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              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Friday, July 12, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 139

                            Headlines

ACA CONTRACTING: Munoz Sues Over Unpaid Compensations
AFSCME CALIFORNIA: Court OKs Partial Dismissal in Hernandez
AHMED VENTURES: Guerra Sues Over TCPA Violation
AMERICAN MEDICAL: Mendell Sues Over Unauthorized Recordings
APPLE INC: No Class Certification in Defective Touchscreen Suit

ARRAY BIOPHARMA: Noel Sues Over Securities Exchange Act Breach
BAKER TECHNOLOGIES: Komaiko Sues Over TCPA Violation
BANK OF AMERICA: Rodriguez Asserts Breach of FCRA
BARCLAYS PLC: Second Circuit Appeal Filed in Sullivan Class Suit
BARRY DILLER: Teamsters Sues Over Violated of Fiduciary Duties

BEAZER HOMES: July 15 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
BPI SPORTS LLC: Maroney Sues Over Defective Dietary Supplement
BRISTOL COMPRESSORS: Court Certifies Class in Messer WARN Act Suit
BUCKEYE PARTNERS: Ingalis Sues Over Securities Exchange Act Breach
BUCKEYE PARTNERS: McManus Sues Over Exchange Act Violation

CAGLE STUCCO: Rivera Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
CALIFORNIA TEACHERS: Ninth Circuit Appeal Initiated in Babb Suit
CARING FOR MONTANANS: Depot Inc.'s ERISA Suit Goes to Fed. Court
CELLCO PARTNERSHIP: Katz Files Petition for Writ of Certiorari
CLARK & GENTRY: Avrahami Files RICO Class Suit in Arizona

COSTCO WHOLESALE: Korolshteyn Files Appeal in Suit
COVANCE INC: Mitchell Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Compensations
EASTERN ACCOUNT: Welsh Files FDCPA Class Suit in New Jersey
EMPOWER HEALTHCARE: King Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
ESPARZA ENTERPRISES: Ramirez Sues Over Unpaid Wages

FARMERS RESTAURANT: Court Grants Final Approval of $1.4MM Deal
FEDEX CORPORATION: Rhode Island Sues Over Exchange Act Breach
FEDEX GROUND: Ct. Further Amends Chapman Scheduling Pretrial Order
FELIPE'S PIZZA: Martinez Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Compensation
FIDELITY TAX: Newman Sues Over Abusive Telemarketing Practices

FIRST NATIONAL: Miller Suit Alleges FDCPA Violation
FLUOR CORPORATION: Court Denies Dissemination of Original Notice
GENE BY GENE: Court Denies Limiting Potential Damages Bid in Cole
GEORGIA: Gonzalez Files Civil Rights Suit v. S. Moore
GRIMMWAY ENTERPRISES: Jimenez Files Class Suit in California

HILL'S PET: Boggio Files Product Liability Suit in Kansas
IMPERIAL FIRE: Carvajal Files Class Suit in Florida
INDEPENDENT MEDIA: Production Staff in Netflix Film Seek OT Pay
INFOGROUP INC: Schultz Sues Over TCPA Violation
INTEGRITY SERVICE: Moyer Sues Over Overtime Wages

ISLANDWIDE: Mikoda Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Compensation
J&W GRADING: Court Narrows Claims in M. Brown FLSA Suit
J.F. SANTOS BAKERY: Pacheco Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Compensation
JANSSEN BIOTECH: Self-Insured Schools Sues Over Unlawful Scheme
KIK INTERNATIONAL: McNeil Suit Removed to C.D. California

KULE LLC: Conner Alleges Violation under Disabilities Act
LEAVITT FAMILY: Persson Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Compensation
LOUISIANA: Court Narrows Documents Production in DWCC Inmates' Suit
MADISON COUNTY, TN: Grayson Sues Over Unpaid Compensations
MDL 2741: Rogers v. Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated

MDL 2850: Court Narrows Claims in No-Poach Antitrust Suit
MIDLAND FUNDING: Roth Sues Over FDCPA Violation
MILO INC: Court OKs FLSA Settlement in Paredes
NAPLES RESTAURANT: Lopez Sues Over Unpaid Compensations
NEW INDIAN: Court OKs Settlement in Morales FLSA Suit

NEW YORK: 2nd Cir. Appeal v. Gomez Filed in Gulino Racial Bias Suit
NEW YORK: Second Circuit Appeal v. Negron Filed in Gulino Suit
NISSAN NORTH: Answer to CCAC Reply Opposition Due July 15
OMNICARE INC: Hager Sues Over Unpaid Compensations
PDR NETWORK: Supreme Court Remands Chiropractors' Suit

PPG INDUSTRIES: Smith Sues Over Underpayment of Overtime
RCI HOSPITALITY: Grossman Sues Over Exchange Act Violation
RED & BROWN TRUCKING: Lee Labor Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Premium
RED PANDA: Karaisaridis Sues Over Unpaid Compensations
RUSKIN COMPANY: Reyes Suit Removed to C.D. California

S1 SECURITY: Mckay-Taylor Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
SPA NAIL 9: Li Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
SQUARE INC: Ruark Sues Over Negligent Approach To Medical Billing
SRA ASSOCIATES: Kinning Sues Over FDCPA Violation
ST. LOUIS, MO: Seeks 8th Circuit Review of Ruling in Ahmad Suit

STATE FARM: Court Dismisses L. Relf Insurance Suit
STATE FARM: Court Grants Dismissal Bid in A. Queen Suit
STONEMOR PARTNERS: 3rd Cir. Court Affirms Dismissal in P. Fan Suit
SYNERGETIC COMMUNICATION: Reeves Sues Over FDCPA Violation
TERRASMART LLC: Lake Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Compensation

TIBI LLC: Conner Alleges Violation under Disabilities Act
TIGER NATURAL: $3.7MM Fishman Settlement Has Final Court Approval
TRANSAMERICA CORP: Marshall Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS: Gray Sues Over Debt Collection Practices
TUMBLEWEED: Delamora Files Fraud Class Suit in California

UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Court Narrows Claims in Diva's UCL Suit
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Seeks 9th Cir. Review of Order in Congdon Suit
UNITED HEALTHCARE: Strickland Sues Over ERISA Violation
UNIVERSAL FIDELITY: Kucur Asserts Breach of FDCPA
USA: Vita Nuova Inc Files Class Suit in Texas

VHS OF MICHIGAN: Appeal From Cir. Court Order Filed in Brown Suit
VHS OF MICHIGAN: Seeks Review of Cir. Court Order in Brown Suit
VILLARREAL DRYWALL: Mejia Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Compensation
WAG LABS INC: Meli Sues Over Deceptive and Misleading Statements
WALGREENS BOOTS: Illinois Ct. Affirms Dismissal of McIntosh Suit

WASHINGTON: Guerin Files Petition for Cert. in Fowler Class Suit
WILCO LIFE: V. Anderson Suit Remanded to Georgia State Court

                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: 191 Cases vs. CECO Still Pending at March 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: 2 Asbestos Cases Filed in St. Louis on June 20
ASBESTOS UPDATE: 2 Asbestos Cases Filed in St. Louis on June 21
ASBESTOS UPDATE: 3 Asbestos Cases Filed in St. Louis on June 19
ASBESTOS UPDATE: 3 Cases Filed in St. Louis Court on June 18

ASBESTOS UPDATE: 5 Asbestos Cases Filed in St. Louis Ct. on June 14
ASBESTOS UPDATE: 6,214 Bendix Claims Still Pending at March 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: AG Charges Hotel Owner Over Asbestos Removal
ASBESTOS UPDATE: American Optical Had 46,400 Claims at March 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Argo Group Had $44.9MM A&E Reserves at March 31

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Cal. App. Orders Retrial in Friedman Suit
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Colfax Had $58.6MM Accrued Liability at March 29
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Conrail Loses Appeal of $2.3MM Award to Smoker
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Curtiss-Wright Still Defends Suits at March 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Duke Energy Carolinas Had 196 Claims at March 31

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Duke Energy Carolinas Has $617MM Liabilities
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Emerson Electric Had $328MM Liability at March 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Ferraro Law Firm Lans $70MM Verdict vs. Nabi
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Former Electrician Sues PLENCO, Others
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Garrett Motion Paid $38MM to Honeywell in 1Q 2019

ASBESTOS UPDATE: GMS Inc. Still Faces 31 PI Suits at April 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Harsco Corp. Had 17,127 PI Suits at March 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Insurers Lose Bid to Lift Stay in J&J Talc Ch. 11
ASBESTOS UPDATE: J&J Knew of Carcinogenic Asbestos in Baby Powder
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Maremont's Asbestos Trust Gains Final Court OK

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Metropolitan Life Had 843 New Claims in 1Q 2019
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Pfizer Still Faces Various Lawsuits at March 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Scotts Miracle-Gro Still Faces Suits at March 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Tenneco Has At Most 500 Cases in US, 50 in Europe
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Univar Defends Less Than 105 Claims at March 31

ASBESTOS UPDATE: US Auto Parts Units Still Defend Suits at March 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Workers Sue San Diego for Asbestos Exposure


                            *********

ACA CONTRACTING: Munoz Sues Over Unpaid Compensations
-----------------------------------------------------
JOSEPH MUNOZ, MATTHEW MUSTAKAS, DOMINICK RUVOLO, and TIFFANY
OUMANO-WILLIAMS, on behalf of themselves and all others persons
similarly situated Plaintiffs v. ACA CONTRACTING INC., DIANA
AMOROSO, individually and MICHAEL AMOROSO, individually,
Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-03824 (E.D. N.Y., July 1, 2019) is a
lawsuit seeking recovery against Defendants for Defendants'
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended (the "FLSA"),
and the New York Labor Law, and the supporting New York State
Department of Labor regulations (collectively, "NYLL"), and allege
that they and all others who elect to opt into this action pursuant
to the collective action provision, are entitled to recover from
Defendants: unpaid wages for work performed for which they received
no compensation at all; unpaid wages for overtime work for which
they did not receive overtime premium pay; liquidated damages;
statutory penalties; and attorneys' fees and costs.

The Defendants intentionally, willfully and repeatedly engaged in a
pattern, practice and/or policy of violating the FLSA and NYLL with
respect to Plaintiffs and others similarly situated. This policy
and pattern or practice includes but is not limited to: willfully
failing to pay Plaintiffs and others similarly situated, overtime
wages for certain hours that they worked in excess of 40 hours per
workweek; and willfully failing to accurately record all of the
time Plaintiffs and others similarly situated have worked for the
benefit of Defendants. The Defendants' unlawful conduct has been
widespread, repeated, and Consistent, says the complaint.

Plaintiffs worked for Defendants as foremen providing construction
services on these contracts for Defendants' clients.

Defendants operate a contracting company out of Deer Park, New York
in Suffolk County.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Alexander Granovsky, Esq.
     Granovsky & Sundaresh PLLC
     48 Wall Street
     New York, NY 10005
     Phone: 646-524-6001
     Email: ag@g-s-law.com


AFSCME CALIFORNIA: Court OKs Partial Dismissal in Hernandez
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued a Memorandum and Order granting Union Defendants'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in the case captioned LILIANA
HERNANDEZ, MIRANDA ALEXANDER, NATASHA JOFFE, MARIA ISABEL HOLTROP,
MARCO FEKRAT, EMIN GHARIBIAN, ROHIT SHARMA, HECTOR ARROYO, and
TIMOTHY PORTER, on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. AFSCME CALIFORNIA; AMERICAN FEDERATION OF
STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES; AFSCME LOCAL 3299, AFSCME
LOCAL 2620, and AFSCME LOCAL 3634, as individual defendants and as
representatives of the class of all chapters and affiliates of the
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees;
XAVIER BECERRA, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the
State of California; ADRIA JENKINS-JONES, in her official capacity
as Acting Director of the California Department of Human Resources;
RALPH DIAZ, in his official capacity as Acting Secretary of the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation; BETTY YEE,
in her official capacity as State Controller of California; PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION SERVICES CORPORATION; LOS ANGELES COUNTY
METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, Defendants. No. 2:18-cv-2419
WBS EFB. (E.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiffs are employees of the state of California who reside
throughout the state, and an AFSCME affiliate represents each
plaintiff as their exclusive collective bargaining representative.

The Plaintiffs allege that these defendants have unconstitutionally
compelled payments from plaintiffs to the union defendants and that
they have not allowed public employees to resign their union
membership.

Plaintiffs' Refund Claim

The Plaintiffs' complaint alleges, inter alia, that the plaintiffs
and putative class members are entitled to a full refund of all
agency fees, or the equivalent amount in union dues, paid to the
union defendants before Janus.  

The Plaintiffs bring their claim for refund under 42 U.S.C. Section
1983. Because the defendants do not contest that they were acting
under the color of state law, the court assumes for the purposes of
this order that they were.

However, the union defendants argue that that they are not liable
because they relied in good faith on existing law that authorized
the collection of agency fees. At the hearing on this motion,
plaintiffs' counsel agreed in part, conceding that the union
defendants' good-faith reliance bars any legal claim for damages.
This court concurs. The Ninth Circuit has held that private parties
may be entitled to a good-faith defense to a claim under Section
1983 where they did their best follow the law and had no reason to
suspect that there would be a constitutional challenge to [their]
actions.

In the agency fees context, not only did unions have authorization
under state statute, but the practice of collecting agency fees in
this manner had been upheld for decades as constitutional by the
United States Supreme Court.  

Faced with this good-faith defense, the plaintiffs seek to avoid it
by characterizing their demand for a refund as an equitable claim
for restitution rather than a legal claim for damages.They argue
that defenses like qualified immunity and good faith are
categorically inapplicable to claims for equitable relief. Even if
this distinction is well taken, plaintiffs' refund claim fails for
two independent reasons.

First, the plaintiffs cannot simply plead around defenses by
labeling the proposed remedy as equitable rather than legal.
Instead, this court must look to the substance of the remedy sought
rather than the label placed on that remedy. It is uncontroverted
that plaintiffs' claim seeks payment out of the general assets of
the union defendants. And the Supreme Court has stressed that
recovering money out of a defendant's general assets, as opposed to
a segregated fund, is a legal remedy, not an equitable one.

The Plaintiffs do not allege that the union defendants
intentionally comingled agency fees with general funds to avoid
claims for restitution. Further, unions dissipated any agency fees
on non-traceable items. Plaintiffs' theory under Janus depends on
the fact that the fees and dues collected were expended for
expressive activities with which they disagreed.  Accordingly,
because plaintiffs' proposed remedy is legal in nature, the union
defendants' good faith bars relief.

Second, the court would reach the same conclusion in a suit in
equity. The essence of equity jurisdiction is that federal courts
have the flexibility to mould each decree to the necessities of the
particular case. Even in constitutional adjudication, equitable
remedies are a special blend of what is necessary, what is fair,
and what is workable. Given these considerations, it is well
established that reliance interests weigh heavily in the shaping of
an appropriate equitable remedy.

Accordingly, the court will dismiss the plaintiffs' claim for a
refund in the amount of agency fees paid prior to Janus.

Plaintiff Timothy Porter's Claims

Under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, the judicial power is
limited to Cases and Controversies. That a plaintiff must have
standing to sue is rooted in the traditional understanding of a
case or controversy. To have Article III standing, a plaintiff must
have an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be
redressed by a favorable judicial decision. An injury for the
purposes of Article III must be concrete, particularized, and
actual or imminent. For an injury to be concrete and
particularized, it must cause real harm that affects the plaintiff
in a personal and individual way.  

Porter argues that he has standing to seek declaratory and
injunctive relief because the challenged provisions of the
California Government Code prevent him from instructing his
employer to terminate payroll deductions. This alleged harm by
itself is insufficient to confer standing. Even if Porter has a
right to instruct his employer to terminate payroll deductions,
Porter would not satisfy Article III's injury-in-fact requirement
with an injury divorced from any concrete harm. Although Porter may
not want to submit a request to terminate payroll deductions to his
union, it is difficult to imagine how submitting this request,
without more, would cause Porter harm to any of his real interests.
While the Supreme Court in Spokeo stated that intangible injuries
can nevertheless be concrete, Porter fails to sufficiently allege
why this requirement independently exacts any harm to his First
Amendment rights.

The union defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss be granted in
part.

The Plaintiffs' claims against AFSCME International are dismissed
with prejudice.

The Plaintiffs' claim for the refund of agency fees, or the
equivalent portion in union dues, paid prior to Janus is dismissed
with prejudice.  Plaintiff Timothy Porter's claims for declaratory
and injunctive relief are dismissed for lack of standing.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 20, 2019 Memorandum
and Order is available at  https://tinyurl.com/y4vcz26g from
Leagle.com.

Liliana Hernandez, Miranda Alexander, Natasha Joffe & Rohit Sherma,
Plaintiffs, represented by Bradley A. Benbrook --
brad@benbrooklawgroup.com -- Benbrook Law Group, Jonathan F.
Mitchell, Mitchell Law, PLLC, 559 Nathan Abbott Way, Stanford, CA,
pro hac vice & Talcott J. Franklin, Talcott Franklin P.C., 1920
McKinney Ave., 7th Floor, Dallas, TX 75201pro hac vice.
Hector Arroyo, Timothy Porter, Emin Gharibian, Maria Isabel Holtrop
& Marco Fekrat, Plaintiffs, represented by Jonathan F. Mitchell,
Mitchell Law, PLLC, pro hac vice.

AFSCME Local 3299, Defendant, represented by Arthur Wei-Wei Liou --
aliou@leonardcarder.com -- Leonard Carder, LLP, Georgina Yeomans,
Bredhoff & Kaiser, PLLC, pro hac vice, John West, Bredhoff &
Kaiser, PLLC, 805 Fifteenth Street N.W. Washington, DC 20005-2207,
pro hac vice, Katherine R. Hallward -- khallward@leonardcarder.com
-- Leonard Carder, LLP & Peter Saltzman --
psaltzman@leonardcarder.com -- Leonard Carder, LLP.

Edmund G. Brown, in his official capacity of Governor of the State
of California, Xavier Becerra, in his official capacity as Attorney
General of the State of California, Mark Gregersen, Eric Banks, in
his official capacity as chair and member of the California Public
Employment Relations Board, Priscilla Winslow, in her official
capacity as chair and member of the California Public Employment
Relations Board, Erich Shiners, in his official capacity as chair
and member of the California Public Employment Relations Board,
Arthur A. Krantz, in his official capacity as chair and member of
the California Public Employment Relations Board, Betty Yee, in her
official capacity as State Controller of California, Ralph Diaz, in
his official capacity as Acting Secretary of the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation & Adria Jenkins-Jones,
Defendants, represented by Anthony Paul O'Brien, Attorney General's
Office for the State of California Department of Justice.
AFSCME Local 2620, As Representatives of the Class of all chapters
and affiliates of AFSCME California, Defendant, represented by
Andrew H. Baker -- abaker@beesontayer.com -- Beeson Tayer & Bodine,
Georgina Yeomans, Bredhoff & Kaiser, PLLC, pro hac vice & John
West, Bredhoff & Kaiser, PLLC.

American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees &
AFSCME Local 3264, Defendants, represented by John West, Bredhoff &
Kaiser, PLLC.

William D. Brice, Movant, represented by Steven R. Burlingham,
Gary, Till, Burlingham & Lynch,1380 Lead Hill Blvd., Suite 200,
Roseville, CA 95661


AHMED VENTURES: Guerra Sues Over TCPA Violation
-----------------------------------------------
MARIO GUERRA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. AHMED VENTURES, INC, d/b/a GOLDEN TOUCH
CARWASH, Defendant, Case No. 0:19-cv-61628-XXXX (S.D. Fla., June
30, 2019) is a putative class action under the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act ("TCPA") seeking injunctive relief to halt
Defendant's illegal conduct. Plaintiff also seeks statutory damages
on behalf of himself and members of the class, and any other
available legal or equitable remedies resulting from the illegal
actions of Defendant.

In efforts to drum-up business, Defendant would often send
marketing text messages providing different types of offers and
savings for future purchases without first obtaining express
written consent to send such marketing text messages as required to
do so under the TCPA. These messages were sent using mass-automated
technology through a third-party company hired by Defendant to send
marketing text messages on Defendant's behalf en masse. In sum,
Defendant knowingly and willfully violated the TCPA, causing
injuries to Plaintiff and members of the putative class, including
invasion of their privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on
seclusion, trespass, and conversion, says the complaint.

Plaintiff is a natural person who, at all times relevant to this
action, was a resident of Broward County, Florida.

Defendant is a Florida corporation, with a principal office located
at 1625 South Federal Highway, Hollywood, Florida 33020.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     JIBRAEL S. HINDI, ESQ.
     THOMAS J. PATTI, ESQ.
     The Law Offices of Jibrael S. Hindi
     110 SE 6th Street, Suite 1744
     Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
     Phone: 954-907-1136
     Fax: 855-529-9540
     Email: jibrael@jibraellaw.com
            tom@jibraellaw.com


AMERICAN MEDICAL: Mendell Sues Over Unauthorized Recordings
-----------------------------------------------------------
MICHAEL MENDELL, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN MEDICAL RESPONSE, INC., Defendant,
Case No. 3:19-cv-01227-BAS-KSC (S.D. Cal., July 1, 2019) is an
action for damages and injunctive relief against Defendant, and its
present, former, or future direct and indirect parent companies,
subsidiaries, affiliates, agents, related entities for unauthorized
recordings of conversations with Plaintiff and Class Members
without any notification nor warning to Plaintiff or Class Members
in violation of the California Invasion of Privacy Act ("CIPA").

The Defendant records all of its outbound and inbound telephonic
conversations. On or around November 12, 2018, at approximately
10:49 am, Defendant called Plaintiff on his cellular telephone.
During the telephonic conversation, Defendant's representative,
agent, or employee and Plaintiff discussed Plaintiff's personal
information including financial obligations allegedly owed to
Defendant, Plaintiff's medical insurance and Plaintiff's legal
representation. Defendant's agent was insistent, threatening, and
spoke aggressively towards Plaintiff. At the inception of the call,
Defendant did not advise Plaintiff that the call was being
recorded, and Plaintiff did not consent to the call being recorded.
Indeed, at no point did Defendant inform Plaintiff that the call
was being recorded. Nonetheless, Defendant was in fact
surreptitiously recording the entirety of the approximately
one-minute long phone conversation between Plaintiff and Defendant,
says the complaint.

Plaintiff is a natural person and residents of the State of
California, County of San Diego.

Defendant is and was a Delaware corporation with its headquarters
located in Greenwood Village, Colorado.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Yana A. Hart, Esq.
     Robert L. Hyde, Esq.
     HYDE & SWIGART, APC
     2221 Camino Del Rio South, Suite 101
     San Diego, CA 92108-3609
     Phone: (619) 233-7770
     Fax: (619) 297-1022
     Email: yana@westcoastlitigation.com
            bob@westcoastlitigation.com

          - and -

     Daniel G. Shay, Esq.
     LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL G. SHAY
     409 Camino Del Rio South, Suite 101B
     San Diego, CA 92108
     Phone: (619) 222-7429
     Fax: (866) 431-3292
     Email: danielshay@tcpafdcpa.com


APPLE INC: No Class Certification in Defective Touchscreen Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order denying Plaintiffs' Third Motion for
Class Certification in the case captioned THOMAS DAVIDSON, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. APPLE, INC., Defendant. Case No. 16-CV-04942-LHK.
(N.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiffs bring this putative class action against Defendant
Apple, Inc. (Apple) based on Apple's alleged failure to disclose an
alleged defect with the iPhone 6 and iPhone 6 Plus. According to
Plaintiffs, the iPhone 6 and 6 Plus suffer from a material
manufacturing defect that causes the touchscreen to become
unresponsive to users' touch inputs (touchscreen defect).
Plaintiffs allege that the touchscreen defect is caused by a defect
in the iPhone's external casing. Specifically, the touchscreen
function fails because the phones' external aluminum casing, whose
primary purpose is to protect the sensitive internal components
from strain, is insufficient to prevent the phones from bending
during normal use.

The Plaintiffs seek to certify the following class:

     Any person residing in Florida or Washington who purchased an
Apple iPhone 6 or iPhone 6 Plus from Apple or an Apple Authorized
Service Provider (listed on https://locate.apple.com/) that was
manufactured without underfill under the U2402 (Meson) integrated
circuit chip.

The Court denied the Plaintiffs' first motion for class
certification because the Plaintiffs' damages model failed to
satisfy Comcast, Comcast, 569 U.S. at 35., although the Court
determined that Plaintiffs met the other requirements of Rule
23(b)(3).

The sole issue at stake in the Plaintiffs' third motion for class
certification is whether the Plaintiffs' revised damages model
satisfies Comcast.

Although individual damages calculations alone do not make class
certification inappropriate under Rule 23(b)(3),  the United States
Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff bears the burden of
providing a damages model showing that damages are susceptible of
measurement across the entire class for purposes of Rule 23(b)(3).

The Deficient Damages Model in the First Boedeker Report

As set forth at length in the Procedural History, the Court denied
Plaintiffs' first motion for class certification because
Plaintiffs' damages model failed to measure only those damages
attributable to Plaintiffs' theory of liability. The Court
explained that Plaintiffs' theory of liability is that Apple failed
to disclose the touchscreen defect in the iPhone 6 and 6 Plus,
causing consumers to pay more for those products than they
otherwise would have.

To prove damages, the Plaintiffs submitted the Expert Report of
Stefan Boedeker (First Boedeker Report), which relied on a conjoint
analysis survey that Boedeker had conducted.  

However, the Plaintiffs' damages model had three fatal flaws:
Boedeker's survey (1) assumed that the touchscreen defect will
manifest in all iPhones, even though Plaintiffs contended that the
touchscreen defects manifests in approximately 5.6 percent of the
iPhone 6 Plus (after two years of use) and at a somewhat lower rate
for the iPhone 6, assumed that the touchscreen defect renders
affected iPhones inoperable, when none of the named Plaintiffs
experienced complete iPhone inoperability and (3) asked respondents
about a generic defect instead of one specifically affecting a
phone's touchscreen, and thus "necessarily assumed that respondents
would value all defects equally.

The Court stated that each of the three flaws provided an
independent basis to deny certification.  

The Court gave the Plaintiffs an opportunity to fix the identified
issues with the Plaintiffs' damages model. Thus, the Plaintiffs
filed a second motion for class certification, which relied on a
damages model premised on a hypothetical Boedeker survey. After
that second motion for class certification had been fully briefed
on December 20, 2018, and after Apple's motion to exclude the
hypothetical survey and Boedeker's supplemental declaration was
fully briefed on December 27, 2018, Plaintiffs served on Apple on
January 18, 2019 the Second Boedeker Report, which discusses a
second survey that Boedeker conducted, rather than the hypothetical
survey discussed in Plaintiffs' second motion for class
certification.  

Accordingly, the Court denied without prejudice the Plaintiffs'
second motion for class certification and instructed Plaintiffs to
file a third motion for class certification premised on the Second
Boedeker Report and Boedeker's second survey.  The Plaintiffs then
filed the instant motion.

The Second Boedeker Report Fails to Satisfy Comcast

Like the First Boedeker Report, the Second Boedeker Report analyzes
the results of a choice-based conjoint analysis study that Boedeker
conducted.  

The Plaintiffs contend that Boedeker's second survey and the Second
Boedeker Report remedy the three deficiencies that the Court
identified in Davidson III. However, the Plaintiffs have again
failed to provide a damages model that accounts for how much
consumers overpaid based on the defect, and have thus failed to
cure the first deficiency identified in Davidson III. The
Plaintiffs' theory of liability is as follows: Plaintiffs contend
Apple failed to disclose the existence of a touchscreen defect that
manifests in approximately 5.6 percent of the iPhone 6 Plus (after
two years of use) and at a somewhat lower rate for the iPhone 6.
Davidson III, 2018 WL 2325426, at *22.

Accordingly, the Court held in denying the Plaintiffs' first motion
for class certification that the Plaintiffs' damages model should
reflect how much consumers overpaid for iPhones assuming those
manifestation rates.

However, the Plaintiffs have failed to provide a damages model that
accords with the Plaintiffs' theory of liability because
Plaintiffs' damages model overstates the cost to purchasers of
addressing the touchscreen defect. This leads to elevated economic
loss calculations. The FACC acknowledges that Apple provides iPhone
purchasers a one-year warranty.  As a result, the second survey was
supposed to inform respondents that a purchaser could replace her
iPhone for free if the defect touchscreen defect manifested within
the warranty period, as follows: You are further informed that
Apple provides a one-year warranty.  

However, the actual second survey omitted that material information
about the free warranty replacement, and instead informed
respondents that the defect would always cost $149 to repair: You
are further informed that Apple offers to repair the phone for $149
when the touchscreen defect manifests on the phone you are about to
buy. In conflict with Plaintiffs' theory of liability, the second
survey informed respondents that even if the defect manifested
within the warranty period, a purchaser's only remedy was to pay
$149 for repairs.

As Boedeker admitted at his deposition, the second survey thus
failed to measure how purchasers would value a defect that could be
remedied for free within the one-year warranty period, and inflated
the economic loss calculations.  Logically, the economic harm of a
defect that can be remedied for free within one year is lower than
a defect that can only be remedied by paying $149 for repairs.
Boedeker acknowledged in his own supplemental declaration that not
disclosing the one-year warranty affected his damages calculations:
How much this additional disclosure affects class wide damages is
an empirical question. It is an empirical question that Plaintiffs'
damages model ignored.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs' damages model fails to satisfy Comcast
because the second survey did not account for Apple's one-year
warranty period and its effect on class damages.

In addition, Plaintiffs' damages model also fails to satisfy
Comcast because Plaintiffs' damages survey used the wrong
manifestation rates for the touchscreen defect. Although the
touchscreen defect manifestation rates are 0.7% for the iPhone 6
and 5.6% for the iPhone 6 Plus, Boedeker's second survey never
disclosed these percentages. Instead, Boedeker's second survey used
raw numbers and switched the numbers for the two phones.
Specifically, Boedeker's second survey asked about a defect that
manifested in approximately 2.86 million out of the 51,139,595
iPhone 6 models that were manufactured" and a defect that
manifested in approximately 125,000 out of the 17,527,727 iPhone 6
Plus models that were manufactured.

Thus, Boedeker's second survey used the wrong manifestation rates.

The Second Boedeker Report, which was served on January 18, 2019,
also does not acknowledge the manifestation rate errors in the
second survey. In fact, as Boedeker admitted at his March 2019
deposition, Boedeker never reviewed the screenshots of the second
survey as actually conducted before Boedeker signed the Second
Boedeker Report.  Thus, the Second Boedeker Report assumes that
respondents were asked about the correct manifestation rates, in
accordance with Plaintiffs' theory of liability -- but that is not
what respondents to the second survey were asked.
  
Accordingly, the Second Boedeker Report reaches economic loss
conclusions premised on a consumer survey conducted using
manifestation rates not aligned with Plaintiffs' theory of
liability. Specifically, the Second Boedeker Report projects that
the median economic loss was $412.90 for an iPhone 6 and $382.50
for an iPhone 6 Plus. Plaintiffs concede that because of the errors
in the second survey, these figures are inaccurate and useless.
This is a commonsense conclusion. If survey respondents assumed
that the risk of manifestation in the iPhone 6 was eight times
higher than Plaintiffs' theory of liability presumes, survey
respondents then overvalued the economic harm caused by the
touchscreen defect, and Boedeker's economic loss calculations are
inaccurate.
  
Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' damages model does not satisfy
Comcast's requirement that a damages model measure only those
damages attributable to the plaintiff's theory of liability.
Instead, for the iPhone 6, Plaintiffs' damages model measures the
damages attributable to a defect that is eight times more likely to
manifest than is "empirically validated, in the words of the
Plaintiffs' own expert.  

Nonetheless, the Plaintiffs contend that the second survey's
overvaluation of the iPhone 6 defect and undervaluation of the
iPhone 6 Plus defect are immaterial because Plaintiffs' damages
model generally accounts for the allegation of a risk of
manifestation. Plaintiffs effectively argue that a damages model
testing the effect of a 5.6% manifestation rate somehow measures
the damages attributable to a defect with a 0.7% manifestation
rate. However, varying manifestation rates lead to vast differences
in economic loss calculations. The Second Boedeker Report
recognizes this, as the Second Boedeker Report (using erroneous
manifestation rates) calculates that purchasers of the iPhone 6
experienced on median $30 more in economic loss than purchasers of
the iPhone 6 Plus, even though the iPhone 6 has a 0.7%
manifestation rate compared to the iPhone 6 Plus's 5.6%
manifestation rate, and the iPhone 6 costs $100 less than the
iPhone 6 Plus.  

Even though the Plaintiffs concede that the Plaintiffs need to redo
the second survey to generate economic loss figures that accord
with the Plaintiffs' theory of liability, Plaintiffs also contend
that the errors in the second survey are immaterial to class
certification because Plaintiffs need only propose a damages model
at this stage. To be sure, this Court and others have granted
motions for class certification based on proposed damages models
that measure damages in accordance with the plaintiffs' theory of
liability.  

The Plaintiffs have repeatedly failed to produce a damages model
that satisfies Comcast, despite three motions for class
certification, two completed Boedeker surveys, and one hypothetical
Boedeker survey, and despite the benefit of the many filings
identifying flaws in Plaintiffs' damages models, including the
Court's May 8, 2018 order, Apple's three oppositions to class
certification, and Apple's rebuttals to two completed Boedeker
surveys and one hypothetical Boedeker survey.

Allowing the Plaintiffs a fourth attempt to produce a Comcast
compliant damages model would be severely prejudicial to Apple.
Comcast does not require the Court or Apple to engage in an endless
cycle of flawed attempts to produce a satisfactory damages model.
Thus, because Plaintiffs have failed to present a damages model
that measures only those damages attributable to Plaintiffs' theory
of liability, class certification is not warranted.

The Court denies the Plaintiffs' third motion for class
certification.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 20, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yy9awfac from Leagle.com.

Thomas Davidson, Plaintiff, represented by David Christopher Wright
-- dcw@mccunewright.com -- McCune Wright Arevalo, LLP, Gregory F.
Coleman, Greg Coleman Law PC, Adam A. Edwards, Greg Coleman Law PC,
800 S. Gay Street, Suite 1100, Knoxville, TN 37929, pro hac vice,
Bruce Daniel Greenberg -- bgreenberg@litedepalma.com -- Lite
Depalma Greenberg LLC, pro hac vice, Joseph G. Sauder,
McCuneWright, 3287 East Guasti RoadSuite 100Ontario, CA 91761, LLP,
pro hac vice, Matthew David Schelkopf, Sauder Schelkopf,  555
Lancaster Avenue, Berwyn, PA 19312, Mitchell M. Breit --
mbreit@simmonsfirm.com -- SIMMONS HANLY CONROY, LLC, pro hac vice,
Paul J. Hanly, Jr. -- phanly@simmonsfirm.com -- Simmons Hanly Conry
LLC, pro hac vice, Rachel Lynn Soffin -- rachel@gregcolemanlaw.com
-- Morgan and Morgan, pro hac vice, Richard Christian Harlan,
Larson O'Brien LLP, Stephen Gerard Larson, Larson O'Brien LLP, 555
S. Flower St. Suite 4400. Los Angeles, CA 90071, Susana Cruz Hodge
-- scruzhodge@litedepalma.com, Lite DePalma Greenberg, LLC, pro hac
vice & Richard D. McCune, Jr., McCune Wright Arevalo, LLP,3281 E.
Guasti Road, Suite 100, Ontario, California 91761.

Apple, Inc., Defendant, represented by Arturo J. Gonzalez --
agonzalez@mofo.com -- Morrison & Foerster LLP, David Ramraj Singh
-- david.singh@weil.com -- Weil, Gotshal and Manges LLP, Alexandria
Armida Amezcua -- aamezcua@mofo.com -- Morrison & Foerster LLP,
Christopher Leonard Robinson -- christopherrobinson@mofo.com --
Morrison & Foerster LLP, David Michael Walsh, Esq. --
dwalsh@mofo.com -- Morrison & Foerster, Diane P. Sullivan --
dwalsh@mofo.com -- Weil, Gotshal and Manges LLP, pro hac vice,
Penelope Athene Preovolos -- ppreovolos@mofo.com -- Morrison &
Foerster LLP, Sabrina Larson -- slarson@mofo.com -- Morrison and
Foerster, LLP & Tiffany Cheung -- tcheung@mofo.com -- Morrison &
Foerster LLP.


ARRAY BIOPHARMA: Noel Sues Over Securities Exchange Act Breach
--------------------------------------------------------------
JACQUES NOEL, on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, v. ARRAY BIOPHARMA INC., CARRIE S. COX,
CHARLES M. BAUM, GWEN A. FYFE, KYLE A. LEFKOFF, JOHN A. ORWIN,
SHALINI SHARP, RON SQUARER, and GIL J. VAN LUNSEN, Defendants, Case
No. 1:19-cv-01925 (D. Colo., July 3, 2019) is a class action on
behalf of the public stockholders of Array BioPharma Inc. against
Array and the members of its Board of Directors for their
violations of  the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 14d-9, and to enjoin the
expiration of a tender offer on a proposed transaction, pursuant to
which Array will be acquired by Pfizer Inc. through Pfizer's wholly
owned subsidiary Arlington Acquisition Sub Inc.

On June 17, 2019, Array and Pfizer issued a joint press release
announcing they had entered into an Agreement and Plan of Merger
dated June 14, 2019 to sell Array to Pfizer. Under the terms of the
Merger Agreement, on June 28, 2019, Purchaser commenced the Tender
Offer to purchase all outstanding shares of Array for $48.00 in
cash per share of Array common stock.  The Tender Offer is
scheduled to expire at one minute after 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on
the date that is 20 business days following commencement of the
Tender Offer. The Proposed Transaction has a total enterprise value
of approximately $11.4 billion.

On June 28, 2019, defendants filed a Solicitation/Recommendation
Statement on Schedule 14D-9 with the SEC. The Recommendation
Statement, which recommends that Array stockholders tender their
shares in favor of the Proposed Transaction, omits and/or
misrepresents material information concerning, among other things:
(i) the background of the Proposed Transaction; (ii) Company
management's financial projections; and (iii) the valuation
analyses prepared by the Company's financial advisor, Centerview
Partners LLC, in connection with rendering its fairness opinion.
The failure to adequately disclose such material information
constitutes a violation of Sections 14(d), 14(e) and 20(a) of the
Exchange Act as Array stockholders need such information in order
to make a fully informed decision whether to tender their shares in
favor of the Proposed Transaction or seek appraisal.

In short, unless remedied, Array's public stockholders will be
forced to make a tender or appraisal decision on the Proposed
Transaction without full disclosure of all material information
concerning the Proposed Transaction being provided to them.
Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the expiration of the Tender Offer unless
and until such Exchange Act violations are cured, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff is the owner of Array common stock.

Array is a biopharmaceutical company focused on the discovery,
development and commercialization of targeted small molecule drugs
to treat patients afflicted with cancer.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Richard A. Acocelli, Esq.
     WEISSLAW LLP
     1500 Broadway, 16th Floor
     New York, NY 10036
     Phone: (212) 682-3025
     Fax: (212) 682-3010
     Email: racocelli@weisslawllp.com

          - and -

     Melissa A. Fortunato, Esq.
     BRAGAR EAGEL & SQUIRE, P.C.
     885 Third Avenue, Suite 3040
     New York, NY 10022
     Phone: (212) 308-5858
     Fax: (212) 486-0462
     Email: fortunato@bespc.com


BAKER TECHNOLOGIES: Komaiko Sues Over TCPA Violation
----------------------------------------------------
RICHARD KOMAIKO and MARCIE COOPERMAN, on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. BAKER TECHNOLOGIES, INC
and TILT HOLDINGS INC. Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-03795-DMR (N.D.
Cal., June 28, 2019) is an action against Defendants for their
roles in sending text messages in violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA"), and California's Unfair
Competition Law ("UCL").

Plaintiff Mr. Komaiko has received ATDS sent telemarketing texts
from Baker client dispensaries Mile High Green Cross ("Mile High")
of Denver, Colorado; Native Roots of Boulder, Colorado; and Purple
Star MD ("Purple Star") of San Francisco, California. Ms. Cooperman
has received telemarketing text messages transmitted using an ATDS
from Baker client dispensary Herban Legends of Seattle, Washington.
Baker was highly involved in those transmissions. Neither Mr.
Komaiko nor Ms. Cooperman gave valid prior express written consent
to receive such communications from any of the aforementioned
dispensaries, says the complaint.

Plaintiffs are residents of Los Angeles, California.

Baker is the leading [customer relationship management services
provider (CRM)] for the cannabis industry, helping dispensaries
grow their business and build relationships with their
customers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Peter Roldan, Esq.
     Jason Fisher, Esq.
     EMERGENT LLP
     5 Third Street, Suite 1000
     San Francisco, CA 94103
     Phone: 415/894-9284
     Fax: 415/276-8929
     Email: peter@emergent.law
            jason@emergent.law


BANK OF AMERICA: Rodriguez Asserts Breach of FCRA
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Bank of America, N.A.
The case is styled as Gloria Rodriguez, individually and on behalf
of others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Bank of America, N.A.,
Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-01236-LAB-MSB (S.D. Cal., July 3,
2019).

The case was filed pursuant to the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

The Bank of America Corporation is an American multinational
investment bank and financial services company based in Charlotte,
North Carolina, with central hubs in New York City, London, Hong
Kong, Minneapolis, and Toronto. Bank of America was formed through
NationsBank's acquisition of BankAmerica in 1998.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Yana A. Hart, Esq.
   Hyde & Swigart
   2221 Camino Del Rio South, Suite 101
   San Diego, CA 92108
   Tel: (619) 233-7770
   Fax: (619) 297-1022
   Email: yana@westcoastlitigation.com



BARCLAYS PLC: Second Circuit Appeal Filed in Sullivan Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs California State Teachers' Retirement System, FrontPoint
Australian Opportunities Trust, FrontPoint Partners Trading Fund,
L.P., Sonterra Capital Master Fund, LTD., Stephen Sullivan and
White Oak Fund LP filed an appeal from a Court ruling in their
lawsuit entitled Sullivan, et al. v. Barclays PLC, et al., Case No.
13-cv-2811, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York (New York City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit is
a class action brought by investors, who say they lost money in
derivatives transactions because big banks conspired to manipulate
Euribor, the euro interbank offered rate.

The investors first sued the banks in Illinois federal court in
February 2013, before the case was transferred to New York that
April.  The suit claims that from June 2005 to March 2011, the
banks conspired to fix Euribor, which is used to reflect the
interest rate charged on short-term loans of unsecured funds in
euros between prime banks and the wholesale money market.

The appellate case is captioned as Sullivan, et al. v. Barclays
PLC, et al., Case No. 19-1769, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants Stephen Sullivan, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, White Oak Fund LP, FrontPoint
Partners Trading Fund, L.P., FrontPoint Australian Opportunities
Trust, Sonterra Capital Master Fund, LTD. and California State
Teachers' Retirement System are represented by:

          Vincent Briganti, Esq.
          LOWEY DANNENBERG, P.C.
          44 South Broadway
          White Plains, NY 10601
          Telephone: (914) 997-0500
          E-mail: vbriganti@lowey.com

               - and -

          Christopher Lovell, Esq.
          LOVELL STEWART HALEBIAN JACOBSON, LLP
          500 5th Avenue
          New York, NY 10110
          Telephone: (212) 608-1900
          E-mail: CLovell@lshllp.com

Defendant-Appellee UBS AG is represented by:

          Eric Jonathan Stock, Esq.
          GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
          200 Park Avenue
          New York, NY 10166
          Telephone: (212) 351-2301
          E-mail: estock@gibsondunn.com

Defendant-Appellee The Royal Bank of Scotland PLC is represented
by:

          David Sapir Lesser, Esq.
          WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND DORR LLP
          7 World Trade Center
          250 Greenwich Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 230-8851
          E-mail: david.lesser@wilmerhale.com

Defendants-Appellees Credit Agricole CIB and Credit Agricole S.A.
are represented by:

          Kimberly Haviv, Esq.
          WHITE & CASE LLP
          1221 Avenue of the Americas
          New York, NY 10020
          Telephone: (212) 819-8683
          E-mail: kim.haviv@whitecase.com

Defendant-Appellee Societe Generale S.A. is represented by:

          Andrew Calica, Esq.
          MAYER BROWN LLP
          1221 Avenue of the Americas
          New York, NY 10020
          Telephone: (212) 506-2256
          E-mail: acalica@mayerbrown.com

Defendant-Appellee Cooperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen Boerenleenbank
B.A. is represented by:

          Mark D. Villaverde, Esq.
          MILBANK LLP
          55 Hudson Yards
          New York, NY 10001
          Telephone: (212) 530-5230
          E-mail: mvillaverde@milbank.com

Defendants-Appellee ICAP plc and ICAP Europe Limited are
represented by:

          Shari A. Brandt, Esq.
          RICHARDS KIBBE & ORBE LLP
          1 World Financial Center
          200 Liberty Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Telephone: (212) 530-1874
          E-mail: sbrandt@rkollp.com

Intervenor United States of America is represented by:

          Benjamin H. Torrance, Esq.
          UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR THE
          SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
          86 Chambers Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 637-2703
          Facsimile: (212) 637-2702
          E-mail: benjamin.torrance@usdoj.gov


BARRY DILLER: Teamsters Sues Over Violated of Fiduciary Duties
--------------------------------------------------------------
TEAMSTERS UNION LOCAL No. 142 PENSION FUND, on Behalf of Itself and
All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. BARRY DILLER, PETER M.
KERN, SUSAN C. ATHEY, A. GEORGE BATTLE, COURTNEE CHUN, CHELSEA
CLINTON, PAMELA L. COE, JONATHAN L. DOLGEN, CRAIG A. JACOBSON,
VICTOR KAUFMAN, DARA KHOSROWSHAHI, MARK OKERSTROM, SCOTT RUDIN,
CHRISTOPHER W. SHEAN, ALEXANDER VON FURSTENBERG, and EXPEDIA GROUP,
INC., Defendants, Case No. 2019-0494- (Chancery Ct., State of Del.,
June 26, 2019) is an action on behalf of itself and all other
similarly situated holders of Expedia Group, Inc. ("Expedia Group"
or the "Company") common stock other than Defendants, Liberty
Expedia Holdings, Inc. ("Liberty Expedia"), and their affiliates
(the "Class").

Virtually from the Company's inception, Barry Diller ("Diller") has
employed manipulative devices designed to enable him to have
significant influence over Expedia Group while having a relatively
small equity interest in the Company. Originally Granted an
irrevocable proxy over certain securities of IAC/InterActiveCorp
("IAC") (a predecessor of the Company), Diller managed to negotiate
similar devices while the Company went through various iterations
and multiple transactions. Whether or not those earlier
transactions were fair to stockholders is not at issue here.
Rather, Plaintiff challenges Diller's recent behavior to secure
direct and lasting voting control of the Company in conjunction
with the proposed business combination of Expedia Group and Liberty
Expedia (the "Merger"). At a time when Liberty Expedia wished to
relinquish its majority voting control over Expedia Group, Diller
and his conflicted counsel extracted direct voting control of
Expedia Group for Diller under the guise that such control was
contractually due to Diller. It was not.

The Merger could allow Expedia Group to become an independent
corporation without a controlling stockholder where election of
directors and decisions on fundamental corporate transactions and
other matters rest with the publicly held common shares
representing the majority of the Company's equity. Instead, Expedia
Group's board of directors (the "Expedia Group Board") has approved
a series of transactions and agreements that will entrench Diller,
who is seventy-seven years old, with voting control of the Company
essentially for life. In so doing, the Expedia Group directors have
also entrenched themselves. The virtually meaningless "equal
treatment" and "sunset" protections the directors supposedly
"negotiated" with Diller are a transparent fig leaf that cannot
cover up the naked transfer of direct voting control to Diller.
Defendants' behavior is patently unfair to Expedia Group's current
common stockholders.

Diller and the Expedia Group Board have violated their fiduciary
duties by contractually granting Diller direct voting control of
Expedia Group, while deliberately structuring the Merger and other
transactions so that the Expedia Group common stockholders get no
vote on these transactions, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Teamsters Union Local No. 142 Pension Fund is a
beneficial owner of Expedia Group common stock and has beneficially
owned shares of Expedia Group common stock at all relevant times.

Diller has been Chairman of the Expedia Group Board and Senior
Executive of Expedia Group since the completion of the Company's
spin-off from IAC on August 9, 2005. Expedia Group is one of the
world's largest online travel companies.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Eric L. Zagar, Esq.
     Michael C. Wagner, Esq.
     Christopher M. Windover, Esq.
     Grant D. Goodhart III, Esq.
     KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK LLP
     280 King of Prussia Road
     Radnor, PA 19087
     Phone: (610) 667-7706
     Facsimile: (610) 667-7056
     Email: mwagner@ktmc.com

          - and –

     Michael Hanrahan, Esq.
     Kevin H. Davenport, Esq.
     Samuel L. Closic, Esq.
     Mary S. Thomas, Esq.
     PRICKETT, JONES & ELLIOTT, P.A.
     1310 N. King Street
     Wilmington, DE 19801
     Phone: (302) 888-6500
     Email: khdavenport@prickett.com


BEAZER HOMES: July 15 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
--------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP on June 5 disclosed that a class action lawsuit has
been filed against Beazer Homes USA, Inc. ("Beazer Homes" or the
"Company") (NYSE:  BZH) and certain of its officers.   The class
action, filed in United States District Court, for the Southern
District of New York, and indexed under 19-cv-05301, is on behalf
of a class consisting of all persons and entities who purchased or
otherwise acquired Beazer Homes securities between August 1, 2014
and May 2, 2019, both dates inclusive (the "Class Period"), seeking
to recover damages caused by Defendants' violations of the federal
securities laws and to pursue remedies under Sections 10(b) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act")
and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, against the Company and
certain of its top officials.

If you are a shareholder who purchased Beazer Homes securities
during the class period, you have until July 15, 2019, to ask the
Court to appoint you as Lead Plaintiff for the class.  A copy of
the Complaint can be obtained at www.pomerantzlaw.com To discuss
this action, contact Robert S. Willoughby at
rswilloughby@pomlaw.com or 888.476.6529 (or 888.4-POMLAW),
toll-free, Ext. 9980. Those who inquire by e-mail are encouraged to
include their mailing address, telephone number, and the number of
shares purchased.

Beazer Homes designs, constructs, and sells single-family and
multi-family homes for entry-level, move-up, or retirement-oriented
home buyers under the Beazer Homes, Gatherings, and Choice Plans
names.  The Company sells its homes through commissioned new home
sales counselors and independent brokers in Arizona, California,
Nevada, Texas, Delaware, Indiana, Maryland, Tennessee, Virginia,
Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina.
             
The complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and misleading statements regarding the
Company's business, operational and compliance policies.
Defendants made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose the Registration Statement issued in connection with the
IPO was materially false and misleading and failed to disclose
material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading.  These materially false and misleading statements and
omissions remained alive and uncorrected during the Class Period.
Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose the following adverse
facts, which were known to Defendants or recklessly disregarded by
them as follows:  (i) Beazer Homes' California assets classified as
land held for future development were deteriorating in value or
improperly valuated; (ii) the foregoing created a foreseeable risk
of an eventual substantial impairment that would negatively impact
the profitability of the Company; and (iii) as a result, the
Company's public statements were materially false and misleading at
all relevant times.

On May 2, 2019, Beazer Homes issued a press release announcing its
financial and operating results for the second quarter of 2019 (the
"May 2019 Press Release").  Among other issues, Beazer Homes
announced a net loss from continuing operations of $100.8 million
for the quarter, reflecting a $147.6 million impairment on certain
California assets the Company had acquired before 2007.  According
to Defendants, all of the assets at issue were either currently or
previously classified as land held for future development.

On this news, Beazer Homes' stock price fell $1.73 per share, or
12.15%, to close at $12.51 per share on May 3, 2019.
             
With offices in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Paris, The
Pomerantz Firm --http://www.pomerantzlaw.com-- is acknowledged as
one of the premier firms in the areas of corporate, securities, and
antitrust class litigation. Founded by the late Abraham L.
Pomerantz, known as the dean of the class action bar, the Pomerantz
Firm pioneered the field of securities class actions. Today, more
than 80 years later, the Pomerantz Firm continues in the tradition
he established, fighting for the rights of the victims of
securities fraud, breaches of fiduciary duty, and corporate
misconduct. The Firm has recovered numerous multimillion-dollar
damages awards on behalf of class members. [GN]


BPI SPORTS LLC: Maroney Sues Over Defective Dietary Supplement
--------------------------------------------------------------
GREGORY MARONEY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. BPI SPORTS LLC, Defendant, Case No.
7:19-cv-06107 (S.D. N.Y., June 28, 2019) is a class action lawsuit
against BPI for selling a defective dietary supplement product,
Best BCAA ("Best BCAA" or the "Product"), which purports to build
"lean muscle" by way of increased protein synthesis, but actually,
based on independent, peer reviewed research, decreases muscle
protein synthesis and is wholly incapable of causing an increase in
muscle mass.

Dr. Robert Wolfe, a renowned and highly-respected authority in the
area of amino acid metabolism, concludes that consumption of BCAA
supplements actually negatively impacts muscle protein synthesis
due to lack of all essential amino acids ("EAA"), which causes EAAs
stored in the muscle to be catabolized, thereby perpetuating a
catabolic state of muscle protein breakdown. To build muscle, the
body must have an abundant availability of all EAAs, which must be
consumed through the diet. Anything less than a full panel of EAAs
will grind protein synthesis to a halt due to lack of sufficient
raw materials with which the body can use to build muscle mass.
Despite the findings of Dr. Wolfe and other scholars, BPI continues
to misrepresent that its Best BCAA product builds "lean muscle."
Indeed, the front label panel of Best BCAA prominently states "lean
muscle," "muscle protein synthesis," and "muscle recovery." Indeed,
BPI, on its own website, markets its Best BCAA product under the
"Build
Muscle" category of products.

Best BCAA contains only three of the nine EAAs, and therefore it
cannot, in fact, build muscle. As such, BPI's claim that the
Product builds "lean muscle" is false based on peer-reviewed
scientific data, and in fact negatively impacts protein synthesis,
thereby leaving Plaintiff and Class members in a worse position
than if not taking the product at all. Plaintiff brings this class
action lawsuit on behalf of himself and purchasers of the Best BCAA
dietary supplement. Plaintiff asserts claims on behalf of himself
and a nationwide class of purchasers of Best BCAA for violation of
New York General Business Law, violation of the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act ("MMWA"), breach of express warranty, breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability, unjust enrichment, and fraud,
says the complaint.

Plaintiff Gregory Maroney is a citizen of New York who resides in
Wurtsboro, New York who purchased BPI's Best BCAA product for
approximately $29.99 from a Vitamin Shoppe store in Middletown, New
York, in approximately 2018.

BPI is engaged in the manufacturing, processing, packaging, and
distribution of Best BCAA. BPI sells Best BCAA throughout New York
and the entire United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Joseph I. Marchese, Esq.
     Philip L. Fraietta, Esq.
     Andrew J. Obergfell, Esq.
     BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
     888 Seventh Avenue
     New York, NY 10019
     Phone: (646) 837-7150
     Facsimile: (212) 989-9163
     Email: jmarchese@bursor.com
            pfraietta@bursor.com
            aobergfell@bursor.com


BRISTOL COMPRESSORS: Court Certifies Class in Messer WARN Act Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Virginia, Abingdon Division, issued an Opinion and Order granting
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification in the case captioned
TONY A. MESSER, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. BRISTOL COMPRESSORS
INTERNATIONAL, LLC, ET AL., Defendants. Case No. 1:18CV00040. (W.D.
Va.).

In this action for violations of the Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification Act, the plaintiffs, former employees of a
closed manufacturing plant. Bristol Compressors sent letters to all
employees, informing them that the company would permanently close
on or around August 31, 2018, and that layoffs would begin
immediately and continue through August. To receive the bonus for
working through the wind-down process, employees were required to
execute a Stay Bonus Letter Agreement (SBLA), which released all
claims related to their employment, including an express waiver of
all Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN Act)
claims and the right to join the present lawsuit.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a party seeking class
certification to demonstrate that: (1) the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable (2) there are
questions of law or fact common to the class (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class and(4) the representative parties will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class.

With respect to Subclass One, the defendants object to
certification on the sole ground that the subclass fails to satisfy
Rule 23(a)'s numerosity requirement. However, in ruling on the
Motion for Class Certification.

To satisfy Rule 23(a)'s numerosity requirement, the class must be
so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. No
specified number is needed to maintain a class action; rather, the
rule should be considered in light of the particular circumstances
of the case. It has been held that a class of 74 members is well
within the range appropriate for class certification. Indeed, a
class of as few as 18 members has been approved.  

In determining whether the class is sufficiently numerous, the
court may consider the estimated size of the class, the geographic
diversity of the class, the difficulty of identifying class
members, and the negative impact on judicial economy if individual
suits were required.  

Here, the defendants allege that proposed Subclass One contains 47
members, 11 of whom are already named plaintiffs, and 16 of whom
have retained plaintiffs' counsel in relation to this case. The
plaintiffs contend that the numerosity requirement is satisfied in
light of the estimated size of the class and the efficiency of
adjudicating their claims in a single case.

However, the defendants argue that a class of 47 members, over half
of whom have already individually engaged plaintiffs' counsel, is
not so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical.
Instead, they argue that joinder of the remaining 20 unrepresented
members would be manageable, and in support, they contend that
plaintiffs' counsel has already contacted these individuals. The
defendants also argue that the subclass does not meet the
numerosity requirement because its potential members are likely
easily identifiable and not geographically dispersed.

The Court finds that in light of the circumstances in this case,
Subclass One satisfies the numerosity requirement. Although the
subclass members are likely to be easily identifiable using Bristol
Compressors' employment records, and many are likely still located
in and around Bristol, Virginia, the remaining factors weigh in
favor of class certification.  

The second requirement under Rule 23(a), commonality, requires a
showing that the class members have suffered the same injury.  

The plaintiffs contend that there are multiple issues common to the
members of Subclass One, including whether the defendants gave them
60 days' notice of the factory closing, whether sufficient facts
exist to support the defendants' faltering company and unexpected
business circumstances" defenses, whether the defendants' written
severance pay scheme constituted an employee benefit plan under the
WARN Act, and if so, whether the posted memorandum and email was
sufficient notice of cancellation of the benefits. The defendants
do not raise any challenges to Subclass One's satisfaction of the
commonality requirement. The Court  finds that Subclass One
satisfied this requirement, as the resolution of each of these
issues is central to the validity of all of the subclass members'
WARN Act violation claims.

As to the third Rule 23(a) requirement, typicality, the class
representative must be a member of the class and possess the same
interest and suffer the same injury as the class members. This
requirement serves as a guidepost for whether "the named
plaintiff's claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the
interests of the class members will be fairly and adequately
protected in their absence.

The named plaintiffs in this case satisfy the typicality
requirement. The defendants agree that 11 of the named plaintiffs
are members of Subclass One. In addition, all of these named
plaintiffs and the remaining members of Subclass One received the
same allegedly deficient notice of the factory's closing, and they
are all subject to the same defenses by the defendants. Thus, the
named plaintiffs have suffered the same alleged injury as the
members of Subclass One, and their claims will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the subclass members.

The final requirement under Rule 23(a), adequacy of representation,
involves two issues: (i) whether plaintiffs have any interest
antagonistic to the rest of the class, and (ii) whether plaintiffs'
counsel are qualified, experienced and generally able to conduct
the proposed litigation.

Here, the named plaintiffs do not appear to have any interests
antagonistic to the rest of the subclass. Moreover, plaintiffs'
counsel is experienced and qualified she has experience litigating
WARN Act violation claims and class actions, and she is well
regarded in the legal community. Further, no conflicts of interest
appear to exist for plaintiffs' counsel. For the foregoing reasons,
the Court finds that proposed Subclass One satisfies the
requirements of Rule 23(a).

Rule 23(b)(3) requires that questions of law or fact common to
class members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy.

With respect to Subclass One, plaintiffs identify individualized
inquiries into damages as the only question that would affect
individual subclass members. However, they argue that these
individualized inquiries will be limited and that the numerous
common questions of law and fact will predominate. The defendants
counter that because the plaintiffs had different rates of pay;
worked different hours; were terminated on different days; claimed
different amounts of severance, vacation, and holiday pay; and may
have found new employment during the period of the alleged
violation, individualized damages questions will predominate, and
it will not be efficient to adjudicate the matter as a class
action.

Where questions of individual damage calculations overwhelm
questions common to the class, certification is improper. However,
in cases where the fact of injury and damage breaks down in what
may be characterized as virtually a mechanical task, capable of
mathematical or formula calculation, the existence of
individualized claims for damages seems to offer no barrier to
class certification on grounds of manageability.

The Court finds that individualized damage calculations do not
prevent certification of Subclass One. Although the defendants are
correct that calculating damages for each subclass member will
require reference to facts specific to each individual, it is still
the case that a mathematical formula will allow for the calculation
of damages on a classwide basis. Local Joint Exec. Bd. of
Culinary/Bartender Tr. Fund v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc., 244 F.3d
1152, 1163 (9th Cir. 2001), holding that the district court erred
in denying class certification in an action for violation of the
WARN Act where, among other things, the damages for individual
class members will entail a straightforward calculation of which
days and how many hours they would have worked, and how much they
would have earned in tips.

Like in Las Vegas Sands, the formula here will likely entail a
relatively straightforward calculation of which days and how many
hours class members would have worked, their rate of pay, and their
unused vacation time. The defendants' employee records will likely
provide all of this information for each class member. Only any
reductions in damages for earnings from new employment during the
violation period would require individualized inquires. However,
given the number of common issues in Subclass One, the Court finds
that these issues predominate over this individualized question.

Here, a class action is superior to other methods of adjudicating
the controversy. Given the relatively small and uniform amount of
potential damages available to each plaintiff under the WARN Act,
the interests of some class members in controlling the prosecution
are not likely to outweigh the interests of others. In addition,
this case is currently the only litigation by potential class
members for violations of the WARN Act, and this forum is desirable
given that the controversy arises out of federal law and conduct
occurring in the forum state. Lastly, the class action will be
manageable in light of the geographic location and relative ease of
identifying the class members, the numerous common issues, and the
limited individualized issues, as discussed above.

The Court will grant the Motion for Class Certification with
respect to Subclass One..
The defendants object to certification of Subclass Two, consisting
of employees who were terminated after August 31, 2018, because
they contend that it does not satisfy Rule 23(b)(3).  

The defendants argue that Subclass Two fails to satisfy Rule
23(b)(3) because individualized questions of law or fact
predominate over questions common to the subclass. They contend
that individualized questions predominate because 249 of the
approximately 307 members of the subclass signed the SBLA, and
plaintiffs' briefing suggests that they intend to argue that they
signed the agreement because they were enticed, as well as that the
defendants knew they were in financial and emotional distress and
had no choice but to execute the newly demanded waiver.

In other words, the defendants argue that for 249 of the subclass
members, the defendants' liability depends on the validity of the
SBLA waivers, which the plaintiffs intend to attack on grounds that
turn on the unique mental and financial states of each individual
member.

However, at oral argument, plaintiffs' counsel assured the court
that the overarching issue arising from the SBLA will be its legal
unconscionability, based on facts common to all class members. In
particular, the plaintiffs intend to argue that the defendants'
memorandum promising employees a $1,000 bonus for working through
the company's wind-down process induced employees to continue
working at the factory, and it was unconscionable to later require
them to sign an agreement waiving valuable rights to get the bonus
they were already promised. The plaintiffs argue that because this
attack on the validity of the agreement applies in equal force for
all class members who signed it, it will not give rise to
individualized questions.

Applying the defendants' arguments regarding the requirements of
Rule 23(b)(3) to the new Subclass Two, the Court finds that the
subclass satisfies the rule. Plaintiffs' counsel has assured the
court that the validity of the agreement will turn on facts common
to all those who signed it rather than on individualized inquiries
into their mental and financial states.  

As to numerosity, the defendants estimate that the new Subclass Two
will contain approximately 249 individuals. Subclass Three will
contain approximately 58 members. I find that each subclass is
sufficiently numerous. Because the members of Subclasses Two and
Three do not differ from those of Subclass One with respect to the
factors relevant to numerosity, joinder of these individuals is
impractical for the same reasons stated with respect to Subclass
One.

The Motion for Class Certification is granted.

The subclasses certified are defined as follows:

     Subclass One: All those persons employed at Bristol
Compressors International, LLC's Bristol, Virginia, manufacturing
facility full time and who were terminated without cause on their
part between July 31, 2018, and August 31, 2018, as part of, or as
the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the plant closing
ordered on July 31, 2018, who do not file a timely request to opt
out of the class.

     Subclass Two: All those persons employed at Bristol
Compressors International, LLC's Bristol, Virginia, manufacturing
facility full time and who were terminated without cause on their
part after August 31, 2018, as part of, or as the reasonably
foreseeable consequences of the plant closing ordered by Defendants
on July 31, 2018, who signed a Stay Bonus Letter Agreement, and who
do not file a timely request to opt out of the class.

     Subclass Three: All those persons employed at Bristol
Compressors International, LLC's Bristol, Virginia, manufacturing
facility full time and who were terminated without cause on their
part after August 31, 2018, as part of, or as the reasonably
foreseeable consequences of the plant closing ordered by Defendants
on July 31, 2018, who did not sign a Stay Bonus Letter Agreement,
and who do not file a timely request to opt out of the class.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 20, 2019 Opinion and
Order is available at  https://tinyurl.com/yyx5kehw from
Leagle.com.

Tony A. Messer, Philip E. Barbrow, Benjie G. Hicks, Kendall W.
Luttrell, Darrell G. Murray, Dennis J. Stiltner, Timothy M.
Wampler, Michael L. Parker, Charles E. Vestal, Jimmy Ambergey, Dave
S. Booher, Joanne T. Booher, John S. Booker, David Browning, Summer
Carmack, William C. Church, Melvin E. Clark, Joyce Daughtery, Homer
L. Davis, Patricia C. Eads, David Estep, James D. Foster, Dennis A.
Fraley, Curtis D. Hayden, Penny Helton, Gaylord K. Hobbs, Jr., Gary
Houser, Sherrie Hubbard, Michael Leonard, Gearl Lowe, Mandy Martin,
Stewart Maxfield, David C. McClain, Floyd D. McMillan, Jackie L.
Mullins, Tommy Mullins, Dorothy M. Orr, David O'Quinn, Larry J.
Richards, Danny L. Saltz, Karen P. Scyphers, James E. Smith, Jamie
Stout, Robert L. Sullins, Timothy A. Thomas, Alison Walls, Jeff
Wampler & David A. Stovall, Plaintiffs, represented by Mary Lynn
Tate, TATE LAW FIRM.

Bristol Compressors International, LLC, T/A Bristol Compressors,
Defendant, represented by Alexander A. Ayar --
aayar@mcdonaldhopkins.com -- McDonald Hopkins, PLC, pro hac vice &
William Bradford Stallard -- bstallard@pennstuart.com -- Penn
Stuart & Eskridge.

Garrison Investment Group, LP, Defendant, represented by Mark
Hunter Churchill -- Mark.Churchill@hklaw.com -- Holland & Knight
LLP & Kevin Myles D'Olivo -- Kevin.DOlivo@hklaw.com -- Holland &
Knight LLP.


BUCKEYE PARTNERS: Ingalis Sues Over Securities Exchange Act Breach
------------------------------------------------------------------
JOHN INGALLS, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, v. BUCKEYE PARTNERS, L.P., CLARK C. SMITH,
PIETER BAKKER, BARBARA M. BAUMANN, BARBARA J. DUGANIER, JOSEPH A.
LASALA, JR., MARK C. MCKINLEY, LARRY C. PAYNE, OLIVER G. RICHARD,
III, FRANK S. SOWINSKI, and MARTIN A. WHITE, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-06098 (S.D. N.Y., June 28, 2019) is a unitholder class
action brought by Plaintiff on behalf of himself and all other
public unitholders of Buckeye Partners, L.P. ("Buckeye" or the
"Company") against Buckeye and the members of Buckeye's Board of
Directors (the "Board" or the "Individual Defendants"), for their
violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange
Act"), and U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") Rule,
and to enjoin the vote on a proposed transaction, pursuant to which
Buckeye will be acquired by IFM Investors Pty Ltd ("IFM
Investors"), through its IFM Global Infrastructure Fund ("IFM GIF,"
and together with IFM Investors, "IFM"), Hercules Intermediate
Holdings LLC ("Parent"), and Parent's wholly-owned subsidiary
Hercules Merger Sub LLC ("Merger Sub") (the "Proposed
Transaction").

On May 10, 2019, Buckeye and IFM issued a joint press release
announcing they had entered into an Agreement and Plan of Merger
dated May 10, 2019 ("Merger Agreement") to sell Buckeye to IFM.
Pursuant to the terms of the Merger Agreement, each issued and
outstanding unit of Buckeye representing limited partner interests
in the Company will be converted into the right to receive $41.50
in cash (the "Merger Consideration"). The Proposed Transaction has
an equity value of approximately $6.5 billion.

On June 25, 2019, Buckeye filed a Definitive Proxy Statement on
Schedule 14A (the "Proxy Statement") with the SEC. The Proxy
Statement, which recommends that Buckeye unitholders vote in favor
of the Proposed Transaction, omits or misrepresents material
information concerning, among other things: (i) the data and inputs
underlying the financial valuation analyses that support the
fairness opinion provided by the Company's financial advisor, Wells
Fargo Securities, LLC ("Wells Fargo"); (ii) potential conflicts of
interest faced by Company insiders; and (iii) potential conflicts
of interest faced by the Company's additional financial advisor,
Intrepid Partners, LLC ("Intrepid"). The failure to adequately
disclose such material information constitutes a violation of
Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act, as Buckeye
unitholders need such information to cast a fully-informed vote in
connection with the Proposed Transaction.

In short, unless remedied, Buckeye's public unitholders will be
forced to make a voting decision on the Proposed Transaction
without full disclosure of all material information concerning the
Proposed Transaction being provided to them. Plaintiff seeks to
enjoin the unitholder vote on the Proposed Transaction, unless and
until such Exchange Act violations are cured, says the complaint.

Plaintiff is a continuous unitholder of Buckeye.

Buckeye owns and operates a diversified network of integrated
assets  providing midstream logistic solutions, primarily
consisting of transportation, storage, processing and marketing of
liquid petroleum products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Richard A. Acocelli, Esq.
     WEISSLAW LLP
     1500 Broadway, 16th Floor
     New York, NY 10036
     Phone: (212) 682-3025
     Fax: (212) 682-3010
     Email: racocelli@weisslawllp.com


BUCKEYE PARTNERS: McManus Sues Over Exchange Act Violation
----------------------------------------------------------
HEATHER MCMANUS, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, v. BUCKEYE PARTNERS, L.P., CLARK C. SMITH,
PIETER BAKKER, BARBARA M. BAUMANN, BARBARA J. DUGANIER, JOSEPH A.
LASALA, JR., MARK C. MCKINLEY, LARRY C. PAYNE, OLIVER G. RICHARD,
III, FRANK S. SOWINSKI, MARTIN A. WHITE and BUCKEYE GP, LLC,
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-06000 (S.D. N.Y., June 26, 2019) is a
class action on behalf of the public unitholders of Buckeye against
the Partnership's general partner, Buckeye GP, LLC ("Buckeye GP")
and the Partnership's Board of Directors (the "Board" or the
"Individual Defendants") for their violations of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, in connection with the proposed sale of the
Partnership to IFM Investors ("IFM," or "Parent") (the "Proposed
Transaction") through IFM's wholly owned subsidiary IFM Global
Infrastructure Fund ("Merger Sub").

On May 10, 2019, Buckeye entered into an Agreement and Plan of
Merger (the "Merger Agreement") with IFM, whereby IFM will acquire
all outstanding units of Buckeye for $41.50 per unit in an all-cash
transaction valued at approximately $10.3 billion (including
assumed debt). On June 7, 2019, in order to convince Buckeye's
unitholders to vote in favor of the Proposed Transaction, the Board
authorized the filing of a materially incomplete and misleading
preliminary proxy statement with the SEC (the "Proxy Statement"),
in violation of the Exchange Act.

For these reasons, and as set forth in detail herein, Plaintiff
asserts claims against Buckeye and the Board for violations of the
Exchange Act and Rule 14a-9. Plaintiff seeks to enjoin Defendants
from taking any steps to consummate the Proposed Transaction unless
and until the material information discussed below is disclosed to
Buckeye unitholders before the vote on the Proposed Transaction or,
in the event the Proposed Transaction is consummated, recover
damages resulting from the Defendants' violations of the Exchange
Act, says the complaint.

Plaintiff is the owner of Buckeye units.

Buckeye is a publicly traded master limited partnership which owns
and operates a diversified global network of integrated assets
providing midstream logistic solutions, primarily consisting of the
transportation, storage, processing and marketing of liquid
petroleum products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Joshua M. Lifshitz, Esq.
     LIFSHITZ & MILLER LLP
     821 Franklin Avenue, Suite 209
     Garden City, NY 11530
     Phone: (516) 493-9780
     Facsimile: (516) 280-7376
     Email: jml@jlclasslaw.com


CAGLE STUCCO: Rivera Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
----------------------------------------------------
KEVIN RIVERA, JORGE RIVERA, and MARVIN RIVERA, Individually and On
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. CAGLE
STUCCO & MASONRY OF TEXAS, LLC d/b/a CAGLE STUCCO & MASONRY,
Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-02290 (S.D. Tex., June 26, 2019) is a
collective action and lawsuit, arising under the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, ("FLSA") on behalf of themselves and all
other similarly situated employees to recover unpaid overtime wages
from Defendant.

The Defendant Cagle violated the FLSA by employing Plaintiffs and
other similarly situated nonexempt employees "for a workweek longer
than forty hours but refusing to compensate them for their
employment in excess of forty hours at a rate not less than one and
one half times the regular rate at which they are or were
employed", says the complaint.

Plaintiffs were employed by Cagle during the last three years.

Cagle Stucco & Masonry of Texas, LLC d/b/a Cagle Stucco & Masonry
is residential and commercial construction company in the Houston
and Dallas metropolitan areas.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Melissa Moore, Esq.
     Curt Hesse, Esq.
     Bridget Davidson, Esq.
     MOORE & ASSOCIATES
     Lyric Centre
     440 Louisiana Street, Suite 675
     Houston, TX 77002
     Phone: (713) 222-6775
     Facsimile: (713) 222-6739


CALIFORNIA TEACHERS: Ninth Circuit Appeal Initiated in Babb Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Georgia Babb, et al., filed an appeal from a Court
ruling in their lawsuit entitled Georgia Babb, et al. v. California
Teachers Association, et al., Case No. 8:18-cv-00994-JVS-DFM, in
the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California,
Santa Ana.

The nature of suit is stated as constitutionality of state
statutes.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
was filed on June 5, 2018, and assigned to Hon. Judge James V.
Selna.

The appellate case is captioned as Georgia Babb, et al. v.
California Teachers Association, et al., Case No. 19-55692, in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by July 18, 2019;

   -- Transcript is due on August 19, 2019;

   -- Appellants Georgia Babb, John J. Frangiamore Jr., William
      Happ, Aaron Holbrook, Michelle Pecanic-Lee, David Schmus
      and Abram van der Fluit's opening brief is due on
      September 26, 2019;

   -- Appellees Attorney General for the State of California,
      Eric Banks, California Teachers Association, Arthur A.
      Krantz, National Education Association, Erich Shiners,
      United Teachers of Los Angeles and Priscilla Winslow's
      answering brief is due on October 28, 2019; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants GEORGIA BABB, JOHN J. FRANGIAMORE, Jr.,
WILLIAM HAPP, AARON HOLBROOK, MICHELLE PECANIC-LEE, DAVID SCHMUS
and ABRAM VAN DER FLUIT, as individuals, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, are represented by:

          Bradley A. Benbrook, Esq.
          BENBROOK LAW GROUP, PC
          400 Capitol Mall, Suite 2530
          Sacramento, CA 95814
          Telephone: (916) 447-4900
          Facsimile: (916) 447-4904
          E-mail: brad@benbrooklawgroup.com

               - and -

          Talcott J. Franklin, Esq.
          TALCOTT FRANKLIN P.C.
          1920 McKinney Avenue, 7th Floor
          Dallas, TX 75201
          Telephone: (214) 326-5349
          E-mail: tal@talcottfranklin.com

               - and -

          Christopher Hellmich, Esq.
          HELLMICH LAW GROUP
          5753-G E. Santa Ana Canyon Road, Suite 512
          Anaheim Hills, CA 92807
          Telephone: (949) 287-5708
          E-mail: chellmich@hellmichlaw.com

               - and -

          Jonathan F. Mitchell, Esq.
          MITCHELL LAW PLLC
          111 Congress Avenue, Suite 400
          Austin, TX 78701
          Telephone: (512) 686-3940

Defendants-Appellee CALIFORNIA TEACHERS ASSOCIATION; UNITED
TEACHERS OF LOS ANGELES, as representative of the class of all
chapters and affiliates of the California Teachers Association; and
NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION are represented by:

          Jeffrey B. Demain, Esq.
          Scott A. Kronland, Esq.
          ALTSHULER BERZON LLP
          177 Post Street
          San Francisco, CA 94108
          Telephone: (415) 421-7151
          Facsimile: (415) 362-8064
          E-mail: jdemain@altshulerberzon.com
                  skronland@altshulerberzon.com

Defendants-Appellees ERIC BANKS, PRISCILLA WINSLOW, ERICH SHINERS
and ARTHUR A. KRANTZ, in their official capacities as chairman and
members of the California Public Employment Relations Board, are
represented by:

          Peter H. Chang, Esq.
          AGCA - OFFICE OF THE CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL
          455 Golden Gate Avenue
          San Francisco, CA 94102
          Telephone: (415) 510-3796
          Facsimile: (415) 703-1234
          E-mail: peter.chang@doj.ca.gov

Intervenor-Defendant-Appellee ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA is represented by:

          Lara Haddad, Esq.
          AGCA-OFFICE OF THE CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL
          300 South Spring Street
          Los Angeles, CA 90013
          Telephone: (213) 269-6250
          E-mail: Lara.Haddad@doj.ca.gov


CARING FOR MONTANANS: Depot Inc.'s ERISA Suit Goes to Fed. Court
----------------------------------------------------------------
The case, The Depot, Inc., a Montana Corporation; Union Club Bar,
Inc., a Montana Corporation; Trail Head, Inc., a Montana
Corporation;  Ed Wells; and Doug Hutcheon, on behalf of himself and
all those similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. Caring for
Montanans, Inc. formerly known as: Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Montana, Inc.; Health Care Service Corporation; and John Does I-X,
the Defendants, Case No. DV-16-521, was removed from the Montana
Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, to the U.S.
District Court for the District of Montana (Missoula) on July 3,
2019. The District of Montana Court Clerk assinged Case No.
9:19-cv-00113-DWM to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the
Hon. Judge Donald W. Molloy. The suit alleges Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 violation.

Health Care Service Corporation is a member owned health insurance
company in the United States. HCSC was formerly known as Hospital
Service Corporation and changed its name to Health Care Service
Corporation in 1975.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintifffs are:

           John C. Heenan, Esq.
           BISHOP, HEENAN & DAVIES
           1631 Zimmerman Trail, Ste 1
           Billings, MT 59102
           Telephone: (406) 839-9091
           Facsimile: (406) 839-9092
           E-mail: john@lawmontana.com

                - and -

           John M. Morrison, Esq.
           Linda M. Deola, Esq.
           MORRISON, SHERWOOD,
              WILSON & DEOLA, PLLP
           401 N Last Chance Gulch
           PO Box 557
           Helena, MT 59624
           Telephone: (406) 442-3261
           Facsimile: (406) 443-7294
           E-mail: john@mswdlaw.com
                   ldeola@mswdlaw.com

Attorneys for Caring for Montanans, Inc.:

           Michael D. McLean, Esq.
           Stefan T. Wall, Esq.
           WALL, McLEAN & GALLAGHER, PLLC
           40 West Lawrence, Suite B
           PO Box 1713
           Helena, MT 59624
           Telephone: (406) 442-1054
           Facsimile: (406) 442-6455
           E-mail: mmclean@mlfpllc.com
                   stefan@mlfpllc.com

Attorneys for Health Care Service Corporation:

           Kimberly A. Beatty, Esq.
           M. Christy S. McCann, Esq.
           Stanley T. Kaleczyc, Esq.
           BROWNING KALECZYC BERRY & HOVEN, P.C.
           800 N. Last Chance Gulch Suite 101
           PO BOX 1697
           Helena, MT 59624-1697
           Telephone: (406) 443-6820
           Facsimile: (406) 443-6883
           E-mail: kim@bkbh.com
                   christy@bkbh.com
                   stan@bkbh.com

CELLCO PARTNERSHIP: Katz Files Petition for Writ of Certiorari
--------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Michael A. Katz filed with the Supreme Court of United
States a petition for a writ of certiorari in the matter titled
MICHAEL A. KATZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. CELLCO PARTNERSHIP, DBA VERIZON WIRELESS, Case No.
18-1543.

Response is due on July 15, 2019.

Mr. Katz wants the Supreme Court to determine whether:

   1. Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") Section 3 requires the
      District Court to stay the action after it compels
      arbitration of all claims and a stay is requested by one of
      the parties; and

   2. the standard for voluntary consent prescribed in Wellness
      Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1948
      (2015), applies under the FAA to the waiver of the
      constitutional rights (i) to the exercise of the Article
      III judicial power in connection with state law private
      rights brought within the jurisdiction of the federal
      courts, and (ii) to judicial review of non-Article III
      rulings of law required under the Due Process Clause of the
      Fifth Amendment.

The Lower Court Case is entitled Michael A. Katz, Individually and
on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Petitioner v. Cellco
Partnership, dba Verizon Wireless, Case No. 18-1436, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Second
Circuit affirmed on March 12, 2019, the District Court's
arbitration judgment in the case.

Plaintiff-Appellant Katz brings the putative class action against
Defendant-Appellee Cellco Partnership, doing business as Verizon
Wireless, asserting claims under New York state law for breach of
contract and consumer fraud based on an administrative charge that
Verizon adds to the monthly bill of each of its subscribers.  Katz
was compelled to arbitrate the dispute and, dissatisfied with the
outcome, he sought vacatur and de novo review of the arbitrator's
legal conclusions in the District Court, arguing that the standard
of review imposed by the Federal Arbitration Act violates his due
process right to judicial review.  The District Court declined to
exercise de novo review and confirmed the arbitration decisions.
Katz appeals.

Mr. Katz entered into a customer agreement with Verizon in 2011.
The agreement contained an arbitration clause requiring the parties
"to resolve disputes only by arbitration or in small claims court"
and prohibiting class arbitrations.  In December 2012, Katz sued
Verizon in federal court, asserting class claims for breach of
contract and consumer fraud related to the monthly administrative
charge under New York's General Business Law ("GBL") section 349.
He also sought a declaration that compelling arbitration on these
claims would violate Article III of the United States
Constitution.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Petitioner Michael A. Katz is represented by:

          William Robert Weinstein, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF WILLIAM R. WEINSTEIN
          199 Main Street, 4th Floor
          White Plains, NY 10601
          Telephone: (914) 997-2205
          E-mail: wrw@wweinsteinlaw.com


CLARK & GENTRY: Avrahami Files RICO Class Suit in Arizona
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Clark & Gentry PLLC.
The case is styled as Benyamin Avrahami, OrnaAvrahami, Feedback
Insurance Company LTD, BYS Company ACC, Chandler One LLC, Junction
Development LLC, O&E Corporation, White Mountain Equities LLC,
White Knight Investment ACC, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Celia Clark, Clark & Gentry PLLC,
John Garcia, in His Capacity as Personal Representative for the
Estate of Estate of Craig McEntee, McEntee & Associates PC, Neil
Hiller, Fennemore Craig PC, Alan Rosenbach, ACR Solutions Group,
RMS Solutions Incorporated, Heritor Managment Limited and Pan
American Reinsurance Company Limited, Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-04631-SPL (D. Ariz., July 3, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Other Statutes:
Racketeer/Corrupt Organization filed pursuant to the Racketeering
(RICO) Act.

Clark & Gentry, PLLC is a firm serving New York, NY in Tax Law,
Estate Planning and Trusts And Estates cases.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

   David Ray Deary, Esq.
   Loewinsohn FlegleDeary Simon LLP
   12377 Merit Dr., Ste. 900
   Dallas, TX 75251
   Tel: (214) 572-1700
   Fax: (214) 572-1717
   Email: DavidD@LFDSlaw.com

      - and -

   Donna Lee, Esq.
   Loewinsohn FlegleDeary Simon LLP
   12377 Merit Dr., Ste. 900
   Dallas, TX 75251
   Tel: (214) 572-1700
   Fax: (214) 572-1717
   Emmail: DonnaL@LFDSlaw.com

      - and -

   Garrett Webster Wotkyns, Esq.
   Schneider Wallace Cottrell KoneckyWotkyns LLP
   8501 N Scottsdale Rd., Ste. 270
   Scottsdale, AZ 85253
   Tel: (480) 428-0141
   Fax: (866) 505-8036
   Email: gwotkyns@schneiderwallace.com

     - and -

   Jim L Flegle, Esq.
   Loewinsohn Flegle Deary Simon LLP
   12377 Merit Dr., Ste. 900
   Dallas, TX 75251
   Tel: (214) 572-1700
   Fax: (214) 572-1717
   Email: jimf@lfdlaw.com

     - and -

   John William McKenzie, Esq.
   Loewinsohn Flegle Deary Simon LLP
   12377 Merit Dr., Ste. 900
   Dallas, TX 75251
   Tel: (214) 572-1700
   Fax: (214) 572-1717
   Email: JohnM@LFDSlaw.com

      - and -

   Tyler M Simpson, Esq.
   Loewinsohn Flegle Deary Simon LLP
   12377 Merit Dr., Ste. 900
   Dallas, TX 75251
   Tel: (214) 572-1700
   Fax: (214) 572-1717
   Email: tylers@lfdlaw.com

     - and -

   W Ralph Canada , Jr., Esq.
   Loewinsohn Flegle Deary Simon LLP
   12377 Merit Dr., Ste. 900
   Dallas, TX 75251
   Tel: (214) 572-1700
   Fax: (214) 572-1717
   Email: RalphC@LFDSlaw.com

      - and -

   Wilson E Wray , Jr., Esq.
   Loewinsohn Flegle Deary Simon LLP
   12377 Merit Dr., Ste. 900
   Dallas, TX 75251
   Tel: (214) 572-1700
   Fax: (214) 572-1717
   Email: wilsonw@lfdlaw.com


COSTCO WHOLESALE: Korolshteyn Files Appeal in Suit
--------------------------------------------------
A notice of appeal has been filed in the class action styled as
TATIANA KOROLSHTEYN, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. COSTCO WHOLESALE CORPORATION;
NBTY, INC., Defendants - Appellees, Case No. 19-55739 (S.D. Cal.,
June 26, 2019).[BN]

COVANCE INC: Mitchell Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Compensations
-------------------------------------------------------------
Larhonda Mitchell, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Covance, Inc. and Chiltern
International, Inc. Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-02877-ER (E.D.
Pa., July 1, 2019) is an action initiated to redress violations of
the Defendants of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and the
Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act ("PAMWA").

Plaintiff alleges that Covance and Chiltern International have
failed to pay their Startup Specialists overtime pay as required by
the FLSA. Plaintiff has worked greater than 40 hours per week. For
example, Plaintiff is regularly required to work as many as 12 to
14 hours per day, and is also frequently required to work on
weekends and holidays. As such, Plaintiff has and continues to
regularly work as many as 70 hours per week. Even though Plaintiff
regular works greater than 40 hours per week, at all times relevant
herein, Plaintiff was paid on a salaried basis such that she was
not paid overtime wages for hours worked beyond 40 hours per week,
says the complaint.

Plaintiff was hired by Defendant as a Startup Specialist on about
November 22, 2016.

Defendant is a global drug development company whose business
includes but is not limited to overseeing clinical trials for
various pharmaceutical companies and contract research related to
such clinical trials.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jonathan W. Chase, Esq.
     KRAEMER, MANES & ASSOCIATES LLC
     1628 JFK Blvd., Suite 1650
     Philadelphia, PA 19103
     Phone: (215) 475 3504
     Fax: (215) 734 2466
     Email: jwc@lawkm.com


EASTERN ACCOUNT: Welsh Files FDCPA Class Suit in New Jersey
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Eastern Account
System of Connecticut, Inc. The case is styled as Tracy Welsh,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Eastern Account System of Connecticut, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-05611 (D. N.J., July 3, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Act.

Eastern Account Service of Connecticut, Inc. offers consumer debt
collection services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Craig B. Sanders
   Barshay Sanders PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   (516) 203-7600
   Email: csanders@barshaysanders.com



EMPOWER HEALTHCARE: King Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
--------------------------------------------------------
QUIANA KING, Individually and on behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff v. EMPOWER HEALTHCARE SOLUTIONS, LLC,
Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-00456-SWW (W.D. Ark., June 28, 2019)
is an action under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), for
declaratory judgment, monetary damages, liquidated damages,
prejudgment interest, and costs, including reasonable attorneys'
fees as a result of Defendants' commonly applied policy and
practice of failing to pay Plaintiff and all others similarly
situated overtime compensation for the hours in excess of 40 hours
in a single week that they were/are made to work.

During the course of her employment, Plaintiff did not manage the
enterprise or a customarily recognized subdivision of the
enterprise. Plaintiff did not have any control of or authority over
any employee's rate of pay or working hours. Plaintiff did not
maintain or prepare production reports or sales records for use in
supervision or control of the business. Plaintiff and Defendant had
no agreement that her salary would be the entirety of her pay, nor
did they agree that Plaintiff's salary was intended to cover all
hours worked. Plaintiff did not receive overtime premiums for hours
worked in excess of 40 in a workweek. Plaintiff worked more than 40
hours in almost all workweeks during which she was employed by
Defendant, says the complaint.

Plaintiff worked as a Clinical Care Coordinator for Defendant
starting around August of 2018.

Defendant is a for-profit, domestic corporation, providing its
customers with medical care service provider coordination and
in-home instruction regarding medical treatment plans.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Sean Short, Esq.
     Josh Sanford, Esq.
     SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
     One Financial Center
     650 South Shackleford Road, Suite 411
     Little Rock, AR 72211
     Phone: (501) 221-0088
     Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
     Email: sean@sanfordlawfirm.com
            josh@sanfordlawfirm.com


ESPARZA ENTERPRISES: Ramirez Sues Over Unpaid Wages
---------------------------------------------------
JUANA GUERRERO RAMIREZ, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly aggrieved, Plaintiff, v. ESPARZA ENTERPRISES, INC., a
California Corporation; GENE WHEELER FARMS, INC., a California
Corporation; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants, Case
No. 19STCV22552 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty., June 28, 2019)
is a representative action, pursuant to the Labor Code Private
Attorneys General Act of 2004 ("PAGA"), on behalf of Plaintiff and
all similarly aggrieved employees currently or formerly employed by
Defendants.

The Defendants have had a policy or practice of failing to pay
overtime wages to Plaintiff and other non-exempt employees in the
State of California in violation of State of California wage and
hour laws as a result of, among other things, compelling Plaintiff
and all similarly aggrieved employees to work over 8 hours in a
workday or 40 hours in a workweek; over 12 hours in a workday;
and/or 7 consecutive workdays in a workweek without properly
compensating for hours worked to work over 8 hours in a workday or
40 hours in a workweek; over 12 hours in a workday; and/or 7
consecutive workdays in a workweek by, including without
limitation, failing to accurately track and/or pay for all hours
worked; engaging, suffering, or permitting employees to work off
the clock by, among other things, requiring employees to scheduled
shifts; and paying overtime hours at regular or otherwise
inaccurate overtime rate(s) of pay, to the detriment of Plaintiff
and all similarly aggrieved employees, says the complaint.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendants as a non-exempt employee from
approximately June of 2017 through approximately July of 2018.

Esparza is a labor contractor within the meaning of Labor Code
section 2810.3 that provides farm labor contractor services,
including to defendant Wheeler.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     David D. Bibiyan, Esq.
     Diego Aviles, Esq.
     BIBIYAN LAW GROUP, P.C.
     1801 Century Park East, Suite 2600
     Los Angeles, CA 90067
     Phone: (310) 438-5555
     Facsimile: (310)300-1705
     Email: david@tomorrowlaw.com
            diego@tomorrowlaw.com


FARMERS RESTAURANT: Court Grants Final Approval of $1.4MM Deal
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court, District of Columbia issued a
Memorandum Opinion granting Joint Motion for Final Approval of the
Settlement Agreement in the case captioned SHAYN STEPHENS, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. FARMERS RESTAURANT GROUP, et al., Defendants. Civil
Action No. 17-1087 (TJK). (D.D.C.).

The Plaintiffs, who worked at several restaurants operated by
Defendants in Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia,
bring claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and District
of Columbia and Maryland law, alleging that the Defendants violated
federal and state minimum-wage, overtime-pay, and sick-leave
requirements.

The Settlement Terms

Upon final approval of the settlement, the Defendants will deposit
$1,490,000 in a settlement fund. Class counsel will receive an
award of $388,484 in attorney's fees and $8,516 for litigation
expenses, and the settlement administrator will be paid in an
amount not to exceed $35,000 for its services. Each of the seven
named plaintiffs, as representatives of the collective action and
Rule 23 classes, will receive a service award of $5,000. The 119
individuals who opted in to the collective action will receive
$498,715, to be distributed to each individual based on the total
number of weeks that he or she worked as a server during the
applicable period. Of the remaining $524,285 set aside for members
of the Rule 23 class, $179,538.52 has been claimed by the 226
individuals who submitted proper claim forms. The unclaimed balance
of $344,746.48 will revert to Defendants.

Final Approval of the Settlement Agreement

In making that determination, a court must consider whether: (1)
the class representatives and class counsel have adequately
represented the class (2) the proposal was negotiated at arm's
length (3) the relief provided for the class is adequate, taking
into account, as relevant here, the costs, risks, and delay of
trial and appeal, the effectiveness of the proposed method of
distributing relief to the class, and the proposed attorney's fee
awards and (4) the proposal treats class members equitably relative
to each other.

According to the structure of the settlement agreement, members of
the collective action, including Calvillo and Stephens, are to
recover only from the funds set aside for the collective action
claims and will not recover from the sum set aside for the Rule 23
class members. And that bifurcated structure presented a possible
conflict, because Calvillo and Stephens had no direct monetary
interest in the negotiated settlement amount for the Rule 23
classes and therefore may not have adequately represented those who
stood to recover only from those funds. The Court requested
supplemental briefing from the parties addressing that issue and it
ultimately concluded, for purposes of provisional certification,
that Calvillo and Stephens were nevertheless adequate
representatives of the classes.

The Court finds no reason to depart from the conclusion here.
Courts in this Circuit examine two criteria to determine whether
absent class members are adequately represented in a class action
or settlement (1) the named representative must not have
antagonistic or conflicting interests with the unnamed members of
the class and (2) the representative must appear able to vigorously
prosecute the interests of the class through qualified counsel.  

Given the parties' representations, both in their briefing and at
the fairness hearing, the Court finds sufficient assurances of fair
and adequate representation of the absent Rule 23 class members by
Calvillo and Stephens. As the Court noted in its prior opinion and
as counsel confirmed again at the fairness hearingthe parties
negotiated the damages for Rule 23 class members based on the same
theories applied to the collective action claims. And in that
regard, the interests of Calvillo and Stephens and the absent class
members were aligned.

Despite these structural concerns, however, after reviewing the
parties' filings and their representations at the fairness hearing,
the Court finds no reason to suspect that any conflict of that
nature corrupted the negotiating process. As the Court noted
previously, Calvillo and Stephens have affirmed that they
negotiated the settlement amounts separately.  And they declare
that at all times during the negotiations they understood that they
represented the interests of both the opt-in plaintiffs as well as
the Rule 23 class members in the District of Columbia.

Nor does the Court see any basis to conclude that Calvillo and
Stephens did not vigorously prosecute the interests of the class
through qualified counsel regarding the discount incorporated into
the Rule 23 settlement amount. Ms. Elkin has extensive experience
in representing employees in wage and hour disputes, and she
specifically consulted with the proposed class representatives
about the risks of proceeding to litigation and the appropriate
valuation of the Rule 23 class members' claims. To the extent that
there is any doubt about the vigorousness of Calvillo and
Stephens's negotiating, Ms. Elkin's expertise and careful guidance
offset that concern. While the disparity between the two
litigation-risk discounts still gives the Court pause, whether the
agreement reached as to the Rule 23 class members is ultimately a
fair settlement of their claims can be properly addressed and is
addressed as part of the Court's review of the terms of the
agreement under Rule 23(e).

The Court finds that Calvillo and Stephens were adequate
representatives of the Rule 23 class members under Rule 23(a)(4).
And having therefore found that the proposed District of Columbia
and Maryland classes satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(a) and
(b)(3) and with the consent of the parties, the Court will certify
the classes for settlement purposes.

Final Approval of the Settlement

In determining whether a proposal is fair, reasonable, and
adequate, Rule 23(e) directs courts to consider the: (1) adequacy
of representation by class representatives and class counsel (2)
appearance of arm's-length negotiations  (3) adequacy of the
negotiated relief and (4) relative treatment of class members.  

Adequacy of Representation and Arm's-Length Negotiation

Rule 23(e)(2)(A) and (B) direct the Court to consider the adequacy
of class representatives' and class counsel's representation as
well as whether the proposed settlement appears to have been
negotiated at arm's length. These factors address "matters that
might be described as procedural concerns, looking to the conduct
of the litigation and of the negotiations leading up to the
proposed settlement.

For the same reasons identified in the Court's prior opinion, it
appears that the settlement negotiations were conducted fairly and
without any undue pressure. The negotiations took place over two
months before a neutral, Court-appointed mediator. As the parties
describe, they were able to reach a deal after nine hours of
in-person mediation, and counsel for both parties reaffirmed at the
fairness hearing that the negotiations were principled and
conducted at arm's length, with the ultimate goal of swiftly and
fairly resolving the litigation for the benefit of all parties.
Furthermore, not one individual of the hundreds notified questioned
the integrity of the negotiations process or otherwise objected to
the settlement.  

Nor does the Court find any basis to conclude that the class
representatives inadequately represented the absent members of the
collective action and Rule 23 classes during the negotiations
process. Calvillo and Stephens have made clear that they were at
all times during the mediation aware of their role representing the
interests of those individuals and the various tradeoffs of
reaching a settlement as opposed to proceeding to trial.  

Likewise, the Court finds no indication that Ms. Elkin provided
less than adequate counsel over the course of this litigation. She
has extensive experience in litigating wage and hour collective and
class actions, including through arbitration and mediation and both
she and the class representatives represent that they relied on her
experienced advice over the course of the settlement negotiations.

Adequacy of the Relief and Relative Treatment of Class Members

In determining whether a proposed settlement provides the class
with adequate relief, Rule 23(e)(2)(C) instructs Courts to
consider, as relevant here, the costs, risks, and delay of trial
and appeal, the effectiveness of any proposed method of
distributing relief to the class and the terms of any proposed
award of attorney's fees. And in evaluating the overall fairness of
a proposed settlement, courts in this Circuit also generally
consider the terms of the settlement in relation to the strength of
the plaintiffs' case, the status of the litigation at the time of
settlement, and the reaction of the class and experienced counsel.

Upon review of these various considerations, the Court finds that
the proposed settlement satisfies Rule 23(e)'s requirements of
adequacy and fairness.

While both parties maintain that their legal positions are strong,
they recognize the inherent risks and costs of continuing to
litigate the matter and have therefore agreed to settlement terms
that, in their view, adequately account for those uncertainties.
During the negotiations process, Plaintiffs asserted that were the
collective action members to prevail on either their uniforms,
tools-of-the-trade, or tip-pool claims, they would be entitled to
$536,593 for the 119 individuals. And were they only to prevail on
their side-work claims, Plaintiffs asserted that they would at
least be entitled to 20% of the difference between the applicable
minimum wage and tipped wage, or $107,318.60.   

The Defendants insisted that they were not liable to Plaintiffs on
any of their collective action claims, and acknowledged that at
best, if Plaintiffs were to prevail on their uniform and
tools-of-the-trade theories, they would be entitled to $33,787 in
out-of-pocket costs.  Both parties recognized the inevitable costs
if they were to proceed to discovery and trial, though they
acknowledged that the Court had already certified the collective
action. Considering that posture and the risks and costs of
continuing to litigate, the parties agreed to settle these claims
for $498,715, reflecting a 7% discount from Plaintiffs' projected
recovery.
   
And in light of those considerations, the Court sees no reason to
conclude otherwise.

As for settlement of the Rule 23 class members' claims, Plaintiffs
applied the same theory of damages as the collective action claims,
projecting that the 861 class members would be entitled to a total
recovery of $7,066,241 were they to prevail entirely on their
minimum wage claims or, at the very least, 20% of that sum,
$1,413,248, were they to prevail only on their after-hours
side-work claim.  Defendants again argued that Plaintiffs were
entitled to no recovery, and they continued to take the position
that Plaintiffs could not certify the proposed District of Columbia
and Maryland classes under Rule 23. In light of these disputes, as
well as the other risks and costs attendant to continuing to
litigate the class action, the parties agreed to settle the class
action claims for a potential total of $524,285, depending on how
many members submitted claims.

As the Court explained in its order requesting supplemental
briefing, and reiterated at the fairness hearing, the disparity
between the discount applied to the collective action claims
compared to the class actions claims gives the Court pause. Still,
after considering the circumstances of the litigation and the
reactions of the classes and class counsel, the Court ultimately
agrees that the settlement fairly and equitably resolves the claims
of the Rule 23 classes.

The Court finds that the proposed agreement satisfies the
requirements of Rule 23(e)(2) and will therefore grant the parties'
joint motion and approve the settlement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 20, 2019 Memorandum
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y3ygt77q from
Leagle.com.

SHAYN STEPHENS, ANITA CLARK, VANESSA CALVILLO, SYLVIA RACHAELl
KROHN, DESMOND PITT & JEANIE WILLIG, Plaintiffs, represented by
Gregory K. McGillivary, MCGILLIVARY STEELE ELKIN LLP, Theodore R.
Coploff, MCGILLIVARY STEELE ELKIN LLP, Sarah M. Block, MCGILLIVARY
STEELE ELKIN LLP & Molly Ann Elkin, MCGILLIVARY STEELE ELKIN LLP,
1101 Vermont Ave., N.W., Suite 1000, Washington, AUSTIN HALL &
SHANNON STOREY, Plaintiffs, represented by Sarah M. Block,
MCGILLIVARY STEELE ELKIN LLP & Molly Ann Elkin, MCGILLIVARY STEELE
ELKIN LLP.

FARMERS RESTAURANT GROUP, DANIEL SIMON & MICHAEL VUCUREVICH,
Defendants, represented by Joy Catherine Einstein --
jeinstein@shulmanrogers.com -- SHULMAN, ROGERS, GANDAL, PORDY &
ECKER. P.A. &Meredith Sarah Campbell -- mcampbell@shulmanrogers.com
-- SHULMAN, ROGERS, GANDAL, PORDY & ECKER, P.A.


FEDEX CORPORATION: Rhode Island Sues Over Exchange Act Breach
-------------------------------------------------------------
RHODE ISLAND LABORERS' PENSION FUND, Individually and on Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. FEDEX CORPORATION,
FREDERICK W. SMITH, ALAN B. GRAF, JR., DAVID J. BRONCZEK, RAJESH
SUBRAMANIAM, DAVID L. CUNNINGHAM, DONALD F. COLLERAN, and MICHAEL
C. LENZ, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-05990 (S.D. N.Y., June 26,
2019) is a securities fraud class action on behalf of all those who
purchased, or otherwise acquired, FedEx common stock during the
period from September 19, 2017 through December 18, 2018, inclusive
(the "Class Period"), who were damaged thereby (the "Class"),
seeking to pursue remedies under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the "Exchange Act"), and Rule l0b-5 promulgated thereunder.

Traditionally, FedEx has generated a substantial majority of its
revenues in the United States. During its fiscal year 2016, FedEx
generated 76 percent of its revenues in the United States and 24
percent of its revenues in international markets. In July 2016,
FedEx significantly expanded its international operations through
its
$4.8 billion acquisition of TNT Express N.V. ("TNT"), a Netherlands
based logistics company with operations concentrated in Europe. To
date, this has been the largest acquisition in FedEx history. This
acquisition instantly added billions of dollars of European
revenues to FedEx's topline and increased the Company's
international revenue mix from 24 percent in fiscal year 2016 to 33
percent in fiscal year 2017.

After the acquisition closed, FedEx embarked on an aggressive
strategy to integrate its legacy European operations with TNT. On
March 31, 2017, nine months after completing the acquisition, FedEx
issued a three-year operating income improvement target in order
for investors to gauge and track the purported benefits of the TNT
acquisition and FedEx's integration efforts. Specifically, the
Company stated that, in fiscal year 2020, its integration with TNT
would result in a $1.2 billion to $1.5 billion operating income
improvement above its fiscal year 2017 reported operating income
(the "TNT Income Improvement Target"). On June 27, 2017, however,
TNT's operations were crippled by a cyberattack known as NotPetya,
which involved the spread of a malware virus throughout TNT's
systems (the "Cyberattack"). NotPetya is considered one of the
largest cyberattacks in history, having affected a multitude of
companies on a global scale. The timing of the attack was
particularly problematic for FedEx, as TNT's systems were paralyzed
during the critical period involving the integration of TNT with
the Company's legacy European operations.

Throughout the Class Period, Defendants continually assured
investors about its recovery from the Cyberattack and that any
negative impact from the attack was minimal. For example,
Defendants told investors that TNT customer volumes were being
restored to pre-attack levels and that "despite the cyberattack,
the customers stuck with us." Defendants also stated that TNT
integration efforts were successfully progressing and continuously
stated that FedEx was "on track" to achieve the TNT Income
Improvement Target. Notwithstanding these positive representations
to the market, Defendants made false and misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (1) TNT's overall package volume
growth was slowing as TNT's large customers permanently took their
business to competitors after the Cyberattack; (2) as a result of
the customer attrition, TNT was experiencing an increased shift in
product mix from higher-margin parcel services to lower-margin
freight services; (3) the anticipated costs and timeframe to
integrate and restore the TNT network were significantly larger and
longer than disclosed; (4) FedEx was not on track to achieve the
TNT Income Improvement Target; and (5) as a result of these
undisclosed negative trends and cost issues, FedEx's positive
statements about TNT's recovery from the Cyberattack, integration
into FedEx's legacy operations, customer mix, customer service
levels, profitability, and prospects lacked a reasonable basis,
says the complaint.

Plaintiff purchased FedEx common stock during the Class Period

FedEx is a global logistics company that ships goods to commercial
and residential customers throughout the world.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Christopher J. Keller, Esq.
     Eric J. Belfi, Esq.
     Francis P. McConville, Esq.
     LABATON SUCHAROW LLP
     140 Broadway
     New York, NY 10005
     Phone: (212) 907-0700
     Facsimile: (212) 818-0477
     Email: ckeller@labaton.com
            ebelfi@labaton.com
            fmcconville@labaton.com

          - and -

     Guillaume Buell, Esq.
     THORNTON LAW FIRM LLP
     1 Lincoln Street
     Boston, MA 02111
     Phone: (617) 720-1333
     Facsimile: (617) 720-2445
     Email: gbuell@tenlaw.com


FEDEX GROUND: Ct. Further Amends Chapman Scheduling Pretrial Order
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order amending the Amended Pretrial Scheduling
Order in the case captioned TRAVIS CHAPMAN and JOHN CHURCHWELL,
individually, on behalf of all others similarly situated, and as
representatives of the State of California on behalf of all
aggrieved employees, Plaintiffs, v. FEDEX GROUND PACKAGE SYSTEM,
INC., a Delaware corporation d/b/a FedEx Home Delivery, and DOES 1
through 50, inclusive, Defendants. Case No. 2:19-cv-00410-TLN-DMC.
(E.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiffs bring this putative class action against FedEx
Ground on behalf of themselves and the following persons: all
California residents who were nominally employed by one or more
independent service providers (ISPs) with whom FedEx Ground
contracted and worked at or from FedEx Ground's terminal in
Redding, California, as drivers delivering FedEx Ground packages at
any time within the time period of four (4) years preceding the
filing of this Complaint up to and through the time of trial for
this matter. Plaintiffs, individually and as representatives of the
State of California on behalf of all aggrieved employees, bring
this representative action against FedEx Ground and thereby seek to
recover the maximum civil penalties permitted by the California
Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), California
Labor Code (Labor Code), from FedEx Ground for all civil violations
of Labor Code Sections 201, 202, 203, 226(a), 510(a) and 1194 as
well as reasonable attorney's fees and costs.

FedEx Ground denies the Plaintiffs' allegations except as
specifically admitted in its Answer. At all relevant times, FedEx
Ground: (1) has operated pursuant to Independent Service Provider
Agreements (ISPA), pursuant to which Independent Service Providers
(ISP) provide package transportation services and are expected to
employ drivers to perform such services; and (2) has had no direct
employment or independent contractor relationship with the drivers
comprising the putative class alleged by the Plaintiffs.

FedEx Ground also intends to make the below-listed assertions in
its defense, and to assert the below-listed affirmative defenses,
in addition to the matters set forth in its Answer and in any
amendments thereto. FedEx Ground reserves the right to supplement
and amend this list, inter alia: Neither Plaintiffs nor members of
the putative class were, at any relevant time, employees of FedEx
Ground.

The Plaintiffs have not alleged an ascertainable class.

The Plaintiffs' claims may be not be litigated on a class-wide
basis, including because their claims relate to individualized
circumstances, especially as pertains to the particular ISPs who
employed the Plaintiffs and putative class members.

The Plaintiffs' claims are not manageable on a class or
representative basis.

Even assuming Cal. Lab. Code Section 226(a) applies, any violations
of same were not knowing and/or intentional.

Even assuming Cal. Lab. Code Section 226(a) applies, neither
Plaintiffs nor any putative class members suffered any injury as a
result of a knowing and intentional failure to comply with Cal.
Lab. Code Section 226(a).

Even if the Plaintiffs prove that FedEx Ground was their employer
and that of the putative class members, the alleged violations of
the Labor Code and other laws did not occur and/or are not
actionable.

Possibility of Settlement/Prompt Resolution

The Parties do not believe that prompt resolution is possible.
FedEx Ground does not wish to participate in mediation or
settlement discussions until such time as the question of class
certification is decided.

Discovery Plan

The Parties have no objections to the discovery schedule set by the
Court in its Amended Pretrial Scheduling Order. The Parties address
additional discovery issues as set forth below.

Changes to Timing, Form, or Requirement of FRCP 26(a) Disclosures

The Parties have agreed to provide initial disclosures pursuant to
FRCP 26(a)(1) on or before May 31, 2019. The Parties agree that,
prior to using documents as deposition exhibits, they will produce
such documents (unless previously produced) to the opposing party
as supplemental FRCP 26(a)(1) disclosures, at least seven (7) days
in advance of such depositions, unless circumstances (such as late
discovery or ongoing investigation) warrant later disclosure, in
which case such documents shall be produced as soon as practicable
prior to the depositions.

Subjects on Which Discovery Should be Completed, Timing, Phases

The Parties anticipate a discovery dispute regarding the scope of
discovery prior to class certification. Defendant contends that
discovery should be focused on the particular ISPs pertaining to
the named Plaintiffs, whereas Plaintiffs believe that discovery
should be permitted as to any ISPs that serviced FedEx Ground's
station in Redding, California. The Parties will continue to confer
on this issue and will submit any remaining disputes to the U.S.
Magistrate Judge for resolution.

Electronically Stored Information

The Parties have implemented litigation holds, including as to
electronic information. The Parties agree to produce electronic
data in native format to the extent practicable, and to meet and
confer regarding such alternative formats for particular data items
as may foster cost-effective production and analysis, and
accuracy.

Privileges/Protection

The Parties anticipate that discovery may require disclosure of
confidential information. The Parties will separately and jointly
submit a stipulated protective order re confidentiality.

Regarding Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Parties do
not at this time propose any particular agreements or modifications
to Rule 502, as contemplated by Rule 502(e). The Parties will
continue to meet and confer regarding managing privilege/work
product issues and will submit any disputes to the assigned U.S.
Magistrate Judge for resolution.

Regarding privilege logs, the Parties have agreed to meet and
confer on an ongoing basis as to methods that may avail themselves
for the efficient provision of privilege log information so as, on
the one hand, to provide the propounding party sufficient
information to assess the validity of privilege assertions while,
on the other hand, avoid unnecessary burden, unreasonable
deadlines, excessive expense, and duplicative, cumulative and
laborious work by the responding party.

Limitations on Discovery

FedEx Ground contends that discovery should be limited to matters
pertaining to the particular ISPs that employed Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs dispute this. The Parties agree to submit any particular
disputes that materialize in this and other regards, to the
assigned U.S. Magistrate Judge for resolution.

Otherwise, for now the Parties believe that the discovery
procedures and limitations provided by the FRCP should suffice,
subject to their right to seek appropriate relief from the Court.

Pursuant to the above stipulation and good cause appearing, the
Amended Pretrial Scheduling Order is further amended to reflect the
following dates and deadlines. The Scheduling Order is otherwise
unchanged.

Event Date Plaintiffs may amend their Complaint, and Defendant June
21, 2019 may amend its Answer, no motion required. Subsequent
amendments, except as permitted by Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure governing responses to amended pleadings, will
require a showing of good cause under Rule 16. Plaintiffs to file
Motion for Class Certification June 12, 2020 Defendant to file
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for July 10, 2020 Class
certification Plaintiffs to file Reply in support of Motion for
Class July 24, 2020 Certification Hearing on Motion for Class
Certification August 6, 2020.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 20, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yy58k25g from Leagle.com.

Travis Chapman & John Churchwell, Plaintiffs, represented by Daniel
V. Santiago, Law Offices of Daniel V. Santiago, P.C. 11622 El
Camino Real1st Floor, San Diego, CA 92130

FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., Doing business as FedEx Home
Delivery, Defendant, represented by Brandy Thompson Cody --
bcody@laborlawyers.com -- Fisher & Phillips, Christopher M. Ahearn
-- cahearn@fisherphillips.com -- Fisher & Phillips LLP & Natalie B.
Fujikawa -- nfujikawa@fisherphillips.com -- Fisher & Phillips,
LLP.


FELIPE'S PIZZA: Martinez Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Compensation
---------------------------------------------------------------
FORTINO MARTINEZ, on behalf of himself, and others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. FELIPE'S PIZZA AND RESTAURANT, INC., doing
business as FRANK'S TRATTORIA; and HORTENSIA PINO and FELIPE PINO,
individually, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-06136 (S.D. N.Y., July
1, 2019) alleges that, pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA"), and the New York Labor Law, he is entitled to recover
from Defendants: unpaid wages and minimum wages; unpaid overtime
compensation; unpaid "spread of hours" premium for each day he
worked in excess of 10 hours; liquidated damages; prejudgment and
post-judgment interest; and attorneys' fees and costs.

Plaintiff was paid a weekly "salary" of $760.00, without an
overtime premium of 150% of his regular hourly rate, or "time and a
half", for hours worked in excess of 40 per week. In or around
November 2018, Plaintiffs weekly salary was increased to $820.00
per week. Plaintiff did not receive tips in connection with his
employment. The Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their
business with a policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly
situated employees' wages for all hours worked; minimum wages; or
overtime (of time and one-half), in direct violation of the FLSA
and New York Labor Law and the supporting federal and New York
State Department of Labor Regulations. The Defendants knowingly and
willfully operated their business with a policy of not paying New
York State "spread of hours" premiums to Plaintiff and other
similarly situated employees, says the complaint.

Plaintiff, Fortino Martinez, was employed by Defendants in New York
County, New York, to work as a cook, cleaner, and general helper,
at Defendants' restaurant known as "Frank's Trattoria", in or about
1995.

Felipe's Pizza and Restaurant, Inc., dba "Frank's Trattoria", is a
domestic business corporation organized and existing under the laws
of the State of New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Justin Cilenti, Esq.
     Peter H. Cooper, Esq.
     CILENTI & COOPER, PLLC
     10 Grand Central
     155 East 44th Street – 6th Floor
     New York, NY 10017
     Phone: (212) 209-3933
     Fax: (212) 209-7102
     Email: info@jcpclaw.com



FIDELITY TAX: Newman Sues Over Abusive Telemarketing Practices
--------------------------------------------------------------
Wesley R. Newman, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Fidelity Tax Relief LLC, a
California Limited Liability Company; Tax Rise Inc., a California
Corporation; Price Holdings Inc., a California Corporation;
Bridgley Inc., a California Corporation; and DOES 1-10, Defendants,
Case No. 8:19-cv-01282 (C.D. Cal., June 26, 2019) is a class action
lawsuit against Defendants for repeated and habitual violations of
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (the "TCPA"), a federal law
that was designed to curtail abusive telemarketing practices.

The Defendants violateS the TCPA by using an automatic telephone
dialing system to deliver non-emergency advertising and marketing
text messages to telephone numbers assigned to a cellular telephone
service without prior express written consent, says the complaint.

Plaintiff is an individual who at all relevant times resided in
Chicago, Illinois.

Fidelity Tax is, and at all times herein mentioned herein was, a
California Limited Liability Company, with its principal place of
business in Orange County,
California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Robert Ahdoot, Esq.
     Bradley K. King, Esq.
     AHDOOT & WOLFSON, PC
     10728 Lindbrook Drive
     Los Angeles, CA 90024
     Phone: (310) 474-9111
     Fax: (310) 474-8585
     Email: rahdoot@ahdootwolfson.com
            bking@ahdootwolfson.com


FIRST NATIONAL: Miller Suit Alleges FDCPA Violation
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against First National
Collection Bureau Inc. The case is styled as Anthony I Miller,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. First National Collection Bureau Inc, Defendant, Case
No. 3:19-cv-05611 (W.D. Wash., July 3, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Act.

First National Collection Bureau Inc. is a Debt collection agency
in Reno, Nevada.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Craig B Sanders, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Ste 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Email: csanders@barshaysanders.com




FLUOR CORPORATION: Court Denies Dissemination of Original Notice
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina, Rock Hill Division, issued an Order and Order and Opinion
granting in part and denying in part Harry Pennington, III, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated; and Timothy
Lorentz, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. Fluor Corporation, Fluor Enterprises, Inc., SCANA
Corporation, Fluor Daniel Maintenance Services, Inc., South
Carolina Electric & Gas Company, Defendants, Lawrence Butler,
Lakeisha Darwish, Darron Eigner, Jr., Bernard A. Johnson, and Jimi
Che Sutton, Plaintiffs, v. Fluor Corporation and Fluor Enterprises
Inc., Defendants. Civil Action Nos. 0:17-cv-02094-JMC,
0:17-cv-02201-JMC (D.S.C.).

This matter is before the court for review of Plaintiffs Harry
Pennington, III and Timothy Lorentz's Motion for a Supplemental
Order Approving the Sending of Notice of Class Certification and
Related Relief.

Pennington Plaintiffs allege that Fluor and SCANA Defendants
committed violations of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act (WARN Act). Specifically, Pennington Plaintiffs
contend that Fluor and SCANA Defendants failed to give Pennington
Plaintiffs and the class members written notice that complied with
the requirements of the WARN Act.

The Timing of Pennington Plaintiffs' Class Notice

The first issue before the court is whether class notice should be
disseminated at this time.  
SCANA Defendants contend that the court should not issue class
notice at this time because summary judgment motions have not yet
been briefed or resolved, while Pennington Plaintiffs vigorously
maintain that it is appropriate to notify class members of the
instant action. SCANA Defendants, however, do not bring any
opposition as to the contents of Pennington Plaintiffs' proposed
notice.  

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not proscribe a specific
time during which class notice may be disseminated to class members
certified under Rule 23(b)(3). Rule 23 is noticeably silent as to
whether class notice should issue before or after any summary
judgment dispositions.

Likewise, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
is also silent as to when notice should issue to class members
certified under Rule 23(b)(3). However, several federal appellate
courts have stated that notice should issue well before a federal
district court reaches the merits of a case and can bind class
members with a formal decision. The general rule is that notice
should issue swiftly after class certification and before a formal
determination on the merits.  

In this case, SCANA Defendants do not allege, in any concrete way,
that they will be harmed by the issuance of class notice. SCANA
Defendants only believe that, until discovery is completed and
summary judgment is decided, the court will lack the necessary
information to determine whether potential class members were
`employees of Defendants' or `affected employees' who meet the
class definition as certified in this case. These concerns do not
suggest that SCANA Defendants will be harmed by the issuance of
class notice, but rather concern a defense put forth by SCANA
Defendants and the underlying merits of the dispute. Indeed, SCANA
Defendants even state that a revised notice would need to be sent
to class members to redefine the nature of the action and the class
claims, issues, or defences if they prevail on a summary judgment
motion.
  
Although Rule 23 does not provide a specific time for the
transmission of class notice, it certainly does not foreclose the
delivery of notice before summary judgment proceedings. For these
reasons, it is appropriate for the issuance of class notice at this
time, and SCANA Defendants' argument is contrary to the weight of
authority and, therefore, strikingly unpersuasive.

The Contents and Alleged Deficiencies of Pennington Plaintiffs'
Class Notice

The Current and General Contents of the Class Notice

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically require that
Pennington Plaintiffs' class notice must clearly and concisely
state in plain, easily understood language the following: (i) the
nature of the action; (ii) the definition of the class certified
(iii) the class claims, issues, or defenses (iv) that a class
member may enter an appearance through an attorney if the member so
desires (v) that the court will exclude from the class any member
who requests exclusion (vi) the time and manner for requesting
exclusion and (vii) the binding effect of a class judgment on
members under Rule 23(c)(3).

First, as it relates to the nature of the action, the second page
of the notice includes language specifying that the dispute
involves the violation of rights under the Federal Worker
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (Warn Act) and this
action seeks to recover 60 days' wages and ERISA benefits. On the
first page, the notice is specifically geared to those employees
who worked at V.C. Summer. The court finds that this language is
sufficient to describe the nature of the action because it directly
states who is involved and the federal laws at issue. Second,
examining the definition of the class certified, on the first and
fourth pages, the proposed notice uses the exact same language that
the court has approved for defining the certified class.

Based upon these findings, Pennington Plaintiffs' class notice
clearly and concisely conveys the nature of the action, definition
of the class certified, class claims at issue, opportunity for
class members to appear through an attorney, manner for requesting
exclusion, and binding effect of a class judgment. However,
Pennington Plaintiffs' class notice is problematic as it relates to
clearly and concisely explaining the defenses of SCANA and Fluor
Defendants, the court's compulsory exclusion of class members
requesting exclusion, and the time for requesting exclusion.   

Accordingly, Pennington Plaintiffs' original notice must be denied
unless it conforms with the revisions set forth in their Reply
Memorandum of Law and this court's Order and Opinion.

Fluor Defendants' Identification of Alleged Deficiencies of the
Class Notice

Turning to the arguments raised by Fluor Defendants regarding
Pennington Plaintiffs' class notice, Fluor Defendants raise
approximately nine (9) issues with the proposed notice.
  
Fluor Defendants' Objections to Deficiencies of the Class Notice

First, Fluor Defendants take issue with the notice containing a
direct reference to Fluor Corporation. However, because Fluor
Corporation remains a party to this action, it is properly included
within the notice.  

Second, as it specifically relates to the class claims at issue,
Fluor Defendants wish to indicate that the claims involve whether
terminated employees were terminated without cause as opposed to
without notice, which was included in the proposed class notice.
Pennington Plaintiffs expressly agree to modify its original
language from without notice to without 60 days' notice. The court
concurs that this change accurately reflects the true nature of the
class claims, which is whether terminated employees received
sufficient notice under the WARN Act. Thus, the court approves
Pennington Plaintiffs' change to the class notice and partly
sustains Fluor Defendants' objection.

Third, Fluor Defendants request that Plaintiffs Darron Eigner, Jr.
and Bernard A. Johnson be excluded from the class notice because
they may be removed as named plaintiffs from the action. To date,
there is a pending Motion to Remove Named Plaintiffs before the
court. However, Pennington Plaintiffs agree to conform the notice
to any determination of the court concerning [those] individuals
prior to distribution. Thus, because of their agreement to follow
the court's decision, the court orders Pennington Plaintiffs to
remove Plaintiffs Darron Eigner, Jr. and Bernard A. Johnson from
the notice if they are ultimately removed as named plaintiffs by
the court. Accordingly, Fluor Defendants' objection is sustained in
this respect.

Fourth, Fluor Defendants object to the class notice because it
lacks their applicable defenses. Pennington Plaintiffs responded to
Fluor Defendants' concern by expressly agreeing to a revision and
provided the court with a revision that included some of the
defenses of Fluor and SCANA Defendants. The proposed revision
complies with Rule 23(c)(2)(B)(iii), which the court determined was
needed in the preceding section.   Accordingly, the court approves
this revision to the class notice because it complies with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Fifth, Flour Defendants argue that the current class notice
improperly suggests that class members will receive benefits if
they choose not to opt  out of the class. However, Pennington
Plaintiffs' class notice is clearly conditional on a number of
factors because it explicitly states that class members will
receive whatever benefits to which they may be entitled as a member
of the class and if he or she is determined to be eligible as a
class member.   Accordingly, Fluor Defendants' fifth objection to
the class notice is wholly without merit and at odds with the
proposed notice's express language.

Sixth, Fluor Defendants wish for the class notice to inform class
members that they may be subject to discovery obligations.
Generally, in a class action arising under Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, absent a showing of a particularized
need, the court will not permit general discovery from passive
class members.

Seventh, Fluor Defendants request that class members be provided
with the opportunity to electronically sign and submit the
exclusion form. Pennington Plaintiffs, on the other hand, submit
that an electronic exclusion form is unwarranted because they have
not asked for electronic transmission of the class notice, but
insist upon sending notice by means of First-Class Mail.  

Pennington Plaintiffs emphasize that anyone who wishes to steer
clear of the class action, can put a stamp on an envelope and drop
the form in the mail. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits
the transmission of class notice by one or more of the following:
United States mail, electronic means, or other appropriate means.
While Rule 23 permits the use of electronic means for the
dissemination of class notice, it does not mandate a plaintiff to
honor the transmission requests of a defendant.

Here, Pennington Plaintiffs expressly indicate that they are
willing to permit an electronic means for class members to opt out
when that class member receives notice by email and not through the
postal channels. Because Pennington Plaintiffs seem to agree that a
means of electronic exclusion may be necessary, the court will
sustain Fluor Defendants' challenge, but only as it relates to
those class members who receive notice through electronic means.
Thus, Pennington Plaintiffs are directed to create an electronic,
exclusion form.  

Eighth, Fluor Defendants request that the opt-out deadline "be
based on the date that class members postmark and/or electronically
submit the exclusion form, rather than the date received by
Plaintiffs' counsel, as Plaintiffs' proposal improperly limits the
opt-out period. In response to Fluor Defendants' suggestion,
Pennington Plaintiffs expressly agree to Fluor Defendants'
proposal.

Specifically, Pennington Plaintiffs submit a proposed revision that
states that the exclusion form must be postmarked no later than
deadline date, 2019. The court concurs that this change
appropriately notifies class members of the time and manner for
requesting exclusion. Thus, the court approves Pennington
Plaintiffs' change to the class notice and partly sustains Fluor
Defendants' objection in this regard.  

Lastly, but certainly not least, Fluor Defendants request thirty
(30) days to compile the contact information for class members,
while Pennington Plaintiffs propose ten (10) days. Fluor Defendants
propose thirty (30) days because of the large number of plaintiffs.
Pennington Plaintiffs believe that ten (10) days is sufficient
because Fluor Defendants had eight months to compile the class
list. Pursuant to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter
that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional
to the needs of the case. Federal district courts have wide
latitude in controlling discovery and their rulings will not be
overturned absent a showing of clear abuse of discretion.

Here, the parties do not dispute whether Pennington Plaintiffs
should have access to the class members' contact information, but
only dispute the time in which Fluor Defendants must provide that
information. Pursuant to its wide latitude in controlling
discovery, the court will permit Fluor Defendants with thirty (30)
days to provide Pennington Plaintiffs with the contact information
of class members, which the court expects to be organized and
correct information, because, according to their own
representation, there is a large number of plaintiffs.

The Court's Revisions to the Class Notice & Other Issues of
Concern

In addition to the foregoing set forth above, the court takes the
opportunity to revise Pennington Plaintiffs' class notice, order
the parties to agree upon a postmark deadline for opt-out period,
address the disagreement among the parties concerning the use of
telephone numbers, and determine whether Pennington Plaintiffs
should include paid postage for the exclusion form that will be
delivered to class members. Pennington Plaintiffs' notice contains
nothing about how the court is compelled to exclude any class
member requesting exclusion.  

Accordingly, the court modifies Pennington Plaintiffs' class notice
to include a sentence pertaining to the court's affirmative
obligation under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to exclude
class members desiring exclusion, and the revision is included
under the section entitled

Secondly, there is disagreement among the parties regarding
Pennington Plaintiffs' access to the telephone numbers of class
members and whether paid postage for the exclusion form should
accompany the class notice. Under the FLSA, where class members are
required to opt in a class action and not opt out, federal district
courts are divided as to whether plaintiffs should have access to
the telephone numbers of class members, and, therefore, some courts
require plaintiffs to show special circumstances for the telephone
numbers.  

After careful consideration of all the parties' positions and for
the reasons set forth herein, the court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES
IN PART Pennington Plaintiffs' Motion for a Supplemental Order
Approving the Sending of Notice of Class Certification and Related
Relief. Specifically, the court GRANTS Pennington Plaintiffs'
request to send class notice at this time, but the court DENIES the
dissemination of the original notice put forth by Pennington
Plaintiffs in their Motion. However, the court GRANTS the sending
of class notice that conforms with Pennington Plaintiffs' Reply
Memorandum of Law and this court's Order and Opinion.
  
A full-text copy of the District Court's June 20, 2019 Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yyrxpbl4 from
Leagle.com.

Harry Pennington, III, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated & Timothy Lorentz, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Lucy Clark
Sanders, Bloodgood and Sanders, 242 Mathis Ferry Road, Suite 201,
Mt. Pleasant, SC 29464, Jack A. Raisner -- jar@outtengolden.com --
Outten and Golden LLP, pro hac vice, Nancy Bloodgood, Bloodgood and
Sanders, 242 Mathis Ferry Road, Suite 201, Mt. Pleasant, SC 29464 &
Rene S. Roupinian -- rsr@outtengolden.com -- Outten and Golden LLP,
pro hac vice.

Fluor Corporation & Fluor Enterprises Inc, Defendants, represented
by John Hagood Tighe -- htighe@fisherphillips.com -- Fisher and
Phillips, Matthew Robert Korn -- mkorn@fisherphillips.com -- Fisher
and Phillips LLP, David Kresser -- dkresser@fisherphillips.com --
Fisher and Phillips LLP, pro hac vice & Kathleen McLeod Caminiti --
kcaminiti@fisherphillips.com -- Fisher and Phillips LLP, pro hac
vice.

SCANA Corporation & South Carolina Electric & Gas Company,
Defendants, represented by Charles T. Speth, II --
ted.speth@ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak and Stewart
PC, D. Michael Henthorne -- michael.henthorne@ogletree.com --
Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak and Stewart PC, James Roy Silvers --
james.silver@ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak and
Stewart, Piper Reiff Byzet -- piper.byzet@ogletree.com -- Ogletree
Deakins Nash Smoak and Stewart & Christopher Ray Thomas --
christopher.thomas@ogletgree.com -- Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak and
Stewart PC.

Fluor Daniel Maintenance Services Inc, Defendant, represented by
John Hagood Tighe, Fisher and Phillips & Matthew Robert Korn,
Fisher and Phillips LLP.


GENE BY GENE: Court Denies Limiting Potential Damages Bid in Cole
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Alaska issued
an Order denying Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Limiting Potential Damages in the case captioned MICHAEL COLE,
Plaintiff, v. GENE BY GENE, LTD., a Texas Limited Liability Company
d/b/a FAMILY TREE DNA, Defendant. Case No. 1:14-cv-00004-SLG. (D.
Alaska).

At Docket 211 is Mr. Cole's Motion to Strike or for Leave to File
Surreply. Gene by Gene filed a response in Gene by Gene encouraged
Mr. Cole to join surname affinity groups, known as projects. Mr.
Cole joined projects both before and after receiving his test
results. Mr. Cole did not understand that, by joining a project,
project administrators would need his relevant DNA results to
connect him with others in the project.5 Prior to receiving his
test results, Mr. Cole discovered that information including his
name, DNA test kit number, and grandmother's maiden name appeared
on a website called Rootsweb, which is not connected to Gene by
Gene. Cole filed his Complaint in this Court, in which he alleged
on his own behalf and on behalf of a proposed class a violation of
Alaska's Genetic Privacy Act (Act).

The Act provides for the following damages: In addition to the
actual damages suffered by the person, a person violating this
chapter shall be liable to the person for damages in the amount of
$5,000 or, if the violation resulted in profit or monetary gain to
the violator, $100,000.

Gene by Gene maintains that it is entitled to summary judgment as
to its potential $100,000 liability. It asserts that no reasonable
jury could find that Gene by Gene profited from the alleged
disclosure of Mr. Cole's information. Gene by Gene makes two
arguments to support its claim that it did not profit from the
Rootsweb disclosure.

First, Gene by Gene maintains that Mr. Cole can only speculate as
to whether any profit occurred from the unidentified disclosure.

Second, Gene by Gene argues that Mr. Cole cannot produce evidence
from which a jury could determine the amount of profits generated
from such disclosure.

Although Gene by Gene is correct that a litigant cannot survive
summary judgment by speculating about the potential intersection of
multiple possibilities, Mr. Cole is not obligated at this stage to
prove that Gene by Gene profited from the alleged disclosure. He
must merely produce evidence such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict in his favor as to that issue.

Furthermore, profit is not the only means by which a violator may
face $100,000 liability. The Act provides such liability for a
violator that has received profit or monetary gain.

The Court has previously quoted the deposition testimony of Bennett
Greenspan, Gene by Gene's Founder and President. Mr. Greenspan
testified that when customers join projects, Gene by Gene increases
its ability to reach out to other potential test takers. Nir
Leibovich, another Gene by Gene executive, characterized project
administrators' outreach to potential customers as basically like
organic viral marketing.  

In this case, Mr. Cole has presented evidence at the summary
judgment stage that draws a substantial link between Gene by Gene's
projects and its monetary gain. Mr. Cole's information was released
by a group administrator who was participating in the organic viral
marketing that, by Gene by Gene's own admission, resulted in new
customers for the firm.50 The evidence of benefits received by Gene
by Gene is such `that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
Mr. Cole as to Gene by Gene's monetary gain.

Gene by Gene  argues that Mr. Cole cannot produce evidence from
which a jury could determine the amount of profits generated from
such disclosure.

To support this argument, Gene by Gene relies on State v. Hammer,
State v. Hammer, 550 P.2d 820, 824-25 (Alaska 1976)), in which a
landowner and tenant sought compensation from the state government
for the taking of a property. The Alaska Supreme Court, in
determining that stipulated damages for the tenant's monthly lost
profits had been properly presented to the jury, opined that the
trier of fact must be able to determine the amount of lost profits
from evidence on the record and reasonable inferences therefrom,
not from mere speculation and wishful thinking. Hammer is
inapposite for two interrelated reasons.

First, Mr. Cole correctly notes that no part of the Act requires an
accounting or even an approximation of the profits or monetary gain
resulting from a prohibited act. Rather, the Act presents a binary
yes/no question: did the violation result in profit or monetary
gain to the violator. And as Gene by Gene admitted in its response
to Interrogatory No. 12, the company does not track or quantify the
indirect benefits that it receives from the network effect
associated with its customers' voluntary participation in the
comparative databases or the family project groups.

Therefore, a calculation of the amount of profit may be impossible.
Second, Hammer concerned a plaintiff seeking an award for a
specific amount of lost profits. Mr. Cole seeks a finding under the
Act that Gene by Gene received profit or monetary gain such that
the $100,000 statutory damages award applies. Based on the
foregoing, Gene by Gene's motion for partial summary judgment will
be denied.

Accordingly, Gene by Gene's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Limiting Potential Damages is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 20, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yyvoku96 from Leagle.com.

Michael Cole, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Alexander Glenn Tievsky --
atievsky@edelson.com -- Edelson PC, Douglas K. Mertz, Law Office of
Douglas K. Mertz, 319 Seward St # 5, Juneau, AK 99801, Jay Edelson
-- edelson@edelson.com -- Edelson PC, Rafey S. Balabanian --
rbalabanian@edelson.com -- Edelson PC, Benjamin H. Richman, Edelson
PC & David I. Mindell -- dmindell@edelson.com -- Edelson PC.

Gene by Gene, Ltd., a Texas limited liability company, Defendant,
represented by Matthew R. Wojcik -- matt.wojcik@bullivant.com --
Bullivant Houser Bailey PC, Timothy J. Petumenos, Law Office of Tim
Petumenos, LLC, 1227 W 9th Ave #200, Anchorage, AK 99501, E.
Pennock Gheen -- penn.gheen@bullivant.com -- Bullivant Houser
Bailey PC, pro hac vice & Holly D. Brauchli --
holly.brauchli@bullivant.com -- Bullivant Houser Bailey PC, pro hac
vice.

State of Alaska, Intervenor Defendant, represented by Jessica Moats
Alloway, Office of the Attorney General, Civil Division & Ruth
Botstein, Attorney General's Office.


GEORGIA: Gonzalez Files Civil Rights Suit v. S. Moore
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Spencer R. Moore. The
case is styled as Kenneth Caban Gonzalez, on behalf of himself and
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Spencer R. Moore, in his
official capacity as Commissioner of Georgia Department of Driver
Services and James Woo, in his individual capacity, Defendants,
Case No. 1:19-cv-03035-TWT (N.D. Ga., July 2, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Civil Rights:
Other filed pursuant to the Civil Rights Act.

The Defendants are individuals in their official capacity.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   AtteeyahEshe Hollie, Esq.
   Southern Center for Human Rights
   83 Poplar Street, N.W.
   Atlanta, GA 30303
   Tel: (404) 688-1202
   Email: ahollie@schr.org

      - and -

   Gerald R. Weber, Esq.
   Southern Center for Human Rights
   83 Poplar Street, N.W.
   Atlanta, GA 30303
   Tel: (404) 688-1202
   Fax: (404) 688-9440
   Email: gweber@schr.org


GRIMMWAY ENTERPRISES: Jimenez Files Class Suit in California
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Grimmway Enterprises,
Inc. The case is styled as Rosa A. Jimenez, an individual, on
behalf of the state f California, as a private attorney general,
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Grimmway Enterprises, Inc., a California Corporation, Defendant,
Case No. BCV-19-101843 (Cal. Super. Ct., County of Kern, July 2,
2019).

The lawsuit arises under CV Other Employment - Civil Unlimited.

Grimmway Enterprises, Inc., doing business as Grimmway Farms,
grows, produces, and supplies fruits and vegetables. It offers
carrots that includes baby carrots, bunch carrots, carrot shred,
carrot stixx, dipper carrots, rainbow baby carrots, and carrot
chips; organic products, such as green chard, red and green leaf
lettuce, spinach, gold and red beets, egg radishes, potato medley,
turnips, curly parsley, broccoli, cauliflower, green and white
onion, and sweet corn; and frozen products, including frozen
carrots, cauliflower riced, chopped cilantro, green beans, chopped
kale, and diced potatoes.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Craig J. Ackermann, Esq.
   1180 S Beverly Dr, Ste 610
   Los Angeles, CA 90035-1158
   Tel: (310) 277-0614


HILL'S PET: Boggio Files Product Liability Suit in Kansas
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Hill's Pet Nutrition,
Inc. The case is styled as Alexandra Boggio, on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Hill's Pet
Nutrition, Inc., a Delaware corporation and Colgate-Palmolive
Company, a Delaware corporation, Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-02360-JAR-TJJ (D. Kan., July 2, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Tort Product
Liability.

Hill's Pet Nutrition, Inc, marketed simply as "Hills", is an
American pet food company that produces dog and cat foods. The
company is a subsidiary of Colgate-Palmolive.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Brant A McCoy, Esq.
   Jones, McCoy & Lincoln, P.A.
   9401 Indian Creek Pkwy, Suite 600
   Overland Park, KS 66210
   Tel: (913) 322-7200
   Fax: (913) 322-9275
   Email: brant@jmlkc.com



IMPERIAL FIRE: Carvajal Files Class Suit in Florida
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Imperial Fire And
Casualty Insurance Company. The case is styled as Stephany
Carvajal, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Imperial Fire And Casualty Insurance
Company, a Louisiana corporation, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-22759-FAM (S.D. Fla., July 3, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Insurance filed
pursuant to the Diversity-Breach of Contract.

Imperial Fire and Casualty Insurance Company provides auto,
property, and flood insurance products and services in Arkansas,
Oklahoma, Louisiana, Texas, and Florida. It offers auto insurance
policies in the areas of personal liability, collision, other than
collision, personal injury protection, uninsured motorist, medical
payments, rental and towing coverage, and home and car insurance;
homeowners and dwelling property insurance; and personal and
commercial flood insurance. The company also provides claims
support services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Edmund Alonso Normand, Esq.
   Normand PLLC
   3165 McCrory Place, Ste. 175
   Orlando, FL 32803
   Tel: (407) 603-6031
   Email: Ed@ednormand.com

     - and -

   Jacob Lawrence Phillips, Esq.
   Normand PLLC
   3165 McCrory Place, Ste. 175
   Orlando, FL 32803
   Tel: (407) 603-6031
   Fax: (888) 974-2175
   Email: jacob.phillips@normandpllc.com

     - and -

   Jordan David Utanski, Esq.
   Edelsberg Law P.A.
   19495 Biscayne Blvd. #607
   Aventura, FL 33180
   Tel: (305) 773-6732
   Email: utanski@edelsberglaw.com

     - and -

   Scott Adam Edelsberg, Esq.
   Edelsberg Law PA
   19495 Biscayne Blvd 607
   Aventura, FL 33180
   Tel: (305) 975-3320
   Email: scott@edelsberglaw.com

     - and -

   Andrew John Shamis, Esq.
   14 NE 1st Ave STE 1205
   Miami, FL 33131
   Tel: (404) 797-9696
   Email: ashamis@sflinjuryattorneys.com




INDEPENDENT MEDIA: Production Staff in Netflix Film Seek OT Pay
---------------------------------------------------------------
MARSHALL HILLIARD, and HANH NGUYEN, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. INDEPENDENT MEDIA,
LLC, a California Limited Liability Company; BARRY BARNHOLTZ, an
individual; and DOE 1 through and including DOE 10, Defendants,
Case No. 2:19-cv-05804 (C.D. Cal., July 3, 2019) is a class action
brought under the California Labor Code Private Attorneys General
Act ("PAGA") and the Fair Labor Standards Act, seeking relief under
state and federal law on account of unpaid wages, unpaid overtime,
damages, continuing wages, liquidated damages, penalties,
restitution and attorneys' fees and costs.

The Defendants have failed to timely compensate Plaintiffs in full
for their work on the Netflix series entitled "Secret Obsession".
For example, Plaintiffs were not compensated for the first and last
15 minutes of work when they waited for shuttles to take them to
the shooting location. With respect to meal and rest breaks,
Plaintiffs worked many 12-hour days but were not provided a second
meal break or otherwise compensated for the missed break. They were
regularly not provided with all required rest breaks. The
Defendants failed to fully compensate Plaintiffs and other persons
who performed services for Defendants for work performed.
Plaintiffs and the aggrieved employees worked overtime on the
filming of the Production, toiling in excess of eight hours in a
single day and over 40 hours in a work week, says the complaint.

Plaintiffs were employed by Defendants as actors on the Production
from approximately October 2018 to November 2018.

Defendant IM is a production company owned by Defendant
Barnholtz.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Alan Harris, Esq.
     David Garrett, Esq.
     Min Ji Gal, Esq.
     HARRIS & RUBLE
     655 North Central Avenue, 17th Floor
     Glendale, CA 91203
     Tel: 323-962-3777
     Fax: 323-9623004
     Email: harrisa@harrisandruble.com
            dgarrett@harrisandruble.com
            mgal@harrisandruble.com


INFOGROUP INC: Schultz Sues Over TCPA Violation
-----------------------------------------------
MILTON SCHULZ, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. INFOGROUP INC., Defendant, Case No.
3:19-cv-01620-N (N.D. Tex., July 3, 2019) challenges Defendant's
practice of initiating autodialed telemarketing calls to cellular
telephones without the prior express written consent required by
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

Plaintiff sent letters to Defendant on January 22, 2019, and
February 21, 2019, and sent an e-mail to Defendant on or about
March 1, 2019, demanding that Defendant cease its attempts to
contact Plaintiff and informing Defendant that its conduct violated
the TCPA.

Despite Plaintiff's repeated demands, Defendant continued to
contact Plaintiff. Each time Defendant attempted to contact
Plaintiff, Defendant utilized an "automatic telephone dialing
system". Plaintiff seeks class-wide relief against Defendant for
violating the TCPA. A class action is the best means of obtaining
redress for Defendant's illegal telemarketing and is consistent
both with the private right of action afforded by the TCPA and the
fairness and efficiency goals of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, says the complaint.

Plaintiff is a private individual as well as the owner and operator
of a chiropractic facility located in Salina, Kansas.

Infogroup describes itself as a "big data, analytics and marketing
services provider that delivers best in class data-driven customer
centric technology solutions" and "provides both digital and
traditional marketing channel expertise that is enhanced by access
to our proprietary data on 245MM individuals and 25MM businesses,
which is distributed real-time to our clients".[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Collen A. Clark, Esq.
     Jacon L. von Plonski, Esq.
     CLARK & McCREA
     3500 Maple Avenue, Suite 1250
     Dallas, TX 75219
     Phone: 214-780-0500
     Fax: 214-780-0501
     Email: cclark@clarkmccrea.com
            eservice@clarkmccrea.com
            jake@clarkmccrea.com

          - and -

     Timothy J. Becker, Esq.
     Jennell K. Shannon, Esq.
     JOHNSON BECKER, PLLC
     444 Cedar Street, Suite 1800
     Saint Paul, MN
     Phone: 612-436-1800
     Fax: 612-436-1801
     Email: tbecker@johnsonbecker.com
            jshannon@johnsonbecker.com

          - and -

     Jason J. Thompson, Esq.
     SOMMERS SCHWARTZ, P.C.
     2000 Town Center, Suite 900
     Southfield, MI 48075
     Phone: 248-415-3206
     Fax: 248-436-8453
     Email: jthompson@sommerspc.com

          - and -

     Phillip A. Bock, Esq.
     Tod A. Lewis, Esq.
     BOCK, HATCH, LEWIS & OPPENHEIM, LLC
     134 N. La Salle Street, Suite 1000
     Chicago, IL 60602
     Phone: 312-658-5500
     Fax: 312-658-5555
     Email: phil@classlawyers.com
            tod@classlawyers.com


INTEGRITY SERVICE: Moyer Sues Over Overtime Wages
-------------------------------------------------
JAMES MOYER and KAREN MOYER for themselves, and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. INTEGRITY SERVICE GROUP, LLC,
DEANNA CHURCH, and REX CHURCH, Defendants, Case No.
3:19-cv-00198-TMR (S.D. Ohio, June 30, 2019) is an action brought
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act ("the FLSA"), and Ohio
Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act.

From the beginning of their employments through December 31, 2017,
Defendants did not pay Plaintiffs one-and-one-half times their
regular rate of pay for hours worked over 40 hours per workweek.
The Defendants paid Plaintiffs an hourly rate which was constant
regardless of the number of hours worked by Plaintiffs per
workweek, says the complaint.

Plaintiffs began working for Defendants as janitors in or around
March 2007 and in or around August 2012.

Integrity Service Group, LLC is an Ohio limited liability company
doing business in the Southern District of Ohio.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Angela J. Gibson, Esq.
     Brian G. Greivenkamp, Esq.
     GIBSON LAW, LLC
     9200 Montgomery Rd., Suite 11A
     Cincinnati, OH 45242
     Phone: (513) 834-8254
     Email: angela@gibsonemploymentlaw.com
            brian@gibsonemploymentlaw.com


ISLANDWIDE: Mikoda Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Compensation
---------------------------------------------------------
MARY MIKODA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. ISLANDWIDE GASTROENTEROLOGY PC, PHILLIP R.
CASSAR, individually and in his official capacity, and any other
related persons and/or entities, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-03715
(E.D. N.Y., June 26, 2019) is an action to recover for unpaid
overtime which Defendants failed to pay in violation of the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), and the New York Labor Law; failure
to provide Plaintiff with an accurate wage statement with each
payment as required by the NYLL; and failure to provide Plaintiff
with written notice of pay rate as required by the NYLL.

Plaintiff regularly worked over 40 hours per week, typically around
47 hours per week, from 2011 through approximately June 2017.
Plaintiff was not paid one and one-half times her regular hourly
rate for hours worked over 40 in a workweek. The Defendants failed
to provide Plaintiff with an accurate statement or notice of her
full wages, hours worked, regular rate of pay, overtime rate of
pay, or other information required by NYLL. The Defendants knew
that the foregoing acts violated the FLSA and the NYLL and would
economically injure Plaintiff and the other similarly situated
employees. The Defendants committed the foregoing acts knowingly,
intentionally and willfully, says the complaint.

Plaintiff worked a medical assistant for Defendants from
approximately 2011 through approximately May 2019.

Defendant Islandwide Gastroenterology, PC is a New York corporation
with a principal place of business at 1205 Franklin Avenue, Suite
150, Garden City, NY 11530.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Laura R. Reznick, Esq.
     BELL LAW GROUP, PLLC
     100 Quentin Roosevelt Boulevard, Suite 208
     Garden City, NY 11530
     Phone: 516.280.3008
     Fax: 212.656.1845
     Email: lr@belllg.com


J&W GRADING: Court Narrows Claims in M. Brown FLSA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico
issued a Memorandum granting in part and denying in part
Defendants' Motion for Dismiss in the case captioned MICHAEL BROWN,
JR.; NATHAN COLE; AARON FLOYD; BRANDON HORTON; ERIC MOORE; GREGORY
SEAL; MANNY RIVERA; DAN VISCHANSKY; NEAL NIDA; KEVIN SHOFNER; SHAUN
STOCKTON; KYRAN ADAMS; CODY PIPER; JOHN GABLE; DONNA TURBVILLE;
JOHN WILTERDING; and RICHARD PADILLA; individually, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated; Plaintiffs, v. J&W
GRADING, INC.; MIGO IQ, INC.; RADAR_APPS, INC.; ECO IQ LLC; CLOUD
IQ, LLC; SYNERGY, LLC; MOJO TRANSPORT, LLC; RONNIE GUTHRIE;
JONATHON KOTTHOFF; CAROL LEESE; JASON NEILITZ; IVELISSE ESTRADA
RIVERO; and DOES1-100; Defendants. Civil Action. No.
3:18-01263-WGY. (D.P.R.).

The Plaintiffs bring the present action seeking to recover unpaid
wages, overtime compensation, damages, and attorneys' fees if they
prevail on a series of claims including violations of the wage,
hour, and anti-retaliation provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) and Puerto Rico employment laws, breach of contract,
unjust enrichment, fraudulent inducement, conversion, and negligent
bailment.

FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT AND ASSOCIATED CLAIMS

The Plaintiffs bring three claims under the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA). They allege in counts I and II that the Defendants
violated the FLSA's wage and overtime protections and in count III
that the Technology Defendants violated the FLSA's prohibition on
retaliation against those exercising their rights under the
statute.

The Defendants are only liable for such violations if they are
employers of the Plaintiffs under the FLSA. Synergy, Rivero, ECO
IQ, Neilitz, Migo IQ, Kotthoff, and Leese ask this Court to dismiss
the FLSA claims against them on the grounds that they were not
employers of the Plaintiffs.  Cloud IQ, Mojo, and Radar_Apps do not
contest their FLSA employer liability.

The absence of available documentation describing the relationship
between the Plaintiffs and the Technology Defendants and their
owners does not overcome the compelling circumstantial evidence
that the Plaintiffs have alleged suggesting the existence of an
employer-employee relationship. Because the Plaintiffs adequately
allege that Synergy, Rivero, ECO IQ, Neilitz, Migo IQ, Kotthoff,
and Leese employed them pursuant to the FLSA, this Court denied all
motions to dismiss on this ground.

Employer Liability Under the FLSA

Under the FLSA, an employer is any person acting directly or
indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an
employee. The statute further defines the term employ to include to
suffer or permit to work.

This test directs courts to consider whether the alleged employer
(1) had the power to hire and fire the employees (2) supervised and
controlled employee work schedules or conditions of employment (3)
determined the rate and method of payment and (4) maintained
employment records.

The Plaintiffs allege facts suggesting the Technology Defendants14
were joint employers under the Baystate factors. This Court all but
ignores such conclusory statements as the Plaintiffs' allegation
that Synergy, ECO IQ, Cloud IQ, Migo IQ, Mojo, and J&W made
statements that they had the power to hire and fire Plaintiffs. The
Court pays more heed, however, to the following specific
allegation: In the January 28, 2018 meeting, Migo IQ and ECO IQ
identified various conduct that would get Plaintiffs `sent home,'
including not doing as instructed, self-monitoring and not using
the App. This allegation supports the claim that at least Migo IQ
and ECO IQ had the power to hire and fire the Plaintiffs,
satisfying the first Baystate factor.

The Plaintiffs also plausibly have alleged that Rivero, Kotthoff,
and Leese were joint employers pursuant to the FLSA. A corporate
officer with operational control of a corporation's covered
enterprise is an employer along with the corporation, jointly and
severally liable under the FLSA for unpaid wages. The Plaintiffs'
allegations that Kotthoff and Leese own and manage Synergy, ECO IQ,
Cloud IQ, and Migo IQ supported by specific allegations that
Kotthoff spoke with authority at meetings and reiterated that the
companies "were all working under one flag, and that Rivero owns
Synergy and ECO IQ, plausibly allege that they are also joint
employers pursuant to the FLSA."

In sum, given the sufficiency of the allegations suggesting the
FLSA employer liability of Synergy, Rivero, ECO IQ, Neilitz, Migo
IQ, Kotthoff, and Leese, the Court denied the motions to dismiss on
that ground.

Individual Coverage Under the FLSA

Some of the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs fail to establish
a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce for the FLSA to apply.  

The FLSA's minimum wage and overtime protections cover employees
engaged in commerce (individual coverage) or employed in an
enterprise engaged in commerce or the production of goods for
commerce (enterprise coverage).

The Plaintiffs urge the Court to rule that they are subject to FLSA
individual coverage because (1) they crossed state lines to
commence their work on the Project (2) residents of other
jurisdictions performing disaster relief in Puerto Rico inherently
are involved in interstate commerce (3) their activities were
necessary to reopen instrumentalities to make interstate commerce
free and unbounded and (4) their activities facilitated interstate
travel by individuals and Cloud IQ, Mojo, and Neilitz point to a
Fourth Circuit case for the proposition that transporting refuse is
an inherently local activity that cannot be the basis for
individual coverage. Many of the elements absent in Modern
Trashmoval on which the Fourth Circuit relied to rule that there
was no FLSA individual coverage there are, however, present here.


The Defendants also fail to mention that three years prior to the
Fourth Circuit's opinion in Modern Trashmoval, the First Circuit
reached a contrary conclusion on similar facts in Mitchellv. Dooley
Bros., Inc., 286 F.2d 40 (1st Cir. 1960). In Mitchell, the First
Circuit held that independent contractors engaged in local debris
collection from homes, businesses, and government agencies were
engaged in commerce, emphasizing that the removal of the debris
seems as closely related to the production of goods for commerce as
it does essential.

The Court is persuaded that the Plaintiffs adequately have
alleged16 that they engaged in interstate commerce as it is defined
in the FLSA by stating that they traveled to Puerto Rico,
transported tools and equipment from the continental United States
to Puerto Rico, employed those imported tools to clean up debris
across the island, and conducted disaster relief efforts in Puerto
Rico pursuant to a FEMA contract. The Court notes that while not
all of the Plaintiffs traveled to Puerto Rico for the Project,  the
Plaintiffs allege that they all employed tools that had been
transported from the continental United States, and some assisted
in unloading that equipment from barges upon its arrival in Puerto
Rico.

As the Plaintiffs plausibly allege that the Defendants were their
employers, as discussed above, and the Plaintiffs plausibly allege
individual coverage under the FLSA, each of the Defendants is
subject to the FLSA's reach.

Alleged Minimum Wage and Retaliation Violations

Because the Plaintiffs plausibly allege violations of the FLSA's
wage and retaliation provisions, the Court denied the Technology
Defendants' motions to dismiss counts I and III for failure to
state a claim. For the same reason, the Court denied the motions to
dismiss counts V and VII, Plaintiffs' claims based on corollary
provisions in Puerto Rican law.

In contesting the sufficiency of the Plaintiffs' wage violation
allegations, Cloud IQ, Mojo, Neilitz, and Guthrie point to the
absence of specific allegations regarding the daily flat pay rates
owed to the Plaintiffs, the specific two weeks for which they were
paid, the amount they were paid in the one paycheck they received,
an estimated number of unpaid hours, and the overall amount the
Plaintiffs were owed. They liken such gaps to those in Pruell,
where the First Circuit affirmed dismissal of an FLSA action where
the plaintiffs failed to allege specific estimates for the amount
unpaid and hours worked.  

While the Plaintiffs allege in a fairly conclusory manner that they
regularly worked over 8 hours per day and over 40 hours per week,
they provide more detail than the Pruell plaintiffs did and enough
to overcome the Defendants' motions.  

There is less great a need for specific numbers to calculate the
degree to which they were underpaid than in some other cases
because, as the Plaintiffs point out, no complicated mathematical
calculation is needed to determine that Plaintiffs were not paid
minimum wage if they received no payment at all for ten of twelve
weeks.  

Because these allegations suffice to state a plausible claim to
relief for violation of the minimum wage provisions of the FLSA,
and thus also the minimum wage provisions of the Puerto Rican code,
the Court denied the motions to dismiss on this ground.

Likewise, the Court denied the motion to dismiss for failure to
state a retaliation claim under the FLSA and Puerto Rico law.

To state a retaliation claim under FLSA section 15(a)(3), the
Plaintiffs must allege that (1) they engaged in a statutorily
protected activity and (2) the employer subjected them to an
adverse employment action (3) as a reprisal for having engaged in
protected activity.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants terminated them or
threatened to terminate them when they sought back pay and the
Defendants became aware that the Plaintiffs planned to bring a
lawsuit alleging violations of the FLSA.

These allegations squarely suffice to state a plausible claim of
retaliation.
Failure to Plead Overtime Violations

Some of the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs fail sufficiently
to plead overtime violations under the FLSA and Puerto Rican law.
The Court agrees that the Plaintiffs' allegations do not meet the
Pruell standards for pleading overtime violations, and dismissed
count II as to Cloud IQ, Mojo, Neilitz, Synergy, and Rivero and
count VII as to Cloud IQ, Mojo, and Synergy on their motions.

To defend the sufficiency of their overtime allegations, the
Plaintiffs attempt to rely again on the fact that "no complicated
mathematical calculation of hours worked overtime is needed if
their payments were simply never submitted. This is true, but the
Plaintiffs must allege specific instances in which they actually
worked overtime or provide other substantive content to elevate the
FLSA claims above the mere possibility of defendants' liability.

The Plaintiffs' allegations thatPlaintiffs often worked several
consecutive days that exceeded 8 hours and Plaintiffs were required
to work off the clock and were not paid for missed meal periods at
double the rate, closely resemble the claims the First Circuit
dismissed in Pruell as merely conclusory. With the Plaintiffs'
limited concrete factual allegations regarding overtime work here,
the Court granted the Defendants' motions to dismiss counts II and
VI for failure to state a claim.

BREACH OF THE PER DIEM AGREEMENT

Only Guthrie and ECO IQ moved to dismiss this count. Guthrie argues
that if he signed the Per Diem Agreement, he did so on behalf of
J&W and not in his personal capacity. He thus suggests that the
Plaintiffs cannot reach him without piercing the corporate veil and
insists that the complaint does not make a sufficient showing to do
so. The Plaintiffs posit that their complaint adequately alleges
alter ego liability via veil piercing. ECO IQ suggests that its
absence from the Subcontractor Agreement attached to the complaint
absolves it from liability.  

The Plaintiffs correctly note that they have pled enough to
establish a veil-piercing claim against Guthrie.  

The Plaintiffs may overcome Puerto Rican law's presumption of
corporate separateness where they allege that (1) the owner of a
corporation's level of control renders the corporation a mere shell
of the owner, and (2) the corporation is being used to sanction
fraud, provide injustice, evade obligations, defeat public policy,
justify inequity, protect fraud or defend crime. Here, the
complaint alleges that Guthrie owns J&W and that he is heavily
involved with J&W's day-to-day operations, especially regarding the
alleged misconduct, which includes a count of fraud. Consequently,
the complaint states a plausible claim for piercing the corporate
veil.

ECO IQ protests that the complaint fails to allege that it signed
the Subcontractor Agreement. The complaint does allege, however,
that ECO IQ agreed to pay the Plaintiffs a per diem and does not
allege that the Subcontractor Agreement is the only basis for ECO
IQ's promise to pay. ECO IQ cites no authority for the proposition
that the Plaintiffs had to produce evidence of the agreement
itself.  

As such, the Plaintiffs plausibly allege that ECO IQ breached an
agreement to pay them a per diem.

BREACH OF RENTAL AGREEMENT

In count IX, the Plaintiffs allege that J&W and the Technology
Defendants breached the Equipment Rental Agreement.  The Court
dismissed this count against all of the Technology Defendants as
the Plaintiffs fail to allege plausibly that the Technology
Defendants were parties to this agreement.

The Equipment Rental Agreement lists only J&W and the Plaintiffs as
parties. The Complaint nonetheless alleges that the Technology
Defendants manifested an intent to be bound by the Equipment Rental
Agreement. This allegation does not hold water, whether Puerto Rico
law or Virginia law (to which the parties agreed in the Equipment
Rental Agreement) applies.

Here, the Plaintiffs make no effort to show that they agreed with
any of the Technology Defendants on the contract's terms. See
generally Compl. Instead, they indicate instances in which the
Technology Defendants benefitted from the Equipment Rental
Agreement, such as through installing GPS and load tracking devices
in Plaintiffs' vehicles. They do not allege that any of the
Technology Defendants signed the Equipment Rental Agreement, that
they paid the Plaintiffs under it, or even that the Technology
Defendants were aware of it.   As such, they fail to allege that
the Technology Defendants were parties to the Equipment Rental
Agreement. The Court dismissed this count against all of them for
this reason.

UNJUST ENRICHMENT

Guthrie suggests that the Plaintiffs must pierce the corporate veil
in order to show his liability for unjust enrichment.  As described
above, the Plaintiffs have alleged enough to move forward on a
veil-piercing theory. ECO IQ contends that the complaint fails to
provide enough facts to make out an unjust enrichment claim against
it.

The complaint states a claim for unjust enrichment against ECO IQ:

To prove a claim for unjust enrichment under Puerto Rico law, the
following requirements must be present: (1) existence of enrichment
(2) a correlative loss (3) nexus between loss and enrichment (4)
lack of cause for enrichment and (5) absence of a legal precept
excluding application of enrichment without cause.

Here, the Plaintiffs allege that ECO IQ benefitted from their
labors on the Project through contract funding and advertising on
their trucks. Notwithstanding these efforts, ECO IQ did not pay the
Plaintiffs in full. As a result, the complaint establishes a
plausible unjust enrichment claim against ECO IQ.

FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT

The Court granted ECO IQ's motion for judgment on the pleadings on
the fraudulent inducement claim because the Plaintiffs fail to
allege any facts showing that ECO IQ deliberately induced
Plaintiffs to travel to Puerto Rico to work for them and that they
promised to pay Plaintiffs for their work and for the lease of
their property.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants fraudulently induced them
to accept employment.  
While there is some evidence that the J&W Defendants induced the
Plaintiffs to Puerto Rico for work on the Project, the complaint
attempts to bootstrap all the Defendants by stating that they acted
through Guthrie. Such an allegation as to ECO IQ is conclusory and
without any basis in other facts asserted. As such, the Court
granted judgment on the pleadings for ECO IQ on this claim.

CONVERSION

The Court likewise granted ECO IQ's motion for judgment on the
pleadings as to the conversion claim as the complaint is bereft of
allegations that ECO IQ specifically exercised control over the
Plaintiffs' equipment. Instead, the complaint offers conclusory
allegations such as that Defendants, and each of them, illegally
exercised and assumed authority over the Plaintiffs' equipment.
These allegations are insufficient to plead conversion.

The Court dismissed count II as to Cloud IQ, Mojo, Neilitz,
Synergy, Guthrie, and Rivero; count IV as to all of the Defendants;
count VI as to Cloud IQ, Mojo, and Synergy; count IX as to ECO IQ,
Cloud IQ, Mojo, Migo IQ, Radar_Apps, and Synergy; and counts XI and
XII as to ECO IQ. count II remains pending against ECO IQ, Migo IQ,
Radar_Apps, Kotthoff, and Leese, as does count VI as to ECO IQ,
Migo IQ, and Radar_Apps. Counts XI and XII remain pending against
Guthrie (albeit stayed), Cloud IQ, Mojo, Neilitz, Synergy, Rivero,
Migo IQ, Radar_Apps, Kotthoff, and Leese. Counts I, III, V, VII,
VIII, and X remain alive as to all of the Defendants against whom
they were brought although proceedings are stayed with regards to
the claims against the J&W Defendants.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 20, 2019 Memorandum
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y3leelrl from Leagle.com.

Michael Brown, Jr., Nathan Cole, Aaron Floyd, Brandon Horton, Eric
Moore, Gregory Seal, Manny Rivera, Dan Vischansky, Neal Nida, Kevin
Shofner, Shaun Stockton, Kyran Adams, Cody Piper, John Gable, Donna
Turbville, John Wilterding & Richard Padilla, Plaintiffs,
represented by L. Michelle Gessner, THE LAW OFFICES OF MICHELLE
GESSNER, PLLC, 435 East Morehead Street, Charlotte, North Carolina
28202, pro hac vice & Enrique J. Mendoza-Mendez, Mendoza Law
Office, Centro de Seguros Building701 Ponce de Leon Avenue, Suite
403San Juan, PR 00907

J&W Grading, Inc. & Ronnie Guthrie, Defendants, represented by
Sylvia M. Arizmendi-Lopez-de-V, Reichard & Escalera, PO Box 364148.
San Juan, PR 00936-4148, Carlos R. Rivera-Ortiz, 255 Ponce de Leon
AvenueMCS Plaza10th FloorSan Juan, PR 00917- 1913, Kelsey M. Martin
-- martin@gentrylocke.com -- Gentry Locke Rakes & Moore, LLP, Kirk
M. Sosebee -- sosebee@gentrylocke.com -- Gentry Locke Rakes &
Moore, LLP, pro hac vice & W. David Paxton -paxton@gentrylocke.com
-- Gentry Locke.

Eco Iq LLC, Defendant, represented by Carlos R. Sosa-Padro, Carlos
R. Sosa Padro Law Office, 281 Ave. Domenech, San Juan, Puerto Rico


J.F. SANTOS BAKERY: Pacheco Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Compensation
------------------------------------------------------------------
Jacinto Pacheco, on behalf of himself, and others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. J.F. SANTOS BAKERY, LTD., FERNANDO C.
SANTOS and JOHN SANTOS, Defendants, Case No. 7:19-cv-06153 (S.D.
N.Y., July 1, 2019) is an action seeking, inter alia, damages for
violations of overtime wages and unpaid wage provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), and the New York Codes, Rules, and
Regulations ("NYCCRR").

Plaintiff regularly worked 7 days a week in excess of forty hours
per week. From approximately October 2017 until his separation date
on or about August 13, 2018, Plaintiff worked 82.5 hours week.
Other similarly situated employees and/or workers also worked more
than 40 hours per week. Plaintiff and similarly situated workers
did not receive overtime pay, says the complaint.

Plaintiff worked with Defendants, at their bakery business for
approximately four and a half years from on or about April 2, 2013
until August 13, 2018.

Santos Bakery is engaged in the business of offering a variety of
baked goods, including breads, donuts, cakes and pastries and fresh
coffee to the public, serving food and drink to its customers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Michael Taubenfeld, Esq.
     FISHER TAUBENFELD LLP
     225 Broadway, Suite 1700
     New York, NY 10007
     Phone: (212) 571-0700
     Fax: (212) 505-2001


JANSSEN BIOTECH: Self-Insured Schools Sues Over Unlawful Scheme
---------------------------------------------------------------
SELF-INSURED SCHOOLS OF CALIFORNIA, on behalf of itself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. JANSSEN BIOTECH, INC.,
JANSSEN ONCOLOGY, INC., JANSSEN RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
JOHNSON & JOHNSON, and BTG INTERNATIONAL LIMITED, Defendants, Case
No. 2:19-cv-14291 (D. N.J., June 26, 2019) is a civil antitrust
action seeking to recover damages arising from Defendants' unlawful
scheme to prolong their monopoly in the market for abiraterone
acetate, which is used to treat patients with prostate cancer.
Plaintiff seeks an award of damages for itself and for the proposed
class of end-payors that purchased Zytiga (Defendants' branded
abiraterone acetate) indirectly from Defendants at supracompetitive
prices.

Federal law rewards inventors with a fixed period of patent
protection for their novel and non-obvious inventions. But once
their legally sanctioned monopoly ends, the law prohibits patent
holders from unlawfully prolonging their monopoly through
fraudulent patents, sham proceedings, and collusion. A patent
holder may not extend its monopoly by misrepresenting facts to the
Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") to obtain additional blocking
patents. The patent covering the chemical compound in Zytiga—U.S.
Patent No. 5,604,213 (the '213 Patent)—expired on December 13,
2016. Prior to the expiration of the '213 Patent, Defendants knew
that roughly a dozen generic manufacturers were ready, willing, and
able to introduce generic versions of Zytiga as soon as Defendants'
patent on the chemical compound expired. Such generic competition
would have reduced the price of abiraterone acetate by at least
80%, and Defendants would have reasonably expected to lose 90% or
more of Zytiga's market share.

To extend their supracompetitive profits for abiraterone acetate
beyond the legitimate exclusivity period secured by the '213
Patent, Defendants fraudulently obtained and asserted a second
patent to block generic entry after the expiration of the '213
Patent. The fraudulently obtained patent, U.S. Patent 8,822,438
(the '438 Patent), covers the use of abiraterone acetate in
combination with prednisone to treat prostate cancer. Prednisone is
one of the most commonly prescribed corticosteroids, which are
man-made drugs that closely resemble cortisol. Defendants had
previously tried to patent this method in an earlier application to
the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("Patent Office").
But, as the Patent Office stated in five separate rejections of
Defendants' submissions, the method of using abiraterone acetate in
combination with prednisone to treat prostate cancer was obvious
and thus not patentable.

After five failed attempts to prove that the combination of the two
drugs was not obvious, Defendants took the "commercial success"
approach in their sixth submission to the Patent Office. But
Defendants omitted a central fact that would have explained the
commercial success of Zytiga: The '213 Patent was a "blocking
patent" that prevented any other manufacturer from making any drug
product containing abiraterone acetate. In the absence of
Defendants' anticompetitive scheme to extend their monopoly on
abiraterone acetate beyond the term of the '213 Patent, generic
abiraterone acetate would have been available by December 2016, and
Plaintiff and the proposed class would have paid less for
abiraterone acetate products. Instead, Plaintiff and the proposed
class have paid hundreds of millions of dollars in overcharges as a
result of Defendants' anticompetitive scheme, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Self-Insured Schools of California ("SISC"), is a Joint
Powers Authority under California law that serves the interests of
California public school district members.

Janssen Biotech, Inc., is a corporation organized and existing
under the laws of Pennsylvania.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     PETER S. PEARLMAN, ESQ.
     COHN LIFLAND PEARLMAN HERRMANN & KNOPF LLP
     Park 80 West-Plaza One
     250 Pehle Avenue | Suite 401
     Saddle Brook, NJ 07663
     Phone: 201/845-9600
     Fax: 201/845-9423
     Email: psp@njlawfirm.com

          - and -

     Joseph R. Saveri, Esq.
     Steven N. Williams, Esq.
     Kevin Rayhill, Esq.
     OSEPH SAVERI LAW FIRM, INC.
     601 California Street, Suite 1000
     San Francisco, CA 94108
     Phone: (415) 500-6800
     Facsimile: (415) 395-9940

          - and -

     Dan Drachler, Esq.
     ZWERLING, SCHACHTER & ZWERLING, LLP
     1904 Third Avenue, Suite 1030
     Seattle, WA 98101-1170
     Phone: (206) 223-2053
     Facsimile: (206) 343-9636

          - and -

     Robert S. Schachter, Esq.
     Sona R. Shah, Esq.
     ZWERLING, SCHACHTER & ZWERLING, LLP
     41 Madison Avenue, 32nd Floor
     New York, NY 10010
     Phone: (212) 223-3900
     Facsimile: (212) 371-5969

          - and -

     Vincent J. Esades, Esq.
     Renae Steiner, Esq.
     HEINS MILLS & OLSON, P.L.C.
     310 Clifton Avenue
     Minneapolis, MN 55403


KIK INTERNATIONAL: McNeil Suit Removed to C.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned KEVIN MCNEIL, individually, and on behalf of
other members of the general public similarly situated; Plaintiff,
v. KIK INTERNATIONAL, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company;
KIK POOL ADDITIVES, INC., a California corporation; KIK CUSTOM
PRODUCTS, INC., a Texas corporation; and DOES 1 through 100,
inclusive; Defendants, Case No. CIV DS 1915438 was removed from the
Superior Court of California for the County of San Bernardino to
the United States District Court for the Central District of
California on June 28, 2019, and assigned Case No. 5:19-cv-01208.

In the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts eight causes of action,
including claims for: (1) unpaid overtime; unpaid meal periods; (3)
unpaid rest periods; (4) unpaid minimum wages; (5) final wages not
timely paid; (6) non-compliant wage statements; (7) unreimbursed
business expenses; and (8) unfair business practices.[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

     Gerald L. Maatman, Esq.
     Jennifer A. Riley, Esq.
     SEYFARTH SHAW LLP
     233 S. Wacker Drive, 80th Floor
     Chicago, IL 60606
     Phone: (312) 460-5000
     Facsimile: (312) 460-7000
     Email: gmaatman@seyfarth.com
            jriley@seyfarth.com

          - and -

     Justin Curley, Esq.
     Melissa B. Black, Esq.
     SEYFARTH SHAW LLP
     560 Mission Street, 31st Floor
     San Francisco, CA 94105
     Phone: (415) 397-2823
     Facsimile: (415) 397-8549
     Email: jcurley@seyfarth.com
            mblack@seyfarth.com


KULE LLC: Conner Alleges Violation under Disabilities Act
---------------------------------------------------------
Kule, LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant to the
Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as Mary Conner,
individually and as the representative of a class of similarly
situated persons, Plaintiff v. Kule, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-03872 (E.D. N.Y., July 3, 2019).

Kule, LLC's designs, manufactures, rents and sells form-fitted
products, including table lines and chair covers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Dan Shaked, Esq.
   Shaked Law Group, P.C.
   14 Harwood Court, Suite 415
   Scarsdale, NY 10583
   Tel: (917) 373-9128
   Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com



LEAVITT FAMILY: Persson Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Compensation
--------------------------------------------------------------
MICHELLE PERSSON, Individually, and on behalf of herself and other
similarly situated current and former employees, Plaintiffs, v.
LEAVITT FAMILY MEDICINE, PLLC a Tennessee Professional Limited
Liability Company, and PAUL J. LEAVITT, MD, individually,
Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-00552 (M.D. Tenn., July 1, 2019) is a
lawsuit brought against Defendants as a collective action under the
Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), to recover unpaid overtime
compensation and other damages owed to Plaintiff and other
similarly situated current and former employees of Defendants.

The Defendants violated the FLSA in that they failed to properly
pay Plaintiff for all hours she worked by not compensating her at
the rate of time and one-half her regular rate of pay for all the
hours worked over 40 hours in each workweek. Throughout the
statutory recovery period applicable to this action, Defendants
knew that the law required that the employees who worked for him be
paid overtime for each hour they worked over 40 in any given
workweek, says the complaint.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendants as a full time, hourly-paid
Medical Assistant from approximately December 10, 2018 until June
7, 2019.

Defendants' primary business is providing primary medical care to
patients as well as providing preventative medical services and
care for acute and chronic diseases.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     J. Russ Bryant, Esq.
     Robert E. Turner IV, Esq.
     Nathaniel A. Bishop, Esq.
     Robert E. Morelli, III, Esq.
     JACKSON, SHIELDS, YEISER & HOLT
     262 German Oak Drive
     Memphis, TN 38018
     Phone: (901) 754-8001
     Fax: (901) 759-1745
     Email: gjackson@jsyc.com
            rbryant@jsyc.com
            rturner@jsyc.com
            rmorelli@jsyc.com

          - and -

     Nina Parsley, Esq.
     PONCE LAW
     400 Professional Park Drive
     Goodlettsville, TN 37072
     Email: nina@poncelaw.com


LOUISIANA: Court Narrows Documents Production in DWCC Inmates' Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Louisiana, Shreveport Division, issued a Memorandum Order granting
in part and denying in part Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production
in the case captioned ANTHONY TELLIS, ET AL, v. JAMES M. LEBLANC,
ET AL. Civil Action No. 18-cv-0541. (W.D. La.).

The Advocacy Center, on behalf of inmates at the David Wade
Correctional Center (DWCC), filed this putative class action to
seek injunctive relief with respect to the mental health care
afforded inmates who are held in extended lockdown on the south
compound in buildings N-1 through N-4, which are solitary
confinement and extended lockdown tiers.
  
Request for Production No. 3

The Plaintiffs request all documents and communications related to
Administrative Remedy Procedures (ARP) regarding 15 prisoners,
including the two named plaintiffs. Plaintiffs claim that
Defendants did not provide responsive documents for inmates Hearne
and Palmer, nor did Defendants certify that they had no such
documents.

The Defendants respond that Palmer has not been housed at the
facility since June 2017 and that there are no responsive documents
for either offender. Therefore, Defendants should have responsive
documents as to Palmer. Plaintiffs also request that Defendants
certify that they have no responsive documents as to Hearne.

Granted in part. If Palmer submitted ARPs while at DWCC, then
Defendants are ordered to produce the requested documents.

Request for Production No. 4

The Plaintiffs request all documents and communications related to
ARPs on the topics of mental health, medication management, tier
temperature, use of force, Policy 34, and interference with the
mail system. Plaintiffs argue that Defendants have only provided
ARPs for the two named Plaintiffs as well as individuals named in
other requests, but the complete response should include ARPs on
the specified topics filed by anyone on extended lockdown.

The Defendants objected to the request on the basis that the
request sought information that was not relevant or admissible.
Defendants also objected to the extent that the request called for
a determination of what documents or classes of documents are
related to the specified topics. The Defendants further objected on
the basis that the request sought confidential information and was
unduly burdensome.

Granted. The Defendants have not met their burden of showing the
request is unduly burdensome.  

Request for Production No. 5

The Plaintiffs seek all mental health records for certain
offenders. The Plaintiffs claim that the records produced by the
Defendants contain certain gaps in the records, that some of the
records are lacking signatures, and that there was no record
provided for inmate Palmer. The Defendants respond that there are
no additional documents that have not already been provided. They
state that the missing signatures are due to the records being
printed from DWCC's system. Finally, no documents were produced for
Palmer because he is not housed at DWCC.

Denied. The court cannot force Defendants to produce something they
do not have.

Request for Production No. 6

The Plaintiffs request all documents related to suicide watch or
extreme suicide watch for prisoners placed on either status during
the relevant time period. The Defendants objected to the request on
the basis that it called for a determination of what documents are
related to suicide watch and to the extent that the request sought
confidential information. Subject to those objections, the
Defendants did provide some responsive documents.

Granted in part. The request is very overbroad as written, but the
court will modify it include only the documents that were created
by Defendants as a result of specific prisoners, to be identified
by Plaintiffs, being placed on either type of suicide watch status
during the relevant time period.

Request for Production No. 7

The Plaintiffs seek documents sufficient to show the names, job
title, and dates of employment of all mental health and medical
staff employed by or contracting with DWCC. Plaintiffs assert that
Defendants have not provided end dates for some of the staff.
Defendants respond that they provided a responsive document, but it
did not contain the end dates. Defendant argues that, pursuant to
Stevens v. Omega Protein, Inc., 2002 WL 1022507, *3 (E.D. La.
2002), a request for production cannot compel the production of a
document. Defendants state that they can provide end dates for the
employees informally or through another discovery device.

Granted in part as follows. Defendants are directed to provide the
end dates informally (but in writing).

Request for Production No. 8

Plaintiffs request all documents sufficient to show the monthly
inventory of all mental health medications at DWCC within the last
12 months. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants objected on the basis
that they did not possess any responsive documents but referred to
the medicine administration records and prescription records
attached to their response to Request for Production No. 9.

Defendants argue that DWCC does not have an onsite pharmacy, and
its pharmacy needs are fulfilled by the Elayn Hunt Correctional
Center, which is not a party to this suit. In their reply,
Plaintiffs point out that the records of Elayn Hunt are under the
custody and control of defendant LDPSC.

Granted. The court does not believe it would be difficult for
Defendants to obtain this inventory information from Elayn Hunt.

Request for Production No. 9

Plaintiffs request all documents related to DWCC's prescription
drug database. Plaintiffs allege that defendants did not provide
any documents related to DWCC's prescription drug database but only
provided pill call logs for a small number of individuals.

Defendant objected to the request as vague with regard to the term
database. Defendant asserts that it does not have a prescription
drug database within the intent of the request as its pharmacy
needs are fulfilled by Elayn Hunt.

Denied. This request is redundant of No. 8.

Request for Production No. 11

Plaintiffs requested all unusual occurrence reports during the
relevant time period pertaining to several individuals. Defendant
did not provide reports for inmates Blanchard, Johnson, Kelly, or
Palmer. Defendant objected to the request on the basis that it
sought information regarding offenders who were not named
plaintiffs and who had not authorized release of their information.
Defendants again state that Palmer is not housed at DWCC, and
Defendants have not located any responsive documents as to Johnson
and Kelly. Defendants also claim that they have provided several
reports relating to Blanchard, contrary to Plaintiff's assertion.

Granted. Defendants shall produce the information requested to the
extent it exists.

Request for Production No. 12

Plaintiffs request documents that show every instance in which a
prisoner has been admitted to the DWCC infirmary due to
self-inflicted injuries. Defendants objected on the basis that the
request was overbroad and unduly burdensome, sought protected
health information, and was vague as to the term self-inflicted
injuries. Defendants claim that they asked for clarification as to
that term, but Plaintiffs did not provide clarification. Defendants
argue that the request would require them to review all infirmary
admissions and evaluate them for whether or not a given injury was
self-inflicted.

Granted, but only as to documents created by Defendants from
February 20, 2017 until this order was issued.

Request for Production No. 14

Plaintiffs request all documents related to any internal
investigations or analyses of the mental health care system at
DWCC. Defendants' response to the request referenced an Excel
spreadsheet, but Plaintiffs had not received that spreadsheet. In
their response to the motion, Defendants state that they have
located that spreadsheet and will make it available to Plaintiffs
for inspection and copying.

Granted, but the scope is narrowed to any document within the
possession, custody, or control of Defendants (including the
spreadsheet) that reports on, summarizes, or describes the findings
or results of any internal investigation or analysis of the mental
health care system at DWCC for the three years before suit was
filed until the present.

Request for Production No. 15

Plaintiffs request documents sufficient to show all contracts with
third-party health care providers effective at any time during the
relevant time period. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants have only
provided responsive documents for 2018-2019, but none for 2017.  

Defendants objected to providing the expired contracts as having no
relevance to claims for relief or the current conditions at DWCC.
But Plaintiffs argue that the expired contracts are relevant to
demonstrate obligations of parties to the contract during the
period the contract was effective.  
Granted. Defendants' objections are overruled. The information is
relevant to the claims and defenses in this case.

Request for Production No. 16

Plaintiffs request all communications with third party health care
providers at DWCC regarding patient mental health care or treatment
during the relevant period. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants only
pointed to the records produced in response to RFP 5, but this
request was not limited to the individuals in RFP 5 and is broader
than the contents of individual health care records.

Defendants respond that the request is unduly burdensome as it
would require them to identify all communications with any health
care provider over a two-year period and to review the substance of
any identified communications to determined whether they regard
mental health care or treatment.
Denied. The request is overbroad.

Request for Production No. 18

Plaintiffs request all documents related to instances in which a
prisoner was disciplined or threatened with discipline for
malingering, including any sick call forms leading to such
discipline or threated discipline. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants
have only provided the updated policies on malingering, not the
individual charges.

Defendants object to the request as being overly broad and unduly
burdensome and on the basis that it seeks protected health
information. Defendants produced a report that identified 112
malingering reports during the relevant time period. Defendants
also point out that malingering is no longer a rule violation
system-wide.

Granted in part. Defendants shall produce the disciplinary reports
for any prisoner who was actually disciplined for malingering as a
result of putting in a request for a mental health related sick
call during the relevant time period.

Request for Production No. 22

Plaintiffs request video recordings documenting the use of force
against any prisoner in extended lockdown at DWCC. Plaintiffs claim
that they are missing all footage between June 2017 and November
2017. Plaintiffs and Defendants give conflicting stories as to the
production of the recordings. Defendants assert that they
previously made these videos available for copying and inspecting,
but Plaintiffs did not copy the missing videos. Plaintiffs claim
that they arranged to inspect the videos, but the staff at the
prison did not allow them time to inspect and copy the videos.
Instead, Warden Goodwin handed Plaintiffs' counsel a hard drive
containing video footage.
Defendants state that they will make the videos available to
Plaintiffs for inspection and copying again. Therefore, this issue
is moot.

Request for Production No. 23

Plaintiffs request unusual occurrence reports of any use of force
in extended lockdown from January 2016 to the present date.
Defendants objected to the request on the basis that some of the
reports contained HIPAA information, but Plaintiffs argue that
Defendants did not supplement the request after the court entered a
HIPAA stipulation. Defendants respond that they have provided all
of the requested reports and that Plaintiffs do not point to any
specific documents they seek. Defendants contend that their
response to this request is complete.

Denied. The court cannot force Defendants to produce documents that
do not exist.

Request for Production No. 24

Plaintiffs request the names and mental health records of any
prisoners transferred from DWCC to Elayn Hunt between January 1,
2016 and the present. Plaintiffs state that Defendants have only
provided a list of names of those transferred subject to an
objection that the requested information was protected under
HIPAA.

Defendants respond that the request seeks records for offenders
housed at Elayn Hunt, therefore, the records are at that facility
rather than at DWCC.

Granted as to those prisoners who were transferred during the time
period requested for the purpose of providing mental health
treatment.

Request for Production No. 27

Plaintiffs request the tier card swipe records and tier log books
from building N4 for several months. Defendants objected to the
request on the basis that it was not possible to produce the
records as requested. Defendants did provide punch history reports
in response to another request, which Plaintiffs claim contradict
the objection.

Defendants respond that they produced over 3,000 pages of log books
for the requested areas. They claim that the requested swipe card
data is searchable and exportable by card, not by location.
Accordingly, it would require hundreds of hours to review the data
and provide the information as requested. Defendants also state
that the log books produced provide the information sought.
Denied. Defendants' production is sufficient.

Request for Production No. 30

Plaintiffs request all documents showing dates of purchase and
delivery for all body cameras received at DWCC. Defendants objected
on the basis that the documents sought are not reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, but
they did provide 15 pages of responsive documents. Plaintiffs ask
whether any records have been withheld or whether the documents
produced constitute all documents. Defendants respond that, to
their knowledge, the response was complete at the time it was
made.

Granted in part as follows. Defendants shall specify whether
documents were withheld on the basis of their objections or whether
all responsive documents have been produced. If the production is
not complete, Defendants shall produce the remaining documents.

Interrogatory No. 3

Plaintiffs seek a description of the qualifications and job
description for the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
coordinator position at DWCC. Defendants answered by stating that
there was no ADA coordinator at DWCC, but they identified an ADA
liaison" position. Plaintiffs requested a supplement with the
liaison position description or clarification, but Defendants did
not answer the request.

Defendants respond that requiring Defendants to describe the
position of ADA liaison is tantamount to a new request and that
their response to the interrogatory as originally written is
complete. In their reply, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants are
playing a word game. Plaintiffs point out that Angie Huff's name
and the title "ADA coordinator were prominently displayed on the
bulletin board in the security building, and the request was based
on this posting.
Granted. Defendants' objection is frivolous and is borderline
sanctionable.
  
Plaintiffs' Third Set of Requests for Production

In these requests, Plaintiffs seek various documents related to
Torre Huber, an inmate who died on July 21, 2018. His autopsy
indicated that he died a natural death incident to cardiovascular
disease and COPD.  

Defendants respond that these requests constitute a fishing
expedition, and Plaintiffs have not articulated why the requested
documents would be relevant to their claims. Defendants point out
that Huber, who died of natural causes, was not participating in
the instant suit.

Denied as unduly burdensome and not proportional to the needs of
this case. Defendants' response is sufficient.

Request for Production No. 51

Plaintiffs request documents showing which educational programs and
curriculum are offered to any prisoners at DWCC and documents
showing housing requirements for participation. Plaintiffs argue
that the documents are relevant to the allegations in the complaint
pertaining to the lack of educational or other programs available
to inmates housed on extended lockdown.

Defendants objected to the request as vague, not relevant, overly
broad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the
case. Defendants argue that educational programs are not germane to
the system of health at DWCC and pulling all documents regarding
such programs over a two-year period is overly burdensome.

Granted but only as to programs available, if any, to prisoners on
extended lockdown.

Request for Production No. 52

Plaintiffs request documents showing licensure of any and all staff
employed at DWCC. Plaintiffs claim that they are missing documents
pertaining to Aeriel Robinson, Nicki McCoy, Steve Hayden, and
Johnie Adkins. Defendants claim that these persons are either not
licensed or work in a position at DWCC that does not require a
license. Defendants state that they have provided all license
documents in their possession.

Denied. Defendants' response is sufficient.

Request for Production No. 53

Plaintiffs request all logs or documents related to any chemical
agent/OC spray/pepper spray/mace, specifically including documents
showing use and purchase. Plaintiffs allege that the documents
produced by Defendants had descriptions of items redacted, having
the name blacked out on every single line item on every page, with
no reason given for the redaction. Plaintiffs provided a copy of
the redacted documents. Defendants respond that they produced the
documents as they exist, and nothing was redacted from the
documents.

Granted. The names of the products are redacted. Defendants shall
either produce unredacted documents or explain in detail who
redacted the documents and why.

Request for Production No. 56

Plaintiffs request all documents related to individuals who have
died while in the custody of DWCC in the last 6 years, whether the
death occurred on DWCC grounds or offsite. Plaintiffs contend that
they are missing any critical incident reviews or suicide reviews.
Defendants respond that all responsive documents have been produced
with one exception, which relates to documents related to an
offender who was shot during an escape attempt. As that matter is
an ongoing investigation by outside agencies, Defendants cannot
produce those documents.

Denied. The court cannot order Defendants to produce documents that
do not exist.
Request for Production No. 57

Plaintiffs request all documents related to the recent change in
status and use of the N-1 dorm. Plaintiffs claim that defendants
did not provide responsive documents to this request. Defendants
respond that they have provided these documents, which can be found
at DWCC 016520-016527.
Plaintiffs claim that these documents were attached to another
request and were not specifically identified in Defendants response
to this request. Plaintiffs argue that they should not have to
guess which documents are responsive to a particular request.

Granted. Defendants shall supplement their response and specify
which documents are responsive to this request.  

Request for Production No. 58

Plaintiffs request all Classification Review Board documents and
results related to extended lockdown. Defendants objected to the
request as overly broad, unduly burdensome, and not relevant.
Plaintiffs argue that the core of the complaint is that individuals
with mental illness are held on lockdown without any determination
as to whether they have a mental health condition that would make
such placement improper. Plaintiffs assert that the requested
documents are relevant to the issues of numerosity and commonality
for disability discrimination and failure to provide reasonable
accommodations in classification decisions.

Defendants argue that the requested documents are voluminous and
would be expensive to produce as classification reviews are done at
least every 90 days and are stored by individual offender.
Defendants also claim that many of these documents have been
produced in the files of individual offenders. Defendants also
argue that Plaintiffs have not offered any explanation for why the
material is needed.

Granted in part as follows. Plaintiffs shall identify up to 15
additional prisoners, and Defendants shall provide the reviews for
those prisoners for the time period requested.

Request for Production No. 59

Plaintiffs request all letters between prisoners on the south
compound of DWCC and staff. Defendants objected to the request as
unduly burdensome and overly broad. Defendant argues that they
receive letters routinely, but these documents are not generally
kept during the course of operations at DWCC. Defendants stated
that they will attempt to locate any specific communications that
Plaintiffs identify and request.

Denied for lack of specificity and undue burden (as written).

Request for Production 60

Plaintiff request the complete prison records of 27 inmates,
including pill call records. Plaintiffs claim that they are missing
the "Master Prison File" for inmate Joe Smith. Plaintiffs also
claim that the medical/mental health records are incomplete for 11
of the individuals.

Defendants originally objected to the request as overbroad and
unduly burdensome; however, they did produce over 36,000 pages of
responsive documents. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs did not
confer on this issue, and it was raised for the first time in this
motion, but Plaintiffs dispute this allegation.  

Granted. Defendants shall provide the requested information if they
have not already done so.
Request for Production No. 61

Plaintiffs request all health pathology and other temperature
monitoring logs for extended lockdown (N-1, N-2, N-3, and N-4
buildings). Plaintiffs claim that Defendants provided the tier log
books, but no temperature-specific log books or records of heat
pathology precautions were provided. Defendants respond that they
have provided over 41,000 pages of responsive documents and a
complete response to the request has been furnished.

Denied. Defendants represent that they complied with this request.

Request for Production No. 63

Plaintiffs request documents reflecting or pertaining to staff
entry onto or presence in the lockdown buildings, including swipe
card/access card records and log books. Plaintiffs claim that,
despite objecting to the request as burdensome and not possible,
Defendants provided a Punch History Report that appears to account
for the locations and months requested. Defendants respond that
they have already verified that the response to this request is
complete.

Plaintiffs offer to view all swipe card records in Defendants'
possession and undertake the burden of sorting through that data to
organize it by building and date. Plaintiffs argue that the
hand-written log books are not an adequate substitute for the
documents they seek, so the Defendants' response is not complete.

Granted as follows. Defendants shall either produce all swipe card
records for the five months requested (this will minimize the
burden of sorting the information by building or tier) or permit  

Request for Production No. 64

Plaintiffs seeks documents showing all prisoner call outs for any
reason from lockdown for five specified months. Defendants did not
produce any responsive documents and objected to the request as
overboard, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of
the case. Defendants argue that the request would require them to
review all documents evidencing offender movement and pull and copy
the ones that are responsive. Defendants claim that this is likely
thousands of documents, and thus the request is not proportional to
the needs of the case.

Denied. The request is unduly burdensome as written.

Request for Production No. 68

Plaintiffs request any and all policies pertaining to heat
precautions. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants raised objections and
stated that the relevant policies were attached, but none of the
documents are identified as responsive. Defendants did not address
this request in their response.
Granted. If this information was already produced, Defendants shall
identify the relevant policies with specificity.

Interrogatory No. 16

Plaintiffs ask Defendants to identify the names of all people in
the mental health caseload or receiving mental health care on the
dates of January 1, 2017 and January 1, 2018. Plaintiffs claim that
Defendants provided information as of November 2018. Plaintiffs
argue that knowing how many people were on the mental health
caseload at any given time is key to establishing the central
issues to class certification and numerosity.

Defendants respond that the information cannot be determined
without significant burden because the records cannot be exported
as of a specific date. Rather, Defendants would have to review the
entire database and retrieve individually those persons receiving
treatment as of those specific dates. Plaintiffs reply that
Defendants have offered no evidence or affidavits that would show
pulling the records is an undue burden.

Granted. The parties shall confer by telephone and determine how
this information can be obtained without significant burden or
expense on Defendants.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 20, 2019 Memorandum
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yyamnnxa from
Leagle.com.

Bruce Charles, on behalf of themselves and all other smimilarly
situated prisoners at David Wade Correctional Center, Plaintiff,
represented by Jonathan Cameron Trunnell -- trunnell@gmail.com --
Advocacy Center,Bruce W. Hamilton, American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation of LA, Katharine Murphy Schwartzmann, American Civil
Liberties Union Foundation of LA,  P.O. Box 56157. New Orleans, LA
70156, Melanie Ann Bray, Advocacy Center of LA, Ronald Kenneth
Lospennato, Advocacy Center & Sarah H. Voigt, Advocacy Center, 8325
Oak Street; New Orleans, LA 70118

Advocacy Center of Louisiana, Plaintiff, represented by Jonathan
Cameron Trunnell, Advocacy Center, Katharine Murphy Schwartzmann,
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of LA,Melanie Ann Bray,
Advocacy Center of LA, Ronald Kenneth Lospennato, Advocacy Center &
Sarah H. Voigt, Advocacy Center.

James M LeBlanc, Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Public
Safety and Corrections, Jerry Goodwin, Warden of David Wade
Correctional Center, Lonnie Nail, Col, Deborah Dauzat, Assistant
Warden & Johnie Adkins, Defendants, represented by Margaret Annette
C. Collier, LA Dept of Justice, Connell L. Archey -connell@kswb.com
-- Kantrow Spaht et al, George Prentiss Holmes -- george@kswb.com
-- Kantrow Spaht et al, Keith Joseph Fernandez -- keith@kswb.com --
Kantrow Spaht et al & Randal J. Robert -- randy@kswb.com -- Kantrow
Spaht et al.

Gregory Seal, Dr & Aerial Robinson, Defendants, represented by
Margaret Annette C. Collier, LA Dept of Justice, Connell L. Archey,
Kantrow Spaht et al, George Prentiss Holmes, Kantrow Spaht et al &
Randal J. Robert, Kantrow Spaht et al.


MADISON COUNTY, TN: Grayson Sues Over Unpaid Compensations
----------------------------------------------------------
NATASHA GRAYSON, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. MADISON COUNTY, TENNESSEE, Defendant, Case
No. 1:19-cv-01136-STA-tmp (W.D. Tenn., July 3, 2019) is an action
to recover wages and damages owed under the Fair Labor Standards
Act ("FLSA").

The Defendants failure to pay the named Plaintiff and Plaintiff
class member for all time worked resulted, not only in them not
being paid for all of the hours they worked but also required them
to work time in excess of 40 hours per week for which they were not
paid an overtime premium. The Defendants failed to maintain
accurate time records of the time named Plaintiff and Plaintiff
class members worked at the beginning and end of each shift, says
the complaint.

Plaintiff was hired by Defendant to work in various positions at
the jail(s) operated by the Defendant located in Jackson, Madison
County, Tennessee.

Madison County, Tennessee, is a governmental entity duly
incorporated under the laws of the State of Tennessee.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Michael L. Weinman, Esq.
     WEINMAN & ASSOCIATES
     101 N. Highland Ave.
     P.O. Box 266
     Jackson, TN 38302
     Telephone: (731) 423-5565
     Facsimile: 731-423-5372
     Email: mike@weinmanthomas.com


MDL 2741: Rogers v. Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated
------------------------------------------------------------
JUDITH B. ROGERS, as the Personal Representative of THE ESTATE OF
JOSEPH N. ROGERS, SR., deceased,, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO
COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, the Defendant, Case No.
3:19-cv-00551 (Filed May 15, 2019) was transferred from the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Florida, to the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California (San
Francisco) on July 3, 2019. The Northern District of California
Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:19-cv-03836-VC to the proceeding.

The suit seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiffs, as a
direct and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and
wrongful conduct in connection with the design, development,
manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising,
distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM),
containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Joseph N.
Rogers, Sr.'s injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiffs brings this action for personal injuries sustained
by exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.

The Rogers Case is being consolidated with MDL 2741 in re: Roundup
Products Liability Litigation. The MDL was created by Order of the
United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on October
3, 2016. These actions share common factual questions arising out
of allegations that Monsanto's Roundup herbicide, particularly its
active ingredient, glyphosate, causes non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. The
Plaintiffs allege that they or their decedents developed
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma after using Roundup over the course of
several or more years. The Plaintiffs also alleges that the use of
glyphosate in conjunction with other ingredients, in particular the
surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA), renders Roundup
even more toxic than glyphosate on its own. Issues concerning
general causation, the background science, and regulatory history
will be common to all actions.

In its October 3, 2016 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions
in this MDL involve common questions of fact, and that
centralization in the Northern District of California will serve
the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just
and efficient conduct of this litigation. Centralization will
eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings (including with respect to discovery, privilege, and
Daubert motion practice); and conserve the resources of the
parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the
MDL is Hon. Judge Vince Chhabria. The lead case is
3:16-md-02741-VC.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Christopher Shakib, Esq.
          TERRELL HOGAN & YEGELWEL, P.A.
          233 East Bay Street, 8 th Floor
          Jacksonville, FL 32202
          Telephone: (904) 632-2424
          Facsimile: (888) 575-3241
          E-mail: shakib@terrellhogan.com
                  jfleury@terrellhogan.com

MDL 2850: Court Narrows Claims in No-Poach Antitrust Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania issued an Opinion granting in part and denying in
part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned IN RE:
RAILWAY INDUSTRY EMPLOYEE NO-POACH ANTITRUST LITIGATION. This
Document Relates to: All Actions Master Docket: Misc. No. 18-798,
MDL No. 2850. (W.D. Pa.).

The Defendants, who are railway equipment suppliers and their
subsidiaries, filed a joint motion to (a) dismiss the consolidated
class action complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6).

In this multi-district antitrust putative class action, plaintiffs1
allege defendants, their employers, violated the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. Section 1, by entering into unlawful no-poach agreements
pursuant to which defendants agreed to not hire or solicit each
other's employees.

Here, the defendants argue that the plaintiffs' claim should be
dismissed because the claim is subject to a rule of reason analysis
and plaintiffs did not allege the relevant market in the
consolidated class action complaint.  

The Plaintiffs respond that they adequately alleged a per se
violation of the antitrust laws, and, therefore, they are not
required to plead a relevant market. At this stage of the
proceedings, plaintiffs have the better view on this issue.

In this case, based upon the allegations in the consolidated class
action complaint, the answer to the first question, i.e., whether
the challenged conduct truly involves a horizontal restraint
between actual or potential competitors allocating markets or
customers, reducing output, or otherwise restricting competition
between them, would be "yes." The Supreme Court of the United
States has explained: One of the classic examples of a per se
violation of Section 1 is an agreement between competitors at the
same level of the market structure to allocate territories in order
to minimize competition. Indeed, one treatise has explained: An
agreement among employers that they will not compete against each
other for the services of a particular employee or prospective
employee is, in fact, a service division agreement, analogous to a
product division agreement.

Here, plaintiffs allege that Wabtec, Knorr, and Faiveley N.A. along
with their subsidiaries were the largest railroad industry
suppliers, i.e., they were at the same level of the market, and
they agreed to not hire each other's employees, i.e., they entered
into an agreement to allocate their employees to minimize
competition for the employees. Thus, plaintiffs plausibly alleged
that defendants' agreements constituted horizontal restraints of
competition with respect to defendants' employees.

The Plaintiffs also plausibly alleged that defendants' horizontal
product division agreements are naked agreements. A naked agreement
is an agreement among competitors with no plausible efficiency
justifications. Plaintiffs in the consolidated class action
complaint do not allege any basis upon which the court could
reasonably infer that the agreements had any procompetitive results
or were somehow ancillary to a proper business dealing or purpose.
Under those circumstances, plaintiffs plausibly alleged that the
no-poach agreements described in the consolidated class action
complaint were horizontal service division agreements, which, like
product division agreements would be, are per se unlawful under the
antitrust laws. Plaintiffs, therefore, are not required to plead
the requirements of a rule of reason analysis, e.g., relevant
market.

The motion to dismiss will, therefore, be denied without prejudice
with respect to this issue. Defendants may raise this issue if
warranted in a motion for summary judgment.

Plausibility of Claim for Antitrust Conspiracy

Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides, in pertinent part:

Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.

To state a Section 1 claim, then, a plaintiff must allege (1) an
agreement (2) to restrain trade unreasonably. A private plaintiff
suing under the Clayton Act must also allege antitrust standing,
including that its injury is of the type the antitrust laws were
intended to prevent and flows from that which makes defendants'
acts unlawful.

Here, plaintiffs allege that the defendants entered into three
bilateral agreements: (1) beginning no later than 2009 and lasting
at least until 2016, Wabtec's and Knorr's senior executives entered
into an express no-poach agreement and then actively managed it
with each other through direct communications (2) beginning no
later than 2011 and lasting until at least 2015, senior executives
at Knorr and Faiveley N.A. reached an express no-poach agreement
that included a commitment to contact one another before pursuing
an employee of the other company and actively managed the agreement
through direct communications and(3) beginning no later than 2014
and lasting at least until the companies merged in 2016, senior
executives at Wabtec and Faiveley N.A. entered into a no-poach
agreement in which the companies agreed not to hire each other's
employees without approval from the other company and actively
managed and enforced the agreement through direct communications.

The allegations plausibly show that there existed three bilateral
agreements to restrain competition for employees in the railway
equipment supplier industry. Issues remain, however, about: (1)
whether plaintiffs set forth factual allegations to show plausibly
that Wabtec, Knorr, and Faiveley N.A. were members of an
overarching conspiracy and (2) if so, when the overarching
conspiracy began.

The Plaintiffs plausibly alleged that by 2014 Wabtec, Knorr, and
Faiveley N.A. were engaged in three separate bilateral
conspiracies. Plaintiffs, however, did not set forth factual
allegations from which the court could conclude it is plausible
that Wabtec in 2009 up until 2014 knew about Knorr and Faiveley
N.A.'s agreement, Knorr knew about Wabtec and Faiveley N.A.'s
agreement, or Faiveley N.A. knew about Wabtec and Knorr's
agreement. Plaintiffs, however, may prove the existence of an
overarching conspiracy via circumstantial evidence. Plaintiffs'
allegations are sufficient to support a reasonable inference that
at least by 2014 when all three competitors had entered into
no-poach agreements they were engaged in conduct that would limit
competition for the employees of each company, i.e., it is
plausible they each entered into an overarching agreement to
refrain from competing for employees with their top rivals.

The Plaintiffs also plausibly alleged something more from which a
reasonable inference can be drawn that by 2014, Wabtec, Knorr, and
Faiveley N.A. were members of an overarching conspiracy to refrain
from competing against each other with respect to employees. First,
plaintiffs assert that Wabtec, Knorr, and Faiveley N.A. each had a
motive to enter into an overarching agreement. Plaintiffs allege:

Wabtec, Knorr, and Faiveley N.A. were the three largest rail
equipment suppliers and some of the largest employers in the rail
industry; there is a high demand for and limited supply of skilled
employees who have rail industry experience; directly soliciting
employees from other rail industry employers is a particularly
efficient and effective method of competing for qualified
employees; in a properly functioning and lawfully competitive labor
market, rail industry employers compete with one another to attract
highly-skilled talent for their employment needs and the
competition benefits employees because it increases the available
job opportunities and improves an employee's ability to negotiate
for a better salary and other terms of employment.

Based upon the foregoing allegations, it is plausible to infer that
by 2014, Wabtec, Knorr, and Faiveley N.A. each had a motive to join
an overarching conspiracy because: (1) they were each other's
biggest competitors for skilled employees; and (2) they each
entered into bilateral agreements with their two largest
competitors. An overarching agreement among all three of the
largest rail equipment suppliers would place Wabtec, Knorr, and
Faiveley N.A. on equal footing with respect to competition for
employees from their largest competitors. In any event, the 2016
acquisition of Faiveley by Wabtec resulted in Faiveley N.A.
becoming part of the bilateral conspiracy between Wabtec and
Knorr.

The Plaintiffs set forth factual allegations sufficient to show
plausibly that the entry into the bilateral agreements was contrary
to the competitive interests of Wabtec, Knorr, and Faiveley N.A.:
By soliciting and hiring employees from other rail industry
employers, a company is able to take advantage of the efforts its
rival has expended in identifying and training the employees, while
simultaneously inflicting a cost on the rival by removing an
employee on whom the rival may depend.By entering into the
bilateral agreements, Wabtec, Knorr, and Faiveley N.A. forfeited
the advantages gained from soliciting and hiring their competitors'
employees. A reasonable inference is that they would enter into
such agreements in exchange for promises that their top competitors
would not solicit or hire each other's employees. Thus, the top
rivals would be on equal footing in the competition for employees.

The Plaintiffs set forth sufficient factual allegations to show
plausibly that there were similarities between the three bilateral
agreements from which a reasonable inference may be drawn that the
three bilateral agreements evolved into to an overarching agreement
when Wabtec and Faiveley N.A. (no later than 2014) entered into the
third bilateral agreement described in the consolidated class
action complaint.  

Based upon the foregoing, plaintiffs set forth factual allegations
to show plausibly four conspiracies to restrain competition for
employees in the railway equipment supplier industry: (1) beginning
no later than 2009, Wabtec and Knorr; (2) beginning no later than
2011, Knorr and Faiveley N.A. (3) beginning no later than 2014,
Wabtec and Faiveley N.A. and (4) beginning at the earliest 2014,
the overarching conspiracy among Wabtec, Knorr, and Faiveley.

The Plaintiffs and defendants cite to three decisions in support of
their positions with respect to whether the allegations in the
consolidated complaint are sufficient to plausibly show an
overarching conspiracy among Wabtec, Knorr, and Faiveley.

The district court determined the factual allegations in the
complaint plausibly showed the defendants were a part of the
overarching conspiracy because the plaintiffs alleged facts beyond
mere parallel conduct which tend to exclude the possibility of
independent action. The court explained the plaintiffs alleged: (1)
the six bilateral agreements were negotiated by senior executives;
(2) at all relevant times, at least one of three [senior]
executives had significant influence over at least one party to
each of the six bilateral agreements (3) the six bilateral
agreements, which were reached in secrecy over a span of two years,
were identical and (4) one of the senior executives (Steve Jobs)
exerted significant influence over companies involved in four of
the bilateral agreements. The court concluded: The fact that all
six identical bilateral agreements were reached in secrecy among
seven Defendants in a span of two years suggests that these
agreements resulted from collusion, and not from coincidence.

The factual allegations in support of an overarching conspiracy in
this case are not as strong as the factual allegations in
High-Tech; indeed, plaintiffs in this case do not allege that a)
Wabtec, Knorr, or Faiveley N.A. shared senior executives or board
members b) senior executives or board members had influence over
another party to the bilateral agreements, c) the agreements were
reached within a span of two years (here it was approximately 5
years), or d) the agreements were identical. Plaintiffs do allege,
however, that beginning in 2014, the three largest railroad
equipment suppliers were all engaged with each other in bilateral
agreements to not poach each other's employees.

The agreements, like the agreement in High-Tech, were company-wide
in the United States and included the same essential terms. Wabtec,
Knorr, and Faiveley N.A. would have been motivated to enter into an
overarching agreement to ensure that the other two companies also
agreed to not poach each other's employees and obtain any advantage
in the marketplace. Under those circumstances, there is a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence that at
least beginning in 2014 (when Wabtec and Faiveley N.A. entered into
their no poach agreement) there was an overarching conspiracy among
Wabtec, Knorr, and Faiveley N.A. to not poach each other's
employees. Like the plaintiffs in High-Tech, plaintiffs in this
case set forth factual allegations sufficient to show parallel
conduct and something more to show defendants were acting pursuant
to an overarching conspiracy.

Those agreements were reached and managed by the senior executives
of the three largest railroad equipment suppliers and the
agreements applied company-wide throughout the United States. Under
those circumstances, there is a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence that beginning no later than 2014,
Wabtec, Knorr, and Faiveley N.A. were members of an overarching
conspiracy to restrain competition for employees.

Based upon the foregoing, plaintiffs set forth factual allegations
sufficient to show plausibly that: (1) Wabtec, Knorr, and Faiveley
N.A. entered into three bilateral no-poach agreements to not poach
each other's employees; and (2) beginning in at least 2014, the
three bilateral no-poach agreements were part of an overarching
conspiracy among Wabtec, Knorr, and Faiveley N.A. to not poach each
other's employees. Defendants' motion to dismiss will be denied on
that basis.

Ricon and Bendix will be dismissed without prejudice from the
consolidated class action complaint.

The Defendants argue that the complaint filed by the DOJ in the
underlying criminal action did not name Bendix or Ricon as
defendants and the factual allegations with respect to Bendix, a
subsidiary of Knorr and Ricon, a subsidiary of Wabtec are
particularly sparse. With respect to Ricon, defendants argue that
the single reference to Ricon in the Complaint comes in the
paragraph in which Plaintiffs describe Ricon as a defendant.
Plaintiffs make no allegation that Ricon's products are principally
for the 'railway industry. Plaintiffs do not oppose Defendants'
request to dismiss the claims against Ricon. Plaintiffs request the
court dismiss the claims against Ricon without prejudice to
Plaintiffs' ability to request leave to amend in the future. The
motion to dismiss will be granted without prejudice with respect to
Ricon, and Ricon will be dismissed without prejudice as a
defendant.

To state a Section 1 claim against Bendix, plaintiffs must set
forth factual allegations sufficient to plausibly show that Bendix
had unity of purpose or a common design and understanding or a
meeting of minds or a conscious commitment to a common scheme with
Wabtec to divide the market in the employee rail equipment supplier
industry. Plaintiffs, however, are not required to show that Bendix
knew of or participated in every transaction in furtherance of or
related to the alleged conspiracy.

Allegations that Bendix knew about the conspiracy without more are
insufficient to show plausibly that Bendix was a member of an
alleged conspiracy in this case. Id. Plaintiffs must set forth
factual allegations to show plausibly: (1) Bendix had knowledge of
the agreement between Wabtec and Knorr; and (2) Bendix intended to
join the agreement.  A party progresses form mere knowledge of an
endeavor to intent to join it when there is 'informed and
interested cooperation, stimulation, instigation. And there is also
a stake in the venture which, even if it may not be essential, is
not irrelevant to the question of conspiracy.

Here, plaintiffs allege Bendix, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Knorr,
acted as Knorr's recruiter for certain employment needs and that
Knorr directed Bendix to refrain from soliciting employees from
Wabtec. Those allegations, however, are not sufficient to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence that
Bendix knew Knorr agreed with Wabtec to restrict competition for
employees and that Bendix intended to join the agreement.
Plaintiffs' allegations against Bendix amount to no more than
allegations that Bendix aided and abetted Knorr in violating the
antitrust laws.

The Sherman Act, however, does not establish liability for a
wholly-owned subsidiary who aids and abets its parent-corporation
in violating the antitrust laws; rather, to state a valid antitrust
claim against a wholly-owned subsidiary, the plaintiff must assert
conduct by the wholly-owned subsidiary that is directly forbidden
by the Sherman Act. In other words, aiding and abetting is not an
independent theory of civil liability under the Sherman Act.

The motion to dismiss with respect to Bendix will, therefore, be
granted, and Bendix will be dismissed without prejudice as a
defendant.

The motion to dismiss  will be denied with respect to defendants'
arguments that the horizontal market allocation agreements alleged
in the consolidated class action complaint must be plead under the
rule of reason. The motion to dismiss is granted without prejudice
with respect to Bendix and Ricon.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 20, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y6rke7fw from Leagle.com.

DAVID B. WHITE, Special Master, pro se.

DANIEL LIENEMANN, Plaintiff, represented by Paul A. Lagnese  --
paull@bergerlagnese.com -- Berger & Lagnese & Robert N. Kaplan --
rkaplan@kaplanfox.com -- Kaplan, Kilsheimer & Fox, pro hac vice.

JASON T. ROOZEMOND, Plaintiff, represented by Alexandra S. Bernay
-- xanb@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac
vice, Jessica H. Meeder, Murphy Falcon and Murphy, Nicholas Adam
Szokoly, Murphy, Falcon & Murphy & William H. Murphy, III, Murphy
Falcon and Murphy, 1 South Street,, Ste 2300

Baltimore, MD 21202, pro hac vice.

WESTINGHOUSE AIR BRAKE CO., Defendant, represented by Amanda R.
Cashman -- Amanda.cashman@klgates.com -- K&L Gates, LLP, Melissa J.
Tea -- Melissa.tea@klgates.com -- K&L Gates LLP & Thomas E. Birsic
-- thomas.birsic@klgates.com -- K&L Gates LLP.


MIDLAND FUNDING: Roth Sues Over FDCPA Violation
-----------------------------------------------
MELISSA ROTH, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. MIDLAND FUNDING LLC, and MIDLAND CREDIT
MANAGEMENT, INC., Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-00780-MJH (W.D. Pa.,
July 1, 2019) is an action seeking damages, attorneys' fees, and
costs against Defendants for their violations of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), the Fair Credit Extension
Uniformity Act ("FCEUA"), Chapter 63 of the Consumer Credit Code
("CCC"), and the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law
("UTPCPL").

On November 6, 2018, Defendants sued Plaintiff in an Allegheny
County Magisterial District Court (the "Action"). Defendants
claimed Midland Funding purchased a credit card account (the
"Account") previously issued to Plaintiff. The Account involved the
sale of goods or services, for personal, family, or household
purposes, in which the outstanding sale balance was paid in
installments and a finance charge was imposed, either as an add-on
charge to the unpaid sale balance, or at an accruing percentage of
periodic balances following the sale. Plaintiff hired counsel to
defend the Action. On November 7, 2018, the court entered judgment
for Plaintiff and against Defendants. Despite initiating legal
process against Plaintiff and forcing Plaintiff to defend the
Action, Defendants lacked authority to initiate process against
Plaintiff because Defendants never sent Plaintiff a RCN. The
Defendants were required to send a RCN because the Account was a
"closed-end credit agreement" or an "open-end credit agreement"
under the CCC, the original creditor was a "seller," "finance
company," or "holder" under the CCC, and Defendants were "holders"
under the CCC. As a result of Defendants' actions, Plaintiff hired
counsel on the belief that Defendants had the authority to initiate
suit.

Plaintiff should not have been forced to defend the Action because
Defendants had no authority to sue Plaintiff. The Defendants'
lawsuit, among other things, misrepresented Defendants' ability to
sue Plaintiff and collect on the Account through legal process, and
unfairly subjected Plaintiff to the legal system. As a result of
Defendants' actions, Plaintiff suffered injury and actual damages,
including, among other things, monetary harm, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Melissa Roth is and was a resident of Allegheny County,
Pennsylvania.

Midland Funding's sole business is the purchasing of defaulted
consumer debt with the purpose of collecting on that debt for
profit.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Kevin Abramowicz, Esq.
     BCJ Law LLC
     186 42nd Street, P.O. Box 40127
     Pittsburgh, PA 15201
     Phone: (412) 223-5740
     Email: kevina@bcjlawyer.com

          - and –

     Katrina Carroll, Esq.
     Edward W. Ciolko, Esq.
     CARLSON LYNCH LLP
     1133 Penn Avenue
     5th Floor
     Pittsburgh, PA 15222
     Phone: (412) 322-9243
     Email: glynch@carlsonlynch.com
            ekilpela@carlsonlynch.com


MILO INC: Court OKs FLSA Settlement in Paredes
----------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, Hammond Division issued an Opinion and Order granting
Parties Joint Motion to Approve Settlement Agreement in the case
captioned ARMANDO PAREDES, DESIDERIA PAREDES, MAYRA PAREDES,
CLAUDIA PAREDES, and JESSICA PAREDES, Plaintiffs, v. HERMILO CANTU,
JR., and MILO, INC., Defendants. Case No. 4:15-cv-88-JVB. (N.D.
Ind.).

The parties, having reached a settlement agreement, jointly move to
have this Court approve the agreement, dismiss the instant action,
order the parties to comply with the agreement, and retain
jurisdiction to enforce it.  

The Defendants employed THE Plaintiffs in 2011 and 2012 as seasonal
agricultural workers. The Plaintiffs were paid a lump sum at the
end of the season for each acre worth of work performed.  In the
interim, the Defendants would pay Plaintiffs, on a weekly basis,
minimum wage for each hour of work performed.

The Defendants deducted these wages from the lump sum payment.  The
Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendants reported the lump sum
payments using 1099-MISC forms, which shifted the burden of paying
certain payroll taxes from Defendants to Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs
alleged that the Defendants withheld some weekly wages to funnel
more payments through the 1099-MISC forms. The Plaintiffs sought
relief for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA Claims)
and for willful filing of fraudulent tax returns (Tax Return
Claims).

Courts look favorably upon settlement agreements that arose from
contentious arm's-length negotiations, which were undertaken in
good faith by counsel, especially when serious questions of law and
fact exist such that the value of an immediate recovery outweighs
the mere possibility of further relief after protracted and
expensive litigation.

The parties argue that the settlement agreement they reached
(Agreement) is a reasonable compromise because Plaintiffs receive
most of the damages they sought and because Plaintiffs accepted a
substantially reduced amount of attorney's fees.

This Court agrees.

The Agreement Is a Reasonable Compromise of Disputed Claims

The Plaintiffs sought a combined $3,629.36 for their FLSA Claims
and a combined $70,000 for their Tax Return claims. The Agreement
requires Defendants to pay $60,000 to be distributed equally among
the plaintiffs, which represents full satisfaction of their FLSA
Claims and partial satisfaction of their Tax Return claims.
Additionally, the Agreement requires Defendants to pay $50,000 in
attorney's fees. This amount comprises $16,500 for a discovery
sanction this Court previously imposed, $13,500 for expenses, and
$20,000 for fees, based on 66.67 billable hours at a $300 per hour
rate.

When examining proposed FLSA settlements for reasonableness, this
District employs a multi-factor test the Second Circuit adopted in
Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d Cir. 1974).

For non-class-action suits, reasonableness depends on (1) the
expected complexity, expense, and duration of the litigation (2)
"the stage of the proceeding and the amount of discovery completed
(3) the uncertainty of liability and damages (4) the defendant's
ability to withstand a larger judgment and (5) the reasonableness
of the settlement in light of all the risks of litigation.

The parties have conducted enough discovery to arrive at a
reasonable settlement. Courts look at how much discovery the
parties have exchanged to ensure that the settlement agreement
represents an informed decision rather than a number pulled out of
a hat. Formal discovery is not required, so long as the parties
have enough information to properly understand the claims the
parties brought.  

Here, the parties conducted enough discovery to secure approval of
a settlement agreement as to Monsanto  Plaintiffs also adjusted the
amount they sought based on subsequent further discovery. This
demonstrates that the Agreement represents an informed decision.

Liability and damages are uncertain. Generally, a defendant's
wholesale denial of the plaintiff's claims establishes uncertainty.
Here, this Court's order striking Defendants' answer evidences
Defendants' refusal to budge.  This demonstrates uncertainty as to
liability and damages.

A defendant's ability to withstand a larger judgment usually does
not come into play unless the settlement itself is inadequate.
Here, the settlement is adequate, as will be explained below, and
there is no evidence that Defendants' financial condition
influenced the Agreement. Moreover, Defendants, a company and its
sole shareholder described themselves as having very limited
resources.Thus, to the extent this factor is relevant, it weighs in
favor of approving the Agreement.

Lastly, the Agreement is reasonable in light of the risks of
litigation. For starters, the parties reached the Agreement in
formal mediation, which shows that it was the product of
arms-length negotiation. Second, Plaintiffs' counsel filed an
affidavit attesting that further litigation would require
expenditures and delay that are not necessary in light of the
Agreement. Courts tend to afford such opinions from counsel
considerable weight. Third, the Agreement merely requires
Plaintiffs to release Defendant of the claims asserted in the
instant action.Such nonrestrictive agreements tend to pass muster.
Fourth, the Agreement awards Plaintiffs over 80% of their requested
relief. Courts have accepted far lower recovery rates in the past.


On the basis of the above factors, this Court finds that the
Agreement is reasonable.

The Requested Attorney's Fees Are Reasonable

The Agreement provides for attorney's fees that nearly match the
amount Plaintiffs recover. Courts should take a close look before
awarding fees that seem high relative to the amount the plaintiff
recovered. Here, upon closer inspection, the requested attorney's
fees are reasonable.

First, the statutes giving rise to Plaintiffs' claims specifically
call for awarding reasonable attorney's fees to successful
plaintiffs. In the presence of such so-called fee-shifting
statutes, large attorney's fees are less worrisome.   Second, the
parties negotiated attorney's fees amongst themselves, and courts
look favorably upon such agreements. Third, Plaintiffs request only
66.67 hours' worth of fees, compared to the "hundreds of billable
hours" actually expended, which further shows reasonableness.
Fourth, the attorney's fees are based on a $300 hourly rate, which
this Court previously held to be reasonable. Fifth, and most
importantly, Plaintiffs will receive substantially all of the
damages they sought, so counsel should be compensated accordingly.
  
The Agreement represents a reasonable compromise of disputed
issues. Accordingly, the parties' joint motion is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 20, 2019 Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y5lf565w from
Leagle.com.

Armando Paredes, Desideria Paredes, Mayra Paredes, Claudia Paredes
& Jessica Paredes, Plaintiffs, represented by Kathryn Blair
Craddock, Texas RioGrande Legal Aid Inc, pro hac vice &Daniela
Dwyer, Texas RioGrande Legal Aid Inc., 301 S Texas Ave, Mercedes,
TX 78570-3125

Hermilo Cantu, Jr. & Milo Inc., Defendants, represented by Donald
W. Shelmon , Law Office of Donald W Shelmon, 119 1/2 N Cullen St;
Rensselaer, Indiana 47978


NAPLES RESTAURANT: Lopez Sues Over Unpaid Compensations
-------------------------------------------------------
MARIO LOPEZ, an individual, Plaintiff, v. NAPLES RESTAURANT GROUP
LLC D/B/A BOATHOUSE ON THE BAY, a California Limited Liability
Company, and DOES 1 through 20, Inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
19STCV22606 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty., June 28, 2019)
class action on behalf of himself and other similarly situated
current and former non-exempt hourly wage earners employed in the
State of California, of Defendants, for violations of the
California Labor Code. Plaintiff reserves the right to name
additional class representatives.

Plaintiff and Class Members were required to work through their
rest breaks as well as through their meal periods. Indeed, at no
time have Plaintiff and Class Members clocked out for a meal period
throughout their employment with Defendant BOATHOUSE. Instead,
Plaintiff and Class Members would work straight through lunch. In
addition to not receiving an uninterrupted meal period, in the
event that Plaintiff and Class Members worked in excess of ten
hours per day, Defendant BOATHOUSE would likewise fail to provide a
second, uninterrupted, thirty-minute meal period, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant BOATHOUSE as a line cook from
in or about October 2016 until or about January 20, 2019.

BOATHOUSE was and is a California limited liability company, who is
engaged in the restaurant business.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Sahag Majarian, Esq.
     LAW OFFICES OF SAHAG MAJARIAN II
     18250 Ventura Boulevard
     Tarzana, CA 91356
     Phone: (818)609-0807
     Fax: (818) 609-0892
     Email: sahagii@aol.com

          - and -

     Ruben Limonjyan, Esq.
     LIMONJYAN LAW GROUP, APC
     263 West Olive Avenue
     Burbank, CA 91502
     Phone: (213) 277-7444
     Phone: (213) 270-9374
     Fax: (818) 609-0892
     Email: rlimonjyan@lawgroupla.com



NEW INDIAN: Court OKs Settlement in Morales FLSA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for an Order
Granting Preliminary Approval To Proposed Class Action Settlement
And Plan Of Allocation in the case captioned ENRIQUE GARCIA
MORALES, on behalf of himself, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and the
Class, Plaintiff, v. NEW INDIAN FOODS LLC, et al., Defendants. No.
18-CV-3401. (S.D.N.Y.).

The Plaintiff in this lawsuit was employed by the Defendants as
non-exempt, front-of-house, tipped employee. The Plaintiff brings
claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the New York
Labor Law (NYLL). The Plaintiff claims, inter alia, that the
Defendants failed to pay non-exempt employees proper minimum wages
and overtime wages, improperly retained tips, and failed to meet
the NYLL's requirements on wage statements and notices.  

Definition Of The Settlement Class

The Parties have entered into the Settlement Agreement solely for
the purposes of compromising and settling their disputes in this
matter. As part of the Settlement Agreement, Defendant has agreed
not to oppose, for settlement purposes only, conditional
certification under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and
23(b)(3) and 29 U.S.C. Settlement 216(b) of the following
settlement class (Class):

Named Plaintiff and all current and former non-exempt employees of
the Defendants' restaurant located at 195 Spring Street, New York,
New York from June 1, 2016 through October 3, 2018, who do not
opt-out of the Litigation.

Designation Of The Class As An FLSA Collective Action

The Court finds that the members of the Class are similarly
situated within the meaning of Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b), for purposes of
determining whether the terms of settlement are fair. Accordingly,
the Court conditionally certifies the Class as an FLSA collective
action. The Court authorizes the Notice (attached as Exhibit B to
the Declaration of C.K. Lee) to be mailed to potential members of
the FLSA collective action, notifying them of the pendency of the
FLSA claim, and of their ability to join the lawsuit.

Rule 23 Certification of the Class

Preliminary settlement approval, provisional class certification,
and appointment of class counsel have several practical purposes,
including avoiding the costs of litigating class status while
facilitating a global settlement, ensuring all class members are
notified of the terms of the proposed Agreement, and setting the
date and time of the final approval hearing.   

In examining potential conditional certification of the settlement
class, the Court has considered: (1) the allegations, information,
arguments and authorities cited in the Motion for Preliminary
Approval and supporting memorandum and declarations (2) the
allegations information, arguments and authorities provided by the
Parties in connection with the pleadings and motions filed by each
of them in this case (3) information, arguments, and authorities
provided by the Parties in conferences and arguments before this
Court (4) Defendant's conditional agreement, for settlement
purposes only, not to oppose conditional certification of the
settlement class specified in the Settlement Agreement  (5) the
terms of the Settlement Agreement, including, but not limited to,
the definition of the settlement class specified in the Settlement
Agreement and (6) the elimination of the need, on account of the
Settlement, for the Court to consider any trial manageability
issues that might otherwise bear on the propriety of class
certification.

This Court finds (exclusively for the present purposes of
evaluating the settlement) that Plaintiff meets all the
requirements for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3).  Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 23(c)
and (e), the court certifies this class for the purposes of
settlement, notice and award distribution only.

Should this Settlement not receive final approval, be overturned on
appeal, or otherwise not reach completion, the class and collective
certification granted above shall be dissolved immediately upon
notice to the Plaintiff and Defendants, and this certification
shall have no further effect in this case or in any other case.
Plaintiff will retain the right to seek class and collective
certification in the course of litigation, and Defendants will
retain the right to oppose class and collective certification.
Neither the fact of this certification for settlement purposes
only, nor the findings made herein, may be used to support or
oppose any Party's position as to any future class or collective
certification decision in this case, nor shall they otherwise have
any impact on such future decision.

Disposition Of Settlement Class If Settlement Agreement Does Not
Become Effective

If, for any reason, the Settlement Agreement ultimately does not
become effective, Defendants' agreement not to oppose conditional
certification of the settlement class shall be null and void in its
entirety; this Order conditionally certifying the settlement class
shall be vacated; the Parties shall return to their respective
positions in this lawsuit as those positions existed immediately
before the Parties executed the Settlement Agreement; and nothing
stated in the Settlement Agreement, the Motion, this Order, or in
any attachments to the foregoing documents shall be deemed an
admission of any kind by any of the Parties or used as evidence
against, or over the objection of, any of the Parties for any
purpose in this action or in any other action. In particular, the
class certified for purposes of settlement shall be decertified,
and Defendants will retain the right to contest whether this case
should be maintained as a class action or collective action and to
contest the merits of the claims being asserted by Plaintiff.

Preliminary Approval Of The Terms Of The Settlement Agreement,
Including The Proposed Plan Of Allocation

The Court has reviewed the terms of the Settlement Agreement and
the description of the Settlement in the Motion papers. Based on
that review, the Court concludes that the Settlement is within the
range of possible Settlement approval such that notice to the Class
is appropriate.

The Court has also read and considered the declaration of C.K. Lee
in support of preliminary approval. Based on review of that
declaration, the Court concludes that the Settlement was negotiated
at arms length and is not collusive. The Court further finds that
Class Counsel were fully informed about the strengths and
weaknesses of the Class's case when they entered into the
Settlement Agreement.

As to the proposed plan of allocation, the Court finds that the
proposed plan is rationally related to the relative strengths and
weaknesses of the respective claims asserted. The proposed plan of
allocation is also within the range of possible approval such that
notice to the Class is appropriate.

Accordingly, the Court hereby grants preliminary approval to the
Settlement Agreement and the Plan of Allocation.

Procedures For Final Approval Of The Settlement

Fairness Hearing

The Court schedules, for September 4, 2019, at the hour of 10:00AM,
a hearing to determine whether to grant final certification of the
Settlement Class, and the FLSA collective action, and final
approval of the Settlement Agreement and the Plan of Allocation
(Fairness Hearing). At the Fairness Hearing, the Court also will
consider any petition that may be filed for the payment of
attorneys' fees and costs/expenses to Class Counsel, and any
service payments to be made to the Plaintiff. Class Counsel shall
file their petition for an award of attorneys' fees and
reimbursement of costs/expenses and the petition for an award of
service payments no later than 15 days prior to the Fairness
Hearing.

Deadline To Request Exclusion From The Settlement

Class Members who wish to be excluded from the Settlement must
submit a written and signed request to opt out to the Claims
Administrator (Opt-Out Statement) provided with the Class Notice.
To be effective, such Opt-Out Statements must be delivered to the
Claims Administrator and postmarked by a date certain to be
specified on the Notice, which will be 30 calendar days after the
Claims Administrator makes the initial mailing of the notice.

The Claims Administrator shall stamp the postmark date of the
Opt-Out Statement on the original of each Opt-Out Statement that it
receives and shall serve copies of each Statement on Class Counsel
and Defendant's Counsel not later than 2 business days after
receipt thereof. The Claims Administrator also shall, within 5
calendar days after the end of the Opt-Out Period, provide Class
Counsel and Defendants' Counsel with (1) stamped copies of any
Opt-Out Statements, with Social Security Numbers redacted, and (2)
a final list of all Opt-Out Statements. Also within 5 calendar days
after the end of the Opt-Out Period, the Claims Administrator (or
counsel for the Parties) shall file with the Clerk of Court copies
of any timely submitted Opt-Out Statements with Social Security
Numbers and addresses redacted. The Claims Administrator shall
retain the stamped originals of all Opt-Out Statements and
originals of all envelopes accompanying Opt-Out Statements in its
files until such time as the Claims Administrator is relieved of
its duties and responsibilities under this Agreement.

Deadline For Filing Objections To Settlement

Class Members who wish to present objections to the proposed
settlement at the Fairness Hearing must first do so in writing. To
be considered, such objections must be (1) delivered to the Claims
Administrator and postmarked by a date certain, to be specified on
the Notice, which shall be 30 calendar days after the initial
mailing by the Claims Administrator of such Notice.

Deadline For Filing Motion For Judgment And Final Approval

No later than 15 days before the Fairness Hearing, Plaintiff and
Defendants will submit a joint Motion for Judgment and Final
Approval of the Settlement Agreement and Settlement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 20, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y3d9guvj from Leagle.com.

Enrique Garcia Morales, on behalf of himself & Enrique Garcia
Morales, on behalf of FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs,
represented by Anne Melissa Seelig, Lee Litigation Group, PLLC &
C.K. Lee, Lee Litigation Group, PLLC, 30 East 39th Street, Second
Floor New York, NY 10016

New Indian Foods, LLC, doing business as The Bombay Bread Bar &
Floyd Cardoz, Defendants, represented by Carolyn Diane Richmond --
crichmond@foxrothschild.com -- Fox Rothschild, LLP & Jordan Elliot
Pace, Fox Rothschild, LLP.


NEW YORK: 2nd Cir. Appeal v. Gomez Filed in Gulino Racial Bias Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
entered on April 25, 2019, in the lawsuit entitled Gulino, et al.
v. Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 14,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1504, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Jose Gomez is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: Second Circuit Appeal v. Negron Filed in Gulino Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
entered on April 25, 2019, in the lawsuit titled Gulino, et al. v.
Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 14,
2019, the Board of Education filed several appeals from the
District Court's ruling against several Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1497, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Yolanda Negron is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NISSAN NORTH: Answer to CCAC Reply Opposition Due July 15
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, In re Nissan North America, Inc. Litigation, Case No.
4:18-cv-07292-HSG (N.D. Cal.), Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. of the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California,
Oakland Division, has entered a stipulated order extending the
deadline for Defendant Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. ("NML") to respond to
the Plaintiffs' Consolidated Class Action Complaint ("CCAC"), and
modifying briefing schedule.

On March 22, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed their CCAC.  After they
served Defendant NML through Hague Convention with the superseded
Bashaw Complaint, NML proposed to waive service and respond to the
CCAC 60 days thereafter, resulting in an agreement whereby NNL
agreed to waive service of the CCAC and to respond to the CCAC in
45 days.

NML, an entity organized under the laws of Japan, needs an
additional 15 days to prepare its response to the CCAC, consistent
with NML's initial request for 60 days.

The Plaintiffs and NML have met and conferred through the counsel
regarding the deadline for NML to respond to the CCAC, as well as
certain modifications to the briefing schedule in the event that
NML responds by way of a motion(s), and have reached the agreement
set forth below, pursuant to Civil L.R. 6-1(a).  The timing
modifications set forth in the stipulation do not alter the date of
any event or any deadline already set by the Court.

The parties therefore, through their respective counsel, stipulated
and Judge Gilliam granted, as follows:

      1. The deadline for NML to answer or otherwise respond to the
CCAC will be extended 15 days to and including June 14, 2019.

      2. If NML files a motion(s) in response to the CCAC, the
briefing schedule will be as follows: (i) the Plaintiffs will have
until July 15, 2019 to file their opposition(s); (ii) NML will have
until Aug. 5, 2019 to file its reply (or replies); and (iii) NML
will notice the hearing for the earliest date that is available for
the Court, subject to the availability of the counsel.

The agreement will not be deemed a waiver by NML of personal
jurisdiction or any other defense in the case or any other case.
It will not be deemed a general appearance or a waiver of NML's
right to challenge the Court's personal jurisdiction over it.  It
will not be used to claim that NML is subject to personal
jurisdiction.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 28, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/oW8eWB from Leagle.com.

Cathy Bashaw, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Joel Dashiell Smith --
jsmith@bursor.com -- Bursor & Fisher, P.A., Frederick J. Klorczyk,
III -- fklorczyk@bursor.com -- Bursor and Fisher, P.A. & Lawrence
Timothy Fisher -- ltfisher@bursor.com -- Bursor & Fisher, P.A.

Robert Garneau, Nancy Housell & Jeffrey Olkowski, Plaintiffs,
represented by Joel Dashiell Smith, Bursor & Fisher, P.A. &
Lawrence Timothy Fisher, Bursor & Fisher, P.A.

Courtney Johnson, Scott Reeves, Lisa Hendrickson, Rhonda Perry &
Jane Reeves, Plaintiffs, represented by Lawrence Timothy Fisher,
Bursor & Fisher, P.A.

Vaughn Kerkorian, Consol Plaintiff, represented by Benjamin L.
Bailey, BAILEY AND GLASSER, LLP, Daniel Adam Schlanger, Schlanger
Law Group LLP, H. Clay Barnett, III, Beasley, Allen, Crow, Methvin,
Portis and Miles, P.C., Jaimie Mak, Richman Law Group, Joel
Dashiell Smith -- jsmith@bursor.com -- Bursor & Fisher, P.A.,
Frederick J. Klorczyk, III -- fklorczyk@bursor.com -- Bursor and
Fisher, P.A. & Lawrence Timothy Fisher -- ltfisher@bursor.com --
Bursor & Fisher, P.A.

David Turner, Consol Plaintiff, represented by Benjamin L. Bailey,
BAILEY AND GLASSER, LLP, Daniel Adam Schlanger, Schlanger Law Group
LLP, H. Clay Barnett, III, Beasley, Allen, Crow, Methvin, Portis
and Miles, P.C., Joel Dashiell Smith , Bursor & Fisher, P.A.,
Jonathan David Boggs , BAILEY AND GLASSER, LLP, Lawrence Timothy
Fisher , Bursor & Fisher, P.A., Michael L. Murphy , Bailey and
Glasser, LLP & Wilson Daniel Miles, III , Beasley, Allen, Crow,
Methvin, Portis & Miles, P.C.

Nissan North America, Inc., Defendant, represented by E. Paul
Cauley, Jr., Drinker Biddle & Reath, LLP, Matthew Jacob Adler --
matthew.adlerdbr.com -- Drinker Biddle Reath LLP & Paul Jeffrey
Riehle, Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP.

Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., Defendant, represented by Paul Jeffrey
Riehle, Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP.


OMNICARE INC: Hager Sues Over Unpaid Compensations
--------------------------------------------------
CATHY L. HAGER, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. OMNICARE, INC., Defendant, Case No.
5:19-cv-00484 (S.D. Va., June 28, 2019) is an action brought under
the Fair Labor Standards Act on behalf of individuals who are
current and former delivery drivers of Defendant, challenging the
unlawful misclassification of them as independent contractors
instead of employees and seeking remedies for statutory violations
resulting from this misclassification.

Drivers, including Plaintiff Hager, typically work more than 40
hours per week while providing services for Defendant. However,
drivers are never provided with time and one-half their regular
rate of pay for hours worked greater than 40 hours in a work week.
For example, Plaintiff Hager frequently worked 6 days in a week for
8 or more hours per day. Consequently, she worked more than 40
hours in one week delivering pharmaceutical products for Defendant.
However, she only was paid her ordinary per delivery rate and was
never paid any overtime pay. Moreover, the Defendant, by
misclassifying drivers as independent contractors, forces all
drivers to bear all of the costs of performing delivery services.
Upon information and belief, when these expenses are taken into
account, Defendant fails to pay an hourly rate of pay to drivers,
including Plaintiff Hager, equal to or greater than the applicable
federal minimum wages, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Hager delivered pharmaceutical products on behalf of and
at the direction of Defendant in West Virginia from approximately
October 2018 to May 17, 2019.

Defendant is a Cincinnati-based pharmaceutical services company
specializing in the sale, delivery, and distribution of medicine,
medical devices (herein jointly referred to as "pharmaceutical
products"), and pharmaceutical services throughout the United
States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Thomas R. Goodwin, Esq.
     Susan C. Wittemeier, Esq.
     W. Jeffrey Vollmer, Esq.
     Goodwin & Goodwin, LLP
     300 Summers Street, Suite 1500
     Charleston, WV 25301
     Phone: (304) 346-7000
     Email: trg@goodwingoodwin.com
            scw@goodwingoodwin.com

          - and -

     Harold L. Lichten, Esq.
     Zachary L. Rubin, Esq.
     LICHTEN & LISS-RIORDAN, P.C.
     729 Boylston St., Suite 2000
     Boston, MA 02116
     Phone: (617) 994-5800
     Email: hlichten@llrlaw.com
            zrubin@llrlaw.com


PDR NETWORK: Supreme Court Remands Chiropractors' Suit
------------------------------------------------------
The Supreme Court of the United States issued an Opinion vacating
the judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the District Court's
Order granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss in the case
captioned PDR NETWORK, LLC, ET AL., Petitioners, v. CARLTON &
HARRIS CHIROPRACTIC, INC. No. 17-1705. (U.S.).

The District Court found in PDR's favor and dismissed the case.
Carlton & Harris appealed to the Fourth Circuit, which vacated the
District Court's judgment.

One of the fax recipients was respondent Carlton & Harris
Chiropractic, a health care practice in West Virginia. It brought
this putative class action against PDR in Federal District Court,
claiming that PDR's fax violated the Telephone Act. Carlton &
Harris sought statutory damages on behalf of itself and other
members of the class.

This case concerns two federal statutes, the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991 (Telephone Act) and the Administrative
Orders Review Act (Hobbs Act). The first statute generally makes it
unlawful for any person to send an unsolicited advertisement by
fax. 47 U. S. C. Section 227(b)(1)(C). The second statute provides
that the federal courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction to
enjoin, set aside, suspend in whole or in part, or to determine the
validity of certain final orders of the Federal Communication
Commission.

The District Court found in PDR's favor and dismissed the case. It
concluded that PDR's fax was not an unsolicited advertisement under
the Telephone Act. The court did recognize that the FCC's Order
might be read to indicate the contrary. And it also recognized that
the Hobbs Act gives appellate courts, not district courts,
exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of certain FCC
final orders.

In 2006, the FCC issued an Order stating that the term unsolicited
advertisement in the Telephone Act includes certain faxes that
promote goods or services even at no cost, including free magazine
subscriptions and catalogs.

The Hobbs Act says that an appropriate court of appeals has
exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend in whole or in
part), or to determine the validity of final orders of the Federal
Communication Commission made reviewable by section 402(a) of title
47.

Here, the Court is asked to decide whether the Hobbs Act's
commitment of exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of appeals
requires a district court in a private enforcement suit like this
one to follow the FCC's 2006 Order interpreting the Telephone Act.


First, what is the legal nature of the 2006 FCC Order? In
particular, is it the equivalent of a legislative rule, which is
issued by an agency pursuant to statutory authority and has the
force and effect of law. Or is it instead the equivalent of an
interpretive rule, which simply advises the public of the agency's
construction of the statutes and rules which it administers and
lacks the force and effect of law.

If the relevant portion of the 2006 Order is the equivalent of an
interpretive rule, it may not be binding on a district court, and a
district court therefore may not be required to adhere to it. That
may be so regardless of whether a court of appeals could have
determined during the 60-day review period that the Order is valid
and consequently could have decided not to enjoin, set aside, or
suspend  it.
  
Second, and in any event, did PDR have a prior and adequate
opportunity to seek judicial review of the Order? The
Administrative Procedure Act provides that agency action is subject
to judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings for judicial
enforcement except to the extent that a prior, adequate, and
exclusive opportunity for judicial review is provided by law.

The Court believes it important to determine whether the Hobbs
Act's exclusive-review provision, which requires certain challenges
to FCC final orders to be brought in a court of appeals within 60
days after the entry of the order in question, afforded PDR a prior
and adequate opportunity for judicial review of the Order. If the
answer is no, it may be that the Administrative Procedure Act
permits PDR to challenge the validity of the Order in this
enforcement proceeding even if the Order is deemed a legislative
rule rather than an interpretive rule. The Court again say may
because the Court does not definitively decide this issue here.

Because the Court of Appeals has not yet addressed the preliminary
issues the Court has described, the Court vacates the judgment of
the Court of Appeals and remands this case so that the Court of
Appeals may consider these preliminary issues, as well as any other
related issues that may arise in the course of resolving this
case.

A full-text copy of the Supreme Court's June 20, 2019 Opinion is
available at  https://tinyurl.com/y249ohlc from Leagle.com.

Carter G. Phillips -- CPHILLIPS@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP,
Attorney for Petitioner PDR Network, LLC, et al.

Jeffrey Neal Rosenthal -- rosenthal-j@blankrome.com -- Blank Rome
LLP, Attorney for Petitioner, PDR Network, LLC, et al.

Glenn L. Hara -- ghara@andersonwanca.com -- Anderson + Wanca,
Attorney for Respondent Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc.

Noel J. Francisco, Solicitor General, United States Department of
Justice, for UNITED STATES.
Aditya Bamzai, University of Virginia School of Law, for Aditya
Bamzai.

Megan L. Brown -- mbrown@wileyrein.com -- Wiley Rein LLP, for U.S.
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE.
Ashley Elizabeth Johnson  -- ajohnson@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson,
Dunn & Crutcher LLP, for State and Local Government Associations.

Charles H. Kennedy, The Kennedy Privacy Law Firm, 1050 30th Street,
NW. Washington, DC 20007,  for American Bankers Association,
Consumer Bankers Association, Independent Community Bankers of
America.

Mithun Mansinghani, Solicitor General, Office of the Oklahoma
Attorney General, for State of Oklahoma.

Marc Rotenberg, Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), 1718
Connecticut Ave, N.W., Suite 200, Washington, DC 20009 for
Electronic Privacy Information Center.


PPG INDUSTRIES: Smith Sues Over Underpayment of Overtime
--------------------------------------------------------
JEREMIAH SMITH, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. PPG INDUSTRIES, INC. Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-01518 (N.D. Ohio, July 3, 2019) is a case challenging
policies and practices of Defendant that violate the Fair Labor
Standards Act.  Plaintiff further brings this case as a class
action to remedy violations of the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards
Act ("OMFWSA").

Plaintiff and those similarly situated to Plaintiff frequently
worked in excess of 40 hours per week. Accordingly, Defendant's
failure to pay Plaintiff and those similarly situated for the
activities resulted in Plaintiff and those similarly situated being
denied overtime compensation. As a result of Plaintiff and other
similarly-situated employees not being paid for all hours worked,
Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees were not paid all
overtime compensation for all of the hours they worked over 40 each
workweek. The Defendant knowingly and willfully engaged in the
above-mentioned violations of the FLSA and Ohio law. For example,
Defendant specifically instructed Plaintiff and the similarly
situated employees to perform such work off the clock, evidencing
Defendant's actual notice of these violations, says the complaint.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a non-exempt employee at
Defendant's Cleveland, Ohio location from September 2018 through
May 2019.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Christopher J. Lalak, Esq.
     NILGES DRAHER LLC
     614 W. Superior Ave., Suite 1148
     Cleveland, OH 44113
     Phone: 216.230.2955
     Email: clalak@ohlaborlaw.com

          - and -

     Shannon M. Draher, Esq.
     Nilges Draher LLC
     7266 Portage Street, N.W., Suite D
     Massillon, OH 44646
     Phone: 330.470.4428
     Email: sdraher@ohlaborlaw.com


RCI HOSPITALITY: Grossman Sues Over Exchange Act Violation
----------------------------------------------------------
DAVID GROSSMAN, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. RCI HOSPITALITY HOLDINGS, INC., ERIC
LANGAN, and PHILLIP MARSHALL, Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-02318
(S.D. Tex., June 28, 2019) is a class action on behalf of persons
or entities who purchased or otherwise acquired publicly traded RCI
securities from August 10, 2017 through May 10, 2019, inclusive
(the "Class Period"). Plaintiff seeks to recover compensable
damages caused by Defendants' violations of the federal securities
laws under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange
Act").

On December 13, 2016, RCI filed a Form 10-K for the fiscal year
ended
September 30, 2016. The Form 10-K stated that the Company's
internal controls over financial reporting were effective as of
that fiscal year. On August 9, 2017, after the market closed, RCI
announced its results for its Fiscal 2017 third quarter ended June
30, 2017. On the same day, the Company filed a Form 10-Q for the
Fiscal 2017 third quarter ended June 30, 2017 (the "3Q 2017 10-Q")
with the SEC that confirmed RCI's announced financial results and
stated that the Company's internal controls were effective as of
that quarter. The 3Q 2017 10-Q was signed by the Individual
Defendants. The 3Q 2017 10-Q also contained signed certifications
pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("SOX") by the
Individual Defendants, attesting to the accuracy of financial
reporting, the disclosure of any material changes to the Company's
internal control over financial reporting, and the disclosure of
all fraud.

Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (i) RCI engaged in numerous
transactions with Langan, its CEO, including lending him large
amounts of money; (ii) these practices were likely to lead to
investigations of RCI by regulators; (iii) investigations into
RCI's corporate governance would harm RCI's prospects by, among
other things, causing it to be unable to timely file its financial
statements; and (iv) as a result, Defendants' statements about
RCI's business, operations and prospects were materially false and
misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis at all relevant times,
says the complaint.

Plaintiff purchased RCI securities during the Class Period and was
economically damaged thereby.

RCI owns and operates gentlemen's clubs and restaurants in
locations throughout the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
     J. Alexander Hood II, Esq.
     POMERANTZ LLP
     600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor
     New York, NY 10016
     Phone: (212) 661-1100
     Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
     Email: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
            ahood@pomlaw.com

          - and -

     Patrick V. Dahlstrom, Esq.
     POMERANTZ LLP
     10 South La Salle Street, Suite 3505
     Chicago, IL 60603
     Phone: (312) 377-1181
     Facsimile: (312) 377-1184
     Email: pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com


RED & BROWN TRUCKING: Lee Labor Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Premium
------------------------------------------------------------------
Kenneth Lee, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Red & Brown Trucking, LLC and Carlos Harden,
Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-00446, (E.D. Ark., June 26, 2019) seeks
declaratory judgment, monetary damages, liquidated damages,
prejudgment interest, civil penalties and costs, including
reasonable attorney's fees for failure to pay lawful minimum and
overtime wages as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
Arkansas Minimum Wage Act.

Red & Brown Trucking, LLC provides transportation services to
customers throughout Arkansas and across the country where Lee
worked as a driver. He regularly worked in excess of forty hours
per weekly pay period without being paid overtime. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Chris Burks, Esq.
      Brandon M. Haubert, Esq.
      WH LAW, PLLC
      1 Riverfront Pl., Suite 745
      North Little Rock, AR 72114
      Telephone: (501) 891-6000
      Email: chris@whlawoffices.com
             brandon@whlawoffices.com


RED PANDA: Karaisaridis Sues Over Unpaid Compensations
------------------------------------------------------
KASEY KARAISARIDIS, Individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. RED PANDA ASIAN BISTRO INC. d/b/a
LOBSTER HOUSE, SAM CHENG and MAY CHENG, Jointly and Severally,
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-03780 (E.D. N.Y., June 28, 2019)
alleges that Defendants willfully violated the New York Labor Law
("NYLL") and the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") by: (i) failing
to pay the minimum wage, (ii) failing to pay overtime premium pay,
(iii) failing to pay spread-of-hours pay, (iv) failing to provide
the Notice and Acknowledgement of Payrate and Payday under the
NYLL, (v) failing to provide proper wage statements under the NYLL,
and (vi) unlawfully retaining gratuities.

Throughout her employment, Plaintiff Karaisaridis often worked in
excess of 40 hours per week. the Defendants paid Plaintiff
Karaisaridis below the minimum wage because, upon information and
belief, she was a tipped employee and they took a tip credit: this
credit means an employer can pay its tipped employees lower than
the statutory minimum wage, provided certain conditions are met.
Defendants did not meet the necessary conditions to claim a tip
credit against her hourly rate. The Defendants were not permitted
to take a tip credit because Plaintiff Karaisaridis' non-tipped
duties exceeded 20% or 2 hours, whichever is less, of each work
day, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Kasey Karaisaridis worked as a server for Defendants at
their seafood restaurant from February 2019 to May 31, 2019.

Defendants operate and manage a seafood restaurant in Rego Park,
Queens County, New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Douglas B. Lipsky, Esq.
     Sara Isaacson, Esq.
     LIPSKY LOWE LLP
     630 Third Avenue, Fifth Floor
     New York, NY 10017-6705
     Phone: 212.392.4772
     Email: doug@lipskylowe.com
            sara@lipskylowe.com


RUSKIN COMPANY: Reyes Suit Removed to C.D. California
-----------------------------------------------------
The case captioned VICENTE REYES, as an individual and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. RUSKIN COMPANY, a
Delaware corporation; JOHNSON CONTROLS, INC., a Wisconsin
corporation; and DOES 1 through 100, Defendant, Case No. RIC1902599
was removed from the Superior Court of the State of California,
County of Riverside for the Central District of California on July
1, 2019, and assigned Case No. 5:19-cv-01220.

This lawsuit arises from Plaintiff's employment at Ruskin.
Plaintiff alleges four causes of action, (1) Violation of
California Labor Code (Unpaid Minimum Wages) (2) Violation of
California (Rest Period Violations); (3) Violation of California
Labor Code (Waiting Time Penalties); and (4) Violation of
California Business & Professions Code.[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

     LINDA CLAXTON, ESQ.
     KIMBERLY A. MILLER, ESQ.
     OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.
     400 South Hope Street, Suite 1200
     Los Angeles, CA 90071
     Phone: 213-239-9800
     Facsimile: 213-239-9045
     Email: linda.claxton@ogletree.com
            kimberly.miller@ogletree.com



S1 SECURITY: Mckay-Taylor Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
------------------------------------------------------------------
MAUREEN MCKAY-TAYLOR and other similarly-situated individuals,
Plaintiff, v. S1 SECURITY GROUP INC, and ROLANDO E. PALMA,
individually, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-22705-XXXX (S.D. Fla.,
June 30, 2019) is an action to recover money damages for unpaid
minimum and overtime wages under the laws of the United States
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act ("the Act").

During her time of employment with Defendants, Plaintiff was
misclassified as an independent contractor. During Plaintiff's
employment time, she always worked more than 40 hours every week
period. Nevertheless, Plaintiff never was properly compensated for
overtime hours worked. Moreover, the unusual number of hours worked
by Plaintiff every week and the amount paid to her weekly ($600.00)
resulted in an hourly rate of $5.04, which is less than the minimum
wage established by the Fair Labor Standards Act, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff MAUREEN MCKAY-TAYLOR as a non-exempt security employee,
approximately from June 11, 2018 to March 13, 2019 or 39 weeks.

Defendant S1 SECURITY GROUP is a Florida corporation that provides
security services to businesses, residential communities,
construction sites, executive body guard protection, etc.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Zandro E. Palma, Esq.
     ZANDRO E. PALMA, P.A.
     9100 S. Dadeland Blvd., Suite 1500
     Miami, FL 33156
     Phone: (305) 446-1500
     Facsimile: (305) 446-1502
     Email: zep@thepalmalawgroup.com


SPA NAIL 9: Li Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
-------------------------------------------------------
WEIDONG LI, on his own behalf and on behalf of others similarly
situated Plaintiff, v. SPA NAIL 9, INC d/b/a Spa Nail 9; DI YANG
a/k/a Peter Yang, AMY YANG, and ANDY DOE, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-06118 (S.D. N.Y., June 30, 2019) is an action brought by
the Plaintiff on behalf of himself as well as other employees
similarly situated, against the Defendants for alleged violations
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, (FLSA) and the New York Labor Law
(NYLL), arising from Defendants' various willfully and unlawful
employment policies, patterns and practices.

The Defendants have willfully and intentionally committed
widespread violations of the FLSA and NYLL by engaging in pattern
and practice of failing to pay its employees, including Plaintiff,
minimum wage for each hour worked and overtime compensation for all
hours worked over 40 each workweek, says the complaint.

Plaintiff WEIDONG LI was employed by Defendants to work as a nail
saloon worker and masseur from on or about July 01, 2017 to
November 15, 2017.

SPA NAIL 9, INC d/b/a Spa Nail 9 is a domestic business corporation
organized under the laws of the State of New York who purchased and
handled goods moved in interstate commerce.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     John Troy, Esq.
     TROY LAW, PLLC
     41-25 Kissena Boulevard Suite 119
     Flushing, NY 11355
     Phone: (718) 762-1324


SQUARE INC: Ruark Sues Over Negligent Approach To Medical Billing
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A. TRENT RUARK, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. SQUARE, INC. a Delaware corporation; and
DOES 1-10, Defendants, Case No. 37-2019-00024742-CU-BT-CTL (Cal.
Super. Ct., San Diego Cty., June 26, 2019) is a class action
lawsuit on behalf of himself and other individuals whose protected
personal and medical information has been compromised as a result
of
Square's negligent approach to medical billing. Plaintiff seeks
injunctive relief requiring Square to implement and maintain
effective security practices that comply with regulations designed
to prevent and remedy these types of data breaches, as well as
restitution, damages, and other relief.

As part of its credit card processing services, Square provides
electronic invoices to consumers for transactions using Square's
payment processing. Square markets its credit card processing
services specifically to health care providers by stating that
Square will contractually safeguard the protected medical
information of their customers. When Plaintiff paid for his medical
services, he was surprised to learn that his invoice was sent via
an unsecure text message and website to his friend. Plaintiff has
no idea how his friend's contact information became associated with
his credit card or this particular transaction and never consented
to his medical information being shared.

This unauthorized disclosure results from Square's lack of any
appreciable security measures to ensure that protected personal
medical information (or any other receipt sent by Square) is not
disclosed to third parties. The use of such insecure communications
to send personally identifiable medical information is a violation
of both state and federal law, including the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA") and the
California Medical Information Act ("CMIA"), says the complaint.

Plaintiff is the patient of a health care provider that uses Square
for its payment processing.

Square is a payment processing company based in San Francisco,
California. The company markets several software and hardware point
of-sale solutions and credit card processing services for small to
mid-size businesses.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jeffrey R. Krinsk, Esq.
     Trenton R. Kashima, Esq.
     FINKELSTEIN & KRINSK LLP
     550 West C St., Suite 1760
     San Diego, California 92101
     Phone: (619) 238-1333
     Facsimile: (619) 238-5425
     Email: jrk@classactionlaw.com
            trk@classactionlaw.com



SRA ASSOCIATES: Kinning Sues Over FDCPA Violation
-------------------------------------------------
JOSEPH G. KINNING, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. SRA ASSOCIATES, LLC, and JOHN DOES,
Defendants, Case No. 8:19-cv-00293 (D. Neb., July 3, 2019) is a
consumer credit class action brought pursuant to the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (hereinafter "FDCPA" or "Act") and the
Nebraska Consumer Protection Act ("NCPA").

Plaintiff's claims arise from Defendants' routine practices of
sending confusing and misleading letters about when posted dated
checks will be cashed, and failing to provide proper notice of
deposit of postdated checks or instruments pursuant to the FDCPA.
The Defendant's actions violate the FDCPA, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Joseph G. Kinning is an adult individual residing in
Norfolk, Madison County, Nebraska.

SRA Associates, LLC ("SRA") is a collection agency engaged in the
business of collecting debts due or alleged to be due to others
across the state of Nebraska, with its principal place of business
in Hi-Nella, New Jersey.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     William L. Reinbrecht, Esq.
     Pamela A. Car, Esq.
     Car & Reinbrecht, P.C., LLO
     2120 South 72nd St., Suite 1125
     Omaha, NE 68124
     Tel: (402) 391-8484
     Email: billr205@gmail.com

          - and -

     O. Randolph Bragg, Esq.
     Horwitz, Horwitz& Associates
     25 East Washington Street, Suite 900
     Chicago, IL 60602
     Telephone: (312) 372-8822
     Facsimile: (312) 372-1673
     Email: rand@horwitzlaw.com



ST. LOUIS, MO: Seeks 8th Circuit Review of Ruling in Ahmad Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The City of St. Louis filed an appeal from a Court ruling in the
lawsuit styled Maleeha Ahmad, et al. v. City of St. Louis,
Missouri, Case No. 4:17-cv-02455-CDP, in the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis.

The appellate case is captioned as Maleeha Ahmad, et al. v. City of
St. Louis, Missouri, Case No. 19-2221, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 24,
2019, the City filed an appeal from a decision in the lawsuit.
That appellate case is titled Maleeha Ahmad, et al. v. City of St.
Louis, Missouri, Case No. 19-2062.

The ACLU of Missouri filed a class action lawsuit against the City
of St. Louis on behalf of protesters -- alleging the City has
retaliated against them for expressing their right to free speech,
unreasonably seized them, applied undue force and violated their
due process rights with methods including "kettling," gassing them
and spraying them without fair warning.

The lawsuit was filed in federal court on behalf of lead plaintiffs
Maleeha Ahmad and Alison Dreith, who was also pepper-sprayed at the
downtown protest.  Dreith is also executive director of NARAL
Pro-Choice Missouri.

Both Dreith and Ahmad were protesting downtown on the afternoon of
September 15, 2017.  That was just hours after the announcement
that former St. Louis police officer Jason Stockley had been found
not guilty of murder, and well before any of the damage that would
result later in the weekend following the end of organized
protests.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Appendix is due on July 24, 2019;

   -- Brief of Appellant City of St. Louis, Missouri is due on
      July 24, 2019;

   -- Appellee brief is due 30 days from the date the court
      issues the Notice of Docket Activity filing the brief of
      appellant; and

   -- Appellant reply brief is due 21 days from the date the
      court issues the Notice of Docket Activity filing the
      appellee brief.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees Maleeha S. Ahmad, W. Patrick Mobley, Iris
Maclean and Pamela Lewczuk are represented by:

          Omri E. Praiss, Esq.
          Anthony E. Rothert, Esq.
          AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MISSOURI FOUNDATION
          906 Olive Street
          Saint Louis, MO 63101
          Telephone: (314) 652-3114
          E-mail: opraiss@aclu-mo.org
                  trothert@aclu-mo.org

               - and -

          Jessie M. Steffan, Esq.
          AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MISSOURI FOUNDATION
          454 Whittier Street
          Saint Louis, MO 63108-0000
          Telephone: (314) 652-3114
          E-mail: jsteffan@aclu-mo.org

               - and -

          Gillian R. Wilcox, Esq.
          ACLU OF MISSOURI FOUNDATION
          406 W. 34th Street, Suite 420
          Kansas City, MO 64111
          Telephone: (816) 470-9938
          E-mail: gwilcox@aclu-mo.org

Defendant-Appellant City of St. Louis, Missouri, is represented
by:

          Megan Kathleen G. Bruyns, Esq.
          Robert Henry Dierker, Jr., Esq.
          Abby Duncan, Esq.
          Brandon David Laird, Esq.
          Amy Raimondo, Esq.
          CITY COUNSELOR'S OFFICE
          314 City Hall
          1200 Market Street
          Saint Louis, MO 63103-0000
          Telephone: (314) 622-3361
          E-mail: duncana@stlouis-mo.gov
                  bruynsm@stlouis−mo.gov


STATE FARM: Court Dismisses L. Relf Insurance Suit
--------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Georgia, Columbus Division, issued an Order granting Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned LARRY RELF, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. STATE FARM
MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, J.D. POWER & ASSOCIATES, and
MITCHELL INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendants. Case No. 4:18-CV-240
(CDL). (M.D. Ga.).

When Larry Relf wrecked his 2006 Pontiac Torrent, he was insured
with State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. Determining
that the car was a total loss, State Farm sent Larry a check in the
amount of $5,848.22, which it concluded was the actual cash value
of the Pontiac less Larry's deductible. Larry accepted. Almost four
years later, a lawyer apparently convinced Larry that he had been
paid $298.77 less than he was legally entitled to under his
insurance contract with State Farm. Larry and his lawyers now claim
that many other State Farm insureds have been similarly cheated,
and they have filed this class action seeking justice (and of
course dollars for these people.  

Plaintiff's Claims Against State Farm are Untimely and Otherwise
Fail to State a Claim

The Plaintiff alleges that State Farm breached the insurance policy
by failing to pay the actual cash value of his vehicle. The policy,
which the parties acknowledge is part of the pleadings for purposes
of the pending motion to dismiss, clearly requires that legal
action may only be brought against State Farm regarding Physical
Damage Coverages if the legal action relating to these coverages is
brought against us within one year immediately following the date
of the accident or loss.

The Plaintiff did not file this action until nearly four years
later, on December 12, 2018.
The Plaintiff argues that the one-year limitation period does not
apply to his claim because the policy also stated, If any
provisions of this policy are in conflict with the statutes of
Georgia, they are amended to conform to these statutes. Plaintiff
argues that based on this provision, Georgia's six-year statute of
limitations for actions upon simple contracts applies.  

The Georgia courts have rejected arguments like the Plaintiff's
when the contract does not contain amendatory language that
explicitly refers to statutes of limitation. If a contract contains
a limitations clause and a separate amendatory clause that does not
explicitly refer to the statute of limitations, then the contract's
limitation period is generally enforceable.  

The Plaintiff argues that even if the one-year limitation period
applies, there is a fact question on whether State Farm waived it
or is estopped from asserting it, so this issue should be deferred
until the summary judgment stage.  For example, if an insurer
admits liability and continually discusses the loss with its
insured with a view toward negotiation and settlement without the
intervention of a suit, then there is a fact question on whether
this conduct lulled the insured into believing that the insurer
waived the policy's limitation period.  

Here, however, the Plaintiff makes no specific factual allegations
that he abstained from filing suit during the one-year limitation
period based on conduct by State Farm. The Plaintiff does allege
that State Farm used a statistically invalid total loss valuation
methodology to determine the value of his loss, that State Farm
underpaid his total loss claim by using a statistically invalid
downward condition adjustment and that State Farm concealed from
him that its total loss valuations were statistically invalid and
unlawful.

But these factual allegations do not plausibly suggest that State
Farm's conduct during its adjustment of Plaintiff's claim amounted
to a waiver of its right to rely upon the one-year limitation in
the policy. In summary, because the factual allegations in
Plaintiff's complaint establish that his breach of contract claim
against State Farm is untimely, that claim must be dismissed.

Obviously, if the Plaintiff's breach of contract claim fails as a
matter of law, his bad faith claim likewise fails. But even if his
breach of contract claim was timely, his bad faith claim would
still fail. Plaintiff concedes that he did not allege the requisite
60-day notice to State Farm required by O.C.G.A. Section 33-4-6,
and, as that procedural hurdle is strictly construed by Georgia
courts, he does not oppose the dismissal of the bad faith claim..
Plaintiff's bad faith claim against State Farm is thus dismissed.

Although the Plaintiff's civil conspiracy claim against State Farm
may survive a timeliness challenge, it is fundamentally flawed. The
basis for that claim is the alleged tortious interference with the
contract between Plaintiff and State Farm.  Under Georgia law,
tortious interference with a business relationship is a cause of
action for which proof of a civil conspiracy will expand liability
among all co-conspirators.  But, to be liable for tortious
interference with a contract, one must be a stranger to the
business relationship giving rise to and underpinning the contract.
State Farm was not a stranger to its insurance contract with
Plaintiff. Therefore, it could not tortiously interfere with the
contract or conspire to do so.  

Based on this, the Court grants State Farm's motion to dismiss all
of the Plaintiff's claims against it.

Plaintiff's Claims Against J.D. Power and Mitchell Must Be
Dismissed for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

In addition to State Farm, the Plaintiff also alleges claims
against J.D. Power Associates and Mitchell International, Inc.
Neither the Defendant argued that these claims are untimely.
Plaintiff alleges that J.D. Power and Mitchell conspired with and
assisted State Farm in its effort to under-value the claims of its
insureds. The class that the Plaintiff seeks to certify and
represent consists of State Farm insureds who presented claims that
were evaluated using the valuation tool developed by J.D. Power and
Mitchell. The thrust of the class claims is that State Farm
underpaid claims to its insureds with the help of J.D. Power and
Mitchell. State Farm's alleged liability is essential to this
putative class action.

The Plaintiff alleged subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
Section 1332(d) based solely on this action proceeding as a class
action against all Defendants, including State Farm. With the
Plaintiff's claims against State Farm now dismissed, it is clear
that this action is not the one that the Plaintiff initially sought
to pursue as a class action. It is also clear to the Court that
based on the pleadings, including the policy's clear one-year
limitations period that bars the Plaintiff's claims against State
Farm, the Plaintiff's claims lack the expectation that a class may
eventually be certified as pled. For these reasons, the Court finds
that it lacks jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d).
Furthermore, no independent basis for jurisdiction exists for
Plaintiff's individual claims against J.D. Power and Mitchell
because of the amount in controversy, which, according to the
Complaint, is $298.7.

Accordingly, the claims against J.D. Power and Mitchell are
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

State Farm's motion to dismiss is granted, and the claims against
J.D. Power and Mitchell are dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 20, 2019 Order is
available at  https://tinyurl.com/y2mvebct from Leagle.com.

LARRY RELF, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by JOHN A. YANCHUNIS, 20 North Orange Ave,
Suite 1600, Orlando, FL 32801, pro hac vice, JONATHAN B. COHEN --
jonathan.cohen@jmcesq.com -- pro hac vice, Jonathan H. Waller 2001
Park Place, Ste. 900, Birmingham, AL 35203 & R. WALKER GARRETT, 408
12th Street, Suite 200, Columbus, Georgia 31901.

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant,
represented by CASSANDRA KERKHOFF JOHNSON --
cassie.johnson@alston.com -- ALSTON & BIRD LLP, DANIEL F. DIFFLEY
-- dan.diffley@alston.com -- ALSTON & BIRD & JAMES B. CASH
-james.cash@alston.com -- ALSTON & BIRD LLP.

J D POWER & ASSOCIATES & MITCHELL INTERNATIONAL INC, Defendants,
represented by A. MCCAMPBELL GIBSON, SCOTT T. SCHUTTE & TRAVIS C.
HARGROVE, THE FINLEY FIRM, P.C., Piedmont Center, 3535 Piedmont
Road, Building 14, Suite 230, Atlanta, GA 30305


STATE FARM: Court Grants Dismissal Bid in A. Queen Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland,
Southern Division issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order denying
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned ANDRAE QUEEN
and others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO., et al., Defendants. Case No. PWG-18-2625.
(D. Md.).

Andrae Queen, who had an automobile insurance policy through State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, was injured in an
automobile accident in St. Mary's County, Maryland involving
Desiree Berry, who was not insured. In this putative class action
brought on behalf of similarly situated policyholders, Queen seeks
to recover from State Farm for breach of contract (Count II) and
requests a declaratory judgment that automobile insurance policies
must cover loss of use expenses, including rental car costs, under
their uninsured motor vehicle coverage provisions (Count III).

Contractual Language

In this case, whether State Farm breached the contract depends on
the nature of its contractual obligation for Uninsured Motor
Vehicle Coverage claims, which is a matter of contract
interpretation.

Maryland courts adhere to the principle of the objective
interpretation of contracts, if the language employed is
unambiguous, a court shall give effect to its plain meaning and
there is no need for further construction by the court. We attempt
to construe contracts as a whole, to interpret their separate
provisions harmoniously, so that, if possible, all of them may be
given effect.

This language is unambiguous, and any argument to the contrary is
disingenuous at best. The property damage for which State Farm will
pay compensatory damages under its uninsured motorist provision
only includes the damage that the car sustains. Lest a policyholder
believe that such damage somehow includes the cost of a car rental
while the car is repaired, the Policy also includes symbols on the
Declarations Page that clearly show the coverage included; for Mr.
Queen, the uninsured motorist coverage does not include the symbol
that would indicate that car rental expenses were covered.  

Statutory Requirements for Coverage

Queen insists that, regardless of the language of the Policy,
Maryland law establishing minimum, mandatory liability coverage
[and] mandatory UM uninsured motorist coverage requires that
uninsured motorist provisions cover car rental expenses. It is true
that the Policy language must be read within the context of
Maryland's strong public policy favoring compensation of those
injured by UM drivers. Any provisions of [an] insurance policy
which purport to condition, limit or dilute the unqualified
uninsured motorist coverage mandated by the statute are void and
unenforceable. The Court of Appeals has consistently rejected
attempts by insurers, as well as insureds and the insurance
commissioner, to circumvent the plain language of the required
coverage provisions of the statutes dealing with automobile
insurance.  

Thus, insofar as the Policy impermissibly does not include coverage
required by law, the omission or exclusion is ineffective, and the
insurance policy will be applied as if the minimum required
coverage were contained in the policy.

Relevantly, Maryland insurance law states:

The uninsured motorist coverage contained in a motor vehicle
liability insurance policy: (i) shall at least equal: 1. the
amounts required by Title 17 of the Transportation Article and 2.
the coverage provided to a qualified person under Title 20,
Subtitle 6 of this article, i.e., the Maryland Automobile Insurance
Fund (MAIF) provisions.

The relevant section of the Transportation Article provides that
the insurance that drivers in Maryland are required to carry must
provide for at least: (1) The payment of claims for bodily injury
or death arising from an accident of up to $30,000 for any one
person and up to $60,000 for any two or more persons, in addition
to interest and costs (2) The payment of claims for property of
others damaged or destroyed in an accident of up to $15,000, in
addition to interest and costs.

As Queen sees it, the Maryland Court of Appeals in D'Ambrogi v.
Unsatisfied Claim & Judgment Fund Board, 305 A.2d 136 (Md. 1973),
already determined that the statutorily-required coverage for
property damage includes coverage for rental car expenses.  

A more careful reading of D'Ambrogi is necessary. Following an
automobile accident, D'Ambrogi obtained a judgment against the
tortfeasor in a state court action and, when the tortfeasor failed
to pay, he sought reimbursement from the Unsatisfied Claim and
Judgment Fund (Fund), the predecessor of MAIF. The court denied his
claim against the Fund for $862.91 he spent on a rental truck while
his truck was being repaired.

On appeal, D'Ambrogi argued that damage sustained as a result of
loss of use of a motor vehicle is properly payable from the Fund.


The court observed that the Act should be liberally construed so as
to advance the remedy, due regard being had for the protection of
the Fund and the realization of essential legislative design. The
court concluded that, pursuant to the statutory provision providing
payment for damages to property, D'Ambrogi could recover from the
Fund the cost of repairing his truck, which was damage which he
suffered which stemmed from loss of use. It reasoned:

No extensive citation of authority is necessary to support the
proposition that the measure of damages for injury to personal
property which has not been entirely destroyed is the cost of
repairing the property together with the value of the use of the
property during the time it would take to repair it.

Significantly, not only did the Maryland appellate court not agree
with the Fund that the phrase damages resulting from needed to
appear immediately before damage to property for damage to property
to include damages for loss of use, but it also did not construe
the statutory language to refer to damages resulting from damage to
property.

Thus, the elimination of the phrase damages resulting from when
MAIF was enacted did not change the holding of D'Ambrogi because it
was not a part of the court's analysis and, even when it was a part
of the statute, it did not affect the meaning of damage to
property. Therefore damage to property, which uninsured motorist
coverage must cover, includes the value of the use of the property
during the time it would take to repair it, a value that can
include the cost of renting a replacement vehicle. Based on this
case law from more than fortysix years ago, and State Farm's
failure to show that the law has changed, Queen has stated
plausible claims, notwithstanding the unambiguous language of the
Policy excluding the coverage Queen demands.

Therefore, State Farm's Motion to Dismiss is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 20, 2019 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y26lj45x from
Leagle.com.

Andrae Queen, on behalf of himself and all similarly situated
persons, Plaintiff, represented by David Errol Tompkins --
dtompkins@lewisandtompkins.com -- Lewis and Tompkins PC & Thomas
Joseph Minton -- tminton@charmcitylegal.com -- Goldman and Minton
PC.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company & State Farm Fire
and Casualty Co., Defendants, represented by Laura Basem Jacobs ,
Budow and Noble, P.C., 12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 540,
Rockville, MD 20852, Cassandra Kerkhoff Johnson --
cassie.johnson@alston.com -- Alston and Bird LLP, pro hac vice &
Daniel F. Diffley -- dan.diffley@alston.com -- Alston and Bird LLP,
pro hac vice.


STONEMOR PARTNERS: 3rd Cir. Court Affirms Dismissal in P. Fan Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming the District Court's judgment granting
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned PETER FAN;
ROYAL ESTATE MANAGEMENT LLC; FREMONT HOTEL INC, Individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Appellants, v. STONEMOR
PARTNERS LP; STONEMOR GP LLC; STONEMOR GP HOLDINGS LLC; AMERICAN
CEMETERIES INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTORS LLC; LAWRENCE MILLER; SEAN P.
McGRATH; ROBERT B. HELLMAN, JR.; WILLIAM R. SHANE; TIMOTHY YOST.
No. 17-3843. (3rd Cir.).

StoneMor sells products and services for funerals, including burial
plots and related products.These pre-need sales, however, could not
be demonstrated as an increase in current revenue since the
proceeds were held in trusts. Thus, as pre-need sales grew, so too
did a substantial disparity between StoneMor's overall sales and
its accessible cash cash which would have otherwise been used for
quarterly investor distributions. Plaintiffs alleged that
Defendants made false or misleading statements, with scienter,
which Plaintiffs relied on to their financial detriment.

The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint, which the
District Court granted for failure to state a claim under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and for failure to satisfy the
heightened pleading standards of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act (PSLRA).

Under 17 C.F.R. Section 240.10b-5(b), when selling securities it is
illegal for any person to make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading. In order to state a claim under
Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) A material
misrepresentation or omission (2) scienter, a wrongful state of
mind) (3) a connection between the misstatement and the purchase or
sale of a security (4) reliance upon the misstatement (5) economic
loss and(6) loss causation.

Because they allege fraud, the Plaintiffs must state with
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.  

The Plaintiffs base their claim of fraud on three categories3 of
alleged misstatements by the Defendants.

First, the Plaintiffs claim that StoneMor fraudulently lauded its
financial strength or health in connection with the release of
certain quarterly distributions.  

The Plaintiffs allege that this statement is false and misleading
because StoneMor could not, and never intended to fund the
distributions from the performance of the business, i.e.,from
day-to-day business operations. The Plaintiffs argue that StoneMor
fraudulently omitted that its ability to fund cash distributions
was contingent on its access to the capital markets.

The second category of alleged misstatements relate to the
connection between StoneMor's operations and distributions. For
example, StoneMor stated in a press release that its primary source
of cash from which to pay partner distributions is operating cash
flow. The Plaintiffs argue that statements such as this
misrepresented the fact that StoneMor's primary source of liquid
cash for distributions was equity proceeds.

The third category of alleged misstatements concern StoneMor's
ability to pay down its debt facility using equity proceeds. For
example, a StoneMor press release stated that StoneMor intends to
use the net proceeds from the common units it is offering to pay
down the borrowings outstanding under its existing credit facility.
Plaintiffs allege that this statement is misleading because
StoneMor allegedly omitted the fact that its cash distributions
were funded through borrowings from its credit facility.

Falsity and Materiality

In this securities fraud case, these statements are only actionable
if, when read in light of all the information then available to the
market or a failure to disclose particular information, they
conveyed a false or misleading impression. A false or misleading
statement, however, is not enough. The Court must also find that
the alleged misstatement or omission is material.

Materiality may be found when certain information, if disclosed,
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the total mix of information available to
that investor. As such, vague and general statements of optimism"
are non-actionable precisely because they are not material a
reasonable investor would not base decisions on such statements.  

This case turns on the Plaintiffs' allegations that StoneMor
omitted necessary information that would have alerted investors to
its methods for funding its distributions. For this reason, the
Court focuses primarily on the specific disclosures made by
StoneMor that relate to Plaintiffs' alleged misstatements. And, as
the Court discuss below, for each category of alleged
misstatements, StoneMor disclosed sufficient information to render
them immaterial.

The Plaintiffs' first category of alleged misstatements claimed
that StoneMor fraudulently lauded its financial health and
misrepresented that its distributions were funded from the
performance of the business, i.e., from day-to-day business
operations.

In its Form 10-Ks issued during the Class Period, StoneMor defined
its Available Cash as consisting of cash on hand at the end of that
quarter, plus cash on hand from working capital borrowings made
after the end of the quarter less cash reserves. This disclosure,
among others, would alert reasonable investors to the real business
risks facing StoneMor. Thus, these statements Plaintiffs identify
as fraudulently misleading are rendered immaterial given the
pertinent disclosures.  

The Plaintiffs' second category of alleged misstatements concerns
the fact that StoneMor's distributions were funded in large part
through its cash borrowings, and not its day-to-day operating
revenue. But this information was also readily and repeatedly
disclosed.

In each of its annual reports during the Class Period, StoneMor
issued GAAP and non-GAAP financials side-by-side, which
demonstrated the mathematical reality that StoneMor was not able to
fund its distributions primarily from its day-to-day operations
because much of that cash was being held in state trusts and was
unrecognized by GAAP. StoneMor was transparent in this accounting
method, and even used a bar chart at a 2013 investor presentation
that represented its distribution amount and non-GAAP operating
profits towering over its GAAP operating profit. When viewed
alongside these disclosures, Plaintiffs' allegations that StoneMor
fraudulently concealed the fact that its distributions were not
funded primarily from the current operating revenue fall flat.
StoneMor's disclosures render any such perceived misstatement
immaterial.

The third category of alleged misrepresentations relates to
StoneMor's usage of equity proceeds as a means to pay down its debt
facility from which it borrowed cash for distributions. Here too,
StoneMor's disclosures are sufficient to render these allegations
immaterial.

Indeed, the Plaintiffs' own Complaint quotes from StoneMor press
releases that state clearly that StoneMor intend[ed] to use the net
proceeds from the [equity] offering to pay down outstanding
indebtedness under its revolving credit facility. The Complaint
also references a 2016 Quarterly Report, which describes a
successful public offering and explains that the proceeds from the
offering were used to pay down outstanding indebtedness under the
Credit Facility. In light of these disclosures, we cannot conclude
that the statements contained in Plaintiffs' third category of
alleged misrepresentations are material because a reasonable
investor would have been aware of the fact that StoneMor used
equity proceeds to pay down its debt.

Overall, for each category of StoneMor's alleged misstatements,
clear and consistent disclosures were made available to investors
throughout the Class Period. As a result, we hold that StoneMor
sufficiently disclosed facts and information that render its
alleged misrepresentations not misleading.  

Scienter

Even if we were to hold that StoneMor's alleged misrepresentations
were materially misleading, Plaintiffs' claims would still fail
because our review of the record does not demonstrate the necessary
state of mind by Defendants. In line with its heightened pleading
standards, the PSLRA requires that the plaintiff's pleadings
conjure a strong inference that the defendant acted with the
necessary state of mind, that is, with intent to defraud
shareholders.

Scienter may also be shown by a knowing or reckless state of mind,
which in this securities context would be demonstrated by pleading
an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care.

Such an inference is clearly not present here. For each category of
statements, as described above, StoneMor's disclosures draw a
strong inference that the investors were appraised of the relevant
information regarding StoneMor's cycle of equity offerings, cash
borrowings, and cash distributions. These disclosures do not
demonstrate an intent to defraud, rather, they accurately show how
StoneMor leveraged its assets in order to maximize its
distributions despite the state trust requirements attached to its
pre-need sales. StoneMor may have been caught by the risk inherent
in its business strategy, but those risks were disclosed in their
annual Form 10-Ks throughout the Class Period.

Thus, the Court holds that the pleadings do not demonstrate
scienter as the PSLRA requires.
The Court will affirm the decision of the District Court.

A full-text copy of the Third Circuit's June 20, 2019 Opinion is
available at  https://tinyurl.com/y4ye56k7 from Leagle.com.

James W. Johnson, David J. Goldsmith [ARGUED], Michael H. Rogers,
Claiborne R. Hane, James T. Christie, Labaton Sucharow LLP, 140
Broadway, New York, New York 10005.

Naumon A. Amjed, Ryan T. Degnan, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check LLP,
280 King of Prussia Road, Radnor, Pennsylvania 19087, Counsel for
Appellant.

James H. Steigerwald, Robert M. Palumbos, Brian J. Slipakoff, Duane
Morris LLP, 30 South 17th Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
19103.

Michael C. Holmes [ARGUED], Craig E. Zieminski, Amy T. Perry,
Merriwether T. Evans, R. Kent Piacenti, Vinson & Elkins LLP, 2001
Ross Avenue, Suite 3700, Dallas, Texas 75201, Counsel for
Appellee.


SYNERGETIC COMMUNICATION: Reeves Sues Over FDCPA Violation
----------------------------------------------------------
Shanell Reeves, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Synergetic Communication, Inc., Defendant,
Case No. 2:19-cv-14718 (D. N.J., July 3, 2019) seeks to recover for
violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA").

In its efforts to collect the alleged Debt, Defendant contacted
Plaintiff by letter dated July 3, 2018. The Letter was the initial
written communication Plaintiff received from Defendant concerning
the alleged Debt. The Letter states in part: "Unless you notify
this office within 30 days after receiving this notice that you
dispute the validity of this debt or any portion thereof, this
office will assume this debt is valid." The Letter fails to state
explicitly that a dispute to be effective, must be in writing and
sent to the address. Even if a debt collector conveys the required
information, the debt collector nonetheless violates the FDCPA if
it conveys that information in a confusing or contradictory fashion
so as to cloud the required message with uncertainty. The Letter
fails to properly inform the least sophisticated consumer that to
effectively dispute the alleged debt, such dispute must be in
writing. The least sophisticated consumer upon reading the Letter
would likely be confused as to what she must do to effectively
dispute the alleged debt. Because the Letter can reasonably be read
by the least sophisticated consumer to have two or more meanings,
one of which is inaccurate, as described, it is deceptive within
the meaning of the FDCPA, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Shanell Reeves is an individual who is a citizen of the
State of New Jersey and is a natural person allegedly obligated to
pay a debt.

Defendant is regularly engaged, for profit, in the collection of
debts allegedly owed by consumers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
     BARSHAY SANDERS, PLLC
     100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
     Garden City, NY 11530
     Tel: (516) 203-7600
     Fax: (516) 706-5055
     Email: csanders@barshaysanders.com


TERRASMART LLC: Lake Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Compensation
-----------------------------------------------------------
BARRY A. LAKE, JR., individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. TERRASMART, LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 1:19-cv-01110-UN1 (M.D. Pa., June 28, 2019) is a Complaint -
Collective Action against Defendant, for violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"), as well as individual claims
pursuant to the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act of 1968 ("PMWA"), and
the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law ("PWPCL").

The Defendant TerraSmart told Mr. Lake and all Plaintiffs opting
into the collective action aspect of this lawsuit that they would
earn a salary, and were not paid by the hour or an overtime rate,
although federal and state law requires paying them by the hour and
at an overtime rate for hours in excess of 40 hours per week. Mr.
Lake and all Plaintiffs opting into the collective action aspect of
this lawsuit are entitled to compensation for certain travel time
that was integral and indispensable to their work for Defendant as
work time. The Defendant TerraSmart willfully refused to pay Mr.
Lake and all Plaintiffs opting into the collective action aspect of
this lawsuit overtime for the time they worked in excess of 40
hours per week from their date of hire through the filing date of
this Complaint, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Mr. Lake was employed as a Field Supervisor at Terra
Smart, LLC from on or about April 13, 2016 to on or about June 29,
2018.

TerraSmart, LLC is registered in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
as a foreign limited liability corporation (incorporated in
Florida), providing solar ground mount racking, design,
engineering, manufacturing and installation.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Derrek W. Cummings, Esq.
     Larry A. Weisberg, Esq.
     Steve T. Mahan, Esq.
     Stephen P. Gunther, Esq.
     WEISBERG CUMMINGS, P.C.
     2704 Commerce Drive, Suite B
     Harrisburg, PA 17110-9380
     Phone: (717) 238-5707
     Fax: (717) 233-8133
     Email: dcummings@weisbergcummings.com
            lweisberg@weisbergcummings.com
            smahan@weisbergcummings.com
            sgunther@weisbergcummings.com


TIBI LLC: Conner Alleges Violation under Disabilities Act
---------------------------------------------------------
Tibi, LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant to the
Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as Mary Conner,
individually and as the representative of a class of similarly
situated persons, Plaintiff v. Tibi, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-03873 (E.D. N.Y., July 3, 2019).

Tibi is an American fashion company based in New York City.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Dan Shaked, Esq.
   Shaked Law Group, P.C.
   14 Harwood Court, Suite 415
   Scarsdale, NY 10583
   Tel: (917) 373-9128
   Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com



TIGER NATURAL: $3.7MM Fishman Settlement Has Final Court Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Final
Approval of a Proposed Class Settlement in the case captioned EMILY
FISHMAN and SUSAN FARIA, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. TIGER NATURAL GAS INC., an
Oklahoma corporation; COMMUNITY GAS CENTER INC., a Colorado
corporation; JOHN DYET, an individual; and DOES 3-100, Defendants.
No. C 17-05351 WHA. (N.D. Cal.).

In this class action for violations of California's Recording Law,
the plaintiffs move for final approval of a proposed class
settlement and for attorney's fees and expenses. The Defendants do
not oppose.

Defendant John Dyet owned several telemarketing companies,
including defendant Community Gas Center, Inc.  CGC called PG&E
customers to promote defendant Tiger Natural Gas, Inc.'s
capped-rate program, pursuant to which program Tiger's supply rate
for natural gas would be capped at $0.69 per therm. This case stems
from alleged misrepresentations made during these phone
solicitations to PG&E's customers. Plaintiffs further alleged that
defendants recorded these sales calls without customers' consent.
Plaintiffs' most recent iteration of the complaint contained
thirteen claims for relief, including for violations of
California's Recording Law, California's Unfair Competition Law,
and California's Consumers Legal Remedies Act. A November 2018
order certified the following class only with respect to
plaintiffs' Recording Law claim, denying without prejudice
certification as to the Section 17200 and CLRA claims.

The Plaintiffs move for final approval of the proposed class
settlement of $3.7 million and for an award of $925,000 in
attorney's fees (comprising 25 percent of the gross settlement
fund), $217,127.91 in unreimbursed expenses, and an incentive award
of $1,500 for each of the two named plaintiffs. Defendants do not
oppose. This order follows full briefing and oral argument.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) provides that the claims,
issues, or defenses of a certified class may be settled only with
the court's approval.

FINAL APPROVAL OF PROPOSED CLASS SETTLEMENT

Adequacy of Notice

The notice must be reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.
It must also describe the terms of the settlement in sufficient
detail to alert those with adverse viewpoints to investigate and to
come forward and be heard. The undersigned judge previously
approved the form, content, and planned distribution of the class
notice   As described above, the claims administrator has fulfilled
the notice plan. This order accordingly finds that notice to class
members was adequate.

In addition to the notice already sent by the claims administrator,
class counsel propose to include a further notice with class
members' settlement checks (which will not impose any additional
cost). According to class counsel, California Deputy Attorney
General Sheldon Jaffe contacted them regarding the settlement and
expressed that class members should be informed that they can
cancel Tiger's program without any penalties or fees. To address
this concern, class counsel now proposes including the following
language with class members' settlement checks.

This order agrees that including the above-cited language would be
beneficial for class members and accordingly GRANTS plaintiffs'
request to include it with class members' settlement checks.

Scope of Release

This settlement releases only the Recording Law, Section 17200, and
CLRA claims asserted in the action. The ten other claims alleged in
the operative complaint will be dismissed with prejudice.
Furthermore, the class is defined as the same as that in the class
certification order, so a subclass of only consumers would be used
for the CLRA claim. This scope of release is thus appropriately
tailored an approved.

Fairness, Reasonableness, and Adequacy of Proposed Settlement

A district court may approve a proposed class settlement only upon
finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate, taking into
account (1) the strength of the plaintiffs' case; (2) the risk,
expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation (3)
the risk of maintaining class action status throughout the trial
(4) the amount offered in settlement (5) the extent of discovery
completed and the stage of the proceedings (6) the experience and
view of counsel (7) the presence of a governmental participant; and
(8) the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.
For the following reasons and for the reasons stated in the
February 2019 order, this order finds that the proposed class
settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate under FRCP 23(e).

First, the settlement terms are fair, reasonable, and adequate.
Although the gross settlement fund of $3.7 million amounts to only
2.78 percent of the statutory damages that plaintiffs contend are
owed to the class, there exists a serious risk that defendants
would go bankrupt and the class would be left with much less (if
anything) even if plaintiffs did succeed at trial. With respect to
plaintiffs' Section 17200 and CLRA claims, the proposed settlement
provides for injunctive relief prohibiting Tiger from engaging in
the misleading business practices alleged in this case.  

Second, the plan of allocation of the settlement proceeds is fair
and reasonable. The net settlement after the deduction of expenses,
attorney's fees, and any incentive award will be distributed evenly
amongst the nearly 27,000 class members. In the event that any
class member does not cash their settlement check, leftover funds
will go to cy pres recipient The Utility Reform Network. The
proposed settlement agreement does not require class members to
participate in a claims process in order to claim their share of
the settlement fund.

In short, having considered the applicable factors, this order
finds the proposed class settlement is fair, reasonable, and
adequate so as to warrant final approval. Accordingly, final
approval of the proposed class settlement and plan of allocation is
GRANTED.

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES, EXPENSES, AND INCENTIVE AWARD

Expenses

Class counsel seek to recover from the settlement fund $217,128 in
litigation expenses. The largest component of these expenses is
class notice and administration ($87,494.58). The second largest
component are experts/consultants/special master" ($86,079.11).
Counsel also seek reimbursement for depositions ($22,081.31),
research ($3,833.52), and process servers, postage, messengers
($2,439.82). These expenses were a reasonable and necessary part of
the litigation, and are of a type customarily billed to a
fee-paying client. No class member objected to recovery of these
costs.

The motion for reimbursement of these costs is granted.

The undersigned also finds that the proposed class settlement is
fair, reasonable, and adequate as to the class, plaintiffs, and
defendants; that it is the product of good faith, arms-length
negotiations between the parties; and that the settlement is
consistent with public policy and fully complies with all
applicable provisions of law. The settlement is therefore
approved.

Having considered class counsel's motion for attorney's fees,
reimbursement of expenses, and an incentive award, the undersigned
hereby awards class counsel attorney's fees of $870,718. Half of
this amount shall be paid after the effective date as defined in
the settlement agreement. The other half shall be paid when class
counsel certify that all funds have been properly distributed and
the file can be completely closed.

Class counsel shall also receive $217,128 as reimbursement for
their litigation expenses, to be paid from the settlement fund.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 20, 2019 Order is
available at  https://tinyurl.com/y528vvvd from Leagle.com.

Emily Fishman, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated & Susan Faria, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Daniel L. Balsam --
calbar@danbalsam.com -- The Law Offices of Daniel Balsam, Jacob N.
Harker -- harkerjacob@gmail.com -- Law Offices of Jacob Harker,
Kathleen Styles Rogers -- krogers@kraloweclaw.com -- Kralowec Law,
P.C. & Kimberly Ann Kralowec -- krogers@kraloweclaw.com -- Kralowec
Law, P.C.

Tiger Natural Gas, Inc., an Oklahoma corporation, Defendant,
represented by Janet Chung , Holland and Knight LLP,  Amazon
Lab126, 1100 Enterprise Way, Sunnyvale, CA 94089-1412, John Andrew
Canale -- John.Canale@hklaw.com -- Holland and Knight LLP, Leah E.
Capritta -- Leah.Capritta@hklaw.com -- Holland & Knight LLP, Thomas
Drew Leland -- Thomas.Leland@hklaw.com -- Holland and Knight LLP &
Vince Lee Farhat -- vince.farhat@hklaw.com -- Holland and Knight
LLP.

Community Gas Center Inc., a Colorado corporation & John Dyet,
Defendants, represented by Anastasia Bondarchuk --
abondarchuk@manatt.com -- Manatt, Phelps & Phillips LLP, Christine
Marie Reilly- creilly@manatt.com -- Manatt Phelps & Phillips LLP &
Emily Marie Speier -- espeier@manatt.com -- Manatt, Phelps and
Phillips LLP.

Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Objector, represented by Elliott
Thomas Seals , Pacific Gas and Electric.


TRANSAMERICA CORP: Marshall Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------
Breanna Marshall, Individually and on behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff v. TRANSAMERICA CORP. and TATA
CONSULTANCY SERVICES LTD., Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-00472-JM
(E.D. Ark., July 3, 2019) is an action under the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA"), for declaratory judgment, monetary damages,
liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, and costs, including
reasonable attorneys' fees as a result of Defendants' failure to
pay Plaintiff and all others similarly situated lawful overtime
compensation for all hours that Plaintiffs and all others similarly
situated worked in excess of 40 per workweek.

As a direct result of Defendants' policies, even though Plaintiff
and other customer care representatives worked more than 40 hours
in many weeks that they worked for Defendants during time period
relevant to this Complaint, they were not compensated for all of
their overtime hours worked. The Defendants have deprived Plaintiff
and other customer care representatives of regular wages and
overtime compensation for all of their hours worked over 40 per
week. The Defendants knew or showed reckless disregard for whether
the way they paid Plaintiff and all others similarly situated
violated the FLSA, says the complaint.

Plaintiff began her employment with Defendant Transamerica Corp.
around October of 2017 in the Employee Benefits division.

Defendants sell voluntary life and supplemental health insurance
products to employers at the workplace through their Employee
Benefits division.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Stacy Gibson, Esq.
     Josh Sanford, Esq.
     SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
     One Financial Center
     650 South Shackleford Road, Suite 411
     Little Rock, AR 72211
     Phone: (501) 221-0088
     Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
     Email: stacy@sanfordlawfirm.com
            josh@sanfordlawfirm.com


TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS: Gray Sues Over Debt Collection Practices
------------------------------------------------------------
ANNA GRAY, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC., a
California corporation, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-04550 (N.D.
Ill., July 3, 2019) is a class action complaint against TransWorld
Systems, Inc. to stop Defendant's unlawful debt collection
practices in the form of unauthorized prerecorded or automated
telephone calls, and to obtain redress for all persons injured by
its conduct.

In an effort to increase its recovery on delinquent accounts,
Defendant violated federal law by making unauthorized prerecorded
or automated telephone calls ("robocalls") to the cellular
telephones of individuals throughout the nation. By effectuating
these unsolicited robocalls, Defendant has violated the called
parties' statutory and privacy rights and has caused the call
recipients actual harm, not only because the called parties were
subjected to the aggravation and invasion of privacy that
necessarily accompanies unsolicited calls, but also because the
recipients frequently have to pay their cell phone service
providers for receiving the calls. In order to redress these
injuries, Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and a nationwide class,
brings suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (the
"TCPA"), which protects the privacy right of consumers to be free
from receiving unsolicited prerecorded and/or automated telephone
calls, says the complaint.

Plaintiff is domiciled in North Carolina.

TransWorld Systems, Inc. is a nationwide debt collection
agency.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Eugene Y. Turin, Esq.
     MCGUIRE LAW, P.C.
     55 W. Wacker Drive, 9th Fl.
     Chicago, IL 6060l
     Tel: (312) 893-7002
     Fax: (312) 275-7895
     Email: eturin@mcgpc.com


TUMBLEWEED: Delamora Files Fraud Class Suit in California
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Tumbleweed f/k/a
Rocktape, Inc. The case is styled as Mario Delamora, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Tumbleweed f/k/a Rocktape, Inc. and Implus Footcare LLC,
Defendants, Case No. 5:19-cv-03865 (N.D. Cal., July 3, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Other Fraud
filed pursuant to the Diversity-Fraud.

RockTape, Inc. provides kinesiology tape, medical education, and
other health and wellness products. The company was incorporated in
2009 and is based in Campbell, California. As of October 2, 2018,
Rock Tape USA operates as a subsidiary of Implus Corporation.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Michael Milton Liskow, Esq.
   The Sultzer Law Group, P.C.
   351 W. 54th St., Suite 1C
   New York, NY 10019
   Tel: (212) 969-7811
   Fax: (888) 749-7747
   Email: liskowm@thesultzerlawgroup.com




UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Court Narrows Claims in Diva's UCL Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting in part and denying
Defendants’ Motion for Dismiss in the case captioned DIVA
LIMOUSINE, LTD., Plaintiff, v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., et al.,
Defendants. Case No. 18-cv-05546-EMC. (N.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff Diva Limousine (Diva), a licensed provider of livery
services in California, brings this putative class action on behalf
of providers of pre-arranged ground transportation services against
Uber Technologies and its subsidiaries (Uber). Diva alleges that
Uber secures unlawful cost savings by misclassifying its drivers as
independent contractors instead of employees. In doing so, Uber
takes business and market share from competitors like Diva who
operate their businesses in compliance with the law. Diva also
alleges that Uber, armed with cash from investors, prices its
services below cost in order to drive out competitors.

Diva asserts that Uber's actions violate the California Unfair
Competition Law (UCL) and the California Unfair Practices Act
(UPA).

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Diva asserts that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over
the claims in this case under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA).
CAFA vests the district court with original jurisdiction of any
civil action in which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is a
class action in which' the parties satisfy, among other
requirements, minimal diversity.

The FAC alleges that Uber is incorporated in Delaware and
headquartered in San Francisco. For diversity purposes, then,
Defendants are citizens of Delaware and California.  

Diva alleges that these affiliates are, indeed, not citizens of
California. The FAC recites a statistic that 84 percent of the
approximately 17,300 limousine and chauffeur-driven ground
transportation companies in the United States have their principal
place of business in states other than California, and that the
overwhelming majority of these companies are also incorporated in
states other than California. As a result, Diva submits that it can
be reasonably estimated that there are out-of-state affiliates in
each putative class that are not citizens of California.

These allegations are insufficient to establish minimal diversity.
Absent unusual circumstances, a party seeking to invoke diversity
jurisdiction should be able to allege affirmatively the actual
citizenship of the relevant parties. The FAC does not identify any
specific out-of-state affiliates or their states of citizenship.
Nor does the FAC expressly allege that the out-of-state affiliates
are not citizens of Delaware.

Because the FAC on its face does not allege sufficient facts to
establish subject matter jurisdiction, Uber's Rule 12(b)(1) motion
to dismiss is GRANTED.  

UPA Claim

The UPA makes it unlawful for any person engaged in business within
this state to sell any article or product at less than the cost
thereof to such vender, or to give away any article or product for
the purpose of injuring competitors or destroying competition. Diva
alleges that Uber's practice of offering rides as a loss leader2
with the intent of driving competitors out of the market violates
the UPA.  Uber argues that Diva's UPA claim fails as a matter of
law because a statutory provision exempts Uber from UPA liability.


Uber believes it falls within the first exemption. Diva disagrees.
Their dispute centers on the meaning of the phrase for which rates
are established under the jurisdiction of the Public Utilities
Commission. To Uber, this phrase indicates that it does not matter
who sets the rates, as long as the rates are established under the
jurisdiction of the CPUC. Diva, on the other hand, interprets the
phrase as applying only to rates actually established by the CPUC;
it is not enough that the CPUC has the authority to set rates but
has not exercised it. This distinction is critical because while
the parties do not dispute that the CPUC has authority to regulate
Uber, Diva alleges that the CPUC has never used that authority to
set Uber's rates.

The plain language of the statute and the case law interpreting
Section 17024 support Uber's position.

Statutory Text and Related Provisions`

Diva counters that with respect to establishing rates, this
provision refers to no actor other than the CPUC, so it must be the
CPUC that is setting the rates. Diva cites Coso Energy Developers
v. Cty. of Inyo, 122 Cal.App.4th 1512 (2004), in which the court
held that one clause in a statute written in the passive voice is
not ambiguous where the statute "includes no language suggesting an
actor other than the State of California.

The applicability of Section 17024(1) does not turn on whether the
CPUC has actually set rates. As Uber points out, the California
Public Utilities Code expressly provides that it is within the
CPUC's discretion to regulate public utilities within its
jurisdiction, including by setting rates, but that the CPUC is not
required to do so in all instances. This context lends credence to
the notion that the rates established by a public utility which are
merely subject to the CPUC's jurisdiction are rates are established
under the jurisdiction of CPUC irrespective of whether the CPUC
actually exercises its rate setting authority.

Diva's statutory arguments to the contrary are not persuasive.
First, Diva purports to rely on the plain text of the statute:

A plain reading of Section 17024(1) shows that the exemption only
applies to a service, such as an Uber ride, for which rates are
established by the CPUC. By reading these critical words out of the
statute, Uber invites the Court to violate fundamental canons of
statutory interpretation.

Second, Diva argues that Uber's interpretation of Section 17024(1)
cannot be harmonized with Section 17024(2).  Whereas Section
17024(1) exempts privately owned public utilities from the UPA's
proscriptions, Section 17024(2) exempts publicly owned public
utilities for which rate-setting authority belongs to
municipalities rather than the CPUC.  

Third, Diva points to California Public Utilities Code Section 2106
as evidence that the legislature did not intent to broadly immunize
public utilities from liability via Section 17024. Section 2106
authorizes a private right of action against public utilities. Even
by Diva's description, however, Section 2106 only enshrines a
general rule that public utilities are liable for violations of the
law. As such, it does not override an express statutory exemption,
like Section 17024, created by the legislature.

Case Law

No higher court in California has definitively construed Section
17024(1), but the Court of Appeal in Hladek v. City of Merced, 69
Cal.App.3d 585 (1977) provided an analysis of Section 17024(2) that
also illuminates the scope of § 17024(1). In Hladek, a privately
owned dial-a-bus, dial-a-ride service sued the City of Merced under
the UPA for starting a competing transportation service that
allegedly operated at a loss. The City's service was a publicly
owned public utility, raising the question whether was exempt from
UPA liability under Section 17024(2). In resolving the question,
the court held that the pivotal issue is whether the Public
Utilities Commission would have the jurisdiction to establish the
rates for such service if it had been sold or furnished by a
privately owned public utility.

As Uber points out, and the Superior Court in Actions v. Uber
Technologies observed, Hladeksupports Uber's interpretation of
Section 17024(1) because  Hladek considered only whether the PUC
would have had jurisdiction; it did not consider whether the PUC
did in fact, or would, exercise its jurisdiction.  

The courts that have addressed the issue have so concluded that the
CPUC is not required to actually establish rates in order for
Section 17024(1) to apply. This Court agrees.

The Filed Rate Doctrine

Diva makes one final argument for construing the Section 17024(1)
exemption narrowly by analogizing Section 17024 to the federal
filed rate doctrine.  The filed rate doctrine is a judicial
creation that bars challenges under state law and federal antitrust
laws to rates set by federal agencies. There is no state-law
equivalent of the filed rate doctrine in California.

Diva asserts that the California Legislature intended for Section
17024 to function as an analogous exemption to UPA liability for
public utilities whose rates are actually set by the CPUC: in the
face of private litigation contesting public utilities rates, the
Legislature needed to create a narrow safe-haven for rates approved
by state regulators akin to the filed-rate doctrine. Section 17024
accomplishes this exact purpose. But Diva cites no authority
legislative history or otherwise for this claim. There is simply no
support for Diva's claim that § 17024 must be construed as
narrowly as the filed rate doctrine.

The plain language of Section 17024(1) indicates that the exemption
should be construed to apply to all public utilities over which the
CPUC has rate-setting authority. Accordingly, Diva's UPA claim is
DISMISSED with prejudice.

UCL Claim

The UCL proscribes business practices that are (1) unlawful (2)
unfair or (3) fraudulent.  
Uber contends that Diva's claim under the unfair prong fails
because Uber's alleged conduct does not violate antitrust laws, and
that the claim under the "unlawful" prong fails because causation
is not sufficiently alleged.

Unfair Prong

The California Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff who claims
to have suffered injury from a direct competitor's `unfair' act or
practice must allege "conduct that threatens an incipient violation
of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of
those laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a
violation of the law, or otherwise significantly threatens or harms
competition.

Uber contends that the allegations in the FAC reveal that Uber's
misclassification of drivers results in more competition and lower
prices for consumers, which means that no antitrust laws were
violated even if Diva lost business.  

Uber is correct that the antitrust laws' prohibitions focus on
protecting the competitive process and not on the success or
failure of individual competitors.

Diva claims that Uber's conduct crossed the line from robust
competition to unfair anti-competition. In particular, the FAC
alleges that Uber's misclassification of drivers "violates the
policy or spirit of the antitrust laws and threatens an incipient
violation of antitrust law, including but not limited to
monopolization and/or attempted monopolization under Section 2 of
the Sherman Antitrust Act.

However, this conclusory allegation is not accompanied by specific
facts that would support a Sherman Act claim. In order to state a
claim for monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, a
plaintiff must prove: (1) possession of monopoly power in the
relevant market (2) willful acquisition or maintenance of that
power and (3) causal antitrust injury.

And to state a claim for attempted monopolization, the plaintiff
must show: (1) specific intent to control prices or destroy
competition; (2) predatory or anticompetitive conduct to accomplish
the monopolization; (3) dangerous probability of success; and (4)
causal antitrust injury. The FAC, as currently pleaded, does not
speak to many of these elements, so Diva's unfair prong claim
cannot be sustained by its bare allegations of Sherman Act
violations.

Further, there is no question that the prohibition on worker
misclassification is tethered to some legislatively declared
policy. The California Labor Code expressly declares that it is the
policy of this state to vigorously enforce minimum labor standards
in order  to protect employers who comply with the law from those
who attempt to gain a competitive advantage at the expense of their
workers by failing to comply with minimum labor standards.

Uber's motion to dismiss the UCL unfairness claim is DENIED to the
extent the claim is based on violations of California labor laws.
The motion is GRANTED to the extent the unfairness claim is based
on Sherman Act violations. Diva may amend its complaint with
specific facts that would support its claim that Uber's
misclassification of drivers violates the Sherman Act.

Unlawful Prong

Uber next contends that Diva lacks standing to bring a claim under
the unlawful prong of the UCL. To establish Article III standing, a
plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) injury-in-fact in the form of
concrete and particularized and actual or imminent harm to a
legally protected interest (2) a causal connection between the
injury and the conduct complained of and (3) a likelihood that a
favorable decision would redress the injury-in-fact.
  
Standing as to All Plaintiffs

Uber argues that Diva has not shown that Uber's driver
misclassification is the cause of its unfair cost advantage over
its competitors because Diva also alleges that investor subsidies
allow Uber to price its rides below cost.  Thus, Uber reasons, Diva
would have suffered the same harm even if Uber had complied fully
with labor laws and paid its drivers as employees.

The argument is meritless for several reasons.

First, the dismissal of Diva's UPA claim resolves this issue. As
Diva explains, the FAC pleads alternative theories of liability
under the UPA and UCL. Opp. at 21-22. The UPA cause of action
incorporates only the allegations that pertain to Uber's
investor-funded loss-leader pricing, whereas the UCL cause of
action incorporates only the allegations that pertain to Uber's
driver misclassification. Now that the UPA cause of action has been
dismissed, the sole remaining source of Uber's cost advantage is
its alleged misclassification practices. Causation is thus
simplified.

Second, even if Diva's harm is caused by both Uber's driver
misclassification and predatory pricing subsidized by investor
financing, Diva has still established standing by asserting that
the misclassification is a substantial cause of the harm. Opp. at
22-23. It does not appear that the UCL requires the unlawful
conduct be the sole factor in causing harm in order to support UCL
standing and thus a contributing cause may satisfy standing.
Admittedly, the courts have not definitively decided this question.


Diva has adequately alleged a causal link between Uber's
misclassification practices and Diva's UCL injury.

Standing as to Out-of-State Plaintiffs

Uber next argues that there is a causation problem specific to the
out-of-state affiliates, because the alleged harm to those
affiliates arises from Uber's extraterritorial conduct. It is
well-established that the UCL does not apply extraterritorially.
Thus, the UCL does not reach claims of non-California residents
injured by conduct occurring beyond California's borders.

Uber asserts that the out-of-state affiliates cannot be losing
business because of Uber's practices in California; rather, the
only plausible, non-speculative reason is due to competition from
Uber in those other states.

Uber's argument appears to be grounded in a misunderstanding about
how the affiliate system allegedly works. Uber repeatedly focuses
on the fact that the out-of-state affiliates are booking rides for
out-of-state clients.

However, the FAC states that when out-of-state clients want to book
rides in California, they do so through out-of-state affiliates who
refer the clients to companies (like Diva) in California who
provide the rides in California. The California company and the
out-of-state affiliate split the revenue for the ride.  

Thus, when Uber undercuts its competitors' prices in California,
fewer clients book rides with California limousine companies
through out-of-state affiliates. Uber's pricing practices outside
of California do not affect clients' booking decision for rides in
California under this model. In short, there is a direct causal
link between Uber's alleged misconduct in California and the
out-of-state affiliates' loss of revenue. That meets the
requirement for standing under for the UCL to apply.  

Uber's motion to dismiss Diva's claim under the unlawful prong of
the UCL is DENIED.

Uber's motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Specifically, (1) Diva's complaint is dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1)
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, with leave for Diva to
amend within 30 days of the date of this Order to cure the
jurisdictional defects; (2) Diva's UPA claim is dismissed with
prejudice; and (3) Diva's claim under the "unfair" prong of the UCL
unfairness claim is dismissed to the extent it is predicated on
Sherman Act violations, with leave for Diva to amend within 30
days. Diva's motion for partial summary judgment is DENIED without
prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 20, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y2hutspm from Leagle.com.

Diva Limousine, Ltd., individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Michael A. Geibelson
-- mgeibelson@robinskaplan.com -- Robins Kaplan LLP, Aaron M.
Sheanin -ASheanin@RobinsKaplan.com -- Robins Kaplan LLP, Ashley
Conrad Keller -- ack@kellerlenkner.com -- Keller Lenkner LLC, pro
hac vice, Seth Adam Meyer -- sam@kellerlenkner.com -- Keller
Lenkner LLC, pro hac vice, Thomas Kayes -- tk@kellerlenkner.com --
Keller Lenkner LLC, pro hac vice, Travis Lenkner --
tdl@kellerlenkner.com -- Keller Lenkner LLC, pro hac vice & Warren
D. Postman -- wdp@kellerlenkner.com -- Keller Lenkner, pro hac
vice.

Uber Technologies, Inc., Rasier, LLC, Rasier-CA, LLC, Uber USA, LLC
& UATC, LLC, Defendants, represented by Brian C. Rocca --
brian.rocca@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Kent
Michael Roger -kroger@morganlewis.com -- Morgan Lewis & Bockius
LLP, Minna L. Naranjo -- minna.naranjo@morganlewis.com -- Morgan
Lewis and Bockius & Sujal Shah -- sujal.shah@morganlewis.com --
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP.


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Seeks 9th Cir. Review of Order in Congdon Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Uber Technologies, Inc., et al., filed an appeal from a
Court ruling in the lawsuit titled Chuck Congdon, et al. v. Uber
Technologies, Inc., et al., Case No. 4:16-cv-02499-YGR, in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California, Oakland.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the District
Court has certified in March 2018 this class:

     (A) all persons in the United States; (B) who entered the
     2013 Agreement, the June 2014 Agreement, or the November
     2014 Agreement, or a combination of those agreements; (C)
     opted-out of arbitration under the last Uber driver contract
     the person executed; and (D) provided at least one minimum
     fare ride on the UberX platform for which a Safe Rides Fee
     applied before November 16, 2015.

The appellate case is captioned as Chuck Congdon, et al. v. Uber
Technologies, Inc., et al., Case No. 19-16309, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by July 29, 2019;

   -- Transcript is due on August 27, 2019;

   -- Appellants Raiser-CA LLC, Rasier, LLC and Uber
      Technologies, Inc.'s opening brief is due on October 7,
      2019;

   -- Appellees Chuck Congdon, Ryan Cowden, Anthony Martinez,
      Jason Rosenberg and Jorge Zuniga's answering brief is due
      on November 7, 2019;

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellee CHUCK CONGDON, RYAN COWDEN, ANTHONY MARTINEZ,
JASON ROSENBERG and JORGE ZUNIGA, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, are represented by:

          Andrew A. August, Esq.
          BROWNE GEORGE ROSS LLP
          101 California Street, Suite 1225
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 391-7100
          E-mail: aaugust@bgrfirm.com

               - and -

          Charles M. Auslander, Esq.
          George Richard Baise, Jr., Esq.
          John Granville Crabtree, Sr., Esq.
          Brian Tackenberg, Esq.
          CRABTREE & AUSLANDER
          240 Crandon Boulevard, Suite 101
          Key Biscayne, FL 33149
          Telephone: (305) 361-3770
          E-mail: causlander@crabtreelaw.com
                  gbaise@crabtreelaw.com
                  jcrabtree@crabtreelaw.com
                  btackenberg@crabtreelaw.com

Defendants-Appellants UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., RASIER, LLC, a
Delaware corporation, and RAISER-CA LLC, a Delaware corporation,
are represented by:

          Ziwei Song, Esq.
          William L. Stern, Esq.
          COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
          415 Mission Street
          San Francisco, CA 94105-2533
          Telephone: (415) 591-6000
          E-mail: wstern@cov.com


UNITED HEALTHCARE: Strickland Sues Over ERISA Violation
-------------------------------------------------------
BONNIE STRICKLAND, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. UNITED HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 91736197 (13th Judicial Circuit Ct.,
Hillsborough Cty., Fla., June 26, 2019) is a Class Action Complaint
against  Defendant on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated for Defendant's violation of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), as amended by the
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 ("COBRA").

The Defendant violated ERISA and the by failing to Plaintiff and
the putative class members whom she seeks to represent with a COBRA
notice that complies with the law. Despite having knowledge of and
access to the Department of Labor's Model COBRA form, Defendant
chose not to use the model form— but only to the extent it served
Defendant's interests. The Defendant COBRA notice process pushes
beneficiaries and participants, like Plaintiff here, toward the
marketplace and away from enrolling in COBRA continuation coverage,
presumably to save Defendant money.

Rather than utilizing the DOL Model Notice and sending a single
COBRA notice "written in a manner calculated to be understood by
the average plan participant" containing all required by law,
Defendant instead opted to break the information into multiple
documents, mailed at different times, containing bits and pieces of
information on COBRA, both of which are still missing critical
information. In fact, the DOL Model Notice was designed to avoid
precisely the issues caused by Defendant's COBRA notification
process.

As a result of receiving the COBRA enrollment notice, and the
subsequent letter attached as Exhibit C, Plaintiff could not make
an informed decision about her health insurance and lost health
coverage both for her, and her family. Plaintiff suffered a
tangible injury in the form of economic loss, specifically the loss
of insurance coverage and incurred medical bills, due to
Defendant's deficient COBRA election notice. In addition to a
paycheck, health insurance is one of the most valuable things
employees get in exchange for working for an employer like
Defendant. Insurance coverage has a monetary value, the loss of
which is a tangible and an economic injury. And, not only did
Plaintiff lose her insurance coverage, after Plaintiff lost her
health insurance she and her family incurred medical bills
resulting in further economic injury, says the complaint.

Plaintiff is a former employee of Defendant and covered under the
health plan through Defendant.

Defendant is a foreign corporation with its headquarters in
Minnesota, but is registered to do business in the State of
Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     LUIS A. CABASSA, ESQ.
     BRANDON J. HILL, ESQ.
     CHRISTOPHER J. SABA, ESQ.
     WENZEL FENTON CABASSA, P.A.
     1110 North Florida Ave., Suite 300
     Tampa, FL 33602
     Main No: 813-224-0431
     Facsimile: 813-229-8712
     Email: lcabassa@wfclaw.com
            bhill@wfclaw.com
            jcornell@wfclaw.com
            gnichols@wfclaw.com


UNIVERSAL FIDELITY: Kucur Asserts Breach of FDCPA
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Universal Fidelity
LP. The case is styled as Suleyman Kucur, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Universal
Fidelity LP, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-03880 (E.D. N.Y., July 3,
2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Act.

Universal Fidelity LP, also known as UFLP, provides billing,
collection, and call center services for companies; and federal,
state, and local governments. It offers consumer and commercial
collection services; pre-charge off, charge-off, account
receivables, outsourcing, and call center solutions; and debt,
automotive, billing and letter, consumer loan, credit card, direct
marketing, financial institution, government, healthcare, insurance
premium, insurance subrogation, outsourcing, retail, and
telecommunication collection services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   David M. Barshay, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 706-5055
   Email: dbarshay@barshaysanders.com

     - and -

   Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 281-7601
   Email: csanders@barshaysanders.com



USA: Vita Nuova Inc Files Class Suit in Texas
---------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against United States of
America. The case is styled as Vita Nuova Inc., on behalf of itself
and others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Alex M. Azar II and
United States of America, Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-00532-A
(N.D. Tex., July 3, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Other Statutes:
Administrative Procedure Act/Review or Appeal of Agency Decision
filed pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act.

The U.S. is a country of 50 states covering a vast swath of North
America, with Alaska in the northwest and Hawaii extending the
nation’s presence into the Pacific Ocean. Major Atlantic Coast
cities are New York, a global finance and culture center, and
capital Washington, DC. Midwestern metropolis Chicago is known for
influential architecture and on the west coast, Los Angeles'
Hollywood is famed for filmmaking.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jonathan F Mitchell, Esq.
   111 Congress Avenue, Suite 400
   Austin, TX 78701
   Tel: (512) 686-3940
   Fax: (512) 686-3941
   Email: jonathan@mitchell.law



VHS OF MICHIGAN: Appeal From Cir. Court Order Filed in Brown Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
An appeal was filed on June 6, 2019, from an order entered in the
lawsuit styled RACHEL BROWN v. VHS OF MICHIGAN INC., Case No.
18-007528-CZ, in the Wayne Circuit Court.

The appellate case is captioned as RACHEL BROWN v. VHS OF MICHIGAN
INC., Case No. 349240, in the Michigan Court of Appeals.[BN]

Plaintiff BROWN RACHEL INDIVIDUALLY & ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED is represented by:

          Peter J. Parks, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF PETER J. PARKS
          2833 Crooks Road, Suite 104
          Troy, MI 48084
          Telephone: (248) 458-0800
          Facsimile: (248) 822-3174
          E-mail: info@peterjparkslaw.com

Defendant VHS OF MICHIGAN INC. DBA: DETROIT MEDICAL CENTER is
represented by:

          Cullen B. McKinney, Esq.
          TANOURY, NAUTS, MCKINNEY & GARBARINO PLLC
          38777 W. Six Mile Road, Suite 101
          Livonia, MI 48152
          Telephone: (313) 964-4500
          Facsimile: (734) 469-4298
          E-mail: cullen.mckinney@tnmglaw.com


VHS OF MICHIGAN: Seeks Review of Cir. Court Order in Brown Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant VHS of Michigan Inc. filed an appeal from a Court ruling
in the lawsuit titled RACHEL BROWN v. VHS OF MICHIGAN INC., Case
No. 18-007528-CZ, in the Wayne Circuit Court.

The appellate case is captioned as RACHEL BROWN v. VHS OF MICHIGAN
INC., Case No. 349251, in the Michigan Court of Appeals.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee BROWN RACHEL/ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED is
represented by:

          Peter J. Parks, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF PETER J. PARKS
          2833 Crooks Road, Suite 104
          Troy, MI 48084
          Telephone: (248) 458-0800
          Facsimile: (248) 822-3174
          E-mail: info@peterjparkslaw.com

Defendant-Appellant VHS OF MICHIGAN INC. DBA: DETROIT MEDICAL
CENTER is represented by:

          Linda M. Garbarino, Esq.
          TANOURY, NAUTS, MCKINNEY & GARBARINO PLLC
          38777 W. Six Mile Road, Suite 101
          Livonia, MI 48152
          Telephone: (313) 964-4500
          Facsimile: (734) 469-4298
          E-mail: linda.garbarino@tnmglaw.com


VILLARREAL DRYWALL: Mejia Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Compensation
----------------------------------------------------------------
EDIN OMAR MEJIA, Individually and On Behalf of All Similarly
Situated Persons, Plaintiff, v. VILLARREAL DRYWALL, INC. and EDWARD
VILLARREAL, Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-02361 (S.D. Tex., July 1,
2019) is an action arising under the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938 ("FLSA"), brought both as an individual action and collective
action to recover unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages,
and attorney's fees owed to Plaintiff and all other similarly
situated employees ("Members of the Class") employed by, or
formerly employed by Defendants, their subsidiaries and affiliated
companies.

During his tenure with the Defendants, Plaintiff regularly worked
in excess of 40 hours per week. Plaintiff was paid on an hourly
basis and was not paid an overtime premium for hours worked over 40
hours per workweek. The Defendants knew of, approved of, and
benefited from Plaintiff's regular and overtime work. The
Defendants are jointly and severally liable to the Plaintiff and
the Members of the Class, for the damages sought herein, as the
Defendants are a joint enterprise as defined in terms of the FLSA,
says the complaint.

Plaintiff Edin Omar Mejia worked for Defendants as a construction
worker performing drywall services from December of 2015 until
November of 2018.

Defendants were an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce,
operating on interstate highways, purchasing materials,
transporting materials and on the interstate highways, conducting
transactions through commerce, including the use of credit cards,
phones and/or cell phones, electronic mail and the Internet.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Josef F. Buenker, Esq.
     Vijay Pattisapu, Esq.
     THE BUENKER LAW FIRM
     2060 North Loop West, Suite 215
     Houston, TX 77018
     Phone: 713-868-3388
     Facsimile" 713-683-9940
     Email: jbuenker@buenkerlaw.com
            vijay@buenkerlaw.com


WAG LABS INC: Meli Sues Over Deceptive and Misleading Statements
----------------------------------------------------------------
BARBARA MELI, individually & for all those similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. WAG LABS, INC., Defendants, Case No. 9:19-cv-03807
(E.D. N.Y., July 1, 2019) is a case of greed and profit trumping
animal welfare as dogs nationwide, and in New York State, are being
lost, stolen abused and killed while in the custody of Wag's dog
walkers. All of that while Wag has generated over $360 Million
Dollars in venture capital to take advantage of a multi-Billion
Dollar dog walking industry. In short, Wag reaps huge profits in
this new age of a mostly unregulated gig economy where lives are
for profit, at a cost of silent deaths of the dogs who are
meaningless in this technological business model.

Since 2015, Wag operates an on-demand dog walking mobile app and
website that consumers use to pay for a dog walker dispatched by
Wag to their homes. They enter via a key or a door code on a lock
provided by Wag, as most times the home is vacant where the dog
awaits the unknown walker. Consumers do this because they rely on
Wag's app and web advertisements claiming their dog walkers are
"Trusted dog walkers" qualified to care for the safety of their
pets, and licensed and bonded and vetted by Wag's "thorough
background checks". Those statements are deceptive, misleading, and
incredible when Wag's business model relies on volume to make
profits. Wag operates in 43 states and more than 100 cities
nationwide, using thousands of dog walkers they never personally
met or interviewed. Indeed, Wag dog walkers regularly prove the
training is inadequate, and that trust is not a priority as they
have stolen, lost, beaten and killed pets, then Wag offers pay-offs
to silence the owners or they send actress Olivia Munn to meet and
greet the distraught pet owners, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Barbara Meli has three dogs and was interested in dog
walking services for July, 2019. On June 29, 2019, she used the Wag
dog walking app that advertised dog walkers in Nassau County.

Defendant operates nationwide under the name "Wag" and conducts
substantial business in this District, where New York consumers use
the Wag dog-walking app at fees averaging $20-40.00 an hour paid
through the app to Wag.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Susan Chana Lask, Esq.
     LAW OFFICES OF SUSAN CHANA LASK
     244 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2369
     New York, NY 10001
     Phone: (917) 300-1958
     Email: scl@appellate-brief.com



WALGREENS BOOTS: Illinois Ct. Affirms Dismissal of McIntosh Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Supreme Court of Illinois issued an Opinion reversing the Order
of the Court of Appeals reversing the judgment of the Circuit Court
granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned DESTIN
McINTOSH, Appellee, v. WALGREENS BOOTS ALLIANCE, INC., Appellant.
No. 123626. (Ill.).

The circuit court of Cook County dismissed the action under section
2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS
5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2014)) and the appellate court reversed.

Plaintiff Destin McIntosh filed a class action complaint against
defendant Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc. (Walgreens). The complaint
alleged that Walgreens violated the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act (Consumer Fraud Act) by unlawfully
collecting a municipal tax imposed by the City of Chicago (City) on
purchases of bottled water that were exempt from taxation under the
City ordinance.

The circuit court of Cook County dismissed the action under section
2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS
5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2014)), on the ground that McIntosh's claim was
precluded under the voluntary payment doctrine, which provides that
money voluntarily paid with full knowledge of the facts cannot be
recovered on the ground that the claim for payment was illegal.

The appellate court reversed, holding that the voluntary payment
doctrine did not bar McIntosh's claim because he had pleaded that
the unlawful collection of the bottled water tax was a deceptive
act under the Consumer Fraud Act.
  
Walgreens argues that the appellate court erred in reversing the
dismissal of McIntosh's complaint under section 2-619(a)(9) of the
Code. Specifically, Walgreens contends that the appellate court's
decision effectively nullifies the voluntary payment doctrine.
Walgreens further contends that the policy underlying the voluntary
payment doctrine applies to this case and that the facts alleged in
the complaint are insufficient to invoke the fraud exception to the
doctrine.

McIntosh urges that the appellate court's judgment be affirmed,
asserting that the voluntary payment doctrine does not apply to
claims brought under the Consumer Fraud Act. McIntosh alternatively
contends that the circuit court's dismissal of his complaint was
erroneous because he sufficiently pleaded that his claim falls
within the doctrine's exception for fraud.

Section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code permits dismissal of an action
where the claim asserted against defendant is barred by other
affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the
claim. The phrase affirmative matter refers to a defense that
negates the cause of action completely or refutes crucial
conclusions of law or conclusions of material fact contained in or
inferred from the complaint. A motion to dismiss under section
2-619 admits well-pleaded facts but does not admit conclusions of
law and conclusory factual allegations unsupported by allegations
of specific facts alleged in the complaint.
  
The Voluntary Payment Doctrine in Consumer Fraud Cases

The Consumer Fraud Act is a regulatory and remedial statute
intended to protect consumers, borrowers, and business persons
against fraud, unfair methods of competition, and other unfair and
deceptive business practices.   Section 2 of the statute provides
that it is unlawful to engage in unfair or deceptive acts or
practices, including but not limited to the use or employment of
any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise,
misrepresentation or the concealment, suppression or omission of
any material fact, with intent that others rely upon the
concealment, suppression or omission of such material fact in the
conduct of any trade or commerce.  

To sufficiently plead a cause of action based on a violation of
section 2, a plaintiff must allege the following: (1) a deceptive
act or practice by the defendant (2) the defendant's intent that
the plaintiff rely on the deception (3) the occurrence of the
deception in the course of conduct involving trade or commerce and
(4) actual damage to the plaintiff (5) proximately caused by the
deception.   

The common-law voluntary payment doctrine embodies the ancient and
universally recognized rule that money voluntarily paid under a
claim of right to the payment and with knowledge of the facts by
the person making the payment cannot be recovered back on the
ground that the claim was illegal.

To avoid application of this long-standing doctrine, it is
necessary to show not only that the claim asserted was unlawful but
also that the payment was not voluntary, such as where there was
some necessity that amounted to compulsion and payment was made
under the influence of that compulsion.

In addition to compulsion or duress, other recognized exceptions to
the voluntary payment doctrine include fraud or misrepresentation
or mistake of a material fact.  

The voluntary payment doctrine is a common-law rule of general
application, including cases involving the erroneous collection of
a tax. This rule also applies to tax payments made to an
intermediary such as a retailer.  

In support of his assertion that the voluntary payment doctrine
does not apply to claims brought under the Consumer Fraud Act,
McIntosh relies primarily on the appellate court's decisions in
Nava v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 2013 IL App (1st) 122063, Ramirez v.
Smart Corp., 371 Ill.App.3d 797 (2007), and Flournoy v. Ameritech,
351 Ill.App.3d 583 (2004). The Court finds, however, that these
cases do not establish a categorical exemption from the voluntary
payment doctrine for claims brought under the Consumer Fraud Act.

In Flournoy, the plaintiff brought an action under the Consumer
Fraud Act against the defendant, a provider of telephone service to
prison inmates. Flournoy, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 584-85. The plaintiff
alleged that the defendant engaged in a deceptive course of conduct
by offering telephone service under a specified rate structure and
then fraudulently collecting multiple fees and surcharges to
reinitiate calls that had been prematurely and deliberately
terminated by the defendant. The gravamen of the plaintiff's claim
was that the defendant had misrepresented the true rate of the
telephone service by terminating calls prematurely and imposing
duplicate fees when the plaintiff placed the same call again.

The appellate court held that the plaintiff's claim was not barred
by the voluntary payment doctrine because he had alleged a
deceptive practice under the Consumer Fraud Act that was in the
nature of fraud. The decision in Flournoy is a straightforward
application of the fraud exception to the voluntary payment
doctrine. As such, it does not support the assertion that statutory
consumer fraud claims are categorically exempt from the voluntary
payment doctrine.

Nothing in the language of the Consumer Fraud Act reflects a
legislative intent to alter the voluntary payment doctrine or its
applicability to claims brought under the statute. Therefore, it
cannot be said that the Consumer Fraud Act abrogates the voluntary
payment doctrine.  Accordingly, the Court rejects McIntosh's
assertion that statutory consumer fraud claims are categorically
exempt from the voluntary payment doctrine.

Application of the Voluntary Payment Doctrine

Having determined that the voluntary payment doctrine applies to
statutory consumer fraud claims, the Court next considers whether
McIntosh's complaint pled sufficient facts to defeat its
application. In doing so, the Court initially rejects McIntosh's
assertion that Walgreens has forfeited any pleading challenges to
his allegations of fraud. This argument is without merit because a
motion to dismiss under section 2-619(a)(9) does not admit
conclusions of law or conclusory factual allegations nor does it
admit the truth of allegations that relate to the affirmative
matters asserted as a defense to the claim.

In tax cases, the voluntary payment doctrine precludes recovery of
an erroneous tax that was paid voluntarily and remitted by the
retailer to the taxing authority. In the absence of a statute or
unjust enrichment by a seller who retains an erroneously collected
tax, a plaintiff may not recover against the seller for the
overpayment of taxes that have been remitted to the taxing
authority. To avoid application of the doctrine, a plaintiff must
allege facts that bring the claim within one of the recognized
exceptions such as necessity or compulsion, fraud, or
misrepresentation or mistake of fact.  

McIntosh does not argue that he was compelled to pay the bottled
water tax because the purchase of carbonated or flavored water was
a necessity and could not have been obtained from any other source
without paying the municipal tax. Instead, he contends that his
claim falls within the exception for fraud. McIntosh argues that
Walgreens knowingly overcharged him by misrepresenting the legality
of the bottled water tax that was charged on exempt purchases. He
predicates this argument on the contention that the receipt issued
by Walgreens for such an exempt purchase constitutes a
representation that the tax was required by the ordinance.

The Court does not agree.

Under Illinois law, a receipt constitutes prima facie evidence as
to payment of the amount reflected in the receipt. As such, a
receipt documents the fact of the transaction and raises a
rebuttable presumption that the specified payment was made. It is
recognized that an accurate receipt is one of the factors that
indicates there was no deception by the retailer. Where the nature
and amount of a charge is fully disclosed, the plaintiff cannot
successfully assert that he or she was operating under a mistake of
fact with regard to the charge.
  
In this case, Vartanian's affidavit averred that the bottled water
tax and the amount of the tax was specifically listed on Walgreens
receipts and that the bottled water tax it collected was remitted
to the City. McIntosh does not dispute that the Walgreens receipts
accurately reflected that the bottled water tax was charged on
exempt purchases, nor does he contend that Walgreens did not remit
the bottled water tax it collected on those purchases to the City
or was unjustly enriched by the erroneous collection of the tax.

McIntosh has not pointed to any information set forth on the
receipt that was factually inaccurate. As a consequence, McIntosh
has not alleged any misrepresentation of a material fact as the
basis for his claim under section 2 of the Consumer Fraud Act.
  
Rather, McIntosh concedes that the bottled water tax was disclosed
on the receipts issued for exempt purchases. He argues, however,
that the disclosure of the tax on the receipt operates as a
representation as to the legality of its collection of the bottled
water tax. Specifically, McIntosh asserts that the disclosure on
the receipt constituted a representation that the total price [of
the purchase] included the tax required and allowable by law. This
allegation, however, is insufficient to sufficiently plead a
statutory consumer fraud claim.

It is understood that misrepresentations or mistakes of law cannot
form the basis of a claim for fraud. An erroneous conclusion of the
legal effect of known facts constitutes a mistake of law and not of
fact. Because all persons are presumed to know the law, a mistake
or misrepresentation of law will not avoid application of the
voluntary payment doctrine. Where a misrepresentation of law is
discoverable by the plaintiff in the exercise of ordinary prudence,
it cannot form the basis of an action for fraud.  

McIntosh asserts that the disclosure of the bottled water tax on
the receipt constituted a representation that the total price of
the purchase included the tax required and allowable by law. Such a
representation would be one of law, constituting Walgreens'
understanding and interpretation of what the bottled water tax
ordinance required. Because McIntosh is charged with knowledge of
the law, he cannot claim to have been deceived by the information
disclosed on the receipt. McIntosh had the ability to investigate
the ordinance to determine if the bottled water tax applied to his
purchases of carbonated or flavored water. He has not alleged that
Walgreens had superior access to the information set forth in the
bottled water tax ordinance or that he could not have discovered
what the ordinance required through the exercise of ordinary
prudence. Therefore, the alleged misrepresentation asserted by
McIntosh cannot form the basis of a claim for statutory consumer
fraud.

Because McIntosh's complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to
assert the fraud exception to the voluntary payment doctrine, the
circuit court properly dismissed his complaint. The appellate court
erred in holding otherwise.

In sum, the voluntary payment doctrine applies to claims brought
pursuant to the Consumer Fraud Act, and McIntosh's complaint failed
to allege sufficient facts to establish the fraud exception to the
doctrine. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate
court is reversed, and the judgment of the circuit court of Cook
County is affirmed.

Appellate court judgment reversed.

Circuit court judgment affirmed.

A full-text copy of the state Supreme Court's June 20, 2019 Opinion
is available at   https://tinyurl.com/yyvzk4lq from Leagle.com.


WASHINGTON: Guerin Files Petition for Cert. in Fowler Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Tracy Guerin filed with the Supreme Court of the United
States a petition for a writ of certiorari in the matter styled
TRACY GUERIN, DIRECTOR OF THE WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF
RETIREMENT SYSTEMS v. MICKEY FOWLER, LEISA MAURER, AND A CLASS OF
SIMILARLY SITUATED INDIVIDUALS, Case No. 18-1545.

Response is due on July 15, 2019.

Petitioner is Tracy Guerin, in her official capacity as Director of
the Washington State Department of Retirement Systems.

Ms. Guerin presented to the Supreme Court these two questions:

   1. If a State's statutorily created pension system allows
      government employees to transfer their accumulated pension
      contributions into a different pension plan, do the
      employees have a constitutional right to a particular
      method for calculating interest on the contributions at the
      time of transfer?

   2. Does the Eleventh Amendment provide a state immunity from a
      claim in federal court for money damages, when the claim is
      framed as a request for an injunction ordering the State to
      provide compensation to Plaintiffs?

The Lower Court Case is titled Tracy Guerin v. Mickey Fowler, et
al., Case No. 16-35052, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Ninth
Circuit reversed the District Court's judgment denying the
Stipulated Motion to Certify Class.

The District Court denied the stipulated motion to certify a class
and then dismissed the action as prudentially unripe.

Washington public school teachers Mickey Fowler and Leisa Maurer
bring this class action to order the Director of the Washington
State Department of Retirement Systems (DRS) to return interest
that was allegedly skimmed from their state-managed retirement
accounts.[BN]

Defendant-Petitioner Tracy Guerin is represented by:

          Robert W. Ferguson, Esq.
          Noah G. Purcell, Esq.
          Peter B. Gonick, Esq.
          Anne E. Egeler, Esq.
          WASHINGTON STATE, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
          1125 Washington Street SE
          Olympia, WA 98504-0100
          Telephone: (360) 753-6200
          E-mail: peter.gonick@atg.wa.gov
                  noahp@atg.wa.gov
                  AnneE1@atg.wa.gov


WILCO LIFE: V. Anderson Suit Remanded to Georgia State Court
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Georgia, Augusta Division, issued an Order granting Plaintiffs'
Motion to Remand in the case captioned VANESSA ANDERSON,
Individually and on Behalf of a Class of Similarly Situated
Persons, Plaintiff, v. WILCO LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. No.
CV 119-008. (S.D. Ga.).

This putative class action challenges an alleged scheme to
improperly raise the cost of insurance rates charged by Defendant
Wilco Life Insurance Company (Wilco) on Georgia universal life
insurance policies. Named Plaintiff Vanessa Anderson, on behalf of
the class, alleges Wilco unilaterally and massively increased" the
monthly cost of insurance deductions from her life insurance
account by some 300% between 2004 and 2016, in violation of her
policy. These increases significantly increased the cost of
maintaining coverage, which eventually led to her policy lapsing.


Wilco's Notice of Removal offers two theories to satisfy the
subject matter jurisdiction requirement. First, it contends there
is traditional diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section
1332(a). Wilco is incorporated and has its principal place of
business in Indiana while Plaintiff is a citizen of Georgia.
According to Wilco, the amount in controversy requirement is met
because Plaintiff's damages, attorney's fees, and injunctive and
declaratory relief are more than $75,000.  

Second, Wilco argues this Court has subject matter jurisdiction
under CAFA, 28 U.S.C. Sectdion 1332(d). In Wilco's view, the
parties' citizenship satisfies the minimal diversity requirement,
the proposed class exceeds 100 members, and the amount in
controversy is more than $5 million.  In her motion to remand.
Plaintiff only challenges whether the amount in controversy is met
for both bases of jurisdiction.  

Diversity Jurisdiction

Federal district courts are empowered to hear cases between
citizens of different states in which the amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs.  

This case principally concerns insurance premiums and an alleged
scheme to overcharge policyholders in violation of their policies.
Nearly the entire complaint, save for the class allegations, is
devoted to describing Plaintiff's life insurance policy and the
damages caused by Wilco's increases in COI charges.  

The Plaintiff calculates that her COI damages caused by the
overcharging are only $1,149.78, well below the $75,000 threshold.
Recognizing this fact, Wilco's primary contention is that
Plaintiff's request for reinstatement of her policy puts the
$150,000 face value at issue.4 Thus, the decisive issue is whether
reinstatement of the lapsed policy puts the face value of the
policy at issue for amount in controversy purposes. If the face
value can be included, Wilco can meet its burden; if the face value
must be excluded, the amount in controversy will be insufficient to
confer diversity jurisdiction.

In challenges to the cost of insurance premiums, courts in the
Eleventh Circuit routinely find that reliance on future
contingencies renders the monetary value of declaratory and
injunctive relief too speculative to be qonsidered in the amount in
controversy.  

Here, the Plaintiff is not attacking the validity of her insurance
policy, rather she is challenging Wilco's decision to raise COX
charges based on improper factors. Put differently, the issue is
not whether there is an enforceable agreement between Plaintiff and
Wilco, but instead whether Wilco breached a term of the agreement.
And, all the requested relief, including reinstatement, flows from
this alleged breach.

The bottom line is that even if the Plaintiff prevails on her
claims, she will not necessarily be awarded the face value of the
policy. Unlike the policy in Muniz, Wilco's obligation to pay
Plaintiff the policy's death benefits is not certain. Plaintiff
could surrender her policy or again be forced to allow it to lapse
before her death. Also, the policy is set to mature in 2059 when
Plaintiff is 100 years old; it is not inconceivable that Plaintiff
could outlive the maturity date.5 Point being, Wilco paying
Plaintiff the policy's face value is not an event bound to happen.
Thus, it is too speculative to include the face value of
Plaintiff's policy in the amount in controversy.

Similarly, the court in Schriner considered a specific request for
reinstatement in a cost of insurance case and excluded the face
value of the policy from the amount in controversy calculation.
Although the policy in Schriner had not lapsed at the time the
plaintiff brought suit, the court did not consider the face value
of the policy because, as here, the issue in dispute was the amount
of the insured's premiums.  

To summarize. Plaintiff's request for reinstatement does not put
the face value at issue because Plaintiff is challenging Wilco's
COI charges and it is too speculative to assume Wilco will pay the
policy's death benefits to Plaintiff. As such. Defendant cannot
carry its burden to show Plaintiffs claims meet the required amount
in controversy for diversity jurisdiction.

CAFA Jurisdicbion

CAFA grants federal courts original jurisdiction over class actions
where the class has at least 100 members, the parties are minimally
diverse, and the aggregated amount in controversy exceeds $5
million.  

Turning to the case at hand, it is undisputed that the class
contains more than 100 members and Wilco, as a company
headquartered and organized in Indiana, is diverse from Plaintiff,
who resides in Georgia. Accordingly, the only issue in dispute is
whether the class's aggregate damages exceed $5 million.

Wilco advances two arguments to satisfy the amount in controversy.
First, it borrows the reasoning from above that the class's request
for reinstatement of their policies puts the face value of those
policies at issue. Across the entire class, the total aggregate
death benefits payable on those policies is $76,314,499.00.  
Second, Wilco contends the total COI charges collected from the
class members since December 6, 2012, exceeds $5 million.

Wilco's first argument is foreclosed by the speculative nature of
Plaintiff's injunctive and declaratory relief, as discussed above.
Simply because class members' policies are reinstated does not mean
they will collect the face value of those policies. Class members
may outlive their policy's maturity date, elect to discontinue
coverage, or find themselves unable to afford the coverage.

Wilco's second argument also fails to meet its burden. Wilco
calculated that between July 1, 2015, and the date of removal it
charged $3.5 million in COI deductions from the cash value of
Georgia CIUL2 policies. From this number, Wilco extrapolates that
the total charges for the entire class period are about $7 million,
approximately double. This argument fails to meet Defendant's
burden for several reasons.

First, the class is not challenging the total COI charges for the
class period, rather they are only seeking to recover the portion
of those increased charges attributable to reasons not permitted by
the policies. Between 2004 and 2011, the COI increased 11.25%,
10.12%, 9.19%, 7.10%, 5.15%, 6.10%, and 6.33% respectively, an
average yearly increase of 7.89%.  

Plaintiff does not allege that the COI increases in those years was
improper. Because the COI increased in each of the seven prior
years, it is reasonable to assume that the 45.47% increase in
2011-2012 was not entirely improper. Said another way, a portion of
the 45.47% increase can be attributed to factors that the policy
expressly authorizes Wilco to use in raising the COI. In short,
Wilco's $3.5 million calculation incorporates COI charges that do
not breach the terms of the policy and, therefore, cannot be
recovered as damages.

Wilco's calculation is entitled to little weight.

The Court finds that the Defendant has failed to carry its burden
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in
controversy is satisfied for traditional diversity jurisdiction or
for CAFA jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Plaintiff's motion to
remand is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 20, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y5mu2gom from Leagle.com.


                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: 191 Cases vs. CECO Still Pending at March 31
-------------------------------------------------------------
CECO Environmental Corp. continues to face 191 asbestos-related
cases pending as of March 31, 2019, according to the Company's Form
10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for
the quarterly period ended March 31, 2019.

The Company states, "Our subsidiary, Met-Pro Technologies LLC
("Met-Pro"), beginning in 2002, began to be named in
asbestos-related lawsuits filed against a large number of
industrial companies including, in particular, those in the pump
and fluid handling industries.  In management's opinion, the
complaints typically have been vague, general and speculative,
alleging that Met-Pro, along with the numerous other defendants,
sold unidentified asbestos-containing products and engaged in other
related actions which caused injuries (including death) and loss to
the plaintiffs.  Counsel has advised that more recent cases
typically allege more serious claims of mesothelioma.  The
Company's insurers have hired attorneys who, together with the
Company, are vigorously defending these cases.  Many cases have
been dismissed after the plaintiff fails to produce evidence of
exposure to Met-Pro's products.  In those cases, where evidence has
been produced, the Company's experience has been that the exposure
levels are low and the Company's position has been that its
products were not a cause of death, injury or loss.  The Company
has been dismissed from or settled a large number of these cases.
Cumulative settlement payments from 2002 through March 31, 2019 for
cases involving asbestos-related claims were US$2.9 million, of
which, together with all legal fees other than corporate counsel
expenses, US$2.8 million has been paid by the Company's insurers.
The average cost per settled claim, excluding legal fees, was
approximately US$35,000.

"Based upon the most recent information available to the Company
regarding such claims, there were a total of 191 cases pending
against the Company as of March 31, 2019 (with Illinois, New York,
Pennsylvania and West Virginia having the largest number of cases),
as compared with 208 cases that were pending as of December 31,
2018.  During the three-months ended March 31, 2019, nine new cases
were filed against the Company, and the Company was dismissed from
21 cases and settled five cases.  Most of the pending cases have
not advanced beyond the early stages of discovery, although a
number of cases are on schedules leading to or scheduled for trial.
The Company believes that its insurance coverage is adequate for
the cases currently pending against the Company and for the
foreseeable future, assuming a continuation of the current volume,
nature of cases and settlement amounts.  However, the Company has
no control over the number and nature of cases that are filed
against it, nor as to the financial health of its insurers or their
position as to coverage.  The Company also presently believes that
none of the pending cases will have a material adverse impact upon
the Company's results of operations, liquidity or financial
condition."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/KMkVl8


ASBESTOS UPDATE: 2 Asbestos Cases Filed in St. Louis on June 20
---------------------------------------------------------------
The following cases categorized as "asbestos" cases were on the
docket in the St. Louis 22nd Judicial Circuit Court on June 20:

   * Joyce Wetzel; Rebekah Anderson v. 3m Company; Air & Liquid
Systems Corporation; Armstrong International Inc.; Aurora Pump
Company; Basic Inc; Bw Ip Inc; Cbs Corporation; Certainteed
Corporation; Cleaver Brooks Inc; Cooper Industries LLC; Copes
Vulcan Inc; Crane Co; Crown Cork & Seal USA Inc.; Eaton
Corporation; Flowserve US Inc.; Fmc Corp; Ford Motor Company;
Foster Wheeler LLC; General Electric Company; General Gasket
Corporation; Gould Electronics Inc; Goulds Pumps LLC; Graybar
Electric Company Inc.; Grinnell LLC; Gte Products Of Connecticut
Corporation; Honeywell International Inc.; Inc. Uniroyal; Ingersoll
Rand Company; Itt Corporation; Jp Bushnell Packing Supply Co;
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company; Pfizer Inc; Rockwell
Automation Inc; Rscc Wire & Cable LLC; Schneider Electric USA Inc.;
Siemens Energy & Automation Inc; Sprinkmann Insulation Inc;
Sprinkmann Sons Corporation; The Okonite Company; Trane US Inc.;
Union Carbide Corp.; Weil Mclain Company; Zurn Industries LLC,
1922-CC10509

   Randy Lee Gori (plaintiff's attorney)

   * Rosemary T Firestone v. 3m Company; Air & Liquid Systems
Corporation; Armstrong International Inc.; Aurora Pump Company;
Basic Inc; Burnham LLC; Bw Ip Inc; Cbs Corporation; Cleaver Brooks
Inc; Conwed Corporation; Crane Co; Crown Cork & Seal USA Inc.;
Eaton Corporation; Flowserve US Inc.; Fmc Corporation; Foster
Wheeler LLC; Gardner Denver Inc; General Electric Company; General
Gasket Corporation; Goulds Pumps LLC; Grinnell LLC; Honeywell
International Inc.; Imo Industries Inc.; Inc. Uniroyal; Ingersoll
Rand Company; Metropolitan Life Insurance Company; Pfizer Inc;
Schneider Electric USA Inc.; Trane US Inc.; Union Carbide Corp.;
Warren Pumps LLC; Weil Mclain Company; Zurn Industries Inc.,
1922-CC10540

   Randy Lee Gori (plaintiff's attorney)


ASBESTOS UPDATE: 2 Asbestos Cases Filed in St. Louis on June 21
---------------------------------------------------------------
The following cases categorized as "asbestos" cases were on the
docket in the St. Louis 22nd Judicial Circuit Court on June 21:

   * George Routin v. A O Smith Corporation; Advance Auto Parts
Inc.; Armstrong International Inc.; Arvinmeritor Inc; Aurora Pump
Company; Basf Catalyst LLC; Borg Warner Corporation; Brand
Insulations Inc; Bridgestone Americas Inc; Bw Ip International;
Bwdac Inc; CNH America LLC; Cameron International Corp.; Carboline
Company; Caterpillar Inc; Cbs Corporation; Certainteed Corporation;
Cleaver Brooks; Copes Vulcan Inc; Crane Co; Cummins Inc; Daimler
Trucks North America LLC; Dana Companies LLC; Dap Inc; Deere &
Company; Eaton Corporation; Flowserve US Inc.; Fmc Corporation;
Ford Motor Company; Gardner Denver Inc; General Gasket Corporation;
Goulds Pumps LLC; Grinnell LLC; Harley-davidson Motor Company Group
LLC; Hennessy Industries Inc.; Hercules Inc; Hitco Carbon
Composities Inc; Honeywell International Inc.; Imo Industries Inc.;
Ingersoll Rand Company; Itt Corporation; John Crane Inc; Jp
Bushnell Packing Supply Co; Kcg Inc; Kelly Moore Paint Company
Inc.; Kelsey Hayes Company; Lamons; Lear Siegler Diversified
Holdings Corp.; Mack Trucks Inc; Mccord Corporation; Mcmaster Carr
Supply Company; Meadwestvaco Corporation; Mendenhall Rebuilders;
O'reilly Automotive Stores Inc; Paccar Inc; Pneumo Abex LLC;
Sherwin Williams Company; Standard Motor Products Inc; Tenneco
Automotive Operating Co Inc; The Dow Chemical Company; The William
Powell Company; Toyota Motors Sales USA Inc.; Trane US Inc.; Union
Carbide Corp.; Weil Mclain Company; Welco Manufacturing Company;
Western Auto Supply Company, 1922-CC10563

   Matt C Morris (plaintiff's attorney)

   * Judith Goins; Otto Goins v. A O Smith Corporation; Advance
Auto Parts Inc.; Ameron International Corp.; Armstrong
International Inc.; Brand Insulations Inc; Carboline Company; Cbs
Corporation; Certainteed Corporation; Cleaver Brooks; Conwed
Corporation; Copes Vulcan Inc; Corrigan Company Mechanical
Contractors Inc.; Crane Co; Cytec Engineered Materials Inc; Dap
Inc; Eaton Corporation; Ferro Engineering; Fisher Scientific
Company LLC; Flowserve US Inc.; Fmc Corporation; Gardner Denver
Inc; General Electric Company; General Gasket Corporation; Genuine
Parts Company; Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company; Goulds Pumps LLC;
Grinnell LLC; Guard Line Inc; Gusmer Enterprises Inc; Haberberger
Incorporated Mechanieal Contractor; Hercules Inc; Honeywell
International Inc.; Imo Industries Inc.; Inductotherm Corporation;
Ingersoll Rand Company; Itt Corporation; Jp Bushnell Packing Supply
Co; Kcg Inc; Kelly Moore Paint Company Inc.; Lindberg; Meadwestvaco
Corporation; Metropolitan Life Insurance Company; Mine Safety
Appliances Company; Nooter Corporation; Novartis Corporation;
Occidental Chemical Corporation; Pfaudler Inc; Pfizer Inc;
Pharmacia Corporation; Plastics Engineering Company; Pneumo Abex
LLC; Sargent Welch; Schneider Electric USA Inc.; Scientific
Products Inc; Sunbeam Products Inc; Swindell-dressler International
Co.; The Dow Chemical Company; The William Powell Company; Trane US
Inc.; Union Carbide Corp.; Urs Corporation; VWR International LLC;
W W Grainger Inc; Welco Manufacturing Company; Western Auto Supply
Company; Wilsonart International Inc., 1922-CC10641

   Matt C Morris (plaintiff's attorney)


ASBESTOS UPDATE: 3 Asbestos Cases Filed in St. Louis on June 19
---------------------------------------------------------------
The following cases categorized as "asbestos" cases were on the
docket in the St. Louis 22nd Judicial Circuit Court on June 19:

   * Larry J Smith v. 3m Company; Abb Inc; BMI Refractory Services
Inc.; Beazer East Inc; Bmw Constructors Inc; Borg Warner Morse Tec
LLC; Cbs Corporation; Certainteed Corporation; Chicago Pneumatic
Tool Company LLC; Chicago Wilcox Manufacturing Co; Cooper
Industries LLC; Crane Co; Crosby Valve LLC; Dap Products Inc; Dow
Chemical Company; Eaton Corporation; Emerson Automation Solutions
Final Control US LP; Ferro Engineering Division of on Marine
Services Company; Flowserve US Inc.; Formosa Plastics USA Corp.;
Foseco Inc; Foster Wheeler Corporation; General Cable Industries
Inc.; General Electric Company; General Gasket Corporation;
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company; Goulds Pumps IPG LLC; Grinnell LLC;
Hercules LLC; Honeywell International Inc.; Imo Industries Inc.;
Inc Spx Cooling Technologies; Inc. Armstrong Pumps; Inc. Gould
Electronics; Inc. Uniroyal; Industrial Holdings Corporation;
Ingersoll Rand Company; Jp Bushnell Packing Supply Co; Krogh Pump
Company Inc.; Metropolitan Life Insurance Company; Nucor
Corporation; Pneumo Abex LLC; Riley Power Inc; Saint Gobain
Abrasives Inc; Santa Fe Braun Inc; Siemens Industry Inc.; Spence
Engineering INC Co.; Spirax Sarco Inc; Square D; Sterling Fluid
Systems USA LLC; Tenova Core Inc; The Gorman Rupp Company; The Jr
Clarkson LLC Co.; Trane US Inc.; Treco Constructions Services Inc.;
Union Carbide Corp.; Urs Corporation; Warren Pumps LLC; Zurn
Industries LLC, 1922-CC09964

   Randy Lee Gori (plaintiff's attorney)

   * Jeanne Miles; Terry Miles v. Aurora Pump Company; Borg Warner
Corporation; Cbs Corporation; Crane Co; Crown Cork & Seal USA Inc.;
Fmc Corporation; Gardner Denver Inc; General Electric Company;
General Gasket Corporation; Goulds Pumps LLC; Grinnell LLC;
Hercules Inc; Honeywell International Inc.; Imo Industries Inc.;
Ingersoll Rand Company; Itt Corporation; Kelly Moore Paint Company
Inc.; Metropolitan Life Insurance Company; Pneumo Abex LLC; The Dow
Chemical Company; Trane US Inc.; Union Carbide Corp., 1922-CC10452

   Matt C Morris (plaintiff's attorney)

   * Rosemary T Firestone v. 3m Company; Air & Liquid Systems
Corporation; Armstrong International Inc.; Aurora Pump Company;
Basic Inc; Burnham LLC; Bw Ip Inc; Cbs Corporation; Cleaver Brooks
Inc; Conwed Corporation; Crane Co; Crown Cork & Seal USA Inc.;
Eaton Corporation; Flowserve US Inc.; Fmc Corporation; Foster
Wheeler LLC; Gardner Denver Inc; General Electric Company; General
Gasket Corporation; Goulds Pumps LLC; Grinnell LLC; Honeywell
International Inc.; Imo Industries Inc.; Inc. Uniroyal; Ingersoll
Rand Company; Metropolitan Life Insurance Company; Pfizer Inc;
Schneider Electric USA Inc.; Trane US Inc.; Union Carbide Corp.;
Warren Pumps LLC; Weil Mclain Company; Zurn Industries Inc.,
1922-CC10540

   Randy Lee Gori (plaintiff's attorney)


ASBESTOS UPDATE: 3 Cases Filed in St. Louis Court on June 18
------------------------------------------------------------
The following cases categorized as "asbestos" cases were on the
docket in the St. Louis 22nd Judicial Circuit Court on June 18:

   * Larry J Smith v. 3m Company; Abb Inc; BMI Refractory Services
Inc.; Beazer East Inc; Bmw Constructors Inc; Borg Warner Morse Tec
LLC; Cbs Corporation; Certainteed Corporation; Chicago Pneumatic
Tool Company LLC; Chicago Wilcox Manufacturing Co; Cooper
Industries LLC; Crane Co; Crosby Valve LLC; Dap Products Inc; Dow
Chemical Company; Eaton Corporation; Emerson Automation Solutions
Final Control US LP; Ferro Engineering Division of on Marine
Services Company; Flowserve US Inc.; Formosa Plastics USA Corp.;
Foseco Inc; Foster Wheeler Corporation; General Cable Industries
Inc.; General Electric Company; General Gasket Corporation;
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company; Goulds Pumps IPG LLC; Grinnell LLC;
Hercules LLC; Honeywell International Inc.; Imo Industries Inc.;
Inc Spx Cooling Technologies; Inc. Armstrong Pumps; Inc. Gould
Electronics; Inc. Uniroyal; Industrial Holdings Corporation;
Ingersoll Rand Company; Jp Bushnell Packing Supply Co; Krogh Pump
Company Inc.; Metropolitan Life Insurance Company; Nucor
Corporation; Pneumo Abex LLC; Riley Power Inc; Saint Gobain
Abrasives Inc; Santa Fe Braun Inc; Siemens Industry Inc.; Spence
Engineering INC Co.; Spirax Sarco Inc; Square D; Sterling Fluid
Systems USA LLC; Tenova Core Inc; The Gorman Rupp Company; The Jr
Clarkson LLC Co.; Trane US Inc.; Treco Constructions Services Inc.;
Union Carbide Corp.; Urs Corporation; Warren Pumps LLC; Zurn
Industries LLC, 1922-CC09964

   Randy Lee Gori (plaintiff's attorney)

   * Jeanne Miles; Terry Miles v. Aurora Pump Company; Borg Warner
Corporation; Cbs Corporation; Crane Co; Crown Cork & Seal USA Inc.;
Fmc Corporation; Gardner Denver Inc; General Electric Company;
General Gasket Corporation; Goulds Pumps LLC; Grinnell LLC;
Hercules Inc; Honeywell International Inc.; Imo Industries Inc.;
Ingersoll Rand Company; Itt Corporation; Kelly Moore Paint Company
Inc.; Metropolitan Life Insurance Company; Pneumo Abex LLC; The Dow
Chemical Company; Trane US Inc.; Union Carbide Corp., 1922-CC10452

   Matt C Morris (plaintiff's attorney)

   * Joyce Wetzel; Rebekah Anderson v. 3m Company; Air & Liquid
Systems Corporation; Armstrong International Inc.; Aurora Pump
Company; Basic Inc; Bw Ip Inc; Cbs Corporation; Certainteed
Corporation; Cleaver Brooks Inc; Cooper Industries LLC; Copes
Vulcan Inc; Crane Co; Crown Cork & Seal USA Inc.; Eaton
Corporation; Flowserve US Inc.; Fmc Corp; Ford Motor Company;
Foster Wheeler LLC; General Electric Company; General Gasket
Corporation; Gould Electronics Inc; Goulds Pumps LLC; Graybar
Electric Company Inc.; Grinnell LLC; Gte Products Of Connecticut
Corporation; Honeywell International Inc.; Inc. Uniroyal; Ingersoll
Rand Company; Itt Corporation; Jp Bushnell Packing Supply Co;
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company; Pfizer Inc; Rockwell
Automation Inc; Rscc Wire & Cable LLC; Schneider Electric USA Inc.;
Siemens Energy & Automation Inc; Sprinkmann Insulation Inc;
Sprinkmann Sons Corporation; The Okonite Company; Trane US Inc.;
Union Carbide Corp.; Weil Mclain Company; Zurn Industries LLC,
1922-CC10509

   Randy Lee Gori (plaintiff's attorney)


ASBESTOS UPDATE: 5 Asbestos Cases Filed in St. Louis Ct. on June 14
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The following cases categorized as "asbestos" cases were on the
docket in the St. Louis 22nd Judicial Circuit Court on June 14:

   * Sanders Betty; Sanders Timothy v. Armstrong International
Inc.; Cleaver Brooks; Crown Cork & Seal USA Inc.; Fmc Corporation;
Gardner Denver Inc; General Gasket Corporation; Goulds Pumps LLC;
Grinnell LLC; Imo Industries Inc.; Ingersoll Rand Company;
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company; The William Powell Company;
Trane US Inc., 1922-CC07399.

     Matt C Morris (plaintiff's attorney)

   * James D Mccullah v. 3m Company; Alfa Laval Inc; Armstrong
International Inc.; Blackmer Pump Company; Borg Warner Morse Tec
LLC; Buffalo Air Handling; Buffalo Pumps Inc; Cbs Corporation;
Certainteed Corporation; Conocophillips Company; Cooper Crouse
Hinds LLC; Cooper Industries LLC; Crane Co; Crosby Valve LLC; Crown
Cork & Seal USA Inc.; Daniel International Corp.; Dap Products Inc;
Eaton Corporation; Fluor Corporation; Foster Wheeler Corporation;
General Electric Company; General Gasket Corporation; Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Company; Goulds Pumps IPG LLC; Grinnell LLC; Hercules LLC;
Honeywell International Inc.; Howden North America Inc; Imo
Industries Inc.; Inc Gould Electronics; Inc Viking Pump; Inc.
Armstrong Pumps; Inc. Brake Resources; Inc. Fluor Enterprises;
Industrial Holdings Corporation; Ingersoll Rand Company; Mcneil &
Nrm Inc; Mcneil Ohio Corporation; Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company; Morton International LLC; Nooter Corporation; Paul J Krez
Company; Pneumo Abex LLC; Riley Power Inc; Saint Gobain Abrasives
Inc; Sb Decking Inc; Siemens Industry Inc.; Spence Engineering INC
Co.; Spirax Sarco Inc; Square D; Sterling Fluid Systems USA LLC;
The Dow Chemical Company; The Nash Engineering Co.; The Sherwin
Williams Company; Trane US Inc.; Union Carbide Corp.; Warren Pumps
LLC; Weir Valves & Controls USA Inc.; Zurn Industries LLC,
1922-CC08554

   Randy Lee Gori (plaintiff's attorney)

   * Rosemary Robertson v. Armstrong International Inc.; Aurora
Pump Company; Borg Warner Corporation; Cbs Corporation; Cleaver
Brooks; Copes Vulcan Inc; Crane Co; Crown Cork & Seal USA Inc.;
Flowserve US Inc.; Fmc Corporation; Gardner Denver Inc; General
Gasket Corporation; Goulds Pumps LLC; Grinnell LLC; Hercules Inc;
Honeywell International Inc.; Imo Industries Inc.; Ingersoll Rand
Company; Itt Corporation; Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.; Pneumo
Abex LLC; Spirax Sarco Inc; The Dow Chemical Company; The William
Powell Company; Trane US Inc.; Union Carbide Corp., 1922-CC08688

   Matt C Morris (plaintiff's attorney)

   * Kristyn Schell v. 3m Company; Armstrong Pumps Inc; Bmw
Constructors Inc; Borg Warner Morse Tec LLC; Brand Insulations
Company; Cbs Corporation; Certain Teed Corporation; Chicago Gasket
Company; Chicago Pneumatic Tool Company LLC; Chicago Wilcox
Manufacturing Co; Cooper Industries LLC; Copes Vulcan Inc; Crane
Company; Crown Cork & Seal USA Inc.; Dap Products Inc; Dow Chemical
Company; Flowserve US Inc.; Foster Wheeler Corporation; Gardner
Denver Inc; General Electric Company; General Gasket Corporation;
General Refractories Company; Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company;
Goulds Pumps Ipg Inc; Grinnell LLC; Harris Corporation; Heidelberg
USA Inc.; Henkel Corporation; Hercules Inc; Honeywell Inc;
Honeywell International Inc.; Imo Industries Inc.; Industrial
Holdings Corporation; Ingersoll Rand Company; Itt Corporation;
Kaiser Gypsum Company Inc.; Kcg Inc; Keeler Dorr Oliver Boiler
Company; Krogh Pump Company Inc.; Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company; Nooter Corporation; Occidental Chemical Corporation;
Pfizer Inc; Pneumo Abex LLC; Ric Wil Inc; Riley Power Inc; Rockwell
Automation Inc; Rogers Corporation; Ross Operating Valve Company;
Rust International Inc.; Saint Gobain Abrasives Inc; Spence
Engineering Company Inc.; Spirax Sarco Inc; Spx Cooling
Technologies Inc; Sterling Fluid Systems USA LLC; Sulzer Pumps US
Inc.; Superior Boiler Works Inc; Textron Inc; The Boeing Company;
The William Powell Company; Thiem Corporation; Trane US Inc.; Union
Carbide Corp.; Uniroyal Inc; Universal Refractories Inc; Urs
Corporation; Warren Pumps LLC; Warren Rupp Inc; York International
Corp.; Zurn Industries LLC, 1922-CC08910

   Randy Lee Gori (plaintiff's attorney)

   * Russell Martin v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation; Armstrong
International Inc.; Aurora Pump Company; Borg Warner Corporation;
Brand Insulations Inc; Bw Ip International; Carver Pump Company;
Cbs Corporation; Certainteed Corporation; Cleaver Brooks; Copes
Vulcan Inc; Core Furnace Systems Corp; Crane Co; Crown Cork & Seal
USA Inc.; Dap Inc; Despatch Industries Limited Partnership;
Eichleay Corporation; Flowserve US Inc.; Fmc Corporation; Foster
Wheeler LLC; Gardner Denver Inc; General Electric Company; General
Gasket Corporation; Goulds Pumps LLC; Greene Tweed & Co Inc;
Grinnell LLC; Hercules Incorporated; Honeywell International Inc.;
Imo Industries Inc.; Inductotherm Corporation; Industrial Holdings
Corporation; Ingersoll Rand Company; Itt Corporation; James Walker
Mfg Co; John Crane Inc; Jp Bushnell Packing Supply Co; Kelly Moore
Paint Company Inc.; Lindberg; Mcmaster Carr Supply Co; Mendenhall
Rebuilders; Metropolitan Life Insurance Company; Milwaukee Valve
Company Inc.; Nagle Pumps Inc; Nash Engineering Company; Nooter
Corporation; Pfizer Inc; Pharmacia Corporation; Pneumo Abex LLC;
Spirax Sarco Inc; The Dow Chemical Company; The Gorman Rupp
Company; The William Powell Company; Trane US Inc.; Union Carbide
Corp.; Velan Valve Corporation; Warren Pumps LLC; Welco
Manufacturing Company; Wti Rust Holdings Inc; Zurn Industries LLC,
1922-CC08950

   Matt C Morris (plaintiff's attorney)


ASBESTOS UPDATE: 6,214 Bendix Claims Still Pending at March 31
--------------------------------------------------------------
Garrett Motion Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
March 31, 2019, that there are 6,214 unresolved asbestos claims
related to the Bendix legacy Honeywell business at March 31, 2019.

The Company also disclosed that within the three months ended March
31, 2019, there were 631 new claims filed and 626 claims resolved.

As previously reported, Garrett Motion Inc. became an independent
publicly-traded company on October 1, 2018 through a pro rata
distribution by Honeywell International Inc. of 100% of the
then-outstanding shares of Garrett to Honeywell's stockholders (the
"Spin-Off").

The Company states, "For the periods prior to the Spin-Off, these
Consolidated and Combined Interim Financial Statements reflect an
estimated liability for resolution of pending and future
asbestos-related and environmental liabilities primarily related to
the Bendix legacy Honeywell business, calculated as if we were
responsible for 100% of the Bendix asbestos-liability payments.
However, this recognition model differs from the recognition model
applied subsequent to the Spin-Off.  In periods subsequent to the
Spin-Off, the accounting for the majority of our asbestos-related
liability payments and accounts payable reflect the terms of the
Indemnification and Reimbursement Agreement with Honeywell entered
into on September 12, 2018, under which we are required to make
payments to Honeywell in amounts equal to 90% of Honeywell's
asbestos-related liability payments and accounts payable, primarily
related to the Bendix business in the United States, as well as
certain environmental-related liability payments and accounts
payable and non-United States asbestos-related liability payments
and accounts payable, in each case related to legacy elements of
the Business, including the legal costs of defending and resolving
such liabilities, less 90% of Honeywell's net insurance receipts
and, as may be applicable, certain other recoveries associated with
such liabilities.  The Indemnification and Reimbursement Agreement
provides that the agreement will terminate upon the earlier of (x)
December 31, 2048 or (y) December 31st of the third consecutive
year during which certain amounts owed to Honeywell during each
such year were less than US$25 million as converted into Euros in
accordance with the terms of the agreement."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/uMxAiU


ASBESTOS UPDATE: AG Charges Hotel Owner Over Asbestos Removal
-------------------------------------------------------------
Attorney General Bob Ferguson has filed criminal charges in King
County Superior Court against the owner of the Seattle Pacific
Hotel, alleging multiple violations of the state Clean Air Act for
illegal asbestos removal, and perjury for making false statements
to investigators under oath.

Ferguson asserts that during renovations of the Aurora Avenue
hotel, owner Vrajlal Nariya directed a non-asbestos certified
roofing contractor to remove ceiling material he knew contained
asbestos in the hotel lobby. Another contractor saw the workers
removing the asbestos-containing material without the proper safety
equipment, and notified the Department of Labor & Industries of the
alleged violation.

After allegedly confirming to investigators that he had instructed
the workers to remove the material, Nariya later denied those
statements under oath to L&I investigators. He instead claimed he
had removed the material himself.

The charges contained in the complaint are only allegations. A
person is presumed innocent unless and until he or she is proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

"Asbestos is a dangerous pollutant, and poses significant risks to
workers and our environment if it's not properly handled," Ferguson
said. "My office takes worker protection and environmental
enforcement seriously, and those who intentionally violate our laws
around asbestos removal should expect significant consequences."

Renovation work on the Seattle Pacific Hotel began in 2016. Nariya
hired a contractor to oversee most of the renovation, but also
independently hired some contractors himself, including a roofing
company to replace the hotel's roof. The overseeing contractor
subcontracted to another asbestos-certified company to remove
asbestos-containing popcorn ceiling material in hallways and guest
rooms, which had been previously identified as part of an asbestos
survey of the property.

During demolition in June of 2017, the asbestos-certified
subcontractor discovered a previously hidden false ceiling in the
lobby of the hotel, which also tested positive for asbestos. The
subcontractor submitted an estimate for removal of the newly found
asbestos. Nariya countered with a much lower offer, which the
contractor turned down.

In July of 2017, the renovation contractor's on-site supervisor
reported that he saw workers from the roofing company, who were not
asbestos-certified workers, removing the asbestos-containing
ceiling in the lobby. The supervisor notified L&I of the
violation.

Investigators reported that roofing company workers confirmed that
they removed the material. The investigators took samples from the
debris, which later tested positive for asbestos.

Two weeks later, the investigators returned and spoke to Nariya,
who allegedly admitted to them that he had instructed the workers
to remove the ceiling.

Three months later, under oath during an interview with L&I
investigators, Nariya denied making the previous statements,
instead claiming that he had removed the material himself. L&I
fined Nariya $355,000 for the violations, which Nariya is
appealing.

Ferguson today charged Nariya with two counts of violating the
state Clean Air Act, and one count of second-degree felony
perjury.

The Attorney General's Counsel for Environmental Protection is
handling the case for Washington.

In 2016, Attorney General Ferguson created the Counsel for
Environmental Protection to protect our environment and the safety
and health of all Washingtonians.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: American Optical Had 46,400 Claims at March 31
---------------------------------------------------------------
Pfizer Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
March 31, 2019, that approximately 46,400 claims naming American
Optical and numerous other defendants were pending as of March 31,
2019, in various federal and state courts seeking damages for
alleged personal injury from exposure to asbestos and other
allegedly hazardous materials.

The Company states, "Between 1967 and 1982, Warner-Lambert owned
American Optical Corporation (American Optical), which manufactured
and sold respiratory protective devices and asbestos safety
clothing. In connection with the sale of American Optical in 1982,
Warner-Lambert agreed to indemnify the purchaser for certain
liabilities, including certain asbestos-related and other claims.
As of March 31, 2019, approximately 46,400 claims naming American
Optical and numerous other defendants were pending in various
federal and state courts seeking damages for alleged personal
injury from exposure to asbestos and other allegedly hazardous
materials.

"Warner-Lambert was acquired by Pfizer in 2000 and is a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Pfizer. Warner-Lambert is actively
engaged in the defense of, and will continue to explore various
means of resolving, these claims."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/YIiJAt


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Argo Group Had $44.9MM A&E Reserves at March 31
----------------------------------------------------------------
Argo Group International Holdings, Ltd. has net loss reserves of
US$44.9 million for asbestos and environmental matters for its
Run-Off Lines at March 31, 2019, according to the Company's Form
10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for
the quarterly period ended March 31, 2019.

Within the three months ended March 31, 2019, the Company has
incurred losses (net) of US0.2 million and paid losses (net) of
US$1.5 million for asbestos and environmental matters.

The Company states, "Losses and loss adjustment expenses for the
three months ended March 31, 2019 was the result of net unfavorable
loss reserve development on prior accident years in other run-off
lines.  Losses and loss adjustment expenses for the three months
ended March 31, 2018 was the result of net unfavorable loss reserve
development on prior accident years of US$1.3 million in other
run-off lines and US$0.5 million in Risk Management."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/VTScHG


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Cal. App. Orders Retrial in Friedman Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
HarrisMartin Publishing reported that a California appellate court
has reversed an order granting American Biltrite Inc. directed
verdict at the close of plaintiffs' evidence in an asbestos trial,
finding that a "minor difference" in study methodology was not
enough to justify a directed verdict in favor of the defendant.

In the June 19 order, the California Court of Appeals, Second
District, opined that the plaintiffs had presented sufficient
exposure and causation evidence to support a verdict in their
favor.

The plaintiffs asserted the claims on behalf of Robert Friedman,
contending that he developed mesothelioma as a result of exposure
to asbestos-containing products.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Colfax Had $58.6MM Accrued Liability at March 29
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Colfax Corporation had accrued asbestos-related liability of
US$58,556,000 and long-term asbestos liability of US$282,298,000 as
of March 29, 2019, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended March 29, 2019.

The accrued liability represents current accruals for probable and
reasonably estimable asbestos-related liability costs that the
Company believes the subsidiaries will pay, and unpaid legal costs
related to defending themselves against asbestos-related liability
claims and legal action against the Company's insurers, which is
included in Accrued liabilities in the Condensed Consolidated
Balance Sheets.

The Company states, "Management's analyses are based on currently
known facts and assumptions.  Projecting future events, such as new
claims to be filed each year, the average cost of resolving each
claim, coverage issues among layers of insurers, the method in
which losses will be allocated to the various insurance policies,
interpretation of the effect on coverage of various policy terms
and limits and their interrelationships, the continuing solvency of
various insurance companies, the amount of remaining insurance
available, as well as the numerous uncertainties inherent in
asbestos litigation could cause the actual liabilities and
insurance recoveries to be higher or lower than those projected or
recorded which could materially affect the Company's financial
condition, results of operations or cash flow."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/yotl3A


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Conrail Loses Appeal of $2.3MM Award to Smoker
---------------------------------------------------------------
Bloomberg Law reported that Consolidated Rail Corp. lost its appeal
of a $2.3 million asbestos exposure award to a lung
cancer-afflicted railroad worker who smoked a pack of cigarettes a
day most of his adult life.

Kevin Howell presented enough evidence to show that his exposure to
asbestos was a substantial contributing factor to his cancer.
That's the standard under Ohio law that a plaintiff who smokes must
prove in an asbestos action based on lung cancer, the Ohio Court of
Appeals said.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Curtiss-Wright Still Defends Suits at March 31
---------------------------------------------------------------
Curtiss-Wright Corporation said in its Form 10-Q filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period
ended March 31, 2019, that to date, it has not been found liable or
paid any material sum of money in settlement in any case.  

The Company states, "We have been named in pending lawsuits that
allege injury from exposure to asbestos.  To date, we have not been
found liable or paid any material sum of money in settlement in any
case.  We believe that the minimal use of asbestos in our past
operations as well as our acquired businesses and the relatively
non-friable condition of asbestos in our historical products make
it unlikely that we will face material liability in any asbestos
litigation, whether individually or in the aggregate.  We maintain
insurance coverage and indemnification agreements for these
potential liabilities and we believe adequate coverage exists to
cover any unanticipated asbestos liability."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/EsU3u9


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Duke Energy Carolinas Had 196 Claims at March 31
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC faces a total of 196 asserted claims
related to asbestos exposure as of March 31, 2019, according to
Duke Energy Corporation's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended March 31,
2019.

The Company states, "Duke Energy Carolinas has experienced numerous
claims for indemnification and medical cost reimbursement related
to asbestos exposure.  These claims relate to damages for bodily
injuries alleged to have arisen from exposure to or use of asbestos
in connection with construction and maintenance activities
conducted on its electric generation plants prior to 1985.  As of
March 31, 2019, there were 139 asserted claims for non-malignant
cases with cumulative relief sought of up to US$34 million, and 57
asserted claims for malignant cases with cumulative relief sought
of up to US$18 million.  Based on Duke Energy Carolinas'
experience, it is expected that the ultimate resolution of most of
these claims likely will be less than the amount claimed."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/5crSHC


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Duke Energy Carolinas Has $617MM Liabilities
-------------------------------------------------------------
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC has recognized asbestos-related reserves
of US$617 million at March 31, 2019, according to Duke Energy
Corporation's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2019.

The Company states, "Duke Energy Carolinas has recognized
asbestos-related reserves of US$617 million at March 31, 2019, and
US$630 million at December 31, 2018.  These reserves are classified
in Other within Other Noncurrent Liabilities and Other within
Current Liabilities on the Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets.
These reserves are based upon Duke Energy Carolinas' best estimate
for current and future asbestos claims through 2038 and are
recorded on an undiscounted basis.  In light of the uncertainties
inherent in a longer-term forecast, management does not believe
they can reasonably estimate the indemnity and medical costs that
might be incurred after 2038 related to such potential claims.  It
is possible Duke Energy Carolinas may incur asbestos liabilities in
excess of the recorded reserves.

"Duke Energy Carolinas has third-party insurance to cover certain
losses related to asbestos-related injuries and damages above an
aggregate self-insured retention.  Duke Energy Carolinas'
cumulative payments began to exceed the self-insured retention in
2008.  Future payments up to the policy limit will be reimbursed by
the third-party insurance carrier.  The insurance policy limit for
potential future insurance recoveries indemnification and medical
cost claim payments is US$764 million in excess of the self-insured
retention.  Receivables for insurance recoveries were US$739
million at March 31, 2019, and December 31, 2018.  These amounts
are classified in Other within Other Noncurrent Assets and
Receivables within Current Assets on the Condensed Consolidated
Balance Sheets.  Duke Energy Carolinas is not aware of any
uncertainties regarding the legal sufficiency of insurance claims.
Duke Energy Carolinas believes the insurance recovery asset is
probable of recovery as the insurance carrier continues to have a
strong financial strength rating."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/5crSHC


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Emerson Electric Had $328MM Liability at March 31
------------------------------------------------------------------
Emerson Electric Co. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period
ended March 31, 2019, that it has US$328 million as liability
related to asbestos litigation, included in other liabilities, at
March 31, 2019.

The Company also recorded US$118 million for asbestos-related
insurance receivables, which was included in other assets, at March
31, 2019.

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/LD0VRR


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Ferraro Law Firm Lans $70MM Verdict vs. Nabi
-------------------------------------------------------------
Raychel Lean, writing for Daily Business Review, reported that Marc
P. Kunen and Jose Becerra of the Ferraro Law Firm in Miami secured
a $70 million jury verdict for 71-year-old Charles E. Thornton, a
former lab technician who claimed he contracted mesothelioma after
being exposed to asbestos at work.

Thornton worked for biotech company Nabi Pharmaceuticals in Broward
and Miami-Dade counties between 1976 and 2010. His job in the
fractional department involved separating plasma from blood using
biopharmaceutical equipment. But some of those tools contained
asbestos, according to Thornton's March 2017 products liability
lawsuit.

Asbestos is a naturally occurring group of minerals made of silicon
and oxygen. For decades its microscopic flexible and fireproof
fibers lent themselves to various uses, including pipe and roofing
insulation -- until it was eventually discovered to be a silent
killer.

Asbestos is banned in more than 55 countries, but not in the U.S.
Though the Environmental Protection Agency banned certain uses of
it in 1973 and barred it from most products in 1989, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals overturned that in 1991. As a result, the
ban only covers new uses of asbestos, and decades of litigation has
followed. In 2019, the EPA introduced a rule that says discontinued
asbestos products can't be reintroduced into commerce without
evaluations and restrictions in place.

In 2016, Thornton was diagnosed with mesothelioma, a cancer in the
lining of his lungs. Kunen and Becerra alleged this came from
exposure to asbestos while performing maintenance work on his
separating equipment, designed and manufactured by defendant New
Jersey-based GEA Mechanical US Inc.

"Being exposed to asbestos ultimately causes the mutations that led
to the cancer, mesothelioma, which is an incurable cancer, so it's
always terminal," Kunen said.

The disease presents itself as a painful cough, with chest pain,
shortness of breath and lumps of tissue under the skin, and always
kills its victims.

The complaint initially tagged various defendants, but GEA
Mechanical, which supplies technology and equipment for food
processing across the country, was the only one left standing at
trial.

Thornton accused GEA Mechnical of negligence and strict liability,
alleging the company knew or should have known about the harm its
products could cause, but never told Thornton and failed to put
proper warnings on packaging.

Kunen took the lead at trial in Miami-Dade Circuit Court, claiming
the defendant let Thornton down by failing to properly test its
products and purposely misled the public with its advertising.

GEA Mechanical argued it wasn't at fault and claimed asbestos
wasn't the cause of Thornton's cancer. In its answer to the
complaint, the company argued that any contact with
asbestos-containing materials in its products "would be so slight
that it would not be a substantial factor in causing or
contributing to" Thornton's mesothelioma.

Counsel to the defense, Stuart A. Weinstein of Shapiro, Blasi,
Wasserman & Hermann in Boca Raton, did not respond to emails and
calls seeking comment by deadline.

Kunen called epidemiologist Dr. Murray Finkelstein, who used his
specialization in pulmonary medicine to explain how asbestos
damaged the plaintiff's lungs. Pathologist and pulmonologist Dr.
Richard Kradin expanded on that, giving jurors a sense of how
end-stage mesothelioma was taking its toll on the plaintiff.

Thornton's wife Constance, 70, has been married to him for nearly
40 years and claimed loss of consortium as she'll lose her
husband's emotional and financial support when he dies.

The evidence, as Kunen saw it, "weighed heavily" in his clients'
favor, and he says the most important thing became their well-being
during a two-week trial.

"Making sure that Mr. Thornton was doing well and that his wife was
doing well during the trial, that was the most important thing for
us," Kunen said.

On Jun. 17, jurors found GE Mechanical was negligent in causing
Thornton's illness. They awarded $102,000 for past medical
expenses, gave Thornton $50 million in pain and suffering damages
and his wife $20 million.

The verdict is one of South Florida's largest asbestos-related
verdicts, but Kunen pointed out it doesn't change Thornton's
diagnosis.

"The verdict is bittersweet," Kunen said. "Obviously, we're pleased
with the results, but the reality is that Mr. Thornton is still
suffering from this devastating cancer and it's ultimately going to
take his life."

Case: Charles E. Thornton, Constance Thornton v. GEA Mechanical
Equipment US

Case No.: 2017006018CA01

Description: Products liability

Filing date: March 13, 2017

Verdict date: June 17, 2019

Judge: Miami-Dade Circuit Judge Jose Rodriguez

Plaintiffs attorneys: Marc P. Kunen and Jose L. Becerra, The
Ferraro Law Firm, Miami

Defense attorneys: Stuart A. Weinstein, Shapiro, Blasi, Wasserman &
Hermann, Boca Raton

Verdict amount: $70,102,000


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Former Electrician Sues PLENCO, Others
-------------------------------------------------------
Jasmine Stole Weiss, writing for Pacific Daily News, reported that
a couple filed a lawsuit in federal court suing two companies which
they say supplied equipment with asbestos to Navy ships that the
man worked on between 1962 to 1985.

Eusebio and Marta Jacob are suing Plastics Engineering Company
(PLENCO) and Rockwell Automation, Inc.

Eusebio Jacob's exposure to the company's equipment which contained
asbestos led to him developing malignant mesothelioma, the lawsuit
states.

The Jacobs, through their attorney Daniel Berman, allege the two
companies manufactured, sold and/or supplied products with asbestos
to the U.S. Navy and the Guam Navy Ship Repair Facility.

'Exposed to great quantities of asbestos'

Eusebio Jacob was a journeyman electrician at the Navy Ship Repair
Facility in Guam from about 1962 to 1985.

He was "repeatedly exposed to great quantities of asbestos,
asbestos dust and asbestos fibers," the suit states.

It caused him to develop malignant mesothelioma and other
asbestos-related diseases and injuries which weren't discovered
until August 2018, according to the lawsuit.

The lawsuit states the companies, since 1929, had medical and
scientific data which indicated the asbestos products were
hazardous to people.

The Jacobs are suiting for an unstated amount of compensatory and
punitive damages.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Garrett Motion Paid $38MM to Honeywell in 1Q 2019
------------------------------------------------------------------
Garrett Motion Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
March 31, 2019, that it paid Honeywell International Inc. the
Euro-equivalent of US$38 million in connection with the
Indemnification and Reimbursement Agreement during the first
quarter of 2019.

As previously reported, Garrett Motion Inc. became an independent
publicly-traded company on October 1, 2018 through a pro rata
distribution by Honeywell International Inc. of 100% of the
then-outstanding shares of Garrett to Honeywell's stockholders (the
"Spin-Off").

The Company states, "Honeywell is a defendant in asbestos-related
personal injury actions mainly related to its legacy Bendix
friction materials ("Bendix") business.  The Bendix business
manufactured automotive brake linings that contained chrysotile
asbestos in an encapsulated form.  Claimants consist largely of
individuals who allege exposure to asbestos from brakes from either
performing or being in the vicinity of individuals who performed
brake replacements.  Certain operations that were part of the
Bendix business were transferred to Garrett.

"In connection with the Spin-Off, we entered into an
Indemnification and Reimbursement Agreement with Honeywell on
September 12, 2018.  As of the Spin-Off date of October 1, 2018, we
are obligated to make payments to Honeywell in amounts equal to 90%
of Honeywell's asbestos-related liability payments and accounts
payable, primarily related to the Bendix business in the United
States, as well as certain environmental-related liability payments
and accounts payable and non-United States asbestos-related
liability payments and accounts payable, in each case related to
legacy elements of the Business, including the legal costs of
defending and resolving such liabilities, less 90% of Honeywell's
net insurance receipts and, as may be applicable, certain other
recoveries associated with such liabilities.  Pursuant to the terms
of this Indemnification and Reimbursement Agreement, we are
responsible for paying to Honeywell such amounts, up to a cap of an
amount equal to the Euro-to-U.S. dollar exchange rate determined by
Honeywell as of a date within two business days prior to the date
of the Distribution (1.16977 USD = 1 EUR) equivalent of US$175
million in respect of such liabilities arising in any given
calendar year.  The payments that we are required to make to
Honeywell pursuant to the terms of this agreement will not be
deductible for U.S. federal income tax purposes.

"The Indemnification and Reimbursement Agreement provides that the
agreement will terminate upon the earlier of (x) December 31, 2048
or (y) December 31st of the third consecutive year during which
certain amounts owed to Honeywell during each such year were less
than US$25 million as converted into Euros in accordance with the
terms of the agreement.  During the first quarter of 2019, we paid
Honeywell the Euro-equivalent of US$38 million in connection with
the Indemnification and Reimbursement Agreement."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/uMxAiU


ASBESTOS UPDATE: GMS Inc. Still Faces 31 PI Suits at April 30
-------------------------------------------------------------
GMS Inc.'s subsidiaries are still defending themselves against 31
pending asbestos-related personal injury lawsuits as of April 30,
2019, according to the Company's Form 10-K filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year ended April
30, 2019.

The Company states, "The building materials industry has been
subject to personal injury and property damage claims arising from
alleged exposure to raw materials contained in building products as
well as claims for incidents of catastrophic loss, such as building
fires.  As a distributor of building materials, we face an inherent
risk of exposure to product liability claims in the event that the
use of the products we have distributed in the past or may in the
future distribute is alleged to have resulted in economic loss,
personal injury or property damage or violated environmental,
health or safety or other laws.

"Such product liability claims have included and may in the future
include allegations of defects in manufacturing, defects in design,
a failure to warn of dangers inherent in the product, negligence,
strict liability or a breach of warranties.  In particular, certain
of our subsidiaries have been the subject of claims related to
alleged exposure to asbestos-containing products they distributed
prior to 1979.

"Since 2002 and as of April 30, 2019, approximately 994
asbestos-related personal injury lawsuits have been filed and we
vigorously defend against them.  Of these, 953 have been dismissed
without any payment by us, 31 are pending and only 10 have been
settled, which settlements have not materially impacted our
financial condition or operating results."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://is.gd/3THmkx


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Harsco Corp. Had 17,127 PI Suits at March 31
-------------------------------------------------------------
Harsco Corporation still faces approximately 17,127 pending
asbestos personal injury actions at March 31, 2019, according to
the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2019.

Harsco Corp. states, "The Company is named as one of many
defendants (approximately 90 or more in most cases) in legal
actions in the U.S. alleging personal injury from exposure to
airborne asbestos over the past several decades.  In their suits,
the plaintiffs have named as defendants, among others, many
manufacturers, distributors and installers of numerous types of
equipment or products that allegedly contained asbestos.

"The Company believes that the claims against it are without merit.
The Company has never been a producer, manufacturer or processor
of asbestos fibers.  Any asbestos-containing part of a Company
product used in the past was purchased from a supplier and the
asbestos encapsulated in other materials such that airborne
exposure, if it occurred, was not harmful and is not associated
with the types of injuries alleged in the pending actions.

"At March 31, 2019, there were approximately 17,127 pending
asbestos personal injury actions filed against the Company.  Of
those actions, approximately 16,586 were filed in the New York
Supreme Court (New York County), approximately 119 were filed in
other New York State Supreme Court Counties and approximately 422
were filed in courts located in other states.

"The complaints in most of those actions generally follow a form
that contains a standard damages demand of US$20 million or US$25
million, regardless of the individual plaintiff's alleged medical
condition, and without identifying any specific Company product.

"At March 31, 2019, approximately 16,550 of the actions filed in
New York Supreme Court (New York County) were on the
Deferred/Inactive Docket created by the court in December 2002 for
all pending and future asbestos actions filed by persons who cannot
demonstrate that they have a malignant condition or discernible
physical impairment.  The remaining approximately 36 cases in New
York County are pending on the Active or In Extremis Docket created
for plaintiffs who can demonstrate a malignant condition or
physical impairment.

"The Company has liability insurance coverage under various primary
and excess policies that the Company believes will be available, if
necessary, to substantially cover any liability that might
ultimately be incurred in the asbestos actions.  The costs and
expenses of the asbestos actions are being paid by the Company's
insurers.

"In view of the persistence of asbestos litigation in the U.S., the
Company expects to continue to receive additional claims in the
future.  The Company intends to continue its practice of vigorously
defending these claims and cases.  At March 31, 2019, the Company
has obtained dismissal in approximately 28,189 cases by stipulation
or summary judgment prior to trial.

"It is not possible to predict the ultimate outcome of
asbestos-related actions in the U.S. due to the unpredictable
nature of this litigation, and no loss provision has been recorded
in the Company's condensed consolidated financial statements
because a loss contingency is not deemed probable or estimable.
Despite this uncertainty, and although results of operations and
cash flows for a given period could be adversely affected by
asbestos-related actions, the Company does not expect that any
costs that are reasonably possible to be incurred by the Company in
connection with asbestos litigation would have a material adverse
effect on the Company's financial condition, results of operations
or cash flows."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/n0gptp


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Insurers Lose Bid to Lift Stay in J&J Talc Ch. 11
------------------------------------------------------------------
Law360 reported that a Delaware bankruptcy judge rejected insurers'
request to lift a stay in the Chapter 11 case for Johnson &
Johnson's talc supplier so a California action over liability
coverage can proceed, as the supplier faces thousands of
asbestos-related personal injury claims.

During a brief hearing in Wilmington following lengthy proceedings
the day before, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Laurie Selber Silverstein
ruled there was no cause to grant the insurers' request to lift the
stay put in place when Imerys Talc America Inc. filed for Chapter
11.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: J&J Knew of Carcinogenic Asbestos in Baby Powder
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Rachel Sasser, writing for MesoWatch, reported that the detailed
investigatory report revealed that Johnson & Johnson, famous for
its baby powder, was aware of the fact that their staple talc
products were contaminated with carcinogenic substance, asbestos,
but kept it from the public for decades. Talc and asbestos are
scientifically known to cause ovarian cancer, mesothelioma, and
other talc related diseases.

An extensive investigative report reveals that Johnson & Johnson
knew about the contamination of its baby powder with asbestos
fibers and talc, the primary triggers for the development of
ovarian, mesothelioma, and other asbestos-related cancers, for
decades but neither informed the regulators nor the public.

This detailed report was published on December 14, 2018, by the
Reuters News Service providing all documented proof that Johnson &
Johnson knew it since the 1970s that talc contaminated with
asbestos exists in their product. Also, the company allegedly
neglected the health of its users by keeping it a secret for
decades.

In response to this report, the investors responded negatively, and
the company faced a severe financial setback with the loss of 10%
stocks in the market.

Shockingly, the shares of Johnson & Johnson rose by 2% in
mid-April, 2019. But the earnings per share and net earnings were
dropped by 13.1% and 14.2% in comparison with the same time last
year.

Last year, the share price of Johnson & Johnson was $1.60 that came
down to $1.39, because of the extended and massive litigation
expenses the company is facing now.

The boom of the Company and Its Products Expansion

Johnson & Johnson started its business from New Brunswick, New
Jersey, more than 100 years ago in 1886 by selling sterilized
equipment for medical purposes, and soon the company expanded and
developed maternity kits for hygienic and safer childbirth, and
first aid kits.

Their iconic and widely used product, Johnson & Johnson baby
powder, was launched in 1894. And since then it has become one of
the must-have a product for the parents. Later their business
expanded to other countries as well.

Lawsuits Against Johnson & Johnson

With extensive research and numerous cases of cancer, experts have
proven that baby powder contains carcinogens.

It did not only pose severe health problems to children but adults
as well.

People who have been using it for several years are now suffering
from various sorts of cancers, including mesothelioma, lung cancer,
and ovarian cancer.

The report has mentioned three different lab results completed
between the period of 1972 to 1975. All three show the presence of
asbestos in the talc samples of Johnson & Johnson's

Talc and asbestos are mined together naturally. So, talc products
are at a high risk of being contaminated with asbestos. Moreover,
these minerals occur in the same geological area.

Talc Contributes to $420 Million to the Revenue of J&J

As per the data published by Johnson & Johnson in their revenue
report for 2017, talc products contribute $420 million in a total
of $76 billion in revenue generated by the company in 2017.

According to the recently published financial report by Johnson &
Johnson's showed that the financial status of the company is still
rising, amidst all the lawsuits.

Response by Johnson & Johnson's Officials

Johnson & Johnson has thoroughly denied all the claims and findings
concerning the presence of any carcinogenic substance in their
products.

To the investigative report published by Reuters, the vice
president of the global media relations for J&J, Ernie Knewitz
responded as, "This is all a calculated attempt to distract from
the fact that thousands of independent tests prove our talc does
not contain asbestos or cause cancer. Any suggestion that Johnson &
Johnson knew or hid information about the safety of talc is
false."

Talc-Related Cancer Cases Handled Over Recently

There have been thousands (more than 13,000) of lawsuits filed
against Johnson & Johnson over the past couple of years claiming
that talc-based products of the company have caused the development
of several cancers. A significant percentage of these cases involve
the development of ovarian cancer, and a smaller percentage of talc
cases include mesothelioma against Johnson & Johnson, which is
caused by asbestos exposure. And then things get out of hand for
J&J since 2017.

There are more than 6000 cases filed against J&J with the claim of
ovarian cancer development. And since 2018, allegations of
contamination of its products with asbestos causing mesothelioma
are increasing.

There are 11 cases filed that specifically claim that the presence
of asbestos in talc is the main reason for mesothelioma, ovarian
cancer, and other cancers that are caused by asbestos exposure. Out
of these cases, three cases won by plaintiffs, three ended in favor
of J&J, whereas others ended with hung juries.

Following are a few the highly publicized cases against J&J:

   * (Specifically alleging contamination of asbestos in talc) In
July 2018, a Missouri jury gave its verdict in favor of 22 women
who claimed that the presence of asbestos in J&J's talc products
caused ovarian cancer in their bodies. And J&J was ordered to pay a
total of $4.69 billion to these women.

   * In August 2017, a California jury ordered the company to pay
$417 million to a woman who has ovarian cancer that was caused by
regular use of Johnson & Johnson's talc-based baby powder.

   * (Specifically alleging contamination of asbestos in talc) In
March 2019, a California jury ordered J&J $29 million to a woman
who claimed to have developed ovarian cancer because of asbestos in
their talcum powder.

   * (Specifically alleging contamination of asbestos in talc) In
May 2018, a Los Angeles jury settled the case in favor of 68 years
older woman suffering from mesothelioma with a $21.7 million award
against J&J and the distributors. The plaintiff made the case with
the reason that asbestos and talc are carcinogenic substances, and
exposure to asbestos is the known leading cause of the development
of mesothelioma.

A Flood of Lawsuits Against J&J is About to Rise in 2019

In several cases against Johnson & Johnson, the plaintiffs have
proven in court with evidence, and research by experts about the
presence of asbestos in its talcum powder products. But the Reuters
report is based on authenticated scientific information, initial
lab tests report from the 1970s, courtroom testimonies, and other
documents. The authenticity, claims, and powerful originality of
this report can stem an even bigger string of lawsuits in 2019
against Johnson & Johnson.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Maremont's Asbestos Trust Gains Final Court OK
---------------------------------------------------------------
Bloomberg Law reported that Maremont Corp. has obtained final
approval of its Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan that will resolve more
than 13,000 pending asbestos-related lawsuits.

Judge Colm F. Connolly of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Delaware approved Maremont’s plan June 27.

The Troy, Mich.-based auto parts maker filed for Chapter 11
protection Jan. 22 with a reorganization plan that sets up a $50
million asbestos personal injury trust to assume the liabilities
for all current and future injured claimants.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Metropolitan Life Had 843 New Claims in 1Q 2019
----------------------------------------------------------------
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company said in its Form 10-Q filing
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended March 31, 2019, that it received approximately 843 new
asbestos-related claims for the three months ended March 31, 2019.

The Company states, "Metropolitan Life Insurance Company is and has
been a defendant in a large number of asbestos-related suits filed
primarily in state courts.  These suits principally allege that the
plaintiff or plaintiffs suffered personal injury resulting from
exposure to asbestos and seek both actual and punitive damages.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company has never engaged in the
business of manufacturing, producing, distributing or selling
asbestos or asbestos-containing products nor has Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company issued liability or workers' compensation
insurance to companies in the business of manufacturing, producing,
distributing or selling asbestos or asbestos-containing products.
The lawsuits principally have focused on allegations with respect
to certain research, publication and other activities of one or
more of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company's employees during the
period from the 1920's through approximately the 1950's and allege
that Metropolitan Life Insurance Company learned or should have
learned of certain health risks posed by asbestos and, among other
things, improperly publicized or failed to disclose those health
risks.  Metropolitan Life Insurance Company believes that it should
not have legal liability in these cases.  The outcome of most
asbestos litigation matters, however, is uncertain and can be
impacted by numerous variables, including differences in legal
rulings in various jurisdictions, the nature of the alleged injury
and factors unrelated to the ultimate legal merit of the claims
asserted against Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.  Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company employs a number of resolution strategies to
manage its asbestos loss exposure, including seeking resolution of
pending litigation by judicial rulings and settling individual or
groups of claims or lawsuits under appropriate circumstances.

"Claims asserted against Metropolitan Life Insurance Company have
included negligence, intentional tort and conspiracy concerning the
health risks associated with asbestos.  Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company's defenses (beyond denial of certain factual allegations)
include that: (i) Metropolitan Life Insurance Company owed no duty
to the plaintiffs — it had no special relationship with the
plaintiffs and did not manufacture, produce, distribute or sell the
asbestos products that allegedly injured plaintiffs; (ii)
plaintiffs did not rely on any actions of Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company; (iii) Metropolitan Life Insurance Company's
conduct was not the cause of the plaintiffs' injuries; (iv)
plaintiffs' exposure occurred after the dangers of asbestos were
known; and (v) the applicable time with respect to filing suit has
expired.  During the course of the litigation, certain trial courts
have granted motions dismissing claims against Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company, while other trial courts have denied
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company's motions.  There can be no
assurance that Metropolitan Life Insurance Company will receive
favorable decisions on motions in the future.  While most cases
brought to date have settled, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
intends to continue to defend aggressively against claims based on
asbestos exposure, including defending claims at trials.

"As reported in the 2018 Annual Report, Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company received approximately 3,359 asbestos-related claims in
2018.  For the three months ended March 31, 2019 and 2018,
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company received approximately 843 and
823 new asbestos-related claims, respectively.

"The number of asbestos cases that may be brought, the aggregate
amount of any liability that Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
may incur, and the total amount paid in settlements in any given
year are uncertain and may vary significantly from year to year."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/EuqA66


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Pfizer Still Faces Various Lawsuits at March 31
----------------------------------------------------------------
Pfizer Inc. still defends itself against a number of
asbestos-related lawsuits, according to the Company's Form 10-Q
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2019.

The Company states, "Numerous lawsuits are pending against Pfizer
in various federal and state courts seeking damages for alleged
personal injury from exposure to products allegedly containing
asbestos and other allegedly hazardous materials sold by Pfizer and
certain of its previously owned subsidiaries.

"There also are a small number of lawsuits pending in various
federal and state courts seeking damages for alleged exposure to
asbestos in facilities owned or formerly owned by Pfizer or its
subsidiaries."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/YIiJAt


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Scotts Miracle-Gro Still Faces Suits at March 30
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Scotts Miracle-Gro Company said in its Form 10-Q filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended March 30, 2019, that it is "vigorously defending"
against claims related to asbestos-containing products.

Scotts Miracle-Gro states, "The Company has been named as a
defendant in a number of cases alleging injuries that the lawsuits
claim resulted from exposure to asbestos-containing products,
apparently based on the Company's historic use of vermiculite in
certain of its products.  In many of these cases, the complaints
are not specific about the plaintiffs' contacts with the Company or
its products.  The cases vary, but complaints in these cases
generally seek unspecified monetary damages (actual, compensatory,
consequential and punitive) from multiple defendants.

"The Company believes that the claims against it are without merit
and is vigorously defending against them.  No accruals have been
recorded in the Company's consolidated financial statements as the
likelihood of a loss is not probable at this time; and the Company
does not believe a reasonably possible loss would be material to,
nor the ultimate resolution of these cases will have a material
adverse effect on, the Company's financial condition, results of
operations or cash flows.

"There can be no assurance that future developments related to
pending claims or claims filed in the future, whether as a result
of adverse outcomes or as a result of significant defense costs,
will not have a material effect on the Company's financial
condition, results of operations or cash flows."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/WQ9FO1


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Tenneco Has At Most 500 Cases in US, 50 in Europe
------------------------------------------------------------------
Tenneco Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 9, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2019, that its current docket of
active and inactive cases is less than 500 cases in the United
States and less than 50 in Europe.

The Company states, "For many years the Company has been and
continues to be subject to lawsuits initiated by claimants alleging
health problems as a result of exposure to asbestos.  The Company's
current docket of active and inactive cases is less than 500 cases
in the United States and less than 50 in Europe.

"With respect to the claims filed in the United States, the
substantial majority of the claims are related to alleged exposure
to asbestos in the Company's line of Walker(R) exhaust automotive
products although a significant number of those claims appear also
to involve occupational exposures sustained in industries other
than automotive.  A small number of claims have been asserted
against one of the Company's subsidiaries by railroad workers
alleging exposure to asbestos products in railroad cars.  The
Company believes, based on scientific and other evidence, it is
unlikely that U.S. claimants were exposed to asbestos by the
Company's former products and that, in any event, they would not be
at increased risk of asbestos-related disease based on their work
with these products.  Further, many of these cases involve numerous
defendants, with the number in some cases exceeding 100 defendants
from a variety of industries.  Additionally, in many cases the
plaintiffs either do not specify any, or specify the jurisdictional
minimum, dollar amount for damages.

"With respect to the claims filed in Europe, the substantial
majority relate to occupational exposure claims brought by current
and former employees of Federal-Mogul facilities in France and
amounts paid out were not material.  A small number of occupational
exposure claims have also been asserted against Federal-Mogul
entities in Italy and Spain.

"As major asbestos manufacturers and/or users continue to go out of
business or file for bankruptcy, the Company may experience an
increased number of these claims.  The Company vigorously defends
itself against these claims as part of its ordinary course of
business.  In future periods, the Company could be subject to cash
costs or charges to earnings if any of these matters are resolved
unfavorably to the Company.  To date, with respect to claims that
have proceeded sufficiently through the judicial process, the
Company has regularly achieved favorable resolutions.  Accordingly,
the Company presently believes that these asbestos-related claims
will not have a material adverse effect on the Company's condensed
consolidated financial position, results of operations or
liquidity."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/DLPqGY


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Univar Defends Less Than 105 Claims at March 31
----------------------------------------------------------------
Univar Inc. has fewer than 105 asbestos-related claims as of March
31, 2019, for which the Company has liability for defense and
indemnity pursuant to the indemnification obligation, according to
the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2019.

Univar states, "The Company is subject to liabilities from claims
alleging personal injury from exposure to asbestos.  The claims
result primarily from an indemnification obligation related to
Univar USA Inc.'s ("Univar") 1986 purchase of McKesson Chemical
Company from McKesson Corporation ("McKesson").  Univar is also a
defendant in a small number of asbestos claims.  As of March 31,
2019, there were fewer than 105 asbestos-related claims for which
the Company has liability for defense and indemnity pursuant to the
indemnification obligation.  The volume of such cases has decreased
in recent quarters.  Historically, the vast majority of the claims
against both McKesson and Univar have been dismissed without
payment.  The Company does incur costs in defending these claims.
While the Company is unable to predict the outcome of these
matters, it does not believe, based upon currently available facts,
that the ultimate resolution of any of these matters will have a
material effect on its overall financial position, results of
operations or cash flows.  However, the Company cannot predict the
outcome of any present or future claims or litigation and adverse
developments could negatively impact earnings or cash flows in a
particular future period."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/K0FDeF


ASBESTOS UPDATE: US Auto Parts Units Still Defend Suits at March 31
-------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Auto Parts Network, Inc.'s subsidiaries still defend
themselves against lawsuits involving claims for damages caused by
installation of brakes with asbestos, according to the Company's
Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
for the quarterly period ended March 30, 2019.

The Company states, "A wholly-owned subsidiary of the Company,
Automotive Specialty Accessories and Parts, Inc. and its
wholly-owned subsidiary Whitney Automotive Group, Inc. ("WAG"), are
named defendants in several lawsuits involving claims for damages
caused by installation of brakes during the late 1960's and early
1970's that contained asbestos.  WAG marketed certain brakes, but
did not manufacture any brakes.  WAG maintains liability insurance
coverage to protect its and the Company's assets from losses
arising from the litigation and coverage is provided on an
occurrence rather than a claims made basis, and the Company is not
expected to incur significant out-of-pocket costs in connection
with this matter that would be material to its consolidated
financial statements."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/5jr46G


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Workers Sue San Diego for Asbestos Exposure
------------------------------------------------------------
Jonathan Horn, writing for 10News, reports that a group of City of
San Diego employees is suing the city after they were exposed to
asbestos inside their office for months.

The class-action lawsuit, filed in Superior Court June 21, accuses
high-ranking city officials of knowing about the asbestos at 1010
Second Avenue, but keeping the workers there because they did not
want to break the lease.

The tower began undergoing a major renovation project in July
2017.

Within weeks, workers began reporting burning throats, breathing
issues and coughs. Court documents allege that city officials
ignored their concerns, only vacating the building after the County
Air Pollution Control District found measurable levels of asbestos
in January 2018.

Exposure to asbestos can lead to serious health conditions,
including the deadly mesothelioma lung cancer.

"I don't know in 20 years if I'm going to get sick or not," said
Stephanie Teel, 39, who worked in the building as part of the
Fire-Rescue Department. "Did that exposure -- that they said was
nothing -- make me be where in 20 years when I'm still fairly
young, my family is burying me?"

Teel said experienced firefighters spotted the asbestos but city
officials did nothing.

The City Attorney's office said it would respond through the
courts.

Maria Severson, representing the class of 550 workers on the case,
said it's about long-term protection.

"They need to know that if they leave the city and they ultimately
come down with a lung-related disease that the city is going to
take care of them," she said.

The building's owner said after the 2018 incident it worked with
tenants and regulatory agencies to address the concerns surrounding
the tower.

Teel has since transferred to a position in the mayor's office.



                            *********

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