/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/200305.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Thursday, March 5, 2020, Vol. 22, No. 47

                            Headlines

3M CO: Bair Hagger Suit Ongoing in Ontario, Canada
3M CO: Bid to Dismiss Delaware Class Suit Pending
3M CO: Contaminated Public Water, City Water Providers Claim
ADVANCED MARKETING: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Williams Claims
ADVENTIST HEALTH: Court Dismisses Sheedy ERISA Suit with Prejudice

AEROFLOT RUSSIAN: Dismissed From Bandurin Suit, Finnair Remains
AFNI INC: Waller Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime Pay Under FLSA
AK SECURITY: Faces Hiebler Suit over OT Pay, Misclassification
ALBERTSONS LLC: Bid to Certify Class in Dorfman TCPA Suit Denied
ALLIANZ LIFE: Fails to Notify Lapsed Policies' Owners, Small Says

AMERICAN TOUR & TRAVEL: Dominguez Seeks Proper Wages for Cleaners
APPLE INC: Cal. App. Upholds Class Decertification in Adame Suit
APPLE INC: New Jersey District Narrows Claims in Priano-Keyser Suit
ASHBRITT INC: Court Strikes Class Allegations in Mason Suit
AVENUE A CANDY: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Andilema Alleges

BLOUNT INT'L: Settlement in Azar Securities Suit Has Final Approval
CANOPY GROWTH: 9 U.S. Law Firms Launch Cannabis Class Actions
CARRIBANA'S BAR: Bourassa Seeks Unpaid Wages for Wait Staff
CATHOLIC DIOCESE: Sex Abuse Class Suit Seeks to Add More Dioceses
CENTRAL EUROPEAN: Rigrodsky & Long Files Class Action in Del.

CHAMPION PETFOODS: Krosnick & Weir Opinions Excluded in Weaver Suit
CHEESE MERCHANTS: Wypych Sues Over Unlawful Use of Biometric Data
CIRCLE GROUP: Underpays Construction Workers, Berrios et al. Say
CLARK COUNTY, NV: Allison Has Until Today to Submit Complaint
CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY: Faces Closure, Students File Class Action

D&C INSPECTION: Morgan Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
D&M CARRIERS: Galloway Labor Suit Removed to C.D. Cal.
DAVID BURKE 59: Hedges Sues in S.D. New York Over ADA Violation
DENEFITS LLC: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Brow Alleges
DERMIRA INC: Thompson Files Suit Over Sale to Bald Eagle

DEVACURL: Kozonis & Klinger Files Class Action Over Hair Product
EQUIALT LLC: Faces Ubinstein Securities Suit Over Ponzi Scheme
EUREKA RESTAURANT: Denial of Arbitration Bid in Cummings Upheld
FIDELITY INVESTMENTS: $1MM Attorneys' Fees in Reynolds Suit Awarded
FIDELITY INVESTMENTS: $3MM Deal in Reynolds Suit Has Final Approval

FIRST TRANSIT: Prelim. Approval of Alkady Deal Denied w/o Prejudice
FIVE OAKS ACHIEVEMENT: Davis, Humphrey Seek OT Pay for Care Staff
FORD MOTOR CO: Diesel Truck Owners Sue Over Defective Fuel Pump
FORD MOTOR: Faces Class Action Over Truck "Death Wobble" Issues
FOREST LABORATORIES: Welfare Plan Sues Over Namenda IR Monopoly

FORTERRA INC: April 29 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
GARDNER, MA: Ct. Vacates Dismissal and Remands Magliacane Suit
GDT ENTERPRISES: Faces Valle Wage and Hour Suit in E.D. New York
GEORGIA: Ga. App. Upholds Dismissal of United Cerebral Palsy Suit
GERON CORP: Connor Sues over 62% Drop in Share Price

GLAXOSMITHKLINE PLC: White Suit Moved From Illinois to Florida
GODDESS DETOX: Sued Over Vaginal Detox Marketing Claims
GOJO INDUSTRIES: Faces Class Action Over Hand Sanitizer Claims
GOLD'S GYM: Denial of Archer's Attys' Fees in Piccinetti Vacated
GOOGLE INC: Faces Google Photos Facial Recognition Class Action

GOSHEN HOSPITAL: Spouses Added to Infection Exposure Class Action
GREAT AMERICA: Ill. App. Reverses Dismissal of Soto Suit
HAWAII: Certification Denied in A.B. School Discrimination Suit
HEALTHALL CONSULTING: Consultant Class in Dyse Cond. Certified
HP INC: Fonseca Can't Intervene in Forsyth Job Discrimination Suit

HY-VEE INC: Faces Greenstate Credit Suit in District of Minnesota
INLET BAY AT GATEWAY: Turizo Sues Over Illegal Telemarketing Calls
JPMORGAN CHASE: Turizo Sues Over Unsolicited Marketing Messages
LJM PRESERVATION: June 3 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
LOGISTICARE SOLUTIONS: Class in Bunton FLSA Suit Cond. Certified

LOOMIS ARMORED: Mailing of CAFA Notices in Myers FLSA Suit Approved
LUCKY SEVEN: Fails to Pay Minimum and OT Wages, Roncancio Claims
MALCOLM CISNEROS: Court Enters Final Judgment in Aikens Suit
MAPLE VIEW HOLDINGS: Faces Hedges ADA Suit in S.D. New York
MDL 2433: Cohen & Dahl Testimonies Excluded in Personal Injury Suit

MISSISSIPPI: Oliver Law Group Sues Over Prison Conditions
MOLINA HEALTHCARE: Candelaria Labor Suit Dismissed w/o Prejudice
MYSTIQUE HOOKAH: Fails to Pay Proper Minimum Wage, Vitale Claims
NEW YORK, NY: Faces Class Action Over Special Ed Court Delays
NSC TECHNOLOGIES: Thompson Labor Suit Removed to S.D. California

ONSTAR LLC: Court Denies Bid to Certify Class in Robinson Suit
PENSKE TRUCK: Blumenthal Nordrehaug Files Wage Class Action
PETER THOMAS: Summary Judgment Bid in Miller Suit Partly Granted
PHILIP MORRIS: Judge Dismisses Securities Class Action in N.Y.
PK MANAGEMENT: Bid to Exclude/Limit Testimony in Riley Overruled

PREMIER CAPITAL FUNDING: DIY Seeks to Invalidate Court Ruling
PRO OIL: Baird Seeks OT Pay for Oilfield Workers
PWCC MARKETPLACE: Baseball Card Collectors Allege Fraud
QUDIAN INC: Levi & Korsinsky Reminds Investors of Class Action
RT WHOLESALE: Faces Sotelo Suit Over Violations of BIPA and IWPCA

RUE21 INC: Avila Labor Suit Remanded to Tulare Superior Court
SALDUTTI LAW: Weiss FDCPA Suit Moved From E.D. to S.D. New York
SALZBERG: Corporate Charters Provisions at Issue in Class Action
SANDERSON FARMS: 2nd Cir. Upholds Dismissal of Gamm Lawsuit
SANDISK LLC: Court Dismisses Dinan Suit with Prejudice

SARATOGA DIAGNOSTICS: Floyd Balks at Unsolicited Fax Ads
SARBANAND FARMS: $3.75MM Deal in Rosas Labor Suit Gets Prelim. OK
SASOL LIMITED: Howard G. Smith Reminds of April 6 Deadline
SASOL LIMITED: Rosen Law Announces Class Action Lawsuit
SASOL LTD: Bernstein Liebhard Announces Class Action

SCENIC TOURS: High Court to Consider European Cruise Class Action
SEIU 521: Court Orders Parties Prepare for Some Issues in Bermudez
SHINE SOLAR: Lewis Sues in W.D. Arkansas Alleging FLSA Violation
SINCLAIR BROADCAST: Certain Claims in Securities Suit Dismissed
SIX FLAGS: Federman & Sherwood Files Securities Class Action

SIX FLAGS: Gainey McKenna Files Securites Class Action
SIX FLAGS: Johnson Fistel Files Securities Class Action
SIX FLAGS: Rosen Law Files Securities Class Action
SONIM TECHNOLOGIES: Maither May File Surreply in Malhotra Suit
SPIRIT AEROSYSTEMS: Federman & Sherwood Files Class Action

STEAK N SHAKE: Faces White Suit Over Improperly Paid Minimum Wage
STERLING BANCORP: Faces OPPRS Securities Suit Over IPO Price Drop
TACONIC: Must Face Class Action Over PFAs in New York
TARSADIA HOTELS: Order on Residual Beaver Settlement Funds Issued
TERRAVIA HOLDINGS: Judge Partially Dismisses Securities Claims

TEXAS LEGACY: Mejia Suit Seeks OT Pay for Full-Time Bricklayers
TILLAMOOK CREAMERY: Products Contain Fake Vanilla, Angeles Says
TRAVIS COUNTY, TX: Judge Dismisses Sexual Assault Class Action
TRUE HEARTS: Judgment of Pleadings Bid in Askew FLSA Suit Denied
U.S. STEEL: Court Certifies Class in Vrakas Securities Suit

UNDER ARMOUR: Court Grants Indicative Ruling Bid in Securities Suit
UNDERWEST WESTSIDE: Court OKs Conditional Certification in Hilaire
UNITED NATIONS: Israeli Settlers to File Class Action Suit
UNITED STATES: 3rd Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Stewart Suit
UNITED STATES: Individual Defendants in Cunningham Suit Dismissed

UTZ QUALITY: Court Dismisses Feldman Fraud Suit with Prejudice
UZBEK LOGISTICS: Class in Kopaleishvili Drivers Suit Certified
VEGG 58TH LLC: Fails to Pay Overtime Pay, Campos Suit Says
VIGLIOTTI ENTERPISES: Cordova Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
VITAL ENERGY: Roberson Sues Over Unpaid Minimum & Overtime Wages

VMSB LLC: Rosell Seeks Minimum & OT Wages for Servers Under FLSA
WAG LABS INC: Faces Slade Suit Over Blind-Inaccessible Web Site
WAITR HOLDINGS: Court Strikes 1st Amended Complaint in Bobby's Case
WASHINGTON STATE BAR: Dismissal of Eugster Suit Upheld
WAYNE COUNTY: Detroiters Prevented From Appealing Tax Assessments

WELLS FARGO BANK: Simon Seeks Overtime Pay for Off-the-Clock Work
WESTPAC BANKING: Glancy Prongay Reminds of March 30 Deadline
WESTPAC BANKING: Levi & Korsinsky Reminds of Class Action
WHIRLPOOL CORP: Deal in Corzine Refrigerator Suit Gets Final OK
WILLIAMS-SONOMA: Reed Smith Attorney Discusses Court Ruling

WM BOLTHOUSE: $118K Deal in Felix FDCPA Suit Has Prelim Approval
ZB NA: Status Conference in Evans Fraud Suit Continued to April 27

                            *********

3M CO: Bair Hagger Suit Ongoing in Ontario, Canada
---------------------------------------------------
3M Company said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on February 6, 2020, for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2019, that the company continues to
defend itself against a putative class action related to the
company's Bair Hugger(TM) patient warming system, pending before
the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.

In June 2016, the Company was served with a putative class action
filed in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice for all Canadian
residents who underwent various joint arthroplasty, cardiovascular,
and other surgeries and later developed surgical site infections
due to the use of the Bair Hugger(TM) patient warming system. The
representative plaintiff seeks relief (including punitive damages)
under Canadian law based on theories similar to those asserted in a
multi-district litigation.

No liability has been recorded for the Bair Hugger(TM) litigation
because the Company believes that any such liability is not
probable and estimable at this time.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

3M Company operates as a technology company worldwide. The
company's Industrial segment offers tapes, abrasives, adhesives,
ceramics, sealants, specialty materials, purification products,
closure systems, acoustic systems products, automotive components,
abrasion-resistant films, and paint finishing and detailing
products. The company was founded in 1902 and is headquartered in
St. Paul, Minnesota.


3M CO: Bid to Dismiss Delaware Class Suit Pending
-------------------------------------------------
3M Company said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on February 6, 2020, for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2019, that the motion to dismiss the
Delaware class action suit remains pending.

In Delaware, 3M is defending one putative class action brought by
individuals alleging PFAS contamination of their water supply
resulting from the operations of local metal plating facilities.
Plaintiffs allege that 3M supplied PFAS to the metal plating
facilities. DuPont, Chemours, and the metal platers have also been
named as defendants. This case has been removed from state court to
federal court, and plaintiffs have filed a motion to remand to
state court. 3M has also filed a motion to dismiss.

3M Company operates as a technology company worldwide. The
company's Industrial segment offers tapes, abrasives, adhesives,
ceramics, sealants, specialty materials, purification products,
closure systems, acoustic systems products, automotive components,
abrasion-resistant films, and paint finishing and detailing
products. The company was founded in 1902 and is headquartered in
St. Paul, Minnesota.


3M CO: Contaminated Public Water, City Water Providers Claim
------------------------------------------------------------
The case, CITY OF MILLINGTON; NATIONAL RURAL WATER ASSOCIATION,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. 3M COMPANY, f/k/a Minnesota mining and Manufacturing
Co., BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY, CHEMGUARD, INC., TYCO FIRE
PRODUCTS L.P., individually and as successor in interest to Ansul
Co., NATIONAL FOAM, INC., ANGUS INTERNATIONAL SAFETY GROUP, LTD,
ANGUS FIRE ARMOUR CORPORATION, E.I DUPONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY,
individually and as successor in interest to DuPont Chemical
Solutions Enterprise, THE CHEMOURS COMPANY, individually and as
successor in interest to DuPont Chemical Solutions Enterprise, THE
CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC, individually and as successor in interest
to DuPont Chemical Solutions Enterprise, CORTEVA, INC., DUPONT DE
NEMOURS INC., f/k/a DOWDUPONT, INC., ARCHROMA MANAGEMENT LLC,
ARKEMA INC., ARKEMA FRANCE, S.A., AGC, INC. f/k/a ASAHI GLASS CO.
LTD., DAIKIN INDUSTRIES LTD., DAIKIN AMERICA, INC., DYNAX
CORPORATION, SOLVAY SPECIALTY POLYMERS, USA, LLC., AMEREX
CORPORATION, KIDDE-FENWAL, INC., KIDDE P.L.C., INC., UTC FIRE &
SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC., UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION, CHUBB FIRE LTD., CLARIANT CORPORATION, and BASF
CORPORATION, Defendants, Case No. 1:20-cv-00546 (D.D.C., February
25, 2020), is a class action lawsuit brought by Plaintiffs on
behalf of the City of Millington and others similarly situated
public water providers supported by the National Rural Water
Association seeking injunctive and equitable relief to determine
the extent of the contamination of Plaintiffs' public water
supplies caused and/or created by Defendants' products and to
protect the public health, safety, welfare, and the environment.
Plaintiffs hit Defendants' alleged widespread contamination of
public water supplies with per- and polyfluoalkyl substances (PFAS)
in violation of the Toxic Substances Control Act.

The City of Millington provides drinking water intended for human
consumption to residents inside the city's boundaries.

The National Rural Water Association is a non-profit organization
dedicated to training, supporting, and promoting the water and
wastewater professionals that serve small communities across the
U.S.

According to the complaint, Defendants designed, developed,
manufactured, marketed and/or sold aqueous film forming foam (AFFF)
products used at military and civilian airports throughout the
U.S., and were aware that PFAS chemicals are toxic to animals and
humans and will contaminate the air, soil, and groundwater once it
is released into the environment.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to comply with federal law
which requires chemical manufacturers and distributors to
immediately notify the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency if they
have information that "reasonably supports the conclusion that such
substance or mixture presents a substantial risk of injury to
health or the environment.

Defendants are either chemical manufacturers and/or distributors.
[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Matthew M. Lavin, Esq.
          Paul J. Napoli, Esq.
          Andrew W. Croner, Esq.
          Michelle Greene, Esq.
          NAPOLI SHKOLNIK, PLLC
          360 Lexington Ave., 11th Fl.
          New York, NY 10017
          Tel: (212)397-1000
          Emails: mlavin@napolilaw.com
                  pnapoli@napolilaw.com
                  acroner@napolilaw.com
                  mgreene@napolilaw.com


ADVANCED MARKETING: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Williams Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
LEEROY WILLIAMS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. ADVANCED MARKETING & PROCESSING, INC. d/b/a
PROTECT MY CAR; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants, Case
2:20-cv-01508 (C.D. Cal., Feb. 14, 2020) seeks to stop the
Defendants' practice of making unsolicited calls.

Advanced Marketing & Processing, Inc. d/b/a Protect My Car is
engaged as an insurance company. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          Meghan E. George, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: (323) 306-4234
          Facsimile: (866) 633-0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                  abacon@toddflaw.com
                  mgeorge@toddflaw.com


ADVENTIST HEALTH: Court Dismisses Sheedy ERISA Suit with Prejudice
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Gregory A. Presnell of the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Florida, Orlando Division, dismissed with prejudice the
case, DONNA SHEEDY, Plaintiff, v. ADVENTIST HEALTH SYSTEM SUNBELT
HEALTHCARE CORPORATION, ADVENTIST RETIREMENT BOARD, ADVENTIST
RETIREMENT PLAN ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE and DOES 1-9, Defendants,
Case No. 6:16-cv-1893-Orl-31GJK (M.D. Fla.).

Plaintiff Sheedy filed the lawsuit against AHS, the Retirement
Board, and the Administrative Committee, seeking relief concerning
the Seventh Day Adventist Hospital Retirement Plan.  The Hospital
Plan is a defined-benefit pension plan that was established in 1980
and suspended in 1992.  The Plan is administered by the Retirement
Board and the Hospital Plan Committee.  The Plaintiff alleges,
among other things, that the Defendants violated the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA").

The Plaintiff first filed the lawsuit on Oct. 28, 2016.  After
identifying numerous deficiencies, including a failure to establish
standing and incorrectly including certain defendants in various
claims, the Court dismissed the First Amended Complaint without
prejudice.  The Plaintiff then filed her Second Amended Complaint,
later abandoning portions of those claims and leaving the Court to
ascertain which parts of which allegations remained.  

On March 25, 2019, the Court dismissed the convoluted remains of
the Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint without prejudice and gave
the Plaintiff another chance to replead.  In that order, the Court
warned the Plaintiff that she should draft any amended complaint
carefully, considering whether she truly intends to include each
claim and defendant and avoiding shotgun-style pleading.

In her Third Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff added new allegations
and legal theories.  Count I is brought derivatively on behalf of
the Hospital Plan and seeks declaratory relief that the Hospital
Plan is subject to ERISA and an order directing the Defendants to
bring the Hospital Plan into compliance with ERISA.  Count II is
brought derivatively on behalf of the Hospital Plan and alleges
violation of ERISA reporting and disclosure provisions with respect
to annual reports against the Retirement Board and the
Administrative Committee.  Count III is brought derivatively on
behalf of the Hospital Plan and alleges violation of ERISA
reporting and disclosure provisions with respect to notice of
underfunding against AHS.  Count IV is brought as a class action
and alleges violation of ERISA reporting and disclosure provisions
with respect to funding notices against the Retirement Board and
the Administrative Committee.  Count V is brought derivatively on
behalf of the Hospital Plan and alleges failure to provide minimum
funding in violation of ERISA against AHS, the Retirement Board,
and the Administrative Committee.  Count VI is brought as a class
action and seeks a civil money penalty against AHS, the Retirement
Board, and the Administrative Committee.  Count VII is brought
derivatively on behalf of the Hospital Plan and alleges breach of
fiduciary duty under ERISA against the Retirement Board and the
Administrative Committee.  Count VIII is brought derivatively on
behalf of the Hospital Plan and alleges breach of fiduciary duty
under ERISA by engaging in prohibited transactions against the
Retirement Board and the Administrative Committee.  Count IX is
brought derivatively on behalf of the Hospital Plan and seeks
declaratory relief that the Church Plan Exemption as applied to
Defendants violated the Establishment Clause.  Count X is brought
as a class action and alleges breach of contract and seeks specific
performance against AHS.  Count XI is brought as a class action and
alleges breach of fiduciary duty against the Retirement Board and
the Administrative Committee.

The matter before the Court is on the Defendants' Motion to Strike
portions of the Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint and Motion to
Dismiss.  The Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in response to the
motion, and the Defendants filed a Reply.

Judge Presnell holds that over the past two years, the Plaintiff
has been given numerous opportunities to plead a viable claim.  She
has failed to do so.  The Plaintiff has failed to overcome the
deficiencies that resulted in the dismissal of her prior
complaints.  Accordingly, the Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint
is subject to dismissal.

Among other things, Judge Presnell finds that (i) the Plaintiff
does not allege any concrete or particularized injury to the
Hospital Plan or to the Plaintiff; (ii) the Plaintiff has not
adequately pleaded that the Hospital Plan is underfunded for
purposes of ERISA; (iii) because the allegations in Counts VII and
VIII fail to distinguish between the Retirement Board and the
Administrative Committee, Counts VII and VIII fail to put the
Defendants on sufficient notice of the allegations against them;
(iv) the Plaintiff appears to concede that there was no breach of
an express contract; she does not respond to the Defendants'
arguments at all; and (v) because the allegations in Count XI fail
to distinguish between the Retirement Board and the Administrative
Committee, Count XI fails to put the Defendants on sufficient
notice of the allegations against them.

Because the Judge finds that the Third Amended Complaint should be
dismissed in full, he need not address the Motion to Strike.

In light of the foregoing, Judge Presnell granted the Motion to
Dismiss.  The Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint is dismissed with
prejudice.  The Clerk is directed to close the file.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 7, 2020 Order is available at
https://is.gd/jYnbiG from Leagle.com.

Donna Sheedy, On Behalf of Herself and All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Bryan E. DeMaggio, Sheppard,
White, Kachergus, & DeMaggio PA, Gregory M. Egleston --
bgainey@gme-law.com -- Gainey, McKenna & Egleston, pro hac vice,
Thomas J. McKenna -- tjmckenna@gme-law.com -- Gainey & McKenna,
pro
hac vice &William J. Sheppard -- sheplaw@sheppardwhite.com --
Sheppard, White, Kachergus, & DeMaggio PA.  

Adventist Health System Sunbelt Healthcare Corporation, doing
business as Adventist Health System (Healthcare Corporation),
Adventist Retirement Board & Adventist Retirement Plan
Administrative Committee, Defendants, represented by Lars C.
Golumbic -- lgolumbic@groom.com -- Groom Law Group, Chartered, pro
hac vice, Sean Abouchedid -- sabouchedid@groom.com -- Groom Law
Group, Chartered, pro hac vice & Walter A. Ketcham, Jr. --
waketcham@growerketcham.com -- Grower, Ketcham, Eide, Telan &
Meltz, PA.

United States of America, Movant, represented by Emily Newton, U.S.

Department of Justice.


AEROFLOT RUSSIAN: Dismissed From Bandurin Suit, Finnair Remains
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DMITRY BANDURIN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. AEROFLOT
RUSSIAN AIRLINES, et al., Defendants, Case No. 19 CV 255 (N.D.
Ill.), Judge Manish S. Shah of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, (i) granted
Aeroflot's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of
personal jurisdiction and Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim; and (ii) granted in part and denied in part Finnair's motion
to dismiss.

The Plaintiffs booked international airline tickets for different
flights with Defendants Aeroflot, a Russian airline, and Finnair, a
Finnish airline.  They allege that the airlines subjected them to a
series of inconveniences that largely occurred in Moscow, including
preventing them from boarding, forcing them to buy new tickets for
missed flights, and delivering their checked bags late, damaged, or
to the wrong city.  

The Plaintiffs bring claims for delay and injury on behalf of
themselves and a proposed nationwide class under the Montreal
Convention, a treaty that governs international air transportation.
They also bring a breach-of-contract claim against both
defendants, and a RICO claim against Aeroflot.

The airlines move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of
personal jurisdiction and Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim.  In the alternative, they move to strike the class
definitions because, the Defendants say, they are overly broad and
include unnamed Plaintiffs whose claims do not arise out of the
airlines' contacts with Illinois.

The airlines argue that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction with
regard to the majority of the Plaintiffs' claims.  They also argue
that the Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim because they do
not plead the necessary elements for their claims under Articles 17
or 19 of the Montreal Convention.  They argue that the Plaintiffs'
breach-of-contract claims must be dismissed because they fail to
identify what contract term was breached.  Finally, they argue that
the Plaintiffs have failed to plead the necessary elements of a
RICO case.

Judge Shah finds that the Plaintiffs offer no information at all
about the extent or frequency of the airlines' contacts with
Illinois.  While it can be inferred that the airlines operate
flights in and out of Chicago with at least some regularity, even
continuous and systematic contacts with a state do not establish
that the company is essentially at home here.  If Aeroflot and
Finnair were essentially at home in Illinois just by virtue of
operating flights to and from Chicago, they'd be essentially at
home in every state where they fly.  General personal jurisdiction
does not sweep that broadly.  The Plaintiffs have failed to
establish general personal jurisdiction over Aeroflot and Finnair.

The Court also lacks specific personal jurisdiction over the
airlines with regard to the claims brought by Izenov, Hanson,
Dzugkoeva, Tolparova, and Zangieva.  The airlines had little or no
contact with Illinois in the circumstances underlying all of those
Plaintiffs' claims.  The airlines' motions to dismiss all claims
asserted by Izenov, Hanson, Dzugkoeva, Tolparova, and Zangieva are
granted for lack of personal jurisdiction.  Aeroflot also moves to
dismiss all of Berezkina's claims against it because Berezkina
booked a Finnair flight and only asserts a claim against Finnair.
That motion is granted.

The following claims survive the airlines' motions to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction: Svetlana Bandurina's Article 17
claim against Aeroflot; the Bandurin group's Article 19 claim
against Aeroflot and Finnair; Berezkina's Article 19 claim against
Finnair; the Bandurin group's RICO claim against Aeroflot; the
Bandurin group's breach-of-contract claim against both airlines;
and Berezkina's breach-of-contract claim against Finnair.  Among
other things, the Judge finds that (i) because Bandurina has failed
to plead that her injury occurred while she was embarking, she has
failed to state an Article 17 claim, (ii) because the Bandurins
have failed to plead the existence of an enterprise or pleaded
predicate acts of fraud with particularity, their RICO claim is
dismissed; (iii) the Plaintiffs cannot establish a pattern of
racketeering activity without identifying acts that qualify as
racketeering activity, and pleading fraud with particularity; (iv)
the  Bandurins fail to identify any distinct entity that engaged in
alleged misconduct other than Aeroflot itself; and (v) the
Plaintiffs have failed to identify either a distinct enterprise or
predicate acts of racketeering.

The airlines move to strike th ePlaintiffs' class definitions on
the basis that they are overly broad and the court lacks personal
jurisdiction over some unnamed Plaintiffs.  The Judge denied that
motion.  The only remaining Plaintiff in the case is Berezkina.
While Berezkina may not ultimately be able to represent a class as
broad as the one alleged in the complaint, that is not an issue the
Judge need to address at the motion-to-dismiss stage of the case.
Finnair has preserved its personal-jurisdiction argument.  If
Berezkina seeks to certify a class at a later point, he will
consider personal jurisdiction and the scope of the class then.

Ordinarily, an initial dismissal for failure to state a claim
should be without prejudice, and leave to amend should be freely
given.  The Judge holds that there is no reason to permit the
Plaintiffs to amend their complaint.  They cannot plead any
additional facts to establish personal jurisdiction over the
airlines with regard to the claims asserted by Hanson, Dzugkoeva,
Tolparova, Zangieva, or Izenov.  In responding to the motion to
dismiss, the Plaintiffs do not suggest what additional facts they
could allege to salvage their RICO, breach-of-contract, or Montreal
Convention claims.  They have filed a complaint, a first amended
complaint, and a second amended complaint.  There is no reason to
think that they have left something out on the issues resolved.
The dismissals for failure to state a claim are with prejudice.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Shah granted in part and denied in
part the airlines' motions to dismiss.  Claims Two, Three, Four,
Seven, and Eight are dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Claims One, Six, Nine, and Ten are dismissed with prejudice for
failure to state a claim.  All claims against Aeroflot are
dismissed.  Claim Five, Berezkina's Article 19 claim against
Finnair, is not dismissed.  The clerk will correct the docket to
reflect that Berezkina and Finnair are the only remaining parties.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 22, 2020 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://is.gd/tRiSUW from Leagle.com.

Nina Berezkina, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated passengers of proposed Class, Plaintiff, represented by
Vladimir M. Gorokhovsky, Law Offices of Vladimir M. Gorokhovsky.

Finnair O.Y.J., a foreign corporation, Defendant, represented by
Alexander William Ross -- alexander.ross@clydeco.us -- Clyde &
Co..


AFNI INC: Waller Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime Pay Under FLSA
----------------------------------------------------------------
Natalie Waller, Justin Racer, Alexandria Barleycorn, and La'Quenza
Frett, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated
v. AFNI, INC., Case No. 1:20-cv-01080-JES-JEH (C.D. Ill., Feb. 27,
2020), seeks damages, over alleged unpaid overtime wages, pursuant
to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, the Illinois Minimum Wage
Law, and the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, the Kentucky
Wage and Hour Act, the Arizona Fair Wages and Healthy Families Act
and Alabama common-law.

The Defendant enforced a uniform company-wide policy wherein it
improperly required its hourly call-center employees--the
Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members--to perform work
"off-the-clock" and without pay, according to the complaint. The
Defendant's illegal company-wide policy has caused the Plaintiffs
to have hours worked that were not compensated and further created
a miscalculation of their regular rate(s) of pay for purposes of
calculating their overtime compensation each workweek.

Although the Plaintiffs have routinely worked in excess of 40 hours
per workweek, the Plaintiffs have not been paid overtime of at
least one and one-half their regular rates for all hours worked in
excess of 40 hours per workweek, says the complaint.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendant in customer service.

AFNI, Inc. operates call centers throughout the United States
customer support/engagement services to its business clients.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Ryan F. Stephan, Esq.
          James B. Zouras, Esq.
          Anna M. Ceragioli, Esq.
          STEPHAN ZOURAS, LLP
          100 N. Riverside Plaza, Suite 2150
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Phone: (312) 233-1550
          Fax: (312) 233-1560
          Email: rstephan@stephanzouras.com
                 jzouras@stephanzouras.com
                 aceragiol@stephanzouras.com

               - and –

          Clif Alexander, Esq.
          Austin Anderson, Esq.
          ANDERSON ALEXANDER, PLLC
          819 North Upper Broadway
          Corpus Christi, TX 78401
          Phone: (361) 452-1279
          Facsimile: (361) 452-1284
          Email: cliff@a2xlaw.com
                 austin@a2xlaw.com


AK SECURITY: Faces Hiebler Suit over OT Pay, Misclassification
--------------------------------------------------------------
JESSE HIEBLER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. AK SECURITY SERVICES, LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 1:20-cv-00054-RH-GRJ (N.D. Fla., February 28, 2020) is a class
action against the Defendant for violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant failed to compensate the
Plaintiff and hundreds of similarly situated security guards for
hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week, failed to keep or
maintain adequate time records, and misclassified them as
independent contractors to avoid federal wage obligations under
FLSA.

The Plaintiff was hired by the Defendant as a non-exempt security
guard from July 2019.

AK Security Services, LLC is an east coast regional protection
agency which was established in 2004 and engaged in patrolling and
security-related services in the states of Florida and Georgia.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jordan Richards, Esq.
          JORDAN RICHARDS PLLC
          805 East Broward Blvd. Suite 301
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301          
          Telephone: (954) 871-0050
          E-mail: jordan@jordanrichardspllc.com
                  melissa@jordanrichadrspllc.com
                  jake@jordanrichardspllc.com

ALBERTSONS LLC: Bid to Certify Class in Dorfman TCPA Suit Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ROBERT DORFMAN, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ALBERTSON'S, LLC, a
Delaware corporation, doing business in California as SAV-ON
PHARMACY, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-00094-DCN (D. Idaho), Judge
David C. Nye of the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho
granted Albertson's' Second Motion to Deny Class Certification
Pursuant to Rule 23(c)(1).

On Feb. 27, 2018, Plaintiff Dorfman filed a Class Action Complaint
against Albertsons alleging that its prerecorded artificial voice
telephone messages ("robocalls") related to prescription pick-up
that it made on behalf of "Sav-On Pharmacy" violated the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991 ("TCPA").  On May 2, 2018,
Albertsons filed a motion to dismiss based on an affirmative
statutory defense.  The Court denied Albertsons' motion on Oct. 18,
2018, finding the calls at issue did not, as a matter of law, fall
within the "emergency purposes" statutory exception to TCPA
liability.

On Nov. 12, 2018, Albertsons filed a Motion to Deny Class
Certification Pursuant to Rule 23(c)(1), challenging Dorfman's
prima facie ability to establish that (1) Dorfman is a
representative of the class whose claims he wishes to litigate as
required under Rule 23(a); (2) common questions of fact predominate
over individual issues as required under Rule 23(b)(3); and (3)
class action is the superior method to resolve this issue as also
required under Rule 23(b)(3).  The Court found that Dorfman was not
a member of the class he sought to represent and no common
questions of fact predominated over individual issues, but it was
possible that the class could be manageable (i.e., a superior
method to resolve the issue).

In considering Albertsons' Motion to Deny Class Certification, the
Court relied on Doninger v. Pac. Nw. Bell, Inc., where the Ninth
Circuit noted that where a party cannot make a prima facie showing
of Rule 23's prerequisites, or show that discovery measures
probably would produce information that substantiated the class
action allegations, class certification may be properly denied
without discovery.  As Dorfman had failed to make a prima facie
showing of Rule 23's prerequisites and had not attempted to show
that discovery measures were likely to produce persuasive
information substantiating the class action allegations, the Court
denied class certification without discovery.  However, because the
Court thought it possible that Dorfman could define its class in a
way that complied with Rule 23, it granted Dorfman leave to amend.

Dorfman filed his First Amended Class Action Complaint on March 18,
2019.  Once again, the Dorfman brings the action under the TCPA on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated who received
robocalls from, or on behalf of, Albertsons.

Dorfman alleges that he received a call from, or on behalf of,
Albertsons for him to pick up an "order" that he had never placed
at Sav-on.  More specifically, he alleges that he: (1) is not a
customer of Sav-on; (2) has never given Sav-on consent to call his
wireless number; (3) received approximately 21 automated phone
calls on his cell phone from the Defendant beginning on or around
June 12, 2017, regarding a prescription ready for pick-up and
belonging to an unknown third party; and (4) has asked the
Defendant to stop calling him.  Approximately seven calls were
received after July 10, 2017, when Dorfman had "asked the Defendant
to stop calling him."

Pending before the Court is Albertsons' Second Motion to Deny Class
Certification Pursuant to Rule 23(c)(1) filed on March 27, 2019.  

Neither party contests that Dorfman meets the requirements of Rule
23(a) to be a class representative.  Rather, Albertsons
predominately challenges Dorfman's prima facie ability to establish
that his newly proposed overall class and two sub-classes satisfy
Rule 23(b)(3).  Dorfman contends he has met his burden and,
furthermore, that he can show discovery measures that are likely to
produce persuasive information substantiating the class action
allegations.

Because Albertsons narrowly focuses its class certification
challenge, the Court will focus its review on whether Dorfman has
sufficiently amended his proposed class definitions to either
satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance inquiry or meet his burden of
showing that discovery measures are likely to produce persuasive
information to substantiate his class action allegations.

Dorfman defines the overall class in his First Amended Complaint
as: All natural persons within the United States who, within the
four years prior to the filing of the original Complaint in this
matter, Defendant called or caused to be called, through the use an
artificial or prerecorded voice, where such person was not listed
in Defendant's records as the intended recipient of the call(s).

Judge Nye finds that Dorfman has not cured the deficiency in his
amended class definition.  No common questions prevail over
individualized ones because the Court would need to make
individualized inquiries into the circumstances and content of
wrong number calls that the class members received to determine if
the messages fell within a TCPA exception.  Additionally, for all
non-emergency purposes calls, the members of the proposed class
would need to present evidence that they did not consent to the
call.  As the class members would need to present evidence that
varies from member to member, the issue is not susceptible to
generalized, class-wide proof.  No common question of fact
predominates Dorfman's Class.

Dorfman defines Sub-Class No. 1 as: All natural persons within the
United States who, within the four years prior to the filing of the
original Complaint in this matter, Defendant called or caused to be
called two (2) or more times through the use of an artificial or
prerecorded voice, where such person was not listed in Defendant's
records as the intended recipient of the calls.

The Court holds that the definition of Sub-Class No. 1 is identical
to the overall class definition, except for the addition that
Albertsons robocalled class members two or more times.  The
proposed Sub-Class No. 1 members would have to submit more evidence
than the overall class members, as they would need to provide
either testimony or documentation that they had been called two or
more times by Albertsons.  Similar to Dorfman's overall class
definition, no common question of fact predominates Dorfman's
Sub-Class No. 1 definition.

Dorfman defines Sub-Class No. 2 as: All natural persons within the
United States who, within the four years prior to the filing of the
original Complaint in this matter, Defendant called or caused to be
called through the use of an artificial or prerecorded voice, where
such person was not listed in Defendant's records as the intended
recipient of the calls, and after the called party requested of
Defendant that no calls be made.

Because it would also need to make individualized inquiries into
the circumstances and content of the calls other the class members
received, the Court agrees with the Defendant that no common
question predominates the issue, as the Sub-Class No. 2 is
currently defined, as required under Rule 23(b)(3).

Finally, the Court holds that Dorfman has not shown that his class
definition meets Rule 23's requirements.  Further, he provides no
methodology, expert testimony, or plans on how he would use
discovery to solve consent, or lack of consent, on a class-wide
basis.  Dorfman has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that
discovery measures are likely to produce persuasive information
substantiating the class action allegations; it will not allow
class discovery.

For these reasons, the District Court granted the Defendant's
Second Motion to Deny Class Certification Pursuant to Rule
23(C)(1).

A full-text copy of the District Court's Jan. 7, 2020 Memorandum
Decision & Order is available at https://is.gd/Zu1zjf from
Leagle.com.

Robert Dorfman, Plaintiff, represented by Brittany Casola --
bcasola@carlsonlynch.com -- Carlson Lynch sweet Kilpela &
Carpenter, LLP, pro hac vice, Deval R. Zaveri -- dev@zaveritabb.com
-- Zaveri Tabb, APC, pro hac vice, James A. Tabb --
jimmy@zaveritabb.com -- Zaveri Tabb, APC, pro hac vice, Todd D.
Carpenter -- tcarpenter@carlsonlynch.com -- Carlson Lynch Sweet
Kilpela & Carpenter, LLP, pro hac vice & Gabriel J. McCarthy --
gabe@gabrielmccarthy.com -- McCarthy Law, PLLC.

Albertson's, LLC, a Delaware Corporation doing business as Sav-On
Pharmacy, Defendant, represented by David S. Almeida --
dalmeida@beneschlaw.com -- Benesch Friedlander Coplan and Aronoff
LLP, pro hac vice, Jason Emerson Prince -- jeprince@hollandhart.com
-- Holland & Hart LLP, Mark Stephen Eisen -- meisen@beneschlaw.com
-- Ben, pro hac vice & Alexandra Shantel Grande --
asgrande@hollandhart.com -- Holland & Hart LLP.


ALLIANZ LIFE: Fails to Notify Lapsed Policies' Owners, Small Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Lawanda D. Small, Individually, and on Behalf of the Class v.
ALLIANZ LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, a Minnesota
Corporation, Case No. 2:20-cv-01944 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2020), is
brought against the Defendant to recover for the injuries and
damages resulting from the Defendants refusal to comply with
mandatory provisions of the California Insurance Code, as well as
California common law, regulating the lapse and termination of life
insurance policies.

Since January 1, 2013, Allianz and other related entities have
systematically and purposely failed to provide certain classes of
policy owners, insureds, assignees and others, proper notices of
pending lapse or termination, according to the complaint. Allianz
has refused to provide required grace periods and to notify
thousands of policy owners of their right to designate someone to
receive critical notices and information regarding life insurance,
despite being required to do so on an annual basis. All these
important safeguards are required by, among other sources,
California Insurance Code Sections 10113.71 and
10113.72.1 California law requires strict compliance with these
safeguards and Allianz refuses to comply.

As a result, Allianz has failed to properly administer policies,
evaluate the status of payments due under policies, and pay claims
to beneficiaries for policies improperly lapsed or terminated, the
Plaintiff alleges. Indeed, she notes, thousands of policy owners
and beneficiaries have lost, and continue to lose, the benefit,
value and security of their life insurance; have been, and continue
to be, forced into unnecessary reinstatements; and in many
instances have lost all reasonable access to any insurance at all.
Ultimately, the Defendant has robbed thousands of their customers
and beneficiaries of the investment in such policies, including
policy benefits as well as the security intended to be provided
from such insurance. The Plaintiff and the deceased, Mr. Small, are
victims of Allianz's failures, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff has been a co-owner and beneficiary of the life
insurance policy insuring herself and her former husband, Carl
Small.

Allianz is one of the largest sellers of life insurance in
California by market share.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Craig M. Nicholas, Esq.
          Alex M. Tomasevic, Esq.
          Shaun Markley, Esq.
          NICHOLAS & TOMASEVIC, LLP
          225 Broadway, 19th Floor
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Phone: (619) 325-0492
          Facsimile: (619) 325-0496
          Email: cnicholas@nicholaslaw.org
                 atomasevic@nicholaslaw.org
                 smarkley@nicholaslaw.org

               - and -

          Jack B. Winters, Jr., Esq.
          Georg M. Capielo, Esq.
          Sarah Ball, Esq.
          WINTERS & ASSOCIATES
          8489 La Mesa Boulevard
          La Mesa, CA 91942
          Phone: (619) 234-9000
          Fax: (619) 750-0413
          Email: jackbwinters@earthlink.net
                 gcapielo@einsurelaw.com
                 sball@einsurelaw.com


AMERICAN TOUR & TRAVEL: Dominguez Seeks Proper Wages for Cleaners
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The case RUBEN DOMINGUEZ, Individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. MARK TELMANY, Individually and
AMERICAN TOUR & TRAVEL INC. d/b/a US COACHWAYS Defendants, Case No.
1:20-cv-01105 (E.D.N.Y., February 28, 2020) seeks to recover unpaid
wages and related damages for overtime hours worked by Plaintiff
and others similarly situated under the applicable provisions of
the Fair Labor Standards Act while being employed by the
Defendants.

Mr. Dominguez was employed by the Defendants as cleaner from 2013
through January 4, 2020.

American Tour & Travel Inc. is a charter bus rental company with
operations in Staten Island, New York and is doing business as US
Coachways. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

            Darren P.B. Rumack, Esq.
            THE KLEIN LAW GROUP
            39 Broadway Suite 1530
            New York, NY 10006
            Telephone: (212) 344-9022
            Facsimile: (212) 344-0301


APPLE INC: Cal. App. Upholds Class Decertification in Adame Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of California for the Fourth District,
Division One, affirmed a trial court order decertifying the class
in the case, DENISE ADAME, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. APPLE INC.,
Defendant and Appellant, Case No. D073567 (Cal. App.).

The appeal involves a challenge to Apple's iPhone sales tax
practices.  Apple sold the iPhone at a discounted price to buyers
who also entered a cellular service agreement, in what is known as
a bundled transaction. California sales tax provisions required
Apple to pay sales tax on the unbundled price of the phone.  Apple
was permitted, but not required, to collect sales tax reimbursement
from consumers, and it did so.  Apple stated in signs and its
online store that sales tax was based on the unbundled price, and
its receipts reflected the reimbursement amount (though not the
unbundled price).

In 2012, Adame bought a bundled iPhone 4S (16GB) for $199 at an
Apple retail store.  She paid $50.30 in sales tax reimbursement
(i.e., a rate of 7.75%, as applied to an unbundled phone cost of
$649).  Adame exchanged the phone the same day for an iPhone 4S
(32GB), which cost $299. She paid the $100 difference, and sales
tax reimbursement of $7.75. In 2014, Adame bought a bundled iPhone
6 (128GB) for $399 from the online Apple Store.  She paid $67.92 in
sales tax reimbursement (i.e. a then-current rate of 8 percent, on
an unbundled price of $849).  Adame did not see Apple's sales tax
disclaimer, and later stated in a declaration that she would not
have understood it to mean the tax applied to anything other than
the sale price.

In 2010, Adame filed a putative class action alleging Apple
violated the Unfair Competition Law ("UCL") and the Consumer Legal
Remedies Act ("CLRA") by failing to adequately disclose that sales
tax would be imposed on the full, unbundled price.  

The trial court granted class certification in 2013.  Adame filed
the operative third amended class action complaint in 2015,
asserting claims under the UCL and CLRA, and seeking restitution,
among other relief.

In October 2017, Apple moved to decertify the class, citing Walmart
records to contend that Adame and at least some class members could
not have purchased the same phones at Walmart, undermining her
standing and meaning individual issues would predominate.  The
trial court agreed, and granted decertification.  The trial court
entered judgment for Apple.  

Adame appealed, and Apple filed a protective appeal. Adame
challenges the court's rulings on standing, commonality, and
restitution.  Apple contends those rulings were correct, and
indicated in both briefing and at oral argument that the Court can
decide the appeal on standing alone.  As alternative grounds for
affirmance, Apple contends the court erred in overruling its
demurrer based on Loeffler v. Target, and denying its motion for
summary adjudication.

The Appellate Court agrees that Adame has not established standing.
Adame alleged Apple inadequately disclosed it was collecting sales
tax reimbursement based on unbundled prices and thus deprived her
of the chance to buy the same phones at Walmart without paying such
amounts.  The evidence at class certification reflected she could
not have bought her phones at Walmart.  Adame maintains she has
standing because she testified that she would have bought at least
one of her iPhones from Walmart.  The record does not support her
assertion.  Adame's declaration addresses what she most likely
would have done had she been aware of Apple's sales tax
reimbursement practices, including conducting research to find
other retailers, waiting for the phones, or accepting different
phones.  The deposition testimony in the record is even more
equivocal.  After initially agreeing that she and the other class
members would have "conducted a diligent search" for other
retailers, had Apple disclosed its practices, Adame then indicated
she "maybe" would have done research.

The testimony amounts to an assertion that Adame would have shopped
around, had she known about Apple's sales tax reimbursement
practices, and Apple's failure to disclose those practices meant
she could not do so.  This purported injury is just as conjectural
as in Bower v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, and the trial court properly
concluded that Adame lacked standing.

The Appellate Court concludes that the trial court correctly
determined that Adame lacked standing.  

For these reasons, the trial court judgment is affirmed, the
Appellate Court rules. Apple will recover its costs on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Appellate Court's Dec. 31, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/yKWbSy from Leagle.com.

Siminou Appeals, Benjamin I. Siminou -- ben@siminouappeals.com;
Hiden, Rott & Oertle, Michael I. Rott and Eric M. Overholt;
Thorsnes Bartolotta McGuire, Kevin F. Quinn and Jarrett S. Charo
for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Morrison & Forester, David F. McDowell -- dmcdowell@mofo.com --
Purvi G. Patel -- ppatel@mofo.com -- Margaret E. Mayo --
mmayo@mofo.com -- Arturo J. Gonzalez -- agonzalez@mofo.com --
Joseph R. Palmore -- jpalmore@mofo.com -- and James R. Sigel --
jsigel@mofo.com -- for Defendant and Appellant.


APPLE INC: New Jersey District Narrows Claims in Priano-Keyser Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GINA PRIANO-KEYSER, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. APPLE, INC., Defendant,
Civ. No. 19-09162 (KM)(MAH)(D. N.J.), Judge Kevin McNulty of the
U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey granted in part
and denied in part Apple's motion to dismiss certain claims for
lack of Article III standing, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1), and for failure to state a claim, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (DE 10).

Gina Priano-Keyser, on behalf of herself and a class of New Jersey
purchasers, commenced the putative class action against Apple for
damages, restitution, and injunctive relief relating to alleged
defects in Second Generation and Third Generation models of the
Apple Watch.  The class action complaint ("CAC") asserts three
causes of action -- for violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud
Act ("NJCFA"), breach of express warranty, and breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability.

Since April 2015, Apple has manufactured and sold "smart watches,"
which allow a wearer to download apps, send and receive text
messages, track the watch's location, and receive phone calls,
among other features.  The first smart watches were known as "First
Generation" watches.  Since then, Apple has released additional
generations, which include "Series 1" and "Series 2" watches, which
were released in September 2016, and "Series 3" watches, which were
released in September 2017.

The different Series have different capabilities; for example, the
Series 2 and 3 watches were advertised as water resistant up to 50
meters, and Series 3 watches featured faster performance than
Series 2 watches.  In general, the watches were advertised as
"activity-oriented devices"; in promotional images, watch-wearers
are shown participating in various physical activities, such as
running, hiking, climbing, dancing, swimming, and surfing.

Apple provides a limited warranty for its watches, running for one
year from the original purchase date.  Its website states that an
Apple Watch is considered "out of warranty" when it is (1) past the
eligible warranty term; (2) "has an issue that's not covered under
warranty or consumer law, such as accidental damage"; and (3) if
such service is not covered by an AppleCare plan.

On Oct. 15, 2017, the Plaintiff purchased a Series 3, 38 mm gold,
aluminum case Apple Watch.  On July 4, 2018, while the watch was in
the charger, the watch screen unexpectedly detached from the watch
body.  At that time, the Plaintiff saw that there was a long, deep,
jagged crack spanning the length of the bottom section of the
screen.  Her daughter pushed the screen back into place but the
watch was no longer functional.  The Plaintiff brought the watch to
a Genius Bar appointment on Aug. 10, 2018, where she was informed
that the watch would need to be screened, diagnosed, and repaired
at an Apple depot.  On Aug. 13, 2018, the Plaintiff was told that
Apple would not cover the cost of the repair of the watch under its
Limited Warranty, and that fixing the watch would cost her $229.
She declined to pay out-of-pocket to repair her watch and has been
unable to use the watch since July 2018.

The Plaintiff alleges that her experience is identical to those of
thousands of Apple Watch owners.  She alleges that all Apple smart
watches contain a common defect and flaw, consisting of swelling
lithium-ion batteries, which causes Apple Watch screens to crack,
shatter, or detach from the body of the Watch.  The Plaintiff
alleges that the Defect manifests itself suddenly, and is not the
result of any damage or misuse on the part of the wearer.  The CAC
also alleges, however, that the Defect could be caused by aging or
defective internal components of the watches.  The Defect can pose
a risk to consumers, and several putative class members have
suffered scratches and burns due to the Defect.

The Plaintiff alleges that Apple knew about the Defect based on
consumer complaints published on the "Communities" forum on Apple's
own website.  In April 2017, Apple acknowledged the swelling
battery defect in First Generation Watches and, for those watches,
extended its Limited Warranty from one year to three years.  Apple
also acknowledged the swelling battery defect in certain Series 2
watches, and, for qualifying watches, extended its Limited Warranty
from one year to three years.

The CAC is less specific about the Series 3 watches, however.  The
Plaintiff alleges generally that purchasers of Series 3 watches
encountered the same Defect as the purchasers of the Series 1 and 2
watches and have likewise complained on Apple's community forum.
The CAC is silent, however, as to whether Apple has acknowledged
the swollen battery issue or extended the warranty for Series 3
watches.  Furthermore, although Apple has acknowledged the "swollen
battery" issue in certain First- and Second-Generation Watches, it
has refused to acknowledge that the swollen batteries are the cause
of the Defect.

The CAC alleges that Apple knew or should have known about the
Defect, but actively concealed or failed to disclose it to the
Plaintiff (and the putative class members).  She also alleges that
Apple's internal policy is to deny the existence of the Defect or
to claim that the Defect is the result of "accidental damages"
caused by consumer.  Apple has thus refused to have its Limited
Warranty cover the cost of fixing the shattered or dislocated watch
screens.  The Plaintiff alleges that if she and other class members
had known about the Defect at the time of purchase, they would not
have bought the watches, or would have paid less for them.

Now before the Court is Apple's motion to dismiss certain claims
for lack of Article III standing, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1), and for failure to state a claim, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (DE 10).

Judge McNulty denied Apple's motion to dismiss claims for lack of
standing, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).  The relevant
claims the Plaintiff asserts on her own behalf involve only the
Series 3 watch that she purchased.  Claims based on Series 1 or 2
are class-based claims which she could assert only in a
representative capacity, if the action were certified as a class
action under Rule 23 and Plaintiff were found to be an appropriate
representative.  It would be premature to dismiss them from the
complaint, however.

The Judge granted in part and denied in part Apple's motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).  The Judge granted as to Count I (NJCFA) and Count III
(breach of implied warranty of merchantability), which are
dismissed.  The motion is granted as to Count II (breach of express
warranty) to the extent that claims lie outside of the one-year
warranty period.  The motion to dismiss is denied as to the
remainder of Count II (breach of express warranty) and the prayer
for injunctive relief.

Because it is an initial motion to dismiss, all dismissals are
without prejudice to a properly supported motion to amend filed
within 45 days.  

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 31, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/31use7 from Leagle.com.

GINA PRIANO-KEYSER, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by JAMES C. SHAH --
jshah@sfmslaw.com -- SHEPHERD, FINKELMAN, MILLER & SHAH, LLP.

APPLE, INC., Defendant, represented by DIANE P. SULLIVAN --
diane.sullivan@weil.com -- WEIL GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP.


ASHBRITT INC: Court Strikes Class Allegations in Mason Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting Defendants' Motion to Strike
Class Allegations in the case captioned CRAIG MASON, Plaintiff, v.
ASHBRITT, INC., et al., Defendants; CHARLOTTE HORNE, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. TETRA TECH, INC., et al., Defendants, Case Nos.
19-cv-01062-DMR, 18-cv-07181-DMR (N.D. Cal.).

Defendants move to strike Plaintiffs' class allegations pursuant to
Rule 12(f).

These related putative class actions arise from property damage
caused by the Northern California wildfires of October 2017 and
subsequent remediation efforts. The Horne Plaintiffs are all
California residents who owned real property in Napa or Sonoma
County during that same time period.

Plaintiffs claim that the ACE contracts required Defendants to
perform incremental soil removal by removing small layers of soil
and re-sampling the soil for additional contamination before
removing more. They allege that Defendants routinely removed
excessive amounts of soil, up to six feet in depth at a time, far
more than was necessary to dispose of contaminants, without
performing sampling to determine whether the soil was
contaminated.

Defendants move to strike Mason and the Horne plaintiffs' class
allegations because the class definitions are overbroad and
contains proposed class members who lack standing; the proposed
classes lacks commonality; the named plaintiffs' purported injuries
are not typical of the classes; individual issues predominate; and
class treatment is not the superior method of resolution.

To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must show:

(1) it has suffered an injury in fact that is (a) concrete and
particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action of the defendant and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to adequately allege
standing for either the class members or named plaintiffs.

The putative class consists of all owners of real property in
Sonoma, Lake, Mendocino, and Napa Counties on whose land Defendants
performed cleanup work in relation to 2017 Northern California
wildfire damage from October 2017 to the present.

According to Tetra Tech and ECC, the proposed class necessarily
includes individuals who were not injured, since the class is not
defined to include only the people who suffered damages because of
their conduct. Tetra Tech also lay out the elements of the classes'
various tort claims to show why the class definitions are
overbroad.

The conclusion that only named plaintiffs must establish Article
III standing also follows logically from consideration of Rule 23's
requirements of commonality and typicality:

Most courts concerned about the standing of absent class members
are in fact concerned about whether the class is properly defined,
as the issue tends to arise in the context of class certification,
not jurisdiction. In this sense, the problem of un-injured absent
class members is a problem of Rule 23, not of Article III.

In other words, Rule 23 adequately addresses Defendants' concerns
over whether they will be exposed to liability by uninjured class
members by prohibiting certification of classes that fail to meet
certification standards.  

In sum, the court holds that only the named plaintiff must meet
Article III's standing requirements, and that non-injured class
members can be excluded through the normal operation of Rule 23.
Defendants' Rule 23 challenges to the proposed classes are
addressed below in conjunction with their motion to strike.

Class Representatives' Standing

There is still the question of whether Plaintiffs have adequately
pleaded that they have standing as class representatives.

The court concludes that they have not.  

Plaintiff Craig Mason is a resident of the State of California.
During the class period, Mr. Mason owned real property in Sonoma
County on which Defendants performed cleanup services relating to
the Northern California Fires. During the cleanup, Defendants
removed excessive amounts of soil, structures, vegetation, or other
land or materials from Mr. Mason's property, resulting in damage to
real property, loss of personal property, and annoyance and
discomfort.

The Horne Plaintiffs' descriptions of their injuries are identical,
substituting only their own names and counties. From the broad
descriptions offered, it is impossible to tell what damage the
class representatives allegedly suffered. The description states
that Defendants removed excessive amounts of soil, structures,
vegetation, or other land or materials" from each of their
properties, but the disjunctive obscures which of these harms
occurred to which plaintiffs or whether all the named plaintiffs
suffered each listed harm.   

Further, the plaintiffs in both actions allege that Defendants
failed to test for contaminated soil yet none of the named
plaintiffs allege that they themselves suffered any injuries
because of this conduct. They make general allegations that the
class was injured due to Defendants' conduct, but it is circular to
suggest that the named plaintiffs must have standing because of the
class members' injuries. Each named plaintiff must plead that they
suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is "fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant. The named
plaintiffs' vague, overbroad, and disjunctive statements as to the
harm they suffered does not meet this standard.

Accordingly, the court grants Defendants' motion to strike on the
basis that the named plaintiffs have not adequately pleaded that
they each have Article III standing. As explained further below,
however, the court will grant leave to amend with respect to the
standing of the named plaintiffs. To obviate the need for
Defendants to file another motion to strike if Plaintiffs' amended
complaint adequately alleges standing, the court also reaches the
merits of Defendants' arguments regarding the class allegations.

Class Allegations

Defendants argue that it is appropriate to strike class allegations
prior to the completion of discovery where the complaint
demonstrates that a class action cannot be maintained on the facts
alleged.

Defendants state that the Horne and Mason complaints contain
inconsistent primary theories of liability that necessarily require
an individualized factual investigation to determine which theory
fits each class members' claimed damages. The inconsistency at
issue is the supposed allegation that Defendants over-excavated
some properties and under-excavated others.

At the outset, the court notes that the apparent inconsistency does
not exist. The SACs allege that Defendants engaged in
over-excavation by removing excess soil, including uncontaminated
soil.

The SACs also allege that Defendants failed to remove contaminated
soil. These allegations are both consistent with the theory that
Defendants excavated the land indiscriminately and failed to test
for contamination, such that they may have taken too much
uncontaminated soil from the same properties where they left
contaminated soil. It is possible that all the properties at issue
suffered from both problems, thus, the allegations are not
logically inconsistent.

Even if the issues in this case would or will require individual
examinations that are inappropriate for a class action, it is still
necessary to establish whether this analysis should be undertaken
in a Rule 12(f) motion rather than at class certification. Many of
the cases cited by Defendants are unpublished district court
opinions in other Circuits. The court has read and considered these
opinions but does not find them persuasive.

Other cases cited by Defendants are decisions on class
certification motions rather than motions to strike.  These cases
may illustrate the difficulty of certifying classes such as the
ones that Plaintiffs propose here, but they do not suggest that the
court should address this issue on a motion to strike. To the
extent that Defendants seek a pronouncement that property
contamination and trespass cases are inherently unsuitable for
class treatment, the court declines to adopt such a sweeping
proposition.

In sum, the court is not convinced that under no set of
circumstances could the claim or defense succeed in this case.
Although Defendants' motions are granted because the named
plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege that they have
standing to bring claims on behalf of the class, the court denies
the motions insofar as they challenge the adequacy of Plaintiffs'
class allegations at the pleadings stage.

Accordingly, Defendants' motions are granted on the basis that the
named plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege individual
standing.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 17, 2020 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/r9ot2pq from Leagle.com.

Craig Mason, Plaintiff, represented by Kevin M. Osborne -
kmo@arnslaw.com - The Arns Law Firm, Julie C. Erickson -
jce@arnslaw.com - The Arns Law Firm, Shounak Sanjeev Dharap , The
Arns Law Firm & Robert Stephen Arns  - rsa@arnslaw.com - The Arns
Law Firm.

ASHBRITT, INC., Defendant, represented by Gayle M. Athanacio -
gathanacio@rjo.com - Rogers Joseph & O'Donnell.

Tetra Tech, Inc., Defendant, represented by James Harold Vorhis  -
jvorhis@nossaman.com -, Nossaman LLP, David C. Lee -
dlee@nossaman.com - Nossaman LLP & Jill Nicole Jaffe  -
jjaffe@nossaman.com - Nossaman LLP.


AVENUE A CANDY: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Andilema Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------
MANUEL ANDILEMA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. AVENUE A CANDY LLC d/b/a WHITMANS EAST
VILLAGE; WHITMANS WESTSIDE LLC d/b/a WHITMANS HUDSON YARDS;
WHITMANS 261 HUDSON LLC d/b/a WHITMANS SOHO; WHITMANS TIMES SQUARE
LLC d/b/a WHITMANS CITY KITCHEN; LAWRENCE KRAMER; and CRAIG KOENIG,
Defendants, Case 1:20-cv-01346 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 14, 2020) seeks to
recover from the Defendants unpaid wages and overtime compensation,
interest, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, and costs under the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff Andilema was employed by the Defendants as non-exempt
employee.

Avenue A Candy LLC d/b/a Whitmans East Village owns and operate a
restaurant business in New York City. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          C.K. Lee, Esq.
          Anne Seelig, Esq.
          LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
          148 West 24th Street, Eighth Floor
          New York, NY 10011
          Telephone: (212) 465-1188
          Facsimile: (212) 465-1181


BLOUNT INT'L: Settlement in Azar Securities Suit Has Final Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ELIA AZAR and DEAN ALFANGE, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. BLOUNT
INTERNATIONAL, INC., JOSHUA L. COLLINS, DAVID A. WILLMOTT, ROBERT
E. BEASLEY, JR., RONALD CAMI, ANDREW C. CLARKE, NELDA J. CONNORS,
E. DANIEL JAMES, HAROLD E. LAYMAN, MAX L. LUKENS, and DANIEL J.
OBRINGER, Defendants, Case No. 3:16-cv-0483-SI (D. Or.), Judge
Michael H. Simon of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Oregon granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs' Unopposed
Motion for Final Approval of: (i) Class Action Settlement; (ii) Cla
ss Certification; (iii) Plan of Allocation; and (iv) Application
for Award of Attorney's Fees, Reimbursement of Expenses, and
Service Awards.

The Court held an initial final approval hearing in September 2019
to determine: (1) whether the terms and conditions of the
Stipulation of Settlement are fair, reasonable, and adequate for
the settlement of all claims asserted by Lead Plaintiffs Elia Azar
and Dean Alfange against the Defendants; (2) whether to approve the
proposed plan of allocation as a fair and reasonable method to
allocate the Settlement Fund among the Class Members; (3) whether
to approve the requested attorney's fees and expenses; and (4)
whether to approve the requested service, or incentive, awards for
the Lead Plaintiffs.  The Court continued the hearing because the
counsel for the Defendants failed to comply with the requirements
of the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"), specifically, to provide
the notice required under 28 U.S.C. Section 1715(b), (d).  It
continued the Fairness Hearing and consideration of the Plaintiffs'
motion until after the Defendants' counsel provided notice under
CAFA.

Upon consideration of the motion, arguments, and records in the
case, Judge Simon finds that the Stipulation is fair, reasonable,
and adequate to the Class Members.

Upon the Effective Date, each and all of the Lead Plaintiffs and
the Class Members, on behalf of themselves and their respective
heirs, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns and all
persons acting in concert with any such person shall, with respect
to each and every Released Claim, waive, release, forever
discharge, and dismiss, with prejudice, and agree not to institute,
maintain, or prosecute any or all Released Claims against any or
all of the Released Persons, and will be permanently and finally
enjoined, without the necessity of posting a bond, from commencing
or prosecuting any actions or other proceedings asserting any of
the Released Claims either directly, indirectly, or
representatively against any of the Released Persons or the Defense
Counsel.

Upon the Effective Date, each of the Released Persons will be
deemed to have, and by operation of the Opinion and Order and the
concurrently-filed Judgment will have, fully, finally, and forever
released, relinquished and discharged Lead Plaintiffs, each and all
of the Class Members, and their attorneys (including, without
limitation, Lead Counsel), employees, heirs, successors, and
assigns from all claims (including, without limitation, Unknown
Claims) arising out of, relating to, or in connection with, the
institution, prosecution, assertion, settlement or, resolution of
the Action and/or the Action. Claims to enforce the Settlement are
not released.

Upon the Effective Date, the Lead Plaintiffs and all the Class
Members and anyone claiming through or on behalf of any of them,
are forever barred and enjoined from commencing, instituting, or
continuing to prosecute any action or proceeding in any court of
law or equity, arbitration tribunal, administrative forum, or other
forum of any kind, asserting any of the Released Claims against any
of the Released Parties, and each of them.

Next, the Judge perceives no special circumstances justifying an
upward departure from the benchmark fee of 25%.  Although the
litigation lasted three years, the time and effort expended by the
Lead Counsel was not unusual.  The only motion litigated was the
Defendants' motion to dismiss, although the Court and the parties
also informally addressed discovery matters three times.  Other
cases involve much more effort, including litigating class
certification, motions for summary judgment, and sometimes
litigating appeals to the Ninth Circuit or even the Supreme Court.

The legal and factual issues are not particularly complex, there
are no issues of first impression or issues that would clarify
certain laws, and the risks involved were no greater than the
average case alleging a violation of Section 14(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act.  Although the Judge does not dispute the
skill of the Plaintiffs' counsel, as it was not a particularly
unusual Section 14(a) case and there was not any unusual litigation
efforts, the counsel has not shown exceptional skill or quality of
work to warrant a departure from the 25% benchmark.

The counsel is, however, experienced, did obtain a good result in
light of the circumstances, does have a lodestar that likely is
higher than a 25% fee award, and no class member objected to the
settlement or the fee award.  Thus, the Judge finds that a downward
adjustment to the benchmark fee award is also not warranted and
that 25% of the common fund is a reasonable fee award.  The Court
therefore awards attorney's fees in the amount of 25% of the
Settlement Fund -- $764,750.

The Court acknowledges that it results in a greater negative
multiplier than would the 33.33% fee requested by the Plaintiff.
Nonetheless, the Court finds that the fee of $764,750 is fair,
reasonable, and adequate compensation given all the circumstances
of the case.

Finally, the Lead Plaintiffs request service, or incentive, awards
in the amount of $15,000 to Plaintiff Azar and $7,500 to Plaintiff
Alfange.  As an alternative request, the Plaintiffs withdraw the
request for Plaintiff Alfange and request $3,000 for Plaintiff
Azar.  The Court finds Plaintiff Azar provides no information in
his declaration regarding how many days per week on average he
works as a background actor, let alone whether his work on this
case precluded any acting work.  No evidence shows what portion of
the 120 hours spent working on the litigation reasonably might have
been an "earning opportunity" that he lost.  That Plaintiff Azar
would have been available to work is not enough if the earning
opportunity would not have been available.

The Court thus grants in part the motion for attorney's fees,
expenses, and service awards.  Any appeal or any challenge
affecting his decisions regarding the attorney's fees, expenses,
and service awards will in no way disturb or affect the finality of
the concurrently-filed Judgment.

In sum, Judge Simon approved the Class Action Settlement and Plan
of Allocation.  The Plaintiffs' counsel are awarded $764,750 in
attorney's fees and $317,922.40 in expenses, to be paid from the
Settlement Fund.  The Lead Plaintiffs' request for service or
incentive awards is denied.

The case is dismissed, but the Court retains jurisdiction over the
parties and all matters relating to the Action and the Stipulation,
including the administration, interpretation, construction,
effectuation, enforcement, and consummation of the Settlement and
the Opinion and Order.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Dec. 31, 2019 Opinion &
Order is available at https://is.gd/MYU4iR from Leagle.com.

Elia Azar, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Rocco, Levi & Korsinsky, LLP, pro
hac vice, Aurelia J. Erickson -- aurelia@law7555.com -- McGaughey
Erickson, Kristen Le O'Connor, Johnson Fistel, LLP, pro hac vice,
Sebastiano Tornatore, Levi & Korsinsky, LLP, pro hac vice, Shannon
L. Hopkins -- shopkins@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky, LLP, pro hac
vice, W. Scott Holleman -- Scott@johnsonandweaver.com -- Johnson
Fistel, LLP, pro hac vice & Robert J. McGaughey -- bob@law7555.com
-- McGaughey Erickson.

Dean Alfrange, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Aurelia J. Erickson, McGaughey
Erickson, Kristen Le O'Connor, Johnson Fistel, LLP, pro hac vice,
W. Scott Holleman, Johnson Fistel, LLP, pro hac vice, Shannon L.
Hopkins, Levi & Korsinsky, LLP & Robert J. McGaughey, McGaughey
Erickson.

Blount International Inc., Andrew C. Clarke, Nelda J. Connors, E.
Daniel James & Harold E. Layman, Defendants, represented by Gary A.
Bornstein -- bornstein@cravath.com -- Cravath. Swaine & Moore LLP,
pro hac vice, Joshua M. Sasaki, Miller Nash Graham & Dunn LLP,
Nicole D. Valente, Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, pro hac vice,
Alison B. Miller -- amiller@hsgllp.com -- Cravath, Swaine & Moore
LLP, pro hac vice, Ian Christy -- ian.christy@millernash.com --
Miller Nash Graham & Dunn LLP & Robert M. Tanner, Cravath, Swaine &
Moore, pro hac vice.

Joshua L. Collins & David A. Willmott, Defendants, represented by
B. John Casey, Stoel Rives LLP, Jay P. Lefkowitz, Kirkland & Ellis
LLP, pro hac vice, Gary A. Bornstein, Cravath. Swaine & Moore LLP &
Nathaniel Kritzer, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, pro hac vice.

Robert E. Beasley, Jr., Ronald Cami, Max L. Lukens & Daniel J.
Obringer, Defendants, represented by Lawrence J. Portnoy, Davis
Polk & Wardwell LLP, Rebecca L. Martin, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP,
pro hac vice, Gary A. Bornstein, Cravath. Swaine & Moore LLP, Ian
Christy, Miller Nash Graham & Dunn LLP & Joshua M. Sasaki, Miller
Nash Graham & Dunn LLP.


CANOPY GROWTH: 9 U.S. Law Firms Launch Cannabis Class Actions
-------------------------------------------------------------
Graham Slaughter, writing for CTV News, reports that at least nine
U.S. law firms have launched proposed class-action lawsuits in
American courts against three major Canadian cannabis producers:
Canopy Growth, Aurora Cannabis and Hexo Corp. While they vary from
case-to-case, the allegations include releasing misleading
inventory information and overstating the potential for sales.

To make matters worse for the industry, cannabis stocks have
dropped 75 per cent in the past two years, down to US$44 per share
currently compared to US$180 in Jan. 2018, according to the global
cannabis stock index.

Whether the proposed class-action lawsuits will discourage
investors from backing Canadian cannabis is "very hard to say,"
according to Toronto-based lawyer Paul-Erik Veel.

"That's the million dollar question," Veel, a partner at Lenczner
Slaght, told CTV's Your Morning on Feb. 10.

"To some extent, class-action lawsuits are a normal part of a
growing industry. This isn't unique to cannabis. All industries see
them. But certainly it's going to be something that's going to
cause investors to think twice before they invest in this
industry."

The proposed class-action cases raise deeper questions about the
strength of the burgeoning industry. Aurora Cannabis – one of the
world's largest cannabis companies with operations in 25 countries
-- eliminated 500 positions in Canada and announced the sudden
retirement of its CEO Terry Booth. Days before, Nanaimo-based
Tilray Inc. laid off 10 per cent of its workforce.

For the moment the class-action cases are limited to the U.S. But
it's possible that similar cases could be filed in Canada, Veel
said.

"In Canada, these types of issues are burbling. Certainly the very
same things these companies are being sued for in the U.S. they can
be sued for in Canada. So I think this is something that we could
see potentially coming down the pipeline," he said.

COMPANIES ACCUSED OF MISLEADING MARKET

In January, U.S. firm Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP filed a
class-action suit against Aurora Cannabis alleging, among other
things, that the company "failed to disclose that they had
materially overstated the demand and potential market for Aurora's
consumer cannabis products."

Earlier in January, New-York based Pawar Law Group filed a similar
class-action lawsuit alleging that Hexo Corp., based in Ottawa,
cultivated cannabis that was not licensed by Health Canada and
released public statements that were "materially false and
misleading at all relevant times."

Canopy Growth is the subject of a proposed class-action case by
Rosen Law Firm alleging, in part, that the company "exaggerated
and/or overestimated the potential market for its products in
Canadian retail stores."

But even if the cases do make it to court, the allegations will
still need to be proven before a judge, Veel said.

"It may be that the companies were doing the very best that they
could with the information they had at the time and they just
thought they were going to do better than they did and they got it
wrong in hindsight. It still remains to be seen whether any of
these claims actually have any merit."

BLACK-MARKET POT STILL CHEAPER: REPORT

Experts say the cannabis industry needs to adjust its prices after
a recent Statistics Canada report found that illegal cannabis is
significantly cheaper than legal cannabis.

According to crowdsourced data collected by the government agency
and released in January, the average price of legal cannabis
increased to $10.30 per gram versus $5.73 per gram for black-market
pot. Those figures reflect prices between October and December
2019.

Delays in opening new dispensaries in Ontario may also be playing a
role.
Aphria Inc., a cannabis company based in Leamington, Ont., blamed
the Ontario government's delay in approving licenses for new
cannabis stores to its decision to cut its revenue outlook for
2020. The company expects a net revenue of between $575 million and
$625 million, down from $650 to $700 million.

The province recently announced that it would drop its
lottery-based system to allowing select business owners to open pot
stores. Anyone hoping to open a new dispensary may need to wait
until the spring. [GN]


CARRIBANA'S BAR: Bourassa Seeks Unpaid Wages for Wait Staff
-----------------------------------------------------------
The case, KENNEDY BOURASSA, individually and on behalf of all other
similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff v. CARRIBANA'S BAR &
GRILL, INC., DBA DARK HORSE TAVERN, Defendant, Case No. 2020CH02540
(Ill. Cir., Cook Cty., February 28, 2020), arises from Defendant's
alleged failure to pay overtime wages in violation of the Fair
Labor Standards Act.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a waitress approximately
April 2017 to March 2018.

According to the complaint, Plaintiff began to receive paychecks
that were not reflective of the total amount owed to her by
Defendant from approximately October 2017 to March 2018. The
management did not response to Plaintiff when he tried to reach out
to complain. However, on June 14, 2019, Plaintiff received an
insufficient check worth $280 from Defendant, but it did not
reflect the back-pay amount that Plaintiff was owed, thereby
prompting Plaintiff to file the complaint.

The complaint asserts these claims:
     
     -- Breach of contract by breaching their contractual
obligations with Plaintiff;
     
     -- Unjust enrichment by using and benefiting Plaintiff's
labor;

     -- Common law fraud since Defendant made a false statement
which made Plaintiff suffered damages;

     -- Fraud in the inducement by making a false representation of
material fact with the purpose of inducing another party to act or
to refrain from acting;

     -- A promissory estoppel by making an unambiguous promise to
Plaintiff and which Plaintiff has relied on to its detriment; and

     -- Punitive damages due to Defendant's lack of diligence in
providing payment to Plaintiff and other similarly situated.

Carribana's Bar & Grill, Inc. is a business place in Cook County,
Illinois that serves drinks and grilled foods to customers. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Nathaniel A. Frenkel, Esq.
          659 W. Randolp St., #602
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Tel: 847-612-7632
          Email: Nathanielafrenkel@gmail.com



CATHOLIC DIOCESE: Sex Abuse Class Suit Seeks to Add More Dioceses
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Deb Erdley, writing for TRIBLIVE, reports that lawyers in a class
action suit trying to force the Catholic Diocese of Pittsburgh to
open its clergy abuse archives expanded their campaign to include
the Greensburg, Harrisburg and Altoona-Johnstown dioceses as well
as the Archdiocese of Philadelphia.

The move comes one month after Allegheny County Common Pleas Court
Judge Christine Ward ruled the lawsuit could move forward with
regard to the Pittsburgh diocese.

The suit was filed in September 2018 by a pair of Pittsburgh
diocese families with children in the church's parochial schools.
It seeks the disclosure of records, rather than monetary awards.

The families who filed the complaint contend that records that were
made public in a 2018 Pennsylvania grand jury report contained
gaping holes that suggest the church failed to meet mandatory
reporting laws and poses a public nuisance.

Now, they want the court to include the other dioceses and
archdiocese in an amended complaint that includes families and
abuse survivors of those church bodies.

Ward has yet to issue a ruling on the amended complaint.

A spokeswoman for the Harrisburg diocese said its lawyers are
reviewing the complaint.

"The Diocese of Harrisburg would note that we provided hundreds of
thousands of documents to the Pennsylvania Attorney General's
Office as part of the Grand Jury investigation into clergy-child
sexual abuse. Those documents were summarized and made available as
part of a comprehensive report issued by the Commonwealth," Rachel
A. Bryson said.

Diocesan spokesmen in Greensburg, Altoona-Johnstown and
Philadelphia did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

The claimants from the Greensburg diocese include unnamed abuse
survivors from Uniontown and Torrance.

Lawyer Timothy Hale, who is representing the families seeking
records, said he plans to ask Ward for permission to add additional
survivors and families from the Erie, Scranton and Allentown
dioceses.

Hale previously filed suits in California in cases that forced the
Catholic Church and the Boy Scouts of America to release files that
named hundreds of alleged child predators. [GN]


CENTRAL EUROPEAN: Rigrodsky & Long Files Class Action in Del.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Rigrodsky & Long, P.A. on Feb. 10 disclosed that it has filed a
class action complaint in the United States District Court for the
District of Delaware on behalf of holders of Central European Media
Enterprises Ltd. ("Central European Media" or the "Company")
(NASDAQ GS: CETV) common stock in connection with the proposed
acquisition of Central European Media by affiliates of PPF Group
N.V. (the "Buyers") announced on October 27, 2019 (the
"Complaint").  The Complaint, which alleges violations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 against Central European Media and
its Board of Directors (the "Board"), is captioned Sabatini v.
Central European Media Enterprises Ltd., Case No. 1:20-cv-00087 (D.
Del.).

If you wish to discuss this action or have any questions concerning
this notice or your rights or interests, please contact plaintiff's
counsel, Seth D. Rigrodsky or Gina M. Serra at Rigrodsky & Long,
P.A., 300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220, Wilmington, DE 19801, by
telephone at (888) 969-4242, by e-mail at info@rl-legal.com, or at
http://rigrodskylong.com/contact-us/.

On October 27, 2019, Central European Media entered into an
agreement and plan of merger (the "Merger Agreement") with the
Buyers.  Pursuant to the terms of the Merger Agreement,
shareholders of Central European Media will receive $4.58 in cash
for each share of Central European Media common stock they own (the
"Proposed Transaction").

Among other things, the Complaint alleges that, in an attempt to
secure shareholder support for the Proposed Transaction, defendants
issued materially incomplete disclosures in a proxy statement (the
"Proxy Statement") filed with the United States Securities and
Exchange Commission.  The Complaint alleges that the Proxy
Statement omits material information with respect to, among other
things, the Company's financial projections and the analyses
performed by Central European Media's financial advisor. The
Complaint seeks injunctive and equitable relief and damages on
behalf of holders of Central European Media common stock.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than April 10, 2020.  A lead plaintiff is a representative
party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation.  Any member of the proposed class may move the Court to
serve as lead plaintiff through counsel of their choice, or may
choose to do nothing and remain an absent class member.

Rigrodsky & Long, P.A., with offices in Delaware and New York, has
recovered hundreds of millions of dollars on behalf of investors
and achieved substantial corporate governance reforms in securities
fraud and corporate class actions nationwide.

Attorney advertising.  Prior results do not guarantee a similar
outcome. [GN]


CHAMPION PETFOODS: Krosnick & Weir Opinions Excluded in Weaver Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SCOTT WEAVER, Plaintiff, v. CHAMPION PETFOODS USA INC.
and CHAMPION PETFOODS LP, Defendants, Case No. 18-CV-1996-JPS-JPS
(E.D. Wis.), Judge J.P. Stadtmueller of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Wisconsin (i) granted the Defendants'
motion to exclude the opinions of Jon Krosnick and Colin Weir; (ii)
denied the Defendants' motion for summary judgment; (iii) denied
the Plaintiff's motion for class certification; and (iv) granted
the parties' motions to restrict documents.

The case is a class action alleging that the Defendants have
marketed their dog foods as being natural and of high-quality, and
sold them at a premium price, when their advertisements were
misleading at best, meaning that the products' price was unfairly
inflated.  

The Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking
dismissal of the case in its entirety.  The Plaintiff has filed his
own motion for class certification.  The parties have also moved to
exclude the opinions of various experts pursuant to Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

Judge Stadtmueller addresses only one such motion -- the
Defendants' motion to exclude two of the Plaintiff's damages
experts, Jon Krosnick and Colin Weir.  The Judge sees the motion is
pivotal to the case and may drastically change the parties'
approaches to the litigation moving forward.

Krosnick is an expert in creating and conducting surveys.  In the
case, he was hired by the Plaintiff to conduct two.  The first,
called the damages survey, was aimed to test how consumers'
purchasing decisions would change when the allegedly misleading
statements on the Defendants' product packaging were corrected.
The offending statements, which include the phrases "Biologically
Appropriate," "Fresh Regional Ingredients," and "Never Outsourced,"
are referred to in shorthand as BAFRINO.  Krosnick determined that
those who saw more corrective statements were less willing to pay
the market price of the products; the respondents who saw one
statement thought they would pay 10% less, and those who read all
eight would pay almost 60% less.

Krosnick's data was provided to Weir, an economist, to calculate
damages on a class-wide basis.  Weir took the sales figures for the
subject products in Wisconsin for the class period and multiplied
them by the diminution-in-value percentage obtained from
respondents who had seen seven or eight of the corrective
statements.  Weir determined that the class damages, namely their
overpayment to the Defendants based on the unjustified premium
price they were charged, stands at almost $9 million.

The second survey tested the consumers' reaction to the potential
presence of pentobarbital in the products.  It was conducted
similarly to the damages survey, except Krosnick concluded that
there was no need to analyze diminution-in-value; it is entirely
illegal to sell pentobarbital-laced dog food.  Weir calculated that
consumers would be entitled to approximately $2.25 million as a
full refund for the purchase price of the products which had a risk
of pentobarbital. Because they are not materially different for
present purposes, the Judge refers to the surveys in the singular
as the Survey.

The Judge concludes that Krosnick and his survey evidence must be
excluded under the Daubert and FRE 702 standards.  He begins by
noting a preliminary issue with the Plaintiff's claims at this
juncture.  Five of the eight corrective statements apply to
allegations regarding heavy metal levels in the Defendants'
products.  The Judge has already dismissed the heavy metal
allegations in deciding the Defendant's motion to dismiss.  The
Plaintiff nevertheless re-pleaded comparable allegations in his
operative amended complaint.  

The Plaintiff's only avenue to bring heavy metals back into this
case is a successful appeal reversing the Court's decision on the
motion to dismiss.  Plaintiff's defiance of the Court's orders is
neither advisable nor an effective strategy.  Even if the Survey
were not entirely inadmissible, the portions relating to heavy
metals would certainly be excluded.

In light of the foregoing, the Court must exclude Krosnick's
opinion and his Survey evidence.  Weir's calculations are entirely
founded on the Survey results.  With the exclusion of those results
from the case, Weir's opinion must go as well.  Without these two
opinions, the parties' approach to class certification, summary
judgment, and the litigation generally will likely be significantly
altered.  The Judge will, therefore, deny the pending motions for
summary judgment and class certification without prejudice.  He
will also grant various pending motions to restrict documents.

Accordingly, Judge Stadtmueller granted the Defendants' motion to
exclude the opinions of Jon Krosnick and Colin Weir.  The opinions
of Jon Krosnick and Colin Weir be and the same are excluded from
the evidence in the case.  The Judge denied without prejudice (i)
the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, and (ii) the
Plaintiff's motion for class certification.  The Judge granted the
parties' motions to restrict certain documents (Docket #40, #49,
#59, #77, and #86).

A full-text copy of the District Court's Dec. 31, 2019 Order is
available at https://is.gd/iMvGDq from Leagle.com.

Scott Weaver, Plaintiff, represented by Katherine Van Dyck --
kvandyck@cuneolaw.com -- Cuneo Gilbert & Laduca LLP, Charles
Laduca
-- charlesl@cuneolaw.com -- Cuneo Gilbert & Laduca LLP, Daniel E.
Gustafson, Gustafson Gluek PLLC, 120 South 6th Street, Suite 2600,
Minneapolis, MN 55402, Joseph J. Depalma --
jdepalma@litedepalma.com -- Lite Depalma Greenberg LLC, Karla M.
Gluek, Gustafson Gluek PLLC, 120 South 6th Street, Suite 2600,
Minneapolis, MN 55402, Kevin A. Seely -- kseely@robbinsarroyo.com
-- Robbins Arroyo LLP, Raina C. Borrelli, Gustafson Gluek PLLC,
120
South 6th Street, Suite 2600, Minneapolis, MN 55402, Rebecca A.
Peterson, Lockridge Grindal Nauen PLLP,

Champion Petfoods USA Inc & Champion Petfoods LP, Defendants,
represented by David A. Coulson -- coulsond@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg
Traurig LLP, Derek J. Waterstreet -- jaolivieri@michaelbest.com --
Michael Best & Friedrich, Mark E. Schmidt --
mjschmitt@michaelbest.com -- Michael Best & Friedrich & Susan E.
Lovern -- slovern@vonbriesen.com -- Michael Best & Friedrich.

JBS USA Food Company, Interested Party, represented by Sarah L.
Brew -- sarah.brew@FaegreBD.com -- Faegre & Benson LLP.


CHEESE MERCHANTS: Wypych Sues Over Unlawful Use of Biometric Data
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Zack Wypych, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. CHEESE MERCHANTS OF AMERICA, L.L.C., Case No.
2020CH02437 (Ill. Cir., Cook Cty., Feb. 27, 2020), seeks to put a
stop to the Defendant's unlawful collection, use, and storage of
the Plaintiff's and the putative Class members' sensitive biometric
data.

According to the complaint, while there are tremendous benefits to
using biometric time clocks and key access systems in the
workplace, there are also serious risks. Recognizing the need to
protect its citizens from situations like these, Illinois enacted
the Biometric Information Privacy Act, specifically to regulate
companies that collect and store Illinois citizens' biometrics,
such as fingerprints. Despite this law, the Plaintiff notes, the
Defendant disregarded its employees' statutorily protected privacy
rights and unlawfully collects, stores, and uses their biometric
data in violation of the BIPA.

The Defendant have violated (and continues to violate) the BIPA
because it did not: Properly inform Plaintiff and the Class members
in writing of the specific purpose and length of time for which
their hand geometry were being collected, stored, and used, as
required by the BIPA; Provide a publicly available retention
schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying Plaintiffs and
the Class's hand geometry, as required by the BIPA; nor Receive a
written release from Plaintiff or the members of the Class to
collect, capture, or otherwise obtain hand geometry, as required by
the BIPA, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff is a natural person and citizen of the State of
Illinois.

Cheese Merchants is a premium cheese processing and packaging
company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David Fish, Esq.
          Mara Baltabols, Esq.
          John Kunze, Esq.
          THE FISH LAW FIRM, P.C.
          200 East Fifth Avenue, Suite 123
          Naperville, IL 60563
          Phone: 630.355.7590
          Fax: 630.778.0400
          Email: dfish@fishlawfirm.com
                 mara@fishlawfirm.com
                 kunze@fishlawfirm.com


CIRCLE GROUP: Underpays Construction Workers, Berrios et al. Say
----------------------------------------------------------------
FIDEL BERRIOS, MIGUEL MARTINEZ, JOSE LOPEZ PINEDA, ANTONIO LEYBA,
and CRISTIAN CORNEJO, individually and on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. THE CIRCLE GROUP, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 1:20-cv-00230 (E.D. Va., February 28, 2020), is
an individual and collective action complaint against Defendant for
its alleged failure to pay its construction workers their legally
mandated wages in violation of Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938.

Plaintiffs were employed by Defendants in 2019 to work on a
construction project at Herndon High School in Herndon, Virginia.

According to the complaint, Plaintiffs were compensated an hourly
rate while employed by Defendant at the Project. However, they were
not paid at the time and a half overtime rate for frequently
working in excess of forty hours per week.

Plaintiffs seek to recover all unpaid wages and unpaid overtime
wages, plus an equal amount in liquidated damages, attorneys' fees,
litigation expenses, costs, and any other and further relief that
the Court deems appropriate.

The Circle Group, LLC is an interior specialty contractor
headquartered in Georgia that provides construction services
throughout the Southern U.S. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Rachel Nadas, Esq.
          Matthew K. Handley, Esq.
          HANDLEY FARAH & ANDERSON PLLC
          777 6th Street, NW-Eleventh Floor
          Washington, DC 20001
          Tel: 202-899-2991
          Email: rnadas@hfajustice.com

                - and -

          Matthew B. Kaplan, Esq.
          THE KAPLAN LAW FIRM
          1100 N Glebe Rd, Suite 1010
          Arlington, VA 22201
          Tel: (703)665-9529
          Email: mbkaplan@thekaplanlawfirm.com


CLARK COUNTY, NV: Allison Has Until Today to Submit Complaint
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RONALD JOSEPH ALLISON, Plaintiff, v. CLARK COUNTY
DETENTION CENTER, Defendant, Case No. 2:20-cv-00216-RFB-BNW (D.
Nev.), Magistrate Judge Brenda Weksler of the U.S. District Court
for the District of Nevada granted the Plaintiff 30 days from the
date of the Order to submit a complaint to the Court.

The Plaintiff, who is an inmate in the custody of the Clark County
Detention Center ("CCDC"), has filed a Class Action for Federal
Justice.  He has not filed a complaint or an application to proceed
in forma pauperis in the matter.  

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3, a civil action is
commenced by filing a complaint with the court.  As such, the
Magistrate Judge will grant the Plaintiff 30 days from the date of
the Order to submit a complaint to the Court.

Under 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(a)(2) and Local Rule LSR 1-2, the
Plaintiff must complete an application to proceed in forma pauperis
and attach both an inmate account statement for the past six months
and a properly executed financial certificate.  He will be granted
an opportunity to file an application to proceed in forma pauperis,
or in the alternative, pay the full filing fee for the action.  If
the Plaintiff chooses to file an application to proceed in forma
pauperis he must file a fully complete application to proceed in
forma pauperis, including an inmate account statement for the past
six months and a properly executed financial certificate.

For the foregoing reasons, Magistrate Judge Weksler ordered the
Clerk of the Court to send the Plaintiff the approved form
application to proceed in forma pauperis by a prisoner, as well as
the document entitled information and instructions for filing an in
forma pauperis application.

Within 30 days from the date of the Order, the Plaintiff must
either: (1) file a fully complete application to proceed in forma
pauperis, on the correct form with complete financial attachments;
or (2) pay the full $400 fee for filing a civil action (which
includes the $350 filing fee and the $50 administrative fee).

The Plaintiff will submit a complaint to the Court within 30 days
from the date of the Order.

The Clerk of the Court will send to the Plaintiff the approved form
for filing a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 complaint and instructions for
the same.  He must follow the instructions on the form and must
identify the defendants, including which Defendants he is suing for
each claim.  Further, the Clerk of the Court will also send the
Plaintiff a copy of his Class Action for Federal Justice.

If the Plaintiff does not timely comply with the Order, dismissal
of the action may result.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 5, 2020 Order is available at
https://is.gd/Nk1acM from Leagle.com.

Ronald Joseph Allison, Plaintiff, pro se.


CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY: Faces Closure, Students File Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------------
Lisa Balick, writing for KOIN 6 News, reports that citing "years of
mounting financial challenges, and a challenging and changing
educational landscape," Concordia University will cease operations
after the Spring 2020 semester.

The Board of Regents approved on Feb. 7 and posted it to their
website. Students were alerted by a text message Feb. 10 before a
campus-wide meeting was held at 10 a.m.

"We woke up to a text message at 6 a.m.--a mass message from our
school saying, 'Mandatory meeting at 10 a.m. and all classes are
canceled,'" said junior Sami Howard.

The decision was due to declining enrollment and financial losses,
school leaders said. Tuition alone at the private Lutheran
university is more than $30,000 per year.

"Four years ago we were just over 8000 students," said Interim
President Thomas Reis. "Now we're just over 5000." He said "the
biggest driver" in the enrollment drop is competition and a
"challenging online market."

"It's just hard because I definitely feel like, with such a small
campus like this, a lot of us feel like we can call this place
home. And we really built a family here," said another student in
reaction to the news.

There are about 340 full- and part-time employees at Concordia
University, including more than 200 faculty members. Students are
scrambling to find out where else they can attend in the fall and
whether their credits will transfer.

"Sometimes credits are hard to transfer from small liberal arts
schools, and that's what I'm worried about," said Howard.

It's a tough break for student-athletes who depend on their
scholarships to be able to afford college.

"Our coaches finish up our 2020 class, so now all those people have
to find new homes," said university student Adrianna Rupright. "And
all the people who are on the team who still have eligibility
left—they still have to find homes."

Officials are working with accrediting bodies to help current
students continue at a new school. Portland State University said
it's working with Concordia to help students. Concordia Law school
in Boise, Idaho, is affiliated with the university and is expected
to remain open while officials work to find a new university with
which to join forces.

George Fox University offers assistance

George Fox University has announced that the institution will offer
aid to any Concordia University students seeking enrollment at the
school.

Undergraduate students who transfer to GFU are eligible for a
$5,000 automatic grant that can be renewed annually, in addition to
other aid already available, according to their website.
Application fees will be waived, and students' existing credits
will be accepted. Those wishing to transfer will also go through an
expedited application process.

Students in adult degree or graduate programs are also eligible for
the expedited application process and the fee waiver. The
university said resources are available for students to map out the
rest of their education pathways.

Class-Action Lawsuit

Following the Feb. 10 announcement of the university's closure, a
class-action lawsuit was filed on behalf of Concordia University
students. The documents filed at the Multnomah County Circut Court
make two claims against the private school: unlawful trade
practices and unjust enrichment.

The lawsuit states:

"Concordia University misled hundreds of students about its
financial condition, and collected tuition in 2020 that students
would not have paid had the students known the truth about
Concordia University's looming closure. Now many Concordia
University students are left unable to graduate and with credits
that cannot be directly transferred for credits of equal value at a
different university."

The university's announcement marks the fourth private university
closure in the Portland area, including Marylhurst University.
Another question yet to be answered is what will happen to the
partnership between Concordia and the nearby Faubion Elementary
School. The public school will stay open, but there are questions
about what will happen to the joint program on campus.

Concordia University, the state's largest private university, has
been in operation since 1905. It's expected the owners of the
property, the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, will sell the 24-acre
campus, which sits in the middle of a residential neighborhood.

The last commencement ceremony is set for April 25 for the Portland
campus and May 2 for the Concordia University School of Law.

This article was written with contributions from the Associated
Press. [GN]


D&C INSPECTION: Morgan Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
-------------------------------------------------------------
DAVID MORGAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. D&C INSPECTION SERVICES, INC., Case No. 4:20-cv-00673
(W.D. Tex., Feb. 26, 2020), seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages
and other damages from D&C under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

D&C employs inspector personnel, like Mr. Morgan, to carry out its
work. Mr. Morgan, and the other workers like him, were typically
scheduled for 10-hour shifts, as many as 7 days a week, for weeks
at a time, but D&C does not pay these workers overtime for hours
worked in excess of 40 hours in a single workweek. Instead, D&C
paid Morgan, and other workers like him, the same hourly rate for
all hours worked, including those in excess of 40 in a workweek,
says the complaint.

D&C was founded in 1991. The Company's line of business includes
providing various business services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
          Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP, Esq.
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: 713-352-1100
          Facsimile: 713-352-3300
          E-mail: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
                  adunlap@mybackwages.com

               - and -

          Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
          BRUCKNER BURCH, P.L.L.C.
          8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: 713-877-8788
          Facsimile: 713-877-8065
          E-mail: rburch@brucknerburch.com


D&M CARRIERS: Galloway Labor Suit Removed to C.D. Cal.
------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned Clifford Galloway and Timothy Baker,
individuals, on behalf of themselves, and on behalf of all persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. D&M Carriers, LLC and Does 1
through 50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. CIVDS1935995 (Cal.
Super., November 27, 2019), was removed to California Central
District Court on January 27, 2020 under Case No. 20-cv-00178.

Galloway and Baker seek redress for failure to provide meal and
rest breaks, failure to provide itemized wage statements, interest
thereon at the statutory rate, actual damages, all wages due
terminated employees, costs of suit, prejudgment interest and such
other and further relief pursuant to the California Labor Code and
applicable Industrial Welfare Commission wage orders. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Norman B. Blumenthal, Esq.
      Kyle R. Nordrehaug, Esq.
      Aparajit Bhowmik, Esq.
      BLUMENTHAL NORDREHAUG BHOWMIK DE BLOUW LLP
      2255 Calle Clara
      La Jolla, CA 92037
      Telephone: (858) 551-1223
      Facsimile: (858) 551-1232
      Website: www.bamlawca.com

D&M Carriers is represented by:

      Christopher C. McNatt, Jr., Esq.
      SCOPELITIS, GARVIN, LIGHT, HANSON & FEARY, LLP
      2 North Lake Avenue, Suite 560
      Pasadena, CA 91101
      Tel: (626) 795-4700
      Fax: (626) 795-4790
      Email: cmcnatt@scopelitis.com

             - and -

      James A. Eckhart, Esq.
      SCOPELITIS, GARVIN, LIGHT, HANSON & FEARY, P.C.
      10 West Market Street, Suite 1400
      Indianapolis, IN 46204
      Tel: (317) 637-1777
      Fax: (317) 687-2414
      Email: jeckhart@scopelitis.com


DAVID BURKE 59: Hedges Sues in S.D. New York Over ADA Violation
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against David Burke 59 Corp.
The case is styled as Donna Hedges, for herself and on behalf of
all other persons similarly situated v. David Burke 59 Corp., Case
No. 1:20-cv-01752 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 27, 2020).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

David Burke 59 Corp. operates a restaurant in New York City.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin Alexander Zeller, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF JUSTIN A. ZELLER, P.C.
          277 Broadway, Suite 408
          New York, NY 10007
          Phone: (212) 229-2249
          Fax: (212) 229-2246
          Email: jazeller@zellerlegal.com


DENEFITS LLC: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Brow Alleges
------------------------------------------------------
RAMONA BROWN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. DENEFITS, LLC, Defendant, Case 8:20-cv-00305
(C.D. Cal., Feb. 14, 2020) seeks to stop the Defendants' practice
of making unsolicited calls.

Denefits, LLC is a US based Healthcare Financing Company that
provides financing services patients. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Abbas Kazerounian, Esq.
          KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC
          245 Fischer Avenue, Unit D1
          Costa Mesa, CA 92626
          Telephone: (800) 400-6808
          Facsimile: (800) 520-5523
          E-mail: ak@kazlg.com

               - and –

          Ryan L. McBride, Esq.
          KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC
          2633 E. Indian School Road, Suite 460
          Phoenix, AZ 85016
          Telephone: (800) 400-6808
          Facsimile: (800) 520-5523
          E-mail: ryan@kazlg.com


DERMIRA INC: Thompson Files Suit Over Sale to Bald Eagle
--------------------------------------------------------
John Thompson, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Dermira, Inc., Eugene A. Bauer, David E.
Cohen, Fred Craves, Matthew Fust, Halley E. Gilbert, Mark Mcdade,
Jake Nunn, William Ringo, Kathleen Sebelius, Thomas G. Wiggans, Eli
Lilly And Company and Bald Eagle Acquisition Corporation,
Defendants, Case No. 20-cv-00132 (D. Del., January 27, 2020) seeks
to enjoin defendants and all persons acting in concert with them
from proceeding with, consummating or closing the acquisition of
Dermira, Inc. by Eli Lilly and Bald Eagle Acquisition Corporation,
rescinding it in the event defendants consummate the merger,
rescissory damages, costs of this action, including reasonable
allowance for plaintiff's attorneys' and experts' fees and such
other and further relief under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.

Bald Eagle Acquisition Corporation will purchase all of Dermira's
outstanding common stock for $18.75 per share in cash.

The complaint alleges that the registration statement for the
merger failed to include all line items used to calculate the
Adjusted Net Revenue, Adjusted Cost of Sales, Adjusted Total
Operating Expenses and Changes in Net Working Capital and Other
Adjustments, a reconciliation of all non-GAAP to GAAP metrics that
should support the fairness opinions needed to make a fully
informed decision whether to vote in favor of the proposed
transaction or seek appraisal needed by the shareholders to make an
informed decision on the merger deal. The Solicitation Statement
also omits the analyses performed by the Dermira's financial
advisors, Citi Group Global Markets Inc. and SVB Leerink LLC in
connection with the proposed transaction, adds the complaint.

Dermira is a biopharmaceutical company offering medical dermatology
for the treatment of chronic skin conditions. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Brian D. Long, Esq.
      Gina M. Serra, Esq.
      RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
      300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
      Wilmington, DE 19801
      Tel: (302) 295-5310
      Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
      Email: bdl@rl-legal.com
             gms@rl-legal.com

             - and -

      Richard A. Maniskas, Esq.
      RM LAW, P.C.
      1055 Westlakes Dr., Ste. 3112
      Berwyn, PA 19312
      Tel: (484) 324-6800
      Email: rm@maniskas.com


DEVACURL: Kozonis & Klinger Files Class Action Over Hair Product
----------------------------------------------------------------
Gwen Aviles, writing for NBC News, reports that former aficionados
of the popular haircare brand DevaCurl are now decrying the
company, alleging that consistent use of its products has led to
adverse symptoms, such as hair loss and damage, scalp itchiness and
burning, curl relaxation and dandruff, and their complaints are now
the basis of a class action lawsuit.

Though Stephanie Mero, a hairstylist based in Florida, began
speaking out against the company in August 2019 when she started
the Facebook group "Hair Damage & Hair Loss from DevaCurl -- You're
Not Crazy or Alone," the social media allegations grew after
influencer Ayesha Malik posted a YouTube video Jan. 31 about her
experiences using the products.

According to Malik, the Facebook group had around 4,000 followers
when she posted her video. As of Feb. 10, the group had more than
35,000 members.

"These products are really expensive, so when you pay the money,
you're expecting high-quality and that's why I feel like I've been
lied to," Malik said in her video, after detailing how her hair,
which she considers a major part of her identity, has lost its
curl. "I've been trying to make this video for so long. I can't
even look at myself."

The emotional impact of hair loss
Consumers aren't sure which DevaCurl products may allegedly be
responsible for their hair damage, as many have used multiple
products from the company, but what's clear is that the damage is
not superficial. For them, the products represent a breach of trust
and the changes in their hair have caused severe emotional
turmoil.

"I'm really insecure about my hair. It's all I talk about and it's
consumed me," Ginger Cox Dixon, 39, told NBC News. "I feel like I
have to wear a hat when I go out because of my hair loss and I cry
about it all the time."

Though Dixon had been using DevaCurl products for nearly 10 years,
it wasn't until after the publication of Malik's video, that she
said she realized that the styling cosmetics could be the cause of
the distressing hair loss, "red rashes" and "intense dandruff"
she'd been experiencing.

"I sat and cried for a good few hours before a sense of relief
washed over me," Dixon said. "Because I finally saw that I wasn't
alone and that I wasn't crazy."

Dixon has been to multiple doctors -- none of whom could pinpoint
with certainty the reason why her hairline was becoming more
pronounced or why her nails kept breaking. They chalked her
symptoms up to stress or female pattern baldness and speculated
that she had thyroid issues. Yet, other than "losing 100 strands of
hair per day" and having to take Benadryl to "numb" her raw scalp,
Dixon said she felt perfectly healthy.

Dixon was not the only DevaCurl devotee to recently connect her
hair loss with the company's products.

Carine Ghm, 21, began using DevaCurl in June because she had heard
friends, family and influencers she respected "rave about their
products." At first, she loved the way they made her hair look.

"Using the products helped me finally come to terms with my curly
hair," Ghm told NBC News. "I was so proud of my hair; everyone
associated me with my curly hair."

Yet, she said, a few months later she began losing clumps of hair
every time she'd shower.

"I started questioning whether it was normal to be losing the
amount of hair I was, but I thought it was because of the weather
changing," Ghm, who recently moved from Miami to Scotland, said. "I
couldn't think of anything else it would be, since I'm so young and
have no preexisting health conditions."

Yet, after other women began publicly criticizing DevaCurl
products, Ghm began to think that her symptoms could be attributed
to the beauty brand.

"I started looking at pictures of me from five months ago and
realized how much fuller my hair was and that I now had a bald
spot," Ghm said. "I got so so scared and so upset, but getting no
answers from DevaCurl is what's scariest to me."

What's next for DevaCurl and its users?
A spokesperson for DevaCurl states that its formulas are "subject
to rigorous and thorough testing" to ensure their safety, but that
to "provide the community with extra reassurance following recent
conversations about curl and scalp health," it will be conducting
additional testing with independent parties.

The company added that it will announce additional measures to
"better understand the concerns that have been shared by the curly
community" and will share additional resources regarding how to
maintain healthy hair.

Yet, some consumers say they plan to take action against DevaCurl.

Brooke Marr, who said she had only used DevaCurl products four
times since purchasing them in December, said she would like to get
involved with a class-action suit against the company and she may
have a chance to. On Feb. 10, Gary Klinger of Kozonis & Klinger
filed a complaint against DevaCurl, accusing the company of
"unambiguously having knowledge of hair loss and irritation" caused
by its products.

Marr said that before using DevaCurl, she "never had issues" with
her hair. Now, she states that she has "red lesions and psoriasis
skin" on her scalp and that she can't wear black because of
"embarrassing" dandruff flakes. She added that she is also in
physical pain from the bumps on her scalp.

"I don't want people to suffer in the way I've suffered," Marr
said. "This has been an eye-opener; no matter the brand or its
reputation, do your research."

Other women in the group say they have filed complaints with the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration, hoping the agency will launch an
investigation into DevaCurl. A spokesperson for the FDA said the
agency cannot discuss specific investigation plans at this time,
but an investigation into a hair care company would not be
unprecedented. In 2016, the FDA announced that it would conduct an
investigation into WEN by Chaz Dean Cleansing Conditioner products
after receiving nearly 2,000 complaints from consumers reporting
hair loss, hair breakage, balding, itching and rashes after using
the products. WEN settled a class action lawsuit for approximately
$26 million.

"The one bright spot in all of this has been seeing people support
each other and giving tips," Marr said. "It's devastating but we
need to stay strong."

The first DevaCurl salon was founded by Lorraine Massey in 1994 in
New York City to give women "curl confidence." The company has
become a cultural phenomenon, especially in recent years as
influencers promoted the products. Some consumers suspect the
company has changed its formulations in recent years, but DevaCurl,
which was acquired by a German company called Henkel in November,
has not announced any adaptations to the make of its products.
[GN]


EQUIALT LLC: Faces Ubinstein Securities Suit Over Ponzi Scheme
--------------------------------------------------------------
STEVEN J. RUBINSTEIN, et al. v. EQUIALT, LLC, et al., Case No.
8:20-cv-00448-WFJ-TGW (M.D. Fla., Feb. 26, 2020), is brought over
violations of securities laws on behalf of the Plaintiffs and a
proposed nationwide class of investors of EquiAlt and its
associated real estate investment funds seeking to recover funds
allegedly misused, commingled, and stolen by the Defendants.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs are some of the largest
individuals, who invested in an alleged EquiAlt Ponzi scheme and
have agreed to bring these claims not only on behalf of themselves,
but also on behalf of all similarly situated investors that were
all promised that substantially all of their money would be used to
purchase real estate in distressed markets in the United States and
that their investments would yield generous returns. Instead,
EquiAlt, EquiAlt's principals and various aiders and abettors,
misappropriated millions of dollars in investor funds for their own
personal use and benefit.

The Plaintiffs contend that EquiAlt and its principals and
officers, along with some very prominent aiders and abettors,
scammed more than 1,100 mostly senior citizens from across the
country of much of their life savings. Most of the investors were
senior citizens, mainly from Florida, Arizona and California, that
all invested and lost more than $170 million dollars in this fraud.
Evidence already uncovered reveals that the Defendants conducted a
classic Ponzi scheme, the Plaintiffs allege.

The Plaintiffs include STEVEN J. RUBINSTEIN and TRACEY F.
RUBINSTEIN, as trustees for THE RUBINSTEIN FAMILY LIVING TRUST
DATED 6/25/2010, and CARY B. TOONE, individually and FBO CARY B.
TOONE IRA, RONALD WEBB, individually and FBO RONALD WEBB IRA,
JUDITH TUGGLE, individually, GEORGIA F. MURPHY, individually,
HAROLD HAMMON, individually and FBO HAROLD HAMMON IRA, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated.

The Defendants include EQUIALT, LLC, an Arizona limited liability
company, EQUIALT FUND, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company,
EQUIALT FUND II, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company, EQUIALT
FUND III, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company, EA SIP, LLC, a
Nevada limited liability company, BRIAN DAVISON, a Florida
individual, BARRY RYBICKI, a Florida individual, TONY JAMES MICHAEL
KELLY, a Florida individual, FAMILY TREE ESTATE PLANNING, LLC, an
Arizona limited liability company, JASON PAUL WOOTEN, an Arizona
individual, TIM LADUCA, an Arizona individual, AMERICAN FINANCIAL
SECURITY, LLC, an Arizona limited liability company, AMERICAN
FINANCIAL INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Arizona limited liability company,
RONALD F. STEVENSON, an Arizona individual, JOSEPH FINANCIAL
INVESTMENT ADVISORS, LLC, a California limited liability company,
and ROBERT JOSEPH ARMIJO, a California individual.

EquiAlt is a Tampa-based real estate firm. Armijo and his company,
Joseph Financial, operated as a sales agent of EquiAlt,
distributing sales materials to solicit investment in EquiAlt.
Joseph Financial and Armijo processed applications for investment
in EquiAlt and engaged in communication with investors regarding
the status of their investments, including the reinvestment of
funds. Joseph Financial and Armijo were paid for their solicitation
efforts.

The EquiAlt Principals controlled EquiAlt, whose primary business
was to directly, or indirectly, manage all of the day-to-day
operations of the Funds including the solicitation of investors,
and all of the Funds' accounting and financial activities. Davison
formed EquiAlt in 2011 and has signature authority over the
company's bank accounts. Rybicki managed EquiAlt's relationship
with various unlicensed sales agents (acting as unregistered
broker-dealers), including the Defendants, who sold the Funds'
securities, communicated with investors, and was otherwise involved
in raising money for the Fund. In marketing materials and through
its website, EquiAlt claims to own a portfolio of
revenue-generating condominiums and single and multi-family homes.
EquiAlt also attracted investors using private placement
memorandums, or "PPMs."[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Adam M. Moskowitz, Esq.
          Adam A. Schwartzbaum, Esq.
          THE MOSKOWITZ LAW FIRM, PLLC
          2 Alhambra Plaza, Suite 601
          Coral Gables, FL 33134
          Telephone: (305) 740-1423
          Facsimile: (786) 298-5737
          E-mail: Adam@moskowitz-law.com
                  Adams@moskowitz-law.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey R. Sonn, Esq.
          SONN LAW GROUP
          One Turnberry Place
          19495 Biscayne Blvd. Suite 607
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Telephone: 305-912-3000
          Facsimile: 786-485-1501
          E-mail: jsonn@sonnlaw.com

               - and -

          Andrew S. Friedman, Esq.
          Francis J. Balint, Jr., Esq.
          BONNETT FAIRBOURN FRIEDMAN & BALINT, P.C.
          2325 E. Camelback Rd., Suite 300
          Phoenix, AZ 85016
          Telephone: (602) 274-1100
          Facsimile: (602) 274-1199
          E-mail: afriedman@BFFB.com
                  fbalint@BFFB.com
                  bking@BFFB.com


EUREKA RESTAURANT: Denial of Arbitration Bid in Cummings Upheld
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of California for the Second District,
Division Six, affirmed the trial court's order denying Eureka's
arbitration petition in the case, JOEL CUMMINGS, Plaintiff and
Respondent, v. EUREKA RESTAURANT GROUP, LLC, Defendant and
Appellant, 2d Civ. No. B294120 (Cal. App.).

Cummings worked at Eureka's Santa Barbara restaurant from February
2016 to June 2017.  In 2018, he brought a class action lawsuit
alleging that Eureka did not provide meal periods, rest periods,
accurate wage statements, or pay all wages owed upon termination.
He makes an unfair competition claim and seeks civil penalties.

Eureka petitioned to compel contractual arbitration.  Eureka's
declarations state that it uses an electronic system to recruit
employees. Job seekers apply online and consent to electronically
access, review and sign documents.  Candidates create an account
with a unique username and password and agree to keep their
credentials confidential.  Eureka cannot reset passwords or access
these accounts.

New hires complete their employment documentation on a computer at
the restaurant.  They log in with their username and password and
fill in biographical and tax information.  The documents include an
arbitration agreement and arbitration rules and procedures.  A
print-out shows Cummings's e-signature on an arbitration agreement
under his username "Joelkillsit."  New employees who sign the
Agreement waive their right to a jury trial or to bring a class
action; those who do not wish to arbitrate may sign an "opt out"
clause.

Cummings opposed the arbitration petition, denying that he e-signed
the Agreement.  He declared that he went to the restaurant to
complete the electronic documentation.  After he started the
process, but before he reached the screen with the Agreement,
Eureka's manager Caitlin Lyons gave him a copy of the food menu to
study and asked him to write down his username and password so she
could complete his electronic "paperwork."  Cummings denies
e-signing the Agreement or authorizing Lyons to apply his
e-signature.  He asserts that no eyewitness saw him press a button
to e-sign the Agreement.

In rebuttal, Caitlin Lyons declared that she initiated Cummings's
online paperwork and received emails indicating he completed it.
She did not ask Cummings for his username or password and he did
not supply them.  She did not access his account, sign documents on
his behalf, or ask Cummings to study the menu.

In a written decision, the court stated that someone clicked the
software buttons to express agreement to the arbitration agreement.
It was either Cummings or Lyons.  The court concluded that it is a
close case.  Both sides present plausible scenarios.  After
considering the totality of the arguments and evidence, the court
determines that Eureka has not met its burden to show that Cummings
acted so as to manifest assent to the Agreement.  In the absence of
sufficient proof of an agreement to arbitrate, the motion to compel
arbitration is denied.

The Appellate Court finds that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by implicitly denying Eureka's belated request to start
discovery.  Eureka does not assert it actually had insufficient
time to conduct discovery before the hearing of the petition, or
that it sought and was refused discovery of any matter pertinent to
the enforceability of the arbitration clause.  Where, as in the
instant case, the parties have chosen to rely on their own
recollections of the transaction, written evidence and
declarations, the choice does not mean they were unfairly denied
information needed to oppose or support the petition to compel
arbitration.

The Appellate Court also finds that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by resolving evidentiary conflicts without live
testimony.  Neither party asked the trial court to hear oral
testimony.  At most, Eureka made an untimely and ambiguous
suggestion, just before the hearing, that it might make a possible
future request for oral testimony should it "deem it necessary."
Under the circumstances, the court did not exceed the bounds of
reason by proceeding without live testimony.

Finally, the Appellate Court finds that Cummings denied e-signing
the Agreement.  He claimed that restaurant manager Lyons obtained
his username and password and used them to affix his e-signature
without his knowledge or consent.  Lyons disputed Cummings's claim.
The trial court believed Cummings.  The Appellate Court cannot
reassess witness credibility or reweigh evidence on appeal.
Cummings's declaration is sufficient to prove that he did not
e-sign the Agreement.

In light of the foregoing, the Appellate Court affirmed the order
denying the arbitration petition.  The Respondent is entitled to
recover his costs on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Appellate Court's Jan. 7, 2020 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/C1dVAe from Leagle.com.

Karasik Law Firm and Gregory N. Karasik -- greg@karasiklawfirm.com;
Davtyan PLC and Emil Davtyan, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

K&L Gates, Spencer Hamer -- Spencer.Hamer@klgates.com --
Christopher J. Kondon -- christopher.kondon@klgates.com -- Saman M.
Rejali -- saman.rejali@klgates.com -- and Kate G. Hummel --
kate.hummel@klgates -- for Defendant and Appellant.


FIDELITY INVESTMENTS: $1MM Attorneys' Fees in Reynolds Suit Awarded
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BAILEY REYNOLDS and HELEN MARTINEZ on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
FIDELITY INVESTMENTS INSTITUTIONAL OPERATIONS COMPANY, INC., FMR
LLC, FIDELITY BROKERAGE SERVICES LLC, FIDELITY WORKPLACE INVESTING
LLC, and VERITUDE LLC, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-CV-423 (M.D.
N.C.), Judge Catherine C. Eagles of the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of North Carolina granted the Class Counsel's
motion for attorney's fees and expenses and service awards for the
named Plaintiffs and for certain Plaintiffs who opted into the Fair
Labor Standards Act settlement.

The class and collective action arose out of the Defendants'
timekeeping practices in several call centers.  The Plaintiffs
contend that Fidelity failed to adequately compensate them for time
worked in Fidelity's call centers, including time required to be
"call ready," and incorrectly calculated appropriate overtime rates
in violation of the FLSA and North Carolina and New Mexico state
wage and hour laws.

The named Plaintiffs have asserted claims on behalf of two Rule 23
classes of individuals working in Fidelity's workplace business
call centers in North Carolina ("NCWHA Class") and New Mexico
("NMWHA Class"), as well as an FLSA collective action for similarly
situated individuals.

After filing the complaint in May 2018, the Plaintiffs responded to
the Defendants' partial motion to dismiss, filed two amended
complaints, and moved for class certification.  The parties then
agreed to pursue mediation and reached a settlement in December.

In April 2019, the Court granted preliminary approval of the
settlement, provisionally certified the settlement classes and
collective action, appointed the class counsel, approved the
settlement administrator, and approved the Plaintiffs' notice of
the settlement with some modifications.

In the settlement agreement, the Defendants have agreed to pay up
to $3 million to the eligible class members, as well as the
employer share of payroll taxes associated with any back wages.
The claimants will receive their proportionate share of settlement
proceeds relative to their estimated hours of unpaid work; the
Plaintiffs who opted in before the agreement will receive the
greater of either a $2,000 service award or their proportionate
share of the settlement; and the named Plaintiffs will receive
their proportionate share in addition to their service awards.  The
proportionate share for class members who do not submit a claim
form reverts to the Defendants, but funds leftover from
unnegotiated settlement checks will be distributed to designated cy
pres recipients.

Consistent with these provisions, the Plaintiffs request Court
approval of service awards of $20,000 for named Plaintiff Bailey
Reynolds, $15,000 for named Plaintiff Helen Martinez, and $2,000
for each of the members who opted into the FLSA collective action
before settlement.  The Class Counsel stated at the fairness
hearing that there were 15 to 20 of these opt-in Plaintiffs.  The
Class Counsel also requests $1 million in attorney's fees and
$33,931.42 in litigation expenses.  These motions have been on the
docket since February 2019, and the Court ordered the settlement
administrator, RG/2, to notify the class members of the settlement
and that the Class Counsel had sought compensation from the
settlement fund for these Plaintiffs, attorney's fees, and costs.

The Court extended the notice period twice, once for a second
reminder postcard to be sent and later so notice could be sent to
inadvertently overlooked class members.  Original notice recipients
were also mailed a postcard advising them of the new final approval
hearing date, which was continued in light of the newly notified
class members.  The claims administrator at RG/2 confirmed that
notice was mailed to all the class members and published on a
settlement website, with a relatively small number returned
undeliverable.  Of the 5,761 identified class members, five
requested to be excluded from the suit and none filed objections.
The Defendants have not opposed the motions for attorney's fees or
expenses or for service awards.

Judge Eagles concludes that the Class Counsel's uncontested motion
for attorney's fees, expenses, and service awards for the named
Plaintiffs and the FLSA opt-in Plaintiffs is well supported and
reasonable.  Accordingly, the Judge granted the Plaintiffs'
unopposed motion for attorney's fees and reimbursement of costs and
expenses, and the Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for approval of
service awards,

The Plaintiffs' Counsel are awarded attorney's fees in the amount
equal to one-third of the Maximum Gross Settlement Amount (i.e., $1
million), and  litigation expenses of $33,931.42, both to be paid
from the settlement amount.  A Service Award, paid from the
settlement amount, to (i) Named Plaintiff Bailey Reynolds is
approved in the amount of $20,000; (ii) Named Plaintiff Helen
Martinez is approved in the amount of $15,000; and (iii) the Opt-In
Plaintiffs who previously submitted a written consent form
requesting to join the FLSA collective action in the case are
approved to receive a minimum settlement payment of $2,000, in
recognition of their support in prosecuting the case.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Jan. 7, 2020 Memorandum
Opinion & Order is available at https://is.gd/mLkTh8 from
Leagle.com.

BAILEY REYNOLDS, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated & HELEN MARTINEZ, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by CHRISTINE E. WEBBER
-- cwebber@cohenmilstein.com -- COHEN MILSTEIN HAUSFELD & TOLL,
P.L.L.C., GILDA A. HERNANDEZ -- ghernandez@gildahernandezlaw.com --
THE LAW OFFICES OF GILDA A. HERNANDEZ, PLLC & STACY N. CAMMARANO,
COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL PLLC.

FIDELITY INVESTMENTS INSTITUTIONAL OPERATIONS COMPANY, INC., FMR,
LLC, FIDELITY BROKERAGE SERVICES LLC & FIDELITY WORKPLACE INVESTING
LLC, Defendants, represented by KEVIN SCOTT JOYNER --
kevin.joyner@ogletreedeakins.com -- OGLETREE DEAKINS NASH SMOAK &
STEWART, P.C., AUGUST W. HECKMAN, III --
august.heckman@morganlewis.com -- MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP,
BLAIR J. ROBINSON, MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS, LLP, REGINA W. CALABRO
-- regina.calabro@ogletreedeakins.com -- OGLETREE DEAKINS NASH
SMOAK & STEWART, P.C., RICHARD G. ROSENBLATT --
richard.rosenblatt@morganlewis.com -- MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP &
ROBERT A. SAR -- robert.sar@ogletreedeakins.com -- OGLETREE DEAKINS
NASH SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.


FIDELITY INVESTMENTS: $3MM Deal in Reynolds Suit Has Final Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BAILEY REYNOLDS and HELEN MARTINEZ on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
FIDELITY INVESTMENTS INSTITUTIONAL OPERATIONS COMPANY, INC., FMR
LLC, FIDELITY BROKERAGE SERVICES LLC, FIDELITY WORKPLACE INVESTING
LLC, and VERITUDE LLC, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-CV-423 (M.D.
N.C.), Judge Catherine C. Eagles of the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of North Carolina granted the Plaintiffs' motion
for final approval of a settlement agreement with the Defendants
and dismissal with prejudice of two Rule 23 class actions and a
collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Reynolds and Martinez worked as call center associates for the
Defendants in their Durham, North Carolina and Albuquerque, New
Mexico locations, respectively.  They assert claims on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, under the FLSA; the
North Carolina Wage and Hour Act ("NCWHA"); and the New Mexico
Minimum Wage Act ("NMMWA").

The Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants failed to pay workers in
their Workplace Call Centers for required pre-shift work and failed
to include some bonuses and reimbursements for student loan
payments and fitness expenses in calculating the regular rate and
the correct overtime rate.  They assert that each violation
resulted in a failure to accurately calculate overtime due, in
violation of all three statutes, and that the unpaid pre-shift time
violates the NCWHA even in weeks when no overtime was worked.  In
addition, Plaintiff Reynolds asserts that the Defendants retaliated
against her individually in violation of the Family Medical Leave
Act ("FMLA").  In February 2019, the Court allowed the Plaintiffs
to file a Second Amended Complaint, which added the Defendant
Veritude and narrowed class claims to Workplace call centers
specifically.  The Defendants denied all of these allegations.

On Dec. 14, 2018, the parties participated in an all-day mediation
session with an attorney experienced in the mediation of complex
wage and hour actions.  The parties reached an agreement in
principle, and after nearly two months of further negotiation, the
parties reached the settlement agreement.

On Feb. 22, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed their unopposed motion for
preliminary settlement approval, consistent with the parties'
Stipulation and Settlement Agreement, to (1) provisionally certify
the settlement classes; (2) appoint the Plaintiff's counsel as the
Class Counsel; (3) approve the appointment of RG/2 as the
settlement administrator; and (4) approve the proposed Notice and
Claim Form.  The Court held a telephonic hearing and asked the
parties' counsel to respond to questions about the settlement
agreement, notice, and forms.  To address some of the Court's
concerns, the Plaintiffs' counsel filed a supplemental memorandum.

On April 10, 2019, the Court preliminarily approved, subject to
further consideration at the Final Approval Hearing, the Parties'
Stipulation and Settlement Agreement; the proposed notices for
mailing, consistent with the procedures outlined in the Parties'
Stipulation and Settlement Agreement; and the appointment of RG/2
as the Settlement Administrator.  It conditionally certified the
Putative FLSA Collective under Section 216(b) of the FLSA and
conditionally certified the Putative Rule 23 Settlement Class under
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for settlement
purposes only. The Court ordered the appointed the Settlement
Administrator, RG/2, to notify the class members of the settlement
and how to opt out or object to the settlement terms.  Under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(e), the Court scheduled a fairness hearing for Aug.
21, 2019.

The RG/2 Director of Claims Administration affirms that notice and
reminder postcards were mailed to all 5,761 class members and
notice was published on a settlement website.  Of the notices
returned undeliverable, RG/2 was able to identify corrected or
updated addresses for all but 263 of the 5,761 class members.
Overall, RG/2 received 1,945 claim forms, representing 33.7% of the
class.  No class members objected, and only five opted out.

The proposed settlement agreement provides for a Gross Settlement
Amount of $3 million.  From this and subject to Court approval, the
Class Counsel may receive up to $1 million, or one-third the common
fund, in attorney's fees and reimbursement of litigation expenses
(which total $33,931.42).  The named Plaintiffs may also receive
$20,000 and $15,000 in addition to their settlement allocations,
and FLSA opt-in Plaintiffs may receive the greater of $2,000 or
their settlement allocation.  The Class Counsel have requested
these awards and reimbursement in other motions,which the Court has
granted in an Order issued concomitantly with this one.

RG/2 estimates that the class members will receive $984,389.74,
excluding service awards.  The amount will be distributed to the
class members in amounts proportional to each person's estimated
unpaid wages.  The estimated maximum recovery by an individual
class member is $5,972.17, the lowest is $25, and the average is
$506.11.  The Defendants will pay the employer's share of all
required payroll taxes, the amount of which is not included in the
Gross Settlement Amount.  The settlement does not include
injunctive relief because, as their counsel noted at the fairness
hearing, the Defendants have since instituted an automatic log-in
for their timekeeping system that they aver will avoid
uncompensated time going forward.  North Carolina claimants may
recover for any weeks worked, and other claimants may only recover
for weeks in which they worked more than 40 hours.

The Class members must timely submit a claim form to receive
payment, which also serves as an opt-in form for the FLSA
collective action.  The Claimants whose calculated award is less
than $25 will be awarded $25.  Any unclaimed funds -- i.e., for the
class members who do not timely submit the claim forms or who opt
out of the settlement -- will revert to the Defendants.  If the
claimants do not timely cash their settlement checks, that amount
will go to cy pres recipients, the National Employment Law Project
and Legal Aid of North Carolina.

The class members agree to release all claims that "relate to hours
worked or the payment of wages" and that arose before the final
approval of the settlement agreement.  Other than for the named
Plaintiffs, the release does not include discrimination claims.
The released claims are thus limited to the subject matter and
timeframe of the case.  The settlement agreement further clarifies
that members of a settlement class who do not opt into the
collective action have not waived claims under the FLSA.

As the settlement agreement is fair, adequate, and reasonable, and
the differential treatment among class members is justified, Judge
Eagles approves the Settlement as to the Rule 23 classes.  The
requested attorney's fees and costs are also reasonable for
purposes of approving the FLSA settlement; these requests are fully
analyzed in a separate order entered concomitantly.  The Class
Counsel's request for one-third of the Gross Settlement Amount in
attorney's fees is common among Fourth Circuit district courts, and
the lodestar amount -- supported by the Class Counsel's
declarations as to the number of hours and the reasonableness of
the hourly rates -- is just under $1 million.  There do not appear
to be unsuccessful claims unrelated to the successful ones, which
could reduce the amount otherwise properly payable,"and the
expenses are supported by the documentation submitted.  The Court
approves the FLSA settlement as a fair and reasonable resolution of
a bona fide dispute of FLSA provisions.

For these reasons, the Court granted the consent motion for final
approval of the settlement agreement, and approved the settlement
of the Rule 23 class actions and FLSA collective action as fair,
adequate, and reasonable to the parties.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's Jan. 7, 2020 Memorandum
Opinion & Order is available at https://is.gd/PFryiv from
Leagle.com.

BAILEY REYNOLDS, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated & HELEN MARTINEZ, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by CHRISTINE E. WEBBER
-- cwebber@cohenmilstein.com -- COHEN MILSTEIN HAUSFELD & TOLL,
P.L.L.C., GILDA A. HERNANDEZ -- ghernandez@gildahernandezlaw.com --
THE LAW OFFICES OF GILDA A. HERNANDEZ, PLLC & STACY N. CAMMARANO,
COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL PLLC.

FIDELITY INVESTMENTS INSTITUTIONAL OPERATIONS COMPANY, INC., FMR,
LLC, FIDELITY BROKERAGE SERVICES LLC & FIDELITY WORKPLACE INVESTING
LLC, Defendants, represented by KEVIN SCOTT JOYNER --
kevin.joyner@ogletreedeakins.com -- OGLETREE DEAKINS NASH SMOAK &
STEWART, P.C., AUGUST W. HECKMAN, III --
august.heckman@morganlewis.com -- MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP,
BLAIR J. ROBINSON, MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS, LLP, REGINA W. CALABRO
-- regina.calabro@ogletreedeakins.com -- OGLETREE DEAKINS NASH
SMOAK & STEWART, P.C., RICHARD G. ROSENBLATT --
richard.rosenblatt@morganlewis.com -- MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP &
ROBERT A. SAR -- robert.sar@ogletreedeakins.com -- OGLETREE DEAKINS
NASH SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.


FIRST TRANSIT: Prelim. Approval of Alkady Deal Denied w/o Prejudice
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge M. James Lorenz of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California denied without prejudice the Plaintiff's
unopposed motion for preliminary approval of the class action
settlement in ANDREW ALKADY, Plaintiff, v. FIRST TRANSIT, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 16-cv2291-L-BGS (S.D. Cal.).

The putative class action alleges wage and hour violations on
behalf of non-exempt fixed-route bus drivers at the Defendant's
Orange County Transportation Authority locations in Santa Ana and
Irvine.  The Plaintiff filed an unopposed motion for preliminary
approval of class action settlement.  

Judge Lorenz denied the motion without prejudice.  The Judge finds
that although the operative complaint alleges a number of wage and
hour violations, the Plaintiff sought to certify a class only with
respect to the alleged rest break violations and derivative claims
for failure to provide accurate wage statements, failure to timely
pay wages upon termination, unfair competition and claims for
penalties under Labor Code California Private Attorney General Act.
The scope of the proposed settlement is the same.  Nevertheless,
the class proposed in the Plaintiff's motion for class
certification differs significantly from the definition in the
proposed settlement, the Court notes.  Furthermore, no information
is provided to determine whether the Plaintiff is a former
employee, so as to be able to adequately and fairly represent the
interests of the former employees.

Judge Lorenz also finds that the release provision includes the
class members' claim for waiting time penalties; however, the
settlement provides no relief for the claim.  Although a settlement
does not necessarily have to provide relief for all the released
claims, the Judge is not inclined to approve the settlement without
an adequate explanation why no relief is provided.  Finally,
subsections (2) and (3) of the Released Claims should include the
same limiting language as subsection (4) to specify that they are
released only insofar as they relate to the alleged rest break
violations.

The Settlement provides for "California Rural Legal Assistance" as
the cy pres recipient.  The Judge finds that neither the settlement
nor the motion specifies whether reference is to California Rural
Legal Assistance, Inc. or the California Rural Legal Assistance
Foundation.  Either organization lacks the close nexus required to
ensure that the class members would ultimately benefit from the
award.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(5) provides that "any class
member may object" to the proposed settlement and does not require
written objections.  Although the parties may encourage the class
members to provide written objections by a date certain, the Court
is not inclined to approve a settlement or notice of settlement
suggesting that a class member who does not timely file written
objections is barred from objecting.

The Judge will not approve any settlement appointing the Settlement
Administrator as a "final arbiter" of any class member substantive
rights, for example, a dispute over the number of work weeks used
to calculate a class member's distribution from the settlement.

The proposed settlement notice is also confusing and verbose.  The
Judge holds that the notice should be complete, clear, concise and
user-friendly, especially in the areas where a class member may be
required to make a decision or take action, such as, disputing the
proposed claim calculation, ir excluding oneself from or objecting
to the settlement.

Insufficient information is provided for the Court to determine
whether ILYM, Inc. is qualified to serve as the Settlement
Administrator.  The Plaintiff also has not indicated whether any
responses have been received to the notices of settlement pursuant
to the Labor Code California Private Attorney General Act or the
Class Action Fairness Act.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 31, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/4LMiQS from Leagle.com.

Andrew Alkady, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Ali Sarah Carlsen, Aegis Law
Firm, PC, Jessica Lynn Campbell -- jcampbell@aegislawfirm.com --
Aegis Law Firm, Samuel Alan Wong, Aegis Law Firm & Simon Kwak,
Aegis Law Firm.

First Transit, Inc., Defendant, represented by David Dow --
ddow@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson & Matthew B. Riley --
mriley@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C.


FIVE OAKS ACHIEVEMENT: Davis, Humphrey Seek OT Pay for Care Staff
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DEVERY DAVIS and CLIFTON HUMPHREY, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF
ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiffs, v. FIVE OAKS ACHIEVEMENT
CENTER, LLC d/b/a FIVE OAKS ACHIEVEMENT CENTER; WHISPERING HILLS
ACHIEVEMENT CENTER, LLC d/b/a WHISPERING HILLS ACHIEVEMENT CENTER;
and NORTH FORK EDUCATIONAL CENTER, LLC d/b/a NORTH FORK EDUCATIONAL
CENTER, Defendants, Case No. 4:20-cv-00724 (S.D. Tex., February 28,
2020) is a class action against the Defendants for routinely
requiring Plaintiffs to work in excess of 40 hours per week but
refusing to compensate them for those hours at the overtime rate
required under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).

Both Davis and Humphrey were employed by the Defendants as Direct
Care Staff Employees.

Five Oaks Achievement Center, LLC serves as a Texas-based
for-profit residential treatment center for troubled youth.

Whispering Hills Achievement Center, LLC is a Fort Bend County,
Texas-based for-profit residential treatment center for troubled
youth which is doing business as Whispering Hills Achievement
Center.

North Fork Educational Center, LLC is a for-profit residential
treatment center for troubled youth with principal location in
Texas. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

            Mickey L. Washington, Esq.
            Kimberly R. Bennett, Esq.
            WASHINGTON & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
            2019 Wichita Street
            Houston, TX 77004
            Telephone: (713) 225-1838
            Facsimile: (713) 225-1866

FORD MOTOR CO: Diesel Truck Owners Sue Over Defective Fuel Pump
---------------------------------------------------------------
Zachary J. Farlow, Matthew H. Clough, Curtis McNeal Mertz, William
Tsumpes, James Higdon, Daryl Alejandro, Gary O. Pederson, Bobby J.
Griffith, Barry R. Gonsalves, Joseph Sawicki, Allen J. Fowler,
James Crowell, Jr., Kelly Arnold, Robert C. Haus and Warren Story,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. Ford Motor Company, Defendant, Case No. 20-cv-10202,
(N.D. Cal., January 27, 2020), seeks damages, attorneys' fees and
costs, and such other and further relief resulting from breach of
contract, negligence, deceit by concealment and violation of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and the California Unfair Competition
Law.

Plaintiffs are owners of F-250 and F-350 diesel trucks manufactured
by Ford Motor Company. They claim that their vehicles contain the
CP4 fuel pump that is not compatible with American diesel fuel. The
latter allegedly contains less lubrication thus running the fuel
pump nearly dry. Air pockets form inside the pump during operation,
causing metal to rub against metal, generating metal shavings which
are dispersed throughout the fuel injection system, contaminating
and destroying the fuel system. [BN]

Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Steve W. Berman, Esq.
     HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
     1301 Second Avenue, Suite 2000
     Seattle, WA 98101
     Telephone: (206) 623-7292
     Facsimile: (206) 623-0594
     Email: steve@hbsslaw.com

            - and -

     Robert C. Hilliard, Esq.
     Rudy Gonzales, Jr., Esq.
     John B. Martinez, Esq.
     HILLIARD MARTINEZ GONZALES LLP
     719 S. Shoreline Boulevard
     Corpus Christi, TX 78401
     Telephone No.: (361) 882-1612
     Facsimile No.: (361) 882-3015
     Email: bobh@hmglawfirm.com
            rudyg@hmglawfirm.com
            john@hmglawfirm.com

            - and -

     Steve W. Berman, Esq.
     Sean R. Matt, Esq.
     HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
     1301 Second Avenue, Suite 2000
     Seattle, WA 98101
     Telephone: (206) 623-7292
     Facsimile: (206) 623-0594
     Email: steve@hbsslaw.com
            sean@hbsslaw.com

            - and -

     Jeff D. Friedman, Esq.
     HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
     715 Hearst Avenue, Suite 202
     Berkeley, CA 94710
     Telephone: (510) 725-3000
     Facsimile: (510) 725-3001
     Email: jefff@hbsslaw.com


FORD MOTOR: Faces Class Action Over Truck "Death Wobble" Issues
---------------------------------------------------------------
Justin Gray, writing for WSB-TV, reports that it can be a
terrifying experience. Your steering wheel is shaking so hard, you
have no control of the vehicle.

It's happening with thousands of popular pickup trucks.

Channel 2 investigative reporter Justin Gray found so many owners
have experienced it, it's been given a name: "death wobble."

Ford drivers are posting videos to YouTube, sharing their "death
wobble" experiences.

"Prayer was all I had. I was, like, ‘Dear God, let me get through
this,'" said Derek Spann, of Cedartown.

Spann said it happened with his 2018 Ford F-250.

Owners of Ford F-250s and Ford F-350s have been complaining about
the wobble since 2005, and now there's a class-action lawsuit
against Ford.

Ford labels the trucks "Super Duty."

Many are used as work trucks for contractors, landscapers and
construction workers -- or, as in Spann's case, retirement vehicles
used to pull recreational vehicles or boats across the country.

Spann's cost $72,000.

"Safety was the main reason I bought this," Spann said.

But a moment with his four grandchildren driving on I-20 changed
everything.

"I could not control it. It was jerking all over the road," Spann
said.

Spann has been a tractor-trailer driver for decades. But stopping
in the middle of the highway with a tractor-trailer behind him was
his worst moment on the road.

"I was in tears because I knew what was behind me, what was
barreling down on me," Spann said.

Spann has taken his truck into the Ford dealership five different
times. He said he's had a variety of steering components replaced,
including the steering rod and two steering stabilizers. He said
after a few months the wobble returned.

"This is the kind of thing that would set it off. That kind of
bouncing," Spann said as he and Gray encountered a rough patch of
road.

He's not alone.

A search at the National Highway Transportation Safety
Administration website shows more than 1,200 complaints that
reference "death wobble." Gray found death wobble complaints on
models as old as 2005.

"What we saw was this was happening to a lot of people and it was
terrifying," attorney David Wright told Gray.

Wright has filed a class-action lawsuit against Ford on behalf of
F-250 and F-350 owners in the Southern District of California.

"Ford has known about this problem for a long time. If Ford can't
fix the problem it certainly needs to tell the potential buyers of
its vehicle that this problem exits," Wright said.

Over the years, Adam Richmond has seen so many trucks come in with
death wobble at Southern Off-Road Specialists in Alpharetta, they
have a special inspection process for it.

Richmond said what makes this so tough is there is not a
one-size-fits-all-fix. That's because finding which steering part
is the source of the wobble can be trial and error. Ford has never
issued a recall, putting owners on the hook for thousands of
dollars in repair costs.

"Every single vehicle has a different combination of parts or
pieces that ultimately contribute to or are directly responsible
for death wobble," Richmond said.

Finally last year, Ford instructed dealers to replace the steering
damper in 2017 to 2019 model trucks -- if owners complain of death
wobble. But Richmond says that's just a Band-Aid.

"A steering damper or something to stop the shaking did not fix the
shaking. So the root cause of the problem was not addressed,"
Richmond said.

Spann has owned 30 Ford trucks. His father drove Fords, too. But he
tells Gray this could be his last.

Most of the time, his F-250 sits, except for one chore.

"It's a high-dollar garbage truck. I take my garbage off with it,"
Spann said. "They need to pull these trucks off the road."

Because of the pending litigation, Ford declined to comment. [GN]


FOREST LABORATORIES: Welfare Plan Sues Over Namenda IR Monopoly
---------------------------------------------------------------
The case, A.F. of L.-A.G.C. BUILDING TRADES WELFARE PLAN,
individually and on behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. FOREST LABORATORIES, LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 1:20-cv-01799-UA (N.Y. Sup., February 28, 2020), arises from
Defendant's alleged anti-competitive scheme to maintain its
monopoly over the $1.5 billion per year market for its blockbuster
drug Namenda IR.

Namenda IR is a U.S. Food & Drug Administration approved oral
medication prescribed by physicians to treat moderate to severe
dementia in Alzheimer's patients.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has violated the New York General
Business Law, specifically the Hatch-Waxman Act and the Food Drug
and Cosmetic Act, by illegally impeding a less expensive generic
version of its Namenda IR from timely entering the market, thereby
damaging over $2 billion to consumers and third-party payors who
purchased the drug.

The Food Drug and Cosmetic Act and Hatch-Waxman amendments operate
on the proven scientific principle that bioequivalent drug products
containing identical amounts of the same active ingredients, having
the same route of administration and dosage form, and meeting
applicable standards of strength, quality, purity and identity, are
therapeutically equivalent and may be substituted for one another.

Plaintiff seeks damages caused by Defendant's misconduct.

A.F. of L.-A.G.C. Building Trades Welfare Plan is a self-insured
health and welfare benefit plan with its principal place of
business in Mobile, Alabama.

Forest Laboratories, LLC is a company engaged in the development,
marketing, and distribution of branded pharmaceutical products.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael M. Buchman, Esq.
          Jacob Onile-Ere, Esq.
          MOTELY RICE LLC
          777 Third Avenue, 27th Floor
          Tel: (212)577-0040
          Fax: (212)577-0054
          Emails: mbuchman@motleyrice.com
                  jonileere@motleyrice.com


FORTERRA INC: April 29 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
------------------------------------------------------
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

IN RE FORTERRA INC. SECURITIES  LITIGATION

Case No. 3:18-cv-01957-X
Hon. Brantley Starr


SUMMARY NOTICE OF (I) PENDENCY OF CLASS ACTION, CERTIFICATION OF
SETTLEMENT CLASS, AND PROPOSED SETTLEMENT; (II) SETTLEMENT FAIRNESS
HEARING; AND (III) MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES
AND REIMBURSEMENT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES

TO:  All persons and entities who purchased or otherwise acquired
Forterra common stock between Forterra's Initial Public Offering on
October 19, 2016 and August 14, 2017, inclusive, and/or who
purchased or acquired stock pursuant to and/or traceable to the
Registration Statement issued in connection with Forterra's Initial
Public Offering and were damaged thereby (the "Settlement Class"):

PLEASE READ THIS NOTICE CAREFULLY, YOUR RIGHTS WILL BE AFFECTED BY
A CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT PENDING IN THIS COURT.

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and an Order of the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas, that the above-captioned
litigation (the "Action") has been certified as a class action on
behalf of the Settlement Class for the purpose of settlement only,
except for certain persons and entities who are excluded from the
Settlement Class by definition as set forth in the full Notice of
(I) Pendency of Class Action, Certification of Settlement Class,
and Proposed Settlement; (II) Settlement Fairness Hearing; and
(III) Motion for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement of
Litigation Expenses (the "Notice").

YOU ARE ALSO NOTIFIED that Plaintiffs in the Action have reached a
proposed settlement of the Action for $5,500,000 in cash (the
"Settlement"), that, if approved, will resolve all claims in the
Action.

A hearing will be held on April 29, 2020 at 10:00 a.m., before the
Honorable Brantley Starr at the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Texas, United States Courthouse, Courtroom
1310, 1100 Commerce Street, Dallas, TX 75242, to determine (i)
whether the proposed Settlement should be approved as fair,
reasonable, and adequate; (ii) whether the Action should be
dismissed with prejudice against Defendants, and the Releases
specified and described in the Stipulation and Agreement of
Settlement dated November 4, 2019 (and in the Notice) should be
granted; (iii) whether the proposed Plan of Allocation should be
approved as fair and reasonable; and (iv) whether Lead Counsel's
application for an award of attorneys' fees and reimbursement of
expenses should be approved.

If you are a member of the Settlement Class, your rights will be
affected by the pending Action and the Settlement, and you may be
entitled to share in the Settlement Fund.  The Notice and Proof of
Claim and Release Form ("Claim Form"), can be downloaded from the
website maintained by the Claims Administrator,
www.ForterraSecuritiesLitigation.com. You may also obtain copies of
the Notice and Claim Form by contacting the Claims Administrator at
In re Forterra Inc. Securities Litigation, c/o Epiq, P.O. Box 4655,
Portland, OR 97208-4655, (844) 412-0823.

If you are a member of the Settlement Class, in order to be
eligible to receive a payment under the proposed Settlement, you
must submit a Claim Form online or postmarked no later than
June 5, 2020.  If you are a Settlement Class Member and do not
submit a proper Claim Form, you will not be eligible to share in
the distribution of the net proceeds of the Settlement but you will
nevertheless be bound by any judgments or orders entered by the
Court in the Action.

If you are a member of the Settlement Class and wish to exclude
yourself from the Settlement Class, you must submit a request for
exclusion such that it is received no later than April 8, 2020, in
accordance with the instructions set forth in the Notice.  If you
properly exclude yourself from the Settlement Class, you will not
be bound by any judgments or orders entered by the Court in the
Action and you will not be eligible to share in the proceeds of the
Settlement.

Any objections to the proposed Settlement, the proposed Plan of
Allocation, or Lead Counsel's motion for attorneys' fees and
reimbursement of expenses, must be filed with the Court and
delivered to Lead Counsel and Defendants' Counsel such that they
are received no later than April 8, 2020, in accordance with the
instructions set forth in the Notice.

Please do not contact the Court, the Clerk's office, Forterra, or
its counsel regarding this notice.  All questions about this
notice, the proposed Settlement, or your eligibility to participate
in the Settlement should be directed to Lead Counsel or the Claims
Administrator.

Inquiries, other than requests for the Notice and Claim Form,
should be made to Lead Counsel:

GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
Joshua L. Crowell, Esq.
1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
Los Angeles, CA 90067
(310) 201-9150
settlements@glancylaw.com

Requests for the Notice and Claim Form should be made to:

In re Forterra Inc. Securities Litigation
c/o Epiq
P.O. Box 4655
Portland, OR 97208-4655
(844) 412-0823
www.ForterraSecuritiesLitigation.com

DATED: February 10, 2020

BY ORDER OF THE COURT
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
[GN]


GARDNER, MA: Ct. Vacates Dismissal and Remands Magliacane Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JANICE MAGLIACANE, vs. CITY OF GARDNER & others, Case
No. SJC-12736 (Mass.), Judge Ralph D. Gants of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, Worcester, vacated the order allowing the
city's motion to dismiss, and remanded the case to the Superior
Court for further proceedings consistent with his Opinion.

Plaintiff Magliacane is a homeowner in the city of Gardner whose
hot water heating system failed prematurely three times due to
corrosion of its copper heating coils.  She replaced the coils on
the first two occasions but, after the third malfunction, switched
out her tankless hot water system for a water heater to avoid
additional replacement costs.  She was not alone; as alleged, the
hot water heating systems of hundreds of other homeowners in the
city also failed because of corroded copper heating coils.

Magliacane commenced the putative class action suit in the Superior
Court alleging that the city and its private water supply
contractors, AECOM Technical Services, Inc., and Suez Water
Environmental Services, Inc., were negligent and grossly negligent
and created a nuisance in knowingly supplying corrosive water to
the city's residents.

The city owns two water treatment plants at Crystal Lake and Snake
Pond, and it sells and distributes water to the city's residents,
property owners, and businesses.  In 1998, the city entered into a
contract with Defendant AECOM that privatized the city's water
maintenance and distribution operation.  Defendant Suez acquired
the contract and assumed all attendant obligations in 2008.  Suez
has operated the city's water facilities and distribution system
since then.

The Defendants knew for years that the water they sold and
distributed to the city's residents was corrosive.  By 2009 or
2010, the city had received numerous complaints about copper water
heater coil failures and had initiated an investigation into the
issue.  Meanwhile, the city's residents' heating coils continued to
fail.  In 2015, as the city continued to receive complaints, it and
Suez retained yet another consultant, Corrosion Testing
Laboratories ("CTL"), to test the leaking copper coils.  Until
September 2015, the city denied that the coil corrosion problem was
caused by, or related to, the chemistry of its water.  The city
issued a press release concerning the CTL study in which it
acknowledged that the soft water (low alkalinity) and a low level
of Dissolved Inorganic Carbons contributed to the coil failures.

Following the press release, the city's mayor denied that the city
had any culpability for the corrosion because the CTL report
attributed the issue to the natural state of the water.  Around the
same time as the issuance of the press release, the city engineer
noted in an internal memorandum that the city and Suez have not
looked at their corrosion control strategy in years.  When
Magliacane filed the present suit in December 2017, the city and
Suez still had not implemented any coil corrosion mitigation plan.

On Oct. 12, 2017, Magliacane sent a demand letter to the
defendants, individually and on behalf of a class defined as
Gardner residents, property owners and businesses who have had to
replace/purchase heating coils, boilers and/or hot water heaters
since 2000 due to coil corrosion.  The city responded to the
presentment by letter dated Dec. 4, 2017, and denied all
responsibility and liability for Magliacane's claimed injuries.
Magliacane then commenced the putative class action on Dec. 13,
2017.

The city moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Mass. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), and for entry of separate and
final judgment pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 54(b), 365 Mass. 820
(1974).  After a hearing, the Court allowed the city's motion to
dismiss, concluding that Magliacane failed to make timely
presentment as required by the Tort Claims Act.

Magliacane filed a notice of appeal, and the Court transferred the
appeal to the Court on its own motion.  Magliacane contends that
her class action claims fall outside the scope of the act because a
city historically has been exempt from sovereign immunity when it
acts in a "proprietary" or "commercial" capacity by selling water
to its residents.  She also argues that, even if her claims are
covered by the act, she made timely presentment because the city
fraudulently concealed her cause of action, thereby tolling the
act's presentment requirement until she had actual knowledge of her
claims.

Judge Gants concludes that, apart from the exceptions set forth in
the act, the act covers all claims brought against a city, even
those arising from the city's sale of water to its residents.  He
also concludes that the judge erred in dismissing Magliacane's
complaint for lack of timely presentment, where her complaint made
specific allegations that, if true, would support factual findings
(1) that the city fraudulently concealed her cause of action and
(2) that she did not have actual knowledge of the city's
responsibility for the corrosion of her heating coils until less
than two years before the date of presentment.

Because the Judge looks to the same record as the motion judge and
because allowance of a motion to dismiss is a question of law, he
also reaches the arguments that the judge did not address and
conclude (1) that Magliacane adequately gave notice of her nuisance
claim in her presentment; (2) that she made proper presentment on
behalf of the putative class; and (3) that the allegations in her
complaint suffice to show that the city is not entitled to
dismissal of the complaint under the statutory exceptions to
liability under the act that it invoked.

For these reasons, Judge Gants vacated the judge's allowance of the
city's motion to dismiss and remanded the case for further
proceedings consistent with his Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 22, 2020 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/W8y0wH from Leagle.com.

Michelle H. Blauner -- mblauner@shulaw.com -- for the plaintiff.

John J. Davis -- jdavis@piercedavis.com -- for the defendants.

J. Raymond Miyares -- contact@miyares-harrington.com -- Bryan F.
Bertram, & Ivria Glass Fried, for department of public works of
Wellesley.

Michele E. Randazzo -- mrandazzo@k-plaw.com -- for Massachusetts
Water Works Association & another.

Cynthia L. Amara -- camara@mhtl.com -- for Massachusetts Municipal
Lawyers Association.


GDT ENTERPRISES: Faces Valle Wage and Hour Suit in E.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------------
Jaime David Valle, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. GDT ENTERPRISES, INC., d/b/a CROWN STEAKHOUSE
and GERARD MCCLOREY, as an individual, Case No. 2:20-cv-01095
(E.D.N.Y., Feb. 27, 2020), seeks to recover damages for violations
of state and federal wage and hour laws arising out of the
Plaintiff's employment with the Defendants.

Although the Plaintiff worked for 60 hours or more per week during
his employment by the Defendants, the Defendants did not pay him
time and a half for hours worked over 40, a blatant violation of
the overtime provisions contained in the Fair Labor Standards Act
and New York Labor Law, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as a good preparer,
dishwasher, and kitchen worker.

GDT ENTERPRISES, INC., d/b/a CROWN STEAKHOUSE, is a corporation
organized under the laws of New York with a principal executive
office in Bellmore, New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Roman Avshalumov, Esq.
          HELEN F. DALTON & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          80—02 Kew Gardens Road, Suite 601
          Kew Gardens, NY 11415
          Phone: 718-263-9591


GEORGIA: Ga. App. Upholds Dismissal of United Cerebral Palsy Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, United Cerebral Palsy of Georgia, Inc. et al. v.
GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF BEHAVIORAL HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES et al, A19A2203, A19A2225 (Ga. App.), the Court of
Appeals of Georgia for the First Division affirmed in part and
vacated in part the superior court's order (i) granting the
Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' putative class action
complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and (ii)
affirming the final administrative decision reached by the
Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Community Health
("DCH").

Following the grant of their application for discretionary review,
the Plaintiffs appeal the superior court's order (i) affirming the
administrative decision reached by the Commissioner in thedispute
over Medicaid reimbursements to service providers; and (ii)
dismissing the Plaintiffs' related putative class action brought
against the DCH, the Georgia Department of Behavioral Health and
Developmental Disabilities ("DBHDD"), and the commissioners of
those two agencies in their official capacities on the ground that
the Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.

Medicaid is a joint federal-state program in which the federal
government subsidizes the states to provide medical assistance to
certain individuals in need.  Georgia has elected to participate in
the Medicaid program, and the DCH is the state agency responsible
for administering the state's Medicaid plan.

In March 2018, the Plaintiffs filed their "Class Action Complaint
or, in the Alternative, Petition for Judicial Review of
Commissioner's Decision" in the Superior Court of Fulton County.
The Plaintiffs' putative class action complaint contained the same
factual allegations as in the prior lawsuit as well as claims for
breach of contract and violation of their constitutional rights,
but the complaint also asserted that the administrative proceedings
had demonstrated that further agency review would be futile and
that the DCH's administrative procedures were inadequate to provide
the broad relief requested by the Plaintiffs.  Alternatively, the
Plaintiff sought judicial review of the Commissioner's final agency
decision.

The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' putative
class action complaint and opposed the Plaintiffs' petition for
judicial review of the Commissioner's final agency decision.
Subsequently, the superior court entered its order granting the
Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' putative class action
complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and
affirming the Commissioner's final agency decision.  

Among other things, the superior court concluded that the only
process for administrative review now available to the Plaintiffs
was the one specified by Medicaid Procedures Manual Section 502,
which provides for the review of the denial of individual payment
claims through the GAMMIS Web Portal.  In this regard, it rejected
the Plaintiffs' argument that administrative review should have
occurred in the same manner as if they had been provided prior
notice of adverse action, reasoning that the administrative review
process afforded by Medicaid Procedures Manual Section 505 for
proposed adverse actions by the DCH does not contemplate looking
backwards at past conduct.

The superior court further concluded that the Plaintiffs had failed
to come forward with any evidence in the administrative proceeding
reflecting that they had been denied or underpaid any
reimbursements, and thus had failed to show any "adverse action" by
the defendants for which they would have been entitled to receive
advanced written notice.  In reaching this conclusion, the superior
court noted that the Commissioner's findings of fact included
findings that the four individual payment claims inputted by the
plaintiffs via the GAMMIS Web Portal had been paid in full as
submitted under the standard rate set forth in the Medicaid manual
for COMP payments.  And given the Commissioner's finding that the
claims were paid in full as required by the applicable Medicaid
manual, the superior court ruled that it was "irrelevant" whether
the Commissioner erred when it determined that the Plaintiffs'
claims were untimely.

The Plaintiffs now appeal from the rulings of the superior court.
In several related enumerations of error, the Plaintiffs contend
that the superior court erred in affirming the Commissioner's final
agency decision granting summary determination to the Defendants on
their petition for administrative review and hearing.

The Appellate Court finds that the Commissioner did not address
whether the administrative review afforded by Rule 350-4-.04 and
Medicaid Procedures Manual Section 505 could be pursued when a
provider fails to receive the required advanced notice of an
adverse action from the DCH.  Nor did the Commissioner make a
determination that there had been no "adverse action" requiring
advanced notice as that term is used in the applicable regulations
and Medicaid Procedures Manual.  Resolving these questions involves
agency expertise and thus must be decided in the first instance in
the administrative process rather than on appeal in the superior
court.

Furthermore, the Defendants did not move for summary determination
on the ground that there had been no "adverse action" requiring
advanced notice; instead, they expressly stated that they were
seeking summary determination on whether the Plaintiffs were
limited to contesting the four payment claims inputted on the
GAMMIS Web Portal and whether those claims were untimely.
Consequently, the Commissioner's final agency decision could not be
affirmed on the alternative grounds articulated by the superior
court.

The Plaintiffs contend that the superior court erred in dismissing
their putative class action complaint for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.

The Appellate Court disagrees.  Where, as in the case, exhaustion
of administrative remedies is a precondition for suit, the
satisfaction of the requirement by the class Plaintiff normally
will avoid the necessity for each class member to satisfy the
requirement individually.  The Appellate Court finds that in light
of the Court's decision in Division 1, the administrative process
with respect to the Plaintiffs (the putative class representatives)
is not complete.  Hence, administrative remedies have not yet been
exhausted, and the superior court properly dismissed the
Plaintiffs' putative class action complaint.

Based on the foregoing, the Appellate Court affirmed in part and
vacated in part, and remanded the case with direction.  The
Appellate Court vacated the superior court's order in so far as it
affirmed the DCH Commissioner's final agency decision, and remanded
with direction that the superior court vacates the final agency
decision and remands the case to the Commissioner for further
action consistent with her Opinion.  The Appellate Court affirmed
the superior court's order in so far as it dismissed the
Plaintiffs' putative class action.

A full-text copy of the Appellate Court's Jan. 7, 2020 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/lHoow6 from Leagle.com.

Lawrence Joseph Bracken, II -- lbracken@hunton.com -- for
Appellant.

Eric Jon Taylor -- etaylor@hunton.com -- for Appellant.

LAURA THAYER WAGNER -- lwagner@hunton.com -- for Appellant.

DANIEL BYRUM MILLMAN -- dmillman@hunton.com -- for Appellant.

Ra Olusegun Amen -- ramen@hunton.com -- for Appellant.

Jason S. Alloy, for Appellee.

Joshua Barrett Belinfante, for Appellee.

Christopher Michael Carr, for Appellee.

Annette M. Cowart, for Appellee.

Shalen S. Nelson, for Appellee.

Michelle W. LeGrande, for Appellee.

Alexander Fraser Denton, for Appellee.

JOSEPH HARRIS SAUL, for Appellee.


GERON CORP: Connor Sues over 62% Drop in Share Price
----------------------------------------------------
EUGENE CONNOR, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. GERON CORPORATION; and JOHN A. SCARLETT,
Defendants, Case 3:20-cv-01163 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 14, 2020) is a
securities fraud action brought under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 by the Plaintiff on behalf of all persons and entities who
purchased Geron securities between March 19, 2018 and September 26,
2018.

Geron is a biopharmaceutical company.  According to the complaint,
throughout March 19, 2018 and September 26, 2018, the Defendants
misled investors regarding a drug called imetelstat, which was
intended to treat certain cancers that occur in bone marrow.
Specifically, the Defendants misled investors about the results of
a clinical drug study of imetelstat called IMbark. That study was
designed to ascertain whether imetelstat helped patients with a
cancer called myelofibrosis.

On March 27, 2018, a biotech journalist published an article which
called out the Defendants for misleading the market with their
statements on March 19, 2018, and for failing to disclose IMbark's
primary endpoint data or the baseline disease characteristics of
patients in the study, all of which would help investors evaluate
Defendants' encouraging claims.

On this news, Geron shares, which had closed at $5.98 per share on
March 26, 2018, dropped 29% over the next two days to close at
$4.23 per share on March 28, 2018.

The partial disclosure of Defendants' deception, however, did not
fully reveal the extent of the fraud with respect to IMbark.
Indeed, the Defendants were undeterred and continued to push the
misleading increased survival rate narrative at a March 27, 2018
healthcare conference and in the Company's first quarter and second
quarter Form 10-Qs filed with the SEC on May 10, 2018 and July 31,
2018. At the same time, they continued to hold back the results of
the IMbark study and other information which would have allowed
investors to evaluate Defendants' positive spin on the study's
secondary results.

As a result, the price of Geron common stock continued to trade at
artificially inflated levels. Geron took advantage of the inflation
that it created by selling more than $83 million of its common
stock to unsuspecting investors during the second quarter of 2018.

On September 27, 2018, the Defendants issued a press release
finally admitting that IMbark was a failure. Geron disclosed that
patients in the IMbark study had shown only 10% spleen volume
reduction and 32% TSS reduction. Not coincidentally, Defendants
further announced that Janssen had decided to terminate its
partnership with Geron.

In response to these belated disclosures, the price of Geron's
stock plummeted a price of $6.23 per share, on September 26, 2018,
to $2.31 per share on September 27, 2018, a decrease of over 62%.

Geron Corporation operates as a clinical stage biopharmaceutical
company. The Company develops telomerase inhibitor, imetelstat, and
in hematologic myeloid malignancies. Geron serves customers in the
State of California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jennifer Pafiti, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          1100 Glendon Avenue, 15th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90024
          Telephone: (310) 405-7190
          E-mail: jpafiti@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
          J. Alexander Hood II, Esq.
          POMERANTZ, LLP
          600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 661-1100
          Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
          E-mail: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                  ahood@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          Patrick V. Dahlstrom, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          Ten South La Salle Street, Suite 3505
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 377-1181
          Facsimile: (312) 377-1184
          E-mail: pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          Peretz Bronstein, Esq.
          BRONSTEIN, GEWIRTZ & GROSSMAN, LLC
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4600
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 697-6484
          Facsimile: (212) 697-7296
          E-mail: peretz@bgandg.com


GLAXOSMITHKLINE PLC: White Suit Moved From Illinois to Florida
--------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as Lynn White, Nataliya Birman, Karl D.
Stursberg, Gregory Alan Wayland, Marishia Qualls, Reva Hodges,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
GlaxoSmithKline P.L.C., GlaxoSmithKline LLC, Sanofi S.A.,
Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC, Sanofi U.S. Services Inc., Chattem Inc.,
Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Ltd, Glenmark Generics Ltd., Glenmark
Generics, Inc., U.S.A., Dr. Reddy's Laboratories, SA, Dr. Reddy's
Laboratories, Inc., Amneal Pharamaceuticals, Inc., Amneal
Pharamaceuticals, LLC, Perrigo Company PLC, Perrigo Company,
Perrigo Research and Development Company, Strides Pharma Science
Ltd., Strides Pharma, Inc., Case No. 1:19-cv-07773, was transferred
from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida on
Feb. 27, 2020.

The Florida District Court Clerk assigned Case No.
9:20-cv-80320-RLR to the proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Personal Injury: Health
Care/Pharmaceutical Personal Injury Product Liability.

GlaxoSmithKline plc (GSK) is a British multinational pharmaceutical
company headquartered in Brentford, London.[BN]


GODDESS DETOX: Sued Over Vaginal Detox Marketing Claims
-------------------------------------------------------
Izzy Kapnick, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that a
class action filed in Florida state court accuses a vaginal detox
company of putting out deceptive marketing materials that claim its
products can purge women's bodies of ex-lovers and increase
fertility.

The Broward County lawsuit, which was filed on Feb. 7 and made
available on Feb. 10, says that Goddess Detox's ads for its vaginal
suppository products are misleading and deceive the public about
the products' health benefits.

The complaint lists a single count for alleged violations of the
Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Act. It seeks class
certification for buyers of Goddess's Vaginal Detox Pearls.

The defendant company -- whose self-described mission is "to get
women to connect with their womb areas" -- says on its website that
the detox pearls are made of herbal ingredients including cnidium,
stemona and motherwort.

The products have "helped over 10,000 women with painful menstrual
cramping, detoxing an ex-lover, smelly odor [and] dryness," Goddess
says. According to the company, the products promote fertility and
help reestablish the menstrual cycle after ceasing birth control
use.

The company claims the suppositories can clear out "the old
stagnant energy of an ex-lover," which impedes "blood flow in [the]
uterus."

Goddess Detox instructs women to leave the products inside of them
for three days. The product promotional materials have a
disclaimer: "We can not and do not make guarantees on curing any
disease or ailment."

Goddess's marketing practices drew scrutiny last year from Canada's
health care regulators, who had the company halt sales in that
country, according to news network CBC.

The Florida lawsuit maintains the marketing of the detox pearls as
a treatment for disease is illegal in the United States since the
products do not have Food and Drug Administration approval.

Borneol, one of the herbs in the pearls' ingredient list, has not
been established as safe for internal use, according to the
complaint.

"The product's labeling, marketing and advertising contained on the
packaging and on defendant's website are false, deceptive and
misleading because the product is not safe and because the product
cannot provide the claimed benefits," the lawsuit states.

The case is the latest in a flurry of class action complaints filed
in the last two weeks by attorney Howard Rubinstein across South
Florida courts. Alleging violations of Florida deceptive trade law,
Rubinstein is going after Costco for purportedly overstating the
amount of Pima cotton in its underpants. Among other cases, he's
also suing a Florida grocer for selling root beer whose label
supposedly misleads consumers about the source of its vanilla
flavoring.

The case against Goddess Detox cites criticism of the company by
Canadian gynecologist Jennifer Gunter. Gunter, who is not
personally associated with the lawsuit, has been a vocal critic of
female hygiene products, describing the vagina as a "self-cleaning
oven." She had a widely publicized war of words with Gwyneth
Paltrow's company Goop over its marketing of Jade Egg vaginal
exercise products.

Goop in 2018 settled a consumer-protection action filed by Santa
Clara, California's district attorney, who alleged Goop made
misleading promotional statements asserting that its Jade Egg
products balance women's hormones.

Goddess Detox did not respond on Feb. 10 to a request for comment
on the lawsuit. The company is owned by self-help writer Vanessa
White aka Olanikee Osi. White, who is in her late 20s, said in an
interview with VoyageATL last year that she started selling the
detox products when she was in graduate school.

Her website states: "Goddess Detox is a company dedicated to
providing self-love inspired products . . . that physically,
spiritually and emotionally cleanse using herbs."


GOJO INDUSTRIES: Faces Class Action Over Hand Sanitizer Claims
--------------------------------------------------------------
Sheila A. Millar, Esq., of Keller and Heckman LLP, in an article
for National Law Review, reports that GOJO Industries, the maker of
Purell hand sanitizer, needs to clean up its advertising act
according to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The FDA
sent GOJO a letter on January 17, 2020 warning the company to stop
making unsubstantiated claims about its hand sanitizers to avoid
giving consumers the impression that they are pharmaceutical
products. The FDA further stated that "the defendant's statements
regarding the efficacy of the Products to combat Ebola, norovirus,
influenza, absenteeism, and common colds indicate the Products were
being marketed as drugs without FDA approval." The agency cautions
that failure to promptly correct the violations may result in legal
action, including seizure and injunction.

On the heels of the FDA warning letter, a class action against GOJO
was filed in New York Federal court over claims that Purell
products could prevent the spread of everything from the flu to
Ebola. While the world braces for a possible pandemic of the Wuhan
Coronavirus, GOJO assured consumers that Purell products could stem
the spread of viral diseases with marketing and packaging
statements such as "Kills more than 99.99% of most common germs
that may cause illness in a healthcare setting, including MRSA &
VRE." GOJO also stated that their products were "proven to reduce
absenteeism" among students and teachers and that a "recent outcome
study shows that providing the right products, in a customized
solution, along with educational resources for athletes and staff
can reduce MRSA and VRE by 100%."

The plaintiffs charge that Purell's marketing statements were
misleading and unfair because they gave "the impression to
consumers the products are effective at preventing colds, flu,
absenteeism and promoting bodily health and increased academic
achievement." FDA and plaintiffs assert that GOJO could not
substantiate its health claims since "no topical antiseptic
products have ever been able to achieve the results defendant
advertises." Plaintiffs assert that consumers relied on GOJO's
health claims when deciding to buy products to help protect their
health.

Companies that either expressly state or imply that
over-the-counter products can "reduce the risk of spread" of any
disease or condition are likely to attract both regulatory scrutiny
and the attention of class action attorneys. The lawsuit and FDA
warning letter to GOJO serve as reminders that businesses should
carefully craft advertising claims and back them up with competent
and reliable scientific evidence.[GN]


GOLD'S GYM: Denial of Archer's Attys' Fees in Piccinetti Vacated
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BRIAN A. PICCINETTI, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. GOLD'S GYM, INC., and
GOLD'S GYM OF EAST WINDSOR, Defendants-Appellants, Case No.
A-0894-18T1 (N.J. Super. App. Div.), the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Appellate Division, vacated the Sept. 14, 2018 order of the
Law Division denying the Defendant Archer Janny Enterprises, LLC's
motion for attorney's fees and costs.

Piccinetti filed a putative class action complaint in the Law
Division alleging claims under the Health Club Services Act, the
Consumer Fraud Act, and the Truth-In-Consumer Contract, Warranty,
and Notice Act, arising from his execution of a membership
agreement at a health club operated by Archer Janny.  Piccinetti
alleged the agreement violated the statutes because it contained an
automatic renewal clause, was binding for more than three years,
and failed to set forth in a conspicuous manner on its front page
the total payment obligation for the first year of membership.

After initial motion practice and discovery, Archer Janny sent
Piccinetti a written notice and demand pursuant to Rule 1:4-8(b)(1)
to withdraw what Archer Janny believed to be Piccinetti's frivolous
complaint.  Piccinetti did not withdraw his complaint within the
twenty-eight days permitted by the rule.

Archer Janny thereafter moved for summary judgment.  Piccinetti
opposed the motion.  On Aug. 3, 2018, the trial court granted
Archer Janny's motion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.

Archer Janny subsequently filed a motion for attorney's fees and
costs pursuant to Rule 1:4-8 and N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1.  Its notice
of motion requested oral argument pursuant to Rule 1:6-2(d).

On Sept. 14, 2018, the court denied Archer Janny's motion without
having heard oral argument.  It did not issue written or oral
findings of fact and conclusions of law explaining its decision.
The Sept. 14, 2018 order indicates the motion was opposed.

The appeal followed.  Prior to the filing of the parties' briefs,
the trial court submitted a letter pursuant to Rule 2:5-1(b)
amplifying its decision.  It stated that because of an error in
processing the motion, it had inadvertently denied Archer Janny's
motion without holding oral argument or issuing findings of fact
and conclusions of law.

The parties acknowledge the trial court's error in deciding Archer
Janny's motion without hearing oral argument or issuing findings of
fact and conclusions of law.  They request the Court to exercise
its original jurisdiction to decide Archer Janny's motion.

The Court exercises original jurisdiction sparingly.   Generally,
the exercise of original jurisdiction is disfavored when
fact-finding is necessary.  Findings of fact on each element of
Rule 1:4-8 are necessary before awarding attorney's fees and costs.
The Court, therefore, declined to exercise original jurisdiction
to decide Archer Janny's motion.

The September 14, 2018 order is vacated, and the matter is remanded
for oral argument and a determination of Archer Janny's motion for
attorney's fees and costs.  The Court doed not retain
jurisdiction.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 5, 2020 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/djuPpC from Leagle.com.

Gregg S. Sodini, argued the cause for appellant Archer Janny
Enterprises, LLC (Cutolo Barros LLC, attorneys; Gregg S. Sodini, on
the briefs).

Ari H. Marcus -- Ari@MarcusZelman.com -- argued the cause for
respondent (Marcus Zelman LLC, attorneys; Ari H. Marcus, on the
brief).


GOOGLE INC: Faces Google Photos Facial Recognition Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------------
John Pletz, writing for Crain's Chicago Business, reports that a
little more than a week after Facebook agreed to pay $550 million
in a class-action suit over Illinois' biometric-privacy statute,
Google has been sued over the same law.

Google was sued in U.S. District Court in Northern California on
behalf of an Illinois man, Brandon Molander, who claims the company
violated the 2008 law by uploading pictures of him and extracting
"geometric data relating to the unique points and contours" of his
face in its Google Photos product for purposes of facial
recognition.

He claims Google violated the law by not getting his consent to
collect or store his facial features for purposes of grouping and
categorizing photo collections. The case was first reported by
Law.com.

Google did not respond to a request for comment.

Facebook was sued under similar circumstances.

Molander's attorneys, Ahdoot & Wolfson of Los Angeles, are seeking
class-action status on behalf of all other users of the product,
which was introduced by Google in 2015 and was pre-installed on
phones using its Android operating system. About 87 percent of
smartphones operate on Android, according to research firm
International Data Corp.

Molander's attorneys are seeking damages of $1,000 to $5,000 for
each violation. [GN]


GOSHEN HOSPITAL: Spouses Added to Infection Exposure Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Jordan Fouts, writing for The Elkhart Truth, reports that a second
potential class that includes spouses has been added to a proposed
class-action lawsuit filed on behalf of Goshen Hospital patients
told they may have been exposed to infection by improperly
sterilized equipment.

The lawsuit was originally filed Nov. 22 on behalf of Linda Gierek
and others who were potentially exposed to hepatitis C, hepatitis B
and human immunodeficiency virus when they had surgery between
April and September. The hospital alerted patients from that period
that one step in the sterilization process wasn't completed for
certain instruments, potentially exposing 1,182 patients to
hepatitis and HIV. [GN]


GREAT AMERICA: Ill. App. Reverses Dismissal of Soto Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
In the case, HUGO SOTO and SHARON SOTO, Individually and on Behalf
of Similarly Situated Persons, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GREAT
AMERICA LLC, d/b/a Six Flags Great America and Six Flags Hurricane
Harbor, and DOES 1 TO 20, Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 2-18-0911
(Ill. App.), Judge Robert D. McLaren of the Appellate Court of
Illinois for the Second District reversed the trial court's
dismissal of the complaint under section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of
Civil Procedure.

On Aug. 11, 2017, Plaintiffs, Hugo and Sharon Soto, individually
and on behalf of similarly situated persons, filed a complaint
against Defendants, Great America LLC, doing business as Six Flags
Great America and Six Flags Hurricane Harbor, and Does 1 to 20,
alleging that Six Flags willfully violated the federal Fair and
Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 ("FACTA") when it printed
more than the last five digits of their debit card numbers on its
sales receipts.

The Plaintiffs' claim arose on Aug. 5, 2017, when they used their
debit cards to make five food purchases at Six Flags, each time
receiving an electronically printed receipt that included at least
the first six digits of their debit card numbers in addition to the
last four digits.  They alleged that Six Flags' conduct exposed
them and the members of the class to an increased risk that their
payment card could be compromised.  They further alleged that Six
Flags either knowingly violated FACTA's truncation requirements or
engaged in "reckless conduct" by failing to take necessary steps to
prevent the requirements from being violated.  The Plaintiffs
sought statutory damages, punitive damages "if the evidence
warrants," and attorney fees and costs.

The Defendants removed the case to federal district court, citing
diversity and federal-question jurisdiction.  The district court
granted the Plaintiffs' motion to remand the case to state court.

In state court, the Defendants filed a combined motion to dismiss
the Plaintiffs' complaint under section 2-619.1 of the Code (735
ILCS 5/2-619.  They argued, pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9), that
the Paintiffs lacked standing because they did not allege any
injury beyond the improper disclosure of the first six digits of
their debit card numbers.  According to the Defendants, the
Plaintiffs could not have been injured by the disclosure because
under the numbering system set by the International Standards
Organization, the first six digits, defined as the Issuer
Identification Number, identify only the card issuer and reveal no
personally identifying information.  The Defendants also argued,
pursuant to section 2-615, that the Plaintiffs failed to allege
facts showing a willful violation of FACTA in issuing the
receipts.

The trial court granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss under
section 2-619(a)(9) based on standing.  It declined to reach the
issue of willfulness and did not rule on the section 2-615 portion
of the Defendants' motion.

The Plaintiffs appeal.  They argue that the trial court erred in
determining that they lacked standing to bring the action under
FACTA because they did not plead an injury in fact.  According to
them, the statute does not require a plaintiff to plead an injury
or actual damages in addition to a statutory violation and,
therefore, the court's ruling on standing is incorrect.  The
Defendants contend that Illinois' principles of standing require a
"concrete and palpable" injury in fact and that their failure to
truncate the first six digits of teh Plaintiffs' debit cards was
harmless.  Both sides also contest whether the Defendants
adequately pleaded a willful failure to comply with FACTA.

Guided by FACTA's plain language, Judge McLaren holds that the
Plaintiffs had standing to pursue their statutory claims without
pleading an actual injury beyond the violation of their statutory
rights.  And because the Court is not required to follow federal
law on issues of standing, the Judge need not consider the
inconsistent positions of the federal courts.  Even if the Court
were to consider the Defendants' harmless-violation theory, it
would not impact our disposition of the standing issue, as the
Plaintiffs are not required under Illinois law to plead an injury
other than a willful violation of their statutory rights to pursue
their claims of statutory damages under FACTA.  Accordingly, Judge
McLaren reverses the trial court's dismissal of the Plaintiffs'
complaint pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9).

The question remains whether the Plaintiffs also pleaded a willful
violation of the statute.  Judge McLaren concludes that, in
addition to establishing standing by praying for statutory damages,
the Plaintiffs pleaded sufficient facts to allege a willful
violation of FACTA and, therefore, pleaded a justiciable claim over
which the trial court had jurisdiction.

For these reasons, Judge McLaren reversed the judgment of the
circuit court of Lake County and remanded for further proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 22, 2020 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/eF5KyJ from Leagle.com.

HAWAII: Certification Denied in A.B. School Discrimination Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, A.B., BY HER PARENTS AND NEXT FRIENDS, C.B. AND D.B.,
AND T.T., BY HER PARENTS AND NEXT FRIENDS, K.T. AND S.T.,
Plaintiffs, v. HAWAII STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, and OAHU
INTERSCHOLASTIC ASSOCIATION, Defendants, Civ. No. 18-00477 LEK-RT
(D. Haw.), Judge Leslie E. Kobayashi of the U.S. District Court for
the District of Hawaii denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification.

The operative pleading at this time is the Sept. 26, 2019 Second
Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief.  Plaintiff
A.B. is a 17-year-old, 12th-grade student at James Campbell High
School, who is a member of the Campbell girls' varsity water polo
and swimming teams.  Plaintiff A.M.B. is a 14-year-old, ninth-grade
student at Campbell, who is a member of the Campbell girls' varsity
water polo team.  Plaintiff T.T. is also a 17-year-old, 12th-grade
student at Campbell, who is a member of the Campbell girls' varsity
water polo and swimming teams.  Plaintiff A.P. is a 16-year-old,
11th-grade student at Campbell, who is a member of the girls'
varsity soccer and water polo teams.

According to the Second Amended Complaint, the DOE is a state
administrative agency that manages 292 public schools within the
State of Hawai'i, including Campbell, which is a four-year high
school.  The Plaintiffs allege the DOE receives federal financial
assistance and is subject to the anti-discrimination provisions of
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.  Because of the OIA's
connections with the DOE, the Plaintiffs allege it receives federal
financial assistance, and is therefore subject to the
anti-discrimination provisions of Title IX.

Campbell is the largest high school in the DOE by population. In
the 2017-18 school year, of the 3,123 students, 1,506 were female.
The Plaintiffs allege: female athletes at Campbell suffer worse
treatment, receive fewer benefits, and have fewer opportunities
than male athletes; and the OIA's policies and practices control
and/or greatly influence the disparate treatment.  

With regard to the DOE, the Plaintiffs allege sex-based
discrimination in its administration of: (i) athletic locker rooms,
practice facilities, and competitive facilities; (ii) equipment and
supplies; (iii) scheduling of games and practice times; (iv)
availability and quality of coaching; (v) travel opportunities;
(vi) medical and training services and facilities; and (vii)
publicity and promotion.  

With regard to the OIA, they allege discrimination is evidenced by
its treatment of the girls' teams with respect to: (i) competitive
facilities; (ii) scheduling of games; (iv) travel opportunities;
and (iv) publicity and promotion.

The Plaintiffs allege they have submitted numerous complaints to
the DOE regarding unfair treatment, and have made written and oral
requests to obtain equal accommodation and/or to engage in
discussions with the DOE regarding the same.  In response, the DOE
and Campbell administrators have allegedly retaliated against them
by, inter alia, threatening to cancel the Campbell girls' water
polo season, eliminate the team, or both; and increasing
administrative burdens on the water polo team, such as forcing the
team to resubmit program paperwork after a particularly heated
meeting between the water polo athletes, their parents, and
Campbell administrators.

The Plaintiffs have alleged the following claims: (1) a violation
of Title IX against Defendants based on their failure to take
remedial actions to meet the anti-discrimination provisions under
Title IX, and their continued unequal treatment of female athletes
at Campbell ("Count I"); (2) a violation of Title IX against the
Defendants based on their failure to provide Campbell female
athletes with equivalent athletic participation opportunities
("Count II"); and (3) a violation of Title IX against the DOE based
on the DOE's retaliation for Plaintiffs' attempts to report and/or
discuss the DOE's practice of sex discrimination ("Count III").

The Motion proposes the following class of the Plaintiffs:  "All
present and future James Campbell High School female students and
potential students who participate, seek to participate, and/or
were deterred from participating in athletics at Campbell."  They
assert the proposed class satisfies the requirements of Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(a), (b)(1)(B) and (b)(2).   They ask the Court to
certify them as the class representatives.  The Plaintiffs also
move to have their counsel appointed as the class counsel under
Rule 23(g).

Judge Kobayashi concluded that the proposed class cannot be
certified because it fails to meet the numerosity requirement and,
as to Count III, the commonality and typicality requirements.
Because the proposed class does not meet the Rule 23(a)
requirements, it is not necessary to address the Rule 23(b)
requirements.  On the basis of the foregoing, Judge Kobayashi
denied the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Dec. 31, 2019 Order is
available at https://is.gd/EoSTWv from Leagle.com.

A. B., by her parents and next friends, C.B. and D.B. & T. T., by
her parents and next friends, K.T. and S.T., Plaintiffs,
represented by Mateo Caballero -- mcaballero@acluhawaii.org --
ACLU
of Hawai'i, Elizabeth Kristen, Legal Aid At Work, pro hac vice,
Harrison J. Frahn, IV -- hfrahn@stblaw.com -- Simpson Thacher &
Bartlett LLP, pro hac vice, Jayma M. Meyer -- jmeyer@stblaw.com --
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, pro hac vice, Jeeyung Cacilia Kim
-- ckim@legalaidatwork.org -- Legal Aid At Work, pro hac vice,
Jongwook Philip Kim, ACLU of Hawaii, Kim Turner, Legal Aid At
Work,
pro hac vice & Wyatt A. Honse -- wyatt.honse@stblaw.com -- Simpson
Thacher & Bartlett LLP, pro hac vice.

A. M. B., by their parents and next freinds, C.B. an D.B.,
Plaintiff, represented by Elizabeth Bixby, Legal Aid at Work, pro
hac vice, Mateo Caballero, ACLU, Elizabeth Kristen, Legal Aid At
Work, pro hac vice, Harrison J. Frahn, IV, Simpson Thacher &
Bartlett LLP, pro hac vice, Jayma M. Meyer, Simpson Thacher &
Bartlett LLP, pro hac vice, Kim Turner, Legal Aid At Work, pro hac
vice & Jongwook Philip Kim, ACLU.

A. P., Plaintiff, represented by Elizabeth Bixby, Legal Aid at
Work, pro hac vice, Mateo Caballero, ACLU & Jongwook Philip Kim,
ACLU.

Hawaii State Department of Education, Defendant, represented by
John M. Cregor, Jr., Office of the Attorney General Civil Rights
Litigation.

Oahu Interscholastic Association, Defendant, represented by Lyle
S.
Hosoda, Hosoda & Bonner.


HEALTHALL CONSULTING: Consultant Class in Dyse Cond. Certified
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, HEATHER DYSE, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated Plaintiff, v. HEALTHALL CONSULTING, Defendant,
Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-10704-PBS (D. Mass.), Judge Patti B. Saris
of the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts
allowed in part Dyse's motion to conditionally certify a nationwide
collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and
issuance of a notice.

On April 12, 2019, Dyse filed a collective action complaint seeking
payment of unpaid overtime wages.  Dyse brings the action against
HealthAll under the FLSA seeking payment of unpaid overtime wages.
Dyse alleges she was misclassified as an independent contractor.

HealthAll moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), and Dyse opposed.  

HealthAll, headquartered in North Andover, Massachusetts, provides
information technology educational services to the healthcare
industry across the country.  It contracts with consultants to
deliver training and support to client healthcare facilities in
connection with the implementation of new electronic recordkeeping
systems.  Consultants such as Dyse were assigned to provide
educational and support services to healthcare staff at Huntsville
Hospital in Huntsville, Alabama.  Consultants regularly worked over
40 hours a week for HealthAll.

In August 2019, Dyse moved for Conditional Certification.  Dyse
requests that the Court conditionally certifies the following
collective action group: All individuals who worked for HealthAll
providing training and support to HealthAll's health care clients
in using electronic recordkeeping systems in the United States
during the past three years, who did not receive overtime for hours
worked over forty in a week and were classified as independent
contractors.

HealthAll opposed.  Dyse further filed a motion for an emergency
protective order requesting that HealthAll be prohibited from
distributing a contract addendum to its consultants which required
them to assure HealthAll that they were not and would not be a part
of any lawsuit against HealthAll regarding the payment of overtime
wages.

The Court held a hearing on Dec. 6, 2019, in which it denied
HealthAll's motion to dismiss and granted Dyse's motion for an
emergency protective order.

Judge Saris finds that Dyse has not shown the existence of
similarly situated consultants at locations outside of Huntsville
Hospital.  There is no evidence in the record that consultants
outside of Huntsville Hospital performed similar duties, were
subject to similar conditions and operated under a similar
compensation scheme.  Accordingly, certification is limited to
consultants who currently perform work or who have performed work
for Huntsville Hospital in Huntsville, Alabama.

Accordingly, Judge Saris allows conditional certification of the
collective action group proposed by Dyse limited to consultants who
perform or who have performed work for Huntsville Hospital in
Huntsville, Alabama in the past three years.

In addition to seeking conditional certification, Dyse asks the
Court to approve her proposed notice to the potential opt-in
Plaintiffs.  She attaches as exhibits to her motion a
"Court-Authorized Notice of Your Right to 'Opt-In' to Claims
Brought Under the FLSA Against HealthAll Consulting, LLC" and a
"Consent to Join and Authorization to Represent."  HealthAll
contests the notice, arguing that it is not impartial and does not
give sufficient information to ensure that group members are
similarly situated.

After review, the Judge approved the Proposed Notice and Consent
Forms as applied to consultants in Huntsville for the last three
years.  A 90-day deadline is acceptable.

In sum, Judge Saris allowed Dyse's motion for conditional
certification.  The following collective action group is
conditionally certified:

     All individuals who worked for HealthAll at Huntsville
     Hospital in Huntsville, Alabama, providing training and
     support to HealthAll's healthcare clients in using electronic
     recordkeeping systems in the United States during the past
     three years, who did not receive overtime for hours worked
     over forty in a week and were classified as independent
contractors.

Judge Saris denied without prejudice the motion for conditional
certification of a nationwide class.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 7, 2020 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://is.gd/IbVhlR from Leagle.com.

Heather Dyse, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Alexandra K. Piazza, Berger
Montague, PC, pro hac vice, David M. Blanchard, Blanchard & Walker,
PLLC, pro hac vice, Frances J. Hollander, Blanchard & Walker, PLLC,
pro hac vice, Sarah R. Schalman-Bergen, Berger & Montague, P.C.,
Harold L. Lichten -- hlichten@llrlaw.com -- Lichten & Liss-Riordan,
P.C. & Olena Savytska -- osavytska@llrlaw.com -- Lichten &
Liss-Riordan, P.C.

HealthAll Consulting LLC, Defendant, represented by Michael L.
Coyne, Coyne and Condurelli & Artemis Dimitriadis, Amy
Dimitriadis.


HP INC: Fonseca Can't Intervene in Forsyth Job Discrimination Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Edward J. Davila of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, San Jose Division, denied Bryant Fonseca's
motion to intervene in the case, DONNA J. FORSYTH, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. HP INC., et al., Defendants, Case No.
5:16-cv-04775-EJD (N.D. Cal.).

On Aug. 18, 2016, the Plaintiffs filed a putative class action
alleging that the Defendants violated the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA"), California Fair Employment and Housing Act
("FEHA"), and other California laws.

In October 2013, HP's CEO Meg Whitman stated during a Securities
Analyst Meeting that HP planned to "recalibrate and reshape" the
workforce by "replacing" existing workers with "a whole host of
young people."  The Plaintiffs filed the action alleging that HP's
Workforce Reduction Plan ("WFR") caused age discrimination in
violation of the ADEA, FEHA, and other California laws.  Their
original Complaint and the operative pleading, the SAC, both plead
facts arguing that the Defendants are liable under disparate
treatment and disparate impact (two commonly accepted age
discrimination theories).

On May 8, 2017, Fonseca was terminated from his employment with HP
pursuant to the WFR.  On Nov. 29, 2017, Fonseca filed an action
against Defendants Hewlett-Packard Co., HP, Inc., and HP Enterprise
Services, LLC, in which he alleged, similar to the Plaintiffs, that
the Defendants violated FEHA, ADEA, and other California laws.

On Jan. 12, 2018, the Defendants removed the Fonseca action to
federal court.  On Sept. 5, 2018, the federal court remanded
Fonseca's action.  The Defendants filed a motion to stay the
Fonseca action pending the final resolution of the action.  On
April 12, 2019, the state court stayed the age discrimination
claims because of the "clear overlap" between Fonseca's action and
the case.  The Fonseca action includes antitrust claims, which are
currently being litigated in federal court, and are irrelevant to
the present action.

From April 22 to July 20, 2019, Fonseca states that his counsel met
and conferred with Forsyth's counsel about mediations and possible
intervention.  On July 23, 2019, Fonseca filed his Motion to
Intervene.  On Nov. 18, 2019, the Defendants filed their
Opposition.  The Plaintiffs also filed an Opposition on Nov. 18,
2019.  On Nov. 26, 2019, Fonseca filed two Reply briefs: (1)
Proposed Intervenor's Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Motion to
Intervene ("D Reply") and (2) Proposed Intervenor's Reply to
Plaintiffs' Response to Motion to Intervention ("P Reply").

Fonseca argues that the Court must permit intervention under Rule
24(a)(2) because his action has theories of liability not addressed
in the Forsyth action.  Specifically, he argues that his "failure
to prevent discrimination" claim is not represented as it is not
pled in the Forsyth SAC.  In the alternative, he argues that Rule
24(b)(1)(B) supports the Court using its discretion to permit
intervention.

Judge Davila holds that Fonseca has not overcome his compelling
burden to demonstrate that the Plaintiffs do not adequately
represent his interests.  The Judge finds that (i) Fonseca's and
the Plaintiffs' interests are exactly aligned; and (ii) Fonseca's
disagreement with Plaintiffs' litigation strategies and the pace of
the case does not justify intervention.  The Court denies Fonseca's
motion to intervene as of right.

In the alternative, Fonseca moves for permissive intervention
pursuant to Rule 24(b).  The Court finds that it is unclear how
antitrust claims, which are distinct from the issues in the action,
support jurisdiction.  Indeed, Fonseca provides no precedent
supporting the "independent grounds for jurisdiction" on claims
unrelated to the alleged reason for intervention.  Such an approach
seems inconsistent with the requirement that an "independent" basis
for jurisdiction be established and with the constraints on
jurisdiction present 28 U.S.C. Section 1367.  Accordingly, in its
discretion, the Court denies Fonseca's motion for permissive
intervention.

For the foregoing reasons, the District Court denied Fonseca's
request to intervene.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Jan. 7, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/Gn689o from Leagle.com.

Donna J. Forsyth, for and on behalf of themselves and other
person similarly situated, Sidney L. Staton, III, for and on
behalf of themselves and other person similarly situated, Arun
Vatturi, for and on behalf of themselves and other person
similarly situated & Dan Weiland, for and on behalf of themselves
and other person similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by
Douglas P. Dehler -- Doug.Dehler@wilaw.com -- O'Neil Cannon
Hollman DeJong and Laing SC, pro hac vice, Paul Zimmer --
Paul.Zimmer@wilaw.com -- O'Neil, Cannon, Hollman, DeJong and
Laing S.C., pro hac vice, Leland Humphrey Belew --
leland.belew@andrusanderson.com -- Andrus Anderson LLP & Jennie
Lee Anderson -- jennie@andrusanderson.com -- Andrus Anderson LLP.

Shafiq Rahman, Ed Kaplan, Karen Becks & Albert R. DeVere,
Plaintiffs, represented by Douglas P. Dehler, O'Neil Cannon
Hollman DeJong and Laing SC, Jennie Lee Anderson, Andrus Anderson
LLP & Leland Humphrey Belew, Andrus Anderson LLP.

HP Inc. & Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company, Defendants,
represented by Shannon Rutledge Creasy -- screasy@littler.com --
Littler Mendelson, PC, pro hac vice, Allan G. King --
agking@littler.com -- Benjamin A. Emmert -- bemmert@littler.com -
- Littler Mendelson, pro hac vice, Donald William Myers --
dwmyers@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, PC, pro hac vice, John
Sung Hong -- jhong@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C., Lisa
A. Schreter -- lschreter@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C. &
Richard W. Black -- rblack@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson,
P.C., pro hac vice.


HY-VEE INC: Faces Greenstate Credit Suit in District of Minnesota
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Hy-Vee, Inc. The case
is styled as Greenstate Credit Union, on Behalf of Itself and All
Others Similarly Situated v. Hy-Vee, Inc., Case No.
0:20-cv-00621-DSD-DTS (D. Minn., Feb. 27, 2020).

The nature of suit is stated as Other P.I.

Hy-Vee, Inc. operates as a supermarket. The Company offers bakery,
catering, floral, gift, meat, seafood, pharmacy, grocery, and other
meal products. Hy-Vee serves customers in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bryan L. Bleichner, Esq.
          Karl L. Cambronne, Esq.
          CHESTNIT CAMBRONE PA
          100 Washington Avenue South, Suite 1700
          Minneapolis, MN 55401
          Phone: (612) 339-7300
          Fax: (612) 336-2940
          Email: bbleichner@chestnutcambronne.com
                 kcambronne@chestnutcambronne.com

               - and -

          Gary F. Lynch, Esq.
          Jamisen A Etzel, Esq.
          CARLSON LYNCH SWEET & KILPELA, LLP
          1133 Penn Avenue, 5th Floor
          Pittsburgh, PA 15222
          Phone: (412) 322-9243
          Email: glynch@carlsonlynch.com
                 jetzel@carlsonlynch.com

               - and -

          Karen Hanson Riebel, Esq.
          Kate M. Baxter-Kauf, Esq.
          Stephen Matthew Owen, Esq.
          LOCKRIDGE GRINDAL NAUEN PLLP
          100 Washington Ave. S, Suite 2200
          Minneapolis, MN 55401-2179
          Phone: (612) 339-6900
          Fax: (612) 339-0981
          Email: khriebel@locklaw.com
                 kmbaxter-kauf@locklaw.com
                 smowen@locklaw.com


INLET BAY AT GATEWAY: Turizo Sues Over Illegal Telemarketing Calls
------------------------------------------------------------------
Ryan Turizo, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Inlet Bay At Gateway, LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 20-cv-60172 (S.D. Fla., January 27, 2020), seeks injunctive
relief, statutory damages and any other available legal or
equitable remedies resulting from violations of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act.

Inlet Bay at Gateway is a residential dwelling located at 12000 4th
St N, St. Petersburg. It attempted to contact Turizo via SMS on her
cellular telephone offering rental apartments using an automatic
telephone dialing system. Turizo did not give his express consent
to be contact in this manner. [BN]

Barbieri is represented by:

      Thomas J. Patti, Esq
      Jibrael S. Hindi, Esq.
      THE LAW OFFICE OF JIBRAEL S. HINDI, PLLC
      110 SE 6th Street
      Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
      Telephone: (954) 907-1136
      Facsimile: (855) 529-9540
      Email: jibrael@jibraellaw.com
             tom@jibraellaw.com


JPMORGAN CHASE: Turizo Sues Over Unsolicited Marketing Messages
---------------------------------------------------------------
Ryan Turizo, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., Case No. 0:20-cv-60428-RAR (S.D.
Fla., Feb. 27, 2020), arises from the Defendant's unsolicited
telemarketing that violates the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

To solicit consumers for its AARP Credit Card, the Defendant
engages in unsolicited prerecorded message marketing with no regard
for privacy rights of the recipients of those messages, the
Plaintiff asserts. The Defendant caused thousands of unsolicited
prerecorded messages to be sent to the cellular telephones of the
Plaintiff and class members, causing them injuries, including
invasion of their privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on
seclusion, trespass, and conversion, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff is a natural person, who was and is a citizen and
resident of Broward County, Florida. The Plaintiff seeks injunctive
relief to halt the Defendant's alleged illegal conduct.

The Defendant is a foreign corporation with a principal address in
New York City.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq.
          HIRALDO P.A.
          401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Phone: 954.400.4713
          Email: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com

               - and –

          Jibrael S. Hindi, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF JIBRAEL S. HINDI
          110 SE 6th Street, Suite 1744
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Phone: 954-907-1136
          Fax: 855-529-9540
          Email: jibrael@jibraellaw.com


LJM PRESERVATION: June 3 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
--------------------------------------------------------
CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY
STATE OF ILLINOIS

SUMMARY NOTICE OF (I) PROPOSED CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENT; (II) SETTLEMENT FAIRNESS HEARING; AND
(III) MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES

TO:  All persons and entities who held a Limited Partnership
Interest in: (i) the LJM Preservation and Growth Fund, L.P.; (ii)
the Asset Class I Series of LJM Fund, L.P.; or (iii) the PFC-LJM
Fund, L.P. as of February 6, 2018

PLEASE READ THIS NOTICE CAREFULLY. YOUR RIGHTS WILL BE AFFECTED BY
A CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT PENDING IN THIS COURT.

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED, pursuant to the Illinois Rules of Civil
Procedure and an Order of the Circuit Court of Cook County,
Illinois, that the Plaintiffs and LJM Partners, Ltd. ("LJM"),
Anthony Caine ("Caine"), Kathryn McBride, Anish Parvataneni, Arjuna
Ariathurai, Lauren C. Savino, Pacific Futures and Capital, LLC, J.
Scott Sykora, James E. Dickinson, Bryan Thurston, and Chun Liu
("LJM Defendants") in Lundgren-Wiedinmyer, et al. v. LJM Partners,
Ltd., et al., Case No. 18-CH-10712 ("Action") have reached a
proposed settlement of the Action.  The Settlement does not include
any cash for distribution to Class Members.  Instead, the
Settlement provides that one of the Defendants, Anthony Caine, will
provide an assignment of 20% of any monies he recovers in a current
lawsuit brought by Defendant LJM Partners, Ltd. alleging the
manipulation of the VIX ("VIX Manipulation Case").  The Settlement
also provides for a payment of $175,000, of which the attorneys
will be seeking court approval of $100,000 in fees and expenses,
$40,000 in incentive payments for the Class Representatives, and
$35,000 to pay notice costs.  If the Settlement is approved, it
will resolve all claims against the LJM Defendants in the Action.

A hearing will be held on June 3, 2020, at 11:00 a.m., before the
Honorable Raymond Mitchell at Courtroom 2601 of the Circuit Court
of Cook County, Illinois, 50 W. Washington Street, Chicago, IL
60602, to determine: (1) whether the proposed Settlement should be
approved as fair, reasonable, and adequate; (2) whether the Action
should be dismissed with prejudice against the LJM Defendants, and
the Releases specified and described in the Settlement Agreement
should be approved; (3) whether Class Counsel's motion for an award
of attorneys' fees and expenses in the amount of $100,000 from the
Settlement Fund should be approved; (4) whether Class Counsel's
motion for an incentive award for Class Representatives in the
amount of $5,000 for each of them (for a total of $40,000) should
be approved; and (5) any other matter related to the Settlement
that the Court deems appropriate.  

If you are a member of the Settlement Class, your rights will be
affected by the pending Action and the Settlement. If you have not
yet received the Long-Form Notice, you may obtain copies of this
document by contacting the Settlement Administrator at:
Lundgren-Wiedinmyer LJM Funds State Action, c/o A.B. Data, Ltd.,
P.O. Box 173095, Milwaukee, WI 53217, (877) 212-3362. Copies of the
Long-Form Notice can also be downloaded from the website maintained
by the Settlement Administrator,
www.LJMPartnersStateLitigation.com.   

If additional funds are recovered by LJM Partners, Ltd. from the
VIX Manipulation Case, a claims process will be commenced in this
Action.  Therefore, if you are a Settlement Class Member, and do
not exclude yourself, you should retain any and all records of your
ownership and transactions in:  (i) the LJM Preservation and Growth
Fund, L.P.; (ii) the Asset Class I Series of LJM Fund, L.P.; or
(iii) the PFC-LJM Fund, L.P.

If you are a member of the Settlement Class and wish to exclude
yourself from the Settlement Class, you must submit a request for
exclusion so that it is received no later than March 25, 2020, in
accordance with the instructions set forth in the Long-Form Notice.
If you properly exclude yourself from the Settlement Class, you
will not be bound by any judgments or orders entered by the Court
in the Action and you will not be able to participate in any future
potential recovery from the Assignment.

Any objections to the proposed Settlement, Class Counsel's motion
for attorneys' fees and reimbursement of expenses, or Class
Counsel's request for incentive awards for the Class
Representatives must be filed with the Court and delivered to Class
Counsel such that they are received no later than May 11, 2020, in
accordance with the instructions set forth in the Long-Form
Notice.

If you have questions regarding this Summary Notice, please do not
contact the Court.  All questions about this Notice, the proposed
Settlement, or your eligibility to participate in the Settlement
should be directed to Class Counsel or the Settlement
Administrator.

Requests for the Long-Form Notice should be made to:
Lundgren-Wiedinmyer LJM Funds State Action, c/o A.B. Data, Ltd.,
P.O. Box 173095, Milwaukee, WI 53217; (877) 212-3362 toll-free; or
info@LJMPartnersStateLitigation.com.

Inquiries, other than requests for the Long-Form Notice, should be
made to Class Counsel: Michael E. Criden, Esq., Criden & Love,
P.A., 7301 S.W. 57th Court, Suite 515, South Miami, FL 33143; (305)
357-9000; lgrossman@cridenlove.com.

Dated:   February 10, 2020    
By Order of the Court [GN]


LOGISTICARE SOLUTIONS: Class in Bunton FLSA Suit Cond. Certified
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SHANIQUA BUNTON, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL
OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff, v. LOGISTICARE SOLUTIONS,
LLC, Defendant, Case No. A-19-CV-00372-LY-SH (W.D. Tex.),
Magistrate Judge Susan Hightower of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Texas, Austin Division, granted in part the
Plaintiff's Opposed Motion for Conditional Certification and Notice
to the Putative Class Members, filed July 11, 2019.

The case is a collective action to recover unpaid back wages
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended
("FLSA"), which establishes federal minimum-wage and overtime
standards.  Defendant LogistiCare brokers non-emergency medical
transportation programs for state government agencies and managed
care organizations.  It employs more than 3,160 non-exempt
employees at its 18 call centers in 16 states.

Plaintiff Bunton was employed by LogistiCare in Austin, Texas, as
an hourly Customer Service Representative from 2017 to 2018.  In
her Complaint, Bunton alleges that LogistiCare required her and
other members of the putative class to work without compensation
for up to 20 minutes before the official beginning of each of their
scheduled work shifts to start their computers and log in to all
LogistiCare programs.  She further alleges that she and other
putative class members were not compensated at the rates required
by the FLSA for similar amounts of time they spent rebooting their
computers after each of multiple weekly computer crashes, nor for
any break time that exceeded fifteen minutes, including time worked
in excess of a forty-hour workweek.  In all, Bunton alleges that
she often worked from one to three hours in addition to her
scheduled hours each week without compensation.  She also asserts a
class action alleging violations of Texas common law.

Before the Court are the Plaintiff's Opposed Motion for Conditional
Certification and Notice to the Putative Class Members, filed July
11, 2019 , and the related response and reply briefs.  On Dec. 6,
2019, the District Court referred all pending and future motions in
the case to Magistrate Judge Hightower.

Bunton asks the Court to conditionally certify her proposed class:
All hourly call-center employees who worked for LogistiCare
Solutions LLC, anywhere in the United States, at any time in the
past three years through the final disposition of the matter.

LogistiCare argues that employees at its call centers do different
jobs,  and submitted evidence that some non-exempt call center
employees may or may not need to log in to the telephone system to
perform their jobs.  In her reply, Bunton states that she would
agree to amend the class definition to clarify that only those who
must log into their various systems before they are paid are
included.

Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Hightower amends the putative class
definition to the following: All hourly call-center employees who
worked for LogistiCare Solutions LLC, anywhere in the United
States, at any time in the past three years through the final
disposition of the matter, who were required to log in to their
computers, phones, and internet programs before beginning their
work for the day.

Magistrate Judge Hightower also finds that because Bunton has
stated a FLSA violation and the evidence before the Court shows
that there is a reasonable basis for crediting Bunton's assertions
that other aggrieved individuals exist, that they are similarly
situated to her, and that at least some of them desire to opt into
the case, Bunton has provided sufficient evidence to satisfy the
first stage of the Lusardi analysis.  The Magistrate therefore
conditionally certifies the case as a collective action under 29
U.S.C. Section 216(b) with respect to the putative class, as
amended, identified.

Magistrate Judge Hightower identifies no apparent problems with the
proposed notice and consent format, nor with the proposed
distribution order, except that LogistiCare will not be required to
disclose the dates of birth or the driver's license numbers of the
putative class members.  Nonetheless, as LogistiCare has requested,
the parties are ordered to confer on the specifics of the notice
within 21 days of the date of the order.  LogistiCare must disclose
to Bunton the potential class members' names, addresses, e-mail
addresses, telephone numbers, and dates of employment, "in a usable
electronic format," at or before the conference.

Magistrate Judge Hightower granted in part the Plaintiff's Opposed
Motion for Conditional Certification and Notice to the Putative
Class Members.  She conditionally certified the class of all hourly
call-center employees who worked for LogistiCare Solutions LLC,
anywhere in the United States, at any time in the past three years
through the final disposition of the matter, who were required to
log in to their computers, phones, and internet programs before
beginning their work for the day.

The parties were directed must submit to the Court for
consideration either a joint proposed notice and consent form or
competing options for notice, including an indication as to which
portions are agreed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 22, 2020 Order is available at
https://is.gd/7XASqG from Leagle.com.

Shaniqua Bunton, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Alan Clifton Gordon --
cgordon@a2xlaw.com -- Anderson2X, PLLC, Carter T. Hastings --
carter@a2xlaw.com -- Anderson2X, PLLC, Lauren E. Braddy --
lauren@a2xlaw.com -- Anderson2X, PLLC & William Clifton Alexander,
Anderson Alexander, PLLC.

Logisticare Solutions, LLC, Defendant, represented by Rachel Z.
Ullrich -- rullrich@fordharrison.com -- Ford Harrison.

LOOMIS ARMORED: Mailing of CAFA Notices in Myers FLSA Suit Approved
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Shakeera Myers, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Loomis Armored US LLC, Defendant,
Civil Action No. 3:18-cv-00532-FSW-DSC (W.D. N.C.), Magistrate
Judge David S. Cayer of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina granted the Parties' Joint Motion to
Mail Class Action Fairness Act Notice by Jan. 9, 2020.

The Settlement Administrator was to issue CAFA Notices to the
appropriate state and federal officials by Jan. 9, 2020.  Sending
of the CAFA Notices on Jan. 9, 2020, will not trigger CAFA's
non-compliance provisions under 28 U.S.C. section 1715(e).

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 31, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/mX66qP from Leagle.com.

Shakeera Myers, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Charles Robert Ash, IV --
crash@sommerspc.com -- Sommers Schwartz, P.C., pro hac vice,
Charlotte Claire Smith -- csmith@gildahernandezlaw.com -- Law
Offices of Gilda A. Hernandez, Matthew L. Turner --
mturner@sommerspc.com -- Sommers Schwartz, P.C., pro hac vice &
Gilda Adriana Hernandez -- ghernandez@gildahernandezlaw.com -- The
Law Offices of Gilda A. Hernandez.

Loomis Armored US, LLC, Defendant, represented by Claire B. Deason
-- cdeason@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson P.C., pro hac vice,
Jerry Howard Walters, Jr. -- jwalters@littler.com -- Littler
Mendelson, P.C. & Lyndsey M. Marcelino, Littler Mendelson P.C.,
pro hac vice.


LUCKY SEVEN: Fails to Pay Minimum and OT Wages, Roncancio Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
Reny Roncancio, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated
v. LUCKY SEVEN RESTAURANT & BAR LLC., d/b/a LUCKY 7 TAPAS BAR; LA
CASA DEL MOFONGO 207 LLC, JULIO MIRANDA, DAVID DISHI, LIOR DISHI or
any other related entity, Case No. 651320/2020 (N.Y. Sup., New York
Cty., Feb. 27, 2020), is brought pursuant to New York Labor Law to
recover overtime wages, minimum wage, unlawfully retained
gratuities, spread of hours compensation, and unpaid wages owed to
the Plaintiff.

According to the complaint, the Defendants engaged in a regular
pattern and practice of unlawfully reporting and retaining the
earned tips of tipped employees in violation of the NYLL. The
Defendants failed to distribute all of the Plaintiff's tips. The
Plaintiff worked more than 40 hours a week while employed by the
Defendants. The Plaintiff  alleges that she did not receive
overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in
any given week.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as a server and
waitress.

LUCKY SEVEN RESTAURANT & BAR LLC, d/b/a LUCKY 7 TAPAS BAR, is
engaged in the restaurant business.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. Tompkins, Esq.
          LEEDS BROWN LAW, P.C.
          One Old Country Road, Suite 347
          Carle Place, NY 11514
          Phone: (516) 873-9550


MALCOLM CISNEROS: Court Enters Final Judgment in Aikens Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Josephine L. Staton of the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California has entered final judgment in the
case, Delia Aikens, on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Malcolm Cisneros, A Law Corporation,
Defendant; Malcolm Cisneros, A Law Corporation, Third-party
Plaintiff, v. Panatte, LLC, and Special Default Services, Inc.,
Third-party Defendants, Case No. 5:17-cv-02462-JLS-SP (C.D. Cal.).

On Dec. 13, 2019, the Court held a fairness hearing regarding the
parties' proposed class action settlement.  Thereafter, it finally
approved the settlement by Order dated Jan. 2, 2020.

Judge Staton finds the settlement proposed by the parties in the
proposed Settlement Agreement is fair, adequate and reasonable.
She further finds that the Settlement Agreement is the product of
good faith, non-collusive, and arms-length negotiations between the
parties, and confers a significant benefit to the class.

The Judge approved the $6,900 non-revisionary class fund and $1,000
statutory damages payment to named Plaintiff Delia Aikens.  The
total anticipated administration cost of $2,880.80 is reasonable.


The Judge awarded the class counsel $80,004.33 in attorneys' fees
and reimbursement of $1,095.67 in costs and litigation expenses.

The releases, waivers and covenant not to sue by Plaintiff Delia
Aikens and the Class Members, as set forth in the Settlement
Agreement, are approved.  The released claims are consequently
compromised, settled, released, discharged, and dismissed with
prejudice by virtue of these proceedings and the Judgment.

The action is dismissed with prejudice as to all other issues
concerning the Plaintiff's and the class members' claims against
the Defendant.  

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 5, 2020 Final Judgment is
available at https://is.gd/ob5yiJ from Leagle.com.

Delia Aikens, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Todd M. Friedman --
tfriedman@toddflaw.com -- Law Office of Todd M Friedman PC & Jesse
S. Johnson -- jjohnson@gdrlawfirm.com -- Greenwald Davidson Radbil
PLLC, pro hac vice.

Malcolm Cisneros, A Law Corporation, Defendant, represented by
Benjamin C. Wohlfeil -- BWohlfeil@KlinedinstLaw.com -- Klinedinst
PC, Heather Rosing -- hrosing@KlinedinstLaw.com -- Klinedinst Law
Offices & Christopher D. Holt -- CHolt@KlinedinstLaw.com --
Klinedinst PC.


MAPLE VIEW HOLDINGS: Faces Hedges ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Maple View Holdings
Corp. The case is styled as Donna Hedges, for herself and on behalf
of all other persons similarly situated v. Maple View Holdings
Corp., Case No. 1:20-cv-01754 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 27, 2020).

The Plaintiff alleges violation of the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Maple View Holdings Corp. does business categorized under Non-Bank
Holding Companies.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin Alexander Zeller, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF JUSTIN A. ZELLER, P.C.
          277 Broadway, Suite 408
          New York, NY 10007
          Phone: (212) 229-2249
          Fax: (212) 229-2246
          Email: jazeller@zellerlegal.com


MDL 2433: Cohen & Dahl Testimonies Excluded in Personal Injury Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY C-8
PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION. This document relates to: Angela Swartz
and Teddy Swartz v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, Case No.
2:18-cv-00136, Civil Action No. 2:13-md-2433 (S.D. Ohio), Judge
Edmund A. Sargus, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio, Eastern Division, granted (i) the Plaintiffs'
Motion to Exclude the Specific Causation Opinions and Testimony of
Defendant's Expert Dr. Samuel Cohen; and (ii) the Plaintiffs'
Motion to Exclude the Specific Causation Opinions and Testimony of
Defendant's Expert Dr. Douglas Dahl.

The litigation between the parties in the multidistrict litigation
("MDL") began in 2001 in a class action in West Virginia state
court captioned Leach v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., No.
01-C-698 (Wood County W. Va. Cir. Ct.).  The Leach Case ended in
November 2004 when the parties entered into a class-wide
settlement.  

In the Leach Settlement Agreement, the parties fashioned a unique
procedure to determine whether the approximately 80,000 members of
the class would be permitted to file actions against Defendant E.
I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. based on any of the human diseases
they believed had been caused by their exposure to ammonium
perfluorooctanoate ("C-8" or "PFOA") discharged from DuPont's
Washington Works plant.  The procedure required DuPont and the
plaintiff's to jointly select three completely independent,
mutually-agreeable, appropriately credentialed epidemiologists
("Science Panel") to study human disease among the Leach Class.

The Science Panel engaged in what ultimately became one of the
largest epidemiological studies ever convened, utilizing nearly
70,000 blood samples and medical histories of the Leach Class
members, and lasting seven years.  In 2012, the Science Panel
delivered Probable Link Findings for six human diseases ("Linked
Diseases"): kidney cancer, testicular cancer, thyroid disease,
ulcerative colitis, diagnosed high cholesterol
(hypercholesterolemia), and pregnancy-induced hypertension and
preeclampsia.  

The Probable Link Finding means that for the Leach Class members it
is more likely than not that there is a link between their exposure
to C-8 (i.e., drinking water containing at least .05 ppb of C-8 for
at least one year) and their Linked Disease.  Ultimately, over
3,500 individuals filed cases in the MDL, all of whom alleged that
they are Leach Class members, are subject to the Leach Settlement
Agreement, have a Linked Diseases, and that C-8 specifically caused
their Linked Disease.

The Science Panel also delivered No Probable Link Findings for
approximately 50 diseases it studied.  Any Leach Class member who
received a No Probable Link Finding was prohibited from filing a
personal injury action against DuPont as a result of being subject
to the Leach Settlement Agreement, regardless of whether any other
study or expert disagreed with the Science Panel' No Probable Link
Finding.

Beginning in February 2015, the Court held four month-long trials
in the MDL: Carla Marie Bartlett v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours and
Company, Case No. 2:13-cv-170; David Freeman v. E. I. du Pont de
Nemours and Co., 2:13-cv-1103; Kenneth Vigneron, Sr. v. E. I. du
Pont de Nemours Company, Case No. 13-cv-136, and; Larry Ogle Moody
v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours Company, Case No. 15-cv-803.  The first
two trials were bellwether trials and the second two were
non-bellwether trials.  The parties reached a global settlement of
the 3,500-plus cases in February 2017.

Since the global settlement, over 50 cases have been filed
("Post-Settlement Cases").  As did the plaintiff's in the
pre-settlement cases, the plaintiff's in these Post-Settlement
Cases allege that they are Leach Class members, are subject to the
Leach Settlement Agreement, have a Linked Diseases, and that C-8
specifically caused their Linked Disease.  Pursuant to the Court's
trial schedule, the parties have filed their motions directed at
experts.

The Plaintiff moves for exclusion of the opinions and testimony of
DuPont's specific causation expert, Samuel M. Cohen, M.D., PhD, for
the same reasons the Court excluded Dr. Cohen's testimony and
opinions in the first trial in the action, Bartlett.  In Bartlett,
DuPont offered Dr. Cohen as its specific causation expert and the
Plaintiff moved for exclusion of his opinions and testimony as
irrelevant and unreliable.

The Court addressed issues related to Dr. Cohen in Evidentiary
Motions Order No. ("EMO") 1 and EMO 1-A.  Because the Court finds
that the reasons for exclusion of Dr. Cohen's testimony and
opinions in Bartlett are present in his testimony and opinions in
the case, the Court incorporates both EMO 1 and EMO 1-A, and
addresses portions of them herein in explanation of the issues at
hand.

In EMO 1, the Court excluded Dr. Cohen's and Dr. Hanauer's ultimate
causation opinions because, although the experts framed their
"analysis as relating to specific causation, in actuality the
analysis is directed at what the parties defined in the Leach
Settlement Agreement as general causation," which is not a triable
issue.

In EMO 1-A, the Court clarified its exclusion of Dr. Cohen's
testimony and opinions as irrelevant, stating that in EMO 1, the
Court excluded Dr. Cohen's general causation testimony and
opinions, and it reaffirms that exclusion.  Dr. Cohen's referenced
testimony is not relevant because there is no connection between
the opinion being offered and any disputed factual issues that are
before the Court.  Because Rule 702 requires that the evidence or
testimony 'assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence,'
expert testimony which does not relate to any issue in the case is
not relevant and ergo, nonhelpful.  In other words, there must be a
'fit' between the proposed testimony and the question(s) presented
by the case at bar.  Dr. Cohen's testimony is not relevant because
it cannot assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine any fact in issue [i.e., specific causation].

The Court also found Dr. Cohen's opinions unreliable for, inter
alia, these opinions contradict the threshold used in (a) the Leach
Settlement Agreement, and (b) the Science Panel's Probable Link
Finding.  In other words, Dr. Cohen opines that C-8 has not been
found to be capable of causing kidney cancer in a member of the
Leach Class.  He cannot testify to this.  Because of Dr. Cohen's
faulty premises, his differential diagnosis is unreliable.  A
differential diagnosis, which is a standard scientific technique of
identifying the cause of a medical problem by eliminating the
likely causes until the most probable one is isolated.  The
reliability of a differential diagnosis is determined by, inter
alia, whether the expert reliably rule[d] in the possible causes of
the disease under consideration.  The Court previously held that
Dr. Cohen's differential diagnosis is unreliable, explainingthat
the Probable Link Findings are valid and reliable evidence
admissible to establish that it is more likely than not that there
is a link between the Trial Plaintiffs' exposure to and/or dose of
C-8 and their Linked Diseases.

In the instant action, Dr. Cohen states that there is only a 10%
increased likelihood of developing a Probable Link Disease, and
similarly in Bartlett, Dr. Cohen stated that there was only a small
increased risk of developing the Probable Link Disease.  Likewise,
in instant case and in Bartlett, Dr. Cohen opines that the
increased risk was found only at much higher exposures than that to
which Mrs. Bartlett or Mrs. Swartz had been exposed.  

Judge Sargus rejects this position for the same reasons the Court
has previously rejected it: The parties contractually agreed to
application of the Probable Link Findings and the No Probable Link
Findings to every member of the Leach Class.  Thus, each Plaintiff
in the MDL who can prove that he or she is a member of the Leach
Class and has or had one of the six Linked Diseases receives the
benefit of the Probable Link Finding in the same way that DuPont
received the benefit of the No Probable Link Findings related to
over 40 human diseases.

As Plaintiff correctly notes, experts may offer compelling
arguments as to temporality, genetics, or other factors (none of
which were attempted in the case) might be employed to demonstrate
another specific cause of the cancer, but the Defendants cannot
redefine the Probable Link findings in order to lessen the relative
risk percentage so as to boot strap an otherwise nonviable
alternative differential diagnosis.  Such an endeavor strips the
class members of everything for which they bargained in the Leach
settlement.

While DuPont will only present one specific causation expert at
trial, it has named and provided reports for a second expert as
well: Douglas M. Dahl, M.D.  The Plaintiffs move to exclude the
opinions and testimony of Dr. Dahl for the same reasons it moved to
exclude the testimony and opinions of Dr. Cohen.

The Court holds that the Plaintiffs' arguments are well taken.  Dr.
Dahl provides the same ultimate causation opinion as Dr. Cohen and
utilized the same methodology to reach his conclusions.
Consequently, for the same reasons explained and in EMO 1 and EMO
1-A, the Court also excludes the opinions and testimony of Dr.
Dahl.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Sargus granted (i) the Plaintiff's
Motion to Exclude the Specific Causation Opinion and Testimony of
Defendant's Expert Dr. Samuel Cohen, and (ii) the Plaintiffs'
Motion to Exclude the Specific Causation Opinions and Testimony of
Defendant's Expert Dr. Douglas Dahl.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Dec. 31, 2019 Order is
available at https://is.gd/YAkQY7 from Leagle.com.

Thomas Yakubik, Ronald Bachtel, Cheryl Durst, Robert Durst, Larry
Turley, Linda Turley, Sharon Arnott, Kathy Willis & Troy Willis,
Plaintiffs, represented by David G. Utley, Collins, Roche, Utley &
Garner, LLC, 875 Westpoint Parkway, Suite 500, Cleveland, Ohio
44145, Jon C. Conlin, Cory Watson Crowder & DeGaris, Michael A.
London, Douglas & London, PC, 59 Maiden Ln, 6th Floor, New York,
NY
10038, pro hac vice, Ethan T. Vessels, Fields, Dehmlow & Vessels
LLC, 309 2nd St., Marietta, OH 45750-2921 & Gregory Harold
Collins,
Collins, Roche, Utley & Garner, 875 Westpoint Parkway, Suite 500,
Cleveland, Ohio 44145

Betty Bragg, Lotie Cline, Linda Davis, Crystal Forshey, Vicky
Lightfritz, Willard Lightfritz, Kathy Lowe, Kit McPeek-Stalnaker,
Thomas Eugene Molden, Jack Offenberger, Kay Sheridan, Herbert
Short, John Wright & Amber Wriston, Plaintiffs, represented by
Debra Anne Nelson dnelson@debranelsonlaw.com -- The Nelson Law
Firm, LLC, Jon C. Conlin, Cory Watson Crowder & DeGaris, 875
Westpoint Parkway, Suite 500, Cleveland, Ohio 44145, Michael A.
London, Douglas & London, PC, pro hac vice, Nina M. Towle, Cory
Watson Attorneys, pro hac vice & Richard A. Wright, Cory Watson
Attorneys, 875 Westpoint Parkway, Suite 500, Cleveland, Ohio
44145,
pro hac vice.

E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, Defendant, represented by
Damond R. Mace -- damond.mace@squirepb.com -- Squire Patton Boggs
(US) LLP, Aaron Todd Brogdon -- aaron.brogdon@squirepb.com --
Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP, Aneca E. Lasley --
aneca.lasley@squirepb.com -- Squire Sanders (US) LLP, C. Craig
Woods -- craig.woods@squirepb.com -- Squire Patton Boggs (US)LLP,
Clifford F. Kinney, Jr. -- ckinney@spilman.com -- Spilman Thomas &
Battle, PLLC, pro hac vice, D. Patrick Long --
patrick.long@squirepb.com -- Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP,David J.
Millstone, pro hac vice, John K. Sherk -- jsherk@shb.com -- SHOOK,
HARDY & BACON LLP, pro hac vice, Kevin T. Van Wart --
kevin.vanwart@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis, pro hac vice.


MISSISSIPPI: Oliver Law Group Sues Over Prison Conditions
---------------------------------------------------------
Oliver Law Group, P.C. has submitted a class action complaint filed
on behalf of 14 prisoners confined at the Mississippi State
Penitentiary at Parchman regarding unacceptable prison conditions.

Due to the state of Mississippi's failure to properly fund, staff,
and maintain its prisons, many inmates are currently being confined
in conditions which pose serious and imminent dangers to their
safety and well-being.

The shortage of correctional officers on staff at Mississippi State
Penitentiary at Parchman in particular has created an environment
in which the inmates are susceptible to violence, gang influence,
and prolonged states of anarchy. Running water is scarce, mold is
rampant, and inmates are forced to sleep on the floor with no
mattresses or pillows. Since January 1, 2020, no less than nine
inmates have died at Parchman and at least two others have escaped.
Prison reform activists have called for the facility to be shut
down since the 1990s but attempts to close or reform Parchman have
been unsuccessful.

In January, Jay-Z and Yo Gotti filed a case for injunctive release
in an effort to obtain better conditions for Parchman inmates.

Now the Oliver Law Group has partnered with Calderon Law against
the Mississippi Department of Corrections. The Defendants are
Pelicia E. Hall, the Commissioner of the Mississippi Department of
Corrections, her successors, and Marshal Turner, the Superintendent
of the Mississippi State Penitentiary.

This lawsuit is seeking damages on behalf of inmates whose 8th
amendment rights have been violated.

This is the only class action lawsuit that seeks monetary damages
on behalf of the Parchman inmates.

For more information, get in touch with Oliver Law Group, P.C. at
www.oliverlawgroup.com. [GN]



MOLINA HEALTHCARE: Candelaria Labor Suit Dismissed w/o Prejudice
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge William P. Johnson of the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Mexico granted in part the Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss any Remaining Claims and for Sanctions in NORA CANDELARIA,
Plaintiff, v. MOLINA HEALTHCARE, INC. and MOLINA HEALTHCARE OF NEW
MEXICO, INC., Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-725-WJ-GBW (D. N.M.).

The Plaintiff brought the case as a class action alleging a claim
under the New Mexico Minimum Wage Act.  On Sept. 9, 2019, the Court
dismissed the individual claims.  Two weeks later, Magistrate Judge
Gregory B. Wormuth denied the Plaintiff's motion to extend the
class certification deadline.  The case, in its present form, is
without a plaintiff or a certified class.

The matter before the Court is the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
any Remaining Claims and for Sanctions.  There is no dispute that
the case is without a plaintiff or a certified class.  The
Plaintiff's counsel, however, opposes dismissal arguing that
dismissal would be highly prejudicial to the interests of absent
class members and have little impact on the Defendants and requests
that the Court permits substitution of another class member for the
lead Plaintiff.

Judge Johnson finds that the Plaintiff's counsel offers no
supporting authority for his argument, and that the substitution
request is untimely considering he made it approximately 15 months
after the case was filed, 9 months after the deadline to join
additional parties, 5 months after the deadline to file for class
certification, 3 months after the close of discovery, and 2 months
after the Court dismissed the Plaintiff's individual claims.  The
Judge holds that the Plaintiff's counsel is "a day late and a
dollar short" in terms of his argument for keeping the case alive.
Therefore, the Court is dismissing the case on the grounds of
mootness.

The Defendants argue that the Court should also sanction the
Plaintiff and her counsel citing their discovery failures.  In all
honesty, the Judge finds the Defendants' argument for sanctions
very tempting considering the prior failures by the Plaintiff to
participate in discovery.  However, in the Sept. 9, 2019 Order
dismissing the Plaintiff's individual claims, the Court put the
Plaintiff and her counsel on notice that subsequent failures to
participate in discovery will not be tolerated and that sanctions
may be imposed in the future.  It is not clear to the Court whether
the Plaintiff and her counsel failed to participate in discovery
after the Court's warning, so at this time, the Judge finds
dismissal of the case a sufficient remedy.

For these reasons, Judge Johnson granted in part the Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss any Remaining Claims and for Sanctions.  The case
is dismissed without prejudice.  Sanctions on the Plaintiff and her
counsel, however, are not imposed at this time.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Jan. 7, 2020 Memorandum
Opinion & Order is available at https://is.gd/dEmavW from
Leagle.com.

Nora Candelaria, Plaintiff, represented by Jack L. Siegel, Siegel
Law Group PLLC, Travis Andrew Gasper, Lee & Braziel, LLP & J. Derek
Braziel -- jdbraziel@l-b-law.com -- Lee & Braziel LLP.

Molina Healthcare, Inc. & Molina Healthcare of New Mexico, Inc.,
Defendants, represented by Corbin Hildebrandt, Corbin Hildebrandt,
P.C., Michael J. Slocum -- slocumm@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traurig,
LLP & Robert H. Bernstein -- bernsteinrob@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg
Traurig, LLP.


MYSTIQUE HOOKAH: Fails to Pay Proper Minimum Wage, Vitale Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
Justine Vitale and Salwa Murshed, on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated v. MYSTIQUE HOOKAH LOUNGE, INC., MYSTIQUE
GARDENS HOOKAH LOUNGE and MAGED ELDEIRY, in his individual and
professional capacity, Case No. 2:20-cv-01091 (E.D.N.Y., Feb. 27,
2020), accuses the Defendants of violating the Fair Labor Standards
Act and the New York Labor Law by not paying the Plaintiffs the
applicable minimum wage rates.

The Defendants engage in a common and deliberate policy and
practice of consistently compensating the Plaintiffs at rates that
are drastically below the applicable minimum wage rates, according
to the complaint. The Defendants also routinely fail to pay their
employees on their regularly scheduled pay days, instead at times
paying them several months or years after their wages are due.

The Defendants also engage in a practice of withholding and
retaining either all or a significant portion of their employees'
first several paychecks until the last day of an employee's
employment in order to incentivize them to provide the Defendants
with two weeks' notice before terminating their employment with the
Defendants, says the complaint.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants.

The Defendants own and operate two hookah bars in Long Island, New
York: Mystique Lounge and Mystique Gardens.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Innessa M. Huot, Esq.
          Patrick J. Collopy, Esq.
          Camilo M. Burr, Esq.
          FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
          685 Third Avenue, 26th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Phone: 212-983-9330
          Facsimile: 212-983-9331
          Email: ihuot@faruqilaw.com
                 pcollopy@faruqilaw.com
                 cburr@faruqilaw.com


NEW YORK, NY: Faces Class Action Over Special Ed Court Delays
-------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Elsen-Rooney, writing for New York Daily News, reports that
disabled city students who file legal complaints over their
treatment at school wait an average of nine months for a
resolution, despite a federal legal wait-time limit of 75 days, a
new class action lawsuit alleges.

The special education courts are designed to protect the legal
rights of those children, but the city's system is so overburdened
that vulnerable students wait months or years for help getting
critical support, according to the legal complaint.

"This problem has been getting worse for years and years and
years," said Danielle Tarantolo, a lawyer at New York Legal
Assistance Group, which represents five families in the suit filed
on Feb. 7 in Manhattan federal court -- the first class action to
take on the delays, Tarantolo said, adding: "The system remains
entirely broken."

The strains reflect the ballooning number of legal complaints
against the city's Education Department for failing to accommodate
children's special ed needs. During the 2017-18 school year, for
example, there were 7,000 such complaints — more than California,
Florida, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Texas combined, according to
an 2019 analysis commissioned by the state education department.

Parents can file legal grievances when a school refuses to evaluate
a child for a learning disability, offers inadequate support, or
declines to recommend a school better suited to the child's needs.

But the city has only 69 special education judges to handle the
load. As a result, 10,000 legal cases remain open, and it takes an
average of 259 days for a complaint to wind its way through the
legal system, a violation of the 75-day federal limit, the suit
alleges.

"The law is extremely clear about how long an educational agency
has to do these hearings, and it's a deliberately very short time
line," said Tarantolo. "These are children and this is their
education. They need to get what they need now," she said.

Low-income families are hit especially hard since they can't front
the money for therapy, tutoring, or tuition at private schools
while their cases are in limbo, advocates said.

Critics say both the state and city bear responsibility. State
officials are in charge of recruiting and hiring the judges, but
haven't raised the maximum hourly pay rate of $100 since 2001,
according to the external review, a pittance of what top special
education lawyers make.

City officials, meanwhile, decided to pay judges by task rather
than time worked, which often works out to a lower pay rate than
elsewhere in the state, according to the analysis. State officials
said the practice also makes it harder to find judges willing to
work in the city.

The city Education Department released a new pay policy for judges,
and an agency spokesperson said it's expected pay rates will rise
as a result, though the new plan also reduces payments for some
jobs.

"We are working closely with the State to make this process better
for families including updating and expediting the pay policy for
impartial hearing officers, adding staff to process cases faster,
completing more settlements, and eliminating case processing
backlogs. We recognize we have more work to do to serve every
family quickly and thoroughly but we are glad we have made so much
progress over the past year and a half," said city Education
Department spokeswoman Danielle Filson.

The state education department did not respond to requests for
comment. [GN]


NSC TECHNOLOGIES: Thompson Labor Suit Removed to S.D. California
----------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned Arthur Thompson, an individual, and on behalf of
others similarly situated v. NSC TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, a Virginia
limited liability corporation; BAE SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware
corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Case No.
37-2020-00001726-CU-OE-CTL, was removed from the Superior Court of
California, County of San Diego, to the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California on Feb. 27, 2020.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:20-cv-00371-JLS-LL to
the proceeding.

In the First Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges ten causes of
action: (1) failure to provide required meal periods; (2) failure
to provide required rest periods; (3) failure to pay overtime
wages; (4) failure to pay minimum wages; (5) failure to pay all
wages due to discharged and quitting employees; (6) failure to
maintain required records (7) failure to furnish accurate itemized
wage statements; (8) failure to indemnify employees for necessary
expenditures incurred in discharge of duties; (9) unfair and
unlawful business practices; and (10) Private Attorneys General
Act.[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

          Mary C. Dollarhide, Esq.
          Taylor Wemmer, Esq.
          DLA PIPER LLP (US)
          4365 Executive Drive, Suite 1100
          San Diego, CA 92121-2133
          Phone: 858.677.1400
          Fax: 858.677.1401
          Email: mary.dollarhide@dlapiper.com
                 taylor.wemmer@dlapiper.com


ONSTAR LLC: Court Denies Bid to Certify Class in Robinson Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KATHRYN M. ROBINSON, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ONSTAR, LLC; and DOES 1
through 50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 15-CV-1731 JLS (MSB)
(S.D. Cal.), Judge Janis L. Sammartino of the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of California (i) denied without
prejudice Plaintiff Robinson's Motions for Class Certification; and
(ii) denied as moot her Motion to Exclude Portions of the New
Raddatz Declaration and for Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c) & (e)(1)
Evidentiary Sanctions in the Form of an Order Excluding Portions of
the New Raddatz Declaration.

The Defendant provides telematics services, including emergency and
safety services and additional services for customers' convenience.
For example, its technology can detect when a car has been in an
accident and then connect the customer with a representative for
help without the customer needing to do anything.  The Defendant's
equipment comes pre-installed in most General Motors vehicles.

At all relevant times, lessees or purchasers of new vehicles
equipped with OnStar Telematics Services ("OTS") were required to
sign a one-page GM Customer Incentive and OnStar Acknowledgment
Form, which contains both a Customer Incentive Acknowledgment and a
Vehicle Software and OnStar Acknowledgment.  Paragraph 39 of the
Terms and Conditions is an arbitration provision.

On Dec. 15, 2013, Scott Robinson leased a 2014 Cadillac ATS sedan.
The Plaintiff sat next to her husband as he signed numerous
documents pertaining to the lease transaction, including the
Acknowledgment Form containing the OnStar Acknowledgment.  The
Plaintiff, however, did not sign any documents.

As the Robinsons were leaving the dealership, the dealer
representative mentioned that their new vehicle came with 12 months
of free OTS, which could be activated from inside the vehicle by
pressing the blue button.  The Plaintiff activated the OTS trial on
Dec. 17, 2013, by pressing the blue button, which connected her
with an agent of the Defendant.  The Plaintiff provided the agent
with her email address and debit card number to purchase sixty
cell-phone minutes.  The agent did not inform the Plaintiff during
the Welcome Call that her debit card would be used to charge her
for continuation of OTS after the end of her free trial.

The Defendant subsequently mailed the Plaintiff a copy of its Terms
and Conditions,and two "OnStar Vehicle Diagnostics" emails.  In
December 2014, January 2015, and February 2015, following the
expiration of the Plaintiff's free trial, the Defendant used the
Plaintiff's debit card three times to take $29.90 from her bank
account each month as payment for continuation of OTS.

On July 2, 2015, the Plaintiff filed the putative class action in
the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego, alleging
four causes of action for violations of the Electronic Funds
Transfer Act ("EFTA"); violations of the Automatic Renewal Law
("ARL"), California Business and Professions Code §§ 17600 et
seq.; and "unlawful" and "unfair" business practices in violation
of the Unfair Competition Law ("UCL").  The Defendant removed on
the basis of federal question jurisdiction and pursuant to the
Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA").

On Sept. 11, 2015, the Defendant moved to dismiss and to compel
arbitration pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) on
the grounds that the Plaintiff's husband had signed the
Acknowledgment Form, which incorporated by reference the
arbitration provision contained in the Terms and Conditions.
Following the evidentiary hearing on April 19, 2016, Judge William
Q. Hayes granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss on Aug. 25,
2016, and directed the Parties to proceed to arbitration.

The Plaintiff appealed Judge Hayes' dismissal to the U.S. Court of
Appeal for the Ninth Circuit,  which reversed and remanded on March
15, 2018.  The Ninth Circuit issued an amended memorandum and
denied the Defendant's petition for panel rehearing on May 1, 2018.
It concluded that the Plaintiff had formed an agreement with the
Defendant when she called to activate her one-year trial
subscription, at which time she was unaware that Defendant intended
to send her the Terms and Conditions, including the arbitration
provision.  Accordingly, the agreement -- when formed -- did not
include the Terms and Conditions, and the Defendant's subsequent
mailing of the Terms and Conditions was merely an offer to modify
the agreement, which was not accepted by the Plaintiff's retention
of the original OTS trial subscription.

Following the spreading of the mandate, Judge Hayes recused, and
the action was reassigned to the Court.  The Defendant answered the
Plaintiff's original complaint on June 12, 2018, and filed a motion
for judgment on the pleadings and to modify the class allegations
on July 19, 2018.

On March 18, 2019, the Court granted in part and denied in part the
Defendant's motion.  Specifically, the Court dismissed the
Plaintiff's second cause of action for violation of the ARL on the
grounds that the ARL does not create a private cause of action, but
denied the Defendant's motion as to the Plaintiff's first, third,
and fourth causes of action.  It also denied without prejudice as
premature the Defendant's motion to strike the Plaintiff's
nationwide class allegations, and granted the Defendant's motion as
to the Plaintiff's class claim for actual damages under the EFTA.

On May 31, 2019, the Parties jointly moved for Magistrate Judge
Michael S. Berg to approve several stipulations, including a
Stipulation Regarding 30(b)(6) Deposition of OnStar, LLC, Topics 6
and 11.  Topics 6 and 11, respectively, addressed the Defendant's
procedures, during the compliance period, for conducting sign-up
call.

The Certification Motion followed on June 24, 2019.  Having been
granted leave by the Court, the Plaintiff filed the operative First
Amended Complaint ("FAC") on Aug. 28, 2019, which asserts the same
causes of action as her original complaint but amends the proposed
class definitions.  The Plaintiff filed the Motion to Exclude on
Sept. 26, 2019.

Judge Sammartino (i) denied without prejudice the Plaintiffs'
Motion for Class Certification, and (ii) denied as moot the
Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude.  Among other things, Judge
Sammartino finds that the Plaintiff has failed (i) to establish
that her full restitution damages model measures class-wide
damages; (ii) to establish that common issues predominate as to the
claims for the unfair prong UCL claims to the extent they are
predicated on the balancing test; (iii) to establish that common
issue predominate to the extent the unlawful prong UCL claims are
predicated on violations of the TSR; (iv) to establish that common
questions predominate as to the unlawful prong UCL claims to the
extent they are predicated on alleged violations of the ARL; (v) to
establish that common issues do not predominate as to the
"unlawful" UCL claims to the extent they are predicated on the
alleged EFTA violations; and (vi) to satisfy the predominance
requirement as to the EFTA claims.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 22, 2020 Order is available at
https://is.gd/fKgSQy from Leagle.com.

Kathryn M. Robinson, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly sltuated, Plaintiff, represented by Chad Saunders --
csaunders@ssrplaw.com -- Sundeen Salinas & Pyle, Kathleen Styles
Rogers -- krogers@kraloweclaw.com -- Kralowec Law, P.C., Kimberly
A. Kralowec -- kkralowec@kraloweclaw.com -- Kralowec Law, P.C. &
Stuart Eppsteiner , Eppsteiner Law, APC.

OnStar, LLC, Defendant, represented by Dean Nicholas Panos --
dpanos@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block, LLP, pro hac vice, Kirsten
Hicks Spira -- kspira@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block LLP, Michael
Timothy Brody -- mbrody@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block LLP, pro hac
vice & Nayiri Pilikyan -- npilikyan@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block.

PENSKE TRUCK: Blumenthal Nordrehaug Files Wage Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Los Angeles employment law lawyers at Blumenthal Nordrehaug
Bhowmik De Blouw LLP, filed a class action complaint alleging that
Penske Truck Leasing Co., failed to provide their California
employees with meal and rest periods as required by California law.
Penske Truck Leasing Co., class action lawsuit, Case No.
20STCV04055, is currently pending in the Los Angeles Superior Court
of the State of California.

According to the lawsuit filed in the Los Angeles Superior Court,
Penske Truck Leasing Co., alleges the company (a) failed to provide
PLAINTIFF accurate itemized wage statements, (b) failed to properly
record and provide legally required meal and rest periods, (c)
failed to pay overtime wages, (d) failed to pay minimum wages, (e)
failed to reimburse employees for required expenses, and (f) failed
to pay wages when due, all in violation of the applicable Labor
Code sections listed in Labor Code Sections §§ 201, 202, 203,
204, 210, 226(a), 226.7, 510, 512, 1194, 1197, 1197.1, 1198, 2802,
and the applicable Wage Order(s), and thereby gives rise to civil
penalties as a result of such alleged conduct.

Additionally, the complaint further alleges Penske Truck Leasing
Co., committed acts of unfair competition in violation of the
California Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§
17200, et seq. (the "UCL"), by engaging in a company-wide policy
and procedure which failed to accurately calculate and record all
missed meal and rest periods by PLAINTIFFS and other CALIFORNIA
CLASS Members. As a result of DEFENDANT's intentional disregard of
the obligation to meet this burden, DEFENDANT allegedly failed to
properly calculate and/or pay all required compensation for work
performed by the members of the CALIFORNIA CLASS and violated the
California Labor Code.

If you would like to know more about the Penske Truck Leasing Co.,
lawsuit, please contact Attorney Nicholas J. De Blouw today by
calling (800) 568-8020.

Blumenthal Nordrehaug Bhowmik De Blouw LLP is an employment law
firm with offices located in San Diego, San Francisco, Sacramento,
Los Angeles, Riverside and Chicago that dedicates its practice to
helping employees, investors and consumers fight back against
unfair business practices, including violations of the California
Labor Code and Fair Labor Standards Act. If you need help in
collecting unpaid overtime wages, unpaid commissions, being
wrongfully terminated from work, and other employment law claims,
contact one of their attorneys today.

***THIS IS AN ATTORNEY ADVERTISEMENT*** [GN]


PETER THOMAS: Summary Judgment Bid in Miller Suit Partly Granted
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KARI MILLER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. PETER THOMAS ROTH,
LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. C 19-00698 WHA (N.D. Cal.), Judge
William Alsup of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California granted in part and denied in part the Defendants
move for summary judgment.

Defendants Peter Thomas Roth, Designs, Global, and Labs LLC ("PTR
Labs") market specialty skincare products.  At issue are PTR Labs'
Rose Stem Cell and Water Drench product lines.  PTR Labs advertised
the Rose Stem Cell line with the buzzwords "bio repair,"
"reparative," "rejuvenates," and "regenerates," and the Water
Drench Products as containing hyaluronic acid which attracts and
retains one thousand times its weight in water from moisture in the
atmosphere.

Plaintiff Samantha Paulson saw the words "bio repair,"
"rejuvenates," and "regenerates," concluded the rose stem cells
might help the appearance of a facial scar, and bought a Rose Stem
Cell Gel Mask.  Plaintiff Miller heard PTR Labs' claims about
hyaluronic acid's exceptional water retention, believed the Water
Drench products superior skin hydrators, and purchased one.  The
Plaintiffs contend both ads were false or misleading and filed suit
under, among others, California's Unfair Competition Law.

Following the Plaintiffs' motion, an order dated January 22 denied
class certification.  The Defendants moved for summary judgment
while the class certification motion was pending.

Judge Alsup concludes that the Plaintiffs offer sufficient evidence
to create triable issues about whether Paulson has standing and
whether PTR Labs' Rose Stem Cell ads were false or misleading.  As
to Paulson, PTR Labs' motion for summary judgment is denied.  The
Plaintiffs also offer sufficient evidence to create triable issues
about whether Miller has standing and whether the Water Drench ad
claiming hyaluronic acid can attract and retain up to one thousand
times its weight in water is false or misleading.  As to this
challenge, PTR Labs' motion for summary judgment is also denied.
But because the Plaintiffs do not present evidence challenging the
claims that hyaluronic acid absorbs water from the atmosphere or
provides long lasting benefits, summary judgment against those
claims is granted.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 22, 2020 Order is available at
https://is.gd/Wze3JC from Leagle.com.

Kari Miller, on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated
&
Samantha Paulson, on behalf of themselves and those similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Anthony J. Patek, Gutride
Safier LLP, Seth Adam Safier -- seth@gutridesafier.com -- Gutride
Safier LLP, Adam Gutride -- adam@gutridesafier.com -- Gutride
Safier LLP, Kristen Gelinas Simplicio -- Kristen@gutridesafier.com
-- Gutride Safier LLP, Kyle Wayne Wilson & Todd M. Kennedy --
todd@gutridesafier.com -- Gutride Safier LLP, pro hac vice.

Peter Thomas Roth, LLC, Peter Thomas Roth Global, LLC & Peter
Thomas Roth Labs LLC, Defendants, represented by Brad Michael
Scheller, pro hac vice, Daniel J. Herling -- djherling@mintz.com
--
Mintz Levin Cohn Ferris Glovsky & Popeo P.C., Nicole V. Ozeran --
NVOzeran@mintz.com -- Mintz Levin Cohn Ferris Glovsky and Popeo,
P.C. & Nada I. Shamonki -- nshamonki@mintz.com -- Mintz Levin Cohn
Ferris Glovsky Popeo.

Kyle Wayne Wilson, Miscellaneous, pro se.


PHILIP MORRIS: Judge Dismisses Securities Class Action in N.Y.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Shearman & Sterling LLP, in an article for Lexology, reports that
on February 4, 2020, Judge Ronnie Abrams of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed a
putative class action asserting claims under Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 against a tobacco company and
certain of its executives.  In re Philip Morris Int'l Inc. Sec.
Litig., No. 18-CV-08049 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2020).  Plaintiffs
alleged that the company made misrepresentations in securities
filings and public statements regarding clinical studies it
published in connection with its application to the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration to sell its vapor-based product in the United
States and to market it as presenting a lower risk than traditional
tobacco products.  Plaintiffs also alleged that the company made
misrepresentations regarding sales growth in Japan for the same
product.  The Court held that plaintiffs failed to allege an
actionable misstatement or omission or to establish scienter, but
granted leave to amend with respect to certain allegations.

Plaintiffs argued that statements such as "regulators may not
permit the commercialization of these products or the communication
of scientifically substantiated risk-reduction claims" were
misleading in light of the fact that the company had conducted but
delayed publishing four studies with negative results.  Id. at 22.
The Court held, however, that such statements were a "truthful
expression of [the company's] lack of certainty that the FDA would
approve its [application]" and therefore could not serve as the
basis for an Exchange Act claim.  Id.

The Court also determined that a number of statements identified by
plaintiffs were mere puffery, including that the company was
"conducting extensive and rigorous scientific studies," "producing
the best science you can produce in the field today," and that its
"studies are very advanced and point in the direction of risk
reduction and potential to improve health."  Id. at 23-24.  The
Court held that such statements did not amount to a guarantee and
were "too general to cause a reasonable investor to rely upon
them."  Id. at 24.

The Court also considered whether statements about the company's
clinical studies and adherence to ethical and scientific standards
were actionable "subjective statements of opinion" because they
were either subjectively false or the supporting facts supplied
were untrue.  Id. at 24-25 (citing Tongue v. Sanofi, 816 F.3d 199
(2d. Cir 2016)).  The Court determined that plaintiffs' argument
essentially amounted to a dispute about how to interpret the data
from the clinical studies, and a reasonable investor would not
expect that the FDA would necessarily agree with the company's view
of the data.  Id. at 27.  The Court further emphasized that a
company "need not disclose all concerns about its research
methodology so long as the omitted facts do not conflict with what
a reasonable investor would take from the statement itself."  Id.
at 28.

With respect to allegations that the company delayed the release of
four adverse studies, the Court held, pursuant to the Second
Circuit's decision in Sanofi, that the company need not disclose
all negative facts that "tended to cut against their projections"
of FDA approval, and plaintiffs are "not entitled to so much
information as might have been desired to make their own
determination about the likelihood of FDA approval."  Id. at 29.
However, the Court concluded that these allegations did suggest a
lack of transparency and "thus come closest to representing a
material omission."  Id. at 28-29.  The Court therefore granted
leave to amend regarding these allegations, cautioning that
plaintiffs must allege with specificity how the non-disclosure of
those studies made the company's statements misleading.  Id. at
30.

The Court separately rejected plaintiffs' allegations that
defendants had made misleading statements about its growth
projections in Japan relating to the same product.  The Court
emphasized that statements such as that the company expected
"continued investment" to "further drive its positive momentum,"
that "there's nothing on the horizon that . . . would cause any
change in what happened in the previous years," and that demand was
"anticipated to further increase in the first quarter of 2018,"
were protected as forward-looking statements of opinion and were
accompanied by meaningful cautionary language.  Id. at 32-33.
Moreover, allegations based on an alleged failure to meet market
share projections amounted to impermissible "fraud by hindsight."
Id. at 36.

The Court also held that plaintiffs had failed to establish the
required strong inference of scienter, either by alleging facts
showing "motive and opportunity to commit the fraud" or "strong
circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness."
Id. at 36-37.  The Court rejected plaintiffs' argument that two
stock sales by a company executive established motive and
opportunity, finding to the contrary that these stock sales were
part of consistent trading patterns, were not unusual in size, and
that the executive actually increased his stock holdings during the
period in question.  Id. at 39.  The Court also held that
plaintiffs' allegations of conscious misbehavior or recklessness
were insufficient because they were based on allegations made by a
former company scientist who left well before the relevant period
and had limited interactions with company executives.  Id. at 40.
Separately, the Court rejected plaintiffs' argument, based on the
"core operations" theory, that the company's executives would have
been aware of key non-public information by virtue of their
positions.  The Court held that, even assuming the "core
operations" theory were viable and sufficient to establish
scienter, plaintiffs alleged no particularized facts and
"boilerplate allegations are insufficient to establish scienter."
Id. at 41.

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide
to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about
your specific circumstances. [GN]


PK MANAGEMENT: Bid to Exclude/Limit Testimony in Riley Overruled
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LEORA RILEY, et al., Plaintiff, v. PK MANAGEMENT, LLC,
et al., Defendant, Civil Action No. 18-2337-KHV (D. Kan.), Judge
Kathryn H. Vratil of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Kansas overruled without prejudice the Plaintiff's Omnibus Motion
To Strike Expert Designations Or In The Alternative, Exclude Or
Limit Expert Testimony.

Plaintiffs Riley and Terri Ozburn brought putative class action
claims against PK Management, Central Park Investors, LLC, Aspen
Cos. Management, LLC and Central Park Holdings, LLC.  The Second
Amended Class Action Complaint was filed on July 15, 2019.  The
Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants failed to prevent and remedy
uninhabitable living conditions at Central Park Towers, an
apartment building in Kansas City, Kansas.

On July 26, 2019, Defendants PK Management and Central Park
Investors designated the following individuals as non-retained
expert witnesses: (1) Scott Rhine; (2) Ed Milberger; (3) Terry
Davis; (4) Claudio Carreon; (5) Michael Mason, Jr.; (6) Charity
McClendon; and (7) Devon Bryant.  The individuals so designated did
not file expert witness reports.

Also on July 26, 2019, Defendants Aspen and Central Park Holdings
joined their co-Defendants in designating Michael Mason, Jr. and
Claudio Carreon.  They also designated the following non-retained
expert witnesses: (1) Michael Mosley; (2) Loren Albright; (3) Josh
Johnson; (4) Barry Weiss; and (5) Joe Reynolds.  These designated
individuals did not file expert witness reports.

On Sept. 16, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed their Omnibus Motion To
Strike Expert Designations Or In The Alternative, Exclude Or Limit
Expert Testimony.  They challenge all of the Defendants' experts
except Davis and Mason.  The Plaintiffs requested that the Court
strike the Defendants' expert designations or, in the alternative,
limit or exclude their testimony pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 702 and
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.  The Defendants opposed the
Plaintiffs' motion.

After a hearing on Nov. 13, 2019, Magistrate Judge Teresa J. James
denied the Plaintiffs' motion to strike but ordered that by Dec. 6,
2019, the Defendants serve supplemental expert designations that
fully comply with Rule 26(a)(2)(C).  Judge James did not rule on
the Plaintiffs' alternative request that the Court excludes or
limits expert testimony.

In accordance with Judge James's order, the Defendants served
supplemental non-retained expert designations.  In addition, PK
Management and Central Park Investors withdrew their designations
of Rhine, Carreon, Mason and McClendon.  Aspen and Central Park
Holdings withdrew their designation of Carreon.

On Dec. 12, 2019, the Plaintiffs withdrew their motion to exclude
or limit expert testimony of Scott, Milberger, Carreon, McClendon
and unidentified technicians and individuals who prepared the
pre-Real Estate Assessment Center ("REAC") inspections.  They did
not withdraw their motion as to other experts, and did not file
additional briefing.  The Court therefore construes the Plaintiffs'
motion as one to limit or exclude testimony of Bryant, Mosley,
Albright, Johnson, Weiss and Reynolds.

The Defendants did not respond to the Plaintiffs' partial
withdrawal of their motion or supplement their briefs to respond to
the parties' supplemental disclosures.

Judge Vratil holds that in light of the Defendants' supplemental
disclosures under Rule 26(a)(2)(C), the Plaintiffs must re-brief
their motion to exclude or limit expert testimony.  If they wish to
challenge the Defendants' supplemental non-retained expert witness
designations, the Plaintiffs must directly address how such
testimony is deficient under Rule 702, and Daubert v. Merrel Dow
Pharm., Inc.  

In addition, the Court advised the Plaintiffs to be mindful that
Rule 702 and Daubert are primarily addressed to the sufficiency of
expert opinion.  Like non-expert witnesses, witnesses who qualify
as experts by virtue of knowledge, skill, experience, training or
education may generally testify as to facts; they generally do not
need to qualify their factual testimony under Rule 702 or Daubert,
and the Plaintiffs should take care to challenge only the opinion
testimony of such witnesses.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Vratil overruled without prejudice
the Plaintiff's Omnibus Motion To Strike Expert Designations Or In
The Alternative, Exclude Or Limit Expert Testimony.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 7, 2020 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://is.gd/5Bp6ea from Leagle.com.

Leora Riley, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated & Terri Ozburn, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Bryce B. Bell, Bell
Law, LLC, 2600 Grand Blvd., Ste. 580, Kansas City, MO, 64108, Gina
M. Chiala, Heartland Center for Jobs and Freedom, Inc., 4047
Central St. Kansas City, MO 64111, pro hac vice, Jeffrey M.
Lipman,
Lipman Law Firm, PC, Beco Towers II10461 Mill Run CircleSuite
550Owings Mills, MD 21117, pro hac vice, Mark W. Schmitz, Bell
Law,
LLC, 2600 Grand Blvd., Ste. 580, Kansas City, MO, 64108 & Zachary
D. Poole, ZDP Law, LLC.

PK Management, LLC, Defendant, represented by Derek H. Mackay --
mackay@knightnicastro.com -- Knight Nicastro MacKay, LLC & Pamela
Winter -- winter@knightnicastro.com -- Knight Nicastro MacKay,
LLC.

Central Park Investors, LLC, Defendant, represented by Jacqueline
M. Sexton -- jsexton@fwpclaw.com -- Foland, Wickens, Roper, Hofer
&
Crawford, PC & Zachary Tyler Bowles, I -- zbowles@fwpclaw.com --
Foland, Wickens, Roper, Hofer & Crawford, PC.

Aspen Companies Management, LLC & Central Park Holdings, LLC,
Defendants, represented by Jeffrey A. Bullins -- jbullins@slln.com
-- Simpson, Logback, Lynch, Norris, PA, John G. Schultz --
jschultz@fsmlawfirm.com -- Franke Schultz & Mullen, PC, Michael T.
Halloran, Franke Schultz & Mullen, PC, 8900 Ward Pkwy.


PREMIER CAPITAL FUNDING: DIY Seeks to Invalidate Court Ruling
-------------------------------------------------------------
DIY Tee Shirts Screen Printing Supply, Inc. and Gary Jurman, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs
v. Premier Capital Funding, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 502015/2020
(N.Y. Sup., January 27, 2020), seeks liquidated damages and
nullification or avoidance of the wrongfully obtained judgment for
fraud and breach of contract for improper actions surrounding the
merchant cash advance contract as well as for violation of New York
General Business Laws.

DIY Tee Shirts sold screen print materials in Florida and elsewhere
until its business shut down in 2019.

Premier Capital is a company providing merchant cash advance
services, providing financing to small businesses such as DIY Tee
Shirts through the purchase of future company sales in exchange for
a short-term business loan.

On June 12, 2018, DIY Tee Shirts and Premier Capital entered into a
Future Receivable Purchase Agreement whereby Premier Capital
disbursed $15,434.00 to DIY Tee Shirts in exchange for the purchase
of DIY Tee Shirts' future receivables in the amount of $21,600.00.
Said contract called for an estimated $155.00 to be directly
debited from DIY Tee Shirts' account until the amount purchased was
paid in full.

DIY was not able to sustain its business and the account was closed
due to overdraft. In May of 2019, Premier Capital filed the
Confession of Judgment in the Supreme Court of New York granting
Premier Capital a judgment against DIY Tee Shirts in the amount of
$20,408.76.

DIY alleges that the judgment was invalid because it was entered in
an improper venue in breach of the contract and the use of
Confessions of Judgment was and is illegal in the State of Florida.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Bryce Jones, Esq.
      JONES LAW FIRM, P.C.
      42 W. 38th St., Suite 1002
      New York, NY 10018
      Tel: (212) 258-0685
      Email: bryce@ioneslawfirm.com


PRO OIL: Baird Seeks OT Pay for Oilfield Workers
------------------------------------------------
COLBY BAIRD, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. PRO OIL & GAS SERVICES, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
7:20-cv-51 (W.D. Tex., February 28, 2020) brings this collective
and class action against Defendant for its alleged violation of the
Fair Labor Standards Act and the New Mexico Minimum Wage Act.

Plaintiff worked for Defendant as a non-exempt employee to provide
wireline and other services to Defendant's customers.

According to the complaint, Plaintiff was required by Defendant to
work over 40 hours in one or more individual workweeks in the last
three years, but was not paid by Defendant an overtime at
one-and-one-half times his regular rate of pay for hours over 40.

Plaintiff claims that due to Defendant's Shaved Hours and Overtime
Miscalculation Policies, Defendant has failed to pay its non-exempt
employee an overtime premium for all overtime hours worked, and
overtime at the legally required rate.

Pro Oil & Gas Services, LLP is an oilfield services company that
provides drilling, completion and other oilfield services to its
clients at oilfield job sites throughout Texas and New Mexico.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jack Siegel, Esq.
          SIEGEL LAW GROUP PLLC
          4925 Greenville Ave, Suite 600
          Dallas, TX 75206
          Tel: (214)790-4454
          Email: Jack@siegellawgroup.biz

                - and -

          Travis M. Hedgpeth, Esq.
          THE HEDGPETH LAW FIRM, PC
          3050 Post Oak Blvd., Suite 510
          Houston, TX 77056
          Tel: (281)572-0727
          Email: travis@hedgpethlaw.com


PWCC MARKETPLACE: Baseball Card Collectors Allege Fraud
-------------------------------------------------------
Mike Rogoway, writing for Oregon Live, reports that litigation
filed in California alleges an Oregon company and others defrauded
baseball card collectors by selling cards that had been
deliberately altered to hide defects.

The class-action complaint is the latest salvo in a long-running
controversy over the authenticity of trading cards. Collectors
allege that fraudsters were trimming cards and making other
permanent changes to disguise flaws or damage.

Rare cards in pristine condition can be worth millions of dollars
apiece. The allegations that cards were manipulated roiled the
sports card market, threatening to undermine the foundation of a
hobby that treasures mementos of the past.

"Altered cards are worth a fraction of the value of unaltered cards
in part because it is the authenticity of the cards that is
prized," the complaint asserts. Attorneys filed the case on behalf
of a California collector, Eric Savoy, who believes he unknowingly
purchased altered cards.

Defendants include PWCC Marketplace, a Lake Oswego company that
auctions off sports cards on eBay. The case, filed in California
Superior Court in Orange County, alleges PWCC was aware of the
manipulation.

PWCC declined to comment on the litigation Thursday. Last year, the
Oregon company said it would investigate allegations against people
who sell cards though its service. PWCC said it was cooperating
with an unspecified law enforcement agency that was conducting its
own investigation.

Other defendants in this week's litigation include Collectors
Universe, a publicly traded company in California that operates a
prominent sports card grading service called Professional Sports
Authenticator.

The complaint alleges PSA gave high-quality grades to baseball
cards it knew had been manipulated. Collectors Universe did not
immediately respond to a request for comment Thursday, February
13.

"Our client and the members of the class relied on the veracity of
the sellers and the expertise and reliability of the grading
companies to determine the authenticity of trading cards,"
California attorney Marcus Bradley, Esq. wrote in an email
Thursday, February 13. "Our client relied on a system that was
exposed as fraudulent and unfair." [GN]


QUDIAN INC: Levi & Korsinsky Reminds Investors of Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Levi & Korsinsky, LLP announces that class action lawsuits have
commenced on behalf of shareholders of publicly-traded Qudian Inc.
Shareholders interested in serving as lead plaintiff have until the
deadlines listed to petition the court. Further details about the
cases can be found at the links provided. There is no cost or
obligation to you.

QD Shareholders Click Here:
https://www.zlk.com/pslra-1/qudian-inc-loss-form?prid=5462&wire=1

Qudian Inc. (QD)

QD Lawsuit on behalf of: investors who purchased December 13, 2018
- January 15, 2020

Lead Plaintiff Deadline : March 23, 2020

TO LEARN MORE, VISIT:
https://www.zlk.com/pslra-1/qudian-inc-loss-form?prid=5462&wire=1

According to the filed complaint, during the class period, Qudian
Inc. made materially false and/or misleading statements and/or
failed to disclose that: (i) regulatory developments in China
threatened to negatively impact Qudian's fiscal full year 2019
("FY19") financial results; (ii) Qudian's business was unprepared
to mitigate the risks associated with these regulatory changes;
(iii) as a result, Qudian's loan portfolio was plagued by growing
delinquency rates; (iv) all of the foregoing made Qudian's repeated
assertions concerning its FY19 financial guidance unrealistic; and
(v) as a result, the Company's public statements were materially
false and misleading at all relevant times.

You have until the lead plaintiff deadlines to request that the
court appoint you as lead plaintiff. Your ability to share in any
recovery doesn't require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

Levi & Korsinsky is a national firm with offices in New York,
California, Connecticut, and Washington D.C. The firm's attorneys
have extensive expertise and experience representing investors in
securities litigation and have recovered hundreds of millions of
dollars for aggrieved shareholders.

Contact:

         Joseph E. Levi, Esq.
         Levi & Korsinsky, LLP
         55 Broadway, 10th Floor
         New York, NY 10006
         Tel: (212) 363-7500
         Fax: (212) 363-7171
         Website: www.zlk.com
         Email: jlevi@levikorsinsky.com
[GN]


RT WHOLESALE: Faces Sotelo Suit Over Violations of BIPA and IWPCA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Crispin Calderon Sotelo, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated v. RT WHOLESALE, LLC, a/k/a FOOD EVOLUTION, Case
No. 2020CH02461 (Ill. Cir., Cook Cty., Feb. 27, 2020), is brought
against the Defendant alleging claims under the Biometric
Information Privacy Act and the Illinois Wage Payment and
Collection Act.

The Defendant has refused to pay employees the monetary equivalent
of all accrued, paid vacation upon their separation of employment
from the Defendant, in violation of the IWPCA, the Plaintiff
alleges.

In direct violation of the BIPA, the Defendant has collected,
stored, and used its employees' biometric information without their
informed written consent and has failed to make publicly available
its retention schedule for this biometric information, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff Sotelo is a natural person, who resides in Chicago,
Illinois, and worked for the Defendant in the cooler, preparing
platters of food.

Food Evolution is a catering company that prepares sandwiches and
fruit, cheese, and vegetable platters.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Christopher J. Wilmes, Esq.
          Chirag G. Badlani, Esq.
          Margaret E. Truesdale, Esq.
          HUGHES SOCOL PIERS RESNICK DYM, LTD.
          70 West Madison Street, Suite 4000
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Phone: 312-580-0100
          Email: cwilmes@hsplegal.com
                 cbadlani@hsplegal.com
                 mtruesdale@hsplegal.com


RUE21 INC: Avila Labor Suit Remanded to Tulare Superior Court
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARIA AVILA, individually, and on behalf of other
members of the general public similarly situated and on behalf of
other aggrieved employees pursuant to the California Private
Attorneys General Act, Plaintiff, v. RUE21, INC., an unknown
business entity, and DOES 1-100, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-01040-LJO-SKO (E.D. Cal.), Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill of the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California granted
the Plaintiff's Motion to Remand.

The case is a wage and hour putative class action first initiated
by Plaintiff Avila in the Tulare Superior Court.  The Defendant
allegedly employed the Plaintiff as an hourly-paid, non-exempt
employee from approximately October 2013 to November 2018.  The
First Amended Complaint ("FAC") asserts eleven causes of action
against the Defendant.  The first nine causes of action are based
on violations of various sections of the California Labor Code for
unpaid overtime, meal and rest periods, minimum wage, and business
expenses; for non-compliant with wage statements; and for failure
to keep requisite payroll records and to timely pay wages during
employment and final wages.  The tenth cause of action is for
violation of the California Business & Professions Code Sections
17200, et seq., and the eleventh cause of action is for violation
of PAGA.

After the Plaintiff filed the FAC for herself, as well as on behalf
of other members of the general public similarly situated and on
behalf of other aggrieved employees pursuant to the California
Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA"), the Defendant removed the
case to the District Court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness
Act ("CAFA") on July 30, 2019.

Seeking to challenge the removal, the Plaintiff timely brought the
instant Motion to Remand on Aug. 29, 2019, as required by 28 U.S.C.
Section 1447(c).  In particular, the Plaintiff contends that the
removal was untimely and that the Defendant has failed to meet its
burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the
amount in controversy exceeds $5 million as required by CAFA.  The
Defendant filed an Opposition on September 16, and the Plaintiff
replied on September 23.

Judge O'Neill finds that the FAC fails to affirmatively reveal
enough information such that it was obvious, when a reasonable
amount of intelligence is applied, for the Defendant to ascertain
the existence of removability.  Accordingly, the 30-day period to
remove the action under Section 1446(b) has not been triggered.
The Judge also cannot say the Defendant has ignored pleadings or
other documents from which removability may be ascertained and
sought removal only when it becomes strategically advantageous for
it to do so.  The Defendant's removal of the action is timely.

Next, having reviewed the FAC and Notice of Removal, Judge O'Neill
finds that the Defendant has provided plausible allegations showing
that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional
threshold.  The Notice of Removal alleges that the average hourly
and overtime rates of non-exempt employees in California similar to
the Plaintiff are $11.12 and $16.68, respectively.  The Plaintiff
proposes a class of all former and current hourly-paid or
non-exempt employees of the Defendant in California from Feb. 6,
2015 to final judgment.  The Defendant claims that 2,660 of its
employees in at least 28 stores in California fall within the
proposed class.  Based on these numbers, the Defendant calculates
the Plaintiff's maximum potential liability to be $7,996,357.12,
exclusive of attorneys' fees.

Accepting the allegations as true for purposes of removal, Judge
O'Neill is persuaded that the Defendant has provided a plausible
assertion of the required amount in controversy in its notice of
removal.  The Defendant, therefore, is not required to produce
proof to demonstrate by the preponderance of the evidence that
greater than $5 million in damages is recoverable, unless the
Plaintiff asserts that the amount in controversy is $5 million or
less.  As far as the Court can discern, the Plaintiff fails to
clearly admit that the amount in controversy is $5 million or less
in her Motion and Reply.

Nevertheless, given the overall thrust of the Motion and the
Plaintiff's intent to challenge the Court's jurisdiction under
CAFA, Judge O'Neill construes the Plaintiff's position as claiming
that the amount in controversy is $5 million or less.  He finds
that the maximum damages the Plaintiff and the other class members
could reasonably obtain for their waiting time penalty claim should
be calculated as follows: (average hourly rate of $11.12 x 5.95
hours/day [$66.16/day]) x 30 days maximum penalty x 584 former
employees = $1,159,123.20 -- which is far lower than the $3.8
million in damages the Defendant suggests.

Next, the Court finds that a violation rate of 40% for the initial
failure to pay minimum wage and 20% for the second failure to be
reasonable.  The calculation for the unpaid minimum wage claim,
accordingly, should be: (2,660 employees x 40% x $100) + (2,660
employees x 20% x $250) = $239,400.

Turning to the amount in controversy for the first to fourth
claims, the Judge finds that the Plaintiff fails to assert any
different rate of violation or to submit any evidence indicating a
contrary rate of violation.  The Plaintiff does not even submit her
own declaration stating that she experienced less frequent rates of
violation than those asserted by the Defendants.  For these
reasons, the Judge cannot say the Defendant's assumptions
underlying calculations of maximum damages for the first to fourth
claims to be unreasonable.

Finally, the Court finds that the fifth claim ($1,159,123.20 in
maximum recovery) must be excluded from the attorneys' fees
calculation.  Thus, even if the Court assumes the Plaintiff is
entitled attorneys' fees at the rate of 25% of the remaining first
claim ($989,190.72 maximum recovery for unpaid overtime) and fourth
claim ($533,736 maximum recovery for unpaid minimum wage and
$239,400 in statutory penalty for the unpaid minimum wage) under
Sections 218.5 and 1194, respectively, the resulting attorneys'
fees at stake would only be $440,584.68.  This amount in addition
to the $4,330,940.12 in recovery that the Defendant has shown by a
preponderance of the evidence is still less than $5 million.  The
Defendant has failed, therefore, to meet its burden.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge O'Neill granted the Plaintiff's
Motion to Remand.  The action is remanded to the Tulare Superior
Court.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Jan. 7, 2020 Memorandum
Decision & Order is available at https://is.gd/WALEVn from
Leagle.com.

Maria Avila, individually, and on behalf of other members of the
general public similarly situated and on behalf of other aggrieved
employees pursuant to the California Private Attorney General Act,
Plaintiff, represented by Edwin Aiwazian -- edwin@lfjpc.com --
Lawyers for Justice, PC & Melissa Anne Leblanc --
m.leblanc@lfjpc.com -- Lawyers for Justice, P.C.

Rue 21, Inc., an unknown business entity, Defendant, represented by
Angela Elizabeth Meakin -- ameakin@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson
P.C., Anne Sweeney Jordan -- ajordan@littler.com -- Littler
Mendelson, P.C. & Karin Morgan Cogbill -- kcogbill@littler.com --
Littler Mendelson, PC.


SALDUTTI LAW: Weiss FDCPA Suit Moved From E.D. to S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as Salomon Weiss, on behalf of himself and all
other similarly situated consumers v. Saldutti Law, LLC, doing
business as: Saldutti Law Group, Case No. 1:19-cv-07216, was
transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of New York to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York on Feb. 27, 2020.

The Southern District of New York Court Clerk assigned Case No.
7:20-cv-01718-NSR to the proceeding.

The Plaintiff alleges violation of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Saldutti Law Group is a boutique creditors' rights and collection
law firm with locations in both New Jersey and Philadelphia.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Adam Jon Fishbein, Esq.
          ADAM J. FISHBEIN, P.C.
          735 Central Avenue
          Woodmere, NY 11598
          Phone: (516) 668-6945
          Email: fishbeinadamj@gmail.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Arthur Sanders, Esq.
          BARRON & NEWBURGER, P.C.
          30 South Main Street
          New City, NY 10956-3515
          Phone: (845) 499-2990
          Fax: (845) 499-2992
          Email: asanders@arthursanderslaw.com


SALZBERG: Corporate Charters Provisions at Issue in Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
Alexander "Sasha" Aganin of Cornerstone Research Reports, in an
article for National Law Review, reports that with the legalization
of recreational marijuana in Canada in October 2018 and the
increasing number of U.S. states permitting medicinal and
recreational use, numerous corporations have entered the cannabis
industry in recent years. These corporations are involved in the
financing, farming, distribution, or sales of cannabis products.
Peripheral businesses supporting the industry or developing
products derived from cannabis (e.g., specialized drugs from
cannabidiol) have grown in concert.

Beginning in the latter part of 2018, companies with connections to
the cannabis industry were increasingly the target of federal class
action filings. In 2018, six core federal filings involved
companies selling cannabis or cannabidiol products. In 2019, 13
companies were sued in federal courts. Three of these companies
also faced state 1933 Act claims.

Multiple Canadian cannabis-related companies with securities
trading on U.S. exchanges were the subject of class action filings
in 2018 and 2019. Nine of these filings involved many of the
largest Canadian-licensed cannabis growers.

State Court 1933 Act Claims
Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg is a matter currently before the Delaware
Supreme Court. At issue is whether provisions in corporate charters
can dictate that class action securities claims under the 1933 Act
be adjudicated in federal courts.

In recent years, multiple companies chartered in Delaware have
adopted so-called Federal Forum Provisions dictating that 1933 Act
claims be adjudicated in federal rather than  state courts. In the
wake of the March 2018 U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Cyan permitting
plaintiffs to continue to file 1933 Act claims in state courts,
even more companies have adopted Federal Forum Provisions.

In December 2018, the Delaware Chancery Court ruled that the
charter provisions were invalid under Delaware law. The decision
was appealed by defendants, with briefing before the Delaware
Supreme Court in the fall of 2019. [GN]


SANDERSON FARMS: 2nd Cir. Upholds Dismissal of Gamm Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In Gamm v. Sanderson Farms, Inc., 944 F.3d 455 (2d Cir. 2019),
Second Circuit holds that if a securities class action is based on
claim that public statements were misleading because defendant did
not disclose illegal activity, plaintiffs are required to plead the
underlying illegal activity with particularity.

The complaint alleged that Sanderson Farms and several other large
chicken producers began colluding to inflate the price of chicken
by coordinating supply reductions and manipulating a chicken price
index. Sanderson Farms allegedly planned the antitrust conspiracy
with its competitors during industry meetings and conferences. The
conspiracy was also supposedly facilitated at investor conferences
organized by Wall Street analysts and attended by Sanderson Farms
and its competitors. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and a
putative class of purchasers of Sanderson Farms shares, alleged
that the failure to disclose this antitrust conspiracy rendered
various statements issued by Sanderson Farms during the class
period false and misleading.

On appeal, plaintiffs acknowledged that allegations of
misstatements and omissions in support of a securities fraud claim
must be pleaded with particularity, but argued that the allegations
of the facts of the underlying antitrust conspiracy must merely
meet the Rule 8 plausibility standard. The Second Circuit
disagreed, holding that because plaintiffs were required to plead
with particularity sufficient facts to support their contention
that Sanderson Farms' financial disclosures were misleading, they
necessarily were required to state the facts of the underlying
anticompetitive conduct with particularity. Applying this standard,
the Second Circuit found that, while the complaint alleged
Sanderson engaged in anticompetitive conduct, there was "virtually
no explanation as to how the collusive conduct occurred, and
whether and how it affected trade." Accordingly, the Second Circuit
affirmed dismissal. [GN]

SANDISK LLC: Court Dismisses Dinan Suit with Prejudice
------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOHN DINAN et al, Plaintiffs, v. SANDISK LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-05420-BLF (N.D. Cal.), Judge Beth Labson
Freeman of the U.S. District Court for the Northern Distict of
California, San Jose Division, granted the Defendant's motion to
dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) without
leave to amend.

The case is a putative class action concerning the meaning of the
term "GB" (or "gigabyte") as it is used to denote the capacity of
electronic storage devices.  Defendant SanDisk, a manufacturer of
such devices, uses GB on its product packaging to mean one billion
bytes.  Many computer operating systems, however, use GB to mean
1,073,741,824 bytes.  The Plaintiffs therefore contend that the
Defendant's use of GB is deceptive, causing the average consumer to
believe that its products contain more storage space than they
actually do.

Based on these allegations, the Plaintiffs have asserted the
following four claims: (1) a claim for common law breach of
contract; (2) a claim for violation of California's Unfair
Competition Law ("UCL"); (3) a claim for violation of California's
Consumer Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"); and (4) a claim for violation
of California's False Advertising Law ("FAL").

Counts (1), (2), and (3) are brought on behalf of the named
Plaintiffs individually, a nationwide Class, and a California
Subclass; Count (4) is brought on behalf of the named Plaintiffs
individually and the California Subclass.  Specifically, the Class
is defined as all individuals and entities in the United States who
purchased a Sandisk USB Drive within the applicable statutes of
limitations preceding the filing of the lawsuit; and the Subclass
is defined as all individuals in the State of California who
purchased a Sandisk USB Drive within the applicable statutes of
limitations preceding the filing of the lawsuit.

The Court previously granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss the
original complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, but allowed the Plaintiffs
to amend their complaint as to Counts (2), (3), and (4) (the UCL,
CLRA, and FAL claims, respectively) and without leave to amend as
to Count (1) (the breach of contract claim).  The Plaintiffs
subsequently filed an amended complaint, which the Defendant again
moves to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The Court held a
hearing on the instant motion on Dec. 19, 2019,

Although the parties do not make any new requests for judicial
notice in connection with the instant motion, the Defendant relies
upon certain facts of which the Court took judicial notice in its
order granting its motion to dismiss the original Complaint.
Moreover, the Plaintiff now challenges some of these facts.  Judge
Freeman therefore clarifies the judicially noticeable facts at
hand.

First, the Court previously took judicial notice of the packaging
for the SanDisk 64 GB iXPAND Flash Drive USB 3.0 -- the product
that named Plaintiff Dinan purchased -- because it was incorporated
by reference into the Complaint.  Now, Judge takes judicial notice
only of the packaging for the SanDisk 64 GB iXPAND Flash Drive USB
3.0 and not for the products purchased by named Plaintiffs Cohee
and Choday.  Cohee and Choday are alleged to have purchased a
SanDisk Ultra Plus 64 GB microSDXC UHS-I Card and a SanDisk 256 GB
flash drive, respectively, and neither party has submitted the
packaging for those products.

Second, the Defendant asserts that the decimal definition of GB is
the legal standard set by the U.S. Government, a fact of which this
Court previously took judicial notice.  Notwithstanding the
Plaintiffs' Exhibits C and D, the Judge again takes judicial notice
of the fact that the decimal definition of giga has been adopted by
NIST as the preferred standard measurement for United States trade
and commerce.

Third, the Court previously took judicial notice of certain
dictionary definitions that were incorporated by reference into the
initial Complaint.  The same definitions are contained in the
Amended Complaint, and the Judge again takes judicial notice of
them. The three dictionaries (the online Oxford English Dictionary;
the online Merriam-Webster Dictionary; and Dictionary.com) each
state that -- as the Plaintiffs' allege -- a gigabyte equals 1024
megabytes or 1,073,741,824 bytes, but also that a gigabyte can mean
"one billion bytes."

The Defendant moves to dismiss the entire Amended Complaint.  Judge
Freeman first addresses the Defendant's arguments with regard to
their claims under California's consumer protection statutes
(Counts 2, 3, and 4) and then turns to the Plaintiff's claim for
breach of contract (Count 1).  

She finds that holds that Counts 2, 3, and 4 are subject to
dismissal for a combination of two reasons, as contended by the
Defendants.  First, no reasonable consumer would believe based on
the Defendant's packaging that the Plaintiff was receiving more
bytes than he actually received, which was the ground for the
Court's ruling in its previous dismissal order.  The Amended
Complaint adds no new, saving allegations and hence fails for the
same reason.  Second, the Plaintiffs' claims are barred by a
statutory safe harbor.

Judge Freeman notes that the Court previously dismissed named
Plaintiff Dinan's claims under the reasonable consumer standard,
and that the Plaintiffs have already been given an opportunity to
amend their complaint.  The Plaintiffs have failed to cure the
deficiencies identified by the Court, and the Judge is skeptical
that they would be able to do so if given allowed to amend their
complaint again.  In any event, the Judge also dismissed the
Plaintiffs' UCL, CLRA, and FAL claims as to all the Plaintiffs
under California's safe harbor doctrine.  The Plaintiff cannot cure
the fatal defect with amendment.  Because leave to amend would be
futile, Counts 2, 3, and 4, are dismissed with prejudice.

Turning to Count 1, Judge Freeman finds that although the
Plaintiffs oppose dismissal, they do not attempt to argue that the
Amended Complaint cures the fatal defect in the original Complaint.
As already discussed, the Plaintiffs continue to acknowledge that
all three products purchased by the named Plaintiffs display a
disclosure that "1GB = 1,000,000,000 bytes" on the back of the
packaging.  Under these circumstances, the Judge sees no cause to
revisit its holding that the Plaintiffs have failed to state a
claim for breach of contract.  Count 1 is again dismissed with
prejudice.

For these reasons, Judge Freeman dismissed the Amended Complaint
with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 22, 2020 Order is available at
https://is.gd/UiBGkN from Leagle.com.

John Dinan, Plaintiff, represented by Paul Anthony Maddock, Carey
Danis and Lowe, pro hac vice, James Jonathan Rosemergy, Carey &
Danis LLC, pro hac vice & Francis J. Flynn, Jr. --
casey@lawofficeflynn.com -- Law Offices of Francis J. Flynn, Jr.

SanDisk LLC, Defendant, represented by Anthony J. Weibell --
aweibell@wsgr.com -- Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati A
Professional Corporation & Keith E. Eggleton -- keggleton@wsgr.com
-- Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati A Professional Corporation.

SARATOGA DIAGNOSTICS: Floyd Balks at Unsolicited Fax Ads
--------------------------------------------------------
LOUIS FLOYD, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. SARATOGA DIAGNOSTICS, INC., a California
corporation, and THOMAS PALLONE, an individual, Defendants, Case
No. 5:20-cv-01520 (N.D. Cal., March 1, 2020) alleges that
Defendants send facsimile transmissions of unsolicited
advertisements to Plaintiff and the Class which is in violation of
the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005.

According to the complaint, Defendants faxed the same unsolicited
facsimile, which promotes their services and goods, to Plaintiff
and more than 40 other recipients without first receiving the
recipients' express permission or invitation.

The complaint further notes that unsolicited faxes may cause damage
to their recipients as it prevent fax machines from receiving
authorized faxes, prevent their use for authorized outgoing faxes,
cause undue wear and tear on the recipients' fax machines, and
require additional labor to attempt to discern the source and
purpose of the unsolicited message.

Saratoga Diagnostics, Inc. is a California-based company which
provides aesthetic systems, skin care products, and lasers for
cosmetic surgeries. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

            Steven L. Weinstein, Esq.
            P.O. Box 27414
            Oakland, CA 94602
            Telephone: (510) 336-2181
            Facsimile: (510) 336-2181
            Email: steveattorney@comcast.net

                    – and -

             Patrick H. Peluso, Esq.
             Taylor T. Smith, Esq.
             Woodrow & Peluso, LLC
             3900 East Mexico Ave., Suite 300
             Denver, CO 80210
             Telephone: (720) 213-0675
             Facsimile: (303) 927-0809
             Email: ppeluso@woodrowpeluso.com
                    tsmith@woodrowpeluso.com

SARBANAND FARMS: $3.75MM Deal in Rosas Labor Suit Gets Prelim. OK
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BARBARO ROSAS and GUADALUPE TAPIA, as individuals and
on behalf of all other similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs, v.
SARBANAND FARMS, LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. C18-0112-JCC
(W.D. Wash.), Judge John C. Coughenour of the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Washington, Seattle, granted the
Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for preliminary approval of a class
settlement.

The parties have proposed creating a total fund of $3.75 million
with $2,962,500 set aside to compensate the class members for all
claims.  The class members are eligible for a minimum payment of
over $4,300 if all eligible 519 class members file claims, and the
subclass members would receive another minimum payment of over
$10,384 if all eligible 65 subclass members file claims.  If all
the class and the subclass members do not file claims, their shares
will be divided equally amongst those who do file claims.

The Named Plaintiffs and class representatives Barbaro Rosas and
Guadalupe Tapia would be paid $10,000 each for their services as
the class representatives.

Because the parties have proposed a settlement that was produced
through non-collusive negotiations, lacks deficiencies, is
reasonable, and treats all members of the class, the subclass, and
the class representatives fairly, the Judge granted preliminary
approval.

Judge Coughenour approved the proposed class action notices that
the Plaintiffs attached as Exhibits 1 and 2 to their motion.  All
the notices will be translated into Spanish.  The Judge approved
the method of dissemination of the two proposed class action
notices proposed by the Plaintiffs in their motion.

Class counsel Columbia Legal Services ("CLS") are appointed as the
administrators of the class notification and settlement process.
CLS will issue notice, administer the claims process, and process
payment to the qualified claimants.

The Plaintiffs was to deliver a Spanish version of the class action
notice to all the class members as proposed by the end of January.
The claims by the class members must be submitted by March 31,
2020.

Any class member who wishes to object to the fairness,
reasonableness, or adequacy of the settlement agreement must send a
written statement setting forth their objection(s) as set forth in
the Plaintiffs' motion on March 31, 2020.

The class counsel will file a motion for final approval of the
settlement and a response to any proper objections no later than
April 10, 2020.

The Judge struck the jury trial set for April 20, 2020.

The final approval hearing is set for April 21, 2020 at 9:00 a.m.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 31, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/STDwZY from Leagle.com.

Barbaro Rosas & Guadalupe Tapia, Plaintiffs, represented by Adam
J.
Berger -- berger@sgb-law.com -- SCHROETER GOLDMARK & BENDER,
Joachim Morrison, COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES, Andrea L. Schmitt,
COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES, Bonnie A. Linville, COLUMBIA LEGAL
SERVICES, Lindsay Halm, SCHROETER GOLDMARK & BENDER, Lori Isley,
COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES & Tony Gonzalez, COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES,
201200 Palouse StWenatchee, WA 98801- 2235

Sarbanand Farms LLC, Munger Bros LLC & Nidia Perez, Defendants,
represented by Theodore William Hoppe -- tad@hoppe-law.com --
HOPPE
LAW GROUP, pro hac vice, Christopher E. Hawk -- chawk@grsm.com --
GORDON REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI & Derek Allan Bishop --
dbishop@grsm.com -- GORDON REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI LLP.

CSI Visa Processing, S.C., Defendant, represented by Adam S.
Belzberg -- adam.belzberg@stoel.com -- STOEL RIVES & Christopher
T.
Wall -- christopher.wall@stoel.com -- STOEL RIVES.

Washington State Employment Security Department, Interested Party,
represented by Mary Maureen Tennyson, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE.


SASOL LIMITED: Howard G. Smith Reminds of April 6 Deadline
----------------------------------------------------------
Law Offices of Howard G. Smith reminds investors of the upcoming
April 6, 2020 deadline to file a lead plaintiff motion in the class
action filed on behalf of investors who acquired of Sasol Limited
("Sasol" or the "Company") (NYSE: SSL) securities between March 10,
2015 and January 13, 2020 inclusive (the "Class Period").

Investors suffering losses on their Sasol investments are
encouraged to contact the Law Offices of Howard G. Smith to discuss
their legal rights in this class action at 888-638-4847 or by email
to howardsmith@howardsmithlaw.com.

On October 27, 2014, Sasol announced the construction of an $8.1
billion ethane cracker and derivatives complex called the Lake
Charles Chemicals Project ("LCCP").

On June 6, 2016, Sasol reported "that the expected total capital
expenditure for the [LCCP] could increase up to US $11 billion,
including site infrastructure and utility improvements." Moreover,
the Company disclosed that "the estimated LCCP capital cost and
extended schedule will reduce the expected project returns by
approximately the same amount as the Company's lower long-term
price assumptions."

On this news, Sasol's American depositary receipt ("ADR") price
fell $3.53 per share, or approximately 11%, to close at $28.60 per
share on June 6, 2016, thereby injuring investors.

On May 22, 2019, during pre-market hours, Sasol revealed that "the
cost estimate for the LCCP has been revised to a range of $12.6 to
$12,9 billion which includes a contingency of $300 million."

On this news, Sasol's ADR price fell $4.50 per share, or nearly
15%, to close at $25.64 per share on May 22, 2019, thereby injuring
investors further.

On August 16, 2019, during pre-market hours, Sasol postponed its
full year 2019 financial results because of "possible LCCP control
weaknesses."

On this news, Sasol's ADR price fell $0.74 per share, or over 4%,
to close at $17.67 per share on August 16, 2019, thereby injuring
investors further.

On October 28, 2019, Sasol disclosed that there were "errors,
omissions, and inaccuracies in the [LCCP] cost estimate" and that
the highest level of management had engaged in a number of
unethical and improper reporting activities. Sasol also announced
the resignation of, inter alia, its Joint Presidents and Chief
Executive Officers ("CEOs") and Senior Vice Presidents and others
previously in charge of the LCCP.

On January 14, 2020, Sasol confirmed "an explosion and fire at its
LCCP low-density polyethylene (LDPE) unit." Sasol stated that
"[t]he unit was in the final stages of commissioning and startup
when the incident occurred."

On this news, Sasol's ADR price fell $1.70 per share, or nearly 8%,
over the following two trading days to close at $19.99 per share on
January 15, 2020, thereby injuring investors further.

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout
the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to
investors: (1) that Sasol had conducted insufficient due diligence
into, and failed to account for multiple issues with, the LCCP, as
well as the true cost of the project; (2) that construction and
operation of the LCCP was consequently plagued by control
weaknesses, delays, rising costs, and technical issues; (3) that
these issues were exacerbated by Sasol's top-level management, who
engaged in improper and unethical behavior with respect to
financial reporting for the LCCP and the project's oversight; (4)
that all of the foregoing was reasonably likely to render the LCCP
significantly more expensive than disclosed and negatively impact
the Company's financial results; and (5) that as a result, the
Company's public statements were materially false and misleading at
all relevant times.

If you purchased Sasol securities during the Class Period, you may
move the Court no later than April 6, 2020 to ask the Court to
appoint you as lead plaintiff if you meet certain legal
requirements. To be a member of the class action you need not take
any action at this time; you may retain counsel of your choice or
take no action and remain an absent member of the class action. If
you wish to learn more about this class action, or if you have any
questions concerning this announcement or your rights or interests
with respect to these matters, please contact Howard G. Smith,
Esquire, of Law Offices of Howard G. Smith, 3070 Bristol Pike,
Suite 112, Bensalem, Pennsylvania 19020 by telephone at (215)
638-4847, toll-free at (888) 638-4847, or by email to
howardsmith@howardsmithlaw.com, or visit our website at
www.howardsmithlaw.com.

Contact:

         Howard G. Smith, Esquire
         Law Offices of Howard G. Smith
         Tel: 215-638-4847, 888-638-4847
         Website: www.howardsmithlaw.com
         Email: howardsmith@howardsmithlaw.com
[GN]


SASOL LIMITED: Rosen Law Announces Class Action Lawsuit
-------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, announces the
filing of a class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of the
securities of Sasol Limited (NYSE: SSL) between March 10, 2015 and
January 13, 2020, inclusive (the "Class Period"). The lawsuit seeks
to recover damages for Sasol investors under the federal securities
laws.

To join the Sasol class action, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1770.htmlor call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) Sasol had conducted insufficient due diligence into, and
failed to account for multiple issues with, the Lake Charles
Chemicals Project ("LCCP"), as well as the true cost of the
project; (2) construction and operation of the LCCP was
consequently plagued by control weaknesses, delays, rising costs,
and technical issues; (3) these issues were exacerbated by Sasol's
top-level management, who engaged in improper and unethical
behavior with respect to financial reporting for the LCCP and the
project's oversight; (4) all the foregoing was reasonably likely to
render the LCCP significantly more expensive than disclosed and
negatively impact the Company's financial results; and (5) as a
result, the Company's public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times. When the true details entered the
market, the lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than April 6,
2020. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on behalf
of other class members in directing the litigation. If you wish to
join the litigation, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1770.htmlor to discuss
your rights or interests regarding this class action, please
contact Phillip Kim, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll free at
866-767-3653 or via e-mail at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com.

Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe,
concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm was Ranked No. 1
by ISS Securities Class Action Services for number of securities
class action settlements in 2017. The firm has been ranked in the
top 3 each year since 2013. Rosen Law Firm has secured hundreds of
millions of dollars for investors.

Contact:

         Laurence Rosen, Esq.
         Phillip Kim, Esq.
         The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
         275 Madison Avenue, 40th Floor
         New York, NY 10016
         Tel: (212) 686-1060
         Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
         Fax: (212) 202-3827
         Website: www.rosenlegal.com
         Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com, pkim@rosenlegal.com,
                cases@rosenlegal.com
[GN]


SASOL LTD: Bernstein Liebhard Announces Class Action
----------------------------------------------------
Bernstein Liebhard, a nationally acclaimed investor rights law
firm, announces that a securities class action has been filed on
behalf of investors that purchased or acquired the securities of
Sasol Limited (NYSE: SSL) between March 10, 2015, and January 13,
2020 (the "Class Period").  The lawsuit filed in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York alleges
violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

If you purchased Sasol securities, and/or would like to discuss
your legal rights and options, please visit Sasol Shareholder
Investigation or contact Matthew E. Guarnero toll free at (877)
779-1414 or MGuarnero@bernlieb.com.

The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and misleading statements regarding the
Company's business, operational and compliance policies.
Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (i) Sasol had conducted
insufficient due diligence into, and failed to account for multiple
issues with, the LCCP, as well as the true cost of the project;
(ii) construction and operation of the LCCP was consequently
plagued by control weaknesses, delays, rising costs, and technical
issues; (iii) these issues were exacerbated by Sasol's top-level
management, who engaged in improper and unethical behavior with
respect to financial reporting for the LCCP and the projects
oversight; (iv) all the foregoing was reasonably likely to render
the LCCP significantly more expensive than disclosed and negatively
impact the Company's financial results; and (v) as a result, the
Company's public statements were materially false and misleading at
all relevant times.

On June 6, 2016, Sasol reported that the expected total capital
expenditure for the [LCCP] could increase up to US$11 billion.
Following these disclosures, Sasol's ADR price fell $3.53 per
share, or 10.99% to close at $28.60 per share on June 6, 2016.

On May 22, 2019, during pre-market hours, Sasol disclosed that the
cost estimate for the LCCP has been revised to a range of $12,6 to
$12,9 billion which includes a contingency of $300 million.
Following these disclosures, Sasol's ADR price fell $4.50 per
share, or 14.93%, to close at $25.64 per share on May 22, 2019.

Later, on August 16, 2019, during pre-market hours, Sasol issued a
press release disclosing that it was delaying the announcement of
its 2019 financial results because of possible LCCP control
weaknesses. On this news, Sasol's ADR price fell $0.74 per share,
or 4.02%, to close at $17.67 per share on August 16, 2019.

Then, on October 28, 2019, Sasol disclosed that its review of the
LCCP control weaknesses had brought to light errors, omissions, and
inaccuracies in the [LCCP] cost estimate, and a number of unethical
and improper reporting activities that took place at the highest
level of management.

Finally, on January 14, 2020, Sasol issued a press release
confirming that on January 13, 2020, the Company experienced an
explosion and fire at its LCCP low-density polyethylene (LDPE)
unit. Following these disclosures, Sasol's ADR price fell $1.70 per
share, or 7.84%, over the following two trading days, closing at
$19.99 per share on January 15, 2020.

If you purchased Sasol securities, and/or would like to discuss
your legal rights and options please visit
https://www.bernlieb.com/cases/sasollimited-ssl-shareholder-class-action-lawsuit-stock-fraud-245/apply/
or contact Matthew E. Guarnero toll free at (877) 779-1414 or
MGuarnero@bernlieb.com.  

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than April 6, 2020. A lead plaintiff is a representative
party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation. Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't require
that you serve as lead plaintiff. If you choose to take no action,
you may remain an absent class member.

Since 1993, Bernstein Liebhard LLP has recovered over $3.5 billion
for its clients. In addition to representing individual investors,
the Firm has been retained by some of the largest public and
private pension funds in the country to monitor their assets and
pursue litigation on their behalf. As a result of its success
litigating hundreds of lawsuits and class actions, the Firm has
been named to The National Law Journal's "Plaintiffs' Hot List"
thirteen times and listed in The Legal 500 for ten consecutive
years.

Contact:

         Matthew E. Guarnero, Esq.
         Bernstein Liebhard LLP
         Website: https://www.bernlieb.com
         Tel: (877) 779-1414
         E-mail: MGuarnero@bernlieb.com
[GN]


SCENIC TOURS: High Court to Consider European Cruise Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Elizabeth Byrne, writing for ABC News, reports that a group of
would-be luxury cruise travellers set sail for the Danube, but have
ended up in the High Court in Canberra on Feb. 11.

A New South Wales school teacher is leading the charge after his
holiday of a lifetime, sailing Europe's most scenic rivers, turned
into a bus trip.

David Moore booked his holiday with Scenic Tours in 2013 at a cost
of $18,000, expecting 10 days of cruising on the Rhine, Main and
Danube rivers.

In submissions to the High Court, his lawyers said he and his wife
liked the idea of unpacking their belongings only once, while still
being able to visit a large number of destinations.

"The ability to travel without the restriction of confined spaces
was of significance to [Mr] Moore, who had previously undergone
spinal surgery and found it difficult to spend extended periods
sitting down," the submissions say.

But a deluge that flooded many European waterways meant he cruised
for just three days, and relied instead on long bus trips to visit
many of the attractions on the itinerary.

Precedent will affect many
Mr Moore took the matter to court, but he is not the only one who
will be affected by the decision.

Many other travellers were caught up in the 2013 imbroglio, such as
Adelaide couple Darran and Merrilyn Kelly.

They saved for two years for their $37,000 Jewels of Europe cruise
but said Scenic Tours failed to provide the promised luxury
experience for at least five of the 14 days.

Mr Kelly said he would have postponed the holiday had he known of
the "significant risk" of problems.

"It was devastating," he said.

He added they were given meals of "ordinary quality" while the
cruise was suspended.

In 2019, another couple, Gavin and Tina Lawrence, of Wollongong,
spent more than $17,000 on a 15-day cruise from Amsterdam to
Budapest.

Mr Lawrence said their honeymoon became a "disaster" when low river
levels forced them on to buses for half of the trip.

The price of disappointment
The case is not about an entitlement to a refund for a holiday that
was not delivered.

What is new about the challenge is that Mr Moore wants extra
damages for the distress and disappointment caused by the company's
failure to provide the service he was expecting.

Mr Moore won an initial court battle, where it was found Scenic
Tours had breached the care, purpose and result guarantees written
into the Australian Consumer Law.

He was awarded $2,000.

However, an appeal later stripped him of that compensation, though
it did not throw out most of the other findings.

The problem that the High Court will ponder is a dispute over
whether state or Commonwealth consumer laws apply to the
compensation question.

Oddly, if the state law applies, Mr Moore would be technically
entitled to compensation but unable to claim it, because his claim
falls below the necessary threshold.

Many fellow Scenic Tours travellers will be watching carefully to
see if they too are in line to claim for distress and
disappointment for a holiday. [GN]


SEIU 521: Court Orders Parties Prepare for Some Issues in Bermudez
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JORGE BERMUDEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SERVICE
EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, LOCAL 521, et al., Defendants, Case
No. 18-cv-04312-VC (N.D. Cal.), Judge Vince Chhabria of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California ordered the
parties to be prepared to discuss the following issues at the
preliminary approval hearing (although other issues may be
discussed as well):

     a. Do the potential commonality and typicality problems
identified on page 5 of the motion prevent certifying a class for
settlement purposes?

     b.  The motion describes the predominant legal question in the
case as whether the union's conduct violated the First Amendment
(p. 13), but the proposed class period appears to be based on the
statute of limitations for the conversion and restitution claims
(p. 7).  Does this reflect a flaw in the composition of the class?

     c. Might union members who communicated an explicit intent to
resign from the union have stronger claims than those who merely
checked the fair share fees box on their forms?  If so, should
those class members who explicitly sought to resign be receiving a
premium (a greater pro rata share of the fund)?

     d. Why was the potential total recovery for the class
calculated using a list of at least 150 class members, rather than
all 183 class members?

     e. Does this case require notice to government officials under
CAFA?

     f. Should class members be notified of the proposed settlement
by email in addition to regular mail?

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 7, 2020 Order is available at
https://is.gd/ducpkl from Leagle.com.

Jorge Bermudez, Virginia Valdez & Angelica Pedrozo, Plaintiffs,
represented by Christopher D. Banys -- contact@banyspc.com --
Banys, P.C., Jennifer Lu Gilbert -- jgilbert@bdiplaw.com -- Bunsow
De Mory LLP & Richard Cheng-hong Lin -- rlin@bdiplaw.com -- Bunsow
De Mory LLP.

Service Employees International Union, Local 521 & County of Santa
Clara, Defendants, represented by Caren P. Sencer --
csencer@unioncounsel.net -- Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld, A
Professional Corporation, Eric Jason Wiesner, Weinberg, Roger &
Rosenfeld, Jeffrey B. Demain -- jdemain@altshulerberzon.com --
Altshuler Berzon LLP, Nancy Joan Clark, Office of County Counsel,
Patrick Casey Pitts -- cpitts@altshulerberzon.com -- Alsthuler
Berzon LLP & Scott Alan Kronland -- skronland@altshulerberzon.com
-- Altshuler Berzon LLP.

William Hough, Interested Party, represented by Milton L. Chappell,
National Right to Work Legal, Defense Foundation, Inc.

Ruth Aliser, Amicus, represented by Bradley A. Benbrook --
brad@benbrooklawgroup.com -- Benbrook Law Group.


SHINE SOLAR: Lewis Sues in W.D. Arkansas Alleging FLSA Violation
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Shine Solar, LLC, et
al. The case is styled as Brigid Lewis, Jenny Bolin, Skylar Mann,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
Shine Solar, LLC, Thomas Lowden, Case No. 5:20-cv-05038-PKH (W.D.
Ark., Feb. 27, 2020).

The Plaintiffs accuse the Defendants of violating the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

Shine Solar helps homeowners own their personal power plan, making
their own electricity rather than "renting" it from the power
company.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM PLLC
          One Financial Center
          650 South Shackleford, Suite 411
          Little Rock, AR 72211
          Phone: (501) 221-0088
          Fax: (888) 787-2040
          Email: josh@sanfordlawfirm.com


SINCLAIR BROADCAST: Certain Claims in Securities Suit Dismissed
---------------------------------------------------------------
Shearman & Sterling LLP, in an article for Lexology, reports that
on February 4, 2020, Judge Catherine C. Blake of the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed certain
claims in a putative class action asserting claims under Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 against a media
company and certain of its executives.  In re Sinclair Broadcast
Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., slip op., No. 18-cv-2445 (D. Md. Feb. 4,
2020).  Plaintiffs alleged that the company made various
misstatements to the FCC in connection with an ultimately
unsuccessful merger with another media company, and that the
company had engaged in an illegal price-fixing conspiracy regarding
advertising rates.  The Court dismissed most of plaintiffs' claims,
but held that plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged falsity and
scienter with respect to certain specific statements concerning
proposed divestitures in connection with the merger.

As a threshold matter, the Court rejected the company's argument
that alleged misstatements in submissions to the FCC constituted
"legal advocacy" and therefore were not made "in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security," as required for liability to
attach under Section 10(b).  Id. at 9.  The challenged statements
were contained in public filings, the Court noted, and the company
offered no reason why a reasonable investor might not have relied
on those statements.  Id. at 10. [GN]



SIX FLAGS: Federman & Sherwood Files Securities Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
Federman & Sherwood announces that on February 12, 2020, a class
action lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Texas against Six Flags Entertainment
Corporation (NYSE: SIX). The complaint alleges violations of
federal securities laws, Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5, including allegations of
issuing a series of material or false misrepresentations to the
market which had the effect of artificially inflating the market
price during the Class Period, which is April 25, 2018 through
January 9, 2020.

To learn how to participate in this action, please visit
https://www.federmanlaw.com/blog/federman-sherwood-announces-the-filing-of-a-securities-class-action-lawsuit-against-six-flags-entertainment-corporation/

Plaintiff seeks to recover damages on behalf of all Six Flags
Entertainment Corporation shareholders who purchased common stock
during the Class Period and are therefore a member of the Class as
described above. You may move the Court no later than Monday, April
13, 2020 to serve as a lead plaintiff for the entire Class.
However, in order to do so, you must meet certain legal
requirements pursuant to the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995.

If you wish to discuss this action, obtain further information and
participate in this or any other securities litigation, or should
you have any questions or concerns regarding this notice or
preservation of your rights, please contact:

         Robin Hester
         FEDERMAN & SHERWOOD
         10205 North Pennsylvania Avenue
         Oklahoma City, OK 73120
         Email to: rkh@federmanlaw.com [GN]


SIX FLAGS: Gainey McKenna Files Securites Class Action
------------------------------------------------------
Gainey McKenna & Egleston announces that a class action lawsuit has
been filed against Six Flags Entertainment Corporation ("Six Flags"
or the "Company") (NYSE: SIX) in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas on behalf of those who purchased
or acquired the securities of Six Flags between April 25, 2018 and
January 9, 2020, inclusive (the "Class Period").  The lawsuit seeks
to recover damages for Six Flags investors under the federal
securities laws.

The Complaint alleges that Defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) the delays of park
develop in China with Riverside were not "short-term" and were
material in the context of long-term opportunity; (2) Riverside was
in severe financial distress and did not have the resources to
timely complete its projects with Six Flags; and (3) as a result,
the Company's public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times.  When the true details entered
the market, the lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.

Investors who purchased or otherwise acquired shares of Spirit
during the Class Period should contact the Firm prior to the April
13, 2020 lead plaintiff motion deadline.  A lead plaintiff is a
representative party acting on behalf of other class members in
directing the litigation.  If you wish to discuss your rights or
interests regarding this class action, please contact Thomas J.
McKenna, Esq. or Gregory M. Egleston, Esq. of Gainey McKenna &
Egleston at (212) 983-1300, or via e-mail at tjmckenna@gme-law.com
or gegleston@gme-law.com. [GN]


SIX FLAGS: Johnson Fistel Files Securities Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------
Shareholder Rights Law Firm Johnson Fistel, LLP is investigating
potential violations of federal and state laws by Six Flags
Entertainment Corporation (NYSE: SIX) and certain of its officers.

On February 12, 2020, a Securities Class Action Complaint was filed
on behalf of those who purchased securities of Six Flags, between
April 25, 2018 and January 9, 2020.

According to the lawsuit, Six Flags throughout the Class Period,
made materially false and misleading statements regarding the
Company's business, operations, and growth prospects related to its
agreements with Riverside to develop parks in China. As development
of those parks began to face delays, Defendants misled investors by
downplaying the problems as "short-term" and "not material in the
context of the long-term opportunity."  Defendants also assured
investors that Riverside was "work[ing] through" the macroeconomic
issues in China and that Riverside was in "great shape"
financially. In truth, Riverside was in severe financial distress
and did not have the resources to timely complete its projects with
Six Flags. As a result of Defendants' misrepresentations, shares of
Six Flags' common stock traded at artificially inflated prices
throughout the Class Period.

If you are a long-term shareholder of Six Flags continuously
holding shares before April 25, 2018, you may have standing to hold
Six Flags harmless from the alleged harm caused by the officers and
directors of the Company by making them personally responsible. You
may also be able to assist in reforming the Company's corporate
governance to prevent future wrongdoing.

If you are interested in learning more about the investigation,
please contact Jim Baker (jimb@johnsonfistel.com) at 619-814-4471.
If you email, please include your phone number.

Additionally, if you have been continuously holding shares before
April 25, 2018, you can [Click here to join this action]. There is
no cost or obligation to you.

Johnson Fistel, LLP is a nationally recognized shareholder rights
law firm with offices in California, New York, and Georgia. The
firm represents individual and institutional investors in
shareholder derivative and securities class action lawsuits. For
more information about the firm and its attorneys, please visit
http://www.johnsonfistel.com.Attorney advertising. Past results do
not guarantee future outcomes.

         Contact:
         Jim Baker, Esq.
         Johnson Fistel, LLP
         Tel: 619-814-4471
         Email: jimb@johnsonfistel.com
[GN]


SIX FLAGS: Rosen Law Files Securities Class Action
--------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, announces the
filing of a class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of the
securities of Six Flags Entertainment Corporation (NYSE: SIX)
between April 25, 2018 and January 9, 2020, inclusive (the "Class
Period"). The lawsuit seeks to recover damages for Six Flags
investors under the federal securities laws.

To join the Six Flags class action, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1777.htmlor call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) the delays of park develop in China with Riverside were
not "short-term" and were material in the context of long-term
opportunity; (2) Riverside was in severe financial distress and did
not have the resources to timely complete its projects with Six
Flags; and (3) as a result, the Company's public statements were
materially false and misleading at all relevant times. When the
true details entered the market, the lawsuit claims that investors
suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than April 13,
2020. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on behalf
of other class members in directing the litigation. If you wish to
join the litigation, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1777.htmlor to discuss
your rights or interests regarding this class action, please
contact Phillip Kim, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll free at
866-767-3653 or via e-mail at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com.

Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe,
concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm was Ranked No. 1
by ISS Securities Class Action Services for number of securities
class action settlements in 2017. The firm has been ranked in the
top 3 each year since 2013. Rosen Law Firm has secured hundreds of
millions of dollars for investors.

Contact:

         Laurence Rosen, Esq.
         Phillip Kim, Esq.
         The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
         275 Madison Avenue, 40th Floor
         New York, NY 10016
         Tel: (212) 686-1060
         Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
         Fax: (212) 202-3827
         Website: www.rosenlegal.com
         Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com, pkim@rosenlegal.com,
                cases@rosenlegal.com
[GN]


SONIM TECHNOLOGIES: Maither May File Surreply in Malhotra Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, AJAY MALHOTRA, Plaintiff, v. SONIM TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
et al., Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-06416-MMC (N.D. Cal.), Judge
Maxime M. Chesney of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California has issued an order (i) affording Lyndon
Maither an opportunity to file surreply, and (ii) vacating the Jan.
10, 2020 hearing.

Before the Court are the following motions: (1) The Motion for
Appointment as Lead Plaintiff and Approval of Lead Counsel,"filed
by David Sterrett; (2) The Motion for Appointment as Lead
Plaintiff, and Approval of His Selection of Lead Counsel, filed by
Maither; and (3) The Motion for Appointment as Lead Plaintiff and
Approval of Lead Counsel, filed by Ajay Malhotra and Andre Ling Bin
Zulkifli.

In the instant complaint, Malhotra, on behalf of a putative class,
alleges claims under Sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Act.  The
Movants seek appointment as the Lead Plaintiff for such class.  

It is undisputed that Sterrett has the greatest loss, the Court
finds.  Additionally, there is no dispute, and the Judge finds,
Sterrett's claims are typical of those of the class members, in
that, like other putative class members, (1) he purchased shares in
Defendant Sonim Technologies, Inc. after the Defendants allegedly
made false and misleading statements about Sonim's financial
picture and (2) he continued to own such shares on the date Sonim's
share price allegedly fell in response to certain truthful
disclosures made by defendants.

With respect to adequacy, Sterrett relies on the statements in his
"Certification of Proposed Lead Plaintiff" filed in support of his
motion, and, in particular, on his statements therein that he has
selected experienced counsel to represent him, he did not purchase
the subject securities at the direction of the counsel, and he is
willing to serve as a representative plaintiff and to provide
testimony in support of the class claims.  In opposition to
Sterrett's motion, Maither argues Sterrett's showing nonetheless is
deficient in that Sterrett did not provide in his motion even the
most basic background information about himself.

The Court finds that although Sterrett contends such additional
information is not required at this stage of the litigation, he has
filed in support of his reply a declaration in which he sets forth
information about his background, which facts, read in connection
with the showing made in his motion, appear sufficient to show
Sterrett would be an adequate representative.  As those additional
facts were not, however, provided prior to the reply, Maither has
not had an opportunity to respond.

Accordingly, the Court orders that if he wishes to, Maither may
file a surreply limited to three pages in length exclusive of
exhibits.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 7, 2020 Order is available at
https://is.gd/Et8S1E from Leagle.com.

Ajay Malhotra, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Lesley F. Portnoy, Glancy
Prongay & Murray LLP, Lionel Z. Glancy -- LGLANCY@GLANCYLAW.COM --
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Charles Henry Linehan --
CLINEHAN@GLANCYLAW.COM -- Glancy Prongay and Murray LLP, Pavithra
Rajesh -- PRAJESH@GLANCYLAW.COM -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP &
Robert Vincent Prongay -- RPRONGAY@GLANCYLAW.COM -- Glancy Prongay
& Murray LLP.

Sonim Technologies, Inc., Robert Plaschke, James Walker, Maurice
Hochschild, Alan Howe, Kenny Young, Susan G. Swenson, John Kneuer &
Jeffrey D. Johnson, Defendants, represented by Matthew W. Close --
mclose@omm.com -- O'Melveny & Myers LLP.

David Sterrett, Movant, represented by Richard W. Gonnello, Faruqi
& Faruqi, LLP, pro hac vice, Benjamin Heikali, Faruqi and Faruqi
LLP, Katherine M. Lenahan, Faruqi and Farqui, LLP, pro hac vice &
Sherief Morsy, Faruqi and Faruqi, LLP, pro hac vice.

Sean Campbell, Movant, represented by Laurence Matthew Rosen, The
Rosen Law Firm, P.A.

Lyndon Maither, Movant, represented by Danielle Smith, Hagens
Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Lucas E. Gilmore, Hagens Beman Sobol
Shapiro LLP & Reed R. Kathrein, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP.

Andre Ling Bin Zulkifli, Movant, represented by Lesley F. Portnoy,
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP & Pavithra Rajesh, Glancy Prongay &
Murray LLP.


SPIRIT AEROSYSTEMS: Federman & Sherwood Files Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
Federman & Sherwood on Feb. 11 disclosed that on February 10, 2020,
it filed a class action lawsuit in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Oklahoma against Spirit AeroSystems
Holdings, Inc. (NYSE: SPR). The complaint alleges violations of
federal securities laws, Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5, including allegations of
issuing a series of material or false misrepresentations to the
market which had the effect of artificially inflating the market
price during the Class Period, which is October 31, 2019 through
January 29, 2020.

To learn how to participate in this action, please visit
https://www.federmanlaw.com/blog/federman-sherwood-announces-the-filing-of-a-securities-class-action-lawsuit-against-spirit-aerosystems-holdings-inc/.

Plaintiff seeks to recover damages on behalf of all Spirit
AeroSystems Holdings, Inc. shareholders who purchased common stock
during the Class Period and are therefore a member of the Class as
described above. You may move the Court no later than Friday, April
10, 2020 to serve as a lead plaintiff for the entire Class.
However, in order to do so, you must meet certain legal
requirements pursuant to the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995.

If you wish to discuss this action, obtain further information and
participate in this or any other securities litigation, or should
you have any questions or concerns regarding this notice or
preservation of your rights, please contact:

Robin Hester
FEDERMAN & SHERWOOD
10205 North Pennsylvania Avenue
Oklahoma City, OK 73120
Email to: rkh@federmanlaw.com
Or, visit the firm's website at www.federmanlaw.com [GN]


STEAK N SHAKE: Faces White Suit Over Improperly Paid Minimum Wage
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Melissa White, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated
individuals v. STEAK N SHAKE, INC., Case No. 4:20-cv-00323 (Mo.
Cir., Saint Louis Cty., Feb. 27, 2020), is brought against the
Defendant pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
Missouri's Minimum Wage Laws.

The Plaintiff and other servers were wrongfully denied minimum
wages when they worked in non-tipped occupations and/or spent a
substantial amount of their time performing non-tipped job tasks
that are related to their tipped occupation, says the complaint.

Ms. White worked as a server for the Defendant.

Steak N Shake operates and/or has operated its corporate owned
restaurants in St. Louis County.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Sheila R. Stuart, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF SHEILA R. STUART, LLC
          Bemiston Tower
          231 South Bemiston Avenue, Suite 800
          Clayton, MO 63105
          Phone: (314) 854-1339 (office)
          Phone: (314) 680-0920 (cell)
          Email: sheilarstuart@yahoo.com

               - and –

          Samuel Henderson, Esq.
          HENDERSON LAW FIRM
          1027 South Vandeventer Ave., 6th Floor
          Saint Louis, MO 63110
          Phone: (314) 399-8266
          Fax: (314) 399-8265
          Email: attysamuelhenderson@gmail.com
                 Hendersa85@hotmail.com


STERLING BANCORP: Faces OPPRS Securities Suit Over IPO Price Drop
-----------------------------------------------------------------
OKLAHOMA POLICE PENSION AND RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. STERLING BANCORP, INC.;
GARY JUDD, THOMAS LOPP; MICHAEL MONTEMAYOR; BARRY ALLEN; JON FOX;
SETH MELTZER; SANDRA SELIGMAN; PETER SINATRA; BENJAMIN WINEMAN;
LYLE WOLBERG; PIPER SANDLER COMPANIES AND AMERICAN CAPITAL
PARTNERS, LLC, Case No. 2:20-cv-10490-AJT-EAS (E.D. Mich., Feb. 26,
2020), is brought on behalf of all persons and entities, who
purchased or otherwise acquired Sterling common stock in or
traceable to the Company's November 17, 2017 initial public
offering seeking to recover damages pursuant to Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.

On October 19, 2017, Sterling filed its initial registration
statement on Form S-1 with the Securities and Exchange Commission
attempting to register its shares for its IPO. On November 17,
2017, the Company commenced its IPO through which 15 million shares
of common stock were offered at a price of $12 per share, including
7,692,308 shares of common stock sold by the Company and 7,307,692
shares sold by selling shareholders.

On June 21, 2019, after the market closed, Sterling filed a Form
8-K revealing that it had entered into an agreement with the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) to enhance its anti-money
laundering and Bank Secrecy Act compliance. However, the Company
attempted to temper this news, stating that it did not believe that
the agreement would have any material impact on its performance
metrics, the Plaintiff alleges.

After the market closed on June 21, 2019, the Company filed another
8-K announcing that director Jon Fox was resigning from the Board
of Directors. Fox had served as a Director for the Company since
1997 and was a member of the Audit and Risk Management Committee.
Again, the Plaintiff notes, the Company attempted to temper the
news, stating that Fox's retirement and resignation was not due to
any disagreement on any matter relating to the Company's
operations, policies or practices.

Upon this news, including the attempts to minimize it, Sterling's
stock price dropped $0.16, or 1.59%, from a close of $10.06 on
Friday, June 21, 2019, to a close of $9.90 on Monday, June 24,
2019.

On December 9, 2019, Sterling filed a Form 8-K revealing it was
suspending its Advantage Loan Program due to an internal review of
documentation on past loans. Upon this news, Sterling shares fell
from a close of $9.45 on Friday December 6, 2019, to a close of
$7.29 on Monday December 9, 2019, a decline of $2.16 or 22.86%, on
heavy volume.

Sterling is the unitary thrift holding company of Sterling Bank and
Trust, founded in 1984. The Company is headquartered in Southfield,
Michigan, with its primary branch operations located in the San
Francisco Bay Area and Greater Los Angeles. The Company specializes
in residential mortgages but offers a broad suite of products. The
vast majority of the Company's loans are to customers in
California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Paul F. Novak, Esq.
          WEITZ & LUXENBERG
          Fisher Building
          3011 West Grand Blvd., Suite 2150
          Detroit, MI 48202
          Telephone: (313) 800-4170
          Facsimile: (646) 293-7992
          E-mail: pnovak@weitzlux.com

               - and -

          Kristin J. Moody, Esq.
          Chowning Poppler, Esq.
          Patrick T. Egan, Esq.
          Nicole Maruzzi, Esq.
          BERMAN TABACCO
          44 Montgomery Street, Suite 650
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 433-3200
          Facsimile: (415) 433-6382
          E-mail: kmoody@bermantabacco.com
                  cpoppler@bermantabacco.com
                  pegan@bermantabacco.com
                  nmaruzzi@bermantabacco.com


TACONIC: Must Face Class Action Over PFAs in New York
-----------------------------------------------------
John Breslin, writing for Legal Newsline, reports that a class
action lawsuit claiming a company that manufactures products
containing teflon contaminated the groundwater in and around a town
in upstate New York has largely survived a challenge to dismiss the
claims.

Residents of the town of Petersburgh accuse the company, Taconic,
of polluting the area with a chemical known as perfluorooctanoic
acid (PFOA), which is alleged to have made its way into wells and
the soil from its factory.

Taconic, also known as Tonaga Inc., asked the New York Supreme
Court for the County of Rensselaer to dismiss the action on the
grounds that many other agencies are dealing with the issues raised
and that the company has properly responded to any concerns.

The company manufactured products coated with pietrafluoroethylene
(PTFE), the generic name for Teflon, the court noted. PFTE contains
PFOA, which is used as a water, oil and grease repellent. It is
part of the PFAS family of chemicals that is the subject of
lawsuits around the country, as well as regulatory efforts by both
the federal government and state governments.

In some instances, states have hired private lawyers on contingency
fees to pursue PFAS cases against large companies like DuPont and
3M.

The Petersburgh plaintiffs allege "the contaminants discharged by
defendant have been linked to cancers, pregnancy-related conditions
and other health issues." Skeptics have alleged that links between
PFAS and certain diseases are based on shaky research.

Justice Patrick McGrath, in his Jan. 24 ruling largely dismissing
the motion for summary judgment, said the defendant would have to
show the "cause of action . . . has no merit."

"The court finds that there are issues of fact as to whether
defendant knew the potential health affects of PFOA, and that it
had contaminated the wells and soil of some of its employees and
tenants, but failed to take any steps to share PFOA-related
information with the greater community," McGrath wrote.

The judge did find in favor of the defendant on the issue of strict
liability as he dismissed the claim that the company's intent did
not matter. In an earlier ruling, the court also sided with the
plaintiffs by refusing to dismiss class action certification.

Four classes were previously certified -- three relating to the
alleged contamination of property and drinking water with a fourth
linked to wider exposure.

The defendant, in its motion to dismiss, argued the court cannot
have jurisdiction to decide "disputes within an administrative
agency's authority, especially where the agency's specialized
experience and technical expertise is involved."

It was argued that several New York agencies are investigating
alleged contamination and deciding on remedial measures.

Taconic has also offered expert testimony that the company response
up to 2006 was within the standards laid down at that time, and
that actions taken since were "timely, appropriate and effective."

The plaintiffs are also arguing Taconic should pay punitive damages
because it placed profits above the health and safety of the
community. That issue is up to the jury, McGrath said.

Lead class counsel are Faraci Lange and Weitz Luxenberg, while the
defendant is represented by Greenberg Traurig and Hollingsworth.
[GN]


TARSADIA HOTELS: Order on Residual Beaver Settlement Funds Issued
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DEAN BEAVER and LAURIE BEAVER, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
TARSADIA HOTELS, a California Corporation et al., Defendants, Case
No. 11-CV-1842-GPC (KSC) (S.D. Cal.), Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel of
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California has
issued an order on the distribution of the residual settlement
funds.

The Class Counsel in the case filed a final status report and
request for an order paying residual amounts to the Claims
Administrator on Dec. 20, 2019.

The class action alleged violations of the disclosure requirements
under the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act concerning the
sale of condominium units at the Hard Rock in San Diego, CA.  After
years of contentious litigation, the parties settled.  On Sept. 28,
2017, the Court granted the Plaintiffs' motion for final approval
of class action settlement and judgment and the Plaintiffs'
application for attorneys' fees and costs, and service awards.

On May 9, 2018, the Court granted approval of the distribution of
settlement funds to the Class Members.  On June 12, 2018, the Class
Counsel filed a status report informing the Court that the Claims
Administrator made a clerical error and underpaid one Class Member
by $180,342.16 and the rest of the class, in aggregate, were
overpaid by the same amount.  The Claims Administrator took
immediate steps to remedy the error and used its own funds to pay
the underpaid Class Member.

The final status report states that 100% of the class members have
received and cashed their settlement distribution checks.  624
class members received checks totaling $33,724,038.46.  After
payment of court approved attorney fees and expenses, class
representative service awards, class member awards, administration
fees and expenses, tax payments, appraiser fees, and private
investigator fees, the settlement account has a balance of
$48,550.70.  The excess balance is due to the interest accrued on
the account and the remaining funds for private investigator fees
not used.  Plus, the account currently accrues interest at an
average of $85/month.  Remaining are unbilled administration fees
and expenses concerning post-distribution work that total
$20,112.69.  Therefore, the remaining residual amount is
$28,438.01.

The Class Counsel requests that $20,112.69 for unpaid
administration fees and expenses be paid to the Claims
Administrator and the remaining residual amount of $28,438.01 be
paid to the Claim Administrator to partially reimburse it for
paying $180,342.16 of its own funds to correct a clerical error.
Alternatively, the Class Counsel notes that if the Court would
prefer another distribution to the class members, it will instruct
the Claims Administrator to proceed accordingly.

Judge Curiel finds that when the error was noted, the Class
Counsel's status report, filed on June 12, 2018, noted that if at
the end of the distribution process, there are funds remaining in
the settlement fund, the class counsel and GCG may request that
those funds be used to repay GCG up to the $180,342.16 that it paid
to Stanzaz, LLC, before any second distribution is made to the
class members.  Accordingly, in the final status report, the Class
Counsel requests that the entire amount remaining in the settlement
fund be paid to the Claims Administrator to pay current unpaid fees
and partially reimburse it for paying $180,342.16 from its own
funds.  However, the Class Counsel has provided no legal or
contractual basis to support this distribution.

In fact, the Distribution Plan, referenced in the Court's order
granting final approval of the class action settlement provides
that any leftover Settlement Administration costs, will be
distributed pro rata to the Class members who cashed their checks,
unless the Plaintiffs' Counsel, with District Court approval, deems
the residual too small to efficiently distribute, in which event
the residual will be paid cy pres to an appropriate charity or
non-profit suggested by the Plaintiffs and approved by the District
Court.  

The Class Counsel fails to explain with legal authority its
divergence from the Distribution Plan.  Unless otherwise shown, the
Plaintiffs must comply with the Distribution Plan, which was
approved by the Court on Sept. 28, 2017, that any residual amounts
be distributed to either to the class members or to a cy pres.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Jan. 7, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/TBi0lL from Leagle.com.

Dean Beaver, Plaintiff, represented by Donald Eugene Chomiak,
Talisman Law, P.C., Michael J. Reiser, Law Office of Michael
Reiser, Michael L. Schrag -- mls@classlawgroup.com -- Gibbs Law
Group, LLP, Tyler R. Meade, The Meade Firm P.C., Michael Rubin --
mrubin@altber.com -- Altshuler Berzon LLP & Wendy C. Fostvedt,
Fostvedt Legal Group, LLC, pro hac vice.

Laurie Beaver, Steven Adelman, Abram Aghachi, Dinesh Gauba, Kevin
Kenna, Veronica Kenna, Plaintiffs, represented by Donald Eugene
Chomiak, Talisman Law, P.C., Michael L. Schrag, Gibbs Law Group,
LLP, Tyler R. Meade, The Meade Firm P.C., Michael Rubin, Altshuler
Berzon LLP & Wendy C. Fostvedt, Fostvedt Legal Group, LLC, pro hac
vice.

Tarsadia Hotels, Tushar Patel, B.U. Patel, Gregory Casserly,
Gaslamp Holdings, LLC, Defendants, represented by Alicia Natalie
Vaz -- avaz@coxcastle.com -- Cox Castle and Nicholson, Perry
Hughes -- phughes@coxcastle.com -- Cox Castle & Nicholson,
Frederick H. Kranz, Jr. -- rkanz@coxcastle.com -- Cox Castle &
Nicholson, LLP & Lynn T. Galuppo -- lgaluppo@coxcastle.com -- Cox,
Castle & Nicholson, LLP.

5th Rock LLC, MKP One, LLC, Defendants, represented by Alicia
Natalie Vaz, Cox Castle and Nicholson, Natalia Arpy Minassian,
Bruce A. Hatkoff, A Law Corporation, Perry Hughes, Cox Castle &
Nicholson, Frederick H. Kranz, Jr., Cox Castle & Nicholson, LLP &
Lynn T. Galuppo, Cox, Castle & Nicholson, LLP.

Playground Destination Properties, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Daniel M. Benjamin -- dbenjamin@mcnamarallp.com -- McNamara
Benjamin LLP, John J. Rice & Thomas W. McNamara --
tmcnamara@mcnamarallp.com -- McNamara Benjamin LLP.

Gregory Casserly, MKP One, LLC, Tushar Patel, Gaslamp Holdings,
LLC, Tarsadia Hotels, B.U. Patel, ThirdParty Plaintiffs,
represented by Alicia Natalie Vaz, Cox Castle and Nicholson, Perry
Hughes, Cox Castle & Nicholson & Frederick H. Kranz, Jr., Cox
Castle & Nicholson, LLP.


TERRAVIA HOLDINGS: Judge Partially Dismisses Securities Claims
--------------------------------------------------------------
Shearman & Sterling LLP, in an article for Lexology, reports that
on February 4, 2020, Judge James Donato of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California partially
dismissed a putative class action asserting claims under Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 against a food
supplement company and certain of its former executives.  In Re
TerraVia Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 16-CV-06633-JD, 2020 WL
553939 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2020).  Plaintiffs alleged that the
company made misrepresentations regarding the health benefits and
commercial viability of certain ingredients it created and sourced
for its food manufacturing partners, based on the company having
received reports that these ingredients were causing illnesses,
ultimately leading to product recalls.  The Court held that certain
of the alleged misstatements were non-actionable, but that
plaintiffs' allegations respecting certain other alleged
misstatements were sufficient to state a claim.

Plaintiffs alleged that the company had an affirmative duty to
disclose reports that its products had caused illnesses, and that
its failure to do so rendered its public statements misleading.
The Court explained, however, that the federal securities laws
"prohibit only misleading and untrue statements, not statements
that are incomplete."  Id. at *3.  [GN]



TEXAS LEGACY: Mejia Suit Seeks OT Pay for Full-Time Bricklayers
---------------------------------------------------------------
RAMON MEJIA, JOSE RAMIREZ, ARLENDA GODOY, VICTOR LOVO, and NAHUN
ROJAS, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated v.
TEXAS LEGACY CONTRACTING LLC, TILMAN JOHN CHAMBERS III, and WILSON
OMAR MARTINEZ, Case No. 4:20-cv-00689 (S.D. Tex., Feb. 26, 2020),
is a complaint for damages brought by a group of full-time
bricklayers seeking to recover unpaid wages owed to them by the
Defendants.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs worked for Defendants as
full-time bricklayers on a construction project in Houston, Texas,
and regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per week. The Defendants
failed to pay the Plaintiffs their promised wages, failed to pay
them overtime wages at time and one half of their regular rate of
pay, and in some weeks failed to pay even the required minimum wage
rate.

The Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated to recover damages for the Defendants'
violations of their rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act, and
the Texas Minimum Wage Act.

Texas Legacy, a general contractor, was operated by Tilman John
Chambers III. Martinez owned and operated M3 Roofing and
Restoration, a bricklaying and roofing company, as a sole
proprietorship.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Jordyn Rystrom Emmert, Esq.
          Christopher J. Willett, Esq.
          Rebecca Eisenbrey, Esq.
          EQUAL JUSTICE CENTER
          1922 Common Street
          Houston, TX 77009
          Telephone: (832) 322-7889
          Facsimile: (512) 474-0008
          E-mail: jemmert@equaljusticecenter.org
                  cwillett@equaljusticecenter.org
                  reinsenbrey@equaljusticecenter.org


TILLAMOOK CREAMERY: Products Contain Fake Vanilla, Angeles Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
MARITZA ANGELES, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. TILLAMOOK COUNTY CREAMERY ASSOCIATION,
Defendant, Case No. 1:20-cv-01764 (S.D.N.Y., February 28, 2020)
alleges that the Tillamook Lowfat Greek Yogurt Old-Fashioned
Vanilla product, which is manufactured and distributed by
Defendant, contains non-vanilla flavors which imitate and extend
vanilla but are not derived from the vanilla bean, yet these
flavors are not disclosed to consumers as required and expected.

The case affirms that the Defendant's branding and packaging of the
Product is designed to deceive, mislead, and defraud consumers in
violation of Express Warranty, Implied Warranty of Merchantability
and the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act.

Tillamook County Creamery Association manufactures, distributes,
markets, labels and sells yogurt products purporting to be flavored
only with vanilla under their Tillamook brand. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Spencer Sheehan, Esq.
          SHEEHAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          505 Northern Blvd., Ste. 311
          Great Neck, NY 11021-5101
          Tel: (516)303-0552
          Fax: (516)234-7800
          Email: spencer@spencersheehan.com

                - and -

          Michael R. Reese, Esq.
          REESE LLP
          100 W 93rd St. F1 16
          New York, NY 10025-7524
          Tel: (212)643-0500
          Fax: (212)253-4272
          Email: mreese@reesellp.com


TRAVIS COUNTY, TX: Judge Dismisses Sexual Assault Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Schnitker and Kate Winkle, writing for KXAN, report that a
United States district court judge ruled to dismiss a class-action
lawsuit on Feb. 10 that claimed Travis County District Attorney
Margaret Moore, Austin Police Chief Brian Manley and other Austin
officials mishandled sexual assault cases for eight women.

In June 2018, three women filed a lawsuit, claiming they were
denied "equal access to justice and equal protection of the law,"
according to a lawsuit. The lawsuit claimed the three women were
subjected to "policies, customs, and practices that discriminate
against them based on their gender." Since then, five other women
joined the suit, including one who filed a lawsuit against Moore
and First Assistant District Attorney Melinda Montford last
September, claiming that the two conspired together to say that her
alleged sexual assault was consensual.

Along with Moore and Manley, the city of Austin, former Travis
County DA Rosemary Lehmberg, former APD Chief Art Acevedo, Travis
County Sheriff Sally Hernandez and the county itself were named in
the class-action suit.

The lawsuit dismissed on Feb. 10 put the main question from the
plaintiffs like this: "Plaintiffs assert that at the heart of this
case is the ‘federal constitutional question: Does it violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution for the City of Austin and Travis County to
systematically refuse to appropriately investigate and prosecute
sex crimes against women based on biased assumptions about
women?'"

"While this lawsuit has been pending, it has been an impediment to
the work we are doing, to the handling of sexual assault cases. I
think now that the lawsuit's out of the way, good information can
be put before the public," Moore said to KXAN on Feb. 10.

The defendants argue the plaintiffs have not "stated claims for
which relief may be granted." The judge found except for one case,
the plaintiffs' claims are not specific. The judge also "declines
to exercise jurisdiction" related to other claims in the case, in
part because the plaintiffs may be able to bring their claims to
state court, and because the federal court did not want its ruling
to conflict with new laws in Texas.

An attorney for the defendants said in a statement to KXAN that her
clients are "obviously disappointed", but the ruling isn't the end
for their case.

"We are reviewing the order in detail and our clients intend to
pursue all legal options available to them. Of note, Judge Yeakel
did not issue a ruling with respect to the majority of the claims
(or their substance) based on the premise that he should abstain
because survivors and advocates have already been successful in
changing laws and policies as a result of the Survivor Plaintiffs'
willingness to shine a light on the issues. This ruling is
certainly not a vindication for any of the Defendants or for the
systems in Travis County that continue to fail survivors; we hope
the Defendants will begin the hard work of listening and trying to
make positive change," Jennifer Rudenick Ecklund said.

The City of Austin released this statement to KXAN on Feb. 10 after
the judge's ruling:

"We appreciate the Judge's thoughtful and thorough deliberation in
this matter, and agree that the case should be dismissed.
Regardless of the court's ruling, though, the City of Austin
remains committed to treating all sexual assault survivors with
dignity and respect, and will ensure our officers have the
appropriate resources and training to investigate all such cases
appropriately."

The lawsuit was originally heard Dec. 17, 2018, but further
consideration of the case was delayed to see if the Texas
Legislature passed any laws that might affect it. The legislature
passed a number of bills, including one that creates deadlines for
Sexual Assault Kit testing and requires law enforcement to clear
their backlogs. In February 2019, the Austin Police Department
cleared its backlog of 2,665 untested rape kits.

Another bill created a sexual assault task force, which is charged
with recommending how law enforcement around the state can improve
how sex assault cases are handled.

In January 2019, the Austin City Council also asked the city
manager to hire an outside firm to review how the city investigates
sexual assaults.

"Were the court to review Plaintiffs' remaining claims, not only
would the court be assessing the new laws as they might affect
Plaintiffs' claims and any underlying criminal cases, but the court
would need to analyze how the requested prospective relief could be
granted without coming into conflict with the implementation of the
new laws," the decision stated. [GN]


TRUE HEARTS: Judgment of Pleadings Bid in Askew FLSA Suit Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHANTAL ASKEW, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. TRUE HEARTS OF CARE, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 5:19-cv-1619 (N.D. Ohio), Judge Sara Lioi of
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern
Division, denied THC's motion for judgment on the pleadings.

On July 16, 2019, Askew filed her complaint against THC under the
Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").  THC provides direct care
services and transportation to individuals with developmental
disabilities.  Askew was employed by THC3 in a direct care
position, providing care and in-home support for developmentally
disabled individuals in their homes.  She was paid on an hourly
wage basis.

Although Askew acknowledges she was paid overtime for hours worked
in excess of 40 hours per week, she alleges she was not paid for
hours worked between client appointments, including time spent
driving to and from client homes, which is allegedly compensable
time under the "continuous workday rule."  The gravamen of Askew's
complaint is the allegation that she had approximately two to three
appointments per day during her employment with THC, and was not
paid for an average of 30 to 45 minutes of driving between client
appointments per day.

THC denies that the Plaintiff traveled between client homes at all,
indicating instead that she worked full shifts at each individual
client's home, and that she was paid for all time worked, as
reflected in time sheets attached to THC's answer.  The Defendant
denies Askew's allegation that she had two to three appointments
per day and was not paid for 30 to 45 minutes of driving between
appointments per day.

In its counterclaim, the Defendant alleges that Askew was generally
scheduled to work 8- to 10-hour shifts (which Askew admits), the
entirety of which was performed at one location for the duration of
each shift, without clocking out (which Askew denies).  THC also
alleges that Askew was not permitted to provide any form of
transportation or do any driving during her shifts, a condition of
her employment that Askew acknowledged in writing.  Askew denies
this allegation.  THC alleges that Askew falsified her time sheets,
both charging for time she did not work and claiming time for
training she did not attend.  Askew denies these allegations.  On
Feb. 13, 2019, as Askew admits, she was suspended due to multiple
write-ups for failing to appear for scheduled shifts.  Finally, as
Askew also admits, she was eventually placed on unpaid
administrative leave due to an assault charge and, ultimately, was
terminated.

Before the Court is THC's motion for judgment on the pleadings.
THC argues that, because Askew was paid for all the time she
worked, THC is entitled to judgment.  It also notes that Askew's
complaint does not allege she did not receive compensation for
hours submitted, but rather only that she was not paid for time
traveling between client appointments.

Askew, in opposition, asserts that the FLSA requires compensation
for travel time under the "continuous workday rule" if the travel
itself is an indispensable part of performing one's job.

Based solely on the pleadings, Judge Lioi holds that THC has not
shown Askew's factual allegations to be implausible.  The Judge
notes, however, that, were she to consider the matters that have
been excluded, Askew's factual allegations would appear discredited
(or even false).  Therefore, it is possible that THC may prevail at
the summary judgment stage; however, the Judge is not prepared to
enter judgment on the pleadings.

For the reasons set forth, although the Judge recognizes several
weaknesses in the Plaintiff's claims, at this juncture they cannot
be deemed implausible.  Therefore, the Judge denied the Defendant's
motion for judgment on the pleadings.  The Judge will separately
issue a Case Management Plan and Trial Order, without the need to
conduct a Case Management Conference.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 7, 2020 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://is.gd/xjG87f from Leagle.com.

Chantel Askew, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Anthony J. Lazzaro --
anthony@lazzarolawfirm.com -- Lazzaro Law Firm, Chastity L. Christy
-- chastity@lazzarolawfirm.com -- Lazzaro Law Firm & Lori M.
Griffin -- lori@lazzarolawfirm.com -- Lazzaro Law Firm.

True Hearts of Care, LLC, Defendant, represented by J. Reid Yoder
-- ryoder@dpylaw.com -- DiCaudo Pitchford & Yoder & Benjamin R.
Sorber, DiCaudo Pitchford & Yoder.

True Hearts of Care, LLC, Counter-Claimant, represented by J. Reid
Yoder, DiCaudo Pitchford & Yoder & Benjamin R. Sorber, DiCaudo
Pitchford & Yoder.

Chantel Askew, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Counter-Defendant, represented by Anthony J. Lazzaro,
Lazzaro Law Firm, Chastity L. Christy, Lazzaro Law Firm & Lori M.
Griffin, Lazzaro Law Firm.


U.S. STEEL: Court Certifies Class in Vrakas Securities Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHRISTAKIS VRAKAS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED
STATES STEEL CORPORATION, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No.
17-579 (W.D. Pa.), Judge Cathy Bissoon of the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania (i) granted the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, and (ii) granted in
part and denied in part the Defendants' Motion to Strike the Expert
Rebuttal Report of Michael L. Hartzmark, Ph.D.

On Aug. 16, 2017, the Court issued an order consolidating the case,
as well as any other subsequently-filed related actions, appointing
Mr. Christakis Vrakas to serve as the Lead Plaintiff in the
consolidated action and approving Mr. Vrakas's choice of counsel.
In October 2017, Mr. Vrakas, along with Plaintiffs Leann Reed and
Robert Myer, filed an Amended Complaint against U.S. Steel,
individuals Mario Longhi, David Burritt and Dan Lesnak, and many
entities that served as underwriters for U.S. Steel's secondary
public offering on Aug. 15, 2016.

On Sept. 29, 2018, the Court dismissed all but one of the
Plaintiffs' claims against all the Defendants.  Since then, Mr.
Myer has withdrawn from the Action, and Ms. Reed voluntarily
dismissed her claims, with prejudice, against the underwriter
Defendants.  In January 2019, the parties filed their Rule 26(f)
Joint Report of the Parties Pursuant to Appendix LCvR 23.E (Class
Action), and the Court issued its Case Management Order ("CMO")
shortly thereafter.

In April 2019, Plaintiffs Mr. Vrakas and Ms. Reed filed a Motion
for Class Certification, accompanied by a Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Class Certification in support of their Motion.  The
Plaintiffs moved, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23(a), (b)(3) and
(g), to: (1) certify the action as a class action; (2) appoint the
Plaintiffs as the Class representatives; (3) appoint Levi &
Korsinsky, LLP as the Class counsel, and (4) grant any other relief
the Court deems just and proper.  They posit that the Court should
certify the proposed Class because they contend that it meets the
following requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3).

The Defendants filed an Opposition to the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Class Certification, along with a Declaration in support of their
Opposition.  Specifically, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs
have failed to meet the following requirements: (i) Predominance
because the Plaintiffs have not proven that common questions
predominate because they have not supplied a damages model that
fits their liability theory and failed to provide a workable
methodology to address damages on a class-wide basis; (ii)
Numerosity because the Plaintiffs have not provided sufficient
proof that the proposed class would be so numerous that joinder of
all parties would be impracticable; and (iii) Adequacy because the
Plaintiffs have not shown that Ms. Reed will adequately represent
the proposed class because of her lack of involvement in the
strategy and dismissal of the Securities Act claims, because she
did not expect to be involved in or attend the mediation and
because she would rely on legal counsel with respect to resolving
the case.

The Defendants also filed a Motion to Strike the Expert Rebuttal
Report of Michael L. Hartzmark, Ph.D accompanied by a Memorandum of
Law in support.

The Plaintiffs filed a Response in Opposition to Motion to Strike
the Hartzmark Rebuttal Report, along with a Declaration in support.
The Defendants' Motion for Leave to File Reply in Support of the
Defendants' Motion to Strike was denied.  

Judge Bissoon first addresses the Motion for Class Certification
before proceeding to the Motion to Strike.  

As for the Motion for Class Certification, Judge Bissoon finds that
the Plaintiffs' have met the Rule 23(a) requirements, and have
satisfied the Predominance and Superiority requirements under Rule
23(b)(3).  Among other things, the Defendants' arguments about the
appropriateness and detail of the Plaintiffs' methodology are
premature, and do not affect whether common issues of law or fact
predominate at this stage, the Court notes.  The Defendants also do
not contest the superiority of proceeding as a class action.

Turning to the Motion to Strike, Judge Bissoon (i) does not find
any violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(d) and 37(c)(1), as the
Plaintiffs operated according to the CMO, and will not strike the
Hartzmark Rebuttal based on timeliness; (ii) finds that merely
calling material "new" and describing it as "an attempt to provide
details that should have been incorporated into Dr. Hartmark's
initial report" is insufficient to strike the rebuttal report as a
matter of law; (iii) finds that Dr. Hartzmark's six paragraphs of
analysis on Comcast is based on his interpretation and application
of the law in that case and applies his construction of the law in
Comcast to the facts of the case; and (iv) does not find that Dr.
Hartzmark's discussion on the number of institutional investors is
a rebuttal to Dr. Zurek's report, and will grant the Defendants'
motion to strike the relevant portions, Paragraphs 5, 34-37, of the
Hartzmark Rebuttal.

The Court will not adopt the Plaintiffs' view that the Defendants'
Motion to Strike was improperly filed as a sur-reply to get the
last word, as she finds some merit in the Motion to Strike.  For
these reasons, the Court will strike Paragraphs 4-5, 24-30 and
34-37 of the Hartzmark Rebuttal.

Consistent with the foregoing, Judge Bissoon granted the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification.  Plaintiffs Christakas
Vrakas and Leann Reed are appointed as the Class Representatives.
Levi & Korsinsky, LLP, is appointed as the class counsel.  The
Court granted the Defendants' Motion to Strike with respect to Dr.
Hartzmark's arguments about numerosity and Comcast, and denied it
with respect to the remainder of the Hartzmark Rebuttal.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Dec. 31, 2019 Memorandum
Order is available at https://is.gd/yjoq52 from Leagle.com.

HENRY BIERYLA, OKLAHOMA FIREFIGHTERS PENSION AND RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
CASSANDRA CETLIN & ROY CETLIN, Plaintiff Consolidateds, represented
by Vincent A. Coppola , Pribanic & Pribanic.

CHRISTAKIS VRAKAS, Plaintiff, represented by Nancy A. Kulesa, Levi
& Korsinsky, LLP, pro hac vice, Shannon Hopkins -- shopkins@zlk.com
-- Levi & Korsinsky LLP, Gregory M. Potrepka -- gpotrepka@zlk.com
-- Levi & Korsinsky, LLP, Stephanie A. Bartone -- sbartone@zlk.com
-- Levi & Korsinsky, LLP & Vincent A. Coppola, Pribanic &
Pribanic.

LEEANN REED, Plaintiff, represented by Nancy A. Kulesa, Levi &
Korsinsky, LLP, pro hac vice, Shannon Hopkins, Levi & Korsinsky
LLP, Gregory M. Potrepka, Levi & Korsinsky, LLP & Stephanie A.
Bartone, Levi & Korsinsky, LLP.

UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION, DAVID B. BURRITT & MARIO LONGHI,
Defendants, represented by Adrienne F. Mueller --
afmueller@jonesday.com -- Jones Day, pro hac vice, Geoffrey J.
Ritts -- gjritts@jonesday.com -- Jones Day, pro hac vice, Leon F.
DeJulius -- lfdejulius@jonesday.com -- Jones Day & Margaret C.
Gleason -- mcgleason@jonesday.com -- Jones Day.

DAN LESNAK, Defendant, represented by Adrienne F. Mueller, Jones
Day, pro hac vice & Geoffrey J. Ritts, Jones Day, pro hac vice.


UNDER ARMOUR: Court Grants Indicative Ruling Bid in Securities Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, In re UNDER ARMOUR SECURITIES LITIGATION, Civil Action
No. RDB-17-0388 (D. Md.), Judge Richard D. Bennett of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Maryland granted the Plaintiffs'
Motion for Indicative Ruling Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
62.1.

The central allegation in the putative class action lawsuit is that
Defendants Under Armour and its representatives, including its
former CEO Kevin Plank, misrepresented the level of demand for
Under Armour products.  In two previous opinions, the Court
dismissed the Plaintiffs' claims under Sections 10(b), 20(a), and
20A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder, as well as Sections 11 and 15 of the
Securities Act of 1933.

Under Armour is a Maryland-based sports apparel company that sells
branded athletic apparel, footwear and accessories worldwide.
Since its formation in 1996, the Company has grown to become a
leading premium sportswear brand, achieving the position of number
two sportswear brand by revenue in the United States by 2014.  By
capitalizing on its premium brand image and reputation for
state-of-the-art fabrics, Under Armour reported 26 consecutive
quarters of 20% or more compounded annual growth between 2010 and
2016.  On Oct. 22, 2019, the Company announced that Plank would
become the Executive Chairman and Brand Chief of the Company.

The Plaintiffs allege generally that beginning in September 2015,
the Defendants' public statements concealed that they knew consumer
demand for Under Armour's products was declining, so the Company
abandoned its "brand strength over price" sales philosophy and
resorted to discounting, which led to Under Armour's stock prices
being artificially inflated by lower-margin sales and international
expansion.  Additionally, they allege that Under Armour inflated
its sales numbers by pressuring Dick's Sporting Goods to order more
inventory than it required, with the promise that it could return
the items later.  Similarly, Under Armour is alleged to have
continued making sales to The Sports Authority even after learning
that the retailer was headed towards bankruptcy.

In their Consolidated First Amended Complaint, Lead Plaintiff
Aberdeen City Council as Administrating Authority for the North
East Scotland Pension Fund, and Bucks County Employees Retirement
Fund, brought a putative class action against Under Armour, Plank,
Lawrence P. (Chip) Molloy, Brad Dickerson, the Director Defendants,
and the Underwriter Defendants, alleging violations of federal
securities laws.  Under Counts I and II, Bucks County Employees
Retirement Fund brought Securities Act claims against Under Armour,
Plank, Molloy, the Director Defendants, and the Underwriter
Defendants.  Under Counts III and IV, the Plaintiffs brought
Exchange Act7 claims against Under Armour, Plank, Molloy, and
Dickerson.

On Nov. 16, 2018, the Lead Plaintiff and Monroe County Employees'
Retirement System, on behalf of all persons or entities that
purchased or acquired common stock of Under Armour between Sept.
16, 2015 and Jan. 30, 2017, inclusive and who were damaged thereby,
filed a Consolidated Second Amended Complaint.  The Second Amended
Complaint asserted only Exchange Act claims against only Under
Armour and Plank.

On Aug. 19, 2019, the Court dismissed all three Counts of the
Second Amended Complaint, once again finding that the Plaintiffs
had failed to allege scienter.  As to Plank's scienter, this Court
concluded that "the most reasonable likely inference to be drawn is
that Plank interpreted the data that was available to him through,
the lens of the Company's consistent success to date, attributed
any non-conforming data to typical retail market challenges, and
assumed the Company would continue to rise above such challenges as
it had always done in the past.

On September 9, 2019, the Court Court entered Judgment in favor of
all the Defendants.  On Sept. 17, 2019, the Plaintiffs, led by the
Aberdeen City Council as Administrating Authority for the North
East Scotland Pension Fund, filed a timely Notice of Appeal to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

On Nov. 3 and 14, 2019, The Wall Street Journal published two
articles reporting that Under Armour has been the subject of
investigations by the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
and the Department of Justice ("DOJ") since at least July 2017 and
that Under Armour shifted sales from quarter to quarter to appear
healthier.  Based on this new evidence, the Plaintiffs have filed a
Motion for Indicative Ruling Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
62.1 and Motion for Relief from the Court's September 9, 2019
Judgment.  Moving separately, the Lead Plaintiff has filed a Motion
to Consolidate and Vacate Notice and Lead Plaintiff Deadline, and a
Motion for Consolidation of Related Actions, Appointment of a Lead
Plaintiff, and Approval of Selection of Counsel.

On Jan. 14, 2020, the Court conducted a Motions Hearing concerning
the Motion for Indicative Ruling Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 62.1 and Motion for Relief from the Court's September 9,
2019 Judgment.

As explained during the Motions Hearing of Jan. 14, 2020, Judge
Bennett is inclined to grant the Plaintiffs' Motion for relief from
Judgment under Rule 60(b) if the case is remanded for that purpose.
New evidence that Under Armour has been under investigation by the
SEC and the DOJ related to accounting practices which were
allegedly employed during the Class Period provides a sufficient
basis for vacating this Court's Sept. 9, 2019 Judgment.
Additionally, the Plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements of
timeliness, a meritorious position, lack of prejudice to the
opposition, and exceptional circumstances.

The Defendants do not contend that any of the remaining evidence
fails to qualify as "newly discovered" or accuse the Plaintiffs of
failing to exercise due diligence.  Instead, they argue that the
remaining evidence is either cumulative when compared to the
allegations of the Second Amended Complaint or otherwise does not
require the judgment to be vacated.  These arguments are without
merit.

On the whole, the evidence is not "merely cumulative" with the
allegations presented in the Second Amended Complaint.  The new
information provided by the Plaintiffs places their original
allegations in a new light and is not merely cumulative.

The Court is keenly aware that a federal investigation is not
tantamount to a violation of the law.  It does not suggest that
Under Armour failed to uphold a duty to disclose the existence of
this investigation.  It takes no position as to the legality of
Under Armour's sales strategies or revenue recording practices.
These issues are not dispositive at this stage.  The only issue the
Court must resolve is whether the Defendants' alleged awareness of
Under Armour's sales activities and accounting practices, which
have become the subject of a federal inquiry, generates a "cogent
and compelling" inference of scienter.  The Judge concludes that it
does.  Accordingly, he finds that the Defendants would not be
prejudiced by granting the relief sought by the Plaintiffs.

Finally, there is no suggestion that the Plaintiffs have mismanaged
their case.  They have taken advantage of ordinary avenues for
relief by filing an appeal.  They are not seeking to circumvent a
statute of limitations defense by re-opening an old case.  The
Plaintiffs have presented new evidence which places their
allegations in a new light and are highly relevant to their
Exchange Act claims.  The nature of the evidence, which has
revealed a previously undisclosed federal investigation into the
Defendants' accounting practices, presents exceptional
circumstances warranting relief under Rule 60(b).

For these, Judge Bennett granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Indicative Ruling Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1.
Pursuant to Rule 62.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, he
concludes that he would grant the Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief
from the Court's September 9, 2019 Judgment if the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit remands for that purpose.  Upon
remand, the Judge would consolidate this matter with Patel v. Under
Armour, Inc. (RDB-19-3209) and Waronker v. Under Armour, Inc.
(RDB-19-3581) and appoint the Lead Plaintiff of the action as the
Lead Plaintiff over the consolidated cases.  Finally, he would
permit the Plaintiffs to file a Third Amended Complaint bringing
only Exchange Act Claims against only Defendants Under Armour and
Plank.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 22, 2020 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/81P6Is from Leagle.com.

Brian Breece, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Charles J. Piven, Brower
Piven,
A Professional Corporation, Yelena Trepetin, Brower Piven A
Professional Corporation, 125 Old Valley Road, Stevenson, Maryland
21153, Austin P. Brane -abrane@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller
Rudman
and Dowd LLP, pro hac vice, Christopher R. Kinnon-
ckinnon@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman and Dowd LLP, pro hac
vice, Elizabeth A. Shonson -- eshonson@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins
Geller Rudman and Dowd LLP, pro hac vice, Mark J. Dearman --
mdearman@rgrdlaw. com -- Robbins Geller Rudman and Dowd LLP, pro
hac vice, Robert R. Henssler, Jr. -- bhenssler@rgrdlaw.com --
Robbins Geller Rudman and Dowd LLP, pro hac vice, Stephen R.
Astley
-- SAstley@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman and Dowd LLP, pro
hac vice &William Nelson Sinclair -- bsinclair@mdattorney.com --
Silverman Thompson Slutkin and White LLC.

Under Armour, Inc., Defendant, represented by G. Stewart Webb, Jr.
-- gswebb@Venable.com -- Venable LLP, James D. Wareham --
james.wareham@friedfrank.com -- Fried Frank Harris Shriver &
Jacobson LLP, Samuel P. Groner -- samuel.groner@friedfrank.com --
Fried Frank Harris Shriver and Jacobson LLP, pro hac vice, Michael
P. Sternheim -- michael.sternheim@friedfrank.com -- Fried Frank
Harris Shriver and Jacobson LLP, pro hac vice & Michael Jackman
Wilson -- mjwilson@Venable.com -- Venable LLP.

Kevin A. Plank, Defendant, represented by Scott R. Haiber --
scott.haiber@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells US LLP & Jon Myer
Talotta -- jon.talotta@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells US LLP,
pro hac vice.


UNDERWEST WESTSIDE: Court OKs Conditional Certification in Hilaire
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional
Certification in the case captioned JEAN HILAIRE, JEAN FRESNEL,
SUALIO KAMAGATE, JEAN VERTUS, FOUSSEIMI CAMARA, JEAN MOROSE, NOE
PEREZ, EDGAR ESPINOZA, BOLIVIO CHAVEZ, BRAULIO MATAMORES FLORES,
JEORGE VENTURA CONCEPCION, ANGEL SANDOVAL, CARLOS DE LEON CHIYAL,
and LESLY PIERRE on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated who were employed by Underwest West Side Operating,
Plaintiffs, v. UNDERWEST WESTSIDE OPERATING CORP., MOSHE WINER,
MARTIN TAUB, AVI GOLAN, and ELAD EFORATI, Defendants, Case No. 19
Civ. 3169 (S.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiffs filed this action against a carwash business and its
owners and managers, claiming violations of wage and hours laws
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the New York Labor
Law (NYLL).  

Plaintiffs performed non-managerial tasks at Westside, such as
washing, drying, and detailing. Their tenure of employment varied.
According to Plaintiffs, Defendants unlawfully retained portions of
Plaintiffs' tips and claimed a tip credit without providing
Plaintiffs with appropriate notice of the tip credit. Additionally,
Plaintiffs typically worked more than forty hours each week but
were not paid the requisite amount of overtime pay.

Plaintiffs filed a motion for an order (1) conditionally certifying
their FLSA claims as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C.
Section 216(b).

Section 216(b)'s Two-Step Collective Certification Process

At the first step, the present stage of this litigation , a
district court may make an initial determination to send notice to
potential opt-in plaintiffs who may be similarly situated to the
named plaintiffs with respect to whether a FLSA violation has
occurred. Thus, the threshold issue in deciding whether to
authorize class notice in an FLSA action is whether plaintiffs have
demonstrated that potential class members are similarly situated.


At the second stage of certification, which occurs at a future
juncture that the instant case has not yet reached, with the
benefit of additional factual development, the district court
determines whether the collective action may go forward by
determining whether the opt-in plaintiffs are in fact similarly
situated to the named plaintiffs..

The Requirements for Conditional Certification are Met Here

Plaintiffs seek conditional certification of a collective of all
current and former employees of Westside employed in the position
of carwash worker, performing washing, cleaning, drying and
detailing vehicles and/or other related tasks in furtherance of the
Defendants' carwash business during the last six years.

In applying the legal standards set forth above, the Court finds
that Plaintiffs have carried their low burden at this procedural
stage.

Plaintiffs have submitted sworn declarations from four of the named
Plaintiffs. Each of their accounts demonstrates that they are
similarly situated to each other with respect to the claims against
Westside. Each purport to have worked at the carwash in various
overlapping capacities. Each provides detail about the number of
hours they worked per week and the pay received. Each attest to the
same pay and tip practices to support the existence of a common
policy or plan.

There is no indicia that Plaintiffs or others similarly situated to
them are exempt employees not subject to the same wage and hour
requirements, and Defendants have not argued or even suggested
otherwise, notes the Court.

In opposing Plaintiffs' motion to certify the collective,
Defendants argue the facts and merits of the case, but otherwise
concede the relevant legal issue on this motion. For instance,
Defendants contend that no collective action should be approved
with respect to the minimum wage and overtime claims because the
Plaintiffs are wholly unable to prove that they have suffered any
FLSA minimum wage or overtime violations. That is precisely the
type of merits-based argument that is not relevant to conditional
determination of whether other employees are similarly situated to
Plaintiffs. And, with respect to Plaintiffs' retained-tips claim,
Defendants concede that Plaintiffs have arguably met the admittedly
low threshold at this early stage to obtain conditional
certification.

At the same time, Defendants contend that any collective with
respect to the retained-tips claim action should be "sharply
limited in time and scope. That argument turns on the enactment
date of the statutory provision invoked by Plaintiffs in the
Complaint.

The Complaint claims Defendants improperly withheld tips pursuant
to 29 U.S.C. Section 203(m), which provides: An employer may not
keep tips received by its employees for any purposes, including
allowing managers or supervisors to keep any portion of employees'
tips, regardless of whether or not the employer takes a tip
credit.

Defendants point out that the portion of Section 203(m) prohibiting
employers and managers from sharing employee tip income even when
they do not take an employee tip credit became part of the statute
on March 23, 2018. According to Defendants, they never took a tip
credit. Accordingly, they argue, they would not have been in
violation of Section 203(m) prior to March 23, 2018, and at most,
Plaintiffs' claim could be conditionally certified for only the
period of time after March 23, 2018.  

This argument, however, suffers from the same deficiency as
Defendants' response to the other FLSA claims: it is dependent on
disputed fact and interpretation of FLSA's requirements, says the
Court. These issues are not appropriate for determination at this
early juncture and provide no basis to limit conditional
certification based on when the current formulation of Section
203(m) was enacted.

In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have met their burden for
conditional certification of their FLSA claims for unpaid overtime
(Third Cause of Action) and unlawful tip retention (Seventh Cause
of Action).

A collective action is, therefore, conditionally certified for
non-exempt Westside carwash employees for the last three years.

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 17, 2020 Decision
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/tymclbe from
Leagle.com.

Jean Hilaire, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated who were employed by Underwest West Side Operating, Jean
Fresnel, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated
who were employed by Underwest West Side Operating, Sualio
Kamagate, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated
who were employed by Underwest West Side Operating, Jean Vertus, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated who were
employed by Underwest West Side Operating, Fousseimi Camara, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated who were
employed by Underwest West Side Operating, Jean Morose, on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated who were employed
by Underwest West Side Operating, Noe Perez, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated who were employed by
Underwest West Side Operating, Edgar Espinoza, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated who were employed by
Underwest West Side Operating, Bolivio Chavez, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated who were employed by
Underwest West Side Operating, Braulio Matamores Flores, on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated who were employed
by Underwest West Side Operating, Jeorge Ventura Concepcion, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated who were
employed by Underwest West Side Operating, Angel Sandoval, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated who were
employed by Underwest West Side Operating, Carlos De Leon Chiyal,
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated who were
employed by Underwest West Side Operating, Lesly Pierre, on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated who were employed
by Underwest West Side Operating, Papa Diouf, Youssouf Soukouna,
Victor Manuel Castillo, Kassan Doucoure, Ladji Diagouraga,
Mahamadou Fisiru, Amara Timite, Boubacar Diawara, Abdoul Amine
Cisse, Bully Dukuray, Gonzalo Reyes Martinez, Abdoul Razak Sambare
& Arfan Kaba, Plaintiffs, represented by Steven Arenson , Arenson
Dittmar & Karban, 200 Park Avenue, Suite 1700, New York, New York
10166.

Underwest Westside Operating Corp., Moshe Winer, Martin Taub, Avi
Golan & Elad Eforati, Defendants, represented by Stephen D. Hans ,
Stephen D. Hans & Associates, P.C. & Nils C. Shillito , Stephen D.
Hans & Associates, P.C.,45-18 Ct Square W Suite 403, Long Island
City, NY 11101

UNITED NATIONS: Israeli Settlers to File Class Action Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
Tovah Lazaroff, writing for The Jerusalem Post, reports that
Israeli settlers said on Feb. 13 they planned to file a local class
action suit against the United Nations, based on Israel's
anti-boycott law.

Samaria Regional Council head Yossi Dagan announced the plan at an
emergency meeting he held in his offices, with Economic and Trade
Minister Eli Cohen (Likud) and factory owners from the Barkan
Industrial Park.

"Yesterday the organization that called itself the 'UN Human Rights
Council' became a Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions organization in
every sense of the word," Dagan said. "It is an antisemitic
organization and a hypocritical organization. It talks about peace,
but its real purpose is only to sabotage the State of Israel and
harm coexistence,"  Dagan said. As such, he said, the anti-boycott
laws can be used against it in local courts.

The suit would target UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet and the United
Nations Human Rights Council.

The suit would demand compensation and would also name left-wing
organizations. Dagan said he did not believe that diplomatic
immunity extended to this kind of civil compensation suit.

He spoke in the aftermath of the publication Wednesday, February
12, by Bachelet's office of a blacklist of businesses operating in
Jewish areas over the pre-1967 lines, the West Bank, east Jerusalem
and the Golan Heights. The list was compiled at the request of the
UNHRC. No such data base has been created that warns against the
link between business activity and potential human rights abuses.
[GN]


UNITED STATES: 3rd Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Stewart Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DOROTHY M. STEWART, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Appellant, v. POSTMASTER GENERAL UNITED
STATES, Case No. 18-3262 (3d Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's granting of Megan
J. Brennan's motion to dismiss.

As the district court explains, by signing the Claim Form and
Release in the Pittman class action on June 14, 2014, Stewart
released any right to appeal the settlement agreement to the EEOC,
any right to file a civil action in a federal court related to the
claims in the case, and any other right she might have to seek
relief for a claim included within the Pittman class action.  The
district court's well-reasoned opinion more than adequately
addresses it and Stewart's related claims.  Therefore, the Third
Circuit affirmed substantially for the reasons set forth in that
opinion.

A full-text copy of the Third Circuit's Jan. 29, 2020 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/gGAFBK from Leagle.com.

UNITED STATES: Individual Defendants in Cunningham Suit Dismissed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Denorah K. Chasanow of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Maryland granted the Individual Defendants' motion to
dismiss the case, CRAIG CUNNINGHAM, v. DEBORAH S. LESTER, et al.,
Civil Action No. DKC 18-3486 (D. Md.).

In April 2013, General Dynamics Information Technology, Inc.
("GDIT") became party to a contract with the Center for Medicare
and Medicaid Services ("CMS").  Under that contract, GDIT was to
make calls to consumers to inform them about their ability to buy
health insurance through the exchanges created by the Affordable
Care Act ("ACA").

During the period of Jan. 1, 2015 through May 16, 2016, when GDIT
was making the calls that form the basis of the action, Ms. Lester
served as CMS's "Contracting Officer" with respect to the GDIT
contract, Ms. Johnson worked as the deputy director of CMS's Call
Center Operations group, and Ms. Joliffe worked in that same Call
Center Operations group.

In December 2015, the Defendants, as employees of CMS with
responsibilities relating to the GDIT contract, instructed GDIT to
use an automatic telephone dialing system to reach consumers.  The
Defendants also provided a list of phone numbers and a script to be
used for prerecorded and/or artificial voice calls, or "robocalls."
GDIT recorded the script and placed the calls, just as it was
instructed.

Among the 680,000 consumers alleged to have received calls from
GDIT was Mr. Cunningham who did not consent to receiving the
message, nor did anyone else who received the message.

Mr. Cunningham responded by suing GDIT in the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia -- Cunningham v. Gen. Dynamic
Info. Tech., Inc., Case no 1:16-cv-00545 (E.D. Va. 2017)
("Cunningham I").  He alleged that GDIT had violated the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA").  The district court dismissed for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction because GDIT is entitled to
sovereign immunity under Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Const. Co.

Mr. Cunningham appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not
err in treating Yearsley applicability as a jurisdictional bar to
suit and granting GDIT's Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss on the
basis that GDIT is immune from suit under the Yearsley doctrine
("Cunningham II").

After failed attempts to 1) have his case reheard en banc and, 2)
petition the United States Supreme Court for certiorari, Mr.
Cunningham filed his complaint in this action on Nov. 13, 2018.
Mr. Cunningham seeks to bring the case as a class action on behalf
of himself and all others similarly situated under rules 23(a) and
23(b)(1-3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  He alleges
that the Individual Defendants violated the TCPA by causing GDIT to
make unsolicited robocalls.

On Feb. 26, 2019, the Individual Defendants filed a motion to
dismiss, and on March 13, 2019, the Plaintiff filed an amended
complaint and a corrected first amended complaint.  One day later,
the Defendants filed the motion to dismiss.  On May 8, the
Plaintiff responded in opposition to the motion, and on May 29, the
Defendants replied with a memorandum of law in further support of
their motion to dismiss.  The Plaintiff has since requested that
the Court takes notice of two recent Supreme Court decisions
potentially bearing on the case.

In their motion to dismiss, the Defendants raise three arguments:
1) that the Plaintiff is precluded from relitigating facts or
issues that were actually and necessarily decided in Cunningham I
and II, 2) the TCPA does not provide subject matter jurisdiction
for the Plaintiff's Claims, and 3) the Defendants are, alternately,
entitled to qualified immunity.

Judge Chasanow finds that the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Martin v.
Wood comports perfectly with that reading of Lewis v. Clarke.  In
Martin, the Fourth Circuit listed "(3) would a judgment against the
state officials be institutional and official in character such
that it would operate against the State" as one of the five factors
for determining the real, substantial party in interest.  Rather
than overturning Martin, Lewis explained a situation where one of
several factors becomes the decisive factor.  That, however, is not
the situation the Court is currently faced with.

Martin was a case under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
("FLSA").  There, the plaintiff, a registered nurse formerly
employed by a state-operated hospital, sued two of her state
employee supervisors for violation of the FLSA.  The plaintiff
there, as in the instant case, exclusively sought damages from
individual defendants.  Martin is in fact the binding and decisive
precedent in the case.  Unlike in Lewis, who may be legally bound
by the court's adverse judgment is not the critical inquiry.  It is
one of several inquiries, but, under the circumstances of the
instant case, it is not in and of itself decisive.  By the same
token, far from being overturned and abrogated by Lewis, certain of
the Martin factors have magnified importance in the instant case.

Clearly the Individual Defendants' actions were "tied inextricably
to their official duties."  The purpose of "official capacity"
sovereign immunity is to prevent an official acting within his or
her authority from facing liability for an alleged violation of
law, and thus, it cannot be that an alleged violation of law per se
precludes "official capacity" sovereign immunity.  Just as
Cunningham II held that Congress had the authority to assign GDIT
to complete the task of informing consumers regarding healthcare
enrollment, the Judge now holds that the Individual Defendants had
the authority to instruct GDIT as to how to carry out that task.

Analysis of the Martin factors leads to the conclusion that the
real party in interest is the United States, and thus that
Individual Defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity.
Therefore, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the
case.  Because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction,  Judge
Chasanow need not address the issue of qualified immunity nor the
arguments for dismissal based on failure to state a claim.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Chasanow granted the Individual
Defendants' motion to dismiss.  A separate order will follow.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 22, 2020 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/tBiKgP from Leagle.com.

Craig Cunningham, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Aytan Y. Bellin --
aytan.bellin@bellinlaw.com -- Bellin and Associates LLC, pro hac
vice & John Michael Bredehoft -- jmbredehoft@kaufcan.com -- Kaufman
& Canoles, P.C.

Deborah S. Lester, in her individual capacity, Naomi E. Johnson, in
her individual capacity & Jessica Joliffe, in her individual
capacity, Defendants, represented by Jane Elizabeth Andersen,
United States Attorney's Office.

UTZ QUALITY: Court Dismisses Feldman Fraud Suit with Prejudice
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Ronnie Abrams of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York dismissed the case, DAVID FELDMAN on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. UTZ
QUALITY FOODS, LLC; GOOD HEALTH NATURAL PRODUCTS, INC.; GOOD HEALTH
NATURAL PRODUCTS, LLC; PAT POSTS 1-10 and ABC CORPS. 1-10,
Defendants, Case No. 18-CV-6004 (RA) (S.D. N.Y.), with prejudice.

The Court is in receipt of the Defendant's letter, dated Jan. 21,
2020, informing the Court of the California Superior Court's Jan.
14, 2020 final approval of the nationwide class action settlement
in Tran et al. v. Good Health Natural Products, Inc., Case Nos.
BC561427, BC588986.  

Although Plaintiff argues that he did not receive class notice, he
does not -- and indeed, cannot -- argue that he was unaware of the
nationwide settlement or the process for opting out.  In fact, the
Court previously recognized that the deadline for requesting
exclusion for the nationwide settlement class was July 5, 2019, and
advised the Plaintiff that if he did not inform the Court of his
request to opt out of the nationwide settlement, including by
submitting proof of his opt-out, the Court would assume he had
chosen to remain in the settlement class.   The Plaintiff thus
cannot reasonably argue that he was not on notice of the settlement
or the process for opting out.

As the Plaintiff never opted out of the nationwide settlement, he
is bound by the terms of the settlement agreement, including its
release.  Accordingly, the action is dismissed with prejudice,
rules Judge Abrams.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 5, 2020 Order is available at
https://is.gd/Chm6Dj from Leagle.com.

David Feldman, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Joshua Scott Bauchner --
jb@ansellgrimm.com -- Ansell Grimm & Aaron, P.C. & Seth Michael
Rosenstein -- smr@ansellgrimm.com -- Ansell Grimm & Aaron, PC.

UTZ Quality Foods, LLC, Defendant, represented by Richard Fama --
rfama@cozen.com -- Cozen O'Connor, E. Dean Harris Porter --
ehporter@cozen.com -- Cozen O'Connor & F. Brenden Coller --
bcoller@cozen.com -- Cozen O'Connor.

Good Health Natural Products, Inc. & Good Health Natural Products,
LLC, Defendants, represented by Richard Fama, Cozen O'Connor & E.
Dean Harris Porter, Cozen O'Connor.

UZBEK LOGISTICS: Class in Kopaleishvili Drivers Suit Certified
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Timothy Black of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio has granted class certification in the case
captioned RAUL KOPALEISHVILI, on behalf of himself and others
similarly-situated, Plaintiff, v. UZBEK LOGISTICS, INC., et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-702, (S.D. Ohio).

Plaintiff Raul Kopaleishvili commenced the class action on behalf
of himself and those similarly situated setting forth a single
breach of contract claim against his former employers, Defendants
Uzbek Logistics, Inc. and Uzbek Transport Express, LLC. Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants breached their employment contracts by
paying truck drivers a per-mile rate based on "practical miles,"
calculated using an atlas, MapQuest, or Google Maps, rather than
based on the "actual miles" they drove.  Plaintiff alleges that as
a result of being paid based on practical miles, his "compensation
was regularly short by at least 100 miles in every payment."

Plaintiff filed a Motion for Class Certification.

To address certain deficiencies raised by Defendants in response to
Plaintiff's motion for class certification, Plaintiff, in his reply
brief, further refined the class definition as follows:

     All drivers who entered into written contracts with Uzbek
     Logistics, Inc. and/or Uzbek Transport Express, LLC since
     April 2009 requiring payment on a per mile basis. The class
     does not include those drivers whose contracts expressly
     state compensation will be paid based on practical miles.

The Court will thus treat Plaintiff's motion for class
certification as a motion to certify the amended class definition
proposed in Plaintiff's reply brief.

The Court finds that the proposed class is sufficiently definite
and ascertainable.

Defendants objected to a finding of ascertainability based on
Plaintiff's prior class definition, which would have included
drivers with oral agreements, as well as "owner-operators" who were
not paid on a per-mile basis.  Plaintiff's narrower class
definition adequately addresses these objections, as it is limited
to drivers with written contracts containing the relevant "per
mile" language.  Consequently, class members can be identified
based on the objective criterion of whether they had a written
agreement with Defendants specifying a "per mile" rate of pay
(excluding drivers with contracts expressly stating pay is "based
on practical miles").

As to commonality and predominance, Plaintiff argues that common
question of whether Defendants breached their contracts by paying
drivers based on practical miles will predominate over individual
questions. Defendants argue that the issue of breach is not capable
of class-wide resolution and that individualized issues will
dominate the litigation.  On review, the Court finds that Plaintiff
has demonstrated both commonality and predominance.

The Court further finds that class certification will afford a
superior method for addressing the drivers' claims. The Court
disagrees with Defendants' assertion that the Court will have to
engage in mini-trials to consider what each class member knew and
when. Defendants describe their defense of actual knowledge as
being based on the fact that drivers were sent settlement sheets
that included a breakdown of their compensation and mileage.
However, this defense would apply to all class members, and would
be based on the same evidence of Defendants having provided the pay
statements. As such, trying the cases individually would present
the potential for discordant constructions of a uniform contract
and the inefficient presentation of redundant evidence.

Plaintiff has met the numerosity requirement by demonstrating that
the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable, the Court adds.  In a response to an interrogatory,
Defendants indicated that there are approximately 167 individuals
who entered into Independent Contractor Driver Policy Agreements
that are substantially similar to the one that Plaintiff entered
into with Uzbek, noting that Uzbek did not implement these
Agreements until 2016. That baseline number is bound to grow by
adding in those drivers who had the less formal versions of the
contracts Uzbek Transport and Uzbek Logistics used prior to 2016,
which also contained the relevant "per mile" language. Plaintiff
has therefore demonstrated that the class is so numerous that
joinder of all putative class members would be impracticable.

Here, typicality is met largely for the same reasons Plaintiff has
demonstrated commonality, the Court opines.  Plaintiff's claims
arise out of a single course of conduct Defendants' practice of
paying contract drivers based on practical miles rather than actual
miles driven. Each class member will have entered a written
contract with Defendants, stating that pay would be based on a per
mile rate. Plaintiff's and the class members' claims also rely on
the same legal theory: pursuant to the terms of the contract,
Defendants were required to compensate them based on the actual
number of miles they drove.

Defendants' argument that different drivers did not share
Plaintiff's interpretation of the contract based on the deposition
testimony of drivers Bay and McCracken fails, because these drivers
signed a different version of the contract and would not fall
within the class definition.

The adequacy of representation requirement of Rule 23(a)(4) ensures
that the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class. The named Plaintiff suffered the same
alleged injury as the proposed class members, having been paid
based on practical miles. As such, Plaintiff and the putative class
members share the same interest.  Defendants do not specifically
challenge adequacy, and based on an independent review of the
record, the Court finds no reason to suspect a conflict of interest
between Plaintiff and the class members.  In addition, Plaintiff is
represented by qualified counsel experienced in the work of class
action litigation, as demonstrated by counsels' citation to
numerous, prior examples of their representation.

In sum, the District Court granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Class
Certification.

A full-text copy of the District Court December 5, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/wauwnwn  from Leagle.com

Raul Kopaleishvili, Plaintiff, represented by Melinda E. Knisley -
mknisley@croskerylaw.com - Croskery Law Offices, Robert Forsythe
Croskery , Croskery Law Offices, 810 Sycamore St, Cincinnati, OH
45202 , Jack Lee Newhouse , Virginia & Ambinder LLP, 40 Broad St.
7th Fl., New York City, New York, 10004, pro hac vice, LaDonna M.
Lusher , Virginia & Ambinder, LLP, 40 Broad St. 7th Fl., New York
City, New York, 10004, pro hac vice & Lloyd Robert Ambinder ,
Virginia & Ambinder LLP, 40 Broad St. 7th Fl., New York City, New
York, 10004, pro hac vice.

Uzbek Logistics, Inc. & Uzbek Transport Express, LLC, Defendants,
represented by Brandon McGrath - BMcGrath@bgdlegal.com - Bingham
Greenebaum Doll LLC, Andrew J. Butcher -ABUTCHER@SCOPELITIS.COM -
Scopelitis, Garvin, Light, Hanson & Feary, P.C., pro hac vice,
Angela S. Cash - ACASH@SCOPELITIS.COM - SCOPELITIS, GARVIN, LIGHT,
HANSON & FEARY, P.C., pro hac vice, Carmine Joseph Castellano –
ccastell@hodgsonruss.com - Hodgson Russ LLP, pro hac vice & E.
Ashley Paynter - APAYNTER@SCOPELITIS.COM - Scopelitis, Garvin,
Light, Hanson & Feary, P.C., pro hac vice.


VEGG 58TH LLC: Fails to Pay Overtime Pay, Campos Suit Says
----------------------------------------------------------
VICTOR CAMPOS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. VEGG 58TH LLC d/b/a MASSERIA DEI VINI; PEPE
WEST 48TH STREET LLC d/b/a LA MASSERIA; GIUSEPPE COLADONATO;
GIUSEPPE IUELE; EDWARD RICCI; and VINCENZO RUGGIERO, Defendants,
Case 1:20-cv-01337 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 14, 2020) seeks to recover from
the Defendants unpaid wages and overtime compensation, interest,
liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, and costs under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

The Plaintiff Campos was employed by the Defendants as non-exempt
employee.

Vegg 58th LLC d/b/a Masseria Dei Vini owns and operate a restaurant
business in New York City. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          C.K. Lee, Esq.
          Anne Seelig, Esq.
          LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
          148 West 24th Street, Eighth Floor
          New York, NY 10011
          Telephone: (212) 465-1188
          Facsimile: (212) 465-1181


VIGLIOTTI ENTERPISES: Cordova Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
---------------------------------------------------------
Sady Lopex Cordova, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Vigliotti Enterpises, LLC and
Charles Vigliotti, Defendants, Case No. 20-cv-00442, (E.D. N.Y.,
January 27, 2020), seeks to recover damages for violations of New
York State labor laws and the Fair Labor Standards Act,
compensatory and liquidated damages, interest, attorneys' fees,
costs and all other legal and equitable remedies.

Vigliotti Enterpises operates as Vigliotti Landscape Service Center
where Cordova worked as landscaper. He claims to have worked in
excess of 40 hours per day without overtime premium and failed to
provide accurate wage statements. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Roman Avshalumov, Esq.
      HELEN F. DALTON & ASSOCIATES, PC
      69-12 Austin Street
      Forest Hills, NY 11375
      Telephone: (718) 263-9591
      Fax: (718) 263-9598
      Email: HFDalton6912@Gmail.com


VITAL ENERGY: Roberson Sues Over Unpaid Minimum & Overtime Wages
----------------------------------------------------------------
Larry Roberson and Michael Johnson, Each Individually and on Behalf
of All Others Similarly Situated v. VITAL ENERGY TRANSPORTATION,
INC., and KENNETH ANCAR, JR., Case No. 4:20-cv-00695 (S.D. Tex.,
Feb. 27, 2020), is brought against the Defendants under the Fair
Labor Standards Act.

The Defendants violated the FLSA when they failed to pay the
Plaintiffs lawful overtime premiums for hours worked in excess of
40 per week, says the complaint. The Defendants also violated the
FLSA when they failed to pay the Plaintiffs at a rate equivalent to
or greater than the federal minimum wage for all hours worked.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants as transportation
service employees.

The Defendants operate a freight hauling and logistics service
business based in Texas.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          One Financial Center
          650 South Shackleford, Suite 411
          Little Rock, AR 72211
          Phone: (501) 221-0088
          Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
          Email: josh@sanfordlawfirm.com


VMSB LLC: Rosell Seeks Minimum & OT Wages for Servers Under FLSA
----------------------------------------------------------------
ISRAEL ROSELL and ROBERTO GONZALEZ, for themselves and on behalf of
those similarly situated v. VMSB, LLC, d/b/a GIANNI'S and d/b/a
CASA CASUARINA, a Florida Limited Liability Company, Case No.
1:20-cv-20857-XXXX (S.D. Fla., Feb. 26, 2020), asserts claim for
unpaid wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiffs contend that the Defendant violated the FLSA by
failing to pay them and other similarly situated bartenders/servers
the proper minimum wage and overtime compensation for all hours
worked.

The Defendant operates a restaurant business.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Angeli Murthy, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
          8151 Peters Road, Suite 4000
          Plantation, FL 33324
          Telephone: 954-318-0268
          Facsimile: 954-327-3016
          E-mail: Amurthy@forthepeople.com


WAG LABS INC: Faces Slade Suit Over Blind-Inaccessible Web Site
---------------------------------------------------------------
Linda Slade, Individually and as the representative of a class of
similarly situated persons v. WAG LABS, INC., Case No.
1:20-cv-01746 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 27, 2020), is brought against the
Defendant for its failure to design, construct, maintain, and
operate its Web site to be fully accessible to and independently
usable by the Plaintiff and other blind or visually-impaired
persons.

The Defendant is denying blind and visually-impaired persons
throughout the United States with equal access to the goods and
services Wag Labs provides to their non-disabled customers through
http://www.Wagwalking.com/.The Defendants' denial of full and
equal access to its Web site, and therefore denial of its products
and services offered, and in conjunction with its physical
locations, is a violation of the Plaintiff's rights under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, the Plaintiff contends.

The Web site provides to the public a wide array of the goods,
services, price specials, employment opportunities and other
programs offered by Wag Labs. Yet, the Plaintiff asserts, the Web
site contains thousands of access barriers that make it difficult
if not impossible for blind and visually-impaired customers to use
Web site. In fact, the access barriers make it impossible for blind
and visually-impaired users to even complete a transaction on the
Web site, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who
requires screen reading software to read Web site content using her
computer.

Wag Labs provides to the public the Web site, which provides
consumers with access to an array of goods and services, including
the ability to book dog related services including dog walking, dog
boarding, dog sitting, and dog daycare, learn about the services
provided, and learn about safety.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Dan Shaked, Esq.
          SHAKED LAW GROUP, P.C.
          14 Harwood Court, Suite 415
          Scarsdale, NY 10583
          Phone: (917) 373-9128
          Email: ShakedLawGroup@gmail.com


WAITR HOLDINGS: Court Strikes 1st Amended Complaint in Bobby's Case
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Kathleen Kay of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Louisiana, Lake Charles Division, granted
without prejudice Waitr's Motion to Strike the First Amended Class
Action Complaint in BOBBY'S COUNTRY COOKIN' LLC, ET AL., v. WAITR
HOLDINGS, INC, Case No. 19-cv-552 (W.D. La.).

Waitr operates an online food order and delivery platform.  It
contracts with "Restaurant Partners" to be part of its network of
restaurants and posts their menus so restaurant customers can use a
phone or computer to order food.  Its drivers pick up the order
from the Restaurant Partners and deliver it to the customer.  In
exchange for this service, Waitr collects, inter alia, a fixed
percentage of the revenue from each order.

In July 2017, Bobby's entered into an agreement with Waitr to
become one of its Restaurant Partners.  Under the terms of its
initial agreement, Bobby's agreed to pay Waitr a 10% service fee
for each order Bobby's costumers placed through the Waitr platform.
Bobby's alleges that, in 2018, Waitr violated the express terms of
the agreement by "unilaterally" increasing the service fee to 15%.

On April 30, 2019, Bobby's Country Cookin' filed a Class Action
Complaint against Waitr alleging breach of contract, violation of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment.  

On July 22, 2019, Waitr filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) alleging that Bobby's failed to state a claim against it.
Bobby's did not file an opposition brief.  The Plaintiffs filed a
First Amended Class Action Complaint in August 2019.  Waitr filed
the motion to strike currently before the Court arguing that the
Plaintiffs were required to obtain leave of the Court before filing
the First Amended Class Action Complaint.

Magistrate Judge Kay holds that Waitr is correct.  Rule 12(d)
requires "motion and reasonable notice" to file a supplemental
pleading.  For this reason, the Judge will grant the motion to
strike.  However, the Judge does so with the caveat that the
Plaintiffs may seek leave to refile its amended and supplemental
complaint which, if opposed, will be set for briefing on the
merits.

For the reasons stated, Magistrate Judge Kay granted Waitr's Motion
to Strike without prejudice to the Plaintiffs seeking leave to
refile its amended and supplemental complaint.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Jan. 7, 2020 Memorandum
Ruling is available at https://is.gd/lhOyNA from Leagle.com.

Bobbys Country Cookin L L C, individually and on behalf of all
persons or entities nationwide who are similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Adras Paul LaBorde, III --
PLaborde@dudleydebosier.com -- Dudley DeBosier Injury Lawyers,
Garrett Owens -- garrett@pricearmstrong.com -- Price Armstrong, pro
hac vice, John M. Rainwater -- john@rainfirm.com -- Rainwater Holt,
pro hac vice, Nicholas W. Armstrong -- nick@pricearmstrong.com --
Price Armstrong, pro hac vice & Robert L. Beard, Rainwater Holt,
pro hac vice.

Casa Manana Inc, Que Pasa Taqueria L L C & Casa Tu Sulphur L L C,
Plaintiffs, represented by Adras Paul LaBorde, III, Dudley DeBosier
Injury Lawyers, Garrett Owens, Price Armstrong, pro hac vice, John
M. Rainwater, Rainwater Holt, pro hac vice & Nicholas W. Armstrong,
Price Armstrong.

Waitr Holdings Inc, Defendant, represented by Amelia Williams Koch
-- akoch@bakerdonelson.com -- Baker Donelson et al, Kathlyn G.
Perez -- kperez@bakerdonelson.com -- Baker Donelson et al & Matthew
Charles Juneau -- mjuneau@bakerdonelson.com -- Baker Donelson et
al.


WASHINGTON STATE BAR: Dismissal of Eugster Suit Upheld
------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Two, affirmed the
superior court's dismissal of Eugster's claims in the case, STEPHEN
KERR EUGSTER, Appellant/Cross-Respondent, v. WASHINGTON STATE BAR
ASSOCIATION, a legislatively created Washington association (WSBA);
PAULA LITTLEWOOD, WSBA Executive Director; PACIFICA LAW GROUP LLP,
a Washington limited liability partnership, PAUL J. LAWRENCE;
JESSICA A. SKELTON; and TAKI V. FLEVARIS,
Respondents/Cross-Appellants, Case No. 53325-1-II (Wash. App.).

Eugster, a Washington attorney, has filed a number of cases against
the WSBA in state and federal court in both his personal and
representative capacities.  The most recent case, prior to the case
presently before the Appellate Court on appeal, is Caruso v. Wash.
State Bar Ass'n, No. C17-003 RSM, 2017 WL 1957077 (W.D. Wash. May
11, 2017).  Eugster previously filed several lawsuits on his own
behalf against the WSBA challenging the constitutionality of
mandatory bar membership, license fees, and the validity of the
WSBA's discipline system, which he claimed violate due process and
freedom of association.

The district court granted WSBA's motion to dismiss and dismissed
the complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.  Eugster appealed the dismissal and
the order denying sanctions to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
orders and expressly rejected both of Eugster's allegations of
fraud and his request for sanctions ruling that his claims against
the WSBA are meritless and unsupported.

Following the conclusion of Caruso, Eugster filed the present case
in Spokane County Superior Court against the WSBA, its then
Executive Director Paula Littlewood, and the lawyers who
represented the WSBA in Caruso.  Eugster asserted five claims: (1)
defamation, (2) false light invasion of privacy, (3) intentional
abuse of process by false statements, (4) civil conspiracy, and (5)
civil rights damages under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.  These claims
are substantially the same claims as those claims that he alleged
in the Caruso federal district court action which were dismissed by
the district court and affirmed by the Ninth Circuit.

Eugster alleged that the WSBA's statements -- that he was a
disgruntled lawyer and on a meritless crusade against the WSBA --
defamed him, abused the judicial process, resulted from an unlawful
conspiracy, violated his constitutional rights under the First,
Fifth, and Fourteenth amendments, and amounted to civil rights
violations under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.  The only other facts
alleged in the complaint are that early in the Caruso litigation,
the WSBA's lawyer explained to him during a telephone conference
call that the WSBA would seek an award of attorney fees as a
sanction against him if he proceeded with the Caruso lawsuit.

The WSBA and its lawyers moved to dismiss the complaint under CR
12(b)(6).  The superior court dismissed Eugster's claims with
prejudice based on three alternative grounds.  First, the court
concluded that the statements made by the WSBA's attorney during
litigation are "privileged under absolute immunity."  Second, the
court concluded that collateral estoppel barred Eugster's claims
because the Ninth Circuit already decided that his accusations of
fraud and defamation were meritless and unsupported.  Third, the
court ruled that because the Ninth Circuit concluded that Eugster
failed "to allege any facts supporting" his assertions of "unlawful
conduct," he failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.

Following entry of the superior court's order dismissing Eugster's
claims with prejudice, the WSBA and its attorneys filed a motion
for an award of attorney fees against Eugster under RCW 4.84.185,
arguing that Eugster's claims were frivolous.  The superior court
denied the WSBA's request for fees and explained that it was
"debatable" whether the WSBA's statements in Caruso were pertinent
to that litigation.

Eugster appeals the superior court's order dismissing the case with
prejudice.  He argues that the court erred in ruling that (1) the
WSBA's lawyers' statements about Eugster during prior litigation,
in which Eugster acted as opposing counsel, were subject to
absolute privilege, (2) collateral estoppel applied to bar
Eugster's claims, and (3) Eugster failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.

The WSBA cross-appeals the superior court's order denying an award
of attorney fees under RCW 4.84.185.  WSBA argues that the superior
court erred by denying its motion for an award of attorney fees
under RCW 4.84.185 because Eugster's claims are frivolous.

The Appellate Court finds that Eugster's disagreement with the
lawyer's statements in Caruso does not negate the privileged nature
of the statements.  Because each of the statements Eugster takes
issue with pertained to the substance and procedural framework of
the Caruso litigation, these statements are undoubtedly "pertinent
or material to the redress or relief sought.  Thus, these
statements are absolutely privileged.  The Appellate Court holds
that the superior court did not abuse its discretion when it
dismissed Eugster's claims.  Because the Appellate Court is
affirming on this ground, it does not reach the alternative bases
for dismissal.

The Appellate Court also holds that the statements made by the
WSBA's lawyers were pertinent to the Caruso litigation and
therefore are subject to absolute immunity.  The Appellate
concludes that Eugster's claims to the contrary are not supported
by rational argument and therefore are frivolous.  This is
particularly true because the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected
Eugster's claims that the WSBA's lawyers had made fraudulent
statements.  Accordingly, the Appellate Court holds that the
superior court erred by denying the WSBA's request for an award of
attorney fees.  The Appellate Court reverses the order and remands
the matter to the superior court to determine an appropriate fee
award.

Based on the foregoing, the Appellate Court holds that the superior
court did not err by dismissing Eugster's claims with prejudice and
affirm that order on the basis of absolute immunity.  As to the
WSBA's cross-appeal, the Appellate Court holds that because
Eugster's claims against the WSBA are frivolous, the superior court
erred.  The Appellate Court reversed the superior court's order
denying the WSBA an award of attorney fees under RCW 4.84.185 and
remanded the matter to the superior court to determine an
appropriate fee award.

A full-text copy of the Appellate Court's Jan. 7, 2020 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/hQWecy from Leagle.com.

Stephen Kerr Eugster -- eugster@eugsterlaw.com -- Eugster Law
Office PSC, 2418 W. Pacific Ave, Spokane, WA, 99201-6422, Counsel
for Appellant/Cross-Respondent.

Christopher Joseph Kerley -- ckerley@ecl-law.com -- Evans, Craven &
Lackie, P.S., 818 W. Riverside Ave. Ste. 250, Spokane, WA,
99201-0994, Jessica Anne Skelton --
jessica.skelton@pacificalawgroup.com -- Pacifica Law Group LLP,
1191 2nd Ave. Ste. 2000, Seattle, WA, 98101-3404, Taki V. Flevaris
-- taki.flevaris@pacificalawgroup.com -- Pacifica Law Group LLP,
1191 2nd Ave. Ste. 2000, Seattle, WA, 98101-3404, Counsel for
Respondent/Cross-Appellant.


WAYNE COUNTY: Detroiters Prevented From Appealing Tax Assessments
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Christine MacDonald, writing for The Detroit News, reports that a
coalition of community activists announced on Feb. 13 that it filed
a class action lawsuit in U.S. District Court against Detroit,
Wayne County and state officials arguing property owners were
"illegally" prevented from appealing inflated tax assessments.

Detroit officials, in response, called the lawsuit "frivolous,"
saying residents had ample time to appeal their home values.

Activists, experts and city officials gathered at City Hall on the
afternoon of Feb. 13 to announce the lawsuit and push for reforms
that would compensate tens of thousands of overtaxed Detroit
homeowners. In attendance were U.S. Rep. Rashida Tlaib, D-Detroit,
and Detroit City Council Pro Tem Mary Sheffield, along with members
of the Coalition for Property Tax Justice.

Chicago law firm Goldman Ismail Tomaselli Brennan & Baum LLP filed
the lawsuit against officials with the State Tax Commission, Wayne
County and Detroit on Thursday, February 13.

"The city of Detroit has overassessed low-valued residential homes
for years," a release from the Coalition for Property Tax Justice
said. "Additionally, the city has at times failed to mail tax
notices to owners in a timely fashion.

"The lawsuit specifically points to data showing that in 2017, all
homeowners in Detroit were mailed their tax assessments too late to
have a reasonable chance to file a tax appeal. This failure to
timely mail tax notices violated homeowners' constitutional
rights."

The class action is representing owner-occupants who got
"deficient" property tax notices in 2017. They want residents to be
allowed to appeal their 2017 assessments and recover damages. And
they want Wayne County to halt foreclosures of any properties that
did not get proper notice to appeal.

In 2017, the city completed a property-by-property reappraisal —
its first in nearly 60 years — ordered by the state after a 2013
Detroit News investigation highlighted the overassessment problem.


City officials pushed back Thursday, February 13, afternoon, saying
the group had its facts wrong. The mailings went out about a week
late on Jan. 24, 2017, said spokesman John Roach. On Friday,
February 14, the city admitted that date was incorrect but didn't
provide the date it believes notices were mailed.

Officials said they extended the appeal window by two weeks, so
homeowners had the same amount of time to file, which was
publicized in various media, he said.  

The lawsuit alleges most notices went out "no earlier" than Feb. 14
that year.

"This is a frivolous lawsuit with claims that can be proven false
with a simple Google search," City Assessor Alvin Horhn said in a
press release. "... The city extended the appeals period by two
weeks to last the entire month of February. Numerous media outlets
reported this fact based on a press release issued by the city."

State and Wayne County officials declined to comment.

The lawsuit also alleges "unjust enrichment" by Wayne County, which
has oversight of Detroit's property assessments. The lawsuit argues
the county was "complicit in systemic, illegal overassessment that
directly led to unjust delinquency fines and property tax
foreclosures, which could have been prevented had homeowners not
been denied their tax appeal rights."

Detroit and the county have been challenged in court before over
the city's inflated assessments. The ACLU of Michigan and the NAACP
Legal Defense and Education Fund sued the Wayne County Treasurer in
2016 to stop the tax auction, highlighting the city's "unlawfully"
inflated city tax assessments. Those claims were thrown out when a
Wayne County Circuit judge rules the Michigan Tax Tribunal had
oversight, not the court.

Tlaib said her office is researching ways to address overassessment
in Detroit.

"Behind those numbers, behind those processes, were so many
failures that hurt so many families," she said.

Homeowner Vanessa Phillips, 55, never knew she could appeal the
value Detroit put on her home that she said she's owned since 1999.
The News estimates she was overtaxed by nearly $2,700 between 2010
and 2016.

"I thought it was whatever they said, like a DTE bill," Phillips
said.

She said the city should reimburse homeowners and can't "sweep it
under the rug."

"I was shocked," Phillips said. "I can't believe you did us like
this."

The coalition also released a series of demands beyond the
lawsuit:

   * Across the board assessment cuts for properties valued under
$30,000

   * Asking the Michigan Attorney General and City's Auditor
General to conduct an investigation

   * Turn Mayor Mike Duggan's proposed $250 million blight bond
into a compensation bond for overtaxed residents

   * State of Michigan and Wayne County should create a
compensation fund for overtaxed owners

   * Abolish the first step of appealing assessments in Detroit,
called an assessor's review, to make it easier to appeal

The Detroit News published an investigation in January that found
City Hall overtaxed homeowners by at least $600 million between
2010 and 2016 after officials failed to accurately bring down
property values in the years following the recession.

Duggan has acknowledged past overassessment but said he cleaned up
the practice and lowered values after he took office in 2014. The
mayor said he can't correct past mistakes because current law
doesn't allow it and the city can't afford it.

In a recent memo to the Detroit City Council, Duggan's chief
financial officer, Dave Massaron, argued the appeals window to
challenge assessments is over and that any effort to repay people
would be "so enormous" it would require higher property taxes,
costing the city school district and libraries, along with the
city.

"A huge property tax increase would be needed to fund the repayment
of past property taxes," the memo reads. "The consequence of this
burden would certainly trigger an entirely new round of
foreclosures as homeowners would be unable to afford the judgment
levy assessment."

But the memo does allude to possible help for those who were
overtaxed: "We will provide a forthcoming second memo about
opportunities to help homeowners who may have been impacted by
overassessments."

That second memo hasn't been released to the public as of Thursday
afternoon.

A report shared last month by Sheffield and community activists
proposed a variety of ideas Detroit could compensate homeowners who
lost their properties in "illegal" tax foreclosures due to
overassessment, from cash payments to free city-owned homes.

"We understand your frustration and your concerns," Sheffield told
the crowd Thursday, February 13. "We are committed to giving you a
voice in how you will be compensated.

"We are demanding swift action for affected homeowners throughout
the city of Detroit."

Bernadette Atuahene, a professor at the Chicago-Kent College of
Law, concluded the city overassessed 55% to 85% of its properties
between 2009 and 2015. She and other researchers said Thursday that
Detroit is still overassessing the majority of low-valued homes,
although city officials say they are working to make sure that is
not happening.

"The burden of these unconstitutional property tax assessments is
being born by the most vulnerable of us," Atuahene said.

The News analysis is the first to estimate how much Detroit
homeowners were overbilled. State law mandates that assessments
reflect the home's market value.

Taxpayers can appeal their assessments, but many are not aware they
have the option.

Massaron said he believes The News' analysis is inflated in part
because conditions vary by neighborhood, and some areas might have
seen actual losses in value over the time period analyzed.
Properties in those areas could appear to have been overtaxed more
than they were in The News analysis, he argues. The city has not
done its own study and doesn't plan to.

Duggan has tried to lower tax foreclosures through lobbying the
state Legislature to create low-interest payment plans and new
legislation called "Pay as You Stay" that would significantly cut
the tax bills of low-income homeowners. The legislation unanimously
passed the Senate Thursday, February 13, and Gov. Gretchen Whitmer
is expected to sign it soon.

The News' investigation last month found that the vast majority of
Detroit homes who currently owe debt to the Wayne County treasurer
were overtaxed.

Of the more than 63,000 Detroit homes with delinquent debt as of
last fall, more than 90% were overtaxed — by an average of at
least $3,700 — between 2010 and 2016, according to calculations
by The News. The debt owed on about 40,000 of those homes is less
than the properties were overtaxed over those seven years. [GN]


WELLS FARGO BANK: Simon Seeks Overtime Pay for Off-the-Clock Work
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Caudley Simon, Jr., on behalf of himself, all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA and Does 1-50,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 20STCV03229 (Cal. Super., January
27, 2020), seeks unpaid wages, actual damages, liquidated damages,
restitution, declaratory relief, pre-judgment interest, statutory
penalties, civil penalties, costs of suit, reasonable attorneys'
fees and such other relief pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards
Act, California Labor Code and the California Business and
Professional Code.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have failed to provide them with
meal and rest periods and/or premium wages for such, overtime
wages, failure to provide accurate written wage statements and
failed to timely pay final wages following separation of
employment.

Simon worked for Wells Fargo as a non-exempt, hourly employee from
approximately November 20, 2014 through on or about November 24,
2018.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Shaun Setareh, Esq.
      Thomas Segal, Esq.
      Farrah Grant, Esq.
      SETAREH LAW GROUP
      9454 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 907
      Beverly Hills, CA 90212
      Telephone: (310) 888-7771
      Facsimile: (310) 888-0109
      Email: shaun@setarehlaw.com
             thomas@setarehlaw.com
             farrah@setarehlaw.com


WESTPAC BANKING: Glancy Prongay Reminds of March 30 Deadline
------------------------------------------------------------
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP ("GPM") reminds investors of the
upcoming March 30, 2020 deadline to file a lead plaintiff motion in
the class action filed on behalf of Westpac Banking Corporation
("Westpac" or the "Company") (NYSE: WBK) securities between
November 11, 2015 and November 19, 2019, inclusive (the "Class
Period").

If you wish to learn more about this action, or if you have any
questions concerning this announcement or your rights or interests
with respect to these matters, please contact Charles Linehan,
Esquire, at 310-201-9150, Toll-Free at 888-773-9224, or by email to
shareholders@glancylaw.com, or visit our website at
www.glancylaw.com.

On November 19, 2019, Westpac was charged by the Australian
Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre ("AUSTRAC") with over 23
million violations of the Anti-Money Laundering and
Counter-Terrorism Financing Act (the "AML-CTF Act"). Among other
things, AUSTRAC's Statement of Claim contends that the Company
failed to distinguish money laundering or risky payments to and
from Southeast Asia indicative of child sexual exploitation,
despite Westpac senior management being "specifically briefed" in
2016 on how the bank's international digital payments service could
be at risk for such abuse.

On this news, the Company's share price fell $0.80, or over 4%, to
close at $17.15 per share on November 20, 2019, thereby injuring
investors.

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout
the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to
investors: (1) contrary to Australian law, the Company failed to
report over 19.5 million international funds transfer instructions
to AUSTRAC; (2) the Company did not appropriately monitor and
assess the ongoing money laundering and terrorism financing risks
associated with movement of money into and out of Australia; (3)
the Company did not pass on requisite information about the source
of funds to other banks in the transfer chain; (4) despite being
aware of the heightened risks, the Company did not carry out
appropriate due diligence on transactions in South East Asia and
the Philippines that had known financial indicators relating to
child exploitation risks; (5) the Company's AML/CTF Program was
inadequate to identify, mitigate and manage money laundering and
terrorism financing risks; and (6) as a result, Defendants'
statements about its business, operations, and prospects, were
materially false and misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis at
all relevant times.

If you purchased or otherwise acquired Westpac securities during
the Class Period, you may move the Court no later than March 30,
2020 to request appointment as lead plaintiff in this putative
class action lawsuit. To be a member of the class action you need
not take any action at this time; you may retain counsel of your
choice or take no action and remain an absent member of the class
action. If you wish to learn more about this class action, or if
you have any questions concerning this announcement or your rights
or interests with respect to the pending class action lawsuit,
please contact Charles Linehan, Esquire, of GPM, 1925 Century Park
East, Suite 2100, Los Angeles, California 90067 at 310-201-9150,
Toll-Free at 888-773-9224, by email to shareholders@glancylaw.com,
or visit our website at www.glancylaw.com.  If you inquire by email
please include your mailing address, telephone number and number of
shares purchased.

Contact:

         Charles Linehan, Esq.
         Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Los Angeles
         Tel: 310-201-9150 or 888-773-9224
         Website: www.glancylaw.com
         E-mail: shareholders@glancylaw.com
                 clinehan@glancylaw.com
[GN]


WESTPAC BANKING: Levi & Korsinsky Reminds of Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------
Levi & Korsinsky, LLP announces that class action lawsuits have
commenced on behalf of shareholders of publicly-traded Westpac
Banking Corporation. Shareholders interested in serving as lead
plaintiff have until the deadlines listed to petition the court.
Further details about the cases can be found at the links provided.
There is no cost or obligation to you.

WBK Shareholders Click Here:
https://www.zlk.com/pslra-1/westpac-banking-corporation-loss-form?prid=5462&wire=1

Westpac Banking Corporation (WBK)

WBK Lawsuit on behalf of: investors who purchased November 11, 2015
- November 19, 2019

Lead Plaintiff Deadline : March 30, 2020

TO LEARN MORE, VISIT:
https://www.zlk.com/pslra-1/westpac-banking-corporation-loss-form?prid=5462&wire=1

According to the filed complaint, during the class period, Westpac
Banking Corporation made materially false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) contrary to
Australian law, the Company failed to report over 19.5 million
international funds transfer instructions to the Australian
Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre ("AUSTRAC"); (2) the
Company did not appropriately monitor and assess the ongoing money
laundering and terrorism financing risks associated with movement
of money into and out of Australia; (3) the Westpac did not pass on
requisite information about the source of funds to other banks in
the transfer chain; (4) despite being aware of the heightened
risks, the Company did not carry out appropriate due diligence on
transactions in South East Asia and the Philippines that had known
financial indicators relating to child exploitation risks; (5) the
Company's Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing
Policy Program was inadequate to identify, mitigate and manage
money laundering and terrorism financing risks; and (6) as a
result, Defendants' statements about its business, operations, and
prospects, were materially false and misleading and/or lacked a
reasonable basis at all relevant times.

You have until the lead plaintiff deadlines to request that the
court appoint you as lead plaintiff. Your ability to share in any
recovery doesn't require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

Levi & Korsinsky is a national firm with offices in New York,
California, Connecticut, and Washington D.C. The firm's attorneys
have extensive expertise and experience representing investors in
securities litigation and have recovered hundreds of millions of
dollars for aggrieved shareholders.

Contact:

         Joseph E. Levi, Esq.
         Levi & Korsinsky, LLP
         55 Broadway, 10th Floor
         New York, NY 10006
         Tel: (212) 363-7500
         Fax: (212) 363-7171
         Website: www.zlk.com
         Email: jlevi@levikorsinsky.com
[GN]


WHIRLPOOL CORP: Deal in Corzine Refrigerator Suit Gets Final OK
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JULIE CORZINE, Plaintiff, v. WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION,
Defendant, Case No. 15-cv-05764-BLF (N.D. Cal.), Judge Beth Labson
Freeman of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose Division, granted (i) the Class' Motion for
Final Approval of Settlement, and (2) the Class' Motion for
Attorneys' Fees, Costs Reimbursement, and Service Award.

On Nov. 13, 2015, the Plaintiff filed the class action in Santa
Clara Superior Court.  The Lawsuit alleges a defect in certain
Whirlpool-manufactured refrigerators; namely, that the drain tubes
become blocked with ice, overflow with water, and in some cases,
leak from the bottom of refrigerators.  Whirlpool designed the
drain tubes to channel defrosted water from the freezer into a
drain pan at the base of Class Refrigerators as part of the daily
defrost cycle.  But the drain tubes feature a rubber grommet
component resembling a duckbill that is prone to clogging with
debris, which dams the flow of defrosted water from the freezer.
Trapped water then freezes, forming a solid plug of ice.  Over
time, large quantities of water and ice accumulate, eventually
resulting in water leaking out of the freezer, into the
refrigerator compartment, and, at times, onto the ground near the
refrigerator.

After several years of litigation, on Aug. 21, 2019, the Court
entered an Order Granting Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of
Class Action Settlement, which provisionally certified a nationwide
settlement class and directed notice of the Settlement preliminary
order.  The preliminary Settlement Class is defined as follows: All
persons in the United States and its territories who (a) purchased
a new Class Refrigerator, as defined in the Settlement Agreement,
(b) acquired a Class Refrigerator as part of the purchase or
remodel of a home, or (c) received as a gift, from a donor meeting
those requirements, a new Class Refrigerator not used by the donor
or by anyone else after the donor purchased the Class Refrigerator
and before the donor gave the Class Refrigerator to the Class
Member.

The Court made several specific decisions relating to the
Settlement Class.  First, it appointed Graham B. LippSmith and
Jaclyn L. Anderson of the law firm Kasdan LippSmith Weber Turner
LLP as the Class Counsel for the Settlement Class.  Second, it
appointed Plaintiff, Julie Corzine, as the representative of the
Settlement Class.  Third, the Court appointed Angeion Group as the
Settlement Administrator.

The Settlement Agreement effectively creates an extended warranty
program for the Class Members.  Prior to the lawsuit, Whirlpool had
implemented a voluntary Special Project whereby it provided $15
replacement parts for certain Class Refrigerators if they
experienced a Freezing Event within five years of purchase as
reported to Whirlpool by a Service Technician.  The Special Project
provided replacement parts beyond the limited one-year warranty for
certain Class Refrigerators, but it did not compensate most
consumers for labor costs associated with repairing or replacing
their drain tubes.   Under the Settlement Agreement, Whirlpool
agrees to keep the Special Project open for multiple years going
forward and to expand its scope to include reimbursement for labor
costs and additional Class Refrigerators.

The terms of the Settlement Agreement provide that the Class
Members who experience a Freezing Event prior to Sept. 5, 2019 must
submit a completed Claim Form, which includes (1) a valid Class
Refrigerator model and serial number combination, (2) proof of
purchase, (3) proof that claimant experienced a Freezing Event, and
(4) poof that claimant paid for repair of a Class Refrigerator
necessitated by a Freezing Event.

The Class Members satisfying the requirements may receive up to
$150 reimbursement for Paid Qualified Repairs incurred within five
years of the Refrigerator purchase as follows: (i) 1 to 3 Years
after Purchase: 100% Reimbursement for Paid Qualified Repairs; (ii)
Year 4 after Purchase: 100% reimbursement for parts and 65%
reimbursement for labor costs of Paid Qualified Repairs; and (iii)
Year 5 after Purchase: 100% reimbursement for parts and 50%
reimbursement for labor costs of Paid Qualified Repairs.  A Class
Member's compensation will be reduced if the Class Member
previously received any form of compensation for the Freezing Event
from Whirlpool.

The Class Members who experience a Freezing Event on or after the
Notice Date are entitled to the same benefits available to
claimants for past Freezing Events and will be directed to contact
Whirlpool through a dedicated toll-free number no later than 90
days after first experiencing a Freezing Event to report the
Freezing Event and request repair service.

In its Preliminary Approval Order, the Court approved (1) the form
and content of settlement notices to be mailed, emailed, and
published to members of the Settlement Class; (2) the form and
content of the Claim Form; (3) the content of the Settlement
Website, with the FAQ and other information and documents that the
Parties jointly agreed to post concerning the nature of the Lawsuit
and status of the Settlement; and (4) the plan specified in the
Settlement Agreement for distributing and publishing the Settlement
Notices.

Two motions are before the Court: (1) the Class' Motion for Final
Approval of Settlement, and (2) the Class' Motion for Attorneys'
Fees, Costs Reimbursement, and Service Award.  The Class requests
that the Court awards: (1) $1,823,394.75 in attorneys' fees and (2)
$26,605.25 in costs reimbursements to the Class Counsel.  The class
representative, Ms. Corzine, requests an incentive award in the
amount of $5,000.

Judge Freeman finds that the notice of the proposed Settlement was
adequate; the Settlement was not the result of collusion; and the
Settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable.  

The Judge also finds that the Class' request for attorneys' fees,
costs and incentive award is reasonable and thus, the Class' Motion
for Award of Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Incentive Award will be
granted.

For these reasons, Judge Freeman granted (i) the Class' Motion for
Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, and (ii) the Class'
Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Incentive Award.  

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 31, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/WaUZX6 from Leagle.com.

Julie Corzine, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Graham Bruce LippSmith, Kasdan
LippSmith Weber Turner LLP, Jaclyn Louise Anderson, Kasdan
LippSmith Weber Turner LLP, Kenneth S. Kasdan, Kasdan Lippsmith
Weber Turner LLP, Scott James Thomson -- SThomson@Kasdancdlaw.com
-- Kasdan LippSmith Weber Turner LLP, Celene Chan Andrews, Kasdan
LippSmith Weber Turner LLP & Frank A. Perez -- fperez@klwtlaw.com
-- Kasdan LippSmith Weber Turner LLP.

Whirlpool Corporation, a Delaware corporation, Defendant,
represented by Clement L. Glynn -- cglynn@glynnfinley.com -- Glynn
& Finley, Andrew M. Unthank -- unthank@wtotrial.com -- Wheeler
Trigg ODonnell LLP, pro hac vice, Michael Norris Mulvania, Wheeler
Trigg O'Donnell LLP, pro hac vice & Jonathan A. Eldredge --
jeldredge@glynnfinley.com -- Glynn & Finley, LLP.


WILLIAMS-SONOMA: Reed Smith Attorney Discusses Court Ruling
-----------------------------------------------------------
James M. Beck, Esq., of Reed Smith LLP, in an article for Lexology,
reports that mandamus appeals are difficult to win. That's one
reason that we were intrigued to read In re Williams-Sonoma, Inc.,
___ F.3d ___, 2020 WL 131360 (9th Cir. Jan. 13, 2020). The second
was the result, which prevented an improper would-be class
representative from using discovery as a bootstrap method to his
own replacement. The plaintiff here was a would-be litigation
tourist from Kentucky who sought to utilize California's more
liberal class action practices to bring a claim that was
impermissible under Kentucky law:

[Plaintiff] brought an action . . . to recover damages under the
law of the State of California that he allegedly suffered due to
[defendant's] alleged misrepresentations. He also sought damages
under California law for a class of consumers. . . . Before a class
action was certified, the district court determined, inter alia,
that Kentucky law governed [plaintiff's] claims and that Kentucky
consumer law prohibited class actions.

Id. at *1-2 (footnote omitted).

Rather than go quietly into the night following these rulings,
plaintiff "sought to obtain discovery from [defendant] for the sole
purpose of aiding his counsel's attempt to find a California
purchaser . . . who might be willing to sue." Id. at *2. The
District Court thought plaintiff's bootstrap attempt to use
discovery in an invalid action to recruit a replacement was
peachy-keen and ordered the defendant "to produce a list of all
California customers," for this particular product for a period of
over seven years. Id.

That discovery, of course, had nothing to do with any claim that
the plaintiff seeking it could validly bring, so the defendant
sought mandamus relief in the Ninth Circuit – and won.

Three elements of mandamus were important, not just to the result,
but to simply being heard: "(1) The party seeking the writ has no
other adequate means" of relief; "(2) The petitioner will be
damaged or prejudiced in a way not correctable on appeal"; and "(3)
The district court's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of
law." Id.

From our perspective as interested outsiders, item three was the
key. The Ninth Circuit (by a 2-1 decision) held as a matter of law
it was clearly erroneous for a class action plaintiff to use
discovery solely to seek his/her own replacement.

Rule 26(b)(1) limits the scope of discovery to "nonprivileged
matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense." . . .
[S]eeking discovery of the name of a class member (here an unknown
person, who could sue [defendant]) is not relevant within the
meaning of that rule.

Williams-Sonoma, 2020 WL 131360, at *2.

Even under the pre-2015 scope of discovery, it was improper to use
discovery to identify putative class members:

Respondents' attempt to obtain the class members' names and
addresses cannot be forced into the concept of "relevancy"
described above. The difficulty is that respondents do not seek
this information for any bearing that it might have on issues in
the case.

Id. at *3 (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340,
350-53 (1978) (footnote omitted)). Oppenheimer involved a
plaintiff's attempt to use discovery to identify class members for
purposes of providing class notice, 437 U.S. at 353, but the Ninth
Circuit majority held that, as long as the reason for seeking class
members' identities was extraneous to the substance of the
litigation, Oppenheimer's prohibition applied. "[W]e do not think
that the discovery rules are the right tool for this job."
Williams-Sonoma, 2020 WL 131360, at *3 (quoting Oppenheimer).

Longtime readers may be forgiven for thinking, "Oppenheimer,
Oppenheimer . . . where have I seen that name before?" Several
years ago, we complained about a number of courts' misuse of
language from the same Oppenheimer decision to avoid the 2015
tightening of the definition of the scope of discovery in Rule 26.
Well, the Ninth Circuit in Williams-Sonoma threw cold water on
that, because plaintiff raised those 2015 rules change in an
attempt to avoid the actual Oppenheimer decision. However, the 2015
amendment to Rule 26 "cut against" allowing greater discovery than
permissible under Oppenheimer:

Rule 26(b)(1) was amended to its current form after 1978 when
Oppenheimer was decided. As quoted above, the rule then indicated
that discovery must be "relevant to the subject matter involved in
the pending action" that related to a party's claim or defense.
Now, the "subject matter" reference has been eliminated from the
rule, and the matter sought must be "relevant to any party's claim
or defense." Rule 26(b)(1). That change, however, was intended to
restrict, not broaden, the scope of discovery. See Rule 26(b)(1)
advisory committee's note to 2000 amendment; see also id. advisory
committee's note to 2015 amendment.

Williams-Sonoma, 2020 WL 131360, at *3 (emphasis added). After a
couple of quick searches, we're pretty sure that Williams-Sonoma is
the first appellate court explicitly holding that Oppenheimer has
been superseded by the 2015 federal rules amendment.

Plaintiff also failed with a second, less important, attempt to
distinguish Oppenheimer. That no class had been certified in
Williams-Sonoma (as opposed to Oppenheimer, where certification had
occurred), was all the more reason to reject the plaintiff's
attempt at self-help. "[H]ere counsel is without a lead plaintiff
for the class issues that counsel wishes to pursue," so without any
certified class, "the request here is less relevant than the
request in Oppenheimer." Id. Thus, it was "clear error" "as a
matter of law" to force a defendant to provide discovery designed
to facilitate its opponent's attempt to solicit a new class
representative. "[U]sing discovery to find a client to be the named
plaintiff before a class action is certified is not within the
scope of Rule 26(b)(1)." Id.

That, too, is a useful ruling.

The other essential prerequisites to mandamus relief were also
satisfied:

[Defendant] has no other adequate means for relief available to it
at this time, and before a direct appeal could be taken and heard,
the disclosure and damage to its (and its customers') interests
would be complete − its claim would be mooted. Thus, the first
and second factors weigh in favor of granting the petition.

Id. at *4 (footnotes omitted).

Finally, we see a broader implication in Williams-Sonoma with
possible spill-over effects to other types of complex litigation.
The 2015 "claim or defense" amendment to Rule 26(b)(1), comes into
play any time that a party (usually, but not necessarily, a
plaintiff) seeks some kind of collateral advantage through
"discovery" that is unrelated to the merits of the litigation.
Here, it was an attempt to solicit a new class representative. But
plaintiffs have been known to use what they call "discovery" to
disrupt a defendant's relationships with its customers, to pressure
a governmental unit, or even a nihilistic desire just to generate
bad publicity for the other side. Unless any given request is
"relevant to any party's claim or defense," Williams-Sonoma is
persuasive precedent for it being impermissible discovery, with
mandamus as a proper remedy. [GN]


WM BOLTHOUSE: $118K Deal in Felix FDCPA Suit Has Prelim Approval
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ERIC FELIX, an individual, on behalf of himself and
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. WM. BOLTHOUSE FARMS, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00312-AWI-JLT (E.D. Cal.), Magistrate
Judge Jennifer L. Thurston of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California granted the Plaintiff's motion for
preliminary approval of class settlement.

Felix filed the action against the Defendant on March 7, 2019,
alleging that the Defendant violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act
("FDCPA") by requiring him and the FCRA Class Members' to execute a
"Consent to Request Consumer Report & Investigative Consumer Report
Information" form to permit Sterling Infosystems Inc. to obtain and
use consumer report information for employment purposes for the
Plaintiff and all the FCRA Class Members, and the Defendant
therefore obtained consumer reports regarding them without proper
authorization in violation of 15 U.S.C. Section 1681
b(b)(2)(A)(ii).  The complaint further alleged Defendant failed to
provide lawful meal and rest breaks to the proposed California
Class Members.

On May 3, 2019, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint in part and to strike the Plaintiff's third and fourth
causes of action.  Subsequently, on May 20, 2019, the Plaintiff
filed his first amended complaint removing his third and fourth
cause of action.  The first amended complaint alleges claims for
(1) violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act for failure to make
proper disclosures; and (2) violation of the Fair Credit Reporting
Act for failure to obtain proper authorization.

The parties exchanged initial discovery disclosures, and engaged in
extensive discussions about their respective positions and the
information and data needed to properly evaluate the merits of the
claims alleged.  The parties reached a proposed class action
settlement on Sept. 6, 2019 through arms-length direct
negotiations, now submitted to the Court for preliminary approval.

The first amended complaint defined the class as: "All applicants
in the United States who filled out WM. BOLTHOUSE FARMS, INC.'s
standard "Consent to Request Consumer Report & Investigative
Consumer Report Information" form at any time during the period
beginning five (5) years prior to the filing of this action to the
present."  The Settlement Class, which includes approximately 1,245
individuals, is defined as: "all applicants in the United States
who filled out WM. BOLTHOUSE FARMS, INC.'s standard 'Consent to
Request Consumer Report & Investigative Consumer Report
Information' form as administered by Sterling Infosystems Inc.
during the Class Period."  The "Class Period" is March 17, 2017 to
July 31, 2018.

The Plaintiff filed the motion for preliminary approval of the
settlement now pending before the Court.  Pursuant to the proposed
settlement, the parties agree to a gross settlement amount not to
exceed $118,275.  If the Court approves the Settlement, the
following estimates the breakdown of payments from the amount: (i)
$54,350 for estimated settlement funds to the Settlement Class (Net
Settlement Amount); (ii) $18,500 for administration costs regarding
the Settlement; (iii) $5,000 for a Service Award to the Plaintiff;
and (iv) $39,425 for attorneys' fees and $1,000 in litigation
costs.

The parties anticipate the approximate gross payment per class
member on average will be $95 with an approximate net payment on
average of $43.65.  According to the Plaintiff, this is a
non-reversionary, total payout Settlement.  Any funds remaining in
the Gross Settlement Amount due to uncashed Settlement checks
(after a 180-day negotiability period) will be remitted to the
California Legal Aid Fund.

Any class member who wishes may file objections or elect not to
participate in the Settlement.  The Notice of Class Action
Settlement explains the claims that are released as part of the
Settlement.  In addition, it explains the procedures to claim a
share of the settlement, object to the settlement, or elect not to
participate in the Settlement.

Based upon her review, Magistrate Judge Thurston finds the proposed
class settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.  The factors
set forth by the Ninth Circuit weigh in favor of preliminary
approval of the settlement agreement.  Moreover, preliminary
approval of a settlement and notice to the proposed class is
appropriate if [1] the proposed settlement appears to be the
product of serious, informed, noncollusive negotiations, [2] has no
obvious deficiencies, [3] does not improperly grant preferential
treatment to class representatives or segments of the class, and
[4] falls within the range of possible approval.  In the case, the
proposed settlement agreement satisfies the test.

Accordingly, the District Court granted the Plaintiff's request for
conditional certification.  The Settlement class is defined as
follows: All applicants in the United States who filled out WM.
BOLTHOUSE FARMS, INC.'s standard 'Consent to Request Consumer
Report & Investigative Consumer Report Information' form as
administered by Sterling Infosystems Inc. during the Class Period
of March 17, 2018 through July 31, 2018.

The District Court appointed (i) Eric Felix  as the representative
of the Settlement Class; (ii) Eric B. Kingsley and Kelsey M. Szamet
of Kingsley & Kingsley APC and Emil Davtyan of Davtyan Professional
Law Corporation as the attorneys for the Settlement Class; and
(iii) JND Legal Administration as the Settlement Administrator.

The Class Representative enhancement request is granted
preliminarily up to the amount of $5,000, subject to a petition and
review at the Final Approval Hearing.  The Class Members and their
counsel may support or oppose the request, if they so desire, at
the Final Approval Hearing.

The Class Counsel's request for fees that total $39,425, which
represents 33% of the $118,275.00 common fund are granted
preliminarily, subject to tge counsel's petition for fees and
review at the Final Approval Hearing.  The Class Members and their
counsel may support or oppose the request, if they so desire, at
the Final Approval Hearing.

The Plaintiffs should file a petition for attorneys' fees and for
the class representative enhancement fee.  Costs of settlement
administration will not exceed $18,500.

The Court also preliminarily approved the proposed Notice Packet.
The parties are directed to file a finalized Notice Packet with the
required revisions for the Court's approval.

The parties are directed to provide the Settlement Administrator
with the Class List and Data.  

The Class Members who desire to be excluded from the action may opt
out from the Settlement within 60 days, or no later than March 6,
2020.  The Class Members who wish to object to the Settlement must
mail a written objection to the Settlement Administrator within 60
days, or no later than March 6, 2020.

A Final Approval Hearing will be held on March 27, 2020 at 9:00
a.m.  The Court reserves the right to vacate the Final Approval
Hearing if no comments or objections are filed with the Court by
March 6, 2020.

The Court reserves the right to continue the Final Approval Hearing
without further notice to members of the Settlement Class, and
retains jurisdiction to consider all further applications arising
from or related to the Settlement Agreement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Jan. 7, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/eqIDL2 from Leagle.com.

Eric Felix, an individual, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Emil Davtyan --
emil@davtyanlaw.com -- Davtyan Professional Law Corporation, Eric
Bryce Kingsley -- eric@kingsleykingsley.com -- Kingsley & Kingsley
APC & Kelsey Szamet -- kelsey@kingsleykingsley.com -- Kingsley &
Kingsley, APC.

WM. Bolthouse Farms, Inc., Defendant, represented by Ashley
Adrianne Baltazar -- ashley.baltazar@morganlewis.com -- Morgan,
Lewis & Bockius LLP.


ZB NA: Status Conference in Evans Fraud Suit Continued to April 27
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RONALD C. EVANS, an individual; JOAN M. EVANS, an
individual; DENNIS TREADAWAY, an individual; and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. ZB, N.A., a national banking
association, dba California Bank & Trust, Defendant, Case No.
2:17-cv-01123-WBS-DB (E.D. Cal.), Judge William B. Shubb of the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California,
Sacramento Division, continued the status conference scheduled for
Jan. 21, 2020 at 1:30 p.m. to April 27, 2020 at 1:30 p.m.

The putative class action representatives filed a class action
complaint against CB&T on May 16, 2017.

On Dec. 19, 2017, the Court dismissed the Complaint.  The Putative
Class Action Representatives subsequently appealed the dismissal
order.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued a
Memorandum reversing, vacating, and remanding the trial court
decision dismissing the Complaint on June 24, 2019.

On Aug. 1, 2019, the Ninth Circuit denied CB&T's Petition for Panel
Rehearing and for Rehearing En Banc.  On Aug. 9, 2019, the
Appellate Court issued its formal mandate pursuant to Rule 41(a) of
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

On Aug. 29, 2019, the District Court ordered the parties to appear
for a status conference on Jan. 21, 2020 at 1:30 p.m. and to file a
Joint Status Report by Jan. 7, 2020.

On Oct. 15, 2019, the Putative Class Action Representatives filed
their First Amended Complaint ("FAC").  CB&T filed a Motion to
Dismiss the Putative Class Action Representatives' FAC on Nov. 15,
2019, which the Court heard on Dec. 16, 2019.

On Dec. 18, 2019, the Court issued its Memorandum and Order
granting in part and denying in part CB&T's Dismissal Motion.  The
December 2019 Memorandum and Order dismissed with leave to amend
the Putative Class Action Representatives' second cause of action
(securities fraud) based on transactions or acts before May 26,
2012, fourth cause of action (aiding and abetting breach of
fiduciary duty), and fifth cause of action (intentional
interference with contract).  The Court's Memorandum and Order
denied CB&T's Dismissal Motion as to the Putative Class Action
Representatives' first cause of action (aiding and abetting fraud),
second cause of action (securities fraud) based on transactions or
acts after May 26, 2012, third cause of action (conspiracy to
commit fraud), and sixth cause of action (violation of Penal Code
section 496) ("Remaining Claims").  

The December 2019 Memorandum and Order afforded the Putative Class
Action Representatives until Jan. 2, 2020 to file a Second Amended
Complaint.  The Putative Class Action Representatives did not file
a Second Amended Complaint by Jan. 2, 2020.

The Counsel for the Parties met and conferred via telephone on Jan.
6, 2020.  They agreed to the following stipulation and schedule,
subject to the District Court's approval: (i) the Putative Class
Action Representatives will not file a Second Amended Complaint to
attempt to cure the dismissals as outlined; (ii) CB&T will file and
serve an answer to the Remaining Claims asserted in Putative Class
Action Representatives' FAC by Jan. 31, 2020; (iii) the Putative
Class Action Representatives' counsel will file and serve a motion
with the Court seeking an order designating them as the interim
counsel under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(g)(3) on March 6,
2020; (iv) the Parties will confer and attempt to agree upon a
discovery plan, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(f), on March 20, 2020; (v) the Parties will exchange their
initial disclosures under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) on
April 3, 2020; and (vi) the Parties will file a joint status report
on March 30, 2020.

The Parties submitted the proposal in an effort to conserve
judicial resources.  If the foregoing schedule is acceptable, the
Parties request that the Court continues the Status Conference
scheduled for Jan. 21, 2020 at 1:30 p.m. to April 13, 2020 at 1:30
p.m. or to such other date and time as the Court deems appropriate.
The Stipulation does not waive, alter, or modify any rights,
defenses or claims of any of the Parties in the case.

Upon deliberation, Judge Shubb approved the Stipulation.  He
ordered that (i) CB&T must file and serve an answer to the Putative
Class Representatives' FAC by 31, 2020; (ii) the Parties must
confer and attempt to agree upon a discovery plan, as required by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f), on March 20, 2020; (iii) the
Parties must exchange their initial disclosures under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 26(a) on April 3, 2020; (iv) the Status
Conference scheduled for Jan. 21, 2020 at 1:30 p.m. is continued to
April 27, 2020 at 1:30 p.m.; and (v) the Parties must file a joint
status conference report on April 13, 2020.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Jan. 7, 2020 Stipulated
Order is available at https://is.gd/uAaCcd from Leagle.com.

Ronald C. Evans, Joan M. Evans & Dennis Treadaway, Plaintiffs,
represented by Michael Patrick Denver -- mpdenver@hbsb.com --
Hollister & Brace & Robert Louis Brace -- rlbrace@rusty.lawyer

ZB, N.A., Doing business as, Defendant, represented by Robert
Scott
McWhorter -- rmcwhorter@buchalter.com -- Buchalter, A Professional
Corporation & Jarrett S. Osborne-Revis --
josbornerevis@buchalter.com -- Buchalter, A Professional
Corporation.



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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