/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR

/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/200120.mbx C L A S S A C T I O N R E P O R T E R Monday, January 20, 2020, Vol. 22, No. 14 Headlines ABM INDUSTRIES: Appeal in Castro and Marmolejo Suit Dismissed ABM INDUSTRIES: Trial in Bucio Class Suit Set for May 2020 ACACIA RESEARCH: Proxy on Starboard Deal Incomplete, Franchi Says ADAMAS PHARMACEUTICALS: Schall Law Files Class Action ADTRAN INC: Burbridge Suit Moved From S.D.N.Y. to N.D. Alabama ALJ REGIONAL: Mediation in Marshall Suit Set for May 2020 ALLERGAN INC: Olinger Sues Over Defective BIOCELL Implants ALTA DEVICES: Faces Patterson Suit Alleging Violation of WARN Act APPLE INC: Bid to Deny Class Certification in Davidson Suit Nixed APPLE INC: Bid to Dismiss 1st Amended MacBook Keyboard Suit Denied ASCOT RIDGE: Fails to Pay Minimum Wage Under NYLL, Haughwout Says BAOZUN INC: Glancy Prongay Reminds Investors of Feb. 10 Deadline BAOZUN INC: Levi & Korsinsky Reminds Investors of Class Action BAXTER INT'L: Schall Law Reminds of Jan. 24 Deadline BIG MIKE'S RESTAURANT: Court Partly Grants Deal in Fitzwater Suit BOOT BARN: Mendez Sues Over Unwanted Telemarketing Messages BUTH-NA-BODHAIGE INC: Taylor FACTA Suit Moved to C.D. California CANOPY GROWTH: Vincent Wong Reminds of Jan. 21 Deadline CATERPILLAR INC: Faces Texas Hill Suit Over Defective Liners CENLAR AGENCY: Gemborys Suit Removed to District of Massachusetts COMCAST CABLE: Court Denies Arbitration on Hearn's FCRA Suit COOPER COMPANIES: Final Settlement Approval Hearing on Feb. 25 CVS HEALTH: Arizona & New York Classes Certified in Corcoran Suit DANNY & JIMMY'S: Herrera Seeks Minimum and OT Wages for Dancers DART TRANSIT: Court Orders Arbitration in Byars Case DELTA DENTAL: Faces Bemus Suit Over Antitrust Law Violation DIVISION III: Peralta Suit Moved to Southern District of Florida EATALY CHICAGO: Illegally Collects Biometric Data, Sykes Claims ENERGY TRANSFER: Vincent Wong Reminds of Jan. 21 Deadline EXELON CORP: Bernstein Liebhard Reminds of Feb. 14 Deadline EXELON CORP: Lieff Cabraser Reminds Investors of Feb. 14 Deadline EXELON CORP: Schall Law Files Class Action Lawsuit EXELON CORP: Vincent Wong Reminds of Feb. 14 Deadline FIAT CHRYSLER: Faces Tan Securities Suit Over Drop in Share Price FIRST AMERICAN: Antao Sues Over Improperly Charged Fees to Buyers FITBIT INC: Faruqi & Faruqi Files Securities Class Action FRONTIER AIRLINES: Women Sue Over Sex Assaults by Passengers GEO GROUP: Court Partly Grants Class Cert. in Ramirez Labor Suit GOLDEN STATE: Transfer Trevino Suit to Cal. Central Dist. Denied GPB CAPITAL: Barasch Sues Over $1.8BB Fraud on Investors HCP INC: District Dismisses Boynton Firefighters Securities Suit HOME OWNERS MGMT: Supreme Ct. Upholds Arbitration Order in Robinson IC SYSTEM: Makurat Moves for Class Certification Under Damasco ILLINOIS: Court Denies Class Certification in Inmates' Suit INNOPHOS HOLDINGS: Faces Kappelman Suit Over Merger With One Rock INSTRUCTURE INC: Faces Post Securities Suit Over Thoma Bravo Sale INSTRUCTURE RESOURCES: Zhang Balks at Planned Sale to Thoma Bravo JPMORGAN CHASE: Court Awards $731M Attorneys' Fees in Merryman Suit JPMORGAN CHASE: Settlement in Merryman Suit Gets Final Approval KEMET CORPORATION: Faces Silverberg Suit Over Sale to Yageo KOHN LAW FIRM: Certification of Class Sought in Rozani Suit LEEDS MORELLI: Can't Compel Arbitration in Dowe Suit LIBERTY PROPERTY: Rigrodsky & Long Files Suit Over Prologis Deal LOANCARE LLC: Charges Illegal Pay-to-Pay Fees, Tanner Suit Claims MARYLAND: Retirees Seek Class Action Status in Drug Benefits Case MDL 1203: Denial of Panoussi Claim for Matrix A-1 Benefits Upheld MDL 2804: Taylor v. Purdue Pharma Over Opioid Drugs Consolidated MERIT MEDICAL: Glancy Prongay Reminds of Feb. 3 Deadline MERIVALE: Says Employees Unlikely to Benefit From Class Action MICROSOFT CORP: No Class Status of Gender Bias Claims Upheld MIH SALES: Violates Overtime Provisions of FLSA, Turner Alleges MPSK INC: Faces Acevedo Suit Over Improper Pay Under FLSA & IMWL NOW HOME: Rogers Sues Over Unwanted Robo-Calls and Robo-Texts ONLINE INFORMATION: Certification of Class Sought in Morgan Suit PALM BEACH, FL: Denial of Class Status in Utilities Case Appealed PATHWAY SENIOR: Dukes Sues Over Illegal Collection of Biometrics PIONEER HOME: State Attorneys Seek Dismissal of Class Action Suit PRECISION PIPELINE: Severe Labor Suit Removed to S.D. New York RIDGEWOOD INDUSTRIES: Winters Sues Over Dressers' Tip-Over Issues SAFEGUARD DOCUMENT: McKenna Seeks Overtime Wages Under FLSA SCOFFOLDING SOLUTIONS: Mag. Judge Recommends OK of $200K Epps Deal SEATTLE, WA: 9th Cir. Upholds Class Certification Denial in Willis SGS NORTH AMERICA: Gomez Seeks to Recover Overtime Pay Under FLSA SPRINT CORP: Turina Sues Over Illegal Deductions on Commissions SPSG PARTNERS: Whiteside Seeks to Recover Minimum and OT Wages SSK DONUTS: Joell Sues Over Failure to Pay for All Hours Worked TRIPLE CROWN: Myers Labor Class Suit Removed to S.D. California UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Aleksanian Seeks to Recover Illegal Deductions UMG RECORDINGS: Court Enters Protective Order in Soundgarden Suit UNITI GROUP: Schall Law Files Securities Class Action WAWA INC: Customers File Class Suit Over Data Breach WAWA INC: Faces High Suit in Eastern District of Pennsylvania WELLIVER & ASSOCIATES: Martinez Sues Over Use of Consumer Reports WILCO LIFE: 11th Cir. Flips Remand of Anderson Suit to State Court WINDSOR HEIGHTS, IA: Class Action Suit Filed Over Traffic Cams WOODLAND CLINIC: Martinez FCRA Suit Removed to N.D. California ********* ABM INDUSTRIES: Appeal in Castro and Marmolejo Suit Dismissed ------------------------------------------------------------- ABM Industries Incorporated said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on December 20, 2019, for the fiscal year ended October 31, 2019, that the company has dismissed its appeal in the class action suit entitled, Castro and Marmolejo v. ABM Industries, Inc., et al., before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On October 24, 2014, Plaintiff Marley Castro filed a class action lawsuit alleging that ABM did not reimburse janitorial employees in California for using their personal cell phones for work-related purposes, in violation of California Labor Code section 2802. On January 23, 2015, Plaintiff Lucia Marmolejo was added to the case as a named plaintiff. On October 27, 2017, plaintiffs moved for class certification seeking to represent a class of all employees who were, are, or will be employed by ABM in the State of California with the Employee Master Job Description Code "Cleaner" (hereafter referred to as "Cleaner Employees") beginning from October 24, 2010. ABM filed its opposition to class certification on November 27, 2017. On January 26, 2018, the district court granted plaintiffs' motion for class certification. The court rejected plaintiffs' proposed class, instead certifying three classes that the court formulated on its own: (1) all employees who were, are, or will be employed by ABM in the State of California as Cleaner Employees who used a personal cell phone to punch in and out of the EPAY system and who (a) worked at an ABM facility that did not provide a biometric clock and (b) were not offered an ABM-provided cell phone during the period beginning on January 1, 2012, through the date of notice to the Class Members that a class has been certified in this action; (2) all employees who were, are, or will be employed by ABM in the State of California as Cleaner Employees who used a personal cell phone to report unusual or suspicious circumstances to supervisors and were not offered (a) an ABM-provided cell phone or (b) a two-way radio during the period beginning four years prior to the filing of the original complaint, October 24, 2014, through the date of notice to the Class Members that a class has been certified in this action; and (3) all employees who were, are, or will be employed by ABM in the State of California as Cleaner Employees who used a personal cell phone to respond to communications from supervisors and were not offered (a) an ABM-provided cell phone or (b) a two-way radio during the period beginning four years prior to the filing of the original complaint, October 24, 2014, through the date of notice to the Class Members that a class has been certified in this action. On February 9, 2018, ABM filed a petition for permission to appeal the district court's order granting class certification with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which was denied on April 30, 2018. On March 20, 2018, ABM moved to compel arbitration of the claims of certain class members pursuant to the terms of three collective bargaining agreements. In response to that motion, on May 14, 2018, the district court modified the class definition to exclude all claims arising after the operative date(s) of the applicable collective bargaining agreements (which is June 1, 2016 for one agreement and May 1, 2016 for the other two agreements). However, the district court denied the motion to compel arbitration as to claims that arose prior to the operative date(s) of the applicable collective bargaining agreements. ABM appealed to the Ninth Circuit the district court's order denying the motion to compel arbitration with respect to the periods preceding the operative dates of the collective bargaining agreements. After a court-ordered mediation held on October 15, 2018, the parties agreed to a class action settlement of $5.4 million, subject to court approval. The plaintiffs' motion for preliminary approval of the settlement was filed on January 4, 2019, and the court held a hearing on the motion on February 12, 2019. On February 14, 2019, the court granted preliminary approval of the settlement. The court granted final approval of the settlement on September 3, 2019, and the settlement was funded on September 23, 2019. In connection with the settlement, the modified its existing written policies for California to expressly confirm that ABM service workers are not required to use personal cell phones for work purposes and began centralizing the process and implementing technology for such employees to request reimbursement for personal cell phone use due to work. Because the settlement was finally approved, on October 31, 2019, ABM dismissed its Ninth Circuit appeal regarding the district court's order denying the motion to compel arbitration. ABM Industries Incorporated provides integrated facility solutions in the United States and internationally. It operates through Business & Industry, Aviation, Technology & Manufacturing, Education, Technical Solutions, and Healthcare segments. The company was founded in 1909 and is headquartered in New York, New York. ABM INDUSTRIES: Trial in Bucio Class Suit Set for May 2020 ---------------------------------------------------------- ABM Industries Incorporated said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on December 20, 2019, for the fiscal year ended October 31, 2019, that the trial in the consolidated cases of Bucio and Martinez v. ABM Janitorial Services has been set for May 26, 2020. The Bucio case is a class action pending in San Francisco Superior Court that alleges that the company failed to provide legally required meal periods and make additional premium payments for such meal periods, pay split shift premiums when owed, and reimburse janitors for travel expenses. There is also a claim for penalties under the California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA"). On April 19, 2011, the trial court held a hearing on plaintiffs' motion to certify the class. At the conclusion of that hearing, the trial court denied plaintiffs' motion to certify the class. On May 11, 2011, the plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider, which was denied. The plaintiffs appealed the class certification issues. The trial court stayed the underlying lawsuit pending the decision in the appeal. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, heard oral arguments on November 7, 2017. On December 11, 2017, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order denying class certification and remanded the matter for certification of a meal period, travel expense reimbursement, and split shift class. The case was remitted to the trial court for further proceedings on class certification, discovery, dispositive motions, and trial. On September 20, 2018, the trial court entered an order defining four certified subclasses of janitors who were employed by the legacy ABM janitorial companies in California at any time between April 7, 2002 and April 30, 2013, on claims based on alleged previous automatic deduction practices for meal breaks, unpaid meal premiums, unpaid split shift premiums, and unreimbursed business expenses, such as mileage reimbursement for use of personal vehicles to travel between worksites. On February 1, 2019, the trial court held that the discovery related to PAGA claims allegedly arising after April 30, 2013 would be stayed until after the class and PAGA claims accruing prior to April 30, 2013 had been tried. The parties engaged in mediation in July 2019, which did not result in settlement of the case. On October 17, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion asking the trial court to certify additional classes based on an alleged failure to maintain time records, an alleged failure to provide accurate wage statements, and an alleged practice of combining meal and rest breaks. The company's response to this motion was filed on November 4, 2019, and the trial court heard the matter on December 10, 2019. This matter is currently set for trial on May 26, 2020. ABM Industries said, "Prior to trial, we will have the opportunity to move for summary judgment, seek decertification of the classes, or engage in further mediation, if we deem such actions appropriate. We expect to engage in one or more such activities in upcoming quarters." No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report. ABM Industries Incorporated provides integrated facility solutions in the United States and internationally. It operates through Business & Industry, Aviation, Technology & Manufacturing, Education, Technical Solutions, and Healthcare segments. The company was founded in 1909 and is headquartered in New York, New York. ACACIA RESEARCH: Proxy on Starboard Deal Incomplete, Franchi Says ----------------------------------------------------------------- Adam Franchi, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. ACACIA RESEARCH CORPORATION, MAUREEN O'CONNELL, ALFRED V. TOBIA, JR., CLIFFORD PRESS, ISAAC T. KOHLBERG, KATHARINE WOLANYK, JONATHAN SAGAL, and LUIS RINALDINI, Case No. 1:20-cv-00045-UNA (D. Del., Jan. 13, 2020), stems from the Defendants' dissemination of a materially incomplete proxy statement relating to a securities purchase agreement with Starboard Value LP. On November 18, 2019, Acacia Research Corporation's Board of Directors caused Acacia to enter into a securities purchase agreement with Starboard Value LP and certain of its affiliates. Pursuant to the terms of the Purchase Agreement, Acacia issued to the Buyers: (i) an aggregate of 350,000 shares of Series A Convertible Preferred Stock; and (ii) warrants to purchase up to 5,000,000 shares of the Company's common stock, in exchange for a cash payment of $35 million. If the Company's stockholders approve the Proposals, the Company will issue to Starboard warrants to purchase up to 100,000,000 shares of common stock, and may issue up to $365 million in senior secured notes. On December 10, 2019, the Defendants filed with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission a proxy statement relating to the Agreement. The Plaintiff asserts that the Proxy Statement omits material information, which renders it false and misleading. Accordingly, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants violated Sections the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in connection with the Proxy Statement. The Plaintiff, who owns common stock of Acacia, contends that the Proxy Statement fails to disclose whether the Individual Defendants engaged a financial advisor in connection with the Purchase Agreement. If the Individual Defendants engaged a financial advisor, the Proxy Statement fails to disclose the terms of the financial advisor's engagement, including: (i) the amount of compensation the financial advisor has received or will receive in connection with its engagement; (ii) whether the financial advisor has performed past services for any parties to the Purchase Agreement or their affiliates; (iii) the timing and nature of such services; and (iv) the amount of compensation received by the financial advisor for providing such services. Because of the false and misleading statements in the Proxy Statement, the Plaintiff and the Class are threatened with irreparable harm, says the complaint. Acacia invests in intellectual property and related absolute return assets, and engages in the licensing and enforcement of patented technologies.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Brian D. Long, Esq. Gina M. Serra, Esq. RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A. 300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220 Wilmington, DE 19801 Phone: (302) 295-5310 Facsimile: (302) 654-7530 Email: bdl@rl-legal.com gms@rl-legal.com - and - Richard A. Maniskas, Esq. RM LAW, P.C. 1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300 Berwyn, PA 19312 Phone: (484) 324-6800 Facsimile: (484) 631-1305 Email: rm@maniskas.com ADAMAS PHARMACEUTICALS: Schall Law Files Class Action ----------------------------------------------------- The Schall Law Firm, a national shareholder rights litigation firm, has filed a class action lawsuit against Adamas Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (NASDAQ:ADMS) for violations of Secs. 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Investors who purchased the Company's securities between August 8, 2017 and September 30, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"), are encouraged to contact the firm before February 10, 2020. We also encourage you to contact Brian Schall of the Schall Law Firm, 1880 Century Park East, Suite 404, Los Angeles, CA 90067, at 424-303-1964, to discuss your rights free of charge. You can also reach us through the firm's website at www.schallfirm.com, or by email at brian@schallfirm.com. The class, in this case, has not yet been certified, and until certification occurs, you are not represented by an attorney. If you choose to take no action, you can remain an absent class member. According to the Complaint, the Company made false and misleading statements to the market. Adamas suffered from insurers excluding GOCOVRI from their coverage or requiring patients to try other therapies first. The rapid increase in doctors prescribing GOCOVRI to patients was not based on the drug's effectiveness. Based on these facts, the Company's public statements were false and materially misleading throughout the class period. When the market learned the truth about Adamas, investors suffered damages. Join the case to recover your losses. The Schall Law Firm represents investors around the world and specializes in securities class action lawsuits and shareholder rights litigation. Contact: Brian Schall, Esq. The Schall Law Firm Website: www.schallfirm.com Office: 310-301-3335 Cell: 424-303-1964 E-mail: info@schallfirm.com brian@schallfirm.com [GN] ADTRAN INC: Burbridge Suit Moved From S.D.N.Y. to N.D. Alabama -------------------------------------------------------------- The class action lawsuit styled as MICHAEL BURBRIDGE, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, v. ADTRAN, INC., THOMAS R. STANTON, MICHAEL FOLIANO, ROGER D. SHANNON, Case No. 1:19-cv-09619 (Filed Oct. 17, 2019), was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama (Northeastern) on Jan. 13, 2020. The Northern District of Alabama Court Clerk assigned Case No. 5:20-cv-00050-HNJ to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Herman N Johnson, Jr. The case is a class action brought on behalf of persons and entities that purchased or otherwise acquired ADTRAN securities between February 28, 2019, and October 9, 2019, inclusive, pursuing claims against the Defendants under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The Plaintiff contends that the Defendants made materially false and/or misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and prospects. Specifically, the Defendants failed to disclose to investors that there were material weaknesses in the Company's internal control over financial reporting; as a result, certain E&O reserves had been improperly reported; as a result, the Company's financial results for certain periods were misstated; there would be a pause in shipments to the Company's Latin American customer; and as a result of the foregoing, the Defendants' positive statements about the Company's business, operations, and prospects, were materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis. Mr. Burbridge purchased ADTRAN securities during the Class Period, and suffered damages as a result of the federal securities law violations and alleged false and/or misleading statements and/or material omissions. ADTRAN is a networking and communications company that provides services which enable voice, data, video, and internet communications across a variety of network infrastructures. ADTRAN also offers a broad portfolio of flexible software and hardware network solutions to service providers.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Garth Avery Spencer, Esq. Gregory Bradley Linkh, Esq. Lesley Frank Portnoy, Esq. GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP 230 Park Avenue, Suite 530 New York, NY 10169 Telephone: (212) 682-5340 Facsimile: (212) 884-0988 The Defendants are represented by: Jessica P Corley, Esq. KING & SPALDING LLP 1180 Peachtree St. NE Atlanta, GA 30309-3521 Telephone: (404) 572-4717 E-mail: jpcorley@kslaw.com ALJ REGIONAL: Mediation in Marshall Suit Set for May 2020 --------------------------------------------------------- ALJ Regional Holdings, Insaid in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on December 23, 2019, for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2019, that the court has ordered the parties in the case, Marshall v. Faneuil, Inc., to mediation scheduled for May 2020. On July 31, 2017, plaintiff Donna Marshall filed a proposed class action lawsuit in the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Sacramento against Faneuil and ALJ. Marshall, a previously terminated Faneuil employee, alleges various California state law employment-related claims against Faneuil. Faneuil has answered the complaint and removed the matter to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California; however, Marshall filed a motion to remand the case back to state court, which has been granted. In connection with the above, an amended complaint was filed by certain plaintiffs to add a claim for penalties under the California Private Attorneys General Act. Faneuil demurred to the PAGA Claim and it was eventually dismissed by the trial court. The parties are currently engaged in limited discovery. A court-ordered mediation is scheduled between the parties for May 2020. Faneuil believes this action is without merit and intends to defend this case vigorously. The Company has not accrued any amounts related to the Marshall claim as of September 30, 2019. ALJ Regional Holdings, Inc. provides call center, back-office, staffing, and toll collection services to government and commercial clients in the healthcare, utility, consumer goods, toll, and transportation industries in the United States. It operates through three segments: Faneuil, Carpets, and Phoenix. The company was formerly known as YouthStream Media Networks, Inc. and changed its name to ALJ Regional Holdings, Inc. in October 2006. ALJ Regional Holdings, Inc. was founded in 1995 and is based in New York, New York. ALLERGAN INC: Olinger Sues Over Defective BIOCELL Implants ---------------------------------------------------------- ERIKA OLINGER v. ALLERGAN, INC. f/k/a INAMED CORPORATION, ALLERGAN USA, INC., and ALLERGAN plc, Case No. 2:20-cv-00103 (E.D. La., Jan. 10, 2020), is a class action complaint brought against the Defendants alleging that their BIOCELL textured implants are defective. The lawsuit arises from Allergan's July 24, 2019 announcement of a worldwide recall of BIOCELL after the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) called for the action following new information that Allergan's BIOCELL implants were tied to cases of breast implant-associated anaplastic large cell lymphoma ("BIA-ALCL") not seen with other textured implants. On July 30, 2019, Allergan announced it has created a BIOCELL Replacement Warranty for all customers that currently have BIOCELL textured implants ("the Warranty"). The Warranty provides that Allergan will provide Allergan smooth implants to replace the BIOCELL textured implants, the lawsuit says. However, Allergan will not provide any surgical fee assistance or reimbursement for the surgery to remove the BIOCELL textured implants and replace them with Allergan smooth implants. The Warranty will run for 24 months, until July 24, 2021, and will apply only to revision surgeries on or after the date of the FDA's recall, July 24, 2019. As a result of Allergan's conduct, including refusal to pay for the removal of the recalled BIOCELL implants and the increased risk of developing BIA-ALCL, the Plaintiff contends she will be forced to expend substantial amounts of money for surgery, medical monitoring, diagnostic testing, and other medical expenses. The Plaintiff also alleges that she is entitled to have Allergan pay all possible incurred expenses. Breast implants are medical devices that are implanted under the breast tissue to increase breast size or replace breast tissue that has been removed. Tissue expanders are a type of inflatable breast implant which stretches skin and muscle to make room for a permanent implant in the future. Tissue expanders are often used in breast reconstruction surgeries. BIA-ALCL is a serious cancer and can be fatal, especially if not diagnosed early or promptly treated. The FDA determined the risk of developing BIA-ALCL was six times higher with Allergan's BIOCELL textured implants when compared with textured implants from other manufacturers, the lawsuit adds. In Allergan's recall statement, the FDA stated there are 573 cases of BIA- ALCL worldwide. Of those 573 cases, 33 people have died as a result of BIA-ALCL. The products affected by the FDA's recall are as follows: Style Allergan Natrelle Saline-Filled Breast Implants; Allergan Natrelle Silicone-Filled Textured Breast Implants; Natrelle 410 Highly Cohesive Anatomically Shaped Silicone Filled Breast Implants; and Allergan tissue expanders that have BIOCELL texturing originally cleared as: o Natrelle 133 Plus Tissue Expander (K143354) and Natrelle 133 Tissue Expander with Suture Tabs (K102806). Allergan manufactures and sells BIOCELL saline-filled and silicone-filled breast implants and tissue expanders "BIOCELL" or "BIOCELL textured implants").[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Claire E. Berg, Esq. Irving J. Warshauer, Esq. Michael J. Ecuyer, Esq. M. Palmer Lambert, Esq. Claire E. Berg, Esq. GAINSBURGH, BENJAMIN, DAVID, MEUNIER & WARSHAUER L.L.C. 2800 Entergy Centre 1100 Poydras Street New Orleans, LA 70163 Telephone: (504) 521-7643 Facsimile: (504) 528-9973 E-mail: iwarshauer@gainsben.com mecuyer@gainsben.com cberg@gainsben.com plambert@gainsben.com - and - Dawn M. Barrios, Esq. Zachary L. Wool, Esq. BARRIOS, KINGSDORF & CASTEIX, LLP 701 Poydras Street, Suite 3650 New Orleans, LA 70139 Telephone: (504) 524-3300 Facsimile: (504) 524-3313 E-mail: barrios@bkc-law.com wool@bkc-law.com ALTA DEVICES: Faces Patterson Suit Alleging Violation of WARN Act ----------------------------------------------------------------- Daniel Patterson, Ben Lenail, Brendan Kayes, James Bustamante, Octavi Semonin, Annett Suess, and Glenn Garcia, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated v. ALTA DEVICES, INC.; HANERGY HOLDING GROUP, LTD., Case No. 5:20-cv-00296 (N.D. Cal., Jan. 13, 2020), arises from the Defendants' unlawful labor practices resulting to breach of contract and violation of the Worker Adjustment Retraining Notification Act and the California Labor Code. On October 15, 2019, the Defendants abruptly shut the doors to their Sunnyvale, California factory, leaving almost 300 employees without a job--and without their final paychecks--just before the holiday season. The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants abandoned employees without any pay and left them in the lurch--providing no official notice of termination, and repeatedly promising that the plant would be back up and running any day. In the meantime, employees are having trouble paying bills and are left with uncertainty relating to healthcare coverage after being given false hope that Defendant Hanergy would reopen the Alta plant and resume operations as usual. In abruptly closing the Alta plant, the Defendants violated the federal and California WARN Acts, which require at least 60 days written notice of termination where a plant is shut down and/or mass layoffs occur, the Plaintiffs contend. They add that the Defendants also failed to pay employees wages and vacation time already earned in violation of the California Labor Code, and have breached agreements with the Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees by failing to provide severance pay as clearly outlined in some employees' agreements. The Plaintiffs are all former or current employees of the Defendants, who did not receive warning. Alta is a thin film solar company, which was founded in 2008.[BN] The Plaintiffs are represented by: Justin T. Berger, Esq. Sarvenaz "Nazy" J. Fahimi, Esq. COTCHETT, PITRE & McCARTHY, LLP 840 Malcolm Road Burlingame, CA 94010 Phone: (650) 697-6000 Facsimile: (650) 697-0577 Email: jberger@cpmlegal.com sfahimi@cpmlegal.com APPLE INC: Bid to Deny Class Certification in Davidson Suit Nixed ----------------------------------------------------------------- In the case captioned THOMAS DAVIDSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. APPLE, INC., Defendant, Case No. 16-CV-04942-LHK (N.D. Cal.), Judge Lucy H. Koh of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, San Jose Division, denied the Defendant's motion to deny class certification. The Plaintiffs commenced the putative class action against Apple based on the Defendant's alleged failure to disclose an alleged defect in the iPhone 6 and the iPhone 6 Plus. The Defendant released the iPhone 6 and iPhone 6 Plus on Sept. 19, 2014. The iPhone 6 and 6 Plus both have a larger touchscreen than the Defendant's prior iPhone models. The Purchasers of the iPhone 6 and 6 Plus had 14 days after purchase to return their iPhones for a full refund. According to the Plaintiffs, the iPhone 6 and 6 Plus suffer from a material manufacturing defect that causes the touchscreen to become unresponsive to users' touch inputs. They allege that the touchscreen defect is caused by a defect in the iPhone's external casing. The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant knew about the touchscreen defect before releasing the iPhone 6 and 6 Plus. They allege that within days of the iPhones' release, there were widespread consumer complaints about the iPhones bending. On Nov. 18, 2016, the Defendant announced a customer service program related to the touchscreen defect called the "Multi-Touch Repair Program." Prior to the Multi-Touch Repair Program, the Defendant charged approximately $349 for a refurbished iPhone when a consumer complained of the touchscreen defect outside of its warranty. Through the Repair Program, the Defendant has offered to repair consumers' devices for $149 if the iPhone is otherwise working, and the screen is not broken. It also offers to reimburse consumers for amounts previously paid over $149. The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant did not disclose the existence of the touchscreen defect despite having exposed consumers to materials in which it could have disclosed the defect. On Aug. 27, 2016, Plaintiffs Davidson, Jun Bai, and Todd Cleary filed a putative class action complaint against the Defendant that alleged claims under (1) California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act; (2) Unfair Competition Law; (3) False Advertisement Law; (4) common law fraud; (5) negligent misrepresentation; (6) unjust enrichment; (7) breach of implied warranty; (8) violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act; and (9) violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. On Oct. 7, 2016, the Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Class Action Complaint that added several Plaintiffs and added claims under the consumer fraud statutes of Illinois, New Jersey, Florida, Connecticut, Texas, Colorado, Michigan, New York, and Washington. On Dec. 2, 2016, the Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Class Action Complaint ("SACC"), which added a Utah Plaintiff and a claim under Utah's consumer fraud statute. The Plaintiffs therefore alleged 22 claims against the Defendant in total. Their references in their opposition to only 21 claims are therefore incorrect. The Plaintiffs sought to represent a Nationwide Class of all persons or entities in the United States that purchased an Apple iPhone 6 or 6 Plus. Alternatively, they sought to represent state sub-classes. Given the breadth of the Plaintiffs' action, the Court ordered the parties at the Nov. 30, 2016 initial case management conference to each select five claims to litigate through trial. The Court initially scheduled trial on Oct. 12, 2018. On Dec. 5, 2016, the parties selected (1) New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act; (2) Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act; (3) Washington Consumer Protection Act; (4) Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Trade Practices Act; (5) Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act; (6) Colorado Consumer Protection Act; (7) common law fraud; (8) breach of express warranty; (9) breach of implied warranty; and (10) Magnuson-Moss Act. On Jan. 5, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed their first motion for class certification as to the Selected Claims. On May 8, 2018, the Court denied the motion. On Nov. 8, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed their second motion for class certification as to the Selected Claims. On Feb. 12, 2019, the Court denied without prejudice the second motion for class certification as to the Selected Claims because analysis of whether Boedeker's new survey satisfies Comcast is essential to a class certification determination; because the Plaintiffs did not complete this survey before filing their renewed motion for class certification despite having 6 months to do so; and because briefing on class certification should address Boedeker's new survey. The Court gave Plaintiffs yet another opportunity to file a motion for class certification. On March 5, 2019, Plaintiffs John Borzymowski of Florida, William Bon of Washington, and Matt Muilenburg of Washington ("Former Plaintiffs") filed a third motion for class certification as to the Selected Claims. The Former Plaintiffs sought to certify the following class of any person residing in Florida or Washington who purchased an Apple iPhone 6 or iPhone 6 Plus from Apple or an Apple Authorized Service Provider (listed on https://locate.apple.com/) that was manufactured without underfill under the U2402 (Meson) integrated circuit chip. On March 29, 2019, Defendant filed its opposition. On June 20, 2019, the Court denied the Former Plaintiffs' third motion for class certification as to the Selected Claims. The Court explained that the varying manifestation rates lead to vast differences in economic loss calculations. Fact discovery closed on Nov. 2, 2018, and expert discovery closed on March 8, 2019. On July 2, 2019, the Former Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Justin Bauer of Colorado dismissed all of their claims without prejudice. These Plaintiffs were the only individuals who alleged the three Selected Claims that survived summary judgment: (1) Colorado Consumer Protection Act; (2) Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act; and (3) Washington Consumer Protection Act. On Aug. 30, 2019, the Former Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Justin Bauer dismissed all of their claims with prejudice. Only the following Plaintiffs now remain in the instant case: Todd Cleary of California; Thomas Davidson of Pennsylvania; Eric Siegal of Illinois; Michael Pajaro of New Jersey; Brooke Corbett of Connecticut; Taylor Brown of Texas; Heirloom Estate Services, Inc. of Michigan; Kathleen Baker of New York; and Jason Petty of Utah. The Fourth Amended Class Action Complaint ("FACC")'s claim for Violation of the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act was not one of the Selected Claims. However, the parties indicated in their July 17, 2019 joint case management statement that the Court's decision on summary judgment rendered moot the claim for Violation of the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Thus, on July 25, 2019, the Court dismissed this claim with prejudice pursuant to the parties' agreement in the July 17, 2019 joint case management statement. Accordingly, the following 10 Parked Claims remain pending in the instant case, on behalf of representative Plaintiffs for sub-classes located in California, Connecticut, Michigan, New York, and Utah: (Count 1) Violation of the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act; (Count 2) Violation of California Unfair Competition Laws; (Count 3) Violation of California False Advertising Law; (Count 8) Violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act; (Count 11) Violation of the Michigan Consumer Protection Act; (Count 12) Violation of New York General Business Law Section 349; (Count 13) Violation of New York General Business Law Section 350 16 Negligent Misrepresentation; (Count 17) Unjust Enrichment; (Count 22) Violation of Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act. On Aug. 21, 2019, the Defendant filed the instant motion to deny class certification. Defendant argues that the Court's order denying Plaintiffs' third motion for class certification as to the Selected Claims requires the Court to also denies class certification as to the Parked Claims. It claims that class certification as to the Parked Claims is barred on the basis of three different doctrines: (1) issue preclusion; (2) law of the case; and (3) comity. The Plaintiffs filed an opposition. Judge Koh will deny the Defendant's motion to deny class certification to the extent that it argues that issue preclusion applies in the instant case. Against the great weight of this authority, the Defendant cites no case law to demonstrate that issue preclusion may indeed apply in the context of a single, continuing case. There is no "subsequent suit" before the Court. Issue preclusion therefore has no application in the instant case. The Judge proceeds to consider the Defendant's argument that law of the case bars class certification of the Parked Claims. She concludes that the law of the case doctrine is inapplicable to the Plaintiffs because they were not party to the Former Plaintiffs' third motion for class certification as to the Selected Claims. For the sake of completeness, Judge Koh further proceeds to analyze the question of whether the issue of the Plaintiffs' class certification as to the Parked Claims has already been "decided explicitly or by necessary implication" in the instant case. In light of the Plaintiffs' new representation, the Judge cannot determine as a matter of law that the Plaintiffs will necessarily be unable to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), as would be required for the law of the case doctrine to bar class certification as to the Parked Claims. She finds that because the Plaintiffs were not party to the third motion for class certification as to the Selected Claims, and because the Court did not decide the question of class certification as to the Parked Claims by "necessary implication" in the instant case, she will deny the Defendant's motion to deny class certification to the extent that the Defendant argues that the law of the case doctrine bars class certification in the instant case. Judge Koh will also deny the Defendant's motion to deny class certification to the extent that it argues that principles of comity bar class certification as to the Selected Claims. In sum, because she has concluded that class certification as to the Parked Claims cannot be denied based on issue preclusion, law of the case, or principles of comity, she will deny the Defendant's motion to deny class certification. Finally, to the extent that the Plaintiffs now intend to rely on Boedeker 3 as to the Parked Claims, the Plaintiffs will not be permitted to do so. Nor will they be permitted to file any other untimely expert report bearing any other name. Fact discovery has been closed since Nov. 2, 2018, and expert discovery has been closed since March 8, 2019. The sole exception that the Court contemplated was for transactional discovery, such as sales information and customer names, in states that correspond to the Parked Claims. Even if the doctrines of issue preclusion, law of the case, or comity do not bar class certification as to the Parked Claims, the Defendant is indeed correct that Boedeker 3 remains untimely and that allowing the Plaintiffs to rely on Boedeker 3 or any other untimely expert discovery would still "result in severe prejudice" to the Defendant. For the foregoing reasons, Judge Koh denied the Defendant's motion to deny class certification. A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 22, 2019 Order is available at https://is.gd/mMmXgk from Leagle.com. Thomas Davidson, Todd Cleary, Jun Bai, William Bon, Adam Benelhachemi, Brooke Corbett, Matt Muilenburg, Kathleen Baker, Taylor Brown, Michael Pajaro, Heirloom Estate Services, Inc., John Borzymowski & Justin Bauer, Plaintiffs, represented by David Christopher Wright -- dcw@mccunewright.com -- McCune Wright Arevalo, LLP, Gregory F. Coleman -- greg@gregcolemanlaw.com -- Greg Coleman Law PC, Adam A. Edwards, Greg Coleman Law PC, pro hac vice, Bruce Daniel Greenberg -- bgreenberg@litedepalma.com -- Lite Depalma Greenberg LLC, pro hac vice, Joseph G. Sauder -- jgs@mccunewright.com -- McWright, LLP, pro hac vice, Matthew David Schelkopf -- mds@mccunewright.com -- McCuneWright LLP, pro hac vice, Mitchell M. Breit -- mbreit@simmonsfirm.com -- SIMMONS HANLY CONROY, LLC, pro hac vice, Paul J. Hanly, Jr., Simmons Hanly Conry LLC, pro hac vice, Richard Christian Harlan -- rcharlan@larsonobrienlaw.com -- Larson O'Brien LLP, Stephen Gerard Larson -- slarson@larsonobrienlaw.com -- Larson O'Brien LLP, Susana Cruz Hodge -- scruzhodge@litedepalma.com -- Lite DePalma Greenberg, LLC, pro hac vice & Richard D. McCune, Jr. -- rdm@mccunewright.com -- McCune Wright Arevalo, LLP. Jason Petty, Plaintiff, represented by David Christopher Wright, McCune Wright Arevalo, LLP, Gregory F. Coleman, Greg Coleman Law PC, Mitchell M. Breit, SIMMONS HANLY CONROY, LLC, Adam A. Edwards, Greg Coleman Law PC, pro hac vice, Bruce Daniel Greenberg, Lite Depalma Greenberg LLC, pro hac vice, Joseph G. Sauder, McCuneWright, LLP, Matthew David Schelkopf, McCuneWright LLP, pro hac vice, Richard Christian Harlan, Larso O'Brien LLP, Stephen Gerard Larson, Larson O'Brien LLP, Susana Cruz Hodge, Lite DePalma Greenberg, LLC, pro hac vice & Richard D. McCune, Jr., McCune Wright Arevalo, LLP. Eric Siegal, Plaintiff, represented by Joseph G. Sauder, McCuneWright, LLP, Richard D. McCune, Jr., McCune Wright Arevalo, LLP, Adam A. Edwards, Greg Coleman Law PC, Bruce Daniel Greenberg, Lite Depalma Greenberg LLC, pro hac vice, David Christopher Wright, McCune Wright Arevalo, LLP, Richard Christian Harlan, Larson O'Brien LLP, Stephen Gerard Larson, Larson O'Brien LLP & Susana Cruz Hodge, Lite DePalma Greenberg, LLC, pro hac vice. Apple, Inc., Defendant, represented by Arturo J. Gonzalez, Esq. -- agonzalez@mofo.com -- Alexandria Armida Amezcua, Esq. -- aamezcua@mofo.com -- Christopher Leonard Robinson, Esq. -- christopherrobinson@mofo.com -- Penelope Athene Preovolos, Esq. -- ppreovolos@mofo.com -- and -- Tiffany Cheung, Esq. -- tcheung@mofo.com -- MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP -- David Ramraj Singh, Esq. -- david.singh@weil.com -- and -- Diane P. Sullivan, Esq. -- diane.sullivan@weil.com -- Weil, Gotshal and Manges LLP, pro hac vice. APPLE INC: Bid to Dismiss 1st Amended MacBook Keyboard Suit Denied ------------------------------------------------------------------ Judge Edward J. Davila of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California denied Apple's motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint in IN RE: MacBOOK KEYBOARD LITIGATION, Case No. 5:18-cv-02813-EJD (N.D. Cal.). The Plaintiffs claim the Apple MacBook, MacBook Pro, and MacBook Pro with Touch Bar laptops they purchased in 2016, 2017, and 2018 contain a defective "butterfly" keyboard design that causes their keyboards to fail -- resulting in sticky keys, unresponsive keys, and keys that do not register strokes properly. The Plaintiffs bring a putative class action against Defendant Apple for allegedly selling MacBook, MacBook Pro, and MacBook Air laptops with defective keyboards in violation of state consumer protection and warranty laws. The Plaintiffs seek monetary damages, equitable relief, attorneys' fees, and costs. In October 2018, 10 plaintiffs, citizens and residents of California, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and Washington, filed a putative class action against Apple on behalf of individuals who purchased model year 2015 or later Apple MacBook laptops and model year 2016 or later MacBook Pro laptops -- the Consolidated Class Action Complaint or CACC. The Plaintiffs claimed the MacBook and MacBook Pro laptops have defective "butterfly" keyboards that place consumers at a constant threat of non-responsive keys and keyboard failure. Accordingly, they brought ten claims against Apple for alleged violations of: (1) the Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"); (2) Consumers Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"); (3) fraudulent concealment; (4) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (common law); (5) Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act ("Song-Beverly Act"); (6) Washington Consumer Protection Act; (7) Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act; (8) Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act; (9) New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act; (10) New York General Business Law Section 349; and (11) Michigan Consumer Protection Act. In December 2018, Apple filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' CCAC and Request for Judicial Notice. Soon after, the Plaintiffs filed their Opposition and Apple filed a Reply. In April 2019, the Court granted in part and denied in part Apple's Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff's CCAC under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 9(b). The Court denied Apple's Motion to Dismiss the non-California Plaintiffs' claims under California law, deciding to defer the choice of law analysis. The Court also denied the motion as to the Plaintiffs' claims based on fraud by omission and the Plaintiffs' claim under the unfair prong of California's UCL. The Court, however, granted Apple's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs'claims under the CLRA, Song-Beverly Act, and implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In their Opposition, the Plaintiffs claimed Apple's Keyboard Service Program did not moot their CLRA and Song-Beverly Act claims because Apple could not "provide an effective fix to the defect" and the Program does not provide all of the relief that they seek. But, the Plaintiffs did not allege any facts about the Program in the CCAC. Thus, they did not allege any facts showing that the Keyboard Service Program does not moot their claims under the CLRA and the Song-Beverly Act. Regarding the Program, Apple had requested the Court to take judicial notice of an apple.com webpage that described the Program. The webpage represented that Apple will provide free service to model years 2015-2017 MacBooks and model years 2016-2017 MacBook Pros with keyboards that malfunction in ways similar to the alleged failures that the Plaintiffs have experienced. The webpage stated that the service may involve the replacement of one or more keys or the whole keyboard. The Court took judicial notice of the following facts under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b): (1) Exhibit A is an accurate depiction of an apple.com webpage, (2) Apple has made the above representations about the Key Board Service Program to the public through that website, and (3) Apple is providing free services to the models of MacBook and MacBook Pro listed on the website. The order granted the Plaintiffs leave to amend. In May 2019, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint (FAC). In June 2019, Apple filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' FAC. The Plaintiffs and Apple respectively filed an Opposition and Reply. The court heard oral arguments on Apple's Motion to Dismiss. In its Motion to Dismiss the FAC, Apple moves the court: (1) to dismiss all of the Plaintiffs' claims on grounds that they have not demonstrated an injury, Article III standing, or prudential standing; (2) to dismiss the Plaintiffs' CLRA claim for mootness; and (3) to dismiss the Plaintiffs' Song-Beverly Act claim for mootness. Because the Plaintiffs establish standing, Judge Davila will deny Apple's Motion to Dismiss all of the Plaintiffs' claims under Rule 12(b)(1). Because the Plaintiffs adequately plead claims under the CLRA and Song-Beverly Act that the Program does not moot their claims, Judge Davila will deny the Apple's Motion to Dismiss these claims under Rule 12(b)(6). Judge Davila first addressed Apple's Request for Judicial Notice ("RJN"). Next, the Judge addressed the issue of standing. Third, the Judge evaluates the Plaintiffs' claims under the CLRA and Song-Beverly Act. Judge Davila takes judicial notice of the following facts: (1) Exhibit A is an accurate depiction of the apple.com webpage for the Program for MacBook and MacBook Pro laptops as it existed on Dec. 3, 2018, (2) Exhibit B is an accurate depiction of the apple.com webpage for the Program for MacBook, MacBook Pro, and MacBook Air laptops as it existed on June 4, 2019, (3) the fact that Apple made the statements in Exhibits A and B to the public through the apple.com website, and (4) that Apple is offering free service under the Program for eligible models of MacBook, MacBook Pro, and MacBook Air laptops as listed on the website. The Judge, however, does not take judicial notice of whether the Program effectively remedies the behavior associated with the allegedly defective keyboards -- a question the parties vigorously dispute. In sum, the Judge takes judicial notice of the apple.com webpages describing the Program (Exhibits A-B) and Apple's representations to the public on those webpages. Next, Judge Davila finds that the Apple does not meet its "heavy" burden of showing that the Program moots the Plaintiffs' claims and deprives them of standing. First, Apple cites cases involving refund programs that offered the Plaintiffs full relief, such as full refunds. But the program does not moot the Plaintiffs' claims because the Plaintiffs seek relief beyond what the Program offers, including monetary damages and injunctive relief. Second, Apple cites distinguishable cases where the effectiveness of recall programs was not at issue. The Plaintiffs, however, rely on Apple's internal documents allegedly acknowledging a design defect and Apple's multiple failed attempts to repair their allegedly defective keyboards in the past. Judge Davila will deny Apple's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' claims under the CLRA and Song-Beverly Act. The Plaintiffs have adequately pled that the Program is ineffective. They sufficiently plead that their laptops are unfit for the ordinary purposes for which a laptop computer is used, and the Plaintiffs are not required to participate in the Program. Hence, the Plaintiffs sufficiently plead a claim under the Song-Beverly Act. For the reasons stated, Judge Davila denied Apple's Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint in its entirety. A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 22, 2019 Order is available at https://is.gd/a9IOV1 from Leagle.com. Zixuan Rao, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated & Kyle Barbaro, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Andrew William Ferich, Chimicles Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP, Angelica Maria Ornelas, Girard Sharp LLP, Beena M. McDonald, Chimicles Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP, pro hac vice, Benjamin F. Johns, Chimicles Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP, Jordan S. Elias, Girard Sharp LLP, Simon Seiver Grille, Girard Sharp LLP, Steven Alan Schwartz, Chimicles Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP, Trevor Taige Tan -- ttan@girardsharp.com -- Girard Sharp LLP, Adam E. Polk -- apolk@girardsharp.com -- Girard Sharp LLP & Daniel C. Girard, Girard Sharp LLP. Remy Turner & Christopher Martin, Plaintiffs, represented by Esther Shinjung Kim, Attorney at Law, Noah M. Schubert, Schubert Jonckheer & Kolbe LLP, Robert C. Schubert, Schubert Jonckheer & Kolbe LLP, Willem F. Jonckheer, Schubert Jonckheer & Kolbe LLP, Beena M. McDonald, Chimicles Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP, pro hac vice, Benjamin F. Johns, Chimicles Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP, Daniel C. Girard, Girard Sharp LLP & Steven Alan Schwartz, Chimicles Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP. Joey Baruch, Plaintiff, represented by Esther Shinjung Kim, Attorney at Law, Noah M. Schubert, Schubert Jonckheer & Kolbe LLP, Robert C. Schubert, Schubert Jonckheer & Kolbe LLP, Willem F. Jonckheer, Schubert Jonckheer & Kolbe LLP, Angelica Maria Ornelas, Girard Sharp LLP, Beena M. McDonald, Chimicles Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP, pro hac vice, Benjamin F. Johns, Chimicles Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP, Daniel C. Girard, Girard Sharp LLP, Jordan S. Elias, Girard Sharp LLP, Steven Alan Schwartz, Chimicles Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP & Trevor Taige Tan, Girard Sharp LLP. Kevin Kou, Plaintiff, represented by Beena M. McDonald, Chimicles Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP, pro hac vice, Benjamin F. Johns, Chimicles Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP, Daniel C. Girard, Girard Sharp LLP, Esfand Nafisi, Migliaccio & Rathod LLP & Steven Alan Schwartz, Chimicles Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP. Steve Eakin, Kevin Melkowski, Lorenzo Ferguson, Michael Hopkins, Benjamin Gulker & Adam Lee, Plaintiffs, represented by Angelica Maria Ornelas, Girard Sharp LLP, Beena M. McDonald, Chimicles Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP, pro hac vice, Benjamin F. Johns, Chimicles Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP, Jordan S. Elias, Girard Sharp LLP, Steven Alan Schwartz, Chimicles Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP, Trevor Taige Tan, Girard Sharp LLP & Daniel C. Girard, Girard Sharp LLP. Apple Inc., California Corporation, Defendant, represented by Margaret Elizabeth Mayo -- mmayo@mofo.com -- Morrison & Foerster LLP, Penelope Athene Preovolos -- ppreovolos@mofo.com -- Morrison & Foerster LLP & Purvi Govindlal Patel -- ppatel@mofo.com -- Morrison & Foerster LLP. ASCOT RIDGE: Fails to Pay Minimum Wage Under NYLL, Haughwout Says ----------------------------------------------------------------- VINCENT HAUGHWOUT and DONNA HAUGHWOUT, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated v. ASCOT RIDGE CORP, SCOTT DECKER, JEFFREY GOLOWNER, DESPINA BONKOWSKI (a/k/a DESPINA RAFTOPOULOS), ELIZABETH TOBIO, INGER NIELSON, JAMES POPPE (a/k/a "JIM POPPE"), VINCENT BONKOWSKI, HARVEY FRIEDMAN, ANDREW VOllBECK, GIANCARLO SCACCIA, and MAUREEN MOONEY, Case No. 610749/2019 (N.Y. Sup., Jan. 13, 2020), alleges violations of the New York Labor Law arising from the Defendants' decision not to pay minimum wages, wages for all hours worked, keep records, provide wage statements or pay stubs, provide wage notices, pay wages timely, and pay for the costs of tools of the trade. The action also alleges breach of the implied warranty of habitability. As a result of the alleged violations, the Plaintiffs assert that they are entitled to recover from the Defendants: unpaid minimum and overtime wages, premiums, the maximum statutory penalty amounts allowed for failure to provide wage notices and wage statements under New York Labor Law, liquidated damages, prejudgment and post-judgment interest, monetary damage for breach of the warranty of implied habitability, attorneys' fees and costs. Vincent Haughwout was employed by the Defendants from 1999 until August 1, 2019, while Donna Haughwout was employed by the Defendants from 1999 until May 2019. They were employed to perform cleaning, maintenance work for the lot and building located at 1 Ascot Ridge, in Great Neck, New York. Ascot Ridge operates luxury apartments and townhomes. The Individual Defendants are officers and directors of the Company.[BN] The Plaintiffs are represented by: Michael Faillace, Esq. MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES One Grand Central Place 60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510 New York, NY 10165 Telephone: 212 317-1200 Facsimile: 212-317-1620 E-mail: michacl@faillacelaw.com ctucker@faillacelaw.com BAOZUN INC: Glancy Prongay Reminds Investors of Feb. 10 Deadline ---------------------------------------------------------------- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP ("GPM") reminds investors of the upcoming February 10, 2020 deadline to file a lead plaintiff motion in the class action filed on behalf of Baozun Inc. (NASDAQ: BZUN) investors who purchased American Depository Receipts ("ADRs") between March 6, 2019 and November 20, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"). If you wish to learn more about this action, or if you have any questions concerning this announcement or your rights or interests with respect to these matters, please contact Charles Linehan, Esquire, at 310-201-9150, Toll-Free at 888-773-9224, or by email to shareholders@glancylaw.com, or visit our website at www.glancylaw.com On November 21, 2019, Baozun announced third quarter 2019 financial results that were below market expectations, and provided dismal fourth quarter 2019 financial guidance. The Company attributed the negative results and outlook to adverse impacts from terminating its service agreement with one electronics brand. Baozun did not disclose who that large electronics brand was, but some in the financial media have suggested that it was Huawei. On this news, Baozun's share price fell $7.60 per share, or more than 17%, to close at $35.90 per share on November 21, 2019. The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to investors: (1) that Baozun was heavily reliant upon a single brand partner, Huawei, for the exponential service fee growth it had been reporting historically, which was in turn fueling its historical revenue growth; (2) that, compared to other brands Baozun had as brand partners, the Huawei work had historically included a lot of additional add-on service fees, increasing the revenue reported from Huawei vis-à-vis its other brand partners; (3) that Huawei, like other large brands, was actively preparing to bring its online merchandising in-house, meaning Baozun knew that it was losing a significant brand partner; and (4) that, as a result of the foregoing, the Company was not on track to achieve the financial results and performance Defendants claimed the Company was on track to achieve during the class period. Follow us for updates on Twitter: twitter.com/GPM_LLP If you purchased Baozun ADRs during the Class Period, you may move the Court no later than February 10, 2020 to request appointment as lead plaintiff in this putative class action lawsuit. To be a member of the class action you need not take any action at this time; you may retain counsel of your choice or take no action and remain an absent member of the class action. If you wish to learn more about this class action, or if you have any questions concerning this announcement or your rights or interests with respect to the pending class action lawsuit, please contact Charles Linehan, Esquire, of GPM, 1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100, Los Angeles, California 90067 at 310-201-9150, Toll-Free at 888-773-9224, by email to shareholders@glancylaw.com, or visit our website at www.glancylaw.com. If you inquire by email please include your mailing address, telephone number and number of shares purchased. Contact: Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Los Angeles Charles Linehan, Esq. 310-201-9150 or 888-773-9224 Email: shareholders@glancylaw.com, clinehan@glancylaw.com Website: www.glancylaw.com [GN] BAOZUN INC: Levi & Korsinsky Reminds Investors of Class Action -------------------------------------------------------------- Levi & Korsinsky, LLP announces that class action lawsuits have commenced on behalf of shareholders of publicly-traded Baozun Inc. (BZUN). Shareholders interested in serving as lead plaintiff have until the deadlines listed to petition the court. Further details about the cases can be found at the links provided. There is no cost or obligation to you. BZUN Shareholders Click Here: https://www.zlk.com/pslra-1/baozun-inc-loss-form?prid=5051&wire=1 Baozun Inc. (BZUN) BZUN Lawsuit on behalf of: investors who purchased Baozun American Depository Receipts between March 6, 2019 and November 20, 2019 Lead Plaintiff Deadline : February 10, 2020 TO LEARN MORE, VISIT: https://www.zlk.com/pslra-1/baozun-inc-loss-form?prid=5051&wire=1 According to the filed complaint, (a) Baozun was heavily reliant upon a single brand partner, Huawei, for the exponential service fee growth it had been reporting historically, which was in turn fueling its historical revenue growth; (b) compared to other brands Baozun had as brand partners, the Huawei work had historically included a lot of additional add-on service fees, increasing the revenue reported from Huawei vis-a-via its other brand partners; (c) Huawei, like other large brands, was actively preparing to bring its online merchandising in-house, meaning Baozun knew that it was losing a significant brand partner; and (d) as a result of the foregoing, the Company was not on track to achieve the financial results and performance Defendants claimed the Company was on track to achieve during the class period. You have until the lead plaintiff deadlines to request that the court appoint you as lead plaintiff. Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't require that you serve as a lead plaintiff. Levi & Korsinsky is a national firm with offices in New York, California, Connecticut, and Washington D.C. The firm's attorneys have extensive expertise and experience representing investors in securities litigation and have recovered hundreds of millions of dollars for aggrieved shareholders. Contact: Joseph E. Levi, Esq. Levi & Korsinsky, LLP 55 Broadway, 10th Floor New York, NY 10006 Phone: (212) 363-7500 Toll Free: (877) 363-5972 Fax: (212) 363-7171 Website: www.zlk.com Email: jlevi@levikorsinsky.com [GN] BAXTER INT'L: Schall Law Reminds of Jan. 24 Deadline ---------------------------------------------------- The Schall Law Firm, a national shareholder rights litigation firm, announces it has filed a class action lawsuit against Baxter International Inc. (NYSE:BAX) for violations of Secs. 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Investors who purchased the Company's securities between February 21, 2019 and October 23, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"), are encouraged to contact the firm before January 24, 2020. If you are a shareholder who suffered a loss, click here to participate. We also encourage you to contact Brian Schall of the Schall Law Firm, 1880 Century Park East, Suite 404, Los Angeles, CA 90067, at 424-303-1964, to discuss your rights free of charge. You can also reach us through the firm's website at www.schallfirm.com, or by email at brian@schallfirm.com. The class, in this case, has not yet been certified, and until certification occurs, you are not represented by an attorney. If you choose to take no action, you can remain an absent class member. According to the Complaint, the Company made false and misleading statements to the market. Baxter engaged in intra-Company transactions designed to generate gains from foreign exchanges that did not follow GAAP principles and were undertaken when the foreign exchange rates were already known. The Company failed to maintain effective controls on financial reporting. Based on the Company's internal investigation of these matters, it was not capable of filing a Form 10-Q quarterly report for the period ending September 30, 2019. Based on these facts, the Company's public statements were false and materially misleading throughout the class period. When the market learned the truth about Baxter, investors suffered damages. Join the case to recover your losses. The Schall Law Firm represents investors around the world and specializes in securities class action lawsuits and shareholder rights litigation. Contact: Brian Schall, Esq. The Schall Law Firm Website: www.schallfirm.com Office: 310-301-3335 Cell: 424-303-1964 E-mail: info@schallfirm.com brian@schallfirm.com [GN] BIG MIKE'S RESTAURANT: Court Partly Grants Deal in Fitzwater Suit ----------------------------------------------------------------- In the case captioned WENDY FITZWATER, Plaintiff, v. MIKE COLE, SR, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 18-00137-N (S.D. Ala.), Magistrate Judge Katherine P. Nelson of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, Southern Division, granted in part and denied in part the parties' joint motion to approve the settlement of the Plaintiffs' Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) claims. The named Defendants are Mike Cole, Sr., Scott Powell, Caine Conway, Casey Taylor, Big Mike's Restaurant LLC, Big Mike's Steakhouse OB, LLC, Big Mike's Restaurant II, LLC and Big Mike's Restaurant Andalusia, LLC. In the conditionally certified collective action alleging violations of the FLSA, the parties have filed a joint motion for the Court's approval of their proposed settlement of the FLSA claims of the named Plaintiff Fitzwater, and the 6 opt-in Plaintiffs: Carlissa Phillips, Jeanie Odom, Lisa Smith, Cynthia Woodard, Veronica McLaughlin, and Alexandria Glass. A telephonic hearing was held with the counsel for the parties on Oct. 4, 2019, to discuss some concerns the undersigned had with aspects of the proposed settlement, and the Plaintiffs filed a supplemental brief addressing those concerns. The Plaintiffs have also since filed a supplemental motion for approval of the settlement agreement, which also requests modification of a deadline in the stipulated judgment. Fitzwater filed the action on March 21, 2018. In April 2018, before the Defendants were served with the complaint in late May and early June, the Wage and Hour Division of the U.S. Department of Labor initiated an audit of the Defendants' payroll practices. The DOL issued its determinations to the Defendants on Aug. 22, 2018, including a settlement demand requiring payment of back wages and other elements of compensation, including properly calculated overtime and other elements of compensation, to all current and former employees, with the sole exception of Plaintiff Fitzwater. The Agency's determination and settlement demand included loss of the Defendants' 'tip credit' due to a tip pooling arrangement that was deemed not compliant with the FSLA. The DOL did not assess liquidated damages after determining no willful conduct on the part of the Defendants. Fitzwater was excluded from the DOL's payment compensation roster due to the DOL's policy of not representing employees who are represented by counsel and have claims pending in court. The roster did include former employee Carlissa Phillips, to date the only opt-in plaintiff. As confirmed by the parties at the hearing, the DOL Settlement Plaintiffs have all accepted their settlement checks from the mentioned DOL investigation. The record also otherwise indicates that there are bona fide disputes over FLSA wage-and-hour provisions for all the Plaintiffs. While the Defendants concede that they required the Plaintiffs to engage in an invalid "tip pool" arrangement, the measure of damages is contested, as evidenced by, inter alia, the Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings seeking a ruling that certain withheld tips are not recoverable under the FLSA. The Defendants also dispute that the Plaintiffs are entitled to liquidated damages in the action, claiming a defense of good faith. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, the Plaintiffs will receive the following amounts to settle their claims for back wages and liquidated damages: (i) Fitzwater - $16,266.35; (ii) Phillips - $38,903.60; (iii) Odom - $3,046.30; (iv) Smith - $3,778.32; (v) Woodard - $7,745.97; (vi) McLaughlin - $644.41; and (vii) Glass - $5,602.10. The parties agree that each of the Plaintiffs stands to receive significantly more under the settlement than they would (or did) under the DOL settlement formula, and that these amounts were negotiated prior to discussions regarding attorneys' fees and costs. Judge Nelson finds those amounts to be fair and reasonable settlements of the aforementioned bona fide FLSA disputes. In addition to settling the Plaintiffs' claims for back wages and liquidated damages under the FLSA's minimum wage and overtime provisions, the parties also report that they have separately settled Fitzwater's potential claim for unlawful retaliation in violation of 29 U.S.C. Section 215(a)(3) in exchange for a payment of $15,000. They also propose to pay Fitzwater an additional $5,000, which the Plaintiffs characterize as a service/incentive award for bringing the action on behalf of the class. Judge Nelson holds that though not addressed in their joint motion, the parties' proposed stipulated judgment appears to request that the Court makes findings about how the various proceeds from the settlement agreement will be treated for tax purposes. The parties have not presented any authority to suggest that such findings are either permitted or appropriate, and the undersigned declines to make any such findings here or include them in the resulting judgment. Judge Nelson also declines to include specific instructions about how disbursement of the settlement is to be carried out, to retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement, or to delay dismissal of the Plaintiffs' claims until the issue of attorneys' fees and costs is resolved. However, the Judge will permit a generous period to allow for reinstatement of the action should the settlement agreement not be carried out in full. In accordance with the foregoing analysis, Judge Nelson granted in part and denied in part the parties' joint motion to approve the settlement of the Plaintiffs' FLSA claims. The Judge approved the proposed settlement as a fair and reasonable resolution of a bona fide dispute over FLSA provisions; and denied that certain requested relief as set forth. A modified version of the parties' stipulated final judgment will separately issue in accordance with the settlement agreement, Lynn's Food, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58, at which time all of the Plaintiff's claims in the action will be dismissed with prejudice, subject to the right of any party to move to reinstate the action within 90 days from the date of entry of the accompanying judgment, should the settlement agreement not be fully carried out. As such, the Plaintiffs' pending motion to compel and motion to extend the discovery deadline, and the Defendants' pending motion for partial judgment on the pleadings are moot, and all remaining deadlines and settings in the scheduling order are cancelled. Judge Nelson set Jan. 31, 2020, as the deadline for the Plaintiffs to file and serve any motion for attorneys' fees and costs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) in connection with the accompanying final judgment. An appropriate briefing schedule will be entered if any such motion is timely filed. A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 22, 2019 Order is available at https://is.gd/tEbQLc from Leagle.com. Wendy Fitzwater, Plaintiff, represented by Charles Peter Yezbak, III -- yezbak@yezbaklaw.com -- Yezbak Law Offices, pro hac vice, Daniel Eduardo Arciniegas -- Daniel@attorneydaniel.com -- Arciniegas Law PLLC & Nicholas Chase Teeples, Yezbak Law Offices, pro hac vice. Lisa Smith, Cynthia Woodard, Jeanie Odom, Veronica McLaughlin & Alexandria Glass, Plaintiffs, represented by Charles Peter Yezbak, III, Yezbak Law Offices, Daniel Eduardo Arciniegas, Arciniegas Law PLLC & Nicholas Chase Teeples, Yezbak Law Offices, pro hac vice. Carlissa Phillips, Plaintiff, represented by Charles Peter Yezbak, III, Yezbak Law Offices, pro hac vice, Daniel Eduardo Arciniegas, Arciniegas Law PLLC, pro hac vice & Nicholas Chase Teeples, Yezbak Law Offices, pro hac vice. Mike Cole, Sr., Scott Powell, Caine Conway, Casey Taylor, Big Mike's Restaurant LLC, Big Mike's Steakhouse OB, LLC, Big Mike's Restaurant II, LLC & Big Mike's Restaurant Andalusia, LLC, Defendants, represented by Emily C. Killion -- ekillion@burr.com -- BURR & FORMAN LLP & H. William Wasden -- bwasden@burr.com -- Burr Forman. BOOT BARN: Mendez Sues Over Unwanted Telemarketing Messages ----------------------------------------------------------- CARRINA MENDEZ, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. BOOT BARN, INC., Case No. 8:20-cv-00054 (C.D. Cal., Jan. 10, 2020), alleges that the Defendant promotes and markets its merchandise, in part, by sending unsolicited automated text messages to wireless phone users, in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. The Plaintiff alleges that she did not give the Defendant prior express written consent to send text messages to her cellular telephone number by using an automatic telephone dialing system. She adds that the text message Boot Barn sent to the Plaintiff consisted of pre-written templates of impersonal text, and was identical to text messages the Defendant sent to other consumers. Boot Barn's telemarketing campaign, which caused harm to the Plaintiff and purported class members across the country, emanated from Irvine, California, according to the complaint. Boot Barn is a retailer of western and work related footwear, apparel, and accessories for men, women, and children, consisting of over 200 stores in 33 states.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by Abbas Kazerounian, Esq. Yana A. Hart, Esq. KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC 245 Fischer Avenue, Suite D1 Costa Mesa, CA 92626 Telephone: 800 400 6808 Facsimile: 800 520 5523 E-mail: ak@kazlg.com yana@kazlg.com BUTH-NA-BODHAIGE INC: Taylor FACTA Suit Moved to C.D. California ---------------------------------------------------------------- Buth-Na-Bodhaige, Inc. removed the case captioned as MONIKA TAYLOR, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, v. BUTH-NA-BODHAIGE, INC. (d/b/a The Body Shop), Case No. 30-2019-01105338-CU-BT-CXC (Filed Oct. 17, 2019), from the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Orange, to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California on Jan. 10, 2020. The Plaintiff alleges that after April 22, 2014, The Body Shop provided her with one or more electronically-printed receipts that displayed more than the last five digits of her credit or debit card number, in violation of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act. Buth-Na-Bodhaige manufactures and retails cosmetics products. The company offers bath, body care, skin care, make-up, hair care, and fragrance products.[BN] The Defendant is represented by: Sarah M. Indrawes, Esq. McDERMOTT WILL & EMERY LLP 2049 Century Park East, Suite 3200 Los Angeles, CA 90067-3026 Telephone: 310 277 4110 Facsimile: 310 722 1555 E-mail: sindrawes@mwe.com CANOPY GROWTH: Vincent Wong Reminds of Jan. 21 Deadline ------------------------------------------------------- The Law Offices of Vincent Wong announce that a class action has commenced on behalf of certain shareholders in Canopy Growth Corporation (CGC). If you suffered a loss you have until the lead plaintiff deadline to request that the court appoint you as lead plaintiff. There will be no obligation or cost to you. Canopy Growth Corporation (CGC) If you suffered a loss, contact us at: http://www.wongesq.com/pslra-1/canopy-growth-corporation-loss-submission-form?prid=5062&wire=1 Lead Plaintiff Deadline: January 21, 2020 Class Period: June 21, 2019 to November 13, 2019 Allegations against CGC include that: (1) the Company was experiencing weak demand for its softgel and oil products; (2) as a result, the Company would be forced to take a CA$32.7 million restructuring charge due to poor sales, excessive returns, and excess inventory; and (3) as a result, Defendants' statements about its business, operations, and prospects, were materially false and misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis at all relevant times. To learn more contact Vincent Wong, Esq. either via email vw@wongesq.com or by telephone at 212.425.1140. Vincent Wong, Esq. is an experienced attorney who has represented investors in securities litigations involving financial fraud and violations of shareholder rights. Contact: Vincent Wong, Esq. 39 East Broadway Suite 304 New York, NY 10002 Phone: 212.425.1140 Fax: 866.699.3880 Email: vw@wongesq.com [GN] CATERPILLAR INC: Faces Texas Hill Suit Over Defective Liners ------------------------------------------------------------ Texas Hill Country Landscaping Inc. d/b/a Organic Quality Products, Easterling Wood Products Inc., Morning Star Farms, and Northwest Recycling, LLC, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated v. Caterpillar Inc., Case No. 1:20-cv-00227 (N.D. Ill., Jan. 13, 2020), is brought on behalf of those who purchased or leased a Caterpillar product containing the C-18 or C-32 engine with particular cylinder liners. According to the complaint, the Liners have an inherent defect (Defect) that leads to repeated failures. In particular, as confirmed by metallurgical analysis, the Liners crack because of residual stress. This allows oil and coolant to mix, ultimately leading to engine failure. The Plaintiffs tell the Court that they paid hundreds of thousands of dollars for these defective products. They contend that the failure requires expensive, time-consuming repairs in existing engines and prevented them and other proposed class members from using their products. They note that properly designed and manufactured liners do not allow oil and coolant to mix, yet Caterpillar sold and leased two different commercial propulsion engines (the C-18 and C-32) with the Liners. The Plaintiffs assert that Caterpillar was no less than negligent when it sold the Liners because a reasonably careful manufacturer would have uncovered the Defect. They add that Caterpillar did know about the Defect, but simply chose to conceal it from its customers. Quality Organic Products provides agricultural services in Texas, including mulching, soil and compost, gravel and sand, fertilizer, trees, and palletized products. Morning Star Farms is a general partnership located and headquartered in Greensburg, Kansas. Morning Star Farms operates a rotochopper as part of its farming. Caterpillar manufactures constructing and mining equipment, diesel and natural gas engines, industrial gas turbines and diesel-electric locomotives.[BN] The Plaintiffs are represented by: Robert A. Clifford, Esq. Shannon M. McNulty, Esq. CLIFFORD LAW OFFICES, P.C. 120 N. LaSalle Street, 31st Floor Chicago, IL 60602 Telephone: 312-899-9090 E-mail: rclifford@cliffordlaw.com smm@cliffordlaw.com - and - Kenneth S. Byrd, Esq. LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP 222 2nd Ave. S, Suite 1640 Nashville, TN 37201 Telephone: 615-313-9000 E-mail: kbyrd@lchb.com - and - Jason L. Lichtman, Esq. Sean A. Petterson, Esq. 250 Hudson Street, 8th Floor New York, NY 10013 Telephone: 212-355-9500 E-mail: jlichtman@lchb.com spetterson@lchb.com - and - Enrique G. Serna, Esq. Daniel E. Serna, Esq. SERNA & ASSOCIATES PLLC City View Office Building 10999 IH 10 West, Suite 305 San Antonio, TX 78230 Telephone: 210-472-2222 E-mail: enrique@serna-associates.com daniel@serna-associates.com - and - Jon Powell, Esq. Mickey Johnson, Esq. THE POWELL LAW FIRM 1148 East Commerce Street San Antonio, TX 78205 Telephone: 210-225-9300 E-mail: jon@jpowell-law.com mickey@jpowell-law.com CENLAR AGENCY: Gemborys Suit Removed to District of Massachusetts ----------------------------------------------------------------- The class action lawsuit styled as Ely Gemborys, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. Cenlar Agency, Inc., Case No. 1985CV1725C, was removed from the Worcester Superior Court to the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts (Worcester) on Jan. 10, 2020. The District of Massachusetts Court Clerk assigned Case No. 4:20-cv-40006 to the proceeding. The Plaintiff appears pro se.[BN] The Defendant is represented by: Krystle S. Guillory Tadesse, Esq. LOCKE LORD LLP 2800 Financial Plaza Providence, RI 02903 Telephone: (401) 274-9200 E-mail: krystle.tadesse@lockelord.com COMCAST CABLE: Court Denies Arbitration on Hearn's FCRA Suit ------------------------------------------------------------ The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division issued an Opinion and Order denying Defendants' Motion to Compel Individual Arbitration and Stay Litigation in the case captioned MICHAEL HEARN individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated consumers, Plaintiff, v. COMCAST CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, Defendant, Civil Action No. 1:19-CV-1198-TWT (N.D. Ga.). This is a class action under Fair Credit Report Act. The Plaintiff Michael Hearn alleges that he called Defendant Comcast Cable Communications to inquire about its services. During the call, a representative for the Defendant made a hard pull of the Plaintiff's consumer report, damaging his credit score. The Plaintiff alleges that he did not consent to a credit check, was not a customer of the Defendant at the time, and did not request any services before or after the Defendant pulled his consumer report. The Defendant argues that the Court should therefore stay these proceedings pending arbitration of the Plaintiff's FCRA claim. The Federal Arbitration Act covers any arbitration provision that is (1) in writing and (2) is part of a contract evidencing a transaction involving interstate commerce. The Plaintiff does not dispute that the arbitration provision is in writing and that, by contracting for telecommunications services, the parties engaged in a transaction involving interstate commerce. Therefore, the Court will consider and apply precedent construing the Federal Arbitration Act in adjudicating the Defendant's motion. Legal Standard Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act provides in relevant part that a written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transactionshall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. When considering a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, the Court must first determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute. The Defendant argues that the arbitration provision is valid and compels arbitration of the Plaintiff's FCRA claim. The Plaintiff makes three arguments in response. First, the Plaintiff argues that he ceased to be bound by the arbitration provision of the 2016 Service Agreement when he terminated the Defendant's services in August of 2017. Second, the Plaintiff argues that his FCRA claim is beyond the scope of the arbitration provision because they do not relate to the 2016 Service Agreement. Third, the Plaintiff argues that if the arbitration provision requires arbitration of claims unrelated to the 2016 Service Agreement, then the provision is unenforceable because it is unconscionable. Whether the Arbitration Provision Continues to Bind the Parties The Plaintiff does not dispute that he entered into the 2016 Service Agreement when he purchased services from the Defendant in December of 2016. The Plaintiff argues, however, that he is no longer bound by the arbitration provision because he terminated the 2016 Service Agreement two years before the events giving rise to this lawsuit. Section 9(b) of the Agreement permits customers to terminate the Agreement for any reason at any time by, among other options, calling the Defendant's customer service line during normal business hours. The Plaintiff called the Defendant and cancelled his services in August of 2017. At that time, he also confirmed that no outstanding balance remained due on his account.The Plaintiff argues that any agreement to arbitrate was necessarily extinguished when he cancelled the 2016 Service Agreement. The Court is not persuaded. The Plaintiff's argument contravenes the express language of the arbitration provision's survival clause, which states that this Arbitration Provision shall survive the termination of your Services with Comcast.The survival clause unambiguously reflects the parties' intent that their agreement to arbitrate would survive termination of the 2016 Service Agreement. The Plaintiff argues that the survival clause somehow renders the termination provision ambiguous, and that this ambiguity must be resolved against the Defendant as the drafter of the Agreement. But the termination provision and the arbitration provision are not in conflict. The termination provision explains how the parties can terminate the 2016 Service Agreement, and the arbitration provision's survival clause explains that the parties' agreement to arbitrate survives termination of the 2016 Service Agreement. Because the plain language of the contract makes the parties' intentions clear, the Court need not apply rules of contract construction to manufacture ambiguity where none exists. Based on the plain language of the contract, the Court concludes that the parties intended for the arbitration provision to survive termination of the 2016 Service Agreement. The Court will therefore compel arbitration of the Plaintiff's FCRA claim unless, as the Plaintiff argues in the alternative, they fall outside the scope of the arbitration provision or the arbitration provision is unenforceable on unconscionability grounds. Whether the Plaintiff's FCRA Claim is Within the Scope of the Arbitration Provision The Plaintiff argues that his FCRA claim is wholly unrelated to the 2016 Service Agreement and that it is therefore beyond the scope of the Agreement's arbitration provision. The Defendant responds that the plain language of the arbitration provision states that it reaches any claim related to Comcast, such that claims unrelated to the 2016 Service Agreement fall under the provision's broad scope. The Defendant argues in the alternative that the Plaintiff's FCRA claim is, in fact, related to the 2016 Service Agreement and that the arbitration provision therefore covers the Plaintiff's FCRA claim even if the Court subjects it to a limiting construction. Whether the Arbitration Provision Covers Unrelated, Post-Expiration Claims The Defendant has not identified a single case in which a court has compelled arbitration of a claim that was (1) unrelated to the agreement containing the arbitration provision and (2) arose after the arbitration provision had expired. Indeed, the case law interpreting arbitration provisions like the one at issue in this case is sparse and largely unfriendly to the Defendant's position. In the Seventh Circuit case Smith v. Steinkamp, 318 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 2003), the court highlighted the problems that could arise if courts began enforcing arbitration agreements untethered to an underlying commercial contract or transaction. In Steinkamp, the plaintiffs brought federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claims against a payday loan company for making usurious loans. The loan company moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement that the plaintiffs signed when taking out prior loans from the payday lending company. Crucially, however, the plaintiffs had not signed any arbitration agreements when taking out the loans that gave rise to their RICO claims. The Seventh Circuit ultimately concluded that the arbitration provision did not on its face extend to future claims, and upheld the lower court's denial of the motion to compel arbitration on that basis. But the court aptly described the absurd results that could ensue if the court were to construe the arbitration provision to cover future, unrelated claims: If the arbitration provisions are read as standing free from any loan agreement, absurd results ensue, for example that if Instant Cash murdered Smith in order to discourage defaults and her survivors brought a wrongful death suit against Instant Cash (a common law suit, thus encompassed by [the arbitration provisions]), Instant Cash could insist that the wrongful death claim be submitted to arbitration. For that matter, if an employee of Instant Cash picked Smith§s pocket when she came in to pay back the loan, and Smith sued the employee for conversion, he would be entitled to arbitration of her claim. It would make no difference that the conversion had occurred in Smith§s home 20 years after her last transaction with Instant Cash. The arbitration provision at issue in this case is an attempt to do just that. The Court will not embrace the Defendant's attempt to extend the scope of arbitrable claims past the point that any reasonable customer would expect it to go. The Court will therefore decline to compel arbitration of the Plaintiff's FCRA claim unless the Defendant can show that it relates to or arises out of the 2016 Service Agreement. Whether the Plaintiff's FCRA Claim is Related to the 2016 Service Agreement The Defendant argues that it was only able to pull the Plaintiff's consumer report during the March 2019 call because it already had the Plaintiff's personal information, including the Plaintiff's social security number, on file. But for the parties' prior contractual relationship, the Defendant argues, the alleged FCRA violation would have been impossible. Thus, the Plaintiff's FCRA claim necessarily relates to the 2016 Service Agreement. The Court is not persuaded. A dispute does not arise out of a contract just because the dispute would not have arisen if the contract had never existed. Rather, the test for determining whether a dispute relates to" or arises out of a contract is whether the dispute was an immediate, foreseeable result of the performance of contractual duties. The Plaintiff bases his claim on his rights under the FCRA, not the 2016 Service Agreement. The Court concludes that the Plaintiff's FCRA claim does not relate to the 2016 Service Agreement and therefore does not fall within the scope of the parties' agreement to arbitrate. The Defendant's motion to compel arbitration should therefore be denied. Because the Court has determined that the parties did not agree to arbitrate the Plaintiff's FCRA claim, it does not reach the question of whether enforcement of the arbitration provision would be unconscionable. Defendant Comcast Cable's Motion to Compel Individual Arbitration and Stay Litigation is DENIED, rules the Court. A full-text copy of the District Court's October 21, 2019 Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y2z34tuv from Leagle.com. Michael Hearn, individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated consumers, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Zemel , Zemel Law, 70 Clinton Ave Suite 3 , Newark NJ 07114, pro hac vice & Jonathan Braxton Mason , Mason Law Group, LLC. 1100 Peachtree Street NE, Suite 200, Atlanta, GA, 30309 Comcast Cable Communications, LLC, Defendant, represented by Meredith C. Slawe - mslawe@akingump.com - Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, Michael W. McTigue, Jr.- mmctigue@akingump.com - Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, pro hac vice & Samuel S. Woodhouse, III , The Woodhouse Law Firm, LLC, Suite 1402, 260 Peachtree Street, NW, Atlanta, GA 30303-1237 COOPER COMPANIES: Final Settlement Approval Hearing on Feb. 25 -------------------------------------------------------------- The Cooper Companies, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on December 20, 2019, for the fiscal year ended October 31, 2019, that the final hearing to consider approval of the settlement in the class action suit involving contact lens-related suit has been set for February 25, 2020. Since March 2015, over 50 putative class action complaints were filed by contact lens consumers alleging that contact lens manufacturers, in conjunction with their respective Unilateral Pricing Policy (UPP), conspired to reach agreements between each other and certain distributors and retailers regarding the prices at which certain contact lenses could be sold to consumers. The plaintiffs are seeking damages against CooperVision, Inc., other contact lens manufacturers, distributors and retailers, in various courts around the United States. In June 2015, all of the class action cases were consolidated and transferred to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. In August 2017, CooperVision entered into a settlement agreement with the plaintiffs, without any admission of liability, to settle all claims against CooperVision. In July 2018, the Court approved the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary approval of the settlement, and the Company paid the $3.0 million settlement amount into an escrow account. The settlement remains subject to final Court approval at a future hearing currently scheduled for February 25, 2020. The Cooper Companies, Inc. operates as a medical device company worldwide. It operates through CooperVision and CooperSurgical business units. The Cooper Companies, Inc. was founded in 1980 and is headquartered in Pleasanton, California. CVS HEALTH: Arizona & New York Classes Certified in Corcoran Suit ----------------------------------------------------------------- In the case captioned CHRISTOPHER CORCORAN, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. CVS HEALTH, ET AL., Defendants, Case No. 15-cv-03504-YGR (N.D. Cal.), Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California (i) granted the Plaintiffs' amended motion to substitute class representatives and for certification of New York and Arizona classes based on two substituted class representatives; and (ii) granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs' motion for approval of the notice provider, Angeion Group LLC, and for approval of the class notice program. The Plaintiffs commenced the putative class action alleging that the Defendants knowingly overcharged millions of insured patients by submitting falsely inflated drug prices to pharmacy benefit managers ("PBMs") and third-party payor insurance providers ("TPPs"), which resulted in higher copayment obligations for the Plaintiffs. Specifically, the Plaintiffs raise claims under the laws of eleven states: (i) each state's statutory laws proscribing unfair and deceptive acts and practices; and common law claims for (ii) fraud, (iii) negligent misrepresentation, and (iv) unjust enrichment. On Sept. 5, 2017, the District Court granted in part the Plaintiffs' prior motion for class certification; granted in part the Defendants' motion to exclude certain opinions by an expert witness; and granted the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The District Court denied in part the motion for class certification based on the representatives of the proposed New York and Arizona classes failing to meet the requirements of Rule 23(a)— -- specifically, typicality and adequacy. It concluded that the proposed class representatives did not have any qualifying transactions, and thus, denied without prejudice plaintiffs' motion to certify a New York and Arizona class. On June 12, 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued a memorandum decision reversing and remanding the September 2017 Order. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's holdings that certain materials and issues failed to create a triable issue, with respect to narrowing the classes on typicality grounds, and in striking the Plaintiffs' expert witness' testimony. On Aug. 23, 2019, the District Court issued an order complying with the Ninth Circuit's mandate by denying the motion to strike the Plaintiffs' expert witness, and denying the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, and by certifying the following class without limitation: All CVS customers in California, Florida, Illinois, and Massachusetts, who, between November 2008 and July 31, 2015, (1) purchased one or more generic prescription drugs that were offered through CVS's Health Savings Pass (HSP) program at the time of the purchase; (2) were insured for the purchase(s) through a third-party payor plan administered by one of the following pharmacy benefit managers: Caremark/PCS, Express Scripts, Medco, MedImpact, or Optum/Prescription Solutions (prior to Jan. 29, 2015); and (3) paid CVS an out-of-pocket payment for the purchase greater than the HSP price for the prescription. Recognizing that the September 2017 Order had denied the Plaintiffs' motion to certify a New York and Arizona class without prejudice, the District Court permitted the Plaintiffs a limited period to identify an appropriate representative for each class and permitted the parties to engage in appropriate discovery and motion practice on the proposed class representatives. The Plaintiffs so moved to certify New York and Arizona classes, identifying Joseph Luzier and Aaron Allen as class representatives for the New York class, and Darlene McAfee as the class representative for the Arizona class. They further moved for approval of the notice provider, class notice program, and forms of notice. For the good cause shown in the Plaintiffs' administrative motion, the District Court permitted them to substitute Allen and Luzier, the initially proposed New York class substitutes, with Stephen Sullivan. Having identified McAfee for the Arizona class and Sullivan for the New York class, the Plaintiffs now seek to certify two additional state classes composed of individuals from New York and Arizona who have filled prescriptions for generic drugs at CVS pharmacies using coverage provided by their TPP plans. Judge Rogers finds that the addition of one or two more classes does not impact the District Court's prior superiority analysis. Accordingly, in light of her holdings that both McAfee and Sullivan satisfy the typicality and adequacy requirements of Rule 23(a), and that the class action continues to satisfy the superiority analysis of Rule 23(b), Judge Rogers will grant the Plaintiffs' motion to substitute class representatives and certify New York and Arizona classes. Having reviewed the parties' briefings, the Plaintiffs' declarations regarding the selection process for a notice provider in the matter and regarding Angeion's experience and qualifications, and in light of the Defendants' non-opposition, Judge Rogers will approve Angeion as the notice provider. Thus, the Judge will grant the motion for approval of class notice provider and class notice program on this basis. Having considered the parties' revised proposed notice program, Judge Rogers agrees that the parties' proposed notice program is the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances." The District Court is satisfied with the representations made regarding Angeion's methods for ascertaining email addresses from existing information in the possession of the Defendants. Rule 23 further contemplates and permits electronic notice to class members in certain situations. Judge Rogers finds, in light of the representations made by the parties, that this is a situation that permits electronic notification via email, in addition to notice via United States Postal Service. Thus, Judge Rogers will approve the parties' revised proposed class notice program, and will grant the motion for approval of class notice provider and class notice program as to notification via email and United States Postal Service mail. Because the Plaintiffs have withdrawn their request for notice via text messaging, the Judge will deny the motion as moot. Finally, the parties' joint status report notes that the parties are revising the proposed short-form and long-form notices to incorporate the District Court's comments at the Nov. 12, 2019 hearing. The parties agree to submit the revised forms following the issuance of this Order. Judge Rogers will therefore deny the motion as to the proposed form notices. The parties may seek approval on an expedited basis of the revised form notices on Dec. 2, 2019. Judge Rogers granted the Plaintiffs' motion to substitute the class representatives and certified Arizona and New York classes. The Judge amended the class definition to state as follows: All CVS customers in California, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, New York, and Arizona, who, between November 2008 and July 31, 2015 (the Class Period), (1) purchased one or more generic prescription drugs that were offered through CVS' Health Savings Pass (HSP) program at the time of the purchase; (2) were insured for the purchase(s) through a third-party payor plan administered by one of the following pharmacy benefit managers: Caremark/PCS, Express Scripts, Medco, MedImpact, or Optum/Prescription Solutions (prior to Jan. 29, 2015); and (3) paid CVS an out-of-pocket payment for the purchase greater than the HSP price for the prescription. Judge Rogers further granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs' motion for approval of the notice provider and for approval of the class notice program. She ordered, with respect to the motion for approval of the notice provider and for approval of the class notice program, as follows: 1. For the purpose of providing notice to class members, the Defendants are authorized to disclose, and is ordered to disclose, to Angeion Group, LLC: (a) the name; (b) the last known mailing address; and (c) email address for the Defendants' customers associated with the purchases at the pharmacies identified by the Plaintiffs' expert report attached to their amended motion for class certification (June 6, 2017). The disclosure to Angeion will occur: a. Within two business days of the entry of the Order, for individuals associated with the purchases occurring at CVS pharmacies in California, Florida, Illinois, and Massachusetts identified by the Plaintiffs' expert report; or b. Within two business days of the entry of any order certifying a class or classes for Arizona and New York, for individuals associated with the purchases occurring at the Defendants' pharmacies in Arizona or New York identified by the Plaintiffs' expert report. 2. The Defendants are authorized to disclose the information identified in the Order pursuant to the regulations of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996. 3. The parties to the action and Angeion are expressly prohibited from using or disclosing the contact information obtained pursuant to the Order for any purpose other than providing notice to proposed class members in the action. 4. Angeion is further ordered to destroy contact information received in connection with the Order within 10 business days following the conclusion of the action. 5. The parties will file revised proposed short-form and long-form notices incorporating the Court's comments at the November 12, 2019 hearing on or before Dec. 2, 2019. A full-text copy of the District Court's Nov. 22, 2019 Order is available at https://is.gd/lheIKM from Leagle.com. Christopher Corcoran, Plaintiff, represented by Elizabeth Cheryl Pritzker -- ecp@pritzkerlevine.com -- Pritzker Levine LLP, Jonathan Krasne Levine -- jkl@pritzkerlevine.com -- Pritzker Levine, LLP, Bonny E. Sweeney -- bsweeney@hausfeld.com -- Hausfeld LLP, Edward H. Meyers -- emeyers@steinmitchell.com -- Stein Mitchell Cipollone Beato and Missner LLP, Gary Ivan Smith, Jr. -- gsmith@hausfeld.com -- Hausfeld LLP, Kristen Ward Broz -- kbroz@constantinecannon.com -- Haufeld, pro hac vice, Kristen Marie Ward, Hausfeld LLP, Michael Paul Lehmann -- mlehmann@hausfeld.com -- Hausfeld LLP, Michaela Spero -- mspero@hausfeld.com -- Hausfeld, Pasquale A. Cipollone -- pcipollone@steinmitchell.com -- Stein Mitchell Muse Cipollone Beato LLP, pro hac vice, Rebecca Ruby Anzidei, Stein Mitchell Muse Cipollone Beato LLP, pro hac vice, Richard S. Lewis -- rlewis@hausfeld.com -- Hausfeld LLP, pro hac vice, Robert B. Gilmore -- rgilmore@steinmitchell.com -- Stein Mitchell Muse Cipollone Beato LLP, pro hac vice, Sathya S. Gosselin -- sgosselin@hausfeld.com -- Hausfeld LLP & Shiho Yamamoto, Pritzker Levine LLP. Robert Garber, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher L. Lebsock, Hausfeld LLP, Elizabeth Cheryl Pritzker, Pritzker Levine LLP, Jonathan Krasne Levine, Pritzker Levine, LLP, Bethany Caracuzzo, Pritzker Levine LLP, Bonny E. Sweeney, Hausfeld LLP, Edward H. Meyers, Stein Mitchell Cipollone Beato and Missner LLP, Gary Ivan Smith, Jr., Hausfeld LLP, Kristen Ward Broz, Haufeld, pro hac vice, Kristen Marie Ward, Hausfeld LLP, Michael Paul Lehmann, Hausfeld LLP, Richard S. Lewis, Hausfeld LLP, pro hac vice, Robert B. Gilmore, Stein Mitchell Muse Cipollone Beato LLP, pro hac vice, Sathya S. Gosselin, Hausfeld LLP & Shiho Yamamoto, Pritzker Levine LLP. Vincent Gargiulo, Zulema Avis, Carolyn Caine & Zachary Hagert, Plaintiffs, represented by Elizabeth Cheryl Pritzker, Pritzker Levine LLP, Jonathan Krasne Levine, Pritzker Levine, LLP, Edward H. Meyers, Stein Mitchell Cipollone Beato and Missner LLP, Gary Ivan Smith, Jr., Hausfeld LLP, Kristen Marie Ward, Hausfeld LLP, Richard S. Lewis, Hausfeld LLP, pro hac vice, Sathya S. Gosselin, Hausfeld LLP, Shiho Yamamoto, Pritzker Levine LLP & Bonny E. Sweeney, Hausfeld LLP. Robert Jenks, Tyler Clark, Carl Washington & Debbie Barrett, Plaintiffs, represented by Elizabeth Cheryl Pritzker, Pritzker Levine LLP, Jonathan Krasne Levine, Pritzker Levine, LLP, Bethany Caracuzzo, Pritzker Levine LLP, Edward H. Meyers, Stein Mitchell Cipollone Beato and Missner LLP, Gary Ivan Smith, Jr., Hausfeld LLP, Kristen Marie Ward, Hausfeld LLP, Richard S. Lewis, Hausfeld LLP, pro hac vice, Sathya S. Gosselin, Hausfeld LLP, Shiho Yamamoto, Pritzker Levine LLP & Bonny E. Sweeney, Hausfeld LLP. Amanda Gilbert & Gilbert Brown, Plaintiffs, represented by Bonny E. Sweeney, Hausfeld LLP, Edward H. Meyers, Stein Mitchell Cipollone Beato and Missner LLP, Gary Ivan Smith, Jr., Hausfeld LLP, Jonathan Krasne Levine, Pritzker Levine, LLP, Sathya S. Gosselin, Hausfeld LLP & Elizabeth Cheryl Pritzker, Pritzker Levine LLP. CVS Health, Defendant, represented by August P. Gugelmann -- august@smllp.law -- Swanson & McNamara LLP, David Michael Horniak -- dhorniak@wc.com -- Williams & Connolly, LLP, Edward W. Swanson -- ed@smllp.law -- Swanson & McNamara LLP, Enu A. Mainigi -- emainigi@wc.com -- Williams and Connolly LLP, pro hac vice, Frank Lane Heard, III -- lheard@wc.com -- Williams and Connolly LLP & Grant A. Geyerman -- ggeyerman@wc.com -- Williams Connolly, LLP, pro hac vice. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., Defendant, represented by Andrew Watts -- awatts@wc.com -- Williams and Connolly, Ashley Wall Hardin -- ahardin@wc.com -- Williams and Connolly LLP, August P. Gugelmann, Swanson & McNamara LLP, Colleen Marie McNamara, Williams and Connolly LLP, Daniel M. Dockery, Williams and Connolly LLP, Edward W. Swanson, Swanson & McNamara LLP, Enu A. Mainigi, Williams and Connolly LLP, pro hac vice, Frank Lane Heard, III, Williams and Connolly LLP, Grant A. Geyerman, Williams Connolly, LLP & Sarah Lochner O'Connor -- soconnor@wc.com -- Wiliams & Connolly LLP. DANNY & JIMMY'S: Herrera Seeks Minimum and OT Wages for Dancers --------------------------------------------------------------- Melissa Herrera, aka Veronica, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. DANNY & JIMMY'S ENTERTAINMENT, LLC, A/K/A PANDORA'S MENS CLUB, and BRANDON CROSBY an individual, Case No. 3:20-cv-00076-K (N.D. Tex., Jan. 13, 2020), is brought against the Defendants for damages resulting from their evading the mandatory minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, and for illegally absconding with the Plaintiff's and other dancers' tips. The Plaintiff alleges that she has been denied minimum wage payments and denied overtime as part of the Defendants' scheme to classify her and other dancers/entertainers as "independent contractors." She contends that the Defendants failed to pay her minimum wages and overtime wages for all hours worked in violation of the FLSA. The Defendants' conduct violates the FLSA, which requires non-exempt employees to be compensated for their overtime work at a rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay, Ms. Herrera contends. As a result of the Defendants' violations, the Plaintiff and the FLSA Class Members seek to recover double damages for failure to pay minimum wage, overtime liquidated damages, interest, and attorneys' fees. The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as a dancer from July 2019 through the present. The Defendants own and operate a strip club named Pandora's Mens Club.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Jarrett L. Ellzey, Esq. W. Craft Hughes, Esq. Leigh Montgomery, Esq. HUGHES ELLZEY, LLP 1105 Milford Street Houston, TX 77066 Phone: (713) 554-2377 Fax: (888) 995-3335 Email: jarrett@hughesellzey.comd - and - Jacob J. Ventura, Esq. KRISTENSEN, LLP 12540 Beatrice Street, Suite 200 Los Angeles, CA 90066 Phone: (310) 507-7924 Fax: (310) 507-7906 Email: jacob@kristensenlaw.com DART TRANSIT: Court Orders Arbitration in Byars Case ---------------------------------------------------- The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, Nashville Division issued a Memorandum Opinion granting in part and denying in part Defendant's Motion to Transfer Venue, or, Alternatively, to Stay Proceedings and Compel Arbitration in the case captioned KIMBERLY BYARS, an individual appearing on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. DART TRANSIT COMPANY, et al., Defendants. No. 3:19-cv-00541. (M.D. Tenn.) This putative class action arises out of an employment dispute concerning alleged unpaid wages. Defendant Dart Transit Company (Dart), a Minnesota-based interstate trucking company, hired Plaintiff Kimberly Byars as a truck driver to transport trailers and freight for its shipping customers. As part of her pre-employment on-boarding process in Texas, Plaintiff signed various employment related documents, including a Business Operating Agreement (Dart BOA) that contained the following provision regarding its scope. When a trial court is presented concurrently with a motion to transfer venue and a motion to compel arbitration, it is more efficient to consider the motion to compel arbitration first. Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings Defendants move to stay this action in favor of arbitration based on the BOAs. In response, Plaintiff does not dispute that she signed separate BOAs with Dart and Mainstream, both of which include arbitration provisions. She instead argues against the BOAs' enforceability generally, claiming that the Court cannot compel arbitration under any applicable law in this case, and even if it could, the arbitration provisions in the BOAs are invalid and unconscionable. The Federal Arbitration Act Does Not Apply to the BOAs Generally, where a litigant establishes the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate the dispute at issue, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) requires the district court to grant the litigant's motion to compel arbitration and stay or dismiss proceedings until the completion of arbitration. Earlier this year, however, the Supreme Court held that section 1 of the FAA excludes from the Act's coverage contracts between an interstate trucking company and its driver, regardless of the driver's status as an employee or independent contractor. New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S.Ct. 532, 543-44 (2019). Thus, New Prime makes clear that the Court has no authority under the FAA to compel arbitration in this case. Choice of Law In New Prime, the Supreme Court left open the possibility that a truck driver working for an interstate trucking company suing under the FLSA who had signed an arbitration agreement could still be compelled to arbitration, just not under the FAA. That's true even when the contract says that the FAA applies and mentions no other law if the federal act doesn't apply, the agreement to arbitrate remains viable, and the only question becomes what state's law applies to the contract to arbitrate. Plaintiff argues that the BOAs' arbitration provisions cannot be enforced under state law because the parties intended that the FAA was the only law that applied to those agreements. Specifically, she contends that because the Advantage® Fuel Network and Advances Contract addenda to the Dart BOA states that the FAA applies to the arbitration provision in that addendum, the parties have no valid agreement to arbitrate under any other law. The BOAs, however, explicitly state that the entire Agreement and any properly adopted Addenda shall be interpreted under the laws of the State of Minnesota and any disputes arising under this Agreement or in its interpretation, or that are related in any way to this Agreement shall be submitted to final and binding arbitration. Thus, the inapplicability of the FAA does not nullify the parties' agreement to arbitrate. Given this background, the Court must determine which state's law applies to the enforceability of the arbitration provisions in this case. In federal question cases, a District Court entertaining pendent state claims should follow the choice of law rules of the forum state. Because Tennessee is the forum state, the Court will apply Tennessee choice-of-law rules. Tennessee's conflict of law doctrine applicable to contractual claims provides that when the dispute involves questions concerning rights and obligations under a contract, the court applies the law of the state where the contract was made, absent a contrary intent. The BOAs' choice-of-law clause is valid and enforceable under these criteria. The BOAs and accompanying addenda, including the Advantage® Fuel Network and Advances Contract, explicitly state that they shall be interpreted under the laws of the State of Minnesota. Accordingly, the Court will apply Minnesota law. Under Minnesota law, agreements to arbitrate entered into on or after August 1, 2011 are governed by the Minnesota Uniform Arbitration Act (MUAA). Validity of Arbitration Agreement When a party moves to compel arbitration, Minn. Stat. Section 572B.06(b) requires a court to determine two gateway issues: (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and (2) whether the particular dispute falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement. There is no dispute that Plaintiff signed contracts with both Defendants, and those contracts refer to arbitration Plaintiff acknowledged by her signature that she was subject to a binding arbitration provision, and this clause distinct from the arbitration clause itself suggests that disputes would be subject to arbitration. The overall agreements are also supported by adequate consideration, as Plaintiff would receive payment for her services. Accordingly, the BOAs' arbitration provisions are presumed to be valid. Notwithstanding this objective evidence of her assent to arbitration, Plaintiff contends that the arbitration agreements she signed are invalid and unenforceable because (1) the potential arbitrator pool and arbitration rules are biased in favor of Defendants and (2) the arbitration agreements are unconscionable. The Court finds that these arguments are mainly aimed at the enforceability of the arbitration provisions, rather than the BOAs as a whole. Thus, the court, and not the arbitrator, must decide whether the parties have an enforceable agreement to arbitrate. Alleged Bias of Arbitration Procedures Plaintiff argues that the arbitration provisions are unenforceable because they require disputes to be submitted to final and binding arbitration under the commercial rules of the Transportation ADR Council, Inc (TAC), which are biased in favor of Defendants. Although Plaintiff's bias argument is not a contract-based defense to the enforceability of an arbitration agreement, a party may avoid the agreed-upon arbitration process when the arbitrator-selection process itself is fundamentally unfair. Plaintiff argues that the TAC's arbitrator-selection process is unfairly biased in Defendants' favor because all potential TAC arbitrators are required to be members of the Transportation Lawyers Association (TLA), an independent bar organization whose members must actively represent companies in the transportation industry and cannot affiliate with a firm that represents plaintiffs against the transportation industry. She further notes that some of Defendants' own lawyers are either current or former TLA members. As a result, Plaintiff claims the entire TAC arbitrator pool lacks the minimum level of impartiality required for arbitration, and thus there is no valid agreement to arbitrate. The TAC's arbitration rules5 provide satisfactory protections against biased arbitrators. For example, the rules require that no person shall serve as an Arbitrator who has a financial or personal interest in the outcome of the arbitration or who has acquired prior detailed knowledge of the matter in dispute. Each potential TAC arbitrator is also required to disclose to the parties any information that might cause the person's impartiality or independence to be questioned and Plaintiff is then free to challenge the appointment of any arbitrator who exhibits undue bias. Even assuming arguendo that all of the TAC arbitrators have a lengthy background in transportation employer defense work, a party cannot avoid the arbitration process simply by alleging that the arbitration panel will be biased. The Court declines to indulge the presumption that the parties and arbitral body conducting a proceeding will be unable or unwilling to retain competent, conscientious, and impartial arbitrators. Accordingly, the Court does not find the TAC arbitrator-selection process to be so fundamentally unfair to warrant invalidating the parties' arbitration agreements. Unconscionability Plaintiff also presents numerous arguments about why the arbitration agreements are unconscionable. A contract is unconscionable if it is `such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other. First, Plaintiff argues that the arbitration agreements are unconscionable contracts of adhesion presented on a take it or leave it basis. By definition, a contract of adhesion is one drafted unilaterally by the business enterprise and forced upon an unwilling and often unknowing public for services that cannot readily be obtained elsewhere. Accordingly, the two factors for determining whether a contract is one of adhesion are: (1) was the contract the result of the superior bargaining power of one of the parties? and (2) was the service involved a public necessity? The record before the Court fails to support a finding that the arbitration agreements are unenforceable contracts of adhesion. Plaintiff contends she was in desperate financial need of a job and feared not having enough money to return home from her on-boarding orientation, but the degree of economic compulsion that Plaintiff asserts is no different from that of any unemployed individual who is looking for a job and cannot possibly suffice to support the revocation of an otherwise legal and valid contract. Most importantly, Plaintiff has neither shown that Defendants provide services of public necessity, nor that she was unable to obtain employment with another company providing similar services. Thus, the arbitration provisions in this case were not contracts of adhesion. For the foregoing reasons, the Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff's unconscionability arguments and concludes that the parties entered into a valid and enforceable agreement to arbitrate. Compelling Arbitration and Staying Proceedings The parties' agreement to arbitrate in Minnesota is enforceable under the MUAA. Unlike the FAA, the MUAA provides that if a proceeding involving a claim referable to arbitration under an alleged agreement to arbitrate is pending in court, a motion under this section must be filed in that court. Not only were Defendants required to file their motion to compel arbitration in this Court, this is the only court in which they could have done so. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants' motion to the extent it seeks to compel arbitration under the MUAA. Motion to Transfer Venue When a matter is stayed pending arbitration, it is appropriate for the court to deny other pending motions, without prejudice. Thus, given the stay ordered herein, Defendants' motion to transfer venue is denied without prejudice to it being re-filed if the stay is lifted and the case is administratively re-opened. Defendants' Motion to Transfer Venue or, Alternatively, to Stay Proceedings and Compel Arbitration will be GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiff will be ORDERED to submit to arbitration, and this case will be STAYED pending resolution of the arbitration. Defendants' motion to transfer venue will be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The case will be ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSED and may be reopened for cause on the motion of either party, rules the Court. A full-text copy of the District Court's October 21, 2019 Memorandum Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y2q7gful from Leagle.com. Kimberly Byars, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Bass - daniel@kicklawfirm.com - The Kick Law Firm, APC, David W. Garrison - dgarrison@barrettjohnston.com - Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison, LLC, Joshua A. Frank - jfrank@barrettjohnston.com - Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison, LLC, Scott P. Tift - stift@barrettjohnston.com - Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison, LLC & Taras Kick - taras@kicklawfirm.com - The Kick Law Firm, APC. Dart Transit Company & Mainstream Transportation, Inc., Defendants, represented by Daniel W. Olivas - dolivas@lewisthomason.com - Lewis, Thomason, King, Krieg & Waldrop, P.C., David M. Krueger - dkrueger@beneschlaw.com - Benesch Friedlander Coplan & Aronoff LLP, Eric Larson Zalud - ezalud@beneschlaw.com - Benesch Friedlander Coplan & Aronoff LLP & John Roy Tarpley - jtarpley@lewisthomason.com - Lewis, Thomason, King, Krieg & Waldrop, P.C.. DELTA DENTAL: Faces Bemus Suit Over Antitrust Law Violation ----------------------------------------------------------- Bemus Point Dental, LLC, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated v. Delta Dental Insurance Company, et al., Case No. 1:19-cv-07362 (N.D. Ill., Nov. 6, 2019), arises from the Defendants' anticompetitive conduct, including market allocation for dental insurance, that violates federal antitrust laws, the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act. The Defendants are Delta Dental Insurance Company; DeltaCare USA; Delta USA Inc.; Delta Dental Plans Association; Delta Dental Insurance Company Alabama; Delta Dental of Alaska; Delta Dental of Arizona; Delta Dental of Arkansas; Delta Dental of California; Delta Dental of Colorado; Delta Dental of Connecticut; Delta Dental of Delaware; Delta Dental of the District of Columbia; Delta Dental of Florida; Delta Dental Insurance Company-Georgia; Hawaii Dental Service; Delta Dental of Idaho; Delta Dental of Illinois; Delta Dental of Indiana; Delta Dental of Iowa; Delta Dental of Kansas; Delta Dental of Kentucky; Delta Dental Insurance Company-Louisiana; Delta Dental of Maryland, Inc.; Delta Dental of Massachusetts; Delta Dental of Michigan; Delta Dental of Minnesota; Delta Dental Insurance Company-Mississippi; Delta Dental of Missouri; Delta Dental Insurance Company-Montana; Delta Dental of Nebraska; Delta Dental Insurance Company-Nevada; Delta Dental of New Jersey; Delta Dental of New Mexico; Delta Dental of New York; Delta Dental of North Carolina; Delta Dental of North Dakota; Northeast Delta Dental (of Maine, New Hampshire and Vermont); Delta Dental of Ohio; Delta Dental of Oklahoma; Delta Dental of Oregon; Delta Dental of Pennsylvania; Delta Dental of Puerto Rico; Delta Dental of Rhode Island; Delta Dental of South Carolina; Delta Dental of South Dakota; Delta Dental of Tennessee; Delta Dental Insurance Company-Texas; Delta Dental Insurance Company-Utah; Delta Dental of Virginia; Delta Dental of Washington; Delta Dental of West Virginia; Delta Dental of Wisconsin; and Delta Dental of Wyoming. Bemus Point Dental, LLC, is a dental services provider and a New York State professional corporation. During the relevant time period, the Plaintiff provided dental goods and services to patients insured by Delta Dental of New York and was reimbursed by Delta Dental of New York for said goods and services. The Plaintiff contends that as a result of the Defendants' anticompetitive conduct, it was deprived of the choice of accepting dental patients under a greater number of insurance plans than it would have been in a competitive market and was reimbursed less for providing dental goods and services than it would have been but for such conduct. The Delta Dental State Insurers are 50 predominantly not-for-profit dental services corporations that operate in 39 state territories, multi-state territories, or territories (the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico) across the United States. They contract with dentists and dental practices--like the named Plaintiff--that accept Delta Dental insurance (collectively, the "Delta Dental Providers") to reimburse the providers for dental services provided to Delta Dental insureds under Delta Dental insurance contracts. The Delta Dental State Insurers are supported in turn by the Delta Dental Plans Association, a nationwide entity that acts as an administrator and watchdog for the Delta Dental insurance plans offered to the Delta Dental Providers and their patients via the Delta Dental State Insurers. Each Delta Dental State Insurer operates independently ("Delta Dental Plans Association is comprised of a network of . . . independent Delta Dental companies."). Delta Dental Plans Association is funded and controlled by the Delta Dental State Insurers, and acts as a vehicle for their concerted activity, including via a contract entered into by each Delta Dental State Insurer with the Delta Dental Plans Association (the "Delta Dental Plan Agreement"). The Plaintiff alleges that the Delta State Insurers engaged in a Market Allocation Conspiracy by dividing the U.S. dental insurance market into 39 territories and setting forth that within each Delta State Insurer's territory, which is usually one state but in some cases encompasses multiple states, other Delta State Insurers will not compete (the "Market Allocation Conspiracy"). This has greatly reduced or effectively eliminated competition in state-level markets for dental insurance, the Plaintiff argues. The Plaintiff also alleges, among other things, that the Delta State Insurers also conspired to fix and reduce the reimbursement rates that they pay to Delta Dental Providers for services performed for Delta Patients (the "Price Fixing Conspiracy"). Given that the Market Allocation Conspiracy has resulted in greatly reduced competition within each territory, the Delta State Insurers are able to abuse their market power in order to force Delta Dental Providers to accept these lower reimbursement rates, because such a large fraction of actual and potential patients have Delta insurance, so that a practice cannot practically refuse to accept Delta Patients. Delta Dental Plans Association is located in Oak Brook, Illinois. Delta Dental Plans Association was comprised of and managed by a network of the Delta Dental State Insurers.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Leonid Feller, Esq. Athena Dalton, Esq. QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP 191 N. Wacker Drive, Suite 2700 Chicago, IL 60606 Telephone (312) 705-7400 E-mail: leonidfeller@quinnemanuel.com athenadalton@quinnemanuel.com - and - Stephen Neuwirth, Esq. Toby E. Futter, Esq. Joseph N. Kiefer, Esq. QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP 51 Madison Avenue, 22nd Floor New York, NY 10010 Telephone: (212) 849-7000 E-mail: stephenneuwirth@quinnemanuel.com tobyfutter@quinnemanuel.com josephkiefer@quinnemanuel.com - and - Robert N. Kaplan, Esq. Gregory K. Arenson, Esq. Elana Katcher, Esq. Matthew P. McCahill, Esq. KAPLAN FOX & KILSHEIMER LLP 850 Third Ave., 14th Floor New York, NY 10022 Telephone: (212) 687-1980 E-mail: rkaplan@kaplanfox.com garenson@kaplanfox.com ekatcher@kaplanfox.com mmccahill@kaplanfox.com - and - Gary Specks, Esq. KAPLAN FOX & KILSHEIMER LLP 681 Prestwick Lane Wheeling, IL 60090 Telephone: (847) 831-1585 Facsimile: (847) 831-1580 E-mail: gspecks@kaplanfox.com DIVISION III: Peralta Suit Moved to Southern District of Florida ---------------------------------------------------------------- Division III Group Corp., et al., removed the case captioned as ULISES GAMALIEL MAYORGA PERALTA, and all others similarly situated under 29 U.S.C. 216(b) v. DIVISION III GROUP CORP., MATRIX CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPERS CORP., MICHAEL MEJIA and VICTOR QUINTERO, Case No. 2019-034834-CA-01 (Filed Nov. 26, 2019), from the Florida Circuit Court in and for Miami-Dade County, 11th Judicial Circuit, to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida on Jan. 10, 2020. The Southern District of Florida Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:20-cv-20110-XXXX to the proceeding. Division III Group Corp is in the commercial and office building contractors business. Matrix provides trained employees in construction industry.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: J.H. Zidell, Esq. J.H. ZIDELL, P.A. 300 71st Street, Suite 605 Miami Beach, FL 33141 Telephone: (305) 865-6766 Facsimile: (305) 865-7167 E-mail: zabogado@aol.com The Defendants are represented by: Pedro Forment, Esq. Edwin Cruz, Esq. JACKSON LEWIS P.C. One Biscayne Tower, Suite 3500 Two South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, FL 33131 Telephone: (305) 577-7600 Facsimile: (305) 373-4466 E-mail: pedro.forment@jacksonlewis.com edwin.cruz@jacksonlewis.com EATALY CHICAGO: Illegally Collects Biometric Data, Sykes Claims --------------------------------------------------------------- Melissa Sykes and Latasha Fox, on behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly situated, known and unknown v. EATALY CHICAGO, LLC, Case No. 2020CH00418 (Ill. Cir., Cook Cty., Jan. 13, 2020), is brought against the Defendant for violations of the Biometric Information Privacy Act. In enacting the Biometric Information Privacy Act, the Illinois legislature recognized that biologically unique identifiers, like fingerprints, can never be changed when compromised, and thus subject a victim of identity theft to heightened risk of loss. As a result, Illinois restricted private entities, like the Defendant, from collecting, storing, or using a person's biometric identifiers and information without adhering to strict informed-consent procedures established by the BIPA. The Defendant collected, stored, and used unique biometric identifying information based on the fingerprints of the Plaintiffs and others similarly situated without following the detailed requirements of the BIPA, according to the complaint. As a result, the Defendant violated the BIPA and compromised the privacy and security of the biometric identifiers and information of the Plaintiffs and other similarly-situated employees. Plaintiff Sykes was employed by the Defendant as a retail associate. Plaintiff Fox was employed by the Defendant as a housekeeper. The Defendant operates an Italian marketplace in Chicago, Illinois.[BN] The Plaintiffs are represented by: Douglas M. Werman, Esq. Sarah J. Arendt, Esq. Zachary C. Flowerree, Esq. WERMAN SALAS P.C. 77 West Washington, Suite 1402 Chicago, IL 60602 Phone: (312) 419-1008 Email: dwerman@flsalaw.com sarendt@flsalaw.com zflowerree@flsalaw.com ENERGY TRANSFER: Vincent Wong Reminds of Jan. 21 Deadline --------------------------------------------------------- The Law Offices of Vincent Wong announce that a class action has commenced on behalf of certain shareholders in Energy Transfer LP (ET). If you suffered a loss you have until the lead plaintiff deadline to request that the court appoint you as lead plaintiff. There will be no obligation or cost to you. Energy Transfer LP (ET) If you suffered a loss, contact us at: http://www.wongesq.com/pslra-1/energy-transfer-lp-loss-submission-form?prid=5062&wire=1 Lead Plaintiff Deadline: January 21, 2020 Class Period: February 25, 2017 to November 11, 2019 Allegations against ET include that: (i) Energy Transfer's permits to conduct the Mariner East pipeline project in Pennsylvania were secured via bribery and/or other improper conduct; (ii) the foregoing misconduct increased the risk that the Partnership and/or certain of its employees would be subject to government and/or regulatory action, thereby depreciating the Partnership's unit value; and (iii) as a result, the Partnership's public statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant times. To learn more contact Vincent Wong, Esq. either via email vw@wongesq.com or by telephone at 212.425.1140. Vincent Wong, Esq. is an experienced attorney who has represented investors in securities litigations involving financial fraud and violations of shareholder rights. Contact: Vincent Wong, Esq. 39 East Broadway Suite 304 New York, NY 10002 Phone: 212.425.1140 Fax: 866.699.3880 Email: vw@wongesq.com [GN] EXELON CORP: Bernstein Liebhard Reminds of Feb. 14 Deadline ----------------------------------------------------------- Bernstein Liebhard, a nationally acclaimed investor rights law firm, reminds investors of the deadline to file a motion for lead plaintiff in a securities class action that has been filed on behalf of investors that purchased or acquired the securities of Exelon Corporation ("Exelon" or the "Company") (EXC) between February 9, 2019, and November 1, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"). The lawsuit filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois alleges violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. If you purchased Exelon securities, and/or would like to discuss your legal rights and options please visit Exelon Shareholder Class Action or contact Matthew E. Guarnero toll free at (877) 779-1414 or MGuarnero@bernlieb.com. Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i) Exelon and/or its employees were engaged in unlawful lobbying activities; (ii) the foregoing increased the risk of a criminal investigation into Exelon; (iii) ComEd's revenues were in part the product of unlawful conduct and thus unsustainable; and (iv) that, as a result, the Company's public statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant times. On October 15, 2019, shortly before the market closed, Exelon issued a press release announcing the abrupt departure of Anne Pramaggiore (Pramaggiore), Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Exelon Utilities, and former President/CEO of ComEd. On this news, Exelon's stock price fell $2.15 per share, or 4.57%, to close at $44.91 per share on October 16, 2019. Then, on October 31, 2019, during intraday trading, Exelon filed a Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q with the SEC, disclosing that [o]n October 22, 2019, the SEC notified Exelon and ComEd that it has also opened an investigation into their lobbying activities. On this news, Exelon's stock price fell $1.17 per share, or 2.51%, to close at $45.49 per share on October 31, 2019. Finally, on November 1, 2019, after the market opened, the Chicago Tribune reported that [a] source with knowledge of the case in Chicago confirmed that Pramaggiore is one focus of the ongoing federal investigation. On this news, Exelon's stock price fell an additional $0.15 per share to close at $45.34 per share on November 1, 2019, total decline of 2.83% since the initial announcement of the SEC investigation. If you purchased Exelon securities, and/or would like to discuss your legal rights and options please visit https://www.bernlieb.com/cases/exeloncorporation-exc-shareholder-class-action-lawsuit-stock-fraud-232/apply/ contact Matthew E. Guarnero toll free at (877) 779-1414 or MGuarnero@bernlieb.com. If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than February 14, 2020. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the litigation. Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't require that you serve as lead plaintiff. If you choose to take no action, you may remain an absent class member. Since 1993, Bernstein Liebhard LLP has recovered over $3.5 billion for its clients. In addition to representing individual investors, the Firm has been retained by some of the largest public and private pension funds in the country to monitor their assets and pursue litigation on their behalf. As a result of its success litigating hundreds of lawsuits and class actions, the Firm has been named to The National Law Journal's "Plaintiffs' Hot List" thirteen times and listed in The Legal 500 for ten consecutive years. Contact: Matthew E. Guarnero, Esq. Bernstein Liebhard LLP Website: https://www.bernlieb.com Tel: (877) 779-1414 E-mail: MGuarnero@bernlieb.com [GN] EXELON CORP: Lieff Cabraser Reminds Investors of Feb. 14 Deadline ----------------------------------------------------------------- The law firm of Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP announces that class action litigation has been filed on behalf of investors who purchased or otherwise acquired the securities of Exelon Corporation (Nasdaq: EXC) between February 9, 2019 and November 1, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"). If you purchased or otherwise acquired the securities of Exelon during the Class Period, you may move the Court for appointment as lead plaintiff by no later than February 14, 2020. A lead plaintiff is a representative party who acts on behalf of other class members in directing the litigation. Your share of any recovery in the actions will not be affected by your decision of whether to seek appointment as lead plaintiff. You may retain Lieff Cabraser, or other attorneys, as your counsel in the action. Exelon investors who wish to learn more about the litigation and how to seek appointment as lead plaintiff should click here or contact Sharon M. Lee of Lieff Cabraser toll-free at 1-800-541-7358. Exelon, incorporated in Pennsylvania and headquartered in Chicago, Illinois, is a utility services holding company that serves as the parent company of the Commonwealth Edison Company ("ComEd"), the largest electric utility in Illinois, and the sole electric provider in Chicago. The complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) Exelon and/or its employees were engaged in unlawful lobbying activities; (2) this conduct increased the risk of a criminal investigation into Exelon; (3) ComEd's revenues were partly the product of unlawful conduct and therefore unsustainable; and (4) as a result, the Company's public statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant times. On July 15, 2019, Exelon disclosed that it had received a grand jury document subpoena from the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Illinois ("USAO") concerning Exelon's "lobbying activities in the State of Illinois." On this news, the price of Exelon stock price fell $0.18 per share, or 0.37% from a previous closing price of $49.06 on July 12, 2019, to close at $48.88 per share on July 15, 2019. On October 9, 2019, Exelon disclosed that the USAO sought records of communications with Illinois State Senator Martin Sandoval, chairman of the Illinois Senate Transportation Committee. Exelon also revealed that it had formed a Special Overnight Committee in June 2019 to oversee compliance with the subpoenas. On October 15, 2019, shortly before market close, Exelon announced the departure of Chief Executive Officer Anne Pramaggiore, "effective immediately." On this news, Exelon's stock price dropped $2.15 per share, or 4.57% from a closing price of $47.06 on October 15, 2019, to close at $44.91 per share on October 16, 2019, on elevated trading volume. On October 31, 2019, Exelon revealed that on October 22, 2019, the Securities and Exchange Commission had notified the Company that it had opened an investigation into Exelon's lobbying activities. On this news, the price of Exelon dropped $1.17 per share, or 2.51% from a previous closing price of $46.66 on October 30, 2019, to close at $45.49 per share on October 31, 2019. The next day, on November 1, 2019, the Chicago Tribune reported that "a source with knowledge of the case in Chicago" confirmed that "Pramaggiore is one focus of the ongoing federal investigation." According to the same article, "the ComEd lobbying investigation dates to at least mid-May, when the FBI executed search warrants at the homes of former lobbyist Mike McClain of Quincy, a longtime confidant of House Speaker Michael Madigan, and of former 23rd Ward Ald. Michael Zalewski." Additionally, "the information sought by the FBI included records of communications among Madigan, McClain and Zalewski about attempts to obtain ComEd lobbying work for Zalewski." On this news, the price of Exelon stock declined an additional $0.15, or 0.33% from the previous day's close, to close at $45.34 per share on November 1, 2019. About Lieff Cabraser Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, with offices in San Francisco, New York, and Nashville, is a nationally recognized law firm committed to advancing the rights of investors and promoting corporate responsibility. The National Law Journal has recognized Lieff Cabraser as one of the nation's top plaintiffs' law firms for fourteen years. In compiling the list, the National Law Journal examines recent verdicts and settlements and looked for firms "representing the best qualities of the plaintiffs' bar and that demonstrated unusual dedication and creativity." Law360 has selected Lieff Cabraser as one of the Top 50 law firms nationwide for litigation, highlighting our firm's "laser focus" and noting that our firm routinely finds itself "facing off against some of the largest and strongest defense law firms in the world." Benchmark Litigation has named Lieff Cabraser one of the "Top 10 Plaintiffs' Firms in America." For more information about Lieff Cabraser and the firm's representation of investors, please visit https://www.lieffcabraser.com/. Contact: Sharon M. Lee, Esq. Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP Telephone: 1-800-541-7358 [GN] EXELON CORP: Schall Law Files Class Action Lawsuit -------------------------------------------------- The Schall Law Firm, a national shareholder rights litigation firm, announces the filing of a class action lawsuit against Exelon Corporation ("Exelon" or "the Company") (NASDAQ:EXC) for violations of Secs. 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Investors who purchased the Company's securities between February 9, 2019 and November 1, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"), are encouraged to contact the firm before February 14, 2020. If you are a shareholder who suffered a loss, click here to participate. We also encourage you to contact Brian Schall of the Schall Law Firm, 1880 Century Park East, Suite 404, Los Angeles, CA 90067, at 424-303-1964, to discuss your rights free of charge. You can also reach us through the firm's website at www.schallfirm.com, or by email at brian@schallfirm.com. The class, in this case, has not yet been certified, and until certification occurs, you are not represented by an attorney. If you choose to take no action, you can remain an absent class member. According to the Complaint, the Company made false and misleading statements to the market. Exelon and its employees engaged in improper lobbying of government officials. These actions increased the likelihood of a criminal investigation of the Company. Exelon subsidiary Commonwealth Edison gained revenues as a result of the improper conduct which would be unsustainable in the future. Based on these facts, the Company's public statements were false and materially misleading throughout the class period. When the market learned the truth about Exelon, investors suffered damages. Join the case to recover your losses. The Schall Law Firm represents investors around the world and specializes in securities class action lawsuits and shareholder rights litigation. Contact: Brian Schall, Esq. The Schall Law Firm Website: www.schallfirm.com Office: 310-301-3335 Cell: 424-303-1964 Email: info@schallfirm.com, brian@schallfirm.com [GN] EXELON CORP: Vincent Wong Reminds of Feb. 14 Deadline ----------------------------------------------------- The Law Offices of Vincent Wong announces that a class action has commenced on behalf of certain shareholders in Exelon Corporation (EXC). If you suffered a loss you have until the lead plaintiff deadline to request that the court appoint you as lead plaintiff. There will be no obligation or cost to you. Exelon Corporation (EXC) If you suffered a loss, contact us at: http://www.wongesq.com/pslra-1/exelon-corporation-loss-submission-form?prid=5062&wire=1 Lead Plaintiff Deadline: February 14, 2020 Class Period: February 9, 2019 to November 1, 2019 Allegations against EXC include that: (i) Exelon and/or its employees were engaged in unlawful lobbying activities; (ii) the foregoing increased the risk of a criminal investigation into Exelon; (iii) Exelon subsidiary Commonwealth Edison's revenues were in part the product of unlawful conduct and thus unsustainable; and (iv) that, as a result, the Company's public statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant times. To learn more contact Vincent Wong, Esq. either via email vw@wongesq.com or by telephone at 212.425.1140. Vincent Wong, Esq. is an experienced attorney who has represented investors in securities litigations involving financial fraud and violations of shareholder rights. Contact: Vincent Wong, Esq. 39 East Broadway Suite 304 New York, NY 10002 Phone: 212.425.1140 Fax: 866.699.3880 Email: vw@wongesq.com [GN] FIAT CHRYSLER: Faces Tan Securities Suit Over Drop in Share Price ----------------------------------------------------------------- JENNIFER H. TAN, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. FIAT CHRYSLER AUTOMOBILES N.V., ROLAND ISELI AND ALESSANDRO BALDI AS CO-EXECUTORS OF THE ESTATE FOR SERGIO MARCHIONNE, MICHAEL MANLEY, and RICHARD K. PALMER, Case No. 1:20-cv-00202 (E.D.N.Y., Jan. 10, 20200), is brought on behalf of persons or entities, who purchased or otherwise acquired publicly traded Fiat securities from February 26, 2016, through November 20, 2019, inclusive, seeking to recover compensable damages caused by the Defendants' violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. On February 22, 2019, Fiat filed its Annual Report on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2018 with the SEC (the "2018 20-F"). The 2018 20-F was signed by Defendant Palmer. The 2018 20-F contained signed SOX certifications by Defendants Manley and Palmer attesting to the accuracy of financial reporting, the disclosure of any material changes to the Company's internal controls over financial reporting, and the disclosure of all fraud. The Plaintiff alleges that the statements in the reports were materially false and/or misleading because the Defendants misrepresented and failed to disclose certain adverse facts pertaining to the Company's business, operations and prospects, which were known to the Defendants or recklessly disregarded by them. Specifically, the Plaintiff asserts, the Defendants made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: the Company employed a bribery scheme to obtain favorable terms in its collective bargaining agreement with The International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW); high-ranking Fiat official were aware of and authorized the scheme; and as a result, the Defendants' statements about Fiat's business, operations, and prospects were materially false and/or misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis at all relevant times. On November 20, 2019, while the market was open, General Motors ("GM") filed a racketeering lawsuit against Fiat in the Eastern District of Michigan styled as General Motors LLC, et al. v. FCA US LLC et al., Case No. 2:19-cv-13429-PDB-DRG, for damages caused by a bribery scheme perpetuated by UAW and the Company. According to the lawsuit, the illegal activity was authorized by the high-level officers of the Company, including Marchionne, and helped the Company win union acceptance of cost concessions in 2011 and 2015. The lawsuit also contended that Fiat executives bribed UAW leaders to pressure GM into a merger with Fiat. On this news, shares of Fiat fell $0.58 per share, or 3.72%, to close at $15.00 per share on November 20, 2019, damaging investors. The Plaintiff purchased Fiat securities during the Class Period. As a result of the Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's securities, Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered significant losses and damages, the lawsuit says. Fiat, together with its subsidiaries, designs, engineers, manufactures, distributes, and sells vehicles, components, and production systems. Fiat is incorporated in the Netherlands, with principal executive offices located at 25 St. James's Street, London, SW1A 1HA, United Kingdom. The company's stock trades on the New York Stock Exchange under the ticker symbol "FCAU." The Individual Defendants are officers and directors of the company.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq. J. Alexander Hood II, Esq. Patrick V. Dahlstrom, Esq. POMERANTZ LLP 600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor New York, NY 10016 Telephone: (212) 661-1100 Facsimile: (212) 661-8665 E-mail: jalieberman@pomlaw.com ahood@pomlaw.com pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com FIRST AMERICAN: Antao Sues Over Improperly Charged Fees to Buyers ----------------------------------------------------------------- ANTAO PROPERTIES LLC, a Florida limited liability company, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, Case No. 19-007377-CI (Fla. Cir., Pinellas Cty., Nov. 6, 2019), arises from closing fees improperly charged and collected by the Defendant from buyers of real estate transactions throughout the state of Florida. Antao is a single member Florida limited liability company. The Plaintiff's single individual member, Edward Antao, is a resident of Florida. The Defendant, a licensed title agency, is a foreign company licensed and registered to do business in Florida, having offices located throughout the state of Florida, including in Clearwater, Florida. On November 14, 2017, the Plaintiff entered into a real estate purchase and sale contract ("Contract") with the owner ("Seller") of certain real estate located in Pinellas, Florida ("Property"). Pursuant to the terms of the Contract, the Plaintiff agreed to pay cash for the Seller's Property. Accordingly, the Contract was between Plaintiff, as the "Buyer," and the owners, as the "Seller." Pursuant to Paragraph 9(c)(1) of the Contract, charges and fees are only to be paid by the Buyer in the event the transaction is being financed by a lender. Since the Contract here was an all-cash transaction with no lender, the Plaintiff says it was not responsible for any title agent fees, title policy premiums or lender endorsements. Antao contends that the Contract provided that the Closing Services Fee would only be charged to, and collected from, the Seller. Antao adds that because the sale was a cash transaction, there was no lender's policy, endorsement or related loan closing services required to be paid by the Plaintiff, the Buyer.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Joshua H. Eggnatz, Esq. EGGNATZ PASCUCCI 7450 Griffin Road, Suite 230 Davie, FL 33328 Telephone: (954) 889-3359 Facsimile: (954) 889-5913 E-mail: JEggnatz@JusticeEarned.com - and - Seth M. Lehrman, Esq. EDWARDS POTTINGER LLC. 425 North Andrews Avenue, Suite 2 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 Telephone: (954) 524-2820 Facsimile: (954) 524-2822 E-mail: seth@epllc.com - and - Richard B. Feinberg, Esq. FLORIDA LEGACY LAW, LLC 600 Cleveland Street, Suite 313 Clearwater, FL 33755 Telephone: (727) 231-6400 E-mail: ricfeinberg@hotmail.com FITBIT INC: Faruqi & Faruqi Files Securities Class Action --------------------------------------------------------- Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP has filed a class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Case No. 4:19-cv-08046-HSG, on behalf of shareholders of Fitbit, Inc. (NYSE:FIT) who have been harmed by Fitbit's and its board of directors' (the "Board") alleged violations of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") in connection with the proposed merger of the Company with Alphabet Inc. (the "Proposed Transaction"). On November 1, 2019, the Board caused the Company to enter into an agreement and plan of merger under which Fitbit shareholders stand to receive $7.35 in cash for each share of Fitbit stock they own. The complaint alleges that the Proxy filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission in connection with the Proposed Transaction violates Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act because it provides materially incomplete and misleading information about the Company and the Proposed Transaction, including information concerning the Company's financial projections and certain valuation analyses conducted by the Company's financial advisor, on which the Board relied to recommend the Proposed Transaction as fair to Fitbit shareholders. If you wish to obtain information concerning this action, you can do so by clicking here: www.faruqilaw.com/FITBIT. Take Action Plaintiff is represented by Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP, a law firm with extensive experience in prosecuting class actions, and significant expertise in actions involving corporate fraud. Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP, was founded in 1995 and the firm maintains its principal office in New York City, with offices in Delaware, California, Georgia, and Pennsylvania. If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than 60 days from the date of this notice. Any member of the putative class may move the Court to serve as lead plaintiff through counsel of their choice, or may choose to do nothing and remain an absent class member. If you wish to discuss this action, or have any questions concerning this notice or your rights or interests, please contact: Nadeem Faruqi, Esq. James M. Wilson, Jr., Esq. FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP 685 3rd Avenue, 26th Floor New York, NY 10017 Telephone: (877) 247-4292 or (212) 983-9330 E-mail: nfaruqi@faruqilaw.com Email: jwilson@faruqilaw.com [GN] FRONTIER AIRLINES: Women Sue Over Sex Assaults by Passengers ------------------------------------------------------------ CBS Denver reports that two women who say they were sexually assaulted by passengers on Frontier Airlines flights are suing the Denver-based budget carrier for allegedly refusing to help them and either not having or failing to follow policies to respond to assaults. The class action lawsuit was filed Dec. 16, 2019, by two Denver residents. The women say they reported the assaults to flight attendants, who did not report them to anyone else and did not request that law enforcement meet the planes. A Frontier spokeswoman said she can't comment on litigation but added that the safety of the airline's passengers and employees is its top priority. A statement released by attorney Annika K. Martin, Esq. for plaintiffs Lena Ramsay and "Jane Doe" - "on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated" - stated: This is a class action against Frontier for failure to have and/or follow policies and procedures to prevent, report, and respond to sexual assault of its passengers on its flights. The prevalence of passenger-on-passenger in-flight sexual assault is a wellknown, and growing, problem. In fact, in 2018, the FBI issued a warning – to airlines and the public at large – that the number of sexual assaults reported during commercial airline flights has been increasing "at an alarming rate." Frontier, like all airlines, has an affirmative duty to aid and protect its passengers. This duty includes protecting passengers from sexual assaults by fellow passengers, and responding properly to in-flight sexual assaults that do occur. Frontier violated this duty by failing to implement and enforce appropriate policies and procedures to prevent, or properly respond to, sexual assaults that occur on its flights; failing to report in-flight sexual assaults to the proper authorities, or to any authorities; and failing to cooperate with authorities in the reporting and investigation process into in-flight sexual assaults. As a result of these violations by Frontier, Plaintiffs were sexually assaulted by their fellow passengers while they were on Frontier flights, and are at an ongoing risk for future sexual assaults. Frontier's failure to implement and enforce polices to prevent and properly respond to in-flight sexual assault led Frontier employees and representatives to fail to properly respond to those assaults; fail to report the assaults to the any authorities; and fail to cooperate with authorities investigating those assaults. 7. Frontier's actions and inactions were – and are – part of a pattern of behavior and a common course of conduct towards all its passengers, including Plaintiffs and Class members. Plaintiffs seek appropriate relief, including but not limited to compensatory damages and injunctive relief, on behalf of all others similarly situated who were unnecessarily put at risk and harmed by Frontier's common course of misconduct. [GN] GEO GROUP: Court Partly Grants Class Cert. in Ramirez Labor Suit ---------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, RAYMOND RAMIREZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE GEO GROUP, et al., Defendants, Case No. 18cv2136-LAB (MSB) (S.D. Cal.), Judge Larry Alan Burns of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California granted in part and denied in part Ramirez's Motion for Class Certification. Defendant GEO Group and its subsidiaries own and operate private prisons throughout the United States. From 2000 until 2017, Plaintiff Ramirez served as a corrections officer at the Western Region Detention Facility in San Diego. The Facility is owned by GEO Group subsidiary GEO Corrections and Detentions, LLC and houses between 700 and 770 federal detainees awaiting trial, sentencing, or a hearing. At issue in the case are Ramirez's allegations that GEO violated various provisions of California labor law by, among other things, failing to provide adequate meal and rest breaks, failing to reimburse employees for job-related expenses, and improperly rounding employee time. Based on these and other alleged violations of California law, Ramirez brought the suit in San Diego County Superior Court in August 2018. GEO timely removed the case to the Court, and Ramirez now seeks class certification. Ramirez originally purported to represent all correctional officers employed by GEO in California, but now limits the putative class to only those correctional officers employed by GEO at the San Diego Facility from Aug. 9, 2014 to present. GEO opposes Ramirez's motion, arguing that its policies do not violate California law and that Ramirez cannot meet the requirements for class certification. Ramirez seeks to certify one class and two subclasses: a. Class: All current and former employees who worked as a Correctional Officer or Assistant Shift Supervisor at GEO's Western Region Detention Facility from Aug. 9, 2014 to present. b. Ten Hour Shift Subclass: All Class Members who worked a shift of ten hours or more without receiving a second 30-minute duty-free meal break. c. Waiting Time Penalty Subclass: All Class Members who separated from their employment with GEO between Aug. 9, 2014 to the present. GEO's opposition focuses primarily on what it sees as Ramirez's inability to show commonality (and the related requirement of predominance). But GEO also argues that even if there are common questions, Ramirez's claims are not typical and that he is an inadequate representative. The Court will address each requirement of Rule 23 in turn, with a focus on commonality. Judge Burns finds that these two narrow questions -- whether GEO's rounding policy was permissible and whether GEO's wage statements violated California law -- are common to the class. These common questions predominate over individual questions and are therefore appropriate for class treatment. Next, the Judge finds that even setting aside the question of whether GEO's reimbursement policy was sufficient, the fact that only some of the class members were required to purchase duty belts means that the question is not common to the class and cannot form the basis for class certification. Further, there is no evidence that Ramirez himself fell within the category of employees required to purchase a duty belt, so he couldn't serve as an adequate representative for those employees even if the Court were inclined to form a sub-class. But the Court is not certifying the issue of whether GEO's meal and rest break policies were lawful. The issues for class-wide adjudication -- whether GEO improperly rounded its employees' time and whether its pay statements complied with California law -- are common to both Corrections Officers and their Supervisors. The Judge therefore finds the typicality and adequacy requirements met. As part of their briefing, the parties jointly move to have certain documents related to GEO's policies, procedures, and schedules file under seal. According to the parties, because GEO operates a detention facility, its policies and procedures are significantly more sensitive than those of a typical corporation, because such documents directly impact the safety and privacy of detainees and officers. The Judge finds that the parties have demonstrated "good cause." If made public, the documents at issue could jeopardize the safety of employees and detainees at the Facility. The documents reveal when detention officers go on break, what equipment and weapons particular officers carry, when and how detainee counts are conducted, the location of keys, and how officers are expected to respond to certain emergency situations. Limiting the spread of this information is important to protect both employees and detainees from harm. The Judge therefore finds the "good cause" standard met and granted the parties' Motions to File Documents under Seal. The documents conditionally lodged under seal in Docket Entries 49 and 85 are ordered sealed pending further order of the Court. For these reasons, Judge Burns granted in part and denied in part Ramirez's motion for class certification. He certified one class and one sub-class as follows: a. Class: All current and former employees who worked as a Correctional Officer or Assistant Shift Supervisor at GEO's Western Region Detention Facility from Aug. 9, 2014 to present. b. Waiting Time Penalty Subclass: All Class Members who separated from their employment with GEO between Aug. 9, 2014 to present. But the class claims are limited only to those common questions found above—namely, whether GEO improperly rounded employee time and whether GEO's pay statements complied with California law. Related claims, such as whether GEO violated California's Unfair Competition Law and whether GEO failed to pay all wages due upon termination of employment, may be litigated on behalf of the class only insofar as those claims are predicated on these two narrow issues. All other claims must be litigated on an individual basis. Plaintiff Ramirez will serve as the class representative, and his attorneys at the Patterson Law Group, APC will serve as the class counsel. The Judge granted the parties' Motions to Seal, as is GEO's Request for Judicial Notice. The parties' various evidentiary objections are overruled. A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 11, 2019 Order is available at https://is.gd/uFsfjh from Leagle.com. Raymond Ramirez, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by James Richard Patterson -- jim@pattersonlawgroup.com -- Patterson Law Group, APC & Jennifer M. French, Patterson Law Group, APC. The Geo Group, Inc., a Florida Corporation, Defendant, represented by Anthony Gerald Ly -- aly@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson PC, Lena Kae Sims -- lsims@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson & Peiyi Chen -- pchen@littler.com -- Littler & Mendelson PC. GEO Corrections and Detention, LLC ("GEO Corrections"), a subsidiary of GEO Group, Inc., a Florida limited liability corporation, Defendant, represented by Peiyi Chen, Littler & Mendelson PC & Anthony Gerald Ly, Littler Mendelson PC. GOLDEN STATE: Transfer Trevino Suit to Cal. Central Dist. Denied ---------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, JUAN TREVINO, ROMEO PALMA, JUAN C. AVALOS, ALBERTO GIANINI, CHRISTOPHER WARD, and LINDA QUINTEROS, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. GOLDEN STATE FC, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, AMAZON.COM INC., a Delaware Corporation, and AMAZON FULFILLMENT SERVICES, INC., a Delaware Corporation, Defendants, Lead Case No. 1:18-cv-00120-DAD-BAM (Trevino) (E.D. Cal.), Judge Dale E. Drozd of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California denied Amazon's motion to transfer the consolidated action to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The consolidated action consists of five separately filed class actions which were initially filed in state courts located within the boundaries of the U.S. District Court for either the Eastern or Central Districts of California and thereafter removed to those federal courts. Three of the five cases (Trevino, Ward, and Palma) were filed within the Eastern District of California, and the remaining two (Avalos and Hagman) were originally filed within the Central District of California. Each of these actions was filed as a class action and each asserted similar wage and hour violations against Amazon. On Jan. 8, 2018, Plaintiff Trevino filed a notice of related cases, seeking to relate Trevino, Ward, and Palma. On Jan. 24, 2018, Judge Drozd issued an order relating the Trevino, Ward, and Palma cases. On April 23, 2018, the parties in Avalos filed a stipulation seeking to transfer that case to the district and, on Aug. 29, 2018, the parties in Hagman filed a stipulation seeking to transfer that case to the district. Both stipulations were adopted by court order and the Avalos and Hagman actions were thereafter assigned to the Court. On Feb. 25, 2019, the parties in each of the five aforementioned actions stipulated to consolidating those actions. That stipulation was adopted by court order and Trevino was designated as the lead case. On March 28, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed a first amended consolidated class action complaint. Therein, they allege the following wage and hour violations: (1) failure to pay wages for all hours worked, including overtime; (2) meal period violations; (3) rest period violations; (4) wage statement violations; (5) failure to pay waiting time wages; and (6) violations of California Business and Professions Code. On April 23, 2019, the parties participated in a joint scheduling conference before Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe. During the scheduling conference, Magistrate Judge McAuliffe informed the parties that the Chief Judge of the Eastern District would be retiring at the end of 2019, leaving Judge Drozd as the only remaining district court judge in the Fresno Courthouse. On June 6, 2019, 27 named Plaintiffs filed a separate wage and hour class action in Orange County Superior Court against Amazon.com Services, Inc. and, on July 5, 2019, that action was removed to the Central District of California. On July 5, 2019, Amazon filed the pending motion to transfer. Therein, it seeks to transfer the consolidated action back to the Central District of California. First, Amazon argues that the original purpose of transferring the Avalos and Hagman actions to the district has been frustrated by the impending retirement of the Chief Judge, which was unknown and unforeseen at the time the parties stipulated to transferring and consolidating all related cases in the Eastern District. Second, it contends that transfer is warranted because the Sherman class action asserts claims that overlap with those asserted in the consolidated class action. Finally, Amazon argues that the action meets all the requirements for transfer under 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a) and that the parties will not be prejudiced by the transfer. On Aug. 6, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed their opposition to the pending motion and, on Aug. 13, 2019, Amazon filed its reply thereto. The parties do not dispute that the action may have been brought in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. Rather, they focus on the balance of the relevant factors. Amazon primarily argues that the original purpose of transferring the Avalos and Hagman action to the district has been frustrated by Chief Judge O'Neill's impending move to inactive senior status. It also contends that transfer back to the Central District is warranted because the Sherman action overlaps with this action. Judge Drozd addresses Amazon's arguments with respect to the Sherman action first, and then addresses whether the original purpose of the Avalos and Hagman transfers has been frustrated by Chief Judge O'Neill's taking of inactive senior status in early 2020. He finds that Amazon offers no analysis for why this consolidated class action overlaps with the Sherman class action beyond simply asserting so in conclusory fashion. It is not, however, the Court's task to compare the allegations in the respective actions to determine whether the actions are overlapping, and transfer is warranted. Accordingly, Amazon's intention to seek consolidation of Sherman with Trevino in the Central District, pending the outcome of this motion, in light of the overlapping claims and class period does not weigh in favor of transfer, as Judge Selna has already ruled that there is no substantial overlap between the two actions, thus clearly indicating that he is unlikely to consolidate the action with Sherman. Next, the Judge addresses Amazon's contention that the purpose of transferring Avalos and Hagman to the Eastern District has been frustrated by Chief Judge O'Neill's impending move to inactive senior status. Amazon argues that it will leave only one presiding judge in the Fresno division of the already-congested Eastern District, and thwart the original purpose of the transfer and consolidation: preserving time and resources, and ensuring faster and more efficient outcomes in the case. The Judge is not persuaded. First, it appears that Amazon was (or at least should have been) aware that the Eastern District was "already-congested" prior to stipulating to transferring the Avalos and Hagman actions to the district. Second, further undercutting Amazon's position are the stipulations themselves. Third, while Amazon states that courts regularly consider docket congestion when deciding a motion to transfer venue, it offers no authority for the proposition that court congestion alone provides an adequate reason to transfer an action to another district. Finally, the Judge briefly addresses the Section 1404(a) factors. Amazon argues that the Central District is more convenient for the parties and witnesses for various reasons, but its arguments in this regard rely on a finding that the Sherman action overlaps with the action. Because there is no overlap, Amazon's arguments with respect to the Section 1404(a) factors are unpersuasive. For the reasons set forth, Judge Drozd denied the motion to transfer. A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 11, 2019 Order is available at https://is.gd/ShhVCX from Leagle.com. Juan Trevino, Plaintiff, represented by Lonnie C. Blanchard, III -- lonnieblanchard@gmail.com -- The Blanchard Law Group, APC, Peter R. Dion-Kindem -- peter@dion-kindemlaw.com -- Peter R. Dion-Kindem, P.C. & James Ross Hawkins -- James@jameshawkinsaplc.com -- James Hawkins APLC. Romeo Palma, Plaintiff, represented by Graham Lambert -- GL@Haffnerlawyers.com -- Haffner Law PC, Joshua H. Haffner -- jhh@Haffnerlawyers.com -- Haffner Law, PC & James Ross Hawkins, James Hawkins APLC. Golden State FC LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, Amazon.com Inc., a Delaware Corporation & Amazon Fulfillment Services, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendants, represented by Helen Ofelia Avunjian -- havunjian@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn and Crutcher LLP, Jason C. Schwartz -jschwartz@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, pro hac vice, Katherine V.A. Smith -ksmith@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Michele Leigh Maryott -- mmaryott@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP & Ashley Louise Allyn -- aallyn@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn & Crutcher, LLP. Amazon, Defendant, pro se. GPB CAPITAL: Barasch Sues Over $1.8BB Fraud on Investors -------------------------------------------------------- MILLICENT R. BARASCH, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated v. GPB CAPITAL HOLDINGS, LLC; DAVID GENTILE; WILLIAM JACOBY; MINCHUNG KGIL; MANUEL FREDERICO VIANNA; DOTTY J. BOLLINGER; MICHAEL FROST; EVAN MYRIANTHOPOULOS; ABHAYA SHRESTHA; MICHAEL COHN; STEVEN FRANGIONI; SCOTT NAUGLE; GPB HOLDINGS, LP; GPB HOLDINGS II, LP; GPB AUTOMOTIVE PORTFOLIO, LP; GPB COLD STORAGE, LP; GPB WASTE MANAGEMENT FUND, LP; GPB HOLDINGS III, LP; GPB HOLDINGS QUALIFIED, LP; GPB NYC DEVELOPMENT, LP; ASCENDANT CAPITAL, LLC; ASCENDANT ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES, LLC; AXIOM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, INC.; JEFFRY SCHNEIDER; MARK D. MARTINO; DJ PARTNERS LLC; MR RANGER, LLC; RSM US LLP (f/k/a McGLADREY LLP); EISNERAMPER LLP; GENTILE PISMENY & BRENGEL, LLP; CROWE, LLP; CROWE GLOBAL; DOE AUDITORS 1 through 10; PHOENIX AMERICAN FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.; CKFG HOLDING LLC; McANNA, LP; ROBERT KESSLER; GERALD FRANCESE; RINA CHERNAYA; and DIANA CHERNAYA, Case No. 1:19-cv-01079-LY (W.D. Tex., Nov. 6, 2019), seeks recoverable compensatory and other damages sustained by Plaintiff and the proposed class members, and for the rescission of all investments they made to the GPB Funds, as well as all transactions made by the GPB Funds to other entities in furtherance of the Defendants' fraudulent activities, which included selling unregistered securities, in violation of the Texas Securities Act. According to the complaint, GPB Capital Holdings, LLC ("GPB Capital"), led by its CEO David Gentile ("Gentile"), CFO William Jacoby ("Jacoby"), former CFO Minchung Kgil, and its directors and partners, ran a Ponzi scheme, by and through a series of limited partnerships--GPB Holdings, LP, GPB Holdings Qualified, LP, GPB Holdings II, LP, GPB Automotive Portfolio, LP, GPB Cold Storage, LP, GPB NYC Development, GPB Waste Management, LP, and GPB Holdings III, LP (collectively, "the GPB Funds"). Plaintiff Millicent R. Barasch through her sons, Jeffrey Barasch and Phillip Barasch in their capacities as powers of attorney and/or trustee of the Millicent Barasch Trust ("Plaintiff"), asserts that on the surface, the GPB Capital Ponzi scheme was a garden variety Ponzi scheme. Investors were promised 8% returns guaranteed, and those purported returns were generated not by actual investment returns, but by tapping the capital investments of the next round of investors (or, in some cases, from the capital accounts of the investor itself, cannibalizing a particular investor's own principal). GPB Capital was able to keep this enterprise afloat for several years, long enough to generate $1.8 billion in investment capital, a significant percentage of which was siphoned into the pockets of GPB Capital's principals. The Plaintiff was one of those individuals, who invested in the GPB Capital Ponzi scheme. The Plaintiff alleges that behind the public-facing facade of GPB Capital and the GPB Funds, however, lurked a complex web of entities and individuals, who propped up, facilitated, and financially benefitted, from the GPB Capital Ponzi scheme. Like an onion, the Plaintiff explains, every time you peel a layer off of the outer surface, you find another layer underneath, each layer ultimately profiting off of the investors, who put their money into the illegal machine of GPB Capital. Thus, GPB Capital (controlled by Gentile) bought the assets of the conglomerate controlled by Gentile and his associates, funneling money from the Plaintiff and investors into the pockets of Gentile and his associate. None of these improper and self-dealing transactions were disclosed. Through this action, the Plaintiff and other similarly situated investors seek to encompass the entirety of the onion that is GPB. In doing so, Plaintiff and the class seek to hold all responsible parties accountable for what at the end of the day is a $1.8 billion fraud on investors. GPB Capital Holdings, LLC, is a Delaware limited liability company with a principal place of business in New York City. GPB is the general partner of the GPB Funds and was at all relevant times the control person, manager, and majority owner of the GPB Funds. GPB, therefore, effected the GPB Funds' securities offerings. GPB is an investment advisor registered under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 ("IAA"). Each of the Defendants was involved in the operation, selling, or distribution of the GPB Funds. The GPB Funds were underwritten by, and thus originated from, Defendant Ascendant, which is located in Austin, Texas.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: L. Todd Kelly, Esq. THE CARLSON LAW FIRM, P.C. 11606 North Interstate Highway 35 Austin, TX 78753 Telephone: (512) 346-5688 Facsimile: (512) 719-4362 E-mail: tkellyefile@carlsonattorneys.com - and - David Meyer, Esq. Matthew R. Wilson, Esq. Michael J. Boyle, Jr., Esq. Courtney M. Werning, Esq. MEYER WILSON CO., LPA 1320 Dublin Road, Ste. 100 Columbus, OH 43215 Telephone: (614) 224-6000 Facsimile: (614) 224-6066 E-mail: dmeyer@meyerwilson.com mwilson@meyerwilson.com mboyle@meyerwilson.com cwerning@meyerwilson.com - and - Joseph Peiffer, Esq. PEIFFER WOLF CARR AND KANE, APLC 201 St. Charles Avenue, Suite 4314 New Orleans, LA 70170 Telephone: (504) 523-2434 Facsimile: (504) 523-2464 E-mail: jpeiffer@pwcklegal.com HCP INC: District Dismisses Boynton Firefighters Securities Suit ---------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, Boynton Beach Firefighters' Pension Fund, On Behalf of Itself and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. HCP, Inc., et al., Defendants, Case No. 3:16-cv-1106 (N.D. Ohio), Judge Jeffrey J. Helmick of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division, granted Defendants HCP, Lauralee E. Martin, Timothy Schoen, and Darren A. Kowalske's (the "HCP Defendants") motion to dismiss the Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, pursuant to Rule 9(b) and Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. HCP is a real estate investment trust ("REIT") that primarily leases the real property it owns to companies involved in the healthcare industry. Martin previously served as HCP's Chief Executive Officer and President, while Schoen was HCP's Executive VP and CFO. Kowalske served first as the Senior VP of Hospital and Post-Acute and the Executive VP of Asset Management, Senior Housing and Care. On April 7, 2011, HCP entered into an agreement with HCR ManorCare in which HCP purchased substantially all of HCR ManorCare, Inc.'s real estate assets and then leased those assets back to ManorCare. In connection with this transaction, HCP also acquired a 9.9% equity ownership interest in ManorCare. The Lead Plaintiffs allege ManorCare accounted for approximately 30% of HCP's revenue stream following these transactions. Lead Plaintiffs Societe Generale Securities Services GmbH and the City of Birmingham Retirement and Relief System allege ManorCare was heavily dependent upon revenue generated by unlawful and unsustainable billing practices, including alleged Medicare fraud. ManorCare, they allege, engaged in a variety of practices designed to increase revenues by increasing the percentage of services for which it could bill at Medicare's higher or highest reimbursement level, grouping patients together to permit physical and occupational therapists to bill for multiple therapy sessions at one time, and maximizing the length of a patient's stay in a ManorCare facility. The Lead Plaintiffs assert that, between 2009 and 2011, three individuals who previously worked as therapists for ManorCare each filed qui tam complaints to assert False Claims Act claims against ManorCare as a result of these billing practices. They further allege HCP had access to information concerning ManorCare's billing practices before completing the 2011 Transactions. In early 2013, the Department of Justice served a Civil Investigative Demand at ManorCare's corporate headquarters. That investigation led to the United States intervening in the qui tam actions in December 2014. The Lead Plaintiffs allege all the Defendants violated Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, and that the individual Defendants violated Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. They assert their securities fraud claims on behalf of a class of all individuals or entities who purchased or acquired HCP's common stock between March 30, 2015, and Feb. 8, 2016, inclusive. The HCP Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint. Pursuant to the parties' request, the Court held oral argument on Oct. 23, 2018. Defendants HCR ManorCare, Inc., Paul A Ormond, and Steven M. Cavanaugh ("ManorCare Defendants") also filed a motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint. After briefing on that motion was completed and oral argument was held, the Defendants and the Plaintiff stipulated to the voluntary dismissal without prejudice of the claims against the ManorCare Defendants. The Lead Plaintiffs allege the HCP Defendants offered or failed to correct their false or misleading statements with the intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud the market so that HCP could sell approximately $1.35 billion of newly-issued securities to investors. A court seeking to determine whether the plaintiff has adequately pled scienter reviews all of the plaintiff's allegations collectively and considers a non-exhaustive list of nine factors: (1) insider trading at a suspicious time or in an unusual amount; (2) divergence between internal reports and external statements on the same subject; (3) closeness in time of an allegedly fraudulent statement or omission and the later disclosure of inconsistent information; (4) evidence of bribery by a top company official; (5) existence of an ancillary lawsuit charging fraud by a company and the company's quick settlement of that suit; (6) disregard of the most current factual information before making statements; (7) disclosure of accounting information in such a way that its negative implications could only be understood by someone with a high degree of sophistication; (8) the personal interest of certain directors in not informing disinterested directors of an impending sale of stock; and (9) the self-interested motivation of defendants in the form of saving their salaries or jobs. The Lead Plaintiffs assert the Complaint alleges facts implicating the first, second, third, fifth, sixth, seventh, and ninth Helwig v. Vencor, Inc. factors. They implicitly concede the Complaint does not include allegations which would implicate the fourth or eighth Helwig factors. Judge Helmick finds that (i) the Complaint does not contain allegations of insider trading; (ii) the allegations in the Complaint show the HCP Defendants acknowledged the DOJ was investigating ManorCare and offered reasons why HCP believed that investigation would not adversely impact HCP's ability to collect lease payments; (iii) the Lead Plaintiffs fail to plead allegations which could prove that HCP made adverse disclosures approximately two and three months after offering positive evaluations of ManorCare's business and the likelihood ManorCare would continue to pay its lease payments on time; (iv) while the Lead Plaintiffs argue they have alleged facts implicating this factor, they do not identify any in their brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss; (v) the Lead Plaintiffs do not allege HCP failed to accurately report either the initial revenue number or the corrected revenue number; and (vi) the Lead Plaintiffs do not allege that any of the individual Defendants acted to save their salaries or jobs. The Judge further finds that Lead Plaintiffs' allegations fail to establish a strong inference of scienter. The Lead Plaintiffs have not offered any facts which support their argument that the HCP Defendants must have known ManorCare's revenues were irreversibly declining and it was on its way to bankruptcy. They fail to show a reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter to be at least as strong as the countervailing inference that the HCP Defendants had no knowledge of or reason to suspect the allegedly fraudulent billing scheme ManorCare used from 2006 to 2012 had improperly inflated ManorCare's past revenues and had undermined the reliability of those past revenues as a data point for ManorCare's future viability. HCP's heavy reliance on income from ManorCare, while perhaps a poor business strategy, is not evidence of scienter which could support Lead Plaintiffs' securities fraud claims. Because he has concluded the Lead Plaintiffs fail to allege sufficient facts to create a strong inference of scienter, Judge Helmick finds it unnecessary to consider the parties' arguments concerning the remaining elements of the Lead Plaintiffs' Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims. The Lead Plaintiffs also claim Martin, Schoen, and Kowalske violated Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. When a plaintiff's Section 10(b) claims have been dismissed, the plaintiff's related Section 20(a) claims also are subject to dismissal. Therefore, the Judge also grants the HCP Defendants' motion as to these claims. For the reasons he stated, Judge Helmick granted the HCP Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 22, 2019 Memorandum Opinion & Order is available at https://is.gd/lhaK42 from Leagle.com. Boynton Beach Firefighters' Pension Fund, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Scott D. Simpkins, Climaco, Wilcox, Peca, Tarantino & Garofoli, Avi Josefson, Bernstein, Litowitz, Berger & Grossman, Gerald H. Silk, Bernstein, Litowitz, Berger & Grossman, Jack Landskroner, Landskroner Law Firm, John R. Climaco -- jrclim@climacolaw.com -- Climaco, Wilcox, Peca, Tarantino & Garofoli & Rebecca E. Boon -- Rebecca.Boon@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein, Litowitz, Berger & Grossman. Public Employees' Retirement System of Mississippi, Plaintiff, represented by Ross M. Shikowitz, Bernstein, Litowitz, Berger & Grossman, Jack Landskroner, Landskroner Law Firm & Scott D. Simpkins, Climaco, Wilcox, Peca, Tarantino & Garofoli. HCP, Inc., Lauralee E. Martin, originally named as & Timothy Schoen, Defendants, represented by Audra J. Soloway -- asoloway@paulweiss.com -- Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, Daniel J. Kramer -- dkramer@paulweiss.com -- Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, James A. King -- jking@porterwright.com -- Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur & Kirsten R. Fraser -- kfraser@porterwright.com -- Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur. Darren A. Kowalske, Defendant, represented by James A. King, Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur & Kirsten R. Fraser, Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur. Albert J Belle, Movant, represented by Katherine C. Ferguson, Kooperman Gillespie Mentel. Societe Generale Securities Services GmbH, Movant, represented by Christopher F. Moriarty, Motley Rice, Darren J. Robbins, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, Gregg S. Levin, Motley Rice, Jack Reise, Law Office of Robert J. Hunt, pro hac vice, Joseph F. Rice, Motley Rice, Nathan R. Lindell, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, Sara B. Polychron, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, Tricia L. McCormick, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, William H. Narwold, Motley Rice, Jack Landskroner, Landskroner Law Firm & Richard M. Kerger, Kerger Law Firm. City of Birmingham Retirement and Relief System, Movant, represented by Darren J. Robbins, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, Gregg S. Levin, Motley Rice, Jack Reise, Law Office of Robert J. Hunt, pro hac vice, Nathan R. Lindell, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, Sara B. Polychron, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, Tricia L. McCormick, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, Jack Landskroner, Landskroner Law Firm & Richard M. Kerger, Kerger Law Firm. HOME OWNERS MGMT: Supreme Ct. Upholds Arbitration Order in Robinson ------------------------------------------------------------------- In the case captioned NATHAN ROBINSON AND MISTI ROBINSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Petitioners, v. HOME OWNERS MANAGEMENT ENTERPRISES, INC. D/B/A HOME OF TEXAS AND WARRANTY UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondents, Case No. 18-0504 (Tex.), Judge Eva M. Guzman of the Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the court of appeal's denial of motion to compel arbitration of class claims under the parties' arbitration agreement. The arbitration dispute between homeowners and their home-warranty company began as an individual action for construction-defect damages and evolved into a putative class action complaining about "deliberately overbroad" releases the warranty company allegedly "demanded" before making covered repairs. Only the class claims are at issue in the appeal. The homeowners, Nathan and Misti Robinson, purchased a newly constructed residential home that was enrolled in a limited warranty program operated by Home Owners Management Enterprises, Inc. and Warranty Underwriters Insurance ("HOME"). When construction-related defects were discovered, the Robinsons sued HOME and other Defendants alleging the defects were not promptly or properly resolved. Over the Robinsons' vigorous opposition, the trial court abated the case and compelled arbitration in accordance with the terms of the limited warranty and its addendum. Yet, with less than a month before the scheduled arbitration, the Robinsons filed an amended statement of claims seeking to add class-action claims against HOME to the arbitration proceeding. The new -- and entirely independent -- claims alleged that HOME routinely demanded overbroad releases as a precondition to fulfilling its warranty obligations. HOME promptly filed written objections to the amended statement and moved to strike the class claims from the arbitration proceeding. The following week, mere days before the arbitration began, the arbitrator denied HOME's objections and motion to strike "in its entirety," but bifurcated the class claims from the Robinsons' construction-defect claims. After arbitration on the Robinsons' individual claims had concluded, but before the arbitrator had issued a decision, HOME asked the trial court to clarify the "scope of the issues" referred to the arbitrator and, in the alternative, to strike the Robinsons' class claims. While HOME's motion was pending in the trial court, the arbitrator ruled against HOME on the warranty claims and awarded the Robinsons substantial damages, costs, and fees. Furthermore, and in accordance with the arbitration agreement's terms, the arbitrator awarded HOME the costs and fees it had incurred compelling arbitration over the Robinsons' resistance. With the arbitrator's award in hand, the Robinsons returned to the trial court to file a "Statement of Claims, Individually and as the Representatives of All Persons Similarly Situated." Once again, the Robinsons' putative class action alleged HOME refused to pay for home repairs unless the homeowners executed overbroad releases. But this time, the Robinsons did not resist arbitration; they demanded it, asserting HOME was required to arbitrate the class claims under the broad arbitration provisions in the limited warranty and addendum. HOME responded with a motion to dismiss, disputing that the arbitration agreement authorized class arbitration and arguing that only the court, not the arbitrator, could make that determination. The trial court ruled in HOME's favor. Affirming the trial court's conclusion that availability of class arbitration is a gateway issue for the court, the appeals court declined to follow the Court's In re Wood decision, which held that an arbitrator should rule on class certification issues when an arbitration agreement is governed by the FAA and the parties have agreed to submit all disputes arising out of the agreement to the arbitrator. After surveying federal authority issued after Wood, the appeals court concluded that Wood was based entirely on presumably binding Supreme Court authority that has since proved to be a chimera and thus was not binding authority because it did not really 'squarely decide' the issue. Having concluded the trial court properly assumed the role of decider, the appeals court then examined the arbitration agreement's text to determine whether the agreement evinced the parties' plain intent that class-based claims would be arbitrated. Adhering to the Supreme Court's mandate that a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so, the appeals court found no agreement to arbitrate class claims because the agreement contained not one word about class arbitration. The Robinsons' petition for review presents three issues: (1) who decides whether parties have agreed to class arbitration; (2) whether the Robinsons and HOME agreed to class arbitration; and (3) whether HOME otherwise consented or acquiesced to arbitration of the class claims. Though an order denying an arbitration demand is reviewed for abuse of discretion, the issues on appeal present only questions of law, which are subject to de novo review. Considering the fundamental differences between bilateral and class arbitration, and the bedrock principle that a party cannot be forced to arbitrate any dispute absent a binding agreement to do so, Judge Guzman holds that a court must determine, as a gateway matter, whether an arbitration agreement permits class arbitration unless the parties have clearly and unmistakably agreed otherwise. The class arbitration implicates what must be arbitrated and who must arbitrate, matters that are presumptively for the court's determination. Because the arbitration agreements at issue are silent as to arbitrability and do not mention class claims at all, the lower courts correctly determined HOME was not bound to arbitrate the Robinsons' putative class claims. Judge Guzman affirmed the court of appeals' judgment. A full-text copy of the Texas Supreme Court's Nov. 22, 2019 Opinion is available at https://is.gd/kQljfn from Leagle.com. Evan 'Van' L. Shaw -- info@shawlawoffice.com -- Jennifer W. Johnson, Mark A. Ticer, for Misti Robinson and Nathan Robinson, Petitioners. Edward J. Baines -- ted.baines@saul.com -- Curt M. Covington -- curt@lrclegal.com -- for Home Owners Management Enterprises, Inc., Respondent. IC SYSTEM: Makurat Moves for Class Certification Under Damasco -------------------------------------------------------------- Kari Makurat moves the Court to certify the class described in the complaint of the lawsuit titled KARI MAKURAT, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. I.C. SYSTEM, INC., Case No. 2:20-cv-00027 (E.D. Wisc.), and further asks that the Court both stay the motion for class certification and to grant the Plaintiff (and the Defendant) relief from the Local Rules setting automatic briefing schedules and requiring briefs and supporting material to be filed with the Motion. Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class action complaint could moot a class representative's case by depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016). To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the certification motion. Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs."). While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class, the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June 20, 2017). The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D. Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut, Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 24, 2016). The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff avers. As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends. The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative, and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class counsel.[CC] The Plaintiff is represented by: John D. Blythin, Esq. Mark A. Eldridge, Esq. Jesse Fruchter, Esq. Ben J. Slatky, Esq. ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP 3620 East Layton Avenue Cudahy, WI 53110 Telephone: (414) 482-8000 Facsimile: (414) 482-8001 E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com meldridge@ademilaw.com jfruchter@ademilaw.com bslatky@ademilaw.com ILLINOIS: Court Denies Class Certification in Inmates' Suit ----------------------------------------------------------- The United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois issued a Memorandum and Order dismissing in part Plaintiff's Claims in the case captioned TRAVIS WESTON, (also known as Nafiabdul Basir), on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, #M07414, Plaintiff, v. JOHN BALDWIN, JACQUELINE LASHBROOK, FRANK LAWRENCE, LLOYD HANNA, HOWARD HARNER, and JAMES CLAYCOMB, Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-01020-NJR (S.D. Ill.). The case came before the Court for preliminary review of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915A, which requires the Court to screen prisoner Complaints to filter out nonmeritorious claims. Plaintiff Travis Weston, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center (Menard), brings this action for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Weston asserts claims under the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). Any portion of the Complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or requests money damages from an immune defendant must be dismissed. At this juncture, the factual allegations of the pro se complaint are liberally construed. The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The designations do not constitute an opinion regarding their merit. Any other claim that is mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly pleading standard. Counts 1-3 It is well-established that a prisoner is entitled to practice his religion insofar as doing so does not unduly burden the administration of the prison. To state a claim under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment, a plaintiff must allege facts to plausibly suggest that his right to practice his chosen religion was burdened in a significant way. A religious diet is substantially burdened when officials force an inmate to choose between his religious practice and adequate nutrition. Weston's allegations are sufficient to proceed on his claims in Counts 1-3 against Claycomb, Harner, Lawrence, and Hanna. Count 4 Inmates are afforded broader religious protections under RLUIPA, which prohibits prisons receiving federal funds from imposing a substantial burden on an inmate's religious exercise unless prison officials can demonstrate that imposition of the burden on that person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. Although Weston has generally stated a colorable RLUIPA claim, RLUIPA does not authorize a suit for money damages against defendants in their individual capacities. Therefore, the RLUIPA claim in Count 4 against Defendants in their individual capacities shall be dismissed with prejudice. But a court may order injunctive relief to correct a violation of RLUIPA. As the Warden of Menard, Frank Lawrence is a proper defendant for injunctive relief. Lawrence will be added in his official capacity, and the RLUIPA claim shall proceed only against him. Count 5 To state a claim for retaliation under the First Amendment, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected speech (2) he suffered a deprivation likely to deter protected speech and (3) his protected speech was a motivating factor in the defendants' actions. A complaint states a claim for retaliation when it sets forth a chronology of events from which retaliation may plausibly be inferred. Weston's allegations are sufficient for the retaliation claim in Count 5 to proceed against Claycomb. Count 6 Weston's allegations are sufficient for the claim in Count 6 to proceed against Baldwin, Lashbrook and Lawrence. To the extent a RLUIPA claim is raised in Count 6, it will proceed only against Lawrence in his official capacity as the Warden of Menard. Counts 7 and 8 An Illinois negligence claim for personal injuries requires the plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, and an injury proximately caused by that breach. To state a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress under Illinois law, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that defendant owed plaintiff a duty; (2) that defendant breached that duty; and (3) that plaintiff's injury was proximately caused by that breach. Weston bases his state law claims on the facts that serve as the basis for Counts 1-3. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the claims because they involve the same facts as the federal claims. At the screening stage, Weston's allegations are sufficient to proceed on the claims in Counts 7 and 8 against Claycomb, Harner, Hanna, and Lawrence. Class action Weston purports to bring a class action on behalf of unknown plaintiffs who are similarly situated. Weston is the only individual who signed the Complaint, and the Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. Because Weston is proceeding pro se, he cannot represent a class of plaintiffs. Therefore, to the extent that Weston seeks class certification, the request is denied, rules the Court. Count 1 will proceed against Claycomb. Count 2 will proceed against Harner and Lawrence. Count 3 will proceed against Hanna and Claycomb. Count 4 will proceed against Lawrence in his official capacity as the Warden of Menard Correctional Center and is dismissed as to the remaining Defendants. Count 5 will proceed against Claycomb. Count 6 will proceed against Baldwin, Lashbrook and Lawrence but the RLUIPA claim will proceed only against Lawrence in his official capacity as the Warden of Menard Correctional Center. Counts 7 and 8 will proceed against Claycomb, Harner, Hanna, and Lawrence. A full-text copy of the District Court's December 2, 2019 Memorandum and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/qpfle2f from Leagle.com. Travis Weston also known as Nafiabdul Basir, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff, pro se. INNOPHOS HOLDINGS: Faces Kappelman Suit Over Merger With One Rock ----------------------------------------------------------------- Gary Kappelman, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. INNOPHOS HOLDINGS, INC., KIM ANN MINK, GARY CAPPELINE, JANE HILK, LINDA MYRICK, KAREN OSAR, JOHN M. STEITZ, PETER T. THOMAS, and ROBERT J. ZATTA, Case No. 1:20-cv-00039-UNA (D. Del., Jan. 13, 2020), is brought against Innophos Holdings, Inc. and the members of the Company's board of directors for their violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, in connection with the proposed merger between Innophos and an affiliate of One Rock Capital Partners, LLC. On October 20, 2019, Innophos entered into an Agreement and Plan of Merger, pursuant to which the Company's shareholders will receive $32.00 in cash for each share of Innophos common stock they own. On December 6, 2019, in order to convince Innophos' shareholders to vote in favor of the Proposed Merger, the Defendants authorized the filing of a materially incomplete and misleading definitive proxy statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission, in violation of the Exchange Act, the Plaintiff alleges. In particular, the Plaintiff says, the Proxy contains materially incomplete and misleading information concerning: (i) financial projections for Innophos; and (ii) the valuation analyses performed by Innophos' financial advisor Lazard Freres & Co. LLC, in support of their fairness opinion. The special meeting of Innophos shareholders to vote on the Proposed Merger was scheduled on January 15, 2020. The record date to participate in the Shareholder Vote is for Innophos holders as of November 25, 2019. As a direct and proximate result of the dissemination of the misleading Proxy the Defendants used to obtain stockholder approval of the Proposed Merger, the Plaintiff and the Class will suffer damages and actual economic losses (i.e. the difference between the value they received as a result of the Proposed Merger and the true value of their shares prior to the Proposed Merger) in an amount to be determined at trial, according to the complaint. For these reasons, the Plaintiff asserts claims against the Defendants for violations of the Exchange Act. The Plaintiff seeks to recover damages resulting from the Defendants' violations of the Exchange Act, says the complaint. The Plaintiff is a holder of Innophos common stock. Innophos is an international producer of specialty ingredient solutions for the food, health, nutrition, and industrial markets.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Juan E. Monteverde, Esq. Miles D. Schreiner, Esq. MONTEVERDE & ASSOCIATES PC The Empire State Building 350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 4405 New York, NY 10118 Phone: 212-971-1341 Fax: 212-202-7880 Email: jmonteverde@monteverdelaw.com mschreiner@monteverdelaw.com - and - Guri Ademi, Esq. Jesse Fruchter, Esq. ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP 3620 East Layton Avenue Cudahy, WI 53110 Phone: (414) 482-8000 Fax: (414) 482-8001 Email: gademi@ademilaw.com jfruchter@ademilaw.com - and - Blake A. Bennett, Esq. COOCH AND TAYLOR, P.A. The Nemours Building 1007 N. Orange St., Suite 1120 Wilmington, DE 19801 Phone: (302) 984-3800 INSTRUCTURE INC: Faces Post Securities Suit Over Thoma Bravo Sale ----------------------------------------------------------------- Joseph Post, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. INSTRUCTURE, INC., JOSH COATES, DAN GOLDSMITH, STEVEN A. COLLINS, WILLIAM M. CONROY, ELLEN LEVY, KEVIN THOMPSON, and LLOYD G. WATERHOUSE, Case No. 1:20-cv-00034-UNA (D. Del., Jan. 13, 2020), stems from a proposed transaction, pursuant to which Instructure will be acquired by affiliates of a fund managed by Thoma Bravo, LLC. On December 4, 2019, Instructure's Board of Directors caused the Company to enter into an agreement and plan of merger with PIV Purchaser, LLC and PIV Merger Sub, Inc. Pursuant to the terms of the Merger Agreement, Instructure's stockholders will receive $47.60 in cash for each share of Instructure common stock they own. On January 2, 2020, the Defendants filed a proxy statement with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission in connection with the Proposed Transaction, which scheduled a stockholder vote on the Proposed Transaction for February 13, 2020. The Plaintiff contends that the Proxy Statement omits material information with respect to the Proposed Transaction, which renders the Proxy Statement false and misleading. The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in connection with the Proxy Statement because it omits material information regarding the Company's financial projections. The Proxy Statement also omits material information regarding the analyses performed by the Company's financial advisor in connection with the Proposed Transaction, J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, the Plaintiff asserts. The Plaintiff adds that the Proxy Statement fails to disclose the timing and nature of all communications regarding "Instructure's recent modifications of its stock-based compensation policies," including who participated in all such discussions, which resulted in "an increase in operating expenses starting in January 2020." The omissions and false and misleading statements in the Proxy Statement are material in that a reasonable stockholder will consider them important in deciding how to vote on the Proposed Transaction, the Plaintiff argues. Because of the false and misleading statements in the Proxy Statement, the Plaintiff and the Class are threatened with irreparable harm, says the complaint. The Plaintiff is the owner of Instructure common stock. Instructure is a leading software-as-a-service technology company that provides learning management system software to the global education market and employee development and engagement solutions for people focused companies via its Bridge platform.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Brian D. Long, Esq. Gina M. Serra, Esq. RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A. 300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220 Wilmington, DE 19801 Phone: (302) 295-5310 Facsimile: (302) 654-7530 Email: bdl@rl-legal.com gms@rl-legal.com - and - Richard A. Maniskas, Esq. RM LAW, P.C. 1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300 Berwyn, PA 19312 Phone: (484) 324-6800 Facsimile: (484) 631-1305 Email: rm@maniskas.com INSTRUCTURE RESOURCES: Zhang Balks at Planned Sale to Thoma Bravo ----------------------------------------------------------------- ZIYANG ZHANG, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. INSTRUCTURE RESOURCES, INC., JOSEPH A. MILLS, MATTHEW BONANNO, EVAN LEDERMAN, JOHN V. LOVOI, PAUL B. LOYD, JR., MICHAEL RALEIGH, ANDREW TAYLOR, and ANTHONY TRIPODO, the Defendants, Case No. 1:20-cv-00042-UNA (D. Del., Jan. 13, 2020), accuses the Defendants of violating securities laws in connection with their proposed sale of the Company to Thoma Bravo. The lawsuit is a stockholder class action brought against the Defendants for violations of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and for breaches of fiduciary duty as a result of their efforts to sell the Company to PIV Purchaser, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company ("Parent"), and PIV Merger Sub, Inc., a Delaware corporation and a direct wholly owned subsidiary of Parent ("Merger Sub," and with Parent, "Thoma Bravo"), as a result of an unfair process for an unfair price. The Plaintiff challenges and seeks to enjoin an upcoming stockholder vote on a proposed transaction by which Thoma Bravo will acquire each issued and outstanding share of Instructure for an inadequate and insufficient price. Both companies' boards of directors have approved the deal. Pursuant to the terms of the definitive Agreement and Plan of Merger entered into by and among Instructure and Thoma Bravo on December 4, 2019, Thoma Bravo will acquire all of the outstanding shares of Instructure common stock, in compensation for which, Instructure stockholders will be entitled to receive only $47.60 in cash for every Instructure share they own. On December 23, 2019, Instructure filed a Preliminary Proxy Statement on Schedule 14A (the "Preliminary Proxy") with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission in support of the Proposed Transaction, followed by the January 2, 2020 filing of the Definitive Proxy Statement and January 7, 2020 filing of the Revised Definitive Proxy Statement on Schedule 14A. The Plaintiff alleges that the Proxy is wholly insufficient and provides either materially misleading and or insufficient information for Instructure stockholders to properly analyze whether to vote in favor of the Proposed Transaction, and is therefore, a continuation of the Board's breaches of fiduciary duty. The Plaintiff contends that the Proposed Transaction is unfair and undervalued for a number of reasons. The Plaintiff notes that the Proxy describes an insufficient sales process in which the Board only paid lip service to its fiduciary duties. In fact, only 20 days passed (over the Thanksgiving holiday) between the Company announcing a strategic review and reaching a deal with Thoma Bravo. In addition to Thoma Bravo's interest in the Proposed Transaction, the deal may also be tainted by conflicts of interest of the directors and Company executives. Certain of the Company's directors and senior executive officers may have been motivated to enter into the Proposed Transaction in order to receive benefits not shared equally with the Plaintiff and members of the Class, the Plaintiff says. Under the terms of the Merger Agreement, all illiquid Company options and other incentive awards will vest no later than seven days before the effective date of the Proposed Transaction, the Plaintiff adds. If the Proposed Transaction is approved, the Plaintiff asserts, the Individual Defendants will have breached their fiduciary duties of loyalty and due care by, inter alia, agreeing to sell Instructure without first taking steps to ensure that Plaintiff and Class members who are the minority stockholders of the Company, would obtain adequate and fair consideration under the circumstances. The Plaintiff adds that the Proxy is materially deficient and deprives Instructure stockholders of the information they need to make an intelligent, informed and rational decision of whether to vote their shares in favor of the Proposed Transaction. According to the complaint, the Proxy omits and/or misrepresents material information concerning, among other things: (a) the sales process leading up to the Proposed Transaction; (b) the Company's financial projections; (c) Citizen's financial projections; and (d) the data and inputs underlying the financial valuation analyses that purport to support the fairness opinions provided by the "Financial Advisor" to the Board, J.P. Morgan Securities, LLC ("J.P. Morgan"). Absent judicial intervention, the Merger will be consummated, resulting in irreparable injury to Plaintiff and the Class. Accordingly, the action seeks to enjoin the Proposed Transaction and compel the Individual Defendants to properly exercise their fiduciary duties to Instructure's stockholders, and to recover damages resulting from violations of federal securities laws by Defendants, the lawsuit adds. The Plaintiff alleges that he, along with all other public stockholders of Instructure common stock, are entitled to enjoin the Proposed Transaction or, alternatively, to recover damages in the event that the Proposed Transaction is consummated. The Plaintiff is and has been a stockholder of Instructure. Instructure provides applications for learning, assessment, and performance management through a software-as-a-service business model worldwide. It develops Canvas, a learning management platform for higher education; and Bridge, an employee development and engagement platform.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Blake A. Bennett, Esq. COOCH AND TAYLOR, P.A. 1007 N. Orange Street, Suite 1120 Wilmington, DE 19801 Telephone: (302) 984-3800 - and - Marc L. Ackerman, Esq. Ryan P. Cardona, Esq. BRODSKY & SMITH, LLC Two Bala Plaza, Suite 510 Bala Cynwyd, PA 19004 Telephone: (610) 667-6200 Facsimile: (610) 667-9029 E-mail: mackerman@brodskysmith.com rcardona@brodskysmith.com JPMORGAN CHASE: Court Awards $731M Attorneys' Fees in Merryman Suit ------------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, BENJAMIN MICHAEL MERRYMAN, AMY WHITAKER MERRYMAN TRUST, B MERRYMAN AND A MERRYMAN 4TH GENERATION REMAINDER TRUST AND CHESTER COUNTY EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT FUND, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Defendant, Civil Action No. 1:15-cv-09188-VEC (S.D. N.Y.), Judge Valerie Caproni of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement of Litigation Expenses. The Plaintiffs are owners of American Depositary Receipts ("ADRs") held on deposit by J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. ("JPM"). ADRs are negotiable United States securities that enable holders to obtain ownership of publicly traded shares in foreign corporations. Pursuant to Deposit Agreements between JPM, the foreign issuer, and the registered owners of the ADRs, JPM converted dividends or cash distributions received from the foreign companies into U.S. dollars before distributing them to the owners of the ADRs. The Plaintiffs claim that during the conversion into U.S. dollars, JPM added a spread over and above the foreign exchange rates it obtained. In adding this spread, the Plaintiffs allege the Defendant breached the Deposit Agreements. On May 1, 2015, the Merryman Plaintiffs, represented by Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Arkansas. The complaint asserted claims against Defendant for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and conversion. The Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on several grounds, including lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. On Nov. 19, 2015, the Plaintiffs' complaint was dismissed, without prejudice, for lack of personal jurisdiction. Two days later, on Nov. 21, 2015, the Merryman Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Court, again alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and conversion. On Dec. 8, 2015, the Defendant wrote to the Court regarding Merryman v. Citigroup, Inc. et al., No. 15-CV-9185 (CM) ("Citi"), a parallel case pending in the New York District. The Plaintiffs acknowledged the similarity between the two cases but requested that they remain separate because they concerned different defendants and a different set of agreements. The Court did not combine or coordinate the two cases. On Jan. 22, 2016, JPM moved to dismiss the Complaint. The motion argued, among other things, that: (1) the Plaintiffs' claims were barred by the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act ("SLUSA"); (2) the Plaintiffs lacked contractual standing under the Deposit Agreements; (3) the Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring claims on behalf of all JPM-sponsored ADRs; (4) the Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for breach of contract; and (5) the Plaintiffs' claims for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing and conversion were duplicative of the breach of contract claim. On Sept. 29, 2016, the Defendant's motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part. On Nov. 21, 2016, the Plaintiffs filed an Amended Class Action Complaint, adding Chester County Employees Retirement Fund as a plaintiff and adding claims for ADRs owned by Chester County; the Amended Complaint did not otherwise change the causes of action or theories of liability. The Defendant again moved to dismiss and the motion to dismiss was again granted in part and denied in part. After months of written discovery, depositions, expert discovery, and additional negotiations, the Parties reached an agreement in principle on April 12, 2018. The Settlement Agreement provides for $9.5 million, less any attorneys' fees and litigation expenses, notice and administration costs, and taxes, to be distributed to the eligible Class Members according to the court-approved plan of allocation. By Order dated Nov. 22, 2019, the Court certified a settlement class pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and approved the parties' Settlement Agreement as fair and adequate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e). The Court also approved the parties' Plan of Allocation. The Class Counsel requests (i) one third of the settlement amount, or $3,166,666.67 as attorneys' fee, (ii) reimbursement of $264,680.05 in litigation expenses, and (iii) Class Counsel requests Service Awards of $2,500 each to the Merryman Plaintiffs and Chester County. The Merryman Plaintiffs received $20,000 from the Citi Settlement Agreement. Judge Caproni finds that the although the Kessler Firm suggests that it is, therefore, taking a slight haircut, its fee request is shockingly high given the circumstances of the case. In particular, "scrutiny of the unique circumstances" surrounding the case, namely the case's procedural history and its marked similarity to the Citi case, necessitates a significant reduction of the lodestar. After consideration of the Goldberger factors and significantly recalculating Class Counsel's lodestar, Judge Caproni finds an award of $731,063.99 to be reasonable. As for the expert expenses, the Class counsel retained two experts in the case; 8Rivers Capital to prepare a damages methodology and calculate class-wide damages and HF Media, LLC to design the modified class notice program. The Class Counsel requests $167,400 for 8Rivers's fee and $7,560.60 for HF Media, LLC's fee, totaling $174,960.60. Because the Class Counsel did not even attempt to show that there was not substantial duplication of the expert's work between these two cases, Judge Caproni reduces the requested amount by 75%. Accordingly, Judge Caproni will award $41,850 as reimbursement for work performed by 8Rivers and $7,560.60 for work done by HF Media, LLC, totaling $49,410.60 in reimbursement for expert expenses. The Class Counsel seeks reimbursement of $16,536.21 in travel expenses. The amount is unreasonably high, Judge Caproni opines. Specifically, the Judge finds the Class Counsel's caps, particularly $500 per night for lodging, $20 per person for breakfast, and $50 per person for dinner, to be too generous. The Class Counsel also fails to indicate whether it has a policy prohibiting its attorneys from charging alcohol to the client. Lastly, the Class Counsel provides inadequate detail regarding the expenses incurred during the six depositions taken in New York. For these reasons, the Judge reduces the requested travel expenses by 20%. Accordingly, Judge Caproni awards $13,228.97 in travel expenses. The Class Counsel requests $16,129.78 for the cost of online legal and factual research. Because despite the Court putting the Counsel on notice that it might not allow reimbursement for computerized legal research services, the Counsel failed to do so, all of the costs for these expenses will be disallowed. The Class Counsel's request for $1,133 in court fees is reasonable; those costs will be allowed. In sum, the Court awards $63,772.57 as reimbursement for expert expenses, travel expenses, and court fees. Finally, the Class Counsel requests Service Awards of $2,500 each to the Merryman Plaintiffs and Chester County. The Merryman Plaintiffs received $20,000 from the Citi Settlement Agreement. It is difficult to believe that any incremental work done by them in this case warrants an additional $2,500. As a result, Judge Caproni awards nothing to the Merryman Plaintiffs. Judge Caproni awards the requested $2,500 to Chester County, which also received a service award of $2,500 in the Citi case. For reasons stated, Judge Caproni granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Litigation Expenses. The Class Counsel is awarded attorneys' fees of $731,063.99 and reimbursement of expenses in the sum of $63,772.57. The Judge awarded a service fee of $2,500 to Chester County. A full-text copy of Judge Caproni's Nov. 22, 2019 Opinion & Order is available at https://is.gd/S61Db6 from Leagle.com. Benjamin Michael Merryman, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Christopher Mulveny, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Ethan J. Barlieb, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Geoffrey Coyle Jarvis, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Jennifer L. Enck, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Jonathan Flexer Neumann, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Joseph H. Meltzer -- jmeltzer@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP & Sharan Nirmul -- snirmul@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP. Amy Whitaker Merryman Trust, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated & B Merryman and A Merryman 4th Generation Remainder Trust, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Daniel Christopher Mulveny, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Ethan J. Barlieb, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Geoffrey Coyle Jarvis, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Jennifer L. Enck, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Jonathan Flexer Neumann, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Joseph H. Meltzer, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Zachary Arbitman, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP & Sharan Nirmul, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP. Chester County Retirement Board, Plaintiff, represented by Sharan Nirmul, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP. Chester County Employees Retirement Fund, Plaintiff, represented by Geoffrey Coyle Jarvis, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Jennifer L. Enck, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Jonathan Flexer Neumann, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Joseph H. Meltzer, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Zachary Arbitman, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP & Sharan Nirmul, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., Defendant, represented by Susan Leslie Saltzstein, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Franklin B. Velie, Pierce Bainbridge Beck Price & Hecht, LLP, Jeffrey S. Geier, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Jonathan G. Kortmansky -- jkortmansky@piercebainbridge.com -- Pierce Bainbridge Beck Price & Hecht, LLP & Marco Enrique Schnabl -- marco.schnabl@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. JPMORGAN CHASE: Settlement in Merryman Suit Gets Final Approval --------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, BENJAMIN MICHAEL MERRYMAN, AMY WHITAKER MERRYMAN TRUST, B MERRYMAN AND A MERRYMAN 4TH GENERATION REMAINDER TRUST AND CHESTER COUNTY EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT FUND, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Defendant, Civil Action No. 1:15-cv-09188-VEC (S.D. N.Y.), Judge Valerie Caproni of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York fully and finally approved the parties' Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement dated June 12, 2018. Having reviewed and considered the Stipulation, all papers filed and proceedings held in connection with the Settlement, all oral and written comments received regarding the Settlement, and the record in the Litigation, and good cause appearing therefor, Judge Caproni finds that the Settlement is, in all respects, fair, reasonable and adequate to the Settlement Class. The Judge finally certified, solely for purposes of effectuating the Settlement, the Litigation as a class action on behalf of a Settlement Class defined as all Persons or entities who are or were holders (directly or indirectly, registered or beneficially) of or otherwise claim any entitlement to any payment (whether a dividend, rights offering, interest on capital, sale of shares or other distribution) in connection with (1) the securities listed in Appendix 1 to the Stipulation (including any predecessor or successor securities) from Nov. 21, 2010 to July 18, 2018, inclusive; or (2) the securities listed in Appendix 2 to the Stipulation (including any predecessor or successor securities) from Nov. 21, 2012 to July 18, 2018, inclusive. The Plaintiffs are appointed, for purposes of effectuating the Settlement only, as the representatives for the Settlement Class. Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, which was appointed by the Court to serve as the Lead Counsel, is appointed, for settlement purposes only, as the counsel for the Settlement Class. A full-text copy of Judge Caproni's Nov. 22, 2019 Order & Final Judgment is available at https://is.gd/7bOzis from Leagle.com. Benjamin Michael Merryman, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Christopher Mulveny, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Ethan J. Barlieb, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Geoffrey Coyle Jarvis, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Jennifer L. Enck, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Jonathan Flexer Neumann, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Joseph H. Meltzer -- jmeltzer@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP & Sharan Nirmul -- snirmul@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP. Amy Whitaker Merryman Trust, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated & B Merryman and A Merryman 4th Generation Remainder Trust, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Daniel Christopher Mulveny, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Ethan J. Barlieb, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Geoffrey Coyle Jarvis, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Jennifer L. Enck, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Jonathan Flexer Neumann, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Joseph H. Meltzer, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Zachary Arbitman, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP & Sharan Nirmul, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP. Chester County Retirement Board, Plaintiff, represented by Sharan Nirmul, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP. Chester County Employees Retirement Fund, Plaintiff, represented by Geoffrey Coyle Jarvis, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Jennifer L. Enck, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Jonathan Flexer Neumann, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Joseph H. Meltzer, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Zachary Arbitman, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP & Sharan Nirmul, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., Defendant, represented by Susan Leslie Saltzstein, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Franklin B. Velie, Pierce Bainbridge Beck Price & Hecht, LLP, Jeffrey S. Geier, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Jonathan G. Kortmansky -- jkortmansky@piercebainbridge.com -- Pierce Bainbridge Beck Price & Hecht, LLP & Marco Enrique Schnabl -- marco.schnabl@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. KEMET CORPORATION: Faces Silverberg Suit Over Sale to Yageo ----------------------------------------------------------- HERBERT SILVERBERG, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. KEMET CORPORATION; FRANK G. BRANDENBERG; WILFRIED BACKES; GURMINDER S. BEDI; JACOB KOTZUBEI; WILLIAM M. LOWE, JR.; E. ERWIN MADDREY, II; YASUKO MATSUMOTO; ROBERT G. PAUL; and KAREN M. ROGGE, Case No. 1:20-cv-00036-UNA (D. Del., Jan 10, 2020), accuses the Defendants of violating the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-9, in connection with the proposed sale of KEMET to Yageo Corporation and Sky Merger Sub Inc. On November 11, 2019, the Company's board of directors caused the Company to enter into an agreement and plan of merger with Yageo Corporation and Sky Merger Sub Inc. Under the terms of the Merger Agreement, KEMET stockholders will receive $27.20 in cash, without interest, for each share of KEMET common stock they hold. The consummation of the Proposed Merger is subject to certain closing conditions, including the approval of the stockholders of KEMET. The Company expects the Proposed Merger to close in the second half of 2020. On December 26, 2019, in order to convince KEMET's stockholders to vote in favor of the Proposed Merger, the Board authorized the filing of a preliminary proxy statement, which was filed with the SEC on Schedule 14A (the "Proxy Statement"). The Proxy Statement is materially incomplete and misleading, and in violation of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act, the Plaintiff alleges. The Plaintiff contends that while the Defendants, in the Proxy Statement, tout the fairness of the Merger Consideration to the Company's stockholders, they have failed to disclose material information that is necessary for KEMET's stockholders to properly assess the fairness of the Proposed Merger, thereby, rendering certain statements in the Proxy Statement incomplete and misleading. The Plaintiff contends that it is imperative that the material information that has been omitted from the Proxy Statement is disclosed to the Company's stockholders prior to the forthcoming stockholder vote so that they can properly exercise their corporate suffrage rights. The Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the Defendants from holding the stockholder vote on the Proposed Merger and taking any steps to consummate the Proposed Merger unless and until the material information is disclosed to KEMET's stockholders sufficiently in advance of the vote on the Proposed Merger or, in the event the Proposed Merger is consummated, to recover damages resulting from the Defendants' violations of the Exchange Act. The Plaintiff is and has been a KEMET stockholder. KEMET manufactures and sells passive electronic components under the KEMET brand worldwide. The company operates in three segments: Solid Capacitors; Film and Electrolytic; and Electro-Magnetic, Sensors, and Actuators. The individual Defendants are officers and directors of the company.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Brian D. Long, Esq. Gina M. Serra, Esq. RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A. 300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220 Wilmington, DE 19801 Telephone: (302) 295-5310 Facsimile: (302) 654-7530 E-mail: bdl@rl-legal.com gms@rl-legal.com - and - Jeffrey S. Abraham, Esq. Michael J. Klein, Esq. ABRAHAM, FRUCHTER & TWERSKY, LLP One Penn Plaza, Suite 2805 New York, NY 10119 Telephone: (212) 279-5050 Facsimile: (212) 279-3655 E-mail: jabraham@aflaw.com mklein@aflaw.com KOHN LAW FIRM: Certification of Class Sought in Rozani Suit ----------------------------------------------------------- Julian Rozani moves the Court to certify the class described in the complaint of the lawsuit captioned JULIAN ROZANI, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. KOHN LAW FIRM, S.C., Case No. 2:20-cv-00029 (E.D. Wisc.), and further asks that the Court both stay the motion for class certification and to grant the Plaintiff (and the Defendant) relief from the Local Rules setting automatic briefing schedules and requiring briefs and supporting material to be filed with the Motion. Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class action complaint could moot a class representative's case by depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016). To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the certification motion. Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs."). While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class, the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June 20, 2017). The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D. Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut, Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 24, 2016). The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff asserts. As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends. The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative, and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class counsel.[CC] The Plaintiff is represented by: John D. Blythin, Esq. Mark A. Eldridge, Esq. Jesse Fruchter, Esq. Ben J. Slatky, Esq. ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP 3620 East Layton Avenue Cudahy, WI 53110 Telephone: (414) 482-8000 Facsimile: (414) 482-8001 E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com meldridge@ademilaw.com jfruchter@ademilaw.com bslatky@ademilaw.com LEEDS MORELLI: Can't Compel Arbitration in Dowe Suit ---------------------------------------------------- In the case captioned MAUREEN DOWE; ELVIE MOORE; and ESTHER BUCKRAM, individually and on behalf of those Class Members similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. LEEDS BROWN LAW, P.C.; LEEDS MORELLI & BROWN, P.C.; LEEDS MORELLI & BROWN, LLP; LEEDS & MORELLI, P.C.; LENARD LEEDS; STEVEN A MORELLI; JEFFREY K. BROWN; PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL INC., parent and successor in interest to PRUDENTIAL SECURITIES, INC.; ERIC SCHWIMMER; and JOHN DOES 1-25, fictitious persons and entities, Defendants, Case No. 18cv11633 (DLC) (S.D. N.Y.), Judge Denise Cote of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (i) granted Prudential's motion to compel arbitration; (ii) denied LMB's motion to compel arbitration; and (iii) granted LMB's motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs Dowe, Moore, and Buckram are former employees of Prudential and former clients of the law firm Leeds & Morelli, P.C. or its successors ("LMB"). In the putative class action, the Plaintiffs allege that LMB conspired with Prudential to settle discrimination claims against Prudential for less than their true value, in exchange for side payments from Prudential to LMB. Beginning in 1997, LMB solicited Prudential employees to become clients of the firm and bring employment-discrimination claims against Prudential. Dowe was one such client, and in January 1998, she signed a retainer agreement providing that LMB would represent her in "negotiating a settlement against" Prudential and that LMB would receive one third of the settlement as attorneys' fees. On Feb. 13, 1998, LMB entered into a five-page Dispute Resolution Agreement ("DRA") with Prudential. The DRA provided that Prudential and the employees represented by LMB had agreed to utilize confidential and informal dispute resolution procedures for the resolution of" the employment-discrimination claims. Despite these representations, the Plaintiffs allege that LMB had not shown the DRA to its clients and never did so. Instead, LMB later presented its clients with a signature page for the DRA and instructed them to sign. The Defendants have submitted a signature page executed by Dowe on March 8, 1998. It is entitled Execution and Acknowledgement and contains a declaration under penalty of perjury. Unbeknownst to Dowe or the other employees, LMB and Prudential had also executed a side agreement on Feb. 13, 1998 -- the same day they entered into the DRA. In a letter to LMB, Prudential agreed that it would pay LMB $1.5 million within one week of LMB's execution of the DRA. Between 1998 and 2000, Prudential paid LMB an additional $6 million in fees. In February 1999, LMB informed Dowe that Prudential had offered $150,000 to settle her claim. LMB recommended that Dowe accept the settlement, and she did so. Dowe signed a settlement agreement on Feb. 6, 1999. That agreement was made between Dowe and Prudential. Prudential therein agreed to pay Dowe $150,000 in exchange for release of her claims. Dowe agreed not to disclose "any information regarding the amount of, terms of, or facts or circumstances underlying" the settlement. The settlement agreement also included an arbitration clause. In the agreement, Dowe also acknowledged that she had carefully read and understood its terms, had not relied on any extrinsic representations or statements, and had been encouraged to have the document reviewed by her attorney. The document was executed by Prudential and Dowe. It was not signed by LMB, nor was LMB mentioned anywhere in the settlement agreement. Dowe filed the lawsuit on Dec. 12, 2018. On April 5, 2019, Dowe filed an amended complaint. On May 20, LMB and Prudential filed separate motions to compel arbitration, or in the alternative to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). On June 10, Dowe filed a second amended complaint, which added Moore and Buckram as the named Plaintiffs and added four new claims. The Defendants' motions became fully submitted on Aug. 9, 2019. There is no dispute that the claims against Prudential fall within the broad arbitration clause contained in the settlement agreement between the Plaintiffs and Prudential. The Plaintiffs contend, however, that Prudential may not compel arbitration based upon the arbitration clause contained in their settlement agreements because the settlement agreements were fraudulently induced. Judge Cote holds it is not the law. A court may consider a claim of fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself, but claims of fraud in the inducement of the contract generally are for arbitrators to decide. The Plaintiffs make no allegations targeted at the arbitration clause itself; rather, they allege a conflict of interest that tainted the agreement as a whole. Under the Supreme Court's cases, the issue is for the arbitrator to decide. In contrast, LMB's motion to compel arbitration must be denied, Judge Cote opines. The Plaintiffs, by agreeing to arbitrate disputes arising out of their settlement agreements with Prudential, did not agree to arbitrate claims they might have against LMB. Nor are they estopped from seeking court adjudication of their claims against LMB. LMB cannot compel arbitration of the claims. Turning to the Motions to Dismiss on statute of limitations grounds, Judge Cote holds that none of the Plaintiffs' claims against LMB is timely. The only possible avenues for the Plaintiffs to plead timely claims are the two-year discovery rule under N.Y. C.P.L.R. Section 213(8) or equitable estoppel due to fraudulent concealment. Neither path is open to the Plaintiffs. For reasons stated, Judge Cote (i) granted Prudential's May 20, 2019 motion to compel arbitration; and (ii) granted LMB's May 20, 2019 motion to dismiss. The action against Prudential is stayed pending the outcome of arbitration proceedings. A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 22, 2019 Opinion & Order is available at https://is.gd/hhUTd0 from Leagle.com. Maureen Dowe, individually and on behalf of those Class Members similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Arthur D. Middlemiss -- arthur.middlemiss@lbkmlaw.com -- Lewis Baach Kaufmann Middlemiss, John W. Moscow -- john.moscow@lbkmlaw.com -- Lewis Baach Kaufmann Middlemiss PLLC & Andrew Lavoott Bluestone, Andrew Lavoott Bluestone, Esq. Elvie Moore & Esther Buckram, Plaintiffs, represented by Andrew Lavoott Bluestone, Andrew Lavoott Bluestone, Esq & John W. Moscow,Lewis Baach Kaufmann Middlemiss PLLC. Leeds, Morelli & Brown PC, Leeds, Morelli & Brown LLP, Lenard Leeds, Steven A. Morelli & Jeffrey K. Brown, Defendants, represented by Carol A. Lastorino, Rivkin Radler LLP, Janice J. DiGennaro -- janice.digennaro@rivkin.com -- Rivkin Radler, LLP & Shari Claire Lewis -- shari.lewis@rivkin.com -- Rivkin Radler, LLP. Eric Schwimmer, Defendant, represented by Catherine Barry Schumacher, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Liza May Velazquez, Paul Weiss & Vincent Anthony Sama, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP. Leeds Brown Law P.C. & Leeds & Morelli, PC, Defendants, represented by Janice J. DiGennaro, Rivkin Radler, LLP. Prudential Financial Inc., parent and successor in interest to Prudential Securities Incorporated, Defendant, represented by Vincent Anthony Sama, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP. LIBERTY PROPERTY: Rigrodsky & Long Files Suit Over Prologis Deal ---------------------------------------------------------------- Rigrodsky & Long, P.A., announces that it has filed a class action complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware on behalf of holders of Liberty Property Trust ("LPT") (NYSE: LPT) common stock in connection with the proposed acquisition of LPT by Prologis, Inc. and its affiliates ("Prologis") announced on October 27, 2019 (the "Complaint"). The Complaint, which alleges violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 against LPT, its Board of Directors (the "Board"), and Prologis, is captioned Thompson v. Liberty Property Trust, Case No. 1:19-cv-02230 (D. Del.). If you wish to discuss this action or have any questions concerning this notice or your rights or interests, please contact plaintiff's counsel, Seth D. Rigrodsky or Gina M. Serra at Rigrodsky & Long, P.A., 300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220, Wilmington, DE 19801, by telephone at (888) 969-4242, by e-mail at info@rl-legal.com, or at http://rigrodskylong.com/contact-us/. On October 27, 2019, LPT entered into an agreement and plan of merger (the "Merger Agreement") with Prologis. Pursuant to the terms of the Merger Agreement, shareholders of LPT will receive 0.675 shares of Prologis common stock per share (the "Proposed Transaction"). Among other things, the Complaint alleges that, in an attempt to secure shareholder support for the Proposed Transaction, defendants issued materially incomplete disclosures in a Form S-4 Registration Statement (the "Registration Statement") filed with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission. The Complaint alleges that the Registration Statement omits material information with respect to, among other things, the Company's and Prologis's financial projections and the analyses performed by LPT's financial advisors. The Complaint seeks injunctive and equitable relief and damages on behalf of holders of LPT common stock. If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than February 24, 2020. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the litigation. Any member of the proposed class may move the Court to serve as lead plaintiff through counsel of their choice, or may choose to do nothing and remain an absent class member. Rigrodsky & Long, P.A., with offices in Delaware, New York, and California, has recovered hundreds of millions of dollars on behalf of investors and achieved substantial corporate governance reforms in numerous cases nationwide, including federal securities fraud actions, shareholder class actions, and shareholder derivative actions. Contact: Rigrodsky & Long, P.A. Seth D. Rigrodsky, Esq. Gina M. Serra, Esq. Phone: (888) 969-4242 (302) 295-5310 Fax: (302) 654-7530 Website: www.rigrodskylong.com Email: info@rl-legal.com gms@rl-legal.com sdr@rl-legal.com [GN] LOANCARE LLC: Charges Illegal Pay-to-Pay Fees, Tanner Suit Claims ----------------------------------------------------------------- TRISTAN TANNER, STEPHANIE AUGUSTIN, SHIRLEY MCNEELY, and TIERA HOLMES, On Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated v. LoanCare, LLC, Case No. 8:20-cv-00074-WFJ-AAS (M.D. Fla., Jan. 10, 2020), accuses the Defendant of breaches of contract and violations of the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act and Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act by charging and collecting illegal processing fees, the Pay-to-Pay Fees, when borrowers pay their monthly mortgage by phone or online. The Plaintiffs contend that LoanCare illegally charges homeowners fees between $5.00 and $15.00 for each online and telephone payment. LoanCare services mortgages throughout the United States and is supposed to be compensated out of the interest paid on each borrower's monthly payment. Here, LoanCare charged borrowers more for online and telephone Pay-to-Pay Fees than it spends to process those payments, pocketing the difference, the Plaintiffs allege. Despite its uniform contractual obligations to charge only fees explicitly allowed under the Uniform Mortgages and applicable law, and only those amounts actually disbursed, LoanCare leverages its position of power over homeowners and demands exorbitant Pay-to-Pay Fees, according to the complaint. Even if some fee were allowed, the mortgage uniform covenants and applicable law only allow LoanCare to pass along the actual costs of fees incurred to it by the borrowers--here, only a few cents per transaction. The Plaintiffs all paid Pay-to-Pay Fees. The Plaintiffs assert they and the Class Members were harmed by these Defendant's breaches. LoanCare provides loan servicing solutions.[BN] The Plaintiffs are represented by: James L. Kauffman, Esq. BAILEY GLASSER LLP 1055 Thomas Jefferson Street NW, Suite 540 Washington, DC 20007 Telephone: (202) 463-2101 Facsimile: (202) 463-2103 E-mail: jkauffman@baileyglasser.com - and - Hassan A. Zavareei, Esq. Katherine M. Aizpuru, Esq. Chai Oliver Prentice, Esq. TYCKO & ZAVAREEI LLP 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1000 Washington, DC 20036 Telephone: (202) 973-0900 Facsimile: (202) 973-0950 E-mail: hzavareei@tzlegal.com kaizpuru@tzlegal.com vprentice@tzlegal.com MARYLAND: Retirees Seek Class Action Status in Drug Benefits Case ----------------------------------------------------------------- Danielle E. Gaines, writing for Maryland Matters, reports that more than 1,000 state retirees are seeking to be recognized as a class in a lawsuit against the state of Maryland over lost prescription drug benefits -- and another 1,000 filings are on their way. Certifying a class-action case would bring all retiree claims about the drug benefits into one courtroom, while "separate actions by individual members of the class would create a risk of inconsistent adjudications," plaintiffs wrote in a memorandum filed with the U.S. District Court on December 27. It is the latest development in Fitch, et al. v. State of Maryland, which was filed in 2018 and yielded an injunction that stopped a state reform from taking place this year. It would have removed Medicare-eligible retirees from a state plan and shifted them to the federal program. Lead plaintiff Kenneth Fitch and his attorney, Deborah A. Holloway Hill, Esq., have held meetings across the state to inform retirees about the change. They've collected thousands of forms from retirees who say they want to be part of a class-action case. The first 1,000 forms were delivered as part of a motion to certify retirees as a class, and another 1,000 forms are being processed now, Hill said December 25. The state has so far not responded to the motion to certify a class-action claim and officials from the Office of the Attorney General and Department of Budget and Management declined to comment Wednesday, December 25. The number of retirees or vested state employees who could be part of the case is estimated to be between 35,000 and 90,000 people, according to the plaintiffs' filing. The shift in retiree health benefits was in the works for several years, but only became widely known last spring, when thousands of retirees were mailed notices that they would need to enroll in Medicare. That stemmed from pension reform passed by the General Assembly in 2011, which lowered the state's post-employment benefits liability by roughly $8 billion. The plaintiffs' lawsuit claims that pension benefits are a form of deferred compensation and constitute a property right, and that reducing the availability of a previously promised health benefit is unconstitutional. "The promise and provision of certain guaranteed health benefits, which include prescription drug coverage, for the duration of their retirement, induced the Plaintiffs and all other similarly situated persons to continue working as a State of Maryland employee and forgo additional options and opportunities for employment and benefits from other employers," Hill reiterated in December 27's filing. In response to outcry from retirees, the legislature passed a bill this year to update the retiree prescription drug program. That bill creates three plans to try to keep retirees "as whole as possible," lawmakers said. Under the bill, which passed into law last month without Republican Gov. Lawrence J. Hogan Jr.'s signature, those who retire before Dec. 31, 2019, would have access to a plan with an out-of-pocket expense cap at $1,500. Retirees after that date would have a cap of $2,500. All retirees would have access to a life-sustaining prescription drug plan in which the state would pick up the costs for critical medications that are covered by the state's current plan but not Medicare Part D. Lawmakers have tasked state government with creating a program that would provide instant or near-instant reimbursements to retirees after they pass the annual out-of-pocket cap. The bill will not take effect until the lawsuit is settled. Hill and Fitch said the lawsuit to reinstate the previous benefit is necessary because a reimbursement-based program is not sufficient for retirees on a fixed income who might need expensive drugs to survive. "Who has that kind of money to lay out?" Fitch asked about pricey prescriptions. "They've eliminated that drug coverage – in a different way," Hill said. Fitch, who is diabetic, said he paid $930 in co-pays each year under the state prescription drug plan, a figure that would shoot up to an estimated $11,683.10 under a Medicare plan. The class-action forms that he's collected include other tales of sticker shock, Fitch and Hill said. [GN] MDL 1203: Denial of Panoussi Claim for Matrix A-1 Benefits Upheld ----------------------------------------------------------------- Judge Harvey Bartle III of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania affirmed the AHP Settlement Trust's denial of Julie Panoussi's claim for Matrix A-1 Benefits in IN RE: DIET DRUGS (PHENTERMINE/FENFLURAMINE/DEXFENFLURAMINE) PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION, THIS DOCUMENT RELATE TO: SHEILA BROWN, et al., v. AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS CORPORATION, MDL No. 1203, Civil Action No. 99-20593, No. 2:16 MD 1203 (E.D. Pa.). Claimant Julie Panoussi, a class member under the Diet Drug Nationwide Class Action Settlement Agreement with Wyeth, seeks benefits from the AHP Settlement Trust. To seek Matrix Benefits, a claimant must first submit a completed Green Form to the Trust. The Green Form consists of three parts. The claimant or the claimant's representative completes Part I of the Green Form. Part II is completed by the claimant's attesting physician, who must answer a series of questions concerning the claimant's medical condition that correlate to the Matrix criteria set forth in the Settlement Agreement. Finally, claimant's attorney must complete Part III if claimant is represented. In August 2016, the Claimant submitted a completed Green Form to the Trust signed by her attesting physician, Duncan Salmon, M.D. Based on an echocardiogram dated April 24, 2015, Dr. Salmon attested in Part II of Ms. Panoussi's Green Form that claimant suffered from severe mitral regurgitation and had surgery to repair or replace the aortic and/or mitral valve(s) following the use of Pondimin(R) and/or Redux(TM). Based on such findings, the Claimant would be entitled to Matrix A-1, Level III benefits in the amount of $297,859. Dr. Salmon also attested that Ms. Panoussi did not suffer from mitral annular calcification. Under the Settlement Agreement, the presence of mitral annular calcification requires the payment of reduced Matrix Benefits for a claim based on damage to the mitral valve. As the Trust does not contest claimant's entitlement to Level III benefits, the only issue before the Court is whether claimant is entitled to payment on Matrix A-1 or Matrix B-1. In October 2016, the Trust forwarded the claim for review by Zuyue Wang, M.D., one of its auditing cardiologists. In audit, Dr. Wang concluded that there was no reasonable medical basis for finding that claimant did not have mitral annular calcification. Pursuant to Court Approved Procedure No. 11, the Consensus Expert Panel subsequently reviewed Ms. Panoussi's claim. The Consensus Expert Panel did not recommend re-audit of Ms. Panoussi's claim. Based on the auditing cardiologist's findings, the Trust issued a post-audit determination that Ms. Panoussi was entitled only to Matrix B-1, Level III benefits. Pursuant to the Rules for the Audit of Matrix Compensation Claims, the Claimant contested this adverse determination. In contest, Ms. Panoussi argued that there was a reasonable basis for finding that mitral annular calcification was not present on the April 24, 2015 echocardiogram. Although not required to do so, the Trust forwarded the claim to the auditing cardiologist for a second review. Dr. Wang submitted a declaration in which she again concluded that there was no reasonable medical basis for finding that Ms. Panoussi did not have mitral annular calcification. The Trust then issued a final post-audit determination again determining that Ms. Panoussi was entitled only to Matrix B-1, Level III benefits. The Claimant disputed this final determination and requested that the claim proceed to the show cause process established in the Settlement Agreement. The Trust then applied to the Court for issuance of an Order to show cause why Ms. Panoussi's claim should be paid. On April 12, 2018, the Court issued an Order to show cause and referred the matter to the Special Master for further proceedings. Once the matter was referred to the Special Master, the Trust submitted its statement of the case and supporting documentation. The Claimant then served a response upon the Special Master. The Special Master assigned a Technical Advisor, Gary J. Vigilante, M.D., F.A.C.C., to review the documents submitted by the Trust and claimant and to prepare a report for the court. The Show Cause Record and Technical Advisor Report are now before the court for final determination. The issue presented for resolution of the claim is whether the Claimant has met her burden of proving that there is a reasonable medical basis for finding that she did not have mitral annular calcification. Ultimately, if the Court determines that there is no reasonable medical basis for this finding, it must affirm the Trust's final determination and may grant such other relief as deemed appropriate. If, on the other hand, it determines that there is a reasonable medical basis for this finding, it must enter an Order directing the Trust to pay the claim in accordance with the Settlement Agreement. After reviewing the entire show cause record, Judge Bartle finds that Ms. Panoussi's arguments are without merit. As the Court noted previously, the Settlement Agreement provides that the presence of mitral annular calcification requires the payment of reduced Matrix Benefits. The Judge disagrees with Ms. Pannousi that there is a reasonable medical basis for finding that her April 24, 2015 echocardiogram does not demonstrate mitral annular calcification. Dr. Wang and Dr. Vigilante each reviewed claimant's April 24, 2015 echocardiogram and concluded that it demonstrated mitral annular calcification. Notably, the cardiologist who initially interpreted claimant's echocardiogram noted there is mild mitral annular calcification. Neither Dr. Wang nor Dr. Vigilante simply deferred to the findings of claimant's surgeon in light of these specific findings, which claimant does not adequately dispute. The Settlement Agreement provides that the presence of mitral annular calcification, regardless of level, requires the payment of reduced Matrix Benefits. Unlike some of the other factors that reduce a claim to Matrix B-1, any presence of mitral annular calcification, regardless of the amount, places the claim on Matrix B-1. The Claimant further argues the fact that she had mitral valve repair, rather than replacement, surgery is evidence that she did not have mitral annular calcification. Dr. Salmon's own statement undermines this argument. Dr. Salmon opined that calcification of the mitral annulus renders mitral valve repair difficult and replacement surgery is typically performed in cases involving mitral annular calcification. Dr. Wang confirmed that patients with mitral annular calcification undergo repair surgery routinely and that she has even consulted on such procedures. Thus, it is not reasonable to infer that simply because Ms. Panoussi underwent mitral valve repair surgery she did not have mitral annular calcification. For the stated reasons, Judge Bartles concludes that Ms. Panoussi has not met her burden of proving that there is a reasonable medical basis for finding that she did not have mitral annular calcification. Accordingly, Judge Bartles affirmed the Trust's denial of Ms. Panoussi's claim for Matrix A-1 Benefits. A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 22, 2019 Memorandum is available at https://is.gd/rsOAhb from Leagle.com. WILLIAMS DAILEY, Special Master, represented by MICHAEL L. WILLIAMS, WILLIAMS O'LEARY LLC. VIVIAN NAUGLE, QUINTIN LAYER, Plaintiffs, represented by ARNOLD LEVIN -- alevin@lfsblaw.com -- LEVIN SEDRAN & BERMAN, CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL PLACITELLA -- cplacitella@cprlaw.com -- COHEN PLACITELLA & ROTH PC, DIANNE M. NAST -- dnast@nastlaw.com -- NASTLAW LLC, GENE LOCKS -- glocks@lockslaw.com -- LOCKS LAW FIRM PLLC, JOHN J. CUMMINGS, III, CUMMINGS CUMMINGS & DUDENHEFER, MARK W. TANNER -- mtanner@feldmanshepherd.com -- FELDMAN, SHEPHERD, WOHLGELERNTER, TANNER & WEINSTOCK, MICHAEL D. FISHBEIN, LEVIN, FISHBEIN, SEDRAN & BERMAN, RICHARD S. LEWIS -- rlewis@hausfeld.com -- HAUSFELD LLP, RICHARD S. WAYNE -- rswayne@strausstroy.com -- STRAUSS & TROY, ROBERT ERIC KENNEDY, WEISMAN, KENNEDY & BERRIS, SOL H. WEISS -- sweiss@anapolweiss.com -- ANAPOL WEISS & STANLEY M. CHESLEY, WAITE, SCHNEIDER, BAYLESS & CHESLEY CO., L.P.A.. JOAN S. LAYER, Plaintiff, represented by SOL H. WEISS, ANAPOL WEISS. BRENDA CHAMBERS, ISABEL CONNOR, RANDY G. ALLEN, Appellants, represented by ARNOLD LEVIN, LEVIN SEDRAN & BERMAN. CHARLENE ALLSPAUGH, Appellant, pro se. DORIS ATANMO, Appellant, pro se. EVELYN AMEND, Appellant, pro se. JOAN BAKANOWSKY, Appellant, pro se. STEVEN BERKOWITZ, Appellant, pro se. KATHY BURROW, Appellant, pro se. LINDA BUSBY, Appellant, pro se. JO BUTTERFIELD, Appellant, pro se. LINDA CASTON, Appellant, pro se. AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS CORPORATION, Defendant, represented by Andrew A. Chirls, Esq. -- achirls@finemanlawfirm.com -- FINEMAN KREKSTEIN & HARRIS PC; Kevin A. Cline, Esq. -- kevin.cline@aporter.com -- ARNOLD & PORTER LLP; Leslie Anne Benitez, Esq. -- lbenitez@gordonrees.com -- GORDON & REES LLP; Edward F. Hanover, III, Esq. -- ehanover@reedsmith.com -- Louis W. Schack, Esq. -- lschack@reedsmith.com -- and Milind M. Shah, Esq. -- mshah@reedsmith.com -- REED SMITH LLP. AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS CORPORATION, Defendant, pro se. MDL 2804: Taylor v. Purdue Pharma Over Opioid Drugs Consolidated ---------------------------------------------------------------- The case captioned as William Taylor individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. PURDUE PHARMA L.P.; PURDUE PHARMA, INC.; THE PURDUE FREDERICK COMPANY, INC.; MCKESSON CORPORATION; CARDINAL HEALTH, INC.; AMERISOURCEBERGEN CORPORATION; TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES, LTD.; TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC.; CEPHALON, INC.; JOHNSON & JOHNSON; JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.; ORTHO-MCNEIL-JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. n/k/a JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.; JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS, Case 2:19-cv-02596 (Filed Oct. 2, 2019), was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio (Cleveland) on Jan. 10, 2020. The Northern District of Ohio Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:20-op-45017-DAP to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Dan Aaron Polster. The lead case is Case No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP. The lawsuit seeks to recompense for compensatory damages, emotional distress; loss of enjoyment of life; lost earning capacity and loss of income; loss of filial consortium; loss of spousal consortium; anguish; sorrow; solace, including companionship, comfort, guidance, kindly offices, advise, services, protection, care, and assistance; services for medical care, including any necessary rehabilitation; and/or funeral and burial expenses. Prescription opioids have devastated communities across the country and in the State of West Virginia. In addition to the tragic loss of life and the heartbreaking impact on children and loved ones, some estimates state that the opioid crisis is costing governmental entities and private companies as much as $500 billion per year. The Defendants manufacture, market, sell, and distribute prescription opioids, which are highly addictive narcotic painkillers. The Plaintiff contends that the Defendants have engaged in a cunning and deceptive marketing scheme to encourage doctors and patients to use opioids to treat chronic pain. In doing so, the Plaintiff says, the Defendants falsely minimized the risks of opioids, overstated their benefits, and generated far more opioid prescriptions than there should have been. The opioid epidemic is the direct result of the Defendants' deliberately crafted, well-funded campaign of deception. For years, they misrepresented the risks posed by the opioids they manufacture and sell, misleading susceptible prescribers and vulnerable patient populations. As families and communities suffered from the scourge of opioid abuse, the Defendants earned billions in profits as a direct result of the harms they inflicted, the Plaintiff asserts. The direct and proximate consequence of the Defendants' misconduct is that every West Virginia purchaser of private health insurance paid higher premiums, co-payments, and deductibles. Insurance companies have considerable market power and pass onto their insureds the expected cost of future care--including opioid-related coverage. Accordingly, insurance companies factored in the unwarranted and exorbitant healthcare costs of opioid-related coverage caused by the Defendants and charged that back to insureds in the form of higher premiums, deductibles, and co-payments, the lawsuit says. The Taylor Case is being consolidated in MDL 2804 RE: NATIONAL PRESCRIPTION OPIATE LITIGATION. The MDL was created by Order of the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on Dec. 5, 2017. The Plaintiffs in the actions allege that: (1) manufacturers of prescription opioid medications overstated the benefits and downplayed the risks of the use of their opioids and aggressivelymarketed (directly and through key opinion leaders) these drugs to physicians, and/or (2) distributors failed to monitor, detect, investigate, refuse and report suspicious orders of prescription opiates. All actions involve common factual questions about, inter alia, the manufacturing and distributor defendants' knowledge of and conduct regarding the alleged diversion of these prescription opiates, as well as the manufacturers' alleged improper marketing of such drugs. In its Dec. 5, 2017 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions in this MDL involve common questions of fact, and that centralization in the Northern District of Ohio will serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient conduct of the litigation.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Robert L. Kinsman, Esq. KRAUSE & KINSMAN 4717 Grand Avenue, Ste. 250 Kansas City, MO 64112 Telephone: (816) 760-2700 Facsimile: (816) 760-2800 MERIT MEDICAL: Glancy Prongay Reminds of Feb. 3 Deadline -------------------------------------------------------- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP ("GPM") reminds investors of the upcoming February 3, 2020 deadline to file a lead plaintiff motion in the class action filed on behalf of Merit Medical Systems, Inc. ("Merit" or the "Company") (NASDAQ: MMSI) investors who purchased common stock between February 26, 2019 and October 30, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"). If you wish to learn more about this action, or if you have any questions concerning this announcement or your rights or interests with respect to these matters, please contact Charles Linehan, Esquire, at 310-201-9150, Toll-Free at 888-773-9224, or by email to shareholders@glancylaw.com, or visit our website at www.glancylaw.com. On July 25, 2019, post-market, the Company announced disappointing financial results for second quarter 2019, reporting net income of $6.9 million, or $0.12 per share, compared to $10.9 million, or $0.21 per share for the same period in the prior year. Merit's Chief Executive Officer cited "a number of factors affecting revenues and gross margins during the second quarter," including "foreign exchange [and] slower than anticipated conversion and uptake of acquired products." On this news, the Company's stock price fell $13.84, or over 25%, to close at $41.00 on July 26, 2019, thereby injuring investors. On October 30, 2019, the Company announced its third quarter 2019 financial results, lowered revenue guidance for fiscal 2019, and eliminated previously issued guidance for fiscal 2020. On this news, the Company's stock price fell $8.45, or 29%, to close at $20.66 per share on October 31, 2019, thereby injuring investors further. The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to investors: (1) that the integrations of Cianna and Vascular Insights, including their products, sales people, and R&D facilities, had caused operational disruptions and reduced sales and were months behind schedule; (2) that sales of acquired company products had slowed substantially due to pre-acquisition pipeline fill, in particular for Vascular Insights products which, as late as July 2019, had zero orders during fiscal 2019; and (3) that in light of the foregoing, the Company's reported financial guidance for fiscal 2019 and 2020 was made without a reasonable basis. Follow us for updates on Twitter: twitter.com/GPM_LLP. If you purchased Merit common stock during the Class Period, you may move the Court no later than February 3, 2020 to request appointment as lead plaintiff in this putative class action lawsuit. To be a member of the class action you need not take any action at this time; you may retain counsel of your choice or take no action and remain an absent member of the class action. If you wish to learn more about this class action, or if you have any questions concerning this announcement or your rights or interests with respect to the pending class action lawsuit, please contact Charles Linehan, Esquire, of GPM, 1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100, Los Angeles, California 90067 at 310-201-9150, Toll-Free at 888-773-9224, by email to shareholders@glancylaw.com, or visit our website at www.glancylaw.com. If you inquire by email please include your mailing address, telephone number and number of shares purchased. Contact: Charles Linehan, Esq. Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Los Angeles Tel: 310-201-9150 or 888-773-9224 E-mail: shareholders@glancylaw.com clinehan@glancylaw.com Website: www.glancylaw.com [GN] MERIVALE: Says Employees Unlikely to Benefit From Class Action -------------------------------------------------------------- Anna Patty, writing for The Sydney Morning Herald, reports that Justin Hemmes' hospitality giant Merivale has denied employees will get any benefit from a class action for alleged underpayments of up to $129 million, saying the company will vigorously defend the case. "Merivale has always acted with the interests of its workforce squarely in mind and does not anticipate that its employees will in any way benefit from these proceedings," said Sue Cato, a Merivale spokeswoman. Adero, a Canberra-based law firm that specialises in class actions, said it has filed Federal Court action against Merivale alleging a WorkChoices agreement which resulted in the underpayment of penalty rates and other benefits was not validly approved 10 years ago. The claim alleges that staff should have been paid industry award rates because the agreement was invalid. The statement of claim alleges that a pastry chef at Merivale's French bistro Felix, in Sydney, was paid a base salary of $48,000 for a 38-hour week but was required to work an average of 55 hours or more each week. Adero has estimated more than 8000 Merivale restaurant and bar staff could be eligible to claim backpay of up to $129 million under the class action. The Merivale spokeswoman said Adero's class actions were typically bankrolled by litigation funders "whose interests in the proceedings concern receiving very large commissions from proceeds which the Courts award to class action members". "The scale of those commissions have previously been the subject of adverse criticisms from a range of courts," she said. If the class action goes ahead, Merivale, which has more than 70 restaurant, pub and hotel venues, would "vigorously defend" any legal claim lodged. A letter written in June 2009 by Penny Weir, acting director of the Australian government's Workplace Authority, to Merivale's lawyers says that a 2007 wages agreement for Merivale staff had not passed the fairness test. Despite this failure, the Workplace Authority then decided to rescind its previous decision to reject the agreement because of unexplained administrative issues. "The undertaking submitted on 29 December 2008 was not sufficient for the Agreement to pass the fairness test," Ms Weir's letter says. "However, you outline significant administrative issues experienced by your client and this provides grounds to rescind the original notice advising you that the Agreement does not pass the fairness test." In the statement of claim, Adero says the 2010 hospitality industry award covered Merivale staff for the past six years, the maximum period claimable under the Fair Work Act. The Merivale spokeswoman said it had not yet received any class action proceedings via the courts or Adero. "Responding without service of any class action documents is difficult, however Merivale firmly believes there is no basis for any action," the spokeswoman said. "From the scant information at hand, the only basis for this claim seems to be that the Federal Government regulator is alleged to have got it wrong when it approved the enterprise agreement some ten years ago which cannot be Merivale's fault. "Merivale regularly reviews its compliance regarding employee entitlements and has had them independently assessed by external parties." [GN] MICROSOFT CORP: No Class Status of Gender Bias Claims Upheld ------------------------------------------------------------ Nate Robson, writing for The Recorder, reports that a federal appeals court has upheld a ruling undercutting a prospective class action against Microsoft for allegedly underpaying and not promoting nearly 8,600 female employees. A panel for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit sided with a team from Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe in affirming a 2018 decision not to certify the class accusing Microsoft of systematically discriminating against women in both pay and promotions. U.S. District Judge James Robart of the Western District of Washington found there were no uniform policies or job descriptions that tied the proposed class together. "The allegedly discriminatory pay and promotion decisions in the instant case do not present common questions because the proposed class consists of more than 8,600 women, who held more than 8,000 different positions in facilities throughout the United States," the panel wrote in the unpublished ruling December 24. "Further, appellants failed to identify a common mode of discretion throughout Microsoft because the individual managers had broad discretion over how to conduct the Calibration Meetings/People Discussions, as well as over the decisions that they made at those meetings." More than 30 civil rights and labor groups filed an amicus brief urging the panel to reverse Robart's ruling. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Washington Legal Foundation were among the groups that filed amicus briefs siding with Microsoft. The panel was composed of Ninth Circuit Judges Richard Paez and Johnnie Rawlinson, and U.S. District Judge Leslie Kobayashi of Hawaii sitting by designation. Attorneys from Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein represented the plaintiffs, and appeared to face an uphill fight during oral arguments in November. The panelists peppered Lieff Cabraser partner Anne Shaver with questions during the hearing about how Microsoft evaluated its employees, and pushed her to identify the policy at issue. "I don't feel there is a policy that's been pointed out," Rawlinson said at one point during the hearing. Orrick partner Lynne Hermle handled arguments for Microsoft. The case is one of several gender bias lawsuits that have targeted the technology industry. Other companies that have faced scrutiny include Google, Oracle, Twitter and Uber Technologies. A California appellate court earlier in December refused to overturn a ruling denying class certification in a case against Twitter brought on behalf of 135 female software engineers who claimed they were disproportionately passed over for promotions. Orrick represents Twitter in that case. [GN] MIH SALES: Violates Overtime Provisions of FLSA, Turner Alleges --------------------------------------------------------------- JESSIE TURNER, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, and MELODEE THOMPSON v. M.I.H. SALES & MARKETING, INC., AND JOHN HILGER, Case No. 4:20-cv-00044-LPR (E.D. Ark., Jan 10, 2020), accuses the Defendants of violating the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act. According to the compliant, the Defendants willfully failed to pay overtime wages to the Plaintiffs and similarly situated employees, who worked more than 40 hours in a week during the time period relevant to the complaint. The Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment, monetary damages, liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, and a reasonable attorney's fee and costs as a result of the violations of the FLSA and AMWA. Plaintiff Turner worked for the Defendants as a cashier and delivery driver from August 2019 to November 2019. Plaintiff Thompson worked for the Defendants as cashier from August 2019 to November 2019. As cashiers, the Plaintiffs performed duties, such as servicing customers and keeping the store in order. The Defendants own and operate several Chicken City stores throughout Arkansas, including stores in North Little Rock, Conway, White Hall, Jonesboro and Marion. Hilger manages and controls the day-to-day operations of MIH.[BN] The Plaintiffs are represented by: Josh Sanford, Esq. Lydia Hamlet, Esq. SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC One Financial Center 650 South Shackleford Road, Suite 411 Little Rock, AR 72211 Telephone: (501) 221-0088 Facsimile: (888) 787-2040 E-mail: josh@sanfordlawfirm.com lydia@sanfordlawfirm.com MPSK INC: Faces Acevedo Suit Over Improper Pay Under FLSA & IMWL ---------------------------------------------------------------- EDWARD ACEVEDO, on behalf of himself, and all other plaintiffs similarly situated, known and unknown v. M.P.S.K., INC. D/B/A THE SYBER TECHNOLOGY GROUP, AN ILLINOIS CORPORATION AND MICHAEL POWELL, INDIVIDUALLY, Case No. 1:19-cv-07332 (N.D. Ill., Nov. 6, 2019), is brought over improper compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Illinois Minimum Wage Law and the Chicago Minimum Wage Ordinance, Section 1-241-10 of the Municipal Code of Chicago. Mr. Acevedo, a former employee of the Defendants, alleges that the Defendants compensated him and members of the proposed class on a "piece-rate" basis but failed to pay one- and one-half times the employees' effective rate established by the piece-rate compensation. He asserts that the Defendants' failure to properly calculate the overtime rate and compensate him and others at the statutory overtime rate for work in excess of 40 hours in a workweek is in violation of local, state and federal laws. M.P.S.K., Inc., doing business as The Syber Technology Group, is an Illinois corporation that provides IT support services to corporate clients in the private and public sectors. STG is located in Chicago, Illinois. Michael Powell is the owner and President of STG.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: John William Billhorn, Esq. BILLHORN LAW FIRM 53 West Jackson Blvd., Suite 401 Chicago, IL 60604 Telephone: (312) 853-1450 E-mail: jbillhorn@billhornlaw.com NOW HOME: Rogers Sues Over Unwanted Robo-Calls and Robo-Texts ------------------------------------------------------------- NICK ROGERS, as an individual and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. NOW HOME BUYERS LLC dba WHOLESALE FLORIDA HOMES, INC., a Florida Corporation, Case No. 9:20-cv-80037-XXXX (S.D. Fla., Jan 10, 2020), alleges that the Defendant promotes and markets its merchandise, in part, by sending unsolicited telemarketing calls and spam texts to wireless phone users, in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. The Plaintiff contends that Defendant knew and/or should have known that it was using "robo-calling" and "robo-texting" to generate leads. Additionally, the Defendant failed to have adequate and proper policies and procedures in place to ensure that its agents and/or vendors were not using the illegal telephone solicitation method of "robo-calling" and robo-texting." Therefore, the Plaintiff asserts, the Defendant is directly liable for the "robo-calls" and "robo-texts' made to its prospective customers. The Plaintiff seeks to recover damages, injunctive relief, and any other available legal or equitable remedies to secure redress from the illegal actions of the Defendant in negligently or willfully contacting his cellular telephone multiple times, thereby invading his privacy. The Defendant is a real estate broker in the business of selling real estate, including the solicitation of potential investors for Defendant's business.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Joshua H. Eggnatz, Esq. Michael J. Pascucci, Esq. Joshua H. Eggnatz, Esq. Steven N. Saul, Esq. EGGNATZ PASCUCCI 5400 S. University Drive, Ste. 417 Davie, FL 33328 Telephone: (954) 889-3359 Facsimile: (954) 889-5913 ONLINE INFORMATION: Certification of Class Sought in Morgan Suit ---------------------------------------------------------------- Regina Morgan moves the Court to certify the class described in the complaint of the lawsuit titled REGINA MORGAN, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. ONLINE INFORMATION SERVICES, INC., Case No. 2:20-cv-00028 (E.D. Wisc.), and further asks that the Court both stay the motion for class certification and to grant the Plaintiff (and the Defendant) relief from the Local Rules setting automatic briefing schedules and requiring briefs and supporting material to be filed with the Motion. Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class action complaint could moot a class representative's case by depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016). To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the certification motion. Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs."). While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class, the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June 20, 2017). The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D. Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut, Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 24, 2016). The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff asserts. As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended motion is filed, the Plaintiff avers. The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative, and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class counsel.[CC] The Plaintiff is represented by: John D. Blythin, Esq. Mark A. Eldridge, Esq. Jesse Fruchter, Esq. Ben J. Slatky, Esq. ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP 3620 East Layton Avenue Cudahy, WI 53110 Telephone: (414) 482-8000 Facsimile: (414) 482-8001 E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com meldridge@ademilaw.com jfruchter@ademilaw.com bslatky@ademilaw.com PALM BEACH, FL: Denial of Class Status in Utilities Case Appealed ----------------------------------------------------------------- William Kelly, writing for Palm Beach Daily News, reports that two residents are appealing a judge's denial of class certification of their lawsuit challenging the town assessments of property owners to pay for the burial of all overhead utilities on the island. Michael Scharf and Carol Kosberg have appealed Palm Beach County Circuit Judge James Nutt's decision to Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal. The town was notified of the action on December 26, the last day in a 30-day window to appeal Nutt's Nov. 26 ruling. Boca Raton attorney William Berger, Esq., who is representing Kosberg and Scharf, could not be reached for comment. The town is represented by West Palm Beach attorneys Joanne O'Connor, Esq. and Robert Wilkins, Esq. "It's not unexpected," Wilkins said. "They had an absolute right to file the notice of appeal." Kosberg and Scharf have 35 days to file an initial brief with the appellate court, followed by a response from the town. It typically takes six to nine months before the three appellate judges issue a ruling, Wilkins said. If the appeal is denied, the plaintiffs' remaining recourse would be to petition the Florida Supreme Court to hear the request. A class-action certification would enable Kosberg and Scharf to collect reimbursement from the town for their attorneys' fees should they prevail in the case. But failure to win the certification would not prevent them from going forward with their lawsuit as individuals if they so choose. In his ruling, Nutt said Scharf and Kosberg failed to demonstrate that their complaint would adequately and fairly represent the divergent interests of all other property owners who would have been certified as class members. The town is assessing property owners to repay bonds issued to finance most of the cost of burying all overhead utilities on the island. The assessments are being collected annually over a period of 30 years. Construction began in 2017 and is expected to take nine years to complete. The cost of the work was recently revised upward from $103 million to $120 million. Scharf, a former zoning commissioner who owns a house in the North End, and Kosberg, who owns a condominium in the South End, sued the town in 2017, alleging the assessments are invalid because the town relied on a consultant's "arbitrary" assessment methods. They are asking a judge to halt the assessments and force the town to refund the money it has so far collected. More than 7,000 parcels are being assessed. Individual assessments range from a few hundred dollars to thousands of dollars based on a number of factors. Each property is rated based on the improved safety, reliability and aesthetic value it would receive from a town-wide underground system. Also considered is the size and type of each property, including whether it is single-family, condominium, vacant, non-residential or multi-family. Kosberg and Scharf contend in the suit that there are no special benefits from buried utilities because there's no objective evidence of an increase in the affected parcels' market values. Voters in a 2016 referendum narrowly approved up to $90 million in bonds to finance the project. "There is plainly conflict between those who voted for and against the referendum," Nutt wrote in his opinion. "There is plainly not a uniform class-wide view of either the benefits or the [assessment] apportionment." If the assessments are invalidated, the town would have to repay the bonds through a property tax increase, Nutt wrote. Property taxes are based on each property's taxable value — a different approach than the special assessment formula. "In the end, some class members would financially benefit from the relief while others would be financially disadvantaged," Nutt wrote. As of last month, the town had spent $516,238 defending against the suit, according to the Finance Department. The Kosberg-Scharf suit is one of three filed against the town challenging the referendum language or assessments. The other two, brought by South End resident Arthur Goldmacher and PBT Real Estate, were dismissed without going to trial. The town spent $183,701 defending against the Goldmacher suit. To date, it has spent $159,182 in the case against PBT Real Estate, which has appealed U.S. District Judge Donald M. Middlebrooks' ruling to the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals. PBT Real Estate's agent is John D. O'Neill, an attorney and West Palm Beach resident. PBT Real Estate is a property owner in the Palm Beach Towers, whose board of directors has said it is not involved with the case. [GN] PATHWAY SENIOR: Dukes Sues Over Illegal Collection of Biometrics ---------------------------------------------------------------- TAKITA DUKES, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. PATHWAY SENIOR LIVING, LLC, Case No. 2020CH00330 (Ill. Cir., Jan. 10, 2020), seeks to stop the Defendant's capture, collection, use and storage of individuals' biometric identifiers and/or biometric information, which violate the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act. The Plaintiff contends that she was required to "clock-in" and "clock-out" using a timeclock that operated, at least in part, by scanning her fingerprint. As an employee, she was required to scan at least one finger, multiple times, so Defendant could create, collect, capture, construct, store, use, and/ or obtain a biometric template for her. The Defendant then used the Plaintiff's biometrics as an identification and authentication method to track her time, potentially with the help of a third-party vendor. The Defendant subsequently stored her biometric data in its database(s). Each time she began and ended her workday, in addition to clocking in and out for lunches, she was required to scan her fingerprint using the biometric timeclock device. Ms. Dukes worked for the Defendant at Victory Centre in Galewood, Illinois. The Plaintiff alleges that she has never been informed of the specific limited purposes or length of time for which Defendant collected, stored, or used her biometrics. She further alleges that she has never been informed of any biometric data retention policy developed by Defendant, nor has she ever been informed of whether Defendant will ever permanently delete her biometrics. The Plaintiff brings the action for damages and other legal and equitable remedies resulting from the illegal actions of the Defendant. Pathway provides senior care services. The Company operates, manages, owns, and develops assisted as well as independent living facilities for senior citizens.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Brandon M. Wise, Esq. Paul A. Lesko, Esq. PEIFFER WOLF CARR & KANE, APLC 818 Lafayette Ave., Floor 2 St. Louis, MO 63104 Telephone: 314 833-4825 E-mail: bwise@pwcklegal.com plesko@pwcklegal.com PIONEER HOME: State Attorneys Seek Dismissal of Class Action Suit ----------------------------------------------------------------- Eric Stone, writing for KRBD.com, reports that state attorneys are asking a Ketchikan judge to dismiss a class-action lawsuit brought by three Pioneer Home residents after monthly rates more than doubled: with top tier residents liable to owe $15,000 a month for state-run assisted living. Attorneys filed a suit in Ketchikan Superior Court on behalf of Pioneer Home residents in Juneau and Ketchikan claiming that dramatic rates increases threaten to bankrupt elderly Alaskans who live in the state-run assisted living homes. The lawsuit asks a judge to issue an injunction against the rate increases and prevent any residents from being evicted for not paying. One of the plaintiffs, Ketchikan resident Eileen Casey, is now nearly $100,000 in debt to the facility and administrators have threatened to kick her out of the home, according to court filings. The state Attorney General's office's 12-page answer filed on Dec. 23 doesn't dispute these facts. Rather, it asks the court to toss it on technical grounds by calling into question the plaintiffs' standing and other factors. State attorneys also argue that the plaintiff facing eviction hadn't paid her rent prior to the hike or applied for assistance. It also denies the claim that previous incremental rate increases make a large jump - of around 138 percent in some cases - unfair. The state's filing lays out some general avenues for a defense. It could argue that Pioneer Home residents haven't been harmed by rate increases; it could argue that residents had other options for relief besides suing and it could argue that the plaintiffs are acting in bad faith by challenging their bills in court. A timeline for the lawsuit remains unclear. In the meantime, the octo- and nonagenarians continue to live in Pioneer Homes in Ketchikan and Juneau. They are among the 497 residents in six Pioneer Homes affected by the increases. [GN] PRECISION PIPELINE: Severe Labor Suit Removed to S.D. New York -------------------------------------------------------------- Precision Pipeline Solutions, LLC removed the case captioned as RONALD SEVERE and EDUARDO NEGRON, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated who were employed by PRECISION PIPELINE SOLUTIONS, LLC v. PRECISION PIPELINE SOLUTIONS, LLC, Case No. 162286/2019 (Filed Dec. 19, 2019), from the Supreme Court of New York, New York County, to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York on Jan. 13, 2020. The action seeks to recover damages for alleged breach of utility contracts purportedly requiring payment of prevailing wage. The Plaintiffs seek damages for prevailing rates of wages and supplemental benefits for themselves and the putative class plus interest, costs, and attorneys' fees pursuant to the New York Labor Law. Precision Pipeline is a natural gas and electric utility contractor headquartered in New Windsor, New York.[BN] The Plaintiffs are represented by: James Emmet Murphy, Esq. Lloyd Ambinder, Esq. VIRGINIA & AMBINDER, LLP 40 Broad Street, 7th Floor New York, NY 10004 Telephone: (212) 943-9080 E-mail: JMurphy@vandallp.com RIDGEWOOD INDUSTRIES: Winters Sues Over Dressers' Tip-Over Issues ----------------------------------------------------------------- WINDI WINTERS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. RIDGEWOOD INDUSTRIES LTD. and DOREL HOME FURNISHINGS, INC., Case No. 2:20-at-00045 (E.D. Cal., Jan. 13, 2020), alleges that the Defendants violated California's Consumers Legal Remedies Act, California's Unfair Competition Law, the Song-Beverly Act and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act in connection with their sale of defective Belmont Four-4 Drawer Dresser products. According to the complaint, the Defendants manufacture, market, and sell the Belmont Four-4 Drawer Dresser products, all of which suffer from an identical defect in design. Specifically, the Products' defective design renders them unstable, posing severe tip-over and entrapment hazards that can result in death or injuries to children. This defect renders the Products unsafe for their principal purpose, the Plaintiff asserts. In the fall of 2017, Ms. Winters purchased multiple Belmont Four-Drawer Dressers from a K-Mart store located in Stockton, California, for approximately $40 each. Ms. Winters is a mother of young children and purchased the Products because she believed they were safe and suitable for use as dressers. However, the Products Ms. Winters purchased were not fit for use as dressers due to the Products' defective nature. In fact, the Products indeed tipped over posing a severe safety hazard to her children. Ms. Winters would not have purchased the Products had she known that the Products were unsafe and unfit to perform their intended purpose, the lawsuit says. Furniture tip-over accidents are becoming increasingly common. Every year, approximately 40,000 people visit emergency rooms due to such accidents, 25,000 of whom are children, according to the complaint. For instance, in 2010, furniture tip-overs accounted for the deaths of 49 children in the United States. In 2011, according to the Consumer Product Safety Commission, furniture tip-overs killed 49 children in the United States. The CPSC estimates that between 2000 and 2018, there have been 459 deaths involving children due to furniture tip-overs. Ridgewood manufactures furniture products throughout the United States. Dorel Home markets, distributes, and sells furniture products throughout the United States.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: L. Timothy Fisher, Esq. Joel D. Smith, Esq. BURSOR & FISHER, P.A. 1990 North California Boulevard, Suite 940 Walnut Creek, CA 94596 Telephone: (925) 300-4455 Facsimile: (925) 407-2700 E-mail: ltfisher@bursor.com jsmith@bursor.com SAFEGUARD DOCUMENT: McKenna Seeks Overtime Wages Under FLSA ----------------------------------------------------------- Kenny McKenna, and others similarly situated v. SAFEGUARD DOCUMENT DESTRUCTION, INC., and FRANK VITARELLI, JR., Case No. CACE-20-000706 (Fla. Cir., Broward Cty., Jan. 13, 2020), seeks to recover from the Defendants unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, and attorney's fees and costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act. According to the complaint, the Plaintiff worked about 56 hours every week in that year (52 weeks) which yields about 16 hours of overtime every week. The Plaintiff alleges he was only paid his regular rate of pay for all of his overtime hours. The Defendants knew and/or showed reckless disregard for properly paying overtime because the Defendants paid the overtime at the regular rate in cash or by a separate check, because the Defendants knew they weren't paying overtime properly, and because the booked labor costs didn't match the hours worked by the employees, says the complaint. The Plaintiff was employed by Safeguard as a FLSA-covered employee from January 2017 until December 2019. Safeguard Document Destruction, Inc., was engaged in interstate commerce in the document shredding industry.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Ben Murphey, Esq. LAWLOR WHITE & MURPHEY, LLP 2211 Davie Blvd. Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33312 Phone: 954-525-2345 Fax: 954-730-8908 Email: bmurphey@lwmlegal.com beller@lwmlegal.com pleadings@lwmlegal.com SCOFFOLDING SOLUTIONS: Mag. Judge Recommends OK of $200K Epps Deal ------------------------------------------------------------------ In the case, TONY EPPS and MATTHEW SULLIVAN, For themselves and on behalf of all others similarly situated Plaintiff, v. SCOFFOLDING SOLUTIONS, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-562 (E.D. Va.), Magistrate Judge Lawrence R. Leonard of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Norfolk Division, recommended that the parties' Joint Motion for Settlement Approval be granted. Before the Court is the parties' Joint Motion for Settlement Approval, which was filed in accordance with the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). The matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge for a report and recommendation. The Defendant, is engaged in the business of erecting and dismantling scaffolding, with six locations in North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia, including in the City of Chesapeake. The named Plaintiffs and the opt-in Plaintiffs were employees of the Defendant -- either as Erectors, Foremen or Helpers -- who worked out of the Chesapeake location between October 2014 and April 2018. The Plaintiffs erected and dismantled scaffolding at various job sites throughout Hampton Roads, as well as out of the area in Richmond, Fredericksburg, Charlottesville, Lynchburg, Northern Virginia, the District of Columbia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Pennsylvania. As hourly employees of a business engaged in interstate commerce with annual gross receipts in excess of $500,000, the Plaintiffs and the Defendant are subject to the FLSA. The Court previously ruled that the Plaintiffs as a class were subject to a compensation policy for out-of-town travel which violated the FLSA and for which some Plaintiffs were entitled to recover. The Plaintiffs alleged further that they were entitled to compensation which they were not paid for the time from when they were required to report to the Chesapeake Yard in the morning at 6:00 a.m. until they arrived at the first job site of the day, and that they were not compensated for the return journey from the last job site of the day or for subsequent work at the Chesapeake Yard at the end of the work day. The Defendant disputed that the Plaintiffs were entitled to such compensation, contending that they were not performing work-related duties until they arrived at the various jobsites. The Plaintiffs filed their cause of action on Oct. 26, 2017, which the Defendant answered on Jan. 16, 2018. The Plaintiffs moved to conditionally certify their class on Feb. 16, 2018, and the Court granted the motion on Feb. 21, 2018. Over the Defendant's objection, the Court granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend their complaint, and the Amended Complaint was filed on Jan. 3, 2019. The parties subsequently litigated motions for decertification, for partial summary judgment, and to dismiss Count II and claim for willfulness (Defendant), for bifurcation (joint), and to strike Defendant's expert, and for partial summary judgment (Plaintiffs). After trial was bifurcated and the liability portion of trial rescheduled for Nov. 19, 2019, the parties engaged in a settlement conference with United States Magistrate Judge Miller, at which the proposed Settlement Agreement was reached. According to the proposed Settlement Agreement, the Defendant agreed to pay a total amount of $200,000 to settle the action. In exchange, the named Plaintiffs and all participating members agree to release their claims against Scaffolding Solutions. Under the Settlement Agreement, no more than $100,000 will be allocated to the Plaintiffs' damages and the balance of the settlement amount will be allocated to attorneys' fees and costs. Pursuant to the Joint Motion for Settlement Approval, the 20 opt-in Plaintiffs actually will share $85,000 in damages, with $5,000 allocated to costs and $110,000 allocated to attorneys' fees. The $85,000 in damages is alleged to represent the about 90% of the claimed unpaid overtime pay within two years of the respective opt-in dates as calculated by the Plaintiffs' counsel. Neither Tony Epps nor Matthew Sullivan, the named Plaintiffs, are earmarked to receive any additional recovery for their efforts in bringing and prosecuting the matter. The Court held a hearing on the Joint Motion for Settlement Approval on Dec. 10, 2019. Magistrate Judge Leonard finds that the amount of settlement in relation to the potential recovery weighs in favor of approving the settlement. The compromise proposed therefore is reasonable under these circumstances as the desired settlement fairly reflects the parties' wish to finalize all potential collective litigation, put an end to the expenditure of attorneys' fees and costs, and end the uncertainty that accompanies litigation. As to the attorneys' fees and costs, the Magistrate Judge concludes that the requested $110,000 allocation for attorneys' fees and $5,000 in costs are fair and reasonable. Consequently, given the strength of the Plaintiffs' claims, the defenses advocated by Defendant, the uncertainty of damages, consideration of appropriate attorneys' fees and costs, and the general uncertainty and expense that accompanies all litigation, the Magistrate finds that that the proposed $200,000 settlement is fair and reasonable and in accordance with the purposes of the FLSA. Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Leonard recommended that the Joint Motion for Settlement Approval be accepted by the District Judge. A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 11, 2019 Report & Recommendation is available at https://is.gd/RMSU7M from Leagle.com. Tony Epps, MATTHEW SULLIVAN, For themselves and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Mike Wall, Shakai Cowell, Christopher Jackson, Eternal Kamal Allah, Justin Switzer, Joseph Johnson, Brandon Hecker, Ras Jelani A. Simba, Marlon Stallings, Antoine Davis, Brandon L. Dunbar, Otis Fulbright, Brandon Neusome, David A. Riggins, Chad D. Schlny, Malik Williams, Quandarius Dowell & Malik Davis, Plaintiffs, represented by Christopher Colt North, The Consumer & Employee Rights Law Firm PC, Samuel Young Lee, David Kamp & Frank LLC & Joshua Michael David -- jdavid@davidkampfrank.com -- David Kamp & Frank LLC. Scaffolding Solutions, LLC, Defendant, represented by Jaime Brett Wisegarver -- jwisegarver@hirschlerlaw.com -- Hirschler Fleischer PC & Courtney Moates Paulk -- cpaulk@hirschlerlaw.com -- Hirschler Fleischer PC. SEATTLE, WA: 9th Cir. Upholds Class Certification Denial in Willis ------------------------------------------------------------------ In the case captioned KAYLA WILLIS; REAVY WASHINGTON; LISA HOOPER; BRANDIE OSBORNE, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly individuals; THE EPISCOPAL DIOCESE OF OLYMPIA; TRINITY PARISH OF SEATTLE; REAL CHANGE, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF SEATTLE; WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; ROGAR MILLAR, Secretary of Transportation for WSDOT, in his official capacity, Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 18-35053 (9th Cir.), Judge Jennifer Choe-Groves of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's refusal to grant the Appellants' motion for class certification. Multi-Departmental Administrative Rules 08-01, enacted by the City of Seattle in 2008, establish, in part, standard procedures for the removal of unauthorized encampments, camping equipment, and personal property left on city-owned property. The City of Seattle amended its encampment rules in 2017 by promulgating Multi-Departmental Administrative Rules 17-01. The Washington State Department of Transportation ("WSDOT") has adopted guidelines instituting similar removal procedures for unauthorized encampments on state property, titled "WSDOT's Guidelines to Address Illegal Encampments within State Right of Way." Appellants Willis, Hooper, Osborne, and Washington are four individuals who live outside on public property and seek to represent a class of approximately 2,000 other people similarly situated. They appeal the district court's order denying a motion for class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Referencing the MDARs and the WSDOT Guidelines, the Appellants asserted in their motion for class certification that the City of Seattle and WSDOT engaged in an alleged policy and practice of "sweeps" that destroyed property, violating the unreasonable seizure and due process clauses under both the U.S. Constitution and the Washington State Constitution. By bringing the action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, the Appellants sought declaratory and injunctive relief from the "sweeps." The district court found that the Appellants satisfied the numerosity requirement of Rule 23, but concluded that they failed to establish sufficiently the existence of a practice that applied uniformly to all proposed class members and was subject to resolution in a single action. The district court denied the motion for class certification for failure to satisfy all the requirements of Rule 23(a). The Ninth Circuit finds that the Appellants failed to proffer sufficient evidence and articulate a practice that was common to the claims of the proposed class in their motion for class certification. The Appellants presented five bases for commonality before the district court in their motion, and each basis relates to whether the Defendants' course of conduct, such as failing to provide adequate notice and removing or destroying personal property, raises a common question. Although the record contains voluminous declarations, photographs, and videos in support of a broad description of "sweeps," the Appellants notably do not point to a specific practice that applies uniformly to all proposed class members. Despite the broad allegations in their complaint, there is no evidence that every Appellant has experienced the same challenged practice or suffered the same injury due to the implementation of the MDARs or the WSDOT Guidelines. In fact, the Appellants themselves acknowledged that "each sweep is different." The Ninth Circuit concludes that it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to hold that an alleged practice affecting each of the Appellants was not discernable from the record and to deny the Appellants' class action certification accordingly. The Ninth Circuit cannot agree with her dissenting colleague that that the Appellants' motion for class certification raises a facial challenge to the MDARs or the WSDOT Guidelines as a basis for establishing commonality for purposes of Rule 23(a). The Appellants themselves have dismissed the relevance of a facial challenge as a basis for commonality, stating that the City's argument that they have not facially challenged the Defendants' policies or practices is irrelevant to class certification because they've shown that the Defendants' conduct places all unhoused persons in Seattle at risk. Because the Appellants' commonality argument before the district court rested upon extra-regulatory conduct, the Ninth Circuit declines to read their argument as premised upon a facial challenge. The Ninth Circuit also declines to rewrite the Appellants' commonality argument for them to include a facial challenge. Based upon the Appellants' failure to proffer sufficient evidence of a practice that was common to the claims of the proposed class members or lodge a facial challenge in satisfaction of the Rule 23(a) commonality requirement, the Ninth Circuit readily concludes that the district court's refusal to grant class certification was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the Appellate Court affirmed. A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's Nov. 29, 2019 Opinion is available at https://is.gd/NwoFXp from Leagle.com. Toby J. Marshall -- tmarshall@terrellmarshall.com -- (argued), Terrell Marshall Law Group PLLC, Seattle, Washington; Emily Chiang, Nancy Talner , and Breanne Schuster, ACLU of Washington Foundation, Seattle, Washington; Eric A. Lindberg -- elindberg@corrcronin.com -- Kristina Markosova, and Todd T. Williams -- twilliams@corrcronin.com -- Corr Cronin Michelson Baumgardner Fogg & Moore, Seattle, Washington; for Plaintiffs-Appellants. Matthew J. Segal -- matthew.segal@pacificalawgroup.com -- (argued), Taki V. Flevaris -- taki.flevaris@pacificalawgroup.com -- and Athanasios P. Papailiou -- athan.papailiou@pacificalawgroup.com -- Pacific Law Group LLP, Seattle, Washington; Patrick Downs, Gregory Narver, Carlton Seu, and Gary Smith, Seattle City Attorney's Office, Seattle, Washington; for Defendant-Appellee City of Seattle. Alicia O. Young (argued) and Matthew D. Huot, Assistant Attorneys General; Robert W. Ferguson, Attorney General; Office of the Attorney General, Olympia, Washington; for Defendants-Appellees Washington State Department of Transportation and Rogar Millar. J. Dino Vasquez and Joshua Howard, Karr Tuttle Campbell, Seattle, Washington; Eric Tars, National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty, Washington, D.C.; for Amici Curiae Disability Rights of Washington, et al. Shenoa Payne and Zachariah Allen, Richardson Wright LLP, Portland, Oregon, for Amici Curiae Civil Procedure Professors. SGS NORTH AMERICA: Gomez Seeks to Recover Overtime Pay Under FLSA ----------------------------------------------------------------- Israel Gomez, individually and for others similarly situated v. SGS NORTH AMERICA INC., Case No. 4:20-cv-00125 (S.D. Tex., Jan. 13, 2020), seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages and other damages from the Defendant under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Defendant has failed to pay the Plaintiff overtime as required by the FLSA, says the complaint. Instead, the Defendant paid the Plaintiff and other workers like him, the same hourly rate for all hours worked, including those in excess of 40 in a work week. Plaintiff Gomez performed work for the Defendant as a Plant Insulation Inspector from April 2019 through July 31, 2019. SGS is a member of SGS Group, and is the world's largest certification and inspection company.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Michael A. Josephson, Esq. Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq. Carl A. Fitz, Esq. JOSEPHSON DUNLAP 11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050 Houston, TX 77046 Phone: 713-352-1100 Facsimile: 713-352-3300 Email: mjosephson@mybackwages.com adunlap@mybackwages.com cfitz@mybackwages.com - and - Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq. BRUCKNER BURCH PLLC 8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500 Houston, TX 77046 Phone: (713) 877-8788 Telecopier: (713) 877-8065 Email: rburch@brucknerburch.com SPRINT CORP: Turina Sues Over Illegal Deductions on Commissions --------------------------------------------------------------- KRISTINA TURINA, individually and on behalf of a class of others similarly situated v. SPRINT CORPORATION, a Kansas Corporation & SPRINT/UNITED MANAGEMENT COMPANY, a Kansas Corporation, Case No. 2:20-cv-02018 (D. Kan., Jan. 10, 2020), is brought against the Defendants for unpaid wages and related penalties based on contracts for commissions they had with the Defendants. According to the complaint, specifically at issue is the Defendants' policy and practice of making illegal deductions from the Plaintiff and the Putative Class' commissions/wages related to commissions earned based on sales of the Defendants' "Sprint Mobile AI" product. The Plaintiff contends that the conduct is in violation of Sprint's 2019 Sales Incentive Compensation Plan, and the Kansas Wage Payment Act. The Plaintiff brings a nationwide class action on her own behalf and on behalf of those similarly situated, including all Account Managers working in the Defendants' Business Inside Sales Organization (BISO), who have had illegal deductions made from their pay in connection with the sale of the Defendant's "Sprint Mobile AI" product. The Plaintiff and the Putative Class are employees of the Defendants' BISO Department. Sprint Corporation is an American telecommunications company that provides wireless services and is an internet service provider, based in Overland Park, Kansas.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Ruben J. Krisztal, Esq. SMITH MOHLMAN INJURY LAW, LLC 701 E. 63rd Street, 3rd Floor Kansas City, MO 64110 Telephone: (816) 866-7711 Facsimile: (816) 866-7715 E-mail: rkrisztal@accidentlawkc.com - and - Jolie N. Pavlos, Esq. C. Ryan Morgan, Esq. MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A. 20 N. Orange Ave., 15th Floor Orlando, FL 32802-4979 Telephone: (407) 420-1414 Facsimile: (407) 245-3401 E-mail: JPavlos@forthepeople.com RMorgan@forthepeople.com SPSG PARTNERS: Whiteside Seeks to Recover Minimum and OT Wages -------------------------------------------------------------- STEPHON WHITESIDE, as individual and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. SPSG PARTNERS, an Unincorporated Joint California Venture; SPSG PARTNERS, LLC, a Limited Liability Company; SUKUT CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Corporation; SUKUT CONSTRUCTION, LLC., a California Limited Liability Company; GOODFELLOWS BROS. CALIFORNIA, LLC., a California Limited Liability Company; PACIFIC STATES ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTORS, INC., a California Corporation; and DOES 1 to 100, inclusive, Case No. 20CV000901 (Cal. Super., Jan. 13, 2020), seeks to recover unpaid overtime and minimum wages, unpaid meal and rest period premiums, unpaid reimbursement expenses, and derivative penalties for inaccurate wage statements and for failure to keep accurate time records under the California Labor Code. The Plaintiff and similarly situated employees worked for the Defendants as hourly, non-exempt employees. The Plaintiff contends that the Defendants had a uniform rounding policy that negatively affected the employees. The Plaintiff also alleges that the Defendants failed to the employees minimum wages and overtime wages, did not provide all meal and rest periods, and failed to pay all applicable meal and rest period premiums. The Plaintiff worked as laborer for the Defendants from April 2019 to July 2019. The Defendants are doing business in the construction industry.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Galen T. Shimoda, Esq. Justin P. Rodriguez, Esq. Brittany V. Berzin, Esq. Ronald Konini, Esq. SHIMODA LAW CORP. 9401 East Stockton Blvd., Suite 200 Elk Grove, CA 95624 Telephone: (916) 525-0716 Facsimile: (916) 760-3733 SSK DONUTS: Joell Sues Over Failure to Pay for All Hours Worked --------------------------------------------------------------- KOVAN JOELL, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. SSK DONUTS LLC and SSK DONUTS 2 LLC, Case No. 615609/2019 (N.Y. Sup., Jan. 13, 2020), alleges that pursuant to the New York Labor Law, the New York Code of Rules and Regulations and the New York Wage Theft Prevention Act, the Plaintiff is entitled to be paid in full for all hours that he worked. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Arthur M. Diamond. The Plaintiff alleges that he spent time off-the-clock and money to clean and maintain his uniform consistent with the uniform appearance standards Defendants required. He adds that he was entitled to reimbursement or additional pay for time spent off the clock and money spent in laundering and maintaining the Defendants' uniform. The Plaintiff contends that throughout his entire employment with Defendants, he was a covered, non-exempt employee within the meaning of the NYLL. As such, he was, and is, entitled to be paid in full for all hours worked. In addition, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants failed to pay him for all hours worked. He would regularly work through breaks without compensation. He adds that the Defendants further failed to compensate him for all hours worked, routinely deducting one or more hours per week from him pay. Because of Defendants' improper compensation policies, the Plaintiff argues he was deprived of pay, in direct violation of the NYLL. The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants from July 2017 through October 6, 2019. The Defendants own and operate Dunkin' Donuts restaurants.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Mark Gaylord, Esq. BOUKLAS GAYLORD LLP 445 Broadhollow Road, Suite 110 Melville, NY 11747 Telephone: (516) 742-4949 E-mail: mark@bglawny.com The Defendants are represented by: KAUFMAN DOLOWICH SCHNEIDER 135 Crossways Park Dr., Suite No. 201 Woodbury, NY 11797 Telephone: (516) 681-1100 TRIPLE CROWN: Myers Labor Class Suit Removed to S.D. California --------------------------------------------------------------- The class action lawsuit styled as JENNIFER MYERS v. TRIPLE CROWN NUTRITION, INC., LISA WEIGMAN, AND DOES 1 TO 30, Case No. 37-2019-00061046-CU-WT-NC (Filed Nov. 15, 2019), was removed from the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego, to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California on Jan. 10, 2020. The Southern District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:20-cv-00080-H-BGS to the proceeding. Ms. Myers, on behalf of all similarly situated employees, seeks to pursue all available penalties resulting from Defendants' violations of the California Labor Code. She also asserts claims for damages for discrimination, harassment, failure to engage in good faith interactive process, and failure to accommodate. The Plaintiff was an employee of Triple Crown serving under the direction of Lisa Weigman and Robert Daugherty. Triple Crown specializes in developing horse feed. The Company offers products, such as feeds, supplements, forages, and racing formulations. Weigman and Daugherty are officers of the Company.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Charles P. Boylston, Esq. Amber S. Jones, Esq. THE LAW OFFICES OF CHARLES P. BOYLSTON, APC 28991 Old Town Front Street, Suite 103 Temecula, CA 92590 Telephone (909) 825-9276 Facsimile (909) 825-9369 E-mail: cboylston@boylstonlaw.com UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Aleksanian Seeks to Recover Illegal Deductions ----------------------------------------------------------------- LEVON ALEKSANIAN, SONAM, LAMA, HARJIT KHATRA, and, Individually, on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, and as Class Representatives v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., UBER LOGISTIK, LLC, UBER USA LLC, jointly and severally, Case No. 1:19-cv-10308 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 6, 2019), arises from the Defendants' alleged systematic breaches of contract. Specifically, the lawsuit seeks to recover amounts that were systematically deducted from drivers' earnings, in violation of Uber's driver contracts (known as Uber "Software License and Services Agreement," hereafter "contracts") as a result of Uber's payment practices in New York from at least November 6, 2013, through May 22, 2017. The Plaintiffs are present and former drivers, who contracted with Uber to drive Black Cars as part of Uber's New York City fleet and who did not opt out of arbitration. Uber is a Delaware corporation headquartered in San Francisco, California. Uber operates twenty-eight (28) wholly owned subsidiaries in New York, each of which has held or currently holds a TLC license to operate a For-Hire Vehicle (FHV) Base. Uber operates its Black Car operations in New York City as a group of Black Car bases and one luxury limousine base, each of which is licensed by the New York City Taxi Limousine Commission (TLC). According to the complaint, the claims raised on behalf of those similarly situated seek to provide redress to more than 96,000 New York City Uber drivers for breaches of contract affecting every member of the largest private sector workforce in New York City over the relevant period. From the time Uber entered the New York City market in 2011, until May 22, 2017, Uber illegally deducted from drivers' earnings monies, which Uber represented were sales taxes and the surcharge for the Black Car Fund (BCP) surcharge, which provides Workers' Compensation for Black Car drivers. The Plaintiffs contend that Uber's own contract did not allow for such deductions from driver earnings. Rather, Uber's contracts promised drivers a set percentage of each fare paid by the passenger, with only Uber's commission, or "Service Fee" deducted from each fare. They note that during the relevant time period, Uber deducted its Service Fee, which ranged from 20-28% of the fare. In the relevant period, the New York City sales tax rate was 8.875% and the BCF surcharge rate was 2.5%.[BN] The Plaintiffs are represented by: Jeanne E. Mirer, Esq. Ria Julien, Esq. MIRER, MAZZOCCHI, & JULIEN & PLLC 1 Whitehall Street, 16th Floor New York, NY 10031 Telephone: (212) 231-2235 E-mail: Jmirer@mmsjlaw.com rjulien@mmsjlaw.com - and - Zubin Soleimany, Esq. NEW YORK TAXI WORKERS ALLIANCE 31-10 37th Avenue, Suite 300 Long Island City, NY 11101 Telephone: (718) 706-9892 E-mail: zsoleimany@nytwa.org UMG RECORDINGS: Court Enters Protective Order in Soundgarden Suit ----------------------------------------------------------------- Magistrate Judge Jean P. Rosenbluth of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, Western Division, has entered the parties' Stipulated Protective Order in the case captioned SOUNDGARDEN, a Partnership; TOM WHALLEY, as Trustee of the Afeni Shakur Trust; JANE PETTY; STEVE EARLE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. UMG RECORDINGS, INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-05449 JAK (JPRx) (C.D. Cal.). The Action is likely to involve privacy interests of the putative class members and third parties, trade secrets and other valuable research, development, commercial, financial, technical and/or proprietary information for which the parties believe special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecution of the Action is warranted. Accordingly, to expedite the flow of information, to facilitate the prompt resolution of disputes over confidentiality of discovery materials, to adequately protect information the parties are entitled to keep confidential, to ensure that the parties are permitted reasonable necessary uses of such material in preparation for and in the conduct of trial, to address their handling at the end of the litigation, and serve the ends of justice, a protective order for such information is justified in the matter. It is the intent of the parties that information will not be designated as "Confidential" or "Highly Confidential" for tactical reasons and that nothing be so designated without a good faith belief that it has been maintained in a confidential, non-public manner, and there is good cause why it should not be part of the public record of the case. The protections conferred by the Order cover not only Protected Material, but also (1) any information copied or extracted from Protected Material; (2) all copies, excerpts, summaries, or compilations of Protected Material; and (3) any testimony, conversations, or presentations by Parties or their Counsel that might reveal Protected Material. Even after final disposition of the litigation, the confidentiality obligations imposed by the Order will remain in effect until a Designating Party agrees otherwise in writing or a court order otherwise directs. Final disposition will be deemed to be the later of (1) dismissal of all claims and defenses in the Action, with or without prejudice; and (2) final judgment after the completion and exhaustion of all appeals, rehearings, remands, trials, or reviews of the Action, including the time limits for filing any motions or applications for extension of time pursuant to applicable law. All challenges to confidentiality designations will proceed under Local Rule 37-1 through Local Rule 37-4. Unless the Designating Party has waived or withdrawn the confidentiality designation, all Parties will continue to afford the material in question the level of protection to which it is entitled under the Producing Party's designation until the Court rules on the challenge. Within 60 days after the final disposition of the Action, each Party will return all Protected Material to the Designating Party or destroy such material, including all copies, abstracts, compilations, summaries and any other format reproducing or capturing any Protected Material. The Receiving Party must submit a written certification to the Designating Party by the 60-day deadline. A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 22, 2019 Stipulated Protective Order is available at https://is.gd/g96x10 from Leagle.com. Soundgarden, a Partnership, Tom Whalley, as Trustee of the Afeni Shakur Trust, Jane Petty & Steve Earle, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Steven G. Sklaver -- ssklaver@susmangodfrey.com -- Susman Godfrey LLP, Andres Monserrate -- amonserrate@khpslaw.com -- King Homes Paterno and Soriano LLP, Edwin F. McPherson -- emcpherson@mcpherson-llp.com -- McPherson LLP, Henry D. Gradstein -- hgradstein@khpslaw.com -- King Holmes Paterno and Soriano LLP, Howard E. King -- hking@khpslaw.com -- King Holmes Paterno and Soriano LLP, Kalpana Srinivasan -- ksrinivasan@susmangodfrey.com -- Susman Godfrey LLP, Mark H. Hatch-Miller, Susman Godfrey LLP, pro hac vice, Meng Xi, Susman Godfrey LLP, Pierre B. Pine -- ppine@mcpherson-llp.com -- McPherson LLP & Stephen E. Morrissey, Susman Godfrey LLP. UMG Recordings, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendant, represented by Deborah L. Stein -- dstein@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn and Crutcher LLP, Nathaniel L. Bach -- nbach@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher LLP & Scott A. Edelman -- sedelman@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn and Crutcher LLP. UNITI GROUP: Schall Law Files Securities Class Action ------------------------------------------------------ The Schall Law Firm, a national shareholder rights litigation firm, announces the filing of a class action lawsuit against Uniti Group Inc. (NASDAQ: UNIT) for violations of Secs. 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Investors who purchased the Company's securities between April 20, 2015 and June 24, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"), are encouraged to contact the firm before December 30, 2019. We also encourage you to contact Brian Schall of the Schall Law Firm, 1880 Century Park East, Suite 404, Los Angeles, CA 90067, at 424-303-1964, to discuss your rights free of charge. You can also reach us through the firm's website at www.schallfirm.com, or by email at brian@schallfirm.com. The class, in this case, has not yet been certified, and until certification occurs, you are not represented by an attorney. If you choose to take no action, you can remain an absent class member. According to the Complaint, the Company made false and misleading statements to the market. Uniti's customer, Windstream, defaulted on unsecured notes, rendering the Company's financial results unsustainable. Based on this fact, the Company's public statements were false and materially misleading throughout the class period. When the market learned the truth about Uniti, investors suffered damages. Join the case to recover your losses. The Schall Law Firm represents investors around the world and specializes in securities class action lawsuits and shareholder rights litigation. View source version on businesswire.com: https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20191226005109/en/ Contact: Brian Schall, Esq. The Schall Law Firm Website: www.schallfirm.com Office: 310-301-3335 Cell: 424-303-1964 E-mail: info@schallfirm.com brian@schallfirm.com [GN] WAWA INC: Customers File Class Suit Over Data Breach ---------------------------------------------------- Rudy Chinchilla, writing for NBC Philadelphia, reports that a group of Wawa customers has filed a class-action lawsuit against the company a week after the chain revealed that a data breach potentially exposed people's credit and debit card information at hundreds of its locations. The plaintiffs allege that Wawa failed to take adequate security measures, which exposed customers to fraud and identity theft and left them vulnerable to criminals for potentially years to come. "The Data Breach was the inevitable result of Wawa's inadequate data security measures and cavalier approach to data security," the plaintiffs allege in the suit filed December 26 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Wawa announced the data breach in a Dec. 19 open letter, saying that malware began running at its stores around March 4 and wasn't discovered until Dec. 10. The company said the malware was finally contained Dec. 12. Sensitive information exposed during the data breach included card numbers, expiration dates and cardholder names at more than 860 locations throughout the East Coast, the company said. The plaintiffs allege the company failed to notify individual customers about the breach, relying only on the open letter posted to its website. Tabitha Hans-Arroyo, of Woodbury Heights, New Jersey, who is named in the suit, said she found out her card had been compromised only after receiving a Christmas Eve email from her bank telling her that someone had tried to make an online purchase of around $2,535. Wawa CEO Chris Gheysens apologized "deeply to all of you, our friends and neighbors, for this incident," and the company has offered customers one year of free credit monitoring and identity theft protection. However, the plaintiffs say the offer "is too little too late," since they have already had their data exposed and "will suffer increased vulnerability to fraudulent transactions and identity theft for many years into the future." The plaintiffs are seeking unspecified damages through a jury trial. Wawa declined to comment for this story, citing pending litigation. [GN] WAWA INC: Faces High Suit in Eastern District of Pennsylvania ------------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Wawa, Inc. The case is captioned as SUZANNE HIGH, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED v. WAWA, INC., Case No. 2:20-cv-00001-JHS (E.D. Pa., Jan. 1, 2020). The case is assigned to the Hon. Joel H. Slomsky. The suit alleges violation fraud related laws. Wawa is an American chain of convenience stores and gas stations located along the East Coast of the United States, operating in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Washington, D.C., and Florida.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Kevin Clancy Boylan, Esq. MORGAN & MORGAN 1800 John F. Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 1401 Philadelphia, PA 19103 Telephone: (215) 446-9795 Facsimile: (215) 446-9799 E-mail: cboylan@forthepeople.com WELLIVER & ASSOCIATES: Martinez Sues Over Use of Consumer Reports ----------------------------------------------------------------- PABLO MARTINEZ, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated v. WELLIVER & ASSOCIATES, LLC, a Utah limited liability company; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Case No. 30-2020-01123128-CU-BT-CXC (Cal. Super., Jan. 10, 2020), arises from the Defendants' violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act relating to their preparation and furnishing of consumer reports for employment purposes without first obtaining compliant certifications from users. As a result of the Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, the Plaintiff and other putative class members have been injured, including having their privacy and statutory rights invaded in violation of the FCRA, their employment prospects diminished, and resulting losses including lost income and emotional harm, says the complaint. The Plaintiff seeks statutory, actual, or compensatory damages, punitive damages, costs and expenses of litigation including attorney's fees, declarative and equitable relief, including injunctive relief requiring the Defendants to comply with their legal obligations, as well as additional and further relief that may be appropriate. Welliver is a consumer reporting agency.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Anthony J. Orshansky, Esq. Alexandria R. Kachadoorian, Esq. Justin Kachadoorian, Esq. COUNSELONE, PC. 9301 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 650 Beverly Hills, CA 90210 Telephone: (310)277-9945 Facsimile: (424)277-3727 E-mail: anthony@counselonegroup.com alexandria@counselonegroup.com justin@counselonegroup.com WILCO LIFE: 11th Cir. Flips Remand of Anderson Suit to State Court ------------------------------------------------------------------ In the case, VANESSA ANDERSON, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILCO LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant, Case No. 19-14127, Non-Argument Calendar (11th Cir.), Judge Frank Mays Hull of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's order granting Plaintiff Anderson's motion to remand the putative class action back to a Georgia state court. Vanessa Anderson, on behalf of herself and all those similarly situated, sued her former insurer, Wilco. Anderson alleges that Wilco improperly raised the cost of insurance premiums for her life insurance policy, which caused her policy to lapse. As relief, Anderson seeks both money damages and declaratory and injunctive relief requiring Wilco (1) to reinstate all life insurance policies that were surrendered or lapsed as a result of the improper premium increases and (2) to lower premiums. Anderson filed her lawsuit in the Superior Court of Columbia County, Georgia. Wilco timely removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia under the Class Action Fairness Act. The federal district court remanded the case to state court, concluding that Wilco had not met its burden of showing that the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million, as required by CAFA. The District Court granted Wilco permission to appeal under 28 U.S.C. Section 1453(c). Wilco thus appealed. On appeal, Wilco argued that the district court incorrectly found that the case did not meet the $5 million amount-in-controversy standard under CAFA. According to Wilco, because the putative class seeks reinstatement of their lapsed life insurance policies, the face value of the policies is at issue. In response, Anderson countered that the putative class is not challenging the validity or face value of the insurance policies, rather her claim is that she and others were overcharged for the policies. Anderson submitted that because her allegations challenge the premium costs, only the wrongfully charged premiums are in the controversy, not the policies' face values. She also contended that, because it is difficult to predict when the class members will die, or whether their policies will remain in effect until their deaths, and, if so, in what amounts, the value of her request to reinstate the lapsed policies is too speculative to be treated as the amount in controversy in any event. Because Anderson seeks equitable relief to reinstate a lapsed or surrendered life insurance policy, Judge Hull concludes that (1) the face value of the policy can be used to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement, and (2) the aggregate face value of the life insurance policies is over $75 million. Wilco thus has met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds the $5 million CAFA threshold, the Eleventh Circuit opines. For the reasons stated, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and vacated the district court's order remanding the Anderson case to state court, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with her Opinion. A full-text copy of the Eleventh Circuit's Nov. 22, 2019 Opinion is available at https://is.gd/JdZfFE from Leagle.com. Lee W. Brigham, for Plaintiff-Appellee. Charles A. McCallum, III, for Plaintiff-Appellee. Elizabeth Joy Campbell -- ecampbell@lockelord.com -- for Defendant-Appellant. Robert Brent Irby, for Plaintiff-Appellee. Carl C. Scherz -- cscherz@lockelord.com -- for Defendant-Appellant. WINDSOR HEIGHTS, IA: Class Action Suit Filed Over Traffic Cams -------------------------------------------------------------- Sue Danielson, writing for whoradio.iheart.com, reports that there's a new chapter in a long legal battle, over traffic cameras in two cities in Iowa. A new class-action lawsuit has been filed against Windsor Heights, Iowa. The suit is similar to one filed against the city of Cedar Rapids which may be close to being resolved. A proposed settlement was recently announced in the Cedar Rapids case. Under the proposed settlement, more than 200-thousand people who received citations because of traffic cameras over the past several years, will be able to get a refund. Those who had fees subtracted from the Iowa Income Tax refund would also be reimbursed. Those eligible for a refund will be contacted. The class-action lawsuit against the city, was led by WHO Radio talk show host, Simon Conway.[GN] WOODLAND CLINIC: Martinez FCRA Suit Removed to N.D. California -------------------------------------------------------------- The class action lawsuit styled as JOSE MARTINEZ, as an individual and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. WOODLAND CLINIC MEDICAL GROUP, a medical corporation, DIGNITY HEALTH, a California Corporation; DIGNITY COMMUNITY CARE, a Colorado Corporation: and DOES 1-50, Inclusive, Case No. CGC-19-580640 (Filed Nov. 8, 2019), was removed from the California Superior Court to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California on Jan. 10, 2020. The Northern District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No. 4:20-cv-00225-DMR to the proceeding. The case is assigned to Hon. Judge Donna M Ryu. The lawsuit alleges violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. The action arises from the Defendants' acquisition and use of consumer and/or investigative consumer reports (background reports) to conduct background checks on the Plaintiff and current and former employees. The Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants routinely obtain and use information from background reports in connection with its hiring processes without complying with state and federal mandates. Woodland Clinic offers family medicine, pediatrics, and primary care. Dignity Health is a California-based not-for-profit public-benefit corporation that operates hospitals and ancillary care facilities in three states.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Zachary Crosner, Esq. Michael Crosner, Esq. David Watson, Esq. CROSNER LEGAL, P.C. 433 N. 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