allegedly significant chemical active ingredients.
And if their suit ultimately requires the Defendants to remove the
phrase "mineral-based" from their labels, such a result does not
conflict with the FDCA because FDA regulations do not require or
prohibit the use of phrase "mineral-based."  Instead, FDA
regulations generally prohibits claims that would be false and/or
misleading on sunscreen products.  

Thus, Magistrate Judge Cousins holds that the Plaintiffs' claim
that the Defendants mislead by calling their sunscreen is
"mineral-based" is in line with FDA regulations.  Accordingly, he
concludes that the Plaintiffs' claims are not preempted by the
FDCA's express preemption provision, and denies the Defendants'
motion to dismiss on preemption grounds.

The Defendants next argue that the Plaintiffs' lawsuit should be
dismissed or stayed under the primary jurisdiction doctrine pending
the FDA's proposed administrative order for sunscreen regulation
pursuant to the recently enacted Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
Economic Security Act ("CARES Act").  They also suggest that
primary jurisdiction is appropriate because the FDA is considering
further regulations regarding ingredient disclosures.

First, the Magistrate Judge finds that false advertising suits like
the instant one are squarely within the conventional experiences of
judges and courts.  Every day courts decide whether conduct is
misleading and the reasonable-consumer determination and other
issues involved in the Plaintiff's lawsuit are within the expertise
of the courts to resolve.  Second, contrary to the Defendants'
suggestion, the lawsuit does not involve technical or policy
considerations within the FDA's field of expertise.  Although the
Plaintiffs' complaint contains much rhetoric regarding chemical
active ingredients used in sunscreen lotions, the crux of their
lawsuit concerns whether the Defendants' description of their
products is misleading.  Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge
concludes that the primary jurisdiction doctrine is inappropriate
in the case and denies the Defendants' motion to dismiss on primary
jurisdiction grounds.

The Defendants raise two standing-related arguments for dismissal.
First, they contend that the two named Plaintiffs lack standing to
sue over two of the four contested products because they did not
purchase them.  Second, they argue that the Plaintiffs lack
standing to pursue injunctive relief.

The Magistrate Judge holds that while the challenged labels are not
identical, the essence of each label is the same: the product
claims to be "mineral-based."  If the Plaintiffs are correct and
reasonable consumers believe that the "mineral-based" descriptor
implies that all or substantially all of the active ingredients are
minerals, the misleading effect of all four labels are
substantially the same.  Thus, for the purposes of the motion to
dismiss, the Magistrate concludes that the Plaintiffs have
established standing.  Accordingly, he denies the Defendants'
motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims relating to the Water
Babies Lotion or Stick for lack of standing.

The Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs now have all the
information they require to avoid future misunderstanding about the
challenged products ingredients: "they need only review the label."
But it is not clear why the burden to avoid future
misunderstanding lies with the Plaintiffs and not the Defendants
when it is their actions that are allegedly unlawful.  After all,
if the ability to fully review a product label automatically
defeats standing for injunctive relief, it is difficult to imagine
any mislabeling and formulation case where injunctive relief would
be appropriate.  And the Ninth Circuit was not persuaded that
injunctive relief is never available for a consumer who learns
after purchasing a product that the label is false.  Accordingly,
the Magistrate Judge denies the Defendants' motion to dismiss for
lack of standing to pursue injunctive relief.

Turning to the merits, the Defendants next argue that the
Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged that the reasonable consumer
would find the phrase "mineral-based" to be false or misleading.
Because the Plaintiffs' claims all rely on the premise that the
Defendants' use of "mineral-based" is false or misleading, the
Defendants contend that each of the Plaintiffs' claims must be
dismissed.

The Magistrate Judge finds that the Plaintiffs have plausibly
alleged that the reasonable consumer may be misled by the
Defendants' use of the phrase "mineral-based."  Because the
Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' first, second, third,
fourth, and fifth claims all turn on whether the Plaintiffs have
adequately alleged deception, the Magistrate Judge denies the
Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' first, second, third,
fourth, and fifth claims for failure to allege deception.

In the alternative, the Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs'
CLRA claim must be dismissed for failure to provide sufficient
notice.  However, the Plaintiffs' amendment of their complaint
cures any defects with their CLRA notice.  Although some courts
dismiss CLRA claims with prejudice when the notice requirement is
not met, most courts in this district grant leave to amend with
liberality.  Indeed, Section 1782 explicitly provides for the
possibility of amendment.  The Plaintiffs' original complaint
clearly notifies both Defendants of the alleged violations and the
first amended complaint was filed more than 30 days after the
original complaint.  Both requirements in Section 1782(a) are
therefore satisfied.  

Finally, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs' class
allegations must be stricken because the class members' claims are
governed by the laws of their home states and variances in state
law predominate. Defendants also contend that the Plaintiffs lack
standing to bring claims on behalf of out-of-California class
members.  These arguments, however, are more appropriate at the
class certification stage.  The Magistarte therefore defers
decision on the Defendants' motion to strike until class
certification.

Based on the foregoing reasons, Magistrate Judge Cousins denied the
Defendants' motion to dismiss.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 31, 2020 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y2p9xrsl from Leagle.com.


BIOMARIN PHARMA: Gross Law Firm Announces Class Action
------------------------------------------------------
The securities litigation law firm of The Gross Law Firm issues the
following notice on behalf of shareholders of BioMarin
Pharmaceutical Inc. Shareholders who purchased shares in the
company during the dates listed are encouraged to contact the firm
regarding possible Lead Plaintiff appointment. Appointment as Lead
Plaintiff is not required to partake in any recovery.

BioMarin Pharmaceutical Inc. (NASDAQ:BMRN)

Investors Affected : February 28, 2020 - August 18, 2020

A class action has commenced on behalf of certain shareholders in
BioMarin Pharmaceutical Inc. The filed complaint alleges that
defendants made materially false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (i) differences between the Phase
1/2 and Phase 3 study of valoctocogene roxaparvovec, an
investigational adenoassociated virus gene therapy, limited the
reliability of the Phase 1/2 study to support valoctocogene
roxaparvovec's durability of effect; (ii) as a result, it was
foreseeable that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration would not
approve the Biologics License Application for valoctocogene
roxaparvovec without additional data; and (iii) as a result, the
Company's public statements were materially false and misleading at
all relevant times.

Shareholders may find more information at
https://securitiesclasslaw.com/securities/biomarin-pharmaceutical-inc-loss-submission-form/?id=9763&from=1

The Gross Law Firm is committed to ensuring that companies adhere
to responsible business practices and engage in good corporate
citizenship. The firm seeks recovery on behalf of investors who
incurred losses when false and/or misleading statements or the
omission of material information by a Company lead to artificial
inflation of the Company's stock. Attorney advertising. Prior
results do not guarantee similar outcomes. [GN]

BIOMARIN PHARMA: Howard G. Smith Reminds of Nov. 24 Deadline
------------------------------------------------------------
Law Offices of Howard G. Smith announces that a class action
lawsuit has been filed on behalf of investors who purchased
BioMarin Pharmaceuticals Inc. ("BioMarin" or the "Company")
(NASDAQ: BMRN) securities between February 28, 2020 and August 18,
2020 (the "Class Period"). BioMarin investors have until November
24, 2020 to file a lead plaintiff motion.

On August 19, 2020, the Company announced receipt of a Complete
Response Letter ("CRL") from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") regarding BioMarin's Biologics License Application ("BLA")
for valoctocogene roxaparvovec. Therein, the FDA determined that
the "differences between Study 270-201 (Phase 1/2) and the Phase 3
study limited its ability to rely on the Phase 1/2 study to support
durability of effect." As a result, the FDA recommended that
BioMarin "complete the Phase 3 Study and submit two-year follow-up
safety and efficacy data on all study participants."

On this news, BioMarin's stock price fell $41.82 per share, or 35%,
to close at $76.72 per share on August 19, 2020, thereby injuring
investors.

The complaint filed alleges that throughout the Class Period,
Defendants made materially false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose material adverse facts about the
Company's business, operations, and prospects. Specifically,
Defendants failed to disclose to investors that: (1) the
differences between the Phase 1/2 and Phase 3 study of
valoctocogene roxaparvovec limited the reliability of the Phase 1/2
study to support valoctocogene roxaparvovec's durability of effect;
(2) as a result, it was foreseeable that the FDA would not approve
the BLA for valoctocogene roxaparvovec without further data; and
(3) that, as a result of the foregoing, Defendants' positive
statements about the Company's busines, operations, and prospects
were materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

If you purchased BioMarin securities, have information or would
like to learn more about these claims, or have any questions
concerning this announcement or your rights or interests with
respect to these matters, please contact Howard G. Smith, Esquire,
of Law Offices of Howard G. Smith, 3070 Bristol Pike, Suite 112,
Bensalem, Pennsylvania 19020, by telephone at (215) 638-4847,
toll-free at (888) 638-4847, or by email to
howardsmith@howardsmithlaw.com, or visit our website at
www.howardsmithlaw.com.

This press release may be considered Attorney Advertising in some
jurisdictions under the applicable law and ethical rules.

         Howard G. Smith, Esquire
         Law Offices of Howard G. Smith
         Tel No: 215-638-4847
                 888-638-4847
         E-mail: howardsmith@howardsmithlaw.com [GN]

BLINK CHARGING: Pomerantz Law Firm Reminds of Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP announces that a class action lawsuit has been filed
against Blink Charging Company ("Blink" or the "Company") (NASDAQ:
BLNK) and certain of its officers. The class action, filed in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida,
and docketed under 20-cv-23643, is on behalf of a class consisting
of all persons other than Defendants who purchased or otherwise,
acquired Blinksecurities between March 6, 2020, and August 19,
2020, inclusive (the "Class Period"). This action is brought on
behalf of the Class for violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"), 15 U.S.C.
Sec. 78j(b) and 78t(a) and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the
SEC, 17 C.F.R. Section 240.10b-5.

If you are a shareholder who purchased Blink securities during the
class period, you have until October 23, 2020, to ask the Court to
appoint you as Lead Plaintiff for the class.  A copy of the
Complaint can be obtained at www.pomerantzlaw.com.   To discuss
this action, contact Robert S. Willoughby at
rswilloughby@pomlaw.com or 888.476.6529 (or 888.4-POMLAW),
toll-free, Ext. 7980. Those who inquire by e-mail are encouraged to
include their mailing address, telephone number, and the number of
shares purchased.

According to its most recent Annual Report filed on Form 10-K with
the SEC, Blink purports to be "a leading owner, operator, and
provider of" electric vehicle ("EV") "charging equipment and
networked charging services. Blink offers both residential and
commercial EV charging equipment, enabling EV drivers to easily
recharge at various location types."

Recently, Blink has touted the purported growth of its EV charging
network, asserting that "drivers can easily charge at any of
[Blink's] 15,000 charging stations." Over the last several months,
Blink's stock price has climbed from trading between approximately
$1.40 to $3.12 per share to an intraday high of $14.58 per share on
July 30, 2020.

The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and misleading statements regarding the
Company's business. Specifically, Defendants made false and/or
misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i) many of
Blink's charging stations are damaged, neglected, non-functional,
inaccessible, or non-accessible; (ii) Blink's purported
partnerships and expansions with other companies were overstated;
(iii) the purported growth of the Company's network has been
overstated; and (iv) as a result, the Company's public statements
were materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

Culper continued to detail that of the 242 stations its
investigators visited in the Atlanta, Chicago, Miami, and San Diego
metro areas, twenty-three times (9.5% of total), Blink's map
claimed that there were chargers onsite, but Culper's investigators
were either unable to locate the chargers or locate all of the
chargers claimed. In thirty-nine cases (16.1% of total), Culper's
investigators "found chargers that, even though they existed, were
visibly damaged and/or non-functional," and that "[a]s many of
these chargers have been left to the elements for close to a
decade, the most common deformities were due to sun and heat
damage." Furthermore, in another eighteen cases (7.4% of total),
Culper's investigators "found that chargers were inaccessible to
the general public," and that "[m]any of these were behind locked
garages, or restricted only for employee (in office buildings) or
resident (in condo or apartment buildings) use only." Culper
concluded: "In short, our sampling suggests that of the 3,275
chargers listed on the Company's map, only 67% of these, or 2,192
exist, are functional, and are publicly accessible."

The Culper report included photos, from multiple locations, of
Blink chargers that were severely damaged, inaccessible, and/or
non-functional. It also included details of interviews with parking
attendants and other locals who described the lack of use and/or
other issues experienced with the Blink chargers.

Also on August 19, 2020, analyst Mariner Research Group ("Mariner")
published another report that was highly critical of Blink. Mariner
wrote that Blink's "revenue growth has significantly seriously
lagged the EV industry -- yet CEO Farkas made >$7M in
compensation during this period. We believe that this is due to
persistent issues around product quality, customer churn, and user
experience, and believe that these issues will continue to hamper
[Blink]'s growth."

Mariner concluded: "[W]e believe the business should be valued at
its liquidation, or book value, of just 17c in a downside scenario
and at $2 a share in a bull case scenario . . . . The average of
our price targets produces a base case target of $1.09, a drop of
91% from the 8/18/20 close."

On this news, Blink's stock price fell from its August 18, 2020
closing price of $10.23 per share to an August 20, 2020 closing
price of $7.94 per share. This represents a two day drop of
approximately 22.4%. Indeed, the intraday price on August 20, 2020
reached as low as $6.42 per share.

The Pomerantz Firm, with offices in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles,
and Paris is acknowledged as one of the premier firms in the areas
of corporate, securities, and antitrust class litigation. Founded
by the late Abraham L. Pomerantz, known as the dean of the class
action bar, the Pomerantz Firm pioneered the field of securities
class actions. Today, more than 80 years later, the Pomerantz Firm
continues in the tradition he established, fighting for the rights
of the victims of securities fraud, breaches of fiduciary duty, and
corporate misconduct. The Firm has recovered numerous
multimillion-dollar damages awards on behalf of class members. See
www.pomerantzlaw.com.

         Robert S. Willoughby
         Pomerantz LLP
         E-mail: rswilloughby@pomlaw.com [GN]

BRASKEM SA: Zhang Investor Law Reminds of Class Action
------------------------------------------------------
Zhang Investor Law announces a class action lawsuit on behalf of
shareholders who bought shares of Braskem S.A. (: BAK) between May
6, 2020 and July 8, 2020, inclusive (the "Class Period"). The
lawsuit seeks to recover investor losses under the federal
securities laws.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court
before the OCTOBER 26, 2020 DEADLINE. A lead plaintiff is a
representative party acting on behalf of other class members in
directing the litigation.

To join the class action, go to
http://zhanginvestorlaw.com/join-action-form/?slug=braskem-s-a&id=2374
or call Sophie Zhang, Esq. toll-free at 800-991-3756 or email
info@zhanginvestorlaw.com for information on the class action.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: 1) Braskem's salt mining operations were unsafe and presented
a significant danger to surrounding areas, including nearly two
thousand properties; (2) the foregoing foreseeably increased the
risk that Braskem would be subjected to remedial liabilities,
including, but not limited to, increased governmental and/or
regulatory oversight or enforcement, significant monetary and
reputational damage, and/or the permanent closure of one or more of
its salt mining operations; (3) accordingly, earnings generated
from Braskem's salt mining operations were unsustainable; (4)
Braskem downplayed the true scope and severity of the Company's
liability with respect to its salt mining operations; and (5) as a
result, the Company's public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times. When the true details entered the
market, the lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.

Lead plaintiff status is not required to seek compensation. You may
retain counsel of your choice. You may remain an absent class
member and take no action at this time.

Zhang Investor Law represents investors worldwide. Attorney
Advertising. Prior results do not guarantee similar outcomes. [GN]

BRIGHT FLOORING: Faces Cedeno FLSA Suit Over Abrupt Termination
---------------------------------------------------------------
ANTHONY CEDENO, Plaintiff v. BRIGHT FLOORING DESIGNERS CORP. and
NELSON MARTINEZ ENCISO, Defendants, Case No. CACE-20-017163 (Fla.
Cir., 17th Judicial, Broward Cty., October 15, 2020) is brought on
behalf of the Plaintiff and those similarly situated against the
Defendants for their alleged wrongful, retaliatory discharge
conduct in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as an assistant.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff suffered a work-related
injury on or about October 3, 2020 that was caused by a car
accident due to the lack of functioning seatbelt of the Defendants'
vehicle. The Plaintiff reported his injury to the Defendants and
requested for a medical treatment. However, the Defendants
terminated the Plaintiff on or about October 6, 2020.

Bright Flooring Designers Corp. is a licensed and insured flooring
company owned and operated by Nelson Martinez Enciso. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Tanesha Blye, Esq.
          Aron Smukler, Esq.
          R. Martin Saenz, Esq.
          SAENZ & ANDERSON, PLLC
          20900 NE 30th Ave., Ste. 800
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Tel: (305) 503-5131
          Fax: (888) 270-5549
          E-mail: tblye@saenzaderso.com
                  asmukler@saenzanderson.com
                  msaenz@saenzanderson.com


BUDGET VAN: Loses Bid to Dismiss Caplan TCPA Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHAEL CAPLAN, Plaintiff(s), v. BUDGET VAN LINES,
INC., Defendant(s), Case No. 2:20-CV-130 JCM (VCF) (D. Nev.), Judge
James C. Mahan of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Nevada denied (i) Budget's motion to dismiss Caplan's complaint,
and (ii) Budget's motion to strike the class allegations from
Caplan's complaint.

The putative class action arises from a dispute over a series of
electronic communications.  Caplan was a resident of Jupiter,
Florida, preparing to move to Knoxville, Tennessee.  To prepare for
his move, he sought out quotes for movers and found Budget.  Budget
is a broker who provides quotes for various moving services.
Caplan visited Budget's website and at least partially completed a
form to compile quotes for moving services. He alleges that he
never submitted the form to Budget.

Soon after, Caplan received an allegedly prerecorded voicemail in
which "Jeff with Budget Van Lines" solicited him to contact Budget
for more information about moving services.  He received another
similar voicemail two days later.  Through online research, Caplan
discovered that other individuals reported receiving identical
voicemail messages.  Caplan now alleges these voicemail messages
were violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA").


Presently before the Court is Budget's motion to dismiss and its
motion to strike the class allegations from Caplan's complaint.
Caplan has replied to both motions.

There are two salient issues in the motion to dismiss.  First, is
whether Caplan has standing to bring the claim.  Second is whether
ringless voicemail messages ("RVMs") are "calls" under the TCPA.
Budget argues that the court should dismiss Caplan's claims because
Caplan consented to receiving the calls, therefore negating the
injury-in-fact required for Article III standing.  Caplan
challenges that factual assertion by claiming he did not consent.

Judge Mahan holds that the FCC has previously extended the TCPA's
coverage to include internet-to-phone text messaging, finding that
a focus on the means used to initiate the communication would
elevate form over substance, thwart Congressional intent that
evolving technologies not deprive mobile customers of the TCPA's
protections, and potentially open a floodgate of unwanted text
messages to wireless customer.  He finds that the TCPA is
applicable to RVMs for the same reason.  Focusing on the method of
delivery, as Budget would have the Court do, elevates form over
substance.  At bottom, RVMs are still a nuisance delivered to the
recipient's phone by means of the phone number.  RVMs are calls as
defined by the TCPA.  The Judge therefore denied Budget's motion to
dismiss.

In the alternative, Budget moves to strike the class allegations
from Caplan's complaint on the grounds of overbreadth and Caplan's
inadequacy as a class representative.  Caplan's proposed class
extends to people in an identical factual scenario.  The proposed
class fits within the same theory of legal liability Caplan
advances himself.  Therefore, the Court will not exercise its
discretion to strike the class definition on the grounds of
overbreadth.

To the extent the Budget's motion does not rely on argument from
its motion to dismiss, it relies on argument that the class cannot
be certified under Rule 23.  A motion to strike class allegations
at the pleading stage is not the proper procedural vehicle to
eliminate those claims.  It is the functional equivalent of denying
a motion to certify a case as a class action.  Budget can raise
these arguments regarding Caplan's adequacy as a class
representative in response to Caplan's inevitable Rule 23 motion.
For these reasons, the Judge denied Budget's motion to strike.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 31, 2020 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yxob2p4e from Leagle.com.


CANADIAN MEDICAL: Byer Clinic et al. Sue Over Unsolicited Fax Ads
-----------------------------------------------------------------
BYER CLINIC OF CHIROPRATIC, LTD., an Illinois corporation, and ERIC
B. FROMER CHIROPRACTIC, INC., a California corporation,
individually and as the representatives of a class of
similarly-situated persons, Plaintiffs v. CANADIAN MEDICAL DIST
INC. a/k/a MEDYKITS, a Canadian corporation, Defendant, Case No.
1:20-cv-06210 (N.D. Ill., October 20, 2020) is a class action
complaint brought against the Defendant for its alleged unlawful
practice of sending unsolicited advertisements by facsimile in
violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

The Plaintiffs claim that they received unsolicited fax
advertisements from the Defendant even without providing their
prior express invitation or permission to the Defendant to send the
faxes.

The Plaintiffs suffered damages as a result of the Defendant's
unwanted faxes, which caused them to lose paper and toner consumed,
occupied their telephone lines and fax machines, wasted their time,
intruded into their seclusion, and violated their right to privacy,
the suit says.

Canadian Medical Dist Inc. a/k/a Medykits provides various personal
protection products. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Ryan M. Kelly, Esq.
          ANDERSON + WANCA
          3701 Algonquin Road, Suite 500
          Rolling Meadows, IL 60008
          Tel: (847) 368-1500
          Fax: (847) 368-1501
          E-mail: rkelly@andersonwanca.com


CARVERTISE INC: Faces Kostakis Suit Over Unsolicited Text Messages
------------------------------------------------------------------
GEORGE KOSTAKIS, individually and as the representative of a class
of similarly-situated persons, Plaintiff v. CARVERTISE, INC., a
Delaware corporation, Defendant, Case No. 1:20-cv-06162 (N.D. Ill.,
October 16, 2020) is a class action complaint brought against the
Defendant for its alleged violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.

The Plaintiff claims that the Defendant sent a text message on his
personal cellular telephone on or about October 6, 2020 in attempt
to promote its products or services. The Defendant allegedly used
an automatic telephone dialing system (ATDS) in transmitting its
message without obtaining the Plaintiff's prior express written
consent to transmit any advertisement or telemarketing messages to
his cellular telephone.

The Plaintiff incurred expenses to his wireless service, wasted
data storage capacity, and suffered the nuisance, waste of time,
aggravation, intrusion upon his seclusion, and invasion of privacy
as a result of receiving the Defendant's unsolicited text message,
the suit says.

Carvertise, Inc. is an advertising/marketing company. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ryan M. Kelly, Esq.
          ANDERSON + WANCA
          3701 Algonquin Road, Suite 500
          Rolling Meadows, IL 60008
          Tel: (847) 368-1500
          Fax: (847) 368-1501
          E-mail: rkelly@andersonwanca.com


CDM FEDERAL: Faces Ali Suit Over Failure to Pay Overtime Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
DONALD ALI, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. CDM FEDERAL PROGRAMS CORPORATION and CDM
SMITH INC., Defendants, Case No. 1:20-cv-05008 (E.D.N.Y., October
19, 2020) brings this collective action complaint against the
Defendants for their alleged failure to pay their employees for all
hours worked in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
and the New York Labor Law (NYLL).

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants from approximately
September 2016 to approximately July 2020.

According to the complaint, the Defendants classified the Plaintiff
as a W-2 employee and paid him on an hourly basis. Although the
Plaintiff regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per week, the
Defendants denied him of his lawfully earned overtime at the rate
of one and one-half times his regular rate of pay as required by
the FLSA and NYLL. The Defendants, instead, paid him straight time
without overtime, the suit says.

CDM Federal Programs Corporation and CDM Smith Inc. provide natural
disaster relief services. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ricardo J. Prieto, Esq.
          Melinda Arbuckle, Esq.
          SHELLIST LAZARS SLOBIN LLP
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1515
          Houston, TX 77046
          Tel: (713) 621-2277
          Fax: (713) 621-0993
          E-mail: rprieto@eeoc.net
                  marbuckle@eeoc.net

                - and –

          Carlo A. C. e Oliveira, Esq.
          COOPER ERVING & SAVAGE LLP
          39 North Pearl St., Fourth Floor
          Albany, NY 12207
          Tel: (518) 449-3900
          Fax: (518) 432-3111
          E-mail: Cdeoliveira@coopererving.com


CDM FEDERAL: Fails to Pay Proper OT to Staff, Batiste Suit Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
HORACE BATISTE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. CDM FEDERAL PROGRAMS CORPORATION; and CDM
SMITH INC., Defendants, Case No. 3:20-cv-01497 (D.P.R., Sept. 23,
2020) is an action against the Defendants' failure to pay the
Plaintiff and the class overtime compensation for hours worked in
excess of 40 hours per week.

The Plaintiff Batiste was employed by the Defendants as staff.

Cdm Federal Programs Corporation provides engineering and
construction services. The Company offers lasting and integrated
solutions in water, environment, transportation, energy, and
facilities. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ricardo J. Prieto, Esq.
          Melinda Arbuckle, Esq.
          SHELLIST LAZARZ SLOBIN LLP
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1515
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 621-2277
          Facsimile: (713) 621-0993
          E-mail: rprieto@eeoc.net
                  marbuckle@eeoc.net

               - and -

          Enrique J. Mendoza Mendez, Esq.
          MENDOZA LAW OFFICES
          P.O. Box 9282
          San Juan, PR 00908-0282
          Telephone: (787) 722-5522
          Facsimile: (787) 723-7057
          E-mail: mendozalo@yahoo.com


CELL NATION: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Aribou et al. Claim
-----------------------------------------------------------
SHAYMAA ARIBOU; NESTOR ALVARADO; ARMANDO HERRERA; and ERIKA
HERRERA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. FARID SULEIMAN; MOHAMMAD SULEIMAN; ALI
SULEIMAN; CELL NATION OF 77 INC.; CELL NATION OF AUSTIN, INC.; CELL
NATION OF JAMAICA INC.; CELL NATION OF FULTON CORP.; FLATBUSH CELL
INC.; and JOHN DOES 1 – 30, Defendants, Case No. 1:20-cv-04511
(E.D.N.Y., Sept. 23, 2020) seeks to recover from the Defendants
unpaid wages and overtime compensation, interest, liquidated
damages, attorneys' fees, and costs under the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants as store clerks.

Cell Nation of 77 Inc. owns and operates a cellular telephone store
in Brooklyn, New York. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Mohammed Gangat, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF MOHAMMED GANGAT
          675 3rd Avenue, Suite 1810
          Telephone: (718) 669-0714
          E-mail: mgangat@gangatllc.com


COLONIAL PARKING: $1.95MM Deal in Abraha Gets Prelim. Approval
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BERTHE BENYAM ABRAHA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. COLONIAL
PARKING, INC., et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 16-680 (CKK)
(D. D.C.), Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly of the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia granted the Plaintiffs' Unopposed
Motion for Entry of an Order Preliminarily Approving a Settlement
and Conditionally Certifying a Settlement Class.

The proposed class action against Defendants Colonial and FCE
Benefit Administrators, Inc., arises under the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") in relation to two
employee benefit plans.  The Plaintiff's Amended Complaint asserts
five claims.  The principal claim is that the fees paid to FCE from
the Forge Company Health and Welfare Plan were done under an
arrangement that is prohibited under ERISA sections 406(a)(1)(D)
and 406(b).  The Plaintiffs further claim that the fiduciaries did
not act solely within the interests of the participants or
prudently pursuant to ERISA section 404.

The Plaintiffs also assert three claims relating to the DUB
accounts maintained within the ACEC-MW Health and Welfare Plan.
First is that the Defendants violated ERISA sections 404, 405, and
406 with respect to the investment of the assets in the ACEC Plan
that allegedly generated earnings that were credited to the DUB
benefit balances of the Plaintiffs.  Second, they claim that the
Defendants violated ERIA sections 404 and 405 by not allocating the
ACEC Plan's surplus assets to the DUB accounts of the Plaintiffs.
Third, the Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants violated ERISA
sections 404, 405, and 406 in connection with deductions for a
"Trust Tax" that were taken from distributions made to the
Plaintiffs from the ACEC Plan.

The Plaintiffs next allege that the Defendants violated ERISA
sections 404, 405, and 406 by reducing the DUB balances of 18
participants who elected dependent health coverage from 2007
through 2009.  They lastly assert that the surplus assets in the
Forge Plan should be distributed to them.

On April 12, 2016, the Plaintiffs filed their original Complaint
against the Defendants as a class action alleging breaches of
fiduciary duty in direct violation of ERISA.  In November 2017, the
Plaintiffs filed their first Motion for Class Certification, which
was opposed by both Defendants.  In April 2018, the Court denied
the motion without prejudice and allowed the Plaintiffs to amend
the Complaint.

In August 2019, the parties informed the Court that the Plaintiffs'
renewed Motion for Class Certification would be unopposed, and on
Dec. 6, 2019, the Court was informed that the parties reached a
settlement in principle.  On Dec. 13, 2019, the Court denied the
Unopposed Motion for Class Certification, again without prejudice,
and ordered that the parties seek class certification together with
the proposed settlement agreement.  On Jan. 24, 2020, the
Plaintiffs filed the pending motion, seeking an order from the
Court to preliminarily approve the proposed settlement and
conditionally certify the class action as a settlement class.

The parties have submitted their proposed settlement to the Court.
The Settlement Agreement contemplates that a non-opt-out class will
be certified pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a),
23(b)(1), and 23(e).  The proposed class is defined as: Individuals
who participated in the Forge Company Health and Welfare plan who
also received a DUB Benefit distribution between Oct. 1, 2006 and
Dec. 31, 2015.  The parties have identified 119 persons in the
proposed class.

As for monetary consideration, the Settlement Agreement provides
for a Settlement Fund with approximately $1.95 million.  This
breaks down into three separate payments.  First, the Defendants
will pay $1.65 million in cash.  Second, Trust Management Services
("TMS"), the current trustee of the Forge Plan, will deposit the
remaining surplus of the assets in the Forge Plan, which totals
approximately $90,000.  Lastly, TMS will also deposit the remaining
surplus in the ACEC Plan, which totals approximately $200,000.
Payment from the Defendants would be sent within ten business days
after the entry of the Court's Order preliminarily approving the
Settlement Agreement, while TMS would send its payments within 10
business days after the Effective Date of Settlement.

The Class Counsel are not seeking any attorney's fees and seek only
reimbursement of out of pocket costs of approximately $70,000 as
well as Incentive Awards to the four Named Plaintiffs of $15,000
each.  The Defendants do not oppose expense reimbursements to the
Class Counsel as long as they do not exceed $70,000 and do not
oppose Incentive Awards of up to $15,000 for each of the four Named
Plaintiffs.

Under the Settlement Agreement, after these administrative expenses
are distributed, the remaining funds are distributed under the Plan
of Allocation, which has two stages.  The first would involve
distribution of $99,116.69 to 18 Settlement Class members whose DUB
benefits were allegedly reduced because they elected health
insurance coverage for their spouse or children between 2007 and
2009.  The second stage is the distribution of the remaining funds,
approximately $1.8 million, which will be distributed based on the
total hours worked by each Settlement Class Member at the relevant
facility.

The Settlement Agreement further provides for releases by, and
among, the parties.  Under the Settlement Agreement, the Plaintiffs
would release the "Released Parties" from the "Released Claims."

Judge Kollar-Kotelly's Memorandum Opinion proceeds in three parts.
First, having determined that the requirements of both Rule 23(a)
and Rule 23(b)(3) are satisfied, and with the consent of the
parties, the Judge certifies the Plaintiff class for settlement
purposes.  She appoints Edward Scallet and Susan Baron as class
counsel at this time pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(g).

Second, the Judge preliminarily approves of the proposed class
settlement as fair, adequate, reasonable, and not the product of
collusion.  She finds that the proposed settlement was the result
of extensive arm's-length negotiations between the parties and a
process that was thorough, adversarial, and professional.  The
settlement falls within the range of fair, adequate and reasonable
settlements for the purposes of preliminary approval.  It comes at
the appropriate time in the action.  The Judge will determine
whether to grant final approval of the settlement after considering
any class member objections and holding a fairness hearing.

Third, the Judge approves of the proposed notice to be sent to the
class members and schedules a hearing on the fairness of the
proposed settlement.  She finds that the proposed notice is
sufficient and orders that it be provided to all the class members.
The proposed a manner for providing the notice is reasonable.

The Class Counsel will cause the Class Notice to be disseminated to
the Settlement Class Members in the manner set forth in the
Preliminary Approval Order.  The Class Notice will be mailed to the
members of the Settlement Class at the last known addresses.  The
Defendants will use good faith, reasonable efforts to provide such
last known addresses, as well as social security numbers, to the
Settlement Administrator but otherwise will bear no responsibility
for the distribution of the Class Notice.  The Class Counsel also
will cause the Class Notice to be published on the website
identified in the Class Notice.

Based on the foregoing reasons, Judge Kollar-Kotelly granted the
Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Entry of an Order Preliminarily
Approving a Settlement and Conditionally Certifying a Settlement
Class.  She conditionally certified the Plaintiff class for
settlement purposes, appointed the Plaintiffs' counsel as the class
counsel, preliminarily approved of the class settlement, approved
of the agreed-upon notice to potential class members of the
proposed settlement, and set a final approval hearing on the
fairness of the settlement as outlined in her accompanying Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 31, 2020 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yyfqn2tg from Leagle.com.


COMCAST CORP: Faces Be ERISA Suit Over Denied Insurance Claim
-------------------------------------------------------------
SU BE, individually, and on behalf of all those similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. COMCAST CORPORATION and MAGELLAN HEALTH SERVICES,
INC., Defendants, Case No. 1:20-cv-08571 (S.D.N.Y., October 14,
2020) is a class action complaint filed by the Plaintiff to
challenge the Defendants' unlawful practice that violated the
Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act, which is
incorporated into the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA).

The Plaintiff worked at the company that was eventually owned by
Comcast, and so her health insurance was provided by Defendant
Comcast through a COBRA plan covering employees and plan
participants and their beneficiaries.

According to the complaint, the Comcast COBRA plan coverage will
only pay benefits for medically necessary services or supplies that
covered health services, mental health services and substance use
disorder services. Covered inpatient mental health services include
lodging and dietary services, physician, psychologist, nurse,
counselor and trained staff services, family, group and individual
therapy and counseling, partial hospitalization, and facility-based
day/night care.

The services at issue were incurred by the Plaintiff's daughter,
whose initials are So Be, who was diagnosed with mental disorders
by the time she was 14 and was enrolled as an inpatient at a
wilderness therapy program as recommended by her caregivers after
her continued suicide ideation. Subsequently, the Plaintiff
submitted her coverage claim to Defendant Comcast. However, she
received an explanation of benefits form under Defendant Magellan
letterhead indicating that her insurance was denied.

Comcast Corporation is a broadcasting and cable television
company.

Magellan Health, Inc. is a for-profit managed health care company.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Amanda Peterson, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
          90 Broad Street, Suite 1011
          New York, NY 10004
          Tel: (212) 564-4568
          E-mail: apeterson@forthepeople.com

                - and –

          Robert R. Sparks, Esq.
          STRAUSS TROY O., LPA
          150 E. Fourth Street, 4th Floor
          Cincinnati, OH 45202
          Tel: (513) 621-2120
          E-mail: rrsparks@strausstroy.com

                - and –

          Jordan Lewis, Esq.
          JORDAN LEWIS, P.A.
          4473 N.E. 11th Avenue
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33334
          Tel: (954) 616-8995
          E-mail: jordan@jml-lawfim.com


CONTRACTED MEDICAL: Court Denies Class Certification of Snyder Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOANNA M. SNYDER and JENNIFER DONAHUE, v. CONTRACTED
MEDICAL FOR THE DOC, et al, Civil Action No. 20-10226-RGS (D.
Mass.), Judge Richard G. Stearns of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Massachusetts denied (i) the motions by Elba Morales,
Nikki Piazza, Tonicia Goodwin, Wendy Filkins, Caroline McDonough,
Diane Farley and Justina Talbot to join the lawsuit; (ii) the
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification; and (iii) the
Plaintiffs' motion for appointment of counsel.

The prisoner civil rights action was initiated by Snyder and
Donahue, both inmates in custody at MCI-Framingham.  On June 12,
2020, the Plaintiffs filed motions for class certification and
appointment of counsel.  At that time, the following seven inmates
at MCI-Framingham filed motions to join the lawsuit: Morales,
Piazza, Goodwin, Filkins, McDonough, Farley and Talbot.

While the Plaintiffs' claims may implicate common questions of law,
Movants Morales, Piazza, Goodwin, Filkins, McDonough, Farley and
Talbot interacted at different times with some of the Defendants
regarding their own particular concerns.  Not every Plaintiff had
contact with every Defendant and the claims do not "necessarily
arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences."  The similarities do not convert each
Movant's claims into claims arising from the same transaction or
series of transactions or occurrences.  Should the Defendants
assert defenses in the case based on the failure exhaust
administrative remedies, the Plaintiffs' response to those defenses
would likely require different proof for each Plaintiff.  Thus,
Stearns denied the motions filed by the Movants.

In their motion for class certification, the Plaintiffs assert that
there are too many potential Plaintiffs to join the action pursuant
to Rule 20(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  As a
general rule an individual appearing pro se may not represent other
individuals in federal court, and courts have routinely denied a
prisoner's request to represent a class of prisoners without the
assistance of counsel.

Each of the two Plaintiffs who signed the amended complaint appears
pro se in the action, and neither of them is an attorney admitted
to the Bar of the Court.  The pro se Plaintiffs cannot adequately
represent the interests of the class they have identified.
Accordingly, the motion to certify a class is denied.

Finally, under 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(e)(1), exceptional
circumstances are shown when the denial of appointed counsel will
result in fundamental unfairness impinging on a litigant's due
process rights.  In determining whether there are exceptional
circumstances sufficient to warrant the appointment of counsel, a
court must examine the total situation, focusing on the merits of
the case, the complexity of the legal issues, and the litigants'
ability to represent themselves.  In the case, it does not appear
that exceptional circumstances that would justify the appointment
of counsel exist.  Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' motion for
appointment of counsel is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 31, 2020 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yyyqn7pt from Leagle.com.


COPPERAS COVE: Cox Sues Over Unpaid Overtime for Nursing Aides
--------------------------------------------------------------
The case, TINISHA COX, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. COPPERAS COVE LTC PARTNERS, INC.
and CENTURY REHABILITATION OF TEXAS, LLC, Defendants, Case No.
6:20-cv-00971 (W.D. Tex., October 16, 2020) arises from the
Defendants' alleged violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff was originally employed by Defendant Copperas Cove as
a certified nursing assistant (CAN) and then she was subsequently
jointly employed by Century Rehabilitation as a restorative aide.

The Plaintiff asserts that Century Rehabilitation frequently forced
her to work off the clock, frequently cut her hours to keep her
hours below 40 hours per week, and simply ignored her complaints
about their unlawful practices. Additionally, the Defendants
refused to combine the hours she worked for both Defendants each
week for overtime purposes even though both jointly employed her.
As a result, despite consistently working well over 40 hours per
week, the Plaintiff was not properly compensated for her lawfully
earned overtime pursuant to the FLSA.

Copperas Cove LTC Partners, Inc. and Century Rehabilitation of
Texas, LLC offer long-term care and rehabilitation services.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Douglas B Welmaker, Esq.
          MORELAND VERRETT, PC
          700 West Summit Dr.
          Wimberly, TX 78676
          Tel: (512) 782-0567
          Fax: (512) 782-0605
          E-mail: doug@morelandlaw.com


COSTCO WHOLESALE: Consolidated Opioid-Related Litigation Ongoing
----------------------------------------------------------------
Costco Wholesale Corporation said in its Form 10-K report filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal
year ended August 30, 2020, that the company continues to defend a
consolidated class action suit entitled, In re National
Prescription Opiate Litigation (MDL No. 2804) (N.D. Ohio).

In December 2017, the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation consolidated numerous cases concerning the impacts of
opioid abuses filed against various defendants by counties, cities,
hospitals, Native American tribes, third-party payors, and others.


Included are federal cases that name the Company, including actions
filed by counties and cities in Michigan, New Jersey, Oregon,
Virginia and South Carolina, a third-party payor in Ohio, and class
actions filed on behalf of infants born with opioid-related medical
conditions in 40 states, and class actions and individual actions
filed on behalf of individuals seeking to recover alleged increased
insurance costs associated with opioid abuse in 43 states and
American Samoa.

In 2019, similar actions were commenced against the Company in
state court in Utah. Claims against the Company in state courts in
New Jersey, Oklahoma, and Arizona have been dismissed.

The Company is defending all of these matters.

Costco Wholesale Corporation, together with its subsidiaries,
operates membership warehouses. It offers branded and private-label
products in a range of merchandise categories. The company was
formerly known as Costco Companies, Inc. Costco Wholesale
Corporation was founded in 1976 and is based in Issaquah,
Washington.


COSTCO WHOLESALE: Continues to Defend Martinez Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
Costco Wholesale Corporation said in its Form 10-K report filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal
year ended August 30, 2020, that the company continues to defend a
class action suit entitled, Martinez v. Costco Wholesale Corp.
(Case No. 3:19-cv-05624; N.D. Cal.; filed June 11, 2019).

In June 2019, an employee filed a class action against the Company
alleging claims under California law for failure to pay overtime,
to provide meal and rest periods, itemized wage statements, to
timely pay wages due to terminating employees, to pay minimum
wages, and for unfair business practices.

The Company filed an answer denying the material allegations of the
complaint.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Costco Wholesale Corporation, together with its subsidiaries,
operates membership warehouses. It offers branded and private-label
products in a range of merchandise categories. The company was
formerly known as Costco Companies, Inc. Costco Wholesale
Corporation was founded in 1976 and is based in Issaquah,
Washington.



COSTCO WHOLESALE: Decision to Remand Nevarez Suit Appealed
----------------------------------------------------------
Costco Wholesale Corporation said in its Form 10-K report filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal
year ended August 30, 2020, that the decision to remand the case,
Nevarez v. Costco Wholesale Corp. (Case No. 2:19-cv-03454; C.D.
Cal.), has been appealed.

On March 25, 2019, employees filed a class action against the
Company alleging claims under California law for failure to pay
overtime, to provide meal and rest periods and itemized wage
statements, to timely pay wages due to terminating employees, to
pay minimum wages, and for unfair business practices. Relief is
sought under the California Labor Code, including civil penalties
and attorneys' fees.

The Company filed an answer denying the material allegations of the
complaint. In December 2019, the court issued an order denying
class certification.

In January 2020, the plaintiffs dismissed their Labor Code claims
without prejudice, and the court remanded the action to state
court.

The remand is being appealed.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Costco Wholesale Corporation, together with its subsidiaries,
operates membership warehouses. It offers branded and private-label
products in a range of merchandise categories. The company was
formerly known as Costco Companies, Inc. Costco Wholesale
Corporation was founded in 1976 and is based in Issaquah,
Washington.


COSTCO WHOLESALE: Soulek Putative Class Action Ongoing
------------------------------------------------------
Costco Wholesale Corporation said in its Form 10-K report filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal
year ended August 30, 2020, that the company continues to defend a
putative class action suit entitled, Dustin S. Soulek v. Costco
Wholesale, et al., Case No. 20-cv-937.

On June 23, 2020, a putative class action was filed against the
Company, the "Board of Directors," the "Costco Benefits Committee"
and others under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.

The class is alleged to be beneficiaries of the Costco 401(k) plan
from June 23, 2014, and the claims are that the defendants breached
their fiduciary duties in the operation and oversight of the plan.


The complaint seeks injunctive relief, damages, interest, costs,
and attorneys' fees.

On September 11, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint, and on September 21 the plaintiffs filed an amended
complaint.

Costco Wholesale Corporation, together with its subsidiaries,
operates membership warehouses. It offers branded and private-label
products in a range of merchandise categories. The company was
formerly known as Costco Companies, Inc. Costco Wholesale
Corporation was founded in 1976 and is based in Issaquah,
Washington.



CREDIT ACCEPTANCE: Kahn Swick Reminds of Dec. 1 Deadline
--------------------------------------------------------
Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC ("KSF") and KSF partner, former Attorney
General of Louisiana, Charles C. Foti, Jr., remind investors that
they have until December 1, 2020 to file lead plaintiff
applications in a securities class action lawsuit against Credit
Acceptance Corporation (NasdaqGS: CACC), if they purchased the
Company's shares between November 1, 2019 and August 28, 2020,
inclusive (the "Class Period"). This action is pending in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.

What You May Do

If you purchased shares of Credit Acceptance and would like to
discuss your legal rights and how this case might affect you and
your right to recover for your economic loss, you may, without
obligation or cost to you, contact KSF Managing Partner Lewis Kahn
toll-free at 1-877-515-1850 or via email
(lewis.kahn@ksfcounsel.com), or visit
https://www.ksfcounsel.com/cases/nasdaqgs-cacc/ to learn more. If
you wish to serve as a lead plaintiff in this class action, you
must petition the Court by December 1, 2020.

                          About the Lawsuit

Credit Acceptance and certain of its executives are charged with
failing to disclose material information during the Class Period,
violating federal securities laws.

On August 28, 2020, the Attorney General of Massachusetts filed a
lawsuit against the Company for allegedly unfair and deceptive
automobile loans it made to thousands of Massachusetts consumers,
providing its investors with false and/or misleading information
regarding the asset-backed securitizations offered, and for unfair
debt collection practices.

On this news, the price of Credit Acceptance's shares plummeted.

The case is Palm Tran, Inc. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1577
Pension Plan V. Credit Acceptance Corporation, et al, 20-cv-12698.

                About Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC

KSF, whose partners include former Louisiana Attorney General
Charles C. Foti, Jr., is one of the nation's premier boutique
securities litigation law firms. KSF serves a variety of clients
– including public institutional investors, hedge funds, money
managers and retail investors – in seeking to recover investment
losses due to corporate fraud and malfeasance by publicly traded
companies. KSF has offices in New York, California and Louisiana.

         Lewis Kahn
         Managing Partner
         Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC
         Tel No: 1-877-515-1850
         E-mail: lewis.kahn@ksfcounsel.com [GN]

DELORES & WILLIAM: Website Inaccessible to Disabled, Sarwar Claims
------------------------------------------------------------------
SAIM SARWAR, individually, Plaintiff v. DELORES & WILLIAM &
BEIDMAN, Defendant, Case No. 3:20-cv-00210-SLH (W.D. Pa., October
19, 2020) is brought on behalf of the Plaintiff and all other
individuals similarly situated against the Defendant for its
alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act.

The Plaintiff is unable to engage in the major life activity of
walking more than a few steps without assistive devices and has
limited use of his hands.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff was unable to access the
Defendant's online reservations services when he visited its
Websites for the purpose of reviewing and assessing the accessible
features at the Defendant's lodging property and ascertain whether
they meet the requirements of 28 C.F.R. Section 36.302(e) and his
accessibility needs. The Defendant allegedly failed to comply with
the requirements, thereby depriving the Plaintiff the same goods,
services, features, facilities, benefits, advantages, and
accommodations of the property available to the general public.

Delores & William & Beidman operates and owns a place of lodging
known as Judy's Motel in Bedford, Pennsylvania. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Tristan W. Gillespie, Esq.
          THOMAS B BACON, P.A.
          5150 Cottage Farm Rd.
          Johns Creek, GA 30022
          Tel: (404) 276-7277
          E-mail: gillespie.tristan@gmail.com


DIGITAL MEDIA: Hooper Sues Over Unsolicited Text Messages
---------------------------------------------------------
GRAHAM HOOPER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. DIGITAL MEDIA SOLUTIONS, INC., a Florida
corporation, Defendant, Case No. 1:20-cv-24241 (S.D. Fla., October
16, 2020) is a class action complaint brought against the Defendant
for its alleged violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff began receiving numerous
telemarketing text messages to his cellular telephone number ending
in 5783 on or about June 11, 2020 from the Defendant attempting to
convince the Plaintiff to purchase vehicles, auto insurance, and
other various products and services offered by the Defendant's
marketing clients. The Plaintiff asserts that he never provide the
Defendant with his prior express written consent to be sent
telemarketing text messages to his cellular telephone number that
was registered on the National Do-Not-Call Registry since September
22, 2018.

As a result of the Defendant's unsolicited telemarketing messages,
the Plaintiff suffered actual harm, that include invasion of his
privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass,
and conversion.

Digital Media Solutions, Inc. is a global marketing company. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Aaron M. Ahlzadeh, Esq.
          Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
          EDELSBERG LAW, P.A.
          20900 NE 30th Ave., Suite 417
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Tel: (305) 975-3320
          E-mail: aaron@edelsberglaw.com
                  scott@edelsberglaw.com

                - and –

          Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
          Garrett O. Berg, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
          14 NE 1st Ave., Suite 705
          Miami, FL 33132
          Tel: (305) 479-2299
          E-mail: ashamis@shamisgentile.com
                  gberg@shamisgentile.com


DNF ASSOCIATES: Loses Summary Judgment Bid in Viernes Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RONALD VIERNES, and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. DNF ASSOCIATES, LLC, Defendant, Civ. No. 19-00316
JMS-KJM (D. Haw.), Chief District Judge J. Michael Seabright of the
U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii denied DNF's Motion
for Summary Judgment.

Plaintiff Viernes brought the class action against DNF, alleging
that DNF unlawfully collected debts in violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), and Hawaii Revised Statutes
("HRS") Section 480-2 for failure to register as a collection
agency with the State of Hawaii.  Specifically, the Plaintiff
alleges that DNF violated both the FDCPA and HRS Section 480-2 when
it filed a complaint against the Plaintiff seeking to collect a
debt which DNF had purchased from Kay Jewelers, but was not
registered with the Hawaii Department of Commerce and Consumer
Affairs ("DCCA") as a "collection agency" pursuant to HRS Section
443B-3.

On May 28, 2020, DNF filed the instant Motion, seeking summary
judgment as to both claims.  On July 15, 2020, the Plaintiff filed
his Opposition.  On July 20, 2020, DNF filed its Reply.

Under 15 U.S.C. Section 1692e of the FDCPA, a debt collector may
not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means
in connection of any debt.  And a complaint served directly on a
consumer to facilitate debt-collection efforts is a communication
subject to the requirements of Section 1692e.

DNF does not dispute that a collection complaint was filed on its
behalf, that the Plaintiff is a "consumer," or that DNF is a "debt
collector" for purposes of the FDCPA.  Rather, it argues it did not
communicate with the Plaintiff in connection with the collection of
a debt because the collection complaint was filed by its lawyers,
Mandrich Law, and not by DNF or any of its employees.

Judge Seabright disagrees.  First, DNF cites to no authority (nor
can it) for such proposition.  At most, it cites to two cases --
both of which are inapposite to its position.  Further, DNF's
position -- that a complaint filed by its lawyers is allegedly a
third-party filing -- belies basic principal-agency principles
between a lawyer and a client.  Under DNF's theory, any filings in
courts, including the Court, could never be attributed to the
clients whom attorneys represent, including DNF's own filings by
its counsel.  That cannot be.  Accordingly, DNF's Motion for
Summary Judgment as to the Plaintiff's FDCPA count is denied.

DNF also argues that it did not violate HRS Section 480-2 because
it is not a "collection agency" for debt collection purposes under
Hawaii law and thus was not required to register with the DCCA
pursuant to HRS Section 443B-3.  A collection agency cannot collect
or attempt to collect any money or any other forms of indebtedness
alleged to be due and owing from any person who resides or does
business in Hawaii without first registering.  And failure to
register by a collection agency will constitute unfair methods of
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the
conduct of any trade or commerce for the purpose of section 480-2.

The Judge holds that the email from the DCCA, which itself states
is "not legal advice" or a "legal interpretation" is insufficient
for DNF to meet its burden at summary judgment to show that it was
not, as a matter of law, a collection agency under Hawaii law.
Nor, does DNF's cited authority aid its position.  And DNF does not
provide any other arguments or evidence in support that it was not
a collection agency as a matter of law.  Accordingly, DNF fails to
meet its initial burden for summary judgment purposes that it is
not a "collection agency" and its motion for summary judgment as to
the Plaintiff's state law claim, HRS Section 480-2, is also
denied.

For these reasons, Judge Seabright denied DNF's Motion for Summary
Judgment.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 31, 2020 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y42adye4 from Leagle.com.


EASTMAN KODAK: Hagens Berman Reminds of Class Action
----------------------------------------------------
Hagens Berman urges Eastman Kodak Company (NYSE: KODK) investors
with losses in excess of $500,000 to submit your losses now. The
lead plaintiff deadline in a securities fraud class action that has
been filed against the company and senior executives is fast
approaching.

Class Period: July 27, 2020 - Aug. 11, 2020
Lead Plaintiff Deadline: Oct. 13, 2020
Visit: www.hbsslaw.com/investor-fraud/KODK
Contact An Attorney Now: KODK@hbsslaw.com
         844-916-0895

Eastman Kodak Company (KODK) Securities Class Action:

The complaint alleges Defendants perpetrated a scheme to profit by
misleading investors about a purported deal Kodak reached with the
U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC).

Specifically, on July 27, 2020, Kodak issued a statement to media
outlets about the imminent public announcement of a "new
manufacturing initiative" involving the DFC and the response to
COVID-19. Following publication, the Company claimed this
information was released inadvertently.

That same day, Kodak granted several insiders options to purchase
approximately 1.885 million shares of Kodak, including Executive
Chairman and CEO Jim Continenza and CFO David E. Bullwinkle.  

On July 28, 2020, the price of Kodak's shares jumped 200% following
news the Company secured a $765 million government loan from the
DFC to produce pharmaceutical materials. Shares continued to surge
by over 300% the next day. This massive stock price increase
allowed Kodak insiders to profit.  

Thereafter, media outlets uncovered Defendants' compensation
scheme. As a result of these revelations, Congress, the Office of
Inspector General, and the SEC are reportedly investigating, the
DFC paused the deal, and Kodak's share price has declined sharply
thereby damaging Class Period investors.

Recently, Kodak's Board released a report authored by Kodak's
attorneys – Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP – purportedly
absolving the Company's leadership of securities laws violations.
But on Sept. 18, 2020, Congressional Reps. Jim Clyburn, D-S.C.,
Maxine Waters, D-Calif., and Carolyn Maloney, D-N.Y. reiterated
that Congress will continue to "vigorously pursue" their own
ongoing investigation of the DFC loan, stating, "Let's be clear:
this report does not represent the findings of any regulator; it is
a report generated by a law firm hired by Kodak." In fact, the
lawmakers stated that the Akin Gump report "raises more questions
than it answers," including why the Trump administration would give
a loan to the onetime photography giant to set up a pharmaceutical
manufacturing arm despite no prior experience in that industry and
related "windfalls" by insiders stemming from stock trades executed
before the loan was made public.

"We're focused on investors' losses and holding Kodak and its
insiders accountable for their fraudulent compensation scheme,"
said Reed Kathrein, the Hagens Berman partner leading the
investigation.

If you are a Kodak investor who lost over $500,000 on Class Period
investments, click here to discuss your legal rights with Hagens
Berman.

Whistleblowers: Persons with non-public information regarding Kodak
should consider their options to help in the investigation or take
advantage of the SEC Whistleblower program. Under the new program,
whistleblowers who provide original information may receive rewards
totaling up to 30 percent of any successful recovery made by the
SEC. For more information, call Reed Kathrein at 844-916-0895 or
email KODK@hbsslaw.com.

                        About Hagens Berman

Hagens Berman is a national law firm with nine offices in eight
cities around the country and eighty attorneys. The firm represents
investors, whistleblowers, workers and consumers in complex
litigation.   More about the firm and its successes is located at
hbsslaw.com. For the latest news visit our newsroom or follow us on
Twitter at @classactionlaw. [GN]

EIGHT SLEEP: Website Inaccessible to Blind, Romero Suit Claims
--------------------------------------------------------------
JOSUE ROMERO, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. EIGHT SLEEP, INC., Defendant, Case No.
1:20-cv-08768 (S.D.N.Y., October 21, 2020) arises from the
Defendant's failure to design and operate its Web site to be fully
accessible to and independently usable by the Plaintiff and other
blind or visually-impaired people, in violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act.

The Plaintiff claims that when he visited the Defendant's Web site,
www.eightsleep.com, in October 2020, he encountered multiple access
barriers that denied him full and equal access to the facilities,
goods and services offered to the public. The Defendant allegedly
has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination due to its
failure to comply with the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines 2.1
which would have provide the Plaintiff and the class with equal
access to the Web site.

Eight Sleep, Inc. is a mattress manufacturing company. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Fl.
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Tel: (929) 575-4175
          Fax: (929) 575-4195
          E-mail: Joseph@cml.legal


ENVISION PHYSICIAN: Weller Sues Over Unsolicited Text Messages
--------------------------------------------------------------
MITCHELL WELLER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. ENVISION PHYSICIAN SERVICES, LLC, a Delaware
limited liability company, Defendant, Case No. CACE-20-017084 (Fla.
Cir., 17th Judicial, Broward Cty., October 15, 2020) is a class
action complaint brought against the Defendant for its alleged
violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant sent unsolicited text
messages to the Plaintiff's cellular telephone number on or about
March 12, 2020 in an attempt to promote its services. The Defendant
allegedly used an automatic telephone dialing system (ATDS) in
transmitting unsolicited text messages and did not obtain prior
express consent from the Plaintiff and other similarly situated
individuals to be contacted using an ATDS.

Envision Physician Services, LLC provides healthcare services.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
          14 NE 1st Ave., Suite 705
          Miami, FL 33132
          Tel: (305) 479-2299
          E-mail: ashamis@shamisgentile.com

                - and –

          Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
          EDELSBERG LAW, PA
          20900 NE 30th Ave., Suite 417
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Tel: (305) 975-3320
          E-mail: scott@edelsberglaw.com

                - and –

          Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq.
          HIRALDO P.A.
          401 E. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1400
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Tel: (954) 400-4713
          E-mail: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com


FAST GRILL: Fails to Properly Pay Overtime Wages, Pichardo Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The case, JOSE O. BARRERA PICHARDO, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. FAST GRILL ENTERPRISES OF
HIALEAH d/b/a LA GRANJA POLLO'S A LA BRASA, A Florida Profit
Corporation and JULIO MARTINEZ, individually, Defendants, Case No.
1:20-cv-24277 (S.D. Fla., October 19, 2020) arises from the
Defendants' alleged violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff was employed by the
Defendants as a non-exempt employee from on or about May 15, 2015
until on or about September 15, 2020. He was hired as a cook and
promoted to manager on or about July 2019.

The Plaintiff alleges that despite regularly working at least 72
hours per work week, the Defendants failed to properly pay him
overtime for those hours worked over 40 in a given workweek at time
and one-half per hour as required by the federal law.

Fast Grill Enterprises of Hialeah operates a grill business owned
and operated by Julio Martinez. As a corporate officer and
president, Defendant Martinez exercised operational control over
the activities of his company. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Nathaly Saavedra, Esq.
          Juan J. Perez, Esq.
          PEREGONZA THE ATTORNEYS, PLLC
          1414 NW 107th Ave., Suite 302
          Doral, FL 33172
          Tel: (786) 650-0202
          Fax: (786) 650-0200
          E-mail: nathaly@peregonza.com
                  juan@peregonza.com


FIDELITY NATIONAL: Faces Colmone Suit Alleging WARN Act Violations
------------------------------------------------------------------
JOSEPH COLMONE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. FIDELITY NATIONAL FINANCIAL, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:20-cv-05616 (N.D. Ill., Sept. 22, 2020),
alleges violation of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act (WARN Act).

The Plaintiff seeks back pay and benefits, including medical
expenses, at the highest rate of compensation due to the Plaintiff
and other proposed class members for the entire 60 day period of
the WARN Act violation.

According to the complaint, the Defendant terminated the employment
of the Plaintiff on April 13, 2020. The Defendant paid the
Plaintiff through April 15, 2020, which was his last day of work.
Until April 19, 2020, the Plaintiff worked as Director of Risk
Management and was an employee in the Defendant's corporate
division.

On or about April 2020, the Defendant reported to investors that it
had discharged 11% of the employees of its corporate division. The
mass layoff on April 2020, without any prior proper notice, of more
than 500 employees assigned to the location in Jacksonville
Florida, and such mass layoff occurred within 30 days of the
Plaintiff's last day of work on April 19, 2020, violated the WARN
Act.

Fidelity National Financial, Inc. provides title insurance,
technology, and transaction services to the real estate and
mortgage industries.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Thomas Geoghegan, Esq.
          Michael Persoon, Esq.
          Will Bloom, Esq.
          DESPRES SCHWARTZ AND GEOGHEGAN LTD.
          77 West Washington St.
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 372-2511
          E-mail: tgeoghegan@dsgchicago.com
                  mpersoon@dsgchicago.com
                  wbloom@dsgchicago.com


FIRST UNION: Faces Fabricant Suit Over Unsolicited Marketing Calls
------------------------------------------------------------------
TERRY FABRICANT, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. FIRST UNION LENDING LLC and DOES 1 through
10, inclusive, and each of them, Defendants, Case No. 2:20-cv-09495
(C.D. Cal., October 16, 2020) is a class action complaint brought
against the Defendants for its alleged negligent and willful
violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants placed calls to the
Plaintiff's cellular telephone number ending in -1083 beginning in
or around May 2018 in an attempt to solicit the Plaintiff to
purchase its services. The Defendants allegedly used an "automatic
telephone dialing system" (ATDS) in placing its calls without
obtaining prior express consent from the Plaintiff to receive calls
using an ATDS or an artificial or prerecorded voice on his cellular
telephone.

First Union Lending LLC is business lending company. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Tel: (323) 306-4234
          Fax: (866) 633-0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                  abacon@toddflaw.com


FREEDOM MORTGAGE: 4th Cir. Revives Lawsuit
------------------------------------------
Jody Godoy at Reuters reports that a federal appeals court in
Virginia has revived a proposed class action against national
mortgage company Freedom Mortgage, reversing a lower court's ruling
that the company was not responsible for making property tax
payments on mortgages it had recently purchased.

A three-judge panel of the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals said
that under a federal law that governs mortgage escrow accounts,
when a mortgage changes hands, the servicer who handles the
mortgage when the tax bill comes due is the one responsible for the
payment -- not the servicer who initially received the borrower's
escrow payment. [GN]

G4S SECURE: Fails to Timely Pay Overtime, Melendez et al. Claim
---------------------------------------------------------------
JESUS A. MELENDEZ and DANIEL BETANCOURT, each individually and on
behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. G4S SECURE
SOLUTIONS (USA) INC., a Florida limited liability company,
Defendant, Case No. 1:20-cv-24213 (S.D. Fla., October 14, 2020)
brings this complaint against the Defendant for its alleged
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).

The Plaintiffs worked for the Defendant as security guards at Miami
International Airport at a post assigned to them by their
employer.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs regularly worked
overtime hours, but the Defendant routinely and systematically
failed to pay their overtime hours at the applicable premium rate
as required by the FLSA.

The Plaintiffs assert that the Defendant failed to:

     -- properly use the applicable base rate of pay in calculating
the overtime premium payment due;

     -- timely pay the Plaintiffs for all overtime hours they
worked;

     -- maintain the types of books and records and policies
necessary for enforcement of the FLSA's hourly wage requirements;
and

     -- timely disburse the correct overtime compensation due on
the regularly scheduled payday for the corresponding workweek.

G4S Secure Solutions (USA) Inc. provides security solutions to its
customers. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:
          
          Anthony F. Sanchez, Esq.
          ANTHONY F. SANCHEZ, P.A.
          6701 Sunset Drive, Suite 101
          Miami, FL 33143
          Tel: (305) 665-9211
          Fax: (305) 328-4842
          E-mail: AFS@LABORLAWFLA.COM


GATES CORP: Bid to Strike 13 Opt-Ins from Lundine FLSA Suit Denied
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PEGGY LUNDINE, on behalf of herself and other
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. GATES CORPORATION, Defendant,
Case No. 18-1235-EFM (D. Kan.), Judge Eric F. Melgren of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Kansas denied Gates' Motion to
Strike Opt-In Plaintiffs from the Conditional Class.

Lundine filed the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") class action on
behalf of herself and others similarly situated to recover alleged
unpaid overtime wages from Gates.  The Court granted conditional
class certification on July 11, 2019, defining the putative class
as all current and former nonexempt manufacturing employees who
were employed by Gates from July 11th, 2016, to the present.

On Oct. 25, 2019, Lundine served the approved class notice on the
prospective class members.  The notice does not explicitly address
corresponding deadlines for consent forms received via email or
fax.  The notice period ended on Dec. 24, 2019.

To assist in notifying the 4,432 putative class members, Lundine
hired Simpluris, Inc.  Simpluris employee Daniela Rojas managed
Lundine's case.  As Simpluris received consent forms back from the
class members, Rojas would email the forms in PDF format to
Lundine's counsel for filing with the Court.

Between October 25 and Dec. 24, 2019, some 197 Opt-In Plaintiffs
consented to join the action.  After the close of the notice
period, Lundine filed 32 additional consents on three separate
dates: Dec. 31, 2019, Jan. 7, 2020, and Jan. 16, 2020.  

Of those Opt-in Plaintiffs, Gates moves to strike the following 13
from the conditionally-certified class for the noted reasons:

(1) Keith Taylor (no postmark on return envelope);
(2) Anthony Adkins (no postmark on return envelope);
(3) Windolinne Young (illegible postmark on envelope);
(4) Robert Robertson (timely received via email, but not from
    Robertson's email address);
(5) Dalton Ryan (consent form timely received by fax);
(6) Mary Wyatt (consent form timely received by fax);
(7) Kevin Jenkins (consent form timely received by fax);
(8) Ashley Graham (consent form timely received by fax);
(9) Justin Cooper (consent form timely received by fax);
(10) Joseph Garza (consent form timely received, filed late);
(11) Phillip Johnson (consent form timely received, filed late);
(12) Joseph McQueeney (consent form timely received, filed
     late);
(13) Abby Sidebottom (consent form timely received, filed late).

Opt-in Plaintiffs Taylor and Adkins' consent forms lacked postmarks
and Simpluris received those two forms on Dec. 27 and 30,
respectively.  Opt-in Plaintiff Young's consent form bears an
unclear postmark, but Simpluris confirmed that it received the form
on December 23.  Opt-in Plaintiff Robertson's consent form was
emailed to Mac Beckett, an employee in Simpluris' sales department,
rather than to Rojas as directed.  Upon recognizing Robertson's
mistake, Beckett forwarded the email to Rojas who then filed the
consent form with the Court before the notice deadline.  Opt-in
Plaintiffs Ryan, Wyatt, Jenkins, Graham, and Cooper's consent forms
were faxed to Simpluris before the deadline but lacked postmarks.

Opt-in Plaintiffs Garza, Johnson, McQueeney, and Sidebottom mailed
Simpluris their consent forms by Nov. 15, 2019, but none of the
forms arrived in postmarked envelopes.  On Nov. 15, 2019, Rojas
emailed a batch of consent forms to Lundine's counsel but forgot to
attach the forms for these four Opt-in Plaintiffs.  Rojas saved the
four consent forms as "Response 100-103.pdf." but accidentally
omitted the PDF as an attachment on the email to Lundine's counsel.
Instead, that email's attachments ended with the document
"Response 96-99.pdf."  Rojas next emailed Lundine's counsel on Nov.
21, 2019, attaching documents beginning with "Responses
104-111.pdf."  After realizing its mistake, Simpluris emailed the
four missing consent forms to Lundine's counsel on Jan. 15, 2020,
which Lundine then filed with the Court.

Gates seeks to strike the 13 Opt-In Plaintiffs from the case,
arguing that all of their consent forms contained procedural
defects.  Gates first seeks to strike Opt-in Plaintiffs Adkins and
Taylor because their consent forms lacked postmarks.  Given the
proximity of the notice deadline to multiple federal holidays, it
is reasonable to assume that Adkins and Taylor mailed their forms
within the proper timeframe.  Without clear evidence to the
contrary, Judge Melgren declines to strike those Opt-In Plaintiffs
from the class action.

Gates next seeks to strike Opt-in Plaintiff Young because the
postmark on her consent form is allegedly illegible.  However,
Simpluris confirmed that it received Young's form on December 23
and that it was postmarked, albeit unclearly, December 16.  As
such, the Judge concludes that Young timely returned her consent
form and will not strike her from the case.

Gates also seeks to strike Opt-in Plaintiff Robertson because the
email containing his consent form was sent from an address
different than that listed under his primary contact information.
The Judge holds that Robertson timely emailed his consent form to
Simpluris before the December 24 deadline.  Although the class
notice did not delineate procedures for returning consent forms via
email, the Judge concludes that Robertson returned his form to
Simpluris within the notice period.  As such, he will not strike
him from the case.

Gates next seeks to strike five Opt-in Plaintiffs (Ryan, Wyatt,
Jenkins, Graham, and Cooper) because their consent forms lacked
postmarks.  The class notice did not proscribe all non-mail methods
for returning consent forms.  These five Opt-in Plaintiffs faxed
their consent forms to Simpluris.  Faxed documents obviously lack
postmarks.  But all of the fax coversheets reflect that Simpluris
received them before the December 24 deadline.  While the class
notice does not explicitly address deadlines for faxed consent
forms, the Judge concludes that these Opt-in Plaintiffs fulfilled
the clear intent of both the class notice and the FLSA.  As such,
the Judge will not strike Opt-in Plaintiffs Ryan, Wyatt, Jenkins,
Graham, and Cooper from the action.

Finally, Gates seeks to strike Opt-in Plaintiffs Garza, Johnson,
McQueeney, and Sidebottom because Simpluris filed their consent
forms with the Court on Jan. 15, 2020, and the forms otherwise
lacked postmarks indicating that Simpluris received them before the
notice deadline.  The Judge agrees with Gates that Simpluris'
mistake does not excuse Lundine's counsel's oversight.  Lundine's
counsel should have noticed the numerical discrepancy in the
attached PDF documents and requested the missing forms from
Simpluris.  Moreover, that oversight persisted for two months.
Such lack of attention to detail is inexcusable.

However, the Judge concludes that under the circumstances, these
four Opt-in Plaintiffs should not be penalized for the counsel's
mistake.  They fit squarely within the putative class definition
and they all returned their signed consent forms well over a month
before the deadline, complying with both the spirit and letter of
the FLSA.  As such, the Judge will not strike them from the class
action.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Melgren denied Defendant Gates'
Motion to Strike Opt-In Plaintiffs.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 31, 2020 Memorandum &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yxkgjf55 from
Leagle.com.


GLENCORE PLC: Court Dismisses Church's Amended Securities Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, HENRY CHURCH VI, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. GLENCORE PLC, et al.,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 18-11477 (SDW) (CLW) (D. N.J.), Judge
Susan D. Wigenton of the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey granted Defendants Glencore, Ivan Glasenberg, and Steven
Kalmin's Motion to Dismiss Lead Plaintiff Randall Seymour and
Plaintiff Michael Shannon's Amended Putative Class Action
Complaint.

On Jan. 7, 2020, the Plaintiffs filed the Amended Complaint
alleging that the Defendants -- Glencore; Glasenberg, Glencore's
CEO; and Kalmin, Glencore's CFO -- violated Sections 10(b) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 10b-5, which
was promulgated thereunder.

In sum, the Amended Complaint alleges that Glencore, a "natural
resource company" that produces and markets over 90 commodities
worldwide and often in developing countries has common stock that
trades on the New York-based over-the-counter market under the
ticker symbols "GLCNF" and "GLNCY."  From Sept. 30, 2016 through
Dec. 5, 2019, the Defendants allegedly made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose adverse facts relating to
briberies Glencore purportedly engaged in with the Democratic
Republic of Congo ("DRC"), Venezuela, and Nigeria.  After news
regarding various countries' investigations into the alleged
bribery was published, Glencore's common shares declined in market
value, allegedly damaging investors.

On May 18, 2018, Bloomberg reported that the U.K.'s Serious Fraud
Office was preparing to open a formal bribery investigation into
Glencore.  That same day, the share price of GLNCY dropped $0.55
per share, and GLCNF dropped $0.32 per share.  On July 3, 2018,
Glencore disclosed that it had received a subpoena from the United
States Department of Justice with respect to the company's
compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and United States
money laundering statutes.  That same day, shares of GLNCY fell
$0.86 per share, and GLCNF fell $0.41 per share.  The Plaintiffs
contend that they and other class members were damaged as a result
of the Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions.

Glencore is incorporated in Jersey, United Kingdom, and is
headquartered in Baar, Switzerland.  It allegedly operates some
offices and is affiliated with operations and/or subsidiaries
located in the United States.  Glasenberg is a citizen of
Switzerland, South Africa, Australia, and Lithuania, and has
maintained a primary residence in Switzerland since 1993.  Kalmin
is a citizen of Australia and has maintained a primary residence in
Switzerland since 2010.  The Plaintiffs allege that they are
located "in the United States" and purchased artificially inflated
GLCNF/GLNCY shares in the United States, specifically Florida for
Lead Plaintiff Seymour.

After the Court granted their request to exceed the maximum page
limit under Local Civil Rule 7.2, the Defendants filed a joint
Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs filed an
opposition, and the Defendants submitted their reply.

In the present matter, the Plaintiffs are purportedly located in
the United States.  Although a plaintiff's connection with the
particular federal district must be considered, Judge Wigenton
finds no indication that the Plaintiffs are connected to New
Jersey, nor do they proffer any purported relationship.  Nor do the
Plaintiffs allege that Glencore has any offices or subsidiaries in
New Jersey.  Rather, Glencore is headquartered in Baar,
Switzerland, and incorporated in Jersey, United Kingdom.  

Moreover, the alleged conduct giving rise to the Plaintiff's claims
purportedly occurred abroad in the DRC, Venezuela, and Nigeria.
The Plaintiffs do not refute the Defendants' contention that the
alleged misstatements/omissions were crafted and approved in
Switzerland, where Glencore is headquartered, and that earnings
calls were usually conducted from Switzerland or the United
Kingdom.  Furthermore, because the Amended Complaint's allegations
are centered abroad, there is no indication that New Jersey houses
any evidence relevant to the matter.

For these reasons, the Judge holds that the Plaintiff's choice of
forum is accorded less deference.

The Defendants are willing to consent to jurisdiction in
Switzerland as it relates to the Plaintiffs' claims.  Additionally,
Switzerland's judicial system permits the adjudication of the
subject matter of the Plaintiffs' securities fraud claims.
Moreover, the Court need not conduct complex exercises in
comparative law as part of the forum non-conveniens analysis.
Thus, the Defendants have met their burden by showing that at least
one adequate alternate forum exists.

Lastly, the Court must balance the private and public interest
factors.  The Judge finds that the relevant documentary evidence
and other potential witnesses are likely located outside the United
States, which may burden the Defendants with additional costs and
implicate compulsory process for unwilling witnesses.  The also
Plaintiffs do not dispute that the witnesses or evidence relevant
to their claims are located abroad.

Similarly, as noted, there is no apparent connection to New Jersey.
Rather, the center of the Defendants' purported securities
violations appears to have occurred abroad in Switzerland, where
the alleged misstatements/omissions were drafted and approved.
Therefore, because the locus of the dispute lies in Switzerland, it
would be unfair to burden New Jersey citizens with jury duty in the
matter. Thus, the public interest factors

The Judge concludes that the private and public interest factors
weigh in favor of dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds.
Accordingly, dismissal of the action is appropriate.  

Finally, because the Judge concludes, in exercising discretion,
that dismissal is appropriate on the ground of forum non
conveniens, she need not reach the merits of the Defendants'
arguments under Rules 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6).

Accordingly, Judge Wigenton granted the Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 31, 2020 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yyzpguf7 from Leagle.com.


GOLAR LNG: Rosen Law Reminds of Nov. 23 Deadline
------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, announces the
filing of a class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of the
securities of Golar LNG Limited (NASDAQ: GLNG ) between April 30,
2020 and September 24, 2020, inclusive (the "Class Period"). The
lawsuit seeks to recover damages for Golar investors under the
federal securities laws.

To join the Golar class action, call Phillip Kim, Esq. toll-free at
866-767-3653 or email for information on the class action.

The complaint alleges throughout the Class Period defendants made
false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that:
(1) certain employees, including Hygo's CEO, had bribed third
parties, thereby violating anti-bribery policies; (2) as a result,
the Company was likely to face regulatory scrutiny and possible
penalties; (3) as a result of the foregoing reputational harm,
Hygo's valuation ahead of its IPO would be significantly impaired;
and (4) as a result of the foregoing, Defendants' positive
statements about the Company's business, operations, and prospects
were materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than November
23, 2020 . A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on
behalf of other class members in directing the litigation. If you
wish to join the litigation, go to [To enable links contact MENAFN]
or to discuss your rights or interests regarding this class action,
please contact Phillip Kim, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll free at
866-767-3653 or via e-mail.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe,
concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm was Ranked No. 1
by ISS Securities Class Action Services for number of securities
class action settlements in 2017. The firm has been ranked in the
top 3 each year since 2013. Rosen Law Firm has achieved the largest
ever securities class action settlement against a Chinese Company.
Rosen Law Firm's attorneys are ranked and recognized by numerous
independent and respected sources. Rosen Law Firm has secured
hundreds of millions of dollars for investors. Attorney
Advertising. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. [GN]

GRACE 365: Faces Cortes Suit Over Failure to Pay Proper Wages
-------------------------------------------------------------
ARMANDO CORTES, individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. GRACE 365 GROUP LLC, d/b/a
Macchina, HANOVER VENTURES, LLC, ANDRES VALBUENA, and RAMON MORADO,
jointly and severally, Defendants, Case No. 1:20-cv-08704
(S.D.N.Y., October 19, 2020) is a class and collective action
complaint brought against the Defendants for their alleged willful
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor
Law.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as a busser and food
runner from in or around May 2018 until in or around February 2019,
and as a waiter from in or around March 2019 until in or around May
2019.
         
The Plaintiff asserts these claims:

     -- The Defendants did not allow him and other similarly
situated employees to retain all of their tips;

     -- The Defendants failed to pay him and other similarly
situated employees the statutory minimum wage, spread-of-hours pay,
and overtime premium pay at one and one-half times their regular
rate of pay for all hours they worked over 40 per week;

     -- The Defendants failed to provide him and other similarly
situated employees any meal break period for any weekday shift;
and

     -- The Defendants failed to provide accurate wage statements,
and the notice and acknowledgement of payrate and payday.

Grace 365 Group, LLC and Hanover Ventures, LLC are owners and
operators of Macchina, a restaurant that specializes in Italian
American fare wood fired pizzas, wine pairings, and delicious
cocktails. Andres Valbuena and Ramon Morado control Macchina's
day-to-day operations and management, regularly present at the
restaurant, and have the authority to change employees' pay and
employee's schedules. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Douglas B. Lipsky, Esq.
          Alfons D'Auria, Esq.
          LIPSKY LOWE LLP
          420 Lexington Ave., Suite 1830
          New York, NY 10170
          Tel: (212) 392-4772
          Fax: (212) 444-1030
          E-mail: doug@lipskylowe.com
                  alfonso@lipskylowe.com


GREENE COUNTY, MO: $750,000 Deal in Voorhis Gets Final Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, THOMAS VOORHIS and REGINALD LEWIS, individually, and
on behalf of a class of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
GREENE COUNTY, Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-03257-SRB (W.D. Mo.),
Judge Stephen R. Bough of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Missouri, Southern Division granted the Plaintiffs'
Unopposed Motion for Final Approval of Class Settlement.

The Court preliminarily approved the Settlement Agreement on May 1,
2020, finding that the likelihood of final approval of the
Settlement Agreement is sufficient to warrant notice to the class
members as specified in the Settlement Agreement.  The Court
conducted a final approval and fairness hearing on July 31, 2020.

And having duly considered the motion and supporting memorandum of
law and other materials presented with respect to the Settlement
addressing the class and collective claims asserted in the
litigation under state and federal wage and hour law, Judge Bough
finally approved the Settlement Agreement and the Settlement of the
Missouri Minimum Wage Law Class and the Fair Labor Standards Act
claims as fair, reasonable, and adequate.

The Defendant will pay a total of $750,000, plus the employers'
share of payroll taxes as set forth in the Settlement Agreement, to
resolve the litigation.  It will also allocate an additional
$15,066.96 in compensatory time to account for the allocation issue
identified during the notice period.

The Defendant will issue payment, through the Class Counsel, to all
the class members in accordance with the Settlement Agreement.

All members of the Settlement Class will conclusively be deemed for
all purposes to be permanently barred from commencing, prosecuting,
or otherwise maintaining in any court or forum any action against
the Defendant for any Released Claims consistent with the terms of
the Settlement Agreement.

The Plaintiffs' request for service payments to the Named
Plaintiff, who has adequately represented the Class, is approved,
and the Defendant will issue such payments, via the Settlement
Administrator, in accordance with the Settlement Agreement.

The Class Counsel has adequately represented the Class.  Their
application for an award of attorneys' fees and reimbursement of
costs as set forth in the Motion for Final Settlement Approval is
approved, and the Defendant will issue such payment in accordance
with the Settlement Agreement.

The litigation is dismissed with prejudice with respect to
participating class members without costs to any party, except to
the extent otherwise expressly provided in the Settlement Agreement
and as otherwise ordered.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 31, 2020 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y2wa7gmn from Leagle.com.


HARBORSIDE INC: Rosen Law Reminds of November 9 Deadline
--------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, reminds
purchasers of the securities of Harborside Inc. (OTC: HSDEF)
between July 2, 2019 and August 12, 2020, inclusive (the "Class
Period"), of the important November 9, 2020 lead plaintiff deadline
in the securities class action. The lawsuit seeks to recover
damages for Harborside investors under the federal securities
laws.

To join the Harborside class action, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1897.htmlor call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) Harborside had undisclosed material weaknesses and
insufficient financial controls; (2) Harborside's previously issued
financial statements were false and unreliable; (3) Harborside's
earlier reported financial statements would need restatement; (4)
as a result of the foregoing and subsequent reporting delays,
Harborside's Canadian stock trading would be suspended; (5)
Harborside downplayed the negative impacts of errors and delays
regarding its financial statements; and (6) as a result,
defendants' public statements were materially false and/or
misleading at all relevant times. When the true details entered the
market, the lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than November
9, 2020. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on
behalf of other class members in directing the litigation. If you
wish to join the litigation, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1897.htmlor to discuss
your rights or interests regarding this class action, please
contact Phillip Kim, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll free at
866-767-3653 or via e-mail at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe,
concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm was Ranked No. 1
by ISS Securities Class Action Services for number of securities
class action settlements in 2017. The firm has been ranked in the
top 3 each year since 2013. Rosen Law Firm has achieved the largest
ever securities class action settlement against a Chinese Company.
Rosen Law Firm's attorneys are ranked and recognized by numerous
independent and respected sources. Rosen Law Firm has secured
hundreds of millions of dollars for investors. Attorney
Advertising. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. [GN]

HAVENLOCK INC: Website Inaccessible to Blind Users, Jaquez Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
RAMON JAQUEZ, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. HAVENLOCK INC., Defendant, Case No.
1:20-cv-08750-RA (S.D.N.Y., October 20, 2020) brings this class
action complaint against the Defendant for its alleged violation of
the Americans with Disabilities Act.

The Plaintiff, who is a blind, visually-impaired handicapped
person, and dependent of a popular screen reading software called
NonVisual Desktop Access, asserts that the Defendant's Website,
www.havenlock.com, has multiple access barriers which denied him
access similar to that of a sighted individual. He made this claim
when he visited the Website on or around September 2020 with the
intent of browsing and potentially making a purchase.

The Defendant allegedly failed to comply with the Web Content
Accessibility Guidelines 2.1, and thus, it lacks of a variety of
features and accommodations which effectively barred the Plaintiff
from being able to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the
Defendant's public accommodation.

The Defendant has engaged in act of intentional discrimination
because of its failure to maintain a Website that is accessible to
members of a protected class, the suit says.

Havenlock Inc. is a smart lock manufacturing company that owns and
operates the said Website. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
          MARCUS & ZELMAN, LLC
          701 Cookman Ave., Suite 300
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712
          Tel: (732) 695-3282
          Fax: (732) 298-6256
          E-mail: Yzelman@MarcusZelman.com


HERB & LOU'S: Website Inaccessible to Blind, Jaquez Suit Says
-------------------------------------------------------------
RAMON JAQUEZ, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. HERB & LOU'S LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:20-cv-08753-LJL (S.D.N.Y., October 20, 2020) is a class action
complaint brought against the Defendant for its alleged violation
of the Americans with Disabilities Act.

The Plaintiff is a blind, visually-impaired handicapped person, and
a member of a protected class of individuals under the ADA.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff was denied access similar
to that of a sighted individual when he visited the Defendant's
Website, www.herbandlous.com, on or around September 2020 with the
intent of browsing and potentially making a purchase. Because the
Defendant allegedly failed to comply with the Web Content
Accessibility Guidelines 2.1, its Website allegedly lacks a variety
of features and accommodations, which effectively barred the
Plaintiff and other similarly situated blind and visually-impaired
persons from being able to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the
Defendant's public accommodation.

Herb & Lou's LLC is a cubed cocktail mixer distributing company
that owns and operates the Website. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
          MARCUS & ZELMAN, LLC
          701 Cookman Ave., Suite 300
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712
          Tel: (732) 695-3282
          Fax: (732) 298-6256
          E-mail: Yzelman@MarcusZelman.com


IDEXX DISTRIBUTION: Bid to Dismiss Howard Labor Suit Denied as Moot
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, EBONY HOWARD, et al., individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. IDEXX DISTRIBUTION,
INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 2:20-cv-00079-JDL (D. Me.),
Judge John D. Levy of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Maine denied as moot Idexx's Motion to Dismiss.

On March 5, 2020, Howard commenced the putative class action
against Idexx Distribution and Idexx Laboratories, Inc., for
alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and
certain Nevada wage-and-hour laws.  On May 5, 2020, Idexx moved to
dismiss the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  

Magistrate Judge John H. Rich, III filed his Recommended Decision
on the motion to dismiss with the Court on July 5, 2020.  The time
within which to file objections has expired, and no objections have
been filed. The Magistrate Judge provided notice that a party's
failure to object would waive the right to de novo review and
appeal.

Judge Levy has reviewed and considered the Magistrate Judge's
Recommended Decision, together with the entire record, and has made
a de novo determination of all matters adjudicated by the
Magistrate Judge.  Judge Levy concurs with the recommendations of
the Magistrate Judge for the reasons set forth in his Recommended
Decision and determines that no further proceeding is necessary.

Therefore, Judge Levy accepted the Recommended Decision of the
Magistrate Judge, and denied as moot Idexx's Motion to Dismiss.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 31, 2020 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yyoc2k4h from Leagle.com


IES RESIDENTIAL: Ajpaccaja Sues Over Unpaid OT for Electricians
---------------------------------------------------------------
BRIAN AJPACCAJA, JORGE AGUILAR, KEVIN DIAZ, JEFFERSON LOPEZ,
EDWINRIVERA, and JONATHAN TORRES, individually and on behalf of all
other similarly situated current and former employees, Plaintiff v.
IES RESIDENTIAL, INC. and IES HOLDINGS, INC. a/k/a INTEGRATED
ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS, INC., and ARMANDO LOPEZ, individually,
Defendants, Case No. 3:20-cv-00889 (M.D. Tenn., October 16, 2020)
arises from the Defendants' alleged unlawful pay policy in
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants as non-exempt
electricians.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs worked in excess of 40
hours per week, on average 60 to 66 hours per week, but they were
only paid straight time wages for all the hours worked. The
Defendants allegedly denied them of overtime compensation at one
and one-half times their base rate of pay for all the time they
worked in excess of 40 hours per week.

The Corporate Defendants are a large, publicly traded company which
provide installation and/or maintenance of residential electrical
systems services. Armando Lopez is the direct supervisor of the
Plaintiffs. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Gordon E. Jackson, Esq.
          J. Russ Bryant, Esq.
          Robert E. Turner, IV, Esq.
          Nathaniel A. Bishop, Esq.
          Robert E. Morelli, Esq.
          JACKSON, SHIELDS, YEISER, HOLT OWEN & BRYANT
          262 German Oak Drive
          Memphis, TN 38018
          Tel: (901) 754-8001
          Fax: (901) 754-8524
          E-mail: gjackson@jsyc.com
                  rbryant@jsyc.com
                  rturner@jsyc.com
                  nbishop@jsyc.com
                  rmorelli@jsyc.com

                - and –

          Nina H. Parsley, Esq.
          MICHAEL D. PONCE & ASSOCIATES
          400 Professional Park Drive
          Goodlettsville, TN 37072
          Tel: (615) 851-1776
          Fax: (615) 859-7033


INDIVIOR INC: Class Certification in Suboxone Antitrust Suit Upheld
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, In re: Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochlorine and
Naloxone) Antitrust Litigation. Indivior Inc. f/k/a Reckitt
Benckiser Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Appellant, Case No. 19-3640 (3d
Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the
District Court's order certifying class of those who purchased
Suboxone from Reckitt.

Reckitt, manufactured Suboxone, a prescription drug used to treat
opioid addiction.  Reckitt developed Suboxone tablets.  The FDA
granted Reckitt a seven-year period of exclusivity in which other
manufacturers could not introduce generic versions of Suboxone
tablets. As the exclusivity period neared its end for its brand
drug, Reckitt developed an under-the-tongue film version of
Suboxone, which would enjoy its own exclusivity period. Generic
versions of Suboxone tablets would not be AB-rated to Suboxone
film, so state substitution laws would not require pharmacists to
substitute generic Suboxone tablets if a patient were prescribed
Suboxone film.

According to the Purchasers, Reckitt's transition to Suboxone film
was coupled with efforts to eliminate demand for Suboxone tablets
and to coerce prescribers to prefer film.  To that end, Reckitt
allegedly: (1) engaged in a widespread campaign falsely disparaging
Suboxone tablets as more dangerous to children and more prone to
abuse; (2) publicly announced that it would withdraw Suboxone
tablets from the market due to these safety concerns; (3) ended its
Suboxone tablet rebate contracts with managed care organizations in
favor of Suboxone film rebate contracts; (4) increased tablet
prices above film prices; (5) withdrew brand Suboxone tablets from
the market; and (6) impeded and delayed the market entry of generic
Suboxone tablets by manipulating the FDA's Risk Evaluation and
Mitigation Strategy ("REMS") process and filing a baseless citizen
petition.  

Through these actions, Reckitt shifted the market to Suboxone film
by the time generic Suboxone tablets hit the market and continued
to dominate the Suboxone market as the exclusive maker of Suboxone
film.

The Purchasers sued Reckitt, alleging that its efforts to suppress
generic competition amounted to unlawful maintenance of monopoly
power, in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.  The
Purchasers moved to certify a class of all persons or entities who
purchased branded Suboxone tablets directly from Reckitt during a
specified period.  The proposed class representatives were
Burlington Drug Co., Inc. and two other purchasers.

In support of class certification, the Purchasers submitted an
expert report by Dr. Russell Lamb, an economist.  Dr. Lamb
concluded that, due to Reckitt's allegedly anticompetitive conduct,
the proposed class paid more for brand Suboxone products.  Dr. Lamb
attributed these overcharges to Reckitt's actions that: (1)
suppressed generic tablet competition, so the Purchasers had to buy
brand tablets or film instead of less expensive generic tablets;
(2) delayed market entry of generic tablets, increasing the time
more expensive brand tablets could dominate the market; and (3)
increased the price of brand tablets.

To reach these conclusions, Dr. Lamb relied on internal Reckitt
documents reflecting its national Suboxone strategy and economic
analysis of tablet pricing.  He also calculated the damages
attributable to this injury. Using economic modeling and data from
Reckitt, he estimated, in the aggregate, the difference between the
actual prices charged for brand Suboxone tablets and film and the
price class members would have paid for generic and
non-Reckitt-brand versions.

The District Court certified the class.  As relevant to the appeal,
the Court held that (1) common evidence of injury and damages
showed that the Purchasers paid more for brand Suboxone products
than they would have for generic tablets due to Reckitt's actions
to promote film, disparage tablets, and suppress generics' market
entry; (2) although the Purchasers' aggregate damages model did not
allocate damages among class members, issues regarding allocation
of individual damages were insufficient to defeat class
certification; and (3) Burlington was an adequate class
representative because it had the requisite knowledge of the
litigation, including "the basis for the claimed injury," and its
interests aligned with the class.

Reckitt appeals.  It first argues that the Purchasers have not
provided common evidence of injury or damages that matches a viable
theory of liability, as required by Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,
(holding that class certification was inappropriate when a damages
model reflected injury from four antitrust injuries, but only one
viable theory of antitrust liability and injury remained in the
case).  Reckitt does not dispute that the Purchasers have provided
common evidence showing that the class paid more for Suboxone
products.  It, however, argues that it could lawfully raise the
prices on Suboxone tablets and change its rebate program, so the
Purchasers do not have an antitrust injury.

The Appellate Court holds that the Purchasers' theory of their
case, however, is not simply that Reckitt's pricing of brand
tablets individually caused harm.  Rather, they allege that the
totality of Reckitt's actions, such as raising prices, withdrawing
tablets from the market, providing rebates only for film,
disparaging the safety of tablets, and delaying the generics' entry
by filing a citizen petition and not cooperating in the REMS
process, suppressed generic competition and thus violated the
antitrust laws.

Reckitt incorrectly asks the Appellate Court to examine each of
these acts individually.  Rather, the Appellate Court looks at all
the acts taken together [to determine whether they show the willful
acquisition or maintenance of a monopoly].  The common evidence
would be used to prove that these actions occurred and together
suppressed generic competition, and thereby caused the Purchasers
to buy the higher-priced brand Suboxone products because Reckitt's
actions made it difficult for the less expensive generics to
compete.  Thus, common evidence exists to prove the Purchasers'
antitrust theory and the resulting injury.

Next, Reckitt argues that the Purchasers did not satisfy the
predominance requirement because their damages model only
calculates aggregate damages, and the eventual need for
individualized damages inquiries defeats predominance.  Reckitt is
incorrect, the Appellate Court says.  Antitrust plaintiffs may
satisfy the predominance requirement by using a model that
estimates the damages attributable to the antitrust injury, even if
more individualized determinations are needed later to allocate
damages among class members.  

The Purchasers' theory of injury and damages is provable and
measurable by an aggregate model relying on class-wide data.
Although allocating the damages among the class members may be
necessary after judgment, such individual questions do not
ordinarily preclude the use of the class action device.  Thus, the
District Court correctly found that common issues predominate.

Finally, Reckitt argues that Burlington is not an adequate class
representative.  Rule 23(a)(4) requires a district court to find
that representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.  Reckitt argues that the Purchasers failed
to satisfy the adequacy requirement because Burlington has a risk
of a conflict with class counsel and lacks control over the
litigation, precluding it from protecting the class.

Both arguments fail.  First, each conflict that Reckitt identifies
is speculative or without basis.  Second, Reckitt's claim that
Burlington has ceded control of this litigation to the class
counsel, and that that creates a risk of conflicts, does not render
Burlington an inadequate representative.  Reckitt cites no
precedent from the Appellate Court for its argument that a class
representative must "control" the litigation.  Accordingly,
Reckitt's attack on Burlington's adequacy as class representative
lacks merit.

For the foregoing reasons, the Third Circuit affirmed the District
Court's order certifying a direct purchaser class.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 28, 2020 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/y6c3jovh from Leagle.com.

Bruce E. Gerstein -- bgerstein@garwingerstein.com -- Joseph Opper
-- jopper@garwingerstein.com -- Garwin Gerstein & Fisher, New York,
NY, Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellee Burlington Drug Co., Inc..

Thomas M. Sobol -- tom@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro,
Cambridge, MA, Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellees Meijer Inc. and
Meijer, Distribution Inc..

Caitlin G. Coslett -- ccoslett@bm.net -- David F. Sorensen --
dsorensen@bm.net -- Berger Montague, Philadelphia, PA, Peter Kohn,
[ARGUED] Faruqi & Faruqi, Philadelphia, PA, Counsel for
Plaintiff-Appellee Rochester Drug Cooperative Inc..

Jonathan B. Berman -- jberman@jonesday.com -- [ARGUED] Jones Day,
Washington, DC, James R. Saywell -- jsaywell@jonesday.com -- Jones
Day, Cleveland, OH, Counsel for Defendant-Appellant Indivior Inc.,
f/k/a, Reckitt Benckiser Pharmaceuticals Inc..

Anthony Russomanno, Wisconsin Department of Justice, Madison, WI,
Counsel for Amicus State of Wisconsin in support of, Appellees.

Randy Stutz -- rstutz@antitrustinstitute.org -- Kensington, MD,
Counsel for Amicus American Antitrust Institute in support of
Appellees.


INTERSTATE BROKERS: Parks Sues Over Unsolicited Telephone Calls
---------------------------------------------------------------
The case, CHRISTOPHER PARKS, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. INTERSTATE BROKERS OF AMERICA LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 1:20-cv-11885-MPK (D. Mass., October 20, 2020)
arises from the Defendant's alleged violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act.

The Plaintiff claims that he received several telemarketing calls
from the Defendant, including on August 20, 2020, September 16, 21,
25, 28, 2020 and October 12, 2020, to his cellular telephone number
508-XXX-8565 that was registered on the National Do Not Call
Registry in 2008. The Defendant's pre-recorded calls were purposely
encouraging the Plaintiff to avail its services. Although the
Plaintiff contacted the Defendant to ask for the calls to stop, the
Defendant continued contacting the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff and other similarly situated individuals who were
contacted by the Defendant have been harmed by the acts of the
Defendant, the suit says.

Interstate Brokers of America LLC is an American independent
insurance agency.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Anthony I. Paronich, Esq.
          PARONICH LAW, P.C.
          350 Lincoln St., Suite 2400
          Hingham, MA 02043
          Tel: (508) 221-1510
          E-mail: anthony@paronichlaw.com


INVESTMENTS MANAGEMENT: Alfonso Sues Over Unpaid OT, Retaliation
----------------------------------------------------------------
RANDY ALFONSO, and other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff
v. INVESTMENTS MANAGEMENT I, LLC d/b/a INVESTMENTS LIMITED,
Defendant, Case No. 9:20-cv-81906 (S.D. Fla. October 14, 2020)
brings this complaint against the Defendant for its alleged
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant approximately from
September 2014 to August 28, 2020 as a non-exempt, full time,
hourly-paid maintenance employee at the Defendant's Island Shores
Apartments located at 1600 Island Shore Drive, Green Acres,
Florida.

The Plaintiff asserts that the Defendant refused to pay him for the
overtime hours he worked, a minimum of 30 minutes at least one day
every week, at the rate of one and one-half times his regular rate
for every hour that he worked in excess of 40.

Additionally, the Defendant unfairly terminated the Plaintiff from
his position on or about August 28, 2020 due to his association
with a former employee who filed an FLSA and discrimination claim
against the Defendant, the suit says.

Investments Management I, LLC d/b/a Investments Limited provides
property leasing, management, and maintenance services to
commercial accounts. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Zandro E. Palma, Esq.
          ZANDRO E. PALMA P.A.
          9100 S. Dadeland Blvd., Suite 1500
          Miami, FL 33156
          Tel: (305) 446-1500
          Fax: (305) 446-1502
          E-mail: zep@thepalmalawgroup.com


IPSOS PUBLIC: Faces Orlando TCPA Suit Over Unsolicited Phone Calls
------------------------------------------------------------------
ANGEL ORLANDO, individually and as the representative of a class of
similarly-situated persons, Plaintiff v. IPSOS PUBLIC AFFAIRS, LLC
d/b/a KnowledgePanel, Defendant, Case No. 2:20-cv-09579-JFW-GJS
(C.D. Cal., October 19, 2020) is a class action complaint brought
against the Defendant for its alleged violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff received at least nine
robocalls from the Defendant between May 2, 2020 and June 14, 2020.
The Defendant used an automatic telephone dialing system (ATDS) as
part of its overall marketing campaign to advertise its paid survey
service. The Plaintiff asserts that she never provided the
Defendant with her prior express written consent to be contacted
using an ATDS or an autodialed or prerecorded telemarketing calls
on his cellular telephone.

Ipsos Public Affairs, LLC d/b/a KnowledgePanel is a for profit
research corporation that designs and conduct surveys for its
commercial clients. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Trinette G. Kent, Esq.
          KENT LAW OFFICES
          1333 Stradella Road
          Los Angeles, CA 90077
          Tel: (480) 247-9644
          Fax: (480) 717-4781
          E-mail: tkent@kentlawpc.com

                - and –

          Jonathan B. Piper, Esq.
          BOCK HATCH LEWIS & OPPENHEIM, LLC
          134 N. La Salle St., Ste. 1000
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Tel: (312) 658-5500
          Fax: (312) 658-5555
          E-mail: service@classlawyers.com


KAISER FOUNDATION: Court Modifies July 13 Opinion in Futterman Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SUSAN FUTTERMAN, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v.
KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN, INC., Defendant and Respondent, Case
No. A155946 (Cal. App.), the Court of Appeals of California for the
First District, Division Four, has entered an order modifying its
July 13, 2020 Opinion.

The July 13, 2020 is be modified as follows: On page 18, at the end
of the final paragraph of section 1(d) of the Discussion, add as
footnote 8 the following: "In a petition for rehearing, Kaiser
contends that this opinion erroneously accepts and relies on the
DMHC's own interpretation of the meaning of the Settlement
Agreement between the DMHC and the Plan, as expressed in the DMHC's
amicus brief, which Kaiser contends is both incorrect and
irrelevant. On remand the court should explore whether DMHC is
construing the settlement agreement correctly and whether the
agency's understanding of its role affects the court's analysis of
the class action issues."

The footnote will require renumbering the subsequent footnote.

The Court denied the petition for rehearing.  There is no change in
the judgment.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 31, 2020 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y2rvswqu from Leagle.com.


KEMPER SPORTS: Agras Sues Over Illegal Background Check
-------------------------------------------------------
VICTOR M. ARGAS, an individual, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. KEMPER SPORTS MANAGEMENT, INC. and
DOES 1 thru 50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 5:20-cv-02104 (C.D.
Cal., October 8, 2020) is a class action complaint brought against
the Defendants for their alleged failure to make proper disclosure
and obtain proper authorization of consumer report in violation of
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).

According to the complaint, in connection with his employment, the
Plaintiff filled out the Defendant's standard FCRA form in June 14,
2019 which contained extraneous information such as state
disclosures. Although the Plaintiff was confused regarding the
nature of his rights under the FCRA and did not give valid
authorization for the Defendant to procure a consumer report, the
Defendant, however, procured or caused to be procured the
Plaintiff's consumer report.

The complaint asserts that the Defendant deprived the Plaintiff and
other similarly situated of their right to information and the
right to privacy.

Kemper Sports Management, Inc. provides municipal and public golf
courses, private clubs, resorts, development, and renovation. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Eric B. Kingsley, Esq.
          Kelsey M. Szamet, Esq.
          KINGSLEY & KINGSLEY, APC
          16133 Ventura Blvd., Suite 1200
          Encino, CA 91436
          Tel: (818) 990-8300
          Fax: (818) 990-2903
          E-mail: eric@kingsleykingsley.com
                  kelsey@kingsleykingsley.com


KENAN ADVANTAGE: Underpays Dispatchers, Burns Suit Claims
---------------------------------------------------------
PAUL BURNS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. THE KENAN ADVANTAGE GROUP, INC., and
PETRO-CHEMICAL TRANSPORT, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 5:20-cv-01227
(W.D. Tex., October 15, 2020) is a collective action complaint
brought against the Defendants for their alleged willful violations
of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as a dispatcher from
December 2018 to August 2020.

The Plaintiff claims that the Defendants classified him and other
similarly situated dispatchers as salaried employees, exempt from
the overtime requirements of the FLSA starting in January or
February 2019. As a result, despite regularly working more than 40
hours in a workweek, the Plaintiff and other similarly situated
dispatchers were not paid overtime wages by the Defendants.

The Kenan Advantage Group, Inc. and Petro-Chemical Transport, LLC
operate as a single enterprise providing tank truck transportation
and logistics services. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Merideth Q. McEntire, Esq.
          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          One Financial Center
          650 South Shackleford, Suite 411
          Little Rock, AR 72211
          Tel: (501) 221-0088
          Fax: (888) 787-2040
          E-mail: merideth@sanfordlawfirm.com
                  josh@sanfordlawfirm.com


LENDINGCLUB CORP: Bid to Strike Class Claims in Erceg Suit Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LUKA ERCEG, Plaintiff, v. LENDINGCLUB CORPORATION,
Defendant, Case No. 20-cv-01153-HSG (N.D. Cal.), Judge Haywood S.
Gilliam, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California granted in part and denied in part the Defendant's
motion to stay the action, or alternatively to dismiss the first
amended complaint.

The Plaintiff alleges that in the course of attempting to secure
financing for his children's tutoring, he submitted an application
to "Your Tuition Solutions," a loan broker owned and/or operated by
Springstone Financial LLC, which is a subsidiary of LendingClub.
Following the application process, a representative of LendingClub,
located at a call center in Massachusetts, left a telephone message
for Plaintiff on his cellphone requesting a return call.  The
Plaintiff, who was located in California, returned the call at the
direct line of the LendingClub representative, and left several
voicemails.

The Plaintiff alleges that on Oct. 3, 2018, he received a return
call from the LendingClub representative, and did not receive
notice that the call was being recorded.  The representative
proceeded to ask him about the loan application, at which point the
conversation became contentious when LendingClub's representative
accused the Plaintiff of fraud.

The LendingClub representative later filed an application for a
protective order against the Plaintiff, claiming that he threatened
her during the call.  On Feb. 14, 2019, during a hearing related to
the protective order, the representative's attorney played a
recording of the telephone call between the representative and the
Plaintiff.  The Plaintiff alleges that it was the first time he was
informed or had reason to know that he had been recorded.

During the course of the protective order hearing, a separate
LendingClub employee testified that it was the company's "protocol"
to record "pretty much anything" that involved an interaction
between LendingClub and its customers and clients.  The Plaintiff
alleges that at no time during the Oct. 3, 2018 telephone
conversation was he advised that the call was being recorded.  He
also alleges that during the recorded conversation, he disclosed
sensitive personal and financial information at the request of the
LendingClub representative, including social security numbers.  He
contends that despite having policies requiring its customer
service representatives to inform individuals that they may be
recorded, LendingClub failed to enforce this policy and does not
always disclose to customers that it is recording the call.

The Plaintiff alleges three causes of action: violations of (i)
California Penal Code Section 632;1 (ii) California Penal Code
Section 632.7; and (iii) Mass. Gen. Law. Ch. 272 Section 99.  He
seeks relief on behalf of a nationwide class of all individuals who
have had their telephone calls with LendingClub recorded by
LendingClub without their knowledge and consent.

The Defendant moves to stay the pending action, or alternatively to
dismiss the first amended complaint.  

Section 632.7 makes it a violation to, without consent,
"intercept[] or receive[] and intentionally record[]" a cellphone
communication. The California Court of Appeal recently held that
"section 632.7 prohibits only third-party eavesdroppers from
intentionally recording telephonic communications involving at
least one cellular or cordless telephone. Conversely, section 632.7
does not prohibit the participants in a phone call from
intentionally recording it." Smith v. LoanMe, Inc., 43 Cal. App.
5th 844, 848 (2019).  That ruling, which is fatal to the
Plaintiff's section 632.7 cause of action because the Plaintiff
does not allege that a third-party eavesdropper recorded the call
at issue, is currently on appeal to the California Supreme Court,
and the Defendant seeks a stay of the action pending the outcome of
that appeal.

Judge Gilliam holds that because issuing a stay in the case will
result in minimal harm to the parties and will eliminate a
potential hardship by not requiring the parties to go forward with
premature discovery, he stays the Plaintiff's section 632.7 and
section 632 causes of action pending the California Supreme Court's
decision in Smith.  The Defendant is directed to file a notice of
recent authority without delay.  The filing must simply attach the
decision, and must not include any legal or factual argument or
characterization.

The Defendant moves to dismiss the Plaintiff's third cause of
action.  It also moves under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f)
to strike the Plaintiff's nationwide class allegations on the
grounds that neither California nor Massachusetts law can be
applied to a nationwide case.  

The Plaintiff asserts that he is a California resident and was
located in California when the alleged harm occurred.

While the Plaintiff maintains that Mass. Gen. Law Ch. 272 Section
99 does not contain a residency requirement, the Judge finds that
the Plaintiff fails to point to any authority (and the Court
likewise cannot find any) in which a court has applied Mass. Gen
Law Ch. 272 Section 99 to a non-resident located outside of
Massachusetts at the time of the alleged recording.  Because the
Plaintiff has not otherwise identified any substantive differences
between Massachusetts and California law, California law applies.
Even if there were minor substantive differences, under Kearney v.
Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 39 Cal.4th 95, 117-118 (2006), because
the Plaintiff is a resident of California, California has a greater
interest in applying its privacy laws to protect the citizens of
its states than Massachusetts does in applying its privacy laws to
protect the citizens of a different state.

The Plaintiff can and does bring claims under California's privacy
statutes, and thus has a sufficient remedy.  Because any amendment
would be futile as a matter of law, the Defendant's motion to
dismiss the Plaintiff's third cause of action is granted without
leave to amend.

Finally, the Defendant moves to strike the Plaintiff's class
allegations, contending that the class definition of "all
individuals who have had their telephone calls with LendingClub
recorded by LendingClub without their knowledge and consent, is
overbroad because neither California nor Massachusetts law can be
applied to a nationwide class.  The Plaintiff alleges that
LendingClub employs call centers in both California and
Massachusetts, and therefore is subject to the laws of both
states.

The Judge holds that if the case proceeds following the California
Supreme Court's ruling in Lopez v. Smith, discovery will be
necessary regarding the many issues that will arise at the class
certification stage.  The proposed class of individuals who
potentially had their calls with LendingClub recorded without
knowledge and consent is not overbroad at this stage given the
facts alleged in the FAC.  LendingClub has not carried its burden
to show that it is one of the rare cases in which class allegations
should be stricken prior to certification.  The Judge therefore
denies the Defendant's motion to strike the Plaintiff's nationwide
class allegations.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Giliam (i) stayed the Plaintiff's
California Penal Code Section 632.7 and California Penal Code
Section 632 causes of action, (ii) granted without leave to amend
the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's Mass. Gen. Law.
Ch. 272 Section 99 cause of action, and (iii) denied the
Defendant's motion to strike the Plaintiff's nationwide class
allegations.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 28, 2020 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y5hj8ljn from Leagle.com.


LYFE PRODUCTIVES: Faces Fuller Wage-and-Hour Suit in California
---------------------------------------------------------------
DILLON FULLER, individually and on behalf of all other aggrieved
employees, Plaintiff v. LYFE PRODUCTIVES, LLC; ISAAC BROWN; DOES 1
through 50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 20STCV39378 (Cal.
Super., Los Angeles Cty., October 14, 2020) is a class action
against the Defendants for violations of the California Labor Code
and the California Business and Professions Code including willful
misclassification of the Plaintiff and all others similarly
situated workers as independent contractors, failure to provide
meal and rest periods, failure to timely pay wages upon
termination, failure to pay minimum wages and overtime
compensation, improper wage statements, failure to reimburse
business expenses, failure to maintain records, and unfair business
practices.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as a content manager
in Burbank, California from November 2017 until May 2020.

Lyfe Productives, LLC is a social marketing and education firm
focused on product development, with its principal place of
business located in Burbank, California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                  
         
         Arin Norijanian, Esq.
         James H. Demerjian, Esq.
         ARIN | JAMES LLP
         100 North Brand Blvd., Suite 620
         Glendale, CA 91203
         Telephone: (818) 476-0133
         Facsimile: (818) 230-5243
         E-mail: arin@arinjames.com
                 james@arinjames.com

MANTEI & ASSOCIATES: Black Suit Remanded to Lexington County Court
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Mary Geiger Lewis of the U.S. District Court for the District
of South Carolina, Columbia Division, granted the Plaintiffs'
motion for remand the case, DONALD BLACK, MARCIA BLACK, LARRY
MARTIN, REBECCA MARTIN, BARBARA THOMPSON, and JAMES THOMPSON, for
themselves and a class of similarly situated plaintiffs,
Plaintiffs, v. MANTEI & ASSOCIATES, LTD., RICKEY ALAN MANTEI, CINDY
CHIELLINI, CENTAURUS FINANCIAL, INC., and J.P. TURNER & CO., LLC,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 3:19-02097-MGL (D. S.C.), to the
Lexington County Court of Common Pleas.

The Plaintiffs, for themselves and a class of similarly situated
Plaintiffs, brought the action for various South Carolina state law
claims in the Lexington County Court of Common Pleas.

They originally alleged the Defendants advertised and sold illiquid
debt instruments to unsophisticated investors.  More specifically,
the Plaintiffs alleged the suit involves products including
structured certificates of deposit, principal protected notes, and
'medium term' corporate bonds, all of which shared the same
characteristics the Defendants willfully misrepresented and/or
concealed from the Named Plaintiffs and other Class Members.

The Plaintiffs further asserted that all of the products included
in the suit were debt securities exempt from registration pursuant
to rules issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission under the
Securities Act of 1933, which were not issued by investment
companies registered under or which have filed registration
statements under the Investment Company Act of 1940, and/or which
otherwise did not qualify as covered securities for purposes of the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 ("SLUSA").  

Importantly, neither the definition, nor any other portion of the
complaint, identified specific products subject to the suit.
Instead they provided merely a description of the products
potentially applicable under the suit, without identifying specific
products.

The Defendants removed the action to federal court based on 15
U.S.C. Section 78bb(f)(2).  Thereafter, the Plaintiffs filed a
motion to remand the action to state court, which the Court denied
because the original complaint implicated SLUSA and thus presented
a federal question.

Subsequently, the Plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their
complaint, which the Court granted.  The First Amended Complaint
("FAC") makes two relevant changes from the original complaint.
First, it modifies paragraph five, adding: "The Named Plaintiffs
hereby expressly exclude any products that otherwise meet the
definition of a covered security from this action."  Second, they
likewise limit the class definition to individuals sold "a debt
instrument that is not a 'covered security' under SLUSA."  Stated
differently, these changes exclude from the suit any product
determined by a court during the course of the litigation to be a
covered security, rather than declaring from the start the products
meeting the other parameters of the suit fail to meet the
requirements of a covered security.

The Plaintiffs filed their amended complaint and filed a new motion
for remand.  They move to remand the case, arguing the FAC
eliminates any SLUSA applicability and presents only state-law
claims.  They present two distinct arguments.  First, they assert
the changes made in the FAC mean the case no longer presents any
federal questions, making SLUSA inapplicable and requiring remand.
Second, they argue even if remand is not required, the Court should
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the FAC, since
all federal claims have been removed.  The Defendants responded and
the Plaintiffs replied.

Judge Lewis identifies three analytical steps to address the
Plaintiffs motion.  First, she must determine whether the FAC still
implicates SLUSA.  The Judge finds that the FAC fails to implicate
any federal questions, as the sued-upon products are definitionally
not covered securities.  Stated differently, even at this stage of
the litigation, the FAC eliminates the possibility the suit will
ever implicate a covered security, rather than requiring claims
related to covered securities later be dismissed from the suit.
This nuanced distinction from the original complaint is
determinative.  All purportedly fraudulent acts sued upon and their
associated products, under the FAC, fail the fourth criteria of
SLUSA preemption inasmuch as they have no connection with the
purchase or sale of a covered security, and therefore no federal
question remains.

The fact a court might need to make later preclusion determinations
on individual products associated with the purportedly fraudulent
acts is insufficient to create a federal question.  The Plaintiffs,
thus, are correct; SLUSA no longer applies to the case.

Having determined no federal questions remain in the FAC, the Judge
must examine whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction to
hear the case moving forward.  A court's subject matter
jurisdiction is determined by the original complaint.  Importantly,
subject matter jurisdiction is not divested from the district court
when the federal claims are dismissed from the complaint.  Thus,
because the Court previously determined the original complaint
implicated federal questions, it retains subject matter
jurisdiction over the complaint.

Although the Court retains jurisdiction based on the original
complaint, the Judge must decide whether to decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction once she has decided the federal claims.
Because the case can be remanded, the Judge must now perform a
supplemental jurisdiction analysis.  Among the factors that inform
discretionary determination are convenience and fairness to the
parties, the existence of any underlying issues of federal policy,
comity, and considerations of judicial economy.

The Judge finds that the factors for supplemental jurisdiction
weigh against the District Court exercising supplemental
jurisdiction in the case.  Because the case still is in its
infancy, there are no arguments for convenience or judicial economy
present.  Further, there is nothing inherently unfair to the
parties in remanding a case at such an early stage of litigation.
Finally, the mere fact a state court will make determinations of
preclusion, fails to implicate a federal policy requiring the Court
to retain jurisdiction.  Accordingly, the Judge declines to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law
claims.

For the reasons stated, Judge Lewis granted the Plaintiffs' motion
for remand.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 31, 2020 Memorandum
Opinion & Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y69nhxxp from
Leagle.com.


MARS PETCARE: Dismissal of Moore's California State Claims Reversed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TAMARA MOORE; GRETA L. ERVIN; RAFF ARANDO; NICHOLS
SMITH; RENEE EDGREN; CYNTHIA WELTON, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MARS
PETCARE US, INC.; NESTLE PURINA PETCARE COMPANY; HILL'S PET
NUTRITION, INC.; PETSMART, INC.; MEDICAL MANAGEMENT INTERNATIONAL,
INC., DBA Banfield Pet Hospital; BLUEPEARL VET, LLC; ROYAL CANIN
USA INC., Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 18-15026 (9th Cir.), the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court's order granting the Defendants' motions to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint.

The appeal arises out of a challenge by Moore and five other
California residents to the marketing of so-called prescription pet
food under California's consumer protection laws and federal
antitrust law.  The Plaintiffs brought a putative class action
lawsuit against four pet food manufacturers, two veterinary clinic
chains, and one pet goods retailer.  They allege that the
prescription requirement and advertising lead reasonable consumers
falsely to believe that such food has been subject to government
inspection and oversight, and has medicinal and drug properties,
causing consumers to pay more or purchase the product when they
otherwise would not have.

The Defendants consist of pet food manufacturers, Mars and Royal;
Purina and Hill's; veterinary clinic chains, Banfield and
BluePearl; and pet goods retailer, PetSmart.  Hill's manufactures
and markets its prescription pet food in packaging labeled
"Prescription Diet."  Purina manufactures and markets its
prescription pet food under the label "Pro Plan Veterinary Diets."
Mars manufactured and sold prescription pet food under the "Iams"
label prior to Jan. 1, 2017 and switched to "Royal Canin Veterinary
Diet" starting in 2017.

In September 2012, the U.S. Food & Drug Administration ("FDA")
published for comment a Draft Compliance Policy Guide ("Draft
CPG").  In the Draft CPG, the FDA noted that there has been an
increase in the number of pet food products labeled as intended for
use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of
disease, as well as a shift in marketing toward pet owners
directly.  The agency expressed concerns that animal health may
suffer from consumption of these products because they "affect
physiological processes to extents that may not be tolerated by all
animals and/or may not achieve effective treatment."  The FDA was,
however, less concerned when such dog and cat food products are
marketed only through and used under the direction of a licensed
veterinarian because the agency presumed the veterinarian will
provide direction to the pet owner.  The FDA then proposed a set of
nine factors it would consider in determining whether to initiate
enforcement action against pet food products.

At that time, in late-2012, the Defendant Manufacturers' products
violated three of the factors in the Draft CPG.  First, their
prescription pet food included indications of disease claims on the
labels.  Second, the distribution of promotional materials with
disease claims were not limited to veterinary professionals.
Third, they electronically disseminated promotional materials with
disease claims to consumers on the internet.  The FDA adopted a
final Compliance Policy Guide ("Final CPG") in April 2016, in
substantially the same form as the Draft CPG, although it added two
more conditions that could lead to enforcement action.  The
Defendant Manufacturers did not change their behavior despite
violating the same three conditions of the Final CPG.  The FDA has
not, however, taken any enforcement action against the Defendant
Manufacturers.

The Plaintiffs are six California residents who purchased
prescription pet food for their sick pets after consulting with
their vets.  They assumed from the prescription requirement that
the pet food was (i) a substance medically necessary to health;
(ii) a drug, medicine, or other controlled ingredient; (iii) a
substance that has been evaluated by the FDA as a drug; (iv) a
substance to which the manufacturers' representations regarding
intended uses and effects have been evaluated by the FDA; and (v) a
substance legally required to be sold by prescription.  As a
result, the Plaintiffs paid more for the prescription pet food than
they would have in the absence of the prescription requirement, had
they purchased it at all.

The Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint in August 2017
after the district court granted, with leave to amend, the
Defendants' initial motions to dismiss the Plaintiffs' First
Amended Complaint.  The Plaintiffs alleged, among other matters,
claims for relief that Mars and Hill's violated three California
state consumer protection laws: California's Unfair Competition
Law; California's False Advertising Law; and California's Consumer
Legal Remedies Act.  They also sought class certification,
injunctive relief, and damages.

The Defendants filed motions to dismiss the Second Amended
Complaint for failure to state a claim for relief under the
California consumer protection laws, failure to plead those claims
with sufficient particularity under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
9(b), and for lack of standing.  The district court granted the
motions with leave to amend the California state law claims to
specify how the term prescription or Rx symbol affected each
plaintiff's decision to purchase such pet food.  The Plaintiffs
elected to rest on the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint,
and the district court dismissed the case with prejudice.

The Plaintiffs timely appealed.  They argue that the district court
erred by dismissing their California state law consumer protection
claims against Defendants Mars and Hill's.  

The district court dismissed the Plaintiffs' California state law
claims on three separate grounds: first, the court concluded that
the sale of the prescription pet food exclusively through vets or
with veterinarian approval was not itself a deceptive or otherwise
misleading practice; second, the court concluded that the
Plaintiffs failed to plead enough facts to show that prescription
pet food and other pet food are not materially different; third,
the court determined that the Plaintiffs failed adequately to
allege that the use of the word "prescription" or "Rx" symbol to
have caused any of their claimed loss.

The Ninth Circuit disagrees with all three grounds.  First, the
Appellate Court concludes that the Plaintiffs have sufficiently
alleged a deceptive practice under the reasonable consumer test.
The labeling of "prescription pet food" does appear deceptive and
misleading.  Common sense dictates that a product that requires a
prescription may be considered a medicine that involves a drug or
controlled substance.  The district court seems to have discounted
the potential to mislead in part because vets play a role in the
referral process.  Moreover, even though the FDA, in the 2016 CPG,
explicitly sanctions the role of vets in supervising consumption of
this type of pet food, that does not automatically defeat the
Plaintiffs' claim.  The Court also finds it persuasive that the FDA
warns in the CPG that the labeling on such pet food may lack
sufficient information, particularly for pet owners.

Next, the Ninth Circuit concludes that the Plaintiffs have pleaded
sufficient detail to put Defendants on notice as to the fraud
claim.  If the case had proceeded in the district court, the
Defendants could have submitted evidence about why the difference
in ingredients mattered between those specific prescription and
non-prescription pet foods to justify the price differentials.  The
fact that the Plaintiffs placed the Defendants on sufficient notice
to respond to the alleged fraud reflects how their allegations meet
Rule 9(b).

Finally, the Ninth Circuit concludes that the fact that vets had
prescribed each Plaintiff the pet food -- rather than each
discovering the pet food on their own -- does not negate the
allegation of actual reliance because the prescription requirement
and advertising need not be the sole or even the decisive cause of
the purchase.  Whether a misrepresentation is sufficiently material
to allow for an inference of reliance is generally a question of
fact that cannot be decided at the motion to dismiss stage.
Similarly, it certainly seems plausible that a reasonable consumer
would at least partially rely on the prescription labeling to pay
more money for a certain type of pet food over others.  

For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's
dismissal of the Plaintiffs' California state claims.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's July 28, 2020 Opinion is
available at https://bit.ly/3jBPjjV from Leagle.com.

Michael von Loewenfeldt (argued), Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP, San
Francisco, California; Daniel R. Shulman --
daniel.shulman@gpmlaw.com -- Gray Plant Mooty Mooty & Bennett P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota; Michael A. Kelly --
mkelly@walkuplawoffice.com -- and Matthew D. Davis --
mdavis@walkuplawoffice.com -- Walkup Melodia Kelly & Schoenberger,
San Francisco, California; Michael L. McGlamry --
mmcglamry@pmkm.com -- and Wade H. Tomlinson III --
triptomlinson@pmkm.com -- Pope McGlamry P.C., Atlanta, Georgia;
Edward J. Coyne III -- ejcoyne@wardandsmith.com -- Ward and Smith
P.A., Wilmington, North Carolina; for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Jonathan D. Hacker (argued), Richard B. Goetz -- rgoetz@omm.com--
Michael Tubach -- mtubach@omm.com -- and Hannah Y. Chanoine ,
O'Melveny & Myers LLP, Los Angeles, California; John E. Schmidtlein
(argued), Benjamin M. Greenblum, and Xiao Wang, Williams & Connolly
LLP, Washington, D.C.; Jeffrey E. Faucette, Skaggs Faucette LLP,
San Francisco, California; Bryan A. Merryman and Christopher M.
Curran, White & Case LLP, Los Angeles, California; for
Defendants-Appellees.


MDL 2047: Court Orders Depositions in Chinese Drywall Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE CHINESE-MANUFACTURED DRYWALL PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LITIGATION, SECTION L (5). THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: Elizabeth
Bennett, et al. v. Gebr. Knauf Verwaltungsgesellschaft, KG, et al.,
No. 14-2722, Civil Action MDL No. 2047 (E.D. La.), Judge Eldon E.
Fallon of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana granted in part and denied in part the Defendants'
Motions to Dismiss Claims Asserted by Michael Phillips, Peter and
Lin H. Robinson, Jeremy Jordan, Cesar and Ines Jaramillo, and
Annetta, LLC and Baco Annetta LLC, Richard Calevro, and Martin
Kuntz, Under Rule 37, or Alternatively, Other Sanctions.

From 2004 through 2006, the housing boom in Florida and rebuilding
efforts necessitated by Hurricanes Rita and Katrina led to a
shortage of construction materials, including drywall.  As a
result, drywall manufactured in China was brought into the United
States and used to construct and refurbish homes in coastal areas
of the country, notably the Gulf Coast and East Coast.  Sometime
after the installation of the Chinese drywall, homeowners began to
complain of emissions of foul-smelling gas, the corrosion and
blackening of metal wiring, surfaces, and objects, and the breaking
down of appliances and electrical devices in their homes.  Many of
these homeowners also began to complain of various physical
afflictions believed to be caused by the Chinese drywall.

These homeowners then began to file suit in various state and
federal courts against homebuilders, developers, installers,
realtors, brokers, suppliers, importers, exporters, distributors,
and manufacturers who were involved with the Chinese drywall.  As a
result, many homebuilders also filed suit seeking to recoup their
damages.  Because of the commonality of facts in the various cases,
the litigation was designated as a multidistrict litigation.

Pursuant to a Transfer Order from the United States Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation on June 15, 2009, all federal cases
involving Chinese drywall were consolidated for pretrial
proceedings in MDL 09-2047 before the Court.  Since that date,
numerous cases have been consolidated, involving thousands of
individua l claims; over 20,000 documents have been entered into
the record, millions of documents have been exchanged in discovery,
depositions have been taken in the United States and in China, and
over 30 Pretrial Orders have been issued; the Court has appointed
steering committees and liaison counsel for plaintiffs,
homebuilders, insurers, installers, and manufacturers, and it has
presided over monthly status conferences, hearings, and several
bellwether trials.

The Chinese drywall at issue was largely manufactured by two groups
of the Defendants: (1) the Knauf Entities and (2) the Taishan
Entities.  The litigation has focused upon these two entities and
their downstream associates and has proceeded on strikingly
different tracks for the claims against each group.

The instant matter is a purported class action filed on Nov. 13,
2014 by Elizabeth Bennett in the Northern District of Alabama.  Ms.
Bennet raised claims on her own behalf and on the behalf of a
nationwide class of similarly situated homeowners who allegedly
suffered damages due to the presence of defective Chinese drywall
in their homes.

The Plaintiffs raised claims against the Knauf Entities for
negligence, negligence per se, strict liability, breach of express
and/or implied warranty, redhibition, violations of the Louisiana
Products Liability Act, private nuisance, negligent discharge of a
corrosive substance, unjust enrichment, violations of consumer
protection laws, and equitable and injunctive relief and medical
monitoring with respect to the manufacture of allegedly defective
Chinese drywall.  In January 2015, the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation transferred the case to the Eastern
District of Louisiana and consolidated it with the In re Chinese
Manufactured Drywall Liability Litigation, MLD 09-2047, currently
pending before the Court.

On Oct. 31, 2019, the Court granted leave for the Plaintiffs to add
several new Plaintiffs to the action.  The case now involves 130
affected properties.  On that date, the Court also extended many of
the Case Management Order's deadlines.  With discovery well
underway, the Knauf Defendants have begun to file dispositive
motions targeting the claims of several individual Plaintiffs.

In their Motion, the Defendants seek dismissal of claims asserted
by Michael Phillips, Peter and Lin H. Robinson, Jeremy Jordan,
Cesar and Ines Jaramillo, and Annetta, LLC and Baco Annetta on the
grounds that these Plaintiffs either failed to attend their
depositions or failed to accommodate the inspections of their
properties.  

They also seek dismissal of Richard Calevro's claims, or,
alternatively sanction under Rule 37, on the grounds that Calevro
has not produced a Plaintiff Profile Form, a Supplemental Plaintiff
Profile Form, an Owner Affidavit, or a Plaintiff Fact Sheet, nor
has he submitted to a deposition.

The Defendants further seek dismissal of Martin Kuntz's claims, or,
alternatively sanctions under Rule 37, on the grounds that Kuntz
has not produced "a single document in support of his claims," nor
has he submitted a Plaintiff Profile Form, a Supplemental Plaintiff
Profile Form, or a Plaintiff Fact Sheet.  Alternatively, the
Defendants seek partial summary judgment with respect to any
non-remediation claims on the grounds that Kuntz was only assigned
remediation claims by the property's prior owner, Steve Binns.

Judge Fallon declines to dismiss the cases of Plaintiffs Phillips,
the Robinsons, Jordan, the Jaramillos, the Annetta Entities, and
Calevro.  He, however, exercises discretion under Rule 37 and
orders the Plaintiffs to promptly submit to depositions and/or
property inspections.  Considering the fact that the discovery
period is over and the delay has caused prejudice to the
Defendants, the Plaintiffs and the Defendants will each bear their
own costs related to the rescheduled depositions and
or/inspections.

However, in contrast to the other Plaintiffs, Mr. Phillips failed
to appear for two depositions and failed to provide access to his
property during a scheduled inspection.  The Judge believes his
actions have more significantly frustrated the discovery process
than those of other Plaintiffs and therefore warrant a more
dramatic sanction.  Accordingly, Mr. Phillips must bear all
reasonable costs associated with his rescheduled deposition and
property inspection.

Plaintiffs Calevro and Kuntz also failed to submit Plaintiff Fact
Sheets, Plaintiff Profile Forms, and Supplemental Plaintiff Profile
Forms in a timely manner.  The Judge recognizes that the delay in
document production has significantly frustrated the discovery
process and prejudiced Defendants' ability to develop a defense to
Calevro and Kuntz's claims.  However, the record does not indicate
that Calevro or Kuntz acted willfully or in bad faith.
Accordingly, the Judge declines to penalize Kuntz and Calevro for
what could conceivably amount to attorney oversight, particularly
because the documents were eventually produced.

Lastly, the Defendants seek partial summary judgment on Kuntz's
non-remediation claims.  The Judge concludes that partial summary
judgment is warranted with respect to Kuntz' non-remediation
claims.  The Defendants have demonstrated that Kuntz purchased the
affected property from Binns on Jan.y 11, 2019, and received an
assignment of claims that same day.  The Plaintiff has not provided
any argument or evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact
with respect to Binns' retention of all non-remediation based
claims.  Accordingly, Kuntz only has the right to prosecute
remediation-based claims, and all other claims he asserts must be
dismissed.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Fallon granted in part and denied in
part the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Claims Asserted by Mr.
Phillips, the Robinsons, Mr. Jordan, the Jaramillos, and the
Annetta Entities.  The motion is granted to the extent it seeks an
order requiring the Plaintiffs' to submit to depositions and/or
inspections, but is denied to the extent it seeks the sanction of
dismissal.

The Judge also granted in part and denied in part the Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss Claims Asserted by Calevro.  The motion is
granted to the extent it seeks an order requiring Calevro to submit
to depositions and/or inspections, but is denied to the extent it
seeks the sanction of dismissal.

The Judge further granted in part and denied in part the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Claims Asserted by Kuntz.  The motion
is granted to the extent it seeks partial summary judgment on
Kuntz's non-remediation claims, but is denied to the extent it
seeks sanctions.

The parties arrange for depositions of Mr. Phillips, the Robinsons,
the Jaramillos, the Annetta Entities, and Calevro, within 14 days
of the Order's issuance.  Due to ongoing concerns regarding the
global outbreak of COVID-19, these depositions may take place via
videoconference.  The Plaintiffs and the Defendants are to bear
their own costs, except for Mr. Phillips, who will bear all
reasonable costs associated with his deposition.

The parties arrange for inspections of Mr. Phillips' and the
Robinsons' properties within one month of the Order's issuance.
The Robinsons and the Defendants will each bear their own costs.
Mr. Phillips will bear all reasonable costs associated with the
inspection.

Kuntz and Calevro must properly provide all outstanding documents
necessary to complete the discovery process to the Defendants
without delay.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 31, 2020 Order &
Reasons is available at https://tinyurl.com/y63ru3wb from
Leagle.com.


MDL 2047: Knauf Entities Win Partial Summary Judgment v Steve Binns
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE CHINESE-MANUFACTURED DRYWALL PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LITIGATION, SECTION L (5). THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: Elizabeth
Bennett, et al. v. Gebr. Knauf Verwaltungsgesellschaft, KG, et al.,
No. 14-2722, Civil Action MDL No. 2047 (E.D. La.), Judge Edon E.
Fallon of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana granted the Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on Claims Asserted by Steve Binns.

From 2004 through 2006, the housing boom in Florida and rebuilding
efforts necessitated by Hurricanes Rita and Katrina led to a
shortage of construction materials, including drywall.  As a
result, drywall manufactured in China was brought into the United
States and used to construct and refurbish homes in coastal areas
of the country, notably the Gulf Coast and East Coast.  Sometime
after the installation of the Chinese drywall, homeowners began to
complain of emissions of foul-smelling gas, the corrosion and
blackening of metal wiring, surfaces, and objects, and the breaking
down of appliances and electrical devices in their homes.  Many of
these homeowners also began to complain of various physical
afflictions believed to be caused by the Chinese drywall.

These homeowners then began to file suit in various state and
federal courts against homebuilders, developers, installers,
realtors, brokers, suppliers, importers, exporters, distributors,
and manufacturers who were involved with the Chinese drywall.  As a
result, many homebuilders also filed suit seeking to recoup their
damages.  Because of the commonality of facts in the various cases,
the litigation was designated as a multidistrict litigation.

Pursuant to a Transfer Order from the United States Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation on June 15, 2009, all federal cases
involving Chinese drywall were consolidated for pretrial
proceedings in MDL 09-2047 before the Court.  Since that date,
numerous cases have been consolidated, involving thousands of
individua l claims; over 20,000 documents have been entered into
the record, millions of documents have been exchanged in discovery,
depositions have been taken in the United States and in China, and
over 30 Pretrial Orders have been issued; the Court has appointed
steering committees and liaison counsel for plaintiffs,
homebuilders, insurers, installers, and manufacturers, and it has
presided over monthly status conferences, hearings, and several
bellwether trials.

The Chinese drywall at issue was largely manufactured by two groups
of the Defendants: (1) the Knauf Entities and (2) the Taishan
Entities.  The litigation has focused upon these two entities and
their downstream associates and has proceeded on strikingly
different tracks for the claims against each group.

The instant matter is a purported class action filed on Nov. 13,
2014 by Elizabeth Bennett in the Northern District of Alabama.  Ms.
Bennet raised claims on her own behalf and on the behalf of a
nationwide class of similarly situated homeowners who allegedly
suffered damages due to the presence of defective Chinese drywall
in their homes.

The Plaintiffs raised claims against the Knauf Entities for
negligence, negligence per se, strict liability, breach of express
and/or implied warranty, redhibition, violations of the Louisiana
Products Liability Act, private nuisance, negligent discharge of a
corrosive substance, unjust enrichment, violations of consumer
protection laws, and equitable and injunctive relief and medical
monitoring with respect to the manufacture of allegedly defective
Chinese drywall.  In January 2015, the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation transferred the case to the Eastern
District of Louisiana and consolidated it with the In re Chinese
Manufactured Drywall Liability Litigation, MLD 09-2047, currently
pending before the Court.

On Oct. 31, 2019, the Court granted leave for the Plaintiffs to add
several new Plaintiffs to the action.  The case now involves 130
affected properties.  On that date, the Court also extended many of
the Case Management Order's deadlines.  With discovery well
underway, the Knauf Defendants have begun to file dispositive
motions targeting the claims of several individual Plaintiffs.

The Defendants seek partial summary judgment of claims asserted by
Binns.  Binns' claims arise from the alleged presence of Chinese
drywall in a property located at 1417 Southwest Devera Avenue, Port
St. Lucie, Florida.  He sold the affected property to Martin Kuntz
on January 2019, allegedly assigning to Kuntz all remediation
claims but reserving for himself claims for diminution in value,
alternative living expenses, and loss of use and enjoyment, among
others.  The Defendants argue that summary judgment of Binns'
remediation claim is warranted because the Assignment of Claims is
"clear and unambiguous, evidencing the parties' intent to assign
all remediation claims to Kuntz.

Binns has not filed an opposition.  The Defendants filed a reply,
recognizing that although a failure to oppose a motion is not alone
dispositive, the factual circumstances here warrant summary
judgment.

Judge Fallon finds that the Defendants have provided evidence that
Binns assigned and transferred all of his Chinese drywall related
remediation claims to a third party, Kuntz.  Specifically, they
point to an "Assignment of Claims & Retention of Rights Agreement"
executed by Binns and Kuntz, in which Binns, as the seller of the
affected property, agreed to assign and transfer to Kuntz all filed
claims he may possess related to the remediation of the residential
structure containing Chinese-manufactured drywall.  Binns
specifically retained non-remediation claims, including but not
limited to claims for alternative living expenses, personal
property, loss of equity, diminution in value, and loss of use and
enjoyment, for himself.  

The Agreement also obligated Kuntz, as the Buyer, to follow through
with all steps in the litigation process necessary to fully recover
all damages, engage Doyle Law Firm, PC to prosecute the remediation
claim, and assume all obligations and duties of the Seller against
any responsible party.  Further, a Warranty Deed executed on Jan.
11, 2019, indicates that Binns and his ex-wife, Jean A.
William-Binns, conveyed the affected property to Kuntz.

The Judge holds that contracts are to be construed in accordance
with the plain meaning of the words contained therein.  Considering
the Assignment of Claims & Retention of Rights Agreement, he finds
that the assignment of any Chinese-drywall related remediation
claims from Binns to Kuntz is clear and unambiguous.  Binns
divested himself of any and all interest in the outcome of the
remediation claim in executing the assignment, reserving for
himself the right to prosecute other Chinese drywall related
claims.  Accordingly, summary judgment is warranted with respect to
Binns' remediation claim.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Fallon granted the Defendants'
Partial Motion for Summary Judgment.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 31, 2020 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y3lg8osc from Leagle.com.


MDL 2047: Knauf Entities Win Summary Judgment vs. Amuso Claims
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE CHINESE-MANUFACTURED DRYWALL PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LITIGATION, SECTION L (5). THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: Elizabeth
Bennett, et al. v. Gebr. Knauf Verwaltungsgesellschaft, KG, et al.,
No. 14-2722, Civil Action MDL No. 2047 (E.D. La.), Judge Edon E.
Fallon of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana granted the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on
Claims Asserted by Robert Amuso, Jr.

From 2004 through 2006, the housing boom in Florida and rebuilding
efforts necessitated by Hurricanes Rita and Katrina led to a
shortage of construction materials, including drywall.  As a
result, drywall manufactured in China was brought into the United
States and used to construct and refurbish homes in coastal areas
of the country, notably the Gulf Coast and East Coast.  Sometime
after the installation of the Chinese drywall, homeowners began to
complain of emissions of foul-smelling gas, the corrosion and
blackening of metal wiring, surfaces, and objects, and the breaking
down of appliances and electrical devices in their homes.  Many of
these homeowners also began to complain of various physical
afflictions believed to be caused by the Chinese drywall.

These homeowners then began to file suit in various state and
federal courts against homebuilders, developers, installers,
realtors, brokers, suppliers, importers, exporters, distributors,
and manufacturers who were involved with the Chinese drywall.  As a
result, many homebuilders also filed suit seeking to recoup their
damages.  Because of the commonality of facts in the various cases,
the litigation was designated as a multidistrict litigation.

Pursuant to a Transfer Order from the United States Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation on June 15, 2009, all federal cases
involving Chinese drywall were consolidated for pretrial
proceedings in MDL 09-2047 before the Court.  Since that date,
numerous cases have been consolidated, involving thousands of
individual claims; over 20,000 documents have been entered into the
record, millions of documents have been exchanged in discovery,
depositions have been taken in the United States and in China, and
over 30 Pretrial Orders have been issued; the Court has appointed
steering committees and liaison counsel for plaintiffs,
homebuilders, insurers, installers, and manufacturers, and it has
presided over monthly status conferences, hearings, and several
bellwether trials.

The Chinese drywall at issue was largely manufactured by two groups
of the Defendants: (1) the Knauf Entities and (2) the Taishan
Entities.  The litigation has focused upon these two entities and
their downstream associates and has proceeded on strikingly
different tracks for the claims against each group.

The instant matter is a purported class action filed on Nov. 13,
2014 by Elizabeth Bennett in the Northern District of Alabama.  Ms.
Bennet raised claims on her own behalf and on the behalf of a
nationwide class of similarly situated homeowners who allegedly
suffered damages due to the presence of defective Chinese drywall
in their homes.

The Plaintiffs raised claims against the Knauf Entities for
negligence, negligence per se, strict liability, breach of express
and/or implied warranty, redhibition, violations of the Louisiana
Products Liability Act, private nuisance, negligent discharge of a
corrosive substance, unjust enrichment, violations of consumer
protection laws, and equitable and injunctive relief and medical
monitoring with respect to the manufacture of allegedly defective
Chinese drywall.  In January 2015, the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation transferred the case to the Eastern
District of Louisiana and consolidated it with the In re Chinese
Manufactured Drywall Liability Litigation, MLD 09-2047, currently
pending before the Court.

On Oct. 31, 2019, the Court granted leave for the Plaintiffs to add
several new Plaintiffs to the action.  The case now involves 130
affected properties.  On that date, the Court also extended many of
the Case Management Order's deadlines.  With discovery well
underway, the Knauf Defendants have begun to file dispositive
motions targeting the claims of several individual Plaintiffs.

The Defendants seek summary judgment of the claims asserted by Mr.
Amuso on the grounds that he does not have a legal interest in the
affected property.  Mr. Amuso's claims arise from the alleged
presence of Chinese drywall in a property located at 3461 Ambrose
Lane, Kimberly, Alabama.  The Defendants argue summary judgment is
warranted because Amuso has not set forth any evidence
demonstrating that he owns the affected property.

Mr. Amuso's claims arise from the alleged presence of Chinese
drywall in a property he has not demonstrated an interest in.  The
Defendants have provided evidence suggesting that Amuso is not an
owner of the affected property, and Mr. Amuso has not rebutted
these allegations with evidence of his own to establish the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact.  

Specifically, the deed for the property lists Stephanie Doss (now
Stephanie Amuso), as the sole Grantee of the property.  Both
Stephanie Amuso and Mr. Amuso were deposed in connection with the
litigation, and neither could confirm that Mr. Amuso was actually a
coowner of the property.  Although Ms. Amuso explained that she
made her husband a co-owner of the property in 2014 while
refinancing, she did not know whether he was included as an owner
of the property, or simply added to the mortgage.  When Mr. Amuso
was questioned about his ownership of the property, he could not
recall whether he was added to the title, deed, or any other
documents, or whether he and his wife ever went back to a closing
agent and [did] any sort of active transfer for the property.  In
failing to oppose the motion, the Plaintiff has not introduced any
evidence to suggest he was actually made a co-owner of the
property.

Recognizing that an individual cannot recover for damage to
property he does not own, Judge Fallon concludes that Robert Amuso
has not set forth any specific facts, by affidavit or otherwise,
supporting his right to prosecute the instant claims.  They must
accordingly be dismissed.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Fallon granted the Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 31, 2020 Order &
Reasons is available at https://tinyurl.com/y4c5x2l4 from
Leagle.com.


MDL 2047: Knauf Entities Win Summary Judgment vs. Arrowhead Claims
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE CHINESE-MANUFACTURED DRYWALL PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LITIGATION, SECTION L (5). THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: Elizabeth
Bennett, et al. v. Gebr. Knauf Verwaltungsgesellschaft, KG, et al.,
No. 14-2722, Civil Action MDL No. 2047 (E.D. La.), Judge Edon E.
Fallon of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana granted the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on
Claims Asserted by Arrowhead Investments, LLC and Dr. Peter
Walimire.

From 2004 through 2006, the housing boom in Florida and rebuilding
efforts necessitated by Hurricanes Rita and Katrina led to a
shortage of construction materials, including drywall.  As a
result, drywall manufactured in China was brought into the United
States and used to construct and refurbish homes in coastal areas
of the country, notably the Gulf Coast and East Coast.  Sometime
after the installation of the Chinese drywall, homeowners began to
complain of emissions of foul-smelling gas, the corrosion and
blackening of metal wiring, surfaces, and objects, and the breaking
down of appliances and electrical devices in their homes.  Many of
these homeowners also began to complain of various physical
afflictions believed to be caused by the Chinese drywall.

These homeowners then began to file suit in various state and
federal courts against homebuilders, developers, installers,
realtors, brokers, suppliers, importers, exporters, distributors,
and manufacturers who were involved with the Chinese drywall.  As a
result, many homebuilders also filed suit seeking to recoup their
damages.  Because of the commonality of facts in the various cases,
the litigation was designated as a multidistrict litigation.

Pursuant to a Transfer Order from the United States Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation on June 15, 2009, all federal cases
involving Chinese drywall were consolidated for pretrial
proceedings in MDL 09-2047 before the Court.  Since that date,
numerous cases have been consolidated, involving thousands of
individual claims; over 20,000 documents have been entered into the
record, millions of documents have been exchanged in discovery,
depositions have been taken in the United States and in China, and
over 30 Pretrial Orders have been issued; the Court has appointed
steering committees and liaison counsel for plaintiffs,
homebuilders, insurers, installers, and manufacturers, and it has
presided over monthly status conferences, hearings, and several
bellwether trials.

The Chinese drywall at issue was largely manufactured by two groups
of the Defendants: (1) the Knauf Entities and (2) the Taishan
Entities.  The litigation has focused upon these two entities and
their downstream associates and has proceeded on strikingly
different tracks for the claims against each group.

The instant matter is a purported class action filed on Nov. 13,
2014 by Elizabeth Bennett in the Northern District of Alabama.  Ms.
Bennet raised claims on her own behalf and on the behalf of a
nationwide class of similarly situated homeowners who allegedly
suffered damages due to the presence of defective Chinese drywall
in their homes.

The Plaintiffs raised claims against the Knauf Entities for
negligence, negligence per se, strict liability, breach of express
and/or implied warranty, redhibition, violations of the Louisiana
Products Liability Act, private nuisance, negligent discharge of a
corrosive substance, unjust enrichment, violations of consumer
protection laws, and equitable and injunctive relief and medical
monitoring with respect to the manufacture of allegedly defective
Chinese drywall.  In January 2015, the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation transferred the case to the Eastern
District of Louisiana and consolidated it with the In re Chinese
Manufactured Drywall Liability Litigation, MLD 09-2047, currently
pending before the Court.

On Oct. 31, 2019, the Court granted leave for the Plaintiffs to add
several new Plaintiffs to the action.  The case now involves 130
affected properties.  On that date, the Court also extended many of
the Case Management Order's deadlines.  With discovery well
underway, the Knauf Defendants have begun to file dispositive
motions targeting the claims of several individual Plaintiffs.

The Defendants seek summary judgment of the claims asserted by
Arrowhead and Walimire.  Arrowhead's claims arise from the alleged
presence of Chinese drywall in a property located at 19 Money Hill
Lane, Poplarville, Mississippi.  The Defendants argue that
Arrowhead's claims must fail because the company assigned its
claims involving Chinese drywall to a third party, Christopher
Payton.

Walimire's claims arise from the alleged presence of Chinese
drywall in a property located at 3589 Malagrotta Circle, Cape
Coral, Florida.  Defendants argue Dr. Walimire's claims are barred
because payment for Chinese drywall remediation for the Walimire
Property was provided in 2012, and the prior owner authorized
remediation and provided a release.  They further explain that the
Plaintiff's counsel orally agreed to dismissal of Walimire's claim
upon learning of the prior settlement and release, but that to
date, the claim has not yet been dismissed.

Neither Arrowhead nor Walimire have filed an opposition to the
motion.  The Defendants filed a reply, recognizing that although a
failure to oppose a motion is not alone dispositive, the factual
circumstances warrant summary judgment.

Considering the deposition transcript and the Assignment of Claims
Agreement, Judge Fallon finds that the assignment of any Chinese
drywall related claims from Arrowhead to Mr. Payton is clear and
unambiguous.  Arrowhead divested itself of any and all interest in
the outcome of the instant lawsuit in executing the assignment, and
accordingly lacks standing to bring the prosecute the instant
claims.  Accordingly, summary judgment is warranted.

Summary judgment is also warranted with respect to Dr. Walimire's
claims.  The Defendants have demonstrated, with competent evidence,
that Walimire's property was remediated in 2012 at the direction of
the prior owner, who signed a General Release releasing all claims
against the Knauf Defendants and other parties arising from the
presence of allegedly defective Chinese manufactured drywall.
Further, it appears as though Walimire's attorney agrees that his
claim ought to be dismissed, as evidenced by the fact that
Walimire's deposition was cancelled when the prior settlement and
release was brought to his attention and the lack of opposition to
the instant motion.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Fallon granted the Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 31, 2020 Order &
Reasons is available at https://tinyurl.com/y5qlby97 from
Leagle.com.


MDL 2047: Knauf Wins Dismissal of Gaspard Claims in Drywall Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE CHINESE-MANUFACTURED DRYWALL PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LITIGATION, SECTION L (5). THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: Elizabeth
Bennett, et al. v. Gebr. Knauf Verwaltungsgesellschaft, KG, et al.,
No. 14-2722, Civil Action MDL No. 2047 (E.D. La.), Judge Eldon E.
Fallon of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana granted the Knauf Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Claims
Asserted by Nicole Gaspard.

From 2004 through 2006, the housing boom in Florida and rebuilding
efforts necessitated by Hurricanes Rita and Katrina led to a
shortage of construction materials, including drywall.  As a
result, drywall manufactured in China was brought into the United
States and used to construct and refurbish homes in coastal areas
of the country, notably the Gulf Coast and East Coast.  Sometime
after the installation of the Chinese drywall, homeowners began to
complain of emissions of foul-smelling gas, the corrosion and
blackening of metal wiring, surfaces, and objects, and the breaking
down of appliances and electrical devices in their homes.  Many of
these homeowners also began to complain of various physical
afflictions believed to be caused by the Chinese drywall.

These homeowners then began to file suit in various state and
federal courts against homebuilders, developers, installers,
realtors, brokers, suppliers, importers, exporters, distributors,
and manufacturers who were involved with the Chinese drywall.  As a
result, many homebuilders also filed suit seeking to recoup their
damages.  Because of the commonality of facts in the various cases,
the litigation was designated as a multidistrict litigation.

Pursuant to a Transfer Order from the United States Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation on June 15, 2009, all federal cases
involving Chinese drywall were consolidated for pretrial
proceedings in MDL 09-2047 before the Court.  Since that date,
numerous cases have been consolidated, involving thousands of
individua l claims; over 20,000 documents have been entered into
the record, millions of documents have been exchanged in discovery,
depositions have been taken in the United States and in China, and
over 30 Pretrial Orders have been issued; the Court has appointed
steering committees and liaison counsel for plaintiffs,
homebuilders, insurers, installers, and manufacturers, and it has
presided over monthly status conferences, hearings, and several
bellwether trials.

The Chinese drywall at issue was largely manufactured by two groups
of the Defendants: (1) the Knauf Entities and (2) the Taishan
Entities.  The litigation has focused upon these two entities and
their downstream associates and has proceeded on strikingly
different tracks for the claims against each group.

The instant matter is a purported class action filed on Nov. 13,
2014 by Elizabeth Bennett in the Northern District of Alabama.  Ms.
Bennet raised claims on her own behalf and on the behalf of a
nationwide class of similarly situated homeowners who allegedly
suffered damages due to the presence of defective Chinese drywall
in their homes.

The Plaintiffs raised claims against the Knauf Entities for
negligence, negligence per se, strict liability, breach of express
and/or implied warranty, redhibition, violations of the Louisiana
Products Liability Act, private nuisance, negligent discharge of a
corrosive substance, unjust enrichment, violations of consumer
protection laws, and equitable and injunctive relief and medical
monitoring with respect to the manufacture of allegedly defective
Chinese drywall.  In January 2015, the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation transferred the case to the Eastern
District of Louisiana and consolidated it with the In re Chinese
Manufactured Drywall Liability Litigation, MLD 09-2047, currently
pending before the Court.

On Oct. 31, 2019, the Court granted leave for the Plaintiffs to add
several new Plaintiffs to the action.  The case now involves 130
affected properties.  On that date, the Court also extended many of
the Case Management Order's deadlines.  With discovery well
underway, the Knauf Defendants have begun to file dispositive
motions targeting the claims of several individual Plaintiffs.

Nicole Gaspard's claims arise from the alleged presence of Chinese
drywall in a property located at 1402 O'Donnell Lane SE, Port St.
Lucie, Florida.  The Defendants allege that although Mercedes
Gaspard, the owner of the home, submitted a Plaintiff Profile Form,
Supplemental Plaintiff Profile Form, and Plaintiff Fact Sheet,
Nicole Gaspard did not sign any of these documents.  Additionally,
they note that the warranty deed provided during discovery revealed
that the property was granted only to Mercedes Gaspard, who
confirmed during her deposition that Nicole Gaspard does not own
the property.  Accordingly, the Defendants seek summary judgment of
Nicole Gaspard's claims on the grounds that she lacks standing.

Judge Fallon finds that Gaspard's claims arise from the alleged
presence of Chinese drywall in a property Defendants have
demonstrated she does not own.  Notably, a warranty deed dated Jan.
31, 2007 reflects that the property was conveyed by Majestic Land
Holdings to Mercedes Gaspard alone.  During Mercedes Gaspard's
deposition, when asked why Nicole Gaspard was listed as a Plaintiff
in the amended complaint filed on May 14, 2018, Mercedes Gaspard
responded that because Nicole Gaspard's helping her.  Mercedes
Gaspard then confirmed that the house belongs to her.  

Further, Nicole Gaspard did not sign any of the documents required
in the prosecution of the litigation, such as a Plaintiff Profile
Form, which lists only Mercedes Gaspard as the Claimant and
property owner.  Mercedes Gaspard is listed as the sole owner in a
Saint Lucie County Property Appraiser report, and the sole insured
on a Renewal Declaration from United Property & Casualty Insurance
Co.

The Judge holds that Gaspard has not produced any evidence to rebut
the claim that she does not own the affected property.  Recognizing
that an individual cannot recover for damage to property he does
not own, the Judge concludes that Gaspard lacks standing to bring
the instant claims.  They must accordingly be dismissed.

Based on the foregoing, Jude Fallon granted the Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss Claims.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 31, 2020 Order &
Reasons is available at https://tinyurl.com/y4tw7pfx from
Leagle.com.


MDL 2323: Langfitt Garner to Get 60% of Counsel Fees in NFL Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS' CONCUSSION
INJURY LITIGATION. Kevin Turner and Shawn Wooden, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. National
Football League and NFL Properties, LLC, successor-in-interest to
NFL Properties, Inc., Defendants. THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO Locks
Law Firm v. Tamra Alexander Attorney Lien Dispute (Doc. No. 10684),
Case No. 2:12-md-02323-AB, MDL No. 2323 (E.D. Pa.), Magistrate
Judge David R. Strawbridge of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania divided the atorneys' fee award
between Locks Law Firm and Langfitt Garner PLLC, such that they
receive 40% and 60% respectively, of the total fee (15% of the
monetary award).

Presently before the Court is the assertion of an Attorney Lien by
Locks Law against the Award granted to Representative Claimant
Tamra Alexander, on behalf of her husband, Settlement Class Member
Kermit Alexander, in the litigation that became part of the class
action.  Locks Law seeks payment of attorneys' fees of up to as
much as 10% of the Award that has been authorized for Mr.
Alexander, its former client, pursuant to a contingency fee
agreement ("CFA") that it entered into in an earlier phase of the
litigation.

By their current counsel, Langfitt Garner, the Alexanders challenge
the Lien.  Langfitt Garner also seeks approval of a 15% contingent
fee for its work, which included securing a referral of Mr.
Alexander to a different provider who certified a diagnosis of a
more serious condition at an earlier date, leading to a larger
monetary award than was initially contemplated when the case was
handled by Locks Law. The parties consented to my resolution of
this lien dispute.

Mr. Alexander entered into a CFA with Locks Law on May 5, 2016 for
litigation against the NFL for cognitive deficiencies resulting
from injuries sustained while playing in the NFL.  Under the terms
of the fee agreement, if recovery were made by way of lawsuit or
settlement, the Alexanders would pay 10% of the net recovery as the
legal fee.  The Alexanders would not owe a legal fee or expense if
the firm made no recovery on his behalf by settlement or trial.

Mr. Alexander had already been diagnosed with "dementia" when he
engaged Locks Law.  He sought evaluation and treatment for his
memory problems and other symptoms at the Kaiser Riverside Medical
Office when he was in his early 70s.  A geriatrician and family
medicine specialist who saw him for a consultation at Kaiser's
Memory Clinic on Jan. 7, 2015, Palak Dave, M.D., was the first to
diagnose dementia.  Accordingly, after registering Mr. Alexander in
the settlement claims portal on Feb. 8, 2017 and facing a deadline
of Feb. 6, 2019 to file a pre-effective date claim, Locks Law wrote
to Dr. Dave on Jan. 29, 2019 and asked her to complete a
certification form required by the Settlement Claims Administrator.
Unfortunately, she declined to do so.

Without a certification form signed by Dr. Dave, Locks Law was left
with no choice but to file a claim on behalf of Mr. Alexander on
Feb. 5, 2019 without the requisite supporting materials.  The claim
sought an award for a Level 2.0 Neurocognitive Impairment diagnosis
as of Oct. 24, 2018.  As expected, the Claims Administrator
notified Locks Law of deficiencies in the claim on April 29, 2019
and requested additional documentation.

In the meantime, Locks Law had been working to obtain the necessary
evaluations.  In the midst of these efforts to obtain a
neurologist's assessment, on June 7, 2019, Attorney Langfitt left
Locks Law and set up a new firm, Langfitt Garner.  The Alexanders
were notified of the development and chose to follow him to
Langfitt Garner.  They entered into a CFA on June 20, 2019 that
provided for a 15% contingency fee.  In light of its termination,
Locks Law promptly filed a Notice of Lien on June 22, 2019 seeking
reasonable attorney's fees, plus expenses and costs, for its work
on behalf of Mr. Alexander.

Given the requirements of the 150-Mile Rule, Langfitt Garner sought
out a Qualified MAF Physician in California to examine Mr.
Alexander, interview Mrs. Alexander, and review earlier medical
records.  William Chow, M.D., evaluated Mr. Alexander on Sept. 25,
2019 and prepared his report on Sept. 27, 2019.  He diagnosed
Alzheimer's Disease and, based on his examination and review of Mr.
Alexander's medical records, could date the onset of the condition
to Dec. 9, 2014.  Langfitt Garner submitted Dr. Chow's materials
and certification form to the Claims Administrator as part of a new
claim on Oct. 23, 2019.  On Jan. 13, 2020, the Claims Administrator
issued a Notice of Monetary Award, reflecting that Mr. Alexander
qualified for an award based upon a diagnosis of Alzheimer's
Disease and an onset consistent with the certification of Dr. Chow.
The NFL did not appeal the decision.

In light of the attorney liens and the contingency fee agreements
of record, the Claims Administrator withheld from Mr. Alexander's
award funds for payment of attorneys' fees in an amount equal to
22% of his Award, which reflects the presumptive cap on attorneys'
fees imposed by the Court's April 5, 2018 Opinion and Order.  Of
the attorney fee withholding, a portion reflecting 5% of the Award
was separately deposited into the Attorneys' Fees Qualified
Settlement Fund ("AFQSF") pursuant to the Court's June 27, 2018
Order Regarding Withholdings for the Common Benefit Fund.  Those
funds may be distributed at a later date upon further order(s) of
Judge Brody.  The Claims Administrator also withheld the amount of
costs asserted by Langfitt Garner in its April 27, 2020 Statement
of Attorneys Fees and Costs

The Court must determine the appropriate distribution for the
attorney fees currently available for disbursement (representing
17% of Mr. Alexander's Award) and the allocation of those funds
that are currently held in the AFQSF (representing 5% of his
Award), if those funds, or a portion thereof, are distributed by
the Court at a future date.  Pursuant to a briefing schedule the
Court issued through the Claims Administrator, and in accordance
with the Lien Rules, both firms submitted simultaneous Statements
of Dispute on April 27, 2020 concerning their entitlement to a fee
in light of the other firm's claim to fees. They submitted
Responses to the other's filings on May 12 and 15, 2020.  Pursuant
to Lien Rule 17, the Record of Dispute was then referred to the
Court for resolution.

As the Court set out in a Report and Recommendation filed on Jan.
7, 2019, Magistrate Judge Strawbridge's evaluation of these
positions involves a consideration of the CFA between the
Alexanders and former counsel and an assessment of the
reasonableness of the requested fees of both law firms in light of
the analysis set out by the Third Circuit's McKenzie Constr., Inc.
v. Maynard decision.

The approach obligates him to scrutinize the reasonableness of the
CFAs at the time of the signing of the contracts and then determine
whether the circumstances compel a different evaluation of the
agreement at the time each lienholder seeks enforcement.  He then
examines the results Mr. Alexander obtained, the quality of the
representation provided by Locks Law, and most importantly the
extent to which the efforts of Locks Law substantially contributed
to the result.  As part of that analysis, the Magistrate
necessarily considers the role of current counsel, Langfitt Garner.


Ultimately, the Magistrate Judge concludes that both firms are
entitled to recoup attorney's fees and costs but only such that
their fees, when aggregated, do not exceed 15% of Mr. Alexander's
total award, and with Locks Law and Langfitt Garner sharing the fee
on a 40%-60% ratio.  The Magistrate Judge opines that Mr. Alexander
received an award under the Agreement that certainly can be
considered favorable for someone of his advanced age.  It was a
meaningful development in the case, which was primarily handled by
the same personnel that originated at Locks Law and moved to
Langfitt Garner.  

It is apparent, however, that little was done on Mr. Alexander's
matter for a period of time at Locks Law such that receipt of his
award was unnecessarily delayed.  Given the question of the quality
of work in the earlier phase of representation, and the
significance of the later opinion of Dr. Chow to the favorable
award that Langfitt Garner secured for Mr. Alexander from its claim
submission of Oct. 23, 2019, the Magistrate approves each firm's
fee request in part but allocate the larger share to Langfitt
Garner.

Both Locks Law and Langfitt Garner agreed to represent Mr.
Alexander for less than the maximum fee authorized to IRPA counsel
in the litigation.  After Locks was retained with a 10% contingency
fee, its personnel did little over a period of about two years to
advance his claim.  When Mr. Alexander followed Attorney Langfitt
from Locks Law to Langfitt Garner in 2019, he obligated himself to
pay a 15% fee.  The Magistrate Judge finds that number to fairly
reflect what should be the total fee divided between the two firms
in the case.

The Magistrate Judge concludes that a fair resolution of the
dispute is to divide the fee between Locks Law and Langfitt Garner,
such that they receive 40% and 60% respectively, of the total fee
(15% of the monetary award).  These amounts must be reduced by the
Common Benefit Fee deduction currently applicable to all Awards.
Both firms are also entitled to the costs asserted.  The balance of
funds withheld by the Claims Administrator for the counsel fees
will be payable to the Alexanders in accordance with all other
applicable liens and the terms of the Settlement Agreement.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 31, 2020 Memorandum
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y499btrn from
Leagle.com.


MICHIGAN: Two Classes of Non-citizen Detainees in Malam Certified
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Janet Malam, Petitioner-Plaintiff, and Qaid Alhalmi,
et al., Plaintiff-Intervenors, v. Rebecca Adducci, et al.,
Respondent-Defendants, Case No. 20-10829 (E.D. Mich.), Judge Judith
E. Levy of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division, granted the Plaintiffs' motion for
class certification.

The Plaintiffs in the case are all non-citizens subject to U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") custody in detention at
the Calhoun County Correctional Facility.  

On March 30, 2020, Petitioner Malam filed an Emergency Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus challenging her continued detention at the
Calhoun County Correctional Facility.   On April 3, 2020, the Court
allowed Plaintiff-Intervenors Amer Toma and Ruby Briselda Escobar
to intervene.  On April 26, 15 named Plaintiffs filed an amended
class action complaint.  On June 5, 2020, the Court granted the
Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint and to add seven
additional named Plaintiffs.

The Court has issued five preliminary injunctions in the case
granting relief to 13 civil detainees.  Separately, it granted a
preliminary injunction to Petitioner Fawzi Zaya, a noncitizen who
similarly was detained by ICE at the Calhoun County Correctional
Facility.   Petitioner Zaya raises the same claims and seeks the
same relief as the proposed habeas litigation group in the instant
case.

The Plaintiffs' second amended petition for writ of habeas corpus
and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief brings three
counts.  First, on behalf of all named Plaintiffs and the proposed
class, the Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants' continued
detention of the Plaintiffs and the proposed class members under
the current conditions violates their due process rights under the
Fifth Amendment.

Second, on behalf of the 13 named Plaintiffs and the proposed
subclass, the Plaintiffs claim that given the substantial risk of
serious illness or death from COVID-19, there are no conditions of
confinement that would permit the safe detention (or redetention)
of the 13 named Plaintiffs and the subclass, and their continued
detention is not reasonably related to, and excessive in relation
to, the government's interest in ensuring their availability for
removal.  The Plaintiffs argue that the Fifth Amendment thus
requires release of the 13 named Plaintiffs and the subclass.

Third, the Plaintiffs claim that the removal of Plaintiffs Alhalmi,
Baroi, Escobar, Ley Santana, Rodriguez Salabarria and Toma is not
significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.  They
argue that the Plaintiffs' detention is therefore not authorized by
statute and they are entitled to immediate release under orders of
supervision.

On June 5, 2020, the Court established a case management plan in
which it set deadlines for the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification.  On June 14, 2020, the Plaintiffs filed the motion
to certify a class and subclass of noncitizen immigration detainees
at the Calhoun County Correctional Facility.  The Defendants
responded on June 26, 202, and the Plaintiffs replied on July 5,
2020.

The Plaintiffs' proposed subclass poses a more complicated legal
question with respect to certification.  They suggest that under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(d), the Court may create a
subclass as a case management device that need not independently
comply with all of the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b).  But the
Plaintiffs proposed subclass -- if it is to be certified -- will
proceed under a different jurisdictional source than its umbrella
class.   Specifically, the Court has habeas jurisdiction over the
Plaintiffs' second claim but not their first, and accordingly the
subclass exists as a distinct habeas case in the hybrid action.
The subclass therefore cannot piggyback off a decision to certify
the full class.  Instead, the Court will consider certification of
the Plaintiffs' proposed subclass as a distinct habeas litigation
group.

With respect to their first count, the Plaintiffs seek to certify a
class of all noncitizens who are detained in Immigration and
Customs Enforcement custody at the Calhoun County Correctional
Facility.  For their second claim, they move to certify a habeas
litigation group of all noncitizens who are detained in ICE custody
in the Calhoun County Correctional Facility, and who have one or
more risk factors placing them at heightened risk of severe illness
or death if exposed to COVID-19.

Judge Levy finds that the class satisfies Rule 23 requirements and
that Rule 23 analysis favors certifying the habeas litigation
group.  The Plaintiffs' proposed class satisfies Rule 23's
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements and
meets the standard for collective litigation set forth by Rule
23(b)(2).  She therefore grants the Plaintiffs' motion.

The Plaintiffs also seek certification of a subclass of all
noncitizens who are detained in ICE custody in the Calhoun County
Correctional Center, and who have one or more risk factors placing
them at heightened risk of severe illness or death if exposed to
COVID-19.  

Because the proposed subclass proceeds under a different
jurisdictional source than the certified class, the Judge treats
the Plaintiffs' motion for subclass certification as one for
certification of a habeas litigation group.  She looks to the Rule
23 requirements to determine whether an analogous procedure would
help achieve the Court's mandate to summarily hear and determine
the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require.
The Judge finds a Rule 23(b)(2) class action to be an appropriate
framework from which it can analogize proceedings to govern the
habeas litigation group so as to best summarily hear and determine
the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require.  

Next, on the basis of both parties' vigorous advocacy to date and
the information provided by the Plaintiffs regarding the counsel's
qualifications, the Judge finds that the Plaintiffs' counsel has
done a great deal of work in identifying and investigating
potential claims, has significant experience in handling class
actions, has a deep knowledge of the applicable law, will commit
sufficient resources to representing the class, and will fairly and
adequately represent the interests of the class.  Accordingly, the
Judge appoints the American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan,
the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, the ACLU Foundation
Immigrants' Rights Project, and Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &
Garrison LLP to be class and habeas litigation group counsel.

Finally, the Defendants argue in a footnote that the Court should
amend the class and habeas litigation group definitions to exclude
Calhoun detainees who brought individual habeas petitions that were
denied.  These detainees get the chance to appeal their denials.
Having been denied on their individual claims, they should not be
granted yet another chance by joining a class action.  The
Defendants neither develop nor offer legal support for its
argument; the Judge declines to limit the class definitions at this
time. While the Defendants' argument is likely inapplicable to the
class, which proceeds under federal question jurisdiction, they may
formally move to limit the class or habeas litigation group
definition.

For the reasons stated, Judge Levy concludes that the Plaintiffs
have shown that both the general class and habeas litigation group
may proceed on a collective basis.  With respect to the Plaintiffs'
first claim, Judge Levy certified a class of all noncitizens who
are detained in ICE custody at the Calhoun County Correctional
Facility.  With respect to the Plaintiffs' second claim, she
certified a habeas litigation group of all noncitizens who are
detained in ICE custody in the Calhoun County Correctional Center,
and who have one or more medical risk factors placing them at
heightened risk of severe illness or death if exposed to COVID-19.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 31, 2020 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y59sj36a from Leagle.com.


MIELE INCORPORATED: Williams Suit Moved From S.D.N.Y. to N.D. Cal.
------------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled PAMELA WILLIAMS, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated v. MIELE, INCORPORATED, Case No.
1:20-cv-04794, was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California on October 22, 2020.

The Clerk of Court for the Northern District of California assigned
Case No. 3:20-cv-07329-LB to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendant's alleged violations of the
Americans with Disabilities Act and the New York City Human Rights
Law by failing to design, construct, maintain, and operate its Web
site, www.mieleusa.com, to be fully accessible to and independently
usable by the Plaintiff and other blind or visually-impaired
persons.

Miele, Incorporated is a home appliance company based in New
Jersey. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                    
         
         David P. Force, Esq.
         STEIN SAKS, PLLC
         285 Passaic Street
         Hackensack, NJ 07601
         Telephone: (201) 282-6500
         Facsimile: (201) 282-6501
         E-mail: dforce@steinsakslegal.com

MONDELEZ GLOBAL: Court Dismisses Harris Suit with Prejudice
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHARLES HARRIS, et al., individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. MONDELEZ GLOBAL LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-2249 (ERK) (RER) (E.D. N.Y.), Judge
Edward R. Korman of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss with
prejudice.

The Purchasers of Oreo cookies allege that the manufacturer has
misleadingly stated on the front packaging label that the cookies
are "Always Made With Real Cocoa," even though the cocoa has been
refined through an alkalizing process.  They claim that the
addition of alkali diminishes the quality and taste of the cocoa
and that a reasonable consumer would understand "real cocoa" to
refer to cocoa in an "unadulterated, non-artificially processed
form."  They further allege that Oreos are sold at a price premium
as a result of the misleading representation.

The Plaintiffs are consumers from twelve states who purchased the
Defendant's well-known Oreo cookies.  They allege that they were
misled by the representation on the Oreos' front label that the
cookies are "Always Made With Real Cocoa."  Specifically, they
claim that the text is misleading because the cocoa used in the
cookies is "highly processed and modified" with alkali.  In
Plaintiffs' view, the Defendant's failure to caveat that the cocoa
is processed with alkali is misleading to a reasonable consumer.
Rather, they allege that reasonable consumers expect 'real cocoa'
to be a quality of cocoa that is not processed with alkali.

As the Plaintiffs explain, cocoa powder can be mixed with alkali
ingredients to make the cocoa less acidic, which makes the taste of
the cocoa milder.  They claim that the representation 'real cocoa'
is false, deceptive and misleading because consumers expect 'real
cocoa' to indicate a higher quality cocoa than had the ingredient
merely been accurately identified as 'cocoa.'  Additionally, they
allege that unalkalized cocoa is commercially available and has
certain health benefits.

The Plaintiffs assert claims under statutes from 40 states and the
District of Columbia prohibiting deceptive or misleading business
practices, as well as a claim for unjust enrichment.  They have
withdrawn their claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and
breach of warranty.  They seek damages and injunctive relief on
behalf of a putative nationwide class and on behalf of subclasses
for the states of each named Plaintiff.

Although the Plaintiffs allege violations of consumer protection
statutes from 40 states and the District of Columbia, the parties
agree that the critical issue for resolving the motion is whether a
reasonable consumer would be misled by the Defendant's statement
that its Oreos are "Always Made With Real Cocoa."  The Plaintiffs
argue that reasonable consumers are misled by the claim that the
cookies are made with "real" cocoa and therefore would not expect
that the cocoa has been adulterated, processed with alkali, or
modified from its real nature.

Judge Korman dismisses the Plaintiffs' claims for failure to allege
a statement that would mislead a reasonable consumer.  The Judge
holds that it is not misleading for the Defendant to represent that
its Oreos are made with "real" cocoa when they in fact contain
cocoa.  

The crux of the Plaintiffs' claim is not that the label
misrepresents the quantity or proportion of cocoa; they allege that
the cocoa it contains is not "real" in light of the application of
alkali.  The Plaintiffs do not allege, for example, that the amount
of cocoa is de minimis relative to the amount of alkali.  Their
claims are trained on whether the product contains cocoa that is
real, and the Oreos indisputably do contain cocoa, along with other
ingredients.  There is no 'only' or 'exclusively' modifier before
the phrase "real cocoa."  In that context, reasonable consumers
would not expect, upon learning that the Oreos contain cocoa, that
the cocoa is present in a particular form or not mixed with other
ingredients.

Because the Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim is premised on the
same theory of misrepresentation the Judge has rejected, that claim
likewise fails.  The claim is pleaded in a single sentence alleging
that Defendant was unjustly enriched because the Products were not
as represented and expected.  Where a deceptive trade practices
claim fails for failure to allege deception, an unjust enrichment
claim fails, too.

The Plaintiffs request leave to amend in the event the Defendant's
motion is granted, but offer no explanation of what new allegations
might be added.  A plaintiff need not be given leave to amend if it
fails to specify how amendment would cure the pleading deficiencies
in its complaint.  Because the Plaintiffs' substantive problem
could not be cured through better pleadings, the Judge denies leave
to amend as futile.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Korman granted the Defendant's motion
to dismiss with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 28, 2020 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y3ovpf59 from Leagle.com.


MONTANA: Summary Judgment Order in Brooke Suit Affirmed
-------------------------------------------------------
In the case, NICK BROOKE, ETHAN LERMAN, and BRIAN WEST,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Petitioners and Appellants, v. STATE OF MONTANA, STEVE BULLOCK, in
his official capacity as Governor; and RHONDA SCHAFFER, in her
official capacity as the Director of the Office of the State Public
Defender, Respondents and Appellees, Case No. DA 19-050 (Mont.), a
five-judge panel of the Supreme Court of Montana affirmed the First
Judicial District Court's order (i) granting the State's motion for
summary judgment, and (ii) denying the Appellants' motion for
partial summary judgment.

On May 10, 2018, the Appellants filed a class action complaint
against the State of Montana, Gov. Steve Bullock, and the director
of the Office of the State Public Defender ("OPD") Rhonda Schaffer
seeking declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages for
breach of contract and violation of the Contract Clause, Article
II, Section 31, of the Montana Constitution.  The Appellants are
attorneys who contract with OPD to provide legal services for
indigent clients.  They represent clients for whom OPD employees
cannot provide legal representation due to conflict, lack of
resources, or other reasons.

To become an OPD contract attorney, a licensed Montana attorney
signs a contract, referred to as a Memorandum of Understanding
("MOU"), with OPD.  After the MOU is signed by the attorney and
approved by a representative of OPD, OPD assigns cases to the
attorney and pays the attorney in accordance with a fee schedule
attached to the MOU.

OPD relies on biennial legislative appropriations to fund its
operations and fulfill its mission of affording counsel to indigent
criminal defendants and others entitled to legal counsel at public
expense.  Until June 30, 2019, OPD operated on appropriations made
during the 2017 legislative session.  OPD's budget for that
biennium was $32 million.  

OPD determined it was facing a shortfall of over $7 million if it
did not cut costs.  On Jan, 29, 2018, OPD notified its contract
attorneys by email that it proposed to reduce rates for all
contracted services effective March 1, 2018.  It also proposed to
reduce the hourly rate for travel time from $62 to $20.  OPD
invited public comment and held two public meeting.

On March 22, 2018, OPD announced the final rate changes and
notified contract attorneys by email.  It reduced the hourly rate
of pay for contracted legal services from $62 to $56 per hour,
nearly a 10% reduction.  Pay for case-related travel time was
reduced from $62 to $45 per hour.  The reduced rates were effective
for any services rendered on or after April 1, 2018.  Each of the
Appellants had existing cases at the time of OPD's rate changes.
The Appellants continued their existing cases despite the newly
reduced rates.

On Oct. 17, 2018, the State filed a motion for summary judgment
based on legal interpretation of the MOU under contract law.  The
Appellants filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment asking
the court to rule, as a matter of law, that the Defendants are
liable for breach of contract or violation of the Contract Clause.


On June 27, 2019, the District Court granted the State's summary
judgment motion, finding that the OPD did not breach its contract
since the MOU specifically identified that the fee arrangement was
subject to change by the Director upon notice.  Regarding the
Contract Clause claim, it found OPD had administrative discretion
to reduce the rates to address budget issues since the Clause
regulates legislative action, not the decisions of administrators,
and OPD's decision was not compelled by the Legislature, citing
Smith v. Sorensen.

The Appellants appeal.  The Court addresses the following issue on
appeal: Whether a provision in the Office of the State Public
Defender's contract with private attorneys specifying that hourly
compensation rates can be unilaterally changed by the State permits
prospective changes to a contract attorney's compensation rate for
existing cases.

The Appellants contend OPD breached its contract by failing to pay
them the hourly rate in effect at the time a case was accepted
through the duration of representation on the case.  They argue
that the MOU's language regarding compensation is ambiguous and
that by failing to pay them the compensation rate that was in
effect at the time they agreed to take on an assigned case, OPD
breached the contract.  They also argue the District Court's
interpretation of the MOU renders it illusory since it gives the
Director unlimited discretion to alter compensation rates.
Alternatively, th eAppellants argue that the District Court's
interpretation of the MOU results in giving the Director of OPD
unlimited discretion to modify the compensation rates rendering its
promise to pay contract attorneys illusory.

The State Supreme Court concludes that the District Court did not
err in granting the State's motion for summary judgment.  Nothing
in the MOU indicates that the compensation rates are locked in
place for the duration of the contract attorney's representation.
The MOU's language clearly provides for prospective modification of
compensation rates at the OPD Director's discretion.  The
discretion to change the compensation rates is limited by both
Montana statute, Section 47-1-121, MCA, and the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.  However, budget shortfalls compelling
contract rate changes violates neither.  For these reasons, State
Supreme Court affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 28, 2020 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/y5cwo82t from Leagle.com.

Sean M. Morris, Jesse C. Kodadek, Worden Thane P.C., Missoula,
Montana, for Appellants.

Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Christopher D. Abbott,
Assistant Attorney General, Agency Legal Services Bureau, Helena,
Montana.

Raphael J.C. Graybill, Special Assistant Attorney General, Chief
Legal Counsel, Office of the Governor, Helena, Montana.

Michael P. Manion, Special Assistant Attorney General, Chief Legal
Counsel, Department of Administration, Helena, Montana, for
Appellees.


MOUNTAIRE FARMS: Interlocutory Appeal Cert. in Cuppels Suit Refused
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, STATE OF DELAWARE, DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES &
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL, Third Party Petitioner Below, Appellant, v.
GARY and ANNA-MARIE CUPPELS, Plaintiffs Below, Appellee, Case No.
212, 2020 (Del.), Judge Gary F. Traynor of the Supreme Court of
Delaware refused the State of Delaware Department of Natural
Resources & Environmental Control's application for certification
of an interlocutory appeal.

The Appellant-third party petitioner, the Department of Natural
Resources & Environmental Control (DNREC) has petitioned the Court
under Supreme Court Rule 42 to accept an interlocutory appeal from
a Superior Court opinion and order, dated April 14, 2020, denying
its motion to quash subpoenas served by the Plaintiffs-Appellees,
Gary and Anna-Marie Cuppels.

The case is one of several cases arising from Defendant-Appellee
Mountaire Farms of Delaware, Inc.'s disposal of waste at its
poultry processing plant in Millsboro.  In the class-action
lawsuit, the Cuppels allege that they suffered property damage and
personal injuries as a result of Mountaire Delaware's improper and
unlawful waste disposal.  The Cuppels have asserted tort claims
against Mountaire Delaware, Mountaire Corp., and Mountaire Farms
Inc.

The other cases were filed by DNREC.  In DNREC v. Mountaire Farms
of Delaware, Inc., C.A. No. 18-838 (D. Del.) ("Federal DNREC
Action"), DNREC alleged that Mountaire Delaware violated federal
environmental laws in its disposal of waste.  DNREC informed the
District Court in late 2019 that DNREC and Mountaire had executed a
settlement agreement and filed the agreement for entry as a consent
decree.  The Cuppels, who were permitted to intervene in the
Federal DNREC Action, object to the proposed consent decree.

In DNREC v. Mountaire Farms of Delaware, Inc., C.A. No. S18M-06-002
("State DNREC Action"), DNREC alleged that Mountaire Delaware
violated State environmental laws and permits in its disposal of
waste. DNREC filed a consent decree with the complaint.  The
Cuppels moved to intervene in the State DNREC Action, but the
Superior Court stayed that case pending resolution of the Federal
DNREC Action without deciding the motion to intervene.

In the course of the litigation, the Cuppels served a subpoena upon
DNREC for all documents from July 1, 2017 to the present, in the
possession or control of five DNREC employees, that related to the
Millsboro plant's wastewater, sludge facilities, groundwater, and
nearby wells.  They also served subpoenas for depositions of the
five DNREC employees named in the document subpoena.

DNREC filed motions to quash the subpoenas or in the alternative
for a protective order.  In the motions, DNREC argued that: (i) it
had already produced many documents from before July 1, 2017 in
response to requests that the Cuppels made under the Delaware
Freedom of Information Act; (ii) the subpoenas sought investigatory
files and information protected from disclosure by Section
10002(l)(3) and D.R.E. 508(b); (iii) it should not be compelled to
produce information protected by the attorney-client privilege,
work product doctrine, or D.R.E. 408; and (iv) the subpoena was
unduly burdensome to DNREC.  

The Cuppels opposed the motions.

The Superior Court denied the motions.  On April 14, 2020, the
Superior Court issued an opinion further explaining its reasoning
for the denial of the motions.

On June 29, 2020, DNREC filed an application for certification of
an interlocutory appeal.  Mountaire supported the application.  The
Cuppels opposed the application.  On July 14, 2020, the Superior
Court denied the application for certification.

In denying the application for certification, the Superior Court
questioned whether a non-party may pursue an interlocutory appeal,
but proceeded to consider the Rule 42 criteria.  It acknowledged
that the discoverability of the subpoenaed information was an
important and substantial issue to DNREC, but expressed concern
that appellate review would unduly delay the litigation to the
detriment of the parties.  As to the Rule 42(b)(iii) criteria, the
Superior Court concluded that interlocutory review was not in the
interests of justice because it would result in substantial and
serious delay for the parties to the litigation.

Applications for interlocutory review are addressed to the sound
discretion of the Court.  Even assuming a non-party may pursue an
interlocutory appeal, Judge Traynor has concluded that the
application for interlocutory review does not meet the strict
standards for certification under Supreme Court Rule 42(b).
Exceptional circumstances that would merit interlocutory review of
the Superior Court's interlocutory opinion do not exist in the
case, and the potential benefits of interlocutory review do not
outweigh the inefficiency, disruption, and probable costs caused by
an interlocutory appeal.

For these reasons, Judge Traynor refused the interlocutory appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 28, 2020 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y489ts2x from Leagle.com.


MRS BPO: Faces Pugh TCPA Suit Over Unsolicited Telephone Calls
--------------------------------------------------------------
STEVEN PUGH, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. MRS BPO, LLC d/b/a MRS ASSOCIATES, DOES 1
through 10, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 3:20-cv-02075-MMA-LL
(S.D. Cal., October 21, 2020) brings this class action complaint
against the Defendants for their alleged negligent and willful
violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

The Plaintiff claims that he was contacted by the Defendants on his
cellular telephone (619) 453-2318 beginning during or around June
2019 in an attempt to sell or solicit its services. The Plaintiff
contends that he did not provide the Defendants with his prior
express consent to be contacted using an automatic telephone
dialing system or an "artificial or prerecorded voice."

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff and other similarly
situated persons were harmed by the unlawful conduct of the
Defendants causing them to incur certain charges or reduced
telephone time for which they had previously paid, and invasion of
their privacy.

MRS BPO, LLC is a collections company. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Meghan E. George, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Tel: (323) 306-4234
          Fax: (866) 633-0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                  mgeorge@toddflaw.com
                  abacon@toddflaw.com


NEWREZ LLC: Court Denies Dismissal of Labrecque RESPA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Richard J. Labrecque, Plaintiff, v. NewRez LLC,
Defendant, Case No. CV-19-00465-TUC-RCC (EJM) (D. Ariz.), Judge
Raner C. Collins of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Arizona denied the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant was required to pay
Plaintiff's property taxes from Plaintiff's escrow account.  The
Defendant did not pay in a timely manner, causing late charges to
accrue.  Despite repeated assurances that the Plaintiff would not
be responsible for the incurred fees, the Defendant paid the
overdue fees out of his escrow funds.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover for the erroneously charged funds;
for himself and for others similarly situated.  Plaintiff alleges
the Defendant violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
("RESPA"), raises allegations of unjust enrichment and conversion,
and seeks declaratory judgment.

On June 16, 2020, Magistrate Judge Eric J. Markovich issued a
Report and Recommendation ("R&R") in which he recommended the Court
deny the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.  Judge Markovich notified
the parties they had 14 days from the date of the R&R to file
objections and an additional 14 days to file a response.  The
Defendant filed an objection to the R&R, and the Plaintiff a
response.  The Defendant does not object to the Magistrate Judge's
statement of facts.

The Defendant first argues that the Plaintiff's claim for a
violation of the RESPA should be dismissed because the RESPA does
not permit a private right of action.  It believes that the
Magistrate Judge erred and expanded the permissible actions under
Section 2605 beyond those which were intended and interpreted in
case law.  It points to several cases that permit a private right
of action under other circumstances but uses these cases to support
its contention that subsection (g) does not provide for such
relief.  

Judge Collins finds it incorrect.  The Judge says while the cited
case law may directly address other instances in which a private
action may proceed, the cases also suggest that a suit under any
subsection of Section 2605 is permissible, and they do not
specifically preclude a right of action under subsection (g).  The
Defendant's argument is not persuasive, and Judge Collins agrees
with the Magistrate Judge that Section 2605 is "broadly actionable"
and the plain language permits a private right of action under 12
U.S.C. Section 2605(g).

Because he agrees that a private right exists under RESPA, like the
Magistrate Judge, Judge Collins concludes that granting a motion to
dismiss the Plaintiff's attempt to obtain declaratory relief is
inappropriate.

Judge Collins also finds that the Plaintiff has a legal remedy
under RESPA, therefore the Plaintiff cannot also seek relief under
a theory of unjust enrichment.  Therefore, this count will be
dismissed.

The Defendant has not challenged the Magistrate Judge's
determination that the Plaintiff has pleaded a viable allegation of
conversion.  Judge Collins has reviewed the Magistrate Judge's
analysis and finds that the conversion claim should proceed.  

First, Judge Collins finds that the Plaintiffs do not dispute that
the Court has no general jurisdiction over the Defendants.
Furthermore, it appears that the only connection between the
Defendant's actions and putative non-resident Plaintiff's injury is
the allegation that the Arizona resident Plaintiffs suffered
similar injury in this state.  At a glance, it appears the Court
does not have specific jurisdiction over the Defendant as to the
non-resident Plaintiffs.

Second, Judge Collins cannot find that the Magistrate Judge erred
in his determination that the circuit has repeatedly declined to
extend BMS to class actions with unnamed plaintiffs and in the
instance the Court could exercise jurisdiction over Defendant as to
the putative, non-resident, class action claims.  Courts in the
Ninth Circuit do not support extending BMS to class actions.
Furthermore, most of the Defendant's citations are drawn from the
Northern District of Illinois and build off of one another, are
from a district court's dissent, or constitute dicta.  Judge
Collins will not, therefore, strike to class action allegations and
dismissal is inappropriate at this juncture.

Finally, the Defendant also argues that the Magistrate Judge
erroneously combined the standards for a motion to dismiss with the
standards for class certification when deciding not to strike the
nationwide class action claims.  Judge Collins disagrees.  Judge
Collins holds that the Complaint's class allegations request that
the class action members include all persons with loans serviced by
Shellpoint in which Shellpoint within the applicable limitations
period failed to make timely payment of taxes from their
non-delinquent escrow account."

In general, for class certification, a litigant must present claims
that share numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy of
representation, predominance, and superiority of class action over
individual actions.  Based on the allegations, and taking the facts
in favor of the Plaintiff, the numerous putative class litigants
have a common claim, the Plaintiff may be able to adequately
represent the others' interests, and the simplicity of the
allegations may be more easily handled through a class action.
However, Judge Collins agrees with the Magistrate Judge; it is too
soon to tell.  Further discovery is necessary to provide the
Plaintiff with a fair chance at presenting the class allegations
and for the Defendants to argue against.  Striking the class
allegations and dismissing the putative Plaintiffs is premature.

Accordingly, Judge Collins adopted the R&R.  Judge Collins denied
the Motion to Dismiss and dismissed the Plaintiff's unjust
enrichment claim.  All other claims for relief may proceed.  

The matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Eric J. Markovich for
all pretrial proceedings and a report and recommendation in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P. 72,
and 72.2. of the Rules of Practice of the U.S. District Court for
the District of Arizona.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 28, 2020 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y66bt72j from Leagle.com.


NIKOLA CORP: Kessler Topaz Reminds of Nov. 16 Deadline
------------------------------------------------------
The law firm of Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP reminds Nikola
Corporation (NASDAQ: NKLA, NKLAW) ("Nikola") investors that a
securities fraud class action lawsuit has been filed in the United
States District Court for the District of Arizona against Nikola on
behalf of those who purchased or otherwise acquired Nikola
securities between March 3, 2020 and September 20, 2020, inclusive
(the "Class Period").

Important Deadline Reminder: Investors who purchased or otherwise
acquired Nikola securities during the Class Period may, no later
than November 16, 2020, seek to be appointed as a lead plaintiff
representative of the class. For additional information or to learn
how to participate in this litigation please click
https://www.ktmc.com/nikola-corporation-class-action?utm_source=PR&utm_medium=link&utm_campaign=nikola.

According to the complaint, Nikola operates as an integrated zero
emissions transportation systems provider, which designs and
manufactures battery-electric and hydrogen-electric vehicles,
electric vehicle drivetrains, vehicle components, energy storage
systems, and hydrogen fueling station infrastructure. The merger of
VectoIQ and Nikola closed on June 3, 2020.

The Class Period commences on March 3, 2020 when Nikola issued a
press release entitled, "Nikola Corporation, a Global Leader in
Zero Emissions Transportation Solutions, to Be Listed on NASDAQ
Through a Merger with VectoIQ." In connection with the merger
announcement, Nikola released an investor presentation on March 3,
2020, which touted Nikola founder and Executive Chairman Trevor R.
Milton's ("Milton") experience in the clean energy and technology
field and Nikola's hydrogen production capabilities.

The complaint alleges that, on September 10, 2020, before market
hours, Hindenburg Research published a report describing, among
other things, how: (i) Nikola claims to design key components in
house, but they appear to simply be buying or licensing them from
third parties; (ii) Nikola has not produced hydrogen; (iii) a
spokesman for Powercell AB, a hydrogen fuel cell technology company
that formerly partnered with Nikola, called Nikola's battery and
hydrogen fuel cell claims "hot air"; (iv) Nikola staged a "test"
video for its Nikola Two (a prototype truck); (v) some of Nikola's
team, including Milton, are not experts and do not have relevant
experience; and (vi) Nikola did not have five Tre trucks completed.
Following this news, shares of Nikola fell $10.24, or 24%, over the
next two trading days, to close at $32.13 per share on September
11, 2020.

Then, on September 15, 2020, before trading hours, Hindenburg
Research published another report, focused on Nikola's responses
and nonresponses to its initial report, entitled "We View Nikola's
Response As a Tacit Admission of Securities Fraud." Following this
news, shares of Nikola fell $2.96, or 8%, to close at $32.83 per
share on September 15, 2020.

Finally, on September 20, 2020, Nikola issued a press release
entitled "Nikola Board of Directors Announces Leadership
Transition: Trevor Milton Steps Down as Executive Chairman; Stephen
Girsky Appointed Chairman of the Board." Following this news, the
price of Nikola's shares fell in pre-market trading on September
21, 2020, further damaging investors.

The complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, the
defendants made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose that: (1) VectoIQ did not engage in proper due diligence
regarding its merger with Nikola; (2) Nikola overstated its
"in-house" design, manufacturing, and testing capabilities; (3)
Nikola overstated its hydrogen production capabilities; (4) as a
result, Nikola overstated its ability to lower the cost of hydrogen
fuel; (5) Milton tweeted a misleading "test" video of the Nikola
Two truck; (6) the work experience and background of key Nikola
employees, including Milton, had been overstated and obfuscated;
(7) Nikola did not have five Tre trucks completed; and (8) as a
result, the defendants' public statements were false and/or
misleading at all relevant times.

If you wish to discuss this securities fraud class action lawsuit
or have any questions concerning this notice or your rights or
interests with respect to this litigation, please contact Kessler
Topaz Meltzer & Check (James Maro, Jr., Esq. or Adrienne Bell,
Esq.) at (844) 877-9500 (toll free) or (610) 667–7706, or via
e-mail at info@ktmc.com.

Nikola investors may, no later than November 16, 2020, seek to be
appointed as a lead plaintiff representative of the class through
Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, or other counsel, or may choose to
do nothing and remain an absent class member.  A lead plaintiff is
a representative party who acts on behalf of all class members in
directing the litigation.  In order to be appointed as a lead
plaintiff, the Court must determine that the class member's claim
is typical of the claims of other class members, and that the class
member will adequately represent the class.  Your ability to share
in any recovery is not affected by the decision of whether or not
to serve as a lead plaintiff.

Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check prosecutes class actions in state and
federal courts throughout the country involving securities fraud,
breaches of fiduciary duties and other violations of state and
federal law. Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check is a driving force
behind corporate governance reform, and has recovered billions of
dollars on behalf of institutional and individual investors from
the United States and around the world.  The firm represents
investors, consumers and whistleblowers (private citizens who
report fraudulent practices against the government and share in the
recovery of government dollars).  The complaint in this action was
not filed by Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check.  [GN]

NIKOLA CORPORATION: Johnson Fistel Reminds of Nov. 16 Deadline
--------------------------------------------------------------
Shareholder rights law firm Johnson Fistel, LLP reminds investors
that a class action lawsuit has been filed against Nikola
Corporation ("Nikola or the "Company") (NASDAQ: NKLA) on behalf of
all purchasers of common stock during the period between March 3,
2020 and September 15, 2020, inclusive (the "Class Period").

If you wish to serve as a lead plaintiff, you must move the Court
no later than November 16, 2020. If you want to discuss this action
or have any questions concerning this notice, please contact lead
analyst Jim Baker (jimb@johnsonfistel.com) at 619-814-4471. If you
email, please include your phone number.

The complaint alleges that during the Class Period, defendants
throughout the Class Period made false and misleading statements
and failed to disclose that: (1) VectoIQ did not engage in proper
due diligence regarding its merger with Nikola; (2) Nikola
overstated its "in-house" design, manufacturing, and testing
capabilities; (3) Nikola overstated its hydrogen production
capabilities; (4) as a result, Nikola overstated its ability to
lower the cost of hydrogen fuel; (5) Nikola founder and Executive
Chairman, Trevor Milton, tweeted a misleading "test" video of the
Company's Nikola Two truck; (6) the work experience and background
of key Nikola employees, including Mr. Milton, had been overstated
and obfuscated; (7) Nikola did not have five Tre trucks completed;
and (8) as a result, defendants' public statements were materially
false and misleading at all relevant times. According to the suit,
these true details were disclosed by a market research firm.

On September 14, 2020, media outlets reported Nikola is facing a
probe by the SEC and the DOJ. Then on September 20, 2020, Nikola
announced that Trevor Milton, its founder stepped down as executive
chairman.

                 About Johnson Fistel

Johnson Fistel, LLP is a nationally recognized shareholder rights
law firm with offices in California, New York and Georgia. The firm
represents individual and institutional investors in shareholder
derivative and securities class action lawsuits. For more
information about the firm and its attorneys, please visit
http://www.johnsonfistel.com.Attorney advertising. Past results do
not guarantee future outcomes.

         Jim Baker
         Johnson Fistel, LLP
         Tel No: 619-814-4471
         E-mail: jimb@johnsonfistel.com [GN]

NMG LONG: Faces Jones TCPA Suit Over Unsolicited Text Messages
--------------------------------------------------------------
ANGELA JONES, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. NMG LONG BEACH, LLC d/b/a Showgrow, a
California Limited Liability Company, Defendant, Case No.
2:20-cv-09595 (C.D. Cal., October 20, 2020) is a class action
complaint brought against the Defendant for its alleged violation
of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff has been receiving
numerous telemarketing text messages to his cellular telephone
number ending in 0844 from the Defendant over the past two years.
The Defendant purportedly used an automatic telephone dialing
system in transmitting the telemarketing text messages without
obtaining the Plaintiff's express written consent to be contacted
using an ATDS.

NMG Long Beach, LLC sells cannabis and cannabis product. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
          EDELSBERG LAW, P.A.
          20900 NE 30th Ave., Suite 417
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Tel: (305) 975-3320
          E-mail: scott@edelsberglaw.com


NORTH CENTRAL: Compton Sues Over Drivers' Unreimbursed Expenses
---------------------------------------------------------------
MICHAEL DEREK COMPTON, individually and on behalf of other
similarly situated persons, Plaintiff v. NORTH CENTRAL VIRGINIA
RESTAURANTS, INC. d/b/a "Papa John's Pizza," Defendant, Case No.
5:20-cv-00073-TTC (W.D. Va., October 19, 2020) is a collective
action complaint brought against the Defendant for its alleged
flawed reimbursement policy in violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

The Plaintiff was hired by the Defendant as a delivery driver from
about August 2019 to September 2020 at its Papa John's stores in
Waynesboro, Virginia and Stanton, Virginia.

According to the complaint, the Defendant required the Plaintiff
and other similarly situated delivery drivers to maintain and pay
for safe, legally-operable, and insured automobiles when delivering
pizza and other food items. As a result, the Plaintiff and other
similarly situated delivery drivers have incurred work-related
expenses that include gasoline, vehicle parts and fluids, repair
and maintenance services, insurance, depreciation, and other
automobile expenses.

The Defendant, however, employed a reimbursement policy which
reimburses delivery drivers on a per-delivery basis resulting in a
per-mile reimbursement far below the Internal Revenue Service
business mileage reimbursement rate or a much less than a
reasonable approximation of its delivery drivers' automobile
expenses.

North Central Virginia Restaurants, Inc. operates approximately 22
Papa John's franchise stores in Virginia, Maryland and West
Virginia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Cary Powell Moseley, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF CARY POWELL MOSELEY, PLLC
          401 Otey Street
          Bedford, VA 24523
          Tel: (540) 583-5362
          E-mail: cary@carymoseley.com

                - and –

          Mark A. Potashnick, Esq.
          WEINHAUS & POTASHNICK
          11500 Olive Blvd., Suite 133
          St. Louis, MO 63141
          Tel: (314) 997-9150
          E-mail: markp@wp-attorneys.com

                - and –

          Kevin J. Dolley, Esq.
          DOLLEY LAW, LLC
          12977 N. Outer Forty Drive, Suite 230
          St. Louis, MO 63141
          Tel: (314) 645-4100
          E-mail: kevin@dolleylaw.com


OHIO STATE TEACHERS: Dismissal of Amended Dennis Suit Recommended
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DEAN DENNIS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. STATE TEACHERS
RETIREMENT BOARD, et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00386 (S.D.
Ohio), Magistrate Judge Stephanie K. Bowman of the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division,
recommended that the motions filed by Ohio State Teachers
Retirement Board ("STRB") and the 10 Individual Board members to
dismiss the Plaintiffs' amended complaint be granted.

Plaintiffs Dennis and Robert Buerkle, though counsel, initiated the
putative class action against STRB on May 23, 2019.  After the
Defendant STRB moved to dismiss the original complaint, the
Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on Aug. 26, 2019.  The
amended complaint names the 10 individual Board members ("Board
members").  Both the Board and the individual Board members have
filed motions to dismiss the amended complaint, to which the
Plaintiffs have filed responses, and the Defendants have replied.

The Plaintiffs are retired public school teachers.  STRB
administers the State Teachers Retirement System ("STRS"), which is
a public retirement system in which the Plaintiffs are enrolled.
The Plaintiffs seek damages as well as declaratory and injunctive
relief for themselves and all similarly situated persons in the
form of reinstatement of a 2% annual cost of living allowance
("COLA") that was reduced to 0% by STRB on July 1, 2017.  They
allege that they had an unconditional, contractual right to the
COLA, and/or a constitutionally protected property interest in the
COLA.  They further allege that the COLA could not be reduced below
2% unless the Board's actuary determined (in a specific, designated
report) that a reduction was necessary to preserve the fiscal
integrity of the system.

The Plaintiffs allege that as of Aug. 1, 2013, they were given a
"vested right" to an annual COLA for all then-current retirees,
pursuant to O.R.C. Section 3307.42(A).  Based upon the definition
of "allowance" as including the pension plus the annuity, or any
other payment under the STRS defined benefit plan, the Plaintiffs
assert that the annual COLA became an integral part of their vested
"allowance."

In its motion to dismiss, STRB argues that the Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction because the Board is entitled to immunity from
suit under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution.  Alternatively, they argue that the Plaintiffs have
failed to allege any plausible basis for the existence of a
constitutionally protected contractual or property interest.  STRB
cites to legislative history in the 2012 enactment of the COLA
statute that expressly states that no member has a legitimate
expectation of any particular future cost-of-living adjustment
under Ohio law.  The individual Board members present additional
arguments based upon the fact that they have been sued in their
individual capacities.

In Guertin v. State, the Sixth Circuit rejected a claim by the City
of Flint that it was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity
because Michigan had taken over some of the City's administrative
functions on an emergency basis based upon the City's insolvency.
In rejecting the City's argument, the court reiterated the four
factors to be considered in determining whether an entity or agency
is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity under established case
law: (1) the State's potential liability for a judgment against the
entity; (2) the language by which state statutes, and state courts
refer to the entity and the degree of state control and veto power
over the entity's actions; (3) whether state or local officials
appoint the board members of the entity; and (4) whether the
entity's functions fall within the traditional purview of state or
local government.

The Plaintiffs urge the Court to reject the reasoning of Appeal of
Ford, Ashmus v. Bay Vill. City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., and State
ex rel. Schumacher v. State Teachers Ret. Bd., as inconsistent with
the Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit's emphasis on the liability of
the State for a judgment as the "foremost" of the four factors used
to determine Eleventh Amendment immunity.  Although the Plaintiffs
concede that the first factor can be overcome by the remaining
three factors, they argue that the presumption is not rebutted.
For its part, STRB insists that not only should the Court follows
the lead of other courts that have decided the same issue, but that
all four factors favor a conclusion that it is entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity.

Magistrate Judge Bowman finds that STRB has presented a relatively
strong case that the statutory scheme as written and in practice
results in the "potential" liability of the State treasury for
additional employer contributions to STRS.  Considering the case
law of other jurisdictions on the issue as well as the relevant
Ohio statutes, Appeal of Ford, Ashmus and Schumacher, the
Magistrate is persuaded that the first factor of the Eleventh
Amendment immunity analysis favors STRB.

Even if a reviewing court were to disagree with the undersigned's
analysis of the first factor relevant to the Eleventh Amendment
inquiry, STRB persuasively argues that analysis of the remaining
three factors overcomes any presumption that the State treasury
could not be impacted.  The fact that an instrumentality of the
state retains some autonomy does not outweigh the strong support
the factor provides in favor of immunity.  No local officials
appoint the members of the Board.  And the fact that STRS is not
directly funded through annual appropriations does not sufficiently
differentiate it from other state-wide retirement funds established
for the benefit of the state.

Relying on a series of statutory provisions, the Plaintiffs argue
that Ohio has waived immunity for STRB.  They assert that the
"implication" is that Ohio intended to waive immunity in both state
and federal courts.  Leaping from state court to federal court and
over geographical boundaries, the Plaintiffs further reason that
because the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
has a court in Franklin County, suit is valid in the federal
Court.

In order to waive immunity from suit in federal court, however, a
State must either "voluntarily invoke" federal jurisdiction, or
else make a clear declaration' that it intends to submit itself to
federal jurisdiction.  The Supreme Court flatly rejected the notion
that a "clear declaration" of waiver could be construed or implied
as the Plaintiffs suggest.  Accordingly, Ohio has not consented to
suit against STRB in the federal court.

In the Board Members' Motion, the Board members argue that even
though the Plaintiffs "purport" to sue them in their individual
capacities, the only allegations against them pertain to actions
taken collectively as the Board.  As such, they encourage the Court
to disregard the Plaintiffs' allegation that the Board members are
in fact being sued in their individual capacities, and to instead
conclude based on the substantive allegations that the Plaintiffs
claims are "actually asserted" against them in their official
capacity.

The Magistrate Judge finds that the Defendants' argument has some
facial appeal.  And to the extent that any reviewing court were to
accept it, the Magistrate Judge agrees that duplicative claims
against the individual Board members in their official capacities
are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.  However, it is one thing to
look beyond the caption of a complaint and quite another to ignore
allegations in a complaint in the context of a motion to dismiss.

The Magistrate Judge holds that the case law cited by the Board
members does not support the proposition that the Court may ignore
allegations that unambiguously confirm the Plaintiffs' intention to
sue the Board members in their individual capacities.  Multiple
counts are pleaded against the Board members individually rather
than STRB.  Also, the Plaintiffs allege that the individual Board
members "acted unlawfully" and "outside the scope of their
statutory authority" by rescinding the COLA.

Finally, the Board members also are entitled to qualified immunity
on all of the Plaintiffs' federal claims, including Count II
(Impairment of Contract), Count IV (Unconstitutional Taking), Count
VI (violation of procedural due process); and Count VII (violation
of substantive due process).  Qualified immunity protects
government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.  The Plaintiffs maintain that they have asserted several
bases for their alleged constitutional claims, including under the
Contract Clause, the Takings Clause, and the Due Process Clause
(both substantive and procedural).

The Magistrate Judge finds no significant body of case law to
suggest that a state pension-related COLA constitutes a type of
property interest to which due process attaches.  The Plaintiffs'
reliance on other statutory provisions does not clear things up to
the point that the constitutional rights asserted are "beyond
debate."  Having determined that the individual Board members are
entitled to qualified immunity, the Plaintiffs' state law claims
also should be dismissed.

Accordingly, for these reasons, Magistrate Judge Bowman recommends
that the motions to dismiss filed by both STRB and by the Board
members be granted in full, and that all claims be dismissed, with
the case to be terminated from the docket of the Court.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 28, 2020 Report &
Recommendation is available at https://tinyurl.com/y29tcbe3 from
Leagle.com.


OHIOHEALTH CORP: Underpays Services Officers, Melgard Suit Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The case, DANE MELGARD, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. OHIOHEALTH CORPORATION, Defendant, Case No.
2:20-cv-05322-SDM-CMV (S.D. Ohio, October 8, 2020) arises from the
Defendant's alleged unlawful pay and rounding policies and/or
practices in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff, who was employed by the Defendant as an hourly-paid,
non-exempt protective services officer from approximately September
2017 through approximately October 2020, alleges that the Defendant
failed to compensate his and other similarly situated officers'
seven minutes pre-shift and another seven minutes post-shift, which
are integral and indispensable work-related time spent resulted in
unpaid overtime.

OhioHealth Corporation operates a system of hospitals and
healthcare providers throughout Ohio. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew J.P. Coffman, Esq.
          Adam C. Gedling, Esq.
          COFFMAN LEGAL, LLC
          1550 Old Henderson Rd., Suite #126
          Columbus, OH 43220
          Tel: (614) 949-1181
          Fax: (614) 386-9964
          E-mail: mcoffman@mcoffmanlegal.com
                  agedling@mcoffmanlegal.com


OLD NORTHERN: Underpays Restaurant Servers, Giapitzaki Suit Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
MEA GIAPITZAKI, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. OLD NORTHERN BOULEVARD RESTAURANT, LLC d/b/a KYMA,
EIRINEOS CHRISTOU, MERKOURIOS ANGELIADES, and CHRISTOS
PANAGIOTOPOULOS, Defendants, Case No. 1:20-cv-04990 (E.D.N.Y.,
October 16, 2020) is a collective action complaint brought against
the Defendants for their alleged violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as a server at Kyma
Restaurant from 2013 until late 2018, when she was promoted as a
floor manager.

The Plaintiff contends that the Defendants illegally required him
and other similarly situated servers to share tips with bar manager
Herodotos Xenofontos. As a result, they were paid tip credit rate
lower than the regular New York minimum wage. Moreover, the
Defendants automatically deducted 30 minutes lunch break from each
of the Plaintiff's workdays although she did not take a 30-minute
break every workday.

Old Northern Boulevard Restaurant, LLC owns and operates the
restaurant Kyma Restaurant in Roslyn, NY. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          D. Maimon Kirschenbaum, Esq.
          JOSEPH & KIRSCHENBAUM LLP
          32 Broadway, Suite 601
          New York, NY 10004
          Tel: (212) 688-5640
          Fax: (212) 688-2548


ONESPAN INC: Pomerantz Law Reminds of Class Action
--------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP announces that a class action lawsuit has been filed
against OneSpan, Inc. ("OneSpan" or the "Company") (NASDAQ: OSPN)
and certain of its officers.   The class action, filed in United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division, and docketed under 20-cv-04906, is on behalf of a
class consisting of all persons other than Defendants who purchased
or otherwise acquired OneSpan securities between May 9, 2018, and
August 11, 2020, both dates inclusive (the "Class Period"), seeking
to recover damages caused by Defendants' violations of the federal
securities laws and to pursue remedies under Sections 10(b) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act")
and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, against the Company and
certain of its top officials.

If you are a shareholder who purchased OneSpan securities during
the class period, you have until October 19, 2020, to ask the Court
to appoint you as Lead Plaintiff for the class.  A copy of the
Complaint can be obtained at www.pomerantzlaw.com.   To discuss
this action, contact Robert S. Willoughby at newaction@pomlaw.com
or 888.476.6529 (or 888.4-POMLAW), toll-free, Ext. 7980. Those who
inquire by e-mail are encouraged to include their mailing address,
telephone number, and the number of shares purchased.

OneSpan was founded in 1991 and is headquartered in Chicago,
Illinois.  The Company was formerly known as VASCO Data Security
International, Inc. and changed its name to OneSpan Inc. in May
2018.  OneSpan, together with its subsidiaries, designs, develops
and markets digital solutions for identity, security, and business
productivity worldwide.

The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and misleading statements regarding the
Company's business, operational, and compliance policies.
Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (i) OneSpan had inadequate
disclosure controls and procedures and internal control over
financial reporting; (ii) as a result, OneSpan overstated its
revenue relating to certain contracts with customers involving
software licenses in its financial statements spread out over the
quarters from the first quarter of 2018 to the first quarter of
2020; (iii) as a result, it was foreseeably likely that the Company
would eventually have to delay one or more scheduled earnings
releases, conference calls, and/or financial filings with the SEC;
(iv) OneSpan downplayed the negative impacts of errors in its
financial statements; (v) all the foregoing, once revealed, was
foreseeably likely to have a material negative impact on the
Company's financial results and reputation; and (vi) as a result,
the Company's public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times.

On August 4, 2020, during pre-market hours, OneSpan postponed its
second-quarter 2020 earnings release and conference call by one
week, attributing the delay to prior period revenue recognition
problems relating to certain software license contracts spread out
over the quarters from the first quarter of 2018 to the first
quarter of 2020.  OneSpan further stated that "[t]he net contract
assets that originated from a portion of these contracts in prior
periods were not properly accounted for in subsequent periods,
which caused overstatements of revenue."

On this news, OneSpan's common share price fell $0.46 per share, or
1.40%, to close at $32.50 per share on August 4, 2020.

Then, on August 11, 2020, during after-market hours, OneSpan
disclosed that it would not timely file its quarterly report for
the quarter ended June 30, 2020, with the SEC; reported that same
quarter year-over-year revenues had declined; and withdrew its
full-year 2020 earnings guidance, which the Company had affirmed
one quarter earlier.

On this news, OneSpan's common share price fell $12.36 per share,
or 39.62%, to close at $18.84 per share on August 12, 2020.

The Pomerantz Firm, with offices in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles,
and Paris is acknowledged as one of the premier firms in the areas
of corporate, securities, and antitrust class litigation. Founded
by the late Abraham L. Pomerantz, known as the dean of the class
action bar, the Pomerantz Firm pioneered the field of securities
class actions. Today, more than 80 years later, the Pomerantz Firm
continues in the tradition he established, fighting for the rights
of the victims of securities fraud, breaches of fiduciary duty, and
corporate misconduct. The Firm has recovered numerous
multimillion-dollar damages awards on behalf of class members. [GN]

P.A.M. TRANSPORT: $16.5MM Settlement in Browne Gets Final Approval
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DAVID BROWNE, ANTONIO CALDWELL, and LUCRETIA HALL, on
behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
P.A.M. TRANSPORT, INC., Defendant, Case No. 5:16-CV-5366 (W.D.
Ark.), Judge Timothy L. Brooks of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Arkansas, Fayetteville Division, granted the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of Collective and Class
Action Settlement.

The litigation began nearly four years ago when the Named
Plaintiffs filed their complaint alleging claims under the Fair
Labor Standards Act and the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act, along with
some other collateral claims.  Over the course of the hard-fought
litigation, the Court certified class and collective actions of
over-the-road truck drivers employed by Defendant PAM.  Ultimately,
the parties in the case reached a Settlement Agreement in February
2020, on the eve of trial.  The Court gave preliminary approval to
the Agreement and ordered that notice of the settlement be provided
to all the class members, more than 16,000 over-the-road truck
drivers in all.  

Notice having gone out and the objection and opt-out periods having
expired, the Plaintiffs filed the instant unopposed Motion seeking
final approval of the Agreement, accompanied by a Brief in Support.


Judge Brooks opines that the Agreement is a fair, reasonable, and
equitable settlement.  The Judge is confident that there is a bona
fide dispute between the parties and that the settlement agreement
is the product of arm's length negotiations based on the merits of
the case.

The settlement agreement provides for the Plaintiffs' class counsel
to seek one-third of the total settlement amount to cover the
attorneys' fees in the matter, a total of $5.5 million.  In
considering the appropriate amount of attorney fees, courts in the
Eighth Circuit have considered the factors laid out in Johnson v.
Ga. Highway Express, Inc.

The Judge finds that all of the Johnson factors apply and all of
them weigh in favor of a finding that a one-third contingency fee
is appropriate in the case.  For example, the case was extremely
hard-fought.  The litigation stretched over nearly four years and
involved extensive motion practice, voluminous discovery, and
numerous depositions.  It presented novel questions of law.  The
Plaintiffs' counsel proved themselves to be highly skilled and
experienced in this particular area of litigation.  They took the
case on a contingent basis despite a significant risk that they
might not prevail or might not be able to collect the judgment in
full even if they did prevail.  Even adjusting downward the
reasonable hourly rate, resulting in a higher multiplier, the Judge
believes that the lodestar calculation supports the appropriateness
of the one-third contingency fee in the case.

As to service awards, the Judge recognizes that the Named
Plaintiffs are worthy of extraordinary recognition for their role
in the litigation and approves a service award of $40,000 to each
of the three Named Plaintiffs.  In declining to award the full
$50,000 requested by the Plaintiffs, he notes that the amount
awarded represents approximately $100 per hour each Named Plaintiff
spent on the case.  It is his position that it is appropriate
compensation and that any more would constitute a windfall.  The
Judge finds that the proposed service awards of $1,000 to the
Plaintiffs who sat for deposition and $2,500 to the Plaintiffs who
were prepared to appear and testify at trial are also appropriate.

Finally, the settlement agreement proposes that any unclaimed funds
from the settlement be donated to the St. Christopher Truckers
Development and Relief Fund.  The Judge believes that the St.
Christopher Fund is an appropriate cy pres recipient in the case,
as it provides support to truck drivers and their families who face
financial struggles because of injury or illness.  However, the
Judge concludes that a final decision regarding the distribution of
the residual amount in the settlement fund is better made when the
parties and the Court knows exactly what that amount is.  

Based on all these findings, Judge Brooks granted final approval of
the Class and Collective Settlement.  

The Defendant will cease charging $10 service fees for wage
advances and to stop withholding wages on payday due to late
paperwork.

The Claims Administrator will distribute the Settlement Fund to all
the Class Members Consistent with the Settlement, subject to any
modification directed by the Court.

The Judge granted:

   (i) the Class Counsel's requests for their reasonable attorneys'
fees of $5.5 million, representing 33 1/3% of the Settlement Fund;


  (ii) the Named Plaintiffs David Browne, Antonio Caldwell, and
Lucretia Hall modified service payments of $40,000;

(iii) Service Payments of $1,000 each to the Opt-in Plaintiffs who
sat for deposition, whose identities are provided in Section
3.3(A)(a) of the Settlement;

  (iv) Service Payments of $2,500 each to the Opt-in Plaintiffs who
sat for deposition and who had made arrangements to travel to
Arkansas to testify live at trial, whose identities are provided in
Section 3.3(A)(b) of the Settlement;

   (v) the Class Counsel's request for reimbursement of their
reasonable litigation costs of $600,000; and

  (vi) the Claims Administrator its reasonable fees and costs
incurred in providing notice of and administering the settlement to
be paid from the Settlement Fund in accordance with the Settlement
Agreement, not to exceed $124,500.

After one year of the final settlement check being issued, the
parties submit to the Court information as to any unclaimed funds
remaining in the Settlement Fund and the best allocation of those
funds - either distribution among the class members or donation to
the St. Christopher Truckers Relief Fund.

The Court will retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the
settlement and the Judge directed the Parties to provide a status
report to the Court in 90 days.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 31, 2020 Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y5yk9au5 from
Leagle.com.


PARKOFF OPERATING: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Amended Quinn Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, COURTNEY QUINN, JEANNE SHOTZBARGER, JAMES EDWARDS,
CLAIRE SHRIVER, ANUM SHAH, JAMES RAMSAY, MIRIAM RAMSAY, LORA SEO,
ADAM HELTZER, CHRISTINE YI, RICHARD BOROVOY, IDALMIS BOROVOY,
GRAHAM CIRAULO, THOMAS PIERCE, APRIL TOWNES, JUDITH TREZZA, ANTONIO
VAZQUEZ, JENNIFER DUPREY, JULIETTE VAIMAN, LISAVETTA REYES, ANDOM
GHEBREGHIOGIS, DOUG BENDER, SARA BENDER, CHARLES GOLDMAN,
CHRISTOPHER FORD, STEVEN KATCHEN, RON YOSIPOVICH, R.S. SALAMON,
S.E. FALK, Plaintiff, v. PARKOFF OPERATING CORPORATION, GRAMERCY
PARK ESTATES LLC, SEADYCK REALTY CO., LLC, 19 SEAMAN LLC, ELBRIDGE
REALTY CORPORATION, Defendant, Case No. 155195/2017 (N.Y. Sup.),
Judge Robert R. Reed of the New York County Supreme Court denied
the Defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to
various provisions of CPLR 3211.

The individually named Plaintiffs are all tenants of record in four
residential apartment buildings located at: (i) 144 East 22nd St.
in New York County; (ii) 1-9 Seaman Ave. in New York County; (iii)
11-19 Seaman Ave. in New York County; and (iv) 500 West 235th St.
in the County of the Bronx.  The Plaintiffs allege that four of the
named Defendants are "single purpose entities," whose sole function
is to act as the corporate owner of one each of the subject
buildings, and that Defendant Parkoff controls the other four
Defendants.  As a result, they refer to the four buildings as the
"Parkoff buildings."

The Plaintiffs allege that all of the Parkoff buildings were
registered with the New York City Department of Housing
Preservation and Development in the "J-51" real estate tax
abatement program, the rules of which required that all of the
buildings' apartments be registered as rent stabilized units with
the New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal for
the duration of the buildings' enrollment.  They further allege
that Parkoff illicitly removed a number of Parkoff building
apartments from rent stabilization while the buildings were
enrolled in the "J-51" program, and began to collect inflated
"market rate rents" and other improper charges from the tenants of
those apartments.

As a result, the Plaintiffs seek to assert rent overcharge claims
against Parkoff and its subsidiary Defendants both on behalf of
themselves, whom they refer to as "the class," and on behalf of
other similarly situated tenants in the Parkoff buildings who have
not yet been named as Plaintiffs, whom they refer to as the
"sub-class."

To that end, the Plaintiffs originally commenced the proposed class
action by filing a summons and complaint on June 7, 2017.  The
Defendants moved to dismiss that complaint, and the Court granted
the Defendants' motion in a decision dated March 16, 2018.  The
Plaintiffs appealed, and the Appellate Division, First Department,
reversed and remanded the Court's earlier decision in an opinion
dated Dec. 3, 2019.

Immediately after remand, the Plaintiffs filed the instant amended
class action complaint on Dec. 17, 2019, which sets forth causes of
action for: (i) rent overcharge (on behalf of the class); (ii) rent
overcharge (on behalf of the sub-class); (iii) a declaratory
judgment (on behalf of the sub-class); and (iv) attorney's fees (on
behalf of the class).

Rather than file an answer, the Defendants submitted their new
motion to dismiss on Jan. 31, 2020.  The parties filed opposition
and reply papers in February 2020; however, the Covid-19 national
pandemic forced the court to suspend its operations indefinitely in
mid-March, 2020.  

During that period, the parties nevertheless submitted a quantity
of correspondence to the court concerning certain supervening
changes to New York's Rent Stabilization Law ("RSL").  Notably,
however, the Plaintiffs have not yet filed a motion for class
certification pursuant to CPLR 901, as the First Department
indicated they should.  In any case, sufficient court operations
have now been restored to permit the Defendants' dismissal motion
to be addressed.

Judge Reed holds that the memorandum of law supporting the
Defendants' dismissal motion specifically declines to address the
issue of class certification, although the counsel avers that they
submit that the Amended Complaint makes clear on its face that the
claims of the Plaintiffs do not have enough in common with one
another (let alone with absent putative class members) to warrant
class treatment.  The Plaintiffs' opposition papers are similarly
devoid of any class status arguments (apart from a minor point that
they made in relation to the proposed "sub-class").

Instead, the parties focus solely on their respective arguments
pursuant to CPLR 3211.  The Judge concludes that it would be
premature to address the parties' dismissal arguments at this
juncture of the litigation.  Instead, he believes that the
appropriate course is to deny the Defendants' motion without
prejudice to renewal after the Plaintiffs have filed a motion for
class certification pursuant to CPLR 901 and 902, as the First
Department indicated they should.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Reed denied without prejudice the
Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint.  The Plaintiffs are
directed to serve and file a motion for class certification
pursuant to CPLR 901 and 902 within 60 days of the date of the
Decision and Order.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 31, 2020 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yy6ozv7p from Leagle.com.

Newman Ferrara LLP, By: Noe Solorzano Esq., and Roger Alan Sachar
Esq. -- rsachar@nfllp.com -- 1250 Broadway, 27th Floor, New York,
NY 10001 Safirstein Metcalf LLP, The Empire State Building, By:
Peter George Safirstein, 350 Fifth Avenue, 59th Floor, New York, NY
10118, Plaintiffs.

Katsky Korins LLP, By: Elan R. Dobbs Esq., Adrienne B. Koch Esq. --
akoch@katskykorins.com -- Mark Walfish Esq., and Liza Merzel Esq.,
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158, Defendants.


PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Sites WVCCPA Suit Removed to S.D. West Virginia
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as STEPHEN SITES, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC,
Case No. 18-C-1442, was removed from the West Virginia Circuit
Court of Kanawha County to the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia on October 22, 2020.

The Clerk Court for the Southern District of West Virginia assigned
Case No. 2:20-cv-00704 to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendant's alleged violations of the West
Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act (WVCCPA).

Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC is a debt collection company
based in Norfolk, Virginia. [BN]

The Defendant is represented by:                                  
         
         Jonathan P. Floyd, Esq.
         TROUTMAN PEPPER HAMILTON SANDERS LLP
         1001 Haxall Point
         Richmond, VA 23219
         Telephone: (804) 697-1435
         Facsimile: (804) 697-1339
         E-mail: jonathan.floyd@troutman.com

PROCTER & GAMBLE: Bid to Dismiss Davis Suit Denied as Moot
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANGELA DAVIS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE PROCTER &
GAMBLE COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 20-CV-3220 YGR (N.D. Cal.),
Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California denied as moot the pending motion
to dismiss in light of the filing of the First Amended Class Action
Complaint.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 31, 2020 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yxqmxnnz from Leagle.com.


PROGENITY INC: Johnson Fistel Reminds of Oct. 27 Deadline
---------------------------------------------------------
Shareholder rights law firm Johnson Fistel, LLP reminds investors
that a class action lawsuit has been filed against Progenity, Inc.
("Progenity" or the "Company") (NASDAQ: PROG) pursuant and/or
traceable to the Company's initial public offering conducted in
June 2020.

If you wish to serve as a lead plaintiff, you must move the Court
no later than October 27, 2020.

On or about June 6, 2020, Progenity sold about 6.7 million shares
of stock in its initial public stock offering (the "IPO"), at
$15.00 a share, raising nearly $100.5 million in new capital.

The class-action lawsuit alleges that the Registration Statement
for the IPO was negligently prepared and, as a result, contained
untrue statements of material fact, omitted material facts
necessary to make the statements contained therein not misleading,
and failed to make the necessary disclosures required under the
rules and regulations governing its preparation. Specifically, the
Registration Statement failed to disclose, adverse facts that
existed at the time of the IPO, rendering numerous statements
provided therein materially false and misleading: (i) that
Progenity had overbilled government payors by $10.3 million in 2019
and early 2020 and, thus, had materially overstated its revenues,
earnings and cash flow from operations for the historical financial
periods provided in the Registration Statement; (ii) that Progenity
would need to refund this overpayment in the second quarter of 2020
(the same quarter in which the IPO was conducted), adversely
impacting its quarterly results; and (iii) that Progenity was
suffering from accelerating negative trends in the second quarter
of 2020 concerning Progenity's testing volumes, revenues and
product pricing.

Since the IPO, Progenity stock has plummeted, on August 18, 2020,
the stock closed at $9.56.

A lead plaintiff will act on behalf of all other class members in
directing the Progenity class-action lawsuit.  The lead plaintiff
can select a law firm of its choice to litigate the Progenity
class-action lawsuit.  An investor's ability to share any potential
future recovery of the Progenity class action lawsuit is not
dependent upon serving as lead plaintiff.  If you are interested in
learning more about the case, please contact Jim Baker
(jimb@johnsonfistel.com) at 619-814-4471.  If you email, please
include your phone number.

Additionally, you can [Click here to join this action]. There is no
cost or obligation to you.

               About Johnson Fistel, LLP

Johnson Fistel, LLP is a nationally recognized shareholder rights
law firm with offices in California, New York and Georgia. The firm
represents individual and institutional investors in shareholder
derivative and securities class action lawsuits. For more
information about the firm and its attorneys, please visit
http://www.johnsonfistel.com.Attorney advertising. Past results do
not guarantee future outcomes.

         Jim Baker
         Johnson Fistel, LLP
         Tel No: 619-814-4471
         E-mail: jimb@johnsonfistel.com [GN]

PUCKS EXPRESS: Underpays Delivery Drivers, Reese Suit Alleges
-------------------------------------------------------------
VICTOR REESE, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. PUCKS EXPRESS, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:20-cv-02610-JMS-DML (S.D. Ind., October 8, 2020) is a class and
collective action complaint brought against the Defendant for its
alleged class-wide hour and overtime violations pursuant to the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff, who was employed by the Defendant as an hourly-paid
and non-exempt delivery driver, alleges that the Defendant has been
underpaying its delivery drivers.

The Plaintiff asserts these claims:

     -- The Defendant failed to pay him and other similarly
situated delivery drivers' pre-shift and post-shift time spent on a
continuous workday basis;

     -- The Defendant failed to include all earned wages in its
calculation of its employees' overtime rate of pay; and

     -- The Defendant failed to reimburse its delivery drivers
work-related expenses, particularly those related to truck
maintenance, which resulted to an illegal "kickbacks."

Pucks Express, LLC provides package delivery services for Amazon.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Robert P. Kondras, Esq.
          HASSLER KONDRAS MILLER LLP
          100 Cherry Street
          Terre Haute, IN 47807
          Tel: (812) 232-9691
          Fax: (812) 234-2881
          E-mail: kondras@hkmlawfirm.com

                - and –

          Aaron J. Williamson, Esq.
          WILLIAMSON CIVIL LAW, LLC
          8888 Keystone Crossing, Suite 1300
          Indianapolis, IN 46240
          Tel: (317) 434-0370
          Fax: (765) 204-7161
          E-mail: aaron.williamson@wcivillaw.com


QUTOUTIAO INC: Gross Law Announces Class Action
-----------------------------------------------
The securities litigation law firm of The Gross Law Firm issues the
following notice on behalf of shareholders of Qutoutiao Inc.
Shareholders who purchased shares in the company during the dates
listed are encouraged to contact the firm regarding possible Lead
Plaintiff appointment. Appointment as Lead Plaintiff is not
required to partake in any recovery.

Qutoutiao Inc. (NASDAQ:QTT)

This lawsuit is on behalf of persons and entities that: a)
purchased or otherwise acquired Qutoutiao American Depositary
Shares pursuant and/ortraceable to the registration statement and
prospectus issued in connection with the Company's September 2018
initial public offering; and/or b) purchased or otherwise acquired
Qutoutiao securities between September 14, 2018 and July 15, 2020.

A class action has commenced on behalf of certain shareholders in
Qutoutiao Inc. The filed complaint alleges that defendants made
materially false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose that: (1) Qutoutiao replaced its advertising agent with a
related party, thereby bypassing third-party oversight of the
content and quality of the advertisements; (2) the Company placed
advertisements on its mobile app for products whose claims could
not be substantiated and thus were considered false advertisements
under applicable regulations; (3) as a result, the Company would
face increasing regulatory scrutiny and reputational harm; (4) as a
result, the Company's advertising revenue was reasonably likely to
decline; and (5) as a result of the foregoing, Defendants' positive
statements about the Company's business, operations, and prospects,
were materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

Shareholders may find more information at
https://securitiesclasslaw.com/securities/qutoutiao-inc-loss-submission-form-2/?id=9763&from=1

The Gross Law Firm is committed to ensuring that companies adhere
to responsible business practices and engage in good corporate
citizenship. The firm seeks recovery on behalf of investors who
incurred losses when false and/or misleading statements or the
omission of material information by a Company lead to artificial
inflation of the Company's stock. Attorney advertising. Prior
results do not guarantee similar outcomes. [GN]

QUTOUTIAO INC: Pomerantz Law Firm Reminds of Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP announces that a class action lawsuit has been filed
against Qutoutiao, Inc.  ("Qutoutiao" or the "Company") (NASDAQ:
QTT) and certain of its officers.   The class action, filed in
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
and docketed under 20-cv-07717, is on behalf of a class consisting
of all persons and entities that: (a) purchased or otherwise
acquired Qutoutiao American Depositary Shares ("ADSs") pursuant
and/or traceable to the registration statement and prospectus
(collectively, the "Registration Statement") issued in connection
with the Company's September 2018 initial public offering ("IPO" or
the "Offering"); and/or (b) purchased or otherwise acquired
Qutoutiao securities between September 14, 2018, and July 15, 2020,
inclusive (the "Class Period"). Plaintiff pursues claims against
the Defendants under the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities
Act") and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange
Act").

If you are a shareholder who: (a) purchased or otherwise acquired
Qutoutiao American Depositary Shares ("ADSs") pursuant and/or
traceable to the registration statement and prospectus
(collectively, the "Registration Statement") issued in connection
with the Company's September 2018 IPO; and/or (b) purchased or
otherwise acquired Qutoutiao securities between September 14, 2018,
and July 15, 2020, you have until October 19, 2020, to ask the
Court to appoint you as Lead Plaintiff for the class.  A copy of
the Complaint can be obtained at www.pomerantzlaw.com.   To discuss
this action, contact Robert S. Willoughby at newaction@pomlaw.com
or 888.476.6529 (or 888.4-POMLAW), toll-free, Ext. 7980. Those who
inquire by e-mail are encouraged to include their mailing address,
telephone number, and the number of shares purchased.

Qutoutiao offers a mobile application called Qutoutiao (which means
"fun headlines" in Chinese) that aggregates articles and short
videos from professional media and freelancers and presents
customized feeds to users.

On September 14, 2018, the Company filed its prospectus on Form
424B4 with the SEC, which forms part of the Registration Statement.
In the IPO, the Company sold 13.8 million ADSs at a price of $7.00
per share. The Company received proceeds of approximately $85.8
million from the Offering, net of underwriting discounts and
commissions. The proceeds from the IPO were purported to be used
for expanding and enhancing the Company's content offerings, for
product development and technology infrastructure, and for general
corporate purposes, including marketing and promotion of its
products and branding and potential acquisitions and investments.

The Complaint alleges that in the Registration Statement and
throughout the Class Period, Defendants made materially false
and/or misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose
material adverse facts about the Company's business, operations,
and prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to
investors: (i) that Qutoutiao replaced its advertising agent with a
related party, thereby bypassing third-party oversight of the
content and quality of the advertisements; (ii) that the Company
placed advertisements on its mobile app for products whose claims
could not be substantiated and thus were considered false
advertisements under applicable regulations; (iii) that, as a
result, the Company would face increasing regulatory scrutiny and
reputational harm; (iv) that, as a result, the Company's
advertising revenue was reasonably likely to decline; and (v) that,
as a result of the foregoing, Defendants' positive statements about
the Company's business, operations, and prospects were materially
misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

On December 10, 2019, Wolfpack Research ("Wolfpack") published a
report, alleging, among other things, that the Company had
overstated its revenues by recording non-existent advances from
advertising customers. Moreover, the report alleged that Qutoutiao
replaced its third-party advertising agent with a related party,
thereby bypassing the agent's oversight and allowing the Company to
"perpetrate the unmitigated ad fraud that [Wolfpack] observed in
[its] sample."

On this news, the Company's ADS price fell $0.12 per share, or
approximately 4%, to close at $2.86 per share on December 11,
2019.

On July 15, 2020, hosts of a consumer rights gala stated that
Qutoutiao had allowed ads on its platform promoting exaggerated or
impossible claims from weight-loss products. For example, one such
ad offered free weight-loss products valued at $14,300 that would
help users lose more than 30 pounds a month.

On this news, the Company's ADS price fell $0.85 per share, or
approximately 23%, to close at $2.84 per share on July 16, 2020.

On July 17, 2020, Chinese media reported that Qutoutiao's app had
been removed from domestic Android app stores.

By the commencement of this action, Qutoutiao's ADSs last closed at
$2.42 per share on September 17, 2020, representing a 65.43%
decline from the $7.00 per share IPO price.

The Pomerantz Firm, with offices in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles,
and Paris is acknowledged as one of the premier firms in the areas
of corporate, securities, and antitrust class litigation. Founded
by the late Abraham L. Pomerantz, known as the dean of the class
action bar, the Pomerantz Firm pioneered the field of securities
class actions. Today, more than 80 years later, the Pomerantz Firm
continues in the tradition he established, fighting for the rights
of the victims of securities fraud, breaches of fiduciary duty, and
corporate misconduct. The Firm has recovered numerous
multimillion-dollar damages awards on behalf of class members. See
www.pomerantzlaw.com. [GN]

ROCKLINE INDUSTRIES: Fails to Pay Proper OT Wages, King Claims
--------------------------------------------------------------
JOHN KING and BRIAN SIMPSON, each individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. ROCKLINE INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 2:20-cv-02188-PKH (W.D. Tex., October 20, 2020)
is a collective action complaint brought against the Defendant for
its alleged violations of the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendant as hourly-paid
employees at the Defendant's facilities in Booneville. Plaintiff
King was hired as a Maintenance Supervisor from July 2017 to August
2020, while Plaintiff Simpson as a Mechanic from 2012 to the
present.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs were informed by the
Defendant upon hiring that they will receive bonuses as part of the
Defendant's compensation package. However, the Defendant did not
include the bonuses in the regular rates of the Plaintiffs and
other similarly situated hourly employees when calculating their
overtime pay. As a result, although the Plaintiffs and other
similarly situated hourly employees regularly worked in excess of
40 hours per week throughout their employment with the Defendant,
they were not properly paid their lawfully earned overtime at the
rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay.

Rockline Industries, Inc. is one of the world's largest
manufacturers of coffee filters and consumer, health care,
industrial and institutional wet wipes. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          One Financial Center
          650 South Shackleford Road, Suite 411
          Little Rock, AR 72211
          Tel: (501) 221-0088
          Fax: (888) 787-2040
          E-mail: josh@sanfordlawfirm.com


ROSETTA STONE: Harrison Challenges Proposed Sale to Cambium Holding
-------------------------------------------------------------------
BRYAN HARRISON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. ROSETTA STONE INC.; LAURENCE FRANKLIN; A.
JOHN HAAS III; AEDHMAR HYNES; PATRICK GROSS; GEORGE LOGUE; DAVID
NIERENBERG; KATHRYN EBERLE WALKER; JESSIE WOOLLEY-WILSON; and
STEVEN YANKOVICH, Defendants, Index No. 654635/2020 (N.Y. Sup., New
York Cty., Sept. 23, 2020) is a class action against the Defendants
for breaches of fiduciary duty as a result of the Defendants'
efforts to sell the Company to Cambium Holding Corp., and Empower
Merger Sub Inc. as a result of an unfair process for an unfair
price, and to enjoin an upcoming tender offer on a proposed all
cash transaction valued at approximately $792 million.

According to the complaint the terms of the proposed transaction
were memorialized in an August 31, 2020, filing with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on Form 8-K, attaching the definitive
agreement and plan of merger. Under the terms of the merger
agreement, Cambium will commence a tender offer to acquire all of
the outstanding shares of Rosetta Stone's common stock at a price
of $30 per share in cash. As a result, Rosetta Stone will become an
indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of Cambium.

Thereafter, on September 15, 2020, Rosetta Stone filed a
Solicitation/Recommendation Statement on Schedule 14D-9 with the
SEC in support of the proposed transaction. In approving the
proposed transaction, the Defendants have breached their fiduciary
duties of loyalty, good faith, due care and disclosure by: (i)
agreeing to sell Rosetta Stone without first taking steps to ensure
that the Plaintiff and Class members would obtain adequate, fair
and maximum consideration under the circumstances; and (ii)
engineering the proposed transaction to benefit themselves and/or
the Cambium without regard for Rosetta Stone's public
stockholders.

Rosetta Stone, Inc. provides technology-based language learning
solutions. The Company develops, markets, and sells language
learning solutions consisting of software, online services, and
audio practice tools primarily under our Rosetta Stone brand. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Evan J. Smith, Esq.
          BRODSKY & SMITH, LLC
          240 Mineola Boulevard
          Mineola, NY 11501
          Telephone: (516) 741-4977
          Facsimile: (561) 741-0626


RUMPKE WASTE: Gambrell Sues Over Unpaid Overtime for Welders
------------------------------------------------------------
ROBERT GAMBRELL, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. RUMPKE WASTE, INC. d/b/a RUMPKE WASTE
COLLECTION & DISPOSAL SYSTEMS, Defendant, Case No.
1:20-cv-00801-MRB brings this collective and class action complaint
against the Defendant for its alleged failure to pay overtime in
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Ohio Minimum Fair
Wage Standards Act, and the Ohio Prompt Pay Act.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant from 2015 until August
2020 as an hourly, non-exempt welder at one of the Defendant's
facilities.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant routinely deducted 30
minutes from his and other similarly situated employees' daily
hours worked for meal breaks that they did not take or that were
interrupted by work. As a result, despite they regularly worked
more than 40 hours per workweek, the Defendant failed to fully and
properly pay them for all of their hours worked at one and one-half
times their regular rate of pay.

Rumpe Waste, Inc. d/b/a Rumpe Waste Collection & Disposal Systems
provides residential and commercial trash and recycling services to
its customers in Ohio, Kentucky, Indiana, and West Virginia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew J.P. Coffman, Esq.
          Adam C. Gedling, Esq.
          COFFMAN LEGAL, LLC
          1550 Old Henderson Rd., Suite #126
          Columbus, OH 43220
          Tel: (614) 949-1181
          Fax: (614) 386-9964
          E-mail: mcoffman@mcoffmanlegal.com
                  agedling@mcoffmanlegal.com


S.W.O.R.N. PROTECTION: Buckley Sues Over Managers' Unpaid Overtime
------------------------------------------------------------------
CASANDRA BUCKLEY, individually and on behalf of those similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. S.W.O.R.N. PROTECTION LLC and MICHAEL
DELONG, Defendants, Case No. 1:20-cv-00357 (N.D. Ind., October 14,
2020) is a collective action complaint brought against the
Defendants for their alleged failure to pay overtime in violation
of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff, who worked for the Defendants as a manager, alleges
that the Defendants failed to pay her and other similarly situated
employees at one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for
all the overtime hours worked in excess of 40 in a single
workweek.

S.W.O.R.N. Protection LLC is licensed professional private security
and investigative agency. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jason Ramsland, Esq.
          RAMSLAND LAW
          8520 Allison Pointe Blvd. Ste. 223 PMB 65298
          Indianapolis, IN 46250-4299
          Tel: (765) 267-1240
          E-mail: jason@rams.land



SAFESPEED LLC: Court Refuses to Dismiss Marso ADA Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANDREW MARSO, individually and on behalf of all
similarly situated persons, Plaintiff, v. SAFESPEED, LLC, et al.,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 19-2671-KHV (D. Kan.), Judge Kathryn
H. Vratil of the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas
overruled both (i) Defendant Safespee's Motion To Dismiss Amended
Complaint, and (ii) Defendant Village of North Riverside, Illinois'
Motion To Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint.

Marso brings individual and putative class action claims against
Safespeed and Village for violations of Kansas law and the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA").  The Plaintiff is a
resident of Kansas and a disabled individual within the meaning of
the ADA.  Village is a municipality in Illinois.  SafeSpeed is an
Illinois limited liability company that provides red light
enforcement systems to more than 30 municipalities in Illinois,
including the Village.  SafeSpeed offices and operations are in
Illinois, and it does not provide services to municipalities
outside of Illinois.  Its operations affect travel, transportation
and commerce between Kansas and Illinois.  SafeSpeed and the
Village have a financial incentive to send out violation notices.

The Kansas Department of Revenue issues Disabled Parking Placards
to disabled drivers.  Each Disabled Parking Placard has a number
which is separate from the license plate number of the disabled
driver.  The Plaintiff has a Disabled Identification Placard Number
for his vehicle.

On May 23, 2019, a truck with a Kansas license plate ran a red
light in the Village.  Its license plate number was identical to
the Plaintiff's Disabled Identification Placard Number, and
SafeSpeed and the Village mistakenly issued the violation notice to
him.  The Plaintiff disputed the notice and Village dismissed it.

The Plaintiff believes that he may not be the only disabled
individual who has mistakenly received a violation notice from
SafeSpeed and the Village.  He alleges that by failing to properly
verify vehicle information, SafeSpeed sends erroneous violation
notices to disabled Kansans, and perhaps residents of other states
as well.

He alleges that SafeSpeed discriminates against individuals with
disabilities by failing to make reasonable modifications in
policies, practices and procedures to correct this problem. He
asserts that unless the Court requires SafeSpeed to cease sending
violation notices based on Disability Identification Placard
Numbers, disabled individuals in Kansas and other states could
suffer irreparable harm (i.e., wrongful criminal citations,
impaired driving records, etc.).

The Plaintiff seeks to represent a class that includes all persons
residing in the United States who are disabled within the meaning
of the ADA and whose state government or agency has issued
Disability Identification Placard Numbers or other
disability-related identification numbers.  On behalf of the class,
he asserts that: (1) SafeSpeed violated Section 12182 of the ADA
and (2) the Village violated of Section 12132 of the ADA.

He also seeks to represent two subclasses: (1) persons in Kansas
who have Disability Identification Placard Numbers ("Kansas
Subclass") and (2) individuals who have received wrongfully-issued
violation notices ("Wrongfully-Issued Subclass").  On behalf of the
Wrongfully-Issued Subclass, the Plaintiff asserts that SafeSpeed
and the Village (1) were negligent and (2) committed malicious
prosecution.

Plaintiff asserts that the District Court has federal question
jurisdiction based on the ADA. As to personal jurisdiction,
plaintiff does not allege that the Court has general jurisdiction
over defendants. As to specific jurisdiction, plaintiff alleges
that the District Court has specific personal jurisdiction over
SafeSpeed and the Village because they regularly conduct business
in Kansas by causing notices of violation to be mailed into Kansas,
and because SafeSpeed and the Village's purposeful establishment of
significant contact with Kansas gave rise to the Plaintiff's cause
of action.  SafeSpeed and the Village have caused notices of
violation to be mailed into Kansas even when the recipient has not
traveled to Illinois.

SafeSpeed argues that the Court should dismiss the Plaintiff's
amended complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, misjoinder of
parties, improper venue, failure to state a claim and, if the Court
dismisses the Plaintiff's ADA claim, lack of diversity
jurisdiction.  It argues that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction
because it does not have minimum contacts with Kansas.  In
addition, SafeSpeed asserts that under its contract with Village,
SafeSpeed conducts only an initial review of potential violations
and the Village has final decision-making authority regarding who
receives a violation notice.  After Village makes the final
decision, a SafeSpeed subcontractor prints and mails the notices.
Accordingly, SafeSpeed argues that Village - not it -- is the
proper Defendant in the case.

Village argues that the Court should dismiss the Plaintiff's
amended complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue
and, as to the laintiff's request to certify a class, failure to
state a claim.  It asserts that it does not have minimum contacts
with Kansas and that in enforcing its traffic laws in Illinois, it
did not anticipate being haled into court in Kansas.  Village
further asserts that requiring it to litigate in Kansas would
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Finally, it claims that venue is improper in Kansas because a
substantial portion of the events occurred in Illinois.

Judge Vratil finds that it is reasonable and consistent with
notions of "fair play and substantial justice" to assert personal
jurisdiction over the Defendants.  It is particularly so in view of
the lightness of the Plaintiff's burden of establishing personal
jurisdiction at this early stage of litigation.  She therefore
overruled the Defendants' motions to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction.

Next, under 28 U.S.C. Section 1391(b)(2), venue is proper in a
judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.  As noted, the
Plaintiff received the erroneous violation notice in Kansas and
felt the brunt of the Defendants' allegedly tortious conduct in
Kansas.  In other words, a substantial part of the events which
give rise to his claims occurred in Kansas.  Accordingly, venue is
proper in Kansas.

In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Judge
assumes as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and determines
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.
SafeSpeed asserts that the Court should dismiss the Plaintiff's
claims under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.  In
addition, it seeks dismissal on the ground that it carries out a
government function on behalf of illage and therefore is immune
from suit under the public official immunity doctrine.  Village
asserts that the Court should dismiss the Plaintiff's request for
class certification.

First, the Judge holds that SafeSpeed cannot argue both that it has
no discretion over who receives a violation notice because Village
makes that decision, and that it is entitled to immunity based on
its exercise of discretion in who receives them.  At this stage,
SafeSpeed has not carried its burden of demonstrating that it is
entitled to immunity.

Second, SafeSpeed tagged the Plaintiff as a traffic offender
because the license plate of the violator's vehicle matched the
number on the Plaintiff's Disabled Identification Placard Number.
At this stage, the Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that by
simply assigning the violation to him based on his Disabled
Identification Placard Number, SafeSpeed discriminated against him
because of his disability.  The Judge therefore overrulef
SafeSpeed's motion to dismiss Count I.

Third, in light of the parties' disagreement regarding the
relationship between SafeSpeed and Village, and without the benefit
of adequate briefing, the Judge cannot accept SafeSpeed's bare
assertion that the public duty doctrine bars the Plaintiff's
negligence claim.  The Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that
SafeSpeed owed him a duty to properly query the Illinois Secretary
of State and Nlets regarding driver information, to verify that the
information it receives is accurate and to confirm the identity of
an alleged traffic law violator before issuing a violation notice.
The Judge therefore overruled SafeSpeed's motion to dismiss Count
III.

Fourth, the Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim of malicious
prosecution against SafeSpeed.  Among, other things, the Plaintiff
has sufficiently alleged that SafeSpeed procured the proceedings
against him by wrongly identifying him as a traffic violator and
mailing the violation notice to him; he has sufficiently alleged
that SafeSpeed acted without probable cause; and the Plaintiff
alleges that he and the subclass sustained damages in the form of
substantial time and effort obtaining dismissal of their respective
wrongfully-issued violation notices.  The Judge therefore overruled
SafeSpeed's motion to dismiss Count IV.  

Finally, consideration of whether the Plaintiff's class action
allegations are sufficient under Rule 23, Fed. R. Civ. P., is not
appropriate at the motion to dismiss stage.  The Judge will make
such determination at the class certification phase.  

Based on the foregoing, Judge Vratil overruled both Safespeed's and
Village's Motion To Dismiss.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Aug. 4, 2020 Memorandum &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y3hsgfq7 from
Leagle.com.


SAM GILDERSLEEVE: Becker Sues Over Failure to Pay OT to Laborers
----------------------------------------------------------------
The case, BRANDON BECKER, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly-situated, Plaintiff v. SAM GILDERSLEEVE & SON PLUMBING,
INC., SAM GILDERSLEEVE SR., SAM GILDERSLEEVE JR., and ERICA
BRININGER, Defendants, Case No. 1:20-cv-02359 (N.D. Ohio, October
15, 2020) arises from the Defendants alleged failure to pay
overtime in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff was hired by the Defendants in or around May 2019 as
a non-exempt and hourly-paid manual laborer to perform duties as
directed by the Defendants at their various worksites.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff regularly worked in
excess of 40 hours per week for the Defendants. Although the
Plaintiff was required by the Defendants to not record his travel
time back to the Defendants' shop on his timecard and any time he
spent working at the shop after returning from the worksite, the
Plaintiff regularly reported more than 40 hours each week. However,
the Defendants only paid him for 40 hours of work, thereby failing
to pay the Plaintiff's lawfully earned overtime at one and one-half
times his regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40
per week.

After Defendant Gildersleeve Sr.'s refusal to address the
Plaintiff's complaints about their failure to pay him overtime, the
Plaintiff filed his resignation to the Defendants on or about
September 15, 2020.

Sam Gildersleeve & Son Plumbing, Inc. operates a plumbing and
remodeling business owned and operated by Sam Gildersleeve Sr. and
Sam Gildersleeve Jr. Erica Brininger is a supervisor and/or manager
for the Gildersleeve Plumbing. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Chris P. Wido, Esq.
          THE SPITZ LAW FIRM, LLC
          25200 Chagrin Blvd., Suite 200
          Beachwood, OH 44122
          Tel: (216) 291-4744
          Fax: (216) 291-5744
          E-mail: chris.wido@spitzlawfirm.com


SAN JOSE: Fails to Provide Accurate Wage Statements, Flores Claims
------------------------------------------------------------------
The case, FERNANDO FLORES, as an individual and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. SAN JOSE, LLC and DOES 1
through 50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 20CV371772 (Cal.
Super., Los Angeles Cty., October 19, 2020) challenges the
Defendants' alleged systemic illegal employment practices in
violations of the California Labor Code.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as an hourly-paid
non-exempt employee during the period of February 22, 2010 to
August 6, 2020.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants failed to provide proper
payroll records, accurate itemized wage statements, and pay
accurate overtime rate at one and one-half times the regular rate.
Specifically, when overtime wages and/or differential wages were
paid, the wage statements do not accurately show the total number
of hours worked during the pay period. Additionally, the total
hours displayed on the wage statements does not correlate to the
correct number of total hours worked during the pay period.

Moreover, the Plaintiff sent written notice to the California Labor
and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) on or about October 14,
2020 concerning the Defendant's Labor Code violations pursuant to
the Private Attorney General Act. However, the LWDA has not
responded to the Plaintiff's written notice. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Larry W. Lee, Esq.
          Kristen M. Agnew, Esq.
          Nicholas Rosenthal, Esq.
          Mai Tulyathan, Esq.
          DIVERSITY LAW GROUP, P.C.
          515 S. Figueroa St., Suite 1250
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Tel: (213) 488-6555
          Fax: (213) 488-6554


SDM HOSPITALITY: Fails to Pay Proper OT to Cooks, Hardy Suit Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
MARSHALL HARDY, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. SDM HOSPITALITY, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
3:20-cv-03157-S (N.D. Tex., October 16, 2020) brings this
collective action complaint against the Defendant for its alleged
unlawful pay policy or practice in violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

The Plaintiff was hired by the Defendant as a non-exempt cook in
2015 and still currently employed.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant deprived him and other
similarly situated employees of their lawfully earned overtime
compensation by regularly refusing to pay them for all hours worked
over 40 per workweek. Despite consistently working in excess of 40
hours per week, the Defendant paid them straight time for all hours
worked instead of paying them at one and one-half times their
regular rate of pay.

SDM Hospitality operates a bar and grill restaurant. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Douglas B. Welmaker, Esq.
          MORELAND VERRETT, PC
          700 West Summit Dr.
          Wimberley, TX 78676
          Tel: (512) 782-0567
          Fax: (512) 782-0605
          E-mail: doug@morelandlaw.com


SEALIFT HOLDINGS: Bond Posted for Llagas Claims Reduced to $42,000
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DANIEL GONZALES LLAGAS, v. SEALIFT HOLDINGS INC. ET
AL, Case No. 2:17-CV-00472 (W.D. La.), Judge James D. Cain, Jr. of
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, Lake
Charles Division, granted the Motion to Reduce Security filed by
Sealift Holdings, Sealift, Inc., Black Eagle Shipping, LLC, Fortune
Maritime, LLC, Sealift Tankships, LLC, Sagamore Shipping, LLC and
Remington Shipping, LLC, requesting that the Court reduce the
security posted for the claims of Plaintiff Daniel Gonzales
Llagas.

The Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit on March 17, 2017,
asserting claims arising out of his employment on Sealift vessels;
he alleges that his wages were paid contrary to U.S. law.  

The Plaintiff prayed for relief including (1) certification as a
class action on behalf of all foreign nationals who worked as a
seafarer aboard the vessels of the Sealift Fleet between Jan. 1,
2015 and March 17, 2017; (2) payment of wages calculated at the
highest rate of pay from the proposed class' port of embarkation;
and (3) issuance of a writ of attachment of Sealift's vessel, the
M/V Black Eagle.

To avoid seizure, Sealift provided the Plaintiff with alternate
security in the form of a Letter of Undertaking ("LOU") in the
amount of $7.5 million issued by the American Steamship Owners
Protection & Indemnity Association.

After removal from state court, and pursuant to a Motion to Stay
Litigation and Arbitration filed by Sealift, followed by various
other motions, the last of which was a Motion to Appoint Arbitrator
and, Additionally or in the Alternative, Motion to Enjoin Select
Foreign Proceedings, the Court concluded that the Plaintiff's
employment contract ("POEA") which contained an arbitration clause
was enforceable and that the arbitral proceeding belongs before the
arbitral bodies in the Philippines.  It also found that Section 5
of the POEA grants the Court the authority to designate and appoint
an arbitrator.

The Court expressly noted that the counsel for Plaintiff Llagas had
failed to comply with the Court's rulings and orders to arbitrate
the Plaintiff's claims pursuant to the arbitration provision in the
POEA.  Due to the protracted motion practice, and the counsel for
Plaintiff Llagas' blatant non-compliance with the Court's orders,
the Court ordered him to proceed with arbitration in the
Philippines with the National Conciliation Mediation Board of the
Department of Labor and Employment within 30 days of the ruling.
Also before the Court was a Motion to Certify Class which was
denied due to a lack of standing because Llagas's claims are
subject to arbitration under Fifth Circuit law.  

Sealift now asks the Court to reduce its $7.5 million bond to a
maximum of $41,570.  It argues that this amount is more than
sufficient to secure any conceivable arbitration award in Llagas's
favor.  

Llagas was employed as a "fitter," on various vessels owned by
Sealift during 2015-2017; during that three-year period, Llagas
worked 24 months and earned a total pay of $41,570 which equates to
approximately $1,732 per month.  Sealift informs the Court that the
$7.5 million security equates to $312,500 per month which is
roughly 180 times Llagas' gross earnings over three years.  Llagas
claims as damages the difference between the highest rate of wages
available to fitters in Manila during the relevant time period, and
the wages actually paid to Llagas.

Llagas opposes the reduction in security.  He asserts that the case
is stayed pending arbitration and remains a putative class action.
He attempts to persuade the Court not to evaluate the merits and
value of the litigation.  He acknowledges that it is up to the
Philippine arbitrator to determine the merits of his individual
claim and then argues that the putative class is at least the same
today as it was when Sealift agreed to the $7.5 million LOU.

Noting that it is Llagas' burden to prove the quantum of his claim
as well as to demonstrate the "fairly stated" value of that claim
for security purposes, Sealift suggests that security equal to
Llagas' gross wages over three years ($41,570) is more than
adequate for his claim.  Thus, Sealift requests that its security
be reduced from $7.5 million to $41,570.

Judge Cain agrees with Sealift that the Court has authority to
reduce its security and furthermore, that the security originally
agreed upon is now excessive.  The Judge notes that Llagas has not
provided any quantum value of his claims for the Court to consider,
nor does he dispute the reduced amount of security offered by
Sealift.  The Judge further finds that security in the amount of
$41,570 as presented by Sealift is a reasonable amount as to
Llagas' claims.

For these reasons, Judge Cain granted the Motion to Reduce
Security.  The Court reduced the $7.5 million security and set at
$41,570.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 31, 2020 Memorandum
Ruling & Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yypjr2rb from
Leagle.com.


SK FOODS: Status Conference in Cliffstar Case Moved to December
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned CLIFFSTAR CORPORATION, on behalf of itself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. SK FOODS, L.P.,
INGOMAR PACKING COMPANY, LOS GATOS TOMATO PRODUCTS, SCOTT SALYER,
STUART WOOLF and GREG PRUETT, Defendants, Case No. 09-cv-00442 KJM
EFB (E.D. Cal.), District Judge Kimberly J. Mueller approved the
parties' stipulation that the Sept. 24, 2020 status conference be
continued until Dec. 10, 2020, or any other date convenient for the
Court to address status of the final distributions to the Class in
the Consolidated Cases.

On Sept. 16, 2014, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Eastern District of California entered an order confirming the
Second Amended Joint Plan of Liquidation of SK Foods, L.P. and its
Substantively Consolidated Affiliates in the Chapter 11 bankruptcy
action filed by Defendant SK Foods, L.P.

Class counsel has informed Defendant Scott Salyer of the following
facts relating to SK Foods bankruptcy proceedings.

All funds from the Class settlements with Ingomar Packing Company,
Los Gatos Tomato Products, Stuart Woolf and Greg Pruett have been
paid and distributed to the Class and Final Judgment has been
entered as to these Defendants in the consolidated cases Four in
One Company v. SF Foods, LP, et al. (Case No.
2:08-cv-03017-KJM-EFB), Diversified Foods and Seasoning, Inc. v. SK
Foods, et al. (Case No. 2:08-cv-03074 KJM-EFB), Bruce Foods
Corporation v. SK Foods, LP, et al. (Case No.
2:09-cv-00027-KJM-EFB), and Cliffstar Corporation v. SK Foods, LP,
et al. (Case No. 2:09-cv-00442-KJM-EFB) (the "Consolidated
Cases").

A portion of the funds previously recovered through the SK Foods
bankruptcy action have been paid and distributed to the Class in
the Consolidated Cases, and the only remaining distributions to the
Class are additional funds recovered pursuant to the SK Foods
Bankruptcy Plan in the bankruptcy action.

On Jan. 13, 2020, the Chapter 11 Trustee mailed a check to the
escrow agent of Class Counsel for $306,954.36, an amount
representing the second distribution to the Class of the Allowed
General Unsecured Claim Amount of $10.6 million based on a
distribution rate of 2.895796%, which was deposited into the escrow
account for this case held by Class Counsel (the "Escrow Account
Funds"), and has informed Class Counsel the Chapter 11 Trustee has
made final distributions of bankruptcy funds to unsecured creditors
and the Class.

The Chapter 11 Trustee is performing outreach regarding uncashed
checks after which time the Trustee will file a motion to address
any unclaimed funds or redistributions, if needed, and close the
case. The Chapter 11 Trustee informs Class Counsel that there could
be one final distribution not expected to be material which would
consist of a redistribution of the funds from the uncashed checks
and any funds left over in the administrative reserve after closing
the case.

Pursuant to the SK Foods Bankruptcy Plan, Class Counsel is in the
process of making a pro rata distribution of the Escrow Account
Funds to Class members in accordance with the plan of allocation
approved by this Court, subject to the fees awarded to Class
Counsel by the bankruptcy court, and that approximately 87% of the
total check value issued has been cashed with 14 checks which
remain uncashed.

The claims administrator has determined additional outreach to the
available contacts for the uncashed checks would not be fruitful at
this time, due to the continued unavailability of some employees as
a result of Covid-19, and that additional outreach can be resumed
in late September and early October.

In a 2009 ruling with regard to the consolidation of the cases,
Judge Morrisson England stated that the cases stem from alleged
violations of antitrust law that arise from claimed anticompetitive
conduct by numerous common defendants involved in the processed
tomato products market. The March 2009 ruling is available at
https://bit.ly/2TdmI9T from Leagle.com.

A copy of the Court's Order is available at https://bit.ly/2HjMZB7
from Leagle.com.

                         About SK Foods

SK Foods LP ran a tomato processing facility.  It filed for Chapter
11 bankruptcy protection after being dropped by its lending group.
Creditors filed an involuntary Chapter 11 petition against SK Foods
LP and affiliate RHM Supply/ Specialty Foods Inc. (Bankr. E.D. Cal.
Case No. 09-29161) on May 8, 2009.  SK Foods had said it was
preparing to file a voluntary Chapter 11 petition when the
creditors initiated the involuntary case.  The Company later put
itself into Chapter 11 and Bradley D. Sharp was appointed as
Chapter 11 trustee.  The Debtors were authorized on June 26, 2009,
to sell the business for $39 million cash to a U.S. arm of
Singapore food processor Olam International Ltd.  The replacement
cost for the assets is $139 million, according to Olam. In February
2010, a federal grand jury returned a seven-count indictment
charging Frederick Scott Salyer, former owner and CEO of SK Foods,
with violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act, in connection with his direction of various
schemes to defraud SK Foods' corporate customers through bribery
and food misbranding and adulteration, and with wire fraud and
obstruction of justice.

Salyer supporters launched a Web site which can be accessed from
two addresses: http://www.operationrottentomato.com/and
http://www.scott-salyer.com/

SK FOODS: Status Conference in DFSI Case Moved to Dec. 10
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned DIVERSIFIED FOODS AND SEASONING, INC., on
behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
SK FOODS, L.P., INGOMAR PACKING COMPANY, LOS GATOS TOMATO PRODUCTS,
SCOTT SALYER, STUART WOOLF and GREG PRUETT, Defendants, Case No.
08-cv-03074 KJM EFB (E.D. Cal.), District Judge Kimberly J. Mueller
approved the parties' stipulation that the Sept. 24, 2020 status
conference be continued until Dec. 10, 2020, or any other date
convenient for the Court to address status of the final
distributions to the Class in the Consolidated Cases.

On Sept. 16, 2014, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Eastern District of California entered an order confirming the
"Second Amended Joint Plan of Liquidation of SK Foods, L.P. and its
Substantively Consolidated Affiliates in the Chapter 11 bankruptcy
action filed by Defendant SK Foods, L.P.

Class counsel has informed Defendant Scott Salyer of the following
facts relating to SK Foods bankruptcy proceedings.

All funds from the Class settlements with Ingomar Packing Company,
Los Gatos Tomato Products, Stuart Woolf and Greg Pruett have been
paid and distributed to the Class and Final Judgment has been
entered as to these Defendants in the consolidated cases Four in
One Company v. SF Foods, LP, et al. (Case No.
2:08-cv-03017-KJM-EFB), Diversified Foods and Seasoning, Inc. v. SK
Foods, et al. (Case No. 2:08-cv-03074 KJM-EFB), Bruce Foods
Corporation v. SK Foods, LP, et al. (Case No.
2:09-cv-00027-KJM-EFB), and Cliffstar Corporation v. SK Foods, LP,
et al. (Case No. 2:09-cv-00442-KJM-EFB) (the "Consolidated
Cases").

A portion of the funds previously recovered through the SK Foods
bankruptcy action have been paid and distributed to the Class in
the Consolidated Cases, and the only remaining distributions to the
Class are additional funds recovered pursuant to the SK Foods
Bankruptcy Plan in the bankruptcy action.

On Jan. 13, 2020, the Chapter 11 Trustee mailed a check to the
escrow agent of Class Counsel for $306,954.36, an amount
representing the second distribution to the Class of the Allowed
General Unsecured Claim Amount of $10.6 million based on a
distribution rate of 2.895796%, which was deposited into the escrow
account for this case held by Class Counsel (the "Escrow Account
Funds"), and has informed Class Counsel the Chapter 11 Trustee has
made final distributions of bankruptcy funds to unsecured creditors
and the Class.

The Chapter 11 Trustee is performing outreach regarding uncashed
checks after which time the Trustee will file a motion to address
any unclaimed funds or redistributions, if needed, and close the
case. The Chapter 11 Trustee informs Class Counsel that there could
be one final distribution not expected to be material which would
consist of a redistribution of the funds from the uncashed checks
and any funds left over in the administrative reserve after closing
the case.

Pursuant to the SK Foods Bankruptcy Plan, Class Counsel is in the
process of making a pro rata distribution of the Escrow Account
Funds to Class members in accordance with the plan of allocation
approved by this Court, subject to the fees awarded to Class
Counsel by the bankruptcy court, and that approximately 87% of the
total check value issued has been cashed with 14 checks which
remain uncashed.

The claims administrator has determined additional outreach to the
available contacts for the uncashed checks would not be fruitful at
this time, due to the continued unavailability of some employees as
a result of Covid-19, and that additional outreach can be resumed
in late September and early October.

In a 2009 ruling with regard to the consolidation of the cases,
Judge Morrisson England stated that the cases stem from alleged
violations of antitrust law that arise from claimed anticompetitive
conduct by numerous common defendants involved in the processed
tomato products market. The March 2009 ruling is available at
https://bit.ly/2TdmI9T from Leagle.com.

A copy of the Court's Order is available at https://bit.ly/3kjku4R
from Leagle.com.

                         About SK Foods

SK Foods LP ran a tomato processing facility.  It filed for Chapter
11 bankruptcy protection after being dropped by its lending group.
Creditors filed an involuntary Chapter 11 petition against SK Foods
LP and affiliate RHM Supply/ Specialty Foods Inc. (Bankr. E.D. Cal.
Case No. 09-29161) on May 8, 2009.  SK Foods had said it was
preparing to file a voluntary Chapter 11 petition when the
creditors initiated the involuntary case.  The Company later put
itself into Chapter 11 and Bradley D. Sharp was appointed as
Chapter 11 trustee.  The Debtors were authorized on June 26, 2009,
to sell the business for $39 million cash to a U.S. arm of
Singapore food processor Olam International Ltd.  The replacement
cost for the assets is $139 million, according to Olam. In February
2010, a federal grand jury returned a seven-count indictment
charging Frederick Scott Salyer, former owner and CEO of SK Foods,
with violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act, in connection with his direction of various
schemes to defraud SK Foods' corporate customers through bribery
and food misbranding and adulteration, and with wire fraud and
obstruction of justice.

Salyer supporters launched a Web site which can be accessed from
two addresses: http://www.operationrottentomato.com/and
http://www.scott-salyer.com/

SK FOODS: Status Conference in Four in One Case Moved to December
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned FOUR IN ONE COMPANY, INC., on behalf of
itself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. SK FOODS,
L.P., INGOMAR PACKING COMPANY, LOS GATOS TOMATO PRODUCTS, SCOTT
SALYER, STUART WOOLF and GREG PRUETT, Defendants, Case No.
08-cv-3017 KJM EFB.(E.D. Cal.), District Judge Kimberly J. Mueller
approved the parties' stipulation that the Sept. 24, 2020 status
conference be continued until Dec. 10, 2020, or any other date
convenient for the Court to address status of the final
distributions to the Class in the Consolidated Cases.

On Sept. 16, 2014, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Eastern District of California entered an order confirming the
Second Amended Joint Plan of Liquidation of SK Foods, L.P. and its
Substantively Consolidated Affiliates in the Chapter 11 bankruptcy
action filed by Defendant SK Foods, L.P.

Class counsel has informed Defendant Scott Salyer of the following
facts relating to SK Foods bankruptcy proceedings.

All funds from the Class settlements with Ingomar Packing Company,
Los Gatos Tomato Products, Stuart Woolf and Greg Pruett have been
paid and distributed to the Class and Final Judgment has been
entered as to these Defendants in the consolidated cases Four in
One Company v. SF Foods, LP, et al. (Case No.
2:08-cv-03017-KJM-EFB), Diversified Foods and Seasoning, Inc. v. SK
Foods, et al. (Case No. 2:08-cv-03074 KJM-EFB), Bruce Foods
Corporation v. SK Foods, LP, et al. (Case No.
2:09-cv-00027-KJM-EFB), and Cliffstar Corporation v. SK Foods, LP,
et al. (Case No. 2:09-cv-00442-KJM-EFB) (the "Consolidated
Cases").

A portion of the funds previously recovered through the SK Foods
bankruptcy action have been paid and distributed to the Class in
the Consolidated Cases, and the only remaining distributions to the
Class are additional funds recovered pursuant to the SK Foods
Bankruptcy Plan in the bankruptcy action.

On Jan. 13, 2020, the Chapter 11 Trustee mailed a check to the
escrow agent of Class Counsel for $306,954.36, an amount
representing the second distribution to the Class of the Allowed
General Unsecured Claim Amount of $10.6 million based on a
distribution rate of 2.895796%, which was deposited into the escrow
account for this case held by Class Counsel (the "Escrow Account
Funds"), and has informed Class Counsel the Chapter 11 Trustee has
made final distributions of bankruptcy funds to unsecured creditors
and the Class.

The Chapter 11 Trustee is performing outreach regarding uncashed
checks after which time the Trustee will file a motion to address
any unclaimed funds or redistributions, if needed, and close the
case. The Chapter 11 Trustee informs Class Counsel that there could
be one final distribution not expected to be material which would
consist of a redistribution of the funds from the uncashed checks
and any funds left over in the administrative reserve after closing
the case.

Pursuant to the SK Foods Bankruptcy Plan, Class Counsel is in the
process of making a pro rata distribution of the Escrow Account
Funds to Class members in accordance with the plan of allocation
approved by this Court, subject to the fees awarded to Class
Counsel by the bankruptcy court, and that approximately 87% of the
total check value issued has been cashed with 14 checks which
remain uncashed.

The claims administrator has determined additional outreach to the
available contacts for the uncashed checks would not be fruitful at
this time, due to the continued unavailability of some employees as
a result of Covid-19, and that additional outreach can be resumed
in late September and early October.

In a 2009 ruling with regard to the consolidation of the cases,
Judge Morrisson England stated that the cases stem from alleged
violations of antitrust law that arise from claimed anticompetitive
conduct by numerous common defendants involved in the processed
tomato products market. The March 2009 ruling is available at
https://bit.ly/2TdmI9T from Leagle.com.

A copy of the Court's Order is available at https://bit.ly/3dJ79Al
from Leagle.com.

                         About SK Foods

SK Foods LP ran a tomato processing facility.  It filed for Chapter
11 bankruptcy protection after being dropped by its lending group.
Creditors filed an involuntary Chapter 11 petition against SK Foods
LP and affiliate RHM Supply/ Specialty Foods Inc. (Bankr. E.D. Cal.
Case No. 09-29161) on May 8, 2009.  SK Foods had said it was
preparing to file a voluntary Chapter 11 petition when the
creditors initiated the involuntary case.  The Company later put
itself into Chapter 11 and Bradley D. Sharp was appointed as
Chapter 11 trustee.  The Debtors were authorized on June 26, 2009,
to sell the business for $39 million cash to a U.S. arm of
Singapore food processor Olam International Ltd.  The replacement
cost for the assets is $139 million, according to Olam. In February
2010, a federal grand jury returned a seven-count indictment
charging Frederick Scott Salyer, former owner and CEO of SK Foods,
with violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act, in connection with his direction of various
schemes to defraud SK Foods' corporate customers through bribery
and food misbranding and adulteration, and with wire fraud and
obstruction of justice.

Salyer supporters launched a Web site which can be accessed from
two addresses: http://www.operationrottentomato.com/and
http://www.scott-salyer.com/

SODEXO INC: Underpays Hospital Staff, Nodal Suit Alleges
--------------------------------------------------------
FRANCISCO NODAL, on behalf of himself and all others aggrieved,
Plaintiff v. SODEXO, INC.; SDH SERVICES WEST, LLC; SHARP MEMORIAL
HOSPITAL; TIM SMITH; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants,
Case No. 20STCV40601 (Cal. Super., Los Angeles Cty., October 22,
2020) is a class action against the Defendants for violations of
the California Labor Code Private Attorney's General Act including
failure to provide the Plaintiff and all others similarly situated
employees appropriate minimum wages and overtime pay for all hours
worked, failure to provide required meal and rest periods or
provide compensation in lieu thereof, failure to timely pay wages
during employment and upon termination, and failure to furnish
accurate itemized wage statements.

The Plaintiff worked for the Defendants as a non-exempt employee,
with duties that included, but were not limited to, maintaining and
cleaning the floors at Sharp Memorial Hospital in San Diego,
California since June 2015.

Sodexo, Inc. is a company that provides outsourced food and
facilities management services, headquartered in Gaithersburg,
Maryland.

SDH Services West, LLC is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Sodexo, Inc.
based in Gaithersburg, Maryland.

Sharp Memorial Hospital is a hospital located in San Diego,
California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                
         
         David D. Bibiyan, Esq.
         Diego Aviles, Esq.
         Sara Ehsani-Nia, Esq.
         BIBIYAN LAW GROUP, P.C.
         8484 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 500
         Beverly Hills, CA 90211
         Telephone: (310) 438-5555
         Facsimile: (310) 300-1705
         E-mail: david@tomorrowlaw.com
                 diego@tomorrowlaw.com
                 sara@tomorrowlaw.com

SONIC CORP: Faces Collins TCPA Suit Over Unsolicited Text Messages
------------------------------------------------------------------
DANNY COLLINS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. SONIC CORP., d/b/a SONIC DRIVE-IN, a
Delaware Corporation, Defendant, Case No. 5:20-cv-01067-JD (W.D.
Okla., October 21, 2020) is a class action complaint brought
against the Defendant for its alleged violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant sent telemarketing text
messages to the Plaintiff's cellular telephone number ending in
0177 on or around July 11, 2020 and July 22, 2020 in an attempt to
encourage the Plaintiff to avail its services. Despite the
Plaintiff's preferred opt-out language, the Defendant continued
sending promotional text message to the Plaintiff's cellular
telephone.

Sonic Corp. operates drive-in fast-food restaurant chain. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
          14 NE 1st Ave., Suite 705
          Miami, FL 33132
          Tel: (305) 479-2299
          E-mail: ashamis@shamisgentile.com


ST. DAVID'S: Court Partially Grants Motion to Dismiss Mock's Action
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case MELANIE MOCK, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ST. DAVID'S HEALTHCARE
PARTNERSHIP, L.P., LLP, a Texas limited liability partnership, Case
No. 1:19-cv-611-RP (W.D. Texas), Judge Robert Pitman of the U.S.
District Court for Western District of Texas adopted the Report and
Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Andrew Austin concerning
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.  Accordingly, St. David's Motion to
Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part, the Court rules.

The Court makes clear that the R&R is adopted with the
clarification that Mock has standing to seek injunctive relief to
prevent future collection efforts.

The Court further orders that Mock's objections are granted only
for the purpose of clarifying the report and recommendation.

A copy of Judge Pitman's Sept. 2, 2020 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y4wv2ry7 from PacerMonitor.com.

The case is a putative class action suit in which Plaintiff Mock
asserts DTPA and Federal Declaratory Judgment Act claims against
Defendant St. David's.  Mock asserts that St. David's improperly
charged her and other patients hidden emergency department fees for
"overhead expenses" in the form of a surcharge.  Mock seeks
declaratory and injunctive relief.

Mock was admitted to the St. David's South Austin Medical Center's
Emergency Department on Oct. 27, 2018.  Upon admission, she signed
St. David's form contract, called the Conditions of Admission and
Consent for Outpatient Care.  It states that in consideration of
the services to be rendered to Patient, Patient or Guarantor
individually promises to pay the Patient's account at the rates
stated in the hospital's price list (known as the Charge Master)
effective on the date the charge is processed for the service
provided.  The Charge Master identifies five possible pricing
levels for the ED Facility Fee: Level 1: $396; Level 2: $719; Level
3 $1,364; Level 4: $2,800; and Level 5: $3,975.

Mock was charged the Level 4 fee of $2,800.  She was billed $13,288
including a $2,800 ED Facility Fee for her visit to the St. David's
emergency room.  St. David's bill to Mock's insurer included a
HCPCS code of 99284 for the ED Facility Fee.  After insurance
reductions and a payment of $75, Mock owes St. David's $8,960.84.
To date, Mock has not paid any portion of the bill.

Mock seeks a number of declarations for herself and the putative
class and also requests an injunction.  With regard to the
declarations, she asks that the Court declare that: (1) St. David's
billing practices for the ED Facility Fee are unconscionable under
Texas common law and the DTPA; (2) the Contract she signed does not
authorize the ED Facility Fee; (3) Mock and the putative class are
not liable for the ED Facility Fee; and (4) St. David's billing
practices for the ED Facility Fee are deceptive trade practices
under DTPA.  For injunctive relief, she requests an injunction that
would require St. David's to disclose the ED Facility Fee before
treatment and prohibit St. David's from billing and collecting the
ED Facility Fee without advance disclosure.

St. David's moved to dismiss with prejudice arguing that Mock lacks
standing to bring her claims and that it complies with all federal
and state laws governing disclosure and billing in charging these
fees.  St. David's further argued that Mock has failed to plead a
viable DTPA claim, and therefore cannot bring a Federal Declaratory
Judgment Act claim.  Mock responded that she has suffered an injury
in fact conferring standing and she has pled a viable DTPA claim.

              July 2020 Report & Recommendation

Magistrate Judge Austin reviewed the Motion to Dismiss and issued a
Report and Recommendation dated July 2020.

To satisfy the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing under
Article III, a plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact,
(2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the
defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable
judicial decision.  St. David's only contests the first and third
elements of the test.

Magistrate Judge Austin concluded that Mock satisfies the
injury-in-fact requirement for standing, as her outstanding debt to
St. David's, which includes the entirety of that $2,800 fee,
demonstrates she has suffered an actual injury.  Assuming that the
Plaintiff is correct that the Service Fee is unlawful, she would be
injured if forced to pay the fee under the Patient Contract.

As to the redressability prong of the standing inquiry, Judge
Austin has identified Mock's injury as the debt she owes to St.
David's for the fees imposed.  Each of the requested declarations
would redress Mock's injury.  She therefore fulfills the
redressability prong of the standing analysis as to this portion of
the relief requested.  

But Mock also requests injunctive relief that is forward looking,
which would require St. David's to disclose the ED Facility Fee
before treatment, and prohibit it from billing and collecting the
ED Facility Fee without advance disclosure.  Such an injunction
would not address the injury Mock is suing for in the case -- her
debt to St. David's.  Instead, it would address future emergency
room patients, and Mock has submitted no evidence that she is
likely to suffer any such future injury.  She therefore lacks
standing to sue for this injunction, Judge Austin held.

St. David's also asserts that Mock's claims brought pursuant to the
Declaratory Judgment Act and DTPA should be dismissed for failure
to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).  It makes six
arguments: (1) St. David's has complied with applicable state and
federal law because it disclosed the ED Facility Fee in the Charge
Master which is referenced in the Contract Mock signed upon
admission; (2) the DTPA claim fails because Mock failed to plead
economic damages and did not plead the alleged fraud with enough
particularity to comply with Rule 9; (3) Mock failed to adequately
plead a claim specifically enumerated in Tex. Bus. & Com. Code
Section 17.50(a); (4) Mock failed to adequately plead a DTPA
unconscionability claim; (5) the putative class' DTPA claims are
largely time-barred; and (6) Mock has failed to plead a viable
declaratory judgment claim.

Magistrate Judge Austin finds that (i) the DTPA is a law of the
state of Texas as much as the Texas Health and Safety Code is, and
if the latter is not precluded by federal law, the former is not
either; (ii) nothing in the DTPA requires Mock to plead for
economic or mental anguish damages; (iii) Mock's pleadings are
adequate to state a plausible claim that St. David's actions in not
disclosing the ED Facility Fee were unconscionable; (iv) because
Mock brings her substantive claims under the DTPA, its two year
statute of limitation applies, and any claims based on conduct
occurring prior to May 21, 2017, would be barred; and (v) because
he has found Mock has adequately stated a claim for relief pursuant
to the DTPA, St. David's assertion that Mock cannot bring a
Declaratory Judgment Act claim because she has failed to plead a
viable DTPA claim argument fails.

In sum, in a July 31, 2020 Report & Recommendation available at
https://tinyurl.com/y3eu9yj4 from Leagle.com, Magistrate Judge
Austin recommended that the District Court grant in part and deny
in part St. David's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended
Complaint.  Specifically, he recommended that the Court grants the
motion as to Mock's claim seeking an injunction for lack of
standings, any claims accruing prior to May 21, 2017, as time
barred, but otherwise denies the motion in all other respects.


STAAR SURGICAL: Pomerantz Law Firm Reminds of Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP announces that a class action lawsuit has been filed
against STAAR Surgical Company ("STAAR" or the "Company") (NASDAQ:
STAA) and certain of its officers.   The class action, filed in
United States District Court for the Central District of
California, Southern Division, and docketed under 20-cv-01660, is
on behalf of a class consisting of all persons other than
Defendants who purchased or otherwise acquired STAAR Surgical
Company securities between February 26, 2020, and August 10, 2020,
inclusive (the "Class Period"), seeking to recover damages caused
by Defendants' violations of the federal securities laws and to
pursue remedies under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder by the SEC, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.

If you are a shareholder who purchased STAAR securities during the
class period, you have until October 19, 2020, to ask the Court to
appoint you as Lead Plaintiff for the class.  A copy of the
Complaint can be obtained at www.pomerantzlaw.com.   To discuss
this action, contact Robert S. Willoughby at
rswilloughby@pomlaw.com or 888.476.6529 (or 888.4-POMLAW),
toll-free, Ext. 7980. Those who inquire by e-mail are encouraged to
include their mailing address, telephone number, and the number of
shares purchased.

STARR designs, develops, manufactures, and sells implantable lenses
for the eye and companion delivery systems used to deliver the
lenses into the eye. STAAR's primary products are: (1) "implantable
Collamer® lenses," or "ICLs," used in refractive surgery; and (2)
intraocular lenses, or "IOLs," used in cataract surgery.

The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and/or misleading statements, as well as
failed to disclose material adverse facts to investors.
Specifically, Defendants misrepresented and/or failed to disclose
to investors that the Company was overstating and/or
mischaracterizing: (1) its sales and growth in China; (2) its
marketing spend; (3) its research and development expenses; and
that as a result of the foregoing, (4) Defendants' public
statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant
times.

On August 5, 2020, after the markets closed, STAAR reported
disappointing financial results, as detailed below. On this news,
shares of STAAR common stock fell approximately 10%, down from the
August 5, 2020 closing price of $61.81 to an August 6, 2020 close
of $55.86.

On August 11, 2020, analyst J Capital Research published a report
in which it wrote that "[w]e think that STAAR Surgical has
overstated sales in China by at least one-third, or $21.6 mln. That
would mean that all of the company's $14 mln in 2019 profit is
fake." The report continued that "[f]ake sales [in China] come at
100% margins and therefore translate directly into profit. That
means that the roughly $21.6 mln in overstated Chinese sales in
2019 represents 152% of total company profit. In other words,
without the fraud that we believe pervades the China business,
STAAR is losing money."

J Capital Research stated in reaching its conclusions, it
"conduct[ed] over 75 interviews, visited company sites in China and
Switzerland, and reviewed financial statements and other government
documents for STAAR's distributors and customers in China. We will
show that sales of STAAR's ICLs are dramatically overstated."

On this news, the stock continued its descent, closing at just
$48.25 per share on August 11, 2020.

The Pomerantz Firm, with offices in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles,
and Paris is acknowledged as one of the premier firms in the areas
of corporate, securities, and antitrust class litigation. Founded
by the late Abraham L. Pomerantz, known as the dean of the class
action bar, the Pomerantz Firm pioneered the field of securities
class actions. Today, more than 80 years later, the Pomerantz Firm
continues in the tradition he established, fighting for the rights
of the victims of securities fraud, breaches of fiduciary duty, and
corporate misconduct.  [GN]

STARKEY LABORATORIES: Court Narrows Claims in Beck ERISA-RICO Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JAIME BECK, BYRON HANSON, and LYNN MELCHER,
Plaintiffs, v. WILLIAM F. AUSTIN; BRANDON SAWALICH; JEROME RUZICKA;
SCOTT A. NELSON; LAWRENCE W. MILLER; W. JEFFREY TAYLOR; JEFFREY
LONGTAIN; STARKEY LABORATORIES, INC.; Defendants, Case No.
19-CV-1453 (PJS/ECW) (D. Minn.), Judge Patrick J. Schiltz of the
U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota granted in part
and denied in part the Defendants' motion to dismiss.

Starkey is a privately held Minnesota corporation that manufactures
hearing aids.  From 2006 to 2015, it was the victim of fraudulent
schemes perpetrated by some of its high-level executives and their
coconspirators.  These thieves stole approximately $30 million from
Starkey.

Plaintiffs Beck, Hanson, and Melcher were participants in Starkey's
employee stock ownership plan ("ESOP").  The Plaintiffs bring the
putative class action asserting claims under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), and common law arising out
of the fraudulent schemes and the failure to detect and prevent
them.

The matter before the Court is a motion to dismiss brought by three
Defendants: Starkey, William Austin (founder and CEO of Starkey),
and Brandon Sawalich (president of Starkey).  The fiduciary
Defendants move to dismiss all of the claims against them on the
ground that those claims have been settled and released.

The Plaintiffs do not dispute that all of their claims -- which
they are asserting on behalf of the ESOP -- fall within the scope
of the release (with the exception of their claims against Taylor,
the former president of Sonion).  Instead, they argue that, under
the collateral-source rule, the release is ineffective with respect
to the individual Defendants.  Specifically, they argue that,
because Starkey was the sole source of funds for the settlement
payment, the payment is a "collateral source" as to the individual
Defendants and cannot operate to bar claims against them.

Judge Schiltz finds argument to be plainly meritless.  The
Plaintiffs have not cited, and the Judge has not found, a single
judicial decision suggesting that a plaintiff can enter a
settlement agreement under which it expressly agrees to release its
claims against the paying party and other parties in return for
money, accept that money from the paying party, and then turn
around and sue the very parties whom it was just paid to release.
The Judge rejects the Plaintiffs' argument -- as well as their
closely related argument that the settlement operates only as an
offset rather than a bar.

The Plaintiffs next argue that the release was a prohibited
transaction and thus is invalid unless it meets the requirements of
the Prohibited Transaction Exemption ("PTE") 2003-39.  The parties
dispute whether the Plaintiffs must plead facts that plausibly call
into question the validity of the release under PTE 2003-39.  The
Plaintiffs argue that they are under no obligation to plead that
their claims were not released -- or, more specifically, to plead
that the release did not meet the requirements of PTE 2003-39 --
because release is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and
proved by the Defendants.

The Judge need not resolve the parties' dispute about what, if
anything, the Plaintiffs were required to plead about the validity
of the release under PTE 2003-39.  The Defendants do not contend
that the release was in effect at the time that the Plaintiffs
filed their amended complaint.  Instead, they argued in their
opening brief that the release of claims will become effective if
the second independent fiduciary, retained pursuant to the
procedures set forth by PTE 2003-39, approves the settlement terms
as reasonable.

As a result, even if the Plaintiffs generally bear the burden of
pleading facts that plausibly call into question the validity of a
release, that obligation cannot possibly apply to a Plaintiff who
files a complaint when no such release exists.  The Judge therefore
denies the Defendants' motion to dismiss insofar as it is premised
on their argument that the claims have been released.

That said, the Judge believes that it is quite likely that the
Plaintiffs' claims (save for those against Taylor) are in fact
barred by the release.  In order to spare the parties from
incurring the considerable expense of engaging in full discovery on
the merits of claims that appear to have been released -- and
recognizing that Starkey paid $800,000 to the ESOP so that the
Defendants would not have to bear the costs of litigating claims
brought on behalf of the ESOP -- the Judge will bifurcate
discovery.  The first phase of discovery will be strictly limited
to matters relevant to the validity of the release under PTE
2003-39.  The Judge will then determine if the release is valid.
If he determines that the release is invalid -- or that a jury must
decide the question of validity -- then the parties can engage in a
second phase of discovery on the merits of the claims and defenses
involved in the litigation.

The Defendants move to dismiss the Plaintiffs' fiduciary-duty
claims to the extent that those claims are focused on Austin's and
Sawalich's actions after September 2015, when the fraud was
discovered.   The Plaintiffs do not allege any harm to the ESOP
caused by Austin's and Sawalich's delay.  At oral argument, the
Plaintiffs premise of their claims is that the ESOP suffered losses
due to the RICO Defendants' fraudulent activities and that Austin
should have attempted to recover those losses on the ESOP's behalf.
All of it may be true, but the fact remains that Austin's inaction
after September 2015 did not impair the ESOP's ability to recover
and therefore, under the Plaintiffs' theory of the case, Austin did
not cause the loss.  The Plaintiffs have therefore failed to state
a claim for a post-September 2015 breach of fiduciary duty.

In Counts III and IV of the amended complaint, the Plaintiffs bring
a claim for violations of co-fiduciary duties and an alternative
claim for an accounting.  The Defendants' only argument with
respect to these claims is that they are derivative of the
Plaintiffs' other fiduciary-duty claims and so should be dismissed.
As the Plaintiffs still have pending fiduciary-duty claims for
pre-September 2015 conduct, however, dismissing these claims would
be premature.

Finally, in Count V of the amended complaint, the Plaintiffs plead
a claim to reverse pierce the corporate veil in order to hold
Starkey liable for Austin's alleged breaches of his fiduciary
duties to Starkey and the ESOP.  The Judge holds that the
allegations are insufficient to plead a plausible basis for reverse
piercing in the case.  As the Plaintiffs admit, Starkey conducts
legitimate business, is sufficiently capitalized, pays dividends,
and is solvent.

Even if they could satisfy the first prong of Victoria Elevator,
they Plaintiffs cannot show that reverse piercing is necessary to
avoid injustice or fundamental unfairness.  They provide no reason
to believe that Austin will be unable to pay any judgment entered
against him.  Moreover, if Austin's own alleged negligence were
enough to justify reverse piercing, then reverse piercing would be
the rule rather than the rare exception.  The Judge therefore
grants the Defendants' motion to dismiss the reverse-piercing
claim.

Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and
proceedings, Judge Schiltz granted in part and denied in part the
Defendants' motion to dismiss.  The Judge granted the motion as to
the following claims, and those claims are dismissed with prejudice
and on the merits: (i) Counts I, II, and III to the extent that
they are based on defendants William Austin's and Brandon
Sawalich's post-September 2015 failure to bring a lawsuit on behalf
of the ESOP, and (ii) Count V.  The Judge denied the motion in all
other respects.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Aug. 4, 2020 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yxgffy5s from Leagle.com.

Kate M. Baxter-Kauf -- kmbaxter-kauf@locklaw.com -- Gregg M.
Fishbein -- gmfishbein@locklaw.com -- Arielle S. Wagner --
aswagner@locklaw.com -- and Kristen G. Marttila --
kgmarttila@locklaw.com -- LOCKRIDGE GRINDAL NAUEN P.L.L.P., for
plaintiffs.

Scott A. Neilson -- sneilson@hensonefron.com -- and David Bradley
Olsen -- dolsen@hensonefron.com -- HENSON & EFRON, P.A. for
defendants William F. Austin, Brandon Sawalich, and Starkey
Laboratories, Inc.


SUMMIT HEALTH: Braunshtein Remanded to L.A. County Superior Court
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Stephen V. Wilson of the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California remanded the case, PAVEL JOSEPH BRAUNSHTEIN,
as an individual and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. SUMMIT HEALTH INC. D/B/A RETAIL HEALTH NETOWRK, INC.,
a Michigan corporation; and DOES 1 through 100, Defendants, Case
No. 2:20-cv-00937-SVW-KS (C.D. Cal.), to the Superior Court of the
State of California for the County of Los Angeles.

The Parties have stipulated to the remand of the action.  

A full-text copy of the Court's July 28, 2020 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yxrdr6sb from Leagle.com.


TACTILE SYSTEMS: Gainey McKenna Reminds of Nov. 30 Deadline
-----------------------------------------------------------
Gainey McKenna & Egleston announces that a class action lawsuit has
been filed against Tactile Systems Technology, Inc. ("Tactile
Systems" or the "Company") (NASDAQ: TCMD) in the United States
District Court for the District of Minnesota on behalf of those who
purchased or acquired the securities of Tactile Systems between May
7, 2018 and June 8, 2020, inclusive (the "Class Period"). The
lawsuit seeks to recover damages for Tactile Systems investors
under the federal securities laws.

The Complaint alleges that Defendants failed to disclose to
investors that: (1) while the Company publicly touted a $4 plus
billion or $5 plus billion market opportunity, in truth, the total
addressable market for the Company's medical devices was materially
smaller; (2) to induce sales growth and share gains, Tactile
engaged in illegal sales and marketing activities; and (3) the
Company's revenues were in part the product of unlawful conduct and
thus unsustainable.

Investors who purchased or otherwise acquired shares of Tactile
Systems during the Class Period should contact the Firm prior to
the November 30, 2020 lead plaintiff motion deadline. A lead
plaintiff is a representative party acting on behalf of other class
members in directing the litigation.  If you wish to discuss your
rights or interests regarding this class action, please contact
Thomas J. McKenna, Esq. or Gregory M. Egleston, Esq. of Gainey
McKenna & Egleston at (212) 983-1300, or via e-mail at
tjmckenna@gme-law.com or gegleston@gme-law.com. [GN]


THOMAS P. GOHAGAN: Can Compel Arbitration in Saperstein Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GUY SAPERSTEIN, Plaintiff, v. THOMAS P. GOHAGAN &
COMPANY, et al., Defendants, Case No. 20-cv-03143-JCS (N.D. Cal.),
Chief Magistrate Judge John C. Spero of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California granted Defendant Gohagan's
motion to compel arbitration and dismiss or stay the proceeding.

Guy Saperstein commenced a putative class action against Defendant
Gohagan, asserting claims of breach of contract, breach of covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, intentional misrepresentation,
unjust enrichment, and violations of California's Unfair
Competition Law.  

In August 2019, Saperstein and his wife, Jeanine Saperstein,
purchased a deluxe travel program from Gohagan on Cal Discoveries
Travel, a travel booking site for alumni of the University of
California, Berkeley.  Gohagan is one of a dozen specialized
wholesale tour operators that participate in Cal Discoveries
Travel.  The Sapersteins made reservations for the European Coastal
Civilizations: A Voyage from Lisbon to London scheduled from April
27, 2020 to May 6, 2020.  On Aug. 26, 2019, they also purchased
travel insurance in connection with the Cruise and paid a total of
$3,079 to Travel Guard Americas, LLC.

In order to register for the Cruise, the Plaintiff signed a
reservation form and submitted it to Gohagan's offices.  The
reservation form contained the Release of Liability, Assumption of
Risk and Binding Arbitration Agreement.  Saperstein signed the
reservation form and paid a deposit of $2,000 on Aug. 16, 2019, and
Gohagan confirmed the reservation on Aug. 19, 2019.  On Dec. 18,
2019, the Sapersteins received an invoice for and paid the
remaining balance of $27,480 to Gohagan.  In total, the Sapersteins
paid Gohagan $29,480.

In March 2020, Gohagan notified the Sapersteins that it had
canceled the Cruise in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.  Gohagan
presented the Sapersteins with two options for compensation: (1)
transfer the reservation and money paid to another European Coastal
Civilizations travel program in 2021 or 2022, or (2) receive travel
certificates valid on other Gohagan travel programs operating
through 2022.  Gohagan denied Saperstein's request for a refund of
monies paid to Gohagan for the Cruise.

On May 7, 2020, Saperstein brought the action alleging Gohagan
breached its contract with Saperstein by denying Saperstein's
request to refund the money he paid for the Cruise after Gohagan
announced the cancellation.  He also alleges breach of covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, intentional misrepresentation, unjust
enrichment, and violations of the Unfair Competition Law against
Gohagan in relation to the same set of facts.  Saperstein initially
named Travel Guard as a second Defendant, but dismissed all claims
against that party without prejudice on May 19, 2020.

Gohagan filed a motion to compel arbitration and dismiss or stay
the proceeding based on an arbitration provision in the trip
reservation form between Saperstein and Gohagan.  It also argues
that Saperstein's claims fall within the scope of the signed
arbitration agreement and that relevant case law supports enforcing
the arbitration agreement.  It further argues that the agreement to
arbitrate is unambiguous and enforceable and that Saperstein's
claims against it fall within the scope of the arbitration
provision in the parties' agreement.  Alternatively, Gohagan argues
that questions about the scope or enforceability of the arbitration
agreement should be resolved by the arbitrator in accordance with
the delegation clause of the arbitration agreement.

In his opposition, Saperstein concedes that the Court must compel
arbitration if (1) a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, and (2)
the dispute at issue falls within the scope of that agreement, but
argues that there is no such valid agreement to arbitrate because
the arbitration provision cited by Gohagan is unconscionable and
thus unenforceable under California law.  He suggests the contract
is procedurally unconscionable because it contains both the
elements of oppression and surprise required to make a showing of
procedural unconscionability under California law.  Saperstein
argues that the agreement is substantively unconscionable because
it grants Gohagan the sole authority to amend the contract.
Alternatively, Saperstein argues that the arbitration provision is
invalid because it prevents his request for public injunctive
relief.

Magistrate Judge Spero finds that the motion is appropriate for
resolution without oral argument, and vacates the hearing and case
management conference scheduled for Aug. 7, 2020.

Because Gohagan has presented undisputed evidence that Saperstein
signed an agreement which contains both an arbitration provision
and delegation clause requiring resolution of the dispute by
arbitration, the Magistrate Judge finds that Gohagan has met its
burden of showing that Saperstein agreed to the arbitration clause
Gohagan seeks to enforce.

Turning to the delegation clause, the Magistrate Judge finds that
Saperstein had not shown that the delegation clause present in his
agreement with Gohagan is unconscionable.  Pursuant to the Supreme
Court's ruling in Rent-A-Center and his analysis, a valid agreement
exists between Saperstein and Gohagan at least to arbitrate gateway
issues of arbitrability, which encompasses the dispute of whether
the broader arbitration provision is unconscionable.  Thus, the FAA
requires enforcement of the delegation provision in accordance with
its terms.  Whether any other provision of the parties' agreement
might be unconscionable is for an arbitrator to decide.

Finally, the Magistrate Judge holds that he need not decide whether
Saperstein actually seeks public injunctive relief because
Saperstein conspicuously fails to argue that the arbitration
provision Gohagan seeks to enforce would prevent such relief.  The
arbitration provision at issue contains no language purporting to
preclude public injunctive relief in any way, and Saperstein fails
to argue how it would have such an effect.  Thus, Saperstein has
not shown that the agreement would violate the McGill v. Citibank,
N.A. rule.  To the extent that Saperstein seeks public injunctive
relief, an arbitrator may determine whether to award such relief.

For the reasons discussed, Magistarte Judge Spero granted the
Defendant's motion to compel arbitration, and stayed the case
pending arbitration.  If an arbitrator determines that the
arbitration agreement is invalid or unenforceable, or that any
aspect of Saperstein's claims should be litigated in court rather
than arbitrated, Saperstein may file a motion to lift the stay.  If
the case proceeds in arbitration to a complete resolution, either
party may move to dismiss the action.  A status conference is set
for Jan. 29, 2021 at 2:00 p.m., and the parties will file a joint
report on the status of arbitration no later than Jan. 22, 2021.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Aug. 4, 2020 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y6kc856n from Leagle.com.


TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS: Denial of Arbitration Bid in Landry Affirmed
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester, affirmed
the denial of Transworld's motion to compel arbitration in the
case, PHILIP LANDRY vs. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS INC, Case No. SJC-12813
(Mass.).

Landry, purportedly owes a debt to Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of
Boston, LLC (Enterprise), for damage to a rental vehicle that he
has declined to pay.  In February 2018, Landry rented a vehicle
from Enterprise, which Enterprise asserts that he returned in a
damaged condition.  Enterprise repaired the vehicle and billed
Landry for the repairs.  After Landry failed to make any payment,
Enterprise assigned the debt to Transworld, a company that
Enterprise had engaged to provide it debt collection services.

In September 2018, Landry filed a class action complaint against
Transworld in the Superior Court.  The complaint asserted that
Transworld had called Landry's cellular telephone eight times
within a seven-day period, in violation of the limits established
under the Massachusetts consumer protection act, and debt
collection regulations.  Landry seeks to represent all
Massachusetts consumers who have received more than two collection
calls from Transworld in a seven-day period in the four years
immediately prior to the filing of his complaint.

Transworld moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the Federal
Arbitration Act.  In support of its motion, Transworld cited a
binding arbitration provision contained in Landry's rental contract
with Enterprise.  In order to rent a vehicle from Enterprise,
Landry signed a form lease contract, which contains the Mandatory
Arbitration Agreement.

The Superior Court judge denied Transworld's motion to compel
arbitration.  The Judge reasoned that Transworld, as a
non-signatory, was required to present "clear and unmistakable"
evidence that Landry had agreed to arbitrate his claims against
Transworld, and that Transworld had failed to do so.  Transworld
sought an interlocutory appeal in the Appeals Court, as was its
right pursuant to G. L. c. 251, Section 18, of the denial of its
motion to compel arbitration.  The Supreme Judicial Court
transferred the case to its jurisdiction on its own motion.

The sole issue before the Court is whether Transworld may enforce
the arbitration provision in a contract to which it is not a
signatory.  Hence, it looks State law principles of contract law
pertaining to such enforcement.  

The Court has acknowledged six theories under which a nonsignatory
may enforce a contract, such as an arbitration agreement, against a
signatory: (1) incorporation by reference; (2) assumption; (3)
agency; (4) veil-piercing/alter ego; (5) equitable estoppel, and
(6) third-party beneficiary.  These theories ordinarily are applied
to resolve a different question from the question at issue in the
case -- whether a signatory to a contract could enforce the
contract against a nonsignatory.  Nonetheless, the theories also
have been used where a nonsignatory seeks to enforce a contract
against a signatory.

Transworld contends that two of the theories discussed in Machado
v. System4 LLC apply.  First, Transworld asserts that it may
enforce the arbitration provision in Enterprise's contract with
Landry under the "agency" theory.  Second, Transworld argues that
it may enforce the arbitration provision as a third-party
beneficiary.

The Court concludes that, on these facts, neither theory is
applicable.  Transworld argues that it is entitled to enforce
Enterprise's arbitration provision because it acted as Enterprise's
agent for debt collection purposes.  Assuming, without deciding,
that Transworld was acting as Enterprise's agent, the Court
nonetheless concludes that, given the facts at issue, Transworld
cannot rely upon the "agency" theory in its effort to enforce
Enterprise's arbitration provision with Landry.

The Court does not agree with Transworld's assertion that the
agency theory would permit a nonsignatory agent to enforce an
arbitration provision in a contract signed by its principal solely
by virtue of its status as an agent of the signatory.  Typically,
agents do not obtain rights from contracts entered into by their
principals.

Landry has no dispute with Enterprise, and Landry's claims are not
related to his rental contract with Enterprise.  Moreover, if
Transworld had engaged in the untoward debt collection practices
alleged, it would not have been acting within the scope of the work
Enterprise hired it to perform. The service agreement between
Enterprise and Transworld expressly prohibits debt collection by
any means that violate applicable Federal and State law.

Transworld argues as well that it may enforce the arbitration
provision as a third-party beneficiary.  It contends that, because
the arbitration provision is to be broadly interpreted and applies
to all claims Renter may bring against Enterprise's employees,
agents, affiliates or representatives, the contract must be read to
require Landry to arbitrate his claim against Transworld.

The arbitration provision in question contains competing language
regarding the parties who may enforce it.  The second sentence of
the arbitration provision states that the Renter and Enterprise
agree to arbitrate any and all claims against each other.  In light
of these competing provisions, reasonable minds surely could differ
as to whether the arbitration provision is applicable to claims
brought against Transworld.  Even assuming, without deciding, that
Transworld's interpretation of the arbitration provision is
reasonable, it is by no means the only reasonable interpretation.

The Court concludes that the language in the arbitration provision
is susceptible of multiple interpretations; the arbitration
provision is, at a minimum, ambiguous as to whether Transworld can
enforce it.  Transworld accordingly has not put forth the "clear
and definite" evidence of intent that it must if it were to be
entitled to enforce the arbitration provision as a third-party
beneficiary.  In sum, there was no error in the denial of
Transworld's motion to compel arbitration.  Accordingly, the order
denying motion to compel arbitration is affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 28, 2020 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/y4v4kdrd from Leagle.com.

Bryan C. Shartle -- bshartle@sessions.legal -- of Louisiana, for
the defendant.

Sergei Lemberg for the plaintiff.

Angela Laughlin Brown -- abrown@grayreed.com -- of Texas, & John C.
La Liberte -- jclaliberte@sherin.com -- for ACA International,
amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Maura Healey, Attorney General, & Max Weinstein, Assistant Attorney
General, for the Commonwealth, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.


TTOTTAL BUSINESS: Viera Sues Over Unpaid Overtime and Retaliation
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ATANASILDO A. VIERA, and other similarly situated individuals,
Plaintiff v. TTOTTAL BUSINESS LLC d/b/a MARGHERITA PIZZA BEER &
WINE, DANIEL CADOSCH DELMAR and URI DALY, individually, Defendants
Case No. 1:20-cv-24225 (S.D. Fla., October 15, 2020) brings this
collective action complaint against the Defendants for their
alleged failure to pay overtime and unlawful retaliation in
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants approximately from
March 1, 2018 to January 13, 2020 as a non-exempted full-time
restaurant employee.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff worked more than 40 hours
every week, but he was only paid by the Defendants for a fraction
of all his hours worked. As a result, the Defendants willfully
failed to pay the Plaintiff regular and overtime hours at the rate
of one and one-half times his regular rate of pay for every hour
that he worked in excess of 40.

Ttottal Business LLC d/b/a Margherita Pizza Beer & Wine is a pizza
restaurant. Daniel Cadosch Delmar and Uri Dally are owners,
partners, officers and operators of the Ttottal Business. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Zandro E. Palma, Esq.
          ZANRO E. PALMA, P.A.
          9100 S. Dadeland Blvd., Suite 1500
          Miami, FL 33156
          Tel: (305) 446-1500
          Fax: (305) 446-1502
          E-mail: zep@thepalmalawgroup.com



UMTH LAND: Court Narrows Claims in Fannin Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------
In the case, DAVID C. FANNIN AND LUCILLE S. FANNIN AS CO-TRUSTEES
OF THE DAVID C. FANNIN REVOCABLE TRUST DATED AUGUST 3, 1995 AND THE
LUCILLE STEWART FANNIN REVOCABLE TRUST DATED AUGUST 3, 1995,
Plaintiffs, v. UMTH LAND DEVELOPMENT, L.P., UMT SERVICES, INC., UMT
HOLDINGS, L.P., UMTH GENERAL SERVICES, L.P., UNITED MORTGAGE TRUST,
UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING, L.P., UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING IV,
UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING X, L.P., TODD F. ETTER, HOLLIS M.
GREENLAW, MICHAEL K. WILSON, BEN L. WISSINK, CARA D. OBERT, AND
MELISSA H. YOUNGBLOOD, Defendants, and UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING
III, L.P., Nominal Defendant, C.A. No. 12541-VCF (Del. Ch.), the
Court of Chancery of Delaware granted in part and denied in part
the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss.    

United Development Funds is a family of investment funds that makes
loans for the purpose of real estate development.  The nominal
defendant in the action, United Development Funding III
("Partnership"), is a Delaware limited partnership and a member of
the family.

The Plaintiffs are limited partners of UDF III.  They allege that
UDF III's general partner and the entities and individuals that
ultimately control UDF III used the Partnership's funds to support
earlier-formed funds within the family as part of a broader scheme
to conceal the earlier funds' losses and to support their continued
payment of partnership distributions.  The Plaintiffs allege the
general partner and those that control it breached their fiduciary
duties and UDF III's limited partnership agreement, committed
corporate waste, and were unjustly enriched.  They also allege that
affiliates of the general partner aided and abetted the breaches of
fiduciary duty alleged in the complaint and were also unjustly
enriched.

The Complaint contains the following seven counts (Counts I, III to
V, and VII are pleaded as derivative claims, and Counts II and VI
are pleaded as direct claims):

  a. Count I (Derivative Claim, On Behalf of UDF III, For Breach
     of Fiduciary Duty): Count I is a derivative claim on behalf
     of UDF III against Etter, Greenlaw, Wilson, Wissink, Obert,
     Youngblood, UMT Services, and UMTH LD for breach of fiduciary

     duty.  The Plaintiffs allege that UMTH LD owes fiduciary
     duties to UDF III because it is the general partner of UDF
     III; that UMT Services owes fiduciary duties because it is
     the general partner of UMTH LD; that Etter and Greenlaw owe
     fiduciary duties because they are the ultimate controllers
     and owners of UMT Services; that Etter, Greenlaw, and Wilson
     owe fiduciary duties because they are directors and officers
     of UMT Services and controllers of the decisions and conduct
     which injured UDF III; and that Wissink, Obert, and
     Youngblood owe fiduciary duties as senior executive decision-
     makers concerning the conduct that injured UDF III.  The
     Plaintiffs argue that each of these Defendants breached their

     fiduciary duties through conflicted and self-dealing conduct.

  b. Count II (Direct Claim, On Behalf of the Class, for Breach of

     Fiduciary Duties): Count II asserts a direct claim on behalf
     against Etter, Greenlaw, Wilson, Wissink, Obert, Youngblood,
     UMT Services, and UMTH LD for the same breach of fiduciary
     duty.  The Plaintiffs allege these Defendants breached their
     fiduciary duties by their decision to cease distributions of
     the Cash Available for Distribution to UDF III's Limited
     Partners since January 2016 and by omitting and misstating
     material information provided to the Limited Partners
     concerning UDF III and its assets.

  c. Count III (Derivative Claim, On Behalf of UDF III, for Waste
     of Partnership Assets): Count III alleges that Etter,
     Greenlaw, Wilson, Wissink, Obert, Youngblood, UMT Services,
     and UMTH LD wasted Partnership assets by engaging in the
     challenged loan transactions and for failing to enforce UDF
     III's rights under the loan agreements.  In response to the
     Defendants' briefs, the Plaintiffs have abandoned the claim
     as to all the Defendants except UMTH LD.

  d. Count IV (Derivative Claim, On Behalf of UDF III, for Aiding
     and Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duty): Count IV asserts a
     derivative claim on behalf of UDF III against UMT, UMT
     Holdings, UMTH General, UDF I, UDF IV, and UDF X for aiding
     and abetting the breaches of fiduciary duty described in
     Counts I and II.

  e. Count V (Derivative Claim, on Behalf of UDF III, for Breach
     of Contract): Count V is a derivative claim against UMTH LD
     for breach of the Partnership Agreement.  The Plaintiffs
     contend that by causing UDF III to invest in and/or to make
     loans to UDF I and its subsidiaries and to the Developer
     Borrowers, UMTH LD breached Section 11.3(b) of the
     Partnership Agreement, which provides loan concentration
     limitations to any single borrower.  The Plaintiffs allege
     that UMTH LD also breached the Partnership Agreement by
     failing to obtain appraisals in connection with the UMT
     Participation Interest and UMT Option.

  f. Count VI (Direct Claim, on Behalf of the Class, for Breach of

     Contract): Count VI is a direct claim against UMTH LD for
     breach of the Partnership Agreement.  The Plaintiffs contend
     that UMTH LD's decision to cease distributions of the Cash
     Available for Distribution and to cease distributions of
     financial reports for UDF III breached the Partnership
     Agreement.

  g. Count VII (Derivative Claim, on Behalf of UDF III, for Unjust

     Enrichment): Count VII is a claim for unjust enrichment
     against all the Defendants.

On June 28, 2019, the Entity Defendants and the Individual
Defendants each filed separate motions to dismiss the Complaint.
The Defendants have moved to dismiss pursuant to Court of Chancery
Rules 12(b)(6) and 23.1.  They contend the Complaint does not state
a claim under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6), because (1) claims
based on transactions that occurred and were disclosed more than
three years prior to the commencement of the action are barred by
laches and statutes of limitations; (2) the Plaintiffs have failed
to allege injury; and (3) the Complaint fails to state claims as to
each of the causes of actions.  

Second, the Individual Defendants argue that they do not owe
fiduciary duties to UDF III or its limited partners.  The argument
urges the Court to reject the well-established precedent of In re
USACafes, L.P. Litigation and its progeny, which held that the
persons who ultimately control a corporate general partner owe
fiduciary duties to the limited partnership. Wissink, Obert, and
Youngblood separately argue that even if the Court follows
USACafes, Counts I, II, and VII should be dismissed as to them
because the Plaintiffs have failed to allege that these specific
Defendants exercise sufficient control over UDF III to impose
fiduciary duties upon them.  

The Defendants further argue that the derivative claims based upon
the transactions with "unaffiliated, third-party borrowers" must be
dismissed pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 23.1 for failure to
plead demand futility.

On April 14, 2020, the Court held oral argument on the Motions to
Dismiss.

Pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6), the Motion to Dismiss
for Failure to State a Claim is granted in part and denied in part.
It is denied as to Counts I, II, IV, V, and VI, and is granted as
Counts III and VII.

Among other things, the Court finds that the Complaint falls short
of the high standard to plead a claim for waste of partnership
assets.  The challenged transactions fail to show economic terms
"so one-sided" that they are "unconscionable."  For example,
extending the maturity date and accepting assignments for some of
the challenged loans rather than writing them off would not be
unconscionable if it increased the likelihood that they would be
repaid.  Furthermore, the Plaintiffs do not allege facts to show
that the Partnership received no consideration for the challenged
loans and transactions.  Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have failed to
state a claim for waste of partnership assets.

The Court cannot also determine, as a matter of law, that any of
the unjust enrichment claims should be dismissed solely on the
grounds that relationships were comprehensively governed by
contract.  As to the other grounds for dismissal, the Court
concludes that the claim for unjust enrichment must be dismissed as
to UMT Services and UMT.  The Plaintiffs specifically pointed to
paragraphs 150, 316, 326, 330, 334, and 340 of the Complaint as
allegations showing "unjust profits obtained" by several of the
Entity Defendants as a result of the Partnership's lending.  But
those paragraphs do not allege facts to support a reasonable
inference that UMT Services or UMT were unjustly enriched.
Therefore, Count VII is dismissed as to those two Defendants.

The Court cannot dismiss the unjust enrichment claims as to the
Individual Defendants.  It finds that it is unlikely that those who
have been determined to owe fiduciary duties—UMTH LD, UMT
Services, Greenlaw, Etter, Wilson, and Wissink—"could be liable
for unjust enrichment under circumstances when they would not also
be liable for a breach of fiduciary duty.  Yet it is possible that
they could have a defense to fiduciary duty liability but the
profits they received could have resulted from a fiduciary breach.
Under those circumstances, the unjust enrichment claim could be a
vehicle for the Partnership's recovery.  That same rationale
supports the Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claims against Obert and
Youngblood.  Although the Court has concluded that they do not owe
fiduciary duties, the Plaintiffs may be able to show that the
profits they are alleged to have obtained are without
justification.

Pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 23.1, the Motion to Dismiss for
Demand Futility is denied.  The parties disagree as to whether the
demand futility analysis should be conducted solely from the
perspective of UDF III's General Partner, UMTH LD, or the
individuals with ultimate decision-making authority regarding any
litigation demand.  The Defendants argue that the Court may only
consider whether the General Partner is disinterested and
independent.  The Plaintiffs argue that the Court should also look
to Etter and Greenlaw, who constitute a majority of the board of
UMT Services, the general partner to UMTH LD.

The Court finds that the Plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient
to raise a reasonable doubt that UMTH LD is disinterested and
independent.  The Complaint sufficiently alleges that UMTH LD, as
the general partner of UDF III, is not disinterested and
independent with respect to each of UDF III's loans to CTMGT,
Buffington, and their respective affiliates.  The Plaintiffs have
adequately alleged that UMTH LD derives a financial benefit not
shared with the Limited Partners and that its actions were designed
to enrich UMTH LD and its controllers at UDF III's expense with
respect to its loans to the Developer Borrowers.  For these
reasons, the Court need not consider whether demand futility can be
satisfied by raising reasonable doubt as to the disinterestedness
and independence of Etter and Greenlaw.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 31, 2020 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y44yopmx from Leagle.com.

Robert J. Kriner, Jr. -- RobertKriner@chimicles.com -- and Tiffany
J. Cramer -- TiffanyCramer@chimicles.com -- CHIMICLES SCHWARTZ
KRINER & DONALDSON-SMITH LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Attorneys for
Plaintiffs David C. Fannin, and Lucille S. Fannin, as Co-Trustees
of the David C. Fannin Revocable Trust Dated August 3, 1995 and the
Lucille Stewart Fannin Revocable Trust Dated August 3, 1995.

Steven L. Caponi -- steven.caponi@klgates.com -- K&L GATES LLP,
Wilmington, Delaware; John W. Rotunno -- john.rotunno@klgates.com
-- Paul J. Walsen -- paul.walsen@klgates.com -- Joseph C. Wylie II,
Molly K. McGinley, Matthew A. Alvis, K&L GATES LLP, Chicago,
Illinois; Attorneys for UMTH Land Development, L.P., UMT Services,
Inc., UMT Holdings, L.P., UMTH General Services, L.P., United
Mortgage Trust, United Development Funding, L.P., United
Development Funding IV, and United Development Funding X, L.P.

Myron T. Steele -- msteele@potteranderson.com -- Timothy R.
Dudderar -- tdudderar@potteranderson.com -- Jacqueline A. Rogers,
POTTER ANDERSON & CORROON LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Attorneys for
Defendants Todd F. Etter, Hollis M. Greenlaw, Michael K. Wilson,
Ben L. Wissink, Cara D. Obert, and Melissa Youngblood.


UNITED AMERICAN: Can Compel Hardy to Arbitrate Claims in Jones Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANTWAUN JONES, on behalf of himself and those
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. UNITED AMERICAN SECURITY, LLC
d/b/a GARDAWORLD SECURITY SERVICES, Defendant, Case No.
1:20-cv-00440 (N.D. Ohio), Judge James S. Gwin of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted in part and denied
in part the Defendant's motion to compel Opt-in Plaintiffs Shannon
Hardy and Danial Tucker to arbitrate their claims.

On Feb. 26, 2020, Plaintiff Jones sued Defendant GardaWorld.  Jones
says that he and others similarly situated worked for GardaWorld as
security guards and were hourly employees.  He says that the
Defendant required them to arrive to work 10 to 15 minutes before
their shift start time to perform shift-change duties.  The
Plaintiff alleges GardaWorld did not pay the security guards for
that time.  Additionally, because the time was unpaid it was not
included in overtime calculations.  Jones sues under the Fair Labor
Standards Act and Ohio's overtime statute and includes collective
and class action allegations.

On March 4, 2020, Hardy and Tucker joined the collective action as
opt-in Plaintiffs.  The Defendant moved to compel Hardy and Tucker
to arbitrate their claims on April 24, 2020.  On May 15, 2020,
Plaintiff Jones filed a notice of non-opposition to the motions to
compel.

Defendant GardaWorld and Opt-in Plaintiff Hardy executed an
arbitration agreement in which they agreed to arbitrate, among
other issues, claims for violation of, or arising out of any city,
county, local, state, federal or other governmental law relating to
the payment of wages, the amount of wages, off the clock work,
overtime pay, or compensation.  

Judge Gwin finds that such agreement appears to cover the claims in
the present litigation in which the Plaintiff alleges claims under
the Fair Labor Standards Act and Ohio's overtime statute for
uncompensated work performed pre-shift.  Furthermore, the federal
statutory claims under the FLSA, are arbitrable.  He finds that
Opt-in Plaintiff's Hardy's claims are arbitrable.  She further
finds that the litigation should not be stayed pending the
arbitration of Opt-in Plaintiff Hardy's claims.

As to Opt-in Plaintiff Tucker, Defendant GardaWorld states that
Opt-In Plaintiff Tucker never worked for GardaWorld and instead
worked for non-party Whelan Security Protection Services, Inc.  It
attaches an arbitration agreement between Tucker and Whelan in
support of that assertion.  Without explaining its relationship
with Whelan Security, GardaWorld seeks to compel enforcement of the
Tucker-Whelan arbitration agreement.

As a non-party to the agreement, Defendant GardaWorld does not
explain why it would have standing to compel the arbitration.  The
Judge therefore declines to enforce the arbitration agreement
between Opt-In Plaintiff Tucker and non-party, Whelan.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Gwin granted the motion to compel
the arbitration as to Opt-in Plaintiff Hardy, but denied the motion
as to Opt-in Plaintiff Tucker.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 28, 2020 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y2ha7suz from Leagle.com.


UPMC: Court Denies Remand of Doe Privacy Suit to State Court
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JANE DOE I and JANE DOE II, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. UPMC, Defendant,
Case No. 2:20-cv-359 (W.D. Pa.), Judge Marilyn J. Horan of the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (i) denied
the Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand, and (ii) denied as moot both the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Jurisdictional Discovery and Request for
Judicial Notice.

The Plaintiffs, currently proceeding under pseudonyms, filed the
present class action against Defendant UPMC in the Court of Common
Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.  The Plaintiffs seek
redress under Pennsylvania law for UPMC's alleged disclosure of
their personally identifiable information to third parties for
internet marketing purposes without their knowledge or
authorization.

The Plaintiffs bring the action individually and on behalf of a
class consisting of all Pennsylvania residents who are, or were,
patients of UPMC or any of its affiliates, and who used UPMC's web
properties, including, but not limited to, UPMC.com and the Patient
Portal at myupmc.upmc.com.

According to the Complaint, UPMC encourages patients to exchange
communications through its website and patient portal to search for
a doctor, learn more about their conditions and treatments, access
medical records and test results, and make appointments.  The
Plaintiffs allege that UPMC then re-directs certain personally
identifiable information and patient communication content from its
website and patient portal to third parties, such Facebook and
Google, for marketing purposes without patients' consent.  They
contend that through this conduct, UPMC fails to uphold its
obligations and promises to protect patients' privacy.

The Plaintiffs thus bring the following claims: in Count I, breach
of provider-patient confidentiality; in Count II, violation of
Pennsylvania's Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act;
in Count III, violation of Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices
and Consumer Protection Law; in Count IV, identity theft, in
violation of 40 P.S. Section 4120; in Count V, negligence; and in
Count VI, intrusion upon seclusion.

UPMC removed the matter to federal court primarily on the basis of
the federal officer removal jurisdiction, found at 28 U.S.C.
Section 1442.  In its Notice of Removal, UPMC states that when it
engaged in the complained-of conduct, it was acting under the
Department of Health and Human Services ("DHHS"), the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS"), and the Office of the
National Coordinator for Health Information Technology, to
implement DHHS's voluntary electronic health records incentive
program, known as the EHR Incentive Program or, more commonly, the
Meaningful Use Program.

Through the Meaningful Use Program, the federal government makes
incentive payments to healthcare providers who increase their use
of, as well as patient engagement with, electronic health records,
or "EHR."  The program came about as a result of the federal
government's goal of a nationwide implementation of interoperable
health information technology in both the public and private health
care sectors.  According to UPMC, the Plaintiffs' claims
effectively ask a court to intervene in the operation of a federal
program and hold that the federal government, UPMC, and most other
healthcare systems are all violating state law.  As such, UPMC
argues, the matter belongs in federal court.  The Plaintiffs
disagree.

UPMC also contends that removal is proper under the Class Action
Fairness Act, in that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million
and minimal diversity exists.  In response, the Plaintiffs argue
that the "home state" exception to CAFA applies, which requires the
Court to remand the matter to state court if more than two-thirds
of the class are citizens of the same state as the primary
defendant.  They ask that the Court takes judicial notice of
certain information and that they be allowed to engage in discovery
related to the citizenship of the potential class, so that they may
show that more than two-thirds of the class are citizens of
Pennsylvania.

Judge Horan opines that something more than regulation by the
federal government or compliance with federal law by the private
entity is required to establish an "acting under" relationship
between the private entity and the federal government.  That said,
the burden is not so high that a private entity must establish that
it has an agency relationship with the federal government.  The
private entity need only show that the allegations in the complaint
are directed at the private entity's efforts to assist a federal
superior.

UPMC, as a participant in the Meaningful Use Program, receives
incentive payments from DHHS for its development and use of the
UPMC website and the MyUPMC portal in accordance with the program's
criteria.  In particular, UPMC must, among other things, raise
awareness and increase usability of the UPMC website and the MyUPMC
portal.  The Plaintiffs' Complaint addresses the design and
functionality of UPMC's website and patient portal, implicating
UPMC's implementation of the Meaningful Use Program, particularly
as the implementation involves patient engagement and usership.

The fact that the government offers payment in exchange for UPMC's
voluntary participation in implementing a nationwide EHR network
shows the relationship between UPMC and DHHS is less like the
regulator-regulated relationship in Watson v. Philip Morris
Companies, Inc. and more like the government contractor
relationship in Papp v. Fore-Kast Sales Co.  And, the Plaintiffs'
allegations are directed at that relationship.  UPMC is therefore
"acting under" a federal superior for purposes of the federal
officer removal statute.

Next, the parties dispute whether the Plaintiffs' claims are "for
or relating to" an act under color of federal office.  To establish
this element, the removing defendant only needs to show that there
is a 'connection' or 'association' between the act in question and
the federal office.  It is a broad standard: as noted by the Third
Circuit, Congress's addition of "or relating to" in 2011 "was
intended to broaden the universe of acts that enable Federal
officers to remove to Federal court."  

The Plaintiffs' allegations target mechanisms by which UPMC manages
and markets its website and patient portal.  There is plainly a
connection or association between UPMC's website management and
marketing strategies and the Meaningful Use program, particularly
the incentives that are tied to patient participation and
usability.  The Plaintiffs' claims are therefore "for or relating
to" an act under color of federal office.

Lastly, the parties dispute whether UPMC has raised a defense that
is both colorable and based in federal law.  UPMC argues that it
will raise four colorable federal defenses in response to the
Complaint: a duty-based defense under the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act; preemption of the Plaintiffs'
state law claims by HIPAA; Buckman preemption; and the dormant
Commerce Clause.

The Judge holds that UPMC has pleaded facts supporting removal
under the federal officer removal statute.  UPMC has shown that by
its participation in the Meaningful Use Program, it was "acting
under" DHHS when it engaged in the conduct that is at issue in the
Complaint.  Furthermore, the complained-of conduct is "for or
relating to" an act under color of office, and UPMC has raised
several colorable federal defenses.  Consequently, the Plaintiffs'
Motion to Remand will be denied.

Having found that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction under
the federal officer removal statute, the Judge does not need to
reach the issue of whether it also has jurisdiction under CAFA.
Accordingly, she does not address the parties' CAFA arguments or
the Plaintiffs' additional Motions filed in support of their Motion
to Remand at this time.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Horan denied the Plaintiffs' Motion
to Remand the matter to state court.  Additionally, the Judge
denied as moot the (i) Plaintiffs' Motion for Jurisdictional
Discovery, and (ii) the Plaintiffs' Request for Judicial Notice.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 31, 2020 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y3e75pbf from Leagle.com.


V.F. CORP: Website Inaccessible to Blind Users, Paguada Claims
--------------------------------------------------------------
JOSUE PAGUADA, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. V.F. CORPORATION, Defendant, Case No.
1:20-cv-08658 (S.D.N.Y., October 16, 2020) is a class action
complaint brought against the Defendant for its alleged violation
of the Americans with Disabilities Act.

The Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who
cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading
software.

The Plaintiff contends that the Defendant's Website has multiple
access barriers which he encountered when he visited the Website in
October 2020 to browse and potentially make a purchase. Because the
Defendant failed to comply with the Web Content Accessibility
Guidelines 2.1, its Website lacks variety of features and
accommodations which effectively barred the Plaintiff and other
similarly situated visually-impaired and legally blind persons from
being able to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Defendant's
public accommodation similar to that of the sighted individuals.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant has engaged in acts of
intentional discrimination due to its failure to construct and
maintain a Website that is equally accessible to visually-impaired
individuals, and failure to take actions to correct these access
barriers.

V.F. Corporation is a boot manufacturing company that owns and
operates the website, www.kodiakboots.com. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          MARS KHAIMOV LAW, PLLC
          10826 64th Ave., Second Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Tel: (929) 324-0717
          E-mail: marskhaimovlaw@gmail.com


WALDORF ASTORIA: Perez Sues Over Unpaid Overtime for Housekeepers
-----------------------------------------------------------------
IVET C. PEREZ and DERECK S. DUMONT, for themselves and on behalf of
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. WALDORF ASTORIA EMPLOYER
LLC a/k/a WALDORF ASTORIA ORLANDO d/b/a WALDORF ASTORIA ORLANDO,
Defendant, Case No. 6:20-cv-01910 (M.D. Fla., October 15, 2020)
bring this collective action complaint against the Defendant for
its alleged unlawful pay policy and/or practice in violation of the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendant as a non-exempted,
full time, hourly-paid housekeepers.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs and other similarly
situated housekeepers were not allowed by the Defendant's managers
to clock-in before their scheduled shift start-time, but were
required to clock out at the end of their scheduled shift although
they were required to stay working at least one more
off-the-clock-hour. Otherwise, the Defendant's managers harassed,
reprimanded, and threatened workers who have tried to clock-in
early to record their pre-shift work, or to clock late to record
their post-shift work.

As a result, the Defendant failed to pay the Plaintiffs and other
similarly situated housekeepers the proper overtime compensation at
the rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for
all the hours worked over 40 in a workweek.

Waldorf Astoria Orlando operates a luxury hotel and resort located
at 14200 Bonnet Creek Resort Lane, Orlando, FL 32821. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Zandro E. Palma, Esq.
          ZANRO E. PALMA, P.A.
          9100 S. Dadeland Blvd., Suite 1500
          Miami, FL 33156
          Tel: (305) 446-1500
          Fax: (305) 446-1502
          E-mail: zep@thepalmalawgroup.com


WELLS FARGO: Faces Popal Suit Over Denied Sick Leave Benefits
-------------------------------------------------------------
MERYAM POPAL, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, and
DOES 1 through 10, Inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
37-2020-00038101-CU-OE-CTL (Cal. Super., October 21, 2020) is a
class action complaint brought against the Defendants for their
alleged unlawful and unfair business practices in violation of the
California Labor Code and the California Business and Professions
Code.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants underpaid his and other
similarly situated employees' sick leave wages. As a result, the
Defendants violated the Business and Professions Code sections
17200 for failing to provide the Plaintiff and the class the
employment protections, wages, premiums, and funds and property
owed to them.

Wells Fargo provides banking, insurance, investment, and financial
services. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael D. Singer, Esq.
          Jeff Geraci, Esq.
          COHELAN KHAOURY & SINGER
          605 C Street, Suite 200
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Tel: (619) 595-3001
          Fax: (619) 595-3000
          E-mail: msinger@ckslaw.com
                  jgeraci@ckslaw.com


ZIMMER BIOMET: Class of Sales Associates in Karl Suit Certified
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JAMES KARL, on behalf of himself, and on behalf of a
class of those similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. ZIMMER BIOMET
HOLDINGS, INC., a Delaware corporation, ZIMMER US, INC., a Delaware
corporation, BIOMET U.S. RECONSTRUCTION, LLC, an Indiana limited
liability company, BIOMET BIOLOGICS, LLC, an Indiana limited
liability company, and BIOMET, INC., an Indiana corporation,
Defendants, Case No. C 18-04176 WHA (N.D. Cal.), Judge William
Alsup of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California granted the Plaintiff sales associates' motion for class
certification.

Defendant (and parent corporation) Zimmer Biomet Holdings and its
subsidiaries design, manufacture, and market biopharmaceutical and
medical products.  Relevant in the matter, subsidiaries Zimmer US,
Inc., Biomet U.S. Reconstruction, LLC, and Biomet Biologics, sell
knee, hip, sports medicine, foot and ankle, extremity, and trauma
products to physicians and hospitals.

In August 2015, Plaintiff Karl signed a sales associate agreement
classifying him as an independent contractor (and not an employee)
with Zimmer and began selling orthopedic devices as a member of
"Team Golden Gate" in the San Francisco Bay Area.  Zimmer paid the
team on a commission-only "pooled" arrangement.  

That is, the Defendants (1) set a "base rate" commission percentage
for each product type sold, (2) pooled each team member's base rate
commissions, and (3) paid each member a predetermined percentage of
the pooled commissions, regardless of the amount of commissions
that member personally generated.  Karl himself was paid through
Edge Medical, LLC, an entity he established for tax purposes.

On the job, Karl typically spent 60% to 70% of his time on "case
coverage," assisting surgeons in the operating room and planning
for procedures, such as designing modifications for implants.  He
averaged between 10 to 12 hours each workday.

In July 2018, Karl filed the instant putative class action alleging
primarily his misclassification as an independent contractor
instead of an employee of Zimmer.  Initially successful in
certifying an FLSA collective, Zimmer's motion for summary judgment
cut down several of Karl's claims (including those for overtime
wages and failure to provide meal and rest periods), an Oct. 31,
2019 order finding him an exempt "outside salesperson."  Though the
Court certified the summary judgment order for interlocutory
appeal, our court of appeals declined to intervene.

The case having resumed, Karl seeks, for himself and the putative
class, reclassification as employees of Zimmer, itemized wage
statements, reimbursement of business expenses, restitution for
unpaid wages and benefits, and a finding that their classification
as independent contractors was unlawful.  

The Plaintiffs now move for class certification under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23.  Following an initial proposed class
definition reaching to nearly a year before the merger that created
the current Zimmer Biomet Holdings and the relevant subsidiaries,
Karl has revised his class definition to:  Any person who, during
the period commencing June 24, 2015 to the present, was hired or
otherwise engaged as an independent contractor for the purposes of
solicitation or sales of Zimmer Biomet products and/or services in
California by Zimmer US, Inc., Biomet U.S. Reconstruction, LLC, and
Biomet Biologics, LLC, or any one of them.

Zimmer naturally opposes certification.  

Judge Alsup finds that common questions predominate the merits of
the Plaintiffs' claims.  Under the Plaintiffs' theory of liability,
Zimmer's common sales associate agreements and policies will decide
whether its sales associates may remain independent contracts or
must be reclassified as employees.  That analysis will serve as the
bedrock for two derivative claims, first for unpaid business
expenses, and second for restitution of unpaid wages and benefit.
Last, the lawfulness of Zimmer's classification of sales associates
as independent contractors under the Medicaid Anti-Kickback statute
presents a common question of law.

Zimmer says Karl atypically lacks standing to pursue the Section
17200 claim for unpaid benefits.  But this argument largely rests
on Zimmer's contention that its benefits plans exclude sales
associates from entitlement even if they are reclassified as common
law employees, an argument that targets Karl as much as any
putative class member.  Rather than rendering him atypical, the
common applicability of the defense confirms Karl's typicality on
this front.

Next, nothing in the record suggests Karl's interests deviate from
the interests of the other putative class members.  Nor does the
record suggest any risk that Karl or his counsel would fail to
prosecute the action vigorously.  The suit addresses whether sales
associates and their team leaders should be treated as employees of
Zimmer, not whether sales associates and team leaders should always
get along.  Karl remains adequate to litigate the suit on behalf of
the putative class.

As for superiority, the Judge finds that a court within California
presents the superior forum for application of California law.
And, as for case management, the Plaintiffs propose a three-part
trial plan: (i) trial of Labor Code claims before the jury; (ii)
trial of Section 17200 and PAGA claims before the Court; and (iii)
damages before the Court or a special master.  Zimmer does not
contest the superiority of a class in these circumstances.

Zimmer also does not contest the sufficient numerosity of a
266-member class.

Finally, in its Footnote 19, Zimmer buries an objection to use of
improper electronic signatures in declarations under the local
rules.  Aside from probing the putative classmembers' states of
mind regarding their expected recovery, the facts driving class
certification here are Zimmer's own policies, not the Plaintiffs'
declarations.  Hence, the objection is denied as moot.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Alsup certified the following
class:

  Any person who, during the period commencing June 24, 2015, to
the present, was hired or otherwise engaged as an independent
contractor for the purposes of solicitation or sales of Zimmer
Biomet products and/or services in California by Zimmer US, Inc.,
Biomet U.S. Reconstruction, LLC, and Biomet Biologics, LLC, or any
one of them.

Lohr Ripamonti & Segarich LLP and Scherer Smith & Kenny, LLP are
appointed the class counsel.  

A full-text copy of the Court's July 28, 2020 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y5y9d6rj from Leagle.com.



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