/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/191223.mbx
C L A S S A C T I O N R E P O R T E R
Monday, December 23, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 255
Headlines
1-800 CONTACTS: Thompson Moves to Certify Class of Purchasers
5 STAR PIZZA: Settlement in Slaughter FLSA Suit Gets Court Approval
7HBF NO. 2: Court Denies Arbitration in Brice RICO Suit
AARP INC: Third Amended Friedman Lawsuit Dismissed
ACCURATE BACKGROUND: Faces Stepp Suit Alleging Violation of FCRA
AMANO USA: Shelby-Williams Hits Biometrics Data Collection
AMENDOLA MARBLE: Cabrera Seeks to Recover Overtime Pay Under FLSA
ANIXTER INTERNATIONAL: Teamsters 142 Sues Over CD&R Merger Deal
APPLE INC: Burris Product Liability Suit Removed to W.D. Missouri
ARMSTRONG FLOORING: KSF Reminds of Jan. 14 Plaintiff Deadline
AURORA CANNABIS: Rosen Law Files Class Action Lawsuit
BAXTER INT'L: Hagens Berman Reminds Investors of Class Action
BLACK KNIGHT: Rosen Law Investigating Securities Claims
BLOOD CENTERS: Danielsson Parties Ordered to File Add'l. Evidence
BLOOM ENERGY: Hagens Berman Reminds Investors of Jan. 3 Deadline
BREMER FINANCIAL: Illegally Charges OD & NSF Fees, MJ Evans Says
CALIFORNIA COAST: Faces Trim Suit Over Erroneous Credit Reports
CANOPY GROWTH: Schall Law Files Class Action Lawsuit
CERTAINTEED CORP: Segebarth Sues Over Faulty Fiberglass Shingles
CHEMOURS COMPANY: Schall Law Files Class Action Lawsuit
DCD AUTOMOTIVE Dwyer Seeks Overtime Wages for Sales Associates
DIRECT ENERGY: Schafer Seeks to Stop False Marketing of Low Rates
DOLLAR TREE: Settlement in Nakooka Labor Suit Gets Final Approval
DOWNERS GROVE: Smith Sues Over Collection of Biometric Data
EMERSON ELECTRIC: 8th Cir. Flips Class Certification in Hale Suit
EUROSTAR INC: Denial of Class Certification in Cacho Suit Affirmed
FH CANN: $10.4K Attys' Fees & Cost Award in Scanno Suit Affirmed
GO NEW YORK: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Balderramo FLSA Suit
GRAY TAVERN: Owens Sues Over Sexual Harassment and Unpaid Wages
HALLIBURTON CO: Bids to Compel Arbitration in LeBlanc Suit Denied
HAVERHILL RETIREMENT: $300MM Lawyer Fees Award in Kornell Upheld
HIOSSEN INC: Kee Suit Remanded to San Diego County Superior Court
HOME DEPOT: Summary Judgment Bid Denied in Bell Lawsuit
HOMEDELIVERYLINK: Obtains Partial Summary Judgment in Kloppel Case
INTEGRATED TECH: Monplaisir Moves to Certify Technicians Class
INTER-CONTINENTAL HOTELS: Bid to Remand Cavada to State Court Nixed
INTERO REAL ESTATE: Chinitz Suit Transferred to N.D. California
INTU CORP: Must Reply to Interrogatory No. 4 in Johnson FLSA Suit
JACKSON PARK: Williams BIPA Class Suit Removed to N.D. Illinois
JAGGED PEAK: Rigrodsky & Long Files Class Action Complaint
JET PRO: Diaz Seeks Minimum Wages and Overtime Pay for Drivers
JOSAM ACQUISITIONS: Navarrete Hits Biometrics Data Collection
KERN COUNTY, CA: Settlement in T.G. Suit Gets Initial Approval
LGSTX SERVICES: Faces Santana Suit Alleging Violation of FCRA
LIFE TIME FITNESS: Faces Turner Employee Suit in California
MARRIOTT INT'L: Remand of Rivera Suit to L.A. Super. Ct. Denied
MDL 2286: Hartranft Can't Intervene in Midland Credit TCPA Suit
MDL 2843: Questions for CMC in Facebook User Privacy Suit Entered
MILLER STARK: Court Defers Ruling on Holmes' Bid to Certify Class
MK 32 RESTAURANT: Court Okays $60K Settlement in Tucubal FLSA Suit
MR SQEEKY CAR WASH: Sweeney Sues Over Disclosure of Card Info
OZARKS ELECTRIC: Ark. Appeals Ct. Overturns Ruling in Stanley Suit
PLANTRONICS INC: KSF Reminds of Jan. 13 Plaintiff Deadline
PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL: Timothy L. Miles Files Class Action
REALREAL INC: Rosen Law Files Class Action Lawsuit
ROBERT CARTER: Taylor Suit Transferred From S.D. to N.D. Indiana
ROSEGOLD INVESTMENTS: $6K Attorneys Fees Awarded in Garrison Suit
SALON 94 DESIGN: Mendez Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Web Site
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS: DeFrank Sues Over Defective Drying Machines
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS: Settlement in Bronson Suit Gets Prelim. OK
SAN DIEGO, CA: 9th Cir. Upholds Certification Denial in D.C. Suit
SCOTT FARMS: Court Certifies AWPA, NCWHA Classes in Mondragon Suit
SETTON PISTACHIO: Ordered to Submit Supplemental Declaration
SHNIPPER RESTAURANTS: $330K Alvarez Suit Deal Denied w/o Prejudice
SI 40 LLC: Fails to Return Security Deposits, Mercado Suit Says
SIGNET JEWELERS: Seeks 2nd Cir. Review of Decision in Dube Suit
SMILEDIRECTCLUB INC: Andre Securities Suit Moved to M.D. Tennessee
SOUTH CAROLINA: Cook Electric Utility Suit Removed to D.S.C.
SUMMIT MEDICAL: Appeals Court Vacates Coleman Class Certification
SUPERIOR GROCERS: Fails to Comply With Labor Code, Valadez Claims
TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL: Moe Sues Over Sale of Addictive Opioids
TRADER JOE'S: Lopez-Barnett Sues Over Misleading Product Label
TUPELO, MS: Court Won't Reconsider Sept. 24 Rulings in Edwards Suit
TWITTER INC: Cal. App. Ct. Affirms Denial of Huang Class Cert. Bid
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: NY Drivers Seek to Recover Surcharges & Fees
UNDER ARMOUR: Hagens Berman Reminds Investors of Jan. 6 Deadline
UNDER ARMOUR: Rosen Law Files Class Action Lawsuit
VOLKSWAGEN AG: Emissions Scandal Class Action Begins in UK
WANDA SPORTS: KSF Reminds of Jan. 17 Plaintiff Deadline
WYNN LAS VEGAS: Schrader Suit Removed to Nevada District Court
YUNJI INC: KSF Reminds of Jan. 13 Plaintiff Deadline
*********
1-800 CONTACTS: Thompson Moves to Certify Class of Purchasers
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled J THOMPSON, et al., Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. 1-800 CONTACTS, INC., et
al., Case No. 2:16-cv-01183-TC-DBP (D. Utah), the Plaintiffs move
for an order certifying this proposed litigation damages Class,
pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
All persons in the United States who made at least one
online purchase of contact lenses from 1-800 Contacts from
January 1, 2006 through November 14, 2018 ("Class Period").
Excluded from the Class are Defendants, their parent
companies, subsidiaries and affiliates, any co-conspirators,
governmental entities and instrumentalities of government,
states and their subdivisions, agencies and
instrumentalities.
The Plaintiffs also ask the Court to appoint Plaintiffs J Thompson,
Iysha Abed, Tyler Nance, William P. Duncanson, Edward Ungvarsky,
Daniel J. Bartolucci, Jill Schulson and Leia Pinto as Class
representatives, and appoint Boies Schiller Flexner LLP and Robbins
Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP as Class Counsel.
The Plaintiffs' Consolidated Amended Complaint challenges under
Section of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1, a series
of agreements between 1-800 Contacts, Inc. and 14 other online
contact lens retailers (the "Competitive Ad Suppression
Agreements"). As detailed in the complaint, Plaintiffs allege that
through the Competitive Ad Suppression Agreements, 1-800 and most
of its rivals agreed not to compete against one another in certain
online advertising, including highly relevant and truthful
advertising. The complaint seeks damages for the injuries to the
Plaintiffs and other class members.[CC]
The Plaintiffs are represented by:
Heather M. Sneddon, Esq.
Jared Scott, Esq.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
50 West Broadway, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 534-1700
Facsimile: (801) 364-7697
E-mail: hsneddon@aklawfirm.com
jscott@aklawfirm.com
- and -
David W. Mitchell, Esq.
Brian O. O'Mara, Esq.
Steven M. Jodlowski, Esq.
Ashley M. Kelly, Esq.
ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
San Diego, CA 92101
Telephone: (619) 231-1058
Facsimile: (619) 231-7423
E-mail: davidm@rgrdlaw.com
bomara@rgrdlaw.com
sjodlowski@rgrdlaw.com
akelly@rgrdlaw.com
- and -
Scott E. Gant, Esq.
Melissa F. Zappala, Esq.
BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
1401 New York Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20005
Telephone: (202) 237-2727
Facsimile: (202) 237-6131
E-mail: sgant@bsfllp.com
mzappala@bsfllp.com
- and -
Carl Goldfarb, Esq.
BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
401 East Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1200
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
Telephone: (954) 356-0011
Facsimile: (954) 356-0022
E-mail: cgoldfarb@bsfllp.com
One of the Plaintiffs' attorneys certifies that notice was sent to
those who are currently on the list to receive e-mail notices for
this case:
* Jeffrey C. Bank -- jbank@wsgr.com, ageritano@wsgr.com,
lalmeida@wsgr.com;
* Steven H. Bergman -- steven-bergman@rbmn.com,
ladonna-whelchel@rbmn.com, info@bergmanesq.com;
* Douglas J. Beteta -- dbeteta@charislex.com;
* Mark M. Bettilyon -- mark.bettilyon@tnw.com,
joshua.gray@tnw.com, litigation@tnw.com,
Kaelynn.Moultrie@tnw.com;
* Dorn Bishop -- db@markhamlawfirm.com, kim@dornbishoplaw.com;
* Alycia N. Broz -- anbroz@vorys.com;
* Robert S. Clark -- rclark@parrbrown.com,
calendar@parrbrown.com, afoutz@parrbrown.com;
* Justin A. Cohen -- jcohen@wsgr.com;
* Jerry R. DeSiderato -- jdesiderato@dilworthlaw.com,
vmckeage@dilworthlaw.com;
* Tyler Anne Dever -- tyler-dever@rbmn.com,
ladonna-whelchel@rbmn.com;
* Jason Eliaser -- je@markhamlawfirm.com;
* Stephen Fishbein -- sfishbein@shearman.com,
managing-attorney-5081@ecf.pacerpro.com,
CourtAlert@Shearman.com, manattyoffice@shearman.com;
* Scott E. Gant -- sgant@bsfllp.com;
* Sean P. Gates -- sgates@charislex.com;
* Carl E. Goldfarb --cgoldfarb@bsfllp.com,
lambersley@bsfllp.com, mcalvin@bsfllp.com,
hgreen@bsfllp.com;
* Richard M. Golomb -- rgolomb@golombhonik.com,
emalloy@golombhonik.COm;
* Kenneth J. Grunfeld -- kgrunfeld@golombhonik.com,
emalloy@golombhonik.COm;
* Brent O. Hatch -- bhatch@hjdlaw.com, brenthatch@gmail.com,
administrator@hjdlaw.com;
* Christopher J. Hood -- chood@bsfllp.com;
* Mike Houchin -- mike@consumersadvocates.com;
* Steven M. Jodlowski -- sjodlowski@rgrdlaw.com,
akelly@rgrdlaw.com,e_file_sd@rgrdlaw.com,
LBrowne@rgrdlaw.com, AKellyRGRD@ecf.courtdrive.com;
* Patrick E. Johnson -- pjohnson@cohnekinghorn.com,
jdannenmueller@cohnekinghorn.com;
* Theodore E. Kanell -- tkanell@pckutah.com,
mstones@pckutah.com;
* Jason M. Kerr -- jasonkerr@ppktrial.com,
elphelps@ppktrial.com, johnsnow@ppktrial.com,
steven.garff@ppktrial.com, angelajohnson@ppktrial.com;
* William A. Markham -- wm@markhamlawfirm.com,
la@markhamlawfirm.com, aa@markhamlawfirm.com;
* Ronald Marron -- ron.marron@gmail.com,
ecf@consumersadvocates.com;
* David W. Mitchell -- davidm@rgrdlaw.com, ckopko@rgrdlaw.com;
* Matthew W. Modell -- matt.modell@shearman.com;
* Rachel Elizabeth Mossman -- rachel.mossman@shearman.com,
managing-attorney-5081@ecf.pacerpro.com,
courtalert@shearman.com, manattyoffice@shearman.com;
* Paul T. Moxley -- pmoxley@cohnekinghorn.com,
msine@cohnekinghorn.com, mcerutti@cohnekinghorn.com;
* Kara M. Mundy -- kmmundy@vorys.com;
* Sara M. Nielson -- snielson@parrbrown.com,
acoats@parrbrown.com, calendar@parrbrown.com;
* Chul Pak -- cpak@wsgr.com, ageritano@wsgr.com;
* Rebecca A. Peterson -- rapeterson@locklaw.com,
bgilles@locklaw.com;
* Kenneth J. Rubin -- kjrubin@vorys.com;
* Jared D. Scott -- jscott@aklawfirm.com,
krubino@aklawfirm.com;
* Robert K. Shelquist -- rkshelquist@locklaw.com,
kjleroy@locklaw.com, bgilles@locklaw.com;
* Timothy J. Slattery -- timothy.slattery@shearman.com,
managing-attorney-5081@ecf.pacerpro.com,
Rachel.Mossman@Shearman.com, CourtAlert@Shearman.com,
Brian.Hauser@Shearman.com, manattyoffice@shearman.com;
* Heather M. Sneddon -- hsneddon@aklawfirm.com,
krubino@aklawfirm.com;
* David J. Stanoch -- dstanoch@golombhonik.com,
emalloy@golombhonik.com;
* Todd M. Stenerson -- todd.stenerson@shearman.com,
managing-attorney-5081@ecf.pacerpro.com,
CourtAlert@Shearman.com, manattyoffice@shearman.com;
* Samuel C. Straight -- sstraight@rqn.com, bsears@rqn.com,
docket@rqn.com;
* Lara A. Swensen -- lswensen@hjdlaw.com,
administrator@hjdlaw.com; and
* Melissa Felder Zappala -- mzappala@bsfllp.com
5 STAR PIZZA: Settlement in Slaughter FLSA Suit Gets Court Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ROBERT SLAUGHTER, On behalf of himself and those
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. 5 STAR PIZZA, LLC, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-1456 (S.D. Ohio), Judge Algenon L.
Marbley of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio, Eastern Division, granted the Plaintiffs' unopposed Motion
for Settlement Approval and dismissed without prejudice the case.
In April 2019, Plaintiff Slaughter filed his Complaint on behalf of
himself and similarly situated employees alleging violations of the
Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and West Virginia state wage and
hour statutes. Plaintiffs Sengstock, Mainville, Smith, and West
joined the action at various times between May and September. The
proposed settlements would fully resolve all claims which presently
exist or may exist in the future against Defendants arising out of
or relating to the Plaintiffs' assertions in the Complaint.
The proposed settlement agreements provide for: (i) $9,742.37 for
mileage reimbursement and damages and $3,728.18 in attorneys' fees
and costs for Plaintiff Slaughter; (ii) $12,771.35 for mileage
reimbursement and damages and $5,242.68 in attorneys' fees and
costs for Plaintiff Sengstock; (iii) $6,736.42 for mileage
reimbursement and damages and $3,238 in attorneys' fees and costs
for Plaintiff Mainville; (iv) $5,012 for mileage reimbursement and
damages and $2,238 in attorneys' fees and costs for Plaintiff
Smith; and (v) $13,471.08 for mileage reimbursement and damages and
$6,092.54 in attorneys' costs and fees for Plaintiff West.
Under their contingency fee agreement, the Plaintiffs will pay a
third of their damages in attorneys' fees, but any amount of
attorneys' fees separately agreed to will reduce the amount of
attorneys' fees deducted from the damages amount. There are two
methods for determining whether a fee is reasonable: the lodestar
method and the percentage-of-the-fund method. The Sixth Circuit
has approved both methods.
Judge Marbley has reviewed Plaintiffs' unopposed Motion and
Settlement Agreements. He found that that Agreements are fair,
reasonable, and adequate. The negotiations were conducted at
arm's-length and there is no reason to believe the settlement
involves collusion. This weighs in favor of approving the proposed
settlements.
He also agrees the attorneys' fees in the proposed settlements are
reasonable. The Plaintiffs are receiving a substantial benefit, in
the amount of two-thirds or greater of the total settlement fund.
All the Plaintiffs except Plaintiff Smith are receiving more than
their alleged damages calculated at the IRS reimbursement rate.
Their Counsel undertook the representation on a contingency fee
arrangement. Thus, the Counsel has borne the risk that accompanies
contingent-fee representation, including the prospect that the
investment of substantial attorney time and resources would be
lost. Counsel should be compensated for this risk. The litigation
is complex and involves skilled attorneys on both sides. For these
reasons, the Judge finds the balance of factors weighs in favor of
granting the proposed attorneys' fees and costs.
For the reasons stated, Judge Marbley granted the Motion for
Settlement Approval and dismissed without prejudice the case. The
parties are directed by the Court to file a Dismissal Order
dismissing this case with prejudice not later than 30 days after
the entry of the Order. The Court will retain jurisdiction over
this action only for the purposes of supervising the
implementation, enforcement, construction, administration, and
interpretation of the Settlement Agreement, including for
overseeing the distribution of settlement funds. The parties will
abide by all terms of the Settlement Agreements and the Order.
A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 4, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/y7mY0t from Leagle.com.
Robert Slaughter, on behalf of himself and those similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Biller --
abiller@billerkimble.com -- Biller & Kimble, LLC, Andrew P. Kimble
-- akimble@billerkimble.com -- Biller & Kimble, LLC Of Counsel &
Philip J. Krzeski -- pkrzeski@billerkimble.com -- Biller & Kimble,
LLC Of Counsel.
5 Star Pizza, LLC, Susan Graves, John Doe Corp. 1-10 & John Doe
1-10, Defendants, represented by Mathew A. Parker --
mparker@fisherphillips.com -- Fisher & Phillips LLP.
7HBF NO. 2: Court Denies Arbitration in Brice RICO Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned KIMETRA BRICE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. 7HBF
NO. 2, LTD., et al., Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-01481-WHO (N.D.
Cal.), Judge William H. Orrick of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California denied the Defendants' motions to
stay, to compel arbitration, and transfer.
Plaintiffs Brice, Earl Browne, and Jill Novorot commenced the class
action against the Defendants alleging that the loans they took out
from entities controlled, managed, or funded by the Defendants were
usurious and illegal under California and federal law. The
Plaintiffs allege that an entity called Think Finance, LLC and its
subsidiaries operated a rent-a-tribe scheme, which sought to evade
the usury laws of certain states by using the Chippewa Cree,
Otoe-Missouria, and Tunica-Biloxi Tribe as the conduit for their
loans. Under the rent-a-tribe model, loans were made in the name
of Plain Green, LLC, Great Plains Lending, LLC, and Mobiloans, LLC.
The Plaintiffs allege generally that the Defendants are the owners
and investors of Think Finance and received the proceeds of its
illegal enterprise. Through their ownership of Think Finance,
Defendants participated in the business's key decisions,
strategies, and objectives and, in return, generated large profits
from their ownership interest in Think Finance. The Defendants
personally participated in and oversaw the illegal lending
enterprise rendering them personally liable to consumers.
Plaintiff Brice is alleged to have paid no less than $2,634.40 on
her loans with Great Plains, most of which was credited to interest
and fees. Plaintiff Browne is alleged to have paid no less than
$10,250.20 on his loans with Plain Green and Great Plains -- most
of which was credited to interest and fees. Plaintiff Novorot is
alleged to have paid no less than $6,244 on her loans with Great
Plains, including a payment of $65 in the last year, most of which
was credited to interest and fees.
Based on the allegations, the Plaintiffs assert claims on behalf of
a class of California consumers who took out similar loans under:
(i) the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO"); (ii) California's usury laws; (iii) California's Unfair
Competition Law; and (iv) unjust enrichment. The Defendants move
to stay and compel arbitration or, in the alternative, transfer the
case to the Northern District of Texas where bankruptcy proceedings
are pending against Think Finance.
In the related case, Brice et al. v. Rees et al., Case No.
18-cv-01200, Judge Orrick addressed the enforceability of the same
exact arbitration agreements (Arbitration Agreements) in the same
loan agreement forms at issue in the case. There, after
exhaustively considering the full text of the agreements as well as
the relevant case law, he concluded that the Plain Green and Great
Plains Lending arbitration agreements are unenforceable because
they are prospective waivers of the plaintiffs' rights and
remedies.
In addition to arguing that the Judge reached the wrong conclusion
in his prior Order, the Defendants in the instant case argue that
because he did not consider specific cases or arguments, the Judge
should reconsider and conclude that the Arbitration Agreements are
enforceable and grant these the Defendants' motions to stay and
compel arbitration. In the alternative, they also bring a motion
to transfer the case to the Northern District of Texas where
bankruptcy proceedings are pending concerning Think Finance. The
Plaintiffs oppose all three motions.
The Sequoia Defendants move to stay proceedings, arguing that
arbitration is required given the Plaintiffs' agreements to
arbitrate disputes regarding the loans they took out. The
Shareholder Defendants move to compel arbitration based on those
same Arbitration Agreements.
As noted in his March 2019 Order in the related case Brice, et al.
v. Rees, et al., Case No. 18-cv-01200-WHO, Judge Orrick considered
the language of the loan agreements, including the provisions
identifying governing law and the text of the Arbitration
Agreements, of the exact loan agreements at issue in the instant
case. He reviewed the arguments raised, studied two opinions from
the Fourth Circuit and numerous district court opinions (all of
which addressed similar if not identical tribal loan agreements and
found them unenforceable), and concluded that the choice-of-law
provisions regarding the lenders and the loan agreements, in
conjunction with arbitration agreement provisions restricting the
law the arbitrator may apply, create an unambiguous waiver of
rights and the agreements and are therefore unenforceable. The
Judge explained that he did not need to reach whether there is a
clear and unmistakable delegation clause because that would not
change the fact that the arbitration agreement is unenforceable as
an unambiguous prospective waiver. None of the arguments raised by
the Sequoia Defendants or the Shareholder Defendants on these
motions undermines or alters the conclusion the Judge reached in
the related Rees case. The motions to stay and compel are denied,
the Court rules.
Both sets of the Defendants, in the alternative to their motions to
stay and compel arbitration, seek transfer of the case to the
Northern District of Texas where bankruptcy proceedings are pending
with respect to Think Finance, LLC. They argue that the claims
asserted against the related-to Think Finance Defendants are by
extension "related to" the Think Finance bankruptcy proceedings.
Assuming that the claims in the case, which are not asserted
against Think Finance but only against entities and persons that
owned or invested in Think Finance, are sufficiently "related to"
the Think Finance bankruptcy proceedings, Judge Orrick concludes
that transfer is not warranted. Given the near-resolution of the
proceedings in Texas, transfer would not further the economic or
efficient administration of the estate, which is the most
significant interest of justice factor. Nor would transfer promote
judicial efficiency, considering his familiarity with the claims
asserted in the case and the related case against different
Defendants based on the same tribal-lending scheme. Finally, the
state of California's interest in having usury claims raised under
its law resolved in California and the Plaintiffs' original choice
of forum in California both weigh heavily against transfer.
As to convenience of the parties, that significant discovery has
already taken place in connection with the Think Finance
proceedings in Texas, which will be of use to both the Defendants
and the Plaintiffs in the case. That reduces but does not
eliminate the burden on the Defendants to litigate these claims
here instead of Texas. On the other hand, while the Plaintiffs'
direct claims against Think Finance are being resolved in the
Northern District of Texas without apparent insurmountable
inconvenience, litigating these claims against these Defendants in
this forum is significantly more convenient to these
California-based Plaintiffs. On balance, the transfer is not
independently warranted for the convenience of the parties. The
Defendants' motion to transfer is denied.
Based on the foregoing, Judge Orrick denied the Defendants' motions
to stay, to compel arbitration, and transfer.
A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 1, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/6Q675P from Leagle.com.
Kimetra Brice, Jill Novorot & Earl Browne, Plaintiffs, represented
by Craig Carley Marchiando -- intake@clalegal.com -- Consumer
Litigation Associates, Tanya Susan Koshy, Tycko and Zavareei LLP,
Kristi Cahoon Kelly -- kkelly@kellyguzzo.com -- Kelly and Crandall
PLC, Maren Irene Christensen, Tycko & Zavareei LLP, Sabita J.
Soneji -- ssoneji@tzlegal.com -- Tycko & Zavareei LLP & Anna C.
Haac -- ahaac@tzlegal.com -- Tycko and Zavareei LLP.
7HBF No. 2, LTD., Defendant, represented by Anna S. McLean --
amclean@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP
A Limited Liability Partnership, David Foster Herman --
dherman@atllp.com -- Armstrong, Teasdale, LLP, Jacqueline Melissa
Simonovich -- jsimonovich@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard Mullin
Richter & Hampton LLP, Jonathan P. Boughrum, Armstrong Teasdale LLP
& Richard L. Scheff -- rlscheff@armstrongteasdale.com -- Armstrong
Teasdale LLP.
SEQUOIA CAPITAL IX, L.P, Sequoia Capital Franchise Partners, L.P.,
SEQUOIA CAPITAL FRANCHISE FUND, LP, Sequoia Capital Growth Fund
III, L.P., SEQUOIA CAPITAL GROWTH III PRINCIPALS FUND, LLC, SEQUOIA
CAPITAL GROWTH PARTNERS III, LP, Sequoia Entrepenuers Annex Fund,
L.P & Sequoia Capital Operations, LLC, Defendants, represented by
Stephen D. Hibbard, Jones Day & Todd Raymond Geremia, Jones Day.
STARTUP CAPITAL VENTURES, L.P, Stephen J. Shaper, THE STINSON 2009
GRANTOR RETAINED ANNUITY TRUST, Michael Stinson & Linda Stinson,
Defendants, represented by Anna S. McLean, Sheppard Mullin Richter
& Hampton LLP A Limited Liability Partnership, David Foster Herman,
Armstrong, Teasdale, LLP, pro hac vice, Jacqueline Melissa
Simonovich, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP, Jonathan P.
Boughrum, Armstrong Teasdale LLP, pro hac vice & Richard L. Scheff,
Armstrong Teasdale LLP, pro hac vice.
AARP INC: Third Amended Friedman Lawsuit Dismissed
--------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned JERALD FRIEDMAN, Individually and on Behalf
of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. AARP, INC., AARP
SERVICES, INC., AARP INSURANCE PLAN, UNITEDHEALTH GROUP, INC., and
UNITED HEALTHCARE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants, Case No. 14-00034
DDP (PLA) (C.D. Cal.), Judge Dean P. Pregerson of the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California (i) granted the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and (ii) denied the Plaintiffs'
Motion for Class Certification.
Plaintiffs Friedman and Carol McGee commenced the putative class
action against the Defendants. In or around 2011, the Plaintiffs
purchased a type of health insurance policy, known as a "Medigap"
policy, which is designed to offer extra coverage to Medicare
beneficiaries beyond the basic Medicare benefits, including
coverage of copays and deductibles that would otherwise be the
patient's responsibility. They purchased a Medigap policy that was
endorsed by AARP, with UnitedHealth as the insurer.
AARP Insurance Plan is the group policyholder under the Policy.
Additionally, for every AARP/UnitedHealth Medigap policy sold, AARP
receives a payment of 4.9%3 of the amount paid by the insured
individual. All UnitedHealth Medigap policies are endorsed by
AARP. Though the Defendants' agreements cast the payment as a
royalty, paid in exchange for UnitedHealth's use of AARP's
intellectual property in marketing and selling its Medigap
coverage, the Plaintiffs allege that this characterization of the
4.9% payment is false. On behalf of a putative class, Plaintiffs
allege that the 4.9% royalty that AARP receives is (1) an unlawful
commission; and/or (2) an unlawful rebate/kickback.
In support of their first claim that the royalty fee is an unlawful
commission, the Plaintiffs allege that AARP improperly acts as an
unlicensed insurance agent in actively soliciting insurance
purchases for Medigap policies on behalf of UnitedHealth. They
allege that the 4.9% payment that AARP receives on every
AARP/UnitedHealth Medigap policy is an unlawful insurance
commission paid to AARP for its role in marketing, soliciting, and
selling or renewing the Medigap policies. They further allege that
while the Defendants disclose the existence of a payment in general
to AARP which they term a 'royalty' paid for the use of AARP's
intellectual property, the Defendants hide the fact that the cost
of AARP Medigap insurance includes a percentage-based commission to
AARP that is funded by consumers, in addition to the insurance
premium paid to UnitedHealth for coverage.
For their second claim that the royalty fee is an illegal
rebate/kickback, the Plaintiffs allege that the royalty is a
contract promising returns and profits as an inducement for the
group policyholder AARP to insure its group plan with UnitedHealth.
The Plaintiffs further allege that AARP is induced to the tune of
hundreds of millions of dollars per year to keep AARP Medigap plan
with UnitedHealth and the Defendants worked out a scheme whereby
consumers unwittingly fund the illegal rebate. Therefore, they
allege, even if UnitedHealth's payment to AARP is determined to be
a royalty payment for the use of AARP's intellectual property, the
payment would remain an illegal rebate paid to induce AARP to
insurance.
The Plaintiffs allege that they were injured because they paid more
for their Medigap policy due to the 4.9% illegal ommission/rebate.
They allege that they agreed to pay a monthly premium for insurance
coverage, not a monthly premium plus a 4.9% surcharge used to fund
an illegal scheme between the Defendants, and the Plaintiffs are
harmed by paying 4.9% above the actual cost of insurance coverage
so that the Defendants can secretly divert this illegal
commission/rebate fee to the unlicensed AARP.
Plaintiff Friedman filed a putative class action in January 2014
asserting violations of California's Unfair Competition Law
("UCL"), money had and received, and conversion. The Defendants
filed a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). On Oct. 6, 2014,
the Court granted Defendants' Motion concluding that Friedman had
not plausibly alleged that AARP was acting as an unlicensed
insurance agent collecting an illegal commission. Friedman
appealed.
On May 3, 2017, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Friedman
sufficiently pled a claim under the UCL's unlawful, unfair, and
fraudulent prongs. On remand, the Court was to consider the
Defendants' additional challenge to the complaint based on the
filed-rate doctrine.
On Jan. 16, 2018, the court concluded that filed rate principles
permitted Friedman to proceed. It also concluded that Friedman had
standing under the UCL, however, Friedman lacked standing to seek
injunctive relief because Friedman no longer held a Medigap policy
with the Defendants.
On Aug. 31, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed the First Amended Complaint
adding McGee as a named Plaintiff and adding additional claims.
The First Amended Complaint contains claims for (1) violations of
the UCL; (2) money had and received; (3) conversion; (4) breach of
contract; (5) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing; (6) financial elder abuse; and (7) violations of the
Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act ("CUTPA").
The Defendants now move to dismiss the First Amended Complaint
under Rule 12(b)(6). They challenge the sufficiency of the
Plaintiffs' claims based on the following: (1) the Plaintiffs' lack
standing under the UCL and CUTPA; (2) they fail to allege an
underlying predicate for the UCL and CUTPA claims; and (3) the
Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege any state law claims.
On review, Judge Pregerson concludes that the Plaintiffs have not
plausibly alleged unlawful premium rebates in violation of
California's or Connecticut's anti-rebating statutes. The
Plaintiffs do not allege that any portion of the 4.9% royalty
payment was passed on to the insured members. They have not
alleged that they received any discount, or that their premium was
less because of UnitedHealth's payments to AARP. The insureds'
underlying insurance coverage was unaffected and there are no
allegations that the individual insureds were induced to insurance
by the arrangement. Therefore, the Plaintiffs have not plausibly
alleged violations of California's or Connecticut's anti-rebating
statutes.
The Judge also concludes that the Plaintiffs also do not meet
CUTPA's economic harm requirement. They also lack standing under
CUTPA for the independent reason that they are not Connecticut
residents nor were they injured in Connecticut. CUTPA provides, in
relevant part: "Persons entitled to bring an action under
subsection (a) of this section may, bring a class action on behalf
of themselves and other persons similarly situated who are
residents of this state or injured in this state to recover
damages." Because they have not alleged that they are Connecticut
residents or that they were injured in Connecticut, the Plaintiffs
lack standing to assert CUTPA claims.
Finally, regarding the state law claims, Judge Pregerson holds that
the Plaintiffs do not allege that they paid more than the
DOI-approved rate or that they paid more than they agreed to pay.
Their theory that they paid more than what is required to obtain
coverage under the insurance policy, is not plausible to support
the state law claims. Absent any plausible allegations that the
Defendants charged them more than they agreed to pay, that the
Defendants provided unsatisfactory coverage, or that the contract
prohibited the Defendants from the alleged conduct, the Plaintiffs
state law claims fail.
For the reasons stated, Judge Pregerson granted the Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss, and dismissed the Third Amended Complaint
without leave to amend. The Judge denied the Plaintiffs' motion
for class certification.
A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 1, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/AomSGd from Leagle.com.
Jerald Friedman, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher Collins
-- chrisc@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman and Dowd LLP,
Frank J. Janecek, Jr. -- frankj@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller
Rudman and Dowd LLP, Michael F. Ghozland --
Michael@ghozlandlawfirm.com -- Ghozland Law Firm, Sean Kennedy
Collins -- sean@neinsurancelaw.com -- Sean K. Collins, Attorney
at Law, Christopher C. Gold -- cgold@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins
Geller Rudman and Dowd LLP, pro hac vice, Dorothy P. Antullis --
dantullis@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman and Dowd LLP, pro
hac vice, Mark J. Dearman -- mdearman@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins
Geller Rudman and Dowd LLP, pro hac vice & Stuart A. Davidson --
SDavidson@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman and Dowd LLP, pro
hac vice.
AARP Inc, AARP Services Inc & AARP Insurance Plan, Defendants,
represented by John W. Amberg -- jwamberg@bclplaw.com -- Bryan
Cave LLP, Alec W. Farr -- awfarr@bclplaw.com -- Bryan Cave LLP,
pro hac vice, Darci F. Madden -- dfMadden@bclplaw.com -- Bryan
Cave LLP, pro hac vice, Gregory J. Sachnik --
gregory.sachnik@bclplaw.com -- Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP,
pro hac vice, Heather S. Goldman -- heather.goldman@bclplaw.com -
- Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP, pro hac vice, Jeffrey S.
Russell -- jsrussell@bclplaw.com -- Bryan Cave LLP, pro hac vice
& Sarah Beth Burwick -- sarah.burwick@bclplaw.com -- Bryan Cave
Leighton Paisner LLP.
UnitedHealthGroup Inc & UnitedHealthCare Insurance Company,
Defendants, represented by Brian David Boyle -- bboyle@omm.com --
O'Melveny and Myers LLP & Meaghan VerGow -- mvergow@omm.com --
O'Melveny and Myers LLP, pro hac vice.
ACCURATE BACKGROUND: Faces Stepp Suit Alleging Violation of FCRA
----------------------------------------------------------------
Cher Stepp, on behalf of herself and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. ACCURATE BACKGROUND, LLC, a foreign limited
liability company, Case No. 8:19-cv-03079 (M.D. Fla., Dec. 16,
2019), is brought against the Defendant for violations of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act of 1970.
The FCRA makes it unlawful to obtain and use a consumer report for
an employment purpose. Such use become lawful if and only if the
consumer reporting agency and user of the consumer report have
complied with the statute's strict certification, disclosure,
authorization and notice requirements. These requirements must be
met as to each report a consumer reporting agency (CRA)
issues--blanket or prospective certifications by the users of
reports are not permitted.
The failure to meet these certification rules means the CRA is
forbidden from issuing reports in the employment context. If the
CRA issues a report without the certifications, it violates the law
with each report it so issues. The Defendant willfully violated
these requirements, in systematic violation of the Plaintiff's
rights and the rights of other putative class members, says the
complaint.
Plaintiff Cher Stepp is a consumer.
Defendant ACCURATE is a consumer reporting agency.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Marc R. Edelman, Esq.
MORGAN & MORGAM, P.A.
201 N. Franklin Street, Suite 700
Tampa, FL 33602
Phone: 813-223-5505
Fax: 813-257-0572
Email: MEdelman@forthepeople.com
AMANO USA: Shelby-Williams Hits Biometrics Data Collection
----------------------------------------------------------
Cora Shelby-Williams, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Amano USA Holdings, Inc. and
Accu-Time Systems, Inc., Defendants, Case No. 2019CH14363 (Ill.
Cir., December 13, 2019), seeks an injunction requiring Defendants
to cease all unlawful activity related to the capture, collection,
storage and use of biometrics, as well as statutory damages
together with costs and reasonable attorneys' fees for violation of
the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act.
Defendants design and manufacture fully-integrated time and
attendance products and services to businesses.
Shelby-Williams has worked as a Certified Nursing Assistant for
Rosewood Care Center of Joliet from September 2018 to the present
at their facility located at 3401 Hennepin Drive, Joliet, Illinois.
Employees were required to "clock-in" and "clock-out" using an
Accu-Time Maximus Biometric Data Reader that scanned fingerprints.
[BN]
Plaintiff is represented by:
James B. Zouras, Esq.
Megan E. Shannon, Esq.
Ryan F. Stephan, Esq.
STEPHAN ZOURAS, LLP
205 N. Michigan Avenue, Suite 2560
Chicago, IL 60601
Email: rstephan@stephanzouras.com
jzouras@stephanzouras.com
mshannon@stephanzouras.com
AMENDOLA MARBLE: Cabrera Seeks to Recover Overtime Pay Under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
PEDRO CABRERA, JESUS CHALE, and EDISON BERMEO BERRONES,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. AMENDOLA MARBLE & STONE CENTER, INC "ABC REQUESTED
CORPORATION" d/b/a STONE LOGIC, name of the corporation being
fictitious and unknown to Plaintiffs, and JOSEPH AMENDOLA, RUBEN
SINCHI, and VICTOR BAUTISTA, as individuals, the Defendants, Case
No. 1:19-cv-06530-RRM-VMS (E.D.N.Y., Nov. 19, 2019), seeks to
recover unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act
and the New York Labor Law.
The Plaintiffs, who are former employees of the Defendants, alleges
that they worked approximately 40-54 hours or more per week during
their employment but the Defendants did not pay them time and a
half (1.5) for hours worked over 40--a blatant violation of the
overtime provisions contained in the FLSA and NYLL.
Stone Logic is a leading company in the constructions industry.
Ruben Sinchi owns Stone Logic. Victor Bautista manages Stone
Logic.[BN]
The Plaintiffs are represented by:
Roman Avshalumov, Esq.
Helen F. Dalton & Associates, P.C.
80-02 Kew Gardens Road, Suite 601
Kew Gardens, NY 11415
Telephone: 718-263-9591
ANIXTER INTERNATIONAL: Teamsters 142 Sues Over CD&R Merger Deal
---------------------------------------------------------------
Teamsters Union No. 142 Pension Fund, on behalf of itself and those
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Anixter International Inc.,
Samuel Zell, Lord James Blyth, Frederic F. Brace, Linda Walker
Bynoe, Robert J. Eck, William A. Galvin, F. Philip Handy, Melvyn N.
Klein, Jamie Moffitt, George Munoz, Scott R. Peppet, Valarie L.
Sheppard, William S. Simon, Charles M. Swoboda, Clayton, Dubilier &
Rice, LLC, CD&R Arrow Parent, LLC and CD&R Arrow Merger Sub, Inc.,
Defendants, Case No. 2019-0999 (D. Del., December 13, 2019), seeks
to enjoin defendants and all persons acting in concert with them
from proceeding with, consummating or closing the acquisition of
Anixter by CD&R, rescinding it in the event defendants consummate
the merger, rescissory damages, costs of this action, including
reasonable allowance for plaintiff's attorneys' and experts' fees
and such other and further relief under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.
Pursuant to the terms of the Merger Agreement, the Anixter
acquisition by CD&R is for $82.50 per share in cash.
The complaint alleges that the proxy filed related to the
transaction fails to disclose or adequately describe Wells Fargo
Securities' conflicts and the Board's rationale for engaging both
Centerview Partners LLC and Wells Fargo Securities as financial
advisors considering that Wells Fargo had performed work for
Anixter including acting as a joint bookrunner on an offering of
debt securities by Anixter in October 2018 while Centerview was the
lead financial advisor despite not having done any work for Anixter
in the prior two years. The Proxy also failed to disclose Samuel
Zell's interest in liquidating his Anixter stake and retaining
cash, management's post-Merger employment and related discussions
with CD&R and certain directors' longstanding relationships with
Zell.
Plaintiff also questions the acceptance of the CD&R's offer of
$82.50/share despite the fact that Anixter's competitor WESCO
International, Inc. made a superior offer on November 19 to acquire
Anixter for $90 per share consisting of 70% cash and 30% stock.
Anixter distributes enterprise cabling and security solutions,
electrical and electronic wire and cable solutions, and utility
power solutions worldwide.
CD&R is a global private investment firm headquartered in New
York.
Teamsters Union No. 142 Pension Fund is a stockholder of Anixter
and has owned Anixter common stock. Teamsters Union No. 142 is a
labor union in Merrillville IN. [BN]
Plaintiff is represented by:
Eric L. Zagar, Esq.
Lee D. Rudy, Esq.
J. Daniel Albert, Esq.
Stacey A. Greenspan, Esq.
KESSLER TOPAZ MELTER & CHECK, LLP
280 King of Prussia Road
Radnor, PA 19087
Tel: (610) 822-2209/0276/0494
(484) 270-1494
(484) 270-1444
Fax: (267) 948-2512
(610) 667-7056
(610) 667-7056
Email: ezagar@ktmc.com
- and -
Michael Hanrahan, Esq.
Samuel L. Closic, Esq.
Stephen D. Dargitz, Esq.
Jason W. Rigby, Esq.
PRICKETT, JONES & ELLIOTT, P.A.
1310 N. King Street
Wilmington, Delaware 19801
Tel: (302) 888-6500
APPLE INC: Burris Product Liability Suit Removed to W.D. Missouri
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Apple Inc. removed the case captioned as WADE C. BURRIS,
Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. APPLE INC., Defendant (Filed Oct. 15, 2019), from the
Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, to the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Missouri on Nov. 19, 2019.
The Western District of Missouri Court Clerk assigned Case No.
4:19-cv-00925-RK to the proceeding.
The Plaintiff contends that Apple manufactured, distributed and/or
sold iPad and iPad Pro devices, and the Plaintiff himself purchased
a 10.5-inch iPad Pro in June 2017. The Plaintiff alleges that iPad
and iPad Pro devices sold by Apple from January 1, 2017, to the
present are defective in that they develop a bright spot on the
screen of the device.
The Plaintiff purports to bring this lawsuit on behalf of himself
and a putative class defined as: All Missouri purchasers of iPad
and iPad Pro devices who purchased these devices since January 1,
2017. Excluded from this class are Defendant's officers, directors
and employees and any judicial officer to whom this matter is
assigned.
The Plaintiff asserts three causes of action against Apple,
including breach of the implied warranty of merchantability; unjust
enrichment; and violation of the Missouri Merchandising Practices
Act.
Apple denies each and every one of the Plaintiff's claims.
Apple Inc. is an American multinational technology company
headquartered in Cupertino, California, that designs, develops, and
sells consumer electronics, computer software, and online
services.[BN]
Defendant Apple Inc. is represented by:
Holly Pauling Smith, Esq.
John Murphy, Esq.
Molly Carella, Esq.
Jennifer J. Artman, Esq.
SHOOK, HARDY & BACON L.L.P.
2555 Grand Boulevard
Kansas City, MO 64108
Telephone: (816) 474-6550
Facsimile: (816) 421-5547
E-mail: jmurphy@shb.com
hpsmith@shb.com
mcarella@shb.com
jartman@shb.com
ARMSTRONG FLOORING: KSF Reminds of Jan. 14 Plaintiff Deadline
-------------------------------------------------------------
Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC ("KSF") and KSF partner, former Attorney
General of Louisiana, Charles C. Foti, Jr., remind investors of
pending deadlines in the following securities class action
lawsuits:
Plantronics, Inc. (NYSE:PLT)
Class Period: 7/2/2018 - 11/5/2019
Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline: January 13, 2020
SECURITIES FRAUD
To learn more, visit https://www.ksfcounsel.com/cases/-plt/
Yunji Inc. (NASDAQ:YJ)
Class Period: American Depository Shares issued either in or after
the May 2019 Initial Public Offering.
Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline: January 13, 2020
MISLEADING PROSPECTUS
To learn more, visit https://www.ksfcounsel.com/cases/nasdaqgm-yj/
Armstrong Flooring, Inc. (NYSE:AFI)
Class Period: 3/6/2018 - 11/4/2019
Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline: January 14, 2020
SECURITIES FRAUD
To learn more, visit https://www.ksfcounsel.com/cases/-afi/
Wanda Sports Group Company Limited (NASDAQ:WSG)
Class Period: securities issued either in or after the July 2019
Initial Public Offering.
Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline: January 17, 2020
MISLEADING PROSPECTUS
To learn more, visit
https://www.ksfcounsel.com/cases/nasdaqgs-wsg/
If you purchased shares of the above companies and would like to
discuss your legal rights and your right to recover for your
economic loss, you may, without obligation or cost to you, contact
KSF Managing Partner, Lewis Kahn, toll-free at 1-877-515-1850, via
email (Lewis.Kahn@KSFcounsel.com), or via the case links above.
If you wish to serve as a Lead Plaintiff in the class action, you
must petition the Court on or before the Lead Plaintiff Motion
deadline.
KSF, whose partners include former Louisiana Attorney General
Charles C. Foti, Jr., is one of the nation's premier boutique
securities litigation law firms. KSF serves a variety of clients -
including public institutional investors, hedge funds, money
managers and retail investors - in seeking recoveries for
investment losses emanating from corporate fraud or malfeasance by
publicly traded companies. KSF has offices in New York, California
and Louisiana.
To learn more about KSF, you may visit www.ksfcounsel.com.
Contact:
Lewis Kahn, Esq.
Managing Partner
Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC
Tel: 1-877-515-1850
1100 Poydras St., Suite 3200
New Orleans, LA 70163
E-mail: lewis.kahn@ksfcounsel.com
[GN]
AURORA CANNABIS: Rosen Law Files Class Action Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, announces it has
filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of the
securities of Aurora Cannabis Inc. (NYSE: ACB) from September 11,
2019 and November 14, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"). The
lawsuit seeks to recover damages for Aurora investors under the
federal securities laws.
To join the Aurora class action, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1724.htmlor call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action.
NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF
According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) Aurora's revenue would decline in its first quarter of
fiscal 2020 ended September 30, 2019; (2) the Company would halt
construction on its Aurora Nordic 2 and Aurora Sun facilities; and
(3) due to the foregoing, defendants' statements about Aurora's
receivables, business, operations, and prospects, were materially
false and misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis at all
relevant times. When the true details entered the market, the
lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.
A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to
serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than
January 21, 2020. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting
on behalf of other class members in directing the litigation. If
you wish to join the litigation, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1724.htmlor to discuss
your rights or interests regarding this class action, please
contact Phillip Kim, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll free at
866-767-3653 or via e-mail at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com.
Follow us for updates on LinkedIn:
https://www.linkedin.com/company/the-rosen-law-firm or on Twitter:
https://twitter.com/rosen_firm or on Facebook:
https://www.facebook.com/rosenlawfirm.
Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe,
concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm was Ranked No. 1
by ISS Securities Class Action Services for number of securities
class action settlements in 2017. The firm has been ranked in the
top 3 each year since 2013. Rosen Law Firm has secured hundreds of
millions of dollars for investors.
Contact:
Laurence Rosen, Esq.
Phillip Kim, Esq.
The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
275 Madison Avenue, 40th Floor
New York, NY 10016
Tel: (212) 686-1060
Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
Fax: (212) 202-3827
Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
pkim@rosenlegal.com
cases@rosenlegal.com
Website: www.rosenlegal.com
[GN]
BAXTER INT'L: Hagens Berman Reminds Investors of Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
Hagens Berman urges Baxter International (NYSE: BAX) investors who
have suffered losses in excess of $100,000 to submit their losses
now to learn if they qualify to recover compensable damages. A
securities fraud class action has been filed against the Company
and senior executives.
Class Period: Feb. 21, 2019 - Oct. 23, 2019
Lead Plaintiff Deadline: Jan. 24, 2020
Sign Up: www.hbsslaw.com/investor-fraud/BAX
Contact An Attorney Now: BAX@hbsslaw.com
510-725-3000
Baxter International (BAX) Securities Class Action:
The complaint alleges that Defendants misled investors by engaging
in fraudulent accounting.
According to the complaint, Baxter engaged in intra-company
transactions to generate foreign exchange gains and losses, used
foreign exchange rate conventions that violated generally accepted
accounting principles ("GAAP"), and enabled intra-company
transactions to be undertaken after the related exchange rates were
already known.
Baxter investors began to learn the truth when, on Oct. 24, 2019,
Baxter disclosed an Audit Committee investigation into the
Company's accounting for certain foreign-currency sales, which
violated GAAP and resulted in Baxter misreporting nearly $300
million in net foreign-exchange gains over the past five years.
Baxter said it would not be able to timely file its third quarter
2019 quarterly report.
This news drove the price of Baxter shares sharply lower that day.
More recently, on Nov. 22, 2019, Baxter disclosed that it had
received a notice of noncompliance from the NYSE, threatening to
potentially delist the Company should it fail to file its quarterly
report and any subsequently delayed filings by May 20, 2020.
If you invested in Baxter between Feb. 21, 2019 and Oct. 23, 2019
(the "Class Period") and suffered significant losses, you may
qualify to be a lead plaintiff – one who selects and oversees the
attorneys prosecuting the case. Contact Hagens Berman immediately
for more information about the case and being a lead plaintiff.
"We're focused on investors' losses and whether Baxter sought to
manufacture profits through shady foreign-currency sales
accounting," said Reed Kathrein, the Hagens Berman partner leading
the investigation.
Whistleblowers: Persons with non-public information regarding
Baxter International should consider their options to help in the
investigation or take advantage of the SEC Whistleblower program.
Under the new program, whistleblowers who provide original
information may receive rewards totaling up to 30 percent of any
successful recovery made by the SEC. For more information, call
Reed Kathrein at 510-725-3000 or email BAX@hbsslaw.com.
Hagens Berman is a national law firm with nine offices in eight
cities around the country and eighty attorneys. The firm
represents investors, whistleblowers, workers and consumers in
complex litigation. More about the firm and its successes is
located at hbsslaw.com. For the latest news visit our newsroom or
follow us on Twitter at @classactionlaw.
Contact:
Reed Kathrein, Esq.
HAGENS BERMAN
Tel: 510-725-3000
E-mail: reed@hbsslaw.com
[GN]
BLACK KNIGHT: Rosen Law Investigating Securities Claims
-------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, continues to
investigate potential securities claims on behalf of shareholders
of Black Knight, Inc. (NYSE: BKI) resulting from allegations that
Black Knight may have issued materially misleading business
information to the investing public.
On November 6, 2019, PennyMac Financial Services, Inc., announced
that it had filed a lawsuit against Black Knight, "alleging that
Black Knight . . . uses its market-dominating LoanSphere(R) MSP
mortgage loan servicing system to engage in unfair business tactics
that both entrap its licensees and create barriers to entry that
stifle competition."
PennyMac's press release specified that "[t]he lawsuit alleges that
Black Knight violated the federal Sherman Act, the California
Cartwright Act and California's Unfair Competition Law and engaged
in unfair competition under common law" and that PennyMac "seeks,
among other relief, to preliminarily and permanently enjoin Black
Knight's wrongful practices, and seeks the recovery of actual and
statutory damages."
On this news, Black Knight's stock price fell $4.69 or over 7.5% to
close at $57.65 on November 6, 2019.
Rosen Law Firm is preparing a class action lawsuit to recover
losses suffered by Black Knight investors. If you purchased shares
of Black Knight please visit the firm's website at
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1715.htmlto join the
class action. You may also contact Phillip Kim of Rosen Law Firm
toll free at 866-767-3653 or via email at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com.
Follow us for updates on LinkedIn:
https://www.linkedin.com/company/the-rosen-law-firm or on Twitter:
https://twitter.com/rosen—firm or on Facebook:
https://www.facebook.com/rosenlawfirm.
Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe,
concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm was Ranked No. 1
by ISS Securities Class Action Services for number of securities
class action settlements in 2017. The firm has been ranked in the
top 3 each year since 2013. Rosen Law Firm has secured hundreds of
millions of dollars for investors.
Contact:
Laurence Rosen, Esq.
Phillip Kim, Esq.
The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
275 Madison Avenue, 40th Floor
New York, NY 10016
Tel: (212) 686-1060
Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
Fax: (212) 202-3827
Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
pkim@rosenlegal.com
cases@rosenlegal.com
Website: www.rosenlegal.com
[GN]
BLOOD CENTERS: Danielsson Parties Ordered to File Add'l. Evidence
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned RUBY DANIELSSON, Plaintiff, v. BLOOD CENTERS
OF THE PACIFIC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-04592-JCS (N.D.
Cal.), Chief Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Spero of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California ordered the parties
to submit additional evidence related to the violation rate and the
disputed amount in controversy.
The case is a class action that was initially filed in the Superior
Court of California for the County of San Francisco. Defendant
Vitalant (erroneously sued as Blood Centers of the Pacific) removed
to federal court under diversity jurisdiction, and the Class Action
Fairness Act. Plaintiff Danielsson moved to remand the action back
to state court because, she claims, Vitalant did not prove by
preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy
exceeds $5 million. The Court orders the parties to submit
additional evidence related to the amount in controversy.
Vitalant provided two declarations: the original declaration of
Senior Corporate Director, Total Rewards & HR Systems Elizabeth
Sweeley and a second, supplemental declaration also from Ms.
Sweeley. These declarations estimated the number of putative class
members, the number of weeks they worked during the class period,
and their average hourly wage. Ms. Sweeley based her estimates on
he databases, software and computer systems Vitalant uses to
maintain its human resource records, along with the data contained
within those records" along with her "personal knowledge of all the
facts set forth" in the declaration.
Magistrate Judge Spero finds these declarations substantially
similar to the declaration that the Ninth Circuit found
insufficient to establish the required amount in controversy in
Ibarra v. Manheim Investments, Inc. As in that case, Ms. Sweeley's
declarations do not address the violation rate. The Magistrate
follows the Ninth Circuit's directive and asks both sides to submit
additional evidence related to the violation rate and the disputed
amount in controversy. Defendant Vitalant has the ultimate burden
of proof.
A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 1, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/1W3Eav from Leagle.com.
Ruby Danielsson, individually, and on behalf of other members of
the general public similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by
Edwin Aiwazian -- edwin@lfjpc.com -- Lawyers for Justice, PC &
Jeffrey D. Klein -- jeff@lfjpc.com -- Lawyers for Justice, PC.
Blood Centers of the Pacific, a California corporation & Blood
Systems, an unknown business entity, Defendants, represented by
Thomas Michael McInerney -- tmm@ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins
Nash Smoak & Stewart, P.C. & Lisa Mireille Bowman --
lisa.bowman@ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart,
P.C.
BLOOM ENERGY: Hagens Berman Reminds Investors of Jan. 3 Deadline
----------------------------------------------------------------
Hagens Berman urges Bloom Energy Corporation (NYSE: BE) investors
who have suffered significant losses to submit their losses now to
learn if they qualify to recover their investment losses. A
securities fraud class action was recently filed on behalf of
certain BE investors against the Company and senior executives and
Bloom investors may have valuable claims.
Class Period: July 22, 2018 - Sept. 16, 2019
Lead Plaintiff Deadline: Jan. 3, 2020
Sign Up: www.hbsslaw.com/investor-fraud/BE
Contact an Attorney Now: BE@hbsslaw.com
510-725-3000
Bloom Energy Corporation (BE) Securities Class Action:
The complaint alleges that Defendants misrepresented and concealed
that: (1) Bloom's technology produced emissions comparable to that
of a modern natural gas plant, (2) Bloom's estimates of useful life
for its energy servers and fuel cells were inaccurate, and (3)
Bloom used misleading accounting to hide the true effect of future
servicing expenses.
On Sept. 17, 2019, the market learned the truth when Hindenburg
Research published a scathing report about Bloom Energy, stating
that it uncovered billions in servicing liabilities and called the
company an "obvious bankruptcy candidate." Hindenburg claimed that
Bloom's technology is "not sustainable, clean, green or remotely
profitable." Hindenburg also accused the Company of having an
estimated $2.2 billion in undisclosed servicing liabilities and
using "tricky accounting…to avoid recognizing major recent
additional losses." The company "will become yet another tombstone
in the Silicon Valley cemetery of dead unicorns," Hindenburg said.
In response, the price of Bloom Energy shares fell sharply that
day.
If you invested in Bloom Energy Corporation between July 22, 2018
and Sept. 16, 2019 (the "Class Period") and suffered significant
losses, you may qualify to be a lead plaintiff – one who selects
and oversees the attorneys prosecuting the case. Contact Hagens
Berman immediately for more information about the case and being a
lead plaintiff.
"We're focused on recovering investors' substantial losses and
holding BE and its senior management accountable for their alleged
accounting fraud," said Reed Kathrein, the Hagens Berman partner
leading the investigation.
If you purchased shares of BE and suffered significant losses,
click here to discuss your legal rights with Hagens Berman.
Whistleblowers: Persons with non-public information regarding Bloom
Energy should consider their options to help in the investigation
or take advantage of the SEC Whistleblower program. Under the new
program, whistleblowers who provide original information may
receive rewards totaling up to 30 percent of any successful
recovery made by the SEC. For more information, call Reed Kathrein
at 510-725-3000 or email BE@hbsslaw.com.
Hagens Berman is a national law firm with nine offices in eight
cities around the country and eighty attorneys. The firm represents
investors, whistleblowers, workers and consumers in complex
litigation. More about the firm and its successes is located at
hbsslaw.com. For the latest news visit our newsroom or follow us on
Twitter at @classactionlaw.
Contact:
Reed Kathrein, Esq.
HAGENS BERMAN
Tel: 510-725-3000
Email: reed@hbsslaw.com
[GN]
BREMER FINANCIAL: Illegally Charges OD & NSF Fees, MJ Evans Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
MJ EVANS BEAUTY, on behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. BREMER FINANCIAL CORPORATION, Defendant,
Case No. 27-CV-19-19390 (Minn. Dist., Nov. 21, 2019), arises from
the Defendant's routine practice of:
-- charging overdraft fees ("OD Fees") on transactions that
did not overdraw an account; and
-- assessing more than one insufficient funds fee ("NSF Fee")
on the same item.
The Plaintiff contends that these practices breach contractual
promises; violate the covenant of good faith and fair dealing;
result in the Bank being unjustly enriched; and/or are deceptive
trade practices in violation of Section 325D.44 of the Minnesota
Statutes.
According to the complaint, Bremer's customers have been injured by
the Bank's improper practices to the tune of millions of dollars
bilked from their accounts in violation of the customers'
agreements with Bremer. The Plaintiff seeks damages, restitution,
and injunctive relief for the Defendant's violations.
MJ Evans Beauty is a small business located in Edina, Minnesota,
and holds a Bremer checking account.
Bremer Bank is engaged in the business of providing retail banking
services to consumers, including Plaintiff and members of the
putative Classes. Bremer has its headquarters in Saint Paul,
Minnesota. Bremer has $12.7 billion in assets and provides banking
services to customers through bank branches in the states of
Minnesota, North Dakota, and Wisconsin.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Timothy Becker, Esq.
JOHNSON BECKER PLLC
444 Cedar Street, Suite 1800
St. Paul, MN 55101
Telephone: (612) 436-1804
Facsimile: (612) 436-4801
E-mail: tbecker@johnsonbecker.com
- and -
Jeffrey Kaliel, Esq.
KALIEL PLLC
1875 Connecticut Avenue NW, 10th Floor
Washington, DC 20009
Telephone: (202) 350-4783
E-mail: jkaliel@kalielpllc.com
- and -
Lynn Toops, Esq.
COHEN & MALAD LLP
One Indiana Square, Suite 1400
Indianapolis, IN 46204
Telephone: (317) 636-6481
E-mail: ltoops@cohenandmalad.com
CALIFORNIA COAST: Faces Trim Suit Over Erroneous Credit Reports
---------------------------------------------------------------
MARTIN TRIM, Individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. CALIFORNIA COAST CREDIT UNION, Defendant,
Case No. 3:19-cv-02198-BAS-AGS (S.D. Cal., Nov. 19, 2019), seeks to
recover damages resulting from the illegal actions of the Defendant
in reporting erroneous negative and derogatory information on the
Plaintiff and similarly situated consumers' credit reports.
Specifically, the Plaintiff contends, the Defendant has erroneously
reported remaining financial obligations on accounts that have been
closed and discharged. The financial obligation arose from a loan
that the Defendant extended to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff seeks
claims pursuant to the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the California
Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act.
On September 20, 2018, Plaintiff filed Chapter Seven bankruptcy in
the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of California
under Case No. 18-05654-MM7. On December 18, 2018, the Debt was
discharged pursuant to a court order that was mailed to the
Defendant by the Bankruptcy Court. The order advised the Defendant
that the Debt had been discharged.
Following the bankruptcy, the balance on the Debt should have been
listed as $0.00 on all consumer reports and the reports should have
stated the account was "closed", the lawsuit says. However,
following the bankruptcy and discharge, on February 27, 2019, when
checking his Experian credit report, the Plaintiff discovered the
Defendant reported that there remained a balance of $4,422 on the
Debt (Account number beginning with the number 913990).
California Coast Credit Union is the longest-serving credit union
in San Diego County, headquartered in San Diego, California.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Yana A. Hart, Esq.
KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC
2221 Camino Del Rio, Suite 101
San Diego, CA 92108
Telephone: (619) 233-7770
Facsimile: (619) 297-1022
E-mail: yana@kazlg.com
- and -
Daniel G. Shay, Esq.
LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL G. SHAY
2221 Camino Del Rio South, Suite 308
San Diego, CA 92108
Telephone: (619) 222-7429
Facsimile: (866) 431-3292
E-mail: danielshay@tcpafdcpa.com
CANOPY GROWTH: Schall Law Files Class Action Lawsuit
----------------------------------------------------
The Schall Law Firm, a national shareholder rights litigation firm,
announces the filing of a class action lawsuit against Canopy
Growth Corporation (NYSE:CGC) for violations of Sec. 10(b) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder by the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission.
Investors who purchased the Company's securities between June 21,
2019 and November 13, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"), are
encouraged to contact the firm before January 20, 2020.
If you are a shareholder who suffered a loss, click here to
participate.
We also encourage you to contact Brian Schall of the Schall Law
Firm, 1880 Century Park East, Suite 404, Los Angeles, CA 90067, at
424-303-1964, to discuss your rights free of charge. You can also
reach us through the firm's website at www.schallfirm.com, or by
email at brian@schallfirm.com.
The class, in this case, has not yet been certified, and until
certification occurs, you are not represented by an attorney. If
you choose to take no action, you can remain an absent class
member.
According to the Complaint, the Company made false and misleading
statements to the market. Canopy suffered from weak demand for its
softgel and oil products. The poor demand, along with heavy returns
and excessive inventory, forced the Company to take a CA$32.7
million restructuring charge. Based on these facts, the Company's
public statements were false and materially misleading throughout
the class period. When the market learned the truth about Canopy,
investors suffered damages.
Join the case to recover your losses.
The Schall Law Firm represents investors around the world and
specializes in securities class action lawsuits and shareholder
rights litigation.
Contact:
Brian Schall, Esq.,
The Schall Law Firm
Office: 310-301-3335
Cell: 424-303-1964
E-mail: info@schallfirm.com
brian@schallfirm.com
Website: http://www.schallfirm.com/
[GN]
CERTAINTEED CORP: Segebarth Sues Over Faulty Fiberglass Shingles
----------------------------------------------------------------
KIM SEGEBARTH, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. CERTAINTEED CORPORATION, Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-05500-PD (E.D. Pa., Nov. 21, 2019), is brought on behalf of
a class of individuals, who own or have owned homes or other
structures on which CertainTeed and its asphalt fiberglass
shingles, marketed and sold as the "Horizon" product line, are or
have been installed.
Fiberglass shingles are a type of asphalt shingle, often compared
to an organic mat asphalt shingle. Fiberglass shingles are
different because they have a fiberglass mat while organic asphalt
shingles use paper as the base.
According to the complaint, the Defendant's Shingles are plagued by
defects in design and manufacturing that result in cracking,
fishmouthing, curling, degranulating, and premature deterioration.
The results of these defects have allowed for water intrusion and
damage to other property. The Defendant sold these defective
Shingles to the public and made false representations and
warranties despite the fact that the Shingles are defective and
have and will prematurely fail causing property damage, and costing
consumers substantial removal and replacement costs, the Plaintiff
alleges.
The class action seeks damages, injunctive relief, costs,
attorneys' fees, and other relief as a result of Defendant's
willful, wanton, reckless, deceptive, and/or grossly negligent
conduct in causing consumers' structures to suffer damages and
preventing consumers from learning of the latent defects in the
Shingles.
Mr. Segebarth purchased his newly constructed home in 2008, which
was constructed using the Defendant's Shingles. His home was part
of the Cutters Creek planned unit development, which included at
least 24 other homes, which were also constructed using the
Defendant's Shingles in 2008 and in 2009.
The Defendant designed, manufactured, warranted, advertised, and
sold defective Shingles that were installed on thousands of
structures throughout the United States.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Charles E. Schaffer, Esq.
LEVIN SEDRAN & BERMAN, LLP
510 Walnut Street, Suite 500
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Telephone: (215) 592-1500
Facsimile: (215) 592-4663
E-mail: cschaffer@lfsblaw.com
- and -
Charles J. LaDuca, Esq.
Brendan S. Thompson, Esq.
CUNEO GILBERT & LADUCA, LLP
4725 Wisconsin Ave., NW, Suite 200
Washington, DC 20016
Telephone: (202) 789-3960
Facsimile: (202) 789-1819
E-mail: charlesl@cuneolaw.com
brendant@cuneolaw.com
- and -
Michael A. McShane, Esq.
Clinton Woods, Esq.
Ling Y. Kuang, Esq.
AUDET & PARTNERS, LLP
711 Van Ness Ave., Suite 500
San Francisco, CA 94102
Telephone: (415) 568-2555
E-mail: mmceshane@audetlaw.com
cwoods@audetlaw.com
lkuang@audetlaw.com
CHEMOURS COMPANY: Schall Law Files Class Action Lawsuit
-------------------------------------------------------
The Schall Law Firm, a national shareholder rights litigation firm,
announces the filing of a class action lawsuit against The Chemours
Company ("Chemours" or "the Company") (NYSE:CC) for violations of
Sec. 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission.
Investors who purchased the Company's securities between February
16, 2017 and August 1, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"), are
encouraged to contact the firm before December 9, 2019.
We also encourage you to contact Brian Schall of the Schall Law
Firm, 1880 Century Park East, Suite 404, Los Angeles, CA 90067, at
424-303-1964, to discuss your rights free of charge. You can also
reach us through the firm's website at www.schallfirm.com, or by
email at brian@schallfirm.com.
The class, in this case, has not yet been certified, and until
certification occurs, you are not represented by an attorney. If
you choose to take no action, you can remain an absent class
member.
According to the Complaint, the Company made false and misleading
statements to the market. Chemours failed to properly account for
its environmental liabilities and did not accrue reserves to cover
them. Contrary to the Company's claims, the chance of costs
exceeding the accrued amounts was not "remote." Based on these
facts, the Company's public statements were false and materially
misleading throughout the class period. When the market learned the
truth about Chemours, investors suffered damages.
Join the case to recover your losses.
The Schall Law Firm represents investors around the world and
specializes in securities class action lawsuits and shareholder
rights litigation.
Contact:
Brian Schall, Esq.,
The Schall Law Firm
Website: www.schallfirm.com
Office: 310-301-3335
Cell: 424-303-1964
Email: brian@schallfirm.com
[GN]
DCD AUTOMOTIVE Dwyer Seeks Overtime Wages for Sales Associates
--------------------------------------------------------------
JOHN R. DWYER, individually and on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. DCD AUTOMOTIVE HOLDINGS, INC., DCD
BT NORTH, INC. d/b/a BOCH TOYOTA, DCD DEALERSHIP MANAGEMENT, LLC
and DANIEL S. DAGESSE, Defendants, Case No. 19-1468 (Mass. Super.,
Nov. 18, 2019), alleges that the Defendants failed to properly pay
the Plaintiff and other sales associates' overtime wages.
According to the complaint, the Defendants failed to pay the
Plaintiff and class members one and one-half times their regular
rates of pay for all hours worked over 40 during each seven day
workweek and/or all hours worked on each Sunday and/or holiday
pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws.
Mr. Dwyer has worked as a sales associate for the Defendants since
October 2010. The Plaintiff and putative Class Members are former
or current employees of the Defendants.
DCDAH operates retail vehicle dealerships in the Commonwealth at
which its employees sell vehicles to customers. DCDBTN operates a
retail vehicle dealership throughout the Commonwealth at which its
employees sell vehicles to customers.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Edward C. Cumbo, Esq.
Robert Richardson, Esq.
RICHARDSON & CUMBO, LLP
225 Franklin Street, 26th Floor
Boston, MA 02110
Telephone: (617)217-2779
E-mail: e.cumbo@ecllp.com
r.richardson@rc-llp.com
DIRECT ENERGY: Schafer Seeks to Stop False Marketing of Low Rates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Richard Schafer, James Brietfeller, and William Underwood, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated v. DIRECT
ENERGY SERVICES, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, Case
No. 6:19-cv-06907-FPG (W.D.N.Y., Dec. 16, 2019), seeks to enjoin
the Defendant from continuing its dishonest business practice of
advertising low, temporary fixed rates, and burying the long-term
variable rate pricing structure in fine print.
For decades, the prices paid by consumers for their electricity and
natural gas were strictly regulated. However, in 1996, the New York
legislature opened New York's energy market to "competition,"
whereby consumers could choose from a variety of companies selling
residential energy in addition to traditional utilities like
Consolidated Edison. Taking advantage of the deregulation in New
York and other states, companies like the Defendant jumped into the
market and began to grow rapidly.
The Defendant has fueled its rapid expansion not by providing a
good service for a fair price, but rather by developing and using
deceptive and unlawful marketing and sales practices that often
result in its energy customers paying far more than they would have
paid had they stayed with their traditional energy suppliers, the
Plaintiffs contend. They assert that regardless of any savings, or
lack thereof, DES fails to conspicuously disclose its variable rate
pricing structure, in violation of New York law.
The Plaintiffs point out that DES advertises low, temporary fixed
rates, and then buries the long-term variable rate pricing
structure in the fine print of a dense contract without any
highlighting or call to attention. These unscrupulous practices
violate New York's Energy Services Consumers Bill of Rights, which
mandates that all ESCO contracts and all ESCO marketing materials
clearly and conspicuously identify all variable charges included as
part of an energy plan, they argue. In addition, and in the
alternative, DES unjustly retained payments obtained from customers
pursuant to purported contracts that were void as against public
policy pursuant to ESCO Bill of Rights, says the complaint.
The Plaintiffs are residents of New York.
DES sells electricity or natural gas in New York, eighteen other
states, and the District of Columbia.[BN]
The Plaintiffs are represented by:
Benjamin J. Sweet, Esq.
THE SWEET LAW FIRM, PC
1145 Bower Hill Road, Suite 104
Pittsburgh, PA 15243
Phone: (412) 857-5350
Email: ben@sweetlawpc.com
- and -
Scott A. Kamber, Esq.
Michael Aschenbrener, Esq.
KAMBER LAW, LLC
201 Milwaukee Street, Suite 200
Denver, CO 80246
Phone: (303) 222-0281
Email: masch@kamberlaw.com
- and -
Adam C. York, Esq.
KAMBER LAW, LLC
220 N Green Street
Chicago, IL 60607
Phone: (212) 920-3072
Email: ayork@kamberlaw.com
- and -
David L. Steelman, Esq.
STEELMAN & GAUNT
901 Pine Street, Ste. 110
P.O. Box 1257
Rolla, MO 65402
Phone: (573) 341-8336
Email: dsteelman@steelmangaunt.com
DOLLAR TREE: Settlement in Nakooka Labor Suit Gets Final Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge James Donato of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California granted the joint motion for final approval
of classwide settlement in the case captioned LOVELY NAKOOKA and
ELVA REYES, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. DOLLAR TREE STORES, INC., and DOES 1-10,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 3:17-cv-03955-JD (N.D. Cal.).
After the parties resolved a variety of shortcomings in their
initial request for preliminary approval of a classwide settlement,
the Court granted preliminary approval to a revised settlement
proposal in December 2018. That approval was based in part on
representations about the amount of fees to be paid to the
settlement administrator. The joint motion for final approval
featured significantly higher fees for the administrator, with no
good reason provided for the extra costs. Because the
administrator fees looked excessive, the Court denied final
approval, and asked the parties to reduce them to a more reasonable
level and to provide a revised proposal for a second round of
distributions to the class if warranted. The parties filed a
supplemental memorandum stating that they had reached an agreement
to reduce the administrator fees, and explaining how a second
distribution round would happen.
Judge Donato still has concerns about the amount of fees to be paid
to the administrator. While they are no longer sky-high, they are
still at the higher end of fees paid in comparable cases. Even so,
he has concluded that they are just within the boundary of being
acceptable, and granted final approval based on the revised
administrator fees set out in the supplemental memorandum.
For the reasons stated in the Order Re Preliminary Approval, Judge
Donato ordered that the Class is finally approved and certified as
a class for purposes of the Settlement.
Judge Donato finds and determines that the Settlement Shares to be
paid to the Class Members whose address was confirmed and who did
not timely submit valid elections not to participate, as provided
for by the Settlement, are fair and reasonable. The Judge granted
final approval to and ordered that payment of those amounts be made
to the Class Members who did not timely submit valid elections not
to participate and whose addresses were confirmed out of the Net
Settlement Amount in accordance with the Settlement.
Judge Donato finds and determines that the LWDA Payment is fair and
reasonable. The Judge granted final approval to and ordered that
payment.
Judge Donato granted final approval to and ordered that the cost to
administer the Settlement, in the amount of $113,000 for the first
distribution, be paid out of the Maximum Settlement Amount in
accordance with the Settlement.
After the initial distribution is completed, the parties are
directed to submit a joint proposal for a second distribution of
the uncashed Settlement Shares, if warranted, and the balance of
uncashed funds remaining after a second distribution. The Court
determines that the cost of administering the second distribution,
in the amount of $0.76 per check, is fair and reasonable. If a
second distribution is approved, the cost of $0.76 per check will
be paid out of the Maximum Settlement Amount in accordance with the
Settlement.
Judge Donato approved the revised costs to administer the
settlement. He determines by separate order the request by the
Plaintiffs and the Class Counsel to the Class Representative
Payments and the Class Counsel Fees and Expenses Payment.
Pursuant to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California's Procedural Guidance for Class Action Settlements,
updated Dec. 5, 2018, within 21 days after the distribution of the
Settlement Shares, the parties will file with the Court, and post
on the settlement website, a Post-Distribution Accounting.
Upon completion of administration of the Settlement, the Settlement
Administrator will provide written certification of such completion
to the Court and counsel for the parties.
The Judge entered final judgment in accordance with the terms of
the Settlement Agreement, the Order Re Preliminary Approval entered
on Dec. 19, 2018, and the Order.
The parties will bear their own costs and attorneys' fees except as
otherwise provided by the Court's order granting the Class Counsel
Fees and Expenses Payment.
A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 5, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/njxVe6 from Leagle.com.
Lovely Nakooka, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated & Elva Reyes, Plaintiffs, represented by Brent A.
Robinson
-- bar@asmlawyers.com -- Aiman-Smith & Marcy, Hallie Von Rock --
hvr@asmlawyers.com -- Aiman-Smith & Marcy, Randall Bruce
Aiman-Smith -- ras@asmlawyers.com -- Aiman-Smith & Marcy, Reed
W.L.
Marcy -- rwlm@asmlawyers.com -- Aiman-Smith & Marcy & Carey A.
James -- caj@asmlawyers.com -- Aiman-Smith and Marcy.
Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jeffrey D.
Wohl
-- jeffwohl@paulhastings.com -- Paul Hastings LLP, Paul Andrew
Holton -- paulholton@paulhastings.com -- Paul Hastings LLP, Ryan
David Derry -- ryanderry@paulhastings.com -- Paul Hastings LLP &
William Tucker Page, Paul Hastings LLP.
DOWNERS GROVE: Smith Sues Over Collection of Biometric Data
-----------------------------------------------------------
Renee Smith, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Downers Grove SP, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
2019L001300 (Ill. Cir., Nov. 18, 2019), seeks money damages arising
from the Defendant's violations of the Illinois Biometric
Information Privacy Act, in that the Defendant illegally collected,
stored and used the Plaintiff's and other similarly situated
individuals' biometric identifiers and biometric information
without informed written consent.
According to the complaint, if the Defendant's database of
biometric information were to fall into the wrong hands, by data
breach or otherwise, the employees to whom these sensitive
biometric identifiers belong could have their identities stolen.
BIPA confers on the Plaintiff and all other similarly situated
Illinois residents a right to know of such risks, which are
inherently presented by the collection and storage of biometrics,
and a right to know how long such risks will persist after
termination of their employment.
The Defendant never adequately informed anyone of its biometrics
collection practices, never obtained written consent from employees
and former employees regarding its biometric practices, and never
provided any data retention or destruction policies to anyone, the
lawsuit says.
Renee Smith is a resident of Lisle, Illinois, and, since March 18,
2018, an employee at Lacey Creek Supportive Living in Downers
Grove, Illinois. She was required to submit her biometric
information at the direction of and for use by the Defendant. At no
time during her employment was she informed in writing that her
biometric information was being collected or stored or of the
specific purpose and length of term for which her biometric
information was being collected, stored, and used, the Plaintiff
claims.
Downers Grove SP, LLC, owns, operates, manages and controls Lacey
Creek Supportive Living in Downers Grove, Illinois.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Michael L. Fradin, Esq.
LAW OFFICE OF MICHAEL L. FRADIN
8401 Crawford Ave., Suite 104
Skokie, IL 60076
E-mail: mike@fradinlaw.com
EMERSON ELECTRIC: 8th Cir. Flips Class Certification in Hale Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case styled as Jeff Hale, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated; Raymond Gray, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated; Andrew Bowers; Emilio Gonzales;
Kenneth Thompson, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly
situated; Eric Shults; Justin Swires, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated; Estaban Maravilla, individually and
on behalf of all others; Lauren Checki; Kevin Brees; Chad Venhaus;
Chris Willis; Fred Wilmer Plaintiffs-Appellees v. Emerson Electric
Company, Defendant-Appellant, Sears Holdings Corporation; Sears,
Roebuck and Company; The Home Depot, Inc., Defendants, Case No.
18-1585 (8th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit reversed the district court's order certifying a nationwide
class of the Plaintiffs.
The lawsuit arises out of allegedly deceptive advertising
associated with RIDGID brand vacuums. Emerson, a Missouri
corporation, manufactures, markets, and sells RIDGID vacuums. It
makes all marketing decisions regarding the vacuums in Missouri.
Emerson markets the vacuums by emphasizing their "peak horsepower"
-- the maximum potential output of the vacuums' motors. Emerson
acknowledges that the vacuums can only achieve "peak horsepower" in
a laboratory. A consumer using a standard wall outlet would
achieve less horsepower than advertised.
The Plaintiffs allege advertising based on peak horsepower is
misleading and bring claims for violations of the Missouri
Merchandising Practices Act ("MMPA"), breach of express warranty,
breach of implied warranty, unjust enrichment, violations of other
states' consumer protection laws, and redhibition (on behalf of a
Louisiana sub-class).
The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation assigned the case to
the district court as a consolidated action and the district court
oversaw discovery. At the close of discovery, the Plaintiffs
sought to certify a nationwide class. The district court applied
Missouri choice of law rules and determined that all claims should
be governed by Missouri law. It then certified the class under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3).
Emerson argues that the district court erred twice. First, the
claims of non-Missouri residents do not relate to trade or commerce
in or from the state of Missouri" and the MMPA cannot be applied to
them. Second, the district court should have conducted separate
choice of law analyses for the breach of warranty and unjust
enrichment claims.
The Eighth Circuit agrees. In its view, the case is more like
Perras v. H & R Block than State ex rel. Nixon v. Estes. As in
Perras, every part of the challenged transaction took place in a
class member's home state. The class members encountered the
allegedly misleading advertising, purchased a vacuum, and
ultimately were disappointed with its performance, all in their
home states. As in Perras, the only relevant action taking place
in Missouri was the design of the advertisement. That is not
enough. The Eighth Circuit holds that the consumer protection law
of each class member's home state governs each consumer protection
claim and class certification is inappropriate as to those claims.
As to the other claims in the case, the Eighth holds that the
district court failed to conduct any choice of law analysis. As
Plaintiffs acknowledge, Missouri applies the "most significant
relationship" test to all claims, but considers different factors
for claims sounding in tort (MMPA), contract (breach of warranty),
and unjust enrichment. A district court must conduct an
individualized choice-of-law analysis that is susceptible to
meaningful appellate review to ensure that the application of a
given state's law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.
The district court did not do that and so the Eighth Circuit
remands.
The Eighth Circuit does not pass on Emerson's other arguments or
the merits of the district court's choice of law analysis under the
MMPA. The Eighth Circuit reversed the decision of the district
court certifying a nationwide class action, and remanded for
further proceedings consistent with its Opinion.
A full-text copy of the Eighth Circuit's Nov. 1, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/ECkVf4 from Leagle.com.
Mark G. Arnold -- mark.arnold@huschblackwell.com -- for
Defendant-Appellant.
Anthony G. Simon -- asimon@simonlawpc.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellee.
John G. Simon -- jsimon@simonlawpc.com -- for Plaintiff-Appellee.
James F. Bennett -- jbennett@dowdbennett.com -- for
Defendant-Appellant.
Richard J. Arsenault -- rarsenault@nbalawfirm.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellee.
Joseph C. Orlet -- joseph.orlet@huschblackwell.com -- for
Defendant-Appellant.
Reginald Von Terrell -- reggiet2@aol.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellee.
Hannah Fleener Preston -- hpreston@dowdbennett.com -- for
Defendant-Appellant.
Randall Seth Crompton -- scrompton@allfela.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellee.
Eric D. Holland -- eholland@allfela.com -- for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Charles E. Schaffer -- cschaffer@lfsblaw.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellee.
Matthew R. Grant -- matt.grant@husch.com -- for
Defendant-Appellant.
Adam R. Gonnelli -- agonnelli@faruqilaw.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellee.
Jay Dinan -- jdinan@yourlawyer.com -- for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Jordan L. Chaikin -- jchaikin@yourlawyer.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellee.
EUROSTAR INC: Denial of Class Certification in Cacho Suit Affirmed
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DAVID CACHO et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v.
EUROSTAR, INC., Defendant and Respondent, Case No. B284827 (Cal.
App.), the Court of Appeals of California for the Second District,
Division Seven, affirmed the trial court's order denying class
certification.
Plaintiffs Cacho and Silva assert class claims against their former
employer, Eurostar, alleging Eurostar violated California wage and
hour laws by failing to provide employees with required meal and
rest breaks and compelling employees to work off the clock at
Eurostar's Warehouse Shoe Sale ("WSS") retail shoe stores in
California.
Eurostar operates approximately 69 WSS retail shoe stores in
California and has more than 2,500 hourly employees in the state.
At each WSS store, Eurostar employs three categories of managerial
employees: store manager, assistant manager, and supervisor. The
store manager is a salaried position, while the assistant manager
and supervisor are nonexempt hourly positions. Nonmanagement
hourly employees include head cashiers, cashiers, sales associates,
apparel assistants, and loss prevention personnel. An individual
store may have from nine to 26 employees.
Cacho was hired in January 2010 as a loss prevention officer in the
San Bernardino store, then was promoted that year to sales
associate, and later to cashier. At the end of 2010 Cacho
transferred to the Rialto store where he worked first as a cashier,
then a supervisor. In late 2011 Cacho transferred to the Riverside
store, where he worked as a supervisor for approximately nine
months. In September 2012 he transferred to the Fontana store
where he worked as a supervisor until he was promoted to assistant
manager in approximately January 2013. Cacho reported to a
different store manager at each of these locations; however, the
stores were all within the same district, under the supervision of
district manager Juan Carlos Mancera. Eurostar terminated Cacho's
employment in August 2013 for violating company policy. According
to Cacho, Mancera and Fontana store manager Luis Arzate told Cacho
he was terminated for tampering with the store security system.
Regina Silva was hired in November 2009 as a sales associate at the
Fontana store while she was still in high school, and over the next
three and a half years she held multiple nonexempt nonmanagerial
positions, including sales associate, cashier, and head cashier.
Silva worked at the Fontana store throughout her employment, except
for six months in 2013 when she worked at the San Bernardino store.
From about August 2012 to August 2013 Silva reported to Cacho in
his role as a supervisor or assistant manager for the Fontana
store. Eurostar terminated Silva's employment in August 2013 for
violating company policy. Silva believed she was terminated in
connection with Eurostar's allegation Cacho had tampered with the
store security system to steal money.
On Sept. 25, 2014, Cacho and Silva filed a putative class action on
behalf of all similarly situated current and former nonexempt
Eurostar employees in the State of California at any time within
the period from Sept. 25, 2010 to the conclusion of the case. On
Feb. 25, 2015, they filed their operative first amended complaint
alleging 11 causes of action for violations of Industrial Welfare
Commission wage order No. 7-2001 and related provisions of the
Labor Code, including for: (1) failure to provide meal breaks; (2)
failure to provide rest breaks; (3) failure to pay overtime wages;
(4) failure to pay minimum wages; (5) failure to pay timely wages;
(6) failure to pay all wages due to discharged employees; (7)
failure to maintain required records; (8) failure to furnish
accurate itemized wage statements; (9) failure to reimburse for
work-related expenditures; (10) failure to pay unused vacation
time; and (11) unfair and unlawful business practices.
The Plaintiffs' first amended complaint defined 11 subclasses of
Eurostar employees, one for each of the 11 causes of action. The
Plaintiffs separated the subclasses into two time periods, class
period "A" running from Sept. 25, 2010 through the judgment, and
class period "B" running from May 29, 2013 through the judgment.
The meal break subclass was divided into a subclass for
nonmanagerial employees (all in class period A) and managerial
employees (all in class period B). According to the Plaintiffs,
they alleged these subclasses and time periods in response to a
2013 settlement of certain wage and hour claims asserted against
Eurostar in Reyes v. Eurostar.
On Oct. 19, 2016, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for class
certification seeking to certify eight subclasses of nonexempt
Eurostar employees, including four meal break subclasses, a rest
break subclass, a "shaved time" subclass of employees who were paid
less than the time recorded on their time sheets, an off-the-clock
subclass of employees who were required to perform unpaid work
while clocked out, and a subclass of employees who were not
reimbursed for necessary expenditures.
In opposition to the Plaintiffs' class certification motion,
Eurostar filed declarations from Mendoza and Abigail Vasquez, an
assistant manager and former supervisor who had worked at the
Baldwin Park and Riverside WSS stores. Eurostar also submitted
excerpts of Berger's deposition.
On June 21, 2017, after hearing oral argument, the trial court
issued its ruling from the bench. The court found the Plaintiffs
established the putative class members were ascertainable and
sufficiently numerous, and business records would be sufficient to
identify which employees fell within the subclasses. It also found
the Plaintiffs and their counsel adequately represented the class.
However, the court denied class certification, concluding the
Plaintiffs had not met their burden of establishing predominant
common questions of law or fact or the typicality of Silva and
Cacho's claims.
The Plaintiffs appeal from the trial court's order denying their
motion for class certification, in which the court found they
failed to demonstrate common issues of law or fact predominated
over individual issues and their claims were not typical of the
class.
The Plaintiffs contend Eurostar maintained uniform break and
overtime policies that are facially inconsistent with the labor
laws, and therefore the claims are "eminently suited" for class
adjudication under Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court.
The case presents the question whether in the wake of Brinker, if
the employer has a break policy -- a meal break policy -- that is
compliant with the applicable wage order but silent as to certain
requirements, the omission of those requirements supports class
certification in the absence of evidence of a uniform unlawful
policy or practice. Similarly, where an employer has a uniform
written break policy that on its face is unlawful -- a rest break
policy -- but in practice the policy has not been applied to
company employees, it is nonetheless suitable for class
certification.
The Appeals Court holds that the answer to both questions is no.
Although the trial courts must be wary of analyzing evidence of
wage and hour violations at the class certification stage in a
manner that prejudges the merits, they may properly consider the
evidence to determine whether class-wide liability can be
established through common proof.
Because the Plaintiffs failed to show they could prove Eurostar's
liability for meal break, rest break, and off-the-clock violations
by common proof at trial, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying class certification. In reaching its
determination, the trial court did not err in considering the
evidence submitted by the parties as to Eurostar's policy and
practices to assist the court in making the threshold determination
whether the Plaintiffs could prove liability for the alleged
violations with common proof.
In light of the foregoing, the Appeals Court affirmed. Eurostar is
entitled to recover its costs on appeal.
A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 4, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/IvHnfI from Leagle.com.
Matern Law Group, Matthew J. Matern and Dalia Khalili for
Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, Andrew L. Satenberg --
asatenberg@manatt.com -- Benjamin G. Shatz -- bshatz@manatt.com --
and Cherise S. Latortue for Defendant and Respondent.
FH CANN: $10.4K Attys' Fees & Cost Award in Scanno Suit Affirmed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOANNE SCANNO, on behalf of herself and all other
similarly situated, Appellant v. F.H. CANN & ASSOCIATES, INC, Case
No. 19-1055 (3d Cir.), Judge Julio M. Fuentes of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's order
granting in part and denying in part Scanno's motion for attorney's
fees, and awarding total attorney's fees and costs in the amount of
$10,418.
The appeal arises out of Scanno's efforts to recover $27,333 in
attorney's fees under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
("FDCPA") for a putative class-action lawsuit that was resolved via
settlement on an individual basis.
In September 2016, Scanno, on behalf of herself, and on behalf of a
putative class of others similarly situated, sued F.H. Cann under
the FDCPA for deceptive debt collection practices. After a
scheduling conference in February 2017, F.H. Cann moved for leave
to amend its answer and, without leave from the District Court,
moved to stay proceedings and compel arbitration. Scanno opposed
the motion to amend and the District Court stayed briefing on the
motion to compel arbitration.
In June 2017, F.H. Cann offered to settle the case for $2,500,
inclusive of the maximum statutory award of $1,000, attorney's
fees, and costs. Scanno's counsel rejected the offer, stating that
the counsel would have received only approximately $1,000, although
the attorney's fees alone were $9,250 at that time. Three months
later, F.H. Cann offered Scanno $4,000 to settle, inclusive of the
maximum statutory award, attorney's fees, and costs. Scanno again
rejected the offer, noting that the attorney's fees alone were
$17,100 because the counsel had spent additional time opposing F.H.
Cann's motion to amend and researching issues related to the motion
to compel arbitration. Days after, the parties settled the matter
on an individual basis for the same, maximum statutory award of
$1,000 and agreed that Scanno would submit a motion for reasonable
attorney's fees.
Thereafter, Scanno filed her motion, seeking attorney's fees in the
amount of $27,333. The District Court referred the motion to a
Magistrate Judge, who issued a report recommending that the
District Court grant in part and deny in part the motion, and
reduce the fees award to $10,418. The District Court adopted the
report and recommendation and awarded attorney's fees in the amount
of $10,418. It found that Scanno's counsel rejected a settlement
offer in June 2017, only to reach the same resolution months later,
and that counsel's "significant experience" litigating FDCPA cases
rendered "certain billing entries excessive." The appeal
followed.
Scanno first challenges the District Court's conclusion that she
had only limited success on the merits of her case, arguing that
her total recovery, including attorney's fees, increased from June
2017 to September 2017.
Judge Fuentes holds that even considering that Scanno's counsel
brought the suit as a class action, the case was ultimately settled
on an individual basis with no change in Scanno's recovery from the
June 2017 settlement offer. Therefore, he cannot say that the
District Court abused its discretion in reducing the lodestar by
50%.
Scanno also challenges the District Court's 60% reduction of the
lodestar regarding the preparation of the fee petition, arguing
that time spent on the fee petition was not excessive and that she
had more than limited success on the petition.
The Judge disagrees. The Court has held that the fee reduction
rationale of Hensley applies by force of the Court's reasoning to
fees generated in the litigation of a fee petition, and compels us
to treat the fee petition litigation as a separate entity subject
to lodestar and Hensley reduction analysis. In the case, the
District Court properly reduced the lodestar by 60% percent for
time spent preparing the fee petition because the amount of time
billed was excessive given counsel's "significant experience in
this field." Accordingly, the Court finds no abuse of discretion
in the District Court's reduction of the fees sought in preparation
of the fee petition.
For the reasons stated, Judge Fuentes affirmed the District Court's
order granting in part and denying in part Scanno's motion for
attorney's fees, and awarding total attorney's fees and costs in
the amount of $10,418.
A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 4, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/BhNRWl from Leagle.com.
GO NEW YORK: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Balderramo FLSA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned VICTOR H. ALVARADO BALDERRAMO, individually
and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, v. GO NEW YORK TOURS INC., and ASEN KOSTADINOV, jointly
and severally, Defendants, Case No. 15 Civ. 2326 (ER) (S.D. N.Y.),
Judge Edgardo Ramos of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss for
failure to prosecute.
Balderramo and 21 opt-in Plaintiffs filed the class action pursuant
to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"), and New York
labor laws, against Go New York, and jointly and severally against
its owner, shareholder, officer, or manager, Asen Kostadinov.
Balderramo claimed that he was employed by the Defendants as a bus
driver and that, inter alia, they failed to pay him minimum and
overtime wage.
Balderramo initiated the instant case over four years ago on March
27, 2015, purportedly on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated. Balderramo, along with Luis Falquez, filed a written
consent to become a party Plaintiff on May 28, 2015. Balderramo
and Falquez filed an amended complaint on Jan. 22, 2016, adding
Falquez as a Plaintiff.
Go New York is a tour bus operator doing business in New York City.
Kostadinov was allegedly an owner, shareholder, officer, or
manager of Go New York and exercised substantial control over their
employees' functions, hours, and wages. Balderramo allegedly
worked for the Defendants as a bus driver approximately six months,
from August 2013 until February 2014. Falquez worked for the
Defendants as a tour bus driver for approximately five months, from
July 2013 until November 2013. The Defendants allegedly failed to
post or keep posted notices explaining their minimum wage rights
under FLSA and so the Plaintiffs were uninformed of their rights
during the relevant time period. Between June 20, 2016 and April
3, 2017, 20 other Plaintiffs opted into the litigation.
On Jan. 22, 2016, the Plaintiffs filed a motion to conditionally
certify a collective action on behalf of all employees of the
Defendants within the three years preceding the date of the
Complaint. The Court granted the motion on May 9, 2016. On Nov.
25, 2016, the Plaintiffs moved to certify a class composed of Go
New York bus drivers employed by the Defendants within six years
preceding the date of the Complaint, and to conditionally certify a
collective action composed of Go New York tour guides employed by
the Defendants within three years of filing the Complaint.
On June 28, 2017, the Court granted class certification for the bus
drivers, but denied conditional certification for collective action
as to the tour guides because the Plaintiffs did not allege
sufficient facts to support the contention that the tour guides
were similarly situated to the Plaintiffs. For the next 22 months
after the Court's June 28 Order, the Plaintiffs took no substantive
action in the case. A ccordingly, on April 2, 2019, the Court asked
the parties to provide a status report by April 16, 2019. The
Plaintiffs did not reply. As a result, on April 24, 2019, the
Court sua sponte dismissed the case on the grounds of failure to
prosecute and failure to comply with a Court order.
However, that same day, te Plaintiffs asked the Court to reopen the
case requesting a nunc pro tunc extension of time to file a status
report and requesting that the Court vacates the order dismissing
the case. They alleged that following the April 2, 2019 Order they
were in communication with tje Defendants' counsel on discovery and
settlement negotiations and that the failure to file a report with
the Court was purely an oversight.
In response, the Court reopened the action, scheduled a status
conference for May 22, 2019, and directed the parties to submit a
status report no later than May 15, 2019. On May 16, 2019, one day
past the Court-imposed deadline, the parties filed a joint letter
advising the Court that they had conferred on discovery, case
management, and other pretrial matters and expected to continue
settlement negotiations. The joint letter is dated May 15, 2019,
but the parties did not provide an explanation for their late
filing.
On May 22, 2019, the Court held a status conference at which the
Plaintiffs' counsel represented that the parties were in the midst
of settlement negotiations. The next day, the Court issued an
amended civil case discovery plan and proposed scheduling order and
referred the case to Magistrate Judge Debra C. Freeman for
settlement. The Defendants answered the Amended Complaint on June
6, 2019. The parties appeared telephonically in front of Judge
Freeman on June 12, 2019 for a settlement conference that was
unsuccessful.
On July 10, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed a letter motion for a
conference, requesting leave to file a motion to compel pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(3)(B)(iii)-(iv), for failure
to answer interrogatories and failure to produce documents.
However, pursuant to the Amended Scheduling Order, requests for
interrogatories and document requests were due by July 15, 2019,
and responses by August 15, 2017. Thus, the Defendants were still
within their time to respond.
On the other hand, the Defendants timely served their
interrogatories and document requests, but the Plaintiffs failed to
respond on time. On July 17, 2019, the Defendants opposed the
Plaintiffs' motion to compel, particularly because the Plaintiffs
had taken no steps to prosecute the case for approximately two
years. The Defendants also submitted their own request for leave
to file a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute or a motion to
compel discovery responses.
During a July 18, 20193 pre-motion conference, Plaintiffs discussed
their discovery concerns and the Court stated that if the case
moved forward, they could make whatever motions they deemed
appropriate. The Plaintiffs have not filed any discovery motions
since then. At that conference, the Court also granted the
Defendants leave to file a motion to dismiss.
On Aug. 19, 2019, the Defendants filed the instant motion to
dismiss for lack of prosecution pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(b).
In the Circuit, a delay of merely a matter of months may be
sufficient to warrant dismissal under Rule 41. In the case, the
Plaintiffs took no action in the case for approximately 22 months.
Accordingly, Judge Ramos holds that this factor weighs in favor of
dismissal.
Next, the Judge finds that the Plaintiffs failed to respond to the
Court's request for a status report by April 16, 2019, and
subsequently the Court dismissed the case on April 24, 2019.
However, the circumstances do not show that the Plaintiffs had
notice that the Court was contemplating dismissing the case. The
Court's Order on April 2, 2019, requesting status report, did not
contain an explicit warning about the threat of dismissal. On the
other hand, as the Defendants correctly point out, the Court's sua
sponte dismissal Order on April 24, 2019, did give the Plaintiffs a
clear warning and yet they subsequently violated another Court
order. Thereafter, the Plaintiffs failed to comply with the Aug.
15, 2019 interrogatory response deadline set in the Amended
Scheduling Order. This factor weighs in favor of dismissal but
only slightly.
Prejudice to the Defendants resulting from unreasonable delays can
be fairly presumed as a matter of law. The Defendants merely state
that they have devoted substantial time and resources to this
matter, but do not detail any particular or especially burdensome
prejudice that they suffered as a result of the Plaintiff's failure
to prosecute. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of dismissal
only slightly.
The Second Circuit has held that there must be compelling evidence
of an extreme effect on court congestion before a litigant's right
to be heard is subrogated. No such evidence is present in the
case. Additionally, the Plaintiff's failure to prosecute was
silent and unobtrusive, rather than vexatious and burdensome such
as by swamping the Court with irrelevant or obstructionist filings,
dismissal due to the Court's docket is not warranted. Under the
circumstances, the Judge holds that the Court's need to alleviate
congestion does not outweigh the Plaintiffs' due process rights.
Accordingly, this factor weighs against dismissal.
Finally, the Judge finds that the Plaintiffs do not provide a
reasonable excuse for the lengthy delay. Nevertheless, he does not
find that sanctions lesser than dismissal would be ineffective at
this time. The record does not indicate the lack of prosecution
was motivated by an obstructionist litigation strategy. Instead of
dismissal, lesser sanctions such as no award of attorney's fees and
costs for the Plaintiffs' counsel may be appropriate. Thus, this
factor weighs against dismissal.
For the reasons set forth, Judge Ramos denied the Defendants'
motion to dismiss. The Plaintiffs are on notice that failure to
comply with this or any other Court order, or further unreasonable
or unexcused delays in prosecuting the case, may result in adverse
action Including dismissal.
Furthermore, the Judge denied as moot the Plaintiffs' letter motion
for leave to file a motion to compel and the Defendants' letter
motion for leave to file a motion to dismiss for lack of
prosecution or to compel, because the Court addressed them during
the July 18, 2019 pre-motion conference.
A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 1, 2019 Opinion & Order is
available at https://is.gd/bpeyeX from Leagle.com.
Victor H. Alvarado Balderramo, Individually & Victor H. Alvarado
Balderramo, in behalf of all other persons similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Brandon David Sherr --
bsherr@zellerlegal.com -- Law Office of Justin A. Zeller, P.C. &
Justin Alexander Zeller -- Jazeller@zellerlegal.com -- The Law
Office of Justin A. Zeller, P.C.
Luis Falquez, Ronald McQueen, Daniel Wright, William Ubiles,
William T. Steward, Sheldon Hampton, Arthur Jenkins, David H.
Brown, Lawrence Atkinson, Carlton Grady, Terrence Young, Darryl A.
Williams, Kyle Robinson, Keith Burton, Alonzo Day, Andrew Wong,
Lionel Briggs, Waki Roper, Delia Ortiz, Gary Nelson & Chye Chew
Kee, Plaintiffs, represented by Brandon David Sherr, Law Office of
Justin A. Zeller, P.C.
Go New York Tours Inc., Asen Kostadinov, jointly & Asen Kostadinov,
and severally, Defendants, represented by Maurice Newmark Ross --
mross@bartonesq.com -- Barton LLP & Laura-Michelle Horgan --
lmhorgan@bartonesq.com -- Barton LLP.
GRAY TAVERN: Owens Sues Over Sexual Harassment and Unpaid Wages
---------------------------------------------------------------
HANNAH OWENS, Plaintiff v. GRAY TAVERN INC. and DOES 1 to 25,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 19STCV41714 (Cal. Super., Nov. 19,
2019), alleges that Gray Tavern did not provide the Plaintiff and
other similarly situated aggrieved employees with the minimum wages
to which they were entitled to for work performed "off the clock"
and, as such, did compensate them for all hours worked.
The Plaintiff initially started working for Gray Tavern as a
server/bartender in January 2019. She alleges that during her
employment tenure at Gray Tavern, she experienced consistent sexual
harassment from owner Miro Darakjian, including Mr. Darakjian
asking her about her dating life, asking her if she was single,
telling her that it's better for her to date older guys, telling
her that she may find someone to date at the workplace,
consistently coming into Plaintiffs personal space, making comments
about her physical appearance, touching her lower back area,
gawking/leering at her in a sexual manner, telling her that she can
get whatever she wants with her eyes, making comments about her
hair being very long and almost to her butt, telling her that her
beauty can get her into trouble, among other things.
Ms. Owens alleges that the Defendants violated the Fair Employment
and Housing Act (FEHA) in connection to sexual harassment,
discrimination on the basis of sex/gender, retaliation, and failure
to prevent harassment, discrimination, and retaliation; violated
Public Policy in connection to wrongful constructive discharge,
negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress; and violated the California Labor
Code by failure to compensate for all hours worked, failure to pay
minimum wages, failure to pay overtime, failure to provide accurate
itemized wage statements, failure to pay wages owed every pay
period, failure to maintain accurate records, failure to provide
rest breaks, failure to provide meal breaks, failure to pay wages
when employment ends, and failure to reimburse business expenses.
The Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory damages including lost
past and future wages, overtime, commissions, and all other sums of
money, including employment benefits, together with interest, and
any other economic injury.
Gray Tavern is an elevated gastropub.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Harout Messrelian, Esq.
MESSRELIAN LAW INC.
500 N. Central Ave., Suite 840
Glendale, CA 91203
Telephone: (818) 484-6531
Facsimile: (818) 956-1983
HALLIBURTON CO: Bids to Compel Arbitration in LeBlanc Suit Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned BRENT LeBLANC, Individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, et al., Plaintiffs, v. HALLIBURTON
COMPANY, Defendant, Civ. No. 17-718 KG/GJF (D. N.M.), Judge Kenneth
J. Gonzales of the U.S. District Court for the District of New
Mexico denied both the Defendant's (i) Motion to Compel Arbitration
and Dismiss the Claims of 14 Opt-In Plaintiffs, and (ii) Motion to
Compel Arbitration and Dismiss the Claims of 16 Plaintiffs, both
filed on July 31, 2019.
On July 10, 2017, LeBlanc filed a Class and Collective Action
Complaint in which he alleged the Defendant failed to pay him and
similarly situated workers overtime in violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, and the New Mexico Minimum Wage Act. The Defendant
filed an Answer to the Complaint on Aug. 28, 2017.
On Oct. 20, 2017, Judge Gregory J. Fouratt, the assigned Magistrate
Judge, held a Rule 16 Scheduling Conference and set pretrial
deadlines and a deadline for Plaintiff LeBlanc to file a motion for
conditional certification of a collective action under the FLSA.
On Jan. 2, 2018, Plaintiff Keith Briggs filed a notice of consent
to join the action. Also on Jan. 2, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed an
opposed Motion to Certify a Collective Action. The Defendant filed
a response to the Motion to Certify on Feb. 2, 2018, and the
Plaintiffs filed a reply on Feb. 13, 2018.
On Aug. 21, 2018, the Court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order
granting the Motion to Certify a Collective Action and
conditionally certifying a class of: Directional drillers employed
by, or working on behalf of, Halliburton Company as independent
contractors any time between three years prior to the date of the
Memorandum and Order of Conditional Certification, and the present.
Pursuant to the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order, between Oct.
26, 2018 and Jan. 3, 2019, 36 additional individuals filed consents
to join the action, bringing the total number of the Plaintiffs to
38.
On March 11, 2019, the Defendant sent the Plaintiffs a
meet-and-confer letter regarding the Defendant's intention to
compel arbitration for certain Plaintiffs. On May 15, 2019, the
Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Class and Collective Action
Complaint, adding five of the opt-in Plaintiffs as named
Plaintiffs, and adding state law claims under Title 34 of the North
Dakota Century Code, and the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act. The
Defendant filed an Answer to the First Amended Complaint on June
14, 2019, in which it asserted arbitration as an affirmative
defense.s
Thereafter, on July 10, 2019, the assigned Magistrate Judge entered
an Order staying discovery and setting a deadline for the Defendant
to file a motion to compel arbitration. On July 31, 2019, the
Defendant filed its two Motions to Compel Arbitration. In the
first Motion to Compel Arbitration, the Defendant contends 14
Plaintiffs signed contracts with the Defendant agreeing to
arbitrate their claims and waiving their right to participate in a
collective action. In the second Motion to Compel Arbitration, the
Defendant contends 16 Plaintiffs signed binding employment
agreements with a third-party service provider (Upstream
Directional Consultants) agreeing to arbitrate their claims with
the Defendant and waiving their right to participate in a
collective action.
In both Motions to Compel Arbitration, the Defendant asserts 30 of
the 38 Plaintiffs signed agreements to arbitrate their claims with
the Defendant and waived their right to participate in a collective
action. Based on where the Plaintiffs signed the agreements, the
Defendant states Texas law governs 28 agreements, Pennsylvania law
governs Plaintiff Tong Xiong's agreement, and Minnesota law governs
Plaintiff Robert Walsh's agreement.
The Defendant argues any question of arbitrability, including
waiver of the right to enforce the arbitration agreements, is a
question for the arbitrator, not the Court. However, if the Court
determines that it should decide arbitrability, the Defendant
contends the arbitration agreements are valid and encompass the
Plaintiffs' claims, and the Defendant has not waived its right to
arbitration. The Defendant asks the Court to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' claims with prejudice because they agreed to arbitrate
their claims and waived their right to participate in a collective
or class action.
In response to both Motions to Compel Arbitration, the Plaintiffs
argue the Defendant waived its right to arbitrate by undertaking
actions inconsistent with that right. The Plaintiffs further
contend fourteen of the agreements are unenforceable because the
Defendant solicited the agreements after the lawsuit was underway.
Plaintiff Brooks Hondl also argues his arbitration agreement is
invalid because the Defendant has only provided the signature page
without the remainder of the agreement.
In its replies, the Defendant maintains that it promptly sought to
enforce arbitration as soon as it received all of the agreements.
The Defendant also argues the agreements are enforceable because
they were executed as part of its ordinary course of business
before the Plaintiffs were notified of the collective action and
filed their consents to join the action. Additionally, the
Defendant contends it has sufficiently established the existence of
Plaintiff Hondl's arbitration agreement.
Judge Gonzales agrees that the question of whether the Defendant's
conduct constitutes waiver of its right to arbitrate is properly
for the Court to decide. Not only is the Court better suited to
consider and weigh the consequences of the Defendant's
litigation-related conduct, it also would be inefficient to send
this case to an arbitrator to decide whether it should be sent back
to the Court. Additionally, the Judge finds that federal law
governs the question.
Judge Gonzalez also finds that the Defendant took actions
inconsistent with its right to arbitrate, substantially invoked the
litigation machinery, and significantly delayed seeking
arbitration. He further finds these actions prejudiced the
Plaintiffs.
In sum, Judge Gonzalez finds that the Defendant waived its right to
arbitrate the Plaintiffs' claims. Based on this finding, the Judge
does not reach the Plaintiffs' arguments that the Defendant
improperly solicited agreements from fourteen of the Plaintiffs and
failed to sufficiently prove the existence of Plaintiff Hondl's
agreement.
Judge Gonzalez denied both the Defendant's Motions to Compel
Arbitration.
A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 1, 2019 Memoranum Opinion &
Order is available at https://is.gd/aQJlpD from Leagle.com.
Brent LeBlanc, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew W. Dunlap --
adunlap@mybackwages.com -- Josephson Dunlap Law Firm, pro hac
vice,
Matthew Scott Parmet -- mparmet@brucknerburch.com -- Bruckner
Burch
PLLC, Michael A. Josephson -- mjosephson@mybackwages.com --
Josephson Dunlap Law Firm, pro hac vice & Richard Burch --
rburch@brucknerburch.com -- Bruckner & Burch PLLC.
Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Charles J. Vigil -- cvigil@rodey.com -- Rodey Dickson Sloan Akin &
Robb, P.A., Jeffrey L. Lowry -- jllowry@rodey.com -- Rodey,
Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A., Mark D. Temple --
mtemple@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP & Paige T. Bennett --
pbennett@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith, LLP, pro hac vice.
HAVERHILL RETIREMENT: $300MM Lawyer Fees Award in Kornell Upheld
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned KEITH KORNELL, Objector-Appellant, v.
HAVERHILL RETIREMENT SYSTEM, ON BEHALF OF ITSELF AND ALL OTHER
SIMILARLY SITUATED, VALUE RECOVERY FUND LLC, STATE-BOSTON
RETIREMENT SYSTEM, THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, BOARD OF PENSIONS AND
RETIREMENT, OKLAHOMA FIREFIGHTERS PENSION AND RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
TIBERIUS OC FUND, LTD., AUREUS CURRENCY FUND, L.P., EMPLOYEES'
RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC POWER AUTHORITY, SYENA
GLOBAL EMERGING MARKETS FUND, LP, J. PAUL ANTONELLO, MARC G.
FREDERIGHI, THOMAS GRAMATIS, DOUG HARVEY, IZEE TRADING COMPANY,
JOHN KERSTEIN, MICHAEL MELISSINOS, MARK MILLER, ROBERT MILLER,
RICHARD PRESCHERN, DBA PRESCHERN TRADING, PETER RIVES, MICHAEL J.
SMITH, SYSTRAX CORPORATION, CASEY STERK, UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL
WORKERS UNION AND PARTICIPATING FOOD INDUSTRY EMPLOYERS TRI-STATE
PENSION FUND, Plaintiffs-Appellees, Case No. 18-3673-cv (2d Cir.),
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the Nov.
8, 2018 opinion and order of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York, awarding the Class Counsel
attorneys' fees of $300,335,750, equal to 13% of the class action
settlement fund.
Kornell primarily challenged the Nov. 8 decison on the basis that
the district court erred in how it calculated the attorneys' fees.
The Second Circuit finds no error in the district court's
calculation of the attorneys' fee award. The district court
properly assessed the market rate of the class counsel by relying
on a set of six comparator antitrust class action cases resolved
through settlements with a value of $1 billion or greater.
Furthermore, the Second Circuit disagrees with Kornell that the
risk of litigation evaporated upon settlement with a portion of the
Defendant financial institutions, because this contention ignores
that claims against the other Defendants remained unresolved and
runs counter to Goldberger v. Integrated Resources' rule that
litigation risk must be measured as of when the case is filed.
The Second Circuit also finds that the district court did not abuse
its discretion by awarding the Class Counsel a percentage of the
gross class action settlement fund, rather than the settlement fund
net of expenses. A district court has discretion to award the
Class Counsel a percentage of the gross class action settlement
fund, provided that its award of attorneys' fees is reasonable.
Kornell's argument that the district court erred by relying on
total hours in calculating its lodestar, instead of a breakdown of
hours by time, task, and the Defendant, also fails, the Second
Circuit notes. The Court held in Goldberger that when a court
relies on the lodestar as a mere cross-check, the hours documented
by counsel need not be exhaustively scrutinized by the district
court. Instead, the reasonableness of the claimed lodestar can be
tested by the court's familiarity with the case (as well as
encouraged by the strictures of Rule 11).
The Second Circuit has considered the remainder of Kornell's
arguments and finds them to be without merit. Accordingly, the
order of the district court hereby is affirmed, the Second Circuit
rules.
A full-text copy of the Second Circuit's Nov. 1, 2019 Summary Order
is available at https://is.gd/daWiWm from Leagle.com.
John J. Pentz, Sudbury, MA Appearing for Objector-Appellant.
Christopher M. Burke -- CBURKE@SCOTT-SCOTT.COM -- (Walter W. Noss
-- WNOSS@SCOTT-SCOTT.COM -- Kristen M. Anderson --
KANDERSON@SCOTT-SCOTT.COM -- on the brief), Scott+Scott Attorneys
at Law LLP, San Diego, CA; Michael D. Hausfeld --
mhausfeld@hausfeld.com -- on the brief, Hausfeld LLP, Washington,
D.C., Appearing for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
HIOSSEN INC: Kee Suit Remanded to San Diego County Superior Court
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned CHARLES KEE, Individually and On Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. HIOSSEN, INC., a
Pennsylvania Corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-1440-WQH-BLM (S.D. Cal.), Judge William
Q. Hayes of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
California granted the Plaintiff's Motion to Remand to State
Court.
On May 3, 2019, the Plaintiff initiated the action by filing a
Complaint in the Superior Court of California for the County of San
Diego, assigned case number 37-2019-00023035-CU-OE-CTL, against
Defendant Hiossen. On July 18, 2019, the Plaintiff filed a First
Amended Complaint in the Superior Court for the County of San
Diego.
The Plaintiff alleges that he was employed by the Defendant as a
sales representative from July 2017 to November 2018. He alleges
that the Defendant (1) subjected him and the Class to unlawful
non-compete agreements; (2) failed to pay accrued and unused paid
time off; (3) failed to provide accurate itemized wage statements;
(4) failed to pay earned wages and overtime compensation; (5)
failed to provide 30-minute employee meal periods; (6) failed to
authorize and permit 10-minute employee rest periods; (7) failed to
reimburse business expenses; (8) failed to pay compensation when
due at employment separation; (9) engaged in unlawful and unfair
business practices; and (10) violated the Labor Code Private
Attorneys General Act of 2004.
The Plaintiff alleges that he is a citizen of California and the
Defendant is a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of
business in New Jersey. He seeks (1) an Order certifying the
Class; (2) compensatory damages; (3) prejudgment interest; (4) an
Order compelling the Defendants to restore unpaid wages,
expenditures, losses, income, and other related benefits as well as
to reinstate any forfeited Paid Time Off; (5) an Order compelling
Defendants to disgorge and pay all profits and savings resulting
from the Defendants' alleged unlawful and unfair business
practices; (6) a permanent injunction enjoining Defendants from
continuing to engage in unlawful and unfair business practices; (7)
attorneys' fees; (8) wait time penalties; (9) civil penalties; and
(10) underpaid wages.
On July 31, 2019, the Defendant removed the action to the
California District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1332,
diversity jurisdiction. On Aug. 20, 2019, the Plaintiff filed a
Motion to Remand. On Sept. 9, 2019, the Defendant filed a Response
in Opposition.
The Plaintiff contends that the Defendant failed to demonstrate
that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. He contends that
the actual amount in controversy is $70,731.38.
The Defendant asserts that the Plaintiff's Jan. 24, 2019 Demand
Letter alleged damages in excess of $200,000. It asserts that the
Plaintiff's Demand Letter stated that he could prove to a San Diego
jury that Hiossen is liable to Kee for damages of at least $139,960
as a result of its violations of the California Labor Code and
other laws and an additional $68,600 in penalties and liquidated
damages.
In Reply, the Plaintiff asserts that the Demand Letter is neither
an accurate nor reasonable assessment of his true damages.
Judge Hayes concludes that the Demand Letter does not provide
persuasive evidence that the amount in controversy is met. The
Plaintiff has submitted a payroll statement demonstrating his rates
of pay for 2017 and 2018 in order to calculate damages for unpaid
overtime hours, unused PTO days, and waiting time penalties. Some
claims in the Demand Letter are not included in the lawsuit. The
Defendant has not offered evidence to the contrary or arguments
challenging the Plaintiff's calculations. Using the Plaintiff's
calculations ($42,080.62 for 1,080 unpaid overtime hours; $1,946.88
for unused PTO days; $6,489.60 in waiting time penalties; $1,450 in
penalties for violations of Labor Code Section 226; $1,450 for
violations of Private Attorney General Act Section 2699(f);
$3,562.50 for violations of Private Attorney General Act Section
226.3; $1,450 in penalties for violations of Labor Code Section
558) and the amounts of undisputed damages ($7,300 for unreimbursed
business expenses and prejudgment interest in the amount of
$5,000), the Plaintiff submits evidence to show that damages
excluding attorneys' fees amount to $70,729.60.
Judge Hayes further concludes that the Defendant has not carried
its burden of proving that the amount in controversy (including
attorneys' fees) exceeds the jurisdictional threshold by a
preponderance of the evidence with summary-judgment-type evidence.
While the Plaintiff's estimate of attorneys' fee amounting to $1.78
is unpersuasive because future attorneys' fees were not included in
the calculation, the Defendant has offered no evidence in support
of its claim that attorneys' fees will amount to $1 milliom. The
Defendants have failed to prove that the amount in controversy
(including attorneys' fees) exceeds the jurisdictional threshold by
a preponderance of the evidence.
For the reasons stated, Judge Hayes remanded the Kee action to the
Superior Court for the State of California, County of San Diego,
where it was originally filed under case number
37-2019-00023035-CU-OE-CTL.
A full-text copy of the District Court's Nov. 1, 2019 Order is
available at https://is.gd/pPUhse from Leagle.com.
Charles Kee, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by David C. Hawkes --
dhawkes@bkflaw.com -- Blanchard Krasner & French & David Anthony
Huch -- david.a.huch@gmail.com -- Law Offices of David A Huch.
Hiossen, Inc., a Pennsylvania Corporation, Defendant, represented
by Todd Alexander Pickles -- picklest@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg
Traurig.
HOME DEPOT: Summary Judgment Bid Denied in Bell Lawsuit
-------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned SANDY BELL, MARTIN GAMA, and MICHAEL GAMA,
individually, and on behalf of others similarly situated, and as
aggrieved employees pursuant to the Private Attorneys General Act
("PAGA"), Plaintiffs, v. HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC., a Delaware
corporation; JOHN BROOKS, an individual; and DOES 1-10 inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 2:12-cv-02499-JAM-CKD (E.D. Cal.), Judge John
A. Mendez of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
California denied the Defendants' successive motion for summary
judgment.
The Plaintiffs allege Defendants Home Depot, U.S.A. and John
Brooks, the regional manager for the Home Depot stores where the
Plaintiffs worked, violated California law by designing Home
Depot's workday to evade overtime obligations.
In 2012, Bell and Martin Gama brought a wage-and-hour class action
in state court, alleging the Defendants violated several provisions
of the California Labor Code. The Defendants removed the suit to
the Court, where it was ultimately consolidated with Henry v. Home
Depot, U.S.A., a case transferred from the Northern District of
California.
Over the past six years, the Defendants have filed four motions for
summary judgment. In September 2015, before Bell and Henry's cases
were consolidated, the Defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment in Henry's case. Henry filed suit in the Northern
District of California, alleging Defendants designed Home Depot's
workday to avoid overtime obligations. Judge Tigar denied the
Defendants' motion for summary judgment on this claim, finding they
failed to show, as a matter of law, that Home Depot's workday was
not designed to evade overtime compensation.
The next month, the Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment
in Bell's case. The Court granted the Defendants' motion in all
but one respect. Largely adopting the reasoning set forth in Judge
Tigar's decision, it denied the Defendants' motion on the
Plaintiffs' claim that Home Depot's workday was designed to evade
overtime compensation.
After the Court consolidated Bell and Henry's cases, the Defendants
filed a motion for summary adjudication on the Plaintiffs' Section
203 and 226 claims. Section 203 and 226 levy penalties against
employers who "willfully" fail to pay final wages (section 203) or
"knowingly and intentionally" fail to provide proper wage
statements (section 226). The Court granted the Defendants' motion
for summary adjudication in full.
Following this series of motions, the Plaintiffs' only remaining
claim is that the Defendants designed the Home Depot workday to
evade overtime obligations. The current motion for summary
judgment, maintains the Defendants are entitled to judgment on that
claim.
The Defendants argue the Court should adjudicate its successive
motion for summary judgment because the motion (1) is based on an
expanded record; and (2) proffers a new legal theory that would
resolve the case in its entirety. The Plaintiffs disagree, arguing
the motion is premised on a baseless legal theory and facts that
were available at the time of the Defendants' earlier motions.
Judge Mendez will not re-adjudicate the argument that the
Plaintiffs cannot prove Home Depot's workday was designed to evade
overtime. He finds that the Defendants' Barnaby-based argument is
purely repetitive. He will not allow them to exploit a successive
motion's "potential for abuse." He denies the motion on this
ground.
The Judge also denies the Defendants' motion for summary judgment
based on their "new and distinct legal theory" that California
labor law only prohibits an employer from changing its workday in a
way that evades overtime obligations. The newness of Home Depot's
second argument does not pardon how closely it flirts with
frivolity. The Judge denies the Defendants successive motion for
summary judgment on this ground.
Accordingly, Judge Mendez denied the Defendants' successive motion
for summary judgment.
A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 5, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/80j6nW from Leagle.com.
Sandy Bell & Martin Gama, Plaintiffs, represented by Arnab Banerjee
-- Arnab.Banerjee@capstonelawyers.com -- Capstone Law APC, Chaim
Shaun Setareh -- shaun@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group, Frank
James Gatto -- Frank.Gatto@capstonelawyers.com -- Capstone Law APC,
Glenn A. Danas -- glenn.danas@capstonelawyers.com -- Capstone Law,
APC, Melissa Grant -- Melissa.Grant@CapstoneLawyers.com -- Capstone
Law APC, Raul Perez -- Raul.Perez@CapstoneLawyers.com -- Capstone
Law APC & Suzy E. Lee, FISHER & PHILLIPS LLP.
Michael Henry, Plaintiff, represented by Arnab Banerjee, Capstone
Law APC, Chaim Shaun Setareh, Setareh Law Group, Melissa Grant,
Capstone Law APC, Raul Perez, Capstone Law APC & Thomas Alistair
Segal, Setareh Law Group.
Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. & John Brooks, Defendants, represented by
Donna M. Mezias -- dmezias@akingump.com -- Akin Gump Strauss Hauer
& Feld LLP, Joel M. Cohn -- jcohn@akingump.com -- Akin Gump Strauss
Hauer & Feld LLP, pro hac vice & Liz Kathryn Bertko --
lbertko@akingump.com -- Akin Gump Strauss Hauer and Feld LLP.
HOMEDELIVERYLINK: Obtains Partial Summary Judgment in Kloppel Case
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of New
York issued a Decision and Order granting in part and denying in
part Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in the case captioned
MIKE KLOPPEL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. HOMEDELIVERYLINK, INC.
Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-6296-FPG-MJP (W.D.N.Y.).
Plaintiffs Mike Kloppel and Adam Wilson filed this putative class
action alleging that Sears Holding Corporation and Sears, Roebuck &
Company and Defendant HomeDeliveryLink (HDL) misclassified them as
independent contractors and took deductions from their wages in
violation of New York Labor Law (NYLL).
On February 28, 2018, the Court issued a Decision and Order
granting Sears's motion to dismiss in full and granting in part and
denying in part HDL's motion to dismiss the amended complaint. The
only surviving claims are against HDL for (1) illegal deductions
pursuant to NYLL Sec. 193, (2) illegal kickback of wages pursuant
to NYLL Sec. 198-b, and (3) record-keeping violations pursuant to
NYLL Sec. 195. HDL now moves for judgment on the pleadings pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(c) on the Sec. 193
and Sec. 198-b claims.
Legal Standard
The standard for granting a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the
pleadings is identical to that of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for
failure to state a claim. Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a party may
move to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. In reviewing a motion to dismiss, a court
must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the
complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor.
No Private Right of Action for Wage Kickbacks Under NYLL Section
198-b
NYLL Section 198-b prohibits an employer from requesting,
demanding, or receiving any part of an employee's wages upon the
statement, representation, or understanding that failure to comply
with such request or demand will prevent such employee from
procuring or retaining employment.
HDL argues that Section 198-b does not contain an express private
right of action and that, based on the text of the statute and the
legislative history, the Court cannot infer one here.
Plaintiffs argue that because other courts have found or inferred a
private right of action under Section 198-b, this Court should do
the same.
In the absence of an express private right of action, plaintiffs
can seek civil relief in a plenary action based on a violation of
the statute only if a legislative intent to create such a right of
action is fairly implied in the statutory provisions and their
legislative history.
In recent amendments, the Legislature carved out express private
rights of action for many provisions of the NYLL, but not Section
198-b, suggesting that the Legislature did not intend to do so.
Additionally, Section 198-b does contain an enforcement mechanism,
albeit a criminal one. It provides that a violation of Section
198-b is a misdemeanor. New York courts have routinely declined to
recognize a private right of action in instances where, as here,
the legislature specifically considered and expressly provided for
enforcement mechanisms' in the statute itself.
Therefore, Plaintiff's NYLL Section 198-b claim is dismissed.
Plaintiffs Have Stated a Claim Under NYLL Section 193
Article 6 of the NYLL regulates the payment of wages by employers.
To prevail on a claim under Article 6 of the NYLL, a plaintiff must
first demonstrate that he or she is an employee entitled to its
protections. Second, a plaintiff must allege that their wages were
withheld in violation of one of the substantive provisions of the
Labor Law.
HDL argues only that a contractual relationship did not exist
between Plaintiffs, as individuals, and HDL. But, as explained
below, Plaintiffs need only plead that they were employees of HDL
and that HDL violated some substantive provision of Article 6 of
the NYLL.
Plaintiffs' amended complaint sufficiently alleges both.
Employee and Substantive Violation
HDL does not argue that Plaintiffs have failed to properly allege
that they are employees under these tests. Indeed, taking the facts
in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs have
sufficiently pled that they are employees of HDL under both tests.
Prior to 2014, a worker who alleged misclassification as an
independent contractors was an employee covered by Article 6 if he
or she: (1) worked at his/her own convenience (2) was free to
engage in other employment (3) received fringe benefits (4) was on
the employer's payroll and (5) was on a fixed schedule.
HDL has not made any argument for purposes of this motion that
Plaintiffs are not employees within the meaning of either of these
frameworks or that any exception applies. Its sole argument is that
Plaintiffs' incorporation is dispositive.
The Court disagrees.
The Fair Play Act contains a list of 12 requirements that must be
established for a business entity performing commercial goods
transportation to be treated as an independent contractor.
HDL has not argued that Plaintiffs' LLCs meet any much less all of
these requirements. To be sure, if any business could avoid the
Fair Play Act by simply classifying their workers as independent
contractors and compensating them through corporations rather than
paying them directly, the Fair Play Act would be rendered useless.
And, under the common law test, it is not significant how the
parties defined the employment relationship.
Therefore, Plaintiffs have stated a claim under NYLL Section 193.
Enforceable Contractual Right
HDL argues that none of the analysis above matters because
Plaintiffs have failed to allege any enforceable contractual right
between HDL and Plaintiffs.
This is a red herring.
Plaintiffs involve claims for compensation outside of the
traditional meaning of wages, i.e., for the payment of bonuses or
other incentive compensation. Bonuses or incentive compensation can
be considered wages for purposes of Article 6, but a right to such
wages" arises only by virtue of an agreement between the employer
and employee.
In these circumstances, the plaintiff must allege some basis for
claiming that this compensation constitutes wages.
But NYLL does not require an enforceable contractual right where,
like here, straight wages are at issue. Requiring Plaintiffs to
prove a contract that entitles them to wages for time they worked
is belied by a century of statutory protection for workers' wages.
Even if such an enforceable contractual right is required,
Plaintiffs have at the very least pled that they had an agreement
with HDL whereby HDL paid Plaintiffs for the time they worked.
HDL's motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED with respect
to the NYLL Section 198-b claim and DENIED with respect to the NYLL
Section 193 claim, rules the Court.
A full-text copy of the District Court's November 18, 2019 Decision
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/tul49l4 from
Leagle.com
Mike Kloppel & Wilson Adam, on behalf of themselves and all other
similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs, represented by Anthony S.
Almeida , The Sattiraju Law Firm, P.C., 116 Village Blvd. , Ste.
200, Princeton, New Jersey, pro hac vice, Benjamin J. Weber -
bjweber@llrlaw.com - Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C., Harold L.
Lichten - hlichten@llrlaw.com - Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C., pro
hac vice, Ravi Sattiraju , The Sattiraju Law Frim, P.C. 116 Village
Blvd. , Ste. 200, Princeton, New Jersey, Samuel A. Alba , Friedman
& Ranzenhofer, P.C., 70 Niagara Street, Buffalo, NY, 14202 &
Shannon Liss-Riordan - sliss@llrlaw.com - Lichten & Liss-Riordan,
P.C., pro hac vice.
HomeDeliveryLink, Inc., Defendant, represented by Andrew R. Brehm -
ABREHM@SCOPELITIS.COM - Scopelitis, Garvin, Light, Hanson & Feary,
Andrew J. Butcher - ABUTCHER@SCOPELITIS.COM - Scopelitis Garvin
Light Hanson & Feary, P.C., pro hac vice, Charles Andrewscavage ,
Scopelitis Garvin Light Hanson & Feary, P.C., Emily A. Quillen ,
Scopelitis, Garvin, Light, Hanson & Feary, P.C., Jared S. Kramer ,
Scopelitis Garvin Light Hanson & Feary, P.C., 30 West Monroe
StreetSuite 600Chicago, IL 60603, pro hac vice & Rodney O.
Personius - rop@personiusmelber.com - Personius Melber LLP.
INTEGRATED TECH: Monplaisir Moves to Certify Technicians Class
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit titled PAUL MONPLAISIR, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. INTEGRATED TECH GROUP,
LLC and ITG COMMUNICATIONS LLC, Case No. 3:19-cv-01484-WHA (N.D.
Cal.), moves the Court for an order certifying a class under Rules
23(a) and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
All current and former non-exempt hourly employees of ITG
working as Technicians throughout the State of California
from March 21, 2015 until the resolution of this action.
Certification of the class is sought for claims of failing to: (i)
pay proper minimum wage, overtime wages, and completed piece rates;
(ii) provide a reasonable opportunity to take meal and rest
periods, and failing to properly compensate Class members when such
meal and rest periods were not taken; (iii) reimburse
necessarily-incurred business expenses; and (iv) issue accurate,
itemized wage statements in violation of the California Labor
Code.
Mr. Monplaisir also asks the Court to appoint him as representative
of the Class and to appoint the law firms of Schneider Wallace
Cottrell Konecky Wotkyns LLP and Berger & Montague, P.C. as Class
Counsel. Pursuant to Rule 23(c)(2)(B), he also asks the Court to
order that the Class be given best practical notice under the
circumstances.
The Court will commence a hearing on January 23, 2020, at 8:00
a.m., to consider the Motion.[CC]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Carolyn Hunt Cottrell, Esq.
Ori Edelstein, Esq.
Michelle S. Lim, Esq.
SCHNEIDER WALLACE COTTRELL KONECKY WOTKYNS LLP
2000 Powell Street, Suite 1400
Emeryville, CA 94608
Telephone: (415) 421-7100
Facsimile: (415) 421-7105
E-mail: ccottrell@schneiderwallace.com
oedelstein@schneiderwallace.com
mlim@schneiderwallace.com
- and -
Sarah R. Schalman-Bergen, Esq.
Krysten Connon, Esq.
BERGER & MONTAGUE, P.C.
1818 Market Street, Suite 3600
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Telephone: (215) 875-3000
Facsimile: (215) 875-4604
E-mail: Sschalman-bergen@bm.net
KConnon@bm.net
INTER-CONTINENTAL HOTELS: Bid to Remand Cavada to State Court Nixed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned MALLORY CAVADA, on individual, on behalf of
herself and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, Plaintiff,
v. INTER-CONTINENTAL HOTELS GROUP, INC., a Corporation; IHG
MANAGEMENT MARYLAND LLC, a Limited Liability Company;
INTERCONTINENTAL HOTELS GROUP RESOURCES, INC., a Corporation;
INTERCONTINENTAL HOTELS GROUP RESOURCES, LLC, a Limited Liability
Company; and DIES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
19cv1675-GPC (BLM) (S.D. Cal.), Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of California denied the
Plaintiff's motion to remand the putative class action to state
court.
On July 29, 2019, the Plaintiff filed a putative class action in
San Diego Superior Court against her joint employers Defendants
InterContinental Hotels Group, Inc.; IHG Management Maryland, LLC;
Intercontinental Hotels Group Resources, Inc.; and Intercontinental
Hotels Group Resources, LLC, alleging (1) unfair competition; (2)
failure to pay minimum wages; (3) failure to pay overtime wages;
(4) failure to provide required meal periods, in violation of Cal.
Lab. Code Sections 226.7, 512 and the applicable Industrial Welfare
Commission ("IWC") Wage Order; (5) failure to provide required rest
periods, in violation of Cal. Lab. Code Sections 226.7, 512, and
the applicable IWC Wage Order; (6) failure to reimburse necessary
business-related expenses and costs; (7) failure to provide
complete and accurate wage statements; and (8) failure to timely
pay wages. On Sept. 3, 2019, the Defendants removed the case to
the Court.
The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants at the Staybridge
Suites in the Rancho Bernardo area of San Diego from October 2017
to September 2018 as a Front Desk Agent, as a non-exempt employee,
paid on an hourly basis, and entitled to the legally required meal
and rest periods and payment of minimum and overtime wages due for
all time worked.
She brings a class action on behalf of herself and a California
class on the First Cause of Action for UCL violations as defined as
all individuals who are or previously were employed by Defendant
InterContinental Hotels Group, Inc. and/or Defendant IHG Management
Maryland LLC and/or Defendant Intercontinental Hotels Group
Resources, LLC and/or Intercontinental Hotels Group Resources, Inc.
in California and classified as non-exempt employees at any time
during the period beginning four years prior to the filing of the
Complaint and ending on the date as determined by the Court.
She also seeks to certify a California labor sub-class on the
Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth causes of
action defined as all members of the California Class who are or
previously were employed by Defendant Inter-Continental Hotels
Group, Inc., and/or Defendant IHG Management Maryland LLC and/or
Defendant Intercontinental Hotels Group Resources, LLC and/or
Intercontinental Hotels Group Resources, Inc. in California at any
time during the period three (3) years prior to the filing of the
complaint and ending on the date as determined by the Court.
She claims that the amount in controversy does not exceed $5
million. On Sept. 11, 2019, the Plaintiff filed a motion to remand
the case to state court challenging the Defendants' claim in their
Notice of Removal that the $5 million amount in controversy has
been met.
Judge Curiel finds that the Defendants have demonstrated, by a
preponderance of the evidence that the $5 million amount in
controversy is met. The Defendants have shown the amount in
controversy is $1,971,130 for unpaid overtime; $3,692,696 for meal
break violations; $657,043 for rest break violations; $1,236,740
for unreimbursed business expenses; $677,550 for inaccurate wage
statements; and $989,107 for waiting time penalties and totals
$9,224,2665 exclusive of attorneys' fees. Based on these reasons,
Judge Curiel denied the Plaintiff's motion to remand the case to
state court.
A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 1, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/PUd8My from Leagle.com.
Mallory Cavada, an individual, on behalf of herself and on behalf
of all persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by
Jeffrey Scott Herman -- jeff@bamlawca.com -- Blumenthal Nordrehaug
Bhowmik De Blouw LLP & Norman B. Blumenthal -- norm@bamlawca.com --
Blumenthal, Nordrehaug & Bhowmik.
Inter-Continental Hotels Group, Inc., a corporation, Defendant,
represented by Eric E. Hill -- ehill@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw
LLP.
IHG Management Maryland LLC, a limited liability company,
Intercontinental Hotels Group Resources LLC, a limited liability
company & Intercontinental Hotels Group Resources, Inc., a
corporation, Defendants, represented by Eric E. Hill, Seyfarth Shaw
LLP & Ryan Ashley McCoy -- rmccoy@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw
LLP.
INTERO REAL ESTATE: Chinitz Suit Transferred to N.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit styled as Ronald Chinitz, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Intero Real
Estate Services and Mojo Dialing Solutions, LLC, Defendants, Case
No. 3:19-mc-00396, was transferred from the U.S. District Court for
the District of Puerto Rico to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California (San Jose) on Nov. 18, 2019.
The Northern District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
5:19-mc-80279-BLF the proceeding. The case is assigned to the Hon.
Judge Beth Labson Freeman.
Intero Real Estate Services Inc. operates as real estate services
company.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Hector Sueiro-Alvarez, Esq.
GALLO LLC
1311 Ponce de Leon Ave., Suite 400
San Juan, PR 00907
Telephone: (415) 257-8800
Facsimile: (415) 257-8844
E-mail: hsueiro@gallo.law
The Defendants are represented by:
Andres W. Lopez, Esq.
THE LAW OFFICES OF ANDRES W. LOPEZ, P.S.C.
PO Box 13909
San Juan, PR 00908
Telephone: (787) 294-9508
Facsimile: (787) 294-9519
E-mail: andreswlopez@yahoo.com
INTU CORP: Must Reply to Interrogatory No. 4 in Johnson FLSA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned KRYSTAL JOHNSON, et al., Plaintiff(s), v.
INTU CORPORATION, Defendant(s), Case No. 2:18-cv-02361-MMD-NJK (D.
Nev.), Magistrate Judge Nancy J. Koppe of the U.S. District Court
for the District of Nevada granted in part and denied in part
Plaintiffs Johnson and Elizabeth Spangler's motion to compel
answers to interrogatories.
The class-action case arises from casino-floor massage services in
the Bellagio's poker room. The Plaintiffs performed massage
services pursuant to agreements with the Defendant, which had a
contract to provide the services. The Plaintiffs allege that after
the Defendant lost the contract, the Defendant interfered with the
Plaintiffs' efforts to work for the company that took over the
contract. The Plaintiffs further allege that the Defendant failed
to pay them owed overtime wages, that it fired them for bringing
the case, and that the Defendant misclassified them as independent
contractors.
On May 3, 2019, the Plaintiffs propounded interrogatories on the
Defendant. After a conference between the Plaintiffs' and the
Defendant's counsel, the parties' disputes about the
interrogatories were narrowed to three. The Plaintiffs then filed
the pending motion to compel.
The Plaintiffs move to compel responses to following three
interrogatories:
a. No. 3 - "Provide the date on which Defendant first learned
it would not be contracted to perform massage services at the
Bellagio after Dec. 7, 2018 and identify how Defendant first became
aware of this information, including identifying any person(s) who
transmitted such information to the Defendant and identifying the
means through which such information was transmitted."
b. No. 4 - "Provide all facts that support your fifteenth
(15th) affirmative defense that the Plaintiffs herein have failed
to mitigate their damages."
c. No. 10 - "Provide contact information, including names,
addresses, e-mail addresses, telephone numbers, and facsimile
numbers, for all agents, employees, directors, officers, and/or
managers of the Bellagio and Aria casinos (or, as it is, the
companies owning and operating such properties) with whom the
Defendant has communicated about the performance of massage
services therein at any time since Dec. 12, 2015."
The Defendant objected to No. 3 interrogatory and submitted that it
(1) is vague, ambiguous, and overbroad; (2) is argumentative and
assumes facts not in the record; (3) is irrelevant; (4) is
disproportional to the needs of the case; (5) is unduly burdensome
or costly; and (6) is confidential and proprietary. However, the
only basis on which the Defendant submits an argument in its
response to the motion to compel is that the interrogatory requests
irrelevant information.
The Plaintiffs submit, however, that the information the
interrogatory requests is relevant because if the Defendant knew
well in advance of the end of the Bellagio contract that it would
not be renewed, it would support an intentional interference
claim.
Magistrate Judge Koppe disagrees with the Plaintiffs. She holds
that when the Defendant learned of this information is irrelevant
because the alleged interference happened after it lost the
contract and the Plaintiffs do not allege that they had contracts
with the company that took over the contract before the Defendant
lost the contract. In other words, when the Defendant knew that
the contract would not be renewed is irrelevant because it does not
bear on any element of a claim of intentional interference with
contractual relations. Accordingly, she denies the motion to
compel with respect to this interrogatory.
The Defendant objected to No. 4 interrogatory and submitted that it
(1) is vague, ambiguous, and overbroad; (2) seeks a legal opinion;
and (3) that discovery is ongoing and that it believes that
discovery will reveal facts showing that Plaintiffs have failed to
mitigate their damages by failing to seek other opportunities for
work, independent contracts, or employment as massage therapists.
However, the only basis on which Defendant submits an argument in
its response to the motion to compel is that it can provide no more
specific facts because, essentially, discovery is ongoing and
depositions have not yet been taken.
Magistrate Judge Koppe disagrees with the Defendant. As the
Plaintiffs state, the Defendant, at a minimum, can provide the
facts that form the basis, as it currently understands it, for why
it believes that the Plaintiffs have failed to mitigate their
damages. Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Koppe grants the motion to
compel with respect to this interrogatory.
The Defendant objected to No. 10 interrogatory and submitted that
it (1) is vague, ambiguous, and overbroad, specifically over the
term "performance of massage services"; (2) is argumentative and
assumes facts not in the record; (3) is irrelevant; (4) is
disproportional to the needs of the case; (5) is unduly burdensome
or costly; and (6) is confidential and proprietary. However, the
only two bases on which it submits an argument in its response to
the motion to compel are that the interrogatory requests irrelevant
information and that its customer contacts are proprietary.
The Magistrate has already found that the sought information is
relevant to the Plaintiffs' claims. However, the Plaintiffs do not
argue, let alone establish, that the information is necessary to
prepare the case for trial. The Plaintiffs therefore fail to meet
their burden. Accordingly, she denies the motion to compel with
respect to this interrogatory.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, Magistrate Judge Koppe granted
in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs' motion to compel.
Magistrate Judge Koppe ordered the Defendant to serve, no later
than Nov. 18, 2019, supplemental responses to the Plaintiffs'
interrogatory No. 4.
A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 5, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/x5DUqI from Leagle.com.
Krystal Johnson & Elizabeth Spangler, Plaintiffs, represented by
Maurice Belmont VerStandig -- mac@mbvesq.com -- The VerStandig Law
Firm, LLC, pro hac vice & Ronald D. Green, Jr. -- rdg@randazza.com
-- Randazza Legal Group, PLLC, pro hac vice.
INTU Corporation & Deanna Edwards, Defendants, represented by Sarah
J. Odia -- sjo@paynefears.com -- Payne & Fears, LLP.
INTU Corporation, Counter Claimant, represented by Sarah J. Odia,
Payne & Fears, LLP.
Dusty Dangerfield, Shannon DeLelle, Crystal Honeck, Krystal
Johnson, Sarah Pascoe, Elizabeth Spangler, Shannon Thompson &
Jennifer Wakuzawa-Kida, Counter Defendants, represented by Maurice
Belmont VerStandig -- admin@mbvesq.com -- The VerStandig Law Firm,
LLC, pro hac vice & Ronald D. Green, Jr. -- contact@randazza.com --
Randazza Legal Group, PLLC, pro hac vice.
JACKSON PARK: Williams BIPA Class Suit Removed to N.D. Illinois
---------------------------------------------------------------
Christopher Williams, behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. JACKSON PARK SUPPORTIVE LIVING FACILITY, LLC and
JACKSON PARK SLF, LLC, Case No. 2019-CH-09286, was removed from the
Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, to the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois on Dec. 16, 2019.
The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-08198 to the
proceeding.
In his complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant violated
the Illinois Biometric Privacy Act.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
James B. Zouras, Esq.
Ryan F. Stephan, Esq.
Catherine T. Mitchell, Esq.
STEPHAN ZOURAS, LLP
100 N. Riverside Plaza, Suite 2150
Chicago, IL 60606
Phone: (312) 233-1550
Fax: (312) 233-1560
Email: jzouras@stephanzouras.com
rstephan@stephanzouras.com
cmitchell@stephanzouras.com
The Defendant is represented by:
Melissa A. Siebert, Esq.
Matthew C. Wolfe, Esq.
Jonathon M. Studer, Esq.
SHOOK, HARDY & BACON L.L.P.
111 South Wacker Drive, Suite 4700
Chicago, IL 60606
Phone: (312) 704-7700
Fax: (312) 558-1195
Email: masiebert@shb.com
mwolfe@shb.com
jstuder@shb.com
JAGGED PEAK: Rigrodsky & Long Files Class Action Complaint
----------------------------------------------------------
Rigrodsky & Long, P.A., announces that it has filed a class action
complaint in the United States District Court for the District of
Delaware on behalf of holders of Jagged Peak Energy Inc. (NYSE:JAG
) common stock in connection with the proposed acquisition of
Jagged Peak by Parsley Energy, Inc. and Jackal Merger Sub, Inc.
('Merger Sub') announced on Oct. 14, 2019 (the 'Complaint'). The
Complaint, which alleges violations of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 against Jagged Peak, its Board of Directors, Parsley, and
Merger Sub, is captioned Sabatini v. Jagged Peak Energy Inc., Case
No. 1:19-cv-02114 (D. Del.).
If you wish to discuss this action or have any questions concerning
this notice or your rights or interests, please contact plaintiff's
counsel, Seth D. Rigrodsky or Gina M. Serra atRigrodsky & Long,
P.A. , 300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220, Wilmington, DE 19801, by
telephone at (888) 969-4242, by e-mail , or
athttp://rigrodskylong.com/contact-us/.
On October 14, 2019, Jagged Peak entered into an agreement and plan
of merger (the 'Merger Agreement') with Parsley and Merger Sub.
Pursuant to the terms of the Merger Agreement, shareholders of
Jagged Peak will receive 0.447 shares of Parsley common stock per
share (the 'Proposed Transaction').
Among other things, the Complaint alleges that, in an attempt to
secure shareholder support for the Proposed Transaction, defendants
issued materially incomplete disclosures in a Form S-4 Registration
Statement (the 'Registration Statement') filed with the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission. The Complaint alleges
that the Registration Statement omits material information with
respect to, among other things, the Company's and Parsley's
financial projections and the analyses performed by Jagged Peak's
financial advisors. The Complaint seeks injunctive and equitable
relief and damages on behalf of holders of Jagged Peak common
stock.
If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than January 28, 2020. A lead plaintiff is a representative
party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation. Any member of the proposed class may move the Court to
serve as lead plaintiff through counsel of their choice, or may
choose to do nothing and remain an absent class member.
Rigrodsky & Long, P.A. , with offices in Delaware, New York, and
California, has recovered hundreds of millions of dollars on behalf
of investors and achieved substantial corporate governance reforms
in numerous cases nationwide, includingfederal securities fraud
actions, shareholder class actions, and shareholder derivative
actions .
Contact:
Rigrodsky & Long, P.A.
Seth D. Rigrodsky, Esq.
Gina M. Serra, Esq.
Tel: (888) 969-4242, (302) 295-5310
Fax: (302) 654-7530
Website: http://www.rigrodskylong.com
E-mail: gms@rl-legal.com
sdr@rl-legal.com
[GN]
JET PRO: Diaz Seeks Minimum Wages and Overtime Pay for Drivers
--------------------------------------------------------------
PAUL DIAZ JR., Plaintiff v. JET PRO, INC. and DOES 1 to 25,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 19STCV41981 (Cal. Super., Nov. 21,
2019), arises from the Defendants' failure to:
-- compensate the Plaintiff for all hours worked;
-- pay minimum wages;
-- pay overtime wages;
-- provide accurate itemized wage statements;
-- pay wages when employment ends;
-- pay wages owed every pay period;
-- maintain accurate records;
-- give rest breaks;
-- give meal breaks; and
-- reimburse for business expenses, in violation of the
California Labor Code.
The Plaintiff started working for Jet Pro as a warehouse agent on
March 28, 2018. The Plaintiff's position was thereafter changed to
a driver.
Jet Pro designs air freight programs for discriminating customers,
who are concerned about cold chain protection and food safety.
According to the complaint, the Plaintiff was classified as an
hourly, non-exempt employee. The Plaintiff asserts that Jet Pro has
violated numerous Labor Code Sections against him and other
similarly situated aggrieved employees.
Jet Pro did not provide the Plaintiff and other similarly situated
aggrieved employees with the minimum wages to which they were
entitled for work performed "off the clock" and as such did
compensate the Plaintiff and others for all hours worked, the
lawsuit says.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Harout Messrelian, Esq.
MESSRELIAN LAW INC.
500 N. Central Ave., Suite 840
Glendale, CA 91203
Telephone: (818) 484-6531
Facsimile: (818) 956-1983
JOSAM ACQUISITIONS: Navarrete Hits Biometrics Data Collection
-------------------------------------------------------------
Xiomara Navarrete, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Josam Acquisitions, Defendant,
Case No. 2019CH14368 (Ill. Cir., December 13, 2019), seeks an
injunction requiring Defendants to cease all unlawful activity
related to the capture, collection, storage and use of biometrics.
The Plaintiff also seeks statutory damages together with costs and
reasonable attorneys' fees for violation of the Illinois Biometric
Information Privacy Act.
Josam Acquisitions operates as "Good 2 Go Food," where Navarrete
worked as an hourly-paid employee at Josam's office located at 310
S. Racine Avenue, Chicago IL. Employees were required to "clock-in"
and "clock-out" using a timeclock that scanned fingerprints.
Plaintiffs alleges that Josam improperly collected and stored
employees' fingerprint data without informed consent. [BN]
Plaintiff is represented by:
Christopher J. Williams, Esq.
National Legal Advocacy Network
53 W. Jackson Blvd, Suite 1224
Chicago, IL 60604
Tel: (312) 795-9121
- and -
Miranda Huber, Esq.
Raise the Floor Alliance - Legal Department
1N La Salle St., Suite 1275
Chicago, IL 60602
Tel: (312) 795-9115
Fax: (312) 888-2178
KERN COUNTY, CA: Settlement in T.G. Suit Gets Initial Approval
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, T.G., et al., Plaintiffs, v. KERN COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-0257 JLT (E.D. Cal.), Magistrate Judge
Jennifer L. Thurston of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California granted the joint motion for preliminary
approval of class settlement.
T.G., P.P., and J.A. assert they suffered discrimination as minors
with disabilities held in Kern County's juvenile detention
facilities. According to the Plaintiffs, these facilities have the
effect of punishing, isolating, and intimidating the young people
in their care, while depriving them of crucial educational and
rehabilitative opportunities. Thus, the Plaintiffs filed a
complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from Kern
County; the Kern County Probation Department; and T.R. Marickel,
Chief of the Probation Department ("Probation Defendants"), as well
as Kern County Superintendent of Schools and Mary Barlow,
Superintendent of Schools ("Schools Defendants").
T.G. and P.P. have entered into settlement agreements with the
Probation Defendants and the Schools Defendants, and the parties
jointly seek preliminary approval of the class action settlement.
Specifically, the parties now request: (1) preliminary approval of
the two class settlements, (2) certification of the proposed
settlement class, (3) approval of the proposed class notice and
related materials, and (4) scheduling for final approval of the
settlements.
The parties report the Probation Settlement and KCSOS Settlement
are each intended to settle the claims for a class defined as
follows: All youth with mental health, behavioral, learning,
intellectual and/or developmental disabilities as defined by the
Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act, and/or Individuals with Disabilities Education Act who are
currently detained, or who will be detained during the Monitoring
Term (through Aug. 31, 2022), at the Kern County Juvenile
Facilities (Juvenile Hall, Crossroads, and Camp Erwin Owen).
The settlement between Plaintiffs and Probation Defendants
functions in conjunction with the related Kern Probation Action
Plan which is incorporated into the settlement agreement.
In the Probation Settlement, with the Probation Action Plan, the
Defendants intend to transition from a corrections model to a
treatment model, with new training for staff to reform," and
provides for "special attention paid to youth with disabilities."
The Action Plan is divided into sections, which address the
facilities' culture and environment; case management system
programming; training; youth, family, and staff input; complaints
and grievances; use of Oleoresin Capsicum ("O.C." or "pepper")
spray; use of restrictive housing such as isolation, seclusion, and
confinement; and re-entry.
The Probation Department will create an Implementation Team, which
"will consist of Juvenile Corrections Officers, Deputy Probation
Officers, facility managers, and executive management" to oversee
the Action Plan. This team will meet on a monthly basis initially,
with frequency of meetings to be determined as progress is made.
The parties selected the Council of Juvenile Correctional
Administrators ("CJCA") to act as the Monitoring Expert to monitor
compliance with the Probation Plan for the term of the Probation
Settlement. As the Monitoring Expert, CJCA will have complete
access to staff and youth records, as well as any information
necessary to assist in conducting the review of the Action Plan and
monitoring Probation Defendants' progress in implementing that
Action Plan. The Monitoring Expert will prepare a written report
for review and comment by the Parties on a quarterly basis for the
first year of the Monitoring Term and on a semiannual basis
thereafter. Each monitoring report will be reviewed by the
Plaintiffs' counsel, which will provide written feedback, if any,
to the Monitoring Expert and counsel for the Probation Defendants.
The parties also agreed the Probation Settlement would be in effect
from the Execution Date until the completion of the Monitoring Term
and issuance of the final monitoring report. As noted, the
Monitoring Term ends three years after the Execution Date of the
Probation Settlement," which will be Aug. 31, 2022.
The Probation Settlement provides the Plaintiffs and the Class
Members, in exchange for the injunctive relief proposed, release
the Probation Defendants from claims arising from Feb. 21, 2016,
though the term of the agreement.
The Probation Defendants have agreed the Plaintiffs' Counsel will
be awarded attorneys' fees and costs, subject to the Court granting
final approval of the class action settlement. Under the terms of
the agreement, within 30 days of preliminary approval of the
agreement and certification of the settlement class, the
Plaintiffs' Counsel will provide counsel for the Probation
Defendants complete billing records that the Plaintiffs' Counsel
would submit to the Court pursuant to a motion for approval.
The parties have agreed that the Plaintiffs will move for approval
by the Court of the reasonable attorneys' fees, expenses, and costs
incurred by the Plaintiffs' Counsel, pursuant to Rule 23(h) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," in the amount of $900,000. The
amount will be paid by the Probation Defendants within 60 days of
final approval of the settlement. Of this total, the Plaintiffs
Counsel anticipates setting aside $25,000 for fees, expenses, and
costs incurred in monitoring implementation of the Agreement.
The KCSOS Settlement between Plaintiffs and the Schools Defendants
functions in conjunction with the related Kern Court Schools
Implementation Plan," which is incorporated into their settlement
agreement. The Schools Defendants agreed to make most of the
changes recommended by the Education Experts in their Report.
Thus, the Schools Defendants will take a number of steps to improve
education programs at each of the facilities.
The KCSOS settlement provides the Plaintiffs and the Class Members,
in exchange for the injunctive relief proposed, release the KCSOS
Defendants from claims arising from Feb. 21, 2016, though the term
of the agreement. The parties agree the Plaintiffs have the right
to seek and recover reasonable attorneys fees, but have not reached
an agreement regarding the amount to be awarded. Therefore, the
parties agreed the Plaintiffs will file a motion for approval of
any amount of fees to be awarded.
The proposed settlements do not set forth procedures for Class
Members to object to the terms. However, the parties agree the
proposed notice should include information on "how and where any
objections should be submitted." They propose the deadline for any
objections to be made be set for 30 days before the Final Approval
Hearing. The Proposed Notice informs Class Members of they right
to raise "concerns with the Court," and will identify the deadline
for submitting objections to the Court.
T.G. and P.P. seek appointment as the class representatives,
asserting that no conflicts exist between named Plaintiffs, the
Class Counsel, and the settlement Class with respect to the
negotiation and consummation of the terms of the settlement.
Based upon the foregoing, Magistrate Judge Thurston finds the
proposed class settlements are fair, adequate, and reasonable. The
factors set forth by the Ninth Circuit weigh in favor of
preliminary approval of the settlement agreements. Moreover,
preliminary approval of a settlement and notice to the proposed
class is appropriate if [1] the proposed settlement appears to be
the product of serious, informed, noncollusive negotiations, [2]
has no obvious deficiencies, [3] does not improperly grant
preferential treatment to class representatives or segments of the
class, and [4] falls within the range of possible approval. The
proposed settlement agreements satisfy this test.
Accordingly, the Magistrate granted the Plaintiffs' request for
conditional certification of the Settlement Class. The class is
defined follows: All youth with mental health, behavioral,
learning, intellectual and/or developmental disabilities as defined
by the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, and/or Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act who are currently detained, or who will be detained during the
Monitoring Term (through Aug. 31, 2022), at the Kern County
Juvenile Facilities (Juvenile Hall, Crossroads, and Camp Erwin
Owen.
The Magistrate granted preliminary approval of the parties'
proposed settlements. She approved the proposed notice plan.
T.G. and P.P. are appointed as the Class Representatives; and
Disability Rights Advocates and Disability Rights California are
apppointed as the Class Counsel.
Within 30 days of th3 date of service of th3 order, the Class
Counsel will provide the counsel for Probation Defendants complete
billing records that the Plaintiffs' Counsel would submit to the
Court pursuant to a motion for approval.
The proposed Notice is preliminarily approved, and the parties will
file a finalized Notice with the required revisions for the Court's
approval no later than Dec. 13, 2019.
No later than January 6, 2020, the Probation Defendants and the
Schools Defendants shall:
a. Distribute the Notice to all youth currently at the
Juvenile Hall, Crossroads, or Camp Erwin Owen and mail a copy to
those youth's respective parents and/or guardians of record, and
the outside front of the envelope or mailing surface will clearly
be printed with the phrase IMPORTANT SETTLEMENT DOCUMENTS ENCLOSED
in both English and Spanish;
b. Ensure the Notice is posted in each classroom at each of
the Facility Schools; the visitor areas; the entrance lobby of
Juvenile Hall, Crossroads, and Camp Erwin Owen; and in a prominent
place on each active housing unit within the Facilities; and
c. Mail a copy of the Notice to the Kern County Juvenile Court
Judges, the Kern County Public Defender's Office, the Kern County
Behavioral Health and Recovery Services, the Kern County Indigent
Criminal Defense Panel, the Kern County Department of Human
Services - Child Welfare Division, and the Kern County District
Attorney's Office.
No later than Jan. 6, 2020, the Plaintiffs' Counsel, the Probation
Department and KCSOS will each post on the front page of their
respective websites a copy of the Notice of Proposed Settlement of
Class Action Lawsuit and the proposed Settlement Agreements, to
remain until the deadline for submitting objections has passed.
The Class Counsel and the Defendants' Counsel will provide
declarations to the Court attesting they each disseminated the
Notice in compliance with the Order no later than April 1, 2020.
Any objections to or comments on the Settlement Agreement must be
filed with the Court no later than March 16, 2020.
The Class Counsel and/or Defendants' Counsel will respond to any
objections and file a joint motion for final approval of the
settlements no later than March 18, 2020. The Class Counsel will
file any motion for approval/award of attorneys' fees and costs no
later than March 18, 2020.
Plaintiff P.P. will file a motion for approval of minor's
compromise for any settlement related to his individual claims no
later than March 18, 2020.
A Final Approval and Fairness Hearing is set for April 15, 2020.
The hearing will be located at the United States Courthouse at 510
19th Street, Bakersfield, California. The Court reserves the right
to vacate the Final Approval and Fairness Hearing if no comments or
objections are filed with the Court on March 16, 2020.
A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 4, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/b5FptP from Leagle.com.
T G, by and through his Next Friend Tanita J., P P, by and through
his & J A, Plaintiffs, represented by Carly Jean Munson --
carly.munson@disabilityrightsca.org -- Disability Rights
California, Melinda R. Bird -- melinda.bird@disabilityrightsca.org
-- Disability Rights California, Michelle Brooke Iorio, Disability
Rights Advocates, Thomas Philip Zito -- tzito@dralegal.org --
Disability Rights Advocates & Neeraj Kumar, Disability Rights
California.
Kern County, Kern County Probation Department & T R Merickel, in
his official capacity as Chief of the Probation Department,
Defendants, represented by Kendra Layne Graham, Office Of County
Counsel Kern County Administrative Center, Margo A. Raison, Office
Of Kern County Counsel Kern County Administrative Center, Andrew
Christopher Hamilton, Kern County Counsel & Andrew C. Thomson,
Office of County Counsel, County of Kern.
Kern County Superintendent of Schools & Mary C. Barlow, in her
official capacity of Superintendent of Schools, Defendants,
represented by Mark R. Bresee -- mbresee@aalrr.com -- AALRR.
LGSTX SERVICES: Faces Santana Suit Alleging Violation of FCRA
-------------------------------------------------------------
Carmen Santana, on behalf of herself and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. LGSTX SERVICES, INC., Case No.
8:19-cv-03078-WFJ-TGW (Fla. Cir., Hillsborough Cty., Dec. 16,
2019), is brought against the Defendant under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act of 1970.
The Defendant routinely obtains and uses information in consumer
reports to conduct background checks on prospective employees and
existing employees, and frequently relies on such information as a
basis for adverse employment action. While the use of consumer
report information for employment purposes is not per se unlawful,
it is subject to strict disclosure and authorization requirements
under the FCRA. The Defendant willfully violated these
requirements, thereby, systematically violating the Plaintiff's
rights and the rights of other putative class members, says the
complaint.
The Plaintiff applied to and worked for the Defendant as a
warehouse assistant.
The Defendant owns and operates distribution centers throughout the
United States.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Luis A. Cabassa, Esq.
Brandon J. Hill, Esq.
WENZEL FENTON CABASSA, P.A.
1110 North Florida Ave., Suite 300
Tampa, FL 33602
Main No: 813-224-0431
Direct Dial: 813-337-7992
Facsimile: 813-229-8712
Email: lcabassa@wfclaw.com
bhill@wfclaw.com
LIFE TIME FITNESS: Faces Turner Employee Suit in California
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Life Time Fitness,
Inc., et al. The case is captioned as Samuel Turner, On behalf of
other members of the general public similarly situated and on
behalf of other aggrieved employees, Plaintiff v. Does 1-100, Life
Time Fitness, Inc., and LTF Club Management CO, LLC, Defendants,
Case No. 34-2019-00269609-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super., Nov. 21, 2019).
The suit alleges violation of employment-related laws.
Life Time is a chain of health clubs in the United States and
Canada. LTF Club Management Company, LLC is in the membership
sports and recreation clubs business.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Edwin Aiwazian, Esq.
LAWYERS for JUSTICE, PC
410 Arden Ave., Ste. 203
Glendale, CA 91203
Telephone: (818) 265-1020
Facsimile: (818) 265-1021
E-mail: edwin@lfjpc.com
MARRIOTT INT'L: Remand of Rivera Suit to L.A. Super. Ct. Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LORENZO RIVERA, Plaintiff, v. MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL,
INC.; et al., Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-05050-ODW (KSx) (C.D.
Cal.), Judge Otis D. Wright, II of the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California denied the Plaintiff's Motion to
Remand.
On April 24, 2019, Rivera filed the putative class action in Los
Angeles Superior Court against Marriot International, Inc. ("MII").
Rivera brings the class action against MII on behalf of himself
and the putative class he seeks to represent. The Class consists
of all non-exempt employees, including, but not limited to,
dishwashers, cooks, runners, bartenders, servers, cashiers, other
food and beverage staff, housekeeping staff, front desk staff,
maintenance staff, and guest service representatives currently
and/or formerly employed by Defendants MII during the Class
Period.
Rivera is a citizen of California. MII is a Delaware corporation
with its principal place of business in Maryland. Rivera alleges
seven causes of action against MII: (1) Failure to Pay Wages (2)
Failure to Provide Meal Periods (3) Failure to Authorize or Permit
Rest Periods (4) Failure to Pay Wages Due at Separation of
Employment (5) Failure to Provide Accurate Wage Statements and
Failure to Issue and Maintain Records (6) Failure to Indemnify for
Expenditures or Losses in Discharge of Duties (7) Unfair Business
Practices.
On June 10, 2019, MII removed the action under CAFA. It supports
its Removal with a Declaration from Tiffany Schafer, the Senior
Area Director of Human Services at MII. MII claims that removal is
proper because there are more than 100 putative class members,
minimal diversity is satisfied, and the amount in controversy
exceeds $5 million. MII asserts that the number of putative class
members is 4,342 employees. MII further argues that the parties
are minimally diverse because MII is a Delaware Corporation with
its principal place of business in Maryland, while Rivera is a
citizen of California. Lastly, MII contends that the face of the
Complaint easily demonstrates that the amount in controversy
exceeds $5 million, and with over $3,112,662.50 in just attorney's
fees.
Rivera moves to remand. Rivera does not dispute that the class is
over 100 members or that the parties are minimally diverse.
However, Rivera argues that MII fails to establish the amount in
controversy because MII speculates a 100% violation rate. Rivera
further asserts that MII's contention that the amount in
controversy exceeds $5 million is inconsistent with its contention
that it did not employ Rivera.
Judge Wright finds that MII has established that the amount in
controversy is greater than $5 million. He finds that the issue of
Rivera's true employer is irrelevant on a motion to remand and MII
may remove so long as it is plausible that the jurisdictional
threshold is met. Accordingly, the Judge denies the Motion on this
basis.
In addition, given the size of the alleged class, the number of
claims alleged in the complaint, and the potential for attorneys'
fees, the Judge determines that the amount in controversy
requirement is satisfied. MII has supported the use of a 100%
violation rate for claims one and three based on allegations in
Rivera's complaint. Although MII uses a 100% violation rate to
calculate the amount in controversy for claims without alleged
uniform violations, even considering Rivera's first claim, MII
supports an estimate that far exceeds $5 million amount in
controversy. And, assuming each employee was entitled to pay for
an extra 30 minutes of unpaid minimum wage and overtime per shift,
MII calculates the amount in controversy for just this one hotel
would be $8,800,725-far exceeding the $5 million requirement.
Based on the foregoing, Judge Wright the denied the Plaintiff's
Motion.
A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 4, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/6YR7Nw from Leagle.com.
Lorenzo Rivera, Plaintiff, represented by Alexander Perez --
apcrcz@mahoney-law.net -- Mahoney Law Group APC, Katherine J.
Odenbreit -- kodenbreit@mahoney-law.net -- Mahoney Law Group APC &
Kevin Mahoney -- kmahoney@mahoney-law.net -- Mahoney Law Group
APC.
Marriott International, Inc., Defendant, represented by Hilary Ann
Habib -- hhabib@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard Mullin Richter and
Hampton LLP, Bryanne Lewis -- blewis@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard
Mullin Richter and Hampton LLP & Greg S. Labate --
glabate@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard Mullin Richter and Hampton
LLP.
MDL 2286: Hartranft Can't Intervene in Midland Credit TCPA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Michael M. Anello of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California denied Sean Hartranft's motion to intervene
in the multidistrict litigation IN RE: MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT,
INC., TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT LITIGATION, Case No.
3:11-md-2286-MMA (MDD) (S.D. Cal.).
The Plaintiffs in the present multidistrict litigation ("MDL"),
which originated in 2011, allege the Defendants violated the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA") by illegally making debt
collection calls to them, through use of an automatic dialer or
pre-recorded voice, on their cellular telephones without first
obtaining their prior consent. On Feb. 8, 2018, the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation ("JPML") suspended JPML Rule of
Procedure 7.1(a), which ceased conditional transfer orders to
prevent further tag-along actions. In effect, the February 2018
JPML order bars new member cases from entering the MDL.
The Applicant filed a putative class action, Hartranft v. Encore
Capital Group, Inc., (No. 3:18-cv-1187-BEN-RBB), in the district on
June 6, 2018, alleging violations by the Defendants of the TCPA and
Federal Debt Collection Practices Act. He asserts that his action
and the operative consolidated complaint in the MDL overlap
substantially with respect to the TCPA claims and putative class
members.
On Aug. 12, 2019, the Applicant filed his motion to intervene.
Emphasizing the related issues of fact and law, he argues
intervention is proper as a matter of right pursuant to FRCP 24(a).
In the alternative, the Applicant requests permission to intervene
pursuant to FRCP 24(b).
Judge Anello finds that the Applicant fails to meet any of the
requirements necessary to intervene in the MDL action as a matter
of right. First, the MDL has been before the Court since 2011, and
the parties are currently completing discovery. In light of the
MDL's procedural posture and the fact that the Applicant initiated
his separate action more than a year ago, his motion is the
antithesis of timely. Second, the Applicant fails to detail how
the disposition of any claims or issues the MDL action would
prevent him from recovery in his separate pending putative class
action. Third, the Applicant has failed to show how counsel's
representation is inadequate.
Judge Anello also finds that granting intervention would cause
substantial undue delay by necessitating further discovery and
pushing back the summary judgment and class certification timeline.
Judge Anello finds the Applicant's motion both untimely and likely
to cause undue delay if granted. Irrespective of any delay or
prejudice, the Judge says permissive intervention would effectively
contravene and circumvent the JPML's Feb. 8, 2018, order that
suspended JPML Rule 7.1(a) and thus barred the new members' cases
from entering the MDL. Allowing the Applicant to intervene in an
MDL that originated in 2011 would undermine the JPML's order and
set a precedent at odds with that order. The Judge will not
condone the Applicant's transparent attempt to circumvent the
JPML's order barring new member cases from entering the MDL.
Based on the foregoing, Judge Anello denied the Applicant's motion
to intervene.
A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 1, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/WWn2r3 from Leagle.com.
Christopher Robinson, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Douglas J. Campion --
doug@djcampion.com -- Law Offices of Douglas J Campion, Abbas
Kazerounian, Kazerounian Law Group, APC & Joshua B. Swigart --
josh@westcoastlitigation.com -- Hyde & Swigart.
Eduardo Tovar, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Brian J. Trenz, Law Offices of
David Schafer PLLC, pro hac vice & David P. Schafer, Law Offices of
David Schafer PLLC, pro hac vice.
Nicholas Martin, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Alexander H. Burk, Burke Law
Offices, LLC, pro hac vice.
Dave Scardina, individually and on behalf of a class, Plaintiff,
represented by Daniel A. Edelman, Edelman Combs Latturner & Goodwin
LLC, pro hac vice, James O. Latturner, Edelman, Combs, Latturner &
Goodwin, LLC, pro hac vice, Cassandra P. Miller, Edelman, Combs,
Latturner & Goodwin LLC, Cathleen M. Combs, Edelman, Combs,
Latturner & Goodwin, LLC, Curtis Charles Warner, Warner Law Firm,
LLC & Francis Richard Greene, Edelman Combs Latturner & Goodwin
LLC.
Chad R. Goetz, Plaintiff, pro se.
Midland Funding LLC, Defendant, represented by Aaron L. Vorce,
Dykema Gossett, Amy M. Gallegos, Jenner & Block LLP, Andrew Michael
Schwartz, Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, P.C.,
Benjamin Michael Katz, Burr and Forman, Brett J Natarelli, Dykema
Gossett PLLC, Bryan James Anderson, Dykema Gossett, PLLC, Daniel
Andrew Brown, WILLIAMS KASTNER & GIBBS, Danielle M. Vugrinovich,
Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, David J. Elkanich,
Holland & Knight, LLP, David M. Schultz, Hinshaw & Culbertson, LLP,
pro hac vice, Ethan A. Glickstein, Jenner & Block LLP, Heather L.
Kramer -- hkramer@dykema.com -- Dykema Gossett PLLc, James Michael
Golden, Dykema Gossett PLLC, John Anthony Love, King and Spalding,
pro hac vice, Joshua C. Dickinson, SPENCER FANE, LLP, LATI WELLS
SPENCE, MARSHALL DENNEHEY WARNER COLEMAN & GOGGIN PC, Lauren M.
Burnette, Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, Matthew B.
Ames, Balch & Bingham LLP, Matthew Brady Johnson, Marshall Dennehey
Warner Coleman & Goggin, Matthew W. McDade, BALCH & BINGHAM, LLP,
Michael Ronald Ayers, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP,
Palak Naimesh Shah, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Patrick Michael
DeLong, Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, Patrick T.
McLaughlin, SPENCER FANE LLP, Paul F. Labaki, Peltan Law, PLLC,
Paul A. Wilhelm, Dykema Gossett, Renee Lynn Zipprich, Dykema
Gossett PLLC, Stephen Michael Mahieu, Dykema Gossett, PLLC,
Theodore W. Seitz -- tseitz@dykema.com -- Dykema Gossett PLLC, pro
hac vice, Todd A Gale -- tgale@dykema.com -- Dykema Gossett PLLC,
Todd Philip Stelter, Hinshaw & Culbertson, Amanda Catherine
Fitzsimmons, DLA Piper LLP & Edward D Totino, DLA Piper LLP.
Midland Credit Management, Inc., Defendant, represented by Aaron L.
Vorce, Dykema Gossett, Aimee Guidry Szygenda, McGlinchey Stafford,
Amanda E Wilson, Amy M. Gallegos, Jenner & Block LLP, Amy R.
Jonker, DYKEMA GOSSETT PLLC, Andrew Michael Schwartz, Marshall,
Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, P.C., Anthony J. Palermo,
Holland & Knight, LLP, Benjamin Michael Katz, Burr and Forman,
Brandon Stein, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Brandon M. Wrazen, Peltan
Law, PLLC, Brett J Natarelli, Dykema Gossett PLLC, Bryan James
Anderson, Dykema Gossett, PLLC, Christopher David Johnsen, Holland
& Knight, Christopher Spain, Simmonds & Narita LLP, Cory W.
Eichhorn, Holland & Knight, LLP, pro hac vice, Daniel Andrew
Brown,
WILLIAMS KASTNER & GIBBS, Danielle M. Vugrinovich, Marshall,
Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, David J. Elkanich, Holland &
Knight, LLP, David George Peltan, Peltan Law, PLLC, David M.
Schultz, Hinshaw & Culbertson, LLP, pro hac vice, Erica Gooden
Bartimmo, Holland & Knight, LLP, Ethan A. Glickstein, Jenner &
Block LLP, Gennifer Lynn Bridges, Burr & Forman, LLP, Gregg D
Stevens, McGlinchey Stafford, Heather L. Kramer, Dykema Gossett
PLLc, James A. Byram, Jr., BALCH & BINGHAM, LLP, James Michael
Golden, Dykema Gossett PLLC, James S. Kreamer, Baker, Sterchi,
Cowden & Rice, LLC, James Lanter, James Lanter, P.C., Jared D.
Kemper, Dykema Gossett, PLLC, Jason Brent Tompkins, Balch & Bingham
LLP, pro hac vice, Jeffrey M. Sankey, Sankey Law Offices, Jennifer
L. Braster, Naylor & Braster Attorneys at Law, PLLC, John Anthony
Love, King and Spalding, pro hac vice, John M. Naylor, Naylor &
Braster Attorneys at Law, John Christopher Suedekum, Burr and
Forman, LLP, Jonathan Clayton Brown, Burr Forman LLP, Joseph L.
Francoeur, Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP, Joseph W
Letzer, Burr and Forman, Joshua C. Dickinson, SPENCER FANE, LLP,
Keasha Ann Broussard, King & Spalding, LLP, pro hac vice, LATI
WELLS SPENCER, MARSHALL DENNEHEY WARNER COLEMAN & GOGGIN PC, Laura
Irene Hillerich, Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin,
Laura Westerman Tanner, Burr & Forman, LLP, Lauren M. Burnette,
Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, Lauren Lynn Millcarek,
Holland & Knight, LLP, Lawrence J. Bartel, III, MARSHALL DENNEHEY
WARNER COLEMAN & GOGGIN, Leah Suzanne Strickland, Solomon Ward
Seidenwurm & Smith LLP, M. Cory Nelson Lewis, Rice & Fingersh, pro
hac vice, Matthew B. Ames, Balch & Bingham LLP, Matthew J. Devine,
Burr & Forman, LLP, Matthew Brady Johnson, Marshall Dennehey Warner
Coleman & Goggin, Mei-Ying M. Imanaka, Solomon Ward Seidenwurm &
Smith, LLP, Melissa S. Gutierrez, McGlinchey Stafford, Michael
Ronald Ayers, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Nicole Strickler, Messer,
Stilp & Strickler, Ltd., pro hac vice, Palak Naimesh Shah, Hinshaw
& Culbertson LLP, Patrick Michael DeLong, Marshall, Dennehey,
Warner, Coleman & Goggin, Patrick T. McLaughlin, SPENCER FANE LLP,
Paul F. Labaki, Peltan Law, PLLC, Paul A. Wilhelm, Dykema Gossett,
Peter J. Caltagirone, Solomon, Ward, Seidenwurm and Smith, Rachel
R. Friedman, Burr & Forman LLP, Randy Jiro Aoyama, Hinshaw &
Culbertson LLP, Reid Stephens Manley, Burr Forman LLP, Renee Lynn
Zipprich, Dykema Gossett PLLC, Richard David Lane,, Marshall
Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, Robert Franklin Springfield, Burr
& Forman, LLP, Ronald Michael Metcho, II, Marshall, Dennehey,
Warner, Coleman & Goggin, P.C., pro hac vice, Russell S. Ponessa,
Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Stephen Michael Mahieu Dykema Gossett,
PLLC, Theodore J. Greeley, Dykema Gossett, PLLC, Theodore W.
Seitz, Dykema Gossett PLLC, pro hac vice, Thomas Butler Alleman,
Dykema Cox Smith, Thomas F. Landers, Solomon Ward Seidenwurm &
Smith, LLP, Thomas A. Leghorn, Wilson, Elser Law Firm, Thomas M.
Martin, Lewis Rice LLC, Todd A Gale, Dykema Gossett PLLC, Todd
Philip Stelter, Hinshaw & Culbertson, Tomio B. Narita, Simmonds &
Narita LLP, Amanda Catherine Fitzsimmons, DLA Piper LLP, Edward D
Totino, DLA Piper LLP, Jacqueline A. Simms-Petredis,, Burr &
Forman, LLP, Tatiana Alexander Waits, McGlinchey Stafford LLP &
Thomas Richard DeBray, Jr.,, Balch & Bingham, LLP.
Encore Capital Group, Inc., Defendant, represented by Amy M.
Gallegos, Jenner & Block LLP, Brett J Natarelli, Dykema Gossett
PLLC, Bryan James Anderson, Dykema Gossett, PLLC, Cory W. Eichhorn,
Holland & Knight, LLP, pro hac vice, Danielle M. Vugrinovich,
Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, Ethan A. Glickstein,
Jenner & Block LLP, James Michael Golden, Dykema Gossett PLLC,
Lauren Lynn Millcarek, Holland & Knight, LLP, Matthew B. Ames,
Balch & Bingham LLP, Rachel R. Friedman, Burr & Forman LLP, Renee
Lynn Zipprich, Dykema Gossett PLLC, Robert Franklin Springfield,
Burr & Forman, LLP, Theodore W. Seitz, Dykema Gossett PLLC, pro hac
vice, Amanda Catherine Fitzsimmons, DLA Piper LLP & Edward D
Totino, DLA Piper LLP.
Laura E. Hartman, an individual, Defendant, represented by Robert
W. Murphy, Law Office of Robert W. Murphy.
X, Y, Z Corporations, Defendant, represented by Lauren M. Burnette,
Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin.
Frederick J. Hanna & Associates, P. C., Defendant, represented by
Scot W. Groghan, Frederick J. Hanna & Associates, P.C.
MDL 2843: Questions for CMC in Facebook User Privacy Suit Entered
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Vince Chhabria of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California has entered Pretrial Order No. 27 on
questions for case management conference in IN RE FACEBOOK, INC.
CONSUMER PRIVACY USER PROFILE LITIGATION, MDL No. 2843, Case No.
18-md-02843-VC (N.D. Cal.).
Judge Chhabria ordered the parties to be prepared to discuss the
following at the case management conference, assuming the Court
grants Facebook's request to proceed with discovery on liability
with respect to each named Plaintiff before proceeding with
discovery that would be related only to class certification:
a. Whether the parties can offer further explanation of what
Phase 1 discovery would look like.
b. The sort of discovery requests that would be out of bounds
during Phase 1. For example, (i) whether discovery would be
limited to an inquiry about which apps were able to access each
named Plaintiff's information as alleged in the complaint; whether
it would include an inquiry about which apps had access to user
information in general; (ii) whether it would be limited to an
inquiry about what restrictions Facebook imposed on the particular
apps that had access to the named Plaintiffs' information, or it
include a general inquiry about the restrictions Facebook placed on
apps; and (iii) whether it is even possible to determine which apps
were given access to which users' information.
A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 1, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/ZyFQGG from Leagle.com.
Lauren Price, Plaintiff, represented by John A. Yanchunis --
jyanchunis@ForThePeople.com -- Morgan and Morgan, P.A., Joshua
Haakon Watson -- carnold@justice4you.com -- Clayeo C. Arnold, A
Professional Law Corporation, Patrick A. Barthle, II --
pbarthe@forthepeople.com -- Morgan and Morgan Complex Litigation
Group, Ryan McGee -- rmcgee@forthepeople.com -- Morgan and Morgan
Complex Litigation Group & Steven William Teppler --
steppler@abbottlawpa.com -- Abbott Law Group, P.A.
Jonathan D. Rubin, Plaintiff, represented by Brian Samuel Clayton
Conlon -- bsc@phillaw.com -- Phillips, Erlewine, Given & Carlin
LLP, Nicholas A. Carlin -- nac@phillaw.com -- Phillips Erlewine
Given & Carlin LLP & David M. Given -- dmg@phillaw.com -- Phillips
Erlewine Given & Carlin LLP.
Facebook, Inc., Defendant, represented by Brian Michael Lutz --
blutz@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Carl S.
Burkhalter -- cburkhalter@maynardcooper.com -- MAYNARD COOPER &
GALE PC, David Evan Ross -- dross@ramllp.com -- Ross Aronstam &
Moritz LLP, Evan P. Moltz -- emoltz@maynardcooper.com -- MAYNARD
COOPER & GALE PC, Joshua Seth Lipshutz -- jlipshutz@gibsondunn.com
-- Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher LLP, Kristin A. Linsley --
klinsley@gibsondunn.com -- Esq., Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP &
Orin Snyder -- osnyder@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn and Crutcher.
SCL Group, a United Kingdom Company & Cambridge Analytica LLC,
Defendants, represented by Ashlee Nicole Lin -- alin@eisnerlaw.com
-- Eisner APC & Mark Christopher Scarsi -- mscarsi@milbank.com --
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP.
Robert Mercer, Defendant, represented by Mark C. Hansen, Kellogg,
Hansen, Todd, Figel & Frederick, P.L.L.C., Sumner Square, 1615 M
Street, NW, Suite 400, Washington, DC 20036-3209.
MILLER STARK: Court Defers Ruling on Holmes' Bid to Certify Class
-----------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Magistrate Judge James R. Klindt defers ruling on the
Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification in the lawsuit captioned
SUMMER HOLMES, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. MILLER, STARK, KLEIN & ASSOCIATES, Case No.
3:18-cv-01193-BJD-JRK (M.D. Fla.).
According to the Order, the Court has placed under active
advisement Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification, filed April
1, 2019. In reviewing that Motion, however, a concern has arisen
about the proper defendant in this matter. The Plaintiff
represents in footnote on the Motion that "[r]esearch performed in
preparation for drafting this motion revealed that Defendant
Miller, Stark, Klein & Associates is a d/b/a of DRS Processing,
LLC."
The Plaintiff contends that "Miller, Stark, Klein & Associates and
DRS Processing, LLC are one in the same." While that may be
accurate as a practical matter, it appears based on the Plaintiff's
representations that the proper defendant is "DRS Processing, LLC
d/b/a Miller, Stark, Klein & Associates." See, e.g., Cont'l Cas.
Co. v. HealthPrime, Inc., No. 1:07-cv-2512-BBM, 2009 WL 10665024,
at *3 (N.D. Ga. June 18, 2009).
Judge Klindt opines that the applicable authority suggests, in
turn, that whether any final judgment would be valid and
enforceable turns on whether the error in naming the defendant is a
misidentification or a misnomer. But, because this case is still
pending and default judgment has not entered, the party issue
should be addressed, he adds.
"It is particularly important to address and resolve this issue
now, rather than ruling on the Motion and awaiting the filing of a
default judgment motion. This is because if a class is ultimately
certified, the Court would want to be satisfied that the
certification is against the proper party," Judge Klindt notes.
Accordingly, Judge Klindt rules that the Plaintiff has up to and
including January 3, 2020, to move the Court for whatever relief
she deems appropriate in this circumstance. If the Plaintiff does
not believe any relief is necessary or appropriate, she shall file
a memorandum by that same date explaining why. As a second
alternative, the Plaintiff is free to voluntarily dismiss this
matter.
Judge Klindt also rules that decision on the Plaintiff's Motion for
Class Certification is deferred pending resolution of the proper
party defendant issue.[CC]
MK 32 RESTAURANT: Court Okays $60K Settlement in Tucubal FLSA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RICARDO ARTURO MENDEZ TUCUBAL, Plaintiff, v. MK 32
RESTAURANT CORP., et al., Defendants, Case No. 18-CV-1442 (VSB)
(S.D. N.Y.), Judge Vernon S. Broderick of the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York approved the settlement
agreement and awarded the Plaintiff's counsel $12,000 in attorney's
fees.
On Jan. 7, 2019, the Court issued an Order denying without
prejudice the parties' proposed settlement agreement in light of
the parties' inclusion of an overbroad release. It instructed the
parties that they may proceed by either (1) filing a revised
proposed settlement agreement that cures the deficiencies outlined
in its January 7 Order, or (2) filing a joint letter indicating
their intention to abandon settlement. The parties have submitted
a revised settlement agreement that amends the release in
accordance with the January 7 Order.
The agreement provides for a gross settlement amount of $60,000.
This amount represents approximately 24% of the total amount the
Plaintiff claims that he could have recovered had he prevailed on
his claims at trial; a figure that includes liquidated damages.
In the joint letter seeking approval of the parties' settlement,
the Plaintiff's counsel requests $20,000 in fees and costs, which
represents one-third of the total FLSA settlement amount. The
counsel requests the fee for the work performed by two attorneys,
Michael Faillace and Haleigh Amant, and has submitted
contemporaneous billing records to facilitate a lodestar
cross-check
Judge Broderick says that because the release complies with the
parameters set forth in his January 7 Order and limits released
claims to those claims relating to wage-and-hour violations, he
finds the revised release to be fair and reasonable.
Separately addressing the settlement amount and the reasonableness
of the requested attorney's fees, Judge Broderick finds that the
revised settlement amount is fair and reasonable. However, the
Judge finds that the Plaintiff's counsel's requested attorney's
fees are unreasonably high given the circumstances of the case.
The counsel has spent only 25 total hours on the case, and the case
is relatively simple -- involving only one Plaintiff and minimal
formal litigation -- the Judge finds that a $20,000 fee is
excessive. Accordingly, Judge Broderick finds that a reduction of
the Plaintiff's attorney's fees is appropriate, and he awards the
Plaintiff's counsel 20% of the total settlement amount, or $12,000,
which still amounts to more than double the lodestar amount,
calculated using the reasonable hourly rates referenced.
For the reasons stated, Judge Broderick approved the settlement
agreement but awarded the Plaintiff's counsel $12,000 in attorney's
fees, rather than the requested $20,000.
A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 1, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/iS47R5 from Leagle.com.
Ricardo Arturo Mendez Tucubal, indivually & Ricardo Arturo Mendez
Tucubal, on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by Gennadiy Naydenskiy, Michael Faillace & Assocaites,
PC, Jesse S. Barton -- jbarton@faillacelaw.com -- Michael Faillace
& Associates, P.C. & Michael Antonio Faillace --
Michael@Faillacelaw.com -- Michael Faillace & Associates, P.C.
MK 32 Restaurant Corp., doing business as The Kunjip, Myounga
Restaurant, Inc., doing business as The Kunjip, Hai Hwa Pak & Chung
Ho, Defendants, represented by Richard Ian Greenberg --
Richard.Greenberg@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis P.C. & Adam
Simeon Gross -- Adam.Gross@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis P.C..
MR SQEEKY CAR WASH: Sweeney Sues Over Disclosure of Card Info
-------------------------------------------------------------
BRENDAN SWEENEY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. MR SQEEKY CAR WASH, INC., Defendant, Case
No. CACE-19-024237 (Fla. Cir., Nov. 21, 2019), seeks to put an end
to the Defendant's conduct of disclosing the personal and private
financial information of thousands of consumers throughout the
country.
The Defendant operates a car wash, sells car wash equipment and
seeks to franchise its concept and/or brand. The Defendant markets
itself as "revolutionizing the car washing experience by providing
our customers with the high quality wash they expect in the short
time their busy schedules demand."
Despite its size and sophistication, the Defendant routinely
violates the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act amendment to
the Fair Credit Reporting Act by willfully, knowingly, and/or
recklessly issuing electronically printed receipts to its customers
for payment card transactions that include the expiration date of
consumers, credit and debit cards. FACTA is a federal privacy
statute that unambiguously states: "no person that accepts credit
cards or debit cards for the transaction of business shall print
more than the last 5 digits of the card number or the expiration
date upon any receipt provided to the cardholder at the point of
the sale or transaction."
On November 10, 2019, the Plaintiff purchased goods/services from
one of the Defendant's stores in Pompano Beach, Florida. To pay for
these items, the Plaintiff provided the Defendant with his debit
card or credit card and the amount of $18 was charged to
Plaintiff's bank account. The Plaintiff was provided an
electronically printed paper receipt bearing the Defendant's name
and logo, the amount of the transaction ($18.00), the type of card
used (Visa/MC), the date of the (11/10/2019), and the first four
digits and last four digits of his credit card.
The Defendant's conduct has damaged the Plaintiff and members of
the putative class by invading their privacy, and by exposing them
to a heightened risk of identity theft and payment card fraud,
according to the complaint.
The Plaintiff seeks redress for himself and all others, who have
been injured by the Defendant's conduct, including injunctive
relief, statutory damages, costs, and reasonable attorneys,
fees.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq.
HIRALDO P.A.
401 E. Las Olas Boulevard Suite 1400
Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
Telephone: 954 400 4713
E-mail: mbiraldo@hiraldolaw.com
- and -
Michael Eisenband, Esq.
EISENBAND LAW, P.A.
515 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 120
Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
Telephone: 954 533 4092
E-mail: Eisenband@Eisenbandlaw.com
OZARKS ELECTRIC: Ark. Appeals Ct. Overturns Ruling in Stanley Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, WILLIAM B. STANLEY, NIOLENE E. STANLEY, STEPHEN C.
PARKER, KATHRYN A. PARKER, MATTHEW BRITT, AND MICHAEL C. WILLIS, ON
BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Appellants,
v. OZARKS ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE CORPORATION AND OZARKSGO, LLC,
Appellees, Case No. CV-18-1036 (Ark. App.), Judge Bart F. Virden of
the Court of Appeals of Arkansas for Divisions II & III reversed
the Washington County Circuit Court's order dismissing the
Appellants' complaint against Appellees Ozarks Electric.
The Plaintiffs/Appellants are property owners in Washington County.
The Stanleys and the Parkers own property subject to
general-utility easements. Ozarks Electric has installed and is
operating a commercial fiber-optic communications network
independent of the transmission or distribution of electricity.
The Stanleys and the Parkers allege that Ozarks Electric entered
land adjacent to the existing utility easements to install its
fiber-optic communications network. They allege that during
construction of the network, they suffered damages, e.g., loss of
use and loss of privacy, to the land adjacent to the easements for
which no compensation was offered. They also allege that they
suffered damages to the land within the existing easements due to
the increased interference with their use of the land.
Britt owns property through which Ozarks Electric has a
right-of-way easement for the transmission or distribution of
electricity. Britt executed the easement for Ozarks Electric's
distribution line, but the recorded easement's use is limited on
its face to an "electric line or system." He alleges that Ozarks
Electric plans to install and operate a newly constructed 100%
fiber-optic communications network independent of the existing
system for the transmission or distribution of electricity. Britt
seeks damages for inverse condemnation or, alternatively, increased
interference.
Willis owns property through which Ozarks Electric installed and
maintains a transmission or distribution line for electricity.
While there are no existing easements on record with respect to
Willis' property, Ozarks Electric plans to install and operate a
newly constructed 100 percent fiber-optic communications network on
his property. Willis seeks damages for inverse condemnation or,
alternatively, increased interference.
The Appellants allege that Ozarks Electric plans to install and
operate a commercial fiber-optic communications network that is
independent of the existing wires and cables for the transmission
or distribution of electricity. Ozarks Electric's plans for such a
network is a separate business distinct from the generation,
transmission, or distribution of electricity. Neither the written,
recorded electric power-line easement to Ozarks (on Britt's
property) nor the unrecorded electric power-line easement
benefiting Ozarks (on Willis's property) authorizes the
installation of fiber-optic cables for communication, internet, or
television purposes.
The Appellants allege that the Broadband Over Power Utility Lines
Enabling Act provides for an award of damages to property owners
for increased interference when a utility company installs
broadband over power lines without just compensation. They allege
that BPL (broadband over power lines) is technology that sends two
signals down one line: one signal is electricity, and the other is
a broadband internet signal. According to them, the new
fiber-optic system is not broadband over power lines; rather, it is
broadband over newly installed fiber-optic cables. They contend
that none of Ozarks Electric's existing power lines are being used
for the transmission of the internet signal.
The circuit court granted Ozarks Electric's motion to dismiss
because it found that the PSC had primary jurisdiction over the
matter. Subject-matter jurisdiction is the power of the court to
hear and determine the subject matter in controversy between the
parties. An Arkansas court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction if it
cannot hear a matter "under any circumstances" and is "wholly
incompetent to grant the relief sought." Generally, condemnation
proceedings are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the circuit
court.
Judge Virden finds that the particular claims raised by these
Appellants do not involve public rights or the provision of
broadband services. The complaint identifies the Appellants as
landowners, not consumers of the utility company. The gist of
their complaint is a taking of private property without just
compensation. The Appellants do not dispute that Ozarks Electric
has a right to use its own existing lines to transmit broadband
services. Their issue is with Ozarks Electric's entry onto their
land to install completely new lines for broadband services without
just compensation or an assessment of damages for the increased
interference. Because the circuit court has exclusive, original
jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute involving private-property
rights and damages for inverse condemnation and increased
interference, the Judge reversed and remanded to the circuit court
for further proceedings.
A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 4, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/KXGDbR from Leagle.com.
The Evans Law Firm, P.A., by: Marshall Dale Evans --
firm@evans-law-firm.com; and Hirsch Law Firm, P.A., by: E. Kent
Hirsch, for appellants.
Friday, Eldredge & Clark LLP, by: Marshall S. Ney --
mney@fridayfirm.com -- and Katherine C. Campbell --
kcampbell@fridayfirm.com; and Eldridge Law Firm, by: John R.
Eldridge III, for appellees.
PLANTRONICS INC: KSF Reminds of Jan. 13 Plaintiff Deadline
----------------------------------------------------------
Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC ("KSF") and KSF partner, former Attorney
General of Louisiana, Charles C. Foti, Jr., remind investors of
pending deadlines in the following securities class action
lawsuits:
Plantronics, Inc. (NYSE:PLT)
Class Period: 7/2/2018 - 11/5/2019
Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline: January 13, 2020
SECURITIES FRAUD
To learn more, visit https://www.ksfcounsel.com/cases/-plt/
Yunji Inc. (NASDAQ:YJ)
Class Period: American Depository Shares issued either in or after
the May 2019 Initial Public Offering.
Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline: January 13, 2020
MISLEADING PROSPECTUS
To learn more, visit https://www.ksfcounsel.com/cases/nasdaqgm-yj/
Armstrong Flooring, Inc. (NYSE:AFI)
Class Period: 3/6/2018 - 11/4/2019
Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline: January 14, 2020
SECURITIES FRAUD
To learn more, visit https://www.ksfcounsel.com/cases/-afi/
Wanda Sports Group Company Limited (NASDAQ:WSG)
Class Period: securities issued either in or after the July 2019
Initial Public Offering.
Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline: January 17, 2020
MISLEADING PROSPECTUS
To learn more, visit
https://www.ksfcounsel.com/cases/nasdaqgs-wsg/
If you purchased shares of the above companies and would like to
discuss your legal rights and your right to recover for your
economic loss, you may, without obligation or cost to you, contact
KSF Managing Partner, Lewis Kahn, toll-free at 1-877-515-1850, via
email (Lewis.Kahn@KSFcounsel.com), or via the case links above.
If you wish to serve as a Lead Plaintiff in the class action, you
must petition the Court on or before the Lead Plaintiff Motion
deadline.
KSF, whose partners include former Louisiana Attorney General
Charles C. Foti, Jr., is one of the nation's premier boutique
securities litigation law firms. KSF serves a variety of clients -
including public institutional investors, hedge funds, money
managers and retail investors - in seeking recoveries for
investment losses emanating from corporate fraud or malfeasance by
publicly traded companies. KSF has offices in New York, California
and Louisiana.
To learn more about KSF, you may visit www.ksfcounsel.com.
Contact:
Lewis Kahn, Esq.
Managing Partner
Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC
Tel: 1-877-515-1850
1100 Poydras St., Suite 3200
New Orleans, LA 70163
E-mail: lewis.kahn@ksfcounsel.com
[GN]
PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL: Timothy L. Miles Files Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------
The Law Offices of Timothy L. Miles, a national shareholder rights
firm who has been leading the fight to protect shareholder rights
for over 18 years, announces that a purchaser of Prudential
Financial, Inc. (PRU) filed a class action complaint against
Prudential on behalf of purchasers of Prudential securities between
February 15, 2019 and August 2, 2019. The complaint alleges
violations of Sec. 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission. Prudential provides a wide
range of insurance, investment management, and other financial
products and services to both individual and institutional
customers throughout the United States and in many other
countries.
Prudential Accused of Misleading Shareholders
According to the Complaint, the Company made false and misleading
statements to the market. Prudential failed to account for
worsening mortality experience in its individual life business
segment when making its reserve assumptions. Far from being
over-reserved, the Company did not have sufficient reserves to pay
future policy benefits. The Company overstated net income on the
basis of flawed assumptions and calculations. Based on these facts,
the Company's public statements were false and materially
misleading throughout the class period. When the market learned the
truth about Prudential, investors suffered damages.
Prudential Shareholders Urged to Contact the Firm
If you purchased Prudential securities, have information, or would
like to learn more about these claims, or have any questions
concerning this announcement or your rights or interests with
respect to these matters, please contact Timothy L. Miles, Esquire,
at 615-587-738, Toll-Free at 855-846-6529, or by email to
tmiles@timmileslaw.com. If you inquire by email please include your
mailing address, telephone number, and the number shares owned.
Timothy L. Miles is a nationally recognized shareholder rights
attorney raised in Nashville, Tennessee. Mr. Miles was recentely
selected by Martindale-Hubbell(R) and ALM as a 2019 Top Ranked
Lawyer; 2019 Top Rated Litigator; and a 2019 Elite Lawyer of The
South. Mr. Miles also maintains the AV Preeminent Rating by
Martindale-Hubbell(R), their highest rating for both legal ability
and ethics. Mr. Miles is a member of the prestigious Top 100 Civil
Plaintiff Trial Lawyers: The National Trial Lawyers Association, a
superb rated attorney by Avvo, a recipient of the Lifetime
Achievement Award by Premier Lawyers of America (2019) and
recognized as a Distinguished Lawyer, Recognizing Excellence in
Securities Law, by Lawyers of Distinction (2019). Awards: Top Rated
Litigator by Martindale-Hubbell(R) and ALM (2019); 2019 Elite
Lawyer of The South by Martindale-Hubbell(R) and ALM (2019); Member
of the Top 100 Civil Plaintiff Trial Lawyers: The National Trial
Lawyers Association (2017-2019); AV(R) Preeminent(TM) Rating by
Martindale-Hubble(R) (2014-2020); PRR AV Preeminent Rating on
Lawyers.com (2017 & 2019); The Top-Rated Lawyer in Litigation(TM)
for Ethical Standards and Legal Ability (Martindale-Hubble(R)
2015); Lifetime Achievement Award by Premier Lawyers of America
(2019); Superb Rated Attorney (Avvo); Avvo Top Rated Lawyer for
2017 & 2018 (Avvo).
Contact:
Timothy L. Miles, Esq.
Law Offices of Timothy L. Miles
124 Shiloh Ridge
Hendersonville, TN 37075
Telephone: (855-846-6529)
Website: www.timmileslaw.com
Email: tmiles@timmileslaw.com
[GN]
REALREAL INC: Rosen Law Files Class Action Lawsuit
--------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, announces it has
filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of the
securities of The RealReal, Inc. (NASDAQ: REAL) pursuant and/or
traceable to the registration statement and related prospectus
(collectively, the "Registration Statement") issued in connection
with RealReal's June 2019 initial public stock offering (the "IPO"
or the "Offering"). The lawsuit seeks to recover damages for
RealReal investors under the federal securities laws.
To join the RealReal class action, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1678.htmlor call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action.
NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.
According to the lawsuit, the Registration Statement featured false
and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1)
the Company's employees received little training on how to spot
fake items; (2) the Company's strict quotas on its employees
exacerbated product authentication issues; (3) consequently, the
potential for counterfeit or mislabeled items to make it through
the Company's authentication process was higher than disclosed; and
(4) as a result, defendants' statements about RealReal's business,
operations, and prospects were materially false and misleading
and/or lacked a reasonable basis at all relevant times. When the
true details entered the market, the lawsuit claims that investors
suffered damages.
A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than January
24, 2020. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on
behalf of other class members in directing the litigation. If you
wish to join the litigation, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1678.htmlor to discuss
your rights or interests regarding this class action, please
contact Phillip Kim, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll free at
866-767-3653 or via e-mail at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com.
Follow us for updates on LinkedIn:
https://www.linkedin.com/company/the-rosen-law-firm or on Twitter:
https://twitter.com/rosen_firm or on Facebook:
https://www.facebook.com/rosenlawfirm.
Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe,
concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm was Ranked No. 1
by ISS Securities Class Action Services for number of securities
class action settlements in 2017. The firm has been ranked in the
top 3 each year since 2013. Rosen Law Firm has secured hundreds of
millions of dollars for investors.
Contact:
Laurence Rosen, Esq.
Phillip Kim, Esq.
The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
275 Madison Avenue, 40th Floor
New York, NY 10016
Tel: (212) 686-1060
Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
Fax: (212) 202-3827
Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
pkim@rosenlegal.com
cases@rosenlegal.com
Website: www.rosenlegal.com
[GN]
ROBERT CARTER: Taylor Suit Transferred From S.D. to N.D. Indiana
----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit styled as Greg Taylor, Individually and on
behalf of those similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Robert Carter,
Jr., Wexford, Overholser, and Dr. Pental, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-02957, was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana to the U.S. District Court Northern
District of Indiana (South Bend) on Nov. 19, 2019.
The Northern District of Indiana Court Clerk assigned Case No.
3:19-cv-01064-PPS-MGG to the proceeding. The case is assigned to
the Hon. Judge Philip P. Simon.
The Plaintiff appears pro se.[BN]
ROSEGOLD INVESTMENTS: $6K Attorneys Fees Awarded in Garrison Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned TOMMY GARRISON, an individual, and CHRISTINE
GARRISON, an individual, Plaintiffs, v. REGINALD BUDDY RINGGOLD,
III aka Rasool Abdul Rahim El, an individual, ROSEGOLD INVESTMENTS,
LLP, a Delaware Partnership, and MASTER INVESTMENT GROUP, INC., a
California Corporation, Defendants, Case No. 19cv244-GPC(RBB) (S.D.
Cal.), Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California granted in part the
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants' motion for attorney's fees.
Garrison, who is over 65 years old, and his wife, Plaintiff
Christine Garrison, filed a complaint for securities violations and
financial elder abuse against Defendant Reginald Buddy Ringgold,
III aka Rasool Abdul Rahim El, Rosegold Investments LLP, and Master
Investment Group, Inc.
On May 13, 2019, the Court granted in part and denied in part
Defendant Ringgold's motion to dismiss with leave to amend. On May
28, 2019, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint alleging the same
three causes of action. Defendant Ringgold, proceeding pro se,
filed an answer and a counterclaim.
The counterclaim alleged malicious prosecution and abuse of
process, defamation, emotional distress, and sought punitive
damages. On July 9, 2019, the Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants filed a
motion to strike the counterclaims under California's
anti-Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation ("anti-SLAPP
statute") pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section
425.16(e)(4), or in the alternative, motion to dismiss under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The
Defendant/Counterclaimant did not file an opposition.
On Aug. 26, 2019, the Court granted the Garrisons' motion to strike
and dismissed the counterclaims as unopposed. In that order, the
Court denied without prejudice the Plaintiffs' request for
attorney's fees as they did not demonstrate that they were
"prevailing parties" as required under the anti-SLAPP statute.
On Sept. 13, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for attorney's fee
under the anti-SLAPP statute seeking fees in the amount of $8,150.
On the motion, Ringgold filed an opposition and the Garrisons also
filed a reply.
The Garrisons, relying on Gottesman v. Santana, argue they are
prevailing parties under the anti-SLAPP statue even if the
anti-SLAPP motion was unopposed or the action was voluntarily
dismissed after the anti-SLAPP motion was filed. Ringgold responds
that due to recent hardships, he was unable to file an opposition
to the motion to strike because he was homeless for a couple of
months and was unable to access the internet to view the courthouse
records.
Judge Curiel finds that Ringgold has not provided any evidence,
such as by declaration, to support his claim that he suffered
hardship and was unable to access the Court's docket or file his
opposition because he did not have access to the internet. He also
does not state when he was homeless. Moreover, even if Ringgold
was homeless, he had the option to access the Court records by
visiting the Clerk's Office. Thus, by failing to produce any
evidence to support his argument, the Judge concludes that Ringgold
has failed to rebut the presumption that the Garrisons are the
prevailing parties under section 425.16(c). The Garrisons are
prevailing parties under the anti-SLAPP statute.
Turning to what amount of attorney's fees are reasonable, the Judge
concludes, after a review of cases in non-class action cases, that
$550 per hour is the prevailing rate in the district based on the
counsel's skill and experience. Because the Plaintiffs have failed
to provide any support for the $150 per hour for the paralegal, the
Judge denied their request for the paralegal fee.
The Plaintiffs' counsel asserts he spent a total of 12.1 hours on
the motion and did not include time that was spent on drafting the
Rule 12(b)(6) portion of the motion to dismiss and did not include
time to draft the reply to the motion to dismiss as well as the
reply to the instant motion. Therefore, they contend 12.1 hours
spent by Restis is reasonable.
Ringgold generally objects arguing the fee is excessive, ridiculous
and outrageous. First, he contends that the records are ambiguous
because they do not specify what amount of time was spent on what
activity. In the reply, Restis submitted his detailed time
records. Next, Ringgold claims that the work is duplicative,
irrelevant or inefficient.
A review of the records demonstrates that the work performed by
Restis was not duplicative, irrelevant or inefficient. Moreover,
contrary to Defendant's argument, Plaintiffs are not seeking
multipliers above the lodestar amount. The Judge finds that the
12.1 hours spent on the motion to strike was reasonable in light of
the fact that the Plaintiffs did not include fees for drafting the
reply to the motion to strike as well as the reply to the motion.
Bsed on the foregoing, Judge Curil garnted in part the
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants' motion for attorney's fee in the
amount of $6,655.
A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 1, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/iljum3 from Leagle.com.
Tommy Garrison, an Individual & Christine Garrison, an Individual,
Plaintiffs, represented by William Richard Restis --
support@restislaw.com -- The Restis Law Firm, P.C.
Reginald Buddy Ringgold, III, an Individual, Defendant, pro se.
SALON 94 DESIGN: Mendez Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Web Site
-------------------------------------------------------------
Himelda Mendez, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. SALON 94 DESIGN LLC and SALON 94 LLC, Case No.
1:19-cv-11511 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 16, 2019), is brought against the
Defendant for its failure to design, construct, maintain, and
operate its Web site to be fully accessible to and independently
usable by the Plaintiff and other blind or visually-impaired
people.
The Defendants' denial of full and equal access to its Web site,
and therefore denial of its products and services offered thereby
and in conjunction with its physical location, is a violation of
the Plaintiff's rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
the Plaintiff alleges. Because the Defendants' Web site,
https://salon94.com/, is not equally accessible to blind and
visually-impaired consumers, it violates the ADA, says the
complaint.
The Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who
requires screen-reading software to read Web site content using her
computer. The Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a
change in the Defendants' corporate policies, practices, and
procedures so that its Web site will become and remain accessible
to blind and visually-impaired consumers.
The Defendants' art gallery operates as a place of public
accommodation, as a sales establishment and/or place of
exhibition.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
John M. Gurrieri, Esq.
Justin A. Zeller, Esq.
LAW OFFICES OF JUSTIN A. ZELLER, P.C.
277 Broadway, Suite 408
New York, NY 10007-2036
Phone: (212) 229-2249
Facsimile: (212) 229-2246
Email: jmgurrieri@zellerlegal.com
jazeller@zellerlegal.com
- and -
Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq.
GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
New York, NY 10003-2461
Phone: (212) 228-9795
Fax: (212) 982-6284
Email: nyjg@aol.com
danalgottlieb@aol.com
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS: DeFrank Sues Over Defective Drying Machines
----------------------------------------------------------------
Lisa DeFrank, Hollis Stavn, and Chris Garcia, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS
AMERICA, INC., Case No. 2:19-cv-21401 (S.D. Ohio, Dec. 16, 2019),
arises from a defect in clothes drying machines manufactured and
sold by the Defendant.
The lawsuit is brought to redress Samsung's violations of the
California Unfair Competition Law; the California False Advertising
Law; the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act; the New Jersey
Consumer Fraud Act; the New Mexico Unfair Practices Act; the Ohio
Consumer Sales Practices Act; the Ohio Deceptive Trade Practices
Act; and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.
This case involves Samsung's design, manufacture, marketing, and
sale of clothes drying machines with a faulty design or
manufacturing process that resulted in cracked drums, ultimately
rendering the Dryers unusable for their ordinary purpose. The
Defect occurs in both gas and electric dryers designed,
manufactured, marketed and sold by Samsung. Prior to the Class
Dryers becoming useless, the Defect generally causes a loud noise
throughout a consumer's home, and also damage to consumers'
clothing. In some instances, when the crack exposes the Dryers'
heating element, lint build-up increases the risk of a fire in
consumers' homes.
The only effective means of resolving the problems caused by the
Defect is the replacement of the Class Dryers' drums. Replacement
drums and related parts generally cost several hundred dollars. The
consumer must also either hire a professional to install the
replacement drums, which could cost several hundred additional
dollars, or attempt self-installation, expending one's own time and
effort with no promise of success.
The Plaintiffs seek to obtain relief from Samsung, including
damages and declaratory relief. Specifically, this class action is
brought to remedy violations of law in connection with Samsung's
fraudulent and deceptive marketing and pricing scheme relating to
the Class Dryers. Samsung represents, through advertising to
potential customers, that the Class Dryers are safe, capable of
silently, efficiently and effectively drying clothes, when they are
not.
Samsung's marketing techniques are false and misleading in that a
reasonable consumer would believe that the Class Dryers are capable
of adequately drying clothes in a silent, efficient and effective
manner, when their cracked drums actually cause damage ultimately
rendering them unsafe and useless, and also result in loud noises
during use, as well as damage to consumers' clothing, and an
increased risk of fire when the crack exposes the heating element,
the Plaintiffs contend. Samsung also inflates its Dryer prices to
reflect their purported drying capabilities. As a consequence of
this scheme, consumers across the nation are paying more than they
would otherwise pay if the true facts were disclosed by Samsung,
and consumers are receiving a lower quality product than is
represented in Samsung's advertising, says the complaint.
The Plaintiffs purchased Class Dryers for their household's
personal use.
Samsung is the manufacturer, producer, distributor, and seller of
numerous home appliances and other electronic products, including
gas and electric dryers, throughout the United States.[BN]
The Plaintiffs are represented by:
Daniel R. Karon, Esq.
KARON LLC
700 W. St. Clair Ave., Ste. 200
Cleveland, OH 44113
Phone: (216) 622-1851
Cell: (216) 390-2594
Fax: (216) 241-8175
Email: dkaron@karonllc.com
- and -
Joseph G. Sauder, Esq.
SAUDER SCHELKOPF LLC
555 Lancaster Avenue
Berwyn, PA 19312
Phone: (610) 200-0580
Facsimile: (610) 421-1326
Email: jds@sstriallawyers.com
- and -
Bruce D. Greenberg
Susana Cruz Hodge, Esq.
LITE DEPALMA GREENBERG, LLC
570 Broad Street, Suite 1201
Newark, NJ 07102
Phone: (973) 623-3000
Facsimile: (973) 623-0858
Email: bgreenberg@litedepalma.com
scruzhodge@litedepalma.com
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS: Settlement in Bronson Suit Gets Prelim. OK
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In the case captioned ALEXIS BRONSON and CRYSTAL HARDIN, on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC. et al., Defendants, No. C
18-02300 WHA (N.D. Cal.), Judge William Alsup of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California granted both
Plaintiff Hardin's motions (i) for conditional certification of a
settlement class and (ii) for preliminary approval of a class
settlement.
Plaintiffs Hardin and Bronson each bought Samsung plasma
televisions in 2013. Both television sets had been manufactured in
2013 and later developed colored-lines on the screen. In 2018,
each Plaintiff was separately told by two different
Samsung-authorized service and repair facilities that a spare part
was not available to fix their televisions. Defendants Samsung
Electronics Co., Ltd. and Samsung Electronics America, Inc.
manufactured the Plaintiffs' plasma televisions.
Plaintiff Bronson (but not Plaintiff Hardin) had commenced the
putative class action in April 2018. He then twice amended his
complaint. By January 2019, the operative complaint contained only
two surviving claims: a claim under Section 1793.03(b) of the
California Civil Code and a derivative claim under Section 17200 of
the California Business and Professions Code. An order also then
permitted Plaintiff Hardin to intervene.
In April 2019, Samsung moved for summary judgment. In May 2019,
Plaintiff Bronson (but not Plaintiff Hardin) moved for partial
summary judgment. An order denied Samsung's summary judgment
motion. An order granted Plaintiff Bronson's partial summary
judgment motion. Samsung had not made functional parts available
to service and repair facilities for Plaintiff Bronson's television
as required by Section 1793.03(b).
An order also permitted the scope of discovery to extend to
television models other than those owned by the Plaintiffs. As
relevant for the instant motion, since the television model
Plaintiff Hardin owned contained the identical faulty part (part
number BN96-25240A), as two other models of television (models
PN51F5300 and PN51F5350) -- discovery extended as to those models
as well. The Plaintiff Hardin's model was numbered PN51F5500.
Since May 2019, the parties have engaged in multiple settlement
discussions. In June 2019, Plaintiff Hardin (but not Plaintiff
Bronson) moved for class certification. In August 2019, after the
motion was fully briefed, the parties struck an agreement on a
settlement injunctive class. An order held the motion for class
certification in abeyance.
In September 2019, the Plaintiff moved for certification of the
settlement class and for preliminary approval of the class
settlement. Samsung did not oppose.
In brief, the counsel abandon certification of a damages class
under Rule 23(b)(3), in favor of an injunctive -- only class under
Rule 23(b)(2). That is, although the operative complaint sought
class damages, the class would receive zero dollars under the deal.
In contrast, Plaintiff Bronson and Plaintiff Hardin would each
receive $6,000 -- and the Plaintiffs' counsel would seek $487,000
in fees, subject to Court approval.
The September settlement also drastically narrows the scope of the
class. The class for settlement purposes became: Any person in the
State of California who owned as of July 1, 2019, a Samsung plasma
television model PN51F5500, PN51F5300, or PN51F5350 manufactured
since Jan. 1, 2013 (Affected Models), that exhibits a line issue
that requires a replacement plasma display panel assembly ("PDP")
as confirmed through diagnostic testing by a Samsung-authorized
service center ("ASC"). Significantly, the September agreement
explicitly prohibits any form of notice to the class. That is,
Samsung considers the absence of notice to the settlement class a
non-severable material term.
After a hearing, an order denied the September settlement as
unfair, unreasonable, and inadequate.
The parties try again with a new settlement, referred to as the
October settlement. It purports to have fixed the glaring
unfairness of the September settlement.
The October settlement redefines the proposed class as: Any person
in the State of California who owns a Samsung plasma television
model PN51F5500, PN51F5300, or PN51F5350 (Affected Models), that
exhibits a line issue that requires a replacement plasma display
panel assembly (PDP). The October deal further agrees to provide
notice and to significantly narrow the objection procedures.
The October settlement makes three other changes worth mentioning.
First, reference to Plaintiff Bronson has disappeared from the
agreement completely. So, his previously disclosed $6,000 award is
no longer part of the class-settlement agreement. Second, the
agreement now explicitly provides that the settlement class members
do not release any claims for money damages, injunctive or
equitable relief, or other form of relief. Third, Samsung now
retains sole discretion to make the replacement part available for
purchase by the class member, but if Samsung declines to provide
the part, the class member could then choose between exchanging the
television or receiving a refund.
At the hearing on the October settlement, both Samsung and the
Plaintiffs' counsel explained the reason why the October settlement
was structured in this way. Only one plasma panel remains. So,
this structure will enable Samsung to keep the lone remaining panel
"available" to authorized service and repair centers, in attempted
compliance with Section 1793.03(b). But then Samsung will exercise
its discretion to decline to sell the part, thereby giving the
consumer the choice as to whether they will exchange the television
or seek a refund
This explanation, however, was not described anywhere in the
agreement or in the notices. This deficiency was eventually fixed.
Specifically, both notices now provide that Samsung intends to
exercise its discretion so that class members will be able to
exercise this choice of receiving either an exchange or refund.
In addition, at the hearing on the October settlement, the Court
informed the parties that the notices were not sufficiently clear,
and directed the parties to make certain changes, including adding
the following paragraph to both notices: "Under the settlement, the
named Plaintiff will receive $6,000 and counsel will ask for
$487,000 in fees. Another named Plaintiff herein also received
$6,000 in settling these same claims. You, however, will receive
no cash but your claims for damages will not be released. This
means that even though you will receive no money under this deal,
you are free to bring your own claim on your own against Samsung,
or, on behalf of the class or if someone else possibly brings a new
class claim, to participate in that class action. From the date of
the original lawsuit (April 17, 2018) until the date of this
notice, the statute of limitations has been suspended. Now,
however, the statute of limitations period will begin to run again.
Thus, if you'd like to bring your own lawsuit, you must do so
before the statute of limitations runs on your claim (assuming it
is not already barred). You will, however, be the beneficiary of
aspects of the settlement agreement, namely authorized repair
facilities will make the part to fix your plasma television
available to you for purchase. The Court has not given final
approval to this settlement. If you want to object, you may do so
provided you follow the procedures stated elsewhere in this notice.
The Court will decide whether to give final approval on (TBD),
2019 and would appreciate your views."
The parties revised and re-submitted the October settlement
agreement and the notices, to comply with this direction. The
revised October settlement makes three noteworthy revisions.
First, the Plaintiffs' counsel will file annual statements by
October 15 of every year until the injunctive relief period runs
(Nov. 30, 2021). Second, the Plaintiffs' counsel will provide the
preliminary approval order, the settlement agreement, and both
forms of notices to a third-party website that regularly provides
information to the public on class actions and class action
settlements. Third, the short-form notice will be published within
45 days of the preliminary approval order. The long-form notice
will be published within 15 days of preliminary approval.
To summarize, in August 2019, an order held the fully-briefed
litigation class-certification order in abeyance. Plaintiff Hardin
moved for preliminary approval of a class-settlement in September
2019. An order denied preliminary approval. In October 2019,
Plaintiff Hardin moved for preliminary approval of a new
settlement. After a hearing, the October settlement was further
revised. The parties also made Court-directed changes to the
notices.
To the following extent, Judge Alsup granted the Plaintiffs' motion
for class certification for settlement purposes. He denied as moot
the prior motion for class certification for litigation purposes.
He certfied the class, for purposes of settlement, defined as any
resident of the State of California who owns a Samsung plasma
television model PN51F5500, PN51F5300, or PN51F5350 ("Affected
Models"), that exhibits a "line" issue that requires a replacement
plasma display panel assembly ("PDP"). Plaintiff Crystal Hardin is
appointed as the class representative, and the Plaintiffs' counsel,
Paul Rothstein and Kyla Alexander, as the class counsel.
The Judge preliminarily approved terms of the parties' settlement
agreement as being fair, reasonable and adequate to the members of
the class, subject to further consideration at the final approval
hearing. The motion for preliminary approval of the settlement is
granted. Both proposed forms of notice for the class are
approved.
Consistent with the revised October settlement, the long-form
notice should be published on the settlement website by Nov. 15,
2019. The short-form notice should be published no later than Dec.
16, 2019. By Dec. 19, 2019, the Plaintiff will file her motion for
attorney's fees and costs, which must also be published on the
settlement website.
The deadline for filing objections to the settlement is Jan. 31,
2020. The parties will respond to any objections to the settlement
by Feb. 13, 2020. By this same date, the parties will file a
motion for final approval of the class settlement. A Fairness
Hearing is set for Feb. 27, 2020 at 11:00 a.m. The final pretrial
conference and trial dates are vacated and will be reset if final
approval is not granted.
A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 1, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/dECzNk from Leagle.com.
Alexis Bronson, Plaintiff, represented by Kyla V. Alexander --
Kyla.tm@rothsteinforjustice.com -- pro hac vice, Peter Y. Lee,
Attorney Peter Y. Lee, pro hac vice, Paul Rothstein --
PSR@Rothsteinforjustice.com -- pro hac vice & Alan J. Sherwood --
alansherwood@earthlink.net -- Law Office of of Alan J. Sherwood.
Crystal Hardin, Plaintiff, represented by Kyla V. Alexander, pro
hac vice, Paul Rothstein, pro hac vice & Alan J. Sherwood, Law
Office of of Alan J. Sherwood.
Samsung Electronics America, Inc. & Samsung Electronics Co., LTD.,
Defendants, represented by Shannon Suzanne Broome --
sbroome@HuntonAK.com -- Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP, Beth Sharon
Coplowitz -- bcoplowitz@HuntonAK.com -- Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP,
Michael J. Mueller -- mmueller@HuntonAK.com -- Hunton Andrews
Kurth
LLP & Thomas Richard Waskom -- twaskom@HuntonAK.com -- Hunton
Andrews Kurth LLP.
SAN DIEGO, CA: 9th Cir. Upholds Certification Denial in D.C. Suit
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In the case, D.C., a minor by and through his Guardian Ad Litem,
Helen Garter, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 18-55853 (9th Cir.), the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
denial of the Plaintiff's motion to certify a liability-only
class.
D.C., on his own behalf and on behalf of others similarly situated,
brought the action against the County of San Diego, under 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983, for violation of his constitutional rights. He now
appeals the district court's denial of his motion to certify a
liability-only class. He contends that determination of the
question of liability on the claims he seeks to advance could fit
comfortably within the ambit of Rule 23(c)(4).
Notwithstanding any success D.C. might have in advancing
liability-only class claims against the County -- and his burden
has very likely been lightened by the decision in Mann v. County
of San Diego, 907 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2018) -- the Ninth Circuit
holds that certification of such a class would be "appropriate"
only if the adjudication of the certified issues would
significantly advance the resolution of the underlying case,
thereby achieving judicial economy and efficiency.
Consideration of D.C.'s request for certification of a
liability-only class cannot be divorced from the impact the
certification decision might have on the resolution of class
claims. In his complaint, D.C. alleges that he and other putative
class members suffered damages for, inter alia, emotional distress,
humiliation, and loss of "human dignity" resulting from the
County's overly intrusive physical examinations of them.
The district court found that, regardless of any resolution of
issues a liability-only class might afford, individualized injuries
of each class member would still potentially require tens of
thousands of trials. It was appropriate for the district court to
bring its practical assessment and broader perspective to its
consideration of D.C.'s request for certification of a
liability-only class. Although the Court is mindful that
individualized questions of damages cannot alone defeat class
certification, the Plaintiffs seeking certification must
nevertheless carry their burden of showing damages are capable of
efficient calculation.
The district court correctly recognized and applied this standard
in considering D.C.'s request for certification of a Rule 23(c)(4)
liability-only class, finding, within the bounds of its discretion,
that D.C. failed to show that damages could be efficiently
calculated on a class-wide basis following success in the liability
phase of the litigation. Based on its finding that certification
of a liability-only class would not significantly advance the
resolution of the class claims, the district court did not abuse
its discretion by denying D.C.'s motion for certification of a
liability-only class.
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's Nov. 5, 2019 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/xL1hkP from Leagle.com.
SCOTT FARMS: Court Certifies AWPA, NCWHA Classes in Mondragon Suit
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The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina, Western Division issued Order granting Parties' Joint
Motion for Class Action Certification in the case captioned RICARDO
MONDRAGON, EUSTORGIO ESPINOBARROS FELICIANO, JUAN CONTRERAS,
CUTBERTO ORTIZ HERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO JIMENEZ GONZALEZ, RENATO ROMERO
ACUNA, JOSE TAPIA, ANASTACIO LOPEZ SOLIS, and ABDON QUIRASCO
SIXTECO, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated
persons, Plaintiffs, v. SCOTT FARMS, INC., ALICE H. SCOTT, LINWOOD
H. SCOTT, JR., LINWOOD H. SCOTT III, DEWEY R. SCOTT, JFT HARVESTING
INC., JUAN F. TORRES OASIS HARVESTING, INC., and RAMIRO B. TORRES,
Defendants, Case No.: 5:17-cv-356-FL (E.D.N.C.).
This matter came before the Court on the parties' joint motion for
class action certification.
In the Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs Espinobarros Feliciano,
Contreras, Romero Acuna and Quirasco Sixteco (FLSA plaintiffs)
assert an FLSA collective action seeking payment of back wages and
liquidated damages under 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b) based upon the
defendants' alleged failure to pay FLSA plaintiffs and the members
of the collective action that they sought to represent the overtime
rate required by Section 207(a) of the FLSA.
Plaintiffs also alleged two separate class actions under the North
Carolina Wage and Hour Act (NCWHA), and an additional class action
claim under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Workers
Protection Act (AWPA).
The Plaintiffs and Defendants have negotiated a settlement
agreement in this action which includes relief on a class wide
basis for the Plaintiffs' claims under the AWPA and NCWHA for
Defendants' alleged failure to pay the AEWR, and relief for a
collective action of similarly situated employees for Plaintiffs'
overtime claims under the FLSA.
Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, the parties now seek to
certify two classes. First, the parties move the Court, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, to certify a class represented
by all Plaintiffs defined as follows:
All non-H-2A migrant and seasonal agricultural workers (as the
terms migrant agricultural worker and seasonal agricultural worker
are defined in 29 U.S.C. Sections 1802(8) and 1802(10) and 29
C.F.R. Sections 500.20(p) and 500.20(r)) who were employed by one
or more of the Defendants to perform any job task listed in the
H-2A clearance order or any job task actually performed by any H-2A
worker at Scott Farms from September 15, 2014 through August 14,
2019.
This class will be referred to as the AWPA Class.
Second, the parties move the Court, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23, to certify a class represented by all
Plaintiffs defined as follows:
All non-H-2A farmworkers who were employed by one or more of the
Defendants when, during the time period covered by an H-2A
clearance order for work to be performed at Scott Farms, they
performed any job task listed in the H-2A clearance order or any
job task actually performed by any H-2A worker at Scott Farms from
July 17, 2015 to August 14, 2019.
This class will be referred to as the NCWHA #1 Class.
The parties seeking class certification must still meet the four
prerequisites of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a)(1) through
(4) and then must establish that they constitute a proper class of
at least one of the types delineated in Rules 23(b)(1) through (3).
Named Plaintiffs are Members of and have Precisely Defined the
Class They Seeks to Represent
This class will be referred to as the AWPA Class. Each Plaintiff
claims that he worked for Defendants as a seasonal agricultural
worker during the relevant time period. Plaintiffs also alleged
that each of them worked in positions constituting corresponding
employment with H-2A workers during the period in question.
Therefore, they are all members of the AWPA Class that they seek to
represent.
The Plaintiffs are non H-2A farmworkers employed by Scott Farms
Inc. and allege that they performed work in corresponding
employment to H-2A workers during the relevant time period. Thus,
again, they are members of the NCWHA Class #1 they seek to
represent.
Each of the classes are sufficiently precise and Plaintiffs are
members of these classes.
The Numerosity, Commonality, Typicality and Adequacy Requirements
of Rule 23(a) are Satisfied with regard to the Classes.
The AWPA and NCWHA Classes are sufficiently numerous and joinder is
impracticable.
The numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P., mandates
that the class be so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable.
The proposed AWPA settlement class includes 122 people who worked
for Defendants. The proposed NCWHA #1 settlement class includes 189
people. Although there are a sufficient number of putative class
members to establish numerosity, this Court's analysis should not
be limited to numbers alone.
Because the number of class members is sufficient and the
circumstances do not make joinder a practical alternative, the
class meets the Rule 23(a)(1) standard for numerosity.
There are common questions of law and fact.
Under the commonality requirements of Rule 23(a)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P.,
at least one common question of law or fact must exist among class
members.
Here, named Plaintiffs and the other putative class members were
all paid on an hourly basis and share common questions of law or
fact for each of the respective classes.
For the AWPA class, the common questions of law or fact include
whether the Defendants provided false information to the class
members about the availability of H-2A positions and how much class
members were owed for that work and whether Defendants paid class
members less than the AEWR while employing H-2A workers.
For the NCWHA Class #1 class, the common questions of law or fact
are whether Defendants are joint employers of H-2A workers and the
class members, whether class members performed the same authorized
or unauthorized task as H-2A workers, and whether Defendants failed
to pay class members a promised rate while they employed H-2A
workers.
Therefore, the commonality requirement is satisfied.
The named Plaintiffs' claims are typical of those of the Class
Rule 23(a)(3) requires that the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defense of the
class.
The allegations in Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint meet the
requirements of Rule 23(a)(3) with respect to each of the Classes.
The named Plaintiffs' claims and the claims of the respective Class
members arise from the same practices and course of conduct by
Defendants.
The named Plaintiffs and the members of the proposed AWPA Class and
proposed NCWHA Class #1 were all employees of Defendants and all
allegedly performed work in corresponding employment during the
relevant time period.
The claims of the named Plaintiffs and proposed Class members are
based on the same legal theory. Therefore, the named Plaintiffs
have established that the claims under the AWPA and the NCWHA are
typical of the claims of the Classes each seeks to represent.
The Named Plaintiffs are Adequate Representatives of the Class
Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the representative parties will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Plaintiffs have a common interest with class members in the
litigation, possess a personal financial stake in the outcome,
consulted regularly with Class Counsel, were involved with the
discovery responses by responding to written discovery and,
additionally, three named plaintiffs were deposed, and five of the
named Plaintiffs participated in person in a lengthy mediation to
resolve these claims, while the other named Plaintiffs were
available by phone.
In addition, under the arrangement between named Plaintiffs and
counsel, all expenses incident to class certification can be
advanced to the named Plaintiffs by counsel for the Plaintiffs,
with the named Plaintiffs remaining ultimately liable for such
costs in the event that the Court rejects either the Settlement
Agreement or Plaintiffs request and motion that the expenses
involved in providing notice to the class be paid for by the
Defendants.
Lastly, Robert Willis, Carol Brooke, and Clermont Ripley, counsel
for the named Plaintiffs, are experienced counsel who have
previously been counsel in class action litigation, including class
litigation involving identical claims as asserted in the instant
case.
The Class Satisfies the Requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).
Class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) requires that common issues
of law or fact predominate over individual issues and that the
class action be the superior method of dealing with the dispute.
The proposed class satisfies the requirements of (b)(3) for the
reasons already stated above in the memorandum of law submitted in
support of the Motion. Based on the allegations in the Complaint,
certification of the AWPA Class and the NCWHA Class #1 is
appropriate under Rule 23(b)(3). The legal and factual issues
described in paragraphs 146-51, 152-57, 158-63, of the Third
Amended Complaint predominate over any individual issues of law and
fact for any Plaintiff class member.
Because Plaintiff and members of the AWPA Class and the NCWHA
Classes were all employed by the same corporate employer, Scott
Farms, Inc., that maintained payroll records and employee data for
the entire time period covered by the classes, the management of a
class action under Rule 23(b)(3) in this matter should not present
any difficulties.
Accordingly, the parties Joint Motion for Certification of
Settlement Classes is GRANTED, rules the Court.
A full-text copy of the District Court's November 18, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/tr992jn from Leagle.com
Ricardo Mondragon, Eustorgio Espinobarros Feliciano, Juan
Contreras, Cutberto Ortiz Hernandez, Alejandro Jimenez Gonzalez,
Renato Romero Acuna & Jose Tapia, Plaintiffs, represented by
Clermont Fraser Ripley - clermont@ncjustice.org - North Carolina
Justice Center, Robert J. Willis-
robertjwillisattorneync.net - & Carol L. Brooke , North Carolina
Justice Center, 224 S. Dawson St , Raleigh, NC 27601.
Anastacio Lopez Solis & Abdon Quirasco Sixteco, Plaintiffs,
represented by Carol L. Brooke , North Carolina Justice Center.
Scott Farms, Inc., Alice H. Scott, Linwood H. Scott, Jr., Linwood
H. Scott III & Dewey R. Scott, Defendants, represented by F.
Marshall Wall - mwall@cshlaw.com - Cranfill Sumner & Hartzog LLP &
Laura E. Dean - ldean@cshlaw.com - Cranfill Sumner & Hartzog.
JFT Harvesting, Inc., Juan F. Torres, Oasis Harvesting, Inc. &
Ramiro B. Torres, Defendants, represented by Andrew Miller Jackson
, Andrew M. Jackson, Attorney at Law, 407 College Street
Clinton, NC 28328.
SETTON PISTACHIO: Ordered to Submit Supplemental Declaration
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued Order requiring Submission of Supplemental
Declaration of Damage Model in the case captioned LILIA ALI, on
behalf of herself and all similarly aggrieved employees, Plaintiff,
v. SETTON PISTACHIO OF TERRA BELLA, INC. and DOES 1 through 100,
inclusive, Defendants, No. 1:19-cv-00959-LJO-BAM (E.D. Cal.).
Before the Court is Lilia Ali's motion to remand to state court.
Plaintiff's lawsuit was originally filed on April 27, 2016 in
Tulare County Superior Court alleging wage violations under
California Law. Plaintiff subsequently amended the complaint on
August 1, 2016. On July 12, 2019, Defendant, Setton Pistachio of
Terra Bella, Inc., filed a notice of removal to federal court under
the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Plaintiff
asserts that the lawsuit must be remanded because Defendant's
removal of the case was untimely. Defendant contends that the time
to remove the case has not expired or begun to run because minimal
diversity of citizenship was not readily apparent on the face of
the complaint or the FAC. Similarly, the parties dispute when the
amount in controversy was disclosed to Defendant. Plaintiff asserts
that the amount in controversy was disclosed during mediation on
June 28, 2017 in the form of a "damages model" provided to
Defendant. Defendant contends that it never received this document
and that it only learned of the amount in controversy in an email
from defense counsel on June 14, 2019. The parties do not otherwise
dispute that the requirements under CAFA for removal are met.
To resolve the factual dispute on the issue of timeliness, the
Court orders Plaintiff to file a declaration, and for Defendant to
file a responsive declaration, consistent with this order.
In addition to responding to Plaintiff's declaration, Defendant
shall address the date that Defendant learned from its own
investigation that minimal diversity was present.
LEGAL STANDARD
28 U.S.C. Section 1441(a) provides that civil actions brought in
state court may be removed when the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction.
CAFA provides expanded original diversity jurisdiction for class
actions meeting the amount in controversy, minimal diversity, and
numerosity requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d).
Where a party seeks to invoke federal jurisdiction under CAFA, the
party must show (1) minimal diversity that at least one plaintiff
is diverse in citizenship from any defendant, (2) the putative
class is comprised of at least 100 members, and (3) that the amount
in controversy exceeds $5,000,000 exclusive of costs and interest.
The question presented is whether the damages model, purportedly
given to Defendant during mediation in June 2017 constitutes an
other paper that placed Defendant on notice that the case was
removable. Next, if the document constitutes an other paper, the
Court must determine whether it was received by the Defendant,
through service or otherwise.
The damages model constitutes an other paper for purposes of
Section 1446(b)
Plaintiff relies on Babasa, 498 F.3d at 975, claiming that the
damages model constituted sufficient Section 1446 notice of the
amount in controversy.
Notice of removability is determined through examination of the
four corners of the applicable pleadings, not through subjective
knowledge or a duty to make further inquiry.
In the present case, the damages model contains six categories of
claims: uneven rounding, regular rate of pay, meal and rest break
violations, derivative claims (including wage statement violation),
interest, and Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) civil penalties.
Under each category, Plaintiff gives a brief description of the
claim and calculates the Defendant's exposure under the claim. For
instance, under Uneven Rounding, the document outlines the
calculations and then states: Total Exposure for Uneven Rounding
$623,361.68.
Defendant argues that, even assuming it had notice of the damages
model, the meal and rest break calculations are not alleged in the
FAC so these figures cannot be included in the total. In this way,
Defendant suggests that the damages model was not capable of
putting it on notice of removability.
But, even when the meal and rest break totals are not considered,
the total amount of damages is well over the amount in controversy.
The FAC does allege a wage statement violation and the damages
calculation based upon that claim alone exceeds $5 million.
Defendant relatedly suggests that, again assuming it had notice of
the damages model, the amount disclosed in the damage model was
completely unreasonable at that time. Among other things, Defendant
suggests that the class allegations were never as strong as boldly
presented at the mediation. But, Defendant fails to explain why the
damages calculation was so completely unreasonable at the time of
mediation, but nonetheless provides the primary basis for its
calculation of damages in its notice of removal.
The Court finds Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the
damages model was so unreasonable as to have been incapable of
putting it on notice.
There is a factual dispute about whether the defendant received the
document by service or otherwise.
Plaintiff's counsel claims to have provided the damages model to
the mediator and defense counsel at the June 28, 2017 mediation.
Defense counsel claims that the defense never received the damages
model at the June 2017 mediation. Instead, Anthony Raimondo,
counsel for Defendant at the time of the June 2017 mediation,
stated that he received a $25 million demand communicated by the
mediator, but that the mediator indicated he could not understand
the Plaintiff's calculation of damages.
A motion to remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is the
functional equivalent of a motion to dismiss on the same ground
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) seeks to dismiss a claim
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. But when a Rule 12(b)(1)
motion raises a factual attack, a court may weigh the evidence
presented and determine the facts in order to evaluate whether they
have power to hear the case.
Defendant's objection to evidence in Nourmand Declaration is
well-taken
Defendant filed an objection to Mr. Nourmand's assertion that he
provided a damages model to the mediator and defense counsel,
claiming the assertion lacks foundation under Federal Rules of
Evidence 101 and 602. Defendant contends that Mr. Nourmand's
declaration does not set forth facts about how Mr. Nourmand has
knowledge that Defendant received the damages model when the
parties were separated from each other during the mediation.
Only admissible evidence may be considered by the trial court in
ruling on a fact-based motion to dismiss.
Federal Rule of Evidence 602 provides that a witness may testify to
a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a
finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter."
Mr. Raimondo asserts that the parties were separated during the
June 2017 mediation and that defense counsel only spoke directly
with the mediator. Plaintiff's briefing and Mr. Nourmand's
declaration do not attempt to dispute this fact. If defense counsel
and Plaintiff's counsel never met, then Mr. Nourmand's declaration
that defense counsel received the damages model would lack
foundation.
In light of this factual dispute, the Court orders Plaintiff to
file a declaration to clarify its assertion that Plaintiff's
counsel provided a damages model to the mediator and defense
counsel.
The Court is unable to determine when the Defendant became aware
that minimal diversity existed
Plaintiff does not contest the existence of minimal diversity of
citizenship and instead argues only that the notice was untimely.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant failed to provide evidence that it
timely removed after discovering the class members' citizenship and
at the latest Defendant knew of the class members' citizenship when
the class list was disclosed on December 26, 2017.
The Defendant has not established the date when it purportedly
learned through its investigation that minimal diversity was
present. If the Defendant contends that the 30-day period initiated
when it discovered the existence of minimal diversity, then
Defendant will need to present evidence of this date because the
burden of proof remains with the Defendant to demonstrate that the
notice of removal is timely, rules the Court.
A full-text copy of the District Court's November 18, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/wcslzrc Leagle.com
Lilia Ali, on behalf of herself and all similarly aggrieved
employees, Plaintiff, represented by James A. De Sario -
jdesario@nourmandlawfirm.com - The Nourmand Law Firm, APC, Michael
Nourmand - mnourmand@nourmandlawfirm.com - The Nourmand Law Firm,
APC, Kevin T. Barnes , Law Offices Of Kevin T. Barnes, 1635 Pontius
Ave2nd FloorLos Angeles, CA 90025 & Melissa Misao Kurata -
mkurata@nourmandlawfirm.com - The Nourmand Law Firm, APC.
Setton Pistachio of Terra Bella, Inc., a California Corporation,
Defendant, represented by Gerardo Hernandez, Jr. -
gvh@raimondoassociates.com - Raimondo & Associates, , Steven R.
Wainess , Raimondo & Associates, 7110 N Marks Ave. Suite 104Fresno,
CA 93711 & Anthony Peter Raimondo - APR@raimondoassociates.com -
Raimondo & Associates.
Applicant-Intervenors One Through Fifteen, Intervenor, represented
by Yesenia Zamora Carrillo - yesenia@hatmakerlaw.com - Hatmaker Law
Group.
SHNIPPER RESTAURANTS: $330K Alvarez Suit Deal Denied w/o Prejudice
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned MARTIN ALVAREZ a/k/a EDUARDO LOPEZ, on behalf
of himself, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and the Class, Plaintiff, v.
SHNIPPER RESTAURANTS LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 16 Civ. 5779
(ER) (S.D. N.Y.), Judge Edgardo Ramos of the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York denied without prejudice the
Plaintiffs' request for approval of the proposed settlement.
The Plaintiff brought the action on behalf of himself and those
similarly situated against the Defendants, claiming violations of
the Fair Labor Standards Act and of New York Labor Law.
Schnipper's Quality Kitchen, owned by Andrew and Jonathan
Schnipper, has four locations throughout New York. Alvarez asserts
that he was employed as a delivery person for Schnipper's Times
Square from May 2013 until May 2016. Alvarez claims that during
his employment, he also worked at the three other locations of
Schnipper's Quality Kitchen. During Alvarez's employment, he
claims he was paid at a rate between $5 and $7.50 per hour and did
not receive notice that the Defendants were taking a tip credit
until August 2014. He was also required to engage in nontipped
work for over 20% of his work day. Alvarez also alleges that he
never received a proper wage and hour notice from Defendants and
did not receive proper wage statements each month. According to
Alvarez, other non-managerial tipped employees were subject to the
same policies and practices.
Alvarez retained Lee Litigation Group, PLLC to represent himself
and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class members and filed the
action on July 20, 2016. The Defendants filed an answer on Nov. 9,
2016. On Dec. 12, 2017, the Court granted conditional
certification of the FLSA class. Fifteen individuals opted-in to
become party Plaintiffs. Following private mediation on Sept. 7,
2018, the parties reached a class settlement. On Dec. 17, 2018,
the Plaintiffs filed the instant unopposed motion for preliminary
approval of the class settlement and related relief.
The Settlement Agreement reached by the parties provides that
Defendants will pay up to $330,000 to settle fully and finally all
Released Claims in the Litigation. At minimum, the Defendants will
pay an amount sufficient to satisfy the Claimed Net Settlement
Fund, payment of Service Award, payment of the Settlement
Administrator's fees and Payment of Class Counsel's Legal Fees and
Costs. The Defendants will deposit the sum in installments into a
qualified settlement fund, to be established and controlled by a
settlement claims administrator, Rust Consulting. The Class
Members will be mailed notice of the settlement agreement with
information about how they can either participate in the settlement
or exclude themselves from or object to the settlement. Those who
file a valid claim form will receive a settlement check based on
weeks worked within the class period.
Additionally, Alvarez can petition the Court for $7,500 as a
service award from the fund. The settlement claims administrator
will receive $15,000. The Class Counsel may also apply for
reimbursement from the fund. The Court will have the opportunity
to approve the amount of fees and costs paid to the class counsel,
who will file a motion for approval of attorneys' fees and costs
prior to the final settlement approval hearing. The Class counsel
will seek fees totaling one-third of the settlement fund.
The Settlement Agreement provides that within 15 days of the
Court's preliminary approval, the Defendants will provide the
settlement administrator with the name, telephone number, social
security number, and last known address of all the class members in
electronic form. Fifteen days after that, the settlement claims
administrator will mail all the class members the Court-approved
settlement notice and claim form. From that point, the settlement
class members will have sixty days to either submit a claim form,
opt out of the settlement agreement, or mail written objections to
the settlement administrator. Anyone who does not opt-out will be
deemed to have accepted the settlement and will release all
relevant claims. The Settlement Agreement also provides for a
fairness hearing before the Court before final approval of the
settlement.
Judge Ramos finds that probable cause does not exist to hold a
full-scale hearing as to the fairness of the Settlement Agreement
for four reasons. First, Alvarez's release is far too broad and
goes well beyond the claims at issue in the litigation. Second,
the Settlement Agreement has a confidentiality clause that contains
both non-disclosure and non-disparagement provisions. Third, the
Plaintiffs argue that the settlement amount is fair because it
represents a good value given the attendant risks of litigation.
Finally, the Settlement Agreement provides that the settlement
checks will be allocated 25% to W-2 wage payments and 75% to 1099
non-wage payments for interest, liquidated damages and statutory
penalties.
For the foregoing reasons, Judge Ramos must therefore deny the
Plaintiff's motion for preliminary approval. Because the proposed
notice and schedule for final settlement approval are dependent on
preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement, Judge Ramos
declines to consider these at this juncture.
The Plaintiff also seeks conditional certification of a Rule 23
Class for the purposes of facilitating a settlement. The
Plaintiffs seek to certify the following class under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23, for settlement purposes: "Named Plaintiff,
Opt-in Plaintiffs and all individuals who worked as delivery
employees for any of the Corporate Defendants from July 20, 2010
through the date of preliminary approval." The Defendants do not
oppose class certification for the purposes of achieving settlement
and therefore do not contest that the requirements for class
certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 have been
met.
Judge Ramos finds that, based on the information presently before
it, the Plaintiffs meet the requirements for class certification.
The Plaintiffs satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(1)
because there are approximately 225 class members, rendering
joinder impracticable. They satisfy Rule 23(a)(4)'s "adequacy of
representation" inquiry because Alvarez's interests are not
antagonistic to or at odds with those of the settlement class
members. The Plaintiffs also satisfy Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(3), as common factual allegations and a common
legal theory predominate over any factual or legal variations among
the Class Members.
The Plaintiffs also seek conditional certification of a FLSA
collective action. They argue that they are similarly situated
because they were not paid proper minimum wages due to invalid tip
credit. The Judge finds that the Plaintiffs are likely entitled to
conditional certification as an FLSA collective action.
Finally, the adequacy of the class counsel is also not contested at
this stage. Judge Ramos finds that appointment of C.K. Lee of Lee
Litigation Group PLLC as the class counsel is likely warranted
because counsel has performed substantial work identifying,
investigating, and settling the Plaintiffs' and the class members'
claims.
Based on the foregoing, Judge Ramos denied without prejudice the
Plaintiffs' request for approval of the proposed settlement.
A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 1, 2019 Opinion & Order is
available at https://is.gd/HAemoM from Leagle.com.
Martin Alvarez, on behalf of himself, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs
and the Class, Plaintiff, represented by Anne Melissa Seelig --
anne@leelitigation.com -- Lee Litigation Group, PLLC & C.K. Lee --
cklee@leelitigation.com -- Lee Litigation Group, PLLC.
Audencio Maldonado Sanchez, Federico Parrales Zambrano, Francisco
Tipaz, Hermenegildo Mendez, Isaias Gonzalez, Marcelo Ordaz,
Maurilio De Los Santos, Mohammed A Ahad, Nicolas Mendez Avila,
Valentin Florencio, Daniel Najera, Javier Galabay, Emmanuel
Dominguez, Israel Reyes & Mahboob U Chowdhury, Plaintiffs,
represented by C.K. Lee, Lee Litigation Group, PLLC.
Schnipper Restaurants LLC, SRG1 LLC, doing business as Schnipper's
Quality Kitchen, SRG2 LLC, doing business as Schnipper's Quality
Kitchen, SRG 570 Lex LLC, doing business as Schnipper's Quality
Kitchen, SRG NYP LLC, doing business as Schnipper's Quality
Kitchen, Andrew Schnipper & Jonathan Schnipper, Defendants,
represented by Felice B. Ekelman -- Felice.Ekelman@jacksonlewis.com
-- Jackson Lewis P.C., Douglas Joseph Klein --
Douglas.Klein@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis P.C. & Paul J.
Rutigliano -- paul.rutigliano@akerman.com -- Meister Seelig & Fein
LLP.
SI 40 LLC: Fails to Return Security Deposits, Mercado Suit Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
BRIAN MERCADO, an individual and on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. SI 40 LLC, a California
limited liability company; ALLIANCE COMMUNITIES, INC., a Delaware
corporation; and DOES 1 through 8, Defendants, Case No. 19CV358667
(Cal. Super., Nov. 18, 2019), arises from the Defendants' failure
to return security deposits to the Plaintiff and other lessees.
The Plaintiff was a resident of the property owned and managed by
the SI 40. The property is located at 431 El Camino Real, in Santa
Clara, California.
According to the complaint, the Plaintiff and Class Members entered
into lease agreement with the Defendants. Each of those lease
agreements provide that the Landlord agrees to return the security
deposit in compliance with the Civil Code section 1950.5 after full
possession of the Premises has been recovered.
The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants have avoided return of
security deposits and have failed to reimburse the Plaintiff and
Class Members as required by law in connection with lease
agreement.
As a direct and legal result of the Defendants' unfair and unlawful
business practice, the Defendants have reaped unfair and illegal
profits during the Class Period at the expense of Plaintiff and
Class Members and members of the public, the Plaintiff says. He
contends that the Defendants should be made to disgorge their
ill-gotten gains and to restore them to him and Class Members. He
argues that the Defendants' unfair and unlawful business practices
entitle him and Class Members to restitution of all moneys to be
disgorged from the Defendants in an amount according to proof at
trial.
The Plaintiff and Class Members are also entitled to interest,
expense, costs and reasonable attorneys' fees as provided by law,
including California Code of Civil Procedure, the lawsuit says.
Alliance Communities is a real estate company.
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Daniel Muller, Esq.
Kornbluh Davidi, Esq.
VENTURA HERSEY & MULLER, LLP
15o6 Hamilton Avenue
San Jose, CA 95125-4539
Telephone: 408 512 3022
Facsimile: 408 512 3023
E-mail: dmuller@venturahersey.com
dkornbluh@venturahersey.com
SIGNET JEWELERS: Seeks 2nd Cir. Review of Decision in Dube Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Signet Jewelers Limited, et al., filed an appeal from a
court ruling in the lawsuit styled Susan Dube, et al. v. Signet
Jewelers Limited, et al., Case No. 16-cv-6728, in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York.
The appellate case is captioned as Susan Dube and Lyubomir Spasov,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Nebil
Aydin; Scopia Windmill Fund LP; Scopia PX LLC; Scopia PX
International Master Fund LP; Scopia Partners LLC; Scopia Long QP
LLC; Scopia Long LLC; Scopia Long International Master Fund LP;
Scopia LB LLC; Scopia LB International Master Fund LP; Scopia
International Master Fund LP; Marcato LP; Marcato International
Master Fund, LTD., Plaintiffs; Public Employees Retirement System
of Mississippi, Plaintiff-Appellee; and Irving Firemen's Relief &
Retirement System, Intervenor v. Signet Jewelers Limited; Mark
Light; Michele Santana; Michael Barnes; Ronald Ristau; and Virginia
C. Drosos, Defendants-Appellants, Case No. 19-3837, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on Aug. 30,
2019, District Court Judge Colleen McMahon granted the Plaintiff's
motion for class certification.
The putative securities fraud class action is typical in all
respects save one: it is really two securities fraud class actions
that have been joined in a single complaint, because two entirely
separate sets of non-disclosures occurred during the same time
period. This irregularity makes the case somewhat unique
but--despite suggestions to the contrary--far from extraordinary.
Before and during the class period, Signet operated an in-house
credit program, run through its wholly owned subsidiary, Sterling
Jewelers, Inc., whereby it extended credit to its customers for
jewelry purchases. Over the course of the Class Period, Signet's
credit program was the subject of extensive public disclosures,
which included key metrics associated with the program (e.g.,
accounts receivable, allowances for credit losses, charge offs, and
net bad debt expense figures) and Signet's methods for calculating
those numbers.
The Defendants also represented at various points--both orally and
in Signet's SEC filings--that they closely monitored Signet's
lending operation, and that its credit portfolio was healthy.
Among other things, the Defendants repeatedly characterized
Signet's credit program as "strong" or "very strong"; described the
portfolio as being "conservatively managed," "so well managed," and
"watched very closely"; and stated that the company "does not push
the credit" on its customers, and that it "would never cross that
line." The Defendants further conveyed the purported strength of
Signet's loan portfolio by reporting very low loan loss reserves
throughout the Class Period--ranging from 6.5% to 7.8% of Signet's
receivables--which allegedly enabled Signet to meet earnings
estimates for eleven straight fiscal quarters.
According to the Plaintiff, these representations were false or
misleading, because Signet's underwriting practices were, in fact,
reckless, and its loan portfolio was of exceedingly poor quality.
In addition to these allegations regarding Signet's underwriting
processes, the Plaintiff also alleges that Signet materially
understated the reserves for its loan portfolio and its related bad
debt expenses, thereby materially overstating its income. Central
to their fraud, the Plaintiff submits, was the company's decision
to use a less common method for aging accounts receivable called
the "recency" method. According to the Plaintiff, using the
recency method enabled the Defendants to disguise the risk
associated with Signet's credit portfolio.
On March 22, 2018, Lead Plaintiff the Public Employees' Retirement
System of Mississippi filed the Fifth Amended Complaint ("FAC"),
the operative complaint in the action, against Defendants Signet
and five of Signet's corporate officers, including former CEO and
director Michael Barnes; former CEO and director Mark Light;
current CEO and director Virginia Drosos; former CFO Ronald Ristau.
It alleged that the Defendants were liable for violations of
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder, and Section 20(a) of the Act based upon the
events described.
Signet Jewelers Ltd. is the world's largest retailer of diamond
jewellery. The company is domiciled in Bermuda and headquartered in
Akron, Ohio, and is listed on the New York Stock Exchange.[BN]
Plaintiff-Appellee Public Employees Retirement System of
Mississippi is represented by:
John James Rizio-Hamilton, Esq.
BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMANN LLP
1251 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10020
Telephone: (212) 554-1505
E-mail: johnr@blbglaw.com
Intervenor Irving Firemen's Relief & Retirement System is
represented by:
David Avi Rosenfeld, Esq.
ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
58 South Service Road
Melville, NY 11747
Telephone: (619) 231-1058
E-mail: DRosenfeld@rgrdlaw.com
Defendants-Appellants Signet Jewelers Limited, Mark Light, Michele
Santana, Michael Barnes, Ronald Ristau, and Virginia C. Drosos are
represented by:
Joseph Allerhand, Esq.
WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP
767 5th Avenue
New York, NY 10153
Telephone: (212) 310-8725
E-mail: joseph.allerhand@weil.com
SMILEDIRECTCLUB INC: Andre Securities Suit Moved to M.D. Tennessee
------------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit styled as RICHARD ANDRE, Individually and
On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff v.
SMILEDIRECTCLUB, INC., DAVID KATZMAN, KYLE WAILES, STEVEN KATZMAN,
JORDAN KATZMAN, ALEXANDER FENKELL, RICHARD SCHNALL, SUSAN GREENSPON
RAMMELT, J.P. MORGAN SECURITIES LLC, CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS INC.,
BOFA SECURITIES, INC., JEFFERIES LLC, UBS SECURITIES LLC, CREDIT
SUISSE SECURITIES (USA) LLC, GUGGENHEIM SECURITIES, LLC, STIFEL,
NICOLAUS & COMPANY, INCORPORATED, WILLIAM BLAIR & COMPANY, L.L.C.,
and LOOP CAPITAL MARKETS LLC, Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-12883
(Filed Oct. 2, 2019), was transferred from the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan to the U.S. District Court for
the Middle District of Tennessee on Nov. 18, 2019.
The Middle District of Tennessee Court Clerk assigned Case No.
3:19-cv-01057 to the proceeding.
The case is a class action on behalf of persons and entities that
purchased or otherwise acquired SmileDirectClub Class A common
stock pursuant and/or traceable to the registration statement and
prospectus issued in connection with the Company's September 2019
initial public offering.
On September 13, 2019, the Company filed its prospectus on Form
424B4 with the Securities and Exchange Commission, which forms part
of the Registration Statement. In the IPO, the Company sold
approximately 58.5 million shares of Class A common stock at a
price of $23.00 per share. The Company received proceeds of
approximately $1.27 billion from the Offering, net of underwriting
discounts and commissions. The proceeds from the IPO were
purportedly to be used for employee incentive bonuses, certain
equity arrangements, and general corporate purposes.
On September 24, 2019, a class action complaint was filed by
dentists, orthodontists, and consumers against SmileDirectClub,
alleging false advertising, fraud, negligence, and unfair and
deceptive trade practices. The complaint disputed the accuracy of
several statements in the Registration Statement and highlighted
that the Company is subject to litigation for operating as a
dentist without proper licensing in several states, as well as
other litigation.
On this news, the Company's share price fell $1.47, or nearly 9%,
to close at $15.68 per share on September 24, 2019, on unusually
heavy trading volume. The price stock continued to decline over the
next two trading sessions by $2.74, or over 17%, to close at $12.94
per share on September 26, 2019, on unusually heavy trading
volume.
By the commencement of the action, the Company's stock was trading
as low as $12.94 per share, a nearly 44% decline from the $23 per
share IPO price.
The Registration Statement was false and misleading and omitted to
state material adverse facts.
Specifically, the Defendants failed to disclose to investors that
(1) administrative personnel, rather than licensed doctors,
provided treatment to the Company's customers and monitored their
progress; (2) as a result, the Company's practices did not qualify
as teledentistry under applicable standards; (3) as a result, the
Company was subject to regulatory scrutiny for the unlicensed
practice of dentistry; (4) that the efficacy of the Company's
treatment was overstated; (5) that the Company had concealed these
deceptive marketing practices prior to the IPO; and (6) as a result
of the foregoing, Defendants' positive statements about the
Company's business, operations, and prospects, were materially
misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis.
As a result of the Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the
precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's
securities, the Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered
significant losses and damages, the lawsuit says.
SmileDirectClub purports to be the "first direct-to-consumer
medtech platform for transforming smiles" that manufactures,
markets, and sells clear aligner treatments.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
E. Powell Miller, Esq.
Marc L. Newman, Esq.
Sharon S. Almonrode, Esq.
THE MILLER LAW FIRM
950 W. University Dr., Suite 300
Rochester, MI 48307
Telephone: (248) 841-2200
Facsimile: (248) 652-2852
- and -
Robert V. Prongay, Esq.
Lesley F. Portnoy, Esq.
Charles H. Linehan, Esq.
Pavithra Rajesh, Esq.
GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Telephone: (310) 201-9150
Facsimile: (310) 201-9160
SOUTH CAROLINA: Cook Electric Utility Suit Removed to D.S.C.
------------------------------------------------------------
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company, SCANA Corporation, and SCANA
Services, Inc. (SCE&G) removed the class action lawsuit filed by
Jessica S. Cook, et al., against South Carolina Public Service
Authority, et al., from the Court of Common Pleas, Fourteenth
Judicial District, Hampton County, South Carolina, to the U.S.
District Court for the District of South Carolina on Nov. 21,
2019.
The District of South Carolina Court Clerk assigned Case No.
6:19-cv-03285-TLW to the proceeding.
The case arose out of a project to build two new nuclear power
plants at the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station in South Carolina (the
Project). SCE&G and South Carolina Public Service Authority, an
agency of the State of South Carolina (also known as Santee Cooper)
jointly owned the Project. After several years of construction, the
Project was abandoned in 2017, following the bankruptcy of the
contractor hired to build the nuclear plants.
The Plaintiffs are eight individuals who allege to be "direct" or
"indirect" utility customers of the South Carolina Public Service
Authority. They claim that they purchased electricity either
directly from Santee Cooper or through certain electric
cooperatives, including Central Electric Cooperative, Inc. and
Palmetto Electric Cooperative, Inc., that distributed power
purchased from Santee Cooper.
The Plaintiffs claim that Santee Cooper charged them increased
utility rates--either directly or through Central, Palmetto, or
another electricity cooperative--to finance the Project.
Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Santee Cooper customers have
financed approximately $4.7 billion in pre-construction, capital,
in-service, construction, interest, and other pre-operational costs
associated with the Project.
The Plaintiffs allege that Santee Cooper and SCE&G mismanaged
critical aspects of the Project and that they should not have been
required to pay increased utility rates to cover Project-related
costs. The Plaintiffs seek actual, consequential, and punitive
damages on that basis.
The case is captioned as JESSICA S. COOK, CORRIN F. BOWERS & SON,
CYRIL B. RUSH, JR., BOBBY BOSTICK, KYLE COOK, DONNA JENKINS, CHRIS
KOLBE, and RUTH ANN KEFFER, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. SOUTH CAROLINA PUBLIC SERVICE
AUTHORITY, an agency of the State of South Carolina (also known as
Santee Cooper); W. LEIGHTON LORD, III (in his capacity as chairman
and director of the South Carolina Public Service Authority;
WILLIAM A. FINN, in his capacity as director of the South Carolina
Public Service Authority; BARRY WYNN, in his capacity as director
of the South Carolina Public Service Authority; KRISTOFER CLARK, in
his capacity as director of the South Carolina Public Service
Authority; MERRELL W. FLOYD, in his capacity as director of the
South Carolina Public Service Authority; J. CALHOUN LAND, IV, in
his capacity as director of the South Carolina Public Service
Authority; STEPHEN H. MUDGE, in his capacity as director of the
South Carolina Public Service Authority; PEGGY H. PINNELL, in her
capacity as director of the South Carolina Public Service
Authority; DAN J. RAY, in his capacity as director of the South
Carolina Public Service Authority; DAVID F. SINGLETON, in his
capacity as director of the South Carolina Public Service
Authority; JACK F. WOLFE, JR., in his capacity as director of the
South Carolina Public Service Authority; CENTRAL ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE, INC.; PALMETTO ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.; SOUTH
CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY; SCANA CORPORATION, and SCANA
SERVICES, INC., the Defendants, Case No. 2017-CP-2500348 (S.C. Com.
Pleas, Aug. 22, 2017).[BN]
Defendants Scana Corporation, South Carolina Electric and Gas
Company, and Scana Services, Inc., are represented by:
Steven J. Pugh, Esq.
Benjamin P. Carlton, Esq.
RICHARDSON PLOWDEN & ROBINSON, P.A.
1900 Barnwell Street (29201)
Post Office Drawer 7788
Columbia, SC 29202
Telephone: 803-771-4400
E-mail: spugh@richardsonplowden.com
bcarlton@richardsonplowden.com
- and -
David L. Balser, Esq.
Jonathan R. Chally, Esq.
KING & SPALDING LLP
1180 Peachtree Street NE
Atlanta, GA 30309
Telephone: 404-572-4600
E-mail: dbalser@kslaw.com
jchally@kslaw.com
SUMMIT MEDICAL: Appeals Court Vacates Coleman Class Certification
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned SUMMIT MEDICAL GROUP, INC., d/b/a ST.
ELIZABETH PHYSICIANS, Appellant, v. LISA COLEMAN, Appellee, Case
No. 2018-CA-001238-ME (Ky. App.), Judge James H. Lambert of the
Court of Appeals of Kentucky reversed the Aug. 10, 2018 class
certification order of the Kenton Circuit Court.
Summit Medical, doing business as Saint Elizabeth Physicians
("SEP"), appeals from the Kenton Circuit Court's order certifying
the Appellee's claim as a class action under Kentucky Rule of Civil
Procedure (CR) 23.
The Plaintiff is seeking class action certification in an action
against SEP for deceptive or misleading billing practices in
violation of the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act ("KCPA"),
Kentucky Revised Statutes 367.170. She alleges that SEP charged an
office fee in addition to a preventative medical examination fee
for same-day visits where patients raised medical concerns which
necessitated some type of further action by the physician. The
Plaintiff alleges that SEP did not inform her, or others similarly
situated, that an additional office fee could be added to their
preventative exam bills under such circumstances.
The circuit court went on to analyze the issues pursuant to CR 23
(holding that its requirements had been met) and ultimately defined
the class of Plaintiffs as: All current and former patients of St.
Elizabeth Physicians who went to St. Elizabeth Physicians for
preventative exams and who were subsequently charged a fee for a
preventative exam as well as an additional office outpatient visit
fee for same-day service and who incurred a debt for or paid
out-of-pocket for the additional fee. The circuit court order
ruled on all outstanding motions and appointed the class counsel.
The interlocutory appeal was filed by SEP pursuant to CR 23.06.1
SEP's challenge to certification is two-fold: (1) that Coleman
failed to meet her burden under CR 23.01 (namely, commonality,
typicality, and adequacy) of showing that the class should be
certified; and (2) that, because the circuit court's analysis under
CR 23.01 was insufficient, it thus erred in applying its analysis
pursuant to CR 23.02.
Regarding SEP's first argument, Judge Lambert disagrees. The Judge
finds that review under CR 23.01(b) should focus on whether the
Defendant's conduct was common as to all of the class members. And
even if some individualized determinations may be necessary to
completely resolve the claims of each putative class member, tthose
are not the focus of the commonality inquiry. The circuit court
did not abuse its discretion in determining that SEP's "conduct was
common to all of the class members.
The Judge next addresses the issue of whether the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class. He finds no abuse of discretion in the
circuit court's holding that the typicality requirement was met.
Coleman's conduct with SEP does not take her out of the similar
situation on which the action is based. Despite her efforts she
was still in the same situation as those 714 others she seeks to
represent. They were all similarly damaged by the same billing
policy of SEP.
Next, SEP questions the circuit court's finding of adequacy of the
class representatives, i.e., whether the representative parties
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. The
Judge agrees with SEP that the issue regarding appointment of
counsel requires further analysis by the circuit court. In the
case, there was no such analysis, and, even if there had been, the
issue would need revisiting because of the proposed substitution of
current counsel in place of Collins. The Court would be usurping
the trial court's discretionary power if it were to make factual
findings and legal conclusions.
Because the typicality, commonality, and adequacy prongs overlap in
analysis, the trial court should revisit all prongs on remand to
determine whether to certify a class. Accordingly, Judge Lambert
deemed moot SEP's motion to strike and Coleman's motions to
supplement the record and to take judicial notice, and will deny in
a separate order issued with his Opinion. The Judge declined to
examine the circuit court's CR 23.02 findings until such time as
the CR 23.01 issues are addressed on remand.
The class certification order of the Kenton Circuit Court is
vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with Judge
Lambert's Opinion.
A full-text copy of Judge Lambert's Nov. 1, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/eGIhzx from Leagle.com.
David V. Kramer -- dkramer@dbllaw.com -- Mark D. Guilfoyle --
mguilfoyle@dbllaw.com -- Christopher B. Markus --
cmarkus@dbllaw.com -- Crestview Hills, Kentucky, BRIEFS FOR
APPELLANT.
Alan J. Statman -- ajstatman@statmanharris.com -- Cincinnati, Ohio,
A. Dominick Romeo -- anthonydominickromeo@gmail.com -- Frederick J.
Johnson, Independence, Kentucky, BRIEF FOR APPELLEE.
SUPERIOR GROCERS: Fails to Comply With Labor Code, Valadez Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
EVA VALADEZ, an individual, on behalf of herself and all aggrieved
employees, Plaintiffs v. SUPER CENTER CONCEPTS, INC. DBA SUPERIOR
GROCERS, a corporation, and DOES 1-50, inclusive, Defendants, Case
No. 19STCV41458 (Cal. Super., Nov. 18 2019), alleges that the
Defendants failed to comply with the requirements of the California
Labor Code by engaging in erroneous employment practices and
policies.
The Defendants' erroneous practices and policies include failure to
provide suitable seating; failure to provide rest breaks; failure
to provide timely, uninterrupted meal breaks; failure to pay for
all hours worked, including overtime hours worked and work
performed during meal periods; failure to timely pay all wages
owed, including willfully failing to pay wages due upon termination
and failure to pall all wages owed twice per month; failure to
reimburse for required business expenses; and failure to provide
accurate itemized wage statements under the California Labor Code.
The Plaintiff and the class are all hourly employees, who were
employed by the Defendants within the State of California.
Superior Grocers is an independently-owned chains of grocery stores
in Southern California.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Nazo Koulloukian, Esq.
KOUL LAW FIRM
3435 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1710
Los Angeles, CA 90010
Telephone: (213) 761-5484
Facsimile: (818) 561-3938
E-mail: nazo@koullaw.com
- and -
Neal J. Fialkow, Esq.
LAW OFFICE OF NEAL J. FIALKOW, INC.
215 N. Marengo Ave., 3rd Floor
Pasadena, CA 91101
Telephone: (626) 584-6060
Facsimile: (626) 584-2950
E-mail: nfialkow@pacbell.net
- and -
Sahag Majarian, II, Esq.
LAW OFFICES OF SAHAG MAJARIAN II
18250 Ventura Blvd.
Tarzana, CA 91356
Telephone: (818)609-0807
Facsimile: (818)609-0892
E-mail: Sahagii@aol.com
TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL: Moe Sues Over Sale of Addictive Opioids
------------------------------------------------------------
ALEXANDER MOE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES, LTD.; TEVA
PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC.; CEPHALON, INC.; JOHNSON & JOHNSON;
JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.; ENDO HEALTH SOLUTIONS INC.; ENDO
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.; ACTAVIS PLC; ACTAVIS, INC.; WATSON
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.; WATSON LABORATORIES, INC.; MCKESSON
CORPORATION; CARDINAL HEALTH, INC.; and AMERISOURCEBERGEN
CORPORATION, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-01469-TSE-TCB (E.D. Va.,
Nov. 19, 2019), alleges that the Defendants aggressively pushed
highly addictive, dangerous opioids and falsely represented to
practitioners that patients would only rarely succumb to drug
addiction.
The Defendants, which are pharmaceutical companies manufacturing
prescription opioids, aggressively advertised to and persuaded
practitioners to prescribe highly addictive, dangerous opioids, and
turned patients into drug addicts or dependents for their own
corporate profit, the lawsuit says.
The Plaintiff seeks to recover monetary losses that have been
incurred, and will continue to be incurred, as a direct and
proximate result of the Defendants' false, deceptive, and unfair
marketing and/or unlawful diversion of prescription opioids.
According to the complaint, opioid analgesics are widely diverted
and improperly used, and the widespread abuse of opioids has
resulted in a national epidemic of opioid overdose deaths,
addictions, and dependencies. The opioid epidemic is "directly
related to the increasingly widespread misuse of powerful opioid
pain medications."[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
William S. Consovoy, Esq.
J. Michael Connolly, Esq.
CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC
1600 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 700
Arlington, VA 22209
Telephone: 703 243 9423
E-mail: will@consovoymccarthy.com
mike@consovoymccarthy.com
- and -
Ashley Keller, Esq.
Travis Lenkner, Esq.
Seth Meyer, Esq.
KELLER LENKNER LLC
150 N. Riverside Plaza, Suite 4270
Chicago, IL 60606
Telephone: 312 741 5220
E-mail: ack@kellerlenkner.com
tdl@kellerlenkner.com
sam@kellerlenkner.com
TRADER JOE'S: Lopez-Barnett Sues Over Misleading Product Label
--------------------------------------------------------------
Jennifer Lopez-Barnett, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Trader Joe's Company, Defendants,
Case No. 19-cv-11469 (S.D. N.Y., December 14, 2019), seeks to
recover actual damages, statutory damages, attorney fees and costs
for breaches of express warranty, implied warranty of
merchantability and for violation of the Magnuson Moss Warranty
Act.
Trader Joe's Company manufactures, distributes, markets, labels and
sells corn flakes under their Trader Joe's brand. Lopez-Barnett
alleges that the product label stating an ingredient "Evaporated
Cane Juice" is just a misleading term for sugar and not an actual
"juice." [BN]
Plaintiff is represented by:
Peter N. Wasylyk, Esq.
LAW OFFICES OF PETER N. WASYLYK
1307 Chalkstone Avenue
Providence, RI 02908
Telephone: (401) 831-7730
Facsimile: (401) 861-6064
Email: pnwlaw@aol.com
- and -
Spencer Sheehan, Esq.
SHEEHAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
891 Northern Blvd., Suite 201
Great Neck, NY 11021
Tel: (516) 303-0552
Email: spencer@spencersheehan.com
TUPELO, MS: Court Won't Reconsider Sept. 24 Rulings in Edwards Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned VINCENT EDWARDS, Individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF TUPELO,
MISSISSIPPI, et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:17-CV-131-DMB-DAS (N.D.
Miss.), Judge Debra M. Brown of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Mississippi, Aberdeen Division, denied the
Defendants' motion for reconsideration of the Court's Sept. 24,
2019 order.
On Aug. 18, 2017, Edwards, individually and as class
representatives, filed a "Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights"
against the City of Tupelo, Mississippi; Lee County, Mississippi;
Ramierre Warren; and certain fictitious parties. In addition to
individual claims asserted by Edwards, the complaint proposed a
class action based on certain allegedly unconstitutional practices
of the City and the County. On Oct. 12, 2018, Edwards filed a
motion to certify the proposed class.
Later, Edwards, with leave of the Court, filed an amended complaint
against the same Defendants. In addition to the individual claims,
the amended complaint asserted four proposed constitutional claims,
titled as (1) "The City Violated Plaintiffs' Rights by
Incarcerating Them for Non-Payment of Debts without a
Constitutional Inquiry into Their Ability to Pay," (Count One); (2)
"The City Violated the Plaintiffs' Rights by Imprisoning Them for
Inability to Pay Debts without Appointing Adequate Counsel," (Count
Two); (3) "The City of Tupelo and Lee County's Scheme of Forcing
Indigent Prisoners to Labor in Order to Work Off Their Debts
Violates the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Federal Law," (Count Three); and (4) "The Use of Incarceration
and Threats of Incarceration to Collect Debts Owed to the City
Violates the Equal Protection Clause," (Count Four). On Feb. 28,
2019, Edwards filed a supplemental motion for class certification
based on the claims asserted in the amended complaint.
On July 24, 2019, U.S. Magistrate Judge David A. Sanders issued a
Report and Recommendation ("R&R") recommending, among other things,
that the motions to certify be denied. On Aug. 13, 2019, Edwards
filed objections to the R&R; a motion for voluntary dismissal as to
all claims but those related to indigency hearings for those held
in contempt; and a motion for an evidentiary hearing on the issue
of class certification.
On Sept. 24, 2019, the Court issued an order which (1) construed
Edwards' motion for voluntary dismissal as a motion to amend filed
after the amendment deadline; (2) found good cause to modify the
scheduling order to consider Edwards' untimely filing; and (3)
found sufficient grounds to grant the motion to amend.
On Oct. 1, 2019, the City of Tupelo filed a motion for
reconsideration on the issue of amendment; the County joined the
motion for reconsideration. Edwards, pursuant to the September 24
order, filed a second amended proposed class action complaint.
In their motion for reconsideration, the Defendants raise three
arguments: (1) because Edwards' motion for voluntary dismissal did
not reference Rule 16, he "waived/forfeited" his right to seek
modification of the scheduling order; (2) the relevant factors do
not support modification of the scheduling order; and (3) the
relevant factors do not support amendment of the complaint.
Judge Brown finds no indication that Edwards intentionally
relinquished a right to seek modification of the scheduling order
under Rule 16. While the Court certainly could have deemed this
right forfeited, it was not required to do so. More fundamentally,
whether waived or forfeited, it is undisputed that a district court
may sua sponte modify a scheduling order. Accordingly, the Court
did not err by treating Edwards' motion for voluntary dismissal as
a motion to modify brought under Rule 16.
While it is true Judge Sanders identified numerous deficiencies
which touch on Edwards' new proposed class, the Judge again finds
no indication that Edwards would have been unable to make the
required showing had he been provided the evidentiary hearing to
which he was likely entitled. Put differently, at most, Judge
Sanders' R&R suggests that based on the evidence presented, the
proposed claim likely would have failed the numerosity requirement.
This does not mean the claim itself is futile. Under these
circumstances, the Court concludes that the proposed amendment is
not clearly meritless. It follows then that the Court did not err
in deeming the amendment important to Edwards' case.
The Defendants' arguments as to the remaining factors rely on
general contentions of prejudice arising from (1) defending against
a meritless suit; (2) participating in additional discovery; and
(3) defending against additional claims from individual defendants.
Each of these arguments is unpersuasive. First, the Judge cannot
conclude at this time that the proposed action is meritless.
Second, no additional discovery has been authorized and, because
the amendment resulted in no additional claims, no such discovery
will likely be needed. Finally, she does not see how maintenance
of the proposed class action would result in individual claims
against the Defendants. Accordingly, the Defendants have not shown
grounds which would justify altering the previously reached finding
of good cause.
Finally, pointing to Edwards' delay in seeking amendment and to the
alleged futility of the proposed class, the Defendants contend the
Court erred in allowing amendment under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15. The Court previously concluded that the delay
standing alone did not warrant denial of leave, and the Defendants
have offered no argument as to why it was error. Furthermore, for
the reasons she stated, the Judge concludes that the Defendants
have failed to adequately establish futility.
Based on the foregoing, Judge Brown denied the Defendants' motion
for reconsideration.
A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 1, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/ZeioI0 from Leagle.com.
Vincent Edwards, Individually, and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Halbert E. Dockins,
Jr., DOCKINS TURNAGE & BANKS.
The City of Tupelo, Mississippi, Defendant, represented by John
Samuel Hill -- Jhill@mitchellmcnutt.com -- MITCHELL, MCNUTT & SAMS
& Stephen Pierce Spencer -- sspencer@mitchellmcnutt.com --
MITCHELL, MCNUTT & SAMS.
Lee County, Mississippi, Defendant, represented by Margaret Sams
Gratz -- mgratz@mitchellmcnutt.com -- MITCHELL, MCNUTT & SAMS,
William C. Murphree -- Bmurphree@mitchellmcnutt.com -- MITCHELL,
MCNUTT & SAMS, Gary L. Carnathan, CARNATHAN & MCAULEY & Michael D.
Chase -- Mchase@mitchellmcnutt.com -- MITCHELL, MCNUTT & SAMS.
TWITTER INC: Cal. App. Ct. Affirms Denial of Huang Class Cert. Bid
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case TINA HUANG, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. TWITTER, INC.,
Defendant and Respondent, Case No. A155155 (Cal. App.), the Court
of Appeals of California for the First District, Division Five,
affirmed the trial court's order denying the Plaintiff's class
certification motion.
Twitter is an online news and social networking service. The
Plaintiff began working at Twitter in October 2009. At that time,
the company had approximately 130 employees, and few formal job
titles for software engineers. In the next several years, the
number of employees expanded to almost 3,000. As the company grew,
it created formal titles for software engineers ("SWE").
In 2012, Twitter created a "Software Engineering Technical Ladder"
which assigned each SWE a job title and identified job xpectations.
About a year later, the company modified the ladder to delineate
eight job levels and to describe the skills required for a
promotion. The levels were: SWE I (level 1); SWE II (level 2);
senior SWE (level 3); staff SWE (level 4); senior staff SWE (level
5); principal SWE (level 6); distinguished SWE (level 7); and
fellow SWE (level 8). Between 2012 and 2018, only one employee
held the level 7 role. No employee held the level 8 role.
The promotion process -- and the role managers played in that
process -- hanged as the company grew. In 2013, however, Twitter
added structure, establishing timing for promotion cycles and
requiring managers to prepare promotion packets with designated
information for employees seeking promotions.
In 2014, Twitter changed the promotion process significantly. In
2015, the promotion process changed again. The promotion process
evolved again in 2016.
The Plaintiff began working at Twitter in October 2009 as a SWE.
When Twitter instituted the technical ladder in 2012, the Plaintiff
was assigned the title of senior SWE (level 3). She was later
promoted to staff SWE (level 4). The Plaintiff's manager supported
her promotion. In 2013, the Plaintiff's manager prepared a
promotion packet for senior staff SWE (level 5). In early 2014,
the promotion committee met to discuss the 12 candidates for level
5 promotions. Of the candidates, the Plaintiff was the only woman.
The committee promoted seven candidates. It declined to promote
the Plaintiff based on concerns about her personality and the
quality of her coding. The Plaintiff resigned in June 2014.
The Plaintiff filed a complaint against Twitter, alleging a claim
on behalf of herself and a putative class of female SWEs for gender
discrimination in violation of the California Fair Employment &
Housing Act. The operative complaint alleged Twitter discriminated
against female employees on the technical ladder by failing to
promote them to engineering leadership positions. According to the
complaint, the company had no formal job postings or job
application procedures, and managers had "complete discretion" over
whether SWEs were nominated or considered for promotions. The
Plaintiff alleged promotion decisions were tainted with conscious
or unconscious prejudices and gender-based stereotypes and, as a
result, few female employees advanced to senior and leadership
positions.
The Plaintiff moved to certify a class of approximately 135 SWEs on
the technical ladder based on a disparate impact theory, e.g., that
regardless of motive, a facially neutral employer practice bearing
no manifest relationship to job requirements, had a
disproportionate adverse effect on members of the protected class.
The trial court denied the motion. It determined that the
Plaintiff failed to establish commonality because Twitter did not
have a uniform system of selecting and assessing candidates for
promotion during the class period. It found the "Impact" and "How"
criteria were "highly-subjective" guidelines for managers' exercise
of discretion, not -- as plaintiff suggested -- a common mode of
discretion. Next, the court concluded the Plaintiff's claim was
not typical of the class because her managers supported her
promotions. Finally, it determined the Plaintiff failed to
demonstrate a class action was the superior device for adjudicating
the claim.
The Appeals Court finds that Plaintiff's complaint regarding Dukes
is barred by the invited error doctrine, which applies where a
party, for tactical reasons, persuades the trial court to follow a
particular procedure. The argument also fails on the merits. The
Plaintiff's disagreement with the result reached by the court after
it considered Dukes does not demonstrate the court applied the
wrong legal standard. Nor is the Appeals Court persuaded by the
cursory argument in the Plaintiff's opening brief that the court
erred by relying on Dukes because California and federal class
action procedures differ. California courts have noted the
similarity between Code of Civil Procedure section 382 and the
"federal rules" and have considered rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure for "guidance in class certification matters."
Next, the Appeals Court concludes that substantial evidence
supports the court's determination that the Plaintiff failed to
establish commonality. Having reached this result, it need not
address Twitter's argument that the Plaintiff cannot establish
"common issues would predominate the causation inquiry" in part
because her expert could not link the alleged promotion disparity
to the purported gatekeeping policy.
Finally, the Appeals Court concludes that the trial court properly
concluded the Plaintiff failed to establish the commonality and
typicality requirements. It discerns no abuse of discretion in the
trial court's determination that the Plaintiff was not typical of
the class because the alleged gatekeeping policy did not prevent
her from getting promoted. The Appeals Court does not address the
court's lack of superiority finding.
In light of the foregoing, the Appeals Court affirmed the trial
court's order denying the Plaintiff's class certification motion.
Twitter is entitled to costs on appeal.
A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 4, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/Fh3s6s from Leagle.com.
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: NY Drivers Seek to Recover Surcharges & Fees
---------------------------------------------------------------
Blake Montgomery, writing for The Daily Beast, reports that Uber
drivers in New York have accused the the ride-hailing company of
stealing millions of dollars from them over the course of four
years in a class action lawsuit filed November 27 that could
involve as many as 96,000 drivers. The New York Taxi Workers
Alliance, the plaintiff in the suit, alleges that the company
deducted sales tax, a workers' compensation surcharge, and its own
service fee from drivers' pay, which the group alleges undercut
wages. Uber acknowledged underpaying drivers in 2017.
The same day, protesting Uber drivers gathered outside the
California homes of venture capitalist Bill Gurley and Garrett
Camp, one of the company's early investors and a co-founder,
respectively. Both are expected to reap massive returns on their
shares in the company as the mandatory post-IPO lockup period for
its stock ends. [GN]
UNDER ARMOUR: Hagens Berman Reminds Investors of Jan. 6 Deadline
----------------------------------------------------------------
Hagens Berman urges Under Armour, Inc. (NYSE: UA, UAA) investors
who have suffered losses in excess of $100,000 to submit their
losses now to learn if they qualify to recover compensable damages.
A securities fraud class action has been filed against the company
and senior executives.
Class Period: Aug. 3, 2016 - Nov. 1, 2019
Lead Plaintiff Deadline: Jan. 6, 2020
Sign Up: www.hbsslaw.com/investor-fraud/UA
Contact An Attorney Now: UA@hbsslaw.com
510-725-3000
Under Armour (UA, UAA) Securities Class Action:
The complaint alleges that Defendants misled investors by engaging
in fraudulent accounting.
According to the complaint, Under Armour improperly shifted sales
from quarter to quarter to appear healthier, including to keep pace
with its long-running year-over-year 20% net revenue growth. In
addition, Defendants concealed the U.S. Department of Justice's and
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's investigations of Under
Armour's accounting.
On Nov. 3, 2019, The Wall Street Journal reported that the
Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission
were investigating Under Armour to determine whether the company
"shifted sales from quarter to quarter to appear healthier." On
this news, the price of Under Armour shares fell sharply.
On Nov. 14, 2019, The Wall Street Journal reported (1) former Under
Armour executives "said they scrambled to meet aggressive sales
targets, borrowing business from future quarters to mask slowing
demand in 2016," (2) the company "frequently leaned on retailers to
take products early and redirected goods intended for its factory
stores to off-price chains to book sales in the final days of a
quarter," and (3) Federal investigators "are examining emails that
show Under Armour's founder and chief executive, Kevin Plank, knew
about efforts to move revenue between quarters, according to a
person familiar with the matter."
If you invested in Under Armour between Aug. 3, 2016 and Nov. 1,
2019 (the "Class Period") and suffered significant losses, you may
qualify to be a lead plaintiff – one who selects and oversees the
attorneys prosecuting the case. Contact Hagens Berman immediately
for more information about the case and being a lead plaintiff.
"We're focused on recovering investors' substantial losses and
holding Under Armour and its senior management accountable for
their alleged accounting fraud," said Reed Kathrein, the Hagens
Berman partner leading the investigation.
If you purchased shares of Under Armour and suffered significant
losses, click here to discuss your legal rights with Hagens
Berman.
Whistleblowers: Persons with non-public information regarding Under
Armour should consider their options to help in the investigation
or take advantage of the SEC Whistleblower program. Under the new
program, whistleblowers who provide original information may
receive rewards totaling up to 30 percent of any successful
recovery made by the SEC. For more information, call Reed Kathrein
at 510-725-3000 or email UA@hbsslaw.com.
Hagens Berman is a national law firm with nine offices in eight
cities around the country and eighty attorneys. The firm
represents investors, whistleblowers, workers and consumers in
complex litigation. More about the firm and its successes is
located at hbsslaw.com. For the latest news visit our newsroom or
follow us on Twitter at @classactionlaw.
Contact:
Reed Kathrein, Esq.
Hagens Berman
Tel: 510-725-3000
Email: reed@hbsslaw.com
[GN]
UNDER ARMOUR: Rosen Law Files Class Action Lawsuit
--------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, announces it has
filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of the
securities of Under Armour, Inc. (NYSE: UA, UAA) from August 3,
2016 to November 1, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"). The
lawsuit seeks to recover damages for Under Armour investors under
the federal securities laws.
To join the Under Armour class action, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1709.htmlor call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action.
NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.
According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) Under Armour shifted sales from quarter to quarter to
appear healthier, including to keep pace with their long-running
year-over-year 20% net revenue growth; (2) the Company had been
under investigation by and cooperating with the U.S. Department of
Justice and U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission since at least
July 2017; and (3) as a result, defendants' statements about its
business, operations, and prospects, were materially false and
misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis at all relevant times.
When the true details entered the market, the lawsuit claims that
investors suffered damages.
A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than January 6,
2020. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on behalf
of other class members in directing the litigation. If you wish to
join the litigation, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1709.htmlor to discuss
your rights or interests regarding this class action, please
contact Phillip Kim, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll free at
866-767-3653 or via e-mail at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com.
Follow us for updates on LinkedIn:
https://www.linkedin.com/company/the-rosen-law-firm or on Twitter:
https://twitter.com/rosen_firm or on Facebook:
https://www.facebook.com/rosenlawfirm.
Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe,
concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm was Ranked No. 1
by ISS Securities Class Action Services for number of securities
class action settlements in 2017. The firm has been ranked in the
top 3 each year since 2013. Rosen Law Firm has secured hundreds of
millions of dollars for investors.
Contact:
Laurence Rosen, Esq.
Phillip Kim, Esq.
The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
275 Madison Avenue, 40th Floor
New York, NY 10016
Tel: (212) 686-1060
Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
Fax: (212) 202-3827
Website: www.rosenlegal.com
E-mail: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
pkim@rosenlegal.com
cases@rosenlegal.com
[GN]
VOLKSWAGEN AG: Emissions Scandal Class Action Begins in UK
----------------------------------------------------------
Sandra Laville, writing for The Guardian, reports that lawyers
representing more than 90,000 motorists will accuse the carmaker
Volkswagen on December 2 of fitting some of its most popular models
with an emissions defeat device, in the biggest class action of its
kind in the UK.
Four years after the emissions scandal emerged, customers in the UK
will take their case to the courts in a class action which will
focus on whether software fitted to 1.2 million vehicles was
designed to cheat clean air laws in the UK.
The carmaker admitted in 2015 to manipulating 11m vehicles
worldwide to fool emissions tests. In the US VW pleaded guilty two
years ago to criminal charges and paid out $4.3bn in civil and
criminal penalties – the largest levied by the US government
against a car company. Total costs for VW are estimated to have
reached $21bn.
Earlier this year, in Australia, VW settled a multimillion-dollar
class action over the global diesel emissions scandal and will pay
between $87m and $127m in compensation to customers. Volkswagen
made no admission of liability under the agreement.
But in Europe, VW is still denying that the software it used was an
illegal defeat device – despite German regulators having ruled in
2015 that it was designed to cheat emissions tests.
On December 2, lawyers for UK customers will argue that the device
fitted to 1.2 million cars was designed to defeat emissions tests
in the first of a string of European class actions, which include
Germany and Italy.
Gareth Pope, head of group litigation at Slater Gordon, which is
representing the majority of the UK customers, said the trial would
be a milestone for attempts to hold VW accountable in the UK.
"VW has had plenty of opportunity to come clean, make amends and
move on from this highly damaging episode. But instead it's chosen
to spend millions of pounds denying the claims our clients have
been forced to bring against it rather than paying that to their
own customers in compensation."
VW admitted in 2015 to fitting software to 1.2 million of its
vehicles in the UK, and rolled out a "fix" to make cars compliant
with emissions laws.
But VW's case is that this software did not breach the law.
VW said in a statement: "Volkswagen Group maintains that there has
never been a defeat device installed in any of its vehicles in the
UK.
"The question the judge is deciding in this hearing is not whether
the affected vehicles contained such a device, but whether the
legal definition is met in certain circumstances. We will continue
to defend robustly our position in the high court."
Dieselgate became public in September 2015 when the US
Environmental Protection Agency revealed how VW and Audi had
violated the Clean Air Act, leading to investigations by government
agencies around the world in the biggest scandal to hit the car
industry in decades.
In January, former Volkswagen CEO Martin Winterkorn and four others
were charged in Germany with fraud in connection with the emissions
scandal. [GN]
WANDA SPORTS: KSF Reminds of Jan. 17 Plaintiff Deadline
-------------------------------------------------------
Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC ("KSF") and KSF partner, former Attorney
General of Louisiana, Charles C. Foti, Jr., remind investors of
pending deadlines in the following securities class action
lawsuits:
Plantronics, Inc. (NYSE:PLT)
Class Period: 7/2/2018 - 11/5/2019
Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline: January 13, 2020
SECURITIES FRAUD
To learn more, visit https://www.ksfcounsel.com/cases/-plt/
Yunji Inc. (NASDAQ:YJ)
Class Period: American Depository Shares issued either in or after
the May 2019 Initial Public Offering.
Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline: January 13, 2020
MISLEADING PROSPECTUS
To learn more, visit https://www.ksfcounsel.com/cases/nasdaqgm-yj/
Armstrong Flooring, Inc. (NYSE:AFI)
Class Period: 3/6/2018 - 11/4/2019
Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline: January 14, 2020
SECURITIES FRAUD
To learn more, visit https://www.ksfcounsel.com/cases/-afi/
Wanda Sports Group Company Limited (NASDAQ:WSG)
Class Period: securities issued either in or after the July 2019
Initial Public Offering.
Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline: January 17, 2020
MISLEADING PROSPECTUS
To learn more, visit
https://www.ksfcounsel.com/cases/nasdaqgs-wsg/
If you purchased shares of the above companies and would like to
discuss your legal rights and your right to recover for your
economic loss, you may, without obligation or cost to you, contact
KSF Managing Partner, Lewis Kahn, toll-free at 1-877-515-1850, via
email (Lewis.Kahn@KSFcounsel.com), or via the case links above.
If you wish to serve as a Lead Plaintiff in the class action, you
must petition the Court on or before the Lead Plaintiff Motion
deadline.
KSF, whose partners include former Louisiana Attorney General
Charles C. Foti, Jr., is one of the nation's premier boutique
securities litigation law firms. KSF serves a variety of clients -
including public institutional investors, hedge funds, money
managers and retail investors - in seeking recoveries for
investment losses emanating from corporate fraud or malfeasance by
publicly traded companies. KSF has offices in New York, California
and Louisiana.
To learn more about KSF, you may visit www.ksfcounsel.com.
Contact:
Lewis Kahn, Esq.
Managing Partner
Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC
Tel: 1-877-515-1850
1100 Poydras St., Suite 3200
New Orleans, LA 70163
E-mail: lewis.kahn@ksfcounsel.com
[GN]
WYNN LAS VEGAS: Schrader Suit Removed to Nevada District Court
--------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Brenna Schrader, an individual, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated v. WYNN LAS VEGAS, LLC
dba WYNN LAS VEGAS a Nevada Limited Liability, WYNN RESORTS, LTD, a
Nevada Limited Liability Company; STEPHEN ALAN WYNN; an individual;
MAURICE WOODEN, an individual, and DOES 1-20, inclusive; ROE
CORPORATIONS 1-20, inclusive, Case No. A-19-802598-C, was removed
from the Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County, Nevada, to
the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada on Dec. 16,
2019.
The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:19-cv-02159-JCM-BNW to
the proceeding.
The Plaintiff contends that this action is properly removed to
federal court under federal question jurisdiction because her
complaint contains claims, which arise under federal law,
specifically, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Fair
Labor Standards Act, Forced Labor, and Federal Racketeering
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO).[BN]
The Defendants are represented by:
Deverie J. Christensen, Esq.
Joshua A. Sliker, Esq.
JACKSON LEWIS P.C.
300 S. Fourth Street, Suite 900
Las Vegas, NV 89101
Phone: (702) 921-2460
Email: deverie.christensen@jacksonlewis.com
joshua.sliker@jacksonlewis.com
YUNJI INC: KSF Reminds of Jan. 13 Plaintiff Deadline
----------------------------------------------------
Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC ("KSF") and KSF partner, former Attorney
General of Louisiana, Charles C. Foti, Jr., remind investors of
pending deadlines in the following securities class action
lawsuits:
Plantronics, Inc. (NYSE:PLT)
Class Period: 7/2/2018 - 11/5/2019
Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline: January 13, 2020
SECURITIES FRAUD
To learn more, visit https://www.ksfcounsel.com/cases/-plt/
Yunji Inc. (NASDAQ:YJ)
Class Period: American Depository Shares issued either in or after
the May 2019 Initial Public Offering.
Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline: January 13, 2020
MISLEADING PROSPECTUS
To learn more, visit https://www.ksfcounsel.com/cases/nasdaqgm-yj/
Armstrong Flooring, Inc. (NYSE:AFI)
Class Period: 3/6/2018 - 11/4/2019
Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline: January 14, 2020
SECURITIES FRAUD
To learn more, visit https://www.ksfcounsel.com/cases/-afi/
Wanda Sports Group Company Limited (NASDAQ:WSG)
Class Period: securities issued either in or after the July 2019
Initial Public Offering.
Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline: January 17, 2020
MISLEADING PROSPECTUS
To learn more, visit
https://www.ksfcounsel.com/cases/nasdaqgs-wsg/
If you purchased shares of the above companies and would like to
discuss your legal rights and your right to recover for your
economic loss, you may, without obligation or cost to you, contact
KSF Managing Partner, Lewis Kahn, toll-free at 1-877-515-1850, via
email (Lewis.Kahn@KSFcounsel.com), or via the case links above.
If you wish to serve as a Lead Plaintiff in the class action, you
must petition the Court on or before the Lead Plaintiff Motion
deadline.
KSF, whose partners include former Louisiana Attorney General
Charles C. Foti, Jr., is one of the nation's premier boutique
securities litigation law firms. KSF serves a variety of clients -
including public institutional investors, hedge funds, money
managers and retail investors - in seeking recoveries for
investment losses emanating from corporate fraud or malfeasance by
publicly traded companies. KSF has offices in New York, California
and Louisiana.
To learn more about KSF, you may visit www.ksfcounsel.com.
Contact:
Lewis Kahn, Esq.
Managing Partner
Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC
Tel: 1-877-515-1850
1100 Poydras St., Suite 3200
New Orleans, LA 70163
E-mail: lewis.kahn@ksfcounsel.com
[GN]
*********
S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
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