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              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Monday, August 17, 2020, Vol. 22, No. 164

                            Headlines

1870 NARRAGANSETT AVENUE: Gruber Files Suit in N.Y. Supreme Ct.
ALEXION PHARMA: Bid to Dismiss ACERA Suit v. Portola Pending
ALEXION PHARMA: Litigation over SOLIRIS Sales Practices Ongoing
ALLERGAN INC: Valerie R. Suit Moved From Louisiana to New Jersey
ALLIED INTERSTATE: Class & Subclass Certified in Schafer Suit

ALLIED TUBE: Class Certification in Latitude Suit Upheld
ALLSTATE INSURANCE: Faces Hilario Class Suit in N.D. California
AMAZON.COM INC: Vance et al. Sue over Biometric Data Collection
AMAZON.COM SERVICES: Court Narrows Claims in Thomas OMFWSA Suit
AMERICAN WEB: $141M Solomon Suit Settlement Has Prelim Approval

AMERIS BANK: Barrena Seeks Payment of PPP Loan Agent Fees
ARIZONA STATE: Faces Concussion Class Action
ATLANTIC INTERTECH: Delange Sues Over Failure to Pay Overtime
BANK OF AMERICA: $17,500 Legal Fees Awarded to FXCM in Contant Case
BARILLA SPA: 2nd Cir. Vacates Approval of Berni Suit Settlement

BAXTER INT'L: Continues to Defend Silverman Class Suit
BAXTER INT'L: Dismissal of IV Solutions Suit Not Appealed
BLC LEXINGTON: Court Denies Class Certification Bid in Johnson Suit
BMW OF N.A.: Key's 2nd Amended Suit Dismissed w/out Leave to Amend
BOB'S RED MILL: Dawson Sues in S.D. New York Over ADA Violation

BOKF NA: Court Narrows Claims in Almeida Class Suit
CALIFORNIA PHYSICIANS: Crosby Seeks to Certify ERISA Class
CARDINAL HEALTH: Nguyen Labor Class Suit Remanded to State Court
CAREERBUILDER LLC: Martin ERISA Suit Dismissed Without Prejudice
CASILLAS OPERATING: Kernen Suit Seeks to Certify Class

CENTRAL COAST: Spitzer Files Suit in California Superior Court
CHAMPION PETFOODS: Court Dismisses Weaver Class Suit with Prejudice
CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS: Warenski Stayed Pending Ruling in AAPC Case
CHIPOTLE MEXICAN: Appeal in Ong Class Action Still Pending
COGNIZANT TECH: To Appeal Order Denying Dismissal Bid

COLUMBIA REHABILITATION: Darty Case Returns to Cook Cty. Cir. Court
COMCAST CABLE: Settlement in Shahlai Labor Suit Has Final Approval
COMSCORE INC: Court Dismisses Bratusov Securities Class Suit
CONTRACT LAND: Misclassifies Employees, Clark Claims
CORAL GABLES: Denial of Counsel Fees in Suarez FDUTPA Suit Reversed

CVS HEALTH: Discovery & Class Cert. Briefing Sched in Hyams Entered
CVS PHARMACY: Fuog Sues in Rhode Island Alleging Violation of ADA
DAVITA INC: Agreement in Principle Reached in Peace Officers' Suit
DENSO CANADA: Faces Class Action Over Defective Fuel Pumps
DOMINO'S PIZZA: 6th Cir. Affirms Arbitration Ruling in Blanton Suit

EAGLE NATIONAL: Class of Borrowers Certified in Edmondson Suit
ELECTROLUX HOME: Bid to Bifurcate Discovery in Obertman Suit Denied
ENJOY LIFE NATURAL: Faces Dawson ADA Class Suit in S.D. New York
EVERGREEN PROFESSIONAL: Rodriguez Suit Settlement Gets Initial Okay
FEDERAL DEPOSIT: Adams Wins Partial Judgment in Guida FLSA Suit

FEDERAL EXPRESS: Court Dismisses Yelverton Suit with Prejudice
FIESTA FLOORING: No Ruling on Bid to File Hawthorn Deal Under Seal
FIRST NATIONAL: CCC Can't Compel In-Person Deposition in Lundquist
FLAGSTAR BANK: Castaneda Sues over Homeowner's Insurance Policy
FREDDIE MAC: Discovery Ongoing in Senior Preferred Stock Suit

FREDDIE MAC: Still Defending Ohio Public Employees Case
FRONTLINE ASSET: Faces Gordon FDCPA Class Suit in S.D. New York
G&J'S PIZZERIA: Fails to Pay Minimum Wage, Jimenez Claims
GARZA FOOD: Dawson Sues in S.D. New York Alleging ADA Violation
GEICO INDEMNITY: Wins Bid for Payment of Costs in Jimenez Case

GENERALI US: Keith Sues in South Carolina Over Insurance Disputes
GEO GROUP: Jakubowitz Law Notifies of Securities Class Action
GEORGIA: Denial of Daker's Bid to Intervene in Gumm Suit Upheld
GOOGLE LLC: Best Carpet Sues over Unpaid Website Ads
GPB CAPITAL: Inspection of Books & Records Allowed in Younker Suit

HANOVER FOODS: Dawson Sues in S.D. New York Over Violation of ADA
HARVEY WEINSTEIN: Victim's Lawyer Criticize AG Over Settlement
HEALTH CARE SERVICE: MMEs' Objection to Candelaria Deal Overruled
HSBC MORTGAGE: Wins Final OK of Settlement in Tardibuono-Quigley
HUNTINGTON NATIONAL: Hannah's Class Claims May Proceed for MLOs

IBM CORP: Continues to Defend ERISA-Related Class Suit in New York
IHI E&C INT'L: Fails to Pay for Overtime, Ketchie Claims
INSPERITY INC: Jakubowitz Law Notifies of Securities Class Action
IREDALE COSMETICS: Website Not Accessible to Blind, Hecht Claims
JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS: Siskinds LLP Files Elmiron Class Action

JEANNE D'ARC: $1.2MM Bettencourt Suit Deal Gets Final Approval
JERSEY CITY, NJ: Court Narrows 8 Erie's Claims Over Ordinances
JOHN ELLIOT: Dawson Sues in S.D. New York Alleging ADA Violation
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Appeal in TRACLEER(R) Antitrust Suit Pending
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: AWP Suit in New Jersey Ongoing

JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Continues to Defend cART Antitrust Suit
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Talc-Related Class Suit Ongoing in Illinois
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: ZYTIGA(R) Antitrust Class Suit Ongoing
K&N ENGINEERING: Dawson Sues in S.D. New York Over ADA Violation
LADDER FINANCIAL: Young Sues in S.D. New York Over ADA Violation

LEAD INDUSTRIES: Ill. Sup. Ct. Flips Judgment Reversal in Lewis
LEXICON PHARMACEUTICALS: Manopla Class Action Ongoing
LEXINGTON HEALTH: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Jones Adversary Case
LEXMARK INTERNATIONAL: CRIS Ordered to Establish Settlement Account
LIBERTY MUTUAL: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Valley Class Suit

LLR INC: Ninth Circuit Flips Dismissal of Van's Sales Tax Suit
LM GENERAL: Court Narrows Counterclaims in LeBruns Suit
LOMPOC, CA: FCC Faces Class Action Over Home Confinement
LOUISIANA: Court Denies TRO Bid for Immediate Furlough in J.H. Suit
MARY'S GONE: Faces Dawson Suit in New York Alleging ADA Violation

MDL 2672: Laderoute's Bid for Sanctions in Clean Diesel Suit Denied
MEWBOURNE OIL: Felps Allowed to Supplement Evidence on Notice Bid
MGP INGREDIENTS: Litigation over Sales of Aged Whiskey Ongoing
MICHIGAN: Faces Class Actions Over Dam Safety Issues
MISSISSIPPI: Parchman Prison Inmates File Class Action

MITR PHOL: Transboundary Class Action Can Move Forward
MONDELEZ GLOBAL: Averts Class Action Over Cocoa Labeling
MONDELEZ INT'L: Continues to Defend Wheat Trading-Related Suit
NATIONAL FREIGHT: Court Certifies Class of Drivers in Portillo Suit
NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE: Third Circuit Affirms Leo Suit  Dismissal

NESTLE USA: First Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Tomasella Suits
NEW YORK: Faces Class Action Over Medical Vaccination Exemptions
NORTHERN NATURAL: De Leon Seeks Unpaid Overtime
NOW HEALTH: Faces Dawson Suit Over Violation of Disabilities Act
NVIDIA CORP: Securities Suit Parties' Briefs May Exceed Page Limit

OAKLAND COUNTY, MI: Court Certifies Jail Class in Cameron Suit
OKLAHOMA: Cherokee Citizens File Class Action
OREGON MUTUAL: Baker Files Breach of Contract Suit in California
P.F. CHANG'S: Court Certifies Class of Servers in Belt FLSA Suit
PACIFIC BELL: Appeal from Class Cert. Order in Meza Suit Dismissed

PANERA LLC: Court Dismisses Tabler Class Suit with Leave to Amend
PAYPAL INC: Seeks Confirmation of FAA in Friends for Health Case
PENTAURUS PROPERTIES: Turizo Sues Over Unsolicited Text Messages
PFIZER INC: Order on Hess' Claim in Securities Class Suit Entered
PG&E CORP: Hearing on Bid to Dismiss Vataj Suit Set for August 20

PG&E CORP: Motions to Dismiss PERA New Mexico Suit Pending
PHILLIPS & COHEN: Romero Sues in New Jersey Over FDCPA Violation
PILGRIM'S PRIDE: Continues to Defend Plant Workers' Class Suits
PPG INDUSTRIES: Castro Seeks to Certify Class & Subclasses
PREMIER NUTRITION: Dismissal of Sonner's Restitution Claims Upheld

PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MD: Seth's Bid for Inmates' TRO Narrowed
QUALCOMM INC: Appeal on Grant of Class Certification Order Pending
QUALCOMM INC: Bid for Judgment on Pleadings Remains Pending
QUALCOMM INC: Bid to Dismiss Broadcom Merger-Related Suit Pending
QUALCOMM INC: Canadian Consumer Class Suits Ongoing

R.G. NEW YORK: Carrion Sues Over Unpaid Overtime
RESULTS COMPANIES: Fails to Pay Minimum Wage, Bamberg Claims
RETAIL RECOVERY: Settlement Agreement Wins Final Approval
RITE AID: Calagno Suit Removed From Super. Ct. to N.D. California
ROCK HOLDINGS: Hansen Stayed Pending Interlocutory Appeal Ruling

SCHLUMBERGER LIFT: $525,000 Settlement in Garcia Suit Has Prelim OK
SENIOR CARE: Court Conditionally Certifies Class in Moss FLSA Suit
SEYAH LTD: Fails to Pay Minimum Wage, Alvarado Claims
SHIRE LLC: Court Refuses to Decertify Class in Antitrust Suit
SIENNA SENIOR: Faces Class Action Over COVID-19 Related Outbreaks

SIMPLE MILLS: Dawson Sues in S.D. New York Alleging ADA Violation
SIRIUS XM: Continues to Defend Flo & Eddie Class Action
SOUTH CAROLINA: Sued by Huger Alleging Violations of Civil Rights
SOUTHERN CO: Scheduling Order in Monroe ERS Suit Revised
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES: Discovery Ongoing in Aircraft Defect Suit

STATOIL USA: $7MM Settlement in Rescigno Suit Gets Prelim. Approval
STURM RUGER: Primus Group Suit v. Smith and Wesson Ongoing
TACO BELL: Court Dismisses First Amended Dominguez ADA Class Suit
TASTE TRUNK: Faces Nisbett Suit in New York Over Violation of ADA
TEXAS: Court Stays Discovery in J.A. IDEA-ADA Class Suit v. TEA

TPUSA INC: Class in Headspeth FLSA Suit Conditionally Certified
TUPPERWARE BRANDS: Consolidated Class Suit in Florida Ongoing
TWENTY-FOUR/SEVEN: C&F's Bid to Dismiss Ross Denied w/o Prejudice
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Arbitration Provision Unenforceable
UMA ENTERPRISES: Faces Lemus Suit Over Unpaid Meal Breaks

UNITED STATES: Certification of Transgender Detainees Class Denied
UNITED STATES: Court Denies ICE Detainee Alirio's Bid for Release
UNITED STATES: Prelim. Injunction Denied in Bird Suit vs. FBI
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA: Suit Seeks to Delay Classes
WAYFAIR INC:  Court Dismisses Securities Class Action

WEB.COM GROUP: Prelim OK of $500,000 Howard Suit Settlement Denied
WESTINGHOUSE AIR: Settlement in W.D. Pa. Case Wins Initial OK
WHOLESOME HARVEST: Blumenthal Nordrehaug Files OT Class Action
WINK LABS: Rollins Calls Monthly Subscription Fees "Illegal"
WIRECARD AG: Faces Investor Class Action Following Collapse

WISE FOODS: Dawson Sues in N.Y. Over Disabilities Act Violation
WOLVERINE BANCORP: Dismissal of Finke Securities Suit Affirmed
XTO ENERGY: Fails to Pay Minimum Wage, Bone Alleges
ZIMMER BIOMET: Wins Prelim. Nod of $50MM Settlement in Shah Suit
[*] COVID-Related Business Interruption Suits Exceed 700 Mark

[*] Gross Law Notifies of Several Shareholder Class Actions
[*] Johnson Fistel Notifies of Several Shareholder Class Actions
[*] Litigation Funders Level Legal Class Action Playing Field

                            *********

1870 NARRAGANSETT AVENUE: Gruber Files Suit in N.Y. Supreme Ct.
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against 1870 Narragansett
Avenue, et al. The case is styled as Janice Gruber, INDIVIDUALLY
AND AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF BENJAMIN DAVID GRUBER A/K/A
BEN GRUBER, DECEASED, AND O/B/O SHAREHOLDERS OF 1870 NARRAGANSET
AVENUE CORPORATION SIMILARLY SITUATED AND IN THE RIGHT OF SAID
CORPORATION v. 1870 NARRAGANSET AVENUE CORPORATION, ERIC GRUBER,
GINA GRUBER, AND JOHN DOE, Case No. 24080/2019 (N.Y. Sup., Bronx
Cty., Aug. 6, 2020).

The case type is stated as "E-FILED CONTRACT."[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          WARREN WYNSHAW, P.C.
          P.O. BOX 3
          Fishkill, NY 12524
          Phone: (845) 896-3100

The Defendants are represented by:

          FARRELL FRITZ, P.C.
          400 RXR PLAZA
          Uniondale, NY 11556
          Phone: (516) 227-0700


ALEXION PHARMA: Bid to Dismiss ACERA Suit v. Portola Pending
------------------------------------------------------------
Alexion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 30, 2020, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2020, that Portola
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and its officers, directors and underwriters,
have filed a motion seeking dismissal of the consolidated
securities fraud class action suit headed by the Alameda County
Employees' Retirement Association ("ACERA").

On July 2, 2020, the company completed the acquisition of Portola
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Portola), a commercial-stage
biopharmaceutical company focused on life-threatening blood-related
disorders, through a tender offer and subsequent merger of Portola
with Odyssey Merger Sub Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of
Alexion.

In connection with Alexion's acquisition of Portola, the company
had assumed litigation to which Portola was a party. Among the
litigation assumed is a securities fraud class action filed against
Portola and certain of its officers, directors and underwriters
("Defendants") under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.

Specifically, on January 16, 2020, February 7, 2020, and February
28, 2020, stockholders filed three putative class actions in the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California,
captioned Hayden v. Portola Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al., No.
3:20-cv-00367-VC (N.D. Cal.); McCutcheon v. Portola
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al., No. 3:20-cv-00949 (N.D. Cal.); and
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority v. Portola
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al., No. 3:20-cv-01501 (N.D. Cal.).

These cases have since been consolidated, and on April 22, 2020,
the Court issued an Order appointing the Alameda County Employees'
Retirement Association ("ACERA") as Lead Plaintiff in the
litigation.

ACERA filed its amended consolidated complaint on May 20, 2020,
asserting that Defendants made misrepresentations and omissions in
public disclosures (including in materials issued in connection
with the August 7, 2019 securities offering) concerning Portola's
sales of andexanet alfa, marketed as ANDEXXA in the United States
and ONDEXXYA in Europe, between January 8, 2019 and February 26,
2020.

Specifically, plaintiffs allege that Defendants made materially
false and/or misleading statements about the demand for ANDEXXA,
usage of ANDEXXA by hospitals and healthcare organizations, and
about Portola's accounting for its return reserves. Plaintiffs
contend that the alleged fraud was revealed on January 9, 2020,
when Portola announced its preliminary unaudited financial results
for the fourth quarter of 2019, and again on February 26, 2020 when
Portola issued its fourth quarter 2019 financial results.

In July 2020, Portola and the Portola Defendants filed a motion to
dismiss with the Court.

Plaintiffs seek to recover unspecified monetary relief, interest,
and attorneys' fees and costs.

Alexion said, "Given the early stage of these proceedings, we
cannot presently predict the likelihood of obtaining dismissal of
the case (or the ultimate outcome of the case if the motion to
dismiss is denied by the court), nor can we estimate the possible
loss or range of loss at this time."

Alexion Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a biopharmaceutical company,
develops and commercializes various therapeutic products. The
company was founded in 1992 and is headquartered in Boston,
Massachusetts.


ALEXION PHARMA: Litigation over SOLIRIS Sales Practices Ongoing
---------------------------------------------------------------
Alexion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 30, 2020, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2020, that the company
continues to defend a class action suit related to SOLIRIS sales
practices.

On December 29, 2016, a shareholder filed a putative class action
against the Company and certain former employees in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Connecticut, alleging that
defendants made misrepresentations and omissions about SOLIRIS.

On April 12, 2017, the court appointed a lead plaintiff. On July
14, 2017, the lead plaintiff filed an amended putative class action
complaint against the Company and seven current or former
employees.

Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint on September 12,
2017. Plaintiffs filed an opposition to defendants' motion to
dismiss on November 13, 2017, and defendants filed a reply brief in
further support of their motion on December 28, 2017.

On March 26, 2019, the court held a telephonic status conference.
During that conference, the court informed counsel that it was
preparing a ruling granting the defendants' pending motion to
dismiss. The court inquired of plaintiffs' counsel whether they
intended to seek leave to amend their complaint, and indicated that
if they wished to file a second amended complaint, they would be
allowed to do so.  

On April 2, 2019, the court granted plaintiffs until May 31, 2019
to file a second amended complaint, thereby rendering moot
defendants' pending motion to dismiss. On May 31, 2019, plaintiffs
filed a second amended complaint against the same defendants.

The complaint alleges that defendants engaged in securities fraud,
including by making misrepresentations and omissions in its public
disclosures concerning the Company's SOLIRIS sales practices,
management changes, and related investigations, between January 30,
2014 and May 26, 2017, and that the Company's stock price dropped
upon the purported disclosure of the alleged fraud.

The plaintiffs seek to recover unspecified monetary relief,
unspecified equitable and injunctive relief, interest, and
attorneys' fees and costs.

Defendants' filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on
August 2, 2019; plaintiffs' filed their opposition to that motion
on October 2, 2019; and defendants' filed their reply in further
support of their motion on November 16, 2019.

Alexion said, "Given the early stage of these proceedings, we
cannot presently predict the likelihood of obtaining dismissal of
the case (or the ultimate outcome of the case if the motion to
dismiss is denied by the court), nor can we estimate the possible
loss or range of loss at this time."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Alexion Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a biopharmaceutical company,
develops and commercializes various therapeutic products. The
company was founded in 1992 and is headquartered in Boston,
Massachusetts.


ALLERGAN INC: Valerie R. Suit Moved From Louisiana to New Jersey
----------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned Valerie R., April C., Individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated v. Allergan, Inc. formerly known
as: Inamed Corporation, Allergan USA, Inc., Allergan PLC, Case No.
2:20-cv-02099, was transferred from the U.S. District Court for
Eastern District of Louisiana to the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey on Aug. 6, 2020.

The New Jersey District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:20-cv-10087
to the proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Personal Injury: Health
Care/Pharmaceutical Personal Injury Product Liability.

Allergan, Inc., was an American global pharmaceutical company
focused on eye care, neurosciences, medical dermatology, medical
aesthetics, breast enhancement, obesity intervention and
urologics.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Paul A. Lea, Jr., Esq.
          PAUL A. LEA, JR., APLC
          724 E. Boston St.
          Covington, LA 70433-2910
          Phone: (985) 292-2300


ALLIED INTERSTATE: Class & Subclass Certified in Schafer Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In class action lawsuit captioned as LISA J. SCHAFER, v. ALLIED
INTERSTATE LLC, et al., Case No. 1:17-cv-00233-JTN-SJB (W.D.
Mich.), the Hon. Judge Janet T. Neff entered an order:

   1. denying the Defendants' motion to compel arbitration;

   2. granting the Plaintiff's motion to certify class and
      subclass resp. defined as:

      "all persons in Michigan who during a time period from
      March 14, 2016 to March 14, 2017, were sent the subject
      form letter, and it was not returned, where the debt
      sought to be collected was in default for more than six
      years and no payment had been received for more than six
      years";

      and

      "all persons in Michigan who, during a time period from
      March 14, 2016 to March 14, 2017, were sent the subject
      form letter, and it was not returned, where the debt
      sought to be collected was in default for more than six
      years and no payment had been received for more than six
      years and whom either made a payment, disputed the debt or
      requested verification";

   3. appointing herself as the Class Representative and
      appointing Curtis C. Warner as the Class Counsel; and

   4. directing the Plaintiff's counsel, within 21 days of entry
      of this Order, to file a proposed notification form that
      complies with FED.R.CIV.P.23(c), together with a statement
      describing the method by which the notice will be provided
      to class members and a list of persons to whom the notice
      will be sent.

The Court said, "The Plaintiff argues that the class must first be
certified and notice provided to the class members before
Defendants could move for individual arbitration against any member
of the certified class who did not opt out. The Plaintiff also
points out that the Defendants arguably waived any right to compel
class members into later arbitration where the Defendants failed to
raise during discovery or as an affirmative defense that any of the
putative class members would potentially be subject to arbitration.
The Plaintiff argues that actual damages in this case are objective
and do not bar class certification but instead make the class
action vehicle superior to pursuing individual claims. The Court,
in its discretion, determines that the proposed class action meets
the predominance and superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3)."

The Plaintiff filed this putative class action case alleging a
single claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, arising
from the Defendants' collection efforts on a time-barred debt. On
February 9, 2007, the Plaintiff applied for a credit card from
CorTrust. According to the Defendants, CorTrust then mailed
Plaintiff both a credit card and the CorTrust Bank, N.A. MasterCard
Cardholder Agreement and Disclosure Statement.

LVNV Funding eventually came to own Plaintiff's CorTrust account.
LVNV purchases portfolios of consumer debt, including defaulted
debts previously owned by banks, finance companies and other debt
buyers. In privacy notices attached to correspondence with
Plaintiff, LVNV and Resurgent Capital Services L.P. are identified
as "related companies". On April 16, 2013, Resurgent contracted
with Allied Interstate LLC for Allied to provide debt collection
services related to accounts that Resurgent managed, including
accounts that Resurgent managed for LVNV.

Allied Interstate provides financial services. The Company offers
accounts receivable, customer retention, and debt collection
services.[CC]

ALLIED TUBE: Class Certification in Latitude Suit Upheld
--------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Allied Tube and Conduit Corporation, et al.,
Appellants, v. Latitude on the River Condominium Association, Inc.,
Appellee, Case Nos. 3D19-2054, 3D19-2053, 3D19-2051, 3D19-2048,
3D19-2046, 3D19-2044 (Fla. Dist. App.), Judge Monica Gordo of the
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District, affirmed the
trial court's non-final order granting Latitude's motion for class
certification.

Allied, Atkore International, Inc., Tyco Fire Products, L.P., Miami
Riverfront Partners, LLC, Suffolk Construction Co., Inc., Summers
Fire Sprinklers, Inc., Georg Fischer Harvel, LLC, The Lubrizol
Corporation and Lubrizol Advanced Materials, Inc., appeal the trial
court's non-final order on class certification permitting Latitude
on the River Condominium Association to bring claims on behalf of
the association members for damages related to the removal and
replacement of the building's defective fire-sprinkler system.

Latitude sought to certify a class pursuant to Rule 1.221 of the
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure.  The trial court held a
certification hearing, reviewed the parties' submissions and heard
argument regarding the appropriateness of certification.  Based on
the evidence, affidavits and proffers presented, the court found
that Latitude met its threshold burden for class certification
under Rule 1.221 because the claims related to matters of common
interest affecting the association members in a similar way.

Judge Gordon opines that Rule 1.221 expressly authorizes
condominium associations to institute, maintain, settle, or appeal
actions or hearings in its name on behalf of all association
members concerning matters of common interest to the members.  As
to controversies affecting the matters of common interest, the
condominium association, without more, should be construed to
represent the class composed of its members as a matter of law.  

The common interest provision of the rule has been interpreted to
permit a class action by the association for a construction defect
located physically within a unit, rather than in the common
elements, if the defect is prevalent throughout the building.
Judge Gordon therefore, cannot say the trial court abused its
discretion in finding that damages resulting from the replacement
of the fire-sprinkler system throughout the building were a matter
of common interest for purposes of certification at this stage of
the litigation.

For these reasons, Judge Gordon affirmed.  Her Opinion is not final
until disposition of a timely filed motion for rehearing.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 24, 2020 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/ffvZAI from Leagle.com.

Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP, Daniel B. Rogers -- drogers shb.com --
and Eric S. Boos -- eboos shb.com -- for appellants Allied Tube &
Conduit Corporation; Atkore International, Inc.; and Tyco Fire
Products, L.P.; Bilzin Sumberg Baena Price & Axelrod, LLP, and
Kelly R. Melchiondo ; Jeffrey J. Lauderdale (Wickliffe, OH), for
appellants The Lubrizol Corporation and Lubrizol Advanced
Materials, Inc.; Lee, Hernandez, Landrum & Carlson, APC, Robert A.
Carlson and Courtney Willoughby, for appellant Suffolk Construction
Company, Inc.; Rennert Vogel Mandler & Rodriguez, P.A., and Jill
Nexon Berman, for appellant Miami Riverfront Partners, LLC;
Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell, P.A., and Scott M. Sarason, for
appellant Georg Fischer Harvel, LLC; Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A.,
and Therese A. Savona (Orlando), for appellant Summers Fire
Sprinklers, Inc.

Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A., Wm. Allen Bonner -- abonner@colson.com
-- and Patrick S. Montoya -- patrick@colson.com -- for appellee.

ALLSTATE INSURANCE: Faces Hilario Class Suit in N.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Allstate Insurance
Company. The case is styled as Tisha Hilario, individually and on
behalf of a class of all others similarly situated v. Allstate
Insurance Company, Case No. 3:20-cv-05459 (N.D. Cal., Aug. 6,
2020).

The nature of suit is stated as Insurance for Breach of Insurance
Contract.

Allstate Insurance Company offers auto, life, boat, business, home
insurance and more.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David Russell Shane, Esq.
          SHANE & TAITZ
          1000 Drakes Landing Road, Suite 200
          Greenbrae, CA 94904-3027
          Phone: (415) 464-2020
          Fax: (415) 464-2024
          Email: dshane@shanelaw1.com


AMAZON.COM INC: Vance et al. Sue over Biometric Data Collection
---------------------------------------------------------------
STEVEN VANCE; and TIM JANECYK, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. AMAZON.COM, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 2:20-cv-01084 (W.D. Wash., July 14, 2020),
alleges violation of the Biometric Information Privacy Act.

The Plaintiffs allege in the complaint that the Defendants had been
unlawfully collecting, obtaining, storing, using, possessing and
profiting from the biometric identifiers and information of the
Plaintiffs and all other similarly situated Illinois residents and
citizens.

The Defendant never advised or informed the Plaintiffs and the in
writing: (a) that it collected, stored and used Plaintiffs'
biometric identifiers and information; or (b) of the specific
purpose and length of term for which Plaintiffs' biometric
identifiers and information were being collected, stored and used.
Also, the Defendant never received a written release executed by
Plaintiffs and the class, to collect, capture, receive, obtain,
store or use their biometric identifiers and information.

Amazon.com, Inc. is an online retailer that offers a wide range of
products. The Company products include books, music, videotapes,
computers, electronics, home and garden, and numerous other
products. Amazon offers personalized shopping services, Web-based
credit card payment, and direct shipping to customers. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          David B. Owens, Esq.
          LOEVY & LOEVY
          100 S. King Street, Suite 100
          Seattle, WA 98104
          E-mail: david@loevy.com

               - and -

          Michael Kanovitz, Esq.
          Scott R. Drury, Esq.
          LOEVY & LOEVY
          311 N. Aberdeen, 3rd Floor
          Chicago, IL 60607
          Telephone: (312) 243-5900
          E-mail: mike@loevy.com
                  drury@loevy.com

               - and -

          Gary Lynch, Esq.
          Katrina Carroll, Esq.
          Kyle A. Shamberg, Esq.
          Nicholas R. Lange, Esq.
          CARLSON LYNCH LLP
          111 West Washington Street, Suite 1240
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 750-1265
          E-mail: glynch@carlsonlynch.com
                  kcarroll@carlsonlynch.com
                  kshamberg@carlsonlynch.com
                  nlange@carlsonlynch.com


AMAZON.COM SERVICES: Court Narrows Claims in Thomas OMFWSA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court of the Northern District of Ohio issued a
Memorandum and Order granting in part and denying in part the
Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in the case
captioned SAVON THOMAS, et al. v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES, INC., et
al., Case No. 1:19-CV-01696 (N.D. Ohio).

On July 25, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed a putative class action
against the Defendants in this Court, setting forth a single claim
under the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act (OMFWSA). The
Plaintiffs assert that because the Defendants have not paid
warehouse workers for the time spent going through the mandatory
screening process, warehouse workers were not paid for all hours
worked, and such time was not counted for purposes of determining
their entitlement to overtime pay. According to the Plaintiffs,
this resulted in the underpayment of overtime compensation for
every week in which warehouse workers otherwise worked forty hours
in a workweek in violation of the OMFWSA.

On October 1, 2019, the Defendants filed an Answer to the
Plaintiffs' Complaint alleging that warehouse workers are not
required to pass through a security screening prior to taking their
meal breaks because the Defendants provide on-site break room
facilities inside the secured area where employees, including the
Plaintiffs, can take their meal breaks without having to pass
through security screening. The Defendants assert that only those
employees, who choose to leave the secured area during meal breaks
must pass through security screening.

Shortly after filing their Answer, the Defendants filed a Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings, seeking to dismiss the sole count in
the Plaintiffs' Complaint on several bases. Specifically, the
Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs' claim fails because (1) Ohio
law has incorporated the Fair Labor Standards Act's ("FLSA")
overtime standards, under which post-shift time spent passing
through security screening is not compensable; (2) Plaintiffs were
not required to pass through security screening when taking meal
breaks; and (3) time spent walking through security screening is
not "work" because it requires no exertion.

The Court rules that the Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Defendants'
Motion is GRANTED to the extent the Plaintiffs' claim is based on
the underpayment of overtime compensation related to time spent
proceeding through the post-shift security screening process. The
Defendants' Motion is DENIED to the extent the Plaintiffs' claim is
based on the underpayment of overtime compensation related to time
spent proceeding through the pre-lunch security screening process.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 21, 2020 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybp4sjqf from
Leagle.com.


AMERICAN WEB: $141M Solomon Suit Settlement Has Prelim Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Henry Coke Morgan, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia, Newport News Division, granted the
Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class
Settlement in the case ROYCE SOLOMON, et al., individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. AMERICAN
WEB LOAN, INC., et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 4:17cv145
(E.D. Va.).

On April 9, 2019, the Court stayed the case pending appellate
review by the Fourth Circuit regarding American Web Loan ("AWL")
and Curry's Motions to Compel Arbitration.  During the ongoing
appeal process, the parties engaged Former Judge Layn R. Phillips
to conduct mediation.  After an unsuccessful first mediation with
Judge Phillips, the parties returned for an additional mediation
session on Nov. 8, 2019.  In that session, all parties have agreed
to settle the matters in dispute.  The parties have agreed to
settle the case in exchange for a total settlement value of $141
million, comprised of a $65 million cash payment, $76 million in
loan cancellation and other non-monetary relief.

The matter is before the Court on the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Preliminary Approval.  

Judge Morgan finds that all of the Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3)
requirements are met for settlement-only class certification.  The
Settlement Agreement defines the Settlement Class as all persons
within the United States to whom AWL lent money during the
Settlement Class Period.  The Settlement Class Period is further
defined as the period from Feb. 10, 2010 to the date on which the
Preliminary Approval Order is entered.  The Judge preliminary
certifies the defined settlement-only class.

Next, the Judge finds that the settlement is the result of an
arms'-length negotiation between the parties and is fair,
reasonable and adequate.  As such, he preliminarily approves the
settlement.

Finally, as to the class notice, the Plaintiffs lay out a detailed
plan for providing notice.  All the procedures outlined in the
Plaintiffs' Motion clearly meet the standard for notice in Rule 23.
Judge Morgan approves the proposed notice.

For the aforementioned reasons, Judge Morgan granted the Plaintiffs
Motion for Preliminary Approval and Settlement Class Certification.
He certified the class that is outlined and defined in the Order
Granting Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement.
Therefore, he preliminarily approved the settlement, notice and
entered the proposed schedule as outlined in the Order.

The memorandum opinion serves to supplement the findings in the
Court's Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Class Action
Settlement.

The Clerk is requested to send a copy of the Order to all the
counsel of record.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 24, 2020 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/KuC3nU from Leagle.com.


AMERIS BANK: Barrena Seeks Payment of PPP Loan Agent Fees
---------------------------------------------------------
CAROL BARRENA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. AMERIS BANK; and SYNOVUS BANK, Defendants,
Case No. 4:20-cv-00166-MHC (N.D. Ga., July 15, 2020) is an action
against the Defendants to obtain fees owed to the Plaintiff as a
result of its work as an agent to assist small business borrowers
in getting federally guaranteed loans through the Paycheck
Protection Program ("PPP"), a federal program implemented to
provide small businesses with loans to combat the economic impact
of COVID-19.

The Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that federal regulations
require the Defendants to pay the Plaintiff and the Class for their
work as agents who facilitated loans between the Defendants and
small businesses. Despite precise regulatory requirements stating
that agent fees are owed to the Plaintiff, the Defendants have
failed to pay the Plaintiff and the Class Members. Instead, the
Defendants have kept the agent fees for themselves.

Ameris Bank is a full-service bank. The bank offers saving
accounts, debit and credit cards, certificate of deposits, personal
and business loans, mobile banking, and treasury services. Ameris
Bank serves customers in the United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James F. McDonough, III, Esq.
          HENINGER GARRISON DAVIS, LLC
          3621 Vinings Slope, Suite 4320
          Atlanta, GA 30339
          Telephone: 404-996-0869
          Facsimile: 205-326-3332
          E-mail: jmcdonough@hgdlawfirm.com

               - and -

          W. Lewis Garrison, Jr., Esq.
          2224 1 st Avenue North
          Birmingham, AL 35203
          Telephone: (205) 326-3336
          Facsimile: (205) 326-3332
          E-mail: lewis@hgdlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Mark J. Geragos, Esq.
          Ben J. Meiselas, Esq.
          Matthew M. Hoesly, Esq.
          GERAGOS & GERAGOS, APC
          644 South Figueroa Street
          Los Angeles, CA 90017
          Telephone: (213) 625-3900
          Facsimile: (213) 232-3255

               - and -

          Michael E. Adler, Esq.
          GRAYLAW GROUP, INC.
          26500 Agoura Road, #102-127
          Calabasas, CA 91302
          Telephone: (818) 532-2833
          Facsimile: (818) 532-2834


ARIZONA STATE: Faces Concussion Class Action
--------------------------------------------
Jordan Rogers, writing for Cronkite News, reports that Jason
Franklin's personality had taken a dramatic turn. The former
Arizona State University linebacker, often described as upbeat and
social by his friends and family, was withdrawn.

He "would get lost in long, blank stares. He was not sleeping well.
He was having memory problems," his mother, Jan Franklin, later
wrote of that time. "He had no money and couldn't remember how to
get more money out of his bank account. He would go for long walks
to try and calm his head."

On July 14, 2018, seven years after Jason Franklin realized his
dream to play in the Pac-12 -- only to suffer four concussions as a
practice squad player -- he took his own life. He was 26.

Two years after his son's death, his father, Gregg Franklin, has
filed a lawsuit against ASU and the NCAA, alleging that flawed
concussion management protocols were a direct result of his son
contracting the degenerative brain disease called CTE, for chronic
traumatic encephalopathy. The suit claims the organizations
"recklessly ignored these facts and failed to implement reasonable
concussion management protocols to protect its athletes, including
Jason Franklin."

The July 13 suit raises questions about whether the NCAA, as the
governing body for collegiate sports, protects its athletes from
recurring concussions. The NFL did not acknowledge concussions were
a medical issue for years before conceding in 2016 to a direct link
between concussions on the field and degenerative brain disease.

The lawsuit, filed in U.S. District Court in Arizona, seeks
class-action status to cover "all now-deceased individuals who
participated in ASU's football program between 1952 and 2015 and
were diagnosed during life or post- mortem with Alzheimer's
disease, dementia, Parkinson's disease, CTE, or any other
significant neurodegenerative disorder or disease."

ASU declined to comment, and the NCAA didn't respond to a request
for comment.

Protecting college athletes

Chris Nowinski, the co-founder and CEO of the Concussion Legacy
Foundation, noted that college athletes, unlike NFL players, who
have the NFL Players Association, are not unionized.

Changing that could decrease the number of concussions that occur
in college football, said Nowinski, who played football for Harvard
and wrestled professionally.

"Considering that college football is giving people a degenerative
brain disease, I wish there was more caring from the college
football world about these athletes," said Nowinski, whose
foundation collaborates with Boston University, which is widely
regarded as a leading institute for concussion studies. "Right now,
there's no long-term medical care -- they're not paid for the risk
that they are taking with their brain.

"I feel like college football players are exploited because there
is a huge money-making operation around them. Lots and lots of
people have well-paying jobs because of the risk they are taking
with their brain, and once they take that risk, the school is not
going to be there to help them."

Someone who has taken numerous hits to the head, often in football,
hockey, volleyball, sledding and cheerleading, can develop CTE. The
disease can have a major effect on a person's thinking, memory,
personality and behavior, according to studies by Mayo Clinic and
others.

According to the lawsuit, Jason Franklin's emotional and mental
health deteriorated because of concussions he suffered while
playing for ASU from 2011 to 2016.

Walking into an opportunity

Franklin played baseball and football for Chaminade College
Preparatory School in Los Angeles, where he was an accomplished
baseball player. But his heart was in football. He chose to walk on
at ASU, where his hard work earned him a scholarship.

Out of high school, Franklin had scholarship offers from smaller
schools, but he had always wanted to be part of something bigger.
Jan Franklin said becoming an ASU athlete and getting to play in
the Pac-12 was "his dream come true."

In his time playing football at ASU, Franklin suffered just one of
those four concussions before August 2014. Jan Franklin's post said
he then suffered three concussions over the course of a month. All
four occurred on the practice field, the suit says.

Franklin, who had participated in a concussion study conducted by
the Translational Genomics Research Institute, described the
experience to Cronkite News in 2017. He said the possibility of a
concussion was never on his mind when he went out on the field.

"It freaks you out at first because you do not think like that,"
Franklin said. "I was 22, and I thought I was pretty
indestructible, as most 22-year-olds do."

Jan Franklin said that, before her son's concussions, he was the
happiest and funniest person she knew.

"Jason was the most social person I think I have ever met," she
said in a 2018 blog post for the Concussion Legacy Foundation. "He
and I shared the gift of gab and the desire to entertain and engage
everyone we met. Jason entertained everyone constantly, whether it
was one-on-one or in crowds. He had his goofy impressions, crazy
dance moves, amazing stories and hysterical, high-pitched laughs."

Six months after his series of concussions, Jan Franklin wrote that
Jason's friends noticed he had changed, and she found him
constantly agitated, anxious and adrift.

In the fall of 2017, the lawsuit alleges, "Jason became fixated on
conspiracy theories regarding the Illuminati, culminating in a
psychotic episode in which he angrily yelled at his parents and
claimed to be Jesus. Then, in April 2018, Jason experienced a
psychotic episode during which he believed his parents were trying
to kill him. Jason was then hospitalized against his will.

His mother recounted the terrifying experience.

"We took Jason back to our house in California," she wrote. "He ate
a little and then went to sleep. Not too long afterwards, Jason
woke up and started saying his dad was going to kill him. He said
he heard us talking. He started to get more and more agitated. He
was enraged and telling us he would kill us first so we couldn't
kill him. We kept telling him that we loved him and would never
hurt him.

"Given Jason's size and strength, I knew we could be at risk, so I
dialed 911. The police talked to Jason and decided to put him on a
5150 hold, which is a three-day hold to ensure a person is not
violent or suicidal."

He got out and went home to Arizona. His problems persisted. He
complained of serious headaches and siren-like sounds in his head.

A month later, a police officer showed up at his parents' front
door in California with the tragic news about their son.

Gregg Franklin, in the lawsuit, alleges that if his son had been
told more about the long-term effects of concussions, that he would
have stopped playing.

"ASU could certainly have required football players like and
including Jason Franklin to undergo more intensive education about
concussions, but it did not. Nor did the NCAA do anything to ensure
that ASU would," the lawsuit states.

ASU has a set of concussion guidelines to avoid traumatic brain
injuries for all its athletes. The lawsuit claims the university
did not follow those guidelines.

"As compared to Jason Franklin and other ASU football players," it
states, "the NCAA and ASU were in a superior position to know of
and mitigate the risks of sustaining concussions and other
(traumatic brain injuries) while playing football at ASU. They
failed to do so."

Concussion concerns rise

Concussions have become a concern in many sports, with protocols
developed in youth sports, at the college and professional level
for activities ranging from football to volleyball. The National
Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke called traumatic
brain injury a "major global health problem."

In 2013, the NFL reached a $765 million settlement over
concussion-related brain injuries among its 18,000 retired players
after thousands of athletes, including many suffering from dementia
and depression, sued the league.

Since then, the NFL has taken steps to decrease the number of hits
to the head, such as eliminating various types of high-contact
drills, Yahoo Sports reports.

NCAA concussion protocols require universities to educate their
athletes on the dangers of concussions and limit exposure to head
trauma, including "keeping the head out of blocking and tackling,"
making sure helmets and other equipment meet safety standards and
are not used as a weapon and making sure practices and competitions
meet ethical standards.

College athletes have filed lawsuits as well, including several on
the same day in 2016, against the Pac-12 and several other major
football conferences.

"To me, lawsuits from former college players are interesting
because college football players are getting CTE," said Nowinski,
who was one of the first to make CTE part of a public discussion.
"In our experience at Boston University, more than two out of three
college brains that we get have CTE. Playing football in college
can give you CTE or make your CTE worse."

Nowinski said that a study of 266 brains of football players found
that their odds of developing CTE increased every 2 1/2 years.

Establishing a legacy of education

After Franklin died, his mother had his brain sent to Boston
University, where it was analyzed for CTE. The results showed he
had cavum septum pellucidum, a defining feature of CTE. He was
suffering from Stage 2 CTE with nine lesions on multiple areas of
his brain, according to Jan Franklin's post.

Nowinski's foundation works with Boston University on concussion
awareness and research.

"With CTE, we didn't know much about it when we started our
collaboration with Boston University," he said. "When we started,
there were 48 known cases of CTE in the world. We've now hit 1,000
brains going in, at about two-thirds of them being positive for
CTE. We've rewritten the books on what we understand about how
these hits to the head lead to brain disease."

As researchers continue to uncover new information, players,
coaches, parents and others need to better understand concussions,
Nowinski said.

"I do think there needs to be a dramatic shift in how college
football players are treated," he said.

And if athletes were more honest about their post-concussion
symptoms, Nowinski added, it could save them from suffering
long-term mental and physical injuries.

"Athletes would do very well for their own health if they were
honest about concussions," he said. "That's what we try to impress
upon them, is that, if you're not honest and you keep playing, you
really could ruin your brain."

Jan Franklin, in her post, says she is struggling with her feelings
on football. She can't eliminate football entirely from her life,
she said, because that's not what Jason would have wanted.

"Football is now a conundrum for me," she wrote. "We have always
loved to watch the sport. But, given that football was a major
contributor in my son's death, how can I still love and watch this
game?"

She decided on her son's legacy, and her mission is to help others
better understand, diagnose and treat CTE. [GN]


ATLANTIC INTERTECH: Delange Sues Over Failure to Pay Overtime
-------------------------------------------------------------
DANIEL DELANGE, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. ATLANTIC INTERTECH LLC d/b/a DEEP SIX CBD
ONLINE EDIBLES & OILS, Defendant, Case No. 2:20-cv-03624 (E.D.
Penn., July 24, 2020) is a collective and class action complaint
brought against Defendant for its alleged violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection
Law, and the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act of 1968.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a manager for various
periods from June 26, 2017 to January 13, 2020.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to compensate him and other
similarly situated employees for indispensable work performed
before clocking in and after clocking out. When Plaintiff
complained to Defendant's managers about working extra hours
without overtime, he was rebuffed and terminated.

The complaint asserts that Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and
other similarly situated employees for approximately 6 hundred
hours of overtime.

Atlantic Intertech LLC d/b/a Deep Six CBD Online Edibles & Oils is
a retailer of Cannabidiol (CBD) products at multiple outlets
throughout Pennsylvania. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Scott K. Johnson, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF ERIC A Shore, P.C.
          Two Penn Center, Suite 1240
          1500 John F. Kennedy Blvd.
          Philadelphia, PA 19102
          Tel: (267) 546-0124
          Fax: (215) 944-6124
          Email: scottj@ericshore.com


BANK OF AMERICA: $17,500 Legal Fees Awarded to FXCM in Contant Case
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Contant, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Bank of America
Corporation, et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-03139 (LGS) (SDA)
(S.D. N.Y.), Judge Stewart D. Aaron of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York granted in part and denied in
part non-party Forex Capital Markets, LLC ("FXCM")'s Letter Motion
for an Order directing the Plaintiffs to reimburse FXCM for the
legal fees incurred in complying with the Plaintiffs' subpoena for
production of documents.

The Plaintiffs, a group of ten individuals and a small business
that purchased foreign exchange ("FX") instruments from retail
foreign exchange dealers, filed the putative class action against
certain banks and their affiliates seeking injunctive relief under
the Sherman Antitrust Actq., and damages under certain state
antitrust and consumer protection laws.  The Plaintiffs allege that
they paid inflated prices for various financial instruments because
of Defendants' alleged conspiracy to fix prices in the FX spot
market.  FXCM, which is not a party to the case, is one of the
retail foreign exchange dealers from which the Plaintiffs purchased
the FX instruments.

On March 22, 2019, the Plaintiffs served a subpoena upon FXCM for
the production of documents seeking FX transaction-related
documents and data.  The Plaintiffs and FXCM met and conferred and
agreed in principle to the scope of FXCM's production in response
to the Plaintiffs' subpoena.  However, the Plaintiffs and FXCM were
unable to agree on the extent of the Plaintiffs' responsibility in
reimbursing FXCM its costs of production and attorneys' fees
resulting from FXCM's compliance with the subpoena.  

FXCM refused to produce materials responsive to the Plaintiffs'
subpoena unless they paid it the sum of $60,000, which represented
its entire estimated production costs, in addition to $30,000 in
legal fees, which represented three-quarters of FXCM's then-claimed
legal fees.  The Plaintiffs had offered to pay $30,000,
representing one-half of FXCM's estimated production costs, in view
of the fact that HSBC had served its own subpoena on FXCM seeking
similar materials, but had refused to pay FXCM's legal fees.

On April 6, 2019, HSBC, on behalf of the Defendants in the case,
served its own subpoena upon FXCM for the production of documents
that sought much of the same FX transaction-related documents and
data.  HSBC and FXCM failed to reach agreement either as to the
scope of HSBC's subpoena or FXCM's requested reimbursement from
HSBC of the attorneys' fees and expenses incurred in complying with
HSBC's subpoena.

On Nov. 12, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed a Letter Motion to compel
FXCM to comply with their subpoena and on Nov. 19, 2019, HSBC filed
a Letter Motion to compel FXCM to comply with its subpoena.  In
response to the HSBC Letter Motion, FXCM noted that it had
requested that the Defendants work out a cost sharing agreement
with the Plaintiffs' counsel in light of the fact that many of the
documents that FXCM have agreed to produce are responsive to both
subpoenas.

On Dec. 16, 2019, oral argument was held before the Court on the
two then-pending Letter Motions.  Following oral argument, Judge
Aaron ordered the parties and FXCM to meet and confer regarding the
scope of data to be produced by FXCM in response to the parties'
subpoenas, and to file no later than Jan. 15, 2020 a joint letter
regarding any remaining disputes as to the scope of the production
by FXCM.  At the request of the parties, the deadline for
submission of the joint letter was extended to Feb. 5, 2020.

In a letter dated Feb. 5, 2020, FXCM advised the Court that the
parties had reached agreement with FXCM regarding the scope of
production by FXCM, that there were continuing discussions
concerning the reimbursement of production costs and attorneys'
fees incurred by FXCM in complying with the subpoenas, and that the
parties were "optimistic" that they would be able "to work out an
appropriate apportionment on their own.  At the parties request,
the Court gave the parties until March 5, 2020 to report back to
the Court regarding the resolution of the remaining issues.

In a letter dated March 5, 2020, FXCM advised the Court that it had
furnished the counsel for the Plaintiffs and the Defendants with
copies of its partially-redacted legal invoices reflecting the
amounts to which FXCM believed it was entitled as reimbursement for
complying with the subpoenas and that the parties continued to meet
and confer concerning an appropriate apportionment of fees and
costs.  FXCM further advised that, if the parties were unable to
reach agreement, FXCM would seek judicial intervention in 30 days.


In a letter dated April 6, 2020, FXCM advised the Court that the
parties had reached an agreement in principle regarding the costs
of production and that FXCM had reached an agreement in principle
with Defendants regarding reimbursement of FXCM's attorneys' fees,
but that FXCM continued to discuss the issue of attorneys' fees
with te Plaintiffs' counsel.  FXCM further advised that, if the
parties are unable to reach an agreement, FXCM would seek judicial
intervention in 30 days.

In a letter dated May 6, 2020, FXCM advised the Court that it was
continuing to discuss the issue of attorneys' fees with the
Plaintiffs' counsel, but have yet to come to an agreement on the
amount Plaintiffs will reimburse FXCM for its fees in complying
with the subpoena.  At the parties request, the Court gave the
parties an additional 30 days to seek to resolve the remaining
issues.

On June 5, 2020, FXCM filed the Letter Motion that is now before
the Court.  In its Letter Motion, FXCM explains that it was not
required to produce any documents in response to the HSBC subpoena
and that such subpoena has since been withdrawn.  FXCM also states
that it has reached an agreement with counsel for HSBC regarding
the Defendants' reimbursement of attorneys' fees in connection with
the HSBC subpoena.

FXCM states in its Letter Motion that on May 20, 2020, FXCM
produced documents responsive to the Plaintiffs' subpoena.  In
addition, the Plaintiffs agreed to reimburse FXCM for $31,000 of
FXCM's internal costs incurred in retrieving the documents
responsive to the Plaintiffs' subpoena.  However, a dispute remains
regarding amounts to be paid by the Plaintiffs to FXCM to reimburse
for the legal fees incurred in complying with the Plaintiffs'
subpoena.  FXCM seeks $51,737 in legal fees, but the Plaintiffs
seek to pay only $6,750.

Judge Aaron, in his discretion, finds that, under the relevant
factors, cost-shifting some of the reasonable legal fees incurred
by FXCM in complying with the Plaintiffs' subpoena is warranted.
First, although the case will benefit FXCM's customers, FXCM itself
has no interest in the outcome of the case.  Second, while FXCM can
more readily bear the legal fees incurred in responding to the
Plaintiffs' subpoena than any single Plaintiff, the Plaintiffs
collectively have the ability to bear at least some of FXCM's legal
fees.  Third, while this case has importance to retail FX
purchasers, it does not have a larger public importance, as was the
case, for example, in the World Trade Center Disaster Site
Litigation.

With respect to the amount of FXCM's reasonable legal fees, the
Judge determines based upon its own familiarity with the rates
prevailing in the district, that the hourly rates sought by FXCM
are reasonable.  However, he finds that many of the hours for which
FXCM seeks reimbursement were not reasonably incurred in connection
with complying with the Plaintiffs' subpoena.

The records show that the hours for which FXCM seeks to be
reimbursed are in excess of what is reasonable.  Thus, Judge Aaron
finds that an across-the-board cut is justified.  Having carefully
reviewed the parties' submissions, including FXCM's time records,
and considering all the relevant factors, including the equities of
this particular case, he finds that $17,500 is a reasonable amount
for the Plaintiffs to pay to FXCM as reimbursement for attorneys'
fees in complying with their subpoena.  In his view, this amount,
which represents about a 66% across-the-board reduction in the
hours billed by FXCM's counsel, but which is almost three times
more than what the Plaintiffs offered to pay, achieves rough
justice.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Aaron granted in part and denied
in part FXCM's Letter Motion.  The Plaintiffs will pay $17,500 to
FXCM.  The Letter Motions filed at ECF Nos. 325 and 335 are denied
as moot.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 17, 2020 Opinion & Order is
available at https://is.gd/pjKNL1 from Leagle.com.

BARILLA SPA: 2nd Cir. Vacates Approval of Berni Suit Settlement
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ALESSANDRO BERNI, GIUSEPPE SANTOCHIRICO, MASSIMO
SIMIOLI, DOMENICO SALVATI, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. BARILLA S.P.A.,
BARILLA AMERICA, INC., BARILLA USA, Defendants-Appellees, v. ADAM
EZRA SCHULMAN, Objector-Appellant, Case No. 19-1921-cv (2d Cir.), a
three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit vacated the June 3, 2019 order of Magistrate Judge Steven
L. Tiscione of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
New York granting class settlement approval, and remanded for
further proceedings.

Visit the pasta aisle in any major American supermarket and one is
bound to encounter the "iconic blue boxes" of Barilla's pastas.
The pastas come in many familiar varieties--and more recently, in
some less familiar ones.  In addition to the standard "enriched
macaroni" noodles that it sells, Barilla has added a set of
specialty pastas, including those that are whole grain, gluten
free, and made with added fiber or protein. It is their attempt to
keep up with American dietary trends, and to appeal to "health
conscious" consumers.

Enticed by these offerings, Plaintiffs-Appellees Berni, Salvati,
Simioli, and Santochirico, each purchased one or another of
Barilla's new products.  But they quickly found themselves
disappointed.  The problem: the boxes of the pasta were allegedly
underfilled.

According to the Plaintiffs, the newer Barilla pastas were sold in
boxes of the same size as the older, familiar Barilla pastas.  But
there was a key difference: someone who bought one of the older
products would get more pasta than someone who bought one of the
newer products--even though the size of the containers in which the
pastas were sold was exactly the same.  According to the four
Plaintiffs, any consumer--reasonably conditioned to believe that
all Barilla boxes of the same size contain the same amount of
pasta--would thus be deceived, just as they were, by the new
packaging.

Expecting more pasta than they got, the Plaintiffs brought a
lawsuit.  In July 2016, the four purchasers, acting on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, initiated a class action
against Barilla for deceptive packaging.  Alleging that Barilla
intentionally sold its pasta in misleading boxes which concealed
non-functional "slack-fill," they made claims under N.Y. Gen. Bus.
Law Section 349(a) and under the common law for unjust enrichment.
They sought, among other things, damages, restitution, and
injunctive relief.

Nearly two years later, after Barilla filed its motion to dismiss
but before the District Court ruled on it, the Plaintiffs and
Barilla converged on a settlement.  They agreed that Barilla would
pay up to $450,000 in fees to the class counsel and to the four
named representatives; that all the class members would release
Barilla from future claims; and, most importantly, that Barilla
would include a minimum "fill-line" on its boxes going forward, to
indicate how much pasta was contained inside, in addition to
language about how its pasta is sold by weight and not by volume.
The "fill-line" and disclaimer are the only relief to be provided
to the class as a whole as part of the settlement agreement.

Neither party to the agreement challenges any elements of the
settlement.  Instead, the appeal is brought by a lone class member
who objected to the settlement, Objector-Appellant Schulman.
Schulman objected to the settlement in the District Court on
several grounds, among them that the group of past purchasers of
Barilla pasta could not be certified, as it sought to be, under
Rule 23(b)(2) because a group of past purchasers is not eligible
for injunctive relief.

But the District Court rejected Schulman's arguments.  In a Final
Approval Order from June 3, 2019, it certified the class of past
purchasers of Barilla pasta under Rule 23(b)(2) and approved the
settlement struck by the Plaintiffs and Barilla--so that
fill-line-drawing and disclaimer-printing could commence, and new
boxes of pasta could make their way to supermarket shelves.

Schulman challenges the District Court's determination here,
putting forward many of the same arguments: that the Rule 23(b)(2)
certification was incorrect; that the class had not been adequately
represented in the settlement negotiations; and that, even if the
class were certifiable, the settlement unfairly rewarded the class
counsel at the expense of the class members.

The Panel briefly notes on Schulman's standing before proceeding to
the merits of his claim.  The Plaintiffs contend that Schulman
lacks standing to bring the appeal because, by his own admission,
he was not deceived by Barilla's packaging.  Therefore, even if Mr.
Schulman is arguably a class member, the injunctive relief provided
by the settlement will admittedly not impact him.  According to the
Plaintiffs, since Schulman was not harmed in any way by Barilla's
conduct, could not allege such harm and thus could not release any
claims alleging such harm, he lacks standing to object to the
settlement or appeal its approval.

The District Court concluded otherwise and the Panel agrees with
the District Court's determination.  As a member of the class, an
objector, like Schulman, necessarily has an interest in the
settlement that creates a 'case or controversy' sufficient to
satisfy the constitutional requirements of injury, causation, and
redressability.  Once he established that he was a member of the
class, he needed to do no more in order to proceed with his
objection.  For the same reason, he need do no more now to proceed
with his appeal before the Court.

Turning to the  Rule 23(b)(2) certification, the Panel agrees with
Schulman and concludes that the District Court did, in fact, err in
certifying the Plaintiffs-Appellees as a Rule 23(b)(2) class
because not all class members stand to benefit from injunctive
relief, the kind of relief the proposed settlement primarily
provides.   Since injunctive relief is not proper for the group of
past purchasers of Barilla pasta--because not every member of that
group stands to benefit from the "fill-line" and disclaimer
language included in the settlement proposal--that group cannot be
certified as a Rule 23(b)(2) class.  

To summarize, the Panel holds that past purchasers of a
product--like the purchasers of Barilla pasta in the case- are not
eligible for class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.  Accordingly, the Panel vacated the
District Court's June 3, 2019 order granting class settlement
approval, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the
Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Second Circuit's July 8, 2020 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/G1LpsJ from Leagle.com.

Ronen Sarraf, Sarraf Gentile LLP, Great Neck, NY; Daniella Quitt --
DQUITT@GLANCYLAW.COM -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, New York, NY,
for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Steven P. Blonder -- sblonder@muchlaw.com -- Much Shelist P.C.,
Chicago, IL, for Defendants-Appellees.

Adam E. Schulman -- adam.schulman@hlli.org -- Hamilton Lincoln Law
Institute Center for Class Action Fairness, Washington, D.C.,
Counsel in Pro Per.

BAXTER INT'L: Continues to Defend Silverman Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------
Baxter International Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 30, 2020, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2020, that the company continues to
defend a class action suit entitled, Ethan E. Silverman et al. v.
Baxter International Inc. et al.

In November 2019, the company and certain of its officers were
named in a class action complaint captioned Ethan E. Silverman et
al. v. Baxter International Inc. et al. that was filed in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.


The plaintiff, who allegedly purchased shares of the company's
common stock during the specified class period, filed this putative
class action on behalf of himself and shareholders who acquired
Baxter common stock between February 21, 2019 and October 23, 2019.


The plaintiff alleges that the company and certain officers
violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by making allegedly
false and misleading statements and failing to disclose material
facts relating to certain intra-company transactions undertaken for
the purpose of generating foreign exchange gains or avoiding
foreign exchange losses, as well as the company's internal controls
over financial reporting.

On January 29, 2020, the Court appointed Varma Mutual Pension
Insurance Company and Louisiana Municipal Police Employees
Retirement System as lead plaintiffs in the case. Plaintiffs filed
an amended complaint on June 25, 2020 containing substantially the
same allegations.

In addition, the company received a stockholder request for
inspection of the company's books and records in connection with
the announcement made in its Form 8-K on October 24, 2019 that the
company had commenced an internal investigation into certain
intra-company transactions that impacted the company's previously
reported non-operating foreign exchange gains and losses.

Baxter said, "As initially disclosed on October 24, 2019, we also
voluntarily advised the staff of the SEC of our internal
investigation and we are continuing to cooperate with the staff of
the SEC."

Baxter International Inc., through its subsidiaries, develops and
provides a portfolio of healthcare products. The company operates
through North and South America; Europe, Middle East and Africa;
and Asia-Pacific segments. Baxter International Inc. was founded in
1931 and is headquartered in Deerfield, Illinois.


BAXTER INT'L: Dismissal of IV Solutions Suit Not Appealed
---------------------------------------------------------
Baxter International Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 30, 2020, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2020, that the plaintiffs in the
putative antitrust class action suit related to IV solutions sales
have not taken an appeal from the district court's grant of
dismissal of the amended complaint.

In November 2016, a putative antitrust class action complaint
seeking monetary and injunctive relief was filed in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.

The complaint alleges a conspiracy among manufacturers of IV
solutions to restrict output and affect pricing in connection with
a shortage of such solutions. Similar parallel actions subsequently
were filed.

In January 2017, a single consolidated complaint covering these
matters was filed in the Northern District of Illinois.

The company filed a motion to dismiss the consolidated complaint in
February 2017. The court granted its motion to dismiss the
consolidated complaint without prejudice in July 2018.

The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, which the company moved
to dismiss on November 9, 2018.

The court granted the company's motion to dismiss the amended
complaint with prejudice on April 3, 2020. The plaintiffs did not
file an appeal.

Baxter International Inc., through its subsidiaries, develops and
provides a portfolio of healthcare products. The company operates
through North and South America; Europe, Middle East and Africa;
and Asia-Pacific segments. Baxter International Inc. was founded in
1931 and is headquartered in Deerfield, Illinois.


BLC LEXINGTON: Court Denies Class Certification Bid in Johnson Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CARRIE JOHNSON, Individually and on Behalf of Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. BLC LEXINGTON, SNF, LLC, d/b/a
Brookdale Richmond Place SNF, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No.
5:19-064-DCR (E.D. Ky.), Judge Danny C. Reeves of the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, Central Division,
Lexington, (i) denied Johnson's motions for class certification and
to appoint class counsel; (i) granted Johnson's motion to strike
the affidavit of Becky Stocker; and (iii) denied as moot Johnson's
motion for summary judgment regarding reliance for claims Count IX
and X of the Third Amended Complaint.

Johnson has sued a host of Defendants for alleged negligence and
fraud related to her care at BLC Lexington.  She asserts multiple
claims on behalf of a proposed class of persons who sought care
from BLC Lexington from 2014 to 2018.  Johnson was a resident at a
skilled nursing facility, BLC Lexington, from Oct. 20, 2017 to Nov.
9, 2017.  BLC Lexington held the license to operate the skilled
nursing facility where Johnson received care.  It is a subsidiary
of Brookdale Senior Living, Inc.

Johnson alleges that Brookdale Senior, through its employees and
shell corporations, defrauded Kentucky consumers by advertising
false staffing information and inflating star ratings from April 1,
2014 to March 31, 2018.  She asserts that BLC Lexington managers
submitted false CMS-671 forms over the course of five years.
Johnson further contends that BLC Lexington advertised false data
about its staffing levels on a website (Nursing Home Compare) which
in turn gave BLC Lexington a higher star rating than was warranted.
She also asserts an individual claim of medical negligence.

The Court previously granted, in part, a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim.  Therefore, Johnson's remaining
individual claims include negligence (Count I), medical negligence
(Count II), corporate negligence (Count III), and violation of
long-term care residents' rights (Count IV). Her remaining class
claims include fraud in the inducement (Count IX), fraudulent
misrepresentation, concealment, nondisclosure (Count X), negligence
(Count XII), unjust enrichment (Count XVI), violation of the
Kentucky Consumer Protection Act (Count XVII), and attorneys' fees
(Count XXIII).

The Court also granted a renewed motion to dismiss for lack of
person jurisdiction filed by the following Defendants: Lucinda
Baier, in her capacity as Owner and Manager of Various Defendants;
Chad C. White, in his capacity as Owner and Manager of Various
Defendants; Mary Sue Patchett, in her capacity as Owner and Manager
of Various Defendants; Joanne Leskowicz, in her capacity as Owner
and Manager of Various Defendants; George T. Hicks, in his capacity
as Owner and Manager of Various Defendants; Labeed Diab, in his
capacity as Owner of Brookdale Richmond Place, SNF; Geraldine
Gordon-Krupp, in her capacity as Owner of Brookdale Richmond Place,
SNF; Bryan Richardson, in his capacity as Owner of Brookdale
Richmond Place, SNF; and Thomas Smith, in his capacity as Owner of
Brookdale Richmond Place, SNF.

Next, the Court denied the following Defendants' motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction: ARC Richmond Place, Inc., doing
business as Brookdale Richmond Place PCH (KY), Brookdale Lexington
IL/AL/MC (KY), and Brookdale Home Health; Bre Knight SH KY Owner,
LLC; Emeritus Corp.; Park Place Investments, LLC; BKD Personal
Assistance Services, LLC; Horizon Bay Management, LLC; Emericare,
Inc.; BKD Richmond Place Propco, LLC; Brookdale Employee Services
— Corporate LLC; BKD Twenty One Management Co., Inc., and
Brookdale Associate Fund, Inc.

Johnson has now filed a motion for class certification and a motion
to appoint class counsel.  Both parties have filed a plethora of
motions in limine, motions to strike, and motions for summary
judgme.  Judge Reeves focuses his Opinion on the Plaintiff's motion
for class certification and to appoint class counsel.

The Defendants first argue that the plaintiff and the proposed
class do not have standing to bring these claims because alleged
misrepresentations regarding staffing resulted in classwide
economic damages, and the Plaintiff did not actually suffer
economic harm. Standing requires an injury in fact, a causal
connection, and likely redressability.

Judge Reeves finds that just because the payor source was from
insurance rather than direct payment by the plaintiff, there is
still a potential injury in fact because the plaintiff would not
have received the value of the services for which she contracted.
It is counter-intuitive to shield a defendant from liability
because insurance is the payor source when the individual would
still be liable for payment under the contract.  The Plaintiff
would have an obligation to pay the expenses incurred at BLC
Lexington.  Having Medicare cover those costs is not an impediment
to Article III standing.

Turning to the prerequisites of Rule 23(a), Judge Reeves finds that
the Plaintiff has failed to establish that the action meets the
prerequisites for certification under Rule 23(a).  He finds that
(i) Johnson's proposed class is not ascertainable; (ii) he cannot
determine if the class is sufficiently numerous to meet the
requirement of Rule 23(a)(1); (iii) determining prospective class
members' claims would require individualized findings on reliance
and causation; (iv) Johnson's situation is not typical because her
husband did not have the authority to bind her to arbitration; and
(v) Johnson is not an adequate representative because she is not
subject to a binding arbitration defense like other potential class
members might be.

In summary, because the Plaintiff cannot satisfy the requirements
of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the motion
for class certification will be denied, rules the Court.

Judge Reeves also concludes that individualized questions
predominate over common questions.  Therefore, a class action is
not the superior method for adjudicating these claims.  The
Defendants correctly note that the Court would have to determine
whether each class member relied upon the star ratings in choosing
to obtain care at BLC Lexington and what the star ratings and
staffing levels were each time a proposed class member decided to
seek care at the facility. Individualized findings of reliance
would predominate over common questions.  Further, as previously
noted, claims of unjust enrichment are generally ill-suited for
class actions because of the individualized determinations
necessary.  And the Plaintiff makes claims on behalf of the class
for negligence which would require a breach of duty and proximate
cause analysis for each member of the class.  Thus, individualized
inquiries predominate over common questions.

Johnson has also moved the Court to appoint class counsel.  She
requests that the Court appoints Laraclay Parker as the lead
counsel and J. Dale Golden as the co-lead counsel.  Rule 23(g)
requires that the Court appoints class counsel when certifying a
class.  However, because the Judge is not certifying the class,
there is no need to appoint class counsel . Accordingly, the motion
will be denied, Judge Reeves held.

Johnson seeks to strike the affidavit of Becky Stocker attached to
the memorandum in opposition to the motion to certify the class
because Stocker was not disclosed as being an individual likely to
have discoverable information or included in any supplementary
information.  The Defendants oppose the motion, arguing that the
affidavit provides useful information to the Court.  However, they
do not dispute that they failed to provide the information in
accordance with Rule 26(a) or make any attempt to explain how the
failure was substantially justified or harmless.  Accordingly,
exclusion is mandatory and Johnson's motion to strike the affidavit
of Becky Stocker will be granted.

Based on his foregoing reasoning and analysis, Judge Reeves denied
the Plaintiff's motion to certify the class and request for a
hearing.  He dismissed the Plaintiff's class-specific claims for
fraud in the inducement (Count IX), fraudulent misrepresentation,
concealment, nondisclosure (Count X), negligence (Count XII),
unjust enrichment (Count XVI), violation of the Kentucky Consumer
Protection Act (Count XVII), and attorneys' fees (Count XXIII).
The Judge also denied Johnson's motion to appoint class counsel.  

Judge Reeves granted Johnson's motion to strike the affidavit of
Becky Stocker.

He denied as moot Johnson's motion for summary judgment regarding
reliance for claims Count IX and X of the Third Amended Complaint.

Johnson's individual claims for negligence (Count I), medical
negligence (Count II), corporate negligence (Count III), and
violation of long-term care residents' rights (Count IV) remain
pending.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 1, 2020 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://is.gd/h8uyna from Leagle.com.

BMW OF N.A.: Key's 2nd Amended Suit Dismissed w/out Leave to Amend
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Maxine M. Chesney of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California granted BMW's Motion, filed March 13, 2020,
to Dismiss Plaintiff Gretchen Key's Second Amended Class Action
Complaint in the case captioned GRETCHEN KEY, Plaintiff, v. BMW OF
NORTH AMERICA, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-03366-MMC (N.D.
Cal.).

In the SAC, Key alleges she owns a 2008 BMW 750LI that has
"Diagnostic Tools" used by BMW dealerships to extract data from
numerous data points, which data is forwarded by dealerships to
BMW.  Key further alleges that she had various problems with the
vehicle, which she attributes to faulty "repair work" performed by
a dealership, that she requested BMW provide her the data that BMW
is in possession of relating to her vehicle, and that BMW "refused"
to do so.  Based on said allegations, Key asserts a claim for
relief under Section 17200 of the California Business and
Professions Code.

By order filed Jan. 13, 2020, the Court granted BMW's motion to
dismiss Key's First Amended Complaint ("FAC").  In so ruling, the
Court found Key's Section 17200 claim, as alleged in the FAC, was
subject to dismissal for failure to allege facts to support a
finding that Key "lost money or property" as a result of the
"unfair" and "unlawful" practice asserted, namely BMW's refusal to
provide Key with the referenced data.

In that regard, the Court first found unavailing Key's allegation
that she lost the money she paid for various repairs, as she failed
to allege facts to support a finding that any such payment was the
result of BMW's refusal to provide her with the data.  It likewise
found unavailing Key's allegation that she lost property, namely,
the data allegedly belonging to her, as, under California law,
information is not property unless some law makes it so, and Key
cited no such legal authority.  The Court afforded Key leave to
amend her Section 17200 claim, and, as noted, she subsequently
filed the SAC.

Judge Chesney finds that the SAC, however, fails to cure the
above-noted deficiencies.  Key alleges therein she has lost money
or property because the "Diagnostic Tools" in her vehicle are of
diminished value due to BMW's refusal to allow her to retrieve all
of the data, which data, Key alleges, has value.  Although Key
contends she has successfully cured the noted deficiencies by
reframing the allegations to focus on the loss of the value of the
Diagnostic Tools instead of the value of the data, her current
claim is, in essence, based on the same harm on which she
previously relied, specifically, her lack of access to the data.

Accordingly, the Judge granted the motion to dismiss, and dismissed
the Second Amended Complaint without further leave to amend, in an
order dated June 10, 2020, a full-text copy of which is available
at https://is.gd/zrgpnF from Leagle.com.



BOB'S RED MILL: Dawson Sues in S.D. New York Over ADA Violation
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Bob's Red Mill
Natural Foods, Inc. The case is styled as Leshawn Dawson, on behalf
of himself and all others similarly situated v. Bob's Red Mill
Natural Foods, Inc., Case No. 1:20-cv-06186 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 6,
2020).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Bob's Red Mill is a brand of whole-grain foods marketed by
employee-owned American company Bob's Red Mill Natural Foods of
Milwaukie, Oregon.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Phone: (929) 575-4175
          Fax: (929) 575-4195
          Email: joseph@cml.legal


BOKF NA: Court Narrows Claims in Almeida Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------
In the case, TONY ALMEIDA, et al., plaintiffs, v. BOKF, NA,
defendant, Case No. 17-CV-126-JED-FHM (N.D. Okla.), Judge John E.
Dowdell of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Oklahoma granted in part and denied in part Defendant BOKF's Motion
to Dismiss.

From July 2014 through September 2015, Dwayne Edwards engineered a
series of bond offerings that generated roughly $62 million from
investors.  Edwards touted the offerings as vehicles to finance the
development of senior living facilities in Georgia and Alabama.
According to the Plaintiffs, the offerings were also vehicles for a
fraud that bilked investors out of millions.  Ten of the
individuals who invested in the Edwards Offerings are now the named
Plaintiffs in the putative class action.

Edwards's alleged fraud, the Plaintiffs claim, would not have been
possible without the aid, or at least the negligence, of BOKF, the
bank serving as indenture trustee on the offerings.  The Plaintiffs
assert that BOKF's role in the bond offerings entailed a duty to
look out for investors, but the bank ignored that duty in favor of
its own interests.

BOKF served as the indenture trustee on six of Edwards's nine
offerings, conduit financing deals whose structure can be
summarized as follows: A local governmental body, such as a housing
corporation, would issue municipal bonds on behalf of a limited
liability company owned by Edwards and his business partner, Todd
Barker, for the purpose of buying and/or refurbishing a senior
living facility in the community.  Rather than use the proceeds to
develop the facility itself, the government authority would "loan"
the bond proceeds to the Borrower LLC, which would then use the
money to acquire the target property and carryout the necessary
renovations.  In exchange for the loan, the Borrower LLC promised
to pay off the bonds and gave the government issuer a security
interest in the property and its future revenues.  The government
body would then assign its rights in the loan and the accompanying
security interests to BOKF for the benefit of the bondholders.

According to the Plaintiffs, Edwards and Barker ignored their
obligations, improperly commingling $3.5 million in facility
revenues and bond proceeds from different projects.  Of that
amount, they used about $2 million to fund additional offerings and
facility purchases, to pay management fees to which they were not
entitled, to pay for renovation work that may never have been done,
and to otherwise enrich themselves at the expense of bondholders.
The Plaintiffs claim that BOKF was in a position to stop these
violations but chose not to because its own financial interests
were served by keeping Edwards and Barker afloat.

Prior to becoming involved with Edwards, BOKF had a longstanding
business relationship with a man named Christopher Brogdon, who was
also in the business of buying and redeveloping senior living
facilities using conduit financing arrangements.  The terms of his
deals were similar to those governing the Edwards Offerings.  Over
two decades, he conducted 40 such offerings, with BOKF serving as
the indenture trustee on 39 of them, according to the Plaintiffs.

At some point, the Plaintiffs allege, Brogdon began impermissibly
commingling and misappropriating the bond funds and project
revenues associated with his projects.  In order to make sure the
offerings went through, the Plaintiffs claim, BOKF never told
Edwards and Barker that Brogdon was in dire financial straits, and
it remained silent as Edwards executed official statements that
made no mention of the bank's connection to Brogdon or his failure
to abide by his own commitments to bondholders.  They further
allege that, after the deals closed, BOKF turned a blind eye to
various "red flags" as Edwards and Barker essentially repeated
Brogdon's "Ponzi-like scheme."  They allege that BOKF's failure to
intervene allowed Edwards to defraud them and other investors of
millions.

In connection with these allegations, the Plaintiffs bring claims
for (1) aiding and abetting common law fraud, (2) aiding and
abetting breach of a fiduciary duty, (3) gross negligence, (4)
negligence, (5) breach of fiduciary duty, and (6) violation of
Georgia's Blue Sky Laws.

Before the Court is BOKF's Motion to Dismiss.  BOKF, arguing that
the Plaintiffs' allegations fail to state a claim, moves to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The parties dispute which law governs the Plaintiffs' tort claims.
BOKF argues that the Plaintiffs' claims are governed by
choice-of-law clauses included in the Indentures, which call for
the application of either Georgia or Alabama law, depending on the
location of the project in question.  The Plaintiffs argue that
their claims fall outside the choice-of-law clauses and are
therefore governed by the law of either Oklahoma or Florida, the
states with the most significant relationships to the Plaintiffs'
claims.

Judge Dowdell concludes that an Oklahoma court would hold the
Plaintiffs' claims to fall outside the scope of the choice-of-law
provision in the indentures.  Accordingly, he applies Oklahoma's
conflict rules to determine what law governs the Plaintiffs' tort
claims.

The injuries allegedly suffered by the named Plaintiffs most likely
occurred in Florida, where they are domiciled.  The Plaintiffs,
however, purport to represent similarly situated investors whose
domiciles may be elsewhere.  As for the misconduct causing the
injuries, much of the underlying misconduct (that attributed to
Brogdon, Edwards, and Barker) appears to have occurred in Georgia.
Those individuals, however, have not been named as Defendants.  The
misconduct at the heart of this suit allegedly occurred in Tulsa,
Oklahoma, and is attributed to BOKF, which is domiciled in
Oklahoma.  Under these circumstances, Oklahoma has the most
significant relationship to the Plaintiffs' tort claims.
Accordingly, they are governed by Oklahoma law.

Turning to the Motion to Dismiss, Judge Dowdell finds that the
Plaintiffs' allegations fail to state a claim for aiding and
abetting fraud, aiding and abetting breach of a fiduciary duty,
breach of fiduciary duty, simple negligence, conspiracy, and
violation of Georgia's Blue Sky Law.  He, however, finds that the
Plaintiffs' allegations state a claim for gross negligence.
Accordingly, Defendant BOKF's Motion to Dismiss is granted in part
(as to Counts 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7) and denied in part (as to Count
3).

With respect to their claims for breach of fiduciary duty (Count 5)
and violation of Georgia's Blue Sky Law (Count 7), the Plaintiffs
may file an amended complaint, within 14 days of the entry of the
Order, if they wish to attempt to state plausible claims under
those theories.  As to the other claims dismissed by the Order,
Judge Dowdell finds amendment would be futile or is otherwise not
justified.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 8, 2020 Opinion & Order is
available at https://is.gd/Li1T7p from Leagle.com.

CALIFORNIA PHYSICIANS: Crosby Seeks to Certify ERISA Class
----------------------------------------------------------
In class action lawsuit captioned as SCOTT CROSBY and KARISSA
CROSBY, individually and on behalf of their son, JAKE CROSBY, and
all others similarly situated, v. CALIFORNIA PHYSICIANS' SERVICE
dba BLUE SHIELD OF CALIFORNIA; MAGELLAN HEALTH, INC.; and HUMAN
AFFAIRS INTERNATIONAL OF CALIFORNIA, Case No. 8:17-cv-01970-CJC-JDE
(C.D. Cal.), the Plaintiffs will move the Court on August 24, 2020,
for an order:

   1. certifying a following plaintiff class:

      "all participants or beneficiaries in a Blue Shield health
      insurance plan governed by Employee Retirement Income
      Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which is fully underwritten
      by Blue Shield and administered by Magellan (a) who at any
      time since January 1, 2016 were deemed covered for Applied
      Behavioral Analysis therapy for treatment of autism
      spectrum disorder, (b) who Magellan red-flagged as part of
      its Care Shaping Program, and (c) since January 1, 2016
      made a request for continued coverage that was revised
      down, reduced or denied based upon the Magellan medical
      necessity criteria for Applied Behavior  Analysis
      therapy."

      Excluded from the Class are Defendants, any parent,
      subsidiary, affiliate, or controlled person of Defendants,
      as well as officers, directors, agents, servants or
      employees of Defendants, and the immediate family member
      of any such person, and any class member who has
      previously released a claim for benefits under a
      settlement agreement. Also excluded is any judge who may
      preside over this case.;

   2. appointing themselves on behalf of their minor son, Jake
      Crosby, as Class Representatives;

   3. appointing Andrew S. Friedman of Bonnett Fairbourn
      Friedman & Balint, PC, and Randy D. Curry of The Law
      Offices of Randy D. Curry as Class Counsel for the Class.

Blue Shield of California is a health plan provider founded in 1939
and based in Oakland, California. The organization serves over 4
million health plan members and nearly 65,000 physicians across the
state. Blue Shield of California was founded by the California
Medical Association.[CC]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class are:

          Andrew S. Friedman, Esq.
          Francis J. Balint, Esq.
          Kimberly C. Page, Esq.
          Nada Djordjevic, Esq.
          BONNETT, FAIRBOURN,
          FRIEDMAN & BALINT, P.C.
          2325 East Camelback Road, Suite 300
          Phoenix, AZ 85016
          Telephone: (602) 274-1100
          Facsimile: (602) 274-1199
          E-mail: afriedman@bffb.com
                  fbalint@bffb.com
                  kpage@bffb.com
                  ndjordjevic@bffb.com

               - and -

          Randy D. Curry, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF RANDY D. CURRY
          2901 W. Coast Highway, Suite 200
          Newport Beach, CA 92663
          Telephone: (949) 258-4381
          Facsimile: (949) 258-4382
          E-mail: randydcurrylaw@gmail.com

CARDINAL HEALTH: Nguyen Labor Class Suit Remanded to State Court
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, NANCY NGUYEN, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CARDINAL HEALTH PHARMACY
SERVICES, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company; CARDINAL
HEALTH, INC., an Ohio Corporation; 504 CARDINAL HEALTH PHARMACY
SERVICES, an unknown association; 504 CARDINAL HEALTH PHARMACY
SERVICES d.b.a. CARDINAL HEALTH, an unknown association; and DOES 1
to 100, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-01939-KJM-EFB (E.D.
Cal.) Judge Kimberly J. Mueller of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California remanded the case to the Superior
Court of California for the County of Sacramento, Case No.
34-2019-00263185.

The Plaintiff filed a Class Action Complaint against the Defendants
in the Superior Court of California for the County of Sacramento,
Case No. 34-2019-00263185 on Aug. 21, 2019.  The Defendants removed
the Action to the Court and filed a Notice of Removal on Sept. 25,
2019 pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005.

The Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand on Oct. 24, 2019 and the
hearing for that motion was scheduled for July 24, 2020.  The
Defendants have not filed an opposition to the Motion to Remand.

The Parties met and conferred regarding the matters at issue in the
Motion to Remand and stipulate that good cause exists to remand
this case back to state court, Sacramento County Superior Court,
Case No. 34-2019-00263185.  They wish to vacate the Motion to
Remand hearing that was scheduled for 10:00 a.m. on July 24, 2020
under the terms stated.

The Parties stipulated and agreed that the case will be remanded to
state court, Sacramento County Superior Court, Case No.
34-2019-00263185; and the Court will vacate the Plaintiff's Motion
to Remand hearing.

Having considered the above stipulation and finding good cause,
Judge Mueller remanded the case to state court, Sacramento County
Superior Court, Case No. 34-2019-00263185.  A certified copy of the
Order will be mailed by the clerk to the clerk of the Sacramento
County Superior Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1447(c).  The
Judge vacated the Plaintiff's Motion to Remand hearing set for
10:00 a.m. on July 24, 2020.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 24, 2020 Order is available at
https://is.gd/uEqXDg from Leagle.com.

Galen T. Shimoda -- attorney@shimodalaw.com -- Justin P. Rodriguez
-- justicelawpartners@gmail.com -- Brittany V. Berzin --
bberzin@shimodalaw.com -- Shimoda Law Corp., Elk Grove, CA,
Attorneys for Plaintiff NANCY NGUYEN, individually and on behalf of
similarly situated employees.

Lois M. Kosch -- lkosch@wilsonturnerkosmo.com -- Wilson Turner
Kosmo LLP, Nicole R. Roysdon -- nroysdon@wilsonturnerkosmo.com --
Attorneys for Defendants.


CAREERBUILDER LLC: Martin ERISA Suit Dismissed Without Prejudice
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CARL MARTIN, Plaintiff, v. CAREERBUILDER, LLC, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-6463 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Robert M. Dow,
Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, granted CareerBuilder's motion to
dismiss, and dismissed without prejudice the Plaintiff's complaint.


Martin brings the putative class action against Defendant
CareerBuilder and dozens of unnamed Defendants.  The Plaintiff was
a former employee of Defendant CareerBuilder and participated in
its 401(k) defined-contribution retirement plan.  As of 2017, 2,600
employees participated in the Plan, and the Plan had over $180
million in assets.

Each plan is funded by participants' voluntary contributions, which
are matched by Defendant CareerBuilder.  The Plan offered various
investment options into which Plan participants could select to put
their retirement contributions.  Participants who did not actively
select an investment option were placed in a default.

The Plan's "Recordkeeper and/or Advisor" was "ADP and/or Morgan
Stanley."  The Plaintiff alleges that in defined contribution
plans, recordkeepers perform various administrative functions,
including maintaining participant account balances and providing a
website and telephone number for plan participants to monitor or
control their accounts.

According to the Plaintiff, notwithstanding a robust market for
recordkeeping services, the Defendants paid too much for ADP and/or
Morgan Stanley's recordkeeping.Some of the recordkeeping fees are
"hard dollar payments," that are explicitly reported.  But
recordkeepers can also get fees through "revenue sharing."
According to the Plaintiff, such sharing is built into the expense
ratio of a Fund.  The average per-capita cost of recordkeeping
ranged from a low of $136.39 in 2016 to a high of $222.43 in 2014.
The Plaintiffs say that a reasonable fee would be $40 per
participant.

The Plaintiff also has several bones to pick with the Defendants'
selection and retention of various investment options that he
thinks were not up to snuff.  First, according to him, the
Defendants had considerable bargaining power, and could (and
should) have negotiated "institutional class" funds.  Second, he
claims that the funds included as investment options in the Plan
were too expensive.

The Plaintiff filed a three-count putative class action, alleging
that the Defendants violated the fiduciary duties of prudence and
loyalty as required by the Employment Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 ("ERISA").  The Plaintiff claims that four allegations
together allow for the plausible inference of imprudence: (1) the
Plan did not invest in the cheaper "institutional" funds as opposed
to the "retail" versions; (2) the Plan included expensive funds
when it should have included more indexes; (3) 40% of these
expensive funds remained in the Plan for five years; and (4) all of
these expensive funds helped funnel monies to ADP and/or Morgan
Stanley via revenue sharing.  He also brings suit against the
unknown Defendants, arguing that they should have done a better job
of monitoring the Plan's decisionmakers.

Defendant CareerBuilder moved to dismiss for failure to state a
claim.  It argues that these allegations are uncannily similar to
those made in Divane v. Northwestern University, where the Seventh
Circuit recently affirmed dismissal of an ERISA case.  According to
the Defendant, Divane is one in a line of Seventh Circuit cases
preventing courts from paternalistically interfering with Plans'
slates of funds so long as the fiduciaries don't engage in
self-dealing and offer a comprehensive-enough menu of options.

Judge Dow holds that the Defendants are correct that under binding
Seventh Circuit precedent the Plaintiff has not adequately pled a
breach of the duty of prudence.  Divane clarified that a fund's
failure to invest in institutional as opposed to retail funds does
not give rise to an inference of imprudence when a plan offers
cheaper alternatives.  Divane also reiterated that a plan is not
required to offer only index funds--it's not a breach of fiduciary
duty to include high-fee funds along with cheaper funds so long as
the "fiduciary's overall performance" is not deficient.  So too in
the instant case: without more, the Plaintiff cannot proceed on its
allegations that revenue sharing was too high, only institutional
class funds should be on offer, and the Plan should offer exotic
index funds.

The Plaintiff's attempts to distinguish Divane are unconvincing,
rules the Court.  Divane was decided on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, and thus took all of the plaintiffs' well-pled allegations
as true and made all reasonable inferences in their favor.

The Plaintiff's remaining claims fail as well, Judge Dow opines.
The Plaintiff argues that he has adequately alleged a duty of
loyalty claim based on the same facts as the duty of prudence
claim.  The argument fails because most courts require something
more, such as an allegation supporting an inference of
self-dealing, to survive a motion to dismiss.  In any event, even
if the standard for pleading prudence was the same as that for
pleading loyalty, the Plaintiff's loyalty claim would fail for the
reasons set out.  Finally, the Plaintiff's monitoring claim fails
because he has not adequately alleged an underlying fiduciary
breach in the first place.

As a final housekeeping note, the Defendants moved to dismiss with
prejudice.  Judge Dow holds that it would be overkill.  Although
Seventh Circuit precedent dictates that some of the Plaintiff's
allegations are insufficient to state a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty on their own, Rule 15 and circuit precedent counsel
in favor of allowing an amended pleading in the instant case, as it
is by no means clear that amendment would be futile.

For these reasons, Judge Dow granted the Defendant's motion to
dismiss, and dismissed without prejudice the Plaintiff's complaint.
The Plaintiff had until July 28, 2020 to file an amended complaint
consistent with the Judge's Opinion.  If the Plaintiff does not
file an amended complaint by that deadline (or any extension of it
granted by the Court), then the Court will convert the dismissal to
"with prejudice" and enter a final judgment under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 58.  If the Plaintiff files an amended complaint,
the Defendants are given until Aug. 25, 2020 to answer or otherwise
plead and a joint status report that includes a briefing schedule
on a renewed motion to dismiss and/or a proposed discovery plan (if
the Defendants file an answer to some or all of the amended
complaint) is due no later than Sept. 1, 2020.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 1, 2020 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://is.gd/V2ZVnt from Leagle.com.


CASILLAS OPERATING: Kernen Suit Seeks to Certify Class
------------------------------------------------------
In class action lawsuit captioned as MICHAEL KERNEN, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, v. CASILLAS OPERATING,
LLC, Case No. 5:18-cv-00107-JD (W.D. Okla.), the Plaintiff asks the
Court for an order to certify a class consisting of:

   "all non-excluded persons or entities to whom: (1) Defendant
   (or Defendant's designee) made a Late Payment of oil and/or
   gas proceeds from an Oklahoma well on or after March 10,
   2016, and (2) who have not been paid statutory interest on
   the Late Payment per the Production Revenue Standards Act. A
   "Late Payment" for purposes of this class definition means
   payment of proceeds from the sale of oil and/or gas
   production from an oil and/or gas well after the statutory
   periods identified in OKLA. STAT.tit. 52 section 570.10(B)(1)
   (i.e., commencing not later than six (6) months after the
   date of first sale, and thereafter not later than the last
   day of the 2 d succeeding months after the end of the month
   within which such production is sold). Late Payments do not
   include: (a) payments of proceeds to an owner under OKLA.
   STAT.tit. 52 section 570.10(B)(3) (minimum pay); (b) prior
   period adjustments; or (c) pass-through payments."

   The persons or e ntities excluded from the Class are: (1)
   agencies, departments, or instrumentalities of the United
   States of America or the State of Oklahoma; (2) Commissioners
   of the Land Office of the State of Oklahoma (CLO); (3)
   publicly traded oil and gas companies and their affiliates;
   (4) persons or entities (and their affiliates) who are the
   Oklahoma Corporation Commission (OCC) designated operator of
   more than 50 Oklahoma wells in the month when this Class
   definition was originally filed; (5) persons or entities that
   the Plaintiff's counsel may be prohibited from representing
   under Rule 1.7 of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct;
   and (6) officers of the court.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Robert N. Barnes, Esq.
          Patranell B. Lewis, Esq.
          Emily Nash Kitch, Esq.
          BARNES & LEWIS LLP
          208 NW 60th Street
          Oklahoma City, OK 73118
          Telephone: (405) 843-0363
          Facsimile: (405) 832-1007
          E-mail: rbarnes@barneslewis.com
                  plewis@barneslewis.com
                  ekitch@barneslewis.com

               - and -

          Bradley E. Beckworth, Esq.
          Jeffrey J. Angelovich, Esq.
          Lisa P. Baldwin, Esq.
          Drew G. Pate, Esq.
          Trey N. Duck, III, Esq.
          Cody L. Hill, Esq.
          Susan Whatley, Esq.
          NIX PATTERSON, LLP
          3600 N. Capital of TX Hwy.
          Bldg. B, Suite 350
          Austin, TX 78746
          Telephone: (512) 328-5333
          Facsimile: (512) 328-5335
          E-mail: bbeckworth@nixlaw.com
                  jangelovich@nixlaw.com
                  lbaldwin@nixlaw.com
                  dpate@nixlaw.com
                  tduck@nixlaw.com
                  codyhill@nixlaw.com
                  swhatley@nixlaw.com

               - and -

          Patrick M. Ryan, Esq.
          Jason A. Ryan, Esq.
          Paula M. Jantzen, Esq.
          RYAN WHALEY COLDIRON JANTZEN
          PETERS & WEBBER PLLC
          400 North Walnut Ave.
          Oklahoma City, OK 73104
          Telephone: (405) 239-6040
          Facsimile:(405) 239-6766
          E-mail: pryan@ryanwhaley.com
                  pwhaley@ryanwhaley.com
                  jryan@ryanwhaley.com
                  pjantzen@ryanwhaley.com

               - and -

          Michael Burrage, Esq.
          WHITTEN BURRAGE
          512 N. Broadway, Suite 300
          Oklahoma City, OK 73102
          Telephone: (405) 516-7800
          Facsimile: (405) 516-7859
          E-mail: mburrage@whittenburragelaw.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          J. Kevin Hayes, Esq.
          Pamela S. Anderson, Esq.
          Dawson A. Brotemarkle, Esq.
          HALL, ESTILL, HARDWICK
          GABLE GOLDEN & NELSON, P.C.
          320 South Boston Avenue, Suite 200
          Tulsa, OK 74103-3706
          Telephone: (918) 594-0400
          Facsimile: (918) 594-0505
          E-mail: khayes@hallestill.com
                  panderson@hallestill.com
                  dbrotemarkle@hallestill.com

CENTRAL COAST: Spitzer Files Suit in California Superior Court
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against CENTRAL COAST
AGRICULTURE, LLC, et al. The case is styled as Dan Spitzer, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. CENTRAL COAST
AGRICULTURE, LLC, DBA RAW GARDEN, A DELAWARE CORPORATION; Does 1 to
1000, Inclusive; Case No. CGC20585809 (Cal. Super., San Francisco
Cty., Aug. 6, 2020).

The case type is stated as "FRAUD."

Central Coast Agriculture is a farm focused on utilizing science
and sustainability to grow quality, modern crops.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by Marcus J. Bradley, Esq.


CHAMPION PETFOODS: Court Dismisses Weaver Class Suit with Prejudice
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SCOTT WEAVER, Plaintiff, v. CHAMPION PETFOODS USA INC.
and CHAMPION PETFOODS LP, Defendants, Case No. 18-CV-1996-JPS (E.D.
Wis.), Judge J.P. Stadtmueller of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin granted the Defendants' renewed
motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the action with
prejudice.

The Plaintiff, a Wisconsin consumer, asserts in his third amended
complaint that the Defendants, makers of pet food, deceptively
marketed their dog food as having various high-quality attributes
when it was not the case.

The Defendants produce Orijen and Acana dog foods.  They assert
that these products are made with a "Biologically Appropriate
nutritional philosophy," which informs their ingredients based on
what dogs and wolves would eat in the wild.  Peter Muhlenfeld, the
Defendants' former chief brand officer, said that the idea was to
get as close to the natural diet as possible.  The Plaintiff
believes that "biologically appropriate" is a factual statement
rather than a philosophical ideal about what should be included in
dog foods.  For the Plaintiff, it is a scientific term subject to
objective testing.

The Defendants operated exclusively out of Canada until 2016, when
they opened a new factory in Kentucky.  They shifted almost all of
their Orijen and Acana production to that facility.  The Plaintiff
purchased the Orijen brand from 2008 until 2017, and so would have
received product from both and after the transition.  He never
bought Acana.  Orijen's packaging reflects the Defendants'
marketing approach.

The bags state that the food is biologically appropriate.  It also
tout the various fresh and regionally sourced qualities of the
ingredients used in the finished product, including that the
ingredients are never outsourced.  The Defendants downplay it,
stating that the bags do not say that all of the ingredients have
these qualities, but the Plaintiff notes that it might not be how a
consumer would read the packaging.

While the Plaintiff acknowledges that the final products for Orijen
and Acana were not outsourced, he contends that many of the
ingredients could be considered outsourced to some degree. Some of
the ingredients came from local sources, but others came from
across the globe.  The Defendants explain that it is generally
predicated on the inability of local sources to meet their supply
needs.  The Plaintiff is unmoved, noting that the packaging
actively disclaims any outsourcing whatsoever.

Some of the misleading statements identified in the Plaintiff's
pleadings were not actually read by him, as they came from
packaging he did not purchase, websites he did not visit, and
papers he did not read.

The Defendants also use beef tallow in their products--fat rendered
from animal carcasses.  They receive tallow from a number of
suppliers, include a company called JBS.  In May 2018, Defendants
learned that some of JBS' shipments had tested positive for
pentobarbital, a chemical used to euthanize animals.  It is not an
intended ingredient and is, indeed, an adulterant. Defendants
suggest that very little or even no pentobarbital was detectable in
the finished products, and that such low levels would not be
dangerous to dogs.   Thus, although the Defendants were able to
retain most product which may have contained the tainted tallow,
the 100,000 pounds that had made it to retail were not recalled.

The Plaintiffs maintain that the FDA has a zero-tolerance approach
to the chemical's presence, so any detectable amount renders the
food unfit for consumption.  However, it is undisputed that the
Plaintiff had stopped purchasing the Defendants' dog food by the
time they learned that some of JBS' shipments had tested positive
for pentobarbital.

The Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all of the
Plaintiff's claims in the Third Amended Complaint (Count I,
Violation of the Wisconsin Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("WDTPA");
Count II, Fraud by Omission; and Count III, Negligence).
Throughout all of the Plaintiff's claims are allegations that the
Defendants' statements on the dog food packaging were false or
misleading.  Additionally, the Plaintiff claims that Defendants had
the duty to disclose information regarding the potential risk of
the dog food containing BPA and pentobarbital.  The only damages
the Plaintiff is claiming is that he was injured when he paid the
purchase price or a price premium for the dog food that did not
deliver what was promised.  The Defendants seek dismissal of all
claims.

The Defendants offer two bases for dismissal of the Plaintiff's
claims based on the "Biologically Appropriate" phrase.  First, they
argue that the phrase is a nutritional philosophy, not a statement
of fact.  It should therefore be likened to non-actionable
commercial puffery.  The Plaintiff counters that the philosophy
boils down to a representation that the products are fresh and
natural, containing only ingredients that a dog would eat in the
wild.  This representation is, in turn, capable of being factually
proven or disproven.

Judge Stadtmueller sees no reason to treat BPA differently than
heavy metals.  To hold the Defendants liable for the risk that
their products contain unintended and non-harmful concentrations of
these substances, a fact common to many other pet food
manufacturers, would be extraordinary.  The Defendants and all
other manufacturers would need to immediately pull their products
off of Wisconsin store shelves, lest they face a tide of litigation
from consumers who did not care, until now, that the products had
such contaminants.  On the facts and evidence before it, the Judge
must conclude that summary judgment is appropriate on the
Plaintiff's claim that "Biologically Appropriate" is rendered
misleading by the risk of presence of BPA.

The same is true of the pentobarbital allegations, though for a
different reason.  The only confirmed shipments of contaminated
tallow the Defendants received came months after Plaintiff stopped
purchasing the affected products.  The Plaintiff lacks standing to
sue for a risk of harm he never experienced.  The Defendants are,
therefore, entitled to summary judgment as to whether
pentobarbital's alleged presence rendered "Biologically
Appropriate" misleading.

The Plaintiff has argued that based on the Defendants' packaging
and labeling, a reasonable consumer, including the Plaintiff, would
not expect the Defendants to use non-fresh ingredients, including
frozen ingredients or ingredients from non-regional suppliers.
Judge Stadtmueller holds that the Defendants are entitled to
summary judgment regarding the "fresh" and "regional" ingredient
statements.

First, Judge Stadtmueller finds that when the dog food packaging is
viewed in full, it is clear that some ingredients are "fresh, raw,
or dehydrated," and that some ingredients are frozen and/or
freeze-dried, and that at least several pounds of both types of dog
food are not fresh ingredients.  It is absurd to conclude that one
statement can be read in isolation regarding all the ingredients in
a product while ignoring the other statements on the packaging that
refute that conclusion.  Second, the Defendants do use fresh
ingredients in their dog food, therefore the statement on the
packaging is not false or misleading.  Third, the same flawed logic
permeates the Plaintiff's argument that the Defendants' "regional
ingredients" statement is misleading.

The Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the
"Never-Outsourced" statement.  The Plaintiff makes the absurd
argument that because the ingredient for beef tallow is made at a
rendering facility, then the "never-outsourced" statement is false
or misleading.  However, in his argument that the ingredients are
not all regional, it is clear that the Plaintiff understands that
ingredients are not all directly from the Defendants, but instead
are purchased from outside vendors.  Additionally, the Defendants'
NorthStar packaging states that "Quality is Never Outsourced" and
that "we prepare Orijen ourselves, in our award-winning
kitchens—so we know exactly what goes into each and every morsel.
Further, it is undisputed that the Defendants did not outsource
the making of its finished food products.  Therefore, the Judge
holds that the Defendants' statements regarding "Never-Outsourced"
are not false or misleading.

The Plaintiff's remaining claims are Fraud by Omission (Count II)
and Negligence (Count III).  Both of the remaining claims must fail
for the same reasons as the Plaintiff's WDTPA claim discussed.  As
explained, the Plaintiff has failed to meet the second element
because the Defendants' statements on the dog food packaging that
he purchased were not false.  Additionally, the Defendants did not
owe the Plaintiff a duty to disclose the potential that extremely
low levels of BPA may unintentionally be present in the final
product.

Judge Stadtmueller finds that the Defendants did not have a duty to
disclose to the Plaintiff.  Further, the Plaintiff has not provided
any evidence to support a genuine dispute of material fact that dog
food he purchased contained pentobarbital.  Therefore, summary
judgment must be granted to the Defendants on the Plaintiff's Fraud
by Omission and Negligence claims.

The Court previously excluded the Plaintiff's experts who intended
to testify regarding class-wide damages based upon the results of a
consumer survey.  Now, two alternative theories of damages is
presented: benefit-of-the-bargain and full refund.
Benefit-of-the-bargain damages comprise the difference between the
purchase price of the product and its actual value.  Full refund
theory on the other hand, while the language of the WDTPA permits,
and its purpose encourages, a plaintiff to pursue full refund
damages in certain circumstances.

The Court finds that Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that a car
buyer can state her belief in the diminished value of the vehicle
based on the defects therein at the time of purchase.  She did not
claim that the car's value was zero; instead, its purported worth
was about half the purchase price.  The court held that her
testimony was sufficient to survive summary judgment, but need not
be believed by a jury at trial.  The same is true in the instant
case.

And as to full refund, the Plaintiff received far more value from
the Defendants' dog food than the Mueller v. Harry Kaufmann
Motorcars, Inc. plaintiff received for her car.  And unlike
Mueller, which involved a durable good capable of being repaired,
the Defendants' products were an all-or-nothing proposition.  The
Plaintiff received the vast majority of the benefit of his purchase
in that his dogs were sustained and remained healthy.  His injury
was not having his animals poisoned.  Instead, it was his
overpayment for what turned out to be a less-than-premium product.
These seem like the circumstances contemplated by Mueller in which
a full refund would be inappropriate.  Judge Stadtmueller,
therefore, grants the Defendants' motion on this ground and forbids
the Plaintiff from proceeding on a full refund theory.

In light of the foregoing, Judge Stadtmueller granted (i) the
Defendants' renewed motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's
third amended complaint; (ii) the Plaintiff's motions for leave to
file restricted documents; and (iii) the Defendants' motion for
leave to file restricted document.

The Judge denied as moot (i) the Plaintiff's motions to exclude the
Defendants' expert witnesses Dr. Robert H. Poppenga and Lorin M.
Hitt, and to limit testimony of the Defendants' expert witness Dr.
Katerina Mastovska; (ii) the Plaintiff's motion to strike the
Defendants' notice of supplemental authority in support of their
opposition to the Plaintiff's motion for class certification; (iii)
the Defendants' motions to exclude the opinions of the Plaintiff's
expert witnesses Dr. Gary Pusillo and Dr. Sean Callan; and (iv) the
Plaintiff's renewed motion for class certification.

The action is dismissed with prejudice.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 8, 2020 Order is available at
https://is.gd/ZcQ2ZV from Leagle.com.

CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS: Warenski Stayed Pending Ruling in AAPC Case
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Richard F. Boulware, II of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Nevada stayed the case titled ALAN WARENSKI,
individually and on behalf of all and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS d/b/a SPECTRUM, Defendant,
Case No. 2:19-cv-00101-RFB-NJK (D. Nev.), pending a ruling from the
U.S. Supreme Court in Barr v. American Ass'n of Political
Consultants, Case No. 19-631 ("AAPC").

Defendant Charter Communications was incorrectly sued as "Charter
Communications d/b/a Spectrum."  The Plaintiff commenced the
putative class action on Jan. 17, 2019.  On Feb. 12, 2020, Charter
filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings pending ruling by the U.S.
Supreme Court in AAPC.  Said case is fully briefed and awaiting
ruling from the Court.

The AAPC case has been argued before the U.S. Supreme Court and is
now awaiting a decision.  The parties therefore agree to stay the
action in its entirety pending a ruling from the court in the AAPC
case.  Upon the granting of the stipulation, Charter's Motion to
Stay will become moot, and may be withdrawn from consideration.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Boulware granted the stipulation, and
denied as moot (i) Charter's Motion to Stay Proceedings, (ii)
Docket 52, and (iii) Docket 53.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 17, 2020 Order is available at
https://is.gd/5VTGOF from Leagle.com.

Patrick J. Reilly, Esq. -- preilly@bhfs.com -- BROWNSTEIN HYATT
FARBER SCHRECK, LLP, Las Vegas, NV, Matthew D. Guletz, Esq.
(admitted pro hac vice) THOMPSON COBURN, LLP, Saint Louis, MO,
Attorneys for Charter Communications, Inc.


CHIPOTLE MEXICAN: Appeal in Ong Class Action Still Pending
----------------------------------------------------------
Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 29, 2020, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2020, that the appeal from a
decision in the class action lawsuit initiated by Susie Ong is
still pending.

On January 8, 2016, Susie Ong filed a complaint in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of a
purported class of purchasers of shares of the company's common
stock between February 4, 2015 and January 5, 2016.

The complaint purports to state claims against the company, each of
the co-Chief Executive Officers serving during the claimed class
period and the Chief Financial Officer under Sections 10(b) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and
related rules, based on the company's alleged failure during the
claimed class period to disclose material information about its
quality controls and safeguards in relation to consumer and
employee health.

The complaint asserts that those failures and related public
statements were false and misleading and that, as a result, the
market price of the company's stock was artificially inflated
during the claimed class period.

The complaint seeks damages on behalf of the purported class in an
unspecified amount, interest, and an award of reasonable attorneys'
fees, expert fees, and other costs.

On March 22, 2018, the court granted the company's motion to
dismiss, with prejudice. On April 20, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a
motion for relief from the judgment and seeking leave to file a
third amended complaint, and on November 20, 2018, the court denied
the motion.  

On December 20, 2018, the plaintiff initiated an appeal to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

Chipotle said, "We intend to continue vigorously defending the
case, but it is not possible at this time to reasonably estimate
the outcome of or any potential liability from the case."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., together with its subsidiaries,
operates Chipotle Mexican Grill restaurants. As of December 31,
2018, it operated 2,491 restaurants, including 2,452 Chipotle
restaurants in the United States, 37 Chipotle restaurants
internationally, and two non-Chipotle restaurants. The company was
founded in 1993 and is headquartered in Newport Beach, California.

COGNIZANT TECH: To Appeal Order Denying Dismissal Bid
-----------------------------------------------------
Cognizant Technology Solutions Corporation said in its Form 10-Q
Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on July
30, 2020, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2020, that the
company filed a motion to certify the dismissal order for immediate
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1292(b).

On October 5, 2016, October 27, 2016 and November 18, 2016, three
putative securities class action complaints were filed in the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, naming
the company and certain of its current and former officers as
defendants.

These complaints were consolidated into a single action and on
April 7, 2017, the lead plaintiffs filed a consolidated amended
complaint on behalf of a putative class of persons and entities who
purchased the company's common stock during the period between
February 27, 2015 and September 29, 2016, naming the company and
certain of its current and former officers as defendants and
alleging violations of the Exchange Act, based on allegedly false
or misleading statements related to potential violations of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the company's business, prospects
and operations, and the effectiveness of its internal controls over
financial reporting and its disclosure controls and procedures.

The lead plaintiffs seek an award of compensatory damages, among
other relief, and their reasonable costs and expenses, including
attorneys' fees.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the consolidated amended
complaint on June 6, 2017. On August 8, 2018, the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey issued an order which
granted the motion to dismiss in part, including dismissal of all
claims against current officers of the Company, and denied them in
part.

On September 7, 2018, the company filed a motion in the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey to certify the
August 8, 2018 order for immediate appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
Section 1292(b).

On October 18, 2018, the District Court issued an order granting
the company's motion, and staying the action pending the outcome of
the company's appeal petition to the Third Circuit.

On October 29, 2018, the company filed a petition for permission to
appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit. On March 6, 2019, the Third Circuit denied the company's
petition without prejudice.

In an order dated March 19, 2019, the District Court directed the
lead plaintiffs to provide the defendants with a proposed amended
complaint. On April 26, 2019, lead plaintiffs filed their second
amended complaint.

The company filed a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint
on June 10, 2019. On June 7, 2020, the District Court issued an
order denying the company's motion to dismiss the second amended
complaint.

On July 24, 2020, the company filed a motion to certify the
dismissal order for immediate appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
1292(b).

Cognizant Technology Solutions Corporation provides information
technology consulting and technology services in North
America,Europe, and Asia. The company was founded in 1994 and is
based in Teaneck, New Jersey.


COLUMBIA REHABILITATION: Darty Case Returns to Cook Cty. Cir. Court
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Ginger Darty, Plaintiff, v. Columbia Rehabilitation
and Nursing Center, LLC d/b/a Integrity Healthcare of Columbia,
Defendant, Case No. 20-cv-2607 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Elaine Bucklo of
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division, granted the Plaintiff's motion to remand, and
remanded the case to the Circuit Court of Cook County.

Plaintiff Darty filed the putative class action in the Circuit
Court of Cook County seeking relief under the Illinois Biometric
Information Privacy Act ("BIPA").  Columbia Rehab employed Ms.
Darty as a nurse for a short time at the end of 2019.  Ms. Darty
alleges that she, along with other employees with whom she worked,
was required to clock in each day by scanning her hand with a
biometric time clock.  She contends that Columbia's use of the time
clock violated Sections 15(a), 15(b), and 15(d) of BIPA because
Columbia (1) did not obtain written, informed consent from her or
other employees prior to deploying the hand scanners, (2) did not
create and follow a public policy regarding retention and
destruction of the biometric data collected, and (3) shared her and
others' biometric information with Columbia's timekeeping vendor
without first obtaining consent.

Columbia Rehab removed the case to the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
Section 1331.  In its removal papers, Columbia asserts that
although Ms. Darty herself is not a member, her putative class
includes "a substantial number" of members of United Steel, Paper
and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and
Service Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC.  The Union has
entered into collective bargaining agreements with Columbia that
govern the terms and conditions of the Union members' employment
with Columbia, including, but not limited to the equipment to be
utilized by the employees.  As a result, Columbia contends that the
action will require interpretation of a collective bargaining
agreement, and Ms. Darty's claims are therefore subject to federal
preemption under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
("LMRA").  Ms. Darty argues in response that because she herself is
not a union member covered by a collective bargaining agreement,
the LMRA does not confer federal jurisdiction.

Judge Bucklo finds that Ms. Darty is not a member of the union that
has entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the
Defendant.  Accordingly, Ms. Darty's individual claim would seem to
be unrelated to the Union; it is only her putative class members
that implicate the collective bargaining agreement. Ms. Darty
contends that her lack of union membership defeats federal-question
jurisdiction in the case.  The Judge agrees.  Accordingly, Judge
Bucklo holds that because Ms. Darty is not a member of the Union,
and her claim does not require interpretation of a collective
bargaining agreement, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction
over the action.

For these reasons, Judge Bucklo granted the Plaintiff's motion to
remand, and remanded the case to the Circuit Court of Cook County.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 24, 2020 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://is.gd/UziL1y from Leagle.com.

COMCAST CABLE: Settlement in Shahlai Labor Suit Has Final Approval
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RAMIN SHAHLAI, on his own behalf and on Behalf of all
other similarly situated Plaintiff, v. COMCAST CABLE COMMUNICATIONS
MANAGEMENT, LLC, Defendant, Civil Action No. 16-cv-2556-WJM-NRN (D.
Colo.), Judge William J. Martinez of the U.S. District Court for
the District of Colorado granted (i) the parties' Joint Motion for
Final Approval of Revised Settlement Agreement, and (ii) the
Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fee.

Shahlai filed the action on Oct. 13, 2016, and filed an Amended
Complaint on Dec. 8, 2016.  Shahlai is a former employee of Icon
Cable, Inc., a company which was contracted by Defendant Comcast to
install Comcast's cable and internet services in Comcast's clients'
homes.

The Plaintiff alleges, among other things, that (1) Icon Cable
failed to reimburse its cable technician employees for vehicle and
tool expenses, and deducted sums from its employees' paychecks for
employer-provided tool costs; (2) as a result, Icon Cable paid its
employees less than the federal and Colorado minimum hourly and
overtime wage rates, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA"), and the Colorado Minimum Wage Act; and (3) Comcast is
liable for now-defunct Icon Cable's wage and hour violations as a
"joint employer" under the FLSA.

The Plaintiff sought to assert these claims on a class-action
basis.  Comcast denies that it was, or ever was, an employer or
joint employer of any Icon Cable technician.

At the outset of the litigation, the Court granted the parties'
request to bifurcate discovery into an initial discovery period on
the issue of whether Comcast is the Plaintiff's joint employer,
followed by summary judgment briefing on that issue.  Thereafter,
the parties engaged in "extensive discovery" on the issue of
whether Comcast was a joint employer with Icon Cable.  On Oct. 27,
2017, Comcast filed a notice of settlement, which they claim is a
reasonable estimate of alleged damages for the Plaintiff and the
class of Icon Cable technicians proposed by the Plaintiff.

On Feb. 23, 2018, the parties filed their Joint Motion for
Conditional Certification of Class and Preliminary Approval of
Settlement Agreement. They supplemented the motion on March 6, 2018
with a Final Settlement Agreement and Release.

On Aug. 15, 2018, the Court issued an order granting in part the
parties' Joint Motion for Conditional Certification of Class and
Preliminary Approval of Settlement Agreement.  As part of that
order, the Court conditionally certified a collective action under
the FLSA for settlement purposes only, which defined the FLSA class
as "all Icon Cable employees who completed the training program and
worked as cable installation technicians between Oct. 13, 2013 and
April 26, 2016."

The Court also certified a class action under Rule 23 with respect
to the Minimum Wage Act claim, which defined the class as "all Icon
Cable employees who completed the training program and worked as
cable installation technicians between Oct. 13, 2014 and April 26,
2016."  However, it rejected the parties' proposed notice procedure
and ordered the parties to separate the FLSA and Rule 23 notice
procedures.  This allowed the FLSA opt-in class members to have the
opportunity to participate in the settlement of the case after
having opted in.

Thereafter, the parties filed a proposed FLSA Notice and Consent to
Join Form, which the Court approved on Oct. 17, 2018.  The
potential FLSA opt-in class members were then issued notice of the
class action via mail and were advised that they had until Jan. 15,
2019 to join the litigation by returning their notice to the
Settlement Administrator.  According to the parties' submissions,
the Settlement Administrator received seven timely consent to join
forms.

On Aug. 13, 2019, the Plaintiff filed a Joint Motion for
Preliminary Approval of Revised Settlement Agreement.  The Court
reviewed the proposed settlement agreement, and preliminarily
approved the settlement as being fair and reasonable on Feb. 18,
202.  It also approved the revised proposed class notice.

In a declaration recently filed with the Court, the settlement
administrator represents that the Court-approved notice and opt-out
form were mailed on March 20, 2020 to the 93 identified class
members.  The Settlement Administrator was able to successfully
complete mail delivery of the notice to 77 of the 93 identified
class members, or 82.8%.  The Settlement Administrator did not
receive any objections to the Settlement Agreement or opt-out forms
requesting exclusion from the class by the May 19, 2020 deadline.

Finally, on May 31, 2020, the Plaintiff filed a Joint Motion for
Final Approval of Revised Settlement Agreement, and an unopposed
motion for attorneys' fees.  The parties propose that Mr. Shahlai
receive $5,000 as an incentive payment.  The Plaintiff's counsel
seeks an attorneys' fee award totaling 58.4% of the total
settlement amount, or $84,250.  The Court held the Settlement
Hearing on June 30, 2020.

Judge Martinez finds that the Settlement Agreement is fair,
reasonable, and adequate.  Accordingly, he will fully and finally
approve the Settlement Agreement and grant the Joint Motion.

He also finds that the incentive payment of $5,000 is very
reasonable, given Mr. Shahlai's participation in the case and the
overall recovery in the case, and thus will approve the $5,000
incentive award to Mr. Shahlai.  

Finally, the Judge finds that $84,250 in attorneys' fees and costs
fair and reasonable, and he thus will grant the Fee Motion.

Against this backdrop, Judge Martinez granted the parties' Joint
Motion for Final Approval of Revised Settlement Agreement, and the
Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fee.  The parties' Settlement
Agreement is approved.

Plaintiff Ramin Shahlai is awarded an incentive award for serving
as the class representative in the amount of $5,000.  The opt-in
FLSA class members and Rule 23 Class members will receive payments
in the amounts set forth under the terms of the Settlement
Agreement.

The Plaintiff's attorneys' fees and costs will be paid by the
Defendant in the amounts specified under the Settlement Agreement
and confirmed in the Order.

Pursuant to the parties' stipulation in the Settlement Agreement,
all claims in the action are voluntarily dismissed with prejudice.


The Clerk will terminate the case.  The parties will bear their own
fees and costs with the exception of those provided for in the
Settlement Agreement and confirmed in the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 1, 2020 Order is available at
https://is.gd/o2xaCk from Leagle.com.


COMSCORE INC: Court Dismisses Bratusov Securities Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SERGII BRATUSOV, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. COMSCORE, INC., BRYAN
WIENER, and GREGORY A. FINK, Defendants, Case No. 19 Civ. 3210
(KPF) (S.D. N.Y.), Judge Katherine Polk Failla of the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York granted the Defendants'
motion to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 9(b) and 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

Bratusov, on behalf of himself and other similarly situated
shareholders, brings the securities class action against the
Defendants.  The Plaintiff alleges that he and the other putative
class members suffered losses when the Defendants made false and
misleading statements regarding the Company's growth and its
long-term strategy to establish a cross-platform measurement
currency.  He has brought securities fraud claims under Sections
10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule
10b-5 promulgated thereunder.

Comscore is an information and analytics company that creates
products by combining information about content and advertising
consumption on digital platforms, televisions, and movie screens
with demographics and other descriptive information.  At all
relevant times, Wiener was the CEO and Fink was the CFO of
Comscore.

The Plaintiff is an investor in Comscore, having purchased Comscore
securities on March 26, 2019.  He represents a putative class of
persons and entities that purchased or otherwise acquired Comscore
securities between Feb. 28, 2019, and Aug. 7, 2019, inclusive.

The Plaintiff filed the original complaint in this action, styled
as a putative class action, on April 10, 2019.  On April 12, 2019,
the Court ordered the Plaintiff to comply with the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA"), which requires that he
publish a notice advising members of the purported class of the
action.  On April 29, 2019, the Plaintiff docketed the notice he
had published via Business Wire on April 10, 2019, advising the
members of the purported class of the pendency of the action.

On May 2, 2019, the Court issued an order stating that the members
of the purported class had until June 10, 2019, to move the Court
to serve as lead plaintiff.  The Plaintiff was the only class
member who moved to serve as lead plaintiff, and his motion was
unopposed.  On July 26, 2019, the Court appointed the Plaintiff as
the Lead Plaintiff and appointed his counsel, Glancy Prongay &
Murray LLP, as interim the class counsel.

On Aug. 5, 2019, the Court entered a scheduling order.  The
Plaintiff subsequently filed the Complaint on Sept. 30, 2019.  On
Oct. 25, 2019, the Defendants filed a letter seeking leave to file
a motion to dismiss the Complaint.  The Court set a briefing
schedule for the Defendants' motion to dismiss the same day.  The
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and supporting declaration on
Nov. 25, 2019.  The Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition to the
motion on Jan. 13, 2020, and the Defendants filed a reply brief on
Jan. 27, 2020.

The Defendants' motion challenges the adequacy of the Plaintiff's
pleading of three elements of his securities fraud claims: (i) a
material misrepresentation or omission; (ii) scienter; and (iii)
loss causation.

The Plaintiff contends that Comscore's alleged omission--i.e., its
non-disclosure of the business disagreement between the Company's
management and the Board--rendered each of the Alleged
Misstatements false or misleading.  At a more granular level, he
argues first, that the Alleged Misstatements were false because
while Comscore represented that it was focused upon revenue growth
and the implementation of a cross-platform measurement currency,
the Board sought to implement a strategy based on cuts and
cost-control measures; and second, that the Alleged Misstatements
were misleading such that Comscore had a duty to disclose the
disagreement between the Company's management and its Board.

Even considered in its totality, Judge Failla finds that the
Complaint fails to state a claim as to any of the Alleged
Misstatements. The Third Alleged Misstatement is a statement by CEO
Wiener that the Company anticipated mid-single digit revenue
growth, a slight improvement in gross margins over 2018 and
generally flat non-GAAP operating expenses relative to 2018.  The
Plaintiff points to nothing indicating that the Company disbelieved
any aspect of the statement or that any aspect of the statement was
false at the time it was made.

The Alleged Misstatements are also inadequate to support a claim of
securities fraud, whether construed as false statements or as
actionable omissions, rules Judge Failla.  The Alleged
Misstatements themselves belie any argument that the Company had
hyped a strategy of revenue growth to achieve its goal of
establishing a cross-platform measurement currency.  What is more,
the Alleged Misstatements do not commit Comscore to a particular
strategy for achieving its goal of creating a cross-platform
measurement currency.  Importantly, the Plaintiff does not allege
that Comscore hyped its ability to achieve its goal of creating a
cross-platform measurement currency while knowing that the goal was
not feasible or that the Company was secretly planning to abandon
that goal.  Accordingly, the Plaintiff has not shown that Comscore
had a duty to reveal its internal business deliberations.

At bottom, the Plaintiff fails to explain how a reasonable investor
would have been misled by the Alleged Misstatements.  The Plaintiff
has not pleaded an actionable misstatement or omission.
Accordingly, Judge Failla does not reach the the Defendants'
arguments that: (i) the statements are non-actionable as opinion;
and (ii) the statements are non-actionable because they are subject
to the PSLRA's safe harbor for forward-looking statements.

Judge Failla dismisses the Plaintiff's Complaint for the additional
reason that it fails to plead scienter.  The most cogent inference
from the Complaint's allegations, taken holistically, is that the
Departing Executives and the Board had an internal disagreement
about the best way of achieving their shared goal of establishing a
cross-platform measurement currency, and that the Departing
Executives and other employees resigned from the Company because of
such disagreement.  Put simply, Judge Failla finds that any
reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter to be far
less compelling than an inference of, at most, non-actionable
mismanagement or negligence on the part of the Defendants.

A prima facie case of control person liability under Section 20(a)
of the Exchange Act requires [i] a primary violation by the
controlled person; [ii] control of the primary violator by the
Defendant; and [iii] that the Defendant was, in some meaningful
sense, a culpable participant in the controlled person's fraud.
The Plaintiff has failed to allege a primary violation, rules the
Court.  Consequently, he has failed to make a prima facie showing
under Section 20(a).

The Plaintiff requests leave to amend the Complaint and file a
Second Amended Complaint rectifying its deficiencies.  Judge Failla
has not granted the Plaintiff leave to amend to correct pleading
deficiencies on any prior occasion, and cannot find that amendment
would be futile or unduly prejudicial.  She cautions the Plaintiff,
however, to focus on the allegations related to the Class Period.
As written, the first quarter of the Plaintiff's Complaint is
devoted to "Background," which turns out to be verbatim copying of
chunks of Comscore's Sept. 24, 2019 settlement with the SEC in
another matter.  These allegations are unrelated to the Alleged
Misstatements and the Plaintiff is instructed to think carefully
about including such lengthy "well-poisoning" information in any
further amended complaint.  The Judge also expects that the
Plaintiff will consider carefully the Court's observations and
admonitions in the Opinion.

For these reasons, Judge Failla granted the Defendants' motion to
dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint.  The Plaintiff is ordered to
notify the Court regarding whether he will file a second amended
complaint.  The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the motion
at docket entry 30.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 24, 2020 Opinion & Order is
available at https://is.gd/76g7KL from Leagle.com.

CONTRACT LAND: Misclassifies Employees, Clark Claims
----------------------------------------------------
COSMO CLARK, individually and for others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. CONTRACT LAND STAFF, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
4:20-cv-02620 (S.D. Tex., July 24, 2020) is a class and collective
action complaint brought against Defendant for its alleged
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, Iowa Wage Payment
Collection Law, and Wisconsin Wage and Hour Laws.

Plaintiff worked for Defendant as a Right of Way Agent from January
2018 until June 2018.

According to the complaint, Plaintiff and other similarly situated
employees received a flat daily rate only throughout their
employment with Defendant despite the fact that they often work 10
or more hours a day for 7 days a week.

The complaint asserts that Defendant has a policy and practice of
misclassifying Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees as
exempt from overtime pay, thereby failing to pay them overtime for
hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek.

Contract Land Staff, LLC is an independent Right of Way and Land
Management Consulting company that provides Right of Way project
management title, permitting & acquisition, employee training,
staffing, and regulatory consultation regarding FERC. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
          Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq.
          Carl A. Fitz, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP LLP
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Tel: (713) 352-1100
          Fax: (713) 352-3300
          Emails: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
                  adunlap@mybackwages.com
                  cfitz@mybackwages.com

                - and –

          Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
          BRUCKNER BURCH, P.L.L.C.
          8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
          Houston, TX 77046
          Tel: (713) 877-8788
          Fax: (713) 877-8065
          Email: rburch@brucknerburch.com


CORAL GABLES: Denial of Counsel Fees in Suarez FDUTPA Suit Reversed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Coral Gables Imports, Inc., Appellant/Appellee, v.
Ricardo Suarez, Appellee/Appellant, Case Nos. 3D19-1197, 3D19-1721
(Fla. Dist. App.), a three-judge panel of the District Court of
Appeal of Florida for the Third District reversed the trial court's
denial of Suarez's motion for attorney's fees, and remanded for
further consideration.

In September 2004, Suarez filed a single-count, class action
lawsuit against CGI, alleging a violation of the Florida Deceptive
and Unfair Trade Practices Act ("FDUTPA").  The operative complaint
alleged CGI engaged in a practice of arbitrarily and inconsistently
fulfilling exotic vehicle orders, despite routinely collecting and
retaining deposits for the purpose of prioritizing prospective
purchasers.

After languishing on the lower court docket for several years, the
case was dismissed for want of prosecution.  Approximately one year
later, Suarez requested and received from CGI a sum of money
corresponding with his deposit.

Despite having recovered his demand, Suarez revived the litigation
by successfully procuring an order vacating the dismissal.  CGI
moved for summary judgment, and, at a hearing convened on May 1,
2019, the trial court granted the motion.  The court entered a
perfunctory order, simply identifying the title of the motion and
writing the word "granted."

The same day, a Summary Reporting System ("SRS") stamp was affixed
to the order.  The stamp reflected the following language: "Final
orders as to all parties the court dismisses this case against any
party not listed in this final order or previous order(s).  This
case is closed as to all parties."  The trial court initialed the
stamp.

Six days later, the court entered a second order (Final Judgment
for CGI).  Pursuant to the May 1, 2019 Order granting the
Defendant, the court ordered and adjudged that Suarez will take
nothing by the action and the Defendant will go hence without a
day.  The court retains jurisdiction to enter such further orders
as may be proper.  Suarez did not appeal either order.

On June 6, 2019, CGI filed a motion for attorney's fees, claiming
entitlement under the prevailing party provision of FDUTPA.
Finding the initial summary judgment order constituted a final
order that would initiate the 30-day period for serving the fee
motion under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.525, the court
denied the request as untimely.  CGI's instant appeal ensued.

The sole issue on appeal meriting further discussion is whether the
act of affixing a SRS closure stamp ripens a nonfinal order into a
final order.  It is well-established that the clerk of courts is a
ministerial officer of the court and, as such, is not endowed with
any discretion.  Hence, the clerk lacks authority to judicially
determine the legal significance of a document tendered for
filing.

Applying these principles in the case, the clerical designation of
the document was purely ministerial, and the closure stamp did not
operate to convert the otherwise nonfinal order into a final order.
Nonetheless, Suarez further contends that by initialing the stamp,
the lower tribunal placed a judicial imprimatur on the finalization
of the order.

The Panel of the District Court of Appeal of Florida for the Third
District disagrees.  The Panel opines that one cannot transform a
nonfinal order into a final order by calling it final.  Thus, a
trial court's assertion cannot convert an interlocutory order into
a final order because the finality of an order is determined by its
effect.  Accordingly, the language derived from the SRS stamp did
not constitute a mystical incantation which transformed the
non-final order into a final appealable order.

Although the Panel finds no error in the denial of Suarez's motion
for attorney's fees, because it concludes CGI filed its fee motion
within 30 days of the rendition of the executable final judgment,
it reversed the denial of same and remanded for further
consideration.  

The Panel's Opinion is not final until disposition of timely filed
motion for rehearing.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 8, 2020 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/iDXiBO from Leagle.com.

Jesse Dean-Kluger, P.A., and Jesse Dean-Kluger -- jdk@jdkpa.com --
and Lisa J. Jerles -- ljerles@klugerkaplan.com -- for
appellant/appellee.

MSP Recovery Law Firm, and Christine M. Lugo --
clugo@msprecoverylawfirm.com -- and John H. Ruiz --
jruiz@msprecoverylawfirm.com -- for appellee/appellant.


CVS HEALTH: Discovery & Class Cert. Briefing Sched in Hyams Entered
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RYAN HYAMS and REGINE DUHON, individuals, on behalf of
themselves, and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CVS
HEALTH CORPORATION, a Rhode Island Corporation, CVS PHARMACY, INC.,
a Rhode Island Corporation, GARFIELD BEACH CVS, LLC, a California
Corporation, and CVS RX SERVICES, INC., a New York Corporation,
DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
4:18-cv-06278-HSG CLASS ACTION (N.D. Cal.), Judge Haywood S.
Gilliam, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California adopted the Parties' proposed class expert discovery
and class certification briefing schedule.

On April 15, 2020, the Parties submitted a Joint Status Report
updating the Court on their progress in completing outstanding
discovery, and proposing amended deadlines for discovery and class
certification.  

On April 20, 2020, the Court entered an amended scheduling order
setting revised deadlines, including Expert Opening Reports on June
30, 2020, Expert Rebuttal Reports on July 15, 2020, and Close of
Expert Discovery on Aug. 15, 2020.  It also entered an Order
Regarding Class Certification Briefing Schedule, setting a class
certification briefing schedule, including Plaintiffs' Class
Certification Motion Filing Deadline on Aug. 27, 2020--after the
close of expert discovery.

Due to the scope of the various claims and issues in the case, the
cost of having expert witnesses analyze each claim/issue, calculate
full class-wide damages in the matter, and prepare comprehensive
reports--all before the Parties brief class certification--is
significant.  The Parties agree that ordering expert discovery to
take part in phases will avoid the expenditure of unnecessary
resources in preparing a class-wide damages analysis for issues
that the Plaintiffs may not pursue in their briefing, or that the
Court may not certify to proceed on a class-wide basis or may
otherwise limit in scope during the class certification process.

To that end, after extensive meeting and conferring about the
various discovery issues involved in the matter, the Parties agree
that bifurcating expert discovery into two phases will best serve
the interests of judicial and litigation efficiency.  Bifurcated
expert damages discovery will enable the Parties to focus on the
issues required for the various phases of the action, with the
first phase occurring prior to class certification to assess the
evidence for or against certification, and the second phase
occurring after certification to assess damages for any claims that
are certified or that otherwise remain as part of the case
following the Court's class certification decision.

The Parties propose the following amended expert discovery and
class-certification briefing schedule for the first phase of
bifurcated expert discovery:

   a. Class Certification Motion Filing Deadline (unchanged)-Aug.
27, 2020

   b. Deadline to Provide Plaintiffs' Expert Declaration in support
of Plaintiffs' Class Certification Motion-Aug. 27, 2020

   c. Deadline to Produce Plaintiffs' Expert Witness for
Deposition-Sept. 4, 2020

   d. Class Certification Opposition Filing Deadline-Oct. 1, 2020

   e. Defendants' Deadline to Provide Expert Declaration in support
of their Class Certification Opposition-Oct. 1, 2020

   f. Deadline to Produce Defendants' Expert Witness for
Deposition-Oct.9, 2020

   g. Class Certification Reply Filing Deadline-Oct. 29, 2020

   h. Class Certification Motion Hearing Date-Dec. 3, 2020

As reflected in the schedule, the Parties agree to file their
respective expert declarations with their Class Certification
Motion or Class Certification Opposition.  The Parties agree to a
one-week continuation of both the Defendants' Class Certification
Opposition deadline and the Plaintiffs' Class Certification Reply
deadline to account for the depositions of the Parties' expert
witnesses.  The Parties further agree to a two-week continuation of
the Class Certification Motion Hearing to account for the two-week
continuation of the proposed briefing schedule.

The Parties request that the Court schedule a status conference as
soon as practicable after the Court's ruling on the Plaintiffs'
class certification motion to determine post-class certification
expert discovery deadlines based on the case that is going forward
at that point.

They agree that the discovery and briefing schedule proposed above
will enable the Parties to efficiently conduct expert discovery as
required, while also providing the Court with the necessary and
tailored information it needs to rule on the Plaintiffs' class
certification motion.  They further agree that the proposed
discovery and briefing schedule will preserve resources in the
event that the Court does not certify one or more of the
Plaintiffs' proposed classes/subclasses, or otherwise redefines or
limits the issues requiring expert discovery regarding other
liability and damages in the matter.

If the Court is not inclined to modify the expert deadlines set
forth, the Parties request that the current expert deadlines be
vacated and that the Court set a case management conference to
discuss rescheduling expert discovery deadlines in accordance with
the class certification briefing schedule.

In an order entered June 24, 2020, a full-text copy of which is
available at https://is.gd/jDaBEe from Leagle.com, Judge Gilliam
adopted the class expert discovery and class certification briefing
schedule set forth above.

Ryan Hyams, an individual, on behalf of himself, and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Beth Anne Gunn --
beth@gunncoble.com -- Gunn Coble LLP, Catherine Jean Coble --
cathy@gunncoble.com -- Gunn Coble LLP & David Z. Feingold, Gunn
Coble LLP.

CVS Health Corporation, a Rhode Island Corporation, CVS Pharmacy
Inc, a Rhode Island Corporation, Garfield Beach CVS LLC, a
California Corporation & CVS RX Services, Inc., a New York
Corporation, Defendants, represented by Jennifer B. Zargarof --
jzargarof@sidley.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP & Sonia Andrea
Vucetic -- svucetic@sidley.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP.

CVS PHARMACY: Fuog Sues in Rhode Island Alleging Violation of ADA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against CVS Pharmacy, Inc.,
et al. The case is styled as Edith Fuog, individually and on behalf
of those similarly situated v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., Caremark PHC,
LLC, Case No. 1:20-cv-00337-WES-LDA (D.R.I., Aug. 6, 2020).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

CVS Pharmacy Inc. distributes pharmaceutical products. The Company
offers prescription, drugs, vitamins, beauty aids, diaper, health
supplement, and other medical products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Stephen M. Prignano, Esq.
          MCINTYRE TATE LLP
          50 Park Row West, Suite 109
          Providence, RI 02903
          Phone: (401) 351-7700
          Fax: (401) 331-6095
          Email: SPrignano@McIntyreTate.com


DAVITA INC: Agreement in Principle Reached in Peace Officers' Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
DaVita Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on July 30, 2020, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2020, that an agreement in principle has been
reached in the putative securities class action suit initiated by
Peace Officers' Annuity and Benefit Fund of Georgia.

On February 1, 2017, the Peace Officers' Annuity and Benefit Fund
of Georgia filed a putative federal securities class action
complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado
against the Company and certain executives.

The complaint covers the time period of August 2015 to October 2016
and alleges, generally, that the Company and its executives
violated federal securities laws concerning the Company's financial
results and revenue derived from patients who received charitable
premium assistance from an industry-funded non-profit organization.


The complaint further alleges that the process by which patients
obtained commercial insurance and received charitable premium
assistance was improper and "created a false impression of DaVita's
business and operational status and future growth prospects." In
November 2017, the Court appointed the lead plaintiff and an
amended complaint was filed on January 12, 2018.

On March 27, 2018, the Company and various individual defendants
filed a motion to dismiss. On March 28, 2019, the U.S. District
Court for the District of Colorado denied the motion to dismiss.
The Company answered the complaint on May 28, 2019.

On January 31, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class
certification and the Company filed its opposition on June 29,
2020.

While the Company continues to dispute the allegations, in July
2020, it reached an agreement in principle to resolve this matter
without admitting to any liability.

The settlement is subject to, among other things, the approval by
the Court. Settlement of this matter on the agreed terms is
expected to be covered primarily with insurance proceeds, with the
Company contributing an amount that would not have a material
impact on the Company's consolidated financial position, results of
operations or cash flows.

DaVita Inc. provides kidney dialysis services for patients
suffering from chronic kidney failure or end stage renal disease
(ESRD). The company operates kidney dialysis centers and provides
related lab services in outpatient dialysis centers. The company
was formerly known as DaVita HealthCare Partners Inc. and changed
its name to DaVita Inc. in September 2016. DaVita Inc. was founded
in 1994 and is headquartered in Denver, Colorado.


DENSO CANADA: Faces Class Action Over Defective Fuel Pumps
----------------------------------------------------------
David A. Wood, writing for CarComplaints.com, reports that a DENSO
Canada lawsuit alleges defective fuel pumps are installed in the
following Acura, Honda, Lexus, Toyota and Subaru vehicles in
Quebec.

2014-2015 Toyota 4Runner
2019 Toyota Avalon
2018-2019 Toyota Camry
2018-2019 Toyota Corolla
2014 Toyota FJ Cruiser
2018-2019 Toyota Highlander
2014-2015 Toyota Land Cruiser
2018-2019 Toyota Sequoia
2017-2019 Toyota Sienna
2018-2019 Toyota Tacoma
2018-2019 Toyota Tundra
2018-2019 Lexus ES 350
2018-2019 Lexus GS 300
2013-2015 and 2018-2019 Lexus GS 350
2014-2015 Lexus GX 460
2014 Lexus IS-F
2017 Lexus IS 200t
2018-2019 Lexus IS 300
2014-2015 and 2018-2019 Lexus IS 350
2018-2019 Lexus LC 500
2018-2019 Lexus LC 500h (Hybrid)
2013-2015Lexus LS 460
2018-2019 Lexus LS 500
2018-2019 Lexus LS 500h (Hybrid)
2014-2015 Lexus LX 570
2015 Lexus NX 200t
2018-2019 Lexus RC 300
2017 Lexus RC 200t
2015, 2018-2019 Lexus RC 350
2017-2019 Lexus RX 350
2018-2019 Lexus RX 350L
2016-2018 Acura MDX
2018-2019 Acura NSX
2019 Acura RDX
2019 Acura RLS
2019 Acura RLX
2015-2019 Acura TLX
2015-2019 Honda Accord
2018-2019 Honda Civic Hatchback
2018-2019 Honda Civic Type R
2019 Honda Fit
2018-2019 Honda HR-V
2019-2020 Honda Insight
2019-2020 Subaru Ascent
2019-2020 Subaru Impreza
2019-2020 Subaru Outback
2019-2020 Subaru Legacy

The class action includes "all persons, entities, or organizations
resident in Quebec who purchased and/or leased a Subject Vehicle
equipped with a fuel pump designed and manufactured by DENSO."

Although the lawsuit includes Quebec residents only, a separate
DENSO fuel pump lawsuit was filed for the remaining areas of
Canada.

According to the lawsuit, more than 136,000 Canadian vehicles have
been recalled by three automakers due to the fuel pumps.

DENSO says the pumps have low-density impellers that can absorb
fuel, crack and deform to the point the impellers hit the fuel
pumps.

Various conditions can occur, including fuel system failures,
engines that run rough, engines that won't start or engines that
stall while driving.

The plaintiff who sued claims the vehicles place occupants at risk
of injuries and death because of the fuel pump failures. But owners
also allegedly suffer additional consequences in the form of
diminished vehicle values, out-of-pocket expenses and towing and
rental car costs.

The Canadian fuel pump recalls allegedly didn't include all the
Acura, Honda, Lexus, Toyota and Subaru vehicles affected by the
DENSO pumps. In addition, the class action mentions a U.S. DENSO
recall of 2 million fuel pumps.

Canadian vehicle owners haven't been told to stop driving their
vehicles even though fuel pump failures could cause the vehicles to
stall while driving.

The DENSO Canada lawsuit was filed in the Superior Court for the
Province of Quebec District of Montreal Canada: L. Hand vs. DENSO
International America, Inc., et al.

The plaintiff is represented by Consumer Law Group Inc. [GN]


DOMINO'S PIZZA: 6th Cir. Affirms Arbitration Ruling in Blanton Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, HARLEY BLANTON, Plaintiff, DEREK PIERSING, on Behalf
of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. DOMINO'S PIZZA FRANCHISING LLC; DOMINO'S PIZZA MASTER ISSUER
LLC; DOMINO'S PIZZA LLC; DOMINO'S PIZZA, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 19-2388 (6th Cir.), the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's
order granting the Defendants' motion to compel arbitration.

Domino's has thousands of pizza restaurants across the country.
Like other large chains, Domino's operates many of these
restaurants through a franchise model.  Each franchise is an
independently owned and managed business with a separate legal
identity.  But it still controls certain aspects of each franchise.
Relevant in the case, Domino's allegedly required its franchises
to agree not to solicit or hire employees from other franchises
without the prior consent of their employer.

Piersing began working at a Domino's franchise in Washington state
in the fall of 2014.  Four years later, Piersing sought a second
job from a different Domino's franchise in the area.  When he was
hired by the second franchise,  Piersing signed an arbitration
agreement, which requires him to arbitrate a wide array of issues
related to his employment.  The agreement also specifies that the
arbitration will be conducted according to the American Arbitration
Association National Rules for the Resolution of Employment
Disputes ("AAA Rules").

Around the same time, Piersing learned that he had been fired from
the first franchise.  According to Piersing, the store fired him
because it thought that its franchise agreement with Domino's
required it to do so in order to allow him to work at the second
franchise.  Piersing worked at the second franchise for a few
months until he left his job because of a medical condition.

Piersing and another Plaintiff then filed a class action against
Domino's, alleging that the company's franchise agreement violated
federal antitrust law as well as state law.  Domino's soon moved to
compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act.  The
Plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing that Domino's couldn't
enforce the arbitration agreements because the company hadn't
signed the agreements (only their franchises had).  But the
district court ordered the Plaintiffs to go to arbitration anyway,
finding that both Piersing and his co-Plaintiff had agreed to
arbitrate not only the merits of certain claims but also threshold
questions about the agreements themselves.  The appeal followed.

Domino's argues about the correct choice of law.  Judge Amul Roger
Thapar, writing for the Sixth Circuit, holds that Washington courts
have found that the incorporation of the AAA Rules (or similarly
worded arbitral rules) provide "clear and unmistakable" evidence
that the parties agreed to arbitrate "arbitrability."  And Piersing
hasn't give any reason to think that the Washington Supreme Court
would ultimately adopt the minority view in the debate.  So in the
end, the choice of law makes no difference.

For his part, Piersing offers several arguments why the Court
should be the first circuit court in the country to find that the
incorporation of the AAA Rules doesn't provide "clear and
unmistakable" evidence that he agreed to arbitrate "arbitrability."
Piersing argues that (i) his arbitration agreement incorporates
the AAA Rules only as to claims that fall within the scope of the
agreement; (ii) the AAA Rules don't require him to arbitrate the
question of "arbitrability" at issue in the case; (iii) the circuit
has already held that the incorporation of the AAA Rules doesn't
provide "clear and unmistakable" evidence that the parties agreed
to arbitrate "arbitrability"; (iv) even if the incorporation of the
AAA Rules provides evidence that the parties agreed to arbitrate
"arbitrability," it's not "clear and unmistakable" evidence; and
(v) a ruling for Domino's would mean that anyone could force him to
arbitrate "arbitrability" no matter how frivolous the argument for
arbitration.

Judge Thapar holds that none of these arguments prove persuasive.
He opines that one should keep in mind that the question is quite
narrow.  It's not about the merits of the case.  It's not even
about whether the parties have to arbitrate the merits.  Instead,
it's about who should decide whether the parties have to arbitrate
the merits.  And as the Supreme Court has often said, parties don't
give up any of their substantive rights when they choose to
arbitrate an issue; they simply select a different forum to resolve
their dispute.  That's all that happened in the case.  

Aside from the merits, Piersing raises two other arguments.
Neither persuades.  Piersing argues that the district court erred
when it refused him leave to amend his complaint.  Yet the record
makes clear that the court never ruled on the issue.  Piersing also
asks us to vacate the portions of the district court's opinion that
purport to decide whether Domino's can enforce the arbitration
agreement under state contract law (specifically, equitable
estoppel).  Whatever else the court's opinion says, the opinion
makes clear that the arbitrator should decide for itself whether
Domino's can enforce the arbitration agreement.  Judge Thapar will
leave matters at that.

In light of the foregoing, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district
court's order granting the Defendants' motion to compel
arbitration.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 17, 2020 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/fGPxfH from Leagle.com.

ARGUED: Anne B. Shaver -- ashaver@lchb.com -- LIEFF CABRASER
HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP, San Francisco, California, for
Appellant.

Norman M. Leon -- norman.leon@dlapiper.com -- DLA PIPER LLP (US),
Chicago, Illinois, for Appellees.

ON BRIEF: Anne B. Shaver, Dean M. Harvey, Lin Y. Chan , Yaman
Salahi, Jeremy J. Pilaar, LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP,
San Francisco, California, Derek Y. Brandt, Leigh M. Perica ,
McCUNE WRIGHT AREVALO, LLP, Edwardsville, Illinois, Sharon S.
Almonrode, Emily E. Hughes, Dennis A. Lienhardt, THE MILLER LAW
FIRM, P.C., Rochester, Michigan, for Appellant.

Norman M. Leon, J. Robert Robertson, John J. Hamill, Michael S.
Pullos, Mary M. Shepro, DLA PIPER LLP (US), Chicago, Illinois,
David H. Bamberger, DLA PIPER LLP (US), Washington, D.C., Edward J.
Hood , CLARK HILL PLC, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellees.

EAGLE NATIONAL: Class of Borrowers Certified in Edmondson Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland issued a
Memorandum Opinion granting the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification in the case captioned MARY EDMONDSON, et al. v. EAGLE
NATIONAL BANK, et al., Case No. SAG-16-3938 (D. Md.).

In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs Mary Edmondson, Chemene
Clark, and Janet seek to represent a class of borrowers that
"currently have or had a federally related mortgage loan" serviced
by Eagle National Bank or Eagle Nationwide Mortgage Company. The
three named Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of borrowers that
(1) serviced a loan with one of the Defendants, and (2) received
title and settlement services in connection with the closing of the
loan from Genuine Title, LLC. The Plaintiffs assert that a portion
of the respective payments they made to Genuine Title was split
with the Defendants, in violation of the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act ("RESPA").

District Judge Stephanie A. Gallagher opines that, among other
things, the class action vehicle is "superior to other methods" of
adjudicating this controversy. Based upon the common questions that
predominate, a class action is more efficient than allowing
potentially thousands of individual claims arising from the
Defendants' purported kickback arrangement. The Defendants'
suggestion that statutory damages obviate the necessity of a class
action is without merit, Judge Gallagher adds.

The Court, however, notes that the Plaintiffs have not rebutted the
Defendants' contention that Eagle Nationwide terminated its
employees, including Gary Klopp, on January 31, 2011. Therefore,
the Court amends the relevant dates in the Plaintiffs' proposed
class definition, and certifies a class of these individuals:

     All individuals in the United States who were borrowers on a
     federally related mortgage loan (as defined under the Real
     Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. Section 2602)
     from, brokered or originated by, Eagle National Bank or
     Eagle Nationwide Mortgage Company for which Genuine Title
     provided a settlement service, as identified in Section 1100
     on the HUD-1, between January 1, 2007, and January 31, 2011.
     Exempted from this class is any person who, during the
     period of January 1, 2007 through January 31, 2011, was an
     employee, officer, member and/or agent of Defendants Eagle
     National Bank, Eagle Nationwide Mortgage Company, ESSA Bank
     & Trust, Genuine Title LLC, Brandon Glickstein, Inc., and/or
     Competitive Advantage Media Group LLC.

The Defendants' Motion for leave to file a sur-reply is GRANTED.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 21, 2020 Memorandum
Opinion is available at   https://tinyurl.com/ya2oucc6 from
Leagle.com.


ELECTROLUX HOME: Bid to Bifurcate Discovery in Obertman Suit Denied
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case FELIX OBERTMAN, Plaintiff, v. ELECTROLUX HOME CARE
PRODUCTS, INC., Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-02487-KJM-AC (E.D.
Cal.), Judge Kimberly J. Mueller of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California denied the Defendant's request to
bifurcate discovery.

In the putative class action seeking damages for allegedly
defective dehumidifiers, the parties dispute whether or not to
bifurcate discovery into a class certification phase followed by a
merits phase.

The Plaintiff filed the action on Dec. 12, 2019.  The Defendant
filed a motion to dismiss on March 4, 2020, which is still pending.
The suit arises from a central claim that certain Frigidaire
Dehumidifiers including model numbers FFAD3033R1, FFAD5033R1,
FFAD7033R1, suffer from a design defect that causes them to display
an "F0" error message on the products' control panel, rendering the
products "completely useless."

On May 15, 2020, the Court held a scheduling conference in addition
to hearing oral argument on the Defendant's pending motion to
dismiss.  With respect to scheduling the case, the parties raised
the issue of phasing discovery, on which they could not reach an
agreement, and the Court granted the parties 14 days to file
supplemental statements citing authority relevant to the case and
short argument, or any stipulation the parties may reach.  The
Court confirmed it is aware of the parties' proposed dates, and
that once it resolves the issue of phasing, the Court will set
further dates depending on how it resolves the phasing issue.

The parties did not reach a stipulation and instead each filed
supplemental briefs on the issue of phasing.  After considering the
parties' arguments, the Court finds bifurcation of discovery is not
appropriate in the case and so will schedule the case accordingly.

The Defendant argues bifurcation of discovery will promote
efficiency and fairness, because it will prevent it from having to
engage in costly class-wide merits-based discovery when the
Plaintiff's case may never get past the class-certification stage.
The Plaintiff argues that discovery regarding merits and class
certification will overlap substantially, especially given that he
alleges the class members were all harmed by the exact same defect
in the Defendant's dehumidifiers, and therefore bifurcation will
unnecessarily delay the case and waste the Court's time with myriad
discovery disputes.

Judge Mueller finds the concerns the other courts have addressed
regarding separating class and merits discovery are present in the
case, such that bifurcation of discovery is unwarranted.  The
merits of the case appear to overlap substantially with issues that
will be raised on class certification, including whether the
Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class despite having
disposed of the offending product before initiating the lawsuit.
Furthermore, bifurcating discovery risks prejudicing the Plaintiff,
who must meet a high burden to show certification of the class is
proper.  Accordingly, Judge Mueller declines to bifurcate
discovery, in the interest of fairness, efficiency and judicial
economy.

Against this backdrop, the Court denied the Defendant's request to
bifurcate discovery.  The Court will issue a schedule for the case
shortly, based on the parties' joint status report, and their
discussion at the scheduling conference.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 17, 2020 Order is available at
https://is.gd/tQ87QO from Leagle.com.

ENJOY LIFE NATURAL: Faces Dawson ADA Class Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Enjoy Life Natural
Brands, LLC. The case is styled as Leshawn Dawson, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. Enjoy Life Natural
Brands, LLC, Case No. 1:20-cv-06188 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 6, 2020).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Enjoy Life Natural Brands, LLC, supply food products. The Company
offers baking mixes, cookies, chew bars, and chocolates.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Phone: (929) 575-4175
          Fax: (929) 575-4195
          Email: joseph@cml.legal


EVERGREEN PROFESSIONAL: Rodriguez Suit Settlement Gets Initial Okay
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JESSE RODRIGUEZ, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. EVERGREEN PROFESSIONAL
RECOVERIES, INC., Defendant, Case No. C19-0184-JCC (W.D. Wash.),
Judge John C. Coughenour of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington, Seattle, granted the parties' joint motion
for certification of the proposed class and for preliminary
approval of the parties' settlement agreement pursuant to Rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Plaintiff Rodriguez brings the class action against Defendant
Evergreen.  On Feb. 25, 2020, Mr. Rodriguez executed a settlement
agreement with Evergreen.  The Settlement Agreement resolves all
claims for the Settlement Class alleged in the Class Action
Complaint filed in the Court on Feb. 6, 2019.

Having reviewed the settlement agreement and considered the
parties' original and renewed submissions in support of preliminary
approval of the settlement, Judge Coughenour finds that (a) the
Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, adequate, and within the
range of possible approval; (b) the Settlement Agreement has been
negotiated in good faith at arm's length between experienced
attorneys familiar with the legal and factual issues of the Action;
and (c) the forms of notice of the material terms of the Settlement
to persons in the Settlement Class for their consideratio, are
appropriate and warranted.  Therefore, the Judge granted
preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement.

The Court conditionally certified, for purposes of the Settlement
only, the following Settlement Class:  All natural persons residing
in the United States whose consumer report as defined by 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681a(d) was obtained by Evergreen, from Transunion LLC, for the
purpose of collecting a debt arising out of any driving ticket
violation in the United States.  The relevant class period is March
23, 2018 to present.

The Judge appointed (i) the Plaintiff to act as the class
representative, (ii) Ari Marcus and Yitzchak Zelman of Marcus &
Zelman, LLC as the Class Counsel, and (iii) CPT Group, Inc. as the
Claims Administrator.  CPT must perform all the duties of the
Claims Administrator as set forth in the Settlement Agreement and
the order.

The Final Approval Hearing is set for Dec. 8, 2020 at 9:00 a.m.

The Judge approved the proposed plan for mailing class notice to
the Settlement Class, as more fully described in the Parties' joint
motion and the Settlement Agreement.  He directed the Parties and
the Claims Administrator to complete all aspects of the Notice Plan
no later than 30 days from the date the Order is issued.  

By Nov. 25, 2020, the Claims Administrator will file with the Court
proof that notice was provided in accordance with the Settlement
Agreement and the order.  The Settlement Class Members must submit
claims within 90 days after the Notice Deadline.  The Settlement
Class Members who wish to either object to the Settlement Agreement
or request exclusion from the Settlement Class must do so no later
than 60 days after the date the order is issued.  The Claims
Administrator will retain a copy of all requests for exclusion. T
he Claims Administrator will file under seal with the Court a
declaration that lists all of the exclusion requests received no
later than 14 days before the Final Approval Hearing.

For any objection filed, the Clerk of the Court must redact the
objector's social security number, street address, telephone
number, and all but the first letter of the objector's last name.

All proceedings in the Action are stayed upon entry of the Order,
except as may be necessary to implement the Settlement or the
Order.

Accordingly, the Judge set the following deadlines:

     a. Deadline for notice to be provided in accordance with the
Settlement Agreement and the Order--Within 30 days following
entryof the Preliminary Approval Order

     b. Deadline to file objections or to submit requests for
exclusion--Within 60 days following the Notice Deadline

     c.  Deadline for Settlement Class Members to Submit a Claim
Form--Within 90 days following the Notice Deadline

     d. Deadline for Parties to file the following: (1) List of
persons who made timely and proper requests for exclusion (under
seal); (2) Proof of Class Notice; and (3) Motion and memorandum in
support of final approval, including responses to any
objections--20 days prior to the Final Approval Hearing

     e. Motion for Attorney Fees and Incentive Award Final Approval
Hearing--Dec. 8, 2020 at 9:00 a.m.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 8, 2020 Order is available at
https://is.gd/BuB7MX from Leagle.com.

FEDERAL DEPOSIT: Adams Wins Partial Judgment in Guida FLSA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York issued
a Memorandum and Order granting in part and denying in part the
Individual Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in the
case captioned JOSEPH GUIDA, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,
as Receiver for Home Savings of America, DAVID CIROCCO, GREGORY
CAPUTO, DIRK S. ADAMS, GREG RENIERE, and MARTI TROMLEY, Case No. CV
11-0009 (JMA) (AKT) (E.D.N.Y.).

On January 3, 2011, Plaintiff Joseph Guida, individually and on
behalf of other persons similarly situated (collectively,
"Plaintiffs"), commenced this action against the Defendants
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor
Law. The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants failed to pay
minimum wage and overtime wages.  On January 19, 2011, four
individuals filed consent forms to opt-in to the action. These
individuals included Guida, Michael Esposito ("Esposito"), Daniel
McGorman ("McGorman"), and Jahn Ramirez ("Ramirez"). In addition to
the individual claims, the Plaintiffs sought to certify a
collective action for their FLSA claims under 29 U.S.C. Section
216(b), and to certify their NYLL claims as a class action under
Rule 23(b)(3).

On July 21, 2011, the Plaintiffs filed a demand for arbitration
with the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"). That same day,
three individuals submitted opt-in consent forms with AAA,
including Bryant F. Magee, Perry DeSantis, and Artem Uvaydov. On
December 5, 2011, nine individuals submitted opt-in consent forms
to AAA: David Ambaln, Michael Ciavarella, Nelson Hernandez, Richard
Hernandez, Maria Keegan, Kenneth Laudante, Daniel Montenegro, Jason
Shannon, and John Viteritti.

On February 24, 2012, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
closed Defendant Home Savings. As a result, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") was appointed as receiver for Home
Savings.

Individual Defendant Dirk S. Adams has moved for partial summary
judgment, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. On November 1, 2019, Judge Joan Marie Azrack referred
the motion to this Court for a Report and Recommendation as to
whether the Motion should be granted. Thereafter, the parties
consented to the jurisdiction of this Court for purposes of
adjudicating the motion and entering a final order, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. Section 636(c).

The Defendant moves for summary judgment against DeSantis and
Uvaydov on their minimum wage and overtime claims under the FLSA
and the NYLL (Counts I-IV) on the basis that the claims are barred
by issue preclusion.

While the Court is not entirely persuaded that issue preclusion
necessarily bars DeSantis and Uvaydov's FLSA and NYLL claims,
DeSantis and Uvaydov have nonetheless expressly stated that they do
not oppose entry of summary judgment against them on their FLSA and
NYLL claims. Accordingly, the Court finds that DeSantis and Uvaydov
have abandoned their minimum wage and overtime claims under the
FLSA and NYLL (Counts I-IV). Therefore, the Court GRANTS summary
judgment in favor of Defendant Adams on Counts I-IV of the Second
Amended Complaint.

The Defendant moves for summary judgment against Magee, Metrock,
and Nelson on their minimum wage (Count I) and overtime (Count II)
claims under the NYLL on the assertion that no evidence was
provided to the Defendant that these individuals "had any
employment contacts with New York State" and, "[a]s a consequence,
New York State Labor Law does not apply." The Defendant also moves
for summary judgment against Plaintiffs Ambaln, Benitez, Castaldo,
Ciavarella, N. Hernandez, R. Hernandez, Keegan, Laudante, Magee,
Mansi, Montenegro, Shannon, and Viteritti on their minimum wage and
overtime claims (Counts III and IV) under the FLSA on the grounds
that these claims are time-barred.

The Court finds that Magee, Metrock, and Nelson have abandoned
their minimum wage (Count I) and overtime (Count II) claims under
the NYLL. Consequently, the Court GRANTS summary judgment in favor
of Defendant Adams on these claims. The Court DECLINES to grant
summary judgment in favor of Defendant Adams on Counts III and IV
as to Plaintiffs Ambaln, Ciavarella, N. Hernandez, R. Hernandez,
Keegan, Laudante, Montenegro, Shannon, and Viteritti.

The Court also rules that the statute of limitations period will be
tolled from the time in which the opt-in consent forms were filed
in the arbitration proceeding until the stay was lifted by the
Court in this action on March 15, 2013.

In sum, the Court rules that Defendant Adams' motion for partial
summary judgment is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part, as
follows:

   -- Summary judgment in favor of Defendant Adams on Counts I
      and II (NYLL claims) as to Plaintiffs Benitez, DeSantis,
      Magee, Metrock, Nelson and Uvaydov is GRANTED;

   -- Summary judgment in favor of Defendant Adams on Counts III
      and IV (FLSA claims) as to Plaintiffs Benitez, Castaldo,
      DeSantis, Magee, Mansi and Uvaydov is GRANTED; and

   -- Summary judgment as to Plaintiffs Ambaln, Ciavarella,
      Nelson Hernandez, Richard Hernandez, Keegan, Laudante,
      Montenegro, Shannon and Viteritti on Counts III and IV
      (FLSA claims) is DENIED.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 21, 2020 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ydadny9r from
Leagle.com.


FEDERAL EXPRESS: Court Dismisses Yelverton Suit with Prejudice
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Philip S. Gutierrez of the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California, Western Division, dismissed with
prejudice the case captioned MICHAEL YELVERTON, on behalf of
himself and other similarly situated non-exempt former and current
employees, Assigned for all purposes to the Plaintiffs, v. FEDERAL
EXPRESS CORPORATION; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants,
Case No. 2:19-cv-01827 PSG (PJWx) (C.D. Cal.).

The class action causes of action against Defendant Federal Express
are dismissed, and the entire action is dismissed with prejudice as
to all parties and its entirety.  Each party to bear his/her/its
own attorneys' fees and costs, rules the Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 17, 2020 Order is available at
https://is.gd/zH09Lw from Leagle.com.


FIESTA FLOORING: No Ruling on Bid to File Hawthorn Deal Under Seal
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JEREMY HAWTHORN and CHARLES BUSH, Individually and On
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. FIESTA
FLOORING, LLC and THOMAS M. THOMPSON, Individually, Defendants,
Case No. 1:19-CV-00019 WJ/SCY (D. N.M.), Judge William P. Johnson
of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico deferred
ruling on the parties' Joint Motion to File Settlement Agreements
Under Seal, filed June 4, 2020.

The case was brought as a collective action alleging violations of
the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").  The parties have agreed to
settle the collective action.  In their Joint Motion, they seek the
Court's permission to submit the confidential Settlement Agreements
under seal for the Court's in camera review and once the permission
is obtained, they will file their joint motion for judicial
approval of the Agreements.

The parties seek to file the confidential Settlement Agreements
under seal in order to encourage settlement and to preserve the
resources of the Court.  Assuming the Court grants this request,
they intend to subsequently request an in camera judicial review.
The parties contend that the public does not need to know the
details of the Agreements in order to protect their rights, and
they point to generic case law which supports settlement
negotiation as a "favored means" of resolving disputes and which
recognizes confidentiality within settlement agreements.

Judge Johnson's inquiry begins with whether judicial approval of
the Agreements is warranted in the case and if so, why the
Agreements and/or the Court's review of the Agreements should be
kept under seal.

Judge Johnson finds the reasoning by the Fifth Circuit in Martin v.
Spring Break '83 Productions, L.L.C  and from the recent district
court opinions in Martin (Western District of Texas); Fails v.
Pathway Leasing LLC (District of Colorado); Serna v. Bd. of Cty.
Comm'rs of Rio Arriba Cty (District of New Mexico); and Lawson v.
Procare (District of Oklahoma) to be persuasive and intends to
follow that reasoning in considering the parties' Joint Motion.
The Court's "takeaway" from the current legal landscape is this:
judicial approval is not necessary for settlement of bona fide FLSA
disputes where parties reach a private agreement and where the
dispute centered on the amount of hours worked or compensation due
rather than a release of the employee's substantive rights
themselves.

The matter before the Court appears to fall in this category.  In
other words, the case bears no similarities to Lynn's Food Stores.
The case is a class action brought under the FLSA in which the
Plaintiffs, installers and helpers who worked for Defendant within
a specific period of time, seek to recover overtime wages.  The
Plaintiffs have been represented by a team of attorneys since the
case was filed a year ago, and settlement was not reached until
after the discovery termination date, indicating that the parties
had already engaged in the discovery necessary to be fully apprised
of the potential value of the Plaintiff's claims and to identify
any legal or factual disputes before settlement was reached.  In
addition, the parties represent that everyone who could have opted
in has received notice and has done so.

Judge Johnson is satisfied that the parties in the case have
settled a bona fide dispute and that there appears to be no defect
in the process of negotiating the settlement.  Thus, he is not
required to review the merits of the Agreements.  

Accordingly, in a ruling dated June 10, 2020, a full-text copy of
which is available at https://is.gd/TIJ88H from Leagle.com, Judge
Johnson deferred ruling on the parties' Joint Motion to File
Settlement Agreement pending the Court's consideration of the
parties' filing of a Joint Notice as follows:

     (1) Within 14 days, the parties will file a Joint Notice with
the Court advising whether they still wish for the Court to review
the merits of the settlement agreement;

     (2) If the parties no longer wish for the Court to review the
merits of the Settlement Agreements: the parties should include in
their Joint Notice that all claims have been resolved, and that the
parties desire to dismiss the case with prejudice.  In the
alternative, the parties may also request in their Joint Notice
that the Court hold that the Settlement Agreements are enforceable
without Court or DOL approval and dismiss the case with prejudice.
The Court would then allow parties to file the Settlement
Agreements under seal, as they now request;

     (3) Should the parties still request judicial approval of the
Settlement Agreements, they shall: (a) advise the Court whether the
Settlement Agreements constitute a resolution of a bona fide FLSA
dispute or whether there are specific circumstances that warrant
judicial review and approval; (b) provide legal authority for why
judicial approval is warranted in the case; (c) at that time,
should parties still request a merits review of the Settlement
Agreements, the Court will also address the parties' Joint Motion
to File Settlement Agreements Under Seal.

FIRST NATIONAL: CCC Can't Compel In-Person Deposition in Lundquist
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CAMERON LUNDQUIST, an individual, and LEEANA LARA, an
individual, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. FIRST NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF
AMERICA, a New Hampshire Corporation, and LM GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, an Illinois Corporation, and CCC INFORMATION SERVICES
INCORPORATED, a Delaware Corporation, Defendants, Case No. 18-5301
RJB (W.D. Wash.), Judge Robert J. Bryan of the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Washington, Tacoma, (i) denied
Defendant CCC Information Services Incorporated's Expedited Motion
to Compel In-Person Depositions of Cameron Lundquist, Leeana Lara,
and Lance Kaufman and Extend the Case Schedule; and (ii) denied
without prejudice CCC's motion for a four-week extension of the
case schedule to conduct in-person depositions.

In the putative class action, the Plaintiffs assert that the
Defendants' practice of using unexplained and unjustified condition
adjustments to comparable vehicles when valuing a total loss claim
for a vehicle, violates the Washington Administrative Code ("WAC"),
specifically WAC 284-30-391(4)(b) and (5)(d), and so constitutes:
(1) breach of contract, (2) breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, (3) violation of Washington's Consumer
Protection Act and (4) civil conspiracy.  The Plaintiffs seek
damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, attorneys' fees and
costs.

The class has not been certified.  The Second Amended Complaint
proposes to define the class as: All individuals insured by First
National and LMGIC under a private passenger vehicle policy who,
from the earliest allowable time to the date of judgment, received
a first-party total loss settlement or settlement offer based in
whole or in part on the price of comparable vehicles reduced by a
condition adjustment.

The Second Amended Complaint further provides that while the exact
number of members cannot be determined, the class consists at a
minimum of thousands of persons located throughout the State of
Washington.

The Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Class Certification
(unredacted and under seal) and by agreement of the parties, the
briefing schedule and other case deadlines were extended.  The
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification was noted for
consideration last Aug. 3, 2020.  Two of the parties that CCC seeks
to depose inperson are the representative Plaintiffs.  In support
of their motion to certify the class, the Plaintiffs rely, in part,
on the expert opinion of Lance Kaufman; this is the other witness
that CCC seeks to compel to be deposed in-person.

The Plaintiffs oppose the motion arguing that due to the Covid-19
pandemic, they should not be compelled to attend depositions
in-person.  They note that there is sufficient technology to
conduct depositions safely and effectively.  They oppose extension
of the case schedule.

CCC replies and argues that in-person depositions are important to
its ability to test the credibility of these witnesses.  It notes
that the Plaintiffs' objection to the extension of the case
schedule is based on opposing the in-person depositions, but they
are having difficulty scheduling another witness.

The Plaintiffs' motion for class certification was noted for Aug.
3, 2020, the fact discovery deadline is Oct. 15, 2020, the
dispositive motions deadline is Oct. 29, 2020, and the trial is set
to begin on Feb. 1, 2021.

Judge Bryan holds that CCC's motion to compel in-person depositions
of Cameron Lundquist, Leeana Lara, and Lance Kaufman should be
denied.  The Plaintiffs' concerns over exposure to Covid-19 are
sufficient grounds to have their depositions taken by "telephone or
other remote means."  CCC has not shown sufficient prejudice that
would justify forcing the witnesses to participate in in-person
depositions.  Since credibility is at issue, the depositions should
occur by videoconference.  While the Court is sympathetic to the
challenges to the legal community during the pandemic, attorneys
and litigants are adapting to new ways to practice law, including
preparing for and conducting depositions remotely.

CCC's motion to extend the case deadline for four weeks should be
denied without prejudice.  While the extension is currently not
warranted to take the in-person depositions sought above, CCC
referenced difficulty with another witness.  It is not clear if
that would justify an extension of the case schedule at this time.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Bryan (i) denied CCC's motion to
compel; and (ii) denied without prejudice CCC's Motion to Extend
the Case Schedule.  The Clerk is directed to send uncertified
copies of the Order to all the counsel of record and to any party
appearing pro se at said party's last known address.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 17, 2020 Order is available at
https://is.gd/7GW7UX from Leagle.com.


FLAGSTAR BANK: Castaneda Sues over Homeowner's Insurance Policy
---------------------------------------------------------------
LUCY CASTANEDA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. FLAGSTAR BANK, FSB, Defendant, Case No.
5:20-cv-01400 (C.D. Cal., July 15, 2020) alleges that the Defendant
knowingly and purposefully failed to properly disclose that it
failed to direct proper payment of consumers' homeowner's insurance
when this service is expressly included on the consumers' monthly
mortgage statements from Defendant.

According to the complaint, sometime prior to April of 2020, the
Plaintiff's home was severely damaged by rain water, which caused
numerous cracks to Plaintiff's roof. As a result, the Plaintiff's
home became filled with damp walls and carpet, and mold began to
grow on the walls of the Plaintiff's living room.

On April 10, 2020, Plaintiff attempted to make a homeowner's
insurance claim by contacting the Plaintiff's insurance agent at
One City Insurance Agency, Inc.  To the Plaintiff's surprise, the
agent at One City informed the Plaintiff that the Plaintiff did not
have an active homeowner's insurance policy. Immediately
thereafter, the Plaintiff called the Defendant to inquire about the
status of her homeowner's insurance that the Defendant previously
represented to be paying on her behalf. During this call, one of
the Defendant's employees informed the Plaintiff that the Plaintiff
did not have a homeowner's insurance policy linked to her home
mortgage loan with Flagstar.

As a result of the Defendant's failure to provide the Plaintiff
with the agreed upon service of payment of the Plaintiff's
homeowner's insurance on the Plaintiff's behalf, the Plaintiff was
denied the benefit of insurance and the benefit of the Defendant's
mortgage services.

Flagstar Bank FSB operates as a full-service bank. The Bank accepts
deposits, makes loans and provides other services for the public
which includes personal banking, online transaction, and debit and
credit card services. Flagstar Bank serves customers throughout the
United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Abbas Kazerounian, Esq.
          Pamela E. Prescott, Esq.
          KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC
          245 Fischer Avenue, Unit D1
          Costa Mesa, CA 92626
          Telephone: (800) 400-6808
          Facsimile: (800) 520-5523
          E-mail: ak@kazlg.com
                  pamela@kazlg.com


FREDDIE MAC: Discovery Ongoing in Senior Preferred Stock Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 30, 2020,
for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2020, that discovery is
ongoing in the class action suit entitled, In re Fannie Mae/Freddie
Mac Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement Class Action suit.

This case is the result of the consolidation of three putative
class action lawsuits: Cacciapelle and Bareiss vs. Federal National
Mortgage Association, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation and
FHFA, filed on July 29, 2013; American European Insurance Company
vs. Federal National Mortgage Association, Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation and Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA),
filed on July 30, 2013; and Marneu Holdings, Co. vs. FHFA,
Treasury, Federal National Mortgage Association and Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation, filed on September 18, 2013. (The Marneu
case was also filed as a shareholder derivative lawsuit.)

A consolidated amended complaint was filed in December 2013. In the
consolidated amended complaint, plaintiffs alleged, among other
items, that the August 2012 amendment to the Purchase Agreement
breached Freddie Mac's and Fannie Mae's respective contracts with
the holders of junior preferred stock and common stock and the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in such contracts.


Plaintiffs sought unspecified damages, equitable and injunctive
relief, and costs and expenses, including attorney and expert
fees.

The Cacciapelle and American European Insurance Company lawsuits
were filed purportedly on behalf of a class of purchasers of junior
preferred stock issued by Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae who held stock
prior to, and as of, August 17, 2012. The Marneu lawsuit was filed
purportedly on behalf of a class of purchasers of junior preferred
stock and purchasers of common stock issued by Freddie Mac or
Fannie Mae over a not-yet-defined period of time.

Arrowood Indemnity Company vs. Federal National Mortgage
Association, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, FHFA, and
Treasury.

This case was filed on September 20, 2013. The allegations and
demands made by plaintiffs in this case were generally similar to
those made by the plaintiffs in the In re Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac
Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement Class Action Litigations
case described above.

Plaintiffs in the Arrowood lawsuit also requested that, if
injunctive relief were not granted, the Arrowood plaintiffs be
awarded damages against the defendants in an amount to be
determined including, but not limited to, the aggregate par value
of their junior preferred stock, the total of which they stated to
be approximately $42 million.

American European Insurance Company, Cacciapelle, and Miller vs.
Treasury and FHFA.

This case was filed as a shareholder derivative lawsuit,
purportedly on behalf of Freddie Mac as a "nominal" defendant, on
July 30, 2014. The complaint alleged that, through the August 2012
amendment to the Purchase Agreement, Treasury and FHFA breached
their respective fiduciary duties to Freddie Mac, causing Freddie
Mac to suffer damages.

The plaintiffs asked that Freddie Mac be awarded compensatory
damages and disgorgement, as well as attorneys' fees, costs, and
other expenses.

FHFA, joined by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, moved to dismiss the In
re Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement
Class Action Litigations case and the other related cases in
January 2014.

Treasury filed a motion to dismiss the same day.

In September 2014, the District Court granted the motions and
dismissed the plaintiffs' claims. All plaintiffs appealed that
decision, and on February 21, 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed in part and remanded in
part the decision granting the motions to dismiss. The Court of
Appeals affirmed dismissal of all claims except certain claims
seeking monetary damages for breach of contract and breach of
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.

In March 2017, certain institutional and class plaintiffs filed
petitions for panel rehearing with respect to certain claims. On
July 17, 2017, the Court of Appeals granted the petitions for
rehearing and issued a modified decision, which permitted the
institutional plaintiffs to pursue the breach of contract and
breach of implied duty of good faith and fair dealing claims that
had been remanded.

The Court of Appeals also removed language related to the standard
to be applied to the implied duty claims, leaving that issue for
the District Court to determine on remand. On October 16, 2017,
certain institutional and class plaintiffs filed petitions for a
writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court challenging whether
HERA's prohibition on injunctive relief against FHFA bars judicial
review of the net worth sweep dividend provisions of the August
2012 amendment to the Purchase Agreement, as well as whether HERA
bars shareholders from pursuing derivative litigation where they
allege the conservator faces a conflict of interest. The Supreme
Court denied the petitions on February 20, 2018.

On November 1, 2017, certain institutional and class plaintiffs and
plaintiffs in another case in which Freddie Mac was not originally
a defendant, Fairholme Funds, Inc. v. FHFA, Treasury, and Federal
National Mortgage Association, filed proposed amended complaints in
the District Court.

Each of the proposed amended complaints names Freddie Mac as a
defendant for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing claims as well as for new claims alleging
breach of fiduciary duty and breach of Virginia corporate law.

On January 10, 2018, FHFA, Freddie Mac, and Fannie Mae moved to
dismiss the amended complaints. On September 28, 2018, the District
Court dismissed all of the claims except those alleging breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Discovery is ongoing.

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, known as Freddie Mac, is a
public government-sponsored enterprise, headquartered in Tysons
Corner, Virginia. Freddie Mac is ranked No. 38 on the 2018 Fortune
500 list of the largest United States corporations by total
revenue. The company is based in McLean, Virginia.


FREDDIE MAC: Still Defending Ohio Public Employees Case
-------------------------------------------------------
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 30, 2020,
for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2020, that the company
continues to defend a class action suit entitled, Ohio Public
Employees Retirement System ("OPERS") vs. Freddie Mac, Syron, et
al.

This putative securities class action lawsuit was filed against
Freddie Mac and certain former officers on January 18, 2008 in the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio purportedly
on behalf of a class of purchasers of Freddie Mac stock from August
1, 2006 through November 20, 2007.

Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) later intervened as
Conservator, and the plaintiff amended its complaint on several
occasions. The plaintiff alleged, among other things, that the
defendants violated federal securities laws by making false and
misleading statements concerning the company's business, risk
management, and the procedures we put into place to protect the
company from problems in the mortgage industry.

The plaintiff seeks unspecified damages and interest, and
reasonable costs and expenses, including attorney and expert fees.

In October 2013, defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaint.
In October 2014, the District Court granted defendants' motions and
dismissed the case in its entirety against all defendants, with
prejudice. In November 2014, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal in
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

On July 20, 2016, the Court of Appeals reversed the District
Court's dismissal and remanded the case to the District Court for
further proceedings. On August 14, 2018, the District Court denied
the plaintiff's motion for class certification. On January 23,
2019, the Court of Appeals denied plaintiff's petition for leave to
appeal that decision.

Federal Home said, "At present, it is not possible for us to
predict the probable outcome of this lawsuit or any potential
effect on our business, financial condition, liquidity, or results
of operations. In addition, we are unable to reasonably estimate
the possible loss or range of possible loss in the event of an
adverse judgment in the foregoing matter due to the following
factors, among others: pre-trial litigation is inherently
uncertain; while the District Court denied plaintiff's motion for
class certification, this denial may be appealed upon the entry of
final judgment; and the District Court has not yet ruled upon
motions for summary judgment. In particular, absent a final
resolution of whether a class will be certified, the identification
of a class if one is certified, and the identification of the
alleged statement or statements that survive dispositive motions,
we cannot reasonably estimate any possible loss or range of
possible loss."

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, known as Freddie Mac, is a
public government-sponsored enterprise, headquartered in Tysons
Corner, Virginia. Freddie Mac is ranked No. 38 on the 2018 Fortune
500 list of the largest United States corporations by total
revenue. The company is based in McLean, Virginia.


FRONTLINE ASSET: Faces Gordon FDCPA Class Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Frontline Asset
Strategies, LLC, et al. The case is styled as Shifra Gordon,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
Frontline Asset Strategies, LLC; LVNV Funding, LLC; John Does 1-25;
Case No. 7:20-cv-06157 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 6, 2020).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Frontline Asset Strategies provides third-party collection services
and first-party business process outsourcing services for many
different types of accounts.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Raphael Deutsch, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (347) 668-9326
          Email: rdeutsch@steinsakslegal.com


G&J'S PIZZERIA: Fails to Pay Minimum Wage, Jimenez Claims
---------------------------------------------------------
SALVADOR ARELLANES JIMENEZ, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. G&J'S PIZZERIA LLC (D/B/A G&J'S
PIZZERIA); and GREGORIO VARIOS, Defendants, Case No. 1:20-cv-05454
(S.D.N.Y., July 15, 2020) is an action against the Defendants for
failure to pay minimum wages, overtime compensation, authorize and
permit meal and rest periods, provide accurate wage statements, and
reimburse necessary business expenses.

The Plaintiff Jimenez was employed by the Defendant as cook.

G&J'S Pizzeria LLC owns, operates, or controls a pizzeria, at New
York, New York under the name G&J's Pizzeria.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

         Michael Faillace, Esq.
         MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
         60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
         New York, NY 10165
         Telephone: (212) 317-1200
         Facsimile: (212) 317-1620


GARZA FOOD: Dawson Sues in S.D. New York Alleging ADA Violation
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Garza Food Ventures,
LLC. The case is styled as Leshawn Dawson, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated v. Garza Food Ventures, LLC, Case No.
1:20-cv-06189-JGK (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 6, 2020).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Garza Food Ventures, LLC (trade name Siete Family Foods) is in the
Tortillas: Packaged In Cans, Jars, Etc. business.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Phone: (929) 575-4175
          Fax: (929) 575-4195
          Email: joseph@cml.legal


GEICO INDEMNITY: Wins Bid for Payment of Costs in Jimenez Case
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JIMENEZ, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. GEICO INDEMNITY CO.,
Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-00897 (MPS) (D. Conn.), Judge Michael
P. Shea of the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut
(i) granted GEICO's motion for costs under Rule 41(d), and (ii)
denied GEICO's motion to dismiss without prejudice.

On Dec. 4, 2017, Plaintiffs Jose Jimenez and Maryana Glas filed an
action against GEICO in New Haven Superior Court.  The Plaintiffs
were represented by the same counsel as in the action, Attorney
William E. Murray, and the Complaint in the State Court Action
alleged the same causes of action alleged here: breach of contract,
bad faith, and violations of CUTPA/CUIPA, all related to GEICO's
alleged failure to compensate the Plaintiffs for the loss of their
2013 Honda Accord.  

A bench trial was scheduled in the State Court Action for June 6,
2019.  On June 5, 2019--on the eve of trial and a year and a half
after the commencement of the suit--the Plaintiffs voluntarily
withdrew the State Court Action.

On June 10, 2019, the Plaintiffs initiated the present action by
filing a complaint alleging the same three causes of action--breach
of contract, bad faith, and violations of CUTPA/CUIPA--and based,
again, on GEICO's alleged failure to compensate the Plaintiffs for
the loss of their 2013 Honda Accord.  The newly filed complaint
also added class action allegations on behalf of a class of all
citizens of Connecticut who paid GEICO for automobile theft and/or
arson coverage pursuant to policies of insurance but were denied
coverage for same without any valid reason and/or without
articulation by GEICO of the reason for denial from the period of
time from June 11, 2016 to the present date.

GEICO filed the present Rule 41(d) motion for costs and fees on
Sept. 16, 2019.  The Court held a telephonic status conference to
hear argument on the motion on Oct. 8, 2019, during which it
ordered the case stayed pending the resolution of GEICO's Rule
41(d) motion.  GEICO filed an affidavit documenting its costs in
the State Court Action on Oct. 29, 2019, and the Plaintiffs filed
an opposition on Nov. 26, 2019.

The Plaintiffs argue that the Court should not grant GEICO's Rule
41(d) motion because the basis for federal court jurisdiction did
not become evident until the deposition of a GEICO representative
on May 16, 2019.  

Judge Shea finds the Plaintiffs' argument unavailing.  He finds
that the Plaintiffs' reasons for proceeding as they did were
unambiguously and transparently tactical; they believed that the
newly available federal forum would prove more advantageous to
their interests.  At oral argument, the Plaintiffs' counsel
admitted as much, indicating that he had believed that his clients
would have a better chance of recovery in federal court and that
re-filing was thus the best strategy.  They were, in other words,
forum shopping--precisely the conduct that Rule 41(d) is designed
to deter.

The Plaintiffs argue that there was no "improper" forum shopping in
the case; but it is unclear what makes their forum shopping of the
"proper" variety--or, indeed, whether such an animal exists for the
purposes of Rule 41(d).  Of note, the Plaintiffs are both citizens
of Connecticut, while Geico is a citizen of Maryland and the
District of Columbia.  While an in-state Plaintiff may still invoke
the Court's diversity jurisdiction, the Plaintiffs could not
plausibly claim they would be prejudiced by having their
Connecticut state law claims heard in a Connecticut court.  Nor
could they argue that the Court is more experienced in applying the
substantive law at issue in the case.

In short, if the Plaintiffs wished to represent a class, their
recourse was to pursue a motion to amend in the State Court Action,
rather than to withdraw the State Court Action on the eve of
trial--and a year and a half after the commencement of the
suit--and file the nearly identical action five days later.

Judge Shea awards the following costs to GEICO under Rule 41(d):
(1) $1,407.50 for responding to the Plaintiffs' complaints, (2)
$285 for participation in settlement discussions, (3) $1,221 for
trial preparation, and (4) $375 for status conferences, for a total
of $3,288.50.  The Court finds that GEICO's costs incurred in
responding to the Plaintiffs' multiple complaints in the State
Court Action are largely wasted, as GEICO's new counsel must
replicate those efforts in responding to the Plaintiffs' complaint
in the present case.  Similarly, GEICO's participation in
settlement discussions in the State Court Action does not appear to
have produced any work product that will be useful to GEICO in
defending the present suit.  

Similarly, GEICO's preparation for and attendance at status
conferences in the State Court Action are of no benefit to GEICO in
the present action.  Also, GEICO's work preparing for trial,
including drafting a trial management report and attending a
pre-trial conference, is also not useful in the instant case.
GEICO's costs associated with discovery, on the other hand, have
produced tangible work product that will be useful in the present
case.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Shea granted GEICO's motion for
costs under Rule 41(d), and the Plaintiffs are directed to pay
GEICO costs of $3,288.50.  The case is stayed until the Plaintiffs
have done so.

Judge Shea denied GEICO's motion to dismiss without prejudice to
renewal upon the Plaintiffs' payment of costs.  Within seven days
of the ruling, the Plaintiff's counsel will provide a copy of the
ruling to his clients and file a declaration indicating that he has
done so.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 24, 2020 Ruling is available
at https://is.gd/3gDU8C from Leagle.com.

GENERALI US: Keith Sues in South Carolina Over Insurance Disputes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Generali US Branch.
The case is styled as Shelley Keith, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated v. Generali US Branch, Case No.
2:20-cv-02869-RMG (D.S.C., Aug. 6, 2020).

The nature of suit is stated as Insurance Contract.

Generali U.S. Branch is the U.S. Representative office of
Assicurazioni Generali, S.p.A., whose head office is located in
Trieste, Italy. Generali U.S. Branch is licensed in all states and
operates in many lines of insurance business including property,
casualty, aviation, marine, reinsurance, and accident and
health.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Clayton B McCullough, Esq.
          Ross Alan Appel, Esq.
          MCCULLOUGH KHAN
          359 King Street, Suite 200
          Charleston, SC 29401
          Phone: (843) 937-0400
          Fax: (843) 937-0706
          Email: clay@mklawsc.com
                 ross@mklawsc.com


GEO GROUP: Jakubowitz Law Notifies of Securities Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
Jakubowitz Law on Aug. 3 disclosed that securities fraud class
action lawsuits have commenced on behalf of shareholders of The GEO
Group, Inc. who purchased shares within the class periods listed.
Shareholders interested in representing the class of wronged
shareholders have until the lead plaintiff deadline to petition the
court. Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't require that
you serve as a lead plaintiff. For more details and to speak with
our firm without cost or obligation, follow the links below.

The GEO Group, Inc. (NYSE:GEO)

CONTACT JAKUBOWITZ ABOUT GEO:
https://claimyourloss.com/securities/the-geo-group-inc-loss-submission-form/?id=8322&from=1

Class Period: February 27, 2020 - June 16, 2020

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: September 8, 2020

The filed complaint alleges that defendants made materially false
and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i)
GEO Group maintained woefully ineffective COVID-19 response
procedures; (ii) those inadequate procedures subjected residents of
the Company's halfway houses to significant health risks; (iii)
accordingly, the Company was vulnerable to significant financial
and/or reputational harm; and (iv) as a result, the Company's
public statements were materially false and misleading at all
relevant times.

Jakubowitz Law is vigorous in pursuit of justice for shareholders
who have been the victim of securities fraud. Attorney advertising.
Prior results do not guarantee similar outcomes.

CONTACT:

  JAKUBOWITZ LAW
  1140 Avenue of the Americas
  9th Floor
  New York, New York 10036
  Tel No: (212) 867-4490
  Fax No: (212) 537-5887 [GN]


GEORGIA: Denial of Daker's Bid to Intervene in Gumm Suit Upheld
---------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's denial of Waseem Daker's motion to intervene in
the case, TIMOTHY DENVER GUMM, Plaintiff, WASEEM DAKER, Interested
Party-Appellant, v. RICK JACOBS, Field Operations Manager, GDCP,
WARDEN, RODNEY McCLOUD, Superintendent, GDCP, WILLIAM POWELL,
Deputy Warden of Security, GDCP, JUNE BISHOP, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 17-14458 (11th Cir.), and dismissed
the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Gumm, a prisoner at the Georgia Diagnostic & Classification Prison
("GDCP"), filed a Section 1983 civil rights complaint against
several prison officials.  Gumm subsequently filed a second amended
complaint on behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated
persons, in which he alleged that by placing him and other
similarly situated prisoners in Special Management Unit ("SMU")
Tier III confinement, the GDCP deprived them of procedural and
substantive due process, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and subjected them to cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of
the Eighth Amendment.

Daker, a prisoner at the Georgia State Prison ("GSP"), filed a
motion for intervention as of right in the proceedings or,
alternatively, for permissive intervention.  Daker stated as
follows regarding the facts underlying his motion: He was initially
placed in the SMU Tier III segregation at the GDCP without notice
or a hearing after he was sentenced.  As a result, Daker was unable
to access a law library or attend religious services, unlike other
prisoners. Daker was then placed in Tier II segregation, which
involved substantially similar conditions and procedures to Tier
III, which designation he claimed was in retaliation for a lawsuit
he filed in 2012.  Daker is eligible to be returned to Tier III
status at any time, as he was an offender of notoriety.

In support of his motion to intervene as of right, Daker argued
that he met the criteria which entitled him to intervene.  Relevant
to the appeal, Daker argued that he had a substantial and legally
protectible interest in Gumm's lawsuit because he was previously on
Tier III confinement, was currently on Tier II confinement, albeit
at a different prison, and was challenging the same policies that
were at issue in Gumm's lawsuit.  Daker also argued that Gumm did
not adequately represent his interests because Gumm had a different
litigation strategy and was focused on due process and Eighth
Amendment claims, whereas Daker's claims were rooted in the First
Amendment.

GDCP opposed Daker's motion to intervene. After Daker responded to
GDCP's opposition, a magistrate judge issued a report and
recommendation ("R&R") that recommended the denial of Daker's
motion to intervene because he was not entitled to intervention as
of right and permissive intervention was not appropriate.

Daker objected to the R&R, asserting that he was entitled to
intervention as of right because he was challenging the same Tier
III conditions as Gumm, as well as his nearly-identical Tier II
conditions, and that upholding the conditions of Tier III would
likely also set a precedent for Tier II.  He also contended that
Gumm did not adequately represent his interest because he may have
had a different litigation strategy and the case was not yet a
class action lawsuit.  Over Daker's objections, the district court
adopted the R&R and denied Daker's motion to intervene.  Daker
appealed.

Daker argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to
intervene because (1) the PLRA does not prohibit a prisoner from
intervening in another prisoner's lawsuits, and (2) he had a right
to intervene.  

The Eleventh Circuit declines to address the first argument, as
Daker has failed to meet the requirements under Rule 24 for
intervention in the case.  It then finds that the district court
properly denied Daker's motion to intervene as of right because (1)
Daker did not have an interest in the subject matter of the
underlying litigation, and (2) Daker failed to demonstrate that
Gumm would inadequately represent any interests Daker may develop
in the future.

First, Daker does not have an interest in litigation about Tier III
conditions because he is not incarcerated in Tier III conditions.
Second, even if Daker did have an interest in the underlying
lawsuit based on his potential to be re-classified as Tier III, he
has not demonstrated that Gumm will not adequately represent his
interest.  For these reasons, Daker's potential interests are
adequately represented.

For these reasons, the Third Circuit affirmed the denial of the
motion to intervene, and therefore dismissed the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 17, 2020 Order is available at
https://is.gd/iBdIE3 from Leagle.com.


GOOGLE LLC: Best Carpet Sues over Unpaid Website Ads
----------------------------------------------------
BEST CARPET VALUES, INC.; and THOMAS D. RUTLEDGE, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. GOOGLE
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 5:20-cv-04700 (N.D. Cal., July 14, 2020)
is an action on behalf of themselves and millions of website owners
who were similarly harmed by Google's rampant unauthorized practice
of placing cost-free ads on non-Google websites between late March
2018 and April 22, 2020 (the "Class Period").

According to the complaint, during the class period, Google abused
its dominance in three interrelated markets which are the internet
search, internet advertising and smartphone operating system
markets. The Defendant unlawfully obtained over $1 billion of
non-consensual free advertising for Google and for Google's
advertising network clients on the Plaintiffs' and the putative
Class's websites. Google also derived substantial unjustly earned
revenues from its free-riding ads.

Google obtained these illicit benefits by programing Android mobile
phones to impose unpaid-for ads on websites whenever they were
viewed by Android owners who used Google's "Search App" to search
the internet. To effectuate and maximize the returns from its
scheme, Google secretively placed its Search App on every Android
phone in a manner that was designed to induce Android owners to use
the Search App exclusively or extensively in lieu of web browsers
or other means of searching the internet.

The lawsuit explains Google's free-riding leaderboard and half-page
ads were designed to induce, or "nudge" in advertising parlance,
Android users to leave the Plaintiffs' and the Class's sites, which
generated no fees for Google, in favor of other websites that could
generate income for Google. Many of the half-page pop-up
advertisements that Google's Search App imposed on the Plaintiffs'
and the Class's websites promoted and linked to websites owned by
their direct competitors or to news articles disparaging their
businesses. The Plaintiffs and Class would not have voluntarily
permitted competitors' ads or disparaging ads to appear on their
websites. Google's misconduct, however, caused competitors' ads and
disparaging ads to appear on the Plaintiffs' and the Class's
websites against their will. Google's unlawful free-riding ads
damaged, or threatened to damage, the Plaintiffs' and Class
members' reputations and businesses, leading to lost customers,
lost sales and lost goodwill.

Google LLC is a global technology company specializes in
internet-related services and products. The Company is primarily
focused on web-based search and display advertising tools, search
engine, cloud computing, software, and hardware. Google serves
customers worldwide. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Alex Asil Mashiri, Esq.
          MASHIRI LAW FIRM
          A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
          11251 Rancho Carmel Drive #500694
          San Diego, CA 92150
          Telephone: (858) 348-4938
          Facsimile: (858) 348-4939
          E-mail: alexmashiri@yahoo.com

               - and -

          Alexander H. Schmidt, Esq.
          ALEXANDER H. SCHMIDT, ESQ
          5 Professional Circle, Ste. 204
          Colts Neck, NJ 07722
          Telephone: (732) 226-0004
          Facsimile: (732) 845-9078
          E-mail: alex@alexschmidt.law

               - and -

          D. Anthony Mastando, Esq.
          Eric J. Artrip, Esq.
          MASTANDO & ARTRIP, LLC
          301 Washington St., Suite 302
          Huntsville, AL 35801
          Telephone: (256) 532-2222
          E-mail: tony@mastandoartrip.com
                  artrip@mastandoartrip.com


GPB CAPITAL: Inspection of Books & Records Allowed in Younker Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ADAM YOUNKER, DENNIS SCHNEIDER, CHERYL SCHNEIDER,
ELIZABETH PLAZA, PLAZA PROFESSIONAL CENTER INC PFT SHARING,
Plaintiff, v. GPB CAPITAL HOLDINGS, LLC, GPB HOLDINGS, LP, GPB
HOLDINGS II, LP, GPB AUTOMOTIVE PORTFOLIO, LP, GPB COLD STORAGE,
LP, DAVID GENTILE, MACRINA KGIL, WILLIAM JACOBY, SCOTT NAUGLE,
JEFFRY SCHNEIDER, ASCENDANT ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES, LLC, ASCENDANT
CAPITAL, LLC, AXIOM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, INC. Defendant, Docket No.
157679/2019, Motion Seq. No. 004 (N.Y. Sup.), Judge Andrew Borrok
of the New York County Supreme Court granted Plaza Professional
Center Inc. PFT Sharing's motion to compel in its entirety.

Younker, Dennis Schneider, Cheryl Schneider, Elizabeth Plaza, and
Plaza Professional Center Inc. PFT Sharing ("Limited Partners")
filed their motion pursuant to CPLR Section 3124 for an order (1)
compelling GPB Capital Holdings, LLC to permit the Limited Partners
to inspect the books and records of GPB Automotive Portfolio, LP,
GPB Holdings II, LP, GPB Holdings, LP, GPB Cold Storage, LP, and
GPB Waste Management LP ("GPB Parties"); (2) compelling GPB Capital
to produce certain documents produced by the GPB Limited
Partnerships to the SEC, FINRA, the FBI, the Massachusetts Attorney
General, and the New York City Business Integrity Commission in
connection with investigations into the sale of the GPB Limited
Partnerships; and (3) permitting discovery to proceed pursuant to
Commercial Division Rule 11(d).

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number
55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 78, 80,
84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93 were read on the motion to/for
discovery.

The Limited Partners are investors in the GPB Limited Partnerships.
They filed the putative class action lawsuit ("Younker Action") on
behalf of all persons and entities that acquired partnership
interests in the GPB Limited Partnerships from GPB Capital,
alleging that they were defrauded into purchasing these interests
by the GPB Parties, who misappropriated the investors' funds for
their own benefit.  Subsequently, Peter G. Golder filed a putative
class action ("Golder Action") in the Court under index no.
657232/2019.

Both complaints alleged fraud, breach of fiduciary duty,
negligence, breach of contract, and quasi-contractual claims.
Pursuant to the Stipulation and Order for Consolidation and
Appointment of Lead Plaintiffs and Co-Lead and Liaison Counsel, the
Younker Action and the Golder Action were consolidated and Mr.
Younker, Dennis and Cheryl Schneider, Elizabeth Plaza, Plaza
Professional Center Inc. PFT Sharing, and Peter G. Golder were
designated as the Lead Plaintiffs.

Reference is made to a certain Third Amended & Restated Agreement
of Limited Partnership ("LPA"), dated June 30, 2016, by and between
GPB Capital, GPB Auto SLP, LLC, and the Limited partners.  Pursuant
to Section 6.2 of the LPA, each Limited Partner is given the
express right to access the books and records of the GPB Limited
Partnerships.  Further, Section 13.3 provides that Delaware law
will govern the construction of the LPA.

On Dec. 17, 2019, the Limited Partners made a written request
pursuant to Section 6.2 of the LPA for access to the GPB Limited
Partnerships' books and records.  The GPB Parties denied the
request, contending that the Limited Partners had forfeited their
rights of inspection by commencing litigation.

The Limited Partners argue that (i) a stay of discovery is
inappropriate in the case because the GPB Parties have not filed
motions to dismiss and a stay would needlessly delay the resolution
of the claims, (ii) they are contractually entitled to access the
books and records of the GPB Limited Partnerships pursuant to
Section 6.2 of the LPA, and (iii) the GPB Parties have no
legitimate basis for denying the request and withholding the
documents previously produced in the Investigations.

The GPB Parties argue that they are not required to provide access
because (a) each of the GPB Parties intends to move to dismiss the
consolidated complaint and discovery should be stayed pending the
outcome of such motions, (b) the Limited Partners are not entitled
to access the books and records pursuant to Section 9.5 of the LPA
and Delaware law, and (c) the document requests seeking documents
produced in connection with the governmental investigations are
overly broad and unduly burdensome and the documents sought are not
necessarily discoverable in this action.

The arguments, however, fail, Judge Borrok finds.  Although
pursuant to CPLR Section 3124(b), service of a notice of motion
under rule 3211, 3212, or section 3213 stays disclosure until
determination of the motion unless the court orders otherwise, the
Rules of the Commercial Division have the opposite presumption.  A
stay of discovery would not serve the interests of judicial economy
and would cause significant delay in the resolution of the matter.
In any event, the parties have not yet filed a motion to dismiss.
Accordingly, discovery will proceed.

In addition, the Limited Partners are contractually entitled to
access the books and records of the GPB Limited Partnerships
pursuant to Section 6.2 of the LPA and Section 9.5 does not provide
a valid basis for denying access.  There is nothing in the LPA that
prevents a Limited Partner from accessing the books and records if
the Limited Partner has filed a lawsuit on behalf of or against the
GPB Limited Partnerships.  In addition, any concerns raised by the
GPB Parties regarding confidentiality may be addressed by entering
into a confidentiality order.

Significantly, irrespective of the Limited Partners' contractual
rights set forth in the LPA to access the books and records,
disclosure of such books and records is appropriate pursuant to
CPLR Section 3101 because the disclosure sought is material and
necessary to the claims in the consolidated complaint, which
include fraud, breach of contract, quasi contractual claims, and
breach of fiduciary duty, among other claims.  Likewise, the
documents previously produced in connection with the Investigations
are material and necessary to the claims asserted in the
consolidated complaint, and the request cannot be said to be overly
broad as it is limited to the documents already produced to
regulatory authorities in connection with investigations into the
very allegations of fraud and other misconduct that form the basis
of the claims in this action.

The GPB Parties also previously argued that they were not required
to provide the Limited Partners with access to the books and
records until after the consolidated complaint was filed.  Putting
aside that the argument is entirely without merit, the argument is
now moot as the consolidated complaint was filed on June 17, 2020.

Accordingly, Judge Borrok granted the motion to compel in its
entirety.  The Defendants will (i) permit the Plaintiffs to inspect
the books and records of GPB Automotive Portfolio, LP, GPB Holdings
II, LP, GPB Holdings, LP, GPB Cold Storage, LP, and GPB Waste
Management LP within 30 days of the date of this decision and
order; and (ii) produce to the Plaintiffs all documents produced by
the GPB Limited Partnerships to the SEC, FINRA, the FBI, the
Massachusetts Attorney General, and the New York City Business
Integrity Commission in connection with investigations into the
sale of the GPB Limited Partnerships, within 60 days of the date of
the Decision and Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 1, 2020 Decision and Order is
available at https://is.gd/7gW2k5 from Leagle.com.


HANOVER FOODS: Dawson Sues in S.D. New York Over Violation of ADA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Hanover Foods
Corporation. The case is styled as Leshawn Dawson, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. Hanover Foods
Corporation, Case No. 1:20-cv-06190 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 6, 2020).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Hanover Foods Corporation is the largest fully-integrated and
independent food processor in the United States. The Company grows,
processes, packages, markets, and distributes a variety of food
products under several different brand names.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Phone: (929) 575-4175
          Fax: (929) 575-4195
          Email: joseph@cml.legal


HARVEY WEINSTEIN: Victim's Lawyer Criticize AG Over Settlement
--------------------------------------------------------------
Casey Leigh Jackson, writing for The Jewish Voice, reports that a
lawyer for one of Harvey Weinstein's victims is pointing a finger
at New York Attorney General Letitia James for going back on her
word to approve the heavily contested class-action settlement.  In
June, James had pushed the proposed settlement, which bundles the
suits against the 67-year-old former movie mogul, and which only
earmarks $19 million for payouts to the victims.

As reported by the NY Post, Lawyer Thomas Giuffra, who represents
victim Alexandra Canosa, said he is "very disappointed that the AG
didn't follow her words."  He said James had promised attorneys for
victims who were not represented in the class action suit that she
would not accept any deal which would benefit Weinstein and his
company.  "She made those representations to attorneys for
non-settling victims. She said she'd never agree to a settlement
that gave Harvey Weinstein money at the expense of the victims,"
Giuffra said.

Notwithstanding, a Manhattan federal judge rejected the suggested
settlement, saying at the hearing that the terms were unfair to the
victims who were raped or sexually abused.  The included victims
would each only get payouts of $10,000 to $20,000.  The deal would
also set aside about $15 million to the pay legal fees for
Weinstein, his brother Robert, and The Weinstein Company's board of
directors, none of whom would even be required to admit to any
wrongdoing, and would be released of future accountability, as per
the court papers.  Another $7.3 million would go to the company's
creditors, in the deal which is worth a total of $46.8 million.

"The main winners of this deal, if approved, are Harvey Weinstein,
Robert Weinstein, and the ultra-wealthy former directors of the
Weinstein Company, who will be absolved from liability, contribute
nothing to the settlement," Douglas Wigdor, the lawyer for the
women, wrote in a motion challenging the deal earlier in July.

Proponents for the deal said that it was a chance to get something,
considering the troubled finances of Weinstein, who was sentenced
to 23 years in jail in March.  In a statement, a spokesperson for
James defended the rejected deal.  "Attorney General James has
been, and will always be a fighter for survivors of sexual assault
and harassment," the statement says.  "Without a comprehensive
settlement in this case, dozens of Weinstein survivors will be left
with nothing, and will lose their opportunity to find justice,
given the statute of limitations has run out on a lot of their
cases. These brave women have been through so much, and the
Attorney General believes that they deserve to receive what they've
long been owed." [GN]


HEALTH CARE SERVICE: MMEs' Objection to Candelaria Deal Overruled
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, NORA CANDELARIA, KIMANI SINGLETON and all others
similarly situated Under 29 USC Section 216(b), Plaintiffs, v.
HEALTH CARE SERVICE CORPORATION, Defendant, Civ. No. 17-404 KG/SMV
(D. N.M.), Judge Kenneth J. Gonzales of the U.S. District Court for
the District of New Mexico overruled Medical Management
Specialists' Objection to the proposed class action settlement in
the case, and reset the final settlement approval hearing.

The case is a class action lawsuit filed in April 2017.  The
Plaintiffs, Medical Management Employees ("MMEs"), employed by the
Defendant, sued the Defendant for misclassifying them as exempt
from overtime pay and not paying MMEs for overtime as required
under the New Mexico Minimum Wage Act, the Illinois Minimum Wage
Law, and the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").

The Plaintiffs defined the class in their First Amended Class and
Collective Action Complaint as follows: Defendant's current and
former non-supervisory MMEs who were paid a salary, who worked more
than 40 hours in one or more workweeks over the past three years
and whose job duties include Data Collection, Data Entry, Care
Utilization, Plan Education, Care Coordination, or other similar
duties.  The definition specifically includes, without limitation,
such job titles as care coordinator, member care coordinator, case
manager, medical management specialist, UM/CM coordinator,
behavioral health coordinator, medical social worker, utilization
review nurse, care management specialist, and other job titles
performing similar duties.

In July 2019, the parties notified the Court that they had reached
an agreement in principle to resolve all wage-hour claims asserted
in the lawsuit.  In reaching a proposed settlement, the Plaintiffs
narrowed the class to persons with "non-career path" job titles
which do not require a registered nurse ("RN") licensure or
advanced specialized education.  Consequently, the Settlement Class
Members are not presumptively exempt from overtime pay under the
FLSA's learned professional exemption.  The "non-career path" job
titles held by the Settlement Class Members who are Community
Health Coordinator, Family Health Assistant, Managed Care Program
Coordinator, and Member Care Coordinator.

In November 2019, the Plaintiffs filed the "Plaintiffs' Unopposed
Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class and Collective Action
Settlement."  On Dec. 5, 2019, the Court granted the Plaintiffs'
unopposed motion and entered an "Order Preliminarily Approving
Settlement Agreement," which set a hearing on March 19, 2020, to
determine whether to finally approve the proposed settlement.  It
noted that it would hear any objections to the settlement by the
Settlement Class Members at the hearing.

On Feb. 26, 2020, 22 MMS Objectors filed a letter objecting to the
proposed settlement.  The MMS Objectors complain that they have
been unfairly omitted from the Settlement Class although their job
duties are consistent with Member Care Coordinators and Defendant
has also not paid the MMS Objectors for overtime work.  The Court
notes that 21 of the MMS Objectors have RN licensures and one has a
master's social worker licensure.  In fact, unlike the job titles
held by the Settlement Class Members, an MMS is required to have an
RN licensure, social work licensure, or professional counselor
licensure.  Moreover, unlike the Settlement Class Members, the MMS
job title provides a "career path."

Upon receiving the MMS Objectors' letter, the Court vacated the
final settlement approval hearing on March 5, 2020.  Thereafter, on
March 19, 2020, the Plaintiffs and the Defendant responded to the
Objection.  They argue that the Court should overrule the Objection
because the MMS Objectors lack standing to object to the proposed
settlement and the parties appropriately narrowed the Settlement
Class to four job titles that did not include the MMS job title.

Judge Gonzales addresses the standing issue first because it
concerns the Court's jurisdiction to hear the Objection.  He views
the standing issue in the case in two different ways.  First,
whether the MMS Objectors have standing to object to a proposed
class action settlement as non-class members if they are not
members of the Settlement Class.  Second, whether the MMS Objectors
were class members as defined in the First Amended Complaint, if
they have standing to object to the proposed class action
settlement as non-settling parties.

The Judge finds that the proposed settlement will not impede the
MMS Objectors' interest in overtime pay, because the MMS Objectors'
interest falls outside of the issues raised by the Settlement Class
Members.  The MMS Objectors, therefore, have not demonstrated that
they have a direct, substantial, and legally protectable interest
in the proposed settlement or a potential impairment of such an
interest.  Having failed to meet the second and third elements of
an intervention of right, the Judge concludes that the MMS
Objectors are not entitled to intervene as of right.

Next, as non-class members, the MMS Objectors have no right to a
permissive intervention because their claims do not share common
questions of law or fact with the class action.  Although both the
MMS Objectors and the Settlement Class Members contend that the
Defendant did not pay them overtime as required by law, an
important distinction exists between the MMS Objectors and the
Settlement Class Members.  

Specifically, the higher education requirements for the MMS
Objectors raises the question of whether the learned professional
exemption applies to the MMS Objectors, an issue not applicable to
the Settlement Class Members, whose job titles have lower education
requirements not affected by the learned professional exemption.
Moreover, adding the MMS Objectors' separate and distinct claims to
the proposed settlement would unduly complicate and delay the
lawsuit which has been pending since April 2017.  For these
reasons, Judge Gonzales declines to exercise discretion to allow a
permissive intervention.

Finally, as non-settling parties, the MMS Objectors will not be
bound by the proposed settlement.  Moreover, the proposed
settlement will not strip the MMS Objectors of any legal claim or
cause of action nor will the proposed settlement interfere with
their contract rights or contractual remedies.  Accordingly, the
MMS Objectors can bring their claims against Defendant in a
separate lawsuit.  Although it may seem easier for the MMS
Objectors to simply include their claims in the proposed
settlement, such a tactical reason for objecting to the proposed
settlement does not amount to plain legal prejudice.  In sum, the
MMS Objectors have not shown plain legal prejudice.  Therefore, the
MMS Objectors do not have standing, as non-settling parties, to
object to the proposed settlement.

Having ruled that the MMS Objectors lack standing and cannot
intervene in the matter, Judge Gonzales holds that the Court lacks
jurisdiction to hear the Objection.  For this reason, he must
overrule the Objection.  Accordingly, Judge Gonzales overruled the
Feb. 26, 2020 Objection.  The final settlement approval hearing
will be reset by a separate notice of hearing.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 8, 2020 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://is.gd/xsQ7X7 from Leagle.com.

HSBC MORTGAGE: Wins Final OK of Settlement in Tardibuono-Quigley
----------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
issued a Judgment approving the Parties' Class Settlement Agreement
in the case captioned DAWN TARDIBUONO-QUIGLEY, on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated v. HSBC MORTGAGE CORPORATION
(USA) and HSBC BANK USA, N.A., Case No. 7:15-cv-06940-KMK-JCM
(S.D.N.Y.).

The Court issued a final approval of the parties' Stipulation and
Agreement of Settlement dated as of April 24, 2019. Class Counsel
are awarded attorneys' fees of $817,500 and expense reimbursement
in the amount of $133,394. The Class Representative is awarded a
Service Award in the amount of $5,000.

Pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and for the purposes of the Settlement only, the Action
is finally certified as a class action on behalf of these classes:

   (a) All persons who, between July 31, 1992 and December 31,
       2000, entered into a mortgage agreement with HSBC Mortgage
       Corporation (USA) and/or HSBC Bank USA, N.A., concerning
       the purchase of a residential property in New York that is
       not part of a cooperative, and who, at any time between
       September 2, 2012 and December 31, 2017, were assessed
       fees by HSBC Mortgage Corporation (USA), HSBC Bank USA,
       N.A., and/or any of their agents, for property inspections
       and/or broker price opinions;

   (b) All persons who entered into a security agreement with
       HSBC Mortgage Corporation (USA) and/or HSBC Bank USA,
       N.A., concerning the purchase of a unit in a New York
       cooperative, and who, at any time between September 2,
       2012 and December 31, 2017, were assessed fees by HSBC
       Mortgage Corporation (USA), HSBC Bank USA, N.A., and/or
       any of their agents, for property inspections and/or
       broker price opinions;

   (c) All persons who, during the relevant period as set forth
       in the attached Exhibit A, entered into a mortgage
       agreement or security agreement with HSBC Mortgage
       Corporation (USA) and/or HSBC Bank USA, N.A., concerning
       the purchase of residential property in a state other than
       New York, and who, at any time between September 2, 2012
       and December 31, 2017, were assessed fees by HSBC Mortgage
       Corporation (USA), HSBC Bank USA, N.A., and/or any of
       their agents, for property inspections; and

   (d) All persons who, during the relevant period as set forth
       in the attached Exhibit A, entered into a mortgage
       agreement or security agreement with HSBC Mortgage
       Corporation (USA) and/or HSBC Bank USA, N.A., concerning
       the purchase of residential property in a state other than
       New York, and who, at any time between September 2, 2012
       and December 31, 2017, were assessed fees by HSBC Mortgage
       Corporation (USA), HSBC Bank USA, N.A., and/or any of
       their agents, for Broker Price Opinions that satisfies the
       Specified Criteria set forth in Section 2.33 of the
       Settlement Agreement.

Excluded from the Classes are Defendants, their parents,
subsidiaries, affiliates, officers and directors, any entity in
which the Defendants have controlling interest, all Class Members
who make a timely election to be excluded, and all judges assigned
to hear any aspect of this litigation as well as their immediate
family members.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 21, 2020 Judgment is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ya6mbdnb from Leagle.com.


HUNTINGTON NATIONAL: Hannah's Class Claims May Proceed for MLOs
---------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting in part and denying
in part the Plaintiffs' Motion to Proceed as Collective Action in
the case captioned WILLIAM HANNAH, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. THE HUNTINGTON NATIONAL BANK, Case
No. 18-cv-7564 (N.D. Ill.).

Plaintiff William Hannah says he worked long hours as a Mortgage
Loan Officer for the Defendant in a Chicago suburb. He claims that
he was entitled to overtime pay, but Huntington didn't pay him what
he earned. He now sues for overtime pay under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

Mr. Hannah puts the blame squarely on the shoulders of his former
supervisor. She allegedly squelched his overtime requests.
Sometimes she entered his timesheets without his permission,
showing no overtime. When he attempted to submit overtime requests,
she rejected them, forcing him to submit new timesheets with no
overtime. In his declaration, he repeatedly pins the blame on her
for preventing him from receiving the pay that he deserved.

Mr. Hannah doesn't simply bring claims in an individual capacity.
He also seeks to bring a collective action on behalf of all
Mortgage Loan Officers nationwide, alleging that Huntington had a
policy or practice of refusing to pay overtime. Based on his
personal experience in the Chicagoland area, he wants all loan
officers in the country to receive a notice about the possibility
of opting in to this case.

Huntington opposes the motion, and filed a motion of its own.
Huntington moved to dismiss any claims by any opt-in plaintiffs,
who worked outside Illinois. The Bank argues that this Court lacks
personal jurisdiction over claims by non-Illinois plaintiffs about
conduct that took place outside Illinois.

The Court grants in part and denies in part Mr. Hannah's motion to
proceed as a collective action. The Court grants the motion to the
extent that he seeks to proceed as a collective action with respect
to Mortgage Loan Officers, who worked for his supervisor at the
Huntington branch in Downers Grove, Illinois. The Court denies the
motion with respect to employees working anywhere else, including
any other state and any other branch office in Illinois. Because
there are no opt-in plaintiffs from outside Illinois, the Court
denies the Defendant's motion to dismiss as moot.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 21, 2020 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8nf8ap7 from
Leagle.com.


IBM CORP: Continues to Defend ERISA-Related Class Suit in New York
------------------------------------------------------------------
International Business Machines Corporation said in its Form 10-Q
Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on July
28, 2020 for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2020, that the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
reinstated its prior decision and remanded the class action suit
related to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) to
the District Court.

In May 2015, a putative class action was commenced in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York related
to the company's October 2014 announcement that it was divesting
its global commercial semiconductor technology business, alleging
violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).


Management's Retirement Plans Committee and three current or former
IBM executives are named as defendants.

On September 29, 2017, the Court granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss the first amended complaint. On December 10, 2018, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court order.


On January 14, 2020, the Supreme Court of the United States vacated
the decision and remanded the case to the Second Circuit.

On June 22, 2020, the Second Circuit reinstated its prior decision
and remanded the case to the District Court.

International Business Machines Corporation operates as an
integrated technology and services company worldwide. The company
was formerly known as Computing-Tabulating-Recording Co. and
changed its name to International Business Machines Corporation in
1924. The company was incorporated in 1911 and is headquartered in
Armonk, New York.


IHI E&C INT'L: Fails to Pay for Overtime, Ketchie Claims
--------------------------------------------------------
The case, ANTHONY KETCHIE, individually and for others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. IHI E&C INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION,
Defendant, Case No. 4:20-cv-02618 (S.D. Tex., July 24, 2020) arises
from Defendant's alleged unlawful "straight time for overtime"
scheme, which violates the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Plaintiff worked for Defendant from approximately August 2017 until
March 2020 as an hourly paid QA Inspector at Defendant's Elba
Island natural gas liquefaction project near Savannah, Georgia.

According to the complaint, Plaintiff regularly worked over 40
hours in a week. Because Defendant employed a
"straight-time-for-overtime" policy to all its employees, Plaintiff
was never paid overtime for all hours worked in excess of 40 at the
rates required by the FLSA.

IHI E&C International Corporation is an engineering, procurement
and construction company which provides staffing services for many
industries worldwide, including information technology and project
management. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
          Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq.
          Carl A. Fitz, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP, LLP
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Tel: (713) 352-1100
          Fax: (713) 352-3300
          Emails: adunlap@mybackwages.com
                  mjosephson@mybackwages.com
                  cfitz@mybackwages.com

                - and –

          Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
          BRUCKNER BURCH PLLC
          8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
          Houston, TX 77046
          Tel: (713) 877-8788
          Fax: (713) 877-8065
          Email: rburch@brucknerburch.com


INSPERITY INC: Jakubowitz Law Notifies of Securities Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Jakubowitz Law on Aug. 3 disclosed that securities fraud class
action lawsuits have commenced on behalf of shareholders of
Insperity Inc. who purchased shares within the class periods
listed. Shareholders interested in representing the class of
wronged shareholders have until the lead plaintiff deadline to
petition the court. Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't
require that you serve as a lead plaintiff. For more details and to
speak with our firm without cost or obligation, follow the links
below.

Insperity, Inc. (NYSE:NSP)

CONTACT JAKUBOWITZ ABOUT NSP:
https://claimyourloss.com/securities/insperity-inc-loss-submission-form/?id=8322&from=1

Class Period: February 11, 2019 - February 11, 2020

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: September 21, 2020

The filed complaint alleges that defendants made materially false
and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (a)
the Company had failed to negotiate appropriate rates with its
customers for employee benefit plans and did not adequately
disclose the risk of large medical claims from these plans; (b)
Insperity was experiencing an adverse trend of large medical
claims; (c) as a mitigating measure, the Company would be forced to
increase the cost of its employee benefit plans, causing stunted
customer growth and reduced customer retention; and (d) the
foregoing issues were reasonably likely to, and would, materially
impact Insperity's financial results.

Jakubowitz Law is vigorous in pursuit of justice for shareholders
who have been the victim of securities fraud. Attorney advertising.
Prior results do not guarantee similar outcomes.

CONTACT:

  JAKUBOWITZ LAW
  1140 Avenue of the Americas
  9th Floor
  New York, New York 10036
  Tel No: (212) 867-4490
  Fax No: (212) 537-5887 [GN]


IREDALE COSMETICS: Website Not Accessible to Blind, Hecht Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
IRENE HECHT, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. IREDALE COSMETICS, INC., Defendant, Case
No. 1:20-cv-05757-LJL (S.D.N.Y., July 24, 2020) is a class action
complaint brought against Defendant for its alleged violation of
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

Plaintiff is a blind, visually-impaired handicapped person and a
member of a protected class of individuals under the ADA.

According to complaint, Plaintiff tried to visit Defendant's
website on or around March 2020 by using a popular screen reading
software called NonVisual Desktop Access with the intent of
browsing and potentially making a purchase. However, Defendant's
website effectively barred Plaintiff from being able to enjoy the
privileges and benefits of Defendant's public accommodation because
it lack variety of features and accommodations which denied
Plaintiff and other visually-impaired persons access equal to that
of a sighted individual.

The complaint alleges that Defendant failed to maintain and operate
its website in a way to make it fully accessible for Plaintiff and
for other blind or visually-impaired people.

Iredale Cosmetics, Inc. is a cosmetics and skincare company that
owns and operates the website janeiredale.com. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
          MARCUS & ZELMAN, LLC
          701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712
          Tel: (732) 695-3282
          Fax: (732) 298-6256
          Email: Yzelman@MarcusZelman.com


JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS: Siskinds LLP Files Elmiron Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
Siskinds LLP has filed a proposed class action regarding Elmiron,
an oral medication approved to treat interstitial cystitis ("IC"),
which is a chronic condition causing bladder pressure, bladder
pain, and pelvic pain. Siskinds' Quebec-based affiliate, Siskinds
Desmeules, also filed a similar action on behalf of Quebec
residents.

The proposed actions allege that the long-term use of Elmiron
(pentosan polysulfate) is linked to vision issues, specifically a
novel and progressive eye disorder impacting the part of the retina
that allows for highly sensitive, accurate vision. The alleged eye
problems include blurry vision, muted colours, difficulty reading,
and difficulty adjusting and seeing in different lighting
conditions. The actions allege that the makers of Elmiron failed to
adequately warn users and their health care providers that the use
of Elmiron increases the risk of vision loss.

Together, the actions seek to advance claims on behalf of all
Canadians suffering vision loss resulting from their use of
prescription Elmiron to treat interstitial cystitis.

"Elmiron is used by hundreds of thousands of Canadians, the
majority of whom are women, in the management of interstitial
cystitis," said Jill McCartney, a partner practicing Health Law
Litigation with Siskinds LLP. "Elmiron, which is often used
long-term, has been linked to permanent vision loss. These vision
impairments significantly impact the quality of life for the
Canadians that have suffered these injuries."

Individuals who have used Elmiron and have suffered vision issues
are encouraged to visit www.siskinds.com/elmiron, email
elmiron@siskinds.com or call 1-800-461-6166. Quebec residents
should contact Siskinds Desmeules by phone at 418-694-2009 or by
email at recours@siskinds.com.

The case is LOREAN PATRICIA PRITCHARD and BRUCE EDWARD PRITCHARD,
Plaintiffs v. JANSSEN, INC., JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS INC.,
JANSSEN-ORTHO INC., JOHNSON & JOHNSON INC., JOHNSON & JOHNSON, TEVA
BRANDED PHARMACEUTICAL PRODCUTS R&D, INC., TEVA CANADA, TEVA
PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC., and IVAX RESEARCH, INC (aka IVAX
RESEARCH, LLC and/or BAKER NORTON PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.),
Defendants, Court File No. CV-20-00001036-00CP (Ontario Superior
Court of Justice).  A copy of complaint is available at
https://is.gd/m53d4a

                      About Siskinds LLP

Siskinds -- https://siskinds.com -- is a full-service law firm with
offices in London and Toronto, Ontario and an affiliated office in
Quebec. Siskinds is Canada's leading plaintiff class action law
firm and was the first law firm to secure certification of a class
proceeding under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

For further information:

  Media Contacts:
  Jill S. McCartney
  jill.mccartney@siskinds.com
  Tel: 519.660.7858
  Fax: 519.660.7859

For French language inquiries:

  Caroline Perrault
  caroline.perrault@siskinds.com
  Tel: 418.694.2009
  Fax: 418.694.0281 [GN]


JEANNE D'ARC: $1.2MM Bettencourt Suit Deal Gets Final Approval
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Mark Bettencourt, Plaintiff, v. Jeanne D'Arc Credit
Union et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 17-cv-12548-NMG (D.
Mass.), Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton of the U.S. District Court for
the District of Massachusetts allowed Bettencourt's motion for
final approval of class action settlement.

The Plaintiffs contend that Jeanne D'Arc Credit Union ("JDCU")
charged them overdraft fees in violation of its overdraft program.
Specifically, they aver that JDCU charged its customers fees for
transactions which, to be completed, did not leave their accounts
with negative balances.  The Plaintiffs allege breach of contract,
violation of 12 C.F.R. Section 1005.17, breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment and money had and
received.

JDCU moved to dismiss the complaint in March, 2018, arguing that
its contracts unambiguously disclosed the terms of the overdraft
program to its enrolled customers.  The Court allowed, in part, and
denied, in part, JDCU's motion, holding that the Plaintiffs
adequately stated claims for breach of contract and breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing but dismissed the
Plaintiffs' claims for unjust enrichment and money had and
received.

In January, 2020, the parties notified the Court that they reached
a settlement and that the Defendant would deposit $1,197,000 into
an account to be used, with the Court's approval, (1) to provide
restitution to class members, (2) to pay litigation costs, (3) to
pay costs of notice and claims administration and (4) for
attorneys' fees and costs.  The Settlement Agreement further
proposes that any money remaining in the Settlement Fund after
distribution of funds be awarded to Public Citizen, a 501(c)
non-profit corporation actively involved in protecting consumer
rights.

The Court preliminarily approved the class settlement in March,
2020.  In their request for preliminary approval, the Plaintiffs
requested that one-third of the Settlement Fund be awarded as
attorneys' fees.  The Court rejected that request and preliminarily
approved a fee award in an amount not to exceed 30%.  It further
required the Plaintiffs to amend the Settlement Agreement to state
the total amount of the Settlement Fund ($1,197,000) and to include
the total amount of requested attorneys' fees and costs.

The Class Counsel requests an order of the Court (1) certifying the
settlement class; (2) approving the Settlement Agreement; (3)
appointing Mark Bettencourt as the Representative of the settlement
class; (4) appointing Richard McCune of McCune Wright Arevalo, LLP,
and Taras Kick of The Kick Law Firm, APC, as the class counsel and
Christine Craig as the local counsel; (5) appointing KCC Class
Action Services, LLC, as the settlement administrator; and (6)
awarding attorneys' fees in the amount of $359,100 or 30% of the
Settlement Fund, costs and expenses in the amount of $63,270.96 and
a class representative incentive award of $10,000.

The only part of the Settlement Agreement with which the Court
takes issue is the request for attorneys' fees.  

Judge Gorton finds that the class counsel provides very little
reason for him to deviate from the standard award of 25%.  Indeed,
virtually every class action litigation requires the kind of work
and expertise cited by counsel.  That said, the requested amount
includes only a modest multiplier of the lodestar (1.20x) which is
well within the range of multipliers typically allowed by the Court
(1x to 2.7x).  Furthermore, an award of 25% of the Settlement Fund
would result in almost exactly the lodestar amount.  For these
reasons, Judge Gorton  will "split the difference" between the
request and its usual benchmark by awarding attorneys' fees of 27%
of the Settlement Fund or $323,190.

The Court, therefore, allowed Bettencourt's motion for final
approval of class action settlement, with the caveat that the award
of attorneys' fees is set at $323,190.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 17, 2020 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://is.gd/aRvE7p from Leagle.com.

JERSEY CITY, NJ: Court Narrows 8 Erie's Claims Over Ordinances
--------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey issued an
Opinion granting in part and denying in part the Defendants'
Motions to Dismiss in the case captioned 8 ERIE ST. JC LLC v. CITY
OF JERSEY CITY, et al., Case No. 19-cv-9351 (D.N.J.).

In this matter, the Plaintiff alleges that two city ordinances
violated its constitutional rights, state law, and private
contractual rights. The Motions to Dismiss are filed by the
following Defendants: (1) Jersey City Redevelopment Agency; (2) the
City of Jersey City and the Jersey City Council; and (3) the Jersey
City Planning Board.

In 2011, the Council, by ordinance, adopted a redevelopment plan
for a building located at 8 Erie Street in downtown Jersey City.
The JCRA awarded 8 Erie the winning proposal in January 2012, and 8
Erie subsequently entered into an agreement with the JCRA. Through
the Redevelopment Agreement, the Plaintiff purchased the property
and agreed to convert a historic three-story building into
residential units on the second and third floors, and commercial
space on the ground floor and basement. Over the next three years,
the Plaintiff spent over $7 million to redevelop the property; on
June 19, 2015, Jersey City issued Plaintiff a certificate of
occupancy for the building.

While Plaintiff was redeveloping the building, the City passed two
ordinances that limited the type of commercial businesses that
could lease space in certain areas of Jersey City (the "Challenged
Ordinances"). The Challenged Ordinances, City Ordinances 15.052 and
15.053, were passed by the Council on May 13, 2015. Ordinance
15.052 created a definition for "formula business," which,
generally and subject to certain exceptions, is a commercial
business with at least two standardized characteristics and that
has ten or more locations within 300 miles of Jersey City.
Ordinance 15.053 amended certain redevelopment plans, including the
plan for 8 Erie Street, by limiting formula business establishments
"to a maximum of 30% of ground floor leasable commercial area."

The Plaintiff alleges Jersey City's Mayor, Steven M. Fulop, forced
the Challenged Ordinances through the Council to bolster political
support for his gubernatorial campaign. The Plaintiff also alleges
that the restrictions were structured to "focus on soft targets" to
avoid public backlash. These soft targets, like Plaintiff, were
"least likely to bear the cost of challenging the legality of the
ordinances." The Plaintiff also contends that the Defendants have
selectively applied Ordinance 15.053, specifically pointing to a
2017 donut shop opening.

After the Challenged Ordinances were passed, the Plaintiff
purportedly obtained an "economically advantageous proposal" from a
formula business to lease ground floor commercial space in the
building. The formula business, however, was prohibited from
leasing the space because of the Challenged Ordinances. The
Challenged Ordinances also decreased the value of Plaintiff's
property.

Plaintiff brought suit on April 5, 2019, alleging that the
Challenged Ordinances violated the Commerce Clause and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Plaintiff's
Complaint also asserts multiple state law claims. The Plaintiff
initially sought injunctive relief declaring that the Challenged
Ordinances are unconstitutional, in addition to monetary relief
from the lost tenant and decreased property value. After the
Plaintiff filed its Complaint, however, the Challenged Ordinances
were repealed. Although the Plaintiff no longer seeks injunctive
relief, it still seeks monetary damages through this action.

Court's Decision

The Court ruled that the Defendants' motions to dismiss are GRANTED
in part and DENIED in part. Count VII (claims for injunctive
relief) is DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims, Counts I and II,
are DISMISSED pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). These Counts (assert that
the Challenged Ordinances violated the Commerce Clause (Count I)
and Equal Protection Clause (Count II)) are dismissed without
prejudice.

The Plaintiff is provided with thirty (30) days to file an amended
complaint that cures the noted deficiencies with respect to its
Section 1983 claims. The Court says the Plaintiff falls short of
the requirement that it plead specific facts as to each the
Defendant's involvement in the alleged wrongdoing. Alternately, if
the Plaintiff chooses not to replead its Section 1983 claims, the
Plaintiff should notify the Court before the thirty days expire as
this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Plaintiff's
remaining state law claims. If the Plaintiff does not file an
amended pleading, its state law claims will be dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 21, 2020 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y8sfebc8 from Leagle.com.


JOHN ELLIOT: Dawson Sues in S.D. New York Alleging ADA Violation
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against John Elliott, LLC.
The case is styled as Leshawn Dawson, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. John Elliott, LLC, Case No.
1:20-cv-06192 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 6, 2020).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

John Elliott is a fashion brand located in Los Angeles, California,
who designs and produces modern and aspirational apparel.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Phone: (929) 575-4175
          Fax: (929) 575-4195
          Email: joseph@cml.legal


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Appeal in TRACLEER(R) Antitrust Suit Pending
---------------------------------------------------------------
Johnson & Johnson said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 24, 2020 for the
quarterly period ended June 28, 2020, that the appeal made by the
plaintiffs in the class action suit related to TRACLEER(R) is still
pending.

In October 2018, two separate putative class actions were filed
against Actelion Pharmaceutical Ltd., Actelion Pharmaceuticals US,
Inc., and Actelion Clinical Research, Inc. (collectively Actelion)
in United States District Court for the District of Maryland and
United States District Court for the District of Columbia.  

The complaints allege that Actelion violated state and federal
antitrust and unfair competition laws by allegedly refusing to
supply generic pharmaceutical manufacturers with samples of
TRACLEER(R).  

TRACLEER(R) is subject to a Risk Evaluation and Mitigation
Strategy, which imposes restrictions on distribution of the
product.  

In January 2019, the plaintiffs dismissed the District of Columbia
case and filed a consolidated complaint in the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland.  

In October 2019, the Court granted Actelion’s motion to dismiss
the amended complaint.

Plaintiffs have appealed the decision.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Johnson & Johnson, together with its subsidiaries, researches and
develops, manufactures, and sells various products in the health
care field worldwide. It operates in three segments: Consumer,
Pharmaceutical, and Medical Devices. The company was incorporated
in 1887 and is based in New Brunswick, New Jersey.


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: AWP Suit in New Jersey Ongoing
-------------------------------------------------
Johnson & Johnson said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 24, 2020 for the
quarterly period ended June 28, 2020, that the company continues to
defend a putative Average Wholesale Price (AWP) related suit in New
Jersey.

Johnson & Johnson and several of its pharmaceutical subsidiaries
(the J&J AWP Defendants), along with numerous other pharmaceutical
companies, were named as defendants in a series of lawsuits in
state and federal courts involving allegations that the pricing and
marketing of certain pharmaceutical products amounted to fraudulent
and otherwise actionable conduct because, among other things, the
companies allegedly reported an inflated Average Wholesale Price
(AWP) for the drugs at issue. Payors alleged that they used those
AWPs in calculating provider reimbursement levels.

The plaintiffs in these cases included three classes of private
persons or entities that paid for any portion of the purchase of
the drugs at issue based on AWP, and state government entities that
made Medicaid payments for the drugs at issue based on AWP.

Many of these cases, both federal actions and state actions removed
to federal court, were consolidated for pre-trial purposes in a
multi-district litigation in the United States District Court for
the District of Massachusetts, where all claims against the J&J AWP
Defendants were ultimately dismissed.

The J&J AWP Defendants also prevailed in a case brought by the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Other AWP cases have been resolved
through court order or settlement. The case brought by Illinois was
settled after trial.

In New Jersey, a putative class action based upon AWP allegations
is pending against Centocor, Inc. and Ortho Biotech Inc. (both now
Janssen Biotech, Inc.), Johnson & Johnson and ALZA Corporation.

All other cases have been resolved.

Johnson & Johnson, together with its subsidiaries, researches and
develops, manufactures, and sells various products in the health
care field worldwide. It operates in three segments: Consumer,
Pharmaceutical, and Medical Devices. The company was incorporated
in 1887 and is based in New Brunswick, New Jersey.


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Continues to Defend cART Antitrust Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
Johnson & Johnson said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 24, 2020 for the
quarterly period ended June 28, 2020, that the company and Janssen
R&D Ireland continue to defend a class action suit related to
combination antiretroviral therapies (cART) to treat HIV.

In May 2019, a class action antitrust complaint was filed against
Janssen R&D Ireland (Janssen) and Johnson & Johnson in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California.

The complaint alleges that Janssen violated federal and state
antitrust and consumer protection laws by agreeing to exclusivity
provisions in its agreements with Gilead concerning the development
and marketing of combination antiretroviral therapies (cART) to
treat HIV.

The complaint also alleges that Gilead entered into similar
agreements with Bristol-Myers-Squibb and Japan Tobacco.

In March 2020, the Court granted in part and denied in part
defendants' motions to dismiss.

Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint in April 2020.

Johnson & Johnson, together with its subsidiaries, researches and
develops, manufactures, and sells various products in the health
care field worldwide. It operates in three segments: Consumer,
Pharmaceutical, and Medical Devices. The company was incorporated
in 1887 and is based in New Brunswick, New Jersey.


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Talc-Related Class Suit Ongoing in Illinois
--------------------------------------------------------------
Johnson & Johnson said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 24, 2020 for the
quarterly period ended June 28, 2020, that the company continues to
defend a class action suit in in Illinois State Court involving
talc contained in JOHNSON'S(R) Baby Powder and JOHNSON'S(R) Shower
to Shower.

In May 2014, two purported class actions were filed in federal
court, one in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California and one in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Illinois, against Johnson & Johnson
and Johnson & Johnson Consumer Companies, Inc. (now known as
Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc.) (JJCI) alleging violations of
state consumer fraud statutes based on nondisclosure of alleged
health risks associated with talc contained in JOHNSON'S(R) Baby
Powder and JOHNSON'S(R) Shower to Shower (a product no longer sold
by JJCI). Both cases seek injunctive relief and monetary damages;
neither includes a claim for personal injuries.

In October 2016, both cases were transferred to the United States
District Court for the District Court of New Jersey as part of a
newly created federal multi-district litigation.

In July 2017, the district court granted Johnson & Johnson's and
JJCI's motion to dismiss one of the cases. In September 2018, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed this
dismissal.

In September 2017, the plaintiff in the second case voluntarily
dismissed the complaint.

In March 2018, the plaintiff in the second case refiled in Illinois
State Court.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Johnson & Johnson, together with its subsidiaries, researches and
develops, manufactures, and sells various products in the health
care field worldwide. It operates in three segments: Consumer,
Pharmaceutical, and Medical Devices. The company was incorporated
in 1887 and is based in New Brunswick, New Jersey.


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: ZYTIGA(R) Antitrust Class Suit Ongoing
---------------------------------------------------------
Johnson & Johnson said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 24, 2020 for the
quarterly period ended June 28, 2020 that Janssen Biotech, Inc., a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson, continues to defend a
class action suit initiated by Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Louisiana and HMO Louisiana, Inc., related to ZYTIGA(R).

In April 2019, Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Louisiana and HMO
Louisiana, Inc. filed a class action complaint against Janssen
Biotech, Inc, Janssen Oncology, Inc, Janssen Research &
Development, LLC and BTG International Limited in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on behalf of
indirect purchasers of ZYTIGA(R).

Several additional complaints were filed thereafter in Virginia and
New Jersey.

The indirect purchaser complaints generally allege that the
defendants violated the antitrust and consumer protections laws of
several states and the Sherman Act by pursuing patent litigation
relating to ZYTIGA(R) in order to delay generic entry and seek
damages.

The Virginia cases have been transferred to the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey and consolidated with
the New Jersey case for pretrial purposes.

In May 2020, a class action complaint was filed against Janssen
Biotech Inc., Janssen Oncology, Inc., Janssen Research &
Development LLC and BTG International Limited in the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey, on behalf of direct
purchasers of ZYTIGA(R).

The direct purchaser complaint alleges that defendants violated the
Sherman Act by pursuing patent litigation relating to ZYTIGA(R) in
order to delay generic entry, and seek damages and injunctive
relief.

Johnson & Johnson, together with its subsidiaries, researches and
develops, manufactures, and sells various products in the health
care field worldwide. It operates in three segments: Consumer,
Pharmaceutical, and Medical Devices. The company was incorporated
in 1887 and is based in New Brunswick, New Jersey.


K&N ENGINEERING: Dawson Sues in S.D. New York Over ADA Violation
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against K & N Engineering,
Inc. The case is styled as Leshawn Dawson, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated v. K & N Engineering, Inc., Case No.
1:20-cv-06193 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 6, 2020).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

K&N Engineering, Inc., is a manufacturer of air filters, cold air
intake systems, oil filters, performance parts, and other related
products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Phone: (929) 575-4175
          Fax: (929) 575-4195
          Email: joseph@cml.legal


LADDER FINANCIAL: Young Sues in S.D. New York Over ADA Violation
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Ladder Financial
Inc., et al. The case is styled as Lawrence Young, On Behalf of
Himself and All Other Persons Similarly Situated v. Ladder
Financial Inc., Ladder Insurance Services, LLC, Case No.
1:20-cv-06202 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 6, 2020).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Ladder Financial, Inc., provides financial services. The Company
offers life insurance products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeffrey Michael Gottlieb, Esq.
          150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (212) 228-9795
          Fax: (212) 982-6284
          Email: nyjg@aol.com


LEAD INDUSTRIES: Ill. Sup. Ct. Flips Judgment Reversal in Lewis
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Supreme Court of Illinois issued an Opinion reversing the
judgment of the Appellate Court relating to the Defendants' motion
for summary judgment in the case captioned MARY LEWIS, et al.,
Appellees v. LEAD INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION, et al. (Atlantic
Richfield Company, et al., Appellants), Case No. 124107 (Ill.).

Justice P. Scott Neville, Jr., delivered the judgment of the Court,
with opinion.

Nineteen years ago, Plaintiffs Mary Lewis, Tashswan Banks, and
Kathleen O'Sullivan filed a class action in the Circuit Court of
Cook County against Defendants Atlantic Richfield Company; ConAgra
Grocery Products, Inc.; NL Industries, Inc.; and the
Sherwin-Williams Company. The Plaintiffs sought to recover the
costs of blood lead screening, which their children underwent as
required by the Lead Poisoning Prevention Act. The Circuit Court
granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants. The Appellate
Court reversed.

The Supreme Court holds that the Plaintiffs, who do not suffer any
economic loss, cannot maintain a tort action that is based on a
claim that alleges solely an economic injury and no physical injury
or property damage. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reverses the
judgment of the Appellate Court, affirms the judgment of the
Circuit Court, and remands the case to the Circuit Court for
further proceedings.

In sum, Justice Neville wrote, the Court holds as follows. The
Plaintiffs did not incur any liability and did not suffer any
actual economic loss in this case. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs did
not suffer any injury that would satisfy the essential element of
injury in their underlying economic tort claim of intentional
misrepresentation. Consequently, the Plaintiffs cannot prove the
existence of a conspiracy to commit that tort. Thus, the Circuit
Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.
Therefore, the Court reverses the judgment of the Appellate Court,
which reversed the Circuit Court's order granting summary judgment
for the Defendants, and the Court remands the cause to the Circuit
Court of Cook County for further proceedings consistent with this
Opinion.

JUSTICES KILBRIDE and MICHAEL J. BURKE took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case.

A full-text copy of the Supreme Court's May 21, 2020 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ybte93o6 from Leagle.com.


LEXICON PHARMACEUTICALS: Manopla Class Action Ongoing
-----------------------------------------------------
Lexicon Pharmaceuticals, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 29, 2020, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2020, that the company
continues to defend a class action suit entitled, Daniel Manopla v.
Lexicon Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Lonnel Coats, Jeffrey L. Wade and
Pablo Lapuerta, M.D.

On January 28, 2019, a purported securities class action complaint
captioned Daniel Manopla v. Lexicon Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Lonnel
Coats, Jeffrey L. Wade and Pablo Lapuerta, M.D. was filed against
the Company and certain of its officers in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division.

A first amended complaint was filed on July 30, 2019 and Lexicon
filed a motion to dismiss such first amended complaint on September
30, 2019. The plaintiff filed an opposition to Lexicon's motion to
dismiss on November 14, 2019 and Lexicon filed a reply in support
of its motion to dismiss on December 13, 2019.

The lawsuit purports to be a class action brought on behalf of
purchasers of the Company's securities during the period from March
11, 2016 through July 29, 2019.

The complaint alleges that the defendants violated federal
securities laws by making materially false and misleading
statements and/or omissions concerning data from its Phase 3
clinical trials of sotagliflozin in type 1 diabetes patients and
the prospects of FDA approval of sotagliflozin for the treatment of
type 1 diabetes.

The complaint purports to assert claims for violations of Sections
10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule
10b-5 promulgated thereunder.

The complaint seeks, on behalf of the purported class, an
unspecified amount of monetary damages, interest, fees and expenses
of attorneys and experts, and other relief.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Lexicon Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a biopharmaceutical company, focuses
on the development and commercialization of pharmaceutical
products. Lexicon Pharmaceuticals, Inc. was founded in 1995 and is
headquartered in The Woodlands, Texas.


LEXINGTON HEALTH: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Jones Adversary Case
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge David D. Duncan of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the South
Carolina denied the Defendant's motion to dismiss the case, In re,
Jeremiah F. Jones, Chapter 7, Debtor. Jeremiah F. Jones, Teri
Denice Mayers, and Kimberly Ann Williams, individually and on
behalf of all others similar situated, Plaintiffs, v. Lexington
Health Services District, Inc. d/b/a Medical Center, Defendant, C/A
No. 18-06304-DD, 14-00864-DD, and 17-02620-DD, (D. S.C.).

The adversary proceeding was commenced on Jan. 10, 2020.  All three
Plaintiffs were debtors in chapter 7 cases who listed debts to the
defendant in their respective bankruptcy cases.  The adversary
proceeding was commenced as a putative class action.  The complaint
asserts that the Defendant, using, or threatening to use, the
state's Setoff Debt Collection Program, collected the Plaintiffs'
tax refunds to pay medical debts incurred by them despite notice of
the bankruptcy filings, in violation of either the automatic stay
or the discharge injunction.  The complaint asserts causes of
action for violation of the discharge injunction, violation of the
automatic stay, and unjust enrichment, each on behalf of a
different class.

Each Plaintiffs' situation is different, as recited in the
complaint.  Mr. Jones filed his bankruptcy case on Dec. 12, 2018
and listed a debt to the Defendant.  Notice of his bankruptcy case
was sent to the Defendant.  On Jan. 25, 2019, Mr. Jones received
notice that a portion of his tax refund had been seized by the
defendant.  The complaint asserts that the seized funds have been
partially refunded.  Mr. Jones seeks to represent a class of
debtors during whose bankruptcy cases the automatic stay was
violated by the Defendant's seizure of tax refunds through the
Setoff Debt Collection Program.

Ms. Mayers filed her bankruptcy case on Feb. 19, 2014.  In her
bankruptcy schedules she listed three debts to the Defendant.  Ms.
Mayers received her chapter 7 discharge on June 2, 2014,
discharging her personal liability on the debts to the Defendant.
The Defendant received notice both of Ms. Mayer's bankruptcy case
and of her chapter 7 discharge.  Then, in spring 2019, the
Defendant seized a portion of Ms. Mayer's tax refund.  Ms. Mayers
seeks to represent a class of debtors whose discharged debt was
collected by the defendant through the Setoff Debt Collection
Program.

Ms. Williams filed her bankruptcy case on May 25, 2017.  She listed
a debt to the Defendant in her bankruptcy schedules.  Ms. Williams
received her discharge on Aug. 24, 2017, discharging her from
personal liability on the debt to the defendant.  The Defendant
received notice both of Ms. Williams' bankruptcy case and of her
chapter 7 discharge.  In April 2018, the Defendant began sending
Ms. Williams notices seeking to collect the debt.  Ms. Williams
ultimately paid the Defendant over $300, which it has not returned.
Ms. Williams seeks to represent a class of debtors whose
discharged debt was collected by the defendant using threats to
invoke the Setoff Debt Collection Program.

The Defendant asserts that it is a political subdivision and that
pursuant to S.C. Code Section 12-60-80(C), made applicable to the
action by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17, it lacks the capacity
to be named as a party in a class action lawsuit.  The Defendant
additionally asserts that the Plaintiffs' claims against it are
barred by sovereign immunity.  Finally, it argues that the
Plaintiffs' claims must be dismissed because the Plaintiffs have
not exhausted their administrative remedies, as required by the
Setoff Debt Collection Act.

The Plaintiffs assert that Rule 23 controls and that state law
cannot supplant the federal rule.  They further respond that under
Rule 17 and South Carolina state law, the Defendant has the
capacity to be sued, because "capacity" is "a binary determination
of whether a given entity is subject to suit."  They also argue
that the Defendant does not have sovereign immunity because under
United States Supreme Court precedent states have waived sovereign
immunity with respect to bankruptcy matters.  Finally, the
Plaintiffs argue that they are not required to exhaust their
administrative remedies before bringing the action because their
causes of action are under the Bankruptcy Code, not under state
law.

The Defendant argues that it does not have the capacity to be sued
in a class action.  It relies on Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b), which
provides that the law of the state where the court is located
determines capacity to sue or be sued.  It argues that South
Carolina law, specifically S.C. Code Section 12-60-80(C), provides
that it cannot be sued in any class action and therefore cannot be
named as a party in the action.  

The Plaintiffs respond that Rule 17 is irrelevant because Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23, made applicable to this proceeding by Fed. R. Bankr. P.
7023, governs, and the U.S. Supreme Court held in Shady Grove
Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 559 U.S. 393
(2010) that a state law class action bar cannot trump Rule 23's
authorization of class actions in federal court proceedings.

Judge Duncan holds that despite the Defendant's argument to the
contrary, the causes of action asserted by the Plaintiffs are not
for the wrongful collection of taxes--they involve the Defendant's
alleged violation of the stay, violation of the discharge
injunction, and unjust enrichment as a component of bankruptcy
Snectio 105 authority.  The violation of stay and violation of
discharge injunction causes of action do not involve questions of
state law. They involve federal bankruptcy law.

In addition, the unjust enrichment cause of action is intimately
connected to the Plaintiffs' bankruptcy cases because it involves
actions of the Defendant taken during or after the bankruptcy cases
and involves debts treated in those bankruptcy cases.  While the
state of South Carolina can certainly place limitations on
litigants' abilities to bring certain actions in state court, those
limitations do not extend to causes of action brought under federal
bankruptcy law, in the bankruptcy court.  The Defendant's arguments
regarding its lack of capacity to be sued in a class action for the
causes of action asserted by the Plaintiffs fall short.

The Defendant's sovereign immunity argument also fails.  It argues
that it is entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment and that although Congress attempted to abrogate the
defense of sovereign immunity in bankruptcy cases by enacting 11
U.S.C. Section 106, the Fourth Circuit, in Schlossberg v. Maryland,
119 F.3d 1140 (4th Cir. 1997), stated that Section 106 is
unconstitutional.  Because the U.S. Supreme Court has not overruled
Schlossberg, the Defendant argues, it is still the law in this
Circuit and the Defendant has sovereign immunity that requires
dismissal of the action.

Judge Duncan holds that the Supreme Court made clear in Allen that
bankruptcy is unique, and that because of that uniqueness, in
bankruptcy, sovereign immunity has no place.  Pursuant to this
precedent, the Plaintiffs' causes of action against the Defendant
are not barred by sovereign immunity.

Finally, the Defendant also argues that the Plaintiffs are not
entitled to bring their causes of action in the bankruptcy court
because they have not yet exhausted their administrative remedies.
It asserts that the Setoff Debt Collection Act establishes
administrative procedures that must be followed before a federal
action may be filed against the defendant contesting its actions
under the Setoff Debt Collection Act.  It relies on several cases
interpreting 26 U.S.C. Section 7433 to support his failure to
exhaust administrative remedies argument.

Judge Duncan holds that the Bankruptcy Code provides for remedies
upon violation of the automatic stay, and the contempt power of
federal courts is summoned to remedy violations of the discharge
injunction.  A state law restriction or impediment to a debtor
seeking redress of these federally premised rights quickly runs
afoul of the Supremacy Clause.

For these reasons, Judge Duncan denied the Defendant's motion to
dismiss the adversary proceeding.  The Defendant should file a
responsive pleading in accordance with Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7012.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 8, 2020 Order is available at
https://is.gd/xBAvqU from Leagle.com.

LEXMARK INTERNATIONAL: CRIS Ordered to Establish Settlement Account
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, OKLAHOMA FIREFIGHTERS PENSION AND RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff, v. LEXMARK INTERNATIONAL, INC., PAUL A. ROOKE, DAVID
REEDER, GARY STROMQUIST and MARTIN S. CANNING, Defendants, Civil
Action No. 1:17-cv-05543-WHP (S.D. N.Y.), Judge William H. Pauley,
III of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York has issued an order directing Court Registry Investment System
("CRIS") to establish an account, in which the Settlement Amount in
the case will be deposited.  

The parties have entered into a Settlement as set forth in the
Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, dated as of May 8, 2020.
On June 17, 2020, the Court issued an Order Preliminarily Approving
Settlement Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1) and Permitting
Notice to the Class.

Pursuant to the Stipulation, the parties request an account be
established with the CRIS entitled Oklahoma Firefighters Pension
and Retirement System v. Lexmark International, Inc., et al. (No.
1:17-cv-05543-WHP), in which the Settlement Amount of $12 million
in cash will be deposited.  

They further request that the CRIS provide payment instructions via
secure electronic email to the following parties: Jack Reise Robert
J. Robbins Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP 120 East Palmetto Park
Road, Suite 500 Boca Raton, FL 33432, Telephone: 561/750-3000, Fax:
561/750-3364, E-mail: jreise@rgrdlaw.com, rrobbins@rgrdlaw.com, as
the Lead Counsel for Lead Plaintiff William Sushon, O'Melveny &
Myers LLP 7 Times Square New York, NY 10036, Telephone:
212/326-2000, Fax: 212/326-2061 E-mail: wsushon@omm.com, as the
Counsel for the Defendants.

Judge Pauley so ordered.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 24, 2020 Order is available at
https://is.gd/s6jKU5 from Leagle.com.


LIBERTY MUTUAL: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Valley Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, VALLEY CONTAINER COMPANY, INC., individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. LIBERTY
MUTUAL GROUP, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-12133-DJC
(D. Mass.), Judge Denise J. Casper of the U.S. District Court for
the District of Massachusetts granted the Defendants' motion to
dismiss all claims.

Plaintiff Valley has filed the lawsuit, on behalf of itself and
others similarly situated, against Liberty Mutual Group, Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co., Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., Liberty
Insurance Corp., LM Insurance Corp., The First Liberty Insurance
Corp., Liberty County Mutual Insurance Corp., Wausau General
Insurance Corp., Wausau Underwriters Insurance Co., Employers
Insurance Company of Wausau and Peerless Insurance Co., alleging
breach of contract (Count I), unjust enrichment (Count II),
violations of the Massachusetts consumer protection laws under
Mass. Gen. L. c. 93A (Count III) and violations of the Federal
Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO")
(Count IV).

Valley is a Connecticut corporation that purchased worker's
compensation insurance from Liberty Mutual.  Liberty Mutual insured
Valley for the policy period Oct. 20, 2012 through Oct. 19, 2013.
On Sept. 4, 2013, an employee of Valley experienced a work-related
injury and filed a worker's compensation claim.  Liberty Mutual
accepted the Claim and paid the employee benefits under the
insurance plan.  After paying benefits to the employee, Liberty
Mutual received a recovery from a third party.

The National Council on Compensation Insurance ("NCCI") is a
provider of worker's compensation data, statistics and research.
Pursuant to NCCI, insurers are required to report loss history
regarding insureds to NCCI in the form of unit statistical reports
("USRs").  These reports state the insurer's net incurred losses,
including reimbursements and recoveries, on worker's compensation
claims filed by insured's employees.  When an insurer receives a
reimbursement for recovery of losses from a third party, they are
required to revise the USR to reflect the net incurred loss after
these recoveries.  This data is used to calculate an insured's
"experience rating," which is based on an insured's worker's
compensation loss history, and is then used to calculate the
premiums that an insured will be charged.  A higher experience
rating will lead to the calculation of higher premium costs for an
insured.

The "incurred losses" for a particular claim, which are the actual
losses realized, are an important element of an insured's loss
history.  When an insurer reports losses on a USR, they may include
reserves, which represent estimates of future payments that the
insurer expects to expend.  An insurer will report a claim as
"closed" when it does not expect to make any further payments on
the claim.  At such time, the reserves are to be set to zero.

At its highest, the incurred loss reported by Liberty Mutual on the
Claim by Valley's employee was $50,416.  The total included
medical, indemnity and reserve values for the Claim.  On May 18,
2015, Liberty Mutual processed a subrogation recovery in the amount
of $21,427.82.  Shortly thereafter, on June 24, 2015, Liberty
Mutual closed the Claim.  On the date the Claim was closed, the
actual net incurred loss was $120.

On June 26, 2015, Liberty Mutual filed a correction report to
correct two previously filed USRs that reported the net incurred
loss of the claim as $28,988.  Valley alleges that the correction
report should have reflected a net incurred loss of $120.  As
alleged, based on this inaccurate reporting, Valley's experience
rating was negatively affected, leading to Valley incurring higher
premium costs.  Valley alleges that Liberty Mutual's failure to
correct the prior USRs accurately deprived Valley of a premium
reimbursement totaling approximately $13,030.

Valley alleges that Liberty Mutual consistently has failed to file
correction reports that reflect the actual net incurred loss
amounts for claims after reimbursements and recoveries.  It further
alleges that this practice has led to numerous insureds paying
excess premiums.  As such, Valley seeks to represent a class
consisting of insureds in the 35 states that have adopted the NCCI
and have purchased worker's compensation plans through Liberty
Mutual.

The Plaintiff initiated the action on Oct. 15, 2019, and filed the
Amended Complaint on Jan. 31, 2020.  The Defendants have now moved
to dismiss all claims.  The Court heard the parties on the pending
motion and took the matter under advisement.

The parties agree that their worker's compensation insurance policy
contract is governed by Connecticut law.  Valley's breach of
contract claim is based on a provision of the Policy Contract.
Valley alleges that Liberty Mutual failed to comply with the NCCI
Statistical Plan and, thus, breached the terms of the worker's
compensation insurance contract.  Liberty Mutual does not dispute
that the contract incorporates the rules in the NCCI Statistical
Plan but, rather, argues that the contract language requires that
they comply with the rules of the NCCI Statistical Plan in
determining premiums under the Contract Policy and that reporting
that affected the calculation of premiums by other insureds is not
covered under the Policy Contract.

Judge Casper holds that the corrections reports filed by Liberty
Mutual complied with the NCCI Statistical Plan in that they
corrected the prior reports to reflect the Subrogation received,
but did not report the loss related to its determination to close
the case, which was a development for which a corrections report
was prohibited under the NCCI Statistical Plan.  Liberty Mutual was
required to report the change in total loss due to their closing of
the case on the next USR, which reflected the April 2016 value.
Liberty Mutual's third USR complied with the requirement, listing
the total loss as $120.  As a result, Valley has failed to plead
any breach of the Policy Contract based on Liberty Mutual's
reporting of the Claim.  Accordingly, the Judge dismisses Valley's
breach of contract claim.

The Defendants have moved to dismiss Valley's unjust enrichment
claim on the basis that Valley has failed to allege that Liberty
Mutual received any benefit from the alleged improper reporting and
the unjust enrichment claim improperly relies on the worker's
compensation insurance contract.  Valley argues that Liberty Mutual
improperly benefited from the third-party recoveries received
through subrogation and other sources related to the Claim.

Judge Casper holds that Liberty Mutual, as the insurer, was
entitled to seek recovery from third parties in relation to the
incident underlying the Claim.  Valley cannot claim a right to the
subrogation recovery properly received by Liberty Mutual.  Further,
these recoveries did not cause the detriment Valley alleges that it
suffered, which resulted from the reporting of the Subrogation by
Liberty Mutual.  Although Liberty Mutual was required to report the
effect of the recoveries on the total incurred losses, Liberty
Mutual's receipt of the recoveries related to the Claim did not
cause Valley to pay inflated premiums.  In addition to the Court's
determination that Liberty Mutual's reporting was proper, having
failed to allege a benefit received by Liberty Mutual as a result
of the purported improper reporting, Valley's unjust enrichment
claim is dismissed.

Valley asserts a claim against Liberty Mutual for purported
violations of RICO pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(c).  Valley's
RICO claim is based upon allegations of wire and mail fraud.  It
alleges that Liberty Mutual continuously sent, mailed and
transmitted, or caused to be sent, mailed or transmitted, in
interstate or foreign commerce, including on the Internet and on
its website, several materials that facilitated the scheme.

Even assuming the single communication could support an allegation
of mail or wire fraud by Liberty Mutual, Valley does not allege the
requisite pattern.  To satisfy RICO's pattern requirement Valley
must allege at least two acts of racketeering activity occurring
within 10 years of each other.  The pattern element also requires
that the two racketeering predicates be related and amount to or
pose a threat of continued criminal activity, known as the
continuity plus relationship standard.

Valley's Amended Complaint does not meet this standard, rules Judge
Casper.  The only allegation of wire or mail fraud that could
arguably meet the particularity requirement is the allegation
regarding the inaccurate report submitted by Liberty Mutual in June
2015.  This one incident, however, falls well short of establishing
a pattern of racketeering activity.  Valley's RICO claim is,
therefore, dismissed.

The Defendants move to dismiss Valley's Chapter 93A claim.  Liberty
Mutual argues that Valley's Chapter 93A claim must be plead with
particularity because the claim sounds in fraud and Valley has
failed to meet the particularity standard applicable to fraud
claims.  Valley counters that the particularity requirement does
not apply to its Chapter 93A claim because the claim is not
grounded in fraud, but rather, is grounded in Liberty Mutual's
unfair business practices relating to its widespread and systemic
reporting failures following its receipt of third-party
recoveries.

Judge Casper holds that to the extent that Valley's 93A claim is
based upon Liberty Mutual's alleged breach of the Policy Contract,
it is insufficient.  Valley has failed to adequately plead that
Liberty Mutual's reporting violated the NCCI Statistical Plan and,
therefore, the Policy Contract.  Further, a simple, or even
intentional, breach of contract is insufficient in itself to
constitute an unfair or deceptive trade practice under Chapter 93A.
In order to rise to the level of a Chapter 93A violation, the
breach must be both knowing and intended to secure "unbargained-for
benefits" to the detriment of the other party.  In addition to
there being no valid contract claim, Valley has not plead any
unbargained-for benefits received by Liberty Mutual as a result of
their reporting of the Claim.  As a result, Valley's Chapter 93A
claim is dismissed.

Having granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss Valley's
underlying claims, it is unnecessary to address the Defendants'
motion to dismiss the class claims as they are now moot.

Accordingly, Judge Casper allowed the Defendants' motion to dismiss
in a Memorandum & Order entered June 17, 2020, a full-text copy of
which is available at https://is.gd/ochXtm from Leagle.com.

LLR INC: Ninth Circuit Flips Dismissal of Van's Sales Tax Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KATIE VAN, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LLR, INC., DBA LuLaRoe;
LULAROE, LLC, Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 19-35242 (9th Cir.),
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the
district court's dismissal of the action for lack of standing, and
remanded for further proceedings.

Defendants-Appellees LLR and LuLaRo improperly charged sales tax to
customers residing in jurisdictions that do not impose such taxes.
Later, after a related lawsuit was filed, LLR refunded the charges
to affected customers, but LLR did not pay interest to account for
the customers' loss of use of their money.

Plaintiff-Appellant Van filed the putative class action lawsuit on
behalf of LLR customers in Alaska who were improperly charged sales
taxes.  The operative complaint alleges, inter alia, that LLR
failed to compensate Van and putative class members for the full
amount of their damages, including interest.  The complaint asserts
claims for conversion and misappropriation and for violation of the
Alaska Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act/

LLR moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of Article III
standing, arguing that Van could not establish an injury in fact,
because LLR had fully refunded the tax charges and her claim for
interest alone was insufficient to establish standing.  The record
shows that Van was refunded $531.25 for sales tax charges, but Van
contends that she is owed at least $3.76 in interest on that sum to
account for her lost use of the money.  The district court granted
the motion to dismiss, albeit on a ground that LLR had not argued
and that LLR does not defend on appeal--that $3.76 "is too little
to support Article III standing."  Van timely appealed.

Although LLR does not defend the district court's reasoning, it
argues that Van lacks standing because she received a full refund,
less interest, on the money she was wrongfully charged.  In LLR's
view, the lost time value of money standing alone is too
speculative an injury to support Article III standing.  Other
circuits, however, have held to the contrary.

The Ninth Circuit finds the reasoning of those cases persuasive.
Those decisions reflect the firmly established principle that tort
victims should be compensated for loss of use of money--through
either an award of damages or the payment of prejudgment interest.
Under the common law tort remedies of replevin and conversion,
damages for loss of use are the norm.  In sum, the Ninth Circuit
holds that the temporary loss of use of one's money constitutes an
injury in fact for purposes of Article III.

Though not raised before the district court, the Ninth Circuit
closes by addressing what would otherwise likely arise as an issue
on remand: LLR's fallback argument that Van has failed to
adequately allege injury because, to have standing based on the
time value of money, a plaintiff must make specific allegations
regarding how it would have earned interest on the money but for
the defendant's wrongful conduct.  The Ninth Circuit finds that the
argument misstates Van's claimed injury.  Van does not assert that
she is injured because she lost interest income.  She asserts that
she is injured because she lost the use of her money.

Consistent with its Opinion, the Ninth Circuit holds that although
the former injury may be speculative, the latter injury is actual,
concrete, and particularized.  Interest is simply a way of
measuring and remedying Van's injury, not the injury itself.  To
the extent the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Kawa Orthodontics,
LLP v. Secretary, U.S. Department of the Treasury suggests that a
plaintiff must allege specific plans to invest its money into an
interest-bearing asset to establish standing based on a temporary
deprivation of money, the Ninth Circuit respectfully declines to
follow it.  It notes that the Eleventh Circuit did not mention
those types of allegations in its subsequent decision in MSPA
Claims 1, which recognized standing based on the lost use of
money.

For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment of the
district court dismissing the action for lack of Article III
standing, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its
Opinion.  Costs of appeal are awarded to Plaintiff-Appellant Van.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's June 24, 2020 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/VCp1bf from Leagle.com.

Katie Van, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by James J. Davis, Jr. --
jdavis@njp-law.com -- Northern Justice Project, Goriune Dudukgian
-- gdudukgian@njp-law.com -- Northern Justice Project, Kelly K.
Iverson -- contact@carlsonlynch.com -- Carlson Lynch Sweet Kilpela
& Carpenter, LLP, pro hac vice, Kevin W. Tucker --
ktucker@carlsonlynch.com -- Carlson Lynch Sweet Kilpela &
Carpenter, LLP, pro hac vice & R. Bruce Carlson --
bcarlson@carlsonlynch.com -- Carlson Lynch Sweet Kilpela &
Carpenter, LLP, pro hac vice.

LLR, Inc., doing business as LuLaRoe & LuLaRoe, LLC, Defendants,
represented by Brewster H. Jamieson -- jamiesonb@lanepowell.com --
Lane Powell LLC, Michael Bruce Baylous -- baylousm@lanepowell.com
-- Lane Powell LLC, Randolph T. Moore -- rmoore@swlaw.com -- Snell
& Wilmer, L.L.P., pro hac vice & Steven T. Graham --
sgraham@swlaw.com -- Snell & Wilmer, L.L.P., pro hac vice.

LM GENERAL: Court Narrows Counterclaims in LeBruns Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LM GENERAL INSURANCE CO., Plaintiff-Counterclaim
Defendant, v. SHARON LEBRUN and ED LEBRUN, Defendants-Counterclaim
Plaintiffs, Civil Action No. 19-2144-KSM (E.D. Pa.), Judge Karen S.
Marston of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania granted in part and denied in part the LM General's
motion to dismiss the LeBruns' counterclaims.

Defendants-Counterclaim Plaintiffs Sharon and Ed LeBrun assert
claims, on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated
persons, for declaratory judgment and breach of contract against
their insurer, Plaintiff-Counterclaim Defendant LM General.  The
LeBruns seek a declaratory judgment (1) that their claims for
recovery of underinsured motorist ("UIM") benefits are not barred
by the household exclusion provision contained in their insurance
policy and (2) that they are entitled to stacked UIM coverage.  In
addition, the LeBruns seek to recover the stacked UIM benefits
allegedly due to them under their policy.

On Aug. 26, 2016, Ed LeBrun was struck by a motorist while riding
his motorcycle in Sandy Township, Pennsylvania.  Mr. LeBrun
suffered serious injuries, and his left leg was amputated below the
knee.  At the time of the accident, the LeBruns had two insurance
policies--a motorcycle policy issued by State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company, and a personal auto policy issued by
LM General.  The LM General personal auto policy did not cover Mr.
LeBrun's motorcycle.

After the accident, the LeBruns pursued several avenues in their
attempts to recover sufficient compensation for Mr. LeBrun's
injuries.  First, the LeBruns sought and obtained the full
liability limit of $100,000 available under the tortfeasor's
personal auto policy.  Additionally, the LeBruns filed a claim for
UIM benefits1 under their State Farm motorcycle policy, and State
Farm tendered the full limit available under the policy, $50,000.
Finally, the LeBruns made a claim for UIM benefits under the LM
General personal auto policy.  LM General denied the claim, finding
that the policy's household exclusion provision prevented the
LeBruns from recovering.

A few years later, the LeBruns purchased a fourth vehicle, a 2015
GMC Sierra.  The LeBruns allege that at or before purchasing the
fourth vehicle, they contacted their insurance agent and requested
that the fourth vehicle be added to their policy.  The very next
day, when the fourth vehicle was added to the policy, LM General
generated an Amended Declarations Page.  LM General did not require
the LeBruns to sign a new stacking waiver.

In moving to dismiss, LM General makes numerous contentions,
including that the LeBruns cannot recover stacked UIM benefits
because Mrs. LeBrun signed a waiver form, pursuant to which the
LeBruns waived both inter-policy and intra-policy stacking; the
household exclusion in the policy bars the LeBruns from recovering;
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Gallagher v. GEICO
Indemnity Co. does not apply because the LeBruns waived
inter-policy stacking; Gallagher should not be applied
retroactively; the LeBruns are estopped from arguing that they did
not waive stacked benefits; the LeBruns waived stacked benefits by
paying lower premiums associated with non-stacked benefits; the
LeBruns' declaratory judgment claims are duplicative of their
breach of contract claim; the statute of limitations bars class
members' claims who were denied UIM coverage before June 17, 2015;
and the claims of putative class members who pursued uninsured
("UM") claims, as opposed to UIM claims, should be dismissed
because the LeBruns do not have standing.

Judge Marston agrees that the manner in which the LeBruns' fourth
vehicle, the 2015 GMC Sierra, was added to their existing policy is
crucial to the determination of the need for a new stacking waiver.
As the Pennsylvania Superior Court's en banc decision in Bumbarger
states, a court's focus must be (1) how the new vehicle was added
to the existing policy (i.e., via endorsement or newly acquired
auto clause); and (2) what is the specific language of the relevant
clauses found in the applicable insurance policy.  The first step
in the analysis requires a factual determination.  With the sole
exception of Seiple, every case LM General cited resolves the issue
of whether the insurer was required to obtain a new stacking waiver
at the summary judgment stage, not on a motion to dismiss.
Accordingly, the Judge declines to decide the issue at this early
stage in the litigation.  The parties may raise the issue again
later, at summary judgment, with the benefit of discovery.

In Craley v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. Donovan v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., which has not been overruled, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has made clear that waiver of inter-policy stacking
must be "knowing," and conducted a fact-specific inquiry as to
whether Mr. Craley's waiver was knowing in that case.  Given that
Craley and Donovan were decided on summary judgment, after full
discovery, Judge Marston declines to decide the issue on a motion
to dismiss.  The parties may brief the issue again at summary
judgment, with the benefit of discovery.

To the extent that the LeBruns did not waive inter-policy stacking,
the case law indicates that Gallagher may apply, and at the motion
to dismiss stage, Judge Marston is not inclined to interpret
Gallagher's holding narrowly.  With the benefit of discovery, the
parties may brief the issue again on summary judgment.  Gallagher
was the first time a majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
opined on such issues, which the Court does not take lightly.
Accordingly, it's unprepared to determine, at a motion to dismiss
stage, that the household vehicle exception in the insurance policy
at issue does not act as a de facto waiver of stacked UIM coverage.


Next, the Judge finds that Gallagher would apply retroactively and
denies LM General's motion to dismiss on such grounds.  LM General
cites Stockdale v. Allstate Fire & Casualty. Insurance Co.
("Stockdale I") for the proposition that the rule in Gallagher
represents a fundamental break with precedent on which insurers
relied.  Although the Stockdale I court found that Gallagher
announced a new rule of law, Stockdale I actually cuts against LM
General's argument that Gallagher should not apply in the case.
There, the court predicted that, as is generally the case, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would apply Gallagher both retroactively
and prospectively, and thus denied the insurer's motion to
dismiss.

LM General asserts that even if it had been required to obtain an
additional stacking waiver or the waiver did not waive inter-policy
stacking, the LeBruns are estopped from asserting that they did not
waive inter- and intra-policy stacking.  Judge Marston finds that
LM General does not proffer any support for that theory from the
complex realm of insurance stacking law.  Rather, they cite to a
Pennsylvania Supreme Court case espousing the general principles of
estoppel.  Given the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's holdings in
Sackett v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., the Judge find it
insufficient to support dismissal at this stage of the litigation,
regardless of the fact that the LeBruns did not respond to the
estoppel argument in their response.

LM General contends that the LeBruns waived inter-policy stacking
by accepting a policy that limited inter-policy stacking and paying
the associated lower premium.  LM General does not cite a single
case supporting this argument, nor do Judge Marston finds any
support for it in the insurance stacking law discussed.  At this
stage, she finds dismissal would be inappropriate on this ground,
even though the LeBruns did not respond to this argument in their
response.

LM General denied the LeBruns' claim for UIM benefits, relying on
the household exclusion.  As a result, the LeBruns seek
declarations that their claims for recovery of UIM benefits under
the Personal Auto Policy issued by it are not barred by the
household exclusion and they may maintain a claim for such benefits
from it; the household exclusion does not bar their claim for
recovery of UIM benefits under the policy issued by LM General; and
the Personal Auto Policy issued by LM General provides stacked UIM
coverage.  The LeBruns are impermissibly trying to adjudicate past
conduct (i.e., LM General's denial of their claim for UIM benefits)
and resolve liability issues (i.e., their ability to recover UIM
benefits under the policy) through such declarations.  Therefore,
Judge Marston finds dismissal appropriate.

The Judge also finds the Stockdale I court's reasoning persuasive
and applicable in the case, where the LeBruns seek to represent a
nearly identical class as the Stockdale I plaintiff.  Because a
four-year statute of limitations applies, the Judge holds that the
face of the LeBruns' complaint illustrates that the statute of
limitations bars claims in which LM General denied coverage because
of the household exclusion prior to June 17, 2015.  Therefore, the
putative class members' claims based upon a breach of an alleged
insurance contract by reason of the household exclusion prior to
June 17, 2015 are time-barred and will be dismissed.

Finally, Judge Marston finds that neither Sharon nor Ed LeBrun
alleges that they sought, or were denied, UM benefits.  As a
result, she finds that Article III is not satisfied as to the UM
claims.  In the alternative, she finds that the LeBruns have waived
this issue by not responding to it and that dismissal is warranted.


Because the declaratory judgment claims are duplicative of the
breach of contract claim, Judge Marston dismissed Counts I, II, and
III with prejudice.  She also granted LM General's motion to
dismiss with respect to the putative class members' claims that are
based upon a breach of an alleged insurance contract "by reason of
the household exclusion" prior to June 17, 2015, and she dismissed
the putative class members' UM claims with prejudice.  The Judge
denied LM General's motion to dismiss as to the remainder of its
arguments.  An appropriate order follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 1, 2020 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/yV9kfL from Leagle.com.

LOMPOC, CA: FCC Faces Class Action Over Home Confinement
--------------------------------------------------------
Malea Martin, writing for Santa Maria Sun, reports that though the
number of active COVID-19 cases reported from Lompoc's federal
prison has decreased dramatically since May 11 -- when more than 75
percent of prisoners in one facility tested positive -- pro bono
lawyers and governmental entities alike are still probing for
answers as to what happened and whether the outbreak could have
been better mitigated.

A class-action lawsuit filed against the Lompoc Federal
Correctional Complex (FCC) moved a step forward on July 14 when the
court ordered the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to consider home
confinement for individuals incarcerated at Lompoc who are either
over the age of 50 or who have certain underlying health
conditions.

Lawyers from Bird Marella P.C., the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU), and the Prison Law Office are representing the class
members of the case, which alleges that Lompoc prison leadership
did not make full use of its ability to release prisoners into home
confinement.

The case claims that its lack of using home confinement, combined
with the prison's allegedly inadequate medical care for inmates,
violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.

When the Sun asked the BOP for comment on the lawsuit and recent
court order, Public Affairs Officer Emery Nelson wrote in an email
that "the Bureau of Prisons does not comment on pending litigation
or matters that are the subject of legal proceedings."

About a week after the July 14 court order, the Office of the
Inspector General—a branch of the U.S. Department of
Justice—released a remote inspection report of Lompoc FCC.

Among the July 23 report's findings was that the "BOP's use of home
confinement in response to the spread of COVID-19 at FCC Lompoc in
April, as a mechanism to reduce either the at-risk inmate
population or the overall prison population in order to assist with
social distancing, was extremely limited."

Bureau representative Nelson commented on the findings in an email
to the Sun.

"These findings must be placed in context, as these were unique
circumstances where the BOP, along with the rest of the country,
was learning about how to treat and manage this novel virus,"
Nelson wrote. "The mitigation of COVID-19 in all of our facilities,
including FCC Lompoc, has been and remains our highest priority."

Naeun Rim, a lead Bird Marella attorney working on the class-action
case, told the Sun that the new report backs up claims that the
counsel already submitted to the court, thus further substantiating
and corroborating the evidence.

"For Lompoc in particular, it's not just an ACLU lawsuit alleging
these things," she said. "Now OIG [Office of the Inspector
General], which is an arm of the government, has come in and said
that [the prison] handled things poorly, and more poorly in
comparison to other prisons."

One example of Lompoc's comparative response, according to the
report, is seen in the prison's implementation of social distancing
and limiting staff movement.

On March 13, the BOP directed wardens to implement modified
operations to maximize social distancing, the report states. Then
on May 31, the BOP Western Regional Office directed Lompoc to
implement these measures as well as eliminate staff movement
between the prison's various facilities, if possible. However,
staff members were not directed to do so by the acting complex
warden until April 14.

"In comparison, for example, FCC Tucson in Tucson, Arizona, an
institution in the same BOP region as FCC Lompoc but without
staffing concerns or a COVID-19 outbreak in April, fully
implemented its staff movement restrictions on April 5," the report
adds in a footnote.

The report continues that, due to a staffing shortage, "Lompoc
officials told us that they could not fully implement the
compartmentalization of staff."

In late March, Attorney General William Barr advised that inmates
with certain health risks be considered for transfer to home
confinement to mitigate the rising numbers of infections. The
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act further
encouraged these transfers, Rim said.

The Sun asked the BOP public affairs office for the number of
inmates transferred to home confinement from Lompoc FCC in late
April. BOP representative Scott Taylor responded in an April 28
email, stating that "given the fluid nature of the pandemic
situation, we are just providing the total number of inmates
transferred to home confinement across the Bureau of Prisons," and
would not provide Lompoc-specific transfer numbers.

In the same email, Taylor added that "the BOP has begun immediately
reviewing all inmates who have COVID-19 risk factors, as described
by the CDC, to determine which inmates are suitable for home
confinement."

The recent inspector general report, however, revealed the number
of Lompoc-specific home confinement transfers from April 4 to May
15.

The BOP Central Office determined that 509 total Lompoc inmates
were potentially eligible for transfer to home confinement during
that time frame, and it sent those names to Lompoc prison
leadership in a series of rosters. But as of May 13, with more than
900 Lompoc inmates having tested positive for COVID-19, "only eight
inmates had been transferred to home confinement in accordance with
the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act)
authorities and BOP guidance," the report states.

As of July 10, Lompoc prison had released 45 inmates to home
confinement, U.S. Representative Salud Carbajal (D-Santa Barbara)
told the Sun.

Carbajal said he learned of these updated numbers during a July 10
conversation with a Lompoc prison warden. He added that the
conversation was one of the few times that prison leadership has
been communicative and responsive to him.

But even with the new transfers, the court granted the lawsuit's
home confinement claims with a July 14 preliminary injunction.

In other words, home confinement is a disease-mitigation tool that
Lompoc prison leadership had at its disposal, and the court order
agreed with the claims that it was not fully used.

Rim called it a case of "deliberate indifference."

"The first claim, which is what the preliminary injunction granted,
is that it was deliberately indifferent of [the prison] to not make
full use of their ability to release more people into home
confinement, or to accelerate other release decisions, in the
middle of a global pandemic," Rim explained.

She added that releasing inmates into home confinement isn't the
equivalent of a sentence reduction: It's a temporary measure to
decrease overcrowding and prevent the spread of the virus. Once the
threat of the virus resolves, Rim said, those released on home
confinement would still be required to serve any remainder of their
sentences.

Part of that July 14 preliminary injunction is the court order, the
lawsuit's latest victory, which requires the BOP to consider home
confinement for individuals incarcerated at Lompoc who are either
over the age of 50 or who have certain underlying health
conditions.

Those individuals will be collectively represented as a class by
the legal counsel, the order states, and "no later than July 28,
2020, respondents [the prison] shall make full and speedy use of
their authority under the CARES Act and evaluate each class
member's eligibility for home confinement."

Sara Norman, managing attorney at the Prison Law Office and one of
the lawyers working on the case, told the Sun about the tangible
outcomes that are expected as a result of the order.

"We fully expect that with the scrutiny from the court, to ensure
that the prison officials follow the policy directions that are
required of them, that we will see a significant rise in the number
of people who are found to qualify [for home confinement]," Norman
said.

But the prison failing to "use their full authority to evaluate
people to be placed on home confinement," Rim said, is only half of
the story. A second category of claims alleges that some actions
the prison did choose to take may have been unconstitutional as
well—even if the explicit intention was to stop the spread.

"From our perspective, it's not just that [these actions] didn't
work to prevent the spread of the illness, but that it made it
worse," Rim said. [GN]


LOUISIANA: Court Denies TRO Bid for Immediate Furlough in J.H. Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, J.H., by and through his mother and next friend, N.H.,
ET AL., v. JOHN BEL EDWARDS, in his official capacity as Governor
of Louisiana, ET AL, Civil Action No. 20-293-JWD-EWD (M.D. La.),
Judge John W. deGravelles of the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District Louisiana denied the Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order Seeking Immediate Furlough.

COVID-19 is a global pandemic caused by a novel coronavirus that
has infected more than 5.7 million people and killed more than
355,000 to date. Louisiana alone has more than 38,000 confirmed
cases and more than 2,700 deaths as of May 30, 2020.

The case is a class action brought by youths who have been
adjudicated delinquent and are currently confined in secure care
facilities operated by the Louisiana Office of Juvenile Justice.
The Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on May 14, 2020.

The Plaintiffs generally allege that the Defendants' actions and
failures to act with respect to the COVID-19 pandemic constitute
violations of the Plaintiffs' constitutional rights under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  They bring the action pursuant
to 22 U.S.C. Section 2241 for relief from both detention and
conditions of confinement for these alleged constitutional
violations.

Plaintiff J.H. is a minor currently confined at Acadiana Center for
Youth who was previously housed at Bridge City Center for Youth.
J.H.'s mother, N.H., brings the suit on his behalf.  Plaintiff I.B.
is a minor currently confined at Acadiana Center for Youth.  His
parents are A.B. and I.B., and they bring the suit on his behalf.

The Defendants in the action are Gov. John Bel Edwards; the
Louisiana Office of Juvenile Justice ("OJJ"); Edward Dustin
Bickham, Interim Deputy Secretary of OJJ; James Woods, Director of
the Acadiana Center for Youth; Shannon Mathews, former Director of
the Bridge City Center for Youth, though the position is now held
by Cassandra Washington, Interim Director of Bridge City; Shawn
Herbert, Interim Director of the Swanson Center for Youth at
Monroe; and Rodney Ward, Deputy Director of the Swanson Center for
Youth at Columbia.

The Plaintiffs' Complaint seeks a preliminary injunction and
permanent injunction, including but not limited to the release of
juvenile offenders through the duration of the COVID-19 pandemic.

On May 15, 2020, the Plaintiffs' TRO was filed.  In the motion, the
Plaintiffs seek an order enjoining the Defendants from: (a)
continuing to confine all children who are currently within 180
days of their release dates; (b) continuing to confine children who
are presumptively eligible for release, including all children (i)
who have contracted COVID-19; (ii) who have pre-existing medical
conditions that the Centers for Disease Control has determined puts
them at significantly higher risk of developing COVID-19
complications; (iii) who are currently eligible for furlough in
accordance with OJJ's polices; and (iv) who can be safely returned
to their communities; (c) failing to test children for COVID-19;
(d) using Behavioral Intervention Rooms (i.e., isolation rooms) for
any child who tests positive for COVID-19 or displays symptoms of
the disease; (e) confining children to their dormitories for
lengthy periods of time; (f) using pepper spray on children; and
(g) continuing the suspension of structured educational and
rehabilitative programs in OJJ facilities.

The Plaintiffs further moved the Court to order the
Defendants-Respondents to develop, within 48 hours, an effective
COVID-19 response plan governing the state's four children's
detention centers that fully conforms to CDC guidelines.

The Court conducted a status conference on May 20, 2020.  During
the status conference, it ordered the Defendants to submit their
written response in opposition to the Plaintiffs' TRO by no later
than May 26, 2020, and the Plaintiffs to submit their reply brief
by no later than May 27, 2020.  It also set the Plaintiffs' TRO for
hearing via the digital online Zoom platform, to start on June 3,
2020.  The Defendants timely submitted their response to tge
Plaintiffs' TRO, and the Plaintiffs timely submitted their reply.

The Court conducted a full hearing on Plaintiffs' TRO on June 3,
2020 through June 5, 2020.  During the course of the hearing, the
Plaintiffs called six witnesses (including three expert witnesses)
for live testimony, and the Defendants called five witnesses for
live testimony.  The Plaintiffs called one of their experts on
rebuttal.  On June 10, 2020, the parties timely submitted proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law.  

The parties filed their findings of fact and conclusions of law
before any official transcript was completed and filed into the
record.  All record citations by the parties to a transcript are to
an unofficial version provided by the court reporters.  If the
Court cites to a transcript, it is to that unofficial transcript.

Judge deGravelles has carefully considered all of the evidence and
parties' submissions in rendering these findings of fact and
conclusions of law.  He does not mean to downplay the difficulty
the Plaintiffs, the class members, and their families have
experienced as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.  But these are
sacrifices that all members of society have had to make in response
to this crisis.  Grandparents have been unable to hug their
grandchildren.  Many sons and daughters cannot communicate with
their parents in nursing homes, except by telephone or FaceTime.
People have been unable to attend funerals of loved ones.  And
people have been separated from their friends, family, coworkers,
fellow students, churches, and other communities.

On the whole, Judge deGravelles finds that OJJ's job in responding
to the COVID-19 pandemic has been commendable.  As stated
throughout the opinion, the Court was highly impressed with the OJJ
witnesses who testified, all of whom seemed like highly dedicated
workers who were doing the best they could under harrowing and
unprecedented circumstances.  All of their actions were rationally
related to legitimate objectives, and OJJ was certainly not
deliberately indifferent in responding to the crisis.  As the
Defendants said in their opening statement, "this is not even a
close call."  The Judge agrees.  For these reasons, he denied the
Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
Seeking Immediate Furlough.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 24, 2020 Findings of Fact &
Conclusion is available at https://is.gd/yHl3Mv from Leagle.com.

MARY'S GONE: Faces Dawson Suit in New York Alleging ADA Violation
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Mary's Gone Crackers,
Inc. The case is styled as Leshawn Dawson, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated v. Mary's Gone Crackers, Inc., Case
No. 1:20-cv-06194 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 6, 2020).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Mary's Gone Crackers, Inc., was founded in 2007. The Company's line
of business includes the making of fresh cookies, crackers,
pretzels, and other dry bakery products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Phone: (929) 575-4175
          Fax: (929) 575-4195
          Email: joseph@cml.legal


MDL 2672: Laderoute's Bid for Sanctions in Clean Diesel Suit Denied
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Charles R. Breyer of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California denied Dawn Laderoute's motion for sanctions
against the Defendants, Dealerships, the Claims Review Committee
("CRC"), the EPA/CARB, and the Class Counsel in IN RE: VOLKSWAGEN
"CLEAN DIESEL" MDL MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LITIGATION. This Order Relates To: MDL Dkt. No. 6949,
Case No. 2672 CRB (JSC) (N.D. Cal.).

A district court has discretion to impose sanctions for bad faith
or willful disobedience of a court's order.  Sanctions are
available for conduct tantamount to bad faith, such as recklessness
combined with an additional factor such as frivolousness,
harassment, or an improper purpose.

Judge Breyer declines to exercise discretion to impose sanctions
because Laderoute's allegations of misconduct are not supported by
the record.  Indeed, some of her accusations are directly
contradicted by the evidence.  For example, Laderoute represents
that the EPA did nothing to test the recalled vehicles for
pollution compliance.  On the contrary, the EPA has required and
reviewed extensive testing of Volkswagen's modified 3.0-liter TDI
vehicles to ensure compliance with applicable emissions standards.
Similarly, Laderoute is incorrect that class members were never
informed that they would have to release certain claims to
participate in the Class Settlement.  And these examples are
illustrative, not exhaustive.

Other accusations are wholly unsupported by the record or
Laderoute's attached exhibits.  For example, the Court can locate
no evidence that the Claims Review Committee's appeals process was
corrupt, that the Class Counsel has done nothing since 2018 to
protect the Class, or that the class members have been rendered
particularly vulnerable to COVID-19.  Again, these examples are
illustrative, not exhaustive.

Finally, much of Laderoute's motion for sanctions is based on her
concern that she will not receive redress for personal injuries she
believes are attributable to the Defendants' conduct.  Judge Breyer
notes, however, that the Class Settlement did not release personal
injury claims.  Laderoute's participation in the Class Settlement
is not a bar to her bringing personal injury claims in a separate
action.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Breyer concluded that sanctions
are not appropriate in the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 17, 2020 Order is available at
https://is.gd/v0LjgW from Leagle.com.

MEWBOURNE OIL: Felps Allowed to Supplement Evidence on Notice Bid
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JONATHAN FELPS, Individually and On Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. MEWBOURNE OIL COMPANY,
INC. Defendant, Case No. 18-811 MV/GJF (D. N.M.), Judge Martha
Vazquez of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico
(i) granted in part the Plaintiff's Emergency Motion for Corrective
Notice, to Prohibit Class Communications by Defendants, to Set
Aside Settlement Agreements, and For Fees and Costs; and (ii)
granted the Plaintiff's Opposed Motion for Leave to File
Supplemental Evidence in Support of His Emergency Motion for
Corrective Notice.

Defendant Mewbourne is an oil and gas production company doing
business in New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas.  From 2014 to October
2016, Plaintiff Felps worked as a Lease Operator, or Pumper, for
the Defendant at its Hobbs, New Mexico location.  All of the
Defendant's Lease Operators perform the same job duties, namely,
outdoor manual labor.

In August 2016, the United States Department of Labor commenced an
investigation into the Defendant's practices of classifying its
employees, through which it determined that it had been
misclassifying its Lease Operators as exempt from the overtime
protections of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").  Based on
this misclassification, all Lease Operators employed by the
Defendants, including the Plaintiff, were paid only a base salary
and received no additional compensation for hours worked in excess
of 40 hours a week.

As a result of the DOL investigation, the Defendant made back-wage
payments to 53 of its Lease Operators and obtained DOL-approved
releases from them.  Further, in October 2016, the Defendant
reclassified its Lease Operators as hourly, non-exempt employees
entitled to overtime.  It was not until June 21, 2017, however,
that the Defendant began paying its Lease Operators overtime for
hours worked in excess of 40 hours a week.

The Plaintiff, who did not receive any funds as a result of the DOL
investigation and did not sign any release of claims commenced the
action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated
against the Defendant, asserting violations of both the FLSA and
the New Mexico Minimum Wage Act ("NMMWA").  Thereafter, he filed a
motion seeking conditional certification of an FLSA collective
action, which he later amended.  On May 18, 2020, the Court entered
a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting the Plaintiff's amended
motion for conditional certification of an FLSA collective action,
conditionally certifying a class of all persons who worked as a
Lease Operator or Pumper for the Defendant at any time between Oct.
31, 2015 and June 21, 2017.

On April 25, 2019, the Plaintiff's counsel advised the defense
counsel that the Plaintiff would be moving for Rule 23
certification of a class action.  Soon thereafter, on May 6, 2019,
Mewbourne held an "informational meeting" for its employees
regarding their benefits.  The Plaintiff contends that the meeting
was "mandatory" for all employees; the Defendants do not dispute
the contention.  The meeting was scheduled approximately one week
prior to the date of the meeting.

In advance of the meeting, Mewbourne drafted a "Confidential
Settlement Communication" addressed to 56 of its employees,
offering to pay each of them $1,000 per year of employment as a
lease operator with Mewbourne, through June 30, 2017, in exchange
for a full release of any claims for unpaid wages and overtime pay
that such employee may have under any state or local law.  In the
days leading up to the meeting, Scott Lacy, Mewbourne's Production
Superintendent, contacted by telephone these 56 employees to
inquire if they planned to attend the meeting and to notify them
that there would be an envelope available for them after the
meeting, and had "brief" conversations with "these employees."

At the May 6, 2019 meeting, Robin Terrell, District Superintendent
of Mewbourne's Hobbs, New Mexico office, announced that employees
who had been contacted about having an envelope waiting for them
could pick the envelope up from the office's reception desk after
the meeting.  After the meeting ended, most of the 56 employees to
whom Mewbourne extended settlement offers picked up their envelopes
from the receptionist at the front office.  Mewbourne mailed the
envelopes to the employees who did not pick them up in person.

The Settlement Letter encloses a Settlement Agreement and Release.
Of the 56 employees who were presented with a Settlement Letter, 55
individuals signed a Release.  Caleb Ragsdale is a Mewbourne
employee, currently working as a production foreman, who was
presented with the Settlement Letter in connection with his
previous work as a lease operator.  He signed the Release.
Ragsdale testified that he understood that, in signing the Release,
he was releasing his right to sue based on overtime wages.

On May 23, 2019, the Plaintiff filed his motion under Rule 23(b)(3)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for class certification
(for liability only) on his NMMWA claims, which is pending before
the Court.  

The next day, the Plaintiff filed his Motion for Corrective Notice,
asking the Court to enter an order: (1) invalidating the 55
Releases signed by Mewbourne Lease Operators; (2) restricting
Defendants from communicating with putative class members about the
case; (3) requiring the Defendants to send out "corrective notice"
to the putative class; and (4) setting a briefing schedule for a
motion for the Plaintiff to obtain attorney fees and costs in
connection with the instant motion.  Thereafter, the Plaintiff
filed his Motion to Supplement, seeking to add to the record
excerpts from Ragsdale's testimony in support of his Motion for
Corrective Notice.  The Defendant opposes the Plaintiff's Motion
for Corrective Notice and his Motion to Supplement.

Judge Vazquez finds that the Plaintiff's supplemental evidence, in
addition to the Defendants' supplemental evidence, should be
considered by the Court.  She further finds that, in considering
that evidence, in addition to the briefing and additional evidence
submitted by the parties, the Defendants' oral and written
settlement communications were confusing and misleading and had a
potentially chilling effect on participation in the lawsuit such
that narrowly tailored remedial measures are necessary.

For these reasons, Judge Vazquez granted the Plaintiff's Opposed
Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Evidence in Support of His
Emergency Motion for Corrective Notice.  She granted in part the
Plaintiff's Emergency Motion for Corrective Notice, to Prohibit
Class Communications by Defendants, to Set Aside Settlement
Agreements, and For Fees and Costs.

The Defendants are restricted from communicating with putative
class members about the action or the claims or defenses raised,
for purposes of settlement or otherwise, without first submitting
such communications to the Court for review.

The Plaintiff will be permitted to revise the Notice and Consent
that the Court ordered to be issued in its May 18, 2020 Memorandum
Opinion and Order to clarify that the Plaintiff is pursuing claims
under both the NMMWA and the FLSA, that any settlement proposed by
Defendants thus far applies only to the Plaintiff's NMMWA claims
and not to his FLSA claims, that regardless of whether a putative
class member signed a Release, he or she is eligible to opt into
the FLSA collective action, and that by failing to affirmatively
opt into the action (by measures that should be outlined in the
Notice), he or she will lose that eligibility and may lose the
right to recover at all on her or her FLSA claims as a result of
the applicable statute of limitations.  

The Notice should also clearly advise the putative class members as
to the relief Plaintiff requests in connection with his FLSA
claims.  Finally, the Notice should explain in detail that,
regardless of any continuing employment relationship between the
Defendants and their employees and any interest that Defendants may
have in settling rather than litigating the Plaintiff's claims, any
retaliation by Defendants against its employees for taking part in
the lawsuit is absolutely prohibited by law.

In the event that the Court grants certification of a class for
purposes of the Plaintiff's NMMWA claims, any individual who signed
a Release will be notified of the right to invalidate that Release
and to participate in the action for purposes of pursuing NMMWA
claims against the Defendants.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 15, 2020 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://is.gd/FI19ZA from Leagle.com.

MGP INGREDIENTS: Litigation over Sales of Aged Whiskey Ongoing
--------------------------------------------------------------
MGP Ingredients Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 30, 2020, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2020, that the company continues to
defend a consolidated putative class action suit entitled, In re
MGP Ingredients, Inc. Securities Litigation and the file is
maintained under Master File No. 2:20-cv-2090-DDCJPO.

In 2020, two putative class action lawsuit were filed in the United
States District Court for District of Kansas, naming the Company
and certain of its current and former executive officers as
defendants, asserting claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The plaintiffs seek to pursue claims on behalf of a class
consisting of purchasers or acquirers of the Company's Common Stock
during certain specified periods (the "Class Periods").

On May 28, 2020, the two lawsuits were consolidated and the Court
appointed City of Miami Fire Fighters’ and Police Officers’
Retirement Trust as lead plaintiff.

The consolidated action is captioned In re MGP Ingredients, Inc.
Securities Litigation and the file is maintained under Master File
No. 2:20-cv-2090-DDCJPO.

The plaintiffs allege that the defendants made false and/or
misleading statements regarding the Company's forecasts of sales of
aged whiskey, and that, as a result the Company's Common Stock
traded at artificially inflated prices throughout the Class
Periods.

The plaintiffs seek compensatory damages, interest, attorneys'
fees, costs, and unspecified equitable relief, but have not
specified the amount of damages being sought.

The Company intends to vigorously defend itself in this action.

MGP Ingredients Inc. develops and produces natural grain-based
products in the United States. The Company is based in Atchison,
Kansas.


MICHIGAN: Faces Class Actions Over Dam Safety Issues
----------------------------------------------------
Kelly House, writing for Bridge, reports that after a decade as one
of two state inspectors responsible for ensuring the safety of
Michigan's 1,059 state-regulated dams, Luke Trumble is finally
about to get a new colleague.

All it took was a catastrophic dam failure and $200 million in
damages to begin rebuilding a regulatory program that state
officials and outside experts have repeatedly warned does not have
enough staff or funding to keep Michigan's dams safe.

"It's a big step in the right direction," Trumble said. "When you
only have two staff, you're limited in how much you can do, so
increasing the workforce by 50 percent will help."

On July 30, officials in the Michigan Department of Environment,
Great Lakes & Energy announced plans to hire a third inspector as
part of its response to the May 19 Edenville Dam failure that
damaged more than 2,500 buildings in Gladwin, Midland and Saginaw
counties,

The agency has also tapped outside experts and announced a new task
force to suggest other changes to Michigan's dam safety regime.
Legislative inquiries and class-action lawsuits, meanwhile, have
questioned why federal and state regulators knew the dam was faulty
for years but failed to take action.

Trumble and the state inherited oversight in September 2018, when
federal regulators revoked the permit of the dam's owner, Boyce
Hydro LLC, to generate power. He and another colleague authored a
cursory inspection of the dam that deemed it in "fair condition."

But Michigan has flood-control standards that are half as strong as
federal ones for high-hazard dams like Edenville, and state
officials were awaiting a report on the 96-year-old dam's ability
to meet that lower standard when it failed amid heavy rains. In the
meantime, they were working with a local task force that planned to
buy the dams and repair them—a path Trumble said he thought would
yield results faster than pressuring Boyce to make needed fixes.

"People want to point fingers and that's part of the job and I
understand that," Trumble said, adding the dam's safety issues were
"not something you can just walk out there with a shovel and
excavator and fix."

A Beaverton native, Trumble grew up just miles from the dam and its
impoundment, Wixom Lake. For 10 years, he's worked in relative
obscurity, his days filled with paperwork, field inspections, phone
calls and meetings.

But in the two months since the failure of the Edenville and nearby
Sanford dams, he has been consumed with media requests and
legislative inquiries.  He defended the state's response,
acknowledging inspectors worried the dam would fail in a massive
flood but noting those are exceedingly rare. State officials have
called the Edenville flood a 500-year event.

"That dam operated safely, more or less, for almost 100 years,"
Trumble said.

He said regulators were focused on facilitating a sale of the dam
from Boyce Hydro LLC., which insisted for years it didn't have
money for repairs, to the Four Lakes Task Force, a group of
lakeside property owners who planned to repair Boyce's four
mid-Michigan dams.

"If the flood would have waited a couple years, the dam probably
could have handled it," Trumble said.

For weeks after the failure, he worked 16-hour days, traveling from
his home in Lansing to a Midland emergency operations center as the
sun rose, then returning home to continue working late into the
night.

The experience, Trumble said, has been stressful. In the days after
the failure, with Midland still underwater, evacuees returning to
find homes destroyed, and questions swirling about how the dam
failed and who is to blame, Trumble recalled helping a stranded
driver change a flat tire.

It felt like a blessing, he told Bridge.

"Something controllable," he said, amid a disaster that had plunged
his world into chaos.

Years of low funding

The plan to add an inspector to the small state dam safety unit is
likely the first of many proposed changes designed to bolster
Michigan's dam safety in response to Edenville.

While an independent investigation team works to determine what
caused Edenville's failure and who is responsible -- a process that
could take 18 months -- the Association of State Dam Safety
Officials will conduct an independent review of the dam safety
program.

A state release on July 30 said the review will "recommend ways to
improve the performance and management of the program and evaluate
its mission, objectives, and policies and procedures."

A task force of state and federal officials, local governments and
others will build upon that report to recommend their own fixes.

Funding and staffing in Trumble's unit, which is far lower per-dam
than the national average, is likely to be a part of the
discussion.

Michigan's dam safety unit budget in 2018 was just under $400,000.
That works out to about $374 on regulation per dam. The average
state spends $695 per dam in safety regulation, said Jacob Rushlow,
Michigan section president for the American Society of Civil
Engineers.

Trumble said he welcomes suggestions for how the unit can improve.
But, he added, "for only two inspectors, we do a pretty good job."

Every one of Michigan's state-managed dams must be inspected every
three to five years. It would be difficult for the state's two
inspectors to keep up with the workload.

So the state requires the owners of Michigan's 803 state-regulated
private dams to hire their own consultants to inspect the
structures. Trumble and Dan DeVaun, his colleague in northern
Michigan, are available to inspect any of the 350 publicly-owned
dams under their jurisdiction at the owner's request. Trumble
estimated about half of them take the state up on the offer.
Another 1,370 smaller dams are not regulated at all, and 92 fall
under federal oversight.

On a recent round of inspections in August at four smaller dams in
southeast Michigan, Trumble paced the grassy embankments, looking
for irregularities in their slope, as well as damp spots or wetland
plants that could indicate the dam is leaking. He documented his
findings in photographs, which he'll compile along with a written
report, sending it all to the dam owner with a list of recommended
actions.

This time, Trumble's recommendations were minimal: Keep vegetation
mowed on the embankment. Monitor some minor erosion in an area
where anglers have cut a boot path down to the reservoir. Keep an
eye on some minor blemishes in the dam's concrete.

When state inspectors identify a problem, they alert the owner and
direct them to make repairs. But because many dam owners lack money
for repairs and maintenance, Trumble sometimes finds himself
flagging the same problem repeatedly over multiple inspections.

"The typical dam owner wants to do the right thing," Trumble said.
"Fining is sometimes counter-productive because it takes money away
from the repairs."

'There's no 'Easy' button'

The state's decision-making process at Edenville underscores a
fundamental obstacle to quickly addressing dam safety problems:
Inspectors can cite dam owners who refuse to comply, but can only
step in and order repairs unilaterally if a dam's deficiencies pose
an imminent danger.

Trumble said the problem must be so dire that the dam could fail at
any moment. He has taken unilateral action a handful of times, on
small dams where the fix cost a few thousand dollars or less. In
some cases, it required no money at all -- just staff time to
remove the stop logs holding back small small reservoirs.

The problems at Edenville, he said, weren't dire enough to warrant
emergency action. And even if they had been, the state has no money
for such repairs.

"There's no 'Easy' button, or we would have pushed it," Trumble
said.

Legislators have historically been reluctant to dedicate more
funding to dam safety, despite repeated warnings that without it,
failures will become increasingly common.

A 2004 policy document from the Department of Environmental Quality
(which has since been renamed to EGLE), warned that lack of funding
for repair was causing dams to become "seriously degraded."

Instead of boosting funding, lawmakers acting on a budget proposal
from then-Gov. Jennifer Granholm eliminated what was then a
three-inspector dam safety unit amid budget cuts in 2005. They
restored the unit seven months later with two inspectors.

In 2007, the Michigan River Partnership, a coalition of government
and nonprofit groups, concluded that Michigan needs a dedicated
state fund for dam rehabilitation and removal. Nothing came of it,
said Mark Coscarelli, a senior policy fellow at Public Sector
Consultants who led the effort.

"It gets back to the old thing of, what are our priorities in the
public policy arena?" Coscarelli said. "It's health care, it's
criminal justice, and then you've got some boring old dams."

State leaders received a similar message in 2016 from then-Gov.
Rick Snyder's 21st Century Infrastructure Commission, which
estimated Michigan needed $227 million over 20 years to achieve dam
safety goals.

Two years later, the American Society of Civil Engineers again
recommended more state funding and additional staff, warning that
"deficiencies identified during dam inspections often remain
uncorrected, sometimes for decades, because their owners do not
have the money to repair or remove them."

Rushlow, of the society's Michigan section, said report authors
took their suggestions to the Capitol, pushing "as hard as we could
to get the information out there." They sought meetings with
legislators and dropped pamphlets in their mailboxes.

"It's going to cost less now to invest to make those needed
repairs, than it's going to cost to replace or rebuild something
that drastically fails," Rushlow said.

'The system failed'

The Midland dams saga may prove that point: Before the Edenville
and Sanford dams failed, the Four Lakes Task Force planned to spend
up to $35 million to buy and repair Boyce's four mid-Michigan dams.


The failure has ballooned repair costs to $340 million, plus
another $20 million to deal with erosion and other immediate issues
caused by the failure, said task force Chairman David Kepler.

Aside from Boyce and its owner, Lee Mueller, Kepler said he doesn't
blame any one person or agency for the disaster.

"The system failed," Kepler told legislators during an appearance
on July 28 before a joint senate committee. "These dams should have
survived these storms."

The state, he said, needs to do more to make sure dam owners are
financially capable of maintaining their dams. And it should
examine the "handoff protocol" between federal and state regulators
when a dam loses its federal license and becomes state-regulated.

Rep. Sue Allor, R-Wolverine, chairs the Appropriations Subcommittee
on Natural Resources and Environmental Quality whose members
questioned Trumble and other EGLE officials in July about the dam
safety program's policies and staffing.

In light of the disaster, Allor said, she wanted to know "exactly
what they do, and funding that might be needed."

Allor said she was pleased to hear the state is hiring a new
inspector, but she conceded that any effort to bolster dam safety
funding could prove difficult as the state braces for a $3 billion
budget gap for the fiscal year beginning Oct. 1.

"We're going to have to get very creative in looking at the
budgets," Allor said.

Mark Ogden, a technical specialist with the Association of State
Dam Safety Officials, said Pennsylvania's system could provide a
model. There, state law requires dam owners to prove they can cover
costs of needed dam repair, maintenance, or removal. A law passed
in 2018 established a state fund, backed by fees from private dam
owners, to help cover such costs. Dam owners must comply with state
safety regulations and current on inspections to participate in the
fund.

Some landowners surrounding the lakes - which are now rivers
surrounded by debris fields after regulators ordered them drained
for safety following the floods—say policy fixes may be needed
too.   

Mark Mudge, a task force member and Smallwood Lake homeowner, said
he ultimately blames Boyce for the failure.

But "I don't think the state is blameless," he said. They could
have pressured the company to repair Edenville, rather than
counting on new owners to make repairs in the future, Mudge said.

"They knew there were problems, and I don't know why they didn't
act faster."

Trumble said he welcomes suggestions for reforms. He, too, has been
thinking hard about how the state could better prevent future
disasters like the one at Edenville, he said.

"If I need to take some criticism, I'm prepared to do that," he
said. But funding, staffing and changes to the laws that set
Michigan's dam safety standards "can't come from me."

"We need to work with the Legislature to help them understand where
we need help, where they can help, and what's appropriate for the
level of safety that we're trying to achieve." [GN]


MISSISSIPPI: Parchman Prison Inmates File Class Action
------------------------------------------------------
Rhian Daly, writing for NME, reports that a lawsuit backed by
Jay-Z, Yo Gotti and Team ROC has caused a prison healthcare
provider to cut ties with a Mississippi prison.

The rappers helped 227 inmates at Parchman Prison get legal
representation so they could file a class-action lawsuit against
the Mississippi Department of Corrections Commissioner Nathan Burl
Cain and prison healthcare provider Centurion.

The suit claimed the inmates were being held in subpar living
conditions, including the presence of black mould and vermin,
limited access to showers, a water system contaminated with human
faeces and more. Inmates also claimed protocols to prevent the
spread of the coronavirus were not being followed, and that the
kitchen facilities and food available to them were not acceptable.

Now, Pitchfork reports Centurion is set to terminate its contract
on October 5, 2020. The company's CEO, Steven H. Wheeler, said in a
memo filed in the District court for the Northern District of
Mississippi: "We do not believe we can further improve the
effectiveness of our level of care without additional investment
from the Department in correctional staffing and infrastructure
along the lines of what we have already recommended."

Team ROC attorney Marcy Croft said in a statement they hoped
Centurion's decision would "send a clear message to Governor Tate
Reeves -- it's time to invest in the health and well-being of the
people in your prisons."

"There is no excuse for the 53 deaths across the Mississippi prison
system over the past several months, many of which were
preventable," Croft continued. "We will not stop until the
incarcerated receive consistent and competent medical care,
especially now with the COVID-19 crisis. This must be a priority."

When filing the lawsuit in July, Yo Gotti said: "The situation in
Parchman is dire. More and more of the incarcerated population are
reaching out for help and pleading for immediate medical attention,
especially as the coronavirus threatens their lives."

Meanwhile, Jay-Z was one of a number of stars to call for a case
into the death of Danroy "DJ" Henry to be re-opened. Henry was shot
and killed by police officer Aaron Hess on October 17, 2010 in
Pleasantville, New York. [GN]


MITR PHOL: Transboundary Class Action Can Move Forward
------------------------------------------------------
MalaysiaKini reports that Cambodian plaintiffs representing more
than 700 farming families won a landmark appeal allowing them to
move forward with their class action against Asia's largest sugar
producer, Mitr Phol.

The transboundary class action Hoy Mai & Others vs. Mitr Phol Co.
Ltd. is the first of its kind in Southeast Asia. It was filed under
Thai laws permitting a class action to be brought by foreign
plaintiffs for abuses committed by a Thai company overseas.

The complaint accuses Mitr Phol of complicity in the forcible
displacement of the families to clear the way for an industrial
sugarcane plantation in rural northwestern Cambodia. Between 2008
and 2009, the families' land was seized, their crops were looted,
and their homes were demolished and burned. Some of those who
sought to defend their rights were jailed.

The affected communities have been fighting for justice ever since.
In 2015, the Thai National Human Rights Commission found Mitr Phol
responsible for the land grab and called upon the company to
"correct and remedy the impacts." So far, Mitr Phol has steadfastly
refused to provide any form of compensation to the Cambodian
families whose lives it destroyed.

The decision recognizing class status, which was delivered on Aug.
2 by the Bangkok South Civil Court, allows the families to bring
the case as a group, ensuring access to justice and preventing the
laborious and costly process of bringing hundreds of individual
lawsuits.

"The win marks a huge step forward for the plaintiffs and all the
people affected by the evictions. The voices of those who have been
harmed can now be heard. The court's decision shows that access to
justice is possible, and that their decade-long fight has not been
for nothing," said Eang Vuthy, Executive director of Equitable
Cambodia.

For Thailand and the region, the decision changes the legal
landscape, providing that class action legislation can be used in
transboundary cases and to protect some of the region's most
vulnerable people.

"The importance of this legal precedent cannot be overstated," said
Natalie Bugalski, Legal Director for Inclusive Development
International. "This is a David vs Goliath case that will redefine
access to justice for the victims of corporate abuse in Southeast
Asia and beyond."

It is also a key test of corporate accountability. Mitr Phol is the
biggest sugar supplier in the region and has counted some of the
world's largest consumer brands, including Nestle, Coca-Cola,
Pepsi, Mars Wrigley and Corbion, as past and current customers.
While Coca-Cola took initial steps to investigate the allegations
against Mitr Phol, it failed to use its leverage to compel the
company to provide redress to the victims in Cambodia. Instead, in
2018, Coca-Cola informed Inclusive Development International that
it no longer sourced sugar from Mitr Phol. It has never reported
the termination of the supply relationship publicly.

Mitr Pohl is also a member of the sugar industry's "sustainability"
certification body Bonsucro, which is under scrutiny by the UK
National Contact Point for the OECD (a government body that
monitors the operations of British businesses overseas) for failing
to hold Mitr Phol accountable for its abuses against these
communities.

For the families represented in this lawsuit, it has been a
decade-long battle for justice.

"As a representative of the people in Oddar Meanchey province, I am
very happy with this result, I hope to get justice in the future.
We will all continue to fight until the end." said Hoy Mai
following the decision on July 31.

"I applaud the Thai court for supporting the Cambodian people in
Oddar Meanchey by deciding that our case is a collective one," he
said. I hope we, the victims, get justice. According to the
results, it is a new hope for our struggle going forward." Said
Smin Tit, affected community representative. [GN]


MONDELEZ GLOBAL: Averts Class Action Over Cocoa Labeling
--------------------------------------------------------
Law360 reports that Oreo maker Mondelez Global LLC has escaped a
proposed class action accusing it of misleading consumers with
packaging labels saying Oreo cookies are "always made with real
cocoa," as a New York federal judge has dismissed the case. [GN]


MONDELEZ INT'L: Continues to Defend Wheat Trading-Related Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Mondelez International, Inc.said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 29, 2020, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2020, that the company continues to
defend a consolidated class action suit related to wheat trading
contracts.

On April 1, 2015, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
("CFTC") filed a complaint against Kraft Foods Group and Mondelez
Global LLC ("Mondelez Global") in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois (the "District Court"), Eastern
Division (the "CFTC action") following its investigation of
activities related to the trading of December 2011 wheat futures
contracts that occurred prior to the spin-off of Kraft Foods Group.


The complaint alleges that Kraft Foods Group and Mondelez Global
(1) manipulated or attempted to manipulate the wheat markets during
the fall of 2011; (2) violated position limit levels for wheat
futures and (3) engaged in non-competitive trades by trading both
sides of exchange-for-physical Chicago Board of Trade wheat
contracts.

The CFTC seeks civil monetary penalties of either triple the
monetary gain for each violation of the Commodity Exchange Act (the
"Act") or $1 million for each violation of Section 6(c)(1), 6(c)(3)
or 9(a)(2) of the Act and $140,000 for each additional violation of
the Act, plus post-judgment interest; an order of permanent
injunction prohibiting Kraft Foods Group and Mondelez Global from
violating specified provisions of the Act; disgorgement of profits;
and costs and fees.

On August 15, 2019, the District Court approved a settlement
agreement between the CFTC and Mondelez Global. The terms of the
settlement, which are available in the District Court's docket, had
an immaterial impact on our financial position, results of
operations and cash flows. On October 23, 2019, following a ruling
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
regarding Mondelez Global's allegations that the CFTC and its
Commissioners violated certain terms of the settlement agreement
and the CFTC's argument that the Commissioners were not bound by
the terms of the settlement agreement, the District Court vacated
the settlement agreement and reinstated all pending motions that
the District Court had previously mooted as a result of the
settlement.

The parties have reached a new agreement in principle to resolve
the CFTC action and have submitted the settlement to the District
Court for approval.

The District Court cancelled a scheduled conference on June 4, 2020
to discuss the proposed settlement agreement but indicated that it
would rule on pending motions in due course.

Additionally, several class action complaints were filed against
Kraft Foods Group and Mondelez Global in the District Court by
investors in wheat futures and options on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated.

The complaints make similar allegations as those made in the CFTC
action, and the plaintiffs are seeking class action certification;
monetary damages, interest and unjust enrichment; costs and fees;
and injunctive, declaratory and other unspecified relief. In June
2015, these suits were consolidated in the District Court.

On January 3, 2020, the District Court granted plantiffs' request
to certify a class. It is not possible to predict the outcome of
these matters; however, based on the company's Separation and
Distribution Agreement with Kraft Foods Group dated as of September
27, 2012, the company expects to bear any monetary penalties or
other payments in connection with the CFTC action.

Although the CFTC action and the class action complaints involve
the same alleged conduct, a resolution or decision with respect to
one of the matters may not be dispositive as to the outcome of the
other matter.

Mondelez International, Inc., through its subsidiaries,
manufactures and markets snack food and beverage products
worldwide. It offers biscuits, including cookies, crackers, and
salted snacks; chocolates; gums and candies; coffee and powdered
beverages; and cheese and grocery products. Mondelez International,
Inc. was founded in 2000 and is based in Deerfield, Illinois.


NATIONAL FREIGHT: Court Certifies Class of Drivers in Portillo Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOHN F. PORTILLO, et al., individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. NATIONAL FREIGHT,
INC. and NFI INTERACTIVE LOGISTICS, INC., Defendants, Civil No.
15-7908 (JHR/KMW) (D. N.J.), Judge Joseph H. Rodriguez of the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey, Camden Vicinage,
granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification.

The Defendants compose a leading provider of transportation,
logistics and distribution services to various clients including,
most relevant to the case, Trader Joe's Markets.  NFI transports
goods between Trader Joe's warehouses and stores up and down the
Eastern Seaboard.  To fulfill its obligations to Trader Joe's, NFI
uses both its own employees and independent contractors as delivery
drivers.

The Named Plaintiffs in the suit--Portillo, Rafael Suarez, Martin
Duran, German Bencosme, Edin Vargas, Luis A. Hernandez, Josue Paz,
and Alvaro Castaneda--worked for NFI as delivery drivers during the
relevant time period (i.e., between June 22, 2009, and the
present).  Each of them signed an Independent Contractor Agreement
("ICA") with NFI that classified them as independent contractors
rather than employees.

The Plaintiffs believe that NFI entered into at least 135 such
agreements with who performed deliveries full-time to Trader Joe's
stores on the East Coast on NFI's behalf.  They allege, on behalf
of themselves and others similarly situated, that they were wrongly
classified as independent contractors and that as a result of that
misclassification, NFI illegally deducted amounts from their
compensation in violation of the New Jersey Wage Payment Law
("NJWPL").

The Defendants used four different ICAs during the relevant time
period.  In 2009, NFI used an agreement called the Lessor and
Lessee Operating Agreement.  Beginning at some point in 2010, NFI
started using an agreement called the Independent Contractor
Operating Agreement.  In 2017 and 2019, NFI implemented new
versions of the Independent Contractor Operating Agreement ("2017
ICOA" and "2019 ICOA," respectively).  Importantly, the 2009 LLOA
contains a New Jersey choice of law provision and no forum
selection clause; the 2010 and 2017 Agreements contain a New Jersey
choice of law provision and a New Jersey forum selection clause;
and the 2019 Agreement contains a Texas choice of law provision and
a Texas forum selection clause.  According to the Defendants, as of
Oct. 18, 2019, five drivers had signed the 2019 Agreement.

Other than the choice-of-law clauses, the contents of the various
ICAs are materially the same.  They required various things from
the drivers, including background checks, drug and alcohol testing,
the Defendants' exclusive use of the drivers' trucks, utilization
of a specific GPS system, acquisition of various forms of
insurance, regular inspections by the Defendants, record
maintenance, log sheets, toll receipts, and immediate reporting of
all accidents, among various other terms.  The Defendants also
utilized various workplace rules and procedures, including
handbooks, codes of conduct, and other written policies that
dictated the drivers' activities.  The drivers had to put NFI's
logo on their trucks and were prohibited from putting another
company's logo on them.  They were restricted in their ability to
work for other companies, both practically (given the amount of
hours they worked) and contractually (the Defendants had to give
written consent).

The Defendants had the authority to make various deductions from
the drivers' weekly paychecks.  Deductions included costs for the
GPS device, damages to goods or property, fuel, insurance, and
other things.  The crux of the Plaintiffs' case is their allegation
that these deductions were taken illegally by the Defendants.  This
relies on a finding that the Plaintiffs were in fact employees, and
not independent contractors, under the NJWPL, which would make such
deductions illegal.

In order to rectify their alleged damages, the Plaintiffs filed the
suit in the Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division in Camden
County on June 19, 2015.  On Nov. 5, 2015, the Defendants removed
the case to the Court.  After nearly three years of
litigation--including discovery issues and denied motions to
remand, to dismiss, and for summary judgment--the Plaintiffs filed
the operative Amended Complaint on Aug. 13, 2018.

The parties then unsuccessfully attempted to resolve the case via
mediation between Nov. 30, 2018, and April 15, 2019.  After further
discovery issues, the Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Class
Certification on Sept. 3, 2019.  The Defendants filed their
response in opposition on Oct. 18, 2019.  The Plaintiffs timely
filed their response on Nov. 1, 2019.  The Defendants were
permitted to file a sur-reply brief on June 30, 2020.

The Plaintiffs seek to certify the following class: All individuals
who: (1) entered into an independent contractor agreement with NFI,
either personally or through a corporate entity; and (2) drove a
vehicle on a full-time basis to perform deliveries of goods to
Trader Joe's stores anywhere on the East Coast on behalf of NFI at
any time since June 22, 2009.

The first argument that the Defendants make in their opposition to
the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification revolves around what
law should apply in the case.  In their initial brief, the
Plaintiffs refer exclusively to New Jersey law, which they argue
applies because of an earlier decision made by the late Hon. Jerome
B. Simandle.  The Defendants disagree with that interpretation of
that Opinion.

With respect to the Defendants' arguments that the Court's previous
Opinion about choice of law does not apply to anybody beyond Named
Plaintiffs, Judge Rodriguez now holds that the Court's previous
Opinion does apply to the putative class members, except for those
who only signed the 2019 ICOA.  Because the choice-of-law question
is not contested with respect to the drivers who signed the 2019
ICOA, the Judge refrains from giving an in-depth analysis of what
state has the most significant relationship to the circumstances
surrounding the drivers who signed the 2019 ICOA.  For the purposes
of the Motion, it suffices to say that New Jersey law would not
apply to those drivers.

Turning to the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,
which governs class certification, Judge Rodriguez finds that all
of the relevant Rule 23 requirements are met.  Accordingly, he will
grant class certification.

For these reasons, Judge Rodriguez granted the Plaintiffs' Motion
for Class Certification, though he slightly altered the Plaintiffs'
proposed class in light of the findings of his Opinion.

The following class is certified under Rule 23(b)(3): All
individuals who: (1) entered into, either personally or through a
corporate entity, an independent contractor agreement with NFI that
had a New Jersey choice-of-law clause; and (2) drove a vehicle on a
full-time basis to perform deliveries of goods to Trader Joe's
stores anywhere on the East Coast on behalf of NFI at any time
since June 22, 2009.  The "Full-time basis" means having delivered
at least 80% of the loads assigned to the contractor.  An
accompanying Order will be issued.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 1, 2020 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/ns2ROW from Leagle.com.

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE: Third Circuit Affirms Leo Suit  Dismissal
--------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the
District Court's dismissal of the case, EDWARD LEO, as executor of
the Estate of Dawn L. Leo; CLIFFORD J. MARCHION; DONNA MARCHION, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Appellants,
v. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC OF DELAWARE, d/b/a Champion Mortgage Co
Inc; GREAT AMERICAN ASSURANCE CO; WILLIS OF OHIO INC, d/b/a Loan
Protector Insurance Services, Case No. 19-3111 (3d Cir.).

The case is about force-placed insurance, sometimes called
lender-placed insurance.  When a property owner takes out a
mortgage -- or, as here, a reverse mortgage -- that person conveys
an interest in real property as security for a loan.  To safeguard
that security, lenders often require borrowers to maintain hazard
insurance that protects the property against natural disasters.  If
the borrower fails to maintain adequate coverage, the lender may
itself buy insurance and then force the borrower to cover the cost.
That's what is meant by "force-placed" insurance.

The case is also about the filed-rate doctrine.  States regulate
the insurance market to see that insurers don't charge too much
(lest they earn exorbitant profits), nor too little (lest they be
rendered insolvent because of unanticipated claims), nor
discriminate unfairly against certain consumers.  So states
generally require insurers issuing policies in their states to file
rates they will charge with an administrative agency.  And the
filed-rate doctrine "forbids" an insurer from charging rates other
than those properly filed with the appropriate regulatory
authority.

The flipside of the filed-rate doctrine provides that a rate filed
with a governing regulatory agency is unassailable in judicial
proceedings brought by ratepayers.  And that's true even when the
insurance company defrauds an administrative agency to obtain
approval of a filed rate.   The point is that courts are
ill-equipped to engage in the rate making process.  Any court that
attempted to do so would inevitably introduce price discrimination
into the market, since victorious plaintiffs would wind up paying
less than non-suing ratepayers.  In deference, then, to a state's
delegation of rate-approval authority to an administrative agency,
courts stay out of the rate-reviewing business.

In the matter before the Third Circuit, borrowers from New Jersey
and North Carolina ask to review the force-placed-insurance rate
charged by their reverse-mortgage lender, Nationstar.  They allege
Nationstar colluded with a hazard insurance company, Great American
Assurance Co., and a hazard insurance agent, Willis of Ohio, Inc.,
to pocket kickbacks on force-placed insurance policies.  

Specifically, the borrowers say Great American inflated the rate
filed with state regulators so it and Willis could return a portion
of the profits to Nationstar to induce Nationstar's continued
business.  The upshot is that even though the borrowers concede
they paid the rate on file with the appropriate state regulatory
authorities, they claim they paid Nationstar more than Nationstar
paid Great American and Willis.

That, the borrowers contend, violates (i) the terms of their
mortgages (or in the alternative, New Jersey law prohibiting unjust
enrichment); (ii) New Jersey's implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing; (iii) the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act; (iv) New
Jersey law preventing tortious interference with a business
relationship; (v) the federal Truth in Lending Act; and (vi) the
federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.

The Third Circuit must decide whether the filed-rate doctrine
blocks these claims.  The District Court held that it did, and
dismissed the suit.  The borrowers timely appealed.

Judge D. Brooks Smith, writing for the Third Circuit, holds that
because the borrowers seek damages tied to an alleged overcharge
baked-into a rate filed with regulatory authorities, the filed-rate
doctrine precludes their claims.  He reiterates that the filed-rate
doctrine brooks no distinction between, on one hand, challenging a
filed rate as unreasonable and, on the other hand, challenging an
overcharge fraudulently included in a filed rate.  

Judge Brooks notes as much in In re New Jersey Title Insurance
Litigation and its companion, McCray v. Fidelity National Title
Insurance Co., and in AT&T Corporation v. JMC Telecommunications,
LLC.  In the first two cases, the filed-rate doctrine stymied
allegations that insurance companies collectively set and charged
uniform and supra-competitive rates, and embedded within those
rates payoffs, kickbacks, and other charges that are unrelated to
the issuance of insurance.  In AT&T, the filed-rate doctrine
prevented a prepaid-telephone-card seller from bringing
breach-of-contract and state-law fraud claims against AT&T after
AT&T allegedly overcharged the seller based on a service agreement
filed with regulators.  At bottom, each case stands for the
proposition that there is no fraud exception to the filed rate
doctrine.

These facts show why.  The filed-rate doctrine seeks to preserve
the exclusive role of agencies in approving rates by keeping courts
out of the rate-making process.  Yet if courts ruled for the
borrowers, calculating damages would require determining how much
they think they should have been charged for hazard insurance -- a
new, lower-than-filed-rate price tethered only to our conception of
an appropriate kickback-free rate.  

And the borrowers' suit confronts an even more formidable obstacle
in the filed-rate doctrine's other goal: "preventing" insurers from
engaging in price discrimination as between ratepayers.  If the
Court forced Nationstar to pay damages, the former would be giving
these borrowers a better price for force-placed insurance than
other New Jersey and North Carolina borrowers using a different
lender but still obtaining force-placed insurance from Great
American.

Judge Smith concludes that once an insurance rate is filed with the
appropriate regulatory body, the Court has no ability to
effectively reduce it by awarding damages for an alleged
overcharge: the filed-rate doctrine prevents courts from deciding
whether the rate is unreasonable or fraudulently inflated.  Because
Great American filed tes force-placed hazard insurance rate with
the appropriate state agencies, the District Court properly
dismissed claims alleging the rate was fraudulently inflated and
seeking damages tied to the purported overcharge.  Accordingly, the
Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the case.

A full-text copy of the Third Circuit's July 1, 2020 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/RY1Dyv from Leagle.com.

Lawrence E. Bathgate, II -- lbathgate@bathweg.com -- Kyle R. Tognan
-- ktognan@bathweg.com -- Bathgate Wegener & Wolf, Lakewood, NJ.

Howard M. Bushman, Joseph M. Kaye, Adam M. Moskowitz --
amm@kttlaw.com -- Adam A. Schwartzbaum, Moskowitz Law Firm, Coral
Gables, FL, Counsel for Appellants.

Jan T. Chilton, Erik W. Kemp, Severson & Werson, San Francisco,
CA.

Kevin M. Haas -- khaas@cozen.com -- Clyde & Co US, Florham Park,
NJ.

Alexander E. Potente, Clyde & Co US San Francisco, CA.

Edward J. Fanning, Jr. -- efanning@mccarter.com -- Gregory J. Hindy
-- ghindy@mccarter.com -- Robert A. Mintz -- rmintz@mccarter.com --
Scott M. Weingart -- sweingart@mccarter.com -- McCarter & English,
Newark, NJ, Counsel for Appellees.

NESTLE USA: First Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Tomasella Suits
--------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the
district court's dismissal of Danell Tomasella's claims against the
Defendants in three putative class action lawsuits captioned DANELL
TOMASELLA, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, Appellant, v. NESTLE USA, INC., a Delaware corporation,
Defendant, Appellee. DANELL TOMASELLA, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. MARS, INC., a
Delaware corporation; and MARS CHOCOLATE NORTH AMERICA LLC, a
Delaware company, Defendants, Appellees. DANELL TOMASELLA, on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,
Appellant, v. THE HERSHEY COMPANY, a Delaware corporation; HERSHEY
CHOCOLATE & CONFECTIONERY CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation,
Defendants, Appellees, Case Nos. 19-1130, 19-1131, 19-1132.

The exploitation of children in the supply chain from which U.S.
confectionary corporations continue to source the cocoa beans that
they turn into chocolate is a humanitarian tragedy.  The case thus
serves as a haunting reminder that eradicating the evil of slavery
in all its forms is a job far from finished.  Before the Court,
however, is the very narrow question of whether the Defendants'
failure to include on the packing of their chocolate products
information regarding upstream labor abuses in their cocoa bean
supply chains constitutes an unfair or deceptive business practice
within the meaning of Chapter 93A.

The West African nation of Côte d'Ivoire is the world's largest
producer of cocoa beans, the essential ingredient in chocolate.
The United States imports 47% of its supply of cocoa beans from
Côte d'Ivoire.  The Defendants are three of the largest and most
profitable confectionary corporations in the United States. Their
chocolate products are made with cocoa beans and paste that they
source (either directly or through intermediaries) predominantly
from West African countries such as Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana.  The
Defendants' Corporate Business Principles and Supplier Codes of
Conduct prohibit child and slave labor. Additionally, they each
have a stated policy that condemns the use of the worst forms of
child labor.  At the same time, they publicly acknowledge the
existence of the worst forms of child labor in their West African
cocoa supply chains.

The Defendants contend that they have consistently and publicly
acknowledged the child labor problem in their cocoa supply chains,
including on their websites, where they regularly report on their
remedial efforts; however, they do not disclose the existence of
"child and/or slave labor in the cocoa supply chain" on the
packaging of the chocolate products identified in Tomasella's
complaints at the point of sale.  Nestle does label at least one of
its chocolate products, Nestle Crunch, with the Nestle Cocoa Plan
logo and a statement (with a website link) that reads, the Nestle
Cocoa Plan works with UTZ Certified to help improve the lives of
cocoa farmers and the quality of their products.  Both Mars and
Hershey label certain products as certified by the Rainforest
Alliance (another certification that does not permit child labor),
but Tomasella expressly exempts those products from challenge in
her complaints.

On Feb. 12, 2018, Tomasella (a Massachusetts resident) filed a
two-count class action lawsuit against Nestle in federal court
predicated on diversity jurisdiction.  Then, on Feb. 26, 2018, she
filed identical class actions against Mars and Hershey.  The
putative class in all three lawsuits included all consumers who
purchased the Defendants' Chocolate Products in Massachusetts
during the four years prior to the filing of the complaints.  

First, Tomasella alleged that the Defendants violated Chapter 93A
because their failure to disclose the prevalence of the worst forms
of child labor in their cocoa supply chains on their product
packaging is a "material omission" that constitutes an unfair or
deceptive act or practice in the conduct of any trade or commerce
(Count One).

In the second cause of action, Tomasella alleged that the
Defendants had been "unjustly enriched" by receiving payments for
Chocolate Products that would not have been possible absent the
wrongful conduct (Count Two).  Accordingly, Tomasella sought "full
restitution" of the Defendants' "ill-gotten gains."

On April 19, 2018, the Defendants simultaneously filed motions to
dismiss Tomasella's complaints in their respective cases under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  On Jan. 30, 2019, the district court granted
the Defendants' motions to dismiss with prejudice.  It dismissed
Tomasella's complaints in three strokes.  First, the court found
that Tomasella failed to state a deceptive claim under Chapter 93A.
Second, the district court determined that Tomasella likewise did
not state a claim for unfair conduct upon which relief could be
granted under Chapter 93A.  Third, the district court dismissed
Tomasella's unjust enrichment claim.

On Jan. 31, 2019, Tomasella timely appealed all three dismissals.
Due to the symmetry in the complaints, the district court
decisions, and the issues on appeal, the decision addresses the
three appeals as one.  On appeal, Tomasella challenges the
dismissal of her Chapter 93A and common law unjust enrichment
claims.

After careful review, Judge Juan R. Torruella, writing for the
First Circuit, agrees with the district court that Tomasella has
failed to plausibly state Chapter 93A claims against the Defendants
under either a deceptive or unfair acts theory.  Tomasella has not
persuaded the Court that the nondisclosure of upstream labor
conditions on product packaging at the point of sale is
unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers within the
meaning of Chapter 93A.  The pleadings do not provide any basis on
which to conclude that the Defendants have tricked consumers or
taken advantage of their assumptions for capital gain.
Accordingly, the First Circuit affirms the dismissal of her Chapter
93A claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.

Now, Judge Torruella turns to the second count of Tomasella's
complaints: unjust enrichment.  Tomasella argues that the district
court erroneously relied on the availability versus viability
language in Shaulis v. Nordstrom, Inc., to dismiss her unjust
enrichment claim.  She contends that the Court's decision in Lass
v. Bank of America, N.A., (holding that a plaintiff may plead
alternative and even inconsistent legal theories, such as breach of
contract and unjust enrichment, even if Plaintiffs only can recover
under one of these theories), is controlling under the law of the
circuit doctrine because it predates Shaulis.

The First Circuit disagrees.  First, the Court is bound by Shaulis
because it is a prior panel decision that is closely on point.
Next, the Court does do not read Lass and Shaulis as creating an
untenable conflict of law.  It reinstated the unjust enrichment
claim, so that the district court could determine anew whether the
claim "should survive" once it had the chance to develop the
factual record more fully.  Thus, absent any showing that Chapter
93A provides an insufficient remedy at law, Tomasella's Chapter 93A
and unjust enrichment claims are mutually exclusive.  Accordingly,
Judge Torruella affirms the district court's dismissal of
Tomasella's unjust enrichment claims.

Judge Torruella agrees with the district court that Tomasella has
not plausibly stated a claim for relief under Chapter 93A based on
the alleged packaging omissions, and that Tomasella's unjust
enrichment claim is foreclosed by the availability of a remedy at
law.  Therefore, he affirmed the dismissal of the Plaintiff's
complaints against the Defendants.

A full-text copy of the First Circuit's June 16, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/XY5d79 from Leagle.com.

Danell Tomasella, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Elaine Byszewski --
elaine@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac
vice, Steve W. Berman -- steve@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol
Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice & Hannah W. Brennan --
hannahb@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP.

Nestle USA, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendant, represented
by
Bryan A. Merryman -- bmerryman@whitecase.com -- White & Case LLP,
pro hac vice, Julian A. Lamm -- jlamm@whitecase.com -- White &
Case
LLP, pro hac vice, Lauren M. Papenhausen --
lauren.papenhausen@whitecase.com -- White & Case, LLP & Michael
Kendall -- michael.kendall@whitecase.com -- White & Case, LLP.

NEW YORK: Faces Class Action Over Medical Vaccination Exemptions
----------------------------------------------------------------
Kate Lisa, writing for NNY360, reports that eight families whose
children were barred from school because of medical vaccination
exemptions filed a federal class-action suit against the state
Department of Health and their respective public school districts
to challenge regulations that allow educators to override
immunization exemptions for students with underlying conditions.

Attorneys Sujata Gibson, Michael Sussman, Robert F. Kennedy Jr. and
Mary Holland filed on July 24 a class-action lawsuit in federal
court representing eight families across the state in their battle
to allow their children to return to school after district
administrators overruled valid medical exemptions signed by the
students' physicians, absolving them from certain required
vaccines.

Children's Health Defense, a nonprofit anti-vaccination activist
group founded by Kennedy Jr., hosted a digital Zoom news conference
at 10 a.m. on July 30 with the legal team, a licensed physician and
two parents with immune-compromised children involved in the
litigation.

"This case was necessitated because hundreds, if not thousands, of
medically fragile children in New York state have been denied an
education, kicked out of school," said Gibson, adding the affected
students are often bullied or socially ostracized as tension mounts
over parents' decisions to vaccinate their children. But the recent
suit concerns students who don't have a medical choice.

Gibson, the lead attorney on the case, is an adjunct professor of
law at Cornell University and an associate at Ithaca firm
Schlather, Stumbar, Parks & Salk.

The suit includes the state Health Department and Commissioner Dr.
Howard Zucker; Coxsackie-Athens School District and Superintendent
Randall Squier, in Greene County; the Albany City School District
and Superintendent Kaweeda Adams, in Albany County; the
Shenendehowa School District and Superintendent L. Oliver Robinson,
in Saratoga County; the Penfield School District and Superintendent
Thomas Putnam, in Monroe County; the Lansing School District and
Superintendent Chris Pettograsso, in Tompkins County; the Ithaca
City School District and Superintendent Luvelle Brown; and two on
Long Island: Superintendent David Bennardo and the South Huntington
School, in addition to the Three Village School District and
Superintendent Cheryl Pedisich on Long Island.

The state Health Department would not comment, citing pending
litigation.

Squier, Coxsackie-Athens superintendent of schools, did not return
multiple calls for comment about the district's policy to review a
student's medical immunization exemption or the number of students
who submit exemptions to the district each year.

The state requires students receive eight immunizations to attend
day care, pre-K or school, including diphtheria, tetanus and
pertussis (Dtap/DTP/Tdap), hepatitis B, measles, mumps and rubella
vaccine (MMR), polio (IPV/OPV), varicella (chickenpox),
meningococcal conjugate (MenACWY), haemophilus influenzae type b
conjugate (HiB) and pneumococcal conjugate (PCV).

Doctors or physicians can sign a state Health Department's
immunization medical exemption form to prevent immune-compromised
students, or children with underlying conditions, from getting a
vaccine that could be detrimental to the child's health.

Two mothers involved in the litigation shared the stories of their
teenaged daughters who have several auto-immune diseases and were
not allowed to return to school after district administrators
refused to accept their medical immunization exemptions. The
parents spoke during the July 30 press call, but did not identify
themselves, their children or respective school districts, citing
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.

One mother said her daughter has underlying medical conditions
that, if she received some of the state's required immunizations,
could cause her to develop Guillain-Barre syndrome -- a rare
disorder where the body's immune system damages nerve cells,
causing muscle weakness and sometimes paralysis, according to
Centers for Disease Control & Prevention.

The student's mother procured multiple valid exemption forms from
other specialists and immunologists familiar with her daughter's
case at the district's request, she said, but those documents were
also denied.

"The district sent it to a school district consulting doctor, a
school physician, who has never met my child," said the mother, who
spoke under the name Jane Smith.

". . . She was excluded from school," Smith continued about her
daughter. "It was pretty widely known among her peers. We were
under a pretty horrific amount of stress and trauma."

The parent's state senator and assembly member called the school
superintendent, urging him to accept the exemption, but the
superintendent refused and forwarded it to the state Health
Department for further review.

"You have a gene that could paralyze or kill you, but have to get
it [the vaccine] in order to graduate?" Smith said. "I was afraid
of her pending removal from school and not being able to protect
her."

The other mother, who spoke under the name Jane Doe, recalled how
her daughter was forced to be homeschooled after their school
district's physician would not accept her exemption without DOH
review.

"She left school lonely, isolated and confused," Doe said. "As a
family, we knew it was the right health decision to make, but it
was very difficult to explain we had to compromise her health to
attend public school."

Parents or guardians can access or print the state Health
Department's immunization medical exemption form on health.ny.gov.

"We've always had a medical exemption because the program was
enacted to protect medically fragile kids, because we recognize for
some children, it's not safe for some of them to get one or more of
the vaccines," Gibson said. "For a long time, that was a
straightforward process. In recent years, there's been a real push
to tighten these policies and regulations that have really
overruled the spirit of that medical exemption and made it almost
impossible for medically fragile kids to get an exemption.

"And even when they do, it subjects them to so many
unconstitutional burdens. It really harms these kids we say we're
trying to protect."

Gov. Andrew Cuomo signed new legislation June 13, 2019, amending
Public Health Law §2164, which no longer allows children from
attending day care, pre-K or public, private and parochial school
for non-medical vaccine exemption.

"It has come to our attention that apparently invalid medical
exemptions have been provided to families seeking to avoid required
vaccinations," according to a July 16, 2019, Health Department
notice. " . . . The department has also learned of incidents of
parents intentionally misleading physicians who are not familiar
with their family regarding the true identity of the children they
bring to the practice. Parents may bring in a child who is not
their own, so that a blood test for immunity can be drawn in
another child's name."

The state also reported cases of families and physicians submitting
falsified state Immunization Information System records as grounds
for the law change.

Medical exemptions for student immunizations remain legal under the
new law, but plaintiffs - the eight affected families and
Children's Health Defense - argue in the July 24 federal suit that
school administrators' refusal to honor the exemptions, which
barred their children from attending school, is unconstitutional,
and district physicians with no knowledge of their children's
medical conditions or history should not be allowed to override the
decision.

"Now we're telling those very children we're allowing a school
principal to overrule that decision without seeing any [of their]
medical records," Kennedy Jr. said during the July 30 event. "That
is barbaric. It's wrong. It's anti-American and we believe strongly
it's against the law and the constitution, and that's why we're
bringing this lawsuit."

The attorneys, with Children's Health Defense, request the court
find the state policy unconstitutional and allow the children to
return to school.

Sussman and Gibson said the group filed the suit in the middle of
summer to probe a change before the 2020-2021 academic year begins
after Labor Day, Sept. 7. The state was expected to make its final
decision about reopening schools by Aug. 7.

"By filing this summer, we can give everyone a chance to be
reasonable and let these kids back into school this fall while
everyone learns online and is socially distanced," Gibson said. "We
need to get this relief to everyone so you don't need to spend tens
of thousand of dollars to file a lawsuit and get your rights
respected." [GN]


NORTHERN NATURAL: De Leon Seeks Unpaid Overtime
-----------------------------------------------
JESSIE DE LEON, individually and for others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. NORTHERN NATURAL GAS COMPANY, Defendant, Case No.
7:20-cv-00179 (W.D. Tex., July 24, 2020) is a collective action
complaint brought against Defendant for its alleged illegal pay
practice in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a non-exempt inspector from
July 2017 until April 2018.

According to the complaint, Plaintiff and the Putative Class
Members normally worked 12 or more hours a day for 7 days or a
week. However, Defendant paid Plaintiff and the Putative Class on a
flat day-rate amount only for each day worked, denying them
overtime wages for all hours they worked in excess of 40 hours in a
week.

Northern Natural Gas Company provides natural gas transportation
and storage services to 81 utilities and numerous producers, energy
marketing companies and industrial end users. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
          Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq.
          Richard M. Schreiber, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP, LLP
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Tel: (713) 352-1100
          Fax: (713) 352-3300
          Emails: adunlap@mybackwages.com
                  mjosephson@mybackwages.com
                  rschreiber@mybackwages.com

                - and –

          Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
          BRUCKNER BURCH PLLC
          8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
          Houston, TX 77046
          Tel: (713) 877-8788
          Fax: (713) 877-8065
          Email: rburch@brucknerburch.com


NOW HEALTH: Faces Dawson Suit Over Violation of Disabilities Act
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Now Health Group,
Inc. The case is styled as Leshawn Dawson, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated v. Now Health Group, Inc., Case No.
1:20-cv-06196 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 6, 2020).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Now Health Group, Inc., doing business as NOW Foods, manufactures
and distributes food products. The Company offers dietary
supplements, natural foods, sports nutrition, and personal care
products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Phone: (929) 575-4175
          Fax: (929) 575-4195
          Email: joseph@cml.legal


NVIDIA CORP: Securities Suit Parties' Briefs May Exceed Page Limit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California has entered an order allowing
parties to exceed page limitations for briefing on the Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss in In re NVIDIA CORPORATION SECURITIES
LITIGATION. This Document Relates to: All Actions, Case No.
4:18-cv-07669-HSG (N.D. Cal.)

Pursuant to Local Rules 7-11 and 7-12, and with consent of Lead
Plaintiffs E. Ohman J:or Fonder AB and Stichting Pensioenfonds PGB,
Defendants NVIDIA, Jensen Huang, Colette Kress, and Jeff Fisher,
jointly move the Court for leave to (1) file a motion to dismiss
that exceeds Local Rule 7-2(b)'s 25-page limitation by up to 10
pages; (2) allow the Plaintiffs to file an opposition to the
Defendants' motion to dismiss that exceeds Local Rule 7-3(a)'s
25-page limitation by up to 10 pages; and (3) file a reply to the
Plaintiffs' opposition that exceeds Local Rule 7-3(c)'s 15-page
limitation by up to 5 pages

On May 13, 2020, the Plaintiffs filed their First Amended
Consolidated Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Federal
Securities Laws, which contains 263 separately numbered paragraphs
on 83 pages.  The First Amended Complaint alleges that 13 separate
statements made by the Defendants over the 18-month Class Period
were actionably false under the federal securities laws, and each
such statement was made in a separate public document and/or
forum.

The Defendants intend to file a motion to dismiss each of the
Plaintiffs' claims on the ground that each of these claims fail to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  They are filing
one single motion to dismiss on behalf of all four Defendants.

Although they endeavor to keep their Motion as brief as possible,
the Defendants believe that they cannot adequately address each of
their arguments in the 25 pages afforded by Local Rule 7-2(b)  They
submit that their Motion is concise, free of repetition, and
addresses only pertinent points and authorities, but that an
additional 10 pages is needed to fully address each of the
foregoing arguments and supporting authority.

The Plaintiffs intend to file a single opposition to the four
Defendants' motion to dismiss.  Although they respectfully submit
that their Opposition will be concise, free of repetition, and
address only pertinent points and authorities raised in the
Defendants' Motion, the Plaintiffs anticipate requiring an
additional 10 pages beyond the 25 pages afforded by Local Rule
7-3(a) to adequately oppose the Defendants' Motion in light of the
heightened page limit that the Defendants request.

In consideration of the heightened page limits of the Motion and
Opposition, the Defendants' believe their reply to the Plaintiffs'
Opposition cannot be adequately stated in the 15 pages afforded by
Local Rule 7-3(c).  

Accordingly, it is stipulated between the parties, by and through
their counsel of record, and Judge Gilliam granted, that (i) the
Defendants' Motion may exceed the page limitation in Local Rule
7-2(b) by 10 pages; (ii) the Plaintiffs' Opposition to the
Defendants' Motion may exceed the page limitation in Local Rule
7-3(a) by 10 pages; and (iii) the Defendants' reply to the
Plaintiffs' Opposition may exceed the page limitation in Local Rule
7-3(c) by five pages.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 17, 2020 Order is available at
https://is.gd/mVFB1y from Leagle.com.

JOHN C. DWYER -- dwyerjc@cooley.com -- PATRICK E. GIBBS --
pgibbs@cooley.com -- SARAH M. LIGHTDALE, CLAIRE A. McCORMACK,
SAMANTHA A. KIRBY, COOLEY LLP, Palo Alto, CA Attorneys for
Defendants NVIDIA CORPORATION, JENSEN HUANG, COLETTE KRESS, and
JEFF FISHER.

OAKLAND COUNTY, MI: Court Certifies Jail Class in Cameron Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan,
Southern Division, issued an Opinion granting provisionally the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification in the case captioned
JAMAAL CAMERON, RICHARD BRIGGS, RAJ LEE, MICHAEL CAMERON, and
MATTHEW SAUNDERS, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. MICHAEL BOUCHARD, CURTIS D.
CHILDS, and OAKLAND COUNTY, Defendants. Civil Case No. 20-10949.
(E.D. Mich.)

Michael Bouchard is the Sheriff of Oakland County, Michigan.

The case addresses whether persons with a limited ability to
protect themselves from the threat of this serious and deadly
coronavirus due to their incarceration in Michigan's Oakland County
Jail ("Jail") are being adequately protected. If they are not, the
Court says must provide some remedy, as "[p]risoners retain the
essence of human dignity inherent in all persons" and failing to
protect them from serious harm "is incompatible with the concept of
human dignity and has no place in civilized society," citing Brown
v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 510-11 (2011).

The Plaintiffs-Petitioners, five Jail inmates, filed this putative
class action lawsuit, claiming that the Defendants are acting with
deliberate indifference in response to the serious risk that
COVID-19 poses to incarcerated individuals. Because COVID-19
presents a specifically dire threat to "medically-vulnerable
individuals"--a term that has become basic to the lexicon in the
last several months, the Plaintiffs seek the temporary release of
inmates within this category.

On April 17, 2020, the Plaintiffs filed a combined putative class
action complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and a
representative habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2241.
The Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of all current and future
Jail detainees ("Jail Class"), as well as the following
subclasses:

   * The First Subclass (Pre-trial Subclass) is defined as [a]ll
     current and future persons detained at the Oakland County
     Jail during the course of the COVID-19 pandemic who have not
     yet been convicted of the offense for which they are
     currently held in the Jail;

   * The Second Subclass (Post-conviction Subclass) is defined as
     [a]ll current and future persons detained at the Oakland
     County Jail during the course of the COVID-19 pandemic who
     have been sentenced to serve time in the Jail or who are
     otherwise in the Jail as the result of an offense for which
     they have already been convicted; and

   * The Third Subclass (Medically-Vulnerable Subclass) is
     defined as [a]ll members of the Jail class who are also over
     the age of fifty or who, regardless of age, experience an
     underlying medical condition that places them at particular
     risk of serious illness or death fromCOVID-19. . . .

On April 17, the Plaintiffs also filed a Motion to Certify Class.
They further filed an Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order ("TRO") and Preliminary Injunction in which they asked the
Court to order (i) the release of members of the
Medically-Vulnerable Subclass pending briefing and argument and
(ii) the undertaking of certain measures to improve hygiene and
safety at the Jail.

The Court concludes that Section 2241 is the proper vehicle for the
Plaintiffs to challenge the continued confinement of
medically-vulnerable Jail inmates during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Notably, federal judges have the authority to release detainees on
bail while their habeas petitions are pending, citing Lee v. Jabe,
989 F.2d 869, 871 (6th Cir. 1993), among other cases.

At this preliminary stage, the Court concludes that the Prison
Litigation Reform Act's exhaustion requirement does not preclude
the Plaintiffs from pursuing their claims in this lawsuit.

At this time the Court is modifying the Medically-Vulnerable
Subclass to include individuals 60 years of age and older or who,
regardless of age, experience any of the following underlying
medical conditions: (i) chronic lung disease including chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease (e.g., bronchitis or emphysema); (ii)
moderate to severe asthma; (iii) serious heart conditions; (iv)
immunocompromising conditions including cancer treatment, bone
marrow or organ transplantation, immune deficiencies, poorly
controlled HIV or AIDS, and prolonged use of corticosteroids and
other immune weakening medications: (v) severe obesity (body mass
index of 40 or higher); (vi) diabetes; (vii) chronic kidney or
liver disease; (viii) metabolic disorders; or (ix) current or
recent (last two weeks) pregnancy.

The Court also concludes that the Jail Class and Subclasses as
defined in this Opinion meet the requirements for class
certification and should be provisionally certified. This
provisional determination is made with the understanding that it
"may be altered or amended before final judgment."

The Court also opines that because the Plaintiffs allege a
deprivation of their constitutional right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment and the Court finds that the Plaintiffs will
likely succeed on the merits of this claim, the Court finds that
the Plaintiffs satisfy the irreparable harm requirement for issuing
a preliminary injunction.

Court's Conclusion

In this case, the Plaintiffs have shown a substantial likelihood
that the Defendants are being deliberately indifferent to the risk
that COVID-19 poses to Jail inmates, particularly
medically-vulnerable inmates. Without injunctive relief, the
Plaintiffs will suffer immediate irreparable injury for which there
is no adequate remedy at law, in that they will face a high risk of
serious illness or death from exposure to coronavirus. The issuance
of a preliminary injunction will not inflict greater or undue
injury upon those restrained or third parties and the issuance of a
preliminary injunction order will serve the public interest.

The Court finds that the relief it is ordering is narrowly drawn,
is the least intrusive means, and extends no further than necessary
to correct the harm that the Court finds requires preliminary
relief. The Court has given substantial weight to any adverse
impact on public safety and the operation of the criminal justice
system caused by the preliminary relief and shall respect the
principles of comity in tailoring this preliminary relief.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 21, 2020 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ybrof7vd from Leagle.com.


OKLAHOMA: Cherokee Citizens File Class Action
---------------------------------------------
Jack Healy, writing for The New York Times, reports that Kelsey
Lipp was sitting in jail, charged with robbery and murder, when her
lawyer walked into court with three pieces of paper and a new plan
to get her case thrown out.

The documentation he had looked sparse: A letter identifying Ms.
Lipp as a citizen of the Cherokee Nation and grainy photocopies of
her tribal identification card. But under a landmark Supreme Court
decision in July declaring that a huge patch of Oklahoma sits on a
Native American reservation, those papers now meant that the state
could not prosecute Ms. Lipp or thousands of other tribal citizens
like her.

"It's a no-brainer," her Tulsa County public defender, Jack Gordon,
said.

The Supreme Court ruling recognizing the lands of the Muscogee
(Creek) Nation was hailed as a historic win for tribes and their
long struggle for sovereignty. On the ground, it has upended
Oklahoma's justice system, forcing lawyers and the police to
rewrite the rules of whom they can and cannot prosecute inside the
newly recognized borders of a reservation that stretches across 11
counties and includes Tulsa, the state's second-largest city.

Prosecutors are giving police officers laminated index cards that
spell out how to proceed depending on whether suspects and victims
are "Indian" or "non-Indian."

"It's unprecedented," said R. Trent Shores, the United States
attorney for the Northern District of Oklahoma in Tulsa.

Elected district attorneys handle most criminal cases in America,
but they generally have little to no authority over tribal citizens
for crimes committed on reservations. So now, from downtown Tulsa
through rolling farms and dozens of small towns in eastern
Oklahoma, local prosecutors are handing off hundreds of criminal
cases involving tribal victims and defendants.

"My voice mail got filled up in two hours," said Stephen Lee, a
criminal defense lawyer in Tulsa. "People with loved ones who are
locked up, people with pending cases."

Local prosecutors are referring dozens of murders, robberies and
sexual assaults to federal prosecutors, who have responsibility for
major crimes on tribal lands. Lesser cases are being handed over to
tribal courts, which can only hand down smaller fines and sentences
of a year or less in most cases.

The flood of new cases is threatening to overwhelm the smaller
rosters of judges, attorneys and victims' advocates in federal and
tribal courts. There are just two judges on the Muscogee Nation's
court, and tribal officials say they will need more money and staff
to handle hundreds of additional cases.

The fatal shooting that led to Ms. Lipp's arrest began when a
25-year-old man was lured to her apartment in July 2018 on the
promise he would get a kiss in exchange for $100, investigators
say. The victim, Dustin Barham, was robbed and shot, bleeding to
death, prosecutors say. Ms. Lipp, her cousin and cousin's boyfriend
have been charged in his killing.

Mr. Gordon, Ms. Lipp's lawyer, said Ms. Lipp denied any role in the
murder, and hoped that moving the case from state court to federal
court could lead to a plea deal or re-examination of what he called
a flawed case against Ms. Lipp. "We're better off over there," he
said.

Mr. Barham's mother, Andra, said she had already waited two years
for justice for her dead son, whom she called a "good-hearted
person," and worried that refiling the criminal case in federal
court would add years of additional delays.

"We're looking at starting over," she said. "It's frustrating."

The Muscogee Nation established its court system in 1867, and
tribal prosecutors and judges say their courtrooms are the best
forums for Indigenous people to get justice and a fair hearing. "We
understand these people are going back into our community," said
Gregory Bigler, one of the Muscogee district judges.

But they are now confronting a thicket of complications: How will
the tribal court in the small town of Okmulgee, home of the
Muscogee (Creek) Nation's headquarters, handle cases when people
are arrested an hour away in Tulsa for shoplifting or low-level
drug possession? Does it make sense to spend money jailing them or
transporting them to hearings?

"We're going to have to grow exponentially," said Shannon Prescott,
the other Muscogee district judge.

One recent morning, the tribal court was shuffling through the
day's criminal charges and pleas through a video hearing when a
bald man in an orange jumpsuit shuffled in front of the camera. He
had been arrested in Tulsa on a charge of threatening violence but
was brought to the Okmulgee County Jail and handed over to tribal
court when the police realized he had an Osage ancestry.

"That would have been a Tulsa case," Mark Thetford, a Muscogee
prosecutor, said. "It's kind of crazy right now."

In Tulsa, federal prosecutors have vowed "seamless jurisdiction"
and said tribes and law enforcement agencies have a long history of
cooperation. Nevertheless, the federal government is scrambling to
find more lawyers and staff members to handle the surge. The U.S.
attorney's office in Tulsa files about 250 felony cases annually,
compared with the 6,000 felonies that churn through Tulsa's county
courts each year.

"It's a lot more than we normally do," Mr. Shores, the United
States attorney, said. "There's only so much we're able to take."

Native Americans convicted by state courts have begun filing
appeals arguing the state did not have the power to try them. Four
Cherokee citizens have filed a class-action lawsuit demanding that
Oklahoma return millions of dollars in court fees and fines that
Indigenous defendants have been ordered to pay over the years.

Some criminal cases have been upended when the victim, not the
defendant, turns out to be a tribal member.

Dustin Dennis, who prosecutors said was not a tribal member, was
charged with second-degree murder in July after his young son and
daughter, Teagan, 4, and Ryan, 3, were found dead in his sweltering
pickup. The children climbed into the car and were apparently
overcome by the heat while Mr. Dennis slept, prosecutors said.

Tulsa County prosecutors had to drop the case when it turned out
the children were Cherokee on their mother's side. Mr. Dennis was
charged federally with child neglect, but the Tulsa district
attorney, Steve Kunzweiler, said it had been devastating to tell
the children's mother he was dropping the case.

"She thinks she's on her path to justice, and I'm telling her I
have to dismiss this charge," Mr. Kunzweiler said. "I'm just
worried about all these victims out there who've believed they're
getting justice only to have justice interrupted."

Mr. Shores, the U.S. attorney in Tulsa, said his office had reached
out to the children's mother to assure her they were continuing the
case. In a brief interview, the mother, Cheyenne Trent, said that
"I just want justice for my two babies, that's it."

Beyond crime scenes and courtrooms, the ripples are radiating to
other reservations across Oklahoma.

The Supreme Court's decision dealt with the boundaries of the
Muscogee (Creek) Nation, but nearly half of Oklahoma rests on land
of five tribes whose members were forced west along the Trail of
Tears in the 1800s -- an expanse with nearly 2 million residents.

Legal experts say that eastern Oklahoma's other tribes -- the
Choctaw, Chickasaw, Seminole and Cherokee nations -- now have
strong arguments that their lands should also be legally recognized
as reservations.

The question now, Indigenous leaders and activists said, is whether
they will be able to hold on to their recent gains or see them
undone. [GN]


OREGON MUTUAL: Baker Files Breach of Contract Suit in California
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Oregon Mutual
Insurance Company. The case is styled as Steven Baker, Melania
Kang, doing business as: Chloe's Cafe D/B/A Chloe's Cafe, a
California general partnership, individually and on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated v. Oregon Mutual
Insurance Company, an Oregon Corporation, Case No. 3:20-cv-05467-LB
(N.D. Cal., Aug. 6, 2020).

The nature of suit is stated as Insurance for Breach of Insurance
Contract.

Oregon Mutual Insurance is an independent mutual insurance company
providing property and casualty coverages for individuals,
families, and businesses in the U.S. states of Oregon, Idaho,
California, and Washington.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Daniel Jack Veroff, Esq.
          MERLIN LAW GROUP
          1160 Battery Street East, Suite 100
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Phone: (415) 874-3370
          Fax: (415) 874-3017
          Email: dveroff@merlinlawgroup.com


P.F. CHANG'S: Court Certifies Class of Servers in Belt FLSA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, STEVEN BELT, et al., Plaintiffs. v. P.F. CHANG'S CHINA
BISTRO, INC., Defendant, Civil Action No. 18-3831 (E.D. Pa.), Judge
Anita B. Brody of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania granted the Plaintiffs' motion for conditional
certification of the matter as an FLSA collective action and
court-authorized notice.

Plaintiffs Belt, Laura Council, Grace Castro, and James Harris, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, bring the
collective action and class action against Defendant P.F. Chang's,
alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), the
Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act, the Maryland Wage Payment and
Collection Law, and the Maryland Wage and Hour Law.

P.F. Chang's operates hundreds of restaurants throughout the United
States.  At the time of the filing of the Complaint, the Plaintiffs
had been employed as servers at various P.F. Chang's restaurants.
The Plaintiffs were required to perform three different categories
of work: tipped work, untipped work related to their occupation as
servers, and work unrelated to their occupation as servers.

The Plaintiffs contend that P.F. Chang's violates the FLSA by
paying servers a "tip credit" wage, rather than the standard
minimum wage,2 when servers perform (1) non-tipped tasks unrelated
to their tipped occupation, and (2) non-tipped tasks related to
their tipped occupation for more than 20% of the workweek.
Consequently, the Plaintiffs contend that as a result of P.F.
Chang's failure to correctly calculate their regular rate of pay,
it also violates the FLSA by failing to correctly pay them for
overtime -- the "time and a half" of their regular rate for every
hour they worked over forty hours in a week.

Pursuant to the FLSA's collective action provision, 29 U.S.C.
Section 216(b), the Plaintiffs move for conditional certification
of the matter as an FLSA collective action and court-authorized
notice.  

Specifically, they move for an order: (1) granting conditional
certification of a class comprised of all servers who worked at
P.F. Chang's in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and
Wisconsin in the last three years and 288 days (9.5 months); (2)
compelling P.F. Chang's to provide the Plaintiffs' attorneys with
the names, last known contact information, and dates of employment
for all potential class members; (3) permitting the Plaintiffs'
attorneys to send court-authorized notice to all the potential
class members; and (4) providing for a 60-day period from the date
notices are mailed for potential class members to join the action
by filing consents to sue with the Court.

Judge Brody grants the Plaintiffs' motion for conditional
certification because they have made a modest factual showing that
all servers in the putative class are similarly situated.  She
finds that the 11 declarations submitted by the Plaintiffs are
sufficient to make a preliminary determination that the named
Plaintiffs have made a 'modest factual showing' that the employees
identified in their complaint are 'similarly situated.'
Additionally, P.F. Chang's defense that the Plaintiffs' claims are
too individualized is unavailing at this stage.  The Defendant's
claim or defense that the Plaintiffs' claims are too individualized
to be litigated collectively are relevant to determination of a
stage two decertification issue after discovery has closed.

P.F. Chang's argues that the collective action should be limited to
the named Plaintiffs and only those opt-in Plaintiffs who worked in
restaurants in Pennsylvania because the Court lacks personal
jurisdiction over P.F. Chang's as to any opt-in servers who did not
work in Pennsylvania.  Specifically, it argues that the holding in
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company v. Superior Court of California, 137
S.Ct. 1773 (2017) ("BMS"), extends to opt-ins in an FLSA collective
action brought in federal court.

Judge Brody holds that despite P.F. Chang's desire to eliminate
most of the collective action class prior to conditional
certification, it is inappropriate to reach the question of
personal jurisdiction before individuals have even been given
notice of the collective action and the opportunity to opt-in.  The
FLSA clearly indicates that the Court cannot decide whether it has
jurisdiction over individuals who have not yet opted-in because
they are not parties to the collective action.

It would be odd indeed for the Court to have to determine personal
jurisdiction for the limited number of individuals who have
consented to join the action at this point and then again as each
additional individual joined the suit.  Such piecemeal
jurisdictional analysis would quickly impair one of the benefits of
the FLSA -- to yield efficiencies for the judicial system.  Because
it is premature to conduct any personal jurisdiction analysis, the
Judge declines to issue an advisory opinion as to whether BMS
applies to FLSA collective actions.

In order to facilitate notice, the Plaintiffs request that the
Court order P.F. Chang's to produce, within seven days of the
Court's order granting conditional certification, a list of all
servers who worked at P.F. Chang's in the last three years and 288
days (9.5 months) in any of the states included in the collective
action.  They request a sixty-day opt-in period from the date of
mailing of the notice for the collective members to join the
action.  P.F. Chang's seeks to limit the Plaintiffs method of
distributing notice to first-class U.S. Mail, arguing that sending
email and text message notice would be redundant.

Because the proposed notice is timely, accurate, and informative,
and the method of distribution is reasonable, the Judge approves
the Plaintiffs' proposed notice plan.  While the method and manner
of notice are approved, she recognizes that some minor edits to the
language of the notice are necessary before distribution to
eligible putative class members.

For these reasons, Judge Brody conditionally certified the proposed
collective action and approved the Plaintiffs' proposed notice
plan.  However, the Plaintiffs' counsel cannot distribute the
notice until after the Court authorizes minor edits to the language
of the notice that are necessary prior to distribution.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 8, 2020 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/bnG4eQ from Leagle.com.

PACIFIC BELL: Appeal from Class Cert. Order in Meza Suit Dismissed
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DAVE MEZA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. PACIFIC BELL
TELEPHONE COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent, Case No. F077604 (Cal.
App.), a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals of
California for the Fifth District dismissed the Plaintiff's appeals
from a trial court's order partially granting and partially denying
class certification in his action against his former employer
alleging wage and hour violations.

The Plaintiff filed an action, on behalf of himself and "a class
and subclasses" of premises technicians employed by the Defendant.
The second amended complaint contained nine causes of action,
seeking recovery for failure to pay various items of compensation,
failure to give accurate and complete wage statements, unfair
competition, and wrongful termination in violation of public
policy; it also sought statutory penalties for Labor Code
violations under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004.  

The second amended complaint defined three classes and two
subclasses, and alleged the claims of the Plaintiff and the classes
presented common questions of law and fact, including whether the
Defendant implemented a systematic practice by which it unlawfully
failed to pay the Plaintiff and the class members for all hours
worked in accordance with California law.

The Plaintiff filed a motion for class certification, alleging the
Defendant failed to provide legally compliant meal and rest periods
to its premises technicians by adopting and implementing mandatory
policies and practices that controlled their activities during
their meal and rest periods to such a degree that such purported
meal and rest periods were not 'duty free' but constituted `hours
worked.  He asserted the Defendant did not pay the class members
for their noncompliant meal and rest periods, and did not pay the
meal and rest period premium wages due when a compliant meal or
rest period was not provided.  As a result, the class members' wage
statements did not accurately reflect all hours worked.
Additionally, the class members whose employment terminated during
the class period were not paid all wages due upon termination and
are owed statutory penalty wages.

The Plaintiff's motion for class certification identified six
classes and subclasses that he sought to have certified.  The trial
court granted certification of the sixth class only, finding the
Plaintiff had not established that the claims of the other proposed
classes presented common issues that could be addressed on a
classwide basis.  The Plaintiff filed the appeal of the order
denying class certification of the first five proposed classes.

After the Plaintiff's opening brief was filed, the Defendant moved
to dismiss the appeal, asserting the order was nonappealable and
the "death knell" doctrine did not make it appealable because the
class claims were not effectively dismissed as a result of the
order.  In response, the Plaintiff requested that, if the order is
nonappealable, the Court treats the appeal as a petition for writ
of mandate and determine it on the merits.

As a threshold matter, the three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals of California for the Fifth District considers the
Defendant's motion to dismiss the appeal, which is based on the
contention the Plaintiff is appealing from a nonappealable order.
The death knell doctrine is one exception to the one final judgment
rule.   

The Panel concludes that, because the trial court granted
certification in part, and because the Plaintiff's representative
PAGA claim remains pending, the death knell doctrine does not apply
to the challenged order and it is not immediately appealable.  The
existence of an appealable order or judgment is a jurisdictional
prerequisite to an appeal.  Accordingly, if the order or judgment
is not appealable, the appeal must be dismissed.

The Plaintiff argues that, if the order is not appealable, the
Appellate Court should not dismiss the appeal, but treat it as a
petition for a writ of mandate and review the merits of his
challenge to the order denying class certification.  In the absence
of extraordinary circumstances, courts have declined to treat an
appeal from a nonappealable order as a petition for a writ of
mandate.

The Panel concludes that the Plaintiff has not demonstrated
extraordinary circumstances exist in the case that warrant treating
his purported appeal as a petition for writ of mandate.  The
Plaintiff has not demonstrated any extraordinary or unusual
circumstances that would make an appeal after final judgment an
inadequate remedy for any error in the denial of his motion for
class certification.  He has not shown the order will evade review
if it is not reviewed immediately by writ.  The Plaintiff has not
shown his purported appeal presents important issues of continuing
public interest or significant legal impact, that should be
reviewed immediately for the benefit of interested persons
statewide.  He does not suggest the matter presents an issue of
first impression.  The Plaintiff also has not shown that the only
issue in dispute is a legal issue, presented by undisputed facts,
or that both parties are seeking immediate resolution of that
issue.  

Thus, he has not established any of the circumstances which, in
some combination, were found to constitute extraordinary
circumstances warranting writ review in the cases discussed above.
Accordingly, his appeal from a nonappealable order must be
dismissed.  

For these reasons, the Panel dismissed the appeal.  The Defendant
is entitled to its costs on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 8, 2020 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/RipvzK from Leagle.com.

The Dion-Kindem Law Firm, Peter R. Dion-Kindem --
peter@dion-kindemlaw.com; The Blanchard Law Group and Lonnie C.
Blanchard III -- lonnieblanchard@gmail.com -- for Plaintiff and
Appellant.

Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, Thomas R. Kaufman --
tkaufman@sheppardmullin.com; Mayer Brown and Donald M. Falk, for
Defendant and Respondent.


PANERA LLC: Court Dismisses Tabler Class Suit with Leave to Amend
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BRIANNA TABLER, Plaintiff, v. PANERA LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 19-CV-01646-LHK (N.D. Cal.), Judge Lucy H. Koh of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California, San Jose
Division, granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss with leave to
amend.

Tabler is a citizen of Santa Clara County, California.  Defendant
Panera is a limited liability company that was formed under the
laws of New York and maintains headquarters in New York City.  The
Defendant manufactures, markets, and distributes sandwiches, baked
goods, and other prepared foods, including the "Whole Grain Bagel"
and "Whole Grain Bread" in retail outlets in California.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant falsely and deceptively
labels and markets the Products as "100% clean."  According to the
Plaintiff, on Jan. 13, 2017, the Defendant declared that the entire
'Panera Bread Menu is Now 100% Clean' and promoted the claim that
100% of their food is 100% clean' through its marketing, including
a television commercial, billboards, and T-shirts worn by staff at
its roughly 2,000 outlets.  The Defendant has since continued to
represent that all of the food it sells in its retail outlets,
including the Products, are '100% clean,' and that such
representations are ubiquitous at the point of sale of the
Products--on bags, signs, and labels throughout Panera's physical
locations.

Notwithstanding these statements, the Plaintiff alleges that the
Products contain the residue of glyphosate, a synthetic chemical.
Glyphosate is an artificial chemical derived from the amino acid
glycine.  It was invented by the agrochemical and agricultural
biotechnology corporation Monsanto, which marketed the biocide
under the trade name "Roundup."

According to the Plaintiff, the fact that the Products contain
glyphosate residue renders the Defendant's statements that the
Products are "100% clean" misrepresentations.  Indeed, she asserts
that the Defendant's statements indicate to reasonable consumers
that the Products do not contain residue of non-food items such as
synthetic chemicals used during the ingredients growing, harvest,
or processing.  She claims that the Defendant does not disclose
that glyphosate residue is present in the Products on the
Defendant's website, packaging, signage, or in a biannual
"Responsibility Report" that the Defendant disseminates to provide
information about the Products.

The Plaintiff alleges that Defendant is aware that the Products
contain glyphosate residue and that the Defendant is also aware of
the source of the glyphosate residue in the production process.
She asserts that the Defendant purposefully fails to disclose the
information in order to charge a premium from consumers, and in
order to ensure that consumers do not cease purchasing the Products
and switch to one of its competitors.

As previously alleged in the Plaintiff's initial complaint, the
Plaintiff purchased the Defendant's Whole Grain Bagel, as well as
other unspecified Products, at unspecified times during the class
period from three different retail outlets located in California.
The Plaintiff alleges that in deciding to make these purchases, she
saw and believed in-store signage representing that all of the
foods sold there were '100% clean.'

On March 29, 2019, the Plaintiff filed the instant putative class
action complaint against the Defendant and two related entities.
The complaint alleges causes of action under: (1) California's
Consumers Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"); (2) California's False
Advertisement Law ("FAL"); and (3) California's Unfair Competition
Law ("UCL").  On May 15, 2019, the Plaintiff filed a notice of
voluntary dismissal of the two related entities.  Thus, the
Defendant is the only remaining defendant in the instant case.

On July 10, 2019, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, or in
the alternative, to stay the instant case or strike portions of the
Plaintiff's complaint.  On Oct. 19, 2019, the Court granted the
Defendant's motion to dismiss with leave to amend and denied the
Defendant's request to stay and request to strike.

The Court instructed the Plaintiff that to the extent that she does
not plead the existence of an advertising campaign of the necessary
'extent and pervasiveness' to satisfy the In re Tobacco II
exception, the Plaintiff must set forth in chart form the
misstatements that she challenges on a numbered,
statement-by-statement basis: (1) the challenged statement, (2) the
location and timing of the statement; (3) the Product(s) covered by
the statement; (4) the date on which the Plaintiff witnessed the
statement; and (5) the Product(s) the Plaintiff purchased on the
basis of the statement.  Moreover, the Court notified that any
failure to cure deficiencies identified or in the Defendant's
motion to dismiss will result in dismissal of the deficient claims
with prejudice.

On Nov. 27, 2019, the Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint.
The FAC alleges the same three causes of action under the CLRA,
FAL, and UCL.  As before, the FAC includes a number of
representative advertisements but never specifies which particular
advertisements the Plaintiff saw and relied upon "in-store" when
purchasing Panera products.  Indeed, the FAC fails to comply with
the Court's instruction requiring the Plaintiff to set forth in
chart form the misstatements that she challenges.  Furthermore, the
FAC also fails to explain when the Plaintiff viewed any
advertisements and instead only mentions that she viewed some
advertisements at unspecified times during the class period" when
purchasing Panera products at three different retail outlets
located in California.

On Dec. 11, 2019, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the
Plaintiff's FAC.  On Dec. 26, 2019, the Plaintiff filed an
opposition to Defendant's motion to dismiss, which the Defendant
replied on Jan. 2, 2019.

In the motion to dismiss, the Defendant contends that dismissal of
the Plaintiff's FAC is again warranted because (1) the complaint
does not adequately plead reliance with sufficient specificity to
meet the heightened pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b); and (2) no reasonable consumer would understand the
Defendant's alleged statements to mean that the Products are free
of glyphosate residue.  Additionally, it asserts that the Plaintiff
is not entitled to injunctive relief because she fails to allege
future harm and that any claims predicated on products that the
Plaintiff did not purchase should be dismissed because she fails to
allege substantial similarity between the products.

Judge Koh concludes that the FAC again fails to adequately plead
reliance on specific misstatements and that the FAC does not
sufficiently plead that the In re Tobacco II exception applies.
Accordingly, she need not reach the Defendant's other arguments.

Among other things, Judge Koh finds that the Plaintiff fails to
allege reliance on the Defendant's representations with the
specificity required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).
Further, as before, the In re Tobacco II exception that the
Plaintiff invokes is narrow and unavailable under the facts
alleged.  Because the Judge concludes that the Plaintiff has failed
to satisfy the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b) and does
not qualify for the exception contemplated by In re Tobacco II, she
grants the Defendant's motion to dismiss the FAC in its entirety.

In its prior order, the Court explained that failure to cure
deficiencies identified herein or in the Defendant's motion to
dismiss will result in dismissal of the deficient claims with
prejudice.  Typically, when a plaintiff already had an opportunity
to amend the complaint but failed to address the issues that the
Court previously identified in granting a motion to dismiss,
dismissal with prejudice is warranted and appropriate.

However, the instant case is a unique one.  The Judge grants the
Plaintiff leave to amend one final time because her claims may be
able to proceed depending on which specific advertisements she
allegedly saw, believed, and relied upon.  As a result, amendment
would not necessarily be futile.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Koh dismissed the Plaintiff's FAC,
but granted the Plaintiff leave to amend one final time.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 17, 2020 Order is available at
https://is.gd/jR1m4z from Leagle.com.

PAYPAL INC: Seeks Confirmation of FAA in Friends for Health Case
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, FRIENDS FOR HEALTH: SUPPORTING THE NORTH SHORE HEALTH
CENTER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. PAYPAL, INC., et al., Defendants,
Case No. 1:17-cv-01542 (N.D. Ill.), Defendants PayPal, Inc. and
PayPal Giving Fund, pursuant to Section 9 of the Federal
Arbitration Act ("FAA"), asked Judge Martha M. Pacold of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern
Division, to confirm the final arbitration award issued in its
favor and against Plaintiff Terry Kass, and to enter judgment
thereon, and tax costs against Kass and in favor of the Defendants
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1).

The genesis of the case is a putative class action brought by Kass
and five charities, arising from a Dec. 31, 2016 transaction when
Kass used the Defendants' services to designate charitable
donations to the five charities, and others, from a $3,250
charitable donation.  

Kass, along with Friends for Health: Supporting The North Shore
Health Center, commenced the case on Feb. 28, 2017 attempting to
pursue a putative class action against the Defendants.  On Dec. 15,
2017, Kass and Friends for Health, with additional Plaintiffs DC
Central Kitchen, Highland Park-Highwood Legal Aid Clinic, Program
for Early Parent Support, and Kol Hadash Humanistic Congregation,
filed a First Amended Complaint, again seeking to assert claims on
behalf of a putative class.  The claims arise from Kass' December
2016 use of a webpage hosted by PayPal on its website that is
referred to as the "Cause Hub" to make year-end charitable
donations to benefit 13 designated charities (including the Charity
Plaintiffs).

On Jan. 23, 2018, the Defendants moved to compel individual
arbitrations pursuant to the Agreement to Arbitrate in the User
Agreement, the contract governing each of the Plaintiffs'
relationships with PayPal, Inc.  The Court granted the Defendants'
motion to compel individual arbitrations by the Plaintiffs and
stayed these proceedings on June 12, 2018.

Thereafter, Kass initiated an individual arbitration proceeding by
filing a Demand for Arbitration with the American Arbitration
Association ("AAA").  Arbitration commenced with the AAA before
arbitrator Mr. Philip Glick.  On June 19, 2020, Mr. Glick granted
summary judgment in favor of the Defendants, and against Kass, on
all Kass' claims.  

The Defendants, pursuant to Section 9 of the Federal Arbitration
Act ("FAA"), respectfully move the Court to confirm the final
arbitration award issued in its favor and against Kass, and to
enter judgment thereon, and tax costs against Kass and in favor of
the Defendants under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1).
Attorney Francis H. LoCoco certifies that he sent an email to Kass,
who is pro se, asking whether she had any objection to the Motion,
and she has indicated she objects to the Motion.

The Defendants argue that under the FAA and the contract terms,
they are entitled to reduce the arbitrator's final award to a
judgment of the Court.  The arbitrator's June 19, 2020 decision
granting them summary judgment on all claims is a final award in
the arbitration proceedings.  Furthermore, there is no basis for
Kass to move to vacate, modify, or correct the arbitrator's final
decision granting summary judgment.  

Moreover, the Defendants argue that the arbitrator's final decision
granted their summary judgment and awarded Kass none of the relief
she sought in the case.  Upon entry of judgment upon the final
award from the arbitrator, the Defendants are prevailing parties in
the case, entitling them to all costs recoverable by law.  

For these reasons, the Defendants pray that the Court enters (i) an
order granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment Affirming
Arbitration Order in all respects, and dismissing Kass' claims with
prejudice; (ii) an order taxing costs against Kass, and in favor of
the Defendants, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54; and
(iii) such further and other relief as the Court deems just and
proper.

A full-text copy of the July 8, 2020 Motion is available at
https://is.gd/RHp8n3 from Leagle.com.

Francis H. LoCoco -- frank.lococo@huschblackwell.com -- Margaret K.
Heitkamp -- margaret.heitkamp@huschblackwell.com -- HUSCH BLACKWELL
LLP, Milwaukee, WI, Attorneys for the Defendants, PayPal, Inc., and
PayPal Charitable Giving Fund.


PENTAURUS PROPERTIES: Turizo Sues Over Unsolicited Text Messages
----------------------------------------------------------------
The case, RYAN TURIZO, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. PENTAURUS PROPERTIES, LLC, Defendant, Case
No. CACE-20-012344 (Fla. Cir., 17th Judicial, Broward Cty., July
30, 2020), arises from the Defendant's violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act.

The Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly-situated consumers, alleges that the Defendant sent text
messages to his cellular telephone number using an automatic
telephone dialing system in an attempt to promote one of its
residential rental properties without prior express written
consent.

Pentaurus Properties, LLC is a real estate investment and
management company that maintains a primary place of business and
headquarters in Mountainside, New Jersey. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:          
         
         Jibrael S. Hindi, Esq.
         Thomas J. Patti, Esq.
         THE LAW OFFICES OF JIBRAEL S. HINDI
         110 SE 6th Street, Suite 1744
         Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
         Telephone: (954) 907-1136
         Facsimile: (855) 529-9540
         E-mail: jibrael@jibraellaw.com
                 tom@jibraellaw.com

                - and –

         Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq.
         HIRALDO P.A.
         40l E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400
         Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
         Telephone: (954) 400-4713
         E-mail: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com

PFIZER INC: Order on Hess' Claim in Securities Class Suit Entered
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Laura Taylor Swain of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York has entered an order on Claimant
William R. Hess' communication relating to his claim in the case,
IN RE PFIZER INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION, Case No. 04 CV 9866-LTS
(S.D. N.Y.).

The Court has received the attached communication dated June 18,
2020, from the Claimant relating to the matter.  It has redacted
the referenced financial account number and social security number
in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a).  The unredacted original
will be filed under seal.  The counsel for the Plaintiff was
directed to ascertain the status or disposition of the Claimant's
claim and report the results of its investigation to the Claimant
and the Court by July 31, 2020.  The Chambers will mail a copy of
the Order, without the attachment, to Mr. Hess.

The Order is in reference to a notice of settlement in the class
action suit against Pfizer.  The case includes all persons and
entities who purchased and/or otherwise acquired Pfizer, Inc.
common stock between and including Oct. 31, 2000 and Oct. 19, 2005.


A full-text copy of the Court's July 1, 2020 Order is available at
https://is.gd/UAS9nb from Leagle.com.

PG&E CORP: Hearing on Bid to Dismiss Vataj Suit Set for August 20
-----------------------------------------------------------------
PG&E Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 30, 2020, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2020, that the hearing on the
motion to dismiss the class action suit entitled, Vataj v. Johnson
et al., is currently set for August 20, 2020

On October 25, 2019, a purported securities class action was filed
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, entitled Vataj v. Johnson et al.

The complaint named as defendants a current director and certain
current and former officers of PG&E Corporation. Neither PG&E
Corporation nor the Utility was named as a defendant. The complaint
alleged materially false and misleading statements regarding PG&E
Corporation's wildfire prevention and safety protocols and
policies, including regarding the Utility's public safety power
shutoffs, that allegedly resulted in losses and damages to holders
of PG&E Corporation's securities.

The complaint asserted claims under Section 10(b) and Section 20(a)
of the federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder, and sought unspecified monetary relief,
attorneys' fees and other costs.

On February 3, 2020, the District Court granted a stipulation
appointing Iron Workers Local 580 Joint Funds, Ironworkers Locals
40,361 & 417 Union Security Funds and Robert Allustiarti co-lead
plaintiffs and approving the selection of the plaintiffs' counsel,
and further ordered the parties to submit a proposed schedule by
February 13, 2020. On February 20, 2020, the District Court issued
a scheduling order that required the amended complaint to be filed
by April 17, 2020.

On April 17, 2020, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint
asserting the same claims. The amended complaint added PG&E
Corporation and a former officer of PG&E Corporation as defendants,
and no longer asserts claims against the other two officers of PG&E
Corporation previously named in the action.

On May 15, 2020 the officer defendants filed their motion to
dismiss in Vataj. On June 19, 2020, the lead plaintiff filed its
opposition to the motion to dismiss. On July 10, 2020 the officer
defendants filed their reply. The hearing is currently set for
August 20, 2020.

As of July 29, 2020, PG&E Corporation had not yet been served with
this complaint.

PG&E said, "Given the early stages of the litigations, including
but not limited to the fact that defendants’ motions to dismiss
have not yet been decided and no discovery has occurred in the
consolidated securities actions or the de-energization class
action, PG&E Corporation and the Utility are unable to reasonably
estimate the amount of any potential loss."

PG&E Corporation, through its subsidiary, Pacific Gas and Electric
Company, engages in the sale and delivery of electricity and
natural gas to residential, commercial, industrial, and
agricultural customers in northern and central California, the
United States. On January 29, 2019, PG&E Corporation Inc. filed a
voluntary petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California.


PG&E CORP: Motions to Dismiss PERA New Mexico Suit Pending
----------------------------------------------------------
PG&E Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 30, 2020, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2020, that motions to dismiss the
third amended complaint in the consolidated class action suit
entitled, In re PG&E Corporation Securities Litigation, headed by
the Public Employees Retirement Association of New Mexico ("PERA")
as lead plaintiff, are still pending.

In June 2018, two purported securities class actions were filed in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, naming PG&E Corporation and certain of its current and
former officers as defendants, entitled David C. Weston v. PG&E
Corporation, et al. and Jon Paul Moretti v. PG&E Corporation, et
al., respectively.  

The complaints alleged material misrepresentations and omissions
related to, among other things, vegetation management and
transmission line safety in various PG&E Corporation public
disclosures.

The complaints asserted claims under Section 10(b) and Section
20(a) of the federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder, and sought unspecified monetary relief,
interest, attorneys' fees and other costs.

Both complaints identified a proposed class period of April 29,
2015 to June 8, 2018.

On September 10, 2018, the court consolidated both cases and the
litigation is now denominated In re PG&E Corporation Securities
Litigation. The court also appointed the Public Employees
Retirement Association of New Mexico ("PERA") as lead plaintiff.

The plaintiff filed a consolidated amended complaint on November 9,
2018. After the plaintiff requested leave to amend its complaint to
add allegations regarding the 2018 Camp fire, the plaintiff filed a
second amended consolidated complaint on December 14, 2018.

Due to the commencement of the Chapter 11 Cases, PG&E Corporation
and the Utility filed a notice on February 1, 2019, reflecting that
the proceedings were automatically stayed pursuant to section
362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.

On February 15, 2019, PG&E Corporation and the Utility filed a
complaint in Bankruptcy Court against the plaintiff seeking
preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to extend the stay to
the claims alleged against the individual officer defendants.

On February 22, 2019, a third purported securities class action was
filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of California, entitled York County on behalf of the York County
Retirement Fund, et al. v. Rambo, et al. (the "York County
Action").

The complaint names as defendants certain current and former
officers and directors, as well as the underwriters of four public
offerings of notes from 2016 to 2018. Neither PG&E Corporation nor
the Utility is named as a defendant.

The complaint alleges material misrepresentations and omissions in
connection with the note offerings related to, among other things,
PG&E Corporation's and the Utility's vegetation management and
wildfire safety measures.

The complaint asserts claims under Section 11 and Section 15 of the
Securities Act of 1933, and seeks unspecified monetary relief,
attorneys' fees and other costs, and injunctive relief.

On May 7, 2019, the York County Action was consolidated with In re
PG&E Corporation Securities Litigation.

On May 28, 2019, the plaintiffs in the consolidated securities
actions filed a third amended consolidated class action complaint,
which includes the claims asserted in the previously filed actions
and names as defendants PG&E Corporation, the Utility, certain
current and former officers and directors, and the underwriters.

On August 28, 2019, the Bankruptcy Court denied PG&E Corporation's
and the Utility's request to extend the stay to the claims against
the officer, director, and underwriter defendants.

On October 4, 2019, the officer, director, and underwriter
defendants filed motions to dismiss the third amended complaint,
which motions are currently under submission with the District
Court.

PG&E Corporation, through its subsidiary, Pacific Gas and Electric
Company, engages in the sale and delivery of electricity and
natural gas to residential, commercial, industrial, and
agricultural customers in northern and central California, the
United States. On January 29, 2019, PG&E Corporation Inc. filed a
voluntary petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California.


PHILLIPS & COHEN: Romero Sues in New Jersey Over FDCPA Violation
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against PHILLIPS & COHEN
ASSOCIATES, LTD., et al. The case is styled as Alan Hurtado Romero,
on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. PHILLIPS
& COHEN ASSOCIATES, LTD.; John Does 1-25; Case No.
2:20-cv-10099-JMV-MF (D.N.J., Aug. 6, 2020).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Phillips & Cohen Associates, Ltd., built its reputation in the
credit industry by providing specialized engagement services to
clients.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ben A. Kaplan, Esq.
          280 Prospect Ave. 6G
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 803-6611
          Fax: (877) 827-3394
          Email: ben@chulskykaplanlaw.com


PILGRIM'S PRIDE: Continues to Defend Plant Workers' Class Suits
---------------------------------------------------------------
Pilgrim's Pride Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 30, 2020, for the
quarterly period ended June 28, 2020, that the U.S. District Court
for the District of Marland overseeing employees' class suits has
issued a series of Standing Orders related to the exigent
circumstances created by COVID-19, which extended filing deadlines
by 84 days, including the deadlines for the response briefings
related to defendants' motions to dismiss.

Between August 30, 2019 and October 16, 2019, four purported class
action lawsuits were filed in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Maryland against the company (PPC) and a number of
other chicken producers, as well as WMS (Webber, Meng, Sahl and
Company) and Agri Stats.

The plaintiffs seek to represent a nationwide class of processing
plant production and maintenance workers ("Plant Workers"). They
allege that the defendants conspired to fix and depress the
compensation paid to Plant Workers in violation of the Sherman Act
and seek damages from January 1, 2009 to the present.

On November 12, 2019, the Maryland Court ordered the consolidation
of the four cases for pretrial purposes. The defendants (including
PPC) jointly moved to dismiss the consolidated complaint on
November 22, 2019. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs informed the
defendants and the Maryland Court that they would be amending their
complaint, which they did on December 20, 2019.

The consolidated amended complaint asserts largely similar
allegations to the pleadings in the consolidated complaint, but was
extended to include more class members and turkey processors as
well as chicken processors.

The defendants filed motions to dismiss the consolidated amended
complaint on March 2, 2020, with oppositions originally due on
April 24, 2020 and replies on May 21, 2020. The Maryland Court has
issued a series of Standing Orders related to the exigent
circumstances created by COVID-19, which extended filing deadlines
by 84 days, including the deadlines for the response briefings
related to defendants' motions to dismiss.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Pilgrim's Pride Corporation engages in the production, processing,
marketing, and distribution of fresh, frozen, and value-added
chicken products in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe,
and Mexico. The company was founded in 1946 and is headquartered in
Greeley, Colorado. Pilgrim's Pride Corporation is a subsidiary of
JBS S.A.


PPG INDUSTRIES: Castro Seeks to Certify Class & Subclasses
----------------------------------------------------------
In class action lawsuit captioned as ROGELIO CASTRO, individually,
and on behalf of other members of the general public similarly
situated, v. PPG INDUSTRIES, INC., a Pennsylvania corporation;
SIERRACIN/SYLMAR CORPORATION, a California corporation; SIERRACIN
CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation; and DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive, Case No. 2:20-cv-02110-PA-MRW (C.D. Cal.), the Plaintiff
will move the Court on August 31, 2020, for an order:

   1. certify the following class and subclasses:

      Class:

      "all individuals employed by Defendants in California as
      non-exempt, hourly paid employees who worked at any time
      from January 31, 2016 through the date of class
      certification";

      Rest Break Subclass:

      "all Class Members who worked at least one shift of more
      than 3.5 hours from January 31, 2016 19 through the date
      of class certification";

      Meal Break Subclass:

      "all non-exempt, hourly paid employees who worked for the    
  
      Defendants in California at any time from January 31, 2016
      through the date of class certification, and who worked at
      least one shift of more than 6 hours; and

      Meal Break Waiver Subclass:

      "all non-exempt, hourly-paid employees who worked for the    
  
      Defendants in California at any time from January 31, 2016
      through the date of class certification and who worked at
      least one shift between five and six hours or between 10
      and 12 hours; Wage Statement Subclass: All non-exempt,
      hourly-paid employees who worked for Defendants in
      California at any time from January 31, 2019 through
      February 29, 2020 and who received at least one wage
      statement from Defendants; and

      Derivative Claims Subclass:

      "Plaintiff's complaint also includes claims pursuant to
      Labor Code sections 201, 202, 203, 204, 226, 510, 1174(d),
      1194, 1197, 1197.1, 1198, and Business & Professions Code
      section 17200, et seq. These claims are entirely or
      partially derivative of the putative class claims at issue
      in this Motion and should be certified along with them."

   2. appointing himself as representative for the proposed
      Class and Subclasses; and

   3. appointing Capstone Law APC as Class Counsel for the
      proposed Class and Subclasses.

PPG Industries is an American Fortune 500 company and global
supplier of paints, coatings, and specialty materials. With
headquarters in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, PPG operates in more than
70 countries around the globe. Sierracin/Sylmar Corporation
manufactures aircraft parts.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Melissa Grant, Esq.
          Bevin Allen Pike, Esq.
          Orlando Villalba, Esq.
          Joseph Hakakian, Esq.
          Capstone Law APC
          1875 Century Park East, Suite 1000
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 556-4811
          Facsimile: (310) 943-0396
          E-mail: Melissa.Grant@capstonelawyers.com
                  Bevin.Pike@capstonelawyers.com
                  Orlando.Villalba@capstonelawyers.com
                  Joseph.Hakakian@capstonelawyers.com

PREMIER NUTRITION: Dismissal of Sonner's Restitution Claims Upheld
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KATHLEEN SONNER, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PREMIER NUTRITION
CORPORATION, FKA Joint Juice, Inc., Defendant-Appellee, Case No.
18-15890 (9th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's order dismissing Sonner's
claims for restitution.

In March 2013, Vincent Mullins filed a putative class action
regarding "Joint Juice," a nutritional product manufactured,
marketed, and sold by Defendant-Appellee Premier.  After
substituting as the proposed class representative and named
Plaintiff, Sonner amended the complaint in September 2014.  In
April 2016, the district court certified a class of all California
consumers who had purchased Joint Juice since March 1, 2009.

The basis for the lawsuit is false advertising.  In its marketing
materials, Premier touts Joint Juice as a dietary supplement
beverage that supports and nourishes cartilage, lubricates joints,
and improves joint comfort.  But, according to Sonner, Joint Juice
fails to provide its advertised health benefits.

As originally pleaded, the complaint demanded injunctive relief
under the California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL") and Consumers
Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"), restitution under the UCL and CLRA,
and damages under an Illinois consumer protection statute.  In the
first amended complaint, Sonner dropped her claim under Illinois
law and amended the CLRA claim to seek damages because Premier
failed to correct the alleged CLRA violations pursuant to
California Civil Code Section 1782.  Both complaints demanded a
jury trial.

For years, the litigation proceeded in the typical fashion. Both
sides took discovery, engaged in motion practice, and prepared for
the looming jury trial.  But less than two months before trial was
scheduled to begin, and after defeating Premier's summary judgment
efforts, Sonner sought leave to file a second amended complaint to
drop the CLRA damages claim.  The strategy raises an obvious
question on why Sonner would voluntarily abandon an ostensibly
viable claim on the eve of trial after more than four years of
litigation.  The answer is also obvious: to request that the
district court judge award the class $32 million as restitution,
rather than having to persuade a jury to award the amount as
damages.

Premier opposed the motion for leave.  Citing futility, Premier
urged that Sonner's proposed second amended complaint would require
dismissal of the restitution claims pursuant to California's
inadequate-remedy-at-law doctrine.  Without the CLRA damages claim,
Premier argued, the proposed complaint failed to state viable
claims for restitution because an adequate legal
remedy--damages--was available for that injury.

During oral argument on the motion, the district court admonished
Sonner that if Premier successfully moved to dismiss the
restitution claims, it would not allow Sonner to amend her
complaint for a third time to reallege the CLRA damages claim.   It
explained that allowing Sonner to reassert the intentionally
dropped claim under such circumstances would reflect "total
prejudice to the court system," would be "unfair" and "prejudicial"
to Premier, and would constitute an "abuse of the court system."

The district court ultimately granted Sonner leave to amend and
vacated the jury trial.  Undeterred by Premier's arguments and the
district court's warning, Sonner filed her second amended complaint
in August 2017, dropping the CLRA damages claim.  And, true to its
word, Premier moved to dismiss the restitution claims pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Sonner
needed to--but could not--establish that she lacked an adequate
legal remedy as required by both federal equitable principles and
California law.

After full briefing and oral argument, the district court granted
Premier's motion to dismiss.  Applying its interpretation of
California law, the district court held that Sonner could not
proceed on her equitable claims for restitution in lieu of a claim
for damages.  Specifically, the district court concluded that
claims brought under the UCL and CLRA remained subject to
California's inadequate-remedy-at-law doctrine, and that Sonner
failed to establish that she lacked an adequate legal remedy for
the same past harm for which she sought equitable restitution.  The
district court also denied Sonner's request to amend her complaint
to reallege the CLRA damages claim.  

After the district court entered judgment, Sonner timely appealed
the order dismissing her claims for equitable restitution to the
Court.  Sonner argues that because her UCL and CLRA claims arise
under California law and our jurisdiction rests in diversity, state
law alone decides whether she must show a lack of an adequate legal
remedy before obtaining restitution under those statutes.  And,
according to Sonner, the California legislature abrogated the
state's inadequate-remedy-at-law doctrine for claims seeking
equitable restitution under the UCL and CLRA.

In contrast, Premier argues that federal courts in diversity are
bound by traditional federal equitable principles, including the
requirement that the party pursuing equitable relief establish that
it lacks an adequate legal remedy.  It also contends that equitable
claims for restitution under the UCL and CLRA remain subject to
California's inadequate-remedy-at-law doctrine.

Judge Bridget Shelton Bade, writing for the Third Circuit, holds
that pursuant to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, and Guaranty Trust
Co. of New York v. York, federal courts must apply equitable
principles derived from federal common law to claims for equitable
restitution under UCL and CLRA.  She opines that it has been a
fundamental principle for well over a century that state law cannot
expand or limit a federal court's equitable authority.  Erie
intervened in 1938, of course, and the merger of law and equity
followed soon after.  But in 75 years, the Supreme Court has never
repudiated its statements in York--offered seven years after
Erie--that state law can neither broaden nor restrain a federal
court's power to issue equitable relief.

At bottom, that a State may authorize its courts to give equitable
relief unhampered by the restriction that an adequate remedy at law
be unavailable cannot remove that fetter from the federal courts.
Guided by that instruction, Judge Bade holds that the traditional
principles governing equitable remedies in federal courts,
including the requisite inadequacy of legal remedies, apply when a
party requests restitution under the UCL and CLRA in a diversity
action.

Under these principles, Sonner must establish that she lacks an
adequate remedy at law before securing equitable restitution for
past harm under the UCL and CLRA.  Sonner fails to make such a
showing.  Initially, the operative complaint does not allege that
Sonner lacks an adequate legal remedy.  More importantly, Sonner
concedes that she seeks the same sum in equitable restitution as a
full refund of the purchase price--$32 million--she requested in
damages to compensate her for the same past harm.  Sonner fails to
explain how the same amount of money for the exact same harm is
inadequate or incomplete, and nothing in the record supports that
conclusion.  Accordingly, because Sonner fails to establish that
she lacks an adequate remedy at law, Judge Bade holds, albeit on
alternative grounds, that the district court did not err in
dismissing Sonner's claims for equitable restitution under the UCL
and CLRA.

Turning to the final issue before the Court, Judge Bade concludes
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Sonner leave to amend her complaint for a third time to reallege
the CLRA damages claim.  Sonner strategically chose to amend her
complaint on the eve of trial to drop her damages claim.  Premier
opposed Sonner's request to amend, arguing that Sonner needed to
establish a lack of legal remedy before seeking equitable
restitution and warning that it would file a motion to dismiss on
that basis. The district court then cautioned Sonner prior to the
amendment that it would not permit her to reallege the damages
claim because allowing her to do so would be unfair, prejudicial,
and an affront to the judicial system. Under these circumstances,
the district court did not abuse its "particularly broad"
discretion in denying leave to amend.

Judge Bade holds that regardless of whether California authorizes
its courts to award equitable restitution under the UCL and CLRA
when a plain, adequate, and complete remedy exists at law, federal
courts rely on federal equitable principles before allowing
equitable restitution in such circumstances.  And because Sonner
fails to demonstrate that she lacks an adequate legal remedy in the
case, she affirmed the district court's order dismissing Sonner's
claims for restitution.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 17, 2020 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/iWx3vM from Leagle.com.

Leslie E. Hurst (argued), Timothy G. Blood -- tblood@bholaw.com --
Thomas J. O'Reardon II -- toreardon@bholaw.com -- and Paula R.
Brown, Blood Hurst & O'Reardon LLP, San Diego, California; Todd D.
Carpenter -- todd@carpenterlawyers.com -- Carlson Lynch Sweet
Kilpela & Carpenter LLP, San Diego, California; Craig M. Peters,
Altair Law, San Francisco, California; for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Jessica Grant (argued) -- jgrant@venable.com -- Angel A. Garganta
-- AGarganta@Venable.com -- and Brian A. Featherstun, Venable LLP,
San Francisco, California, for Defendant-Appellee.

David M. Arbogast, Arbogast Law, San Carlos, California; Steven M.
Bronson, The Bronson Firm APC, San Diego, California; for Amicus
Curiae Consumer Attorneys of California.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General; Nicklas A. Akers, Senior
Assistant Attorney General; Michele Van Gelderen, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General; Michael Reynolds, Deputy Attorney General;
Office of the Attorney General, Los Angeles, California; for Amicus
Curiae State of California.

PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MD: Seth's Bid for Inmates' TRO Narrowed
----------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland issued a
Memorandum Opinion granting in part and denying in part the
Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction in the case captioned KEITH SETH, et al.,
Individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons
v. MARY LOU McDONOUGH, In her official capacity as Director of the
Prince George's County Department of Corrections, Case No.
8:20-cv-01028-PX (D. Md.).

The case concerns the health, welfare, and safety of detained
individuals housed at the Prince George's County Correctional
Center during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Plaintiffs, on behalf of
themselves and all similarly situated detainees, contend that
Director Mary Lou McDonough, in her official capacity as Director
of the Prince George's County Department of Corrections, has
abdicated her function to provide constitutionally adequate care
during the pandemic in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.

District Judge Paula Xinis says the case is in its infancy and that
the Opinion addresses the propriety of the Plaintiffs' Emergency
Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO") and Preliminary
Injunction.

The Court notes that the situation at the Facility appeared grim
and, accordingly, appointed Dr. Carlos Franco-Paredes, Program
Director of the Division of Infectious Diseases at the University
of Colorado, Denver School of Medicine, and an expert in infectious
diseases, to inspect the Facility.

Among other things, Dr. Franco-Paredes confirmed high-risk
detainees were left wholly exposed. The Defendant, although
specifically aware through CDC guidance that high-risk detainees
could easily succumb to COVID-19, and knowing that 28 staff and 18
detainees had already tested positive, implemented no functional
plan to afford such detainees any additional screening,
supervision, segregated housing, or any like measure. Simply put,
as of the report date, the Defendant had not demonstrated any plan
to address the high-risk detained population.

At the conclusion of the May 11, 2020 hearing, the Court ordered
the exchange of additional evidence to facilitate ongoing
discussions, as well as supplemental briefing on the application of
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. Section 3626, to
the proposed injunctive relief. After careful review of all
evidence presented, and for the following reasons, the Court finds
injunctive relief warranted, although on far narrower grounds than
originally proposed.

In sum, Judge Xinis opines, the Plaintiffs have established the
propriety of issuing injunctive relief, albeit on far narrower
grounds than originally proposed. The Court rules that the
Defendant must develop a comprehensive written plan to address
systematic testing and identification of COVID-19 positive
detainees; long term provision of PPE; increased training,
education, and supervision of medical staff so that COVID-19
symptomatic and positive detainees receive timely and appropriate
care; and prophylactic protections for high-risk detainees.

As for the Plaintiffs' request for immediate release for the
medically vulnerable subclass, the Court rules that, at this
juncture, it fails under the traditional factors under Winter v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008), because
they have not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of the
claim. The Court is not convinced that this subclass challenges the
"fact of" confinement where the Complaint, read most favorably to
the subclass, raises a panoply of conditions that affect all
detainees at the Facility and, if remedied, would render release
unnecessary. Thus, the Court cannot conclude that the claim
survives as a matter of law.

The Plaintiffs also seek injunctive relief for a subclass of
detainees, whom the Plaintiffs contend are currently held without
any lawful authority due to their COVID-19 positive status. The
Court says the record does not support a "policy" of detaining
COVID-19 positive detainees in contravention to a state-court
release order. Hence, the Plaintiffs' proposed injunctive relief is
denied.

Judge Xinis concludes that the Plaintiffs have convinced the Court
that temporary injunctive relief, narrowly drawn, is proper.
Likewise, the Defendant appears willing and able to implement such
relief, and the Court is encouraged that critical measures are
underway to protect the health and safety of the Facility's
detainees. The ordered relief, which follows separately, will
assure continued necessary progress.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 21, 2020 Memorandum
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9yctcan from
Leagle.com.


QUALCOMM INC: Appeal on Grant of Class Certification Order Pending
------------------------------------------------------------------
QUALCOMM Incorporated said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 29, 2020, for the
quarterly period ended June 28, 2020, that the U.S. Court Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit has not yet ruled on the company's appeal
regarding the grant of class certification motion.

Since January 18, 2017, a number of consumer class action
complaints have been filed against the company in the United States
District Courts for the Southern and Northern Districts of
California, each on behalf of a putative class of purchasers of
cellular phones and other cellular devices.

Currently, 22 cases remained outstanding.

In April 2017, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
transferred the cases that had been filed in the Southern District
of California to the Northern District of California. On May 15,
2017, the court entered an order appointing the plaintiffs' co-lead
counsel.

On July 11, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a consolidated amended
complaint alleging that the company violated California and federal
antitrust and unfair competition laws by, among other things,
refusing to license standard-essential patents to the company's
competitors, conditioning the supply of certain of its baseband
chipsets on the purchaser first agreeing to license the company's
entire patent portfolio, entering into exclusive deals with
companies, including Apple Inc., and charging unreasonably high
royalties that do not comply with the company's commitments to
standard setting organizations.

The complaint seeks unspecified damages and disgorgement and/or
restitution, as well as an order that the company be enjoined from
further unlawful conduct.

On August 11, 2017, the company filed a motion to dismiss the
consolidated amended complaint. On November 10, 2017, the court
denied the company's motion, except to the extent that certain
claims seek damages under the Sherman Antitrust Act.

On July 5, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class
certification, and the court granted that motion on September 27,
2018.

On January 23, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit (Ninth Circuit) granted the company's permission to
appeal the court's class certification order. On January 24, 2019,
the court stayed the case pending the company's appeal.

On December 2, 2019, a hearing on the company's appeal of the class
certification order was held before the Ninth Circuit.

The Ninth Circuit has not yet ruled on the company's appeal.

QUALCOMM said, "We believe the plaintiffs' claims are without
merit."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

QUALCOMM Incorporated designs, develops, manufactures, and markets
digital communication products worldwide. It operates through three
segments: Qualcomm CDMA Technologies (QCT); Qualcomm Technology
Licensing (QTL); and Qualcomm Strategic Initiatives (QSI). QUALCOMM
Incorporated was founded in 1985 and is headquartered in San Diego,
California.


QUALCOMM INC: Bid for Judgment on Pleadings Remains Pending
-----------------------------------------------------------
QUALCOMM Incorporated said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 29, 2020, for the
quarterly period ended June 28, 2020, that the company's motion for
judgment on the pleadings in the consolidated class action suit
remains pending in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California.

On January 23, 2017 and January 26, 2017, securities class action
complaints were filed by purported stockholders of the company in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of
California against it and certain of its current and former
officers and directors.

The complaints alleged, among other things, that we violated
Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended, and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, by making false and misleading
statements and omissions of material fact in connection with
certain allegations that the company is or was engaged in
anticompetitive conduct.

The complaints sought unspecified damages, interest, fees and
costs.

On May 4, 2017, the court consolidated the two actions and
appointed lead plaintiffs. On July 3, 2017, the lead plaintiffs
filed a consolidated amended complaint asserting the same basic
theories of liability and requesting the same basic relief.

On September 1, 2017, the company filed a motion to dismiss the
consolidated amended complaint. On March 18, 2019, the court denied
the company's motion to dismiss the complaint.

On January 15, 2020, the company filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings. The court has not yet ruled on our motion.

QUALCOMM said, "We believe the plaintiffs' claims are without
merit."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

QUALCOMM Incorporated designs, develops, manufactures, and markets
digital communication products worldwide. It operates through three
segments: Qualcomm CDMA Technologies (QCT); Qualcomm Technology
Licensing (QTL); and Qualcomm Strategic Initiatives (QSI). QUALCOMM
Incorporated was founded in 1985 and is headquartered in San Diego,
California.


QUALCOMM INC: Bid to Dismiss Broadcom Merger-Related Suit Pending
-----------------------------------------------------------------
QUALCOMM Incorporated said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 29, 2020, for the
quarterly period ended June 28, 2020, that the motion to dismiss
the securities class action suit entitled, In re Qualcomm/Broadcom
Merger Securities Litigation.

On June 8, 2018 and June 26, 2018, securities class action
complaints were filed by purported stockholders of the company in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of
California against the company and two of its current officers.

The complaints alleged, among other things, that the company
violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as amended, and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, by failing to disclose
that the company had submitted a notice to the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS) in January 2018.

The complaints sought unspecified damages, interest, fees and
costs.

On January 22, 2019, the court appointed the lead plaintiff in the
action. On March 18, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a consolidated
complaint asserting the same basic theories of liability and
requesting the same basic relief.

On May 10, 2019, the company filed a motion to dismiss the
consolidated complaint, and on March 10, 2020, the court granted
the company's motion.

On May 11, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint,
and on June 25, 2020, the company filed a motion to dismiss that
complaint. The court has not yet ruled on the company's motion.

QUALCOMM said, "We believe the plaintiffs’ claims are without
merit."

QUALCOMM Incorporated designs, develops, manufactures, and markets
digital communication products worldwide. It operates through three
segments: Qualcomm CDMA Technologies (QCT); Qualcomm Technology
Licensing (QTL); and Qualcomm Strategic Initiatives (QSI). QUALCOMM
Incorporated was founded in 1985 and is headquartered in San Diego,
California.


QUALCOMM INC: Canadian Consumer Class Suits Ongoing
---------------------------------------------------
QUALCOMM Incorporated said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 29, 2020, for the
quarterly period ended June 28, 2020, that the company continues to
defend consumer class action lawsuits in Canada.

Since November 9, 2017, eight consumer class action complaints have
been filed against the company in Canada (in the Ontario Superior
Court of Justice, the Supreme Court of British Columbia and the
Quebec Superior Court), each on behalf of a putative class of
purchasers of cellular phones and other cellular devices, alleging
various violations of Canadian competition and consumer protection
laws.

The claims are similar to those in the U.S. consumer class action
complaints.

The complaints seek unspecified damages.

One of the complaints in the Supreme Court of British Columbia has
since been discontinued by the plaintiffs.

The company had not yet answered the complaints.

The company expects the Ontario and British Columbia complaints
will be consolidated into one proceeding in British Columbia with a
class certification hearing no earlier than late 2020. Once the
certification hearing is scheduled, the company expects the court
to set a timetable for the exchange of evidence and briefing.

As to the complaint filed in Quebec, on April 15, 2019, the Quebec
Superior Court held a class certification hearing, and on April 30,
2019, the court issued an order certifying a class.

QUALCOMM said, "We are awaiting the court to set a timetable for
pre-trial steps, including discovery, as well as the exchange of
expert evidence. We do not expect the trial to occur before 2022.
We believe the plaintiffs’ claims are without merit."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

QUALCOMM Incorporated designs, develops, manufactures, and markets
digital communication products worldwide. It operates through three
segments: Qualcomm CDMA Technologies (QCT); Qualcomm Technology
Licensing (QTL); and Qualcomm Strategic Initiatives (QSI). QUALCOMM
Incorporated was founded in 1985 and is headquartered in San Diego,
California.


R.G. NEW YORK: Carrion Sues Over Unpaid Overtime
------------------------------------------------
JESUS S. CARRION, individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. R.G. NEW YORK TILE, INC.; AARON GAVARTIN;
and RAFAEL GAVARTIN, Defendants, Case No. 1:20-cv-05459 (S.D.N.Y.,
July 15, 2020) seeks to recover from the Defendants for unpaid or
underpaid overtime compensation.

The Plaintiff Carrion was employed by the Defendants as tile
installer.

New York Tile, Inc. provides construction services. The Company
specializes in commercial masonry, tiling, and stone. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John M. Gurrieri, Esq.
          Justin A. Zeller, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF JUSTIN A. ZELLER, P.C.
          277 Broadway, Suite 408
          New York, NY 10007-2036
          Telephone: (212) 229-2249
          Facsimile: (212) 229-2246
          E-mail: jmgurrieri@zellerlegal.com
                  jazeller@zellerlegal.com


RESULTS COMPANIES: Fails to Pay Minimum Wage, Bamberg Claims
------------------------------------------------------------
JOSEPH BAMBERG, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. THE RESULTS COMPANIES, LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 0:20-cv-61420-WPD (S.D. Fla., July 14, 2020) seeks to recover
from the Defendants unpaid wages and overtime compensation,
interest, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, and costs under the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff Bamberg was employed by the Defendant as customer
service agent.

The Results Companies LLC operates as a call center. The Company
offers customers care services in the areas of in-bound, out-bound,
quality assurance, training, analytics, and recruitment and hiring.
Results Companies serves customers in the United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          C. Ryan Morgan, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
          20 N. Orange Ave., 16th Floor
          Orlando, FL 32802-4979
          Telephone: (407) 420-1414
          Facsimile: (407) 245-3401
          E-mail: rmorgan@forthepeople.com

               - and -

          Clif Alexander, Esq.
          Austin W. Anderson, Esq.
          ANDERSON ALEXANDER, PLLC
          819 N. Upper Broadway
          Corpus Christi, Texas 78401
          Telephone: (361) 452-1279
          Facsimile: (361) 452-1284
          E-mail: clif@a2xlaw.com
                  austin@a2xlaw.com


RETAIL RECOVERY: Settlement Agreement Wins Final Approval
---------------------------------------------------------
In class action lawsuit captioned as FAITH TWYMAN and JORGE
GALLINAT, on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated, v.
RETAIL RECOVERY SERVICE OF NJ, INC.; DAVID KAPLAN; RAYMOND F.
MEISENBACHER, JR.; THOMAS M. MEISENBACHER; RAYMOND MEISENBACHER &
SONS, ESQS., P.C., Case No. 2:16-cv-02910-SCM (D.N.J.), the Hon.
Judge Steven C. Mannion granted final approval to the parties'
settlement agreement.

The Court finds that the settlement is fundamentally fair,
reasonable, and adequate, and is in the best interests of the
Settlement Class members, especially in light of the benefits
achieved on behalf of them; the risk and delay inherent in
litigation; and the limited amount of any potential recovery that
could be shared by the Settlement Class members.

Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement:

   --  The Defendants shall fund the bank account to be
       established by the Settlement Administrator within 30
       days from the date this Order.

   --  Within 40 days of the date of the Order, the Settlement
       Administrator shall mail each Settlement Class member
       their check according to the formula and process of the
       Settlement Agreement.

   --  Funds from uncashed checks will be paid as a cy pres
       award to Northeast New Jersey Legal Services, Inc.

   --  For efforts on behalf of the Class and to settle
       individual claims, the Defendants shall pay $2,500.00 to
       Plaintiff Faith Twyman, and $2,500.00 to Plaintiff
       Jorge Gallinat.

   --  The Defendants shall pay Class Counsel's reasonable fees
       and costs in the amount of $72,000.00, which payment
       includes costs and expenses (excluding the expenses of
       the Settlement Administrator), time already spent and
       time to be spent attending hearings, and the monitoring
       of the settlement. This amount does not include any time,
       if necessary, to enforce any breach of the settlement
       agreement. The fees are in addition to the settlement
       benefits each Settlement Class member will be receiving
       and are the sole property of Class Counsel, not the
       Plaintiffs or the class. The Court finds that this award,
       including the hourly rates and time expended, is fair and
       reasonable. Payment of Class Counsel's attorney's fees
       and costs shall be made and allocated pursuant to the
       terms of the Settlement Agreement.

In the lawsuit, the  Plaintiffs alleged violations of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

On April 4, 2020, the Court preliminary approved the class
settlement.  After the parties' joint request to amend the
Preliminary Approval Order, on May 12, the Court entered the
Amended Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Class Action
Settlement Agreement. The Court certified two Settlement Classes
for settlement purposes, appointed a Settlement Administrator,
approved Plaintiffs as Settlement Class Representatives, and
appointed Yongmoon Kim of the Kim Law Firm LLC as Settlement Class
Counsel.

Retail Recovery is an New Jersey collection agency.[CC]

RITE AID: Calagno Suit Removed From Super. Ct. to N.D. California
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned Nicole Calagno, individually and on behalf of a
class of similarly situated individuals v. Rite Aid Corporation,
Case No. HG20064377, was removed from the California Superior Court
for the County of Alameda to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California on Aug. 6, 2020.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:20-cv-05476 to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Other Contract.

Rite Aid Corporation is a drugstore chain in the United States.

The Plaintiff appears pro se.[BN]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Benjamin Patrick Smith, Esq.
          MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS, LLP
          One Market, Spear Street Tower
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Phone: (415) 442-1000
          Fax: (415) 442-1001
          Email: bpsmith@morganlewis.com


ROCK HOLDINGS: Hansen Stayed Pending Interlocutory Appeal Ruling
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BILL HANSEN, Plaintiff, v. ROCK HOLDINGS, INC., et
al., Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-00179-KJM-DMC (E.D. Cal.), Judge
Kimberly J. Mueller of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California (i) granted Defendants CPL Assets, LLC and
LMB Mortgage Services, Inc. ("LMB")'s motion to stay the case
pending resolution of their interlocutory appeal, (ii) granted
Defendant Digital Media Solutions, LLC's motion to stay, and (iii)
denied the Plaintiff's motion to compel two of the three Defendants
to file answers to his complaint.

Hansen filed the suit on behalf of himself and all those similarly
situated, alleging the Defendants violated the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act ("TCPA") by sending text messages advertising
mortgage refinancing services without the recipients' consent.

Defendants LMB, LowerMyBills.Com, and CPL Assets, LLC, doing
business as Core Digital Media Solutions, filed a motion to compel
arbitration of the Plaintiff's claims and stay the case pending
arbitration. Defendant Digital Media, doing business as DCMG,
joined the motion to compel.  The Defendants argued the Plaintiff
should be compelled to arbitrate his TCPA claim, because he agreed
to LMB's Terms of Use, which include an arbitration clause, when he
clicked the button "Click to See Your Free Results!" on LMB's
website.  They also argued that, if the Plaintiff did not click the
submit button, the Plaintiffs' mother, Willena Hansen, must have
done so, and her consent would have bound him to arbitration
through, among other things, the law of agency.

On Jan. 21, 2020, the Court denied the Defendants' motion to compel
arbitration because there is a genuine factual dispute over whether
the Plaintiff ever clicked the submit button and defendants did not
show the Plaintiff's mother's consent to the Terms of Use would
have legally bound him to arbitrate.

On Feb. 18, 2020, two of the three Defendants, CPS and LMB,
appealed the court's order denying the Defendants' motion to
compel.  That appeal is still pending.

On Feb. 26, 2020, the Plaintiff filed a motion to compel CPS and
LMB to file an answer to its complaint, which they have not yet
done.  CPS and LMB have opposed, and the Plaintiff filed a reply.
The same day, CPS and LMB also filed a motion to stay the case
pending the resolution of their appeal, and Digital Media joined
the motion.  The Plaintiff opposed, Defendants CPL and LMB filed a
joint reply, and Defendant Digital Media also filed a reply.  The
Court submitted the motions without hearing and resolves them.

The Defendants move for a stay on two grounds: (1) a stay is
warranted pending the Supreme Court's resolution of Barr v.
American Ass'n of Political Consultants, Inc., No. 19-631 (U.S.),
and (2) a stay is warranted pending the Ninth Circuit's resolution
of the Court's order denying the Defendants' motion to compel.  On
July 6, 2020, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Political
Consultants.  Accordingly, Judge Mueller will deny as moot the
Defendants' motion for a stay on that ground.  

Judge Mueller then addresses the Defendants' motion for a stay
pending their Ninth Circuit appeal.  Having weighed the relevant
factors and considered the parties' arguments, the Judge concludes
that Defendants CPL and LMB have demonstrated their appeal presents
serious legal questions, they would suffer irreparable injury
absent a stay pending appeal, the balance of hardships tips sharply
in their favor and the public interest favors a stay.

The Plaintiff points out that only CPL and LMB appealed the Court's
order on the motion to compel; the remaining Defendant, Digital
Media, did not.  Digital Media has joined the other Defendants'
motion to stay, arguing that the Ninth Circuit's resolution of LMB
and CPL's appeal of the Court's order denying the motion to compel
arbitration will have the same effect on all litigants in the case.
Though the arbitration agreement appears to require the Plaintiff
to arbitrate its claims against parents, affiliates, subsidiaries
or related companies of LMB, Digital Media makes no attempt to show
that it fits into any of those categories.

Nonetheless, given the inefficiencies and confusion that would
accompany a partial stay, Judge Mueller declines to grant such a
stay and adjudicate the case on separate tracks.  She hopes the
Ninth Circuit appeal will be concluded within a reasonable time in
relation to the urgency of the claims presented to the Court.
Accordingly, the stay granted to CPL and LMB will also apply to the
case against Digital Media.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Mueller denied as moot Defendants
CPL, LMB, and Digital Media's motion to stay the case against them
pending the Supreme Court's resolution of Political Consultants.
She granted Defendants CPL and LMB's motion and Digital Media's
motion for a stay pending the resolution of the appeal to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals of the Court's order denying the motion to
compel arbitration.  The parties will notify the Court within seven
days of the Ninth Circuit's decision on appeal.

The result mooted the Plaintiff's motion to compel Defendants CPL
and LMB to file an answer to his complaint; as such, that motion is
denied.

The Order resolved ECF Nos. 53 and 54.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 8, 2020 Order is available at
https://is.gd/gS4ZLu from Leagle.com.

SCHLUMBERGER LIFT: $525,000 Settlement in Garcia Suit Has Prelim OK
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CRISTOBAL GARCIA, an individual, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SCHLUMBERGER LIFT
SOLUTIONS, et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-01261-DAD JLT (E.D.
Cal.), Magistrate Judge Jennifer L. Thurston of the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of California granted the
Plaintiff's motion for preliminary approval of the class
settlement.

Garcia asserts that he and others employed by Defendants
Schlumberger suffered wage and hour violations, including lost
wages.  The Plaintiff asserts that he was employed in Kern County
by the Defendants as a non-exempt employee.  According to him, the
Defendants failed to pay employees for all hours worked.  He
alleges the Defendants also failed to provide duty-free meal
periods in a timely manner.  Furthermore, the Plaintiff asserts
that the Defendants had unlawful policies related to their
uniforms, and failed to indemnify the Plaintiff and the other Class
members for necessary expenditures and bosses incurred by the
employees in the direct discharge of their duties.

On June 5, 2018, the Plaintiff initiated the action by filing a
complaint in Kern County Superior Court.  He filed a First Amended
Complaint on Aug. 7, 2018, in which he asserted the following
claims: (1) failure to pay compensation due, (2) meal period
violations, (3) rest break violations, (4) failure to furnish
itemized wage statements, (5) failure to pay wages timely upon
termination, (6) failure to indemnify business expenses, (7)
violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17203, and
(8) civil penalties pursuant to the California Private Attorney
General Act.

He asserted the first seven cause of action were brought for
himself and on behalf of a class and sub-class initially defined as
follows:

     a. Class: All non-exempt employees of any of the Defendants
who, at any time within the period beginning four years prior to
the filing of this action through the date of class certification,
worked in California.

     b. Termination Pay Sub-Class: All members of the Class whose
employment terminated at any time within the period three years
prior to the filing of this action through the date of
certification.

In response, the Defendants sought to amend their answer to include
two additional affirmative defenses, clarify another defense, and
drop a defense. Plaintiff opposed the addition of the two
affirmative defenses, arguing that the proposed amendments are
futile because neither of those proposed are cognizable affirmative
defenses.  

In a February 24, 2020 Order, a full-text copy of which is
available at https://tinyurl.com/rhz297e from Leagle.com, the
District Court granted in part the Defendants' motion for leave to
file a first amended answer. Specifically:

a. the Defendants were granted leave to amend their answer to
clarify affirmative defense relating to the exhaustion of
administrative requirements and remove the affirmative defense that
defendants were not plaintiff's employer;

b. the Defendants were denied leave to amend their answer to add
affirmative defense on the violation of the separation of powers
based upon the court's conclusion that such an amendment would be
futile;

c. the Defendants were granted leave to amend their answer to add
affirmative defense on manageability.

On March 25, 2020, the parties engaged in mediation with Jeffrey
Krivis.  As a result of a mediator's proposal, the Parties were
able to partially resolve the action with respect to the claim for
unpaid overtime on safety bonuses and related derivative claims.  

Specifically, the parties agree: The Plaintiff's first and seventh
causes of action survive as to Settlement Class Members insofar as
they rely upon any theory of recovery other than miscalculation of
regular rate/unpaid overtime on safety bonuses.  The fifth cause of
action will be resolved, settled and released in full, for the
Settlement Class Members only. The fourth cause of action will be
resolved, settled and released in full, for the Settlement Class
Members only, as to any claims arising prior to Jan. 19, 2019.
They agree the PAGA penalties of $30,000 satisfies in full all PAGA
penalties attributable to the first and fourth causes of action or
claims alleged therein limited to the time period prior to Jan. 19,
2019, and all penalties attributable to the fifth cause of action
or claims alleged therein through the date of Final Approval.

Thereafter, the Plaintiffs filed the motion now pending for
preliminary approval of a settlement that only partially resolves
certain class action claims.  Plaintiff seeks preliminary approval
of a class settlement related only to the claim for payment of
safety bonuses by the Defendants which were not used in calculating
overtime.  Specifically, the Plaintiff seeks: (1) conditional
certification of the settlement class; (2) preliminary approval of
the settlement; (3) appointment of the Plaintiff as the class
representative; (4) appointment of Peter Dion-Kindem and Lonnie
Blanchard as the class counsel; (5) approval of the class notice;
(6) appointment of Simplurius, Inc. as the settlement
administrator; and (7) scheduling for final approval of the partial
settlement.

Pursuant to the proposed settlement, the parties agree to a gross
settlement amount of $525,000 for the class defined as follows: All
non-exempt employees of Schlumberger Lift Solutions LLC or
Schlumberger Rod Lift, Inc. who do not opt out of the settlement
and who, at any time within the period beginning June 5, 2014 and
ending on Jan. 19, 2019 (Class Period), worked in California and
received a safety bonus by Schlumberger Lift Solutions LLC or
Schlumberger Rod Lift, Inc. pursuant to a safety bonus program of
Schlumberger Lift Solutions LLC or Schlumberger Rod Lift, Inc. at
any time within the Class Period.

The Defendants agree to deposit the funds necessary to make all
payments approved by the Court following the final approval and
fairness hearing.

The settlement provides for the following payments from the gross
settlement amount: (i) the Class Representative will receive an
incentive award up to $7,500; (ii) the Class counsel will receive
$175,000 for attorneys' fees, which equals 33.33% of the gross
settlement amount, and $20,000 for costs; (iii) the California
Labor and Workforce Development Agency will receive $22,500 from
the total PAGA payment of $30,000; and (iv) the Settlement
Administrator will receive up to $6,000 for fees and expenses.

After these payments are issued, the remaining money will be
distributed as settlement shares to Class Members.  Payments from
the settlement fund will be divided among three gross Sub-funds:
the Overtime Sub-fund, the Wage Statement Sub-fund, and the 203
Sub-fund.  Thus, the exact each settlement class member will
receive depends on which, and how many, sub-funds they are entitled
to, and the number of class members receiving the funds.

The Settlement provides that the Plaintiffs and the Class Members,
other than those who elect not to participate in the Settlement, at
the time final judgment is entered, will release the Defendants
from several claims in the First Amended Complaint.

Any class member who wishes may file objections or elect not to
participate in the Settlement.  The Notice of Proposed Settlement
explains the procedures object to the settlement, request exclusion
from the settlement, or dispute the employment information.  The
Notice also explains the claims that are released as part of the
Settlement.

Magistrate Judge Thurston finds the proposed class settlement is
fair, adequate, and reasonable.  The factors set forth by the Ninth
Circuit weigh in favor of preliminary approval of the settlement
agreement.  Moreover, preliminary approval of a settlement and
notice to the proposed class is appropriate.  

Accordingly, the Magistrate vacated the hearing date of July 21,
2020, and granted the Plaintiff's request for conditional
certification of the Settlement Class.  

The class is defined as follows: All non-exempt employees of
Schlumberger Lift Solutions LLC or Schlumberger Rod Lift, Inc. who
do not opt out of the settlement and who, at any time within the
period beginning June 5, 2014 and ending on Jan. 19, 2019 (Class
Period), worked in California and received a safety bonus by
Schlumberger Lift Solutions LLC or Schlumberger Rod Lift, Inc.
pursuant to a safety bonus program of Schlumberger Lift Solutions
LLC or Schlumberger Rod Lift, Inc. at any time within the Class
Period.

The Judge granted preliminary approval of the parties' proposed
settlement agreement, and approved the proposed notice plan.

She appointed (i) Cristobal Garcia as the Class Representative;
(ii) Lonnie Blanchard, III and Peter Dion-Kindem as the Class
Counsel; and (iii) Simpluris, Inc. as the Settlement
Administrator.

The Class Representative enhancement request for the Plaintiff is
granted preliminarily up to the amount of $7,500, subject to a
petition and review at the Final Approval and Fairness Hearing.
The Class Counsel's request for fees of not to exceed 33 1/3% of
the gross settlement amount and costs up to $20,000 is granted
preliminarily, subject to the counsel's petition for fees and
review at the Final Approval and Fairness Hearing.  The Class
Members and their counsel may support or oppose these requests, if
they so desire, at the Final Approval and Fairness Hearing.

The petition for attorneys' fees and for class representative
enhancement fee will be filed no later than Nov. 2, 2020.   Costs
of settlement administration will not exceed $6,000.

The proposed Notice is preliminarily approved, and the parties
shall file a finalized Notice with the required revisions for the
Court's approval within five days of the date of service of the
Order.

The Defendants will provide the Settlement Administrator with the
Class Data no later than within 30 days of the Order, or no later
than Aug. 17, 2020.

The Settlement Administrator will mail the approved Class Notice
Packet no later than Sept. 1, 2020.

A Class Member who wishes to be excluded from settlement will
postmark the Opt-Out request no later than Oct. 31, 2020.

Any objections to or comments on the Settlement Agreement must be
submitted to the Settlement Administrator no later than Oct. 31,
2020.

A Final Approval and Fairness Hearing is set for Nov. 23, 2020 at
9:00 a.m.  The Class Members may appear at the hearing in person or
through his or her own attorney, to show cause why the Court should
not approve the Settlement Agreement, or to object to the motion
for attorneys' fees or class member representative enhancement
award.  For comments or objections to be considered at the hearing,
the Class Member must file comments with the Clerk of the Court
indicating briefly the nature of one's comments, support, or
objection.

The Court reserves the right to vacate the Final Approval and
Fairness Hearing if no comments or objections are filed with the
Court on Nov. 2, 2020.  It reserves the right to continue the date
of the Final Approval and Fairness Hearing without further notice
to class members.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 15, 2020 Order is available at
https://is.gd/f7NW8o from Leagle.com.

SENIOR CARE: Court Conditionally Certifies Class in Moss FLSA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANITA MOSS, on behalf of herself and all) others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SENIOR CARE CAROLINAS, PLLC,
INNOVATIVE HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT, LLC, & MELISSA LYNCH, Defendants,
Docket No. 3:20-cv-00137-FDW-DCK (W.D. N.C.), Judge Frank D.
Whitney of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
North Carolina, Charlotte Division, granted the Plaintiff's Motion
for Conditional Certification Pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

Plaintiff Moss filed her initial complaint with the Court on March
04, 2020.  She filed an amended complaint on May 19, 2020.  The
Plaintiff alleges, on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated, that the Defendants violated the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA"), the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act ("NCWHA"), and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

According to the Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant Lynch is the originating manager of Innovative which
operates Senior Care.  Senior Care has five homes throughout North
Carolina, which house two to six elderly or infirmed residents.
The Plaintiff worked as a dedicated care official for the
Defendants at a Senior Care facility from November 2017 to Aug. 28,
2019.

Dedicated care officials are non-exempt hourly employees.  The
Plaintiff's job duties included: light housekeeping; meal
preparation; getting and sending mail; laundry and ironing; linen
washing and bed making; companionship care; medication management;
bathroom assistance; incontinence care; hygiene assistance;
assisting with dressing residents; mobility, safety, and ambulation
assistance; charting; and organizing activities.

The Amended Complaint also asserts the Plaintiff was scheduled by
the Defendants for shifts of 24 hours three to five times a week,
sometimes on consecutive days.  The Plaintiff alleges she and those
similarly situated often worked weeks well in excess of 40 hours.
She contends she was required by the Defendants to stay at her job
location until the next scheduled employee arrived to relieve her
at the end of her shifts.

While on these shifts, the Plaintiff was permitted to sleep but the
Defendants allegedly did not provide a mechanism to clock-in and
clock-out or provide furnished sleeping facilities as required by
the FLSA.  She alleges during at least half and usually more than
half of her shifts she was unable to get a consecutive five hours
of "uninterrupted" sleep, as required by the FLSA, due to
resident's needs.  Further, the Plaintiff alleges the Defendants
knew of these around-the-clock needs that would disrupt her sleep,
but still deducted sleep time from her hours worked without a
written agreement to deduct sleep time.

In regards to pay, the Plaintiff alleges the Defendants paid her
and those similarly situated a flat rate for 24-hour shifts, which
fell below the federal minimum wage.  Also, she contends that the
Defendant's practice of deducting sleep time without a written
agreement caused her pay to fall below the federal minimum wage.
Additionally, the Plaintiff alleges she was not correctly paid
overtime for weeks where she worked over forty hours and the
Defendants did not calculate overtime bonus premiums as required by
the FLSA.

The Plaintiff later filed a Charge of Discrimination against the
Defendants with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC"), where she alleged discrimination, harassment,
and/or retaliation.  The Plaintiff received a right to sue letter
on March 27, 2020.

In the Plaintiff's amended complaint, she alleges that she was
discriminated on the basis of her race and subjected to harassment
and retaliation due to her race.  Further, she states Defendant
Lynch hires African Americans because "they are 'too dumb' to
understand how they are supposed to be paid and what benefits they
are entitled to and are getting."  Also, she alleges Defendant
Lynch believes she is able to keep payroll costs down because
African American employees are "too dumb" to understand their
payroll or pay stubs.  Lastly, the Plaintiff asserts Defendant
Lynch spoke down to African American employees and refused to help
or provide clarification regarding scheduling, time off, and
payroll.  Following receipt of a Right to Sue letter from the EEOC,
the Plaintiff filed the instant action.

The Plaintiff seeks conditional certification and authorization to
send court-supervised notice under the FLSA, for the following
class: all current and former employees of the Defendants who work
or have worked for them as designated caregivers anytime during the
three-year period preceding the filing of the Complaint in the
action.

The Plaintiff states, on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated, that the Defendants have willfully and repeatedly engaged
in a pattern, practice, and/or policy of violating the FLSA by
failing to pay caregiver employees minimum wages for all hours
worked and premium overtime wages for all hours worked in excess of
40 hours per workweek and failing to pay and record all of the time
that its in-home caregiver employees have worked.

The Defendants disagree and argue some potential members of the
collective have waived claims due to a Department of Labor ("DOL")
Agreement, therefore foreclosing the possibility that the Plaintiff
can demonstrate the collective is similarly situated.  According to
the Defendant, the notice is misleading and overbroad.

Since substantial discovery remains, Judge Whitney finds it
appropriate to apply the lenient standard.  The Plaintiff clearly
alleges in her amended complaint, supplemental brief, and
declaration that all dedicated care official employees have the
same job duties, are non-exempt hourly workers, were required to
work 24-hour shifts, frequently worked forty hours or more in one
work week, were subject to the same policy of deducting sleep time
from hours worked without a written agreement, were not provided
sleeping facilities, and were not correctly paid overtime.  The
Plaintiff has therefore proffered minimal evidence, as required by
the lenient standard, to show that she is similarly situated to the
proposed collective.  Thus, the Judge will conditionally certify
the collective.

The Defendant challenges various portions of the notice submitted
by the Plaintiff, construing these portions as "misleading and
overbroad."  Judge Whitney holds that the notice period beginning
on March 4, 2017 to present on the notice proposed by the Plaintiff
can remain as-is.  The notice should be changed to read: "All
current and former employees of Senior Care Carolinas, PLLC and/or
Innovative Healthcare Management, LLC who work or have worked as
designated caregivers from March 4, 2017, to present."

Judge Whitney orders that in the notice under section "V. EFFECT OF
JOINING THIS LAWSUIT," a sentence should be added to read: Should
Plaintiffs be unsuccessful, all opt-in plaintiffs may have to pay a
pro-rata share of Defendant's attorney's fees.  Additionally, under
that same section, another sentence should be added to read:
"Opt-in plaintiffs may be required to participate in the discovery
process by producing documents, participating in oral depositions,
and testifying at a hearing or trial."

The Defendants argue that a description of their position is
required in the Notice to ensure fairness and accuracy.  Judge
Whitney will allow a short sentence or two disclaiming that
Defendants deny any liability, but any further description is
unnecessary for adequate notice.  The counsel is instructed to
confer and agree to the appropriate language to make clear their
position denying liability.

As previously mentioned, the Court declines to address the alleged
DOL Agreement until further discovery by the parties.  Therefore,
nothing should be added to the notice about the DOL Agreement at
this time.

The Defendants argue the notice does not limit the opt-in period to
30 days, but acknowledges that a period between 30-60 days is
permissible.  The Plaintiff suggests a 60-day period for the opt-in
Plaintiffs.  Judge Whitney will allow a 60-day opt in period.
However, the 60-day period should be made explicit in section "IV.
YOUR RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS LAWSUIT" by adding a sentence
stating: "You have 60 days to respond to this Notice should you
decide to participate in the lawsuit."

The Defendants object to the Plaintiff's requests to post the
Notice at work-site locations and disseminate the Notice through
email.  However, the Court has approved posting Notices at places
of employments on numerous occasions.  Therefore, Judge Whitney
approves the Plaintiff's request to disseminate the notice by
First-Class US Mail with a postage-paid return envelope and email
are approved.

Finally, the Defendants object to the Plaintiff's request to
provide the potential opt-in Plaintiff's dates of employment,
Social Security numbers, telephone numbers, email addresses, and
dates of birth in "computer-readable" format as being overly
burdensome.  Judge Whitney finds that the Plaintiff has alleged no
special reason for requiring telephone numbers, Social Security
numbers, and dates of birth.  Absent the special showing, and in an
effort to protect the privacy of the potential opt-in Plaintiffs,
the Judge denies the Plaintiff's request for telephone numbers,
Social Security numbers, and dates of birth.  However, the
Defendant is required to submit to the Plaintiff the names,
addresses, dates of employment, and email addresses of the
potential opt-in Plaintiffs in a "computer readable format."

Based on the foregoing, Judge Whitney granted the Plaintiff's
motion for collective action certification on the terms set forth
in the Order.  The case will proceed with respect to the FLSA
claims as a collective action under 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b).

For purposes of the Plaintiff's FLSA claim, the collective is
defined as: All current and former employees of Defendants who work
or have worked for Defendants as designated caregivers anytime
during the three-year period preceding the filing of the Complaint
in the action.

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g), the Plaintiff's counsel will
serve as the counsel for the collective.

The Defendant will provide the Named Plaintiff's counsel the last
known names, addresses, dates of employment, and email addresses of
the potential opt-in Plaintiffs in a computer readable format of
all putative collective who worked for the Defendant at any time
from March 4, 2017, to present within 14 days of the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 24, 2020 Order is available at
https://is.gd/iGq1up from Leagle.com.

SEYAH LTD: Fails to Pay Minimum Wage, Alvarado Claims
-----------------------------------------------------
ROGELIO ALVARADO, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. SEYAH, LTD. d/b/a CONNECTONE SMART
HOME f/k/a CONNECTONESECURITY.COM, Defendant, Case 4:20-cv-02473
(S.D. Tex., July 15, 2020) seeks to recover from the Defendants
unpaid wages and overtime compensation, interest, liquidated
damages, attorneys' fees, and costs under the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

The Plaintiff Alvarado was employed by the Defendant as alarm
technician.

Seyah, Ltd. is a security service company. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Melissa Moore, Esq.
          Curt Hesse, Esq.
          MOORE & ASSOCIATES
          440 Louisiana Street, Suite 675
          Houston, TX 77002-1063
          Telephone: (713) 222-6775
          Facsimile: (713) 222-6739
          E-mail: melissa@mooreandassociates.net
                  curt@mooreandassociates.net


SHIRE LLC: Court Refuses to Decertify Class in Antitrust Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, In re INTUNIV ANTITRUST LITIGATION (Direct
Purchasers), Civil Action No. 1:16-cv-12653-ADB (D. Mass.), Judge
Allison D. Burroughs of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts granted in part and denied in part the Defendants'
motion to decertify the Direct-Purchaser Plaintiffs ("DPPs") Class
in light of Direct-Purchaser Plaintiff Rochester Drug Co-Operative,
Inc. ("RDC")'s bankruptcy.

RDC filed the antitrust action on behalf of a putative class
comprised of entities that purchased the pharmaceutical Intuniv
(the brand name for extended release guanfacine hydrochloride) from
the drug's brand manufacturer Shire, LLC and Shire U.S., Inc. or
from the drug's generic manufacturer Actavis Elizabeth, LLC,
Actavis Holdco US, Inc., and Actavis, LLC.  The DPPs allege that
the Defendants improperly delayed competition for both brand
Intuniv and generic Intuniv in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act, causing the DPPs to pay an inflated price for Intuniv.


On Sept. 2, 2009, the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") approved
a New Drug Application ("NDA") for Defendant Shire's ADHD
medication Intuniv.  On Dec. 29, 2009, Defendant Actavis filed an
Abbreviated New Drug Application ("ANDA") for a proposed generic
version of Intuniv.  As the first generic manufacturer to file an
ANDA, Actavis would have enjoyed a 180-day period of exclusivity
during which no other generic" manufacturers could have
manufactured an Intuniv alternative.  During that exclusivity
period, Shire and Actavis would have been the only manufacturers
approved by the FDA for Intuniv or a generic alternative.  After
Actavis filed its ANDA, several other companies also sought FDA
approval to manufacture generic Intuniv.

Shire filed suit against Actavis pursuant to 21 U.S.C. Section
355(j)(5)(B)(iii), triggering an automatic 30-month stay of any FDA
approval of generic Intuniv.  After a bench trial, the 30-month
stay expired and the FDA approved Actavis' ANDA.  The DPPs argue
that it appeared likely that Actavis would receive a favorable
verdict.  On April 25, 2013, before any judgment or opinion had
entered on Shire's claim, however, Shire and Actavis entered into a
settlement agreement.

The DPPs argue that the settlement agreement was a reverse payment
agreement, which guaranteed Actavis a 180-day exclusivity period in
return for Actavis delaying the launch of its generic Intuniv until
Dec. 1, 2014.  Therefore, the DPPs allege, the Defendants were able
to guarantee monopolistic profits which resulted in the DPPs paying
artificially inflated prices for both brand and generic Intuniv.

On Sept. 24, 2019, the Court granted the DPPs' motion to certify
the following class: All persons or entities in the United States
and its territories, or subsets thereof, that purchased Intuniv
and/or generic Intuniv in any form directly from Shire or Actavis,
including any predecessor or successor of Shire or Actavis, from
Oct. 19, 2012 through June 1, 2015.  After noting that RDC's
adequacy as a class representative was "a close call," the Court
appointed RDC as the class representative.  

As part of its DPA with the Government, RDC agreed to forfeit $20
million, providing an initial payment of $10 million, and then an
annual payment of $2 million for five years.  In January 2020, RDC
informed the Government that it could not make its first $2 million
payment.  On March 12, 2020, RDC filed for bankruptcy under Chapter
11 in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of New
York. See In re Rochester Drug Co-Operative, Inc., No. 20-cv-20230
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y.).  Upon RDC's filing for bankruptcy, the
Government rescinded its forbearance in order to protect its rights
in bankruptcy.  The Government has not indicated that it will
reinstate the underlying criminal prosecution.

The parties agree that RDC owes roughly $114 million in total.  The
Defendants argue that RDC presently has assets totaling $70
million, while RDC claims that it has assets of $112 million.  The
Defendants argue that RDC presently owes them almost $2 million as
unsecured creditors.  RDC responds that it does not owe Actavis
anything and only owes Shire $185,666.

FWK Holdings, LLC originally filed the action on Dec. 30, 2016.  On
Jan. 11, 2017, RDC filed similar claims, and on March 1, 2017, the
Court granted a joint motion to consolidate the two actions.  RDC
is a regional distributor of pharmaceuticals and FWK holds, by
assignment, the antitrust claims of Frank W. Kerr Co., a former
pharmaceutical wholesaler that entered bankruptcy and subsequently
closed.  The consolidated action has proceeded in coordination with
claims brought on behalf of a putative class of indirect purchasers
of Intuniv.

After RDC declared bankruptcy in March 2020, the Defendants filed
their motion to decertify the class on April 3, 2020, and RDC
opposed on May 4, 2020.  

As a preliminary matter, Judge Burroughs holds that RDC's
bankruptcy proceeding does not automatically stay the class action.
The automatic stay provision in 11 U.S.C. Section 362(a) only
stays proceedings against the debtor, and does not address actions
brought by the debtor which would inure to the benefit of the
bankruptcy estate.

Judge Burroughs must now consider, as a matter of first impression
in the circuit, whether a debtor-in-possession may act as an
adequate representative for absent class members when the
Defendants in the case are also the debtor-in-possession's
creditors.  She finds that RDC would be an inadequate
representative and therefore orders that it be replaced as the
class representative.  First, the conflict of interest is all the
more pertinent where, as in the case, the Defendants are creditors
of the Plaintiff's bankruptcy estate.  Second, RDC is the only
class representative for the DPP class.  Third, because the
Defendants are RDC's unsecured creditors, the parties both may have
incentives to settle the case to lessen the amount owed in
bankruptcy or to use the amount owed in bankruptcy as a bargaining
tool in seeking a lower settlement in the case.  Given the
constellation of potential conflicts and issues impacting adequacy,
the Judge is not prepared to find that the amount of the debt
warrants allowing RDC to continue to represent the absent
Plaintiffs.

Beyond any conflicts of interest, the Defendants also claim that
RDC now lacks the resources to be an adequate class representative.
They argue that because RDC does not have the resources necessary
for its bankruptcy proceeding, it would likewise be unable to
effectively act as a class representative in the case.  RDC
responds that it is well established in the Circuit that the class
counsel may advance litigation costs and accept a contingency fee
depending on the outcome of the case.

Judge Burroughs finds that the Court has previously determined, and
the parties do not contest, that the class counsel is qualified,
experienced, and has and will continue to adequately represent the
class.  Further, the class counsel has represented that they will
cover the costs in bringing the case.  Therefore, the Judge
declines to find that RDC would be an inadequate class
representative based solely on their ability to fund the
litigation.

The Defendants next argue that RDC's bankruptcy raises concerns
about its credibility and the possibility of future criminal
prosecution.  Though she finds that RDC would be an inappropriate
class representative given its conflict of interest, Judge
Burroughs wishes to make clear that she does not base her decision
on any alleged lack of credibility on the part of RDC.  RDC did not
suffer a liquidity crisis until December 2019 and did not file for
bankruptcy until March 2020, both of which were well after its
previous representations before the Court regarding its ability to
represent the class.

Having determined that RDC would be an inappropriate class
representative, Judge Burroughs will not simply decertify the
class.  In finding RDC inappropriate, she seeks to protect the
interests of absent class members.  This goal would be summarily
undermined by decertifying the class.  She therefore allows motions
to substitute a new class representative.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Burroughs is not advocating a blanket
rule that a debtor-in-possession could never be an adequate class
representative.  Nonetheless, given that RDC is in bankruptcy, that
the Defendants are a creditor in that bankruptcy and RDC has
potentially conflicting duties to debtors and absent class members,
as well as the Court's earlier stated belief that RDC's adequacy as
a class representative was a "close call," the Judge finds that RDC
would not be an appropriate class representative.  Accordingly, she
granted in part and denied in part the motion to decertify the
class.

Although RDC is no longer an adequate class representative, rather
than decertify the class, Judge Burroughs will consider motions to
substitute for RDC as a class representative, including Meijer,
Inc. and Meijer Distribution, Inc.'s motion to intervene, filed on
June 2, 2020, which has been fully briefed and is ripe for the
Court's consideration.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 8, 2020 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://is.gd/UBysCM from Leagle.com.

SIENNA SENIOR: Faces Class Action Over COVID-19 Related Outbreaks
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Irelyne Lavery, writing for DH News, reports that a class action
has been launched on behalf of the residents of 96 Ontario
long-term care homes which have experienced COVID-19 related
outbreaks.

The action proposed seeks damages from the owners and operators of
the 96 long-term care homes, stemming from their "alleged
negligence, breaches of fiduciary duty and breaches of section 7 of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms."

"This class action seeks accountability from long-term care
providers with regards to their mishandling of the COVID-19
pandemic. The inaction and slow response time needlessly cost many
lives and has seriously impacted countless more," said Innis
Ingram, an advocate for long-term care home residents and one of
the nine proposed Representative Plaintiffs.

"This suit will hopefully be a catalyst for the change that is
overdue in the long-term care system, which has been neglected for
decades."

The proposed Representative Defendants are Sienna Senior Living
Inc. and the City of Toronto. Once the 60-day notice period expires
the government of Ontario will also be added as a defendant.

The government of Ontario and the Defendandant owners and operators
have been alleged to have ignored "numerous red flags and failed to
adopt timely and reasonable infection prevention and control
measures to avoid exposing the elderly to the risk of infection
with COVID-19."

The Claim also alleges other "long-standing" deficiencies in
Ontario's long-term care system that made facilities hubs for the
disease. Another allegation is that the Defendants adopted ad hoc,
"negligently and recklessly," along with other "inadequate"
measures that exposed Ontario's elderly people to the risk of
infection.

Some of the long-term care facilities included in the Claim are
Erin Mills Lodge Nursing Home, Extendicare Scarborough, Lakeshore
Lodge, The Kensington Gardens and The Village of Humber Heights.

The province of Ontario recently confirmed that there are currently
15 long-term care homes with an outbreak of COVID-19. This includes
Cawthra Gardens in Mississauga and Nisbet Lodge in Toronto. Nisbet
Lodge has seen seven resident deaths.

"This is not a case where it is appropriate to cherry pick certain
homes arbitrarily, leaving hundreds, if not thousands, of the most
vulnerable members of society unrepresented," said Joel P. Rochon,
co-lead counsel in the proposed class action.

"The regrettable truth is that the outbreaks at these homes were
entirely preventable."

The class action is launched by Rochon Genova LLP, Himelfarb
Prosanski and Cerise Latibeaudiere Law Professional Corporation.

In June, a law firm issued a class action proceeding claiming $20
million in damages on behalf of residents at a Scarborough
long-term care home.

Lawyers from Thomson Rogers proceeded with the class action lawsuit
for the residents of Altamont Community Care and their families on
June 1 -- at least 53 residents have died from COVID-19 related
causes since March 17. [GN]


SIMPLE MILLS: Dawson Sues in S.D. New York Alleging ADA Violation
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Simple Mills, Inc.
The case is styled as Leshawn Dawson, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Simple Mills, Inc., Case No.
1:20-cv-06197 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 6, 2020).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Simple Mills is a whole food ingredient brand for baking mixes,
frostings, cookies, and crackers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Phone: (929) 575-4175
          Fax: (929) 575-4195
          Email: joseph@cml.legal


SIRIUS XM: Continues to Defend Flo & Eddie Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------
Sirius XM Holdings Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 30, 2020, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2020, that the company continues to
defend a class action suit initiated by Flo & Eddie Inc.

On October 2, 2014, Flo & Eddie Inc. filed a class action suit
against Pandora (Pandora Media, LLC, the successor to Pandora
Media, Inc.) in the federal district court for the Central District
of California.

The complaint alleges a violation of California Civil Code Section
980, unfair competition, misappropriation and conversion in
connection with the public performance of sound recordings recorded
prior to February 15, 1972 (which we refer to as, "pre-1972
recordings").

On December 19, 2014, Pandora filed a motion to strike the
complaint pursuant to California's Anti-Strategic Lawsuit Against
Public Participation  "SLAPP") statute, which following denial of
Pandora's motion was appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals.

In March 2017, the Ninth Circuit requested certification to the
California Supreme Court on the substantive legal questions. The
California Supreme Court accepted certification. In May 2019, the
California Supreme Court issued an order dismissing consideration
of the certified questions on the basis that, following the
enactment of the Orrin G. Hatch-Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization
Act, Pub. L. No. 115-264, 132 Stat. 3676 (2018) (the "MMA"),
resolution of the questions posed by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals was no longer "necessary to . . . settle an important
question of law."

The MMA grants a potential federal preemption defense to the claims
asserted in the aforementioned lawsuits. In July 2019, Pandora took
steps to avail itself of this preemption defense, including making
the required payments under the MMA for certain of its uses of
pre-1972 recordings.

Based on the federal preemption contained in the MMA (along with
other considerations), Pandora asked the Ninth Circuit to order the
dismissal of the Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Pandora Media, Inc. case. On
October 17, 2019, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a
memorandum disposition concluding that the question of whether the
MMA preempts Flo and Eddie's claims challenging Pandora's
performance of pre-1972 recordings "depends on various unanswered
factual questions" and remanded the case to the District Court for
further proceedings.

After Flo & Eddie filed its action in 2014 against Pandora, several
other plaintiffs commenced separate actions, both on an individual
and class action basis, alleging a variety of violations of common
law and state copyright and other statutes arising from allegations
that Pandora owed royalties for the public performance of pre-1972
recordings.

Many of these separate actions have been dismissed or are in the
process of being dismissed. None of the remaining pending actions
is likely to have a material adverse effect on our business,
financial condition or results of operations.

Sirius said, "We believe we have substantial defenses to the claims
asserted in these actions, and we intend to defend these actions
vigorously."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Sirius XM Holdings Inc. provides satellite radio services in the
United States. The company broadcasts music, sports, entertainment,
comedy, talk, news, traffic, and weather channels, including
various music genres ranging from rock, pop and hip-hop, country,
dance, jazz, Latin, and classical; live play-by-play sports from
principal leagues and colleges; multitude of talk and entertainment
channels for various audiences; national, international, and
financial news; and limited run channels. The company was founded
in 1990 and is headquartered in New York, New York. Sirius XM
Holdings Inc. is a subsidiary of Liberty Media Corporation.


SOUTH CAROLINA: Sued by Huger Alleging Violations of Civil Rights
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against South Carolina
Department of Corrections, et al. The case is styled as Vonea
Huger, Roshanda Gerald, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated v. South Carolina Department of Corrections,
Director Bryan P. Stirling, Warden Tim Riley, Associate Warden
Andrea Thompson, Associate Warden Gary Lane, John Does 1-10, Case
No. 3:20-cv-02871-MGL (D.S.C., Aug. 6, 2020).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Civil Rights.

The South Carolina Department of Corrections is the agency
responsible for corrections in the U.S. state of South
Carolina.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Bruce E. Miller, Esq.
          BRUCE E. MILLER LAW OFFICE
          147 Wappoo Creek Drive, Suite 603
          Charleston, SC 29412
          Phone: (843) 579-7373
          Email: bmiller@brucemillerlaw.com


SOUTHERN CO: Scheduling Order in Monroe ERS Suit Revised
--------------------------------------------------------
The Southern Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 30, 2020, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2020, that the court in the
putative securities class action suit initiated by Monroe County
Employees' Retirement System has entered a revised scheduling
order, which resumed discovery and set out remaining case
deadlines.

In January 2017, a securities class action complaint was filed in
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia by
Monroe County Employees' Retirement System on behalf of all persons
who purchased shares of Southern Company's common stock between
April 25, 2012 and October 29, 2013.

The complaint names as defendants Southern Company, certain of its
current and former officers, and certain former Mississippi Power
officers and alleges that the defendants made materially false and
misleading statements regarding the Kemper County energy facility
in violation of certain provisions under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, as amended.

The complaint seeks, among other things, compensatory damages and
litigation costs and attorneys' fees.

In 2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that provided
additional detail about their claims, increased the purported class
period by one day, and added certain other former Mississippi Power
officers as defendants. Also in 2017, the defendants filed a motion
to dismiss the plaintiffs' amended complaint with prejudice, to
which the plaintiffs filed an opposition.

In 2018, the court issued an order dismissing certain claims
against certain officers of Southern Company and Mississippi Power
and dismissing the allegations related to a number of the
statements that plaintiffs challenged as being false or misleading.
In 2018, the court denied the defendants' motion for
reconsideration and also denied a motion to certify the issue for
interlocutory appeal.

In the third quarter 2019, the court certified the plaintiffs'
proposed class and the defendants filed a petition for
interlocutory appeal of the class certification order with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

In December 2019, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Georgia entered an order staying all deadlines in the case
pending mediation.

The stay automatically expired on March 31, 2020; however, in light
of the COVID-19 pandemic, the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia vacated all existing discovery deadlines until
June 15, 2020.

On June 30, 2020, the court entered a revised scheduling order,
which resumed discovery and set out remaining case deadlines.

The Southern Company, through its subsidiaries, engages in the
generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity. It
operates in four segments: Gas Distribution Operations, Gas
Pipeline Investments, Wholesale Gas Services, and Gas Marketing
Services. The Southern Company was founded in 1945 and is
headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia.


SOUTHWEST AIRLINES: Discovery Ongoing in Aircraft Defect Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Southwest Airlines Co. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 27, 2020 for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2020, that discovery is ongoing in
the class action suit related to the company's concealment of
defects in the Boeing MAX aircraft.

On July 11, 2019, a complaint alleging violations of federal and
state laws and seeking certification as a class action was filed
against Boeing and the Company in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas in Sherman.

The complaint alleges that Boeing and the Company colluded to
conceal defects with the MAX aircraft in violation of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO") and also asserts
related state law claims based upon the same alleged facts.

The complaint seeks damages on behalf of putative classes of
customers who purchased tickets for air travel from either the
Company or American Airlines between August 29, 2017, and March 13,
2019.

The complaint generally seeks money damages, equitable monetary
relief, injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and attorneys' fees
and other costs.

On September 13, 2019, the Company filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint and to strike certain class allegations. Boeing also
moved to dismiss. On February 14, 2020, the trial court issued a
ruling that granted in part and denied in part the motions to
dismiss the complaint.

The trial court order, among other things: (i) dismissed without
prejudice various state law claims that the plaintiffs abandoned in
response to the motions, (ii) dismissed with prejudice the
remaining state law claims, including fraud by concealment, fraud
by misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation on the
grounds that federal law preempts those claims, and (iii) found
that plaintiffs lack Article III standing to pursue one of the
plaintiffs' theories of RICO injury.

The order denied the motion to dismiss with respect to two RICO
claims premised upon a second theory of RICO injury and denied the
motion to strike the class allegations at the pleadings stage.

Discovery is ongoing.

Southwest Airlines said, "The Company denies all allegations of
wrongdoing, including those in the complaint that were not
dismissed. The Company believes the plaintiffs' positions are
without merit and intends to vigorously defend itself."

Southwest Airlines Co. operates a passenger airline that provides
scheduled air transportation services in the United States and
near-international markets. Southwest Airlines Co. was founded in
1967 and is based in Dallas, Texas.


STATOIL USA: $7MM Settlement in Rescigno Suit Gets Prelim. Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANGELO R. RESCIGNO, SR., AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF
CHERYL B. CANFIELD, Plaintiff, v. STATOIL USA ONSHORE PROPERTIES
INC., Defendant, Civil Action No. 3:16-85 (M.D. Pa.), Judge Malachy
E. Mannion of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania granted Rescigno's motion for preliminary approval of
the parties' settlement agreement, and appointment of the class
representatives and the class counsel.

Rescigno owns property in the Marcellus Shale region within
Pennsylvania.  On May 6, 2008, Rescigno entered into an oil and gas
lease with Cabot Oil & Gas Corp. for the exploration of oil and
natural gas on his land. His lease was subsequently acquired, in
part, by Defendant Statoil USA Onshore Properties, Inc. ("SOP").
His dispute primarily revolves around the royalty clause in his
lease agreement.

In his complaint, Rescigno challenged SOP's calculation of
royalties.  SOP's calculation is based on the sale of Rescigno's
natural gas at the well, with that sale price calculated using an
index price.  SOP takes title to its in-kind percentage of the
natural gas extracted at the well and immediately sells the natural
gas to an affiliate, Statoil Natural Gas ("SNG"), pursuant to an
agreement between the two entities.

At issue in the action is the agreement between SOP and SNG for the
price of the raw natural gas at the wellhead where title is
transferred from SOP to SNG.  Their agreement fixes the price of
the natural gas to a uniform hub price or index price for natural
gas, regardless of whether the natural gas is ever delivered to
that particular hub on the interstate pipeline system.  These index
prices are influential in natural gas markets and purport to
represent the price of natural gas at different delivery points in
the country.  Around April 2010, SOP and SNG began using a chosen
index price as opposed to what Canfield describes as an "actual
negotiated price."

On Jan. 15, 2016, Rescigno filed a putative class action complaint
against SOP, SNG, and the indirect parent of these entities,
Statoil ASA.  Rescigno brought six separate claims against SOP
specifically.  In his first claim, Rescigno alleged that SOP
breached the express terms of the royalty clause in his lease
agreement by using an index price.  In his second claim, Rescigno
alleged that SOP breached the lease by engaging in an affiliate
sale with SNG.  In his fourth claim, Rescigno alleged that SOP
breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the
lease by engaging in an affiliate sale.  In this claim, he also
alleged that SOP "had an obligation to use reasonable best efforts
to market the gas to achieve the best price available.  The Court
construed the fourth claim as a duty of good faith claim and/or a
duty to market claim.  Rescigno also alleged civil conspiracy
(third claim) and unjust enrichment (fifth claim).  He also
requested an accounting as a specific form of relief (seventh
claim).

On June 9, 2016, SNG filed a motion to dismiss Rescigno's
complaint.  Also on June 9, 2016, SOP and Statoil ASA,
collectively, filed a motion to dismiss.  By memorandum and order
dated March 22, 2017, the Court dismissed all but one of Rescigno's
claims against SOP, as well as all claims against SNG and Statoil
ASA. ( Rescigno moved for reconsideration, which the Court denied
by memorandum and order dated June 12, 2017.

On March 27, 2018, Rescigno filed the present motion for
preliminary approval of settlement, and a brief in support.  The
settlement agreement, which was originally attached to the motion
for preliminary approval, was updated by order of the court on
March 6, 2020 to reflect the change in the Lead Plaintiff and the
defense counsel. Attached to the settlement agreement is the notice
of proposed settlement, a plan of administration and distribution,
and a proposed final judgment and order of dismissal with
prejudice.

The settlement agreement identifies the class as "Royalty Owners in
Northern Pennsylvania who have entered into oil and gas leases,
regardless of the type of lease, that provide that the Royalty
Owner is to be paid Royalties and to whom SOP has (or had) an
obligation to pay Royalties on production attributable to SOP's
working interest."

The settlement agreement divides all the Plaintiffs and the named
Plaintiffs into two groups.  

The first group, termed the "Lease Form 29 Group," includes those
class members whose leases contain the following provision
governing valuation of royalty on natural gas: To pay Lessor on gas
and casinghead gas produced from the leased premises, percentages
of proceeds based on: (1) the Gross Proceeds paid to Lessee from
the sale of such gas and casinghead gas when sold by Lessee in an
arms-length sale to an unaffiliated third party, or (2) the Gross
Proceeds, paid to an Affiliate of Lessee, computed at the point of
sale, for gas sold by lessee to an Affiliate of Lessee.   The Lease
Form 29 Group comprises approximately 7% of the class and the
settlement agreement provides that they will be allocated 18% of
the net settlement fund.

The second group, termed the "Other Lease Group," includes those
class members with interests under all other lease forms.  The
Other Lease Group comprises approximately 93% of the class and the
settlement agreement provides that they will be allocated
approximately 82% of the net settlement fund.

SOP has agreed to pay $7 million, plus interest, to settle all
claims relating to SOP's use of the index pricing methodology as
the basis for calculation of royalties.  The class has agreed to a
release which will permit SOP to continue using the index pricing
methodology to calculate royalties for a period of five years from
the effective date of the settlement for the Other Lease Group.
However, for those in the Lease Form 29 Group, SOP agrees to base
the royalties on the resale price and to no longer use the index
pricing methodology going forward.  Upon final approval of the
settlement, SOP will make this change effective retroactively to
the first full production month after preliminary approval of the
settlement.

Ultimately, all the class members who are eligible and participate
in the agreement will release all claims asserted in the complaint
or that relate to the methodology of determining royalties paid on
natural gas produced from the class members' wells.  

The settlement agreement indicates that SOP will provide the
settlement administrator the necessary records and information to
prepare a list of class members.  Within 14 days of the Court's
order preliminary approving the settlement agreement, the
settlement administrator will mail copies of the settlement notice
to all the members and post notice on its website at
www.statoilsettlement.com.  If a notice is returned, the settlement
administrator will take reasonable steps to obtain a valid address
and re-mail the notice.

One year after final approval of the settlement, the settlement
administrator will determine the amount of all unclaimed checks and
the unclaimed monies will be donated to a non-profit organization
agreed to by the parties--to wit, the Environmental Defense Fund.

The settlement administrator has been identified as Gilardi & Co.,
LLC.  The settlement agreement indicates that up to $250,000 of the
settlement fund may be used by the class counsel to pay notice and
administration costs.  After the Court has entered final judgment
in the case, the class counsel may pay all further reasonable
notice and administration costs without further order of the Court.


The settlement agreement also indicates that the Lead Plaintiffs
may submit an application for incentive awards for representing the
class in the prosecution of the action.  The notice states that the
incentive awards will not exceed $5,000 each.

The class counsel will receive attorneys' fees in the amount of 25%
of the settlement amount and expenses not to exceed $125,000, plus
interest on both amounts.  The class counsel will file a separate
motion for approval of attorneys' fees and costs prior to the
Court's final fairness hearing.  The settlement agreement provides
that the allowance or disallowance by the Court of any applications
for attorneys' fees or expenses or incentive awards are not part of
the settlement and any order regarding these will not operate to
terminate the settlement or affect the finality of a judgment
approving the settlement.

In a Memorandum dated July 8, 2020, a full-text copy of which is
available at https://is.gd/bjQNGP from Leagle.com, Judge Mannion
wrote that he will preliminarily certify the class for settlement
purposes and for the purpose of sending notice under Rule 23(e).
He reserves the finding on final certification until after the
fairness hearing.  A more thorough certification analysis will be
provided after the class members have been provided with notice of
the action and have had an opportunity to object to the
settlement.

Judge Mannion said he will also preliminarily approve the
settlement agreement.  In making this determination, he has
considered the following: (1) the negotiations occurred at
arms'-length; (2) there was sufficient discovery; and (3) the
proponents of the settlement are experienced in similar litigation.


Lastly, Judge Mannion will also preliminarily approve Gilardi as
the settlement administrator to proceed with the settlement process
agreed to by the parties and as set forth in their proposed
schedule for completing settlement.  He will also direct notice to
the class members as set forth in the parties proposed notice.  He
finds that the proposed notice is the best practicable form of
notice to inform the members of the settlement and to proceed with
the settlement for all claims in a timely and efficient manner.

Accordingly, Judge Mannion granted the motion for preliminary
approval of the parties' settlement agreement.  The parties'
settlement agreement is preliminarily approved and the class
identified in the agreement is preliminarily certified as a Rule 23
class.  A final fairness hearing will be scheduled.  In accordance
with the parties proposed schedule, 35 days prior to the final
fairness hearing, the parties will file motions in support of final
approval.

                    Bid to Intervene Denied

Prior to the Court's preliminary approval the settlement agreement,
Judge Manion (i) denied a motion to intervene filed by Alan
Marbaker, Carol Marbaker, Jerry L. Cavalier, and Frank K. Holdren
("Intervenors"); and (ii) granted Defendant Statoil USA Onshore
Properties, Inc.'s ("SOP") motion to strike the Intervenors' brief
in opposition to a motion for preliminary approval of proposed
settlement.

Judge Mannion finds that, despite having filed the motion to
intervene within the opt-out period, the Intervenors' motion to
intervene is untimely under the totality of the circumstances.

With respect to their arguments on inadequate representation, the
Judge finds that much of the Intervenors' focus is on their
disagreement with aspects of the settlement agreement or with SOP's
and Rescigno's litigation strategy, most of which was set forth in
their brief opposing preliminary class approval.  The Third Circuit
has clearly stated that dissatisfaction with a settlement cannot
provide the basis for granting intervention as of right, says the
Court.

"The Intervenors have not provided a sufficient explanation as to
why their objections cannot be addressed after preliminary
certification during the fairness hearing," Judge Manion added.

To the extent that the Intervenors contend that preliminary
approval is inappropriate because they have not received notice of
the proposed injunction that would apply to them, the argument is
unavailing.  Given that the Intervenors have identified the
applicable portion of the proposed settlement that would impose an
injunction on them, as well as offered argument on it, they are
plainly on notice of the potential injunction in the proposed
preliminary approval order.  Once again, as with their other
concerns about the proposed settlement, if the Intervenors do not
wish to be bound by its terms, they may simply opt out of the
class.  Accordingly, the motion to strike the Intervenors' brief in
opposition, is granted, and the brief in opposition, is struck from
the record, rules the Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 8, 2020 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/K8YMpE from Leagle.com.




STURM RUGER: Primus Group Suit v. Smith and Wesson Ongoing
----------------------------------------------------------
Sturm, Ruger & Company, Inc., said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 29, 2020, for
the quarterly period ended June 27, 2020, that the company
continues to defend a putative class action suit entitled, Primus
Group LLC v. Smith and Wesson, et al.

Primus Group LLC v. Smith and Wesson, et al. is a putative class
action filed in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio on August 8, 2019.

Plaintiff alleges that the defendants' lawful sale of modern
sporting rifles violates the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt
Organizations Act and seeks a temporary restraining order ("TRO")
and permanent injunction.

On August 20, 2019, the court denied plaintiff's request for a TRO.
On September 3, 2019, defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

On September 16, 2019, plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. On
October 9, 2019, the court dismissed plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint, with prejudice.

Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal on October 15, 2019 and sought
two extensions of time to file its initial brief. Plaintiff's
subsequent motion to hold the appeal in abeyance was granted,
though the court also ordered plaintiff to file periodic status
reports.

Plaintiff filed such a report on June 17, 2020, and claimed that it
expected to be in a position to reactivate or dismiss the appeal
within 30 days.

Sturm, Ruger & Company, Inc., together with its subsidiaries,
designs, manufactures, and sells firearms under the Ruger name and
trademark in the United States. It operates in two segments,
Firearms and Castings. Sturm, Ruger & Company, Inc. was founded in
1949 and is based in Southport, Connecticut.


TACO BELL: Court Dismisses First Amended Dominguez ADA Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, YOVANNY DOMINGUEZ and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. TACO BELL CORP., Defendant, Case
No. 19 Civ. 10172 (LGS) (S.D. N.Y.), Judge Lorna G. Schofield of
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss the First Amended
Complaint ("FAC") pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).

Plaintiff Dominguez brings the putative class action for
declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendant Taco Bell,
alleging that the Defendant violated Title III of the Americans
with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), the New York State Human Rights Law,
and the New York City Human Rights Law.  The Plaintiff resides in
the Bronx, New York.  He is legally blind and proficient in reading
braille, which is a tactile writing system.  The Defendant operates
restaurants and is one of the largest restaurant chains in the
world.

On Oct. 26, 2019, the Plaintiff telephoned the Defendant's customer
service to purchase a store gift card.  He asked whether the
Defendant sells gift cards that contain braille and was informed by
an employee that Taco Bell does not.  During the call, the employee
did not offer the Plaintiff any alternative auxiliary aids or
services to help him use the Defendant's gift cards.  

The Defendant does not offer braille gift cards or auxiliary aids
for its gift cards. Without auxiliary aids for Taco Bell's gift
cards, the Plaintiff cannot ascertain important gift card
information, such as the balance, the card's terms and conditions
or its unique identification number.  The Plaintiff also cannot,
without auxiliary aids, distinguish between Defendant's gift cards
and those of other stores.  The Plaintiff states that he has been a
Taco Bell customer on prior occasions and intends to immediately
purchase at least one store gift card from Defendant as soon as the
Defendant sells store gift cards that are accessible to the blind.

The Plaintiff requests a preliminary and permanent injunction to
prohibit the Defendant from violating the disability laws and
require it to take all the steps necessary to make its store gift
cards into full compliance with the requirements set forth in the
ADA, and its implementing regulations, so that the store gift cards
are readily accessible to and usable by blind individuals.  He
seeks a declaratory judgment that the Defendant's gift cards
contain access barriers denying blind customers full and equal
access to the goods, services and facilities of its store gift
cards and by extension its physical locations and fails to comply
with the applicable laws.  He also requests punitive and
compensatory damages, costs and reasonable attorneys' fees.

The Defendant moves to dismiss the FAC.  

Judge Schofield holds that the FAC sufficiently pleads Article III
standing.  The FAC satisfies the past injury requirement by
alleging that the Plaintiff encountered a barrier when he requested
and was denied a braille gift card and was not offered any
auxiliary aid.  The FAC satisfies the second standing requirement
that the discriminatory treatment would continue, based on the
employee's alleged statement that Taco Bell does not sell braille
gift cards, i.e., that the Defendant is not in the practice of
selling braille gift cards.  Finally, the FAC sufficiently pleads
the Plaintiff's intent to return to Taco Bell, stating that he has
been a Taco Bell customer on prior occasions and intends to
immediately purchase at least one store gift card from Defendant as
soon as the Defendant sells store gift cards that are accessible to
the blind.

At this stage in the instant case, Judge Schofield finds that the
FAC's allegation of the Plaintiff's intent to return to Taco Bell
more plausible and therefore sufficient because of the nature of
Taco Bell's business and the broader appeal and accessibility of
its products as compared with Banana Republic clothing.

However, the FAC fails to plead that Taco Bell's decision not to
sell accessible gift cards violates Title III.  Taco Bell's gift
cards are goods that the company sells, and are not themselves
places of public accommodation.  Accordingly, Taco Bell has no duty
to offer braille gift cards under the ADA as a matter of law.  Taco
Bell is required to ensure that its gift cards are accessible, but
the FAC does not sufficiently plead that Taco Bell lacks auxiliary
aids and services to do so.  The FAC is therefore dismissed.

Because the only federal claim is not sufficiently pleaded, Judge
Schofield declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
remaining state law claims.  The Court should weigh various
factors, such as judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and
comity in considering whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction.
But in the usual case in which all federal-law claims are
eliminated before trial, the balance of factors will weigh in favor
of declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.  Because the
case is in its infancy, exercising supplemental jurisdiction over
remaining claims is inappropriate.

Leave to amend should be freely given when justice so requires.
The FAC is dismissed, but the Plaintiff may seek leave to replead
within 14 days of the date of the Opinion.  The Plaintiff will file
a letter explaining how a Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") would
state a claim consistent with the Opinion.  The SAC may not replead
that Taco Bell must offer braille gift cards.  The SAC may seek to
plead additional facts to show that the Defendant does not furnish
auxiliary aids or services that ensure that the information on its
gift cards is effectively communicated to blind persons.  Should
the Plaintiff seek to replead he will append to the letter motion a
draft of the proposed SAC marked to show changes from the FAC.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Schofield granted the Defendant's
motion to dismiss.  The Plaintiff's letter requesting to file a SAC
was due July 1, 2020.  If the letter is not timely filed, the Court
will enter final judgment of dismissal and direct the Clerk of
Court to close the case.  The Clerk of Court is respectfully
directed to close docket nos. 30 and 44.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 17, 2020 Opinion & Order is
available at https://is.gd/u4f077 from Leagle.com.

TASTE TRUNK: Faces Nisbett Suit in New York Over Violation of ADA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Taste Trunk, LLC. The
case is styled as Kareem Nisbett, Individually and on behalf of all
other persons similarly situated v. Taste Trunk, LLC, Case No.
1:20-cv-06187 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 6, 2020).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Taste Trunk is a provider of curated gourmet lifestyle
products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Douglas Brian Lipsky, Esq.
          LIPSKY LOWE LLP
          630 Third Avenue, Fifth Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Phone: (212) 392-4772
          Fax: (212) 444-1030
          Email: doug@lipskylowe.com


TEXAS: Court Stays Discovery in J.A. IDEA-ADA Class Suit v. TEA
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, J.A. B/N/F ALREDO ALVAREZ, and on behalf of other
persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. TEXAS EDUCATION AGENCY,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-CV-921-RP (W.D. Tex.), Magistrate Judge
Susan Hightower of the U.S. District Court for the Western District
of Texas, Austin Division, granted Texas Education Agency ("TEA")'s
Motion to Stay Discovery, filed Dec. 18, 2019.

J.A. is a student in the Corpus Christi Independent School District
who has received special education services under the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") due to his learning
disabilities and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder.  On May
14, 2019, when J.A. was 18 years old, J.A.'s father, Alfredo
Alvarez, filed a request for a due process hearing with the TEA,
arguing that CCISD had failed to provide J.A. with a Free
Appropriate Public Education as required under the IDEA. The TEA
Hearing Officer ruled that Alvarez did not have the authority to
request a due process hearing on J.A.'s behalf because J.A. had
reached the age of majority.  The Hearing Officer also denied
Alvarez's request to appoint him as "next friend" for J.A.

On Sept. 19, 2019, J.A. and Alvarez filed the lawsuit on behalf of
J.A. and a proposed unnamed class of similarly situated
individuals, alleging that the TEA discriminated against J.A. and
the proposed class because of their disabilities, in violation of
the IDEA, the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the
United States and Texas Constitutions.

Specifically, the Plaintiffs complain that they and the members of
the proposed class have reached the age of majority in Texas and
will have no one to represent them in claims related to the IDEA
because the TEA failed to develop a program to serve such class
members as required under the IDEA.  They seek a preliminary and
permanent injunction to enjoin the TEA from continuing in its
discriminatory and unlawful practices, declaratory relief for them
for violation of their civil rights, and reimbursement of their
attorney's fees and costs of litigation as permitted under the
IDEA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the ADA.

On Dec. 18, 2019, TEA filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), arguing that the
lawsuit should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, lack of
standing, Eleventh Amendment immunity, and failure to state a
claim.  The same day, TEA filed the Motion to Stay Discovery,
arguing that discovery should be stayed until the Court's ruling on
the threshold sovereign immunity and jurisdictional challenges
raised in the Motion to Dismiss.

Magistrate Judge Hightower agrees.  She finds that TEA has
established good cause for a stay of discovery of limited duration
by demonstrating the existence of the threshold question whether
the Plaintiff's claims are barred by immunity.  Accordingly, she
granted TEA's Motion to Stay Discovery until TEA's Motion to
Dismiss has been ruled on by the Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 17, 2020 Order is available at
https://is.gd/ZZGiR6 from Leagle.com.


TPUSA INC: Class in Headspeth FLSA Suit Conditionally Certified
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Chantel Headspeth and Kalyee McBride, on behalf of
themselves & those similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. TPUSA, Inc.
dba Teleperformance USA, Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-2062 (S.D.
Ohio), Judge Sarah D. Morrison of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, granted (i) Plaintiffs
Headspeth and McBride's motion to lift the stay in the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA") case lodged under 29 U.S.C. Section 201 et
seq.; and (ii) the Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional Certification
and Court-Authorized Notice.

Defendant TPUSA, Inc., doing business as Teleperformance USA,
provides call center services throughout the United States to its
customers in a variety of industries.  The Plaintiffs worked for
the Defendant as support associates in non-exempt positions in
Columbus, Ohio.  Their job entailed receiving technical support
phone calls and providing technical support and troubleshooting
services.  The Defendant employed other similarly situated
employees as support associates, customer service representatives,
and/or other call center positions at its Ohio call centers.

The Plaintiffs assert the Defendant knowingly and willfully failed
to pay them for their time spent locating and logging into a
computer workstation each day such that it did not pay them
overtime in violation of Sections 201-219 of the FLSA and related
Ohio state statutes.  While the Plaintiffs' Complaint presents a
hybrid collective and class action, they presently move only for
collective FLSA certification under Section 216(b) for the
following potential collective class: "All former and current Ohio
technical support associates, and those working in other Ohio call
center positions, employed by Defendant who worked 40 hours in any
workweek at any time beginning three years prior to the filing of
this Motion to the present."

Headspeth and McBride attached their consents to join to the
Complaint.  Others followed.  Specifically, Gerald Powell, William
Hamblin, Mendy Walters, Lisa Bobo, Lekeshia Reed, Todd King,
Champale Hobbs, Ernestine Williams, Keana Applewhite, Natalie
Oskowski, Jacqualia Strawder, Jacqueline Lovett and LaPaaris
Mallory each filed their consent to join the suit.

The Defendant's Answer is a general denial containing several
affirmative defenses.  It initially responded to the Plaintiffs'
instant Motion for Conditional Certification by filing a Motion for
Limited, Pre-Conditional Certification Discovery.  The Court denied
the Motion for Discovery on Oct. 9, 2019.

The Defendant then filed its Motion to Stay and its Opposition to
the Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional Certification.  It argued
that the case should be stayed because the U.S. District Court for
the District of Utah was considering a Joint Motion for
Certification and Approval of Collective Action Settlement in
Jacqueline Cazeau, et al., v. TPUSA, Inc. dba Teleperformance USA,
case number 2:16-cv-321.  The Defendant argued that approval of the
proposed settlement would result in waiver of the claims being
asserted in this case.  The Court conducted an oral argument on the
Motion to Stay and the Motion for Conditional Certification on Dec.
19, 2019 and issued an order staying the case on Jan. 13, 2020
pending resolution of settlement proceedings in Cazeau.

The Cazeau court issued its decision on July 2, 2020 and caused the
Plaintiffs' Motion to Lift Stay as well as the Plaintiffs' request
that the Court rule on their Motion for Conditional Certification.
Judge Morrison now examines the issues presented.

As noted, the Court previously stayed the case pending resolution
of the Cazeau motion to approve settlement because approval would
prove dispositive of the case.  The Cazeau court declined to affirm
the agreement on July 2, 2020.  Accordingly, Judge Morrison granted
the Plaintiffs' Motion to Lift Stay, and ordered that the stay of
the case be immediately lifted.

Turning to the Motion for Conditional Certification, Judge Morrison
determines whether the Plaintiffs sustain their burden to establish
that they are similarly situated to the putative collective action
members by utilizing a two-step analysis.  The first phase, the
conditional-certification phase, is conducted at the beginning of
the discovery process.  At that point, the plaintiffs need only
make a 'modest factual showing' that they are similarly situated to
proposed class members.  The final certification stage is the
second phase which is conducted after discovery concludes.  When
addressing this portion of the analysis, the Court examines more
closely the question of whether particular members of the class
are, in fact, similarly situated.

Judge Morrison opines that the Plaintiffs' declarants aver that
they were all technical support representatives for the Defendant
who suffered from its company-wide practice of not paying employees
for pre-shift preparatory work.  It is sufficient to show that the
Plaintiffs' positions are similar to the putative class members'
positions.  Accordingly, pursuant to the FLSA's remedial purpose,
the Judge finds that the declarations at this "fairly lenient
stage" sufficiently show that the Plaintiffs are similarly situated
to the other putative collective action members.  The Plaintiffs'
Motion for Conditional Certification is granted on the
certification issue.

Having reached that result, Judge Morrison must address the
Defendant's request that the conditionally certified class exclude
potentially similarly situated employees working at its
Westerville, Ohio location.  It argues that such exclusion is
necessary because the Plaintiffs' failure to provide a declaration
from a Westerville employee prevents the Court from finding that
the conduct in focus occurred at that location as well.  The
Plaintiffs counter that while they did not provide declarations,
both Ms. Applewhite and Ms. Williams worked at the Westerville
location and joined the suit.  Regardless, they continue that the
FLSA's remedial nature would be stifled by a requirement that
workers seeking collective certification must proffer declarations
from employees at every single one of the employer's locations.

Judge Morrison concurs with the Plaintiffs' response.  In addition,
the Court previously granted conditional certification on a
nationwide basis in a FLSA matter--Cowan v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., No. 2:19-cv-1225--in which the workers supplied affidavits
from workers in just four states.  In the instant case, the
Plaintiffs present the Court with affidavits from two of the
Defendant's three Ohio locations.  It is adequate proof of a
company-wide practice at this point in the case.   If the
Plaintiffs provide sufficient evidence of a company-wide practice
through declarations of present and former employees at other
locations, then the Court is justified in sending notice to
similarly situated employees at all locations in issue in the
litigation.  As a result, the Judge declined to limit the class to
the Columbus and Fairborn locations.

Having determined that conditional certification is warranted,
Judge Morrison now turns to the form and manner of the Notice.  She
agrees with the Defendant that the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Collective Certification creates confusion as to notice.
Specifically, the motion asks the Court to order the parties to
confer and file a joint proposed notice and consent to join form to
the Court within 14 days of any order granting conditional
certification.  Yet, the Plaintiffs attach a proposed notice and
consent to their motion and assert in their reply in support that
the Defendant has waived any objection to those proposals by not
stating its grounds of disapproval of the Plaintiffs' suggestion in
the Defendant's Opposition to their Motion for Conditional
Certification.

To rectify the confusion, Judge Morrison ordered the parties to
confer and submit to the Court a joint proposed notice and consent
to join form within 14 days of her Opinion and Order.  Any
outstanding objections and the grounds therefore, as well as
alternative proposed language, will be clearly stated within those
documents.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 8, 2020 Opinion & Order is
available at https://is.gd/Cdnm7i from Leagle.com.

TUPPERWARE BRANDS: Consolidated Class Suit in Florida Ongoing
-------------------------------------------------------------
Tupperware Brands Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 29, 2020, for
the quarterly period ended June 27, 2020, that the company
continues to defend a consolidated putative stockholder class
action suit in the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida.

Beginning in February 2020, a number of putative stockholder class
actions and shareholder derivative actions were filed against the
Company and certain current and former officers and directors.

The putative stockholder class actions allege that statements in
public filings between January 30, 2019 and February 24, 2020 (the
"potential class period") regarding the Company's disclosure of
controls and procedures and financial guidance, as well as the need
for an amendment of its credit facility, violated Sections 10(b)
and 20(a) of the Securities Act of 1934.

The plaintiffs seek to represent a class of stockholders who
purchased the Company's shares during the potential class period
and demand unspecified monetary damages. The cases have been
consolidated and are pending in the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida.

The shareholder derivative actions allege that certain officers and
directors breached fiduciary duties to the Company, were unjustly
enriched, and violated Sections 10(b), 14(a) and 20(a) of the
Securities Act of 1934, on generally the same fact pattern.

Two cases are pending in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida and have been consolidated; another case
is pending in the Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit in and for
Orange County, Florida, Circuit Civil Division.

The Company believes the complaints and allegations to be without
merit and intends to vigorously defend itself against the actions.


The Company is unable at this time to determine whether the outcome
of these actions would have a material impact on its results of
operations, financial condition or cash flows.

Orlando, Florida-based Tupperware Brands Corporation is a global
marketer of household, beauty and personal care products across
multiple brands utilizing social selling. Product brands and
categories include design-centric preparation, storage and serving
solutions for the kitchen and home through the Tupperware brand and
beauty and personal care products through the Avroy Shlain, Fuller
Cosmetics, NaturCare, Nutrimetics and Nuvo brands.


TWENTY-FOUR/SEVEN: C&F's Bid to Dismiss Ross Denied w/o Prejudice
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, VONTESSA ROSS, et al., Plaintiff, v. TWENTY-FOUR/SEVEN
BAIL BONDS, LLC, et al., Defendants, Civil Case No. SAG-20-0088 (D.
Md.), Judge Stephanie A. Gallagher of the U.S. District Court for
the District of Maryland (i) denied without prejudice Crum &
Forster Indemnity Co. ("C&F")'s Motion to Dismiss, and (ii) stayed
the action pending anticipated proceedings before the Maryland
Insurance Administration ("MIA").

Plaintiffs Ross and Kendra Sumpter filed a class action Complaint,
concerning the issuance of bail bonds, against Twenty-Four/Seven,
Randolph Smith, C&F, and Herbert A. Thaler, Jr., in the Circuit
Court of Maryland for Baltimore City on Oct. 15, 2019.  Defendant
Thaler removed the lawsuit to the Court on Jan. 13, 2020.

Defendant Randolph Smith operates Defendant Twenty-Four/Seven, a
bail bond company.  Defendant C&F is a surety company authorized to
do business in Maryland, and has appointed Twenty-Four/Seven to act
as its authorized agent with respect to the issuance of bail bonds.


When a judge sets bail for a criminal defendant, the defendant can
post the full amount of the bail, remain in jail, or purchase a
bail bond.  When a bail bond is purchased, the surety agrees to pay
the State the full amount of the bond, should the defendant fail to
appear.  Bail bond companies act as the intermediary between the
defendant and the surety, and charge a non-refundable premium for
their services (typically ten percent of the total money bail).
Usually, at the conclusion of a criminal case, a trial judge
returns in full a bond directly posted by a criminal defendant, as
long as the defendant appears for court proceedings.  If the
defendant utilizes the services of a bail bond company, however,
the premiums collected by the bail bond companies are not returned.
Bail bond companies pay a percentage of those retained premiums to
the sureties.

On June 1, 2017, the Plaintiffs signed a contract with
Twenty-Four/Seven to obtain a $50,000 bail bond to effect the
release of Plaintiff Sumpter from custody.  The 10% premium owed to
Twenty-Four/Seven was $5,000.  The Plaintiffs paid $900 at the time
of signing.  The bail bond contract did not indicate the amount and
due date for the installment payments, or the number of installment
payments to be made.  The Plaintiffs made two additional
installment payments in 2017, totaling $250.

On June 2, 2019, two years after the bond issued,
Twenty-Four/Seven, through its attorney, Defendant Thaler, filed a
consumer debt action in the District Court of Maryland for
Baltimore City against Plaintiff Ross, to collect the remainder of
the $5,000 premium.  The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants were
not allowed to enter into or collect payments on bail contracts,
including the Plaintiffs', because Twenty-Four/Seven was an
unlicensed bail bond company.

Based on the fact that Twenty-Four/Seven was "unlicensed," and
because their bail bond contract did not properly explain the
required installment payments, the Plaintiffs, and the proposed
class, assert claims under the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection
Act, the Maryland Consumer Protection Act, the Federal Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act, and the Maryland common law for unjust
enrichment.  The Plaintiffs and the class also seek various forms
of declaratory and injunctive relief.

Currently pending is a Motion to Dismiss filed by C&F.  The
Plaintiffs filed an opposition, and C&F filed a reply.  

Each of the Plaintiffs' claims hinges on whether Twenty-Four/Seven
violated the Maryland Insurance Code by (1) issuing bail bonds
while not properly licensed or registered as a trade name of a
valid license holder, as required by Md. Code Ann., Ins. Sections
10-103, -113 (West 2020); or (2) failing to provide the Plaintiffs
with the schedule for the installment payments, as required by Md.
Code Ann., Ins. Section 10-309(c).  

If neither statutory violation occurred, then each of the
Plaintiffs' claims fails, because they would have no basis to
contend that the bail bond contracts were unenforceable, or that
Twenty-Four/Seven had somehow misrepresented its licensing status.
Further, unless Twenty-Four/Seven acted in violation of the
Maryland Insurance Code, its operator, Smith, its alleged agent,
C&F, and its attorney, Thaler, could not be liable for any
contributions to any such violation or for trying to collect on an
"unenforceable" contract.

It is fair to say, however, that with respect to the two statutory
violations at issue in the case, the Maryland Legislature has not
specified whether the administrative remedies set forth in the
Insurance Code were intended to be exclusive, primary, or
concurrent with court jurisdiction.  In such circumstances, there
is a presumption that the administrative remedy is intended to be
primary, and that a claimant cannot maintain the alternative
judicial action without first invoking and exhausting the
administrative remedy.  That presumption is rebuttable, however,
and Zappone v. Liberty Life Ins. Co. set out four factors that
courts should consider, in cases like the instant one, to evaluate
whether the legislature intended for an administrative remedy to be
primary.  Each of those four factors counsels in favor of the MIA
having primary jurisdiction over the underpinning claims at issue.

First, a court must consider "the comprehensiveness of the
administrative remedy."  Judge Gallagher finds that the relevant
statutory scheme appears to provide the Commissioner, and the
State, the ability to vindicate the interests of individuals like
the Plaintiffs, who are harmed as a result of conduct like the
Defendants are alleged to have engaged in Title 10 of the Insurance
Article is noticeably lacking any express language providing tje
Plaintiffs the ability to vindicate their interests themselves.
Accordingly, it is apparent from the statutory scheme that the
Legislature intended the Insurance Commissioner to have primary
jurisdiction when alleged violations arise.   The Plaintiffs
improperly attempt to pursue directly a judicial remedy in a court
of law merely by characterizing or recasting the regulatory
violation as a Debt Collection, Consumer Protection, and common law
claim.

The second Zappone factor is the "agency's view of its own
jurisdiction."  Although the MIA has not weighed in on the
particular case, in other cases, it has taken the position that,
when an administrative process is available to a litigant for the
violation of a statutory obligation, that process must be pursued
and exhausted before judicial relief may be sought.  That quote
suggests that MIA would favor enforcement of its primary
jurisdiction over the Insurance Code violation issues in the case.

The third Zappone factor is the claim's dependence on the statutory
scheme.  As discussed, the Plaintiffs' Debt Collection, Consumer
Protection, and common law claims rely completely on their ability
to establish one of two violations of Title 10 of the Insurance
Article: a violation of Section 10-103(c)'s licensing/registration
requirement, or a violation of Section 10-309(c)'s requirement with
respect to disclosure of terms of an installment plan.  The
Plaintiffs identify no other "misrepresentations" by
Twenty-Four/Seven, or any other Defendant, that would exist if
Twenty-Four/Seven is determined to have fulfilled both of those
statutory requirements.  

All of Plaintiffs' claims in the instant case are wholly dependent
on Twenty-Four/Seven's alleged violations of the Insurance Code.
If Twenty-Four/Seven complied with the Insurance Code by being
properly registered and by appropriately disclosing the installment
payment plan, the Plaintiffs have no independent basis for any of
their claims.  In other words, the Plaintiffs' alleged actions are
only potentially unlawful because of the requirements of the
Insurance Code, not for any other reason.

The fourth and final Zappone factor is the claim's dependence upon
the expertise of the agency.  Judge Gallagher finds that while the
Plaintiffs contend that there is no public designation that
'Twenty-Four Seven Bail Bond' was being used as a properly filed
trade name, and using a name in an address line is not the same as
properly registering a trade name with the Insurance Commissioner,
the MIA is the appropriate entity to assess whether the various
licenses and registrations in the case fulfill the statutory
requirements.  

Although the question about whether Twenty-Four/Seven provided
sufficient information about the installment payments to the
Plaintiffs might be less dependent upon the MIA's expertise, in
light of the more complex licensing question, the Plaintiffs'
claims generally are best presented to the MIA for resolution.
Thus, all four Zappone factors weigh in favor of the MIA's exercise
of its primary jurisdiction to determine whether
Twenty-Four/Seven's actions violated the Insurance Code.

Finally, in Carter v. Huntington Title & Escrow, LLC, the Maryland
Court of Appeals considered the appropriate disposition for a case
involving the primary jurisdiction of an administrative agency.
Because primary jurisdiction only prohibits the adjudication of a
claim in court prior to the exhaustion of the administrative
remedy, the court instructed the circuit court to stay further
proceedings regarding the judicial complaint until the outcome of
the administrative adjudication, leaving open the possibility of
dismissal if the Plaintiff does not timely pursue administrative
relief.  Judge Gallagher will adhere to that procedure in the
instant case, rather than granting the dismissal C&F seeks.

For these reasons, Judge Gallagher denied without prejudice C&F's
Motion to Dismiss.  The case is stayed, and administratively
closed, until the outcome of the anticipated administrative
adjudication of the Plaintiffs' claims.  If the Plaintiffs neglect
to pursue administrative relief within ninety days, C&F is directed
to notify the Court, and the Plaintiffs' claims may be dismissed.
If the stay of the case is lifted following the administrative
adjudication, C&F will be permitted to refile its motion to
dismiss, to allow the Court to consider its other contentions,
including whether Twenty-Four/Seven acted as C&F's agent in
entering the installment arrangement with the Plaintiffs and in
filing a collection action.  A separate Order follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 8, 2020 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/xVM9q6 from Leagle.com.

UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Arbitration Provision Unenforceable
------------------------------------------------------
Christopher Horkins, Esq. -- chorkins@cassels.com -- Adrian D.
Jakibchuk, Esq. -- ajakibchuk@cassels.com -- and Meghan Rourke,
Esq. -- mtrourke@cassels.com -- of Cassels, in an article for
Mondaq, report that the Supreme Court of Canada recently found that
the arbitration provision used by popular ridesharing service, Uber
Technologies, Inc. (Uber), in its standard form agreement with its
drivers was invalid and unenforceable under the common law doctrine
of unconscionability due to the substantial up-front costs
associated with commencing an arbitration which effectively prevent
drivers from pursuing claims. The decision paves the way for the
drivers to pursue a class action in Ontario courts seeking a
declaration that they are employees of Uber and relief for breaches
of Ontario's Employment Standards Act, 2000 (the ESA). The Court's
reformulation of the test for unconscionability may also have wider
ranging impacts on standard form contracts, arbitration clauses,
class actions and employment law.

The Proposed Class Action

In January of 2017, David Heller, a Toronto UberEats driver,
commenced a proposed class action on behalf of Ontario Uber
drivers, which alleged that he and his fellow putative class
members are employees of Uber, rather than independent contractors,
and therefore entitled to the benefits and protections of the ESA.
Mr. Heller initiated the class action after he received a cell
phone message from Uber requiring that he accept changes to his
compensation, while he was out on a delivery.

In the proposed class action, Mr. Heller seeks relief in respect of
four claims on behalf of the proposed class: a claim for breach of
the ESA1, a claim for breach of contract and the duty of good
faith, a claim for negligence and a claim for unjust enrichment.
The success of all of Mr. Heller's claims depend on whether Mr.
Heller is considered an employee under the ESA. The class action
claims damages of $400 million against Uber, $200 million of which
consists of punitive damages.

Uber's Driver Agreement and Arbitration Clause

Uber requires its Ontario drivers to download Uber's "Driver App",
create an account, and provide several documents, including a valid
driver's license and vehicle registration, proof of eligibility to
work in Canada, and valid insurance. After reviewing the
documentation, Uber activates the drivers' accounts.

The first time an Uber driver logs into the activated Uber App, and
before they can drive passengers or deliver food, the driver must
accept an online standard form services agreement (the Agreement).
Drivers accept the 14-page Agreement by clicking "I agree" twice
through the Driver App.

The Agreement contains an arbitration clause which provides that
all disputes about the terms of the Agreement must be resolved
through arbitration in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, using the
International Chamber of Commerce arbitration rules (the
Arbitration Clause). The Agreement did not specify, however, that
the Netherlands arbitration process required by this provision
involved up-front administrative and filing fees of over
USD$14,500, in addition to any travel, accommodation, lost wages,
and legal costs involved in pursuing a claim through arbitration.

Motion to Stay the Proceedings in Favour of Arbitration

Uber brought a pre-certification motion before the Ontario Superior
Court of Justice, seeking to stay the class action in favour of
arbitration. Uber argued that the claims captured by the proposed
class action were subject to the Arbitration Clause and would have
to be arbitrated in the Netherlands. The motion judge agreed with
Uber and stayed the class action.

The Ontario Court of Appeal reversed the motion judge's decision
and held that the Arbitration Clause was invalid for two reasons:

  (a) First, if the drivers are presumed to be employees of Uber as
pleaded by Mr. Heller, the Arbitration Clause would constitute a
contracting out of their rights under the ESA, which includes the
ability to pursue certain claims by submitting a complaint to the
Ontario Ministry of Labour. The ESA provides that any contractual
provision purporting to contract out of "employment standards"
under the Act is void.

  (b) Second, the Court of Appeal also reached the separate and
independent conclusion that the Arbitration Clause was invalid
because it was unconscionable. The common law doctrine of
unconscionability applies in limited circumstances to invalidate
contracts which involve an improvident bargain between parties with
significantly unequal bargaining power. What made the Arbitration
Clause improvident, according to the Court of Appeal, was the fact
that any driver with a claim that might ordinarily amount to
nothing more than a few hundred dollars must undertake an expensive
arbitration in the Netherlands to have their rights determined
independently.

Uber appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Supreme Court of Canada Decision

In an 8-1 decision, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) upheld the
Ontario Court of Appeal's conclusion that the Arbitration Clause
was invalid. A majority of seven Justices agreed with the Court of
Appeal's conclusion that the Arbitration Clause was unconscionable.
Justice Brown, concurring in the result, would have found the
Arbitration Clause to be invalid for being contrary to public
policy. Justice Côté, in dissent, would have allowed the appeal
and granted Uber a stay of the proposed class action conditional
upon Uber's payment of the plaintiff's up-front arbitration costs.

While Ontario's Arbitration Act directs courts to stay judicial
proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement, the court
retains discretion to decline to stay proceedings in five
circumstances -- including when an arbitration agreement is
invalid. In Heller, the SCC expanded this test to provide that the
court may also resolve disputes over an arbitrator's jurisdiction
in circumstances where referring those disputes to the arbitrator
would effectively prevent the dispute from being resolved.

Using this framework, the SCC held that the Arbitration Clause was
unconscionable and invalid because it imposed prohibitive fees for
initiating arbitration and, as a result, there would be a real
prospect that if the stay was granted and the matter sent to
arbitration in the Netherlands, Mr. Heller's challenge to the
validity of the Arbitration Clause may never be resolved. The
majority restated the common law test for determining
unconscionability, distilling it to two factors:

  (1) An inequality of bargaining power: the Court held that this
exists where one party cannot adequately protect its own interests
in the contracting process; and

  (2) An improvident bargain: which is described as a bargain that
unduly advantages the stronger party or unduly disadvantages the
more vulnerable.
Importantly, the Court held that it is not necessary to prove that
the stronger party knowingly sought to take advantage of the more
vulnerable party to establish unconscionability, nor is it
necessary to show that the bargain was grossly unfair or that the
inequality of bargaining power between the parties was
overwhelming. In this regard, the SCC decision represents a
departure from what had been, to that point, the prevailing Ontario
approach to the doctrine of unconscionability.

The SCC found that Uber's Arbitration Clause was unconscionable for
the following reasons:

   * There was a clear inequality of bargaining power – the
Arbitration Clause was part of a standard form contract that Mr.
Heller was unable to negotiate;

  * There was a significant gulf in sophistication between Mr.
Heller and Uber, a large multinational corporation;

  * The Agreement contained no information about the USD$14,500
up-front costs associated with commencing an arbitration in the
Netherlands and Mr. Heller could not have suspected this hurdle to
relief when entering into the Agreement, nor could he have been
reasonably expected to have received legal advice;

  * The costs of commencing an arbitration were disproportionate to
any arbitration award that could reasonably have been foreseen when
the Agreement was entered into. In this respect, the Court noted
that the USD$14,500 up-front cost and related costs would apply to
individual disputes likely over hundreds, not thousands, of
dollars;

  * The Arbitration Clause gave Uber drivers in Ontario the clear
impression that they had little choice but to travel to the
Netherlands at their own expense to individually pursue claims
against Uber; and

  * Any representations to the arbitrator, including about the
location of the hearing, can only be made after the fees have been
paid.

Therefore, the SCC determined that, based on the disadvantages
faced by Mr. Heller in his ability to protect his bargaining
interests, and on the unfair terms that resulted therefrom, the
Arbitration Clause was unconscionable and therefore invalid. As a
result, the proposed class action was permitted to proceed to a
certification motion before the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.

Importantly, neither the majority nor Justice Brown's concurring
reasons addressed the Court of Appeal's finding that the
Arbitration Clause was also invalid for purporting to contract out
of the ESA, nor did they make any finding overturning the Court of
Appeal on this point. If the case proceeds beyond the certification
stage to a trial of the common issues, the Ontario court will be
required to rule on the key question of whether Uber drivers are
properly considered "employees" of Uber and therefore entitled to
ESA protections.

Key Take-Aways and Implications for Arbitration Clauses, Standard
Form Contracts, Class Actions and Employment Law Going Forward

The SCC's decision in Heller has potentially broad implications for
arbitration clauses, employment law, standard form contracts and
class actions arising from such contracts.

In reformulating the test for unconscionability, the majority
decision potentially opens the door for courts to invalidate
arbitration provisions and other onerous contractual terms based on
an inequality of bargaining power between the parties and the
perception of an improvident bargain. Given that nearly all
standard form contracts will, by their nature, involve unequal
bargaining power, the application of the majority's test in future
cases will likely come down to courts' determinations on whether
the resulting contract is improvident. This raises the potential
for an expansion of claims seeking to avoid regrettable contractual
obligations on the basis of unconscionability. It is possible that
Uber's Agreement may have been so uniquely onerous in requiring
drivers to pursue an expensive arbitration process in a foreign
country that the risk of widespread findings of unconscionability
in other standard form contracts will be low, but only time will
tell.

The decision marks a departure from the SCC's longstanding
commitment to the enforceability of arbitration agreements and the
general principle that disputes as to the jurisdiction of an
arbitrator should be referred to the arbitrator. In adding to the
test a caveat that the court may decide such issues if referral to
arbitration poses a risk that the issue may never be decided, the
SCC has staked further ground over disputes that parties have
agreed to submit to arbitration. Parties seeking to rely on
arbitration provisions in their standard form contracts going
forward should heed the SCC's warning in Heller in drafting their
arbitration provisions and ensure that there are no significant
financial barriers to their counterparties' commencement of
arbitration proceedings.

Heller also raises questions about whether arbitration provisions
can continue to be effective deterrents of class actions. Canadian
courts have previously been amenable to staying proposed class
actions where the putative class members' claims are subject to a
valid arbitration clause. While Heller does not go as far as
finding that any arbitration clause that has the effect of
preventing class actions is invalid, the relative access to justice
provided by Mr. Heller's class action as compared to Uber's
inaccessible arbitration process loomed large in the majority's
reasoning. Defendants in future cases should take caution that
arbitration provisions may not be a silver bullet and must be
prepared to defend the class members' ability to effectively pursue
their claims through arbitration.

From an employment law perspective, Heller is noteworthy for a
couple of key reasons. First, to the extent that some employers opt
to include arbitration clauses in employment agreements (or in
independent contractor agreements), it is more important than ever
that such provisions: (a) do not effectively make the arbitration
of disputes inaccessible; and (b) are not drafted in such a way as
to preclude employees from seeking recourse through the ESA (or
other applicable employment standards legislation prohibiting such
"contracting out"). A failure to heed such advice may well
invalidate the arbitration clause, as it did in Heller.

Second, in rejecting the Ontario approach to the doctrine of
unconscionability, which required that the contract in question be
"grossly unfair", that the inequality of bargaining power be
"overwhelming" and that the offending party knowingly take
advantage of the vulnerability of the other, the SCC has made it
somewhat easier for Ontario employees to challenge other terms in
their employment agreements which they might view as unfair. As a
consequence, Ontario employers may be wise to re-examine the terms
of their standard employment agreements to assess whether there are
any that, while not contrary to the ESA, may be susceptible to
challenge as being "improvident" or "unduly disadvantageous". The
Heller decision also reinforces the importance for employers to
ensure that job applicants have a meaningful opportunity to seek
independent legal advice before signing an employment agreement.

Footnotes

1 Including failing to ensure that class members were classified as
employees, and failure to compensate class members or inform them
of their eligibility for the minimum wage, overtime pay, vacation
pay and public holiday pay and premium pay under the ESA, among
other contraventions. [GN]


UMA ENTERPRISES: Faces Lemus Suit Over Unpaid Meal Breaks
---------------------------------------------------------
ALEXIS SIU LEMUS, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. UMA ENTERPRISES, INC.; and DOES 1
through 50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 20STCV26458 (Cal.
Super., July 14, 2020) is an action against the Defendants for
failure to provide:

     -- accurate and itemized wages statements,

     -- payment for regular wages and overtime,

     -- minimum wage,

     -- lawful meal periods,

     -- lawful rest periods,

     -- timely payment during employment, and

     -- payment upon separation of employment.

The Plaintiff Lemus was employed by the Defendants as decor
associate.

UMA Enterprises, Inc. wholesales and distributes house ware
products. The Company imports and markets home decorating products
such as table top accessories, wall decor, accent furnitures,
garden items, and seasonal decorations. UMA Enterprises serves
customers worldwide. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin Lo, Esq.
          WORK LAWYERS, PC
          22939 Hawthorne Blvd., Suite 202
          Torrance, CA 90505
          Telephone: (866) 496- 7552
          Facsimile: (424) 355-8535
          E-mail: Justin@WorkLawyers.com


UNITED STATES: Certification of Transgender Detainees Class Denied
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, C.G.B., et al., Plaintiffs, v. CHAD WOLF, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 20-cv-1072 (CRC) (D. D.C.), Judge Christopher
R. Cooper of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
denied three motions lodged by the Plaintiffs: (1) a motion to
certify a class of all transgender detainees held in ICE custody,
now and in the future; (2) a motion to join two new named
Plaintiffs; and (3) an emergency motion for a temporary restraining
order.

The Plaintiffs, 10 transgender women in the custody of Immigration
and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"), sued the Secretary of Homeland
Security and the Attorney General of the United States based on
their roles in overseeing the nation's civil immigration detention
system.  Asserting that their continued detention during the
COVID-19 pandemic violates the Constitution and the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA"), the Plaintiffs seek an order directing ICE
to immediately release all transgender civil detainees across the
country and not to detain any additional transgender immigrants
until the pandemic ends.

Civil immigration detention centers, which typically house highly
transient populations in close quarters, are difficult environments
in which to prevent the spread of a dangerous contagion like
COVID-19.  Recognizing this, ICE and the CDC have taken several
steps to contain the virus in detention facilities.  Building on
its Action Plan, on April 10, 2020, ICE released a document
entitled COVID-19 Pandemic Response Requirements ("PRR"), which
includes more definitive measures designed to prevent the spread of
COVID-19 in detention facilities.  While the PRR impose these
"mandatory" requirements at all detention centers, they also
indicate that the requirements are "dynamic" and "will be updated
as additional/revised information and best practices become
available."

The Plaintiffs' challenge arises in the context of other requests
for injunctive relief against ICE in connection with the ongoing
pandemic.  Most importantly in the instant case, in Fraihat v. ICE,
Judge Bernal in the Central District of California certified a
class of all people who are detained in ICE custody who have one of
the CDC-recognized Risk Factors placing them at heightened risk of
severe illness and death upon contracting the COVID-19 virus.  The
court proceeded to issue a preliminary injunction that, inter alia,
ordered ICE to identify and track all ICE detainees with
CDC-designated risk factors; to make timely custody determinations
for detainees with Risk Factors, per the latest Docket Review
Guidance; to promptly issue a performance standard or a supplement
to their Pandemic Response Requirements defining the minimum
acceptable detention conditions for detainees with the Risk
Factors, regardless of the statutory authority for their detention,
to reduce their risk of COVID-19 infection pending individualized
determinations or the end of the pandemic; and to monitor and
enforce facility-wide compliance with the Pandemic Response
Requirements and the Performance Standard.

Since the issuance of the Fraihat injunction, the Government has
identified more than 4,400 non-citizens in custody who possess
CDC-designated risk factors.  In addition to the nationwide Fraihat
injunction, several district courts have entered preliminary
injunctions requiring specific ICE facilities within their
jurisdictions to evaluate whether high-risk detainees should be
released and to comply with ICE's PRR and the CDC Detention
Facility Guidelines.  One of these facility-specific injunctions
requiring the release of detainees has been stayed on appeal.  

In Roman v. Wolf, the district court entered an injunction
requiring ICE to fully implement CDC Detention Facility Guidelines
and to release a certain number of detainees at California's
Adelanto Processing Center.  After the government filed an
emergency appeal, the Ninth Circuit stayed the district court's
order to release detainees but let stand the part of the injunction
requiring ICE's substantial compliance with guidelines issued by
the CDC for correctional and detention facilities to follow in
managing COVID-19.

The named Plaintiffs are detained at five detention centers that
are all managed by private contractors: the Florence Correctional
Center and La Palma Correctional Center in Arizona; the Nevada
Southern Detention Center in Nevada; the Aurora Detention Center in
Colorado; and the El Paso Processing Center in Texas.  They are
held pursuant to various provisions of the Immigration and
Nationality Act ("INA"): Some are mandatorily detained as required
by 8 U.S.C. Sections 1225(b), 1226(c), or 1231(a)(2), while others
are detained pursuant to the Government's exercise of discretion
under Section 1226(a).  

The Plaintiffs vary in age from 19- to 37-years-old.  Some
Plaintiffs suffer from serious health conditions, including HIV,
while others describe themselves as in good health.  All five
facilities where named Plaintiffs are held have ramped up their
responses to COVID-19 since the start of the litigation.

On April 23, 2020, the Plaintiffs filed suit against Chad Wolf,
acting Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
("DHS"), and William Barr, Attorney General of United States.  They
allege that ICE, the DHS component that oversees the civil
detention of immigrants, has violated the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution by failing to sufficiently protect transgender
immigrant detainees from COVID-19 and the APA by failing to follow
its internal guidelines.  

Simultaneously, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary
restraining order ("TRO") compelling ICE to immediately release the
named Plaintiffs and all other transgender detainees in ICE
custody; declaring that ICE is violating the Constitution and the
APA; directing the Defendants to implement all CDC and World Health
Organization ("WHO") protocols designed to combat COVID-19; and
prohibiting ICE from placing any additional transgender detainees
in ICE custody until it has implemented sufficient protocols to
prevent the transmission of COVID-19.

On May 5, 2020, the Plaintiffs moved to certify a class consisting
of all transgender people in civil immigration detention, who are
held, or who will be held, in any ICE detention center or facility
across the country during the pendency of the COVID-19 pandemic.
On May 11, 2020, they moved to join two new named Plaintiffs --
M.I.M.M., who is housed at the Otay Mesa Detention Center in San
Diego, California, and Y.Z., who is housed at the Imperial Regional
Detention Facility in Calexico, California.

The Court held a telephonic hearing on the motion for temporary
restraining order (but not on the Plaintiffs' motions for class
certification or joinder, which had not yet been fully briefed) on
May 6, 2020.  Thereafter, it held the hearing record open and
requested additional, more recent evidence.  In response to the
Court's order, the parties filed supplemental declarations under
seal.

The Plaintiffs move to certify a class of all transgender people in
civil immigration detention who are held, or who will be held, by
ICE in any U.S. detention center or facility during the pendency of
the COVID-19 pandemic.  The proposed class includes at least 70
transgender people being held in civil immigration detention
centers across the country.  The Government opposes class
certification on two grounds: first, that the Court lacks
jurisdiction under the INA to issue the classwide relief sought;
and second, that the Plaintiffs' proposed class fails to meet the
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

Judge Cooper need not decide at this juncture whether Section
1252(f)(1) bars it from issuing classwide injunctive relief based
on the Plaintiffs' constitutional claims.  He declines to issue
temporary injunctive relief -- even as to the individual named
Plaintiffs -- on that basis.  In any case, even if Section
1252(f)(1) precludes classwide injunctive relief, it does not bar
the classwide declaratory relief also sought by the Plaintiffs.
Because the Court retains jurisdiction to issue classwide
declaratory relief, Section 1252(f)(1) does not provide a
standalone basis for denying the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification.  The Judge therefore proceeds to analyzing the
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23.

Judge Cooper finds that the putative class fails to meet the
commonality prong of Rule 23.  Certification of the proposed
nationwide class would bind all transgender detainees to the
Court's resolution of issues arising from a rapidly evolving health
crisis.  Given the differences among the named Plaintiffs and
unnamed Plaintiffs (and for that matter, among the named Plaintiffs
themselves) with respect to their conditions of confinement, health
conditions, and suitability for parole, certifying such a broad
class poses potential unfairness to the unnamed class members bound
by the judgment.  

Because the Plaintiffs fail to satisfy the first prong of Rule
20(a), they may not join M.I.M.M. and Y.Z. in the action.  The
Judge concludes that the Plaintiffs fail to satisfy the first prong
of Rule 20(a). M.I.M.M.'s and Y.Z.'s claims fail the logical
relationship test because there is not substantial overlap in the
facts giving rise to their claims and the existing plaintiffs'
claims.  He need not consider the second prong of the rule.

Having limited the suit to the 10 Plaintiffs named in the
complaint, the Judge now considers the merits of their motion for a
temporary restraining order.  The Complaint presents three distinct
legal grounds for ordering the Plaintiffs' immediate release and
the other declaratory and injunctive relief they seek.
Specifically, the Plaintiffs allege that ICE's failures to
implement adequate COVID-19 prevention measures: (1) violate their
due process rights under the Fifth Amendment; (2) are contrary to
law under the APA; and (3) warrant a writ of mandamus.

Judge Cooper concludes that due process requires evaluation of
conditions of confinement on a sliding scale.  In the COVID-19
context, the Court must consider, at a minimum, an individual
detainee's age and specific health conditions, the conditions at
her detention facility, and the legal basis and factual
circumstances of her detention.  The Judge will therefore consider,
facility-by-facility, the due process claims of each named
Plaintiff.  The Judge holds that (i) C.G.B., the only named
Plaintiff at Florence, fails to establish a likelihood of success
on the merits of her Fifth Amendment claim; (ii) K.R.H. is likely
to establish success on her Fifth Amendment claim; (iii) K.M. and
K.S have established a likelihood of success on the merits of their
due process claims; (iv) the four detainees housed at Aurora --
D.B.M.U., M.J.J., M.M.S-M., and L.M.-- have established a
likelihood of success on the merits of their due process claims;
and (v) M.R.P. fails to establish a likelihood of success on the
merits of her due process claim.

The Judge then considers whether the Plaintiffs have made a showing
of irreparable harm.  It is well established that the deprivation
of constitutional rights unquestionably constitutes irreparable
injury.  Thus, those Plaintiffs who have shown a likelihood of
success on their Fifth Amendment claims -- K.R.H., K.M., and K.S.
-- have also established irreparable harm.  Conversely, the
remaining Plaintiffs who have failed to establish a likelihood of
success on the merits of their Fifth Amendment claims -- C.G.B.,
A.F., D.B.M.U., M.J.J., M.M.S-M., L.M., M.R.P. -- also fail to
establish irreparable injury.

The Plaintiffs also seek a writ of mandamus to require the
Respondents to act immediately in accordance with their legal
obligations to protect Petitioners and class members and to follow
their own parole guidelines and directives.  The Judge holds that
the Plaintiffs have failed to cite any legal source requiring the
government to take any particular action or that otherwise cabins
the agencies' discretionary choices on how to best respond to a
pandemic.  Moreover, other adequate remedies are available to the
Plaintiffs.  Because the Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the
merits of their mandamus claim, the Jduge also declines to issue a
TRO on that basis.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Cooper denied the motions for
class certification, joinder, and a temporary restraining order.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 2, 2020 Memorandum
Opinion is available at https://is.gd/4fsGlc from Leagle.com.


UNITED STATES: Court Denies ICE Detainee Alirio's Bid for Release
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey issued an
Opinion denying the Petitioner's Request for Immediate Release in
the case captioned CARLOS ALIRIO R.R., Petitioner v. PAULO CORREIA,
et al., Respondent, Case No. 20-6217 (JMV) (D.N.J.).

The Petitioner is an immigration detainee being held by the
Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement ("DHS/ICE") at the Essex County Correctional Facility
("ECCF") in Newark, New Jersey.  
Defendant Paulo Correia is the Field Office Director, Newark
District Office, of the United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services ("USCIS"), DHS.

The instant petition was filed in the wake of the ongoing COVID-19
pandemic that has been reported to have been contracted by both
personnel and detainees at ECCF. The Petitioner has been in ICE
custody since February 25, 2020, when he was served with a "Notice
to Appear" charging him as an alien present in the United States,
who has not been admitted or paroled. The Petitioner's criminal
history is comprised solely of a domestic violence-related assault
charge for which he was arrested on February 24, 2020, by the North
Bergen Police Department. This charge is currently pending.

On March 12, 2020, the Petitioner's request for
bond-redetermination was denied by an immigration judge ("IJ") on
the grounds that he poses a danger and is a flight risk. On April
24, 2020, the Petitioner's request for humanitarian release was
denied by ICE. On May 21, 2020, the Petitioner filed the instant
petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the conditions of
his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2241.

On May 5, 2020, he filed an "Amended Complaint." The Petitioner
asks the Court to, inter alia, order his immediate release and to
award him costs associated with attorney fees under the Equal
Access to Justice Act ("EAJA").

The Petitioner, who is thirty-seven years old, states that he is
obese, has "borderline diabetes, body swelling and depressive
disorder" as well as a history of infections and scarring in his
abdominal area after an appendix removal. On May 14, 2020, the
Petitioner underwent a rapid antibody screening and the result
indicated that he test positive for IgG. According to ECCF's
medical director, Lionel Anicette, M.D., present IgG antibodies
means that an individual may have developed immunity to COVID-19
after exposure. ECCF only quarantines individuals with such test
results if they are symptomatic, otherwise they are housed in
general population.

Although the Court has jurisdiction, the Court finds that the
Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of success
on the merits.

District Judge John Michael Vazquez writes that before a detainee
contracts the virus, the public has an interest in preventing
further positive cases. In addition to the health and welfare of
the detainee, the public also has an interest in seeing that scarce
medical resources are conserved. Yet, once a detainee tests
positive, the public also has an interest in not introducing
additional cases into the general public.

In sum, the Court credits the Petitioner's complaints as to ECCF.
While ECCF has implemented steps that have worked to lessen the
frequency and number of infections, ECCF's efforts have not been
completely successful. But the Petitioner's alleged medical
conditions do not fall within the CDC guidelines for placing him in
an unusually vulnerable category. As a result, the Court finds that
the Petitioner's detention serves a legitimate governmental
interest. Therefore, the Court does not find that the Petitioner is
likely to succeed on his claims and his request for immediate
release is denied. Because the Petitioner's habeas petition is
denied, he is not entitled to fees and attorney costs pursuant to
EAJA.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 15, 2020 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y32s2rd5 from Leagle.com


UNITED STATES: Prelim. Injunction Denied in Bird Suit vs. FBI
--------------------------------------------------------------
Greg Mersol, Esq. -- gmersol@bakerlaw.com -- of BakerHostetler, in
an article for JDSupra, reports that in the 1991 movie "Silence of
the Lambs" and the book on which it was based, FBI trainee Clarice
Starling is tasked with working with the now-infamous Hannibal
Lector to find a serial killer. That movie won a Best Actress Oscar
for Jodie Foster as well as Oscars for Anthony Hopkins and the
movie's scriptwriters and director.

But not every trainee paints the same exciting picture of life as a
female FBI agent in training. In Bird v. Barr, Case No.
1:2019cv01581 (D.D.C., July 23, 2020), a group of women FBI
trainees claimed that they and others were victims of sex
discrimination in the FBI's basic training program for new agents
and intelligence analysts. After the action was filed, one
plaintiff and one potential witness in Phoenix alleged that a
supervisor had retaliated against them by, among other things,
threatening termination, requiring additional documentation for a
Family and Medical Leave Act leave, not giving them meaningful
assignments or refusing requests to work alternative work
schedules. The plaintiffs filed a motion for an order preliminarily
enjoining the FBI "from engaging in any retaliation against any
plaintiff or witness in this action."

The District Court found not only that the motion was improper, but
was highly critical of it on multiple levels. The court noted at
the outset that a motion for a preliminary injunction was the
improper vehicle to seek relief, finding that it was "premised on a
fundamental misunderstanding of how preliminary injunctions
function in a civil action filed in federal court." As the court
stated, a motion for preliminary injunction must relate to the
conduct complained of in the complaint, not other types of conduct.
The motion in this instance was seeking ancillary relief to assist
the plaintiffs in prosecuting their claims, not addressing claimed
sex discrimination in training.

While the court found that it had no jurisdiction to consider the
request, it was also obviously unimpressed with the merits. Both
individuals claimed actions by what appeared to be a single
supervisor in a single location -- Phoenix -- not classwide or
systemic retaliation. In one case, the individual was unable to
work because she had lost her security clearance, a matter the
court found to be well beyond its purview. The court also noted, in
accordance with the holdings of many other courts, that even loss
of employment did not constitute irreparable harm, as money damages
and post-judgment orders could make the claimed victim whole.

While the court's analysis was generally dismissive of the relief
the plaintiffs sought, they may have hurt their own chances by
overreaching in two directions. First, they sought a nationwide
preliminary injunction even though there were but two individuals
involved, both of whom were from the same office. Second, with
respect to those individuals, they sought highly specific orders
stating the hours they could be required to work, permitting them
to work at home, providing them with a laptop and similar details
that would have caused the court to have to micromanage the
workplace.

In any case, the court denied the motion for preliminary
injunction, as it had neither the power nor the inclination to
grant the requested relief.

The bottom line: A preliminary injunction is generally not the
vehicle to address claims of retaliatory conduct in an employment
class action. [GN]


UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA: Suit Seeks to Delay Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Michael T. Nietzel, writing for Forbes, reports that even as
colleges across the nation backpedal on their plans to reopen
campuses this fall, they're facing a rising tide of resistance from
multiple constituencies about those plans. The pushback typically
centers on concerns that institutions cannot assure the safety of
campus as the coronavirus continues to surge or that they haven't
made adequate pricing adjustments given all the reductions to
typical campus experiences and amenities.

The revolt is heating up. Faculty are advising students to avoid
campus because of safety concerns, athletes are expressing concerns
about practice conditions and competition protocols, students are
suing over tuition and room and board charges, and parents are
demanding greater say in colleges' decision-making.

Faculty Speak Out

At the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 30 tenured
faculty members penned an open letter to UNC undergraduates in The
Charlotte Observer, advising them to stay home for the fall
semester.

"Your experience as a Chapel Hill undergraduate is a journey we are
delighted to join and feel fortunate to be a part of. We want to be
in the classroom teaching you."

"However, we cannot, in good conscience, perform that role on
campus this semester. We need to stay safe from Covid-19 by staying
at home - and we need you to stay home in order to protect
yourselves and your fellow students, your teachers, the many
workers who serve you on campus, the residents of Chapel Hill and
Carrboro, and your own family members and loved ones."

The letter continued, "We recognize that some of you will have to
live on campus this fall semester for financial or personal
reasons, and we want to help ensure that campus is safe for you. We
implore the rest of you to stay home this fall. We believe that
this will result in a better fall semester for most of you."

In addition to the letter, faculty and staff at the University of
North Carolina System's 16 campuses are planning a class-action
lawsuit seeking to require that in-person classes be delayed. A
lawyer representing UNC employees claims that the universities
cannot guarantee they'll be safe when students return to campus.
Gary Shipman said, "it is certain" that university employees will
get the virus. "As each day goes by," he said, "those risks
increase instead of decrease."

Shipman said the lawsuit will ask for an injunction to delay
reopening the public universities to in-person instruction until
the schools can make a plan that will assure employee safety.

Students File Lawsuits, Start Petitions

Students have filed dozens of class-action lawsuits against
institutions, seeking reimbursement for housing, dining, and
on-campus services that were curtailed when campus shut down in the
spring. Many others lawsuits are demanding tuition refunds, arguing
that remote learning is an inferior educational product compared to
face-to-face instruction.

But lawsuits focused on the past spring semester may be the least
of colleges' worries. Across the country, college students are
launching online petitions and threatening more lawsuits seeking
tuition discounts at colleges that will rely on remote instruction
and limit many of the cherished aspects of college life. According
to one large survey of U.S. college students, more than 93% believe
that if classes are held online, tuition should be reduced. And
yet, with a few notable exceptions like Georgetown and Princeton,
most top colleges are not doing so.

Even more significant is a developing story, reported in several
media outlets, that a group of Pac-12 Conference football players
was preparing a list of demands to the conference concerning the
safety protocols that were being implemented to deal with the
pandemic. According to reporting in the Los Angeles Times and ESPN,
some players are considering sitting out practices and games if
their ultimatum was not satisfied. ESPN, citing a text message it
obtained, reported that the group's goal is to "obtain a written
contract with the Pac-12 that legally ensures several protections
and benefits".

On Aug. 2, the players posted a letter titled #WeAreUnited, listing
their demands, including being given the option not to play during
the pandemic, establishing mandatory safety standards enforced by a
third party, protecting all intercollegiate sports, ending racial
injustice, securing economic rights and fair compensation, and
obtaining long-term health insurance.

Of course, what starts in California, doesn't stay in California.
As the Pac-12 athletes move forward, expect similar demands to crop
up at other Power 5 universities. College athletes have already
shown they're ready to press their grievances and demands with a
new activism, and should they challenge pandemic protocols, it
could be a game-changer for many schools.

Parents Demand A Voice

The Harvard Crimson reported that parents of the Harvard Class of
2022 have organized a lobbying movement to persuade the University
to reduce tuition, relax leave of absence policies, and more
clearly explain the decision to limit the number of students
permitted to return to campus.

According to the Crimson, "The day Harvard announced in early July
that it would invite only freshmen and select upperclassmen to
campus in the fall, Yolanda Brown-Spidell said she wanted to
discuss her 'host of feelings' about the news with other parents.
Hours later, she posted in the Facebook group for Harvard Class of
2022 parents inviting others to share their own reactions."

She organized a Zoom call, in which 135 parent took part.
Subsequently, the group sent letters of demand, signed by more than
200 parents, to several Harvard administrators, including
University President Lawrence S. Bacow, and Dean of the Faculty of
Arts and Sciences Claudine Gay.

The parents have requested that Harvard reduce its tuition by 10%
and explain the "complex variables" used in making the decision to
permit only freshmen and select upperclassmen to return to campus.
The group has also demanded that Harvard increase the housing
options for students returning after a leave and allow students on
leave to continue having access to various other University
resources.

Regardless of their fall plans, colleges face conflicting demands
from the very individuals upon whom their success most depends.

  * Faculty and staff are understandably concerned or even afraid
about being forced into work environments they feel are unsafe. At
the same time, they know their institutions must remain financially
viable, which may require reopening as aggressively as possible.

  * Students are angry over being charged the same price for an
online education they believe is greatly diminished from live
instruction, but they also resent some of the on-campus
restrictions that will be imposed on them in the interest of
safety.

   * Parents want schools to resume face-to-face instruction, but
many will be quick to second-guess any decision that goes badly.

But what they all share in common is an increased activism for
their demands. Buckle up, colleges; your ride will get rougher.
[GN]


WAYFAIR INC:  Court Dismisses Securities Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------
In the case, In re WAYFAIR, INC. Securities Litigation. This
Document Relates To: ALL ACTIONS, Civil Action No. 19-10062-DPW (D.
Mass.), Judge Douglas P. Woodlock of the U.S. District Court for
the District of Massachusetts granted the Defendants' motion to
dismiss.

After Wayfair, an online home goods retailer, missed its quarterly
financial projection by .002% one quarter, several individuals who
say they consequently lost money in the stock market initiated the
two lawsuits the Judge has consolidated before him.  The putative
class action litigation is brought against Wayfair and its three
most senior officers, all of whom also serve as directors, to
recover those losses.

Wayfair is a huge online home goods store.  As online retail has
grown and Wayfair has faced increasing competition, Wayfair has
spent more and more money on advertising--$191 million in 2014,
$278 million in 2015, $409 million in 2016, $550 million in 2017,
and $774 million in 2018--to leverage revenue.  Revenue
correspondingly increased: Wayfair's annual revenue was $1.32
billion in 2014, $2.25 billion in 2015, $3.38 billion in 2016,
$4.72 billion in 2017, and $6.78 billion in 2018.

During the alleged class period (Aug. 2, 2018 to Oct. 31, 2018),
Wayfair's advertising-revenue leverage was worse (deleveraged) than
in previous years.  The Plaintiffs assert that the Defendants knew
of this problem but concealed it from investors.  The Defendants,
the Plaintiffs contend, in fact made false statements to the public
about Wayfair's financial position and, in particular, that
defendant Niraj Shah, Wayfair CEO and President and Co-Chairman of
the Board of Directors, made these false and misleading statements
during the class period.

Wayfair's stock price during the class period reached $151.20 per
share on Sept. 14, 2018.  During that same time period, the
individual Defendants, Shah, Steven K. Conine, Co-Chair of the
Board of Directors, and Michael D. Fleisher, CFO, collectively sold
$69 million of their personally held Wayfair shares in dozens of
transactions.  The record before the Court does not clearly
indicate whether this was unusual transactional activity for those
individuals.  

Before the stock market opened on Nov. 1, 2018, the day Wayfair
would be filing its 3Q 2018 SEC Form 10-Q, the Defendants disclosed
in a press release and a conference call that their 3Q results were
worse than anticipated.  In the conference call, Defendant Fleisher
said that Wayfair's advertising had deleveraged in a year to year
comparison between 3Q 2017 and 3Q 2018, from 11.8% in 3Q 2017 to
11.9% in 3Q 2018.  According to the amended complaint, however, the
Defendants had misleadingly signaled during the Class Period that
they were experiencing positive leverage. Defendant Fleisher
explained during the call that the two factors driving the
incremental expense which resulted in a loss were advertising
spending, which was higher than usual because of paybacks and
headcount hiring.

On Nov. 1, 2018, following that conference call, Wayfair stock
suffered a 12.8% loss, closing at $96.16 a share.  Wayfair had an
EBITDA loss of $76.4 million, a net loss of $151.7 million
($1.69/share), and negative free cash flow of $58.8 million.  The
Plaintiffs characterize these losses as much worse than the
Defendants had signaled during the Class Period.  On Nov. 2, 2018,
the stock price fell an additional 3.3%.

The Defendants moved motion to dismiss.

In light of the rigorous analysis he would be required to undertake
in order to determine whether class certification is appropriate in
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA") litigation,
Judge Woodlock is of the view that addressing the case at the
threshold through a motion to dismiss is the best course.
Accordingly, he follows the direction chosen by the Defendants in
first filing a motion to dismiss and consider the dispositive
question whether the case, irrespective of class treatment,
presents claims upon which relief may be granted.

The Plaintiffs allege securities fraud under Section 10(b) of the
Securities and Exchange Act.  The Plaintiffs allege four material
omissions and approximately 12 actionable misstatements.  

Judge Woodlock finds that (i) several of the Defendants' alleged
statements are merely generalized expressions of confidence in
Wayfair's performance; (ii) another set of the Defendants' alleged
statements are forward-looking projections and forecasts about what
they expected to see in Wayfair's future; (iii) a third category of
the Defendants' statements are not forward-looking or puffery, but
are, instead, statements about Wayfair's strategies, including its
advertising strategies, that the Plaintiffs simply have not
adequately alleged were fraudulent when made; and (iv) the
"omitted" information is not sufficiently particularized to be
actionable under the PSLRA.

The Amended Complaint alleges that the Defendants knowingly or
recklessly disseminated materially false information in issued
statements and also neglected to disclose material facts.  The
Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants did so through their public
statements.  They further allege that the Defendants had a motive
to make these false statements.

Judge Woodlock finds that (i) rather than supplying any facts
bearing on the mindset of the top executives of the company, the
Plaintiffs merely "speculate" about what they might have known or
thought; (ii) no meaningful particularized allegations of a motive
to lie about Wayfair's financial condition at all as the PSLRA
requires a strong inference of scienter, not a litany of
possibilities; and (iii) although the Plaintiffs adequately allege
that their losses were connected to the press release, they have
not adequately alleged that the press release was connected to a
prior false or misleading statement by the Defendants, and so they
have not adequately pleaded loss causation.

The Plaintiffs also assert a Section 20(a) claim.  Section 20(a)
claims are necessarily dependent on the existence of a Section
10(b) violation.  Because he has found no Section 10(b) violation,
Judge Woodlock finds no Section 20(a) violation.

For the independent reasons that the Plaintiffs have not adequately
alleged any actionable misstatements or omissions, have not
adequately alleged scienter, and have not sufficiently alleged loss
causation, Judge Woodlock granted the Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 8, 2020 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://is.gd/yNVUR8 from Leagle.com.

WEB.COM GROUP: Prelim OK of $500,000 Howard Suit Settlement Denied
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Casey Howard, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Web.com Group
Incorporated, Defendant, Case No. CV-19-00513-PHX-DJH (D. Ariz.),
Judge Diane J. Humetewa of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Arizona granted in part and denied in part the parties' Joint
Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement and FLSA
Collective Action.

The Defendant is a for-profit company based in Jacksonville,
Florida and provides domain registration and web development
services.  It operates call centers throughout the United States,
including in Arizona, Pennsylvania, and Washington.  Named
Plaintiffs Casey Howard, Phil Martinez, Lori Astwood, and Ben Azar
were hourly call-center employees in the Defendant's call centers
and allege that they were not compensated for all of the hours they
worked--specifically including time spent on preliminary pre-shift
start-up activities.

The Plaintiffs initiated the action on Jan. 30, 2019; they filed a
First Amended Complaint on Feb. 28, 2019 and a Second Amended
Complaint ("SAC") on Sept. 10, 2019.  Their hybrid class and
collective action SAC asserts claims under the Fair Labor Standards
Act to recover their unpaid overtime compensation and statutorily
prescribed penalties.  In addition to their FLSA claims, the
Plaintiffs further allege state-law claims for those current and
former hourly call-center employees who worked in Arizona,
Pennsylvania, and Washington.

Additionally, the Plaintiffs allege that they did not perform work
that meets the definition of exempt work under the FLSA or Arizona,
Pennsylvania, or Washington state law.  Their FLSA claims are
asserted as a collective action under Section 216(b) of the FLSA,
while their state law claims are asserted as a class action under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).  On Nov. 18, 2019, the
parties notified the Court that they settled the action and filed
their Joint Motion.

Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, the Plaintiffs seek to
certify a settlement class that is comprised of three settlement
subclasses ("State Law Classes") defined as follows: (1) the
"Arizona Class Action Members" includes all hourly call-center
employees who were employed by Web.com in the State of Arizona, at
any time from Jan. 30, 2018, through the final disposition of the
matter; (2) the "Pennsylvania Class Action Members" includes all
hourly call-center employees who were employed by Web.com in the
State of Pennsylvania, at any time from Feb. 28, 2016, through the
final disposition of the matter; (3) the "Washington Class Action
Members" includes all call-center workers employed by Web.com in
Spokane, Washington, at any time from May 23, 2016, though the
final disposition of this matter, except for Carl V. Jehle.  The
parties represent that there are approximately 982 individuals
included in the three State Law Classes.

Additionally, the parties have proposed an FLSA Collective Action
that includes the Named Plaintiffs; all hourly call-center
employees who were employed by the Defendant from Jan. 30, 2016,
through final disposition of the case, excluding Carl V. Jehle,
that complete a Claim Form; State Law Class members that complete a
Claim Form; and the individuals identified in Exhibit A ("Opt-in
Plaintiffs") to the proposed Settlement Agreement.  The members of
the State Law Classes and the FLSA Collective Action are
collectively referred to as the "Settlement Class."

Under the Settlement Agreement, the Defendant would pay a maximum
settlement amount of $500,000.  It provides for the following
allocation of the Settlement Fund: (1) up to $30,000 to the claims
administrator, ILYM Group, Inc.; (2) $10,000 to the four class
representatives; (3) $125,000 to be paid to class counsel in
attorney's fees; and (4) estimated litigation costs of up to
$25,000.

After these deductions from the Settlement Fund, each member of the
Settlement Class will receive their pro rata share of the
Settlement Fund based on their workweeks--a number unique to each
class member calculated based on the number of weeks he or she
worked during the relevant period.  The parties estimate that the
average settlement received by the Settlement Class will be $94.
Unclaimed payments will be returned to the Defendant.

Judge Humetewa conditionally certifies the State Law Classes and
conditionally certifies the FLSA Collective Action.  However, she
is unconvinced that the Settlement Agreement falls within the range
of possible approval.  In order for the Settlement Agreement to be
preliminarily approved, the following must be addressed: (1) the
Settlement Agreement must create separate funds for payment of the
Rule 23 claims and the FLSA claims; (2) the Notice must explain the
hybrid nature of this case and explain the option for a member of
the State Law Class to exhaust only the FLSA claim or only the
State Law claims; (3) the settlement must eliminate the claim form
submission requirement for the Rule 23 class members presently
employed by the Defendant or explain the need for it; and (4) the
portion of the settlement attributed to FLSA violation cannot
revert to the Defendant if unclaimed; the parties may remove the
reversion entirely or name an appropriate cy pres recipient for
unclaimed funds.

Accordingly, the Judge granted in part and denied in part parties'
Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement
and FLSA Collective Action.  She conditionally certified the State
Law Classes and the FLSA Collective Action.  She denied the
preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement.

The parties are granted 45 days from the date of the Order to file
an amended motion for approval of class and collective action
settlement addressing the issues described.  They are not required
to discuss class or collative action certification in the amended
motion.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 8, 2020 Order is available at
https://is.gd/igHjW3 from Leagle.com.


WESTINGHOUSE AIR: Settlement in W.D. Pa. Case Wins Initial OK
-------------------------------------------------------------
Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation said in its Form
10-Q Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
July 29, 2020, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2020, that
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
has issued an order granting preliminary approval of the agreed
settlement terms and amount in a class action complaint.

On April 3, 2018, the Company and Knorr-Bremse AG entered into a
consent decree with the United States Department of Justice
resolving allegations that the Company and Knorr-Bremse AG had
maintained unlawful agreements not to compete for each other's
employees.  

The allegations also related to Faiveley Transport before it was
acquired by the Company in November 2016. No monetary fines or
penalties were imposed on the Company. The Company elected to
settle this matter with the Department of Justice to avoid the cost
and distraction of litigation.

Putative class action lawsuits thereafter were filed in several
different federal district courts naming the Company and Knorr as
defendants in connection with the allegations contained in the
consent decree.

A federal Multi-District Litigation (MDL) Panel consolidated the
cases in the Western District of Pennsylvania, and on October 12,
2018, a consolidated class action complaint was filed in the
Western District of PA with five named plaintiffs.

On August 13, 2019, the Company was notified that co-defendant
Knorr-Bremse settled with plaintiffs. On January 21, 2020,
following Court-sponsored early mediation, the Company entered into
a Memorandum of Understanding with plaintiffs, agreeing to settle
all claims in the case.

In March 2020, the Court issued preliminary approval of the agreed
settlement terms and amount.

Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation, doing business as
Wabtec Corp., provides technology-based equipment and services for
the rail industry worldwide. The company operates in two segments,
Freight Group and Transit Group. Westinghouse Air Brake
Technologies was founded in 1869 and is headquartered in
Wilmerding, Pennsylvania.


WHOLESOME HARVEST: Blumenthal Nordrehaug Files OT Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
The San Francisco employment law lawyers at Blumenthal Nordrehaug
Bhowmik De Blouw LLP filed a class action complaint alleging that
Wholesome Harvest Baking, LLC failed to provide their California
employees with meal and rest periods as required by California law.
The Wholesome Harvest Baking, LLC, class action lawsuit, Case No.
C20-00989, is currently pending in the Contra Costa Superior Court
of the State of California.

The lawsuit filed in the Contra Costa Superior Court against
Wholesome Harvest Baking, LLC alleges the company (a) failed to
provide PLAINTIFF accurate itemized wage statements, (b) failed to
properly record and provide legally required meal and rest periods,
(c) failed to pay overtime wages, (d) failed to pay minimum wages,
(e) failed to reimburse employees for required expenses, and (f)
failed to pay wages when due, all in violation of the applicable
Labor Code sections listed in Labor Code Sections Sec. 201, 202,
203, 226, 226.7, 510, 512, 1194, 1197, 1197.1, 2802, and the
applicable Wage Order(s), and thereby gives rise to civil penalties
as a result of such alleged conduct.

Additionally, the complaint further alleges Wholesome Harvest
Baking, LLC committed acts of unfair competition in violation of
the California Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Sec.
17200, et seq. (the "UCL"), by engaging in a company-wide policy
and procedure which failed to accurately calculate and record all
missed meal and rest periods by PLAINTIFFS and other CALIFORNIA
CLASS Members. As a result of DEFENDANT's intentional disregard of
the obligation to meet this burden, DEFENDANT allegedly failed to
properly calculate and/or pay all required compensation for work
performed by the members of the CALIFORNIA CLASS and violated the
California Labor Code.

If you would like to know more about the Wholesome Harvest Baking,
LLC lawsuit, please contact Attorney Nicholas J. De Blouw today by
calling (800) 568-8020.

Blumenthal Nordrehaug Bhowmik De Blouw LLP is an employment law
firm with offices located in San Diego, San Francisco, Sacramento,
Los Angeles, Riverside and Chicago that dedicates its practice to
helping employees, investors and consumers fight back against
unfair business practices, including violations of the California
Labor Code and Fair Labor Standards Act. If you need help in
collecting unpaid overtime wages, unpaid commissions, being
wrongfully terminated from work, and other employment law claims,
contact one of their attorneys today. [GN]


WINK LABS: Rollins Calls Monthly Subscription Fees "Illegal"
------------------------------------------------------------
BRIAN ROLLINS, individually, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. WINK LABS, INC., a Delaware
corporation; and i.am.plus ELECTRONICS, INC., a Delaware
corporation, Defendants, Case No. 3:20-cv-01220 (D. Or., July 27,
2020) alleges that Defendants illegally required and imposed
monthly subscription fees to connect, access, control, and use
smart devices they sold to Plaintiff and the proposed Class in
violation of representations and promises made by Defendants that
there would be no monthly fee or subscription fee to connect,
access, control, and use the devices.

Wink marketed the Wink Hub and the Wink Hub 2 as an automation
platform that a purchaser could use to control smart devices in his
or her home. Wink advertised and marketed the Wink Hub and other
Wink devices online, on packaging, and in other public statements
as not having monthly fees, subscription fees, or requiring an
ongoing contract or any other user fee. Wink represented and
promised that customers would pay only a fixed price to use the
Wink Hub for its intended purpose, and customers would not ever pay
any contract, subscription, or monthly fee to use the Wink Hub for
its intended purpose.

According to the complaint, Wink explained in the May 6, 2020 email
that customers would have to pay a monthly subscription fee of
$4.99, starting on May 13, 2020. Wink wrote, "We have a lot of
great ideas on how to expand on Wink's capabilities and satisfy the
many requests from our user base. In order to provide for
development and continued growth, we are transitioning to a $4.99
monthly subscription, starting on May 13, 2020. This fee is
designed to be as modest as possible. Your support will enable us
to continue providing you with the functionality that you've come
to rely on, and focus on accelerating new integrations and app
features."

On July 27, 2020, Defendants disabled the Wink Hub and Wink devices
for customers who had not paid the subscription fee. Customers who
had not paid the subscription fee lost the ability to access,
control, and use their Wink Hub and Wink devices as the customers
have before, rendering the Wink Hub and Wink devices worthless or
worth less.

The complaint states that Wink acted as i.am.plus' agent in
advertising, marketing, producing, and selling the Wink Hub and
other Wink devices, imposing a subscription fee, and in disabling
devices and features for consumers who did not pay the subscription
fee.

Plaintiff and the proposed Class seek recovery of punitive damages
from Defendants because Defendants' conduct was reprehensible.

Wink Labs, Inc. produces and sells software and hardware that
enable purchasers to connect, access, control, and use smart home
devices and home automation devices from a consolidated user
interface.

i.am.plus is a Delaware corporation with its headquarters in Los
Angeles, California. i.am.plus is the parent corporation of
Wink.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joshua L. Ross, Esq.
          Cody Berne, Esq.
          STOLL STOLL BERNE LOKTING & SHLACHTER P.C.
          209 SW Oak Street, Suite 500
          Portland, OR 97204
          Telephone: (503) 227-1600
          Facsimile: (503) 227-6840
          E-mail: jross@stollberne.com
                  cberne@stollberne.com

               - and -

          Nicholas A. Kahl, Esq.
          NICK KAHL, LLC
          209 SW Oak Street, Suite 400
          Portland, OR 97204
          Telephone: (971) 634-0829
          Facsimile: (503) 227-6840
          E-mail: nick@nickkahl.com

WIRECARD AG: Faces Investor Class Action Following Collapse
-----------------------------------------------------------
Michael Fahy, writing for The National, reports that on April 27,
accountancy firm KPMG published the findings on an independent
audit commissioned by German payment processing giant Wirecard AG
in the hope that it would quash much of the negative publicity that
had surrounded the company over the previous 18 months. It didn't.

Instead, KPMG's verdict -- that it couldn't verify whether vast
amounts of the company's revenue and earnings were genuine -- sent
Wirecard into a downward spiral that ended with it entering into
insolvency on June 25 after declaring a EUR1.9 billion (Dh8.2
billion) hole in its accounts, and the arrest of several of key
executives on suspicion of accountancy fraud.

The company had previously been lauded as a European FinTech star
and was the newest member of the Dax 30 -- the index of the biggest
German companies listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange
-- with its valuation peaking at EUR24bn in August 2018.

KPMG's report focused on claims made in a series of articles by the
Financial Times, which highlighted suspicious transactions with
three "third-party acquirers" that generated most of Wirecard's
profits. These were Dubai-based Al Alam Solution Provider (also
known as Al Alam Solutions), Manila-based PayEasy Solutions and
Singaporean company Senjo.

Between them, these entities contributed 50 per cent of Wirecard's
2016 sales and 95 per cent of earnings before interest, tax,
depreciation and amortisation. Business routed from Dubai-based Al
Alam, made one of Wirecard's Middle East subsidiaries, Cardsystems
Middle East, its most profitable. It supposedly generated one-third
of the company's earnings over a five-year period despite the FT
reporting in April 2019 it was being run as a one-man operation
from an apartment.

Mark Hiley, the founder and managing partner of The Analyst - a
London-based company that sells equity research to hedge funds and
asset managers - had expressed concerns about Wirecard for some
time. He was perplexed by the fact that despite its high margins,
it failed to generate much cash.

"It was, as far as we could see, a company with undifferentiated
technology in a highly competitive market and yet enjoyed a
stratospheric rating," he told The National.

Neil Campling, a technology industry analyst at Mirabaud
Securities, was also non-plussed with Wirecard's technology after
attending an 'innovation day' the company held in October 2018.

"The presentations were full of absolute rubbish," Mr Campling
said. "There was no innovation."

He began poring through its accounts and also struggled to find
where the money was coming from.

"We managed to get hold of 27 subsidiary accounts (the company had
more than 50), and we could only find 10 per cent of the revenue
and 4 per cent of the group operating profit," Mr Campling said.
Many of the subsidiary company filings were out of date by more
than a year.

"We kept looking at the business and thinking, the business either
makes no money, or very little money, and the big hole that
appeared to happen was in the Middle East," he says.

Wirecard's two Middle East subsidiaries, Cardsystems Middle East
and Wirecard Processing, were guarantors of a EUR500m bond issued
by the company last September. Bond documentation shows neither
company filed accounts either for 2017 or 2018. Both said they were
"in the process" of appointing auditors.

"We were very aware of how much Wirecard appeared to be dependent
on revenue from Dubai in particular and the lack of clarity about
where exactly those revenues came from," Mr Hiley said.

"The limited disclosure and the lack of clarity from the company
about issues such as whether these businesses had been audited made
it hard to verify the company's claims."

It wasn't just in Dubai that there were issues. Mr Hiley sent an
investigative accountant to India last year, where the company had
supposedly spent EUR330m on acquisitions, but he found few signs of
where the money had gone.

A lawsuit in 2017 revealed Wirecard paid $200m more for a company,
Hermes I-Tickets Private, to a Mauritius-based private equity
vehicle than its founders had sold it for just three weeks earlier.
In a note last year, Mr Hiley said there was evidence that most of
it found its way, via investments made in companies that then
became Wirecard customers, back to the company in the form of
sales.

When The Analyst's accountant made his way to Wirecard's affiliate
in Chennai, "he found a small office in a dilapidated building"
with just a few employees and some broken laptops, Mr Hiley said.

A similar thing happened when the FT sent a reporter to Wirecard's
affiliate in the Philippines and found it was the home of a retired
seaman.

Mr Campling said that after listening to an investors' call in
March 2019, when management failed to provide satisfactory answers
to questions about its finances, he changed his price target to
EUR0.

During a due diligence exercise, he had asked shareholders what
Wirecard did and why they owned shares. Most couldn't properly
answer the first part of the question and cited its huge margins to
justify the second.

"I said, 'don't you think it's too good to be true?'. They had
ebitda growth of 34 per cent one year, 35 per cent the second and
36 per cent the third. It's like someone sat there with an Excel
spreadsheet saying, 'let's just make it a little bit better than
last year'."

Within days of the KPMG report, both Al Alam Solutions Provider and
Cardsystems Middle East were dissolved.

Wirecard's former chief executive, Markus Braun, the company's
chief financial officer, its chief accounting officer and the head
of its Dubai business have all been arrested on suspicion of
falsifying business with third-party partners. A warrant has been
issued for the arrest of its chief operating officer, who has
reportedly fled the country.

The head of the company's Dubai business admitted wrongdoing to
prosecutors, according to his lawyer, Reuters reported in July.

The fallout is just starting, though. German law firm Tilp, which
specialises in class action suits, has already filed a case against
Wirecard representing 50,000 investors, which it extended late in
July to add Wirecard's auditors, EY. It also recently filed a case
against the regulator, BaFin.

"In our view, EY failed to investigate properly Wirecard's balance
sheets and real economic situation for years," said a spokesman for
the firm. "We are convinced that EY's behaviour was more then
grossly negligent and should lead to direct compensation for claims
[by] investors." A spokeswoman for EY Germany said "we do not
comment on pending litigation".

The law firm also castigated the regulator, arguing that it could
have uncovered an accounting fraud much sooner if it had
investigated claims more thoroughly as opposed to heeding the
company's call for a ban on short sellers, which it imposed between
February and April last year.

Fahmi Quadir, the founder and chief investment officer of New
York-based Safkhet Capital, is also critical of BaFin.

Her fund, a short seller that targets suspected frauds, took a
position in Wirecard shares at inception in January 2018 and by the
time of its insolvency had scaled this up to more than 25 per cent
of the fund's assets.

Her firm doesn't usually disclose its positions, but did so last
year under a lengthy response to BaFin's short-selling ban, where
it criticised the regulator's decision.

"We unequivocally support actions taken to address all forms of
market manipulation," her letter said. "However, such seemingly
unilateral regulatory effort, prompted without sufficient
evidentiary disclosure, can create a toxic environment where
whistleblowers will avoid coming forward for fear of civil or
criminal penalty for telling the truth."

She describes the Wirecard debacle and the lack of oversight by the
regulator as "a black mark on the German financial establishment
and its standing in the world".

A spokeswoman for BaFin said it took action after witnessing what
appeared to be big - and co-ordinated - short-selling attacks on
Wirecard.

"Our target was neither evaluating the outstanding accusations nor
shielding a single issuer, our focus was on protecting market
confidence," the spokeswoman said. She added that the regulator
"investigated all reports it received in line with its duties".

Wirecard, which did not respond to requests for comment, is
continuing to battle its way through the insolvency process. In an
update on July 26, the company said it had secured enough liquidity
to continue operations for the time being and that there had been
interest from investors in various parts of the business.

The most salvageable seems to be its North American operations, in
which 60 out of the 77 parties that have signed confidentiality
agreements so far have expressed an interest. Given the fact that
it owes about EUR3.5bn to lenders, it remains to be seen whether
asset sales can generate enough cash to repay debts, let alone the
army of angry investors that have signed up to the class action
suit. [GN]


WISE FOODS: Dawson Sues in N.Y. Over Disabilities Act Violation
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Wise Foods, Inc. The
case is styled as Leshawn Dawson, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Wise Foods, Inc., Case No.
1:20-cv-06198 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 6, 2020).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Wise Foods, Inc., is a company based in Berwick, Pennsylvania, that
makes snacks and sells them through retail food outlets in 15
eastern seaboard states, as well as Vermont, Ohio, West Virginia,
Kentucky, Tennessee, and Washington, D.C.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Phone: (929) 575-4175
          Fax: (929) 575-4195
          Email: joseph@cml.legal


WOLVERINE BANCORP: Dismissal of Finke Securities Suit Affirmed
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of Michigan issued an Opinion affirming the
Trial Court's Order granting the Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment in the case captioned RANDALL FINKE, Plaintiff-Appellant
v. JOSEPH M. VANDERKELEN, HOWARD I. UNGERLEIDER, JOSEPH DONALD
SHEETS, JAMES W. FISHER, ERIC P. BLACKHURST, ROBERTA N. ARNOLD,
DAVID DUNN, and RICHARD M. REYNOLDS, Defendants-Appellees, Case No.
345621 (Mich. App.).

The Plaintiff appeals by right the Trial Court's order granting
summary disposition in favor of the Defendants under MCR
2.116(C)(8).

The Plaintiff was a shareholder of Wolverine Bancorp, Inc.
(Wolverine), a savings and loan company organized under the laws of
the state of Maryland and principally operating in Midland,
Michigan. The Defendants were directors of Wolverine, and certain
Defendants were also officers of Wolverine.

In June 2017, the Defendants voted unanimously in favor of
approving a merger between Wolverine and Horizon Bancorp, Inc.
(Horizon), with Horizon being the surviving company. The merger
would result in each share of Wolverine being converted into 1.0152
shares of Horizon common stock and a cash payment of $14 per
share.

In negotiating the merger agreement, the Defendants considered, but
ultimately denied, an offer by another corporation, referred to as
"Company A" because of a nondisclosure agreement. The terms of the
merger agreement also precluded the Defendants from soliciting or
encouraging other offers, and required Wolverine to pay a
termination fee of $3,539,000 to Horizon should Wolverine back out
of the deal. When presenting the merger agreement to Wolverine's
shareholders, the Defendants prepared a proxy statement of over 300
pages, which they also submitted to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC).

After the proxy statement was filed, but before the merger was
approved, the Plaintiff filed this putative class action lawsuit
against the Defendants, alleging that, under Maryland law, the
Defendants had breached their fiduciary duties to the shareholders
of Wolverine by refusing the offer from Company A, which was
allegedly more valuable than the offer from Horizon. The Plaintiff
argued that the Defendants agreed to the Horizon merger because
they were set to receive significant benefits that Wolverine's
shareholders would not receive.

The Plaintiff also asserted that the disclosures issued by the
Defendants in advance of the shareholders' vote were insufficient
and would result in an uninformed vote. In lieu of answering the
complaint, the Defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(8), primarily arguing that, under Maryland law, the
Plaintiff did not have standing to bring a direct action against
the Defendants. Rather, applicable caselaw required the Plaintiff
to bring a derivative action on behalf of the corporation.

The Trial Court agreed with the Defendants and dismissed the
Plaintiff's complaint for a lack of standing. This appeal
followed.

The Plaintiff argues that he was entitled to file a direct (i.e.,
non-derivative) claim against the Defendants, and that the Trial
Court, therefore, erred by granting the Defendants' motion for
summary disposition.

With the exception of the claim that the Defendants breached their
duty of candor in preparing the proxy statement, the Court of
Appeals disagrees. With regard to the duty of candor claim, the
Court of Appeals concludes that Maryland law permits such a claim
as a direct action, but it nonetheless holds that the claim was
properly dismissed because the Plaintiff did not allege any
individual damages to shareholders as a result of the alleged
inaccuracies or omissions in the proxy statement.

A full-text copy of the Court of Appeals' May 21, 2020 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yabqlvbz from Leagle.com.


XTO ENERGY: Fails to Pay Minimum Wage, Bone Alleges
---------------------------------------------------
CORY BONE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. XTO ENERGY, INC., Defendant, Case No.
2:20-cv-00697 (D.N.M., July 14, 2020) seeks to recover from the
Defendants unpaid wages and overtime compensation, interest,
liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, and costs under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

The Plaintiff Bone was employed by the Defendant as safety
consultant.

XTO Energy, Inc. operates as an oil company. The Company acquires,
develops, and explores oil and gas properties, as well as offers
processing, marketing, and transportation services. XTO Energy
serves customers in the United States, Canada, and Argentina. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Clif Alexander, Esq.
          Austin W. Anderson, Esq.
          Lauren E. Braddy, Esq.
          ANDERSON ALEXANDER, PLLC
          819 N. Upper Broadway
          Corpus Christi, TX 78401
          Telephone: (361) 452-1279
          Facsimile: (361) 452-1284
          E-mail: clif@a2xlaw.com
                  austin@a2xlaw.com
                  lauren@a2xlaw.com


ZIMMER BIOMET: Wins Prelim. Nod of $50MM Settlement in Shah Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled RAJESH M. SHAH, et al. v. ZIMMER BIOMET
HOLDINGS, INC., et al., Case No. 3:16-cvr-815-PPS-MGG (N.D. Ind.),
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana issued
an Opinion and Order ruling that:

   -- the Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification is DENIED as
      MOOT, except that the Plaintiff's Motion to Be Appointed
      Class Counsel is GRANTED;

   -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP is APPOINTED class counsel for
      the Settlement Class certified; and

   -- the Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for: (I) Preliminary
      Approval of the Class Action Settlement; (II) Certified of
      the Settlement Class; and (III) Approval of Notice of the
      Settlement is GRANTED.

The lawsuit is a securities fraud case and putative class action.
After roughly three-and-a-half years of litigation, the parties
have moved the Court to approve a proposed class settlement to
resolve the litigation. The Defendants offer up a Settlement Fund
of $50 million to pay class members' claims on a pro rata basis,
pay the costs of administering the Settlement Fund, and to
compensate the Plaintiffs' counsel for their work.

The certified Settlement Class consists of all persons or entities
who, between June 7, 2016 and November 7, 2016, inclusive,
purchased or otherwise acquired ZBH Common Stock and/or ZBH Call
Options, and/or wrote ZBH Put Options, and were damaged thereby.
Included in the Settlement Class are all persons or entities who
purchased or otherwise acquired ZBH common stock pursuant to and/or
traceable to ZBH's public offerings on or around June 13, 2016
and/or ZBH's public offering on or around August 9, 2016 and were
damaged thereby. Excluded from the Settlement Class includes the
Defendants (both current and dismissed), members of the immediate
families of each of the Individual Defendants, et al.

Final Fairness Hearing is set for September 3, 2020, at 1:00 p.m.
CDT. Deadline for submitting Claim is on October 19, 2020.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 21, 2020 Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yd3qc3lz from
Leagle.com.


[*] COVID-Related Business Interruption Suits Exceed 700 Mark
-------------------------------------------------------------
Susanne Sclafane, writing for Insurance Journal, reports that when
insurance coverage lawsuits brought by businesses seeking coverage
for COVID-related interruptions surpassed the 700 mark, the natural
question to ask was: Is that a lot?

That's exactly the question that Chris Cheatham, CEO and co-founder
of insurtech RiskGenius, asked during a webinar he hosted,
addressing the question to Tom Baker, the William Maul Measey
professor at the University of Pennsylvania, who presented the
figure.

Baker, an expert in insurance law and policy, showed an analysis of
the numbers of business interruption coverage suits following past
catastrophe events between 2009 and 2020—in particular,
Hurricanes Ike, Irma and Harvey and Superstorm Sandy and COVID-19.

"They exceed the norm by two or three times all the nat cats," he
said, comparing the current level of COVID-19 cases in federal
courts to the business interruption coverage suits filed after
those natural catastrophes.

"It's a big deal," he added, displaying line graphs with case
spikes that rose to less than 100 for Hurricane Ike a year after
the third-quarter 2008 event, and to roughly 150 a year later. For
Sandy, Irma and Harvey, case filings were less than 100 in similar
time frames.

The University of Pennsylvania has been tracking insurance coverage
litigation on a COVID Coverage Litigation Tracker (CCLT) powered by
Lex Machina, machine learning-focused legal analytics software that
harvest information from PACER, the federal docket system.

A webinar slide based on recent CCLT output indicated a figure of
694 total COVID-19 business interruption insurance coverage
lawsuits, but Baker said that he had seen a list of 69 new cases on
the day of the webinar—July 21. While that number likely had some
duplicates (owing to an overly inclusive search he uses to tap the
Lex Machina tool), Baker confidently projected that the BI cases
had eclipsed 700 at that point—more than Ike, Sandy, Irma and
Harvey together.

Although Baker could not compare COVID BI case numbers with those
brought in the wake of Hurricane Katrina because Lex Machina only
goes back to 2009, he speculated that while the Katrina-driven
suits numbers would be bigger than those for the other storms, "it
wouldn't be anything like COVID-19."

"And it's not slowing down," Baker added, referring to the
continual trend in COVID BI coverage suit filings.

Cheatham, who has been using the University of Pennsylvania tracker
to put together analyses of his own, agreed with the assessment.

"It's almost five-times," he said, comparing the COVID case counts
to those following each of the storms individually. Providing one
obvious reason for the disparity, Cheatham noted that while a
hurricane hits just one area -- a single state or multiple states
-- COVID-19 shut down almost everything for a period of time. "That
was a countrywide shutdown essentially, except for some remote
locations, where businesses just across the board were shut down,"
Cheatham said, turning to Baker to supply other reasons that COVID
is a much bigger BI event in terms of the claims being filed than
the storms.

Baker offered that the nature of the coverage disputes is
different. For hurricanes, coverage disputes centered around
question like what share of the loss the insurance company should
pick up vs. the federal flood program. "And then also, what was the
value of the damage?" In contrast, "for COVID-19, the insurance
industry has decided that it's just not paying absent an
affirmative coverage [grant] in the policy." He added: I think
things move to litigation faster and also, with a greater
propensity because there's not that belief that, 'Hey, we can come
to some agreement.' When the answer is, 'No, your claim is denied,'
the next step is litigation."

Penn. Higher Than New York

Cheatham and Bryan Wilson, MIT Fellow, have been working on their
own analysis of trends in COVID litigation for a series of articles
Cheatham is authoring exclusively for Carrier Management, titled
"COVIDigation Nation." In the accompanying article, "COVIDigation:
Why So Many Cases? Are More Coming?"—the first of the series—he
uses Penn Law's COVID Coverage Litigation Tracker to conclude that
69 percent of COVID insurance coverage lawsuits have been filed in
just nine states. While big states known for high litigation rates
generally, like California and Illinois are among them, Cheatham's
analysis shows another factor is the correlation between COVID
infection rates and the number of insurance coverage lawsuits
filed.

Still, there are a few questions that Cheatham needed Baker's help
to answer—like why Pennsylvania, registering 10.5 percent of the
coverage lawsuits as mid-July, and Florida, with 8.3 percent, were
outpacing New York's 7.0 percent?

Part of the reason is that New York isn't viewed as a particularly
policyholder-friendly jurisdiction, Baker said, explaining a slower
pace of filings in the Empire state. Beyond that, he said that
plaintiffs firms actively seeking to consolidate cases in other
states may explain some of the other outliers.

"There is an effort right now in the federal courts to have what is
called an MDL, which is multidistrict litigation—a procedure in
the federal courts that's very widely used in products liability
cases, but has, to my knowledge, never been used before in
insurance cases," Baker said. He explained that what an MDL does is
that it transfers all of the cases of a particular category to one
federal court for proceedings leading up to, but not including
trial. (The cases go back to the court where they originated for
the trial.)

"There are three teams of lawyers who have filed three competing
efforts to consolidate these cases in Pennsylvania, Florida, and
Illinois," Baker said, noting that the three cohorts have adopted
different strategies. "The Pennsylvania lawyers' strategy has been,
'Hey, we're going to file the most cases and that this case should
be consolidated in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania because
that's the center of gravity from cases.'" While Florida lawyers
are using a similar strategy, a high-powered coverage lawyer on the
Illinois team of higher profile national lawyers is simply relying
on their reputations rather than flooding the dockets. "The
strategy that they're taking is, 'Listen, we're just really amazing
lawyers and you should do it in Chicago'—and Chicago is in the
middle of the country," Baker said.

Years Not Months

In his COVIDigation analysis, Cheatham also tracks the timing of
case filings, finding roughly one-month lag between spikes in COVID
infections and new high watermarks for litigation filings. Viewing
a jump in infections during the week of a June 23 based on the New
York Times COVID-19 dataset, Cheatham suggested there could be a
surge in insurance litigation near the end of July. (See related
article by Cheatham, "COVIDigation: Why So Many Cases? Are More
Coming?")

Baker, going back to his analysis of hurricane landfalls and BI
coverage litigation, suggests an even longer loss development tail
for insurers to worry about. "The peak doesn't come until one year"
out, Baker said, pointing to a bar graph showing case counts at
intervals of six months, 1-2 years, 2-3 years and over three years
out for the storm events. While most showed case spikes in the 1-2
year bucket, for Ike, the spike came in 2-3 years, and there were
still Sandy BI lawsuits being filed after 3 years. "To the extent
that COVID-19 cases follow that pattern, which it's too soon to
tell because we're not even six months out really, then that
suggests that there's a lot more lawsuits to come," Baker
concluded. [GN]


[*] Gross Law Notifies of Several Shareholder Class Actions
-----------------------------------------------------------
In a press release dated Aug. 3, 2020, the securities litigation
law firm of The Gross Law Firm issues the following notice on
behalf of shareholders in the following publicly traded companies.
Shareholders who purchased shares in the following companies during
the dates listed are encouraged to contact the firm regarding
possible Lead Plaintiff appointment. Appointment as Lead Plaintiff
is not required to partake in any recovery.

Co-Diagnostics, Inc. (NASDAQ:CODX)

Investors Affected: February 25, 2020 - May 15, 2020

A class action has commenced on behalf of certain shareholders in
Co-Diagnostics, Inc. According to the filed complaint,
Co-Diagnostics and its directors and officers (including PhD-level
scientists who should know better) made continual, knowing, and
willful misstatements about the Company's main product, a Covid-19
diagnostic test. These misstatements had the effect of pumping up
the price of Co-Diagnostics' stock while Company officers and
directors exercised low-priced options and dumped their stock into
the market. Co-Diagnostics' fraudulent misstatements displayed a
disregard for basic scientific principles and caused investors to
lose millions of dollars.

Shareholders may find more information at
https://securitiesclasslaw.com/securities/co-diagnostics-inc-loss-submission-form/?id=8321&from=1

Ideanomics, Inc. (NASDAQ:IDEX)

Investors Affected: March 20, 2020 - June 25, 2020

A class action has commenced on behalf of certain shareholders in
Ideanomics, Inc. The filed complaint alleges that defendants made
materially false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose that: (i) Ideanomics' Mobile Energy Global Division in
Qingdao, China (the "MEG Center") was not "a one million square
foot EV expo center" as the Company had stated in press releases;
(ii) the Company had been using doctored or altered photographs of
the purported MEG Center in Qingdao; (iii) the Company's electric
vehicle business in China was not performing nearly as strongly as
Ideanomics had represented; and (iv) as a result, the Company's
public statements were materially false and misleading at all
relevant times.

Shareholders may find more information at
https://securitiesclasslaw.com/securities/ideanomics-inc-loss-submission-form/?id=8321&from=1

Velocity Financial, Inc. (NYSE:VEL)

This lawsuit is on behalf of investors who purchased VEL stocks
pursuant and/or traceable to the Registration Statement and
Prospectus, as amended, issued in connection with Velocity's
January 2020 initial public offering.

A class action has commenced on behalf of certain shareholders in
Velocity Financial, Inc. According to the filed complaint,
defendants failed to disclose that, at the time of Velocity's
initial public offering (the "IPO"), the Company's non-performing
loans had dramatically increased in size from the figures provided
in the Registration Statement and Prospectus that Velocity had
issued in connection with the IPO. Further, defendants failed to
provide any information to investors regarding the potential impact
of the novel coronavirus on Velocity's business and operations,
despite the fact that the international spread of the virus had
already been confirmed at the time of the IPO. The failure to
disclose the substantial and growing proportion of the Company's
loans that were non-performing and/or on non-accrual status as of
the IPO rendered the statements contained in the Registration
Statement and Prospectus regarding the quality of the Company's
loan portfolio and underwriting practices materially misleading.

Shareholders may find more information at
https://securitiesclasslaw.com/securities/velocity-financial-inc-loss-submission-form/?id=8321&from=1

The Gross Law Firm is committed to ensuring that companies adhere
to responsible business practices and engage in good corporate
citizenship. The firm seeks recovery on behalf of investors who
incurred losses when false and/or misleading statements or the
omission of material information by a Company lead to artificial
inflation of the Company's stock. Attorney advertising. Prior
results do not guarantee similar outcomes.

CONTACT:

The Gross Law Firm
15 West 38th Street, 12th floor
New York, NY, 10018
Email: dg@securitiesclasslaw.com
Phone: (212) 537-9430
Fax: (833) 862-7770 [GN]


[*] Johnson Fistel Notifies of Several Shareholder Class Actions
----------------------------------------------------------------
Johnson Fistel LLP on Aug. 2 disclosed that class action lawsuits
have been commenced on behalf of shareholders of the
publicly-traded companies. The Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 permits any investor who purchased common stock during
the Class Period to seek appointment as lead plaintiff. A lead
plaintiff acts on behalf of all other class members in directing
the litigation.  The lead plaintiff can select a law firm of its
choice.  An investor's ability to share in any potential future
recovery is not dependent upon serving as lead plaintiff.  If you
wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later
than the dates listed below.

If you are a long-term shareholder of any of these companies and
have held shares continuously since before the class period start
date, you may have standing to hold the officers and directors
liable for company losses; assisting in holding the company
harmless and potentially reforming corporate governance to prevent
future wrongdoing. If you want to discuss this action or have any
questions concerning this notice, please contact lead analyst Jim
Baker (jimb@johnsonfistel.com) at 619-814-4471. If emailing, please
include a phone number.

                                                         Lead
                          Class Period  Class Period   Plaintiff
Company                      Start         End        Deadline
-------                  ------------  ------------   ---------
Kirkland Lake Gold Ltd.     1/8/2018     11/25/2019    8/28/2020

Kingold Jewelry, Inc.      3/15/2018      6/28/2020    8/31/2020

Pilgrim's Pride
Corporation                 2/9/2017       6/3/2020     9/4/2020

J2 Global, Inc.            10/5/2015      6/29/2020     9/8/2020

The Geo Group, Inc.         9/8/2020      6/16/2020     9/8/2020

Verrica Pharmaceuticals
Inc.                       9/16/2019      6/29/2020    9/14/2020

Insperity, Inc.            2/11/2019      2/11/2020    9/21/2020

Wins Finance Holdings
Inc.                      10/31/2018       7/6/2020    9/23/2020

Guidewire Software, Inc.    3/6/2019       3/4/2020    9/23/2020

                    About Johnson Fistel, LLP:

Johnson Fistel, LLP is a nationally recognized shareholder rights
law firm with offices in California, New York, and Georgia. The
firm represents individual and institutional investors in
shareholder derivative and securities class action lawsuits. For
more information about the firm and its attorneys, please visit
https://www.johnsonfistel.com. Attorney advertising. Past results
do not guarantee future outcomes.

Contact:

Johnson Fistel, LLP
Jim Baker, 619-814-4471
jimb@johnsonfistel.com [GN]


[*] Litigation Funders Level Legal Class Action Playing Field
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Andrew Saker, writing for Australian Financial Review, asks 'Why
are so many class actions bankrolled by litigation funders?'
Simple. Class actions are high risk, highly complex and highly
expensive.

Few Australians have the resources, the understanding of the legal
process and, frankly, the patience to take on powerful,
deep-pocketed defendants in a fight that can last years.

In approving the settlement in a recent Omni Bridgeway-funded class
action for those who had suffered damage as a result of chemical
contamination of land, Federal Court Justice Michael Lee summed up
the reality for aggrieved parties without litigation funding. They
would, he said, be the equivalent of "supplicants requesting
compensation, in circumstances where they would have been the
subject of a significant inequality of arms".

That is why litigation funding exists. Litigation funders level the
playing field. They manage the complexity, pay the bills and take
on the down-side risk of losing.

The main beneficiaries are the countless Australians who would have
no means of accessing justice and seeking compensation when they
have suffered a mass civil wrong. Our firm, Omni Bridgeway, has
helped more than 300,000 Australians access justice over the past
20 years.

There are other beneficiaries. Funders help ensure only meritorious
class actions are brought before an overworked court system. And a
funder can give defendants a degree of comfort their costs will be
covered in an unsuccessful class action. In Australia's court
system, the losing party is required to pay the successful party's
costs, in addition to their own. This has meant that, when they
emerged almost 30 years ago, Australian class actions were
prohibitively expensive for most claimants to take on the costs and
risks of pursuing an action.

The current Australian parliamentary inquiry into litigation
funding and the regulation of the class actions system is welcome
and has certainly generated a vocal and polarised debate, as seen
in the pages of The Australian Financial Review.

Where there is conflict there are headlines, and yes, when David
beats Goliath, there are Hollywood scripts, as Erin Brockovich's
famous US class action against Pacific Gas and Electric attests.

Claims of an 'explosion' in class action numbers have been debunked
by academic data.

There is legitimate debate about the industry structure for
litigation funding and class actions, but all voices agree this
system is an important mechanism for people to access justice.

While we agree there is room for improvement, class actions provide
an efficient procedure for the courts, claimants and defendants to
resolve disputes with a common set of issues.

'Flawed' analysis

The parliamentary inquiry has provided the opportunity to
scrutinise the flawed and facile analysis of funded class actions
by the Menzies Research Centre. Claims of an "explosion" in class
action numbers have been debunked by academic data,
mischaracterisation of litigation funder returns has been put in
its proper context, and misinterpretation and selective quotation
from Federal Court judgments has been set straight.

Most agree some form of additional regulation is necessary and
desirable, over and above the checks and balances already provided
by the court system. Omni Bridgeway has been a consistent advocate
for regulatory enhancement.

We strongly support the licensing regime proposed by the Treasurer
earlier this year to require all litigation funders operating in
Australia to hold an Australian Financial Services Licence.

We believe this will increase transparency, ensure the capital
adequacy of funders for the benefit of all stakeholders, including
defendants, and enhance public confidence in what we do.

Omni Bridgeway (then known as IMF Bentham) applied for and obtained
an AFSL in 2005, believing at that time that litigation funding
could be a financial product. Once it became clear it was exempt
from a licensing requirement, we gave up the licence in April 2013
but continued to comply with the current regulations overseen by
ASIC.

Omni Bridgeway also supports the government's proposed application
of the managed investment scheme regime to future funded class
actions in Australia, with appropriate modifications. And we think
it is appropriate to ensure a return from any class action of at
least 50 per cent to class members after costs, legal fees and the
return to the litigation funder.

Litigation funding has enabled many class actions to be pursued and
tens of thousands of group members to be compensated for mass
wrongdoing such as environmental damage, product liability and
corporate misbehaviour. Without funding, it is highly likely these
would have received nothing.

In the uncertain environment wrought by the unfolding pandemic,
ensuring that Australians still have access to a well-run class
action and litigation funding system will be as important as ever.
[GN]



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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania,
USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2020. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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The CAR subscription rate is $775 for six months delivered via
e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each. For subscription information, contact
Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.

                   *** End of Transmission ***