/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR

/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/190619.mbx C L A S S A C T I O N R E P O R T E R Wednesday, June 19, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 122 Headlines 3M COMPANY: Duhl Sues over Defective Combat Arms Earplugs A+ HOME: Chapman Seeks Overtime Pay for Home Health Aide ADDUS HEALTHCARE: Court Sets Briefing Schedule in Moore Suit ADVANCED MICRO: Court Enlarges Trial Deadlines in T. Dickey Suit ALLSATE IDEMNITY: Brasher Files Suit in Utah ALNYLAM PHARMA: Bernstein Liebhard to Lead in Securities Suit AMAZON.COM INC: Andrews et al. Sue over Background Checks AMERICAN FAMILY CARE: Arnold et al. Allege Discrimination at Work APPLIED ANALYSIS: Boes Seeks Conditional Class Certification AT&T MOBILITY: Ayala Seeks to Certify Class and Subclasses ATLANTIC RECOVERY: Miller Sues Over Illegal Collection Practices BANKERS LIFE: Court Awards $370K Attorney's Fees in David Suit BERKS COUNTY, PA: Victory et al. Seek to Certify Class BLACKROCK INSTITUTIONAL: Baird et al. Seek to Certify Classes BLINDS TO GO: Delacruz Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York BLOOM ENERGY: Evans Hits Share Drop Over Deployment Deficit BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY: Rogers Suit Removed to N.D. Ill. BOB'S DISCOUNT FURNITURE: Faces Klune Labor Suit in California BOSTON INTERIORS: Sullivan Seeks Overtime Pay for Sales Staff BRIDGETON LANDFILL: Appeals Ruling in Kitchin Suit to 8th Circuit BRIGADOON FITNESS: Gorss Motels Seeks to Certify TCPA Class BRITISH STANDARDS: Williams-Bell Seeks FLSA Collective Class BROWARD COLLEGE: Brough Sues Over FCCPA Violation C & L TRUCKING: Gonzalez Files Class Suit in Cal. Super. Ct. CAPITAL ACCOUNTS: Edmonds Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. Pa. CAPITAL COLLECTION: Tessler Files FDCPA Suit in D. New Jersey CAREER HORIZONS: Charles Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages CAROLINA FRESH: Stafford Seeks Overtime Pay for Installers CHECKERS DRIVE-IN: Cotter Sues Over Failure to Secure PII CHESAPEAKE OPERATING: Court Disallows Amendment to L. West's TAC COCA-COLA CO: Garcia Appeals Ruling in Nelson Suit to 9th Circuit COMENITY BANK: Wilson Sues over Robocalls, Debt Collection Tactics CORBUS PHARMACEUTICAL: Court Appoints Rosen Law as Lead Counsel CVS PHARMACY: Stinson Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct. DAIRYAMERICA INC: $40MM Settlement in Carlin Suit Has Final OK DCD CONSTRUCTION: Brown Seeks OT Pay for Construction Laborers DENSO CORP: Sued for Valve Timing Control Device Price-fixing ENGLAND TRADING: Olsen Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York EQUINOX COLLECTION: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Hargis FDCPA Suit FIOS INC: DiCarlo Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Website FIRST AMERICAN FINANCIAL: Resendiz Files Class Suit in C.D. Calif. FIRST CLASS: Fails to Pay OT & Minimum Wages, Verma et al. Say FISHER-PRICE INC: Barton Sues over Sale of Rock 'n Play Sleeper FLORIDA: DOC Secretary Appeals Ruling in Hoffer Suit to 11th Cir. G4S SECURE: Snell Files FCRA Suit in E.D. California GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE: Russell Suit Removed to S.D. Florida GENERATIONS HEALTHCARE: Court Dismisses D. Smith FLSA Suit GEORGIA DIAGNOSTIC: Settlement in Gumm Suit Gets Final Approval GNP MANAGEMENT: Brown Sues Over Unreasonable Fees GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES: Rosenberg Files Suit in S.D. Florida HECLA MINING: Batters Sue over Securities Fraud HOLLOWAY CREDIT: Muse Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania HYUNDAI MOTOR: 9th Cir. Affirms $140MM Deal in Fuel Economy Suit J.R. SIMPLOT: L. Arroyo Suit Remanded to Calif. Superior Court JM SMUCKER: Court Narrows Claims in 1st Amended Robinson Suit JOSEPH WILDCAT: Jones Files FCRA Suit in E.D. Pa. JPMORGAN CHASE: Removes Osella Class Suit to C.D. California KEEFE COMMISSARY: Reichert Wash. Subclass Conditionally Certified KIA MOTORS: Defective Vehicles Suit Transferred to C.D. Cal. LAKES VENTURE: Marcum Seeks to Certify FLSA Collective Class LASER SPINE: Embry Seeks to Certify Class of Terminated Workers LASER SPINE: Higdon Seeks to Certify Class of Terminated Workers LEX34 FRUIT & VEGETABLE: Bonilla Sues Over Unpaid Wages LYFT INC: A. Oliver Suit Transferred to S.D. Ga. MAXIM INTERNATIONAL: Wang Seeks Unpaid Minimum & OT Wages MERIT RECOVERY: Default Judgment Bid in Muldowney FDCPA Suit Okayed MICHIGAN STATE: Coleman-Weathersbee Sues Over Overdraft Fees MICHIGAN: Driver's-License Suspension Law Enforcement Order Flipped MIDLAND CREDIT: Accetta FDCPA Class Suit Removed to E.D. New York MIDLAND CREDIT: Alarimo Suit Moved From Suffolk to E.D. New York MONSANTO COMPANY: Barr Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup MONSANTO COMPANY: Bichler Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup MONSANTO COMPANY: Combs Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup MONSANTO COMPANY: Holeman Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup MONSANTO COMPANY: Poiriez Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup MONSANTO COMPANY: Vejil Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup MONSANTO COMPANY: Young Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup MOVING SOLUTIONS: Court Rejects Settlement in Middle Rider Case NATIONAL RECOVERY: Second Circuit Appeal Filed in Pettaway Suit NILKANTH MAHADEV: Delacruz Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York NPSG GLOBAL: Court Denies Proposed Discovery Plan in Reese Suit OS RESTAURANT: Briggs Seeks to Certify Class & Subclass OVERHILL FARMS: Aguilar Files Suit for Breach of Contract PNS STORES: Wellons Appeals S.D. California Ruling to 9th Circuit PRIME LEADS: Boger Sues Over Intrusive Telemarketing Practices PROCTER & GAMBLE: Marsh Seeks to Certify 2 Classes QUEST DIAGNOSTICS: Carbonneau Sues Over Data Breach REPUBLIC PARKING: Abrar et al. Suit Transferred to Mass. Cmmw. SAEJ ENTERPRISES: McMillan Seeks Overtime Wages for Operators SCELZI ENTERPRISES: Court Extends Murray Responsive Pleading Filing SCHNEIDER LOGISTICS: Parsittie Labor Suit Removed to C.D. Cal. SECOND ROUND: Thompson-Bailey Sues over Debt Collection Practices SINGING RIVER: Court Grants Arbitration Bid in B. Baria Suit SPERIAN ENERGY: Brady Suit Transferred From N.D. to C.D. Illinois TAMPA BAY: Hanley Seeks to Certify TCPA Class TYSON FOODS: Ranchers Cattlemen Suit Asserts Cattle Price-fixing UNITED HEALTHCARE: Caldwell Sues over Denial of Insurance Claims WELLS FARGO: Court Narrows Claims in A. Hernandez Suit WESTERN OILFIELDS: Errecart Files Class Suit in Cal. Super. Ct. ********* 3M COMPANY: Duhl Sues over Defective Combat Arms Earplugs --------------------------------------------------------- The case, DARREN KAY DUHL, the Plaintiff, vs. 3M COMPANY, AEARO HOLDINGS, LLC, AEARO INTERMEDIATE, LLC, AEARO, LLC and AEARO TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, the Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-01623-MCR-EMT (N.D. Fla., June 3, 2019), seeks to hold 3M liable for hearing loss or damage Plaintiff allegedly suffered while serving variously in the U.S. military, including during foreign conflicts. The Plaintiff contends that Combat Arms TM Earplugs, Version 2 ("CAEv2") manufactured and sold by Aearo were defectively designed and failed to provide adequate hearing protection. 3M denies these allegations. CAEv2, designed by Aearo in close collaboration with the U.S. military, represented a revolutionary breakthrough in hearing protection for service members. CAEv2 helped servicemembers better maintain situational awareness (e.g., to hear nearby voice commands) while also maintaining some protection from gunfire and other higher decibel sounds. CAEv2 met the U.S. military's specifications and helped the military provide hearing protection to service members. Despite knowing of the dangerous defects in its earplugs, Defendant sold the Dual-ended Combat ArmsTM earplugs to the branches of the U.S. military for more than a decade without providing the U.S. military and/or Plaintiff with any warning of said defects, causing Plaintiff and other service members similar permanent injuries, such as hearing loss.[BN] Attorneys for the Plaintiff: Michael W. Gaines, esq. Tim L. Bowden, esq. LAW OFFICES OF TIM BOWDEN 306 Northcreek Blvd., Suite 200 Goodlettsville, TN 37072 Telephone: (615) 859-1996 Facsimile: (615) 859-1921 E-mail: mwgaines01@gmail.com bowden_law@bellsouth.net A+ HOME: Chapman Seeks Overtime Pay for Home Health Aide -------------------------------------------------------- NICOLE CHAPMAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. A+ HOME CARE, the Defendant, Case 2:19-cv-02234-CDJ (E.D. Pa., May 22, 2019), contends that Defendant has unlawfully failed to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated individuals employed in the position of Home Health Aide overtime compensation pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act. According to the complaint, Plaintiff and Class Plaintiffs regularly worked more than 40 hours per week, but were not properly compensated for their work in that Plaintiff and Class Plaintiffs were not paid an overtime premium at 1.5 times their regular rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek.[BN] Attorneys for the Plaintiff: Michael Murphy, Esq. Michael Groh, Esq. Edmund C. Celiesius, Esq. MURPHY LAW GROUP LLC Eight Penn Center, Suite 2000 1628 John F. Kennedy Blvd. Philadelphia, PA 19103 Telephone: (267) 273 1054 Facsimile: (215) 525 0210 E-mail: murphy@phillyemploymentlawyer.com mgroh@phillyemploymentlawyer.com ea@phillyemploymentlawyer.com ADDUS HEALTHCARE: Court Sets Briefing Schedule in Moore Suit ------------------------------------------------------------ The United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Oakland Division, issued an Order regarding Briefing Schedule on Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Portions of the Defendants' Amended Answer in the case captioned MARY MOORE, ALEXANDRIA ENCINIAS, individually, and on behalf of other members of the general public similarly situated; Plaintiffs, v. ADDUS HEALTHCARE, INC., an unknown business entity; ADDUS HOMECARE, INC., an unknown business entity; and DOES 2 through 100, inclusive, Defendants. Case No. 4:19-CV-01519-HSG. (N.D. Cal.). The parties previously filed a stipulation on May 17, 2019, seeking an extension of time to file their respective briefs to provide the parties with an opportunity to meet and confer regarding Defendants amending their answer to Plaintiffs' first amended complaint in order to address the concerns raised in Plaintiffs' motion. On May 20, 2019, the Court approved the stipulation and extended the deadlines for Defendants' opposition and for Plaintiffs' reply to Plaintiffs' motion to strike, to May 31, 2019, and June 7, 2019, respectively. The parties now seek an additional extension of time to file their respective briefs to allow the parties to continue the meet and confer process regarding Defendants amending their answer in order to resolve the concerns raised in Plaintiffs' motion. The parties propose a seven (7) day extension of Defendants' time to file their opposition and for Plaintiffs' to file their reply to Plaintiffs' motion to strike, to June 7, 2019 and June 14, 2019, respectively. The requested extension of time for each side to respond does not impact any other dates in this action, including the August 29, 2019 hearing date for Plaintiffs' motion. The deadline for Defendants' opposition to Plaintiffs' motion to strike portions of Defendants' amended answer to Plaintiffs' first amended complaint is continued seven (7) days and is to be filed by June 7, 2019. The deadline for Plaintiffs' reply to Defendants' opposition to Plaintiffs' motion to strike portions of Defendants' amended answer to Plaintiffs' first amended complaint is continued seven (7) days and is to be filed by June 14, 2019. A full-text copy of the District Court's June 3, 2019 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yyk3xvg2 from Leagle.com. Mary Moore, individually and on behalf of other members of the general public similarly situated & Alexandria Encinias, individually and on behalf of other members of the general public similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Edwin Aiwazian -- edwin@lfjpc.com -- Lawyers for Justice, PC, Stanley Donald Saltzman -- ssaltzman@marlinsaltzman.com -- Marlin & Saltzman & Tara Zabehi -- tara@lfjpc.com -- Lawyers for Justice, PC. Addus Healthcare, Inc., an unknown business entity & Addus HomeCare Corporation, an unknown business entity, Defendants, represented by Gary Matthew McLaughlin -- gmclaughlin@akingump.com -- Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, Gregory William Knopp -- gknopp@akingump.com -- Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP & Victor A. Salcedo -- vsalcedo@akingump.com -- Akin Gump Strauss Hauer Feld LLP. ADVANCED MICRO: Court Enlarges Trial Deadlines in T. Dickey Suit ---------------------------------------------------------------- The United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Oakland Division, issued an Order enlarging all Pre-Trial and Trial Deadlines in the case captioned TONY DICKEY, and PAUL PARMER individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. ADVANCED MICRO DEVICES, INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendant. Case No. 4:15-cv-04922 HSG. (N.D. Cal.). The parties participated in a mediation session before the Honorable James F. Holderman (Ret.) of JAMS in May 2019, and as a result, have reached an agreement in principle to settle this case on a class-wide basis, subject to the Court's preliminary and final approval of the terms of settlement. The Plaintiffs anticipate needing approximately 30 days to prepare and file a motion for preliminary approval of class settlement. The parties have conferred and agreed, subject to the Court's approval, to enlarge all current pre-trial and trial deadlines by 60 days to allow for the preparation of a formal settlement agreement and papers in support of the Plaintiffs' anticipated motion for preliminary approval of class settlement. A full-text copy of the District Court's June 3, 2019 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y2khneef from Leagle.com. Tony Dickey & Paul Parmer, Plaintiffs, represented by Lily E. Hough -- lhough@edelson.com -- Edelson PC, Benjamin Scott Thomassen -- bthomassen@edelson.com -- Edelson P.C., Brandt Silver-Korn -- bsilverkorn@edelson.com -- Gregory Scott Dovel -- greg@dovel.com -- Dovel and Luner, Rafey Sarkis Balabanian -- rbalabanian@edelson.com -- Edelson PC, Simon Carlo Franzini -- simon@dovel.com -- Dovel and Luner & Todd M. Logan -- tlogan@edelson.com -- Edelson PC. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., Defendant, represented by Matthew David Powers -- mpowers@omm.com -- O'Melveny & Myers LLP, Edmundo Clay Marquez -- cmarquez@omm.com -- O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP & Kelsey M. Larson -- klarson@omm.com -- O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP ALLSATE IDEMNITY: Brasher Files Suit in Utah -------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Allstate Indemnity. The case is styled as Donald Brasher individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Allstate Indemnity, Defendant, Case No. 2:19-mc-00395-CW (D. Utah, June 7, 2019). The nature of suit is stated as Other Statutory Actions. Allstate Indemnity Company provides property and casualty insurance services.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Paul Wesley Evans, Esq. BEASLEY ALLEN CROW METHVIN PORTIS & MILES PC PO BOX 4160 MONTGOMERY, AL 36103 Phone: (334) 269-2343 The Defendant is represented by: Daniel K. Brough, Esq. BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE PC 3165 E MILLROCK DR 5TH FL SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84121 Phone: (801) 438-2000 Email: dbrough@btjd.com - and - Roger D. Higgins, Esq. THOMPSON COE COUSINS & IRONS LLP 400 N PEARL ST 25TH FL DALLAS, TX 75201-2832 Phone: (214) 871-8229 ALNYLAM PHARMA: Bernstein Liebhard to Lead in Securities Suit ------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, CARYL HULL LEAVITT, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ALNYLAM PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., JOHN M. MARAGANORE and MANMEET S. SONI, Defendants, TUNC TOKER, FREDERICK EDWARDS and CHARLES IAPPINI, Movants, Civil Action No. 18-12433-NMG (D. Mass.), Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton of the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts appointed Tunc Toker as the Lead Plaintiff and approved his selected Lead Counsel and Liaison Counsel. Alnylam is a biopharmaceutical company incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The Company develops and commercializes treatments for hereditary ATTR amyloidosis which is a gene mutation that causes the build-up of certain proteins in the body's nerves and organs. The putative securities fraud class action is brought by Leavitt on behalf of herself and other similarly situated investors against Alnylam, its CEO and its CFO in September 2018 in the U.S. States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Leavitt alleges that the Defendants made false and/or misleading statements regarding the efficacy and marketability of its therapeutic injection for the treatment of hereditary ATTR amyloidosis during the class period. She brings the putative class action pursuant to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("the PSLRA"). That statute establishes a specific procedure for the appointment and approval of the lead plaintiff and the lead counsel in a private securities class action. In late November, 2018, the case was transferred to the Court. A few days later, putative class members Toker, Leavitt, Edwards and Iappini filed their respective motions to be appointed the Lead Plaintiff pursuant to the PSLRA. In December, 2018, Toker and Edwards filed oppositions to the motions of the other putative class members. Iappini filed a notice in support of Toker as presumptively the most adequate plaintiff under the PSLRA and in opposition to Edwards' motion for appointment as the Lead Plaintiff. Leavitt filed no opposition to the motions of the other putative class members, thereby ostensibly conceding that she is not presumptively the most adequate plaintiff under the PSLRA. Judge Gorton therefore analyzes only whether Toker or Edwards should be appointed as the Lead Plaintiff in the matter. After reviewing the financial figures and calculations of both Toker and Edwards, the Judge finds that all the relevant sales of Toker's stock occurred after the disclosure date and thus the amount of approximate recoverable losses he declares ($89,700) appears to be accurate. Even the largest amount of Edwards' losses (as attributed by Toker) is less than the apparent losses suffered by Toker. Toker therefore has the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class. Aside from having incurred the greatest approximate losses, the Judge finds that Toker also appears to have the largest financial interest. Toker submits that he paid $761,700 more for stock than he realized from the sale of such stock during the Class Period while Edwards' differential during the same time frame was only $3,100. Again, Edwards does not contest any of Toker's calculations. Toker otherwise satisfies the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. First, his claims are typical of those of the other class members because he has suffered the same injuries as a result of the same course of conduct by the Defendants. Second, Toker is an adequate lead plaintiff because 1) he and the other class members have the same interest in maximizing the recovery from defendants for the alleged fraud, 2) he has a substantial financial stake in the litigation that will ensure his vigorous prosecution of the claims and 3) he has chosen qualified and experienced counsel. Toker is therefore presumptively the most adequate Plaintiff and will be appointed as the Lead Plaintiff unless one of the other movants timely demonstrates that he is inadequate. Edwards has not attempted to show that Toker is either unable to protect, fairly and adequately, the interests of the class or is subject to unique defenses that render him incapable of adequately representing the class. Furthermore, Iappini has conceded that Toker is the most adequate plaintiff and Leavitt has submitted no opposition to Toker's appointment as the Lead Plaintiff in the case. Toker is will therefore be appointed as the Lead Plaintiff and the competing motions will be denied. The Judge will approve Toker's selection of Berstein Liebhard as the Lead Counsel and Berman Tabacco as the liaison counsel for the purported class. Both firms appear to have extensive experience in the area of securities class actions and have secured favorable dispositions for their respective clients. There is no apparent reason why both firms cannot adequately represent the class together, particularly if Berman Tabacco is serving in a largely administrative role and an arrangement is made to avoid the incurrence of duplicate fees. Moreover, none of the other movants opposes Toker's choice of counsel. Accordingly, Toker's motion to approve his selection of the Lead Counsel and the Liaison Counsel will be allowed. For these reasons, Judge Gorton allowed the motion to appoint Tunc Toker as the Lead Plaintiff and to approve his selection of the Lead Counsel and the Liaison Counsel. He denied (i) the motion to appoint Caryl Hull Leavitt as the Lead Plaintiff and to approve her selection of the Lead Counsel and the Liaison Counsel; (ii) the motion to appoint Frederick Edwards as the Lead Plaintiff and to approve his selection of the Lead Counsel; and (iii) the motion to appoint Charles Iappini as the Lead Plaintiff and to approve his selection of the Lead Counsel. Upon good cause shown, the Judge granted the Motion of Tunc Toker for Appointment as Lead Plaintiff and Approval of Counsel. Tunc Toker is appointed as Lead Plaintiff, Bernstein Liebhard LLP as the Lead Counsel, and Berman Tabacco as the Liaison Counsel. A full-text copy of the Court's May 8, 2019 Memorandum and Order is available at https://is.gd/sF454q from Leagle.com. Caryl Hull Leavitt, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Daryl DeValerio Andrews, Andrews DeValerio, Joseph Alexander Hood, II -- ahood@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP & Jeremy A. Lieberman -- jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP. Alnylam Pharmaceuticals, Inc., John M. Maraganore & Manmeet S. Soni, Defendants, represented by James R. Carroll, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Michael S. Hines, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Scott D. Musoff -- smusoff@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Alisha Quintana Nanda -- Alisha.Nanda@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP & Marley Ann Brumme -- marley.brumme@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. Tunc Toker, Movant, represented by Laurence Jesse Hasson, Bernstein Liebhard LLP, pro hac vice & Leslie R. Stern, Berman Tabacco. Frederick Edwards, Movant, represented by Joshua Baker, The Rosen Law Firm, P.A. Charles Iappini, Movant, represented by Shannon L. Hopkins, Levi Korsinsky LLP. AMAZON.COM INC: Andrews et al. Sue over Background Checks --------------------------------------------------------- A class action complaint has been filed against Amazon.com, Inc. for the alleged violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The case is captioned DEXTER ANDREWS, RAYMOND DUNN, NUNO GOMES, TITUS ROYAL, MATTHEW SOLER, and NICHOLAS YOUNG, Plaintiffs v. AMAZON.COM, INC., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-11182 (D. Mass., May 24, 2019). The Plaintiffs are Black and Latino delivery drivers who were summarily terminated as a result of Amazon's racially discriminatory background check policy and practice. Accordingly, Plaintiffs call on Amazon to adopt a fair and nondiscriminatory background screening policy. Amazon.com, Inc. is a foreign corporation based in Seattle. It sells and delivers a wide range of goods and products throughout the United States. [BN] The Plaintiffs are represented by: Stephen Churchill, Esq. FAIR WORK, P.C. 192 South Street, Suite 450 Boston, MA 02111 Telephone: (617) 607-3260 E-mail: steve@fairworklaw.com - and - Oren Sellstrom, Esq. Sophia Hall, Esq. LAWYERS FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 61 Batterymarch Street, 5th Floor Boston, MA 02110 Telephone: (617) 482-1145 E-mail: osellstrom@lawyersforcivilrights.org shall@lawyersforcivilrights.org AMERICAN FAMILY CARE: Arnold et al. Allege Discrimination at Work ----------------------------------------------------------------- A class action complaint has been filed against American Family Care, Inc. for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. The case is captioned CLARISA ARNOLD, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. AMERICAN FAMILY CARE, INC., Defendant, Case No. 6:19-cv-00791-LSC (N.D. Ala., May 24, 2019). Plaintiffs assert that the Defendant willfully violated Title VII by subjecting them and other similarly situated African-American clinic managers and/or clinic managers of color to unequal compensation and promotion opportunities compared to white, non-African-American clinic managers. American Family Care, Inc. provides urgent care, primary care, family medicine, and occupational health services for various acute conditions, non-life threatening illness, and injuries. The company has more than 160 clinics and 500 in-network physicians caring for more than 2 million patients a year. [BN] The Plaintiffs are represented by: Robert J. Camp, Esq. WIGGINS, CHILDS, PANTAZIS, FISHER & GOLDFARB, L.L.C. The Kress Building 301 19th Street North Birmingham, AL 35203 Telephone: (205) 314-0500 APPLIED ANALYSIS: Boes Seeks Conditional Class Certification ------------------------------------------------------------ In a class action lawsuit, DOUGLAS C. BOES, individually and on behalf of other similarly situated employees, the Plaintiff, v. APPLIED ANALYSIS CORPORATION, the Defendant, Case No. 5:19-cv-00505-JLS (E.D. Pa.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an order: 1. granting conditional certification and court-authorized notice to Putative Class Members; 2. conditionally certifying the action for purposes of notice and discovery; 3. directing that judicial notice be sent to all putative class members ("Straight Time for Overtime Workers"); 4. approving notice and consent form; 5. directing mailing and e-mailing of notice, along with a reminder notice; 6. permitting Class Counsel to contact Straight Time for Overtime Workers by telephone, if they are former employees, or the mailed or emailed Notice and Consent Forms are returned as undeliverable; 7. directing that Applied Analysis Corporation to produce to Class Counsel the contact information for each of the Day Rate Workers within 10 days of the Court's order; and 8. authorizing a 60-day notice period for the Day Rate Workers to join the case.[CC] Attorneys for the Plaintiff: Michael A. Josephson, Esq. Richard M. Schreiber, Esq. Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq. JOSEPHSON DUNLAP, LLP 11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050 Houston, TX 77046 Telephone: 713 352 1100 Facsimile: 713 352 3300 E-mail: mjosephson@mybackwages.com rschreiber@mybackwages.com adunlap@mybackwages.com - and - Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq. BRUCKNER BURCH, PLLC 8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500 Houston, TX 77046 Telephone: 713 877-8788 Facsimile: 713 877 8065 E-mail: rburch@brucknerburch.com - and - Eric H. Weitz, Esq. THE WEITZ LAW FIRM, LLC 1528 Walnut Street, 4 th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19102 Telephone: 267-587-6240 Facsimile: 215-689-0875 E-mail: eric.weitz@theweitzfirm.com AT&T MOBILITY: Ayala Seeks to Certify Class and Subclasses ---------------------------------------------------------- In a class action lawsuit, NATASHA AYALA, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. AT&T MOBILITY SERVICES, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company; and DOES 1 THROUGH 100, inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-08809-SVW-MRW (C.D. Cal.), the Plaintiff will move the Court for an order on July 1, 2019: 1. certifying a Class and several Subclasses: The Class: "all current and former hourly non-exempt employees of Defendant who, at any time from August 22, 2014 through the date of class certification, worked at Call Centers located in California and received commission payments"; Wage Statement Sub-Class: "all current and former hourly non-exempt employees of Defendant who, at any time during the period of August 22, 2017 through the date of class certification, worked at Call Centers located in California and received commission payments and were provided at least one wage statement containing the "OT TRUE-UP ADD'L COMP" description; "Regular Rate" Sub-Class "all current and former hourly non-exempt employees of Defendant who, at any time during the period of August 22, 2014 through the date of class certification, worked at Call Centers located in California and received nonhourly compensation and worked more than eight (8) hours in a workday or 40 hours in a workweek"; "Meal Period Pay Computation" Sub-Class "all current and former hourly non-exempt employees of Defendant who, at any time during the period of August 22, 2014 through the date of class certification, worked at Call Centers located in California and received commission payments and received at least one meal period premium payment during the same period that commissions were earned"; "Waiting Time Penalties" Sub-Class: "all former hourly non-exempt employees of Defendant who, at any time during the period of August 22, 2015 through the date of class certification, worked at Call Centers located in California and received commission payments and is a member of Regular Rate Sub-Class and/or Meal Period Computation Sub-Class"; 2. finding Plaintiff to be an adequate representative of the class members and certifying her as the class representative; 3. finding Plaintiff's counsel, David P. Myers, Robert M. Kitson, Jason Hatcher, and Morgan B. Good, of The Myers Law Group, A.P.C., as adequate class counsel and certifying them as class counsel; and 4. authorizing Plaintiff's Counsel to send Class Notice pursuant to Rule 23 (in a form to be approved by the Court after a conference with counsel for the Defendant). The Notice shall permit class members to opt-out of the class if they so desire within 30 days of the mailing of the notice by sending a written request signed by the class member which lists the class member's full name, address, telephone number, and last four digits of the class member's social security number. Notice shall be provided to the class via U.S. Mail to the last known address reflected on Defendant's records. Defendant shall cooperate with Class Counsel in preparing a computerized mailing list as required.[CC] Attorneys for Plaintiff Natasha Ayala and all other similarly situated: David P. Myers, Esq. Robert M. Kitson, Esq. Jason Hatcher, Esq. Morgan Good, Esq. THE MYERS LAW GROUP, A.P.C. 9327 Fairway View Place, Suite 100 Rancho Cucamonga, CA 91730 Telephone: (909) 919-2027 Facsimile: (888) 375-2102 E-mail: dmyers@myerslawgroup.com rkitson@myerslawgroup.com jhatcher@myerslawgroup.com mgood@myerslawgroup.com ATLANTIC RECOVERY: Miller Sues Over Illegal Collection Practices ---------------------------------------------------------------- Colleen Miller, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Atlantic Recovery Solutions, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-03988, (C.D. Cal., May 9, 2019) seeks statutory damages and appropriate injunctive relief for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Act. Atlantic Recovery Solutions, LLC -- https://www.atlanticrecoverysolutions.com/ -- is a nationally licensed, insured, bonded debt recovery agency. [BN] Plaintiff is represented by: Nicholas J. Bontrager, Esq. George Thomas Martin, III MARTIN AND BONTRAGER APC 6464 West Sunset Boulevard, Suite 960 Los Angeles, CA 90028 Tel: (323) 940-1697 Fax: (323) 328-8095 Email: nick@mblawapc.com tom@mblawapc.com - and - Matthew A. Rosenthal, Esq. WESTGATE LAW 16444 Paramount Boulevard, Suite 205 Paramout, CA 90723 Tel: (818) 200-1497 Fax: (818) 869-2208 Email: matt@westgatelaw.com BANKERS LIFE: Court Awards $370K Attorney's Fees in David Suit -------------------------------------------------------------- The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, Seattle, issued an Order granting Parties' Stipulated Motion for Preliminary Approval of a Class Action Settlement in the case captioned CHRISTINE DAVID and RODNEY CLURE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. BANKERS LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, a foreign corporation, Defendant. No. 14-cv-00766-RSL. (W.D. Wash.). The Proposed Settlement Class Satisfies Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 To be certified under Rule 23, the Plaintiffs and the proposed Settlement Class must satisfy all the requirements of Rule 23(a): (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable (numerosity) (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class (commonality) (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class (typicality) and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class (adequacy). In addition, the proposed Settlement Class must satisfy the requirements of superiority and predominance under Rule 23(b)(3). Predominance is similar to the inquiry on commonality, but focuses on whether the proposed class is sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation. Superiority requires that a class action be superior to other available methods for adjudication. Numerosity Here, the Settlement Class's size is sufficiently numerous to meet the requirement of numerosity. There are over 200 class members. As a general rule a potential class of 40 members is considered impractical to join. Commonality Rule 23(a)(2) requires that the claims of the proposed class depend upon a common contention of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution. The rule does not require that every question of law or fact be common to every member, nor does it require that class members be identically situated or have suffered the same degree of injury. Here, common legal and factual issues bind the Settlement Classes, namely whether Bankers had a practice of treating new agents under Al Hawks' management as employees rather than independent contractors. In prior briefing, Bankers did not dispute that common evidence existed on most (4 of 6) of the relevant factors on the economic dependence test even as applied to a larger and more diverse class of agents. A common legal and factual question also exists as to whether Bankers can rely on the outside sales exemption to avoid overtime obligations even if the Agents were misclassified. The Court therefore finds that the claims of the Settlement Class Members are bound by sufficient common threads of fact and law to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2). Typicality Typicality is satisfied if the claims or defenses of the representative parties are reasonably co-extensive of the claims of absent class members. This factor closely resembles that of commonality and requires that the representative be part of the class and `possess the same interest and suffer the same injury' as the class members. Here, Plaintiffs challenge their classification and, as such, their claims are typical of and co-extensive with those of the Settlement Class. And again, this factor was not at issue in the Court's prior ruling on class certification. Adequacy. The proposed Class Representatives and their counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Settlement Class. Plaintiffs have no antagonistic or conflicting interests with absent Settlement Class members and Class counsel are experienced in employment litigation and class action practice. Superiority and Predominance. Finally, on the elements of superiority and predominance, the Court is satisfied that both requirements are met. While the Court expressed previous concerns over manageability of this case if it were to proceed as a class action at trial, such concerns are no longer present. The parties' proposed settlement provides a superior method to address Bankers' alleged violations of Washington wage laws than individual claims. The Court has not been presented with any evidence that any class members have ever instituted any other lawsuits on the issues raised in this case or shown any interest in individual control of this litigation even after decertification. As such, rejecting the parties' proposed settlement in this case would lead not to alternative methods of adjudicating this dispute for other Agents, but to a denial of relief to them altogether. The Court finds that the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) are satisfied. The Court Preliminarily Approves the Proposed Settlement as Fair and Reasonable Based on the Court's review of the instant motion and the parties' Settlement Agreement (Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of Lindsay L. Halm) together with its knowledge of the claims and defenses at issue in the case and the proceedings to date, the Court concludes that the terms of the parties' proposed settlement appear fair, reasonable, and adequate. The Court approves notifying the Settlement Class of Plaintiffs' request for $370,000 in attorneys' fees and costs, subject to final approval at the Final Fairness Hearing. payments of $10,000 each for the Class Representatives in recognition of their role in this case and service to the Settlement Class, subject to final approval at the Final Fairness Hearing. The Court directs Class Counsel to submit a motion for final approval of the settlement, along with a proposed order approving the settlement and awarding Class Counsel's fees/costs and incentive payments for Class Representatives no later than fifteen (15) calendar days prior to the date of the Final Fairness Hearing. Such papers shall also inform the Court whether the mailing to Settlement Class Members was completed in accordance with the requirements of this Order, and provide information concerning any optouts or objections received as a result of such mailing. A full-text copy of the District Court's June 3, 2019 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y3v3ufz5 from Leagle.com. Christine David & Rodney Clure, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Adam J. Berger -- berger@sgb-law.com -- SCHROETER GOLDMARK & BENDER, Lindsay Halm -- halm@sgb-law.com -- SCHROETER GOLDMARK & BENDER, Martin S. Garfinkel, SCHROETER GOLDMARK & BENDER & Jamal N. Whitehead -- whitehead@sgb-law.com -- SCHROETER GOLDMARK & BENDER. Bankers Life and Casualty Company, a foreign corporation, Defendant, represented by Ryan Paul Hammond -- rhammond@littler.com -- LITTLER MENDELSON, Breanne Sheetz Martell -- bsmartell@littler.com -- LITTLER MENDELSON & Daniel L. Thieme -- dthieme@littler.com -- LITTLER MENDELSON. BERKS COUNTY, PA: Victory et al. Seek to Certify Class ------------------------------------------------------ In a class action lawsuit, THERESA VICTORY, ALICE VELAZQUEZ-DIAZ, and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. BERKS COUNTY, et al., the Defendants, Case No. 5:18-cv-05170-MAK (E.D. Pa.), the Plaintiffs move the Court for an order: 1. certifying a class of: "all current and future female inmates committed to the Berks County Jail System who have the Trusty custody-level classification and/or Work Release status but have been denied assignment to the Community Reentry Center ("CRC") and denied access to the privileges, services, and programs available to men assigned to the CRC"; and 2. designating Theresa Victory and Alice Velazquez-Diaz as the class representatives. There are currently approximately 5 to 11 women committed to the Berks County Jail System at any time who satisfy the criteria for class membership. Between 43 to 75 women enter the facility throughout the year who satisfy the criteria for class membership, the lawsuit says.[BN] Counsel for the Plaintiffs and Proposed Class Members: Matthew A. Feldman, Esq. Su Ming Yeh, Esq. Angus R. Love, Esq. Jim Davy, Esq. PENNSYLVANIA INSTITUTIONAL LAW PROJECT 718 Arch St., Suite 304S Philadelphia, PA 19106 Telephone: 215 925 2966 E-mail: mfeldman@pailp.org Attorneys for the Defendant: Matthew J. Connell, Esq. Samantha Ryan, Esq. MACMAIN LAW GROUP 433 W. Market Street, Suite 200 West Chester, PA 19382 E-mail: mconnell@macmainlaw.com BLACKROCK INSTITUTIONAL: Baird et al. Seek to Certify Classes ------------------------------------------------------------- In a class action lawsuit against BlackRock, Inc., and several entities, the Plaintiffs will move the Court for an order on August 8, 2019: 1. certifying CTI Class and the BlackRock Plan Class pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(1)(A) and (B), or alternatively, Rule 23(b)(3): CTI Plan Class: "all participants (and their beneficiaries) whose employee benefit plans were governed by Title I of ERISA and invested directly or indirectly in the BlackRock CTIs during the Class Period" BlackRock Plan Class: "all participants (and their beneficiaries) in the BlackRock Retirement Savings Plan during the Class Period"; 2. appointing Plaintiffs as Class representatives; and 3. appointing Class Counsel pursuant to Rule 23(g). The case is captioned as Charles Baird and Lauren Slayton, as individuals, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, and on behalf of the BlackRock Retirement Savings Plan, Plaintiffs, vs. BlackRock Institutional Trust Company, N.A.; BlackRock, Inc.; The BlackRock, Inc. Retirement Committee; The Investment Committee of the Retirement Committee; The Administrative Committee of the Retirement Committee; The Management Development & Compensation Committee, Catherine Bolz, Chip Castille, Paige Dickow, Daniel A. Dunay, Jeffrey A. Smith; Anne Ackerley, Amy Engel, Nancy Everett, Joseph Feliciani Jr., Ann Marie Petach, Michael Fredericks, Corin Frost, Daniel Gamba, Kevin Holt, Chris Jones, Philippe Matsumoto, John Perlowski, Andy Phillips, Kurt Schansinger, Tom Skrobe; Kathleen Nedl, Marc Comerchero, Joel Davies, John Davis, Milan Lint, Laraine McKinnon, (collectively, "BlackRock Defendants") and Mercer Investment Consulting, the Defendants, Case No. 4:17:cv-01892-HSG/KAW (N.D. Cal.).[CC] Attorneys for the Plaintiffs: Michelle C. Yau, Esq. Mary J. Bortscheller, Esq. Daniel R. Sutter, Esq. COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL PLLC 1100 New York Ave. NW Fifth Floor Washington, DC 20005 Telephone: (202) 408-4600 Facsimile: (202) 408-4699 - and - Todd Jackson, Esq. Nina Wasow, Esq. FEINBERG, JACKSON, WORTHMAN & WASOW, LLP 2030 Addison St. Suite 500 Berkeley, CA 94704 Telephone: (510) 269-7998 Facsimile: (510) 269-7994 Attorneys for the Defendants: Mary J. Bortscheller, Esq. E-mail: mbortscheller@cohenmilstein.com COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL PLLC 1100 New York Ave., NW, Suite 500 Washington, D.C. 20005 Telephone: (202) 408-4600 Facsimile: (202) 408-4699 BLINDS TO GO: Delacruz Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York ------------------------------------------------------ A class action lawsuit has been filed against Blinds To Go (U.S.) Inc. The case is styled as Emanuel Delacruz And On Behalf of All Other Persons Similarly Situated, Plaintiff v. Blinds To Go (U.S.) Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-05384 (S.D. N.Y., June 7, 2019). The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Blinds To Go (U.S.) Inc. manufactures home improvement products. The Company offers drapery hardware, blinds, and shades. Blinds To Go serves clients in the United States.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Jeffrey Michael Gottlieb, Esq. 150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR New York, NY 10003 Phone: (212) 228-9795 Fax: (212) 982-6284 Email: nyjg@aol.com BLOOM ENERGY: Evans Hits Share Drop Over Deployment Deficit ----------------------------------------------------------- David L. Evans, Theodor Gillebaard, and Florinel Marica, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. Bloom Energy Corporation, KR Sridhar, Randy Furr, L. John Doerr, Scott Sandell, Eddy Zervigon, Colin L. Powell, Peter Teti, Mary K. Bush, Kelly A. Ayotte, John T. Chambers, J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC, Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, Keybanc Capital Markets Inc., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated, Robert W. Baird & Co., Incorporated, Cowen And Company, LLC, HSBC Securities (USA) Inc., Oppenheimer & Co. Inc., Raymond James & Associates, Inc. and Does 1-25, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 19CV347262 (Cal. Super., May 7, 2019), seeks to recover damages as a result of violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Bloom Energy provides distributed electronic power generation solutions based on its proprietary solid oxide fuel cell technology. Its main product, Bloom Energy Servers, are on-site stationary power generators fueled with natural gas, offering customers clean, uninterrupted, off-the-grid energy. On June 12, 2018, Bloom Energy made its initial public offering of shares of its common stock and sold 20,700,000 shares of Class A common stock at $15.00 per share, netting cash proceeds of $282.3 million. However, the Offering Materials omitted to disclose that Bloom Energy' deployments of Bloom Energy servers for the quarter fell below target due to construction delays which resulted in significantly lower deployments. As a result, Bloom Energy stock plummeted to under $10 per share, or $5 below the IPO price. Plaintiffs purchased or otherwise acquired Bloom Energy common stock pursuant or traceable during its Initial Public Offering. [BN] Plaintiff is represented by: David J. Stone, Esq. BRAGAR EAGEL & SQUIRE P.C. 885 Third Avenue, Suite 3040 New York, NY 10022 Telephone: (212) 308-5858 Email: stone@bespc.com - and - Marion C. Passmore, Esq. Melissa A. Fortunato, Esq. BRAGAR EAGEL & SQUIRE P.C. 885 Third Avenue, Suite 3040 New York, NY 10022 Telephone: (212) 308-5858 Facsimile: (212) 486-0462 Email: fortunato@bespc.com passmore@bespc.com BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY: Rogers Suit Removed to N.D. Ill. ------------------------------------------------------ The case captioned Richard Rogers, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. BNSF Railway Company, Defendant, Case No. 2019-CH-0439 (Cook County Circuit Court, Chancery Division, April 16, 2019), was removed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on May 7, 2019 under Case No. 19-cv-03083. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: David L. Gerbie, Esq. MCGUIRE LAW, P.C. 55 W. Wacker Drive, 9th Floor Chicago, IL 60601 Tel: (312) 893-7002 Fax: (312) 275-7895 Email: dgerbie@mcgpc.com BNSF Railway Company is represented by: Elizabeth Brooke Herrington, Esq. MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP 77 West Wacker Drive, Suite 500 Chicago, IL 60601 Tel: (312) 324-1000 Email: beth.herrington@morganlewis.com - and - Alex David Berger, Esq. MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP 77 W. Wacker Drive Fifth Floor Chicago, IL 60601 Tel: (312) 324-1745 Email: alex.berger@morganlewis.com - and Tyler Zachary Zmick, Esq. MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP 77 W. Wacker Dr., Fifth Floor Chicago, IL 60601 Tel: (312) 324-1188 Email: tyler.zmick@morganlewis.com BOB'S DISCOUNT FURNITURE: Faces Klune Labor Suit in California -------------------------------------------------------------- A class action complaint has been filed against Bob's Discount Furniture, LLC for violations of the California Labor Code and the applicable Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders. The case is captioned BOZENA KLUNE, an individual, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff, vs. BOB'S DISCOUNT FURNITURE, LLC, a Massachusetts limited liability company; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 19STCV17964 (Cal. Super., Los Angeles Cty., May 23, 2019). According to the complaint, Defendants have had a consistent policy of failing to pay all wages due to aggrieved employees during the course of employment and timely upon separation from employment. Specifically, Defendants required Plaintiff and the aggrieved employees to work off the clock and failed to record accurate time worked by these employees. Defendants also failed to provide aggrieved employees with meal and rest periods, because they were not provided with the opportunity to take full, uninterrupted, and duty-free rest periods and meal breaks as required by the Labor Code. In the event Defendants paid employees meal or rest premiums for any missed meal or rest breaks, they failed to accurately calculate the "regular rate of pay" by omitting the weekly earned commissions in the computation. Furthermore, Defendants failed to provide employees with accurately itemized wage statements, which prevented them from learning of their unlawful pay practices. Finally, Defendants failed to provide signed, written commission contracts, and to reimburse necessary business expenses to its California employees. Bob's Discount Furniture, LLC is a Massachusetts limited liability company that operates discount furniture stores. The company sells furniture and bedding products through physical stores and online channels throughout the United States. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: David Yeremian, Esq. DAVID YEREMIAN & ASSOCIATES, INC. 535 N. Brand Blvd., Suite 705 Glendale, CA 91203 Telephone: (818) 230-8380 Facsimile: (818) 230-0308 E-mail: david@yeremianlaw.com - and - Emil Davtyan, Esq. DAVTYAN PROFESSIONAL LAW CORP. 5959 Topanga Canyon Blvd., Suite 130 Woodland Hills, CA 91367 Telephone: (818) 875-2008 E-mail: emil@davtyanlaw.com BOSTON INTERIORS: Sullivan Seeks Overtime Pay for Sales Staff ------------------------------------------------------------- SANDRA SULLIVAN, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. BOSTON INTERIORS FURNISHINGS, LLC, the Defendant, Case No. 19-1527 (Mass. Super., May 31, 2019), seeks to recover overtime pay under Massachusetts General Law. Ms. Sullivan, a resident of Methuen, Massachusetts, worked as a sales associate for Defendant's Burlington retail store. She routinely worked more than 40 hours per week in a given week for Defendant. Indeed, in Ms. Sullivan's experience, the Defendant routinely scheduled its inside sales employees for over 40 hours of work in a week. The Defendant failed to pay Ms. Sullivan and the Class members an hourly rate equal to one and one half limes their regular rate for each hour that they worked for. As a direct result of the failure by Defendant to fully and timely compensate Ms. Sullivan and all Class members for all of the hours that they worked on Sundays when the wages for those hours were due and payable under M.G.L. Ms. Sullivan and all Class members have lost wages and suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial, including treble damages, interest costs, reasonable attorneys' fees and further consequential damages.[BN] Attorneys for the Plaintiffs: John Regan, Esq. EMPLOYEE RIGHTS GROUP, LLC 43 Bowdoin Street, Ste. A Boston, MA 02114 Telephone: (857) 277-0902 Facsimile: (857) 401-3023 E-mail: jay@maemployeerights.com - and - Jeffrey S. Strom, Esq. OFFICE OF JEFFREY S. STROM P.O. Box 916 Boylston, MA 01505 Telephone: (508) 925-5525 E-mail: lawofficeofjeffreystrom@gmail.com BRIDGETON LANDFILL: Appeals Ruling in Kitchin Suit to 8th Circuit ----------------------------------------------------------------- Defendants Allied Services, Bridgeton Landfill LLC and Republic Services, Inc., filed an appeal from a Court ruling in the lawsuit styled John Kitchin, et al. v. Bridgeton Landfill LLC, et al., Case No. 4:18-cv-000672-CDP, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis. The appellate case is captioned as John Kitchin, et al. v. Bridgeton Landfill LLC, et al., Case No. 19-8010, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.[BN] Plaintiffs-Respondents John C. Kitchin, North West Auto Body and Mary Menke, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, are represented by: Celeste Brustowicz, Esq. Victor T. Cobb, Esq. Barry J. Cooper, Jr., Esq. COOPER LAW FIRM 1525 Religious Street New Orleans, LA 70130 Telephone: (504) 399-0009 E-mail: cbrustowicz@sch-llc.com victortcobb@gmail.com bcooper@sch-llc.com - and - Nathaniel R. Carroll, Esq. Ryan A. Keane, Esq. KEANE LAW, LLC 7777 Bonhomme Clayton, MO 63105 Telephone: (314) 391-4700 Facsimile: (314) 244-3778 E-mail: nathaniel@keanelawllc.com ryan@keanelawllc.com - and - Anthony D. Gray, Esq. JOHNSON GRAY LLC 7710 Carondelet Clayton, MO 63105 Telephone: (314) 385-9500 E-mail: agray@johnsongraylaw.com - and - Kimberly Starr Morr, Esq. THE DRISCOLL FIRM 211 N. Broadway, 40th Floor Saint Louis, MO 63102-0000 Telephone: (314) 932-3232 - and - Ron A. Rustin, Esq. 920 Fourth Street Gretna, LA 70053 Telephone: (504) 227-8100 Defendants-Petitioners Bridgeton Landfill, LLC, Republic Services, Inc. and Allied Services are represented by: William Garland Beck, Esq. Allyson Elisabeth Cunningham, Esq. Peter Flint Daniel, Esq. LATHROP GAGE LLP 2345 Grand Boulevard, Suite 2800 Kansas City, MO 64108 Telephone: (816) 292-2000 Telecopier: (816) 292-2001 E-mail: wbeck@lathropgage.com acunningham@lathropgage.com pdaniel@lathropgage.com - and - Patricia L. Silva, Esq. LATHROP GAGE LLP 7701 Forsyth Boulevard, Suite 500 Saint Louis, MO 63105 Telephone: (314) 613-2800 Telecopier: (314) 613-2801 E-mail: psilva@lathropgage.com BRIGADOON FITNESS: Gorss Motels Seeks to Certify TCPA Class ----------------------------------------------------------- In the class action lawsuit, GORSS MOTELS, INC., individually and on behalf of a class of similarly-situated persons, the Plaintiff, v. BRIGADOON FITNESS, INC., BRIGADOON FINANCIAL, INC., and JOHN DOES 1-5, the Defendants, Case No. 1:16-cv-00330-HAB-SLC (N.D. Ind.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to: 1. certify a class of: "all persons or entities whose fax numbers were obtained from the Wyndham Fax List who were successfully sent a Fax on April 17, 2013 stating, "ANY 2 CARDIO = FREE SANITATION STATION," listing "Hotel Fitness A Brigadoon Fitness Company" as the vendor, and containing the phrase "Let Us Help You Design Your Fitness Room! 800.291.0403. Call today to talk to one or our trained experts"; 2. appoint Plaintiff as Class representative; and 3. appoint Plaintiff's counsel as class counsel. The case is a putative class action brought by Plaintiff Gorss Motels, Inc. pursuant to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, as amended by the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005, regarding an unsolicited fax advertisement sent by or on behalf of Defendants Brigadoon Fitness, Inc., and Brigadoon Financial, Inc. On May 20, 2019, the Court denied Plaintiff's motion for class certification based on its finding that individual issues of permission predominated as to the proposed class. In its Order, the Court stated the April 2013 Fax List included fax numbers obtained through Brigadoon's status as a Wyndham approved supplier, and that had all the fax numbers been obtained through this same method, answering whether that method constitutes express invitation or permission would not require a case by case determination. On June 3, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider the Order and supporting memorandum. The Plaintiff filed this amended motion for class certification as an alternative to the motion to reconsider, and is based on the Court's statement as to the "Wyndham" franchisees.[BN] Attorneys for Gorss Motels, Inc., individually and as the representative of a class of similarly-situated persons: Ryan M. Kelly, Esq. Brian J. Wanca, Esq. ANDERSON + WANCA 3701 Algonquin Road, Suite 500 Rolling Meadows, IL 60008 Telephone: (847) 368-1500 Facsimile: (847) 368-1501 BRITISH STANDARDS: Williams-Bell Seeks FLSA Collective Class ------------------------------------------------------------ In a class action lawsuit MARIA WILLIAMS-BELL, on behalf of herself, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. BRITISH STANDARDS INSTITUTION, INC., the Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-05386 (N.D. Ill.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an order: 1. conditional certifying the action as a representative collective action pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, on behalf of the collective class of: "all persons who worked for BSI Group as Client Managers or other similarly titled positions during the applicable statute of limitations period, and who were classified as exempt and were not paid overtime compensation for time worked in excess of 40 hours in given workweeks"; 2. directing the Defendant to produce to Plaintiff, within 10 days of its Order, a computer-readable data file containing the names, addresses, email addresses, telephone numbers, dates of employment, social security numbers, and dates of birth for the members of the FLSA Collective Class; 3. directing court-facilitated notice of this collective action to the FLSA Class; and 4. authorizing the Plaintiff to send the Notice, at her expense, by first-class U.S. Mail and email to all members of the FLSA Collective Class to inform them of their right to opt-in to this lawsuit and a reminder notice 20 days before the end of the opt-in period.[CC] Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Putative Class: Haley R. Jenkins, Esq. Ryan F. Stephan, Esq. STEPHAN ZOURAS, LLP 100 North Riverside Plaza, Suite 2150 Chicago, IL 60606 Telephone: (312) 233-1550 E-mail: rstephan@stephanzouras.com hjenkins@stephanzouras.com BROWARD COLLEGE: Brough Sues Over FCCPA Violation ------------------------------------------------- MATTHEW ALEXANDER BROUGH, individually and on behalf of all those similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. BROWARD COLLEGE, Defendants, Case No. 0:19-cv-61413-BB (S.D. Fla., June 6, 2019) is a class action against Defendant for violation of the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act ("FCCPA"). The debt at issue is a financial obligation Plaintiff incurred primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. In particular, the debt at issue (the "Consumer Debt") represents an allegedly outstanding amount Plaintiff incurred to obtain educational services and/or benefits from Defendant. Defendant sent a collection letter dated June 12, 2017, to Plaintiff in an attempt to collect the Consumer Debt. The Collection Letter states that "Broward College will assess an additional collection fee up to 33% of the outstanding balance for collection of this debt". The complaint asserts that the Defendant does not have any statutory or contractual right to "assess an additional collection fee up to 33% of the outstanding balance" for the collection of the debt referenced in the Collection Letter, i.e., the Consumer Debt. Yet, Plaintiff paid money to Defendant for collection costs and/or fees that were unlawfully assessed by Defendant, adds the complaint. Plaintiff is a natural person, and a citizen of the State of Florida, residing in Broward County, Florida. Defendant is a four-year college receives Federal financial assistance and is an entity governed by the FCCPA.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: JIBRAEL S. HINDI, ESQ. THOMAS J. PATTI, ESQ. The Law Offices of Jibrael S. Hindi 110 SE 6th Street, Suite 1744 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 Phone: 954-907-1136 Fax: 855-529-9540 Email: jibrael@jibraellaw.com tom@jibraellaw.com C & L TRUCKING: Gonzalez Files Class Suit in Cal. Super. Ct. ------------------------------------------------------------ A class action lawsuit has been filed against C & L TRUCKING ENTERPRISES, INC. The case is styled as GERALDINE GONZALEZ, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AND ON BEHALF OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC AS PRIVATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, Plaintiff v. JUAN BEDOLLA, C & L TRUCKING ENTERPRISES, INC., A CALIFORNIA BUSINESS ORGANIZATION, Defendants, Case No. BCV-19-101592 (Cal. Super. Ct., Kern Cty., June 7, 2019). The case type is stated as "Other Employment - Civil Unlimited". Mr. John W. Lake serves as the Chief Executive Officer and President of C & L Trucking Enterprise Inc. C & L Trucking Enterprise Inc. is a licensed and bonded freight shipping and trucking company running freight hauling business from Shafter, California.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by RONALD L. ZAMBRANO, ESQ. CAPITAL ACCOUNTS: Edmonds Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. Pa. ------------------------------------------------------ A class action lawsuit has been filed against CAPITAL ACCOUNTS, LLC. The case is styled as JENNIFER EDMONDS on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CAPITAL ACCOUNTS, LLC, John Does 1-25, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-02490-HB (E.D. Pa., June 7, 2019). The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Capital Accounts, LLC is a debt collection agency located in Brentwood, Tennessee.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: ROBERT P. COCCO, ESQ. LAW OFFICES OF ROBERT P. COCCO PC 1500 WALNUT ST., STE 900 PHILADELPHIA, PA 19102 Phone: (215) 351-0200 Fax: (215) 922-3874 Email: rcocco@rcn.com CAPITAL COLLECTION: Tessler Files FDCPA Suit in D. New Jersey ------------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against CAPITAL COLLECTION SERVICES. The case is styled as BARUCH TESSLER individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CAPITAL COLLECTION SERVICES, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-13500-NLH-JS (D. N.J., June 7, 2019). The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Capital Collections, LLC provides debt collection services. It caters to commercial, retail, medical, municipal government, transportation, and agricultural sectors.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: ARI HILLEL MARCUS, ESQ. YITZCHAK ZELMAN, ESQ. MARCUS ZELMAN LLC 701 COOKMAN AVENUE, SUITE 300 ASBURY PARK, NJ 07712 Phone: (732) 695-3282 Fax: (732) 298-6256 Email: ari@marcuszelman.com yzelman@marcuszelman.com CAREER HORIZONS: Charles Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages -------------------------------------------------------- CHRISTINA CHARLES, individually and on behalf of all similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. CAREER HORIZONS, INC. d/b/a TSD GLOBAL, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-02260-RLY-MJD (S.D. Ind., June 6, 2019) seeks to recover for Defendant's willful violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), alleged contractual obligations (or unjust enrichment if no contract is found), and other appropriate rules, regulations, statutes, and ordinances. Plaintiff, and those similarly situated, were subjected to Defendant's policy and practice of failing to compensate its call center employees for their necessary pre-shift activities, which resulted in the failure to properly compensate them as required under applicable federal and state laws. Plaintiff seeks a declaration that her rights, and the rights of the putative FLSA Collective Class, were violated; and seeks to recover an award of unpaid wages and overtime premiums, liquidated damages, penalties, injunctive and declaratory relief, attorneys' fees and costs, pre- and post-judgment interest, and any other remedies to which they may be entitled, says the complaint. Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as an hourly employee from approximately November 2018 through April 2019 as a Customer Service Representative ("CSR"). CAREER HORIZONS, INC., d/b/a TSD GLOBAL provide sales, customer service and back-office services to our clients as an extension of their businesses, providing value, integrity, and expertise offer transportation customer service solutions that includes, but is not limited to, telephone calls, email, and chat services.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Robert T. Dassow, Esq. HOVDE DASSOW & DEETS, LLC 10201 N. Illinois Street, Suite 500 Indianapolis, IN 46290 Phone: (317) 818-3100 Facsimile: (317) 818-3111 - and - Jacob R. Rusch, Esq. JOHNSON BECKER, PLLC 444 Cedar Street, Suite 1800 Saint Paul, MN 55101 Phone: (612) 436-1800 Fax: (612) 436-1801 Email: jrusch@johnsonbecker.com CAROLINA FRESH: Stafford Seeks Overtime Pay for Installers ---------------------------------------------------------- JEREMY S. STAFFORD, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. CAROLINA FRESH WATER, LLC, the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00562 (M.D.N.C., May 31, 2019), contends that Defendant violated the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, by knowingly suffering and/or permitting Stafford and the putative Collective members to work in excess of 40 hours per week without properly compensating them at an overtime premium rate for these overtime hours. According to the complaint, Stafford and others similarly situated are individuals who have worked for Defendant as Installers. They all shared similar job titles, training, job descriptions and job tasks. Importantly, they were all paid a base salary, plus a fixed amount for each installation he performed. In addition to performing installations, Stafford was required to troubleshoot and service existing customers' water purification systems, perform data entry for each task he performed, and track and organize inventory in Defendant's warehouse. Stafford worked seven days per week and was required to be on call 24 hours per day, seven days per week. The Defendant paid all Installers a weekly salary, plus a fixed amount for each installation performed. Stafford estimates that during his tenure with Defendant, he worked between 60-80 hours each week, depending on the needs of Defendant. Based on Stafford's observations and discussions with other Installers, Stafford has personal knowledge that Defendant's Installers also work in excess of 40 hours each workweek. Despite the fact that the Stafford and the other Plaintiffs did not meet any test for exemption, the Defendant failed to pay them the requisite overtime rate of 1-1⁄2 times their regular rate for all hours worked more than 40 hours per week, the lawsuit says. Stafford is a resident of Rock Hill, South Carolina and worked for Defendant as an Installer. Stafford's primary job duty was installing and servicing water purification systems in residential homes. The Defendant is in the business of selling, installing and servicing water purification systems, primarily to residential customers. Defendant's principal place of business is located in Greensboro, North Carolina. Defendant's service area includes North Carolina, South Carolina and Virginia.[BN] Attorneys for the Plainintiff: Philip J. Gibbons, Jr., Esq. Craig L. Leis, Esq. Jason S. Chestnut, Esq. GIBBONS LEIS, PLLC 14045 Ballantyne Corporate Place, Ste. 325 Charlotte, NC 28277 Telephone: 704-612-0038 E-mail: phil@philgibbonslaw.com craig@gibbonsleis.com jason@gibbonsleis.com CHECKERS DRIVE-IN: Cotter Sues Over Failure to Secure PII --------------------------------------------------------- BREANDAN COTTER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CHECKERS DRIVE-IN RESTAURANTS, INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendant, Case No. 8:19-cv-01386 (M.D. Fla., June 6, 2019) is a class action against Defendant for its failure to secure and safeguard its customers' credit and debit card numbers and other payment card data ("PCD"), personally identifiable information such as the cardholder's names, payment card number, card verification code, expiration date, and other personal information ("PII") (collectively, "Private Information"), and for failing to provide timely and adequate notice to Plaintiff and other Class members that their Private Information had been stolen and precisely what types of information were stolen. Dating back to September 2016, hackers utilizing malicious software, accessed the point-of-sale ("POS") systems at Defendant's Checkers & Rally's restaurants ("Checkers") throughout the United States and stole copies of Defendant's customers' Private Information (the "Data Breach"). According to Defendant, the hackers maintained operation of the malware in Defendant's POS devices at 102 Checkers locations. Dates vary by location, however, upon information and belief, the malware at issue remained on Defendant's POS devises through April 2019. On May 29, 2019, Defendant confirmed that it had allowed a massive breach of its customers' Private Information to occur, stating that the malware was "designed to collect information stored on the magnetic stripe of payment cards, including cardholder name, payment card number, card verification code and expiration date". The Defendant's security protocols were so deficient that the Data Breach continued for years while Defendant failed to even detect it—this despite widespread knowledge of the malicious software (or malware) used to perpetrate the Data Breach. The Defendant disregarded Plaintiff's and Class members' rights by intentionally, willfully, recklessly, or negligently failing to take adequate and reasonable measures to ensure its data systems were protected, failing to take available steps to prevent and stop the breach from ever happening, and failing to disclose to its customers the material facts that it did not have adequate computer systems and security practices to safeguard customers' Private Information, says the complaint. Plaintiff purchased the products and services of Defendant at multiple Checkers location. Defendant operates approximately 860 restaurants in 29 states and the District of Columbia.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: PATRICK A. BARTHLE II, ESQ. RYAN J. MCGEE, ESQ. MORGAN & MORGAN COMPLEX LITIGATION GROUP 201 N. Franklin Street, 7th Floor Tampa, FL 33602 Phone: (813) 223-5505 Facsimile: (813) 223-5402 Email: pbarthle@ForThePeople.com rmcgee@ForThePeople.com - and - JEAN SUTTON MARTIN, ESQ. MORGAN & MORGAN COMPLEX LITIGATION GROUP 2018 Eastwood Road Suite 225 Wilmington, NC 28403 Phone: (813) 559-4908 Facsimile: (888) 316-3489 Email: jeanmartin@forthepeople.com - and - TINA WOLFSON, ESQ. AHDOOT & WOLFSON, PC 10728 Lindbrook Drive Los Angeles, CA 90024 Phone: (310) 474-9111 Facsimile: (310) 474-8585 Email: twolfson@ahdootwolfson.com CHESAPEAKE OPERATING: Court Disallows Amendment to L. West's TAC ---------------------------------------------------------------- The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma issued an Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Third Amended Complaint in the case captioned LISA WEST, STORMY HOPSON, AUBURN & DOUGLAS CLOYES, DELL LIVSEY, JULIA & DALE WHITE, individually, Plaintiffs, v. CHESAPEAKE OPERATING, LLC, EASTOK PIPELINE, LLC, EQUAL ENERGY U.S., INC., FAIRFIELD OIL & GAS CORP., NEW DOMINION, LLC, PHOENIX OIL & GAS, INC., TRANSPRO ENERGY, LLC, AND WHITE STAR PETROLEUM, LLC f/d/b/a AMERICAN ENERGY WOODFORD, LLC, Defendants. Case No. CIV-16-264-F. (W.D. Okla.). Lisa West and Stormy Hopson, individually and on behalf of a proposed plaintiff class of Oklahoma property owners, commenced this action in the District Court of Pottawatomie County, State of Oklahoma. The action was brought against fifteen defendants and a proposed defendant class of companies operating wells injecting wastewater into the Arbuckle formation. The proposed class area included Pottawatomie County and seven surrounding counties. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants' injection of wastewater had induced or triggered earthquakes and would continue to do so, even if injection of wastewater was immediately stopped. According to plaintiffs' petition, three earthquakes of 5.0 to 5.7 magnitude had occurred in and around Prague, Oklahoma in November of 2011. In their motion for leave to file a third amended complaint, the plaintiffs seek to add ten new plaintiffs, Carol Fadaiepour, Vali Fadaiepour, Julie A. Holbrook-Frias, Carol Jensen, Chris Leavitt, Teri Newby, Cole Newby, Carl Searcy, Joe Sochor and Teresa Lynn Sochor. They also seek to add over 40 defendants, including Devon and Oklahoma Oil and Gas Management, Inc. who were previously dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). In their proposed third amended complaint, plaintiffs include allegations based upon newly identified earthquakes occurring in 2017, 2018 and 2019 and allege claims relating to the Edmond earthquake swarm and the Crescent earthquake swarm. Plaintiffs also include class allegations for a proposed plaintiff class and a defendant class. According to the plaintiffs, the new defendants are necessary in view of Rule 19, Fed. R. Civ. P. Plaintiffs claim that the proposed amended pleading is consistent with the court's order addressing the second amended complaint and state that they do not reassert any claims against the bankrupt defendants, Sandridge and Chaparral, or any claims relating to the Fairview/Cherokee swarm. They allege in their proposed pleading that the class allegations are included to provide notice of their intent to reassert class claims if justified after the exchange of expert reports. Defendants, White Star, Equal Energy, U.S., Inc., and Fairfield Oil & Gas Corp., oppose the motion. They contend that the newly named defendants are not necessary parties that must be joined under Rule 19. They assert that the claims against these defendants are futile because they are barred by the statute of limitations. Defendants also argue that the proposed amended pleading is highly prejudicial to them and is unduly delayed. At some point, defendants argue, the pleading cycle must end, to allow discovery to commence and the merits of the claims alleged against the current defendants to be addressed. Because the plaintiffs have twice amended their complaint, Rule 15 instructs that the plaintiffs may amend their pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave. It also instructs that the court should freely give leave when justice so requires. However, whether to grant leave to amend is within the discretion of the court. The court may deny leave to amend upon a showing of undue delay, undue prejudice to the opposing party, bad faith or dilatory motive, failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, or futility of amendment. New Defendants The Plaintiffs seek to add over 40 new defendants, claiming that they are necessary in view of Rule 19, Fed. R. Civ. P. However, contrary to plaintiffs' arguments, the new defendants are not necessary parties to this action. Even if the proposed new defendants are potential joint tortfeasors, it has long been the rule that it is not necessary for all joint tortfeasors to be named as defendants in a single lawsuit. The court thus rejects plaintiffs' argument that the addition of the new defendants is required under Rule 19. Next, the plaintiffs contend that the new defendants should be added in further view of the fact that the putative defendant class was stricken. However, the court notes that even though plaintiffs were aware that the court had stricken the putative defendant class, plaintiffs did not request leave to add defendants when making their alternative request in the motion to remand. They only requested leave to add plaintiffs. Further, at the remand hearing, they represented to the court that they would only be seeking to add plaintiffs. Without any further explanation in the motion, plaintiffs now maintain that the new defendants, including Devon and Oklahoma Oil and Gas Management, Inc., who were previously dismissed, should be added to the lawsuit. The court finds that the addition of the new defendants would be unduly prejudicial to the current defendants. Their addition would clearly affect the course of this action. The court therefore declines to exercise its discretion to allow the addition of the new defendants by the filing of a third amended complaint. This includes Devon and Oklahoma Oil and Gas Management, Inc. New Plaintiffs Holbrook-Frias, Leavitt, Newbys and Sochors The Plaintiffs seek leave to add Julia A. Holbrook-Frias, Chris Leavitt, Teri Newby, Cole Newby, Joe Sochor and Teresa Lynn Sochor as additional plaintiffs. These proposed plaintiffs reside in Edmond or Guthrie. Plaintiffs seek to join them to allege claims based upon the Edmond earthquake swarm or the Crescent earthquake swarm. As previously discussed, no claims relating to the Edmond earthquake swarm and the Crescent earthquake swarm are currently pending in this action, due to the court's August 13, 2018 order. All claims involving those swarms were dismissed by the court pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The claims based on the Edmond and Crescent earthquake swarms were the only claims alleged against Devon and Oklahoma Oil and Gas Management, Inc. and those companies were dismissed completely from the lawsuit. The court, as discussed, is not permitting plaintiffs to add any of the new proposed defendants, including Devon and Oklahoma Oil and Gas Management, Inc. Therefore, the addition of the new plaintiffs' claims based upon the Edmond and Crescent earthquake swarms would be futile. Searcy The Plaintiffs also seek to add Carl Searcy (Searcy) as a new plaintiff. Searcy resides in Ponca City, Oklahoma. According to the proposed third amended complaint, Searcy felt the 5.8 Pawnee earthquake on September 3, 2016 and suffered damage to the interior of his home and the outside patio area. Consequently, plaintiffs seek to add Mr. Searcy to allege claims based upon the Pawnee earthquake swarm. The court concludes that plaintiffs should not be permitted to add Searcy as a plaintiff. As discussed, the court has not granted leave to add any new defendants. Therefore, the only defendants sued with respect to the Pawnee earthquake swarm are EastOK Pipeline, LLC and White Star. Like White Star, EastOK Pipeline, LLC is involved in Chapter 11 proceedings. Doc. no. 329. Plaintiffs' action against both companies is also stayed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 362. Allowing Searcy to allege claims against those companies would violate the automatic stay of Section 362. Thus, the court declines to permit plaintiffs to add Searcy as a new plaintiff to this action. Fadaiepours In addition, the plaintiffs seek to add Carol Fadaiepour and Vali Fadaiepour (the Fadaiepours) as new plaintiffs. The Fadaiepours reside in Edmond, Oklahoma. The proposed third amended complaint alleges that the Fadaiepours felt the 4.5 Edmond earthquake on December 7, 2013, an unidentified 4.3 earthquake on December 29, 2015, the 5.0 Cushing earthquake on November 7, 2016 and the 4.5 Crescent earthquake on July 27, 2015. From the allegations, it appears that the Fadaiepours are added to allege claims based upon the Edmond, Cushing and Crescent earthquake swarms. The court concludes that the Fadaiepours should not be permitted to be added as new plaintiffs. For the reasons previously discussed, the court concludes that plaintiffs should not be permitted to add the Fadaiepours to allege claims based upon the Edmond and Crescent earthquake swarms. Jensen Lasty, the plaintiffs seek to add Carol Jensen as a plaintiff. Jensen resides in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The proposed third amended complaint alleges that Jensen felt the 3.1 Edmond earthquake on December 7, 2013, the 5.7 Prague earthquake on November 6, 2011 and the 5.8 Pawnee earthquake on September 3, 2016. Hence, plaintiffs seek to add Jensen to allege claims based upon the Edmond earthquake swarm, the Prague earthquake swarm and the Pawnee earthquake swarm. For these reasons, the court concludes that plaintiffs should not be permitted to add Jensen to allege claims based upon the Edmond and Pawnee earthquake swarms. As to adding Jensen to allege claims based upon the 2011 Prague earthquake swarm, the court notes that, due to the Section 362 stay, Jensen cannot assert any claims against White Star. As to any claims against Equal Energy US, Inc., Fairfield Oil & Gas Corp. or New Dominion, LLC, plaintiffs, in their motion to amend, have not proffered any explanation why Jensen could not have been added at the time of the second amended complaint. The court concludes that the addition of Jensen is unduly delayed. A full-text copy of the District Court's June 3, 2019 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yyypl4e7 from Leagle.com. Lisa West, Individually, Lisa West, as Class Representative, Stormy Hopson, Individually, Stormy Hopson, as Class Representative, Auburn Cloyes, Individually, Auburn Cloyes, as Class Representative, Douglas Cloyes, Individually, Douglas Cloyes, as Class Representative, Del Livsey, Individually, Del Livsey, as Class Representative, Julia White, Individually, Julia White, as Class Representative, Dale White, Individually & Dale White, as Class Representative, Plaintiffs, represented by Edward L. White, Edward L. White PC, 829 E. 33rd StreetEdmond, OK 73013, Glendell D. Nix, Maples Nix & Diesselhorst, 15401 North May Avenue, Edmond, OK 73013, Kerry D. Green, Edward L. White PC, 829 E. 33rd StreetEdmond, OK 73013, L. Ray Maples, II, Maples & Associates, 15401 North May Avenue, Edmond, OK 73013, April B. Eberle -- aeberle@munsonmcmillin.com -- Munson & McMillin & Nicole R. Snapp-Holloway, Maples Nix & Diesselhorst,15401 North May Avenue, Edmond, OK 73013, Chesapeake Operating LLC, Defendant, represented by J. Todd Woolery -- todd.woolery@mcafeetaft.com -- McAfee & Taft, Patrick L. Stein -- patrick.stein@mcafeetaft.com -- McAfee & Taft & Timothy J. Bomhoff -- tim.bomhoff@mcafeetaft.com -- McAfee & Taft. Eastok Pipeline LLC, Defendant, represented by Leah T. Rudnicki, Rudnicki PLLC & Sharon T. Thomas, The Rudnicki Firm. 6305 Waterford Blvd, Suite 325, Oklahoma City, OK 73118 White Star Petroleum LLC, formerly doing business as American Energy Woodford LLC, Defendant, represented by Bradley Ward Welsh, Gable & Gotwals, 1100 Oneok Plaza, 100 W 5th St Ste 1100, Tulsa, OK 74103-4217, David L. Kearney, Durbin Larimore & Bialick, E. Edd Pritchett, Jr., Durbin Larimore & Bialick, Katherine Taylor Loy, Durbin Larimore & Bialick, Lane R. Neal, Durbin Larimore & Bialick, 920 North Valley Avenue, Oklahoma City, OK 73107, Lewis T. LeNaire, Gable & Gotwals, Tammy D. Barrett, Gable & Gotwals 1100 Oneok Plaza, 100 W 5th St Ste 1100, Tulsa, OK 74103-4217,& William H. Doyle, The Doyle Firm PC, 1313 E. Osborn Road, Suite 220, Phoenix, AZ 85014, pro hac vice. COCA-COLA CO: Garcia Appeals Ruling in Nelson Suit to 9th Circuit ----------------------------------------------------------------- Proposed Intervenor Ernesto Garcia filed an appeal from a Court ruling in the lawsuit titled Karen Nelson v. The Coca-Cola Company, Case No. 3:18-cv-02225-GPC-MSB, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, San Diego. The appellate case is captioned as Karen Nelson v. The Coca-Cola Company, Case No. 19-55572, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Proposed Intervenor Ernesto Garcia filed an appeal from the District Court's ruling in the lawsuit. That appellate case is entitled Karen Nelson v. The Coca-Cola Company, Case No. 19-55355. The lawsuit was filed on September 25, 2018. The nature of suit is stated as Tort Product Liability. The Coca-Cola Company is an American corporation, and manufacturer, retailer, and marketer of nonalcoholic beverage concentrates and syrups. The Company is best known for its flagship product Coca-Cola, invented in 1886 by pharmacist John Stith Pemberton in Atlanta, Georgia. The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows: -- Appellant Ernesto Garcia's opening brief is due on July 16, 2019; -- Appellees Karen Nelson and The Coca-Cola Company's answering brief is due on August 16, 2019; and -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after service of the answering brief. Movant-Appellant ERNESTO GARCIA, Proposed Intervenor, of Miami, Florida, appears pro se.[BN] Plaintiff-Appellee KAREN NELSON, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, is represented by: Timothy G. Blood, Esq. BLOOD HURST & O'REARDON, LLP 501 West Broadway, Suite 1490 San Diego, CA 92101 Telephone: (619) 338-1100 Facsimile: (619) 338-1101 E-mail: tblood@bholaw.com Defendant-Appellee THE COCA-COLA COMPANY is represented by: Michelle Waller Cohen, Esq. Jane Metcalf, Esq. Steven A. Zalesin, Esq. PATTERSON BELKNAP WEBB & TYLER LLP 1133 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10036 Telephone: (212) 336-2000 E-mail: mcohen@pbwt.com jmetcalf@pbwt.com sazalesin@pbwt.com COMENITY BANK: Wilson Sues over Robocalls, Debt Collection Tactics ------------------------------------------------------------------ CARA WILSON, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. COMENITY BANK, the Defendant, Case No. 8:19-cv-01317-CEH-TGW (M.D. Fla., May 31, 2019), asserts that Comenity Bank "robocalled" Plaintiff repeatedly in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and Invasion of Privacy. According to the complaint, Comenity has a corporate policy of repeatedly contacting family and friends of debtors to leave supposedly "urgent messages" for the alleged debtor, using this as a tool to humiliate and embarrass alleged debtors as well as to intentionally cause aggravation and annoyance to their relatives and friends. Harassment of family members and friends is not a novel form of debt collection abuse by any means, but Comenity adds a new twist to this old tactic by using overseas call centers to do so, presumably at an extremely low cost. It also uses autodialers to further economize this mass harassment. The calls are made by Comenity are deceptive as to more than just their supposed "urgency." As evidenced by an April 23, 2019 message, Comenity knew full well it was calling merely "someone who knows" the alleged debtor. However, the very next day on April 24 and three days later on April 27, Comenity left deceptive messages pretending as if it were calling the alleged debtor. Indeed, Comenity is notable for having established an entire department set up to "skip trace" or otherwise track down family members and friends of alleged debtors, just so it can illegally roboblast abusive and deceptive calls to them. Comenity's alleged illegal tactics are another reason why robocalls continue to be the No. 1 complaint in America. Comenity is actively participating in the robocalling plague infecting America. Not only is Comenity known as a prolific robobully, it is also, as clearly illustrated today, the lawsuit says.[BN] Attorney for the Plaintiff: William "Billy" Peerce Howard, Esq. THE CONSUMER PROTECTION FIRM 4030 Henderson Boulevard Tampa, FL 33629 Telephone: (813) 500-1500 Facsimile: (813) 435-2369 E-mail: Billy@TheConsumerProtectionFirm.com CORBUS PHARMACEUTICAL: Court Appoints Rosen Law as Lead Counsel --------------------------------------------------------------- The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts issued an Order granting Plaintiff Marie Berner's Motion for an Order Appointing Her as Lead Plaintiff in the case captioned MARIE BERNER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CORBUS PHARMACEUTICAL HOLDINGS, INC.; YUVAL COHEN; and SEANMORAN, Defendants. Civil Action No. 19-cv-10457-FDS. (D. Mass.). This is a class action filed against defendants Corbus Pharmaceutical Holdings, Inc. and certain of its officers and directors alleging violations of the federal securities laws. Pursuant to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), a notice was issued on March 12, 2019, to potential class members of the action informing them of their right to move to serve as lead plaintiff by May 13, 2019, that is, within 60 days of the date of the issuance of the notice. On May 13, 2019, plaintiff Marie Berner moved for an order appointing her as lead plaintiff and approving the selection of The Rosen Law Firm, P.A. as lead counsel. No opposition to the motion has been filed. The PSLRA provides, among other things, that the most adequate plaintiff to serve as lead plaintiff is the person or group of persons that has either filed a complaint or has made a motion in response to a notice and has the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class and satisfies the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B). The court finds that Berner has the largest financial interest in this action and prima facie satisfies the typicality and adequacy requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. Marie Berner is appointed as lead plaintiff for the class, as she appears to have the largest financial interest in this litigation and otherwise appears to satisfy the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. The Rosen Law Firm, P.A. is appointed as lead counsel. A full-text copy of the District Court's June 3, 2019 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y5r7hxgy from Leagle.com. Carmen Kempf, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jeffrey C. Block jeff@blockesq.com -- Block & Leviton LLP & Jacob A. Walker -- jake@blockesq.com -- Block & Leviton LLP. Corbus Pharmaceutical Holdings, Inc, Yuval Cohen & Sean Moran, Defendants, represented by Katherine L. Dacey -- kseib@goodwinprocter.com -- Goodwin Procter LLP, pro hac vice, Caroline H. Bullerjahn -- cbullerjahn@goodwinlaw.com -- Goodwin Procter, LLP & Deborah S. Birnbach -- dbirnbach@goodwinlaw.com -- Goodwin Procter, LLP. Marie Berner, Movant, represented by Joshua Baker -- jbaker@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.. CVS PHARMACY: Stinson Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct. --------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against CVS Pharmacy, Inc. The case is styled as Stinson, Jay Joel OBO: herself and all other similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., CVS RX Services, Inc., Garfield Beach CVS, L.L.C., Defendant, Case No. SCV-264567 (Cal. Super. Ct., Sonoma Cty., June 6, 2019). The case type is stated as "Unlimited Other Employment". CVS Pharmacy is a subsidiary of the American retail and health care company CVS Health, headquartered in Woonsocket, Rhode Island and operates pharmacy and drug stores in the United States.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by Joshua H. Haffner, Esq. DAIRYAMERICA INC: $40MM Settlement in Carlin Suit Has Final OK -------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, GERALD CARLIN, JOHN RAHM, PAUL ROZWADOWSKI and DIANA WOLFE, individually and on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. DAIRYAMERICA, INC., and CALIFORNIA DAIRIES, INC., Defendants, Case No. 1:09-CV-0430 AWI-EPG (E.D. Cal.), Judge Anthony W. Ishii of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California granted the Parties' Motion for Finall Approval of Settlement and Request for Attorney Fees. In 2009, the Plaintiffs, as purported class representatives, brought claims against Defendants DairyAmerica and California Dairies concerning the misreporting of milk prices. In September 2018, the parties notified the Court of their intent to settle. The Plaintiffs now move for final approval of the class action settlement, asserting the $40 million settlement fund -- for the benefit of almost 26,000 dairy-farmer claimants -- is fair, reasonable, and adequate. They also move for attorney fees, costs, and service awards. The Defendants do not oppose. Judge Ishii is convinced that the settlement is fair, adequate, and free of collusion. He also finds a 33.3% award from the common fund of $40 million to be a reasonable percentage, given the complexity of the case, its lengthy procedural history, and the extraordinary results achieved for the class. He further finds that the Class Counsel's requested reimbursement in the amount of $823,904.04 is reasonable. Finally, the Judge finds that a $90,000 service award for each the four current named Plaintiffs goes beyond ratios described by the Ninth Circuit, given that the average recovery of unnamed class members is just over $1,000. Based on the foregoing, Judge Ishii granted final approval of the Settlement Class defined as all dairy farmers located in the United States who sold raw milk that was priced according to a Federal Milk Marketing Order during the period Jan. 1, 2002 through April 30, 2007. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, he finally approved in all respects the Settlement set forth in the Settlement Agreement. The parties are hereby directed to implement and consummate the Settlement according to its terms and provisions of the Settlement Agreement. He approved the Distribution Plan of the Settlement Fund as described in the Settlement Agreement. The Net Settlement Funds will be distributed on a pro rata basis. An approved Claimant's pro rata share of the settlement will be determined by dividing (i) the volume of the Claimant's total raw Grade A milk produced and pooled on a Federal Milk Marketing Order during the period Jan.y 1, 2002 to April 30, 2007, by (ii) the total volume of raw Grade A milk produced and pooled on Federal Milk Marketing Orders during the period Jan. 1, 2002 to April 30, 2007 by all members of the Settlement Class. To determine the volume of each Claimant's total raw Grade A milk produced and pooled on a Federal Milk Marketing Order during the period Jan. 1, 2002 to April 30, 2007, the Claims Administrator will apply the following procedures: (a) if a Claimant accepted the preprinted volume on the Claim Form, that volume will be used; (b) if a Claimant rejected the preprinted volume on the Claim Form and supplied documentation that substantiates an alternate volume that was provided by the Claimant, that alternate volume will be used; (c) if a Claimant produced and pooled raw Grade A milk on Federal Milk Marketing Order other than Federal Milk Marketing Order 30 during the Class Period, and rejected the pre-printed volume on the Claim Form but failed to supply documentation substantiating an alternate volume, the pre-printed volume on the Claim Form will be used; (d) if a Claimant produced and pooled raw Grade A milk on Federal Milk Marketing Order 30 during the Class Period, rejected the pre-printed volume on the Claim Form and provided an alternate volume that is not greater than twice the value of the preprinted volume, the alternate volume will be used; (e) if a Claimant produced and pooled raw Grade A milk on Federal Milk Marketing Order 30 during the Class Period, rejected the pre-printed volume on the Claim Form and provided an alternate volume that is more than twice the value of the pre-printed volume but failed to supply documentation substantiating that alternate volume, the Claims Administrator will contact the Claimant in order to obtain substantiating documentation, and if the Claimant fails to provide such documentation, a volume equal to twice the pre-printed volume will be used. Judge Ishii granted as modified by the Order the Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees, Reimbursement of Litigation Expenses, and Service Awards for the Named Plaintiffs and Former Plaintiffs. The Class Counsel is awarded 33.3% of the total Settlement Fund, which amount equals $13,333,333, plus any interest that has already accrued or will accrue. The Class Counsel is also awarded litigation expenses in the amount of $823,904.04, to be paid from the Settlement Fund. The awards of attorney fees and expenses will be allocated among the Class Counsel by Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC in a manner that, in the firm's good-faith judgment, reflects the Class Counsel's contributions of time and money to the institution, prosecution and resolution of the litigation. The Class Counsel and their designees are authorized to expend funds from the Escrow Account to pay Taxes, Tax Expenses and notice and administration costs, as set forth in the Settlement Agreement. The Class Counsel and their designees are specifically authorized to expend a total of $418,000 from the Escrow Account to compensate the Claims Administrator for notice and claims administration costs, of which $118,000 remains outstanding due to the initial $300,000 payment made at the end of 2018. The Court retains continuing jurisdiction over any issues regarding the formation or administration of the Escrow Account. Each of the four current named Plaintiffs, Paul Rozwadowski, Gerald Carlin, John Rahm, and Diana Wolfe, is awarded a service award in the amount of $45,000, in addition to any distributions as part of the Settlement Fund to which they may be entitled, to compensate them for their time and efforts in leading the case for the benefit of all Settlement Class Members. Each of the four former named Plaintiffs, James Rehberg, Ron Hayek, Michael Schugg, and Tim Rawlings, is awarded a service award in the amount of $5,000, in addition to any distributions as part of the Settlement Fund to which they may be entitled, to compensate them for their time and efforts in assisting the case for the benefit of all Settlement Class Members. The case is dismissed as to DairyAmerica and California Dairies with prejudice and without costs to any party. Furthermore, finding no just reason for delay, the Judge entered a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as to all claims asserted in the case against DairyAmerica and California Dairies. A full-text copy of the Court's May 8, 2019 Order is available at https://is.gd/F1gpjw from Leagle.com. Gerald Carlin, individually and on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, John Rahm, individually and on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated & Paul Rozwadowski, individually and on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by A. Chowning Poppler -- apoppler@bermantabacco.com -- Berman Tabacco, Anthony David Phillips -- aphillips@bermandevalerio.com -- Berman DeValerio, Benjamin Doyle Brown -- bbrown@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Brent W. Johnson, Cohen Milstein Hausfeld and Toll PLLC, pro hac vice, Cari C. Laufenberg -- claufenberg@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback L.L.P., pro hac vice, Christopher Heffelfinger -- cheffelfinger@bermantabacco.com -- Berman Tabacco, George F. Farah, Cohen Milstein Hausfeld and Toll PLLC, pro hac vice, Juli E. Farris -- jfarris@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback LLP, Justin N. Saif -- jsaif@bermandevalerio.com -- Berman DeValerio, pro hac vice, Leslie M. Kroeger, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, pro hac vice & Ryan McDevitt -- rmcdevitt@kellerrohrback.com, -- Keller Rohrback L.L.P., pro hac vice. Diana Wolfe, Plaintiff, represented by A. Chowning Poppler, Berman Tabacco, Anthony David Phillips, Berman DeValerio, Benjamin Doyle Brown, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Brent W. Johnson, Cohen Milstein Hausfeld and Toll PLLC, pro hac vice, Cari C. Laufenberg, Keller Rohrback L.L.P., pro hac vice, Christopher Heffelfinger, Berman Tabacco, George F. Farah, Cohen Milstein Hausfeld and Toll PLLC, pro hac vice, Juli E. Farris, Keller Rohrback LLP, Justin N. Saif, Berman DeValerio, pro hac vice & Ryan McDevitt, Keller Rohrback L.L.P., pro hac vice. DairyAmerica, Inc., Defendant, represented by Charles M. English, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, pro hac vice, E. John Steren -- esteren@ebglaw.com -- Ober Kaler, pro hac vice, Joseph Michael Marchini -- jmm@bmj-law.com -- Baker, Manock & Jensen, Wendy M. Yoviene -- wyoviene@bakerdonelson -- Ober Kaler, pro hac vice, Allison Ann Davis -- allisondavis@dwt.com -- Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, Joy G. Kim -- joykim@dwt.com -- Davis Wright Tremaine LLP & Sanjay Mohan Nangia -- sanjaynangia@dwt.com -- Davis Wright Tremaine LLP. California Dairies, Inc., Defendant, represented by by Lawrence Michael Cirelli -- lcirelli@hansonbridgett.com -- Hanson Bridgett, Shannon Marie Nessier, Hanson Bridgett LLP & Megan Oliver Thompson, Hanson Bridgett LLP. Bimemiller Candice, Non-Party Candice Bimemiller, Unknown, represented by Edward Zusman, Markun Zusman Freniere & Compton LLP. James Rehberg & Ronald Hayek, ThirdParty Plaintiffs, represented by J. Barton Goplerud, Hudson Law Firm, pro hac vice & Jon A. Tostrud, Tostrud Law Group, P.C. Michael K. Schugg, ThirdParty Plaintiff, represented by J. Barton Goplerud, Hudson Law Firm, pro hac vice & Juli E. Farris, Keller Rohrback LLP. Timothy L. Rawlings, ThirdParty Plaintiff, represented by J. Barton Goplerud, Hudson Law Firm, pro hac vice, Juli E. Farris, Keller Rohrback LLP, Mark A. Griffin, Keller Rohrback LLP, pro hac vice & Raymond J. Farrow, Keller Rohrback LLP, pro hac vice. Land O' Lakes, Inc., Amicus, represented by Gregory M. Schweizer -- gschweizer@eimerstahl.com -- Eimer Stahl LLP, pro hac vice, Scott C. Solberg --ssolberg@eimerstahl.com -- Eimer Stahl LLP, pro hac vice & Seth D. Hilton -- sethhilton@stoel.com -- Stoel Rives LLP. California Farmers Union & California Dairy Campaign, Amicuss, represented by Daniel Bennett Harris. Lani Ellingsworth, Movant, represented by Darin M. Dalmat -- dmdalmat@jamhoff.com -- James & Hoffman, P.C. & Glenn Rothner, Rothner, Segall & Greenstone. DCD CONSTRUCTION: Brown Seeks OT Pay for Construction Laborers -------------------------------------------------------------- An employment-related class action complaint has been filed against DCD Construction, LLC, Dennis Portaev, Aleksei Karpov, and Evgeny Makarin for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the New York Labor Law (NYLL). The case is captioned KURELL BROWN, on behalf of himself and similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, -against- DCD CONSTRUCTION, LLC., DENIS PORTAEV, ALEKSEI KARPOV, and EVGENY MAKARIN, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-04892 (S.D.N.Y., May 24, 2019). Plaintiff Kurell Brown alleges that the Defendants operated their businesses with a policy of not paying Plaintiff and similarly situated individuals' wages for the hours worked over 40 hours in a week at the overtime wage rate. Brown also claims that the Defendants willfully disregarded and purposefully evaded recordkeeping requirements of the FLSA and the NYLL by failing to maintain accurate and complete timesheets and payroll records. Accordingly, Brown seeks to recover from the Defendants: (1) unpaid wages; (2) unpaid wages at the overtime wage rate; (3) statutory penalties; (4) liquidated damages; (5) prejudgment and post-judgment interest; and (6) attorneys' fees and costs. DCD Construction, LLC is a domestic business corporation, organized and existing under the laws of the state of Delaware, with a place of business located at 240 Riverside Blvd, New York, New York. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: James F. Sullivan, Esq. Lawrence Spasojevich, Esq. LAW OFFICES OF JAMES F. SULLIVAN, P.C. 52 Duane Street, 7th Floor New York, NY 10007 Telephone: (212) 374-0009 Facsimile: (212) 374-9931 DENSO CORP: Sued for Valve Timing Control Device Price-fixing ------------------------------------------------------------- All European Auto Supply, Inc., individually and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated v. Denso Corporation, Denso International America, Inc., Denso Korea Corporation, and Denso Automotive Deutschland GmbH, Case No. 2:19-cv-10980 (E.D. Mich., April 03, 2019), is brought against the Defendants for violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. According to the complaint, the Defendants' unlawful and anticompetitive conduct of being a part of a conspiracy to rig bids, fix, raise, maintain, and stabilize prices of Valve Timing Control Devices that resulted to artificially inflated price to direct purchasers such as the Plaintiff, violates the Sherman Act. The Plaintiff is a Michigan corporation with its principal place of business in Royal Oak, Michigan. The Plaintiff purchased Valve Timing Control Devices directly from one or more of the Defendants. The Defendants manufactured, marketed, and sold Valve Timing Control Devices that were purchased throughout the United States. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: David H. Fink, Esq. Darryl Bressack, Esq. Nathan J. Fink, Esq. FINK BRESSACK 38500 Woodward Ave; Suite 350 Bloomfield Hills, MI 48304 Tel: (248) 971-2500 ENGLAND TRADING: Olsen Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York ------------------------------------------------------ A class action lawsuit has been filed against England Trading Company, LLC. The case is styled as Thomas J. Olsen, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. England Trading Company, LLC doing business as: Industry West, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-03376 (E.D. N.Y., June 6, 2019). The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities Act. England Trading Company, LLC (trade name Industry West) is in the Factory Furniture and Fixtures business.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Christopher Howard Lowe, Esq. Lipsky Lowe LLP 630 Third Avenue New York, NY 10017-6705 Phone: (212) 392-4772 Fax: (212) 444-1030 Email: chris@lipskylowe.com EQUINOX COLLECTION: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Hargis FDCPA Suit ----------------------------------------------------------------- The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma issued an Opinion and Order denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned MICHAEL HARGIS, Plaintiff, v. EQUINOX COLLECTION SERVICES, INC., Defendant. Case No. 17-cv-410-JED-FHM. (N.D. Okla.). Plaintiff Michael Hargis has brought this putative class action against Equinox Collection Services, Inc. (Equinox), a debt collector, alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). Plaintiff alleges that Equinox, in attempting to collect on a disputed medical bill on behalf of its client, Dr. ZZZ's Sleep Center, Inc. (Dr. ZZZ's), sent Plaintiff a collection letter that violated certain provisions under 15 U.S.C. Section 1692g(a). Equinox asserts that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the injuryin-fact demands of Article III standing. In his complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that Equinox violated Section 1692g(a)(2), (3), and (5). First, the Plaintiff alleges that Equinox failed to properly identify the name of the creditor to whom the debt was owed. He points to language in the collection letter identifying D. ZZZ's as the original creditor and asserts that the least sophisticated consumer would reasonably believe that the medical debt had been sold or assigned to a subsequent creditor when, in fact, it had not. The alleged Section 1692g(a)(3) violation stems from a statement in the letter that Equinox will assume this debt to be valid unless Equinox is notified in writing within thirty days that the consumer disputes the debt. The Plaintiff asserts that this statement violates Section 1692g(a)(3) by requiring consumers to notify Equinox of a debt dispute in writing. Lastly, the Plaintiff asserts that the collection letter violates Section 1692g(a)(5) by not requiring requests for the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor, to be made in writing. In its 12(b)(1) motion, Equinox challenges the concreteness of the Plaintiff's alleged harm. In regard to the alleged violation of Section 1692g(a)(2), Equinox argues that the Plaintiff suffered no concrete injury because his deposition testimony demonstrates that he correctly understood that Dr. ZZZ's was the current creditor. As to the alleged violation of Section 1692g(a)(3), Equinox insists the Plaintiff has no standing because Equinox accepted Plaintiff's multiple verbal disputes of the debt despite the collection letter's language requiring that such disputes be made in writing. Equinox further argues that the Plaintiff lacks standing because he suffered no emotional or economic damages. In passing the FDCPA, Congress found that there was abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors and that such practices contributed to the number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy. Thus, the purpose of the FDCPA was to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses. Assuming, arguendo, that Equinox's identification of Dr. ZZZ's as the Original Creditor constitutes a violation of Section 1692g(a)(2), the failure to clearly identify the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed poses a real risk of harm. Specifically, a recipient might find himself confused and obliged to guess who currently owned the debt in question. Although Equinox points to evidence that Plaintiff did not himself experience confusion over the identity of the current creditor, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff need not prove that the alleged violation of Section 1692g(a)(2) caused him confusion in order to have standing. Instead, a violation of this particular procedural right is sufficient in and of itself to constitute concrete injury in fact because Congress conferred the procedural right to protect a plaintiff's concrete interests and the procedural violation presents a material risk of real harm to that concrete interest. In regard to Section 1692g(a)(3), the Plaintiff alleges that Equinox added an in-writing requirement for debt disputes when a number of courts have held that Section 1692g(a)(3) does not impose such a requirement. Assuming, arguendo, that Equinox's collection letter violated Section 1692g(a)(3), the Court finds that such a violation presents a material risk of harm to the concrete interests Congress intended to protect. As noted by the Second Circuit in Hooks v. Forman, Holt, Eliades & Ravin, LLC, the right to dispute a debt is the most fundamental of those set forth in Section 1692g(a). Once a debt has been disputed, a debt collector cannot communicate the debtor consumer's credit information to others without disclosing the dispute. A dispute also triggers Section 1692h, which precludes debt collectors from applying any single payment by the consumer to a disputed debt if the consumer owes multiple debts. A dispute made in writing triggers the additional protection of requiring the debt collector to cease collection of the debt until it complies with certain conditions relating to the verification of the debt. Thus, a failure to provide accurate information concerning how to dispute a debt entails a significant risk that consumers will forego disputing a debt altogether and lose important consumer protections even if the debt collector, in practice, handles disputes differently and more generously than is suggested by the collection letter itself. Lastly, the alleged violation of Section 1692g(a)(5) is that Equinox failed to include the in-writing requirement for consumers seeking to validate the name and address of the original creditor. Thus, the Court finds that Equinox's alleged failure to properly disclose information concerning requests for the identity of the original creditor entailed sufficient risk to satisfy the concreteness prong of the injury-in-fact requirement without Plaintiff needing to allege or prove additional harm. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has standing under Article III to bring his claims under the FDCPA. Accordingly, Defendant Equinox's Motion to Dismiss is denied. A full-text copy of the District Court's June 3, 2019 Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y2vhg4w3 from Leagle.com. Michael Hargis, an individual, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Robert William Murphy, 1212 SE 2nd Ave, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33316 & Victor R. Wandres, Paramount Law, 4835 S. Peoria Ave. Tulsa, OK, 74105 Equinox Collection Services, Inc., an Oklahoma corporation, Defendant, represented by Dennis J. Barton, III, Barton Law Group LLC, 17600 Chesterfield Airport Rd, Ste 201, Chesterfield, MO 63005-1246 & Kurt Geoffrey Arras, 9 E. 4th St., 9th Floor, Tulsa, OK 7410 FIOS INC: DiCarlo Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Website ------------------------------------------------------ DAVID DICARLO, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. FIOS, INC., Defendant, Case No. 155652/2019 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. New York Cty., June 6, 2019) seeks to put an end to systemic civil rights violations committed by Defendant FIOS, INC against the blind in New York State. The Defendant is denying blind individuals throughout New York State equal access to the goods and services that FIOS, INC. provides to their non-disabled customers through https://fios.verizon.com (hereafter the "Website"). The Website provides to the public a wide array of the goods, services, testimonials, and other programs offered by FIOS, INC. Yet, the Website contains numerous access barriers that make it difficult if not impossible for blind customers to use the website to its full capacity, says the complaint. Plaintiff DICARLO is legally blind individual. Defendant operates a commercial website that offers products and services that are available by FIOS, INC.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: C.K. Lee, Esq. LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC 148 West 24th Street, 8th Floor New York, NY 10011 Phone: 212-465-1180 Fax: 212-465-1181 FIRST AMERICAN FINANCIAL: Resendiz Files Class Suit in C.D. Calif. ------------------------------------------------------------------ A class action lawsuit has been filed against First American Financial Corporation. The case is styled as Jesus Resendiz individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. First American Financial Corporation, First American Title Insurance Company, Defendants, Case No. 8:19-cv-01137-JVS-JDE (C.D. Cal., June 7, 2019). The nature of suit is stated as Other Contract. First American Financial Corporation is a United States financial services company and is a leading provider of title insurance and settlement services to the real estate and mortgage industries.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Jason M Frank, Esq. Frank Sims and Stolper LLP 19800 MacArthur Boulevard Suite 855 Irvine, CA 92612 Phone: (949) 201-2400 Fax: (949) 201-2405 Email: jfrank@lawfss.com FIRST CLASS: Fails to Pay OT & Minimum Wages, Verma et al. Say -------------------------------------------------------------- A case, DENNIS VERMA, LUIS GONZALEZ, CHRISTOPHER GOODRIDGE and WILLIAM MALDONADO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. FIRST CLASS VALET INC. and STEPHEN VAN EYCK, individually and in his official capacity, the Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-03251 (E.D.N.Y., May 31, 2019), seeks to recover unpaid overtime pay, unpaid minimum wage, unpaid minimum wage, unpaid spread-of-hours wages, unpaid uniform reimbursement, and unpaid uniform maintenance pay in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York. The Plaintiffs' claims under the FLSA are brought as a collective action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. section 216(b), on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all other similarly situated persons who were/are employed by Defendants as valet attendants and/or other similar positions who were/are not paid overtime at a rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek for the period of three years prior to the date of the filing of the complaint to the date of the final disposition of the action, the lawsuit says. The Members of the FLSA Collective are similarly situated because they were all subject to Defendants' common policy and/or practice that resulted in not paying overtime at a rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek during the FLSA Collective Period. First Class Valet specializes in serving residential, commercial and business parking needs.[BN] Attorneys for the Plaintiffs: Laura R. Reznick, Esq. BELL LAW GROUP, PLLC 100 Quentin Roosevelt Boulevard, Suite 208 Garden City, NY 11530 Telephone: 516 280-3008 Facsimile: 212 656-1845 E-mail: lr@belllg.com FISHER-PRICE INC: Barton Sues over Sale of Rock 'n Play Sleeper --------------------------------------------------------------- EMILY BARTON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. FISHER-PRICE, INC.; and MATTEL, INC., the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00670-GWC (W.D.N.Y., May 22, 2019), alleges that the Fisher-Price Rock 'n Play Sleeper is inherently unsafe as a sleeper and unfit for its intended use. Its use poses a number of serious safety risks that have led to many documented instances of infant deaths and injuries. The Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, as permitted by equity, including directing Defendants to identify, with Court supervision, the victims of their misconduct and pay them restitution and disgorgement of all monies acquired by Defendants by means of any act or practice declared by the Court to be unlawful, and ordering Defendants to engage in a corrective advertising campaign of Rock 'n Play Sleeper to place victims of their misconduct on notice of the availability of a full refund. The Rock 'n Play Sleeper is an inclined infant "sleeper" that Defendants, until April 12, 2019, marketed as suitable for all night or prolonged sleep. According to the complaint, the Defendants' marketing of this product as appropriate for prolonged sleep was intentional and overt. Not only is "Sleeper" in the name of the product, but the boxes in which the Rock 'n Play Sleepers were sold, and other materials used to promote them, prominently exclaim, "Baby can sleep at a comfortable incline all night long!" and make similar statements about its fitness for prolonged and nighttime sleep. This marketing was dangerously false and misleading, as the product is not safe for all-night or prolonged sleep for infants. By positioning an infant at a 30-degree incline, the Rock 'n Play Sleeper significantly increases the risk that the infant's head will slip into a dangerous position, tilt to constrict the windpipe and/or cause the infant's face to become pressed against the padded fabric in the sleeper and block airflow, which the infant may be unable to correct. This increases the risk of death by asphyxiation. In addition, because Defendants advise parents to keep babies strapped in restraints overnight while sleeping on an incline, the Rock 'n Play Sleeper increases the infant's risk of developing flat head (plagiocephaly) and twisted neck (torticollis) syndromes, conditions that often require babies to wear expensive head-molding helmets and undergo physical therapy. Despite knowing that the Rock 'n Play Sleeper is unsafe for overnight or prolonged sleep for infants, Defendants marketed and sold the product as a sleeper, leading parents to reasonably believe that the product is safe for its stated purpose. The words "sleeper" and "sleep" appear no fewer than five times on the package, which depicts pictures of a mom blissfully sleeping or about to fall asleep with the baby in the Rock 'n Play Sleeper. The Rock 'n Play Sleeper is extremely popular with parents because it rocks the baby, and various models have other soothing features such as lullabies and vibrations. Because of these characteristics, the Rock 'n Play Sleeper is one of the best-selling "sleepers". Had parents been aware of the potentially fatal dangers posed by the Rock 'n Play Sleeper, or the serious risks of injury such as flat head and twisted neck syndrome, they would not have purchased and/or used the product. Defendants' false and misleading marketing of this dangerous product, and knowing failure to disclose the grave risks of its use as a sleeper for overnight or prolonged sleep, allowed Defendants to reap vast profits at the expense of consumers who erroneously believed they were obtaining a safe place for their babies to sleep. Mattel, until April 12, 2019, directly and/or through Fisher-Price, designed, marketed, distributed and sold Rock 'n Play Sleepers throughout the United States, including in Oklahoma. Mattel shares overall responsibility for the safety of Fisher-Price products, including the Rock 'n Play Sleeper. All recall and safety alerts for both Fisher-Price and Mattel products, as well as customer service for both Fisher-Price and Mattel products, are found on the Mattel website. As initially reported in a November 26, 2018 Wall Street Journal article entitled "Infant Deaths Prompt Questions Over Safety of Inclined Sleepers," at least 30 infant deaths and more than 700 injuries associated with these inclined sleepers -- including, predominantly, the Rock 'n Play Sleeper -- have been reported to the Consumer Product Safety Commission since 2005.[BN] Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Proposed Class: Terrence M. Connors, Esq. Caitlin M. Higgins, Esq. Katherine G. Howard, Esq. CONNORS LLP 1000 Liberty Building Buffalo, NY 14202 Telephone: (716) 852-5533 E-mail: tmc@connorsllp.com cmh@connorsllp.com kgh@connorsllp.com - and - Demet Basar, Esq Daniel Tepper, Esq. Kate McGuire, Esq. WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER FREEMAN & HERZ LLP 270 Madison Avenue New York, New York 10016 Telephone: (212) 545-4600 Facsimile: (212) 545-4653 E-mail: basar@whafh.com tepper@whafh.com mcguire@whafh.com FLORIDA: DOC Secretary Appeals Ruling in Hoffer Suit to 11th Cir. ----------------------------------------------------------------- The Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections filed an appeal from a Court ruling in the lawsuit entitled Carl Hoffer, et al. v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Case No. 4:17-cv-00214-MW-CAS, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida. The appellate case is styled Carl Hoffer, et al. v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Case No. 19-11921, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, interested party Sidney Marts filed an appeal from a court ruling in the lawsuit. That appellate case is captioned as Carl Hoffer v. Sidney Marts, et al., Case No. 18-12571. Sidney Marts is an inmate at the Taylor Work Camp, in Perry, Florida. The lawsuit arises from alleged prison condition.[BN] Plaintiffs-Appellees CARL HOFFER, Individually and on behalf of a class of persons similarly situated; RONALD MCPHERSON, Individually and on behalf of a class of persons similarly situated; and ROLAND MOLINA, Individually and on behalf of a class of persons similarly situated, are represented by: Erica A. Selig, Esq. Raymond J. Taseff, Esq. Dante Pasquale Trevisani, Esq. FLORIDA JUSTICE INSTITUTE 3750 Miami Tower 100 SE 2nd St. Miami, FL 33131 Telephone: (305) 342-6918 E-mail: eselig@floridajusticeinstitute.org rtaseff@floridajusticeinstitute.org dtrevisani@floridajusticeinstitute.org Defendant-Appellant SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, is represented by: Albert J. Bowden, III, Esq. Karen Ann Brodeen, Esq. Ashley Moody, Esq. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE PL-01 The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399 Telephone: (850) 414-3300 E-mail: al.bowden@myfloridalegal.com karen.brodeen@myfloridalegal.com ashley.moody@myfloridalegal.com G4S SECURE: Snell Files FCRA Suit in E.D. California ---------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against G4S Secure Solutions (USA) Inc. The case is styled as James Snell an individual, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. G4S Secure Solutions (USA) Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00802-LJO-SAB (E.D. Cal., June 6, 2019). The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. G4S Secure Solutions (USA) is a United States/British-based security services company, and a subsidiary of G4S plc.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Eric Bryce Kingsley, Esq. Kelsey Szamet, Esq. Kingsley & Kingsley APC 16133 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 1200 Encino, CA 91436 Phone: (818) 990-3800 Fax: (818) 990-2903 Email: eric@kingsleykingsley.com kelsey@kingsleykingsley.com - and - Walter L. Haines, Esq. United Employees Law Group, PC 5500 Bolsa Ave., Suite 201 Huntington Beach, CA 92649 Phone: (562) 256-1047 Fax: (562) 256-1006 Email: whaines@uelglaw.com GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE: Russell Suit Removed to S.D. Florida ------------------------------------------------------------- The class action styled as Randy Rosenberg, D.C., P.A. a/a/o Danielle Russell, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. GEICO General Insurance Company, Defendant, was removed to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida on June 6, 2019, and assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-22335-XXXX. The nature of suit is stated as Insurance. GEICO General Insurance Company, Inc. provides personal automobile insurance products.[BN] The Defendant is represented by: Peter David Weinstein, Esq. Cole Scott Kissane PA 600 N Pine Island Road, Suite 500 Plantation, FL 33324 Phone: (954) 343-3929 Fax: (954) 474-7979 Email: peter.weinstein@csklegal.com GENERATIONS HEALTHCARE: Court Dismisses D. Smith FLSA Suit ---------------------------------------------------------- The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, issued an Opinion and Order granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Prosecution in the case captioned DEANGELA SMITH, Plaintiff, v. GENERATIONS HEALTHCARE SERVICES, LLC., et al. Defendants. Case No. 2:16-CV-0807. (S.D. Ohio). Plaintiff Smith filed this suit as a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and a class action for violation of several similar state provisions. The Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiffs Jessica Climer and Charles Hollins from this suit. This Court may dismiss plaintiffs for failure to prosecute their claims, failure to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or failure to comply with a court order. But dismissal of a claim for failure to prosecute is a harsh sanction which the court should order only in extreme situations showing a clear record of contumacious conduct by the plaintiff. Whether to dismiss a claim is informed by four factors: (1) whether the party's failure is due to willfulness, bad faith, or fault (2) whether the adversary was prejudiced by the dismissed party's conduct (3) whether the dismissed party was warned that failure to cooperate could lead to dismissal and (4) whether less drastic sanctions were imposed or considered before dismissal was ordered. Whether the party was given notice is a key consideration. This Court previously denied the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss because it was not clear that Ms. Climer and Mr. Hollins had adequate notice of the importance of participating in discovery and the possible consequences if they did not. The Court is now satisfied, on Mr. Cash's declaration, that Ms. Climer and Mr. Hollins had more than adequate notice of the need to participate in discovery and the possibility that their claims could ultimately be dismissed. Mr. Cash made numerous attempts to contact Ms. Climer and Mr. Hollins, and Defense counsel has been willing to accommodate them for scheduling depositions. The other factors also support dismissing Ms. Climer and Mr. Hollins. Climer's and Hollins's failure is due, at least, to fault for failing to maintain contact with their attorney so that they could stay informed regarding their case. Additionally, Ms. Climer and Mr. Hollins were warned by counsel several times that their claims could be dismissed. This Court has already considered less drastic sanctions by denying the Defendants' previous Motion to Dismiss. Given the unresponsiveness of Ms. Climer and Mr. Hollins, dismissal, rather than some other sanction, is the appropriate remedy. This record is sufficient to find that the opt-in plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute. A full-text copy of the District Court's June 3, 2019 Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yxep87jw from Leagle.com. DeAngela Smith, Plaintiff, represented by William Franklin Cash, III, Levin Papantonio Thomas Mitchell et al., 316 South Baylen StreetPensacola, FL 32502 & Jacob R. Rusch, 444 Cedar St., Suite 1800, St. Paul, MN 55101, pro hac vice. Generations Healthcare Services LLC & Generations Too, LLC., Defendants, represented by Renny Joe Tyson, Renny J. Tyson Co., LPA, 1465 East Broad Street, Columbus, Ohio 43205 GEORGIA DIAGNOSTIC: Settlement in Gumm Suit Gets Final Approval --------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, TIMOTHY GUMM, ROBERT WATKINS, Plaintiffs, v. BENJAMIN FORD et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 5:15-CV-41 (MTT) (M.D. Ga.), Judge Marc T. Treadwell of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, Macon Division, granted final approval of the settlement. Plaintiff Gumm brought the action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 challenging conditions and practices at the Special Management Unit ("SMU") at Georgia Diagnostic & Classification Prison ("GDCP"). The Court appointed attorney Sarah Geraghty of the Southern Center for Human Rights to represent Plaintiff Gumm. After the parties engaged in several months of discovery, Plaintiff Gumm filed an amended complaint in March 2017, asserting claims for declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of a putative class of all prisoners who are or will be held in the SMU. The class claims were brought under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. The complaint alleged that confinement in the SMU created a substantial risk of serious harm to prisoners and that prisoners were held in the SMU for years without meaningful procedural safeguards. It sought classwide injunctive relief to remedy unconstitutional review procedures and conditions of confinement in the SMU. In May 2018, Gumm filed a further amended complaint, naming SMU prisoners Robert Watkins and Johnny Mack Brown as additional Plaintiffs and class representatives. Plaintiff Watkins is presently assigned to the SMU. Plaintiff Brown was subsequently transferred to the GDCP STEP Unit and has been voluntarily dismissed from the action. The parties engaged in a lengthy discovery process, as well as settlement discussions over the course of approximately 18 months. The negotiations were conducted at arm's length by parties and attorneys familiar with the evidence. In December 2018, the parties reached an agreement to certify a settlement class and settle the injunctive and declaratory relief claims raised in the case. The agreement provides SMU prisoners four hours per day of out-of-cell time, improved conditions, guidelines for prisoners with mental illness, more robust procedural safeguards, and limits on who may be assigned to the SMU and the duration that they may be held there. In weighing final approval of a class settlement, Judge Treadwell holds that the Court's role is to determine whether the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, adequate and reasonable and not the product of collusion between the parties. All but one of these factors -- opposition to the settlement -- were addressed in the Court's preliminary approval order. However, he expand on the Court's previous discussion of six issues relevant to the propriety of approval: (1) the Settlement Agreement's compliance with the requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act; (2) the adequacy of notice to class members; (3) the objections and comments submitted by class members; (4) the views of class counsel; (5) the proposed attorneys' fee award, see Rule 23(e)(2)(C)(iii), and agreements required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3), see Rule 23(e)(2)(C)(iv); and finally, (6) the views of the Court. He also concludes that the settlement class preliminarily certified should be finally certified for settlement purposes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), for the reasons set forth in the Court's preliminary approval order. The class is defined as all persons who are or in the future will be assigned to the facility currently known as the Special Management Unit at Georgia Diagnostic & Classification Prison, or who are or in the future will be assigned to the Tier III Program. For the foregoing reasons, Judge Treadwell granted final approval of the settlement and incorporateed it as an Order of the Court. The settlement class is certified, consisting of all persons who are or in the future will be assigned to the facility currently known as the Special Management Unit at Georgia Diagnostic & Classification Prison, or who are or in the future will be assigned to the Tier III Program, under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(2). The Judge overruled the objections to the proposed settlement filed by class members in response to the notice to the class. He granted the parties' request to adopt the Settlement Agreement. The Settlement Agreement will expire, in accordance with its terms, three years from the date of entry of the Order. The Defendants in their official capacities, their officers, agents, servants, and employees, and those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the injunction by personal service or otherwise, are each enjoined from failing to comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. In order to provide class members with notice of the final disposition of the lawsuit, Judge further ordered that, within 14 days from the date of the Order, the Defendants will cause to be provided to the class members notice of the final disposition of the lawsuit by delivering to each class member the Order and Permanent Injunction and the Court's Judgment. A full-text copy of the Court's May 7, 2019 Final Order and Permanent Injunction is available at https://is.gd/MoAt8p from Leagle.com. TIMOTHY DENVER GUMM, Plaintiff, represented by CHRIS WILLIAM HAAF, RYAN PRIMERANO, SARAH ELISABETH GERAGHTY -- sgeraghty@schr.org -- AARON MICHAEL LITTMAN, C. ALLEN GARRETT, Jr. -- agarrett@kilpatricktownsend.com -- JAMES F. BOGAN, III & TAMARA SERWER CALDAS. ROBERT JORDAN WATKINS, Plaintiff, represented by AARON MICHAEL LITTMAN & RYAN PRIMERANO. RICK JACOBS, Field Operations Manager, GDCP, Warden BRUCE CHAPMAN, GDCP, RODNEY MCCLOUD, Superintendent, GDCP, WILLIAM POWELL, Deputy Warden of Security, GDCP, JUNE BISHOP, RUFUS LOGAN, MARGARET WASHINGTON, TIMOTHY WARD, RICKY MYRICK, STEVE UPTON, RANDY TILLMAN, ERIC SELLERS & MICHAEL CANNON, Defendants, represented by ELIZABETH McRARY CROWDER, LAURA LOUISE LONES, SUSAN ELIZABETH TEASTER, JOHN Clay DEMOULPIED -- jdemoulpied@carlockcopeland.com -- Carlock Copeland & Stair, LLP & ROBERT B. SHAPIRO -- rshapiro@carltonfields.com. DWAIN WILLIAMS, GEORGE BALL & THOMAS SUMPTER, Defendants, represented by ELIZABETH McRARY CROWDER, SUSAN ELIZABETH TEASTER & ROBERT B. SHAPIRO. HJALMAR RODRIGUEZ, JR, Movant, pro se. JEFFREY BOURASSA, Movant, pro se. PABLO F MALDONADO, Movant, pro se. GNP MANAGEMENT: Brown Sues Over Unreasonable Fees ------------------------------------------------- SUE BROWN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. GNP MANAGEMENT GROUP, an Illinois Limited Liability Company, Defendant, Case No. 2019CH06868 (Circuit Ct. Cook Cty., Ill., June 6, 2019) seeks to recover the unreasonable fees paid which GNP Management unlawfully charged Plaintiff and other similarly situated sellers in violation of the Illinois Condominium Property Act (the "Condo Act" or "Act"). Condominium sellers are statutorily required to obtain disclosure documents from their Condo Association Board of Managers or its managing agent, which, in this case is GNP Management, by paying them a reasonable fee for the actual costs of providing the documents. Condo sellers must then provide the documents to the prospective buyer. Condo sellers are thus beholden to property management companies who have complete control over disclosure documents by virtue of their management contracts or agreements with Condo Associations. GNP Management allegedly uses its position of entrustment with disclosure documents as leverage to abuse condo sellers who are often involved in time-sensitive real estate transactions and have no other reasonable option but to pay whatever fee GNP Management chooses to charge, or risk their own potential liability under the Condo Act by not providing the documents to prospective buyers at all, or providing deficient disclosure documents, notes the complaint. By virtue of their management contracts or agreements Association, GNP Management exercises dominion and control over the Association's disclosure documents and does not disclose their "actual cost" of providing the documents to condo sellers, the complaint asserts. Thus, on information and belief, GNP Management is only able to provide disclosure documents to condo sellers precisely because it is an Agent of the Association. For the most part, GNP Management can provide disclosure documents immediately to the unit seller because they are stored in an electronic database managed and controlled by GNP Management. GNP Management sets pre-determined fees for "each" 22.1 disclosure item, regardless of the length of the document or method of delivery. GNP Management does not state the basis for how it determined the amount charged for these documents. GNP Management's predatory practice of price gouging captive condo sellers with unreasonable fees to obtain access to disclosure documents they are required by statute to provide prospective buyers to close on the sale of their unit or risk legal liability for noncompliance with their duty under the statute, gives rise to Plaintiff and the Class' claims, says the complaint. Plaintiff Brown was the owner of a condominium unit in the Shoemaker Lofts for several years until March 3, 2017. GNP Management is the property management agent for the Shoemaker Lofts Condominium Association ("Shoemaker Lofts" or "the Association").[BN] The Plaintiffs are represented by: Terrie C. Sullivan, Esq. Jeffrey C. Blumenthal, Esq. Michael D. Richman, Esq. JEFFREY C. BLUMENTHAL CHARTERED 2970 Maria Avenue, Suite #223 Northbrook, IL 60062 Phone: (847) 498-3220 Fax: (847) 498-3221 Email: Terrie@jcblawyer.com Jeffreyl@.jcblawyer.com kfelbinger@gmail.com - and - Charles R. Franklin, Esq. Allie K. Haling, Esq. FRANKLIN LAW GROUP 181 Waukegan Rd., Suite 205 Northfield, IL 60093-2700 Phone: (847) 716-2380 Fax: (847) 716-2390 Email: cfranklin@charlesfranklinlaw.com ahaling@charlesfranklinlaw.com GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES: Rosenberg Files Suit in S.D. Florida ---------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Government Employees Insurance Company et al. The case is styled as Randy Rosenberg, Randy, D.C., P.A. a/a/o Dorothy Johnson and Tina Scott, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Government Employees Insurance Company, GEICO Indemnity Company, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-22332-XXXX (S.D. Fla., June 6, 2019). The nature of suit is stated as Insurance. The Government Employees Insurance Company is an American auto insurance company with headquarters in Chevy Chase, Maryland. It is the second largest auto insurer in the United States, after State Farm.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Peter David Weinstein, Esq. Cole Scott Kissane PA 600 N Pine Island Road, Suite 500 Plantation, FL 33324 Phone: (954) 343-3929 Fax: (954) 474-7979 Email: peter.weinstein@csklegal.com HECLA MINING: Batters Sue over Securities Fraud ----------------------------------------------- A securities fraud action complaint has been filed against Hecla Mining Company and its executives for violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The case is captioned JEFFREY H. BATTER and CHERYL BATTER, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, vs. HECLA MINING COMPANY, PHILLIPS S. BAKER, JR., LINDSAY A. HALL, and LAWRENCE P. RADFORD, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-04883 (S.D.N.Y., May 24, 2019). Plaintiffs Jeffrey H. Batter and Cheryl Batter allege that the Defendants falsely and misleadingly represented that the Nevada operations would be accretive and cash flow positive, or at the very least self-funding. On May 9, 2019, Hecla shocked investors by its admission that the Nevada operations suffered from negative cash flow and other negative operating metrics and were subject to a comprehensive review. Following the disclosure, the price of Hecla's common stock declined by 23.5% over two trading days, from a closing price of $2.04 per share on May 8, 2019, to close at $1.56 per share on May 10, 2019. The stock price has not recovered and on May 23, 2019 closed at $1.38 per share. Accordingly, Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit as a class action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3) on behalf of a class of all persons and entities who purchased the publicly traded common stock of Hecla during the class period. They seek to recover damages, reasonable attorneys' fees, and any other relief as the court may deem proper. Hecla is headquartered in Coeur D'Alene, Idaho. Hecla's common stock trades on the NYSE under the symbol "HL". Founded in 1891, Hecla purports to discover, acquire, develop, and produce silver, gold, lead and zinc. [BN] The Plaintiffs are represented by: Jeffrey P. Campisi, Esq. Robert N. Kaplan, Esq. Pamela A. Mayer, Esq. KAPLAN FOX & KILSHEIMER LLP 850 Third Avenue, 14th Floor New York, NY 10022 Telephone: (212) 687-1980 Facsimile: (212) 687-7714 E-mail: jcampisi@kaplanfox.com rkaplan@kaplanfox.com pmayer@kaplanfox.com HOLLOWAY CREDIT: Muse Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania ----------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against HOLLOWAY CREDIT SOLUTIONS, LLC. The case is styled as JUANITA MUSE individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. HOLLOWAY CREDIT SOLUTIONS, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-02499-CMR (E.D. Pa., June 7, 2019). The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Holloway Credit Solutions, LLC provides debt collection and management services.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: NICHOLAS J. LINKER, ESQ. ZEMEL LAW LLC 1373 Broad St., SUITE 203-C Clifton, NJ 07013 Phone: (862) 227-3106 Email: nl@zemellawllc.com HYUNDAI MOTOR: 9th Cir. Affirms $140MM Deal in Fuel Economy Suit ----------------------------------------------------------------- The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit issued an Opinion affirming the Judgment of the District Court Nationwide Settlement Class in the case captioned IN RE HYUNDAI AND KIA FUEL ECONOMY LITIGATION, KEHLIE R. ESPINOSA; NICOLE MARIE HUNTER; JEREMY WILTON; KAYLENE P. BRADY; GUNTHER KRAUTH; ERIC GRAEWINGHOLT; REECE PHILIP THOMSON; ALEX MATURANI; NILUFAR REZAI; JACK ROTTNER; LYDIA KIEVIT; REBECCA SANDERS; BOBBY BRANDON ARMSTRONG; SERGIO TORRES; RICHARD WOODRUFF; MARSHALL LAWRENCE GORDON; JOEL A. LIPMAN; JAMES GUDGALIS; MARY P. HOESSLER; STEPHEN M. HAYES; BRIAN REEVES; SAM HAMMOND; MARK LEGGETT; EDWIN NAYTHONS; MICHAEL WASHBURN; IRA D. DUNST; BRIAN WEBER; KAMNEEL MAHARAJ; KIM IOCOVOZZI; HERBERT J. YOUNG; LINDA HASPER; LESLIE BAYARD; TRICIA FELLERS; ORLANDO ELLIOTT; JAMES BONSIGNORE; MARGARET SETSER; GUILLERMO QUIROZ; DOUGLAS KURASH; ANDRES CARULLO; LAURA S. SUTTA; GEORGIA L. THOMAS; ERIC J. OLSON; JENNIFER MYERS; TOM WOODWARD; JEROLD TERHOST; CAMERON JOHN CESTARO; DONALD BROWN; MARIA FIGUEROA; CONSTANCE MARTYN; THOMAS GANIM; DANIEL BALDESCHI; LILLIAN E. LEVOFF; GIUSEPPINA ROBERTO; ROBERT TRADER; SEAN GOLDSBERRY; CYNTHIA NAVARRO; OWEN CHAPMAN; MICHAEL BREIN; TRAVIS BRISSEY; RONALD BURKARD; ADAM CLOUTIER; STEVEN CRAIG; JOHN J. DIXSON; ERIN L. FANTHORPE; ERIC HADESH; MICHAEL P. KEETH; JOHN KIRK MacDONALD; MICHAEL MANDAHL; NICHOLAS McDANIEL; MARY J. MORAN-SPICUZZA; GARY PINCAS; BRANDON POTTER; THOMAS PURDY; ROCCO RENGHINI; MICHELLE SINGLTEON; KEN SMILEY; GREGORY M. SONSTEIN; ROMAN STARNO; GAYLE A. STEPHENSON; ANDRES VILLICANA; RICHARD WILLIAMS; BRADFORD L. HIRSCH; ASHLEY CEPHAS; DAVID E. HILL; CHAD McKINNEY; MORDECHAI SCHIFFER; LISA SANDS; DONALD KENDIG; KEVIN GOBEL; ERIC LARSON; LIN McKINNEY; RYAN CROSS; PHILLIP HOFFMAN; DEBRA SIMMONS; ABELARDO MORALES; PETER BLUMER; CAROLYN HAMMOND; MELISSA LEGGETT; KELLY MOFFETT; EVAN GROGAN; CARLOS MEDINA; ALBERTO DOMINGUEZ; CATHERINE BERNARD; MICHAEL BREIEN; LAURA GILL; THOMAS SCHILLE; JUDITH STANTON; RANDY RICKERT; BRYAN ZIRKEL; JAMES KUNDRAT; ROBERT SMITH; MARIA KOTOVA; JOSIPA CASEY; LUAN SNYDER; BEN BAKER; BRIAN NGUYEN; HATTIE WILLIAMS; BILL HOLVEY; LOURDES VARGAS; KENDALL SNYDER; NOMER MEDINA; SAMERIA GOFF; URSULA PYLAND; MARCELL CHAPMAN; KAYE KURASH; HOLLY AMROMIN; JOHN CHAPMAN; MARY D'ANGELO; GEORGE RUDY; AYMAN MOUSA; SHELLY HENDERSON; JEFFREY HATHAWAY; DENNIS J. MURPHY; DOUGLAS A. PATTERSON; JOHN GENTRY; LINDA RUTH SCOTT; DANIELLE KAY GILLELAND; JOSEPH BOWE; MICHAEL DESOUTO, Plaintiffs-Appellees, GREG DIRENZO, Petitioner-Appellee, HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA; KIA MOTORS AMERICA; KIA MOTORS CORPORATION; GROSSINGER AUTOPLEX, INC., FKA Grossinger Hyundai; JOHN KRAFCIK; HYUNDAI MOTOR COMPANY; SARAH KUNDRAT, Defendants-Appellees, v. CAITLIN AHEARN; ANDREW YORK, Objectors-Appellants. IN RE HYUNDAI AND KIA FUEL ECONOMY LITIGATION, KEHLIE R. ESPINOSA; NICOLE MARIE HUNTER; JEREMY WILTON; KAYLENE P. BRADY; GUNTHER KRAUTH; ERIC GRAEWINGHOLT; REECE PHILIP THOMSON; ALEX MATURANI; NILUFAR REZAI; JACK ROTTNER; LYDIA KIEVIT; REBECCA SANDERS; BOBBY BRANDON ARMSTRONG; SERGIO TORRES; RICHARD WOODRUFF; MARSHALL LAWRENCE GORDON; JOEL A. LIPMAN; JAMES GUDGALIS; MARY P. HOESSLER; STEPHEN M. HAYES; BRIAN REEVES; SAM HAMMOND; MARK LEGGETT; EDWIN NAYTHONS; MICHAEL WASHBURN; IRA D. DUNST; BRIAN WEBER; KAMNEEL MAHARAJ; KIM IOCOVOZZI; HERBERT J. YOUNG; LINDA HASPER; LESLIE BAYARD; TRICIA FELLERS; ORLANDO ELLIOTT; JAMES BONSIGNORE; MARGARET SETSER; GUILLERMO QUIROZ; DOUGLAS KURASH; ANDRES CARULLO; LAURA S. SUTTA; GEORGIA L. THOMAS; ERIC J. OLSON; JENNIFER MYERS; TOM WOODWARD; JEROLD TERHOST; CAMERON JOHN CESTARO; DONALD BROWN; MARIA FIGUEROA; CONSTANCE MARTYN; THOMAS GANIM; DANIEL BALDESCHI; LILLIAN E. LEVOFF; GIUSEPPINA ROBERTO; ROBERT TRADER; SEAN GOLDSBERRY; CYNTHIA NAVARRO; OWEN CHAPMAN; MICHAEL BREIN; TRAVIS BRISSEY; RONALD BURKARD; ADAM CLOUTIER; STEVEN CRAIG; JOHN J. DIXSON; ERIN L. FANTHORPE; ERIC HADESH; MICHAEL P. KEETH; JOHN KIRK MacDONALD; MICHAEL MANDAHL; NICHOLAS McDANIEL; MARY J. MORAN-SPICUZZA; GARY PINCAS; BRANDON POTTER; THOMAS PURDY; ROCCO RENGHINI; MICHELLE SINGLTEON; KEN SMILEY; GREGORY M. SONSTEIN; ROMAN STARNO; GAYLE A. STEPHENSON; ANDRES VILLICANA; RICHARD WILLIAMS; BRADFORD L. HIRSCH; ASHLEY CEPHAS; DAVID E. HILL; CHAD McKINNEY; MORDECHAI SCHIFFER; LISA SANDS; DONALD KENDIG; KEVIN GOBEL; ERIC LARSON; LIN McKINNEY; RYAN CROSS; PHILLIP HOFFMAN; DEBRA SIMMONS; ABELARDO MORALES; PETER BLUMER; CAROLYN HAMMOND; MELISSA LEGGETT; KELLY MOFFETT; EVAN GROGAN; CARLOS MEDINA; ALBERTO DOMINGUEZ; CATHERINE BERNARD; MICHAEL BREIEN; LAURA GILL; THOMAS SCHILLE; JUDITH STANTON; RANDY RICKERT; BRYAN ZIRKEL; JAMES KUNDRAT; ROBERT SMITH; MARIA KOTOVA; JOSIPA CASEY; LUAN SNYDER; BEN BAKER; BRIAN NGUYEN; HATTIE WILLIAMS; BILL HOLVEY; LOURDES VARGAS; KENDALL SNYDER; NOMER MEDINA; SAMERIA GOFF; URSULA PYLAND; MARCELL CHAPMAN; KAYE KURASH; HOLLY AMROMIN; JOHN CHAPMAN; MARY D'ANGELO; GEORGE RUDY; AYMAN MOUSA; SHELLY HENDERSON; JEFFREY HATHAWAY; DENNIS J. MURPHY; DOUGLAS A. PATTERSON; JOHN GENTRY; LINDA RUTH SCOTT; DANIELLE KAY GILLELAND; JOSEPH BOWE; MICHAEL DESOUTO, Plaintiffs-Appellees, GREG DIRENZO, Petitioner-Appellee, HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA; KIA MOTORS AMERICA; KIA MOTORS CORPORATION; GROSSINGER AUTOPLEX, INC., FKA Grossinger Hyundai; JOHN KRAFCIK; HYUNDAI MOTOR COMPANY; SARAH KUNDRAT, Defendants-Appellees, v. ANTONIO SBERNA, Objector-Appellant. IN RE HYUNDAI AND KIA FUEL ECONOMY LITIGATION, KEHLIE R. ESPINOSA; NICOLE MARIE HUNTER; JEREMY WILTON; KAYLENE P. BRADY; GUNTHER KRAUTH; ERIC GRAEWINGHOLT; REECE PHILIP THOMSON; ALEX MATURANI; NILUFAR REZAI; JACK ROTTNER; LYDIA KIEVIT; REBECCA SANDERS; BOBBY BRANDON ARMSTRONG; SERGIO TORRES; RICHARD WOODRUFF; MARSHALL LAWRENCE GORDON; JOEL A. LIPMAN; JAMES GUDGALIS; MARY P. HOESSLER; STEPHEN M. HAYES; BRIAN REEVES; SAM HAMMOND; MARK LEGGETT; EDWIN NAYTHONS; MICHAEL WASHBURN; IRA D. DUNST; BRIAN WEBER; KAMNEEL MAHARAJ; KIM IOCOVOZZI; HERBERT J. YOUNG; LINDA HASPER; LESLIE BAYARD; TRICIA FELLERS; ORLANDO ELLIOTT; JAMES BONSIGNORE; MARGARET SETSER; GUILLERMO QUIROZ; DOUGLAS KURASH; ANDRES CARULLO; LAURA S. SUTTA; GEORGIA L. THOMAS; ERIC J. OLSON; JENNIFER MYERS; TOM WOODWARD; JEROLD TERHOST; CAMERON JOHN CESTARO; DONALD BROWN; MARIA FIGUEROA; CONSTANCE MARTYN; THOMAS GANIM; DANIEL BALDESCHI; LILLIAN E. LEVOFF; GIUSEPPINA ROBERTO; ROBERT TRADER; SEAN GOLDSBERRY; CYNTHIA NAVARRO; OWEN CHAPMAN; MICHAEL BREIN; TRAVIS BRISSEY; RONALD BURKARD; ADAM CLOUTIER; STEVEN CRAIG; JOHN J. DIXSON; ERIN L. FANTHORPE; ERIC HADESH; MICHAEL P. KEETH; JOHN KIRK MacDONALD; MICHAEL MANDAHL; NICHOLAS McDANIEL; MARY J. MORAN-SPICUZZA; GARY PINCAS; BRANDON POTTER; THOMAS PURDY; ROCCO RENGHINI; MICHELLE SINGLTEON; KEN SMILEY; GREGORY M. SONSTEIN; ROMAN STARNO; GAYLE A. STEPHENSON; ANDRES VILLICANA; RICHARD WILLIAMS; BRADFORD L. HIRSCH; ASHLEY CEPHAS; DAVID E. HILL; CHAD McKINNEY; MORDECHAI SCHIFFER; LISA SANDS; DONALD KENDIG; KEVIN GOBEL; ERIC LARSON; LIN McKINNEY; RYAN CROSS; PHILLIP HOFFMAN; DEBRA SIMMONS; ABELARDO MORALES; PETER BLUMER; CAROLYN HAMMOND; MELISSA LEGGETT; KELLY MOFFETT; EVAN GROGAN; CARLOS MEDINA; ALBERTO DOMINGUEZ; CATHERINE BERNARD; MICHAEL BREIEN; LAURA GILL; THOMAS SCHILLE; JUDITH STANTON; RANDY RICKERT; BRYAN ZIRKEL; JAMES KUNDRAT; ROBERT SMITH; MARIA KOTOVA; JOSIPA CASEY; LUAN SNYDER; BEN BAKER; BRIAN NGUYEN; HATTIE WILLIAMS; BILL HOLVEY; LOURDES VARGAS; KENDALL SNYDER; NOMER MEDINA; SAMERIA GOFF; URSULA PYLAND; MARCELL CHAPMAN; KAYE KURASH; HOLLY AMROMIN; JOHN CHAPMAN; MARY D'ANGELO; GEORGE RUDY; AYMAN MOUSA; SHELLY HENDERSON; JEFFREY HATHAWAY; DENNIS J. MURPHY; DOUGLAS A. PATTERSON; JOHN GENTRY; LINDA RUTH SCOTT; DANIELLE KAY GILLELAND; JOSEPH BOWE; MICHAEL DESOUTO, Plaintiffs-Appellees, GREG DIRENZO, Petitioner-Appellee, HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA; KIA MOTORS AMERICA; KIA MOTORS CORPORATION; GROSSINGER AUTOPLEX, INC., FKA Grossinger Hyundai; JOHN KRAFCIK; HYUNDAI MOTOR COMPANY; SARAH KUNDRAT, Defendants-Appellees, v. PERI FETSCH, Objector-Appellant. IN RE HYUNDAI AND KIA FUEL ECONOMY LITIGATION, KEHLIE R. ESPINOSA; NICOLE MARIE HUNTER; JEREMY WILTON; KAYLENE P. BRADY; GUNTHER KRAUTH; ERIC GRAEWINGHOLT; REECE PHILIP THOMSON; ALEX MATURANI; NILUFAR REZAI; JACK ROTTNER; LYDIA KIEVIT; REBECCA SANDERS; BOBBY BRANDON ARMSTRONG; SERGIO TORRES; RICHARD WOODRUFF; MARSHALL LAWRENCE GORDON; JOEL A. LIPMAN; JAMES GUDGALIS; MARY P. HOESSLER; STEPHEN M. HAYES; BRIAN REEVES; SAM HAMMOND; MARK LEGGETT; EDWIN NAYTHONS; MICHAEL WASHBURN; IRA D. DUNST; BRIAN WEBER; KAMNEEL MAHARAJ; KIM IOCOVOZZI; HERBERT J. YOUNG; LINDA HASPER; LESLIE BAYARD; TRICIA FELLERS; ORLANDO ELLIOTT; JAMES BONSIGNORE; MARGARET SETSER; GUILLERMO QUIROZ; DOUGLAS KURASH; ANDRES CARULLO; LAURA S. SUTTA; GEORGIA L. THOMAS; ERIC J. OLSON; JENNIFER MYERS; TOM WOODWARD; JEROLD TERHOST; CAMERON JOHN CESTARO; DONALD BROWN; MARIA FIGUEROA; CONSTANCE MARTYN; THOMAS GANIM; DANIEL BALDESCHI; LILLIAN E. LEVOFF; GIUSEPPINA ROBERTO; ROBERT TRADER; SEAN GOLDSBERRY; CYNTHIA NAVARRO; OWEN CHAPMAN; MICHAEL BREIN; TRAVIS BRISSEY; RONALD BURKARD; ADAM CLOUTIER; STEVEN CRAIG; JOHN J. DIXSON; ERIN L. FANTHORPE; ERIC HADESH; MICHAEL P. KEETH; JOHN KIRK MacDONALD; MICHAEL MANDAHL; NICHOLAS McDANIEL; MARY J. MORAN-SPICUZZA; GARY PINCAS; BRANDON POTTER; THOMAS PURDY; ROCCO RENGHINI; MICHELLE SINGLTEON; KEN SMILEY; GREGORY M. SONSTEIN; ROMAN STARNO; GAYLE A. STEPHENSON; ANDRES VILLICANA; RICHARD WILLIAMS; BRADFORD L. HIRSCH; ASHLEY CEPHAS; DAVID E. HILL; CHAD McKINNEY; MORDECHAI SCHIFFER; LISA SANDS; DONALD KENDIG; KEVIN GOBEL; ERIC LARSON; LIN McKINNEY; RYAN CROSS; PHILLIP HOFFMAN; DEBRA SIMMONS; ABELARDO MORALES; PETER BLUMER; CAROLYN HAMMOND; MELISSA LEGGETT; KELLY MOFFETT; EVAN GROGAN; CARLOS MEDINA; ALBERTO DOMINGUEZ; CATHERINE BERNARD; MICHAEL BREIEN; LAURA GILL; THOMAS SCHILLE; JUDITH STANTON; RANDY RICKERT; BRYAN ZIRKEL; JAMES KUNDRAT; ROBERT SMITH; MARIA KOTOVA; JOSIPA CASEY; LUAN SNYDER; BEN BAKER; BRIAN NGUYEN; HATTIE WILLIAMS; BILL HOLVEY; LOURDES VARGAS; KENDALL SNYDER; NOMER MEDINA; SAMERIA GOFF; URSULA PYLAND; MARCELL CHAPMAN; KAYE KURASH; HOLLY AMROMIN; JOHN CHAPMAN; MARY D'ANGELO; GEORGE RUDY; AYMAN MOUSA; SHELLY HENDERSON; JEFFREY HATHAWAY; DENNIS J. MURPHY; DOUGLAS A. PATTERSON; JOHN GENTRY; LINDA RUTH SCOTT; DANIELLE KAY GILLELAND; JOSEPH BOWE; MICHAEL DESOUTO, Plaintiffs-Appellees, GREG DIRENZO, Petitioner-Appellee, HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA; KIA MOTORS AMERICA; KIA MOTORS CORPORATION; GROSSINGER AUTOPLEX, INC., FKA Grossinger Hyundai; JOHN KRAFCIK; HYUNDAI MOTOR COMPANY; SARAH KUNDRAT, Defendants-Appellees, v. DANA ROLAND, Objector-Appellant. IN RE HYUNDAI AND KIA FUEL ECONOMY LITIGATION, KEHLIE R. ESPINOSA; NICOLE MARIE HUNTER; JEREMY WILTON; KAYLENE P. BRADY; GUNTHER KRAUTH; ERIC GRAEWINGHOLT; REECE PHILIP THOMSON; ALEX MATURANI; NILUFAR REZAI; JACK ROTTNER; LYDIA KIEVIT; REBECCA SANDERS; BOBBY BRANDON ARMSTRONG; SERGIO TORRES; RICHARD WOODRUFF; MARSHALL LAWRENCE GORDON; JOEL A. LIPMAN; JAMES GUDGALIS; MARY P. HOESSLER; STEPHEN M. HAYES; BRIAN REEVES; SAM HAMMOND; MARK LEGGETT; EDWIN NAYTHONS; MICHAEL WASHBURN; IRA D. DUNST; BRIAN WEBER; KAMNEEL MAHARAJ; KIM IOCOVOZZI; HERBERT J. YOUNG; LINDA HASPER; LESLIE BAYARD; TRICIA FELLERS; ORLANDO ELLIOTT; JAMES BONSIGNORE; MARGARET SETSER; GUILLERMO QUIROZ; DOUGLAS KURASH; ANDRES CARULLO; LAURA S. SUTTA; GEORGIA L. THOMAS; ERIC J. OLSON; JENNIFER MYERS; TOM WOODWARD; JEROLD TERHOST; CAMERON JOHN CESTARO; DONALD BROWN; MARIA FIGUEROA; CONSTANCE MARTYN; THOMAS GANIM; DANIEL BALDESCHI; LILLIAN E. LEVOFF; GIUSEPPINA ROBERTO; ROBERT TRADER; SEAN GOLDSBERRY; CYNTHIA NAVARRO; OWEN CHAPMAN; MICHAEL BREIN; TRAVIS BRISSEY; RONALD BURKARD; ADAM CLOUTIER; STEVEN CRAIG; JOHN J. DIXSON; ERIN L. FANTHORPE; ERIC HADESH; MICHAEL P. KEETH; JOHN KIRK MacDONALD; MICHAEL MANDAHL; NICHOLAS McDANIEL; MARY J. MORAN-SPICUZZA; GARY PINCAS; BRANDON POTTER; THOMAS PURDY; ROCCO RENGHINI; MICHELLE SINGLTEON; KEN SMILEY; GREGORY M. SONSTEIN; ROMAN STARNO; GAYLE A. STEPHENSON; ANDRES VILLICANA; RICHARD WILLIAMS; BRADFORD L. HIRSCH; ASHLEY CEPHAS; DAVID E. HILL; CHAD McKINNEY; MORDECHAI SCHIFFER; LISA SANDS; DONALD KENDIG; KEVIN GOBEL; ERIC LARSON; LIN McKINNEY; RYAN CROSS; PHILLIP HOFFMAN; DEBRA SIMMONS; ABELARDO MORALES; PETER BLUMER; CAROLYN HAMMOND; MELISSA LEGGETT; KELLY MOFFETT; EVAN GROGAN; CARLOS MEDINA; ALBERTO DOMINGUEZ; CATHERINE BERNARD; MICHAEL BREIEN; LAURA GILL; THOMAS SCHILLE; JUDITH STANTON; RANDY RICKERT; BRYAN ZIRKEL; JAMES KUNDRAT; ROBERT SMITH; MARIA KOTOVA; JOSIPA CASEY; LUAN SNYDER; BEN BAKER; BRIAN NGUYEN; HATTIE WILLIAMS; BILL HOLVEY; LOURDES VARGAS; KENDALL SNYDER; NOMER MEDINA; SAMERIA GOFF; URSULA PYLAND; MARCELL CHAPMAN; KAYE KURASH; HOLLY AMROMIN; JOHN CHAPMAN; MARY D'ANGELO; GEORGE RUDY; AYMAN MOUSA; SHELLY HENDERSON; JEFFREY HATHAWAY; DENNIS J. MURPHY; DOUGLAS A. PATTERSON; JOHN GENTRY; DANIELLE KAY GILLELAND; JOSEPH BOWE; MICHAEL DESOUTO, Plaintiffs-Appellees, GREG DIRENZO, Petitioner-Appellee, HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA; KIA MOTORS AMERICA; KIA MOTORS CORPORATION; GROSSINGER AUTOPLEX, INC., FKA Grossinger Hyundai; JOHN KRAFCIK; HYUNDAI MOTOR COMPANY; SARAH KUNDRAT, Defendants-Appellees. v. LINDA RUTH SCOTT, Objector-Appellant. IN RE HYUNDAI AND KIA FUEL ECONOMY LITIGATION, JOHN GENTRY; LINDA RUTH SCOTT; DANIELLE KAY GILLELAND; JOSEPH BOWE; MICHAEL DESOUTO, Plaintiffs, and JAMES BEN FEINMAN, Appellant, v. HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA; KIA MOTORS AMERICA; KIA MOTORS CORPORATION; GROSSINGER AUTOPLEX, INC., FKA GROSSINGER HYUNDAI; JOHN KRAFCIK; HYUNDAI MOTOR COMPANY; SARAH KUNDRAT, Defendants-Appellees. Nos. 15-56014, 15-56025, 15-56059, 15-56061, 15-56064, 15-56067. (9th Cir.). The Court reviews five consolidated appeals from the district court's orders and judgment certifying a nationwide settlement class, approving a settlement, and awarding attorney's fees in a multidistrict litigation brought against defendants Hyundai Motor America and Kia Motors America (automakers) regarding alleged misrepresentations about their vehicles' fuel economy. The Espinosa plaintiffs brought claims against Hyundai under California consumer protection statutes and theories of common law fraud and negligent misrepresentation. They alleged that Hyundai misled consumers throughout the United States by advertising inflated fuel economy standards for the Hyundai Elantra and Sonata vehicle model years 2011-12 based on inaccurate estimates that Hyundai provided to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Class members could receive compensation for relinquishing any claims they might have by choosing one of four options: 1. a lump sum payment via a debit card, determined by vehicle type and model year, with the cash value approximating the additional fuel cost over a 4.75-year period associated with the revised fuel economy estimates; 2. a dealer service debit card worth 150% of the value of their lump sum payment for use at Hyundai or Kia dealers; 3. a new car purchase certificate worth 200% of their lump sum payment for use in the purchase of a new Hyundai or Kia vehicle by a class member or their immediate family; or 4. enrollment in the Reimbursement. Program, which was extended as a result of the settlement from December 31, 2013, to July 6, 2015. By the end of March 2015, with more than three months to go before the July 6, 2015, claims deadline, the automakers reported to the district court that the total compensation they had paid or expected to pay to the class members, based on the claims submitted, was more than $140 million. The Reimbursement Program accounted for more than $97 million of this compensation. By May 31, 2015, more than a month before the claims deadline, the participation rate had grown to 23.0%, reflecting 200,013 claims. And when the court included class members' participation in the Reimbursement Program in the analysis, the participation rate jumped to 64.5%. The district court expressed concern with the request by McCuneWright for a 3.0 lodestar multiplier. On June 1, 2015, after supplemental briefing and an additional hearing, the court awarded McCuneWright $2,850,000 in attorney's fees and $93,550.02 in costs based on a reduced multiplier of 1.5521. On August 5, 2015, the court awarded Hagens Berman, class counsel in Hunter and Brady, $2,700,000 in attorney's fees based on a lodestar multiplier of 1.22, and $250,000 in costs. In addition, the court awarded fees and costs to 26 other firms that reflected lodestar reductions of 27 to 80 percent, including an award of $1,257,000 in fees and $66,000 in costs to liaison counsel Girard Gibbs LLP. Jurisdiction and Standards of Review. The reviews for abuse of discretion the district court's decision to certify a class for settlement purposes, limiting our review to whether the district court correctly selected. and applied Rule 23's criteria. Likewise, the Court reviews for abuse of discretion the district court's award of attorney's fees and costs to class counsel as well as its method of calculating the fees. Predominance The predominance inquiry under Rule 23(b)(3) tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation. It presumes that the existence of common issues of fact or law have been established pursuant to Rule 23(a)(2), and focuses on whether the common questions present a significant aspect of the case and they can be resolved for all members of the class in a single adjudication if so, there is clear justification for handling the dispute on a representative rather than on an individual basis. Predominance is not, however, a matter of nosecounting. Rather, more important questions apt to drive the resolution of the litigation are given more weight in the predominance analysis over individualized questions which are of considerably less significance to the claims of the class. Therefore, even if just one common question predominates, the action may be considered proper under Rule 23(b)(3) even though other important matters will have to be tried separately. The Inclusion of Used Car Purchasers in the Class Does Not Defeat Predominance Fetsch and Roland argue that used car purchasers may not have seen the automakers' fuel efficiency representations, because only new cars are required to display the Monroney stickers, and that including used car purchasers in the class creates a factual issue precluding predominance. Their argument ignores the district court's finding that the alleged misrepresentations were made uniformly not only on the Monroney stickers, but also in nationwide advertising.When misrepresentations are made as part of a nationwide, concerted marketing effort, it makes no difference to the predominance analysis whether consumers encounter them in different guises. Similarly, even if, as the automakers' expert opined, used car buyers are in a somewhat different market than new car buyers and would require a different damages analysis, the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that common issues of fact predominated. The mere fact that there might be differences in damage calculations is not sufficient to defeat class certification. Nor is it clear why the damages here would need to be calculated based on each consumer's willingness to pay for higher fuel efficiency. Fraud damages do not normally correlate with the degree of reliance. If a consumer were to establish the threshold level of reliance, the automaker would be liable for the consumer's entire loss from higher-thanexpected fuel costs an amount that can easily be calculated on an individual basis, as it was in the Reimbursement Program. Variations in State Law Do Not Defeat Predominance Fetsch and Roland also argue that the district court failed to address variations in state law affecting claims by used car purchasers and that it was required to do so under Mazza v.American Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2012). They are incorrect. Subject to constitutional limitations and the forum state's choice-of-law rules, a court adjudicating a multistate class action is free to apply the substantive law of a single state to the entire class. Here, no party argued that California's choiceof-law rules should not apply to this class settlement arising from an MDL in a California court. By default, California courts apply California law unless a party litigant timely invokes the law of a foreign state, in which case it is the foreign law proponent who must shoulder the burden of demonstrating that foreign law, rather than California law, should apply to class claims. To meet their burden, the objectors must satisfy the three-step governmental interest test. Under that test, the objectors must prove that (1) the law of the foreign state materially differs from the law of California, meaning that the law differs with regard to the particular issue in question (2) a true conflict exists, meaning that each state has an interest in the application of its own law to the circumstances of the particular case and (3) the foreign state's interest would be more impaired than California's interest if California law were applied. If the objectors fail to meet their burden at any step in the analysis, the district court may properly find California law applicable without proceeding" to the rest of the analysis. Objectors Failed to Meet Their Burden of Showing That California Law Does Not Apply Fetsch and Roland do not suggest that application of California law gives rise to constitutional problems. And before the district court, no objector presented an adequate choice-of-law analysis or explained how, under the facts of this case, the governmental interest test's three elements were met. Further, no objector argued that differences between the consumer protection laws of all fifty states precluded certification of a settlement class. Consequently, neither the district court nor class counsel were obligated to address choice-of-law issues beyond those raised by the objectors, and we will not decertify a class action for lack of such analysis. Application of California Law Satisfies Due Process Objector Linda Ruth Scott, a lead plaintiff in a Virginia class action that was transferred to California as part of the MDL, argues that application of California law violates her due process rights. She asserts that Virginia, unlike most jurisdictions, does not provide cross-jurisdictional tolling of the statutes of limitations on her claims notwithstanding that her case was stayed upon transfer and remained pending in Virginia at the time of certification. Thus, she argues, certification of a nationwide class left Virginia class members with no real opportunity to opt out because their claims would otherwise be dismissed as time-barred. But Scott does not dispute that she, like all class members, had the right to opt out. Rather, she contends that as a practical matter, she and other Virginia class members could not opt out of this nationwide class action settlement because the District Court refused to certify a Virginia subclass with recognized class representatives asserting Virginia causes of action. Attorney Feinman, however, acknowledged that he filed a class action along with two other mass actions in Virginia after the creation of the MDL to toll the statute of limitations there, preserving claims for Virginia plaintiffs who decided to opt out of the MDL settlement. Indeed, a handful of Virginia plaintiffs did opt out of the settlement and continued their litigation in Virginia, along with plaintiffs who purchased subject vehicles after November 2, 2012, without any statute of limitations issues. Ultimately, the Virginia courts dismissed two out of the three actions for pleading deficiencies. The sole remaining action survived the pleading stage with only one lemon law claim regarding the onboard mileage calculator, not the fuel economy misrepresentations at issue in the MDL. The statute of limitations issue raised here did not feature in the district court's or Fourth Circuit's decisions. Even assuming that the statute of limitations would have barred the claims of Virginia plaintiffs who opted out of the settlement, Hanlon forecloses Scott's requested relief. In Hanlon, as here, multiple class actions were filed and then consolidated in California following a federal agency's investigation, with the defendant announcing a remedial plan and entering into a settlement only after the class moved for certification. 150 F.3d at 1018. Like Scott, an objector in Hanlon filed a late class action in another state and sought to litigate it in contravention of the district court's orders. The Court explained that while the objector was free to opt out of the class by filing the out-of-state action, he had no right to do so on behalf of anyone else. Scott claims that the statute of limitations issue and due process require that the Virginia subclass as a whole be remanded. But what she seeks to do here is exactly what Hanlon held was forbidden opt out a state subclass. In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that common issues predominated. Adequacy Separate from the predominance analysis, due process requires that the named plaintiff at all times adequately represent the interests of the absent class members. This adequacy requirement, formalized in Rule 23(a)(4), serves to uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the class they seek to represent as well as the competency and conflicts of class counsel. To determine legal adequacy, the Court resolves two questions: (1) do the named plaintiffs and their counsel have any conflicts of interest with other class members and (2) will the named plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class? Scott contends that class counsel were inadequate because they failed to protect the rights of absent Virginia class members to opt out of the settlement. Since class counsel did in fact protect Virginians' right to opt out, this argument is meritless. Scott also argues that class counsel Hagens Berman, the firm representing the Brady and Hunter plaintiffs, now has a potential conflict with the class. She asserts that more than two years after the settlement was signed, Hagens Berman and the firm representing Hyundai jointly represented consumers in a putative class action suit against Volkswagen for alleged fraud regarding vehicle emissions. Scott identifies no authority establishing that a co-counsel relationship between class counsel and defense counsel in a future, unrelated case presents a conflict. Settlement Approval A binding settlement must provide notice to the class in a reasonable manner and otherwise be fair, reasonable, and adequate. Various objectors allege inadequacies in the notice and claim forms and purported collusion between class counsel and the automakers. None of their claims have merit. The Notice to Class Members Provided Sufficient Information Before the district court approves a class settlement under Rule 23(e), it is critical that class members receive adequate notice. To satisfy Rule 23(e)(1), settlement notices must present information about a proposed settlement neutrally, simply, and understandably. Notice is satisfactory if it `generally describes the terms of the settlement in sufficient detail to alert those with adverse viewpoints to investigate and to come forward and be heard. Fetsch and Roland argue that class members who were already participating in the automakers' voluntary Reimbursement Program likely were unaware that additional compensation could be received by remaining in the program because this information was buried on page 11 of the long form notice and was omitted from the short form and email notices. In fact, the very first page of the long form notice informed class members: If you previously received money under the Reimbursement Program, you may still be able to receive a payment from the Settlement. As for the short form notice, it was designed to be, as the name suggests, short. Its primary purpose was to alert class members to the settlement, provide a high-level overview of the process, including critical dates, and explain where class members could obtain additional information, such as eligibility information and claim forms. In addition, after outlining some of the potential compensation, it informed class members that other settlement benefits exist" and invited them to use an online calculator to estimate their individual benefit under each of the various compensation options based on a host of personalized factors. The short form notice highly recommended that class members use this reimbursement calculator to evaluate their options based on their own circumstances before submitting a claim. This notice was more than adequate. The Claim Forms Were Not Overly Burdensome Objectors Ahearn and York argue that no claim forms were necessary at all and that the automakers should have automatically made lump sum payments to class members who did not request another form of compensation. They cite no evidence that this was possible. The district court found that the automakers did not have complete records of resales of the class vehicles and Ahearn and York fail to explain how the automakers could have identified subsequent purchasers who were also part of the class. They do not dispute that it was reasonable for the settlement to provide class members with different monetary recovery options based on miles driven and ownership status information also not in the automakers' possession. Given that the automakers lacked complete information to determine the identities of all class members and the amounts of their claims, the district court properly exercised its discretion in finding that some sort of claims process is necessary in order to verify that the claimant is a current owner, former owner, or current or former lessee of a qualifying vehicle. Ahearn, York, Fetsch, and Roland contend that the claim forms required too much documentation, such as proof of a class member's current address and proof of sale or ownership, and that this documentation burden is reflected in low claim participation rates. However, class members could easily avoid most documentation requirements by submitting an online claim form, which pre-populated information after class members entered their vehicle identification number and the unique class member identification number provided by their notices. Fetsch and Roland cite no evidence that any claims submitted on the paper claim form were, as they speculate, denied because one box was not checked or one piece of documentation was not turned in. There Is No Evidence of Collusion Between Class Counsel and the Automakers Rule 23(e) ensures that unnamed class members are protected from unjust or unfair settlements affecting their rights. When the district court determines that a proposed settlement is fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable, our review is extremely limited. The Court considers the overall fairness of the settlement taken as a whole, rather than the individual component parts, because neither the district court nor this court has the ability to delete, modify or substitute certain provisions. The objectors argue that the settlement reached here was a sweetheart deal. To the contrary, the settlement bears none of the typical signs of collusion between class counsel and defendants, such as when class counsel receive a disproportionate distribution of the settlement, the agreement contains a clear sailing provision for attorney's fees separate and apart from class funds, or unawarded fees revert to the defendants rather than to the class. It is true, as Fetsch and Roland point out, that class action defendants are generally indifferent to the allocation of settlement funds between class and counsel, which can encourage a settlement that is overly generous to counsel at the expense of the class. But here such concerns are out of place. No objector disputes the district court's finding that the settlement provides substantial relief, including a substantial cash payout, ranging from $240 to $1,420 per class member. The settling parties agreed on the amount of class compensation more than six months before negotiating, over multiple mediation sessions with a respected and experienced mediator, the reasonable attorney's fees provided in the settlement agreement. Here, the district court properly exercised its discretion in calculating the fee award using the lodestar method. As the district court found, the automakers will pay attorneys fees separately from the amount allocated to those covered by the class. Ahearn and York argue that the district court erred by not confirming that attorney's fees were 25% or less of the settlement's value. However, the district court in fact crosschecked the lodestar amount and specifically found that the total amount of attorney's fees awarded in this case is far lower than the 25% of the settlement figure used as a benchmark in many class action cases in the Ninth Circuit. The Court had affirmed fee awards totaling a far greater percentage of the class recovery than the fees here. Ahearn and York also object to the district court's use of a lodestar multiplier. The district court, which had ably managed this complex litigation for several years and observed various counsel's performance during numerous hearings and through extensive briefing, was in the best position to evaluate each firm's contributions. The record shows that the district court carefully made this assessment in determining the appropriate amount of attorney's fees and explained the basis of its ruling. The district court applied downward multipliers of 27 to 80 percent to the lodestars for the non-settling parties' counsel because they had a more minor role in the MDL and did not participate in negotiating the primary settlement. The court applied a multiplier of 1.22 to the fee award for class counsel Hagens Berman due to the complexity and volume of work that counsel engaged in in order to diligently pursue this case and develop its primary theory of liability, finding the multiplier in line with others in comparable complex and multi-year multidistrict litigations. And the court applied a multiplier of 1.5521 to the fees for class counsel McCuneWright because they assumed more risk than other firms" by being one of the first firms to take up this cause, having filed Espinosa nearly 10 months before the automakers announced the fuel efficiency revisions. These multipliers are modest or in-line with others we have affirmed. Denial of Attorney's Fees to Feinman Last, Scott and her counsel Feinman challenge the district court's ruling that Feinman was not entitled to attorney's fees because he conferred no benefit on the class. W]here objectors do not add any new legal argument or expertise, and do not participate constructively in the litigation or confer a benefit on the class, they are not entitled to an award premised on equitable principles. The district court denied Feinman's $800,172.79 fee request because he did not meaningfully contribute to the class settlement. Feinman sought fees on the theory that his due process arguments, which were rejected below and the Court rejects here, were somehow beneficial to the class. However, these arguments are not only baseless, but also detrimental to the class; if adopted, they would permit Scott to hold hostage any class recovery under the settlement until she received the unique benefit of being certified to represent a Virginia subclass. Furthermore, Feinman does not dispute that he engaged in obstructive conduct throughout the litigation, including moving for discovery despite a stay and moving to remand despite an ongoing MDL. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying fees. A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's June 6, 2019 Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/yxfshfl9 from Leagle.com. James B. Feinman, 1003 Church St, Lynchburg, VA 24504, (argued), James B. Feinman & Associates, Lynchburg, Virginia, for Appellants James Ben Feinman, John Gentry, Linda Ruth Scott, Danielle Kay Gilleland, Joseph Bowe, Michael Desouto. George W. Cochran, 1385 Russell Dr, Streetsboro, OH 44241-8369, (argued), Streetsboro, Ohio; Edward W. Cochran -- edwardcochran@wowway.com -- Shaker Heights, Ohio;John J. Pentz, 19 Widow Rites Lane, Sudbury, MA 01776; for Appellants Caitlin Ahearn and Andrew York. Steve A. Miller -- sampc01@gmail.com -- Steve A. Miller P.C., Denver, Colorado, for Appellant Antonio Sberna. Matthew Kurilich, 17321 Irvine Blvd., Ste. 115, Tustin, CA, for Appellant Peri Fetsch. Dennis D. Gibson, Gibson Law Firm, 4925 Greenville Ave Ste 200, Dallas, TX 75206-0500, for Appellant Dana Roland. Elaine S. Kusel (argued), Basking Ridge; Richard D. McCune, McCuneWright LLP, 3281 E. Guasti Road, Suite 100, Ontario, CA 91761; for Appellees Kehlie R. Espinosa, Lilian E. Levoff, Thomas Ganim, and Daniel Baldeschi. Benjamin W. Jeffers -- bjeffers@hhbjlaw.com -- Dommond E. Lonnie -dlonnie@dykema.com -- James S. Azadian -- jazadian@dykema.com -- and Brian H. Newman -- bnewman@dykema.com -- Dykema Gossett LLC, Los Angeles, California, for Appellees Kia Motors America Inc. and Kia Motors Corp. Shon Morgan -- shonmorgan@quinnemanuel.com -- (argued) and Joseph R. Ashby -- shonmorgan@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, Los Angeles, California; Karin Kramer -- karinkramer300@gmail.com -- Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, San Francisco, California; Dean Hansell -- dean.hansell@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells LLP, Los Angeles, California; for Appellees Hyundai Motor America and Hyundai Motor Co. J.R. SIMPLOT: L. Arroyo Suit Remanded to Calif. Superior Court -------------------------------------------------------------- The United States District Court for the Northern District of California, San Jose Division, issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand in the case captioned LUIS ARROYO, Plaintiff, v. J.R. SIMPLOT COMPANY, Defendant. Case No. 18-CV-07187-LHK. (N.D. Cal.). Plaintiff Luis Arroyo brings a putative class action against his former employer, Defendant J.R. Simplot Co., for violations of federal and California credit reporting statutes and for wage and hour violations. The Defendant removed the case to federal court on the grounds of federal question jurisdiction. Specifically, the Defendant stated in its notice of removal that the Court has federal question jurisdiction over the Plaintiff's FCRA claims, which arise under the laws of the United States. The instant motion to remand presents a single question: whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's FCRA claims. The Plaintiff argues that the Court must remand the case to state court because Plaintiff lacks Article III standing to assert his FCRA claims. The Ninth Circuit has held that in FCRA cases, a plaintiff has standing only if the plaintiff alleges more than a procedural violation of the FCRA. A plaintiff may not show an injury-in-fact merely by pointing to a statutory cause of action. Rather, a plaintiff must allege how the specific procedural violations alleged in this case actually harm, or present a material risk of harm to the interests protected by the FCRA. The Ninth Circuit has also addressed the interests protected by the specific FCRA disclosure requirements at issue in this case. Syed v. M-I, LLC, 853 F.3d 492 (9th Cir. 2017). In Syed, the Ninth Circuit stated that the FCRA's disclosure requirements create a right to privacy by enabling applicants to withhold permission to obtain the report from the prospective employer, and a concrete injury when applicants are deprived of their ability to meaningfully authorize the credit check. The plaintiff in Syed alleged such an injury because the plaintiff alleged that he was confused by the inclusion of the liability waiver with the disclosure and would not have signed it had it contained a sufficiently clear disclosure, as required by the statute. By contrast, the Plaintiff has made no such allegations of confusion or that Defendant disseminated inaccurate information about the Plaintiff. Instead, the Plaintiff has conclusorily alleged only that due to the Defendant's violation of the FCRA's disclosure requirements, the Plaintiff and other class members have been injured, including but not limited to, having their privacy and statutory rights invaded in violation of the FCRA. The Defendant is unable to point to any decision in which a court held that conclusory allegations of harm to privacy and statutory rights resulting from a failure to comply with the FCRA's disclosure requirements suffice to allege Article III standing. Instead, the Defendant argues only that the FCRA cases the Plaintiff cites all involve a defendant seeking dismissal for lack of a concrete injury, rather than, as here, a plaintiff seeking remand based on lack of standing. However, the Defendant's argument is contradicted by a case that the Defendant itself cites. Therefore, consistent with the Plaintiff's own concession, the Plaintiff lacks standing to bring his FCRA causes of action in federal court. The Defendant removed this case solely on the basis of federal question jurisdiction arising from the Plaintiff's FCRA causes of action, and does not contend that the Court otherwise may exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the Plaintiff's complaint. When the Court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an action that has been removed to federal court, the Court must remand the case to state court. Thus, the Court must remand Plaintiff's complaint to state court. Accordingly, the Court grants the Plaintiff's motion to remand and remands the instant case to California Superior Court for the County of Santa Clara. A full-text copy of the District Court's June 3, 2019 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yym3jbkt from Leagle.com. Luis Arroyo, on behalf of himself, all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Chaim Shaun Setareh -- shaun@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group, Farrah Grant -- farrah@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group & Thomas Alistair Segal -- thomas@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group. J.R. Simplot Company, a Nevada corporation, Defendant, represented by Elizabeth A. Falcone -- elizabeth.falcone@ogletree.com -- Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., Jason Phillip Brown -- jason.brown@ogletreedeakins.com -- Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C. & Michael J. Nader -- michael.nader@ogletree.com -- Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C.. JM SMUCKER: Court Narrows Claims in 1st Amended Robinson Suit ------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, SHELLY ROBINSON, Plaintiff, v. J.M. SMUCKER COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-04654-HSG (N.D. Cal.), Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California granted in part and denied in part the Defendant's motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint. Robinson brought the putative class action complaint against the Defendant, alleging that its Crisco 100% Extra Virgin Olive Oil No-Stick Spray does not, despite its name, contain 100% extra virgin olive oil. The Defendant manufactures, markets, and sells olive oil labeled as Crisco EVOO. Robinson lives in Brentwood, California. She purchased Crisco EVOO for personal consumption at a Wal-Mart in Antioch, California, and other places during the past four years. In 2017 and 2018, the Plaintiff purchased Crisco EVOO in reliance on the Defendant's advertising and labeling of the product as extra virgin olive oil. But Crisco EVOO is not Extra Virgin Olive Oil, meaning that Defendant's advertising is false and misleading. Rather, extensive clinical testing conducted by a leading laboratory conclusively establishes that Crisco EVOO is not Extra Virgin Olive Oil. The Plaintiff and the members of the putative class would not have paid as much, if at all, for Crisco EVOO but for the Defendant's misrepresentations. The Plaintiff and the members of the putative class are unable to rely on the product's advertising so long as it continues to claim that it is extra virgin olive oil. They will not purchase the Crisco EVOO product in the future, although they would like to do so, unless and until Defendant takes corrective action. The Plaintiff filed her initial complaint on Aug. 2, 2018. After the Defendant moved to dismiss, the Plaintiff filed the FAC on October 24. The Defendant filed a revised motion to dismiss on November 7. The Plaintiff opposed on November 21, and tge Defendant replied on December 5. Judge Gilliam granted in part and denied in part the Defendant's motion to dismiss the FAC. He dismissed the Plaintiff's UCL, FAL, and negligent misrepresentation causes of action, as well as the prayer for punitive damages. Among other things, the Judge finds that (i) the Plaintiff has sufficiently pled claims providing for damages, she has an adequate remedy at law and is therefore barred from seeking equitable relief; (ii) each of the Plaintiff's UCL theories "lacks merit"; (iii) the Plaintiff does not plead any facts to support an award of punitive damages because she does not allege that any individual committed willful and malicious conduct; and (iv) the negligent misrepresentation claim barred is by the economic loss rule because the Plaintiff has not pled any personal liability. The Judge finds that amendment would be futile as to the UCL and FAL claims because no factual allegations could negate the adequate remedy at law, and thus denied the request for leave to amend as to these claims. However, the Judge cannot say that amendment would be futile as to the negligent misrepresentation cause of action or request for punitive damages; therefore, he granted leave to amend on these issues. Should the Plaintiff wish to amend her complaint to plead additional facts to support these theories, she must do so by May 22, 2019. In addition, the Judge set a case management conference for May 28, 2019 at 2:00 p.m. to discuss a plan and schedule for a prompt resolution for the case. The parties will file a joint case management statement by May 22, 2019. A full-text copy of the Court's May 8, 2019 Order is available at https://is.gd/sDdlt9 from Leagle.com. Shelly Robinson, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by David W. Reid, Pacific Trial Attorneys, APC & Scott J. Ferrell -- sferrell@pacifictrialattorneys.com -- Pacific Trial Attorneys. J.M. Smucker Company, an Ohio corporation, Defendant, represented by Ronald Y. Rothstein -- dreid@pacifictrialattorneys.com -- Winston and Strawn LLP, pro hac vice, Crista N. Welch -- cwelch@coblentzlaw.com -- Winston and Strawn LLP & Megan Lee Whipp -- mwhipp@winston.com -- Winston and Strawn LLP. JOSEPH WILDCAT: Jones Files FCRA Suit in E.D. Pa. ------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against CAPITAL ACCOUNTS, LLC. The case is styled as ISIAH A. JONES, III FOR HIMSELF AND OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff v. JOSEPH WILDCAT, SR., NICOLE CHAPMAN-REYNOLDS, EDMUND PETERSON, CHRIS SOULIER, PATRICIA MARQUEZ, PHILLIP CHAPMAN, JR., DAROLD LONDO, RANDY SOULIER, MELISSA DOUD, JESSI PHILLIPS LORENZO, JUANITA HUGULEY also known as: JUANITA GEORGE-HUGULEY ALL DEFENDANTS NAMED SOLELY IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-02493-JS (E.D. Pa., June 7, 2019). The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Joseph Wildcat, Sr. have been President of the Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa since 2016.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: ROBERT F. SALVIN, ESQ. PHILA DEBT CLINIC & CONSUMER LAW CENTER TWO BALA PLAZA SUITE 300 BALA CYNWYD, PA 19004-1573 Phone: (215) 300-2388 Email: rfsalvin@hotmail.com JPMORGAN CHASE: Removes Osella Class Suit to C.D. California ------------------------------------------------------------ The Defendants removed on May 17, 2019, class action lawsuit entitled Eva Osella, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., et al., Case No. 19STCV13525, from the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California (Los Angeles). The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:19-cv-04318 to the proceeding. The nature of suit is stated as Real Property: Other.[BN] Defendants JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., and J.P. Morgan Chase Custody Services, Inc., are represented by: Stephen J. Newman, Esq. STROOCK AND STROOCK AND LAVAN LLP 2029 Century Park East, Suite 1800 Los Angeles, CA 90067-3086 Telephone: (310) 556-5800 Facsimile: (310) 556-5959 E-mail: snewman@stroock.com KEEFE COMMISSARY: Reichert Wash. Subclass Conditionally Certified ----------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, JEFFREY REICHERT, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. KEEFE COMMISSARY NETWORK, L.L.C., d/b/a ACCESS CORRECTIONS; RAPID INVESTMENTS, INC., d/b/a RAPID FINANCIAL SOLUTIONS, d/b/a ACCESS FREDOM; and CACHE VALLEY BANK, Defendant, Case No. 3:17-cv-05848-RBL (W.D. Wash.), Judge Ronald B. Leighton of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, Tacoma, (i) granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification with respect to the Washington subclass on the condition that Reichert add another named Plaintiff who received a cardholder agreement with their release card; and (ii) reserved certification of the national class and necessary joinder under Rule 19. The matter is before the Court on Reichert's Motion for Class Certification. The class action lawsuit challenges the use of prepaid "release cards" for reimbursing confiscated cash to inmates as they are released from incarceration. Many government facilities have opted to use these cards instead of redistributing funds via cash or a check. However, unlike those other methods, release cards carry hefty fees that start depleting inmates' funds within hours of release. The contracts with government agencies to provide release cards, which are managed by Defendant Rapid Investments, Inc., and issued by Cache Valley Bank. Reichert moves to certify both a national class, asserting claims under the Electronic Funds Transfer Act ("EFTA"), and a Washington subclass, asserting claims under EFTA, the Takings Clause, and the Washington Consumer Protection Act ("WCPA"), as well as for conversion and unjust enrichment. The national class definition is defined as all persons in the United States who, at any time since Oct. 20, 2016, were: (1) taken into custody at a jail, correctional facility, detainment center, or any other law enforcement facility, (2) entitled to the return of money either confiscated from them or remaining in their inmate accounts when they were released from the facility, (3) issued a prepaid debit card from Keefe Commissary Network, LLC, Rapid Investments, Inc., and/or Cache Valley Bank that was subject to fees, charges, and restrictions and (4) not offered an alternative method for the return of their money. For the Washington subclass, Reichert defined it as all persons who, at any time since Oct. 20, 2013, were: (1) taken into custody at a jail, correctional facility, detainment center, or any other law enforcement facility located in the state of Washington, (2) entitled to the return coil money either confiscated from them or remaining in their inmate accounts when they were released from the facility, (3) issued a prepaid debit card from Keefe Commissary Network, LT.C, Rapid Investments, Inc., and/or Cache Valley Bank that was subject to fees, charges, and restrictions and (4) not offered an alternative method for the return of their money. In his Reply, Reichert also wishes to amend the class definitions to include only inmates who were not offered a choice between receiving a release card or some other form of reimbursement. Reichert argues that class certification is appropriate because Rule 23(a)'s four requirements of numerosity, typicality, commonality, and adequacy are satisfied. He also contends that Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement is met because the central questions in this case focus on the practice of providing inmates with activated, fee-laden cards instead of a check or cash. Finally, Reichert argues that a class action is the superior method of bringing these claims because individual actions would not be financially feasible and the class definitions are based on objective criteria. The Defendants contest certification on a number of bases but primarily focus on typicality and predominance. They argue that Reichert is not typical of all class members because many facilities provide inmates with a copy of Rapid's cardholder agreement when they are released, creating potential contractual defenses. The Defendants contend that the possibility that some class members formed contracts upon release will raise numerous questions about the circumstances of each inmates' release, which would vary according to the procedures at each facility. They also argue that a national class would be unmanageable in light of the vast amount of evidence and witnesses in other states. Finally, the Defendants assert that the government entities that contract with Defendants are necessary parties under Rule 19 but that they cannot be feasibly joined because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over agencies in other states. Judge Leighton conditionally granted in part Reicheit's Motion for Class Certification. He granted Reichert's Motion with respect to the Washington subclass on the condition that Reichert add another named Plaintiff who received a cardholder agreement with their release card. Certification of the national class and necessary joinder under Rule 19 are reserved. Among other things, the Judge finds that it is appropriate to allow Reichert to redefine the class. The modification would not add a "wholly different group of people" to the case. Instead, it would actually narrow the class definition by excluding inmates who were offered a choice between methods of reimbursement. To the extent the narrowed class definition would require discovery about which facilities offer inmates a choice, the Defendants have already refused to respond to discovery requests on this subject. Reichert's is permitted to amend the class definition. He also finds that it would be a waste of time to certify the national class only to decertify it because there are indispensable parties that cannot feasibly be joined. The Judge has concerns about leaving Kitsap County and other government entities out of the case for other reasons. If the Defendants' clients independently decide whether inmates are given a choice between release cards and other forms of reimbursement, the Court may be unable to fashion adequate injunctive relief in their absence. It is also possible that an injunction would impose inconsistent obligations on Defendants, who would be ordered to reform their practices while still contractually bound to provide the same services to government clients. He therefore reserves the issue of Rule 19 joinder and have the parties address it at oral argument. Oral argument will be set for May 23, at 1:30 p.m. The parties should be prepared to discuss (1) whether the law of different states regarding contract formation and duress is sufficiently consistent to allow certification of the national class, and (2) whether joinder of absent government entities is necessary under Rule 19 to ensure that the Court can accord complete relief and avoid imposing inconsistent obligations. A full-text copy of the Court's May 8, 2019 Order is available at https://is.gd/I9siG7 from Leagle.com. Jeffrey Reichert, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Laura R. Gerber -- lgerber@kellerrohrback.com -- KELLER ROHRBACK, Mark Adam Griffin -- mgriffin@kellerrohrback.com -- KELLER ROHRBACK, Daniel Marshall, HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENSE CENTER, pro hac vice, Lisa Faye Petak -- lpetak@kellerrohrback.com -- KELLER ROHRBACK LLP, pro hac vice, Masimba Mutamba, HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENSE CENTER, pro hac vice & Sabarish Neelakanta, HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENSE CENTER, pro hac vice. Keefe Commissary Network LLC, doing business as Access Corrections, Defendant, represented by Sylvia Karen Bamberger -- kbamberger@bpmlaw.com -- BETTS PATTERSON & MINES, Russell S. Ponessa -- rponessa@hinshawlaw.com -- HINSHAW & CULBERTSON, pro hac vice & Suzanne L. Jones -- sjones@hinshawlaw.com -- HINSHAW & CULBERTSON, pro hac vice. Rapid Investments Inc, doing business as Rapid Financial Solutions doing business as Access Freedom & Cache Valley Bank, Defendants, represented by Emily J. Harris -- eharris@corrcronin.com -- CORR CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER FOGG & MOORE LLP, George F. Verschelden -- george.verschelden@stinson.com -- STINSON LEONARD STREET LLP, pro hac vice & Kristina Markosova -- kmarkosova@corrcronin.com -- CORR CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER FOGG & MOORE LLP. KIA MOTORS: Defective Vehicles Suit Transferred to C.D. Cal. ------------------------------------------------------------ The case captioned Michael Chieco, April Achord, Jennifer Everett, Josh Keener, Donna Hunborg, Daniel Reilley, Terri Sackos, Kimberle Zimmerman and Barbara Myers, on behalf of themselves and similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. KIA Motors America, Corporation and Hyundai Motor Company, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-16215, (D. N.J., November 16, 2018), was transferred to the Central District of California on May 7, 2019 under Case No. 19-cv-00854. Plaintiffs are owners of 2011-14 KIA Optima, 2011–13 KIA Sportage, Hyundai 2011–14 Santa Fe and Sonata vehicle models that use the Hyundai 2.0 liter and 2.4 liter engines. They seek injunctive and declaratory relief, compensatory, punitive, statutory damages and reasonable attorney fees and costs resulting from vehicle defects arising from metal debris left over from the manufacturing process that mixes with engine oil and creates oil sludge which clogs oil ports and prevents lubrication of the engine's moving parts. [BN] Plaintiffs are represented by: Shmuel Klein, Esq. LAW OFFICE OF SHMUEL KLEIN PA 113 Cedarhill Ave. Mahwah, NJ 07430 Tel: (845) 425-2510 Defendants are represented by: Jaclyn Palmerson QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART AND SULLIVAN LLP 51 Madison Avenue, 22nd Floor New York, NY 10010 Tel: (212) 849-7104 Fax: (212) 849-7100 Email: jaclynpalmerson@quinnemanuel.com LAKES VENTURE: Marcum Seeks to Certify FLSA Collective Class ------------------------------------------------------------ In a class action lawsuit DONNA MARCUM, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. LAKES VENTURE, LLC, d/b/a FRESH THYME FARMERS MARKET LLC, the Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-00231-DJH (W.D. Ky.), the Plaintiff moves the Court pursuant to Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act for entry of an order: 1. conditionally certifying proposed collective FLSA class: 2. implementing a procedure whereby Court-approved Notice of Plaintiff's FLSA claims is sent (via U.S. Mail and e-mail) to: "all current and former hourly employees of Defendant who worked over 40 hours in any workweek and were not fully compensated for all hours worked because they were unable to take an uninterrupted meal break of 30 minutes"; 3. requiring Defendant to, within 14 days of this Court's order, identify all potential opt-in plaintiffs by providing a list in electronic and importable format, of the names, job titles, work locations, last known address, telephone number(s), e-mail address(es), and dates of employment of all potential opt-in plaintiffs who worked for Defendant at any time from three years preceding the Court's granting of the instant Motion.[CC] Attorneys for Named Plaintiffs and those similarly situated Matthew J.P. Coffman, Esq. COFFMAN LEGAL, LLC 1550 Old Henderson Road, Suite 126 Columbus, OH 43220 Telephone: 614-949-1181 Facsimile: 614-386-9964 E-mail: mcoffman@mcoffmanlegal.com - and - Daniel I. Bryant, Esq. BRYANT LEGAL, LLC 1550 Old Henderson Road, Suite 126 Columbus, OH 43220 Telephone: 614-704-0546 Facsimile: 614-573-9826 E-mail: dbryant@bryantlegalllc.com - and - Robi J. Baishnab, Esq. NILGES DRAHER LLC 34 N. High St., Ste. 502 Columbus, OH 43215 Telephone: (614) 824-5770 Facsimile: (330) 754-1430 E-mail: rbaishnab@ohlaborlaw.com - and - Hans A. Nilges, Esq. Shannon M. Draher, Esq. NILGES DRAHER LLC 7266 Portage Street, NW, Suite D Massillon, OH 44646 Telephone: (330) 470-4428 Facsimile: (330) 754-1430 E-mail: hans@ohlaborlaw.com sdraher@ohlaborlaw.com LASER SPINE: Embry Seeks to Certify Class of Terminated Workers --------------------------------------------------------------- In a class action lawsuit HEATHER EMBRY, on behalf of herself and a class of those others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. LASER SPINE INSTITUTE, LLC, LSI HOLDCO, LLC and LSI MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC, the Defendants, Case No. 8:19-cv-00539-SDM-AAS (M.D. Fla.), the Plaintiff moves the Court for an order: 1. certifying a class of: all Laser Spine Institute employees throughout the United States who were not given a minimum of 60 days' written notice of termination and whose employment was terminated on or about March 1, 2019, as a result of a "mass layoff” or "plant closing" as defined by the Workers Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988, excluding the directors and officers of Laser Spine Institute"; 2. appointing Heather Embry as Class Representative; 3. appointing Counsel and their firms and members thereof as class counsel; and 4. allowing Plaintiff's comnsel to notify the Class members. Attorneys for the Plaintiff: Ryan D. Barack, Esq. Michelle Erin Nadeau, Esq. KWALL BARACK NADEAU PLLC 304 S. Belcher Road, Suite C Clearwater, FL 33765 Telephone: (727) 441-4947 Facsimile: (727) 447-3158 E-mail: rbarack@employeerights.com jackie@employeerights.com mnadeau@employeerights.com jackie@employeerights.com LASER SPINE: Higdon Seeks to Certify Class of Terminated Workers ---------------------------------------------------------------- In a class action lawsuit DUANE HIGDON, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. LASER SPINE INSTITUTE, LLC, LSI HOLDCO, LLC and LSI MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC, the Defendants, Case No. 8:19-cv-00547-MSS-TGW (M.D. Fla.), the Plaintiff moves the Court for an order: 1. certifying a class of: "any employee employed by Defendant LASER SPINE INSTITUTE, LLC, LSI HOLDCO, LLC, and LSI MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC, who was not given a minimum of 60-days advance written notice of termination and whose employment was terminated as a result of a "mass layoff" or "plant closing" as defined in 20 C.F.R. section 639.3 and 29 U.S.C. section 2101 under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988. The class does not include part-time employees as defined under 29 U.S.C. section 2101(a)(8)."; 2. appointing him as class representative; 3. appointing the law firm of Florin Gray Bouzas Owens, LLC as class counsel; and 4. authorizing notice to all class members. The Plaintiff's termination, and the termination of all similarly situated employees, was caused by a mass layoff or plant closing as defined by the WARN Act. However, Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff and the other class members at least 60-days' advance written notice of their termination. Nor was Plaintiff and the putative class members paid or provided benefits during the 60-day period. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the other class members are entitled to recover their respective wages, benefits, and other permissible damages for the 60-day period pursuant to the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act.[CC] Attorneys for the Plaintiff: Miguel Bouzas, Esq. Wolfgang M. Florin, Esq. FLORIN, GRAY, BOUZAS, OWENS, LLC 16524 Pointe Village Drive, Suite 100 Lutz, FL 33558 Telephone (727) 254-5255 Facsimile (727) 483-7942 E-mail: miguel@fgbolaw.com gina@fgbolaw.com wolfgang@fgbolaw.com LEX34 FRUIT & VEGETABLE: Bonilla Sues Over Unpaid Wages ------------------------------------------------------- Angel Bonilla (a/k/a Victor), Guillermo Garcia Garcia, Jesus Ramales, Jose Alfredo Vargas Arellano, Martin Gonzalez, and Odilon Gonzalez, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Lex34 Fruit & Vegetable Corp. (d/b/a Merci Market), 350-42 Fruit & Vegetable Corp. (d/b/a Merci Market), James Cho, Mike Cho, Nicole Cho, and Mike Chong, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-05327 (S.D. N.Y., June 6, 2019) is an action on behalf of herself, and other similarly situated individuals, for unpaid minimum and overtime wages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"), and for violations of the N.Y. Labor Law (the "NYLL"), and the "spread of hours" and overtime wage orders of the New York Commissioner of Labor, including applicable liquidated damages, interest, attorneys' fees and costs. Plaintiffs have worked for Defendants in excess of 40 hours per week, without appropriate minimum wage, overtime, and spread of hours compensation for the hours that they have worked. Moreover, Defendants have failed to maintain accurate recordkeeping of the hours worked and have failed to pay Plaintiffs appropriately for any hours worked, either at the straight rate of pay or for any additional overtime premium, says the complaint. Plaintiffs have been employed as deli workers, stock persons, and ostensibly as a delivery worker at the Defendants' delis. Defendants own, operate, or control two delis, located at 1413 Sixth Avenue, New York, New York 10019 and at 350 West 42nd Street, New York, New York 10003 (hereinafter "the West 42nd Street location") both under the name "Merci Market".[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Michael Faillace, Esq. MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510 New York, NY 10165 Phone: (212) 317-1200 Facsimile: (212) 317-1620 LYFT INC: A. Oliver Suit Transferred to S.D. Ga. ------------------------------------------------ The United States District Court for the Northern District of California issued on Order granting Defendant's Motion to Transfer Venue in the case captioned ANTHONY OLIVER, Plaintiff, v. LYFT, INC., Defendant. No. C 19-01488 WHA. (N.D. Cal.) to the Southern District of Georgia. Venue Would Have Been Proper in Georgia. This order finds that venue would have been proper in the Southern District of Georgia because this is where plaintiff executed Lyft's Terms of Service and allegedly received the unauthorized texts. At least two times during these proceedings, the plaintiff presents inconsistent statements pertaining to the location where he received the texts. In his complaint, the plaintiff states that the acts giving rise to the claims alleged herein were committed in Georgia. Two paragraphs later, however, the plaintiff contradicts himself, stating that he received the allegedly unauthorized texts in this district. The Plaintiff contradicts himself yet again in a self-serving declaration, attached to his opposition. In this declaration, plaintiff states that he exclusively received the unauthorized texts while he was on vacation in Los Angeles. This order finds it unnecessary to decide which of plaintiff's three equally conflicting statements is true. It is sufficient that plaintiff, in his own complaint, states that the "acts giving rise to the claims alleged herein were committed in Georgia. In light of this, this order finds that venue is proper in the Southern District of Georgia. Relevant Convenience Factors Favors Transfer (1) Plaintiff's Choice of Forum Ordinarily, a plaintiff's choice of forum weighs heavily against a defendant seeking to transfer under Section 1404(a). When the chosen forum is not the plaintiff's home forum, however, the presumption in the plaintiff's favor `applies with less force, for the assumption that the chosen forum is appropriate is in such cases less reasonable. As a resident of Chatham County, the plaintiff's home forum is the Southern District of Georgia. Contrary to plaintiff's assertion, his choice of forum is not accorded the same deference that it typically receives. Though defendant is based in this district, plaintiff worked for Lyft, executed Lyft's Terms of Service, and received the allegedly unlawful texts in Chatham County. This case belongs in Georgia. (2) Convenience of the Parties The Plaintiff is currently being held without bond at the Chatham County Jail, absent a court date. Denying defendant's motion to transfer from this district wholly deprives plaintiff of the ability to participate in all aspects of the proceedings and as a potential witness. Transferring the case obviates some of these issues. The transfer is convenient for defendant as well. Defendant is embroiled in another matter with plaintiff in the Southern District of Georgia and has since obtained counsel in Georgia. Because transfer to the Southern District of Georgia is more convenient for both parties, this factor strongly weighs in favor of transfer. (3) Convenience of Witnesses At this point, neither party has identified any witnesses that they wish to call upon. Plaintiff declares that there are no witnesses in the Southern District of Georgia but fails to states where any witnesses reside. Plaintiff, however, is presumably a witness and is currently incarcerated in Georgia. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of transfer. (4) Ease of Access to the Evidence As with the issue of witnesses, it remains unclear what evidence will be brought forth by either party. Plaintiff's complaint suggests that the bulk of his evidence is in his phone, which is presumably in Georgia, in an evidence locker at the jail. Meanwhile, defendant asserts that any evidence they have is electronic and can be easily transmitted to Georgia. Because the phone contains important evidence and is not easily accessible to this district, this factor weighs in favor of transfer. (5) Forum's Familiarity With the Applicable Law TCPA is a federal statute. Both this district and the Southern District of Georgia are equally familiar with the law. Neither venue is more convenient on this basis. This factor is thus neutral. (6) Feasibility of Consolidation With Other Claims. Neither party identifies any actions in either district that would be consolidated with this claim. Accordingly, this factor is not weighed when considering defendant's motion to transfer. (7) Local Interest in the Controversy. Plaintiff is a resident of Georgia. As a resident of Georgia, this order presumes that he received the texts in Georgia. In addition, plaintiff executed Lyft's Terms of Service, effectively consenting to communications from Lyft while in Georgia. Accordingly, Georgia has a local interest in resolution of this matter. Although California also has an interest in defendant's business practices, given the unusual circumstances under which this controversy arises, Georgia ultimately has a greater interest in resolution of this claim. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of transfer. (8) Judicial Efficiency The Southern District of Georgia has a significantly smaller caseload, allowing the parties to move through the judicial process more quickly. This will likely result in more cost efficient litigation and a more timely decision, quickening the administration of justice to both parties. In addition, there is one other pending case between plaintiff and defendant in the Southern District of Georgia. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of transfer. This order finds that transfer to the Southern District of Georgia is proper. The motion to transfer is granted. A full-text copy of the District Court's June 3, 2019 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y63fbfmy from Leagle.com. Anthony A. Oliver, Plaintiff, pro se. Lyft, Inc., Defendant, represented by Daniel Paul Hart -- dhart@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP & Kerry McCoy Friedrichs -- kfriedrichs@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP. MAXIM INTERNATIONAL: Wang Seeks Unpaid Minimum & OT Wages --------------------------------------------------------- The case, YATAO WANG, on his own behalf and on behalf of others similarly situated the Plaintiff, v. MAXIM INTERNATIONAL GROUP INC. d/b/a Shanghai Broadway Restaurant, d/b/a I Noodles Modern Ramen Restaurant and d/b/a Zen Ramen and Sushi; and ZEN RAMEN AND SUSHI, INC. d/b/a I Noodles Modern Ramen Restaurant and d/b/a Zen Ramen and Sushi; YA YAN RUAN a/k/a Yayan Ruan, CELINA LIN, ZHE LIN a/k/a Zheping Lin, JESSICA "DOE", and SAM "DOE", the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-05168 (S.D.N.Y., June 2, 2019), alleges the Defendants have willfully and intentionally committed widespread violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law by engaging in pattern and practice of failing to pay its employees, including Plaintiff, minimum wage for each hour worked and overtime compensation for all hours worked over 40 each workweek. The Plaintiff alleges pursuant to the FLSA, that he is entitled to recover from the Defendants: unpaid minimum wage and unpaid overtime wages, out of pocket expenses to delivery experts on the road, liquidated damages, prejudgment and post-judgement interest; and or attorney's fees and cost.[BN] Attorney for the Plaintiff, proposed FLSA Collective and potential Rule 23 Class John Troy, Esq. TROY LAW, PLLC 41-25 Kissena Boulevard Suite 119 Flushing, NY 11355 Telephone: (718) 762-1324 MERIT RECOVERY: Default Judgment Bid in Muldowney FDCPA Suit Okayed ------------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, MATTHEW MULDOWNEY, individually and on behalf of all those similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. MERIT RECOVERY SYSTEMS, INC., Defendant, Case No. 5:18-CV-1057 (N.D. N.Y.), Judge David N. Hurd of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York granted the Plaintiff's motion for default judgment. On Feb. 12, 2018, Muldowney, individually and on behalf of all those similarly situated, filed the putative class action against Merit, alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"). The claims in the Plaintiff's complaint arise out of the Defendant's written attempt to collect a debt owed by the Plaintiff. The debt Muldowney incurred was primarily for personal medical services. Sometime after he incurred the debt, he fell behind on payments owed. Thereafter, the debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Merit. In an effort to collect the debt, the Defendant contacted the Plaintiff by letters dated March 26, 2018 and April 18, 2018. The March 26, 2018 letter listed an amount of $70 due to Crouse Hospital, and included "Debtor #: 124400." It included a space where the debtor could fill out his or her credit card information to make payment. The April 18, 2018 letter was identical; it listed an amount of $70.00 due to Crouse Hospital, included "Debtor #: 124400," and contained the same language as the March 26, 2018 letter. Neither letter provided a date of service nor itemization of the balance. Muldowney alleges the Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. Section 1692g because its collection letter was confusing from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer. The Plaintiff also contends Merit violated 15 U.S.C. Section 1692e when it used false, deceptive, or misleading representations or means in connection with attempting to collect his debt. The Plaintiff commenced the action on Sept. 4, 2018 seeking to recover for violations of the FDCPA. A summon was issued as to the Defendant on Sept. 5, 2018. The summon was returned executed on Nov. 6, 2018, indicating service had been completed on Oct. 29, 2018. The Defendant's answer was due on Nov. 18, 2018, but it failed to appear or answer. A Clerk's Certificate of Default was requested on Nov. 27, 2018 and issued Nov. 29, 2018. The Plaintiff then moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 seeking a judgment as to liability, statutory damages, and costs and attorney's fees. Judge Hurd will grant the Plaintiff's motion for a default judgment on the first and second causes of action. He finds that the Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a violation of 15 U.S.C. Section 1692e by alleging that the least sophisticated consumer would be confused by the Defendant's two letters. Muldowney has also sufficiently alleged a violation of 15 U.S.C. Section1692(g) by alleging that from the least sophisticated consumer's perspective, the letters are reasonably susceptible to have two or more meanings, one of which is inaccurate. Therefore, these allegations, if true, establish that the Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. Section 1692(g). The Plaintiff seeks "additional damages," also referred to as statutory damages, in the amount of $1,000.00, the maximum amount a court may award under § 1692k(a)(2)(A). He alleges Merit sent two confusing debt collection letters. As this is a motion for a default judgment, the Judge finds that the Defendant is deemed to have admitted these allegations. However, two confusing letters sent a little over three weeks apart with no other identified communications or conduct certainly do not demonstrate persistent or frequent noncompliance with the FDCPA. Applying the relevant factors to the facts the Plaintiff alleges, an award of statutory damages in the amount of $500 is more than appropriate. With regard to the costs that the Plaintiff seeks -- $400 for the cost of filing this action and $75 for the service of the summons and complaint -- it is found that the Plaintiff is entitled to an award of $475 in costs. With regard to attorney's fees, Muldowney seeks attorney's fees for 9.9 hours of legal work that Attorney Craig B. Sanders performed and 6.3 hours of legal work that Attorney David M. Barshay performed. The Judge will award the Plaintiff a total of $3,870 in attorney's fees, comprised of $2,295 for Attorney Sanders' 9 hours of legal work as an attorney ($250/hour) and 0.09 hours of work as a paralegal ($50/hour) and $1,575 for Attorney Barshay's 6.3 hours of legal work as an attorney ($250/hour). After carefully reviewing the Plaintiff's submissions and the applicable law, and for the reasons stated, Judge Hurd concludes that the Plaintiff has established his entitlement to default judgment for a sum certain. Therefore, he granted the Plaintiff's motion for default judgment. Damages are awarded $4,845 in the following amount: (i) statutory damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Section 1692k(a)(2)(A) - $500; (ii) costs pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Section 1692k(a)(3) - $475; (iii) attorney's fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Section 1692k(a)(3) - $3,870. The Plaintiff will personally serve a copy of the Memorandum-Decision and Order on the Defendant at its following place of business: Merit Recovery Systems, Inc. Basile Rowe Suite 6501-A East Syracuse, New York 13057 The Plaintiff will file an Affidavit of Service indicating that personal service of the Memorandum-Decision and Order on the Defendant was effected. The Clerk enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and close the case. A full-text copy of the Court's May 8, 2019 Memorandum Decision and Order is available at https://is.gd/3mCCdn from Leagle.com. Matthew Muldowney, individually and on behalf of all those similary situated, Plaintiff, represented by Craig B. Sanders, Barshay Sanders, PLLC & David Michael Barshay -- dbarshay@sbglawny.com -- Barshay Sanders, PLLC. MICHIGAN STATE: Coleman-Weathersbee Sues Over Overdraft Fees ------------------------------------------------------------ TIFFANY K. COLEMAN-WEATHERSBEE, individually, and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION and DOES 1 through 100, Defendants, Case No. 5:19-cv-11674-JEL-DRG (W.D. Mich., June 6, 2019) seeks monetary damages, restitution, and injunctive relief due to, inter alia, MSUFCU's policy and practice of assessing an overdraft fee or NSF fee on transactions when there was enough money in the checking account to cover (pay for) the transactions presented for payment. The Defendant MSUFCU wrongfully charged Plaintiff and the Class Members overdraft fees and Non-Sufficient Funds fees. The charging of such overdraft fees breaches MSUFCU's contracts with its members, who include Plaintiff and the members of the Class. This class action seeks monetary damages, restitution, and injunctive relief due to MSUFCU's policy and practice of charging multiple Non-Sufficient Funds Fees ("NSF fees") on the same electronic transaction, a practice which also violates MSUFCU's contracts with its members, who include Plaintiff and the members of the class. Because MSUFCU failed to describe its actual overdraft service in its Opt-In Contract by, inter alia, failing to describe accurately in its Opt-In Contract the actual method by which MSUFCU calculates its overdraft fees, and because, alternatively, MSUFCU also violated or did not fulfill other prerequisites of Regulation E of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act before being allowed to charge overdraft fees, it prohibited MSUFCU from assessing overdraft fees for automated teller machine (ATM) and non-recurring debit card transactions, but MSUFCU did so anyway, says the complaint. Plaintiff is a resident of Warren, Michigan and was a member of MSUFCU at all times relevant to the class action allegations. MSUFCU is a credit union with approximately 19 branches in Michigan with over 271,000 members, and holding approximately $4.3 billion in assets. MSUFCU offers its consumer banking customers a checking account.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Philip J. Goodman, Esq. Hubbard Snitchler & Parzianello, PLC 801 W. Ann Arbor Trail, Ste 240 Plymouth, MI 48170 Phone: 248-760-2996 Email: PJGoodman1@aol.com - and - Taras Kick, Esq. THE KICK LAW FIRM, APC 815 Moraga Drive Los Angeles, CA 90049 Phone: (310) 395-2988 Facsimile: (310) 395-2088 Email: Taras@Kicklawfirm.com MICHIGAN: Driver's-License Suspension Law Enforcement Order Flipped ------------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, ADRIAN FOWLER; KITIA HARRIS, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. JOCELYN BENSON, Michigan Secretary of State, in her official capacity, Defendant-Appellant, Case Nos. 17-2504/18-1089 (6th Cir.), Judge Alice M. Batchelder of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reserved the district court's order granting the Plaintiffs' motion to enjoin Michigan's Secretary of State from enforcing Michigan's driver's-license suspension law. The case is about the constitutionality of Michigan's driver's-license suspension scheme, as applied to indigent drivers. The Plaintiffs are Michigan residents who claim that their driver's licenses were suspended due to their inability to pay court debt. The Plaintiffs claim that the Michigan Secretary of State's suspension of an indigent person's driver's license, on the basis of unpaid court debt, violates the Fourteenth Amendment. They contend that suspending the driver's licenses of the poor is irrational because license suspension makes their commuting to and from work, for instance, much harder, and therefore reduces the chances that they will pay the debt. The Plaintiffs brought a putative class action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against Secretary Benson for unlawfully suspending their driver's licenses. They sought injunctive relief, claiming that Secretary Benson's suspension of the driver's licenses of the indigent who are unable to make payments violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution. The district court found only one of the Plaintiffs' constitutional claims likely to succeed on the merits -- the Plaintiffs' procedural due process claim that they were constitutionally entitled to an "ability to pay" hearing prior to the deprivation of their driver's licenses. The current version of the preliminary injunction order issued by the district court is as follows: The Defendant is enjoined from suspending any further driver's licenses of individuals because of nonpayment of any fine, cost, fee or assessment under Michigan Compiled Laws Section 257.321a unless and until Defendant or another entity: (1) offers drivers the option to request a hearing where they have the opportunity to demonstrate their inability to pay a fine, cost, fee and/or assessment; (2) provides a hearing when requested; (3) provides reasonable notice to drivers of the hearing opportunity; and (4) institutes alternatives to full payment for those unable to pay (e.g. realistic payment plans or volunteer service). As they have held before, Judge Batchelder holds that because the district court committed an error of law -- on the all-important likelihood-of-success factor, no less -- it abused its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction. The district court erred in finding the Plaintiffs likely to succeed on the merits and therefore abused its discretion in granting their requested preliminary injunction. Whatever merit the Plaintiffs' argument might have as a matter of policy, its merit as a constitutional argument is diminished by the fact that the review of state legislative choices in this arena is markedly deferential. Because the Plaintiffs have not shown that Michigan's legal scheme is devoid of a rational basis, the Judge declines the Plaintiffs' invitation to etch their preferred driver's-license policy into constitutional bedrock. Based on the foregoing, Judge Batchelder reversed the judgment of the district court, and remanded for proceedings consistent with her Opinion. A full-text copy of the Court's May 8, 2019 Opinion is available at https://is.gd/Ir3BzA from Leagle.com. ARGUED: John G. Fedynsky -- fedynskyj@michigan.gov -- OFFICE OF THE MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellant. Phil Telfeyan, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF: John G. Fedynsky, OFFICE OF THE MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellant. Phil Telfeyan -- ptelfeyan@equaljusticeunderlaw.org -- Rebecca Ramaswamy, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW, Washington, D.C., John C. Philo -- jphilo@sugarlaw.org -- MAURICE & JANE SUGAR LAW CENTER FOR ECONOMIC & SOCIAL JUSTICE, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellees. MIDLAND CREDIT: Accetta FDCPA Class Suit Removed to E.D. New York ----------------------------------------------------------------- The class action lawsuit styled Angela Accetta, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., Case No. 625094/2018, was removed on May 17, 2019, from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Central Islip). The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:19-cv-02938 to the proceeding. The lawsuit alleges violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.[BN] Defendant Midland Credit Management, Inc., is represented by: Dana Brett Briganti, Esq. HINSHAW & CULBERTSON LLP 800 Third Avenue, 13th Floor New York, NY 10022 Telephone: (212) 471-6200 Facsimile: (212) 935-1166 E-mail: dbriganti@hinshawlaw.com MIDLAND CREDIT: Alarimo Suit Moved From Suffolk to E.D. New York ---------------------------------------------------------------- The class action lawsuit titled Joseph Alarimo, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., Case No. 625087/2018, was removed on May 17, 2019, from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Central Islip). The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:19-cv-02935 to the proceeding. The lawsuit is brought over alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.[BN] Defendant Midland Credit Management, Inc., is represented by: Matthew B. Corwin, Esq. HINSHAW & CULBERTSON, LLP 800 Third Avenue, 13th Floor New York, NY 10022 Telephone: (212) 471-6200 Facsimile: (212) 935-1166 E-mail: mcorwin@hinshawlaw.com MONSANTO COMPANY: Barr Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup ---------------------------------------------------------- John Barr, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-01551 (E.D. Mo., June 3, 2019), seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct in connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the active ingredient glyphosate. The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Plaintiff's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated victims across the country, were avoidable. The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA). As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma. Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products, including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide, Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN] Attorneys for the Plaintiff: Kirk J. Goza, Esq. GOZA & HONNOLD LLC 9500 Nall Ave. Suite 400 Overland Park, KS 66207 Telephone: (913) 451-3433 Facsimile: (913) 839-0567 E-mail: kgoza@gohonlaw.com MONSANTO COMPANY: Bichler Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup ------------------------------------------------------------- John Bichler, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-01550 (E.D. Mo., June 3, 2019), seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct in connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the active ingredient glyphosate. The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Plaintiff's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated victims across the country, were avoidable. The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA). As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma. Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products, including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide, Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN] Attorneys for the Plaintiff: Kirk J. Goza, Esq. GOZA & HONNOLD LLC 9500 Nall Ave. Suite 400 Overland Park, KS 66207 Telephone: (913) 451-3433 Facsimile: (913) 839-0567 E-mail: kgoza@gohonlaw.com MONSANTO COMPANY: Combs Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup ----------------------------------------------------------- ANGELA COMBS, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-02826-VC (E.D. Mo., April 25, 2019), seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct in connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the active ingredient glyphosate. The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Plaintiff's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated victims across the country, were avoidable. The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA). As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma. Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products, including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide, Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN] Attorneys for the Plaintiff: Seth S. Webb, Esq. BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C. 211 North Broadway, Suite 1600 St. Louis, MO 63102 Telephone: (314) 222-2222 Facsimile: (314) 421-0359 E-mail: sethw@getbc.com MONSANTO COMPANY: Holeman Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup ------------------------------------------------------------- TERRY HOLEMAN, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-02821-VC (E.D. Mo., April 24, 2019), seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct in connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the active ingredient glyphosate. The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Plaintiff's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated victims across the country, were avoidable. The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA). As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma. Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products, including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide, Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN] Attorneys for the Plaintiff: Seth S. Webb, Esq. BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C. 211 North Broadway, Suite 1600 St. Louis, MO 63102 Telephone: (314) 222-2222 Facsimile: (314) 421-0359 E-mail: sethw@getbc.com MONSANTO COMPANY: Poiriez Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup ------------------------------------------------------------- Bradley Ray Poiriez, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-01043-BEN-LL (S.D. Cal., June 3, 2019), seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct in connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the active ingredient glyphosate. The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Plaintiff's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated victims across the country, were avoidable. The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA). As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma. Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products, including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide, Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN] Attorneys for the Plaintiff: Gerald Singleton, Esq. Mark F. Fleming, Esq. John C. Lemon, Esq. Erika L. Vasquez, Esq. SINGLETON LAW FIRM, APC 450 A Street, 5th Floor San Diego, CA 92101 Telephone: (619) 771-3473 Facsimile: (619) 255-1515 E-mail: gerald@slffirm.com mark@slffirm.com john@slffirm.com erika@slffirm.com - and - Timothy A. Scott, Esq. Nicolas O. Jimenez, Esq. SCOTT TRIAL LAWYERS, APC 1350 Columbia Street, Suite 600 San Diego, CA 92101 Telephone: (619) 794-0451 Facsimile: (619) 652-9964 E-mail: tas@scotttriallawyers.com noj@scotttriallawyers.com MONSANTO COMPANY: Vejil Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup ----------------------------------------------------------- Virginia Vejil, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-01546 (E.D. Mo., June 3, 2019), seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct in connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the active ingredient glyphosate. The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Plaintiff's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated victims across the country, were avoidable. The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA). As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma. Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products, including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide, Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN] Attorneys for the Plaintiff: Kirk J. Goza, Esq. GOZA & HONNOLD LLC 9500 Nall Ave. Suite 400 Overland Park, KS 66207 Telephone: (913) 451-3433 Facsimile: (913) 839-0567 E-mail: kgoza@gohonlaw.com MONSANTO COMPANY: Young Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup ----------------------------------------------------------- Wendall Young, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-01641 (E.D. Mo., June 6, 2019), seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct in connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the active ingredient glyphosate. The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Plaintiff's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated victims across the country, were avoidable. The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA). As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma. Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products, including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide, Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN] Attorneys for the Plaintiff: Kirk J. Goza, Esq. GOZA & HONNOLD LLC 9500 Nall Ave. Suite 400 Overland Park, KS 66207 Telephone: (913) 451-3433 Facsimile: (913) 839-0567 E-mail: kgoza@gohonlaw.com MOVING SOLUTIONS: Court Rejects Settlement in Middle Rider Case ---------------------------------------------------------------- BARBARA MIDDLE RIDER, et al., the Plaintiffs, vs. MOVING SOLUTIONS, INC., et al., the Defendants, Case 5:17-cv-04015-LHK (N.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Lucy H. Koh entered an order on June 3, 2019, denying Plaintiff's motion for preliminary approval without prejudice. The Court said, "On March 8, 2019, Plaintiffs filed their motion for preliminary approval and their proposed Class Notice and Claim Form. At the May 23, 2019, preliminary approval hearing, the Court found the proposed Class Notice and Claim Form inadequate and instructed the parties to amend the proposed Class Notice and Claim Form by May 30, 2019. The Court warned that if the parties failed to file an adequate amended Class Notice or an adequate amended Claim Form, the Court would deny the motion for preliminary approval without prejudice. On May 30, 2019, the parties filed their amended Class Notice and amended Claim Form. The Court finds the amended Class Notice inadequate. As an initial matter, the amended Class Notice does not clearly identify the causes of action and the relief available for each cause of action. Moreover, some of the information in the amended Class Notice is incomplete, inaccurate or contradictory." This is a class action complaint filed on behalf of nonexempt movers against the Defendants. As reported by the Class Action Reporter, the Plaintiffs moved for preliminary approval of a class action settlement. After a full day of mediation, the Parties agreed to settle this case for $470,000 to be paid by the Defendants. The Settlement Sum includes attorney's fees, costs and expenses directly related to the case. The Settlement Administration costs are estimated to be $16,000. Under the deal, Class Representatives Barbara Middle Rider, Robert Garza, Albert Arellano, and Jose Don Coronado shall receive Service Awards of $5,000 each. Subject to Court approval, Class Counsel will be paid up to $117,500 for attorneys' fees, and an additional amount for reasonable litigation costs not to exceed $8,500. The members of the class shall recover damages based upon the number of work weeks they worked during the class period. The net settlement is an estimated $290,183. If every potential claimant returns a claim form, then a total of approximately 17,225 work weeks will be paid. In that case each claimant shall be paid approximately $16.85 for every week they worked for the Defendants. A Further Case Management Conference is now for July 3, 2019 at 2:00 p.m. in San Jose, Courtroom 8, 4th Floor. A Joint Case Management Statement is due 7 days prior, by June 26, 2019.[CC] The Plaintiffs are represented by: James Dal Bon, Esq. LAW OFFICE OF JAMES DAL BON 606 N. 1st St. San Jose, CA 95112 Telephone: (408) 466-5845 Facsimile: (408) 286-7111 E-mail: jdb@wagedefenders.com - and - Victoria L.H. Booke, Esq. BOOKE & AJLOUNY 606 North First Street San Jose, CA 95112 Telephone: (408) 286-7000 Facsimile: (408) 286-7111 E-mail: vbooke@bookelaw.com NATIONAL RECOVERY: Second Circuit Appeal Filed in Pettaway Suit --------------------------------------------------------------- Plaintiff Jean M. Pettaway filed an appeal from the District Court's order and judgment, both entered on May 20, 2019, in the lawsuit titled Pettaway v. National Recovery Solutions LLC, et al., Case No. 19-cv-1328, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York City). The nature of suit is stated as consumer credit. The appellate case is captioned as Pettaway v. National Recovery Solutions LLC, et al., Case No. 19-1453, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN] Plaintiff-Appellant Jean M. Pettaway, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, is represented by: Andrew T. Thomasson, Esq. STERN THOMASSON LLP 150 Morris Avenue Springfield, NJ 07081 Telephone: (973) 379-7500 E-mail: Andrew@sternthomasson.com Defendants-Appellees National Recovery Solutions, LLC and US Asset Management Inc. are represented by: Brian D. Gwitt, Esq. WOODS OVIATT GILMAN, LLP 350 Main Street 1900 Main Place Tower Buffalo, NY 14202 Telephone: (716) 248-3213 E-mail: bgwitt@woodsoviatt.com NILKANTH MAHADEV: Delacruz Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York ---------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Nilkanth Mahadev LLC. The case is styled as Emanuel Delacruz And On Behalf of All Other Persons Similarly Situated, Plaintiff v. Nilkanth Mahadev LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-05377 (S.D. N.Y., June 7, 2019). The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Nilkanth Mahadev Llc is a company located at 370 4Th Ave, Brooklyn, registered as a domestic limited liability company in Kings county.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Jeffrey Michael Gottlieb, Esq. 150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR New York, NY 10003 Phone: (212) 228-9795 Fax: (212) 982-6284 Email: nyjg@aol.com NPSG GLOBAL: Court Denies Proposed Discovery Plan in Reese Suit --------------------------------------------------------------- The United States District Court for the District of Nevada issued an Order denying Parties' Proposed Discovery Plan in the case captioned DEVONTE REESE, Plaintiff(s), v. NPSG GLOBAL, LLC, Defendant(s). Case No. 2:19-cv-00209-JCM-NJK. (D. Nev.). This case involves putative collective action and class action claims. The proposed discovery plan does not include any provisions regarding those aspects of the case. Accordingly, it is denied without prejudice. An amended proposed discovery plan that discusses certification shall be filed by June 10, 2019. A full-text copy of the District Court's June 3, 2019 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y3yo2cfg from Leagle.com. DeVonte' Reese, Plaintiff, represented by Marta D. Kurshumova -- mkurshumova@hkm.com -- HKM Employment Attorneys & Jenny L. Foley -- jfoley@hkm.com -- HKM EMPLOYMENT ATTORNEYS LLP. NPSG Global, LLC., Defendant, represented by Kirsten Ann Milton -- Kirsten.Milton@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis PC, pro hac vice, Daniel Aquino -- Daniel.Aquino@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis P.C. & Lisa A. McClane -- Lisa.McClane@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis P.C.. OS RESTAURANT: Briggs Seeks to Certify Class & Subclass ------------------------------------------------------- In a class action lawsuit, LLOYD T. BRIGGS III, on behalf of himself, all other aggrieved employees pursuant to the California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. OS RESTAURANT SERVICES, LLC, a Florida limited liability company; BLOOMIN' BRANDS, INC., a Florida corporation; and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-08457-JAK-AFM (C.D. Cal., Aug, 22, 2018), the Plaintiff will move the Court for an order on July 22, 2019: 1. approving class certification as to Plaintiff's First through Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Claims on behalf of the following class and subclasses: Class: "all persons employed by Defendants at their Fleming's restaurants in California as non-exempt employees from August 22, 2014 through the date of the Order granting class certification"; Wage Statement Penalty Subclass: "all persons employed by Defendants from August 16, 2017 through the date of the Order granting class certification"; Waiting Time Penalty Subclass: "all members of the Class whose employment 17 with Defendants has ended"; 2. appointing Felahy Employment Lawyers and all members of the Class who were Yash Law Group as class counsel; 3. appointing Plaintiff as the representative of the Class; and 4. directing to class members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances. The Plaintiff moves for certification of claims on behalf of 6 himself and other Class members, comprised of former and current employees at Defendants' restaurants, who were subjected to, and harmed by, Defendants' wage-and-hour policies and practices that violated the California Labor Code and the California Unfair Competition Law. The policies and practices had a common detrimental impact on Class members and, in particular, deprived them of wages and reimbursements. Resolution of class-wide liability against Defendants for their wage-and-hour violations is susceptible to common proof, such as employee time records, pay stubs, and Defendants' written policies.[CC] Attorneys for the Plaintiff: Allen Felahy, Esq. FELAHY EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS 550 South Hope Street, Suite 2655 Los Angeles, CA 90071 Telephone: (323) 645-5197 Facsimile: (323) 645-5198 E-mail: afelahy@felahylaw.com - and - Yashdeep Singh, Esq. YASH LAW GROUP 550 South Hope Street, Suite 2655 Los Angeles, CA 90071 Telephone: (714) 494-6244 Facsimile: (714) 406-2722 E-mail: ysingh@yashlaw.com OVERHILL FARMS: Aguilar Files Suit for Breach of Contract --------------------------------------------------------- Armando Aguilar and Julia Cumberland, on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. USAA General Indemnity Co. and United States Automobile Association, Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-00866 (M.D. Fla., May 15, 2019), is a breach of contract suit over insurance issues. USAA General Indemnity Company operates as an insurance firm while United Services Automobile Association is a Texas-based diversified financial services company. [BN] Plaintiff is represented by: Andrew John Shamis Shamis & Gentile, PA Suite 1205, 14 NE 1st Ave. Miami, FL 33132 Tel: (305) 479-2299 Fax: (786) 623-0915 Email: ashamis@sflinjuryattorneys.com - and - Christopher J. Lynch CHRISTOPHER J. LYNCH, P.A 6915 SW 57 Avenue, Suite 208 South Miami, FL 33143 Tel: (305) 443-6200 Email: clynch@hunterlynchlaw.com - and - Jacob Lawrence Phillips, Esq. Normand Law PLLC 62 West Colonial Street, Suite 209 Orlando, FL 32814 Tel: (407) 603-6031 Email: jacob.phillips@normandpllc.com - and - Scott Adam Edelsberg EDELSBERG LAW, PA 2875 NE 191st Street, Suite 703 Aventura, FL 33180 Tel: (305) 975-3320 Email: scott@edelsberglaw.com - and - Edmund A. Normand, Esq. NORMAND PLLC 3165 McCrory Place, Suite 175 Orlando, FL 32803 Tel: (407) 603-6031 Email: ed@ednormand.com PNS STORES: Wellons Appeals S.D. California Ruling to 9th Circuit ----------------------------------------------------------------- Plaintiffs S. Wellons, et al., filed an appeal from a Court ruling in their lawsuit entitled S. Wellons, et al. v. PNS Stores, Inc., et al., Case No. 3:18-cv-02913-DMS-WVG, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, San Diego. As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the class action lawsuit alleges violations of labor laws. The lawsuit was originally filed in the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of San Diego (assigned Case No. 37-02018 00015587-CU-OE-CTL) and was removed to the District Court on December 31, 2018. Judge Dana M. Sabraw and Magistrate Judge William V. Gallo are assigned to the case. PNS Stores operates as a community retailer. The appellate case is captioned as S. Wellons, et al. v. PNS Stores, Inc., et al., Case No. 19-80063, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.[BN] Plaintiffs-Petitioners S. WELLONS, et al., are represented by: David J. Gallo, Esq. LAW OFFICES OF DAVID J. GALLO 12702 Via Cortina, Suite 500 Del Mar, CA 92014-3769 Telephone: (619) 509-3652 Defendants-Respondent PNS STORES, INC., a California corporation, and BIG LOTS STORES, INC., an Ohio Corporation, are represented by: Michael Jacob Ball, Esq. Mark A. Knueve, Esq. VORYS, SATER, SEYMOUR AND PEASE LLP 52 East Gay Street Columbus, OH 43215 Telephone: (614) 464-5625 E-mail: mjball@vorys.com maknueve@vorys.com PRIME LEADS: Boger Sues Over Intrusive Telemarketing Practices -------------------------------------------------------------- DAN BOGER on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. PRIME LEADS NETWORK, LLC, THE DEVINE GROUP, JOSEPH GIGUERE INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., and ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY Defendants, Case No. 8:19-cv-01681-GJH (D. Md., June 7, 2019) is an action enforcing the consumer-privacy provisions of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, a federal statute enacted in 1991 in response to widespread public outrage about the proliferation of intrusive, nuisance telemarketing practices. Allstate Insurance Company, through their exclusive agents Joseph Giguere Insurance Agency, Inc. and The Devine Group, hired the co-defendant, Prime Leads Network, who made multiple telemarketing calls to a cellular telephone number of Mr. Boger for the purposes of advertising Allstate Insurance Company goods and services using an automated dialing system, which is prohibited by the TCPA. Prime Leads made telemarketing calls to Mr. Boger even after he contacted Allstate and Prime Leads and requested that his cellular telephone number be placed on their Internal Do Not Call List. Plaintiff never consented to receive the calls, which were placed to him for telemarketing purposes, says the complaint. Plaintiff Dan Boger is a resident of the state of Maryland. Allstate Insurance Company provides various insurance services to its customers.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Stephen H. Ring, Esq. STEPHEN H. RING, PC 9901 Belward Campus Drive, Suite 175 Rockville, MD 20850 Phone: (301) 563-9249 Email: shr@ringlaw.us PROCTER & GAMBLE: Marsh Seeks to Certify 2 Classes -------------------------------------------------- In a class action lawsuit, CASSIDY MARSH, on behalf of himself, and all others similarly situated, and as an "aggrieved employee" on behalf of other "aggrieved employees" under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, the Plaintiff, v. THE PROCTER & GAMBLE PAPER PRODUCTS COMPANY, an Ohio corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-04944-R-E (C.D. Cal.), the Plaintiff will move the Court for an order on July 1, 2019: 1. finally approving a Stipulation and Class Action Settlement Agreement; 2. confirming the certification of the Classes solely for settlement purposes pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23; 3. confirming the appointment of David Spivak of The Spivak Law Firm and Walter Haines of the United Employees Law Group as Class Counsel; 4. confirming the appointment of Plaintiff as class representative; 5. granting final approval to a Service Award of $15,000 to Plaintiff in recognition of his services as class representative; 6. granting final approval to a Fees Award in the amount of $216,666 for attorneys’ fees to Class Counsel; 7. granting final approval to a Costs Award of $9,992.44 in actual litigation costs to Class Counsel; 8. granting final approval to a payment of $7,000 to Simpluris, Inc. for its services as the Settlement Administrator; 9. granting final approval to an allocation of $20,000 to PAGA claims for civil penalties under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General act of 2004, Labor Code sections 2698, et seq. 19 ("PAGA Award"), of which $15,000 will be paid to the Labor and Workforce Development agency ("LWDA") and $5,000 of which will be included within the Net Distribution Fund to be made available for distribution to Class Members; and 10. directing that [Proposed] Final Approval Order and Final Judgment submitted be entered as called for under the Settlement. The "Class Members" are those current and former employees who comprise 8 Hour Class and/or the 12 Hour Class and who do not opt out of 3 the Settlement: The 8 Hour Class is defined as: "all current and former hourly, non-exempt employees who were employed by The Procter & Gamble Paper Products Company in California at any time from April 10, 2014 through February 1, 2019, who were regularly scheduled to work 8 hour shifts." The 12 Hour Class is defined as: "all current and former hourly, non-exempt employees who were employed by The Procter & Gamble Paper Products Company in California at any time from April 10, 2014 through February 1, 2019, who were regularly scheduled to work rotating 12 hour night/day shifts." A member of one of these Classes may also be a member of the other Class. To the extent putative Class Members are members of both the 8 Hour Class and the 12 Hour Class, their proportionate payout will depend on the number of weeks worked in each Class.[CC] Attorneys for the Plaintiff and all others similarly situated David G. Spivak, Esq. Caroline Tahmassian, Esq. THE SPIVAK LAW FIRM 16530 Ventura Blvd., Ste 203 Encino, CA 91436 Telephone (818) 582-3086 Facsimile (818) 582-2561 E-mail: david@spivaklaw.com caroline@spivaklaw.com - and - Walter Haines, Esq. UNITED EMPLOYEES LAW GROUP 5500 Bolsa Ave., Suite 201 Huntington Beach, CA 92649 Telephone: (562) 256-1047 Facsimile: (562) 256-1006 E-mail: walter@uelglaw.com QUEST DIAGNOSTICS: Carbonneau Sues Over Data Breach --------------------------------------------------- FRANCIS CARBONNEAU, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. QUEST DIAGNOSTICS INCORPORATED, AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLECTION AGENCY, INC., and OPTUM360, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-13472 (D. N.J., June 6, 2019) is a class action lawsuit on behalf of a Nationwide Class and a Massachusetts Sub-Class to address Defendants' inadequate safeguarding of class members' Sensitive Information. This is a data breach class action on behalf of 11.9 million patients whose sensitive personal information was accessed by computer hackers in a cyber-attack. Information compromised in the Data Breach includes Social Security numbers, financial information (e.g., credit card numbers and bank account information), medical information, other protected health information as defined by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"), and additional personal information (collectively, "Sensitive Information"). The Defendant AMCA failed to properly safeguard class members' Sensitive Information, allowing hackers to access their Sensitive Information for eight months. AMCA also failed to properly monitor its systems. Had it properly monitored its systems, it would have discovered the intrusion much sooner than eight months after the breach began. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff and class members have been exposed to a heightened and imminent risk of fraud and identity theft. Plaintiffs and class members must now and in the future closely monitor their financial accounts to guard against identity theft. Plaintiff and class members may also incur out of pocket costs for, e.g., purchasing credit monitoring services, credit freezes, credit reports, or other protective measures to deter and detect identity theft. Plaintiff seeks to remedy these harms on behalf of himself and all similarly-situated individuals whose Sensitive Information was accessed during the Data Breach, says the complaint. Plaintiff Francis Carbonneau is an individual residing in Massachusetts and has been a patient of Quest within the past year. Quest is the world's leading provider of medical diagnostic testing services. It performs medical tests that aid in the diagnosis or detection of diseases, and that measure the progress of or recovery from a disease.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Peter S. Pearlman, Esq. COHN LIFLAND PEARLMAN HERRMANN & KNOPF LLP Park 80 West - Plaza One 250 Pehle Avenue, Suite 401 Saddle Brook, NJ 07663 Phone: (201) 845-9600 Fax: (201) 845-9423 Email: psp@njlawfirm.com - and - Sherrie Savett, Esq. Shanon Carson, Esq. Jon Lambiras, Esq. BERGER MONTAGUE, PC 1818 Market Street, Suite 3600 Philadelphia, PA 19103 Phone: (215) 875-3000 Fax: (215) 875-4604 Email: ssavett@bm.net scarson@bm.net jlambiras@bm.net REPUBLIC PARKING: Abrar et al. Suit Transferred to Mass. Cmmw. -------------------------------------------------------------- The case, MOHAMED ABRAR, HUSSEIN HUSSEIN AND SHIFERAW AWLACHEW, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. REPUBLIC PARKING SYSTEM, LLC and SCOTT TITMUS, Defendants, Case No. 1981-CV-00991 (Filed on April 16, 2019), was transferred from the Middlesex County Superior Court to the Trial Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts on May 24, 2019. In the complaint, Plaintiffs Mohamed Abrar, Hussein Hussein and Shiferaw Awlachew allege that the Defendants habitually refused to pay them and other employees for hourly wages worked, overtime and travel time. The Trial Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-11183-GAO to the proceeding. Republic Parking is a limited liability company which provides parking and transportation services at airports and urban markets throughout Massachusetts. Scott Titmus serves as the president and registered manager of Republic Parking. [BN] Attorneys for Defendant: Robert A. Fisher, Esq. Hillary J. Massey, Esq. SEYFARTH SHAW LLP Seaport East Two Seaport Lane, Suite 300 Boston, MA 02210-2028 Telephone: (617) 946-4800 Facsimile: (617) 946-4801 SAEJ ENTERPRISES: McMillan Seeks Overtime Wages for Operators ------------------------------------------------------------- RYAN McMILLAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. SAEJ ENTERPRISES, L.L.C. d/b/a SAEJ ENTERPRISES, the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00091-DLH-CRH (D.N.D., May 31, 2019), seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages and other damages from Saej Enterprises, L.L.C. under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the North Dakota Wage Laws. According to the complaint, McMillan and the other workers like him were typically scheduled for 12-hour shifts, 7 days a week, for weeks at a time. McMillan and these workers often worked even more than that, but never received an overtime premium for hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a single workweek. Saej employs pump/lease operators to perform its oilfield support work. Many of these individuals worked for Saej performing the same or substantially similar job duties as McMillan and were misclassified by Saej as so-called independent contractors in connection with Saej's oilfield operations. While exact job titles and job duties may slightly differ, McMillan and the Putative Class Members were subjected to the same or similar illegal pay practices for similar work. Instead of paying overtime as required by the FLSA, Seaj paid these workers the same hourly rate for all hours worked and improperly classified them as independent contractors, the lawsuit says. Saej is an oilfield services company.[BN] Attorneys for the Plaintiff: Matthew S. Parmet, Esq. PARMET PC PO Box 540907 800 Sawyer St. Houston, TX 77254 Telephone: 713 999 5228 Facsimile: 713 999 1187 E-mail: matt@parmet.law - and - Edmond S. Moreland, Jr., Esq. MORELAND VERRETT, P.C. 700 West Summit Dr. Wimberley, TX 78676 Telephone: 512 782 0567 Facsimile: 512 782 0605 E-mail: edmond@morelandlaw.com SCELZI ENTERPRISES: Court Extends Murray Responsive Pleading Filing ------------------------------------------------------------------- The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California issued an Order extending the Filing of Responsive Pleading on Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint in the case captioned RODERICK MURRAY, an individual, on behalf of the State of California, as a private attorney general, and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Plaintiff, v. SCELZI ENTERPRISES, INC., a California corporation, and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendant(s). Case No. 1:18-CV-01492-LJO-SKO. (E.D. Cal.). On or about January 31, 2019, pursuant to Rule 15(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint in response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, rendering Defendant's Motion moot. Thereafter the Parties, through their counsel of record at that time, met and conferred regarding the issues raised in the action and agreed to participate in private mediation with wage and hour class action mediator Lisa Klerman in attempt to resolve the action. On or about February 5, 2019, Plaintiff and Defendant submitted a Joint Stipulation by which, among other things, Defendant was to file a responsive pleading to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint not later than June 1, 2019. On or about April 8, 2019, Defendant filed a proposed Consent Order by which Defendant substituted in the law firm of Sutton Hague Law Corporation as its counsel of record in this matter. The Plaintiff and the Defendant and their counsel of record participated in a full-day mediation session with Ms. Klerman on May 28, 2019. The Parties did not reach a resolution of the case during the May 28, 2019 mediation session, but desire to continue in negotiations over the coming days with the assistance of Ms. Klerman and, if possible to avoid the need for anticipated motion practice that would be entailed in Defendant's filing of a responsive pleading. A full-text copy of the District Court's June 3, 2019 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y3b36b7w from Leagle.com. Roderick Murray, an individual, on behalf of the State of California, as a private attorney general, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jonathan Melmed -- jm@melmedlaw.com -- Melmed Law Group P.C. & Craig Justin Ackermann -- cja@ackermanntilajef.com -- Ackermann & Tilajef, PC. Scelzi Enterprises, Inc., a California corporation, Defendant, represented by S. Brett Sutton -- brett@suttonhague.com -- Sutton Hague Law Corporation, P.C.. SCHNEIDER LOGISTICS: Parsittie Labor Suit Removed to C.D. Cal. -------------------------------------------------------------- The case captioned Rick Parsittie, on behalf of himself, all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Schneider Logistics, Inc., Schneider Logistics Transportation, Inc., Schneider Logistics Transloading and Distribution, Inc., Connect Staffing, Inc. and Does 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 18CV335339 (Cal. Super., September 21, 2018), was removed to the United States District Court for the Central District of California on May 17, 2019 under Case No. 19-cv-03981. Parsittie seeks compensatory damages, economic and/or special damages, penalties, restitution, unpaid wages and benefits, attorneys' fees, costs and interest pursuant to the California Labor Code.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Shaun Setareh, Esq. Alexandra R. McIntosh, Esq. William M. Pao, Esq. SETAREH LAW GROUP 9454 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 907 Beverly Hills, CA 90212 Telephone: (310) 888-7771 Facsimile: (310) 888-0109 Email: shaun@setarehlaw.com alex@setearehlaw.com william@setarehlaw.com Schneider Logistics is represented by: Matthew C. Kane, Esq. Sabrina A. Beldner, Esq. Sean M. Sullivan, Esq. MCGUIREWOODS LLP 1800 Century Park East, 8th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90067-1501 Tel: (310) 315-8200 Fax: (310) 315-8210 Email: mkane@mcguirewoods.com sbeldner@mcguirewoods.com ssulivan@mcguirewoods.com - and - Sylvia J. Kim, Esq. MCGUIREWOODS LLP 2 Embarcadero Center, Suite 1300 San Francisco, CA 94111 Telephone: (415) 844-9944 Facsimile: (415) 844-9922 Email: skim@mcguirewoods.com SECOND ROUND: Thompson-Bailey Sues over Debt Collection Practices ----------------------------------------------------------------- ANEITA THOMPSON-BAILEY, individually and on behalf of all those similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. SECOND ROUND SUB, LLC, the Defendants, Case No. 0:19-cv-61377-XXXX (S.D. Fla., June 2, 2019), alleges that Defendant violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act. According to the complaint, the Defendant is engaged in the business of collecting consumer debts. The Defendant regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another. The Defendant began attempting collect a consumer debts from Plaintiff. The Defendant mailed a collection letter, dated January 29, 2019. The Defendant has never registered, or otherwise been licensed, to collect consumer debts from Florida consumers in accordance with Fla. Stat. Section 559.553. The Defendant cannot legally collect, or attempt to collect, the Consumer Debt from Plaintiff without first registering, and thereafter maintaining, a valid consumer collection agency license in accordance with Fla. Stat. Sections 559.553(1) and (2), the lawsuit says. The Defendant's collection activities against Plaintiff constitute a criminal misdemeanor under Florida law. The Plaintiff paid money to Defendant for a debt allegedly which Defendant sought to collect from Plaintiff. The Defendant received the payment and did not return it to Plaintiff despite the fact the payment made to Defendant included amounts which Defendant did not have the legal authority to assess or otherwise collect from Plaintiff.[BN] Counsel for the Plaintiff: Jibrael S. Hindi, Esq. Thomas J. Patti, Esq. THE LAW OFFICES OF JIBRAEL S. HINDI 110 SE 6th Street, Suite 1744 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 Telephone: 954-907-1136 Facsimile: 855-529-9540 E-mail: jibrael@jibraellaw.com tom@jibraellaw.com SINGING RIVER: Court Grants Arbitration Bid in B. Baria Suit ------------------------------------------------------------ The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Southern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration in the case captioned BARRETT BARIA; et al., Plaintiffs, v. SINGING RIVER ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE also known as Singing River Electric Power Association, Defendant. Cause No. 1:19cv248-LG-JCG. (S.D. Miss.). The Singing River Electric Cooperative (Singing River) is a rural electric cooperative providing electricity to tens of thousands of Mississippi residents and businesses. In this putative class-action lawsuit, Plaintiffs who are ratepaying members of Singing River allege that Singing River has wrongfully withheld and continues to wrongfully withhold patronage capital from current and former members that, under Mississippi law, should have been disbursed to the Cooperative's members. Singing River argues throughout its briefing on both motions that (1) its bylaws establish the terms and conditions upon which it renders electrical service to members (2) the bylaws contain a valid arbitration agreement and (3) the arbitration agreement contains a valid delegation clause. The Plaintiffs agree that Singing River's bylaws establish terms and conditions of service. However, because the bylaws were simply incorporated by reference in the single page application for electricity which is the only contractual document the Plaintiffs signed and did not, itself, contain an arbitration provision Plaintiffs contend that neither the arbitration agreement nor its delegation clause are valid. Section 11.05 of Singing River's bylaws provides in pertinent part, UNLESS OTHERWISE PROHIBITED BY LAW, ANY CONTROVERSY OR CLAIM ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING TO THESE BYLAWS, OR THE BREACH THEREOF, OR ANY CONTROVERSY OR CLAIM ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING TO PATRONAGE CAPITAL SHALL BE RESOLVED BY BINDING ARBITRATION ADMINISTERED BY THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS ARBITRATION RULES AFTER ALL CONDITIONS PRECEDENT AS SET FORTH IN ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 8.01, IF APPLICABLE, HAVE BEEN MET. THIS AGREEMENT INVOLVES INTERSTATE COMMERCE SUCH THAT THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT, 9 U.S.C. Section 1, ET SEQ. SHALL GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THIS ARBITRATION AGREEMENT. THE ARBITRATION SHALL BE HELD IN THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI AT A LOCATION TO BE DESIGNATED BY THE PARTY NOT MAKING THE INITIAL DEMAND FOR ARBITRATION. A JUDGMENT ON THE AWARD RENDERED BY THE ARBITRATOR SHALL BE ENTERED IN ANY COURT HAVING JURISDICTION THEREOF. EACH PARTY AGREES TO PAY ITS OWN ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS, AND EACH PARTY AGREES TO SHARE EQUALLY IN THE COST OF THE ARBITRATOR. On its face, this appears to be a valid arbitration agreement between the Plaintiffs and Singing River. Notwithstanding, the Plaintiffs contend that they did not agree to arbitrate their claims. They say the only document presented to them at the time they signed up for service with Singing River was a one-page application devoid of any reference to arbitration. They also assert that, if the arbitration clause was added to the bylaws subsequent to commencing service, they never received notice of the Board's intent to make this amendment. Essentially, the Plaintiffs contend that they could not have assented to this arbitration clause because they were unaware of the provision both when they applied for service and during the pendency of their service contract. Thus, say the Plaintiffs, they never entered into an agreement to arbitrate. Parties are free to delegate threshold questions to the arbitrator under the FAA. The Fifth Circuit has held that, generally, stipulating that the American Arbitration Association (AAA) Rules will govern the arbitration of disputes constitutes clear and unmistakable' evidence that the parties agreed to arbitrate threshold questions. Section 11.05 of Singing River's bylaws plainly stipulate that the AAA Rules will govern arbitration. Plaintiffs argue to the contrary by rehashing their arguments challenging the enforceability of the arbitration provision and affixing the additional contention that the delegation clause cannot be valid because the underlying arbitration agreement is invalid. Again, for present purposes, the Court is concerned with whether the parties manifested intent to arbitrate threshold questions, not whether Plaintiffs' agreement to incorporate the AAA rules was valid.Section 11.05 of the bylaws expressly incorporates the AAA rules. The parties have therefore clearly and unmistakably demonstrated their intent to delegate. The Plaintiffs do not specifically challenge the validity of the delegation clause. Rather, their arguments contend that the arbitration provision as a whole is unenforceable under Mississippi law. Because the Plaintiffs' challenge is not specific to the delegation clause, they must present it to an arbitrator. A full-text copy of the District Court's June 3, 2019 Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yysvtjn6 from Leagle.com. Barrett Baria, Edward Zielinski & Lorraine Zielinski, as named Plaintiffs representing a class of Mississippi citizens, Plaintiffs, represented by Brannon L. Berry -- brannon.berry@cs-law.com -- COSMICH, SIMMONS & BROWN, PLLC & Justin R. Glenn -- jglenn@cs-law.com -- COSMICH, SIMMONS & BROWN, PLLC. Singing River Electric Cooperative, also known as Singing River Electric Power Association, Defendant, represented by Robert M. Gore -- RGore@RobinsKaplan.com -- HOLLAND & KNIGHT, LLP, pro hac vice. SPERIAN ENERGY: Brady Suit Transferred From N.D. to C.D. Illinois ----------------------------------------------------------------- The class action lawsuit captioned INTIRA BRADY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. SPERIAN ENERGY CORPORATION, Case No. 1:18-cv-06968, was transferred on May 17, 2019, from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois (Springfield). The Central District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:19-cv-03128-SEM-TSH to the proceeding. The action seeks to redress the Defendant's alleged deceptive conduct and bad faith pricing practices that have caused thousands of Illinois consumers to pay considerably more for their electricity than they should otherwise have paid. The Plaintiff alleges that Sperian has exploited the deregulation of the retail electricity market in Illinois by luring consumers into switching energy suppliers using a bait-and-switch scheme designed to deceive reasonable consumers.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Richard J. Burke, Esq. Jamie E. Weiss, Esq. Zachary A. Jacobs, Esq. QUANTUM LEGAL LLC 513 Central Avenue, Suite 300 Highland Park, IL 60035 Telephone: (847) 433-4500 E-mail: rich@qulegal.com jamie@qulegal.com zachary@qulegal.com - and - Jonathan Shub, Esq. Kevin Laukaitis, Esq. KOHN SWIFT & GRAF, P.C. 1600 Market Street, Suite 2500 Philadelphia, PA 19103 Telephone: (215) 238-1700 E-mail: jshub@kohnswift.com klaukaitis@kohnswift.com - and - Charles E. Schaffer, Esq. Daniel C. Levin, Esq. LEVIN SEDRAN & BERMAN LLP 510 Walnut Street, Suite 500 Philadelphia, PA 19106 Telephone: (215) 592-1500 E-mail: CSchaffer@lfsblaw.com DLevin@lfsblaw.com Defendant Sperian Energy Corporation is represented by: Todd Philip Stelter, Esq. HINSHAW & CULBERTSON LLP 151 N. Franklin Street, Suite 2500 Chicago, IL 60606 Telephone: (312) 704-3000 E-mail: tstelter@hinshawlaw.com TAMPA BAY: Hanley Seeks to Certify TCPA Class --------------------------------------------- In a class action lawsuit, BRYAN HANLEY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. TAMPA BAY SPORTS AND ENTERTAINMENT LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, the Defendant, Case No. 8:19-cv-00550-CEH-CPT (M.D. Fla.), the Plaintiff moves the Court for an order: 1. certifying the case as a class action on behalf of: "all persons who were sent a text message from or on behalf of the Defendant Tampa Bay Sports and Entertainment, LLC or an affiliate, subsidiary, or agent thereof from the shortcode telephone number 61873"; and 2. appointing his attorneys as class counsel. The class excludes the Defendant, any entity in which Defendant has a controlling interest or which has a controlling interest in the Defendant, and any of Defendant's legal representatives, assigns, or successors, as well as the Judge presiding over this case and any member of the Judge's immediate family. The Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, filed this putative class action lawsuit in response to Defendant Tampa Bay Sports and Entertainment, LLC's practice of sending advertisement and telemarketing text messages to Plaintiff's cell phone, and the cell phones of many others, from a single shortcode telephonenumber, without their prior express written consent in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.[CC] Counsel for Bryan Hanley: Ruben Conitzer, Esq. David P. Milian, Esq. Juan J. Rodriguez, Esq. CAREY RODRIGUEZ MILIAN GONYA 1395 Brickell Avenue, Suite 700 Miami, FL 33131 Telephone: (305) 372-7474 Facsimile: (305) 372-7475 E-mail: dmilian@careyrodriguez.com mmartucci@careyrodriguez.com jrodriguez.@careyrodriguez.com cperez@careyrodriguez.com rconitzer@careyrodriguez.com ecf@careyrodriguez.com TYSON FOODS: Ranchers Cattlemen Suit Asserts Cattle Price-fixing ---------------------------------------------------------------- Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers Of America, Weinreis Brothers Partnership, Minatare Feedlot Inc, Charles Weinreis, Eric Nelson, James Jensen and Richard Chambers as Trustee of the Richard C. Chambers Living Trust on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Tyson Foods, Inc., Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., JBS S.A., JBS USA Food Company, Swift Beef Company, JBS Packerland, Inc., Cargill, Incorporated, Cargill Meat Solutions Corporation, Marfrig Global Foods S.A., National Beef Packing Company, LLC and John Does 1-10, Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-01222 (D. Minn., May 7, 2019), bring claims under the Sherman Antitrust Act and Clayton Antitrust Act. According to the complaint, Defendants are in conspiracy to suppress the price of fed cattle, slashing their respective slaughter volumes and curtailing their purchases of fed cattle in the cash cattle market, which precipitated in an unprecedented collapse in fed cattle, steers and heifers raised and fed for the production and sale of beef products. Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of America is a cattle producer membership trade organization. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: David R. Scott, Esq. Peter A. Barile III, Esq. Amanda F. Lawrence, Esq. Anjali Bhat, Esq. SCOTT+SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP The Helmsley Building 230 Park Avenue, 17th Floor New York, NY 10169 Telephone: (212) 223-6444 Facsimile: (212) 223-6334 Email: david.scott@scott-scott.com abhat@scott-scott.com pbarile@scott-scott.com alawrence@scott-scott.com - and - Anthony F. Fata, Esq. Brian O'Connell, Esq. CAFFERTY CLOBES MERIWETHER & SPRENGEL LLP 150 S. Wacker, Suite 3000 Chicago, IL 60606 Tel: (312) 782-4880 Fax: (312) 782-4485 Email: afata@caffertyclobes.com boconnell@caffertyclobes.com - and - Christopher M. Burke, Esq. SCOTT+SCOTT, ATTORNEYS AT LAW, LLP 707 Broadway, Suite 1000 San Diego, CA 92101 Telephone: 619-233-4565 Facsimile: 619-233-0508 Email: cburke@scott-scott.com - and - Ellen Meriwether, Esq. CAFFERTY CLOBES MERIWETHER & SPRENGEL LLP 205 N. Monroe St. Media, PA 19063 Tel: (215) 864-2800 Fax: (215) 864-2810 Email: emeriwether@caffertyclobes.com - and - Thomas J. Undlin, Esq. Stacey P. Slaughter, Esq. K. Craig Wildfang, Esq. ROBINS KAPLAN LLP 800 LaSalle Avenue, Suite 2800 Minneapolis, MN 55402 Telephone: (612) 349-8500 Facsimile: (612) 339-4181 Email: tundlin@robinskaplan.com sslaughter@robinskaplan.com kcwildfang@robinskaplan.com - and - Hollis Salzman, Esq. Kellie Lerner, Esq. ROBINS KAPLAN LLP 399 Park Avenue, Suite 3600 New York, NY 10022 Telephone: (212) 980-7400 Facsimile: (212) 980-7499 Email: hsalzman@robinskaplan.com klerner@robinskaplan.com UNITED HEALTHCARE: Caldwell Sues over Denial of Insurance Claims ---------------------------------------------------------------- A class action complaint has been filed against United Healthcare Insurance Company and United HealthCare Services, Inc. for breach of fiduciary duty under Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The case is captioned MARY CALDWELL, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. UNITEDHEALTHCARE INSURANCE COMPANY; UNITED HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC., Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-02861-SK (N.D. Cal., May 23, 2019). Plaintiff Mary Caldwell brings this action to address United's practice of improperly denying claims for surgical treatment of lipedema made by patients under health insurance plans regulated and governed by ERISA. United is a corporation with its principal place of business in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The company administers and makes benefit determinations related to ERISA health care plans around the country. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Robert S. Gianelli, Esq. Joshua S. Davis, Esq. Adrian J. Barrio, Esq. GIANELLI & MORRIS, A LAW CORPORATION 550 South Hope Street, Suite 1645 Los Angeles, CA 90071 Telephone: (213) 489-1600 Facsimile: (213) 489-1611 E-mail: rob.gianelli@gmlawyers.com joshua.davis@gmlawyers.com adrian.barrio@gmlawyers.com WELLS FARGO: Court Narrows Claims in A. Hernandez Suit ------------------------------------------------------ The United States District Court for the Northern District of California issued an Order granting in part and denying in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the negligence and wrongful-foreclosure case captioned ALICIA HERNANDEZ, EMMA WHITE, KEITH LINDNER, TROY FRYE, COSZETTA TEAGUE, IESHA BROWN, RUSSELL and BRENDA SIMONEAUX, JOHN and YVONNE DEMARTINO, ROSE WILSON, TIFFANIE HOOD, GEORGE and CYNDI FLOYD, DEBORA GRANJA, and DIANA TREVINO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. WELLS FARGO & COMPANY, and WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Defendants. No. C 18-07354 WHA. (N.D. Cal.). The Plaintiffs all had their mortgage loans serviced by defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., when they faced various financial hardships and defaulted on their loans. Although they sought loan modifications from Wells Fargo, those applications were denied. Plaintiff Alicia Hernandez filed this putative nationwide class action, asserting claims for negligence, conversion, violations of California's Unfair Competition Law, and violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act. A complaint must plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when its factual allegations, rather than mere conclusory statements, create the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. STANDING TO BRING STATE LAW CLAIMS BASED ON APPLICATIONS FOR HAMP MODIFICATION The Treasury Department in 2009 launched the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) program to incentivize banks to refinance mortgages of distressed homeowners so they could stay in their homes. Under the program, home-loan servicers, including Wells Fargo, signed servicer participation agreements that entitled them to $1,000 for each permanent modification they made but required them to follow Treasury guidelines and procedures. HAMP did not create a federal right of action for borrowers against lenders. Wells Fargo argues that plaintiffs' state-law claims, which are based in part on allegations that Wells Fargo failed to offer plaintiffs a loan modification as required by HAMP, fail as a matter of law because plaintiffs lack standing to enforce HAMP's requirements. For the reasons now explained, this order disagrees and concludes that HAMP's lack of a private federal right of action does not automatically preclude state-law claims that refer to or incorporate Wells Fargo's failures in meeting HAMP's requirements. STANDING TO ENFORCE OCC CONSENT ORDER Wells Fargo also argues that the complaint must be dismissed because plaintiffs' claims are premised on Wells Fargo's failure to comply with its obligations under the 2011 consent order it entered into with the Office of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) , a consent order to which plaintiffs are not a party. Plaintiffs agree that Wells Fargo's alleged violation of the consent order "is a matter for the federal government to enforce. Wells Fargo fails to explain, however, why plaintiffs' inability to enforce the OCC consent order necessarily dooms all of plaintiffs' claims, each of which relies on Wells Fargo's alleged violations of the consent order to a varying extent. Wells Fargo does not dispute, for example, that the existence of the consent order is relevant to show Wells Fargo's knowledge of deficiencies in oversight or controls concerning its loan modification and foreclosure processes. This order therefore analyzes on a claim-by-claim basis the extent to which the claim is an impermissible attempt to enforce the OCC consent decree. CALIFORNIA'S HOMEOWNERS BILL OF RIGHTS. Plaintiffs Debora Granja and Keith Lindner assert a claim under California's Homeowners Bill of Rights, Section 2924.17 of the California Civil Code, which provides that before recording or filing a notice of default, a notice of sale, and other specified documents, a mortgage servicer shall ensure that it has reviewed competent and reliable evidence to substantiate the borrower's default and the right to foreclose, including the borrower's loan status and loan information. Wells Fargo argues that Section 2924.17 only protects against robo-signing, which occurs when persons sign a document without personal knowledge of the content attested to therein and/or sign the documents without the requisite authority to do so. Because the complaint does not allege robo-signing, Wells Fargo argues, plaintiffs' claim fails as a matter of law. This order declines to read Section 2924.17's protections in such a limited way. The purpose of the Homeowners Bill of Rights is to ensure that borrowers are considered for, and have a meaningful opportunity to obtain, available loss mitigation options, if any, offered by or through the borrower's mortgage servicer, such as loan modifications or other alternatives to foreclosure. Other courts in this district have upheld Section 2924.17 claims outside of the robo-signing context. Indeed, Wells Fargo's own authorities explain that Section 2924.17 prohibits robo-signing, or executing foreclosure documents without substantiating the borrower's default and the right to foreclose. That Section 2924.17's prohibitions arose from national media attention to robosigning, does not mean that the statute was designed to solve this problem alone. Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' Section 2924.17 claim is accordingly denied. SECTION 17200 To state a claim for unfair competition under Section 17200 of California Business and Professions Code, a plaintiff must allege that a defendant engaged in an unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice. The statute is violated where a defendant's conduct violates any of the foregoing prongs. Here, the plaintiffs assert a Section 17200 claim based on the unlawful and unfair prongs. The conduct alleged in the complaint satisfies the unfairness prong under either test. In allegedly failing to properly test and monitor its mortgage modification software, Wells Fargo undermined the legislatively-declared policy of California's Homeowners Bill of Rights to ensure that, as part of the nonjudicial foreclosure process, borrowers are considered for, and have a meaningful opportunity to obtain, available loss mitigation options, if any, offered by or through the borrower's mortgage servicer, such as loan modifications or other alternatives to foreclosure. Moreover, in prioritizing profits over adequate oversight, despite being on notice of deficiencies in its foreclosure practices, and causing hundreds of unnecessary foreclosures, Wells Fargo plausibly engaged in unscrupulous behavior. As to the unlawful prong, plaintiffs allege that Wells Fargo engaged in unlawful practices by denying mortgage modifications in violation of HAMP and other governmental requirements. Wells Fargo argues that HAMP cannot serve as the predicate for a Section 17200 claim because HAMP does not create a private right of action. Contrary to Wells Fargo, California law allows parties to challenge unlawful business practices under Section 17200 even where the underlying conduct violates a law that does not provide a private right of action. Wells Fargo's authorities to the contrary are unconvincing. In both Aleem v. Bank of America,No. 09-cv-01812, 2010 WL 532330, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2010) (Judge Virginia Phillips), and Bunce v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 13-cv-00976, 2013 WL 3773950, at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 17, 2013) (Judge William Shubb), the district court dismissed a Section 17200 claim premised on a violation of HAMP because HAMP does not provide a private right of action. Both Bunce and Aleem, however, ultimately relied on Summit Technology, Inc. v. High-Line Medical Instruments Co., Inc., 922 F.Supp. 299, 316 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (Judge Audrey Collins), for the proposition that Section 17200 cannot create a private right of action where none exists under the federal statute. Summit Technology, however, predates the California Supreme Court's decision in Zhang and, as discussed above, misstates current California law. The motion to dismiss plaintiffs' Section 17200 claim is accordingly denied. STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION CLAIMS In the event that plaintiffs' Section 17200 claim is not applied on a nationwide basis, plaintiffs bring a claim for relief under the consumer protection statutes of five other states: the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, the Maryland Consumer Protection Act and Consumer Debt Collection Act, the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, Section 349(a) of New York's General Business Law, and the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law. This claim is based on the same allegations regarding wrongful HAMP denials and purported audit and testing failures and Wells Fargo once again moves to dismiss these claims on the theory that plaintiffs cannot assert state-law claims premised on violations of HAMP. For the reasons already explained, this order disagrees that HAMP precludes state-law claims. Plaintiffs also allege more than a stand-alone HAMP violation. Rather, the complaint points to unfair and misleading business practices in connection with Wells Fargo's reckless failure to verify and audit its automated software and its misrepresentations regarding mortgagors' eligibility for loan modifications. Wells Fargo also argues, and plaintiffs agree, that for purposes of Maryland law, a lender who complies with the terms of the parties' mortgage contract does not violate the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act or Maryland Consumer Protection Act even if the lender failed to abide by HAMP guidelines. As discussed below, plaintiffs have failed to allege that Wells Fargo breached their mortgage contracts. As to plaintiffs' Maryland claims only, the motion to dismiss plaintiffs' state consumer protection claims is granted. The motion to dismiss these claims is otherwise denied. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS The elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) outrageous conduct (2) an intent to cause or a reckless disregard of the possibility of causing emotional distress (3) severe or extreme emotional distress and (4) actual and proximate cause of the emotional distress by the outrageous conduct. Wells Fargo cites a multitude of decisions in which courts have concluded that the denial of a loan modification resulting in foreclosure does not give rise to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Here, however, plaintiffs allege much more than that. The complaint alleges that Wells Fargo repeatedly failed to test the automated decision-making tool it used to determine borrowers' eligibility for mortgage modifications, even in the face of a consent decree which put Wells Fargo on notice that it needed to implement such testing. Moreover, as alleged in the complaint, Wells Fargo went so far as to conceal its discovery of systemic errors from regulators and borrowers for several years. Plaintiffs allege that Wells Fargo knowingly and repeatedly refused to address these problems, deliberately deciding to put profits and growth over compliance. As a result, plaintiffs and hundreds of other borrowers lost their homes and suffered severe emotional distress. Wells Fargo was happy to receive HAMP money but when it came time to actually deliver on loan modifications, it systematically turned homeowners out into the streets through an alleged pattern of reckless and heartless errors and cover-ups. This order cannot say as a matter of law that Wells Fargo's conduct, as currently pled, could not be deemed outrageous. That issue will need to be considered after the facts are developed in discovery. In the meantime, the borrower-plaintiffs have stated a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and the motion to dismiss their claim is denied. By comparison, plaintiff Iesha Brown's intentional infliction of emotion distress claim goes too far. According to the complaint, Brown lived with her mother, plaintiff Coszetta Teague, who purchased a home in Illinois for herself and her family through a mortgage loan from Wells Fargo. After Wells Fargo denied Teague's request for a loan modification, the entire family, including Brown, was forced to live in their car for roughly three years. This experience emotionally devastated Brown, who became depressed and had suicidal ideations. While the extent to which the borrower-plaintiffs may bring their claims on behalf of putative non-borrower class members will be resolved at class certification, this order concludes that plaintiff Brown has failed to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The parties agree that Brown's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is governed by Illinois law. Unlike California law, which requires that a defendant have known that particular plaintiffs would be affected by its conduct, to state a claim in Illinois, a plaintiff need only allege that the actor knew "that there is at least a high probability that his conduct will cause severe emotional distress. Here, not only does the complaint fail to allege facts plausibly suggesting that Wells Fargo knew of Brown's presence in the home, the complaint fails to plausibly allege that Wells Fargo had reason to believe that anyone other than the borrower would be impacted by foreclosure. Even taking the complaint's allegations and reasonable inferences therefrom as true, Brown has not alleged that Wells Fargo acted recklessly as to anyone other than the homeowners with whom Wells Fargo dealt. Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss Brown's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is granted. NEGLIGENCE To state a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the defendant's legal duty of care to the plaintiff (2) breach of that duty (3) causation and (4) resulting injury to the plaintiff. Here, California plaintiffs Debora Granja and Keith Lindner allege that Wells Fargo failed to use reasonable care in determining whether they were eligible for a mortgage modification. Courts are divided on whether accepting documents for a loan modification is within the scope of a lender's conventional role as a mere lender of money or whether it can instead give rise to a duty of care with respect to the processing of a loan modification application. While some courts have followed Lueras v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 221 Cal.App.4th 49 (2013), in deciding that under the Biakanja factors the loan servicer does not owe a borrower a common law duty of care in processing a loan modification application, others have followed Alvarez v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 228 Cal.App.4th 941 (2014), to conclude that a common law duty of care in the loan modification process does arise under California law. Because the undersigned has previously held that merely engaging in the loan modification process is insufficient to give rise to a duty of care, and because our court of appeals has consistently followed Lueras (albeit in non-binding decisions), this order concludes that plaintiffs have not alleged a duty of care in connection with their requests for loan modifications. Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' negligence claim is granted. This order does not reach Wells Fargo's argument that the economic loss rule also bars plaintiffs' negligence claims. BREACH OF CONTRACT To allege a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the contract (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance (3) defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting damages to plaintiff. Plaintiffs contend that Wells Fargo breached the requirement to notify them of the action required to cure the default by accelerating payments and commencing foreclosure without first notifying them that they could cure their default and avoid acceleration and foreclosure by accepting a mortgage modification. This order disagrees that plaintiffs have alleged a breach of contract claim. Nothing in this provision (or any other provision in the contract) supports plaintiffs' proposed interpretation. The secured-loan instrument does not mention mortgage modification at all. Instead, it gives the bank the absolute right to foreclose in the event of an uncured default. The alleged requirement to offer plaintiffs a loan modification comes only from HAMP or related programs, none of which are referenced in the contract that Wells Fargo purportedly breached. Plaintiffs point to nothing in the complaint to suggest that a government-mandated mortgage modification" even existed at the time they entered into their contracts with Wells Fargo. Accordingly, the phrase the action required to cure the default is susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation under the circumstances alleged payment of the amount required to bring the loan current. While Wells Fargo's failure to offer plaintiffs loan modifications may have violated HAMP for which there is no private right of action, that failure did not amount to a breach of plaintiffs' secured-loan instruments. Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss this claim is granted. WRONGFUL FORECLOSURE Plaintiffs also assert a claim for wrongful foreclosure under California and Georgia law. Under California law, the basic elements of the tort of wrongful foreclosure are as follows: (1) the defendant causes an illegal, fraudulent or willfully oppressive sale of real property pursuant to a power of sale in a mortgage or deed of trust (2) the plaintiff was prejudiced or harmed and (3) the mortgagor tendered the amount of the secured indebtedness or was excused from tendering. Georgia law similarly permits a wrongful foreclosure claim when a creditor forecloses on property without the legal right to do so, in violation of the terms of the deed. As with their breach of contract claim, plaintiffs' wrongful foreclosure claim is premised on the allegation that "the foreclosure was unlawful and/or unfair because Wells Fargo did not first notify Plaintiffs that they could cure their default by accepting a mortgage modification As set forth above, however, nothing in plaintiffs' secured-loan instruments required Wells Fargo to modify their loans or notify them of the potential to cure their default through a loan modification. Accordingly, because plaintiffs' wrongful foreclosure claim is based on the theory that Wells Fargo illegally foreclosed on plaintiffs' properties by failing to comply with the terms of plaintiffs' secured-loan instruments, their claim fails and must be dismissed. Plaintiffs summarily argue that they have stated a wrongful foreclosure claim under California law, separate and apart from any breach of their secured-loan instruments, because California also permits wrongful foreclosure claims to be premised on unfair business practices. Even assuming plaintiffs' statement of the law is correct, they wholly fail to explain why the business practices at issue are sufficiently unfair to be considered fraudulent or willfully oppressive so as to state a claim for wrongful foreclosure. The motion to dismiss plaintiffs' wrongful foreclosure claim is accordingly GRANTED. Accordingly, Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part. A full-text copy of the District Court's June 3, 2019 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y68rogyn from Leagle.com. Alicia Hernandez, Plaintiff, represented by Richard M. Paul, III, Paul LLP, pro hac vice, Ashlea Gayle Schwarz, Paul LLP, pro hac vice, Laura Catherine Fellows, Paul LLP, 601 Walnut Street, Suite 300, Kansas City, MO 64106, pro hac vice, Linda Pham Lam -- Llam@lewisfeinberg.com -- Lewis Feinberg Lee & Jackson, P.C. & Michael Lawrence Schrag -- mls@classlawgroup.com -- Gibbs Law Group LLP. Diana Trevino, Coszetta Teague, Yvonne Demartino, Iesha Brown, George Floyd, Troy Frye, Russell Simoneaux, Tiffanie Hood, Rose Wilson, Emma White, Cyndi Floyd, John Demartino, Keith Lindner, Brenda Simoneaux & Debora Granja, Plaintiffs, represented by Laura Catherine Fellows, Paul LLP, pro hac vice, Linda Pham Lam, Lewis Feinberg Lee & Jackson, P.C. & Michael Lawrence Schrag, Gibbs Law Group LLP. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Defendant, represented by Amanda L. Groves -- agroves@winston.com -- Winston & Strawn LLP, pro hac vice, Kobi Kennedy Brinson -- kbrinson@winston.com -- Winston and Strawn, LLP, pro hac vice, Stacie Corbett Knight – sknight@winston.com -- Winston and Strawn LLP, pro hac vice & Morgan E. Stewart -- mstewart@winston.com -- Winston and Strawn LLP. Wells Fargo & Company, Defendant, represented by Amanda L. Groves, Winston & Strawn LLP, pro hac vice & Morgan E. Stewart, Winston and Strawn LLP. WESTERN OILFIELDS: Errecart Files Class Suit in Cal. Super. Ct. --------------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against JOHN LAKE and WESTERN OILFIELDS SUPPLY COMPANY. The case is styled as DEBORAH ERRECART, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC SIMILARLY SITUATED, AND AS AN AGGRIEVED EMPLOYEE PURSUANT TO THE LABOR CODE PRIVATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL ACT ("PAGA"), Plaintiff v. JOHN LAKE, WESTERN OILFIELDS SUPPLY COMPANY, A DELAWARE CORPORATION, Defendants, Case No. BCV-19-101594 (Cal. Super. Ct., Kern Cty., June 7, 2019). The case type is stated as "Other Employment - Civil Unlimited". Mr. John W. Lake serves as the Chief Executive Officer and President of Western Oilfields Supply Company, Inc. Western Oilfields Supply Company, Inc., doing business as Rain For Rent, Inc., provides temporary liquid handling solutions on rent and for sale.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by TRAVIS E. HODGKINS, ESQ. ********* S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA. Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors. Copyright 2019. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272. This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior written permission of the publishers. Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is not guaranteed. The CAR subscription rate is $775 for six months delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof are $25 each. For subscription information, contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000. *** End of Transmission ***