CAR_Public/190723.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Tuesday, July 23, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 146

                            Headlines

ACCENTURE PLC: Faces Employment Discrimination Class Action
ADIDAS AMERICA: Enos Suit Asserts ERISA Breach
ALPHA BUILDING: Ex-School Custodians File Wage Theft Class Action
AMAZON: Faces Class Action Over Alexa Voice Assistant
AMERICAN HUTS: Wages Paid Fall Below Minimum, King Suit Says

ARS NARTIONAL: Leifer Sues Over Vague Collection Letter
AT&T INC: Commercial Division Asserts Role in Securities Suits
AUSTRALIAN GOLD: Court Dismisses Bauman Suit Without Prejudice
BEAZER HOMES: Schall Law Firm Files Class Action Lawsuit
BLOOM ENERGY: July 29 Lead Plaintiff Bid Deadline

BOEING COMPANY: Earl Files Class Action Over Defective Planes
BP EXPLORATION: Arnold BELO Suit Dismissal w/o Prejudice Endorsed
BP EXPLORATION: Blount BELO Suit Dismissal w/o Prejudice Endorsed
BP EXPLORATION: Can Partly Compel Discovery Responses in Vinet Suit
BP EXPLORATION: Farmer BELO Suit Dismissal with Prejudice Endorsed

CAMBRIDGE ANALYTICA: NY Ct. Rejects Examination by Claim Purchaser
CANADA: From Climate Inaction to Government Class Action
CAPITAL ONE: Bid to Remand McFarland Suit to Circuit Court Granted
CAREMARK PHC: Settlement in Woods FLSA Suit Has Prelim Approval
CASINO RAMA: Cyber Attack Class Action Plaintiffs Face Hurdles

CHEROKEE NATION: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Fleming Suit
CHESAPEAKE APPALACHIA: 6th Cir. Flips Dismissal of Royalties Suit
CHICAGO, IL: Faces Class Action Over Impoundment Policy
CHINACACHE INT'L: Aug. 12 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
CLARK & GENTRY: 2nd Class Action Hits 831(b) Insurance Sector

CONVERGENT OUTSOURCING: Griffin Files FDCPA Suit in M.D. Tennessee
COSTCO: Dismissal of State Taxes Collection Class Action Affirmed
CRST INT'L: Settlement of Theoretical FLSA Claims in Perez Denied
CVS HEALTH: Generic Drug Overcharging Class Action Revived
DELOITTE & TOUCHE: Partial Deal in Ciuffitelli Has Prelim Approval

DIEBOLD NIXDORF: Howard G. Smith Files Securities Class Action
DIEBOLD NIXDORF: Schall Law Firm Files Class Action Lawsuit
ENHANCED RECOVERY: Bid to Certify Class in Berryhill Suit Denied
EQT CORP: Glancy Prongay Files Securities Class Fraud Suit
FACEBOOK INC: Attempts to Snuff Out Biometric Class Action

FAIRLIFE: Faces Class Action Over Fair Oaks Farm Animal Abuse
FIAT CHRYSLER: Faces Class Action Over Jeep Wrangler Death Wobble
FLINT, MI: Class Action Settlement May Impact State Budget
FORD MOTOR: Faces Class Action Over Defective Suspension Systems
GENERAL MOTORS: Faces Chevy Shudder Claims Amid Class Action

GENTLEMAN: Does Not Pay Dancers Proper Wages, Ealy Suit Says
GRUPO HOTELERO: Rivero Mestre Files Helms-Burton Class Action
HALLMARK MANAGEMENT: Hill Seeks Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
HANNA LAW: More Time to Support Class Certification Bid Denied
HERON THERAPEUTICS: Pomerantz Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit

HERON THERAPEUTICS: Schall Law Firm Files Class Action Lawsuit
HORIZON HEALTH: Judge OKs $2.5MM Payout for Misdiagnosed Patients
HUNTER ALLIED: Held in Contempt for Failing to Comply with Orders
HYUNDAI: Akin Gump Strauss Attorneys Discuss 9th Cir. Ruling
HYUNDAI: Polsinelli Attorney Discusses 9th Cir. Ruling

IAS WARRANTY: Michigan Court Dismisses Radner With Prejudice
IKEA: Must Face Employee's "Rounding" Wage Class Action
JAYKAY INC: Management & E3 Dismissed w/o Prejudice from Ogogo Suit
JOSEPH PIGOTT: Court Issues Show Cause Order in Barr Suit
KOLON LIFE: Invossa Investigation Expands Amid Class Action

LANDSTAR: Sued Over Contractors' Worker Status
LYFT INC: Settlement in Wright TCPA Suit Has Final Approval
MAINE: Mental Health System Still Fractured Despite AMHI Closure
MDL 1203: $233K Attys' Fees Awarded to Levin in Diet Drugs Suit
MDL 2804: Wicomico Council Debates Joining Opioid Litigation

MEOW WOLF: Sued by Former Employees for Unfair Labor Practices
METROPCS FLORIDA: Rivera Sues over Marketing Text Messages
MITR PHOL: Thai Court Rejects Class Action Against Sugar Giant
MONSANTO COMPANY: Frantz Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Gutierrezes Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup

MONSANTO COMPANY: Rizzuto Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Weeder Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION: MLS Class Action Pending in Illinois
NCL CORP: Can Compel Arbitration in Phillips Suit
NICKELBACK TRANSPORT: Fenlon Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages

NRL: Class Suit vs. Australian League 'No Chance'
NUTRICION FUNDAMENTAL: Cross Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
OHANA MILITARY: Court Denies Bid to Certify Class in Lake Suit
PAPA MURSPHY'S: Faces Securities Class Action in Washington
PIVOTAL SOFTWARE: Pomerantz Files Securities Fraud Class Suit

PROVIDE COMMERCE: FTD Bankruptcy May Hamper Settlement Petition
PTT EXPLORATION: Indonesian Seaweed Farmers Seek $140MM Damages
QUINCY BIOSCIENCE: Collins Files Product Liability Suit in Fla.
RENT-A-CENTER: 9th Cir. Says FAA Does Not Preempt McGill Rule
RESURGENT CAPITAL: Lacy Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. Arkansas

RETAIL FOOD: Michel's Patisserie Franchisees File Class Action
RIO TINTO: New York Court Dismisses Securities Class Action
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS: Aug. 6 Deadline for Washing Machine Claims
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS: Sued for Claiming Phones Water Resistant
SANDISK LLC: Dinan's Breach of Contract Claim Junked w/ Prejudice

SCHWEIGER DERMATOLOGY: Fischler Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
SHREVEPORT, LA: Seeks Permission to Issue Sewer Customer Refunds
SMITTY'S SUPPLY: Wurth Calls Tractor Hydraulic Fluid "Deceptive"
SOURCE INVESTMENT: Ealy Hits Unpaid Wages, Misclassification
SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC: Judge Finalizes Class Action Settlement

ST LOUIS, MO: Arrestees' Class Action Over Bail Certified
STERLING FIRST: Shine Lawyers Mulls Class Action Over Scheme
SUNLANDS TECHNOLOGY: Howard G. Smith Files Securities Fraud Suit
SWIFT TRANSPORTATION: Court Grants McNutt Leave to Amend Labor Suit
TOYOTA MOTOR: Court Approves Sliding Door Class Action Settlement

TRIM-LINE HITECH: Wilfred Seeks Unpaid OT and Prevailing Wages
TUXEDOS SHOW: Faces Class Action Over Unfair Labor Practices
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: $1.25MM Attys' Fees Awarded in Congdon Suit
UNITED HEALTHCARE: Court Amends Case Schedule in Samson TCPA Suit
UNITED STATES: DOJ Seeks Dismissal of Asylum Seekers' Class Suit

UNITED STATES: Illegal Aliens File Class Action v. Border Patrol
UNITED STATES: Veterans' Class Action Over Benefit Delays OK'd
UNIVESCO INC: Shortchanges Workers' Overtime Wages, Jones Suit Says
VOCUS: Shareholder Class Action Pending in Australia
VOSS INDUSTRIES: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Montanez FAC

WAL-MART ASSOCIATES: $102MM in Damages/Penalties Awarded in Magadia
WELLS FARGO: Settles Auto Insurance Lawsuit for $385MM

                            *********

ACCENTURE PLC: Faces Employment Discrimination Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
Robert Storace, writing for Law.com, reports that a white San
Francisco resident has sued Accenture PLC and Accenture LLP in
Connecticut, claiming the global management consulting and
professional services company discriminates against non-Asians.

In the prospective class action employment discrimination lawsuit
filed in the U.S. District Court for the District for Connecticut,
Matthew Walker alleges discrimination is rampant at the company,
which has global headquarters in Ireland, 459,000 employees
worldwide and about 51,800 throughout various locations in the
United States, including an office in Hartford.

The alleged discrimination at Accenture, which contracts with U.S.
companies to provide information technology-related services, is
"pervasive," according to the 18-page lawsuit.

"Accenture has engaged in a systematic, company-wide pattern or
practice of discrimination in favor of South Asians and against
individuals who are not South Asian, in hiring and employment
decisions," the lawsuit says. Accenture's service offerings are
consolidated into five separate businesses. The lawsuit says the
Accenture Technology and Accenture Consulting divisions are at
least 70 percent South Asian, primarily from Indian-American
workers.

Accenture recruiters, the suit says, "disproportionately seeks out
and recruits South Asian candidates." The company then "gives these
candidates preference over comparably or better qualified non-South
Asian candidates," according to the complaint.

Walker, the plaintiff, worked for the company from November 2011
through June 2015, when he was terminated. The lawsuit said Walker,
who holds a degree in accounting and information systems, got rave
reviews from many of the clients from around the country who he
helped with IT issues. Those clients, the lawsuit said, included
Warner Brothers, Best Buy, Qualcomm and Target.

"However, despite his strong performance as an application
performance consultant, Mr. Walker was never promoted by Accenture
during his 3-1/2 years with the company," according to the
lawsuit.

The lawsuit notes that once an employee finished servicing a
client, they are, as the company calls it, "benched" and must apply
again through an application and interview process, just like
external candidates.

The lawsuit alleges non-South Asians "are disproportionately
relegated to the bench and unable to secure new positions within
Accenture."

According to the lawsuit, Walker was told in June 2015 that he was
being terminated "due to his prolonged bench period and lack of
billable hours. . . . The true reason for his termination was
Accenture's pattern or practice of discrimination."

The lawsuit seeks certification as a class, a declaratory judgment
that the alleged discrimination laid out in the lawsuit is unlawful
and violates the Civil Rights Act of 1866, pre- and post-judgment
awards for the plaintiff and class, and front and back pay for
Walker.

As of June 12 afternoon, Accenture had not assigned an attorney to
represent it in the lawsuit. Company representative Stacey Jones
and Chad Jerdee, its general counsel and chief compliance officer,
did not respond to a request for comment on June 12.

Representing Walker are Michael Reilly -- mreilly@cicchielloesq.com
-- of Hartford-based Cicchiello & Cicchiello and Daniel Kotchen,
Michael von Klemperer and Lindsey Grunert from Washington,
D.C.-based Kotchen & Low. Reilly referred media inquiries to the
Washington, D.C., attorneys, but Kotchen declined to comment and
von Klemperer and Grunert did not respond to a request for
comment.

Judge Janet Bond Arterton is scheduled to hear the case. [GN]


ADIDAS AMERICA: Enos Suit Asserts ERISA Breach
----------------------------------------------
PAUL ENOS and DAVID FREITAS, individually and as representatives of
a Class of Participants and Beneficiaries on Behalf of the Adidas
Group 401(k) Savings and Retirement Plan, Plaintiffs, v. ADIDAS
AMERICA, INC., Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-01073-YY (D. Ore., July
10, 2019) is an action to remedy on behalf of the Plan under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), to
enforce Adidas's liability to make good to the Plan all losses
resulting from Adidas's breaches of fiduciary duty.

The Defendant Adidas America, Inc. is an ERISA fiduciary as it
exercises discretionary authority or discretionary control over the
401(k) defined contribution plan – known as the Adidas Group
401(k) Savings and Retirement Plan– that it sponsors and provides
to its employees. For every year between 2013 and 2017 (financial
information for 2018 is not yet available), the administrative fees
charged to Plan participants for is greater than a minimum of
approximately 75 percent of its comparator fees when fees are
calculated as cost per participant. And for every year between 2013
and 2017 but two (financial information for 2018 is not yet
available), the administrative fees charged to Plan participants is
greater than 80 percent of its comparator fees when fees are
calculated as a percent of total assets. These excessive fees
cannot be justified. The high fees, occurring over years, represent
something more than a sloppy business practice; they are a breach
of the fiduciary duties owed by Adidas to Plan participants and
beneficiaries. Prudent fiduciaries of 401(k) plans continuously
monitor administrative fees against applicable benchmarks and peer
groups to identify excessive and unjustifiable fees, says the
complaint.

Plaintiffs were participants in the Plan under the ERISA.

Adidas America Inc. is a company with its principal headquarters
located at 3449 North Anchor Street, Portland, Oregon.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Beth E. Terrell, Esq.
     Jennifer Rust Murray, Esq.
     TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC
     936 North 34th Street, Suite 300
     Seattle, WA 98103-8869
     Phone: (206) 816-6603
     Facsimile: (206) 319-5450
     Email: bterrell@terrellmarshall.com
            jmurray@terrellmarshall.com


ALPHA BUILDING: Ex-School Custodians File Wage Theft Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Zak Koeske, writing for Chicago Tribune, reports that a group of
janitorial workers who were contracted to work in South Holland
School District 151 claim their former employer, Alpha Building
Maintenance Service, stole tens of thousands of dollars in wages
from them over the last five-plus years.

Eight of the workers, who cleaned three schools within District 151
until they were either terminated or resigned from ABMS in late
February, filed a class action lawsuit against the south suburban
maintenance contractor on June 11 in Cook County Chancery Court.

The suit, brought under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection
Act, accuses the company of "regularly forcing workers to work
through unpaid lunch breaks while requiring them to still clock
out, failing to pay some paychecks and failing to pay a premium
wage for jobs outside their normal duties as required by the
contract."

"You see corporations take advantage of low-income, minority
workers all the time and this is just another example," said Deanne
Medina, an attorney with Community Activism Law Alliance, who is
representing the workers, all of whom are Hispanic.

Medina joined members of the Community Activism Law Alliance and
organizers from Centro de Trabajadores Unidos, an immigrant rights
group, outside Taft Elementary School in Harvey on June 11, where
the former Alpha workers and a number of community activists
gathered to announce the lawsuit and stage a protest.

"They're trying to feed their families, they're trying to take care
of their homes, they're trying to do all the things that we want to
do and they're unable to do it because they're being systemically
robbed from their wages," Medina said.

Taft is one of three District 151 schools where the former ABMS
workers performed custodial work and where some of them send their
own children, organizers said.

District 151 spokeswoman Vanessa Bradley said the district had been
in touch with the former custodial workers and organizers about
their concerns with ABMS, but was unable to provide oversight of an
outside vendor's internal practices.

"Because ABMS is an outside vendor, we do not determine their
personnel policies or work place practices, nor do we have direct
knowledge of the same," Bradley said in a statement. "The dispute
of which we are aware is between Alpha and some of its former
employees."

Alpha, which had been the district's custodial services provider
for at least the past five years, did not immediately respond to a
request for comment on the wage theft accusations.

The company, whose contract with District 151 expires at the end of
July, will not be returning to the district next school year,
Bradley said.

In a move she said was unrelated to the complaints made by former
ABMS employees, the District 151 school board voted on June 10 to
enter into a three-year, $474,163 custodial services contract with
another company, RJB Properties.

"The District's decision has nothing to do with the labor dispute,"
she said. "The School Board chooses the lowest responsible
bidder."

Martha Rios, a Calumet City resident who worked for ABMS for nearly
six years, said she was owed more than $2,000 for work she
performed but was not paid for.

"I started noticing (pay) discrepancies right from the start,"
Rios, who had earned $10 an hour, said through a translator. "And
that's how it continued for years."

Rios said that in addition to not being paid for working through
her lunch break -- which was necessary to complete the job on time
-- she and some other workers also noticed that they were given
larger workloads than other employees, but paid the same amount.
[GN]


AMAZON: Faces Class Action Over Alexa Voice Assistant
-----------------------------------------------------
Tom McKay, writing for Gizmodo, reports that a pair of federal
lawsuits against Amazon seeking class action status allege that the
e-commerce giant's Alexa voice assistant technology "routinely
records and voiceprints millions of children without their consent
or the consent of their parents," breaking laws in nine states, the
Seattle Times reported on June 12.

Per the Recorder, the two suits -- filed on behalf of an eight year
old child in California and a 10 year old child in Massachusetts --
were filed by by Travis Lenkner of Chicago's Keller Lenkner and
L.A.-based law firm Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan. Those
complaints, filed to the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington and Los Angeles Superior Court, seek damages
under privacy laws in nine states: California, Florida, Illinois,
Michigan, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and
Washington.

"What all nine have in common is they are what's known as two-party
consent states," Lenkner told the Recorder. "An audio recording of
a conversation or of another person requires the consent of both
sides to that interaction in these states and when such consent is
not obtained these state laws contain penalties, including set
amounts of statutory damages per violation."

According to the Times, the complaint argues that Amazon saves "a
permanent recording of the user's voice" as well as records and
transmits clips of anything said after Alexa's "wake word" is
uttered. It also claims that Alexa neither informs users that these
permanent recordings will be created nor bothers to ask for their
consent beforehand:

It says the Alexa system is capable of identifying individual
speakers based on their voices and Amazon could choose to inform
users who had not previously consented that they were being
recorded and ask for consent. It could also deactivate permanent
recording for users who had not consented.

"But Alexa does not do this," the lawsuit claims. "At no point does
Amazon warn unregistered users that it is creating persistent voice
recordings of their Alexa interactions, let alone obtain their
consent to do so."

The complaint proposes that the potential class action include
minors in the states "who have used Alexa in their home and have
therefore been recorded by Amazon, without consent," the Times
wrote.

An Amazon spokeswoman referred the Recorder to information about
Amazon FreeTime, while includes Alexa support and bills itself as a
"dedicated service that helps parents manage the ways their kids
interact with technology, including limiting screen time." While
FreeTime does allow parents to delete children's profiles or
recordings and requires listed apps to ask for consent to collect
data, and Alexa "skills" aimed at children have similar consent
requirements, the Times noted that children's use of Alexa outside
those scenarios is not discussed in the company's FAQ.

A broader Amazon disclosure on children's privacy lists examples of
information the company may collect on children, the Times wrote,
and elsewhere the Alexa terms of service assert sweeping rights:

A broader children's privacy disclosure discusses Amazon's
collection of personal information from children under 13 -- which
may include "name, birthdate, contact information (including phone
numbers and e-mail addresses), voice, photos, videos, location, and
certain activity and device information and identifiers" -- noting
"in some cases we may know a child is using our services (for
example, when using a child profile)." In those cases, collecting
that information requires parental consent.

Amazon's Alexa terms of use detail its agreement between "you" and
Amazon, noting at the outset that "if you do not accept the terms
of this agreement, then you may not use Alexa."

Attorney Andrew Schapiro told the Times he believed the "you"
provision was overly broad, adding that he doubts "you could even
design terms of service that bind 'everyone in your household.'"
According to the Times, the plaintiffs are asking for a judge to
certify the class action, that Amazon delete all recordings of
class members, and seeks damages that would be determined at trial.
[GN]


AMERICAN HUTS: Wages Paid Fall Below Minimum, King Suit Says
------------------------------------------------------------
AMANDA KING, individually and on behalf of similarly situated
persons, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN HUTS, INC. d/b/a PIZZA HUT,
Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-00260 (E.D. Tenn., July 11, 2019) is a
lawsuit brought as a collective action under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, and under Tennessee common law to recover unpaid
wages owed to herself and similarly situated persons employed by
Defendant at its Pizza Hut stores.

Defendant operates numerous Pizza Hut franchise stores and employs
delivery drivers who use their own automobiles to deliver pizza and
other food items to their customers. Plaintiff was employed by
Defendant from February 2017 to December 2018 as a delivery driver
at Defendant's Pizza Hut stores located in Alcoa, Tennessee.

According to the complaint, instead of reimbursing delivery drivers
for the reasonably approximate costs of the business use of their
vehicles, Defendant uses a flawed method to determine reimbursement
rates that provide such an unreasonably low rate beneath any
reasonable approximation of the expenses they incur that the
drivers' unreimbursed expenses cause their wages to fall below the
federal minimum wage during some or all workweeks.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Joe P. Leniski, Esq.
     J. Gerard Stranch, IV, Esq.
     BRANSTETTER, STRANCH & JENNINGS, PLLC
     223 Rosa Parks Ave. Suite 200
     Nashville, TN 37203
     Phone: 615/254-8801
     Facsimile: 615/255-5419
     Email: joeyl@bsjfirm.com
            gerards@bsjfirm.com


ARS NARTIONAL: Leifer Sues Over Vague Collection Letter
-------------------------------------------------------
Jacob I. Leifer, Naftali Teitelbaum, Shimon Friedman and Yoel
Labin, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. ARS National Services, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-04002 (E.D. N.Y., July 11, 2019) seeks to recover for
violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

In its efforts to collect an alleged Debt, Defendant contacted
Plaintiffs by letter dated January 3, 2019, March 8, 2019 and April
4, 2019. The Plaintiffs' Letters fails to state whether the payment
must be sent by the consumer, or received by the Defendant, by the
stated deadline. The Letters can be interpreted by the least
sophisticated consumer, to mean that such payment must be mailed to
the Defendant, by the stated deadline. The Letters can also be
interpreted by the least sophisticated consumer, to mean that such
payment must be received by Defendant, by the stated deadline. As a
result of the foregoing, in the eyes of the least sophisticated
consumer, the Letters are open to more than one reasonable
interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate, says the
complaint.

Plaintiffs are individuals who are natural persons allegedly
obligated to pay a debt.

Defendant is regularly engaged, for profit, in the collection of
debts allegedly owed by consumers.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
     BARSHAY SANDERS, PLLC
     100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
     Garden City, NY 11530
     Phone: (516) 203-7600
     Fax: (516) 706-5055
     Email: csanders@barshaysanders.com


AT&T INC: Commercial Division Asserts Role in Securities Suits
--------------------------------------------------------------
Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP writes that in Hoffman v. AT&T
Inc., Justice Ostrager of the Commercial Division recently denied a
motion to stay a securities class action in favor of a subsequently
filed and more comprehensive action brought in the Southern
District of New York (SDNY).[1]  In doing so, he asserted the
Commercial Division's role in securities litigation following the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cty. Emps.
Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061 (2018).

Robert Hoffman filed a class action complaint in N.Y. Supreme Court
on February 7, 2019 on behalf of former shareholders of Time Warner
Inc., alleging violations of the Securities Act of 1933 in
connection with AT&T, Inc.'s acquisition of the company in June
2018.  The complaint alleges that in order to acquire Time Warner,
AT&T issued 1.185 billion shares of new stock while failing to
disclose troubles in its DirecTV and DirecTV Now business.  As the
case is in the Commercial Division, discovery has not been stayed
during motion practice.

On April 1, 2019, Melvin Gross filed a federal complaint in the
SDNY alleging violations of both the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  This complaint asserts broader
claims on behalf of various classes of Time Warner and AT&T
shareholders.  Judge Caproni in the SDNY is currently determining
who of at least five sets of plaintiffs' lawyers to designate lead
or co-lead counsel.

In ruling on defendants' motion to stay the state action in favor
of a federal action, Justice Ostrager noted that prior to the
creation of the Commercial Division, and even for a period
thereafter, the general rule was that securities actions filed in
state court (that were less comprehensive than related federal
actions) should be stayed in favor of the federal actions, even
when the action was first filed in state court.[2]  The rationale
was that the federal courts had a greater familiarity with
securities litigation and staying the state action would avoid
wasting judicial resources and potentially inconsistent decisions.

Justice Ostrager ruled that this rationale no longer holds in all
cases after the creation of specialized state courts like the
Commercial Division, and following the U.S. Supreme Court's
unanimous decision last year in Cyan, in which it affirmed that the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 did not vitiate
state courts' jurisdiction over class actions alleging Securities
Act of 1933 violations.  Justice Ostrager noted that the state
court complaint could be "well on the way to judicial resolution
while five sets of plaintiff's lawyers jockey for control of a
federal court action that includes claims on behalf of individuals
who are not members of the state court class as well as the members
of the state court class."[3]  Moreover, the liability issues
involved in a 1933 Act case, Justice Ostrager pointed out, are less
complex than issues the Commercial Division resolves week in and
week out.  In fact, the federal court might want to stay the 1933
Act claims in its case to allow their swift resolution in the
Commercial Division.

Justice Ostrager concluded by asserting that "the ‘first filed'
rule must have some vitality in a post-Cyan world.  Otherwise, 1933
Act cases could never proceed in state court whenever a
subsequently filed federal court action asserts claims in addition
to 1933 Act claims."[4]  The motion was dismissed without
prejudice, however, and Justice Ostrager stated that he is willing
to entertain a subsequent motion to stay the action depending on
developments in the federal action. [GN]


AUSTRALIAN GOLD: Court Dismisses Bauman Suit Without Prejudice
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, STEPHANIE BAUMAN, individually and on behalf of all
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. AUSTRALIAN GOLD, LLC and DOES
1-10, Defendant, Case No. 3:18-cv-1682-L-BGS (S.D. Cal.), Judge M.
James Lorenz of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of California granted without prejudice the Defendant's motion to
dismiss Plaintiff Bauman's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and/or motion to strike portions of the
complaint under Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules.

On Nov. 16, 2015, the Plaintiff purchased the Defendant's product,
Australian Gold Spray Gel with Instant Bronzer.  At the time of the
Plaintiff's purchase, the purchase product was labeled "Made in
U.S.A."  However, the product contained components made outside the
United States, consisting of more than 10% of the final wholesale
value of the product.  The Defendant manufactures, markets, sells
various sun care products and label its products "Made in U.S.A."
The Plaintiff purchased Defendant's product in reliance on the
representation that the product was "Made in the U.S.A."

On July 24, 2018, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint against the
Defendant.  The Complaint alleged the following five causes of
action: (1) violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA");
(2) violation of Fair Advertising Law ("FAL"); (3) violation of
Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"); (4) Negligent Misrepresentation;
and (5) Intentional Misrepresentation.

The Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on standing
grounds and due to procedural shortfalls made by the Plaintiff in
filling her CLRA claim.  It also seeks to strike the Plaintiff's
prayer for injunctive relief on standing grounds.  The Plaintiff
opposes each of the Defendant's contentions but admits to failing
to file an affidavit with her CLRA claim as required by California
Civil Code section 1780(d).

Judge Lorenz finds that the Plaintiff (i) failed to demonstrate
that the products are comprised of largely the same ingredients;
and (ii) failed to alleged whether the purchased product and the
unpurchased products are of a similar type.  For the reasons
stated, he finds that the Plaintiff does not have standing to bring
class claims on the unpurchased products as the Complaint fails to
allege substantial similarity between the purchased and unpurchased
products.

Lastly, the Defendant contends the Plaintiff lacks standing to
pursue injunctive relief.  The Judge does not agree.  As the
Plaintiff points out, injunctive relief focuses on the Defendant's
conduct, and the Plaintiff need only show the Defendant's conduct
is likely to 'recur' in order to obtain injunctive relief under
UCL, to further protect competitors and the public at large.  The
Complaint alleges the Defendant is currently using the challenged
"Made in U.S.A." representation on its products.  Accordingly, the
Judge finds that the Plaintiff has standing to pursue injunctive
relief because the Complaint alleges the possibility of recurrence
of injury.

Given the liberal amendment policy enshrined in Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a), the Judge will grant the Plaintiff leave to amend.  If she
chooses to file an amended complaint, she is advised to make her
allegations with greater clarity and particularity.

For these reasons, Judge Lorenz granted without prejudice the
Defendant's motion to dismiss.  If the Plaintiff chooses to file an
amended complaint, she must do so within 21 days of the entry of
the order.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 31, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/ibEkJW from Leagle.com.

Stephanie Bauman, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Abbas Kazerounian,
Kazerounian Law Group, APC, Joshua B. Swigart --
josh@westcoastlitigation.com -- Hyde & Swigart & Yana A. Hart --
yana@westcoastlitigation.com -- Hyde & Swigart.

Australian Gold, LLC, Defendant, represented by Aji Abiedu --
aabiedu@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw & Culbertson & Frederick J. Ufkes
-- fufkes@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw & Culbertson.


BEAZER HOMES: Schall Law Firm Files Class Action Lawsuit
--------------------------------------------------------
The Schall Law Firm, a national shareholder rights litigation firm,
announces the filing of a class action lawsuit against Beazer Homes
USA, Inc. (BZH) for violations of Sec. 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission."

Investors who purchased the Company's shares between August 1, 2014
and May 2, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"), are encouraged to
contact the firm before August 5, 2019.

We also encourage you to contact Brian Schall of the Schall Law
Firm, 1880 Century Park East, Suite 404, Los Angeles, CA 90067, at
424-303-1964, to discuss your rights free of charge. You can also
reach us through the firm's website at www.schallfirm.com, or by
email at brian@schallfirm.com.

The class, in this case, has not yet been certified, and until
certification occurs, you are not represented by an attorney. If
you choose to take no action, you can remain an absent class
member.

According to the Complaint, the Company made false and misleading
statements to the market. Beazer's assets classified as land held
for future development in California were deteriorating in value
and in some cases overvalued. The improper valuation created a risk
of considerable impairment that would damage the Company's
profitability. Based on these facts, the Company's public
statements were false and materially misleading throughout the
class period. When the market learned the truth about Beazer,
investors suffered damages.

Join the case to recover your losses.

Contact:

         Brian Schall, Esq.
         The Schall Law Firm
         1880 Century Park East, Suite 404
         Los Angeles, CA 90067
         Phone:
            Cell: 424-303-1964
         Website: www.schallfirm.com
         Email: info@schallfirm.com
                brian@schallfirm.com [GN]


BLOOM ENERGY: July 29 Lead Plaintiff Bid Deadline
-------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, reminds
purchasers of the securities of Bloom Energy Corporation (NYSE: BE)
pursuant and/or traceable to Bloom Energy's false and/or misleading
registration statement and prospectus (collectively, the
"Registration Statement") issued in connection with Bloom Energy's
initial public offering completed in July 2018 (the "IPO") of the
July 29, 2019 lead plaintiff deadline in the class action. The
lawsuit seeks to recover damages for Bloom Energy investors under
the federal securities laws.

To join the Bloom Energy class action, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1586.htmlor call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, the Registration Statement was false
and/or contained misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) Bloom Energy was experiencing material construction
delays that would cause system deployments to fall significantly,
even below the low end of Bloom Energy's previously announced
guidance; and (2) as a result of the foregoing, defendants'
positive statements in the Registration Statement about Bloom
Energy's business, operations, and prospects were materially
misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis. When the true details
entered the market, the lawsuit claims that investors suffered
damages as Bloom Energy's securities are currently trading
significantly below the IPO price.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than July 29,
2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on behalf
of other class members in directing the litigation. If you wish to
join the litigation, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1586.html

Contact:

         Laurence Rosen, Esq.
         Phillip Kim, Esq.
         The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
         275 Madison Avenue, 34thFloor
         New York, NY 10016
         Phone: (212) 686-1060
         Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
         Fax: (212) 202-3827
         Website: www.rosenlegal.com
         Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
                pkim@rosenlegal.com
                cases@rosenlegal.com [GN]


BOEING COMPANY: Earl Files Class Action Over Defective Planes
-------------------------------------------------------------
DAMONIE EARL, LINDA RUGG, ALESA BECK, TIMOTHY BLAKEY, JR.,
STEPHANIE BLAKEY, MARISA THOMPSON, MUHAMMAD MUDDASIR KHAN,
ELIZABETH COOPER, JOHN ROGERS, VALERIE MORTZ-ROGERS, and LAKESHA
GOGGINS, each individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. THE BOEING COMPANY, SOUTHWEST AIRLINES
CO., Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-00507 (E.D. Tex., July 11, 2019)
is an action seeking to hold Southwest and Boeing responsible for
their reckless, greedy conspiracy to launch the defective 737 MAX 8
and to keep it flying.

On February 7, 2018, defendant Southwest Airlines Co. filed its
annual Form 10-K with the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC"). In its filing, it boasted, "For the 45th
consecutive year, the Company was profitable, earning $3.5 billion
in net income"--forty-five consecutive years of profits, in what
Southwest itself described as "an extremely volatile industry
subject to numerous challenges." Southwest had for another year
maintained a multidecade streak that was simply unheard of in an
industry fraught with razor-thin margins, massive bankruptcies, and
fluctuating costs. This case is about how Southwest obtained those
profits through a collusive relationship with codefendant The
Boeing Company, Southwest's sole airplane supplier. It is also
about how Southwest worked with Boeing to protect that
relationship--and its streak of profits--when faced with a fatal
design defect in Boeing's 737 MAX 8 aircraft, by lying to and
defrauding, customers, regulators, and its own pilots and
employees, risking thousands of lives in the process.

For decades, says the complaint, Southwest has propped up Boeing in
seemingly economically irrational ways, including by sending
signals to the market with strategically timed orders for new 737
airplanes; locking itself to a single aircraft manufacturer and
type of aircraft; spending millions of dollars to avoid flying
non-737 airplanes acquired in a merger; creating a trust designed
to hide delays and cancelations of aircraft orders; and releasing
airplanes it had ordered to its own competitors in order to allow
Boeing to meet demand for new airplanes. Boeing and Southwest,
however, had an unwritten but strictly-adhered-to agreement: in
exchange for its otherwise economically irrational backstopping of
Boeing, Southwest would get early access to new 737 models, input
into Boeing's design process, and the lowest price on all 737
aircraft--or a check from Boeing for the difference in price, no
questions asked. This agreement allowed Southwest to streamline its
operations with only one type of aircraft, and to operate without
fear of price increases by Boeing, thereby reducing Southwest's
costs--and increasing its profits dramatically. No other airline
has such a deal.

In the past few years, a series of reckless design and
manufacturing decisions have made this unprecedented relationship
even more critical for both companies. Boeing rushed a terribly
defective new 737 model--the 737 MAX 8--to market, and people died.
Southwest worked with Boeing to cover up the defect in this model,
and to assure the public that the 737 MAX 8 was safe, and later
that it was fixed. More people died. But Southwest still did not
change its tune on the 737 MAX 8. It could not risk its special
relationship with Boeing--or those 45 straight years of profits. It
took government intervention--the grounding of the entire fleet of
737 MAX 8 airplanes by the Federal Aviation Administration--for
Southwest to publicly acknowledge a problem. But in reality,
Southwest knew the 737 MAX 8 was fatally flawed and had worked with
Boeing to cover it up and falsely tout the safety of the airplane,
says the complaint.  

Each of the Plaintiffs bought a ticket to fly on a safe airline
that flew safe planes. None of them would have bought a ticket, let
alone for the price they paid, to potentially fly on a plane that
Southwest and Boeing knew was fatally defective. Put simply,
Southwest and Boeing conspired to cover up this indisputable fact:
The 737 MAX 8 was so defective and poorly designed that it could
easily kill you. Plaintiffs want their money back.

Plaintiffs purchased tickets on either Southwest Airlines or
American Airlines for flights from the date Southwest first took
delivery of the MAX 8, August 29, 2017, until the date that all 737
MAX Series aircraft were grounded by the FAA, March 13, 2019.

Boeing is a for-profit corporation organized and existing under the
laws of the State of Delaware, with its principal executive offices
located in Chicago, Illinois.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Brian J. Dunne, Esq.
     PIERCE BAINBRIDGE BECK PRICE & HECHT LLP
     355 S. Grand Avenue, 44th Floor
     Los Angeles, CA 90071
     Phone: (213) 262-9333
     Email: bdunne@piercebainbridge.com

          - and -

     Yavar Bathaee, Esq.
     David L. Hecht, Esq.
     Andrew J. Lorin, Esq.
     Michael M. Pomerantz, Esq.
     Barron M. Flood, Esq.
     PIERCE BAINBRIDGE BECK PRICE & HECHT LLP
     277 Park Avenue, 45th Floor
     New York, NY 10172
     Phone: (212) 484-9866
     Email: yavar@piercebainbridge.com
            dhecht@piercebainbridge.com
            alorin@piercebainbridge.com
            mpomerantz@piercebainbridge.com
            bflood@piercebainbridge.com


BP EXPLORATION: Arnold BELO Suit Dismissal w/o Prejudice Endorsed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LEO VENTRO ARNOLD, v. BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION,
INC. ET AL., SECTION "J" (2), Civil Action No. 19-9361 (E.D. La.),
Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Wilkinson, Jr. of the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana recommended that BP
Exploration & Production Inc. and BP America Production Co.'s
motion to dismiss be granted, and that the Plaintiff's complaint be
dismissed without prejudice.

Decedent Arnold, a resident of Alabama, was employed as a cleanup
worker along the Alabama Gulf Coast after the BP/Deepwater Horizon
explosion and oil spill on April 20, 2010.  The Estate of Leo
Ventro Arnold by Sandra Arnold, Personal Representative
("Plaintiff"), filed an amended complaint on the Decedent's behalf
pursuant to the Back-End Litigation Option ("BELO") provisions of
the BP/Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement
Agreement.  The Plaintiff's Notice of Intent to Sue and an attached
death certificate indicate that the Decedent died on May 7, 2014,
nearly five years before the instant lawsuit was filed.  The
Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages and related costs for
later-manifested physical conditions that the Decedent allegedly
suffered as a result of exposure to substances released after the
oil spill.

BP filed a motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's complaint.  BP argues
that the Plaintiff failed to comply with the prerequisites of the
Medical Settlement Agreement by not providing documentation in the
Notice of Intent to Sue that verifies her legal authority to file a
lawsuit on the Decedent's behalf.

Local Rule 7.5 requires that a memorandum in opposition to a motion
must be filed no later than eight days before the noticed
submission date.  The Plaintiff did not file an opposition to this
motion.

The court-approved Medical Settlement Agreement is not a case
management order.  Instead, it is an unambiguous, binding contract
that cannot be modified or altered without the express written
consent of the Medical Benefits Class Counsel and BP's counsel.
When a Medical Benefits Settlement Class Member is deceased, his or
her Authorized Representative "may act on his or her behalf" and
"shall be bound by the same terms and conditions" of the Medical
Settlement Agreement as the decedent would have been "if he or she
were acting on his or her own behalf."

The Medical Settlement Agreement enumerates the steps that an
Authorized Representative must satisfy as conditions precedent to
filing a BELO lawsuit on behalf of a deceased Medical Benefits
Settlement Class Member.  An Authorized Representative must submit
a Notice of Intent to Sue with documentation confirming that such
Authorized Representative is legally authorized to file a lawsuit
on behalf of such Medical Benefits Settlement Class Member.  The
Authorized Representative is required to identify the authority
giving him or her the right to act on behalf of the decedent and
provide copies of documentation verifying his or her authority to
act, such as a power of attorney or a court order stating his or
her authority to act or, if such documents are not available,
documents establishing his or her legal relationship" to the
decedent.  The Authorized Representative of a decedent must also
provide a copy of the decedent's death certificate.

Magistrate Judge Martinez finds that Plaintiff and purported
Authorized Representative Arnold did not comply with the Medical
Settlement Agreement's clearly defined prerequisites for filing a
BELO lawsuit on behalf of a deceased Medical Benefits Settlement
Class Member.  Her signature as "Authorized Representative,"
identification of herself as the Decedent's spouse and the death
certificate assure neither BP nor the Court that she has the legal
authority to file the BELO lawsuit on behalf of the Decedent.

The requirement to satisfy this condition precedent is not a mere
case management tool, but is required by the court-approved Medical
Settlement Agreement and is not subject to alteration.  By
neglecting to submit documentation of her legal authority to act on
Decedent's behalf, the Plaintiff failed to satisfy the conditions
precedent to filing a BELO complaint as required in the Medical
Settlement Agreement.

Having considered the motion, the lack of opposition, the record
and the applicable law, Magistrate Judge Wilkinson recommended that
BP's motion to dismiss be granted, and that the Plaintiff's
complaint be dismissed without prejudice for failure to satisfy the
conditions precedent to filing a BELO lawsuit on behalf of a
deceased Medical Benefits Settlement Class Member as required in
the Medical Settlement Agreement.

A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed
findings, conclusions, and recommendation in the Magistrate Judge's
Report and Recommendation within 14 days after being served with a
copy will bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from
attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and
legal conclusions accepted by the district court, provided that the
party has been served with notice that such consequences will
result from a failure to object.  It is suggested, in these
circumstances, that any objection to the Report and Recommendation
filed by the Plaintiff should attach the required documentation
establishing that she is in fact the Decedent's legally authorized
representative to pursue the claim.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 29, 2019 Report and
Recommendation is available at https://is.gd/NDV3mH from
Leagle.com.

Leo Ventro Arnold, Plaintiff, represented by Howard L. Nations --
info@howardnations.com -- Nations Law Firm.

BP Exploration & Production, Inc. & BP America Production Company,
Defendants, represented by Don Keller Haycraft --
dkhaycraft@liskow.com -- Liskow & Lewis.


BP EXPLORATION: Blount BELO Suit Dismissal w/o Prejudice Endorsed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHARLES EDWARD BLOUNT, v. BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION,
INC. ET AL., SECTION "J" (2), Civil Action No. 19-9362 (E.D. La.),
Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Wilkinson, Jr. of the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana recommended that BP
Exploration & Production Inc. and BP America Production Co.'s
motion to dismiss be granted, and that the Plaintiff's complaint be
dismissed without prejudice.

Decedent Blount, a resident of Alabama, was employed as a clean-up
worker along the Alabama Gulf Coast after the BP/Deepwater Horizon
explosion and oil spill on April 20, 2010.  The Estate of Charles
Edward Blount by Linda Blount, Personal Representative
("Plaintiff"), filed an amended complaint on the Decedent's behalf
pursuant to the Back-End Litigation Option ("BELO") provisions of
the BP/Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement
Agreement.

The Plaintiff's Notice of Intent to Sue and an attached death
certificate indicate that the Decedent died on Nov. 11, 2014, more
than four years before the instant lawsuit was filed.  The
Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages and related costs for
later-manifested physical conditions that the Decedent allegedly
suffered as a result of exposure to substances released after the
oil spill

BP filed a motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's complaint.  BP argues
that the Plaintiff failed to comply with the prerequisites of the
Medical Settlement Agreement by not providing documentation in the
Notice of Intent to Sue that verifies her legal authority to file a
lawsuit on the Decedent's behalf.

Local Rule 7.5 requires that a memorandum in opposition to a motion
must be filed no later than eight days before the noticed
submission date.  The Plaintiff did not file an opposition to this
motion.

The court-approved Medical Settlement Agreement is not a case
management order.  Instead, it is an unambiguous, binding contract
that cannot be modified or altered without the express written
consent of the Medical Benefits Class Counsel and BP's counsel.
When a Medical Benefits Settlement Class Member is deceased, his or
her Authorized Representative "may act on his or her behalf" and
"shall be bound by the same terms and conditions" of the Medical
Settlement Agreement as the decedent would have been "if he or she
were acting on his or her own behalf."

The Medical Settlement Agreement enumerates the steps that an
Authorized Representative must satisfy as conditions precedent to
filing a BELO lawsuit on behalf of a deceased Medical Benefits
Settlement Class Member.  An Authorized Representative must submit
a Notice of Intent to Sue with documentation confirming that such
Authorized Representative is legally authorized to file a lawsuit
on behalf of such Medical Benefits Settlement Class Member.  The
Authorized Representative is required to identify the authority
giving him or her the right to act on behalf of the decedent and
provide copies of documentation verifying his or her authority to
act, such as a power of attorney or a court order stating his or
her authority to act or, if such documents are not available,
documents establishing his or her legal relationship" to the
decedent.  The Authorized Representative of a decedent must also
provide a copy of the decedent's death certificate.

Magistrate Judge Martinez finds that Plaintiff and purported
Authorized Representative Blount did not comply with the Medical
Settlement Agreement's clearly defined prerequisites for filing a
BELO lawsuit on behalf of a deceased Medical Benefits Settlement
Class Member.  Her signature as "Authorized Representative,"
identification of herself as the Decedent's spouse and the death
certificate assure neither BP nor the Court that she has the legal
authority to file the BELO lawsuit on behalf of the Decedent.

The requirement to satisfy this condition precedent is not a mere
case management tool, but is required by the court-approved Medical
Settlement Agreement and is not subject to alteration.  By
neglecting to submit documentation of her legal authority to act on
Decedent's behalf, the Plaintiff failed to satisfy the conditions
precedent to filing a BELO complaint as required in the Medical
Settlement Agreement.

Having considered the motion, the lack of opposition, the record
and the applicable law, Magistrate Judge Wilkinson recommended that
BP's motion to dismiss be granted, and that the Plaintiff's
complaint be dismissed without prejudice for failure to satisfy the
conditions precedent to filing a BELO lawsuit on behalf of a
deceased Medical Benefits Settlement Class Member as required in
the Medical Settlement Agreement.

A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed
findings, conclusions, and recommendation in the Magistrate Judge's
Report and Recommendation within 14 days after being served with a
copy will bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from
attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and
legal conclusions accepted by the district court, provided that the
party has been served with notice that such consequences will
result from a failure to object.  It is suggested, in these
circumstances, that any objection to the Report and Recommendation
filed by the Plaintiff should attach the required documentation
establishing that she is in fact the Decedent's legally authorized
representative to pursue the claim.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 29, 2019 Report and
Recommendation is available at https://is.gd/n2ICT2 from
Leagle.com.

Charles Edward Blount, Plaintiff, represented by Howard L. Nations
-- info@howardnations.com -- Nations Law Firm.

BP Exploration & Production, Inc. & BP America Production Company,
Defendants, represented by Don Keller Haycraft --
dkhaycraft@liskow.com -- Liskow & Lewis.


BP EXPLORATION: Can Partly Compel Discovery Responses in Vinet Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TODD ANTHONY VINET, v. BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION,
INC. ET AL., SECTION "R" (2), Civil Action No. 18-9527 (E.D. La.),
Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Wilkinson, Jr. of the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted in part and
denied in part the Defendants' Motion to Compel Discovery
Responses.

Vinet was employed as a clean-up worker after the BP/Deepwater
Horizon explosion and oil spill on April 20, 2010.  The Plaintiff
filed his complaint pursuant to the Back-End Litigation Option
("BELO") provisions of the BP/Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits
Class Action Settlement Agreement.  As a member of the BELO
settlement class, the Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages and
related costs for later-manifested physical conditions that he
allegedly suffered as a result of exposure to substances released
after the oil spill.

The Defendants' Motion to Compel Discovery Responses is now pending
before the Court.  Local Rule 7.5 requires that a memorandum in
opposition to a motion must be filed no later than eight days
before the noticed submission date.  No memorandum in opposition to
the motion has been received.

The Defendants seek an order compelling responses to
Interrogatories Nos. 8, 16, and 17 and Requests for Production Nos.
18, 19, and 33, and the sworn verification by the Plaintiff himself
as to all answers, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(1)(A), (3)
and (5).

It appears to Magistrate Judge Wilkinson that the motion has merit
only in part, therefore he granted in part and denied in part the
motion as follows.  As an initial matter, he granted the
Defendant's motion insofar as it seeks verification of all
interrogatory answers.  The copy of the interrogatory answers
provided to the Magistrate in connection with the motion does not
include the Plaintiff's verification of his answers, sworn under
oath and signed by him, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(1)(A),
(3) and (5).  The required verification must be provided.

The Defendants' motion is granted as to Interrogatory No. 8 and
Request for Production No. 18.  In his complaint, the Plaintiff
alleges that he suffered various kinds of damages, and these
requests simply seek a precise damages computation and
documentation supporting his damages claims.  No objections to
these requests were asserted, and the information sought in these
requests is fundamental, clearly relevant and proportional to both
the Plaintiff's damages claims and the Defendant's defenses to
those claims.  The time for the Plaintiff to provide this basic
information is now, and he must fully and completely supplement
these responses as provided.

The Magistrate granted in part and denied in part the Defendant's
motion as to Interrogatory No. 16.  He finds that this overly broad
interrogatory seeking information concerning "any claims or
lawsuits filed by the Plaintiff or on his behalf, personal injury
or illness claims insurance or worker's compensation policy or for
Social Security benefit bankruptcy claims or filings  bankruptcy
trust claims or submissions, personal injury trust claims or
submissions any settlement of any claims (whether at issue in the
lawsuit or otherwise), includes much that is wholly irrelevant and
not proportional to any claim or defense.  Thus, the motion is
denied insofar as it seeks an answer providing all of the requested
information.  The Defendant's motion is granted in part as to the
payment Vinet received through the Deepwater Horizon Medical
Benefits Claims Administrator.  The amount of that payment is
relevant and discoverable in the BELO litigation that directly
involves the medical benefits settlement process.  The Plaintiff
must supplement the answer to provide the date and amount of the
payment.

The Defendants' motion is also granted in part and denied in part
as to Interrogatory No. 17.  The Defendants' motion fails to cite
any case law or explain why or how the Plaintiff's arrest record
might be relevant to the claims or defenses of any party.  The
Magistrate's review of the pleadings has identified no such
relevance.  Decisions in which discovery of arrest records (as
opposed to admissible criminal convictions under Fed. R. Evid. 609)
has been permitted appear to be cases in which the party's ongoing
criminal record and extensive criminal activities are clearly
essential issues in the case itself.  The Magistrate cannot
discern, in the absence of any explanation by the moving party and
based solely upon his review of the pleadings, any relevance in the
Plaintiff's arrest record.  Thus, the motion is denied insofar as
it seeks all information requested in this interrogatory.  The
Defendants' motion is granted in part, however, insofar as it seeks
information pertaining to his criminal convictions, if any, of the
type described in Fed. R. Evid. 609 (a), which may be admissible at
trial as relevant to the Plaintiff's credibility.

The Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part as to
Request for Production No. 19, subject to the order contained.  On
one hand, the Plaintiff's complaint expressly seeks compensation
for the following damages: (g) lost earnings and damage to
wage-earning capacity, (h) other economic loss.  On the other hand,
in conflict with his pleading, the Plaintiff's objection to this
request states that he has not claimed lost wages.  The Plaintiff
must make up his mind.  If he pursues any sort of earnings or
economic loss claim in the case, a full and complete response to
this request must be provided.  If he abandons his lost earnings
and economic loss claim asserted in his complaint, he must file in
the record and provide the Defendant with his affidavit clearly
saying so by the deadline set out.

The Magistrate granted in part and denied in part the Defendant's
motion as to Request for Production No. 33.  The Plaintiff's
objection to Item (d), which Magistrate extends to closely related
Item (b), is sustained for the same reasons but subject to the same
affidavit requirement concerning abandonment of his lost
earnings/economic loss claim set out above.  However, if the
Plaintiff pursues his lost earnings/economic loss claims, he must
provide this authorization, together with all other requested
authorizations which he has not  yet provided and as to which he
has not objected.

No later than June 12, 2019, the Plaintiff must produce to the
Defendants the interrogatory answers, verification of interrogatory
answers, written responses to requests for production, together
with actual production of all responsive documents, and file and
serve the affidavit concerning abandonment of his lost
earnings/economic loss claim, if appropriate, all as ordered.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 29, 2019 Order and Reasons is
available at https://is.gd/impPjS from Leagle.com.

Todd Anthony Vinet, Plaintiff, represented by Howard L. Nations --
info@howardnations.com -- Nations Law Firm.

BP Exploration & Production, Inc. & BP America Production Company,
Defendants, represented by David W. Leefe -- dwleefe@liskow.com --
Liskow & Lewis, Don Keller Haycraft -- dkhaycraft@liskow.com --
Liskow & Lewis, Charles B. Wilmore -- cbwilmore@liskow.com --
Liskow & Lewis, Devin C. Reid -- dcreid@liskow.com -- Liskow &
Lewis, Lance Christian Bullock -- lbullock@liskow.com -- Liskow &
Lewis & Russell Keith Jarrett -- rkjarrett@liskow.com -- Liskow &
Lewis.


BP EXPLORATION: Farmer BELO Suit Dismissal with Prejudice Endorsed
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CAMILLE FARMER AS PARENT AND LEGAL GUARDIAN ON BEHALF
OF J.F., A MINOR, v. BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION, INC., ET AL.,
SECTION "J" (2), Civil Action No. 19-9237 (E.D. La.), Magistrate
Judge Joseph C. Wilkinson, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana recommended that BP Exploration &
Production Inc. and BP America Production Co.'s motion to dismiss
be granted, and that the Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed without
prejudice.

Farmer and her son were residents of Pensacola, Florida, in the
Northern District of Florida, after the BP/Deepwater Horizon
explosion and oil spill on April 20, 2010.  The Plaintiff filed her
complaint pursuant to the Back-End Litigation Option ("BELO")
provisions of the BP/Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Class
Action Settlement Agreement.  As a member of the BELO settlement
class, the Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages and related costs
for later-manifested physical conditions that she allegedly
suffered as a result of exposure to substances released after the
oil spill.

BP filed a motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's complaint.  It argues
that the Plaintiff failed properly to file her individual BELO
lawsuit by the Medical Settlement Agreement's filing deadline and
that the complaint should be dismissed with prejudice as
time-barred.  Specifically, the Plaintiff did not file her BELO
lawsuit until April 10, 2019, five days after the Medical
Settlement Agreement's deadline of April 5, 2019 had passed.

The Plaintiff filed an opposition memorandum.  The opposition
concedes that the complaint was untimely filed five days beyond the
applicable deadline.  It argues, however, that the "equities"
warrant denial of the motion.  Those "equities" include that the
untimely filing was not the result of ordinary carelessness,
mistake or lapse of judgment.  Instead, it argues that the untimely
filing was caused by two malware attacks affecting the Plaintiff
Counsel's server, corrupting all client files including the
Plaintiff's electronically stored data, ultimately resulting in a
calendaring error.  The Plaintiff argues that other equities
militating against dismissal include that the Plaintiff is a minor
who is suffering a chronic condition due to the BP oil spill and
that dismissal would deprive her of her day in Court, absent any
real showing of prejudice to the Defendants.

Magistrate Judge Wilkinson finds that the court-approved Medical
Settlement Agreement is not a case management order.  Instead, it
is an unambiguous, binding contract that cannot be modified or
altered without the express written consent of the Medical Benefits
Class Counsel and BP's counsel.  

As a condition precedent to filing a BELO suit, a class member must
submit a Notice of Intent to Sue to the Medical Settlement
Agreement Claims Administrator, who must transmit the notice to BP
within ten days.  BP then has 30 days to decide whether to mediate
the claim. If, as in the instant case, BP chooses not to mediate,
the claimant must file her BELO lawsuit within six months of being
notified by the Claims Administrator of BP's election not to
mediate.

The Claims Administrator notified the Plaintiff on Oct. 5, 2018
that BP had declined mediation, which made her deadline to file a
complaint six months later, on April 5, 2019.  The Plaintiff
concedes that a "calendaring error" resulted in her counsel
mistakenly logging this date as Oct. 15, 2018.  The Plaintiff did
not file her BELO complaint until April 10, 2019, five days after
the deadline.

The CMO governs basic procedural matters at the outset of BELO
cases.  The CMO permits the parties to move to dismiss an
individual BELO complaint without prejudice for failure to complete
the conditions precedent to filing a lawsuit.  BP argues that the
instant action should be dismissed with prejudice because the
Plaintiff's untimely filing of her lawsuit cannot be cured by
amending the complaint or granting her additional time to comply
with the conditions precedent.  It asks the Court to modify the CMO
in the particular case, as provided in Paragraph IV(1)(D), to allow
for a dismissal with prejudice.

The clear language of the Medical Settlement Agreement emphasizes
the binding and enforceable nature of the subject deadline.  The
Plaintiff argues that "equitable tolling" should excuse her
untimely filing in these circumstances.  The cited circumstances
boil down essentially to her counsel's calendaring error and the
counsel's computer system service failings without an adequate
non-computer-based backup calendaring procedure of the sort long
employed by lawyers before the dawn of computer systems.  Courts
have frequently held that lawyer failings of this sort do not
excuse untimely filings after a statute of limitations or other
time bar on the assertion of claims have lapsed.

The requirement to satisfy this condition precedent is not a mere
case management tool, but is required by the court-approved Medical
Settlement Agreement and is not subject to alteration.  Nothing in
either the Medical Settlement Agreement or the court order adopting
it affords the Plaintiff the relief she seeks.  Farmer failed to
meet the condition precedent to filing a BELO complaint by timely
filing her lawsuit.  Her explanation for failing to do so in her
opposition memorandum is ultimately unpersuasive.  No purpose would
be served by dismissing the case without prejudice, when its
untimely filing under the Medical Settlement Agreement clearly
means that the claim is barred and must be dismissed with
prejudice.  The Magistrate Judge therefore modifiesd the CMO
insofar as it applies to this particular BELO case to permit filing
of the motion to dismiss with prejudice.

For all the forgoing reasons, Magistrate Judge Wilkinson
recommended that the Defendant's motion be granted, and the
Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed with prejudice as untimely.

A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed
findings, conclusions, and recommendation in a magistrate judge's
report and recommendation within 14 days after being served with a
copy will bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from
attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and
legal conclusions accepted by the district court, provided that the
party has been served with notice that such consequences will
result from a failure to object.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 29, 2019 Report &
Recommendation is available at https://is.gd/EG0G87 from
Leagle.com.

Camille Farmer, as Parent and Legal Guardian on behalf of J.F., a
Minor, Plaintiff, represented by Nathan Lee Nelson , Downs Law
Group, PA.

BP Exploration & Production, Inc. & BP America Production Company,
Defendants, represented by Don Keller Haycraft  --
dkhaycraft@liskow.com -- Liskow & Lewis.


CAMBRIDGE ANALYTICA: NY Ct. Rejects Examination by Claim Purchaser
------------------------------------------------------------------
Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP writes that New York Bankruptcy
Judge Sean Lean recently denied a Rule 2004 request because the
movant sought documents for use in an unrelated litigation.  In re
Cambridge Analytica LLC, No. 18-11500, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 1824
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jun. 14, 2019).  Judge Lane said discovery sought
through Rule 2004 should be used in the bankruptcy case and not in
other disputes.[1]

The debtor Cambridge Analytica LLC (the "Debtor") was a political
consultant that worked for the 2016 Trump election campaign.  In
April 2018, a putative class action was filed in Delaware federal
court against the Debtor and Facebook concerning allegations that
the Debtor had used personal information of Facebook users.  That
same month, a derivative action was filed in Delaware Chancery
Court by other plaintiffs against certain Facebook officers and
directors.

A plaintiff in the derivative action (the "Movant") wanted
documents from the Debtor to use in the derivative action.  To
obtain standing in the bankruptcy case to bring a Rule 2004 motion,
the Movant bought a claim from a creditor of the Debtor that had
been filed in the Debtor's bankruptcy case.  The claim had a face
value of $650.  As a holder of a claim, the Movant then sought an
order in the bankruptcy case directing the production of certain
documents from the Debtor, citing Rule 2004.

Before the Movant filed her motion, the plaintiffs in the class
action had filed a Rule 2004 request in the Debtor's bankruptcy
case that Judge Lane had granted.[2]  Judge Lane's ruling denying
the Movant's request highlighted key differences between the two
Rule 2004 motions.

First, the court noted that the Movant was not a creditor when the
bankruptcy case was filed.  The Movant became a creditor only a
week before she filed her motion by purchasing a claim from a
creditor.  And, significantly, she sought documents not for use in
the bankruptcy case but in the derivative action in Delaware.  In
contrast, the plaintiffs in the class action had sought documents
through Rule 2004 to use in the bankruptcy case.

Second, Judge Lane observed that the Movant had not actively
participated in the bankruptcy case.  All she had done was to buy a
claim and file the Rule 2004 motion.  In contrast, the class action
plaintiffs had been actively involved in critical aspects of the
bankruptcy case.  They had attended multiple hearings, consulted
with the bankruptcy trustee, and took positions on matters central
to the case.  Their Rule 2004 request also concerned matters that
were relevant to their status as creditors in the case.

Finally, Judge Lane expressed concern that granting the Movant's
Rule 2004 motion would set a bad precedent.  Parties in other cases
would be incentivized "to purchase nominal claims in bankruptcy
cases solely to pursue their outside litigation agendas."[3]  This
would be particularly problematic in cases like this where the
bankruptcy estate had limited funds and could easily be rendered
administratively insolvent if forced to comply with Rule 2004
requests. [GN]


CANADA: From Climate Inaction to Government Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------
Braydon Black, writing for Alternatives Journal, reports that as
politicians dither, the clocks on climate change are ticking.  The
Canadian government has continued to promise action on climate
change -- from the Kyoto Protocol to the Paris Agreement -- but its
commitment to change remains to be seen.

Many Canadians have become fed up with government inaction on
climate, including a young group of Quebecers who recently filed a
class action suit against the federal government for their
insufficient response to climate change.

On November 26, ENvironnement JEUnesse, a non-profit environmental
organization in Quebec, sued the Canadian government for its
inadequate response to the growing global crisis. ENJEU says that
the Canadian government is failing its youth, and that its passive
approach to climate change is undermining fundamental rights of the
younger generation.

"The government needs to adopt a more ambitious target and action
plan," says Catherine Gauthier, Executive Director of ENJEU, in an
interview with A\J.

"The ultimate goal [of the lawsuit] is to make sure that Canada is
doing enough to protect our future," she says. "And by that we mean
a more ambitious target that would prevent the worst impacts of
climate change for all young people."

Gauthier has been involved with ENJEU since she was 16, when she
started looking at how composting systems could be implemented in
schools, and later took part in the UN climate change negotiations
in Montréal as a Canadian youth delegate.

ENJEU claims that the government targets aren't sufficient to avoid
the catastrophic effects of climate change, and its current
framework won't even allow Canada to reach these low-level goals.
"The Canadian government is infringing on our generation's rights
to life and security, and also to a safe environment," Gauthier
says. "Canada's target [is to reduce] GHG emissions by 30 percent
by 2030 based on 2005 levels, which is a target that is clearly
insufficient."

According to a report released by the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change in October, global temperature increases of more
than 1.5°C will have devastating impacts on the environment.
Without rapid action and specific planning, the Canadian government
puts people under 35 at risk of suffering these consequences.

"Young people are really scared and also ashamed to see that Canada
is not doing enough," says Gauthier. She notes that impacts of
climate change are already very real, citing a heat wave in Quebec
in summer 2018 that caused nearly 100 deaths. "[It is] really
urgent for the Canadian government to take action and to completely
change the direction we're going."

Canada's economic ties to fossil fuels are another part of the
concern. Funds that could be put towards cleaner and more
sustainable technologies are being used to subsidize oil companies
and build pipelines.

"Fossil fuel companies are putting a lot of pressure on the
Canadian government… which is totally unacceptable," Gauthier
tells A\J, pointing at their $4.5 billion investment in Kinder
Morgan's Trans Mountain pipeline last summer. "What it means for us
is Canada prefers to protect the oil industry rather than the
future of young people."

Trudel Johnston & Lespérance, the firm filing the claim on behalf
of ENJEU, has won the most class action cases in Canada since it
was founded 20 years ago. They are acting pro-bono on this case.

"The Canadian government's behaviour infringes on several
fundamental rights protected by the Canadian and Quebec charters,"
said Bruce Johnston, Esq. -- bruce@tjl.quebec -- a partner at TJL.
"We believe that we have a solid legal case that deserves to be
brought before the courts."

And the lawsuit isn't the first of its kind. Youth around the world
are taking action and calling on their governments for a more
aggressive response to the changing climate. Similar proceedings
are taking place in the U.S., Uganda, New Zealand, and the European
Union, to name a few.

Gauthier notes how movements in other countries served as an
inspiration for ENJEU's recent legal action. "That's really
encouraging, to see how young people are taking climate change to
the court," she says. "Our governments are clearly not doing
enough, and we need more than words in [these] times."

Just last year, a case led by 25 young people in Colombia
successfully sued the government, making it mandatory to halt
deforestation in the Amazon within a five month window. In the
Netherlands, another winning case legally bound the government to
cut greenhouse emissions by at least 25 percent by 2020 (compared
to 1990 emissions).

With youth and environment groups starting to take a stand, perhaps
more ambitious responses to climate change can begin to gain
traction. Young people are starting to lead more sustainable lives,
says Gauthier, but government action is a big barrier to change.

"Whatever we do in terms of reducing our individual GHG emissions .
. . if our government is purchasing pipelines, we won't be able to
limit global warming to 1.5 degrees," she notes. "So we really need
to see strong action from our government."[GN]


CAPITAL ONE: Bid to Remand McFarland Suit to Circuit Court Granted
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANTHONY McFARLAND, On Behalf of Himself and All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. CAPITAL ONE, N.A., d/b/a Capital
One Auto Finance, Defendant, Civil Action No. TDC-18-2148 (D. Md.),
Judge Theodore C. Chuang of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Maryland (i) granted McFarland's Motion to Lift Stay,
(ii) granted McFarland's Motion to Remand, and (iii) denied as moot
Capital One's Motion to Dismiss.

On Oct. 1, 2013, McFarland purchased a vehicle and financed the
purchase through a retail installment sale contract ("RISC"), which
was subsequently assigned to Capital One.  The RISC affirmatively
elects to be governed under the Maryland Credit Grantor Closed End
Credit Provisions ("CLEC").  McFarland alleges that Capital One
charged and collected convenience fees in violation of CLEC and
thus materially breached the RISC.

On May 29, 2018, McFarland filed his Complaint as a class action in
the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Maryland.  He alleges
a breach of contract claim on behalf of a class that consists of:
All persons: (1) who entered into a RISC governed by CLEC; (2)
between Oct. 1, 2013 and Oct. 31, 2013; (3) were charged a
convenience fee by CAPITAL ONE; (4) within four years from the date
of the filing of the Complaint or anytime thereafter.

On July 13, 2018, Capital One removed the case on the basis of
Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA") jurisdiction and filed a Motion
to Dismiss on July 20, 2018.  On July 24, 2018, McFarland moved to
remand the case to the Circuit Court.  On Oct. 12, 2018, the Court
(Titus, J.) stayed the case pending a decision by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Brown v. Capital One, N.A., a
class action that was largely identical to the present case except
that it did not limit the class to individuals who entered into
RISCs during a specific one-month period.

After the Fourth Circuit issued its decision in Brown on Feb. 6,
2019 affirming the district court's dismissal of that case,
McFarland moved to lift the stay.

Because the basis for the stay no longer exists, Judge Chuang
granted the grant the Motion to Lift Stay and address the remaining
Motions.

In his Motion to Remand, McFarland argues that the Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction because Capital One has failed to
demonstrate that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million and
that the class consists of more than 100 individuals.  Capital One,
on the other hand, contends that the amount in controversy
requirement of CAF A is satisfied because the amount at issue in
the present case should be deemed to be the amount in controversy
in Brown.  Because McFarland has now conceded that the class
consists of more than 100 individuals, Judge Chuang will analyze
only the amount in controversy.

He finds that where Capital One, based on its own calculations, has
taken the position that the value of the claims asserted by the
McFarland class is "at least $1,466,268.46," it cannot establish
the $5 million threshold unless the Court adopts and applies the
approach in Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Products Inc. of
aggregating this amount with the amount in controversy in Brown.
In Freeman, the plaintiffs divided their class action into five
separate suits covering distinct six-month periods and limited
their damages for each suit to $4.9 million.  The Sixth Circuit
held that the $4.9 million sought in each of the five suits had to
be aggregated because there was no colorable reason for breaking up
the lawsuits in that fashion, other than to avoid federal
jurisdiction.

Accordingly, the Judge is not persuaded that the Freeman principle
applies to the case, and Capital One has failed to demonstrate that
the CAFA amount in controversy requirement is satisfied.  The Judge
need not, and will not, decide prematurely whether it would find
CAFA subject matter jurisdiction under a different set of facts.
The Motion to Remand will therefore be granted.

Because the case will be remanded for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, Capital One's Motion to Dismiss will be denied as
moot.  Capital One is free to assert its arguments for dismissal,
including those relating to the recent dismissal of Brown, in the
forthcoming proceedings before the state court.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 31, 2019 Mmeorandum Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/e6ytKx from Leagle.com.

Anthony McFarland, On behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Cory L. Zajdel --
clz@zlawmaryland.com -- Z Law LLC & David Matthew Trojanowski --
dmt@zlawmaryland.com -- Z Law, LLC.

Capital One, N.A., doing business as Capital One Auto Finance,
Defendant, represented by Syed Mohsin Reza --
mohsin.reza@troutman.com -- Troutman Sanders LLP & Jonathan S.
Hubbard -- jon.hubbard@troutman.com -- Troutman Sanders LLP, pro
hac vice.


CAREMARK PHC: Settlement in Woods FLSA Suit Has Prelim Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TIMOTHY WOODS and KIMBERLY GIBSON, On Behalf of
Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v.
CAREMARK PHC, L.L.C. d/b/a CVS CAREMARK CORPORATION and CAREMARK,
L.L.C., Defendants, Case No. 4:14-CV-00583-SRB (W.D. Mo.), Judge
Stephen R. Bough of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Missouri, Western Division, granted the Class
Representatives Woods an Gibson's motion for preliminary approval
of the settlement of the litigation as stated in the Class and
Collective Action Settlement Agreement.

The Defendants do not oppose preliminary approval of the
Settlement.  

After having read and considered the Settlement Agreement, the
exhibits attached to it, and the briefing submitted in support of
preliminary approval of the Settlement, Judge Bough preliminarily
approved the Parties' Settlement as fair, reasonable and adequate.

Eric Dirks, Michael Hodgson, Derek Braziel and Jack Siegel will
serve as the Class Counsel, and Plaintiffs Woods and Gibson will
serve as the Class Representatives.

The Judge approved, as to form and content, the Notices of
Settlement as well as the Claim Form.  Within 60 days of the
initial mailing of the Class Notice, the Class Members who have not
previously opted in and who wish to receive a settlement award must
fill out and submit or return a Claim Form, either electronically
or by mail, to the Settlement Administrator.

The Final Approval Hearing is set for Nov. 5, 2019, at 10:00 a.m.
All papers in support of the Settlement will be filed no later than
five days before the Final Approval Hearing.
A full-text copy of the Court's May 31, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/PP2wxW from Leagle.com.

Timothy Woods, On Behalf of Himself And All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Derek Braziel, pro hac vice,
Jack Siegel, pro hac vice, Jesse Forester, pro hac vice, Michael A.
Hodgson -- mike@thehodgsonlawfirm.com -- The Hodgson Law Firm LLC &
Eric L. Dirks -- dirks@williamsdirks.com -- Williams Dirks Dameron
LLC.

Caremark PHC, L.L.C., doing business as CVS Caremark Corporation,
Defendant, represented by Brian J. Zickefoose --
bzickefoose@polsinelli.com -- Polsinelli PC, J. Stanton Hill --
jshill@polsinelli.com -- Polsinelli PC, pro hac vice, James Joseph
Swartz, Jr. -- jswartz@polsinelli.com -- Polsinelli PC, pro hac
vice & Nancy E. Rafuse -- nrafuse@polsinelli.com -- Polsinelli PC,
pro hac vice.

Caremark, L.L.C., Defendant, represented by James Joseph Swartz,
Jr., Polsinelli PC, pro hac vice.

CVS Health Corporation, Defendant, represented by James Joseph
Swartz, Jr., Polsinelli PC.


CASINO RAMA: Cyber Attack Class Action Plaintiffs Face Hurdles
--------------------------------------------------------------
Peter Ruby, Esq. -- pruby@goodmans.ca -- and Melanie Ouanounou,
Esq., of Goodmans LLP, in an article for Mondaq, report that a
recent decision from the Ontario Superior Court of Justice
highlights some of the difficulties plaintiffs might face when
seeking to certify a class action relating to the disclosure of
personal information from a cyber-attack. Specifically, this case
highlights the difficulties in finding commonality in privacy
breach cases where the sensitivity of the information stolen is not
the same amongst all class members.

Background
Kaplan v. Casino Rama concerns the certification of a proposed
class proceeding relating to the cyber-attack of Casino Rama's
computer systems in November 2016. An anonymous hacker accessed
Casino Rama's computer system, stole personal information of
approximately 11,000 customers, employees and suppliers and posted
the stolen data online. There was no evidence before the Court that
anyone had experienced fraud or identity theft as a result of the
cyber-attack, or that anyone had sustained any compensable
financial or psychological loss, although they may have been upset
about their personal information having been accessed and publicly
disclosed. A proposed class proceeding was commenced against Casino
Rama (in addition to the Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation and
various other corporate entities) on behalf of all persons whose
personal information was posted online or whose personal
information was on servers that were accessed by the hackers. The
plaintiffs asserted five causes of action in the claim: negligence,
breach of contract, intrusion upon seclusion, breach of confidence
and "publicity given to private life".

Decision
The Court dismissed the plaintiffs' motion for certification and in
so doing, highlighted potential difficulties in finding commonality
among class members whose private information had been accessed or
publicly disclosed in a cyber-attack.

Section 5(1)(c) of the Class Proceedings Act requires that claims
of the class members raise common issues. For an issue to be
common, it must be capable of being answered for all class members.
In respect of the plaintiffs' negligence claim, the Court found
that because the scope and content of the applicable duty and
standard of care depends on the sensitivity of the personal
information, there could be no common issues regarding the duty and
standard of care. "[T]he less sensitive the information -- such as
simply one's name and mailing or email address, the lower the duty
or standard of care; the more sensitive the information -- credit
card details, banking information or, say, medical records -- the
higher the duty and standard of care." In Kaplan, the nature of the
personal information stolen by the hackers varied widely among the
class members. Some of the stolen personal information was private
and confidential, but most of it was contact information (which is
generally not considered to be private or confidential) and was
made up of incomplete information fragments. Any determination of
whether the defendants met the standard of care by establishing
appropriate security safeguards would necessarily depend on the
type and amount of personal information at issue. Given the degree
of variance in the personal information stolen, the Court held that
liability for negligence could only be determined on an individual
class member basis and would overwhelm any common issues.

The Court had similar difficulties with the common issues related
to the claim for intrusion upon seclusion, which is based upon the
willful or reckless invasion of the privacy of class members in a
manner that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. There
was no way to determine, on a class-wide basis, whether all class
members' privacy was invaded or whether such invasion would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person since that inquiry, again,
depends on whether any given class member had private information
disclosed or simply personal information.

(Interestingly, the Court also dismissed the claim for breach of
confidence. That cause of action requires that the defendants
"misuse" confidential information. Here, however, it was the
hacker, not the defendants, who misused the class members' personal
information.) [GN]


CHEROKEE NATION: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Fleming Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RHONDA LEONA BROWN FLEMING, et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE
CHEROKEE NATION, et al. Defendants, Civil Action No. 19-1397 (TFH)
(D. D.C.), Judge Thomas F. Hogan of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia (i) granted the Defendants' motions to
dismiss, and (ii) denied as moot the Plaintiff's motion for a
preliminary injunction.

Plaintiffs Fleming and the Harvest Institute Freedom Federation,
LLC filed the class action against the Secretary of the Interior
and the Assistant Secretary—Indian Affairs ("Federal
Defendants"), and the Cherokee Nation, the Cherokee Nation Election
Commission, and the Principal Chief of the Cherokee Nation Bill
John Baker ("Tribal Defendants").  They filed their original
complaint on Aug. 30, 2018.  Along with the complaint, Ms. Fleming
filed a motion for a temporary restraining order seeking to
restrain the Cherokee Nation from enforcing the "citizen by blood"
provision of the Cherokee Nation Constitution, which the Court
denied.

The Plaintiffs seek redress through the courts to compel the United
States and the Cherokee Nation to perform obligations to Cherokee
Freedmen under federal law.  As set forth in their complaint, Ms.
Fleming would like to run for the position of Principal Chief of
the Cherokee Nation.  However, the Plaintiffs assert that Article
VII, Section 2 of the Cherokee Nation Constitution, which limits
eligibility for election to the office of Principal Chief to
Cherokee "citizens by blood" who are also domiciled within the
boundaries of the Cherokee Nation for at least 270 days prior to
the election, is impeding Ms. Fleming's ability to run in the
election.

The Federal and Tribal Defendants moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs'
complaint on Dec. 4, 2018.  Although the Court granted the
Plaintiffs' belatedly-filed motion for an extension of time to file
a response, the Plaintiffs did not oppose the motions to dismiss.
Ms. Fleming did, however, file a renewed motion for a preliminary
injunction on March 22, 2019.  On May 14, 2019, the Court granted
the Defendants' motions to dismiss as conceded, and denied the
Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction as moot.  The Court
dismissed the complaint without prejudice.

That same day, the Plaintiffs filed a new complaint in the instant
case seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, along with a motion
for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction.
These filings stemmed from the same facts, and raised identical
challenges as the previous filings.

The Court held a telephonic hearing on the motion for a temporary
restraining order on May 21, 2019, and denied the motion.  The
Court then set an accelerated schedule for motions to dismiss.
Both the Tribal and Federal Defendants filed motions to dismiss on
May 23, 2019, arguing, inter alia, that the Court lacks
jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' claims.  They also opposed the
motion for a preliminary injunction.  The Plaintiffs filed their
opposition to the motions to dismiss on May 28, 2019, missing the
Court-imposed deadline by one day.

The Tribal Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs lack constitutional
standing to bring their claims because they have not alleged that
they have suffered an injury in fact caused by the Tribal
Defendants' violation of the Nash Order.  The Federal Defendants
contend that Ms. Fleming lacks constitutional standing because the
alleged injury she suffered was not caused by the federal
defendants, and cannot be redressed by an order against them.  The
Plaintiffs do not respond to these arguments.

Judge Hogan opines that without alleging why the federal government
should have, but has not, interfered in the Cherokee elections, the
Plaintiffs' alleged injuries have no "causal connection" to the
Dederal Defendants and are not "fairly traceable" to them.  For a
similar reason, the Plaintiffs' asserted injuries are not
redressable by an order against the Federal Defendants.  

Even if the Court granted all the relief that the Plaintiffs
request, including enjoining the election for Principal Chief of
the Cherokee Nation and barring the enforcement of Article VII,
Section 2 of the Cherokee Nation Constitution, it would not
remediate the Plaintiffs' alleged injuries because the Federal
Defendants have no connection to them.  Ms. Fleming lacks standing
to bring her claims against the Defendants.

The Federal Defendants argue that the Harvest Institute has not
shown associational or organizational standing because it relies
only on unidentified members and does not claim that its activities
or resources have been injured by the actions of the Dederal
Defendants.  The Plaintiffs have not responded to these arguments.

The Judge holds that the Harvest Institute has not established that
its members would have standing to sue either the Federal or Tribal
Defendants in their own right.  The Plaintiffs do not assert that
Ms. Fleming is a member of the Harvest Institute.  Even if she
were, the Court has already determined that she lacks standing to
sue the Defendants.  

Meanwhile, the Plaintiffs describe the Harvest Institute's
membership as comprised of persons with African and Native American
ancestry, each of whom has standing to sue in their own right.
Such a vague description is inadequate to demonstrate that the
Harvest Institute's members have standing -- the Plaintiffs do not
even allege that the Harvest Institute's members are Cherokee.  The
Harvest Institute does not have associational standing to proceed
in the litigation.

Because the Plaintiffs do not have standing, Judge Hogan concluded
that the Court lacks jurisdiction over their claims, and does not
reach the other arguments the Defendants raised in their motions to
dismiss.  For the foregoing reasons, he granted the Defendants'
motions to dismiss, and denied as moot the Plaintiff's motion for a
preliminary injunction.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 31, 2019 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/sTNAP8 from Leagle.com.

RHONDA LEONA BROWN FLEMING, Individually and as a putative class
representative & HARVEST INSTITUTE FREEDMEN FEDERATION, LLC,
Plaintiffs, represented by Percy Squire, PERCY SQUIRE CO., LLC.

CHEROKEE NATION, CHEROKEE NATION ELECTION COMMISSION & BILL JOHN
BAKER, The Honorable Principal Chief, Defendants, represented by
Michael Todd Hembree, CHEROKEE NATION OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL & Paiten Taylor-Qualls, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL/CHEROKEE NATION.

DAVID BERNHARDT, The Honorable, Secretary of the Interior & TARA
MACLEAN SWEENY, Assistant Secretary - Indian Affairs, Defendants,
represented by Amber B. Blaha, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Environment & Natural Resources Division & Sara E. Costello, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.


CHESAPEAKE APPALACHIA: 6th Cir. Flips Dismissal of Royalties Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, THOMAS R. BACK, Individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHESAPEAKE
APPALACHIA, L.L.C.; CHESAPEAKE OPERATING LLC, Defendants-Appellees,
Case No. 18-5975 (6th Cir.), Judge Raymond Kethledge of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district
court's judgment dismissing Back's claims for failure to satisfy
Kentucky's statute of frauds.

Back claims that Chesapeake Appalachia failed to pay the full
amount of royalties due to him and other landowners for gas
extracted from their land.  In 1940, Back's family entered an
oil-and-gas lease with the Inland Gas Corp.  That lease provided a
flat-rate royalty of 12 cents per thousand cubic feet of gas.  In
the decades that followed, Inland's successors in interest began to
pay a royalty of 12.5% of the market price for the extracted gas,
rather than the flat rate of 12 cents.  Eventually, Back came to
own a portion of the land in question, and Chesapeake came to own
the lease.  Chesapeake, like its predecessors, purported to pay
royalties of 12.5% of the market price for the gas extracted.

In 2016, Back filed a putative class-action lawsuit against
Chesapeake, alleging that Chesapeake had underpaid him and other
landowners by deducting too many expenses from its royalty payments
and by basing its royalty payments on false market prices.
Chesapeake moved to dismiss.  The district court dismissed Back's
claims for breach of contract, breach of an implied covenant,
fraud, and accounting, holding sua sponte that Kentucky's statute
of frauds barred him from claiming that his agreement differed from
the original 1940 lease.

The parties agree that the original lease agreement satisfies the
statute of frauds. The question is whether the statute of frauds
bars Back's claim that—at some point in the decades that followed
-- Chesapeake's predecessor agreed to pay a royalty that was a
percentage of the gas' market price, rather than a flat rate.

Judge Kethledge finds that Chesapeake's royalty statements -- which
Chesapeake itself submitted in support of its motion to dismiss --
contain all of the requisite information except Back's signature.
Those statements identify Chesapeake and Back as parties to the
lease, identify Back's land by its parcel number in Knott County,
and list the royalty amount as 12.5% of the gas's market price.
And if Back signed the royalty checks that came with the
statements, as he contends in his brief, then the royalty
statements and the checks together would satisfy the statute of
frauds.  Hence the district court erred in dismissing Back's claims
on this ground.

Chesapeake contends that Back did not plead facts adequate to
address the statute of frauds.  But Back did not need to plead
those facts because the statute of frauds is an affirmative defense
for Chesapeake to raise.

Chesapeake argues that the Court should nonetheless affirm the
district court's dismissal because necessary and indispensable
parties are missing from the lawsuit.  Specifically, it says that
Back failed to join the company that purchased the lease from
Chesapeake, as well as two other landowners who are parties to
Back's lease.  The district court did not address Chesapeake's
argument under Rule 19, and on the record, the Judge declines to
decide the question in the first instance.  Moreover, to protect
the absent parties whom it might be necessary to join under Rule
19, he also declines to address Chesapeake's other arguments on the
merits.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Kethledge reversed the district
court's judgment, and remanded the case for proceedings consistent
with the Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 29, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/59iTkL from Leagle.com.


CHICAGO, IL: Faces Class Action Over Impoundment Policy
-------------------------------------------------------
Jonathan Bilyk, writing for Cook County Record, reports that a new
class action asserts Chicago City Hall owes millions of dollars in
restitution to car owners whose vehicles were illegally towed and
impounded, and often later sold for scrap.

On June 11, attorney Jacie Zolna and others with the firm of Myron
M. Cherry & Associates, of Chicago, filed suit in Cook County
Circuit Court against the city of Chicago.

The lawsuit, filed on behalf of named plaintiff Andrea Santiago,
seeks to force the city to pay out unspecified sums to two classes
of perhaps tens of thousands of other car owners whose vehicles
were either towed by the city after being declared abandoned, or
were later "disposed of by the City," a phrase which often meant
the cars were sold to tow companies, which later resold the
vehicles for scrap and parts.

"In short, the City takes vehicles with no warning or opportunity
to contest the claim of abandonment prior to the seizure," the
lawsuit said. "While the City allegedly sends a notice of
impoundment to the owner after it has already been impounded, it
fails to send the required additional notice when the City intends
on disposing of the vehicle.

"As a result, thousands of cars are in effect stolen from citizens
of Chicago and sold without proper notice and due process."

The class action complaint comes about six weeks since the
Washington, D.C.-based Institute for Justice also filed a class
action against City Hall over its vehicle towing and impoundment
policies, which the lawsuit compared to a "racket." In that
complaint, filed in late April, the Institute for Justice asked a
judge to find the city's policies unconstitutional, as they alleged
the policies violate the due process and property rights of those
caught up in the impound system. The complaint accuses the city of
allowing police to seize and impound vehicles for a variety of
offenses and ordinance violations, and then slam the vehicle owners
with thousands of dollars in fees to get their cars back – but
only if they arrive in time to stop the city from selling it off
first.

In the new class action, plaintiffs center their accusations on the
city's practice of towing and "disposing" of vehicles it deems
"abandoned," usually without first properly notifying the vehicle
owners or giving them a chance to do anything about it.

The complaint related the experience of plaintiff Santiago. In the
lawsuit, Santiago said her full-size van, which was specially
fitted with special lift equipment to allow her to use the vehicle
in her wheelchair, was marked as abandoned in June 2018 by city
officials and then towed from the street where it was legally
parked on the block on which Santiago lived.

The complaint said the city never notified her that the vehicle was
either abandoned or towed. Nor, she said, did the city notify her
before it sold the vehicle to United Road Towing, the company which
had towed her van, which then sold the van for scrap to a salvage
yard, where it was crushed.

According to the lawsuit, the city is required by law to notify
vehicle owners by mail of the tow and impoundment, and then mail an
additional notice to the owner before selling off an impounded
vehicle.

"Employees within the Department of Streets and Sanitation are well
aware of the additional notice requirements . . .," the complaint
said. "The Department of Streets and Sanitation nonetheless
deliberately or with utter indifference fails to send an additional
notice warning vehicle owners of the impending disposal of their
vehicles."

The complaint said Santiago's experience during her run-in with the
city's vehicle impoundment system "is not an isolated incident, but
rather is standard operating procedure by the City."

The complaint noted in 2017, the city impounded nearly 94,000
vehicles, and "disposed" of 24,000 vehicles to United Road Towing,
which paid $4 million in that year alone.

The lawsuit asserts the city's actions violated the due process and
property rights of the vehicle owners under the U.S. and Illinois
constitutions.

The lawsuit asks the court to expand the action to include two
classes of additional plaintiffs, including all vehicle owners
whose cars the city deemed abandoned and towed, and everyone whose
impounded vehicles were later "disposed of" by the Chicago
Department of Streets and Sanitation.

The complaint asks the court to order the city to pay "restitution
in an amount to be determined" to the vehicles' owners, plus
attorney fees.

The complaint also asks the court to order the city to send an
additional notice of impoundment and disposal, before selling off
any impounded car. [GN]


CHINACACHE INT'L: Aug. 12 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
------------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP on June 12 disclosed that a class action lawsuit has
been filed against ChinaCache International Holdings Ltd.
("ChinaCache" or the "Company") (NASDAQ: CCIH) and certain of its
officers. The class action, filed in United States District Court,
for the Southern District of New York, and indexed under
19-cv-05485, is on behalf of a class consisting of all persons and
entities other than Defendants who purchased or otherwise acquired
ChinaCache securities between April 10, 2015 and May 17, 2019, both
dates inclusive (the "Class Period"), seeking to recover damages
caused by Defendants' violations of the federal securities laws and
to pursue remedies under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder, against the Company and certain of its top
officials.

If you are a shareholder who purchased ChinaCache securities during
the class period, you have until August 12, 2019, to ask the Court
to appoint you as Lead Plaintiff for the class. A copy of the
Complaint can be obtained at www.pomerantzlaw.com. To discuss this
action, contact Robert S. Willoughby at rswilloughby@pomlaw.com or
888.476.6529 (or 888.4-POMLAW), toll-free, Ext. 9980. Those who
inquire by e-mail are encouraged to include their mailing address,
telephone number, and the number of shares purchased.

ChinaCache is an investment holding company that provides content
and application delivery services in the PRC. It purports to offer
a portfolio of services and solutions to businesses, government
agencies, and other enterprises to enhance the reliability and
scalability of their online services and applications. China
Cache's American depositary receipts ("ADRs") trade on the NASDAQ
under the ticker symbol "CCIH."

The complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and misleading statements regarding the
Company's business, operational and compliance policies.
Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (i) ChinaCache and Song Wang
("Wang")—the Company's Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") and
Chairman of the Board of Directors ("Chairman") at all relevant
times—were engaged in enterprise bribery; (ii) the foregoing
conduct placed ChinaCache and Wang at a heightened risk of criminal
investigation and enforcement action by government authorities,
which would foreseeably disrupt the Company's operations; and (iii)
as a result, the Company's public statements were materially false
and misleading at all relevant times.

On April 29, 2019, ChinaCache filed a Notification of Late Filing
on Form NT 20‑F with the SEC, disclosing that the Company would
delay filing its Annual Report for 2018 on Form 20-F (the "2018
20-F"). According to the Form NT 20-F, ChinaCache was delaying
filing 2018 20-F "because U.S. GAAP [Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles] audited financial statements of the [Company] are not
yet available."

Then, on May 17, 2019, ChinaCache issued a press release disclosing
that the Company and Wang were under criminal investigation by a
government prosecutor office in Beijing for charges of enterprise
bribery and that Wang had resigned from his position as the
Company's CEO (the "May 2019 Press Release").

On this news, ChinaCache's ADR price fell $0.22 per share, or 20%,
to $0.88 per share on May 17, 2019, before NASDAQ halted trading in
ChinaCache ADRs at 11:12 a.m. Eastern Time.

On May 23, 2019, ChinaCache disclosed receipt of a NASDAQ
Notification Letter concerning the Company's failure to comply with
the NASDAQ listing requirements, citing the Company's delay in
filing the 2018 20-F (the "NASDAQ Letter"). The NASDAQ Letter also
posed several questions to the Company regarding the resignation of
Grant Thornton China as the Company's independent registered public
accounting firm ("IRPAF"), ChinaCache's engagement of Michael T.
Studer CPA P.C. as the Company's new IRPAF, and the allegations of
enterprise bribery against ChinaCache and Wang. According to the
NASDAQ Letter, ChinaCache was required to submit its plan to regain
compliance with the NASDAQ listing requirements, as well as to
provide its responses to the NASDAQ Letter's questions, no later
than May 31, 2019.

On May 31, 2019, ChinaCache filed a Report of Foreign Private
Issuer on Form 6‑K with the SEC, wherein the Company disclosed
that it had "terminated Michael T. Studer CPA P.C. as the Company's
independent registered public accounting firm" (the "May 2019
6-K"). According to the May 2019 6-K, "[t]he decision was approved
by the Company's Audit Committee" and "[t]he Company intend[ed] to
appoint a new auditor in the near future." The May 2019 6-K also
noted that "[t]he timing of the [Company's] new auditor's
appointment is dependent on the status of its ongoing
investigation."

Finally, on June 6, 2019, ChinaCache issued a press release
announcing the resignation of Wang from the Company's Board of
Directors.

Trading in ChinaCache ADRs on the NASDAQ remains halted as of the
date this Complaint was filed.

With offices in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Paris, The
Pomerantz Firm -- http://www.pomerantzlaw.com–- concentrates its
practice in the areas of corporate, securities, and antitrust class
litigation. Founded by the late Abraham L. Pomerantz, known as the
dean of the class action bar, the Pomerantz Firm pioneered the
field of securities class actions. Today, more than 80 years later,
the Pomerantz Firm continues in the tradition he established,
fighting for the rights of the victims of securities fraud,
breaches of fiduciary duty, and corporate misconduct. The Firm has
recovered numerous multimillion-dollar damages awards on behalf of
class members. [GN]


CLARK & GENTRY: 2nd Class Action Hits 831(b) Insurance Sector
-------------------------------------------------------------
Jay Adkisson, writing for Forbes, reports that a second
class-action lawsuit has now hit the embattled risk-pooled 831(b)
captive insurance sector, still reeling from its third and latest
loss to the IRS recently in the Syzygy case.

This new class-action lawsuit arises from the industry's first loss
to the IRS in the Avrahami case, which involved the owner of some
jewelry stores in the Phoenix area quite unbelievably paying
hundreds of thousands of dollars to the owner's insurance company
for, among other things, coverage against a biological weapons
attack by terrorists. Very shortly after that particular Tax Court
disaster, the person who largely designed and implemented the
arrangement, and one of the most prolific of the promoters of
risk-pooled 831(b) captives, being New York attorney Celia Clark,
sent out a letter to her remaining clients calling it quits.

The named plaintiffs in the new class-action lawsuit are the
Avrahamis, Bejamin and Orna, and their captive insurance company,
called Feedback Insurance Company, along with some of their
underlying companies and a couple of other parties.

Celia Clark, Esq. is the first-named defendant in the class-action,
along with her law firm, Clark & Gentry, PLLC, the Estate of Craig
McEntee, who was the CPA involved in the case, the late McEntee's
accounting firm, Neil Hiller, the estate planner who sold the
Avrahamis into the deal, and Hiller's law firm, Fennemore Craig, PC
from which Hiller has apparently now "retired", Alan Rosenbach, who
was the actuary whose pie-in-the-sky numbers were rejected by the
U.S. Tax Court, ACR Solutions Group, which was Rosenbach's company,
RMS Solutions, Inc., which is alleged to have provided actuarial
reports and set premium prices for Clark, Heritor Management, Ltd.,
a captive manager based in St. Kitts who facilitated Clark's
arrangement, and Pan American Reinsurance Company, Ltd., which
acted as Celia Clark's risk pool for some of her clients, including
the Avrahamis.

The defendants are accused of, sometimes individually and sometimes
collectively, making material misstatements to the Avrahamis about
the tax treatment of their captive arrangement and misrepresenting
that the Avrahamis' captive and Clark's Pan American "were bona
fide insurers offering bona fide insurance policies", along with a
litany of other wrongs. The Complaint seeks the formation of a
class of plaintiffs, alleging basically that Clark and the other
defendants were putting together cookie-cutter-type deals where
every client's captive looked more-or-less the same as every other
client's captive, such that there is substantial commonality
between all the clients of Clark and the other defendants.

The Complaint also alleges Civil RICO against the defendants,
essentially claiming that together they operated as a criminal
conspiracy to both cheat the U.S. government out of taxes and their
clients out of their money by way of fees. To this end, the
Complaint alleges that:

     "175. There is no question that the Defendants intended to
commit wire and/or mail fraud in connection with the promotion and
operation of the Captive Insurance Strategies because the IRS has
made it clear that any deductions for money put into such plans as
premiums would be disallowed. It is also clear that Defendants'
racketeering activity in creating, designing, establishing,
promoting, and vouching for the Captive Insurance Strategies
involved numerous false and misleading misrepresentations and
omissions that amount to a scheme or artifice to defraud."

The Civil RICO claims, both federal and state, constitute the first
four counts of the Complaint. The following accounts variously
allege claims against the defendants for breach of fiduciary duty,
negligence/professional malpractice, negligent misrepresentation,
disgorgement of illegal profits, rescission of the Avrahami's
contracts with Clark and others, breach of contract and breach of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, aiding and
abetting, and civil conspiracy. For these claims, the Complaint
seeks actual, punitive, and trebled damages, in addition to some
other stuff.

The first risk-pooled 831(b) captive class action lawsuit, was
against Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., its subsidiary Artex Risk
Solutions, Inc., and others, and is at this point in time at least
a more iffy proposition insofar as (to my knowledge at least) no
Artex client has yet to lose a case before the U.S. Tax Court,
although apparently some have had their deductions denied and been
assessed taxes. This class action against Clark, et al., comes
almost ready-made right out of the box, insofar as Avrahamis could
recite Judge Holmes' lengthy findings in their own U.S. Tax Court
case in justification for their lawsuit.

In stark contrast, the defendants here cannot claim that Clark's
planning was sound, for the simple reason that the Clark's planning
utterly failed and the results were akin to a warehouse full of
fireworks struck by lightning. To quote Big Jim McBob and Billy Sol
Hurok, "It blowed up real good." Assuming the class is certified,
perhaps the only issue worth betting on here is how much the
defendants will end up having to fork over in settlement, the issue
of liability not seeming to itself create much drama.

As I've predicted for years, this is the fate that likely awaits
all the risk-pooled 831(b) captive promoters to whom the IRS has
latched: The imposition by the IRS of large promoter penalties,
years in litigation defending against class-actions, and then very
likely bankruptcy for all but the deepest-pocketed or (ironically)
best-insured defendants.

The crazy thing is that even in the face of the IRS promoter
audits, the disallowance of deductions and assessment of penalties
against captive owners, the reported 600+ cases involving
risk-pooled 831(b) captives that are now docketed before the U.S.
Tax Court, and the increasing proliferation of class-action
lawsuits such as this one (trust me, many more are on the way),
some if not most of the risk-pooled 831(b) captive promoters
continue even to this day to aggressively market this failed
strategy to folks who don't know better but are looking for a tax
break.

Which is to say that one should not be surprised if the U.S.
Department of Justice's Tax Division doesn't pick out a promoter
who is still marketing risk-pooled 831(b) captives and whang them
with a promoter injunction to make them stop, and as an example to
all the rest, similar to what DOJ-TAX did with certain promoters of
syndicated conservation easements who refused to acknowledge that
it was time to turn out the light, because the party was over, and
instead went on blissfully (and misleadingly) selling to new
clients to make a fast buck while they still could.

Anyway, the Complaint against Clark, et al., is well worth reading
and there is a link to it below. Standard disclaimer applies that a
Complaint is not a Judgment, but merely somebody's allegations, and
any idiot with $500 and change can file a Complaint with the U.S.
District Court (and they frequently do).

But stay tuned; as with the class action against Gallagher's
subsidiary, Artex, this should be quite interesting to watch
(assuming you are not one of the named defendants).

CITE AS:

Complaint in Avrahami v. Clark, Case No. 19-CV-4631, Doc. # 1
(D.Ariz., July 3, 2019), as found at https://tinyurl.com/y5tuptq9
[GN]


CONVERGENT OUTSOURCING: Griffin Files FDCPA Suit in M.D. Tennessee
------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Convergent
Outsourcing, Inc. The case is styled as Ariel Griffin individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., LVNV Funding LLC, John Does (1-25),
Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-00587 (M.D. Tenn., July 11, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Convergent Outsourcing, Inc. is a debt collection agency.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Susan S. Lafferty, Esq.
     Lafferty Law Firm, P.C.
     1321 Murfreesboro Pike, Suite 521
     Nashville, TN 37217
     Phone: (615) 492-1199
     Fax: (615) 472-7852
     Email: susanl@laffertylawonline.com


COSTCO: Dismissal of State Taxes Collection Class Action Affirmed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Colby Hamilton, writing for New York Journal, reports that the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a
lawsuit brought by a consumer against Costco over its collection of
state taxes.

The appeals court in a per curiam order agreed that only procedures
established under state law could be used to question a sellers
method of collecting sales taxes.

The panel, composed of Circuit Judges Debra Ann Livingston, Gerard
Lynch and Richard Sullivan, pointed to the "unanimous practice" by
district courts within the circuit, as well as recent rulings by
the appellate court itself, that backed up the dismissal by U.S.
District Judge Kenneth Karas of the Southern District of New York.

The initial class action suit was brought against Costco by Mark
Guterman in 2017. He claimed the retail company was essentially
ripping off customers in New York through its process of collecting
state sales tax.

Guterman alleged that Costco was taxing customers for the full
price of products they were buying, when the company itself was
receiving manufacturers' discounts on the items. New York law,
according to Guterman, made Costco, not the consumer, liable for
the difference in the tax.

In September 2018, Karas dismissed Guterman's second amended
complaint for failure to state a claim. The district court
determined the proper approach for such a claim was to go through a
New York administrative proceeding, as defined under §1139 of
state tax law. Karas found that state law "provides the exclusive
remedy for claims that a 'tax, penalty or interest' was
'erroneously, illegally or unconstitutionally collected,'" the
appellate panel noted.

On appeal, Guterman argued the district court erred in dismissing
his claims because §1139 created an implied private right of
action.

The panel pointed to the 2017 circuit decision Estler v. Dunkin'
Brands, which also argued consumers were unlawfully charged sales
tax, but chose to go the federal route rather than the state
application process outlined in §1139. There, the circuit found
"the §1139 application‐and‐refund process is the exclusive
remedy available for claims of unlawfully charged sales tax," the
panel noted.

It added that the decision there was "consistent with the unanimous
practice of the district courts in this Circuit," before referring
to three other decisions from the Eastern, Western and Southern
Districts. New York courts, too, supported this practice, the panel
stated.

"We see no reason to decide otherwise in this case," the panel
said.

It went on to discount Guterman's main argument that the two cases
differ in how the tax was collected, which, in his case,
effectively unjustly enriched Costco. The panel found that even
accepting his argument, state law provides for the "exclusive"
avenue for sales tax claims collected "illegally," as Guterman
claims Costco's actions amount to.

"The plain meaning of the statute governs here, just as it did in
Estler," the panel said.

Litigator William Weinstein represented Guterman on appeal. Sidley
Austin of counsel James Arden handled the appeal for Costco.
Neither attorney responded to a request for comment on the
decision. [GN]


CRST INT'L: Settlement of Theoretical FLSA Claims in Perez Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JESUS PEREZ, as an individual, on behalf of himself,
all others similarly situated, and the general public, Plaintiffs,
v. CRST INTERNATIONAL, INC.; CRST EXPEDITED, INC.; and DOES 1-100,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-23-CJW-KEM (N.D. Iowa), Judge
Charles Joseph Williams of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Iowa, Cedar Rapids Division, (i) granted the parties'
motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's individual claims with prejudice,
to dismiss the class claims without prejudice, and approved the
settlement as to the class claims; and (ii) denied the parties'
motion for an order approving the terms of the settlement of the
Plaintiff's theoretical FLSA claims.

The Plaintiff's complaint alleges 10 California state law claims.
The complaint does not allege any other state law claims or federal
claims.  The crux of the Plaintiff's complaint, as to the nine
claims, is the Defendant's alleged practice of misclassifying the
class members as independent contractors, rather than as employees.


The parties filed cross motions for a determination of the
applicable body of law, and on Dec. 20, 2018, the Court determined
that Iowa law, not California law, applies to the Plaintiff's
claims.  Roughly six weeks later, the parties informed the Court
that the case had settled, and the parties subsequently brought
their Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement.  

The parties ask the Court to approve the terms of the settlement
agreement, dismiss the Plaintiff's individual claims with
prejudice, and dismiss the Plaintiff's class claims without
prejudice.  No party has moved for class certification, and the
class has not been certified.  The Court held a telephonic hearing
on May 28, 2019, and no potential class members appeared.

Consistent with Eighth Circuit precedent, Judge Williams considers
each factor set forth under Marshall v. Nat'l Football League.  The
parties' motion, however, contemplates the five enumerated
Schultzen v. Woodbury Cent. Cmty. Sch. Dist. considerations, and
the Judge reviews each Schultzen factor in addition to the Marshall
factors.  He finds that the settlement is fair, reasonable and
adequate under both sets of factors.

His determination that Iowa law governs the case effectively
defeated each of the Plaintiff's claims because each claim was pled
under California law, which is inapplicable.  The California
claims, then, failed as a matter of law.  To pursue the case, the
Plaintiff would either have to reform his complaint to allege
claims under Iowa law, or he could pursue claims under federal law.
The Plaintiff has not endeavored to do either.  The Judge finds no
evidence of collusion or fraud, and the balance of factors leaves
him satisfied that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and
adequate.

In assessing the factors set forth in Marshall and those set forth
in Schultzen, the Judge finds that the settlement is fair,
reasonable and adequate and that it is proper to dismiss the class
claims.  The class was never certified, and notice of the
settlement is not required to be sent to class members or potential
class members under Rule 23(e).  The Judge approves the proposed
settlement agreement as to the class claims.  The class claims are
dismissed without prejudice under Federal Rule 23(e).

The parties jointly request that the Court dismiss the Plaintiff's
individual claims with prejudice according to the terms of the
settlement agreement.  The Judge notes that the parties jointly
moved for dismissal with prejudice and that the request was made in
a fully briefed motion that accompanied a comprehensive settlement
agreement.  He offers no opinion on the fairness or reasonableness
of the settlement agreement as to the Plaintiff's individual
claims.

Finally, the parties request that the Court approves settlement of
the Plaintiff's FLSA claims, and the parties assert that private
settlement of the FLSA claims would be proper in the case.  The
Judge holds that the parties did not litigate the case with respect
to the FLSA, and there is no indication in the pleadings that the
parties understood the Plaintiff's arguments to be applicable to
the FLSA.  To the extent the parties' motion seeks dismissal of the
Plaintiff's theoretical FLSA claims, the parties' motion is
denied.

For the reasons stated, Judge Williams granted the parties' motion
to dismiss the Plaintiff's individual claims with prejudice, to
dismiss the class claims without prejudice, and approved the
settlement as to the class claims.  He denied the parties' motion
for an order approving the terms of the settlement of the
Plaintiff's theoretical FLSA claims.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 31, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/KoEDD5 from Leagle.com.

esus Perez, as an individual, on behalf of himself, all others
similarly situated, and the general public, Plaintiff, represented
by Michael J. Carroll -- Michael@wdmlawyers.com -- Coppola
McConville Coppola Carroll Hockenberg & Scalise, Christopher
Martin
Lee -- clee@akgllp.com -- Alexander Krakow & Glick LLP, pro hac
vice, Jessica Sun Choi -- jchoi@akgllp.com -- Alexander Krakow &
Glick LLP, pro hac vice, Michael S. Morrison --
mmorrison@akgllp.com -- Alexander Krakow & Glick LLP, pro hac vice
& Nicolas Orihuela -- no@hohlawyers.com -- Hurwitz Orihuela and
Hayes LLP, pro hac vice.

CRST International, Inc, an Iowan corporation & CRST Expedited,
Inc, an Iowan corporation, Defendants, represented by Kevin J.
Visser, Simmons Perrine Moyer Bergman PLC, Nicholas Petersen --
npetersen@simmonsperrine.com -- Simmons Perrine Moyer Bergman PLC,
Charles Andrewscavage -- npetersen@simmonsperrine.com --
Scopelitis
Garvin Light Hanson and Feary PC, pro hac vice, James H. Hanson --
jhanson@scopelitis.com -- Scopelitis Garvin Light Hanson and Feary
PC, pro hac vice & R. Jay Taylor, Jr. -- jtaylor@scopelitis.com --
Scopelitis Garvin Light Hanson and Feary PC, pro hac vice.


CVS HEALTH: Generic Drug Overcharging Class Action Revived
----------------------------------------------------------
Nate Raymond, writing for Reuters, reports that a federal appeals
court on June 12 revived a class action lawsuit accusing pharmacy
chain CVS Health Corp of systematically overcharging people who
bought generic drugs using insurance rather than cash.

The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco ruled that a
lower-court judge erred in dismissing the case after improperly
weighing evidence in the case that should have been presented to a
jury to consider. [GN]


DELOITTE & TOUCHE: Partial Deal in Ciuffitelli Has Prelim Approval
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LAWRENCE P. CIUFFITELLI, for himself and as a Trustee
of CIUFFITELLI REVOCABLE TRUST, et al., Plaintiffs v. DELOITTE &
TOUCHE LLP, et al., Defendants, Case No. 3:16-cv-00580-AC (D. Or.),
Judge Marco A. Hernandez of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Oregon granted the Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for
Preliminary Approval of the Partial Settlement and Notice.

Magistrate Judge Acosta issued a Findings & Recommendation in which
he recommends that the Court grants the Plaintiffs' Amended Motion.
Certain Defendants timely filed objections to the Findings &
Recommendation.

Judge Hernandez carefully considered the Defendants' objections and
concluded there is no basis to modify the Findings &
Recommendation.  He has also reviewed the pertinent portions of the
record de novo and find no other errors in the Magistrate Judge's
Findings & Recommendation.

Accordingly, he adopted the Magistrate Judge Acosta's Findings &
Recommendation, and therefore, granted the Plaintiffs' Amended
Motion.  He (i) provisionally certified the "Class" as defined in
Exhibit 1 is provisionally certified; (2) entered the Order
Preliminarily Approving Settlement and Providing for Notice; (3)
approved the Plan of Allocation; (4) approved the Notice of
Pendency and Proposed Settlement of Class Action and the Summary
Notice; (5) approved the Claims Administrator; and (6) appointed
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP and Stoll Stoll Berne Lokting &
Schlacter P.S. as the Class Co-Lead counsel. The Proposed Schedule
of Events set forth in the Amended Motion is to be followed.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 29, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/DbxklS from Leagle.com.

Lawrence P. Ciuffitelli, for himself and as Trustee of Cuiffitelli
Revocable Trust, Plaintiff, represented by Catherine Y.N. Gannon --
catherineg@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac
vice, Dawn Cornelius -- dawn@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol
Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice, Jeniphr A.E. Breckenridge --
jeniphr@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac
vice, Karl Phillips Barth, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro, LLP, pro
hac vice, Keith A. Ketterling -- kketterling@stollberne.com --
Stoll Stoll Berne Lotking & Shlachter, Nadia H. Dahab, Stoll Stoll
Berne Lokting & Shlachter P.C., Steve W. Berman, Hagens Berman
Sobol Sharpio LLP, pro hac vice, Jennifer S. Wagner, Stoll Stoll
Berne Lokting & Shlachter, Lydia Anderson-Dana, Stoll Stoll Berne
Lokting & Shlachter P.C., Robert S. Banks, Jr. , Banks Law Office,
PC & Timothy S. DeJong -- tdejong@stollberne.com -- Stoll Stoll
Berne Lokting & Shlachter, PC.

Greg Julien, Angela Julien, James MacDonald, as Co-Trustees of the
MacDonald Family Trust, Susan MacDonald, as Co-Trustees of the
MacDonald Family Trust, R.F. MacDonald Co., Andrew Nowak, for
himself and as Trustee of the Andrew Nowak Revocable Living Trust
U/A 2/20/2002, William Ramstein, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Greg Warrick, for himself and, as
Co-Trustees of the Warrick Family Trust & Susan Warrick, as
Co-Trustees of the Warrick Family Trust, Plaintiffs, represented by
Catherine Y.N. Gannon, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac
vice, Dawn Cornelius, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac
vice, Karl Phillips Barth, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro, LLP, pro
hac vice, Keith A. Ketterling , Stoll Stoll Berne Lotking &
Shlachter, Nadia H. Dahab, Stoll Stoll Berne Lokting & Shlachter
P.C., Steve W. Berman, Hagens Berman Sobol Sharpio LLP, pro hac
vice, Jennifer S. Wagner, Stoll Stoll Berne Lokting & Shlachter,
Lydia Anderson-Dana, Stoll Stoll Berne Lokting & Shlachter P.C.,
Robert S. Banks, Jr., Banks Law Office, PC & Timothy S. DeJong,
Stoll Stoll Berne Lokting & Shlachter, PC.

Deloitte & Touche LLP, Defendant, represented by Gary I. Grenley --
ggrenley@gsblaw.com -- Garvey Schubert Barer, Gavin M. Masuda
--gavin.masuda@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, pro hac vice, Marcy
C. Priedeman -- marcy.priedeman@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, pro
hac vice, Nicholas J. Siciliano, Latham & Watkins LLP, pro hac
vice, Nicole C. Valco, Latham & Watkins LLP, pro hac vice, Peter A.
Wald, Latham & Watkins LLP, pro hac vice, Daniel L. Keppler, Garvey
Schubert Barer, Eryn K. Hoerster -- ehoerster@gsblaw.com -- Garvey
Schubert Barer, Paul H. Trinchero -- ptrinchero@gsblaw.com --
Garvey Schubert Barer & Robert C. Weaver, Jr. -- rweaver@gsblaw.com
-- Garvey Schubert Barer.

EisnerAmper LLP, Defendant, represented by Joanna R. Travalini,
Winston & Strawn LLP, pro hac vice, Linda T. Coberly, Winston &
Strawn LLP, pro hac vice, Robine K. Morrison, Winston & Strawn LLP,
pro hac vice & William P. Ferranti, The Ferranti Firm LLC.

Sidley Austin LLP, Defendant, represented by Alexander S. Gorin,
Munger Tolles & Olson LLP, pro hac vice, Brad D. Brian, Munger
Tolles & Olson LLP, pro hac vice, Brandon R. Teachout, Munger
Tolles & Olson LLP, pro hac vice, Bruce A. Abbott, Munger Tolles &
Olson LLP, pro hac vice, Chad M. Colton, Markowitz Herbold PC,
David B. Markowitz , Markowitz Herbold PC, Jonathan E. Altman,
Munger Tolles & Olson LLP, pro hac vice, Lauren M. Harding, Munger
Tolles & Oslon LLP, pro hac vice, Michael R. Doyen, Munger Tolles &
Olson LLP, pro hac vice, Trevor Templeton, Munger Tolles & Olson
LLP, pro hac vice, Zachary M. Briers, Munger Tolles & Olson LLP,
pro hac vice & Jeffrey M. Edelson, Markowitz Herbold PC.

Tonkon Torp LLP, Defendant, represented by Philip S. Van Der Weele,
K&L Gates LLP.

TD Ameritrade, Inc., Defendant, represented by Adam C. Pollet,
Eversheds Sutherland (US) LLP, pro hac vice, Bruce M. Bettigole,
Eversheds Sutherland (US) LLP, pro hac vice, Gail L. Westover,
Eversheds Sutherland (US) LLP, pro hac vice, Nicholas T.
Christakos, Eversheds Sutherland (US) LLP, pro hac vice, Matthew J.
Kalmanson, Hart Wagner, LLP & Lindsay H. Duncan, Hart Wagner, LLP.

Integrity Bank & Trust, Defendant, represented by Peter D. Hawkes
-- phil.vanderweele@klgates.com -- Lane Powell, PC, SreeVamshi C.
Reddy, Lane Powell, PC & Milo Petranovich, Lane Powell, PC.


DIEBOLD NIXDORF: Howard G. Smith Files Securities Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Law Offices of Howard G. Smith announces that a class action
lawsuit has been filed on behalf of investors who purchased Diebold
Nixdorf, Incorporated  (NYSE: DBD) securities between May 4, 2017
and July 4, 2017, inclusive (the "Class Period"). Diebold Nixdorf
investors have until September 3, 2019 to file a lead plaintiff
motion.

Investors suffering losses on their Diebold Nixdorf investments are
encouraged to contact the Law Offices of Howard G. Smith to discuss
their legal rights in this class action at 888-638-4847 or by email
to howardsmith@howardsmithlaw.com.

On July 5, 2017, the Company disclosed that it expected a wider net
loss than prior guidance for fiscal 2017, from a range of $50 to
$75 million to a range of $110 to $125 million net loss. The
Company attributed the lowered expectations to a "delay in systems
rollouts" as well as "a longer customer decision-making process and
order-to-revenue conversion cycle."

On this news, the Company's share price fell $6.40, or nearly 23%,
to close at $21.60 per share on July 5, 2017, thereby injuring
investors.

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout
the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to
investors: (1) the Company was experiencing delays in systems
rollouts as well as a longer customer decision-making process and
order-to-revenue conversion cycle; (2) the foregoing issues were
negatively impacting the Company's services business and
operations; and (3) that, as a result of the foregoing, Defendants'
positive statements about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects were materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable
basis.

If you purchased shares of Diebold Nixdorf, have information, would
like to learn more about these claims, or have any questions
concerning this announcement or your rights or interests with
respect to these matters please contact:

         Howard G. Smith, Esq.
         Law Offices of Howard G. Smith
         3070 Bristol Pike, Suite 112,
         Bensalem, Pennsylvania 19020
         Website: www.howardsmithlaw.com
         Phone: 215-638-4847
         Toll free: 888-638-4847
         Email: howardsmith@howardsmithlaw.com [GN]


DIEBOLD NIXDORF: Schall Law Firm Files Class Action Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Schall Law Firm, a national shareholder rights litigation firm,
announces the filing of a class action lawsuit against Diebold
Nixdorf, Inc. (NYSE: DBD) for violations of Sec. 10(b) and 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

Investors who purchased the Company's shares between May 4, 2017
and July 4, 2017, inclusive (the "Class Period"), are encouraged to
contact the firm before September 3, 2019.

We also encourage you to contact Brian Schall of the Schall Law
Firm, 1880 Century Park East, Suite 404, Los Angeles, CA 90067, at
424-303-1964, to discuss your rights free of charge. You can also
reach us through the firm's website at www.schallfirm.com, or by
email at brian@schallfirm.com.

The class, in this case, has not yet been certified, and until
certification occurs, you are not represented by an attorney. If
you choose to take no action, you can remain an absent class
member.

According to the Complaint, the Company made false and misleading
statements to the market. Diebold experienced delays and slowdowns
in a number of areas, including system rollouts, customer
decision-making, and the order-to-revenue conversion cycle. These
delays had a negative impact on the Company's operations and its
service business. Based on these facts, the Company's public
statements were false and materially misleading throughout the
class period. When the market learned the truth about Diebold,
investors suffered damages.

Join the case to recover your losses.

Contact:

         Brian Schall, Esq.
         The Schall Law Firm
         1880 Century Park East, Suite 404
         Los Angeles, CA 90067
         Phone:
            Cell: 424-303-1964
         Website: www.schallfirm.com
         Email: info@schallfirm.com
                brian@schallfirm.com [GN]


ENHANCED RECOVERY: Bid to Certify Class in Berryhill Suit Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHRISTINA BERRYHILL, individually and on behalf of a
putative class, Plaintiff, v. ENHANCED RECOVERY COMPANY LLC, doing
business as ERC or Enhanced Resource Centers, Defendant, Case No.
17 C 8059 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Harry D. Leinenweber of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern
Division, (i) granted the Defendant's Motion to Strike Reply; and
(ii) denied the Plaintiff's Motion to Certify Class.

Berryhill is an Illinois resident.  She incurred a debt through her
personal T-Mobile consumer cell phone account.  Due to her
financial circumstances, Berryhill could not pay off the debt,
which went into default.  Defendant Enhanced Recovery Co., LLC
("ERC") is a debt collection agency.  T-Mobile assigned Berryhill's
debt to ERC for collection.

On Dec. 25, 2016, ERC communicated information regarding
Berryhill's debt to the TransUnion credit reporting agency.  ERC
reported that the debt had a $347 balance, which included a $69.33
collection fee.  In response to ERC's collection attempts,
Berryhill's attorneys sent a letter to ERC indicating that she
disputed the debt.  On April 20, 2017, ERC sent a letter back to
Berryhill's attorneys, explaining the history of the debt and how
it had been calculated.

Berryhill filed suit in November of 2017, asserting that the $69.33
collection fee is unlawful under Illinois law and therefore in
violation of the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA").
She claims that the fee represents a fixed 25% of the debt's
outstanding balance, in violation of the terms of her agreement
with T-Mobile, in which she only agreed to pay the actual costs of
debt collection in case of default.

She brings two counts: (1) misrepresenting the character, amount,
or legal status of a debt, by inflating the amount of the alleged
debt with an unlawful collection fee, in violation of 15 U.S.C.
Sections 1692e and 1692e(2)(A); and (2) threatening to take an
action not permitted by law, by threatening to collect an unlawful
collection fee, in violation of 15 U.S.C. Section 1692e(5).

Berryhill brings her case on behalf of herself and a putative class
of others similarly situated.  She defines the class as follows:
(1) [A]ll persons similarly situated in the State of Illinois (2)
from whom Defendant attempted to collect on a defaulted T-Mobile
consumer account (3) which includes the assessment of a collection
fee on the consumer's account.

Berryhill now moves for class certification.  ERC opposes the class
certification and, in addition, moves to strike large portions of
her reply brief.  Judge Leinenweber first addresses ERC's Motion to
Strike before turning to the merits of class certification.
  
ERC moves to strike all the exhibits attached to Berryhill's Reply
Brief in Support of her Motion for Class Certification, and all
references to those exhibits in the Reply, on the basis that
parties cannot raise new arguments or facts in a reply brief.
Berryhill filed her Motion for Class Certification on Dec. 21,
2018.  On Jan. 16, 2019, ERC filed its Memorandum in Opposition to
the Motion for Class Certification, arguing that Berryhill failed
to meet her evidentiary burden to demonstrate that the proposed
class meets the requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23.  Then, on Feb. 8, 2019, Berryhill filed her Reply, attaching
three exhibits that she claims satisfy her evidentiary burden on
certain Rule 23 requirements.

The Judge holds that it is "well-settled" that litigants cannot
make new arguments or present new facts in a reply brief. The
purpose of this rule is to prevent one-sided presentation of
arguments or facts, which is contrary to the nature of an
adversarial court system.  Arguments raised only in the reply brief
are waived as are undeveloped arguments, and arguments unsupported
by pertinent authority.  Therefore, Berryhill has waived the
evidence she set forth for the first time in her reply brief, and
the Judge will not consider the exhibits to her Reply nor the
references thereto.  ERC's Motion to Strike is granted.

There is another matter the Court must address before turning to
the merits of Berryhill's class certification.  ERC argues that
Berryhill cannot act as a class representative because she
expressly agreed to pursue any claims related to her T-Mobile
Account in arbitration.  Though the parties dispute whether the
2010 or 2014 T-Mobile Terms & Conditions apply to Berryhill's
T-Mobile account, ERC asserts that both the 2010 and 2014 terms
include the arbitration provisions and class action waivers.

The Judge notes that by asserting its arbitration rights in a
response brief to the Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification,
ERC is doing precisely what it accuses Berryhill of doing --
presenting a legal argument in a way that prevents full adversarial
briefing.  Because ERC raised the arbitration issue in the context
of Berryhill's adequacy to serve as a class representative, rather
than filing a motion to compel arbitration, Berryhill could only
respond to this argument in her Reply in support of class
certification -- which is not, as ERC notes, a place for parties to
initiate legal arguments.  Regardless, ERC has to date failed to
file a motion to compel arbitration.  As such, it has waived any
right it may have had to enforce T-Mobile's arbitration and class
waiver provisions in the lawsuit.

Finally, because Berryhill provides no proof that anyone else
received the same Letter she did, she has not established the
existence of any common question.  Therefore, the Judge denied
Berryhill's Motion for Class Certification.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 31, 2019 Memorandum Opinion and
Order is available at https://is.gd/TYPUV9 from Leagle.com.

Christiana Berryhill, individually and on behalf of a class
described below, Plaintiff, represented by Celetha Chatman --
cchatman@communitylawyersgroup.com -- Community Lawyers Group,
Ltd., Andrew Finko, Andrew Finko P.C. & Michael Jacob Wood --
mwood@communitylawyersgroup.com -- Community Lawyers Group, Ltd.

Enhanced Recovery Company, LLC, doing business as ERC or Enhanced
Resource Centers, Defendant, represented by David J. Scriven-Young
-- DScriven-young@pecklaw.com -- Peckar & Abramson, PC, Scott
Stephen Gallagher -- ssgallagher@sgrlaw.com -- Smith, Gambrell &
Russell, Llp, Edward Otto Pacer -- EPacer@pecklaw.com -- Peckar &
Abramson, Esq. & Richard Dean Rivera -- rrivera@sgrlaw.com --
Smith, Gambrell & Russell, Llp.


EQT CORP: Glancy Prongay Files Securities Class Fraud Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP ("GPM") reminds investors of the
upcoming August 26, 2019 deadline to file a lead plaintiff motion
in the class action filed on behalf of EQT Corporation (NYSE: EQT)
investors who purchased securities between June 19, 2017 and
October 24, 2018, inclusive (the "Class Period").

If you wish to learn more about this action, or if you have any
questions concerning this announcement or your rights or interests
with respect to these matters, please contact Lesley Portnoy,
Esquire, at 310-201-9150, Toll-Free at 888-773-9224, or by email to
shareholders@glancylaw.com or visit our website at
www.glancylaw.com

On June 19, 2017, the Company announced that it would acquire rival
gas producer, Rice Energy Inc., for $6.7 billion, which would
result in $100 million in cost savings in 2018 and $2.5 billion in
synergies.

Then, on October 25, 2018, the Company revealed that estimated
capital expenditures in 2018 would increase by $300 million,
causing the Company to reduce its full year forecast.

On this news, the Company's share price fell $5.12, or nearly 13%,
to close at $35.34 on October 25, 2018, thereby injuring
investors.

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout
the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to
investors: (1) land acquired by the Rice Energy merger was not
contiguous with the Company's previously held acreage, which
reduced the purported synergy benefits; (2) the purported longer
lateral wells were not feasible because of intervening third-party
parcels or prior drilling by EQT, Rice, or third parties; and (3)
that, as a result of the foregoing, Defendants' positive statements
about the Company's business, operations, and prospects were
materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

If you purchased or otherwise acquired EQT securities during the
Class Period you may move the Court no later than August 26, 2019
to request appointment as lead plaintiff in this putative class
action lawsuit. To be a member of the class action you need not
take any action at this time; you may retain counsel of your choice
or take no action and remain an absent member of the class action.
If you inquire by email please include your mailing address,
telephone number and number of shares purchased. If you wish to
learn more about this class action, or if you have any questions
concerning this announcement or your rights or interests with
respect to the pending class action lawsuit please contact:

         Lesley Portnoy,Esq.
         Glancy Prongay and Murray LLP
         1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
         Los Angeles, California 90067
         Phone: 310-201-9150
                    888-773-9224
         Website: www.glancylaw.com
         Email: lportnoy@glancylaw.com
                shareholders@glancylaw.com [GN]


FACEBOOK INC: Attempts to Snuff Out Biometric Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
Ross Todd, writing for Law.com, reports that is the collection of
an individual's biometric data in violation of the Illinois
Biometric Information Privacy Act enough to establish standing in
federal court?

That's one of the questions that a panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit grappled with on June 12 in
considering whether Facebook should face a federal class action for
failing to get written consent from Illinois users before creating
facial maps to fuel its "tag suggestions" feature.
Facebook's lawyers at Mayer Brown convinced the Ninth Circuit to
pump the breaks on the class action that was poised for trial
before U.S. District Judge James Donato last year to consider
whether the plaintiffs had standing and whether the case could move
forward as a class action given the potential billions in statutory
damages at stake.

But on June 12 Mayer Brown's Lauren Goldman faced a series of
pointed questions from judges on the panel -- in particular,
Circuit Judge Sandra Ikuta and U.S. District Judge Benita Pearson
of the Northern District of Ohio sitting by designation -- about
whether the company had invaded users privacy through the feature
launched in 2011, which prompts users to identify friends in
pictures uploaded to the social media site.

"We've said there's an interest in privacy that's a concrete
interest recognized in the law," said Ikuta early in Goldman's
arguments.

Goldman responded that the court had recognized that right in a
case involving ESPN where the network was accused of collecting
viewers personally identifiable information and sharing it with
analytics companies to build consumer marketing profiles.
Facebook's tool, which allows users whom the plaintiffs are already
connected with on the social network to identify them in photos,
makes no such disclosure, Goldman contended.

But Ikuta responded that the tool worked "sort of like CSI" and
later noted that the U.S. Supreme Court had advised courts to look
at "technologically-enhanced invasions of privacy" differently
since they "can multiply the effect of what a normal human can
do."

Pearson added that a recent decision by the Illinois Supreme Court,
where the state's high court found that plaintiffs don't need to
allege any harm beyond a statutory violation to sue under BIPA,
"presumably answered the question that Facebook poses" about
standing.

But Goldman argued that in federal court "a preventative lawsuit is
not sufficient absent a showing of impending harm." People who
don't have standing can't recover damages in federal court, she
added.

Pearson, however, noted that Facebook had disabled the feature in
Canada and other places where it arguably runs afoul of local
regulations. "Why don't you just stop doing it in Illinois?" she
asked.

Goldman responded that the company thinks that its disclosure to
users, which gives them the option of disabling the feature for
their photos, complies with the law and that BIPA was never meant
to apply to software like Facebook's.

Arguing for the plaintiffs, J. Aaron Lawson of Edelson said that
Facebook's failure to get written consent had deprived his clients
of "the meaningful right to say no to the collection of this
information."

Ikuta, however, noted that that privacy right that plaintiffs were
asking the court to recognize didn't fall directly in line with
traditional common law.

Ikuta said there's "not a common law right to not have your face
mapped and stored." [GN]


FAIRLIFE: Faces Class Action Over Fair Oaks Farm Animal Abuse
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Associated Press reports that an animal rights group that
infiltrated a popular Indiana dairy farm and captured disturbing
undercover video that has led to animal cruelty charges against
three former farm workers released new footage on June 12 showing
workers punching and striking adult cows with poles while loading
them into a farm milking carousel.

Animal Recovery Mission said its new video shows workers abusing
adult cows behind the scenes at Fair Oaks Farms at a milking
carousel at the popular agritourism destination about 70 miles (113
kilometers) south of Chicago.

The Miami-based group's release of the new footage comes a week
after it released video showing workers kicking and throwing calves
at Fair Oaks Farms' dairies. That and other video the group later
released led to animal cruelty charges against three former
employees. One was taken into custody on June 12.

The new video shows employees punching adult cows, striking them
with metal poles and apparently breaking the tails of some
uncooperative cows the workers are trying to load into the
carousel. Farm tour footage that is part of the video captures a
guide telling visitors that cows like the carousel, saying it's "a
joy ride for them."

The animal rights group said the video also shows cows being milked
just hours after giving birth, with the placenta sacks still
visible and blood coating their legs.

Fair Oaks didn't immediately respond to a request for comment about
the latest video. Farm officials have said the farm draws about
500,000 tourists per year.

Animal Recovery Mission spokeswoman Rachel Taylor told The
Indianapolis Star that the new video exposes mistreatment of cows
at Indiana's largest dairy farm.

"They are not showing the public everything that happens," she
said.

The group's director of investigations, AJ Garcia, said the new
video shows abuse being carried out by different farm employees
during a different time period than when the alleged abuse of
calves occurred. He said two videos released were filmed in the
second half of 2018, while the newly released video was shot this
spring.

Garcia said police have been provided all of the information about
the group's undercover investigation this spring, and more videos
will be released in the future.

He said an undercover investigator with the group who shot the new
video received no training after being hired by Fair Oaks Farms,
and he witnessed abuse on his first day on the job but did not take
part in it.

After observing the abuse, that investigator reported it to his
supervisors, but the employees who carried out the abuse were never
reprimanded, Garcia said.

After the first videos were made public, Fair Oaks Farms' founder
Mike McCloskey said in a Facebook post that he took responsibility
for the abuse and that the company fired four employees and banned
a third-party truck driver who were shown in calf abuse video.

"I am disgusted by and take full responsibility for the actions
seen in the footage, as it goes against everything that we stand
for in regards to responsible cow care and comfort," McCloskey
wrote.

Fair Oaks Farms is the flagship farm for Fairlife, a national brand
of higher protein, higher calcium and lower fat milk. Some
retailers have pulled Fairlife products from their shelves,
including Chicago-area grocery chain Jewel-Osco.

The Newton County Sheriff's Department said on June 12 that one of
the three fired workers, Edgar Gardozo-Vasquez, 36, of Brook, was
taken into custody and is being held at the Newton County Jail on a
felony charge of torturing or mutilating a vertebrate animal and
misdemeanor animal cruelty. The department says U.S. Immigration
Customs Enforcement has placed a hold on Gardozo-Vasquez. It says
there are outstanding warrants for two other former Fair Oaks
workers

It's not clear whether Gardozo-Vasquez has an attorney who might
comment on his behalf.

Meanwhile, a California man filed a lawsuit on June 11 accusing
Chicago-based Fairlife of fraud following the release of the
videos.

Alain Michael, of Thousand Oaks, California, says in his lawsuit
that he bought Fairlife milk solely because of its guarantee that
it provided "extraordinary animal care," but the videos showed that
its "'promise' is a sham," The (Northwest Indiana) Times reported.

Fairlife says it's reviewing the lawsuit, which was filed in
federal court and seeks class-action status and unspecified
damages.

Fair Oaks Farms' owners, Mike and Sue McCloskey, are also named as
defendants. A message seeking comment was left for the couple.
[GN]


FIAT CHRYSLER: Faces Class Action Over Jeep Wrangler Death Wobble
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Keith Laing, writing for The Detroit News, reports that Fiat
Chrysler Automobiles faces a class-action lawsuit over an alleged
"death wobble" involving 2015-2018 Jeep Wranglers with a solid
front axle that the suit says can cause the steering wheel to shake
violently at highway speeds.

The lawsuit, filed on June 12 in Detroit's U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Michigan, alleges Fiat Chrysler had
knowledge of the issue: "Rather than address it -- or disclose its
possibility and/or warn drivers at the point of sale -- FCA simply
claims in a news article that the 'Death Wobble' is not a 'safety
issue' and that it 'can happen with any vehicle that has a solid
front axle (rather than an independent front suspension), such as
the Wrangler.'"

FCA U.S. said it has not been served with the lawsuit and cannot
comment on its allegations at this time. "We note, however, that
any manufacturer vehicle equipped with a solid axle can experience
steering system vibration and, if experienced, it is routinely
corrected," the automaker said in a statement.

According to the suit, the so-called "death wobble" occurs because
the solid front axle cannot absorb bumps and vibrations as
efficiently as a vehicle with a front suspension that allows each
wheel to move independently. It says the front suspension and
steering components can be jarred out of equilibrium.Drivers
experience an "uncontrollable side-to-side shaking of a Jeep's
front-end steering components and -- by extension -- its steering
wheel," the suit alleges.

The lawsuit, which was filed on behalf of Claire Reynolds, a New
Jersey resident who owns a 2018 Jeep Wrangler Unlimited Sport 4 x
4, accuses the company of offering drivers a "Band-Aid fix" in the
form of replacing the steering damper if the vehicle is under
warranty.

The suit claims the problem will ultimately return and can only be
remedied by substantial revisions and repair to the suspension.
Reynolds claims the damper was replaced three times in six months
and the Jeep's front end still shook

Drivers have complained about Wrangler steering problems to the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration for years.

"I first experienced the 'Death Wobble' within a year or so of
purchasing my new 2016 Jeep Wrangler," an unidentified Wrangler
owner from Paw Paw, Michigan, wrote to NHTSA in February 2019.
"Very scary (seems to happen on a rough spots in the road,
traveling at 45 mph or higher). The front end was shaking so badly
that I thought I had a flat tire, or that a wheel had fallen off.
It has now happened at least 8 times, and I no longer drive on any
interstate highway."

Safety advocates in Washington have been urging federal regulators
and lawmakers in Congress to look into the steering problems with
Jeep Wrangler vehicles as far back as 2012.

"The Jeep 'death wobble' is a serious safety issue that must be
evaluated by NHTSA," the Center for Auto Safety wrote in a March
2012 letter to former NHTSA Administrator David Strickland. "It is
also representative of the problems involving lack of transparency
and access to reliable repairs that are present in other safety and
defect cases."

NHTSA did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

The lawsuit seeks damages for affected drivers in the form of a
buyback program that requires FCA to pay drivers for defective
vehicles and compensation for the loss of value to the vehicles. It
also wants drivers to be provided with replacement vehicles while
their repairs are pending.

The lawsuit also seeks punitive damages "for FCA's knowing fraud
that put drivers and members of the public nationwide at risk;"
calls for regulators to order the company to issue a recall. [GN]


FLINT, MI: Class Action Settlement May Impact State Budget
----------------------------------------------------------
Michael Gerstein, writing for Michigan Advance, reports that the
state is keeping an eye on multiple pending lawsuits, including a
potential settlement for Flint residents, that could leave a huge
hole in Michigan's finances.

Whether the settlements come this year or next, some experts say
the lawsuits are a risk for the state budget, at a time when Gov.
Gretchen Whitmer and GOP legislative leaders are clashing over how
to pay for fixing roads and bridges.

In addition to Flint water crisis civil case, the other lawsuit
that could be settled is with victims of false Unemployment
Insurance Agency (UIA) fraud charges. Another suit involving the
Headlee amendment and municipal financing could have a potentially
larger budget implication.

Trying to budget for a settlement could also impact the settlement
itself.

"In some ways . . . it's unprecedented," said former Lt. Gov. John
Cherry, who served under Democratic former Gov. Jennifer Granholm
in the aughts. "It's an unknown. And I would bet people could
imagine the worst. And when you imagine the worst, that would have
some budget implication."

Because of those implications, negotiations are often forced below
the surface.

"The hard part for a government . . .  when you know these sort of
lawsuits are out there, [is that] you need to budget for them,"
said Eric Lupher, president of the Citizens Research Council (CRC),
a Livonia-based nonpartisan public affairs research group. "But
when you budget for them, you're sort of telegraphing a view that
you may not win, and this is how much you're willing to settle
for."

Flint class-action suit moves ahead
State Budget Office spokesman Kurt Weiss told the Advance that
officials are "certainly monitoring the costs of the lawsuits, as
we do consider it a potential risk to the state budget.

"At this point, we are not accounting for it in the development of
the Fiscal Year 2020 budget," he added, referring to the budget
that must be passed by Sept. 30. "But we are keeping those risks on
our radar and monitoring those potential costs for the development
on the 2021 budget."

Offices that may be involved in settlement negotiations with Flint
residents are not permitted to speak openly about how the
class-action suit and other cases may impact the state budget.

Whitmer spokeswoman Tiffany Brown said the governor's office is
"unable to comment."

While the Budget Office is not "accounting for it" in current
budget negotiations between Whitmer, state Senate Majority Leader
Mike Shirkey (R-Clarklake) and House Speaker Lee Chatfield
(R-Levering), the Flint class-action suit may loom larger in 2020,
Weiss said.

In April, a federal judge allowed the consolidated case seeking
damages for the people of Flint to proceed. The judge also
reinstated GOP former Gov. Rick Snyder as a defendant in the case.

The lawsuits stem from the April 2014 decision to switch the city's
water source to the Flint River. Lead leached into residents'
drinking water after state and local officials failed to apply
corrosion control chemicals to the corrosive river water.

Elevated lead levels were found in residents' blood and an outbreak
of Legionnaires' disease linked to the contaminated river water
killed at least 12 people and sickened dozens more.

U.S. District Court Judge Judith Levy in Carthan v. Snyder allowed
defendants' "bodily injury" claims to proceed against former state
Treasurer Andy Dillon, former Flint emergency managers Darnell
Earley and Gerald Ambrose, and several other state officials.

The judge argued that it's reasonable to think that Snyder "could
have deduced that plaintiffs faced a substantial risk of serious
harm from the Flint River," given his role and other executive
staff knowledge.

No one knows how large the settlement could be, if one is reached.
But it could be substantial.

Michael Pitt -- mpitt@pittlawpc.com -- managing and founding
partner at the Royal Oak-based firm Pitt McGehee Palmer & Rivers
representing plaintiffs in the case, said he expects a settlement
for more than 25,000 Flint residents involved in the case. More
residents who did not seek legal representation could still see
recompense, he said.

"It's hard to say when that's going to happen and what the shape of
it is going to be. But I assure you . . . that everyone involved in
the case is interested in trying to work out a settlement and many
people are working in good faith to try to make that happen," Pitt
said.

The deaths also may weigh heavy on the jury's conscience.

"Juries tend to frown on that," CRC's Lupher said. "I think we're
talking real money here."

Flint lawsuit costs -- and those to come Independent of any civil
settlement, Michigan has spent more than $30 million over 3½ years
on legal fees for the state's criminal probe into the Flint water
crisis, according to state data obtained by the Advance.

Despite the expensive cost to prosecute and defend state officials
in criminal lawsuits arising from the crisis, Attorney General Dana
Nessel announced on June 13 that her office dismissed all pending
charges in the ongoing investigation, as the Advance reported.

AG office drops Flint criminal charges against Lyon, others,
reboots investigation

Solicitor General Fadwa Hammoud and Wayne County Prosecutor Kym L.
Worthy said in a statement that the decision to restart the
criminal probe was due to a flawed investigation that began under
GOP former Attorney General Bill Schuette.

The AG's office alone spent more than $9.4 million on the criminal
prosecution, according to the department.

Economist Mitch Bean is a former director of the nonpartisan
Michigan House Fiscal Agency. He said that in terms of the overall
state budget, those costs and a potential settlement in the Flint
civil suit likely will not impact the state's ability to pay for
public services.

"We've got a [roughly $60] billion budget ," Bean said. "There's
several ways you can amend a budget, and it happens every year. All
the time, there's adjustments."

But other cases offer further risks.

The Michigan Supreme Court in April agreed to allow another
class-action lawsuit against the state -- this one seeking damages
for people who had wages wrongly seized over false unemployment
fraud insurance charges -- to move forward.

Michigan Supreme Court allows unemployment fraud suit to proceed

More than 40,000 people are now waiting to see if the Whitmer
administration will decide to settle the lawsuit fought by Snyder,
her predecessor. The state has refunded about $21 million in wages
taken in relation to the false fraud accusations.

Lawsuits start becoming a problem for the budget when costs climb
above $100 million, Bean said.

That's why the so-called "Headlee Lawsuit" may be the greater
budget danger.

Local communities sued the state in 2016, arguing that Michigan
violated a 1978 constitutional amendment requiring that almost 49%
of the money raised by state taxes go to local governments.

John Philo, a prosecuting attorney in the suit from the
Detroit-based Sugar Law Center for Economic & Social Justice, said
the case is awaiting a ruling before the state Court of Appeals.

Although plaintiffs are no longer seeking damages, municipalities
want to receive what they argue is rightfully theirs going forward.
That cost is not known, but likely "a substantial amount," Philo
said.

Due to Headlee Amendment violations, local school districts have
been shortchanged by roughly $6.4 billion, argued Wayne State
University law Professor John Mogk in an op-ed published in
Bridge.

To put that in perspective, that's more than 10% of Whitmer's
proposed fiscal year 2020 budget.

When asked about the suit, Bean was blunt.

"Yeah that's a big one," he said. [GN]


FORD MOTOR: Faces Class Action Over Defective Suspension Systems
----------------------------------------------------------------
McCune Wright Arevalo, LLP, and Sohn & Associates have filed a
class action lawsuit against Ford Motor Company for defects in the
steering and suspension systems of Ford F-250 and F-350 trucks,
Model Years 2005 through 2019, that can cause the vehicles to shake
violently and cause loss of control (a condition commonly referred
to as a "Death Wobble") when the vehicle encounters a groove or
bump in the road while travelling at freeway speeds, and continue
until the vehicles' speed is reduced substantially.  More than
1,200 consumers have filed complaints with National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration after experiencing the Death Wobble
phenomenon.

The Complaint alleges that not only did Ford Motor Company fail to
disclose to Plaintiff and similarly situated consumers, despite its
longstanding knowledge, that its F-250 and F-350 vehicles contain
latent defects in their suspension and/or steering linkage systems,
it routinely refused to repair these vehicles without charge when
the vehicle owners experienced Death Wobble; even when the problem
was reported within the vehicles' New Vehicle Limited Warranty
period.  The lawsuit seeks damages on behalf of all current and
former owners and lessees of Model Year 2005-2019 Ford F-250 and
F-350 vehicles in the United States.

Lead attorney in the case, David C. Wright, states: "Despite notice
and knowledge of the defect from the numerous complaints it has
received, information received from dealers, more than 1,000
complaints submitted to the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, and its own internal records, Ford Motor Company
has failed to recall and/or offer an adequate repair to the Class
Vehicles, offered its customers suitable repairs or replacements
free of charge, or offered to reimburse its customers who have
incurred out-of-pocket expenses to repair the defect."

Attorney Wright concluded, "The hope of McCune Wright Arevalo is
that the result of this lawsuit will be to compel Ford to correct
this dangerous condition before anyone else is hurt or killed and
to provide relief to the Class Members who have overpaid for their
and vehicles and, in many cases, had to pay to try and fix this
condition on their own." [GN]


GENERAL MOTORS: Faces Chevy Shudder Claims Amid Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
Jay Traugott, writing for CarBuzz, reports that last April, a class
action lawsuit was filed by a group of owners against General
Motors who drive some of the automaker's most popular
rear-wheel-drive vehicles. These include the likes of the Chevy
Corvette, Camaro, Silverado, GMC Sierra, Cadillac ATS and Escalade.
What do they all have in common aside from RWD? An eight-speed
automatic transmission. According to these owners, they've been
experiencing violent shakes, jerks, and even a "hard shift" during
gear change. Before the suit was filed, GM issued 13 technical
bulletins regarding this gearbox and, unfortunately, none of them
fixed the problem.

And now one Chevrolet Silverado 1500 owner has attempted to take
matters into his own hands by doing something rather simple: reach
out to local news media.

According to North Carolina news station Action 9 WSOCTV, Steven
Brack, who bought his expensive pickup truck only last year, felt
it was important to demonstrate the problem, which he has dubbed
"Chevy shudder" in front of the news cameras. With a reporter in
the front passenger seat and the camera rolling, Brack showed the
steering wheel shuddering and shaking while driving at speed. "It's
a $52,000 pickup truck," Brack said. "It's just a constant shudder
vibration."

Obviously Brack is not alone as this issue affects owners all over
the country. But what Brack really wants is for GM to either fix
the issue or buy the vehicles back. "So all of us are stuck with
just having to own it and drive it," he said.

The local news station reached out to GM for comment but the
response likely won't satisfy Brack and many others. "Owners should
visit their GM dealer. Dealers have service and technical
procedures… to address this concern." Below you'll find the
complete list of GM vehicles equipped with this transmission:

   -- 2015-2019 Chevrolet Silverado
   -- 2017-2019 Chevrolet Colorado
   -- 2015-2019 Chevrolet Corvette
   -- 2016-2019 Chevrolet Camaro
   -- 2015-2017 Cadillac Escalade and Escalade ESV
   -- 2016-2019 Cadillac ATS and ATS-V
   -- 2016-2019 Cadillac CTS and CTS-V
   -- 2016-2019 Cadillac CT6
   -- 2015-2019 GMC Sierra
   -- 2015-2019 GMC Yukon and Yukon XL
   -- 2017-2019 GMC Canyon

What will happen next? Well, it's up to GM. [GN]


GENTLEMAN: Does Not Pay Dancers Proper Wages, Ealy Suit Says
------------------------------------------------------------
Tomeisha Ealy, On Behalf of Herself and All Other Similarly
Situated Individuals, Plaintiff, v. Roy Hughes d/b/a the Gentleman
Gentlemen's Club, Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-02443-SHM-cgc (W.D.
Tenn., July 11, 2019) is pursuing this lawsuit on behalf of
themselves and all other similarly situated individuals who
performed work duties as exotic dancers for Hughes at the Gentleman
Gentlemen's Club during the period July 2016 through the final
judgment of this case within the meaning of the Federal Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938.

At no time during Plaintiff's period of employment did Hughes ever
pay Plaintiff or any other exotic dancers any wages for hours that
Plaintiff and other exotic dancers worked each week, asserts the
complaint. Hughes totally failed to pay wages to Plaintiff and all
other exotic dancers for work duties performed. At all times
relevant, Hughes misclassified Plaintiff and all other exotic
dancers at Gentleman Gentlemen's Club as independent contractors
and not as employees. Hughes controlled all aspects of the job
duties Plaintiff and all other exotic dancers performed inside the
Gentleman Gentlemen's Club through employment rules and workplace
policies, adds the complaint.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendants as an exotic dancer at
Defendants' Candyland Gentlemen's Club during the period of about
2013 through 2018.

Gentleman is a corporation formed under the laws of Tennessee with
its principal business being the operation of an exotic dance club
featuring female exotic dancers known as Gentleman Gentlemen's Club
located at 2947 Lamar Avenue Memphis, Tennessee 38118.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Alan G. Crone, Esq.
     Laura Bailey, Esq.
     Bailey Dorsey, Esq.
     The Crone Law Firm, PLC
     88 Union Avenue, 14th Floor
     Memphis, TN 38103
     Phone: (844) 445-2387
     Email: acrone@cronelawfirmplc.com
            lbailey@cronelawfirmplc.com
            bdorsey@cronelawfirmplc.com

          - and -

     Gregg C. Greenberg, Esq.
     Zipin, Amster & Greenberg, LLC
     8757 Georgia Avenue, Suite 400
     Silver Spring, MD 20910
     Phone: (301) 587-9373
     Email: GGreenberg@ZAGFirm.com


GRUPO HOTELERO: Rivero Mestre Files Helms-Burton Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
Rivero Mestre LLP on June 12 filed a class-action lawsuit under the
Helms-Burton Act -- the first of its kind -- against Cuban
government-controlled entities Grupo Hotelero Gran Caribe,
Corporacion de Comercio y Turismo Internacional Cubanacan S.A.,
Grupo de Turismo Gaviota S.A., and Corporacion Cimex S.A., among
others.

The Helms-Burton Act provides Cuban-Americans, whose properties in
Cuba were illegally confiscated by the 60-year Castro dictatorship,
a right to sue foreign entities that wrongfully trafficked in their
properties. The Act also provides a plaintiff with treble damages
against a defendant who had prior notice of the claim.

Andres Rivero, Jorge A. Mestre, Carlos Rodriguez, and Ana Malave of
Rivero Mestre along with their co-counsel, Manuel Vazquez P.A.,
seek relief for a class of U.S. nationals whose hotel properties in
Cuba were wrongfully taken from them by the Castro dictatorship and
subsequently exploited by the Spanish hotel chain Meliá Hotels
International and its subsidiaries.

                     About Rivero Mestre LLP

Rivero Mestre, with offices in Miami and New York, represents
clients from investigation to verdict and appeal in complex
business disputes in U.S. federal courts, state courts, and
domestic and international arbitration proceedings. The firm's
practice focuses primarily on representing corporate and
institutional clients in a broad range of complex commercial
disputes including financial institution matters, intellectual
property disputes, and litigation and arbitration relating to Latin
American trade and investment. [GN]


HALLMARK MANAGEMENT: Hill Seeks Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
SHANDRA HILL, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. HALLMARK MANAGEMENT, INC., Defendant, Case
No. 5:19-cv-00058-LGW-BWC (S.D. Ga., July 11, 2019) is an instant
action arising from Defendant's violations of Plaintiffs rights
under the Fair Labor Standards Act; to remedy violations of the
minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Act by Defendant which
have deprived the named Plaintiff, as well as others similarly
situated to the Plaintiff, of their lawful wages.

The Defendant has committed violations of the FLSA by failing to
compensate Plaintiff at an overtime rate for hours worked in excess
of 40 hours in a given workweek and failing to pay Plaintiff her
final paycheck, says the complaint. Plaintiff seeks unpaid
compensation for work performed, an equal amount of liquidated
damages to compensate her for the delay in payment of money due
which Defendant instead used as working capital, attorneys' fees,
and costs pursuant to the FLSA.

Plaintiff has been employed by Defendant, working as a property
manager for two properties of Hallmark Management, Inc. located in
Blackshear, Georgia.

HALLMARK MANAGEMENT, INC. owns and operates a business specializing
in managing apartment complexes.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Tyler B. Kaspers, Esq.
     THE KASPERS FIRM, LLC
     152 New Street, Suite 109B
     Macon, GA 31201
     Phone: 404-944-3128


HANNA LAW: More Time to Support Class Certification Bid Denied
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, THEODORE McCLAIN, Plaintiff, v. DALEN PATRICK HANNA,
HANNA LAW PLLC, HANNA LLP, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-10700 (E.D.
Mich.), Judge Terrence G. Berg of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, has entered an
order denying the Plaintiff's motion for extension of time to file
reply in support of his motion for class certification, and denying
other pending motions as moot.

Plaintiff McClain brought suit against Defendants, Dalen Patrick
Hanna, Hanna PLLC, and Hanna LLP, an attorney and his law firm,
under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), and
Michigan Regulation of Collection Practices Act.  Defendant Dalen
Hanna is an attorney licensed by the State of Michigan and the
District of Columbia.  Defendant Hanna Law PLLC is a domestic
professional limited-liability company organized under the laws of
the State of Michigan.  And Defendant Hanna LLP is the name of an
entity that appears on the letters at issue in the case.

Thee Plaintiff claims the Defendants sent him two letters and later
called him on the telephone to collect a debt that was time-barred.
He filed his class action complaint on March 8, 2019, on behalf of
himself and others similarly situated, alleging that the Defendants
sent him two threatening letters and attempted to contact him by
phone to collect a time-barred debt.  

In accord with Rule 68, the Defendants made an offer of judgment on
the Plaintiff's individual claims and the Plaintiff accepted that
offer -- but not before filing a self-described "placeholder"
motion for class certification.  While settling his own claim, the
Plaintiff nevertheless seeks to maintain the suit in order to
certify a class of all individuals with Michigan addresses who
received similar letters from the Defendants between March 8, 2018
and March 8, 2019.

Several matters are currently before the Court: (i) from the
Plaintiff, his motion for class certification, his acceptance of
the Rule 68 offer of judgment, and a motion for an extension of
time to file his reply to the Defendants' response to his motion
for class certification; and (ii) from the Defendants, a motion to
dismiss the complaint.

The motion for class certification, expressly described by the
Plaintiff as a mere "placeholder," was filed to procedurally
preserve class claims even though he had already resolved to accept
the Defendants' offer of judgment on his individual claims.
Moreover, the Plaintiff acknowledges he does not yet have adequate
facts to support his motion for class certification.

The case presents the question of what happens if the lead
plaintiff in a proposed class action lawsuit files a "placeholder"
motion for class certification and then immediately accepts a
defendant's offer of individual judgment under Rule 68 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, before the motion for class
certification is fully briefed.  Having closely examined relevant
precedent, Judge Berg concludes that the mootness doctrine requires
dismissal of the Plaintiff's putative class claims.  

He holds that the Sixth Circuit's jurisprudence in this area does
not permit a plaintiff who plainly plans to accept an offer of
judgment as to his individual claims to preserve potential class
claims merely by filing a bare-bones motion for class certification
-- particularly where there is no evidence suggesting that, in
offering to settle the plaintiff's individual claims, the
defendants' actual purpose was to defeat a legitimate class action.
In the instant matter case, if the Defendants' actions were truly
extensive enough to harm a large number of victims, due diligence
may in time reveal facts capable of supporting a class action.  But
the Plaintiff's case is settled, and there is no remaining
controversy to be heard.  Hence, dismissal is required.

For these reasons, judgment will be entered on the Plaintiff's
individual claims in accordance with Rule 68 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.  Judge Berg further ordered that the
Plaintiff's class action claims are dismissed without prejudice as
moot.  Accordingly, the Plaintiff's motion for class certification
and motion for an extension of time to file his reply in support of
the motion for class certification are also denied as moot.  The
Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint is also denied as
moot.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 31, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/N9k3CF from Leagle.com.

Theodore McClain, Plaintiff, represented by John Evanchek --
john@kelawpc.com -- United Sta & Curtis C. Warner --
cwarner@warner.legal -- Warner Law Firm, LLC.

Dalen Patrick Hana, Hanna Law PLLC & Hanna LLP, Defendants,
represented by Dalen P. Hanna, Hanna, LLP.


HERON THERAPEUTICS: Pomerantz Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP announces that a class action lawsuit has been filed
against Heron Therapeutics, Inc. ("Heron" or the "Company") (HRTX)
and certain of its officers. The class action, filed in United
States District Court, for the Southern District of California, and
indexed under 19-cv-01038, is on behalf of a class consisting of
all persons and entities who purchased or otherwise acquired Heron
securities between October 31, 2018 and April 30, 2019, both dates
inclusive (the "Class Period"), seeking to recover damages caused
by Defendants' violations of the federal securities laws and to
pursue remedies under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder, against the Company and certain of its top
officials.

If you are a shareholder who purchased Heron securities during the
class period, you have until August 5, 2019, to ask the Court to
appoint you as Lead Plaintiff for the class. A copy of the
Complaint can be obtained at www.pomerantzlaw.com. To discuss this
action, contact Robert S. Willoughby atrswilloughby@pomlaw.com or
888.476.6529 (or 888.4-POMLAW), toll-free, Ext. 9980. Those who
inquire by e-mail are encouraged to include their mailing address,
telephone number, and the number of shares purchased.

Heron is a biotechnology company that engages in developing
treatments to address unmet medical needs. Heron is developing
HTX-011, an investigational, long-acting, and extended-release
formulation of the local anesthetic bupivacaine in a fixed-dose
combination with the anti-inflammatory meloxicam for post-operative
pain management.

On October 31, 2018, Heron announced the submission of its New Drug
Application ("NDA") for HTX-011 to the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") for postoperative pain management.

The complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and misleading statements regarding the
Company's business, operational and compliance policies.
Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (i) Heron had failed to include
adequate Chemistry, Manufacturing, and Controls ("CMC") and
non-clinical information in its NDA for HTX-011; (ii) the foregoing
increased the likelihood that the FDA would not approve Heron's NDA
for HTX-011; and (iii) as a result, Heron's public statements were
materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

On May 1, 2019, Heron announced receipt of a Complete Response
Letter ("CRL") from the FDA on April 30, 2019, regarding Heron's
NDA for HTX-011 for the management of postoperative pain (the "May
2019 Press Release"). In the May 2019 Press Release, Heron advised
investors that "[t]he CRL stated that the FDA is unable to approve
the NDA in its present form based on the need for additional CMC
and non-clinical information."

On this news, Heron's stock price fell $3.93 per share, or 18.13%,
to close at $17.75 per share on May 1, 2019.

         Contact:
         Robert S. Willoughby, Esq.
         Pomerantz LLP
         Phone: 888-476-6529 ext. 9980
         Website: www.pomerantzlaw.com
         Email: rswilloughby@pomlaw.com [GN]


HERON THERAPEUTICS: Schall Law Firm Files Class Action Lawsuit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Schall Law Firm, a national shareholder rights litigation firm,
announces the filing of a class action lawsuit against Heron
Therapeutics, Inc. (NASDAQ: HRTX) for violations of Sec. 10(b) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder by the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission.

Investors who purchased the Company's shares between October 31,
2018 and April 30, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"), are
encouraged to contact the firm before August 5, 2019.

We also encourage you to contact Brian Schall of the Schall Law
Firm, 1880 Century Park East, Suite 404, Los Angeles, CA 90067, at
424-303-1964, to discuss your rights free of charge. You can also
reach us through the firm's website at www.schallfirm.com, or by
email at brian@schallfirm.com.

The class, in this case, has not yet been certified, and until
certification occurs, you are not represented by an attorney. If
you choose to take no action, you can remain an absent class
member.

According to the Complaint, the Company made false and misleading
statements to the market. Heron failed to include important
information in its New Drug Application ("NDA") to the FDA for
HTX-011. The material omissions included information on chemistry,
manufacturing, and controls for its new drug. The failure to
provide this important information decreased the likelihood of the
FDA approving Heron's HTX-011. Based on these facts, the Company's
public statements were false and materially misleading throughout
the class period. When the market learned the truth about Heron,
investors suffered damages.

Join the case to recover your losses.

Contact:

         Brian Schall, Esq.
         The Schall Law Firm
         1880 Century Park East, Suite 404
         Los Angeles, CA 90067
         Phone:
            Cell: 424-303-1964
         Website: www.schallfirm.com
         Email: info@schallfirm.com
                brian@schallfirm.com [GN]


HORIZON HEALTH: Judge OKs $2.5MM Payout for Misdiagnosed Patients
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Shane Magee, writing for CBC.ca, reports that for Jim Wilson, it's
been an 11-year wait.  He counts himself as a lucky one -- he's
still alive.

In 2004, he was misdiagnosed.  For three years, he was treated for
an infection instead of the prostate cancer he actually had.

Wilson was one of three representative plaintiffs in a class-action
lawsuit launched in 2008 against Horizon Health Network and Dr.
Rajgopal Menon.  The pathologist misdiagnosed or misread thousands
of test results like Wilson's at the Miramichi Hospital.

After 11 years, that lawsuit came to an end on July 4, 2019, when
Court of Queen's Bench Justice Jean-Paul Ouellette accepted a $2.5
million settlement agreement.

"I'm glad it's over and somebody has been held accountable, that's
my main objective," Wilson said outside the courthouse.

The funds will compensate patients like Wilson and about 3,400
others whose tissues were tested for cancer or cancer-like disease
from 1995 to 2007, but mistakenly diagnosed.

An estimated 972 patients were harmed in some way.

Menon died in 2015, but the lawsuit continued against his estate.

"We feel the settlement agreement is in the best interest of the
class," said Ray Wagner, Esq. -- classaction@wagners.co -- of the
Halifax-based serious injury law firm Wagners who represented the
plaintiffs.

"This was a compromise and a hard-fought settlement, to say the
least," Catherine Fawcett, Esq. a lawyer representing Menon's
estate, said in court. "The defendants do not admit liability, they
do not admit negligence."

The judge also agreed to allocate $1.1 million of the settlement
for legal fees and other payments, leaving about $1.4 million for
compensation to class members.

Lawyers for Menon's estate and Horizon declined to comment outside
court.

Once a formal notice of the settlement is published, people have
210 days to file a claim for payment. [GN]


HUNTER ALLIED: Held in Contempt for Failing to Comply with Orders
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, FERNANDO M. IZAGUIRRE, on behalf of himself and other
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. HUNTER ALLIED OF MARYLAND, INC.,
et al., Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-965 (DLF) (D. D.C.), Judge
Dabney L. Friedrich of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia adjudged the Defendants in civil contempt for failing to
comply with the Court's Nov. 13, 2018 Memorandum Opinion and Order,
and Dec. 28, 2019 Minute Order.  

The case was filed by the Izaguirre, against the Defendants, Hunter
Allied of Maryland, Inc. and Mr. Bradford Q. Ott, pursuant to the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"), the District of Columbia
Payment and Collection of Wages Law ("DCPCWL"), and the District of
Columbia Minimum Wage Revision Act ("DCMWRA").  The case arises
from alleged violations of the overtime provisions of the FLSA, the
DCPCWL, and the DCMWRA.  

The original complaint was amended and re-filed as a collective
action for overtime wages under the FLSA and as a class action for
overtime wages pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the DCPCWL, and the DCMWRA.  The Plaintiff brought the
action on behalf of himself and all similarly situated hourly
workers providing labor for Hunter Allied of Maryland, Inc., which
is a Maryland Corporation providing construction services within
Washington, D.C.

Following personal service of the complaint, and the amended
complaint, upon Mr. Bradford Q. Ott, who is the named individual
Defendant in the case and the president and owner of the corporate
defendant, the Defendants failed to appear.  The Plaintiff then
moved for an entry of default, and the Clerk entered default
against the Defendants.

On Nov. 13, 2018, the Court granted the Plaintiff's Motion to
Conditionally Certify a Fair Labor Standards Act Collective Action.
It later ordered the Defendants to produce a computer-readable
list of all employees who worked as hourly employees of Hunter
Allied of Maryland, Inc., since April 24, 2015, by Jan. 18, 2019.
The Plaintiff mailed the Court's orders to the Individual Defendant
on Dec. 29, 2018, and the orders were personally served on the
Defendants on Jan. 8, 2019.

On Jan. 25, 2019, after receiving no response from the the
Defendant, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Order Directing
Defendants to Show Cause Why Defendants Should Not be Held in Civil
Contempt.  On April 24, 2019, the Court held a hearing on the
Plaintiff's motion, which the Court ultimately granted.  In the
Court's April 25, 2019 Minute Order and subsequent Show Cause
Order, it directed the Defendants to appear in person on May 29,
2019 at 11:00 a.m.and show cause why the Court should not find each
Defendant in contempt.  The Court's Show Cause Order was mailed to
the Defendants' address of record.  However, the Defendants failed
to appear at the May 29, 2019 hearing or otherwise respond to the
Court's orders.

By clear and convincing proof, Judge Friedrich finds that the
Plaintiff has established each element of civil contempt.  The
Court's Nov. 13, 2018 Memorandum Opinion and Order and Dec. 28,
2019 Minute Order unambiguously directed the Defendants to provide
the Plaintiff with the contact information of other hourly
employees who worked for the Defendants during the relevant time
period.  To date, the Defendants have not complied with either of
the Court's orders.

And the Defendants have failed to appear despite the fact that the
Individual Defendant was personally served with the complaint,
amended complaint, the Court's Nov. 13, 2018 Memorandum Opinion and
Order, and the Court's Dec. 28, 2019 Minute Order.  They were also
mailed a copy of the Court's April 25, 2019 Order to Show Cause.
Courts have approved daily fines to compel compliance with similar
court orders, and the Court finds it appropriate to do the same in
the case.

Accordingly, Judge Friedrich adjudged the Defendants in civil
contempt for failing to comply with the Court's Nov. 13, 2018
Memorandum Opinion and Order, and Dec. 28, 2019 Minute Order.  The
Defendants may purge themselves of the civil contempt by, within 14
days of the date of service of the Order upon the Defendants,
contacting the counsel for the Plaintiffs and providing the contact
information required under the Court's prior orders.

If they do not purge themselves of the civil contempt, a daily
fine, in the amount of $500 per day, per Defendant, will be imposed
against them, payable to the U.S. Treasury, until they are in
compliance with the Court's orders, with referral to the United
States Department of Justice for collection.

The Defendants are required to pay the Plaintiff's attorney's fees
and costs incurred for the May 29, 2019 show cause hearing and for
the April 24, 2019 motion for order to show cause hearing.

The U.S. Marshal is directed to serve the Individual Defendant, who
is also the owner of the corporate Defendant, with a copy of
theOrder, at his address of record: 521 Tidewater Cove, Berlin, MD
21811.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 29, 2019 Memorandum Opinion and
Order is available at https://is.gd/BeVza6 from Leagle.com.

FERNANDO M. IZAGUIRRE, Plaintiff, represented by Howard B.
Hoffman.


HYUNDAI: Akin Gump Strauss Attorneys Discuss 9th Cir. Ruling
------------------------------------------------------------
Ashley Vinson Crawford, Esq. -- avcrawford@akingump.com -- Geoffrey
Derrick, Esq. -- gderrick@akingump.com –- Markos Generales, Esq.
-- mgenerales@akingump.com -- Rex Heinke, Esq., Hyongsoon Kim,
Esq., and Neal Ross Marder, Esq., of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld
LLP, in an article for JDSupra, report that fifty-six actions were
brought against Hyundai and Kia arising from alleged misstatements
regarding the fuel efficiency of their vehicles in advertisements
and car window stickers. The actions were consolidated in the
Central District of California.

The district court preliminarily certified a settlement class and
approved the settlement agreement, holding that a choice-of-law
analysis was not warranted in the settlement context because these
issues could be addressed as part of the final fairness hearing
under Rule 23(e). The district court gave final approval to the
$210 million class settlement after holding a fairness hearing, and
did not address choice-of-law issues in its final order approving
the settlement. Many objectors promptly appealed to the 9th
Circuit, asserting challenges to the settlement in light of
differences in state law and adequacy of the class representatives
and their counsel.

A split 9th Circuit panel vacated the district court's final
settlement approval order. It held that under Mazza v. American
Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2012), before the district
court could approve a class action settlement, the court was
required to decide whether common questions predominate by applying
California's choice-of-law rules to determine whether California
law applied to the claims of all plaintiffs or whether the court
had to apply the different consumer protection laws of each state.

En Banc Ninth Circuit Opinion
In an 8-3 decision, the 9th Circuit en banc reinstated the district
court's approval of the $210 million settlement.

The 9th Circuit explained that the predominance of common questions
criterion for class certification is applied differently to
settlement classes and litigation classes. It noted that "[i]n
deciding whether to certify a litigation class, a district court
must be concerned with manageability at trial." By comparison,
"such manageability is not a concern in certifying a settlement
class where, by definition, there will be no trial."

Accordingly, the en banc court rejected the argument that the
district court was required to address variations in state law
under Mazza. Rather, it explained that "a court adjudicating a
multistate class action is free to apply the substantive law of a
single state to the entire class," unless an objector meets the
burden of demonstrating that foreign law should apply to class
claims.

The 9th Circuit held that the objectors did not meet their burden
under California's three-step governmental interest test. The court
noted that "no objector presented an adequate choice-of-law
analysis or explained how, under the facts of this case, the
governmental interest test's three elements were met." Likewise,
"no objector argued that differences between the consumer
protection laws of all fifty states precluded certification of a
settlement class." Consequently, the court found that "neither the
district court nor class counsel were obligated to address
choice-of-law issues beyond those raised by the objectors" and
refused to "decertify a class action for lack of such analysis."

The court also rejected the dissent's "suggest[ion] that the
district court must sua sponte survey the law of all fifty states,"
noting that "no case law support[ed] this unduly burdensome task."
The 9th Circuit distinguished Mazza because the foreign law
proponent there met its burden by "exhaustively detail[ing] the
ways in which California law differs from the laws of the 43 other
jurisdictions" and showed how applying the facts to those disparate
state laws made "a difference in this litigation." The court
further explained that "the Mazza class was certified for
litigation purposes," and thus the need to apply th­e laws of
dozens of jurisdiction weighed against predominance because of the
impact it would have on trial manageability. The en banc court
found that the predominance of common questions analysis is
different in the settlement context, where "the district court need
not consider trial manageability issues."

The 9th Circuit also rejected the objectors' challenges to the
adequacy of class counsel and settlement approval, finding that the
notice to class members provided sufficient information, the claims
forms were not overly burdensome and there was no evidence of
collusion between class counsel and the automakers.

Lastly, the court held that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying fees to objector's counsel because he did not
"meaningfully contribute" to the class settlement.

Dissent
Judge Sandra Ikuta argued that the district court committed a
reversible error in certifying the settlement class because the
district court erroneously assumed that a choice-of-law analysis
was not necessary to determine predominance of common questions in
the class settlement context. She disagreed with the majority's
emphasis on the absence of manageability concerns being of key
importance, because Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,
620 (1997), required courts to give "undiluted, even heightened,
attention" to all Rule 23 prerequisites, including predominance of
common questions, before certifying a class.

Takeaway
The 9th Circuit's decision affirms that nationwide class
settlements can be approved in federal court, and that differences
in state substantive law do not present a per se obstacle to
approval under Rule 23. If objectors do not effectively raise the
issue, a court will not need to compare sua sponte the consumer
protection laws of all 50 states; and even if objectors meet their
burden of showing differences in state law, the trial court may
still conclude those differences do not preclude Rule 23
certification, because class certification for settlement does not
implicate the same trial manageability issues that Mazza
considered. Critically, the en banc court's decision applied only
to class certification in settlement, and does not materially
affect Mazza's use in arguing against predominance in class
certification for trial. [GN]


HYUNDAI: Polsinelli Attorney Discusses 9th Cir. Ruling
------------------------------------------------------
Mark A. Olthoff, Esq. -- molthoff@polsinelli.com -- of Polsinelli
PC, in an article for The National Law Review, reports that class
actions bring more complexity to litigating and settling cases, and
it can increase substantially when the claims arise from multiple
state consumer protection laws. In these cases, determining the
applicable law(s) to apply is often critical to whether a class can
or should be certified. Depending on the states' laws and the
elements of claims to be proven, there may be insufficient common
issues of law or fact, or any such issues may not predominate, in
order to satisfy Rule 23 requirements. These vexing questions can
also present themselves when a court must determine whether a
settlement class should be certified to resolve the dispute. In In
re Hyundai and Kia Fuel Economy Litigation, decided June 6, 2019,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals en banc opinion addressed these
very issues when it reversed the panel's opinion and affirmed the
district court's approval of a nationwide settlement class.

Key strategies and takeaways:

   * An early motion may be filed to identify the law(s) to apply
to the proposed class representative and the putative class
members, perhaps coupled with a motion to strike class
allegations.

   * While the potential applicability of multiple states' laws
does not necessarily preclude a class action, material differences
in the laws (e.g., elements of claims, proof needed, damages
recoverable, etc.) may point toward insufficient common issues and
lack of predominance. A survey of applicable laws may be used to
highlight those material differences.

   * An early motion to dismiss or exclude putative class members
with no connection to the forum due to lack of personal
jurisdiction may be used to restrain the scope of a potential
class.

   * Even where the parties and counsel may be in agreement that a
settlement is in the best interest of all involved, a court must
follow the robust process set forth in Rule 23 to ensure the absent
class members are protected. Whether the same scrutiny required for
a litigation class applies to a settlement class is debatable, but
a recent Ninth Circuit decision has recognized that the standards
differ.

Because class actions are an exception to the rule that cases
typically should be litigated on an individual basis rather than on
behalf of unnamed individuals, there is a presumption against class
certification. Plaintiffs carry a strict burden of proof and must
affirmatively demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that
each of the requirements of Rule 23 is satisfied. The court must
conduct a rigorous analysis to determine whether the parties
seeking certification have shown that the putative class satisfies
the prerequisites of the Rule. While not an explicit element, the
court may also consider the merits of the suit to the extent they
relate to determining whether the Rule 23 requirements are
satisfied.

When plaintiffs bring a multi-state or nationwide class action, a
court also must consider the impact of potentially varying state
laws. As with any other requirement of Rule 23, the class
certification proponents in a multi-state action bear the burden of
demonstrating that the laws of the affected states do not vary in
ways which may preclude a finding that common legal issues
predominate. When consumer protection laws differ in material ways,
there may be insufficient common legal issues favoring a class
action approach. On the other hand, state law variations do not
necessarily preclude a 23(b)(3) action, for even when some class
members possess slightly differing remedies based on state statute
or common law, there may still be sufficient common issues to
warrant a class action.

In multi-state class cases, a frequent strategy employed is to
provide the court with a state survey of potentially applicable
laws. This effort can demonstrate that states' consumer protection
laws vary considerably, and support the argument that courts must
respect these differences rather than apply one state's law to
consumers and transactions in other states with different rules.
For example, there may be numerous differences in many important
components to the states' consumer protection laws, such as
variances with respect to state of mind, reliance, causation, types
of damages available, statutes of limitations, notice requirements,
whether class action procedures are permitted and whether there is
a heightened scrutiny for particular victims of the scheme, e.g.,
the elderly. Variations in state consumer protection statutes may
prevent application of a single state's law in any particular case
because differences in state consumer protection laws regarding a
defendant's state of mind, type of prohibited conduct, proof of
injury-in-fact, available remedies and reliance may be so
significant that the states' laws cannot be grouped in any
manageable way. Even where scienter and reliance requirements are
similar across certain states, other issues like the measure of
damages still prevent them from being grouped together. These
variations may present an actual conflict such that a class action
cannot be maintained.

Another potential defense and argument to limit nationwide class
actions is personal jurisdiction. Following a recent Supreme Court
decision involving mass tort litigation, some district courts are
now faced with deciding whether they are precluded from exercising
personal jurisdiction over defendants with respect to claims by
non-resident class representatives and putative class members (at
least where the defendant is not sued in its home state). Whether
successful at the pleading stage or (if preserved) argued in
opposition to certification, personal jurisdiction can create
another opportunity to limit the scope and value of a potential
class.

Whether these same complex issues need to be addressed or might
stall a proposed class resolution is another thing. A tension can
be formed when the plaintiffs and defendants have reached an
arm's-length, negotiated compromise of nationwide class claims. On
the one hand, counsel and their respective clients seek to resolve
their differences in a manner that courts encourage, with an
approach to reach a result that considers the evaluation of claims,
damages and defenses. A robust process then follows to ensure all
affected persons have an opportunity to be heard concerning the
settlement. On the other hand, there is no reason to expect that
the resolution of class certification questions would change in a
settlement context, including the court's rigorous inquiry when it
considers certification of a settlement class. While a district
court need not decide whether a case, if tried, would present
intractable management problems, other specifications of the Rule,
e.g., those designed to protect absentees by blocking unwarranted
or overbroad class definitions, compel perhaps more attention in
the settlement context. This added scrutiny may be needed because a
court is being asked to approve a settlement and certify a
settlement class. It will lack the opportunity, present when a case
is litigated, to adjust the class informed by the adversarial
proceedings as they develop.

The failure to consider all aspects of Rule 23 in the settlement
context played out recently in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
where a panel of the court vacated the district court's decision to
certify a multi-state class action for settlement purposes. There,
the named plaintiffs sought to represent (and settle) claims in a
nationwide class of car owners. While the district court found the
settlement was fair and in the best interest of the class members,
the appeals court specifically found that the district court erred
in failing to consider the choice of law issue and failing to
conduct a rigorous analysis of the elements of certification under
Rule 23(b)(3). Thus, the case was remanded for further analysis and
findings.

As the panel discussed, federal courts do not have authority to
substitute Rule 23's certification criteria with a standard that if
a settlement is fair, then certification is proper. That is, a
court may not justify its decision to certify a settlement class on
the ground that the proposed settlement is fair to all putative
class members. Otherwise, if a common interest in a fair compromise
could satisfy the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), that
vital element would be stripped of any meaning in the settlement
context and the safeguards provided by the Rule, which serve to
inhibit class certifications dependent upon a court's gut feeling
or impression of the settlement's fairness, would be eviscerated.

The full Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has now considered the
panel's decision, reversed it and affirmed the district court's
order and judgment approving the settlement class. The court
recognized that the criteria for class actions differ whether the
matters are litigated or settlement classes. For instance,
manageability is never a concern for settlement classes. Because
the case before the court was a settlement class, the analysis to
be performed on appeal is much more limited.

Here, the court focused on the only challenges made by the
objectors -- the district court's findings on predominance and
adequacy. First, while predominance forms part of the Rule 23
inquiry for certification, it makes a difference if the class is to
be litigated or settled. The court found that the district court
followed the law and the facts it determined satisfied the
applicable standards to conclude that common issues predominated in
the consumer fraud case. Similarly, as to adequacy, the court held
that the plaintiffs and counsel satisfied the Rule 23 requirements.
There was no collusion and the class administration provisions of
the settlement agreement were fair and reasonable. In the end, the
court complimented the district court's "admirable job of managing"
the complex case, held multiple conferences and made careful
findings that support the judgment.

Conclusion
Litigating and settling multi-state class actions can be difficult,
especially when the substantive causes of action are governed by
numerous states' laws. While plaintiffs in these cases usually
focus on the similarities of the elements of the claims, defendants
will highlight the variances in proof, laws and damages. Settling
multi-state class actions brings added challenges but the recent
Ninth Circuit en banc decision should give comfort that the
plaintiffs and defendants can resolve the claims without the
necessity of establishing each Rule 23 client required for
litigated classes. [GN]


IAS WARRANTY: Michigan Court Dismisses Radner With Prejudice
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SOLOMON RADNER, Plaintiff, v. IAS WARRANTY, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 2:17-CV-12704-TGB (E.D. Mich.), Judge Terrence
G. Berg of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division, granted the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, and dismissed the
case with prejudice.

On July 18, 2017, Atty. Radner brought the putative consumer class
action against IAS in the State of Michigan Oakland County Circuit
Court, seeking various forms of relief.  The Plaintiff filed the
class action complaint On Aug. 18, 2017, the complaint was removed
to the Court.

On Sept. 12, 2018, the Court found that there existed multiple
legal-business relationships between named Mr. Radner and his
named-counsel, Attorney Keith L. Altman, and that these
relationships raise the appearance of a conflict of interest as to
whether Mr. Radner may independently, fairly and adequately
represent the interests of the class Plaintiffs while at the same
time being involved in law practice associations with Mr. Altman,
who is the Lead Counsel.

The Court ordered the Plaintiff to either identify a new class
representative or a new class counsel within 21 days.  It further
said that, at the end of the 21-day period, if no individual has
been identified as the class representative or the class counsel,
the Court will dismiss the complaint without prejudice, and the
Plaintiff may refile the complaint at some point in the future
either with a different counsel or a different class
representative.

On Sept. 26, 2018, the Plaintiff filed a "Stipulation Regarding
Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint," indicating that he
instead planned to retain his current counsel and pursue the
lawsuit as an individual plaintiff rather than as a class
representative.  This pleading was then stricken, because it was
entered incorrectly on the docket, in violation of the Local Rules
of the Eastern District of Michigan.  The Plaintiff did not re-file
that pleading, and did not file any other documents or pleadings.

On April 4, 2019, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause why the
action should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute.  In
response, and pursuant to a stipulation with opposing counsel, the
Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint on April 5, 2019.  The
Defendant moved for an extension of time to file their responsive
pleading, citing ongoing potential settlement discussions with the
Plaintiff.  Per the motion, the Plaintiff did not oppose the
extension, and the motion was granted by the Court.

On May 3, 2019, the Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's
Second Amended Complaint.  It seeks to dismiss all counts of
Plaintiff Radner's second amended complaint with prejudice.  To
date, the Plaintiff has not filed any responsive pleading to the
motion, and the time to do so has now run.  By failing to raise any
arguments in opposition of the Defendant's motion to dismiss, the
Plaintiff waives those arguments, and the Court has discretion to
deem the motion unopposed.

Because the motion is unopposed, and given that the Court has
already resorted once to ordering the Plaintiff to show cause why
the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute, Judge
Berg granted the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second
Amended Complaint, and dismissed the case with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 31, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/k6JK25 from Leagle.com.

Solomon Radner, Plaintiff, represented by Keith L. Altman, Excolo
Law PLLC.

IAS Warranty, Inc., Defendant, represented by Douglas A. Albritton
-- doug.albritton@actuatelaw.com -- Actuate Law, LLC & Barry M.  
Rosenbaum -- BROSENBAUM@SEYBURN.COM -- Seyburn, Kahn.


IKEA: Must Face Employee's "Rounding" Wage Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------
Brian Flood, writing for Bloomberg Law, reports that IKEA can't
escape part of a would-be class suit claiming the furniture giant
skimped on employee wages, a federal court ruled June 11.

Terri Powell was a pack team captain for IKEA from 2014 to 2018.
She claims the company has a policy of "rounding" its employees'
clock-in and clock-out times to its own benefit. If she worked from
6:20 a.m. to 3:07 p.m., for example, the company only paid her from
6:30 a.m. to 3 p.m, she says. [GN]


JAYKAY INC: Management & E3 Dismissed w/o Prejudice from Ogogo Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHARI OGOGO, Plaintiff, v. JAYKAY, INC., a California
corporation, MANAGEMENT SOLUTION, LLC, a California Limited
Liability Company, E3 HR, Inc., a New Jersey Corporation, and DOES
1-50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-03203-JAM-DB (E.D.
Cal.), Judge John A. Mendez of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California dismissed Ogogo's claims against
Management Solution and E3 HR.

Ogogo brings the wage and hour class action and Private Attorney
General Act ("PAGA") action against JayKay, Management Solution,
and E3 HR.  She sues on behalf of contractors providing medical
services in California state prisons for unpaid wages, missed meal
periods, missed rest breaks, inaccurate wage statements, and pay
due upon separation.  Ogogo proposed classes for each alleged
violation.

Ogogo was a clinical laboratory scientist contractor at Solano
State Prison.  She alleges she was jointly employed by Defendants
Management Solution, JayKay, and E3 HR.  Management Solution and
JayKay are vendor management companies in healthcare that contract
with CDCR to place temporary medical professionals.  E3 HR is a
payroll processing company.  Ogogo alleges she and the proposed
classes were employed by JayKay, providing time cards to Management
Solution, and issued wage statements by E3 HR.

Ogogo alleges the Defendants "carried out a joint scheme, business
plan or policy" requiring the class members to follow practices and
policies impacting employees' day to day activities, and that these
interrelated business structures and functions worked as a
subterfuge to prevent aggrieved employees from bringing claims
against their joint employers.  Ogogo alleges JayKay and Management
Solution were authorized to fire, demote, and discipline.

To support her claims, Ogogo cites: (1) the employment agreement
she signed with JayKay to work as an at-will Clinical Lab Scientist
at Pleasant Valley State Prison, (2) an onboarding email with
reporting instructions for Ogogo's start date at Solano State
Prison that Management Solution sent to JayKay with the subject
"SOL 1st day start instructions CLS Chari Ogogo," and (3) her wage
statement, bearing each the Defendant's company name.

The Defendants filed Motions to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
Management Solution filed a Motion to Strike Class and PAGA
Allegations, and two requests for judicial notice.  E3 HR also
filed a Request for Judicial Notice.  JayKay joined the motions to
dismiss and motion to strike.  Ogogo opposed the motions to
dismiss, the motion to strike, the request for judicial notice, and
notice of joinder.

The Defendants E3 HR and Management argue Ogogo's claims must be
dismissed because neither party employed Ogogo.  The Defendants
argue Ogogo was at least jointly employed by CDCR, a public agency
exempt from liability for nearly all alleged violations.  The
Plaintiff argues she was not employed by CDCR because she did not
interview or apply with the prisons, was required to wear a
contractor badge on-site, and was required to list the name of her
employer when she signed in and out of the facility.

The Defendants also argue the Plaintiff lacks standing, fails to
state a claim, violates Rule 8 by reciting statutes and making
conclusory allegations without connecting how she was harmed by the
Defendants' actions, and fails to distinguish the Defendants.

Judge Mendez finds that the Plaintiff's allegations that Management
Solution "provided timecards" and E3 HR "issued wage statements"
does not confer employer liability.  Management Solution acted as a
conduit of information for JayKay and CDCR's instructions.  While
Management Solution may require JayKay use a specific timekeeping
procedure, Management Solution does not control working
conditions.

Ogogo has even weaker link to E3 HR.  The latter does not transform
into an employer simply because it processes payroll, issues and
prints the wage statements, or because the company logo appears on
the paystub.

Finally, it is true that CDCR retained more control than JayKay.
The employment agreement shows CDCR exercised control over the most
important aspect of operations -- how services were performed --
and that any control JayKay wielded over wages was secondary to
CDCR's control of hours and working conditions in the facility.

The Judge concludes that since the Plaintiff has not adequately
plead that E3 HR and Management Solution were her employers, the
Plaintiff's claims against E3 HR and Management Solution will be
dismissed without prejudice.  Although Ogogo sufficiently alleges
that she was employed by JayKay, the dismissal of E3 HR -- the only
diverse Defendant -- means that the Court no longer retains subject
matter jurisdiction under CAFA.  Accordingly, the Judge must remand
the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sectopm 1447(c).

Based on the foregoing, Judge Mendez dismissed without prejudice
Ogogo's claims against Management Solution and E3 HR.  If Ogogo
elects to amend her complaint with respect to these claims, she
will file a Second Amended Complaint within 20 days of the Order.
The Defendants' responsive pleadings are due 20 days thereafter.
Absent amendment, the case against JayKay will be remanded to San
Joaquin Superior Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1447(c).

A full-text copy of the Court's May 28, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/oTJjsv from Leagle.com.

Chari Ogogo, Plaintiff, represented by Jonathan Melmed --
jm@melmedlaw.com -- Melmed Law Group P.C. & Martin E. Sullivan --
ms@melmedlaw.com -- Melmed Law Group PC.

JayKay, Inc., Defendant, represented by Sherri Esther Matta --
s.matta.law@gmail.com -- Law Office of Robert Gentino.

Management Solution, LLC, Defendant, represented by Keith Andrew
Custis -- info@custislawpc.com -- Custis Law, P.C.

E3 HR, Inc., Defendant, represented by James S. Brown --
JamesBrown@duanemorris.com -- Duane Morris LLP.


JOSEPH PIGOTT: Court Issues Show Cause Order in Barr Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
Judge Ricardso S. Martinez of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington, Seattle, has issued a show cause
order in the case, HEATHER WINSLOW BARR, Petitioner, v. JOSEPH
STANLEY PIGOTT, Respondent, Case No. C19-682RSM (W.D. Wash).

On May 7, 2019, the Respondent filed a notice of removal in the
Court, attaching a Petition for Divorce (Dissolution) that was
filed in 2017 in the Washington State Superior Court for King
County.  His notice of removal indicates that he demands the class
action case removed to the federal court, on the grounds of
treason, the Moorish American Treaty of Peace & Friendship of 1787
& the United States Constitution of 1789, judicial misconduct,
human trafficking, Racketeering Influenced & Corrupt Organizations,
money laundering, antitrust, monopoly, civil rights, consumer
protection act, bank fraud, home owners being defrauded (by banks),
false imprisonment, fraudulent state judges, obstruction of
justice, Ethics in Government Act & Private U.S. Attorney General
Act et al.  He also demands that the case is worth over $5 million
and there are too many people to give notices to, by joinder and
will need to send notice to all people of the class action.

The Respondent has subsequently made two filings that he indicates
supplement his notice of removal.  The filings include a variety of
legal documents from the state-court divorce proceeding and several
other possibly related state court actions.  The Court is unable to
discern the intended purpose of these filings.

Judge Martinez finds that the precise basis upon which the
Respondent asserts that the state court divorce action may be
removed to the Court is unclear.  The Petition for Divorce that the
Respondent attaches was signed on Aug. 18, 2017 and clearly filed
in 2017, indicating that removal was clearly not timely.  

In addition, the Judge finds that the Respondent's notice of
removal appears to possibly premise removal on the basis of federal
claims.  But federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal
question is presented on the face of the Plaintiff's properly
pleaded complaint.  The Respondent does nothing to allege that any
federal question is raised on the face of the Petition for Divorce
and does nothing to show that the state court action originally
could have been filed in federal court.  Further still, the
Respondent is unable to show that removal on the basis of federal
question jurisdiction is timely.

Accordingly, Judge Martinez ordered that the Respondent, no later
than 14 days from the date of the Order, will show cause (1) why
the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the matter, (2) why
removal was properly accomplished in accordance with the applicable
federal statutes, and (3) why the action should not be remanded for
a lack of jurisdiction.  The Respondent's response will not exceed
five double-spaced pages.  Failure to respond to this Order may
result in remand of the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 29, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/stb36v from Leagle.com.

Heather Winslow Barr, Petitioner, pro se.

Joseph Stanley Pigott, also known as King Abdul Mumin El,
Respondent, pro se.


KOLON LIFE: Invossa Investigation Expands Amid Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
Chae Yun-Hwan, writing for Korea JoongAng Daily, reports that
authorities are widening their investigation into Kolon Life
Science's scandal-ridden gene therapy drug Invossa, banning the
group's former chairman from leaving the country and completing the
registration of half the patients who have taken the drug, which
was approved for commercialization based on false information.

The Ministry of Food and Drug Safety on June 16 said that as of
June 12 it collected information on 1,516 patients from 311 medical
institutions that were giving Kolon's knee osteoarthritis drug
Invossa.

The drug, which was approved by authorities in 2017, had its
license revoked late in May, as the drug safety ministry found that
the company had filed false documents for its approval. Invossa was
approved on the basis that it used cartilage-originated basis
cells, when in fact it used kidney cells.

The drug was taken off the market in April after the company
revealed the presence of the cells.

The ministry is currently tracking down the patients who took the
drug to test for potential side effects over a 15-year period. It
estimates that over 3,000 patients in Korea were given Invossa. The
ministry targets to complete registration of all patients by
October this year.

Meanwhile, prosecutors have widened their probe into Kolon Life
Science after the drug safety ministry reported them for
investigation in May.

The prosecution recently placed a travel ban on Kolon Group's
former chairman Lee Woong-yeul.

Lee, who resigned from his post late last year, was reported to
prosecutors for investigation by shareholders of its U.S.-based
affiliate Kolon TissueGene. They filed a class action lawsuit on
May 21.

Lee has significant influence in Kolon due to his sizeable stake.

The former group chairman is the second-largest shareholder of
Kolon Life Science with a 14.4 percent stake. The former chairman
was not included in the list of executives that the drug safety
ministry reported for investigation late in May.

The wider investigation has focused on whether executives at Kolon
Life Science and its U.S.-based affiliate Kolon TissueGene were
aware that kidney cells were present in Invossa and intentionally
hid the problem.

According to the drug safety ministry, an email between the two
companies indicates they were aware of the problem as early as
2017. Company executives claim that they had no idea the kidney
cells were present in the drug.

Prosecutors already raided the headquarters of Kolon Life Science,
Kolon TissueGene's Seoul office, and the drug safety ministry.

The government has also been on the spotlight over the scandal, as
a civic group reported the drug safety ministry to prosecutors in
May for gross negligence in authorizing Invossa.

The ministry issued an apology earlier in June and promised to
prevent similar cases in the future.

Kolon Life Science was set to present its case against Invossa's
license cancelation on June 18 in a ministry hearing. The ministry
will make a final decision on the revocation of the license based
on the hearing.

The Korea Exchange is also reviewing whether to delist Kolon
TissueGene, as its parent company's executives face possible
criminal charges.

Kolon TissueGene's shares have been suspended since May 28. [GN]


LANDSTAR: Sued Over Contractors' Worker Status
----------------------------------------------
Will Robinson, writing for Jacksonville Business Journal, reports
that a class action suit alleges that Landstar's owner/operators
should be classified as employees, not contractors. [GN]


LYFT INC: Settlement in Wright TCPA Suit Has Final Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KENNETH WRIGHT, on his own behalf and on behalf of
other similarly situated persons, Plaintiff, v. LYFT, INC., a
Delaware corporation, Defendant, Case No. 2:14-cv-00421-BJR (W.D.
Wash.), Judge Barbara Jacobs Rothstein of the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Washington, Seattle, has entered a
final judgment approving the settlement and certifying the
Settlement Class.

In sum, the Judge finds that the settlement is fair, adequate, and
reasonable.  Accordingly, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, she
finally approved the settlement of the Action.  She finally
certified for settlement purposes the following Settlement Class
defined as all Washington residents who, between June 1, 2012, and
the date of preliminary approval, Nov. 15, 2018, received on their
cellular telephones one or more invitational or referral text
messages through Lyft's 'Invite A Friend' program.

The Judge appointed (i) Wright as the Representative Plaintiff of
the Settlement Class; and (ii) the following lawyers as the Class
Counsel: Donald W. Heyrich HKM Employment Attorneys LLP 600 Stewart
Street, Suite 901 Seattle, WA 98101 Kyann Kalin Peter Stutheit
Stutheit Kalin LLC 1 SW Columbia Street, Suite 1850 Portland, OR
97258.

In accordance with the Settlement Agreement, the Settlement
Administrator will issue a payment (i) to the Plaintiffs' counsel
for attorneys' fees in the amount of $998,750, and costs in the
amount of $20,764.06; and (ii) of $5,000 to Named Plaintiff Kenneth
Wright as a service award for his time and effort invested in the
litigation.  Settlement Administrator JND is entitled to fees in an
amount to be determined to be paid from the settlement fund.

All Released Claims of each Settlement Class Member (as those terms
are defined in the Settlement Agreement) are dismissed with
prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 29, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/yn21cQ from Leagle.com.

Kenneth Wright, on his own behalf and on behalf of other similarly
situated persons, Plaintiff, represented by Donald W. Heyrich, HKM
EMPLOYMENT ATTORNEYS LLP, Peter Stutheit -- peter@stutheitkalin.com
-- STUTHEIT KALIN LLC & Jason A. Rittereiser, HKM EMPLOYMENT
ATTORNEYS PLLC.

Lyft, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendant, represented by
Archis A. Parasharami -- aparasharami@mayerbrown.com -- MAYER BROWN
LLP, pro hac vice, Bradley S. Keller -- bkeller@byrneskeller.com --
BYRNES KELLER CROMWELL LLP & Keith David Petrak --
kpetrak@byrneskeller.com -- BYRNES KELLER CROMWELL LLP.


MAINE: Mental Health System Still Fractured Despite AMHI Closure
----------------------------------------------------------------
Eric Russell, writing for Press Herald, reports that the closure of
the Augusta Mental Health Institute 15 years ago was supposed to be
a symbolic end to a long and often sordid chapter in the state's
treatment of the mentally ill.

A new psychiatric facility, Riverview, was built to house the most
acute patients, never more than 100 and only temporarily. The rest
would live in the community with a promise that the state would
provide resources tailored to their individual needs.

But year after year, Maine has failed to make good on its promise.

"Are we better off than we were when AMHI was operating? Yes.
People are not dying in institutions," said Jenna Mehnert,
executive director of the National Alliance on Mental Illness of
Maine. "But do we have any type of comprehensive community mental
health system that meets people where they are at and gets their
life back on course? I think, no, we don't."

Maine's current system for treating the mentally ill was forged out
of a landmark 1990 court decision, referred to as the consent
decree, that settled a class action lawsuit brought on behalf of
about 300 AMHI patients after a series of deaths in the summer of
1988. The facility was considered overcrowded even then, but at its
height AMHI housed more than 1,800 patients. The 99-page decree
lays out in detail a set of principles for the state to follow in
treating the mentally ill, prioritizing patient rights and services
in the least restrictive available setting and using
hospitalization as a last resort.

But the consent decree was never a magic bullet. It doesn't mandate
any funding or even ensure individual access to services.

Daniel Wathen, former chief justice of the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court and court master of the 1990 AMHI consent decree Joe
Phelan/Kennebec Journal

"I think the thing that has been missing is access to services in
the community," said Daniel Wathen, the former Maine Supreme
Judicial Court chief justice who serves as "court master," which
means he monitors whether the state is meeting the requirements.
Many times over the years, the state has fallen short.

Advocates and consumers said the failures can be tied to a
fractured system made worse by geography, as well as a lack of
urgency to address the problem.

As recently as 2013, Maine actually spent more per capita on mental
health services than any other state, and more than twice what it
spent per capita in 2004, according to the Kaiser Family
Foundation, a nonprofit health care research group.

But that can be attributed to two things: Many of Maine's mentally
ill have higher service needs and many more are getting services
primarily in jails and emergency rooms, which are far more
expensive.

More recently, total mental health spending increased each year
from $588 million in 2012 to $641 million in 2016 but has fallen
the last two years and now stands at $603 million. At the same
time, the number of people being served has increased.

"We have defaulted our mental health services to law enforcement,"
said Cathy Breen, a state senator from Falmouth. "The system we
have now isn't treatment, it's crisis management. You shouldn't
have to commit a crime to get treatment."

Breen has two perspectives on the issue, one as chair of the
Legislature's budget-writing committee and the other as a consumer.
She and her husband have been navigating the system for years on
behalf of their adult daughter, who has schizophrenia. It hasn't
been easy, she said, and their family has resources. She thinks
often of the ones who don't.

Mental illness is a broad category of diagnoses that includes
personality disorders, anxiety and depression and also
post-traumatic stress disorder, eating disorders and substance use
disorder. As many as 1 in 5 adults have a mental illness. Last
year, about 115,000 Mainers were receiving some level of mental
health services.

Serious mental illness is any disorder that results in functional
impairment that substantially interferes with or limits one or more
major life activities, according to the National Institute of
Mental Health. This includes schizophrenia, bipolar disorder and
severe depression. About 4.5 percent of the adult population has a
serious mental illness. That translates to more than 40,000 people
in Maine, although only about 12,000 qualify for full mental health
benefits under MaineCare, a number that dropped after the LePage
administration changed eligibility requirements.

The Portland Press Herald/Maine Sunday Telegram requested an
interview with Maine Department of Health and Human Services
Commissioner Jeanne Lambrew several times but was told by
department spokeswoman Jackie Farwell that Lambrew was not
available. Farwell did answer written questions and provide a
statement that said an internal review of mental health services is
underway.

"While more must be done to improve prevention efforts, the
delivery of care in our communities and treatment for those in
crisis, we are prepared to move beyond the consent decree to pursue
that work," the statement read.

In May, lawmakers passed a bill Breen wrote that creates a working
group to study Maine's mental health system and come up with a plan
for reform by December.

Still, the biennial budget that was approved on June 14 by the
Legislature doesn't include any significant additional funding for
mental health. And lawmakers postponed action until next year on a
bill that would have begun to unwind the almost 30-year-old decree
and create a mechanism through legislation to ensure services.

Karen Evans of Portland was a patient at AMHI as a teenager back in
the 1960s and is now an advocate for the mentally ill. She said the
state is better off than it was 15 years ago, when AMHI closed, and
certainly better off than when she was hospitalized there.

"Many years I've suffered because of what happened at AMHI, but I
can say it's the one place that kept me alive," she said.

Evans said she's lucky to have access to quality services but knows
many who don't. That's why she speaks up.

"I can remember being in the back of the public hearing rooms and
being told maybe I could speak, but only if there was time," she
said.

BUILT IN 1840

The Greek Revival stone structure that was built in 1840 to house
AMHI (originally called the Maine Insane Hospital) still stands
today, although it's no longer used. It's directly across the
Kennebec River from the State House so that lawmakers would never
forget the plight of the most vulnerable.

Several buildings were added on the campus in the first few decades
to house a growing population. By the turn of the 20th century,
more than 1,000 people lived there and there still wasn't enough
room. The state had to build another facility, Eastern Maine Insane
Hospital in Bangor, later renamed Dorothea Dix Psychiatric Center
after the pioneering mental health advocate who hailed from Maine.

Controversy plagued AMHI for much of its existence. Early on for
its use of restraints on residents, later for shock therapy.
Despite concerns that people were being housed there for no
diagnosable reason, the population continued to grow, peaking at
more than 1,800 residents by 1955.

Evans still has horror stories about her time at AMHI as a teenager
in the 1960s, when she was hospitalized because she threatened to
harm herself and heard voices. She remembers being in a unit of 30
people and the beds were touching. At that time, alcoholics and
those with substance use disorders were among the residents. It was
a warehouse.

It wasn't long after Evans' time there that the country started to
deinstitutionalize, a process aided in part by the development of
anti-psychotic medications. Over a five-year period in the 1970s,
the population of AMHI dropped to about 300, which means 1,500 were
released into the community. Nationally, the number of people
institutionalized decreased from 558,239 to 71,619 between 1955 and
1994, according to the National Alliance on Mental Illness.

Many didn't find stable housing right away and wound up on the
street. Evans remembers being part of a group who established a
tent city in Portland's Lincoln Park in 1987 in protest. She said
even three decades later, the number of people with severe mental
illness who are homeless is staggering. Federal estimates put it as
high as 40 percent.

Even with the dramatic drop in population through the 1980s
problems persisted at AMHI, too, culminating with 10 patient deaths
in 1988, including five in one month during a summer heat wave.
That led to a class action lawsuit and the 1990 consent decree.

Kevin Voyvodich, managing attorney for Disability Rights Maine,
which represented the class of people covered by the decree, said
that while it was necessary, its impact has been largely
overstated.

"The conclusion we've come to as class counsel is that the
framework is good, but individuals still need to be able to access
services for it to work," he said.

The period after the consent decree was signed was messy, too.
There were widespread reports that mentally ill people who were
supposed to be living in supervised community settings were ending
up in county jails.

In 1995, under then-Gov. Angus King, five top DHHS officials were
fired, including AMHI's then-superintendent, Linda Breslin.

Then there was Mark Bechard, who was among the AMHI patients
released in the early 1990s after the consent decree. In 1996, he
killed two nuns in Waterville who lived near his apartment. The
incident drew national attention and was widely viewed as a
systemic failure.

The next year, back inside AMHI, Wrendy Hayne was killed by another
resident, Harold Pulsifier, inside a storage closet. Hayne and
Pulsifier were a couple but both suffered from severe mental
illness.

Evans said Hayne was a friend of hers.

The original AMHI building was placed on the National Register of
Historic Places in 1982. It remains empty amid a campus of
buildings that house various state offices, a symbol of the past.

PROBLEMS AT RIVERVIEW

Riverview was designed to be an improvement over AMHI and, in the
simplest measure, it was. There have been only three deaths there
and none under suspicious or neglectful circumstances.

But Wathen said staffing shortages plagued the facility for years,
leading to ineffective treatment.

Problems at Riverview culminated in a 2013 federal audit –
initiated after an attack on a staff member by a patient – that
found numerous deficiencies. The hospital failed to ensure safety,
failed to protect patients' civil rights, failed to hold staff
responsible for inadequate care and more. It lost federal
certification and the $20 million in annual subsidy that came with
it. Many feared that the state was repeating past mistakes.

Wathen said things have vastly improved since and credited new
leadership.

"With a hospital like that, you can have a bad incident at any
point," he said. "You really have to stay vigilant."

The bigger problems have always been in the community, but they are
harder to track.

"There is a huge invisibility," said Simonne Maline, executive
director of the Consumer Council System of Maine, which represents
individuals. "We're not seeing these big institutions anymore, but
people have sort of disappeared into their communities for better
or for worse."

Mental health services were targeted during budget cuts in 2007,
the waning years of the Baldacci administration. Wathen later wrote
that the reduction of funds or shifts in funding have affected
services inconsistent with the consent decree.

Gov. Paul LePage didn't prioritize mental health services, either.
According to funding data provided by DHHS, total public spending
on mental health dropped from $618 million in 2015 to $603 million
last year. That's a 2.5 percent decrease but only part of the
picture. There were 15,000 more people receiving services in 2018
than in 2015. So the average amount spent on each individual
dropped from $6,250 to $5,233, or 16 percent.

Last year, Sen. Breen drafted a bill that would have increased the
reimbursement rate for medication management services, which had
not been adjusted in more than a decade. The cost was $1.1 million,
which would have triggered $2 million in matching federal funds.

Breen said it was enough to keep some existing mental health
professionals but not near enough to attract new ones.

Her own daughter is eligible for 20 hours of in-home support
services each week, but Breen said it often falls well short of
that. There simply aren't enough workers to handle the number of
client hours.

Farwell, the DHHS spokeswoman, said the state is starting to see
some strides in its behavioral health home model, which has reduced
the number of hospitalizations. She also said the waitlist for
community integration services, or daily life skills, has been
drastically reduced, and said rental assistance programs have
provided homeless individuals with mental illness housing support.

She said challenges remain in ensuring that providers promptly
accept referrals for services and fulfill their contracts with DHHS
to carry out those services.

Bob Reed, whose adult son has been hospitalized numerous times
because of mental illness, including at AMHI in the 1990s, said
policymakers have never been innovative or comprehensive when
considering reforms.

"We've never made investments on the front end to help people," he
said. "And then we end up spending more when people end up at an
emergency room or in jail."

His son isn't even in Maine anymore because Riverview cannot
accommodate him.

There is also a shortage of psychiatric doctors, especially in
rural parts of the state. Maline said her organization hosted an
event recently in the Aroostook County city of Caribou. All
everyone was talking about was a lack of services.

Fear and stigma about the mentally ill remain barriers, too. People
think of Leroy Smith III, who killed and dismembered his father, or
Will Bruce, who killed his mother, or Enoch Petrucelly, who stabbed
his brother to death on North Haven. All were not getting proper
treatment for their illness. All were found not criminally
responsible for their crimes. All now have varying degrees of
supervision within the community.

Mehnert, the NAMI Maine director, said persistent discrimination of
people with mental illness thwarts progress. She said national data
suggests that if someone with mental illness engages in a violent
act, only about 5 percent of the time can that illness be
considered a causal factor. Yet people with mental illness often
are labeled violent. Similarly, she said, data shows that people
with mental illness are 11 times more likely to be victims than
perpetrators of violent acts.

"The idea that people aren't dying anymore so it's not a crisis . .
. . they are dying," Breen said. "Look at the rates of suicide for
people with mental illness. Look at police shootings."

Breen said she was glad her task force bill passed but would
welcome changes before then, too.

"What I hope is that we finally have an administration that will
work with providers and individuals," she said. [GN]


MDL 1203: $233K Attys' Fees Awarded to Levin in Diet Drugs Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: DIET DRUGS
(PHENTERMINE/FENFLURAMINE/DEXFENFLURAMINE) PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LITIGATION, THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: SHEILA BROWN, et al., v.
AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS CORPORATION, MDL No. 1203, No. 99-20593
(E.D. Pa.), Judge Harvey Bartle, III of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted the Petition for an
Award of Attorneys' Fees and Expense Reimbursements Relating to
Common Benefit Work Performed from Jan. 1, 2018 through Dec. 31,
2018.

Judge Bartle approved the reimbursement of $6,754.10 in litigation
expenses incurred by Levin Sedran & Berman, including amounts
previously approved by the Court or advanced pursuant to order of
the Court, to be paid, reimbursed and/or allocated as follows:

     a. Prior expense reimbursements in the amount of $6,266.78
will be attributed to the MDL 1203 Fee and Cost Account as having
been properly and finally allocated to that Account for payment;

     b. Within 30 days from the date of the Order, the AHP
Settlement Trust will transfer the amount of $3,133 to the Escrow
Agent for the MDL 1203 Fee and Cost Account to reimburse that
account for expense reimbursements previously paid from that
Account that should ultimately be paid by the Settlement Fund;

     c. Within 30 days from the date of the Order, the Trust will
pay from the Settlement Fund the amount of $243.66 to Levin to
reimburse Levin for previously unreimbursed litigation expenses;
and

     d. Within 30 days from the date of the Order, the Escrow Agent
for the MDL 1203 Fee and Cost Account will pay from the MDL 1203
Fee and Cost Account the amount of $243.66 to Levin to reimburse
Levin for previously unreimbursed litigation expenses.

In addition to the amounts previously awarded in Pretrial Order
Nos. 2262, 2859, 7763A, 8516, 8646, 8869, 9102, 9294, 9398, 9465,
9490, and 9502, the Judge awarded Levin an attorneys' fee in the
aggregate amount of $233,057.12 for the class action work performed
by Levin during the period from Jan. 1, 2018 to Dec. 31, 2018.  The
fee award is to be paid by the Trust in accordance with the terms
of the "Stipulation between Wyeth and Class Counsel with Regard to
the Funding of Future Awards of Class-related fees," approved by
the Court in PTO No. 9297.

No earlier than 20 days after the date of the Order and as soon
thereafter as is commercially reasonable the Trust will disburse
the payments set forth.  The Trust will make such payments by check
and will deliver such checks to the payees by overnight courier in
a manner that generates a written acknowledgment of receipt by the
payees.

In addition to the amounts previously awarded in Pretrial Order
Nos. 2262, 2859, 7763A, 8516, 8646, 8869, 9102, 9294, 9398, 9465,
9490, and 9502, the Court awarded Levin an attorneys' fee in the
aggregate amount of $28,562.50 to be paid from funds on deposit in
the MDL 1203 Fee and Cost Account to compensate Levin for services
of benefit to the Plaintiffs in MDL 1203 and the coordinated
state-court litigation performed by Levin during the period from
Jan. 1, 2018 through Dec. 31, 2018.

No earlier than 20 days from the date of the Order and as soon
thereafter as is reasonably practicable, Heather C. Glordanella,
Esquire, as Escrow Agent for the MDL 1203 Fee and Cost Account,
will disburse from said Account the payment set forth.  Ms.
Giordanella will make such payment by check and will deliver such
check to the payee by overnight courier in a manner that generates
a written acknowledgment of receipt by the payee.  In order to make
this payment Ms. Giordanella may transfer funds from the MDL 1203
Fee and Cost Account to a disbursement account at an appropriate
financial institution.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 29, 2019 Pretrial Order is
available at https://is.gd/qZdf1u from Leagle.com.

IN RE DIET DRUGS (PHENTERMINE, FENFLURAMINE, DEXFENFLURAMINE)
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION, Appellants, represented by ANDREW A.
CHIRLS -- achirls@finemanlawfirm.com -- FINEMAN KREKSTEIN & HARRIS
PC, ARNOLD LEVIN -- alevin@lfsblaw.com -- LEVIN SEDRAN & BERMAN,
GERALD COOPER KELL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, JOHN FITZPATRICK --
jfitzpatrick@hdp.com -- HARNES DICKET PIERCE PLC & RAND NOLEN,
FLEMING, NOLEN & JEZ LLP.

IN RE DIET DRUGS (PHENTERMINE, FENFLURAMINE, DEXFENFLURAMINE)
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION, Appellants, represented by JULES S.
HENSHELL -- JHenshell@sogtlaw.com -- SEMANOFF ORMSBY GREENBERG &
TORCHIA LLC, ROBB W. PATRYK -- robb.patryk@hugheshubbard.com --
HUGHES HUBBARD AND REED, ROBERT A. LIMBACHER --
RLIMBACHER@GDLDLAW.COM -- Goodell, DeVries, Leech & Dann LLP,
ROBERT N. SPINELLI, KELLEY JASONS MCGOWAN SPINELLI & HANNA, LLP &
THEODORE V. MAYER -- ted.mayer@hugheshubbard.com -- HUGHES HUBBARD
AND REED.

HEATHER C. GIORDANELLA, Special Master, represented by pro se.


MDL 2804: Wicomico Council Debates Joining Opioid Litigation
------------------------------------------------------------
Bethany Hooper, writing for The Dispatch, reports that officials in
Wicomico County, Maryland recently said they would soon decide on
taking part in legal action against opioid manufacturers.

On July 2, the Wicomico County Council met with executive staff to
reconsider a lawsuit against pharmaceutical companies.

Last year, the council opted against joining a multi-district
lawsuit against opioid manufacturers for their alleged role in the
country's opioid crisis. This week, however, the issue was back on
the work session agenda for discussion.

Sheriff Mike Lewis -- who supports the county entering into
litigation -- noted the many accidents and fatalities that occur in
Wicomico County as a result of opioids.

"These are things that continue to unfold every single day in our
community," he said. "Quite honestly, I deal with these issues more
than I do with anything else."

Lewis argued the county had the opportunity to hold opioid
manufactures accountable. He encouraged the council to hire special
legal counsel and recoup money that was redirected to address the
opioid crisis.

"Why we would wait any longer, to me, defies logic," he said.
"Wicomico County has nothing to lose, but everything to gain."

Council Attorney Bob Taylor, however, cautioned the council from
taking any immediate action.

He said the multi-district case, pending in federal court in
Cleveland, could be converted into a class action lawsuit, making
it possible for municipalities across the nation to receive some
compensation from opioid manufacturers.

"I'm not saying don't do litigation or don't hire an attorney, but
what I am saying is do it smartly," he said. "In this national
litigation, it may actually eliminate the need for an attorney,
which obviously will help any net amount the county gets."

Taylor added that the roughly 1,800 plaintiffs in the
multi-district case could grow to include nearly 25,000 local
governments if it is converted to a class action lawsuit.

"We've got tons of plaintiffs and relatively few defendants …,"
he said. "There's not that much money to go around."

County Attorney Paul Wilber noted that money from any pending
settlement would likely be distributed to participating
municipalities based on a formula.

He added that discussions with a lawyer involved in the case
highlighted a possible two-tier system in which those plaintiffs
that participated earlier in the litigation received a larger
compensation.

"He was saying if we were getting in, we should definitely try to
get in this month," he said.

Unlike Taylor, Wilber also recommended the county hire special
legal counsel, regardless of whether the multi-district litigation
is converted to a class action lawsuit.

"I would recommend you have an attorney," he said. "I think this is
the most complex piece of litigation the court system in this
country has seen ... Even if it is a class action, it is not as
simple as filing some paperwork and getting paid."

Council President Cannon said the council should consider different
law firms to represent the county should it pursue litigation.

"I think we need to evaluate what the most advantageous position is
for the county from the onset, period," he said. "Where the chips
fall is a completely different matter."

With no further discussion, the council agreed to make a formal
decision on the issues at its July 16 meeting.

"If we hire legal counsel for this, we would need a resolution,"
Cannon said. [GN]


MEOW WOLF: Sued by Former Employees for Unfair Labor Practices
--------------------------------------------------------------
Zachary Small, writing for Hyperallergic, reports that the lawsuit
alleges that the corporation subjected them to discrimination and
unfair pay practice, wrongfully firing them after each brought
their complaints to senior staff.

Two former employees of the immersive arts and entertainment
company Meow Wolf filed a lawsuit on July 2, 2019, alleging that
the corporation subjected them to discrimination and unfair pay
practice, wrongfully firing them after each brought their
complaints to senior staff.

Tara Khozein and Gina Maciuszek filed their claim with the First
Judicial Court in Santa Fe; they are seeking to have their case
recognized as a class action, representing more than 50 female
workers of Meow Wolf who the women say have been affected by unfair
labor practices since 2017.

More specifically, their suit alleges "a pattern and practice of
subjecting female employees to different compensation, terms,
conditions, and/or privileges of employment than their male
colleagues." The women are seeking compensatory and punitive
damages for discrimination, attorneys' fees, and other legal
costs.

According to the lawsuit, Khozein began working with the immersive
experience company in September as a performance content director
until she was fired nearly five months later in February. She
claims to have earned well below Santa Fe's minimum wage at the
time, $11.40 per hour. (Recently, the city's minimum wage increased
to $11.80 per hour.) Classified as a part-time employee, Khozein
says she earned $384.61 for a workweek that often lasted longer
than 40 hours with no overtime. Under those circumstances, Meow
Wolf would have been required to pay her at least $456 for a
40-hour workweek. Additionally, she alleges that her firing came
after she brought concerns about pay — in addition to accusations
of a pattern of racial and gender discrimination in the workplace
— to the attention of her supervisors.

Maciuszek was hired as a content director in early October but was
soon fired in mid-November after telling supervisors she was being
scrutinized more severely than her male counterparts, according to
the claim. The allegation names Nicolas Gonda, head of
entertainment at the company, and Marianne Palacios, vice president
of human resources -- both individually listed as defendants in the
lawsuit -- as telling her she was being "too assertive."

"Ms. Maciuszek was told that 'an investigation' had been completed,
and that there was no 'path forward' for her at Meow Wolf," the
complaint says.  She was then fired.

An attorney from Hinkle Shanor LLP of Santa Fe, which is
representing the plaintiffs, declined to comment for this article
until she could confirm a statement with her clients.

Previously, Khozein and Maciuszek filed a discrimination complaint
in April against the company with the New Mexico Human Rights
Bureau, according to the lawsuit, but the bureau issued them
"Orders of Non-Determination" in May.

In their request to represent a class of women employed by Meow
Wolf, the plaintiffs say in their lawsuit that questions pervade
about whether the company promotes women at a disproportionately
low rate compared to its advancements of men; whether less
favorable treatment of women is because of "the acceptance of a
stereotype or bias; and whether the employment policies, practices,
and/or corporate culture of Meow Wolf that have adversely affected
its female employees violate the New Mexico Human Rights Act."

In a statement sent to Hyperallergic, the plantiffs' lawyers told
Hyperallergic that:

In the 48 hours since filing the complaint, we have heard from
numerous women who are current or former Meow Wolf employees, each
with similar stories of harassment and discrimination. Many of the
women expressed reluctance to share their stories, due to
understandable fears of the consequences of coming forward. This
case is not just about Gina and Tara and their experiences. It's
about the experiences of every Meow Wolf employee that has had
her/his/their rights violated. These are all stories that deserve
to be heard.

Meow Wolf founder Vince Kadlubek told the Santa Fe New Mexican that
"there is no gender bias at the company." Meow Wolf has not yet
responded to Hyperallergic's request for comment.

Meow Wolf established itself as a local arts collective in 2008 and
has since become a regional chain of venues showcasing immersive
arts with over 400 employees on staff, according to its website.
Last month, it was announced that Game of Thrones creator George R.
R. Martin would join the company as chief world builder, an
advisory position to help the business build "narrative" and
"mind-bending ideas," he told theLos Angeles Times. In 2015, the
novelist pledged $2.7 million to transform a bowling alley into a
project space for the immersive experience company.

In March, Hyperallergic published an opinion piece that questioned
whether or not Meow Wolf was benefiting the local arts communities
it entered. The company has planned an ambitious roadmap for
itself, looking to expand to Phoenix, Las Vegas, Denver, and
Washington DC. Some artists see its arrival as a welcome
opportunity; others have accused the company of gentrifying their
communities and overshadowing local efforts to create similar
immersive experiences.

Responding to that criticism, Meow Wolf released a statement on
social media, "We provide a creative, artful experience to 500,000
visitors per year in Santa Fe (a town of 70,000 people), and we
currently employ over 400 artists on salary and with full
benefits!"[GN]


METROPCS FLORIDA: Rivera Sues over Marketing Text Messages
----------------------------------------------------------
MISMA RIVERA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. METROPCS FLORIDA, LLC, the Defendant,
Case No. 0:19-cv-61664-XXXX (S.D. Fla., July 5, 2019), seeks
injunctive relief to halt Defendant's illegal conduct under the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act. The Plaintiff also seeks
statutory damages on behalf of himself and members of the class,
and any other available legal or equitable remedies resulting from
the illegal actions of Defendant.

According to the complaint, in efforts to drum-up business, the
Defendant would often send marketing text messages providing
different types of offers and savings for future purchases without
first obtaining express written consent to send such marketing text
messages or make such phone calls as required to do so under the
TCPA.  These messages were sent using mass-automated technology
through a third-party company hired by Defendant to send marketing
text messages on Defendant’s behalf en masse.

Defendant's text messages constitute telemarketing because they
encourage the future purchase of Defendant's products by consumers.
Defendant's text messages continued despite Plaintiff explicitly
requesting defendant to stop on multiple instances.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Jibrael S. Hindi, Esq.
          Thomas J. Patti, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF JIBRAEL S. HINDI
          110 SE 6th Street, Suite 1744
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          E-mail: jibrael@jibraellaw.com
                  tom@jibraellaw.com

MITR PHOL: Thai Court Rejects Class Action Against Sugar Giant
--------------------------------------------------------------
Leonie Kijewski, writing for Aljazeera.com, reports that in a major
setback to a group of Cambodian farmers, a Thai court rejected
their application on July 4, 2019, for their legal case against
Thailand's biggest sugar company to be treated as a class action
lawsuit, according to the plaintiff's lawyer and a land rights
organisation.

Though the Cambodian plaintiffs, representing more than 700
families, say they will appeal, the decision means each family
would most likely have to bring individual cases against Mitr Phol,
making the legal expenses too high for their low incomes. Class
action suits are rare in Thailand.

The plaintiffs, Smen Te and Hoy Mai, took the case against sugar
producer Mitr Phol to court last year claiming that their land had
been appropriated by the company in 2008. Other dispute settlement
mechanisms they tried have failed.

Mitr Phol is Thailand's biggest sugar producer and says it is the
world's fifth-biggest sugar company. Last year, it recorded a
revenue of 95 billion Thai baht ($3bn) and a profit of $30.5m.

Smen Te and Hoy Mai are among hundreds of families in Oddar
Meanchey province in Cambodia's north who claim that Mitr Phol's
subsidiary wrongfully took their land. The company returned the
land to the government a few years later, but villagers say they
have neither received adequate compensation nor their land.

As a direct result of losing their land to the company, the
villagers say they lost their incomes and livelihoods, their
children could not go to school, and multiple villagers were
arrested for protesting against the company.

One of the affected villagers, Chhouy Chhaya, was arrested on June
11 for "clearing forestland", one day after her aunt, Hoy Mai, left
to give evidence in the Thai court. She remains in prison,
Equitable Cambodia, a land rights non-governmental organisation
which supported the villagers' case, said.

The Bangkok South Civil Court ruled on July 4 that the cases of the
711 families were not suitable to be treated as a class action.

Language barrier

A lawyer for the plaintiffs, Sor. Rattanamanee Polkla said the
court argued that evidence collection was difficult as the alleged
human rights breaches took place in another country, that the
plaintiffs could not understand Thai, and there would be problems
notifying all the members of the class. "So in conclusion, the
court realises that taking the case as a normal civil case is more
convenient than taking the case as a class action case." Sor.
Rattanamanee Polkla told Al Jazeera.

Sor. Rattanamanee Polkla said the decision was harmful to the
villagers claiming damages -- who she said didn't have the
resources to go to court in Thailand as individuals. But it also
set a negative precedent for future transboundary class action
cases, in which, for example, Thai development projects are accused
of human rights breaches abroad.

Hoy Mai, who attended the court hearing, said she was "very
disappointed" with the decision. She said this showed that it was
hard for poor villagers from the countryside to pursue justice.

Eang Vuthy, Equitable Cambodia's director, said the villagers would
appeal the court's decision which, he said, "amounts to a failure
to support the protection of basic human rights and access to
justice for vulnerable people."

"We are saddened by the decision but will fight in appeal," he told
Al Jazeera. The appeal petition is due in a week, but lawyer Sor.
Rattanamanee Polkla, Esq. said they would request a one-month
extension to file their appeal notice. The appeal itself would be
due six months later.

"Individual civil actions remain possible if the appeal fails, but
are a last resort because of expense and access issues," Vuthy
said.

Hoy Mai and Smen Te claim damages totalling about four million Thai
baht ($128,000). If class action had been granted, the total
damages claims could have run into the millions of dollars.

Mitr Phol representatives did not immediately respond to requests
for comments. In June, Vice Chairman of Mitr Phol Sugar's Executive
Committee Krisda Monthienvichienchai, denied responsibility in the
case, explaining in an email to Al Jazeera that its subsidiary only
had temporary land concessions that they returned to the
government.

Mitr Phol is part of Bonsucro, a global sugar industry organisation
that aims to "promote sustainable sugar cane" farming.

After the last court hearing in June, Bonsucro's Communications
Manager Joe Woodruff told Al Jazeera in an email that Bonsucro had
exhausted all measures available to ensure that Mitr Phol complied
with human rights standards. "Bonsucro cannot exercise pressure on
Mitr Phol beyond what it is empowered to do by its policies and
procedures, which it has followed," he said. [GN]


MONSANTO COMPANY: Frantz Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
------------------------------------------------------------
JONI M. FRANTZ, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY and John Does
1-50, the Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-03970-VC (E.D. Cal., June
20, 2019), seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a
direct and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and
wrongful conduct in connection with the design, development,
manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising,
distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM),
containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Fernando
Castro's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Betsy Barnes, Esq.
          Richard L. Root, Esq.
          MORRIS BART LLC
          601 Poydras Street, 24th Floor
          New Orleans LA 70130
          Telephone: (504) 525-8000
          Facsimile: (833) 277-4214
          E-mail: bbarnes@morrisbart.com
                  rroot@morrisbart.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Gutierrezes Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
----------------------------------------------------------------
DEBRA GUTIERREZ and JUAN GUTIERREZ, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO
COMPANY and John Does 1-50, the Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-01926
(E.D. Mo., July 7, 2019), seeks to recover damages suffered by the
Plaintiff, as a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's
negligent and wrongful conduct in connection with the design,
development, manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing,
advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide
Roundup (TM), containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiffs maintain that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Debra
Gutierrez's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiffs bring this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Joe McGreevy, Esq.
          KUHLMAN & LUCAS, LLC
          1100 Main Street, Suite 2550
          Kansas City MO 64104
          Telephone: (816) 548-3187
          Facsimile: (816) 799-0336
          E-mail: joe@kuhlmanlucas.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Rizzuto Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
-------------------------------------------------------------
JARED J. RIZZUTO, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY and John Does
1-50, the Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-03956-VC (E.D. Cal., June
20, 2019), seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a
direct and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and
wrongful conduct in connection with the design, development,
manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising,
distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM),
containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Fernando
Castro's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lauren E. Godshall, Esq.
          Betsy Barnes, Esq.
          Richard L. Root, Esq.
          MORRIS BART LLC
          601 Poydras Street, 24th Floor
          New Orleans LA 70130
          Telephone: (504) 525-8000
          Facsimile: (833) 277-4214
          E-mail: bbarnes@morrisbart.com
                  rroot@morrisbart.com
                  lgodshall@morrisbart.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Weeder Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
------------------------------------------------------------
TRACIE E. WEEDER, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY and John Does
1-50, the Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-01078-YY (D. Oreg., July 7,
2019), seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a
direct and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and
wrongful conduct in connection with the design, development,
manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising,
distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM),
containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Fernando
Castro's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Leslie W. O'Leary, Esq.
          JOHNSON, JOHNSON, LUCAS & MIDDLETON, P.C.
          975 Oak St., Suite 1050
          Eugene, OR 97401
          Telephone: (541) 484-2434
          Facsimile: (541) 484-0882
          E-mail: loleary@justicelawyers.com

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION: MLS Class Action Pending in Illinois
----------------------------------------------------------
Jann Swanson, writing for Mortgage News Daily, reports that the
housing crisis put the spotlight, legal and otherwise, on the ways
in which home purchases were financed.  Financial difficulties
weeded out many marginal players as well as unethical ones in the
housing finance space, and new regulations, as well as lawsuits
over previous methods of doing business, changed the industry
dramatically.  Now, attention has turned toward the ways in which
those homes are sold, and the companies involved in doing it.

Over the last few months there has been some legal activity, mostly
directed at multiple listing services (MLS), the entities that
aggregate and display listings of homes for sale.  These actions
are aimed at determining how real estate sales commissions are
established and shared and how this may limit competition..

At present, there are two legal fronts.  The first is a lawsuit,
Moehrl v. National Association of Realtors (NAR), et al. filed in
March in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois.  The class action was filed on behalf of homeowners who
paid a commission to one of four of the largest broker franchises
in the country (Realogy Holdings Corp., HomeServices of America,
Inc., RE/MAX Holdings, Inc., and Keller Williams Realty, Inc.,) and
whose homes were listed on one of 20 different MLS systems in
multiple regions of the country that were also named as defendants.
The plaintiffs maintain that the defendants conspired to require
them to pay the agent representing the buyers of their homes an
inflated commission in violation of federal antitrust laws.

All 20 of the MLSs named in the suit are controlled by local
affiliates of NAR and access to the services is governed by rules
set forth in NAR's published policy which includes a Buyer Broker
Commission Rule.  This rule requires all listing agents to make a
blanket, non-negotiable offer of compensation to a cooperating
buyer-agent.

The suit maintains that the MLS "conspiracy" forces sellers to
assume costs that would belong to the buyer in a competitive
market.  It also forces them to agree to a high percentage
commission because a lower one might disincentivize cooperating
agents to show their homes where there are higher commission
alternatives.  The NAR rule prohibits buyers or their brokers from
making home purchase offers contingent on reducing the commission
and the agent cannot unilaterally reduce his or her own
compensation. In a competitive market, the suit alleges, it would
be buyers who paid their own agents' commissions and could
negotiate those rates.

NAR recently filed a motion to dismiss the suit, calling it
"baseless."  The Association argues on its website that MLSs and
their accompanying rules encourage both competition and cooperation
among brokers to the benefit of the consumer.  In a statement
regarding the suit, NAR said, "The U.S. Courts have routinely found
that Multiple Listing Services are pro-competitive and benefit
consumers by creating great efficiencies in the homebuying and
selling process."

Andrea Riquier, who has written a series of articles on MLS issues
for MarketWatch, said, "If other home sellers joined the class
action, the defendants could find themselves potentially liable for
millions of dollars."

The second front opened (or at least was disclosed) in late May.
The Department of Justice (DOJ) sent a "civil investigative demand
(CID)" to CoreLogic requiring disclosure of information from MLS
databases and answers to interrogatories.  The information DOJ
seeks under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act includes whether
or not MLS members can search for properties by the amount or type
of co-broker commission offered, and any data that may be used to
determine how often such searches are done.  It also seeks
documentation of any rule or agreement that restricts CoreLogic's
distribution of MLS data.  The deadline for response was May 16.

Rob Hahn, a real estate management consultant and publisher of the
Red Dot blog, speculates that DOJ and perhaps the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) is going to bring some kind of an enforcement
action against some MLS systems, and possibly against NAR "alleging
that most of the 'private information' on the MLS is
anti-competitive."  Why he asks, would the DOJ invoke the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act otherwise?

Hahn says other MLS vendors received similar CIDs as that sent to
CoreLogic.  CoreLogic's came to light when the company disclosed
its receipt to its clients only days before the deadline for
compliance, warning them it had no choice but to release some of
the proprietary information entrusted to them. Other MLS vendors do
not appear to have done this, only rumors that they find themselves
in the same DOJ boat.

These rather ominous legal activities are occurring in the midst of
the emergence of a number of "disrupter" companies onto the real
estate sales scene.  Redfin, Zillow, and others are testing new
ways to present properties for sale as well as new agent
compensation and commission models.  All of this is against the
background of the recent expiration of a 10-year deal between DOJ
and the NAR.

That settlement arose out of a 2000 suit by an Austin real estate
agent, Aaron Farmer, against the Texas Real Estate Commission.
Farmer had attempted to start a company which would offer a menu of
a la carte services (entering a house into an MLS, designing
brochures, supplying a lockbox, etc.) among which customers could
pick and pay a fee in lieu of paying a commission for a full
package of listing/selling services.  Before Farmer could hang his
shingle, the Commission passed a rule setting a minimum level of
services agents could provide.

The case dragged on for some time during which the DOJ entered and
negotiated a settlement with the State of Texas.  It stopped
anticompetitive practices such as limiting new business strategies
and agent access to MLS data. That settlement expired last
November.  Riquier notes there has been some movement in Congress
to explore the competitiveness issues and at least two members have
called for hearings.

She writes, "The big question now, many industry participants say,
isn't whether NAR affiliates will go back to practices that critics
say hobbled individuals like Farmer before the settlement came into
force. It's a more existential question: if the full weight of the
Justice Department and a 10-year stretch of time during which the
internet became the de facto way of doing most business hasn't
dislodged the traditional practices still entrenched in real
estate, is there anything that can?" [GN]


NCL CORP: Can Compel Arbitration in Phillips Suit
-------------------------------------------------
In the case, Martha Phillips and Jerry Phillips, Plaintiffs, v. NCL
Corporation Ltd. d/b/a Norwegian Cruise Lines, Defendant, Civil
Action No. 18-23912-Civ-Scola (S.D. Fla.), Judge Robert N. Scola,
Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida
granted in part and denied in part the Defendant's Motion to Compel
Arbitration filed on Jan. 16, 2019.

The Plaintiffs in the case, a group of cruise ship passengers,
filed a complaint on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated alleging violations of the Florida Deceptive Unfair Trade
Practices Act ("FDUTPA") and unjust enrichment.  Their allegations
are centered around their purchase of the Booksafe Travel
Protection Program ("BTPP").

BTPP includes a (1) cancellation fee waiver program, a (2) travel
insurance policy provided by Transamerica or Nationwide, and (3)
the carefree worldwide emergency assistance program provided by On
Call International.  At the time of purchasing their cruise ticket,
the Plaintiffs elected to purchase BTPP.  The Plaintiffs made final
payment for the cruise, which included the payment for BTPP.

As part of purchasing the cruise ticket, the Plaintiffs agreed to
the terms and conditions of the Guest Ticket Contract.  The Guest
Ticket Contract has a broad arbitration clause.  It also includes a
class action waiver which states that Guest agrees that any
arbitration or lawsuit against carrier whatsoever will be litigated
by guest individually and not as a member of any class or as part
of a class action.

The Plaintiffs allege that Norwegian violated FDUTPA and was
unjustly enriched by receiving unearned and undisclosed commissions
related to the Plaintiffs' purchase of BTPP, bundling BTPP together
to conceal the true cost of the program, and presenting BTPP to
create an impression that the price for the BTPP was comprised of
pass-through charges even though Norwegian received an unearned and
undisclosed commission.

The Defendant moves to compel arbitration and strike the
Plaintiffs' class allegations under the terms of the Guest Ticket
Contract.  The Plaintiffs argue that their claims based on the
purchase of BTPP are not subject to the Guest Ticket Contract's
terms and therefore not subject to arbitration or the class action
waiver.

The Plaintiffs do not dispute that they entered a valid arbitration
agreement when they assented to the Guest Ticket Contract.  The
only question before the Court is whether the Plaintiffs' claims,
related to the purchase of BTPP, fall within the scope of the
arbitration clause.  The parties agree that the applicable test for
determining whether a particular claim is arbitrable pursuant to an
agreement containing a broad arbitration clause is whether a
significant relationship exists between the claim and the agreement
containing the arbitration clause.

Judge Scola finds that the Plaintiffs' claims fall under the scope
of the arbitration clause in the Guest Ticket Contract.  The
Plaintiffs' claims, related to the purchase of insurance for the
cruise, are significantly related to the Guest Ticket Contract.
Norwegian's sale of BTPP is related to the guest's cruise because
BTPP is offered to protect the guest's cruise.  If Norwegian
breaches the Guest Ticket Contract or somehow interrupts the
guest's cruise, the BTPP policies may be invoked.  Therefore, this
dispute arises out of Norwegian's performance of its contractual
duties and is "related to" the contract in question.  The class
action waiver in the Guest Ticket Contract therefore applies to the
Plaintiffs' claims in the case and will be enforced.

The Defendant in the case seeks a stay pending the arbitration.
The Plaintiffs ask the Court to dismiss the case if arbitration is
compelled.  As discussed, the Plaintiffs' two-count complaint is
subject to arbitration.  Moreover, the Plaintiffs request that the
Court dismiss the action if it finds that the claims are
arbitrable. Thus, the Judge finds that dismissal of the matter is
proper.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Scola granted in part and denied in
part the Defendant's motion to compel arbitration and strike class
allegations.  The Plaintiffs are compelled to submit their claims
to arbitration on an individual basis and the case is dismissed
with prejudice.   All pending motions are denied as moot. The Clerk
of Court is directed to close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 29, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/leYz82 from Leagle.com.

Martha Phillips & Jerry Phillips, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Andrew Steven
Friedman -- afriedman@bffb.com -- Bonnett Fairbourne Friedman &
Balint, pro hac vice, Francis J. Balint, Jr. -- fbalint@bffb.com --
Bonnett Fairbourne Friedman & Balint, pro hac vice, Howard Mitchell
Bushman -- howard@moskowitz-law.com -- The Moskowitz Law Firm,
PLLC, Joseph M. Kaye -- joseph@moskowitz-law.com -- The Moskowitz
Law Firm, PLLC, Kimberly Lambert Adams , Levin Papantonio Thomas
Mitchell Echsner & Procter, William F. Merlin, Jr. --
cmerlin@MerlinLawGroup.com -- Merlin Law Group PA & Adam M.
Moskowitz -- adam@moskowitz-law.com -- The Moskowitz Law Firm,
PLLC.

Darren Brown, Rosemary Elias & Luis Perez-Hernandez, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly-situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by Adam M. Moskowitz, The Moskowitz Law Firm, PLLC.

NCL Corporation Ltd., a foreign corporation, Defendant, represented
by Alex M. Gonzalez -- alex.gonzalez@hklaw.com -- Holland & Knight,
Israel Jovanny Encinosa -- israel.encinosa@hklaw.com -- Holland &
Knight, Rebecca Jo Canamero -- rebecca.canamero@hklaw.com --
Holland & Knight & Sanford Lewis Bohrer -- sandy.bohrer@hklaw.com
-- Holland & Knight.


NICKELBACK TRANSPORT: Fenlon Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
--------------------------------------------------------
Derek Fenlon, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. NICKELBACK TRANSPORT, INC., Defendant, Case
No. 1:19-cv-00142-DLH-CRH (D. N.D., July 11, 2019) is a lawsuit
seeking to recover unpaid overtime wages and other damages from
Defendant under the Fair Labor Standards Act and North Dakota
Century Cide 34 and North Dakota Minimum Wage and Work Conditions
Order (together, the "ND Wage Laws").

Plaintiff Fenlon and other similarly situated employees were truck
drivers transporting materials to and from oilfield sites within
the State of North Dakota, but were not paid for all the overtime
hours they worked, as Nickelback only paid straight time for all
hours worked, says the complaint. Moreover, Nickelback would also
shave its employees' overtime hours to reduce or eliminate
Nickelback's overtime obligations, it adds.

Plaintiff Fenlon was employed by Defendant as a driver from October
28, 2015 to June 28, 2019.

Nickelback transports fresh water, production water, and flowback
water to and from various oilfield sites in North Dakota.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Douglas B. Welmaker, Esq.
     Edmond S. Moreland, Jr., Esq.
     MORELAND VERRETT, P.C.
     700 West Summit Drive
     Wimberley, TX 78676
     Phone: (512) 782-0567
     Fax: (512) 782-0605
     Email: doug@morelandlaw.com


NRL: Class Suit vs. Australian League 'No Chance'
-------------------------------------------------
Brent Read, writing for The Australian, reports that one of
Sydney's leading compensation lawyers has poured scorn on claims
rugby league could be vulnerable to a class action over the game's
handling of concussion.

Brydens Lawyers principal, Lee Hagipantelis,sq. who sponsors a
number of clubs, insists there are clear differences between the
NRL, and the NFL and tobacco industries, the latter pair having
been forced to pay out billions after losing legal challenges.

"You can prosecute a class action against the NRL if you can
establish that the NRL knew or ought to have known there were
unacceptable or unsafe risks of injury where there were reasonable
steps available to prevent that injury occurring," Hagipantelis
said.

"I would say that the differentiation between this and say the
class actions against the tobacco companies and the NFL is they
were able to establish that the tobacco companies and NFL had
reports and evidence available suggesting what was occurring and
they took no active steps to prevent it.

"The question is what have they known and since when have they
known it. All of the available material seems to suggest that the
NRL has been very proactive. Now the game itself involves an
inherent risk of injury.

"There is no doubt about it. Even playing strictly within the rules
of the game. Anyone who does play the game is taken to have
accepted that risk of injury.

"So on its face I don't see how a class action could possibly
succeed against the NRL. Unless there is other evidence available
to suggest the NRL knew or ought to have known previously."

The Australian this week reported that two Sydney law firms had
joined forces and were investigating a potential class action
against the NRL on behalf of players who believed they were
suffering from the long-term effects of repetitive head knocks.

The prospect of legal action emerged amid revelations that two
former players had been found to have chronic traumatic
encephalopathy, known as CTE.

The NFL in America settled a billion-dollar lawsuit after it was
found to have hidden its knowledge about the risks of repeated
concussions -- as of last year, the NFL had settled more than $500
million in claims.

"That followed the disclosure of evidence that the NFL had been
materially concealing material evidence," Hagipantelis said.

"They were caught with their pants down. I don't think there is any
suggestion that is the case here. Also you cannot judge the NRL's
actions in the 70s, 80s and 90s by 2019 medicine.

"You are judging them by what was known at that time, not by
today's medicine. Apples and apples. As I say, it can be clearly
distinguished from, say, the tobacco cases where they had evidence
going back to the 1930s that tar and nicotine was capable of
causing damage to one's health."

A handful of current and former players have pledged their brains
to science in the wake of the latest revelations, the seriousness
of the issue having hit home.

Parramatta forward Tepai Moeroa is among those to have had his
battles with concussion. The Eels backrower struggles to put an
exact figure on how many concussions he has suffered.

"Quite a few," Moeroa replies.

"I was a bit concerned. When I saw the neurologist and when I
ticked all those boxes and everything came back positive, that
calmed my nerves and assured me everything was all right.

"I don't have any concerns about the long term. It's not something
you think about. Obviously with concussions, all the studies show
it affects you long term, but I don't have any headaches, no
symptoms, nothing like that.

"Hopefully it stays like (that)."

There was a time when Moeroa was more than a little concerned with
concussions. At the start of last year, the Eels backrower -- a
schoolboy rugby union prodigy who was compared to Sonny Bill
Williams prior to his first grade debut -- suffered a series of
head knocks.

His career has stalled since and he is now on the verge of
switching codes and returning to rugby union with the NSW Waratahs.
The Eels took a cautious approach with his retention, no doubt
concerned by the head knocks that cast a cloud over his future. At
the same time, his career hasn't progressed as rapidly as many,
including the Eels, had hoped.

"You get constant headaches all the time, you can't go out," Moeroa
said.

"When you get a concussion you become sensitive to light so you
can't go outside, you can't do stuff with your family.

"I had a concussion and the week after I only got a little knock to
the head but it was enough to get me off the field.

"It took me about two weeks to recover from that fully. It was
about a week in a dark room. After that I still had the headaches
but they slowly got better and better.

"That's when I saw the neurologist, did all the tests. That's when
I was a bit worried. There were no symptoms from that. They put
wires all over your body to measure stuff and the readings came
back good." [GN]


NUTRICION FUNDAMENTAL: Cross Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Nutricion Fundamental
Inc. The case is styled as Asjah Cross, Maira Medina, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v.
Nutricion Fundamental Inc., Does 1-100, Defendants, Case No.
34-2019-00260416-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super. Ct., Sacramento Cty., July
11, 2019).

The case type is stated as "Other Employment".

Nutricion Fundamental, Inc. is a privately held company in
Vacaville, CA and is a Branch business, categorized under Health
Food Stores.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by Edwin Aiwazian, Esq.


OHANA MILITARY: Court Denies Bid to Certify Class in Lake Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KENNETH LAKE, CRYSTAL LAKE, HAROLD BEAN, MELINDA BEAN,
KYLE PAHONA, ESTEL PAHONA, TIMOTHY MOSELEY, ASHLEY MOSELEY, RYAN
WILSON, and HEATHER WILSON, Plaintiffs, v. OHANA MILITARY
COMMUNITIES, LLC, FOREST CITY RESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT, INC., DOE
DEFENDANTS 1-10, Defendants, Civ. No. 16-00555 LEK (D. Haw.), Judge
Leslie E. Kobayashi of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Hawaii denied the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification.

Plaintiffs Kenneth Lake, Crystal Lake, Harold Bean, Melinda Bean,
Kyle Pahona, Estel Pahona, Timothy Moseley, and Ashley Moseley
filed their Complaint in state court on Sept. 14, 2016.  Ryan
Wilson and Heather Wilson were added as Plaintiffs when the First
Amended Complaint was filed on Sept. 20, 2017.  The First Amended
Complaint remains the operative pleading.

The Plaintiffs are current or former residents of housing at
Kaneohe Marine Corps Base Hawaii ("MCBH").  The crux of their
claims is that the soil in some of the residential neighborhoods at
MCBH is contaminated, and Defendants Ohana and Forest City failed
to: 1) perform adequate remediation measures; and 2) disclose the
contamination to the Plaintiffs.  The Plaintiffs allege they were
all exposed to the contaminated soil because the soil in their
respective MCBH neighborhoods was contaminated and/or they
routinely visited, and traveled through, neighborhoods with
contaminated soil.

The First Amended Complaint alleges the following claims: breach of
contract against Ohana ("Count I"); breach of the implied warranty
of habitability against Ohana ("Count II"); a Haw. Rev. Stat.
Chapter 521 claim against the Defendants ("Count III"); an unfair
and deceptive acts or practices ("UDAP") claim against tge
Defendants ("Count IV"); a negligent failure to warn claim against
the Defendants ("Count V"); a negligent infliction of emotional
distress claim and an intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim against the Defendants ("Count VI"); a fraud claim against
the Defendants ("Count VII"); a negligent misrepresentation claim
against the Defendants ("Count VIII"); an unfair methods of
competition ("UMOC") claim against the Defendants ("Count IX"); a
trespass claim against the Defendants ("Count X"); and a nuisance
claim against the Defendants ("Count XI").

Counts IV and IX were stricken because the Court previously
dismissed the Plaintiffs' UDAP and UMOC claims with prejudice.  
Count X was stricken because the Plaintiffs failed to seek leave to
amend that claim.  The portion of Count III based on Haw. Rev.
Stat. Section 521-42(a)(1) was dismissed with prejudice, as were
Harold Bean and Melinda Bean's and Timothy Moseley and Ashley
Moseley's claims in Count XI.  All other claims in the First
Amended Complaint remain.

The Plaintiffs do not dispute that the First Amended Complaint does
not plead the case as a class action, nor does it contain class
allegations.  On March 22, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed their Motion
for Class Certification.  In spite of the lack of class
allegations, the instant Motion asks the Court to certify the
following damages class, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3): All
persons who leased or resided in residential properties leased from
Ohana Military Communities, LLC, at Marine Corps Base Hawaii
('MCBH') in Kaneohe, Oahu, Hawaii, between 2006 to present.

On April 2, 2019, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause ("OSC"),
requiring the Plaintiffs to file a response showing why the Motion
should not be summarily denied.  The Plaintiffs filed their
response to the OSC on April 12, 2019.

Judge Kobayashi finds that the Plaintiffs had notice that they had
to satisfy the standards summarized in Gilliam v. Glassett.  Their
OSC Response, however, does not meet the applicable standards.
First, converting the instant case into a class action would result
in undue delay.  The trial in the case is set to begin on Oct. 21,
2019, and the Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion only seven months
before the trial date.  Further, the case has been pending for
two-and-a-half years, and the Plaintiffs and their counsel were
aware from the outset of the arguable basis for class treatment of
the claims.

Finally, the Judge rejects the Plaintiffs' contention that the
filing of a second amended complaint is not necessary.  She says
the Plaintiffs' argument is both mistaken and unsupported by any
legal authority.  The stay of the Related Cases did not place the
claims of previously unidentified persons before the Court.  The
stay merely recognizes that, after certain common issues are
resolved in the instant case, they will not need to be re-litigated
to resolve the claims of the plaintiffs in the Related Cases.  The
Plaintiffs' Motion, even when read together with their OSC
Response, does not present any circumstances that warrant the
granting of leave to file a second amended complaint which would:
1) convert the instant case into a class action; and 2) add class
allegations.  

Because the Plaintiffs are denied leave to file a second amended
complaint, it is not necessary to address whether the Plaintiffs'
proposed class can be certified.

On the basis of the foregoing, Judge Kobayashi construed the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, filed March 22, 2019,
as a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, and is
denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 31, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/UhWEXb from Leagle.com.

Kenneth Lake, Crystal Lake, Harold Bean, Melinda Bean, Kyle
Pahona,
Estel Pahona, Timothy Moseley, Ashley Moseley, Ryan Wilson &
Heather Wilson, Plaintiffs, represented by Patrick Kyle Smith,
Smith Law, & Terrance M. Revere -- main@revereandassociates.com --
Revere & Associates, LLC.

Ohana Military Communities, LLC & Forest City Residential
Management, Inc., Defendants, represented by Christine A. Terada
-- cterada@goodsill.com -- Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel LLLP,
Joachim P. Cox -- jcox@cfhawaii.com -- Cox Fricke A Limited
Liability Law Partnership LLP, Kamala S. Haake --
khaake@cfhawaii.com -- Cox Fricke LLP, Lisa W. Munger --
lmunger@goodsill.com -- Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel LLLP &
Randall C. Whattoff -- rwhattoff@cfhawaii.com -- Cox Fricke LLP.


PAPA MURSPHY'S: Faces Securities Class Action in Washington
-----------------------------------------------------------
Juan Monteverde, founder and managing partner at Monteverde &
Associates PC, a national securities firm headquartered at the
Empire State Building in New York City on June 11 disclosed that a
class action lawsuit has been filed in the United States District
Court Western District of Washington Tacoma Division, Case No.
3:19-cv-05514, against Papa Murphy's Holdings Inc. ("Papa Murphy's"
or the "Company") (NasdaqGS: FRSH) for shareholders who held Papa
Murphy's securities as of the close of the tender offer on May 22,
2019 (the "Class Period"), and have been harmed by Papa Murphy's
and its board of directors' (the "Board") for alleged violations of
Sections 14(e) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(the "Exchange Act") in connection with the tender offer of Company
common stock to be purchased by MTY Food Group Inc. ("MTY").

Under the terms of the agreement, Papa Murphy's stockholders
received $6.45 per share in cash in exchange for each share of Papa
Murphy's stock they owned ("Merger Consideration"). The complaint
alleges that this offer was inadequate and alleges that the
Schedule 14D-9 Solicitation/Recommendation Statement (the
"Recommendation Statement") provided materially incomplete and
misleading information about the Company's financials and the
transaction, in violation of Sections 14(e), and 20(a) of the
Exchange Act.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than August 12, 2019. Any member of the putative class may
move the Court to serve as lead plaintiff through counsel of their
choice, or may choose to do nothing and remain an absent class
member.

Click here for more information:
strong>https://www.monteverdelaw.com/case/papa-murphys-holdings-inc.
It is free and there is no cost or obligation to you.

Monteverde & Associates PC is a national class action securities
and consumer litigation law firm that has recovered millions of
dollars and is committed to protectingshareholders and consumers
from corporate wrongdoing. Monteverde & Associates lawyers have
significant experience litigating Mergers & Acquisitions and
Securities Class Actions, whereby they protect investors by
recovering money and remedying corporate misconduct. Mr.
Monteverde, who leads the legal team at the firm, has been
recognized by Super Lawyers as a Rising Star in Securities
Litigation in 2013, 2017-2019, an award given to less than 2.5% of
attorneys in a particular field. He has also been selected by
Martindale-Hubbell as a 2017 and 2018 Top Rated Lawyer.

CONTACT:

     Juan E. Monteverde, Esq.
     MONTEVERDE & ASSOCIATES PC
     The Empire State Building
     350 Fifth Ave, Suite 4405
     New York, NY 10118
     Email: jmonteverde@monteverdelaw.com
     Tel: (212) 971-1341 [GN]


PIVOTAL SOFTWARE: Pomerantz Files Securities Fraud Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP announces that a class action lawsuit has been filed
against Pivotal Software, Inc. (PVTL) and certain of its officers.
The class action, filed in United States District Court, for the
Northern District of California, and indexed under 19-cv-03589, is
on behalf of a class consisting of all persons and entities other
than Defendants who purchased or otherwise acquired (1) Pivotal
common stock pursuant or traceable to the registration statement
and prospectus (collectively, the "Registration Statement") issued
in connection with Pivotal's April 2018 initial public offering
(the "Offering" or "IPO"); and/or (2) Pivotal securities between
April 24, 2018 and June 4, 2019, both dates inclusive (the "Class
Period"), seeking to recover damages caused by Defendants'
violations of the federal securities laws and to pursue remedies
under Sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 (the
"Securities Act") and Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder, against the Company and certain of its top
officials.

If you are a shareholder who purchased Pivotal securities during
the class period, or in connection with the company's IPO, you have
until August 19, 2019, to ask the Court to appoint you as Lead
Plaintiff for the class. A copy of the Complaint can be obtained at
www.pomerantzlaw.com. To discuss this action, contact Robert S.
Willoughby atrswilloughby@pomlaw.com or 888.476.6529 (or
888.4-POMLAW), toll-free, Ext. 9980. Those who inquire by e-mail
are encouraged to include their mailing address, telephone number,
and the number of shares purchased.

Pivotal was founded in 2013 and is headquartered in San Francisco,
California. Pivotal, together with its subsidiaries, provides a
cloud-native application platform and services in the United
States.

Pivotal's cloud-native platform, Pivotal Cloud Foundry ("PCF"),
purportedly accelerates and streamlines software development by
reducing the complexity of building, deploying, and operating
cloud-native and modern applications. The Company also purportedly
enables its customers to accelerate their adoption of a modern
software development process and their business success using its
platform through its strategic services, Pivotal Labs ("Labs").
Pivotal markets and sells PCF and Labs through its sales force and
ecosystem partners.

In April 2018, Pivotal commenced the IPO, issuing over 42 million
shares of Pivotal common stock to the investing public at $15.00
per share, all pursuant to the Registration Statement, raising more
than $638 million in gross proceeds.

The complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and misleading statements regarding the
Company's business, operational and compliance policies.
Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: Specifically, Defendants made false
and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i)
Pivotal was facing major problems with its sales execution and a
complex technology landscape; (ii) the foregoing headwinds resulted
in deferred sales, lengthening sales cycles, and diminished growth
as its customers and the industry's sentiment shifted away from
Pivotal's principal products because the Company's products were
outdated, inadequate, and incompatible with the industry-standard
platform; and (iii) as a result, the Company's public statements
were materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

On June 4, 2019, post-market, Pivotal reported its financial and
operating results for the first quarter of fiscal year 2020,
advising investors that "sales execution and a complex technology
landscape impacted the quarter." Wedbush Securities analyst Daniel
Ives called the quarter a "train wreck" and characterized the
Company's operating results as "disastrous," asserting that
Pivotal's "management team does not have a handle on the underlying
issues negatively impacting its sales cycles and the activity in
the field which gives us concern that this quarter will be the
start of some 'dark days ahead' for Pivotal (and its investors)."

Contact:

         Robert S. Willoughby, Esq.
         Pomerantz LLP
         Phone: 888-476-6529 ext. 9980
         Website: www.pomerantzlaw.com
         Email: rswilloughby@pomlaw.com [GN]


PROVIDE COMMERCE: FTD Bankruptcy May Hamper Settlement Petition
---------------------------------------------------------------
Perry Cooper, writing for Bloomberg Law, reports that a petition
seeking U.S. Supreme Court review of the practice of distributing
class settlement funds to charity will likely be put on hold after
the defendant's parent company declared bankruptcy.

Provide Commerce LLC notified the trial court that approved the
settlement that parent FTD Cos. filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Delaware June 3.

The Bankruptcy Code imposes an automatic stay on all litigation
against the company, Provide told the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California June 10.

The stay should affect the Supreme Court petition challenging the
settlement's terms, although nothing on the court's docket reflects
a stay yet.

The settlement resolves allegations that Provide and Regent Group
Inc. unlawfully enrolled online consumers in a rewards program and
charged them a monthly fee when they accepted a $15 "thank you"
gift.

Provide agreed to pay $12.5 million in cash plus $20 merchandise
credits sent automatically to class members even if they didn't
submit claims. If all class members had used the $20, the total
settlement would have been worth $38 million.

Only 3,000 of the 1.3 million class members made claims for cash,
resulting in a $225,000 payout. Class counsel gets $8.85 million in
attorneys fees and $3 million goes to three San Diego
universities.

Rather than sending the $3 million to charities as "cy pres," the
parties to the deal should have made more of an effort to
distribute those funds to the class members, objector Brian
Perryman told the Supreme Court in his June 7 reply brief.

The Provide case gives Perryman's counsel Ted Frank another chance
to get Supreme Court review of cy pres distributions. The court
punted in March after hearing oral argument in his other case,
Frank v. Gaos, which concerned the distribution of all of an $8.5
million Google privacy settlement to charity.

Andrus Anderson LLP, Gupta Wessler PLLC, and Steckler Law Group LP
represent the class. Cooley LLP represents Provide. The Hamilton
Lincoln Law Institute Center for Class Action Fairness represents
Perryman.

Jones Day and Richards, Layton & Finger P.A. represent FTD in
bankruptcy court.

The case is Perryman v. Romero, U.S., No. 18-1074, 6/10/19. [GN]


PTT EXPLORATION: Indonesian Seaweed Farmers Seek $140MM Damages
---------------------------------------------------------------
Sonali Paul, writing for Reuters, reports that Indonesian seaweed
farmers were set to seek more than A$200 million ($137 million)
from Thailand's PTT Exploration and Production in a trial that was
set to on June 17, to cover damage they say they suffered after
Australia's worst oil spill.

The class action represents more than 15,000 seaweed farmers who
claim to have lost their livelihoods in the years after oil gushed
into the Timor Sea for more than 74 days following an explosion at
the Montara oil rig in August 2009.

"We are now 10 years on from this environmental disaster and the
oil company responsible and its wealthy Thai parent continue to
deny the devastating impact their oil spewing out uncontrollably
for months on end had on Indonesian seaweed farmers," Ben Slade, a
lawyer at Maurice Blackburn, which is running the case, said in a
statement.

The lead plaintiff in the case is Daniel Sanda, who claims that the
seaweed industry in Rote Ndao and Kupang, more than 200 km (124
miles) away from the Montara rig were destroyed by PTTEP's failure
to safely operate it.

More than 30 witnesses from Indonesia, including seaweed farmers
and oil spill, chemistry and environmental experts will give
evidence at the 10-week trial in Sydney, Maurice Blackburn said.

PTTEP Australia declined to comment on the case as it is currently
before the Australian courts.

In 2016, when the class action was launched, PTTEP said it had
always accepted responsibility for the Montara explosion but that
satellite imagery, aerial surveys and models concluded no oil
reached the Indonesian coastlines.

It also said there had been "no lasting impact" on ecosystems in
the areas closest to Indonesian waters.

Indonesia separately sued Thailand's PTT and PTTEP in 2017 for 27.5
trillion rupiah ($1.9 billion) for alleged damage to the
environment from the Montara oil spill. [GN]


QUINCY BIOSCIENCE: Collins Files Product Liability Suit in Fla.
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against QUINCY BIOSCIENCE,
LLC. The case is styled as JUAN COLLINS on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. QUINCY BIOSCIENCE, LLC,
a Wisconsin limited liability company, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-22864-MGC (S.D. Fla., July 11, 2019).

The nature of suit is stated as Contract Product Liability.

Quincy Bioscience LLC operates as a biotechnology company. The
Company offers services in areas of dietary supplements, brain
health supplements, and memory related supplements.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Howard Mitchell Bushman, Esq.
     Joseph M. Kaye, Esq.
     Adam M. Moskowitz, Esq.
     The Moskowitz Law Firm, PLLC
     2 Alhambra Plaza, Suite 601
     Coral Gables, FL 33134
     Phone: (305) 740-1423
     Email: howard@moskowitz-law.com
            joseph@moskowitz-law.com
            adam@moskowitz-law.com

          - and -

     John Scarola, Esq.
     Searcy Denney Scarola Barnhart & Shipley
     2139 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard
     PO Drawer 3626
     West Palm Beach, FL 33402-3626
     Phone: (561) 686-6300
     Fax: (561) 383-9451
     Email: scarolateam@searcylaw.com


RENT-A-CENTER: 9th Cir. Says FAA Does Not Preempt McGill Rule
-------------------------------------------------------------
Ballard Spahr LLP writes that earlier this year, it reported on the
pendency of several Ninth Circuit appeals concerning the
enforceability of consumer arbitration agreements with respect to
claims for "public" injunctive relief.  On June 28, 2019, in Blair
v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., the court held that the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA) does not preempt the California Supreme Court's holding
in McGill v. Citibank that an arbitration provision precluding a
consumer from pursuing claims for "public injunctive relief" in any
forum, i.e., in court or in arbitration, is unenforceable under
California law.

The Ninth Circuit also issued two other unreported opinions
yesterday in which holdings on the FAA preemption issue were
identical to Rent-A-Center. The stage is now set for possible
review of this important issue by the Ninth Circuit en banc or the
U.S. Supreme Court.

Relying upon McGill, class action plaintiffs increasingly have been
seeking to circumvent class action waivers by filing lawsuits in
California, expressly seeking public injunctive relief, and arguing
that the entire arbitration agreement is unenforceable under
McGill, or that the request for public injunctive relief must
proceed in court. With limited exceptions, California district
courts have largely followed McGill and either denied motions to
compel arbitration or held that the public injunctive relief claim
is not subject to arbitration. The decision in Rent-A-Center gives
plaintiffs' lawyers in California the green light to continue
trying to side-step arbitration provisions with class action
waivers by asserting claims for public injunctive relief.  

In Rent-A-Center, plaintiffs brought a putative class action
alleging that defendants charged excessive prices for its
rent-to-own plans for household items. Plaintiffs sued under
California statutes that regulate rent-to-own agreements and sought
a public injunction on behalf of the people of California to enjoin
future violations of these laws and to provide an accounting of
monies obtained from California consumers. The district court
denied Rent-A-Center's motion to compel individual arbitration on
the ground that it waived plaintiffs' right to seek public
injunctive relief in any forum and therefore violated McGill. The
Ninth Circuit has now affirmed that decision.

The Ninth Circuit ruled that the FAA does not preempt the McGill
rule because the rule applies equally to arbitration and
non-arbitration agreements and, therefore, does not single out
arbitration for special treatment or prohibit outright the
arbitration of a particular type of claim. Moreover, according to
the Ninth Circuit, the rule does not interfere with the fundamental
attributes of arbitration because the arbitration of a public
injunctive relief claim, unlike class-wide arbitration, does not
require formalities inconsistent with arbitration.

Nevertheless, if the defendants seek en banc review or review by
the U.S. Supreme Court, a compelling case could be made that the
FAA does preempt the McGill rule given the conflict between McGill
and the long line of U.S. Supreme Court cases favoring arbitration.
Those cases include AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, in which the
Court held that class action waivers in consumer arbitration
agreements are valid under the FAA, notwithstanding California law
holding such waivers to be invalid and against public policy.

In Concepcion, the Court emphasized that the "overarching
principle" of the FAA is to ensure that arbitration agreements are
enforced according to their terms. It further instructed that
parties are free to limit both the issues subject to arbitration
and with whom a party will arbitrate its disputes. A state court
declaration that the right to pursue public injunctive relief is
non-waivable directly interferes with an agreement by the parties
to resolve injunction claims in arbitration on an individual,
non-public basis. It is tantamount to a state purporting to exclude
particular disputes from the reach of the FAA, which is clearly
preempted by the FAA as the U.S. Supreme Court has held on multiple
occasions.

Although the Ninth Circuit rejected these arguments in
Rent-A-Center, the U.S. Supreme Court may be more receptive, since
it held in Concepcion that "nothing in [the FAA] suggests an intent
to preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of the FAA's objectives." [GN]


RESURGENT CAPITAL: Lacy Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. Arkansas
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Resurgent Capital
Services LP. The case is styled as Kimberly Lacy Individually and
on Behalf of all Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff v. Resurgent
Capital Services LP, LVNV Funding LLC, John Does 1-25, Defendants,
Case No. 4:19-cv-00484-BRW (E.D. Ark., July 11, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Resurgent Capital Services is a manager and servicer of domestic
and international consumer debt portfolios for credit grantors and
debt buyers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Yaakov Saks, Esq.
     Stein Saks, PLLC
     285 Passaic Street
     Hackensack, NJ 07601
     Phone: (201) 282-6500 ext 101
     Fax: (201) 282-6501
     Email: ysaks@steinsakslegal.com



RETAIL FOOD: Michel's Patisserie Franchisees File Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Dominic Powell, writing for Smart Company, reports that embattled
franchising giant Retail Food Group (RFG) has taken another blow,
with law firm Corrs Chambers Westgarth announcing a possible class
action against the company over its conduct with current and former
Michel's Patisserie franchisees.

RFG copped criticism earlier this year over reports it had
instructed franchisees to extend the use-by dates on certain items
sold, which set off an investigation by various food safety bodies
across the country.

The company later admitted to the practise but said it had told
"less than 1 per cent" of its supplier network to extend the shelf
life of products "where appropriate and safe to do so".

"RFG follows strict standards with regard to food quality and any
product date extension was granted following written approval from
the supplier and with consumer safety top of mind," the company
said at the time.

However, on June 14, Corrs Chambers Westgarth announced it was
fielding interest for a potential class action against the company
for "conduct in relation to RFG's Michel's Patisserie franchise
system".

"We intend to argue that if RFG had behaved lawfully, franchisees
would not have purchased their franchises and that RFG's conduct
caused franchisees (and other persons closely associated with
franchisees) loss or damage," the company said in a statement.

The class action is being backed by litigation funder Augusta,
meaning franchisees do not need to pay to participate, and Corrs is
currently inviting former and current Michel's Patisserie
franchisees to register their interest.

Speaking to The Age, former franchisee Devi Trimuryani announced
she would be the lead plaintiff in the case, saying she could "take
them down". The former Michel's Patisserie owner said her
experience with the company had "ruined her life".

"My marriage, my financials. I can't sleep, I'm in a depression
because everyone is chasing me for money," she told the
publication.

"I never thought my life was going to be this hard by owning a
business in Australia, because I can't get justice until now."

RFG has been in the wars for nearly two years now after a 2017
investigation prompted a parliamentary inquiry into the franchising
sector, which was released earlier this year and devoted an entire
chapter to the company, which also owns Donut King, Crust, Gloria
Jeans, Brumby's and Pizza Capers.

In that chapter, the report alleged the company had profited at the
expense of its franchisees and operated a "particularly unjust
business model". It also claimed RFG and its executives
participated in insider trading, tax avoidance and breaches of
consumer law.

The impending class action, if it goes ahead, will add to an
ever-increasing list of headaches for RFG, which also lost a court
case earlier this year where it was found RFG breached Australian
Consumer Law by misleading two Michel's Patisserie franchisees
about a store purchased in 2012.

It's also the second class action to be laid against the company in
as many years, with firm Bannister Law investigating a class action
in January last year over the "severe financial hardship"
experienced by Retail Food Group franchisees.

In a statement, a spokesperson for RFG said it had not been
contacted by Corrs Chambers Westgarth "in relation to any potential
class action". [GN]


RIO TINTO: New York Court Dismisses Securities Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
Shearman & Sterling LLP, in an article for Lexology, disclosed that
on June 3, 2019, Judge Analisa Torres of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed a putative
class action against the mining company Rio Tinto and certain of
its executives. Colbert v. Rio Tinto plc, 17 Civ. 8169 (AT) (DCF)
(S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2019). Plaintiff -- purportedly on behalf of a
class of purchasers of Rio Tinto's American Depositary Receipts
("ADRs") -- alleged that defendants made misrepresentations
regarding Rio Tinto's investment and mining operations in
Mozambique, in violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-5
thereunder. The Court held that certain of plaintiff's claims were
time-barred and the remaining claims failed to adequately allege an
actionable misrepresentation or scienter.

Plaintiff alleged that, beginning in late 2010 and continuing into
2011, Rio Tinto learned that the coal reserves at a Mozambique mine
that it had purchased were less valuable than initially projected,
and that transporting the coal would be substantially more
difficult and expensive than anticipated at the time of the
purchase, due to physical constraints and the denial of necessary
government approvals. See slip op. at 4-6. Plaintiff further
alleged that defendants did not disclose these adverse developments
until a press release and SEC filings in early 2013, which
disclosed an impairment of more than $3 billion associated with the
Mozambique investment. Id. at 7-8.

The Court first ruled that, because plaintiff did not file suit
until October 2017, claims based on alleged misrepresentations made
prior to October 2012 were time-barred in light of the Exchange
Act's five-year statute of repose. The Court rejected plaintiff's
argument that defendants had violated a continuing duty to "correct
or update" pre-October 2012 statements, holding that such a duty
would make the statute of repose a "nullity." Id. at 10. The Court
also rejected plaintiff's argument that the five-year statutory
period began running when the class members purchased the ADRs in
reliance on the alleged misrepresentations. Id. at 11.
Notwithstanding the Second Circuit's decision in Arnold v. KPMG
LLP, 334 F. App'x 349, 351 (2d Cir. 2009), in which the Second
Circuit held that the statute of repose for securities claims
"starts to run on the date the parties have committed themselves to
complete the purchase or sale transaction," the Court noted that
several other Second Circuit decisions had dismissed complaints
that failed to allege any misrepresentations within five years of
the filing of the complaint. Slip op. at 11 (citing, e.g., SRM
Glob. Master Fund P'ship Ltd. v. Bear Stearns Cos. LLC, 829 F.3d
173, 177 (2d Cir. 2016)).

The Court then turned to, and rejected, claims based on November
2012 statements in a securities filing and during a presentation at
an industry conference that production had "continued to ramp up,"
"work [was] progressing to expand [railway] capacity," and "[o]ur
presence in Africa is growing." Plaintiff argued that these
statements were at a minimum reckless, and an inference of scienter
should be drawn, because "defendants were aware" and "executive
management was aware" that there was no profitable way to exploit
the mine given the inability to cheaply transport the coal. Id. at
13. The Court held, however, that these arguments "fall far short"
of alleging that "an agent of the corporation committed a culpable
act with the requisite scienter." Id. at
13-14. The Court concluded that plaintiff failed to allege any
individual defendant's involvement or the involvement of anyone
else who could have acted with the requisite scienter, and a
"complaint in which defendants are clumped together in vague
allegations" does not meet the heighted pleading requirements for a
Section 10(b) claim. Id. at 14.

The Court also dismissed plaintiff's claim based on Rio Tinto's
CEO's response to a question at an investor conference, in which
the CEO was asked whether transporting coal by barge was "still on
the agenda" for the Mozambique project, and he replied that "any of
the options should always be looked at" but rail was "probably the
highest probability." Id. at 14. While plaintiff argued that this
response was misleading because the investor had asked about a
specific transportation option that was "essential to the success
of the operation," and the response referred only to "options," the
Court determined that the CEO did not misleadingly suggest that
transportation by barge was a "practical or realistic option." Id.
at 14-15.

Finally, the Court rejected plaintiff's claim that Rio Tinto had
misrepresented the value of the Mozambique operation in a 2013 bond
offering that had incorporated a prior Annual Report valuing the
operation at $3.7 billion even though Rio Tinto had known at the
time of the 2013 offering that the operation had a lower value. The
Court concluded that, even if the incorporation of the $3.7 billion
valuation was a misrepresentation, it was immaterial because Rio
Tinto had already announced several weeks prior that it expected to
impair the Mozambique operation's value by "approximately $3
billion." Id. at 15. The Court emphasized that, under the Second
Circuit's decision in Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154,
167 (2d Cir. 2000), a misrepresentation is immaterial if "the
information is already known to the market because the
misrepresentation cannot then defraud the market." Slip op. at 15.
[GN]


SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS: Aug. 6 Deadline for Washing Machine Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
Marilyn Moritz, writing for KSAT San Antonio, reports that the
deadline to file a claim in the Samsung "exploding" washing machine
class action lawsuit  is looming.  And, consumers who bought
certain Purex laundry detergent, Wesson cooking oil or Health Ade
kombucha may be able to pocket a little cash as the result of class
action lawsuit settlements.

In 2016, Samsung recalled 30 models of its top-loaders after
reports of lids flying off during violent spin cycles, causing
damage.

Later, the company settled a class action lawsuit resolving claims
that certain machines were defective. Consumers who bought one of
the 2.8 million machines made from March 2011 and October 2016 can
file a claim for various compensation ranging from repairs to
refunds.

The deadline to file at claim is Aug. 6, 2019.  Find the claim
here: http://www.washermdlsettlement.com.You will need to enter
the model number.

Consumers won't exactly be able to clean up, but they may be able
to recoup a few bucks if they bought certain Purex laundry
detergent.

Purex settled a class action lawsuit to resolve allegations that
its detergent contained synthetic ingredients, even though the
label claimed it was natural.

People who bought the detergent between May 2013 and March 2019 may
be able to receive  up to $40 without proof of purchase. The payout
is either $2 or $4 per bottle depending on the size. The deadline
to file a claim is Aug. 10.

That claim form can be found be going to
www.laundrydetergentsettlement.com.

If you bought Wesson oil as far back as 2010,  you can file a claim
in that class action lawsuit settlement as long as it's by the Aug.
22 deadline.

The company settled a $27 million suit over allegations it
contained GMOs despite product claims that it was 100 percent
natural.   Consumers are eligible for file if they bought the
various cooking oils between January 12, 2010 and July 1, 2017.
The maximum payout is $4.50 with no proof of purchase.  The claim
form and more information can be found at
www.wessonoilsettlement.com.

And Whole Foods and Health Ade settled a $4 million suit to resolve
allegations that its various flavored kombucha drinks were not
nonalcoholic as claimed.

Those who bought the kombucha products between March 6, 2014 and
May 24, 2019, may be due up to $40 without proof of purchase.  With
proof, claimants may receive up to $80.  The deadline to find a
claim is Aug. 27.  That website is www.hakombuchasettlement.com
[GN]


SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS: Sued for Claiming Phones Water Resistant
-------------------------------------------------------------
New York Post reports that Australia's consumer watchdog has sued
Samsung Electronics' Australian unit for allegedly misleading
consumers by promoting water-resistant Galaxy smartphones as
suitable for use in swimming pools and the surf.

The world's largest smartphone maker did not know or sufficiently
test the effects of pool or saltwater exposure on its phones when
ads showed them fully submerged, the Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission (ACCC) lawsuit says.

The case is the first filed by a major regulator and could result
in multimillion-dollar fines. It centers on more than 300
advertisements in which Samsung showed its Galaxy phones being used
at the bottom of swimming pools and in the ocean.

"The ACCC alleges Samsung's advertisements falsely and misleadingly
represented Galaxy phones would be suitable for use in, or for
exposure to, all types of water . . . when this was not the case,"
ACCC chairman Rod Sims said in a statement on July 4.

Samsung said it stood by its advertising, complied with Australian
law and would defend the case.

The South Korean electronics giant has spent heavily on advertising
to rebuild public faith in its premium smartphones following the
costly recall of its fire-prone Galaxy Note 7 devices in 2016.

It is due to announce preliminary quarterly earnings Friday, when
it is widely expected to flag a profit plunge due to drops in chip
prices.

Hot water

Samsung's water resistance claims came under heavy scrutiny as
early as 2016 when influential US magazine Consumer Reports said
the Galaxy S7 phone -- which appears dunked in a fish tank in
commercials -- had failed an immersion test.

The company attributed that to a manufacturing defect affecting a
small number of phones, which it soon fixed. But customers online
continued reporting problems, forum comments show.

Some consumers damaged their phones when exposing them to water and
Samsung had refused to honor warranty claims, the ACCC said in the
lawsuit, though Samsung said it complied with all of its warranty
obligations under Australian law.

The regulator also said Samsung's advice to some Galaxy model users
that the phones were not suitable for beach or pool use suggested
the firm considered water could cause damage.

"Samsung showed the Galaxy phones used in situations they shouldn't
be to attract customers," Sims said.

"Samsung's advertisements, we believe, denied consumers an informed
choice and gave Samsung an unfair competitive advantage."

The ACCC alleges law breaches occurred in more than 300
advertisements. If proven, each breach after Sept. 1, 2018, can
draw a fine of up to A$10 million ($7 million), triple the benefit
of the conduct or as much as 10% of annual turnover.

Breaches prior to Sept. 1, 2018, can draw penalties as high as
A$1.1 million. Rival Sony settled a US class action over similar
claims for its Xperia smartphone range in 2017, promising refunds
where the phones had failed. [GN]


SANDISK LLC: Dinan's Breach of Contract Claim Junked w/ Prejudice
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOHN DINAN, Plaintiff, v. SANDISK LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 18-cv-05420-BLF (N.D. Cal.), Judge Beth Labson Freeman of the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, San
Jose Division, granted with leave to amend in part and granted
without leave to amend in part SanDisk's motion to dismiss Dinan's
complaint.

The case turns on the definition of "GB" (or "Gigabyte") in the
context of computer data-storage devices.  The Plaintiff alleges
that the average consumer understands digital storage capacity and
file size to be measured in binary.  In another counting system,
known as the "base-10" (or "decimal") system, 1 GB = 1,000,000,000
bytes (or 109 bytes).  So, 1 GB in the decimal system contains
fewer bytes than 1 GB in the binary system (1,000,000,000 vs.
1,073,741,824).

The Defendant sells memory storage devices, including Universal
Serial Bus ("USB") flash drives of varying sizes (e.g., 256 GB, 128
GB, 64 GB, etc.).  It advertises that its products have a certain
number of GBs (e.g., 256 GB); the Defendant calculates the GBs in
its products using the decimal system.  That is, 1 GB in the
Defendant's products equals 1,000,000,000 bytes, not 1,073,741,824
bytes.

The Plaintiff is a California citizen who purchased the Defendant's
64 GB iXPAND Flash Drive USB 3.0.  In purchasing the drive, he
believed that he was receiving 64 binary GBs, but instead he
received 64 decimal GBs, which is 6.7% less storage capacity than
he was expecting to receive.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant does not disclose to the
consumer the discrepancy between its decimal-GB offering and the
expected binary-GB offering.  On the front of the packaging, the
Defendant puts the number of GBs in conspicuous, large, differently
colored text.  The Plaintiff acknowledges that on the back of the
packaging, the Defendant discloses that "1 GB = 1,000,000,000
bytes," but he argues that this disclosure is inconspicuous fine
print.  He also alleges that the Defendant does not direct
consumers' attention to the back of the packaging.  And the
Plaintiff alleges that the storage amounts used by the Defendant
(e.g., 256 GB, 128 GB, and 64 GB) are consistent with the binary
system.

Based on these allegations, the Plaintiff claims that the Defendant
misleads consumers into believing that each storage product
contains a certain number of binary GBs, which leads consumers to
believe that the products have more bytes of storage than they
actually contain.  These misleading representations cause consumers
to pay more for the drives than they otherwise would pay.

The Plaintiff thus brings the following causes of action on behalf
of himself and the putative class: (1) breach of contract; (2)
violation of California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"); (3)
violation of California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"); and
(4) violation of California's False Advertising Law ("FAL").

The class is defined as all individuals and entities in the United
States who purchased a Sandisk USB Drive within the applicable
statutes of limitations preceding the filing of the lawsuit, with a
subclass for individuals in the state of California who purchased
the products.

Both the Defendant and the Plaintiff request that the Court takes
judicial notice of certain facts and documents.  Judge Freeman
summarily rejects the Plaintiff's request as untimely because it
was filed well after the deadline for any opposition.  In any
event, she does not need to rely on any of the requested documents
to resolve the motion.

The Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of
several documents, none of which the Plaintiff opposes.  First, it
asks the Court to take judicial notice of the packaging for the
product the Plaintiff purchased because it is incorporated by
reference into the Complaint.  The request for judicial notice is
granted as to the packaging.  

Second, it requests that the Court takes judicial notice that the
decimal system is the standard set by the U.S. Government.  The
Defendant asks the Court to take judicial notice of certain
information in the U.S. Code and the Federal Register, as well as
Guidelines published by the Department of Commerce.  The request
for judicial notice is granted as to the Government standard
because it is available in public government documents, not subject
to reasonable dispute.

Third, the Defendant asks the Court to take judicial notice of
certain dictionary definitions because they are incorporated by
reference into the Complaint.  The request for judicial notice is
granted as to the definitions.  These three dictionaries each show
both (as the  Plaintiff alleges) that a gigabyte equals 1024
megabytes (i.e., binary) and also that a gigabyte can mean 1
billion bytes (i.e., decimal).

Finally, the Defendant asserts that the decimal system is the
industry standard used by all manufacturers of storage devices,
asking the Court to take judicial notice of an Apple, Inc. support
website and a website describing the history of the adoption of
this standard by the International Electrotechnical Commission.
However, the truth of the information in the websites is not
properly subject to judicial notice because it is subject to
reasonable dispute.  Thus, the Defendant's request is denied with
respect to the industry standard, and the Judge does not consider
this evidence in deciding the motion.

In the instant motion, the Defendant moves to dismiss all four of
the Plaintiff's claims.  It makes three principle arguments as to
why the claims must be dismissed: (1) the product labeling
precludes the Plaintiff's claims; (2) the Defendant's use of an
industry standard is not actionable; and (3) the Defendant's use of
a government standard is not actionable -- that is, that the
Defendant's use of the decimal system on the packaging is protected
under California's statutory safe harbor.  

Because Judge Freeman agrees with the Defendant's first argument,
she does not address the second and third.  She first addresses the
Plaintiff's UCL, CLRA, and FAL claims, and then turns to the
Plaintiff's contract claim.  The Judge concludes that no reasonable
consumer would believe based on the Defendant's packaging that he
was receiving more bytes than he actually received.  Under both the
Plaintiff's pled theory and an alternate theory offered at the
hearing, he has failed to state a claim that the Defendant's
packaging is misleading under the UCL, FAL, and CLRA.  However, the
Judge recognizes that this is the first version of the Complaint
and Plaintiff requests leave to amend under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(a)'s liberal standard.  On this basis, the Juduge will
allow leave to amend these claims.  Thus, the Plaintiff's claims
are dismissed without prejudice.

The Plaintiff's breach of contract claim is easier to resolve than
his consumer-protection claims.  The Plaintiff's theory of
liability under his breach of contract claim is that the Defendant
promised to provide a USB Flash Drive to the Plaintiff with a
storage capacity of 64 GBs in exchange for the purchase price, but
did not live up to that promise.  By this, the Plaintiff means that
the Defendant promised to provide 64 binary GBs.  But what the
Defendant actually promised, as expressly noted on the packaging,
was 64 decimal GBs, wherein "1 GB = 1,000,000,000 bytes."  Thus,
the Defendant provided exactly what was promised by the express
terms of the agreement.  The Plaintiff's failure to read those
terms does not provide him grounds for a breach of contract claim.
Unlike his consumer-protection claims, the Plaintiff cannot
possibly cure this fatal defect with amendment.  As such, the claim
is dismissed with prejudice.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Freeman granted with leave to amend
in part and granted without leave to amend in part the Defendant's
motion.  The Plaintiff must file his amended complaint by June 21,
2019.  Failure to meet the deadline to file an amended complaint or
cure the deficiencies in the Order will result in a dismissal of
the Plaintiff's claims with prejudice.  The parties' stipulated
discovery deadlines are due by June 14, 2019.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 31, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/gi3t7o from Leagle.com.

John Dinan, Plaintiff, represented by Paul Anthony Maddock, Carey
Danis and Lowe, pro hac vice, James Jonathan Rosemergy, Carey &
Danis LLC, pro hac vice & Francis J. Flynn, Jr. --
casey@lawofficeflynn.com -- Law Offices of Francis J. Flynn, Jr.

SanDisk LLC, Defendant, represented by Anthony J. Weibell --
aweibell@wsgr.com -- Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati A
Professional Corporation & Keith E. Eggleton -- keggleton@wsgr.com
-- Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati A Professional Corporation.


SCHWEIGER DERMATOLOGY: Fischler Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Schweiger
Dermatology, PLLC. The case is styled as Brian Fischler
Individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Schweiger Dermatology, PLLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-06431 (S.D. N.Y., July 11, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Schweiger Dermatology offers comprehensive medical dermatology
services and treatments and is a full service cosmetic & general
dermatology.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Christopher Howard Lowe, Esq.
     Lipsky Lowe LLP
     630 Third Avenue
     Fifth Floor
     New York, NY 10017
     Phone: (212) 392-4772
     Fax: (212) 444-1030
     Email: chris@lipskylowe.com


SHREVEPORT, LA: Seeks Permission to Issue Sewer Customer Refunds
----------------------------------------------------------------
Sara MacNeil, writing for Shreveport Times, reports that in a
rabbit hole of litigation, the City of Shreveport asked the First
Judicial District Court to allow it to issue refunds to commercial
sewer customers on June 13.

A judge ruled on June 10 the city is liable for overcharging
commercial water and sewer customers. The city filed a motion on
June 13 for permission to issue refunds to commercial sewer
customers.

The Harper Law Firm filed a lawsuit in August 2018 on behalf of the
Haven Property Owners Association and Briarwood Apartments. The
lawsuit alleges the city improperly collected $2.5 million to $3.5
million since July 2015 from commercial or "non-residential" water
and sewer customers.

After the lawsuit had been filed, the city sent a refund for
overcharges to Haven Property Owners Sept. 7, 2018. The letter that
accompanied the refund did not mention the pending litigation.

A month later, refunds to water and sewer customers were stopped by
a court order requested by Harper Law Firm in November of 2018.
Jerry Harper of Harper Law Firm said the judge ordered the city not
to communicate with plaintiffs.

"Any settlement has to go through the court and the court has to
approve the amounts," Harper said.

Ann Wilkes of Harper Law Firm subscribed to Harper's assessment
saying under Louisiana law, the city does not have the authority to
circumvent the court's jurisdiction.

"Now that the class action has been certified, the only way to
settle the class action, or to go through this refund process would
be to get the approval of the court. That's written out in
Louisiana statute very clearly. The city should know that," Wilkes
said.

Wilkes said the city issuing refunds without a court ruling would
not allow refund amounts to be tracked.

"We couldn't confirm whether or not the numbers are accurate,"
Wilkes said.

Mayor Adrian Perkins' Communication Manager Ben Riggs directed
questions to outside counsel handling the case, Edwin Byrd or
Danielle Farr in the City Attorney's Office. [GN]


SMITTY'S SUPPLY: Wurth Calls Tractor Hydraulic Fluid "Deceptive"
----------------------------------------------------------------
DWAYNE WURTH on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. SMITTY'S SUPPLY, INC. and  RURAL
KING, the Defendants, Case No. 5:19-cv-00092-TBR (W.D. Ky., June
27, 2019), alleges that Defendants have deceptively and
misleadingly labeled, marketed and sold tractor hydraulic fluid as
"303" fluid meeting "303" specifications when, in fact, the "303"
designation is obsolete and 303 specifications have not been
available for over 40 years.

The Defendants have also deceptively and misleadingly labeled,
marketed and sold tractor hydraulic fluid as meeting certain
manufacturer specifications and providing certain anti-wear and
protective benefits when, in fact, Defendants knew, or should have
known, the fluid they are selling does not meet all listed
manufacturer specifications and does not contain the anti-wear and
protective properties required in Tractor Hydraulic Fluid. Instead,
the "303" fluid is a fluid mixed from line wash and other lubricant
products (including some used products) that are not suitable for
use as ingredients in a tractor hydraulic fluid.

Tractor Hydraulic Fluid (THF) is a multifunctional lubricant that
has been manufactured for and used in tractors and equipment for
over 50 years. It is designed to act as a hydraulic fluid,
transmission fluid and gear oil for this equipment. In the 1960s
and early 1970s, John Deere (Deere) manufactured a popular and
widely used THF called JD-303 or simply "303," and the term "303"
became synonymous with the John Deere name and this high-quality
and then effective THF product.

Sperm whale oil was an essential ingredient in Deere's 303 THF. In
the mid-1970s, the passage of laws protecting endangered species
outlawed the use of sperm whale oil. Deere's "303" formula could no
longer be manufactured or sold, and because its essential
ingredient -- sperm whale oil -- could no longer be used, the
designation became obsolete and there are no specifications
available for "303" tractor hydraulic fluids. Deere was forced to
manufacture a new tractor hydraulic fluid with different additives
that would be both effective and affordable.

After it stopped producing and selling its 303 THF, Deere
manufactured and sold several THF products with certain ingredient,
viscosity, anti-wear and detergent additive specifications,
including initially offering J14B, J20A and J20B. Many other
manufacturers created and sold fluids that purported to be similar
to these new products while others continued to offer a "303"
product. The J14B specification became obsolete in the late 1970s.
J20A and J20B were then offered and, during the time the J20A/B
specifications were in use, Deere used a licensing program called
Quatrol to police the quality of THF products in the marketplace.

The Quatrol program required blenders and sellers of competing THF
products to submit test data to Deere prior to the use of the
J20A/B specification on their product labels, to ensure the
products met the advertised specifications.

In the late 1980s or early 1990s, Deere abandoned the J20A/B
specification as well. John Deere then and now manufactures and
sells THF meeting a specification called J20C or J20D (low
viscosity). The J20C fluid is sold under the name "Hy-Gard," and
many other manufacturers market and sell products while they
contend meet the J20C specification in order to compete with John
Deere.

John Deere discontinued the Quatrol program around the time J20A
was discontinued (approximately 1989). The subsequent lack of a
quality control program or policing of the products in the market
resulted in a "free for all" with respect to the THF manufactured
and sold in the open market and the opportunity for unscrupulous
manufacturers and sellers to falsely use the Deere specifications
(and other manufacturers' specifications) on the labels of the THF
products they sell.

The Defendants deceptively and illegally trade on the obsolete and
non-existent "303" designation, the other obsolete J14B and J20A
specifications, and the John Deere trade name that was and has
continued to be so prevalent in the industry. This was deceptive as
there is no known "303" specification, there is no way for
manufacturers, sellers, or anyone else to truthfully claim the
products meets or is in compliance with any such
specification.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs and Class Members are:

          Mark. P. Bryant, Esq.
          N. Austin Kennady, Esq.
          BRYANT LAW CENTER, P.S.C.
          P.O. Box 1876
          Paducah, KY 42002-1876
          Telephone: (270) 442-1422
          Facsimile: (270) 443-8788
          E-mail: Mark.bryant@bryantpsc.com
                  Austin.kennady@bryantpsc.com

               - and -

          Dirk Hubbard, Esq.
          Thomas V. Bender, Esq.
          HORN AYLWARD & BANDY, LLC
          2600 Grand, Ste. 1100
          Kansas City, MO 64108
          Telephone: (816) 421-0700
          Facsimile: (816) 421-0899
          E-mail: dhubbard@hab-law.com

               - and -

          Bryan T. White, Esq.
          Gene P. Graham, Jr., Esq.
          William Carr, Esq.
          WHITE, GRAHAM, BUCKLEY, & CARR, L.L.C
          19049 East Valley View Parkway
          Independence, MO 64055
          Telephone: (816) 373-9080
          Facsimile: (816) 373-9319
          E-mail: ggraham@wagblaw.com
                  bwhite@wagblaw.com

SOURCE INVESTMENT: Ealy Hits Unpaid Wages, Misclassification
------------------------------------------------------------
Tomeisha Ealy, On Behalf of Herself and All Other Similarly
Situated Individuals, Plaintiff, v. Source Investment Group, Inc.
d/b/a Candyland Gentlemen's Club and Laurence Carpenter, Defendant,
Case No. 2:19-cv-02442-SHL-dkv (W.D. Tenn., July 11, 2019) is
pursuing this lawsuit on behalf of themselves and all other
similarly situated individuals who performed work duties as exotic
dancers for Defendants at Defendants' Candyland Gentlemen's Club
during the period July 2016 through the final judgment of this case
within the meaning of the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938.

Candyland is a corporation formed under the laws of Tennessee with
its principal business being the operation of an exotic dance club
featuring female exotic dancers known as Candyland Gentlemen's Club
located at 2947 Lamar Avenue Memphis, Tennessee 38118. Plaintiff
was employed by Defendants as an exotic dancer at Defendants'
Candyland Gentlemen's Club during the period of about 2013 through
2018.

According to the complaint, at no time during Plaintiff's period of
employment did Defendants ever pay Plaintiff or any other exotic
dancers any wages for hours that they worked each week. The
Defendants totally failed to pay wages to Plaintiff and all other
exotic dancers for work duties performed. The Defendants also
misclassified Plaintiff and all other exotic dancers at Candyland
Gentlemen's Club as independent contractors and not as employees,
says the complaint.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Alan G. Crone, Esq.
     Laura Bailey, Esq.
     Bailey Dorsey, Esq.
     The Crone Law Firm, PLC
     88 Union Avenue, 14th Floor
     Memphis, TN 38103
     Phone: (844) 445-2387
     Email: acrone@cronelawfirmplc.com
            lbailey@cronelawfirmplc.com
            bdorsey@cronelawfirmplc.com

          - and -

     Gregg C. Greenberg, Esq.
     Zipin, Amster & Greenberg, LLC
     8757 Georgia Avenue, Suite 400
     Silver Spring, MD 20910
     Phone: (301) 587-9373
     Email: GGreenberg@ZAGFirm.com


SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC: Judge Finalizes Class Action Settlement
----------------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Brown, writing for Post and Courier, reports that a South
Carolina judge finalized a legal settlement tied to the failed V.C.
Summer nuclear project on June 11, splitting somewhere between $121
million and $146 million among current and former South Carolina
Electric & Gas customers.

The order ends a lengthy legal battle between the utility and
several high-powered law firms that sued on behalf of SCE&G's
electric ratepayers.

Circuit Judge John Hayes said the complexity and scope of the case
made it "unparalleled in South Carolina legal history."

The lawsuit largely centered on the more than $2 billion SCE&G
charged its customers for two reactors in Fairfield County before
the nuclear project was canceled in July 2017.

The S.C. Attorney General's Office and the lawyers representing the
ratepayers argued the state law SCE&G relied on to bill customers
in advance was unconstitutional.

But the case was settled late last year before it could proceed to
trial.

SCE&G agreed to pay $115 million in cash and to sell several
properties that are valued between $60 million to $85 million. The
properties have yet to be sold, which is why the exact award is
unknown.

Whatever money goes back to ratepayers will need to be divided.
SCE&G informed the court that 866,554 current electric customers
and 742,193 former utility ratepayers were eligible to collect.   

The class-action settlement in November came at a crucial time for
the company. SCE&G was fighting another case in front of the Public
Service Commission, where it was accused of misleading ratepayers,
investors and state officials.

The legal settlement was announced as the commission weighed
whether to allow Dominion Energy, a giant in the utility industry,
to take over SCE&G and its parent company SCANA Corp.

Dominion wrapped up its takeover of SCE&G in January, and was
allowed to charge ratepayers another $2.3 billion for the
unfinished reactors over the next 15 years. But the class-action
attorneys were able to take credit for helping to force Dominion
into covering another $2 billion in costs tied to the failed
nuclear project.

The firms that litigated the case against SCE&G include the Strom
Law Firm; Richardson, Patrick, Westbrook & Brickman; Speights &
Solomons; Bell Legal Group; and McGowan, Hood & Felder.

"The court's order recognizes that our efforts assisting the
customer case at the Public Service Commission and pursuing our
state court class action were indispensable in bringing about a
comprehensive resolution of the controversy," Ed Westbrook, one of
the lead attorneys in the case said in a statement on June 12.

"From the beginning, our focus has been to get the best result
possible for SCE&G's customers in this extraordinarily difficult
litigation against an enormously powerful company," Westbrook
added. "We believe the comprehensive settlement the Court has
approved more than meets that goal and we are proud to have
achieved it."

In recent months, the class-action settlement was held up by
several people who objected to the legal fees the attorneys wanted
to collect for their work.

Westbrook and the other attorneys asked a judge earlier this year
to allow them to pocket up to $66 million of the money SCE&G agreed
to pay out.

But Robert Dodson, a Columbia-area attorney who represented several
SCE&G ratepayers, objected to those costs. He called the proposed
legal fees "outrageously high."

The five powerful law firms are now expected to take home $51
million of the total settlement, which could equal up to $200
million depending on what the various properties sell for.

And for his work challenging the legal fees, Dodson netted $2.9
million.

Current and former SCE&G ratepayers can find more information on
the settlement at scegratepayersettlement.com. [GN]


ST LOUIS, MO: Arrestees' Class Action Over Bail Certified
---------------------------------------------------------
Perry Cooper, writing for BloombergLaw, reports that St. Louis
arrestees won class status June 11 of their suit alleging they were
unlawfully detained because they can't afford bail.

"They seek systemic procedural reforms, applicable to all class
members, in the form of a prompt and proper hearing," Judge Audrey
G. Fleissig wrote for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri. "This is precisely the purpose of Rule
23(b)."

The class includes thousands of current and future arrestees
affected by the city's practices each year. [GN]


STERLING FIRST: Shine Lawyers Mulls Class Action Over Scheme
------------------------------------------------------------
Geof Parry, writing for 7News Perth, reports that an insider of the
failed Sterling First investment company -- which has left dozens
of elderly people millions of dollars out of pocket -- has broken
his silence.

The man, who wanted to remain anonymous, was a former sales
consultant at Sterling First, who originally helped the company
recruit investors -- including his own family and friends.

But today he is one of the many big losers, having seen $500,000 of
his own money disappear in the collapsed scheme.

"We couldn't get our money out. We couldn't sell our shares," he
told 7NEWS.

Sterling First, the flagship of a sprawling WA group of property
management and investment companies behind the scheme, collapsed in
May leaving retirees -- some of them very ill -- facing eviction.

The scheme involved investors handing over their life savings to
secure a home on a lifetime lease of up to 40 years, via a
subsidiary which was promoted by former Test cricketer Mitchell
Johnson and media personality Jenny Seaton.

Their work was purely promotional and they had no other involvement
in Sterling First's schemes or investments.

Despite worrying reports to financial regulators in mid-2017, the
company was still able to raise at least $8 million more from older
West Australians

Company founder Ray Jones has so far refused to answer questions
about how the collapse happened, and where all the money has gone.

The former insider said that silence was uncharacteristic

"Ray was always the ultimate salesman," he said. "He could sell
anything, to anyone -- and he sold us. It was always a great story,
it was always a great sell, to keep us either fooled or
motivated."

The man said part of that sales pitch was the expectation of a
stock exchange listing, and above market interest rates of "91/4
per cent . . . and they were paying".

But the payments dried up, the stockmarket listing never happened
and after years of promises creditors were told their money was
gone.

The visible reminders of Sterling First began disappearing, with
the company sign outside its South Perth office taken down. But the
legal and personal signs of the collapse are likely to remain for
years.

Shine Lawyers are investigating a possible class action. [GN]


SUNLANDS TECHNOLOGY: Howard G. Smith Files Securities Fraud Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Law Offices of Howard G. Smith reminds investors of the upcoming
August 26, 2019 deadline to file a lead plaintiff motion in the
class action filed on behalf of investors who purchased Sunlands
Technology Group (NYSE: STG) securities pursuant and/or traceable
to the registration statement and related prospectus (collectively,
the "Registration Statement") issued in connection with Sunlands
Technology's March 2018 initial public stock offering (the "IPO" or
the "Offering").

Investors suffering losses on their Sunlands Technology investments
are encouraged to contact the Law Offices of Howard G. Smith to
discuss their legal rights in this class action at 888-638-4847 or
by email to howardsmith@howardsmithlaw.com

On March 23, 2018, the Company completed its Initial Public
Offering, issuing 13 million shares at $11.50 per share.

On May 28, 2019, the Company disclosed that new student enrollments
declined during first quarter 2019 and gross billings fell 28.6%
year-over-year due to "softer marketing tactics and expanded trial
programs."

Since the IPO, shares of Sunlands Technology have traded as low as
$2.28 per ADS, a loss of more than 80% from the $11.50 IPO price.

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout
the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to
investors: (1) Sunlands Technology's student enrollment was
declining; (2) Sunlands Technology's gross billings were declining;
(3) Sunlands Technology's marketing tactics were not as robust as
described in the Registration Statement; and (4) that, as a result
of the foregoing, Defendants' positive statements about the
Company's business, operations, and prospects were materially
misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

If you purchased shares of Sunlands Technology during the Class
Period you may move the Court no later than August 26, 2019 to ask
the Court to appoint you as lead plaintiff if you meet certain
legal requirements. To be a member of the class action you need not
take any action at this time; you may retain counsel of your choice
or take no action and remain an absent member of the class action.
If you wish to learn more about this class action, or if you have
any questions concerning this announcement or your rights or
interests with respect to these matters please contact:

         Howard G. Smith, Esq.
         Law Offices of Howard G. Smith
         3070 Bristol Pike, Suite 112,
         Bensalem, Pennsylvania 19020
         Website: www.howardsmithlaw.com
         Phone: 215-638-4847
         Toll free: 888-638-4847
         Email: howardsmith@howardsmithlaw.com [GN]


SWIFT TRANSPORTATION: Court Grants McNutt Leave to Amend Labor Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARY McNUTT, an individual, on behalf of herself and
those similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SWIFT TRANSPORTATION CO. OF
ARIZONA, LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. C18-5668 BHS (W.D.
Wash.), Judge Benjamin H. Settle of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington, Tacoma, granted Plaintiff Mary
McNutt's motion for leave to amend.

On Aug. 15, 2018, McNutt filed a class action complaint against
Swift.  On Nov. 20, 2018, Judge Bryan issued a scheduling order.

On April 1, 2019, McNutt filed the instant motion for leave to
amend.  On April 15, 2019, Swift responded.  On April 19, 2019,
McNutt replied.

On April 25, 2019, Judge Bryan transferred the case to Judge
Settle.  On May 7, 2019, the Court struck the scheduling order and
set a deadline for McNutt's motion for class certification.

Upon review of the instant motion, Judge Settle finds that leave to
amend is warranted.  Swift objects to McNutt's motion because (1)
McNutt failed to amend by the date set in the scheduling order, (2)
it would be prejudiced by McNutt's untimely amendment, and (3)
McNutt's amendment is barred by a preliminary settlement in a
related case.

First, the Court has struck the deadlines in the scheduling order
and therefore Swift's argument on this issue is moot.  Second,
Swift has failed to establish undue delay or actual prejudice by
McNutt failing to meet the deadline in the now stricken scheduling
order or filing the motion six weeks after she received notice of a
preliminary settlement in Hedglin v. Swift Transportation Co. of
Arizona, LLC, Case No. 3:16-cv-05127-BHS (W.D. Wash.).

Finally, Swift argues that McNutt's claims are barred by res
judicata based on the preliminary settlement in Hedglin.  McNutt
responds that Swift fails to provide any authority for the
proposition that a preliminary settlement bars potential claims and
that McNutt intends to opt out of the settlement in Hedglin, which
means that she may bring her own claims against Swift.  The Judge
agrees with McNutt on both issues.  Therefore, he granted McNutt's
motion for leave to amend.  McNutt will file the amended complaint
as a separate entry on the electronic docket.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 31, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/xQpvli from Leagle.com.

Mary McNutt, an individual, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Graham G. Lambert,
HAFFNER LAW PC, pro hac vice & Joshua H. Haffner --
jhh@haffnerlawyers.com -- HAFFNER LAW PC.

Swift Transportation Co of Arizona, LLC, Defendant, represented by
Babak G. Yousefzadeh -- byousefzadeh@sheppardmullin.com -- SHEPPARD
MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON, pro hac vice, Darin M. Sands --
sandsd@lanepowell.com -- LANE POWELL, John David Ellis --
jellis@sheppardmullin.com -- SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON, pro
hac vice & Paul Cowie -- pcowie@sheppardmullin.com -- SHEPPARD
MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON, pro hac vice.


TOYOTA MOTOR: Court Approves Sliding Door Class Action Settlement
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP on June 11 disclosed
that, on June 10, 2019, Judge Victor A. Bolden of the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut approved the
settlement of Simerlein et al. v. Toyota Motor Corporation et al.,
Case No. 3:17-CV-01021-VAB (D. Conn.), a class action on behalf of
the owners and lessees of an estimated 1.3 million model year 2011
through 2018 Toyota Sienna minivans with sliding doors.  In the
litigation, Plaintiffs alleged that the sliding doors in certain
Sienna minivans were defective and asserted claims under the
consumer protection statutes of numerous states as well as warranty
and other claims. Court-appointed co-class counsel Demet Basar of
Wolf Haldenstein, W. Daniel "Dee" Miles III of Beasley Allen, Crow,
Methvin, Portis & Miles, P.C. and Adam J. Levitt of DiCello Levitt
& Gutzler LLC, led a dedicated legal team that was successful in
obtaining quality class-wide relief, including for those class
members who may have experienced issues with their vehicles'
sliding doors, thereby achieving the goal of the class litigation.
The settlement is valued at between $30 and $40 million.

This litigation arose from Toyota's December 2016 "G04 Recall," in
which Toyota recalled certain model year 2011 through 2016 Siennas
because of the possibility that the rear power sliding doors could
open independently while the vehicles were in motion, a serious
safety issue that could result in injury or even death. In the
Simerlein class action, the firm's clients, all of whom were
parents concerned about the safety of their children in their
minivans, alleged that the Siennas' doors were inherently
defective, and that the G04 Recall was not sufficient to render the
doors safe.  The sole remedy that the G04 Recall offered consisted
of replacing a door's junction box and the door motor wiring
harness that connected the junction box to other components of the
door.  Plaintiffs alleged that this partial electrical remedy did
not address all of the safety hazards potentially posed by the
doors, and that problems with the doors' cables, latches and lock
assemblies could also cause the doors to open or close
independently or otherwise malfunction.  Plaintiffs also believed
that the problems with the Sienna doors continued beyond the 2011
through 2016 model years covered by the recall, and brought claims
on behalf of owners and lessees of model year 2017 and 2018 Sienna
minivans.

Many of the complaints posted on the website of the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration concerning the Sienna
minivan's doors did not relate to the electric issues covered by
the recall, but were about malfunctions of the minivan's door
cables, latches and other components.  The investigation performed
by co-class counsel during the litigation confirmed that the
dangerous door malfunctions at issue could occur because of
problems with door cables, latches, lock assemblies and other
mechanical weaknesses.

The settlement now approved by the Court provides classwide relief
that addresses these issues. Under the terms of this economic loss
class action settlement, Toyota will launch a Customer Confidence
Program that will provide prospective coverage, free of charge to
class members, for repairs to sliding door components for a period
of ten years from the first use of the vehicle, which will "travel
with the car" such that subsequent owners will also be protected.
This warranty coverage includes, on an as needed basis, the
replacement of door latches, locks, hinges, cable sub-assemblies
and fuel door assemblies, and an extension of the availability of
the G04 Recall repair.  As an added measure, for those class
members who have any concerns about their vehicles' sliding doors,
Toyota will offer one sliding door inspection for each subject
vehicle at no cost to class members for one year from the date the
Court approved the settlement. For vehicles undergoing repairs that
are covered by the Customer Confidence Program that will exceed
four hours to complete, Toyota will provide a loaner vehicle to
eligible class members. In addition, class members who have
incurred out-of-pocket expenses for repairs to the components
covered by the Customer Confidence Program can submit a claim for
reimbursement of those covered repairs in a streamlined claim
administration program approved by the Court. Details of the
settlement are set forth in
http://www.toyotasiennadoorsettlement.com/

We believe the relief provided under the settlement directly and
comprehensively addresses all of the safety concerns underlying the
litigation, and ensures that the Sienna minivans' doors will
operate as intended for the benefit of the owners and lessees of
the estimated 1.3 million model year 2011-2018 Sienna minivans in
the U.S. and its territories.

Founded in 1888, Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP  has
extensive experience in the prosecution of securities class actions
and derivative litigation in state and federal trial and appellate
courts across the country.  The firm has attorneys in various
practice areas; and offices in New York, Chicago and San Diego.
The reputation and expertise of this firm in shareholder and other
class litigation has been repeatedly recognized by the courts,
which have appointed it to major positions in complex securities
multi-district and consolidated litigation.

Contact:

     Demet Basar, Esq.
     Kate McGuire, Esq.
     Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP
     Email: basar@whafh.com
     mcguire@whafh.com
     Tel: (800) 575-0735
          (212) 545-4600 [GN]


TRIM-LINE HITECH: Wilfred Seeks Unpaid OT and Prevailing Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
CHUA and RODRIGO BALAJADIA WILFRED individually and on behalf of
others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. TRIM-LINE HITECH
CONSTRUCTION CORP., TLH CONSTRUCTION CORP., MEGA CONTRACTING GROUP,
LLC, EE CRUZ CO., INC., RMSK CONTRACTING CORP., KISKA CONSTRUCTION,
INC., CONSTRUCTION CORP., LASHAY'S FORTE CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT
CO., INC., L.K. COMSTOCK & CO., INC., RAILWORKS CORP., JOHN P.
PICONE, INC., J. KOKOLAKIS CONTRACTING, INC., STALCO CONSTRUCTION,
INC., MAKRO GENERAL CONTRACTORS, INC., T.A. AHERN CONTRACTORS
CORP., and MPCC CORP., the Defendants, Case No. 156384/2019 (N.Y.
Sup., June 27, 2019), seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages and
prevailing wages and benefits that the Plaintiffs contend they were
statutorily and contractually entitled to receive for work that
they performed on publicly-financed projects with such government
entities including but not limited to the Metropolitan Transit
Authority, New York City Transit Authority, City University of New
York, State University of New York, Dormitory Authority of the
State of New York, Clinton Housing Development Corporation and the
New York Housing Development Corporation (Government Entities). The
action is brought on behalf of the Plaintiffs who worked as sheet
metal workers and in other construction-related trades for the
Trim-Line Defendants.

According to the complaint, the Prime Contractors entered into
contracts with the Government Entities to perform work on the
Public Works Projects.  The Trim Line Defendants paid the Named
Plaintiffs and other members of the putative class less than the
prevailing rates of wages and supplements to which the Plaintiffs
and other members of the putative class were entitled.

The Prime Contractor Defendants failed to ensure that the Trim Line
Defendants paid the Named Plaintiffs and putative class members at
the prevailing rates of wages and supplements for the type of trade
work they performed on their respective projects.

The promise to pay and ensure payment of the prevailing wage and
supplemental benefit rates in the Public Works Contracts was made
for the benefit of all workers furnishing labor on the sites of the
Public Works Projects and, as such, the workers furnishing labor on
the sites of the Public Works Projects are the beneficiaries of
that promise, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs and the Putative Class are:

          Lloyd Ambinder, Esq.
          VIRGINIA & AMBINDER, LLP
          40 Broad Street - 7th Floor
          New York, NY 10006
          Telephone: (212) 943-9080
          Facsimile: (212) 943-9080
          E-mail: lcoyle@vandallp.com

TUXEDOS SHOW: Faces Class Action Over Unfair Labor Practices
------------------------------------------------------------
Sarah Ritter, writing for Quad-City Times, reports that after a
10-hour shift stripping at Tuxedos Show Club in Davenport, Sadie
Yvonne McLaren would make the required rounds, doling out a portion
of the tips she earned, first to pay the house, then the bouncers,
then the DJ.

By the end of her rounds, McLaren would keep about one-third of the
money she earned that night. On a busy day, she could go home with
$200. Other days she'd take home $18.

Signs plastered on the club's walls were a regular reminder of the
house rules. Dancers who aren't nude by the end of their last song
will be charged a higher stage fee. Dancers who miss a shift or
walk off the stage early will be charged up to $200.

Other rules were unwritten. Breaks are unauthorized or limited to
10 or 15 minutes. It doesn't matter how busy the club is, dancers
stay on stage. Strippers can stop customers from touching them, but
it's likely to come at a cost.

"If you take the job itself out of it, who would put up with that?
Being told where to be and when, and that you can't leave. Being
told you're going to get fired because you can't pay your stage fee
because only two guys walked in all night," McLaren said. "And it's
not just here, it's everywhere. Dancers all over the country have
the same issues."

Two years ago, McLaren walked off the stage and past the house
rules for the last time. Her experiences are the basis of a class
action lawsuit she led against Tuxedos for violating fair labor
standards. Now she's working full time to help bolster a movement
to protect dancers' rights and unionize workers in the adult
entertainment industry.

At the heart of the movement -- championed by dancers in
California, Oregon and elsewhere -- is the debate over whether
strippers should be classified as independent contractors or
employees. This past year, workers across the country, including
Uber drivers and others in the new "gig economy," have brought
national attention to the issue of worker misclassification.

And McLaren said exotic dancers have finally been given space to
have their voices heard and to be seen as more than just dancers or
strippers, but as legitimate workers with human rights.

'Red flags everywhere'
McLaren, a native of Germany, worked as a waitress and exotic
dancer in Chicago before moving to Davenport in 2011. She was hired
at Tuxedos within a week.

Thousands of clubs across the country have house rules and
requirements similar to Tuxedos. But McLaren quickly learned
dancing at a strip club in Iowa comes with added pressure.

Unlike in Portland, Las Vegas and larger metropolitan areas, club
owners in the Quad-Cities struggle to attract crowds of new
customers, she said. And Tuxedos' BYOB liquor policy means dancers
are essentially tasked with bringing in all of the money.  

"Nobody knows that we put up with so much, and we work really hard
because so much of our money gets taken," McLaren said. "You have
to work really hard to make someone else money before you can make
your own money. It starts to become a toxic environment. Nobody
seems happy, and it feels like you're in hell."

In 2016, McLaren was searching online when she learned of the
International Entertainment Adult Union, which had been federally
recognized the previous year. Digging through the union's website,
she not only discovered she had specific rights as an independent
contractor, but that they were potentially being violated.

"The more I learned about labor laws and rights, the angrier I
got," she said. "It just made me want to do something."

Independent contractors include laborers across several industries,
such as truck drivers, construction workers, janitors, hair
dressers, warehouse workers and exotic dancers.

Federal and state laws have various requirements for how an
employer must classify and treat employees and independent
contractors, said Matthew Pappas, an employment lawyer in Rock
Island. If workers are classified as independent contractors, the
Internal Revenue Service dictates employers cannot control what
work will be done or how it will be done.

McLaren argued the postings on the wall detailing her club owner's
requirements and strict scheduling were clear evidence of the
dancers being misclassified as contractors.

"As far as clubs are concerned, they label us as independent
contractors, make us sign a form that we agree we're independent
contractors, but then make us work a schedule. And you're penalized
if you miss one of your days. That's an employee," she said. "So
that's a huge red flag, and it spirals downward from there. There
are red flags everywhere."

Independent contractors also are exempt from protections under laws
governing minimum wage, overtime compensation, family and medical
leave, unemployment insurance and safe workplaces, according to the
Department of Labor.

"If they're not classified as employees, they don't have any
protections in the workplace," said Boston labor lawyer Shannon
Liss-Riordan, who represented McLaren in the class action. "Not
only do they not have wage protection, they don't have protection
against discrimination or if they get injured. It's extremely
important for labor rights to be enforced. I'm a strong believer
those protections are paramount."

The misclassification of workers has been around as long as worker
protections, said David Steen, attorney for Iowa Workforce
Development. The state developed the Iowa Misclassification Task
Force in 2008, and as job growth continues, Steen said
investigation and enforcement efforts have never been this strong.

He said lines are blurred in several ways when employers classify
workers. And oftentimes, he argued, workers "don't understand the
distinction, and many have told investigators that they felt they
had no choice in the matter.

"Many employers simply don't understand they cannot just reclassify
a worker from employee to contractor and avoid taxes," he said.
"They've seen competitors do it, or read about it somewhere, and
they decide it would be a good way to reduce overhead. Some do it
because they know it's not lawful, but they want to try to get
ahead."

In 2015, for example, the taskforce reported Iowa employers failed
to report more than $6 million in wages for unemployment tax
purposes. That resulted in more than $389,000 in unpaid
unemployment taxes, penalties and interest.

In the class action complaint filed last fall, McLaren claimed
Tuxedos misclassified its exotic dancers as independent
contractors, paid dancers less than the minimum wage and failed to
pay them overtime compensation, plus took unlawful deductions from
dancers' pay in violation of Iowa law.

In court, the club argued dancers were properly classified, and as
a result, were not subject to minimum wage and overtime
protections. Documents also state the club did not mandate the
tip-outs made by the dancers, and on many occasions, dancers'
earnings exceeded the minimum wage.

Club owner Ron Farkas did not return calls for comment. His
attorney William Breedlove declined an interview.

'A terribly broken industry'
Independent contractors also lack protections against sexual
harassment and assault in the workplace, which McLaren said is
rampant in strip clubs.

"Clubs are rife with abuse, harassment and discrimination," said
Liss-Riordan, McLaren's attorney. "Just because a woman works at
one of these clubs doesn't mean she is opening herself up to
harassment. This is real work. People are supporting themselves and
their families off this work, and they need protection under the
law."

McLaren said she's spent her career watching dancers, as young as
18 and up to their 40s, being grabbed and assaulted, then shrugging
it off and staying silent. She's seen others penalized for speaking
up.

"There is potential for a lot of disrespect in and outside of the
club, including traumatizing things like sexual harassment and
assault," said Karly Voss, an exotic dancer in Oklahoma City. "This
job is not easy, it is incredibly emotionally, mentally and
physically exhausting. It is expensive to be a stripper, and not
just financially."

Now volunteering full time as an officer of the International
Entertainment Adult Union, McLaren said she's dedicating her career
to informing dancers, a historically marginalized group, of their
rights.

"They have to be humanized to society, but also to themselves in a
way," she said. "A lot of them are conditioned to think that
somebody grabbing you is normal. It's not. That guy should have the
cops called on him. People only see the job for what it is. They
don't think about how these women work really hard under rough
conditions and put up with a lot of abuse."

In filing the lawsuit against the Davenport club, McLaren said she
wanted to "expose a terribly broken industry" and prove labor
rights are being violated in strip clubs across the country,
including in rural Iowa.

"We're working a job that most people don't understand is extremely
taxing. Not everybody is made for it," she said. "I'm the only
union officer in the Midwest, but I'm trying to bring these issues
to light here. And at the same time, I'm trying to let dancers know
there are people out there working to protect them and their
rights."

A common thread
Over the past 20 years, Liss-Riordan has made a legal career
largely focused on independent contractor misclassification cases,
representing everyone from restaurant workers to delivery drivers.

She's gone after national companies, including FedEx and Starbucks,
for misclassifying workers to avoid paying benefits and taxes.
Liss-Riordan is now known across the country for taking on gig
economy companies, such as Uber, Lyft and Postmates.

But she said her career took an interesting turn around 15 years
ago when an exotic dancer walked into her office.

"I listened to her story and realized it was the same scam we're
seeing with so many different industries, where they don't get paid
by the company and they don't get to keep all of their tips," she
said. "I took that case, and one case led to another, and before I
knew it, I had sued just about every club in Massachusetts."

A few years ago, she tackled similar issues in California, where
Déjà Vu, a company that owns dozens of strip clubs, has been
entangled in lawsuits with thousands of dancers. In 2017, a
Michigan judge approved a $6.5 million class action settlement the
company later appealed.

Liss-Riordan said the company has been avoiding lawsuits and
agreeing to settlements of "ridiculously low amounts," spread out
over as many as 28,000 dancers.

The debate has been heightened in California as employers deal with
the 2018 state Supreme Court's Dynamex decision, making it more
difficult to classify workers as independent contractors. The
ruling instructs California businesses to use a three-pronged test
to determine whether a worker is an independent contractor.

The requirements, which are much clearer than those under federal
law, include businesses proving a worker is free from the company's
control, is doing work that isn't central to the company's
business, plus has an independent business in that industry.

In the meantime, following the lawsuits, Liss-Riordan said Déjà
Vu posted signs on doors of clubs across California explaining
dancers would be reclassified as employees.

"They sent a 'this is what happens when you enforce your rights'
type message," she said. "They came after the dancers, changed
their pay structure and slashed their pay, where they walked out
the door with hundreds of dollars less than before. Dancers were
confused and outraged by this."

While Liss-Riordan continues to sue the company for its actions,
protests have broken out across the state. Some dancers, arguing
the clubs were retaliating against them, have fought to remain
independent contractors. Other protesters continue to tout
necessary benefits and protections that go along with employee
status. And others are encouraging all dancers to unionize.

A bill that's moving through California's state legislature would
codify the Dynamex decision and potentially reclassify millions of
California workers. The new restrictions have caused strip club
owners and gig economy businesses to worry about increased costs,
and some employers fear other states will follow California's
lead.

'Change is inevitable'
Watching as dancers have quit their jobs in California due to lower
wages, McLaren worries the fallout in California could reach Iowa.

"Dynamex has caused a huge mess out there, and it would be terrible
if it happened all over the country," she said. "Here in Iowa, with
liquor laws how they are, if there was a Dynamex-type ruling and
dancers were reclassified as employees, probably most of the clubs
here would close. They don't have the liquor sales to pay anybody.
Thousands of people would lose their jobs."

Liss-Riordan, on the other hand, is advocating for other states to
adopt similar rulings, and hopes eventually a federal law will
tighten the standards for who should be classified as an
independent contractor and who receives employment protections.

"We commend bill author Lorena Gonzalez, D-San Diego, and members
of the assembly who voted for the bill for their advocacy of
fundamental worker protections like a minimum wage, overtime pay,
workers' compensation, unemployment insurance and the right to
collectively bargain," the California Labor Federation said in a
statement. "This measure would immediately benefit working people
who are living on the edge every single day as a result of being
misclassified as independent contractors."

While McLaren wants worker protections to be expanded, she said in
states like Iowa, where higher costs would cripple clubs, many
dancers want to remain independent. But if they're classified as
independent contractors, they need to be treated as such.

"Tear up the rules, rip up the schedule and get rid of the mandated
tips," she said. [GN]


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: $1.25MM Attys' Fees Awarded in Congdon Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHUCK CONGDON, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. UBER
TECHNOLOGIES, INC., ET AL., Defendants, Case No. 16-cv-02499-YGR
(N.D. Cal.), Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California granted in part the
Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees, costs, and class
representatives' service awards.

The Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint in this action on May
9, 2016, alleging that Uber was taking its "Safe Rides Fee" out of
drivers' fares on minimum fare rides, notwithstanding written
assurances that it would not do so.  They brought a claim for
breach of contract on behalf of three proposed classes of similarly
situated drivers. In addition to seeking damages, they sought
injunctive and declaratory relief.

Shortly after filing the action, the class counsel filed objections
to a proposed class action settlement in O'Connor v. Uber
Technologies, Inc., Case No. 3:13-03826-EMC, and Yucesoy v. Uber
Technologies, Inc., Case No. 3:15-00262-EMC, which could have
released the Plaintiffs' claims in the instant action.  Judge Chen,
presiding over O'Connor and Yucesoy, denied those plaintiffs'
motion for preliminary approval, thereby preventing release of the
Plaintiffs' claims in the case.

On Oct. 11, 2016, the Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding
additional Plaintiffs and a cause of action for conversion.
Thereafter, Uber moved to compel the Plaintiffs who did not opt out
of Uber's arbitration provisions to arbitrate their claims and to
stay litigation pending arbitration.

The Plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion to certify an issue
class to litigate whether enforcement of the arbitration provisions
would frustrate the drivers' right to relief for claims that were
otherwise subject to arbitration.  On Dec. 8, 2016, after full
briefing on both motions, the Court compelled the non-opt-out
Plaintiffs to arbitration but denied Uber's motion to stay the case
as to the opt-out Plaintiffs.  The Court also denied the
Plaintiff's class certification motion as moot.

After limited discovery, the Plaintiffs filed a class certification
motion and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
The Court granted the Plaintiffs' motions, denied Uber's
cross-motion, and also denied the Plaintiffs' request for punitive
damages.  Thereafter, the parties engaged in discovery to reach an
agreement on compensatory damages and class notice.

On Nov. 19, 2018, following an order granting their motions for
class certification and summary judgment, the Plaintiffs filed a
motion for attorneys' fees, costs, and class representatives'
service awards.  The parties reached an agreement on compensatory
damages but did not agree on attorneys' fees.  Hence, the instant
motion.

Judge Rogers finds that Uber has made valid arguments regarding the
fees sought, but generally speaking, the lodestar amount is
reasonable except for the following amounts, which will be
excluded: $5,813 in fees incurred litigating the motion to shorten
time in O'Connor; $17,242.50 in fees incurred negotiating class
counsel's engagement agreement; $20,937.50 in fees incurred in
connection with non-opt-out and punitive damages discovery; and
$44,325 in fees for travel.  Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' lodestar
amount will be adjusted to $1,251,749.

She also finds that the case is not a "rare" or "exceptional" case
warranting a multiplier.  Further, given Uber's arguments, and on
balance, an award of $1,251,749 is reasonable.

The Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to reimbursement of
$60,525.19 for litigation costs and expenses incurred by the class
counsel through the conclusion of the matter.  The Judge will award
the Plaintiffs $27,045.44 in reimbursable costs
($60,525.19-$23,164.75-$10,000-$315).  She finds that (i) the
Plaintiffs have not provided sufficient evidence to support a
finding that the retainer paid to their fees expert is recoverable;
and (ii) the Plaintiffs are not entitled to recover for meal
expenses of the class counsel because they have provided little
evidence to substantiate these expenses, including explaining who
attended the lunches or why they were necessary to further the
litigation.

The Plaintiffs seek an incentive award of $5,000 for each of the
four named Plaintiffs in the action.  The Judge finds that the
Plaintiffs' request for a $5,000 incentive award for each named
Plaintiff is reasonable and appropriate.  The named Plaintiffs have
been litigating the case for years, during which time they have
reviewed pleadings and motions, consulted with the class counsel,
were each deposed, and conducted document searches.  In addition,
they have put forth sufficient evidence that the incentive award is
proportional to the total amount obtained for the class.  Each
$5,000 incentive award represents just 0.25% of the total recovery,
which is reasonable in light of the expenses and risks named
Plaintiffs have incurred in the action

ased upon the foregoing, Judge Rogers ordered that (1) Uber will
pay the class counsel $1,251.749.00 total as reasonable attorneys'
fees; (2) Uber will pay the class counsel $27,045.44 total as
reimbursable costs; and (3) Plaintiffs Matthew Clark, Ryan Cowden,
Dominicus Rooijackers, and Jason Rosenberg are awarded $5,000 each
in incentive awards.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 31, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/PvTZIS from Leagle.com.

Chuck Congdon, Ryan Cowden, Anthony Martinez, Jason Rosenberg &
Jorge Zuniga, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Brian C. Tackenberg --
btackenberg@crabtreelaw.com -- pro hac vice, Charles M. Auslander
-- causlander@crabtreelaw.com -- pro hac vice, George R. Baise,
Jr. -- gbaise@crabtreelaw.com -- pro hac vice, John Granville
Crabtree, United Sta, Joseph Pascal Russoniello, Browne George
Ross LLP & Andrew A. August -- aaugust@bgrfirm.com -- Browne
George Ross LLP.

Anthony M. Torres, Donovan Bailey, Dan Scheinkman, Brian Webber,
Matthew Clark, Naquisha Winters & Dominicus Rooijackers,
Plaintiffs, represented by Andrew A. August, Browne George Ross
LLP & John Granville Crabtree, United Sta.

Uber Technologies, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Rasier, LLC, a
Delaware corporation & Rasier-CA, LLC, a Delaware corporation,
Defendants, represented by William Lewis Stern -- wstern@mofo.com
-- Morrison & Foerster LLP, Alexandra Eve Laks -- alaks@mofo.com
-- Morrison and Foerster LLP, Ariel Francisco Ruiz --
aruiz@mofo.com -- Morrison Foerster LLP, Claudia Maria Vetesi --
cvetesi@mofo.com -- Morrison & Foerster LLP & Lucia X. Roibal --
LRoibal@mofo.com -Morrison Foerster LLP.


UNITED HEALTHCARE: Court Amends Case Schedule in Samson TCPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, FRANTZ SAMSON, a Washington resident, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v.
UNITEDHEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC., Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-00175-JLR (W.D. Wash.), Judge James L. Robart of the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Washington has entered a
stipulated order amending the case schedule to extend the current
deadlines to brief class certification and associated discovery
deadlines.

The Plaintiff filed the proposed class action lawsuit in King
County Superior Court on Jan. 9, 2019.  The Defendant filed a
notice of removal on Feb. 5, 2019.  The Plaintiff alleges that the
Defendant violates the Telephone Consumer Protection Act by placing
calls with prerecorded messages to consumers' cellular telephones
without their consent.  The Defendant denies the Plaintiff's
allegations and has asserted various affirmative defenses.

The Court entered a scheduling order on Feb. 20, 2019.  The
Defendant filed its Answer and Affirmative Defenses on March 14,
2019.

On March 28, 2019, the Defendant filed a motion to stay the matter
pending rulings by the FCC on various issues.  The Court denied the
Defendant's motion on May 20, 2019.

The parties filed a Joint Status Report and Discovery Plan on April
10, 2019.  In the Joint Status Report, the Plaintiff proposed a
class certification briefing schedule that extended the class
certification deadlines to allow for expert discovery.  The
Defendant proposed that a case schedule be set after the Court
ruled on its motion to stay.

The Plaintiff served his first Requests for Production and
Interrogatories on May 3, 2019.  The Defendant's responses are due
on June 5, 2019.

After the Court denied the Defendant's motion to stay, the parties
conferred further regarding a proposed case schedule and jointly
request that the Court amends the current case management schedule
and enter the following schedule:

     a. Deadline to join additional parties and amend pleadings -
July 15, 2019

     b. The Plaintiff's disclosure of experts related to class
certification - Sept. 9, 2019

     c. The Defendant's disclosure of experts related to class
certification - Oct. 7, 2019  

     d. The Plaintiff's disclosure of rebuttal experts - Nov. 4,
2019

     e. Deadline to complete expert depositions - Nov. 22, 2019

     f. The Plaintiff's motion for class certification due - Dec.
13, 2019

     g. The Defendant's class certification response due - Jan. 17,
2020

     h. The Plaintiff's class certification reply due - Jan. 31,
2020

Judge Robart finds that good cause exists to change the scheduling
order dates.  The current schedule does not build in time for the
parties to complete ESI discovery and expert work relating to the
claims and defenses.  The parties' proposed schedule provides time
for the parties to conduct fact and expert discovery related to
class certification before class certification is briefed.  The
proposed extensions of time will not unduly delay the prosecution
of the case.  Accordingly, the Judge extended the deadlines
consistent with the schedule described.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 31, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/gzEI6V from Leagle.com.

Frantz Samson, a Washington resident, individually, Plaintiff,
represented by Aarthi Manohar -- amanohar@kohnswift.com -- KOHN
SWIFT & GRAF PC, pro hac vice, Beth E. Terrell --
bterrell@terrellmarshall.com -- TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC,
James A. Francis -- info@consumerlawfirm.com -- FRANCIS & MAILMAN
PC, pro hac vice, Jennifer Rust Murray --
jmurray@terrellmarshall.com -- TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC,
John Soumilas, FRANCIS & MAILMAN PC, pro hac vice, Jonathan Shub
--
jshub@kohnswift.com -- KOHN SWIFT & GRAF PC, pro hac vice, Kevin
Laukaitis -- klaukaitis@kohnswift.com -- KOHN SWIFT & GRAF PC, pro
hac vice & Adrienne McEntee -- amcentee@terrellmarshall.com --
TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC.

UnitedHealthCare Services Inc, Defendant, represented by Nipun
Patel -- Nipun.Patel@hklaw.com -- HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP, pro hac
vice, Paul Bond -- Paul.Bond@hklaw.com -- HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP,
pro
hac vice, Zalika Pierre -- Zalika.Pierre@hklaw.com -- HOLLAND &
KNIGHT, pro hac vice, Kristin Mariko Asai --
Kristin.Asai@hklaw.com
-- HOLLAND & KNIGHT & Shannon Lea Armstrong


UNITED STATES: DOJ Seeks Dismissal of Asylum Seekers' Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Brad Petrishen, writing for Telegram & Gazette, reports that
lawyers for the U.S. Department of Justice were scheduled to be in
Worcester on June 17 to ask a federal judge to dismiss a lawsuit
filed by asylum seekers living in Westboro against government
officials over the forcible border separation practice that roiled
the country last year.

The hearing will span several topics and will be the first court
proceeding in the case, which was filed in September by lawyers
seeking compensation for two Westboro families and thousands of
others across the country.

Nine lawyers from six firms are representing two Guatemalan
families who were separated after illegally crossing the border.
They have asked U.S. District Court Judge Timothy S. Hillman to
certify the lawsuit as a class action, allowing them to sue on
behalf of similarly separated migrants nationwide.

Unlike a similar lawsuit filed against the government in
California, the Worcester lawsuit targets individual government
employees, including former U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions and
former Homeland Security Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen.

"Defendants engaged in this conduct to demonstrate the agony that
parents should expect to experience (should) they dare to enter the
United States without authorization with their children," the
lawsuit alleges.

In the California case, a federal judge ruled it was likely parents
would prevail on a charge that the continued separation violated
the Fifth Amendment.

However, government lawyers in the Worcester case argue that a
Supreme Court case grants immunity to specific government employees
formulating "prosecutorial policies."

The government is also demanding the lawsuit be dismissed on
procedural grounds, arguing that none of the officials live or work
here, making the venue inappropriate.

"Rather than sue the defendants in Washington, D.C., where they are
or were employed, or a state of their residence, plaintiffs here
elected to sue the defendants in a forum in which none of the
defendants has sufficient contacts to make them amenable to
personal jurisdiction," DOJ lawyer Paul Quast wrote in a filing in
May.

Also filed in May was a friend-of-the-court brief in support of the
government by the Immigration Reform Law Institute, the legal
affiliate of a Washington, D.C., organization, the Federation for
American Immigration Reform, which seeks to reduce immigration.

In its eight-page filing, the institute argued that the plaintiffs
had not legally accomplished "entry" into the U.S. since they were
detained by border patrol, and therefore "had not acquired any
constitutional rights of which they could be deprived."

The June 17 hearing was expected to cover not only the government's
motion to dismiss, but also a request from the plaintiffs to add
the U.S. government as a defendant and to allow it to conduct
limited discovery before trial.

Both families filing the lawsuit are referred to only by their
initials. One of the families has the identical story and initials
as a family who spoke to the Telegram & Gazette in June 2018 during
a rally in Westboro against border separations.

Elmer Oliva told the T&G he came to America and his wife and
children followed after three family members were killed in
Guatemala.

His wife pleaded guilty to entering the country illegally and was
sentenced to time served; she was separated from her children for
about five weeks.

The kids, ages 9 and 17, were mistreated in a detention center, the
lawsuit alleges, where conditions were "freezing" and ICE agents
yelled, "Shut up, you trash!" in Spanish when children cried.

The government argues the separations were the result of its "zero
tolerance" approach to illegal immigration.

"Any associated interference with the right to family integrity
alleged here was incidental to such enforcement," Mr. Quast wrote
in court papers.

Lawyers for the plaintiffs argue in court papers that they aren't
challenging the administration's "zero tolerance" policy, but
rather an unconstitutional and inhumane practice of family
separation that they say began before the policy was announced.
[GN]


UNITED STATES: Illegal Aliens File Class Action v. Border Patrol
----------------------------------------------------------------
Beth Baumann, writing for Townhall, reports that the crisis along
America's southern border has continued to exasperate Border Patrol
agents in the field and President Donald Trump, who is attempting
to put an end to the flood of illegal aliens. Seven illegal aliens
from Central American countries are suing the Department of
Homeland Security because of overcrowding in Border Patrol
facilities and the lack of access to legal representation, The
Monitor reported.

The lawsuit was brought about by:

   -- Jairo Alexander Gonzalez Recinos - El Salvador
   -- Gerardo Henrique Herrera Rivera - El Salvador
   -- Kevin Eduardo Rizzo Ruano - Guatemala
   -- Jonathan Fernando Beltran Rizzo - Guatemala
   -- Enerly Melitza Ramos - Guatemala
   -- Karen Vanessa Borjas Zuniga - Honduras
   -- Julia Elizabeth Molina Lopez - Honduras

According to the lawsuit, the illegal aliens want themselves, as
well as others in the facilities, to be released on bond.

"Petitioners were apprehended in mid-May at or near the U.S. Border
with Mexico and subsequently detained. Once apprehended, such
persons are often detained for extended periods of time -- on
information and belief, up to six weeks -- in overcrowded holding
cells, with inadequate food, water, and sanitation facilities,
where attorneys are not allowed to visit. The conditions in these
holding cells are dangerous and inhumane," the lawsuit stated.

The number of illegal aliens flocking to the United States'
southern border has overwhelmed Border Patrol resources. Instead of
seeking asylum, like they have long touted, illegal aliens,
primarily from Central America, now look for a Border Patrol agent,
say they want to see an immigration judge and turn themselves in.
They do this because they know of catch-and-release. They know the
number of people flocking to the southern border has overwhelmed
America's immigration system. Border Patrol agents are having to
leave the actual border to help process those who have simply
walked across the border.

The lawsuit claimed the seven illegal aliens were detained at the
Brownsville, Texas facility for more than five days and, during
that time period, they were treated inhumanely. One of the biggest
issues is the inhumane conditions. Most of the facilities are
short-term processing and holding centers, meaning they don't have
showers, beds or adequate bathroom facilities. The illegal aliens
have now coined the facilities as "hieleras," the Spanish word for
freezers, because the facilities are small, concrete facilities
with metal benches.

The conditions are something that Border Patrol agents have
continually brought up. It was also one of the driving forces
behind the immigration crisis in Murrieta, California back in 2014,
where illegal aliens were being flown in from Texas and dumped at a
short-term drug processing facility.

The lawsuit also stated that detainees were receiving one sandwich
a day and haven't showered during their entire incarceration. Some
have been held as long as 40 days.

"They have been packed into overcrowded facilities and detained for
weeks without adequate food and water, sanitation facilities, or
access to counsel," one lawsuit stated. "Attorneys are not allowed
to visit individuals detained at these facilities, so counsel have
been unable to communicate directly with them, or obtain their
signatures on G-28s, the forms required for counsel to be
recognized as their attorneys by DHS."

The argument being made is that the illegal aliens have failed to
receive basic necessities so they've signed away their rights
without knowing what exactly it is they're signing.

"Some detainees at these facilities have been so deprived of basic
necessities that they have signed documents, the contents of which
they are unaware, (but which most likely waive their rights under
the Immigration and Nationality Act), involuntarily, and without
adequate screening regarding their fears of returning to their
native countries and means of learning about potential lawful means
of avoiding prompt removal," the lawsuit stated. "Class members are
unable to receive visits from legal counsel, are detained without
adequate food, water, sleeping and sanitation facilities, and are
often forced or coerced into signing documents, the contents of
which they may be unaware, but which may relate to their voluntary
departure or removal from the United States."

The attorneys in the case want a federal judge to place an
injunction against Border Patrol. If the judge agrees, the federal
agency would have to release anyone who has been held more than 72
hours, even if they don't have an electronic monitoring device.

What's taking place isn't being done by choice. America's
immigration system is so overwhelmed that ICE and Border Patrol
agents literally have no idea what to do with the people. Every
month the number of detainees gets higher and higher, with record
numbers continually being set and broken. Sadly, this isn't
something that's going to be fixed until Congress gets their act
together and gets serious about closing America's southern border.


It's time for Congress to put their money where their mouth is.
These conditions are spreading communicable diseases. Diseases are
spreading rampant amongst the detainees and it's eventually passed
onto the agents. And guess what happens? They bring home those
exact diseases to their families and their communities. It's why
we're seeing measles outbreaks and other disease outbreaks in
various parts of the country. This is literally a public health
crisis.

Border Patrol agents are doing everything they can to weed out
illegal aliens who are sick but they're not properly trained to
evaluate for communicable diseases, a whistleblower previously told
Townhall. The agents don't have medical training so they're having
to guess which aliens are sick and which ones aren't. Illegal
aliens who are sick slip through the cracks and are being flown and
bussed to other Border Patrol stations throughout the country to be
processed. It's why measles, mumps and chicken pox outbreaks are
becoming more prevalent. The illegal aliens disperse throughout the
United States, agents at other stations get sick, they bring it
home to their families and it spreads.

This post has been updated with additional information. [GN]


UNITED STATES: Veterans' Class Action Over Benefit Delays OK'd
--------------------------------------------------------------
Kevin Penton, writing for Law360, reports that veterans who seek to
appeal the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs' denial of their
benefits claims often fall into a multiyear black hole of
bureaucratic inaction, waiting an average of three years for the
agency to simply move their case forward, let alone rule on it.

A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims sought on June 13 to seal that hole, ordering the VA to
process thousands of outstanding claims within 120 days, the first
time the court has certified a case as a class action. Plaintiffs
James A. Godsey Jr., Jeffery S. Henke, Thomas J. Marshall and
Pamela Whitfield argue the delays violate their and other veterans'
due process rights.

The court put aside promises by the agency that officials are
working to remedy the issue, determining that it needed to take
action on its own to assist veterans who have been waiting for
years to hear whether their cases may proceed to the Board of
Veterans' Appeals.

"The secretary has had many years to act and initiate
pre-certification review of class members' cases, and he has failed
to do so," the court wrote in an unsigned opinion, referring to VA
Secretary Robert Wilkie. "Simply put: The time has come for
judicial intervention."

The four veterans filed the case in November 2017, contending that
they had each been waiting at least three years for the VA to move
forward their appeals of their benefit denials so that the board
could simply hear their arguments, according to the opinion.

Under the VA's system, after a veteran appeals the denial of a
claim, an official referred to as a decision review officer is
tasked with ensuring that everything in a case file is ready to be
"certified" so the board may review it, according to court
documents.

Officers may either certify the case outright or determine that it
needs more information, such as outstanding evidence, before it may
be certified. In 2017, this stage of the process took an average of
773 days, according to the June 13 order.

Once the case has been certified, the officer still has to review
it again, before passing it along. In 2017, this step took an
average of 321 additional days, according to the order. Once the
case makes it past the decision review officer and to the board,
officials there must "screen" it and formally place it on the
docket.

The court held that the case challenging these procedures should
move forward as a class action, using federal civil procedure rules
to determine whether the case qualified. It punted on crafting its
own rules for certifying cases as class actions, holding that the
court had ruled last year that it could use the federal civil
procedure rules in the interim.

Judge Coral W. Pietsch dissented, saying she's "deeply concerned"
with the majority's decision to certify a class without having
clear procedures in place.

"Although the Federal Circuit held that this court has the
authority to certify a class or otherwise aggregate claims, I still
question whether we should exercise that authority," Judge Pietsch
wrote. "In refusing to entertain class actions, the court
previously noted that a class action would be 'highly unmanageable'
and, in the context of appeals, unnecessary given the binding
effect of the court's precedential decisions. I remain convinced
that certifying and managing a class at an appellate court will be
troublesome."

The court majority said that while it would normally grant the VA
"great deference" in how the agency is run, it felt compelled to
issue the order, which it expects will require the VA to reorganize
priorities and resources. The order specifically gives the agency
120 days to either certify cases or "affirmatively initiate any
development or adjudication activities necessary for certification
or resolution."

"Extraordinary circumstances call for extraordinary measures, and
the secretary's longstanding failure to remedy the unreasonable
delays in accomplishing pre-certification review, resulting in
claimants waiting in line for years with no action being taken by
VA, has compelled the court's intervention in this case," the court
said.

VA officials could not be reached for comment on June 14. Should
the government opt to appeal, the Federal Circuit would be the
court to consider the matter.

Other cases had also been vying to be the first certified as a
class action by the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims,
including a case alleging that VA policies limiting emergency
medical care reimbursements to veterans violate the Emergency Care
Fairness Act, a 2010 law that expanded veteran eligibility for
emergency medical care reimbursements at non-VA hospitals.

Attorneys Ranganath Sudarshan -- rsudarshan@cov.com -- Benjamin C.
Block -- bblock@cov.com --
John Niles, Kathryn Cahoy, and Isaac Belfer and Christopher Higby
of Covington & Burling LLP worked on the case, together with Barton
F. Stichman of the National Veterans Legal Services Program.

The government stated during the case that the court's decision
easily would affect thousands of veterans, Cahoy told Law360 on
June 14. Veterans affected will not need to do anything themselves,
as the order requires the government to move on their cases, Block
said.

"We achieved a historic result that's going to work for everybody
in the class," Block said. "It's a great precedent for all
veterans." [GN]


UNIVESCO INC: Shortchanges Workers' Overtime Wages, Jones Suit Says
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Demarret Jones, Individually and on behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff v. UNIVESCO, INC., Defendant, Case No.
4:19-cv-00509 (E.D. Tex., July 11, 2019) is an action under the
Fair Labor Standards Act, for declaratory judgment, monetary
damages, liquidated damages, prejudgment interest and costs,
including reasonable attorneys' fees as a result of Defendants'
failure to pay Plaintiff and all other hourly-paid employees who
lived on-premises lawful overtime compensation for hours in excess
of 40 hours  per week.

Plaintiff worked in excess of 40 hours per week on a regular basis
while working for Defendant as an hourly employee. The Defendant
paid Plaintiff and other hourly-paid employees who lived
on-premises one-and-one-half times their base hourly rate plus
certain bonuses and/or commissions for each hour they worked over
40 in a workweek. However, Defendant did not include rent discounts
given to Plaintiff and the other hourly-paid employees who lived
on-premises in their regular rate of pay when calculating their
overtime rate of pay in violation of the FLSA, says the complaint.

Plaintiff worked for Defendant at Defendant's apartment complexes
known as Prestonwood Hills in Plano and Vista Springs in
Lewisville.

Univesco, Inc., is a domestic, for-profit corporation headquartered
in Plano that operates apartment complexes throughout Texas and
Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Josh Sanford, Esq.
     SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
     One Financial Center
     650 South Shackleford Road, Suite 411
     Little Rock, AR 72211
     Phone: (501) 221-0088
     Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
     Email: josh@sanfordlawfirm.com


VOCUS: Shareholder Class Action Pending in Australia
----------------------------------------------------
Colin Kruger and Lucy Battersby, writing for Sydney Morning Herald,
report that Vocus shares plunged by a record 32 per cent on June
17, 2019, after its latest suitor, AGL, walked away from its $3
billion takeover bid just a week after it became public.

The stock dropped 32 per cent to a low of $2.92 soon after the
market opened from its close of $4.36 on June 14, wiping more than
$880 million from its market value, after AGL announced that it had
ceased due diligence and withdrawn its non-binding, indicative
proposal.

AGL was offering $4.85 a share cash offer and entered into a
four-week exclusive due diligence process amid scrutiny over
whether a deal is likely after three earlier takeover bids were
subsequently withdrawn.

"We are no longer confident that an acquisition of Vocus at the
proposed terms would represent sufficient certainty of creating
value for AGL shareholders," said AGL chief executive Brett Redman
in a statement to the ASX on June 17.

Following the AGL announcement, Vocus reiterated its full year
guidance of underlying earnings before, interest, tax,
depreciations, and amortisation (EBITDA) of between $350 million
and $370 million.

Chief executive Kevin Russell said the company will continue with a
three-year turnaround and has "great confidence that our strategy
and ability to execute our business plan will deliver significant
value to our shareholders in the medium to long term".

"There is growing demand for our strategically valuable network
assets and we have a substantial opportunity for Vocus Networks to
gain market share," he said.

Meanwhile, portfolio manager at Tribeca Investment Partners, Jun
Bei Liu, says AGL's decision to walk away was more due to pressure
on the energy company from its own shareholders, concerned that AGL
would not have the ability or expertise to manage communication
networks.

"It does not look good for Vocus, even though they put out an
announcement reiterating guidance. At the moment there is a lot of
confidence that needs to be re-built," Ms Liu says.

Mr Redman indicated AGL will continue to look at ways of creating
new opportunities with connected customers.

"We believe there will be material opportunities for AGL as energy
and data value streams continue to converge and the traditional
energy sector accelerates its transformation."

The AGL offer came just a week after Swedish private equity firm
EQT ditched a $3.3 billion bid during due diligence.

EQT walked away with sources close to the business saying it was
due to the turnaround strategy not being as far progressed as
expected.

In 2017, offshore private equity firms Affinity and KKR both looked
to buy Vocus for $2.2 billion and walked away during due diligence.
Vocus is facing a class action in relation to overly optimistic
disclosures to shareholders during this period.

AGL shares, which dropped seven per cent to $19.42 the day it
announced its bid for Vocus, were up 2 per cent to $19.98 after the
deal was dropped. [GN]


VOSS INDUSTRIES: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Montanez FAC
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, EVANGELITA MONTANEZ, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated Plaintiff, v. VOSS INDUSTRIES, LLC., ET
AL., Defendant, Case No. 1:18CV1378 (N.D. Ohio), Judge Christopher
A. Boyko of the U.S. District Court for the Nothern District of
Ohio, Eastern Division,  denied Motions to Dismiss, or in the
Alternative, to Strike Class Allegations by Defendants Voss and
Technical Search Consultants, Inc. ("TSC").

According to her First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), the Plaintiff was
employed as a material handler between December 2018 and March 2018
with Voss, a manufacturer of specialized band clamps, V-band
couplings, flanges, ducting components and other fabricated
products.  Defendant TSC is a temporary third-party staffing agency
that supplies employees to Voss.  Plaintiff alleges both Voss and
TSC are joint employers of the Plaintiff and the putative class.

The putative class members include material handlers, engineering
assistants and computer numerically controlled ("CNC") operators.
According to the Plaintiff, both the Defendants had the authority
to hire, fire and discipline her and the putative class members and
maintained employment, time and pay records of the putative class.
She further alleges the Defendants controlled the manner in which
the Plaintiff and the putative class performed their work, the
hours, location and how they performed their work and established
policies and rules to be followed.  The Defendants also controlled
the manner in which the Plaintiff and the putative class were paid
including the rate, method and time they were paid.

The Plaintiff alleges the Defendants failed to pay for work
performed before the scheduled start and stop times and failed to
pay for overtime in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA") and the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act ("OMFWSA").
She brings these claims as a collective action under the FLSA and
as a class action under the OMFWSA.

The Plaintiff asserts her FLSA claims collectively on behalf of
eligible employees defined as all former and current manufacturing
employees of Voss Industries, LLC and/or Technical Search
Consultants Inc. at any and all time between June 18, 2015 and the
present.

The Plaintiff's class action claim is brought on behalf of a class
of Ohio employees defined as all former and current manufacturing
employees of Voss Industries, LLC and/or Technical Search
Consultants Inc. in the State of Ohio at any and all time between
June 18, 2015 and the present.

According to Voss, the FAC should be dismissed because it fails to
allege sufficient facts to render her claims plausible. Should the
Court consider the facts as alleged sufficient to support her
claims, Voss asks the Court to strike the class claims because the
First Amended Complaint allegations do not support class
certification.

Voss contends that the Plaintiff fails to allege facts supporting
her conclusory statement that she was not paid overtime for
pre-shift and post-shift off-the-clock work and fails to allege the
Defendants knew or should have known about the unpaid off-the-clock
work.  They further contend that the Plaintiff fails to assert any
factual allegations supporting her claim that the Defendants had a
policy or practice of requiring employees perform off-the-clock
work and completely fails to assert any facts regarding her own job
duties or those of the putative class.  Lastly, the Defendants ask
the Court to strike the Plaintiff's class claims as the nature of
the claims themselves do not support Fed. R. Civ. P. 23's
commonality, typicality, predominance and superiority requirements.
The FAC fails to assert a common unlawful practice by Defendants
that violates the FLSA and OMEFWSA and applied to the different job
duties of the putative class.  Furthermore, the evidence of damages
will not be common to the class but will instead be highly
individualized.

TSC argues the FAC should be dismissed because the Plaintiff fails
to allege sufficient facts to plausibly show TSC was a joint
employer of Plaintiff and the putative class.  As a temporary
employee staffer, TSC did not control relevant aspects of the
Plaintiff's and the putative class's work.  The Plaintiff's
threadbare allegations are conclusory in nature and cannot support
her allegation that TSC was a joint employer.  None of the consent
forms name TSC as an employer and Plaintiff does not allege TSC had
actual or constructive knowledge that the Plaintiff and the
putative class members were not paid overtime wages.

TSC further contends the above defenses apply equally in favor of
striking the Plaintiff's class claims against TSC.  It further
adopts Voss' arguments for striking the class claims and asserts
that the class claims be stricken for failing to allege that all
members of the putative class were provided to Voss by TSC.

The Plaintiff asserts she provided factual allegations sufficient
to meet the federal pleading standard.  She alleges facts
sufficient to show that she worked more that 40 hours a week and
was not paid for the overtime.  She further alleges Defendants knew
of the hours worked and, per Defendants policy or practices, did
not pay Plaintiff and the putative class the statutorily required
overtime pay.

The Plaintiff further asserts her Complaint alleges facts
supporting class and collective action claims including: that the
Plaintiff and other similarly situated manufacturing employees were
not paid for all hours worked; that the Plaintiff and the putative
class were only paid for work performed between their scheduled
start and stop times; the Plaintiff and the putative class were not
paid for getting tools and equipment, walking to and from assigned
work areas, getting necessary information from the previous shift
and for performing production work.  She further alleges she and
the putative class were not paid at the statutory rate for overtime
hours worked.

Judge Boyko holds that the Plaintiff's FAC alleges facts sufficient
to support her claims.  The Plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts
to support plausible claims under the FLSA and OMFWSA as they
assert the kind of work she and the putative class performed that
went unpaid.  She further asserts the approximate time she
performed these duties each day and the amount of unpaid overtime
she estimates resulted from this unpaid work.

Regardless of the more lenient standard favored by courts within
the Sixth District or the more strict standard applied by some
circuit courts, the Judge holds the Plaintiff's FAC asserts
sufficient facts to satisfy the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard
and allows the Defendants sufficient notice of the claims in order
to defend them; i.e., the Plaintiff's job title, dates worked, the
duties performed for which she was not paid and the approximate
hours per week which she worked overtime without pay per the
Defendants' practices and policies.

TSC's Motion to Dismiss incorporates Voss's arguments but further
contends the Plaintiff's FAC fails to sufficiently alleges facts
supporting her claim that TSC is a joint employer of the Plaintiff.
The Judge finds that each of the Plaintiff's allegations are
factual allegations that can be proven or disproven by evidence
and, if taken as true as the Court is required to interpret them at
this stage of the proceedings, would establish TSC as a joint
employer of the Plaintiff and those similarly situated to her.
However, TSC is not foreclosed from raising these issues after
discovery.

The Defendants move alternatively to strike the class allegations.
The Judge has already determined that the allegations in the FAC
meet the Twombly/Iqbal standard.  Therefore, insofar as the same
arguments are relied on to support striking the class allegations,
they are denied.  He also finds the allegations in the FAC are not
so flawed as to support a motion to strike.  At this stage of the
proceedings, the Judge cannot say that factual development will
fail to cure any alleged defect in the pleadings.  He has found no
such defect and recognizes that factual development into the
policies and practices of the Defendants, along with the facts
regarding the application of such policies or practices across the
spectrum of manufacturing employees, will ultimately determine if
the class suffered a deprivation of their rights under the OMFWSA
to be paid for work performed and for overtime pay.  

In addition, the Judge cannot say at this point that the claims do
not lend themselves to class certification in the absence of
discovery and he cannot hold that the class did not suffer from
such alleged deprivations in pay due to the Defendants' alleged
OMFWSA violating policies or practices which were applied
classwide.  While discovery may result in findings adverse to the
Plaintiff's class allegations, the Judge holds that at this stage
the allegations are sufficient.  Consequently, he denied the
Defendants' Motion to Strike.

Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, Judge Boyko denied the
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss and Motions to Strike.  However, the
Defendants are not foreclosed from raising many of these issues
again after discovery is completed.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 31, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/OsxDO4 from Leagle.com.

Evangelita Montanez, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Chastity L. Christy, Lazzaro
Law Firm, Lori M. Griffin, Lazzaro Law Firm & Anthony J. Lazzaro,
Lazzaro Law Firm.

Voss Industries, LLC, Defendant, represented by Mathew A. Parker --
mparker@fisherphillips.com -- Fisher & Phillips & Steven M.
Loewengart -- sloewengart@fisherphillips.com -- Fisher & Phillips.

Technical Search Consultants, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Komlavi Atsou -- KAtsou@cavitch.com -- Cavitch Familo & Durkin &
Michael C. Cohan -- MCohan@cavitch.com -- Cavitch Familo & Durkin.


WAL-MART ASSOCIATES: $102MM in Damages/Penalties Awarded in Magadia
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RODERICK MAGADIA, Plaintiff, v. WAL-MART ASSOCIATES,
INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 17-CV-00062-LHK (N.D. Cal.),
Judge Lucy H. Koh of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, San Jose Division, awarded the Plaintiffs
$48,046,000 in total Section 226(e) statutory damages, and
$53,901,700 in total PAGA penalties.

Plaintiff Magadia, on behalf of three classes, brings suit against
Defendants Wal-Mart Associates, Inc. and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
regarding alleged violations of California wage and hour laws.
Specifically, the Plaintiffs claim Wal-Mart violated: (1) Cal. Lab.
Code Section 226.7 for failure to pay adequate compensation for
missed meal breaks; (2) Cal. Lab. Code Section 226 for failure to
provide accurate itemized wage statements; (3) Cal. Bus. & Prof.
Code Section 17200 et seq. ("UCL") for engaging in unfair and
unlawful business practices; and (4) Cal. Lab. Code Section2698
("PAGA") because Wal-Mart failed to pay adequate compensation for
missed meal breaks and failed to provide accurate itemized wage
statements. However, the operative claims are claims (1) and (2)
because the UCL merely extends the statute of limitations for claim
(1), and PAGA provides for penalties for underlying violations of
the California Labor Code.

On Jan. 9, 2018, the Court granted the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification.  It certified the following three classes:

    a. Meal Period Regular Rate Class: All current and former
California non-exempt retail store employees of Wal-Mart who
received non-discretionary remuneration, including MYSHARE INCT,
and was paid any meal period premium payments in the same period
that the non-discretionary remuneration was earned, at any time
between Dec. 2, 2012, through the present.

    b. Overtime/INCT Wage Statement Class: All current and former
California non-exempt employees of Wal-Mart who received
OVERTIME/INCT, at any time between Dec. 2, 2015, through the
present.

    c. Final Wage Statement Class: All former non-exempt employees
who worked for Wal-Mart in the State of California and whose
employment terminated (whether voluntarily or involuntarily) at any
time from Dec. 2, 2015 to the present.

The Court also appointed Roderick Magadia as the class
representative.

Wal-Mart moved to decertify the Meal Period Regular Rate Class.
The Court denied Wal-Mart's decertification motion on Nov. 13,
2018.

On Oct. 30, 2017, the Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment
on their claim under PAGA, Cal. Lab. Code Sections 2698-2699.  On
May 11, 2018, the Court granted the Plaintiffs' motion for partial
summary judgment on their PAGA claims.  On June 25, 2018, the Court
denied Wal-Mart's request for leave to file a motion for
reconsideration.

On July 26, 2018, Wal-Mart moved for partial summary judgment on
the Plaintiffs' three remaining claims.  On Sept. 27, 2018, the
Court denied Wal-Mart's motion for partial summary judgment.

The Court held a three-day bench trial in the matter beginning on
Nov. 30, 2018.  The parties filed post-trial briefs on Dec. 7,
2018.  Having considered the evidence and arguments of counsel, the
relevant law, and the record in the case, Judge Koh entered her
findings of fact and conclusions of law.

She decertified the Meal Period Regular Rate Class, and denied
Magadia's individual claim for Wal-Mart's violation of Cal. Lab.
Code Section 226.7.  Nevertheless, the Judge finds that Wal-Mart
violated Cal. Lab. Code Section 226.7 for failure to pay adequate
compensation for missed meal breaks, and awards $70,000 in PAGA
penalties to Wal-Mart employees who had meal exceptions coded in
the EMS system under codes 5 or 12 since Oct. 4, 2015.  Thus, the
total award for the Plaintiffs' Section 226.7 claim is $70,000.

Moreover, the Judge awarded the Plaintiffs statutory damages under
Cal. Lab. Code Section 226(e) to the Overtime/INCT Wage Statement
Class for Wal-Mart's violations of Cal. Lab. Code Section 226(a)(9)
in the amount of $48,046,000.  In addition, she awarded $48,046,000
in PAGA penalties to the Overtime/INCT Wage Statement Class.  Thus,
the total award for the Plaintiffs' Section 226(a)(9) claim is
$96,092,000.

The Plaintiffs did not calculate the damages amount for Wal-Mart's
violations of Section 226(a)(6) (regarding the statement of final
pay claim) occurring after May 11, 2018, and thus did not meet
their burden of proof on damages for the statement of final pay
claim.  Therefore, the Judge did not award Section 226(e) statutory
damages to the Final Wage Statement Class.  However, she awarded
$5,785,700 in PAGA penalties to the Final Wage Statement Class for
Wal-Mart's violations of Section 226(a)(6).

Thus, the Plaintiffs are awarded $48,046,000 in total Section
226(e) statutory damages, and $53,901,700 in total PAGA penalties
for an overall total of $101,947,700.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 31, 2019 Findings is available
at https://is.gd/pAktvx from Leagle.com.

Roderick Magadia, individually and on behalf of all those
similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Dennis Sangwon Hyun --
dhyun@hyunlegal.com -- Hyun Legal APC, Larry W. Lee --
lwlee@diversitylaw.com -- Diversity Law Group, P.C., Nicholas
Rosenthal -- nrosenthal@diversitylaw.com -- Diversity Law Group &
William Lucas Marder -- bill@polarislawgroup.com -- Polaris Law
Group, LLP.

Wal-Mart Associates, Inc., a Delaware corporation & Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendants, represented by
Aaron Thomas Winn -- atwinn@duanemorris.com -- Duane Morris LLP,
pro hac vice & Natalie Frances Hrubos -- NFHrubos@duanemorris.com
-- Duane Morris, LLP, pro hac vice.

Lerna Mays, Miscellaneous, represented by Alan Dale Harris --
law@harrisandruble.com -- Harris & Ruble.


WELLS FARGO: Settles Auto Insurance Lawsuit for $385MM
------------------------------------------------------
Caroline Hudson, writing for Charlotte Business Journal, reports
that Wells Fargo & Co. (NYSE: WFC) has agreed to pay at least $385
million to settle a lawsuit after saddling millions of customers
with auto insurance that they neither needed nor wanted.

The lawsuit, initially filed in a California federal court in 2017,
alleged that Wells Fargo purchased collateral protection insurance
from National General Insurance Co. and then placed that insurance
on borrowers' accounts. Wells Fargo charged interest each month on
the insurance premium before applying payments to a customer's
principal balance. That ensured the bank's CPI charges were covered
first, according to the lawsuit.

National General also paid unearned commissions as kickbacks,
meaning the charges on a borrower's account were more expensive
than necessary, the lawsuit stated.

Wells Fargo and National General combined will pay out at least
$393.5 million, plus attorneys' fees, in the settlement. That
includes: $385 million from Wells Fargo, plus another $1 million
for certain customers; and $7.5 million from National General.

Legal representatives for the affected parties conducted interviews
in Charlotte toward the beginning of the case, according to the
lawsuit.

The dates in question span from Oct. 15, 2005, to Sept. 30, 2016.
Affected parties include Wells Fargo Dealer Services customers with
a CPI policy placed on their account during that time frame, as
well as Wells Fargo Auto Finance customers with a CPI policy that
went into effect between Feb. 2, 2006, and Sept. 1, 2011.

Wells Fargo initially agreed to review its policies starting in
2012 -- a timespan that only covered 570,000 affected customers and
came with a proposed $64 million remediation. But that time frame
was "woefully inadequate," the lawsuit stated.

Epiq Systems Inc. is handling case administration.

There is no need to submit a claim form, as settlement checks will
be automatically mailed to the affected parties. A judge must
approve the settlement before funds are disbursed. A hearing for
preliminary approval is set for July 8.

"Reaching this agreement, which leverages remedies available in our
existing remediation plan, is an important step in making things
right for customers impacted by this issue. We will continue
sending individualized letters to customers that clearly set out
the remediation amount due to them, as well as a check for that
amount. This process will continue until the remediation is
complete," Wells Fargo said in a statement.

This lawsuit is, in part, related to a fake-accounts scandal that
erupted in 2016. Millions of fake accounts were uncovered at Wells
Fargo, having been created without customers' knowledge. Further
investigation showed improper practices across multiple lines of
business at the San Francisco-based bank.

It isn't Wells Fargo's first class-action lawsuit related to the
scandal.

Wells Fargo agreed in December to pay out $575 million to customers
affected by its improper practices in retail sales, CPI, Guaranteed
Asset/Auto Protection and mortgage interest-rate locks.

And, prior to that, Wells Fargo agreed to pay $65 million in a
settlement in October related to cross-selling practices in New
York, as the bank failed to disclose to investors that its success
in cross-selling products was actually driven by fraudulent sales
practices.

The bank then settled a similar lawsuit in San Francisco in May,
agreeing to pay $480 million to investors who purchased stock
between February 2014 and September 2016.

A U.S. District Court judge in northern California approved yet
another $142 million class-action settlement in late May for
victims of Wells Fargo's fake accounts scandal. [GN]



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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