CAR_Public/190719.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Friday, July 19, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 144

                            Headlines

1701 PIZZA: Lira Seeks Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
ACT APPRAISAL: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Lara Suit Says
ALLIANCE SECURITY: Bank et al Suit Transferred to E.D. New York
APOGEE ENTERPRISES: Amended Complaint Filed in Mayer Class Suit
ASSOCIATED HEALTH: Jordan Seeks Unpaid Wages for Employees

AVENUE U DENTAL: Yerushalayim Suit Moved to E.D. New York
BAART PROGRAMS: Martinez Hits Unpaid Premiums, Missed Breaks
BKE ADMIN: Habil Seeks Unpaid Overtime, Damages
BLU PRODUCTS: Martinez Moves to Certify Consumer Class & Subclass
BP EXPLORATION: Court Dismisses L. Parker's Deep Horizon Suit

BUCKEYE PARTNERS: Kent Files Securities Class Action in Del.
BUMBLE TRADING: Court Narrows Claims in N. King Suit
CAMERON REAL: Kelly Sues Over Intrusive Telemarketing Practices
CENTAURI HEALTH: Rafano Sues over Unsolicited Telephone Calls
CHECKERS DRIVE-IN: Settlement in Medgebow Has Prelim Approval

CHEERS SPORTS: Hembach Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Compensation
CONVERGENT OUTSOURCING: Sheean Settlement Has Prelim Approval
D&A SERVICES: Knaak Moves for Class Certification Under Damasco
DENNY'S INC: Court Narrows Claims in L. Rafferty's FLSA Suit
DIGNITY HEALTH: Liu Sues Over Surprise Medical Bill

DOMUS DESIGN: Melvin Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
DR. JAMES HEAPS: Jane Doe Sues Over Sexual Harassment
EAST CAPITOL: $100K Settlement in Kinard Suit Has Final Approval
EDDIE BAUER: Harbers Suit Moved to Western District of Washington
EDWARD D. JONES: Court OKs Securities Fraud Suit Dismissal

ELECTRONIC MERCHANT: Court Denies Objection to Winters Settlement
FCA US: Court Extends Deadlines in A. Moran Suit
FINE HOME: Wallace Seeks Overtime Wages for Salespersons
FORD MOTOR: 3rd Cir. Affirms Coba NJCFA Suit Dismissal
FORD MOTOR: Forman Sues over Inaccurate Fuel Economy Test Rating

GLOBAL EQUITY: Winters Sues over Unsolicited Telephone Calls
GLOBAL MEDIATION: Larmer Sues Over FDCPA Violation
HARBOR FREIGHT: Richardson Suit Moved to S.D. Illinois
HEALTH INSURANCE: Non-Disclosure of Confidential Info Order Issued
HERALD SQUARE: Oropeza Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages

HOME TO COMMUNITY: Wilson Seeks Overtime Pay for Caregivers
INTERNATIONAL CARS: Parker Seeks Overtime pay for Salesmen
JACK IN THE BOX: Faces Desalvo ADA Suit in C.D. California
JACKTHREADS, INC: Faces Traynor Suit in Southern Dist. of New York
KANSAS CITY LIFE: Meek Sues Over Breach of Contract

KARABINIS DINER: Ortiz Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
KIA MOTORS: Russell Sues over Vehicle Warranty Obligations
KINJO INC: Cruz Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
KLARNA, INC: Robinson Sues over Consumer Background Check
LABORATORY CORPORATION: Brown-Wells Sues over Medical Data Breach

LIVE WELL FINANCIAL: Williams Sues Over WARN Act Violations
LONE STAR: Bid for Default Judgment Granted in Part
LYONS DOUGHTY: 3d Cir. Flips G. Gross's FDCPA Suit Dismissal
MDL 2047: USG's Bid for Summary Judgment on Repealer States Denied
MDL 2741: Franklin v. Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated

MDL 2741: Lazenby v. Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated
MDL 2741: Trostel v. Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated
MERCY DRIVE: Faces Crispi Suit in New York Supreme Court
MESSERLI & KRAMER: Class Certification Sought in Konings Suit
MUTUAL SECURITIES: Court Rules No Violation in Milliner Settlement

MYLOCKER.COM: Faces Traynor Suit in Southern District of New York
NATIONAL CREDIT: Court Extends Dispositional Paper Filing in Cortes
NATIONAL VISION: J. Mendoza Suit Remains in N.D. Cal.
NAVIENT CORPORATION: NYGBL Claim in Hyland Suit Can Proceed
NCAA: Goins Sues Over Disregard for Student-Athletes' Safety

NEW YORK: 2nd Cir. Appeal v. Mateo-Sencion Filed in Gulino Suit
NEW YORK: 2nd Cir. Appeal v. Paulau-Robotis Filed in Gulino Suit
NEW YORK: 2nd Cir. Appeal v. Preptit-Nestor Filed in Gulino Suit
NEW YORK: 2nd Circuit Appeal v. Anaya Filed in Gulino Bias Suit
NEW YORK: 2nd Circuit Appeal v. Holland Filed in Gulino Bias Suit

NEW YORK: 2nd Circuit Appeal v. Luna Filed in Gulino Bias Suit
NEW YORK: Appeal v. Rangel Filed in Gulino Discrimination Suit
NEW YORK: Appeal v. Toussaint Filed in Gulino Discrimination Suit
NEW YORK: Board of Educ. Files Appeal v. Knowles in Gulino Suit
NEW YORK: Educ. Board Appeals Judgment v. Mostafa in Gulino Suit

NEW YORK: Educ. Board Appeals Judgment v. Panora in Gulino Suit
NEW YORK: Educ. Board Appeals Judgment v. Pineda in Gulino Suit
NEW YORK: Educ. Board Appeals Judgment v. Seaborn in Gulino Suit
NEW YORK: Educ. Board Files Appeal v. Cabrera in Gulino Suit
NEW YORK: Judgment for Abel in Gulino Suit Appealed to 2nd Cir.

NEW YORK: Judgment for Alves in Gulino Suit Appealed to 2nd Cir.
NEW YORK: Judgment for Cambry in Gulino Suit Appealed to 2nd Cir.
NEW YORK: Judgment for Green in Gulino Suit Appealed to 2nd Cir.
NEW YORK: Judgment for Lewis in Gulino Suit Appealed to 2nd Cir.
NEW YORK: Second Circuit Appeal v. Frias Initiated in Gulino Suit

NEW YORK: Second Circuit Appeal v. Keys Initiated in Gulino Suit
NEW YORK: Second Circuit Appeal v. Neuendorf Filed in Gulino Suit
NII HOLDINGS: Nayman Sues Over False and Misleading Statements
NORTHROP GRUMMAN: Court Issues Protective Order in Baleja
NUESTRO SAGRADO: Underpays Home Care Providers, Valdepena Says

PARAMOUNT EQUITY: Winters Sues over Unsolicited Phone Calls
PENNSYLVANIA STATE: Court Dismisses Public-School Teachers' Suit
PIER 1: Town of Davie Police Pension Plan Class Suit Ongoing
PORTOVINO RESTAURANT: Morelos Sues over Time Shaving Practices
PROGRESSIVE PREFERRED: Court OKs Stay of Martinez Suit

QES PRESSURE: Newsome, Jr. Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
QUEST DIAGNOSTICS: Johnston Sues Over Data Breach
QUEST DIAGNOSTICS: Raben Sues over Data Breach
REFINERY 29 INC: Jones Sues Over Deaf-Inaccessible Website
RITE AID: Bid to Dismiss Josten Suit Underway

RONAK FOODS: Martin Sues Over Unpaid Minimum Wages
SECOND ROUND LP: Grey Sues Over FDCPA Violation
SIXT RENT: A. Ayala Suit Remanded to Calif. Superior Court
SMITHSONIAN: Phillips Sues Over PPPA Violation
SOLAR ENERGY: Lee Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Compensation

SUBARU OF AMERICA: Faces Johnson Suit in C.D. California
SUPERIOR RESTORATION: Rivera Seeks Overtime pay
SWIFT TRANSPORTATION: Court OKs $2.49MM Hedglin Class Settlement
SYNERGY ONE: Raub Sues Over FCRA Violation
TESLA INC: Court OKs $1.059MM Wage & Hour Settlement

THE E.L.M PIE BAR: Lopez Sues Over Unpaid Wages
THE FLIGHT CLUB: John Doe Sues Over Unpaid Compensation
THE UNITED STATES: Lane Sues Over Fifth Amendment Violation
TRIVAGO: Mata Sues Over Unlawful Trafficking
UNITED COLLECTION: Certification of Class Sought in Luna Suit

UNITED COLLECTION: Leifer Sues Over FDCPA Violation
UNITED STATES: 9th Cir. Affirms Denial of Bid to Dismiss Gallion
UNITEDHEALTH GROUP: Marden's Ark Sues Over Unsolicited Calls
USHEALTH GROUP: Ford Sues Over Unsolicited Calls
USI SOLUTIONS: Santos Wants to Certify 2 Nationwide FDCPA Classes

VIGIL VENTURES: Bearce Seek Minimum & OT Wages for Drivers
VISA INC: Class Certification Sought in B & R Supermarket Suit
WAYNE COUNTY, WV: Certification of Class Sought in Hurley Suit
WILMINGTON TRUST: Fink Sues Over ERISA Violation
WISMETTAC ASIAN: Cruz Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Compensation

YOUNIQUE, LLC: Website not Accessible to Blind People, Dawson Says

                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: "Hug of Death" Asbestos Case Wins Payment
ASBESTOS UPDATE: 2 CIRCOR Units Still Face Claims at March 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Ampco-Pittsburgh Has $225.1MM Liability Reserve
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Ampco-Pittsburgh Has 6,959 Claims at March 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Found in Lungs of 50% Thai Population

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Britain's Asbestos Death Toll at Crisis Level
ASBESTOS UPDATE: D/C Lift Stay Issue Remains Pending at March 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Everest Had $242.8MM Loss Reserves at March 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Goins Couple Files Asbestos Suit in St. Louis
ASBESTOS UPDATE: H.B. Fuller Settles 2 Suits, Claims for $162K

ASBESTOS UPDATE: IntriCon Corp. Still Defends Lawsuits at March 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Kaanapali Land Still Defends Suits at March 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Lorry Driver Dies from Mesothelioma
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Maryland Sues Over Building Demolition, Asbestos
ASBESTOS UPDATE: National Surety Can't Recoup Settlement Costs

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Park-Ohio Industries Faces 87 Suits at March 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Pastor Sues Church's Landlord Over Asbestos
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Plan for $850K Asbestos Mine Settlement Released
ASBESTOS UPDATE: ProSight Global Has $4.4MM A&E Losses at Dec. 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Resolute Forest Defends Lawsuits at March 31

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Rexnord Corp. Still Defends Stearns PI Lawsuits
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Sheffield Man Dies of Mesothelioma
ASBESTOS UPDATE: States Sue EPA for Tougher Asbestos Regulation
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Union Raises Concern Over NYC Asbestos Removal
ASBESTOS UPDATE: WR Grace Had $80.7MM Libby Costs at March 31



                            *********

1701 PIZZA: Lira Seeks Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------
EPITACIO LIRA, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. 1701 PIZZA LTD. (D/B/A LUIGI'S PIZZA),
SALVATORE ROMANO, and LUIGI ROMANO, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-05704 (S.D. N.Y., June 18, 2019) is an action on behalf of
Plaintiff, and other similarly situated individuals, for unpaid
minimum and overtime wages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938 ("FLSA"), and for violations of the N.Y. Labor Law (the
"NYLL"), including applicable liquidated damages, interest,
attorneys' fees and costs.

Plaintiff worked for Defendants in excess of 40 hours per week,
without appropriate minimum wage, overtime, and spread of hours
compensation for the hours that he worked. The Defendants
maintained a policy and practice of requiring Plaintiff Lira and
other employees to work in excess of 40 hours per week without
providing the minimum wage and overtime compensation required by
federal and state law and regulations, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Lira was employed as a delivery worker, porter and a food
preparer at the restaurant Defendants' restaurant.

Defendants own, operate, or control an Italian restaurant, located
at 1701 1st Avenue, New York, New York 10128 under the name
"Luigi's Pizza".[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Michael Faillace, Esq.
     MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
     60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
     New York, NY 10165
     Phone: (212) 317-1200
     Facsimile: (212) 317-1620


ACT APPRAISAL: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Lara Suit Says
--------------------------------------------------------
VERONICA LARA, JUANITA IBARRA, ALMA AGUILAR, AND KAREN CARDENAS on
behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated persons,
known and unknown, Plaintiffs, v. ACT APPRAISAL, INC., Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-04210 (N.D. Ill., June 24, 2019) is a collective
action pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), and a
class action in the State of Illinois under the Illinois Minimum
Wage Law ("IMWL"), based upon Defendant's failure to properly or
fully compensate them for hours worked in excess of 40 per
workweek.

Act Appraisal, Inc. schedules mortgage appraisals throughout the
nation. Plaintiffs have worked as appraisal schedulers and/or in
vendor management for Defendants.

As a result of the need for speed in scheduling appraisals, all
Plaintiffs were often required to work in excess of in excess of 40
hours per individual workweek. The Named Plaintiffs during peak
seasons would regularly have to work in excess of 40 hours per
individual workweek. However, the Defendant did not pay the Named
Plaintiffs or any member of the putative FLSA or IMWL Classes any
additional compensation for time that they worked in excess of 40
hours per week. The Defendant knew or should have known about their
obligations to compensate its pay appraisers and vendor managers at
the appropriate overtime rate for hours worked in excess of 40 per
week, says the complaint.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Joseph Selbka, Esq.
     Thomas Hargrove, Esq.
     Pluymert, MacDonald, Hargrove &
      Lee, Ltd.
     2300 Barrington Road, #220
     Hoffman Estates, IL 60169
     Phone: (847) 310-0025

          - and -

     Alejandro Caffarelli, Esq.
     Alexis D. Martin, 6309619
     Caffarelli & Associates Ltd.
     224 S. Michigan Ave., Ste. 300
     Chicago, IL 60604
     Phone: (312) 763-6880


ALLIANCE SECURITY: Bank et al Suit Transferred to E.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------------
The case, Todd C. Bank, Jason Bennett, and Scott Dolemba,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiffs, vs. Alliance Security Inc. and Versatile Marketing
Solutions, Inc. doing business as: VMS Alarms, the Defendants, and
LaVincent Nealy and Catherine Smith, the Objectors, Case No.
1:13-md-02493-JPB (Filed July 23, 2014), was transferred form the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, to
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York
(Brooklyn) on July 10, 2019. The Eastern District of New York Court
Clerk assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-03970-AMD-LB to the proceeding. The
case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Ann M Donnelly. The suit alleges
that Defendants violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of
1991.

Alliance Security manufactures security systems for homes. It
offers door, glassbreak, and image sensors; and motion, smoke, and
CO detectors; panic button; firefighter; smart doorlock; keychain
remote, doorbell, and indoor and outdoor cameras; and energy
products, including smart bulb, smart plug, and smart
thermostat.[BN]

The Plaintiffs appear pro se.

Attorneys for Alliance Security Inc. are:

          John R. Teare, Jr., Esq.
          SPILMAN THOMAS & BATTLE PLLC
          300 Kanawha Blvd E
          P. O. Box 273
          Charleston, WV 25321-0273
          Telephone: (304) 340-3800
          Facsimile: (304) 340-3801
          E-mail: jteare@spilmanlaw.com

Attorneys for Catherine Smith are:

          Courtland Wayne Creekmore, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF COURTLAND CREEKMORE
          4832 N. Fairfax Drive No. 5
          Arlington, VA 22203
          Telephone: (415) 528-8995
          E-mail: courtland.creekmore@gmail.com

               - and -

          Salene Rae Mazur Kraemer, Esq.
          MAZURKRAEMER BUSINESS LAW
          331 Jonquil Place
          Pittsburgh, PA 15228
          Telephone: (412) 427-7075
          Facsimile: (412) 202-0056
          E-mail: salene@mazurkraemer.com

               - and -

          Charles Benjamin Nutley, Esq.
          C. BENJAMIN NUTLEY, ATTORNEY AT LAW
          1055 E. Colorado Blvd., 5th Floor
          Pasadena, CA 91106
          Telephone: (310) 654-3365
          E-mail: nutley@zenlaw.com

               - and -

          John W. Davis, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF JOHN W. DAVIS
          501 W Broadway, Suite 800
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 400-4870
          Facsimile: (619) 342-7170
          E-mail: john@johnwdavis.com

APOGEE ENTERPRISES: Amended Complaint Filed in Mayer Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Apogee Enterprises, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 10, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 1, 2019, that an amended complaint has
been filed in the class action suit initiated by Murray Mayer.

On November 5, 2018, Murray Mayer, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, filed a purported securities class
action lawsuit against the Company and its Chief Executive Officer
and its Chief Financial Officer in the United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota.

On February 26, 2019, the Court appointed as lead plaintiffs the
City of Cape Coral Municipal Firefighters' Retirement Plan and the
City of Cape Coral Municipal Police Officers' Retirement Plan.

On April 26, 2019, the lead plaintiffs filed an amended complaint.
The amended complaint alleges that, during the purported class
period of May 1, 2017 to April 10, 2019, the Company and the named
executive officers made materially false and/or misleading
statements or omissions about the Company's acquisition of EFCO
Corporation on June 12, 2017, and about the Company's Architectural
Glass business segment in violation of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The amended complaint seeks an unspecified amount of damages,
attorney's fees and costs.

Apogee said, "We intend to vigorously defend this matter."

Apogee Enterprises, Inc. designs and develops glass and metal
products and services in the United States, Canada, and Brazil. The
company operates in four segments: Architectural Framing Systems,
Architectural Glass, Architectural Services, and Large-Scale
Optical Technologies (LSO). The company was founded in 1949 and is
headquartered in Minneapolis, Minnesota.


ASSOCIATED HEALTH: Jordan Seeks Unpaid Wages for Employees
----------------------------------------------------------
MICHAEL JORDAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. ASSOCIATED HEALTH PROFESSIONALS, INC.,
a California Corporation, and DOES 1-10, inclusive, Case No.
37-2019-00035374-CU-OE-NC (Cal. Super., July 10, 2019), seeks
monetary relief against Defendants on behalf of himself and all
others similarly to recover, among other things, unpaid meal period
compensation, unpaid rest period compensation, reimbursement for
business expenses, interest, attorney's fees, costs and expenses
and penalties pursuant to California Labor Code.

Jordan brings this class action, pursuant to California Code of
Civil Procedure section 382, on behalf of himself and non-exempt
employees employed, or formerly employed, within the State of
California by Associated Health Professionals, Inc.

The Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have increased their profits
by violating state wage and hour laws by, among other things:

(a) Failing to provide lawful meal periods or compensation in lieu
thereof,

(b) Failing to authorize or permit lawful rest periods or provide
compensation in lieu thereof;

(c) Willfully failing to provide accurate semi-monthly itemized
wage statements; and

(d) Failing to pay all wages due upon separation of employment.

AHP is a staffing agency for health professionals.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Kashif Haque, Esq.
          Samuel A. Wong, Esq.
          Jessica L. Campbell, Esq.
          Samantha A. Smith, Esq
          AEGIS LAW FIRM, PC
          9811 Irvine Center Drive, Suite 100
          Irvine, CA 92618-2902
          Telephone: (949) 379-6250
          Facsimile: (949) 379-6251

AVENUE U DENTAL: Yerushalayim Suit Moved to E.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Dr. Mordechai
Liechtung et al. The case is captioned as Ben-Siyon Ish
Yerushalayim, Raizel Brasch-Yerushalayim, and Abraham Hayyim David
Brasch-Yerushalayim on behalf of all similarly situated patients,
the Plaintiffs, vs. Dr. Mordechai Liechtung; Milana (Dr.
Liechtung's office manager in Avenue U Dental Arts); Bridget (Dr.
Liechtung's office manager in Manhattan Dental Arts); John Doe (not
yet identified accomplices of Dr. Liechtung); Jane Doe (not yet
identified accomplices of Dr. Liechtung); Dr. Tal J. Lebel; Avenue
U Dental Arts, Incorporated; John Doe (a) an attorney representing
Dentist Leichtung in the purported "acquisition" of Dentist Lebel's
Brooklyn dental practice; John Doe (b) an attorney representing
Dentist Tal J. Lebel in the purported "sale" of Dentist Lebel's
Brooklyn dental practice; Mayor Bill De Blasio, as ultimately
responsible for all New York City policies and practices; Joseph
Esposito, NYC Commissioner of Emergency Management, as chief
executive of 911;  Responding Police Officer A; Responding Police
Officer B; EMS Technician Timur chernichkin; and EMS Technician
Vincent Mazzarella, the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-06202-UA
(S.D.N.Y., June 28, 2019).

In a July 8 Order, the Hon. Colleen Mcmahon directed the Clerk of
Court to transfer this action to the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York.  "Whether Plaintiff should be
permitted to proceed further without prepayment of fees is a
determination to be made by the transferee court. A summons shall
not issue from this Court. This order closes this case [in S.D.N.Y.
court].  The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C sec. 1915(a)(3),
that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith,
and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of
an appeal," Judge McMahon said.[BN]

The Plaintiffs appear pro se.

BAART PROGRAMS: Martinez Hits Unpaid Premiums, Missed Breaks
------------------------------------------------------------
LEIDY SILVA MARTINEZ, an individual, and on behalf of herself and
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. BAART PROGRAMS, INC., and
DOES 1-50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 19STCV23533 (Cal. Super.
Ct., Los Angeles Cty., July 8, 2019) is an action seeking
compensation for her unpaid premium pay and interest on unpaid
wages for Defendants' violations of the California Labor Code.

Throughout Ms. Silva-Martinez' employment, BAART did not provide or
allow her to take rest periods or uninterrupted meal breaks to
which she was statutorily-entitled, asserts the complaint. In
particular, Ms. Silva-Martinez was not allowed to take her two ten
minute statutorily-entitled breaks because she had to be ready to
help potential patients. Furthermore, overtime was improperly
calculated and not entirely paid. Notably she worked on Saturdays
and was not paid overtime. There are also numerous other
violations, including improperly itemized wage statements, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff Ms. Silva-Martinez was employed by BAART Programs, Inc.
as a medical assistant from approximately May 30, 2017 until May
14, 2018.

BAART clinics provide methadone maintenance services at locations
in Los Angeles, Fresno, San Francisco, San Mateo, and Contra Costa
counties.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     JOHN L. HOLCOMB, JR., ESQ.
     KRAMER HOLCOMB SHEIK LLP
     1925 Century Park East, Ste. 1180
     Los Angeles, CA 90067
     Phone: (310) 551-0600
     Facsimile: (310) 551-0601
     Email: jholcomb@khslaw.com

          - and -

     Francis J. Flynn, Jr., Esq.
     Law Offices of Francis J. Flynn
     422 S. Curson Ave.,
     Los Angeles, CA 90036
     Phone: (314) 662-2836
     Email: casey@lawofficeflynn.com


BKE ADMIN: Habil Seeks Unpaid Overtime, Damages
-----------------------------------------------
ESTHER HABIL, Individually and on behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff v. BKE ADMIN LLC and BOOKKEEPING EXPRESS
ENTERPRISES, INC., Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00847 (E.D. Va.,
June 25, 2019) seeks to recover unpaid overtime compensation,
damages and other relief relating to violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA").

The Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and those similarly situated
1.5 times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked over 40 in
a workweek, says the complaint. The Defendants knowingly suffered
and permitted Plaintiff and those similarly situated to regularly
work more than 40 hours in workweeks. By doing so, Defendants have
violated the FLSA, the complaint adds.

Plaintiff was a former employee of Defendants as a bookkeeper until
approximately January 2, 2019.

BKE is a Delaware corporation registered to do business in Virginia
as a foreign entity and has been an enterprise engaged in commerce
or in the production of goods or services for commerce.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Robert Powers, Esq.
     Dirk McClanahan, Esq.
     Zach Miller, Esq.
     Andrea Harris, Esq.
     Claudia Lopez-Knapp, Esq.
     MCCLANAHAN POWERS, PLLC
     8133 Leesburg Pike, Suite 130
     Vienna, VA 22182
     Phone: (703) 520-1326
     Facsimile: (703) 828-0205
     Email: aharris@mcplegal.com
            rpowers@mcplegal.com
            dmcclanahan@mcplegal.com
            zmiller@mcplegal.com
            pghale@mcplegal.com
            admin@mcplegal.com


BLU PRODUCTS: Martinez Moves to Certify Consumer Class & Subclass
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit entitled DARREN MARTINEZ AND JOE
MOCNIK, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED
v. BLU PRODUCTS, INC., AND SHANGHAI ADUPS TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD.,
Case No. 2:17-cv-02507-GW-AGR (C.D. Cal.), move the Court for an
order certifying a nationwide class, and a California subclass, of
consumers who purchased one or more cellular phones branded by Blu
Products, Inc. ("BLU") and containing firmware and applications
developed and distributed by Defendant Shanghai Adups Technology
Co., Ltd. ("Adups").

The Plaintiffs also ask the Court to appoint them as class
representatives, and to appoint The Hinton Law Firm and The Rosen
Law Firm, P.A. as class counsel.

The Court will commence a hearing on August 1, 2019, at 8:30 a.m.,
to consider the Motion.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Laurence M. Rosen, Esq.
          THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
          355 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2450
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 785-2610
          Facsimile: (213) 226-4684
          E-mail: lrosen@rosenlegal.com

               - and -

          Christopher S. Hinton, Esq.
          THE HINTON LAW FIRM
          275 Madison Ave., 34th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (646) 723-3377
          Facsimile: (212) 202-3827
          E-mail: chinton@hintonlegal.com


BP EXPLORATION: Court Dismisses L. Parker's Deep Horizon Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana issued an Order and Reasons granting Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment in the case captioned LISA LYNN PARKER, v. BP
EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION INC. ET AL., SECTION I. Civil Action No.
18-9518. (E.D. La.).

U.S. District Judge Carl J. Barbier approved the Deepwater Horizon
Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement (MSA), which
includes a Back-End Litigation Option (BELO) permitting certain
class members who follow procedures outlined in the MSA to sue BP
for later-manifested physical conditions. Individuals who worked as
clean-up workers in response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill are
members of the class covered by the MSA.  

BP does not dispute that Parker was a clean-up worker after the oil
spill and that she is a member of the class covered by the MSA. BP
also does not dispute that Parker's alleged conditions, diagnosed
after April 16, 2012, fit within the MSA's definition of a
later-manifested physical condition.

The Defendants move for summary judgment, however, arguing that
Parker cannot prove legal causation. Specifically, BP argues that
Parker must prove that her alleged conditions were legally caused
by her exposure to substances related to the Deepwater Horizon oil
spill and that she will not be able to meet her burden of proof at
a bench trial before this Court.

Summary judgment is proper when, after reviewing the pleadings, the
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits, the
Court determines that there is no genuine dispute of material fact.
A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its
motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact.

The Plaintiffs in BELO lawsuits, such as this case, do not need to
prove BP's fault, but they do have to prove causation.  

Scientific knowledge of the harmful level of exposure to a
chemical, plus knowledge that the plaintiff was exposed to such
quantities, are minimal facts necessary to sustain the plaintiffs'
burden in a toxic tort case. Expert testimony is thus required to
establish causation.

To date, Parker has not indicated that she has retained an expert
who will testify on her behalf at trial, and she has not disclosed
to BP any expert reports in compliance with this Court's June 19,
2019 deadline. The only evidence before the Court with respect to
Parker's medical condition and that relates to causation is a
report of a medical examination performed by Jyoti Chakraborti, MD
on May 20, 2014.

The Court finds that Dr. Chakraborti's report is not competent
summary judgment evidence. Parker has failed to present a genuine
issue of material fact or present any evidence that would support a
finding that her injuries were caused by her alleged exposure to
oil and dispersants while she worked in response to the spill.

The motion for summary judgment is granted and that all claims
asserted by Parker against BP are dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 8, 2019 Order and
Reasons is available at https://tinyurl.com/y5ehd6mc from
Leagle.com.

Lisa Lynn Parker, Plaintiff, represented by Howard L. Nations,
Nations Law Firm, 4203 Montrose Blvd; Houston, Texas 77006

BP Exploration & Production, Inc. & BP America Production Company,
Defendants, represented by Sean M. Toomey, U. S. Attorney's Office,
Alexander J. Baynham -- ajbaynham@liskow.com -- Liskow & Lewis,
Charles B. Wilmore -- cbwilmore@liskow.com -- Liskow & Lewis, Devin
C. Reid -- dcreid@liskow.com -- Liskow & Lewis, Don Keller Haycraft
-- dkhaycraft@liskow.com -- Liskow & Lewis & Russell Keith Jarrett
-- rkjarrett@liskow.com -- Liskow & Lewis.


BUCKEYE PARTNERS: Kent Files Securities Class Action in Del.
------------------------------------------------------------
MICHAEL KENT, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, v. BUCKEYE PARTNERS, L.P., CLARK C. SMITH,
PIETER BAKKER, BARBARA M. BAUMANN, BARBARA J. DUGANIER, JOSEPH A.
LASALA, JR., MARK C. MCKINLEY, LARRY C. PAYNE, OLIVER G. RICHARD,
III, FRANKS S. SOWINSKI, and MARTIN A. WHITE, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-01128-UNA (D. Del., June 18, 2019) is an action stemming
from a proposed transaction announced on May 10, 2019, pursuant to
which Buckeye Partners, L.P. will be acquired by IFM Global
Infrastructure Fund and its affiliates.

On May 10, 2019, the Board of Directors of Buckeye's general
partner, Buckeye GP LLC (the "General Partner"), caused the
Partnership to enter into an agreement and plan of merger with
Hercules Intermediate Holdings LLC, Hercules Merger Sub LLC,
Buckeye Pipe Line Services Company, and the General Partner.
Pursuant to the terms of the Merger Agreement, Buckeye's
unitholders will receive $41.50 in cash for each Buckeye common
unit they own. On June 7, 2019, defendants filed a proxy statement
(the "Proxy Statement") with the United States Securities and
Exchange Commission in connection with the Proposed Transaction.

According to the complaint, the Proxy Statement omits material
information with respect to the Proposed Transaction, which renders
the Proxy Statement false and misleading. Accordingly, plaintiff
alleges herein that defendants violated Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "1934 Act") in connection
with the Proxy Statement.

Plaintiff is the owner of Buckeye common units.

Buckeye is a master limited partnership that owns and operates a
diversified global network of integrated assets providing midstream
logistic solutions, primarily consisting of the transportation,
storage, processing, and marketing of liquid petroleum
products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Richard A. Maniskas, Esq.
     RM LAW, P.C.
     1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300
     Berwyn, PA 19312
     Phone: (484) 324-6800
     Facsimile: (484) 631-1305
     Email: rm@maniskas.com

          - and -

     Brian D. Long, Esq.
     Gina M. Serra, Esq.
     RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
     300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
     Wilmington, DE 19801
     Phone: (302) 295-5310
     Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
     Email: bdl@rl-legal.com            
            gms@rl-legal.com


BUMBLE TRADING: Court Narrows Claims in N. King Suit
----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting in part and denying in part
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned NICK KING, et
al., Plaintiffs, v. BUMBLE TRADING, INC., et al., Defendants. Case
No.18-cv-06868-NC. (N.D. Cal.).

Before the Court is defendants Bumble Trading, Inc. and Bumble
Holding Ltd.'s motion to dismiss plaintiffs Nick King Jr., Deena
Fischer, and Elena Weinberger's claims under California's Dating
Service Law and related consumer protection statutes.

The Plaintiffs bring a putative class action arising out of
Bumble's alleged business practices. Bumble owns and operates
mobile software applications that offer dating services (Bumble
App). Bumble also offers a premium, paid service through the Bumble
App called Bumble Boost. Fischer and Weinberger requested refunds
following their purchases Fischer because of technical issues with
her account and Weinberger because she no longer wanted the Bumble
App but both were denied. Plaintiffs allege that Bumble does not
notify consumers of their right to cancel their dating service
contracts and instead maintains that all purchases are
non-refundable.

Bumble seeks to enforce the choice of law provision in its Terms
and moves to dismiss the Plaintiffs' California law claims.
Plaintiffs argue that the choice of law provision is unenforceable.
First, they argue, the choice of law provision is ambiguous.
Second, the Plaintiffs contend that their claims fall outside the
scope of the choice of law provision. Finally, the Plaintiffs argue
that the choice of law provision is unenforceable under
California's choice-of-law framework.

Choice of Law

Federal courts sitting in diversity apply the laws of the forum
state when analyzing choice of law provisions. Plaintiffs brought
suit in the Northern District of California, so California law
regarding choice of law provisions applies.

California has a strong public policy favoring enforcement of
choice of law provisions.  
Before proceeding to the Nedlloyd test, however, the Court must
first determine whether the Terms even apply to Plaintiffs' claims.
To that end, Plaintiffs contend that the Terms are ambiguous and
their claims fall outside the ambit of the choice of law
provision.

Ambiguity

The Plaintiffs first argue that the Court should not enforce the
choice of law provision because it is ambiguous and arguably
incorporates California law.  According to the Plaintiffs, the
Terms' repeated references to applicable law throughout the
contract suggests that the choice of law provision is unclear as to
which states' laws actually govern the Terms.

The Court disagrees.

The Plaintiffs rely solely on Sutter Home Winery, Inc. v. Vintage
Selections, Ltd., 971 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1992). In Sutter Homes,
the contract at issue repeatedly invoked applicable law throughout.
However, unlike the Terms here, the use of the phrase applicable
law in Sutter specifically referenced local and state laws and
regulations.  

Throughout the contract, however, the Sutter contract explicitly
incorporated local law. Thus, the Sutter contract's choice of law
provision was at best ambiguous because the contract was internally
inconsistent the parties could not both choose for the exclusive
application of foreign law to their conduct yet also require
compliance with local, applicable law.  

Unlike Sutter, none of the three references to applicable law in
Bumble's Terms allude to local or state laws or regulations. The
Term's use of applicable law do not specify what jurisdiction's
laws apply. Rather, the Terms explicitly direct the parties to
apply New York law. Thus, New York law is the applicable law. In
short, this case is distinguishable from Sutter and Bumble's Terms
unambiguously require the parties to choose New York law.

Scope

Next, the Court must determine whether Plaintiffs' claims fall
within the scope of the choice of law provision. When determining a
choice of law provision's scope, California applies the law of the
state facially designated by the provision. Therefore, the Court
examines the scope of Bumble's provision under New York law.  

New York differs from California in its approach to determining the
scope of a choice-of-law clause. New York construes the scope of
choice of law provisions narrowly. Where California law implies
broad coverage of claims related to a contract, New York law
requires express terms capacious enough to encompass the alleged
claims.  

In particular, New York courts generally find that provisions
broadly stating that a contract is governed by or in accordance
with New York law is insufficient to capture extra-contractual
claims.  

Here, Bumble's choice of law provision encompasses Plaintiffs'
claims. As recounted above, the choice of law provision states:
Your access to the App, Our Content, and any Member Content, as
well as these Terms are governed and interpreted by the laws of the
State of New York.Though the Terms use a variant of the unfavored
governed by phrasing, the Terms expressly include claims related to
access and Content.

Rather, Bumble's terms are more analogous to choice of law
provisions covering all issues. Here, Plaintiffs' claims directly
challenge Bumble's Terms and their access to the App and Content.
Their Dating Service Law claim, for example, seeks to void the
Terms because it does not contain statutorily required language.
And Plaintiffs' UCL and CLRA claims rely in part on alleged
violations of the Renewal Law, which requires subscription services
to contain certain termination and notice provisions. In other
words, the crux of Plaintiffs' claims are purported deficiencies in
Bumble's Terms.

Thus, the additional language included in Bumble's Terms
distinguish them from the narrower provisions cited by Plaintiffs.
As such, the Court finds that the choice of law provision
encompasses Plaintiffs' claims.

Nedlloyd Framework

The Court now proceeds to apply California's choice of law
framework. As explained above, California courts apply a three-part
test set out in Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws Section
187. Nedlloyd, 3 Cal. 4th at 464-67.

Substantial Relationship or Reasonable Basis

Under the first step of the Nedlloyd analysis, Bumble must
demonstrate either a substantial relationship to New York or a
reasonable basis for choosing New York law. The reasonable basis
test is a lower standard than substantial relationship. Even under
the reasonable basis standard, however, the choice of a specific
forum's law cannot simply be arbitrary.

The Bumble App has 40 million or more users spread across multiple
jurisdictions. Given the wide spread of Bumble App users, Bumble,
like the defendants in 1-800-Got Junk and Cayanan, has an interest
in identifying a single body of law to govern its users in
different states. These connections to New York satisfy the lenient
reasonable basis standard.  

Dating Service Law

The Plaintiffs argue that the Dating Service Law represents a
fundamental California policy. The Dating Service Law applies to
dating service contracts and online dating services. The law
requires all such contracts and services to include certain terms
and provide certain notices.

As the party opposing enforcement of a choice of law provision,
Plaintiffs must point to a statute or judicial decision that
clearly states such a strong public policy. Plaintiffs do not do
so. Instead, they rely heavily on the Dating Service Law's
anti-waiver provision. But an anti-waiver provision alone does not
automatically defeat a choice of law clause.  

The Plaintiffs' reliance on Savetsky v. Pre-Paid Legal Servs.,
Inc., No. 14-cv-03514-SC, 2015 WL 4593744, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July
30, 2015) is not persuasive.  

The Dating Service Law does not include such language. Though the
Dating Service Law states that any waiver is void and
unenforceable, it lacks the critical language indicating a
fundamental policy present in Savetsky or Cody. And Plaintiffs have
not presented any legislative statement or case law identifying a
strong public policy.
  
The Plaintiffs also argue that, at a minimum, the anti-waiver
provision requires Bumble to show that enforcing the choice of law
provision would not diminish any substantive right afforded by
California law. And, Plaintiffs argue, Bumble has not done so. But
Plaintiffs skip a step. Before the Court reaches the fundamental
conflict analysis, it must first find that the underlying statute
represents a fundamental policy.

America Online, Inc. v. Superior Court (AOL), 90 Cal.App.4th 1
(2001) is instructive. There, the California Court of Appeals
considered whether a forum selection clause could be enforced when
that clause would preclude the plaintiffs' claims under the CLRA.
The court concluded that the clause could not be enforced because
the defendant had not shown that Virginia's consumer protection
statutes would protect the rights afforded by California law.

As a result, Bumble's choice of law provision applies, and
Plaintiffs cannot state a claim under the Dating Service Law.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Bumble's motion to dismiss
Plaintiffs' Dating Service Law claim without leave to amend. The
Court also GRANTS Bumble's motion to dismiss the UCL and CLRA
claims to the extent those claims rely on alleged violations of the
Dating Service Law without leave to amend.
  
Automatic Renewal Law

The Automatic Renewal Law codifies the California Legislature's
intent to end the practice of ongoing charging of consumer credit
or debit cards or third party payment accounts without the
consumers' explicit consent. Under the Renewal Law, businesses are
prohibited from clearly and conspicuously notifying the customer
that their subscription would be automatically renewed.
  
Bumble argues that the Renewal Law is not a fundamental policy of
California and, therefore, does not apply to its Terms due to the
choice of law provision. Bumble largely rests its argument on the
fact that the Renewal Law does not confer a private right of
action. Although Bumble is correct that the Renewal Law does not
confer a private right of the Renewal Law nonetheless represents a
fundamental public policy.

Courts may factor in whether a statute confers a private right of
action in its fundamental policy analysis. But the presence of a
private right of action alone is not dispositive. In Facebook, the
court found that a choice of law provision selecting California law
would run counter to a fundamental Illinois policy. The court
reasoned that the private right of action conferred by the Illinois
statute indicated that Illinois had a fundamental public policy in
protecting the privacy of its citizens' biometric information.  

New York law also conflicts with the Renewal Law. For example, New
York's version of the Renewal Law does not apply to contracts with
durations of less than one month. Thus, New York law would not
cover King's weekly Bumble Boost subscription. More significantly,
New York law differs substantially in the type of contracts it
governs. New York's version of the Renewal Law limits itself to
contracts for service, maintenance or repair to or for any real or
personal property while California's Renewal Law governs any
contract that includes "recurring charges that will be charged to
the consumer's credit or debit card or payment account with a third
party as part of the automatic renewal plan or arrangement.

Because the Renewal Law represents a fundamental California policy
and conflicts with New York law, the Court must now consider
whether California or New York has a materially greater interest in
this lawsuit.

Whether Plaintiffs Stated a Claim Under the UCL and CLRA

Because the choice of law provision is unenforceable to the extent
Plaintiffs' claims allege violations of the Renewal Law,
Plaintiffs' second and fourth claims under the UCL and CLRA claims
survive if they have stated a plausible violation of the Renewal
Law.  

The UCL prohibits any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business
practice. The UCL] thereby borrows' violations from other laws by
making them independently actionable as unfair competitive
practices.

Here, the only plaintiff alleging violations of the Renewal Law is
Nick King, Jr. King alleged that Bumble failed to describe his
subscription's auto-renewal or cancellation policy when he
purchased the Bumble Boost through the mobile app.   Specifically,
King alleged that the screens and buttons presented to [him] before
his purchase did not state that the Boost subscription would
continue until he cancelled" nor did they describe the cancellation
policy that applied to his purchase. He also alleged that Bumble
failed to obtain his affirmative consent to the terms. Finally,
King alleged that Bumble's confirmation email to him did not
contain the automatic renewal terms, cancellation policy, or other
information on cancellation required under the Renewal Law.  

These allegations sufficiently state a violation of the Renewal Law
and, consequently, a claim under the UCL and CLRA.

The Court DENIES Bumble's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' UCL and
CLRA claims to the extent they rely on alleged violations of
California's Renewal Law.

Money Had and Received

Plaintiffs also bring a common count for money had and received. A
common count is not a specific cause of action, however; rather, it
is a simplified form of pleading normally used to aver the
existence of various forms of monetary indebtedness. Thus, a common
count for money had and received rises and falls with the
underlying equitable claims.  

Here, Plaintiffs' claims under the UCL and CLRA survive to the
extent they rely on alleged violations of the Renewal Law. Thus,
Plaintiffs' common count for money had and received also survives.
Accordingly, the Court denies Bumble's motion to dismiss
Plaintiffs' common count for money had and received to the extent
it relies on alleged violations of the Renewal Law.

The Court grants Bumble's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' Dating
Service Law claim without leave to amend. The Court also GRANTS the
motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' UCL and CLRA claim without leave to
amend to the extent they rely on alleged violations of the Dating
Service Law, but denies the motion to dismiss the UCL and CLRA
claims to the extent they rely on alleged violations of the Renewal
Law. The Court also denies Bumble's motion to dismiss the common
count for money had and received. Bumble must file its answer
within 14 days of this order.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 8, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y5lwfgs4 from Leagle.com.

Nick King, Jr., Deena Fischer & Elena Weinberger, Plaintiffs,
represented by Grace E. Parasmo -- gparasmo@parasmoliebermanlaw.com
-- Parasmo Lieberman Law, David Christopher Parisi --
dcparisi@parisihavens.com -- Parisi & Havens LLP, Suzanne Havens
Beckman -- shavens@parisihavens.com -- Parisi & Havens LLP &
Yitzchak Hillel Lieberman, Parasmo Lieberman Law, 7400 Hollywood
Blvd Apt 505, Los Angeles, CA 90046.

Bumble Trading, Inc. & Bumble Holding, Ltd., Defendants,
represented by Michael Graham Rhodes -- mrhodes@cooley.com --
Cooley LLP, Kelsey R. Spector, Kyle Christopher Wong --
kwong@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP & Max Bernstein, Esq., Cooley LLP.


CAMERON REAL: Kelly Sues Over Intrusive Telemarketing Practices
---------------------------------------------------------------
SHANE KELLY on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. CAMERON REAL ESTATE GROUP, INC. Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-11398 (D. Mass., June 24, 2019) is an action to enforce the
consumer-privacy provisions of the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act ("TCPA"), a federal statute enacted in 1991 in response to
widespread public outrage about the proliferation of intrusive,
nuisance telemarketing practices.

The Defendant sent automated calls to cellular telephone numbers
and to some individuals despite their presence on the National Do
Not Call Registry, which is prohibited by the TCPA. The Plaintiff
never consented to receive the calls, which were placed to him for
telemarketing purposes. Because telemarketing campaigns generally
place calls to hundreds of thousands or even millions of potential
customers en masse, the Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of a
proposed nationwide class of other persons who received illegal
telemarketing calls from or on behalf of Defendant, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff Shane Kelly is a Massachusetts resident located in this
District.

Defendant is in the business of selling residential real
estate.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Anthony I. Paronich, Esq.
     Paronich Law, P.C.
     350 Lincoln Street, Suite 2400
     Hingham, MA 02043
     Phone: (508) 221-1510
     Email: anthony@paronichlaw.com

          - and -

     Alex M. Washkowitz, Esq.
     Jeremy Cohen, Esq.
     CW Law Group, P.C.
     188 Oaks Road
     Framingham, MA 01701
     Email: alex@cwlawgrouppc.com


CENTAURI HEALTH: Rafano Sues over Unsolicited Telephone Calls
-------------------------------------------------------------
DEBRA RAFANO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. CENTAURI HEALTH SOLUTIONS INC., a
Delaware registered corporation, the efendant, Case No.
8:19-cv-01667 (M.D. Fla., July 10, 2019), contends that the
Defendant promotes and markets its merchandise, in part, by sending
unsolicited telephone calls to phone users, in violation of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

The Plaintiff files this lawsuit seeking injunctive relief to
require Defendant to stop making prerecorded voice sales calls to
consumers without their consent, as well as an award of statutory
damages to the members of the Class and costs.

Centauri is a healthcare company that assists consumers with
obtaining government subsidized healthcare benefits in return for a
fee.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and the putative Class are:

          Stefan Coleman, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF STEFAN COLEMAN, P.A.
          201 S. Biscayne Blvd, 28 th Floor
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (877) 333-9427
          Facsimile: (888) 498-8946
          E-mail: law@stefancoleman.com

               - and -

          Avi R. Kaufman, Esq.
          KAUFMAN P.A.
          400 NW 26th Street
          Miami, FL 33127
          Telephone: (305) 469-5881
          E-mail: kaufman@kaufmanpa.com

CHECKERS DRIVE-IN: Settlement in Medgebow Has Prelim Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOEL MEDGEBOW, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CHECKERS DRIVE-IN
RESTAURANCTS, INC., Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-80090-BLOOM/Reinhart
(S.D. Fla.), Judge Beth Bloom of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Florida granted the Plaintiff's Unopposed
Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement.

The cause is before the Court upon the Plaintiff's Motion, filed on
May 22, 2019.  Judge Bloom has carefully reviewed the Motion and
attachments, the record in the case and the applicable law, and is
otherwise fully advised.  She finds, for settlement purposes only,
conditioned upon final certification of the proposed class and upon
Final Judgment, that the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 factors
are present and that certification of the proposed Settlement Class
is appropriate under Rule 23.

She therefore preliminarily certified the class of all persons in
the United States (i) identified in the Settlement Class List (ii)
who between Jan. 28, 2018 and the date of preliminary approval,
attempted to unsubscribe from receiving text messages from
Checkers' short code 88001, by texting stop, cancel, unsubscribe,
end, quit, optout, opt out, remove, cancelar, arret, or arrette (or
any variation thereof) and were subsequently sent text message
advertisements or promotions from Checkers to their cellular
telephone and did not re-subscribe to receive text messages.

For settlement purposes only, the Judge preliminarily appointed
Plaintiff Joel Medgebow as the Class Representative, and the
following persons and firms as the Class Counsel for the Settlement
Class: Seth M. Lehrman, Esq. EDWARDS POTTINGER, LLC 425 North
Andrews Avenue, Suite 2 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 Joshua H.
Eggnatz, Esq. Michael J. Pascucci, Esq. EGGNATZ | PASCUCCI 7450
Griffin Road, Suite 230 Davie, FL 33314.

The Judge preliminarily approved the Settlement, together with all
exhibits thereto, as fair, reasonable and adequate.  She finds that
the Settlement was reached in the absence of collusion, is the
product of informed, good-faith, arm's-length negotiations between
the Parties and their capable and experienced counsel.

Upon entry of the Order, the Judge approved Kurtzman Carson
Consultants, LLC as the designated Settlement Administrator.

The Settlement Class Notice Program will be effectuated as
follows:

     a. Within 10 days of the entry of the Order, the Parties will
provide to the Settlement Administrator the Settlement Class List
with sufficient records identifying the telephone numbers of the
Persons to which the text messages were sent by or on behalf of
Checkers.  The Settlement Administrator will use these telephone
numbers to determine the mailing addresses for the Settlement Class
Members.

     b. No later than 42 Days after the entry of the Order, the
Settlement Administrator will mail (and e-mail where applicable)
the Mail Notice to all such members of the Settlement Class whose
addresses were derived as part of the process described and in
accordance with the Agreement.

     c. The Settlement Administrator will maintain the Settlement
Website in accordance with the Agreement.

     d. The Settlement Administrator will file proof of compliance
with the Settlement Class Notice Program at or before the Fairness
Hearing.

The form and content of the Class Notice are fair, reasonable, and
adequate, and Class Notice will be disseminated to the Settlement
Class in accordance with the Agreement and as due process and Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require.  No later than
ten 10 days before the Fairness Hearing, the Settlement
Administrator will file a declaration with the Court attesting to
the: (a) completion of the Settlement Class Notice Program; and (b)
number of valid claims, opt-outs, and objections.

Judge Bloom adopted the Claim Deadline and approved the Claim Form.
Any member of the Settlement Class who wishes to receive benefits
under the Agreement must sign and return a complete and timely
Claim Form no later than 35 days after dissemination of the Mail
Notice.

Any member of the Settlement Class who wishes to opt-out or exclude
himself or herself from the Settlement Class must submit an
appropriate, timely request for exclusion sent to the Settlement
Administrator at the address on the Class Notice and to be
postmarked no later than 35 days after dissemination of the Mail
Notice.

The Fairness Hearing is set for Sept. 17, 2019 at 9:30 a.m. in the
Wilkie D. Ferguson, Jr. United States Courthouse, 400 North Miami
Avenue, Courtroom 10-2, Miami, Florida 33128.  Papers in support of
the final approval of the Settlement, including responses to
objections, will be filed with the Court no later than 60 days
after the Class Notice Date.

An application of the Class Counsel for an award of fees and
expenses and the Class Representatives Service Award will be filed
with the Court no later than 14 days prior to the Objection
Deadline.

The Defendant will file proof of compliance with the notice
requirements of The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 no later than
seven days before the Fairness Hearing.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 28, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/ygwIxr from Leagle.com.

Joel Medgebow, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Michael James Pascucci --
MPascucci@JusticeEarned.com -- Eggnatz Pascucci, P.A., Seth Michael
Lehrman -- seth@epllc.com -- Edwards Pottinger, LLC & Joshua Harris
Eggnatz -- JEggnatz@JusticeEarned.com -- Eggnatz Pascucci, P.A.

Checkers Drive-In Restaurants Inc, Defendant, represented by
Anthony Peter Strasius -- anthony.strasius@wilsonelser.com --
Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker & David S. Almeida --
dalmeida@beneschlaw.com -- Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff,
LLP, pro hac vice.


CHEERS SPORTS: Hembach Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Compensation
-------------------------------------------------------------
SCOTT HEMBACH, individually situated and on behalf of similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. CHEERS SPORTS, INC., Dennis
Petrella, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00850 (E.D. Va., June 25,
2019) is an action for unpaid overtime compensation brought
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (the "FLSA").

During his tenure as an employee for Defendants, Mr. Hembach
routinely worked well over forty hours each workweek and did not
fall under any exemption under the FLSA. Prior to 2014, Defendants
directed Mr. Hembach and other similarly situated non-exempt sales
representatives (the "FLSA Class") to keep track of their hours,
and Defendants paid them additional compensation for such overtime
hours. However, in 2014, Defendants stopped compensating Mr.
Hembach and the FLSA Class for their overtime hours despite the
fact that their duties did not appreciably change. The failure to
pay Mr. Hembach and the FLSA Class at one-and one half times her
regular rate for hours over forty in a workweek is a plain, simple
violation of the FLSA, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Scott Hembach was employed Defendants as a sales
Representative from July 1, 2004 to November 16, 2018.

Cheers operates as a business providing certain sporting goods and
merchandise to individuals and institutions in Northern
Virginia.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     C. Thomas Brown, Esq.
     Erik B. Lawson, Esq.
     SILVER & BROWN
     10621 Jones Street, Suite 101
     Fairfax, Virginia 22030
     Phone: (703) 591-6666
     Facsimile: (703) 591-5618
     Email: tom@virginia-lawyers.net
            erik@virginia-lawyers.net



CONVERGENT OUTSOURCING: Sheean Settlement Has Prelim Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan issued an Order granting Settlement Agreement Preliminary
Approval in the case captioned Michael Sheean, on behalf of himself
and others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Convergent
Outsourcing, Inc., Defendant. Case No. 2:18-cv-11532-GCS-RSW. (E.D.
Mich.).

This Court conditionally certifies this case as a class action
under to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on
behalf of the following settlement classes:

     TCPA Class: All persons throughout the United States (1) to
whom Convergent Outsourcing, Inc. placed, or caused to be placed, a
call  (2) by using an automatic telephone dialing system or an
artificial or prerecorded voice (3) from November 11, 2016 through
February 25, 2019, (4) either (i) directed to a number assigned to
a cellular telephone service, but not assigned to the intended
recipient of Convergent Outsourcing, Inc.'s calls, or (ii) directed
to a number assigned to a cellular telephone service, to which
Convergent Outsourcing, Inc. was previously instructed to stop
placing calls or informed that the number was a wrong number.

     FDCPA Class: All persons throughout the United States (1) to
whom Convergent Outsourcing, Inc. placed, or caused to be placed, a
call (2) from May 15, 2017 through February 25, 2019, (3) and in
connection with the collection of a consumer debt (4) after
Convergent Outsourcing, Inc. was instructed to stop placing calls
to his or her telephone number or informed that the number was a
wrong number.

The Defendant identified a total of 349,744 TCPA settlement class
members and 571 FDCPA settlement class members.

This Court appoints Michael Sheean as the representative for the
settlement classes, and appoints Aaron D. Radbil, Michael L.
Greenwald, and James L. Davidson, of Greenwald Davidson Radbil
PLLC, as class counsel.

This Court preliminarily finds, for settlement purposes only, that
this action satisfies the applicable prerequisites for class action
treatment under Rule 23, namely:

   A. The settlement class members are so numerous and
geographically dispersed that joinder of all of them is
impracticable;

   B. There are questions of law and fact common to the settlement
class members, which predominate over any individual questions;

   C. Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the
settlement class members;

   D. Plaintiff and class counsel have fairly and adequately
represented and protected the interests of all of the settlement
class members; and

   E. Class treatment of these claims will be efficient and
manageable, thereby achieving an appreciable measure of judicial
economy, and a class action is superior to other available methods
for a fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy.

This Court preliminarily finds that the settlement of the Lawsuit,
on the terms and conditions set forth in the Agreement, is in all
respects fundamentally fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the best
interest of the settlement class members, especially in light of
the benefits to the settlement class members, the strength of
Plaintiff's case, the complexity, expense, and probable duration of
further litigation, the amount of discovery engaged in by the
parties, the risk and delay inherent in possible appeals, and, the
opinions of class counsel.  

This Court also considered the following factors in preliminarily
finding that the settlement of this action, on the terms and
conditions set forth in the Agreement, is in all respects
fundamentally fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the best interest
of the settlement class members:

Approval of the Proposal. If the proposal would bind class members,
the court may approve it only after a hearing and only on finding
that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate after considering
whether: (A) the class representatives and class counsel have
adequately represented the class (B) the proposal was negotiated at
arm's length;(C) the relief provided for the class is adequate,
taking into account: (i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and
appeal (ii) the effectiveness of any proposed method of
distributing relief to the class, including the method of
processing class-member claims (iii) the terms of any proposed
award of attorney's fees, including timing of payment  and(iv) any
agreement required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3)  and(D) the
proposal treats class members equitably relative to each other.

This Court approves the form and substance of the proposed notices
of the class action settlement, which includes respective postcard
notices, respective detachable claim forms, and respective
question-and-answer notices to appear on the respective dedicated
websites.

The proposed notices and method for notifying the settlement class
members of the settlement and its terms and conditions meet the
requirements of Rule 23(c)(2)(B) and due process, constitute the
best notice practicable under the circumstances, and constitute due
and sufficient notice to all persons and entities entitled to the
notice.
  
This Court additionally finds that the proposed notices are clearly
designed to advise the settlement class members of their rights.

If this Court grants final approval of the settlement, the
settlement administrator will mail a settlement check to each
settlement class member who submits a valid, timely claim.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 8, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y4pjxl6e from Leagle.com.

Michael Sheean, Plaintiff, represented by Alexander D. Kruzyk --
akruzyk@gdrlawfirm.com -- Greenwald Davidson Radbil PLLC, Andrew L.
Campbell -- andrew.campbell@FaegreBD.com -- Michael L. Greenwald --
mgreenwald@gdrlawfirm.com -- Greenwald Davidson Radbil PLLC & Aaron
David Radbil -- aradbil@gdrlawfirm.com -- Greenwald Davidson Radbil
PLLC.

Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., Defendant, represented by Bethany S.
Sweeny, Varnum LLP, Charity A. Olson, Varnum LLP, 333 Bridge St NW
#1700, Grand Rapids, MI 49501, Nabil G. Foster --
nfoster@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw & Culberston, LLP & Randall J.
Groendyk, Varnum, Riddering, 333 Bridge St NW #1700, Grand Rapids,
MI 49501.


D&A SERVICES: Knaak Moves for Class Certification Under Damasco
---------------------------------------------------------------
Richard Knaak moves the Court to certify the class described in the
complaint of the lawsuit entitled RICHARD KNAAK, Individually and
on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. D&A SERVICES, LLC,
and JH PORTFOLIO DEBT EQUITIES, LLC, Case No. 2:19-cv-00978-DEJ
(E.D. Wisc.), and further asks that the Court both stay the motion
for class certification and to grant the Plaintiff (and the
Defendant) relief from the Local Rules setting automatic briefing
schedules and requiring briefs and supporting material to be filed
with the Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff avers.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


DENNY'S INC: Court Narrows Claims in L. Rafferty's FLSA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio,
Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting in
part and denying in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the case
captioned LINDSAY RAFFERTY, on behalf of herself and all other
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. DENNY'S, INC., Defendant. Case
No. 5:18-cv-2409. (N.D. Ohio).

Rafferty alleges that, from February 2012 until the present, she
has been employed by Denny's as a server at its restaurant located
at 2943 S. Arlington Road, Akron, Ohio 44312. She has been paid by
Denny's as a tipped employee under the FLSA, performing various
tipped and nontipped duties, including, but not limited to, serving
drinks and food to customers, cleaning, busing tables, washing
dishes, and other side work.Rafferty alleges, on behalf of the
collective members, that Denny's violates the FLSA by paying
servers sub-minimum, tip-credit wages without informing them of the
tip-credit provisions of the FLSA.

Denny's has filed a motion to dismiss. It seeks dismissal for lack
of personal jurisdiction of the FLSA claims of any putative
collective members not arising from employment by Denny's in Ohio.
It also seeks dismissal of Counts Two and Three of the complaint
for failure to state a claim.  

Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (Claims of Nonresidents Arising Out
of non-Ohio Employment)

A plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the existence of
personal jurisdiction. Where the Court makes a dismissal
determination based on the pleadings and any supporting affidavits,
without an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a
prima facie showing of jurisdiction. The Court must construe the
allegations in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Where a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction over a case
stems from the existence of a federal question, personal
jurisdiction over a defendant exists if the defendant is amenable
to service of process under the forum state's long-arm statute and
if the exercise of personal jurisdiction would not deny the
defendant due process.

Due Process

There are two types of personal jurisdiction under the Due Process
Clause, general and specific jurisdiction, either one of which is
adequate to confer jurisdiction.

General jurisdiction exists over a foreign corporation when its
contacts with the forum state are so continuous and systematic as
to render it essentially at home in the forum state. If a court has
general jurisdiction over a defendant, it can adjudicate any claims
involving that defendant, regardless of where the cause of action
arose.

This Court does not have general jurisdiction over Denny's because
it is incorporated in Florida and has its headquarters in South
Carolina. Its mere conducting of business at four (4) restaurants
in Ohio, where it employs 175 people and generates a little under
2% of its annual revenues, does not confer general jurisdiction
because that does not amount to operations that are so substantial
and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in this
State.

Specific jurisdiction refers to jurisdiction over claims arising
from or related to a defendant's contacts with the forum state.
This test provides:

First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the
privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in
the forum state. Second, the cause of action must arise from the
defendant's activities there. Finally, the acts of the defendant or
consequences caused by the defendant must have a substantial enough
connection with the forum state to make the exercise of
jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable.

Denny's does not challenge this Court's exercise of personal
jurisdiction with respect to the claims of putative collective
members who work in its Ohio restaurants, admitting that this Court
has specific jurisdiction over Denny's with respect to those
claims. The challenge is directed solely to the claims of the
non-Ohio putative collective members. Denny's points out that
personal jurisdiction must be proper as to each claim. Denny's
urges this Court to follow Maclin, wherein another judge of this
court applied Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal.,
U.S, 137 S.Ct. 1773, 198 L. Ed. 2d 395 (2017), to FLSA collective
actions, and held that the court could not exercise personal
jurisdiction over FLSA claims of nonresident claimants against a
nonresident defendant where the claims had no connection to the
State of Ohio.  

This Court concludes that Denny's position with respect to personal
jurisdiction is correct. As noted by the Court in Bristol-Myers,
restrictions on personal jurisdiction are more than a guarantee of
immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a
consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the
respective States.

The Court concludes that exercising personal jurisdiction over
Denny's for claims of any out-of-state putative collective member
would violate due process.

Ohio's Long-Arm Statute

Because the Court has already determined that, under the Due
Process Clause, it may not exercise personal jurisdiction over
Denny's, it need not examine whether Denny's is amenable to service
of process under Ohio's long-arm statute. Even so, it is apparent
that, under the statute, the Court may entertain claims against an
out-of-state defendant for only a cause of action arising from acts
enumerated this section. All of the enumerated acts require some
connection to the state of Ohio.

The claims of any putative collective member arising out of
employment at restaurants operated by Denny's outside Ohio have no
connection to Ohio.

In conclusion, due to the absence of personal jurisdiction, Denny's
is entitled to dismissal without prejudice of any FLSA claim that
arises out of employment at restaurants operated by Denny's outside
Ohio. To that extent, defendant's motion to dismiss  is granted.

Failure to State a Claim (Counts Two and Three)

Denny's also moves, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), to dismiss two
of the three counts in the complaint for failure to state a claim.
A complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Although this
pleading standard does not require great detail, the factual
allegations in the complaint "must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level.

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face. When there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to
relief." Id. at 679. "The court need not, however, accept
unwarranted factual inferences.

In Count Two. the unrelated nontipped labor claim, which
incorporates by reference the other allegations in the complaint,
Rafferty alleges that Denny's has failed to comply with the FLSA
and with relevant regulations and sections of the Department of
Labor (DOL) Field Operations Handbook, by requiring plaintiff and
the collective [m]embers in a given workweek, and during each and
every workweek they were employed by Denny's, to perform non-tipped
labor unrelated to their tipped occupation over the course of their
regular workweek, while paying them at the tip credit rate.
Plaintiff alleges that Denny's acted willfully to violate the FLSA.


In Count Three, the related nontipped labor claim, which also
incorporates by reference the other allegations of the complaint,
Rafferty alleges that Denny's has failed to comply with the FLSA
and with relevant regulations and sections of the DOL Field
Operations Handbook, by requiring plaintiff and the collective
members in a given workweek, and during each and every workweek
[they] were employed by Denny's, to perform non-tipped labor
related to their tipped occupation in excess of twenty percent
(20%) of their regular workweek, while paying them at the tip
credit rate.

In a supplement to her opposition brief, Rafferty supplies a recent
opinion of another judge of this court that rejected the same
argument presented here by Denny's. In Calloway v. DenOne, LLC,
Case No. 1:18-cv-1981, denying judgment on the pleadings, Judge
James S. Gwin, although agreeing that the relevant regulations are
ambiguous, which ordinarily requires that the court give
controlling weight to the DOL's interpretation of the regulation
found that he need not defer because, for reasons he set forth in
some detail, there are significant signs that the new letter does
not `reflect the agency's fair and considered judgment on the
matter in question.

The Court is not inclined to weigh in on the merits of this
argument between the parties at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
Applying the proper standard, it cannot be said that the complaint
is insufficient to give Denny's fair notice of what the claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests.Nor can it be said that the
complaint fails to raise plaintiff's right to relief above the
speculative level.In fact, the briefing on the motion to dismiss
has sharply revealed the contours of the parties' dispute. These
arguments would be more appropriately raised on summary judgment
and neither party is precluded from doing so.

Accordingly, the Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted in part
and denied in part. The motion is granted to the extent it seeks to
limit the claims to those that can be raised by plaintiff and if a
collective is certified similarly situated employees, employed at
restaurants operated by Denny's in Ohio. The motion is denied to
the extent it seeks to dismiss Counts Two and Three.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 8, 2019 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y22tolkn from
Leagle.com.

Lindsay Rafferty, on behalf of herself and all other persons
similarly situated, known and unknown, Plaintiff, represented by
Christopher J. Bendau -- chris@bendaulaw.com -- Bendau & Bendau,
Clifford P. Bendau, II -- cliffordbendau@bendaulaw.com -- Bendau &
Bendau & James L. Simon -- jamessimon@clevelanddivorce.net -- Law
Offices of Simon & Simon.   

Denny's, Inc., Defendant, represented by Darren W. Ford --
dford@graydon.law -- Graydon, Head & Ritchey, Michael A. Roberts --
mroberts@graydon.law -- Graydon, Head & Ritchey & R. Kenneth
Wellington, II -- kwellington@graydon.law -- Graydon, Head &
Ritchey.


DIGNITY HEALTH: Liu Sues Over Surprise Medical Bill
---------------------------------------------------
KANA LIU, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. DIGNITY HEALTH, VEP HEALTHCARE, INC., and
RIDGELINE EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS MEDICAL GROUP, INC., Defendants,
Case No. 19STCV21296 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty., June 18,
2019) is a class action on behalf of all persons residing in the
State of California who received emergency or urgent medical
services from out of-network medical service providers staffed by
Ridgeline at the Dignity Northridge Emergency Department and
received a surprise medical bill for an amount beyond the
reasonable fair market value rates for the services rendered.

Patients across the country are being ambushed by "surprise
billing," which occurs when patients go to a hospital or emergency
department that is "in-network" with their health insurance
carrier, only to find out weeks or months later that the doctors
that treated them are "out-of-network" and their services are not
covered by the patient's insurance. Disturbingly, surprise billing
is especially common in emergency rooms, where patients must act
quickly under stress. A physician group that contracts with an
in-network hospital behaves egregiously when it does not disclose
its independent status and the fact that the contracted group does
not take the same insurance as the hospital, and when it does not
make information about what insurance is accepted reasonably
available. The problem is compounded when the group then sends
surprise bills for charges in excess of the fair market value of
the services provided. Defendants perpetuate this problem.

Plaintiff received emergency medical services from Dignity
Northridge's Emergency Department in October 2018, where she was
attended to by a Ridgeline Emergency Physician's Medical Group
physician staffed by VEP Healthcare. Plaintiff Liu knew that the
facility was in network to her insurance plan because she had
previously visited other departments in the hospital— including
to give birth to her child—and had never received a balance bill
from an out-of-network physician. She was unaware, however, nor was
it disclosed to her that the Emergency Department's physicians were
not hospital employees and were out-of-network providers. Plaintiff
Liu also had no way to reasonably ascertain this information on her
own in advance of receiving her medical bill after services were
rendered. A little over a month after her visit, Plaintiff Liu was
surprised to receive an out-of network bill from Ridgeline in the
amount of $620.84. Prior to receiving this bill, Plaintiff Liu was
never informed that the Dignity Northridge Emergency Department
physicians she saw were not Dignity Northridge physicians and did
not accept her insurance. Even at that time, Plaintiff Liu remained
unaware of the existence of VEP Healthcare. Plaintiff and the
members of the Class (as defined below) have suffered injury due to
Defendants' conduct and seek damages, injunctive and/or other
equitable relief, restitution and/or disgorgement of profits, and
attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Liu is a resident of the State of California, County of
Los Angeles.

Defendant Dignity Health, a California corporation with its
principal business office located at 185 Berry Street, Suite 300,
San Francisco, CA 94107, is the "fifth largest health system in the
nation and the largest hospital provider in California".[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jonathan M. Rotter, Esq.
     Natalie S. Pang, Esq.
     GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
     1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
     Los Angeles, CA 90067
     Phone: (310) 201-9150
     Facsimile: (310) 432-1495
     Email: info@glancylaw.com

          - and -

     Matthew Insley-Pruitt
     WOLF POPPER LLP
     845 Third Avenue
     New York, NY 10022
     Phone: (212) 759-4600
     Facsimile: (212) 486-2093
     Email: cwaldman@wolfpopper.com


DOMUS DESIGN: Melvin Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
-------------------------------------------------------------
DOMUS DESIGN: Melvin Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages

Rondu Melvin, on behalf of himself and similarly situated
individuals, Plaintiff, v. DOMUS DESIGN CENTERS, INC. and NADER
HAKAKIAN, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-05690 (S.D. N.Y., June 18,
2019) seeks to recover from the Defendants, unpaid minimum and
overtime wages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
("FLSA"), and for violations of the N.Y. Labor Law (the "NYLL"),
including applicable liquidated damages, interest, attorneys' fees
and costs.

The Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their businesses
with a policy of not paying Plaintiff and similarly situated
individuals' wages for the hours worked over 40 hours in a well at
the overtime wage rate in violation of the FLSA and NYLL an
supporting Federal and New York State Department of Labor
Regulations, says the complaint.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendants as a sales associate.

Defendants is a domestic business corporation, organized and
existing under the laws of the State of New York.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     James F. Sullivan, Esq.
     Lawrence Spasojevich, Esq.
     Law Offices of James F. Sullivan, P.C.
     52 Duane Street, 7th Floor
     New York, NY 10007
     Phone: (212) 374-0009
     Facsimile: (212) 374-9931


DR. JAMES HEAPS: Jane Doe Sues Over Sexual Harassment
-----------------------------------------------------
JANE DOE 1, and individual; Plaintiffs, v. DR. JAMES HEAPS, an
individual; THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, a
California Corporation; and DOES 1 through 500, Defendants, Case
No. 19STCV21258 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty., June 18, 2019)
seeks to vindicate the rights of Plaintiff JANE DOE 1 (hereinafter
referred to as, "Plaintiff"), who was sexually abused, harassed and
molested at the hands of serial sexual predator, Defendant DR.
JAMES HEAPS (hereinafter referred to as, "HEAPS" or "THE
PERPETRATOR"), while she was seeking necessary medical treatment
from Defendant THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
(hereinafter referred to as, "The Regents") at The University of
California, Los Angeles ("UCLA").

On June 21, 2017, HEAPS used his position of trust and authority as
Plaintiffs physician to sexually abuse and assault Plaintiff, by
groping and fondling Plaintiffs breasts and pinching Plaintiffs
nipples, under the guise of conducting a "breast examination;" and
rubbing Plaintiffs clitoris with his fingers, under the guise of
conducting a "pelvic examination," for no legitimate medical
purpose and for no other reason than to satisfy his own sexual
desires. Despite the fact that The Regents and UCLA have publicly
admitted that they received numerous complaints of HEAPS's sexually
abusive behavior dating back to at least the year 2015, The Regents
and UCLA actively and deliberately concealed HEAPS's sexual abuse
for years, continuing to grant HEAPS unfettered sexual access to
the vulnerable female patients in his care, all to protect
Defendants' reputation and financial coffers, says the complaint.

Plaintiff JANE DOE 1 is a female who was born in 1975 and currently
resides in Los Angeles County, California and was a medical patient
of UCLA Health and, thus, was under Defendants THE REGENTS',
HEAPS.

Defendant HEAPS was a gynecological physician hired, employed,
supervised, and retained by Defendant THE REGENTS, and DOES 1
through 500, to practice medicine at UCLA Health.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     JOHN C. MANLY, Esq.
     VINCE W. FINALDI, Esq.
     ALEX E. CUNNY, Esq.
     JANE E. REILLEY, Esq.
     MANLY, STEWART & FINALDI
     19100 Von Karman Ave., Suite 800
     Irvine, CA 92612
     Phone: (949) 252-9990
     Fax: (949) 252-9991


EAST CAPITOL: $100K Settlement in Kinard Suit Has Final Approval
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MILDRED KINARD et al., Plaintiffs, v. EAST CAPITOL
FAMILY RENTAL, L.P. et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 15-1935
(TJK) (D. D.C.), Judge Timohy J. Kelly of the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia denied the parties' Joint Motion for
Final Certification of Class for Settlement Purposes and for
Approval of Class Action Settlement.

The Plaintiffs in the class action are tenants of a low-income
housing development in the District of Columbia.  They allege that
the Defendants, management companies overseeing the development,
violated federal laws by adjusting their utility allowances -- rent
reductions that should reflect reasonable utility use -- improperly
and without adequate notice.

After lengthy negotiations, the parties reached a settlement
agreement under which the named Plaintiffs and the other class
members will receive both monetary and non-monetary relief.  In
November 2018, the Court preliminarily approved the settlement
agreement and conditionally certified the class, and in April 2019,
it held a fairness hearing. Before the Court is the panties' Joint
Motion for Final Certification of Class for Settlement Purposes and
for Approval of Class Action Settlement.

Under the terms of the settlement agreement, the Defendants have
agreed to designate $100,000 to compensate the named plaintiffs and
the other class members.  Of that $100,000, the agreement allocates
$15,000 for fees for tje Plaintiffs' counsel and $5,000 for service
awards for each of the four named Plaintiffs.  The remaining amount
is available for distribution to the class members according to a
formula that sets individualized awards based on the length of time
the class member lived in Capitol Gateway and size of the class
member's unit.

The settlement agreement also includes non-monetary relief for the
class members.  The Defendants have agreed to adjust the class
members' utility allowances for two years according to another
formula, and to do so subject to agreed-upon notice provisions.
For their part, the class members have agreed to release all claims
in the complaint and all claims relating to the calculation of
utility allowances by the Defendants during those two years.

Pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement, on Dec. 18,
2018, the Defendants provided the claims administrator identifying
and contact information for the 64 members of the class.  On Jan.
11, 2019, the claims administrator mailed a "Notice to Class of
Proposed Settlement" and a claim form to the last known address of
each class member.

By Feb. 22, 2019 -- the deadline for a class member to opt-out from
the settlement, object to the settlement, or challenge the monetary
amount that he or she would receive -- the claims administrator had
received no opt-outs, objections, or challenges.  On Feb. 25, 2019,
the claims administrator mailed reminder postcards to the 19 class
members who had not returned a claim form by then.  By March 22,
2019 -- the deadline for the class members to submit claim
forms—the claims administrator had received forms from 57 out of
64 class members.

The Court held a fairness hearing on April 10, 2019.

Judge Kelly concludes that the class easily meets the requirements
for certification set out in Rules 23(a) and (b)(3).  He will
certify the class for settlement purposes.  Moreover, the Judge
finds that the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and
adequate under Rule 23(e)(2), and will approve it.

The parties request that the Court approves $5,000 individual
service awards for the four named Plaintiffs to compensate them for
being the class representatives and their efforts to prosecute the
action.  Because neither the Defendants nor any class member has
objected to these fees, the Judge approves them as fair and
reasonable.

Finally, the Plaintiffs' counsel requests that the Court approves
$15,000 in attorney's fees, representing 15% of the settlement
fund.  The Judge finds that the amount requested is below the range
of "reasonable" attorneys' fees recognized in the Circuit, which
generally runs from "20% to 30% of the common fund.  And again,
neither the Defendants nor any class member has objected to the
proposed attorneys' fees.  For these reasons, the Judge approves
the fee request.

For all the reasons explained, Judge Kelly granted, in a separate
order, the parties' Joint Motion for Final Certification of Class
for Settlement Purposes and for Approval of Class Action
Settlement.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 28, 2019 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/KPJ8mB from Leagle.com.

MILDRED KINARD, EARLENE WHEELER, VICKY BORDEAUX & DONALD ROBINSON,
Plaintiffs, represented by Beth Mellen Harrison --
bharrison@legalaiddc.org -- LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA, Rachel A. Rintelmann -- rrintelmann@legalaiddc.org --
LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA & Chinh Q. Le --
cle@legalaiddc.org -- LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA, pro hac vice.

EAST CAPITOL FAMILY RENTAL, L.P. & A&R MANAGEMENT, INC.,
Defendants, represented by David G. Sommer -- dsommer@gejlaw.com --
GALLAGHER EVELIUS & JONES, LLP & James D. Bragdon --
jbragdon@gejlaw.com -- GALLAGHER EVELIUS & JONES LLP.

KETTLER MANAGEMENT, INC., Defendant, represented by Nicholas G.
Hallenbeck -- nhallenbeck@gordonrees.com -- GORDON REES SCULLY
MANSUKHANI, LLP.


EDDIE BAUER: Harbers Suit Moved to Western District of Washington
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit styled as Jennifer Harbers for Herself, as
a Private Attorney General, and/or On Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Eddie Bauer LLC and Does
1-20, the Defendants, Case No. 19-00002-14167-1-SEA, was removed
from the King County Superior Court, to U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington (Seattle) on June 28, 2019. The
Western District of Washington Court Clerk assigned Case No.
2:19-cv-01012-JLR to the proceeding. The suit alleges fraud-related
violation. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge James L. Robart.

Eddie Bauer is an American limited liability company, headquartered
in Bellevue, Washington, that operates the Eddie Bauer clothing
store chain.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Che Z. Corrington, Esq.
          Daniel M Hattis, Esq.
          HATTIS & LUKACS PLLC
          400 108th Ave. NE, Suite 500
          Bellevue, WA 98004
          Telephone: (425) 233-8633
          Facsimile: (425) 412-7171
          E-mail: che@hattislaw.com
                  dan@hattislaw.com

Attorneys for the Defendant are:

          Anthony Anscombe, Esq.
          Meegan Brooks, Esq.
          Stephanie Sheridan, Esq.
          STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP (IL)
          115 S La Salle St.
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 577-1265
          E-mail: aanscombe@steptoe.com
                  mbrooks@steptoe.com
                  ssheridan@steptoe.com

               - and -

          Marc C. Levy, Esq.
          Thomas Shewmake, Esq.
          SEED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW GROUP PLLC
          701 5th Avenue, Ste 5400
          Seattle WA 98104-7092
          Telephone: (206) 622-4900
          E-mail: MarcL@SeedIP.com
                  TomShewmake@SeedIP.com


EDWARD D. JONES: Court OKs Securities Fraud Suit Dismissal
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
in the case captioned IN RE EDWARD D. JONES & CO., L.P. SECURITIES
LITIGATION. No. 2:18-cv-00714-JAM-AC. (E.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiffs bring this federal securities and state breach of
fiduciary duty putative class action based upon an alleged reverse
churning scheme whereby Defendants improperly shifted clients'
commission-based accounts to fee-based advisory programs, without
providing the clients full information, without regard to the
suitability of fee-based accounts for those clients, and for no
other reason than collect more fees on previously low-profit
accounts.

Judicial Notice and Incorporation by Reference

Judicial notice under Rule 201 permits a court to judicially notice
an adjudicative fact if it is not subject to reasonable dispute.  A
fact is not subject to reasonable dispute if it is generally known,
or can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Judicial notice of SEC
filings is appropriate. This Court therefore takes judicial notice
of the existence of Edward Jones' SEC filings and public comments
and reports, but not the truth of the contents asserted in the
filings. The Court will therefore consider these documents under
the incorporation-by-reference doctrine.

Rule 10b-5(b) Claim

Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the
Securities and Exchange Commission's Rule 10b-5 prohibit making any
material misstatement or omission in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security. To prevail on a Rule 10b-5(b) claim, a
plaintiff must prove: (1) a material misrepresentation or omission
by the defendant (2) scienter  (3) a connection between the
misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a
security (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission (5)
economic loss; and (6) loss causation.

At the pleading stage, a complaint stating claims under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 must satisfy the dual pleading requirements of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) and the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). Under Rule 9(b), in alleging fraud,
the circumstances constituting fraud must be stated with
particularity.

Edward Jones argues Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the pleading
standards for their Rule 10b-5(b) claim. For the reasons discussed
below, this Court agrees.

Material Misstatements or Omissions

Under Rule 10b-5(b) it is unlawful to make any untrue statement of
a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made not misleading. An omitted fact
is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
investor would consider it important.

The Plaintiffs frame their claims as based on a set of material
omissions. However, these alleged omissions, some of which are in
fact alleged misrepresentations, are not actionable in light of the
totality of Edward Jones' disclosures in the Agreement, the Fund
Models Brochure, the Account Client Services Agreement, the
Schedule of Fees, the Client Profile, and the Making Good Choices
brochure.

Accurate Description of Accounts

The Plaintiffs allege Edward Jones omitted information necessary to
provide an accurate description of the material differences between
their clients' commission-based accounts and the fee-based accounts
in Advisory Programs. However, the Making Good Choices brochure,
cited by Plaintiffs as lacking some of this information, in fact
explicitly charts and discusses the material differences between
the account types.   

This alleged omission is therefore not actionable.

Fees

The Plaintiffs contend Edward Jones financial advisors failed to
disclose an accurate description of the fees charged by Advisory
Programs, the cost and impact of the fees charged by Advisory
Programs, and that an Advisory Program would result in a higher fee
to its formerly commission-based clients. But Plaintiffs
acknowledge receiving a document expressly outlining the schedule
of fees for Advisory Programs. Plaintiffs also received a document
providing a specific estimate of their anticipated yearly fees in
the Advisory Programs. The Making Good Choices brochure is also
clear that fees in an Advisory Program can be more expensive than
other investment choices over the long term.

The Plaintiffs' omission claims as to fees are non-actionable.

Suitability

The Plaintiffs allege that Edward Jones had not conducted a
sufficient analysis to determine the suitability of a fee-based
Advisory Program for its commission-based clients. This claim
dovetails with the fees claim: Plaintiffs argue the Advisory
Programs were not suitable for clients who traded infrequently
because their fees would increase. This claim fails for the same
reasons.

Furthermore, in choosing the Advisory Programs, Plaintiffs filled
out client questionnaires and acknowledged that they were not
relying on the advice or recommendation of Edward Jones for any
decision about account type, and represented they believed the
investment advisory and other services provided under this
Agreement will add value to their overall investment experience
that more than justifies the additional expenses. Additionally,
this alleged omission is more accurately stated as a
misrepresentation by Edward Jones that the Advisory Programs were
suitable for the Plaintiffs.

The suitability claim is not actionable.

DOL Fiduciary Rule

The Plaintiffs contend that Edward Jones omitted certain material
information when explaining the impact of the DOL Fiduciary Rule,
including that the DOL Fiduciary Rule did not require them to move
their clients with commission-based accounts to a fee-based
Advisory Program. In light of the Amended Complaint alleging Edward
Jones used the DOJ Fiduciary Rule as a pretext to make these client
account changes, this is more accurately considered a
misrepresentation claim by Edward Jones that an account change was
required. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs do not specifically allege why
this omission was material to this investment decision under the
circumstances, particularly given that Plaintiffs had the choice of
signing the authorization, and the allegations are thus not
actionable.

Financial Advisor Incentives

The Plaintiffs allege they were never told that Edward Jones was
incentivizing its financial advisors by promoting, giving pay
raises and/or bonuses to, and/or not terminating advisors who moved
their clients with commission-based accounts to an Advisory
Program, even when it was not in their clients' best interest.
However, Plaintiffs received legally sufficient disclosures on this
topic including that a financial advisor will typically earn more
in upfront fees and commissions when you use brokerage services and
more over time if you invest in Advisory Programs.  

The Plaintiffs' omission claims based on financial advisor
incentives fail.

Scienter

To adequately plead scienter, the complaint must state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the
defendant acted with the required state of mind. To meet the state
of mind requirement a complaint must allege that the defendants
made false or misleading statements either intentionally or with
deliberate recklessness, where recklessness still reflects some
degree of intentional or conscious misconduct.  

Viewing the matter holistically, this Court concludes that
Plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead the strong inference of
scienter required. Plaintiffs allege that the Individual Defendants
envisioned and implemented company-wide policies and procedures to
improperly increase asset-based revenue through the alleged
reverse-churning scheme; that defendant Weddle met with financial
advisors and encouraged them to act according to these policies;
that the omitted facts were core to Edward Jones' business; and
that Edward Jones publicly discussed why fee-based platforms may
not be suitable to their clients.  

However, corporate management's general awareness of the day-to-day
workings of the company's business does not establish scienter at
least absent some additional allegation of specific information
conveyed to management and related to the fraud. Moreover,
allegations of routine corporate objectives such as the desire to
obtain good financing and expand are not, without more, sufficient
to allege scienter, to hold otherwise would support a finding of
scienter for any company that seeks to enhance its business
prospects.

The Plaintiffs' allegations, some of which are conclusory and
vague, do not establish an intent to defraud that is at least as
compelling as an opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent. Edward
Jones provided substantial disclosures to the Plaintiffs laying out
the benefits and drawbacks of the Advisory Programs, to help them
make this investment decision. The mere fact that Edward Jones
financially benefited from certain clients choosing to move into
fee-based accounts does not foreclose that the clients may also
benefit in the long-run from this new offering and that the company
fully believes in the value of its product.

The Plaintiffs fail to adequately allege the strong inference of
scienter required under Rule 10b-5.

Reliance

Reliance establishes the causal connection between the alleged
fraud and the securities transaction.The traditional (and most
direct) way a plaintiff can demonstrate reliance is by showing that
he was aware of a company's statement and engaged in a relevant
transaction based on that specific misrepresentation. Plaintiffs do
not put forward an argument for this traditional reliance on
statements made by Edward Jones. Rather, Plaintiffs contend they
are entitled to a presumption of reliance.  

Edward Jones argues Plaintiffs are not entitled to the Affiliated
Ute presumption because the claims involve either only
misstatements or a mix of misstatements and omissions. Edward Jones
contends Plaintiffs attempt to characterize their claims as being
based on material omissions is a pleading artifice. As discussed
above, the suitability and DOL Fiduciary Rule omission claims are
more properly characterized as misstatements.  

Thus, because the allegations here cannot be characterized
primarily as claims of omissions, the Plaintiffs are not entitled
to the presumption of reliance. Plaintiffs have not alleged actual
reliance on any of the material misstatements. Thus, Plaintiffs
cannot demonstrate reliance and their claims under Rule 10b-5
fail.

Loss Causation

A plaintiff must demonstrate that an economic loss was caused by
the defendant's misrepresentations, rather than some intervening
event. Typically, to satisfy the loss causation requirement, the
plaintiff must show that the revelation of that misrepresentation
or omission was a substantial factor in causing a decline in the
security's price, thus creating an actual economic loss for the
plaintiff.

The Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently allege loss causation. This is
not a typical, stock-drop, fraud-on-the-market securities fraud
case. The Amended Complaint contains no allegations regarding the
overall performance of the fee-based accounts, the clients' account
performance in the fee-based accounts compared to their
commission-based accounts, or any changes to performance based on
corrective disclosures. Instead, the only alleged loss is the
additional, higher fees Plaintiffs have paid by virtue of being in
fee-based accounts rather than commission-based accounts. But, as
discussed above, there is no actionable omission related to the
increase in fees and their potential impact on Plaintiffs' accounts
because information regarding the fees was fully disclosed to the
Plaintiffs. Therefore, there is no causal connection between any
actionable omission and the loss.

Thus, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated loss causation and their
claims under Rule 10b-5 fail.
Plaintiffs allegations of a violation of Rule 10b-5(b) fail to meet
the heightened pleading standards of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b) and the PSLRA. The Amended Complaint does not
sufficiently allege an actionable misstatement or omission, does
not present a strong inference of scienter, fails to establish
reliance, and cannot demonstrate loss causation. Thus, Plaintiffs'
Rule 10b-5(b) claim (Count II) is dismissed.

Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) Claim

The Plaintiffs also bring a Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) scheme liability
claim.  

In order to state a claim under Rules 10b-5(a) or (c), a plaintiff
must allege a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or an act,
practice, or course of business which would operate as a fraud, in
addition to the standard elements of a Section 10(b) violation: (1)
scienter (2) connection with the purchase or sale of securities (3)
reliance; (4) economic loss and (5) loss causation.
  
Edward Jones argues that Plaintiffs' scheme liability claim is
nothing more than a repackaging of the Rule 10b-5(b) omissions
claims discussed above.This Court agrees. Plaintiffs scheme
liability claim largely rests on Edward Jones' supposed
non-disclosure of certain actions it was taking in pitching and
moving clients into the fee-based programs. And the conduct
Plaintiffs allege as violations including, sales training for
financial advisors, changed incentive structures, and a new
computer system is not an actionable deceptive scheme. While the
lack of an allegedly deceptive scheme or practice is fatal to this
claim, the Court also finds that Plaintiffs have failed to properly
allege reliance, scienter, and loss causation. Thus, Plaintiffs'
scheme liability claim under Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) (Count I) is
dismissed.

Section 20(a) Claim

Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides for
control person liability.  To establish a cause of action under
this provision, a plaintiff must first prove a primary violation of
underlying federal securities laws, such as Section 10(b) or Rule
10b-5, and then show that the defendant exercised actual power over
the primary violator. Because Plaintiffs have not adequately
alleged primary violations under Section 10(b), Plaintiffs' Section
20(a) control person claim (Count III) fails and is dismissed.

Section 12(a)(2) Claim

To prevail on a claim under Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act
of 1933, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) an offer or sale of a
security (2) by the use of a means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce (3) by means of a prospectus or oral communication (4)
that includes an untrue statement of material fact or omits to
state a material fact that is necessary to make the statements not
misleading. An oral communication establishing liability under
Section 12(a)(2) is restricted to oral communications that relate
to a prospectus. Thus, liability under this section always requires
a prospectus. The Amended Complaint cites no formal prospectus, and
the marketing materials in this case are not a substitute for the
required prospectus. Plaintiffs' Section 12(a)(2) claim (Count IV)
is therefore dismissed.

Section 15 Claim

To state a claim for control person liability under Section 15 of
the Securities Act, a plaintiff must first establish an underlying
violation of the act. Because Plaintiffs cannot adequately allege a
primary violation under Section 12(a)(2), Plaintiffs' Section 15
control person claim (Count V) fails and is dismissed.

State Law Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims

Edward Jones argue Plaintiffs' claims for breaches of fiduciary
duty under California and Missouri law are preempted by SLUSA
Congress enacted SLUSA, the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards
Act, to stem the shift of class-action securities lawsuits from
federal courts to state courts after passage of the PSLRA by
eliminating federal jurisdiction over any claim that could give
rise to liability under Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5.   

Accordingly, SLUSA bars a plaintiff class from bringing (1) a
covered class action (2) based on state law claims (3) alleging
that the defendants made a misrepresentation or omission or
employed any manipulative or deceptive device (4) in connection
with the purchase or sale of (5) a covered security.

The Plaintiffs argue SLUSA does not bar their fiduciary duty claims
because the claims do not rely on an alleged misstatement or
omission, simply that moving the clients to an Advisory Program was
not in the clients' best interest. Edward Jones contends SLUSA
applies even though Plaintiffs do not incorporate their allegations
of material omissions into the fiduciary duty claims because the
substance of the claims is the alleged deceptive conduct. This
Court agrees with Edward Jones.

The Plaintiffs' fiduciary duty claims substantively mirror their
federal securities claims. Plaintiffs do not argue that there are
no circumstances under which Edward Jones could shift clients from
commission-based to fee-based accounts, and such an argument would
lack common sense. Rather, the base allegations are wrongdoing from
the manner in which Edward Jones changed the accounts   without
providing clients full information and without the shift being in
the clients' best interest. These are the same allegations which
serve as the alleged material omissions on which Plaintiffs'
securities claims rely.

This Court therefore finds that SLUSA bars Plaintiffs' state law
fiduciary duty class claims. SLUSA operates by depriving the
district court of jurisdiction to hear  state-law claims on a
class-wide basis. Thus, because SLUSA applies, this Court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' class claims for
breaches of fiduciary duty under California and Missouri law
(Counts VI and VII) and these claims are dismissed without
prejudice.
  
Accordingly, the Court grants the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in
its entirety. The Amended Complaint is dismissed with leave to
amend.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 8, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y6dwnxzt from Leagle.com.

Edward Anderson, Raymond Keith Corum, Jesse Worthington & Colleen
Worthington, Plaintiffs, represented by Ivy T. Ngo --
ngoi@fdazar.com -- Franklin D. Azar and Associates, P.C., Brian
Hanlin -- HanlinB@fdazar.com -- Franklin D. Azar and Associates,
P.C., pro hac vice, Franklin D. Azar, Franklin D. Azar and
Associates, PC, 14426 East Evans Avenue Aurora, CO 80014, pro hac
vice, Joshua E. Moyer -- moyerj@fdazar.com -- Franklin D. Azar &
Associates, Michael D. Murphy, III, Franklin D. Azar & Associates,
PC, 14426 East Evans Avenue Aurora, CO 80014, pro hac vice & John
Randolph Garner -- john@garner-associates.com -- Garner &
Associates.

Janet Goral, Plaintiff, represented by Ivy T. Ngo, Franklin D. Azar
and Associates, P.C., Joshua E. Moyer, Franklin D. Azar &
Associates & Michael D. Murphy, III, Franklin D. Azar & Associates,
PC, pro hac vice.

Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P., The Jones Financial Companies, LLLP,
EDJ Holding Company, Inc., James D. Weddle, Penelope Pennington,
Daniel J. Timm, Kenneth R. Cella, Jr., Brett A. Campbell, Kevin D.
Bastien, Norman L. Eaker, Vincent J. Ferrari, Timothy J. Kirley,
James A. Tricarico, Jr., Olive Street Investment Advisors, LLC,
Passport Holdings, LLC & Passport Research, LTD., Defendants,
represented by Alexander Kosta Mircheff -- amircheff@gibsondunn.com
-- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Meryl Lyn Young --
myoung@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP & Julie LeAnn
Taylor -- julie.taylor@kyl.com -- Keesal, Young & Logan.


ELECTRONIC MERCHANT: Court Denies Objection to Winters Settlement
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
issued an Order denying David Hoffman's Objection to Settlement
Agreement in the case captioned JEFFREY A. WINTERS, COLLECTION
SOLUTIONS, INC., Plaintiffs, v. ELECTRONIC MERCHANT SYSTEMS, et
al., Defendants. Civil Action No. 17-12003 (CCC). (D.N.J.).

Mr. Hoffman filed a letter on the docket acknowledging that he no
longer represented Mr. Winters or CSI, but nevertheless objecting
to the settlement on the basis that we: (1) retain the right and
obligation to ensure that any settlement agreement is properly
implemented and accurately represents the wishes of Winters and CSI
(2) retain the right to ensure that our attorney's lien on the
settlement proceeds is appropriately handled and (3) assert our
right to move for appropriate sanctions related to inappropriate
and unethical pick off attempt by defense counsel and Mr. Breslin.


The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants have breached various
contractual principles by enforcing supposedly illegible provisions
in contracts and failing to properly account for funds collected on
their behalf.

Mr. Hoffman's filing attempting to add new lead Plaintiffs to the
case, was ineffective for a multitude of reasons.

First, by Order, the case was stayed when Mr. Hoffman made the
February 24 filing, except for briefing on a motion to dismiss. In
short, Mr. Hoffman's filing was improper and violated a Court
Order. Thus, it is of no legal consequence and did not add any
parties to the case.

Second, Mr. Hoffman's February 24 filing was made on behalf of The
Law Office of David M. Hoffman and David M. Hoffman, Esq., and as
attorneys for the Plaintiff Class. However, neither Mr. Hoffman nor
the Plaintiff class are appropriate movants in any application
seeking to add parties. In order to add plaintiffs to the case, the
existing plaintiffs Mr. Winters and CSI were required to move to
add additional parties as co-plaintiffs.   

That did not happen here. Mr. Hoffman moved on his own behalf and
on behalf of a non-existent, not-yet certified class, which is
ineffective.  

Third, even if by some mechanism the filing was not barred by the
stay and was made by a party to the case neither of which are the
case, the filing is still ineffective. Mr. Hoffman's argument that
his filing effectively automatically adds the new plaintiffs to the
case is not correct. Any attempt to add new parties to the case
requires leave of court and an amendment of the pleadings pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. It is not accomplished by
simply filing a document, without leave, and during the period of a
stay.  

In short, Mr. Hoffman contends that the June 4 Stipulation of
dismissal signed by counsel for Plaintiffs Winters and CSI and
counsel for Defendants is ineffective because there are five
additional plaintiffs and him that did not sign off on the
settlement.1 As explained, this is not the case. There are not five
additional plaintiffs in this case. There are two plaintiffs in the
case and they have settled with Defendants. Nothing more. Mr.
Hoffman's February 24 Supplement was filed in violation of a Court
Order; on behalf of himself and not the named Plaintiffs in the
case; and without seeking or receiving leave pursuant to Rule 15.
Therefore, the filing is a nullity, and the Plaintiffs and
Defendants are free to settle and dismiss the case, as they have
attempted to do.

Moreover, Mr. Hoffman's motion seeking attorney's fees and an
ethical determination is not properly a matter for this court and
is denied. If Mr. Hoffman believes he is entitled to some relief of
this type, he is free to pursue same in whatever forum is
appropriate.

Accordingly, Mr. Hoffman's motion is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 8, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yxhdkao5 from Leagle.com.

HON. DENNIS M. CAVANAUGH, RET., Mediator, represented by DENNIS
MICHAEL CAVANAUGH --DCAVANAUGH@MDMC-LAW.COM -- MCELROY, DEUTSCH,
MULVANEY & CARPENTER LLP.

JEFFREY A. WINTERS & COLLECTION SOLUTIONS, INC., individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented
by DAVID M. HOFFMAN -- dhoffman@wrslaw.com -- MICHAEL J. BRESLIN,
Jr., 55 State St, Hackensack, NJ 07601

ELECTRONIC MERCHANT SYSTEMS, an unincorporated entity, BMO HARRIS
BANK, N.A., CHESAPEAKE BANK, MERRICK BANK CORPORATION & Esquire
Bank, Defendants, represented by CHRISTOPHER CHARLES LOEBER --
cloeber@pryorcashman.com -- PRYOR CASHMAN LLP.


FCA US: Court Extends Deadlines in A. Moran Suit
------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California issued an Order granting Parties' Joint Motion to Extend
the Deadlines for Class Discovery Cut-Off and for the filing of
Plaintiff's Class Certification Motion in the case captioned
ALFONSO MORAN, ARLENE MORAN, on behalf of themselves and those
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. FCA US LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company, Defendant. Case No. 17cv2594-GPC-MDD. (S.D.
Cal.).

Class Related Deadlines

Class discovery cutoff is November 15, 2019.

Deadline to file class certification motion is December 19, 2019.

Discovery

No later than May 20, 2020, each party shall comply with Rule
26(a)(2)(A) and (B) disclosure provisions. This disclosure
requirement applies to all persons retained or specially employed
to provide expert testimony, or whose duties as a party's employee
regularly involve giving expert testimony.

No later than June 3, 2020, the parties shall supplement their
disclosures regarding contradictory or rebuttal evidence under Rule
26(a)(2)(D).

All expert discovery shall be completed by all parties no later
than July 1, 2020. The parties shall comply with the same
procedures set forth in the paragraph governing fact discovery.

Mandatory Settlement Conference

A Mandatory Settlement Conference shall be conducted July 15, 2020
at 9:30AM in the chambers of Magistrate Judge Mitchell D. Dembin.
Counsel or any party representing himself or herself shall submit
confidential settlement briefs directly to chambers no later than
July 8, 2020. All named parties, all counsel, and any other persons
whose authority is required to negotiate and enter into settlement
shall appear in person at the conference.

Motion Briefing

Except for motions in limine, all pretrial motions must be filed no
later than August 3, 2020.As provided herein and in the Standing
Order, certain motions, including motions for class certification,
must be filed well before this date.

Counsel for the moving party must obtain a motion hearing date from
the law clerk of the judge who will hear the motion. The period of
time between the date of requesting a motion date and the hearing
date typically exceeds 30 days. Failure to make a timely request
for a motion date may result in the motion not being heard.

Motion briefing must comply with all applicable Rules, Local Rules,
Standing Order, Chambers Rules and court orders.

Final Pretrial Conference

No later than October 30, 2020, counsel shall meet and take the
action required by Local Rule 16.1(f)(4) with a view to enter into
stipulations and agreements to simplify issues for trial. Counsel
shall exchange copies and/or display all exhibits other than those
to be used for impeachment. The exhibits shall be prepared in
accordance with Local Rule 16.1(f)(4)(c). Counsel shall note any
objections they have to other parties' Rule 26(a)(3) pretrial
disclosures. Counsel shall cooperate in the preparation of the
proposed final pretrial conference order.

Counsel for plaintiff is responsible for preparing the proposed
final pretrial conference order and arranging the meetings of
counsel pursuant to Local Rule 16.1(f). No later than November 6,
2020, plaintiff's counsel must provide opposing counsel with the
draft proposed final pretrial order for review and approval.
Opposing counsel must communicate promptly with plaintiff's counsel
concerning any objections to form or content. Both sides shall
attempt promptly to resolve their differences, if any, concerning
the proposed order.

The Final Pretrial Conference is scheduled on the calendar of the
Honorable Gonzalo Curiel on November 20, 2020 at 1:30PM.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 8, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y65c5a2h from Leagle.com.

Alfonso Moran & Arlene Moran, Plaintiffs, represented by Cody R.
Padgett -- Cody.Padgett@capstonelawyers.com -- Capstone Law APC,
Mark Alan Ozzello -- mark.ozzello@capstonelawyers.com -- Capstone
Law, APC, Tarek H. Zohdy -- Tarek.Zohdy@capstonelawyers.com --
Capstone Law APC & Trisha K. Monesi --
Trisha.Monesi@capstonelawyers.com -- Capstone Law, APC.

FCA US LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, Defendant,
represented by Abirami Gnanadesigan -- agnanadesigan@dykema.com --
Dykema Gossett, Dommond Edward Lonnie -- dlonnie@dykema.com --
Dykema Gossett LLP, Fred J. Fresard -- ffresard@dykema.com --
Dykema Gossett PLLC, pro hac vice, James Powell Feeney --
jfeeney@dykema.com -- Dykema Gossett PLLC & Janet L. Conigliaro --
jconigliaro@dykema.com -- Dykema Gossett, pro hac vice.


FINE HOME: Wallace Seeks Overtime Wages for Salespersons
--------------------------------------------------------
RICK WALLACE, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. FINE HOME FURNISHINGS LLC; B & A HOLDINGS OF AMERICA,
LLC; FURNITURE EMPIRE, LLC; and A.J. HUSSEIN, the Defendants, Case
No. 2:19-cv-02973-EAS-EPD (S.D. Ohio, July 10, 2019), alleges that
Defendants failed to pay employees overtime wages and seeks all
available relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Ohio
Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act, and the Ohio Prompt Pay Act.

As a Sales Consultant, Wallace made inside sales of furniture to
potential customers at Defendants' locations. Initially, Wallace
worked at one of Defendants' "Rooms for Less" locations before he
moved to Defendants'Fine Home Furnishings store.

It has been Defendants' policy to uniformly misclassify Wallace and
other inside salespersons as exempt from federal and state overtime
provisions and not to pay them any overtime wages.

Instead, Defendants have maintained a policy to only pay Wallace
and other inside salespersons a salary of their regular hourly rate
for 40 hours per week with non-discretionary bonus payments
regardless of how many hours per week they worked, the lawsuit
says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and similarly situated employees are:

          Matthew J.P. Coffman, Esq.
          COFFMAN LEGAL, LLC
          1550 Old Henderson Road, Suite 126
          Columbus, OH 43220
          Telephone: (614) 949-1181
          Facsimile: (614) 386-9964
          E-mail: mcoffman@mcoffmanlegal.com

FORD MOTOR: 3rd Cir. Affirms Coba NJCFA Suit Dismissal
------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming the District Court's judgment granting
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in the case captioned GALO
COBA; COBA LANDSCAPING AND CONSTRUCTION, INC., individually, and on
behalf of other members of the general public similarly situated,
Appellants, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY. No. 17-2933.(3rd Cir.).

This appeal involves a putative consumer class action seeking
damages resulting from the delamination, i.e., peeling and flaking,
of the lining of certain Ford truck fuel tanks between 2001 and
2010, a problem that plagued numerous Ford F-Series and E-Series
vehicles in multiple countries and that, according to Appellant
Galo Coba, Ford knew stemmed from a defect.

It requires us to resolve two open questions for our Court: first,
whether a district court's denial of class certification divests
the court of jurisdiction in a case where its jurisdiction was
predicated solely on the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C.
Section 1332(d) and second, whether a warranty that covers only
defects in "materials or workmanship" extends to design defects
under New Jersey common law.

On appeal, Coba challenges the District Court's grant of summary
judgment on his claims for breach of express warranty, breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violation
of the NJCFA.  

The Court considers whether Ford has shown that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and [that it] is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.

Breach of Express Warranty

The District Court entered summary judgment on Coba's
breach-of-express-warranty claim because it determined that the
fuel-tank defect at issue was outside the scope of Ford's written
warranty, the NVLW. The District Court reasoned (1) that the NVLW
which provides that Ford will repair, replace, or adjust all parts
on his vehicle that are defective in factory-supplied materials or
workmanship, covers only materials or workmanship defects, not
design defects, and (2) that the fuel-tank defect alleged by Coba
fell in the design-defect category.

The Court agrees on both points.

A Warranty for Defects in Materials or Workmanship Does Not
Encompass Design Defects
New Jersey law, which governs our interpretation of the NVLW, does
not specifically address whether a warranty for materials or
workmanship covers design defects. In the absence of any guidance
from New Jersey courts on this particular issue, the Court must
predict how New Jersey's highest court would decide it based upon
relevant state precedents, analogous decisions, considered dicta,
scholarly works, and any other reliable data tending convincingly
to show how the highest court in the state would decide the issue
at hand.

The plain and ordinary meaning of the term defects in materials or
workmanship, unambiguously excludes design defects. As an initial
matter, the plain definitions of workmanship and materials are
conceptually distinct from the definition of design. Workmanship is
the the execution or manner of making or doing something, Thus, in
the context of product development, defects in workmanship and
materials are flaws pertaining to the construction or manufacture
of a product, while defects in design are shortcomings that arise
in the plans for a product's creation. More specifically, a
materials defect is a failing in the quality of the actual
substances used to make a product,  

In short, the Courts conclude that, under New Jersey law, a
warranty that limits its coverage to defects in materials and
workmanship does not, without more, apply to defects in design.
While parties are free to redefine words in their contracts in ways
that deviate from plain and ordinary meaning, they did not do so
here. Materials and workmanship in the NVLW carry their plain
meaning, and the warranty therefore does not extend to design
defects.

The Fuel Tank Defect Was a Design Defect

Having concluded that the NVLW does not cover design defects, we
must determine whether the fuel-tank-delamination problem, as
alleged, reflected a defect in design. The Court agrees with the
District Court that it does, so the court properly entered summary
judgment on Coba's breach-of-warranty claim.

Accounting for the differences between design, materials, and
workmanship defects, the alleged flaw in Ford's fuel tanks has all
the trappings of a design defect. The fundamental nature of the
defect relates to the overall plan of construction and operation of
the fuel tanks. The problem, as consistently described by Coba, was
not a low-quality supply of the A35 and A36 coatings or a problem
in the process for applying them to Ford's fuel tanks; rather, it
was Ford's plan to use those coatings at all in constructing its
fuel tanks. And that flawed-design theory is consistent with the
evidence on which Coba relies, including Ford's own conclusion in
2010 that tanks were delaminating because the A36 and A35 fuel tank
coatings cannot tolerate a constant supply of acetic and formic
acids in fuel.  

As Coba alleged a design defect, and the NVLW covered only
materials and workmanship defects, the District Court properly
granted summary judgment on Coba's breach-of-warranty claim.

Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

Because Coba did not have any right to repair or replacement of his
fuel tanks under the NVLW, he also could not prevail on his claim
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
New Jersey recognizes an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in every contract, but to state a claim that it was
breached, a plaintiff must have the right to receive the fruits of
the contract and must show that the defendant had improper motive
when interfering with that right.

Here, Coba alleges that Ford breached the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing implied in the NVLW by repairing and replacing his
tanks, while knowing that those repairs and replacements would not
fix or remedy the fuel t+ank defect. But even assuming Ford
possessed an improper motive a questionable notion given the
evolving nature of Ford's knowledge of a design defect the NVLW did
not cover design defects, so tank repair and replacement were not
fruits of the NVLW that Coba had a right to receive.

New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act

To prove a violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, a
plaintiff must establish that the defendant engaged in an unlawful
practice that caused an ascertainable loss to the plaintiff. There
are three general types of unlawful practices: affirmative acts,
knowing omissions, and regulation violations. A plaintiff asserting
a claim based on an omission must demonstrate that the defendant
(1) knowingly concealed (2) a material fact (3) with the intention
that plaintiff rely upon the concealment.

Here, Coba's NJCFA claim rests on two theories, both predicated on
omissions by Ford: (1) that Ford knew and did not disclose that the
fuel tank suffered from a design defect that caused delamination
and (2) that even if Ford did not know the cause of the
delamination, it failed to disclose the risk. The District Court
held, as to the first, that Coba failed to put forth sufficient
evidence of Ford's knowledge of the design defect, and, as to the
second, that the information about the risk of delamination that
Ford had available to it at the time Coba purchased his trucks was
not material.

The Court agrees with both conclusions.

Ford's Knowledge of the Design Defect

To prevail on the theory that Ford failed to disclose a known
design defect, Coba would need to show that Ford had that knowledge
at the time of his purchases, i.e., before March 9, 2007, when Coba
purchased his second truck.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favourable to Coba,  no
reasonable jury could find Ford had that knowledge. Internal email
correspondence shows that, as early as 2005, Ford knew that the
problem had existed for several years and was investigating its
cause. But the evidence does not show that Ford knew that the cause
was the design of its tanks. To the contrary, it shows that
throughout the relevant period, Ford suspected the problem was the
improper use by certain customers of fuel with high biodiesel
concentrations, which seemed plausible in light of the geographic
clustering of delamination occurrence and the phenomenon's origin
in Brazil.  

Although Coba posits that the District Court only reached this
conclusion by construing all facts and drawing all inferences in
favor of Ford, the evidence to which he points fails to raise a
triable issue. Coba relies primarily on a 2005 email  om a Ford
engineer remarking that recent tests of tanks exhibiting
delamination uncovered no bio-diesel traces" and noting that they
were looking at different additives that could cause th
delamination.

But, viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Coba, it
shows that some Ford engineers had doubts whether biodiesel was the
problem and they were continuing to investigate. It does not
support the inference, as Coba contends, that Ford knew the problem
was a design defect and that biodiesel was a pretext. Nor is that
inference supported either by the correspondence to which Coba
points concerning the mere prevalence of the delamination problem
or by other correspondence that post-dates his truck purchases and
thus has no bearing on Ford's earlier knowledge.

Because there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to Ford's
knowledge of a design defect, its failure to disclose that alleged
defect does not give rise to liability under the NJCFA.

Materiality of Delamination Risk

Coba fares no better with his alternative theory that Ford violated
the NJCFA by failing to disclose material information about the
risk of delamination. To establish that information withheld was
material, Coba would need to show that a reasonable person would
attach importance to its existence in determining his or her choice
of action. But the most favorable evidence in the record for Coba
concerning the rate of delamination comes from Ford's expert who
analyzed Ford's warranty database and found that Ford was replacing
Magni-lined steel fuel tanks for model year 2003-2007 F-series
trucks like Coba's at a rate of less than 1% across the United
States. That replacement rate, moreover, included all tank
replacements, not merely those related to delamination, suggesting
an even lower replacement rate for delaminated tanks.

And while Coba criticizes the warranty data as under-inclusive
because it covered only tanks that Ford actually replaced while
excluding those denied warranty coverage, he identifies no concrete
evidence of a higher rate of delamination. Accordingly, Coba's
second NJCFA theory, predicated on non-disclosure of the risk of
delamination, also does not survive summary judgment.

The Court will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

A full-text copy of Third Circuit's July 8, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y5uk27px from Leagle.com.

John E. Stobart, Ryan Wu, I, Capstone Law, 1875 Century Park East,
Suite 1000, Los Angeles, CA 90067, Counsel for Appellant.

Robert M. Palumbos, Andrew R. Sperl, Duane Morris, 30 South 17th
Street, United Plaza, Philadelphia, PA 19103.

John M. Thomas, Dykema, 2723 South State Street, Suite 400, Ann
Arbor, MI 48104.

Karol C. Walker, LeClairRyan, 1037 Raymond Boulevard, One
Riverfront Plaza, 16th Floor, Newark, NJ 07102, Counsel for
Appellee.


FORD MOTOR: Forman Sues over Inaccurate Fuel Economy Test Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
HILARY GOODFRIEND, KATHRYN HUMMEL and SCOTT FORMAN, individually,
and on behalf of others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY, the Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-03794-WFK-JO
(E.D.N.Y., June 28, 2019), seeks relief for the injuries sustained
as the result of the inaccurate testing methods used by Ford to
ascertain the fuel economy ratings of their vehicles and the
resulting material misstatements of fuel economy, as well as
implicitly the accuracy of such ratings, used in the marketing and
sales of Class Vehicles.

The class action lawsuit is brought by Plaintiffs individually and
on behalf of all current and former Ford vehicle owners and lessees
of model years 2017-2019 that were marketed and sold with
overstated fuel economy and who reside in New York, Florida, and
New Jersey.

Ford announced on February 21, 2019 its fuel economy testing
procedures that it performs in order to receive official
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") fuel economy ratings were
not accurate and as a result the Class Vehicles' fuel economy had
been overstated.

The EPA fuel economy ratings, which Defendant represented as
accurate on each of its Class Vehicle's federally mandated windows
stickers and in its various advertising statements regarding such
vehicles, materially overstated the Class Vehicles' real mileage
per gallon ("MPG") and fuel economy which required accurate testing
pursuant to federal mandate would otherwise have produced.

Ford has now admitted that its testing methods were incorrect and
produced artificially high fuel economy ratings. These
misstatements are material because the EPA numbers provide a
necessary tool for vehicle comparison for consumers when evaluating
vehicles to lease or purchase, the lawsuit says.

These fuel economy ratings, resulting from mandated tests outlined
and specified in federal law, exist to help foster realistic
metrics so that consumers can compare them with vehicles of other
manufacturers. These metrics are one of the most important factors
in a new-car buyers' purchase decisions.

Ford Motor Company is an American multinational automaker that has
its main headquarters in Dearborn, Michigan, a suburb of Detroit.
It was founded by Henry Ford and incorporated on June 16, 1903.
The company sells automobiles and commercial vehicles under the
Ford brand and most luxury cars under the Lincoln brand.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs and the Putative Class are:

          Melissa Emert, Esq.
          Howard T. Longman, Esq.
          STULL, STULL & BRODY
          6 East 45th Street, Suite 500
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 687-7230

               - and -

          Gary S. Graifman, Esq.
          KANTROWITZ, GOLDHAMER & GRAIFMAN, P.C.
          747 Chestnut Ridge Road
          Chestnut Ridge, NY 10977
          Telephone: (845) 356-2570

GLOBAL EQUITY: Winters Sues over Unsolicited Telephone Calls
------------------------------------------------------------
RICHARD WINTERS JR., individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. GLOBAL EQUITY FINANCE, INC.;
and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, the Defendants, Case No.
3:19-cv-01276-WQH-L (S.D. Cal., July 10, 2019), contends that the
Defendant promotes and markets its merchandise, in part, by
contacting unsolicited telephone calls to phone users, in violation
of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

The Plaintiff seeks damages and any other available legal or
equitable remedies resulting from the illegal actions of the
Defendant in negligently, knowingly, and/or willfully contacting
Plaintiff on Plaintiff's cellular telephone, thereby invading
Plaintiff's privacy, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Global Equity specializes in mortgage refinancing.

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Meghan E. George, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: 323-306-4234
          Facsimile: 866-633-0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                  mgeorge@toddflaw.com
                  abacon@toddflaw.com

GLOBAL MEDIATION: Larmer Sues Over FDCPA Violation
--------------------------------------------------
HAROULA LARMER, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. GLOBAL MEDIATION GROUP, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 9:19-cv-80831-XXXX (S.D. Fla., June 24, 2019) is an action
for damages and other relief for violation of the Federal Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA").

The Defendant was attempting to collect was an obligation or
alleged obligation of the Plaintiff to pay money arising out of a
transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services
which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for
personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not such
obligation had been reduced to judgment within the meaning of the
FDCPA. The Defendant is not the original creditor of the
Plaintiff's debt and is not the owner of the Plaintiff's debt. The
Defendant used the telephone in their attempt to collect consumer
debts allegedly owed by the Plaintiff by sending recorded
telephonic debt collection demands to the Plaintiff and/or the
Plaintiff's counsel.

The Defendant's initial communication with the Plaintiff was an
oral communication on the telephone with the Plaintiff and/or
Plaintiff's counsel in February 2019. The calls consisted of one of
two recorded messages. The messages were falsely represented the
services rendered by Global Mediation Group as a mediation firm
whose name is an affirmative declaration that the Defendant is not
actually a debt collector but is a mediator. However, the Defendant
is a debt collector. And, the Defendant is not a mediator as the
least sophisticated consumer would understand a mediator to be an
impartial go-between who does not represent either party or
actively solicit on anyone's behalf but is chosen by both parties
to reach a voluntary and amicable settlement of an issue, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff is a resident of Palm Beach County, Florida.

Defendant represents themselves to be a debt collector in
advertisements; and, the Defendant is a holder of a State of
Florida debt collector's license.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     John J.R. Skrandel, Esq.
     Jerome F. Skrandel, PL
     P.O. Box 14759
     North Palm Beach, FL 33408
     Phone: (561) 863-1605
     Email: JFSPA@MSN.COM


HARBOR FREIGHT: Richardson Suit Moved to S.D. Illinois
------------------------------------------------------
The case, Skyla Richardson, individually and on behalf of all other
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Harbor Freight Tools USA,
Inc., the Defendant, Case No. 19-L-0374, was removed from the St.
Clair County Court, Illinois, to the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Illinois (East St. Louis) on June 28, 2019.
The Southern District of Illinois Court Clerk assigned Case No.
3:19-cv-00705-SMY-MAB to the proceeding. The case is assigned to
the Hon. Judge Staci M. Yandle.

Harbor Freight is a privately held discount tool and equipment
retailer, headquartered in Calabasas, California, which operates a
chain of retail stores as well as a mail-order and eCommerce
business.[BN]

Attorneys for Skyla Richardson individually and on behalf of all
other similarly situated are:

          Brandon M. Wise, Esq.
          PEIFFER WOLF CARR & KANE, APLC
          818 Lafayette Avenue, Floor 2
          St. Louis, MO 63104
          Telephone (314) 833-4825
          E-mail: bwise@pwcklegal.com

Attorneys for Harbor Freight Tools USA, Inc.:

          Maria A. Boelen, Esq.
          BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP
          One North Wacker Drive, Suite 4500
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 416-6200
          Facsimile: (312) 416-6201
          E-mail: mboelen@bakerlaw.com

               - and -

          Russell K. Scott, Esq.
          GREENSFELDER, HEMKER & GALE, P.C.
          12 Wolf Creek Drive, Suite 100
          Belleville, IL 62226
          Telephone: (618) 257-7308
          E-mail: rks@greensfelder.com

HEALTH INSURANCE: Non-Disclosure of Confidential Info Order Issued
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California issued an Order requiring Non-Disclosure of Confidential
Information in the case captioned KENNETH J. MOSER, individually,
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v.
HEALTH INSURANCE INNOVATIONS, INC., a Delaware corporation, et al.,
Defendants. Case No. 17cv1127-WQH(KSC). (S.D. Cal.).

Before the Court for in camera review are copies of Settlement
Agreements containing confidentiality clauses that plaintiff
executed in other litigation involving alleged violations of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA).

The Plaintiff alleges the defendants violated the TCPA by making
multiple, unauthorized calls to his cellular and residential
telephones using an automatic dialing system or artificial,
pre-recorded voice.

Defendant Health Insurance Innovations, Inc. (HII) served plaintiff
with discovery requests, including Interrogatory Nos. 10 and 23,
which requested identification of other TCPA lawsuits in which
plaintiff was a party, as well as any such cases plaintiff settled
or resolved in his favor; the amounts of any monetary settlements
he received; and the identities of any parties who paid any
settlement amounts.

In response to the Court's December 21, 2018 Order, plaintiff filed
Objections with the District Court. Plaintiff's objections included
an argument that he should not be required to disclose Settlement
Agreements from other TCPA cases in response to Interrogatory Nos.
10 and 23, if the Settlement Agreements in those cases include a
confidentiality provision, unless there is some procedure for the
other parties in these cases to assert their rights to privacy.   

As to Document Request No. 39, plaintiff contends he should not be
required to produce a responsive deposition transcript, because it
is covered under a confidentiality provision in the settlement of a
case entitled Moser v. American Pacific Mortgage Corp., San Diego
Superior Court Case No. 37-2014-21690-CU-BT-CTL. However, plaintiff
did not submit a copy of the Settlement Agreement in this case for
in camera review as proof that the responsive deposition transcript
is covered by a confidentiality provision.

With respect to the discovery dispute between defendant HII and
plaintiff, the District Court overruled plaintiff's objections to
this Court's December 21, 2018 Order. However, the District Court
directed plaintiff to produce any settlement agreements containing
confidentiality provisions to this Court for an in camera review to
determine what, if any, procedures are necessary to allow third
parties to assert any privacy rights they may have under the
agreements. Pursuant to the District Court's direction, plaintiff
submitted a stack of settlement agreements for in camera review.

In Camera Review

The Plaintiff represents that nearly all the various settlement
agreements resolving plaintiff's other TCPA cases have
confidentiality clauses requiring notice be given if a Court
requires disclosure, and those third parties should have some sort
of procedure to assert their privacy rights if they wish to do so.

In plaintiff's view, the Court should set a timeline to allow for
objection by third parties and some procedure if they wish to
assert their privacy rights.  However, plaintiff has not presented,
and this Court was unable to locate, any controlling authority or
evidence to support plaintiffs contention that the Court must use a
notice and objection procedure before the Settlement Agreements
submitted for in camera review can be disclosed to defendants.

After eliminating duplicate copies, the Court reviewed 35
settlement agreements that were submitted by plaintiff for in
camera review. Pursuant to this review, the Court makes the
following findings, inter alia:

   1. Contrary to plaintiff's contention, the Court was unable to
locate any clauses requiring notice to non-parties in the event one
of the parties is ordered to disclose any of the contents of the
agreements.

   2. Most of the Settlement Agreements submitted for in camera
review are between plaintiff and a business or businesses, but a
few of the parties to the agreements are individuals.

   3. Most of the Settlement Agreements submitted for in camera
review do have a confidentiality provision. However, with only two
exceptions identified in Nos. 4 and 5, these Settlement Agreements
expressly allow for disclosure under certain circumstances.
Although the wording is slightly different in some agreements, they
generally indicate that the parties can disclose the contents of
the agreements "to the extent compelled to do so by the law or
pursuant to lawful subpoena. In other words, these parties
expressly anticipated that the confidential terms could be
disclosed in the future pursuant to a lawful subpoena or court
order.  

Privacy and Confidentiality Considerations.

Federal Courts have typically found that a settlement agreement is
discoverable despite a confidential designation, especially when
there is a protective order in place to prevent unauthorized
disclosure.

Although parties to litigation can agree that they would not
voluntarily disclose any information" related to a settlement,
disclosure would be authorized without a breach of the agreement if
a third party has a legal right of access. If this were not the
case, parties to litigation would be able to buy the silence of
witnesses with a settlement agreement when the facts of one
controversy are relevant to another.

The Settlement Agreements submitted for in camera review each
include a single piece of financial information the amounts paid to
settle the claims. Although there is no complete bar to discovery,
financial information is protected by the right to privacy under
California law and these privacy rights are generally recognized in
federal court. If the balance of interests weighs in favor of
production, any privacy concerns can be addressed with a protective
order.  

Here, most of the parties to the Settlement Agreements, other than
plaintiff, are corporations or limited liability companies and
therefore do not fit the definition of a consumer. In addition, the
Settlement Agreements are not being sought from a non-party witness
by way of a subpoena duces tecum. Rather, defendants have requested
information from plaintiff that is included in records presumably
maintained in plaintiff's possession, custody, or control.

The California Supreme Court has also concluded that notice and an
opportunity to object are appropriate in the context of class
actions or other representative litigation, such as a suit under
the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA), to address the minimal
privacy interests involved when the named plaintiff in such an
action seeks contact information for other potential class members,
percipient witnesses, or other individuals potentially affected by
the outcome of the action.  

Under the circumstances presented, this Court concludes as follows:
First, it would be too burdensome to require plaintiff to produce
the one settlement agreement executed on April 17, 2015 that
includes a confidentiality clause and a forfeiture clause. To
produce this agreement without potentially serious consequences,
plaintiff would first have to pursue a modification of the
agreement. Standing alone, this specific agreement may include some
relevant information. However, without more, this single agreement
is not important enough to require plaintiff to pursue a
modification. Enough information about plaintiff's credibility and
ability to adequately represent the interests of the class can be
gleaned from the information included in the other agreements that
plaintiff will be required to disclose, as outlined below.

Second, the parties to all other Settlement Agreements submitted
for in camera review have diminished expectations of privacy under
the circumstances, because the agreements either do not include a
confidentiality clause (i.e., the agreement mentioned above that
was executed on August 31, 2010) or include an exception to the
confidentiality clause if there is a lawful subpoena or court
order. As to the agreements that include an exception to the
confidentiality clause when there is a lawful subpoena or court
order, it is apparent that the parties anticipated the agreements
might someday become relevant and discoverable in another action.

The Plaintiff is not required to disclose any information included
in the Settlement Agreement executed on April 17, 2015 that
contains a confidentiality clause and a forfeiture clause, because
it would be too burdensome to require plaintiff to suffer a
forfeiture or to seek modification of the agreement to avoid a
forfeiture.

As to all other Settlement Agreements submitted for in camera
review, there is good cause under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(c) to issue a Protective Order to safeguard any privacy
interests that individual parties, other than plaintiff, may have
in maintaining the confidentiality of the financial information in
these Settlement Agreements. Regardless of whether these agreements
include a confidentiality provision, individuals have a limited
right to privacy of their financial information under California
law. Therefore, the names of these individuals need not be
disclosed to defendants and must be redacted from any copies of
Settlement Agreements produced to defendants.

Since the identities of individuals will not be disclosed, notice
and an opportunity to object is not necessary under the
circumstances to protect individual financial privacy interests.

As to the non-party businesses named in the Settlement Agreements,
their privacy interests can be adequately protected by disclosing
the requested information, including the names of the business(es),
subject to the confidentiality Protective Order in this case under
the designation of CONFIDENTIAL FOR COUNSEL ONLY.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 8, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y2st4w4m from Leagle.com.

Kenneth J. Moser, individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher Reichman
-- ChrisR@Prato-Reichman.com -- Prato & Reichman, APC, Jeffrey
Braillard Cereghino -- jbc@rocklawcal.com -- Cereghino Law Group,
Justin M. Prato -- jmprato@gmail.com -- Prato & Reichman, APC &
Matt J. Malone, Rock Law LLP, 20525 Center Ridge Rd., Suite #612
Rocky River, OH 44116.

Health Insurance Innovations, Inc., a Delaware Corporation,
Defendant, represented by Anton N. Handal -- tony.handal@gmlaw.com
-- Greenspoon Marder LLP, Dariel Jonathan Abrahamy --
ariel.abrahamy@gmlaw.com -- Greenspoon Marder LLP, pro hac vice &
Garry W. O'Donnell -- garry.odonnell@gmlaw.com -- Greenspoon
Marder, P.A., pro hac vice.

National Congress of Employers, Inc., a Delaware Corporation,
Defendant, represented by Barton H. Hegeler, Hegler & Anderson,
Ethan T. Litney, Hegeler & Anderson, A.P.C. & Sarah M. Reddiconto,
Hegeler & Anderson, A.P.C., 4660 La Jolla Village Drive Suite 670,
San Diego, CA, 92122


HERALD SQUARE: Oropeza Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
------------------------------------------------------
JAFET OROPEZA, on behalf of himself, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and
the Class, Plaintiff, v. HERALD SQUARE ENTERPRISES INC, d/b/a RAG
TRADER, MFRF ENTERPRISES INC, d/b/a STREET TACO, GREENE STREET
ENTERPRISES INC, d/b/a WHITE OAK TAVERN, MURRAY HILLS ENTERPRISES
INC, d/b/a CASK BAR & KITCHEN and MARK FOX, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-05918 (S.D. N.Y., June 24, 2019) is a Class and Collective
Action
Complaint against Defendants pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards
Act ("FLSA") and the New York Labor Law ("NYLL"), that he and
others similarly situated are entitled to recover from Defendants:
unpaid overtime, unreimbursed uniform costs, statutory penalties,
liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees and costs.

Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, and Class members regularly
worked hours in excess of 40, but Defendants unlawfully failed to
pay Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, and Class Members either
the proper FLSA overtime rate or the proper New York State overtime
rate (of time and one-half) for hours worked in excess of 40. The
Defendants unlawfully failed to pay Plaintiff, FLSA Collective
Plaintiffs, and members of the Class either the FLSA overtime rate
(of time and one-half) or the New York State overtime rate (of time
and one-half) for hours they worked in excess of 40 each workweek,
says the complaint.

Plaintiff JAFET OROPEZA was hired by Defendants as a busser at "Rag
Trader" in or around December 2017. In or around July 2018,
Plaintiff started working for Defendants in dual positions as a
porter and as a busser.

Defendants collectively own and operate four restaurants at the
following locations in New York: "Rag Trader" - 70 West 36th
Street, New York, NY 10018; "Street Taco" - 358 3rd Avenue, New
York, NY 10016; "White Oak Tavern" - 21 Waverly Place, New York, NY
10003; and "Cask Bar & Kitchen" - 167 East 33rd Street, New York,
NY 10016.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     C.K. Lee, Esq.
     Brandon Sherr, Esq.
     LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
     148 West 24th Street, 8th Floor
     New York, NY 10011
     Phone: 212-465-1188
     Fax: 212-465-1181


HOME TO COMMUNITY: Wilson Seeks Overtime Pay for Caregivers
-----------------------------------------------------------
ROSALIND WILSON, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the  Plaintiff, vs. HOME TO COMMUNITY LIVING, INC., the
Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-00480-BSM (E.D. Ark., July 9, 2019),
seeks declaratory judgment, monetary damages, liquidated damages,
prejudgment interest, and costs, including reasonable attorneys'
fees, as a result of Defendant's failure to pay Plaintiff and other
direct caregivers lawful overtime compensation for hours worked in
excess of 40 hours per week under the Fair Labor Standards Act, and
the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant routinely scheduled
Plaintiff and other direct caregivers to work more than 40 hours in
a single workweek.  In most workweeks, Plaintiff worked
approximately 70 hours per week for Defendant. Other direct
caregivers were scheduled to work similar hours.

The Defendant did not pay Plaintiff and other direct caregivers one
and one half times their regular rate for any hours worked in
excess of 40 hours per workweek; rather, Defendant paid them their
regular hourly rates for all recorded hours worked, the lawsuit
says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff is:

          Stacy Gibson, Esq.
          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          One Financial Center
          650 South Shackleford, Suite 411
          Little Rock, AR 72211
          Telephone: (501) 221 0088
          Facsimile: (888) 787 2040
          E-mail: stacy@sanfordlawfirm.com
                  josh@sanfordlawfirm.com

INTERNATIONAL CARS: Parker Seeks Overtime pay for Salesmen
----------------------------------------------------------
CHERYL PARKER; on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. INTERNATIONAL CARS LTD., INC.;
DANVERS ICL 1, LLC d/b/a HONDA NORTH; RICHARD COLLINS,
individually; MARSHALL JESPERSEN, individually, the Defendants,
Case No. 1977CV00952D (Mass. Super., June 28, 2019), alleges that
Defendants did not pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated sales
employees at the Dealerships an hourly rate equal to one and
one-half times their regular hourly rate for all of the hours that
they worked on one or more Sundays.

In compliance with M.G.L. c. 149, section 150, a non-payment of
wage and workplace complaint form was filed for Plaintiff with the
Massachusetts Office of the Attorney General prior to initiating
this action.

The Defendants have employed Plaintiff as a car saleswoman in
Massachusetts from in or about February 2012 through the present.

The Defendants were aware that Plaintiff and their other similarly
situated sales employees at the Dealerships worked in excess of 40
hours in a week during one or more workweeks during the three years
preceding the filing date of this action. At no point in time did
Defendants instruct Plaintiff or their other similarly situated
sales employees at the Dealerships that they could not work in
excess of 40 hours in a workweek.

During the three years preceding the filing date of this action,
the Defendants required that Plaintiff and their other similarly
situated sales employees at the Dealerships work on a Sunday during
one or more workweeks.

International Cars Ltd., Inc. ("ICL") operates a chain of six
automobile dealerships known as "International Cars, Ltd." ICL
functions as a parent company or management company that centrally
operates, controls, oversees, and/or otherwise directs all aspects
of employment matters and general business operations for each of
the dealerships that comprise International Cars, Ltd.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Brook S. Lane, Esq.
          FAIR WORK, P.C.
          192 South Street, Suite 450
          Boston, MA 02111
          Telephone: 617-607-3260
          E-mail: brook@fairworklaw.com

JACK IN THE BOX: Faces Desalvo ADA Suit in C.D. California
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Jack In The Box, Inc.
The case captioned as Brett Desalvo individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Jack In The Box,
Inc., a Delaware corporation, and Does 1 to 10, inclusive, the
Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-05648-DSF-AFM (C.D. Cal., June 28,
2019). The suit alleges violation of Americans with Disabilities
Act. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Dale S. Fischer.

Jack in the Box is an American fast-food restaurant chain founded
February 21, 1951, by Robert O. Peterson in San Diego, California,
where it is headquartered. The chain has 2,200 locations, primarily
serving the West Coast of the United States.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Thiago Merlini Coelho, Esq.
          Babak Bobby Saadian, Esq.
          WILSHIRE LAW FIRM
          3055 Wilshire Boulevard 12th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Telephone: (213) 381-9988
          Facsimile: (213) 381-9989
          E-mail: thiago@wilshirelawfirm.com
                  bobby@wilshirelawfirm.com

JACKTHREADS, INC: Faces Traynor Suit in Southern Dist. of New York
------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Jackthreads, Inc. The
case is captioned as Yaseen Traynor also known as: Yaseen Traylor
on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, vs. Jackthreads, Inc., the Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-06057-ER (S.D.N.Y., June 28, 2019). The suit alleges
violation of Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is assigned
to the Hon. Judge Edgardo Ramos.

Jackthreads, Inc. operates as an online retailer of clothing,
shoes, and accessories for men. It sells outerwear, suits,
sweaters, shirts, tees, sweatshirts, pants, jeans, shorts, blazers,
underwear, and socks; boots, slip-ons, sneakers, and dress shoes;
and bags, watches, ties, wallets, hats, sunglasses, sporting goods,
gloves, jewelry, grooming products, and home essentials and room
accessories, as well as wireless and Bluetooth headphones, phones
chargers, cases for portable speakers, headphones, and others.
Jackthreads, Inc. is based in New York, New York.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiff is:

          David Paul Force, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Telephone: (201) 282-6500
          E-mail: dforce@steinsakslegal.com

KANSAS CITY LIFE: Meek Sues Over Breach of Contract
---------------------------------------------------
CHRISTOPHER Y. MEEK, Individually and On Behalf Of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. KANSAS CITY LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-00472-JTM (W.D. Mo., June 18,
2019) is a class action for breach of contract and conversion to
recover amounts that Defendant charged Plaintiff and the proposed
class in excess of amounts authorized by the express terms of their
life insurance policies.

The terms of Plaintiff's life insurance policy provide for a "cash
value" consisting of monies held in trust by Defendant for
Plaintiff, and Defendant is contractually bound to deduct from the
cash value only those charges that are explicitly identified and
authorized by the policy's terms. Despite unambiguous language in
the policy, which is a fully integrated insurance agreement,
Defendant breaches the policy by deducting charges from Plaintiff's
cash value in excess of the amounts specifically permitted by the
policy. Defendant has breached the policy repeatedly and continues
to do so. The Defendant has caused material harm to Plaintiff and
the proposed class by improperly draining monies they have
accumulated in the cash values under their policies. Every
unauthorized dollar taken from policy owners is one less dollar
that can be used to: earn interest; pay future premiums; increase
the death benefit; use as collateral for policy loans; or withdraw
as cash, says the complaint.

Plaintiff purchased from Defendant a "Flexible Premium Adjustable
Death Benefit Life Policy" bearing policy number 2282560, with an
issue date of October 9, 1984, a policy date of October 18, 1984,
and an initial specified amount of $60,000 (the "Policy").

Kansas City Life Insurance Company is a corporation incorporated
under the laws of the State of Missouri, with its principal place
of business in Kansas City, Missouri.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Patrick J. Stueve, Esq.
     Ethan M. Lange, Esq.
     STUEVE SIEGEL HANSON LLP
     460 Nichols Road, Suite 200
     Kansas City, MO 64112
     Phone: 816-714-7100
     Facsimile: 816-714-7101
     Email: stueve@stuevesiegel.com
            lange@stuevesiegel.com

          - and -

     John J. Schirger, Esq.
     Matthew W. Lytle, Esq.
     Joseph M. Feierabend, Esq.
     MILLER SCHIRGER, LLC
     4520 Main Street, Suite 1570
     Kansas City, MO 64111
     Phone: 816-561-6500
     Facsimile: 816-561-6501
     Email: jschirger@millerschirger.com
            mlytle@millerschirger.com
            jfeierabend@millerschirger.com



KARABINIS DINER: Ortiz Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
---------------------------------------------------------------
JOSE SALAZAR ORTIZ, FLORENCIO RIVERA RODRIGUEZ, FELIX ORTEGA
PACHECO, GONZALO MARTINEZ, JUAN CAMPOS TREJO, PLUTARCO NAVARRETE
CABANAS, and FOTIS LOUZAKOS, Individually and on Behalf of All
Putative Class Members, Plaintiffs, v. KARABINIS DINER CORP. d/b/a
OASIS DINER, AINOS REALTY CORP., PETROS LIBERATOS, HELEN LIBERATOS,
and GEORGE LIBERATOS, Jointly and Severally, Defendants, Case No.
513496/2019 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Kings Cty., June 18, 2019) is an action
to recover unpaid minimum wages and overtime premium pay owed to
them pursuant to the New York Labor Law ("NYLL"). Plaintiffs also
bring claims for unpaid spread-of-hours premiums, and for failure
to provide proper wage notices and wage statements pursuant to NYLL
and the supporting regulations.

For their work, throughout the relevant time period, Plaintiffs
were not paid minimum wages for all hours worked and were not paid
overtime premiums for hours worked over 40 in a given workweek,
says the complaint.

Plaintiffs are current and former dishwashers, delivery employees,
bussers, line cooks and bakers at Defendants' diner located in
Brooklyn, New York.

Defendants have owned and operated the Oasis Diner through the
Corporate Defendants since in or around 2007, although the Oasis
Diner has been open through different corporations and owners,
since in or around 1984.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Brent E. Pelton, Esq.
     Taylor B. Graham, Esq.
     PELTON GRAHAM LLC
     111 Broadway, Suite 1503
     New York, NY 10006
     Phone: (212) 385-9700
     Facsimile: (212) 385-0800


KIA MOTORS: Russell Sues over Vehicle Warranty Obligations
----------------------------------------------------------
TRACY RUSSELL, an individual, the Plaintiff, vs. KIA MOTORS
AMERICA, INC., a California Corporation; and DOES 1 through 20,
inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. 19STCV22828 (Cal. Super. Ct.,
June 28, 2019), targets the warranty obligations of Kia Motors for
a vehicle purchased by the Plaintiff and for which Kia issued a
written warranty.

On or about July 01, 2013, the Plaintiff purchased a new 2013 Kia
Optima, vehicle identification number 5XXGM4A77DG220746, which was
manufactured and or distributed by Defendant. The Subject Vehicle
was leased or used primarily for personal, family, or household
purposes. Plaintiff leased the Subject Vehicle from a person or
entity engaged in the business of manufacturing, distributing, or
selling consumer good at retail.

In connection with the purchase, the Plaintiff received an express
written warranty, including, a 5-year / 60,000 mile express bumper
to bumper warranty, a 10 year/100,000 mile powertrain warranty
which, inter alia, covers the engine and transmission, and
subsequently received a 10-year/120,000 mile extended coverage plan
(e.g. extended warranty) which covers Theta 2.0- 2 liter and 2.4
liter gasoline direct injection engines (the "GDI Engines")
installed in certain Kia Optima, Spoilage, and Sorrento vehicles.

The Defendant undertook to preserve or maintain the utility or
performance for a specified period of time. The warranty provided,
in relevant period, Plaintiff could deliver the Vehicle for repair
services to Defendant's representative and the Subject Vehicle
would be repaired.

During the warranty period, the Vehicle contained or developed
defects, including but not limited to, latent defects causing oil
flow to become restricted through vital areas of the engine
resulting in engine failure; defects related to the engine's rod
bearings; defects related to the engine; defects requiring the
performance of Recall 17V224; defects requiring the performance of
Recall 18V907; defects requiring the performance of the Campaign SC
147; defects requiring the performance of the Campaign PI 1803;
defects causing the Vehicle not to start; defects causing the
battery to be replaced; defects causing the starter to fail
internally; defects causing an internal short; defects causing the
battery to fail; defects necessitating the replacement of the
starter assembly; defects related to the vehicle alarm going off
randomly, and/or any other defects enumerated in the Vehicle's
repair history.  The defects substantially impair the use, value,
or safety of the Subject Vehicle. As a result of the defects and
non-conformities, the Vehicle qualified for repurchase pursuant to
the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, the lawsuit says.

Kia Motors is engaged in the manufacture, sale, distribution,
and/or importing of Kia motor vehicles and related equipment.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiff is:

          Guy Mizrahi, Esq.
          JOURNEY LAW GROUP, INC.
          1762 Westwood Blvd., Suite 260
          Los Angeles, CA 90024
          Telephone: 424 206 4303
          Facsimile: 424 220 7388

KINJO INC: Cruz Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
--------------------------------------------------------
MANUEL CRUZ and FERNANDO PEREZ, on behalf of themselves and the
Class, Plaintiffs, v. KINJO, INC. d/b/a GunBae, ANDY LAU, and
RAYMOND [LNU], Defendants, Case No. 156042/2019 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., New
York Cty., June 18, 2019) is a Complaint against Defendants
alleging, pursuant to the New York Labor Law, that they are
entitled to recover from Defendants: unpaid overtime wages, unpaid
minimum wages, unpaid wages due to time-shaving, unlawfully
retained tips, lost wages due to invalid meal credit deductions,
damages for unlawful retaliation, liquidated damages, statutory
penalties, and attorneys' fees and costs.

The Defendants knowingly and willfully violated Plaintiffs' and
Class members' rights by failing to pay them overtime compensation
at the statutory rate of time-and-one-half for their hours worked
in excess of 40 hours per workweek. The Defendants knowingly and
willfully violated Plaintiffs' and Class members' rights by failing
to pay them minimum wages in the lawful amount for hours worked.
Defendants were not entitled to claim any tip credits under the New
York Labor Law, says the complaint.

Plaintiffs were hired by Defendants and/or their predecessors, as
applicable, to work as a delivery persons for Defendants'
restaurant.

KINJO, INC. d/b/a GunBae is a domestic business corporation
organized under the laws of New York State.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     C.K. Lee, Esq.
     Anne Seelig, Esq.
     LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
     148 West 24th Street, Eighth Floor
     New York, NY 10011
     Phone: 212-465-1188
     Fax: 212-465-1181


KLARNA, INC: Robinson Sues over Consumer Background Check
---------------------------------------------------------
SHEFFIE ROBINSON, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. KLARNA, INC., the Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-03009-CAP-LTW (N.D. Ga., June 28, 2019), alleges that
Klarna routinely, and as a matter of policy and practice, obtains
consumer reports on individuals who apply for merchant services on
behalf of corporate applicants.

Klarna's website states that Klarna was founded "with the aim
making it easier for people to shop online".  Klarna accomplishes
this by contracting with merchants to offer alternative online
payment options for the customers of those merchants.

According to the complaint, Klarna offers customers of those
merchants the option to finance any payment owed to the merchant.
Customers of those merchants can elect to finance any payment owed
to the merchant, subject to Klarna's sole discretion, through
products offered by Klarna, or through products offered by third
parties, such as debit cards, credit cards, ACH or other means of
bank transfer.

Merchants that contract with Klarna enable their customers to pay
for goods and services by integrating the "Klarna Payments"
interface on the merchant's electronic checkout page.

Touco Direct, LLC ("Touco") is a Georgia limited liability
corporation which designs and manages websites for its customers.
Plaintiff Sheffie Robinson is the owner of Touco.

In April 2019, Touco began investigating the possibility of
contracting with Klarna for the purpose of giving its customers
access to the financing options offered by Klarna.

Ms. Robinson completed those portions of the MSA on Touco's behalf.
She also signed the MSA on Touco's behalf on May 1, 2019. Ms.
Robinson did not complete any portions of the MSA in her individual
capacity, nor did she sign the MSA in her individual capacity.

The completed portions of the MSA included the sections entitled
"Basic Merchant Information", "Merchant Bank Account", and a
portion identifying the selected payment options to be offered.

On May 6, 2019, a Klarna employee who identified herself as Spring
Koger told Ms. Robinson that Klarna had obtained a criminal
background check on Ms. Robinson and it had decided not to contract
with Touco based on the results of Ms. Robinson's criminal
background check.

The criminal background check that Klarna obtained on Ms. Robinson
was a "consumer report" pursuant to 15 U.S.C. section 1681a(d).
Klarna did not inform Ms. Robinson that it would obtain a criminal
background check on her as part of Touco's application for merchant
services through Klarna.

Klarna did not have any permissible purpose to obtain a consumer
report on Ms. Robinson. Klarna recklessly and willfully violated 15
U.S.C. 1681b(f) when it obtained a consumer report on Ms. Robinson,
without a permissible purpose.

As a proximate result of Klarna's reckless and willful violations
of the FCRA, including 15 U.S.C. section 1681b(f), Ms. Robinson has
suffered actual damages, including without limitation, invasion of
privacy.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff are:

          Craig E. Bertschi, Esq.
          Charles J. Cole, Esq.
          MCRAE BERTSCHI & COLE LLC
          Suite 200, 1350 Center Drive
          Dunwoody, GA 30338
          Telephone: 678 999 1102
          E-mail: ceb@mcraebertschi.com
                  cjc@mcraebertschi.com

LABORATORY CORPORATION: Brown-Wells Sues over Medical Data Breach
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DENISE BROWN-WELLS, individually and  on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. LABORATORY CORPORATION OF AMERICA
HOLDINGS, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00627 (M.D.N.C., June 24,
2019) is an action against the Defendant for its failure to
properly secure and safeguard protected health information ("PHI"),
medical information, and other personally identifiable
information.

According to the complaint, on June 4, 2019, the Defendant publicly
announced that its billing collections vendor, American Medical
Collection Agency, had been breached exposing the PII of as many as
7.7 million the Defendant customers whose data was stored on the
affected system.

The Data Breach occurred between August 1, 2018 and March 30, 2019.
Despite the breadth and sensitivity of the PII that was exposed,
and the attendant consequences to patients as a result thereof, the
Defendant failed to disclose the Data Breach for nearly two months
from the time it was first discovered, further exacerbating harm to
patients. Moreover, to date, the Defendant has not disclosed the
full extent and nature of the Data Breach, nor offered anything to
its patients to address and compensate for the harm they have
suffered.

This Data Breach was a direct result of the Defendant's failure to
implement adequate and reasonable cyber-security procedures and
protocols necessary to protect Patient PII.

Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings operates as an
independent clinical laboratory company worldwide. Laboratory
Corporation of America Holdings has collaborations with the Boston
University, Columbia University, Duke University, Johns Hopkins
University, The Mount Sinai Hospital, the University of Tennessee,
Yale University, and QIAGEN N.V. The company was founded in 1971
and is headquartered in Burlington, North Carolina. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jean S. Martin, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN
          COMPLEX LITIGATION GROUP
          2018 Eastwood Road, Ste. 225
          Wilmington, NC 28403
          Telephone: (813) 559-4908
          Facsimile: (813) 222-4795
          E-mail: jeanmartin@forthepeople.com

               - and -

          John A. Yanchunis, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN
          COMPLEX LITIGATION GROUP
          201 N. Franklin Street, 7th Floor
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 223-5505
          E-mail: jyanchunis@forthepeople.com


LIVE WELL FINANCIAL: Williams Sues Over WARN Act Violations
-----------------------------------------------------------
MONICA WILLIAMS on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. LIVE WELL FINANCIAL, INC., Defendant, Case
No. 19-50262-LSS (D. Del., June 18, 2019) is an action on behalf of
herself, and other similarly situated former employees who worked
for Defendant and who were terminated without cause as part of, or
as the result of, mass layoffs or plant closings ordered by
Defendant on or about May 3, 2019 and within 30 days of that date,
who were not provided 60 days advance written notice of their
terminations by Defendant, as required by the Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification Act ("WARN Act"), and the California Labor
Code ("Cal WARN Act"), (together the "WARN Acts").

Plaintiff was terminated along with approximately 125 other
similarly situated employees as part of, or as the foreseeable
result of, a mass layoff or plant shutdown ordered by Defendant.
These terminations failed to give Plaintiff and other similarly
situated employees of Defendant at least 60 days' advance notice of
termination, as required by the WARN Acts, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Monica Williams was employed by Defendant as a Loan
Account Manager and worked at the Defendant's facility until her
termination on or about May 3, 2019.

Defendant is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
business located at the Headquarters Facility, and it conducted
business in this district.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Christopher D. Loizides, Esq.
     LOIZIDES, P.A.
     1225 King Street, Suite 800
     Wilmington, DE 19801
     Phone: (302) 654-0248
     Facsimile: (302) 654-0728
     Email: loizides@loizides.com

          - and -

     Jack A. Raisner, Esq.
     René S. Roupinian, Esq.
     OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP
     685 Third Avenue, 25th Floor
     New York, NY 10017
     Phone: (212) 245-1000
     Facsimile: (646) 509-2060
     Email: jar@outtengolden.com
            rsr@outtengolden.com


LONE STAR: Bid for Default Judgment Granted in Part
---------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as JALELISA JEFFERY,
individually and on behalf of similarly situated persons, the
Plaintiff, vs. LONE STAR PJS LLC; and YASIN M. CHOUDRY, the
Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-2901 (Filed Oct. 31, 2018), the Hon.
Judge Barbara M. G. Lynn entered an order on July 10, 2019,
granting in part Plaintiff's motion for default judgment.

The Court will enter a separate final judgment as to Defendant Lone
Star PJS. The Clerk of the Court is directed to sever Plaintiff's
claim against Defendant Choudry from this case and assign a new
case number to the severed action. Plaintiff shall have 90 days
from the date of this Order to file an amended complaint in the
severed action. The new Case No. 3:19-cv-1649-M is opened.

Jalelisa Jeffery, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, seeks to recover for Defendants' violations of the Fair
Standards Act of 1938.

The Defendants operate numerous Papa John's franchise stores.
Defendants employ delivery drivers who use their own automobiles to
deliver pizza and other food items to their customers. However,
instead of reimbursing delivery drivers for the reasonably
approximate costs of the business use of their vehicles, Defendants
use a flawed method to determine reimbursement rates that provides
such an unreasonably low rate beneath any reasonable approximation
of the expenses they incur that the drivers' unreimbursed expenses
cause their wages to fall below the federal minimum wage during
some or all workweeks, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          J. Forester, Esq.
          FORESTER HAYNIE PLLC
          1701 N. Market Street, Suite 210
          Dallas, TX 75202
          Telephone: (214) 210-2100
          Facsimile: (214) 346-5909
          www.foresterhaynie.com

LYONS DOUGHTY: 3d Cir. Flips G. Gross's FDCPA Suit Dismissal
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, issued an
Opinion reversing the District Court's judgment granting
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned GLENN D. GROSS,
on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Appellant, v.
LYONS DOUGHTY & VELDHUIS, P.C. No. 19-1031.(3rd Cir.).

Glenn D. Gross sued debt collector Lyons Doughty & Veldhuis, P.C.
(LDV) for violating the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA),
alleging that its debt collection letter failed to identify the
creditor, as required by 15 U.S.C. Section 1692g(a)(2). Gross
averred that at least four entities were connected in some way with
the debt Capital One Bank, HSBC Bank, RCS Direct Marketing, and
Orchard Bank but the letter did not explicitly identify the
creditor to whom the debt was owed.

The District Court dismissed Gross's complaint under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), holding that LDV's letter sufficiently
identified Capital One Bank as the creditor and thus complied with
Section 1692g(a)(2).

The FDCPA provides a cause of action against debt collectors who
violate its provisions. To prevail, a plaintiff must allege, among
other things, that the defendant debt collector has violated a
provision of the FDCPA in attempting to collect the debt.

To determine whether the creditor's identity is conveyed
effectively to a plaintiff, the Court apples the least
sophisticated debtor standard. The least-sophisticated-debtor
standard is lower than the standard of a reasonable debtor, but it
preserves a quotient of reasonableness and presumes a basic level
of understanding and willingness to read with care.  A debt
collection letter does not comply with the FDCPA if, for example,
the statutorily required disclosure is overshadowed or contradicted
by accompanying messages or notices from the debt collector.

Viewing the allegations in Gross's favor, LDV's letter fails to
apprise the least sophisticated debtor of the creditor's identity
for three related reasons.

First, LDV's letter did not explicitly state that Capital One Bank
was Gross's creditor or that it owned his debt.

Second, identifying Capital One Bank as the assignee of" three
other entities does not disclose the identity of the creditor. The
word assignee is a legal term that would not necessarily help the
least sophisticated consumer understand the relationships between
the parties listed. The Court thus have significant concerns about
whether the least sophisticated consumer would understand the term
assignee at all, much less what role it signifies for the entity
giving versus receiving the assignment.

Indeed, even to a sophisticated consumer, LDV's letter is
susceptible to different interpretations. On one hand, the
assignment language could convey that Capital One Bank was more
akin to an agent who had the right to hire an attorney and collect
the debt, and the other entities would benefit from that activity
without acting on their own. Under this reading, even a
sophisticated debtor could conclude that these entities have an
ownership interest in the debt, and Capital One Bank was acting for
them. An equally plausible reading is that Capital One Bank now
owned the debt previously owned by one or more of the other three
entities.  
  
Third, while the least sophisticated debtor must read collection
notices in their entirety. LDV's letter as a whole does not
effectively disclose the creditor's identity. The letter states
that LDV represents Capital One Bank and that LDV is a debt
collector. This conveys the identity of LDV's client and that LDV
has been retained to collect a debt, but the least sophisticated
debtor could still think that any one or more of the listed
entities was owed the debt. Thus, the letter's reference to three
other entities, as well as its assignee language, overshadowed the
creditor's identity.  

Therefore, assuming the factual allegations are true and viewing
them in a light most favorable to Gross, the letter fails to
disclose the creditor to whom the debt is owed and thus violates
Section 1692g(a)(2)'s creditor-identification requirement.

The Court will reverse the order of the District Court dismissing
Gross's complaint and remand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

A full-text copy of the Third Circuit's July 8, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yyy9kpkd from Leagle.com.


MDL 2047: USG's Bid for Summary Judgment on Repealer States Denied
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana issued a Memorandum granting in part Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment on Choice-of-Law in the case captioned IN RE
CHINESE-MANUFACTURED DRYWALL PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION. THIS
DOCUMENT RELATES TO: Mitchell Company Inc v. Knauf Gips KG, et al.,
No. 09-4115, SECTION L (5). Civil Action MDL No. 2047.

The Plaintiffs, twelve large homebuilders who purchased gypsum
wallboard (drywall) (Plaintiffs), allege that the Defendants,
drywall manufacturers, conspired to eliminate job quotes and fix
prices. Only three Defendants remain in this case: PABCO Building
Products, LLC (PABCO), the United States Gypsum Company (USG) and
the United States Gypsum Corporation (USG Corp.) (USG); and USG
Corp.'s wholly-owned subsidiary, L&W Supply Corporation (L&W).

The Third Amended Complaint the operative Complaint in this
action-alleges four Counts:

   1. Count I: Violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1,
by all Plaintiffs against all Defendants, seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief, pre- and post-judgment interest, and costs,
including attorneys' and expert fees.

   2. Count II: Violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1
by Plaintiffs Ashton Woods and D.R. Horton against all Defendants,
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, pre- and post-judgment
interest, and costs, including attorneys' and expert fees.

   3. Count III: Violations of the California Business &
Professions Code Section 16750(a), et seq. (Cartwright Act) and, in
the alternative, state antitrust and restraint of trade laws in
Illinois, North Carolina, Arizona, District of Columbia, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Oregon,
Tennessee, West Virginia, and Wisconsin by all Plaintiffs against
all Defendants, seeking damages, pre- and post-judgment interest,
and costs, including attorneys' and expert fees.

   4. Count IV: Violations of state consumer protection and unfair
competition laws of California, Colorado, Florida, Nevada, New
Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia by all
Plaintiffs against all Defendants, seeking damages and/or
restitution, pre- and post-judgment interest, and costs, including
attorneys' and expert fees.

At issue is the Plaintiffs' allegation that they may pursue all of
their state antitrust claims in Count III under California's
Cartwright Act. The Defendants seek dismissal of state antitrust
claims made by Plaintiffs' purchasing entities that are
headquartered in states that have not repealed Illinois Brick Co.
v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (non-repealer states).
Non-repealer states do not allow indirect purchasers to seek
recovery from antitrust violators, unlike California, a repealer
state.

LEGAL STANDARD

A district court should grant a motion for summary judgment if the
movant can show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A
dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. A factual dispute
is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law. Summary judgment is appropriate if the adverse party
fails to rebut by making a factual showing sufficient to establish
the existence of an essential element to that party's case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.

The Defendants contend that the law of the state where Plaintiffs'
purchasing entities are located should apply to each of Plaintiffs'
state antitrust claims under California choice-of-law principles
and the United States Constitution. Defendants contend that
California law should only apply to claims arising from purchases
made in California. Defendants reach the following conclusions at
each step of the governmental interest analysis:

Next, Defendants contend that nationwide applicable of California
law would violate the Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the
Constitution. Defendants argue that the Due Process Clause requires
that the law of each state of purchase apply because California
lacks significant contacts with purchases made in other states.  

The Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that the Court must
consider whether application of California law satisfies due
process before conducting a choice-of-law analysis. According to
Plaintiffs, there is a presumption that California law applies
nationwide under the Due Process Clause, and because Defendants
have failed to meet their burden of overcoming that presumption,
California law applies to all of Plaintiffs' state antitrust
claims.  

The Plaintiffs argue that Defendants have more than de minimis
contacts with California, as required to satisfy due process.
Plaintiffs also argue that Defendants engaged in a nationwide
conspiracy directed, at least in part, from California, and
therefore, the application of California law does not violate the
Commerce Clause.  

In the Reply, Defendants reiterate their position that the law of
the state of purchase applies to indirect purchaser claims in
antitrust actions, such as this case. Defendants seek to undermine
Plaintiffs' arguments that once due process is satisfied, the Court
must presume that the law of the forum state California applies,
and that Defendants have failed to meet their "substantial burden"
to overcome that presumption.  

The Defendants argue that they have met this burden by
demonstrating that California's choice-of-law rules require
application of the law of the state of purchase, not California
law, to purchases made outside of California.  According to
Defendants, under California's governmental interest test, the
states of purchase have the greatest interests in applying their
antitrust laws to this matter.  

Further, Defendants contend that even if California's choice-of-law
rules permitted nationwide application of California law,
application of California law would violate the Due Process Clause
because California lacks significant contact or significant
aggregation of contacts to Plaintiffs' claims.

Governing Law: Third Circuit Law Governs Issues of Federal Law, and
California Law Governs the Choice-of-Law Analysis

Before this Court addresses the challenges levied by Defendants,
the Court must determine which law is binding and which is
persuasive. As the Court has previously concluded, Third Circuit
law is binding in this case on issues of federal law.  Though this
Court previously concluded that Third Circuit law is binding on
issues of federal law in this action, the Court stated that it
would give special consideration to Ninth Circuit law in the
Homebuilder action and that the Court would do its best to prevent
a scenario in which the California district court [would] be bound
by law that is contradictory to Ninth Circuit law if the action
were transferred back to the Northern District of California for
trial.  

With respect to issues of state substantive law, including
choice-of-law rules, California law is binding on this Court
because this case was transferred from the district court in
California under Section 1407. In sum, Third Circuit law is
binding, and Ninth Circuit law is persuasive, on this Court's
assessment of constitutional issues. California law, as enumerated
by the California Supreme Court and interpreted by the Ninth
Circuit, is binding on this Court's choice-of-law analysis.

The Court Considers Defendants' Constitutional Arguments Before
Conducting the Choice-of-Law Analysis

The Defendants contend that the Court need not address their
constitutional arguments if the Court concludes, under California
choice-of-law rules, that California law cannot apply nationwide.
Plaintiffs, by contrast, argue that it is widely recognized that
before the Court conducts a choice-of-law analysis, it must
determine if Defendants have met their substantial burden to
overcome the presumption that application of California law
comports with due process.   

The Plaintiffs do not cite any judicial authority demonstrating
that this proposition is widely recognized. The parties also do not
reference, nor is this Court aware of, any precedential, binding
judicial decisions that address both constitutional and
choice-of-law challenges to the application of state antitrust
law.

Under California law, the Court must consider Defendants' due
process challenges prior to conducting a choice-of-law analysis.
The Ninth Circuit has stated, in the context of class
certification, under California's choice of law rules, the class
action proponent bears the initial burden to show that California
has `significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts' to
the claims of each class member

After the proponent demonstrates that the requisite significant
contact or significant aggregation of contacts exist, the burden
shifts to the other side to demonstrate that foreign law, rather
than California law, should apply to class claims.'

Following California federal and state jurisprudence, this Court
first determines whether Plaintiffs have shown that application of
California law to their state antitrust claims is constitutional.
Second, this Court considers whether Defendants have demonstrated
that the law of the state of purchase applies to Plaintiffs' state
antitrust claims under California's choice-of-law rules.

Application of California Law Does Not Violate the Due Process
Clause

The crux of the parties' due process dispute is whether application
of California law to all of Plaintiffs' state law antitrust claims
in Count III of the TAC violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985).

The Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' reliance on AT&T Mobility is
misplaced because cases in the Third Circuit hold that even if a
product is manufactured in one state by a resident defendant, when
the purchase occurs outside of that state, its law cannot be
applied consistently with Due Process. Though Defendants are
correct that the Third Circuit's interpretation of the Due Process
Clause is binding on this Court, Defendants do not cite, nor has
this Court located, any Supreme Court or precedential Third Circuit
opinions rejecting AT&T Mobility or holding that the place of
purchase exclusively governs for purposes of due process in the
antitrust context.  

The Defendants contend that even if AT&T Mobility were binding on
this Court, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that Defendants'
conduct in California amounted to more than de minimis contacts
with California. Put another way, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs'
state antitrust claims lack significant contact or significant
aggregation of contacts with California, as required to satisfy due
process.

The Court disagrees.

The record reflects that California has a significant aggregation
of contacts with Plaintiffs' state antitrust claims. Unlike in
Allstate, where Minnesota law applied even though the individuals
involved in the accident were not residents of Minnesota, the
delivery of the insurance policy did not take place in Minnesota,
and the accident did not occur in Minnesota, here, it is undisputed
that during the relevant period, three Plaintiffs were
headquartered in California, one Defendant was headquartered in
California, and some portion Plaintiffs' purchasing entities
headquartered in California purchased drywall.  Further, as the
record evidence shows that the alleged conspiracy took place, at
least in part, in California, Defendants cannot reasonably complain
that the application of California law is arbitrary or unfair.

While Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have cherry-picked from the
663 relevant facts identified by the class plaintiffs to
manufacture a significant contact with California, the record
reflects that some portion of Defendants' alleged conspiratorial
conduct took place in California during the relevant time period.
As the parties' contacts with California exceed those in Allstate,
the Court need not reach any conclusions as to whether the facts
cited amount to unlawful conspiratorial conduct to conclude that
application of California law comports with the modest restrictions
imposed by the Due Process Clause.  

Application of California Law Does Not Violate the Commerce Clause

The Defendants further argue that application of California law
violates the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, which precludes
the application of a state statute to commerce that takes place
wholly outside of the State's borders, whether or not the commerce
has effects with the State.

The Plaintiffs contend that where the plaintiff challenged the
constitutionality of a state statute that regulated out-of-state
conduct, in this case, Defendants challenge the application of a
state law to out-of-state plaintiffs. Defendants are not arguing
that California's Cartwright Act is unconstitutional.  

In support of their position, Defendants cite only one Third
Circuit decision: A.S. Goldmen & Co. v. New Jersey Bureau of
Securities, 163 F.3d 780 (3d Cir. 1999). Defendants' reliance on
this factually inapposite case is misplaced. A.S. Goldmen, similar
to Healy, involved an action for declaratory judgment to invalidate
a state law.  A.S. Goldmen also fails to demonstrate, as Defendants
posit, that Commerce Clause jurisprudence is applicable to this
Court's choice-of-law analysis. In fact, the only mention of
choice-of-law in A.S. Goldmen is in Judge McKee's dissent, which
underscores the distinction between a challenge to a state law as
violating the Commerce Clause and a challenge to the application of
a forum state's law under choice-of-law principles.  

In sum, Plaintiffs have shown that application of California law to
Plaintiffs' state antitrust claims violates the Commerce Clause,
and Defendants have failed to support a finding to the contrary.
Therefore, the Court proceeds to determine whether Defendants have
met their burden of demonstrating that the laws of the states of
purchase should apply to this matter under California's
choice-of-law rules.

Choice-of-Law Analysis

The parties dispute whether the law of each state of purchase
should apply to purchases made outside of California pursuant to
California's choice-of-law rules. California's governmental
interest analysis involves three steps.

Step One: Whether California Law Materially Differs from the Laws
of Each Potentially Concerned State

Differences between California law and foreign law are material
when they `spell the difference between the success and failure of
a claim' or determine availability of remedies.

The parties do not dispute that there are material differences
between the antitrust laws of California, a repealer state, and the
laws of non-repealer states.  

The Defendants also contend that there are four material
differences between the antitrust laws of California and other
repealer states. First, Defendants contend that unlike California,
many repealer states, including New Mexico, Illinois, and
Minnesota, prohibit Plaintiffs from recovering for wallboard
overcharges passed to their customers.  Second, Defendants argue
that Plaintiffs may not have antitrust standing under the laws of
many states because they have failed to provide reliable evidence
of whom they purchased from, the amount of wallboard purchased, the
percentage of turnkey purchases allocated to wallboard, and the
amounts of overcharges. Third, Defendants argue that treble damages
are unavailable in at least Florida and New Mexico, and they are
limited in Arizona.  

While the Defendants have identified differences between California
law and the laws of a few other repealer states, as Plaintiffs
note, Defendants do not explain how these differences are material
to Plaintiffs' state antitrust claims. Without any analysis, the
Court cannot conclude that Defendants have demonstrated that a true
conflict would exist if California law were applied to claims
arising from purchases in other repealer states.  

The Court also notes that in the class certification context,
judges in the Northern District of California have certified
classes in repealer states under the Cartwright Act after applying
California's governmental interest analysis.  

As the Court concludes that Defendants have failed to meet their
burden of demonstrating that the antitrust laws of California and
other repealer states are materially different, the Court need not
proceed to the second step of the governmental interest analysis as
to repealer states. Therefore, the Court concludes that California
law will govern as to state antitrust claims made by Plaintiffs who
were headquartered in repealer states during the relevant period.
The Court turns to the second step of the governmental interest
analysis to assess the interests of only the non-repealer states.

Step Two: Each State's Interest in Having its Own Law Applied

In step two, the court must determine whether a true conflict
exists; that is, whether both states have a legitimate interest in
having their state law applied to the case.  Defendants argue that
each state of purchase has a legitimate interest in applying its
own law to commercial activity within its borders.  

The second step of the governmental interest analysis requires
[this Court] to examine each jurisdiction's interest in the
application of its own law in the circumstances of the particular
case to determine whether a true conflict exists. The Ninth Circuit
has stated that every state has an interest in having its law
applied to its resident claimants.

California has a well-documented, articulated interest in applying
the Cartwright Act.  

In contrast, there is disagreement amongst district judges in
California regarding whether non-repealer states are interested in
denying their citizens recovery for antitrust violations committed
by out-of-state defendants.  

Here, the Defendants, without discussing the interests of specific
non-repealer states, argue that states of purchase have legitimate
interests in regulating commercial activities within their borders.
Defendants' analysis cites only one precedential judicial decision
in the Ninth Circuit, Mazza, and, in a conclusory fashion, contends
that non-repealer states have interests in prohibiting antitrust
suits arising from indirect purchases. That is not sufficient for
Defendants to satisfy their burden of demonstrating that a true
conflict exists, as Defendants have failed to show that each state
has an interest in the application of its own law to `the
circumstances of the particular case.

Though it is the Defendants burden to demonstrate that there is a
true conflict, the Court also considers Plaintiffs' argument that
no "true conflict" exists. According to Plaintiffs, non-repealer
states have no interest in preventing indirect purchasers from
recovering from Defendants, corporate citizens of repealer states.
In support of this position, Plaintiffs rely almost exclusively on
Qualcomm. As Defendants note, the choice-of-law analysis in a
subsequent opinion in the Qualcomm matter is currently on appeal to
the Ninth Circuit. Further, the only federal judicial decision
cited by Defendants that applied Mazza in the context of a motion
for summary judgment in an antitrust action, TFT-LCD (Flat Panel)
II, took a contrary position to Qualcomm.

Though the Court is not inclined to postpone ruling on Defendants'
Motion until the Ninth Circuit issues an opinion in Qualcomm, the
Court cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that California law
applies to state antitrust claims brought by Plaintiffs located in
non-repealer states based on the current record.  

In short, the parties have not adequately briefed the interests of
non-repealer states in which Plaintiffs were headquartered, as
required for the Court to draw any conclusions about the existence
of a true conflict. Therefore, the Court will require counsel for
Plaintiffs and Defendants to confer as to future briefing on this
issue, particularly in light of the Ninth Circuit's recent en banc
ruling in Hyundai & Kia Fuel Economy Litigation, 926 F.3d 539.
Within ten (10) days, counsel shall file either a joint statement
or individual statements, limited to five (5) pages, addressing
whether supplemental briefing will be required. Any supplemental
briefing must be filed by August 15, 2019 and is limited to twenty
(20) pages.

As the Defendants have not met their burden as to the second step
of the governmental interest analysis, the Court need not proceed
to the third step. Though the Court does not reach the third step,
the Court notes that if the parties submit supplemental briefing,
the briefs must address the degree to which non-repealer states'
interests would be impaired by application of California law to
Plaintiffs' state antitrust claims. In the absence of such
briefing, the Court would be unable to carefully evaluate and
compare the nature and strength of the interest of each
jurisdiction in the application of its own law, as the third step
of California's governmental interest analysis requires.  

Accordingly, the Defendants' Motion will be denied as to repealer
states. California law will apply to state antitrust claims in
Count III brought by Plaintiffs located in repealer states. As to
non-repealer states, the Court withholds judgment pending
resolution by the parties or, if necessary, the Court's review of
supplemental briefing.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 8, 2019 Memorandum is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y6h4hfn7 from Leagle.com.

Lynn C. Greer, Special Master, pro se.

J. Cal Mayo, Jr., Special Master, pro se.

Plaintiff, Plaintiff, represented by Russ M. Herman --
rherman@hhklawfirm.com -- Herman, Herman & Katz, LLC & Leonard A.
Davis -- ldavis@hhklawfirm.com -- Herman, Herman & Katz, LLC.
Homebuilders and Installers Steering Committee, Defendant,
represented by Phillip A. Wittmann -- pwittmann@stonepigman.com --
Stone, Pigman, Walther, Wittmann, LLC.

Insurer Steering Committee, Defendant, represented by Judy Y.
Barrasso, Barrasso, Usdin, Kupperman, Freeman & Sarver, LLC, 909
Poydras Street, Suite 2350, New Orleans, LA 70112
Defendant, Defendant, represented by Kerry James Miller, Fishman
Haygood, LLP, 201 Saint Charles Avenue, Suite 4600, New Orleans, LA
70170-4600  & Andrew J. Brien -- brien@carverdarden.com -- Carver,
Darden, Koretzky, Tessier, Finn, Blossman & Areaux.

Defendant, Liaison Counsel for Taishan, BNMB entities, and CNBM
entities, Defendant, represented by Harry Rosenberg --
harry.rosenberg@phelps.com -- Phelps Dunbar, LLP.


MDL 2741: Franklin v. Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated
--------------------------------------------------------------
NANCY FRANKLIN AND JOHN FRANKLIN, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO
COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, the Defendant, Case No.
4:19-cv-01513 (Filed May 29, 2019) was transferred from the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, to the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California (San
Francisco) on July 10, 2019. The Northern District of California
Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:19-cv-03909-VC to the proceeding.

The suit seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiffs, as a
direct and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and
wrongful conduct in connection with the design, development,
manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising,
distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM),
containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiffs maintain that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Nancy
Franklin's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiffs bring this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.

The Franklin case is being consolidated with MDL 2741 in re:
Roundup Products Liability Litigation. The MDL was created by Order
of the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on
October 3, 2016. These actions share common factual questions
arising out of allegations that Monsanto's Roundup herbicide,
particularly its active ingredient, glyphosate, causes
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. The Plaintiff allege that they or their
decedents developed non-Hodgkin's lymphoma after using Roundup over
the course of several or more years. The Plaintiff also alleges
that the use of glyphosate in conjunction with other ingredients,
in particular the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA),
renders Roundup even more toxic than glyphosate on its own. Issues
concerning general causation, the background science, and
regulatory history will be common to all actions.

In its October 3, 2016 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions
in this MDL involve common questions of fact, and that
centralization in the Northern District of California will serve
the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just
and efficient conduct of this litigation. Centralization will
eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings (including with respect to discovery, privilege, and
Daubert motion practice); and conserve the resources of the
parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the
MDL is Hon. Judge Vince Chhabria. The lead case is
3:16-md-02741-VC.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MDL 2741: Lazenby v. Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated
-------------------------------------------------------------
CHARLES W. LAZENBY and KATHRYN E. LAZENBY, the Plaintiffs, v.
MONSANTO COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, the Defendant, Case No.
4:19-cv-01065 (Filed April 30, 2019) was transferred from the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, to the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California (San
Francisco) on July 10, 2019. The Northern District of California
Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:19-cv-03904-VC to the proceeding.

The suit seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiffs, as a
direct and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and
wrongful conduct in connection with the design, development,
manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising,
distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM),
containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiffs maintain that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Charles W.
Lazenby's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiffs bring this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.

The Lazenby case is being consolidated with MDL 2741 in re: Roundup
Products Liability Litigation. The MDL was created by Order of the
United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on October
3, 2016. These actions share common factual questions arising out
of allegations that Monsanto's Roundup herbicide, particularly its
active ingredient, glyphosate, causes non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. The
Plaintiffs allege that they or their decedents developed
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma after using Roundup over the course of
several or more years. The Plaintiffs also alleges that the use of
glyphosate in conjunction with other ingredients, in particular the
surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA), renders Roundup
even more toxic than glyphosate on its own. Issues concerning
general causation, the background science, and regulatory history
will be common to all actions.

In its October 3, 2016 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions
in this MDL involve common questions of fact, and that
centralization in the Northern District of California will serve
the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just
and efficient conduct of this litigation. Centralization will
eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings (including with respect to discovery, privilege, and
Daubert motion practice); and conserve the resources of the
parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the
MDL is Hon. Judge Vince Chhabria. The lead case is
3:16-md-02741-VC.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MDL 2741: Trostel v. Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated
-------------------------------------------------------------
DAVID TROSTEL AND VALERIE TROSTEL, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO
COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, the Defendant, Case No.
4:19-cv-01520 (Filed May 29, 2019) was transferred from the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, to the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California (San
Francisco) on July 10, 2019. The Northern District of California
Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:19-cv-03916-VC to the proceeding.

The suit seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiffs, as a
direct and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and
wrongful conduct in connection with the design, development,
manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising,
distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM),
containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiffs maintain that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. David
Trostel's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiffs bring this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.

The Trostel case is being consolidated with MDL 2741 in re: Roundup
Products Liability Litigation. The MDL was created by Order of the
United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on October
3, 2016. These actions share common factual questions arising out
of allegations that Monsanto's Roundup herbicide, particularly its
active ingredient, glyphosate, causes non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. The
Plaintiffs allege that they or their decedents developed
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma after using Roundup over the course of
several or more years. The Plaintiffs also alleges that the use of
glyphosate in conjunction with other ingredients, in particular the
surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA), renders Roundup
even more toxic than glyphosate on its own. Issues concerning
general causation, the background science, and regulatory history
will be common to all actions.

In its October 3, 2016 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions
in this MDL involve common questions of fact, and that
centralization in the Northern District of California will serve
the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just
and efficient conduct of this litigation. Centralization will
eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings (including with respect to discovery, privilege, and
Daubert motion practice); and conserve the resources of the
parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the
MDL is Hon. Judge Vince Chhabria. The lead case is
3:16-md-02741-VC.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MERCY DRIVE: Faces Crispi Suit in New York Supreme Court
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Mercy Drive, Inc. The
case is captioned as NANCI CRISPI, AND ANGELICA DIAZ ON BEHALF OF
THEMSELVES, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS
SIMILARLY-SITUATED, the Plaintiff, v. MERCY DRIVE, INC., the
Defendant, Case No. 23089/2018 (N.Y. Sup., June 30, 2019). The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Wilma Guzman.

Mercy Drive Inc. is a religious organization (Christian). Founded
in 2003, it is located in Forest Hills, New York.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          BORRELLI & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
          655 Third Ave, Ste 1821
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 679-5000

Attorneys for Defendant are:

          James P. Clark, P.C.
          256 MAIN Street, Ste 202
          Northport, NY 11768

MESSERLI & KRAMER: Class Certification Sought in Konings Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Eric Konings moves the Court to certify the class described in the
complaint of the lawsuit captioned ERIC KONINGS, Individually and
on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. MESSERLI & KRAMER,
P.A. and CAPITAL ONE BANK (USA), N.A., Case No. 2:19-cv-00977-JPS
(E.D. Wisc.), and further asks that the Court both stay the motion
for class certification and to grant the Plaintiff (and the
Defendant) relief from the Local Rules setting automatic briefing
schedules and requiring briefs and supporting material to be filed
with the Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff
contends.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff asserts.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


MUTUAL SECURITIES: Court Rules No Violation in Milliner Settlement
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting in part and denying in part
Defendant's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement and Stipulated
Protective Order in the case captioned CHARLOTTE B. MILLINER, et
al., Plaintiffs, v. MUTUAL SECURITIES, INC., Defendant, Case No.
15-cv-03354-DMR (N.D. Cal.).

MSI moves for an order enforcing the settlement agreement and the
stipulated protective order entered in this case, arguing that
Plaintiffs and their counsel have breached them
Milliner and Brem filed this putative class action against MSI,
alleging claims stemming from MSI's brokerage agreement with
Plaintiffs. The undersigned conducted a settlement conference on
which resulted in a full resolution of Plaintiffs' individual
claims.  

MSI moves to enforce the settlement agreement, as well as the
parties' stipulated protective order. It contends that Plaintiffs
and/or their counsel have violated the terms of the settlement
agreement as follows:

   (1) Sturgeon-Garcia attached the settlement agreement along with
confidential documents and deposition transcripts produced and/or
used in this case and marked as confidential to the Gilotti claim
in violation of the settlement agreement's confidentiality
provision; and

   (2) the settlement agreement requires Milliner to dismiss her
FINRA statement of claim but to date she has not done so. MSI
further argues that Sturgeon-Garcia violated the protective order
by attaching as exhibits to the Gilotti claim documents and
deposition transcripts used in this litigation and marked as
confidential. MSI asks the court to order Plaintiffs and
Sturgeon-Garcia to pay MSI its attorneys' fees and costs incurred
in enforcing the settlement agreement.

Alleged Violations of the Settlement Agreement

Disclosure of the Settlement Agreement

MSI argues that Plaintiffs and Sturgeon-Garcia are in violation of
the confidentiality provision of the settlement agreement based on
the fact that Sturgeon-Garcia attached a copy of the agreement as
an exhibit to the Gilotti claim. According to MSI, the exceptions
in the confidentiality provision that permit disclosure of the
agreement do not apply here.

In opposition, Plaintiffs note that there is no evidence that Ms.
Milliner or Ms. Brem disclosed anything to anyone. They do not
dispute that Sturgeon-Garcia attached the settlement agreement to
the Gilotti claim but argue that his actions cannot not be imputed
to Plaintiffs. They further argue that Sturgeon-Garcia is not bound
by the settlement agreement's confidentiality provision because he
was not a party to the agreement, citing Monster Energy Company v.
Schechter, 26 Cal. App. 5th 54 (2018), review granted, 239
Cal.Rptr.3d 662 (2018).

In Monster Energy, the court held that an attorney representing two
plaintiffs could not be liable to the defendant for breach of a
confidentiality provision in a settlement agreement, even though
the agreement provided that the plaintiffs and their counsel agree'
to keep the terms of the agreement confidential and the attorney
signed the agreement under the words, Approved as to form and
content.

The court observed that an essential element of any contract is the
mutual consent of the parties, and that the consent of the parties
to a contract must be communicated by each party to the other.
While noting that the confidentiality provisions of the settlement
agreement did at least purport to bind the Attorneys, the court
held that the issue was not one of contractual interpretation, as a
party cannot bind another to a contract simply by so reciting in a
piece of paper. It is rudimentary contract law that the party to be
bound must first accept the obligation.  

The court concluded that no matter how plainly the contract
provided that the Attorneys were bound, they could not actually be
bound unless they manifested their consent.

The Monster Energy court also examined the effect of the attorney's
signature of the settlement agreement under the words, approved as
to form and content. It held that such a signature means only that
the document has the attorney's professional thumbs-up and does not
objectively manifest the attorney's intent to be bound.

The Plaintiffs assert that Sturgeon-Garcia was not a party to the
settlement agreement, and note that unlike the attorney in Monster
Energy, Sturgeon-Garcia did not approve the agreement as to form
and content. Therefore, they argue, he is not bound by its terms,
including the confidentiality provision, as a matter of law.  

The California Supreme Court granted review of Monster Energy on
November 14, 2018, and ordered the parties to brief two issues, one
of which is relevant here: When a settlement agreement contains
confidentiality provisions that are explicitly binding on the
parties and their attorneys and the attorneys sign the agreement
under the legend APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT, have the
attorneys consented to be bound by the confidentiality provisions?


The Plaintiffs inexplicably failed to bring this to the court's
attention, simply citing Monster Energy as settled law. Pending
review by the California Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal's
opinion has no binding or precedential effect, and may be cited for
potentially persuasive value only.

Therefore, the question of whether Sturgeon-Garcia is bound by the
confidentiality provision in the settlement agreement remains
unsettled.

Accordingly, the court orders the following: pending the California
Supreme Court's decision in Monster Energy, Sturgeon-Garcia shall
comply with the confidentiality provision of the settlement
agreement unless and until relieved of this obligation by this
court.
  
Disclosure of Materials Used in this Litigation

MSI next argues that Sturgeon-Garcia also violated the settlement
agreement's confidentiality provision by attaching documents
produced and deposition transcripts used in this case as exhibits
to the Gilotti claim. According to MSI, these discovery materials
fall under the confidentiality provision of the settlement
agreement because they are part of REDACTED Settlement Agreement.

The Plaintiffs failed to address this argument in their opposition.
However, MSI's position is not persuasive. Interpretation of a
release or settlement agreement is governed by the same principles
applicable to any other contractual agreement. In contract
interpretation disputes, the first question to be decided is
whether the language is `reasonably susceptible' to the
interpretation urged by the party. The clear and explicit meaning"
of contractual provisions interpreted in their ordinary and popular
sense, unless used by the parties in a technical sense or a special
meaning is given to them by usage, controls judicial
interpretation. Thus, if the meaning a layperson would ascribe to
contract language is not ambiguous, the court applies that meaning.


Here, the parties did not define the word event in the settlement
agreement; therefore, the court can consider the dictionary
definition to determine the ordinary and popular meaning.
Merriam-Webster defines event as something that happens or an
occurrence. Therefore, MSI's interpretation of the phrase REDACTED
as including discovery materials is not a reasonable
interpretation. The court concludes that Sturgeon-Garcia's
submission of those materials with the Gilotti claim did not
violate the confidentiality provision of the settlement agreement.

Alleged Violations of the Protective Order

Finally, MSI argues that Plaintiffs and Sturgeon-Garcia breached
the stipulated protective order by attaching confidential documents
and deposition transcripts from this litigation to Gilotti's claim.
MSI's argument on this issue is not a model of clarity.
Specifically, MSI did not identify which specific exhibits to the
Gilotti claim are at issue (instead citing to the entire claim) and
did not identify the specific provision or provisions of the
Protective Order that it claims Plaintiffs and Sturgeon-Garcia
breached.

Based on the court's review of the entire Gilotti claim, it appears
that Exhibits 2, 5, and 6 are at issue. Exhibit 2 consists of a
six-page document that appears to contain account information,
including account information specific to Gilotti. All pages of the
exhibit except the first are labeled confidential. Exhibit 5
consists of excerpts of the November 15, 2016 deposition of Julie
Cohen, and Exhibit 6 is excerpts of the April 24, 2017 deposition
of Cohen, who testified as MSI's Rule 30(b)(6) designee.

The protective order provides that any Disclosure or Discovery
Material that is designated as confidential constitutes protected
material. It provides that a Receiving Party may use Protected
Material that is disclosed or produced by another Party or by a
Non-Party in connection with this case only for prosecuting,
defending, or attempting to settle this litigation, or any manner
deemed a related matter within the meaning of Civil Local Rule
3-12.

Exhibits 5 and 6 are portions of deposition transcripts. The
protective order provides that in order to designate testimony as
confidential and thus entitled to protection, the Designating Party
[must] identify on the record, before the close of the deposition,
hearing, or other proceeding, all protected testimony.There is no
indication that MSI designated any portion of the transcripts as
protected testimony, and nothing in the record to support MSI's
claim that they are protected material under the protective order.

Therefore, there was no breach of the protective order with respect
to these exhibits to the Gilotti claim.

As to Exhibit 2, which includes five pages marked confidential,
Plaintiffs argue that these documents are not MSI documents and
were not produced by Defendant in this case. Therefore, Plaintiffs
argue, MSI lacks standing to enforce the protective order as it was
not the designating party.

The Plaintiffs' arguments on this point are without merit. They do
not dispute that these documents, marked confidential by a third
party, constitute protected material. Sturgeon-Garcia's submission
of these documents with the Gilotti claim thus violates section 7.1
of the protective order, which provides that a Receiving Party may
use Protected Material that is disclosed or produced by another
Party or by a Non-Party in connection with this case only for
prosecuting, defending, or attempting to settle this litigation, or
any manner deemed a related matter within the meaning of Civil
Local Rule 3-12.
  
Therefore, within seven days of the date of this order,
Sturgeon-Garcia must withdraw the five pages marked confidential in
Exhibit 2 from the Gilotti claim. By the same deadline, Plaintiffs
must certify to the court that they have complied with Section 13
of the Protective Order.

Accordingly, MSI's motion is granted in part and denied in part,
and partially held in abeyance.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 8, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yxuppdhb from Leagle.com.

Charlotte B. Milliner, as trustee of the Charlotte B. Milliner
Trust dated January 30, 1997 and as owner and holder of the
Charlotte B. Milliner SEP IRA & Joanne Brem, as Trustee of the Van
Santern-Brem Revocable Trust, for themselves and on behalf of all
others similarly situation, Plaintiffs, represented by David
Sturgeon-Garcia -- dsglaw@comcast.net -- The Law Offices of David
Sturgeon-Garcia.

Mutual Securities, Inc., a California corporation, Defendant,
represented by Timothy W. Fredricks -- fredricks.t@wssllp.com --
Winget Spadafora & Schwartzberg LLP, Brandon Scott Reif --
breif@reiflawgroup.com -- Reif Law Group, P.C.,Jared Michael Ahern
-- ahern.j@wssllp.com -- Winget, Spadafora, and Schwartzberg LLP,
Nazanin Afshar -- nafshar@kdvlaw.com -- Kaufman Dolowich & Voluck,
LLP & Shelly C. Yoo, Winget Spadafora & Schwartzberg LLP, 606 S
Olive St Fl 8,  Los Angeles, CA, 90014-1668


MYLOCKER.COM: Faces Traynor Suit in Southern District of New York
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Mylocker.com, LLC.
The case is captioned as Yaseen Traynor also known as: Yaseen
Traylor on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, vs. Mylocker.com, LLC, the Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-06055-JPO (S.D.N.Y., June 28, 2019). The suit alleges
violation of Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is assigned
to the Hon. Judge J. Paul Oetken.

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          David Paul Force, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Telephone: (201) 282-6500
          E-mail: dforce@steinsakslegal.com

NATIONAL CREDIT: Court Extends Dispositional Paper Filing in Cortes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order continuing Deadline to File
Dispositional Papers in the case captioned MIKE CORTES, on Behalf
of Himself and all Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v.
NATIONAL CREDIT ADJUSTERS, L.L.C., Defendant. Case No.
2:16-cv-00823-MCE-EFB. (E.D. Cal.).

The Parties executed a binding Term Sheet setting out an agreement
to settle all claims in this action on a class basis.

On February 6, 2019, upon stipulation of the Parties and notice of
the settlement, the Court vacated all remaining pretrial deadlines
and ordered the Parties to file dispositional papers pursuant to
Local Rule 160 by February 28, 2019.

Upon stipulation of the Parties, the Court extended the Parties'
deadline to file dispositional papers pursuant to Local Rule 160 to
June 28, 2019.

The Parties have made significant progress but need more time to
finalize the full class settlement agreement along with all of the
relevant exhibits thereto, i.e., long form and short-form notice
documents, proposed final approval and judgment orders, etc.

The Parties' deadline to file dispositional papers pursuant to
Local Rule 160 shall be extended to August 9, 2019.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 8, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y5z9f8oa from Leagle.com.

Mike Cortes, Plaintiff, represented by Yeremey Olegovich Krivoshey
-- ykrivoshey@bursor.com -- Bursor & Fisher, P.A.

National Credit Adjusters, L.L.C., Defendant, represented by Debbie
P. Kirkpatrick -- dkirkpatrick@sessions.legal -- Sesions Fishman
Nathan & Israel, LLP & James Kevin Schultz -- jschultz@sessions --
Sessions Fishman Nathan & Israel, LLP.


NATIONAL VISION: J. Mendoza Suit Remains in N.D. Cal.
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand in
the case captioned JAVIER MENDOZA, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL VISION,
INC., Defendant. Case No. 19-cv-01485-SVK. (N.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff Javier Mendoza brings a putative class action alleging
that Defendant National Vision, Inc. committed various wage and
hour violations, including failing to provide meal and rest
periods, failing to pay overtime wages and providing inaccurate
wage statements.  

The Defendant removed the case to this Court.  The Defendant bases
its removal on the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) and
diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1332.

The Plaintiff filed a motion to remand the case to Monterey County
Superior Court, arguing that Defendant failed to establish that
this case meets the amount in controversy requirements under CAFA.

Here, the Parties only dispute whether the Plaintiff's case meets
the amount in controversy requirement under either CAFA or
individual diversity jurisdiction. A defendant claiming federal
jurisdiction under CAFA bears the burden of establishing that the
amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000 by a preponderance of the
evidence.  

Plaintiff's First and Second Claims

The Plaintiff's first and second claims share a similar legal basis
and amount in controversy calculation. The Plaintiff's first claim
alleges that Defendant regularly and repeatedly failed to provide
meal periods to the Plaintiff and the putative class members.
Similarly, the Plaintiff's second claim alleges that the Defendant
regularly and repeatedly failed to provide rest periods to the
Plaintiff and the putative class members. provides that an employer
must pay employees one hour of wages at the employee's normal rate
for each workday that an employer fails to provide a meal or rest
period.  

The Defendant's amount in controversy calculation for both
Plaintiff's first and second claims estimates that class members
worked 133,595 workweeks. Defendant assumes one violation per a
class member per a week at a pay rate of $10.00 per an hour. This
yields an amount in controversy of $1,335,950.00 for both
Plaintiff's first and second claims.  

The Plaintiff's challenge to Defendant's calculations focuses on
the admissibility of the Aguilar declaration. The Court finds that
the Aguilar declaration provides sufficient foundation for its
estimates regarding the number of putative class members and
workweeks at issue. Further, the Court finds that the allegations
in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint support Defendant's assumption of
a weekly violation rate. For both claims, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant regularly and repeatedly failed to provide class members
with meal and rest breaks. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant
maintained and enforced a uniform policy of failing to pay class
members for these missed meal and rest periods. Other courts have
authorized defendants to assume weekly violations based on similar
allegations of regular or consistent meal and rest break
violations.  

The Plaintiff's allegations indicate that Defendant reasonably
estimates a weekly violation rate for Plaintiff's first and second
claims. The Court likewise finds that Defendant's estimate of
$1,335,950.00 for the amount in controversy for each claim is also
reasonable.

Plaintiff's Third Claim

The Plaintiff's third claim alleges that Defendant required
Plaintiff and the Class Members on a regular and repeated basis to
work shifts exceeding eight (8) hours in a workday, and to work
more than forty (40) hours in a workweek, without recording their
hours and without paying overtime premium wages. Plaintiff further
alleges that Defendant regularly and consistently failed to pay
overtime wages as part of its uniform policies and practices.

The Defendant's amount in controversy calculation for the
Plaintiff's third claim estimates that class members worked 133,595
workweeks from November 13, 2014, through March 21, 2019. The
Defendant's amount in controversy calculation thus assumes an
overtime pay rate of $15.00 per an hour. Finally, Defendant assumes
one hour of unpaid overtime per a week per a class member, which
yields an amount in controversy for of $2,003,925.00 for
Plaintiff's third claim.  

Again, Plaintiff's challenge to Defendant's calculations focuses on
the admissibility of the Aguilar declaration. The Court rejects
this argument above because the Aguilar declaration provides
sufficient foundation for its estimates regarding the number of
putative class members and workweeks at issue. The Court further
finds that the allegations in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint support
Defendant's assumption of a one hour of unpaid overtime per a week
violation rate.

The Plaintiff alleges that Defendant regularly and consistently
failed to pay overtime wages as part of its uniform policies and
practices. Plaintiff also alleges that overtime violations took
place each and every day when Defendant required employees to clock
out prior to approving their hours on a separate system. Other
courts have authorized defendants to assume a one hour per a week
violation rate based on similar allegations of regular or
consistent overtime violations.

The Plaintiff's allegations indicate that Defendant's estimate of
one hour of unpaid overtime per a week is reasonable. The Court
thus finds that Defendant's $2,003,925.00 amount in controversy
estimate for Plaintiff's third claim is also reasonable.

Plaintiff's Fourth Claim under Labor Code Section 226

The Plaintiff's fourth claim alleges that Defendant maintained and
enforced a uniform policy of regularly and consistently violating
Labor Code Section 226 by failing to provide Plaintiff and the
putative class members with itemized wage statements.  Plaintiff
specifically alleges that the wage statements failed to accurately
state: (1) the total hours worked  (2) overtime hours worked (3)
gross wages earned  (4) net wages earned (5) the correct regular
rate of pay, overtime and vacation rates of pay and the
corresponding number of hours worked under each rate (6) all
deductions (7) premium wages owed for missed rest and meal
periods;" and (8) "the correct name and address of the employer.  

The Defendant's amount in controversy calculation asserts that
1,501 putative class members worked approximately 31,937 pay
periods during the one-year statute of limitations period through
the date of removal. Defendant assumes a 100% violation rate,
meaning that each pay statement for each class member contained a
violation. Based on Section 226(e)(1)'s penalties, Defendant
calculates the amount in controversy as $3,118,650.00.

Despite Plaintiff's attempts in his motion to limit his claim to
wage statements that include multiple pay rates and
non-discretionary bonuses/commission pay, Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint does not support this limitation. In addition to listing
eight different types of Section 226 violations, Plaintiff alleges
particular examples of violations that are likely to appear on each
wage statement.

For instance, Plaintiff's allegations regarding a failure to
provide meal and rest periods support the assumption that each
class member missed one meal and rest period each week. As a
result, each wage statement will not accurately state the total
hours worked or the amount of premium wages owed for missed rest
and meal periods. Furthermore, Plaintiff's third claim alleges a
failure to pay overtime wages by requiring class members to clock
out prior to approving their hours on a separate system each and
every day. These allegations suggest that every wage statement
will, at a minimum, not accurately state the total hours worked,
overtime hours worked, gross wages earned or net wages earned.

The Court thus finds that Defendant's $3,118,650.00 amount in
controversy estimate for Plaintiff's fourth claim is reasonable.

Plaintiff's Sixth Claim under Labor Code Section 203

The Plaintiff's sixth claim alleges that Defendant maintained a
uniform policy of regularly and consistently failing to pay
employees all owed and unpaid wages for work performed at the end
of their employment in violation of Labor Code Section 203. Labor
Code Section 203 provides that when an employer willfully fails to
pay any wages of an employee who is discharged or quits, the
employee's wages continue to accrue as a penalty for thirty days.


The Defendant's amount in controversy calculation estimates there
were 1,038 terminated putative class members during the three-year
statute of limitations period. Defendant further assumes a 100%
violation rate based on allegations in the Amended Complaint and a
pay rate of $10 per an hour. This calculation results in an amount
in controversy of $2,491,200.00.

As with Plaintiff's fourth claim, the allegations in Plaintiff's
Amended Complaint support assuming a 100% violation rate. In
particular, Plaintiff's third claim alleges that Defendant
regularly and consistently failed to pay overtime wages as part of
its uniform policies and practices. Plaintiff further alleges that
overtime violations occurred each and every day based on
Defendant's policy of requiring employees to clock out prior to
approving their hours.  These allegations support the assumption
that every putative class member who quits or is discharged
suffered a Section 203 violation based on wages due from this
uncompensated overtime.3 Plaintiff's allegations therefore support
assuming a 100% violation rate.   

The Court's finds that Defendant's $2,491,200.00 estimate for the
amount in controversy for Plaintiff's sixth claim is reasonable.

Attorneys' Fees

The Defendant's amount in controversy calculation also includes
attorneys' fees equal to 25% of the aggregate amount in
controversy. Plaintiff does not dispute Defendant's 25% assumption
for attorneys' fees and instead simply argues that any reduction in
estimated damages in light of a reduced violation rate, would also
proportionately reduce any fee award to Plaintiff's counsel. The
Court agrees that 25% of the aggregate amount in controversy
provides a reasonable estimate of the potential attorneys' fees at
issue.  

The Court finds that Defendant's $2,571,418.75 estimate for
attorneys' fees is reasonable.

Total Amount in Controversy

Based on the forgoing analysis, the Court finds the following
amount in controversy totals reasonable:

   First Claim: Meal Period Violations   $1,335,950

   Second Claim: Rest Period Violations  $1,335,950

   Third Claim: Overtime Violations      $2,003,925

   Fourth Claim: Wage Statement
   Violations                            $3,118,650

   Sixth Claim: Waiting Time Penalties   $2,491,200

      Sub-Total:                        $10,285,675

   Attorneys' Fees (25%)                 $2,571,418

      Total:                            $12,857,093

Accordingly, the Court denies the Plaintiff's motion to remand.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 8, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y2kdb7aq from Leagle.com.

Javier Mendoza, Plaintiff, represented by Bernard James Fitzpatrick
-- bjfitzpatrick@fandslegal.com -- Fitzpatrick Spini & Swanston,
Charles Swanston -- Cswanston@fandslegal.com -- Fitzpatrick &
Swanston Attorneys at Law, Kristen Michelle Agnew --
kagnew@diversitylaw.com -- Diversity Law Group, APC, Larry W. Lee
-- lwlee@diversitylaw.com -- Diversity Law Group, P.C., Nicholas
Rosenthal -- nrosenthal@diversitylaw.com -- Diversity Law Group &
Max William Gavron -- mgavron@diversitylaw.com -- Diversity Law
Group.

National Vision, Inc., Defendant, represented by Phillip James
Ebsworth -- pebsworth@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Tiffany T.
Tran -- ttran@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP & Julie Grace Yap
-- jyap@seyfarth.com -- Attorney at Law.


NAVIENT CORPORATION: NYGBL Claim in Hyland Suit Can Proceed
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Opinion and Order granting in part and denying in
part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the case captioned KATHRYN
HYLAND, MELISSA GARCIA, ELDON R. GAEDE, JESSICA SAINT-PAUL, REBECCA
SPITLER-LAWSON, MICHELLE MEANS, ELIZABETH KAPLAN, JENNIFER GUTH,
and MEGAN NOCERINO, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. NAVIENT CORPORATION and NAVIENT
SOLUTIONS, LLC, Defendants. No. 18cv9031 (DLC). (S.D.N.Y.).

Defendants Navient Corporation and Navient Solutions, LLC (Navient)
have moved to dismiss the First Amended Complaint in this action
for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R.
Civ. P.

The plaintiffs commenced this putative class action by filing a
complaint on behalf of a nationwide class of individuals who have
been employed full time by a PSLF-eligible employer and contacted
Navient regarding their eligibility for PSLF, as well as four
sub-classes consisting of those same individuals who have resided
in or taken out loans in Maryland, Florida, New York, and
California.

Plaintiffs filed the FAC, thereby mooting the motion to dismiss.
The FAC asserts fifteen causes of action under various state laws,
including breach of contract, breach of implied warranty of
authority, tortious interference with contract, tortious
interference with expectancy, unjust enrichment, breach of
fiduciary duty, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and
violations of Maryland, Florida, New York, and California consumer
protection statutes.

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face. A claim to relief is plausible when the
factual allegations in a complaint allow the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged. When a party moves to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule
12(b)(6).

Preemption

It is undisputed that there is no private right of action under the
Higher Education Act (HEA). Navient argues that plaintiffs' state
law claims are also barred as preempted by the HEA. That argument
is unavailing.

The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution establishes
that federal law shall be the supreme Law of the Land, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.

In general, three types of preemption exist: (1) express
preemption, where Congress has expressly preempted local law (2)
field preemption, where Congress has legislated so comprehensively
that federal law occupies an entire field of regulation and leaves
no room for state law and (3) conflict preemption, where local law
conflicts with federal law such that it is impossible for a party
to comply with both or the local law is an obstacle to the
achievement of federal objectives.

Express preemption occurs when Congress withdraws specified powers
from the States by enacting a statute containing an express
preemption provision. Even where a federal law contains an express
preemption clause, the court still may be required to consider
implied preemption as it considers the question of the substance
and scope of Congress' displacement of state law.

Conflict preemption arises where compliance with both state and
federal law is impossible, or where the state law stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.

Under field preemption, a state law is preempted if Congress has
legislated comprehensively to occupy an entire field of regulation,
leaving no room for the States to supplement federal law. Field
preemption and conflict preemption are not rigidly distinct,
although they remain independent bases for preemption.

Express Preemption

Navient contends that Section 1098g of the HEA expressly preempts
the plaintiffs' claims. That section provides: Loans made, insured,
or guaranteed pursuant to a program authorized by Title IV of the
Higher Education Act of 1965 shall not be subject to any disclosure
requirements of any State law. The plaintiffs' state law claims are
not expressly preempted by Section 1098g.

Because consumer protection law is a field traditionally regulated
by the states, compelling evidence of an intention to preempt is
required in this area. Plaintiffs here do not seek to impose state
law disclosure requirements on federal student loans. Rather, they
seek to hold Navient liable for affirmative misrepresentations made
in the course of performing its duties under various contracts. The
language of Section 1098g does not express the "clear and manifest
purpose of Congress to preempt such claims.

Navient's argument that this Interpretation should be accorded
so-called Auer deference is misplaced. Auer Auer v. Robbins, 519
U.S. 452 (1997), deference has no application where, as here, the
agency is interpreting a federal statute rather than its own
regulation.

Navient's argument that the Interpretation interprets a disclosure
regime that includes the Department's own rules and regulations
provides no help. An agency may not convert an issue of statutory
interpretation into one of deference to an agency's interpretation
of its own regulations simply by pointing to the existence of
regulations whose relevance is tenuous at best.

Navient alternatively argues that the Interpretation should be
given deference according to its power to persuade under the
doctrine of Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). The
persuasive value of the Interpretation in the context of this
lawsuit is limited. First, the Interpretation is primarily directed
to addressing cases in which States have enacted regulatory regimes
or applied existing State consumer protection statutes that
undermine these goals by imposing new regulatory requirements on
the Department's Direct Loan servicers, including State licensure
to service Federal student loans. This is a private tort suit
alleging misrepresentations regarding federal loan programs; it
does not seek to impose new regulatory obligations on loan
servicers.

Implied Preemption

Nor are the state law claims impliedly preempted by the HEA under a
conflict preemption theory. Defendants urge that subjecting loan
servicers such as Navient to the police powers of the fifty States
would interfere with the accomplishment of the HEA's purpose of
ensuring uniformity for federal student loans. While uniformity is
undoubtedly one of the goals of the HEA, it does not follow that
the HEA broadly preempts any state law cause of action that may be
applied to a federal loan servicer. As the court recognized in
Genna, such a broad reading would be, in effect, to find field
preemption, which precedent precludes us from doing.

Courts have consistently held that field preemption does not apply
to the HEA.

Failure to State a Claim

Although plaintiffs' claims are not preempted by the HEA, only
their claim pursuant to New York General Business Law Section 349
survives this motion to dismiss.

Breach of Contract

Plaintiffs' claim for breach of Navient's Servicing Contracts fails
because plaintiffs are not intended third party beneficiaries of
the contracts. Federal common law governs interpretation of a
federal government contract. The federal common law of contracts
incorporates general principles of contract law. Under federal
common law, proving third-party beneficiary status requires that
the contract terms clearly evidence an intent to permit enforcement
by the third party in question. In the case of government
contracts, individual members of the public are treated as
incidental beneficiaries unless a different intention is
manifested.

Plaintiffs have failed to identify any language in the Servicing
Contracts that clearly evidences an intent to permit enforcement by
the third party in question. It is not enough that the borrowers
incidentally benefit from Navient's performance under the Servicing
Contracts. Such incidental benefit does not rise to the level of
intent to permit enforcement.

The plaintiffs' argument that they should be permitted to proceed
to discovery in order to determine whether the Servicing Contracts
contain such language is meritless. The very unavailability of the
contracts itself supports the conclusion that borrowers are not
intended third party beneficiaries of the Servicing Contracts. It
would be surprising if parties to a contract, intending that
contract to be enforceable by third parties, withheld the terms of
that contract from those same third parties.

The plaintiffs' claim for breach of the Servicing Contracts (Count
One of the FAC) is dismissed.

Breach of an Implied Warranty of Authority

In the alternative to their claim for breach of contract,
plaintiffs plead a claim for breach of an implied warranty of
authority. This claim also fails. The Restatement of Agency defines
an implied warranty of authority as follows:

A person who purports to make a contract, representation, or
conveyance to or with a third party on behalf of another person,
lacking power to bind that person, gives an implied warranty of
authority to the third party and is subject to liability to the
third party for damages for loss caused by breach of that warranty,
including loss of the benefit expected from performance by the
principal . . . .
The core of the plaintiffs' argument with respect to this claim is
that Navient, holding itself out as an agent of the Department,
misled the plaintiffs with respect to their loan repayment options
and thereby caused them damage. Plaintiffs have not alleged,
however, that Navient purported to enter into a contract with them
on behalf of the Department or to take some legally significant
action on behalf of the Department.  

Puzzlingly, the plaintiffs argue that they have alleged an attempt
by Navient to bind the Department because Navient's actions did, in
fact, bind its principal, inducing Borrowers to modify their
contracts with [the Department] by opting into new, less favorable
repayment plans. This makes little sense. An implied warranty of
authority is breached when a defendant purports to bind a
principle, but in fact lacks that authority.

Count Two of the FAC is dismissed.

Tortious Interference with Contract

Plaintiffs' claim for tortious interference with their MPNs also
fails. To state a claim for tortious interference under New York
law, a plaintiff must show (1) the existence of a valid contract
between the plaintiff and a third party, (2) the defendant's
knowledge of that contract, (3) the defendant's intentional
procurement of a third-party's breach of contract without
justification, and (4) damages.

The plaintiffs have failed adequately to allege that Navient
intentionally procured the Department's breach of any provision of
the MPN. They point to the sections of the MPNs entitled Governing
Law and Borrower's Rights and Responsibilities, which explain the
repayment options that borrowers have available to them. They argue
that those options were not available to them because Navient
steered them away from those plans. While Navient's alleged
misrepresentations may have made it more difficult for the
plaintiffs to take advantage of their contractual rights, this does
not establish that the Department breached its contractual
obligations to borrowers. Count Three of the FAC is therefore
dismissed.

Tortious Interference with Statutorily Created Expectancy

Tortious interference with statutorily created expectancy is not a
recognized cause of action, nor does it have any basis in law. That
claim is therefore dismissed.

Even assuming that borrowers have a property right or an expectancy
in PSLF, the plaintiffs have failed to cite any law that suggests
that they may maintain a private cause of action against a third
party for interference with that right. The law that they do cite
deals with interference with an expected inheritance. The
plaintiffs' suggested analogy between a statutorily created
property right and inheritance of property from a decedent is
inapposite.

Count Four of the FAC is dismissed.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Negligence, and Negligent
Misrepresentation

Plaintiffs' claims for breach of fiduciary duty are dismissed
because the FAC does not adequately allege that Navient owed
fiduciary duties to the plaintiffs. Under New York law, the
elements of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty are: (i) the
existence of a fiduciary duty (ii) a knowing breach of that duty
and (iii) damages resulting therefrom.

In Florida, the elements of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty
are: the existence of a fiduciary duty, and the breach of that duty
such that it is the proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages. A
fiduciary relation exists between two persons when one of them is
under a duty to act for or to give advice for the benefit of
another upon matters within the scope of that relation.

Under California law, the elements of a cause of action for breach
of fiduciary duty are the existence of a fiduciary relationship,
breach of fiduciary duty, and damages. Before a person can be
charged with a fiduciary obligation, he must either knowingly
undertake to act on behalf and for the benefit of another, or must
enter into a relationship which imposes that undertaking as a
matter of law.

In Maryland, although the breach of a fiduciary duty may give rise
to one or more causes of action, in tort or in contract, Maryland
does not recognize a separate tort action for breach of fiduciary
duty. To the extent that the plaintiffs bring a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty under Maryland law, that claim is simply duplicative
of their negligence claim.

The general rule is that a lender does not owe tort duties to a
borrower.  

Plaintiffs argue that, notwithstanding this general rule, they have
sufficiently alleged the existence of a fiduciary relationship
because they have alleged that Navient actively held itself out as
a source of guidance and expertise with respect to student loan
repayment and encouraged borrowers to rely on its advice and
representations. These allegations, however, do not establish that
Navient exercised the level of control and dominance necessary for
the existence of a fiduciary relationship. At bottom, plaintiffs
base their breach of fiduciary duty claim on allegations that
Navient made representations on its public-facing website about the
quality of its customer service. These representations do not
establish that Navient has undertaken a fiduciary duty to act or
give advice for the benefit of its borrowers.

Plaintiffs do not make a separate argument in defense of their
negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims. A threshold
requirement of both of these claims is that Navient owed plaintiffs
a duty. The FAC pleads that Navient owed a duty of care to the
plaintiffs due to its special position of confidence and trust.
These claims appear to stem from Navient's purported fiduciary
obligations which, as just discussed, have not been adequately
alleged to exist.

Plaintiffs' claims for breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and
negligent misrepresentation must therefore be dismissed.

Statutory Deceptive Practices Claims

The parties agree that the plaintiffs' claims under the California,
Maryland, and Florida deceptive practices statutes6 sound in fraud
and thus are subject to the heightened pleading standard contained
in Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).  

To satisfy this Rule, a complaint alleging fraud must (1) specify
the statements that the plaintiff contends were fraudulent, (2)
identify the speaker (3) state where and when the statements were
made and (4) explain why the statements were fraudulent.

With one exception, the FAC does not meet the heightened pleading
standards of Rule 9(b). It broadly alleges that, in an unspecified
number of conversations over a range of years, Navient made certain
representations to the named plaintiffs. In most cases, the FAC
simply identifies the approximate year in which these conversations
took place. In other cases, it gives no date range at all, and
simply alleges that the named plaintiff repeatedly contacted
Navient. Such general allegations are insufficient to afford
Navient fair notice of the factual basis for the plaintiffs' claims
sounding in fraud.

Plaintiffs argue that where much of the factual information needed
to fill out plaintiff's complaint lies peculiarly within the
opposing parties' knowledge, the general rule disfavoring
allegations founded upon belief ought not to be rigidly enforced.
The information relevant to these plaintiffs' claims, however, is
not peculiarly within Navient's knowledge. Plaintiffs were parties
to the telephone conversations in which they allege unspecified
Navient representatives made the misrepresentations that are the
subject of their claims. It is of little consequence to this motion
to dismiss that Navient may have maintained better records of these
conversations than the plaintiffs did.

Plaintiffs argue that the CCLRA nevertheless applies to Navient
because they provided services beyond mere servicing and debt
collection. That argument is foreclosed by California law. In
Fairbanks v. Superior Court, 46 Cal.4th 56 (2009), the California
Supreme Court concluded that using the existence of ancillary
services to bring intangible goods within the coverage of the
Consumer Legal Remedies Act would defeat the apparent legislative
intent in limiting the definition of `goods' to include only
`tangible chattels.

Beyond their preemption argument, which has already been rejected,
the defendants make no further argument in support of their motion
to dismiss the plaintiffs' claim under Section 349 of the New York
General Business Law.

Count Fourteen of the FAC therefore survives.

Unjust Enrichment

The final claims are claims of unjust enrichment. To prevail on a
claim for unjust enrichment in New York, a plaintiff must establish
(1) that the defendant benefitted (2) at the plaintiff's expense
and (3) that equity and good conscience require restitution.

Similarly, under Maryland law, unjust enrichment consists of

1. A benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff 2. An
appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit and 3.
The acceptance or retention by the defendant of the benefit under
such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the defendant to
retain the benefit without the payment of its value.

A successful unjust enrichment claim serves to deprive the
defendant of benefits that in equity and good conscience he ought
not to keep, even though he may have received those benefits quite
honestly in the first instance, and even though the plaintiff may
have suffered no demonstrable losses.

Florida unjust enrichment law is similar. Florida courts have long
recognized a cause of action for unjust enrichment to prevent the
wrongful retention of a benefit, or the retention of money or
property of another, in violation of good conscience and
fundamental principles of justice or equity.

Finally, in California, an individual may be required to make
restitution if he is unjustly enriched at the expense of another. A
person is enriched if he receives a benefit at another's expense.

The plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for unjust enrichment.
The core of an unjust enrichment claim is that the defendant has
received something that does not belong to it, and that rightly
belongs to the plaintiff. This is not the plaintiffs' claim. As
described in their opposition to this motion to dismiss, the
plaintiffs' theory of unjust enrichment is that Navient unjustly
retained servicing fees that should have gone to FedLoan.

Count Five of the FAC is therefore dismissed.

Navient's motion to dismiss the FAC is granted except as to Count
Fourteen (New York General Business Law Section 349).

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 8, 2019 Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yy5yhux3 from
Leagle.com.

Kathryn Hyland, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Melissa Garcia, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Eldon R. Gaede, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Jessica Saint-Paul, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Rebecca Spitler-Lawson,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Michelle Means, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Elizabeth Kaplan, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Jennifer Guth, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated & Megan Nocerino,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Faith E. Gay -- fgay@selendygay.com --
Selendy & Gay PLLC, Margaret Siller -- msiller@selendygay.com --
Selendy & Gay PLLC, Maria Ginzburg -- mginzburg@selendygay.com --
Selendy & Gay PLLC, Yelena Konanova -- ykonanova@selendygay.com --
Selendy & Gay PLLC & Mark Richard -- mrichard@phillipsrichard.com
-- Phillips, Richard & Rind, P.A.

Elizabeth Taylor, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated & Anthony Chruch, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Faith E.
Gay, Selendy & Gay PLLC, Mark Richard, Phillips, Richard & Rind,
P.A. & Yelena Konanova, Selendy & Gay PLLC.

Navient Corporation & Navient Solutions LLC, Defendants,
represented by Andrew Arthur Ruffino -- aruffino@cov.com --
Covington & Burling LLP & Ashley Margaret Simonsen --
asimonsen@cov.com -- Covington & Burling LLP.


NCAA: Goins Sues Over Disregard for Student-Athletes' Safety
------------------------------------------------------------
Harvey Goins, Jr., individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. National Collegiate Athletic
Association, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-02565-RLY-MPB (S.D. Ind.,
June 25, 2019) seeks to obtain redress for injuries sustained a
result of Defendant's reckless disregard for the health and safety
of generations of University of Louisiana at Monroe ("ULM")
student-athletes.

Despite knowing for decades of a vast body of scientific research
describing the danger of traumatic brain injuries ("TBIs") like
those Plaintiff experienced, Defendant failed to implement adequate
procedures to protect Plaintiff and other ULM football players from
the long-term dangers associated with them. They did so knowingly
and for profit. As a direct result of Defendant's acts and
omissions, Plaintiff and countless former ULM football players
suffered brain and other neurocognitive injuries from playing NCAA
football. As such, Plaintiff brings this Class Action Complaint in
order to vindicate those players' rights and hold the NCAA
accountable, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Harvey Goins, Jr. is a natural person and citizen of the
State of Texas.

The NCAA is the governing body of collegiate athletics that
oversees twenty-three college sports and over 400,000 students who
participate in intercollegiate athletics, including the football
program at Hampton.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Jeff Raizner, Esq.
     RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
     2402 Dunlavy Street
     Houston, TX 77006
     Phone: 713.554.9099
     Fax: 713.554.9098
     Email: efile@raiznerlaw.com

          - and -

     Jay Edelson, Esq.
     Benjamin H. Richman, Esq.
     EDELSON PC
     350 North LaSalle Street, 14th Floor
     Chicago, IL 60654
     Phone: 312.589.6370
     Fax: 312.589.6378
     Email: jedelson@edelson.com
            brichman@edelson.com

          - and -

     Rafey S. Balabanian, Esq.
     EDELSON PC
     123 Townsend Street, Suite 100
     San Francisco, CA 94107
     Phone: 415.212.9300
     Fax: 415.373.9435
     Email: rbalabanian@edelson.com


NEW YORK: 2nd Cir. Appeal v. Mateo-Sencion Filed in Gulino Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
entered on May 30, 2019, in the lawsuit titled Gulino, et al. v.
Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 24,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1947, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Maritza Mateo-Sencion is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: 2nd Cir. Appeal v. Paulau-Robotis Filed in Gulino Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
entered on May 30, 2019, in the lawsuit titled Gulino, et al. v.
Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 24,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1994, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Maria Elena Paulau-Robotis is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: 2nd Cir. Appeal v. Preptit-Nestor Filed in Gulino Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
entered on May 30, 2019, in the lawsuit titled Gulino, et al. v.
Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 24,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-2001, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Aline Preptit-Nestor is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: 2nd Circuit Appeal v. Anaya Filed in Gulino Bias Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
entered on May 30, 2019, in the lawsuit styled Gulino, et al. v.
Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 24,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1958, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Ana Lydia Anaya is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: 2nd Circuit Appeal v. Holland Filed in Gulino Bias Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
entered on May 30, 2019, in the lawsuit styled Gulino, et al. v.
Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 24,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1965, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Carolyn Holland is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: 2nd Circuit Appeal v. Luna Filed in Gulino Bias Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
entered on May 30, 2019, in the lawsuit entitled Gulino, et al. v.
Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 24,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1946, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Ada Luna is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: Appeal v. Rangel Filed in Gulino Discrimination Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
entered on May 30, 2019, in the lawsuit titled Gulino, et al. v.
Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 24,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1945, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Angel Rangel is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: Appeal v. Toussaint Filed in Gulino Discrimination Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
entered on May 30, 2019, in the lawsuit entitled Gulino, et al. v.
Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 24,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1955, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Parphine Toussaint is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: Board of Educ. Files Appeal v. Knowles in Gulino Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
entered on May 30, 2019, in the lawsuit titled Gulino, et al. v.
Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 24,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1948, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee William Knowles is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: Educ. Board Appeals Judgment v. Mostafa in Gulino Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
entered on May 30, 2019, in the lawsuit styled Gulino, et al. v.
Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 24,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1991, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Osama Mostafa is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: Educ. Board Appeals Judgment v. Panora in Gulino Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
entered on May 30, 2019, in the lawsuit titled Gulino, et al. v.
Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 24,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1983, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Piedad Panora is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: Educ. Board Appeals Judgment v. Pineda in Gulino Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
entered on May 30, 2019, in the lawsuit styled Gulino, et al. v.
Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 24,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1976, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Argentina Sanchez Pineda is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: Educ. Board Appeals Judgment v. Seaborn in Gulino Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
entered on May 30, 2019, in the lawsuit entitled Gulino, et al. v.
Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 24,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1995, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Sheron Seaborn is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: Educ. Board Files Appeal v. Cabrera in Gulino Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
entered on May 30, 2019, in the lawsuit styled Gulino, et al. v.
Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 24,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1951, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Lucina Cabrera is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: Judgment for Abel in Gulino Suit Appealed to 2nd Cir.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
entered on May 30, 2019, in the lawsuit titled Gulino, et al. v.
Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 24,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1973, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Maryse Abel is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: Judgment for Alves in Gulino Suit Appealed to 2nd Cir.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
entered on May 30, 2019, in the lawsuit entitled Gulino, et al. v.
Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 24,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1974, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Kalifa Alves is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: Judgment for Cambry in Gulino Suit Appealed to 2nd Cir.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
entered on May 30, 2019, in the lawsuit entitled Gulino, et al. v.
Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 24,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1950, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Pierre Cambry is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: Judgment for Green in Gulino Suit Appealed to 2nd Cir.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
entered on May 30, 2019, in the lawsuit entitled Gulino, et al. v.
Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 24,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1964, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Catherine Green is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: Judgment for Lewis in Gulino Suit Appealed to 2nd Cir.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
entered on May 30, 2019, in the lawsuit titled Gulino, et al. v.
Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 24,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1953, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Corey Lewis is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: Second Circuit Appeal v. Frias Initiated in Gulino Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
entered on May 30, 2019, in the lawsuit titled Gulino, et al. v.
Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 24,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1962, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Ana Rosa Frias is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: Second Circuit Appeal v. Keys Initiated in Gulino Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
entered on May 30, 2019, in the lawsuit entitled Gulino, et al. v.
Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 24,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1987, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Mozella Keys is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: Second Circuit Appeal v. Neuendorf Filed in Gulino Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
entered on May 30, 2019, in the lawsuit styled Gulino, et al. v.
Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 24,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1998, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Francisca Neuendorf is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NII HOLDINGS: Nayman Sues Over False and Misleading Statements
--------------------------------------------------------------
MATIS NAYMAN, Plaintiff, v. KEVIN L. BEEBE, JAMES V. CONTINENZA,
HOWARD S. HOFFMANN, RICARDO KNOEPFELMACHER, CHRISTOPHER T. ROGERS,
ROBERT A. SCHRIESHEIM, STEVEN M. SHINDLER, and NII HOLDINGS, INC.,
Defendants, Case No. 2019-0525- (Chancery Ct., State of Del., July
8, 2019) is a stockholder class action on behalf of himself and all
other similarly situated public stockholders of NII Holdings, Inc.
("NII" or the "Company"), against the NII board of directors (the
"Board").

As announced on or about March 18, 2019, NII and NII International
Holdings S.à r.l. ("NIIH"), a wholly owned subsidiary of NII,
entered into a As announced on or about March 18, 2019, NII and NII
International Holdings S.à r.l. ("NIIH"), a wholly owned
subsidiary of NII, entered into a purchase agreement (the "Purchase
Agreement") with América Móvil, S.A.B. de C.V. ("AMX") and AI
Brazil Holdings B.V. ("AI Brazil"), pursuant to which NII and AI
Brazil will sell their jointly owned wireless operations in Brazil
(the "Nextel Brazil Business"). Specifically, NIIH will sell all of
the issued and outstanding shares of NII Brazil Holdings S.à r.l.
("NII Brazil") to AMX (the "Nextel Brazil Transaction"). Also,
pursuant to the Purchase Agreement, concurrent to, and as a
condition of, the consummation of the Nextel Brazil Transaction, AI
Brazil will sell all of its interests in Nextel Holdings S.à r.l.
("Nextel Holdings") to NII Brazil (the "AI Brazil Transaction") so
that, immediately prior to the closing of the Nextel Brazil
Transaction, NII Brazil will hold 100% of Nextel Holdings. At the
closing of the Nextel Brazil Transaction and the AI Brazil
Transaction, AMX will directly own all of the issued and
outstanding shares of NII Brazil and indirectly own all of the
issued and outstanding shares of Nextel Holdings.

The Purchase Agreement and proposed Dissolution have so many moving
parts -- including the Indemnification Obligations and Mexico
Escrow -- and the Proxy, is so woefully deficient, that it is
virtually impossible for NII shareholders to understand the amount
and timing of the consideration they will ultimately receive in
connection with the Purchase Agreement and proposed Dissolution.
The Proxy never set forth the parameters – qualitatively or
quantitatively – of the "stand-alone plan" or "range of potential
strategic alternatives" considered by the Board. This information
is highly material given that the Company was in turn-around mode
prior to the sale and the price paid in the transaction was a
discount to NII's trading price prior to the announcement of the
deal. The NII shareholders approved the Purchase Agreement and
Dissolution at a special meeting on June 27, 2019. However, the
Proposed Purchase Agreement and/Dissolution have not closed and/or
taken place yet.

The Proxy for the Purchase Agreement and Dissolution was materially
false and misleading. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the
Proposed Purchase Agreement and/or Dissolution and/or recover
damages in the event the transactions are completed, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff is a current NII stockholder and has been a stockholder
continuously since prior to the announcement of the Purchase
Agreement and/or Proposed Dissolution.

NII provides wireless communication services under the NextelTM
brand in Brazil through its subsidiary Nextel Telecomunicações
Ltda.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Carmella P. Keener, Esq.
     ROSENTHAL, MONHAIT & GODDESS, P.A.
     919 North Market Street, Suite 1401
     Citizens Bank Center
     P.O. Box 1070
     Wilmington, DE 19899-1070
     Phone: (302) 656-4433
     Email: ckeener@rmgglaw.com

          - and –

     U. Seth Ottensoser, Esq.
     KELLER LENKNER LLC
     477 Madison Avenue, Suite 621
     New York, NY 10022
     Phone: (516) 782-3817

          - and -

     Ashley Keller, Esq.
     KELLER LENKNER LLC
     150 North Riverside Plaza, Suite 4270
     Chicago, IL 60606
     Phone: 312.506.5641
     Email: ack@kellerlenkner.com


NORTHROP GRUMMAN: Court Issues Protective Order in Baleja
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California, Eastern Division, issued a Protective Order in the case
captioned JOHN BALEJA, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. NORTHROP GRUMMAN SPACE AND
MISSION SYSTEMS CORP. SALARIED PENSION PLAN; NORTHROP GRUMMAN
BENEFIT PLANS ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE; NORTHROP GRUMMAN
CORPORATION; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants. No.
5:17-cv-00235-JGB-SP. (C.D. Cal.).

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 8, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yyeazfla from Leagle.com.

John Baleja, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented byBrendan Stephen Maher, Stris and
Maher LLP, Peter K. Stris -- peter.stris@strismaher.com -- Stris
and Maher LLP, Shaun P. Martin, University of San Diego Law School,
5998 Alcala Park, San Diego, CA 92110, Victor A. O'Connell --
victor.oconnell@strismaher.com -- Stris and Maher LLP & John
Randolph Stokes -- john.stokes@strismaher.com -- Stris and Maher
LLP.

Northrop Grumman Space and Mission Systems Corp. Salaried Pension
Plan, Northrop Grumman Benefit Plans Administrative Committee &
Northrop Grumman Corporation, Defendants, represented by C. William
Phillips -- cphillips@cov.com -- Covington and Burling LLP, pro hac
vice, Christian J. Pistilli -- cpistilli@cov.com -- Covington and
Burling LLP, pro hac vice, Mark Y. Chen -- mychen@cov.com --
Covington and Burling LLP, Mitchell A. Kamin -- mkamin@cov.com --
Covington & Burling LLP, Robert S. Newman -- rnewman@cov.com --
Covington and Burling LLP, pro hac vice & William E. O'Neil,
Covington and Burling LLP, pro hac vice.

Does, 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendant, represented by Mark Y.
Chen, Covington and Burling LLP & Mitchell A. Kamin, Covington &
Burling LLP.


NUESTRO SAGRADO: Underpays Home Care Providers, Valdepena Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
GLORIA VALDEPENA, individually and on behalf of those similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NUESTRO SAGRADO CORAZON PRIMARY HOME
CARE, INC., OUR SACRED HEART HOME HEALTH, INC., and MARIA ALICIA
MORENO, the Defendants, Case No. 5:19-cv-00094 (S.D. Tex., July 10,
2019), seeks all unpaid wages, liquidated damages, and attorney's
fees and expenses for herself and for similarly situated workers
who join the action under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff worked for Defendants as a home care provider in Webb
County, Texas. The Plaintiff and Group Members performed home care
service work for the Defendants in and around counties throughout
Texas.

The Plaintiff and Group Members regularly worked more than 40 hours
per workweek. The Defendants did not pay overtime rates equal to
one and one-half times Plaintiff's and Group Members' regular
hourly rates of pay in the majority of workweeks in which Plaintiff
and Group Members worked more than 40 hours.

Instead, Defendants compensated Plaintiff and Group members at
their regular, non-overtime hourly rates of pay for all or the
majority of the hours that they worked in each workweek, the
lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Lakshmi Ramakrishnan, Esq.
          Nicole Bucheri, Esq.
          Caitlin A. Fish, Esq.
          TEXAS RIOGRANDE LEGAL AID
          301 S. Texas Ave.
          Mercedes, TX 78570
          Telephone: (956) 447-4850
          Facsimile: (956) 825-7035
          E-mail: lramakrishnan@trla.org
                  nbucheri@trla.org
                  cfish@trla.org

PARAMOUNT EQUITY: Winters Sues over Unsolicited Phone Calls
-----------------------------------------------------------
RICHARD WINTERS JR., individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. PARAMOUNT EQUITY MORTGAGE
d/b/a LOANPAL, and DOES 1 through 10, the Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-01266-WBS-EFB (E.D. Cal., July 9, 2019), contends that the
Defendant promotes and markets its merchandise, in part, by
unsolicited telephone calls, in violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.

Paramount Equity LLC., headquartered in Roseville, California, and
consists of Paramount Equity Mortgage, a residential mortgage
lending company, Paramount Solar, a residential solar power
solutions company, and Paramount Equity Insurance Services.

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Meghan E. George, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: 323-306-4234
          Facsimile: 866-633-0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                  mgeorge@toddflaw.com
                    abacon@toddflaw.com

PENNSYLVANIA STATE: Court Dismisses Public-School Teachers' Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania issued a Memorandum Opinion granting Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned ARTHUR DIAMOND, on behalf
of himself and others similarly situated, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
PENNSYLVANIA STATE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, et al., Defendants. Case
No. 3:18-cv-128. (W.D. Pa.).

The Plaintiffs, who are all current or retired Pennsylvania
public-school teachers, allege that the Union Defendants violated
the Plaintiffs' constitutional rights by forcing the Plaintiffs to
pay fees to unions as a condition of their employment (fair-share
fees) under 71 Pa. Stat. Section 575 (Section 575), even though the
Plaintiffs chose not to join the Pennsylvania State Education
Association or its affiliate unions.  The Plaintiffs also claim
that Commonwealth Defendants, who are charged in various ways with
enforcing Pennsylvania's laws, must be enjoined from enforcing
Section 575 in an unconstitutional manner.

Here, the Commonwealth Defendants have not yet filed an answer or
presented competing facts; therefore, their Motion to Dismiss, to
the extent it is based on Rule 12(b)(1), must be treated as a
facial attack on this Court's subject-matter jurisdiction, a
conclusion with which they agree.  

In contrast, in support of their Motion to Dismiss, the Union
Defendants submitted various sworn declarations.  The Union
Defendants seem to assert that based on the submission of these
declarations, their Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) must be
treated as a factual attack on this Court's subject matter
jurisdiction. And the Plaintiffs do not challenge this assertion.
Therefore, when evaluating the Union Defendants' 12(b)(1) grounds
for dismissal, the Court may consider the Union Defendants'
affidavits.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

A complaint may be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Rule
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. But detailed pleading is not generally required. The Rules
demand only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief" to give the defendant fair
notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.  

Commonwealth Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted

In Commonwealth Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint
and brief in support thereof   Commonwealth Defendant move to
dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint because (1)
Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claim fails to specify which
constitutional rights are at issue (2) Plaintiffs' claims against
Commonwealth Defendants are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and
(3) the chairman and members of the PLRB and Attorney General
Shapiro are not appropriate defendants to this action.  

The Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claim states a claim even though it
does not explicitly state which constitutional rights are at
issue.

As an initial matter, the Court rejects Commonwealth Defendants'
assertion that Plaintiffs' failure to specify the constitutional
rights at issue is fatal to Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claim. The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that a complaint
state a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief. Detailed factual allegations are not
required the complaint must simply contain enough information to
give the defendants fair notice of the claim and the facts upon
which the claim is based.   The cases to which Commonwealth
Defendants cite are inapposite, as they involved factual
allegations that were not clear enough to implicate specific
constitutional rights.   

Therefore, based on the Court's experience and common sense, the
Court declines to dismiss Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claim as to
Commonwealth Defendants for failure to specify the constitutional
rights on which the claim is based.

Based on Eleventh Amendment immunity, Plaintiffs' claims against
Commonwealth Defendants are dismissed

Commonwealth Defendants next move to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims
against them because they are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Commonwealth Defendants explain that the Eleventh Amendment
protects Commonwealth Defendants from this lawsuit and that no
exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity applies.  

In response, Plaintiffs do not dispute that Eleventh Amendment
immunity generally applies to Commonwealth Defendants. Instead,
Plaintiffs assert that their claims against Commonwealth Defendants
fall within the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment
immunity because Plaintiffs seek prospective relief to enjoin
violations of federal law.  

The Eleventh Amendment

The Eleventh Amendment states that the Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State. The Supreme Court has long understood the Eleventh
Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the
presupposition which it confirms.  

Here, Commonwealth Defendants assert that Congress did not abrogate
states' immunity for the claims in this case and that the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has not consented to suit. Plaintiffs
do not contest these assertions.   Therefore, the only dispute
between Plaintiffs and Commonwealth Defendants is whether the Ex
parte Young exception to sovereign immunity permits Plaintiffs to
seek prospective relief from Commonwealth Defendants under the
circumstances of this case.

In determining whether the Ex Parte Young doctrine avoids an
Eleventh Amendment bar, the Supreme Court has made it quite clear
that a court need only conduct a straightforward inquiry into
whether the complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law
and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.

Plaintiffs do not allege an ongoing violation of federal law with
respect to Commonwealth Defendants

Commonwealth Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to allege an
ongoing violation of federal law with respect to Commonwealth
Defendants.  They contend that there is no claim that the Attorney
General or any member of the PLRB has done or is doing anything to
violate Plaintiffs' federal constitutional rights. Plaintiffs do
not directly respond to this argument, except to note that
Plaintiffs' claims falls squarely within the Ex parte
Youngexception to sovereign immunity, as they seek prospective
relief to enjoin violations of federal law.

The Court agrees with Commonwealth Defendants. Plaintiffs have not
alleged any ongoing violations of federal law with respect to
Commonwealth Defendants in the Second Amended Complaint. For
example, Plaintiffs have not alleged that Commonwealth Defendants
have enforced or continue to enforce Section 575 in an
unconstitutional manner. The Second Amended Complaint simply claims
that Comrnonwealth Defendants are charged with enforcing Section
575  which does not implicate the Ex parte Young exception to
Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Because Plaintiffs sue Commonwealth Defendants without alleging
that those Defendants continue to enforce an unconstitutional
Pennsylvania statute, the Second Amended Complaint is nominally
against individual officers, but the state is the real, substantial
party in interest and the suit in fact is against the state.
Therefore, this Court must dismiss Plaintiffs' claims against
Commonwealth Defendants because there is no allegation of an
ongoing violation of federal law, and the Eleventh Amendment thus
bars suit against Commonwealth Defendants.  

The Court will dismiss Plaintiffs' claims against Commonwealth
Defendants.

The Plaintiffs' claims against Attorney General Shapiro and the
members and chairman of the PLRB are also dismissed because these
state officials are inappropriate defendants

Commonwealth Defendants also argue that the members and chairman of
the PLRB and Attorney General Shapiro must be dismissed from the
lawsuit because they are not appropriate defendants in Plaintiffs'
challenge to Section 575.  Commonwealth Defendants assert that
Section 575 does not impose any specific enforcement obligations on
Attorney General Shapiro or the PLRB.  

The Plaintiffs disagree, claiming that the PLRB defendants enforce
the State's collective bargaining laws, which include the agency
shop provisions that the plaintiffs have challenged, and the
attorney general is charged with enforcing all of the State's laws
as the State's chief law enforcement officer.

Attorney General Shapiro has no connection with the enforcement of
Section 575.

There is no enforcement role for the attorney general in the
penalty provisions of Section.   
Under Ex parte Young, a state official's enforcement role need not
be set out in the statute itself the connection to enforcement may
come from a different source, including the general law. Yet, in
this case, the attorney general's general authority to enforce the
laws of the Commonwealth does not extend to Section 575. The
attorney general's power comes from the Commonwealth Attorneys Act,
71 Pa. Stat. Sections 732-301 et seq. No provisions of this Act
would give the attorney general the authority to enforce Section
575 under the circumstances of this case.

The Plaintiffs argue with no citations to authority that the
attorney general is charged with enforcing all of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania's laws. They assert that the attorney general's
general enforcement powers make the attorney general an appropriate
defendant, at least at the motion-to-dismiss stage.

The Court disagrees. The Plaintiffs have failed to identify any
connection between the attorney general and the enforcement of
Section 575. The conclusory allegation that the attorney general is
charged with enforcing Section 575 is insufficient to survive a
motion to dismiss. Without factual allegations that the attorney
general has enforced or threatened to enforce Section 575 or
citations that show that the attorney general has some connection
to the enforcement of Section 575, this suit is simply another case
of a high policy official with a general duty to uphold the law
that has been made a party to a suit where there is little
likelihood that he actually would have enforced the particular
statute at issue.

In sum, the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against
Attorney General Shapiro must be dismissed because the attorney
general is not an appropriate defendant in this challenge.
The Court also finds that Mr. Darby, the chairman of the PLRB, and
Mr. Mezzaroba and Mr. Shoop, members of the PLRB, must be dismissed
as defendants for similar reasons. Section 575 does not provide any
role for the PLRB, its chairman, or its members in enforcing its
provisions. Further, Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that the
PLRB chairman or its members have enforced or threatened to enforce
Section 575 against Plaintiffs. Therefore, the members and chairman
of the PLRB are not appropriate defendants in this action, as they
lack some connection with the enforcement of Section 575.

In summary, beyond Commonwealth Defendants' immunity, the claims
against Attorney General Shapiro, Mr. Darby, Mr. Mezzaroba, and Mr.
Shoop must be dismissed because these individuals are inappropriate
defendants to this action.

Union Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted

The Plaintiffs' claim for repayment of previously paid fair-share
fees is dismissed based on the good-faith defense

The Plaintiffs request that this Court order the NEA, the PSEA, and
all of the PSEA's chapters and affiliates to repay the fair-share
fees that Union Defendants extracted from Plaintiffs and their
class members' paychecks, along with pre- and post-judgment
interest.  

Union Defendants seek to dismiss this request for relief. Union
Defendants argue that any fair-share fees that they extracted after
the Janus, Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 1486, decision have already been
repaid with interest, and thus, to the extent Plaintiffs demand
reimbursement for post-Janus extraction, their request is moot.
Plaintiffs do not appear to challenge this claim of mootness.

The Court agrees that Plaintiffs' claims for post-Janus
fair-share-fee reimbursement are moot, as these fees have
undisputedly been repaid.

In response, Plaintiffs argue that when a defendant asserts a
good-faith defense, courts are required to look to the common-law
tort that is most analogous to the situation. If, when Section1983
was enacted, the analogous tort allowed for a similar defense, the
court may recognize that defense to a claim for damages under
Section 1983.   Plaintiffs claim that the most analogous common-law
tort in this case is conversion, which never incorporated a
good-faith defense. Thus, according to Plaintiffs, Union Defendants
are foreclosed from asserting a good-faith defense to Section 1983
liability.

The Plaintiffs also assert that even if the good-faith defense
applies in this case, the Union Defendants cannot establish that
they reasonably relied on Section 575 and Abood. Nor have Union
Defendants proven that they complied with Abood prior to the
issuance of the Janus decision.  

Legal Standard

Retroactive application of a Supreme Court decision is the general
rule: when the Supreme Court applies a rule of federal law to the
parties before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of
federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases
still open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of
whether such events predate or postdate the Court's announcement of
the rule. Reasonable reliance on previously controlling law is not
sufficient to overcome this rule of retroactive application.  

However, as courts apply retroactively' a new rule of law to
pending cases, they will find instances where that new rule, for
well-established legal reasons, does not determine the outcome of
the case. For example, a court may find a previously existing,
independent legal basis having nothing to do with retroactivity for
denying retroactive relief.

In this case, Plaintiffs and Union Defendants dispute whether the
good-faith defense to Section 1983 liability for damages provides
an independent legal basis. The Supreme Court first suggested that
this defense might exist for private actors sued under Section 1983
in the 1982 decision of Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S.
922 (1982), in which the Court stated:

Justice POWELL is concerned that private individuals who innocently
make use of seemingly valid state laws would be responsible, if the
law is subsequently held to be unconstitutional, for the
consequences of their actions. In our view, however, this problem
should be dealt with not by changing the character of the cause of
action but by establishing an affirmative defense. We need not
reach the question of the availability of such a defense to private
individuals at this juncture.

Here, Union Defendants argue in a footnote that it is not clear
that Janus would apply retroactively based on Harper, Harper, 509
U.S. at 90, 97, because the Janus decision did no more than
overrule Abood, reverse the lower courts' order dismissing the
complaint, and remand for further proceedings.

The Court disagrees. According to Harper, when the Supreme Court
applies a new rule of federal law to the parties before it, other
courts must apply that decision retroactively The Court in Harper
did not explicitly define the circumstances in which it applies a
rule of federal law to the parties before it, but the Court has
explained in other decisions that a new principle of law is
established either by overruling clear past precedent on which
litigants may have relied or by deciding an issue of first
impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed. Based on
this definition, Janus announced a new principle of law. Janus
overruled clear past precedent (Abood), announced a new rule
regarding the unconstitutionality of fair-share fees, and applied
that rule to the case by reversing the Seventh Circuit's dismissal
of the plaintiffs' complaint.

Therefore, Haper's retroactivity rule applies to Janus.

However, there is an independent legal basis in this case for
otherwise denying retroactive relief: the good-faith defense
available to private parties who are sued under Section 1983.
Plaintiffs offer numerous arguments against the applicability of
the good-faith defense. The Court addresses each argument in turn.

The Court rejects Plaintiffs' most-analogous-common-law-tort
argument

Plaintiffs first argue, citing to the Supreme Court's decision in
Wyatt, Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 164, that the good-faith defense only
applies if the most analogous common-law tort would have conferred
similar immunities when Section 1983 was enacted. Plaintiffs assert
that the most analogous common-law tort in this case is conversion,
a strict-liability tort that does not provide for a good-faith
defense.  

The Court rejects Plaintiffs' most-analogous-tort argument because
(1) Wyatt and Jordan, Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel,
20 F.3d 1250 (3d Cir. 1994),.do not require comparison to the most
analogous common-law tort and (2) the most analogous common-law
tort in this case would allow for a good-faith defense.

First, Wyatt does not require looking to the most analogous
common-law tort when determining whether the good-faith defense
applies. In fact, as Plaintiffs point out, Wyatt did not
conclusively resolve the issue of whether a good-faith defense to
Section 1983 liability exists at all. Instead, Wyatt's articulation
of the most-analogous-common-law-tort rule dealt with qualified
immunity.  

When the Wyatt Court suggests that a good-faith defense may be
available to private parties exposed to Section 1983 liability, the
Court did not refer to analogous common-law torts. Instead, the
Court discussed the principles of equality and fairness that may
necessitate protecting private parties from Section 1983 liability.


Moreover, when the Third Circuit adopted the good-faith defense in
Jordan, the Third Circuit did not indicate whether the application
of the good-faith defense depends on an analogous common-law tort.
And district court cases applying Jordan have not relied on
common-law-tort analogs.  

Therefore, this Court disagrees with Plaintiffs' assertion that
Wyatt compels courts to look to the most analogous common-law tort,
and it allows courts to recognize a defense only if that tort would
have conferred similar immunities when Section 1983 was enacted.
The Court agrees with the opinions of various district courts that
have determined  when presented with indistinguishable facts that
the applicability of the good-faith defense does not require
analyzing the most analogous common-law tort.  

Second, even if this Court were required to look to the most
analogous common-law tort when determining whether the good-faith
defense applies, conversion is not the most analogous tort. This is
not a case in which someone  walked off with another's property.
Instead, this case involved Union Defendants compelling Plaintiffs
to support particular speech through the state-created processes
found in Section 575. Moreover, it involved Union Defendants'
interference with Plaintiffs' contractual right to receive certain
wages from their employers. Therefore, as many district courts have
found, the most analogous common-law tort here is either abuse of
process.

Union Defendants objectively reasonably relied on Section 575 and
Abood

Plaintiffs next assert that even if the Court recognizes the
applicability of a good-faith defense, Union Defendants cannot
contend that they reasonably relied on Section 575's
constitutionality and the Supreme Court's decision in Abood because
the Supreme Court had repeatedly warned the union defendants that
it had grave misgivings about the constitutionality of
public-sector agency shops long before declaring them
unconstitutional in Janus.

The Court disagrees. It is objectively reasonable to rely on a
state statute that is valid under controlling Supreme Court
precedent. Regardless of how many times the Supreme Court
questioned its holding in Abood, Abood was the law of the land
until it was overturned in Janus. By relying on this law, Union
Defendants acted in good faith and are entitled to the protection
of the good-faith defense as a matter of law.  

To conclude otherwise would undermine the equitable foundation of
the good-faith defense.  

Thus, it was objectively reasonable for Union Defendants to rely on
Section 575 and Abood before the Supreme Court's decision in
Janus.

Union Defendants need not prove that they complied with Abood

Plaintiffs next assert that, in order to establish their good-faith
defense, Union Defendants must prove that they complied with Abood
in terms of how they spent the collected fair-share fees prior to
Janus. Plaintiffs claim that compliance with Abood is a factual
question that cannot be resolved on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

The Court rejects this argument. Union Defendants' good-faith
defense depends on whether the unconstitutional conduct alleged in
the Second Amended Complaint the collection of fair-share fees was
done in good faith. It does not depend on whether Union Defendants'
other actions including the spending of the collected fees were
done in good faith. The Court will not allow the Second Amended
Complaint to survive a motion to dismiss so Plaintiffs can
establish facts that are unrelated to Union Defendants' good-faith
defense. Other district courts have reached the same conclusion in
distinguishable cases.  

The relief Plaintiffs seek sounds in law, not equity

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the relief they seek can be
characterized as equitable and that the good-faith defense does not
apply to claims seeking relief in equity. In response, Union
Defendants assert that Plaintiffs do not allege that the previously
collected fair-share fees were kept in a specific fund against
which a constructive lien could be enforced.  Thus, Union
Defendants explain that if Plaintiffs have a claim for the
repayment of fair-share fees, that claim is a personal claim
against Union Defendants' general assets which sounds in law
instead of in equity.  

The Court finds that Plaintiffs seek a legal remedy as opposed to
an equitable remedy. Plaintiffs' claim for the repayment of
previously paid fair-share fees seeks monetary relief, which sounds
in law unless that money can be clearly traced to particular funds
or property possessed by Union Defendants.  

Moreover, as district courts have explained in comparable cases,
the crux of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint is that Union
Defendants used collected fees to fund union activities pursuant to
Section 575 and thus that Plaintiffs could not recover the specific
funds that they paid to Union Defendants.  

Therefore, regardless of Plaintiffs' attempt to characterize its
claim as equitable, Plaintiffs' claim for the repayment of
previously paid fair-share fees is a claim for legal relief. Thus,
the Court rejects Plaintiffs' argument that the good-faith defense
cannot apply because Plaintiffs' claim can be characterized as
equitable. This conclusion comports with various district-court
decisions on this issue.  

Union Defendants are entitled to assert the good-faith defense as a
matter of law
After rejecting Plaintiffs' various arguments against Union
Defendants' good-faith defense, the Court finds that the good-faith
defense applies to Plaintiffs' claims for repayment of previously
paid fair-share fees as a matter of law.

In Jordan, the Third Circuit explained that good faith gives state
actors a defense that depends on their subjective state of mind,
rather than the more demanding standard of reasonable belief that
governs qualified immunity.

Here, it was objectively reasonable for Union Defendants to rely on
a state statute that was constitutional under controlling Supreme
Court precedent when collecting fair-share fees from Plaintiffs. By
establishing objective reasonableness as a matter of law, Union
Defendants have met the less demanding subjective standard
articulated by the Third Circuit in Jordan. Union Defendants are
therefore entitled to the dismissal of Plaintiffs' Section 1983
claim to the extent Plaintiffs seek repayment of pre-Janus
fair-share fees.

The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiffs' state-law claims
Plaintiffs bring state-law tort claims against Defendants,
including for conversion, trespass to chattels, replevin, unjust
enrichment, and restitution. Plaintiffs urge this Court to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over these state-law claims.  

In any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental
jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in
the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of
the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution. However, "district courts may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if the
district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction.  

This Court will dismiss Plaintiffs' claims under 42 U.S.C. Section
1983 and 28 U.S.C. Section 2201. Therefore, all the claims over
which this Court has original jurisdiction will be dismissed.  

Because the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over these claims, the Court will not address Defendants' various
arguments as to why the state-law claims should be dismissed under
Rule 12(b)(6).  

In summary, Commonwealth Defendants and Union Defendants' Motions
to Dismiss will be granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 8, 2019 Memorandum
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y5wm4ydc from
Leagle.com.

ARTHUR DIAMOND, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
JEFFREY SCHAWARTZ & SANDRA H. ZIEGLER, on behlf of themselves
others similar situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Jonathan F.
Mitchell -- jfmitche@stanford.edu -- Mitchell Law PLLC, pro hac
vice, Sean T. Logue, Sean Logue, PLLC, 500 Grant St, Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania 15219, Shannon Conway -- sconway@talcottfranklin.com
-- Talcott Franklin P.C., pro hac vice & Talcott Franklin --
tal@talcottfranklin.com -- Talcott Franklin P.C., pro hac vice.

MATTHEW SHIVELY, MATTHEW SIMKINS, DOUGLAS R. KASE & JUSTIN BARRY,
Plaintiffs, represented by Shannon Conway, Talcott Franklin P.C.,
pro hac vice, Talcott Franklin, Talcott Franklin P.C., pro hac vice
& Jonathan F. Mitchell, Mitchell Law PLLC.

PENNSYLVANIA STATE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, CHESTNUT RIDGE EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION, as representative of the class of all chapters and
affiliates of the Pennsylvania State Education Association &
NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, Defendants, represented by Amanda
B. Bundick -- amanda@eblaborlaw.com -- Eberle & Bundick, LLC,
Robert A. Eberle, Eberle & Bundick, LLC, PO Box 44290 Pittsburgh,
PA 15205-0690, Adam Bellotti, Bredhoff & Kaiser, PLLC, pro hac
vice, Jacob Karabell, Bredhoff & Kaiser, PLLC, pro hac vice, John
West, Bredhoff & Kaiser, PLLC, 805 Fifteenth Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20005-2207, Joseph F. Canamucio, Pennsylvania State
Education Association, pro hac vice, Leon Dayan, Bredhoff and
Kaiser PLLC, 805 Fifteenth Street N.W. Washington, DC 20005-2207,
pro hac vice & Lubna A. Alam, National Education Association, pro
hac vice.


PIER 1: Town of Davie Police Pension Plan Class Suit Ongoing
------------------------------------------------------------
Pier 1 Imports, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 10, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 1, 2019, that the company continues to
defend a consolidated class action suit entitled, Town of Davie
Police Pension Plan, Plaintiff, v. Pier 1 Imports, Inc., Alexander
W. Smith and Charles H. Turner, Defendants.

Putative class action complaints were filed in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas - Dallas Division
against Pier 1 Imports, Inc., Alexander W. Smith and Charles H.
Turner in August and October 2015 alleging violations under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

The lawsuits, which have been consolidated into a single action
captioned Town of Davie Police Pension Plan, Plaintiff, v. Pier 1
Imports, Inc., Alexander W. Smith and Charles H. Turner,
Defendants, were filed on behalf of a purported putative class of
investors who purchased or otherwise acquired stock of Pier 1
Imports, Inc. between April 10, 2014 and December 17, 2015.

The plaintiffs seek to recover damages purportedly caused by the
Defendants' alleged violations of the federal securities laws and
to pursue remedies under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. The
complaint seeks certification as a class action, unspecified
compensatory damages plus interest and attorneys' fees.

On August 10, 2017, the court granted the Company's motion to
dismiss the complaint, while providing the plaintiffs an
opportunity to replead their complaint. An amended complaint was
filed with the court on September 25, 2017.

On June 25, 2018, the court granted the Company's motion to dismiss
the amended complaint, with prejudice. The plaintiffs subsequently
filed a notice of appeal and a related appellate brief and the
Company filed its reply brief in January 2019.

On June 12, 2019, the court heard oral arguments on plaintiff's
appeal.

Pier 1 said, "Although the ultimate outcome of litigation cannot be
predicted with certainty, the Company believes that this lawsuit is
without merit and intends to defend against it vigorously."

Pier 1 Imports, Inc. engages in the retail sale of decorative
accessories, furniture, candles, housewares, gifts, and seasonal
products. The company was founded in 1962 and is headquartered in
Fort Worth, Texas.


PORTOVINO RESTAURANT: Morelos Sues over Time Shaving Practices
--------------------------------------------------------------
SANTOS VILLAMAR MORELOS, on behalf of himself, FLSA Collective
Plaintiffs and the Class, the Plaintiff, vs. PORTOVINO RESTAURANT
INC., d/b/a PORTOFINO RESTAURANT, CARMINE POLITO and JACK
BRUCCULERI, the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-03988 (E.D.N.Y., July
10, 2019), seeks to recover unpaid wages due to time shaving,
unpaid wages due to invalid tip credit, illegally retained
gratuities, liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees and costs,
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor
Law. The Plaintiff further alleges that he was deprived his
statutory rights as a result of Defendants' unlawful discrimination
practices under New York State Human Rights Law, New York Executive
Law, and New York City Human Rights Law on the basis of his sexual
orientation.

The Plaintiff brings claims for relief as a collective action
pursuant to FLSA, on behalf of all non-exempt employees, including
servers, bussers, runners, cooks, line cooks, food preparers,
dishwashers, among others employed by Defendants on or after the
date that is six years before the filing of the complaint.

Defendants own and operate a restaurant under the trade name
"Portofino Restaurant," also known as "Portofino Ristorante,"
located at 109-32 Ascan Avenue, Forest Hills, New York 11375.

The Plaintiff and other FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are and have
been similarly situated, have had substantially similar job
requirements and pay provisions, and are and have been subjected to
Defendants' decisions, policies, plans, programs, practices,
procedures, protocols, routines, and rules, all culminating in a
willful failure and refusal to pay them their proper wages,
including the overtime, due to time shaving, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and the
Class are:

          C.K. Lee, Esq.
          Anne Seelig, Esq.
          LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
          148 West 24th Street, Eighth Floor
          New York, NY 10011
          Telephone: 212-465-1188
          Facsimile: 212-465-1181

PROGRESSIVE PREFERRED: Court OKs Stay of Martinez Suit
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico
issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting Plaintiffs' Opposed
Motion to Stay in the case captioned DIANE MARTINEZ; and ERIN
MARTIN, individually and on behalf of other similarly situated
individuals. Plaintiffs, v. PROGRESSIVE PREFERRED INSURANCE
COMPANY; PROGRESSIVE CLASSIC INSURANCE COMPANY; PROGRESSIVE
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY; PROGRESSIVE MAX INSURANCE COMPANY;
PROGRESSIVE DIRECT INSURANCE COMPANY; PROGRESSIVE ADVANCED
INSURANCE COMPANY; PROGRESSIVE SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY; and
PROGRESSIVE NORTHERN INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants. No. CV
19-0004JHR/KK. (D.N.M.).

Both the Plaintiffs were injured in automobile collisions. Neither
were determined to be at fault, and both were injured by drivers
who maintained New Mexico's minimum required liability insurance
limits of $25,000.00 per person, $50,000.00 per accident. The
Plaintiffs now bring this putative class action case against the
Progressive Defendants, asserting that the first $25,000.00 of
their purported uninsured motorist benefits were illusory.

The Plaintiffs move the Court to enter a stay in this case until
the New Mexico Supreme Court answers the certified question in
Crutcher v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, CV 18-0412 JCH/LF.
The Defendants generally oppose a stay, arguing in their Motion to
Dismiss that this Court should determine that the coverage they
provided to both Plaintiffs was not illusory. Defendants argue that
both claims are barred, positing that the numbers are different,
but the methodology is the same. Progressive did exactly what
Schmick instructs, and following the law cannot be unlawful as
Plaintiffs claim.

Following the New Mexico Supreme Court's acceptance of the
certified question in Crutcher, District Judge Vazquez subsequently
stayed the proceedings in Thaxton v. GEICO Advantage Ins. Co., CV
18-0306 MV/KK, and concluded that the defendants' motion to certify
in that case was rendered moot. Chief District Judge Johnson
followed suit in Schwartz v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.,
CV 18-0328 WJ/SCY, after determining that the certified question is
substantially similar to the question the defendants in that case
sought to certify.

The Plaintiffs now move the Court to enter a stay in this case
until the New Mexico Supreme Court answers the certified question
in Crutcher. As to Ms. Martin, Defendants ask the Court to certify
the following question:

Where a tortfeasor's minimum auto liability insurance limits are
the same as an injured driver's minimum UM/UIM limits such that the
tortfeasor is not underinsured under N.M.S.A. Section 66-5-301(B),
does the non-occurrence of the covered risk of being hit by an
underinsured driver create illusory UIM coverage even though the
risk of being hit by an underinsured driver is covered when it
occurs?

In their response to the Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay, the Defendants
apparently agree that at least part of this case should be stayed,
Ms. Martin's because there may be some overlap between the minimum
UM/UIM limits question certified in Crutcher and Progressive's
first proposed question here as to Ms. Martin's minimum UM/UIM
limits claim.

Applying the above principles, the Court finds that resolution of
the certified question in Crutcher may determine liability as to
the putative class in this case. This is especially true as to Ms.
Martin's claims, which are factually analogous to those asserted in
Crutcher. As such, the Court finds no need to also certify
Defendants' first proposed question to the New Mexico Supreme
Court.

Likewise, the Court finds that there is no need to certify the
Defendants' proposed second question, which may resolve the
question of liability for Ms. Martinez' claims. While the
Defendants disagree, the Court finds that Ms. Martinez' stacked
policies are factually analogous to Ms. Martin's one policy because
both policies purported to insure the applicable vehicles for
$25,000.00 per person, $50,0000.00 per accident. That Ms. Martinez
had three vehicles insured for this amount changes nothing. As
Defendants admit in their Motion to Dismiss, the numbers are
different, but the methodology they applied to deny the first
$25,000.00 in coverage is the same.

The Court finds persuasive Chief Judge Johnson's decision to deny
certification of additional questions in Schwartz, insofar as this
Court is readily able, once the New Mexico Supreme Court answers
the certified question, to apply the settled law to this case and
determine whether Defendant's underinsured motorist coverage
provides value or is illusory. As the Chief Judge said, the Court
need not certify every factual variation to the New Mexico Supreme
Court.

The Court deems it prudent to enter a stay in this case and to deny
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss without prejudice.  

The Defendants have failed to demonstrate that their proposed
certified questions are necessary to the resolution of this case.
The Court presumes that, once the certified question in Crutcher is
answered, there will be a reasonably clear and principled course
which the Court can follow to fully resolve both Plaintiffs' claims
here.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 8, 2019 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y29hhe5p from
Leagle.com.

Diane Martinez & Erin Martin, individually and on behalf of other
similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs, represented by Corbin
Hildebrandt, Corbin Hildebrandt, P.C., 1400 Central SE,
Albuquerque, NM 87106, David A. Freedman, Freedman Boyd Hollander
Goldberg Urias & Ward P.A. 20 First Plaza, Suite 700, 200 Third
Street, NW, P.O. Box 25326, Albuquerque, NM 87125-0326, & Kedar
Bhasker, Law Office of Kedar Bhasker, LLC, 1400 Central Ave SE Ste.
2000, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87106

Progressive Preferred Insurance Company, Progressive Classic
Insurance Company, Progressive Casualty Insurance Company,
Progressive Direct Insurance Company, Progressive Advanced
Insurance Company, Progressive Specialty Insurance Company &
Progressive Northern Insurance Company, Defendants, represented by
Meena H. Allen, Allen Law Firm, LLC, 6121 Indian School Road NE,
Suite 230, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87110, Casie Collignon --
ccollignon@bakerlaw.com -- Baker & Hostetler LLP, pro hac vice &
Justin Winquist -- jwinquist@bakerlaw.com -- Baker & Hostetler LLP,
pro hac vice.


QES PRESSURE: Newsome, Jr. Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
----------------------------------------------------------
JOHN NEWSOME, JR., Individually and on behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff v. QES PRESSURE CONTROL, LLC,
Defendants, Case No. 7:19-cv-00150 (W.D. Tex., June 24, 2019) is an
action under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), for declaratory
judgment, monetary damages, liquidated damages, prejudgment
interest, and costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees as a
result of Defendants' failure to pay Plaintiff and other Field
Supervisors lawful overtime compensation for hours worked in excess
of 40 hours per week.

Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees worked in excess
of 40 hours per week throughout their tenure with Defendant. On
average, Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees worked
over 90 hours per week. They did not receive any overtime
compensation. The Defendant did not pay Plaintiff and other
similarly-situated employees one and one-half times their regular
rate of pay for all hours worked over forty per week. The Defendant
knew, or showed reckless disregard for whether, the way it paid
Plaintiff and its other Field Supervisors violated the FLSA, says
the complaint.

Plaintiff worked for Defendant as a Field/Coil Tubing Supervisor
from approximately May of 2016 through May of 2019, in Texas and
New Mexico.

Defendant is a provider of oil and gas services including coiled
tubing, fluid pumping, nitrogen, rig-assist snubbing, well control,
and special services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Merideth Q. McEntire, Esq.
     Josh Sanford, Esq.
     SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
     One Financial Center
     650 South Shackleford Road, Suite 411
     Little Rock, AR 72211
     Phone: (501) 221-0088
     Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
     Email: steve@sanfordlawfirm.com
            merideth@sanfordlawfirm.com


QUEST DIAGNOSTICS: Johnston Sues Over Data Breach
-------------------------------------------------
MARK JOHNSTON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. QUEST DIAGNOSTICS, INC., and OPTUM360 LLC,
Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-13957 (D. N.J., June 18, 2019) is a
class action on behalf of a nationwide class against Quest for its
failure to secure and safeguard millions of patients' confidential
information – including financial information, medical
information, other personally identifiable information ("PII"),
and/or other protected health information ("PHI") as defined by the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
("HIPAA") (collectively "Personal Information") – and for failing
to provide timely, accurate and adequate notice to Plaintiff and
other Class Members that their Personal Information had been
compromised.

Quest is one of the largest medical testing providers in the
country. It collects private personal, medical, and financial
information from its customers in providing its services. Optum360
is Quest's revenue cycle management provider. Retrieval-Masters
Creditors Bureau Inc., d/b/a American Medical Collection Agency,
Inc. ("AMCA") is Quest's billing collection vendor. As a part of
the billing collection services, Quest and Optum360 share certain
patient information with AMCA.  On June 3, 2019, Quest disclosed in
a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC")
that Quest and Optum360 had been notified by AMCA on May 14, 2019
"about unauthorized activity on AMCA's web payment page" between
August 1, 2018 and March 30, 2019.1 Quest disclosed that
information for 11.9 million of its patients "was contained on
AMCA's affected system". The cyber security event disclosed by
Quest on June 3, 2019 is referred to hereinafter as the "Data
Breach".

On its website, Quest states that AMCA has advised it will be
sending letters to patients notifying them if their "social
security number or financial information was involved in the
incident." Plaintiff Johnston received a notification letter from
AMCA after having a laboratory test processed with Quest, which
required the collection of his Personal Information. Quest breached
its duty to patients from across the country by sharing patient
information with a third-party vendor that employed severely
deficient data security practices. The security deficiencies were
so significant that the intrusion remained undetected for nearly
eight months even as patient information was being placed for sale
on underground marketplaces known as the "dark web."

As set forth herein, the Data Breach was the inevitable result of
Quest's inadequate approach to data security and its failure to
protect its patients' Personal Information that it collected and
disseminated to Optum360 and AMCA during the course of its
business. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and similarly situated
individuals, seeks to recover damages, equitable relief, and
injunctive relief requiring Defendants to implement and maintain
reasonable and industry-standard data security and data-sharing
practices designed to prevent a reoccurrence of the Data Breach,
says the complaint.

Plaintiff Mark Johnston is a resident and citizen of Orange, Ohio,
whose Personal Information was compromised in the Data Breach.

Quest Diagnostics is a Delaware corporation with its principal
place of business in Secaucus, New Jersey.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     James E. Cecchi, Esq.
     Lindsey H. Taylor, Esq.
     CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C.
     5 Becker Farm Road
     Roseland, NJ 07068
     Phone: (973) 994-1700

          - and -

     Norman E. Siegel, Esq.
     Barrett J. Vahle, Esq.
     J. Austin Moore, Esq.
     STUEVE SIEGEL HANSON LLP
     460 Nichols Road, Suite 200
     Kansas City, MO 64112
     Phone: (816) 714-7100


QUEST DIAGNOSTICS: Raben Sues over Data Breach
----------------------------------------------
JENNIFER RABEN, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, the Plaintiff, v. QUEST DIAGNOSTICS, INC., the Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-01889-KMT (D. Colo., June 28, 2019), involves a
data breach of the second largest medical billing collections
agency in the United States, American Medical Collections Agency,
Inc., in which the personally identifiable information ("PII") of
over 20 million patients of one of AMCA's clients, Quest, was
exposed to and stolen by unauthorized users. The PII exposed and
stolen consists of Social Security numbers, bank account
information, credit card information, protected health information
as defined by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"), and other personal, sensitive, and private
information.

Quest considers itself a world leader in diagnostic information
services, clinical trials, and drug screening, generating over $7.5
billion in revenue in 2018. It is a constituent of Standard &
Poor's 500 Index, has over 46,000 employees, and is on Forbes 500
list.

When one of its patients' bills becomes delinquent, Quest utilizes
AMCA as a collection agency for that bill. As part of its
relationship with AMCA and in order to expedite the collection of
delinquent bills, Quest provides AMCA with those patients' PII, the
lawsuit says.

On June 3, 2019, Quest publicly announced a data breach impacting
the patients whose PII it provided to AMCA in a Form 8-K filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Data Breach").[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff Raben and the Proposed Class are:

          Alexander F. Beale, Esq.
          Ivy T. Ngo, Esq.
          FRANKLIN D. AZAR & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          14426 East Evans Avenue
          Aurora, CO 80014
          Telephone: (303) 757-3300
          Facsimile: (720) 213-5131
          E-mail: bealea@fdazar.com
                  ngoi@fdazar.com

REFINERY 29 INC: Jones Sues Over Deaf-Inaccessible Website
----------------------------------------------------------
KAHLIMAH JONES, Individually and as the representative of a class
of similarly situated persons, Plaintiff, v. REFINERY 29 INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-03572 (E.D. N.Y., June 18, 2019) seeks
to put an end to systemic civil rights violations committed by
Defendant against deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals in New York
State and across the United States.

The Defendant denies deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals
throughout the United States equal access to the goods and services
that it provides to non-disabled individuals, through
http://www.refinerey29.comand related domains owned by Defendant.
Defendant provides a wide array of goods and services to the public
through its Website. However, the Website contains access barriers
that make it difficult for deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals to
use the Website. In fact, the access barriers make it impossible
for deaf and hard-of-hearing users to comprehend the audio portion
of videos that are posted on the Website. Defendant thus excludes
the deaf and hard of hearing from the full and equal participation
in the growing Internet economy that is increasingly a fundamental
part of the common marketplace and daily living, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff, who currently lives in New York City, is a deaf
individual.

Defendant operates the Website, which is an online media website
serving as a modern woman's destination for how to live a stylish
and well-rounded life.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Dan Shaked, Esq.
     SHAKED LAW GROUP, P.C.
     14 Harwood Court, Suite 415
     Scarsdale, NY 10583
     Phone: (917) 373-9128
     Email: ShakedLawGroup@gmail.com



RITE AID: Bid to Dismiss Josten Suit Underway
---------------------------------------------
Rite Aid Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 10, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended June 1, 2019, that the hearing on the motion
to dismiss the first amended complaint in the case, Robert Josten
v. Rite Aid Corp., Case No. 18-CV-00152-AJB-JLB case, has been set
for July 18, 2019.

In a July 15 Order, Judge Anthony J. Battaglia held that the Motion
to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint is suitable for
determination on the papers and without oral argument in accordance
with Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. Accordingly, "no appearances are
required and the motion will be deemed submitted as of this date,"
the Judge said.

The Company is involved in two putative consumer class action
lawsuits in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of California, alleging that it overcharged customers'
insurance companies for prescription drug purchases, resulting in
overpayment of co-pays.

The first lawsuit, Byron Stafford v. Rite Aid Corp., Case No.
17-CV-01340-AJB-JLB, was filed on June 30, 2017, and the second
case, Robert Josten v. Rite Aid Corp., Case No.
18-CV-00152-AJB-JLB, was filed on January 23, 2018.

Each lawsuit alleges that (i) the Company was obligated to charge
the plaintiffs' insurance companies a "usual and customary" price
for their prescription drugs; and (ii) the Company failed to do so
properly because the prices it reported were not equal to or
adjusted to account for the prices that Rite Aid offers to
uninsured and underinsured customers through its Rx Savings
Program.

On December 19, 2017, the court granted the Company's motion to
dismiss Stafford's complaint with leave to amend for failure to
plead compliance with the applicable statutes of limitations. After
Stafford amended the complaint on January 9, 2018, the Company
filed another motion to dismiss on January 23, 2018, and a similar
motion to dismiss Josten's complaint on March 16, 2018.

The court granted the motion to dismiss most of Josten's claims for
failure to plead compliance with the applicable statute of
limitations but with leave to amend.

The Company's motion to dismiss Josten's amended complaint on the
grounds that the statute of limitations expired and that he failed
to exhaust Medicare administrative remedies, is scheduled to be
heard on July 18, 2019.

The court denied the motion to dismiss Stafford's claims, opened
discovery, and set a June 19, 2019 deadline for Stafford's class
certification motion.

On June 17, 2019, Stafford filed a motion seeking to extend the
time for filing of his class certification motion until December
11, 2019; and the court's decision on that unopposed motion is
pending.  

Also on June 17, 2019, Rite Aid filed a motion to compel all
Stafford's claims to an individual arbitration; and that motion is
scheduled to be heard on September 5, 2019.  

Relatedly, on June 19, 2019, Rite Aid filed an ex parte motion to
stay the entire action pending the court's decision on its motion
to compel arbitration; Plaintiff's opposition was due on June 20,
2019, and the Court will thereafter make a ruling without a
hearing.  

Rite Aid said, "At this stage of the proceedings, the Company is
not able to either predict the outcome of these lawsuits or
estimate a potential range of loss with respect to the lawsuit and
is vigorously defending these lawsuits."

Rite Aid Corporation, through its subsidiaries, operates a chain of
retail drugstores in the United States. The company operates
through two segments, Retail Pharmacy and Pharmacy Services. Rite
Aid Corporation was founded in 1927 and is headquartered in Camp
Hill, Pennsylvania.


RONAK FOODS: Martin Sues Over Unpaid Minimum Wages
--------------------------------------------------
COREY MARTIN, individually and on behalf of similarly situated
persons, Plaintiff, v. RONAK FOODS LLC D/B/A PIZZA HCT, JIGNESH
PANDYA, and KRUPA PATEL, individually, Defendants, Case No.
5:19-cv-02625-GJP (E.D. Pa., June 18, 2019) is a collective action
under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), a class action under
Pennsylvania Annotated Statutes and common law to recover unpaid
minimum wages and overtime hours owed to himself and similarly
situated delivery drivers employed by Defendants at their Pizza Hut
stores.

The Defendants employ delivery drivers who use their own
automobiles to deliver pi72a and other food items to their
customers. However, instead of reimbursing delivery drivers for the
reasonably approximate costs of the business use of their vehicles,
Defendants use a flawed method to determine reimbursement rates
that provides such an unreasonably low rate beneath any reasonable
approximation of the expenses they incur that the drivers'
unreimbursed expenses cause their wages to fall below the federal
minimum wage during some or all workweeks, says the complaint.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendants from 2013 to 2017 as a
delivery driver at Defendants' Pizza Hut stores located in
Feasterville, Pennsylvania.

The Defendants operate numerous Pizza Hut Pizza franchise
stores.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Charles J. Kocher, Esq.
     Patrick Howard, Esq.
     SALTZ MONGELUZZI BARRETT & BENDESKY, P.C.
     120 Gibraltar Road, Suite 218
     Horsham, PA 19044
     Phone: (215) 496-8282
     Fax: (215) 754-4443
     Email: ckocher@.smbb.com

          - and -

     Matthew Haynie, Esq.
     Jay Forester, Esq.
     FORESTER HAYNIE PLLC
     1701 N. Market Street, Suite 210
     Dallas, TX 75202
     Phone: (214) 210-2100
     Fax: (214) 346-5909
     Email: matthew@foresterhaynie.com
            jay@foresterhaynie.com

          - and -

     J. Gerard Stranch, IV, Esq.
     Joe P. Leniski, Esq.
     BRANSTETTER, STRANCH & JENNINGS, PLLC
     223 Rosa Parks Ave. Suite 200
     Nashville, TN 37203
     Phone: 615/254-8801
     Facsimile: 615/255-5419
     Email: gerards@bsjfirm.com
            joeyl@bsjfirm.com


SECOND ROUND LP: Grey Sues Over FDCPA Violation
-----------------------------------------------
Jeff Grey, Jr. Plaintiff v. Second Round LP and Second Round Sub,
LLC, Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-00478-Y (N.D. Tex., June 18,
2019) is a Class Action Complaint against Defendants, to wit, for
violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA").

The Defendants SRS and SRL have caused to be sent a "Collection
Letter" to the Plaintiff and others individuals throughout Texas.
The Collection Letter offers the Plaintiff "2 money saving options"
however these options do not save the Plaintiff anything but risk
reviving the debt. The Defendants invited the Plaintiff to make a
partial payment on the alleged debt. If Plaintiff made a partial
payment on the alleged debt then the debt could become revived and
the Defendants could sue the Plaintiff for the alleged debt. If
Plaintiff made a promise to repay the alleged debt then the debt
could become revived and the Defendants could sue the Plaintiff for
the alleged debt.

The Defendants did not mention the pitfalls of making a partial
payment or promising to repay the debt. The Defendants stated the
"will not sue" for the debt but in reality, the Defendants "cannot
sue" for the debt, and this written statement is deceptive as it
makes an unsophisticated consumer believe that the Defendants will
not sue if he enters into a payment arrangement. However, the
reality is that the Defendants "cannot sue" if the Plaintiff does
not make a payment or promise to pay. Plaintiff has suffered an
informational injury from the Defendants' actions, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff is a natural person residing at 2128 Turf Club Dr,
Arlington TX 76017 and is allegedly obligated to pay a debt to
Defendant SRS.

Defendant SRL is a collection agency headquartered at 1701 Director
Blvd, Suite 900, Austin, TX 78744.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Shawn Jaffer, Esq.
     SHAWN JAFFER LAW FIRM PLLC
     9300 John Hickman Pkwy, Suite 1204
     Frisco, TX 75035
     Phone: (214) 210-0730
     Fax: (214) 594-6100
     Email: Shawn@jafflaw.com


SIXT RENT: A. Ayala Suit Remanded to Calif. Superior Court
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California issued an Order granting Plaintiff's Motion to Remand
Case and to Stay Briefing/Decision on Motion to Dismiss in the case
captioned ANDY AYALA, Plaintiff, v. SIXT RENT A CAR, LLC,
Defendant. Case No. CV 19-1514 FMO (MRWx). (C.D. Cal.).

Before the Court is plaintiff Andy Ayala's Motion to Remand Case
and to Stay Briefing/Decision on Motion to Dismiss.  

Defendant Sixt Rent a Car, LLC is a car rental company that
utilizes electronic systems in its cars that allow renters to
interface their own devices with defendant's systems. However,
defendant's systems copy and store some of the renter's private
data. Plaintiff, who rented a vehicle brings this lawsuit alleging
that defendant failed to delete his private data at the end of the
rental period. Plaintiff alleges that defendant's failure to delete
a customer's private data renders him and other class members
vulnerable to identity thieves and other malefactors.
  
The Plaintiff asserts two causes of action for: (1) violation of
Article I, Section I of the California Constitution, and (2)
violation of Cal. Civ. Code Sections 1939.01, et seq.  

The Defendant removed the instant action on the ground that the
court has subject matter jurisdiction over the case.  However, a
couple months after removing the action to this court, defendant
filed a motion to dismiss arguing that plaintiff's claims should be
dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Thus, defendant is trying to have it both ways by
asserting, then immediately disavowing, federal jurisdiction,
apparently in hopes of achieving outright dismissal, with
prejudice, rather than the remand required by Section 1447(c).

In Mocek, Mocek v. Allsaints USA Ltd., 220 F.Supp.3d 910, 914 (N.D.
Ill. 2016), the court addressed a situation very similar to the
instant one. There, as here, a plaintiff filed a class action
complaint in state court.  Defendant removed the action to federal
court, asserting federal subject matter and diversity jurisdiction.
Then, a "month later, without alleging any change in circumstances
bearing on jurisdiction, defendant moved to dismiss the case for
lack of federal jurisdiction. Specifically, defendant asserted that
plaintiff lacks standing.

As in Mocek, defendant now asks the court to pass upon the merits
of its motion to dismiss, arguing that if the court determines
plaintiff lacks standing, remand would be rendered futile. However,
because the parties are aligned in the view that the court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction the court concludes that remand is
required.

Finally, when defects in a court's subject matter jurisdiction
exist, a district court generally must remand the case to state
court, rather than dismiss it. This is because a failure of federal
subject-matter jurisdiction means only that the federal courts have
no power to adjudicate the matter. State courts are not bound by
the constraints of Article III.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 8, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y649obnc from Leagle.com.

Andy Ayala, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented byMichael R. Reese --
mreese@reesellp.com -- Reese LLP, Anthony J. DiRaimondo --
adiraimondo@rrsc-law.com -- Rice Reuther Sullivan and Carroll LLP,
pro hac vice & George Volney Granade -- ggranade@reeserichman.com
-- Reese LLP.

Sixt Rent A Car, LLC, a Delaware and Florida limited liability
company, Defendant, represented by Shelley G. Hurwitz --
sghurwitz@hklaw.com -- Holland and Knight LLP & Vince L. Farhat --
Vince.Farhat@hklaw.com --  Holland and Knight LLP.


SMITHSONIAN: Phillips Sues Over PPPA Violation
----------------------------------------------
ARTIE DALE PHILLIPS, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION,
Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-11852-AJT-RSW (E.D. Mich., June 24,
2019) is a Class Action Complaint against Smithsonian for its
intentional and unlawful disclosure of its customers' Personal
Reading Information in violation of Michigan's Preservation of
Personal Privacy Act ("PPPA"), and for unjust enrichment.

Between June 24, 2016 and July 30, 2016, defendant Smithsonian
Institution rented, exchanged, and/or otherwise disclosed personal
information about Plaintiff Artie Dale Phillips's Smithsonian
magazine subscription to data aggregators, data appenders, data
cooperatives, and list brokers, among others, which in turn
disclosed his information to aggressive advertisers, non-profit
organizations, and other third-party companies. As a result, Mr.
Phillips has received a barrage of unwanted junk mail. By renting,
exchanging, and/or otherwise disclosing Mr. Phillips's Personal
Reading Information between June 24, 2016 and July 30, 2016,
Smithsonian violated the PPPA.

Prior to and at the time he subscribed to Smithsonian, Smithsonian
did not notify Plaintiff Phillips that it discloses the Personal
Reading Information of its customers, and Plaintiff Phillips has
never authorized Smithsonian to do so. Furthermore, Plaintiff
Phillips was never provided any written notice that Smithsonian
rents, exchanges, or otherwise discloses its customers' Personal
Reading Information, or any means of opting out. Since subscribing
to Smithsonian, and between June 24, 2016 and July 30, 2016,
Smithsonian disclosed, without consent or prior notice, Plaintiff
Phillips's Personal Reading Information to data aggregators, data
appenders, and/or data cooperatives, who then supplemented that
information with data from their own files, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Phillips has been a subscriber to Smithsonian magazine
for approximately the past decade and was a subscriber to
Smithsonian magazine between June 24, 2016 and July 30, 2016.

Smithsonian Institution operates museums and research centers
across the country and publishes the nationally-circulated
magazines Smithsonian and Air & Space.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Joseph I. Marchese, Esq.
     Philip L. Fraietta, Esq.
     BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
     888 Seventh Avenue
     New York, NY 10019
     Phone: 646.837.7150
     Fax: 212.989.9163
     Email: jmarchese@bursor.com
            pfraietta@bursor.com

          - and -

     Frank S. Hedin, Esq.
     David W. Hall, Esq.
     HEDIN HALL LLP
     1395 Brickell Avenue, Suite 900
     Miami, FL 33131
     Phone: 305.357.2107
     Fax: 305.200.8801
     Email:fhedin@hedinhall.com
            dhall@hedinhall.com

          - and -

     Nick Suciu III, Esq.
     BARBAT, MANSOUR & SUCIU PLLC
     1644 Bracken Road
     Bloomfield Hills, MI 48302
     Phone: 313.303.3472
     Email:nicksuciu@bmslawyers.com


SOLAR ENERGY: Lee Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Compensation
--------------------------------------------------------
Justin Lee, Kanayo Okeke, Garrett Ellenberger, Christopher Riley,
Jordan Jackson, Dustin Hamann, Darrin Johnson, Jr., Jeffrey
Williams, and Evelio Rodriguez on behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Solar Energy World, LLC, Tope
Lala, Al Gleeson, and Geoff Mirkin, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-01993-RDB (D. Md., July 8, 2019) is a this lawsuit against
Defendants seeking all available relief under the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA"), the Maryland Wage and Hour Law ("MWHL"),
and the Maryland doctrine of unjust enrichment.

Plaintiff and others similarly situated are non-exempt employees
for purposes of receiving payment for working in excess of 40 hours
per week ("Overtime"). Despite this Work Week being in excess of 40
hours, Installers did not receive Overtime payments. When the
Installers inquired about overtime, they were told "we don't pay
overtime," and/or suffered much harder installations for a period
of time chosen by Defendants. It is evident that Defendants
knowingly and willfully refused, and continue to refuse, to pay
overtime wages and drive time. Additionally, Defendants knowingly
and willfully paid Installers the lesser of the hourly rate of pay
and panel pay, without advanced notice. In failing to properly
compensate Plaintiffs and others similarly situated for all hours
spent working, Defendants have acted willfully and with reckless
disregard of clearly applicable FLSA and MWHL provisions, says the
complaint.

Plaintiffs were employed by Defendants as Installers

Solar Energy World is in the business of installing solar systems
in and around Maryland, Washington, D.C., Virginia, Pennsylvania
and New Jersey.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Paul J. Weber, Esq.
     Sean P. Hatley, Esq.
     Adam G. Smith, Esq.
     HYATT & WEBER, P.A.
     200 Westgate Circle, Suite 500
     Annapolis, MD 21401
     Phone: (410) 266-0626
     Facsimile: (410) 841-5065
     Email: pweber@hwlaw.com
            adamsmith@hwlaw.com
            sphatley@hwlaw.com

          - and -

     Jeffrey P. Bowman, Esq.
     Paul H. Farmer, Jr., Esq.
     GORMLEY JARASHOW BOWMAN, LLC
     162 West St.
     Annapolis, MD 21401
     Phone: 410-268-2255
     Email: jbowman@gjblawfirm.com
            pfarmer@gjblawfirm.com


SUBARU OF AMERICA: Faces Johnson Suit in C.D. California
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Subaru of America,
Inc. et al. The case is captioned as Gerrell Johnson on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs.
Subaru of America, Inc. and Subaru Corporation, the Defendants,
Case No. 2:19-cv-05681-JAK-MAA (C.D. Cal., June 28, 2019). The suit
alleges fraud related violation. The case is assigned to the Hon.
Judge John A. Kronstadt.

Subaru of America, Inc., based in Camden, New Jersey, is the United
States-based distributor of Subaru's brand vehicles, a subsidiary
of Subaru Corporation of Japan. The company markets and distributes
Subaru vehicles, parts and accessories through a network of more
than 600 dealers throughout the United States.[BN]

Attorneys the Plaintiff are:

          David K. Stein, Esq.
          Eric H Gibbs, Esq.
          GIBBS LAW GROUP LLP
          505 14th Street Suite 1110
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone: (510) 350-9700
          Facsimile: (510) 350-9701
          E-mail: ds@classlawgroup.com
                  ehg@classlawgroup.com

               - and -

          H Clay Barnett, III, Esq.
          Wilson Daniel Miles, III, Esq.
          BEASLEY ALLEN CROW METHVIN
             PORTIS AND MILES PC
          218 Commerce Street
          Montgomery, AL 36104
          Telephone: (334) 269-2343
          Facsimile: (334) 954-7555
          E-mail: Clay.Barnett@Beasleyallen.com
                  Dee.Miles@Beasleyallen.com


SUPERIOR RESTORATION: Rivera Seeks Overtime pay
-----------------------------------------------
MARIO ANIBAL RIVERA, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. SUPERIOR RESTORATION & CLEANING
SERVICES, INC., a Florida Corporation, and AHARON ATZMI,
individually, the Defendants, Case No. 0:19-cv-61700-XXXX (S.D.
Fla., July 10, 2019), seeks to recover damages pursuant to the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938, and other relief including violations
of the Florida Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and
violations of the Florida Whistleblower Act.

The Plaintiff worked in excess of 40 hours per week and was not
paid overtime. During the time that Plaintiff had been employed at
Superior, he and other similarly situated employees were improperly
classified as independent contractors rather than as employees.

In addition, Defendants wrongfully issued and filed with the IRS
1099's so that Superior and ATZMI could attempt to avoid complying
with Federal and State laws, including, but not limited to, the
failure to pay Federal payroll taxes and State unemployment,
taxes.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

           Hazel Solis Rojas, Esq.
           LAW OFFICE OF HAZEL SOLIS ROJAS, P.A.
           3105 NW 107 th Avenue, Suite 400
           Doral, FL 33172
           Telephone: (305) 558-8402
           E-mail: hazel@solisrojaslaw.com

                - and -

           Barbra Anne Stern, Esq.
           LAW OFFICE OF BARBRA STERN, PA
           808 E Las Olas Blvd Ste 102
           Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301-2201
           Telephone: 954-743-4710
           E-mail: barbra@sterncnslt.com

SWIFT TRANSPORTATION: Court OKs $2.49MM Hedglin Class Settlement
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Tacoma, issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for
Final Approval of Class Action Settlement in the case captioned
JULIE HEDGLIN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. SWIFT TRANSPORTATION CO. OF ARIZONA, LLC, a
Washington Corporation, Defendant. Case No. 3:16-CV-05127-BHS.
(W.D. Wash.).

The Court makes final the conditional class certification contained
in the Preliminary Approval Order, and thus makes final for
purposes of the Settlement Agreement the certification, pursuant to
FRCP 23(g)(1)(A), of two classes:

   a. The Rest Break Class consisting of all individuals who (1)
resided in Washington State, (2) were employed by Swift
Transportation Co. of Arizona, LLC, in the position of truck
driver, and (3) who were paid, at least in part, on a per mile
piece-rate basis, at any time from January 14, 2013 through January
3, 2019 (the Rest Break Class Period) and

   b. The Non-Driving and Overtime Class consisting of all
individuals who (1) resided in Washington State, (2) were employed
by Swift Transportation Co. of Arizona, LLC, in the position of
truck driver and (3) who were paid, at least in part, on a per mile
piece-rate basis, at any time from August 6, 2015 (three years
prior to the date the Parties participated in private mediation)
through January 3, 2019 (the Non-Driving and Overtime Class
Period).

The Court finds that the Notice of Proposed Class Action
Settlement, as mailed to all Class Members, as previously ordered
by the Court, fairly and adequately described the terms of the
proposed Settlement Agreement, the manner in which Class Members
could object to the settlement, and the manner in which Class
Members could opt out of the Class; was the best notice practicable
under the circumstances; was valid, due and sufficient notice to
all Class Members; and complied fully with FRCP Rule 23(e)(1)(B),
due process, and all other applicable laws.

The court further finds that a full and fair opportunity has been
afforded to Class Members to participate in the proceedings
convened to determine whether the proposed Settlement Agreement
should be given final approval. Accordingly, the Court hereby
determines that all Class Members who did not timely and properly
request to be excluded from the settlement1 are bound by this final
Order and shall be deemed to have released any claims described in
the Settlement Agreement (Released Claims).

The Court finds that the Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable,
and adequate as to the Class, Plaintiff and Defendant, and is the
product of good faith, arm's-length negotiations between the
parties, and further, that the Settlement Agreement is consistent
with public policy, and fully complies with all applicable
provisions of law. Accordingly, the Court hereby finally and
unconditionally approves the Settlement Agreement pursuant to FRCP
23(e)(1), and specifically:

   a. Approves the $2,490,000 Common Fund;

   b. Approves the distribution of the Payout Fund to Participating
Class Members in the manner specified in and subject to the terms
of the Settlement Agreement;

   c. Approves the Class Representative Service Award of $10,000 to
Plaintiff/Class Representative;

   d. Approves Class Counsel's requested fees award of $498,000
which is twenty percent (20%) of, and to be paid from, the
Settlement Amount;

   e. Approves Class Counsel's request for reimbursement of
litigation expenses of $24,529.75 to be paid from the Settlement
Amount;

   f. Approves payment to CPT, Inc., the Settlement Administrator,
of Administration Costs in the amount of $28,500 to be paid from
the Settlement Amount; and

   g. Approves and orders that in all other particulars the
Settlement Agreement be carried out by the Parties and the
Settlement Administrator subject to the terms thereof.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 8, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y6xhrp68 from Leagle.com.

Julie Hedglin, individually, and as putative class represntative,
Plaintiff, represented by India Lin Bodien --
india@indialinbodienlaw.com -- Craig Ackermann  --
cja@ackermanntilajef.com -- ACKERMANN AND TILAJEF PC & Julian
Hammond -- jhammond@hammondlawpc.com -- HAMMOND LAW, P.C.

Swift Transportation Co. of Arizona, LLC, a Delaware Limited
Liability Company, Defendant, represented by Babak G. Yousefzadeh
-- byousefzadeh@sheppardmullin.com -- SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER &
HAMPTON, pro hac vice, David W. Wiley -- dwiley@williamskastner.com
-- WILLIAMS KASTNER, Jeffery M. Wells -- jwells@williamskastner.com
-- WILLIAMS KASTNER, John David Ellis -- jellis@sheppardmullin.com
-- SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON, pro hac vice, Paul Cowie --
pcowie@sheppardmullin.com -- SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON, pro
hac vice & Sheryl D.J. Willert -- swillert@williamskastner.com --
WILLIAMS KASTNER.


SYNERGY ONE: Raub Sues Over FCRA Violation
------------------------------------------
MICHELLE RAUB, individually, and on behalf of other members of the
general public similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SYNERGY ONE
LENDING, INC., a Delaware corporation; and DOES 1 through 100,
inclusive; Defendants, Case No. 37-2019-00032335-CU-OE-CTL (Cal.
Super. Ct., San Diego Cty., June 24, 2019) is a class action
arising from the acquisition and use of consumer, investigative,
and/or credit reports (referred to collectively as "background
reports") by Defendants to conduct background checks on Plaintiff
and other prospective, current, and former employees.

The Defendants routinely obtain and use information from background
reports in connection with their hiring processes without complying
with state and federal mandates for doing so. As part of this
practice, Defendants provide a requisite disclosure form to
applicants. However, the disclosure that Defendants provide to
Plaintiff and each Class Member as part of their hiring process is
noncompliant with state and federal statutes. The Defendants have
violated the requirements under the statutes by failing to provide
proper disclosures. The Defendants' violations occurred because
Defendants willfully have failed to properly apprise themselves of
the statutory mandates before seeking, acquiring, and utilizing
background reports to make employment decisions; violated the
express and unambiguous provisions of the relevant statutes; and/or
failed to implement reasonable procedures to assure compliance with
statutory mandates.

Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all other members of the
public similarly situated, seeks compensatory and punitive damages
due to Defendants' willful or grossly negligent conduct and its
systematic and willful violation of, inter alia, the Fair Credit
Reporting Act ("FCRA"), Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies
Act ("ICRAA"), Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act ("CCRAA"),
and California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"), says the
complaint.

Plaintiff applied for a job with Defendants by completing an
employment application on or about December 29, 2015, in San Diego
County, California.

SYNERGY ONE LENDING, INC. was and is engaged in commercial
transactions throughout this county, the State of California and
the various states of the United States of America.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     DOUGLAS HAN, ESQ.
     SHUNT TATAVOS-GHARAJEH, ESQ.
     DANIEL J. PARK, ESQ.
     JUSTICE LAW CORPORATION
     751 N. Fair Oaks Avenue, Suite 101
     Pasadena, CA 91103
     Phone: (818) 230-7502
     Facsimile: (818) 230-7502


TESLA INC: Court OKs $1.059MM Wage & Hour Settlement
----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Final
Approval of Their Class Action Settlement Agreement in the case
captioned BRIAN WILSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. TESLA, INC., et al.,
Defendants. Case No.17-cv-03763-JSC. (N.D. Cal.).

Plaintiffs Brian Wilson, Carrie Hughes, and Katia Segal filed this
wage and hour action against their employer, Tesla, Inc. and Tesla
Motors, Inc. (Tesla).  The Plaintiffs allege that Tesla
misclassified them as exempt employees and failed to provide them
overtime, rest and meal breaks, wage statements, and final wages.

THE SETTLEMENT

General Terms

The Settlement Agreement establishes a common fund of $1,059,851.40
inclusive of attorneys' fees, costs and expenses, incentive
payments to the named Plaintiffs, payment to the Labor Workforce
Development Agency (LWDA), employee-owed taxes, and administration
costs including settlement administration fees.

Final Class Certification of the Settlement Class

Class actions must meet the following requirements for
certification: 1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable 2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class 3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class and 4)
the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.  

Rule 23(a) Requirements

In the Court's Order granting preliminary approval of the
settlement, the Court found that the putative class satisfied the
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation
requirements of Rule 23(a ). The Court is unaware of any changes
that would alter its analysis. Plaintiffs did not indicate in their
papers that any such developments had occurred and the Court has
not received any communications from Tesla otherwise. Thus, all
four of Rule 23(a)'s requirements have been met.

Rule 23(b) Requirements

In its Order granting preliminary approval of the settlement, the
Court found that the prerequisites of Rule 23(b)(3) were likewise
satisfied. The Court is unaware of any changes that would alter its
analysis, and there was no indication in Plaintiffs' papers or at
the fairness hearing that any such developments had occurred.
Further, there were no objections by individual class members who
claim to have an interest in controlling the prosecution of this
action or related actions.

Accordingly, the Rule 23(b) requirements are met.

Rule 23(c)(2) Notice Requirements

Finally, if the Court certifies a class under Rule 23(b)(3), it
must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable
under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members
who can be identified through reasonable effort.. Rule 23(c)(2)
governs both the form and content of a proposed notice. The notice
must be reasonably certain to inform the absent members of the
plaintiff class, but Rule 23 does not require actual notice.  

As the Court found in its preliminary approval order, the notice
requirements were met here. The revised notice describes the
allegations and claims, included a definition of the class members,
had contact information for Plaintiffs' counsel and the settlement
administrator, a summary of the settlement amount outlining how the
recovery was calculated both generally as well as for the specific
class member receiving the notice, and it indicated that class
members did not need to do anything to recover under the
settlement, but that they could ask to be excluded or object to the
settlement including the amount sought in fees. Class members were
also informed that they may appear at the final fairness hearing in
person or through an attorney.  

Because the settlement class satisfies Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3),
and notice was sufficient in accordance with Rule 23(c), the Court
will grant final class certification.

Approval of the Settlement

Having determined that class treatment is warranted, the Court now
addresses whether the terms of the parties' settlement are fair,
adequate, and reasonable under Rule 23(e). In making this
determination, a court typically considers the following factors
initially set forth in Churchill Village, L.L.C. v. General
Electric, 361 F.3d 566 (9th Cir. 2004): (1) the strength of the
plaintiff's case (2) the risk, expense, complexity, and likely
duration of further litigation (3) the risk of maintaining class
action status throughout the trial (4) the amount offered in
settlement (5) the extent of discovery completed and the stage of
the proceedings (6) the experience and views of counsel (7) the
presence of a governmental participant and (8) the reaction of the
class members to the proposed settlement.

In Bluetooth, Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 946, the Ninth Circuit
explained that when a settlement agreement is negotiated prior to
formal class certification, consideration of these eight factors
alone is insufficient.  The court identified three such signs: (1)
when class counsel receives a disproportionate distribution of the
settlement, or when the class receives no monetary distribution but
counsel is amply awarded (2) when the parties negotiate a clear
sailing arrangement providing for the payment of attorneys fees
separate and apart from class funds without objection by the
defendant (which carries the potential of enabling a defendant to
pay class counsel excessive fees and costs in exchange for counsel
accepting an unfair settlement on behalf of the class and(3) when
the parties arrange for fees not awarded to revert to defendants
rather than to be added to the class fund.

For these reasons, a review of these factors indicates that this
settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.

The Churchill Factors

Strength of Plaintiffs' Case and the Risk, Expense, Complexity, and
Likely Duration of Further Litigation

One important consideration is the strength of the plaintiff's case
on the merits balanced against the amount offered in the
settlement.
  
Here, the SAC alleges Tesla failed to pay overtime, provide breaks,
provide proper wage statements, and pay final wages. Plaintiffs
allege these violations resulted in unlawful and unfair business
practices. While Plaintiffs believe their claims are meritorious,
they concede continued litigation would present significant risks
given Tesla's insistence that employees were properly classified
because their bonus and commission income exceeded the employee's
salary and that employees were in fact allowed to take rest and
meal breaks.  

In light of the risks and costs of continued litigation, the
immediate rewards to class members are preferable. All class
members will receive an award on a pro-rata basis based on the
number of weeks they worked compared to the number of weeks worked
by all class members. The average class member payout is $2,440.29
with the highest payment estimated at $9,497.80 and the lowest at
$42.78. The benefit of receiving this money now rather than later
at some unidentified and uncertain time has its own value.

Given the challenges Plaintiffs would face should this case move
forward instead of resolving, in contrast to the finality and speed
of recovery under the parties' agreement, these first two factors
weigh in favor of approving the settlement.

Risks of Maintaining Class Action Status Throughout Trial

In considering the third factor, the Court looks to the risk of
maintaining class certification if the litigation were to proceed.
As discussed above, Tesla (1) has represented that it will
aggressively oppose any motion for class certification (2) contends
that Plaintiffs' claim will be difficult to prove on a class-wide
basis given the absence of records and uniform policies across
showroom locations and (3) insists that class members claims would
have to be arbitrated on an individual basis absent settlement. In
light of these difficulties in certifying the class, the Court
finds that this factor weighs in favor of approving the
settlement.

Amount offered in Settlement

The fourth fairness factor, the amount of recovery offered, also
favors final approval of the settlement. When considering the
fairness and adequacy of the amount offered in settlement, it is
the complete package taken as a whole, rather than the individual
component parts, that must be examined for overall fairness. It is
well-settled law that a proposed settlement may be acceptable even
though it amounts to only a fraction of the potential recovery that
might be available to the class members at trial.  

Here, the parties agreed that Tesla will establish a settlement
fund of $1,059,851.40. After deducting the fees award, costs award,
incentive award, payment to LWDA, and administration fees, the
remaining amount of at least $688,162.40 will be paid to the class.
Plaintiffs' counsel initially valued the claims here at between
$5.6 to $4.867 million; however, in preparation for mediation,
counsel valued the claims at approximately $2.1 million.  At
preliminary approval, Plaintiffs' counsel contended that the
proposed settlement of $986,000 was 47% of the mediation valuation,
but this included attorneys' fees, costs, and incentive awards. In
the preliminary approval order, the Court excluded these amounts
noting that each class member share of $537,667 was 25% of the
mediation valuation.  As the Court noted then, this amount is fair
and adequate and has only increased since final approval because of
errors Tesla made initially regarding the workweek calculations.  

Finally, no class member has opted out of the settlement. Although
this is a non-claims made settlement and class members were not
required to submit a claim to recover, that the overwhelming
majority of the class willingly approved the offer and stayed in
the class presents at least some objective positive commentary as
to its fairness. The Court therefore concludes that the amount
offered in settlement also weighs in favor of final approval.

Extent of Discovery Completed and Stage of the Proceedings

In the context of class action settlements, as long as the parties
have sufficient information to make an informed decision about
settlement, formal discovery is not a necessary ticket to the
bargaining table. Rather, the court's focus is on whether "the
parties carefully investigated the claims before reaching a
resolution.

Here, in preparation for mediation, Tesla provided Plaintiffs with
discovery regarding the number of class members, its policies and
procedures, timekeeping data, and payroll data. The parties
thereafter participated in an all-day mediation with an experienced
mediator, and continued to work together for months after the
mediation to formulate the Settlement Agreement. Under these
circumstances, the extent of discovery in this case favors the
approval of the settlement.

Experience and Views of Counsel

The experience and views of counsel also weigh in favor of
approving the settlement. Plaintiffs' counsel has substantial
experience in litigating complex class actions on behalf of
employees. Ms. Martin attests that she has recovered substantial
compensation on behalf of employees in at least three actions.
Plaintiffs' counsel further attests that the recovery in this case
is significant given (1) the speed in which class members will
receive their settlement payments (2) the nonenforcement of
potentially valid arbitration agreements and/or class action
waivers that were purportedly entered into by class members and (3)
Tesla's defenses that employees were properly classified because
their bonus and commission income exceeded the employee's salary
and Tesla's policy that its employees were entitled to take meal
and rest breaks. Given counsel's experience in this field, her
assertion that the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable
supports final approval of the settlement.  

Presence of a Government Participant

Although no government entity is a party to this action, because
this action was brought under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA).
Tesla was required to provide notice to the relevant state and
federal officials under 28 U.S.C. Section 1715(b). At the final
approval hearing, Telsa advised the Court that the Section 1715
notice had not been sent. However, on April 9, 2019, Telsa provided
notice to the relevant authorities in accordance with Section
1715(b).  This final approval of the parties' settlement thus
follows the Sction 1715 service by more than 90 days.

Reaction of the Class Members

The settlement administrator identified 282 class members who were
all provided notice of the settlement, although notice was returned
and ultimately deemed unsuccessful for six class members. As of
this date, the Court is not aware of any class member who has filed
an objection to the settlement or the award. Courts have repeatedly
recognized that the absence of a large number of objections to a
proposed class action settlement raises a strong presumption that
the terms of the proposed class settlement action are favorable to
the class members.

Thus, the Court may appropriately infer that a class action
settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable when few class members
object to it.

In sum, the Churchill factors weigh in favor of granting
Plaintiffs' motion for final approval of the class action
settlement.

The Bluetooth Factors

Given that this settlement was reached prior to class
certification, the Court must look beyond the Churchill factors and
examine the settlement for evidence of collusion with an even
higher level of scrutiny. The question here is whether the
settlement was the result of good faith, arms-length negotiations
or fraud and collusion. See id. One of the three warnings signs
that the Ninth Circuit identified arguably is present. However, for
the reasons described below, even if this warning signs exists the
Court finds no evidence of collusion between the parties.  

First, the Court compares the payout to the class actual and
expected to the unopposed claim of fees by class counsel.  The
settlement agreement provides that Plaintiffs are entitled to
reasonable attorneys' fees in an amount not to exceed one-third of
the settlement amount, or $333,333.33, and the notice states that
Plaintiffs will seek an award of attorneys' fees of up to
$333,333.33. In its Order granting preliminary approval of the
settlement, the Court indicated that it had serious concerns
regarding a request for fees based on 33.3% of the settlement fund
given that the Ninth Circuit has identified 25% of the fund as a
reasonable benchmark. In their motion for attorneys' fees,
Plaintiffs reduced the amount of fees sought to 25% of the
settlement fund. Because Plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees is
now within the Ninth Circuit's 25% benchmark, the Court concludes
that this Bluetooth warning sign is not present.

The second warning sign a clear sailing provision is present here:
the settlement agreement states Defendants shall not oppose or
object, and shall file a statement of non-opposition, to
Plaintiffs' request for an award of attorneys' fees in an amount
not to exceed Three Hundred Thirty-Three Thousand Three Hundred
Thirty Three Dollars and Thirty Three Cents ($33,333.33.)
Therefore, when confronted with a clear sailing provision, the
district court has a heightened duty to peer into the provision and
scrutinize closely the relationship between attorneys' fees and
benefit to the class, being careful to avoid awarding `unreasonably
high' fees simply because they are uncontested.

The third warning sign whether the parties have arranged for fees
not awarded to the class to revert to defendants rather than be
added to the class fund, is not present here. The settlement
agreement expressly states: No portion of the Settlement Amount
shall revert to Defendants or result in an unpaid residue, and that
the funds from uncashed checks will be sent to the California
Department of Industrial Relations Unclaimed Wages Fund, with the
identity of the Participating Class Member to who the funds
belong.

Notwithstanding the existence of the one warning sign, the Court
finds that the settlement did not result from, nor was influenced
by, collusion. First, the settlement adequately satisfies the class
members' claims, which is reflected in part by the absence of
objections to the settlement. Second, the Court finds no evidence
of explicit collusion here, where the parties exchanged discovery
and engaged in settlement discussions overseen by an experienced
neutral mediator before agreeing on this settlement. Considering
the scope of litigation and the nature of the negotiations process,
the Court is satisfied that the settlement is the product of
successful arms-length negotiations.  

Accordingly, the Court grants the Plaintiffs' motion for final
approval of the parties' settlement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 8, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yymq64r3 from Leagle.com.

Brian Wilson, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Carrie Hughes, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated & Katia Segal, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly sitatued, Plaintiffs, represented by Lindsay
Christine David, San Diego County Law Offices, Alisa Ann Martin,
Amartin Law & Sandra David Brennan, Brennan & David Law Group.

Tesla, Inc., a corporation, doing business as Tesla Motors, Inc.,
Defendant, represented by Jack Steven Sholkoff, Ogletree, Deakins,
Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C. & Susan Tianyang Ye, Ogletree Deakins
Nash Smoak & Stewart, P.C.

Tesla Motors, Inc., a corporation, Defendant, represented by Jack
Steven Sholkoff, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C..


THE E.L.M PIE BAR: Lopez Sues Over Unpaid Wages
-----------------------------------------------
RACHEL LOPEZ, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. THE E.L.M PIE BAR INC. D/B/A AMERICANO PIE BAR,
LORENZO BRANCHINELLI, MAXWELL BRANCHINELLI and ROSANNA CONTI,
Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-03928 (E.D. N.Y., July 8, 2019) is an
action to remedy violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (the
"FLSA") and the New York State Labor Law (the "NYLL") and to seek
unpaid wages, statutory damages, pre- and post-judgment interest,
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, liquidated damages and other
damages, and all other appropriate legal and equitable relief.

During her employment, Plaintiff was paid below minimum wage and in
tips from what she received at the bar. Plaintiff was also to
receive tips from patrons of Defendants' restaurant, which were
never shared with her or other bartenders. While a bartender,
Plaintiff was sexually harassed by Defendants, which was a common
practice at the restaurant. When she complained about same,
Plaintiff was terminated, says the complaint.

Plaintiff worked as a bartender for Defendants from November 2017
until her termination on July 21, 2018.

The E.L.M Pie Bar Inc. d/b/a Americano Pie Bar ("Americano") is a
domestic corporation authorized to do business in the State of New
York, County of Suffolk.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Yale Pollack, Esq.
     LAW OFFICES OF YALE POLLACK, P.C.
     66 Split Rock Road
     Syosset, NY 11791
     Phone: (516) 634-6340
     Fax: (516) 634-6341
     Email: ypollack@yalepollacklaw.com


THE FLIGHT CLUB: John Doe Sues Over Unpaid Compensation
-------------------------------------------------------
JOHN DOE 1 AND JANE DOES 1 and 2, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. THE FLIGHT CLUB and ALAN
MARKOVITZ, Jointly and severally, Defendants, Case No.
4:19-cv-11805 MFL-DRG (E.D. Mich., June 18, 2019) is Collective
action against Defendants under the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA"), for failure to pay a minimum wage and to remedy
violations of Michigan State Law, including but not limited to
Michigan Minimum Wage Law ("MWL").

The Defendants willfully engaged in a pattern, policy and practice
of unlawful conduct for the actions alleged in this Complaint. The
Defendants willfully fail to pay Plaintiffs, and all others
similarly situated within the Class, minimum wages and other
benefits that they are entitled to under applicable federal laws.
Additionally, the Defendants engage in unlawful tip splitting by
requiring dancers and other members of the Class to split and share
gratuities given to them by patrons with Defendants and their
non-tipped employees, says the complaint.

Plaintiffs were employees of the Defendant Nightclub.

Top Flight Entertainment, d.b.a. The Flight Club., is a Michigan
corporation, with its principal place of business located in
Inkster, Michigan.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Megan Bonanni, Esq.
     Pitt McGehee Palmer & Rivers, P.C.
     117 West Fourth Street, Suite 200
     Royal Oak, MI 48067
     Phone: (248) 398-9800
     Fax: (248) 398-9804
     Email: mbonanni@pittlawpc.com

          - and -

     Jennifer L. McManus, Esq.
     FAGAN MCMANUS, P.C.
     25892 Woodward Avenue
     Royal Oak, MI 48067-0910
     Phone: 248) 542-6300
     Email: jmcmanus@faganlawpc.com


THE UNITED STATES: Lane Sues Over Fifth Amendment Violation
-----------------------------------------------------------
BRIAN P. LANE, Individually and behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant, Case No.
3:19-cv-01492-S (N.D. Tex., June 24, 2019) is a claim on behalf of
himself and a class of similarly situated individuals against the
United States (the "Government" or the "Defendant") after the
Government took his private property without compensation in
violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Plaintiff was the owner of bump-fire type rifle stocks
(collectively referred to as "bump-stocks" or "stocks").

Bump-stocks were fully legal in the United States when Plaintiff
acquired three of them, and they remained legal at all times until
the Government demanded their surrender or destruction on or before
the effective date of the regulation, March 26, 2019. The taking of
Plaintiff's bump-stock was prompted by President Trump's direction
to his Administration to "clarify" whether bump-stocks "should be
illegal" in the wake of the horrific Las Vegas mass shooting in
October of the previous year. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives ("ATF") responded by revisiting the
statutory definition of "machinegun," a category of firearms banned
by Congress in 1986, and artfully reimagining the agency
construction of the term "machinegun" so that it could—for the
first time—encompass bump-stocks.

In December 2018, ATF rolled out a new legislative rule ("the
Final
Rule" or "Rule") banning bump-stocks under the statutory ban on
machineguns. The Rule required owners of bump-stocks to surrender
them to the Government or destroy them, even though legislative
rules are prospective in nature, and the Final Rule was clear that
persons in possession of a bump-stock type device were "not acting
unlawfully unless they fail to relinquish or destroy their device
after the effective date of this regulation." The Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment of United States Constitution provides that
"private property" shall not "be taken for public use, without just
compensation", says the complaint.

Plaintiff legally purchased and owned multiple bump-fire type
devices for his personal use.

United States of America, through the ATF's amendment of 27 CFR
parts 447.11, 478.11 and 479.11, required everyone in possession of
a bump-stock to destroy or surrender the devices.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Sara E. Coopwood, Esq.
     Flint Law Firm, LLC
     3838 Oak Lawn Avenue, Suite 1000
     Dallas, TX 75219
     Phone: (618) 288-4777
     Fax: (618) 288-2864
     Email: scoopwood@flintlaw.com


TRIVAGO: Mata Sues Over Unlawful Trafficking
--------------------------------------------
MARISELA MATA and BIBIANA HERNANDEZ, as individuals and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. TRIVAGO GmbH, a
limited German liability company, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-22529-XXXX (S.D. Fla., June 18, 2019) sue to recover for
Defendant's unlawful trafficking in their property and for just
compensation for themselves and a class of similarly situated
persons.

Antonio Mata y Alvarez built the hotel San Carlos in the historic
history of Cienfuegos, Cuba in 1925. He and his son ran it and
built it up its good will and fame until Fidel Castro seized power
and established a communist government in Cuba which confiscated
the San Carlos from the Mata family. The communist Cuban Government
– and more recently, the Melia hotel chain – has used and
benefitted from the San Carlos for decades without paying the Mata
Family any compensation. Trivago GmbH, a subsidiary of Expedia,
Inc., also has benefitted from the San Carlos-and scores of
properties like it-by providing booking services for those
properties online and receiving compensation in the form of
commissions, fees, and other remuneration for those services, says
the complaint.

Plaintiffs are natural persons and United States citizens who
resides in Miami, Florida.

Trivago GmbH, an affiliate of Expedia, Inc., is a German limited
liability company headquartered in Dusseldorf, Germany, with
offices in New York, New York.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Andres Rivero, Esq.
     Jorge A. Mestre, Esq.
     Alan H. Rolnick, Esq.
     Carlos A. Rodriguez, Esq.
     RIVERO MESTRE LLP
     2525 Ponce de Leon Blvd., Suite 1000
     Coral Gables, FL 33134
     Phone: (305) 445-2500
     Facsimile: (305) 445-2505
     Email arivero@riveromestre.com
           jmestre@riveromestre.com
           arolnick@riveromestre.com
           crodriguez@riveromestre.com

          - and -

     Manuel Vasquez, Esq.
     MANUEL VAZQUEZ, P.A.
     2332 Galiano St., Second Floor
     Coral Gables, FL 33134
     Phone: (305) 445-2344
     Facsimile: (305) 445-4404
     Email: mvaz@mvazlaw.com


UNITED COLLECTION: Certification of Class Sought in Luna Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Modesta Luna and Megan Voeks move the Court to certify the class
described in the complaint of the lawsuit styled MODESTA LUNA and
MEGAN VOEKS, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. UNITED COLLECTION BUREAU, INC., Case No.
2:19-cv-00979-NJ (E.D. Wisc.), and further ask that the Court both
stay the motion for class certification and to grant them (and the
Defendant) relief from the Local Rules setting automatic briefing
schedules and requiring briefs and supporting material to be filed
with the Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiffs contend that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiffs assert that they are obligated to move for class
certification to protect the interests of the putative class.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiffs contend.

The Plaintiffs also ask the Court to appoint them as class
representatives, and to appoint of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


UNITED COLLECTION: Leifer Sues Over FDCPA Violation
---------------------------------------------------
Jacob I. Leifer, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. United Collection Bureau, Inc., Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-03926 (E.D. N.Y., July 8, 2019) seeks to recover
for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
("FDCPA").

In its efforts to collect the alleged Debt, Defendant contacted
Plaintiff by letter ("the Letter") dated August 3, 2018. The Letter
provides various settlement offers. The Letter fails to state
whether the payment must be sent by the consumer, or received by
the Defendant, by the stated deadline. The Letter can be
interpreted by the least sophisticated consumer, to mean that such
payment must be mailed to the Defendant, by the stated deadline.
The Letter can also be interpreted by the least sophisticated
consumer, to mean that such payment must be received by Defendant,
by the stated deadline. As a result of the foregoing, in the eyes
of the least sophisticated consumer, the Letter is open to more
than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which is
inaccurate, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Jacob I. Leifer is an individual who is a citizen of the
State of New York and is a natural person allegedly obligated to
pay a debt.

Defendant regularly collects or attempts to collect debts asserted
to be owed to others.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
     BARSHAY SANDERS, PLLC
     100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
     Garden City, NY 11530
     Phone: (516) 203-7600
     Fax: (516) 706-5055
     Email: kcsanders@barshaysanders.com


UNITED STATES: 9th Cir. Affirms Denial of Bid to Dismiss Gallion
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, issued a
Memorandum affirming the District Court's judgment denying
Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings STEVE GALLION,
Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Intervenor-Appellee, v. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC.; SPECTRUM
MANAGEMENT HOLDING COMPANY, LLC, Defendants-Appellants. No.
18-55667. (9th Cir.).

Charter Communications, Inc., and Spectrum Management Holding
Company, LLC, (Charter) appeal the district court's denial of their
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) motion for judgment on the
pleadings, which raises a First Amendment challenge to the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) in Steve Gallion's
putative class action alleging TCPA violations.

The district court held that the TCPA is constitutional, denied
Charter's Rule 12(c) motion, and granted Charter's motion for
interlocutory review. The parties are familiar with the facts, and
we do not recite them here.  

On interlocutory appeal, the Court reviews de novo the district
court's denial of a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Charter
has standing to challenge the TCPA's government-debt exception
provision as underinclusive.  

Charter's arguments that other provisions of the TCPA, the
delegation to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the
claimed government speakers' preference  are unconstitutional also
fail. These provisions were part of the pre-2015 TCPA challenged
and upheld as constitutional in Moser, 46 F.3d at 973, 975, and
Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co., 768 F.3d 871, 876-77 (9th Cir. 2014),
aff'd on other grounds, 136 S.Ct. 663, 672 (2016).  

Charter also challenges several FCC orders promulgating exceptions
to the TCPA. But the FCC's regulatory exceptions are not before
this court. The proper venue to challenge an FCC order is directly
in a court of appeals, not in the district court.  

The Court do not reach Charter's argument that severing the
unconstitutional portion of the TCPA raises retroactivity concerns
because Charter raised this argument for the first time in its
Reply Brief and later in a Rule 28(j) letter. Smith v. Marsh, 194
F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999), on appeal, arguments not raised by
a party in its opening brief are deemed waived.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's July 8, 2019 Memorandum is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yy5fe7uh from Leagle.com.


UNITEDHEALTH GROUP: Marden's Ark Sues Over Unsolicited Calls
------------------------------------------------------------
MARDEN'S ARK, INCORPORATED, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. UNITEDHEALTH GROUP
INCORPORATED, a Delaware corporation, Defendant, Case No.
0:19-cv-01653 (D. Minn., June 24, 2019) is a Class Action Complaint
and Demand for Jury Trial against Defendant UnitedHealth Group
Incorporated ("UnitedHealth" or "Defendant") to stop its practice
of placing unsolicited calls using "an artificial or prerecorded
voice" to users of cellular telephone numbers nationwide, and to
obtain redress for all injured by Defendant's conduct.

The Defendant made (and continues to make) repeated and unsolicited
prerecorded telephone calls to cellular telephone subscribers
without consent in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act (the "TCPA"). By making these prerecorded calls, Defendant
caused Plaintiff and the members of the Classes actual harm and
cognizable legal injury. This includes the aggravation and nuisance
and invasions of privacy that result from the receipt of such
calls, in addition to the wear and tear on their cellular
telephones, consumption of battery life, lost cellular minutes,
loss of value realized for the monies cellular telephone
subscribers paid to their wireless carriers for the receipt of such
calls, in the form of the diminished use, enjoyment, value, and
utility of their cellular telephone plans. Furthermore, Defendant
made the calls knowing they interfered with
Plaintiff and the other Class members' use and enjoyment of, and
the ability to access their cellphones, including the related data,
software, and hardware components, says the complaint.

Plaintiff is Youngsville, North Carolina resident.

UnitedHealth provides healthcare coverage and benefits services to
consumers throughout the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Ryan D. Peterson, Esq.
     Peterson Legal, PLLC
     5201 Eden Avenue, Suite 300
     Edina, MN 55436
     Phone: (612) 367-6568
     Fax: (612) 295-0415
     Email: ryan@peterson.legal

          - and -

     Stefan Coleman, Esq.
     Law Offices of Stefan Coleman, P.A.
     201 S. Biscayne Blvd., 28th floor
     Miami, FL 33131
     Phone: (877) 333-9427
     Facsimile: (888) 498-8946
     Email: Law@StefanColeman.com

          - and -

     Avi R. Kaufman, Esq.
     KAUFMAN P.A.
     400 NW 26th Street
     Miami, FL 33127
     Phone: (305) 469-5881
     Email: kaufman@kaufmanpa.com


USHEALTH GROUP: Ford Sues Over Unsolicited Calls
------------------------------------------------
JOSEPH FORD JR., individually, EDWARD PERSHWITZ, individually, and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. USHEALTH
GROUP, INC., a Texas corporation, Defendant, Case No.
3:19-cv-00690-AR (M.D. Pa., June 25, 2019) Class Action Complaint
and Demand for Jury Trial against Defendant to stop USHealth from
violating the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA") by making
unsolicited, prerecorded and autodialed calls, and text messages to
consumers without their consent, including unsolicited calls to
phone numbers registered on the National Do Not Call registry (DNC)
as well as to consumers who have expressly requested that the calls
stop, and to otherwise obtain injunctive and monetary relief for
all persons injured by USHealth's conduct.

USHealth provides its agents with a dialer system, as well as
potential leads for the agents to contact. Unfortunately, when
USHealth provides these leads, it appears that multiple USHealth
agents have access to those leads resulting in consumers receiving
multiple solicitations from multiple USHealth agents. USHealth
solicits business from consumers using prerecorded calls,
autodialed calls and autodialed text messages. Unfortunately, many
of these calls and texts are being placed without clear and
conspicuous express written consent in violation of the TCPA, says
the complaint.

Plaintiff Ford is an Edwardsville, Pennsylvania resident.

USHealth sells health insurance plans and supplementary products to
consumers that are underwritten by The Freedom Life Insurance
Company of America.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Stefan Coleman, Esq.
     LAW OFFICES OF STEFAN COLEMAN, P.A.
     201 S. Biscayne Blvd, 28th Floor
     Miami, FL 33131
     Phone: (877) 333-9427
     Facsimile: (888) 498-8946
     Email: law@stefancoleman.com


USI SOLUTIONS: Santos Wants to Certify 2 Nationwide FDCPA Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit styled GLENNPAUL SANTOS, Individually,
and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. USI SOLUTIONS,
INC., Case No. 1:19-cv-04618 (N.D. Ill.), asks the Court to enter
an order determining that this Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
action may proceed as a class action against USI on behalf of two
classes:

   1. Nationwide Class A [Count I] consists of (a) all
      individuals in the United States, (b) to whom a collection
      letter was sent on behalf of USI to collect a debt, (c)
      which debt had previously been settled in full, (d) which
      letter was sent on or after a date one year prior to the
      filing of this action and on or before a date 21 days after
      the filing of this action; and

   2. Nationwide Class B [Count II] consists of (a) all
      individuals in the United States, (b) to whom a collection
      letter was sent on behalf of USI to collect a debt, (c)
      which debt was time-barred by the statute of limitations,
      (d) which letter was sent on or after a date one year prior
      to the filing of this action and on or before a date 21
      days after the filing of this action.

Mr. Santos also asks the Court that Payton Legal Group and Law
Offices of Arthur Czaja be appointed counsel for the classes.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Rusty A. Payton, Esq.
          PAYTON LEGAL GROUP
          20 North Clark Street, Suite 3300
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (773) 682-5210
          E-mail: info@payton.legal

               - and -

          Arthur C. Czaja, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF ARTHUR CZAJA
          7521 N. Milwaukee Ave.
          Niles, IL 60714
          Telephone: (847) 647-2106
          E-mail: arthur@czajalawoffices.com


VIGIL VENTURES: Bearce Seek Minimum & OT Wages for Drivers
----------------------------------------------------------
RYAN BEARCE, individually and on behalf of similarly situated
persons, the Plaintiff, vs. VIGIL VENTURES, INC. d/b/a "Domino's
Pizza" and LAWRENCE ALLEN VIGIL, individually, the Defendants, Case
No. 2:19-cv-00141-Z (N.D. Tex., July 10, 2019), seeks to recover
unpaid minimum wages and overtime hours owed to himself and
similarly situated delivery drivers employed by Defendants at their
Domino's stores under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Defendants operate 14 Domino's Pizza franchise stores in Texas,
including stores within this District. Defendants employ delivery
drivers who use their own automobiles to deliver pizzas and other
food items to their customers. However, instead of reimbursing
delivery drivers for the reasonably approximate costs of the
business use of their vehicles, Defendants use a flawed method
(nominal wages - unreimbursed vehicle costs = subminimum net wages)
to determine reimbursement rates that provides such an unreasonably
low rate beneath any reasonable approximation of the expenses they
incur that the drivers' unreimbursed expenses cause their wages to
fall below the federal minimum wage during some or all
workweeks.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiffs are:

          J. Forester, Esq.
          D. Matthew Haynie, Esq.
          FORESTER HAYNIE PLLC
          1701 N. Market Street, Suite 210
          Dallas, TX 75202
          Telephone: (214) 210-2100
          Facsimile: (214) 346-5909
          E-mail: jay@foresterhaynie.com
                  matthew@foresterhaynie.com

VISA INC: Class Certification Sought in B & R Supermarket Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
B & R Supermarket, Inc. (d/b/a Milam's Market), Grove Liquors LLC,
Strouk Group LLC (d/b/a Monsieur Marcel), and Palero Food Corp. and
Cagueyes Food Corp. (d/b/a Fine Fare Supermarket), Plaintiffs in
the lawsuit titled B & R SUPERMARKET, INC., d/b/a MILAM'S MARKET, a
Florida corporation, et al., Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated v. VISA, INC., a Delaware corporation, et
al., Case No. 1:17-cv-02738-MKB-JO (E.D.N.Y.), move the Court for
an order:

      (i) certifying a class under Rules 23(a) and (b)(3) of the
          Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;

     (ii) appointing the Plaintiffs as Class Representatives; and

    (iii) appointing Robbins Arroyo LLP and Devine Goodman Rasco
          & Watts-FitzGerald, LLP as Co-Lead Class Counsel
          pursuant to Rule 23(g).[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          George C. Aguilar, Esq.
          Gregory E. Del Gaizo, Esq.
          Jenny L. Dixon, Esq.
          Michael J. Nicoud, Esq.
          Lindsey C. Herzik, Esq.
          ROBBINS ARROYO LLP
          600 B Street, Suite 1900
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 525-3990
          Facsimile: (619) 525-3991
          E-mail: gaguilar@robbinsarroyo.com
                  gdelgaizo@robbinsarroyo.com
                  jdixon@robbinsarroyo.com
                  mnicoud@robbinsarroyo.com
                  lherzik@robbinsarroyo.com

               - and -

          John W. Devine, Esq.
          Lawrence D. Goodman, Esq.
          Robert J. Kuntz, Jr., Esq.
          DEVINE GOODMAN RASCO & WATTS-FITZGERALD, LLP
          2800 Ponce De Leon Boulevard., Suite 1400
          Coral Gables, FL 33134
          Telephone: (305) 374-8200
          Facsimile: (305) 374-8208
          E-mail: jdevine@devinegoodman.com
                  lgoodman@devinegoodman.com
                  rkuntz@devinegoodman.com

               - and -

          Thomas G. Amon, Esq.
          Peter B. Patterson, Jr., Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS G. AMON
          733 3rd Avenue, 15th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 810-2430
          Facsimile: (212) 810-2427
          E-mail: tamon@amonlaw.com
                  ppatterson@amonlaw.com

Defendant American Express Company is represented by:

          Damaris Hernandez, Esq.
          Kelsie A. Docherty, Esq.
          Ali Z. Klein, Esq.
          Isaac D. Chaput, Esq.
          Peter T. Barbur, Esq.
          Samantha Bui, Esq.
          CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP
          825 Eighth Avenue
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (212) 474-1486
          E-mail: dhernandez@cravath.com
                  kdocherty@cravath.com
                  aklein@cravath.com
                  ichaput@cravath.com
                  pbarbur@cravath.com
                  sbui@cravath.com

Defendant Discover Financial Services is represented by:

          Elizabeth P. Papez, Esq.
          WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
          1700 K Street, N.W.
          Washington, DC 20006
          Telephone: (202) 282-5000
          Facsimile: (202) 282-5100
          E-mail: epapez@winston.com

               - and -

          Jeanifer Ellen Parsigian, Esq.
          Sean D. Meenan, Esq.
          Dana L. Cook-Milligan, Esq.
          WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
          101 California St., 35th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 591-1469
          E-mail: jparsigian@winston.com
                  smeenan@winston.com
                  dlcook@winston.com

               - and -

          James F. Herbison, Esq.
          Brett A. Walker, Esq.
          WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
          35 West Wacker Drive, 39th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 558-5600
          E-mail: jherbiso@winston.com
                  bwalker@winston.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey L. Kessler, Esq.
          Eva W. Cole, Esq.
          Johanna R. Hudgens, Esq.
          Kelli L. Lanski, Esq.
          WINSTON & STAWN LLP
          200 Park Avenue
          New York, NY 10166
          Telephone: (212) 294-6700
          E-mail: jkessler@winston.com
                  ewcole@winston.com
                  jhudgens@winston.com
                  klanski@winston.com

Defendant Mastercard International Incorporated is represented by:

          Kenneth A. Gallo, Esq.
          Craig A. Benson, Esq.
          Adrienne J. Lighten, Esq.
          Diana V. Valdivia, Esq.
          Michelle K. Parikh, Esq.
          Jessica Anne Morton, Esq.
          Rosa Victoria Gilcrease-Garcia, Esq.
          Melissa R. Alpert, Esq.
          Lina T. Dagnew, Esq.
          PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP
          2001 K Street, NW
          Washington, DC 20006
          Telephone: (202) 223-7300
          E-mail: kgallo@paulweiss.com
                  cbenson@paulweiss.com
                  alighten@paulweiss.com
                  dvaldivia@paulweiss.com
                  mparikh@paulweiss.com
                  jmorton@paulweiss.com
                  rgilcreasegarcia@paulweiss.com
                  malpert@paulweiss.com
                  ldagnew@paulweiss.com

               - and -

          Gary R. Carney, Esq.
          Christopher Tom, Esq.
          PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP
          1285 Avenue of the Americas
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (212) 373-3051
          E-mail: gcarney@paulweiss.com
                  ctom@paulweiss.com

               - and -

          Stephen E. Taylor, Esq.
          Cheryl A. Cauley, Esq.
          TAYLOR & PATCHEN, LLP
          One Ferry Building, Suite 355
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 788-8200
          E-mail: staylor@taylorpatchen.com
                  ccauley@taylorpatchen.com

Defendants Visa Inc. and Visa U.S.A. Inc. are represented by:

          Mark Merley, Esq.
          Matthew A. Eisenstein, Esq.
          Karen C. Otto, Esq.
          Mike Rubin, Esq.
          Laura Butte, Esq.
          Ron Ghatan, Esq.
          ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP
          601 Massachusetts Ave., NW
          Washington, DC 20001
          Telephone: (202) 942-5321
          E-mail: mark.merley@arnoldporter.com
                  matthew.eisenstein@arnoldporter.com
                  karen.otto@arnoldporter.com
                  michael.rubin@arnoldporter.com
                  laura.butte@arnoldporter.com
                  ron.ghatan@arnoldporter.com

               - and -

          Robert J. Vizas, Esq.
          Sharon D. Mayo, Esq.
          Stephanie Fine, Esq.
          ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP
          Three Embarcadero Center, 10th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 356-3000
          E-mail: robert.vizas@arnoldporter.com
                  sharon.mayo@arnoldporter.com
                  stephanie.fine@arnoldporter.com

               - and -

          Robert C. Mason, Esq.
          ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP
          250 West 55th Street
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (212) 836-8077
          E-mail: robert.mason@arnoldporter.com


WAYNE COUNTY, WV: Certification of Class Sought in Hurley Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit titled JOANN HURLEY, on behalf of
herself, and all others similarly situated v. THOMAS MESSER, a W.
Va. citizen, SANDRA PERTEE, a W. Va. citizen, WAYNE COUNTY BOARD OF
EDUCATION, a West Virginia Political Subdivision, RINGCENTRAL,
INC., a Delaware Corp., CALLCENTRIC, INC., a New York Corp., and
VOICENT COMMUNICATIONS, INC., a California Corp., Case No.
3:16-cv-09949 (S.D.W. Va.), moves for class certification.

Defendant Thomas Messer, of Fort Gay, West Virginia, appears pro
se.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Anthony Majestro, Esq.
          POWELL & MAJESTRO, PLLC
          405 Capitol Street, Suite P-1200
          Charleston, WV 25301
          Telephone: (304) 346-2889
          E-mail: amajestro@powellmajestro.com

               - and -

          Timothy C. Bailey, Esq.
          J. Ryan Stewart, Esq.
          BAILEY JAVINS & CARTER, L.C.
          P.O. Box 3712
          Charleston, WV 25337
          Telephone: (304) 345-0346
          Facsimile: (304) 345-0375
          E-mail: tbailey@bjc4u.com
                  rstewart@bjc4u.com

Defendants Wayne County Board of Education and Sandra Pertee are
represented by:

          Michael J. Farrell, Esq.
          Bernard S. Vallejos, Esq.
          FARRELL WHITE & LEGG, PLLC
          914 5th Avenue, P.O. Box 6457
          Huntington, WV 25772-6457
          Telephone: (304) 522-9100
          Facsimile: (304) 522-9162
          E-mail: mjf@farrell3.com
                  bsv@farrell3.com

Defendant Callcentric is represented by:

          John R. McGhee, Jr., Esq.
          Robert R. Rodecker, Esq.
          KAY CASTO & CHANEY, PLLC
          707 Virginia St., East, Suite 1500
          Charleston, WV 25301
          Telephone: (304) 345-8900
          Facsimile: (304) 345-8909
          E-mail: jmcghee@kaycasto.com
                  rrodecker@kaycasto.com

               - and -

          Michael P. Donahue, Esq.
          MARASHLIAN & DONAHUE, PLLC
          THE COMMLAW GROUP
          1420 Springhill Rd., Suite 401
          Tysons, VA 22102
          Telephone: (703) 714-1319
          Facsimile: (703) 563-6222
          E-mail: mpd@commlawgroup.com

Defendant RingCentral, Inc. is represented by:

          Edward P. Tiffey, Esq.
          TIFFEY LAW PRACTICE, PLLC
          P.O. Box 3785
          Charleston, WV 25337-3785
          Telephone: (304) 344-3200
          E-mail: ed@tiffeylaw.com

               - and -

          Mary Ann L. Wymore, Esq.
          GREENSFELDER, HEMKER & GALE, P.C.
          10 South Broadway, Suite 2000
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 516-2662
          E-mail: mlw@greensfelder.com

Defendant Voicent Communications, Inc. is represented by:

          Jared M. Tully, Esq.
          FROST BROWN TODD, LLC
          500 Virginia Street, Suite 1100
          Charleston, WV 25301
          Telephone: (304) 348-2404
          E-mail: jtully@fbtlaw.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey A. Backman, Esq.
          GREENSPOON MARDER LLP
          200 East Broward Blvd., Suite 1800
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 734-1853
          E-mail: jeffrey.backman@gmlaw.com


WILMINGTON TRUST: Fink Sues Over ERISA Violation
------------------------------------------------
KRISTINA FINK, on behalf of the Nation Safe Drivers Employee Stock
Ownership Plan, and on behalf of a class of all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. WILMINGTON TRUST, N.A., as
successor to Wilmington Trust Retirement and Institutional Services
Company, MICHAEL SMITH, ANDREW SMITH, and FRANK MENNELLA,
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-01193-UNA (D. Del., June 25, 2019) is
a suit against Wilmington Trust, the trustee for the Nation Safe
Drivers Employee Stock Ownership Plan (the "Plan") when the Plan
acquired shares of NSD Holdings, Inc. (including its predecessor,
Nation Safe Drivers Holdings, Inc.) ("NSD") in 2014, and against
NSD shareholders Michael Smith, Andrew Smith, and Frank Mennella
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as
amended ("ERISA"),  for losses suffered by the Plan and its
participants caused by Wilmington Trust when it caused the Plan to
buy shares of NSD for more than fair market value in 2014 and other
relief.

The Plan has been injured and its participants have been deprived
of hard-earned retirement benefits resulting from Wilmington
Trust's violations of ERISA. At all relevant times, NSD was a
privately-held company and a party in interest to the Plan. On or
about September 29, 2014, the Plan purchased 640,000 shares of NSD
common stock for $342,000,000, which was financed by a $317,225,000
term note agreement between NSD and the Plan bearing a 2.97%
interest rate, and notes financed by the selling shareholders (the
"Selling Shareholders") of $24,775,000 that bore a 6.00% interest
rate, with the notes to be repaid over a 50 year period (the
purchase and loan transactions together, the "ESOP Transaction" or
"Transaction"). At that time, NSD became 100% employee owned.

Wilmington Trust represented the Plan and its participants as
Trustee in the ESOP Transaction. It had sole and exclusive
authority to negotiate the terms of the ESOP Transaction on the
Plan's behalf. The ESOP Transaction allowed the Selling
Shareholders to unload their interests in NSD above fair market
value and saddle the Plan with hundreds of millions of dollars of
debt over a 50-year repayment period to finance the Transaction.
Wilmington Trust failed to fulfill its ERISA duties, as Trustee and
fiduciary, to the Plan and its participants, including Plaintiff.

Plaintiff brings this action to recover the losses incurred by the
Plan, and thus by each individual account in the Plan held by her
and similarly situated participants, resulting from Wilmington
Trust's engaging in, and causing the Plan to engage in, prohibited
transactions under ERISA, and breaching its fiduciary duties under
ERISA, and the Selling Shareholder Defendants' participation in
these violations, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Kristina Fink is and has been a Plan participant, as
defined in ERISA, since the adoption of the Plan effective on
August 1, 2014.

Wilmington Trust is a trust company chartered in Delaware.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Gregory Y. Porter, Esq.
     Ryan T. Jenny, Esq.
     BAILEY & GLASSER LLP
     1055 Thomas Jefferson Street, NW, Suite 540
     Washington, DC 20007
     Phone: (202) 463-2101
     Facsimile: (202) 463-2103
     Email: gporter@baileyglasser.com
            rjenny@baileyglasser.com

          - and -

     Daniel Feinberg, Esq.
     Todd Jackson, Esq.
     FEINBERG, JACKSON, WORTHMAN & WASOW LLP
     2030 Addison Street, Suite 500
     Berkeley, CA 94704
     Phone: (510) 269-7998
     Facsimile: (510) 269-7994
     Email: dan@feinbergjackson.com
            todd@feinbergjackson.com

          - and -

     David A. Felice, Esq.
     BAILEY & GLASSER LLP
     Red Clay Center at Little Falls
     2961 Centerville Road, Suite 302
     Wilmington, DE 19808
     Phone: (302) 504-6333
     Facsimile: (302) 504-6334
     Email: dfelice@baileyglasser.com


WISMETTAC ASIAN: Cruz Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Compensation
------------------------------------------------------------
JORGE OLIVARES CRUZ, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
aggrieved, Plaintiff, v. WISMETTAC ASIAN FOODS, INC., a California
corporation; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants, Case
No. 19STCV23686 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty., July 8, 2019)
is a representative action, pursuant to the Labor Code Private
Attorneys General Act of 2004, codified at Labor Code section 2698,
et seq. ("PAGA"), on behalf of Plaintiff and all other current and
former similarly situated employees employed by or formerly
employed by Defendants.

The Defendants have had a consistent policy or practice of failing
to pay overtime wages to Plaintiff and other non-exempt employees
in the State of California in violation of California state wage
and hour laws as a result of, without limitation, Plaintiff and
similarly aggrieved employees routinely working over 8 hours per
day or 40 hours per week without being properly compensated for
hours worked in excess of 8 hours per day or 40 hours per week,
working 12 or more hours per day and or more than 8 hours per day
on the seventh consecutive work day in a work week by, as a result
of, among other things, failing to accurately track and/or pay for
all hours actually worked; engaging, suffering or permitting
employees to work off the clock; and/or otherwise failing to pay at
the proper overtime rate(s) of pay, says the complaint.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendants as a non-exempt employee from
approximately September 2007 through May 25, 2018.

Wismettac is a privately-held company specializing in import,
export, and wholesale distribution of Asian food products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     David D. Bibiyan, Esq.
     Diego Aviles, Esq.
     BIBIYAN LAW GROUP, P.C.
     1801 Century Park East, Suite 2600
     Los Angeles, CA 90067
     Phone: (310) 438-5555
     Facsimile: (310)300-1705
     Email: david@tomorrowlaw.com
            diego@tomorrowlaw.com


YOUNIQUE, LLC: Website not Accessible to Blind People, Dawson Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
LESHAWN DAWSON, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. YOUNIQUE, LLC, the Defendant, Case
No. 1:19-cv-06364 (S.D.N.Y., July 9, 2019), asserts that Defendant
failed to design, construct, maintain, and operate its website,
www.youniqueproducts.com, to be fully accessible to and
independently usable by Plaintiff and other blind or
visually-impaired people.

The Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person who
requires screen-reading software to read website content using his
computer. The Plaintiff uses the terms "blind" or
"visually-impaired" to refer to all people with visual impairments
who meet the legal definition of blindness in that they have a
visual acuity with correction of less than or equal to 20 x 200.
Some blind people who meet this definition have limited vision.
Others have no vision.  Based on a 2010 U.S. Census Bureau report,
approximately 8.1 million people in the United States are visually
impaired, including 2.0 million who are blind, and according to the
American Foundation for the Blind's 2015 report, approximately
400,000 visually impaired persons live in the State of New York.

The Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a change in
Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and procedures so that
Defendant's website will become and remain accessible to blind and
visually impaired consumers, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Fl.
          Brooklyn, New York 11201
          Telephone: (929) 575-4175
          E-mail: Joseph@cml.legal

               - and -

          Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
          Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003-2461
          Telephone: (212) 228-9795
          E-mail: nyjg@aol.com
                  danalgottlieb@aol.com

                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: "Hug of Death" Asbestos Case Wins Payment
----------------------------------------------------------
Stuff.co.nz reported that a woman who contracted a deadly asbestos
condition through hugging her father when he came home from work
has won a posthumous accident compensation battle.

Deanna Trevarthen, 45, was among the youngest in New Zealand to die
from mesothelioma, an aggressive form of cancer directly linked to
asbestos.

When she died in 2016 she had claimed ACC for a range of
entitlements such as treatment costs, weekly compensation, a lump
sum and funeral costs.

Her estate continued the fight and in a decision issued a High
Court judge has said Trevarthen does qualify for ACC cover after
all.

For sister-in-law Angela Calver, executrix and trustee of the
estate, the win is the fulfilment of a promise made to Trevarthen.

"I'm very, very pleased. It's always been emotionally quite
difficult having to do this."

"I'm so pleased that the judge has got ACC to do their job as our
no-fault insurer."

Calver hoped the case would set a precedent for others.

Calver's lawyer, Beatrix Woodhouse, said it was a significant
decision that extended ACC cover to mesothelioma victims who
contracted it from secondary exposure to asbestos, not directly
through their work. It can be contracted from a single exposure.

Work-related mesothelioma was already covered by ACC.

When Trevarthen, who was from Auckland, was diagnosed in 2015.

Chemotherapy was tried but failed.

Her family raised thousands of dollars for the drug Keytruda which
was not publicly funded, but that failed as well and she died a
little over a year after diagnosis.

Trevarthen's father was an electrician and she would hug him when
he came home wearing his work clothes, and sometimes she would play
at work sites.

To get cover under accident compensation law she needed to show the
mesothelioma that killed her was a personal injury caused by an
accident.

ACC initially rejected the case because it was said she had a
disease and could not identify a specific instance where she was
injured.

But Justice Jill Mallon has found that Trevarthen's condition was
caused by inhaling asbestos and if that was an accident then she
had ACC cover.

The specific occasion she inhaled the asbestos did not have to be
identified, the judge said.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: 2 CIRCOR Units Still Face Claims at March 31
-------------------------------------------------------------
CIRCOR International, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended March 31, 2019, that asbestos-related product
liability claims continue to be filed against its subsidiaries
Spence Engineering Company, Inc. and CIRCOR Instrumentation
Technologies, Inc.

The Company states, "Asbestos-related product liability claims
continue to be filed against two of our subsidiaries: Spence
Engineering Company, Inc. ("Spence"), the stock of which we
acquired in 1984; and CIRCOR Instrumentation Technologies, Inc.
(f/k/a Hoke, Inc.) ("Hoke"), the stock of which we acquired in
1998.  Due to the nature of the products supplied by these
entities, the markets they serve and our historical experience in
resolving these claims, we do not expect that these
asbestos-related claims will have a material adverse effect on the
financial condition, results of operations or liquidity of the
Company."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/bX19OK


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Ampco-Pittsburgh Has $225.1MM Liability Reserve
----------------------------------------------------------------
Ampco-Pittsburgh Corporation has US$225,133,000 reserve at March
31, 2019, for the total costs, including defense costs, for
Asbestos Liability claims pending or projected to be asserted
through 2052, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period
ended March 31, 2019.

The Company states, "In 2006, the Corporation retained Hamilton,
Rabinovitz & Associates, Inc. ("HR&A"), a nationally recognized
expert in the valuation of asbestos liabilities, to assist the
Corporation in estimating the potential liability for pending and
unasserted future claims for Asbestos Liability.  Based on this
analysis, the Corporation recorded a reserve for Asbestos Liability
claims pending or projected to be asserted through 2013 as of
December 31, 2006.  HR&A's analysis has been periodically updated
since that time.  In 2018, the Corporation engaged Nathan
Associates Inc. ("Nathan") to update the liability valuation, and
additional reserves were established by the Corporation as of
December 31, 2018, for Asbestos Liability claims pending or
projected to be asserted through 2052.

"The methodology used by Nathan in its projection in 2018 of the
operating subsidiaries' liability for pending and unasserted
potential future claims for Asbestos Liability, which is
substantially the same as the methodology employed by HR&A in prior
estimates, relied upon and included the following factors:

   * interpretation of a widely accepted forecast of the population
likely to have been exposed to asbestos;

   * epidemiological studies estimating the number of people likely
to develop asbestos-related diseases;

   * analysis of the number of people likely to file an
asbestos-related injury claim against the subsidiaries and the
Corporation based on such epidemiological data and relevant claims
history from January 1, 2016, to August 19, 2018;

   * an analysis of pending cases, by type of injury claimed and
jurisdiction where the claim is filed;

   * an analysis of claims resolution history from January 1, 2016,
to August 19, 2018, to determine the average settlement value of
claims, by type of injury claimed and jurisdiction of filing; and

   * an adjustment for inflation in the future average settlement
value of claims, at an annual inflation rate based on the
Congressional Budget Office's ten year forecast of inflation.

Using this information, Nathan estimated in 2018 the number of
future claims for Asbestos Liability that would be filed through
the year 2052, as well as the settlement or indemnity costs that
would be incurred to resolve both pending and future unasserted
claims through 2052.  This methodology has been accepted by
numerous courts.

In conjunction with developing the aggregate liability estimate,
the Corporation also developed an estimate of probable insurance
recoveries for its Asbestos Liability.  In developing the estimate,
the Corporation considered Nathan's projection for settlement or
indemnity costs for Asbestos Liability and management's projection
of associated defense costs (based on the current defense to
indemnity cost ratio), as well as a number of additional factors.
These additional factors included the Settlement Agreements in
effect, policy exclusions, policy limits, policy provisions
regarding coverage for defense costs, attachment points, prior
impairment of policies and gaps in the coverage, policy
exhaustions, insolvencies among certain of the insurance carriers,
and the nature of the underlying claims for Asbestos Liability
asserted against the subsidiaries and the Corporation as reflected
in the Corporation's asbestos claims database, as well as estimated
erosion of insurance limits on account of claims against Howden
arising out of the Products.  In addition to consulting with the
Corporation's outside legal counsel on these insurance matters, the
Corporation consulted with a nationally recognized insurance
consulting firm it retained to assist the Corporation with certain
policy allocation matters that also are among the several factors
considered by the Corporation when analyzing potential recoveries
from relevant historical insurance for Asbestos Liability.  Based
upon all of the factors considered by the Corporation, and taking
into account the Corporation's analysis of publicly available
information regarding the credit-worthiness of various insurers,
the Corporation estimated the probable insurance recoveries for
Asbestos Liability and defense costs through 2052.

"The Corporation's reserve at December 31, 2018, for the total
costs, including defense costs, for Asbestos Liability claims
pending or projected to be asserted through 2052, was
US$227,922,000.  The reserve at March 31, 2019, was US$225,133,000.
Defense costs are estimated at 80% of settlement costs.

"The Corporation's receivable at December 31, 2018, for insurance
recoveries attributable to the claims for which the Corporation's
Asbestos Liability reserve has been established, including the
portion of incurred defense costs covered by the Settlement
Agreements in effect through December 31, 2018, and the probable
payments and reimbursements relating to the estimated indemnity and
defense costs for pending and unasserted future Asbestos Liability
claims, was US$152,508,000 (US$150,093,000 at March 31, 2019)."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/XKHZgq


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Ampco-Pittsburgh Has 6,959 Claims at March 31
--------------------------------------------------------------
Ampco-Pittsburgh Corporation has 6,959 asbestos-related claims
pending at March 31, 2019, according to the Company's Form 10-Q
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2019.

The Company states, "Claims have been asserted alleging personal
injury from exposure to asbestos-containing components historically
used in some products manufactured by predecessors of Air & Liquid
("Asbestos Liability").  Air & Liquid, and in some cases the
Corporation, are defendants (among a number of defendants, often in
excess of 50) in cases filed in various state and federal courts.

"Included as "open claims" are approximately 666 and 479 claims in
2019 and 2018, respectively, classified in various jurisdictions as
"inactive" or transferred to a state or federal judicial panel on
multi-district litigation, commonly referred to as the MDL.

"A substantial majority of the settlement and defense costs was
reported and paid by insurers.  Because claims are often filed and
can be settled or dismissed in large groups, the amount and timing
of settlements, as well as the number of open claims, can fluctuate
significantly from period to period."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/XKHZgq


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Found in Lungs of 50% Thai Population
---------------------------------------------------------------
Tim Povtak, writing for Asbestos.com, reported that almost 50% of
the general population in Thailand will die with at least traces of
asbestos in their lungs, based on one recent study.

Asbestos fibers were discovered in the lungs of 48.5% of those who
were part of a one-year, post-mortem analysis done by the
Department of Pathology at Ramathibodi Hospital, Mahidol University
in Bangkok.

The toxic mineral was found during 97 of the 200 autopsies that
were performed at the hospital without regard to occupation, age,
sex or cause of death.

A two-year-old infant, who died of congenital heart disease, was
the youngest to have asbestos identified in the lungs.

"The prevalence [of asbestos] is increasing compared to our past
study in Thailand," Dr. Pimpin Incharoen, who co-authored the
study, told The Mesothelioma Center at Asbestos.com. "Yes, [the
percentage] was surprising."

Asbestos Use in Thailand Remains High

A similar study in Thailand in 1985 identified 33% of the general
population with asbestos in lung tissue. The percentages in other
industrialized countries, using similar post-mortem measurements,
varied widely in the past.

The most recent comparative study was done in Italy, where asbestos
was found in 16.4% percent of those tested.

Thailand has been one of the world's largest importers and users of
asbestos for several decades, trailing only Russia, China, India
and Kazakhstan in annual consumption.

Thailand keeps no standardized, nationwide database to effectively
track asbestos-related disease.

Only a few cases of mesothelioma, which is caused almost
exclusively by asbestos exposure, are reported each year.

Thailand did finalize a partial ban on certain types of asbestos in
2001, following numerous worldwide studies documenting the
relationship between the toxic mineral and respiratory diseases.

Thailand, though, still uses vast amounts of chrysotile asbestos
for industrial purposes. Much of it is used to produce asbestos
cement, roofing and other building materials, along with automobile
brakes and clutch pads.

According to the study, Thailand has used an estimated 60,000 to
180,000 metric tons of asbestos annually through the past 30
years.

The United States, by comparison, imported 750 metric tons of
asbestos in 2018. All of it went to the chlor-alkali industry to
help make chlorine.

Thailand's population is one-fifth of that in the U.S.

No Amount of Asbestos Is Safe

Although many among the 48.5% had only small amounts of asbestos in
the lungs, the World Health Organization contends that no amount of
asbestos inhalation is considered safe.

Occupational asbestos exposure is responsible for the vast majority
of asbestos-related diseases, particularly mesothelioma.

Even in an occupational setting, though, only a small percentage of
those exposed to asbestos develop serious health issues.

More than 60 countries have opted for a complete ban of asbestos.

"We want people to know that asbestos will remain in the human lung
for a long period of time," Incharoen said. "And we've seen
mesothelioma in people who are not exposed to high levels of
asbestos."

Among the occupations of those found with asbestos in their lungs
included housewives, students, government officers, police
officers, salesmen and stewards.

Only 4.5% of the deaths were attributed to respiratory failure and
5.5% were tumor-related, according to the cause of death listings
in the study. Others included drowning, drug abuse, epilepsy,
homicide, liver failure and hanging.

None listed mesothelioma.

The study showed small amounts of asbestos do not automatically
lead to serious health issues, but it also illustrated that
nonoccupational exposure and inhalation of asbestos can happen to
almost anyone.

"The banning of asbestos in our country is not possible now due to
the cost effectiveness of substitute material," Incharoen said.
"But the risk of asbestos disease will not decrease if all asbestos
containing products are not totally replaced. Finding an asbestos
substitute material is important."


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Britain's Asbestos Death Toll at Crisis Level
--------------------------------------------------------------
Frances Perraudin, writing for The Guardian, reported that the
death toll from asbestos exposure has reached crisis levels in
Britain, the Guardian has learned, as people pay the price for
"criminal failings by industry and government" made decades ago.

Asbestos-related cancers can occur as many as 50 years after
exposure and deaths are now thought to be reaching their peak,
years after the widespread industrial use of the carcinogen between
the 1950s and 70s.

According to figures from the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), in
2017 there were 2,523 deaths from mesothelioma, a cancer of the
lining of the organs caused almost exclusively by the inhalation of
asbestos fibres. This is a similar number to the previous five
years.

Rates of mesothelioma, which is almost always fatal, nearly doubled
between 1995, when there were 1,317 cases, and 2017. More than half
of deaths from mesothelioma were people over 75 and 82% were men.

It is estimated that a similar number of people die from
asbestos-related lung cancers, but this cannot be so accurately
measured as establishing a cause for lung cancer is more
difficult.

The HSE predicts that annual numbers will continue at current
levels for the rest of this decade before starting to decline,
though it has previously anticipated earlier falls.

Asbestos, a naturally occurring fibrous mineral, was widely used in
the UK as insulation and a fire retardant. The import and use of
blue and brown asbestos was banned in 1985, while white asbestos,
which is thought to be less dangerous, was banned in 1999.

Deaths from mesothelioma are high among people who worked in the
shipbuilding and construction industries -- especially carpenters,
plumbers and electricians -- as well as those who worked in
factories that produced asbestos products.

Roger Maddocks, a partner with the law firm Irwin Mitchell LLP who
specialises in workplace injuries and illness, said: "In many cases
people are now paying the price for criminal failings by industry
and the government, who were responsible for the lack of action on
the part of the Factory Inspectorate [the precursor to the HSE]."

Maddocks said the Factory Inspectorate knew by the end of the 19th
century that heavy exposure to asbestos carried the risk of
life-threatening respiratory disease and that by the 1960s it was
public knowledge that exposure to small amounts of the substance
carried the risk of mesothelioma.

"Despite that people continued to be exposed, and in many cases
heavily exposed, for years if not decades after the mid-60s," he
said.

An HSE spokesperson said that while controls on the use of blue
asbestos were introduced by 1970, the dangers of brown asbestos
were not appreciated until well into that decade. The heavy use of
brown asbestos is a key reason why the UK, along with Australia,
has the highest mesothelioma rates in the world.

"With the benefit of hindsight it is now obvious that it should
have been banned earlier but the specific evidence about brown
asbestos was slower to emerge and at the time it would have been
more difficult to see this," they said.

Analysis of data shared with the Guardian by the Royal College of
Physicians found that NHS trusts in former industrial areas had
diagnosed the highest numbers of mesothelioma cases in 2014 to
2016.

Northumbria Healthcare NHS foundation trust and University
Hospitals of Leicester NHS trust diagnosed 118 each in that period.
Leeds and Portsmouth diagnosed 107 and 106 respectively.

Guardian analysis of coroners' figures found evidence of the huge
toll that Britain's industrial past has taken on the health of
people across the country.

In Nottinghamshire, North Northumberland and Sunderland, one in
four deaths examined by coroners were found to be caused by
"industrial disease". A large proportion of these deaths are
thought to be asbestos-related, though they will also include
conditions such as chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) and
silicosis.

There were 2,709 "deaths by industrial disease" recorded by
coroners in England and Wales in 2018, a 44% rise on the 1,878
recorded in 1995, the earliest available figure. Nine percent of
all deaths recorded by coroners in 2018 were caused by industrial
disease.

Jo Ritson, from the asbestos victims' support group that covers
South Yorkshire and north Nottinghamshire, said demand for its
services was going up, yet every year it struggled to get funding.
It saw 117 clients in 2011-12, and 298 in 2017-18. It saw 192
people up to May this year.

Ritson said the reactions of her clients to the news that they had
mesothelioma varied. "For some people it hits them like a bolt out
of the blue and they find it really difficult to understand that
what they did as a young man in their 20s or while doing their
apprenticeships is now ruining the retirement that they worked
towards all their lives," she said.

"But others tend to know it's coming because they've seen a lot of
their colleagues die from asbestos-related disease. For a lot of
them it's like a ticking clock and they don't know whether it's
going to hit them or not."

A spokesperson for the Department for Work and Pensions said:
"Since the dangers of asbestos became clear, governments have, over
many years, brought in regulations and legislation. Asbestos is
banned in construction and the risks of exposure today are
extremely low."

It added that it took its responsibility to compensate people with
mesothelioma very seriously, automatically awarding the maximum
rate of industrial injuries disablement benefit and awarding lump
sum compensation of up to GBP92,000, depending on a person's age.

'Just because it is banned doesn't mean it's gone'

Mavis Nye, 78, was diagnosed with cancer in 2009, more than 50
years after being exposed to asbestos dust on her husband's
overalls from his work as an apprentice at Chatham dockyard in
Kent.

"He used to come home with it all in his hair and on his clothes,"
she said. "It was just dust to me. So you'd shake it off and you
put it in the washing machine and that's it."

Nye is one of thousands of people every year to be diagnosed with
mesothelioma.

"When they first tell you you have mesothelioma you can't even say
the word so it doesn't register," said Nye. Writing on the website
for the charity Mesothelioma UK, Nye's husband, Ray, said: "How do
I feel about the fact that it was me who has given her this
sentence? Gutted, destroyed, sick and, yes, guilty."

'Pain is part and parcel of everyday life for me'

In 2015, John Chapman was preparing for the Mallorca 312, the
longest amateur cycling event in Europe. He had been cycling about
6,000 miles a year and so put the fatigue he'd been starting to
experience down to too much exercise and not enough recovery time.

During an appointment with a lung specialist, he was asked if he
had had any past exposure to asbestos. "I said I had. In my early
days I'd spent 10 years working in a foundry," said Chapman.

He was diagnosed with mesothelioma when he was 54. Now, aged 57, he
has outlived many expectations. "It's like being committed to a
death row sentence in that you know there is going to be a point in
time after which you are not going to get past, based on statistics
and life expectancies," he said. "That's the nature of the beast."

He now has only a fifth of his lung capacity in his left lung and a
bone tumour the size of an Easter egg. "Pain is unfortunately part
and parcel of everyday life for me," he said. "I have a Macmillan
nurse who comes out and sees me and we are constantly adjusting and
amending pain medications to try and offset the pain you get."

While Chapman and Nye are angry that they were exposed to the
substance when there was already evidence it was dangerous, both
are primarily concerned with the fact that asbestos is still all
around us.

"Just because it is banned doesn't mean it's gone," says Nye. "It
hasn't. It's everywhere. It's in buildings that are forever being
pulled down and refurbished, which can make it airborne . . . We
need to educate the young because they think it's a problem of the
past."


ASBESTOS UPDATE: D/C Lift Stay Issue Remains Pending at March 31
----------------------------------------------------------------
A motion to lift stay is still pending in the bankruptcy cases of
Kaanapali Land, LLC's subsidiary, D/C Distribution Corporation,
according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
March 31, 2019.

The Company states, "On or about April 28, 2015, eight litigants
who filed asbestos claims in California state court (hereinafter,
"Petitioners") filed a motion for relief from the automatic stay in
the D/C bankruptcy (hereinafter "life stay motion").  Under
relevant provisions of the bankruptcy rules and on the filing of
the D/C bankruptcy action, all pending litigation claims against
D/C were stayed pending resolution of the bankruptcy action.  In
their motion, Petitioners asked the bankruptcy court to lift the
stay in the bankruptcy court to name D/C and/or its alternate
entities as defendants in their respective California state court
asbestos actions and to satisfy their claims against insurance
policies that defend and indemnify D/C and/or their alternate
entities.  The Petitioner's motion to lift stay thus in part has as
an objective ultimate recovery, if any, from, among other things,
insurance policy proceeds that were allegedly assets of both the
D/C and Oahu Sugar bankruptcy estates.

"Kaanapali, the EPA, and the Navy are claimants in the Oahu Sugar
bankruptcy and the Fireman's Fund policies are allegedly among the
assets of the Oahu Sugar bankruptcy estate as well.  For this and
other reasons, Kaanapali, the EPA and the Navy opposed the motion
to lift stay.

"After briefing and argument, on May 14, 2015, the United States
Bankruptcy Court, for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern
Division, in In Re D/C Distribution, LLC, Bankruptcy Case No.
07-12776, issued an order lifting the stay.  In the order, the
court permitted the Petitioners to "proceed in the applicable
nonbankruptcy forum to final judgment (including any appeals) in
accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law.  Claimants are
entitled to settle or enforce their claims only by collecting upon
any available insurance Debtor's liability to them in accordance
with applicable nonbankruptcy law.  No recovery may be made
directly against the property of Debtor, or property of the
bankruptcy estate." Kaanapali, Firemen's Fund and the United States
appealed the bankruptcy court order lifting the stay.

"In March 2016, the district court reversed the bankruptcy court
order finding that the bankruptcy court did not apply relevant law
to the facts in the case to arrive at a reasoned decision.  On
appeal the district court noted that the law requires consideration
of a number of factors when lifting a stay to permit certain claims
to proceed, including consideration of the adequacy of remaining
insurance to meet claims still subject to the stay.  Among other
things, the court noted that the bankruptcy court failed to explain
why it was appropriate for the petitioners to liquidate their
claims before the other claimants whose claims remained subject to
the stay.  The district court remanded the case for further
proceedings.  It is uncertain whether such further proceedings on
the lift stay will take place.

The parties in the D/C and Oahu Sugar bankruptcies have reached out
to each other to determine if there is any interest in pursuing a
global settlement of the claims in the Oahu Sugar and D/C
bankruptcies insofar as the Fireman's Fund insurance policies are
concerned.  If such discussions take place, they may take the form
of a mediation or other format and involve some form of resolution
of Kaanapali's interest in various of the Fireman's Fund insurance
policies for Kaanapali's various and future insurance claims.
Kaanapali may consider entering into such discussions, but there is
no assurance that such discussions will take place or prove
successful in resolving any of the claims in whole or in part.

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/JazFQR


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Everest Had $242.8MM Loss Reserves at March 31
---------------------------------------------------------------
Everest Re Group, Ltd. had net asbestos loss reserves of US$242.8
million, or 96.5%, of total net A&E reserves, at March 31, 2019,
all of which was for assumed business, according to the Company's
Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2019.

The Company states, "In 2015, we sold Mt. McKinley to Clearwater
Insurance Company.  Concurrently with the closing, we entered into
a retrocession treaty with an affiliate of Clearwater.  Per the
retrocession treaty, we retroceded 100% of the liabilities
associated with certain Mt. McKinley policies, which had been
reinsured by Bermuda Re.  As consideration for entering into the
retrocession treaty, Bermuda Re transferred cash of US$140.3
million, an amount equal to the net loss reserves as of the closing
date.  Of the US$140.3 million of net loss reserves retroceded,
US$100.5 million were related to A&E business.  The maximum
liability retroceded under the retrocession treaty will be US$440.3
million, equal to the retrocession payment plus US$300.0 million.
We will retain liability for any amounts exceeding the maximum
liability retroceded under the retrocession treaty.

"Ultimate loss projections for A&E liabilities cannot be
accomplished using standard actuarial techniques.  We believe that
our A&E reserves represent management's best estimate of the
ultimate liability; however, there can be no assurance that
ultimate loss payments will not exceed such reserves, perhaps by a
significant amount.

"Industry analysts use the "survival ratio" to compare the A&E
reserves among companies with such liabilities.  The survival ratio
is typically calculated by dividing a company's current net
reserves by the three year average of annual paid losses.  Hence,
the survival ratio equals the number of years that it would take to
exhaust the current reserves if future loss payments were to
continue at historical levels.  Using this measurement, our net
three year asbestos survival ratio was 5.2 years at March 31, 2019.
These metrics can be skewed by individual large settlements
occurring in the prior three years and therefore, may not be
indicative of the timing of future payments."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/Q8R8JB


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Goins Couple Files Asbestos Suit in St. Louis
--------------------------------------------------------------
The following cases categorized as "asbestos" cases were on the
docket in the St. Louis 22nd Judicial Circuit Court on June 25:

   * Judith Goins; Otto Goins v. A O Smith Corporation; Advance
Auto Parts Inc.; Ameron International Corp.; Armstrong
International Inc.; Brand Insulations Inc; Carboline Company; Cbs
Corporation; Certainteed Corporation; Cleaver Brooks; Conwed
Corporation; Copes Vulcan Inc; Corrigan Company Mechanical
Contractors Inc.; Crane Co; Cytec Engineered Materials Inc; Dap
Inc; Eaton Corporation; Ferro Engineering; Fisher Scientific
Company LLC; Flowserve US Inc.; Fmc Corporation; Gardner Denver
Inc; General Electric Company; General Gasket Corporation; Genuine
Parts Company; Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company; Goulds Pumps LLC;
Grinnell LLC; Guard Line Inc; Gusmer Enterprises Inc; Haberberger
Incorporated Mechanieal Contractor; Hercules Inc; Honeywell
International Inc.; Imo Industries Inc.; Inductotherm Corporation;
Ingersoll Rand Company; Itt Corporation; Jp Bushnell Packing Supply
Co; Kcg Inc; Kelly Moore Paint Company Inc.; Lindberg; Meadwestvaco
Corporation; Metropolitan Life Insurance Company; Mine Safety
Appliances Company; Nooter Corporation; Novartis Corporation;
Occidental Chemical Corporation; Pfaudler Inc; Pfizer Inc;
Pharmacia Corporation; Plastics Engineering Company; Pneumo Abex
LLC; Sargent Welch; Schneider Electric USA Inc.; Scientific
Products Inc; Sunbeam Products Inc; Swindell-dressler International
Co.; The Dow Chemical Company; The William Powell Company; Trane US
Inc.; Union Carbide Corp.; Urs Corporation; VWR International LLC;
W W Grainger Inc; Welco Manufacturing Company; Western Auto Supply
Company; Wilsonart International Inc., Case No. 1922-CC10641

     Matt C Morris (plaintiff's attorney)


ASBESTOS UPDATE: H.B. Fuller Settles 2 Suits, Claims for $162K
--------------------------------------------------------------
H.B. Fuller Company reported that for the six months ended June 1,
2019, two asbestos-related lawsuits and claims were settled for
US$162,000, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period
ended June 1, 2019.

The Company states, "We have been named as a defendant in lawsuits
in which plaintiffs have alleged injury due to products containing
asbestos manufactured more than 30 years ago.  The plaintiffs
generally bring these lawsuits against multiple defendants and seek
damages (both actual and punitive) in very large amounts.  In many
cases, plaintiffs are unable to demonstrate that they have suffered
any compensable injuries or that the injuries suffered were the
result of exposure to products manufactured by us.  We are
typically dismissed as a defendant in such cases without payment.
If the plaintiff presents evidence indicating that compensable
injury occurred as a result of exposure to our products, the case
is generally settled for an amount that reflects the seriousness of
the injury, the length, intensity and character of exposure to
products containing asbestos, the number and solvency of other
defendants in the case, and the jurisdiction in which the case has
been brought.

"A significant portion of the defense costs and settlements in
asbestos-related litigation is paid by third parties, including
indemnification pursuant to the provisions of a 1976 agreement
under which we acquired a business from a third party.  Currently,
this third party is defending and paying settlement amounts, under
a reservation of rights, in most of the asbestos cases tendered to
the third party.

"In addition to the indemnification arrangements with third
parties, we have insurance policies that generally provide coverage
for asbestos liabilities, including defense costs.  Historically,
insurers have paid a significant portion of our defense costs and
settlements in asbestos-related litigation.  However, certain of
our insurers are insolvent.  We have entered into cost-sharing
agreements with our insurers that provide for the allocation of
defense costs and settlements and judgments in asbestos-related
lawsuits.  These agreements require, among other things, that we
fund a share of settlements and judgments allocable to years in
which the responsible insurer is insolvent.

"We do not believe that it would be meaningful to disclose the
aggregate number of asbestos-related lawsuits filed against us
because relatively few of these lawsuits are known to involve
exposure to asbestos-containing products that we manufactured.
Rather, we believe it is more meaningful to disclose the number of
lawsuits that are settled and result in a payment to the plaintiff.
To the extent we can reasonably estimate the amount of our
probable liabilities for pending asbestos-related claims, we
establish a financial provision and a corresponding receivable for
insurance recoveries.  

"Based on currently available information, we have concluded that
the resolution of any pending matter, including asbestos-related
litigation, individually or in the aggregate, will not have a
material adverse effect on our results of operations, financial
condition or cash flow."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/zzwNsk


ASBESTOS UPDATE: IntriCon Corp. Still Defends Lawsuits at March 31
------------------------------------------------------------------
IntriCon Corporation still faces asbestos lawsuits related to its
discontinued heat technologies segment, according to the Company's
Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2019.

IntriCon states, "The Company is a defendant along with a number of
other parties in lawsuits alleging that plaintiffs have or may have
contracted asbestos-related diseases as a result of exposure to
asbestos products or equipment containing asbestos sold by one or
more named defendants.  These lawsuits relate to the discontinued
heat technologies segment which was sold in March 2005.  Due to the
non-informative nature of the complaints, the Company does not know
whether any of the complaints state valid claims against the
Company.

"Certain insurance carriers have informed the Company that the
primary policies for the period August 1, 1970-1978 have been
exhausted and that the carriers will no longer provide defense and
insurance coverage under those policies.  However, the Company has
other primary and excess insurance policies that the Company
believes afford coverage for later years.

"Some of these other primary insurers have accepted defense and
insurance coverage for these suits, and some of them have either
ignored the Company's tender of defense of these cases, or have
denied coverage, or have accepted the tenders but asserted a
reservation of rights and/or advised the Company that they need to
investigate further.  Because settlement payments are applied to
all years a litigant was deemed to have been exposed to asbestos,
the Company believes that it will have funds available for defense
and insurance coverage under the non-exhausted primary and excess
insurance policies.

"However, unlike the older policies, the more recent policies have
deductible amounts for defense and settlements costs that the
Company will be required to pay; accordingly, the Company expects
that its litigation costs will increase in the future.  Further,
many of the policies covering later years (approximately 1984 and
thereafter) have exclusions for any asbestos products or
operations, and thus do not provide insurance coverage for
asbestos-related lawsuits.

"The Company does not believe that the asserted exhaustion of some
of the primary insurance coverage for the 1970-1978 period will
have a material adverse effect on its financial condition,
liquidity, or results of operations.  Management believes that the
number of insurance carriers involved in the defense of the suits,
and the significant number of policy years and policy limits under
which these insurance carriers are insuring the Company, make the
ultimate disposition of these lawsuits not material to the
Company's consolidated financial position or results of
operations."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/HaGI8l


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Kaanapali Land Still Defends Suits at March 31
---------------------------------------------------------------
Kaanapali Land, LLC continues to defend itself against personal
injury suits related to asbestos exposure, according to the
Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2019

The Company states, "Kaanapali Land, as successor by merger to
other entities, and D/C have been named as defendants in personal
injury actions allegedly based on exposure to asbestos.  While
there are relatively few cases that name Kaanapali Land, there were
a substantial number of cases that were pending against D/C on the
U.S. mainland (primarily in California).

"Cases against Kaanapali Land (hereafter, "Kaanapali Land asbestos
cases") are allegedly based on its prior business operations in
Hawaii and cases against D/C are allegedly based on sale of
asbestos-containing products by D/C's prior distribution business
operations primarily in California.  Each entity defending these
cases believes that it has meritorious defenses against these
actions, but can give no assurances as to the ultimate outcome of
these cases.  The defense of these cases has had a material adverse
effect on the financial condition of D/C as it has been forced to
file a voluntary petition for liquidation.

"Kaanapali Land does not believe that it has liability, directly or
indirectly, for D/C's obligations in those cases.  Kaanapali Land
does not presently believe that the cases in which it is named will
result in any material liability to Kaanapali Land; however, there
can be no assurance in that regard."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/JazFQR


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Lorry Driver Dies from Mesothelioma
----------------------------------------------------
Tom Kershaw, writing for Hull Daily Mail, reported that the family
of a Hull lorry driver who died as the result of asbestos exposure
are appealing for colleagues to contact them.

Gavin Hopper, 73, died in May 2017 following a long battle with the
asbestos-related disease mesothelioma.

It is believed Gavin had breathed in the deadly fibres while
working with MAT International LTD and visiting sites between
between 1975 and 2006.

Mr Hopper's son Christian is now hoping former colleagues can help
the family trace his father's whereabouts while on the road.

Christian said: "He would leave home on a late Sunday afternoon and
could then be away for a week or many more, especially in his
younger days, when he did long distance overseas trips too.

"He would sleep in the cab and was with his truck pretty much 24/7.
I'm sure it wasn't an easy life."

Asbestos was widely used in numerous industries until it was
finally banned in its entirety in 1999.

Much as it was in demand for its strength as a building material
and for its heat resistant properties as an effective form of
lagging for boilers, pipes and other heat producing machinery.

However, the material subsequently became notorious for the fibres
that it produced were deadly when inhaled.

Asbestos fibres have been the cause of a vast number of deaths
throughout the country.

New cases of mesothelioma are still being diagnosed due to the fact
asbestos lies dormant in the lungs for a very long period after
being inhaled, before the disease starts to take effect.

Mr Hopper's family have turned to specialist asbestos disease
solicitor James Burrell, a partner with Bridge McFarland LLP
solicitors in Hull, for help in investigating the matter further.

Mr Burrell said: "It is thought Mr Hopper came into contact with
asbestos at some of the sites that he visited with his lorry.

"In particular, Gavin spoke about regularly visiting a company in
Rochdale back in the 1980s where he thought he might have been
exposed to asbestos dust.

"He transported a wide variety of goods and material around the
country and abroad, including industrial waste and industrial
products, which we also believe probably contained asbestos in some
cases."

Mr Hopper's family are hoping that as a result of this appeal, some
of Mr Hopper's former work colleagues will be able to contact them
to talk about the working conditions at MAT during the period in
question.

If you remember working with Gavin Hopper, or worked for MAT at
anytime between 1975 and 2006, call James Burrell, on 01482 730326,
or email me at info@bmcf.co.uk


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Maryland Sues Over Building Demolition, Asbestos
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Associated Press reported that Maryland is suing the owner of a
historic Baltimore building for allegedly demolishing it and
engaging in an asbestos project without a license.

Attorney General Brian Frosh announced the lawsuit on July 2. It's
seeking civil penalties and injunctive relief from the property's
owner, 1411 Division Street, and TCG Development, which was the
demolition contractor.

The lawsuit says the Maryland Department of the Environment
received a complaint in 2018 about demolition at the property. An
MDE inspector took samples at the site and confirmed
asbestos-containing material.

The lawsuit alleges the companies failed to notify the agency of
the demolition and didn't provide workers with protective gear.

Frosh says exposure in the neighborhood has continued for more than
a year.

The property contained the St. Vincent's Infant Asylum and Carver
Hall Apartment buildings.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: National Surety Can't Recoup Settlement Costs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Law360 reported that National Surety Corp. can't make another
insurance company pay its costs for defending a former mutual
client in an asbestos-related settlement, an Illinois federal judge
ruled, saying under Ohio law, each insurance company that covered
the client is on the hook.

U.S. District Judge Sara L. Ellis ruled on dueling motions for
summary judgment, finding that Ohio law applies to the agreement
between National Surety and Bedivere Insurance Co. to cover
Resinoid Engineering Corp., because Resinoid's headquarters and
main business is in Ohio.

Resinoid was sued by Walter Ciokajlo, an Ohio man who had been
exposed to Resinoid's products.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Park-Ohio Industries Faces 87 Suits at March 31
----------------------------------------------------------------
Park-Ohio Industries, Inc. continues to face approximately 87
asbestos-related personal injury cases, according to the Company's
Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2019.

The Company states, "We were a co-defendant in approximately 87
cases asserting claims on behalf of approximately 190 plaintiffs
alleging personal injury as a result of exposure to asbestos.
These asbestos cases generally relate to production and sale of
asbestos-containing products and allege various theories of
liability, including negligence, gross negligence and strict
liability, and seek compensatory and, in some cases, punitive
damages.

"In every asbestos case in which we are named as a party, the
complaints are filed against multiple named defendants.  In
substantially all of the asbestos cases, the plaintiffs either
claim damages in excess of a specified amount, typically a minimum
amount sufficient to establish jurisdiction of the court in which
the case was filed (jurisdictional minimums generally range from
US$25,000 to US$75,000), or do not specify the monetary damages
sought.  To the extent that any specific amount of damages is
sought, the amount applies to claims against all named defendants.

"There are three asbestos cases, involving 19 plaintiffs, that
plead specified damages against named defendants.  In each of the
three cases, the plaintiff is seeking compensatory and punitive
damages based on a variety of potentially alternative causes of
action.  In two cases, the plaintiff has alleged three counts at
US$3.0 million compensatory and punitive damages each; one count at
US$3.0 million compensatory and US$1.0 million punitive damages;
one count at US$1.0 million.  In the third case, the plaintiff has
alleged compensatory and punitive damages, each in the amount of
US$20.0 million, for three separate causes of action, and US$5.0
million compensatory damages for the fifth cause of action.

"Historically, we have been dismissed from asbestos cases on the
basis that the plaintiff incorrectly sued one of our subsidiaries
or because the plaintiff failed to identify any asbestos-containing
product manufactured or sold by us or our subsidiaries.  We intend
to vigorously defend these asbestos cases, and believe we will
continue to be successful in being dismissed from such cases.
However, it is not possible to predict the ultimate outcome of
asbestos-related lawsuits, claims and proceedings due to the
unpredictable nature of personal injury litigation.  Despite this
uncertainty, and although our results of operations and cash flows
for a particular period could be adversely affected by
asbestos-related lawsuits, claims and proceedings, management
believes that the ultimate resolution of these matters will not
have a material adverse effect on our financial condition,
liquidity or results of operations.  Among the factors management
considered in reaching this conclusion were: (a) our historical
success in being dismissed from these types of lawsuits on the
bases mentioned; (b) many cases have been improperly filed against
one of our subsidiaries; (c) in many cases the plaintiffs have been
unable to establish any causal relationship to us or our products
or premises; (d) in many cases, the plaintiffs have been unable to
demonstrate that they have suffered any identifiable injury or
compensable loss at all or that any injuries that they have
incurred did in fact result from alleged exposure to asbestos; and
(e) the complaints assert claims against multiple defendants and,
in most cases, the damages alleged are not attributed to individual
defendants.  Additionally, we do not believe that the amounts
claimed in any of the asbestos cases are meaningful indicators of
our potential exposure because the amounts claimed typically bear
no relation to the extent of the plaintiff's injury, if any.

"Our cost of defending these lawsuits has not been material to date
and, based upon available information, our management does not
expect its future costs for asbestos-related lawsuits to have a
material adverse effect on our results of operations, liquidity or
financial position."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/1gz8fy


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Pastor Sues Church's Landlord Over Asbestos
------------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Johnson and Mari Payton, writing for NBC San Diego, reported
that a pastor is suing his church's landlord after he claimed
asbestos "contaminated the entire premises" and his congregation
was never informed about the potentially dangerous conditions for
nearly two decades.

Pastor Carlos Kelly said the Faith Deliverance church was located
on 70th Street in La Mesa for 18 years before he learned of the
high levels of asbestos in 2018.

"I liked it because of the accessibility -- a lot of traffic, foot
traffic," Kelly told NBC 7.

Since then, Faith Deliverance has operated out of a temporary
location five and a half miles away at the Lafayette Hotel in
University Heights.

According to the complaint, Kelly alleged the landlord "failed to
use reasonable care to repair, replace, remove the asbestos that
had inundated" the church. The suit also said the property owner
"failed to give adequate warning" to its occupants.

From 2001 to 2018, Kelly claimed the landlord "expressly and
verbally" said the church "contained only nonfriable asbestos in
some floor tiles, and that asbestos of this type is found
frequently within commercial buildings and is not considered a
health hazard."

"(The landlord) said, ‘You have nothing to worry about. It's all
fine,'" Kelly claimed.

Then, Kelly notified the California Division of Occupational Safety
and Health, which performed a survey of the building.

"They did swipes and came back again, and it was way over what was
comfortable. They said, 'You need to get out of there,'" Kelly told
NBC 7.

In addition to the possible health risks, the complaint is asking
for compensation for relocating and loss of equipment that had to
be left in the La Mesa church for safety reasons.

The equipment included an organ and audio/visual technology, which
was valued at more than $76,000.

"The cost of my equipment that's all I want," Kelly said.

The pastor said the building has since been sold, and the landowner
sold his items at auction.

NBC 7 reached out to the property owner's son, who wasn't aware of
the lawsuit and declined to comment further.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Plan for $850K Asbestos Mine Settlement Released
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Elizabeth Gribkoff, writing for VTDigger.com, reported that state
and federal officials have decided to spend an $850,000 settlement
from the former owner of the state's closed asbestos mine on road
improvement projects in Eden and Lowell.

During the 1950s, the mine at the eastern base of Belvidere
Mountain was the largest producer of chrysotile asbestos in the
U.S. Now, the defunct mine, situated at the headwaters of the
Lamoille and Missisquoi rivers, is a hazardous site with no clear
plan for long-term cleanup.

Erosion from waste rock and mine tailing piles, the two largest
total an estimated 30 million tons, polluted nearby streams and
wetlands with heavy metals and asbestos.

In 2009, the state and federal government jointly reached a
settlement with former mine owner, G-I Holdings. Representatives
from the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources and the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service opted to spend the settlement on road culverts in
Eden and a culvert and road erosion projects in Lowell.

They say, in a plan, that the projects will allow for better fish
passage and improve water quality. Under CERCLA, the federal law
that governs how the trustees can spend the settlement money, the
money cannot go toward cleaning up the mine.

Eden and Lowell had expressed concerns that the initial plan for
the money did not align with town priorities. Eden residents took
issue with most of their share being used to replace a culvert on a
seasonal, Class Four road. The Lowell selectboard wrote in a
comment letter that they wanted to see road erosion projects
funded.

Linda Elliott, a hazardous site manager with the state Department
of Environmental Conservation, said the trustees reached a
"compromise" in the final proposal for how to spend the
settlement.

The final plan reallocates funding to cover part of the cost of
replacing two culverts on Knowles Flat Road -- a priority for the
town -- with the rest of the money going to replace a culvert on
Square Road. In Lowell, the trustees decided to put $70,000 toward
road erosion control projects prioritized by the town, with the
rest going toward replacing a culvert on Irish Hill Road.

The trustees note that money from the settlement for the Square
Road and Irish Hill culvert replacement projects will result in
$300,000-$400,000 in additional federal matching funds.

"These projects are high priorities for state and federal
biologists because of the benefits they provide to fish passage,"
states the plan.

Leslie White, an Eden resident who has been active in the
settlement plan discussions, said she was in support of having more
money for roadwork on Knowles Flat Road. She still feels, however,
that the trustees could have used the remainder of the funds for
projects that would be more beneficial for residents than the
Square Road culvert replacement.

"But they were only looking at it really from the natural resources
side," she said.

The $850,000 is not the only money for remediation efforts at the
mine. The 2009 settlement also required G-I holdings to establish a
trust to fund air monitoring and security measures at the site.

And in 2013, the Vermont Attorney's General Office, along with the
EPA, reached a settlement with current mine owner Vermont Asbestos
Group.

In 1975, a group of workers bought the mine from G-I Holding's
predecessor, forming VAG, which owned the mine until it closed in
1993. In 2004, the state ANR started investigating the extent to
which mine tailings were moving off-site. They found evidence of
extensive pollution in the Hutchins Brook in Eden and Burgess
Branch in Lowell -- poor aquatic life, diminished canopy cover and
asbestos fibers and other mining metals.

VAG, now owned by Morrisville businessman Howard Manosh, was found
to be financially unable to cover the full remediation costs. The
settlement obligates VAG to pay $5,000 a year until 2023 and to try
to obtain as much as possible in insurance claims.

VAG also has to continue maintaining the temporary mitigation
structures put in place by the EPA since 2007 -- environmental
features such as water bars, diversion trenches and berms to
minimize runoff -- for a decade after the settlement.

The DEC had hoped to designate the site as a Superfund site to
provide federal cleanup money. John Schmeltzer, a hazardous site
manager for the DEC, said in an interview last fall that natural
resources damages, which is the class of settlement that the
$850,000 belongs to, are structured to go "above and beyond" a
cleanup that, in this case, never happened.

State and federal officials have estimated the cost of cleanup to
be somewhere between $129 million-$203 million.

"It's really just a small chunk of change on what the larger
environmental damage is," said Elliott, of the natural resources
settlement.

Residents of Lowell and Eden both voted against the Superfund
designation, leery of government intervention after the state
Department of Health mistakenly reported that people living near
the mine had an above-average rate of asbestos-related diseases.

Manosh has previously said he is seeking to remediate the site by
trucking the mine tailings to an as-yet unbuilt processing plant in
Groveton, New Hampshire. He could not immediately be reached for
further comment Monday afternoon on his long-term plan for the
site.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: ProSight Global Has $4.4MM A&E Losses at Dec. 31
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ProSight Global, Inc. has net losses of US$4,402,000 for asbestos
and environmental related matters as of December 31, 2018,
according to the Company's Form S-1 filed with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission on June 28, 2019.

ProSight Global states, "The Company participated in an insurance
pool in both the issuance of umbrella casualty insurance and ocean
marine liability insurance during the period from 1978 to 1996.
Depending on the underwriting year, the insurance pools' net
retention per occurrence after applicable reinsurance ranged from
US$250,000 to US$2,000,000.  The Company's effective pool
participation on such risks varied from 11% in 1978 to 59% in 1985,
which exposed the Company to asbestos losses.  Subsequent to this
period, the pools substantially reduced their umbrella writings and
coverage was provided to smaller insureds.  In addition, ocean
marine and non-marine policies issued during the past three years
provide coverage for certain environmental risks.

"Additionally, the Company has assumed asbestos and environmental
reserves on a retroactive basis from prior members of the pool.
The liability related to the same was US$8.7 million and US$9.1
million as of December 31, 2018 and December 31, 2017
respectively.

"The Company believes that the uncertainty surrounding asbestos and
environmental exposures, including issues as to insureds'
liabilities, ascertainment of loss date, definitions of occurrence,
scope of coverage, policy limits and application and interpretation
of policy terms, including exclusions, all affect the estimation of
ultimate losses.  Under such circumstances, it is difficult to
determine the ultimate loss for asbestos and environmental-related
claims.  Given the uncertainty in this area, losses from asbestos
and environmental-related claims may develop adversely and
accordingly, management is unable to estimate the range of possible
loss that could arise from asbestos and environmental-related
claims.  However, the Company's net unpaid reserves for loss and
loss adjustment expenses, in the aggregate, as of December 31,
2018, represent management's best estimate."

A full-text copy of the Form S-1 is available at
https://is.gd/wrCHsk



ASBESTOS UPDATE: Resolute Forest Defends Lawsuits at March 31
-------------------------------------------------------------
Resolute Forest Products Inc. said in its Form 10-Q filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period
ended March 31, 2019, that it is involved in a number of
asbestos-related lawsuits filed primarily in U.S. state courts,
including certain cases involving multiple defendants.  

The Company states, "These lawsuits principally allege direct or
indirect personal injury or death resulting from exposure to
asbestos-containing premises.  While we dispute the plaintiffs'
allegations and intend to vigorously defend these claims, the
ultimate resolution of these matters cannot be determined at this
time.  These lawsuits frequently involve claims for unspecified
compensatory and punitive damages, and we are unable to reasonably
estimate a range of possible losses.  However, unfavorable rulings,
judgments or settlement terms could materially impact our
Consolidated Financial Statements.  Certain cases, including cases
that were scheduled in March 2019, were settled without any
material impact in our Consolidated Statement of Operations for the
three months ended March 31, 2019."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/sPZIAf


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Rexnord Corp. Still Defends Stearns PI Lawsuits
----------------------------------------------------------------
Rexnord Corporation continues to face multiple lawsuits relating to
personal injuries due to the alleged presence of asbestos in
certain products by the Company's Stearns division, according to
the Company's Form 10-K filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission for the fiscal year ended March 31, 2019.

The Company states, "Multiple lawsuits (with approximately 300
claimants) are pending in state or federal court in numerous
jurisdictions relating to alleged personal injuries due to the
alleged presence of asbestos in certain brakes and clutches
previously manufactured by the Company's Stearns division and/or
its predecessor owners.  Invensys and FMC, prior owners of the
Stearns business, have paid 100% of the costs to date related to
the Stearns lawsuits.

"In connection with its sale, Invensys plc ("Invensys") provided
the Company with indemnification against certain contingent
liabilities, including certain pre-closing environmental
liabilities.  The Company believes that, pursuant to such indemnity
obligations, Invensys is obligated to defend and indemnify the
Company with respect to the matters relating to the Ellsworth
Industrial Park Site and to various asbestos claims.  The indemnity
obligations relating to the matters are subject, together with
indemnity obligations relating to other matters, to an overall
dollar cap equal to the purchase price, which is an amount in
excess of US$900 million."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://is.gd/ezkLmk


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Sheffield Man Dies of Mesothelioma
---------------------------------------------------
Sarah Marshall, writing for The South Yorkshire Times, reported
that Roger Staniforth, of Wincobank, died in August last year aged
77 after being diagnosed with mesothelioma -- a cancer of the
lining of the lungs most commonly associated with being exposed to
asbestos decades prior to diagnosis.

His wife Jacqueline, son Richard and daughter Helen have instructed
specialist lawyers at Irwin Mitchell to help investigate how Roger
came into contact with the substance.

Jacqueline said: "Roger was diagnosed with mesothelioma about 13
months before he passed away and it was so upsetting to see him
suffer the way he did.

"He was a loving husband, father and grandfather. We all miss him
so much.

"Towards the end of his life, Roger found it extremely difficult to
enjoy the activities he used to, such as travelling to his holiday
caravan in Skegness and spending time at family occasions with his
children and grandchildren. All we want now is to seek some justice
for him and find out exactly how he developed this disease.

"We would be grateful to hear from anyone that may have any
information about Roger's work at the Co-operative Garage, no
matter how small, that could help us with our investigation."

Simone Hardy, specialist asbestos-related disease lawyer at Irwin
Mitchell's Sheffield office, said: "In my work I see so many
families devastated by the effects of asbestos exposure.

"We are determined to seek justice for Roger and his family by
helping them discover where and how he was exposed to the harmful
substance which ultimately led to him developing mesothelioma, a
cancer of the lung lining with limited curative treatment."

Roger was a mechanic working on the Co-op milk floats and delivery
vehicles, and he believed he may have come into contact with
asbestos dust and fibres when changing the brake linings on the
vehicles.

Anyone with information that could assist with the case should
email simone.hardy@IrwinMitchell.com or call 0114 274 4420.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: States Sue EPA for Tougher Asbestos Regulation
---------------------------------------------------------------
Rebecca Beitsch, writing for The Hill, reported that 11 Democratic
attorneys general from across the country have filed suit against
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), arguing the agency has
failed to effectively regulate asbestos.

The agency announced a rule in April to restrict the substance but
stopped short of banning it outright, a move critics say could open
the door to new uses of asbestos.

"It is widely acknowledged that asbestos is one of the most harmful
and toxic chemicals known to humankind," California Attorney
General Xavier Becerra said in a release about the lawsuit. "While
it's troubling that we must once again take the EPA to court to
force the agency to do its job, we won't pull any punches. There's
too much at stake to let the EPA ignore the danger that deadly
asbestos poses to our communities."

The attorneys general had previously petitioned the EPA to create a
new rule requiring data collection on the importation and use of
asbestos, something the agency denied around the time in unveiled
its new rule. The suit would force the agency to issue a new
asbestos reporting rule.

Officials have known for decades that asbestos causes illnesses
including lung cancer, mesothelioma and asbestosis. The EPA's April
rule was the first action the agency took on the substance in 30
years, but it was panned by critics as a half measure that could
reintroduce some asbestos products to the market.

"This new rule makes it more difficult for industry to resume some
abandoned uses of asbestos, but that is a half step at best,"
Melanie Benesh, legislative attorney at the Environmental Working
Group, wrote in a press release at the time. An outright ban "is
the only way the public can trust industry will never again be able
to use this dangerous material that has literally killed tens of
thousands of Americans."

The EPA has not ruled out an asbestos ban under its new rule.

"If there is any unreasonable risk, the EPA will regulate, and our
regulation could take the form of a ban," Alexandra Dapolito Dunn,
assistant administrator of the EPA's Office of Chemical Safety and
Pollution Prevention told The Hill in April.

But many Democrats say they've lost patience with the agency,
expressing concern that agency scientists who recommended a full
ban were ignored by top EPA officials. In May, House Democrats held
a hearing on a bill that would force the agency to do so.

In addition to California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oregon, Washington and the
District of Columbia are parties in the suit.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Union Raises Concern Over NYC Asbestos Removal
---------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Gartland, writing for New York Daily News, reported that
unionized asbestos workers want to know why a developer hired
non-union workers at a city-owned affordable housing project and
why the city agency in charge did not require the hiring of
better-trained workers to remove asbestos.

Members of Asbestos, Lead and Hazardous Waste Laborers' Local 78
have protested for more than a week outside the city Housing
Preservation and Development headquarters over its selection of
politically connected Dunn Development to convert a former
tuberculosis hospital into affordable housing and the selection of
a non-union company to handle asbestos removal there.

The city awarded the site, in the so-called T-building at Queens
Hospital in Jamaica Hills, to Dunn as part of a 99-year lease with
the city Health and Hospitals Corporation. The subcontractor tasked
with asbestos removal for the job is Westchester-based Plains
Environmental.

"This is a dangerous job," said union organizer Carlos Castano.
"You need a responsible contractor to do this."

He and others from Local 78 maintain Plains is not up to the task
because its workers aren't required to get the same training as
people in the union. Non-union workers are not required to be
trained in removing asbestos in confined spaces, using scaffolding
or administering CPR.

Plains to did not respond to requests for comment.

City HPD spokeswoman Juliet Pierre-Antoine said the company is on
the state's approved list of asbestos contractors.

"HPD carefully monitors projects to ensure the health and safety of
workers on sites where we finance the construction of affordable
housing," she said. "Once this particular project is underway, HPD
will vigorously monitor the construction activity and contractor's
performance."

The city has struggled to find a balance between using union labor
and creating housing that is truly affordable, which is much easier
to accomplish when labor costs are low.

"It costs money to this the right way," Castaño said. "It costs a
lot of money."

Union workers also pointed to campaign contributions made by the
company overseeing the work at Queens Hospital, saying they are
concerned that Dunn's ties to Mayor de Blasio have paved the way
for the company to cut costs by using a non-union contractor.

Martin Dunn, Dunn Development's president, has given generously to
politicians over the years. Since 2002, he has donated more than
$85,000 to political campaigns, with $26,000 of that going to Gov.
Cuomo, $400 going to Mayor de Blasio and $10,000 to the Putnam
County Democratic Committee as Democrats tried to take control of
the Senate.

Those efforts came under the scrutiny of Manhattan District
Attorney Cyrus Vance and then-Manhattan U.S. Attorney Preet
Bharara, who probed possible quid pro quos between de Blasio and
donors. Mayor de Blasio was working behind the scenes at the time
to raise money for Democrats aspiring to gain seats in the Senate.

Bharara found that some of his practices appeared to "violate the
intent and spirit" of the law, but he did not bring charges against
the mayor.

Vance also did not bring charges. The probes do not appear to have
focused specifically on Dunn but on the de Blasio campaign finance
operation in general. At the time of the probes, Dunn told the
Daily News that he had not been contacted by investigators.

Dunn's spokesman James Yolles brushed aside the union's criticism.

"We're happy to let New Yorkers decide whether a project that will
provide 200 units of affordable housing including 75 supportive
housing units, a community center, the restoration of an historic
building, more than 600 construction jobs and significant
contracting opportunities for MWBE firms -- including for asbestos
removal -- is deserving of protest," he said. MWBE refers to
minority- and women-owned businesses.

A spokeswoman for Mayor de Blasio said Dunn's political
contributions did not factor into the company's hiring.

"This was a competitive bidding process, and the best applicant was
chosen," said spokeswoman Jane Meyer. "Donations have never, and
will never, factor into that equation."


ASBESTOS UPDATE: WR Grace Had $80.7MM Libby Costs at March 31
-------------------------------------------------------------
W. R. Grace & Co. had total estimated liability of US$80.7 million
at March 31, 2019, for response costs related to a vermiculite mine
in Libby, Montana, as well as at vermiculite processing sites
outside of Libby, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended March 31, 2019.

The Company states, "Grace purchased a vermiculite mine in Libby,
Montana, in 1963 and operated it until 1990.  Vermiculite
concentrate from the Libby mine was used in the manufacture of
attic insulation and other products.  Some of the vermiculite ore
contained naturally occurring asbestos.

"Grace is engaged with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(the "EPA") and other federal, state, and local governmental
agencies in a remedial investigation and feasibility study
("RI/FS") of the Libby mine and the surrounding area, known as
Operable Unit 3 ("OU3").  The RI/FS will determine the specific
areas within OU3 requiring remediation and will identify possible
remedial action alternatives.  Possible remedial actions within OU3
are wide-ranging, from institutional controls such as land use
restrictions, to more active measures involving soil removal,
containment projects, or other protective measures.

"As part of the RI/FS process, Grace contracted an engineering and
consulting firm to develop a range of possible remedial
alternatives and associated cost estimates for OU3.  Based on this
work, Grace recorded a pre-tax charge of US$70.0 million in the
2018 third quarter for the estimated costs of remediation of OU3.
Grace believes that this amount should provide for a protective
remedy meeting the statutory requirements of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act.

"The estimated costs of remediation are preliminary and consist of
several components, each of which may vary significantly as the
remedial alternatives are further developed.  It is reasonably
possible that the ultimate costs of remediation could range between
US$30 million and US$170 million.  Grace is working closely with
the EPA, and the ultimate remedy will be determined by the EPA
after the RI/FS is finalized.  Such remedy will be set forth in a
Record of Decision ("ROD") that is expected to be issued by the EPA
during 2021.  Costs associated with the more active remedial
alternatives would be expected to be incurred over a decade or
more.  Grace will reevaluate its estimated liability as remedial
alternatives evolve based on further work by the engineering and
consulting firm and discussions with the EPA as the RI/FS process
moves toward a ROD.  Depending on the remedial alternatives that
the EPA selects in the ROD, the total cost of remediating OU3 may
exceed Grace's current estimate by material amounts.

"The EPA is also investigating or remediating formerly owned or
operated sites that processed Libby vermiculite into finished
products.  Grace is cooperating with the EPA on these investigation
and remediation activities and has recorded a liability to the
extent that its review has indicated that a probable liability has
been incurred and the cost is estimable.  These liabilities cover
the estimated cost of investigations and, to the extent an
assessment has indicated that remediation is necessary, the
estimated cost of response actions.  Response actions typically
involve soil excavation and removal, and replacement with clean
fill.  The EPA may commence additional investigations in the future
at other sites that processed Libby vermiculite, but Grace does not
believe, based on its knowledge of prior and current operations and
site conditions, that liability for remediation at such other sites
is probable.

"Grace's total estimated liability for response costs that are
currently estimable for OU3 and vermiculite processing sites
outside of Libby at March 31, 2019, and December 31, 2018, was
US$80.7 million and US$81.7 million, respectively.  It is possible
that Grace's ultimate liability for these vermiculite-related
matters will exceed current estimates by material amounts."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/wr9ciP



                            *********

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