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              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Friday, October 4, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 199

                            Headlines

ACCOLADE INC: Court OKs $1.5K Settlement in Fulton-Green Suit
AEI PAINTING: Gallo Seeks OT Pay for Construction Workers
AMEDISYS HOLDING: Seeks 6th Circuit Review of Ruling in TCPA Suit
AMERICAN COLLECTION: Coleman Files FDCPA Suit in N.D. Ohio
AMERICAN FINANCE: Court Dismisses Securities Suit

ANDA, INC: Khan Sues over Sale of Prescription Opioids
ANSELMO LINDBERG: Rodriguez Stayed Under Colorado River Doctrine
ATH HOLDING: $8.4MM Atty.'s Fees & Costs Awarded in Bell ERISA Suit
BARRY UNIVERSITY: Flores Sues over Unsolicited Text Messages
BOGGEY'S INC: Bastys Hits Unpaid Min. Wages, Misappropriated Tips

BOTTLING GROUP: Underpays Account Merchandisers, Bishop Alleges
C.B. FLEET: Allcott et al Suit Moved to C.D. California
CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT: Gershman Challenges Sale to Eldorado
CALIFORNIA: App. Ct. Flips Order Striking 3rd Amended Hashim Suit
CAPITAL ONE BANK: Porterfield Suit Asserts TCPA Breach

CARECORE NATIONAL: Sent Unsolicited Fax Ads, Dean Suit Says
CARRIZO OIL: Sawyer Says Registration Statement Misleading
CASTLE BRANDS: Being Sold to Austin for Too Little, Dugan Claims
CENTRAL COAST: Court Denies Summary Judgment in Garcia
CHEMICAL AND MINING: Court OKs Class Certification in Villella

CIOX HEALTH: Faces Browne et al Suit in Eastern District of Texas
COLDWELL BANKER: Grossberg Sues Under TCPA Over Unsolicited Texts
CONOPCO, INC: Crepps Suit Moved to Eastern Dist. of Missouri
CORTEVA INC: Boothe Farms Files Class Action Over Pesticide
COUNTYWIDE BUILDERS: Construction Workers Seek Unpaid Overtime Pay

DANONE US: Ninth Circuit Appeal Filed in Andrade-Heymsfield Suit
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION: Blanchette Seeks to Certify Class
DESIGNER BRANDS: Whisman Suit Asserts FCRA Violation
DIAMOND DOLLS: Harris Seeks Unpaid Wages, Misclassification
DMSD FOODS: Licea Suit Transferred to Central Dist. of California

DW DIRECT INC: Rhyan Seeks Unpaid Overtime Compensation
E.I. DU PONT: Removes Banks et al. Suit to District of Delaware
ECLINICAL WORKS: Court Denies Bid for Class Certification
ENERGEN RESOURCES: Summary Judgment Bid in Ulibarri Suit Denied
ENLOE MEDICAL: Underpays Registered Dieticians, Aram Alleges

ESTAN HEALTHCARE: Hill Seeks Proper Overtime Wages
EVERGREEN RECREATIONAL: $1.2M Grimes Suit Deal Has Prelim. Approval
FEDCHEX RECOVERY: Castle Files FDCPA Suit in N.D. Illinois
FIRST ADVANTAGE: Court Dismisses Frazier FCRA Suit
FIRST STREET: Faces Mendez Suit in Southern District of New York

FLAVORGOD LLC: Hinesley Sues Over Illegal SMS Ads
FONTANA & FONTANA: In Settlement Talks with "Bardales" Plaintiffs
GARDEN COMMUNITIES: Kohler Files Consumer Credit Suit in S.D. Ca.
GENERAL AUTOMOBILE: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Boger Suit Claims
GREY-RUSO: Underpays Laborers, Amaro Suit Alleges

GULF COAST: Court Denies Final Approval of Mygrant Settlement
IBS CONSTRUCTION: Fails to Provide Overtime Pay, Adkins Alleges
IOWA HEALTH SYSTEM: Doe PI Suit Transferred to W.D. Wisconsin
J.R. SIMPLOT: Phillips Suit Removed to E.D. Washington
JARROW FORMULAS: Shanks Appeals Class Cert. Bid Denial to 9th Cir.

JOVANI FASHION: Website not Accessible to Blind, Brooks Says
JUST ENERGY: Gutman Seeks Damages Over Share Price Drop
JUUL LABS: Smith et al. Sue over Sales of e-Cigarettes
KASMIN GALLERY: Mendez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
KATHRYN MARKEL: Mendez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

KOONSUP THAI: Ramos Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
LAMANTIA GALLERY: Mendez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
LARKIN ENTERPRISES: Hayward Labor Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime
LATSHAW DRILLING: Helenberger Suit Transferred to N.D. Texas
LEVINBOOK LAW FIRM: Diez Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York

LEXISNEXIS RISK: Illegally Sells Motorists' Info, Hatch Claims
LOANCARE, LLC: Court Denies Unopposed Class Certification Bid
LONG BEACH HEALTHCARE: Underpays Nursing Assistants, Herrera Says
LOYAL 9 MARKERTING: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Abante Claims
LUXOTTICA: Failed to Reimburse Work-Related Expenses, Gil Says

LVNV FUNDING: Settlement in Elliott Suit Gets Prelim. Approval
MAYOR WEST: Vizcaino Seeks Overtime Wages for Truck Drivers
MCDERMOTT INT'L: Bennett Appeals W.D. La. Ruling to Fifth Circuit
MDL 2885: Broussard Suit over Combat Arms Earplugs Consolidated
MDL 2885: McDougle Suit over Combat Arms Earplugs Consolidated

MIT: Court Partly Allows Summary Judgment Bid in Tracey ERISA Suit
NEW MEXICO: Court Dismisses Garcia Prisoner's Suit
NEW YORK: Court Denies Bid for Prelim Injunction in F.F. Suit
NISSAN NORTH: Kemp Files Product Liability Suit in Tennessee
NOBLES COUNTY, MN: Court Affirms Temporary Injunction in Esparza

NORTHSHORE UNIVERSITY: Court Certifies Patient Access Reps Class
NUWAVE, LLC: Horn Sues over Sale of Defective Ovens
OJ INSTALLATIONS: Fernandes Seeks OT Pay for Furniture Installers
OMNI FAMILY: Fails to Provide Proper Wages, Arauza Alleges
OOTDFASH, LLC: Website not Accessible to Blind, Brooks Says

PK MANAGEMENT: Riley et al Seek to Certify Class of Residents
PLEXUS WORLDWIDE: Website not Accessible to Blind, Slade Says
PRIORITY METALS: Denial of Arbitration Bid in Perez Suit Upheld
PROVIDENCE COMMUNITY: 11th Cir. Upholds Dismissal of Brinson Suit
RAPHAEL HOWELL: N.T. Files Motion to Enforce Subpoena

REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CA: Riffel Suit Removed to C.D. Ca.
SAFETY EQUIPMENT: Ninth Circuit Appeal Initiated in Jensen Suit
SAINT-GOBAIN: Appeals Sullivan Suit Class Cert. Ruling to 2nd Cir.
SCHELL & KAMPETER: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, Dennis Says
SECURITY LIFE: Zhou Files Class Suit in Colorado

SMITTY'S SUPPLY: Mislabels Tractor Hydraulic Fluids, Suit Alleges
SNOOZE HIC: Court Narrows Claims in Wage and Hour Suit
SOUTHLAND ROYALTY: Summary Judgment Bid in Ulibarri Partly Granted
SYSTEM FREIGHT: Thomason Alleges Retaliation
TERRA OILFIELD: Underpays Frac Supervisors, Barhight Alleges

TETRA TECH: Faces Engasser Suit Alleging Wage-and-Hour Violations
THC-ORANGE COUNTY: Court Dismisses Song Labor Suit with Prejudice
TOMS KING: Mendenhall Seeks to Stop Unlawful Use of Biometric Info
TPUSA, INC: Headspeth & McBride Seek to Certify FLSA Class
UNITED BEHAVIORAL: Underpays Healthcare Providers, Meridian Says

USAA FEDERAL: Can Partly Compel Arbitration in Eiess Lawsuit
WELLS FARGO: Class Certification Bid in Narayan Suit Underway
WEST NEW: Denied Workers Overtime Pay, Minimum Wages, Says Cruz
YORK FOOD CORP: Polanco Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
ZEBRA TECHNOLOGIES: Warren Suit Moved to Northern Dist. of Illinois


                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: 111 Suits v Sempra Energy Units Pending at July 29
ASBESTOS UPDATE: 198 Cases vs. CECO Still Pending at June 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: AMETEK Inc. Still Defends Lawsuits at June 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Aurora Pump's Appeal in Colado Case Withdrawn
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Carter P.I. Claims vs. Warren Pump Dismissed

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Cruz Claims vs. Gerdau Dismissed Without Prejudice
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Duke Energy Carolinas Had 195 Claims at June 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Duke Energy Carolinas Has $607MM Liabilities
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Enpro Had $11.3MM Asbestos Coverage at June 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Foushee Discovery Must be Completed on Dec. 10

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Hartford Financial Still Faces Claims at June 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Janis Claims vs. Georgia Pacific, et al. Dismissed
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Kaiser Gypsum Trust to Get $49MM Cash, $1MM Note
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Mallinckrodt Had 11,700 PI Cases at June 28
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Rogers Corp. Estimates $70.8MM Liability at June30

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Rogers Corp. Had 804 Pending Claims at June 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Schlumberger Bid for Reconsideration Denied


                            *********

ACCOLADE INC: Court OKs $1.5K Settlement in Fulton-Green Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania issued a Memorandum granting Parties' Motion for Final
Approval of Settlement Agreement in the case captioned TASHICA
FULTON-GREEN and DANIEL CREVAK, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. ACCOLADE, INC.,
Defendant. Civil Action No. 18-274. (E.D. Pa.).

After negotiations and mediation, the parties entered into a
settlement agreement, filed a motion for final approval.

In January 2017, Accolade, Inc. was the target of a phishing
scheme. A cybercriminal requested the W-2s for current and former
U.S.-based Accolade employees from an Accolade employee who then
sent the unencrypted files via email. The W-2s included personally
identifying information (PII) such as employees' names, addresses,
Social Security Numbers, salaries, and taxes withheld for 2016.
Tashica Fulton-Green's and Daniel Crevak's PII was included in the
breach. They filed suit against Accolade on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated alleging negligence, negligence
per se, breach of implied contract, and breach of fiduciary duty.

Class Definition

The settlement class consists of:

     All current and former Accolade employees whose W-2 data was
compromised as a result of the Data Disclosure which occurred on or
about January 17, 2017.

Settlement Terms

Under the settlement, all class members are entitled to enroll in
identity theft protection for 24 months through Experian's
ProtectMyID service. Class members who have already enrolled in the
program will be instructed on how to enroll for an additional 24
months. Class members are also entitled to seek reimbursement for
four claim categories (A-D), with an overall cap of $1,500 paid to
each class member.

Class Certification

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals summarized the demands of Rule
23 as follows: Rule 23(a) contains four threshold requirements,
which every putative class must satisfy: (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable (2) there are
questions of law or fact common to the class (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

Certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) seeking monetary
compensation is permitted where (1) questions of law or fact common
to class members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members and (2) a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy.  

Numerosity

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), the first factor to
consider in certifying a class is whether the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable. The plaintiffs need
not precisely enumerate the potential size of the proposed class,
nor are plaintiffs required to demonstrate that joinder would be
impossible. Because there are hundreds of class members, this
factor is easily met.

Commonality

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), the second factor to
consider in certifying a class is whether there are questions of
law or fact common to the class. The commonality prerequisite does
not require that all members of the prospective class share
identical claims. Rather, the commonality requirement will be
satisfied if the named plaintiffs share at least one question of
fact or law with the grievances of the prospective class.  Here,
there are common questions and corresponding common answers
concerning how the data breached occurred, whether Accolade had a
duty to protect PII, and whether the employees were harmed by the
breach. Thus, this factor is satisfied for purposes of certifying
the settlement classes.

Typicality

The third 23(a) factor is typicality, i.e., whether the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class. If the claims of the named plaintiffs and
putative class members involve the same conduct by the defendant,
typicality is established regardless of factual differences.

Here, Accolade released the W-2s for Ms. Fulton-Green and Mr.
Crevak in the same data breach as that of all the other class
members. Mr. Crevak had false tax returns filed and someone
attempted to request his tax information from the IRS as a result
of the breach. Although Ms. Fulton-Green has not suffered from
identity theft, she has enrolled in ProtectMyID Alert and has had
to spend time dealing with the repercussions of the breach. Mr.
Crevak's and Ms. Fulton-Green's claims are virtually identical to
those of other class members.

Thus, their claims are typical of the classes delineated for the
proposed settlement.

Adequacy of Representation

The final Rule 23(a) factor focuses on adequacy whether the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class. The rule tests the qualifications of class
counsel and the class representatives. It also aims to root out
conflicts of interest within the class to ensure that all class
members are fairly and adequately represented in negotiations.
Essentially, the inquiry into the adequacy of the representative
parties examines whether the putative named plaintiff has the
ability and the incentive to represent the claims of the class
vigorously, that he or she has obtained adequate counsel, and that
there is no conflict between the individual's claims and those
asserted on behalf of the class.

In other words, Rule 23(a)(4) serves to uncover conflicts of
interest between named parties and the class they seek to
represent. If any conflicts undercut the representative plaintiffs'
ability to adequately represent the class they are fundamental,
such that class representation is structurally faulty and Rule
23(a)(4) cannot be satisfied. There are no apparent conflicts
between named class representatives and other potential class
members because the class representatives' claims are nearly
identical to those of all other class members.

First, the parties have assured the Court that the plaintiffs have
selected and retained experienced counsel to represent themselves
and the Settlement Class. Class Counsel are well-versed in
prosecuting class actions, in particular data breach and data
disclosure cases.  

Second, although formal discovery has not yet occurred, the parties
have exchanged a substantial amount of information through an
informal process and these disclosures provide enough information,
given the discrete issues in this case, to weigh the terms of
settlement against the risks of ongoing litigation.  

Third, the parties worked with an experienced mediator to
facilitate arm's length negotiations. Therefore, this final Rule
23(a) factor weighs in favor of conditionally certifying a
settlement class.

Predominance

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), a class action may be maintained if
common questions of law or fact predominate questions arguably
affecting only individuals. Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance
requirement imposes a more rigorous obligation than Rule 23(a)(2)'s
commonality element] upon a reviewing court to ensure that issues
common to the class predominate over those affecting only
individual class members. Third Circuit precedent provides that the
focus of the predominance inquiry is on whether the defendant's
conduct was common as to all of the class members, and whether all
of the class members were harmed by the defendant's conduct.

Because Accolade's role in the data breach is at the heart of all
of the plaintiffs' claims, the plaintiffs have met their burden to
show predominance for the purposes of conditional class
certification.

Superiority

The second inquiry under Rule 23(b)(3) deals with whether a class
action is superior to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy. Several factors are
relevant to the superiority inquiry: (A) the class members'
interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of
separate actions (B) the extent and nature of any litigation
concerning the controversy already begun by or against class
members (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the
litigation of the claims in the particular forum and (D) the likely
difficulties in managing a class action.

Here, all of the claims are almost identical because they stem out
of the same underlying activity and the damages should be easily
provable and quantifiable. Furthermore, the value of the claims may
be small and impractical to litigate on a case by case basis. This
is particularly true for people like Ms. Fulton-Green who have not
suffered identity theft but have had to spend time notifying
institutions and signing up for identity theft protection programs.
A class action seems to be a superior vehicle for this suit,
particularly at the settlement stage.

Thus, the class certification meets the requirements of Rule 23(a)
and (b).

Notice

In the class action context, the district court obtains personal
jurisdiction over the absentee class members by providing proper
notice of the impending class action and providing the absentees
with the opportunity to be heard or the opportunity to exclude
themselves from the class.

First, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B) requires that class members be
given the best notice practicable under the circumstances,
including individual notice to all potential class members
identifiable through reasonable effort. This notice is to be given
to all potential members of a Rule 23(b)(3) class.  

Second, Rule 23(e) requires all members of the class be notified of
the terms of any proposed settlement. This notice is designed to
summarize the litigation and the settlement and  to apprise class
members of the right and opportunity to inspect the complete
settlement documents, papers, and pleadings filed in the
litigation.

In this action, the Settlement Administrator mailed 937 notices and
the Notice Program reached 98.8% of the Settlement Class. The
neutral website set up by the parties includes the Complaint, Long
Form Notice, Settlement Agreement, Order Granting Preliminary
Approval, paper Claim Form, and a frequently asked questions page.
The parties also made available an automated phone number that is
available 24/7.

Thus, the Court finds that the parties' notice program satisfies
Rules 23(c)(2)(B) and (e).

Traditional Third Circuit Factors

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has indicated that
courts should consider the Girsh factors in determining whether a
proposed class action settlement is fair, reasonable, and
adequate:

(1) the complexity, expense and likely duration of the litigation
(2) the reaction of the class to the settlement  (3) the stage of
the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed; (4) the
risks of establishing liability (5) the risks of establishing
damages (6) the risks of maintaining the class action through the
trial (7) the ability of the defendants to withstand a greater
judgment (8) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund in
light of the best possible recovery and (9) the range of
reasonableness of the settlement fund to a possible recovery in
light of all the attendant risks of litigation.

The Complexity, Expense and Likely Duration of the Litigation

The first Girsh factor takes into account the probable costs, in
both time and money, of continued litigation. As to this factor,
the parties claim that continued litigation would entail a lengthy
and expensive legal battle that may result in no relief or
substantially delayed relief to the Settlement Classes. They also
argue that appeals would likely follow any trial on the merits.
This factor weighs in favor of the settlement.

The Reaction of the Class to the Settlement

As noted, notice was successful at reaching 98.8% of the 937 class
members and there have been no opt outs or objections. Sixteen
claims have matriculated thus far, and Class Counsel expect up to
28 claims in total. Given that no one has requested to be excluded,
this factor was counted in favor of settlement approval.

The Stage of the Proceedings and the Amount of Discovery Completed

This Girsh factor requires the Court to evaluate whether the
plaintiffs had an adequate appreciation of the merits of the case
before negotiating settlement. The parties have exchanged a
substantial amount of information through an informal discovery
process. Thus, even at this early stage of the proceedings, a
reasonable amount of informal discovery has been done  enough to
give both sides a fairly accurate view of continued litigation.

The Risks of Establishing Liability and Damages and Maintaining the
Class Action through Trial

These three Girsh factors require the Court to survey the potential
risks and rewards of proceeding to litigation in order to weigh the
likelihood of success against the benefits of an immediate
settlement.  

With respect to liability and damages, Class Counsel emphasize that
even though they believe they would ultimately prevail at trial,
there are risks inherent in going to trial, particularly in this
area of class litigation. Likewise, with respect to the risk of
maintaining the class action through trial, the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals has recognized that there will always be a risk or
possibility of decertification, and consequently the court can
always claim this factor weighs in favor of settlement.

The Court agrees that the risks of continued litigation and
maintaining the class action weigh in favor of an early
resolution.

The Ability of the Defendant to Withstand a Greater Judgment

Although the Settlement Fund is uncapped in this case, each
individual claim is capped. Even so, there is a very real
possibility that class members might not recover anything if this
litigation were to move forward. Thus, this factor weighs in favor
of settlement.

The Range of Reasonableness of the Settlement in Light of the Best
Possible Recovery and the Attendant Risks of Litigation

The reasonableness of a proposed settlement depends in part upon a
comparison of the present value of the damages the plaintiffs would
recover if successful, discounted by the risks of not prevailing.
Class Counsel emphasize that the great costs and challenges
associated with continuing litigation would outweigh any potential
for greater recovery at trial. Particularly given the real
possibility of class members receiving nothing if litigation were
to move forward, the Court accepts that the Settlement here is
reasonable. All the Girsh factors weigh heavily in favor of
approving the Settlement.

The Court grants the parties' Motion for Final Approval and Class
Counsel's Motion for Attorneys' Fees.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 23, 2019
Memorandum is available https://tinyurl.com/y3ej5d3c from
Leagle.com.

TASHICA FULTON-GREEN, Plaintiff, represented by BRUCE W. STECKLER -
bruce@stecklerlaw.com - STECKLER GRESHAM & COCHRAN, CHARLES E.
SCHAFFER - cschaffer@lfsblaw.com - LEVIN SEDRAN & BERMAN & JOHN A.
YANCHUNIS - jyanchunis@ForThePeople.com - MORGAN & MORGAN.

DANIEL CREVAK, ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, Plaintiff, represented by CHARLES E. SCHAFFER , LEVIN
SEDRAN & BERMAN & JOHN A. YANCHUNIS , MORGAN & MORGAN.

ACCOLADE, INC., Defendant, represented by MATTHEW C. BAISLEY
-mbaisley@bakerlaw.com - BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP, PAUL G. KARLSGODT -
pkarlsgodt@bakerlaw.com - BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP & TYSON Y. HERROLD
- therrold@bakerlaw.com - BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP.


AEI PAINTING: Gallo Seeks OT Pay for Construction Workers
---------------------------------------------------------
VICTORINO GALLO, Individually and on Behalf of All Those Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. AEI PAINTING CONTRACTORS, LLC and CHAD
SKINNER, Jointly and Severally, the Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-04153-TWT (N.D. Ga., Sept. 15, 2019), seeks to recover
unpaid overtime premium pay pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

The Plaintiff was employed as a painter for the Defendants. The
Plaintiff was paid straight-time for all hours worked, despite
working in excess of 40 hours per week throughout his employment.

The exact number of employees who have suffered the same unpaid
overtime wage injury as Plaintiff is unknown at this time, but
believed to be at least 20 employees. The employees include
painters, laborers, and all other hourly workers who were not paid
overtime wages, the lawsuit says.

The Defendants operate a painting business which serves commercial
and residential clients in Georgia, Alabama, South Carolina, and
North Carolina.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Brandon A. Thomas, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF BRANDON A. THOMAS, PC
          1 Glenlake Parkway, Suite 650
          Atlanta, GA 30328
          Telephone: (678) 330-2909
          Facsimile: (678) 638-6201
          E-mail: brandon@overtimeclaimslawyer.com

AMEDISYS HOLDING: Seeks 6th Circuit Review of Ruling in TCPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Amedisys Holding, LLC filed an appeal from a Court ruling
in the lawsuit entitled ADVANCED REHAB AND MEDICAL, P.C. v.
AMEDISYS HOLDING, LLC, Case No. 1:17-cv-01149, in the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Tennessee at Jackson.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, in its first
amended class action complaint filed Jan. 31, 2018, Advanced Rehab
alleged violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991,
as amended by the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005.

Amedisys, a provider of home health care and hospice services,
received referrals from physicians and health care clinics who
determined their patients were in need of such care.  In an effort
to facilitate those referrals, the Defendant routinely sent
facsimile transmissions to health care providers from whom it had
received prior referrals.

The appellate case is captioned as In re: Amedisys Holding, LLC,
Case No. 19-510, in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Respondent ADVANCED REHAB AND MEDICAL, P.C., A Tennessee
corporation, individually and as the representative of a class of
similarly-situated persons, is represented by:

          Benjamin Cole Aaron, Esq.
          NEAL & HARWELL PLC
          1201 Demonbreun Street, Suite 1000
          Nashville, TN 37219
          Telephone: (615) 244-1713
          E-mail: baaron@nealharwell.com

               - and -

          Brian J. Wanca, Esq.
          ANDERSON + WANCA
          3701 Algonquin Road, Suite 760
          Rolling Meadows, IL 60008
          Telephone: (847) 368-1500
          E-mail: bwanca@andersonwanca.com

Defendant-Petitioner AMEDISYS HOLDING, LLC is represented by:

          Jason Todd Burnette, Esq.
          JONES DAY
          1420 Peachtree Street, N.E., Suite 800
          Atlanta, GA 30309
          Telephone: (404) 521-3939
          E-mail: jtburnette@jonesday.com

               - and -

          Kevin C. Baltz, Esq.
          BUTLER SNOW LLP
          150 Third Avenue, S., Suite 1600
          Nashville, TN 37201
          Telephone: (615) 244-9270
          E-mail: kevin.baltz@butlersnow.com


AMERICAN COLLECTION: Coleman Files FDCPA Suit in N.D. Ohio
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against American Collection
Systems, Inc. The case is styled as Charline Coleman, individually
and behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. American
Collection Systems, Inc., and John Does 1 - 25, Defendants, Case
No. 3:19-cv-02251 (N.D. Ohio, Sept. 27, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

American Collection Systems, Inc. is a full-service professional
billing and debt collection company serving clients across the
Rocky Mountain region. They specialize in both medical and retail
billing and bad-debt recovery services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Amichai E. Zukowsky, Esq.
     23811 Chagrin Blvd., Ste. 160
     Beachwood, OH 44122
     Phone: (216) 800-5529
     Fax: (216) 514-4987
     Email: ami@zukowskylaw.com


AMERICAN FINANCE: Court Dismisses Securities Suit
-------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Opinion  and Order granting Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss Second Amended Complaint in the case captioned CAROLYN ST.
CLAIR-HIBBARD, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN FINANCE TRUST, INC. et al.,
Defendants. No. 18 Civ. 1148 (LGS) (KNF). (S.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiff Carolyn St. Clair-Hibbard brings this action against
Defendants American Financial Trust, Inc. (AFIN), American Finance
Advisors, LLC (AF Advisors), AR Global Investments, LLC (AR
Global), Nicholas S. Schorsch and William D. Kahane. She alleges
that AFIN violated Section 14(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934 (Exchange Act) and Rule 14a-9 promulgated thereunder. She
alleges that AF Advisors, AR Global, Schorsch and Kahane violated
Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. Plaintiff also asserts state law
breach of fiduciary duty claims on behalf of herself and a class of
AFIN's public shareholders.

Standard for Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(6)

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.

Section 14(a) Claim Against AFIN

Count I alleges that AFIN violated Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 by
making false and misleading statements in the Proxy Materials and
seeks rescission of the Third Agreement. The Complaint alleges that
the Proxy Materials contain false and misleading information about
(1) the internalization terms in the Third Agreement and (2) AFIN's
prospect of going public. The Complaint alleges that Defendants
fraudulently procured the shareholders' approval of the merger and
Third Agreement, which has depressed the value of their AFIN common
stock. Count I fails to state a claim.

In short, although Plaintiff alleges facts and risks about the
merger and the accompanying advisory arrangement that might have
caused a reasonable shareholder not to approve the transaction, the
proxy statement contains extensive disclosures about those facts
and risks and the shareholders did approve the transaction.  

Section 14(a) Pleading Requirements

Under section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, it shall be unlawful for
any person in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe to solicit or to permit the use of his
name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of
any security.

To state a claim under Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9, a plaintiff
must allege that: (1) a proxy statement contained a material
misrepresentation or omission which (2) caused plaintiff's injury
and (3) that the proxy solicitation itself, rather than the
particular defect in the solicitation materials, was an essential
link in the accomplishment of the transaction

Section 20(a) Claim Against AF Advisors, AR Global, Schorsch and
Kahane

Control person liability attaches under Section 20(a) of the
Exchange Act only where a plaintiff has shown that a primary
violation by a controlled person occurred. Here, Plaintiff's
Complaint fails to allege a primary violation of the Exchange Act.
Accordingly, the Complaint does not state a claim under Section
20(a).

State Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Aiding and Abetting Claims

The Complaint alleges that the defective Proxy Materials
constituted a class-wide breach of fiduciary duties undertaken by
AF Advisors in the Second Agreement and Third Agreement, as aided
and abetted by AR Global, Schorsch and Kahane. The theory of the
claims is that AF Advisors breached its contractual obligation to
act in the best interest of AFIN and its shareholders, and not for
its own benefit, (i) when AF Advisors negotiated changes to the
Third Agreement that increased AF Advisors' compensation and
imposed the internalization fee and (ii) when AF Advisors
disseminated a proxy statement on June 1, 2015, seeking approval of
a 20-year non-cancellable term in the Second Agreement.

The Complaint fails to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.

The claim is based on a contractually created fiduciary duty in the
Second and Third Agreements. Both agreements prescribe AF Advisors'
rights and responsibilities as a service provider to AFIN.
Accordingly, the fiduciary duty stated in these agreements must
relate to AF Advisors' responsibilities when operating as a service
provider to AFIN.

The Complaint does not allege that AF Advisors failed in performing
those duties, but rather in negotiating the agreements that created
those duties. The contracts do not impose a duty on AF Advisors
that pre-dates the creation of the contracts, specifically the duty
to create a contract with the least desirable terms for AF
Advisors. Similarly, in an ERISA case, the Second Circuit held that
when a service provider that has no relationship to an ERISA plan
is negotiating a contract with that plan, the service provider is
not an ERISA fiduciary with respect to the terms of the agreement
for its compensation. The rationale for this rule is that a service
provider in such a situation has no authority over or
responsibility to the plan and presumably is unable to exercise any
control over the trustees' decision whether or not, and on what
terms, to enter into an agreement.

Conversely, fiduciary responsibility would lie if AF Advisors had
the ability to dictate the terms of the Second and Third
Agreements. Allegations in the SAC and documents it incorporates by
reference show that AF Advisors did not have control over the terms
of either agreement, superseding the Complaint's conclusory
allegations to the contrary. According to the June 2015 proxy
statement seeking approval of the Second Agreement, that agreement
was presented to and approved by the three independent directors on
AFIN's four-member Board of Directors and then approved by AFIN's
shareholders.

The Third Agreement, as a part of the merger, was approved by a
Special Committee at both companies, each comprised of only the
independent directors of AFIN and RCA. The detailed history in the
proxy statement for approval of the merger (and with it the Third
Agreement) shows that the AFIN Special Committee and the RCA
Special Committee had extensive negotiations with AF Advisors about
the terms of the Third Agreement with AF Advisors. The merger of
AFIN and RCA, with the accompanying Third Agreement, was approved
by AFIN's shareholders.

The SAC does not plead any facts to the contrary, and accordingly,
the breach of fiduciary claim against AF Advisors is dismissed.

Because the primary claim does not survive, the claim against the
remaining Defendants alleging aiding and abetting also does not
survive. Under both New York and Maryland law, an aiding and
abetting action can survive only where an underlying violation has
occurred. As the Complaint fails to state a claim for AF Advisors'
breach of fiduciary duty, the Complaint fails to state a claim
against AR Global, Schorsch and Kahane for aiding and abetting.

An additional basis for dismissal is that Plaintiff and the
purported class lack standing to pursue these breach of fiduciary
duty claims as derivative claims, having neither made a demand on
AFIN's Board nor adequately alleged demand futility.  

Defendants' motions to dismiss are granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 23, 2019 Opinion
and Order is available https://tinyurl.com/yxbsmzz4 from
Leagle.com.

Carolyn St. Clair-Hibbard, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Olimpio Lee Squitieri
- lee@sfclasslaw.com - Squitieri & Fearon LLP.

American Finance Trust, Inc., Defendant, represented by Matthew
Jerome Morris , Proskauer Rose LLP & Peter Duffy Doyle , Proskauer
Rose LLP, 11 Times Sq., New York, NY 10036-8299

American Finance Advisors, LLC, AR Global Investments, LLC &
Nicholas S. Schorsch, Defendants, represented by Audra Jan Soloway
- asoloway@paulweiss.com - Paul Weiss, Daniel Shiah Sinnreich -
dsinnreich@paulweiss.com - Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison
LLP & Naomi Dena Morris - nmorris@paulweiss.com - Paul, Weiss.

William M. Kahane, ADR Provider, represented by Audra Jan Soloway ,
Paul Weiss, Daniel Shiah Sinnreich , Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton
& Garrison LLP & Naomi Dena Morris , Paul, Weiss.


ANDA, INC: Khan Sues over Sale of Prescription Opioids
------------------------------------------------------
FARHAN F. KHAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. ANDA, INC., the Defendant, Case No.
95675191 (Fla. 13th Jud'l Cir., Sept. 13, 2019), seeks redress for
Anda's illegal acts that have caused Plaintiff's and class members'
health insurance premiums to increase. The action seeks to hold
Anda accountable for the economic harms it has imposed on Florida
purchasers of private health insurance.

According to the complaint, Anda distributes prescription opioids,
which are powerful, highly addictive narcotic painkillers. Anda
could and should have prevented the brunt of the opioid epidemic,
but instead allowed the country, including Florida, to be flooded
with prescription opioids. Under federal law, distributors are
required to secure and monitor drugs as they travel through
commerce, to protect them from theft, and to reject and report
suspicious or unusual orders by downstream pharmacies, doctors, or
patients. But Anda neglected these duties, turning a blind eye to
known or knowable problems in its own supply chains. By doing so,
Anda created conditions in which vast amounts of opioids flowed
freely from Anda to abusers and drug dealers -- with Anda readily
fulfilling suspicious orders from pharmacies and ignoring red flags
that would require further investigation and resolution.

This behavior by Anda has allowed massive amounts of opioids to be
diverted from legitimate channels of distribution into the illicit
black market, fueling the opioid epidemic. For years, Anda has had
the ability to substantially reduce the death toll and adverse
economic consequences of opioid diversion but opted to pursue
corporate revenues instead, creating an environment in which drug
diversion could flourish.

The explosion in opioid prescriptions and use has created a public
health crisis in Florida. An oversupply of prescription opioids has
provided a source for illicit use or sale of opioids, while their
widespread use has created a population of addicted and dependent
patients. When those patients can no longer afford or legitimately
obtain opioids, they often turn to the street to buy prescription
opioids or even heroin. In addition to the societal impact of
deaths, overdoses, and rampant addiction, Anda's conduct has
created higher demand and thus higher prices for opioids, as well
as the need for expensive medical treatment for a number of covered
health conditions, resulting in increased insurance costs for
Florida residents.

Anda's conduct has fueled skyrocketing opioid addiction,
opioid-related deaths and emergency treatments, and has generated
huge sales of opioids at inflated prices.

The direct and proximate consequence of Anda's misconduct is that
every Florida purchaser of private health insurance has paid higher
premiums, co-payments, and deductibles. Insurance companies have
considerable market power and pass onto their insureds the expected
costs of future care -- including opioid-related coverage.
Accordingly, insurance companies factored in the unwarranted and
exorbitant healthcare costs of opioid-related coverage caused by
Anda and charged those costs back to insureds in the form of higher
premiums, deductibles, and co-payments.

Prescription opioids have devastated communities both across the
country and in the State of Florida. Since 1999, there have been
more than 183,000 reported opioid-related deaths nationwide -- more
than three times the number of U.S. soldiers who died in the
Vietnam War. In addition to the tragic loss of life and the
heartbreaking impact of these deaths on children and loved ones,
some estimates state that the opioid crisis is costing governmental
entities and private companies as much as $500 billion per year,
the lawsuit says.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Putative Class are:

          Ashley Keller, Esq.
          Travis Lenkner, Esq.
          Seth Meyer, Esq.
          KELLER LENKNER LLC
          150 N. Riverside Plaza, Suite 4270
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: 312-506-5641
          E-mail: ack@kellerlenkner.com
                  tdl@kellerlenkner.com
                  sam@kellerlenkner.com

               - and -

          John A. Yanchunis, Esq.
          Juan Martinez, Esq.
          James Young, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN
          COMPLEX LITIGATION GROUP
          201 N. Franklin Street, 7th Floor
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: 813-223-5505
          E-mail: jyanchunis@ForThePeople.com
                  juanmartinez@ForThePeople.com
                  jyoung@ForThePeople.com

               - and -

          William S. Consovoy, Esq.
          J. Michael Connolly, Esq.
          CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC
          1600 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 700
          Arlington, VA 22209
          Telephone: 703-243-9423
          E-mail: will@consovoymccarthy.com
                  mike@consovoymccarthy.com

ANSELMO LINDBERG: Rodriguez Stayed Under Colorado River Doctrine
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Gary Feinerman of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, Eastern Division, granted the Defendants'
motion to stay the case styled JOSE RODRIGUEZ and MARY ARROYO, on
behalf of themselves and those similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
ANSELMO, LINDBERG & ASSOCIATES, LLC, BOSCO CREDIT II TRUST SERIES
2010-1, and FRANKLIN CREDIT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Defendants,
Case No. 19 C 271 (N.D. Ill.), under Colorado River Water
Conservation District v. United States.

Rodriguez and Arroyo allege that Anselmo, Bosco, and Franklin
violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and the Illinois
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act, by bringing a state
court foreclosure action in violation of the Illinois Collection
Agency Act .  

In April 2018, non-party Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. -- as
trustee on behalf of Bosco, at the direction of Franklin as Bosco's
loan servicer, and with Anselmo as its counsel -- brought a state
court foreclosure action against the Plaintiffs.  After filing a
pro se answer, the Plaintiffs retained counsel and on Jan. 4, 2019
moved to amend their answer to assert as an affirmative defense
that, because Bosco had not obtained a debt collection license, the
Defendants violated the ICAA by bringing the foreclosure action.
On Feb. 6, 2019, the state court denied the motion without
explanation.

Later that day, the Plaintiffs filed another motion for leave to
assert the same affirmative defense, this time attaching a proposed
pleading.  Bosco opposed the motion on the ground that the proposed
affirmative defense was futile, and the Plaintiffs replied at
length that the Defendants violated the ICAA by bringing the
foreclosure action without Bosco having obtained a debt collection
license.  The state court denied the Plaintiffs' motion, this time
with an explanation that directly addressed the merits of the ICAA
issue: The Defendant's motion for leave to file affirmative
defenses is denied, the court finding no ICAA violation occurred.

The Plaintiffs brought the suit on Jan. 14, 2019, 10 days after
filing their first motion for leave to amend in the foreclosure
action.  Their complaint, which alleges violations of the FDCPA and
the ICFA, rests on the same premise as their rejected affirmative
defense in the foreclosure action -- that the Defendants violated
the ICAA by bringing that action without Bosco first obtaining a
debt collection license.  In fact, the Plaintiffs' rejected
affirmative defense is substantially identical to their complaint
in the case.

The Defendants now move to stay the suit under Colorado River.  The
Colorado River doctrine provides that a federal court may stay or
dismiss a suit in federal court when a concurrent state court case
is underway, but only under exceptional circumstances and if it
would promote 'wise judicial administration.'  The Colorado River
analysis has two steps.  First, the Court asks whether the state
and federal court actions are parallel.  If the proceedings are not
parallel, Colorado River abstention must be denied.  If the
proceedings are parallel, the Court must weigh 10 non-exclusive
factors, including (1) whether the state has assumed jurisdiction
over property; and (2) the inconvenience of the federal forum, to
determine whether abstention is proper.

Judge Feinerman finds that the parallelism test is satisfied in the
case.  If there was no ICAA violation in connection with the
foreclosure action, the Plaintiffs' FDCPA or ICFA claims
necessarily fail.  So, the central issue here -- whether the
Defendants violated the ICAA -- is being litigated in the
foreclosure action, and the state trial court has already ruled
that there was no violation.  If the Plaintiffs do not appeal that
ruling, or if they appeal unsuccessfully, the foreclosure action
will dispose of all claims presented in the federal case on
preclusion grounds by undercutting an essential premise of the
Plaintiffs' FDCPA and ICFA claims.  That establishes parallelism
between the present suit and the foreclosure action.

The Plaintiffs contend that Colorado River abstention is
inappropriate because the state trial court already ruled on the
ICAA issue.  That contention is unpersuasive.  The Judge finds that
the ICAA issue is still very much part of the ongoing foreclosure
action, and if the Defendants obtain a judgment there, the
Plaintiffs can appeal on the ground that the trial court wrongly
held that the Defendants' bringing the action did not violate the
ICAA.

Equally meritless is the Plaintiffs' contention that abstention is
inappropriate because they did not bring an FDCPA counterclaim in
the foreclosure action.  As the Judge explained, the occurrence of
an ICAA violation is an essential premise of the Plaintiffs' FDCPA
claim here, and that precise issue is being litigated in the
foreclosure action, rendering the two suits parallel.

Finally, the Plaintiffs contend that abstention is inappropriate
because the suit involves parties (Anselmo and Franklin) that are
not parties in the foreclosure action.  But the governing test for
parallelism is not whether the parties are completely the same;
rather, it is whether they are substantially the same.  The overlap
in the case -- the Plaintiffs are the federal court plaintiffs and
state court defendants, while Bosco is a federal court defendant
and the entity on whose behalf the state court plaintiff brought
the foreclosure action -- easily qualifies.  Nor does it matter
that the Plaintiffs brought the suit as a putative class action.

Turning to the second step in the Colorado River analysis, the
Judge finds that nearly all the Colorado River factors favor
abstention, providing the "exceptional circumstances" necessary to
abstain.  The only remaining question is whether the suit should be
dismissed or stayed.  The Seventh Circuit routinely holds that
Colorado River should be implemented through a stay, not dismissal.
Accordingly, the suit is stayed pending further proceedings in the
state foreclosure action.  When that action (including any appeals)
concludes, or at any appropriate juncture before then, any party
may move to lift the stay and proceed in a manner consistent with
the state court's rulings and applicable preclusion law.

Against this backrop, Judge Feinerman granted the Defendants'
motion.  He stayed the case under the Colorado River doctrine
pending further proceedings in the state foreclosure action,
Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Rodriguez, No. 18 CH 5297 (Ill.
Cir. Ct., Cook Cnty.).

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 4, 2019 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/f0fqvK from Leagle.com.

Jose Rodriguez, on behalf of plaintiffs and a class & Mary Arroyo,
on behalf of plaintiffs and a class, Plaintiffs, represented by
Daniel A. Edelman, Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin LLC,
Cathleen M. Combs, Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin LLC, Mary
Frances Charlton, Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin, Llc, Paul
Michael Waldera, Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin Llc & Tara
Leigh Goodwin, Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin LLC.

Anselmo, Lindberg & Associates, LLC, Defendant, represented by
David M. Schultz -- dschultz@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw & Culbertson
LLP & Louis J. Manetti, Jr. -- LManetti@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw &
Culbertson LLP.

Bosco Credit II Trust Series 2010-1, a Delaware statutory trust &
Franklin Credit Management Corporation, Defendants, represented by
David M. Schultz, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Louis J. Manetti, Jr.,
Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP & Mitchell L. Williamson --
williamson@bn-lawyers.com -- Barron & Newburger, P.C, pro hac
vice.


ATH HOLDING: $8.4MM Atty.'s Fees & Costs Awarded in Bell ERISA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARY BELL, JANICE GRIDER, CINDY PROKISH, JOHN HOFFMAN,
and PAMELA LEINONEN, Plaintiffs, v. PENSION COMMITTEE OF ATH
HOLDING COMPANY, LLC, ATH HOLDING COMPANY, LLC, BOARD OF DIRECTORS
OF ATH HOLDING COMPANY, LLC, Defendants, Case No.
1:15-cv-02062-TWP-MPB (S.D. Ind.), Judge Tanya Walton Pratt of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana,
Indianapolis Division, granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Attorneys' Fees, Reimbursement of Expenses and Case Contribution
Awards for Named Plaintiffs.

In their Motion, the Class Counsel asked the Court to approve a fee
for obtaining a settlement of the class claims under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act.  The settlement provides a $23.65
million monetary recovery for the benefit of the Class Members.
Taking into account the significant and powerful non-monetary
relief and benefit of tax deferral, the total benefit to the Class
exceeds $62 million dollars.

The Class Counsel has asked the Court to approve a fee award of
$7,882,545 which constitutes one-third of the monetary award.
Additional improvements to the Plan as a result of the litigation
and settlement bring the actual value to the Class far higher to a
total value of over $62 million dollars.  The Class Counsel has
also asked the Court to award it $513,015.32 for expenses.
Additionally, the Class Counsel has requested the Court approve
incentive awards to the Class Representatives and also to the
Individual Named Plaintiffs.

Judge Pratt finds the Class Counsel's fee request is wholly
appropriate given the extraordinary risk the Class Counsel accepted
in agreeing to represent the Class; the fact that the Class Counsel
brought this kind of case when no one else had; the Class Counsel's
demonstrated willingness to devote tremendous resources for many
years to the case as it has done in other cases; the substantial
monetary recovery; and the additional value of the future relief
included in this settlement to Plan participants.  A $7,882,545 fee
would be justified without considering non-monetary relief and
other benefits to the Class, he said.

The Judge further finds that the $513,015.32 in expenses for which
the Class Counsel seeks reimbursement is warranted.  Given the
high-stakes nature of the case, she finds that the Class Counsel's
incurred expenses are reasonable and should be reimbursed from the
common fund.  Indeed, this final expense item is significantly
below the anticipated submitted expense of $650,000, he added.

The Plaintiffs have also requested that Named Plaintiffs Mary Bell,
John Hoffman, and Pamela Leinonen, who were successfully appointed
by the Court to serve as the Class Representatives in the action,
receive a case contribution award of $20,000.  They further
requested that Named Plaintiffs Janice Grider and Cindy Prokish,
who were not named as the Class Representatives but remained in the
case in their individual capacity, receive a case contribution
award of $5,000.  Without their commitment to pursuing these
claims, the successful recovery for the Class would not have been
possible.  Accordingly, the Judge approves these respective
awards.

After consideration of the Class Counsel's Motion, and consistent
with the findings of the Independent Fiduciary, Judge Pratt
concludes that the requested attorneys' fee and expense
reimbursements are fair, reasonable, and merited by the Class
Counsel's efforts resulting in relief for the Class.  Accordingly,
she approved the requested attorneys' fee of $7,882,545 and the
requested reimbursement of expenses in the amount of $513,015.32.
The Settlement Administrator will pay the combined sum of
$8,395,560.32 to the firm of Schlichter, Bogard & Denton out of the
Settlement Fund.  The Settlement Administrator will separately pay
Named Plaintiffs Mary Bell, John Hoffman, and Pamela Leinonen each
$20,000, and Named Plaintiffs Janice Grider and Cindy Prokish, who
were not named as the Class Representatives but remained in the
case in their individual capacity, each $5,000.

Finally, and for the reasons stated on the record at the hearing
held on Sept. 4, 2019, the Judge overruled the sole objection to
the amount of the attorneys' fees, requested reimbursement of
expenses, and incentive awards.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 4, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/5aEtqD from Leagle.com.

MARY BELL, Plaintiff, represented by Alexander L. Braitberg --
abraitberg@uselaws.com -- SCHLICTHER BOGARD DENTON LLP, pro hac
vice, Andrew D. Schlichter -- aschlichter@uselaws.com --
SCHLICHTER
BOGARD & DENTON, LLP, pro hac vice, Heather Lea --
hlea@uselaws.com
-- SCHLICHTER, BOGARD & DENTON, LLP, pro hac vice, Jerome J.
Schlichter -- jschlichter@uselaws.com -- SCHLICHTER, BOGARD &
DENTON, LLP, pro hac vice, Kurt C. Struckhoff --
kstruckhoff@uselaws.com -- SCHLICHTER, BOGARD & DENTON, LLP, pro
hac vice, Michael A. Wolff -- mwolff@uselaws.com -- SCHLICHTER,
BOGARD & DENTON, LLP, pro hac vice, Sean Soyars --
ssoyars@uselaws.com -- SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON LLP, pro hac
vice
& Troy A. Doles -- tdoles@uselaws.com -- SCHLICHTER, BOGARD &
DENTON, LLP, pro hac vice.

JANICE GRIDER & CINDY PROKISH, individually and as representatives
of a class of similarly situated persons of the Anthem 401(k) Plan
(formerly the WellPoint 401(k) Retirement Savings Plan),
Plaintiffs, represented by Alexander L. Braitberg, SCHLICTHER
BOGARD DENTON LLP, pro hac vice, Andrew D. Schlichter, SCHLICHTER
BOGARD & DENTON, LLP, pro hac vice, Heather Lea, SCHLICHTER,
BOGARD & DENTON, LLP, pro hac vice, Jerome J. Schlichter,
SCHLICHTER, BOGARD & DENTON, LLP, pro hac vice, Kurt C. Struckhoff,

SCHLICHTER, BOGARD & DENTON, LLP, pro hac vice, Michael A. Wolff,
SCHLICHTER, BOGARD & DENTON, LLP, pro hac vice & Troy A. Doles,
SCHLICHTER, BOGARD & DENTON, LLP, pro hac vice.

JOHN HOFFMAN & PAMELA LEINONEN, Plaintiffs, represented by
Alexander L. Braitberg, SCHLICTHER BOGARD DENTON LLP, pro hac
vice, Andrew D. Schlichter, SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON, LLP, pro
hac vice, Troy A. Doles, SCHLICHTER, BOGARD & DENTON, LLP & Jerome
J. Schlichter, SCHLICHTER, BOGARD & DENTON, LLP, pro hac vice.

PENSION COMMITTEE OF ATH HOLDING COMPANY, LLC, ATH HOLDING
COMPANY,
LLC & BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ATH HOLDING COMPANY, LLC, Defendants,
represented by Ada W. Dolph -- adolph@seyfarth.com -- SEYFARTH
SHAW
LLP, pro hac vice, Ian Hugh Morrison -- imorrison@seyfarth.com --
SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, Jason Priebe, SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, pro hac vice &
Megan E. Troy -- mtroy@seyfarth.com -- SEYFARTH SHAW LLP.

VANGUARD GROUP, INC., Interested Party, represented by Laura
Hughes
McNally -- laura.mcnally@morganlewis.com -- MORGAN, LEWIS &
BOCKIUS
LLP.


BARRY UNIVERSITY: Flores Sues over Unsolicited Text Messages
------------------------------------------------------------
DEBORA FLORES, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. BARRY UNIVERSITY, INC., the Defendant
Case No. 95712334 (Fla . 11th Jud'l Cir., Sept. 14, 2019), contends
that the Defendant promotes and markets its merchandise, in part,
by sending unsolicited text messages to wireless phone users, in
violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

To solicit new paying students, the Defendant engages in
unsolicited marketing with no regard for privacy rights of the
recipients of those messages. The Defendant caused thousands of
unsolicited text messages to be sent to the cellular telephones of
Plaintiff and Class Members, causing them injuries, including
invasion of their privacy.

The Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to halt the Defendant's
illegal conduct. The Plaintiff also seeks statutory damages on
behalf of himself and Class Members and any other available legal
or equitable remedies resulting from illegal actions of the
Defendant, the lawsuit says.

The Defendant operates one of the largest colleges in Florida,
charging students an annual tuition of approximately $34,300.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq.
          HIRALDO P.A.
          401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 400 4713
          E-mail: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com

BOGGEY'S INC: Bastys Hits Unpaid Min. Wages, Misappropriated Tips
-----------------------------------------------------------------
TYLER BASTYS, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated. Plaintiff, v. BOGGEY'S, INC. and KEVIN HYNES, Defendants,
Case No. 19-1229 (Commonwealth of Mass., Sept. 24, 2019) seeks to
recover compensatory damages for the minimum wages Plaintiff and
the putative class members did not receive, as well as compensatory
damages for the tips that were improperly remitted to ineligible
employees.

Plaintiff Tyler Bastys worked as a server for Defendants at the Bay
Poinle Waterfront Restaurant in Quincy, Massachusetts. Defendants
owns and operates Bay Pointe and maintains its principal office at
64 Washington Court in Quincy, Massachusetts.

The Defendants pay the servers at Bay Pointe an hourly wage that is
less than the basic minimum wage, asserts the complaint. In
addition, the servers receive tips from customers. However,
Defendants have not permitted the servers to retain all of their
tips. Instead, Defendants have caused, required, or permitted the
servers to share their tips with employees, such as kitchen
expeditors, who do not qualify as "wait staff employees" within the
meaning of the Massachusetts Tips Act.

Accordingly, Defendants have violated the Tips Act by causing,
requiring, or permitting the servers at Bay Pointe to share tips
with employees who are not eligible to accept tips from servers,
says the complaint. In addition, Defendants have violated the
Massachusetts Minimum Fair Wage Law, by paying the servers less
than the basic minimum wage while also failing to comply with the
tip pooling requirements imposed by the Tips Act.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Hillary Schwab, Esq.
     Brant Casavant, Esq.
     FAIR WORK P.C.
     192 South Street. Suite 450
     Boston. MA 02111
     Phone: (617)607-3261
     Fax: (617)488-2261
     Email: hi1lary@fairworklaw.com
            rache@fairworklaw.com


BOTTLING GROUP: Underpays Account Merchandisers, Bishop Alleges
---------------------------------------------------------------
MARTIN BISHOP, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. BOTTLING GROUP, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-05995 (N.D. Ill., Sept. 6, 2019) is an action against the
Defendant's failure to pay the Plaintiff and the class overtime
compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week.

The Plaintiff Bishop was employed by the Defendant as account
merchandiser.

Bottling Group LLC, is a New York limited liability corporation
owning and operating a commercial beverage bottling plant. The
Company offers soft drink, bottled water, energy drink, and fruit
juices. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John William Billhorn, Esq.
          BILLHORN LAW FIRM
          53 West Jackson Blvd., Suite 401
          Chicago, IL 60604
          Telephone: (312) 853-1450


C.B. FLEET: Allcott et al Suit Moved to C.D. California
-------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned Allyson Allcott and Michele Paylor, individually
and on behalf of all other similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs.
C.B. Fleet Company, Inc., a Virginia corporation; Prestige Consumer
Healthcare, Inc., a Delaware corporation; and Does 1-10, inclusive,
the Defendant, Case No. 30-02019-01088761-CU-MC-CXC, was moved from
the Superior Court State of California,  County of Orange, to the
Central District of California (Southern Division - Santa Ana) on
Sept. 13, 2019. The Central District of California Court Clerk
assigned Case No. 8:19-cv-01744-JVS-ADS to the proceeding. The suit
alleges fraud. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge James V.
Selna.

CB Fleet manufactures health and beauty care products. The company
offers deodorant suppositories, disposable enema, feminine hygiene,
and infant care products. Fleet Laboratories serves consumers and
healthcare professionals worldwide.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Timothy G. Blood, Esq.
          BLOOD HURST AND O'REARDON LLP
          501 West Broadway Suite 1490
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 338-1100
          Facsimile: (619) 338-1101
          E-mail: tblood@bholaw.com

               - and -

          Anne Andrews, Esq.
          ANDREWS AND THORNTON
          4701 Von Karman Avenue Suite 300
          Newport Beach, CA 92660
          Telephone: (949) 748-1000
          Facsimile: (949) 315-3540
          E-mail: aa@andrewsthornton.com

               - and -

          Paula R. Brown, Esq.
          BLOOD HURST AND O'REARDON LLP
          501 West Broadway Suite 1490
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 338-1100
          Facsimile: (619) 338-1101
          E-mail: pbrown@bholaw.com

               - and -

          Robert Sean Siko, Esq.
          ANDREWS AND THORNTON
          4701 Von Karman Avenue Suite 300
          Newport Beach, CA 92660
          Telephone: (949) 748-1000
          Facsimile: (949) 315-3540
          E-mail: rsiko@andrewsthornton.com

Attorneys for the Defendants are:

          Melanie Atswei Ayerh, Esq.
          Anthony J. Anscombe, Esq.
          STEPTOE AND JOHNSON LLP
          633 West Fifth Street Suite 1900
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 439-9400
          Facsimile: (213) 439-9599
          E-mail: mayerh@steptoe.com
                  aanscombe@steptoe.com

CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT: Gershman Challenges Sale to Eldorado
-----------------------------------------------------------
ANDREW GERSHMAN, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT CORPORATION, ANTHONY RODIO, JAMES
HUNT, THOMAS BENNINGER, JULIANA CHUGG, DENISE CLARK, KEITH COZZA,
JOHN DIONNE, DON KORNSTEIN, COURTNEY MATHER, JAMES NELSON, RICHARD
SCHIFTER, COLT MERGER SUB, INC., and ELDORADO RESORTS, INC., Case
No. 1:19-cv-01720-UNA (D. Del., Sept. 12, 2019), accuses the
Defendants of violating the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 arising
out of the Board of Directors' attempt to sell the Company to
Eldorado Resorts, Inc. through its wholly-owned subsidiary Colt
Merger Sub, Inc.

The Proposed Transaction was first disclosed on June 24, 2019, when
Caesars and Eldorado announced that they had entered into a
definitive merger agreement pursuant to which Eldorado will acquire
all of the outstanding shares of common stock of Caesars for $8.40
and 0.0899 shares of Eldorado common stock per share of Caesars.
The deal is valued at approximately $17.3 billion and is expected
to close in the first half of 2020.

Despite encouraging growth after emerging from bankruptcy, the
Board acquiesced to pressure from some stockholders to sell the
Company, Mr. Gershman says.  In doing so, he contends, the Board
failed to obtain a proper valuation for Caesars and tied
stockholders to a company where some of its executives and
directors have been issued subpoenas in an investigation by the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission.

Mr. Gershman also alleges the Defendants have violated the Exchange
Act by causing a materially incomplete and misleading registration
statement (the "S-4") to be filed with the SEC on September 3,
2019, which recommends that Caesars stockholders vote in favor of
the Proposed Transaction.  He adds that PJT Partners LP, Caesars'
financial advisor, appears to have artificially lowered Caesars'
value by choosing a lower benefit figure and applying generally
reduced multiples relative to its selected range for EBITDA
multiples in its Discounted Equity Value Analysis and its
Discounted Cash Flow Analysis.

Caesars is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of
the State of Delaware.  The Company's principal executive offices
are located at One Caesars Palace Drive, in Las Vegas, Nevada.  The
Individual Defendants are directors and officers of the Company.

Caesars operates hotels, restaurants and casinos in Las Vegas,
Atlantic City and other locations across the United States.  The
Company brought in $7.3 billion in revenues in 2018, a 73% increase
from $4.2 billion in 2017.

Eldorado Resorts, Inc. is a Nevada corporation with its principal
executive offices located in Reno, Nevada.  Colt Merger Sub, Inc.
is a Delaware corporation and is a wholly owned subsidiary of
Eldorado.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brian D. Long, Esq.
          Gina M. Serra, Esq.
          RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
          300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 295-5310
          Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
          E-mail: bdl@rl-legal.com
                  gms@rl-legal.com

               - and -

          Shane T. Rowley, Esq.
          Danielle Rowland Lindahl, Esq.
          ROWLEY LAW PLLC
          50 Main Street, Suite 1000
          White Plains, NY 10606
          Telephone: (914) 400-1920
          Facsimile: (914) 301-3514


CALIFORNIA: App. Ct. Flips Order Striking 3rd Amended Hashim Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Tracie L. Brown of the Court of Appeals of California for the
First District, Division Four, reversed the trial court's order
granting the Defendant's motion to strike the Plaintiffs' Third
Amended Complaint in the case captioned AARON HASHIM et al.
Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. BETTY T. YEE, as State Controller,
etc., Defendant and Respondent, Case No. A147670 (Cal. App.).

The Plaintiffs filed a putative class action lawsuit challenging
the constitutionality of California's procedures for notifying
owners of certain categories of unclaimed property under the
Unclaimed Property Law ("UPL"), as well as the state Controller's
decision not to issue formal regulations under the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA") to govern the process for claiming unclaimed
property under the UPL.  

The Plaintiffs allege that the Controller fails to collect and post
identifying owner information for property valued under $50, and
that the Controller improperly aggregates this property into
general descriptions on the public website, such as "State Farm
policyholders."  Consequently, these owners are not afforded
constitutional notice that the state has taken their unclaimed
property, and they are permanently deprived of their property in
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution.

The Plaintiffs make similar allegations with respect to owners of
life insurance benefits, money orders, cashier's checks, and safety
deposit boxes.  They also allege that the Controller has
impermissibly failed to issue regulations governing the process for
claiming unclaimed property under the APA, and instead gives
case-by-case verbal instructions to all owners seeking to claim
their property.

In their initial complaint, the Plaintiffs sought to bring a class
action lawsuit against the Controller alleging causes of action
for: (1) declaratory relief; (2) deprivation of the constitutional
right to procedural due process in violation of 42 United States
Code section 1983; (3) unconstitutional taking of personal property
in violation of 42 United States Code section 1983; (4) violation
of the UPL; and (5) breach of fiduciary duty.  

The court sustained a demurrer with leave to amend as to the
Plaintiffs' first, second, and fourth causes of action, and without
leave to amend as to their third and fifth causes of action.  The
Plaintiffs then filed first and second amended complaints following
the Defendant's successful demurrers.

On the Defendant's demurrer to the Plaintiffs' second amended
complaint, the court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend
as to the cause of action for violation of the UPL, but granted the
Plaintiffs leave to amend their claims for declaratory relief and
deprivation of procedural due process in violation of 42 United
States Code section 1983.  With respect to the 42 United States
Code section 1983 claim, it found that the Plaintiffs could not
state a claim against the Controller individually due to qualified
immunity, but it granted them leave to amend as they may be able to
amend the SAC to state a cause of action against the State directly
to the extent they seek damages equal to the amount of the property
held in trust only or an injunction.  As to the declaratory relief
claim, the court ruled that there may be a basis for a declaratory
relief cause of action, but its contours would have to be
consistent with the ruling on the demurrers to the other causes of
action.

The Plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint against the
Controller in his official capacity, alleging claims for
declaratory relief and deprivation of procedural due process in
violation of 42 United States Code section 1983.  The Defendant
demurred to and moved to strike this pleading for noncompliance
with the amendment order.

The court granted the Defendant's motion to strike and ruled that
the demurrer was moot, finding that in their Third Amended
Complaint, the Plaintiffs have not alleged any cause of action
against the State directly.  Further, the basis for declaratory
relief is not consistent with the ruling on demurrer, therefore the
Defendant's motion to strike the Third Amended Complaint is
granted.  The court entered judgment, and the Plaintiffs appealed.

On appeal, the parties brief the merits of the court's order on the
demurrer to the second amended complaint -- i.e., its rulings that
the Plaintiffs failed to state claims for declaratory relief and
under 42 United States Code section 1983 for procedural due process
violations.  They also address the court's order striking the third
amended complaint.

Judge Brown turns first to the court's order striking the third
amended complaint.  She finds that in light of the order allowing
amendment, the court erred in concluding that the third amended
complaint did not fall within the scope of permissible amendment.
She interprets the trial court's amendment order as granting the
Plaintiffs leave to amend to plead a claim under 42 United States
Code section 1983 against the Controller in his official capacity
for prospective injunctive relief or for the return of their
property or the monetary proceeds if sold.  In their third amended
complaint, the Plaintiffs sued the Controller in his official
capacity.  They thus satisfied the requirement that they sue the
state rather than the Controller in his individual capacity.

With respect to the relief sought, at oral argument, the Defendant
argued that the third amended complaint violated the amendment
order because it only sought impermissible damages.  Although the
third amended complaint is not a model of succinctness and clarity,
the Judge holds that when read liberally as it must be, it seeks
injunctive relief and return of the Plaintiffs' wrongfully taken
property.  The court thus abused its discretion in striking the
Plaintiffs' 42 United States Code section 1983 claim in its
entirety for failure to comply with the amendment order, rules
Judge Brown.

The court also struck the Plaintiffs' declaratory relief claim on
the basis that it was not consistent with the amendment order,
which somewhat vaguely allowed them to amend the claim within
contours consistent with the ruling on the demurrers to the other
causes of action.  The declaratory relief claim in the Plaintiffs'
third amended complaint tracks their 42 United States Code section
1983 claim in that it seeks a declaration against the Controller in
his official capacity stating that the Controller violates the
constitutional due process rights of owners of unclaimed property
by seizing the property without requesting any identifying
information from holders, thus depriving owners of their ability to
seek return of their property.  Because this declaratory relief
claim is consistent with the permissible amendment to the claim
under 42 United States Code section 1983, the Judge opines that the
court abused its discretion in striking the declaratory relief
claim as well.

Because the court's abuse of discretion in striking the entire
third amended complaint requires reversal of the judgment, the
Judge does not reach the additional issues raised by the parties.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Brown reversed the trial court's
judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 4, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/sf8w8J from Leagle.com.

CAPITAL ONE BANK: Porterfield Suit Asserts TCPA Breach
------------------------------------------------------
Jason Porterfield, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., Defendant,
Case No. 2:19-cv-05250-ESW (D. Ariz., Sept. 23, 2019) is a class
action brought against Defendant under the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.

The Defendant routinely violates the TCPA by using an automatic
telephone dialing system to place non-emergency calls to telephone
numbers assigned to a cellular telephone service without prior
express consent, says the complaint.

Plaintiff is a natural person who at all relevant times resided in
San Tan Valley, Arizona.

Defendant is a national bank headquartered in McLean,
Virginia.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Aaron D. Radbil, Esq.
     GREENWALD DAVIDSON RADBIL PLLC
     401 Congress Avenue, Suite 1540
     Austin, TX 78701
     Phone: (512) 803-1578
     Fax: (561) 961-5684
     Email: aradbil@gdrlawfirm.com

          - and -

     Michael L. Greenwald, Esq.
     Greenwald Davidson Radbil PLLC
     7601 N. Federal Highway, Suite A-230
     Boca Raton, FL 33487
     Phone: (561) 826-5477
     Fax: (561) 961-5684
     Email: mgreenwald@gdrlawfirm.com


CARECORE NATIONAL: Sent Unsolicited Fax Ads, Dean Suit Says
-----------------------------------------------------------
JESSE DEAN, D.C., a Tennessee resident, individually and as the
representative of a class of similarly-situated persons v. CARECORE
NATIONAL, LLC, a New York limited liability company, Case No.
1:19-cv-01204 (W.D. Tenn., Sept. 13, 2019), challenges the
Defendant's practice of sending "unsolicited advertisements" by
facsimile to the Plaintiff and the Class, in violation of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

CareCore National, LLC, is a New York limited liability company
with its principal place of business in Bluffton, South Carolina.

CareCore operates under the assumed name eviCore healthcare.  The
Company provides managed healthcare services.  The Company offers
radiology, radiation therapy, cardiology, medical oncology, lab
management, and health plan, as well as other specialty
solutions.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Benjamin C. Aaron, Esq.
          Charles F. Barrett, Esq.
          NEAL AND HARWELL, PLC
          1201 Demonbreun Street, Suite 1000
          Nashville, TN 37203
          Telephone: (615) 244-1713
          Facsimile: (615) 726-0573
          E-mail: baaron@nealharwell.com
                  cbarrett@nealharwell.com

               - and -

          Ryan M. Kelly, Esq.
          ANDERSON + WANCA
          3701 Algonquin Road, Suite 500
          Rolling Meadows, IL 60008
          Telephone: (8470 368-1500
          Facsimile: (847) 368-1501
          E-mail: rkelly@andersonwanca.com


CARRIZO OIL: Sawyer Says Registration Statement Misleading
----------------------------------------------------------
CAROLE SAWYER, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, v. CARRIZO OIL & GAS, INC., STEVEN A.
WEBSTER, F. GARDNER PARKER, SYLVESTER P. JOHNSON IV, ROBERT F.
FULTON, FRANCES ALDRICH SEVILLA-SACASA, THOMAS L. CARTER JR., and
FRANK A. WOJTEK, the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-08677 (S.D.N.Y.,
Sept. 18, 2019), alleges that Defendants violated Sections 14(a)
and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, in connection
with a proposed merger between Carrizo and Callon Petroleum
Company. The action is brought as a class action by Plaintiff on
behalf of herself and the other public holders of the common stock
of Carrizo Oil & Gas Inc. against the Company and the members of
the Company's board of directors.

On July 14, 2019, the Board caused the Company to enter into an
agreement and plan of merger, pursuant to which the Company's
shareholders stand to receive 2.05 shares of Callon common stock
for each share of Carrizo stock they own. Carrizo shareholders will
own approximately 46% and Callon shareholders will own
approximately 54% of the combined company.

On August 20, 2019, in order to convince Carrizo shareholders to
vote in favor of the Proposed Transaction, the Board authorized the
filing of a materially incomplete and misleading Form S-4
Registration Statement with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. The materially incomplete and misleading S-4 violates
both Regulation G (17 C.F.R. section 244.100) and SEC Rule 14a-9
(17 C.F.R. 240.14a-9), each of which constitutes a violation of
Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act.

While touting the fairness of the Merger Consideration to the
Company's shareholders in the S-4, Defendants have failed to
disclose certain material information that is necessary for
shareholders to properly assess the fairness of the Proposed
Transaction, thereby violating SEC rules and regulations and
rendering certain statements in the S-4 materially incomplete and
misleading.

In particular, the S-4 contains materially incomplete and
misleading information concerning:

     (i) the financial projections for the Company that were
prepared by the Company and relied on by Defendants in recommending
that Carrizo shareholders vote in favor of the Proposed
Transaction; and

    (ii) the summary of certain valuation analyses conducted by
Carrizo's financial advisors, RBC Capital Markets, LLC. and Lazard
Frères & Co. LLC in support of their opinions that the Merger
Consideration is fair to shareholders, on which the Board relied.

It is imperative that the material information that has been
omitted from the S-4 is disclosed prior to the forthcoming vote to
allow the Company's shareholders to make an informed decision
regarding the Proposed Transaction, the lawsuit contends.

The Plaintiff seeks to enjoin Defendants from holding the
shareholder vote on the Proposed Transaction and taking any steps
to consummate the Proposed Transaction unless, and until, material
information is disclosed to Carrizo shareholders sufficiently in
advance of the vote on the Proposed Transaction.  In the event the
Proposed Transaction is consummated, the Plaintiff seeks to recover
damages resulting from the Defendants' violations of the Exchange
Act.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff are:

          James M. Wilson, Jr., Esq.
          Nadeem Faruqi, Esq.
          FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
          685 Third Avenue, 26th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 983-9330
          Facsimile: (212) 983-9331
          E-mail: nfaruqi@faruqilaw.com
                  jwilson@faruqilaw.com

CASTLE BRANDS: Being Sold to Austin for Too Little, Dugan Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
SEAN DUGAN, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated
v. CASTLE BRANDS, INC., MARK E. ANDREWS, JOHN F. BEAUDETTER, HENRY
C. BEINSTEIN, DR. PHILLIP FROST, DR. RICHARD M. KRASNO, RICHARD J.
LAMPEN, STEVEN D. RUBIN and MARK ZEITCHICK, Case No. 1:19-cv-08550
(S.D.N.Y., Sept. 13, 2019), alleges that the Defendants breached
their fiduciary duties to the Company's stockholders, including the
Plaintiff and the class, by agreeing to a proposed sale of the
Company, which undervalues Castle Brands and is the result of a
flawed sales process.

Mr. Dugan accuses the Defendants of violating the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 by breaching their fiduciary duties in
connection with their efforts to sell the Company as a result of an
unfair process for an unfair price.  He seeks to enjoin a Tender
Offer by which Austin, Nichols & Co., Inc., a Delaware corporation
and affiliate of Pernod Ricard S.A., and Austin's newly-formed
subsidiary, Rook Merger Sub, Inc., a Florida corporation, will
acquire each outstanding share of Castle Brands common stock for
$1.27 per share in cash.

Castle Brands together with its subsidiaries, develops, markets,
imports, and sells beverage alcohol and non-alcoholic beverage
products in the United States, Canada, Europe, and Asia.  The
Company is incorporated in the state of Florida and has a principal
place of business located in New York City.  The Individual
Defendants are directors and officers of the Company.

Non-Party Austin, Nichols & Co., Inc. is a Delaware corporation and
a party to the Merger Agreement.  Non-Party Pernod is a French
Corporation listed by Euronext Paris.  Non-Party Merger Sub is a
Florida Corporation formed for the purpose of effectuating the
Merger Agreement.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Evan J. Smith, Esq.
          BRODSKY & SMITH, LLC
          240 Mineola Boulevard, First Floor
          Mineola, NY 11501
          Telephone: (516) 741-4977
          Facsimile: (516) 741-0626
          E-mail: esmith@brodskysmith.com


CENTRAL COAST: Court Denies Summary Judgment in Garcia
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order denying
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment in the case captioned
JENNIFER GARCIA, Plaintiff, v. CENTRAL COAST RESTAURANTS, INC., et
al., Defendants. Case No. 18-cv-02370-RS. (N.D. Cal.).

Defendants now move for summary judgment, on the grounds that
Garcia either must be compelled to arbitrate her claims or that
Contreras and Lazaro's settlement precludes the ongoing litigation
of this case.

Plaintiff Jennifer Garcia filed this putative class action alleging
various wage and hour violations under California state law by
defendants. Two years ago, Silvia Contreras and Martha Valencia
Lazaro sued the same defendants, alleging the same wage and hour
claims, but under the California Labor Code's Private Attorneys
General Act Section 2698 et seq. (PAGA).

LEGAL STANDARD

Arbitration Standard

When deciding a motion to compel arbitration, a standard similar to
the summary judgment standard is applied The question of whether
parties agreed to arbitration is to be decided by a court, not an
arbitrator, unless the parties clearly provide otherwise. Under the
Federal Arbitration Act, arbitration agreements shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. The purpose of summary judgment is
to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses.
The moving party always bears the initial responsibility of
informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying those portions of the pleadings and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Arbitration

Garcia does not dispute that she signed the Agreement on her first
day of employment with defendants, and that if the Agreement is
valid, its scope would include her present claims. She contends,
however, that the Agreement is unenforceable under three separate
theories based in traditional contract law: fraud in the inception,
disaffirmance of a contract signed as a minor, and
unconscionability.

Because Garcia's defenses raise genuine disputes of material fact,
arbitration cannot be compelled at the summary judgment stage.

Fraud in the Inception

The California Supreme Court has held that, where fraud exists in
the inception of a contract the promisor is deceived as to the
nature of his act, and actually does not know what he is signing,
or does not intend to enter into a contract at all. When the party
does not intend to enter into the contract, mutual assent an
essential element of contract formation is lacking, and the
contract is void.  

Here, Garcia's allegations raise questions on that score. She
states that she has difficulty reading English, especially
complicated words of which there are plenty in the arbitration
agreement. She alleges that her manager rushed her through signing
the paperwork, did not give her a copy to review later, and
misrepresented the contents of the forms in particular, Garcia says
she was told the forms informed of her rights, not that they waived
her rights.  

Defendants counter that Garcia misstates the evidence and that
Garcia's manager did not in any way mislead her. Accepting Garcia's
version of events for purposes of this motion, it is entirely
possible that a reasonable reader in her position would not have
understood the nature of the contract's terms.

Disaffirmation

Under California law, an individual who enters into a contract as a
minor but disaffirms it within a reasonable time after reaching the
age of majority has voided the contract. What is a reasonable time
is to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.  

Here, the parties agree that Garcia signed her employment contract,
including the Agreement, in May 2015 and that she reached the age
of majority in May 2016. The parties disagree as to how much time
elapsed between when Garcia discovered the nature and significance
of the contract and when she disaffirmed it. Garcia claims she
prospectively disavowed any arbitration agreement she might have
signed in her December 2017 complaint, but she did not know about
the definitive existence of this Agreement until defendants filed
it as an exhibit to their present Motion for Summary Judgment; that
is, she disaffirmed the Agreement before she discovered its
significance.

Defendants counter that Garcia must have known about the existence
of the Agreement given her statements in the complaint and
allusions to the existence of such a contract in a Joint Case
Management Statement; that is, she knew what she was signing when
she signed it, and she did not disaffirm it until eighteen months
later.

Thus, the parties raise two genuine disputes of material fact.
First, the parties disagree about when Garcia discovered the nature
and significance of the Agreement: when she signed it, when
defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment, or somewhere in
the middle. Second, they disagree about whether the time that
elapsed between when Garcia came to appreciate the nature and
significance of the Agreement and when she disaffirmed it was
reasonable.

At the summary judgment stage, all facts must be construed in favor
of the non-moving party. Accepting Garcia's version of events for
purposes of this motion, there exists a genuine dispute as to
material fact, i.e. whether the Agreement is void.

Unconscionability

Under California law, a contractual clause is unenforceable only if
it is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Courts
apply a sliding scale: the more substantively oppressive the
contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is
required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable,
and vice versa.

Garcia alleges that the Agreement is procedurally unconscionable
for many of the same reasons she alleges fraud in the inception:
her manager rushed her to sign the contract, did not give her a
copy for later review, and misrepresented the terms. Insofar as the
agreement was imposed on Garcia as a condition of employment and
there was no opportunity to negotiate, her allegations support a
finding of substantial procedural unconscionability. They also
raise questions as to substantive unconscionability.  

Given that Garcia has presented evidence of both procedural and
substantive unconscionability, there exists a factual dispute as to
the Agreement's validity. The facts are not so clear-cut as to any
of the asserted contracts defenses such that compelling arbitration
at the summary judgment stage is appropriate. Defendants' motion to
compel arbitration must thus be denied.

Res Judicata

Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents parties from
relitigating claims that have already been decided. An action is
barred under res judicata when: (1) a claim was raised, or could
have been raised, in a prior action (2) that prior action resulted
in a valid final judgment on the merits and (3) the parties in the
present action are the same as, or in privity with, the parties in
the prior action. Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244
F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 2001).

The Superior Court in the County of Monterey has explicitly
reserved judgment on the issue of whether the Contreras settlement
will have preclusive effect. In their supplemental briefing,
defendants request that judgment on the res judicata issue be
stayed while they petition the Superior Court to reconsider, or
that they be permitted to withdraw the argument altogether.

Because it is not clear what effect a Superior Court reversal would
have on the present action, however, and because the res judicata
issue has been fully briefed, it is discussed here.

Same Claim

California follows a primary rights approach to determine whether
two causes of action are the same. This approach defines a right as
the right to obtain redress for an injury, regardless of the legal
theory asserted or the remedy sought; thus, one injury gives rise
to one claim for relief. Defendants argue that, because Garcia
claims the same violations of the labor code as did the Contreras
plaintiffs, she is asserting the same primary right. Garcia,
however, notes a subtle but important difference. While her
putative class action was filed to redress the injuries of former
employees of the defendants being deprived of their wages and
breaks, and other labor law violations the Contreras case, and
other PAGA actions, are filed on behalf of the state of California.
PAGA actions exist primarily to remedy the injury sustained by the
state when its labor laws are violated because it lacks the
enforcement resources to prosecute every employer-offender.  

Because Garcia seeks to remedy the injury sustained by former
employees of defendants, while the Contreras plaintiffs sued to
protect the state's interests albeit with some incidental benefit
to aggrieved employees they are not asserting the same primary
right.

Prior Judgment

The parties do not dispute that the Settlement is a valid final
judgment on the merits for the purposes of claim preclusion.

Same Parties

In order to be precluded by a prior lawsuit, the parties in the
present action must be the same as, or in privity with, the parties
in the prior suit. Nonparty preclusion applies when (1) the
nonparty was adequately represented in the prior action, or (2) the
party in the present action acts as a proxy for a party in the
prior action.  Garcia is not in privity with the Contreras
plaintiffs for the same reason that she is not asserting the same
right that they were; the Contreras plaintiffs were representing
the interests of the State of California, not of Garcia and other
fellow employees. Garcia and other putative class members have not
yet been given notice of the Contreras case, let alone the
settlement; it is unclear how their interests could be represented
by an action about which they may not have knowledge.

Genuine disputes of material fact exist as to whether arbitration
can be compelled. Garcia's claims are furthermore not estopped by
the Contreras settlement.

Accordingly, defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 23, 2019 Order
is available  https://tinyurl.com/y3f7crcp from Leagle.com.

Jennifer Garcia, an individual, individually and acting on behalf
of class of similarly situated employees, Plaintiff, represented by
Hector R. Martinez - hectorm@themmlawfirm.com - Mallison &
Martinez, Stanley Scott Mallison  - stanm@themmlawfirm.com -
Mallison & Martinez & Hilary P. Hammell - hilary@levyvinick.com -
Mallison & Martinez.

Central Coast Restaurants, Inc. & Yadav Enterprises, Inc.,
Defendants, represented by Joshua Martin Deitz - jdeitz@rjo.com -
Rogers, Joseph, O'Donnell, Katherine M. Svinarich , Rogers Joseph
O'Donnell & Dennis Chi-Yu Huie , Rogers Joseph O'Donnell, Robert
Dollar Building, 311 California Street, 10th Floor, San Francisco,
CA 94104-2695


CHEMICAL AND MINING: Court OKs Class Certification in Villella
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Opinion and Order granting Tyne $ Wear’s Motion to
Certify Class in the case captioned MEGAN VILLELLA, Individually
and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v.
CHEMICAL AND MINING COMPANY OF CHILE INC., Defendant. No. 15 Civ.
2106 (ER). (S.D.N.Y.).

This is a putative federal securities class action brought on
behalf of all individuals who purchased American Depository Shares
in Chemical & Mining Company of Chile Inc. Lead Plaintiff alleges
that SQM violated Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Rule 10b-5, promulgated thereunder.

It petitions the Court to adopt the following class definition:

     All persons who purchased or otherwise acquired SQM ADS traded
on the NYSE between June 30, 2010 and March 18, 2015, inclusive
(the Class Period). Excluded from the Class are: (i) SQM (ii) any
entity in which SQM has a controlling interest; (iii) officers and
directors of SQM and (iv) the legal representatives, heirs,
successors or assigns of any such excluded party.

STANDARD

One or more members of a class are permitted to sue on behalf of
the class if:

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.

SQM'S OPPOSITION TO CLASS CERTIFICATION

SQM argues against class certification on two grounds. First, it
argues that the class does not meet the predominance requirement of
Rule 23(b) because the market in which the ADS traded was not
efficient. Then, it argues that Tyne & Wear specifically has not
met the typicality requirement of Rule 23(a). Finally, in the
alternative, it suggests three limitations on the proposed class.

Rule 23(b) and Market Efficiency

Plaintiffs alleging claims under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
must prove (1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the
defendant; (2) scienter (3) a connection between the
misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a
security (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission (5)
economic loss and (6) loss causation.

Rule 23(a) and Typicality

SQM focuses its Rule 23 argument on whether Tyne & Wear is typical
of the putative class. The typicality requirement is not demanding.
It does not require factual identity between the named plaintiffs
and the class members, only that the disputed issues of law or fact
occupy essentially the same degree of centrality to the named
plaintiff's claim as to that of other members of the proposed
class. Nor does typicality require that damages be identical among
class members.

SQM argues that it can raise the following unique defense to Tyne &
Wear's claim: its investment manager, Sarasin & Partners LLP, did
not rely on the alleged false disclosures when it chose to purchase
SQM's ADS.

Reliance is an essential element of proving a Section 10(b)
securities fraud case. Although an individual securities fraud
plaintiff may invoke the Basic, Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
224, 246 (1988))presumption of reliance, which holds that `the
market price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects
all publicly available information, and, hence, any material
misrepresentations, that presumption may be rebutted. Any showing
that severs the link between the alleged misrepresentation and
either the price received (or paid) by the plaintiff, or his
decision to trade at a fair market price, will be sufficient to
rebut the presumption of reliance.

In practical terms, the Basic presumption may be rebutted in one of
two ways. A defendant may show that the alleged misrepresentation
did not actually affect the market price or, in other words, that
the fraud had no price impact. Alternatively, and more pertinent
here, a defendant may provide direct evidence that an individual
plaintiff did not rely on the integrity of the market price in
trading stock, by showing that plaintiff would have bought or sold
the stock even had he been aware that the stock's price was tainted
by fraud.

As its first attempt at showing that Sarasin, and therefore Tyne &
Wear, did not rely on the market price, SQM argues that, as a value
investor, Sarasin by definition did not rely on the market price.
As SQM argues, Sarasin's investment strategy was based on the
premise that the current market price for SQM was unnaturally low.
If Sarasin purchased the ADS and held them, Sarasin would earn
above-market returns for its client as the price approached
Sarasin's calculation of the ADS' true value. SQM argues that this
investment strategy precludes Tyne & Wear from taking advantage of
Basic.

Unfortunately for SQM, the Supreme Court addressed this situation
in Halliburton II. For a value investor to be afforded the Basic
presumption of reliance, it need only trade stock based on the
belief that the market price will incorporate public information
within a reasonable period. Halliburton II, 573 U.S. at 273-74.
Sarasin's investment plans fit that model it believed that SQM's
shares were undervalued and would reach their true value with the
rise of the price of lithium due to increasing demand for electric
cars.  

SQM next argues that Sarasin's specific actions in response to its
knowledge of SQM's governance issues show that Sarasin was
indifferent to the alleged fraud. In short, SQM contends that, had
Sarasin known of the underlying fraud  that is, that SQM officials
were bribing individuals from the government and not disclosing
those payments to the market  it still would have purchased the SQM
ADS. If this were true, then Sarasin did not rely on the allegedly
fraudulent disclosures and therefore cannot rely on the Basic
presumption.

After a review of the discovery from Sarasin, the Court disagrees.

First of all, SQM has not established that Sarasin knew of the
fraud. The record shows that Sarasin was indeed aware that SQM's
efforts at corporate governance were far from ideal; SQM argues
that this knowledge makes any additional revelations regarding
bribes immaterial to Sarasin's investment case. But Sarasin's
concerns were focused on potential actions by Ponce to act in ways
prejudicial to the minority shareholders. The bribes SQM's CEO,
Contesse, paid to political allies and the resulting firestorm of
an investigation were altogether different from the governance
issues and were apparently uncontemplated by Sarasin and its
analysts.

In short, Sarasin did not expect bribes to politicians to be part
of SQM's governance issues.

If Sarasin had known of the fraud, the Sarasin discovery indicates
that it would not have purchased the ADS at the price it did. For
example, counsel for SQM asked Sarasin's deputy investment manager,
Boucher, a series of hypotheticals regarding what Sarasin would
have done if it had known of various underlying problems with SQM's
management, up to and including material misstatements by its CEO
regarding illegal activity. Boucher's response each time was
simple: Sarasin would have factored those disclosures into the
investment case and most likely not purchased the ADS at the price
inflated by the fraud.  

Its behavior after discovering the fraud confirms Boucher's
analysis. Sarasin did not buy any ADS after discovering the fraud,
even though it expressed the view that, it expended resources to
shore up the company through the election of a corporate governance
expert to SQM's board. If Sarasin were truly indifferent to the
fraud, it would have jumped on the opportunity to increase its
holdings at fire-sale prices. It did not, and so illustrated that
it relied on the integrity of the market price and thus SQM's
statements.

On this point, SQM contends that the question to be asked is
different. It urges the Court to ask instead whether Sarasin would
have bought at any price, rather than whether Sarasin would have
bought at the then-market price allegedly inflated by fraud. The
Second Circuit has declined to directly explore this question. But
a panel of the Seventh Circuit has, and the Court is persuaded by
that analysis.  

Defendants have failed to make a showing that Tyne & Wear did not
rely on the allegedly fraudulent disclosures. The record shows that
Tyne & Wear, through its investment adviser, did rely on the
integrity of the market price in trading stock and would not have
bought or sold the stock had it been aware that the stock's price
was tainted by fraud.

Tyne & Wear therefore meets the typicality requirements of Rule
23(a).

Alterations to the Class Definition

SQM suggests three changes to the class definition. First, it
suggests that the class period should be reduced because none of
the statistically significant financial releases identified by
Steinholt occurred in the first half of the class period as now
defined. If there were some indication that the indirect factors
also varied over the class period  thereby suggesting the
structural factors supporting efficiency had changed over time then
SQM's argument might have force. As it is, there was no change in
the structural factors over time, leading the Court to accept that
the market remained efficient throughout the entire class period.

The proposal to shrink the class period is denied.

Second, SQM suggests excluding foreign members of the putative
class because their home countries might not give preclusive effect
to any judgment of this Court. SQM does not, however, propose which
countries would refuse or why. The burden to do so rests on SQM,
and it has failed to meet it.  

The proposal to exclude foreign claimants is denied.

Third, and finally, SQM seeks to have in-and-out traders removed
from the class. These are the traders who, based on SQM's
definition, sold their stock before January 2015, the first date
Tyne & Wear alleges SQM made a corrective disclosure, causing the
ADS price to drop. If these traders had bought and sold before the
fraud was revealed to the market, they could not have been harmed
by the subsequent price drop. It is Tyne & Wear's responsibility to
prove to the Court that all of the groups in its recommended class
meet the requirements of Rule 23. Instead, it has presented no
evidence that in-and-out traders could have suffered any harm from
the actions of SQM.

Because Tyne & Wear has failed to meet its burden, the Court shall
exclude any person who sold the entirety of their position in SQM
ADS before January 11, 2015 from the class definition.  

UNOPPOSED REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 23

SQM does not argue against the numerosity or commonality of the
class. Nor does it argue that Tyne & Wear would not protect the
interests of the class as lead plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court
makes the following findings:

(1) There are more than forty members of the class because more
than 700 major institutions owned the security. Therefore, the
numerosity requirement is presumptively satisfied.  (2) There are
questions of fact and law common to the class because each class
member will have allegedly suffered injury from the same
representations by SQM.(3) Tyne & Wear and its counsel will
vigorously pursue the claims of the class and are not antagonistic
to the other class members' interests. To wit, Tyne & Wear has
served as lead plaintiff since October 2015, and its counsel,
Robbins Geller, has extensive experience in and knowledge of
securities class actions.

Therefore, the Court finds that Tyne & Wear has met these
requirements of Rule 23(a). Given that it meets the requirement of
Rule 23(a)(3), as well, the Court concludes that a class may be
certified with Tyne & Wear as the class representative.

The Court GRANTS Tyne & Wear's motion to certify a class using the
following class definition, as modified:

     All persons who purchased or otherwise acquired SQM ADS traded
on the NYSE between June 30, 2010 and March 18, 2015, inclusive
(the Class Period). Excluded from the Class are: (i) SQM (ii) any
entity in which SQM has a controlling interest  (iii) officers and
directors of SQM (iv) the legal representatives, heirs, successors
or assigns of any such excluded party and (v) any person who sold
the entirety of their position in SQM ADS before January 11, 2015.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 23, 2019 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y295vbxb from
Leagle.com.

Megan Villella, Individually, Plaintiff, represented by Jeremy Alan
Lieberman - jalieberman@pomlaw.com - Pomerantz LLP & Patrick
Vincent Dahlstrom  - pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com - Pomerantz LLP.

Megan Villella, on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Jeremy Alan Lieberman , Pomerantz LLP,
Patrick Vincent Dahlstrom , Pomerantz LLP & Jason Allen Zweig ,
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, 455 N. Cityfront Plaza Dr., Suite
2410 Chicago, IL 60611

Richard Gielata, Movant, pro se.

Chemical & Mining Co. of Chile Inc., Defendant, represented by
Alison Bonelli -abonelli@milbank.com - Milbank LLP, Grant Richard
Mainland  - gmainland@milbank.com - Milbank LLP & Scott Alexander
Edelman - sedelman@milbank.com - Milbank LLP.


CIOX HEALTH: Faces Browne et al Suit in Eastern District of Texas
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Ciox Health, LLC. The
case is captioned as Marc Browne and Terri Adley, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs.
Ciox Health, LLC, the Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-00667-RWS (E.D.
Tex., Sept 13, 2019). The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Robert
W. Schroeder, III.

Ciox Health is a healthcare information management company with
headquarters in Alpharetta, Georgia.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Roger L. Mandel, Esq.
          JEEVES MANDEL LAW GROUP, P.C.
          12222 Merit Dr., Suite 1200
          Dallas, TX 75251
          Telephone: (214) 253-8300
          Facsimile: (727) 822-1499
          E-mail: rmandel@jeevesmandellawgroup.com

COLDWELL BANKER: Grossberg Sues Under TCPA Over Unsolicited Texts
-----------------------------------------------------------------
STEVEN GROSSBERG, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. COLDWELL BANKER RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE LLC
D/B/A COLDWELL BANKER RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE, Case No.
1:19-cv-23801-FAM (S.D. Fla., Sept. 12, 2019), is brought under the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act alleging that the Defendant
caused thousands of unsolicited text messages to be sent to the
cellular telephones of the Plaintiff and Class Members, causing
them injuries, including invasion of their privacy, aggravation,
annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion.

Coldwell Banker is a foreign corporation with a principal address
in Madison, New Jersey.  The Defendant directs, markets, and
provides business activities throughout the State of Florida.

The Defendant provides real estate brokerage services, which
includes the buying and selling of residential real estate.  The
Defendant engages in unsolicited telemarketing directed towards
prospective customers soliciting them to purchase properties,
according to the complaint.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Eisenband, Esq.
          EISENBAND LAW, P.A.
          515 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 120
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 533-4092
          E-mail: MEisenband@Eisenbandlaw.com

               - and -

          Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq.
          HIRALDO P.A.
          401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 400-4713
          E-mail: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com


CONOPCO, INC: Crepps Suit Moved to Eastern Dist. of Missouri
------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as Dan Crepps, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Conopco, Inc., doing
business as Unilever, and Does 1 – 10, the Defendant, Case No.
19JE-CC00488, was removed from the 23rd Judicial Circuit, Jefferson
County, to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri in St. Louis on Sept. 13, 2019. The Eastern District of
Missouri Court Clerk assigned Case No. 4:19-cv-02553-CDP to the
proceeding. The suit alleges fraud. The case is assigned to the
Hon. District Judge Catherine D. Perry.

Conopco, Inc., doing business as Unilever, provides personal care
products. The Company offers perfumes, soaps, and shampoos, as well
as food products. Unilever serves customers worldwide.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Daniel F. Harvath, Esq.
          HARVATH LAW GROUP, LLC
          75 W. Lockwood, Suite 1
          St. Louis, MO 63119
          Telepone: (314) 550-3717
          E-mail: dharvath@harvathlawgroup.com

Attorneys for the Defendant are:

          James Muehlberger, Esq.
          SHOOK AND HARDY, LLP
          2555 Grand Blvd.
          Kansas City, MO 64108
          Telephone: (816) 474-6550
          Facsimile: (816) 421-5547
          E-mail: jmuehlberger@shb.com

CORTEVA INC: Boothe Farms Files Class Action Over Pesticide
-----------------------------------------------------------
Courthouse News Service reports that Boothe Farms claims in a
federal class action that Dow Chemical, Corteva and DuPont's Loyant
pesticide does not control grasses and weeds as advertised, and
damaged their rice crops.  A copy of the lawsuit is available at:
https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Pesticides.pdf



COUNTYWIDE BUILDERS: Construction Workers Seek Unpaid Overtime Pay
------------------------------------------------------------------
GERARDO MOTA BAUTISTA, HUGO BAUTISTA, JUAN LUIS OVANDO ZEPEDA, JUAN
ZEPEDA, JULIO RICARDO ALVAREZ MACATOMA, LEONCIO TORRES ACUNA, MARIO
MORALES ROJAS, and OMAR RODRIGUEZ, individually and on behalf of
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. COUNTYWIDE BUILDERS, INC.
(D/B/A COUNTYWIDE BUILDERS), NOBLE CONSTRUCTION GROUP, LLC (D/B/A
NOBLE CONSTRUCTION GROUP), EDWARD M. GEERLOF JR., MAYER WEBER,
JORDAN GARRIDO, MIKE GARRIDO, and MARTIN DOE (a/k/a PERU)
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-08808 (S.D. N.Y., Sept. 23, 2019)
seeks unpaid minimum and overtime wages pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, and for violations of the N.Y. Labor Law,
including applicable liquidated damages, interest, attorneys' fees
and costs.

Plaintiffs worked for Defendants in excess of 40 hours per week,
without appropriate minimum wage and overtime compensation for the
hours that they worked, says the complaint. Defendants failed to
maintain accurate recordkeeping of the hours worked and failed to
pay Plaintiffs appropriately for any hours worked, either at the
straight rate of pay or for any additional overtime premium.
Furthermore, Defendants repeatedly failed to pay Plaintiffs wages
on a timely basis, adds the complaint.

Defendants own, operate, or control two construction companies,
located at 100 Beard Street, Brooklyn, New York 11231 under the
name "Countywide Builders" and under the name "Noble Construction
Group". Plaintiffs were employed as construction workers in
Manhattan and Brooklyn at the construction corporations.
[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Michael Faillace, Esq.
     MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
     60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
     New York, NY 10165
     Phone: (212) 317-1200
     Facsimile: (212) 317-1620


DANONE US: Ninth Circuit Appeal Filed in Andrade-Heymsfield Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Evlyn Andrade-Heymsfield, et al., filed an appeal from a
Court ruling issued in their lawsuit styled Evlyn
Andrade-Heymsfield, et al. v. Danone US, Inc., Case No.
3:19-cv-00589-CAB-WVG, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California, San Diego.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
was commenced on March 29, 2019, and is brought against the
Defendant for alleged violations of the Unfair Competition Law,
False Advertising Law, Consumer Legal Remedies Act, and Breach of
Express Warranties.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant sells and markets a
product to health conscious consumers using deceptive health and
wellness claims, with goals of increasing price and sales.

The Defendant is a leading consumer packaged food and beverage
company, that manufactures, markets, distributes, and sells branded
plant-based foods and beverages, coffee creamers and beverages,
premium dairy products and organic produce throughout North
America.  The Company's principal place of business is in White
Plains, New York.

The appellate case is captioned as Evlyn Andrade-Heymsfield, et al.
v. Danone US, Inc., Case No. 19-56082, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Appellants Evlyn Andrade-Heymsfield, Shannon Kawlecki and
      Pamela Parra's opening brief is due on November 12, 2019;

   -- Appellee Danone US, Inc.'s answering brief is due on
      December 12, 2019;

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants EVLYN ANDRADE-HEYMSFIELD, et al., are
represented by:

          Paul K. Joseph, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF
          PAUL K. JOSEPH, PC
          4125 W. Point Loma Boulevard, Room 206
          San Diego, CA 92110
          Telephone: (734) 730-3548
          E-mail: paul@pauljosephlaw.com

Defendant-Appellee, DANONE US, INC. is represented by:

          Angela C. Agrusa, Esq.
          Tamany Vinson Bentz, Esq.
          DLA PIPER LLP (US)
          2000 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 400 North Tower
          Los Angeles, CA 90067-4704
          Telephone: (310) 500-3591
          E-mail: angela.agrusa@dlapiper.com
                  tamany.bentz@dlapiper.com


DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION: Blanchette Seeks to Certify Class
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as TAMARA BLANCHETTE, on behalf
of herself and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs
ELISABETH DEVOS, in her official capacity as Secretary of
Education, and UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, the
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-01775-RC (D.C.), the Plaintiff asks
the Court for an order certifying a class of:

   "individuals who took out federal student loans to attend
   Minnesota School of Business or Globe University based on those

   institutions' misrepresentations about their criminal justice
   program, the transferability of the schools' credits, or both."

According to the complaint, the Department knows about MSB's and
Globe's misrepresentations to these specific borrowers, yet still
has subjected them to coercive collection.

The questions in this case -- namely, whether the Department's
decision to collect these borrowers' defaulted student loan debt
violates the Administrative Procedure Act and whether the
pre-deprivation notice these borrowers received prior to November
2018 violated their due process rights -- should be resolved on a
class-wide basis, the lawsuit contends.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Robyn K. Bitner, Esq.
          Alexander S. Elson, Esq.
          Eric Rothschild, Esq.
          NATIONAL STUDENT LEGAL DEFENSE NETWORK
          1015 15th Street N.W., Suite 600
          Washington, D.C. 20005
          Telephone: (202) 734-7495
          E-mail: robyn@defendstudents.org
                  alex@defendstudents.org
                  eric@defendstudents.org

DESIGNER BRANDS: Whisman Suit Asserts FCRA Violation
----------------------------------------------------
LORI WHISMAN, JOANNE ALLEN and SHARON PESKETT, individually, and on
behalf of other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs, v.
DESIGNER BRANDS INC., an Ohio corporation, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-23963-XXXX (S.D. Fla., Sept. 24, 2019) is an action arising
from Defendant's violation of the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act amendment to the Fair Credit Reporting Act, which
requires persons that accept debit cards or credit cards for the
transaction of business to truncate certain card number account
information on printed receipts provided to consumers.

Despite the clear language of the statute, Defendant knowingly or
recklessly failed to comply with FCRA by printing the first 6 and
last 4 digits of credit and debit card account numbers on
point-of-sale transaction receipts, notes the complaint. As a
result, Plaintiffs and the Class suffered a violation of their
substantive rights under the FCRA; an invasion of their privacy;
breach of their confidence in the safe handling of their account
information; breach of implied bailment; exposure to an elevated
risk of identity theft; and were unfairly burdened with the need to
keep or destroy the receipt, so as to prevent further disclosure of
their sensitive credit or debit card information, adds the
complaint.

Plaintiffs are natural persons were and are citizens of the state
of California who made purchases using their personal debit card at
a store owned and operated by Defendant.

Designer Brands Inc., is an Ohio corporation whose principal
address is 810 DSW Drive, Columbus, Ohio 43219. Defendant was also
previously known as DSW, which is Defendant's flagship retail brand
whose retail stores offer footwear, handbags, and other
accessories.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Scott D. Owens, Esq.
     SCOTT D. OWENS, P.A.
     3800 S. Ocean Dr., Suite 235
     Hollywood, FL 33019
     Phone: 954-589-0588
     Fax: 954-337-0666
     Email: scott@scottdowens.com

          - and -

     Keith J. Keogh, Esq.
     Michael Hilicki, Esq.
     Keogh Law, Ltd.
     55 W. Monroe Street, Suite 3390
     Chicago, IL 60603
     Phone: 312.726.1092
     Facsimile: 312.726.1093
     Email: keith@keoghlaw.com
            mhilicki@keoghlaw.com

          - and -

     BRET L. LUSSKIN, Esq.
     HEKMAT LAW GROUP
     20803 Biscayne Blvd., Ste 302
     Aventura, FL 33180
     Phone: (954) 454-5841
     Facsimile: (954) 454-5844
     Email: blusskin@lusskinlaw.com



DIAMOND DOLLS: Harris Seeks Unpaid Wages, Misclassification
-----------------------------------------------------------
CLARISSA HARRIS, on Behalf of Herself and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. DIAMOND DOLLS OF NEVADA, LLC dba
the SPICE HOUSE, KAMY KESHMIRI, JAMY KESHMIRI Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-01678 (D. Nev., Sept. 25, 2019) is a collective action
complaint alleging that Defendants owe Plaintiff minimum wages,
tips, liquidated damages, attorney's fees, and costs pursuant to
the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The complaint asserts that Defendants permitted and required
Plaintiff and others similarly situated to work as exotic dancers
at their adult entertainment club but refused to compensate them at
the applicable minimum wage. In fact, Defendants refused to
compensate them whatsoever for any hours worked. Plaintiffs' only
compensation was in the form of tips from club patrons, and even
tips were partly confiscated by the club.

The Defendants took money from Plaintiffs in the form of "house
fees" or "rent". Plaintiff was also required to divide tips with
Defendants' managers and employees who do not customarily receive
tips. The Defendants misclassify dancers, including Plaintiff, as
independent contractors so that they do not have to compensate them
at the federally mandated minimum wage rate. The Defendants'
practice of failing to pay employees any wages violates the FLSA's
minimum wage provision, and Defendants' practice of charging house
fees and confiscating tips also violates the FLSA because for at
least one workweek in the relevant statutory period, these
practices caused Plaintiff to be paid below the minimum wage, says
the complaint.

Plaintiff was previously employed as an exotic dancer at
Defendants' adult entertainment club during the statutory time
period afforded under the FLSA.

Defendants operate an adult entertainment club in Nevada, under the
name of "Spice House Adult Cabaret".[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Michael P. Balaban, Esq.
     LAW OFFICES OF MICHAEL P. BALABAN
     10726 Del Rudini Street
     Las Vegas, NV 89141
     Phone: (702)586-2964
     Fax: (702)586-3023
     Email: mbalaban@balaban-law.com


DMSD FOODS: Licea Suit Transferred to Central Dist. of California
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as SEAN LICEA, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, the Petitioner, vs. DMSD FOODS, INC.,
the Respondent, Case No. 19CV1564-DMS-AGS (Filed Aug. 20, 2019),
was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California to the United States District Court for the
Central District of California (Eastern Division – Riverside) on
Sept. 18, 2019. The Central District of California Court Clerk
assigned Case No.  5:19-cv-01793-PSG-SP to the proceeding. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Philip S. Gutierrez.

The Plaintiff was denied full access to Defendant's facilities due
to its use of inaccessible soda fountain dispensers and its failure
to affirmatively offer or provide assistance to Plaintiff with the
otherwise inaccessible soda fountain dispensers. As such, Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant violated the Americans with Disabilities Act
and its implementing regulations as Plaintiff was denied the full
and equal access to, and enjoyment of Defendant's goods, services,
and facilities.[BN]

Attorneys for the Petitioner are:

          Eric David Zard, Esq.
          R. Bruce Carlson, Esq.
          CARLSON LYNCH SWEET KILPELA AND CARPENTER LLP
          1350 Columbia Street Suite 603
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 762-1900
          Facsimile: (619) 756-6991
          E-mail: ezard@carlsonlynch.com
                  bcarlson@carlsonlynch.com

               - and -

          Gerald D. Wells III, Esq.
          CONNOLLY WELLS & GRAY, LLP
          101 Lindenwood Drive, Suite 225
          Malvern, PA 19355
          Telephone: (610) 822-3700
          Facsimile: (610) 822-3800
          E-mail: gwells@cwglaw.com

DW DIRECT INC: Rhyan Seeks Unpaid Overtime Compensation
-------------------------------------------------------
KASIM RHYAN, on Behalf of Himself and on Behalf of Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, v. DW DIRECT, INC., Defendant, Case No.
4:19-cv-03599 (S.D. Tex., Sept. 24, 2019) is a case brought
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, seeking to represent
current and former employees and/or independent contractors of
Defendant who worked as satellite technicians/installers within the
last three years, signed an Agreement to Arbitrate with Defendant
(which Plaintiff asserts is invalid and unenforceable) and worked
over 40 hours per work week and were not paid overtime compensation
in accordance with the FLSA and/or were not paid all wages earned.

According to the complaint, for approximately the first year of
Plaintiff's tenure working for Defendant, he was classified as an
independent contractor by Defendant. He did not receive overtime
compensation but he was expected to work over 40 hours per week
during that time period. Then Defendant changed Plaintiff's
classification to employee. However, nothing else changed about
Plaintiff's job duties. Moreover, the Defendant failed to pay
Plaintiff and its other satellite technicians/installers overtime
wages when they work/worked more than 40 hours in a workweek as
required by the FLSA. The Defendant also makes improper deductions
from Plaintiffs' wages failing to pay all wages earned in violation
of the FLSA, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Kasim Rhyan works as a satellite technician/installer and
has been employed and/or worked for Defendant since October 2016.

Defendant DW Direct is satellite installation company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Gregg M. Rosenberg, Esq.
     Tracey D. Lewis, Esq.
     ROSENBERG & SPROVACH
     3518 Travis Street, Suite 200
     Houston, TX 77002
     Phone: (713) 960-8300
     Facsimile: (713) 621-6670
     Email: gregg@rosenberglaw.com
            tracey@rosenberglaw.com


E.I. DU PONT: Removes Banks et al. Suit to District of Delaware
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Defendants in the case of DORIS BANKS; CANDY CAPORALE; BRUCE
DAVIS; GENE SULLENBERGER; and CHRISTINE WOOTTEN, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. E.I. DU
PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; THE 3M COMPANY
(f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing; Co.); PROCINO PLATING;
INC. a/k/a PROCINO ENTERPRISES a/k/a PROCINO; and BLADES
DEVELOPMENT LLC, Defendants, filed a notice to remove the lawsuit
from the Superior Court of the State of Delaware (Case No.
S19C-05-024 ESB) to the U.S. District Court for the District of
Delaware on September 6, 2019. The clerk of court for the District
of Delaware assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-01672-UNA.

E. I. Du Pont De Nemours and Company, doing business as DuPont,
provides agriculture and specialty products. The Company offers
adhesives, resins, construction materials, animal nutrition and
disease prevention, crop protection, seeds, food ingredients,
polymer, fabrics, and fibers. DuPont serves clients worldwide.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kelly E. Farnan, Esq.
          RICHARDS LAYTON & FINGER, PA
          One Rodney Square
          920 North King Street
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone:(302) 651-7700
          E-mail: farnan@rlf.com

               - and –

          Richard F. Bulger, Esq.
          MAYER BROWN LLP
          71 South Wacker Drive
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 782-7318
          E-mail: rbulger@mayerbrown.com


ECLINICAL WORKS: Court Denies Bid for Class Certification
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LICARI FAMILY CHIROPRACTIC INC., a Florida
corporation, individually and as the representative of a class of
similarly-situated persons and PETER LICARI, individually and as
the representative of a class of similarly-situated persons, the
Plaintiffs, v. ECLINICAL WORKS, LLC, the Defendant, Case No.
8:16-cv-03461-MSS-JSS (M.D. Fla.), the Hon. Judge Mary S. Scriven
entered an order denying Plaintiffs' amended motion for class
certification.

The Plaintiff sought to certify these classes:

   Class A:

   "all persons or entities who were successfully sent a facsimile
   on or about February 4, 2014, from eClinicalWorks, LLC which
   states "eClinicalWorks V10 is here!", and which contained an
   opt out notice the same or similar to the following: "If you
   would like to opt out from fax communications please go to
   www.eclinicalworks.com/optoutfax";

   Class B:

   "all persons or entities who were successfully sent a facsimile

   on or about February 4, 2014, from eClinicalWorks, LLC which
   states "eClinicalWorks V10 is here!", and which contained an
   opt out notice the same or similar to the following: "If you
   would like to opt out from fax communications please go to
   www.eclinicalworks.com/optoutfax," excluding the 3,759
   persons/entities listed in ECW004598 under Tab 9 ("Unique
   ECW")";  and

   Class C

   "all persons or entities who were successfully sent a facsimile

   on or about February 4, 2014, from eClinicalWorks, LLC which
   states "eClinicalWorks V10 is here!", and which contained an
   opt out notice the same or similar to the following: "If you
   would like to opt out from fax communications please go to
   www.eclinicalworks.com/optoutfax," excluding the 14,735
   persons/entities listed in ECW004598 under Category 4 ("SSS All

   Unique")."

The Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf on themselves and all
others who received the Fax, alleging that the Fax violated the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, as amended by the Junk Fax
Prevention.[CC]

ENERGEN RESOURCES: Summary Judgment Bid in Ulibarri Suit Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GERALD ULIBARRI, Plaintiff, v. ENERGEN RESOURCES
CORPORATION, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-294-RB-SCY (D. N.M.),
Judge Robert C. Brack of the U.S. District Court for the District
of New Mexico (i) denied Energen's Motion for Summary Judgment; and
(ii) granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiff's
Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

The Plaintiff brought the putative class action on behalf of
himself and other similarly situated lessors to recover proceeds
they are allegedly owed under royalty agreements with Defendant
Energen, the lessee.  The Plaintiff filed both his original Class
Action Complaint and his First Amended Class Action Complaint on
March 29, 2018, and filed the currently operative Second Amended
Class Action Complaint on March 4, 2019.

The Plaintiff asserts two claims for relief: (1) that Energen
breached its obligations under the leases by failing to pay
royalties based upon the proceeds received on the sale of residue
gas, natural gas liquids ("NGLs") and condensate which came from
the gas wells subject to the Plaintiff's and the Class members'
Royalty Agreements, and (2) that Energen has violated the New
Mexico Oil and Gas Proceeds Payment Act ("OGPPA") by allegedly
underpaying royalties and by failing to make timely payments.

The Second Amended Complaint defines the putative class as all
persons and entities to whom Energen paid royalties on natural gas
produced by Energen from wells located in the state of New Mexico
between March 29, 2012 and May 31, 2015, pursuant to leases or
overriding royalty agreements which contain one of four different
royalty payment provisions.

The Plaintiff claims that language in each of the four categories
of royalty provisions set forth in the class definition prohibit
Energen from deducting post-production costs from its royalty
payments.  However, only one of the four types of royalty
provisions is relevant to the parties' cross-motions for summary
judgment.  The Plaintiff's two leases with Energen include
"Proceeds Royalty Provisions," which require payment of a specified
percentage of the proceeds of the gas, as such, for gas from wells
where gas only is found.

The Second Amended Complaint thus asserts that while
post-production costs may be deducted when the lease requires
calculating royalties based on proceeds "at the well," it is still
improper to deduct post-production costs from royalties paid under
all those leases that don't specify "at the well" valuation and
simply provide for payments to be made on proceeds from the sale of
gas.  Instead, under those types of leases, the Plaintiff asserts
Energen should base payments on the actual sales proceeds of the
natural gas and related products derived from its wells.

Energen sought summary judgment on both the Plaintiff's
claims—arguing (1) that it did not breach its contracts as a
matter of law, and (2) that the OGPPA does not apply to the
Plaintiff's leases.

Judge Brack will deny summary judgment as to the correct
interpretation of the point of valuation in the Plaintiff's leases.
As the plain language of the leases do not specify a point of
valuation, the circumstances surrounding the negotiation of the
contracts in 1950s and the meaning at that time of relevant terms
like "proceeds" and "as such" are critically important to the
determination of whether the contract dictates that royalty
payments should be calculated at the well or at a downstream point
of sale.  However, the evidence presented by both parties in
support of their respective positions is in dispute, turns on
witness credibility, and is susceptible of conflicting inferences.
Thus, he finds that the language is ambiguous as a matter of law.

The Judge will deny summary judgment on Energen's claim that
in-kind payments are not "proceeds" upon which it must pay
royalties.  Lacking knowledge of custom and practice in the
industry and the parties' understanding at the time they executed
the leases, the Judge simply cannot resolve the dispute as a matter
of law based on the plain language of the contracts.  Like the
interpretation of the lease language regarding the proper point of
valuation, this issue should be resolved following further
development of the record in this case after the class
certification phase.

Finally, the Judge will deny summary judgment on Energen's claim
that the OGPPA does not apply to the subject leases, and grant in
part the Plaintiff's motion on this issue.  He finds that though it
does not appear that the Defendant in Anderson Living Trust v.
Energen Resources Corp. made a retroactivity argument, the Tenth
Circuit noted that many of the subject leases at issue were "quite
old,"  and a review of the underlying complaint reveals that each
subject lease was executed prior to enactment of the OGPPA.  The
Tenth Circuit's decision thus implies that the OGPPA may apply to
leases executed before 1985.  The Judge will deny Energen's motion
for summary judgment on this issue.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Brack denied Energen's Motion for
Summary Judgment.  He granted the Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment in part as to the applicability of the
OGPPA and denied as to all other claims.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2019 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/CAoBwU from Leagle.com.

Gerald Ulibarri, on behalf of himself and a class of similarly
situated persons, Plaintiff, represented by A. Michael Chapman --
mchapman@ncg-law.com -- Newbold Chapman & Geyer, P.C., George
Barton -- gab@georgebartonlaw.com -- Law Offices of George Barton,
P.C. & Stacy Burrows -- stacy@georgebartonlaw.com -- Law Offices
of
George A. Barton, PC.

Energen Resources Corporation, Defendant, represented by Bradford
C. Berge -- bberge@hollandhart.com -- Holland & Hart LLP,
Christopher A. Chrisman -- cachrisman@hollandhart.com -- Holland &
Hart LLP, pro hac vice & Lauren R. Caplan --
lrcaplan@hollandhart.com -- Holland & Hart LLP, pro hac vice.

Energen Resources Corporation, Counter Claimant, represented by
Christopher A. Chrisman, Holland & Hart LLP, pro hac vice.

Gerald Ulibarri, on behalf of himself and a class of similarly
situated persons, Counter Defendant, represented by A. Michael
Chapman, Newbold Chapman & Geyer, P.C., George Barton, Law Offices
of George Barton, P.C. & Stacy Burrows, Law Offices of George A.
Barton, PC.


ENLOE MEDICAL: Underpays Registered Dieticians, Aram Alleges
------------------------------------------------------------
MARY ARAM, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. ENLOE MEDICAL CENTER; and DOES 1-10,
Defendants, Case No. 19CV02666 (Cal. Super., Butte Cty., Sept. 5,
2019) is an action against the Defendants for unpaid regular hours,
overtime hours, minimum wages, wages for missed meal and rest
periods.

The Plaintiff Aram was employed by the Defendants as registered
dietician.

Enloe Medical Center provides medical and heathcare services. The
Company offers bariatric program, behavioral health, cardiac
diagnostics, digestive health, diabetes education, surgical
services, stroke, occupational health, and emergency services.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Patricia A. Savage, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF PATRICIA A. SAVAGE
          1550 Humboldt Road, Suite 4
          Chico, CA 95928
          Telephone: (530) 809-1851
          Facsimile: (530) 592-3865
          E-mail: psavesq@gmail.com


ESTAN HEALTHCARE: Hill Seeks Proper Overtime Wages
--------------------------------------------------
LUELLA HILL, Individually and On Behalf of All Similarly Situated
Persons, Plaintiff, v. ESTAN HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC. and STELLA
K. UBI, Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-03624 (S.D. Tex., Sept. 25,
2019) is an action arising under the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, brought both as an individual action and collective action to
recover unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, and
attorney's fees owed to Plaintiff and all other similarly situated
employees employed by, or formerly employed by Defendants, their
subsidiaries and affiliated companies.

During her tenure with the Defendants, Plaintiff regularly worked
in excess of 40 hours per week. Plaintiff was paid on an hourly
basis at an hourly rate of $9.00, but was not paid for all the
hours she worked. In most weeks, Ms. Hill worked in excess of 40
paid hours per week, but was not paid an overtime premium. Ms. Hill
was also not paid at all for off-the-clock hours. The Defendants
knew that Ms. Hill was working more hours than she was being paid
for, says the complaint.

Plaintiff worked for Defendants as a health care provider from 2015
until July 18, 2019.

Defendants were an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce,
operating on interstate highways, purchasing materials through
commerce, transporting materials through commerce and on the
interstate highways, conducting transactions through commerce,
including the use of credit cards, phones and/or cell phones,
electronic mail and the Internet[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Josef F. Buenker, Esq.
     Vijay Pattisapu, Esq.
     THE BUENKER LAW FIRM
     2060 North Loop West, Suite 215
     Houston, TX 77018
     Phone: 713-868-3388
     Facsimile: 713-683-9940
     Email: jbuenker@buenkerlaw.com
            vijay@buenkerlaw.com


EVERGREEN RECREATIONAL: $1.2M Grimes Suit Deal Has Prelim. Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MATTHEW GRIMES, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. EVERGREEN RECREATIONAL VEHICLES,
LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 3:16-CV-472-JD (N.D. Ind.), Judge
Jon E. DeGuilio of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Indiana, South Bend Division, (i) granted the joint
motion for orders (1) preliminarily approving the settlement
agreement, (2) approving the form and manner of the class
settlement notice, and (3) scheduling a final fairness hearing; and
(ii) denied as premature the joint motion for an order finally
approving the settlement agreement.

On March 12, 2018, the Court ordered that class certification was
warranted under Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) for a class that was seeking
damages against Defendants Evergreen RV, KR Enterprises, Inc. and
JMA, LLC, under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification
("WARN") Act.  Grimes alleged that workers at the Defendants' two
Middlebury, Indiana facilities (located at 10758 County Road 2 and
51700 Lovejoy Drive) were terminated without the advance notice
required by the WARN Act.

The Court certified the class defined as any and all persons who
worked at or reported to a facility located at 10758 County Road 2,
Middlebury, Indiana 46540 or 51700 Lovejoy Drive, Middlebury,
Indiana 46540, within sixty days prior to the closing of those
facilities.

Outten & Golden, LLP, was appointed as the class counsel and Cohen
& Malad LLP, was appointed as the liaison counsel.  Grimes was
appointed as the class representative.

After the parties conducted additional discovery and twice engaged
in mediation, they reached a settlement.  The settlement in the
total amount of $1.2 million represents approximately 50% of the
maximum theoretical damages of the class.  The settlement agreement
provides for (i) the one-time $10,000 service fee to the class
representative, (ii) the proposed award of attorney's fees (that
is, one-third of the settlement amount net costs and the service
payment), and (iii) the reimbursement of costs (not to exceed
$30,000).  Furthermore, the agreement identifies a non-profit
organization dedicated to advancing employee rights as the cy pres
recipient and explains that any residual funds will only be
directed to the recipient by Court approval upon motion by the
class counsel describing the efforts taken to deliver the funds to
the class members.

Now before the Court is a joint motion for orders (1) preliminarily
approving the settlement agreement, (2) approving the form and
manner of the class settlement notice, (3) scheduling a final
fairness hearing, and (4) finally approving the settlement
agreement.

Judge DeGuilio finds that the settlement is within the range of
likelihood for being approved under Rule 23(e)(3) and that
preliminary approval of the settlement agreement is warranted.
Therefore, pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, he preliminarily approved the settlement agreement.

The settlement class, defined as any and all persons who worked at
or reported to a facility located at 10758 County Road 2,
Middlebury, Indiana 46540 or 51700 Lovejoy Drive, Middlebury,
Indiana 46540, within sixty days prior to the closing of those
facilities, is properly certified for settlement purposes.

The class notice and the service of such notice by the class
counsel will be provided to each of the class members by first
class mail, postage prepaid, at their last known address that was
found in Evergreen's records or as updated by class counsel.  Such
mailing will be made within 10 days of the entry of the Order.  The
form and content of the class notice is approved except with
respect to the revisions ordered.

Within 14 days after mailing the notices, the class counsel will
file with the Court a status report verifying that the notice was
disseminated in accordance with the Order and identifying those
potential class members that could not be located.  Based on the
number of notices returned as undeliverable, the Judge will
consider the need for additional methods of notice to the class
members.

The class notice will be substantially similar to the form provided
and approved in the Order except the following revisions are
ordered to be made:

     a. The list of employees identified as employed for less than
120 days and the lists identifying which employees were assigned to
each risk factor subgroup will be attached to the notice.

     b. In the second paragraph of page 1, the following language
will be added: "This notice has been authorized by the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana.  The
Court has taken no position in this case regarding the merits of
the claims, and the Court takes no position on whether any
individual should opt-out of or object to the class action."

     c. Consistent with the Court's authority under Rule 23(e)(4)
and given that additional information will be forthcoming in the
parties' joint motion for final approval of the settlement, the
Judge ordered the notice to provide an additional opt-out
opportunity, by stating: "If you do NOT wish to participate in this
Action, and wish to be excluded and thereby reserve your rights
under the WARN Act and not share in any recovery in the Action,
mail a letter providing your name and name of this case, along with
a request to be excluded from the Action by First Class Mail to
Outten & Golden LLP, 685 Third Avenue, 25th Floor, New York, New
York 10017, (212) 245-1000, Attn: René S. Roupinian.  The letter
must be received by Ms. Roupinian no later than 10 days prior to
the fairness hearing. All requests for exclusion received after
that date will not be effective, and any person who sends a late
request will be a member of the class in the Action and will be
bound in the same way and to the same extent as all other Class
Members."

     d. The date by which to opt-out/respond/object, and the
date/time of the final fairness hearing will be included in the
notice.

The Judge approved the selection of American Legal Claims Services
as the Settlement Escrow Agent.  He directed the class counsel to
cause ALCS to perform each and every one of the functions listed in
the settlement agreement and the Order.  Pursuant to the settlement
agreement, costs associated with the administration of the
settlement will be reimbursed from the settlement fund.

The Court will consider comments/responses/objections to the
settlement agreement, including the plan of allocation and the
request for fees, expenses, and costs, if filed with the Court and
mailed to counsel of record so that they are received no later than
10 days prior to the fairness hearing.

A hearing on the final approval of the proposed settlement
agreement will be held on a date that allows the class members
sufficient time to secure further information regarding the relief
sought by the joint motion, to opt-out of or object to the
settlement, and/or to engage counsel to appear at the final
fairness hearing.

With that said, a final fairness hearing will be held at 1:30 p.m.
(ET) on Dec. 5, 2019.

At least 30 days prior to the fairness hearing, the class counsel
will seek final approval of the settlement.  The documents provided
must contain the information requested in the Order and support the
request for attorneys' fees and reimbursement of expenses and costs
(including the service fee for the class representative).  Any
response or objection to the motion for final approval of the
settlement will be filed at least 10 days in advance of the final
fairness hearing.

Three days after the deadline to Opt-Out/Respond/Object, the class
counsel will file with the Court a Notice of Class Action Opt-Outs,
Responses, & Objections, listing the names of all persons who
timely excluded themselves from the settlement class or timely
responded/objected to the proposed settlement.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 4, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/s3TcHv from Leagle.com.

Matthew Grimes, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Irwin B. Levin --
ilevin@cohenandmalad.com -- Cohen & Malad LLP, Jack Raisner --
jar@outtengolden.com -- Outten & Golden LLP, pro hac vice, Rene S.
Roupinian -- rsr@outtengolden.com -- Outten & Golden LLP, pro hac
vice, Richard E. Shevitz -- rshevitz@cohenandmalad.com -- Cohen &
Malad LLP & Vess A. Miller -- vmiller@cohenandmalad.com -- Cohen &
Malad LLP.

Evergreen Recreational Vehicles, LLC & KR Enterprises Inc,
Defendants, represented by Bradford R. Shively --
bshively@riverwalklaw.com -- Sanders Pianowski LLP & Jonathan R.
Slabaugh -- jslabaugh@riverwalklaw.com -- Sanders Pianowski LLP.

JMA, LLC, Defendant, represented by Gerald F. Lutkus --
gerald.lutkus@btlaw.com -- Barnes & Thornburg LLP, Taylor L. Hunter
-- taylor.hunter@btlaw.com -- Barnes & Thornburg LLP & Jeanine M.
Gozdecki -- jeanine.gozdecki@btlaw.com -- Barnes & Thornburg LLP.


FEDCHEX RECOVERY: Castle Files FDCPA Suit in N.D. Illinois
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against FedChex Recovery,
LLC. The case is styled as Bonnie J. Castle individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. FedChex
Recovery, LLC doing business as: FCR Collection Services,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-06441 (N.D. Ill., Sept. 27, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Fedchex Recovery, LLC was founded in 2001. The company's line of
business includes collection and adjustment services on claims and
other insurance related issues.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     James C. Vlahakis, Esq.
     Sulaiman Law Group, Ltd.
     2500 S. Highland Avenue, Suite 200
     Lombard, IL 60148
     Phone: (630) 575-8181 x116
     Email: jvlahakis@sulaimanlaw.com



FIRST ADVANTAGE: Court Dismisses Frazier FCRA Suit
--------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, Richmond Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion granting
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned MICHAEL
FRAZIER, et al., for themselves and on behalf of all similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiffs, v. FIRST ADVANTAGE BACKGROUND
SERVICES CORP., Defendant. Civil Action No. 3:17cv30. (E.D. Va.).

Plaintiffs' three-count Second Amended Class Complaint, alleges
violations of the the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), by First
Advantage. Plaintiffs' allegations flow entirely from circumstances
surrounding their applications for employment with Wells Fargo.
During the application process and before any report was generated,
each plaintiff signed a disclosure authorizing First Advantage to
obtain her or his consumer report. Plaintiffs allege that First
Advantage created a faux compliance scheme by drafting and
providing within its own website a disclosure form it represented
would satisfy the disclosure requirements of the FCRA when, in
fact, the form did not.

Plaintiffs contend that First Advantage violated the FCRA in three
ways. In Count One (Certification Claim), Plaintiffs assert that
First Advantage willfully violated 15 U.S.C. Section 1681b(b)(1)(A)
because it did not receive a valid certification from Wells Fargo
certifying that Wells Fargo's disclosure form complied with the
relevant parts of the FCRA.

In Count Two (Adverse Action Claim), Plaintiffs contend that First
Advantage violated 15 U.S.C. Section 1681b(b)(3)(A) when it failed
to provide a copy of the consumer report used to make an employment
decision to Plaintiffs at least five days before taking an adverse
action that was based in whole or in part on the consumer report.

In Count Three (Notice Claim), Plaintiffs aver that First Advantage
failed to and could not comply with Section 1681k(a)(2) and yet
still failed to provide the written Section 1681k(a)(1) notice at
the same time class member reports were provided to Wells Fargo.
First Advantage cannot also satisfy Section 1681k(a)(2)'s strict
requirements because First Advantage buys bulk data consisting of
incomplete and outdated abstracts of courthouse records, which do
not meet the requirements of Section 1681k(a)(2).

In sum, Plaintiffs contend that First Advantage knew of its
obligations under the FCRA, and that those obligations are well
established in the statute's plain language, judicial decisions
interpreting the Act, and in the Federal Trade Commission's and
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's promulgations.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs allege First Advantage knowingly violated
the FCRA provisions at issue.

First Advantage renewed its Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs
responded, and First Advantage replied. Plaintiffs also filed a
Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Authority.

Legal Standard: Standing

In Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016), the Supreme
Court reiterated that, in order to establish standing, a plaintiff
must have: (1) suffered an injury in fact (2) that is fairly
traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant and (3) that
is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.

Standard to Demonstrate an Injury in Fact

In Spokeo, the Supreme Court discussed the manner in which a
plaintiff must allege injury in fact in order to establish standing
for what courts call a statutory violation resulting in an
informational injury.

First, the Spokeo court found that, for an injury to be
particularized, it must affect the plaintiff in a personal and
individual way. The fact that an injury may be suffered by a large
number of people does not of itself make that injury a
nonjusticiable generalized grievance. The proper inquiry is whether
each individual suffers a particularized harm.

Second, the Spokeo court stated that for an injury to be concrete,
it must be de facto, meaning that it must be real and not abstract.
That said, an injury need not be tangible in order to be concrete.
An intangible injury may constitute injury in fact.

Standard to Demonstrate Causation

At the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff seeking to establish
standing must also plead facts that support a reasonable inference
that the defendant caused the plaintiff's particularized and
concrete harm. In the standing context, this requires a showing
that the plaintiff's injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent
action of some third party not before the court.

Legal Standard: The Right to Privacy and the FCRA

The Right to Privacy

American courts have long recognized that one who invades the right
of privacy of another is subject to liability for the resulting
harm to the interests of the other. Claims involving the right to
privacy frequently turn on control over, and consent for, the
personal information at issue. To that end, the Supreme Court has
observed that an individual's right to privacy encompasses the
individual's control of information concerning his or her person.

Purposes of the FCRA

Enacted in 1970, the FCRA enshrined an employee's right to privacy
in the modern technological age, while maintaining that proper
consent vitiates an invasion of privacy. As the Senate noted while
passing Section 1681b(b)(2)(A), that section permits employers to
obtain consumer reports pertaining to current and prospective
employees. The Committee is concerned, however, that this provision
may create an improper invasion of privacy. Section 403 of this
bill requires that employers provide prior written disclosure to
current and prospective employees that their consumer reports may
be procured in connection with their employment. Further, employers
must obtain a specific or general written authorization prior to
procuring such a report.

Analysis: Plaintiffs Have Not Alleged an Invasion of Privacy Claim
Sufficient to Confer Standing Under the FCRA

Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a sufficient injury-in-fact
because they knowingly and actively consented to the dissemination
of their information to Wells Fargo when they traveled to the First
Advantage portal for the explicit purpose of allowing Wells Fargo
to obtain a background check. The Court faces a case that differs
materially from nearly every consumer rights case this or other
courts have evaluated.

The record here plainly shows that, as part of an application to
work at Wells Fargo, the Plaintiffs actively went to the CRA, First
Advantage, and entered in their private information so First
Advantage could provide a background report to Wells Fargo which
would use to assess employability. This active and direct provision
of private information by the consumer, under these limited facts,
amounts to consent under the common law, independent of the
violative FCRA forms or processes Plaintiffs discuss.

Because Plaintiffs consented to this disclosure, they have not
alleged a sufficient FCRA violation to confer standing.

Count One: The Certification Claim

In the Certification Claim, Plaintiffs assert that First Advantage
violated Section 1681b(b)(1)(A) of the FCRA by furnishing their
employment-purposed consumer reports to Wells Fargo without
receiving a valid certification, as described in Section
1681b(b)(2)(A), from Wells Fargo. They assert that First Advantage
knew, or should have known, that it did not receive a valid
certification because First Advantage itself provided the violative
disclosure form used in Wells Fargo's application process.
Plaintiffs allege that the disclosure form they each signed was
buried in a lengthy application and contained unnecessary,
additional language including a purported release of Plaintiffs'
and putative class members' FCRA rights, and thus violated 15
U.S.C. Section 1681b(b)(2).

Because, under common law, consent defeats an invasion of privacy
claim, and Plaintiffs actively and knowingly consented to the
release of their consumer report when giving their information
directly to First Advantage, they have failed to identify a
violation of Section 1681b(b)(2) sufficient to confer standing.

Plaintiffs Fail to Sufficiently Allege a Concrete Injury to Satisfy
Article III Standing
Plaintiffs do not allege an injury capable of satisfying Article
III standing because, under the common law, their affirmative
consent to the background check on the First Advantage portal
serves as a complete defense to any harm that Congress sought to
protect. As the Supreme Court reiterated in Spokeo, in cases in
which harms may be difficult to prove or measure, the violation of
a procedural right granted by statute can be sufficient and a
plaintiff in such a case need not allege any additional harm beyond
the one Congress has identified.

A plaintiff may therefore suffer an injury that establishes Article
III standing when he or she suffers, by being denied access to that
information, the type of harm Congress sought to prevent by
requiring disclosure.

Under even a liberal reading of these facts, the Plaintiffs falter
when saying they have suffered the type of harm Congress sought to
prevent. Although First Advantage provided a disclosure form that
failed to conform to the requirements of the statute, FCRA's
stand-alone requirement was enacted to decrease the risk of a job
applicant unknowingly providing consent to the dissemination of his
or her private information. The case at bar presents a materially
different scenario.

Here, at the behest of Wells Fargo, the Plaintiffs independently
went to the First Advantage application portal. They did so with
knowledge that the purpose of the forms they were filling out would
allow Wells Fargo to obtain a background check on each of the
Plaintiffs, which First Advantage would furnish. In doing so, by
necessity, the Plaintiffs recognized that their personal
information would be disseminated to two parties: (1) First
Advantage, with whom they were directly communicating; and (2)
Wells Fargo, who requested that the Plaintiffs travel to the portal
for a background check.

After taking such steps, Plaintiffs cannot support a claim that
they suffered an invasion of privacy by First Advantage's
dissemination of certain information to Wells Fargo when the sole
reason they went to the First Advantage portal was to agree to
furnish that very information to Wells Fargo.  

In short, even reading Plaintiffs allegations favorably, the Court
must find that Plaintiffs consented to the transfer of their
information from First Advantage to Wells Fargo when they logged on
to the First Advantage portal to authorize a background check for
Wells Fargo. That action eliminated the possible risk of the harm
that Congress sought to prevent in enacting Section 1681b(b)(2)
that the applicant [might] unknowingly authoriz[e] an employer to
obtain his or her background check because the Plaintiffs actively
provided their personal information so First Advantage could send
it to Wells Fargo could receive it when they first logged on to the
portal.

Because Plaintiffs did not suffer a harm that Congress sought to
protect through the FCRA, they fail to identify an actionable
injury in fact, and lack standing to pursue Count One.

Count Two: The Adverse Action Claim

In Count Two, the Adverse Action Claim, Plaintiffs assert that
First Advantage violated the FCRA by taking adverse action against
them without first providing notice that it intended to do so.
Plaintiffs contend that First Advantage's action in adjudicating
them as ineligible for employment constituted an adverse action and
entitled them to a copy of their consumer report and a summary of
their rights under the FCRA. Plaintiffs allege that this failure
deprived them of the ability to dispute inaccurate information in
their reports or proactively discuss negative information with
Wells Fargo before it decided not to hire them.

Plaintiffs assert that First Advantage violated 15 U.S.C. Section
1681b(b)(3) when it failed to provide them with notice before
coding their consumer reports as ineligible.

Section 1681b(b)(3) provides, in relevant part:

In using a consumer report for employment purposes, before taking
any adverse action based in whole or in part on the report, the
person intending to take such adverse action shall provide to the
consumer to whom the report relates (i) a copy of the report  and
(ii) a description in writing of the rights of the consumer under
this subchapter.

Here, because the Plaintiffs' allegations in the Second Amended
Complaint clearly fail a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis, the Court assumes
without deciding that Plaintiffs have standing to pursue Count Two
based on the allegations in the operative Second Amended
Complaint.

Analysis: Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

Assuming without deciding that Plaintiffs have standing to pursue
Count Two, the Court evaluates whether Plaintiffs plead facts
sufficient to state a claim. Because Plaintiffs fail to allege
facts supporting a reasonable inference that First Advantage used
their consumer reports for employment purposes when it labeled
Plaintiffs as eligible or ineligible for hire based on Wells
Fargo's criteria, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for a violation
of Section 1681b(b)(3), Count Two.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) Standard

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a
complaint; importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding
the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.
To survive Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual information to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. A complaint achieves facial plausibility
when the facts contained therein support a reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.
  
Plaintiffs Fail to State a Claim for a Violation of Section
1681b(b)(3)

In Count Two, the Adverse Action Claim, Plaintiffs allege that
First Advantage acted as both a CRA and a user when it classified
Plaintiffs as "ineligible" and that this act of classifying
Plaintiffs' consumer reports constituted an adverse action.
Plaintiffs state that First Advantage violated Section 1681b(b)(3)
by not providing pre-adverse action notice that it would classify
them as ineligible. Because the allegations in the Second Amended
Complaint do not demonstrate that First Advantage acted beyond its
role as a CRA when it marked Plaintiffs as ineligible, the Court
must find that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for a violation of
Section 1681b(b)(3).

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Count Two, the Adverse Action
Claim.

Plaintiffs Fail to Allege Sufficient Plausible Facts to Support the
Adverse Action Claim Because First Advantage Acted Only as a CRA

Section 1681b(b)(3) requires that, when using a consumer report for
employment purposes, before taking any adverse action based in
whole or in part on the report, the person intending to take such
adverse action shall provide to the consumer to whom the report
relates  a copy of the report and a description in writing of the
consumer's rights under the FCRA. A consumer reporting agency, as
defined by the FCRA, is any person which, for monetary fees, dues,
or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or
in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit
information or other information on consumers for the purpose of
furnishing consumer reports to third parties.

Plaintiffs attempt to extend liability to First Advantage by
stating that First Advantage acts in dual roles as both consumer
reporting agency and user when it both generates the consumer
report for an employer customer and also adjudicates that
applicant's eligibility for hire. But even a liberal reading of the
facts alleged do not support this conclusion. According to
Plaintiffs, when they each applied for employment with Wells Fargo,
First Advantage prepared an employment-purposed consumer report on
each Plaintiff. First Advantage then used the consumer reports and
adjudicated' Plaintiffs and the putative class members as eligible
or ineligible for employment based on criteria specific to Wells
Fargo. Plaintiffs allege this adjudication constituted an adverse
action.

Plaintiffs' allegations cannot overcome the plain language of the
statute. The facts as alleged in the Second Amended Complaint do
not indicate that First Advantage goes beyond its role as a CRA
providing employment-purposed consumer reports to employers when it
labels an applicant as eligible or ineligible for hire. FCRA
defines a CRA as any person which regularly engages in whole or in
part in the practice of evaluating consumer credit information or
other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing
consumer reports to third parties.

Here, no party disputes that First Advantage is a company regularly
engaged in the business of assembling, evaluating, and disbursing
information concerning consumers for the purpose of furnishing
consumer reports to third parties.

Wells Fargo Made the Ultimate Employment Decision Regarding
Plaintiffs

Furthermore, under FCRA, it is the person intending to take such
adverse action who must provide notice to the consumer to whom the
report relates. Under a plain reading of the statute, First
Advantage could not form the requisite intent to take an adverse
action against Plaintiffs because First Advantage was not
authorized to deny employment or make any other decision for
employment purposes. Wells Fargo, not First Advantage, made the
ultimate employment decision which constituted the adverse action
against Plaintiffs.

Because First Advantage simply evaluated Plaintiffs' consumer
credit information in light of the Wells Fargo criteria, the
ultimate user of the information, First Advantage's actions, even
as alleged, constitute nothing more than the actions of a CRA, as
contemplated by the FCRA. Accordingly, even accepting as true the
well-pleaded factual allegations in Plaintiffs' Second Amended
Complaint, First Advantage did not act as a user under the
plain-meaning of the statute.

Therefore, the Court cannot infer that First Advantage used a
consumer report for employment purposes when it determined
Plaintiffs' eligibility or ineligibility according to Wells Fargo
criteria.

Because the Second Amended Complaint fails to plausibly allege
facts that First Advantage violated § 1681b(b)(3), the Court will
dismiss Count Two, the Adverse Action Claim.
Plaintiffs Fail to State a Claim for Count Three, the Notice Claim,
Based on First Advantage's Alleged Violation of Section 1681k(a)

Count Three: Procedural Background

Count Three presents a procedural background that differs from that
of Counts One and Two. Plaintiffs repleaded Count Three verbatim in
their Second Amended Complaint the same count Plaintiffs
voluntarily withdrew in response to First Advantage's initial
motion to dismiss because it did not meet the necessary pleading
burden. For this and other reasons, the Court will dismiss this
claim with prejudice.

Arguments Related to the First Amended Complaint

After Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint, First Advantage
moved to dismiss Count Three because Plaintiffs did not allege that
the reports contained incomplete or outdated information, a
necessary element of a Section 1681k claim.   First Advantage also
argued that  Section 1681k does not apply until a CRA reports
information to a third-party user. Because First Advantage was
never a user of Plaintiffs' reports, and no court has ever held a
CRA to be a user under Section 1681k, First Advantage asserted that
Plaintiffs did not adequately state a Section 1681k claim as
required to sustain Count Three.  

In response to First Advantage's motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs
acknowledged that they could not "meet the necessary pleading
burden for their Notice Claim based on two recent unidentified
decisions of this Court regarding the degree of detail a consumer
must allege in their complaint. Plaintiffs voluntarily moved to
dismiss Count Three without prejudice and stated that they would
seek leave to amend at a later date if appropriate. Thereafter,
Plaintiffs, with the consent of First Advantage, moved the United
States District Court to dismiss without prejudice Count Three of
Plaintiff's First Amended Class Action Complaint. The Court
dismissed Count Three without prejudice.  

After the parties agreed to dismiss Count Three, the Court granted
First Advantage's motion to dismiss and dismissed without prejudice
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint as to Counts One and Two and granted
Plaintiffs leave to amend their Complaint.

Arguments Related to the Second Amended Complaint

Plaintiffs then brought their Second Amended Complaint against
First Advantage. In their Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs
reassert Count Three verbatim.

In the instant Motion to Dismiss, First Advantage states that
Plaintiffs previously admitted that [Count Three] did not `meet the
necessary pleading burden. First Advantage repeats that Plaintiffs
fail to state a claim pursuant to Section 1681k because Plaintiffs
do not allege that First Advantage furnished incomplete or
inaccurate reports about them. First Advantage further contends
that the relevant statute of limitations bars Plaintiffs from
asserting Count Three. the Notice Claim because Plaintiffs waited
more than two years after learning about the facts giving rise to
that claim.  

In response, Plaintiffs ask the Court to dismiss Count Three
without prejudice in part because discovery related to the other
counts will produce evidence necessary to support their Notice
Claim. Plaintiffs do not address First Advantage's statute of
limitations argument, nor do Plaintiffs dispute First Advantage's
contention that Plaintiffs failed to allege that their background
reports contained incomplete or outdated public record information,
as required to bring a claim under Section 1681k(a).

Plaintiffs also do not contest that they restated verbatim their
Notice Claim in the Second Amended Complaint, despite previously
acknowledging the legal deficiencies of that claim.

The Court Will Dismiss Count Three

The Court will dismiss Count Three after twice allowing Plaintiffs
to amend their complaint to sufficiently state their claims under
the FCRA. Here, Plaintiffs have not alleged that First Advantage
provided incomplete or outdated reports as required for a Section
1681k claim. Because Plaintiffs previously agreed that this claim
did not satisfy the Court's pleading standards, the Court does not
see how the same claim, reasserted verbatim in the Second Amended
Complaint, could suffice at this stage. After considering the
multiple opportunities the Court has provided Plaintiffs to correct
their pleading deficiencies for Count Three, the Court finds
appropriate dismissing Plaintiffs' Notice Claim, Count Three.

Plaintiffs chose to replead the same claim that they themselves
previously recognized as not able to "meet the necessary pleading
burden. In doing so, Plaintiffs have failed to discharge their
obligations as to Count Three. This Court cannot allow any
plaintiff, in response to a second motion to dismiss, to replead
verbatim that same count when it was earlier withdrawn by the
plaintiff because it did not meet pleading standards. This is what
Plaintiffs seek to do with Count Three's Notice Claim. If
Plaintiffs have not yet stated a claim, they should not expect
another opportunity to amend in response to First Advantage's
challenges, which a dismissal without prejudice would afford them.
While the Court remains mindful of the legal complexities in this
field, Plaintiffs proceed with sophisticated and accomplished legal
counsel.

Because Plaintiffs failed to distinguish Count Three in the Second
Amended Complaint from Count Three in the Amended Complaint, and
Plaintiffs previously asked the Court to dismiss Count Three, the
Court finds it appropriate to dismiss the Notice Claim with
prejudice.

All Counts Must Be Dismissed with Prejudice

Plaintiffs have twice amended their Complaint. At this juncture,
allowing Plaintiffs to amend their complaint a third time would
also impair their ability to seek immediate review of their claims
at the appellate level. Most fundamentally, allowing Plaintiffs the
opportunity to amend a third time is at odds with the obligation of
the Court and the parties to construe and to apply the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in a manner that secures the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.

To render this decision a final, appealable judgment, the Fourth
Circuit generally requires district courts to dismiss with
prejudice all claims as to all parties. Otherwise, litigants are
left without an appealable decision and have no judicial redress
for their claims.

The Court will grant the Motion to Dismiss.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 23, 2019
Memorandum Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y53xkhl3
from Leagle.com.

Michael Frazier, for themselves and on behalf of all similarly
situated individuals, Chardonney Vick, for themselves and on behalf
of all similarly situated individuals, Kiera Ross, for themselves
and on behalf of all similarly situated individuals, Jarrod
Collier, for themselves and on behalf of all similarly situated
individuals, Cheryl Glenn, for themselves and on behalf of all
similarly situated individuals, Shantelle Gregory, for themselves
and on behalf of all similarly situated individuals, Shavon Smith,
for themselves and on behalf of all similarly situated individuals,
Brittany Harris, for themselves and on behalf of all similarly
situated individuals, Nicholas Northington, for themselves and on
behalf of all similarly situated individuals, Alexandra Booker, for
themselves and on behalf of all similarly situated individuals,
Donald Brasher, Nicole Bolden, for themselves and on behalf of all
similarly situated individuals, Sherod Davis, for themselves and on
behalf of all similarly situated individuals, Juanitra Smith, for
themselves and on behalf of all similarly situated individuals,
Shamaar Mack, for themselves and on behalf of all similarly
situated individuals, Ruchanda Gilliam, for themselves and on
behalf of all similarly situated individuals, Christopher Campbell,
for themselves and on behalf of all similarly situated individuals,
Amilia Thomas, for themselves and on behalf of all similarly
situated individuals & Paul Venzor, for themselves and on behalf of
all similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs, represented by
Elizabeth W. Hanes , Consumer Litigation Associates, Matthew James
Erausquin , Consumer Litgation Associates PC, 626 East Broad
Street, Suite 300, Richmond, VA, 23219, Christopher Colt North ,
The Consumer & Employee Rights Law Firm PC, 751-A Thimble Shoals
Blvd. Newport News, VA 23606, Craig Carley Marchiando , Consumer
Litigation Associates, Leonard Anthony Bennett , Consumer
Litigation Associates, 626 East Broad Street, Suite 300, Richmond,
VA, 23219& Susan Mary Rotkis , Price Law Group, APC, 6345 Balboa
Blvd., Building 2, Suite 27, Encino, CA 91316

First Advantage Background Services Corp., Defendant, represented
by Esther Slater McDonald - emcdonald@seyfarth.com - Seyfarth Shaw
LLP & Frederick Thomas Smith - fsmith@seyfarth.com - Seyfarth Shaw
LLP, pro hac vice.   


FIRST STREET: Faces Mendez Suit in Southern District of New York
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against First Street Gallery,
Inc. The case is captioned as Himelda Mendez and on behalf of all
other persons similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. First Street
Gallery, Inc., the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-08464-DAB (S.D.N.Y.,
Sept 11, 2019). The suit alleges violation of Americans with
Disabilities Act. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Deborah A.
Batts.

First Street is a nonprofit contemporary art gallery located in the
heart of Chelsea.[BN]

The Plaintiff is Represented by:

          Bradly Gurion Marks, Esq.
          THE MARKS LAW FIRM PC
          175 Varick Street 3rd Floor
          New York, NY 10014
          Telephone: (646) 770-3775
          Facsimile: (646) 867-2639
          E-mail: bmarkslaw@gmail.com

FLAVORGOD LLC: Hinesley Sues Over Illegal SMS Ads
-------------------------------------------------
Steven Hinesley, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Flavorgod LLC, Defendant, Case No.
19-cv-62152, (S.D. Fla., July 27, 2019) seeks statutory damages and
injunctive relief for violations of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.

Flavor God is an online retailer of seasonings, spices, as well as
other cooking ingredients, goods and products. It would uniformly
send marketing text messages to thousands of consumers at a time
and providing different types of offers. Hinesley claims to have
received multiple telemarketing texts by use of an automatic
telephone dialing system without permission. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Jibrael S. Hindi, Esq.
      Thomas J. Patti, Esq.
      THE LAW OFFICE OF JIBRAEL S. HINDI, PLLC
      110 SE 6th Street
      Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
      Telephone: (954) 907-1136
      Facsimile: (855) 529-9540
      Email: jibrael@jibraellaw.com
             tom@jibraellaw.com


FONTANA & FONTANA: In Settlement Talks with "Bardales" Plaintiffs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as CORNELIA BARDALES and DONALD
RUSSELL, the Plaintiffs, vs. FONTANA & FONTANA, LLC; a Louisiana
Limited Liability Co.; DARRYL M. FONTANA, An Individual; and JULES
A. FONTANA, III, MAG (3): DANA M. DOUGLAS, An Individual, the
Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-00340-WBV-DMD (E.D. La.), the
Defendants ask the Court to continue the Class Certification Motion
deadline set for September 23, 2019, for 45 days from that date, to
November 7, 2019.

The parties submit that they are engaged in settlement negotiations
and are cautiously optimistic that a resolution can be reached
without the necessity for the parties to undertake any additional
work on this matter, the lawsuit says.[CC]

Counsel for Cornelia Bardales and Donald Russell are:

          Keren E. Gesund, Esq.
          GESUND AND PAILET, LLC
          3421 N. Causeway Blvd., Suite 805
          Metairie, LA 70002
          Telephone: (702) 300-1180
          Facsimile: (504) 265-9492
          E-mail: keren@gp-nola.com

Counsel for the Defendants are:

          Elliot M. Lonker, Esq.
          David S. Daly, Esq.
          FRILOT, LLC
          1100 Poydras St., Suite 3700
          New Orleans, LA 70163
          Telephone: (504) 599-8329
          Facsimile: (504) 599-8139
          E-mail: DDaly@Frilot.com
                  ELonker@Frilot.com

GARDEN COMMUNITIES: Kohler Files Consumer Credit Suit in S.D. Ca.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Garden Communities.
The case is styled as Jordan Kohler, Individually and on Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff v. Garden Communities,
Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-01870-BEN-BLM (S.D. Cal., Sept. 27,
2019).

The nature of suit is stated as Consumer Credit.

Garden Communities offers real estate services. The Company
provides services including real estate development, renting, and
brokerage.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Matthew M. Loker, Esq.
     Kazerouni Law Group APC
     245 Fischer Avenue, Unit D1
     Costa Mesa, CA 92626
     Phone: (800) 400-6808
     Fax: (800) 520-5523
     Email: ml@kazlg.com



GENERAL AUTOMOBILE: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Boger Suit Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DAN L. BOGER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. THE GENERAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE SERVICES,
INC.; and SPANISH QUOTES, INC., Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-05094-JZB (D. Ariz., Sept. 5, 2019) seeks to stop the
Defendants' practice of making unsolicited calls.

The General Automobile Insurance Services, Inc. operates as an
insurance firm. The Company offers auto insurance services. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

           Nathan Brown, Esq.
           BROWN PATENT LAW
           15100 N. 78th Way, Suite 203
           Scottsdale, AZ 85260
           Telephone: (602) 529-3474
           E-mail: Nathan.Brown@BrownPatentLaw.com


GREY-RUSO: Underpays Laborers, Amaro Suit Alleges
-------------------------------------------------
ANGEL AMARO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. GREY-RUSO CONSTRUCTION CORP.; and GREGORY
CARUSO, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-05050-MKB-RER (E.D.N.Y., Sept.
5, 2019) seeks to recover from the Defendants unpaid wages and
overtime compensation, interest, liquidated damages, attorneys'
fees, and costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff Amaro was employed by the Defendant as laborer.

Grey-Ruso Construction Corp. residential and commercial asphalt
paving services. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Roman Avshalumov, Esq.
          HELEN F. DALTON & ASSOCIATES, PC
          80-02 Kew Gardens Road, Suite 601
          Kew Gardens, NY 11415
          Telephone: (718) 263-9591
          Facsimile: (718) 263-9598


GULF COAST: Court Denies Final Approval of Mygrant Settlement
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Alabama, Southern Division, issued an Order denying Parties' Joint
Motion to Approve Settlement in the case captioned BRYAN MYGRANT et
al., Plaintiffs, v. GULF COAST RESTAURANT GROUP, INC., et al.,
Defendants. Civil Action No. 18-0264-WS-M. (S.D. Ala.).

The Court doubted that the parties had met the standard for
conditional certification, particularly in that the named
plaintiffs, who are tipped employees complaining of tip violations,
purport to represent both tipped and non-tipped employees.  

The parties have now clarified that the defendants took a tip
credit uniformly as to all employees included within the complaint
and the proposed collective action, including those the plaintiffs
say are not tipped employees, and that the tip credit is improper
due to the defendants' uniform practice of sharing tips with the
same group of non-tipped employees. With this understanding, the
Court finds that all members of the proposed collective action are
similarly situated to the named plaintiffs and that the
requirements for conditional certification under governing law are
satisfied. Accordingly, the parties' deemed motion for conditional
certification of a collective action is granted.

The following class is conditionally certified:

     All current and former non-exempt employees of Defendants who
worked as bartenders, servers, food expediters, food runners,
and/or bussers between June 30, 2016 and June 30, 2018 at any of
the following Half Shell Oyster House locations: Flowood, Hard
Rock, Destin, Mobile, Hattiesburg, Biloxi, Gulfport, Spanish
Fortand Lafayette.

Final Approval of Settlement

The Court next questioned whether settlement could be approved
prior to: (1) the sending of notice to potential opt-in plaintiffs
(2) the expiration of the post-notice deadline for opting into the
collective action and (3) an opportunity for the opt-in plaintiffs
to object to the terms of the proposed settlement.  

A number of sister courts have rejected efforts to obtain final
settlement approval prior to the sending of notice. Their primary
objections are that final approval would moot the lawsuit
(precluding the sending of notice and that a plaintiff cannot
settle claims of a non-party.

The Court perceives an additional impediment to final approval of
the settlement at this stage. The Court's responsibility is to
determine that a settlement proposed by an employer and employees
is a fair and reasonable resolution of a bona fide FLSA dispute.  


There are two named plaintiffs in this action, but there are
clearly many hundreds of potential opt-in plaintiffs,4 and their
perception of what is fair and reasonable may well differ from that
of the named plaintiffs. It would be premature for the Court to
definitively decide the fairness and reasonableness of the proposed
settlement when well over 99% of the potential claimants have had
no opportunity to identify unfair or unreasonable aspects of the
settlement proposal.

The parties insist that only they should have any say in the
settlement. Unlike in the Rule 23 context, where class members can
be bound to a settlement against their will, those within the scope
of a collective action can remain outside the litigation with no
adverse consequences, thus, they say, employees that believe the
settlement is not fair and reasonable can simply elect not to
participate.  

The question, however, is not whether the class of potential opt-in
plaintiffs will be harmed by the settlement but whether they will
be benefited, and benefited in a way that is fair and reasonable
under the circumstances. Their voice, if they have one, should be
heard before that determination is definitively made.

Were settlement reached and approval sought only after expiration
of the opt-in period, counsel might be in a position to represent,
in compliance with Rule 11, that his clients deem the settlement
fair and reasonable; because settlement of this case was reached
prior to notice, no such representation is possible, and the input
of opt-in plaintiffs must be obtained by different means.

The Court declines to consider final approval of the proposed
settlement at this time.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 23, 2019 Opinion
and Order is available  https://tinyurl.com/yy6ky8p8 from
Leagle.com.

Bryan Mygrant & Jonathan Webber, Plaintiffs, represented by Daniel
Eduardo Arciniegas -Daniel@attorneydaniel.com - Arciniegas Law PLLC
& Charles Peter Yezbak, III , Yezbak Law Offices, pro hac vice.

Gulf Coast Restaurant Group, Inc., Defendant, represented by Dena
H. Sokolow , Walston, Wells, Anderson & Bains, 1819 5th Ave N,
Birmingham, AL 35203, pro hac vice, Daisy Christina Karlson
-dckarlson@bakerdonelson.com - Baker Donelson & Zachary B. Busey ,
Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C., pro hac
vice.

Half Shell Oyster House, Inc. & Robert Taylor, doing business as,
Defendants, represented by Dena H. Sokolow , Walston, Wells,
Anderson & Bains, pro hac vice, Daisy Christina Karlson , Baker
Donelson & Zachary B. Busey , Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell &
Berkowitz, P.C..


IBS CONSTRUCTION: Fails to Provide Overtime Pay, Adkins Alleges
---------------------------------------------------------------
MARK ADKINS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. IBS CONSTRUCTION GROUP, LLC; and ERI PITTS,
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-23697-RNS (S.D. Fla., Sept. 5, 2019)
is an action against the Defendants' failure to pay the Plaintiff
and the class overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of
40 hours per week.

The Plaintiff Adkins was employed by the Defendants as non-exempt
employee.

IBS Construction Group, LLC is a full service general contractor,
construction management consulting firm as well as roofing
contractor service provider. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Cathleen Scott, Esq.
          SCOTT WAGNER & ASSOCIATES, P.A.
          250 S. Central Blvd., Suite 104-A
          Jupiter, FL 33458
          Telephone: (561) 653-0008
          Facsimile: (561) 653-0020
          E-mail: cscott@scottwagnerlaw.com
                  mail@scottwagnerlaw.com


IOWA HEALTH SYSTEM: Doe PI Suit Transferred to W.D. Wisconsin
-------------------------------------------------------------
The class action styled as Jane Doe Individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Iowa Health System
doing business as: UnityPoint Health, Defendant, Case No.
4:18-cv-00453 was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Iowa to the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Wisconsin on Sept. 27, 2019, and assigned Case
No. 3:19-cv-00807.

The nature of suit is stated as Other P.I.

UnityPoint Health is a network of hospitals, clinics and home care
services in Iowa, Illinois and Wisconsin. The system began in 1993,
when Iowa Lutheran Hospital and Iowa Methodist Hospital in Des
Moines merged, forming the state's largest provider of hospital and
related health services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Brian P Galligan, Esq.
     The Plaza
     300 Walnut Street, Suite 5
     Des Moines, IA 50309-2239
     Phone: (515) 282-3333
     Fax: (515) 282-0318
     Email: bgalligan@galliganlaw.com

          - and -

     Lucy McShane, Esq.
     Maureen Brady, Esq.
     McShane & Brady, LLC
     1656 Washington Street, Suite 120
     Kansas City, MO 64108
     Phone: (816) 888-8010
     Fax: (816) 332-6295
     Email: lmcshane@mcshanebradylaw.com
            mbrady@mcshanebradylaw.com

The Defendant is represented by:

     Benjamin Patrick Roach, Esq.
     Nyemaster Goode PC
     700 Walnut Street, Suite 1600
     Des Moines, IA 50309-3899
     Phone: (515) 283-8158
     Email: bproach@nyemaster.com

          - and -

     Casie Dell Collignon, Esq.
     Baker & Hostetler LLP
     1801 California Street, Suite 4400
     Denver, CO 80202
     Phone: (303) 764-4037
     Fax: (303) 861-0600
     Email: ccollignon@bakerlaw.com


J.R. SIMPLOT: Phillips Suit Removed to E.D. Washington
------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned MICHAEL PHILLIPS, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. J.R. SIMPLOT COMPANY,
a Nevada Corporation, and DOES 1-10, inclusive, Defendant, Case No.
19-250984-11 was removed from the Superior Court of Washington in
and for Franklin County to the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Washington on Sept. 23, 2019, and assigned Case
No. 4:19-cv-05234.

Plaintiffs' Complaint asserts causes of action for Failure to Pay
Hourly and Separate Wages for Time Spent on Statutory Rest Periods,
Failure to Pay Minimum Wage for All Hours Worked, Failure to
Satisfy Wage Obligations Assumed Through Contract, and Double
Damages for Willful and Intentional Withholding of Wages against
Defendant.[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

     MICHAEL A. MAURER, ESQ.
     MICHAEL D. FRANKLIN, ESQ.
     LUKINS & ANNIS, P.S.
     1600 Washington Trust Financial Center
     717 W Sprague Ave
     Spokane, WA 99201-0466
     Phone: (509) 455-9555
     Facsimile: (509) 747-2323
     Email: mmaurer@lukins.com
            mfranklin@lukins.com


JARROW FORMULAS: Shanks Appeals Class Cert. Bid Denial to 9th Cir.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Collin Shanks filed an appeal from a Court ruling in the
lawsuit styled Collin Shanks v. Jarrow Formulas, Inc., Case No.
2:18-cv-09437-PA-AFM, in the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California, Los Angeles.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Sept. 9, 2019, the
District Court denied the Plaintiff's motion to certify a class
defined as:

    "all persons who, since November 6, 2014, purchased in the
     United States (or alternatively in California, if the Court
     does not certify a nationwide class), for personal or
     household use, and not for resale or distribution, a 16 oz.
     or 32 oz. Jarrow Organic Extra Virgin or Jarrow Regular
     Coconut Oil whose label did not bear a disclosure statement
     of the type required by 21 C.F.R. 101.13(h)."

The appellate case is captioned as Collin Shanks v. Jarrow
Formulas, Inc., Case No. 19-80119, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Petitioner COLLIN SHANKS, on behalf of himself, all
others similarly situated, and the general public, is represented
by:

          Jack Fitzgerald, Esq.
          Trevor M. Flynn, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF JACK FITZGERALD, PC
          Hillcrest Professional Building
          3636 Fourth Avenue, Suite 202
          San Diego, CA 92103
          Telephone: (619) 692-3840
          Facsimile: (619) 362-9555
          E-mail: jack@jackfitzgeraldlaw.com
                  trevor@jackfitzgeraldlaw.com

               - and -

          Paul K. Joseph, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF
          PAUL K. JOSEPH, PC
          4125 W. Pt. Loma Blvd., Room 206
          San Diego, CA 92110
          Telephone: (734) 730-3548
          E-mail: paul@pauljosephlaw.com

Defendant-Respondent JARROW FORMULAS, INC. is represented by:

          Anthony Anscombe, Esq.
          Darlene Alt, Esq.
          Mary Buckley, Esq.
          STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP
          227 West Monroe Street, Suite 4700
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 577-1265
          E-mail: aanscombe@steptoe.com
                  dalt@steptoe.com
                  mbuckley@steptoe.com


JOVANI FASHION: Website not Accessible to Blind, Brooks Says
------------------------------------------------------------
VALERIE BROOKS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. JOVANI FASHION LTD., a New York
limited company; and DOES 1 to 10, inclusive, the Defendants, Case
No. 2:19-cv-01846-JAM-CKD (E.D. Cal., Sept. 13, 2019), alleges that
the Defendant failed to design, construct, maintain, and operate
its website at https://www.jovani.com/ to be fully and equally
accessible to and independently usable by Plaintiff and other blind
or visually-impaired people. The Defendant's denial of full and
equal access to its website, and therefore denial of its products
and services offered thereby and in conjunction with its physical
locations, is a violation of the Plaintiff's rights under the
Americans with Disabilities Act and California's Unruh Civil Rights
Act.

The Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person who
requires screen-reading software to read website content using her
computer. Plaintiff uses the terms "blind" or "visually-impaired"
to refer to all people with visual impairments who meet the legal
definition of blindness in that they have a visual acuity with
correction of less than or equal to 20 x 200. Some blind people who
meet this definition have limited vision. Others have no vision.

The Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a change in
Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and procedures so that
Defendant's website will become and remain accessible to blind and
visually-impaired consumers, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and Proposed Class are:

          Bobby Saadian, Esq.
          Thiago Coelho, Esq.
          WILSHIRE LAW FIRM
          3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Telephone: (213) 381-9988
          Facsimile: (213) 381-9989

JUST ENERGY: Gutman Seeks Damages Over Share Price Drop
-------------------------------------------------------
GREGORY GUTMAN, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. JUST ENERGY GROUP INC., DEBORAH MERRIL, JAMES LEWIS,
PATRICK MCCULLOUGH, and JIM BROWN, Case No. 4:19-cv-03449 (S.D.
Tex., Sept. 12, 2019), is brought on behalf of holders of Just
Energy securities, like the Plaintiff, seeking to recover
compensable damages caused by the Defendants' violations of the
federal securities laws under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to disclose to
investors that: (1) Just Energy experienced customer enrollment and
nonpayment issues; (2) Just Energy had not taken appropriate
reserves to its trade receivables to reflect these issues, thereby,
rendering previously issued financial results it publicly
disseminated materially false and misleading; (3) Just Energy
lacked adequate internal controls over its financial reporting; and
(4) as a result, the Defendants' positive statements about the
Company's business, operations, and prospects were materially
misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis.  The Plaintiff points
out that when the truth began to emerge, the Company's share price
fell and damaged its investors.

Just Energy is incorporated under the laws of Canada with its
principal executive offices located in Ontario, Canada.  Just
Energy has offices, operates, and provides services in Texas.

Just Energy purports to be a consumer company focused on essential
needs, including electricity and natural gas commodities; on health
and well-being, through products such as water quality and
filtration devices; and on utility conservation, including
renewable energy options.  The Individual Defendants are directors
and officers of the Company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          R. Dean Gresham, Esq.
          STECKLER GRESHAM COCHRAN PLLC
          12720 Hillcrest Rd., Suite 1045
          Dallas, TX 75230
          Telephone: (972) 387-4040
          Facsimile: (972) 387-4041
          E-mail: dean@stecklerlaw.com

               - and -

          Phillip Kim, Esq.
          Laurence M. Rosen, Esq.
          THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
          275 Madison Avenue, 34th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 686-1060
          Facsimile: (212) 202-3827
          E-mail: pkim@rosenlegal.com
                  lrosen@rosenlegal.com


JUUL LABS: Smith et al. Sue over Sales of e-Cigarettes
------------------------------------------------------
SAVANNAH SMITH & TYLER KRAUEL, individually, and on behalf of a
class of similarly situated persons, the Plaintiffs, vs. JUUL LABS,
INC., the Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-05838 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 12,
2019), seeks medical monitoring, monetary damages, personal injury
damages, declaratory, injunctive and other relief, and punitive
damages.

The lawsuit recounts that in 2015, JUUL set out to recapture the
magic of the most successful product ever made -- the cigarette.
Due to regulations and court orders preventing the major cigarette
manufacturers from marketing to young people, youth smoking had
decreased to its lowest levels in decades. While the public health
community celebrated this decline as a victory, JUUL saw an
opportunity.

Seizing on regulatory inaction and loopholes for e-cigarettes, JUUL
set out to develop and market a highly addictive product that could
be packaged and sold to young people. Youth is and has always been
the most sought-after market for cigarette companies, because they
are the most vulnerable to nicotine addiction and are most likely
to become customers for life.

The lawsuit says JUUL was designed perfectly for teenagers. It does
not look or smell like a cigarette. It is a sleek, high-tech
youth-friendly battery-powered device that looks like a USB drive.
The JUUL device heats a nicotine-filled liquid JUUL pod, sold
separately in fun flavors like mango and cool mint, delivering
powerfully potent doses of nicotine, along with aerosol and 20
other toxic chemicals into the lungs, body and brain. Unlike
noxious cigarette smoke, when a JUUL user exhales, the smoke is
undetectable. JUUL is small, easily concealable and can be used
practically anywhere without parents or teachers knowing; just
Google "JUUL in school" and find more than 23,000 videos on how to
JUUL anywhere without detection. This is part of the appeal,
fostered and bolstered by JUUL's viral marketing campaigns using
young models to make the products look cool and stylish.

Defendants designed JUUL to quickly and severely addict young
people to nicotine, one of the most addictive chemicals in the
world. By studying cigarette industry archives, JUUL learned how to
manipulate the nicotine in its products to maximize addictiveness,
particularly among new users and young people, and thereby increase
sales. JUUL designed its products to have maximum inhalability,
without any "throat hit" or irritation that would serve as a
natural deterrent to new users. The sole purpose of this design
element was to initiate new smokers, since those who already smoke
cigarettes are tolerant to the throat hit sensation and associate
it with smoking and nicotine satisfaction. At the same time, JUUL
designed its device to deliver substantially higher concentrations
of nicotine per puff than traditional cigarettes and most other
e-cigarettes. This combination of ease of inhalation and high
nicotine delivery makes JUUL both powerfully addictive and
dangerous.

The Defendants never warned the Plaintiffs that JUUL was addictive,
dangerous, could cause him to suffer nicotine addiction and
associated serious health risk including increased risks for heart,
lung and brain disease including cancer, and other related health
effects.

The Plaintiffs would not have tried JUUL or continued to use JUUL
product shortly thereafter, had he known it contained nicotine, or
was highly addictive, or carried the health risks that were not
warned about, which he did not know at the time he first started
using the product.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' conduct the
Plaintiffs suffered life-altering and permanent injuries,
including: permanent brain damage, ongoing and severe nicotine
addiction and associated serious latent health risk including
increased risks for heart, lung and brain disease and injury
including cancer, and other related health effects, the lawsuit
says.

Juul Labs, Inc. is an electronic cigarette company which spun off
from Pax Labs in 2017. It makes the Juul e-cigarette, which
packages nicotine salts from leaf tobacco into one-time use
cartridges.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Sabita J. Soneji, Esq.
          V Chai Oliver Prentice, Esq.
          Matthew Lanahan, Esq.
          TYCKO & ZAVAREEI LLP
          1970 Broadway, Suite 1070
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone: (510) 254-6808
          Facsimile: (202) 973-0950
          E-mail: ssoneji@tzlegal.com
                  vprentice@tzlegal.com

               - and -

          Ariana J. Tadler, Esq.
          A.J. de Bartolomeo, Esq.
          TADLER LAW LLP
          One Pennsylvania Plaza, 36 th Fl.
          New York, NY 10119
          Telephone: (212) 946-9300
          Facsimile: (212) 273-4375
          E-mail: atadler@tadlerlaw.com
                  ajd@tadlerlaw.com

KASMIN GALLERY: Mendez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against KASMIN GALLERY INC.
The case is styled as Himelda Mendez AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHER
PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff v. KASMIN GALLERY INC,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-09023 (S.D. N.Y., Sept. 27, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Kasmin Gallery was founded in SoHo in 1989. The gallery moved to
Chelsea in 2000. The gallery operated four exhibition spaces along
one block of West 27th Street near 10th Avenue.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Bradly Gurion Marks, Esq.
     The Marks Law Firm PC
     175 Varick Street 3rd Floor
     New York, NY 10014
     Phone: (646) 770-3775
     Fax: (646) 867-2639
     Email: bmarkslaw@gmail.com


KATHRYN MARKEL: Mendez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against KATHRYN MARKEL FINE
ARTS, INC. The case is styled as Himelda Mendez AND ON BEHALF OF
ALL OTHER PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff v. KATHRYN MARKEL
FINE ARTS, INC., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-09020 (S.D. N.Y.,
Sept. 27, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Kathryn Markel Fine Arts operates art galleries in New York City
and Bridgehampton.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Bradly Gurion Marks, Esq.
     The Marks Law Firm PC
     175 Varick Street 3rd Floor
     New York, NY 10014
     Phone: (646) 770-3775
     Fax: (646) 867-2639
     Email: bmarkslaw@gmail.com


KOONSUP THAI: Ramos Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
------------------------------------------------------------
FRANCISCO AMADEO CLEMENTE RAMOS, on behalf of himself, and FLSA
Collective Plaintiffs, Plaintiff, v. KOONSUP THAI, INC. d/b/a PRO
THAI, and ARUNRAT VOONBUMROUNG Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-08823
(S.D. N.Y., Sept. 23, 2019) is a Collective Action Complaint
against Defendants, pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, and
the New York Labor Law seeking unpaid minimum wage, unpaid
overtime, compensation for retaliation, unpaid spread of hours
premium, liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees and costs.

Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs regularly worked over 40
hours per week, but Defendants failed to pay them the proper
overtime compensation in violation of the FLSA and NYLL, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff FRANCISCO AMADEO CLEMENTE RAMOS was employed to work as a
delivery person for Defendants' PRO THAI restaurant from August
2018.

Defendants own and operate a Thai restaurant in New York County,
New York under the trade name "PRO THAI".[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     C.K. Lee, Esq.
     LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
     148 West 24th Street, 8th Floor
     New York, NY 10011
     Phone: 212-465-1188
     Fax: 212-465-1181


LAMANTIA GALLERY: Mendez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against LAMANTIA GALLERY,
LTD. The case is styled as Himelda Mendez AND ON BEHALF OF ALL
OTHER PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff v. LAMANTIA GALLERY,
LTD, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-09019 (S.D. N.Y., Sept. 27,
2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Lamantia Gallery Ltd is in the Art Gallery business.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Bradly Gurion Marks, Esq.
     The Marks Law Firm PC
     175 Varick Street 3rd Floor
     New York, NY 10014
     Phone: (646) 770-3775
     Fax: (646) 867-2639
     Email: bmarkslaw@gmail.com


LARKIN ENTERPRISES: Hayward Labor Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime
------------------------------------------------------------
Calvin Hayward, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Larkin Enterprises, Inc., Defendant, Case
No. 19-cv-00695 (W.D. Mich., August 27, 2019), seeks to recover
unpaid overtime and other damages for violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

Larkin is a staffing agency that supplies personnel to firms in the
power generation and utility industries. Hayward was an hourly paid
Construction Manager. Throughout his employment, he was paid a
day-rate with no overtime compensation. He claims that he was paid
a salary regardless of the number of hours he worked that day
without any overtime pay for hours worked in excess of forty hours
in a workweek. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
      Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq.
      JOSEPHSON DUNLAP LAW FIRM
      11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
      Houston, TX 77046
      Tel: (713) 352-1100
      Fax: (713) 352-3300
      Email: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
             adunlap@mybackwages.com

             - and -

      Richard J. Burch, Esq.
      BRUCKNER BURCH, P.L.L.C.
      8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
      Houston, TX 77046
      Tel: (713) 877-8788
      Fax: (713) 877-8065
      Email: rburch@brucknerburch.com

             - and -

      Jennifer L. McManus, Esq.
      FAGAN MCMANUS, P.C.
      25892 Woodward Avenue
      Royal Oak, MI 48067-0910
      Tel: (248) 542-6300
      Email: jmcmanus@faganlawpc.com


LATSHAW DRILLING: Helenberger Suit Transferred to N.D. Texas
------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as JAMES HELENBERGER, Individually and On Behalf
of Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. LATSHAW DRILLING
COMPANY, LLC, the Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-00193 (Filed April 9,
2019), was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Oklahoma, to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Texas (Dallas) on Sept. 18, 2019. The Northern
District of Texas Court Clerk assigned Case No.  3:19-cv-02243-L to
the proceeding. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Sam A.
Lindsay.

Latshaw Drilling Company does not pay its oilfield electricians
overtime as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
New Mexico Minimum Wage Act. Instead, Latshaw pays them a flat
salary. Because these employees are not exempt under the FLSA and
the NMMWA, the Plaintiff and the other salaried oilfield
electricians are entitled to recover unpaid overtime as well as
other damages, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Jonathan Everett Shook, Esq.
          SHOOK & JOHNSON PLLC
          7420 S Yale Ave.
          Tulsa, OK 74136
          Telephone: (918) 293-1122
          Facsimile: (918) 293-1133
          E-mail: jshook@shookjohnson.com

               - and -

          David Isaac Moulton, Esq.
          Richard J Burch, Esq.
          BRUCKNER BURCH PLLC
          8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 877-8788
          Facsimile: (713) 877-8065
          E-mail: dmoulton@brucknerburch.com
                  rburch@brucknerburch.com

Attorneys for Latshaw Drilling Company LLC are:

          Madalene A B Witterholt, Esq.
          CROWE & DUNLEVY PC
          321 South Boston Avenue, Suite 500
          Tulsa, OK 74103-3313
          Telephone: (918) 592-9809
          Facsimile: (918) 592-9801
          E-mail: m.witterholt@crowedunlevy.com

LEVINBOOK LAW FIRM: Diez Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Levinbook Law
Firm, P.C. The case is styled as Brian Diez individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. The Levinbook
Law Firm, P.C., Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-05503 (E.D. N.Y., Sept.
27, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

The Levinbook Law Firm, P.C. is focused on real estate transactions
and collections, and is experienced in strategies for recovering
commercial and consumer debt.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     David M. Barshay, Esq.
     Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
     Barshay Sanders, PLLC
     100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
     Garden City, NY 11530
     Phone: (516) 203-7600
     Fax: (516) 281-7601
     Email: dbarshay@barshaysanders.com
            csanders@barshaysanders.com


LEXISNEXIS RISK: Illegally Sells Motorists' Info, Hatch Claims
--------------------------------------------------------------
JOHNATHAN HATCH, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated
v. LEXISNEXIS RISK SOLUTIONS, INC., a Georgia Corporation, and
POLICEREPORTS US, LLC, a North Carolina Limited Liability Company,
Case No. 3:19-cv-00449 (W.D.N.C., Sept. 12, 2019), accuses the
Defendants of violating the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of
1994, which the Congress enacted to protect people and their
personal information.

The Defendants, which are data aggregation and distribution firms,
have systematically violated the DPPA by knowingly obtaining
protected personal information from the motor vehicle records of
thousands of motorists involved in automobile accidents, the
Plaintiff alleges.  He contends that the Defendants have then sold
that information to law firms and other entities whom the
Defendants knew would use that protected information for marketing
purposes.

LexisNexis is a Georgia Corporation doing business in the State of
North Carolina, and is a global provider of content-enabled
workflow solutions designed specifically for professionals in the
legal, risk management, corporate, government, law enforcement,
accounting, and academic markets.

PoliceReports.US, LLC ("PRUS") is a North Carolina limited
liability company with an office located in Mooresville, North
Carolina, and is doing business in the State of North Carolina.
PRUS was acquired by LexisNexis on August 4, 2014.  PRUS is an
online distributor of vehicle accident/crash reports currently
doing business in at least 30 states in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          J. David Stradley, Esq.
          WHITE & STRADLEY, PLLC
          3105 Charles B. Root Wynd
          Raleigh, NC 27612
          Telephone: (919) 844-0400
          E-mail: stradley@whiteandstradley.com

               - and -

          Frederick L. Berry, Esq.
          John F. Bloss, Esq.
          HIGGINS BENJAMIN, PLLC
          301 North Elm Street, Ste. 800 (NC Bar # 9696)
          Greensboro, NC 27401
          Telephone: (336) 273-1600
          Facsimile: (336) 274-4650
          E-mail: fberry@greensborolaw.com
                  jbloss@greensborolaw.com

               - and -

          Andrew H. Brown, Esq.
          James R. Faucher, Esq.
          BROWN, FAUCHER, PERALDO & BENSON, PLLC
          822 N. Elm Street Suite 200
          Greensboro, NC 27401
          Telephone (336) 478-6000
          E-mail: drew@greensborolawcenter.com
                  james@greensborolawcenter.com


LOANCARE, LLC: Court Denies Unopposed Class Certification Bid
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as Andrea S. Sanders, the
Plaintiff  et al. vs. LoanCare, LLC, the Defendant, Case No.
2:18-cv-09376-SJO-RAO (C.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge S. James Otero
entered an order denying Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for class
certification and preliminary approval of settlement agreement
filed August 16, 2019.

According to the civil minutes, LoanCare, LLC does not oppose the
Motion. The Court found this matter suitable for disposition
without oral argument and vacated the hearing set for September 16,
2019.

The putative class action centers on allegations that LoanCare
charged consumers Online Payment Fees despite receiving no express
authorization from consumers' deeds of trust or promissory notes
securing their residential mortgages. The Plaintiffs assert that
LoanCare's fees violate California's Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act and California's Unfair Competition Law.[CC]

LONG BEACH HEALTHCARE: Underpays Nursing Assistants, Herrera Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CARMELINA HERRERA on behalf of herself, all aggrieved employees,
and the State of California as a Private Attorneys General, the
Plaintiffs, vs. LONG BEACH HEALTHCARE, LLC, a California limited
liability company, and DOES 1-50, inclusive, the Defendants, Case
No. 19STCV32913 (Cal. Super., Sept. 13, 2019), alleges that
Defendants enforce multiple policies that violate California Labor
Code state, which are intended to increase profits to the detriment
of aggrieved employees.

The Defendants have had a consistent policy and/or practice of:
failing to pay for all hours worked, including overtime hours
worked; failing to timely pay all wages owed; failing to provide
rest breaks; failing to provide compliant off-duty meal breaks; and
failing to provide accurate wage statements and maintain accurate
payroll records, the lawsuit says.

The Plaintiff worked as a certified nursing assistant for
Defendants.

Long Beach Healthcare, LLC, is a 24-hour skilled nursing and
rehabilitation facility.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff are:

          Nazo Koutloukian, Esq.
          E-mail: nazo@koullaw.com
          KOUL LAW FIRM
          3435 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1710
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Telephone: (213) 761-5484
          Facsimile: (818) 561-3938

               - and -

          Sahag Majarian, II, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF SAHAG MAJARIAN II
          18250 Ventura Blvd.
          Tarzana, CA 91356
          Telephone: (818)609-0807
          Facsimile: (818)609-0892
          E-mail: Sahagii@aol.com

LOYAL 9 MARKERTING: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Abante Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------
ABANTE ROOTER AND PLUMBING INC., individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. LOYAL 9 MARKETING, LLC; and
DOES 1 through 10, Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-05607 (N.D. Cal.,
Sept. 5, 2019), seeks to stop the Defendants' practice of making
unsolicited calls.

Loyal 9 Marketing, LLC is engaged in the business advertising and
marketing industry. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: (323) 306-4243
          Facsimile: (866) 633-0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                  abacon@toddflaw.com


LUXOTTICA: Failed to Reimburse Work-Related Expenses, Gil Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
Candido Lara Gil, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Luxottica of America, Inc.,
formerly known as Luxottica Retail North America, Inc., d/b/a
Sunglass Hut, a California Corporation, and DOES 1 to 50,
inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. 19STCV32413 (Cal. Super., Sept.
11, 2019), alleges that Defendant failed to reimburse its current
and former employees for their work-related business cell phone
expenses in violation of the California Labor Code.

Luxottica employed Plaintiff as a manager. The Plaintiff worked
from April 2016 to June 2019 during which he and the other
Aggrieved Employees were not reimbursed for all business expenses
incurred while carrying out their job duties in California.

Luxottica sells 40+ brands of eyewear and retail products.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and the Aggrieved Employees are:

          Craig J. Ackermann, Esq.
          ACKERMANN & TILAJEF, P.C.
          1180 South Beverly Drive, Suite 610
          Los Angeles, CA 90035
          Telephone: (310) 277-0614
          Facsimile: (310) 277-0635
          E-mail: cja@ackermanntilajef.com

               - and -

          Alain V. Bonavida, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF ALAIN V. BONA VIDA
          433 North Camden Drive, Sixth Floor
          Beverly Hills, CA 90210
          Telephone: (310) 552-8292
          Facsimile: (310)362-8441
          E-mail: alain@avbesq.com

LVNV FUNDING: Settlement in Elliott Suit Gets Prelim. Approval
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANTHONY ELLIOTT, Plaintiff, v. LVNV FUNDING, LLC,
Defendant, Civil Action No. 3:16-cv-00675-RGJ (W.D. Ky.), Judge
Rebecca Grady Jennings of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Kentucky, Louisville Division, granted the Settling
Parties' Renewed Joint Motion for Certification of Settlement Class
and Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement Agreement.

LVNV is engaged in the business of purchasing debts from creditors
and collecting these debts.  Mr. Elliott filed a Class Action
Complaint on behalf of himself and two classes, arguing that LVNV
has a "pattern and practice" of collecting court costs, processing
fees, and other collection expenses pursuant to judgments it
obtained against Kentucky consumers that it has no right to collect
under Kentucky law.  Mr. Elliott seeks relief related to LVNV's
alleged violations of the FDCPA as they apply to two classes of
people: (1) those people against whom LVNV had illegally sought to
collect court costs, and (2) those people against whom LVNV had
illegally tried to collect garnishment fees.

After negotiating at arm's length for more than five months, Mr.
Elliott and LVNV filed their Joint Motion, requesting that the
Court certifies a "Prejudgment Court Costs Class" and a "Judgment
Lien Filing Fee and Garnishment Fee Class."  The Court denied the
Joint Motion without prejudice, finding that the proposed
settlement agreement was not fair, reasonable, and adequate and
that the proposed notice was inadequate.

The Settling Parties filed the Renewed Motion, attaching a Revised
Class Action Settlement Agreement, and Revised Notice of Class
Action Lawsuit and Proposed Settlement.  The Revised Settlement
Agreement would create two classes: "Class I: Prejudgment Court
Costs Class" and "Class II: Judgment Lien Filing Fee and
Garnishment Fee Class."  Class I encompasses those against whom
LVNV sought to collect prejudgment court costs without filing a
bill of costs itemizing the prejudgment court costs.  Class II
encompasses those against whom LVNV tried to collect a
"post-judgment filing fee paid by LVNV to file a Notice of Judgment
Lien Upon Real Estate" and/or a "post-judgment garnishment fee."

The settlement agreement refunds all allegedly improper amounts
that LVNV sought or collected from the class members.
Additionally, LVNV will provide class members an additional account
credit.  Thus, pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, no class
member will have paid more than the Plaintiff alleges they should
have paid, and all class members will receive cash or credit
against their judgments.  The settlement essentially removes the
amounts the Plaintiff claims were improperly added to the judgment
balances and makes the class members whole.

More specifically, members of both classes would both receive an
amount equal to the "prejudgment court costs and/or post-judgment
fees" LVNV has collected, or sought to collect, from them, either
in the form of a credit to their account with LVNV, or, if they no
longer have an account with LVNV, in cash.  Both classes would also
receive $75 in statutory damages.

In a section entitled "Release," the Revised Settlement Agreement
provides that in exchange for the detailed benefits, the members of
both Classes would forever release LVNV and its Related Parties1
from any and all claims and causes of action, whether known or
unknown, that were made or could have been made in the Action
arising out of or related in any way to LVNV's efforts to collect
on the Judgments, including but not limited to those claims arising
under the FDCPA or any state statute or rule of procedure.

Judge Jennings granted the Renewed Joint Motion.  She preliminarily
approved the Action as a class action for settlement purposes only,
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3).  

For settlement purposes only, she conditionally certified the
classes of persons described in the Revised Settlement Agreement
and defined as:

     (a) Class I: Prejudgment Court Costs Class - All consumers
against whom LVNV or its respective predecessors in interest,
agents, employees, attorneys, or representatives, filed a lawsuit
in Kentucky, obtained a judgment against the consumer, and
attempted to collect or did collect via a post-judgment garnishment
between Oct. 27, 2015, and the date the Court signs the order
preliminarily approving the Revised Settlement Agreement,
prejudgment court costs from the consumer without filing a bill of
costs itemizing the prejudgment court costs LVNV attempted to
recover, or actually recovered.  Members of Class I include
consumers against whom LVNV actually collected prejudgment court
costs without filing a bill of costs itemizing the costs recovered
from the consumer and those consumers whom LVNV attempted to, but
did not collect prejudgment court costs without filing a bill of
costs itemizing the costs sought to be recovered from the
consumer.

     (b) Class II: Judgment Lien Filing Fee and Garnishment Fee
Class - All consumers against whom LVNV or its respective
predecessors in interest, agents, employees, attorneys, or
representatives, filed a lawsuit in Kentucky, obtained a judgment
against the consumer, and attempted to collect or did collect via a
post-judgment garnishment between Oct. 27, 2015, and the date the
Court signs the order preliminarily approving the Revised
Settlement Agreement, a post-judgment filing fee paid by LVNV to
file a Notice of Judgment Lien Upon Real Estate pursuant to a
judgment entered against the consumer.  

Members of Class II include consumers against whom LVNV actually
collected a post-judgment filing fee paid by LVNV to file a Notice
of Judgment Lien Upon Real Estate pursuant to a judgment entered
against the consumer and those consumers against whom LVNV
attempted to, but did not collect a post-judgment filing fee paid
by LVNV to file a Notice of Judgment Lien Upon Real Estate pursuant
to a judgment entered against the consumer.  Members of Class II
also include all consumers against whom LVNV filed a lawsuit in
Kentucky, obtained a judgment against the consumer, and attempted
to collect or did collect via a post-judgment garnishment between
Oct. 27, 2015, and the date the Court signs the order preliminarily
approving the Revised Settlement Agreement, a post-judgment
garnishment fee paid by LVNV to either a garnishee or a clerk of
court to file a garnishment to enforce a judgment entered against a
consumer.  This includes consumers against whom LVNV actually
collected a post-judgment garnishment fee paid by LVNV to file a
garnishment to enforce a judgment entered against the consumer and
those consumers against whom LVNV attempted to, but did not collect
a post-judgment garnishment fee paid by LVNV to file a garnishment
to enforce a judgment entered against the consumer.

Plaintiff Anthony Elliott is designated as the representative of
the conditionally certified Classes; and James Hays Lawson, of
Lawson at Law, PLLC, and James McKenzie, of James R. McKenzie
Attorney, PLLC, as the Class Counsel.

A Fairness Hearing will be held on Jan. 28, 2020 at 9:30 a.m.

The submissions of the Parties in support of the settlement,
including the Plaintiff's Counsels' application for Attorneys' Fees
and Expenses and incentive awards, will be filed with the Court no
later than 35 days prior to the Fairness Hearing and may be
supplemented up to seven days prior to the Fairness Hearing.

In consultation with and with the approval of the Plaintiff, LVNV
is authorized to establish the means necessary to administer the
proposed settlement and implement the claim process, in accordance
with the terms of the Revised Settlement Agreement.  LVNV will
provide the Class List to the Class Counsel within 30 days from the
date of the entry of the Order.

The Judge conditionally approved the Revised Notice and the notice
methodology described in the Revised Settlement Agreement in
accordance with the Court's analysis conducted.

Beginning not later than 45 days from the date of entry of the
Order, and to be substantially completed not later than 90 days
before the Fairness Hearing, LVNV will cause to be mailed to each
Class Member the Revised Notice.

At least 10 days prior to the Fairness Hearing, after mailing, the
Class Counsel and the Defendant's Counsel will file with the Court
a notice of mailing the Revised Notice to the Class Members.

No later than 45 days before the date of the Fairness Hearing, any
member of the Settlement Classes who desires to be excluded from
the Settlement Classes must file a written request for exclusion
with the Court and mail the written request for exclusion addressed
to the Class Counsel and LVNV's Counsel as follows: Class Counsel:
James H. Lawson, Esq. Lawson at Law, PLLC 115 S. Sherrin Ave.,
Suite 5 Louisville, KY 40207 James R. McKenzie, Esq. James R.
McKenzie Attorney, PLLC 115 S. Sherrin Ave., Suite 5 Louisville, KY
40207 LVNV's Counsel: Gregory S. Berman Jordan M. White WYATT,
TARRANT & COMBS, LLP 500 West Jefferson Street, Suite 2800
Louisville, Kentucky 40202-2898.

Any Class Member who has not filed a timely written request for
exclusion and who wishes to object to the fairness, reasonableness,
or adequacy of the Revised Settlement Agreement, the award of
Attorneys' Fees and Expenses, or the individual awards to the
Plaintiff, must deliver to the Class Counsel identified in the
Class Notice and to LVNV's Counsel, and file with the Court, no
later than 20 days before the date scheduled for the Fairness
Hearing, or as the Court otherwise may direct.

The dates for performance are as follows:

     a. The Defendants provide the Class List to the Class Counsel
        by Sept. 23, 2019, 30 days from the entry of the Court's
        preliminary approval order

     b. Class Notice Mailing Initiated By Oct. 7, 2019, 45 days
        from entry of the Court's preliminary approval order

     c. Class Notice Mailing Completed By Oct. 30, 2019, not
        later than 90 days before the Fairness Hearing

     d. Deadline for Filing and Serving Requests for Exclusion:
        Dec. 16, 2019, not later than 45 days before the
        Fairness Hearing

     e. Deadline for the filing of Motion for Final Approval
        and other papers in support of Settlement: Dec. 24,
        2019, not later than 35 days before the Fairness Hearing

     f. Deadline for Filing and Serving Objections: Jan. 8,
        2019, not later than 20 days before the Fairness Hearing

     g. The Fairness Hearing will Be Held on Jan. 28, 2020

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2019 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/Hp6eIa from Leagle.com.

Anthony Elliott, Plaintiff, represented by James H. Lawson --
james@kyclc.com -- Lawson at Law, PLLC & James R. McKenzie --
jrmckenzie5@hotmail.com -- James R. McKenzie Attorney, PLLC.

LVNV Funding, LLC, Defendant, represented by Gregory S. Berman --
gberman@wyattfirm.com -- Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs, LLP & Jordan M.
White -- jwhite@wyattfirm.com -- Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs, LLP.


MAYOR WEST: Vizcaino Seeks Overtime Wages for Truck Drivers
-----------------------------------------------------------
EDUARDO VIZCAINO, individually and on behalf all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. MAYOR WEST COAST, LLC, a California
Limited Liability Company; MICHAEL MAYOR, an individual; and DOE
ONE through and including DOE TEN, the Defendants, Case No.
I9STCV32549 (Cal. Super., Sept. 13, 2019), alleges that the
Defendant failed to pay hourly and overtime wages, and to provide
meal periods and rest periods or compensation in lieu thereof under
the California Labor Code.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants in and around Los
Angeles County, California, in a non-exempt capacity to perform
truck driving services.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Alan Harris, Esq.
          David Garrett, Esq.
          Min Ji Gal, Esq.
          HARRIS & RUBLE
          655 North Central Avenue, 17th Floor
          Glendale, CA 91203
          Telephone: 323 962 3777
          Facsimile: 323 962 3004

MCDERMOTT INT'L: Bennett Appeals W.D. La. Ruling to Fifth Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Kendrick Bennett and Courtlande Collins filed an appeal
from a Court ruling entered in their lawsuit entitled Kendrick
Bennett, et al. v. McDermott International, Inc., et al., Case No.
2:19-CV-158, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Louisiana, Lake Charles.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Plaintiffs
sought certification of a class defined as:

    "all individuals who, through a contract with Defendant(s) or
     otherwise, performed work, or were associated with such, for
     Defendant(s) at the Cameron LNG Liquefaction Plant, and who
     have not received full compensation of the minimum wage and
     overtime premiums (collectively "Covered Personnel") at the
     conclusion of their employment with Defendant within the
     three (3) years preceding the commencement of the applicable
     prescriptive period under the Louisiana Wage Payment Act
     through the close of the Court-determined opt-out period."

The Plaintiffs have filed the Class and Collective Action Complaint
as a result of the Defendants' alleged failure to pay the
Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated for compensable time
as employees.

The appellate case is captioned as Kendrick Bennett, et al. v.
McDermott International, Inc., et al., Case No. 19-30763, in the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants KENDRICK BENNETT, individually & on behalf of
all others similarly situated, and COURTLANDE COLLINS, individually
& on behalf of all others similarly situated, are represented by:

          Matthew Seth Sarelson, Esq.
          KAPLAN, YOUNG & MOLL PARRON
          600 Brickell Avenue
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 330-6090
          E-mail: msarelson@kymplaw.com

               - and -

          James Edward Sudduth, III, Esq.
          SUDDUTH & ASSOCIATES, L.L.C.
          4216 Lake Street
          Lake Charles, LA 70605
          Telephone: (337) 480-0101
          Facsimile: (337) 419-0507
          E-mail: james@saa.legal

Defendants-Appellees MCDERMOTT INTERNATIONAL, INCORPORATED, CHIYODA
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, and CB&I, L.L.C. are represented by:

          Christopher Earl Moore, Esq.
          OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.
          701 Poydras Street
          New Orleans, LA 70139
          Telephone: (504) 648-3840
          E-mail: christopher.moore@ogletree.com

Defendant-Appellee CAMERON L N G, L.L.C., is represented by:

          Erin Lutkewitte Kilgore, Esq.
          KEAN MILLER, L.L.P.
          400 Convention Street
          II City Plaza
          Baton Rouge, LA 70802
          Telephone: (225) 387-0999
          E-mail: erin.kilgore@keanmiller.com


MDL 2885: Broussard Suit over Combat Arms Earplugs Consolidated
---------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled CHRISTOPHER JOSEPH BROUSSARD ON
BEHALF OF HIMSELF and ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, the Plaintiff,
v. 3M COMPANY, 3M OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY LLC, AEARO HOLDINGS, LLC,
AEARO INTERMEDIATE, LLC, AEARO, LLC, and AEARO TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
the Defendants, Case No. 6:19-cv-01156, was transferred from the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana , to the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida
(Pensacola) on Sept. 4, 2019. The Northern District of Florida
Court Clerk assigned Case No.3:19-cv-03505-MCR-GRJ to the
proceeding.

The Plaintiffs seek to hold 3M liable for hearing loss or damage
Plaintiffs allegedly suffered while serving variously in the U.S.
military, including during foreign conflicts. The Plaintiff
contends that Combat Arms TM Earplugs, Version 2 ("CAEv2")
manufactured and sold by Aearo were defectively designed and failed
to provide adequate hearing protection.

3M denies these allegations. CAEv2, designed by Aearo in close
collaboration with the U.S. military, represented a revolutionary
breakthrough in hearing protection for service members. CAEv2
helped servicemembers better maintain situational awareness (e.g.,
to hear nearby voice commands) while also maintaining some
protection from gunfire and other higher decibel sounds.  3M claims
CAEv2 met the U.S. military's specifications and helped the
military provide hearing protection to service members.

The Broussard case is being consolidated with MDL 2885 in re: 3M
Combat Arms Earplug Products Liability Litigation. The MDL was
created by Order of the United States Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation on April 3, 2019. These actions share
common factual questions and centralization will eliminate
duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings on
Daubert issues and other pretrial matters; and conserve the
resources of the parties, their counsel, and the judiciary.

In the April 3, 2019 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions in
this MDL involve common questions arising out of allegations that
the Defendants' Combat Arms earplugs were defective, causing
plaintiffs to develop hearing loss and/or tinnitus. Issues
concerning the design, testing, sale, and marketing of the Combat
Arms earplugs are common to all actions. Presiding Judge in the MDL
is Hon. Judge M. Casey Rodgers. The lead case is
3:19-md-02885-MCR-GRJ.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff is:

          Ryan Frederick Aylstock, Esq.
          AYLSTOCK WITKIN KREIS ETC PLLC - PENSACOLA FL
          17 E MAIN ST., STE 200
          Pensacola, FL 32502
          Telephone: (850) 916-7450
          Facsimile: (850) 916-7449
          E-mail: baylstock@awkolaw.com

Counsel for 3M Company are:

          Jay Mathew Mattappally, Esq.
          Stephen G.A. Myers, Esq.
          IRWIN FRITCHIE ET AL
          400 Poydras St Ste 2700
          New Orleans, LA 70130
          Telephone: (504) 310-2210
          Facsimile: (504) 310-2101
          E-mail: jmattappally@irwinllc.com
                  smyers@irwinllc.com

MDL 2885: McDougle Suit over Combat Arms Earplugs Consolidated
--------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled BENJAMIN TYLER MCDOUGLE, on behalf
of himself and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. 3M
COMPANY, 3M OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY LLC, AEARO HOLDINGS, LLC, AEARO
INTERMEDIATE, LLC, AEARO, LLC, and AEARO TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, the
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00115 (Aug. 30, 2019), was transferred
from the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky,
to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida
(Pensacola) on Sept. 18, 2019. The Northern District of Florida
Court Clerk assigned Case No.3:19-cv-03505-MCR-GRJ to the
proceeding.

The Plaintiff seeks to hold 3M liable for hearing loss or damage
Plaintiffs allegedly suffered while serving variously in the U.S.
military, including during foreign conflicts. The Plaintiff
contends that Combat Arms TM Earplugs, Version 2 ("CAEv2")
manufactured and sold by Aearo were defectively designed and failed
to provide adequate hearing protection.

3M denies these allegations. CAEv2, designed by Aearo in close
collaboration with the U.S. military, represented a revolutionary
breakthrough in hearing protection for service members. CAEv2
helped servicemembers better maintain situational awareness (e.g.,
to hear nearby voice commands) while also maintaining some
protection from gunfire and other higher decibel sounds.  3M claims
CAEv2 met the U.S. military's specifications and helped the
military provide hearing protection to service members.

The McDougle case is being consolidated with MDL 2885 in re: 3M
Combat Arms Earplug Products Liability Litigation. The MDL was
created by Order of the United States Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation on April 3, 2019. These actions share
common factual questions and centralization will eliminate
duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings on
Daubert issues and other pretrial matters; and conserve the
resources of the parties, their counsel, and the judiciary.

In the April 3, 2019 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions in
this MDL involve common questions arising out of allegations that
the Defendants' Combat Arms earplugs were defective, causing
plaintiffs to develop hearing loss and/or tinnitus. Issues
concerning the design, testing, sale, and marketing of the Combat
Arms earplugs are common to all actions. Presiding Judge in the MDL
is Hon. Judge M. Casey Rodgers. The lead case is
3:19-md-02885-MCR-GRJ.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          David O'Brien Suetholz, Esq.
          J. Gerrard Stranch, IV, Esq.
          BRANSTETTER, STRANCH & JENNINGS, PLLC
          515 Park Avenue
          Louisville, KY 40208
          Telephone: (502) 636–4333
          E-mail: davids@bsjfirm.com
                  gerards@bsjfirm.com

               - and -

          Bryan Aylstock, Esq.
          AYLSTOCK, WITKIN, KREIS, & OVERHOLTZ, PLLC
          17 E. Main Street, Suite 200
          Pensacola, FL 32502
          Telephone: (850) 202–1010
          Facsimile: (850) 916–7449
          E-mail: baylstock@awkolaw.com

Counsel for 3M Company are:

          Byron N. Miller, Esq.
          THOMPSON MILLER & SIMPSON PLC
          734 West Main Street, Suite 400
          Louisville, KY 40202
          Telephone: (502) 585-9900
          Facsimile: (502) 585-9993
          E-mail: bmiller@tmslawplc.com

               - and -

          Michael J. Bender, Esq.
          THOMPSON MILLER & SIMPSON PLC
          734 West Main Street, Suite 400
          Louisville, KY 40202
          Telephone: (502) 585-9900
          Facsimile: (502) 585-9993
          E-mail: mbender@tmslawplc.com

MIT: Court Partly Allows Summary Judgment Bid in Tracey ERISA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DAVID TRACEY, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. MASSACHUSETTS
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, ET AL., Defendants, Civil Action No.
16-NMG-11620 (D. Mass.), Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Massachusetts allowed in part
and denied in part the Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

The case involves an alleged breach of fiduciary duty by the MIT
with respect to its supervision of its employer-sponsored defined
contribution plan under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act.  It is brought as a putative class action by representatives
of participants and beneficiaries of the MIT Supplemental 401(k)
Plan.

On Aug. 8, 2016, Plaintiffs Tracey, Daniel Guenther, Maria
Nicolson, Corrianne Fogg and Vahik Minaiyan, individually and as
representatives of a class of participants and beneficiaries filed
the action alleging a breach of fiduciary duties and prohibited
transactions under ERISA.

The underlying claims are for a breach of the duty of prudence
(failure to monitor, imprudent investment lineup and excessive
recordkeeping) and prohibited transactions in violation of ERISA.
The Plaintiffs claim that 1) the Defendants breached their
fiduciary duty under 29 U.S.C. Section 1104(a)(1)(A) by failing to
monitor the Plan and retaining imprudent and excessive cost
investment options that enriched Fidelity Investments at the Plan's
expense (Count I); 2) the Defendants breached their fiduciary duty
under 29 U.S.C. Section 1104(a)(1)(A) by allowing Fidelity to
collect excessive recordkeeping and administrative fees (Count II);
3) the Defendants caused the Plan to engage in prohibited
transactions in violation of 29 U.S.C. Section 1106(a) (Count III)
and 4) MIT, as the monitoring fiduciary, failed adequately to
monitor the other defendants to whom it delegated fiduciary
responsibilities (Count IV).

The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and, in August 2017,
Magistrate Judge Bowler issued a Report and Recommendation ("R&R")
in which she recommended: (1) allowance of the motion to dismiss
the duty of loyalty claims but denial of the motion to dismiss the
duty of prudence claims under both Counts I and II; (2) denial of
the motion to dismiss the claim for prohibited transactions
involving assets of the plan under Section 1106(a)(1)(D), allowance
of the motion to dismiss the Section 1106(a)(1)(C) claim arising
from mutual funds in the Plan but denial of the motion to dismiss
as to non-mutual fund options under Count III; and (3) denial of
the motion to dismiss the claims for failure to monitor insofar as
they are derived from the Plaintiffs' other claims under Count IV.

The Session entered a Memorandum and Order in October 2017, that
accepted and adopted the Magistrate Judge's R&R with the exception
that it dismissed the Plaintiffs' prohibited transaction claims
under 29 U.S.C. Section 1106(a)(1)(D) in Count III and the
corresponding derivative claim under Count IV.  With leave of
Court, the Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"),
adding additional Defendants and eliminating certain disloyalty
allegations but otherwise reiterating the counts and theories of
liability and damages that were included in the First Amended
Complaint.

Subsequently, the Court allowed the Plaintiffs' motion to certify a
class of all MIT employees who participated in the subject
retirement plan, excluding the Defendants, from Aug. 9, 2010, to
the date of judgment.  Following class certification, the
Defendants filed a motion to strike the Plaintiff's demand for a
jury trial.  In February 2019, Magistrate Judge Bowler allowed the
motion to strike the jury demand which the Court subsequently
affirmed.  In August, 2019, the Court denied the Plaintiffs' motion
to file a third amended complaint.

Now, the Defendants have now moved for summary judgment on all
remaining claims.

Judge Gorton allowed the Defendants' motion for summary judgment
with respect to the Plaintiffs' claim under 29 U.S.C. Section
1106(a) and the derivative failure to monitor claim.  As for Count
III, the Judge found that the Plaintiffs have proffered no evidence
that the fees specific to the non-mutual fund options were
unreasonable or not subject to the exception in Section 1108(b)(8).
Rather, their sole contention is that the subject non-mutual fund
transactions contributed to the excessive administrative charges in
Count II.  To the extent that the Plaintiffs argue that the
Defendants bear the burden of proof of a Section 1108(b)(8)
exception, the Judge found that MIT has met that burden by offering
unrebutted expert testimony.

As for Count IV, the Judge held that because the parties dispute
the alleged underlying breach of fiduciary duty claims, the
Plaintiffs' derivative claims that the Defendants breached their
duty to monitor will also be preserved for trial.  Accordingly, the
Defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to Count IV is
denied as to the duty of prudence claims arising under Counts I and
II but allowed as to the prohibited transaction claim (Count III)
arising under Section 1106(a).

The Judge otherwise denied the Defendants' motion.  The viable
claims for trial are: (1) breach of the duty of prudence for
failure to monitor (Count I), (2) breach of the duty of prudence
for excessive recordkeeping and administrative fees (Count II) and
(3) the corresponding derivative claims that MIT failed to monitor
its appointed fiduciaries (Count IV).

A pre-trial conference in the case was scheduled last Sept. 11,
2019 at 11:00 a.m., with the bench trial commencing Sept. 16, 2019,
at 9:00 a.m.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 4, 2019 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://is.gd/mC4xcC from Leagle.com.

David Tracey, individually and as representatives of a class of
participants and beneficiaries on behalf of the MIT Supplemental
401(k) Plan, Maria Nicholson, individually and as representatives
of a class of participants and beneficiaries on behalf of the MIT
Supplemental 401(k) Plan & Corrinne Fogg, individually and as
representatives of a class of participants and beneficiaries on
behalf of the MIT Supplemental 401(k) Plan, Plaintiffs, represented
by Alexander L. Braitberg, Schlichter, Bogard & Denton, LLP., pro
hac vice, Elena N. Liveris -- eliveris@mmulderlaw.com -- Law
Offices of Michael M. Mulder, pro hac vice, Joel Rohlf, Schlichter
Bogard & Denton, LLP, pro hac vice, Michael M. Mulder, Law Offices
of Michael M. Mulder, pro hac vice, Scott T. Apking, Schlichter,
Bogard & Denton, LLP, pro hac vice, Scott A. Bumb, Schlichter
Bogard & Denton, LLP, pro hac vice, Sean E. Soyars, Schlichter
Bogard & Denton, LLP, pro hac vice, Stephen S. Churchill --
steve@fairworklaw.com -- Fair Work, P.C., Troy A. Doles --
tdoles@uselaws.com -- Schlichter, Bogard & Denton, LLP, pro hac
vice, Heather Lea -- hlea@uselaws.com -- Schlichter, Bogare &
Denton, LLP, pro hac vice, Jerome J. Schlichter
--jschlichter@uselaws.com -- Schlicher, Bogard & Denton, pro hac
vice, Michael A. Wolff -- mwolff@uselaws.com -- Schlichter, Bogard
& Denton, LLP, pro hac vice, Rachel J. Smit, Fair Work, P.C. & kurt
C. Struckhoff -- kstruckhoff@uselaws.com -- Schlichter, Bogard &
Denton LLP, pro hac vice.

Daniel Guenther, individually and as representatives of a class of
participants and beneficiaries on behalf of the MIT Supplemental
401(k) Plan, Plaintiff, represented by Alexander L. Braitberg,
Schlichter, Bogard & Denton, LLP, pro hac vice, Elena N. Liveris,
Law Offices of Michael M. Mulder, pro hac vice, Joel Rohlf,
Schlichter Bogard & Denton, LLP, pro hac vice, Michael M. Mulder,
Law Offices of Michael M. Mulder, pro hac vice, Scott T. Apking,
Schlichter, Bogard & Denton, LLP, pro hac vice, Scott A. Bumb,
Schlichter Bogard & Denton, LLP, pro hac vice, Sean E. Soyars,
Schlichter Bogard & Denton, LLP, pro hac vice, Stephen S.
Churchill, Fair Work, P.C., Troy A. Doles, Schlichter, Bogard &
Denton, LLP, pro hac vice, Heather Lea, Schlichter, Bogare &
Denton, LLP, pro hac vice, Jerome J. Schlichter, Schlicher, Bogard
& Denton, pro hac vice, Michael A. Wolff, Schlichter, Bogard &
Denton, LLP, pro hac vice & kurt C. Struckhoff, Schlichter, Bogard
& Denton LLP, pro hac vice.

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Defendant, represented by
Alison V. Douglass , Goodwin Procter, LLP, Brian D. Boyle --
bboyle@omm.com -- O'Melveny & Myers, LLP, pro hac vice, Catalina J.
Vergara -- cvergara@omm.com -- O'Melveny & Myers LLP, pro hac vice,
Deanna M. Rice -- derice@omm.com -- O'Melveny & Myers LLP, pro hac
vice, Gregory F. Jacob -- gjacob@omm.com -- O'Melveny & Myers LLP,
pro hac vice, Jeffrey A.N. Kopczynski -- jkopczynski@omm.com --
O'Melveny & Myers LLP, pro hac vice, Meaghan VerGow --
mvergow@omm.com -- O'Melveny & Myers LLP, pro hac vice, Natasha S.
Fedder -- nfedder@omm.com -- O'Melveny & Myers LLP, pro hac vice,
Raghav Ahuja, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, pro hac vice, Shannon M.
Barrett, O'Melveny & Myers, LLP, pro hac vice, Angelica Rankins,
Goodwin Procter LLP, Roberto M. Braceras, Goodwin Procter, LLP &
Stuart M. Sarnoff -- ssarnoff@omm.com -- OMelveny & Myers LLP, pro
hac vice.

The MIT Supplemental 401(K) Plan Oversight Committee, The
Administrative Committee, Israel Ruiz, Marc Bernstein, Glenn David
Ellison, S.P. Kothari, Lorraine Goffe-Rush, Glen Shor, Pamela
Weldon, Thomas Wieand & Barton Zwiebach, Defendants, represented by
Brian D. Boyle, O'Melveny & Myers, LLP, pro hac vice, Catalina J.
Vergara, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, pro hac vice, Deanna M. Rice ,
O'Melveny & Myers LLP, pro hac vice, Gregory F. Jacob, O'Melveny &
Myers LLP, pro hac vice, Jeffrey A.N. Kopczynski, O'Melveny & Myers
LLP, pro hac vice, Meaghan VerGow, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, pro hac
vice, Natasha S. Fedder, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, pro hac vice,
Shannon M. Barrett, O'Melveny & Myers, LLP, pro hac vice, Alison V.
Douglass, Goodwin Procter, LLP & Stuart M. Sarnoff, OMelveny &
Myers LLP, pro hac vice.

Gunther Roland, Defendant, represented by Brian D. Boyle, O'Melveny
& Myers, LLP, pro hac vice, Catalina J. Vergara, O'Melveny & Myers
LLP, pro hac vice, Deanna M. Rice , O'Melveny & Myers LLP, pro hac
vice, Gregory F. Jacob, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, pro hac vice,
Jeffrey A.N. Kopczynski, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, pro hac vice,
Meaghan VerGow, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, pro hac vice, Natasha S.
Fedder, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, pro hac vice, Shannon M. Barrett,
O'Melveny & Myers, LLP, pro hac vice, Alison V. Douglass, Goodwin
Procter, LLP & Stuart M. Sarnoff, OMelveny & Myers LLP, pro hac
vice.

Martin Kelly, Robert C. Merton, Alison Alden & Lawrence Candell,
Defendants, represented by Brian D. Boyle, O'Melveny & Myers, LLP,
pro hac vice, Catalina J. Vergara, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, pro hac
vice, Deanna M. Rice , O'Melveny & Myers LLP, pro hac vice, Gregory
F. Jacob, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, pro hac vice, Jeffrey A.N.
Kopczynski, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, pro hac vice, Meaghan VerGow,
O'Melveny & Myers LLP, pro hac vice, Natasha S. Fedder, O'Melveny &
Myers LLP, pro hac vice, Shannon M. Barrett, O'Melveny & Myers,
LLP, pro hac vice, Alison V. Douglass, Goodwin Procter, LLP &
Stuart M. Sarnoff, OMelveny & Myers LLP, pro hac vice.

Michael Howard, Defendant, represented by Brian D. Boyle, O'Melveny
& Myers, LLP, Catalina J. Vergara, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, pro hac
vice, Deanna M. Rice, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, pro hac vice, Jeffrey
A.N. Kopczynski, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, pro hac vice, Meaghan
VerGow, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, Natasha S. Fedder, O'Melveny & Myers
LLP, pro hac vice, Raghav Ahuja, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, pro hac
vice, Shannon M. Barrett, O'Melveny & Myers, LLP & Alison V.
Douglass, Goodwin Procter, LLP.

Abigail P. Johnson & FMR LLC, Movants, represented by James R.
Carroll, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP & Mary Estelle
Grinman, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP.

Mercer, Third Party Witness, represented by Christopher J. Boran,
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, pro hac vice, Siobhan E. Mee, Morgan,
Lewis & Bockius LLP & Keri L. Engelman, Morgan Lewis & Bockius
LLP.


NEW MEXICO: Court Dismisses Garcia Prisoner's Suit
--------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico
issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order dismissing the Prisoner'S Pro
Se Complaint in the case captioned JESSE L. GARCIA, Plaintiff, v.
THE LAW OFFICES OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER, JOHN/DOE, OR JANE/DOE, AND
ROGER BARGAS, CONTRACT ATTORNEY,/THOMAS BENAVIDEZ, CONTRACT
ATTORNEY, AND JAMSHID ASKAR SR, PUBLIC DEFENDER, SUSANA MARTINEZ
GOVERNOR FOR NEW MEXICO, AND THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO, JOHN DOE/OR
JANE-DOE, AND SANTESTEVAN WARDEN FOR L.C.C.F INDIVIDUALLY AND IN
THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES, Defendants. No. CV 18-01161 RB/KRS.
(D.N.M.).

This matter is before the Court under 28 U.S.C. Section 1915A, 28
U.S.C. Section 1915(e)(2)(B) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) on the Complaint filed by Plaintiff Jesse L. Garcia.

Plaintiff is a prisoner incarcerated at the Lea County Correctional
Facility (L.C.C.F.). He was charged with 16 counts of forgery in
State of New Mexico case no. D-1010-CR-2012-00017. He seeks to have
the case proceed as a class action. Plaintiff Garcia prays for
relief:

Ordering Defendants to pay punitive and compensatory damages.
Systematict change to the Public Defenders Dept. in as to the
Attorney Contract System. To be released from prison, and that my
case be vacated or set aside. Awarding Plaintiffs the reasonable
costs and expenses of their action, including attorney's fees.

THE LAW REGARDING FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis.  The Court
has the discretion to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint sua
sponte for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted under either Rule 12(b)(6) or 28 U.S.C. Section
1915(e)(2)(B). Under Rule 12(b)(6) the Court must accept all
well-pled factual allegations, but not conclusory, unsupported
allegations, and may not consider matters outside the pleading. The
court may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to
state a claim if it is patently obvious' that the plaintiff could
not prevail on the facts alleged. A plaintiff must allege enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A
claim should be dismissed where it is legally or factually
insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief.

THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A Section 1983 CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIM

Section 1983 is the exclusive vehicle for vindication of
substantive rights under the United States Constitution.  Section
1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage of any State  subjects or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law.

To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, a
plaintiff must assert acts by government officials acting under
color of law that result in a deprivation of rights secured by the
United States Constitution. There must be a connection between
official conduct and violation of a constitutional right. Conduct
that is not connected to a constitutional violation is not
actionable under Section 1983.  

Plaintiff Does Not Allege Any Actionable Conduct by the Warden

In his Complaint, Plaintiff names as a Defendant Santestevan,
Warden for L.C.C.F. Plaintiff states that Defendant, Santestevan,
Warden of L.C.C.F. is only named because I am incarcerated at
L.C.C.F. He does not allege that Warden Santestevan engaged in any
conduct, at all, much less any conduct in violation of his
constitutional rights. Nor does the Complaint allege any claim
against Warden Santestevan or L.C.C.F. for vicarious liability or
entity liability. The Complaint fails to state any claim for relief
against Warden Santestevan or L.C.C.F., and any alleged claims
against them will be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and
Section 1915(e)(2)(B).

Public Defenders Do Not Act Under Color of State Law.

Plaintiff names as Defendants Roger Bargas, Thomas Benavidez,
Jamshid Askar, and John and/or Jane Doe public defender, attorneys
that represented him in his state court criminal proceedings.  

Section 1983 states:

Every person who, under color of any statue, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State, Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law.

Plaintiff contends that his appointed criminal defense attorneys
were ineffective in their representation of him. He makes no
allegations against the defense attorneys other than that they were
performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel in the state
criminal proceeding. His claims are all based on allegations
regarding the functions of counsel in his criminal case, and, to
the extent his claims against the defense attorneys arise out of
their representation of him, they cannot be sued under Section 1983
because they did not act under color of state law.

The Complaint fails to state any Section 1983 claim for relief
against Defendants Bargas, Benavidez, Askar, John Doe or Jane Doe.

The State is not a person for purposes of Section 1983.

Plaintiff also names the State of New Mexico, the Law Offices of
the Public Defender, and Governor Susana Martinez as Defendants.
Section 1983 is a remedial vehicle for raising claims based on the
violation of constitutional rights. It does not abrogate the
states' sovereign immunity and neither the states nor their
agencies qualify as persons under Section 1983. The State is not a
person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and, therefore,
there is no remedy against the State under Section 1983. Claims
against the State of New Mexico and its agencies, as well as
official capacity claims against its officials, must be dismissed.
  
The Complaint does not make any factual allegations against the
State of New Mexico. Plaintiff fails to state any claims against
the State of New Mexico, the New Mexico Public Defender's Offices,
and Governor Susana Martinez; thus, the claims will be dismissed.


Plaintiff Jesse L. Garcia's Complaint is dismissed with prejudice
for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(e)(2)(B).

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 23, 2019
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available
https://tinyurl.com/y2kpagdf from Leagle.com.

Jesse L. Garcia, Plaintiff, pro se.

Law Offices of the Public Defender & Jamshid Askar, Sr., Public
Defender, Defendants, represented by Mark F. Swanson , New Mexico
Attorney General.


NEW YORK: Court Denies Bid for Prelim Injunction in F.F. Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, F.F. ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILDREN, Y.F., E.F. Y.F.;
M. & T. M. ON BEHALF OF THEIR MINOR CHILDREN, C.M. and B.M.; E.W.,
ON BEHALF OF HIS MINOR SON, D.W.; RABBI M., IN BEHALF OF HIS MINOR
CHILDREN I.F.M., M.M. & C.M.; M.H. ON BEHALF OF W.G.; C.O., ON
BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILDREN, C.O., M.O., Z.O. and Y.O.; Y. & M. ON
BEHALF OF THEIR MINOR CHILDREN M.G., P.G., M.G., S.G., F.G. and
C.G.; J.M. ON BEHALF OF HIS MINOR CHILDREN C.D.M. & M.Y.M.; J.E.,
ON BEHALF OF HIS MINOR CHILDREN, P.E., M.E., S.E., D.E., F.E. and
E.E.; C.B. & D.B., ON BEHALF OF THEIR MINOR CHILDREN, M.M.B. and
R.A.B.; T.F., ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILDREN, E.F., H.F. and D.F.;
L.C., ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILD, M.C.; R.K., ON BEHALF OF HER
MINOR CHILD, M.K.; R.S. & D.S. ON BEHALF OF THEIR MINOR CHILDREN,
E.S. and S.S.; J.M. ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILDREN, S.M. & A.M.;
F.H., ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILDREN, A.H., H.H. and A.H.; M.E. ON
BEHALF OF HIS MINOR CHILDREN, M.E. & P.E.; D.B., ON BEHALF OF HER
MINOR CHILDREN, W.B., L.B. & L.B.; R.B., ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR
CHILD, J.B.; L.R., ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILD, E.R.; G.F., ON
BEHALF OF HIS MINOR CHILDREN, C.F. & A.F.; D.A., ON BEHALF OF HER
MINOR CHILDREN, A.A. & A.A.; T.R., ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILDREN,
S.R. and F.M.; B.N., ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILDREN, A.N., J.N. &
M.N.; M.K., ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILD, A.K.; L.B., ON BEHALF OF
HER MINOR CHILDREN, B.B., A.B. & S.B.; A.V.M., ON BEHALF OF HER
MINOR CHILDREN, B.M. and G.M.; N.L., ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR
CHILDREN, H.L. and G.L.; L.G., ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILDREN,
M.C. and C.C.; L.L., ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILD, B.L.; C.A., ON
BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILDREN, A.A., Y.M.A., Y.A. and M.A.; K.W., ON
BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILD, K.W.; B.K., ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR
CHILDREN, N.K., S.K., R.K. and L.K.; W.E. and C.E., ON BEHALF OF
THEIR MINOR CHILD, A.E.; R.J. & A.J., ON BEHALF OF THEIR MINOR
CHILD, A.J.; S.Y. and Y.B., ON BEHALF OF THEIR MINOR CHILDREN, I.B.
and J.B.; T.H., ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILD, J.H.; K.T., ON BEHALF
OF HER MINOR CHILDREN, A.J.T. & A.J.T.; L.M., ON BEHALF OF HER
MINOR CHILD, M.M., D.Y.B., ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILD, S.B.;
A.M., ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILD, G.M.; F.M., ON BEHALF OF HIS
THREE MINOR CHILDREN, A.M.M., D.M.M. and K.M.M.; H.M., ON BEHALF OF
HER MINOR CHILD, R.M.; M.T. & R.T., ON BEHALF OF THEIR MINOR CHILD
R.T.; E.H., ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILDREN M.M.S.N. and L.Y.N.,
RABBI M.B. ON BEHALF OF HIS MINOR CHILD, S.B. and S.L. & J.F. ON
BEHALF OF THEIR MINOR CHILD C.L., A-M.P., ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR
CHILD, M.P.; R.L., ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILDREN, G.L., A.L. and
M.L.; N.B., ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILD, M.A.L.; B.C., ON BEHALF
OF HER MINOR CHILD, E.H. and J.S. and W.C., ON BEHALF OF THEIR
MINOR CHILDREN, M.C. and N.C., S.L., ON BEHALF OF HIS THREE MINOR
CHILDREN, A.L., A.L. and A.L., L. M., ON BEHALF OF HER TWO MINOR
CHILDREN, M.M. and M.M., N.H., ON BEHALF OF HIS THREE MINOR
CHILDREN, J.H., S.H. and A.H., ON THEIR OWN BEHALVES and ON BEHALF
OF THOUSANDS OF SIMILARLY-SITUATED PARENTS and CHILDREN IN THE
STATE OF NEW YORK, Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF NEW YORK; ANDREW CUOMO,
GOVERNOR; LETITIA JAMES, ATTORNEY GENERAL, Defendants, Case No.
4108-19 (N.Y. Sup.), Judge Denise A. Hartman of the Supreme Court,
Albany County, denied Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction enjoining enforcement of the legislative repeal of New
York's allowed religious exemption for school children from
mandatory vaccinations.

New York's Public Health Law mandates that every parent or guardian
of a child will have administered to such child an adequate dose or
doses of an immunizing agent against poliomyelitis, mumps, measles,
diptheria, rubella, varicella, Haemophilus influenzae type b(Hib),
pertussis, tetanus, pneumococcal disease, and hepatitis B, which
meet federal and state standards and specifications.  The statute
provides generally that a child may not be admitted or attend a
"school" in the State without a certificate from a health care
provider or other proof that the child has received the mandated
vaccine.

Before June 13, 2019, New York's Public Health Law provided for two
types of exemptions: a medical exemption, where a physician
certifies that immunization "may be detrimental to a child's
health"; and a non-medical, religious exemption, where parents or
guardians "hold genuine and sincere religious beliefs which are
contrary" to the required vaccinations.  However, on June 13, 2019,
the Legislature repealed the provision authorizing non-medical,
religious exemptions.

The Plaintiffs commenced the action on or about July 10, 2019, to
challenge the constitutionality and legality of legislation,
enacted June 13, 2019, which repealed New York's Public Health Law
provision allowing religious exemptions from mandatory vaccinations
for children who attend most public and private schools in the
State of New York.  The named Plaintiffs are parents of diverse
religious beliefs who had obtained a religious exemption or who had
qualified for a religious exemption from mandatory vaccinations.  

Seeking to litigate the case as a class action, the Plaintiffs
claim that New York's repeal of the religious exemption was based
on religious discrimination and violates their rights to free
exercise of religion under the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article 1, Section 3 of the New York Constitution.
They also claim that the repeal violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution and forces plaintiffs to
engage in compelled speech or violate New York's compulsory
education laws.

On July 12, 2019, the Supreme Court denied the Plaintiffs' request
for a temporary restraining order.  The Plaintiffs now seek a
preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of the legislative
repeal of the religious exemption.

Given the long line of cases upholding the exercise of the State's
police power to require children to be vaccinated before they may
attend public and private schools, Judge Hartman does not, at this
early stage of the litigation, see a path for the Plaintiffs to
succeed on the merits.  She is therefore constrained to deny the
Plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction, and to allow the
legislative policy choice to repeal the religious exemption to
remain in effect.

The Plaintiffs only briefly developed their claims that the repeal
of the religious exemption violates the Equal Protection Clause and
requires them to engage in compelled speech or violate the State's
compulsory education laws.  The Judge finds that they have failed
to demonstrate a likelihood of success on those claims.  The
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on any
claim that the repeal violates their equal protection rights
because the mandatory vaccination requirements are not being
adequately enforced by school officials.  AS for the Plaintiffs'
claim that the repeal of the religious exemption compels speech
because they will be forced to home school their children, the
record at this stage does not disclose potential mechanisms for
home schooling children or otherwise develop this argument.  The
Plaintiffs have come nowhere near establishing a likelihood of
success on this claim.

For these reasons, Judge Hartman denied the Plaintiffs' motion for
a preliminary injunction.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/35ftJK from Leagle.com.

Sussman & Associates Michael H. Sussman --
info_sussman1@frontier.com -- of Counsel, PO Box 1005, Goshen, New
York 10924, Attorneys for Plaintiffs.

Letitia James, Attorney General of the State of New York, Helena
Lynch, of Counsel The Capitol Albany, New York 12224-0341,
Attorneys for Defendants.


NISSAN NORTH: Kemp Files Product Liability Suit in Tennessee
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Nissan North America,
Inc. et al. The case is styled as Lakeita Kemp individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Nissan North
America, Inc., Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., Defendant, Case No.
3:19-cv-00854 (M.D. Tenn., Sept. 27, 2019).

The nature of suit is stated as 355 Motor Vehicle Prod. Liability.

Nissan North America Inc. operates in the automotive industry. The
Company designs, develops, and manufactures Nissan vehicles and
distributes them through dealers in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Benjamin A. Gastel, Esq.
     James Gerard Stranch, IV, Esq.
     Branstetter, Stranch & Jennings, PLLC
     The Freedom Center
     223 Rosa L. Parks Avenue, Suite 200
     Nashville, TN 37203
     Phone: (615) 254-8801
     Fax: (615) 255-5419
     Email: beng@bsjfirm.com
            gerards@bsjfirm.com

          - and -

     Lisa M. La Fornara, Esq.
     Lynn A. Toops, Esq.
     Email: ltoops@cohenandmalad.com
            llafornara@cohenandmalad.com



NOBLES COUNTY, MN: Court Affirms Temporary Injunction in Esparza
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of Minnesota issued an Opinion affirming the
District Court's judgment granting Plaintiffs' Temporary Injunction
in the case captioned Rodrigo Esparza, et al., Respondents, v.
Nobles County, et al., Appellants. No. A18-2011. (Minn. App.).

Appellants Nobles County (county) and Kent Wilkening (sheriff) seek
review of an order granting a temporary injunction that precludes
appellants from detaining individuals, after their release from
state custody, on behalf of United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) without an arrest by an immigration officer or a
valid arrest warrant under Minnesota law.

Respondents filed a putative class-action complaint and sought a
temporary injunction on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated, alleging that appellants' practice of detaining
individuals after their release from state custody is a new seizure
under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
article I, section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution, and is
unauthorized under Minnesota law.

Appellants challenge the district court's determination that
respondents are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims.

The district court has broad discretion to grant or deny a
temporary injunction, and appellate courts will reverse only for
clear abuse of that discretion. A district court's grant of a
temporary injunction serves only to maintain the status quo until a
case can be decided on the merits and neither establishes the law
of the case nor constitutes an adjudication of the issues on the
merits.

Five factors guide a district court's decision to issue a temporary
injunction. These factors are (1) the relationship and background
of the relationship between the parties before the dispute (2) the
balancing of harms to both parties (3) the likelihood of the
plaintiff's success on the merits (4) public policy considerations
expressed in state and federal statutes and (5) any administrative
burdens involved in judicial enforcement of the temporary
injunction.

The district court did not clearly abuse its discretion by granting
respondents' motion for temporary injunctive relief

Appellants argue that respondents cannot succeed on the merits of
their claim as a matter of law. The parties discuss two issues
central to the likelihood of respondents' success on the merits:
(A) whether appellants' detention of an individual after release
from state custody is a new seizure under the Fourth Amendment; and
(B) if the continued detention is a seizure, whether state or
federal law authorize appellants to do so based on an ICE detainer
and warrant.  

Whether appellants seized respondents anew after they were released
from state custody
Appellants assert that the transfer of an individual from state
custody to ICE custody is not a new seizure by the county, and
therefore the transfer does not require a warrant or a new
probable-cause determination. Appellants contend that the custodial
transfer from state custody to ICE custody is a mere
reclassification of the processed individuals already in custody.

Respondents argue that the county's continued detention of an
individual after release from state custody is a new arrest, and
therefore requires arrest authority and probable cause. This issue
is a question of first impression for Minnesota courts.

The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable
searches and seizures. The ultimate test to be used in determining
whether a suspect was under arrest is whether a reasonable person
would have concluded, under the circumstances, that he was under
arrest and not free to go.

Here, the district court concluded that respondents would likely
succeed on the merits of their claim that appellants' continued
detention of respondents was a seizure. Under Minnesota law, but
for the appellants' practice of continuing detention after
receiving an ICE detainer and warrant, respondents would have been
free to go because each had been released from state custody.  

Appellants concede that they held respondents after their release
from state custody, which is analogous to the situations in
Morales, Lunn, and Wells, all cases that concluded similar
detentions were seizures.  Morales, 793 F.3d at 213l, plaintiff
held in state jail on ICE detainer after being released from
criminal custody,  Lunn, 78 N.E.3d at 1148, plaintiff held by court
officers on ICE detainer after district court dismissed his
criminal charges, Wells, 168 A.D.3d at 40, plaintiff held in county
jail on ICE detainer and warrant after being released from state
custody.

This caselaw supports the district court's decision that
respondents are likely to prevail on the first issue.

The Court also observe that the jail's own practice of serving ICE
detainers and warrants on respondents before their release from
state custody assumes a new probable-cause justification is needed
for their continued detention. The ICE warrant states that an ICE
officer has determined that there is probable cause to believe that
respondent] is removable from the United States.

Still, appellants contend that they have avoided a new seizure of
respondents because the housing contract establishes ICE custody
immediately. But the housing contract provides that appellants can
only receive ICE detainees from properly identified ICE personnel
or other properly identified Federal law enforcement officials.
Cases cited by appellants underscore this point because they hold
that no new seizure occurs when an ICE agent holds and transports
an individual.  

The Court concludes that the district court did not clearly abuse
its discretion in determining that respondents are likely to
prevail on the issue that appellants' continued detention of
respondents after their release from state custody is a new
seizure.

Whether state or federal law authorize appellants to seize
respondents based on ICE detainers and warrants

Appellants argue that, even if the county's detention and transfer
of respondents to ICE custody is a new seizure, local officers can
do so based on ICE detainers and warrants because other courts have
upheld ICE arrest warrants as valid warrants that are supported by
probable cause and constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.

Respondents argue that the constitutional validity of the ICE
detainers and warrants when executed by federal immigration
officers is irrelevant because neither state nor federal law
authorizes appellants to continue detention based on these
documents, or to make warrantless arrests for civil immigration
violations.

The constitutional validity of ICE detainers and warrants when
executed by federal immigration officers is established. In Abel v.
United States, ICE's predecessor, INS, arrested the plaintiff in a
hotel room because it believed he was an illegal alien and
suspected him of espionage. 362 U.S. 217, 221, 80 S.Ct. 683, 688
(1960). The United States Supreme Court held that INS's arrest
procedure fully complied with the statute and regulations at issue
and did not violate the Fourth Amendment.  

The Court agrees with respondents, however, that Abel does not
address the central issue in this case. The parties contest whether
respondents are likely to prevail on their claim that neither state
nor federal law authorize appellants to seize respondents based on
ICE detainers and warrants.

The Court first address state law and, second, consider federal
law.

State law

Appellants recognize that their continued detention of respondents
on immigration violations is not a criminal detention, but a civil
immigration detention.Minnesota law generally provides that peace
officers may seize an individual with or without a warrant only as
authorized by state statute.  

Minnesota statutes permit state and local officers to conduct
administrative searches and seizures both with and without a
warrant, but only in certain circumstances. First, for civil
seizures with a warrant, most statutes require a judge to issue a
warrant or order and follow statutory criteria. Based on our review
and the detailed written submissions of these parties and several
amici curiae, the Court concludes that no Minnesota statute
explicitly authorizes state and local officers to seize an
individual for an immigration violation with or without a warrant.

Appellants concede that there is no explicit Minnesota Statute
authorizing or prohibiting local authorities from executing an ICE
arrest warrant, but then cite two statutes, arguing that they
implicitly permit a state officer to cooperate with ICE and enforce
an ICE detainer and warrant. The Court concludes that neither
statute is relevant.

Based on our review of Minnesota Statutes and the arguments
presented by the parties, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that respondents are likely to succeed on
their claim that Minnesota Statutes do not authorize appellants to
seize respondents with or without an ICE detainer and warrant.

Federal law

Appellants argue that even if Minnesota law does not expressly
permit state and local officers to detain individuals for civil
immigration violations, they are permitted to do so under federal
law, which authorizes state and local officers to cooperate with
ICE in the apprehension, detention, and removal of illegal aliens.

The parties agree that federal immigration officers can seize an
individual pursuant to a civil immigration warrant. Specifically,
ICE officers may arrest and detain an alien pending a removal
decision.  

State officers may also play a role in immigration enforcement.
Federal law specifies limited circumstances in which state officers
may perform the functions of an immigration officer.

The county does not have a 287(g) agreement with DHS. But the
absence of such an agreement does not prevent a state or its
political subdivision from otherwise cooperating with the Attorney
General in the identification, apprehension, detention, or removal
of aliens not lawfully present in the United States.

Appellants contend that section 1357(g)(10)(B) provides authority
for state and local officers to seize and detain aliens subject to
removal because the statute says state and local officers may
cooperate with the federal government without a formal agreement.

Our review of the caselaw summarized above leads us to conclude
that the district court acted within its discretion in determining
that respondents' interpretation of communication and cooperation
under section 1357(g)(10) will likely prevail on the merits.
Generally, a statute should be construed so that effect is given to
all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or
superfluous, void or insignificant. Appellants' interpretation of
section 1357(g)(10) as authorizing state and local officers to
seize and detain removable aliens renders superfluous Congress's
express authorization that state and local officers exercise these
powers under formal 287(g) agreements with training and supervision
from DHS.

The Court conclude that the district court did not clearly abuse
its discretion in determining that respondents are likely to
prevail on the contested issues that (A) appellants' continued
detention of respondents after their release from state custody is
a new seizure and (B) state and federal law do not authorize
appellants to seize respondents based on ICE detainers and
warrants. Thus, the Court concludes that the district court did not
clearly abuse its discretion in granting a temporary injunction in
favor of respondents.

The Court notes, particularly, the district court's determination
that respondents, and others similarly situated, will suffer harm
by appellants' practice of relying on ICE detainers to continue
incarceration after respondents have been released from state
custody, and that there is little if any harm to appellants if this
practice is temporarily halted. Because appellants do not challenge
the district court's finding of harm, we conclude that reversal of
the temporary injunction is not warranted.  

Affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's September 23, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yym2upmv from Leagle.com.

Norman H. Pentelovitch - npentelovitch@anthonyostlund.com - Brooke
D. Anthony Anthony Ostlund Baer & Louwagie P.A., 90 South 7th
Street3600 Wells Fargo Center, Minneapolis, MN 55402; and Ian
Bratlie , Teresa Nelson , American Civil Liberties Union of
Minnesota, P.O. Box 14720, Minneapolis, MN 55414 and Cody Wofsy ,
pro hac vice, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, San
Francisco, California, for respondents.

Stephanie A. Angolkar  - stephanie@irc-law.com - Jon K. Iverson  -
jon@irc-law.com - Jason M. Hiveley - jasonh@irc-law.com - Ivers
Reuvers Condon, Bloomington, Minnesota, for appellants.

William P. Barr , United States Attorney General, Francesca M.
Genova , pro hac vice, Trial Attorney, United States Department of
Justice, Washington, DC; and Erica H. MacDonald , United States
Attorney, Ann M. Bildtsen , Assistant United States Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae United States of
America.

Keith Ellison , Attorney General, Liz Kramer , Solicitor General,
St. Paul, Minnesota, for amicus curiae State of Minnesota.

Kathleen Moccio , Binger Center for New Americans, Minneapolis,
Minnesota, for amici curiae Law Professors and National Immigrant
Justice Center.


NORTHSHORE UNIVERSITY: Court Certifies Patient Access Reps Class
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SAKEENA BARRETT, individually, and on behalf of others
similarly situtated, the Plaintiff, vs. NORTHSHORE UNIVERSITY
HEALTH SYSTEM, the Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-09088 (N.D. Ill.),
the Hon. Judge Mary M. Rowland granted Barrett's motion to certify
a class of:

   "all current and former Patient Access Representatives employed
   by NorthShore University Health System at any time from
   December 19, 2014, through the date of judgment in this case."

The parties shall confer regarding the content of the notice and
the means of distributing the notice, and shall submit either a
joint proposal or competing proposals by October 4, 2019, the Court
held.[CC]

NUWAVE, LLC: Horn Sues over Sale of Defective Ovens
---------------------------------------------------
Kiana Horn, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,
the Plaintiff, vs. NuWave, LLC, the Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-07955-RSWL-KS (C.D. Cal., Sept. 13, 2019), alleges that
Defendant sold its Ovens with a known defect that causes them to
crack in less than a year.  NuWave also fails to live up to its
promises when the defect manifests itself.

NuWave specifically warrants that it will provide replacement parts
or repairs for its Ovens within the one-year warranty period: The
NuWave Oven is covered for a full one year under normal use. NuWave
promised to provide the necessary parts and labor to repair or
replace the NuWave Oven during this time.

NuWave, LLC, founded in 1993, is a manufacturer and retailer of
kitchen appliances. NuWave's flagship product is the NuWave Oven, a
countertop oven that uses a combination of infrared, conduction,
and convection heat to cook food.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Hassan Zavareei, Esq.
          Matthew W. Lanahan, Esq.
          TYCKO & ZAVAREEI LLP
          1970 Broadway, Suite 1070
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone: (510) 254-6808
          Facsimile: (202) 973-0950
          E-mail: hzavareei@tzlegal.com
                  mlanahan@tzlegal.com

               - and -

          Melissa S. Weiner, Esq.
          Joseph C. Bourne, Esq.
          PEARSON, SIMON & WARSHAW, LLP
          800 LaSalle Avenue, Suite 2150
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 389-0600
          Facsimile: (612) 389-0610
          E-mail: mweiner@pswlaw.com
                  jbourne@pswlaw.com

               - and -

          Jeff Ostrow, Esq.
          Jonathan M. Streisfeld, Esq.
          KOPELOWITZ OSTROW FERGUSON WEISELBERG GILBERT
          One W. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 500
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 525-4100
          Facsimile: (954) 525-4300
          E-mail: ostrow@kolawyers.com
                  streisfeld@kolawyers.com


OJ INSTALLATIONS: Fernandes Seeks OT Pay for Furniture Installers
-----------------------------------------------------------------
KAMILLA FERNANDES, Individually and on Behalf of All Those
Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. OJ INSTALLATIONS, LLC and
JAVIER CERNA, the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-04152-ODE (N.D. Ga.,
Sept. 15, 2019), seeks to recover unpaid overtime premium pay
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Defendants employ laborers to install and assemble various
furniture items in residential and commercial properties. The
Plaintiff was employed as a furniture installer for Defendants. The
Plaintiff was not paid overtime wages, despite working in excess of
40 hours per week throughout her employment, the lawsuit says.

The Defendants operate a furniture installation service called OJ
Installations, based out of Norcross, Georgia.[BN]

          Brandon A. Thomas, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF BRANDON A. THOMAS, PC
          Glenlake Parkway, Suite 650
          Atlanta, GA 30328
          Telephone: (678) 330-2909
          Facsimile: (678) 638-6201
          E-mail: brandon@overtimeclaimslawyer.com

OMNI FAMILY: Fails to Provide Proper Wages, Arauza Alleges
----------------------------------------------------------
YASMIN ARAUZA, individually and on behalf of all persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff vs. OMNI FAMILY HEALTH; and DOES 1 THROUGH 50,
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-01246-LJO-SAB (E.D. Cal., Sept. 6,
2019) is an action against the Defendants for failure to pay
minimum wages, overtime compensation, authorize and permit meal and
rest periods, provide accurate wage statements, and reimburse
necessary business expenses.

The Plaintiff Arauza was employed by the Plaintiff as non-exempt
employee.

Omni Family Health provided primary and preventative healthcare to
individuals and families, including comprehensive medical, dental,
and behavioral health services. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Norman B. Blumenthal, Esq.
          Kyle R. Nordrehaug, Esq.
          Aparajit Bhowmik, Esq.
          BLUMENTHAL NORDREHAUG BHOWMIK DE BLOUW LLP
          2255 Calle Clara
          La Jolla, CA 92037
          Telephone: (858)551-1223
          Facsimile: (858) 551-1232


OOTDFASH, LLC: Website not Accessible to Blind, Brooks Says
-----------------------------------------------------------
VALERIE BROOKS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. OOTDFASH, LLC, a California limited
liability company; and DOES 1 to 10, inclusive, the Defendants,
Case No. 2:19-cv-01847-JAM-EFB (E.D. Cal., Sept. 13, 2019), alleges
that Defendants failed to design, construct, maintain, and operate
its website at https://www.ootdfash.com/ to be fully and equally
accessible to and independently usable by Plaintiff and other blind
or visually-impaired people.

The Defendant's denial of full and equal access to its website, and
therefore denial of its products and services offered thereby and
in conjunction with its physical locations, is a violation of
Plaintiff's rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act and
California's Unruh Civil Rights Act.

The Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person who
requires screen-reading software to read website content using her
computer. Plaintiff uses the terms "blind" or "visually-impaired"
to refer to all people with visual impairments who meet the legal
definition of blindness in that they have a visual acuity with
correction of less than or equal to 20 x 200. Some blind people who
meet this definition have limited vision. Others have no vision.

The Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a change in
Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and procedures so that
Defendant's website will become and remain accessible to blind and
visually-impaired consumers, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and Proposed Class are:

          Bobby Saadian, Esq.
          Thiago Coelho, Esq.
          WILSHIRE LAW FIRM
          3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Telephone: (213) 381-9988
          Facsimile: (213) 381-9989

PK MANAGEMENT: Riley et al Seek to Certify Class of Residents
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as LEORA RILEY, and TERRI
OZBURN, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. PK MANAGEMENT, LLC, et al., the
Defendants, Case 2:18-cv-02337-KHV-TJJ (D. Kan.), the Plaintiffs
ask the Court for an order certifying a class of:

   "all persons who currently reside in Central Park Towers or
   formerly resided therein at any time from January 26, 2013 to
   date."

The action arises out of severe infestations of bed bugs,
cockroaches and mice, and Defendants' failure to maintain the units
as required in the leases, and failure to use effective methods and
practices to eradicate the infestations. The spread of the
infestations is building-wide and its entrenchment into the
physical structure of the building has created and exacerbated a
real and present danger to the former and current residents'
health, safety and welfare. The Plaintiffs seeks injunctive,
compensatory and equitable relief and punitive damages from
Defendants.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs and Proposed Class Counsel are:

          Mark W. Schmitz, Esq.
          Bryce B. Bell, Esq.
          BELL LAW, LLC
          2600 Grand Blvd., Ste. 580
          Kansas City, MO 64108
          Telephone: 816-886-8206
          Facsimile: 816-817-8500
          E-mail: Bryce@BellLawKC.com
                  MS@BellLawKC.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey M. Lipman, Esq.
          LIPMAN LAW FIRM, P.C.
          1454 30th Street, Suite 205
          West Des Moines, IA 50266
          Telephone: 515-276-3411
          Facsimile: 515-276-3736
          E-mail: jeff@lipmanlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Gina Chiala, Esq.
          HEARTLAND CENTER FOR JOBS AND FREEDOM
          4047 Central Street
          Kansas City, MO 64111
          Telephone: 816-278-1092
          Facsimile: 816-278-5785
          E-mail: ginachiala@jobsandfreedom.org

               - and -

          Zachary D. Poole, Esq.
          ZDP LAW, LLC
          4330 Belleview, Suite 300A
          Kansas City, MO 64111
          Telephone: 816-833-9168
          Facsimile: 816-756-5067
          E-mail: zpoole@zdplaw.com

PLEXUS WORLDWIDE: Website not Accessible to Blind, Slade Says
-------------------------------------------------------------
LINDA SLADE, Individually and as the representative of a class of
similarly situated persons, the Plaintiff, vs. PLEXUS WORLDWIDE,
LLC, the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-08675 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 18,
2019), alleges that the Defendant is denying blind and
visually-impaired persons throughout the United States with equal
access to the goods and services Plexus provides to non-disabled
customers through http//:www.Plexusworldwide.com  The Defendants'
denial of full and equal access to its website, and therefore
denial of its products and services offered, and in conjunction
with its physical locations, is a violation of Plaintiff's rights
under the Americans with Disabilities Act.

The Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person who
requires screen-reading software to read website content using her
computer. Plaintiff uses the terms "blind" or "visually-impaired"
to refer to all people with visual impairments who meet the legal
definition of blindness in that they have a visual acuity with
correction of less than or equal to 20 x 200. Some blind people who
meet this definition have limited vision; others have no vision.

Plexusworldwide.com provides to the public a wide array of the
goods, services, price specials, employment opportunities and other
programs offered by Plexus. Yet, Plexusworldwide.com contains
thousands of access barriers that make it difficult if not
impossible for blind and visually-impaired customers to use the
website. In fact, the access barriers make it impossible for blind
and visually-impaired users to even complete a transaction on the
website. The complaint seeks compensatory damages to compensate
Class members for having been subjected to unlawful discrimination,
the lawsuit says.

Based on a 2010 U.S. Census Bureau report, approximately 8.1
million people in the United States are visually impaired,
including 2.0 million who are blind, and according to the American
Foundation for the Blind's 2015 report, approximately 400,000
visually impaired persons live in the State of New York.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Class are:

          Dan Shaked, Esq.
          SHAKED LAW GROUP, P.C.
          14 Harwood Court, Suite 415
          Scarsdale, NY 10583
          Telephone: (917) 373-9128
          E-mail: ShakedLawGroup@gmail.com

PRIORITY METALS: Denial of Arbitration Bid in Perez Suit Upheld
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DAKOTA PEREZ, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PRIORITY
METALS, INC., Defendant and Appellant, Case No. G056885 (Cal.
App.), Judge David A. Thompson of the Court of Appeals of
California for the Fourth District, Division Three, affirmed the
trial court's order denying the Defendant's motion to compel
arbitration.

The Plaintiff was employed by Priority Meals as a driver and
warehouse worker.  After a few days on the job, the Defendant's
owner provided him with a packet of employment-related documents.
Among them was a four-page "Support Personnel Employment
Agreement."  The Plaintiff initialed each page of the Agreement and
signed the last page. Among the terms outlined in the Agreement
were the Plaintiff's duties and salary, trade secret protections,
conditions for her use of the Defendant's vehicles, and
termination.  It also contained an arbitration clause which was to
survive the termination of the Plaintiff's employment by the
Defendant.

After about six months, the Defendant terminated the Plaintiff.
The Plaintiff thereafter sued the Defendant, alleging failure to
pay overtime, failure to provide meal and rest breaks, waiting time
penalties, failure to pay all hours worked when due, failure to
provide accurate wage statements, and unfair competition and
business practices.  The complaint also contains a cause of action
under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004.

The Defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration of the
Plaintiff's claims pursuant to the arbitration clause in the
parties' agreement.  The Plaintiff opposed the motion, contending
none of his claims fell within the clause's narrow scope.

The trial court denied the motion to compel.  Its decision
primarily turned on interpretation of the scope of the arbitration
clause.  It explained that the arbitration clause in the case is
unambiguously narrow in scope, limited to controversies involving
the consideration or application of any of the terms, provisions,
or conditions of the Agreement.  The Plaintiff's complaint does not
involve any of the terms, provisions or conditions of the
Agreement.

The Defendant appealed the matter, contending that the trial court
interpreted the arbitration clause at issue too narrowly and under
the proper interpretation the Plaintiff's claims must be sent to
arbitration.

On review, Appellate Judge Thompson opines that the language of the
Agreement's arbitration clause is clear and unambiguous -- only
claims which involve the consideration or application of any of the
terms, provisions, or conditions of the Agreement" must be
arbitrated.  The Plaintiff's claims will not involve consideration
or application of anything in the Agreement, the appellate court
held.

The appellate court finds that the Defendant's interpretation of
the arbitration clause, that it applies to any controversy' related
to the Plaintiff's employment, is extremely overbroad and the
language is not reasonably susceptible to such an interpretation.

Because the Plaintiff's claims fall outside the scope of the
arbitration clause, the trial court did not err in denying the
Defendant's motion to compel, the appellate court opined.
Accordingly, Judge Thompson affirmed the trial court's order.  The
Plaintiff is entitled to costs on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 30, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/Xtozja from Leagle.com.

Burkhalter Kessler Clement & George, Ros M. Lockwood and Andrew M.
Cummings -- acummings@bkcglaw.com -- for Defendant and Appellant.

Solouki Savoy, Daniel A. Law -- shoham@soloukisavoy.com -- and
Grant J. Savoy -- grant@soloukisavoy.com -- for Plaintiff and
Respondent.


PROVIDENCE COMMUNITY: 11th Cir. Upholds Dismissal of Brinson Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHRISTINA BRINSON, and all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PROVIDENCE COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS,
Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 18-13699 (11th Cir.), Judge Ed Carnes
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (i) affirmed
the district court's dismissal of the complaint and denial of
Brinson's motion to amend; and (ii) denied Brinson's motion to
certify questions of state law to the Georgia Supreme Court.

Brinson filed a class action lawsuit in the district court against
Providence Community Corrections.  She raised a state law claim for
money had and received, which the district court dismissed for
failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  The
district court later denied Brinson's motion to amend her complaint
and reaffirmed its order dismissing the complaint.  Brinson
appeals.

Reviewing the denial of leave to amend for clear abuse of
discretion, Judge Carnes holds that the district court did not
clearly err in denying Brinson's motion to amend her complaint
because doing so would have been futile.  As the district court
noted, the proposed amended complaint mostly repackaged the
constitutional claims asserted in Brinson's initial complaint,
which the district court had dismissed.  The only new legal theory
raised in the amended complaint was that the contracts with
Providence are void because of its failure to file the contracts
with the County and Municipal Probation Advisory Council as
required by Chapter 503-1 of the Rules and Regulations of the State
of Georgia.  But the regulation does not say what Brinson asserts.


Accordingly, Judge Carnes affirmed the dismissal of the complaint
and denial of the motion to amend.  The appellate judge denied the
motion to certify questions of state law to the Georgia Supreme
Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 30, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/4x21P3 from Leagle.com.

John C. Bell, Jr., for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Glenn S. Bass, for Defendant-Appellee.

John B. Long -- jlong@tuckerlong.com -- for Plaintiff-Appellant.

William Welsh Horlock, Jr. -- bhorlock@scrudderbass.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Tiana S. Mykkeltvedt -- mykkeltvedt@bmelaw.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

JJohn Ryd Bush Long -- jlongattorney@aol.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Michael Rosen Baumrind -- baumrind@bmelaw.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Jason Randall Clark -- jason@jasonclarkpc.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.


RAPHAEL HOWELL: N.T. Files Motion to Enforce Subpoena
-----------------------------------------------------
A Motion to Enforce Subpoena and a Motion to Compel the Deposition
of Heather Gates was filed by the Plaintiff in the class action
styled as N.T., Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, v. Officer Raphael Howell, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-mc-00011-JRH, (S.D. Ga., Sept. 13, 2019).[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se:

     N.T., Esq.
     Thomas Kennedy Sampson & Thompkins LLP
     3355 Main Street
     Atlanta, GA 30337
     Phone: (404) 688-4503
     Email: w.sampson@tkstlaw.com
     c/o Thomas G. Sampson II
     PRO SE


REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CA: Riffel Suit Removed to C.D. Ca.
----------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned VALENTINA RIFFEL, as an individual, on behalf of
herself and all persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. THE
REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, a California nonprofit
corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
19-STCV-28323 was removed from the Superior Court of the State of
California for the County of Los Angeles to the United States
District Court for the Central District of California on Sept. 24,
2019, and assigned Case No. 2:19-cv-08286.

The Complaint contains the following causes of action against
Defendants: (1) Fraud; (2) Negligent Misrepresentation; (3) False
Advertising; (4) Violation of Business and Professions Code Section
17200 (Unfair Competition); and (5) Negligence. Plaintiff seeks a
variety of remedies, including restitution, damages, and injunctive
relief.[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

     William L. Stern, Esq.
     Jeffrey M. Davidson, Esq.
     Hakeem S. Rizk, Esq.
     COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
     Salesforce Tower
     415 Mission Street, Suite 5400
     San Francisco, CA 94105
     Phone: + 1 (415) 591-6000
     Facsimile: + 1 (415) 591-6091
     Email: wstern@cov.com
            jdavidson@cov.com
            hrizk@cov.com


SAFETY EQUIPMENT: Ninth Circuit Appeal Initiated in Jensen Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Christopher Beatty and Kyle Jensen filed an appeal from
a Court ruling issued in the lawsuit styled Kyle Jensen, et al. v.
Safety Equipment Corporation, et al., Case No.
2:18-cv-02890-RGK-GJS, in the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California, Los Angeles.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Hon. Judge
R. Gary Klausner entered an order granting the Plaintiff's motion
for class certification.

The class is comprised of workers based off the coast of the
Central District of California, and the case turns on the
application of California state labor law.

The appellate case is captioned as Kyle Jensen, et al. v. Safety
Equipment Corporation, et al., Case No. 19-56088, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by October 15, 2019;

   -- Transcript is due on November 12, 2019;

   -- Appellants Christopher Beatty and Kyle Jensen's opening
      brief is due on December 23, 2019;

   -- Appellees Does, Safety Equipment Corporation and Secorp
      Industries' answering brief is due on January 21, 2020;

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants KYLE JENSEN, an individual, for himself and
those similarly situated, and CHRISTOPHER BEATTY are represented
by:

          Aris Edmund Karakalos, Esq.
          Michael Strauss, Esq.
          STRAUSS & STRAUSS, APC
          121 N. Fir Street, Suite F
          Ventura, CA 93001
          Telephone: (805) 641-6600
          E-mail: aris@strausslawyers.com
                  mike@strausslawyers.com

Defendants-Appellees SAFETY EQUIPMENT CORPORATION, a Mississippi
limited liability corporation, DBA Secorp Industries, Inc., and
SECORP INDUSTRIES, a Louisiana partnership, are represented by:

          Cathleen S. Yonahara, Esq.
          FREELAND COOPER & FOREMAN LLP
          150 Spear Street
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Telephone: (415) 541-0200
          E-mail: yonahara@freelandlaw.com


SAINT-GOBAIN: Appeals Sullivan Suit Class Cert. Ruling to 2nd Cir.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp has appealed a court order
entered the class action lawsuit styled as JAMES D. SULLNAN, LESLIE
ADDISON, MLLIAM S. SUMNER, JR., RONALD S. HAUSTHOR, GORDON
GARRISON, LINDA CRAWFORD, TED CRAWFORD, and BILLY J. KNIGHT,
individually, and on behalf of a Class of persons similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. SAINT-GOBAIN PERFORMANCE PLASTICS
CORPORATION, the Defendant, Case No. 5:16-cv-00125-gwc (D. Vt.).

As reported by the Class Action Reporter on September 4, 2019, U.S.
District Judge Geoffrey Crawford certified two classes in this
lawsuit filed by Vermont residents seeking damages for chemical
contamination in groundwater in their Bennington neighborhood.

The appeal case is captioned Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics
Corp., Petitioner v. James D. Sullivan, Leslie Addison, William S.
Sumner Ronald S. Hausthor, Linda Crawford, Gordon Garrison, Ted
Crawford, Billy J. Knight, Individually, and on behalf of a Class
of persons similarly situated, Respondents, Case No. 19-2851 filed
in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on
Sept. 9, 2019.

Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics is a producer of engineered,
high-performance polymer products.[BN]

Petitioner Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp. is represented
by:

     Sheila L. Birnbaum, Esq.
     Dechert LLP
     3 Bryant Park
     1095 Avenue of the Americas
     New York, NY 10036
     Tel: 212-698-3625

Respondents James D. Sullivan, Leslie Addison, William S. Sumner,
Ronald S. Hausthor, Linda Crawford, Gordon Garrison, Ted Crawford,
Billy J. Knight are represented by:

     Emily J. Joselson, Esq.
     Langrock Sperry & Wool, LLP
     111 South Pleasant Street
     P.O. Drawer 351
     Middlebury, VT 05753
     Tel: 802-388-6356

SCHELL & KAMPETER: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, Dennis Says
-----------------------------------------------------------
EDWARD DENNIS, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. SCHELL & KAMPETER, INC., Case No. 5:19-cv-00296-BRW
(E.D. Ark., Sept. 13, 2019), arises from the Defendant's violation
of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act
by failing to pay the Plaintiff and current or former employees a
proper overtime compensation for all hours that they worked.

Schell & Kampeter is a foreign for profit corporation, with its
principal place of business located in Meta, Missouri.

The Defendant does business under the name Diamond Pet Foods and/or
Diamond Pet Company.  The Defendant conducts business within the
State of Arkansas, operating and managing a dog food plant in Desha
County.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          One Financial Center
          650 South Shackleford Road, Suite 411
          Little Rock, AR 72211
          Telephone: (501) 221-0088
          Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
          E-mail: josh@sanfordlawfirm.com


SECURITY LIFE: Zhou Files Class Suit in Colorado
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Security Life of
Denver Insurance Company and Voya Financial, Inc. The case is
styled as SU ZHOU, individually and on behalf of herself and all
similarly situated persons, Plaintiff v. Security Life of Denver
Insurance Company a Colorado corporation, Voya Financial, Inc. a
New York corporation, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-02781 (D. Colo.,
Sept. 27, 2019).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Contract.

Security Life of Denver Insurance Company operates as an insurance
firm. The Company offers life and health insurance services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Francis J. Balint, Jr. , Esq.
     Bonnett Fairbourn Friedman & Balint P.C.-Phoenix
     2325 East Camelback Road, Suite 300
     Phoenix, AZ 85016
     Phone: (602) 274-1100
     Fax: (602) 274-1199
     Email: fbalint@bffb.com

SMITTY'S SUPPLY: Mislabels Tractor Hydraulic Fluids, Suit Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------------
TERRY BLACKMORE; and JASON KINGENBERG, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. SMITTY'S SUPPLY,
INC., Defendant, Case No. 5:19-cv-04052 (N.D. Iowa, Sept. 6, 2019)
contends that the Defendant has deceptively and misleadingly
labeled, marketed and sold tractor hydraulic fluid as "303" fluid
meeting "303" specifications when, in fact, the "303" designation
is obsolete and 303 specifications have not been available for over
40 years.

The Defendant has also deceptively and misleadingly labeled,
marketed and sold tractor hydraulic fluid as meeting certain
manufacturer specifications and providing certain anti-wear and
protective benefits when, in fact, it knew, or should have known,
the fluid it sells does not meet all listed manufacturer
specifications and does not contain the anti-wear and protective
properties required in Tractor Hydraulic Fluid. Instead, the "303"
fluid is a fluid mixed from line wash and other lubricant products
(including some used products) that are not suitable for use as
ingredients in a Tractor Hydraulic Fluid.

Smitty's Supply, Inc. manufactures and distributes lubricants and
related products. The Company offers antifreeze, brake fluids,
chemicals, gear oils, greases, heavy duty engine oils, power
steering fluids, and synthetic oils. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Paul D. Lundberg, Esq.
          LUNDBERG LAW FIRM, P.L.C.
          600 Fourth St., Suite 906
          Sioux City, IA 51101
          Telephone: (712) 234-3030
          E-mail: paul@lundberglawfirm.com

               - and -

          Thomas V. Bender, Esq.
          Dirk Hubbard, Esq,
          HORN AYLWARD & BANDY, LLC
          2600 Grand, Ste. 1100
          Kansas City, MO 64108
          Telephone: (816) 421-0700
          Facsimile: (816) 421-0899 (Fax)
          E-mail: tbender@hab-law.com
                  dhubbard@hab-law.com


SNOOZE HIC: Court Narrows Claims in Wage and Hour Suit
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California issued an Order granting in part Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss in the case captioned TRINITY AMADOR-STEWART Plaintiff, v.
SNOOZE HIC LLC and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants. Case
No. 18cv01604-LAB-MDD. (S.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff Trinity Amador-Stewart brought this putative class action
against Defendant Snooze HiC, LLC for unpaid overtime under the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and California Labor Code, seeking
unpaid overtime, unpaid compensation for interrupted and/or missed
meal and rest periods, and failure to pay minimum wage. She also
seeks interest, penalties, costs, and attorney's fees. She amended
her complaint once, so the amended complaint (FAC) is the operative
pleading.

Legal Standards

A motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level. To meet the ordinary pleading standard and avoid
dismissal, a complaint must plead enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face. The well-pleaded facts must
do more than permit the Court to infer the mere possibility of
misconduct, they must show that the pleader is entitled to relief.


FLSA Minimum Wage Claims

A plaintiff must plead facts that give rise to a plausible
inference that she was not paid FLSA minimum wage. Amador-Stewart
has made wholly conclusory allegations that Snooze paid her and
putative class members less than the minimum wage, or an otherwise
substandard wage. She alleges that the federally mandated wage was
$7.25, but does not say what she was paid, or provide any other
facts giving rise to a reasonable inference that she was paid less
than that. Disregarding Amador-Stewart's own conclusion about the
illegality or substandard rate of her hourly pay rate, this
allegation is merely consistent with liability, but nothing more.
If her hourly rate of pay was $7.25 or more, she was not paid less
than the minimum wage for the first 40 hours of work each week.

Snooze suggests that Amador-Stewart is attempting to assert a gap
time claim that is not cognizable under the FLSA, and cites Perez,
75 F. Supp. 3d at 1188-90 in support of this. Amador-Stewart's
opposition does not address this. The Court accepts this
non-opposition as her concession that she cannot bring such an
argument.  

Because, as discussed below, Amador-Stewart has not pled any
overtime claim, she has also not pled a claim for failure to pay
minimum overtime wages. She has not met the pleading standard for
the FLSA minimum wage claim since she has not plead facts showing
the plausibility of these claims.  

FLSA Overtime Wage Claim

The FAC alleges broadly that Snooze had a general policy of
consistently requiring or encouraging workers to work overtime, for
which they were not properly compensated. It fails to identify any
time when this happened, however, or even if it ever happened to
her. Under Landers, 771 F.3d at 644-45, a plaintiff asserting a
claim to overtime payments must allege that she worked more than
forty hours in a given workweek without being compensated for the
overtime hours worked during that workweek.

One way to meet this standard would be to identify a week when
Amador-Stewart was required to work more than forty hours and not
properly compensated, but the FAC does not do this. Nor does it
reasonably suggest there was any given week, even if unidentified,
when she was not properly compensated. Rather, it suggests only
that she might have worked overtime without being properly
compensated.

Amador-Stewart seeks to distinguish this claim from the claim
Landers found insufficient, by pointing out that she has alleged a
time period for the overtime. But the time period she cites is the
class period, i.e., from July 9, 2014 through the date of trial or
settlement.  

This is not enough.

California Overtime Claims

The FAC alleges that Snooze misclassified both Amador-Stewart and
other employees as exempt from overtime pay requirements.It does
not explain what form this misclassification took, for example,
whether Snooze formally said they were exempt, or whether it merely
failed to pay them overtime. It goes on to allege that they were
not compensated for all of the overtime wages earned, which seems
to mean they were paid some but not all of the overtime they
earned. If they were classified as exempt, it is unclear why Snooze
would have paid them any overtime.

This claim depends on the same allegations as the FLSA claims, with
a few additions. Because the additional allegations do not
adequately shore up the claim, it must also be dismissed.

California Minimum Wage Claim

This claim, as pled, adds no facts, and relies on wholly conclusory
allegations that the wages Snooze paid its workers were less than
the wages required by law for all their compensable work.

Leaving aside the class claims, Amador-Stewart at least needs to
plead facts supporting her conclusion that she was paid less than
permitted under the law, and that what she was doing amounted to
compensable hours worked. Given that California's minimum wage was
$10.50 in 2017 and $11.00 in 2018, Amador-Stewart should know
whether she was paid that much, or whether she was paid
significantly more or less than that. Bearing in mind that she is
also claiming that she was paid less than the federal minimum wage
of $7.25, and assuming that claim is made in good faith, she should
know that she was paid significantly less than $10.50 or $11.00
hourly, and should be able to allege it.

Merely alleging that her hourly pay rate was substandard or
illegal, without more, does not meet the pleading standard.

California Meal and Rest Period Claims

The FAC's only allegations that Amador-Stewart was denied mandatory
meal and rest periods are found in paragraph 19 and repeated in
paragraph 76, where she says she was frequently permitted to work,
and did work, shifts exceeding four hours or a major fraction
thereof at least three and one-half hours without being afforded
net ten-minute rest periods and without being provided mandatory
meal periods. She also alleges that Snooze did not compensate other
employees for missed meal and/or rest periods.

These allegations merely recite or paraphrase statutory language,
and rest on legal conclusions such as what amounts to a net
ten-minute rest period or a mandatory meal period with no facts to
explain or support what they mean. Other federal courts in
California have treated such allegations as conclusory.
  
The Court finds these allegations similarly conclusory.

Other California Claims

Amador-Stewart's sixth through ninth causes of action are
derivative of the first five claims. Until she can adequately plead
at least one of the first five claims, her sixth through ninth
claims must also be dismissed.

The motion to dismiss is granted in part.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 23, 2019
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available
https://tinyurl.com/y5n6m4ct from Leagle.com.

Trinity Amador-Stewart, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel D. Bodell -
dbodell@bodelllawgroup.com - Bodell Law Group & Scott Edward Cole
-scole@scalaw.com - Scott Cole & Associates, APC.

Snooze HIC, LLC, Defendant, represented by Brian Christopher
Sinclair - bsinclair@rutan.com - Rutan and Tucker.


SOUTHLAND ROYALTY: Summary Judgment Bid in Ulibarri Partly Granted
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GERALD ULIBARRI and WHITE RIVER ROYALTIES, LLC,
Plaintiffs, v. SOUTHLAND ROYALTY COMPANY, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:16-cv-215-RB-JHR (D. N.M.), Judge Robert C. Brack of the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Mexico (i) granted in part
and denied in part Southland's Motion for Summary Judgment No. 1,
and (ii) denied the Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment.

The parties' cross-motions for summary judgment in the oil and gas
royalty dispute center on a question of contract interpretation --
whether the phrase "the proceeds of the gas, as such" in a lease
provision require royalty payments is to be calculated on the value
of natural gas when it first emerges from the wellhead.  If so, the
Plaintiffs likely cannot sustain their claims that the Defendant
has been improperly calculating their payments.  If such language
is not synonymous with calculations "at the well," the Plaintiffs'
claims may proceed.  There are numerous other legal issues at play
in the case, but at this stage the Court need only determine
whether the relevant lease language clearly contemplates royalty
payments "at the well" or clearly contemplates payments at some
other downstream valuation point where proceeds are actually
generated.

The case first reached the New Mexico Court in March 2016, when
Defendant Southland removed Plaintiff Ulibarri's original class
action complaint.  The original complaint alleged breach of
contract, breach of implied duty to market, and violations of the
New Mexico Oil and Gas Proceeds Payment Act ("OGPPA").  The claims
were based on allegations that Southland had been underpaying
royalties to leaseholders by improperly deducting from their
royalty payments proportionate shares of: (1) the New Mexico
Natural Gas Processor's Tax, and (2) the post-production costs of
processing and otherwise making natural gas marketable for sale.

The matter was stayed pending the resolution of Anderson Living
Trust v. Energen Resources Corp., a Tenth Circuit case addressing
nearly identical issues and many of the same lease agreements.  In
early 2018, the Tenth Circuit resolved Energen, holding that
production companies can pass along to leaseholders a proportionate
share of the Natural Gas Processors Tax.  In addition, the court
held that the "marketable condition rule" does not apply in New
Mexico -- meaning lessees can "deduct from lessors' royalty
payments their proportionate share of post-production costs --
those costs necessary to make the gas marketable.

Following the Energen decision, Mr. Ulibarri twice amended his
complaint.  The First Amended Complaint made two significant
changes to the definition of the proposed class and his claims
against Southland.  First, Mr. Ulibarri excluded from the putative
class definition any individuals or entities whose lease agreements
provide for royalty payments based on "market value at the well,"
"the prevailing field market price," or any other agreement
language stating that value should be calculated "at the well."
This change was based on his position that the Tenth Circuit's
holding in Energen narrowly applies to only certain types of
leases, and thus allows the deduction of post-production costs only
insofar as that deduction is necessary to calculate the value of
the gas "at the well."

The Second Amended Class Action Complaint again revised the
definition of the putative class and added White River Royalties,
LLC as a named Plaintiff.  The Plaintiffs' proposed class includes
any person to whom Southland has paid royalties since Jan. 1, 2015,
pursuant to a lease containing one of four different types of
royalty payment provisions that the Plaintiffs claim do not require
calculations at the well.  Plaintiffs Ulibarri and White River hold
lessor's interests in natural gas leases with Southland that
contain identical "Proceeds Royalty Provisions," which require
payment of a specified percentage of the proceeds of the gas, as
such, for gas from wells where gas only is found.  Thus, only
Proceeds Royalty Provisions are relevant to the parties'
cross-motions for summary judgment on the lease interpretation
issue.

Southland argues that such language unambiguously provides that the
Plaintiffs are entitled to the value of the gas at the well, which
is the amount actually received by Southland for the sale of the
gas, less a proportionate share of costs incurred after the gas is
brought to the surface at the well.  The Plaintiffs, on the other
hand, argue that pursuant to the plain language of the Proceeds
Royalty Provision, Southland is required to pay them royalties
based upon proceeds received on the sale of the natural gas
products which it sold to third party purchasers" not at the well
but "at the tailgate of the applicable processing plant."

In addition to the issue of whether Proceeds Royalty Provisions
require valuation at the well, Southland's motion for summary
judgment raises two additional arguments: (1) that the Plaintiffs
may not bring claims under the New Mexico Oil and Gas Proceeds
Payment Act because it does not apply retrospectively to the
subject leases"; and (2) that any suggestion in the Second Amended
Complaint that the putative class should include overriding royalty
interest owners cannot be sustained because overriding royalty
interests arise "through a subsequent conveyance instrument by a
lessee, acting as assignor," and are thus not governed by the
underlying leases.

Judge Brack concludes that the Proceeds Royalty Provisions
contained in the Plaintiffs' leases are ambiguous as a matter of
law regarding the point of valuation, and thus he will deny both
parties' motions for summary judgment on this issue.  The
circumstances surrounding the negotiation of the contracts in the
1950s and the meaning at that time of relevant terms like
"proceeds" and "as such" are critically important to the
determination of whether the contract dictates that royalty
payments should be calculated at the well or at a downstream point
of sale.  However, the evidence presented by both parties in
support of their respective positions is in dispute, turns on
witness credibility, and is susceptible of conflicting inferences.
Thus, the Judge finds that the language is ambiguous as a matter of
law.

The Judge will deny summary judgment on Southland's claim that the
OGPPA does not apply to the subject leases.  Though it does not
appear that the Defendant in that case made a retroactivity
argument, the Tenth Circuit noted that many of the subject leases
at issue were "quite old," and a review of the underlying complaint
reveals that each subject lease was executed prior to enactment of
the OGPPA.  The Tenth Circuit's decision thus implies that the
OGPPA may apply to leases executed before 1985.

Finally, the Judge will grant summary judgment as to overriding
royalty interests.  He finds that the Plaintiffs fail to
acknowledge, however, that their operative complaint currently
includes in the putative class all persons and entities to whom
Southland has paid royalties on natural gas pursuant to leases or
overriding royalty agreements which contain a royalty provision
obligating Southland to pay royalties based on one of the four
types of lease provisions.   Based on the plain language of the
complaint, the Judge concludes that overriding interest owners
would only be included in the putative class if the instrument that
created their overriding interest (not the underlying lease)
contains any of the four royalty provisions at issue in the case.
Still, to the extent that the Plaintiffs make any claim or argument
to the contrary, the Judge finds that the Plaintiffs have abandoned
this claim and will grant summary judgment in Southland's favor as
to any claim that payments to overriding royalty interest owners
are governed by royalty provisions in the underlying lease.

Therefore, Judge Brack granted Southland's Motion for Summary
Judgment No. 1 as to the Plaintiffs' claims regarding overriding
royalty owners and denied as to all other claims.  He denied the
Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2019 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/sFpCZz from Leagle.com.

Gerald Ulibarri, Plaintiff, represented by George Barton --
gab@georgebartonlaw.com -- Law Offices of George Barton, P.C. &
Stacy Burrows -- stacy@georgebartonlaw.com -- Law Offices of
George
A. Barton, PC.

Southland Royalty Company LLC, Defendant, represented by Matthew
A.
Zidovsky -- mzidovsky@montand.com -- Montgomery & Andrews, P.A.,
Sharon Theresa Shaheen -- sshaheen@montand.com -- Montgomery &
Andrews & Mark D. Christiansen, McAfee & Taft, P.C., pro hac vice.


SYSTEM FREIGHT: Thomason Alleges Retaliation
--------------------------------------------
WILLIAM THOMASON, the Plaintiff, vs. SYSTEM FREIGHT, INC.; MICHAEL
PAGLIUCA and JOHN DOES 1-5 AND 6-10, the Defendants, Case No.
MID-L-006282-19 (N.J. Super., Sept. 5, 2019), alleges that the
Defendant terminated the Plaintiff in retaliation for the Plaintiff
complaining about illegal and unsafe conditions in the workplace
pursuant to the Conscientious Employee Protection Act.

The Plaintiff asks the Court to order the Defendants to cease and
desist all conduct inconsistent with his claims made going forward,
both as to the specific plaintiff and as to all other individuals
similarly situated.

The Plaintiff began working for Defendant on or around June 2016.
The Defendant terminated the Plaintiff from his employment on or
around December 28, 2018. Prior to April 29, 2017, the Plaintiff
never had any problems at work, and was never written up or
disciplined.

On or around April 29, 2017, the Plaintiff was asked to clean out a
truck trailer on the job. The trailer was full of garbage,
something that Plaintiff had not seen previously when working for
Defendant.  The Plaintiff swept out the truck, cleaned out the
truck, and shortly thereafter, began coughing.

The Plaintiff told his Maintenance Manager, Chuck Verner, and his
Supervisor, Jim Kyle, about the truck being full of garbage.
Shortly after that incident, the Plaintiff was diagnosed with
bronchitis, which he told his employer.

As a result of the medical problems, the Plaintiff was out of work
from June 2018 until August 2018 to undergo surgery.

On or around August 10, 2018, the Shop Steward, Mark Sullivan, and
the Director of Human Resources, Curtis Briggs, along with
Defendant Pagliuca, called the Plaintiff into a meeting.

Pagliuca asked the Plaintiff why he was trying to sue the
Defendant. The Plaintiff responded that he filed a Workers'
Compensation claim so that his medical bills that resulted from the
conditions of the workplace were paid.

After that meeting, the Plaintiff returned to work. Thereafter,
from December 7, 2018 through December 27, 2018, the Plaintiff was
out of work due to a medical procedure.

On or around December 11, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Complaint with
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. In that
Complaint, the Plaintiff complained about the unsafe work
conditions at the Defendant's facility.  The Plaintiff said the
employees were breathing in diesel fumes, that there was no proper
ventilation in the facility, and no local exhaust to allow the
fumes to leave the facility, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Drake P. Bearden, Jr., Esq.
          COSTELLO & MAINS, LLC
          18000 Horizon Way, Suite 800
          Mount Laurel, NJ 08054
          Telephone: (856) 727-9700

TERRA OILFIELD: Underpays Frac Supervisors, Barhight Alleges
------------------------------------------------------------
RONNIE BARHIGHT, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. TERRA OILFIELD SERVICES, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 7:19-cv-00214 (W.D. Tex., Sept. 6, 2019) is an action
against the Defendant's failure to pay the Plaintiff and the class
overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per
week.

The Plaintiff Barhight was employed by the Defendant as frac
supervisor.

Terra Oilfield Services, LLC was founded in 2010. The company's
line of business includes providing miscellaneous water
transportation services. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel A. Verrett, Esq.
          MORELAND VERRETT, P.C.
          2901 Bee Cave Road, Box L
          Austin, TX 78746
          Telephone: (512) 782-0567
          Facsimile: (512) 782-0605
          E-mail: daniel@morelandlaw.com

               - and -

          Edmond S. Moreland, Jr., Esq.
          700 West Summit Drive
          Wimberley, TX 78676
          Telephone: (512) 782-0567
          Facsimile: (512) 782-0605
          E-mail: edmond@morelandlaw.com


TETRA TECH: Faces Engasser Suit Alleging Wage-and-Hour Violations
-----------------------------------------------------------------
GEORGE ENGASSER, an individual v. TETRA TECH, INC., a Delaware
corporation; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Case No.
2:19-cv-07973 (C.D. Cal., Sept. 13, 2019), is a class and
collective action brought by the Plaintiff on behalf of himself and
all other similarly situated Indian Monitors employed by the
Defendants on a Camp Fire cleanup project, who were and have been
denied proper compensation as required by state and federal
wage-and-hour laws.

Tetra Tech, Inc., is a Delaware corporation that does business in
the Central District of California.  Tetra Tech is the prime
contractor for the "Debris Management for the Camp Fire in Butte
County" contract (the "Contract").  Tetra Tech subcontracted with
the Mechoopda Indian Tribe of Chico Rancheria (among other Indian
tribes) to provide Indian Monitors to assess and protect any Native
American artifacts that may be uncovered during the fire cleanup.

Pursuant to the terms of the Contract, Tetra Tech was obligated to
insert in its subcontract with the Mechoopda Tribe a clause
obligating the tribe to pay overtime at the rate of one and
one-half times a laborer's pay for all hours worked in excess of
forty hours in a workweek.  The Plaintiff and the Class were
laborers within the requirements of the Contract.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. Strauss, Esq.
          Andrew C. Ellison, Esq.
          STRAUSS & STRAUSS, APC
          121 North Fir Street, Suite F
          Ventura, CA 93001
          Telephone: (805) 641-6600
          Facsimile: (805) 641-6607
          E-mail: mike@strausslawyers.com
                  andrew@strausslawyers.com


THC-ORANGE COUNTY: Court Dismisses Song Labor Suit with Prejudice
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Josephine L. Staton of the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California, Southern Division, has issued an
amended judgment in the case, EMMY SONG, as an individual and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. THC-ORANGE
COUNTY, INC., a California Corporation; and DOES 1 through 100,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 8:17-cv-00965-JLS-DFMx (C.D.
Cal.).

The Judge dismissed with prejudice all claims asserted in the
Action as to Plaintiff Emmy Song, the Class Members, and PAGA
Releasees to the maximum extent permitted by law.  Except as set
forth in the Settlement Agreement and the Final Approval Order,
each party is to bear her/its own attorneys' fees and costs.

All Class Members who did not properly and timely opt out from the
Class Settlement are permanently enjoined from pursuing or seeking
to reopen, any of the Settled Claims, as defined in the Settlement
Agreement to the maximum extent permitted by law. All PAGA
Releasees are permanently enjoined from pursuing, seeking to
reopen, or to prosecute any of the PAGA Claims, as defined in the
Settlement Agreement to the maximum extent permitted by law.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2019 Amended Judgment is
available at https://is.gd/ztFw7J from Leagle.com.

Emmy Song, as an individual and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Alex Myung Cha --
alex@alexchalaw.com -- Law Office of Alex Cha and Associates APLC,
Edward W. Choi -- edward.choi@calaw.biz -- Choi and Associates APC,
Jin Kook Edward Kim -- edward@alexchalaw.com -- Law Offices of Alex
Cha and Associates APLC & Larry W. Lee -- lwlee@diversitylaw.com --
Diversity Law Group PC.

THC - Orange County, Inc., a California Corporation, Defendant,
represented by Elizabeth Staggs Wilson --
estaggs-wilson@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson PC, James Elliot
Bangert Payer -- jpayer@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson PC, Kaleb
Nathaniel Berhe, Littler Mendelson PC, Maggy Mokhles Athanasious --
mathanasious@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson PC, Jyoti Mittal --
jmittal@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson PC & Steven Andrew Groode
-- sgroode@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson PC.


TOMS KING: Mendenhall Seeks to Stop Unlawful Use of Biometric Info
------------------------------------------------------------------
FAITH MENDENHALL, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. TOMS King, LLC, Case No. 2019CH10636 (Ill.
Cir., Cook Cty., Sept. 13, 2019), seeks to redress and curtail the
Defendants' unlawful collection, use, storage, and disclosure of
the Plaintiff's sensitive and proprietary biometric data, in
violation of the Biometric Information Privacy Act.

TOMS King is a franchisee of the Burger King Corporation.  TOMS
King owns and operates over a dozen Burger King locations
throughout Illinois.

TOMS King is a corporation that conducts business in the State of
Illinois with its principal place of business in Cook County.  When
TOMS King hires an employee, including the Plaintiff, he or she is
enrolled in its employee database(s) using a scan of his or her
fingerprint.  TOMS King uses the employee database(s) to monitor
the time worked by its hourly employees.

A hearing is currently scheduled to be held on January 13, 2020, at
9:30 a.m.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ryan F. Stephan, Esq.
          James B. Zouras, Esq.
          STEPHAN ZOURAS, LLP
          100 N. Riverside Plaza, Suite 2150
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 233-1550
          Facsimile: (312) 233-1560
          E-mail: rstephan@stephanzouras.com
                  jzouras@stephanzouras.com


TPUSA, INC: Headspeth & McBride Seek to Certify FLSA Class
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as Chantel Headspeth and Kaylee
McBride, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, the
Plaintiffs, vs. TPUSA, Inc. d/b/a Teleperformance USA, the
Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-02062-SDM-CMV (S.D. Ohio), the
Plaintiffs ask the Court for an order:

   a. conditionally certifying the case as a Fair Labor Standards
      Act collective action against TPUSA, Inc.;

   b. directing that notice be sent by United States mail and
      email to all former and current similarly situated Ohio
      technical support associates and those working in other Ohio

      call center positions employed by Defendant who worked 40
      hours in any workweek at any time in the period measured
      from three years prior to the filing of this Motion to the
      present;

   c. directing the parties to jointly submit within 14 days a
      proposed Notice informing such present and former employees
      of the pendency of this collective action and permitting
      them to opt into the case by signing and submitting a
      Consent to Join Form;

   d. requiring Defendant to, within 14 days of the Court's
      order, identify all potential opt-in plaintiffs by providing

      a list in electronic and importable format, of the names,
      positions of employment, last-known mailing addresses, last-
      known telephone numbers, email addresses, and dates of
      employment of all potential opt-in plaintiffs who worked for

      Defendant at any time from three years preceding the filing
      of this Motion through the present;

   e. directing that the Notice, in the form approved by the
      Court, be sent to such present and former employees within 7

      days of receipt of the list using the home and email
      addresses provided by Defendant; and

   f. providing that duplicate copies of the Notice may be sent in
      the event new, updated, or corrected mailing addresses or
      email addresses are found for one or more of such present or

      former employees.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs and those similarly situated, are:

          Matthew J.P. Coffman, Esq.
          COFFMAN LEGAL, LLC
          1550 Old Henderson Road, Suite 126
          Columbus, OH 43220
          Telephone: 614-949-1181
          Facsimile: 614-386-9964
          E-mail: mcoffman@mcoffmanlegal.com

               - and -

          Peter A. Contreras, Esq.
          CONTRERAS LAW , LLC
          1550 Old Henderson Road, Suite 126
          Columbus, OH 43220
          Telephone: 614 787-4878
          Facsimile: 614 957-7515
          E-mail: peter.contreras@contrerasfirm.com

UNITED BEHAVIORAL: Underpays Healthcare Providers, Meridian Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
MERIDIAN TREATMENT SERVICES, IRECOVER TREATMENT INC. d/b/a SERENITY
PALMS TREATMENT CENTER and HARMONY HOLLYWOOD TREATMENT CENTER, on
their own behalves and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
the Plaintiffs, vs. UNITED BEHAVIORAL HEALTH
(operating as OPTUMHEALTH BEHAVIORAL SOLUTIONS), the Defendant,
Case No. 3:19-cv-05721-JCS (N.D. Cal., Sept. 12, 2019), seeks
judgment requiring a neutral third-party overseen and appointed by
the Court to re-process all denied claims from behavioral health
providers that UBH denied. The action also seeks punitive damages
pursuant to California law.

The Plaintiffs and the class are behavioral healthcare providers
who treated patients with UBH insurance during the class period
through January 31, 2019.

The Plaintiffs and the class have not been paid for years' worth of
claims that were denied by UBH based on the now-discredited
guidelines.

In every case, Plaintiffs, in their professional judgment as
licensed clinicians, determined that the services provided to their
patients met generally accepted criteria and were medically
necessary before UBH denied their claims.

According to the complaint, the potential dollar amount of
wrongfully denied payments owed to Plaintiffs and the class is
substantial. The three named Plaintiffs had 157 patients with over
2000 collective claims denied by UBH pursuant to their discredited
medical necessity guidelines during the relevant period.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs and the Putative Classes are:

          Jennifer R. Liakos, Esq.
          NAPOLI SHKOLNIK PLLC
          5757 W. Century Blvd., Suite 680
          Los Angeles, CA 90045
          Telephone: (212) 397-1000
          Facsimile: (646) 843-7603
          E-mail: jliakos@napolilaw.com

               - and -

          Matthew M. Lavin, Esq.
          1750 Tysons Blvd., Suite 1500
          McLean, VA 22102
          Telephone: (212) 397-1000
          Facsimile: (646) 843-7603
          E-mail: mlavin@napolilaw.com

USAA FEDERAL: Can Partly Compel Arbitration in Eiess Lawsuit
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ELIZABETH EIESS, Plaintiff, v. USAA FEDERAL SAVINGS
BANK, Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-00108-EMC (N.D. Cal.), Judge Edward
M. Chen of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California granted in part and denied in part USAA's motion to
compel arbitration.

The putative class action alleges that USAA has improperly assessed
fees against Elizabeth Eiess and others similarly situated.  The
action asserts claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment,
as well as violation of California consumer protection laws.

Ms. Eiess, a California resident since 2014, is a customer of USAA
and maintains a checking account with the bank.  In October 2018,
she tried to use funds in her USAA checking account to pay for a
credit card bill for $358.83.  USAA rejected payment of that
transaction due to insufficient funds and charged her a $29 NSF
[non-sufficient funds] Fee for doing so.  Three days later, the
same transaction was submitted for payment again -- (presumably, by
the credit card company), but USAA again rejected the transaction
due to insufficient funds and charged Ms. Eiess a second NSF Fee of
$29.  Five days later, the same transaction was submitted for
payment, and USAA charged Ms. Eiess a third NSF Fee of $29 based on
insufficient funds.  In short, "USAA charged Ms. Eiess $87 in fees
to attempt to process a single $358.85 payment," the action
stated.

According to Ms. Eiess, by charging multiple NSF Fees for only one
transaction, USAA has breached the terms of contracts that exist
between them -- namely, a Deposit Agreement, an Online Banking
Agreement, and a Fee Schedule.  Ms. Eiess maintains that these
documents expressly state that USAA will charge only one NSF Fee
per single transaction.  Ms. Eiess further asserts that, because
the above documents are publicly available, members of the public
who consider opening a checking account with USAA will be misled by
its representations that it only charges one NSF Fee per
transaction.

In response to Ms. Eiess' lawsuit, USAA has moved to compel
arbitration of all of Ms. Eiess' causes of action, both common law
and statutory.  

Judge Chen granted in part and denied in part USAA's motion to
compel arbitration.  More specifically, he granted the motion to
compel with respect to the claims for breach of contract and unjust
enrichment in their entirety, as well as the claims under the
Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and  California Consumer Legal
Remedies Act (CLRA) on the questions of liability and monetary
relief.  However, the Judge found that the arbitration agreement
contains an impermissible waiver of Ms. Eiess' right to seek public
injunctive relief in any forum and thus denied the motion to compel
on that limited claim for relief only.  The judge stayed litigation
on the claim for public injunctive relief pending the arbitration
which the Court presumes will proceed expeditiously.  Upon
completion of arbitration, Ms. Eiess may ask for a lift of the stay
and further proceedings as appropriate.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/fGJOgn from Leagle.com.

Elizabeth Eiess, Plaintiff, represented by Jonathan M. Streisfeld,
Kopelowitz Ostrow P.A., pro hac vice, Todd David Carpenter --
tcarpenter@carlsonlynch.com -- Carlson Lynch LLP, Andrea R. Gold --
agold@tzlegal.com -- Tycko & Zavareei LLP, Annick Marie Persinger
-- apersinger@tzlegal.com -- Tycko & Zavareei LLP, Hassan Ali
Zavareei -- hzavareei@tzlegal.com -- Tycko & Zavareei LLP, Jeffrey
Douglas Kaliel -- jkaliel@kalielpllc.com -- Kaliel PLLC, Sophia
Goren Gold -- sgold@kalielpllc.com -- Kaliel PLLC & Tanya Susan
Koshy -- tkoshy@tzlegal.com -- Tycko and Zavareei LLP.

USAA Federal Savings Bank, Defendant, represented by Megan Sandra
Webster -- megan.webster@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown LLP, Elspeth
Victoria Hansen -- elspeth.hansen@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown LLP
& Thomas Vangel Panoff -- tpanoff@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown
LLP.


WELLS FARGO: Class Certification Bid in Narayan Suit Underway
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as Sat Narayan, et al., the
Plaintiff, vs. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., et  al., the Defendant, Case
No. 1:16-cv-11223 (N.D. Ill.), the Hon. Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer
entered an order terminating, without prejudice, an earlier motion
for class certification due to a renewed motion having been filed,
according to the docket entry made by the Clerk.

Wells Fargo is an American multinational financial services company
headquartered in San Francisco, California, with central offices
throughout the United States.[BN]

WEST NEW: Denied Workers Overtime Pay, Minimum Wages, Says Cruz
---------------------------------------------------------------
Netzahi Cruz, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. West New Malaysia Restaurant Inc., Andy K.
Chong and Tatali Doe, Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-07994 (S.D. N.Y.,
August 27, 2019), seeks to recover unpaid minimum and overtime
wages and redress for failure to provide itemized wage statements
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and New York Labor
Law, including applicable liquidated damages, interest, attorneys'
fees and costs.

Defendants own, operate, or control "West New Malaysia" in Bowery
NY where Cruz has been employed as a delivery worker, food preparer
and a cook. He claims to have spent more than 20% of his time
performing non-tipped duties such as opening and closing the
restaurant, rolling silverware, performing side work, and other
non-tipped duties, which usually is in excess of forty hours per
week but did not receive overtime pay for this. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michael Faillace, Esq.
      MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
      60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
      New York, NY 10165
      Tel: (212) 317-1200
      Email: Faillace@employmentcompliance.com



YORK FOOD CORP: Polanco Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
-------------------------------------------------------
Victoria Polanco, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. YORK FOOD CORP. d/b/a FALUCKA, LE
SOUK INC., and MARCUS ANDREWS, SAMIR JACOB, and LAMIA FUNTI, as
individuals, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-08815 (S.D. N.Y., Sept.
23, 2019) is an action against Defendants to recover damages for
violations of state and federal wage and hour laws arising out of
Plaintiff's employment under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
New York Labor Law.

Although Plaintiff worked approximately 55 to 60 hours or more per
week during her employment by Defendants from in or around
September 2013 until in or around June 2018, Defendants did not pay
Plaintiff time and a half for hours worked over 40, a blatant
violation of the overtime provisions contained in the FLSA and
NYLL, says the complaint.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendants from November 2009 until June
2018.

YORK FOOD CORP. d/b/a FALUCKA, is a corporation organized under the
laws of New York with a principal executive office formerly located
at 162 Bleecker Street, New York, NY 10012.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Roman Avshalumov, Esq.
     Helen F. Dalton & Associated, P.C.
     80—02 Kew Gardens Road, Suite 601
     Kew Gardens, NY 11415
     Phone: 718-263-9591
     Fax: 718-263-9598


ZEBRA TECHNOLOGIES: Warren Suit Moved to Northern Dist. of Illinois
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge A. Kathleen Tomlinson of the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of New York granted the Defendants'
motion, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a), to transfer the
case, CITY OF WARREN POLICE AND FIRE RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff, v. ZEBRA TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION ANDERS GUSTAFSSON and
MICHAEL C. SMILEY, Defendants, Case No. CV 17-4412 (SJF) (AKT)
(E.D. N.Y.), to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois.

The putative securities fraud class action is brought on behalf of
all persons who purchased Zebra common stock between Nov. 4, 2014
and Nov. 9, 2014.  Lead plaintiff, the City of Warren Police and
Fire Retirement System, alleges that Defendant Zebra and certain
former Zebra executive officers violated sections 10(b) and 20(a)
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 10b-5,
promulgated thereunder.  Specifically, the Plaintiff asserts that
following Zebra's acquisition of Motorola Solutions Inc.'s
Enterprise division, the Defendants made misleading statements of
material fact in Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings,
press releases, and earnings calls regarding, inter alia, the costs
associated with integrating Enterprise into the Company.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants made misleading
statements in SEC filings and press releases -- and on earnings
calls -- about the success and progress of the Company's
integration efforts despite knowing, or recklessly disregarding,
among other things, (1) the significant costs associated with
completing the acquisition, (2) substantial and costly problems
associated with integration and data migration, and (3)
deficiencies in Zebra's internal controls over financial reporting.
See generally CAC.  Essentially, the Plaintiff maintains that
Defendants' statements following the acquisition artificially
inflated the market price of Zebra's common stock and ultimately
harmed Zebra shareholders.

Although the class has not yet been certified, the Plaintiff seeks
to represent all persons who purchased Zebra common stock between
Nov. 4, 2014 and Nov. 9, 2015, inclusive and who were damaged
thereby.

The Plaintiff is located in Michigan.  Zebra is incorporated in the
State of Delaware and maintains its headquarters and principal
executive offices in Lincolnshire, Illinois.  Individual Defendants
Anders Gustafsson, who has served as Zebra's CEO since Sept. 4,
2007, and Michael C. Smiley, who served as Zebra's CFO from May 1,
2008 through Nov. 16, 2016, both maintained their offices at the
Company's headquarters in Lincolnshire, Illinois at all relevant
times.  Zebra's Investor Relations, Finance, Sales and Marketing,
and Legal departments are all based at the Company's headquarters
in Lincolnshire, Illinois.

Zebra's Enterprise Visibility & Mobility unit ("EVM"), formerly
Enterprise, which is central to the action, is located in
Holtsville, New York, where Enterprise maintained its headquarters
prior to the acquisition.  EVM's operation consists of a large
laboratory and warehouse facility and employs 800 people.  Zebra's
head of EVM, Bill Burns, has worked out of Holtsville, New York
since being named Senior Vice President of EVM in June of 2015 and
reports directly to CEO Anders Gustafsson.  Zebra also maintains an
unrelated facility, the former Hart Systems operations, in
Hauppauge, New York.

Magistrate Judge Tomlinson holds that the instant action is a
typical securities-fraud case.  It is a putative class action
brought against Zebra and senior Zebra officers based on alleged
misrepresentations in, and omissions from, statements originating
at Zebra's Illinois headquarters.  Moreover, most of the Individual
Defendants, whose conduct is perhaps most essential here are based
in Illinois.  These factors all weigh in favor of transfer.

The Plaintiff argued that the case ought to remain in the Eastern
District of New York because Enterprise, the acquisition of which
is at the essence of the case, is based in the Eastern District of
New York.  The Plaintiff maintained that the statements at issue in
the litigation largely concerned conduct that was very likely
taking place in Holtsville, New York.

Whatever the basis of the statements at issue, the Magistrate holds
that the case remains a securities-fraud action, which requires the
Plaintiff to prove that the Defendants knowingly or recklessly
disregarded the costs associated with the integration of Enterprise
and, as a result, issued statements that were false or misleading.
The locus of these operative facts is Illinois.  Moreover,
transfers of securities fraud class actions to the district where
the issuer is headquartered are "routine."

Based on the foregoing analysis of the relevant factors, Magistrate
Judge Tomlinson concludes that the Defendants have made the
requisite showing that transfer is warranted.  She granted their
motion and directed the Clerk of Court to transfer the case,
including all related consolidated actions, to the Northern
District of Illinois.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2019 Memorandum and Order
Order is available at https://is.gd/plKHyb from Leagle.com.

City of Warren Police and Fire Retirement System, Individually and
on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented
by Alan I. Ellman -- aellman@labaton.com -- Labaton Sucharow LLP,
David A. Rosenfeld -- drosenfeld@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller
Rudman & Dowd LLP, Robert D. Gerson -- rgerson@grdlaw.com --
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP & Samuel H. Rudman --
srudman@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.

Zebra Technologies Corporation, Anders Gustafsson & Michael C.
Smiley, Defendants, represented by Andrew W. Stern --
astern@sidley.com -- Sidley Austin Llp, James Wallace Ducayet --
jducayet@sidley.com -- Sidley Austin LLP & Walter C. Carlson --
wcarlson@sidley.com -- Sidley Austin LLP.

Gerardo Birkenfeld, Movant, represented by Kim E. Miller --
kim.miller@ksfcounsel.com -- Kahn Swick & Foti, Llc.

City of Taylor Police and Fire Retirement System, Movant,
represented by David A. Rosenfeld, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP
& Lindsay K. La Marca -- llamarca@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller
Rudman & Dowd LLP.

Steve Sylvander, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Movant, represented by Adam M. Apton -- aapton@zlk.com --
Levi & Korsinsky, LLP & Nicholas Porritt -- nporritt@zlk.com --
Levi & Korsinsky Llp.


                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: 111 Suits v Sempra Energy Units Pending at July 29
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Sempra Energy's units have 111 asbestos-related personal injury
lawsuits pending as of July 29, 2019, according to the Company's
Form 10-Q filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on
August 2, 2019, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019.

The Company states, "Certain EFH subsidiaries that we acquired as
part of the Merger are defendants in personal injury lawsuits
brought in state courts throughout the U.S. As of July 29, 2019,
111 such lawsuits are pending and 1,685 such lawsuits have been
filed but not served.  These cases allege illness or death as a
result of exposure to asbestos in power plants designed and/or
built by companies whose assets were purchased by predecessor
entities to the EFH subsidiaries, and generally assert claims for
product defects, negligence, strict liability and wrongful death.
They seek compensatory and punitive damages.  Additionally, in
connection with the EFH bankruptcy proceeding, approximately 28,000
proofs of claim were filed on behalf of persons who allege exposure
to asbestos under similar circumstances and assert the right to
file such lawsuits in the future.  We anticipate additional
lawsuits will be filed.  None of these claims or lawsuits were
discharged in the EFH bankruptcy proceeding."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/dVeepZ


ASBESTOS UPDATE: 198 Cases vs. CECO Still Pending at June 30
------------------------------------------------------------
CECO Environmental Corp. is still facing 198 asbestos-related cases
pending as of June 30, 2019, according to the Company's Form 10-Q
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019.

The Company states, "Our subsidiary, Met-Pro Technologies LLC
("Met-Pro"), beginning in 2002, began to be named in
asbestos-related lawsuits filed against a large number of
industrial companies including, in particular, those in the pump
and fluid handling industries.  In management's opinion, the
complaints typically have been vague, general and speculative,
alleging that Met-Pro, along with the numerous other defendants,
sold unidentified asbestos-containing products and engaged in other
related actions which caused injuries (including death) and loss to
the plaintiffs.  Counsel has advised that more recent cases
typically allege more serious claims of mesothelioma.  The
Company's insurers have hired attorneys who, together with the
Company, are vigorously defending these cases.  Many cases have
been dismissed after the plaintiff fails to produce evidence of
exposure to Met-Pro's products.  In those cases, where evidence has
been produced, the Company's experience has been that the exposure
levels are low and the Company's position has been that its
products were not a cause of death, injury or loss.  The Company
has been dismissed from or settled a large number of these cases.
Cumulative settlement payments from 2002 through June 30, 2019 for
cases involving asbestos-related claims were US$2.9 million, of
which, together with all legal fees other than corporate counsel
expenses, US$2.8 million has been paid by the Company's insurers.
The average cost per settled claim, excluding legal fees, was
approximately US$35,000.

"Based upon the most recent information available to the Company
regarding such claims, there were a total of 198 cases pending
against the Company as of June 30, 2019 (with Illinois, New York,
Pennsylvania and West Virginia having the largest number of cases),
as compared with 208 cases that were pending as of December 31,
2018.  During the six-months ended June 30, 2019, 24 new cases were
filed against the Company, and the Company was dismissed from 28
cases and settled six cases.  Most of the pending cases have not
advanced beyond the early stages of discovery, although a number of
cases are on schedules leading to or scheduled for trial.  The
Company believes that its insurance coverage is adequate for the
cases currently pending against the Company and for the foreseeable
future, assuming a continuation of the current volume, nature of
cases and settlement amounts.  However, the Company has no control
over the number and nature of cases that are filed against it, nor
as to the financial health of its insurers or their position as to
coverage.  The Company also presently believes that none of the
pending cases will have a material adverse impact upon the
Company's results of operations, liquidity or financial
condition."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/e6DNm7


ASBESTOS UPDATE: AMETEK Inc. Still Defends Lawsuits at June 30
--------------------------------------------------------------
AMETEK, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2019, that to date, no judgments have been rendered
against the Company as a result of any asbestos-related lawsuit.

AMETEK states, "The Company (including its subsidiaries) has been
named as a defendant in a number of asbestos-related lawsuits.
Certain of these lawsuits relate to a business which was acquired
by the Company and do not involve products which were manufactured
or sold by the Company.  In connection with these lawsuits, the
seller of such business has agreed to indemnify the Company against
these claims (the "Indemnified Claims").

"The Indemnified Claims have been tendered to, and are being
defended by, such seller.  The seller has met its obligations, in
all respects, and the Company does not have any reason to believe
such party would fail to fulfill its obligations in the future.

"To date, no judgments have been rendered against the Company as a
result of any asbestos-related lawsuit.  The Company believes that
it has good and valid defenses to each of these claims and intends
to defend them vigorously."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/P8yiHQ


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Aurora Pump's Appeal in Colado Case Withdrawn
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case styled In Re: New York City Asbestos Litigation, Donna
Colado, As Personal Representative for the Estate of Gerald E.
Colado, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Aurora Pump Company,
Defendant-Appellant, Armstrong International, et al., Defendants,
Motion No. M-3439, Index No. 190380/17, (N.Y. App. Div.), the
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York has withdrawn
the appeal taken from an order of the New York County Supreme
Court, in accordance with the July 19, 2019 stipulation of the
parties.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Carter P.I. Claims vs. Warren Pump Dismissed
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Lisa Godbey Wood of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Georgia granted Warren Pump, Inc.'s Motion for Summary
Judgment and dismissed Warren from the case entitled Sheila B.
Carter, Individually and as Executrix of the Estate of James R.
Carter, Decedent, Plaintiff, v. 3M f/k/a Minnesota Mining &
Manufacturing Company; Warren Pump, Inc.; et al. Defendants, No. CV
2:18-100, (S.D. Ga.).

The case is an action to recover for personal injury suffered by
the Deceased, James R. Carter, the Deceased, who contracted lung
cancer and died from said cancer because of his exposure to
asbestos dust, fibers, and particles. Plaintiff alleges that the
Deceased was exposed to numerous asbestos-containing products
during his long career (from 1968 to 2010) at the ITT Rayonier
Plant in Jesup, Georgia.

Due to the Deceased's alleged exposure to and death from asbestos
dust, fibers, and particles from Warren pumps, Plaintiff has set
forth Georgia state law claims against Warren for negligence and
strict liability (and a derivative claim for spousal loss of
society and consortium).

The Deceased passed away prior to the commencement of the action,
but his co-worker, Larry Madray, was deposed as part of discovery
in this action. While Madray testified that pumps manufactured by
Warren were near where he and the Deceased worked as caustic
helpers at the ITT Rayonier Plant, Madray testified that he did not
have any specific recollections of the Deceased "being near pumps
while they were being fixed or replaced by maintenance." Further,
Madray could not say whether the Deceased ever worked on Warren
pumps at the ITT Rayonier Plant. Finally, Madray never testified
that Warren pumps contained asbestos, whether in the form of dust,
fibers, or particles.

Pursuant to the Georgia Court of Appeals decision in Williams v.
Flintkote Co., 568 S.E.2d 106 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002), the Court finds
Plaintiff's claims fail as a matter of law. In the case of
Williams, one of the defendants moved for summary judgment on the
plaintiffs' claims of negligence and strict liability that were
based in allegations that the plaintiffs "suffered injury from
exposure to asbestos-containing products sold or distributed by the
defendants." The court recognized that "to avoid summary judgment,
the plaintiffs needed to present evidence that the defendant's
asbestos-containing product was used at the Muscogee and/or Opelika
plants," which is where one of the plaintiffs worked. In thi case,
the plaintiffs provided no evidence that the defendant's products
"contained asbestos" -- "in fact, neither plaintiff had heard of
the defendant."

Like in this case, Warren has shown that the record does not
contain evidence that its products at the ITT Rayonier Plant in
Jesup contained asbestos. Warren has shown that based on this
record there is an absence of a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether it manufactured asbestos-containing products to which
the Deceased was exposed. Because Warren has met its burden on this
issue, the burden shifts to the nonmovant, Plaintiff, to show
evidence creating a genuine dispute on this material fact.
Plaintiff, however, has not responded to Warren's Motion for
Summary Judgment. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not met her burden at
this stage.

Sheila B. Carter, Individually and as Executrix of the Estate of
James R. Carter, Decedent, Plaintiff, represented by David Adam
Harper -- adam@sutherslaw.com -- Suthers Law Firm, John E. Guerry,
III -- rguerry@motleyrice.com -- Motley Rice, LLC, pro hac vice &
John E. Suthers -- jes@sutherslaw.com -- Suthers & Thompson.

Bayer Cropscience, Inc., a Delaware Corporation & Union Carbide
Corporation, a Delaware Corporation, Defendants, represented by
Philip Aaron Sandick -- phil.sandick@alston.com -- Alston & Bird &
Catherine Payne -- catherine.payne@alston.com -- Alston & Bird.

CBS Corporation, a Delaware Corporation & Ingersoll-Rand Company, a
Delaware Corporation, Defendants, represented by Ivan A. Gustafson
-- iagustafson@ewhlaw.com -- Evert, Weathersby & Houff, LLC &
Frances Laura Spinelli -- flspinelli@ewhlaw.com -- Evert,
Weathersby & Houff, LLC.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Cruz Claims vs. Gerdau Dismissed Without Prejudice
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Michael A. Shipp of U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey granted Plaintiff Juan Cruz's pro se application to
proceed with his case styled Juan Cruz, Plaintiff, v. Gerdau,
Defendant, Civil Action No. 18-1385, (D.N.J.), without prepayment
of fees due to indigence.

The Court, however, dismisses the Complaint, for following
reasons:

     (A) Plaintiff's Complaint states that the Court has federal
question jurisdiction, however, Plaintiff does not provide the
Federal law or Constitutional provision through which he seeks to
proceed.

     (B) Plaintiff fails to provide sufficient factual support for
his claims. In a single sentence, Plaintiff appears to argue that
Defendant -- Gerdau -- failed to provide him with protective
equipment, and therefore, he was exposed to "metal, dust, and
fumes" and that the "equipment used to move steel is unsafe." It is
unclear from the Complaint, however, what Plaintiff's employment
was, as well as how and why Plaintiff was exposed to such hazards.
The Complaint also fails to allege the relationship between
Plaintiff and Gerdau.

Accordingly, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's Complaint without
prejudice for filing an Amended Complaint adhering to Rule 8(a)'s
pleading requirements.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Duke Energy Carolinas Had 195 Claims at June 30
----------------------------------------------------------------
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, faces a total of 195 asserted claims
related to asbestos exposure as of June 30, 2019, according to Duke
Energy Corporation's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019.

The Company states, "Duke Energy Carolinas has experienced numerous
claims for indemnification and medical cost reimbursement related
to asbestos exposure.  These claims relate to damages for bodily
injuries alleged to have arisen from exposure to or use of asbestos
in connection with construction and maintenance activities
conducted on its electric generation plants prior to 1985.  As of
June 30, 2019, there were 145 asserted claims for non-malignant
cases with cumulative relief sought of up to US$38 million, and 50
asserted claims for malignant cases with cumulative relief sought
of up to US$16 million.  Based on Duke Energy Carolinas'
experience, it is expected that the ultimate resolution of most of
these claims likely will be less than the amount claimed."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/H7Y0Xd


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Duke Energy Carolinas Has $607MM Liabilities
-------------------------------------------------------------
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC has recognized asbestos-related reserves
of US$607 million at June 30, 2019, according to Duke Energy
Corporation's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019.

The Company states, "Duke Energy Carolinas has recognized
asbestos-related reserves of US$607 million at June 30, 2019, and
US$630 million at December 31, 2018.  These reserves are classified
in Other within Other Noncurrent Liabilities and Other within
Current Liabilities on the Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets.
These reserves are based upon Duke Energy Carolinas' best estimate
for current and future asbestos claims through 2038 and are
recorded on an undiscounted basis.  In light of the uncertainties
inherent in a longer-term forecast, management does not believe
they can reasonably estimate the indemnity and medical costs that
might be incurred after 2038 related to such potential claims.  It
is possible Duke Energy Carolinas may incur asbestos liabilities in
excess of the recorded reserves.

"Duke Energy Carolinas has third-party insurance to cover certain
losses related to asbestos-related injuries and damages above an
aggregate self-insured retention.  Duke Energy Carolinas'
cumulative payments began to exceed the self-insured retention in
2008.  Future payments up to the policy limit will be reimbursed by
the third-party insurance carrier.  The insurance policy limit for
potential future insurance recoveries indemnification and medical
cost claim payments is US$764 million in excess of the self-insured
retention.  Receivables for insurance recoveries were US$739
million at June 30, 2019, and December 31, 2018.  These amounts are
classified in Other within Other Noncurrent Assets and Receivables
within Current Assets on the Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets.
Duke Energy Carolinas is not aware of any uncertainties regarding
the legal sufficiency of insurance claims.  Duke Energy Carolinas
believes the insurance recovery asset is probable of recovery as
the insurance carrier continues to have a strong financial strength
rating."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/H7Y0Xd


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Enpro Had $11.3MM Asbestos Coverage at June 30
---------------------------------------------------------------
Enpro Industries, Inc. had approximately US$11.3 million of
insurance coverage for asbestos claims payments and certain expense
payments as of June 30, 2019, according to the Company's Form 10-Q
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2019.

The Company states, "The historical business operations of certain
of our subsidiaries resulted in a substantial volume of asbestos
litigation in which plaintiffs alleged personal injury or death as
a result of exposure to asbestos fibers.  In 2010, certain of these
subsidiaries, including Garlock Sealing Technologies, LLC ("GST"),
filed voluntary petitions for reorganization under Chapter 11 of
the United States Bankruptcy Code in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the Western District of North Carolina (the "Bankruptcy Court").
An additional subsidiary filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition
with the Bankruptcy Court in 2017.  The filings were part of a
claims resolution process for an efficient and permanent resolution
of all pending and future asbestos claims through court approval of
a plan of reorganization to establish a facility to resolve and pay
these asbestos claims.

"These claims against GST and other subsidiaries were resolved
pursuant to a joint plan of reorganization (the "Joint Plan") filed
with the Bankruptcy Court which was consummated on July 29, 2017.
Under the Joint Plan, GST and EnPro Holdings retained their rights
to seek reimbursement under insurance policies for any amounts they
have paid in the past to resolve asbestos claims, including
contributions made to the asbestos claims resolution trust
established under the Joint Plan (the "Trust").  These policies
include a number of primary and excess general liability insurance
policies that were purchased by EnPro Holdings and were in effect
prior to January 1, 1976 (the "Pre-Garlock Coverage Block").  The
policies provide coverage for "occurrences" happening during the
policy periods and cover losses associated with product liability
claims against EnPro Holdings and certain of its subsidiaries.
Asbestos claims against GST are not covered under these policies
because GST was not a subsidiary of EnPro Holdings prior to 1976.
The Joint Plan provides that EnPro Holdings may retain the first
US$25 million of any settlements and judgments collected for
non-GST asbestos claims related to insurance policies in the
Pre-Garlock Coverage Block and EnPro Holdings and the Trust will
share equally in any settlements and judgments EnPro Holdings may
collect in excess of US$25 million.  To date, EnPro Holdings has
collected almost US$22 million in settlements for non-GST asbestos
claims from the Pre-Garlock Coverage Block and anticipates further
collections once the Trust begins making claims payments.

"As of June 30, 2019, approximately US$11.3 million of available
products hazard limits or insurance receivables existed under
primary and excess general liability insurance policies other than
the Pre-Garlock Coverage Block (the "Garlock Coverage Block") from
solvent carriers with investment grade ratings, which we believe is
available to cover GST asbestos claims payments and certain expense
payments, including contributions to the Trust.  We consider such
amount of available insurance coverage under the Garlock Coverage
Block to be of high quality because the insurance policies are
written or guaranteed by U.S.-based carriers whose credit rating by
S&P is investment grade (BBB-) or better, and whose AM Best rating
is excellent (A-) or better.  The remaining US$11.3 million is
available to pending and estimated future claims.  There are
specific agreements in place with carriers regarding the remaining
available coverage.  Based on those agreements and the terms of the
policies in place and prior decisions concerning coverage, we
believe that all of the US$11.3 million of insurance proceeds will
ultimately be collected, although there can be no assurance that
the insurance companies will make the payments as and when due.
Assuming the insurers pay according to the agreements and policies,
we anticipate that the following additional amounts should be
collected in the years set out below:

   * 2019 - US$8.8 million
   * 2020 - US$2.5 million

"We also believe that EnPro Holdings will bill, and could collect
over time, as much as US$10 million of insurance coverage for
non-GST asbestos claims to reimburse it for Trust payments to
non-GST Trust claimants.  After EnPro Holdings collects the first
approximately US$3 million of that coverage, remaining collections
for non-GST asbestos claims from the Pre-Garlock Coverage Block
will be shared equally with the Trust.

"GST has received US$8.8 million of insurance recoveries from
insolvent carriers since 2007, and may receive additional payments
from insolvent carriers in the future.  No anticipated insolvent
carrier collections are included in the US$11.3 million of
anticipated collections.  The insurance available to cover current
and future asbestos claims is from comprehensive general liability
policies that cover EnPro Holdings and certain of its other
subsidiaries in addition to GST for periods prior to 1985 and
therefore could be subject to potential competing claims of other
covered subsidiaries and their assignees."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/ZixaML


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Foushee Discovery Must be Completed on Dec. 10
---------------------------------------------------------------
Pursuant to the Consent Motion of the Parties for an Amended
Discovery Scheduling Order, Judge James C. Dever, III of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina ordered
the discovery scheduling order to be amended as follows:

      (a) All discovery will be completed by Dec. 10, 2019;

      (b) The parties will conduct a mediated settlement conference
on or before Dec. 20, 2019;

      (c) The matter will be trial ready by February 1, 2020.

      (d) The parties may modify any of the terms of this Order,
except the trial date, by written consent or upon Order of the
Court upon a showing of good cause.

The case is Belinda Lipscomb Foushee, Individually and as Executrix
of the Estate of Anneka Foushee, Plaintiff, v. R.T. Vanderbilt
Holding Company, Inc. Indiv. and as Successor in Interest to R.T.
Vanderbilt Holding Company, Inc., and Vanderbilt Minerals, LLC
f/k/a R.T. Vanderbilt, Individually and as Successor in Interest to
INTERNATIONAL TALC CO., Defendants, Civil Action No. 5:17-CV-71-D,
(E.D.N.C.).

Belinda Lipscomb Foushee, as Personal Representative of the Estate
of Anneka Foushee, Plaintiff, represented by Donald P. Blydenburgh
, Levy Konigsberg, LLP, Edward L. Pauley --
epauley@wallacegraham.com -- Wallace and Graham, P.A., Mona Lisa
Wallace -- mwallace@wallacegraham.com -- Wallace and Graham, P.A.,
Patrick I. Andrews , Levy Konigsberg, LLP & William M. Graham ,
Wallace & Graham, PA.

R.T. Vanderbilt Holding Company, Inc., Individually and as
Successor in Interest to R.T. Vanderbilt Company, Inc. & Vanderbilt
Minerals, LLC, f/k/a R.T. Vanderbilt Company, Inc., Individually
and as Successor in Interest to International Talc Co., Defendants,
represented by Gerald A. Stein, II -- astein@hedrickgardner.com --
Hedrick, Gardner, Kincheloe & Garofalo, LLP, Hatcher B. Kincheloe
-- hkincheloe@hedrickgardner.com -- Hedrick, Gardner, Kincheloe &
Garofalo, LLP & David L. Levy -- dlevy@hedrickgardner.com --
Hedrick Gardner Kincheloe & Garofalo LLP.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Hartford Financial Still Faces Claims at June 30
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc. continues to face
asbestos-related claims and actions, according to the Company's
Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2019.

The Company states, "The Hartford also has been joined in actions
by asbestos plaintiffs asserting, among other things, that insurers
had a duty to protect the public from the dangers of asbestos and
that insurers committed unfair trade practices by asserting
defenses on behalf of their policyholders in the underlying
asbestos cases.  Management expects that the ultimate liability, if
any, with respect to such lawsuits, after consideration of
provisions made for estimated losses, will not be material to the
consolidated financial condition of The Hartford.  Nonetheless,
given the large or indeterminate amounts sought in certain of these
actions, and the inherent unpredictability of litigation, the
outcome in certain matters could, from time to time, have a
material adverse effect on the Company's results of operations or
cash flows in particular quarterly or annual periods.

"The Company continues to receive asbestos and environmental
("A&E") claims.  Asbestos claims relate primarily to bodily
injuries asserted by people who came in contact with asbestos or
products containing asbestos.  Environmental claims relate
primarily to pollution and related clean-up costs.

"The vast majority of the Company's exposure to A&E relates to
policy coverages provided prior to 1986.  These exposures, together
with certain exposures to latent environmental claims under general
liability policies sold after 1986, are reported in Property &
Casualty Other Operations ("Run-off A&E").  In addition, as part of
its on-going operations, the Company writes environmental and
pollution liability coverages.

"Prior to 1986, the Company wrote several different categories of
insurance contracts that may cover A&E claims.  First, the Company
wrote primary policies providing the first layer of coverage in an
insured's liability program.  Second, the Company wrote excess and
umbrella policies providing higher layers of coverage for losses
that exhaust the limits of underlying coverage.  Third, the Company
acted as a reinsurer assuming a portion of those risks assumed by
other insurers writing primary, excess, umbrella and reinsurance
coverages.

"Significant uncertainty limits the ability of insurers and
reinsurers to estimate the ultimate reserves necessary for unpaid
gross losses and expenses related to environmental and particularly
asbestos claims.  The degree of variability of gross reserve
estimates for these exposures is significantly greater than for
other more traditional exposures.

"In the case of the reserves for asbestos exposures, factors
contributing to the high degree of uncertainty include inadequate
loss development patterns, plaintiffs' expanding theories of
liability, the risks inherent in major litigation, and inconsistent
emerging legal doctrines.  Furthermore, over time, insurers,
including the Company, have experienced significant changes in the
rate at which asbestos claims are brought, the claims experience of
particular insureds, and the value of claims, making predictions of
future exposure from past experience uncertain.  Plaintiffs and
insureds also have sought to use bankruptcy proceedings, including
"pre-packaged" bankruptcies, to accelerate and increase loss
payments by insurers.  In addition, some policyholders have
asserted new classes of claims for coverages to which an aggregate
limit of liability may not apply.  Further uncertainties include
insolvencies of other carriers and unanticipated developments
pertaining to the Company's ability to recover reinsurance for A&E
claims.  Management believes these issues are not likely to be
resolved in the near future.

"For its Run-off A&E, as of June 30, 2019, the Company reported
US$935 million of net asbestos reserves and US$139 million of net
environmental reserves.  While the Company believes that its
current Run-off A&E reserves are appropriate, significant
uncertainties limit our ability to estimate the ultimate reserves
necessary for unpaid losses and related expenses.  The ultimate
liabilities, thus, could exceed the currently recorded reserves,
and any such additional liability, while not reasonably estimable
now, could be material to The Hartford's consolidated operating
results and liquidity."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/L3Kjww


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Janis Claims vs. Georgia Pacific, et al. Dismissed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Maryellen Noreika of the U.S. District for the District of
Delaware dismissed Georgia Pacific LLC, Grinnell LLC, and
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company from the case entitled Earl
Janis, Jr. and Toni Janis, Plaintiffs, v. A.W. Chesterton, Inc., et
al., Defendants, C.A. No. 17-167 (MN) (SRF), (Del.) with prejudice.


On Aug. 20, 2019, Magistrate Judge Fallon issued a Report and
Recommendation for Order of Dismissal, recommending the Complaint
be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) for
failure to prosecute claims against Georgia Pacific, Grinnell, and
MetLife and for failure to respond to the Order to Show Cause.
Judge Noreika adopted the Report and Recommendation for Order of
Dismissal.

Earl Janis, Jr. & Toni Janis, Plaintiffs, represented by R. Joseph
Hrubiec , Napoli Shkolnik, LLC.

Georgia Pacific, LLC, formerly known as Georgia-Pacific
Corporation, Defendant, represented by Jason A. Cincilla --
jcincilla@mgmlaw.com -- Manning Gross + Massenburg LLP, Amaryah K.
Bocchino -- abocchino@mgmlaw.com -- Manning Gross + Massenburg LLP,
Irina N. Luzhatsky -- iluzhatsky@mgmlaw.com -- Manning Gross +
Massenburg LLP & Whitney L. Frame , Manning Gross + Massenburg
LLP.

Georgia Pacific, LLC, Cross Defendant, represented by Whitney L.
Frame , Manning Gross + Massenburg LLP.



ASBESTOS UPDATE: Kaiser Gypsum Trust to Get $49MM Cash, $1MM Note
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc. and Hanson Permanente Cement, Inc.
filed with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of
North Carolina, Charlotte Division, a disclosure statement
explaining their third amended joint chapter 11 plan of
reorganization.

Each allowed claim holder in Class 1 will receive an equal amount
of cash to such allowed claim unless the holder accords to less
favorable treatment.  Three shall receive an equal amount of cash
to such allowed claim which includes any post-petition interest as
the bankruptcy court orders unless the claim order accords to less
favorable treatment.
The asbestos trust to be created under the Plan will be funded with
a $49 million cash payment by the Debtors and Lehigh Hanson, plus a
$1 million note, as well as the assignment of the Debtors' rights
under insurance policies covering Asbestos Personal Injury Claims.


The Debtors' agreement with the United States also resolved the
following claims filed by the Ash Grove Cement Co. on behalf of the
United States: (a) Proof of Claim No. 648, EPA in the amount of
$325,000 against Kaiser Gypsum; (b) Proof of Claim No. 653, EPA in
the amount of $325,000 against HPCI; (c) Proof of Claim No. 651,
NOAA in the amount of $50,000 against Kaiser Gypsum; (d) Proof of
Claim No. 650, NOAA in the amount of $50,000 against HPCI; (e)
Proof of Claim No. 649, DOI in the amount of $50,000 against Kaiser
Gypsum; and (f) Proof of Claim No. 652, DOI in the amount of
$50,000 against HPCI.

In particular, the estimated aggregate Allowed amount of General
Unsecured Claims is $72,055,928. Pursuant to the settlements with
insurers resolving the Debtors' claims for
environmental insurance coverage, the insurers will pay a total of
$50.1 million to the Debtors. The Debtors believe that this amount,
together with Lehigh Hanson's agreed contribution of up to $28.15
million, will be sufficient to satisfy the estimated aggregate
Allowed amount of General Unsecured Claims.

A full-text copy of the Third Amended Disclosure Statement is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y5nlq5z3 from PacerMonitor.com at
no charge.

The Debtors are represented by Edwin Harron and Sharon Zieg of
Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP and Felton Parish of Hull &
Chandler.

Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc., and affiliate Hanson Permanente
Cement, Inc. sought protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code (Bankr. W.D.N.C. Case Nos. 16-31602 and 16-10414) on Sept. 30,
2016.  The petitions were signed by Charles E. McChesney, II,
vice-president and secretary.

The companies are represented by Rayburn Cooper & Durham P.A. and
Jones Day.  Cook Law Firm, P.C. and K&L Gates LLP serve as special
insurance counsel; NERA Economic Consulting as consultant; Miller
Nash Graham & Dunn LLP as special environmental and insurance
counsel; and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as financial advisors.

At the time of the bankruptcy filing, Kaiser and Hanson estimated
their assets and liabilities at $100 million to $500 million.  

Kaiser's principal business consisted of manufacturing and
marketing gypsum plaster, gypsum lath and gypsum wallboard.  The
company has no current business operations other than managing its
legacy asbestos-related and environmental liabilities.  The company
has no material tangible assets.

HPCI's primary business was the manufacture and sale of Portland
cement products. It is a wholly-owned, indirect subsidiary of
non-debtor Lehigh Hanson, Inc.

HPCI is the direct parent of Kaiser Gypsum as well as non-debtor
Hanson Micronesia Cement, Inc. and non-debtor Hanson Permanente
Cement of Guam, Inc., the operating subsidiaries.  Non-debtor
Permanente Cement Company, which has no assets or operations, is
also a wholly-owned subsidiary of HPCI.

The Office of the U.S. Trustee appointed three creditors to serve
on the official committee of unsecured creditors in the Chapter 11
case of Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc.  The Creditors Committee hired
Blank Rome LLP as counsel, and Moon Wright & Houston, PLLC.

An Official Committee of Asbestos Personal Injury Claimants
retained Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, as its counsel.

Lawrence Fitzpatrick, the Future Claimants' Representative, tapped
Ankura Consulting Group, LLC as his claims evaluation consultant;
Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP as attorney; and Hull &
Chandler, P.A. as local counsel.

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Mallinckrodt Had 11,700 PI Cases at June 28
------------------------------------------------------------
Mallinckrodt plc continues to defend itself against approximately
11,700 asbestos-related cases pending as of June 28, 2019,
according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 28, 2019.

The Company states, "Beginning with lawsuits brought in July 1976,
the Company is named as a defendant in personal injury lawsuits
based on alleged exposure to asbestos-containing materials.  A
majority of the cases involve product liability claims based
principally on allegations of past distribution of products
containing asbestos.  A limited number of the cases allege premises
liability based on claims that individuals were exposed to asbestos
while on the Company's property.  Each case typically names dozens
of corporate defendants in addition to the Company.  The complaints
generally seek monetary damages for personal injury or bodily
injury resulting from alleged exposure to products containing
asbestos.  The Company's involvement in asbestos cases has been
limited because it did not mine or produce asbestos.  Furthermore,
in the Company's experience, a large percentage of these claims
have never been substantiated and have been dismissed by the
courts.  The Company has not suffered an adverse verdict in a trial
court proceeding related to asbestos claims and intends to continue
to defend these lawsuits.  When appropriate, the Company settles
claims; however, amounts paid to settle and defend all asbestos
claims have been immaterial.  As of June 28, 2019, there were
approximately 11,700 asbestos-related cases pending against the
Company.

"The Company estimates pending asbestos claims, claims that were
incurred but not reported and related insurance recoveries, which
are recorded on a gross basis in the unaudited condensed
consolidated balance sheets.  The Company's estimate of its
liability for pending and future claims is based on claims
experience over the past five years and covers claims either
currently filed or expected to be filed over the next seven years.
The Company believes that it has adequate amounts recorded related
to these matters.  While it is not possible at this time to
determine with certainty the ultimate outcome of these
asbestos-related proceedings, the Company believes, given the
information currently available, that the ultimate resolution of
all known and anticipated future claims, after taking into account
amounts already accrued, along with recoveries from insurance, will
not have a material adverse effect on its financial condition,
results of operations and cash flows."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/cn2YqJ


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Rogers Corp. Estimates $70.8MM Liability at June30
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Rogers Corporation estimates US$70.8 million asbestos-related
liability as of June 30, 2019, for all current and future claims
through 2058, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2019.

As of June 30, 2019, the projected asbestos-related insurance
receivables were US$64.4 million.

The Company states, "We recognize a liability for asbestos-related
contingencies that are probable of occurrence and reasonably
estimable.  In connection with the recognition of liabilities for
asbestos-related matters, we record asbestos-related insurance
receivables that are deemed probable.

"The liability projection period covers all current and future
claims through 2058, which represents the expected end of our
asbestos liability exposure with no further ongoing claims expected
beyond that date.  This conclusion was based on our history and
experience with the claims data, the diminished volatility and
consistency of observable claims data, the period of time that has
elapsed since we stopped manufacturing products that contained
encapsulated asbestos and an expected downward trend in claims due
to the average age of our claimants, which is approaching the
average life expectancy.

"To date, the defense and settlement costs of our asbestos-related
product liability litigation have been substantially covered by
insurance.  Although we have exhausted coverage under some of our
insurance policies, we believe that we have applicable primary,
excess and/or umbrella coverage for claims arising with respect to
most of the years during which we manufactured and marketed
asbestos-containing products.  In addition, we have entered into a
cost sharing agreement with most of our primary, excess and
umbrella insurance carriers to facilitate the ongoing
administration and payment of claims covered by the carriers.  The
cost sharing agreement may be terminated by any party, but will
continue until a party elects to terminate it.  As of the filing
date for this report, the agreement has not been terminated, and no
carrier had informed us it intended to terminate the agreement.  We
expect to continue to exhaust individual primary, excess and
umbrella coverages over time, and there is no assurance that such
exhaustion will not accelerate due to additional claims, damages
and settlements or that coverage will be available as expected.  We
are responsible for uninsured defense, indemnity and settlement
costs, and we incurred an immaterial amount of expenses for each of
the three- and six-month periods ended June 30, 2019 and 2018,
respectively, related primarily to such costs.

"The amounts recorded for the asbestos-related liability and the
related insurance receivables are based on facts known at the time
and a number of assumptions.  However, projecting future events,
such as the number of new claims to be filed each year, the average
cost of disposing of such claims, the length of time it takes to
dispose of such claims, coverage issues among insurers and the
continuing solvency of various insurance companies, as well as the
numerous uncertainties surrounding asbestos litigation in the
United States, could cause the actual liability and insurance
recoveries for us to be higher or lower than those projected or
recorded."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/SZxleY


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Rogers Corp. Had 804 Pending Claims at June 30
---------------------------------------------------------------
Rogers Corporation still defends itself against 804
asbestos-related product liability claims as June 30, 2019,
according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2019.

The Company states, "We, like many other industrial companies, have
been named as a defendant in a number of lawsuits filed in courts
across the country by persons alleging personal injury from
exposure to products containing asbestos.  We have never mined,
milled, manufactured or marketed asbestos; rather, we made and
provided to industrial users a limited number of products that
contained encapsulated asbestos, but we stopped manufacturing these
products in the late 1980s.  Most of the claims filed against us
involve numerous defendants, sometimes as many as several hundred.

"For the six months ended June 30, 2019, 98 claims were dismissed
and 8 claims were settled.  Settlements totaled approximately
US$0.7 million for the six months ended June 30, 2019."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/SZxleY


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Schlumberger Bid for Reconsideration Denied
------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Brian A. Jackson of the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Louisiana denied Schlumberger Technology Corporation's
Motion for Reconsideration because Schlumberger fails to address
the jurisprudential basis for the Court's ruling on severing
Plaintiff's Jones Act claim.

In the case styled David Hsieh, v. Apache Deepwater, LLC, et al.,
Civil Action No. 19-408-BAJ-JW, (M.D. La.), Schlumberger asked the
Court to reconsider, in part, its Order severing Plaintiff's Jones
Act claim and remanding it to the 19th Judicial District Court for
the Parish of East Baton Rouge. Schlumberger argued that the Court
should have determined whether the Jones Act claim was fraudulently
pleaded before determining that the claim was statutorily
nonremovable.

The Court finds Judge Vance's reconciliation of Lackey v. Atl.
Richfield Co., 990 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1993) with 28 U.S.C. Section
1441(c) in Landerman v. Tarpon Operating and Dev., L.L.C., 19
F.Supp.3d 678 (E.D. La. 2014) more persuasive than the
interpretation that is offered by Schlumberger and based on an
unpublished report and recommendation.

David Hsieh, Plaintiff, represented by Susannah B.
Chester-Schindler , Waters & Kraus, LLP & Charles S. Siegel ,
Waters & Kraus, LLP, pro hac vice.

Badger Oil Corporation, Defendant, represented by Robert Michael
Kallam -- robert.kallam@keanmiller.com -- Kean Miller, Brian Joseph
Lindsey , Preis PLC & John F. Colowich , Preis PLC.

Baker Hughes, a GE Company, LLC & Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations
LLC, Defendants, represented by Robert E. Williams, IV --
rwilliams@sulzerandwilliams.com -- Sulzer & Williams, L.L.C., Barry
C. Campbell -- bcampbell@frilot.com -- Frilot, LLC, Nicole M. Loup
, Sulzer & Williams, LLC & Richard P. Sulzer --
rsulzer@sulzerandwilliams.com -- Sulzer & Williams, L.L.C.

BP America Inc., BP Corporation North America Inc. & BP Products
North America Inc., Defendants, represented by Shelley Kathryn
Napolitano -- SNapolitano@maronmarvel.com -- Maron Marvel Bradley
Anderson & Tardy, Richard Munice Crump -- RCrump@maronmarvel.com --
Maron Marvel Bradley Anderson & Tardy LLC & Robert E. Dille --
RDille@maronmarvel.com -- Maron Marvel Bradely Anderson & Tardy.

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. & Texaco Inc., Defendants, represented by
Vickie R. Thompson -- vthompson@strongpipkin.com -- Strong Pipkin
Bissell & Ledyard, LLP.

Chevron Phillips Chemical Company, LP, Defendant, represented by
Kathleen F. Drew -- kathleen.drew@arlaw.com -- Adams & Reese &
Charles A. Cerise, Jr. -- charles.cerise@arlaw.com -- Adams &
Reese.

ConocoPhillips Company, Defendant, represented by Tyson B.
Shofstahl -- tyson.shofstahl@arlaw.com -- Adams & Reese.

Diamond Offshore Drilling, Inc., Defendant, represented by Michael
J. Vondenstein -- mvondenstein@hmhlp.com -- Hailey, McNamara, Hall,
Larmann & Papale, LLP.

ENSCO Offshore Company, Defendant, represented by Michael A.
McGlone -- mike.mcglone@keanmiller.com -- Kean Miller LLP, Brett
Patrick Fenasci , Kean Miller LLP & Richard Blakeman Crohan --
blake.crohan@keanmiller.com -- Kean Miller, LLP.

Exxon Mobil Corporation & ExxonMobil Oil Corporation, Defendants,
represented by David Mark Bienvenu, Jr. --
David.Bienvenu@bblawla.com -- Bienvenu, Bonnecaze, Foco, Viator and
Holinga, APLLC, Anthony J. Gambino, Jr. --
anthony.gambino@phelps.com -- Phelps Dunbar LLP, Anthony Joseph
Lascaro -- anthony.lascaro@bblawla.com -- Bienvenu, Bonnecaze,
Foco, Viator & Holinga APLLC, Daniel E. Buras, Jr. --
DB@chehardy.com -- Chehardy Sherman Williams, Erin Conner Percy --
epercy@liskow.com -- Liskow & Lewis, Erin Brooke Rigsby
EBR@Chehardy.com -- Chehardy, Sherman, Williams, Inemesit U.
O'Boyle -- IUO@Chehardy.com -- Chehardy Sherman Williams Murray
Recile Stakelum & Hayes, James McClendon Williams --
JMW@Chehardy.com -- Chehardy, Sherman Williams Murrary Recile
Stakelum & Hayes, John Allain Viator -- John.Viator@bblawla.com --
Bienvenu Bonnecaze Foco Viator & Holinga, Lexi T. Holinga --
lexi.holinga@bblawla.com -- Bienvenu, Bonnecaze, Foco, Viator and
Holinga, APLLC, Melissa Jade Shaffer -- jade.shaffer@bblawla.com --
Bienvenu, Bonnecaze, Foco, Viator & Holinga & Nicholas Ryan Varisco
-- NRV@Chehardy.com -- Chehardy Sherman Williams.

Klentos Production Corporation, Defendant, represented by Daniel C.
Hughes -- Dan@HughesAPLC.com.

Montello, Inc., Defendant, represented by McGready Lewis Richeson
-- mricheson@pugh-law.com -- Pugh, Accardo, Haas, Radecker & Carey,
L.L.C., David M. Stein -- dstein@pugh-law.com -- Pugh Accardo,
Ernest G. Foundas -- efoundas@pugh-law.com -- Pugh, Accardo, Haas,
Radecker & Carey, L.L.C., Francis Xavier DeBlanc, III , Kuchler
Polk Schell Weiner & Richeson, LLC, Kathleen Jordan --
kjordan@pugh-law.com -- Pugh Accardo Haas Radecker & Carey, LLC &
Perrey S. Lee , Pugh, Accardo, Haas, Radecker & Carey, L.L.C.

Murphy Exploration & Production Company, Defendant, represented by
Robert S. Emmett -- remmett@bakerdonelson.com -- Baker, Donelson,
Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz & Kimberly C. Delk --
kdelk@bakerdonelson.com -- Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell &
Berkowitz.

Nustar Pipeline Company, LLC, Defendant, represented by Jay Morton
Jalenak, Jr. -- jay.jalenak@keanmiller.com -- Kean Miller LLP,
Alexandra Elise Rossi -- alexandra.rossi@keanmiller.com -- Kean
Miller LLP & Allison N. Benoit -- allison.benoit@keanmiller.com --
Kean, Miller, Hawthorne, D'Armond.

Pintail Minerals Corporation, Defendant, represented by Gregory M.
Anding -- greg.anding@keanmiller.com -- Kean Miller LLP & Alexandra
Elise Rossi -- alexandra.rossi@keanmiller.com -- Kean Miller LLP.

Schlumberger Technology Corporation, Defendant, represented by Mary
Arthur -- mimi.arthur@formanwatkins.com -- Forman Watkins & Krutz
LLP & Peter Andersen Moir -- peter.moir@formanwatkins.com -- Forman
Watkins & Krutz, LLP.

Shell Offshore, Inc., Shell Oil Company & SWEPI LP, Defendants,
represented by Gregory M. Anding -- greg.anding@keanmiller.com --
Kean Miller LLP, Alexandra Elise Rossi --
alexandra.rossi@keanmiller.com -- Kean Miller LLP, Allison N.
Benoit -- allison.benoit@keanmiller.com -- Kean, Miller, Hawthorne,
D'Armond, Anthony M. Williams -- anthony.williams@keanmiller.com --
Kean Miller LLP, Gayla M. Moncla -- gayla.moncla@keanmiller.com --
Kean, Miller, Hawthorne, D'Armond, McCowan & Jarman, Jay Morton
Jalenak, Jr. -- jay.jalenak@keanmiller.com -- Kean Miller LLP &
Sarah W. Anderson , Attorney-at-Law.

Sunbelt Energy, Ltd., Defendant, represented by James Michael
Fussell, Jr. , Ottinger Hebert LLC & Larry Charles Hebert ,
Ottinger Hebert, LLC.

Union Carbide Corporation, Defendant, represented by Ernest G.
Foundas -- efoundas@pugh-law.com -- Pugh, Accardo, Haas, Radecker &
Carey, L.L.C., David M. Stein -- dstein@pugh-law.com -- Pugh
Accardo, Francis Xavier DeBlanc, III , Kuchler Polk Schell Weiner &
Richeson, LLC, Kathleen Jordan -- kjordan@pugh-law.com -- Pugh
Accardo Haas Radecker & Carey, LLC, McGready Lewis Richeson --
mricheson@pugh-law.com -- Pugh, Accardo, Haas, Radecker & Carey,
L.L.C., Milele N. St. Julien , Kuchler Polk Schell Weiner Richeson
& Perrey S. Lee , Pugh, Accardo, Haas, Radecker & Carey, L.L.C.

Apache Deepwater, LLC & Apache Deepwaer, LLC, Defendants,
represented by William L. Schuette, Jr. --
wschuette@joneswalker.com -- Jones Walker LLP, Carmen M. Rodriguez
-- carmenrodriguez@joneswalker.com -- Jones Walker, Douglas C.
Longman, Jr. -- dlongman@joneswalker.com -- Jones Walker LLP &
Michele Whitesell Crosby -- mcrosby@joneswalker.com -- Jones Walker
LLP.



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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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