/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/200101.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Wednesday, January 1, 2020, Vol. 22, No. 1


[*] Major Court Rulings in Class Action Lawsuits - 2019


[*] Major Court Rulings in Class Action Lawsuits - 2019
The Class Action Reporter is pleased to provide our subscribers the
following list of court decisions in class action lawsuits that we
have identified as major rulings in 2019.

This list is the product of and copyrighted by Beard Group, Inc.,
and no reproduction or further use of this list is permitted
without the prior written consent of Beard Group, Inc.

APPLE INC., Petitioner v. ROBERT PEPPER, et al., No. 17–204

           Apple Inc. sells iPhone applications, or apps, directly
           to iPhone owners through its App Store -- the only
           place where iPhone owners may lawfully buy apps.  Most
           of those apps are created by independent developers
           under contracts with Apple.  Apple charges the
           developers a $99 annual membership fee, allows them to
           set the retail price of the apps, and charges a 30%
           commission on every app sale.

           Four iPhone owners sued Apple, alleging that the
           company has unlawfully monopolized the aftermarket for
           iPhone apps.  Apple moved to dismiss, arguing that the
           iPhone owners could not sue because they were not
           direct purchasers from Apple under Illinois Brick Co.
           v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720.  The District Court agreed,
           but the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that the
           iPhone owners were direct purchasers because they
           purchased apps directly from Apple.

           The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit, holding
           that under Illinois Brick, the iPhone owners were
           direct purchasers who may sue Apple for alleged
           monopolization. Applying Section 4 of the Clayton Act,
           the High Court said it has consistently stated that
           "the immediate buyers from the alleged antitrust
           violators" may maintain a suit against the antitrust
           violators, but has ruled that indirect purchasers who
           are two or more steps removed from the violator in a
           distribution chain may not sue.  Unlike the consumer in
           Illinois Brick, the iPhone owners are not consumers at
           the bottom of a vertical distribution chain who are
           attempting to sue manufacturers at the top of the
           chain.  The absence of an intermediary in the
           distribution chain between Apple and the consumer is

           Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court,
           in which Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and
           Kagan, joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting
           opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices
           Thomas and Alito joined.

           Apple is represented by:

              Daniel M. Wall, Esq.
              Christopher S. Yates, Esq.
              Sadik Huseny, Esq.
              Aaron T. Chiu, Esq.
              LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
              505 Montgomery Street, Suite 2000
              San Francisco, CA 94111-6538
              Tel: (415) 391-0600
              Fax: (415) 395-8095
              Email: dan.wall@lw.com

           Solicitor General Noel J. Francisco for the United
           States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court,

           supporting the petitioner.

           Plaintiff Pepper is represented by:

              Mark C. Rifkin, Esq.
              Matthew M. Guiney, Esq.
              270 Madison Avenue
              New York, NY 10016
              Tel: (212) 545-4600
              Fax: (212) 686-0114
              Email: rifkin@whafh.com

                   - and -

              Rachele R. Byrd, Esq.
              Symphony Towers
              750 B Street, Suite 1820
              San Diego, CA 92101
              Tel: (619) 239-4599
              Email: Byrd@whafh.com

                 - and -

              David C. Frederick, Esq.
              Aaron M. Panner, Esq.
              Gregory G. Rapawy, Esq.
              Benjamin S. Softness, Esq.
              Sumner Square
              1615 M Street, N.W., Suite 400
              Washington, D.C. 20036
              Tel: (202) 326-7900
              Email: dfrederick@kellogghansen.com

17–1471 (U.S.)

           Citibank, N. A., filed a debt-collection action in
           state court, alleging that George Jackson was liable
           for charges incurred on a Home Depot credit card.  
           Jackson responded by filing third-party class-action
           claims against Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., and Carolina
           Water Systems, Inc., alleging that they had engaged in
           unlawful referral sales and deceptive and unfair trade
           practices under state law.  Home Depot filed a notice
           to remove the case from state to federal court, but
           Jackson moved to remand, arguing that controlling
           precedent barred removal by a third-party counterclaim
           defendant.  The District Court granted Jackson's
           motion, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that
           neither the general removal provision, 28 U.S.C.
           Section 1441(a), nor the removal provision in the Class

           Action Fairness Act of 2005, Section 1453(b), allowed
           Home Depot to remove the class-action claims filed
           against it.

           The Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's ruling.

           The High Court held that Section 1441(a) does not
           permit removal by a third-party counterclaim defendant.

           Home Depot emphasizes that it is a "defendant" to a
           "claim," but Section 1441(a) refers to "civil
           action[s]," not "claims."  And because the action as
           defined by the plaintiff's complaint is the "civil
           action . . . of which the district cour[t]" must have
           "original jurisdiction," "the defendant" to that action

           is the defendant to the complaint, not a party named in

           a counterclaim.

           The Supreme Court further held that Section 1453(b)
           does not permit removal by a third-party counterclaim
           defendant.  Home Depot contends that even if Section
           1441(a) does not permit removal, Section 1453(b) does
           because it permits removal by "any defendant" to a
           "class action."  The High Court, however, pointed out
           that the two clauses in Section 1453(b) that employ the

           term "any defendant" simply clarify that certain
           limitations on removal that might otherwise apply do
           not limit removal under that provision.  Neither clause
           -- nor anything else in the statute -- alters Section
           1441(a)'s limitation on who can remove, suggesting that

           Congress intended to leave that limit in place.  In
           addition, Section 1453(b) and Section 1441(a) both rely

           on the procedures for removal in Section 1446, which
           also employs the term "defendant."  Interpreting that
           term to have different meanings in different sections
           would render the removal provisions incoherent.

           Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in
           which Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan,
           joined.  Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in
           which Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Gorsuch and
           Kavanaugh, joined.

           Home Depot is represented by:

              William P. Barnette, Esq.
              Kacy D. Goebel, Esq.
              HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC.

                   - and -

              Sarah E. Harrington, Esq.
              Thomas C. Goldstein, Esq.
              Erica Oleszczuk Evans, Esq.
              GOLDSTEIN & RUSSELL, P.C.
              7475 Wisconsin Avenue, Suite 850
              Bethesda, MD 20814
              Tel: (202) 362-0636
              Fax: (866) 574-2033
              Email: sharrington@goldsteinrussell.com

           Plaintiff Jackson is represented by:

              Brian Warwick, Esq.
              Janet Varnell, Esq.
              David Lietz, Esq.
              VARNELL & WARWICK, P.A.
              P.O. Box 1870
              Lady Lake, FL 32158
              Tel: 352-753-8600
              Fax: 352-504-3301

                   - and -

              F. Paul Bland, Esq.
              Karla Gilbride, Esq.
              Leah M. Nicholls, Esq.
              Ellen Noble, Esq.
              PUBLIC JUSTICE, P.C.
              1620 L Street NW, Suite 630
              Washington, DC 20036
              Tel: 202-797-8600
              Fax: 202-232-7203

                   - and -

              Jennifer Bennett, Esq.
              PUBLIC JUSTICE, P.C.
              475 14th Street, Suite 610
              Oakland, CA 94612
              Tel: 510-622-8150

                   - and -

              Rashad Blossom, Esq.
              BLOSSOM LAW PLLC
              225 E Worthington Ave, #200
              Charlotte, NC 28203
              Tel: 704-271-9078

                   - and -

              Daniel K. Bryson, Esq.
              John Hunter Bryson, Esq.
              900 W. Morgan Street
              Raleigh, NC 27603
              Tel: 919-600-5000
              Email: dan@wbmllp.com

JAZMINA GERARD et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. ORANGE COAST
MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant and Respondent, No. S241655,

           The issue before the Supreme Court of California is
           whether or not meal period waivers obtained in
           conformity an applicable wage order, that wage order
           violated a provision of the Labor Code generally
           prohibiting second meal period waivers for employees
           working shifts longer than 12 hours.

           The Court of Appeal initially reversed the trial court,
           holding that although the meal period waivers were
           obtained in conformity with the applicable wage order,
           that wage order violated a provision of the Labor Code
           generally prohibiting second meal period waivers for
           employees working shifts longer than 12 hours.

           Plaintiffs Jazmina Gerard, Kristiane McElroy, and
           Jeffrey Carl are health care workers who were formerly
           employed by defendant Orange Coast Memorial Medical
           Center.  The Plaintiffs usually worked 12-hour shifts
           and sometimes worked shifts longer than 12 hours.  A
           Hospital policy allowed health care employees who
           worked shifts longer than 10 hours caring for patients
           to voluntarily waive one of their two meal periods,
           even if their shifts lasted more than 12 hours.  The
           Plaintiffs alleged they signed second meal period
           waivers and occasionally worked shifts longer than 12
           hours without being provided a second meal period.  The
           Plaintiffs contended that these second meal period
           waivers violated the Labor Code and they sought
           penalties, unpaid wages, and injunctive relief for
           those and other violations.

           Wage and hour claims, including claims regarding the
           availability and timing of meal breaks, are governed by
           two complementary and occasionally overlapping sources
           of authority: the provisions of the Labor Code, enacted
           by the Legislature, and a series of 18 wage orders,
           adopted by the IWC.  In June 1993, at the urging of the
           health care industry, the IWC amended Wage Order 5-1989
           to add subdivision 11(C), which permitted health care
           employees who worked shifts longer than eight hours to
           waive a second meal period.  In 1999, the Legislature
           enacted Assembly Bill No. 60 (AB 60), known as the
           Eight-Hour-Day Restoration and Workplace Flexibility
           Act of 1999.  The legislation repealed five wage
           orders, including Wage Order No. 5 covering the health
           care industry, and required the IWC to review its wage
           orders and readopt orders restoring daily overtime.  AB
           60 also added section 512, which for the first time set
           out statutory meal period requirements.

           The state Supreme Court said the Plaintiffs' argument
           that section 517's language that IWC wage orders
           adopted by July 1, 2000, must be consistent with this
           chapter -- that is, consistent with the provisions of
           AB 60 -- is unpersuasive.  The Court said this reading
           of the statutory provision ignores the broad sweep of
           the phrase notwithstanding any other provision of law.
           The Court held that SB 88's amendment of former section
           516 worked a change in the law.  Although SB 88 was an
           urgency statute, there is no indication that the reason
           for the urgency was to prevent section 11(D) from going
           into effect.  The restriction on the IWC's authority
           with respect to meal period waivers was only one part
           of SB 88; the bill also addressed, among other things,
           the exemption of certain computer software
           professionals and a certain class of certified nurse
           midwives, nurse anesthetists, and nurse practitioners
           from overtime pay.

           Justice Liu penned the decision.  Chief Justice Cantil-
           Sakauye, and Justices Corrigan, Cuellar, Kruger, and
           Siggins, concurred.

           Plaintiffs are represented by:

              Mark Yablonovich, Esq.
              1875 Century Park East, Suite 700
              Los Angeles, CA 90067
              Tel: 310-286-0246
              Fax: 310-407-5391
              Email: mark@yablonovichlaw.com

                   - and -

              Glenn A. Danas, Esq.
              ROBINS KAPLAN LLP
              2049 Century Park East, Suite 3400
              Los Angeles, CA 90067
              Tel: 310-552-0130
              Fax: 310-229-5800
              Email: gdanas@robinskaplan.com

                   - and -

              Robert K. Friedl, Esq.
              Ryan H. Wu, Esq.
              CAPSTONE LAW APC
              1875 Century Park East, Suite 1000
              Los Angeles, CA 90067
              Tel: 310-556-4811
              Fax: 310-943-0396
              Email: robert.friedl@capstonelawyers.com

           Respondent is represented by:

              Richard J. Simmons, Esq.
              Derek R. Havel, Esq.
              Daniel J. McQueen, Esq.
              333 South Hope Street, Forty-Third Floor
              Los Angeles, CA 90071
              Tel: 213-620-1780
              Fax: 213-620-1398
              Email: rsimmons@sheppardmullin.com

                   - and -

              Robert J. Stumpf, Jr., Esq.
              Four Embarcadero Center, Seventeenth Floor
              San Francisco, CA 94111
              Tel: 415-434-9100
              Fax: 415-434-3947
              Email: rstumpf@sheppardmullin.com

                 - and -

              Karin Dougan Vogel, Esq.
              501 West Broadway, 19th Floor
              San Diego, CA 92101
              Tel: 619-338-6500
              Fax: 619-234-3815
              Email: rstumpf@sheppardmullin.com

           California Hospital Association as Amicus Curiae on
           behalf of Defendant and Respondent, is represented by:

              Jeffrey A. Berman, Esq.
              James M. Harris, Esq.
              Kiran A. Seldon, Esq.
              SEYFARTH SHAW LLP
              2029 Century Park East, Suite 3500
              Los Angeles, CA 90067-3021
              Tel: 310-277-7200
              Fax: 310-201-5219
              Email: jberman@seyfarth.com

LAMPS PLUS, INC., et al., Petitioners, v. FRANK VARELA, No. 17-988

           In 2016, a hacker tricked an employee of Lamps Plus,
           Inc., into disclosing tax information of about 1,300
           company employees.  After a fraudulent federal income
           tax return was filed in the name of Frank Varela, a
           Lamps Plus employee, Varela filed a putative class
           action against Lamps Plus in Federal District Court on
           behalf of employees whose information had been
           compromised.  Relying on the arbitration agreement in
           Varela's employment contract, Lamps Plus sought to
           compel arbitration -- on an individual rather than a
           class-wide basis -- and to dismiss the suit.  The
           District Court rejected the individual arbitration
           request, but authorized class arbitration and dismissed
           Varela's claims.  Lamps Plus appealed, arguing that the
           District Court erred by compelling class arbitration,
           but the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

           The Supreme Court reversed and remanded.  The Court had
           held in Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp.,
           559 U. S. 662, that a court may not compel class-wide
           arbitration when an agreement is silent on the
           availability of arbitration.  The Ninth Circuit ruled
           that Stolt-Nielsen was not controlling because the
           agreement in this case was ambiguous rather than silent
           on the issue of class arbitration.

           The Supreme Court has jurisdiction.  An order that both
           compels arbitration and dismisses the underlying claims
           qualifies as "a final decision with respect to an
           arbitration" within the meaning of 9 U.S.C. Section
           16(a)(3), the jurisdictional provision on which Lamps
           Plus relies.  Varela attempts to distinguish Randolph
           on the ground that the appeal here was taken by the
           party who had already secured the relief it requested,
           i.e., Lamps Plus had already obtained an order
           dismissing the claim and compelling arbitration.  Lamps
           Plus, however, did not secure the relief it requested,
           since it sought individual rather than class
           arbitration.  The shift from individual to class
           arbitration is a "fundamental" change, Stolt-Nielsen,
           559 U.S., at 686, that "sacrifices the principal
           advantage of arbitration" and "greatly increases risks
           to defendants," AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.
           S. 333, 348, 350. Avoiding these consequences gives
           Lamps Plus the "necessary personal stake" to appeal.

           The Supreme Court further held that under the Federal
           Arbitration Act, an ambiguous agreement cannot provide
           the necessary contractual basis for concluding that the
           parties agreed to submit to class arbitration.  The
           Ninth Circuit's contrary conclusion was based on the
           state law contra proferentem doctrine, which counsels
           that contractual ambiguities should be construed
           against the drafter.  That default rule is based on
           public policy considerations and seeks ends other than
           the intent of the parties.  The Court ruled that that
           approach is flatly inconsistent with "the foundational
           FAA principle that arbitration is a matter of consent."

           Varela claims that the rule is nondiscriminatory and
           gives equal treatment to arbitration agreements and
           other contracts alike, but an equal treatment principle
           cannot save from preemption general rules "that target
           arbitration either by name or by more subtle methods,
           such as by 'interfer[ing] with fundamental attributes
           of arbitration.'"  This conclusion, the Court said, is
           consistent with its precedents holding that the FAA
           provides the default rule for resolving certain
           ambiguities in arbitration agreements.

           Chief Justice Roberts, delivered the opinion of the
           Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and
           Kavanaugh joined.  Justice Thomas filed a concurring
           opinion.  Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion,
           in which Justices Breyer and Sotomayor joined.  Justice
           Breyer and Justice Sotomayor filed dissenting opinions.

           Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which
           Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined, and in which
           Justice Sotomayor joined as to Part II.

           Lamps Plus is represented by:

              Andrew J. Pincus, Esq.
              Archis A. Parasharami, Esq.
              Daniel E. Jones, Esq.
              MAYER BROWN LLP
              1999 K Street, NW
              Washington, DC 20006-1101
              Tel: 202-263-3000
              Email: apincus@mayerbrown.com

                   - and -

              Jeffry A. Miller, Esq.
              Brittany B. Sutton, Esq.
              LEWIS BRISBOIS
              701 B Street, Suite 1900
              San Diego, CA 92101
              Tel: 619-233-1006
              Fax: 619-233-8627
              Email: Jeff.Miller@lewisbrisbois.com

                   - and -

              Eric Y. Kizirian, Esq.
              Michael K. Grimaldi, Esq.
              633 West 5th Street, Suite 4000
              Los Angeles, CA 90071
              Tel: 213-250-1800
              Fax: 213-250-7900
              Email: Eric.Kizirian@lewisbrisbois.com

                   - and -

              Donald M. Falk, Esq.
              MAYER BROWN LLP
              Two Palo Alto Square, Suite 300
              3000 El Camino Real
              Palo Alto, CA 94306-2112
              Tel: 650-331-2000
              Email: dfalk@mayerbrown.com

           Frank Varela, Respondent, is represented by:

              Michele M. Vercoski, Esq.
              Richard D. McCune, Esq.
              3281 E. Guasti Road, Suite 100
              Ontario, CA 91761
              Tel: 909-345-8110

                 - and -

              Scott L. Nelson, Esq.
              Allison M. Zieve, Esq.
              Washington, DC

MERCK SHARP & DOHME CORP. v. ALBRECHT et al., No. 17–290 (U.S.).

           Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. manufactures Fosamax, a drug
           that treats and prevents osteoporosis in postmenopausal
           women.  Albrecht, et al., are more than 500 individuals
           who took Fosamax and suffered atypical femoral
           fractures between 1999 and 2010.  They sued Merck
           seeking tort damages on the ground that state law
           imposed upon Merck a legal duty to warn respondents and
           their doctors about the risk of atypical femoral
           fractures associated with using Fosamax.  Merck argued
           that respondents' state law failure-to-warn claims
           should be dismissed as pre-empted by federal law.
           Merck conceded that the FDA regulations would have
           permitted Merck to try to change the label to add a
           warning before 2010, but Merck asserted that the FDA
           would have rejected that attempt.  In particular, Merck
           claimed that the FDA's rejection of Merck's 2008
           attempt to warn of a risk of "stress fractures" showed
           that the FDA would also have rejected any attempt by
           Merck to warn of the risk of atypical femoral fractures
           associated with the drug.

           The District Court agreed with Merck's pre-emption
           argument and granted summary judgment to Merck, but the
           Third Circuit vacated and remanded.  The Court of
           Appeals recognized that its pre-emption analysis was
           controlled by this Court's decision in Wyeth v. Levine,
           555 U. S. 555, which held that a state-law failure-to
           -warn claim is pre-empted where there is "clear
           evidence" that the FDA would not have approved a change
           to the label.  The Court of Appeals, however, suggested
           that the "clear evidence" standard had led to varying
           lower court applications and that it would be helpful
           for this Court to "clarif[y] or buil[d] out the

           The Supreme Court vacated and remanded.  The Court held
           that "clear evidence" is evidence that shows the court
           that the drug manufacturer fully informed the FDA of
           the justifications for the warning required by state
           law and that the FDA, in turn, informed the drug
           manufacturer that the FDA would not approve a change to
           the drug's label to include that warning.

           In a case like Wyeth, showing that federal law
           prohibited the drug manufacturer from adding a warning
           that would satisfy state law requires the drug
           manufacturer to show that it fully informed the FDA of
           the justifications for the warning required by state
           law and that the FDA, in turn, informed the drug
           manufacturer that the FDA would not approve changing
           the drug's label to include that warning.  These
           conclusions flow from the High Court's precedents on
           impossibility pre-emption and the statutory and
           regulatory scheme that the Court reviewed in Wyeth.  In
           particular, the Court has refused to find clear
           evidence of impossibility where the laws of one
           sovereign permit an activity that the laws of the other
           sovereign restrict or even prohibit.  And as explained
           in Wyeth, FDA regulations permit drug manufacturers to
           change a label to "reflect newly acquired information"
           if the changes "add or strengthen a . . . warning" for
           which there is "evidence of a causal association."

           The only agency actions that can determine the answer
           to the pre-emption question are agency actions taken
           pursuant to the FDA's congressionally delegated
           authority.  The Supremacy Clause grants "supreme"
           status only to the "the Laws of the United States."
           And pre-emption takes place "'only when and if [the
           agency] is acting within the scope of its
           congressionally delegated authority.'"

           The question of agency disapproval is primarily one of
           law for a judge to decide.  The question often involves
           the use of legal skills to determine whether agency
           disapproval fits facts that are not in dispute.
           Moreover, judges, rather than lay juries, are better
           equipped to evaluate the nature and scope of an
           agency's determination, and are better suited to
           understand and interpret agency decisions in light of
           the governing statutory and regulatory context.  While
           contested brute facts will sometimes prove relevant to
           a court's legal determination about the meaning and
           effect of an agency decision, such factual questions
           are subsumed within an already tightly circumscribed
           legal analysis and do not warrant submission alone or
           together with the larger pre-emption question to a

           Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, in
           which Justices Thomas, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan, and
           Gorsuch joined.  Justice Thomas filed a concurring
           opinion.   Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in
           the judgment, in which Chief Justice Roberts and
           Justice Kavanaugh joined.

           Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. is represented by:

              Shay Dvoretzky, Esq.
              Yaakov M. Roth, Esq.
              Jeffrey R. Johnson, Esq.
              JONES DAY
              51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W.
              Washington, DC 20001-2113
              Tel: 202-879-3939
              Fax: 202-626-1700
              Email: sdvoretzky@jonesday.com

                   - and -

              Stephanie Parker, Esq.
              JONES DAY
              1420 Peachtree Street, N.E., Suite 800
              Atlanta, GA 30309-3053
              Tel: 404-521-3939
              Fax: 404-581-8330
              Email: separker@jonesday.com
           Malcolm L. Stewart, Esq., for the United States as
           amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court,
           supporting the petitioner.

           Albrecht, et al., respondents, are represented by:

              David C. Frederick, Esq.
              Brendan J. Crimmins, Esq.
              Jeremy S.B. Newman, Esq.
              Sumner Square
              1615 M Street, N.W., Suite 400
              Washington, DC 20036
              Tel: 202-326-7900
              Email: dfrederick@kellogghansen.com

17–1094 (U.S.)

           Troy Lambert alleges that Nutraceutical Corporation's
           marketing of a dietary supplement ran afoul of
           California consumer-protection law.  On February 20,
           2015, the District Court ordered the class decertified.

           Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f),
           Lambert had 14 days from that point to ask the Court of
           Appeals for permission to appeal the order.  Instead,
           he filed a motion for reconsideration, which the
           District Court denied.  Lambert petitioned the Court of
           Appeals for permission to appeal the decertification
           order.  Nutraceutical objected that Lambert's petition
           was untimely because it was filed far more than 14 days
           from the entry of the decertification order.  The Ninth
           Circuit held, however, that Rule 23(f)'s deadline
           should be tolled under the circumstances because
           Lambert had "acted diligently." On the merits, the
           court reversed the decertification order.

           The Supreme Court held that Rule 23(f) is not subject
           to equitable tolling.  Rule 23(f) is properly
           classified as a non-jurisdictional claim-processing
           rule, but that does not render it malleable in every
           respect.  Whether a rule precludes equitable tolling
           turns not on its jurisdictional character but rather on
           whether its text leaves room for such flexibility.  The
           Court held that the governing rules speak directly to
           the issue of Rule 23(f)'s flexibility and make clear
           that its deadline is not subject to equitable tolling.
           While Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 2 authorizes
           a court of appeals for good cause to "suspend any
           provision . . . in a particular case," it does so with
           a caveat: "except as otherwise provided in Rule 26(b)."

           Rule 26(b), which generally authorizes extensions of
           time, in turn includes the carveout that a court of
           appeals "may not extend the time to file . . . a
           petition for permission to appeal" -- the precise type
           of filing at issue here.  The Rules thus express a
           clear intent to compel rigorous enforcement of Rule
           23(f)'s deadline, even where good cause for equitable
           tolling might otherwise exist.  Precedent confirms this
           understanding, the Court said, citing Carlisle, 517 U.
           S. 416, and United States v. Robinson, 361 U. S. 220.

           The Supreme Court added that Lambert's counterarguments
           do not withstand scrutiny.  Lambert argues that Rule
           26(b)'s prohibition on extending the time to file a
           petition for permission to appeal should be understood
           to foreclose only formal extensions granted ex ante and
           to leave courts free to excuse late filings on
           equitable grounds after the fact.  But the Court has
           already rejected an indistinguishable argument
           concerning Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 45(b) in
           Robinson, and Lambert offers no sound basis for reading
           Rule 26(b) differently.  Further, the 1998 Advisory
           Committee Notes to Rule 23(f) speak to a court of
           appeals' discretion to decide whether a particular
           certification decision warrants review in an
           interlocutory posture, not to its determination whether
           a petition is timely.  Finally, Lambert notes that
           every Court of Appeals to have considered the question
           would accept a Rule 23(f) petition filed within 14 days
           of the resolution of a motion for reconsideration that
           was itself filed within 14 days of the original order.
           Although his own reconsideration motion was not filed
           until after the initial 14 days had run, he cites the
           lower courts' handling of such cases as evidence that
           Rule 23(f) is amenable to tolling.  However, a timely
           motion for reconsideration affects the antecedent issue
           of when the 14-day limit begins to run, not the
           availability of tolling.

           The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of
           Appeals and remanded the case so the Court of Appeals
           can address other preserved arguments about whether
           Lambert's Rule 23(f) petition was timely even without
           resort to tolling.

           Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous

           Nutraceutical is represented by:

              John C. Hueston, Esq.
              Steven N. Feldman, Esq.
              Joseph A. Reiter, Esq.
              523 West 6th St., Suite 400
              Los Angeles, CA 90014
              Tel: 213-788-4340
              Email: jhueston@hueston.com

           Troy Lambert is represented by:

              Jonathan A. Herstoff, Esq.
              HAUG PARTNERS LLP
              745 Fifth Avenue, 10th Floor
              New York, NY 10151
              Tel: 212-588-0800
              Email: jherstoff@haugpartners.com

                   - and -

              Gregory S. Weston, Esq.
              Andrew Hamilton, Esq.
              The Weston Firm
              1405 Morena Blvd., Ste. 201
              San Diego, CA 92110
              Tel: 619-798-2006
              Fax: 619-343-2789

                   - and -

              Ronald A. Marron, Esq.
              Michael Houchin, Esq.
              651 Arroyo Drive
              San Diego, CA 92103
              Tel: 619-696-9006

THEODORE H. FRANK, et al., Petitioners, v. PALOMA GAOS,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, et
al., Case No. 17-961 (U.S.).

           Three named plaintiffs allege Google violated the
           Stored Communications Act.  The parties negotiated a
           settlement agreement that would require Google to
           include certain disclosures on some of its webpages and
           would distribute more than $5 million to cy pres
           recipients, more than $2 million to class counsel, and
           no money to absent class members.  The Supreme Court
           granted certiorari to review whether those cy pres
           settlements satisfy the requirement that class
           settlements be "fair, reasonable, and adequate."
           Because there remain substantial questions about
           whether any of the named plaintiffs has standing to sue
           in light of the Court's decision in Spokeo, Inc. v.
           Robins, 578 U. S. ___ (2016), the Supreme Court vacated
           the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remand for
           further proceedings.

           In Spokeo, the Court held that "Article III standing
           requires a concrete injury even in the context of a
           statutory violation."  The Court rejected the premise,
           relied on in the decision then under review and in
           Edwards, that "a plaintiff automatically satisfies the
           injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a
           person a statutory right and purports to authorize that
           person to sue to vindicate that right."  Google
           notified the Ninth Circuit of the Court's opinion in

           A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, without
           addressing Spokeo.  The Court granted certiorari to
           decide whether a class action settlement that provides
           a cy pres award but no direct relief to class members
           satisfies the requirement that a settlement binding
           class members be "fair, reasonable, and adequate."

           In briefing on the merits before the High Court, the
           Solicitor General filed a brief as amicus curiae
           supporting neither party.  He urged the Court to vacate
           and remand the case for the lower courts to address
           standing.  The Government argued there is a substantial
           open question about whether any named plaintiff in the
           class action actually had standing in the District
           Court.  Because Google withdrew its standing challenge
           after the Court dismissed Edwards as improvidently
           granted, neither the District Court nor the Ninth
           Circuit ever opined on whether any named plaintiff
           sufficiently alleged standing in the operative

           "We have an obligation to assure ourselves of
           litigants' standing under Article III."  That
           obligation extends to court approval of proposed class
           action settlements.  In ordinary non-class litigation,
           parties are free to settle their disputes on their own
           terms, and plaintiffs may voluntarily dismiss their
           claims without a court order.  By contrast, in a class
           action, the "claims, issues, or defenses of a certified
           class -- or a class proposed to be certified for
           purposes of settlement -- may be settled, voluntarily
           dismissed, or compromised only with the court's
           approval."  A court is powerless to approve a proposed
           class settlement if it lacks jurisdiction over the
           dispute, and federal courts lack jurisdiction if no
           named plaintiff has standing.

           When the District Court ruled on Google's second motion
           to dismiss, it relied on Edwards to hold that Gaos had
           standing to assert a claim under the SCA.  The Court's
           decision in Spokeo abrogated the ruling in Edwards that
           the violation of a statutory right automatically
           satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a
           statute authorizes a person to sue to vindicate that
           right.  Since that time, no court in this case has
           analyzed whether any named plaintiff has alleged SCA
           violations that are sufficiently concrete and
           particularized to support standing.  After oral
           argument, the Court ordered supplemental briefing from
           the parties and Solicitor General to address that
           question.  After reviewing the supplemental briefs, the
           Court concludes that the case should be remanded for
           the lower courts to address the plaintiffs' standing in
           light of Spokeo.  The supplemental briefs filed in
           response to the Court's order raise a wide variety of
           legal and factual issues not addressed in the merits
           briefing before the Court or at oral argument.  The
           Court held it is "a court of review, not of first
           view." Resolution of the standing question should take
           place in the District Court or the Ninth Circuit in the
           first instance.

           The Ninth Circuit judgment is vacated, and the case is
           remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
           Petitioners are represented by:

              Theodore H. Frank, Esq.
              Melissa Holyoak, Esq.
              Anna St. John, Esq.
              1310 L Street NW, 7th Floor
              Washington, DC 20005
              Tel: 202-331-1010
              Fax: 202-331-0640

           Respondents Paloma Gaos, et al., are represented by:

              Kassra P. Nassiri, Esq.
              NASSIRI & JUNG LLP
              1700 Montgomery Street, Suite 207
              San Francisco, CA 94111
              Tel: (415) 762-3100

                   - and -

              Jeffrey A. Lamken, Esq.
              Michael G. Pattillo, Jr., Esq.
              James A. Barta, Esq.
              William J. Cooper, Esq.
              MOLOLAMKEN LLP
              600 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
              Washington, DC 20037
              Tel: 202-556-2000
              Fax: 202-556-2001
              Email: jlamken@mololamken.com

                   - and -

              Jordan A. Rice, Esq.
              MOLOLAMKEN LLP
              300 North LaSalle Street
              Chicago, IL 60654
              Tel: 312-450-6700
              Fax: 312-450-6701
              Email: jrice@mololamken.com

                   - and -

              Michael Aschenbrener, Esq.
              KAMBERLAW, LLC
              401 Center Street, Suite 111
              Healdsburg, CA 95448
              Tel: 212-920-3072

           Google LLC is represented by:

              Randall W. Edwards, Esq.
              O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP
              Two Embarcadero Center, 28th Floor
              San Francisco, CA 94111
              Tel: 415-984-8700
              Email: redwards@omm.com

                   - and -

              Jed W. Glickstein, Esq.
              Samantha C. Booth, Esq.
              MAYER BROWN LLP
              71 South Wacker Drive
              Chicago, IL 60606
              Tel: 312-782-0600
              Email: jglickstein@mayerbrown.com

                   - and -

              Donald M. Falk, Esq.
              Edward D. Johnson, Esq.
              MAYER BROWN LLP
              101 Second Street, Suite 375
              San Francisco, CA 94105-3670
              Tel: 415-874-4230
              Email: dfalk@mayerbrown.com

                   - and -

              Brian D. Netter, Esq.
              Daniel E. Jones, Esq.
              MAYER BROWN LLP
              1999 K Street, NW
              Washington, DC 20006-1101
              Tel: 202-263-3000
              Email: bnetter@mayerbrown.com


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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