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              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Friday, August 24, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 170

                            Headlines

A.A. ACTION: Court Grants Summary Judgment Bid in Matutes' Suit
ACCURATE MECHANICAL: $1.4MM Settlement in FLSA Suit Has Final OK
ADECCO USA: Court Continues CMC in "Shepardson" to Sept. 27
ADT INC: Bids for Lead Plaintiff Status Pending in "Perdomo"
ADT INC: Consolidated Shareholder Complaint Due Today

ALLEGAN COUNTY, MI: 6th Cir. Appeal Filed in Lopez-Lopez Suit
ALLSCRIPTS HEALTHCARE: Surfside Class Suit Still in Discovery
AMALIE OIL: Faces Class Action Over Obsolete XCEL Motor Oil
APOLLO GLOBAL: Amended Complaint Proposed in McEvoy Class Suit
APOLLO GLOBAL: Discovery Still Ongoing in Class Lawsuit vs. Units

APOLLO GLOBAL: Still Defends Suit over Diamond Vacation Points
ASSOCIATED COMMUNITY: Summary Judgment in TCPA Suit Upheld
AUSTRALIA: Katherine Residents Take Part in PFAS Class Action
BANKERS LIFE: Ct. Grants Summary Judgment in Misclassification Suit
BAXTER INTERNATIONAL: Court Nixes Antitrust Suit over IV Solutions

BBX CAPITAL: Time to Appeal Merger Case Dismissal Has Lapsed
BEHR DAYTON: Faruki Ireland Attorney Discusses Court Ruling
BEHR DAYTON: Urges 6th Circuit to Rethink Class Action Ruling
BIG HEART: 9th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Thai Forced Labor Suit
BLUEGREEN VACATIONS: Landons et al. Sue over Timeshares

BLUEGREEN VACATIONS: Seeks Arbitration with 59 Opt-In Plaintiffs
BLUEGREEN VACATIONS: Still Defends "Anderson" TCPA Lawsuit
BLUEGREEN VACATIONS: Still Faces Siu Suit over Telemarketing Calls
BMW: South Korean Vehicle Owners File Class Action
CALIFORNIA: Admin. Bid to File Under Seal in T. Ashker's Suit OK'd

CALIFORNIA: Plaintiffs' Bid to Use Alias in ADA Suit Partly Granted
CAPITAL ONE: Court Dismisses Convenience Fees Suit
CAPITALA FINANCE: Still Defends Paskowitz Class Action
CARTER HOLT: Adina Thorn Files Shadowclad Class Action
CCS COMMERCIAL: Class Certification in A. Rosenberg's Suit Denied

CENTERPLATE OF DELAWARE: Bid to Dismiss FLSA Suit Denied
CHECKERS AND VIBES: Must Face Class Action Over Text Ads
CHEESECAKE FACTORY: Deal Reached in Abdelaziz & Rodriguez Suits
CHEESECAKE FACTORY: Faces "Orellana" Class Suit over Labor Matters
CHEESECAKE FACTORY: Masters Case Settlement Still Pending

CHEESECAKE FACTORY: Still Faces Tagalogon Class Action
CHEESECAKE FACTORY: Tentative Accord in Guglielmo Still Pending
CHEESECAKE FACTORY: Tentative Settlement of "Zhang" Suit Underway
CHILLICOTHE, MO: 8th Circuit Appeal Filed in Pennell Suit
CHIPOTLE MEXICAN: Seeks 10th Circuit Review of Ruling in "Turner"

CIOX HEALTH: Court Certifies Class in R. Faber's Suit
CLUBCORP HOLDINGS: Court Nixes Shareholder Claims vs. AGM
COLORADO: Court Won't Review Denial of 2nd Fairness Hearing
CSO FINANCIAL: Settlement in D. Bowen's Suit Has Final Approval
DAVITA HEALTHCARE: Bid for Sanctions in Wage Suit Partly Granted

EARTHSTONE ENERGY: Olenik Class Action Dismissed With Prejudice
ELECTRONICS FOR IMAGING: Bid to Dismiss Pipitone Suit Pending
EPIC SYSTEMS: Union Issues Fail to Receive Substantial Attention
ETRADE FINANCIAL: Appeal from Schwab Case Dismissal Underway
ETRADE FINANCIAL: Appeals Court Upholds Dismissal of Rayner Suit

EXPERIAN INFORMATION: Court OKs 1st State Notice in R. Wesley Suit
FARMERS CAPITAL: Files Disclosures in Response to "Parshall" Suit
FIDELITY NATIONAL: Engaged in "Deceptive Conduct," Court Says
FITBIT INC: Court Wants More Briefing in PurePulse(R) Tracker Suit
FITBIT INC: Deal Reached in Sleep Tracking Class Action

FITBIT INC: Summary Judgment Bid in Securities Suit Still Pending
FLAGSTAR BANCORP: Summary Ruling in Overdraft Fees' Suit Affirmed
FLINT, MI: Gov. Snyder Dropped from Water Crisis Class Action
FLORIDA: Court Dismisses S. Krabill's Prisoners Suit
GENERAL MOTORS: Faces Class Action Over Duramax Emissions

GEO GROUP: Class Suits by Immigration Detainees Still Ongoing
GLOBAL TELLINK: Appeals Stuart Suit Ruling to 8th Circuit
GOURMET SWEETS: Seeks 2nd Cir. Review of Ruling in Bagga Suit
GRUBHUB INC: 9th Circuit Appeal from N.D. Calif. Order Underway
HEMPSTEAD COUNTY, AK: Detention Jailers File FLSA Class Action

HERSHEY CO: 9th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of L. Dana's Suit
IMPINJ INC: Rosen Law Firm Investigates Securities Claims
JAGUAR LAND: Faces Class Action Over Timing Chain Systems
LAS VEGAS, NV: Sept. 21 Filing of Dispositive Bids in Cardenas
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS: Court Reopens Job Discrimination Suit

MARRIOTT BUSINESS: H. Bartholoma's Suit Remanded to State Court
MARS INC: 9th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Mislabeling Suit
MDL 2000: Court Refuses to Overrule Denial of Class Claim
MICROSOFT CORP: Labor Groups Urge Court to Revive Gender Bias Case
MOVIEPASS: Users Waive Class Action Right Under Terms of Service

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE: 3 Ill. Cases Stayed Pending Outcome in DC Suit
NCAA: Langston Chosen as Sample Concussion Case
NEGRA COMPANIA: Faces Class Action Over October 2017 IPO
NES EQUIPMENT: Tartan Challenges Bid to Dismiss Class Action
NESTLE USA: 9th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Mislabeling Suit

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY: Averts Class Action Over 403(b) Plans
NEW YORK: Court Won't Dismiss Inmate's Pregnancy-Bias Suit
OCWEN LOAN: Court Narrows Claims in K. Henry's WVCCPA Suit
OHIO: Faces Class Action Over Interstate 80 Speed Camera Tickets
P.F. CHANG'S: Esry Class Certification Bid Granted in Part

PACIFIC COAST: Court Okays Cy Press Award in Welch & Berliner Suit
PANATTE LLC: Time to File Class Cert Bid in D. Aikens' Suit Moved
PINDUODUO INC: Sued for Selling Fakes, Knockoffs Over Platform
PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Appeals Decision in "Sprayberry" to 9th Cir.
PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Ct. Won't Review Summary Ruling in FDCPA Suit

PROCTER & GAMBLE: DACA Worker Files Job Discrimination Suit
SOTHEBY'S INC: 9th Cir. Partly Affirms Dismissal of Royalties Suit
STERN & EISENBERG: Limited Discovery in FDCPA Suit Ordered
TABLEAU SOFTWARE: Court Tosses Motion to Dismiss Class Action
TE CACHE: Class Action Mulled Over Delayed Wedding Photos, Videos

TENNESSEE: Court Denies Certification in Inmates' Implant Suit
TOLL GLOBAL: Court Dismisses C. Marquez's Suit
TOOTSIE ROLL: Daniel Files Appeal in Junior Mints Suit to 2nd Cir.
TOYOTA MOTOR: Campbell Appeals D. Maryland Decision to 4th Cir.
TRI-UNION SEAFOODS: Dismissal of Mislabeling Suit Affirmed

UBER TECHNOLOGIES: London Cab Drivers to Pursue Class Action
UNITED STATES: Crawford County Joins PILT Class Action
UNITED STATES: Judge Denies Bond to 7 Immigrant Parents
UNITED STATES: Must Resolve Own Mess on Family Separations
UNITED STATES: Says Restraint Chairs Used in Immigrant Teens

VIRGINIA: Court Dismisses C. Bullock's Inmate Discrimination Suit
VOLKSWAGEN: Sept. 1 Diesel Settlement Claims Filing Deadline
WASHINGTON: Freedom Foundation Files Class Action Over Union Fees
WATERSTONE FINANCIAL: 7th Circuit Appeal in Herrington Underway
WELLS FARGO: ATM Access Fee Litigation Pending in Lower Courts

[*] AFL, NRL Must Take More Responsibility for Players' Welfare
[*] Education Dept's Revision of Obama-Era Rule to Hit Students
[*] Investor Class Actions Related to Cryptocurrencies on the Rise
[*] Mintz Levin Attorney Discusses Class Arbitrability Issues
[*] Victorian Supreme Court Fights Class Action Reform Proposal


                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: ASARCO Loses Contribution Suit vs Union Pacific
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Excess Policies Exclude Post-1971 Royal Claims
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Meyer Couple Sues Over Exposure to Bendix Asbestos
ASBESTOS UPDATE: S. Parra's Suit vs. Marsh Remanded to Bankr. Court


                            *********

A.A. ACTION: Court Grants Summary Judgment Bid in Matutes' Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Re: Matute et al., v. A.A. Action Collection Company,
Inc. et al., Civil Action No. 2:16-cv-8863-CLW (D. N.J.),
Magistrate Judge Cathy L. Waldor of the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey granted the Motion for Summary Judgement
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 of
Plaintiffs/Counterclaim-Defendants, Jorge Matute and Doris Matute,
as well as Third-Party Defendants, Stern Thomasson, LLC, Philip D.
Stern, Esq., and Andrew T. Thomasson, Esq.

The motion was filed on April 13, 2018.  On April 26, 2018, the
Defendants-Counterclaimants and the Third-Party Plaintiffs filed a
preliminary response to the motion and a request for an extension
of time to respond.

The facts of the case are virtually identical to those in Winters,
et al. v. Jones et al., Civ. No. 16-9020, 2018 WL 326518 (D.N.J.
January 8, 2018).  The defense counsel in both cases, David
Hoffman, filed a claim for RICO violations, fraud, negligence, and
malpractice against the Plaintiffs' counsel and against the
Plaintiffs' as co-conspirators.  

Mr. Hoffman was Plaintiffs' attorney in the Winters case where he
affirmatively filed suit in response to a class action litigation
filed by the Defendants under the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act ("FDCPA") in the District of New Jersey.  On a Motion to
Dismiss Judge Vazquez found the allegation that just because
lawyers file a large number of FDCPA cases there is some
wrongdoing, was absurd on its face.  He ruled that the notion that
when two firms use the same form of pleading, they are engaged in
wrongdoing is preposterous."

The Defendants-Counterclaimants and the Third-Party Plaintiffs'
April filing does not put forth any substantive arguments, but
rather makes a procedural argument regarding the appropriateness of
the motion while also requesting time to file a response to the
motion.  The respondents never filed any such opposition to the
motion and thus failed to put forth a meaningful rebuttal to the
Motion for Summary Judgment.

From the record before the Court, Magistrate Judge Waldor finds
that there is no genuine issue of fact because the
Defendants-Counterclaimants and the Third-Party Plaintiffs failed
to put forth any proof to oppose movants insufficiency of proof
argument.  In light of this and the lack of any meaningful
substantive differences between the case and Winters, she adopts
the reasoning set forth in the Jan. 8, 2018 decision in Winters, et
al. v. Jones et al.  As in Winters, Mr. Hoffman's has made similar
unsupported and unsubstantiated allegations in the instant case.
Because respondent has failed to rebut movant's argument, with
respect to the Counterclaim and the Third-Party Complaint there is
no showing of a genuine issue of fact.

She granted the Motion for Summary Judgement.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 3, 2018 Letter Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/rewzPu from Leagle.com.

JORGE MATUTE & DORIS MATUTE, individually and on behalf of all
those similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by ANDREW T.
THOMASSON, Stern Thomasson LLP & PHILIP D. STERN, STERN THOMASSON
LLP.

A.A. ACTION COLLECTION COMPANY, INC., Defendant, pro se.

JAMES BENDER, ESQ., Defendant, pro se.

JOHN DOES 1-10, Defendant, pro se.

TODD BANK, Defendant, represented by STEVEN P. LOMBARDI --
steven@lombardilawfirm.com -- LAW OFFICE OF STEVEN P. LOMBARDI.

TODD BANK, Third Party Plaintiff, represented by STEVEN P.
LOMBARDI, LAW OFFICE OF STEVEN P. LOMBARDI.

STERN THOMASSON LLC, Third Party Defendant, represented by ANDREW
T. THOMASSON, Stern Thomasson LLP & PHILIP D. STERN, STERN
THOMASSON LLP.

PHILIP D STERN, Third Party Defendant, represented by ANDREW T.
THOMASSON, Stern Thomasson LLP.

PHILIP D STERN, Third Party Defendant, pro se.

A.A. ACTION COLLECTION COMPANY, INC., Third Party Plaintiff, pro
se.

JAMES BENDER, ESQ., Third Party Plaintiff, pro se.

JOHN DOES 1-10, Third Party Plaintiff, pro se.

A.A. ACTION COLLECTION COMPANY, INC., Third Party Defendant, pro
se.

A.A. ACTION COLLECTION COMPANY, INC., Counter Claimant, pro se.

DORIS MATUTE, individually and on behalf of all those similarly
situated & JORGE MATUTE, Counter Defendants, represented by ANDREW
T. THOMASSON, Stern Thomasson LLP & PHILIP D. STERN, STERN
THOMASSON LLP.


ACCURATE MECHANICAL: $1.4MM Settlement in FLSA Suit Has Final OK
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PHILIP QUOW, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ACCURATE
MECHANICAL INC. and DANIEL REILLY, Defendants, No. 1:15-CV-09852
(KHP) (S.D. N.Y.), Magistrate Judge Katherine H. Parker of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of Class and Collective
Action Settlement.

The parties' proposed settlement resolves all claims in the action
entitled Quow, et al. v. Accurate Mechanical Inc., et al., No.
15-cv-9852 (KHP).  The Plaintiffs in this action allege that the
Defendants, inter alia, failed to pay them overtime, in violation
of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and the New York Labor
Law.

On Dec. 17, 2015, named Plaintiffs Philip Quow and Clyde Reaves
commenced the action as a putative class action under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23 and as a putative collective action under the FLSA.  The
Defendants deny liability and dispute the hours of overtime claimed
by Plaintiffs.  The Named Plaintiffs are former plumbers employed
by the Defendants who alleged that they and all other similarly
situated employees were not paid overtime at time-and-a-half, but
instead were paid at straight time.

The Defendants filed an Answer on April 22, 2016, disputing the
material allegations and denying any liability in the proposed
class and collective actions.  The parties engaged in extensive
settlement negotiations, ultimately reaching a proposed class and
collective settlement.

On Feb. 12, 2018, the Court preliminarily approved the parties'
proposed class and collective settlement and authorized the
issuance of Notice to Class Members.  It also approved the Notice
of Proposed Settlement of Class Action Lawsuit and Fairness Hearing
and claim form and authorized the mailing of the Notice Packet to
the Class Members.

The Claims Administrator, American Legal Claims Services, LLC
("ALCS"), was provided with a list of Class Members which included,
to the extent maintained by the Defendants, the Class Members'
names, social security numbers, and last known addresses.  ALCS
determined that there were 91 unique Settlement Class Members on
the class list.  It mailed the Notice Packet in English and Spanish
to the Class Members.  Ultimately, there were only two Notice
Packets returned to ALCS as undeliverable for which ALCS was unable
to identify new addresses.  The Settlement Administrator received a
total of 42 unique claim forms before the June 18, 2018, claim form
deadline. There were no class members who objected to the
Settlement and none who submitted an exclusion request.

The Settlement Agreement provides for a total settlement amount of
up to $1,375,000.  The Agreement contains the term "Total
Settlement Amount," which the Court interprets to mean $1,375,000.
The Class Member payments are to be paid from the "Net Settlement
Fund," which equals $1,375,000 less amounts approved by the Court
for any Service Awards to the Named Plaintiffs, attorneys' fees and
costs awarded by the Court, and half of the Settlement
Administrator's approved fees and costs.

The Settlement Administrator will distribute settlement payments to
Class Members who submitted claim forms pursuant to a formula set
forth in Section 11(f) of the Settlement Agreement.  If the formula
would result in an aggregate amount that exceeds the Net Settlement
Fund, the Net Settlement Fund will be divided pro rata among the
Active Class Members based on a formula reflective of each Active
Class Member's actual alleged damages, liquidated damages, and
statutory damages.  Under the formula, Active Class Members recover
a payment reflecting 100% of their claimed overtime, an additional
30% of that amount in liquidated damages, and an additional sum of
$1,000 for Wage Theft Prevention Act damages, subject to the pro
rata reduction described above. The settlement payments range from
$1,000 to $65,164.26.  Based on the claim forms submitted, the
payments to Active Class Members under the specified formula equals
$467,364.41.

The Plaintiffs seek (1) service awards in the amount of $3,500 for
the two Named Plaintiffs; (2) a payment in the amount of $32,317 to
American Legal Claims Services, LLC, the settlement administrator;
(3) $1,170.34 in costs; and (4) $457,943.22 in attorneys' fees.

Magistrate Judge Parker certified the Class and collective for
purposes of settlement and approved the terms and conditions of the
Settlement Agreement as construed and modified.  The Net Settlement
Fund for payment to Active Class Members is $1,194,883.02.
She granted the Plaintiffs' requests for (1) service awards in the
amount of $3,500 for the two Named Plaintiffs; (2) a payment in the
amount of $32,317 to American Legal Claims Services, LLC, the
settlement administrator; and (3) $1,170.34 in costs are granted.
The Class Counsel fees in the amount of $155,788.14 are approved.
The $467,364.41 in settlement awards claimed by Active Class
Members will be paid in full and will not be reduced by the service
awards, payments to the claims administrator, or attorneys' fees
and costs approved by the Court.  Thus, the Settlement Amount
approved is $647,481.39.

The parties will proceed with the administration of the settlement
in accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement.  The
Magistrate Judge dismissed the case on the merits and with
prejudice, with each side to bear its own attorneys' fees and costs
except as set forth in the Order of Final Approval.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 10, 2018 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/Ypfj6m from Leagle.com.

Philip Quow, On behalf of themselves and all other persons
similarly situated, Clyde Reaves, On behalf of themselves and all
other persons similarly situated, German Jaramillo, Denniston
Stapleton, Ruel Wedderburn, Parasram Sawh, Fred Meleka, Manuel
Aybar, Faustino Castaneda Dejesus, Othniel Stapleton, Segundo
Mayancela, Marco Chimbay, Lewis Minchala, Kareem Meade, Segundo
Zurita, Diego Minchala, Leonardo Flores, Ray James, Jeffrey Knights
& Jansy Almanzar, Plaintiffs, represented by David Stein --
dstein@samuelandstein.com -- Samuel & Stein.

Accurate Mechanical Inc., Defendant, represented by Keith Allen
Lavallee, Lavallee Law Offices, PLLC.


ADECCO USA: Court Continues CMC in "Shepardson" to Sept. 27
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KAITLYN SHEPARDSON, individually, and on behalf of
other members of the general public similarly situated, Plaintiff,
v. ADECCO USA, INC., and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants,
Case No. 3:15-cv-05102 (EMC) (N.D. Cal.), Judge Edward M. Chen of
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
continued the Case Management Conference ("CMC"), now scheduled for
Aug. 2, 2018 to Sept. 27, 2018 at 10:30 a.m.

The Plaintiff filed the proposed class action on Aug. 18, 2015.
The Defendant removed the action to the Court and filed a Motion to
Compel arbitration pursuant to the Dispute Resolution Agreement
between the Parties.  The Court granted the Defendant's Motion to
Compel pursuant to the arbitration agreement.  The matter was
stayed pending the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Morris v. Ernst
& Young.

The Court rescheduled the next CMC in the matter for Aug. 2, 2018.
On July 2, 2018, the Defendant filed a Substitution of Counsel to
be represented by Jackson Lewis P.C. on the matter.  Angel R.
Sevilla filed a Notice of Appearance on July 3, 2018.

The Defendant's lead counsel, Mia Farber, is unavailable on Aug. 2,
2018.  As well, Jackson Lewis respectfully asks for continuance of
the CMC to effectuate the transition of the matter from the
Defendant's former counsel, Bryan Cave LLP.  The Plaintiff's
counsel, has a trial presently scheduled to commence on Sept. 10,
2018.

Therefore, the parties stipulated and Judge Chen granted, that the
CMC be continued to a date after Sept. 17, 2018.  The Judge ordered
that the CMC, now scheduled for Aug. 2, 2018, is continued and will
be scheduled to take place on Sept. 27, 2018 at 10:30 a.m.  The CMC
is due by Sept. 20, 2018.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 10, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/DYJvVQ from Leagle.com.

Kaitlyn Shepardson, individually, and on behalf of other members of
the general public similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by
Matthew Righetti -- matt@righettilaw.com -- Righetti Glugoski,
P.C., John Glugoski -- jglugoski@righettilaw.com -- Righetti
Glugoski, P.C. & Michael C. Righetti -- mike@righettilaw.com --
Righetti Glugoski, P.C.

Adecco USA, Inc., Defendant, represented by Mia Farber --
Mia.Farber@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis P.C., Allison Clare
Eckstrom -- allison.eckstrom@bclplaw.com -- Bryan Cave LLP & Julie
Westcott O'Dell -- Julie.odell@bryancave.com -- Bryan Cave LLP.


ADT INC: Bids for Lead Plaintiff Status Pending in "Perdomo"
------------------------------------------------------------
Motions for recognition as lead plaintiff remain pending in a
shareholder class action lawsuit captioned Perdomo v. ADT Inc.,
according to Apollo Global Management, LLC's Form 10-Q filed with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

The lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida on May 21, 2018, and is related to the
January 19, 2018 IPO of ADT Inc. common stock.

On July 20, 2018, several purported ADT shareholders filed
competing motions to be named lead plaintiff in that action.

Founded in 1990, Apollo is a leading global alternative investment
manager. The company is a contrarian, value-oriented investment
manager in credit, private equity and real assets with significant
distressed expertise and a flexible mandate in the majority of its
funds which enables the funds to invest opportunistically across a
company's capital structure.


ADT INC: Consolidated Shareholder Complaint Due Today
-----------------------------------------------------
The plaintiffs in the combined cases under the caption In re ADT
Inc. Shareholder Litigation has until August 24, 2018 to file a
consolidated complaint, according to Apollo Global Management,
LLC's Form 10-Q filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission on August 6, 2018, for the quarterly period ended June
30, 2018.

Five substantially similar shareholder class action lawsuits
related to the January 19, 2018 IPO of ADT Inc. common stock were
filed in the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in and
for Palm Beach County, Florida in March, April and May 2018.

The actions are entitled Goldstrand Investments Inc.  v. ADT Inc.,
Krebsbach v. ADT Inc., Katz v. ADT Inc., Sweet v. ADT Inc., and
Lowinger v. ADT Inc.

Plaintiffs in each case allege the purchase of ADT common stock in
or traceable to the IPO or "pursuant to" ADT's registration
statement, assert claims for alleged violations of the Securities
Act of 1933 (the "1933 Act") and seek to represent a class of
similarly situated shareholders.  Each of the complaints names ADT
Inc. and various ADT officers, directors and IPO underwriters,
including Apollo Global Securities, LLC, as defendants.

Plaintiffs allege that the defendants violated the 1933 Act because
the registration statement and prospectus used to effectuate the
IPO were false and misleading in that they allegedly misled
investors with respect to material litigation involving ADT, ADT's
efforts to protect its intellectual property, competitive pressures
ADT faced, ADT's customer acquisition costs, and false-alarm
pressures.

On July 10, 2018, the Court entered an order consolidating the
cases under the caption In re ADT Inc. Shareholder Litigation and
providing that plaintiffs shall file a consolidated complaint by
August 24, 2018.

Founded in 1990, Apollo is a global alternative investment manager.
The company is a contrarian, value-oriented investment manager in
credit, private equity and real assets with significant distressed
expertise and a flexible mandate in the majority of its funds which
enables the funds to invest opportunistically across a company's
capital structure.


ALLEGAN COUNTY, MI: 6th Cir. Appeal Filed in Lopez-Lopez Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Aaron Lopez-Lopez filed an appeal from a court ruling in
his lawsuit styled Aaron Lopez-Lopez v. Allegan County, MI, et al.,
Case No. 1:17-cv-00786, in the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Michigan at Grand Rapids.

The nature of suit is stated as "Prisoner: Civil Rights."

The appellate case is captioned as Aaron Lopez-Lopez v. Allegan
County, MI, et al., Case No. 18-1928, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant AARON LOPEZ-LOPEZ, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Robert Anthony Alvarez, Esq.
          AVANTI LAW GROUP
          600 28th Street, S.W.
          Wyoming, MI 49509
          Telephone: (616) 257-6807
          Facsimile: (616) 257-8501
          E-mail: ralvarez@avantilaw.com

Defendants-Appellees ALLEGAN COUNTY, MI, and FRANK BAKER, in his
individual capacity, are represented by:

          Andrew James Brege, Esq.
          JOHNSON, ROSATI, SCHULTZ & JOPPICH PC
          822 Centennial Way, Suite 270
          Lansing, MI 48917
          Telephone: (517) 886-3800
          E-mail: abrege@jrsjlaw.com


ALLSCRIPTS HEALTHCARE: Surfside Class Suit Still in Discovery
-------------------------------------------------------------
The purported class action lawsuit related to a ransomware attack
in January 2018 is currently in discovery, according to Allscripts
Healthcare Solutions, Inc.'s Form 10-Q filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

On January 25, 2018, a complaint was filed in Surfside Non-Surgical
Orthopedics, P.A. v. Allscripts Healthcare Solutions, Inc., No.
1:18-cv-00566, in the Northern District of Illinois.  This is a
purported class action lawsuit related to a January 18, 2018
ransomware attack, and alleges the following counts: (1)
negligence, gross negligence and negligence per se; (2) breach of
contract; (3) unjust enrichment; (4) violation of the Illinois
Consumer Fraud Act; and (5) violation of the Illinois Deceptive
Trade Practices Act.  Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of
customers seeking damages from Allscripts.  The parties are
currently engaged in limited jurisdictional discovery.  Allscripts
expects to respond to the complaint after this discovery is
completed.

Allscripts Healthcare Solutions, Inc. delivers information
technology ("IT") solutions and services to help healthcare
organizations achieve optimal clinical, financial and operational
results. The company is based in Chicago, Illinois.


AMALIE OIL: Faces Class Action Over Obsolete XCEL Motor Oil
-----------------------------------------------------------
David A. Wood, writing for CarComplaints.com, reports that an XCEL
motor oil lawsuit alleges
10W-40, 10W-30, 20W-50 and 15W-40 products made by the Amalie Oil
Company should not be used in engines built after 1930.

Plaintiff Brandon Opalka filed the proposed class-action lawsuit on
behalf of Florida consumers who bought XCEL oil to be used in
vehicles manufactured after 1930.

XCEL motor oil is sold throughout Florida at gas station chains and
also at retailers such as Sam's Club, but the lawsuit alleges the
oil is considered "obsolete" by the American Petroleum Institute
(API).

Plaintiff Opalka says he purchased a bottle of XCEL Premium SAE
10W-30 oil in 2017 but wouldn't have if he would have known the oil
wasn't made for his vehicle. The lawsuit doesn't allege he used the
oil or that it damaged his vehicle, but the plaintiff says he filed
the class-action because he lost money on the bottle of oil.

The plaintiff claims API calls older motor oil ratings "obsolete"
because the oil won't protect modern car engines. According to the
lawsuit, in 1947 the API first declared SA-rated oil as obsolete
because it was made for engines manufactured prior to 1931.

SA-rated oil is called a "base oil" because it doesn't have any
additives and cannot handle engines developed after 1930.

Amalie allegedly knows it sells obsolete oil because the plaintiff
claims an executive admitted as much in a 2003 interview.

"We would rather not sell non-detergent oil. There's no question
that it's not good for today's engines. I tell people, 'It's not
going to give your car a heart attack. It's more like cancer.' But
a lot of people are only concerned with price and they'll buy that
stuff because it's 30 cents cheaper. And as long as people are
going to buy non-detergent oils, and other companies are going to
sell them, we feel like we have to compete." - Amalie Senior Vice
President of Sales and Marketing Dennis J. Madden

Based on court documents, the XCEL motor oil will cause
catastrophic engine failure because the oil lacks detergent and
additives used to protect modern engines. The "worthless" oil does
nothing but cost Florida consumers money by using product labels
that allegedly conceal how obsolete the oil really is.

The label on the front of the motor oil bottle allegedly omits
important information relevant to consumers driving vehicles built
after 1930. Nothing on the front label admits additives are missing
and the front label doesn't warn consumers about using the oil in
modern engines.

"The only apparent difference between the Product and other,
non-harmful motor oils, is the price, as the Product is cheaper
than current-specification motor oil." - XCEL lawsuit

Not until a consumer reads the back label do they see, in small
print: "CAUTION: This oil is rated API SA. It contains no
additives. It is not suitable for use in most gasoline powered
automotive engines built after 1930. Use in modern engines may
cause unsatisfactory engine performance or equipment harm."

The plaintiff claims no reasonable consumer would risk their engine
just to save a dollar on motor oil. In addition, most consumers
allegedly don't take the time to read the small print on back
labels and even if they did, the back label of the motor oil
contains no adequate warnings.

The XCEL motor oil lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Florida - Brandon Opalka, et al., v.
Amalie AOC LTD.

The plaintiff is represented by Kozyak Tropin & Throckmorton, LLP,
Kanner & Whiteley, and the Casey Law Firm.

The XCEL motor oil lawsuit filed in Florida is very similar to an
ongoing class-action against Dollar General stores that allegedly
sell motor oil not fit for engines made after 1930. [GN]


APOLLO GLOBAL: Amended Complaint Proposed in McEvoy Class Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Apollo Global Management, LLC disclosed in its Form 10-Q filed with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that Gareth Turner (an
Apollo Partner) and Mark Beith (a former Apollo Principal) have
been dropped from the McEvoy lawsuit based on a proposed amended
complaint.  The amended complaint, however, added Apollo Management
VI, L.P. and CEVA Group as proposed defendants.

On August 3, 2017, a putative class action was commenced in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida
against AGM, Gareth Turner (an Apollo Partner) and Mark Beith (a
former Apollo Principal) by Michael McEvoy on behalf of a class of
current and former employees of subsidiaries of CEVA Group, LLC
("CEVA Group") who purchased restricted Class A shares in CEVA
Investment Limited ("CIL"), the former parent company of CEVA
Group.

The complaint alleges that the defendants breached fiduciary duties
to and defrauded the plaintiffs by inducing them to purchase shares
in CIL and subsequently participating in a debt restructuring of
CEVA Group in which shareholders of CIL did not receive a recovery.
The complaint purports to seek damages in excess of EUR14 million.
On October 18, 2017, the bankruptcy trustee for CIL filed a motion
in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York to
prevent McEvoy and his counsel from continuing to prosecute the
Florida action on the basis that the relevant claims belong to the
CIL bankruptcy estate.

On November 21, 2017, the Florida court granted the parties' joint
motion to stay the case pending resolution of the CIL bankruptcy
trustee's motion to enforce the automatic stay, staying the case
until further Order.  On February 9, 2018, the bankruptcy court
granted the CIL trustee's motion to enforce the automatic stay and
enjoined further prosecution of the McEvoy Action (the "February 9
Order").

On February 23, 2018, Mr. McEvoy filed a motion for leave to appeal
the February 9 Order.  On May 4, 2018, the District Court for the
Southern District of New York denied McEvoy's appeal of the
February 9 Order, but permitted McEvoy to file a motion in the
bankruptcy court to clarify the scope of the injunction or to
modify the order to permit him to amend the complaint.

On May 24, 2018, McEvoy filed a motion with the bankruptcy court
seeking clarification or modification of the February 9 Order,
which the CIL Trustee and Mr. Turner opposed.

On June 1, 2018, the Florida court entered an order continuing the
stay in the case pending the bankruptcy court's ruling on McEvoy's
motion for clarification.  The bankruptcy court held a hearing on
McEvoy's motion for clarification on June 28, 2018, at which it
directed McEvoy to file a reply and proposed amended complaint.
The reply and proposed amended complaint were filed on July 10,
2018.  The proposed amended complaint no longer asserts claims
against Messrs. Turner and Beith but adds Apollo Management VI,
L.P. and CEVA Group as proposed defendants.

The proposed amended complaint purports to seek damages of
approximately EUR30 million and asserts, among other things, claims
for violations of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, breach of
fiduciary duties, and breach of contract.

The Company said, "Based on the allegations in the complaint,
Apollo believes that there is no merit to the claims.
Additionally, as the case is in its early stages, no reasonable
estimate of possible loss, if any, can be made at this time."

Founded in 1990, Apollo is a global alternative investment manager.
The company is a contrarian, value-oriented investment manager in
credit, private equity and real assets with significant distressed
expertise and a flexible mandate in the majority of its funds which
enables the funds to invest opportunistically across a company's
capital structure.


APOLLO GLOBAL: Discovery Still Ongoing in Class Lawsuit vs. Units
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Discover is ongoing in a putative securities class action filed
against certain subsidiaries of Apollo Global Management, LLC,
according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2018.

On March 4, 2016, the Public Employees Retirement System of
Mississippi filed a putative securities class action against
Sprouts Farmers Market, Inc. ("SFM"), several SFM directors
(including Andrew Jhawar, an Apollo partner), AP Sprouts Holdings,
LLC and AP Sprouts Holdings (Overseas), L.P. (the "AP Entities"),
which are controlled by entities managed by Apollo affiliates, and
two underwriters of a March 2015 secondary offering of SFM common
stock.

The AP Entities sold SFM common stock in the March 2015 secondary
offering.  The complaint, filed in Arizona Superior Court and
captioned Public Employees Retirement System of Mississippi v.
Sprouts Farmers Market, Inc. (CV2016-050480), alleges that SFM
filed a materially misleading registration statement for the
secondary offering that incorporated alleged misrepresentations in
SFM's 2014 annual report regarding SFM's business prospects, and
failed to disclose alleged accelerating produce deflation.

Plaintiffs alleged causes of action against the AP Entities for
violations of Sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933,
seeking compensatory damages for alleged losses sustained from a
decline in SFM's stock price.

Defendants moved to dismiss the action, and the court dismissed the
Section 11 claim against the AP Entities but not the Section 15
claim.  Discovery is ongoing.

The Company said, "Because this action is in its early stages, no
reasonable estimate of possible loss, if any, can be made at this
time."

Founded in 1990, Apollo is a leading global alternative investment
manager. The company is a contrarian, value-oriented investment
manager in credit, private equity and real assets with significant
distressed expertise and a flexible mandate in the majority of its
funds which enables the funds to invest opportunistically across a
company's capital structure.


APOLLO GLOBAL: Still Defends Suit over Diamond Vacation Points
--------------------------------------------------------------
Apollo Global Management, LLC continues to defend a class action
suit related to vacation interest points from Diamond Resorts
International, Inc., according to the Company's Form 10-Q filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018,
for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

On February 9, 2018, plaintiffs Joseph M. Dropp, Mary E. Dropp,
Robert Levine, Susan Levine, and Kaarina Pakka filed a complaint in
the United States District Court for the District of Nevada against
Apollo Management VIII, L.P. ("Management VIII"), AGM and Diamond
Resorts International, Inc. ("Diamond") and several of its
affiliates and executives.

Plaintiffs, who allege that they bought vacation interest points
from Diamond, allege that the points are securities and that
defendants violated federal securities laws by selling the points
without registering them as securities.  Plaintiffs also assert a
"control person" claim against Management VIII and AGM.

Plaintiffs assert their claims on their own behalf and on behalf of
a purported class of Diamond customers who bought vacation interest
points over the last three years.  They seek injunctive relief
prohibiting defendants from continuing to market and sell
unregistered securities, the right to rescind their purchases, and
unspecified compensatory damages.

On April 11, 2018, Defendants filed motions to sever Ms. Pakka's
claims from the claims of the other plaintiffs and to transfer
those claims to the United States District Court for the District
of Hawaii.  In regard to the other plaintiffs, Defendants filed
motions to compel those plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims; to
strike their class action claim and to pursue their arbitration
claim individually, rather than jointly; and to dismiss the
complaint or, in the alternative, stay it pending arbitration.

The Company said, "Because this action is in the early stages, no
reasonable estimate of possible loss, if any, can be made at this
time."

Founded in 1990, Apollo is a global alternative investment manager.
The company is a contrarian, value-oriented investment manager in
credit, private equity and real assets with significant distressed
expertise and a flexible mandate in the majority of its funds which
enables the funds to invest opportunistically across a company's
capital structure.


ASSOCIATED COMMUNITY: Summary Judgment in TCPA Suit Upheld
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARSHALL SPIEGEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ASSOCIATED
COMMUNITY SERVICES, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees, Case No.
17-3344 (7th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the district court's entry of the summary judgment
for ACS, and denied ACS's motion for leave to file a supplemental
brief.

Spiegel appeals the entry of summary judgment for ACS in the suit
under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA").  Spiegel
contends that ACS violated the Act when it called him to solicit
donations to the Breast Cancer Society.  On appeal the parties
debate whether the Breast Cancer Society is a "tax exempt nonprofit
organization" within the meaning of the Act.

ACS called Spiegel's home phone multiple times while his number was
registered on the national Do Not Call list.  Although the purpose
of these calls was supposedly to solicit donations to the Breast
Cancer Society, ACS kept about 85% of the total revenue that it
raised.  At all times relevant to the appeal, the IRS recognized
the Breast Cancer Society as a tax-exempt organization under 26
U.S.C. Section 501(c)(3), though the Federal Trade Commission has
identified it as a fraudulent enterprise.

In September 2015, Spiegel filed a class-action complaint seeking
to represent all persons whom ACS had called on behalf of the
Breast Cancer Society in violation of the TCPA.  He also named as
the Defendants three individuals associated with the Breast Cancer
Society, none of whom are participating in the appeal.

ACS moved to dismiss the complaint, highlighting the Act's
exception for calls made by, or on behalf of, tax exempt nonprofit
organizations.  Spiegel countered that dismissal was inappropriate
for two reasons: (1) ACS called Spiegel at least partially on its
own behalf, and (2) because of its fraudulent activities, the
Breast Cancer Society should not be considered a true tax exempt
nonprofit organization.  The judge denied ACS's motion to dismiss,
reasoning that the IRS's classification of the Breast Cancer
Society as a section 501(c)(3) entity resolved the question whether
the charity was a tax exempt nonprofit organization for purposes of
the Act.  But, the judge concluded, dismissal on the pleadings was
unwarranted because Spiegel plausibly alleged that ACS made calls
on its own behalf.

The judge later entered summary judgment for ACS because the
undisputed evidence showed that ACS called on behalf of the Breast
Cancer Society.  The judge concluded, ACS could not have violated
the Act even if the Breast Cancer Society does not qualify as a tax
exempt nonprofit organization.

Spiegel does not challenge the judge's dispositive holding that
solicitations of donations do not violate the Act's prohibition
against calls to numbers on the Do Not Call Registry.  When asked
about this issue at oral argument, Spiegel's counsel suggested that
even if the noncommercial nature of the calls doomed any claim
based on the Do Not Call Registry, he might still have a claim
under a different subsection that prohibits any telephone call to
any residential line using an artificial or prerecorded voice.  But
Spiegel's briefs make no mention of Section 227(b)(1)(B).  And as
the judge correctly observed at summary judgment, Spiegel's
complaint cannot fairly be read to allege calls using prerecorded
voice technology.  The Appellate Court concludes that Spiegel has
thus waived any claim based on Section 227(b)(1)(B).

Moving on to the issue the parties have discussed, Spiegel contends
that the judge erred in finding the Breast Cancer Society's section
501(c)(3) status dispositive to whether it qualifies as a tax
exempt, nonprofit organization for purposes of the Act.  ACS
counters that Spiegel "abandoned" this argument when he failed to
reassert it at summary judgment.  But it is not waiver -- it is
prudence and economy -- for parties not to reassert a position that
the trial judge has rejected.

The Appellate Court finds that the problem for Spiegel is that he
never presented to the district court the only argument that he
advances on appeal.  In arguing that the Breast Cancer Society is
not a tax exempt nonprofit organization within the meaning of the
Act, he now relies almost entirely on an extended comparison to
Zimmerman v. Cambridge Credit Counseling Corp., a case that
interpreted a similar nonprofit exemption in the Credit Repair
Organizations Act.  

Spiegel never advanced any argument under Zimmerman in the district
court.  Instead he merely cited cases like Bob Jones University v.
United States, for the unremarkable proposition that IRS findings
are routinely challenged, revisited, or reversed, by courts and by
the IRS.  That the IRS has authority to revoke an organization's
tax-exempt status for good cause, says nothing about whether the
IRS's designation is controlling for purposes of the TCPA when, as
in the case, the IRS has taken no action to revoke that tax-exempt
status.  It certainly does not support Spiegel's bold assertion
that the IRS' designation is irrelevant to the applicability of the
TCPA exemption.

Because Spiegel waived the only argument he raises on appeal, the
Appellate Court affirmed the district court's judgment.  It denied
ACS' motion for leave to file a supplemental brief.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 6, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/SSd4sK from Leagle.com.

Vincenzo R. Chimera -- VChimera@matushek.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Christopher V. Langone -- clangone@langonebatson.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Eric S. Berman -- esberman@Venable.com -- for Defendant-Appellee.

Michael Daniel Martinez, for Defendant-Appellee.


AUSTRALIA: Katherine Residents Take Part in PFAS Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
Chris McLennan, writing for Katherine Times, reports that all
Katherine residents are taking part in the law suit against the
Department of Defence over PFAS chemical contamination.

Shine Lawyers has filed an "open" class action against Defence on
behalf of everyone, not just those hundreds who have already signed
up.

But any others won't be directly involved.

Defence has already indicated in other cases already presented in
Oakey and Williamtown it intends to contest the cases.

But as the case reaches court, it is expected residents who want to
"opt out" of the action will be allowed to.

"An open class means that anyone that fits within the 'class
definition' is part of the class action," Joshua Aylward from Shine
Lawyers said.

"Essentially, this means that everyone who owns a property or
business within Defence's Investigation Area are part of the
action," Mr Aylward said.

The class action has been filed on behalf of members of the
Katherine community who own, or either own, residential or
commercial property or businesses in the investigation area at
November 23, 2016.

It is alleged that the contamination by PFAS has negatively
impacted business and land values in Katherine.

The Katherine class action follows the launch of a class action in
Oakey by Shine Lawyers against the Department of Defence.

The Katherine class action is not a claim for personal injuries
relating to exposure to PFAS contamination.

"The people who have signed up are the core group of claimants," Mr
Aylward said.

"As these people have registered, we are able to keep them updated
and more involved in the action going forward.

"Their information and personal circumstances will also assist in
guiding the action.

"People who haven't registered won't be directly involved in the
action.

"Although anyone who fits the 'class definition' is automatically
included in the action, the court will order that an opt-out
process occur at some point during the action.

"This is where anyone who doesn't want to be part of the class
action can opt-out."

Mayor Fay Miller was reported to have ABC Radio on the weekend she
was upset not to be have been informed of the class action.

Ms Miller reportedly said she had been "too busy" to attend several
public meetings on the issue in Katherine.

The class action has been widely reported in the Katherine Times
over the past year.

There is no indication yet when court action will begin but it
could take months and likely years. [GN]


BANKERS LIFE: Ct. Grants Summary Judgment in Misclassification Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Seattle, granted Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment in the case captioned CHRISTINE DAVID and RODNEY CLURE,
Plaintiffs, v. BANKERS LIFE AND CASUALTY CO., Defendant, Case No.
C14-766RSL (W.D. Wash.).

Christine David and Rodney Clure are former Bankers Life agents who
claim that, in reality, they were employees instead of independent
contractors and that they are entitled to overtime pay under
Washington's Minimum Wage Act (MWA).

In determining a worker's classification under the MWA, courts ask
whether, as a matter of economic reality, the worker is
economically dependent upon the alleged employer or is instead in
business for himself.

The Court concludes that there is a genuine issue of material fact
precluding summary judgment on the issue of plaintiffs' alleged
employee status. Central to that conclusion is the parties' dispute
over the degree to which Bankers controlled plaintiffs' hours and
the manner in which they performed their work. Plaintiffs' evidence
suggests Bankers controlled their daily hours, weekly schedule, and
sales approach in general.

In addition, plaintiffs' evidence suggests that they could be
disciplined and even terminated for failing to adhere to attendance
and sales requirements. In contrast, Bankers Life's evidence
suggests that the requirements plaintiffs cite were not mandatory
and that agents actually enjoyed flexibility in their decisions of
when to come into the office, when to schedule field appointments,
how to generate business, and how to approach sales in general.
THe Plaintiffs also seek summary judgment regarding defendant's
affirmative defenses, which assert that even if plaintiffs were
employees, they were exempt from the MWA's overtime requirements as
outside salespersons or retail-sales employees.

As an initial matter, plaintiffs argue that the Court should
preclude Bankers Life from asserting any of the MWA's exemptions
because Bankers did not classify plaintiffs as employees in the
first place. Plaintiffs cite no authority suggesting a defendant
cannot argue that alleged employees are independent contractors and
alternatively exempt employees.

The Court finds no reason to preclude Bankers Life from asserting
the MWA's exemptions.

The first of those exemptions is the MWA's outside salesperson
provision. To satisfy the outside-salesperson exemption, an
employer must show: (1) the employee was regularly and customarily
engaged away from the employer's place of business and the employee
regulated her own hours while on the employer's premises; (2) the
employee spent 20 percent or less of her work hours on non-exempt
tasks; and (3) the employee was paid on the basis of commissions,
fees, or guaranteed salary, and was advised of her status as an
outside salesperson.  

The parties' dueling narratives over how much Bankers Life
controlled agents' work creates a genuine issue of material fact
regarding the degree to which plaintiffs regulated their hours at
the Banker Life office.   

This precludes summary judgment on the outside-salesperson
exemption.

Bankers Life also asserts that plaintiffs are exempt from the MWA's
overtime requirements because they are retail-sales employees.

The Court concludes that the Bankers Life Bellevue branch was not a
retail or service establishment within the meaning of the MWA.
There is no Washington precedent on whether retail or service
establishment includes insurance sales offices but guidance from
the Washington Department of Labor and Industries (L&I) explicitly
lists insurance agents as employees that do not fall within the
retail sales exemption.  Persuasive federal authority also suggests
insurance agents fall outside the FLSA's corresponding exemption.
Finally, the Bankers Bellevue branch does not appear to have been a
retail or service establishment in the natural, commonsense
understanding of that term. Though not dispositive, the record
suggests the office was a call center and training facility for
Bankers personnel that was not open to the public like a storefront
or retail location.

The Court concludes summary judgment for plaintiffs is warranted on
Bankers Life's affirmative defense that the MWA's retail-sales
exemption bars plaintiffs' claims.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 25, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yatu8f4j from Leagle.com.

Christine David & Rodney Clure, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Adam J.
Berger -- berger@sgb-law.com -- SCHROETER GOLDMARK & BENDER,
Lindsay Halm -- halm@sgb-law.com -- SCHROETER GOLDMARK & BENDER,
Martin S. Garfinkel, SCHROETER GOLDMARK & BENDER & Jamal N.
Whitehead, SCHROETER GOLDMARK & BENDER.

Bankers Life and Casualty Company, a foreign corporation,
Defendant, represented by Joanna Marie Silverstein --
jsilverstein@littler.com -- LITTLER MENDELSON, Ryan Paul Hammond
rhammond@littler.com -- LITTLER MENDELSON &Daniel L. Thieme --
dthieme@littler.com -- LITTLER MENDELSON.


BAXTER INTERNATIONAL: Court Nixes Antitrust Suit over IV Solutions
------------------------------------------------------------------
An Illinois court has approved Baxter International Inc.'s motion
to dismiss a consolidated antitrust class action complaint,
according to the Company's Form 10-Q filed with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2018.

In November 2016, a purported antitrust class action complaint
seeking monetary and injunctive relief was filed in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.  The
complaint alleges a conspiracy among manufacturers of IV solutions
to restrict output and affect pricing in connection with a shortage
of such solutions.  Similar parallel actions subsequently were
filed.  In January 2017, a single consolidated complaint covering
these matters was filed in the Northern District of Illinois.

On July 5, 2018, the court granted the company's motion to dismiss
the consolidated complaint (which had been previously filed in
February 2017) without prejudice.  A copy of the decision is
available at https://is.gd/yoNEED from Leagle.com.

The plaintiffs were given until August 9, 2018, to file an amended
complaint or to have the court enter a final judgment (which they
can appeal).  

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Baxter is represented in the case by lawyers at Winston & Strawn:

     Christopher Page Wilson, Esq.
     James Franklin Herbison
     Elizabeth P Papez
     Brook R. Long
     Laura Beth Greenspan
     Winston & Strawn LLP
     E-mail: cpwilson@winston.com
             jherbison@winston.com
             epapez@winston.com
             blong@winston.com
             lgreenspan@winston.com

Baxter International Inc. provides a portfolio of healthcare
products. The company operates through North and South America;
Europe, Middle East and Africa; and Asia-Pacific segments. It
offers peritoneal dialysis and hemodialysis, and additional
dialysis therapies and services; renal replacement therapies and
other organ support therapies focused in the intensive care unit;
sterile intravenous (IV) solutions, IV therapies, infusion pumps,
administration sets, and drug reconstitution devices; and
parenteral nutrition therapies. The company is based in Deerfield,
Illinois.


BBX CAPITAL: Time to Appeal Merger Case Dismissal Has Lapsed
------------------------------------------------------------
BBX Capital Corporation said in its Form 10-Q filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for the
quarter ended June 30, 2018, that the time period for the plaintiff
to appeal the Fourth District Court of Appeals ruling regarding the
case styled In Re BCC Merger Shareholder Litigation has lapsed.

In its Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the quarter ended September 30, 2017, the Company
said, "On August 10, 2016, Shiva Stein filed a lawsuit against the
Company, BBX Merger Sub, LLC ("Merger Sub"), BCC and the members of
BCC's board of directors, which seeks to establish a class of BCC's
shareholders and challenges the Merger between BCC and BBX Capital
("the Merger")"

The plaintiff asserts that the Merger consideration undervalues BCC
and is unfair to BCC's public shareholders, that the sales process
was unfair and that BCC's directors breached their fiduciary duties
of care, loyalty and candor owed to the public shareholders of BCC
because, among other reasons, they failed to take steps to maximize
the value of BCC to its public shareholders and instead diverted
consideration to themselves.

The lawsuit also alleges that BBX Capital, as the controlling
shareholder of BCC, breached its fiduciary duties of care, loyalty
and candor owed to the public shareholders of BCC by utilizing
confidential, non-public information to formulate the Merger
consideration and not acting in the best interests of BCC's public
shareholders.

In addition, the lawsuit includes a cause of action against BCC,
the Company and Merger Sub for aiding and abetting the alleged
breaches of fiduciary duties.  The lawsuit requested that the court
grant an injunction blocking the proposed Merger or, if the
proposed Merger is completed, rescind the transaction or award
damages as determined by the court.

On September 15, 2016, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the
amended complaint.  On November 21, 2016, the Court issued an order
granting the Motion to Dismiss with prejudice.

Plaintiff appealed the Court's order dismissing the amended
complaint to the Fourth District Court of Appeals, and on March 21,
2018, the Fourth District Court of Appeals issued an opinion
affirming the dismissal of the action.

BBX Capital Corporation is a Florida-based diversified holding
company with investments in Bluegreen Vacations Corporation
("Bluegreen Vacations" or "Bluegreen"), real estate and real estate
joint ventures, and middle market operating businesses.


BEHR DAYTON: Faruki Ireland Attorney Discusses Court Ruling
-----------------------------------------------------------
Callum S. Morris, Esq., of Faruki Ireland Cox Rhinehart & Dusing
PLL, in an article for Lexology, wrote that the Sixth Circuit
handed plaintiffs greater ability to obtain class certification in
an opinion handed down on July 16, 2018. In Martin v. Behr Dayton
Thermal Products, LLC, a three judge panel for the Sixth Circuit
adopted the "broad view" of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). Martin No.
17-3663, slip op. at 8 (6th Cir. July 16, 2018). In so doing, the
three judge panel aligned the Sixth Circuit with the Second,
Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits in following the "broad view."
Id. at 7. The decision in this case provides Sixth Circuit
litigators with another avenue when seeking class certification.

This case was first filed back in 2008 by thirty named plaintiffs
in the McCook Field neighborhood of Dayton. Id. at 2. The
plaintiffs' allege that the groundwater beneath their properties is
contaminated with carcinogenic volatile organic compounds (VOCs),
as a result of the defendants[1] releasing chemicals from their
nearby facilities. Id. at 2-3. The chemicals seeped from two
properties, forming two separate "plumes" that converged south of
the facilities and ultimately migrated to the area beneath the
plaintiffs' properties. Id. at 3. The plaintiffs originally filed
suit in the Court of Common Pleas for Montgomery County, but
Chrysler removed the case to the Southern District of Ohio. Id. at
4.

The plaintiffs sought to certify a class as to liability for
private nuisance, negligence, negligence per se, strict liability,
and unjust enrichment under Rule 23(b)(3). Id. The District Court
determined that the plaintiffs could not meet Rule 23(b)(3)'s
predominance requirement due to injury-in-fact and causation law in
Ohio. Id. The plaintiffs alternatively sought to certify seven
common issues under Rule 23(c)(4), which the District Court did
grant. Id. at 5. Both parties appealed the order and the Sixth
Circuit heard argument on the Rule 23(c)(4) issue. Id. at 5-6.

Rule 23(c)(4) states, "[w]hen appropriate, an action may be brought
or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). Under the "broad view" of Rule 23(c)(4)
the court applies the predominance and superiority prongs of Rule
23(b)(3) "after common issues have been identified for class
treatment." Martin, slip op. 17-3663
at 7. This view allows courts to apply Rule 23(c)(4) even if
predominance has not been established for the entire cause of
action. Id. The Sixth Circuit argued that the "narrow view," which
would require predominance for the entire class, "would undercut
the purpose of Rule 23(c)(4)." Id. at 10.

Essentially, this rule allows courts to isolate common issues and
proceed with class treatment, even if common questions do not
predominate over individual questions so that class certification
for the entire action would be appropriate. Id. at 7 (citing
Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir.
1996)). The Court did note that the superiority requirement of Rule
23(b)(3) would serve as a "backstop" to prevent minor or
insignificant issues from being certified. Id. at 9.

As an example, in this case the District Court denied class
certification for causation under Rule 23(b)(3), which would have
allowed plaintiffs to establish the cause of the injuries to the
plaintiffs by one common showing of proof, as opposed to each
individual plaintiff offering separate and varying pieces of
evidence that his or her injury had been caused by the defendants'
acts. Rule 23(c)(4) allows the court to certify particular issues
that are common to the whole class, such as "[w]hether Defendants
negligently failed to investigate and remediate the contamination
at and flowing from their respective Facilities." Id. at 5. The
plaintiffs will now be able to make one evidentiary showing and
gain resolution on that question, thus allowing them to use that
ruling in later trials, even if some additional individualized
evidence on causation is necessary.

The Sixth Circuit's decision in this case will expand the ability
of plaintiffs to gain class certification in the course of
litigation. A hopeful class action plaintiffs failing to gain class
certification under Rule 23(b)(3) will have greater access to the
courts through the use of Rule 23(c)(4) as an alternative. While
plaintiffs will still favor certifying a liability class under Rule
23(b)(3), this decision does provide a worthy consolation prize to
plaintiffs. Instead of resting all hope on class certification,
plaintiffs in the Sixth Circuit will be able to resolve common
issues that will go a long way to promoting settlement or aiding
their cases at trial.

This decision will also give courts the ability to narrow down
issues until it finds issues common enough to satisfy predominance
and justify class certification. Defendants will want to be mindful
of how particularized the questions become, however. Questions that
are too minor or insignificant may give defendants the opportunity
to defeat an attempt to certify a class under Rule 23(c)(4) since
it simply will not be an efficient use of the court's time.

While this is not a seismic shift in class action litigation, it
certainly hands plaintiffs a useful weapon when fighting for class
certification. [GN]


BEHR DAYTON: Urges 6th Circuit to Rethink Class Action Ruling
-------------------------------------------------------------
Christine Powell, writing for Law360, reports that four companies
have urged the full Sixth Circuit to rethink a panel's recent
ruling cementing the certification for classwide treatment of
certain issues in a group of Dayton, Ohio, residents' lawsuit
accusing them of groundwater pollution, saying that the panel's
ruling "opened the virtual class action floodgates."

Old Carco LLC, which was formerly known as Chrysler LLC, Behr
Dayton Thermal Products LLC, Behr America Inc. and Aramark Uniform
& Career Apparel LLC on July 30 filed a petition for rehearing en
banc.

The case is styled Terry Martin, et al v. Behr Dayton Thermal
Products, et al, Case No. 17-3663 (6th Cir.).  The case was filed
June 22, 2017. [GN]


BIG HEART: 9th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Thai Forced Labor Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of the case, JESSICA HUGHES, individually and on behalf
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BIG HEART
PET BRANDS, a Delaware corporation; MEOW MIX, LLC, a Rhode Island
corporation; THE J.M. SMUCKER COMPANY, Defendants-Appellees, Case
No. 16-55212 (9th Cir.).

Big Heart is a marketer and distributor of canned and packaged
seafood that sources some of its products from Thailand.  The
Bureau of International Labor Affairs of the United States
Department of Labor recognizes that fish and shrimp products
exported from Thailand may be the result of forced labor.
Therefore, Big Heart's supply chain may include child and forced
labor, but the company does not disclose this on its labels.

Hughes argues that by not labeling its products,  Big Heart misled
purchasers and thereby violated California's consumer protection
laws.  Specifically, Highes brings suit under (1) California Civil
Code Sections 1750, et seq., the Consumers Legal Remedies Act
("CLRA"); (2) California's Business & Professions Code Sections
17200, et seq., the Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"); and (3)
California's Business & Professions Code Sections 17500, et seq.,
the False Advertising Law ("FAL").

The district court dismissed all of Hughes' claims.  Hughes
appeals.

Hughes argues that Big Heart had a duty to disclose, on its labels,
the existence of child labor in its supply chain.  But the
Appellate Court finds that the Plaintiff failed to allege that the
existence of child labor in the supply chain affects the chocolate
products' central function.  Therefore, Big Heart was under no duty
to disclose.

The Court explains that although a claim may be stated under the
CLRA in terms constituting fraudulent omissions, to be actionable,
the omission must be contrary to a representation actually made by
the defendant, or an omission of a fact the defendant was obliged
to disclose.  Therefore, Big Heart did not violate the CLRA.

The UCL prohibits any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act
or practice.  Because Business & Professions Code Section 17200 is
written in the disjunctive, it establishes three varieties of
unfair competition -- acts or practices which are unlawful, or
unfair, or fraudulent.  The Plaintiff claims that Big Heart is
liable under all three varieties.  

However, the Court holds that Big Heart is not liable under the
unlawful prong because Hughes did not state a claim under the CLRA.
Likewise, Hughes cannot state a claim under the fraudulent prong
because Big Heart did not have a duty to disclose the forced labor.
Therefore, Hughes did not state a UCL claim.

Finally, for the purposes of the FAL, whether an advertisement is
misleading is determined by asking whether a reasonable consumer
would likely be deceived.  The Court finds that Hughes' FAL claims
fail because a failure to disclose a fact one has no affirmative
duty to disclose is not likely to deceive anyone.

For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed
by the Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 10, 2018 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/X3sIKT from Leagle.com.


BLUEGREEN VACATIONS: Landons et al. Sue over Timeshares
-------------------------------------------------------
Bluegreen Vacations Corporation ("Bluegreen") and its subsidiary
Bluegreen Vacations Unlimited, Inc. ("BVU") are facing purported
class action lawsuit related to alleged violations of the Wisconsin
Timeshare Act, among other laws, according to BBX Capital
Corporation's Form 10-Q filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission on August 6, 2018, for the quarter ended June 30, 2018.

On June 28, 2018, Melissa S. Landon, Edward P. Landon, Shane Auxier
and Mu Hpare, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, filed a purported class action lawsuit against Bluegreen
and BVU asserting claims for alleged violations of the Wisconsin
Timeshare Act, Wisconsin law prohibiting illegal referral selling,
and Wisconsin law prohibiting illegal attorney's fee provisions.

Plaintiffs allegations include that Bluegreen failed to disclose
the identity of the seller of real property at the beginning of its
initial contact with the purchaser; that Bluegreen misrepresented
who the seller of the real property was; that Bluegreen
misrepresented the buyer's right to cancel; that Bluegreen included
an illegal attorney's fee provision in its sales document(s); that
Bluegreen offered an illegal "today only" incentive to purchase;
and that Bluegreen utilizes an illegal referral selling program to
induce the sale of VOIs.

Plaintiffs seek certification of a class consisting of all persons
who, in Wisconsin, purchased from Bluegreen one or more VOIs within
six years prior to the filing of this lawsuit.  Plaintiffs seek
statutory damages, attorneys' fees and injunctive relief.

The Company said, "Bluegreen believes the lawsuit is without merit
and intend to vigorously defend the action."

BBX Capital Corporation is a Florida-based diversified holding
company with investments in Bluegreen Vacations Corporation
("Bluegreen Vacations" or "Bluegreen"), real estate and real estate
joint ventures, and middle market operating businesses.


BLUEGREEN VACATIONS: Seeks Arbitration with 59 Opt-In Plaintiffs
----------------------------------------------------------------
BBX Capital Corporation said in its Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarter ended June 30,
2018, that in the lawsuit filed by Whitney Paxton and Jeff Reeser
related to alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, Bluegreen Vacations Corporation (Bluegreen) intends to seek
to compel 59 of the currently named opt-in plaintiffs to submit
their respective claims to arbitration on an individual basis.

On August 24, 2016, Whitney Paxton and Jeff Reeser filed a lawsuit
against Bluegreen Vacations Unlimited, Inc. ("BVU"), a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Bluegreen, and certain of its employees, seeking to
establish a class action of former and current employees of BVU and
alleging violations of plaintiffs' rights under the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 (the "FLSA") and breach of contract.  The
lawsuit also claims that the defendants terminated plaintiff
Whitney Paxton as retaliation for her complaints about alleged
violations of the FLSA.  The lawsuit seeks damages in the amount of
the unpaid compensation owed to the plaintiffs.

During July 2017, a magistrate judge entered a report and
recommendation that the plaintiffs' motion to conditionally certify
collective action and facilitate notice to potential class members
be granted with respect to certain employees and denied as to
others.

During September 2017, the judge accepted the recommendation and
granted preliminary approval of class certification.  Based on that
conditional class certification, all potential class members were
provided Consent Forms to opt-in to the lawsuit, which opt-in
period has since expired, and a set number of opt-ins has been
determined.

Class-wide discovery was subsequently served and plaintiffs filed a
Motion for Protective Order which is pending.  Bluegreen intends to
seek to compel 59 of the currently named opt-in plaintiffs to
submit their respective claims to arbitration on an individual
basis.

The Company said, "Bluegreen believes that the lawsuit is without
merit and intends to vigorously defend the action."

BBX Capital Corporation is a Florida-based diversified holding
company with investments in Bluegreen Vacations Corporation
("Bluegreen Vacations" or "Bluegreen"), real estate and real estate
joint ventures, and middle market operating businesses.


BLUEGREEN VACATIONS: Still Defends "Anderson" TCPA Lawsuit
----------------------------------------------------------
BBX Capital Corporation disclosed in its Form 10-Q filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarter ended June
30, 2018, that Bluegreen Vacations Corporation is facing potential
class action suit filed by Katja Anderson and George Galloway over
telemarketing calls.

On May 3, 2018, Katja Anderson and George Galloway, individually
and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, filed a
lawsuit against Bluegreen which asserted violations of the
Telephone Consumer Practices Act.  The plaintiffs claim that they
received multiple telemarketing calls in the spring of 2015 despite
their requests not to be called.  Plaintiffs seek certification of
a class of individuals in the United States who received more than
one telephone call made by Bluegreen or on its behalf within a
12-month period; to a telephone number that has been registered
with the National Do Not Call Registry for at least 30 days.
Plaintiffs seek money damages, attorneys' fees and a court order
requiring Bluegreen to cease all unsolicited telephone calling
activities.  Bluegreen has moved to dismiss the lawsuit, and the
motion is pending.

The Company said, "Bluegreen believes the lawsuit is without merit
and intend to vigorously defend the action."

BBX Capital Corporation is a Florida-based diversified holding
company with investments in Bluegreen Vacations Corporation
("Bluegreen Vacations" or "Bluegreen"), real estate and real estate
joint ventures, and middle market operating businesses.


BLUEGREEN VACATIONS: Still Faces Siu Suit over Telemarketing Calls
------------------------------------------------------------------
BBX Capital Corporation disclosed in its Form 10-Q filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for the
quarter ended June 30, 2018, that Bluegreen Vacations Unlimited,
Inc. ("BVU") still defends itself against a purported class suit
filed by Gordon Siu.

The Company said, "On January 4, 2018, Gordon Siu, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, filed a lawsuit against
BVU and others, Choice Hotels International, Inc. which asserted
claims for alleged violations of California law that relates to the
recording of telephone conversations with consumers.  Plaintiff
alleges that after staying at a Choice Hotels resort, defendants
placed a telemarketing call to plaintiff to sell the Choice Hotels
customer loyalty program and a vacation package at a Choice hotel
via the Bluegreen Getaways vacation package program."

Plaintiff alleges that he was not timely informed that the phone
conversation was being recorded and is seeking certification of a
class comprised of other persons recorded on calls without their
consent within one year before the filing of the original
complaint.

After BVU moved to dismiss the complaint, plaintiff amended his
complaint to dismiss one of the two causes of action in the
original complaint on the basis that that particular statute only
concerns land line phones.

Plaintiff and Choice agreed to a confidential settlement and Choice
has been dismissed from this lawsuit.  Plaintiff seeks money
damages and injunctive relief.

The Company said, "Bluegreen believes the lawsuit is without merit
and intends to vigorously defend the action."

BBX Capital Corporation is a Florida-based diversified holding
company with investments in Bluegreen Vacations Corporation
("Bluegreen Vacations" or "Bluegreen"), real estate and real estate
joint ventures, and middle market operating businesses.


BMW: South Korean Vehicle Owners File Class Action
--------------------------------------------------
Haejin Choi and Hyunjoo Jin, writing for Reuters, report that BMW's
South Korean unit apologised over a spate of engine fires,
estimated by the country's transport ministry at 27 over January to
July, that has prompted a government probe and a major backlash
from consumers.

BMW said it will launch a recall of 106,000 diesel vehicles,
including the 520d, starting from Aug. 20, citing defects in the
exhaust gas recirculation system as the root cause of the fires.

"For the recent series of fire incidents happened in the country,
we sincerely apologise for causing worry and anxiety among people
and government authorities," BMW Korea Chairman Kim Hyo-joon said
at a press conference on Aug. 6.

BMW, the second-most popular foreign carmaker in South Korea, said
it had learned of the problems in 2016, but it identified the root
cause of the problem in June this year.

The automaker has announced a "technical campaign" in Europe,
followed by recalls in South Korea, citing similar failure rates of
the system in both regions.

South Korea's transport ministry said it has urged BMW executives
to cooperate in the ongoing probe, saying they were falling short
of submitting related documents. The government launched the probe
into the affected models on July 16.

Transport Minister Kim Hyun-mee said the country would investigate
the case in a "thorough and transparent manner" and take legal
action if needed.

A total of 13 South Korean owners of BMW vehicles filed a class
action lawsuit against the German automaker on Aug. 3, claiming
compensation worth 5 million won ($4,447.13) each, saying they
could not drive their cars out of fear the faulty part could catch
fire, Yonhap News Agency reported.

BMW, which trails only Mercedes in imported car sales in South
Korea, saw sales more than double to 59,624 vehicles last year,
from five years ago.

Driven by South Korea's free trade deals with Europe and the United
States, foreign car makers' share of the domestic market had risen
to 15 percent last year, from under 1 percent in 2001.

South Korea is a relatively small market, ranking 11th in global
auto sales, but is a major market for lucrative, premium vehicles
and is currently dominated by Hyundai Motor and Kia Motors. ($1 =
1,124.3200 won). [GN]


CALIFORNIA: Admin. Bid to File Under Seal in T. Ashker's Suit OK'd
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TODD ASHKER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. GOVERNOR OF THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., Defendants, Case No. 4:09-cv-05796-CW
(N.D. Cal.), Magistrate Judge Robert M. Illman of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California, Oakland Division,
granted the Plaintiffs' Administrative Motion to File Under Seal.

The Court has received Plaintiffs' Motion, and the Declaration of
Carmen E. Bremer in support of the same.  Pursuant to Civil Local
Rule 79-5(a), the Magistrate Judge holds that the Plaintiffs have
shown that the portions of the documents to be sealed are entitled
to protection under the law because they contain confidential
information that Defendants claim could harm CDCR institutional
safety and security if disclosed.  The Plaintiffs have also met the
"good cause" standard for sealing portions of the Declaration of
Carmen E. Bremer in Support of the Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of
Motion for De Novo Review of Dispositive Matter Referred to
Magistrate Judge Regarding Production of Documents Required by
Settlement Agreement, together with Exhibit A thereto, because
they've shown that they contain confidential information that the
Defendants claim would harm institutional safety and security, and
would further compromise ongoing investigations of alleged prison
gang activity if disclosed.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 6, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/NBz3pj from Leagle.com.

Todd Ashker, Plaintiff, represented by Alexandra Azure Wheeler,
Center for Constitutional Rights, Anne Marie Cappella --
anne.cappella@weil.com -- Weil, Gotshal & Manges, Anne Butterfield
Weills, Siegel & Yee, Bambo Obaro -- bambo.obaro@weil.com -- Weil,
Gotshal and Manges, Carmen E. Bremer --
carmen.bremer@bremerlawgroup.com -- Bremer Law Group PLLC, pro hac
vice, Carol Strickman -- carol@prisonerswithchildren.org -- Legal
Services for Prisoner With Children, Charles Francis-Antonio
Carbone -- charles@charlescarbone.com -- Law Office of Charles
Carbone, Daniel Mark Siegel , Siegel Yee & Brunner, Evan Charles
Greenberg -- EGreenberg@co.tulare.ca.us -- Coleman & Balogh LLP,
Jules Lobel -- jll4@pitt.edu -- pro hac vice, Marilyn S. McMahon --
marilyn.mcmahon@gmail.com -- Rachel Anne Meeropol, Center for
Constitutional Rights, pro hac vice & Samuel Rand Miller --
amrmiller@yahoo.com -- United Sta.

Danny Troxell, George Ruiz, George Franco, Gabriel Reyes, Richard
Johnson, Paul Redd, Luis Esquivel & Ronnie Dewberry, Plaintiffs,
represented by Alexandra Azure Wheeler, Center for Constitutional
Rights, Anne Marie Cappella, Weil, Gotshal & Manges, Anne
Butterfield Weills, Siegel & Yee, Bambo Obaro, Weil, Gotshal and
Manges, Carmen E. Bremer, Bremer Law Group PLLC, pro hac vice,
Carol Strickman, Legal Services for Prisoner With Children, Charles
Francis-Antonio Carbone, Law Office of Charles Carbone, Evan
Charles Greenberg, Coleman & Balogh LLP, Jules Lobel, pro hac vice,
Marilyn S. McMahon, Rachel Anne Meeropol, Center for Constitutional
Rights, pro hac vice & Samuel Rand Miller, United Sta.

Jeffrey Franklin, Plaintiff, represented by Anne Marie Cappella,
Weil, Gotshal & Manges, Anne Butterfield Weills, Siegel & Yee,
Bambo Obaro, Weil, Gotshal and Manges, Carmen E. Bremer, Bremer Law
Group PLLC, pro hac vice, Carol Strickman, Legal Services for
Prisoner With Children, Charles Francis-Antonio Carbone, Law Office
of Charles Carbone, Evan Charles Greenberg, Coleman & Balogh LLP,
Jules Lobel, pro hac vice, Marilyn S. McMahon, Rachel Anne
Meeropol, Center for Constitutional Rights, pro hac vice & Samuel
Rand Miller, United Sta.

Mathew Cate, Secretary, CDCR, Greg Lewis, Warden, Pelican Bay State
Prison, Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor of the State of California &
Anthony Chaus, Chief, Office of Correctional Safety, CDCR,
Defendants, represented by Adriano Hrvatin --
adriano.hrvatin@doj.ca.gov -- California Department of Justice,
Christine Marie Ciccotti -- christine.ciccotti@doj.ca.gov --
California Attorney General's Office, Jay Craig Russell --
jay.russell@doj.ca.gov -- Office of the Attorney General, Jillian
Renee O'Brien, California State Attorney General's Office, Loran
Michael Simon, California State Department of Justice & Martine
Noel D'Agostino, CA State Attorney
General's Office.

California Correctional Peace Officers Association, Intervenor,
represented by Phillip A. Murray -- phil@kernlaw.com -- Phillip
Murray.


CALIFORNIA: Plaintiffs' Bid to Use Alias in ADA Suit Partly Granted
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IVORY N., a minor, by and through her mother and
Guardian ad Litem, Z.F., and JAMES B., a minor, by and through his
mother and Guardian ad Litem, A.B., Plaintiffs, v. JENNIFER KENT,
Director of the Department of Health Care Services, and STATE OF
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES, Defendants, Case No.
C 18-03099 WHA (N.D. Cal.), Judge William Alsup of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California (i) granted
in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs' motion to proceed using
fictitious names, and (ii) granted in part and denied in part the
Plaintiffs' motion to file under seal.

In this putative class action brought under the Medicaid Act, the
Americans with Disabilities Act, and other statutes, the Plaintiffs
request that they and their guardians ad litem be permitted to
proceed under fictitious names and move to seal in part certain
related documents.

The litigation involves the Plaintiffs' right to access medically
necessary in-home nursing services.  The Plaintiffs accordingly
assert they will be required to present medical records regarding
their disabilities, health histories, and treatments, the
disclosure of which could stigmatize or embarrass them or place
them at risk of harassment.  They further contend that because
their guardians in the action are their parents, the disclosure of
their guardians' identities would in effect reveal their own
identities.

Given the sensitive nature of the subject matter of these
proceedings and that the Plaintiffs are minors, for the time being,
Judge Alsup granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs'
motion to proceed using fictitious names.  FRCP 5.2(a)(3) already
restricts the names of minor individuals to their actual initials.
The Plaintiffs may proceed under that rule or may proceed using
their real first name followed by the initial of their last name.
The Plaintiffs' guardians, moreover, may not proceed pursuant to
their proposed pseudonyms.  Instead, they may also proceed under
their first name followed by the initial of their last name.

In future filings, the Plaintiffs will revise the case caption so
that it is in accordance with the Order.  The Judge will revisit
this determination if, as the action proceeds, it becomes clear
that the Plaintiffs' need for anonymity no longer outweighs the
public's interest in knowing their identities.

Judge Alsup granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs'
motion to file under seal.  He granted the Plaintiffs' request to
seal their actual names and their guardians' last names.  He denied
the Plaintiffs' request to seal the first names of their guardians.
The Plaintiffs will file a revised redacted version of the
relevant documents by July 13, 2018.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 6, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/gsnQZD from Leagle.com.

Ivory N., a minor, by and through her mother and Guardian ad Litem,
Z. F. & James B., a minor, by and through his mother and Guardian
ad Litem, A. B., Plaintiffs, represented by William Jordan Leiner
-- william.leiner@disabilityrightsca.org -- Disability Rights
California, Ali L. Nicolette --
ali.nicolette@disabilityrightsca.org -- Disability Rights
California, Elissa Staci Gershon --
elissa.gershon@disabilityrightsca.org -- Disability Rights
California, Maria Fernanda Iriarte --
maria.iriarte@disabilityrightsca.org  -- Disability Rights
California, Maria del Pilar Gonzalez Morales --
pilar.gonzalez@disabilityrightsca.org -- Disability Rights
California, Rebecca Y. Yang, Disability Rights California, Robert
Dexter Newman, Jr., Western Center on Law & Poverty, Salma E. Enan
-- salma.enan@disabilityrightsca.org -- Disability Rights
California & Sarah Jane Somers, National Health Law Program, Inc.

Jennifer Kent, Director of the Department of Health Care Services &
State of California Department of Health Care Services, Defendants,
represented by Carolyn Ortler Tsai, Attorney General of State of
California, Hamsa M. Murthy, Office of the Attorney General of
California, Maryam Toossi Berona, California Department of Justice
Office of the Attorney General & Susan M. Carson, Deputy Attorney
General.


CAPITAL ONE: Court Dismisses Convenience Fees Suit
--------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland,
Southern Division, granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case
captioned ELLA S. BROWN, Plaintiff, v. CAPITAL ONE, N.A.,
Defendant, Case No. GJH-17-3076 (D. Md.).

The Plaintiff brings a class action against, alleging that Capital
One extended secured financing to Maryland borrowers and charged
convenience fees in violation of the Maryland Credit Grantor Closed
End Credit Provisions (CLEC).

First, the Plaintiff argues that because the Defendant collected
non-principal payments after its initial imposition of a
convenience fee in violation of CLEC, Plaintiff need not pay more
than the principal amount owed in order to recover damages.

The Plaintiff's argument was flatly rejected in Bediako, 850
F.Supp.2d 574, 582-83 (D. Md. 2012) aff'd 537 F. App'x 183. There,
the trial court found that the plaintiff failed to state a claim
even if the court considered payments collected after the alleged
CLEC violation because $3,701.03 of principal still remained on the
loan.  No matter how one calculates the effect of the repossession
and private sale of Bediako's vehicle, there is simply no way that
she suffered any actual damages.

Second, the Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to treble damages
under Section 12-1018(b) for each unauthorized convenience fee
regardless of whether she may recover damages under Section
12-1018(a)(2).  

This argument is not persuasive.

Section 12-1018(b) provides for treble damages for fees collected
in excess of that authorized by this subtitle. But since Section
12-1018(a)(2) permits a lender that violates the statute to collect
the principal amount of the loan, Defendant has not collected any
excess fees. Plaintiff's argument would require the Court to read
Section 12-1018(b) in a vacuum, which would run afoul of the rules
of statutory construction and ignore the phrase in addition at the
start of Section 12-1018(b) itself.  

Therefore, the Plaintiff is not entitled to damages under CLEC. Her
corollary breach of contract claim is futile and must be
dismissed.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 25, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y97wgo6l from
Leagle.com.

Ella S. Brown, On behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Cory L. Zajdel --
clz@zlawmaryland.com -- Z Law LLC.

Capital One, N.A., Defendant, represented by Syed Mohsin Reza --
mohsin.reza@troutman.com -- Troutman Sanders LLP & Jonathan S.
Hubbard -- jon.hubbard@troutman.com -- Troutman Sanders LLP, pro
hac vice.


CAPITALA FINANCE: Still Defends Paskowitz Class Action
------------------------------------------------------
Capitala Finance Corp. continues to defend itself in the
"Paskowitz" class action lawsuit, according to the Company's Form
10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

On December 28, 2017, an alleged stockholder filed a putative class
action lawsuit complaint, Paskowitz v. Capitala Finance Corp., et
al., in the United States District Court for the Central District
of California (case number 2:17-cv-09251-MWF-AS) (the "Paskowitz
Action"), against the Company and certain of its current officers
on behalf of all persons who purchased or otherwise acquired the
Company's common stock between January 4, 2016 and August 7, 2017.

On March 1, 2018, the Paskowitz Action was transferred, on
stipulation of the parties, to the United States District Court for
the Western District of North Carolina (case number
3:18-cv-00096-RJC-DSC).

On June 19, 2018, the plaintiffs in the Paskowitz Action filed
their amended complaint.  The complaint, as currently amended,
alleges certain violations of the securities laws, including, inter
alia, that the defendants made certain materially false and
misleading statements and omissions regarding the Company's
business, operations, and prospects between January 4, 2016 and
August 7, 2017.

The plaintiffs in the Paskowitz Action seek compensatory damages
and attorneys' fees and costs, among other relief, but did not
specify the amount of damages being sought.  The time for the
defendants in the Paskowitz Action to respond to the amended
complaint has not yet expired.

Capitala Finance said, "While the Company intends to vigorously
defend itself in this litigation, the outcome of these legal
proceedings cannot be predicted with certainty."

Capitala Finance Corp. is a Business Development Company
specializing in traditional mezzanine, senior subordinated and
unitranche debt, first-lien and second-lien loans, equity
investments in sponsored and non-sponsored lower and traditional
middle market companies.


CARTER HOLT: Adina Thorn Files Shadowclad Class Action
------------------------------------------------------
A multi-million dollar funded class action by building owners
against Carter Holt Harvey has been filed at the Auckland High
Court on August 6 by Adina Thorn Lawyers.

The action seeks damages on behalf of the owners as a result of the
alleged failure of the widely-used Shadowclad building product.

Shadowclad is already subject to court proceedings, with the
Ministry of Education alleging the product has been defective,
leaving it owning approximately 800 leaky school buildings. The
estimated repair bill has been reported as being in excess of $1.1
billion. 1

Adina Thorn, who is also running the current $200 million plus
funded class action against James Hardie companies for the design
and manufacture of cladding products (including Harditex, Monotek
and Titan), says the Carter Holt class action is the result of
building owners expressing concern over weather-tightness issues
with Shadowclad.

"In 2014 the Fair Go television programme found 24 property owners
who believed they had been supplied faulty or sub-standard
Shadowclad material.

"Given Fair Go's research, the extent of the Ministry of
Education's claim, and the approaches we have had, clearly the
issue is significant. This has led to the funded class action."

Adina says that the 117 owners from around New Zealand, who have
joined the action will face no out of pocket expenses while
litigation funding is in place. This will cover the cost of the
legal team, technical experts and associated costs needed to mount
a strong claim against a large organisation like Carter Holt
Harvey.

"Our claim is comfortably in excess of $40 million but it's likely
to round up to $50 million in the wake of recent developments and
the media around this and the Ministry of Education's claim".

"At this stage we will still accept further claimants but people
should act reasonably quickly because this is the opportunity to be
part of an action without having to meet any of the high legal,
court and technical costs associated with a claim of this nature
and scale, against a well-resourced defendant."

She says building owners who wish to join the class action can
still do so at: www.adinathorn.co.nz [GN]


CCS COMMERCIAL: Class Certification in A. Rosenberg's Suit Denied
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Seattle, denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification in the case captioned AYANNA ROSENBERG, Plaintiff, v.
CCS COMMERCIAL, LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. C17-476 MJP (W.D.
Wash.).

The Plaintiff, who was uninsured at the time, was involved in a
collision with one of Progressive's insureds, David Waters.
Progressive paid for the repair of Waters' vehicle, then hired CCS
to recover the cost of the repairs from the Plaintiff. No suit was
filed or judgment obtained against the Plaintiff. About a year
after the accident, CCS sent two collection notices to the
Plaintiff. The Plaintiff alleges that the form and content of the
notices are intended to deceptively mimic debt collection notices.

The Plaintiff proposes the following Class:

     All persons in the State of Washington, and all persons who
were involved in a collision with a Washington insured, who, after
September 28, 2012, received a debt collection-type notice
identified as a subrogation claims from CCS where CCS was
attempting to recover a subrogated interest in the form of an
unadjudicated, unliquidated tort claim on behalf of an insurance
company (including but not limited to Progressive) and remitted
payment to CCS or an insurance company.

The Plaintiff proposes the following Subclass:

     All persons in the State of Washington, and all persons who
were involved in a collision with a Washington insured, who, after
September 28, 2012, received a debt collection-type notice
identified as a subrogation claims from CCS where CCS was
attempting to recover a subrogated interest in the form of an
unadjudicated, unliquidated tort claim on behalf of Progressive and
remitted payment to CCS or Progressive.

FRCP 23(a)(2): Commonality

Satisfaction of this element simply requires a single significant
question of law or fact.
Both CCS and Progressive attack the existence of "common" questions
of law and fact on the basis of the "causation" element of the CPA,
and both for the same reason; namely, that CCS employed a variety
of notices and phone call scripts with the persons whom they
targeted for collection. The permutations and combinations of
different written and oral communications, the Defendants argue,
make the determination of causation an individualized one.

The Court is forced to agree: given that CCS's communication with
the potential class members is not limited to a single phone call,
or a single written communication, but is instead spread out over a
series of communications represented by a variety of different
letters and a plethora of phone scripts with varying responses, the
determination of whether (and at what point, and how) an individual
member was deceived cannot be reduced to a common question of fact
but will depend instead on case-by-case analyses incompatible with
a class action mechanism.

FRCP 23(a)(3): Typicality

The Plaintiff lists the factors supporting a finding of typicality
as:

   1. Conduct by the Defendants which was not unique to the
Plaintiff and was experienced by the class;

   2. the Plaintiff suffered an injury as a result of this conduct
which is same or similar to the injuries of the members of the
class.

The Defendants argue that the small claims judgment raises issues
of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel. The Plaintiff disputes
that, on the ground that a CPA/unjust enrichment case against a
collection agency and an insurance company is not subject to a res
judicata/collateral estoppel defense on the basis of a small claims
negligence action against the other driver. The Court is inclined
to agree with the Plaintiff but the issue is neither fully briefed
nor necessary for a disposition of this certification motion and
the Court makes no finding either way.

The Court does find it beyond question, however, that the possible
defenses listed above are substantive and that they are defenses to
which all the other class members would not be subject. This alone
compels the Court to deny the Plaintiff's request to certify a
class.

FRCP 23(a)(4): Adequacy

The Defendant points out that the Plaintiff's counsel is basically
underwriting the prosecution of this lawsuit; i.e., that the
Plaintiff does not have sufficient funds to hire counsel, and her
attorney will be paid, if at all, out of the proceeds of a
successful class action.

CCS also argues that the Plaintiff lacks credibility, based on
changes that she made to her deposition testimony, primarily
regarding which attorney her former employer.  The Plaintiff rebuts
this accusation by pointing out that the events she was being asked
to recall were 3.5 years prior to her deposition and that the
corrections were made after she had had an opportunity to review
her attorneys' records and refresh her recollection.

The Court does not find that these corrections to the Plaintiff's
recollections rise to a level that calls her credibility into
question.

FRCP 23(b)(3): Predominance and superiority

FRCP 23(b)(3) requires a showing that: the questions of law or fact
common to class members predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members, and that a class members predominate over
any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy.

The Plaintiff's "but for" causation argument breaks down for those
percentage of the recipients who actually were at fault in the
accident. The Plaintiff says that it is speculative to assume, in
the absence of any admissible testimonial evidence, what the
motives of the paying recipients/potential class members are. The
Court does not find it speculative to assert that, among a
potential class of 4600+ persons, a certain percentage of that
group will actually have been at fault in their accident. Which
percentage is unimportant  the operative and fatal fact is that it
requires a case-by-case analysis to determine which members of the
class fall into that category.

On the question of whether a plaintiff who pays a valid debt in
response to unlawful collection activities is injured in the amount
paid, Judge Robart of this district found that there was no
Washington State CPA case authority. A survey of other
jurisdictions who have addressed a similar question led him to
conclude: Plaintiffs are not injured in the amount collected when
the plaintiff owed the debt even where the debt collector violated
state law in doing so.

Accordingly, the motion to certify a class in this matter is
denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 25, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ydaj5u8u from Leagle.com.

Ayanna Rosenberg, individually, and on behalf of all those
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Chase Christian
Alvord -- calvord@tousley.com -- TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS --
jbulthuis@tousley.com -- TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS & Matthew James
Ide.

CCS Commercial, LLC, doing business as, Defendant, represented by
Holly D. Brauchli -- holly.brauchli@bullivant.com -- BULLIVANT
HOUSER BAILEY & Matthew J. Sekits -- matthew.sekits@bullivant.com
-- BULLIVANT HOUSER BAILEY.

Progressive Direct Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by
Shannon Lea Armstrong -- Shannon.Armstrong@hklaw.com -- HOLLAND &
KNIGHT, J Matthew Donohue - Matt.Donohue@hklaw.com -- HOLLAND &
KNIGHT & Kristin Mariko Asai -- Kristin.Asai@hklaw.com -- HOLLAND &
KNIGHT.


CENTERPLATE OF DELAWARE: Bid to Dismiss FLSA Suit Denied
--------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MONIQUE RAQUEDAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CENTERPLATE
OF DELAWARE INC, Defendant, Case No. 17-CV-03828-LHK (N.D. Cal.),
Judge Lucy H. Koh of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, San Jose Division, denied the Defendant's
motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' second amended complaint
("SAC").

The instant putative class action was originally filed by Raquedan
on May 24, 2017 in Santa Clara County Superior Court.  The
Defendant removed the action to the Court on July 5, 2017.  Then,
on Nov. 15, 2017, Mr. Raquedan filed a motion for leave to
substitute in new class representatives -- Raquedan and Ronald
Martinez -- on the grounds that Mr. Raquedan had a criminal
conviction that might raise concerns about his adequacy to
represent the class.  Mr. Raquedan attached to his motion a
proposed first amended complaint that replaced Mr. Raquedan with
the Plaintiffs as the named Plaintiffs.  On Jan. 23, 2018, the
Court granted Mr. Raquedan's motion for leave to substitute in new
class representatives and ordered that the proposed first amended
complaint attached to Mr. Raquedan's motion be filed by Jan. 24,
2018.

On Jan. 24, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed the first amended complaint.
Then, on Feb. 7, 2018, the parties filed a stipulation to allow
the Plaintiffs to file a second amended complaint in order to
expressly plead that they are not asserting any claims that were
released or are barred by the Thompson settlement.  Thereafter, on
Feb. 9, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed their SAC.

In the SAC, Plaintiffs Raquedan and Martinez allege that they were
hired by the Defendant in August 2014 and on July 24, 2014,
respectively, as hourly, non-exempt employees to work at an
entertainment venue in California.  They further allege various
instances and patterns of misconduct by the Defendant regarding its
employment practices.

In very general terms, the Plaintiffs assert that the Defendant
failed to (1) provide the Plaintiffs with meal and rest periods;
(2) pay premium wages for those missed meal and rest periods; (3)
pay the Plaintiffs for all hours worked; (4) reimburse the
Plaintiffs for business expenses; (5) pay the Plaintiffs their
accrued vacation; (6) provide the Plaintiffs with sick days; and
(7) pay the Plaintiffs all of their final wages following
separation of employment.

Based on these and other more detailed factual allegations, the
Plaintiffs' SAC asserts nine causes of action against the
Defendant, including: (1) failure to provide meal periods in
violation of California Labor Code Sections 204, 223, 226.7, 512,
and 1198; (2) failure to provide rest periods in violation of
California Labor Code Sections 204, 223, 226.7, and 1198; (3)
failure to pay hourly wages in violation of California Labor Code
Sections 223, 510, 1194, 1197, and 1198; (4) failure to
indemnify/forced purchases in violation of California Labor Code
Sections 2802 and 450, id. at 17-18; (5) failure to pay vacation
wages in violation of California Labor Code Section 227.3, id. at
18-20; (6) failure to provide paid sick days in violation of
California Labor Code Sections 245 et seq.; (7) failure to provide
accurate written wage statements in violation of California Labor
Code Section 226(a); (8) failure to timely pay all final wages in
violation of California Labor Code Sections 201-203; and (9)
violation of California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL").  However,
the Plaintiffs' SAC also explicitly excludes all claims that were
released or are barred pursuant to the Thompson v. Centerplate of
Delaware, Inc. et al. settlement.

The Plaintiffs seek to assert the causes of action in the SAC on
behalf of two proposed classes and seven proposed sub-classes.
TThe two proposed classes are (1) the "Centerplate Class," which is
comprised of all persons employed by the Defendant and/or any
staffing agencies and/or any other third parties who worked at any
Venue -- that is, any location where the Defendant serves as
hospitality partner -- in hourly or non-exempt positions in
California from July 5, 2013 until judgment is entered; and (2) the
"UCL Class," which is comprised of all Centerplate Class members
employed by the Defendant in California from July 5, 2013 until
judgment is entered.

The seven proposed sub-classes are subdivisions of the Centerplate
Class.  While five of the seven proposed sub-classes have the same
class period as the Centerplate Class -- July 5, 2013 to the date
of judgment -- the other two proposed sub-classes have a slightly
shorter class period -- July 5, 2014 to the date of judgment.

On Feb. 23, 2018, the Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss
the Plaintiffs' SAC.  The Plaintiffs filed an opposition on March
9, 2018, and the Defendant filed a reply on March 16, 2018.

The Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' SAC should be dismissed based
on the following grounds: (1) the Plaintiffs' claims are barred by
the doctrine of res judicata based on the Thompson settlement; (2)
the Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the release in Thompson; and
(3) because the Plaintiffs' claims are barred, their claims are
moot and the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

However, the Defendant's second argument is duplicative of its
first argument.  As the leading treatise on class actions explains,
because the process by which a class action settlement is approved
has the effect of turning the private settlement into a judgment,
the preclusive effect of a class action settlement is always
governed by the doctrine of preclusion and never by the settlement
contract, and by extension, the release contained in the settlement
contract directly.  But for purposes of analyzing the instant case,
the principle that the preclusive effect of a class action
settlement is always governed by the doctrine of preclusion renders
the Plaintiff's second argument -- which is based exclusively on
the settlement agreement in Thompson -- superfluous.

Accordingly, of the Defendant's first two arguments, Judge Koh will
address only the first argument, which is the Defendant's res
judicata argument.  Then, she will discuss the Defendant's third
argument.

Because none of the Plaintiffs' causes of action are entirely
substantively the same as the claims asserted in Thompson, the
Defendant cannot prevail on its argument that the Plaintiffs'
causes of action are barred by the doctrine of res judicata based
on the Thompson settlement.  The Judge says she needs not define
the precise scope of Thompson's preclusive effect on the instant
class action at this stage of the case.  For purposes of addressing
the Defendant's motion to dismiss, it is sufficient for her to note
that the Thompson settlement can only preclude claims that (1) are
asserted by those who worked for the Defendant at Levi's Stadium
during the 2016 Super Bowl; and (2) arise out of the identical
factual predicate as that underlying the claims in Thompson.

The Defendant's third argument is that because the Plaintiffs'
claims are barred by the Thompson judgment and the release, the
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.  Put another way, the
Defendant argues that because all of the claims the Plaintiffs
could bring against the Defendant are covered and barred by the
Thompson Judgment and Release, there is no live case or controversy
and the Plaintiffs have no standing to bring the claims alleged in
the SAC.  Thus, its jurisdictional argument is premised on the
notion that all of the Plaintiffs' claims are covered and barred by
the Thompson Judgment and Release.  However, as she has explained,
the Plaintiffs' causes of action in the instant case are not barred
by claim preclusion based on the settlement in Thompson.  As a
result, the Defendant's jurisdictional argument necessarily fails.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Koh denied the Defendant's motion
to dismiss the SAC.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 10, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/NqeZ3g from Leagle.com.

Monique Raquedan & Ronald Martinez, Plaintiffs, represented by
Chaim Shaun Setareh -- Shaun Setareh -- Setareh Law Group & Thomas
Alistair Segal -- thomas@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group.

Centerplate of Delaware Inc, Defendant, represented by Scott J.
Witlin -- scott.witlin@BTLaw.com -- Barnes & Thornburg, LLP, Steve
Lou Hernandez -- steve.hernandez@btlaw.com -- Barnes & Thornburg
LLP & Donald Patrick Sullivan -- donald.sullivan@wilsonelser.com --
Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP.


CHECKERS AND VIBES: Must Face Class Action Over Text Ads
--------------------------------------------------------
Chandra Lye, writing for Cook County Record, reports that a federal
judge has denied a request by drive-in fast food restaurant chain
Checkers and Vibes Media LLC to throw out a class action lawsuit
accusing them of sending text messages to customers without
including instructions for how to stop more from coming.

Plaintiff Madeleine Yates had filed a lawsuit in 2017 claiming
Checkers and Vibes violated the federal Telephone Consumer
Protection Act by repeatedly sending her advertisements via text
message. The defendants had asked the complaint be dismissed,
asserting the plaintiff had failed to state a claim or had lacked
standing to bring the suit, according to the court decision.

Although Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman denied the defendants'
motion, she did ask Yates "to provide a more definite statement of
her claims."

The order said Ms. Yates initially sent a text message to a short
code number to earn a free cheeseburger coupon from Checkers. In
return she received a message advising her to opt in to get the
coupon "and other deals from Checkers/Rally's."

Ms. Yates said she then received more than 10 text message ads, but
only one gave instructions on how to opt out of future messages.

In support of their dismissal motion, the opinion said the
defendants submitted an advertisement like the one Ms. Yates would
have seen regarding the free coupon, claiming "the advertisement
contains fine print at the bottom."

"The defendants contend that Yates has failed to allege the basic
elements necessary to state a claim for violation of the TCPA," the
ruling said. "The defendants assert that Yates must (demonstrate)
the phone number at issue, the number of text messages received and
the date and content of those messages. The court does not believe
that quite this level of detail is necessary, although it does
agree that Yates' specific factual allegations are minimal."

Judge Coleman instructed Yates to compose a statement that
indicates the approximate date, time and details of each text
message she claims she received.

Ms. Yates is represented in the case by attorneys with the firm of
Beaumont Costales, of Chicago and New Orleans.

Checkers is defended by the firms of Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP, of
Dallas, and Richmond, Va., and Hawkins Parnell Thackston & Young
LLP, of Chicago.

Vibes is represented by the firms of Horwood Marcus & Berk
Chartered, of Chicago, and Harris, Wiltshire & Grannis LLP, of
Washington, D.C. [GN]


CHEESECAKE FACTORY: Deal Reached in Abdelaziz & Rodriguez Suits
---------------------------------------------------------------
The parties in two consolidated lawsuits in California have reached
a tentative settlement, according to The Cheesecake Factory
Incorporated's Form 10-Q filed with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for the quarterly period
ended July 3, 2018.

On February 3, 2017, five present and former hourly restaurant
employees filed a class action lawsuit in the San Diego County
Superior Court, alleging that the Company violated the California
Labor Code and California Business and Professions Code, by failing
to permit required meal and rest breaks, and failing to provide
accurate wage statements, among other claims (Abdelaziz v. The
Cheesecake Factory Restaurants, Inc., et al.; Case No
37-2016-00039775-CU-OE-CTL).

On February 22, 2017, a lawsuit was filed in the San Diego County
Superior Court, alleging similar claims to Case No.
37-2016-00039775-CU-OE-CTL (Rodriguez v. The Cheesecake Factory
Restaurants, Inc., et al.; Case No. 37-2017-00006571-CU-OE-CTL).

The San Diego County Superior Court consolidated Case Nos.
37-2016-00039775-CU-OR-CTL and 37-2017-00006571-CU-OE-CTL.  These
lawsuits seek unspecified penalties under PAGA in addition to other
monetary payments.

On July 24, 2018, the parties reached a tentative settlement which
covers the two consolidated cases.

The Company said, "The final settlement agreement is subject to
documentation and court approval.  Based upon the current status of
these matters, we have reserved an immaterial amount."

The Cheesecake Factory Incorporated operates restaurants in the
United States.  The Company produces cheesecakes and other baked
products for own restaurants and international licensees, as well
as external foodservice operators, retailers, and distributors.
The Cheesecake Factory branded restaurants under licensing
agreements internationally.  The company was founded in 1972 and is
headquartered in Calabasas, California.


CHEESECAKE FACTORY: Faces "Orellana" Class Suit over Labor Matters
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Cheesecake Factory Incorporated is facing the "Orellana" class
action lawsuit in New York related to alleged violations of labor
code, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended July 3, 2018.

On June 1, 2018, a former hourly restaurant employee filed a class
action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of New York, alleging that the Company violated minimum wage and
overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act and New York
Labor Code (Orellana v. Grand Lux Cafe, LLC, et al; Case No.
18-cv-02739).  The plaintiff seeks unspecified amounts of fees,
penalties and other monetary payments on behalf of the plaintiff
and other purported class members.

The Company said, "We intend to vigorously defend this action.
However, it is not possible at this time to reasonably estimate the
outcome of or any potential liability from this matter and,
accordingly, we have not reserved for any potential future
payments."

The Cheesecake Factory Incorporated operates restaurants in the
United States.  The Company produces cheesecakes and other baked
products for own restaurants and international licensees, as well
as external foodservice operators, retailers, and distributors.
The Cheesecake Factory branded restaurants under licensing
agreements internationally.  The company was founded in 1972 and is
headquartered in Calabasas, California.


CHEESECAKE FACTORY: Masters Case Settlement Still Pending
---------------------------------------------------------
The Cheesecake Factory Incorporated said in its Form 10-Q filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018,
for the quarterly period ended July 3, 2018, that the tentative
settlement of the "Masters" class action suit remains subject to
documentation and court approval.  Based upon the current status of
this matter, the Company has reserved an "immaterial amount."

On November 26, 2014, a former hourly restaurant employee filed a
class action lawsuit in the San Diego County Superior Court,
alleging that the Company violated the California Labor Code and
California Business and Professions Code, by failing to pay
overtime, to permit required rest breaks and to provide accurate
wage statements, among other claims (Masters v. The Cheesecake
Factory Restaurants, Inc., et al.; Case No 37-2014-00040278).  The
lawsuit seeks unspecified penalties under California Private
Attorneys' General Act ("PAGA") in addition to other monetary
payments.

By stipulation, the parties agreed to transfer Case No.
37-2014-00040278 to the Orange County Superior Court.  On March 2,
2015, Case No. 37-2014-00040278 was officially transferred and
assigned a new Case No. 30-2015-00775529 in the Orange County
Superior Court.

On June 27, 2016, the Company gave notice to the court that Case
Nos.  CIV1504091 and BC603620 may be related.

On February 13, 2018, the parties in Case No. 30-2015-00775529
reached a tentative settlement subject to documentation and court
approval.  Based upon the current status of this matter, the
Company has reserved an immaterial amount.

On May 21, 2018, a lawsuit was filed in the Los Angeles County
Superior Court, alleging similar claims to Case No.
30-2015-00775529 (Silva v. The Cheesecake Factory Restaurants,
Inc., et al.; Case No. BC706365).  On July 5, 2018, the Company
notified the court that Case No. BC706365 and Case No.
30-2015-00775529 may be related.

The Company said, " The plaintiff in Case No. BC70365 seeks
unspecified penalties under PAGA in addition to other monetary
payments.  We intend to vigorously defend this action.  However, it
is not possible at this time to reasonably estimate the outcome of
or any potential liability from this matter and, accordingly, we
have not reserved for any potential future payments"

The Cheesecake Factory Incorporated operates restaurants in the
United States.  The Company produces cheesecakes and other baked
products for own restaurants and international licensees, as well
as external foodservice operators, retailers, and distributors.
The Cheesecake Factory branded restaurants under licensing
agreements internationally.  The company was founded in 1972 and is
headquartered in Calabasas, California.


CHEESECAKE FACTORY: Still Faces Tagalogon Class Action
------------------------------------------------------
The Cheesecake Factory Incorporated continues to face class action
lawsuit styled Tagalogon v. The Cheesecake Factory Restaurants,
Inc., Case No. BC603620, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018,
for the quarterly period ended July 3, 2018.

On December 10, 2015, a former restaurant management employee filed
a class action lawsuit in the Los Angeles County Superior Court,
alleging that the Company improperly classified its managerial
employees, failed to pay overtime, and failed to provide accurate
wage statements, in addition to other claims.  The lawsuit seeks
unspecified penalties under PAGA in addition to other monetary
payments.

On March 23, 2016, the parties issued their joint status conference
statement at which time, the Company gave notice to the court that
Case Nos. 30-2015-00775529 and CIV1504091 may be related. On April
29, 2016, the Company filed its response to the complaint.

The Company said, "We intend to vigorously defend this action.
However, it is not possible at this time to reasonably estimate the
outcome of or any potential liability from this matter and,
accordingly, we have not reserved for any potential future
payments."

The Cheesecake Factory Incorporated operates restaurants in the
United States.  The Company produces cheesecakes and other baked
products for own restaurants and international licensees, as well
as external foodservice operators, retailers, and distributors.
The Cheesecake Factory branded restaurants under licensing
agreements internationally.  The company was founded in 1972 and is
headquartered in Calabasas, California.


CHEESECAKE FACTORY: Tentative Accord in Guglielmo Still Pending
---------------------------------------------------------------
The tentative settlement in the "Guglielmo" class action lawsuit in
New York remains subject to documentation and court approval,
according to The Cheesecake Factory Incorporated's Form 10-Q filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018,
for the quarterly period ended July 3, 2018.

On May 28, 2015, a group of current and former hourly restaurant
employees filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of New York, alleging that the Company
violated the Fair Labor Standards Act and New York Labor Code, by
requiring employees to purchase uniforms for work and violated the
State of New York's minimum wage and overtime provisions (Guglielmo
v. The Cheesecake Factory Restaurants, Inc., et al; Case No.
2:15-CV-03117).

On September 8, 2015, the Company filed its response to the
complaint, requesting the court to compel arbitration against
opt-in plaintiffs with valid arbitration agreements.

On July 21, 2016, the court issued an order confirming the
agreement of the parties to dismiss all class claims with prejudice
and to allow the case to proceed as a collective action covering a
limited number of the Company's restaurants in the State of New
York.

On February 21, 2018, the parties reached a tentative settlement
subject to documentation and court approval.

The Company said, "Based upon the current status of this matter, we
have reserved an immaterial amount."

The Cheesecake Factory Incorporated operates restaurants in the
United States.  The Company produces cheesecakes and other baked
products for own restaurants and international licensees, as well
as external foodservice operators, retailers, and distributors.
The Cheesecake Factory branded restaurants under licensing
agreements internationally.  The company was founded in 1972 and is
headquartered in Calabasas, California.


CHEESECAKE FACTORY: Tentative Settlement of "Zhang" Suit Underway
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Cheesecake Factory Incorporated said in its Form 10-Q filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018,
for the quarterly period ended July 3, 2018, that the settlement
for the consolidated "Zhang" lawsuit is subject to documentation
and court approval.

On February 3, 2017, a class action lawsuit was filed in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Florida, alleging that
the Company violated the Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act,
by failing to properly censor consumer credit or debit card
information (Muransky v. The Cheesecake Factory Incorporated; Case
No. 0:17-cv-60229-JEM).

On February 21, 2017 and February 28, 2017, two additional lawsuits
were filed in California and New York, respectively, alleging
similar claims to Case No. 0:17-cv-60229-JEM (Tibbits v. The
Cheesecake Factory Incorporated; Case No. 1:17-cv-00968 (
E.D.N.Y.); Zhang v. The Cheesecake Factory Incorporated; Case No
8:17-cv-00357 (C.D. Cal.)).

The Company filed a motion to transfer and dismiss Case No.
0:17-cv-60229-JEM on March 24, 2017 and similarly filed a motion to
transfer and dismiss Case No. 1:17-cv-00968 on April 7, 2017.

On October 16, 2017, the Florida court granted the Company's motion
to transfer Case No. 0:17-cv-60229JEM to California to be
consolidated with Case No. 8:17-cv-00357.  The plaintiff in Case
No. 1:17-cv-00968 agreed to transfer its case to California and
such matter was subsequently consolidated with Case No
8:17-cv-00357.

On May 25, 2018, the parties reached a tentative settlement which
covers the three consolidated cases.  The final settlement
agreement is subject to documentation and court approval.

The Company said, "Based on the current status of this matter, we
have reserved an immaterial amount."

The Cheesecake Factory Incorporated operates restaurants in the
United States.  The Company produces cheesecakes and other baked
products for own restaurants and international licensees, as well
as external foodservice operators, retailers, and distributors.
The Cheesecake Factory branded restaurants under licensing
agreements internationally.  The company was founded in 1972 and is
headquartered in Calabasas, California.


CHILLICOTHE, MO: 8th Circuit Appeal Filed in Pennell Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Linda Pennell, Rebecca Funk and Toni Smith Company filed
an appeal from a court order entered on July 30, 2018, in the
lawsuit entitled Linda Pennell, et al. v. Anne Precythe, et al.,
Case No. 5:18-cv-06034-ODS, in the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Missouri - St. Joseph.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on August 2, 2018, the
Plaintiffs asked the Court for an order to certify a class of:

    "all current and future persons who are currently, or in the
     future, will be, incarcerated at the Chillicothe
     Correctional Center in Chillicothe, Missouri."

The appellate case is captioned as Linda Pennell, et al. v. Anne
Precythe, et al., Case No. 18-2762, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

According to the Appellate Case docket, the $505 appellate filing
and docketing fee has not been paid and is due.  The Appellants are
directed to either pay the fee in the District Court or file their
motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis in the District
Court within 21 days of the date of the order.  If the Appellants
do not pay the fee or move for IFP status by September 6, 2018, a
show cause order will be entered directing the appellants to show
cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for failure to
prosecute.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants Linda Pennell, on behalf of themselves and
all other similarly situated persons; Rebecca Funk, on behalf of
themselves and all other similarly situated persons; and Toni Smith
are represented by:

          Joseph LaCome, Esq.
          LACOME LAW
          3025 East Hawkins Street
          Springfield, MO 65804
          Telephone: (415) 847-1944
          E-mail: lacomelaw@gmail.com

Defendants-Appellees Director Anne L. Precythe, In her official and
individual capacity as Director of the Missouri Department of
Corrections; and Chris McBee, In his official and individual
capacity as Warden of the Chillicothe Correctional Center, are
represented by:

          Nicolas Taulbee, Esq.
          ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
          615 E. 13th Street, Suite 401
          Kansas City, MO 64106
          Telephone: (816) 889-5000
          E-mail: nicolas.taulbee@ago.mo.gov


CHIPOTLE MEXICAN: Seeks 10th Circuit Review of Ruling in "Turner"
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., filed an appeal from a
court ruling in the lawsuit styled Turner, et al. v. Chipotle
Mexican Grill, Inc., et al., Case No. 1:14-CV-02612-JLK, in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado - Denver.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the principal
allegation in the complaint is that Chipotle's hourly employees
were deprived of overtime pay by the operation of a computer
program, Aloha, that plaintiffs assert arbitrarily cuts off the
time clock at half past midnight, in some cases somewhat later in
the night, so that employees were not paid for hours worked after
the time clock stopped.  On August 21, 2015, the Court issued a
Memorandum Opinion and Order permitting a collective action under
the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The appellate case is captioned as Turner, et al. v. Chipotle
Mexican Grill, Inc., et al., Case No. 18-1320, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Docketing statement and transcript order form is due on
      August 30, 2018, for Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.; and

   -- Notice of appearance is due on August 30, 2018, for Brett
      Charles, Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., Markietta Ford,
      Danya Granado, Araceli Gutierrez, Ruby Tsao, Leah Turner
      and Jolessa Wade.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee LEAH TURNER is represented by:

          Loren S. Foy, Esq.
          HUSCH BLACKWELL LLP
          4801 Main Street, Suite 1000
          Kansas City, MO 64112
          Telephone: (816) 983-8000
          E-mail: loren.foy@huschblackwell.com

Plaintiffs-Appellees LEAH TURNER, ARACELI GUTIERREZ, JOLESSA WADE,
DANYA GRANADO, BRETT CHARLES, RUBY TSAO, individually and on behalf
of others similarly situated, and MARKIETTA FORD are represented
by:

          Kevin Edward Giebel, Esq.
          GIEBEL AND ASSOCIATES LLC
          P.O. Box 414
          Lake Elmo, MN 55042
          Telephone: (651) 633-9000
          E-mail: kgiebel@ggwklaw.com

               - and -

          Robert J. Gralewski, Jr., Esq.
          KIRBY MCINERNEY, LLP
          600 B Street, Suite 1900
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 398-4340
          E-mail: bgralewski@kmllp.com

               - and -

          Thomas M. Hnasko, Esq.
          Julie Sakura, Esq.
          HINKLE, HENSLEY, SHANOR & MARTIN
          P.O. Box 2068
          Santa Fe, NM 87504-2068
          Telephone: (505) 982-4554
          E-mail: thnasko@hinklelawfirm.com
                  jsakura@hinklelawfirm.com

               - and -

          Andrew C. Quisenberry, Esq.
          Darin L. Schanker, Esq.
          BACHUS & SCHANKER, LLC
          1899 Wynkoop Street, Suite 700
          Denver, CO 80202
          Telephone: (866) 795-0696
          E-mail: andrew.quisenberry@coloradolaw.net
                  dschanker@coloradolaw.net

Plaintiff-Appellee LEAH TURNER is represented by:

          Michael Edmund Jacobs, Esq.
          HINKLE, HENSLEY, SHANOR & MARTIN
          P.O. Box 2068
          Santa Fe, NM 87504-2068
          Telephone: (505) 982-4554
          E-mail: mjacobs@hinklelawfirm.com

               - and -

          Adam Seth Levy, Esq.
          P.O. Box 88
          Oreland, PA 19075
          Telephone: (267) 994-6952
          E-mail: adamslevy@comcast.net

               - and -

          Kent Morgan Williams, Esq.
          1632 Homestead Trail
          Long Lake, MN 55356
          Telephone: (612) 338-4605
          E-mail: williamslawmn@gmail.com

Defendant-Appellant CHIPOTLE MEXICAN GRILL, INC., is represented
by:

          Kendra Beckwith, Esq.
          Thomas Blackburn, Esq.
          Allison J. Dodd, Esq.
          Adam M. Royval, Esq.
          John K. Shunk, Esq.
          MESSNER REEVES LLP
          1430 Wynkoop Street, Suite 300
          Denver, CO 80202
          Telephone: (303) 623-1800
          E-mail: kbeckwith@messner.com
                  tblackburn@messner.com
                  adodd@messner.com
                  aroyval@messner.com
                  jshunk@messner.com

               - and -

          Richard J. Simmons, Esq.
          SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP
          333 South Hope Street, 43rd Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 620-1780
          E-mail: rsimmons@sheppardmullin.com


CIOX HEALTH: Court Certifies Class in R. Faber's Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
In the case, RICHARD FABER, individually, and on behalf of all
similarly situated persons, and JENNIFER MONROE, individually, and
on behalf of all similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs, v. CIOX
HEALTH, LLC, d/b/a Healthport Technologies, LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 2:16-cv-02337-STA-cgc (W.D. Tenn.), Judge S. Thomas Anderson of
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee,
Western Division, granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification and Appointment of Class Counsel.

The action primarily concerns allegations that the Defendant
routinely and systematically overcharges patients for access to
their medical records in violation of federal and Tennessee law.
Because the relevant federal statutes do not provide a private
cause of action, the Plaintiffs advance their suit under several
state law claims.

Before the Court is the Motion of Plaintiffs Richard Faber and
Jennifer Monroe, both individually and on behalf of all similarly
situated persons, for Class Certification and Appointment of Class
Counsel.  They seek class certification on the basis of Rule
23(b)(1)(A) or, in the alternative, Rule 23(b)(3).  

The Plaintiffs identify their proposed class as follows: From May
13, 2010 to the present, the Plaintiffs and all similarly situated
patients who, personally or through a personal representative such
as an attorney, requested their medical records from Ciox or one of
Ciox's medical provider clients in Tennessee, and whom Ciox charged
any of the following: (1) a basic fee and/or electronic delivery
fee the combined value of which exceeds $6.50; (2) a per page
(paper) fee when records were delivered electronically; or, (3) a
per page(paper) fee that exceeds the actual labor and supply costs
incurred by Ciox in fulfilling that request.

The Defendant would have the Court denies certification on several
grounds.

Judge Anderson finds that (i) the Plaintiffs have satisfied the
threshold questions of class certification; (ii) the Plaintiffs
have satisfied each prerequisite of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(a); and (iii) questions of law or fact common to the class
members predominate the litigation and that the Plaintiffs have
demonstrated the superiority of a class action to resolve said
questions.

Because the Plaintiffs have satisfied the threshold questions, the
Rule 23(a) prerequisites, and the requirements for one of the
certification avenues under Rule 23(b), the Judge granted the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification and Appointment of Class
Counsel.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 10, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/jOHmDV from Leagle.com.

Richard Faber, Individually, and also on behalf of all similarly
situated persons, & Jennifer Monroe, Individually, and also on
behalf of all similarly situated persons,, Plaintiffs, represented
by Ami A. Dave, Kevin Michael McCormack -- kmccormack@bbfpc.com --
BALLIN BALLIN & FISHMAN & Tim Edwards -- tedwards@bbfpc.com --
Ballin, Ballin & Fishman, P.C.

Ciox Health, LLC, d/b/a Healthport, Technologies, LLC, Defendant,
represented by Garry K. Grooms -- ggrooms@burr.com -- BURR & FORMAN
LLP, Jay Phillip Lefkowitz -- lefkowitz@kirkland.com -- KIRKLAND &
ELLIS LLP, pro hac vice & Nathaniel Jacob Kritzer --
nathaniel.kritzer@kirkland.com -- KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP, pro hac
vice.


CLUBCORP HOLDINGS: Court Nixes Shareholder Claims vs. AGM
---------------------------------------------------------
A Nevada court has dismissed the claims against Apollo Global
Management, LLC in a consolidated class action suit entitled In re
ClubCorp Holdings Shareholder Litigation, according to the
Company's Form 10-Q filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission on August 6, 2018, for the quarterly period ended June
30, 2018.

Between July 25 and August 15, 2017, plaintiffs filed three
purported stockholder class actions in the Nevada state and federal
court against ClubCorp Holdings Inc. ("ClubCorp"), the directors of
ClubCorp, and AGM, in connection with the proposed acquisition of
ClubCorp.

The cases in the District Court for Clark County, Nevada were
originally captioned Meng v. ClubCorp Holdings, Inc., et al., No.
A-17-758912-B ("Meng"); Baum v. Affeldt, et al., No. A-17-759227-C
("Baum"); and Solak v. Affeldt, et al., No. A-17-759987-B
("Solak").

On August 16, 2017, the Meng and Baum actions were consolidated
with two other similar actions that did not name AGM as a
defendant.  The consolidated action is captioned In re ClubCorp
Holdings Shareholder Litigation, Case No. A-17-758912-B ("In re
ClubCorp").  On September 21, 2017, the Solak action was
consolidated into In re ClubCorp.

On October 12, 2017, plaintiffs in In re ClubCorp filed a
consolidated amended complaint.  The complaint purports to assert
claims against the directors of ClubCorp for allegedly breaching
their fiduciary duties of loyalty, due care, good faith, and candor
owed to the plaintiff and the public stockholders of ClubCorp.

The complaint includes allegations that the directors, among other
things, agreed to a transaction at an unreasonably low price,
failed to take the necessary steps to maximize stockholder value,
gave preferential severance benefits to certain executives, agreed
to preclusive deal protection provisions, and included materially
incomplete and misleading information in the proxy statement
recommending that stockholders vote in favor of the acquisition.
The complaint also purports to assert a claim against AGM for
aiding and abetting the directors' purported breach of fiduciary
duty.

On November 15, 2017, another plaintiff with separate counsel filed
a motion to intervene, attaching a proposed complaint in
intervention containing similar allegations but asserting claims
only against ClubCorp and its directors, not AGM.  On December 19,
2017, a hearing was held in which the motion to intervene was
denied.

On January 26, 2018, plaintiffs filed a second consolidated amended
complaint.  On February 23, 2018, AGM, ClubCorp, and the ClubCorp
directors filed motions to dismiss the second consolidated amended
complaint.  On March 23, 2018, plaintiffs filed a brief in
opposition to the motions to dismiss.  On April 20, 2018,
defendants filed reply briefs in further support of their motions
to dismiss.

On May 24, 2018, the court granted AGM's motion to dismiss and
continued the ClubCorp directors' motion to dismiss pending
additional discovery.  On June 21, 2018, the court executed an
order dismissing the claims against AGM with prejudice.

Founded in 1990, Apollo is a global alternative investment manager.
The company is a contrarian, value-oriented investment manager in
credit, private equity and real assets with significant distressed
expertise and a flexible mandate in the majority of its funds which
enables the funds to invest opportunistically across a company's
capital structure.


COLORADO: Court Won't Review Denial of 2nd Fairness Hearing
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado
denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration in the case captioned
JESSE MONTEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. JOHN HICKENLOOPER, et al.,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 92-cv-00870-CMA (D. Colo.).

This matter is before the Court on the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Reconsideration, wherein the Plaintiffs request that this Court
reconsider its order approving the Parties' Proposed Settlement
Agreement and denying the Parties' request to hold a second
fairness hearing in this case.

Reconsideration is warranted under Rule 59 when, as the Plaintiffs
contend, the Court has misapprehended a party's position, the
facts, or controlling law. The Court did not misapprehend the
Parties' position, the facts, or the controlling law. The Court
expressly denied the Parties' request for a fairness hearing
because this Court already held a multi-day fairness hearing in
this case, and the Parties presented no legal authority supporting
that this Court must hold a second one.  

Moreover, the original settlement in this case, termed the Remedial
Plan from which the instant Agreement stems contained no provisions
requiring a second fairness hearing; instead, the Plan was intended
to be self-executing, with a preferred and permitted resolution of
compliance disputes without court intervention.

Accordingly, the Court denies the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Reconsideration.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 19, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y7aydcam from Leagle.com.

Jesse F. Montez, Plaintiff, represented by Paula Dee Greisen, King
& Greisen, LLP, Blain David Myhre -- blainmyhre@gmail.com -- Blain
Myhre LLC, Edward T. Ramey, Tierney Lawrence LLP, Kimberly Jo
Jones, King & Greisen, LLP & Lara Elizabeth Baker --
lbaker@fostergraham.com -- Foster Graham Milstein & Calisher, LLP.

David Bryan, George Karl, Gilpin Eugene, John Armintrout, Kenneth
Garcia, as representatives of themselves and all others similarly
situated in this class action, Richard K. Allen, Robert Sikitch,
Gail Levine, Diedra Givens & Patricia Ballard, Plaintiffs,
represented by Paula Dee Greisen, King & Greisen, LLP, Blain David
Myhre, Blain Myhre LLC, Edward T. Ramey, Tierney Lawrence LLP &
Lara Elizabeth Baker, Foster Graham Milstein & Calisher, LLP.

Jimmy R. Bulgier, Consol Plaintiff, represented by Paula Dee
Greisen , King & Greisen, LLP.
Frank Gunter, Former Executive Director of the Colorado Department
of Corrections, Cheryl Smith, Medical Administrator at CTCF, Ari
Zavaras, Executive Director of Colorado Department of Corrections,
Bill Price, Warden of the Arkansas Valley Correctional Center, R.
Mark McDuff, Warden of the Arrowhead Correctional Center, the Four
Mile Correctional Facility, the Skyline Correctional Center, and
the Pre-Release Correctional Center, Gary Neet, Warden of the Buena
Vista Correctional Facility, Warren Diesslin, Former Warden of the
Buena Vista Correctional Facility, Donice Neal, Warden of the
Colorado State Penitentiary, Mark Williams, Warden of the Colorado
Women's Facility, Mark McKinna, Warden of the Colorado Territorial
Correctional Facility, J. Frank Rice, Dr., Warden of the Denver
Reception and Diagnosic Center, Larry Embry, Warden of the Fremont
Correctional Facility, David Holt, Medical Administrator at the
Arrowhead Correctional Facility, the Centennial Correctional
Facility, the Colorado State Penitentiary, the Fremont Correctional
Facility, and the Skyline Correctional Facility, Jean Moltz,
Medical Administrator at the Buena Vista Correctional Facility and
the Rifle Correctional Facility, Ron Johnson, Medical Administrator
at the Denver Reception and Diagnostic Center, Don Lawson, Clinical
Administration Director at the Limon Correctional Facility and the
Arkansas Valley Correctional Facility, Bob Moore, who supervises
the medical department at the Pueblo Minimum Center, and JOHN
DOE(S), current and former Wardens of any correctional facility
maintained, operated or controlled by the Colorado Department of
Corrections, and JOHN ROE(S),, David Holt, Medical Administrator at
the Arrowhead Correctional Facility, Centennial Correctional
Facility, Colorado State Penitentiary, Fremont Correctional
Facility and Skyline Correctional Facility & Jean Moltz, Medical
Administrator at the Buena Vista Correctional Facility and Rifle
Correctional Facility, Defendants, represented by Elizabeth H.
McCann , Beth McCann, Attorney at Law, James Xavier Quinn ,
Colorado Attorney General's Office, Robert Charles Huss , Colorado
Attorney General's Office, Jacquelynn Nichole Rich Fredericks ,
Colorado Attorney General's Office & Willow Ivana Arnold , Lewis
Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP.


CSO FINANCIAL: Settlement in D. Bowen's Suit Has Final Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DUANE BOWEN, et al., on behalf of themselves and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CSO
FINANCIAL, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. C17-0677-JCC (W.D.
Wash.), Judge John C. Coughenour of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington, Seattle, granted the Plaintiffs'
unopposed motion for final approval of the class action settlement,
unopposed motion for attorney fees and statutory damage and service
awards, and the parties' stipulation and proposed order for
injunction.

The Court previously reviewed the Stipulated Settlement Agreement
and Release in the matter.  On Feb. 14, 2018, it entered an order
granting the Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary approval of the
Settlement.  The Plaintiffs now move for final approval of the
Settlemen.  They and their counsel have also moved for an award of
attorney fees and statutory damage and service awards to the class
representative, as provided for in the Settlement.  Both motions
are unopposed.  The parties have separately filed a stipulation and
proposed order for injunction.  The Court held a fairness (final
approval) hearing on July 10, 2018.  No one appeared at the
fairness hearing to object to the Settlement.

Having duly considered all submissions and arguments presented,
Judge Coughenour approved the Agreement, including the plans for
implementation and distribution of the Settlement Fund.  The
Parties will effectuate the Agreement in accordance with its terms.


Within the time period set forth in Section 4 of the Agreement, the
settlement payments will be issued to each Plaintiff Class Member
under the terms and conditions of the Agreement.  The payments
ordered will be made in the manner and at the times set forth in
the Agreement.  Any amounts remaining in the Settlement Fund after
the deadline to cash checks, including any second distribution
checks, has expired will be disbursed to the Northwest Justice
Project and Columbia Legal Services.

The Judge granted the Class Counsel's request for an award of
reasonable attorneys' fees and litigation costs in the amount of
$156,851.  He further granted the Class Counsel's application for
Statutory Damages and Service Awards for Representative Plaintiffs
Duane Bowen, Amanda Maier, Kathleen Muller, and Luis Ortiz in the
amount of $2,500 each.

The Judge dismissed the Action in its entirety with prejudice.
Except as otherwise provided in the Final Approval Order and
Judgment, the parties will bear their own costs and attorneys'
fees.  Without affecting the finality of the Judgment entered, the
Court reserves jurisdiction over the implementation of the
Agreement, including enforcement and administration of the
Agreement.

Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, the Judge further ordered
that Defendant CSO will permanently cease any effort to collect
Check Fees from any member of the CPA Sub-Class as defined in the
Settlement Agreement approved by the Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 10, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/E0bEht from Leagle.com.

Duane Bowen, on behalf of themselves and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Amanda Maier, on behalf of themselves and on
behalf of others similarly situated, Kathleen Muller, on behalf of
themselves and on behalf of others similarly situated & Luis A
Ortiz, on behalf of themselves and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Beth E. Terrell --
bterrell@terrellmarshall.com -- TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC,
Blythe H. Chandler -- bchandler@terrellmarshall.com -- TERRELL
MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC, Elizabeth Anne Adams --
eadams@terrellmarshall.com -- TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC, Paul
Arons, LAW OFFICE OF PAUL ARONS & Samuel R. Leonard, LEONARD LAW.

CSO Financial Inc, also known as Credit Services of Oregon,
Defendant, represented by Jeffrey I. Hasson, HASSON LAW, LLC.

J. Michael Unfred, doing business as Credit Services of Oregon,
Defendant, represented by Keith M. Liguori --
kliguori@davisrothwell.com -- DAVIS ROTHWELL EARLE & XOCHIHUA,
Patrick N. Rothwell -- prothwell@davisrothwell.com -- DAVIS
ROTHWELL EARLE & XOCHIHUA & Suzanne K. Pierce --
spierce@davisrothwell.com -- DAVIS ROTHWELL EARLE & XOCHIHUA.


DAVITA HEALTHCARE: Bid for Sanctions in Wage Suit Partly Granted
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KELSEY OLDERSHAW, ELINA NAVARRO, JANE STANT, and
JAYMIE STEVENS, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. DAVITA HEALTHCARE PARTNERS, INC., and
TOTAL RENAL CARE INC., Defendants, Civil Action No.
15-cv-01964-MSK-NYW (D. Colo.), Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang of
the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado granted in
part and denied in part the  Defendants' Motion for Sanctions.

Ms. Oldershaw, Ms. Navarro, Ms. Stant, and Ms. Stevens, initiated
the lawsuit individually and on behalf of others similarly situated
to allege wage violations by the Defendants.  

The case was originally assigned to the Hon. John L. Kane, who
entered the first scheduling Order on Jan. 26, 2016.  Judge Kane
entered a number of orders amending the schedule before recusing on
Nov. 7, 2016.

The case was then reassigned to the Hon. Marcia S. Krieger, who
referred the matter to the Magistrate Judge for certain pretrial
matters.  Following the referral, the Court held a Status
Conference and, again, amended the pretrial deadlines.  Discovery
progressed, albeit with a number of disputes arising between the
Parties that necessitated court intervention and extensions of
time.

On June 1, 2017, Chief Judge Krieger issued a Supplemental Opinion
and Order with Regard to Bifurcation of Claims, in which she
distinguished between a collective action arising under the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and a class action for claims under
the Colorado Wage Claim Act ("CWCA") brought pursuant to Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  On July 13, 2017, the Court
held a Supplemental Scheduling Conference, and, in light of the
Supplemental Opinion and Order, entered a Supplemental Scheduling
Order that set a total number of hours for depositions of all
opt-in Plaintiffs, to be allocated up to a total of four hours for
any single opt-in Plaintiff.

Jamie Lubken is an opt-in Plaintiff who is represented by the Ramos
Law Firm.  In response to the Defendants' request, the Plaintiffs'
counsel provided Ms. Lubken's address in Queen Creek, Arizona, and
identified Feb. 16, 2018 at 1:30 p.m. as the acceptable date and
time for her deposition.  On Feb. 5, 2018, the Defendants served a
Notice of Deposition for Ms. Lubken's deposition to take place in
Phoenix, Arizona at the date and time provided by the Plaintiffs'
counsel.

The Defense counsel thereafter traveled to Phoenix to take Ms.
Lubken's deposition.  At approximately 1:00 p.m. on Feb. 16,  the
Plaintiffs' counsel became aware that Ms. Lubken would not appear
for her deposition, but the counsel did not send an email to
opposing counsel until 1:26 p.m., at which time counsel for the
Plaintiffs informed counsel for the Defendants that Ms. Lubken had
mistakenly believed that her deposition was scheduled for March,
and would not be appearing for the time scheduled in the Notice.
The Parties rescheduled Ms. Lubken's deposition for March 22, 2018,
at which time Ms. Lubken appeared and provided testimony.

The matter comes before the Court on the Defendants' Motion for
Sanctions filed April 20, 2018, which was referred to the
Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1), the Order
Referring Case dated Nov. 8, 2016, and the memorandum dated April
20, 2018.

Magistrate Judge Wang focuses its analysis on whether Ms. Lubken
was substantially justified in missing her deposition, or if there
are other circumstances that would make an award of expenses
unjust.  Ms. Lubken mistakenly thought her deposition was scheduled
for March 16, 2018, and she could not leave work on Feb. 16, 2018,
when alerted as to her mistake.

Based on the record before it, the Magistrate Judge finds that Ms.
Lubken's mistake, though inadvertent and not repeated, was not
substantially justified.  There is no dispute that Ms. Lubken was
properly noticed for her deposition, which was scheduled on a date
identified by her counsel of record at a location in the vicinity
of where Ms. Lubken resides.  There is also no ambiguity in the
Notice itself that the Defendants intended to proceed with the
deposition in person at the Jackson Lewis firm located in Phoenix,
Arizona, and not by remote means.  And the Plaintiffs do not argue,
nor could they, that defense counsel provided Ms. Lubken
insufficient notice of the deposition, because it appears that the
Notice of Deposition was based upon Ms. Lubken's availability as
relayed by her attorney.  In addition, Ms. Lubken has been
represented by the counsel since opting into the action.

Nor does the Magistrate Judge find that an award of expenses in the
instance would be unjust.  She is not persuaded that an award of
expenses is inappropriate simply because the attorneys appearing in
the matter have scheduled a significant number of depositions and
expended efforts in rescheduling certain depositions so as to
accommodate the deponents and counsel of record.  Nor do Ms.
Lubken's arguments that she could and should have been deposed by
remote means persuade the Court that an award of expenses is
unjust.

Having found that an award of expenses is appropriate, the
Magistrate Judge now turns to whether the amount requested by the
Defendants is reasonable.  The Plaintiffs concede that the payment
of $150 for court reporter fees is appropriate.  The Magistrate
Judge thus considers whether it is reasonable to assess the $430.38
in travel costs (including airfare, parking, and meals) and the
$2,664 in attorney's fees.

As discussed, she concludes that examination of Ms. Lubken by the
Defendants' counsel of record, who is located in Denver, Colorado,
was appropriate.  Courts across the country consistently award
travel costs associated with a plaintiff's failure to attend her
own deposition.  Therefore, she will award Defendants the cost of
the counsel's airplane ticket, reflected as $355.98, and $24.75 in
parking, for a total of $380.73; she will not, however, award the
cost of meals incident to travel as the Defendants have provided no
authority -- and she has found none -- to support reimbursement for
such expenses.

With respect to the Defendants' request for attorney's fees, the
Magistrate Judge will order reimbursement for the .3 hour required
to exchange email correspondence with the Plaintiff's counsel
regarding Ms. Lubken's failure to appear for deposition.
Additionally, while she court acknowledges the 4.6 hours expended
by the defense counsel to travel to Phoenix, the Magistrate Judge
will limit reimbursable time to the .5 hour spent waiting for the
deposition to begin.  Accordingly, the Magistarte Judge finds that
.8 hour of attorney time is reasonable.  And she court will apply
the rate of $295 per hour, which is the median rate for labor and
employment attorneys as reflected in the Colorado Bar Association's
2017 Economics of Law Practice Survey, for a total of $236.

Finally, although Rule 37(d) allows for the Court to assess
reasonable expenses against the attorney for the party who failed
to act, the Magistrate Judge will only award such costs against Ms.
Lubken, because it is not clear that the counsel was responsible
for her failure to appear, and will leave the determination of
apportionment of the actual payment of these expenses to Ms. Lubken
and the Plaintiffs' counsel.

For the reasons set forth, Magistrate Judge Wang granted in part
and denied in part the Defendants' Motion for Sanctions.  She
awarded the Defendants the amount of $766.73 in reasonable
expenses, including attorney's fees, to be paid by Ms. Lubken no
later than seven days after the entry of judgment and/or any
dismissal of Ms. Lubken's claims.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 6, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/tm995B from Leagle.com.

Kelsey Oldershaw, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Madison Elizabeth
Fiedler-Carlson , Ramos Law, LLC, Brian Andrew Calandra, Ramos Law,
LLC, Gretchen Elizabeth Lipman -- info@lipmanlawcolorado.com --
Gretchen E. Lipman, LLC, Ronald Lee Wilcox, Wilcox Law Firm, LLC &
Colleen Therese Calandra -- ccalandra@ramosinjuryfirm.com -- Ramos
Law, LLC.

DaVita Healthcare Partners, Inc., Defendant, represented by Amanda
A. Simpson -- Amanda.Simpson@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis,
P.C., David Anthony Nenni -- David.Nenni@jacksonlewis.com --
Jackson Lewis, P.C., Dorothy Diane McDermott --
Dorothy.McDermott@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis, P.C., Eric R.
Magnus -- Eric.Magnus@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis, P.C.,
Melisa Hallie Panagakos -- Melisa.Panagakos@jacksonlewis.com --
Jackson Lewis, P.C., Stephanie Leigh Adler-Paindiris --
Stephanie.Adler-Paindiris@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis, P.C. &
Veronica Thea von Grabow -- Veronica.vonGrabow@jacksonlewis.com --
Jackson Lewis, P.C.

Total Renal Care Inc., Defendant, represented by Amanda A. Simpson,
Jackson Lewis, P.C., David Anthony Nenni, Jackson Lewis, P.C.,
Dorothy Diane McDermott, Jackson Lewis, P.C., Eric R. Magnus,
Jackson Lewis, P.C. & Veronica Thea von Grabow, Jackson Lewis,
P.C.


EARTHSTONE ENERGY: Olenik Class Action Dismissed With Prejudice
---------------------------------------------------------------
Earthstone Energy, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the case captioned
Olenik v. Lodzinksi et al., has been dismissed by the Delaware
Court of Chancery.

On June 2, 2017, Nicholas Olenik filed a purported shareholder
class and derivative action in the Delaware Court of Chancery
against Earthstone's Chief Executive Officer, along with other
members of the Board, EnCap, Bold, Bold Holdings and OVR.  The
complaint alleges that Earthstone's directors breached their
fiduciary duties in connection with the Bold Contribution
Agreement.

The Plaintiff asserts that the directors negotiated the Bold
Transaction to benefit EnCap and its affiliates, failed to obtain
adequate consideration for the Earthstone shareholders who were not
affiliated with EnCap or Earthstone management, did not follow an
adequate process in negotiating and approving the Bold Transaction
and made materially misleading or incomplete proxy disclosures in
connection with the Bold Transaction.  The suit seeks unspecified
damages and purports to assert claims derivatively on behalf of
Earthstone and as a class action on behalf of all persons who held
Common Stock up to March 13, 2017, excluding defendants and their
affiliates.

On July 20, 2018, the Delaware Court of Chancery granted the
defendants' motion to dismiss and entered an order dismissing the
action in its entirety with prejudice.  Plaintiff may appeal to the
Delaware Supreme Court.  Earthstone and each of the other
defendants believe the claims are entirely without merit and they
intend to mount a vigorous defense.

The Company said, "The outcome of this suit is uncertain, and while
Earthstone is confident in its position, any potential monetary
recovery or loss to Earthstone cannot be estimated at this time."

Earthstone Energy, Inc., a Delaware corporation, is a
growth-oriented independent oil and gas company engaged in the
acquisition and development of oil and gas reserves through
activities that include the acquisition, drilling and development
of undeveloped leases, asset and corporate acquisitions and mergers
and, to a lesser extent, exploration activities.


ELECTRONICS FOR IMAGING: Bid to Dismiss Pipitone Suit Pending
-------------------------------------------------------------
Electronics for Imaging, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the hearing on the
Company's motion to dismiss the "Pipitone" case has "not yet been
scheduled."

On August 10, 2017, a putative class action was filed against the
Company and its two named executive officers in the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey, captioned Pipitone
v. Electronics For Imaging, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-5992 (D.N.J.).  A
First Amended Complaint was filed on February 20, 2018.

The plaintiffs allege, among other things, that statements by the
Company and its officers about the Company's financial reporting,
revenue recognition, internal controls, and disclosure controls and
procedures were false or misleading.  The complaint seeks an
unspecified amount of damages, interest, attorneys' fees, and other
costs, on behalf of a putative class of individuals and entities
that purchased or otherwise acquired EFI securities from February
22, 2017 through August 3, 2017.

EFI filed a motion to dismiss on April 23, 2018.  The plaintiffs
filed an opposition on May 23, 2018, and EFI filed its reply brief
on June 13, 2018.  A hearing on EFI's motion to dismiss has not yet
been scheduled.

Electronics for Imaging, Inc. is a world leader in customer-centric
digital printing innovation focused on the transformation of the
printing, packaging, ceramic tile decoration, and textile
industries from the use of traditional analog based printing to
digital on-demand printing.  The company is based in Fremont,
California.


EPIC SYSTEMS: Union Issues Fail to Receive Substantial Attention
----------------------------------------------------------------
Erwin Chemerinsky, writing for ABA Journal, reports that the
blockbuster cases of the last two weeks of June deservedly
attracted great media attention: Trump v. Hawaii, which upheld
President Donald Trump's travel ban; Janus v. American Federation,
which overruled Abood v. Detroit Board of Education and held that
nonunion members cannot be required to pay the share of the union
dues that support collective bargaining activities; Carpenter v.
United States, which held that police must get a warrant before
obtaining stored cellular location information; South Dakota v.
Wayfair, which reversed earlier decisions and held that states can
force out-of-state merchants to collect sales taxes even if they do
not have a physical presence in the state.

What, though, were some of the "sleeper" cases of the term that did
not attract as much media attention, but are likely to have a major
effect on the law and litigation?

EPIC SYSTEMS V. LEWIS
In Epic Systems v. Lewis, the court in a 5-4 decision ruled that an
employer may lawfully require its employees to agree, as a
condition of employment, to take all employment-related disputes to
arbitration on an individual basis and to waive their right to
participate in a class action suit or class arbitration.

The case involved an effort by workers to file a class action suit
against an employer for violating the federal minimum wage law. The
employer sought to dismiss the case because it had insisted as a
condition of employment that the employees waive their ability to
go to court or be part of a class action; any dispute had to be
resolved out of court in an arbitration.

The National Labor Relations Act, a federal law adopted in 1935,
protects a right for employees to engage in "concerted activities
for the purpose of . . .  mutual aid or protection." Justice Neil
M. Gorsuch, joined by the conservative justices -- John G. Roberts
Jr., Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito --
rejected this and said the arbitration clause in the employment
contract that was insisted upon by employers had to be enforced,
and the workers could not go to court or even have a class action
in arbitration. The U.S. Supreme Court invoked the Federal
Arbitration Act, a law adopted in 1925, which provides that
arbitration clauses in contracts shall be enforced.

The case has great significance for workers in allowing employers
to insist as a condition of employment that employees submit any
disputes to individual arbitrations. The ability to bring a class
action is especially crucial when a large number of people each
lose a relatively small amount of money. This is exactly what
occurs when there is wage theft. As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
noted: "Violations of minimum-wage and overtime laws are
widespread. . . . One study estimated that in Chicago, Los Angeles,
and New York City alone, low-wage workers lose nearly $3 billion in
legally owed wages each year."

But the larger significance of the case, which has not received
substantial attention, is in the high court holding that the
ability to engage in "concerted activities for the purpose of . . .
mutual aid or protection" refers only to doing so for union
organizing purposes. For example, the National Labor Relations
Board has held for over 70 years that this protects the ability of
employees to share wage information. But this, and much else, is in
doubt given the court's very narrow reading of this statutory
language as being only about protection for union organizing.

MCCOY V. LOUISIANA
Robert McCoy was indicted for a triple murder in Louisiana. He
initially had a public defender, but because of disagreements, he
discharged the public defender. His family hired a new lawyer,
Larry English, who strongly advised Mr. McCoy to admit to the
killings, but deny that he had the requisite mental intent to be
guilty of first-degree murder. Mr. McCoy vehemently disagreed and
was adamant that English not do this. He even moved to have English
removed as counsel. The trial court denied this motion and told
English: "You are the attorney" and "you have to make the trial
decision of what you're going to proceed with."

At the beginning of his opening statement at the guilt phase of the
trial, English told the jury there was "no way reasonably possible"
that they could hear the prosecution's evidence and reach "any
other conclusion than Robert McCoy was the cause of these
individuals' death."

Mr. McCoy objected. The trial court rejected this objection.
Continuing his opening statement, English told the jury the
evidence is "unambiguous," that "my client committed three
murders." Mr. McCoy testified in his own defense, maintaining his
innocence and pressing an alibi. In his closing argument, English
reiterated that Mr. McCoy was the killer. Mr. McCoy was convicted
and sentenced to death.

The Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, held that it violates the
Sixth Amendment for defense counsel to concede guilt over the
defendant's objections. The court reiterated the traditional
understanding: Trial management is the lawyer's province. Counsel
makes the decisions such as "what arguments to pursue, what
evidentiary objections to raise, and what agreements to conclude
regarding the admission of evidence." Some decisions, however, are
reserved for the client -- notably, whether to plead guilty, waive
the right to a jury trial, testify in one's own behalf, and forgo
an appeal.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg explained that a client determines the
objectives of representation, and that includes whether to admit to
the killings. This reaffirmed a basic legal principle: The client
determines the goals of representation, but the lawyer determines
the means. But the court went further and said that because the
issue is the client's autonomy and not counsel's performance, this
is not analyzed as an ineffective assistance of counsel issue. The
court says that this is a structural error and the defendant need
not show prejudice, which would be required under an ineffective
assistance of counsel rationale. This is an important change in the
law, and one that provides greater protection for the rights of
clients to make key choices in criminal cases.

ARTIS V. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Supplemental jurisdiction gives a federal court the authority to
decide state law claims that arise from the same matter as federal
law claims that are properly before the court. It is authorized by
28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367. If a federal court dismisses the federal
claims, it then can -- and often will -- dismiss the state law
claims. The plaintiff then can refile the state law claims in state
court. This case involves the statute of limitations for refiling
the state law claims in state court.

Specifically, Section 1367(d) provides: "The period of limitations
for any [state] claim [joined with a claim within federal-court
competence] shall be tolled while the claim is pending [in federal
court] and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless
state law provides for a longer tolling period." The issue in this
case: Does the word "tolled," as used in §1367(d), mean the state
limitations period is suspended during the pendency of the federal
suit; or does "tolled" mean that, although the state limitations
period continues to run, a plaintiff is accorded a grace period of
30 days to refile in state court post dismissal of the federal
case?

Stephanie C. Artis was fired from her job as a health inspector in
the District of Columbia. Thirteen months later, Ms. Artis sued the
District in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, alleging claims under both federal law and D.C. law. The
district court dismissed the federal claims and then used its
discretion to dismiss the state law claims.
Ms. Artis refiled her state-law claims in state court 59 days after
dismissal of her federal suit. Reading Sec. 1367(d) as a 30-day
grace-period prescription, her complaint would be time-barred.
Reading §1367(d) as stopping the limitations clock during the
pendency of the federal-court suit, her complaint would be timely.

The court held in a 5-4 decision that the word "tolled" in
§1367(d) means the state limitations period is suspended during
the pendency of the federal suit. It is not just a 30-day grace
period. Justice Ginsburg, writing for the court, said that the word
"tolled," in the context of a time prescription like §1367(d),
means that the limitations period is suspended (stops running)
while the claim is pending elsewhere, then starts running again
when the tolling period ends, picking up where it left off. The
court said that this fits the ordinary meaning of the term
"tolled," as well as how it has been used in other Supreme Court
case. The practical effect of this decision is that many more
claims will be able to be refiled in state court after being
dismissed by the federal court.

Erwin Chemerinsky is dean of the University of California at
Berkeley School of Law. He is an expert in constitutional law,
federal practice, civil rights and civil liberties, and appellate
litigation. He's the author of seven books, including The Case
Against the Supreme Court (Viking, 2014). [GN]


ETRADE FINANCIAL: Appeal from Schwab Case Dismissal Underway
------------------------------------------------------------
The appeal from the order dismissing a putative class action by
Craig L. Schwab against E*TRADE Financial Corporation remains
pending, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

On July 23, 2016, a putative class action was filed in the US
District Court for the Southern District of New York by Schwab, on
behalf of himself and others similarly situated, naming E*TRADE
Financial Corporation, E*TRADE Securities, and former Company
executives as defendants.

The complaint alleges that E*TRADE violated federal securities laws
in connection with the routing of its customers' orders to various
market-makers and exchanges.  The plaintiff seeks unspecified
damages, declaratory relief, restitution, disgorgement of payments
received by the Company, and attorneys' fees.  By stipulation both
matters are now venued in the Southern District of New York.

On July 10, 2017 the Court dismissed the Schwab claims without
prejudice.  The plaintiff in Schwab filed a third amended complaint
on August 9, 2017, which E*TRADE moved to dismiss.  On January 22,
2018, the Court dismissed all claims with prejudice.

Plaintiffs have appealed.  The Company will continue to defend
itself vigorously in these matters.

E*TRADE is a financial services company that provides online
brokerage and related products and services primarily to individual
retail investors.


ETRADE FINANCIAL: Appeals Court Upholds Dismissal of Rayner Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
E*TRADE Financial Corporation disclosed in its Form 10-Q filed with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that on July 31, 2018,
the Second Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of the class
action initiated by Ty Rayner.

On March 26, 2015, a putative class action was filed in the US
District Court for the Northern District of California by Ty
Rayner, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
naming E*TRADE Financial Corporation and E*TRADE Securities as
defendants.

The complaint alleges that E*TRADE breached a fiduciary duty and
unjustly enriched itself in connection with the routing of its
customers' orders to various market-makers and exchanges.  The
plaintiff seeks unspecified damages, declaratory relief,
restitution, disgorgement of payments received by the Company, and
attorneys' fees.

On April 2, 2017, the District Court dismissed the complaint in
Rayner.  The plaintiffs in Rayner appealed and the oral argument
was heard by the Second Court of Appeals on December 7, 2017.

On July 31, 2018, the Second Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal
of the complaint.  The Company will continue to defend itself
vigorously in these matters.

E*TRADE is a financial services company that provides online
brokerage and related products and services primarily to individual
retail investors.


EXPERIAN INFORMATION: Court OKs 1st State Notice in R. Wesley Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas,
Sherman Division, granted Plaintiff's First Stage Motion for Notice
to Potential Plaintiffs in the case captioned RICKEY WESLEY, ON
BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, v. EXPERIAN
INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, INC., Civil Action No. 4:18-CV-00005 (E.D.
Tex.).

The Plaintiff was employed by Defendant Experian Information
Solutions, Inc. (Experian) as a U.S.-based Information Technology
(IT) employee. The Plaintiff's responsibilities include
troubleshooting and supporting Experian's global security
operations. Experian classifies Plaintiff as hourly-paid and
non-exempt from the overtime requirements of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA).

The Plaintiff and four potential opt-in Plaintiffs state that they
usually worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek and that
Defendant did not pay them overtime for these excess hours. The
Plaintiff and opt-in Plaintiffs further allege that Class Employees
were not compensated for all hours of work, specifically including
those when they were on standby and those when they were merely on
call but still subject to standby conditions.  

The Defendant classified Class Employees as non-exempt, hourly
employees under the FLSA.

The Plaintiff bears the burden of presenting preliminary facts to
show that there is a similarly situated group of potential
plaintiffs. This does not mean that their positions must be
identical, as the court need not find uniformity in each and every
aspect of employment to determine a class of employees are
similarly situated under Section 216(b).

The statute of limitations for an FLSA claim is two years, unless
the violation was willful, in which case the limitations period is
three years. Under the FLSA, a violation is willful if the employer
either knew or showed reckless disregard for whether its conduct
was prohibited by the statute. The Court finds that notice should
be provided within the longer three-year statute of limitations.
The Plaintiff alleged that Defendant willfully violated the FLSA.

The Plaintiff argues the Defendant had a policy of requiring Class
Employees to work in excess of forty hours per week and did not pay
Class Employees for all hours worked. Four potential opt-in
Plaintiffs, Freddie Jenkins, Joseph O'Connor, Nrique Smith, and
Jose Ulloa, have consented to join this suit and have submitted
declarations in support of Plaintiff's claims Plaintiff and the
potential opt-in Plaintiffs state that the Defendant had a policy
of requiring Class Employees to perform standby on call and
additional work for which they were not paid.

Here, the Plaintiff has submitted sufficient evidence that each of
the Class Employees' primary duties involved information technology
support, which includes answering calls pursuant to the Policy. The
Plaintiff's positions do not need to be identical for the Court to
conditionally certify the class. A particular need to address each
perspective member of the collective action as an individual will
be addressed in the second stage.

Thus, the Plaintiff has met the lenient standard of establishing
some factual nexus which binds the named plaintiffs and potential
class members together as victims of a particular alleged policy or
practice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 25, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7qpdake from
Leagle.com.

Rickey Wesley, Plaintiff, represented by Jesse Hamilton Forester,
Forester Haynie PLLC & Jill J. Weinberg -- jill@wlfirm.com --
Weinberg Law Firm PLLC.

Experian Information Solutions, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Michael J. Deponte -- Michael.DePonte@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson
Lewis PC, Paul E. Hash -- Paul.Hash@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson
Lewis PC & Wendy Wilkins -- Wendy.Wilkins@jacksonlewis.com --
Jackson Lewis P.C..


FARMERS CAPITAL: Files Disclosures in Response to "Parshall" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Farmers Capital Bank Corporation provided additional supplemental
disclosures to the Proxy Statement/Prospectus related to the
Proposed Merger, dated June 15, 2018, in an effort to avoid the
costs, disruption, and distraction of further proceedings in the
"Parshall" class action complaint, according to the Company's Form
10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on
August 6, 2018, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

On July 10, 2018, an alleged class action complaint was filed by a
purported stockholder of the Company in the Franklin Circuit Court
of the Commonwealth of Kentucky captioned Parshall v. Farmers
Capital Bank Corporation (Case No. 18-CI-00699) against the
Company, United Bank, the individual members of the board of
directors of the Company ("Defendant Directors"), WesBanco, and
WesBanco Bank, Inc. ("WesBanco Bank") (the "Complaint").  The
Complaint related to the disclosures made by the Company and
WesBanco with respect to the transactions contemplated by the
Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated as of April 19, 2018, by and
among the Company, WesBanco, United Bank, and WesBanco Bank (the
"Merger Agreement"), providing for, among other things, the merger
of the Company with and into WesBanco with WesBanco surviving (the
"Proposed Merger").  Among other things, the Complaint alleges that
the Definitive Proxy Statement filed by the Company with the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") on June 15, 2018 failed
to disclose allegedly material information, including information
relating to the Company's financial projections and the valuation
analyses performed by the Company's financial advisor in connection
with the Proposed Merger, and that the Defendant Directors breached
various of their fiduciary duties to the Company's shareholders and
that the Company, United Bank, WesBanco, and WesBanco Bank aided
and abetted those alleged breaches.

The Complaint generally sought an injunction barring the defendants
from consummating the Proposed Merger.  Alternatively, the
Complaint sought rescission of the Merger or rescissory damages.
The Complaint also requests an accounting for all damages suffered
as a result of the alleged claims asserted in the Complaint and an
award of the costs incurred in prosecuting the case, including
attorneys' and experts' fees and costs.  WesBanco and the Company
believe the allegations in the Complaint were without merit.

On July 18, 2018, in order to avoid the costs, disruption, and
distraction of further litigation, in return for the plaintiff
dismissing the Complaint with prejudice, the Company and WesBanco
provided additional supplemental disclosures to the Proxy
Statement/Prospectus related to the Proposed Merger, dated June 15,
2018.

The Company, Wesbanco, and the other defendants deny all of the
allegations made by the plaintiff in the Complaint and believe the
disclosures in the Proxy Statement are adequate under the law.  The
plaintiff's counsel reserves the right to seek attorneys' fees and
expenses.  After discussion with legal counsel, management of the
Company believes the potential amount of fees and expenses agreed
upon, if any, will not have a material impact on the consolidated
financial statements of the Company.

Farmers Capital Bank Corporation operates as the bank holding
company for United Bank & Capital Trust Company that provides
banking and bank-related services to individual, business,
agriculture, government, and educational customers.  The Company
was founded in 1850 and is headquartered in Frankfort, Kentucky.


FIDELITY NATIONAL: Engaged in "Deceptive Conduct," Court Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
The court in the "Patterson" case has granted the plaintiffs'
motion for partial summary judgment on liability and denied
Fidelity National Financial, Inc.'s motion finding that the Company
failed to advise its agents how to interpret the rate rule so that
it would be uniformly applied, thereby having engaged in "deceptive
conduct," according to Fidelity National's Form 10-Q filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2018.

In a class action captioned Patterson, et al. v. Fidelity National
Title Insurance Company, et al., Case No. GD 03-021176, pending in
the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania,
plaintiffs allege the named Company underwriters violated
Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law
("UTPCPL") by failing to provide premium discounts in accordance
with filed rates in refinancing transactions.

Contrary to rulings in similar federal court cases that considered
the rate rule and agreed with the Company's position, the court
held that the rate rule should be interpreted such that an
institutional mortgage in the public record is a "proxy" for prior
title insurance entitling a consumer to a discount rate when
refinancing when there is a mortgage of record within the number of
years required by the rate rule.  The rate rule requires sufficient
evidence of a prior policy, and because not all institutional
mortgages were insured, the Company's position is that a recorded
first mortgage alone does not constitute sufficient evidence of an
earlier policy entitling consumers to a discounted rate.

The court certified the class refusing to follow prior Pennsylvania
Supreme Court and appellate court decisions holding that the UTPCPL
requires proof of reliance, an individual issue which precludes
certification.  After notice to the class, plaintiffs moved for
partial summary judgment on liability, and defendants moved for
summary judgment.

On June 27, 2018, the court entered an order granting plaintiffs'
motion for partial summary judgment on liability, and denying the
Company's motion finding that the Company failed to advise its
agents how to interpret the rate rule so that it would be uniformly
applied, thereby having engaged in "deceptive conduct."

Fidelity National said, "The Company plans to seek interlocutory
review of the summary judgment order or appeal after entry of
judgment.  There has been no determination as to the size of the
class.  It is unknown whether plaintiffs will seek statutory or
actual damages, whether the judge will exercise discretion to award
treble damages or award prejudgment interest, or what plaintiffs'
counsel will seek as reasonable attorneys' fees.  Accordingly,
damages are not reasonably estimable at this time.  We will
continue to vigorously defend this matter, and we do not believe
the result will have a material adverse effect on our financial
condition."

Fidelity National Financial, Inc., together with its subsidiaries,
provides title insurance, technology, and transaction services to
the real estate and mortgage industries in the United States.  The
company operates in Title, and Corporate and Other segments.  It
was founded in 1847 and is headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida.


FITBIT INC: Court Wants More Briefing in PurePulse(R) Tracker Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitbit, Inc. continues to face legal proceedings related to the
PurePulse(R) heart rate tracking technology, according to the
Company's Form 10-Q filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission on August 6, 2018, for the quarterly period ended June
30, 2018.

On January 6, 2016 and February 16, 2016, two purported class
action lawsuits were filed against the Company in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California, alleging that the
PurePulse(R) heart rate tracking technology does not consistently
and accurately record users' heart rates.  Plaintiffs allege common
law claims, as well as violations of various states' false
advertising, unfair competition, and consumer protection statutes,
and seek class certification, injunctive and declaratory relief,
restitution, an award of unspecified compensatory damages,
exemplary damages, punitive damages, and statutory penalties and
damages, an award of reasonable costs and expenses, including
attorneys' fees, and other further relief as the Court may deem
just and proper.

On April 15, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a Consolidated Master Class
Action Complaint and, on May 19, 2016, filed an Amended
Consolidated Master Class Action Complaint.  On January 9, 2017,
the Company filed a motion to compel arbitration.  On October 11,
2017, the Court granted the motion to compel arbitration.
Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration, and that motion was
denied on January 24, 2018.

On February 20, 2018, plaintiffs filed a Second Amended
Consolidated Master Class Action Complaint ("SAC") on behalf of
plaintiff Rob Dunn, the only plaintiff not ordered to arbitration,
as a purported class action.  The SAC alleges the same common law
claims, as well as violations of false advertising, unfair
competition, and consumer protection statutes of California and
Arizona, and also seeks class certification, injunctive and
declaratory relief, restitution, an award of unspecified
compensatory damages, exemplary damages, punitive damages, and
statutory penalties and damages, an award of reasonable costs and
expenses, including attorneys' fees, and other further relief as
the Court may deem just and proper.

On March 13, 2018, the Company filed a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim and separately moved to strike the class
allegations.  The Court dismissed the claims for revocation of
acceptance, violation of California's Song-Beverly Consumer
Warranty Act, and unjust enrichment, and allowed the remaining
claims pending amendment to the complaint with further details.

Plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint on June 19, 2018.  The
Court granted the motion to strike and ordered the plaintiff to
amend to make clear that he is seeking to represent a class of
opt-outs only, but that plaintiff would be free to amend in the
event Fitbit's arbitration agreement was found to be
unenforceable.

In response to an April 3, 2018 arbitration demand from Kate
McLellan, one of the original plaintiffs who was compelled to
arbitration, the Company attempted to resolve the individual claim
with Ms. McLellan.

At the May 31, 2018 hearing, the Court expressed concern that the
Company was "picking off" McLellan and thereby undermining the
arbitration option and the Court's prior order on arbitration, and
ordered additional briefing.

Fitbit said, "The Company believes that the plaintiffs' allegations
are without merit, and intends to vigorously defend against the
claims.  Because the Company is in the early stages of this
litigation matter, the Company is unable to estimate a reasonably
possible loss or range of loss, if any, that may result from this
matter."

Fitbit, Inc. is an American company headquartered in San Francisco,
California, known for its products of the same name, which are
activity trackers, wireless-enabled wearable technology devices
that measure data such as the number of steps walked, heart rate,
quality of sleep, steps climbed, and other personal metrics
involved in fitness.


FITBIT INC: Deal Reached in Sleep Tracking Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------
A purported class action lawsuit against Fitbit, Inc. related to
the sleep tracking function of its products remains pending in
California, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

On May 8, 2015, a purported class action lawsuit was filed against
the Company in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California, alleging that the sleep tracking function available in
certain trackers does not perform as advertised.  Plaintiffs seek
class certification, restitution, an award of unspecified
compensatory and punitive damages, an award of reasonable costs and
expenses, including attorneys' fees, and other further relief as
the Court may deem just and proper.  On January 31, 2017,
plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification.  Plaintiffs'
motion for class certification was granted on November 20, 2017.
On April 20, 2017, the Company filed a motion for summary judgment.
The Company's motion for summary judgment was denied on December
8, 2017.  During the three months ended June 30, 2018, the parties
agreed to a settlement and on August 1, 2018, the plaintiffs filed
a motion for preliminary approval of the settlement.

Fitbit, Inc. is an American company headquartered in San Francisco,
California, known for its products of the same name, which are
activity trackers, wireless-enabled wearable technology devices
that measure data such as the number of steps walked, heart rate,
quality of sleep, steps climbed, and other personal metrics
involved in fitness.


FITBIT INC: Summary Judgment Bid in Securities Suit Still Pending
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitbit, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that its motion for summary
judgment in a putative securities class action in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California remains pending.

On January 11, 2016, a putative securities class action was filed
in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
naming as defendants the Company, certain of its officers and
directors, and the underwriters of the Company's initial public
offering (the "IPO").  On May 10, 2016, the Court appointed the
Fitbit Investor Group (consisting of five individual investors) as
lead plaintiff, and an Amended Complaint was filed on July 1, 2016.
Plaintiffs allege violations of the Securities Act of 1933, as
amended (the "Securities Act"), and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as amended, based on alleged materially false and misleading
statements about the Company's products between October 27, 2014
and November 23, 2015.  Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of
persons who purchased or otherwise acquired the Company's
securities (i) on the open market between June 18, 2015 and May 19,
2016; and/or (ii) pursuant to or traceable to the IPO.  Plaintiffs
seek class certification, an award of unspecified compensatory
damages, an award of reasonable costs and expenses, including
attorneys' fees, and other further relief as the Court may deem
just and proper.  On July 29, 2016, the Company filed a motion to
dismiss.  The court denied the motion on October 26, 2016.  On
April 26, 2017, the Company filed a motion for summary judgment,
which is still pending.

Fitbit, Inc. is an American company headquartered in San Francisco,
California, known for its products of the same name, which are
activity trackers, wireless-enabled wearable technology devices
that measure data such as the number of steps walked, heart rate,
quality of sleep, steps climbed, and other personal metrics
involved in fitness.


FLAGSTAR BANCORP: Summary Ruling in Overdraft Fees' Suit Affirmed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JAMES LOSSIA, JR.; ALEXANDRA PLAPCIANU, individually
and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs Appellants,
v. FLAGSTAR BANCORP, INC., aka Flagstar Bank, Defendant-Appellee,
Case No. 17-1468 (6th Cir.), Judge Danny Julian Boggs of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment to Flagstar.

This is a breach-of-contract case arising from the order in which
Flagstar processes Automated Clearing House ("ACH") transactions.
Lossia and Plapcianu are former checking-account customers of
Flagstar.  They opened a joint checking account at Flagstar in
December 2014.  Lossia asserts that his checking-account agreement
required Flagstar to process his ACH transactions in the order that
he initiated them, which Flagstar admittedly did not do.  

Between Feb. 25 and Feb. 28, 2015, Lossia authorized merchants to
initiate a series of ten ACH transactions to be debited from
Lossia's Flagstar checking account.  Each of the relevant
transactions was ultimately processed by Flagstar on March 2, 2015.
However, much to Lossia's chagrin, the transactions were not
processed in the order that he initiated them.

Lossia concedes that he did not have sufficient funds in his
account to pay for all 10 transactions.  However, he argues that
had the transactions been processed in the order that Lossia
initiated them, his largest transaction -- the $2,285 Google Wallet
payment -- would have been processed last rather than first.  This
would have resulted in Lossia committing just one overdraft on
March 2.  Instead, because the largest transaction was processed
first, Lossia initially incurred eight overdraft fees on March 2.
The next day, Flagstar manually reversed three overdraft fees.

On Oct. 25, 2016, Lossia filed his third amended complaint,
alleging a federal question under the Fair Credit Reporting Act
("FCRA"), and state-law breach-of-contract claims.  Discovery had
begun in November 2015 from previous iterations of the complaint.

Flagstar filed a motion for summary judgment on Dec. 13, 2016,
which was granted by the district court.  Lossia timely appealed,
challenging the grant of summary judgment as to his
breach-of-contract claims but abandoning his FCRA claim.

Lossia raises two separate breach-of-contract claims.  First, he
argues that Flagstar breached the Agreement by failing to process
his transactions in the order that he initiated them.  Second,
Lossia asserts that Flagstar's initial posting of eight overdraft
charges on March 2 violated the Agreement's cap of five overdraft
charges per day.

Judge Boggs finds no genuine dispute as to any material fact on
Lossia's ordering-of-transactions claim.  First, when read in
context, the Agreement simply does not say what Lossia wants it to
say.  Second, the unrebutted evidence demonstrates that Flagstar
followed the terms of the Agreement in how it processed Lossia's
ACH transactions.  Lossia does not offer any persuasive evidence to
the contrary.  Instead, he argues that he was not afforded
sufficient discovery to confirm whether Flagstar actually processed
Lossia's transactions in the order that they were received from the
Federal Reserve.  However, Flagstar provided a copy of the batch
files sent to Flagstar by the Federal Reserve, Lossia's
end-of-month statement confirms that the transactions were
processed in the same order as they were presented in those batch
files, and Flagstar provided deposition and affidavit testimony
that the bank automatically processes ACH transactions in exactly
the manner that they are received in the batch files.

As for Lossia's overdraft-fees claim, the Judge also finds no
genuine dispute as to any material fact on Lossia's overdraft-fees
claim.  Lossia was not in fact required to pay more than five
overdraft "charges," so there was no breach.  And even if we were
to construe this initial posting of eight fees as a breach of the
Agreement, the next-business-day reversal eliminated Lossia's
damages, preventing Lossia from establishing another element
necessary for a breach-of-contract claim.  Finally, because neither
Lossia nor his fellow Plaintiff suffered any damages on this claim,
they cannot be valid class representatives to pursue it.

For these reasons, Judge Boggs affirmed the district court's grant
of summary judgment to Flagstar.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 6, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/RCSvLE from Leagle.com.

ARGUED: Ronald G. Acho -- racho@cmda-law.com -- CUMMINGS, MCCLOREY,
DAVIS & ACHO, P.L.C., Livonia, Michigan, for Appellants.

Sonal Hope Mithani -- mithani@millercanfield.com -- MILLER,
CANFIELD, PADDOCK & STONE, P.L.C., Ann Arbor, Michigan, for
Appellee.

ON BRIEF: Ronald G. Acho, CUMMINGS, MCCLOREY, DAVIS & ACHO, P.L.C.,
Livonia, Michigan, for Appellants.

Sonal Hope Mithani , Colin M. Battersby --
battersby@millercanfield.com -- Caroline B. Giordano --
giordano@millercanfield.com -- MILLER, CANFIELD, PADDOCK & STONE,
P.L.C., Ann Arbor, Michigan, for Appellee.


FLINT, MI: Gov. Snyder Dropped from Water Crisis Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Associated Press reports that a judge says a class-action
lawsuit against Michigan and Flint officials stemming from the
city's lead-contaminated water crisis can proceed but has dropped
Gov. Rick Snyder and others from the case.

U.S. District Judge Judith Levy ruled that the suit filed on behalf
of residents and businesses didn't claim Snyder knew of risks when
the city switched to Flint River water in 2014.  The corrosive
water caused lead to leach from old plumbing.

Others dismissed include former Department of Environmental Quality
Director Dan Wyant and ex-Flint Mayor Dayne Walling.

Those remaining include former state Treasurer Andy Dillon and
Department of Health and Human Services Director Nick Lyon. Lyon
also has been criminally charged, but his attorneys say he's not
responsible.

Judge Levy also dismissed race, civil rights and negligence claims.
[GN]


FLORIDA: Court Dismisses S. Krabill's Prisoners Suit
----------------------------------------------------
Judge Sheri Polster Chappell of the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Florida, Fort Myers Division, dismissed the
case, STANLEY HALL KRABILL, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF FLORIDA,
KATHLEEN SMITH, MIKE SCOTT, RICK SCOTT, STEPHEN B. RUSSELL, and
LINDA DOGGETT, Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-394-FtM-38CM (M.D.
Fla.).

The matter comes before the Court upon sua sponte review of the
docket.  On June 6, 2018, the Court issued an Opinion and Order
dismissing without prejudice a purported class action complaint
initiated by 14 pretrial detainees held in the Lee County Jail for
failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted to each
pro se Plaintiff filing a separate amended complaint and motion to
proceed in forma pauperis in their own action.  The deadline to
file an amended pleading and motion to proceed in forma pauperis
has expired and no Amended Complaint or motion has been filed.

Accordingly, Judge Chappell dismissed Krabill's case.  The Clerk
shall enter judgment accordingly, terminate all deadlines and close
the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 3, 2018 Opinion Order is
available at https://is.gd/5jh5IA from Leagle.com.

Stanley Hall Krabill, Plaintiff, pro se.


GENERAL MOTORS: Faces Class Action Over Duramax Emissions
---------------------------------------------------------
David A. Wood, writing for CarComplaints.com, reports that a GM
diesel lawsuit claims Duramax engines are equipped with emissions
defeat devices in 2011-2016 Chevrolet Silverado and GMC Sierra
trucks.

The original Duramax diesel lawsuit was filed in 2017 by plaintiff
Andrei Fenner against General Motors and the Robert Bosch company,
then consolidated with another class-action called Carrie Mizell et
al. v. General Motors LLC, et al., with the consolidated action
titled In Re: Duramax Diesel Litigation.

The consolidated class-action names 13 plaintiffs in 10 states who
bought 2011-2016 Silverado 2500/3500 or Sierra 2500/3500 diesel
trucks.

According to the GM diesel lawsuit, the automaker marketed the
Duramax engines as emitting low emissions while delivery high
performance, and engines that offered a "remarkable reduction of
diesel emissions" compared to the previous engines.

But the plaintiffs claim emissions tests show the Silverado and
Sierra 2500 and 3500 trucks emit levels of nitrogen oxides higher
than GM advertised. The emissions are also allegedly higher than
government standards.

"The vehicles' promised power, fuel economy, and efficiency is
obtained only by turning off or turning down emissions controls
when the software in these vehicles senses they are not in an
emissions testing environment."

The Duramax engines are allegedly equipped with three emissions
"defeat devices," with one device used to allegedly reduce the
emission controls when temperatures are above the certification
test range of 86°F.

The plaintiffs claim another device illegally reduces emissions
controls when temps go below 68°F, and a third defeat device
reduces emissions controls after 200-500 seconds of steady speed
operation at all temperatures, causing emissions to increase an
average of 4.5 times above standards.

According to the plaintiffs, the trucks emit nitrogen oxides
between 2.1 and 2.4 times above legal standards, while in some
cases emissions levels are allegedly up to 5.8 times higher than
standards.

In comparison, defeat devices in Volkswagen vehicles emitted up to
40 times the legal levels of nitrogen oxides.

The Duramax diesel engines allegedly fool test machines by placing
the "selective catayltic reduction" (SCR) in front of the "diesel
particulate filter (DPF), increasing the engine's power and fuel
efficiency.

However, the lawsuit alleges that placing the SCR in front of the
DPF also increases potential emissions, something that required GM
to "employ Active Regeneration (burning off collected soot at a
high temperature) and other power- and efficiency-sapping exhaust
treatment measures."

This allegedly took away the power and fuel efficiency gains and
required the automaker to install the three defeat devices,
something the automaker accomplished because of allegedly
conspiring with Robert Bosch LLC.

According to the diesel lawsuit, Bosch and General Motors "were
active and knowing participants in the scheme to evade U.S.
emissions requirements" because of creating and testing the
electronic diesel control (EDC17) that "allowed GM to implement the
defeat device."

The plaintiffs claim the Bosch EDC17 also allegedly helped Audi,
Porsche, Volkswagen and Mercedes to manipulate emissions.

The judge was told Duramax diesel truck owners paid an extra $9,000
for the Chevrolet Silverado and GMC Sierra trucks compared to
gasoline-powered verions.

General Motors told the judge the lawsuit should be dismissed all
all 54 counts, including the allegation GM and Bosch violated the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. The
remaining 53 counts are based on state fraudulent concealment and
consumer protection laws of 43 states.

The lawsuit includes 33 of the state law claims originate from
states where no named plaintiff resides.

The judge says General Motors and the plaintiffs reached agreements
about some claims that will be dismissed without prejudice and also
about certain claims for punitive damages that will be completely
removed.

Out of the 54 counts, the judge ruled the lawsuit will proceed but
without 14 counts, however, the plaintiffs have indicated they will
amend and refile their lawsuit.

The GM diesel lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan -- Andrei Fenner and Joshua Herman, et
al., v. General Motors LLC, et. al., also called In Re: Duramax
Diesel Litigation.

The plaintiffs are represented by Hagens Berman, the Miller Law
Firm PC, Seeger Weiss, Hilliard Muñoz Gonzales, and Carella,
Byrne, Cecchi, Olstein, Brody, Agnello, P.C.

CarComplaints.com has complaints about the Chevy Silverado 2500 and
3500, and the GMC Sierra 2500 and 3500. [GN]


GEO GROUP: Class Suits by Immigration Detainees Still Ongoing
-------------------------------------------------------------
The GEO Group, Inc. still faces immigration detainees' class action
suits in multiple states, according to the Company's Form 10-Q
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

On October 22, 2014, former civil immigration detainees at the
Aurora Immigration Detention Center filed a class action lawsuit
against the Company in the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado (the "Court").  The complaint alleges that the
Company was in violation of the Colorado Minimum Wages of Workers
Act and the federal Trafficking Victims Protection Act ("TVPA").
The plaintiff class claims that the Company was unjustly enriched
as a result of the level of payment the detainees received for work
performed at the facility, even though the voluntary work program
as well as the wage rates and standards associated with the program
that are at issue in the case are authorized by the Federal
government under guidelines approved by the United States
Congress.

In February 2017, the Court granted the plaintiff-class' motion for
class certification which the Company appealed to the 10th Circuit
Court of Appeals.  On February 9, 2018, a three-judge panel of the
appellate court affirmed the class-certification order.  A petition
for rehearing en banc was denied on March 7, 2018.  The Company is
seeking a writ of certiotari to the U.S. Supreme Court on the class
certification order.  The plaintiff class seeks actual damages,
compensatory damages, exemplary damages, punitive damages,
restitution, attorneys' fees and costs, and such other relief as
the Court may deem proper.

Since the Colorado suit was initially filed, three similar lawsuits
have been filed - two in Washington and one in California.  In
Washington, one of the two lawsuits was filed on September 9, 2017
by immigration detainees against the Company in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Washington.  The second
of the two lawsuits was filed on September 20, 2017 by the State
Attorney General against the Company in the Superior Court of the
State of Washington for Pierce County.  On October 9, 2017, the
Company removed the lawsuit to the United States District Court for
the Western District of Washington.

In California, a class-action lawsuit was filed on December 19,
2017 by immigration detainees against the Company in the United
States District Court Eastern Division of the Central District of
California.  All lawsuits allege violations of the respective
state's minimum wage laws.  However, only the California lawsuit,
similar to the Colorado class-action, also includes claims based on
violating the federal TVPA.

The Company intends to take all necessary steps to vigorously
defend itself and has consistently refuted the allegations and
claims in these lawsuits.  The Company has not recorded an accrual
relating to these matters at this time, as a loss is not considered
probable nor reasonably estimable at this stage of the lawsuit.

The Geo Group, Inc. is a real estate investment trust ("REIT")
specializing in the ownership, leasing and management of
correctional, detention and reentry facilities and the provision of
community-based services and youth services in the United States,
Australia, South Africa, and the United Kingdom. The company is
based in Boca Raton, Florida.


GLOBAL TELLINK: Appeals Stuart Suit Ruling to 8th Circuit
---------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Global Tel*Link Corporation filed an appeal from a court
ruling in the lawsuit titled Kaylan Stuart, et al. v. Global
Tel*Link Corporation, Case No. 5:14-cv-05275-TLB, in the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Arkansas -
Fayetteville.

The appellate case is captioned as Kaylan Stuart, et al. v. Global
Tel*Link Corporation, Case No. 18-2763, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on August 17,
2018, the Plaintiffs appealed from two court orders and a judgment
entered in their lawsuit.  That appellate case is titled Kaylan
Stuart, et al. v. Global Tel*Link Corporation, Case No. 18-2640.

The Plaintiffs allege in their complaint that GTL charged them
unjust and unreasonable rates for inmate phone-calling services at
various correctional facilities throughout the United States, in
violation of the Federal Communications Act and the common law of
unjust enrichment.[BN]

Plaintiff-Cross Appellee Kaylan Stuart, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Andrew R. Lynch, Esq.
          ANDREW R. LYNCH, P.C.
          150 E. Ponce de Leon Avenue
          Decatur, GA 30030
          Telephone: (404) 373-7735
          E-mail: andrew@atlnotguilty.com

               - and -

          James Maro, Esq.
          Peter A. Muhic, Esq.
          Donna Siegel Moffa, Esq.
          Amanda Trask, Esq.
          KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK, LLP
          280 King of Prussia Road
          Radnor, PA 19087-0000
          Telephone: (610) 667-7706
          Facsimile: (610) 667-7056
          E-mail: jmaro@ktmc.com
                  pmuhic@ktmc.com
                  dmoffa@ktmc.com
                  atrask@ktmc.com

               - and -

          Amy C. Martin, Esq.
          P.O. Box 765
          Fayetteville, AR 72702
          Telephone: (479) 422-4611
          E-mail: theamymartin@gmail.com

               - and -

          James Radford, Esq.
          RADFORD & KEEBAUGH
          315 W. Ponce de Leon Ave., Suite 1080
          Decatur, GA 30030
          Telephone: (678) 369-3609
          E-mail: james@decaturlegal.com

               - and -

          Richard E. Shevitz, Esq.
          Lynn A. Toops, Esq.
          COHEN MALAD LLP
          One Indian Square, Suite 1400
          Indianapolis, IN 46204
          Telephone: (317) 636-6481
          E-mail: rshevitz@cohenandmalad.com
                  ltoops@cohenandmalad.com

Plaintiff-Cross Appellee Dustin Murilla is represented by:

          Susan L. Burke, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF SUSAN L. BURKE (BURKE PLLC)
          1611 Park Avenue
          Baltimore, MD 21217
          Telephone: (410) 733-5444
          E-mail: sburke@burkepllc.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey B. Gittleman, Esq.
          BARRACK, RODOS & BACINE
          3300 Two Commerce Square
          2001 Market Street
          Philadelphia, PA 19103-0000
          Telephone: (215) 963-0600
          E-mail: jgittleman@barrack.com

               - and -

          Daniel E. Gustafson, Esq.
          GUSTAFSON GLUEK PLLC
          120 S. Sixth Street, Suite 2600
          Minneapolis, MN 55402-0000
          Telephone: (612) 333-8844
          E-mail: dgustafson@gustafsongluek.com

               - and -

          Patrick Howard, Esq.
          Simon Bahne Paris, Esq.
          SALTZ MONGELUZZI BARRETT & BENDESKY PC
          1650 Market Street, 52nd Floor
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 496-8282
          E-mail: phoward@smbb.com
                  sparis@smbb.com

               - and -

          James Maro, Esq.
          Peter A. Muhic, Esq.
          Amanda Trask, Esq.
          KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK, LLP
          280 King of Prussia Road
          Radnor, PA 19087-0000
          Telephone: (610) 667-7706
          Facsimile: (610) 667-7056
          E-mail: jmaro@ktmc.com
                  pmuhic@ktmc.com
                  atrask@ktmc.com

               - and -

          Amy C. Martin, Esq.
          P.O. Box 765
          Fayetteville, AR 72702
          Telephone: (479) 422-4611
          E-mail: theamymartin@gmail.com

               - and -

          Todd Seaver, Esq.
          BERMAN DEVALERIO, LLP
          44 Montgomery Street, Suite 650
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 433-3200
          E-mail: tseaver@bermantabacco.com

Plaintiff-Cross Appellee Walter Chruby is represented by:

          Daniel Berger, Esq.
          Peter R. Kahana, Esq.
          Barbara A. Podell, Esq.
          Yechiel Michael Twersky, Esq.
          BERGER & MONTAGUE, P.C.
          1622 Locust Street
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 875-3000
          Facsimile: (215) 875-4604
          E-mail: danberger@bm.net
                  pkahana@bm.net
                  bpodell@bm.net
                  mitwersky@bm.net

               - and -

          Robert A. Braun, Esq.
          Benjamin Brown, Esq.
          COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL, PLLC
          West Tower, Suite 500
          1100 New York Avenue, N.W.
          Washington, DC 20005-3934
          Telephone: (202) 408-4600
          Facsimile: (202) 408-4699
          E-mail: rbraun@cohenmilstein.com
                  bbrown@cohenmilstein.com

               - and -

          Susan L. Burke, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF SUSAN L. BURKE (BURKE PLLC)
          1611 Park Avenue
          Baltimore, MD 21217
          Telephone: (410) 733-5444
          E-mail: sburke@burkepllc.com

               - and -

          James Maro, Esq.
          Peter A. Muhic, Esq.
          Amanda Trask, Esq.
          KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK, LLP
          280 King of Prussia Road
          Radnor, PA 19087-0000
          Telephone: (610) 667-7706
          Facsimile: (610) 667-7056
          E-mail: jmaro@ktmc.com
                  pmuhic@ktmc.com
                  atrask@ktmc.com

               - and -

          Amy C. Martin, Esq.
          P.O. Box 765
          Fayetteville, AR 72702
          Telephone: (479) 422-4611
          E-mail: theamymartin@gmail.com

Plaintiff-Cross Appellee Rocky Hobbs is represented by:

          Amy C. Martin, Esq.
          P.O. Box 765
          Fayetteville, AR 72702
          Telephone: (479) 422-4611
          E-mail: theamymartin@gmail.com

               - and -

          Peter A. Muhic, Esq.
          KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK, LLP
          280 King of Prussia Road
          Radnor, PA 19087-0000
          Telephone: (610) 667-7706
          Facsimile: (610) 667-7056
          E-mail: pmuhic@ktmc.com

Defendant-Cross Appellant Global Tel*Link Corporation is
represented by:

          Robert J. Herrington, Esq.
          GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP
          1840 Century Park East, Suite 1900
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 586-7700
          Facsimile: (310) 586-7800
          E-mail: herringtonr@gtlaw.com

               - and -

          Marshall S. Ney, Esq.
          FRIDAY, ELDREDGE & CLARK, LLP
          3350 S. Pinnacle Hills Pkwy., Suite 301
          Rogers, AR 72758
          Telephone: (479) 644-6049
          E-mail: mney@fridayfirm.com

               - and -

          Michael R. Sklaire, Esq.
          GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP
          1750 Tysons Boulevard, Suite 1000
          McLean, VA 22102
          Telephone: (703) 749-1308
          E-mail: sklairem@gtlaw.com


GOURMET SWEETS: Seeks 2nd Cir. Review of Ruling in Bagga Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Gourmet Sweets, Inc., and Quaisar Chaundhry filed an
appeal from a District Court minute entry dated July 12, 2018,
entered in the lawsuit titled Bagga v. Gourmet Sweets, Inc., et
al., Case No. 17-cv-1591 filed on Mar 21, 2017, in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Brooklyn).

The lawsuit alleges violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The appellate case is captioned as Bagga v. Gourmet Sweets, Inc.,
et al., Case No. 18-2419, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Sunil Bagga, on behalf of himself and all other
persons similarly situated, is represented by:

          Michael Samuel, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF SAMUEL & STEIN
          38 West 32nd Street
          New York, NY 10001
          Telephone: (212) 563-9884
          E-mail: michael@samuelandstein.com

Defendants-Counter-Claimants-Appellants Quaisar Chaundhry and
Gourmet Sweets, Inc., DBA Gourmet Sweets & Restaurant, are
represented by:

          Kodampallil R. Unnikrishnan, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF UNNI KRISHNAN P.C.
          7232 Broadway
          Jackson Heights, NY 11372
          Telephone: (718) 779-7709
          E-mail: unnilaw@yahoo.com


GRUBHUB INC: 9th Circuit Appeal from N.D. Calif. Order Underway
---------------------------------------------------------------
The plaintiff's appeal from a district court's ruling that delivery
driver is an independent contractor remains pending in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, according to Grubhub Inc.'s
Form 10-Q filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on
August 6, 2018, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

In September 2015, a claim was brought in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California under the
Private Attorneys General Act by an individual plaintiff on behalf
of himself and seeking to represent other drivers and the State of
California.  The claim sought monetary penalties and injunctive
relief for alleged violations of the California Labor Code based on
the alleged misclassification of drivers as independent
contractors.

A decision was issued on February 8, 2018, and the court ruled in
favor of the Company, finding that plaintiff was properly
classified as an independent contractor.

In March 2018, the plaintiff appealed this decision to the Ninth
Circuit.

Grubhub said, "The Company does not believe any of the foregoing
claims will have a material impact on its consolidated financial
statements.  However, there is no assurance that any claim will not
be combined into a collective or class action."

GrubHub Inc., together with its subsidiaries, provides an online
and mobile platform for restaurant pick-up and delivery orders in
the United States.  The Company was formerly known as GrubHub
Seamless Inc. and changed its name to GrubHub Inc. in February
2014.  GrubHub Inc. was founded in 1999 and is headquartered in
Chicago, Illinois.


HEMPSTEAD COUNTY, AK: Detention Jailers File FLSA Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Lynn LaRowe, writing for Texarkana Gazette, reports that a federal
lawsuit filed on Aug. 1 in Texarkana accuses Hempstead County,
Ark., of failing to pay detention officers and jailers
time-and-a-half when they worked more than 40 hours a week.

The suit was filed on behalf of Gary Middleton, a Hempstead County
resident who worked as a detention officer from July 2014 to May
2018, and others similarly situated, according to the complaint
pending in the Texarkana Division of the Western District of
Arkansas. The complaint seeks certification as a class action
seeking damages for detention officers and jailers working in the
Hempstead County jail in Hope, Ark., during the three-year period
prior to the filing of the suit.

Hempstead County Sheriff James Singleton said he has not seen a
copy of the suit and declined to comment. Court records show
Hempstead County has not yet been served with a copy of the
complaint.

The complaint alleges violations of the federal Fair Labor
Standards Act and of state law under the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act.
The suit alleges hourly employees like Middleton were required to
work in excess of 40 hours per week but were not compensated in
accordance with the law. The suit alleges that hourly employees
were neither paid time-and-a-half nor given comp time at the rate
of one-and-a-half hours for every overtime hour, as is permitted
for some public employees.

If certified as a class and collective action, anyone who worked as
a detention officer or jailer during the three years prior to the
suit being filed Aug. 1 will have an opportunity to opt in as a
class member and benefit from any judgment that might be reached in
the case.

The suit was filed by Daniel Ford, Chris Burks and Josh Sanford of
the Little Rock based Sanford Law Firm. The case is pending before
U.S. District Judge Susan Hickey. [GN]


HERSHEY CO: 9th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of L. Dana's Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of the case, LAURA DANA, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE HERSHEY
COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation; HERSHEY CHOCOLATE & CONFECTIONERY
CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation, Defendants-Appellees, Case No.
16-15789 (9th Cir.).

Hershey is one of the world's largest chocolate companies and
sources some of its cocoa beans from the Ivory Coast (or Côte
d'Ivoire).  The Bureau of International Labor Affairs of the United
States Department of Labor recognizes that cocoa beans from the
Ivory Coast are produced using the worst forms of child labour.
Therefore, Hershey's supply chain may include child and forced
labor, but the company does not disclose this on its labels.

Dana argues that by not labeling its products, Hershey misled
purchasers and thereby violated California's consumer protection
laws. Specifically, Dana brings suit under (1) California Civil
Code Sections 1750, et seq., the Consumers Legal Remedies Act
("CLRA"); (2) California's Business & Professions Code Sections
17200, et seq., the Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"); and (3)
California's Business & Professions Code Sections 17500, et seq.,
the False Advertising Law ("FAL").

The district court dismissed all of Dana's claims.  Dana appeals.

Dana argues that Hershey had a duty to disclose, on its labels, the
existence of child labor in its supply chain.  But the Appellate
Court finds that the Plaintiff failed to allege that the existence
of child labor in the supply chain affects the chocolate products'
central function.  Therefore, Hershey was under no duty to
disclose.

The Court explains that although a claim may be stated under the
CLRA in terms constituting fraudulent omissions, to be actionable,
the omission must be contrary to a representation actually made by
the defendant, or an omission of a fact the defendant was obliged
to disclose.  Therefore, Hershey did not violate the CLRA.

The UCL prohibits any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act
or practice.  Because Business & Professions Code Section 17200 is
written in the disjunctive, it establishes three varieties of
unfair competition -- acts or practices which are unlawful, or
unfair, or fraudulent.

The Plaintiff claims that Hershey is liable under all three
varieties.  However, the Court holds that Hershey is not liable
under the unlawful prong because Dana did not state a claim under
the CLRA.  Likewise, Dana cannot state a claim under the fraudulent
prong because Hershey did not have a duty to disclose the forced
labor.  Therefore, Dana did not state a UCL claim.

Finally, for the purposes of the FAL, whether an advertisement is
misleading is determined by asking whether a reasonable consumer
would likely be deceived.  The Court finds that Dana's FAL claims
fail because a failure to disclose a fact one has no affirmative
duty to disclose is not likely to deceive anyone.

For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed
by the Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 10, 2018 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/eZGwdX from Leagle.com.


IMPINJ INC: Rosen Law Firm Investigates Securities Claims
---------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, on Aug. 4
disclosed that it is investigating potential securities claims on
behalf of shareholders of Impinj, Inc. (NASDAQ: PI) resulting from
allegations that Impinj may have issued materially misleading
business information to the investing public.

On August 2, 2018, Impinj announced that the release of its second
quarter 2018 results would be delayed. Impinj disclosed that its
Audit Committee commenced an independent investigation in
connection with a complaint filed by a former employee, and that
Impinj contacted the Securities and Exchange Commission to advise
that the investigation was underway. On this news, Impinj's stock
price fell $3.02 per share or 13.73% to close at $18.97 per share
on August 3, 2018.

Rosen Law Firm is preparing a class action lawsuit to recover
losses suffered by Impinj investors. If you purchased shares of
Impinj please visit the firm's website at
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1394.htmlto join the class action.
You may also contact
Phillip Kim or Zachary Halper of Rosen Law Firm toll free at
866-767-3653 or via email at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
zhalper@rosenlegal.com.

Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe,
concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm was Ranked No. 1
by ISS Securities Class Action Services for number of securities
class action settlements in 2017. The firm has been ranked in the
top 3 each year since 2013. [GN]


JAGUAR LAND: Faces Class Action Over Timing Chain Systems
---------------------------------------------------------
David A. Wood, writing for CarComplaints.com, reports that a Jaguar
Land Rover timing chain lawsuit alleges multiple models have timing
chain systems that cause failures of the engines.

This proposed class-action involves 2012-2014 Jaguar and Land Rover
vehicles equipped with 8-cylinder multi-valve 5-liter AJ-V8 Gen III
engines.

   -- 2012-2014 Land Rover LR4
   -- 2012-2014 Land Rover Range Rover Sport
   -- 2012-2014 Land Rover Range Rover
   -- 2012-2014 Jaguar XF
   -- 2012-2014 Jaguar XJ
   -- 2012-2014 Jaguar XK
   -- 2012-2014 Jaguar XFR
   -- 2012-2014 Jaguar XJR
   -- 2012-2014 Jaguar XKR
   -- 2012-2014 Jaguar F-Type

Failure of the timing chains allegedly causes the camshafts and
crankshafts to go out of synchronization and lose power, or causes
the pistons and valves to slam into each other.

A driver will likely hear noise caused by a loose or worn timing
chain before it completely fails. And damage to the engine will
cause acceleration and stalling problems, with the possibility of
catastrophic engine failure as the valves hit the pistons.

The timing chains in the Jaguar and Land Rover vehicles can also
allegedly suffer from too much slack in the chains from excessive
wear to the chain sprockets.

According to the lawsuit, the timing chain tensioning rails, used
to regulate the timing chain tension, are made with cast aluminum
while the tensioner pistons are made of hardened steel. But the
plaintiff says those rails are defective and fail prematurely, a
problem the automaker knew about before the vehicles were sold.

The plaintiff claims there is a contact point between the
piston-rail that causes a wear point in the tensioning rail that
causes outward movement of the tensioner piston, as well as chain
slack and the chain rattle heard by drivers.

The plaintiff says in addition to the cost and hassle of timing
chain failures, there is a serious safety issue to deal with when a
vehicle loses power steering and power brakes while driving.

The lawsuit also alleges that while the timing chains fail, the
owner's manuals for the vehicles say nothing about inspecting the
timing chains or performing maintenance on the chain assemblies
because timing chains should last at least 150,000 miles.

In place of timing chains that last 150,000 miles, the lawsuit
alleges the affected vehicles are equipped with chains that fail at
less than 50 percent of their expected lifespans.

Plaintiff Schmidt alleges his vehicle started having problems at
80,000 miles, even though the timing chain was supposed to be
"maintenance-free" for life. The plaintiff then references a Jaguar
training publication called "NP10-V8JLR: AJ133 5.0-Liter DFI V8
Engine" that says:

"A maintenance-free highly durable chain transfers drive from the
crankshaft to the camshafts, via the variable camshaft timing (VCT)
units."

Although the class-action lawsuit includes only the one named
plaintiff, he claims some of the damaged engines cannot be repaired
after the timing chain failures, costing owners more than $20,000
for new engines. In addition, customers have lost resale values as
the public has learned about the timing chain defects.

Jaguar Land Rover has allegedly concealed the problems since 2011
when it allegedly redesigned the chain tensioner to alleviate the
problem, but did all of that without telling consumers. The
plaintiff further claims the automaker redesigned the primary
chain, primary chain tensioner and primary chain guide/rails not
once but multiple times to try to prevent engine failures.

The automaker sent technical service bulletins to dealerships
between 2013 and 2015, and those bulletins are allegedly proof
Jaguar Land Rover knew about the timing chain failures.

Mr. Schmidt admits his chain failure occurred outside the warranty
period, but he claims Jaguar still should have reimbursed him or
provided him a replacement vehicle.

The Jaguar Land Rover timing chain lawsuit was filed in the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey - Robert Schmidt, et
al., v. Jaguar Land Rover Automotive PLc, et al.

The plaintiff is represented by Kantrowitz, Goldhamer & Graifman,
P.C., and Thomas P Sobran PC.

CarComplaints.com has complaints from drivers of some of the
vehicles named in the timing chain lawsuit:

   -- Land Rover LR4
   -- Land Rover Range Rover Sport
   -- Land Rover Range Rover
   -- Jaguar XF
   -- Jaguar XJ
   -- Jaguar XK
   -- Jaguar XJR
   -- Jaguar XKR
   -- Jaguar F-Type [GN]


LAS VEGAS, NV: Sept. 21 Filing of Dispositive Bids in Cardenas
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JAZMIN GUADALUPE CARDENAS, Plaintiff, v. JOSEPH
LOMBARDO, Individually, and in his Official Capacity as Sheriff of
Clark County. Nevada; STEVEN A. MAAS, Individually, and in his
Official Capacity as an Officer for the Las Vegas Metropolitan
Police Department, RICHARD E. MAUPIN, JR., Individually, and in his
Official Capacity as a Sergeant for the Las Vegas Metropolitan
Police Department; CITY OF LAS VEGAS, NEVADA; and CLARK COUNTY,
NEVADA, Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-380-RFB-PAL (D. Nev.),
Magistrate Judge Peggy A. Leen of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Nevada, Southern Division, has entered a stipulated
order extending the time for the parties to file their dispositive
motions by 60 days from the current deadline of July 25, 2018 up to
and including Sept. 21, 2018.

The counsel for the Defendants has been occupied in preparing
dispositive motions in Walker v. City of North Las Vegas,
2:14-cv-01475-JAD-NJK and in Murry v. City of North Las Vegas,
2:17-cv-157-APG-CWH.  The counsel for Defendants has also been
occupied in preparing for trial in O.P.H. of Las Vegas v. Oregon
Mutual Insurance Company, A-12-672158-C as well as occupied in
conducting discovery in Small et al v. University Medical Center of
Southern Nevada, 2:13-cv-00298-APG-PAL, a 600 member class action
FLSA matter that has a discovery cutoff date of Aug. 27, 2018.  The
counsel for the Plaintiff has no opposition to the request.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 6, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/S6NX5w from Leagle.com.

Jazmin Guadalupe Cardenas, Plaintiff, represented by Derrick S.
Penney, Penney Law Firm.

Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, Steven A Maas, Richard E
Maupin, Jr & Joseph Lombardo, Defendants, represented by Danielle
Miller -- Danielle.Miller@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis Brisbois
Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Noel E. Eidsmore, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard &
Smith LLP & Robert W. Freeman, Jr. --
Robert.Freeman@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith
LLP.


LIBRARY OF CONGRESS: Court Reopens Job Discrimination Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHRISTINE MILLS, RUNAKO BALONDEMU, GERALDINE DUNCAN,
PRISCILLA IJEOMAH, LAWRENCE PERRY, WILLIAM ROWLAND, DAVID HUBBARD,
CLIFTON KNIGHT, SHARON TAYLOR, and CHARLES MWALIMU, both
individually and on behalf of a class of others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. JAMES H. BILLINGTON, Librarian of Library of
Congress, Defendant, Case No. 1:04-CV-2205 (D. D.C.), Judge
Frederick J. Scullin, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia granted in part and denied in part the
Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of the Court's March 30,
2016 Order granting the Defendant's motion to dismiss, and the
March 31, 2016 judgement, that the Clerk of the Court entered in
compliance with that Order.

The Defendant acknowledges that, under either Rule 59 or Rule 60,
the Plaintiffs filed their motion for reconsideration within the
required time frame.  The parties' disagreement, however, relates
to whether the Plaintiffs have met the other requirements that
would warrant the Court granting their motion for reconsideration.

Judge Scullin finds that the facts of the case fall somewhere
between the circumstances that existed in Norris v. Salazar, and
Lepkowski v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, the two cases that the
Defendant cites in opposition to the Plaintiffs' motion.  In this
case, the Plaintiffs' counsel did not file any opposition to the
Defendant's motion to dismiss until after the Courtroom Deputy
Clerk had telephoned him twice to find out whether he intended to
do so.  

Eventually, the Plaintiffs' counsel filed a memorandum of law in
opposition to the Defendant's motion; but, as the Court noted in
its March 30, 2016 Order granting the Defendant's motion, that not
only was the memorandum untimely but it cited no law, nor provided
any record-supported facts, to support the Plaintiffs' position
that the Court should not grant the Defendant's motion.  In
addition, at oral argument, the Plaintiffs' counsel provided no
valid excuse for his failure to respond to the Defendant's motion
within the required time frame.

The Judge also finds that the Plaintiffs still cannot satisfy the
requirements of Rule 23(a); and, in addition, Wal-Mart still
controls and forecloses the Plaintiffs from relying on Rule
23(b)(2) as a basis for certifying their class.  Therefore, he will
deny the Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration insofar as that
motion seeks to reopen the case so that the Plaintiffs can reargue
their motion for class certification.

As for the Defendant's motion to dismiss or, in the alternative,
for summary judgment, the Judge holds that although the case is
more than 10 years old, under the circumstances, including the fact
that the Plaintiffs are blameless, he will grant the Plaintiffs'
motion to vacate the judgment and to reopen the case to allow them
to file papers in opposition to the Defendant's motion to dismiss
or, in the alternative, for summary judgment.

After reviewing the entire file in the matter, the parties'
arguments and their submissions, as well as the applicable law, and
for the stated reasons, Judge Scullin granted in part and denied in
part the Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration and to reopen the
case.  He vacated the judgment in the case.  He denied the
Plaintiffs' motion to reconsider the Court's denial of their motion
for class certification.

The case is reopened and the Plaintiffs will file their papers in
opposition to the Defendant's motion to dismiss or, in the
alternative, for summary judgment, by Aug.3, 2018.  The Defendant
will file his papers in response to the Plaintiffs' opposition and
in further support of his motion to dismiss or, in the alternative,
for summary judgment on or before Aug. 17, 2018.

The matter is referred to the Chief Judge of the Court for
reassignment of this case to another district judge.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 6, 2018 Memorandum-Decision
and Order is available at https://is.gd/gHWeLG from Leagle.com.

CHRISTINE MILLS, RUNAKO BALONDEMU, GERALDINE DUNCAN, PRISCILLA
IJEOMAH, LAWRENCE PERRY, WILLIAM ROWLAND, DAVID HUBBARD, CLIFTON
KNIGHT, SHARON TAYLOR & CHARLES MWALIMU, Plaintiffs, represented by
Denise Marie Clark, CLARK LAW GROUP, PLLC & Earlene White
Rosenberg, ROSE & ROSE, PC.

JAMES HADLEY BILLINGTON, Librarian, Library of Congress, Defendant,
represented by Jason Todd Cohen, U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.


MARRIOTT BUSINESS: H. Bartholoma's Suit Remanded to State Court
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge J. Michael Seabright of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Hawaii remanded the case, HAZEL BROWN BARTHOLOMA and
JOEY MENDONCA, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. MARRIOTT BUSINESS SERVICES, ET AL.,
Defendants, Civ. No. 18-00044 JMS-RLP (D. Haw.), to the Circuit
Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii.

The Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint ("FAC") in State
Court on March 8, 2016.  It alleges that the Plaintiffs were
employed by the Defendants at the Marriott's Kauai Beach Club to
work on banquets and other food and beverage service events.  It
further claims that the Defendants wrongfully withheld from the
Plaintiffs a service fee paid by the hotel's customers to the
Defendants.  This conduct, according to the FAC, was in violation
of Hawaii Revised Statutes ("HRS") Sections 481B-14, 480-2, and
388-6, and the Plaintiffs and other members of the proposed class
are entitled to treble damages in accordance with HRS Section
480-13(a).  The Plaintiffs filed their Third Motion for Class
Certification on Nov. 6, 2017.

On Feb. 1, 2018, the Defendants removed the case to the Court,
asserting the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA") jurisdiction.  The
Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Remand on March 2, 2018, the
Defendants filed an Opposition on March 15, 2018, and the
Plaintiffs filed a Reply on March 29, 2018.

On April 18, 2018 Magistrate Judge Richard L. Puglisi entered his
Findings and Recommendation to Grant Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand
("April 18 F&R").  The April 18 F&R recommended that the Court
remands the action to the State Court because the Defendants'
removal of the action was untimely.

Specifically, it determined that the Plaintiffs' Third Motion for
Class Certification, filed Nov. 6, 2017, triggered 28 U.S.C.
Section 1446(b)(3), which required the Defendants to remove the
action within 30 days after receipt by the Defendant, through
service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion,
order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that
the case is one which is or has become removable.  And, because the
Defendants removed on Feb. 1, 2018, well past the 30-day window,
the April 18 F&R concluded that the removal was untimely and thus
recommended that the case be remanded to State Court.

After the April 18 F&R granted Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand, the
Defendants filed Objections on May 2, 2018, and the Plaintiffs
filed a Response to the Objections on May 16, 2018.  The sole issue
before the court is whether the Plaintiffs' Third Motion for Class
Certification triggered Section 1446(b)(3)'s 30-day removal clock.

The Plaintiffs argue that the Feb. 1, 2018 removal to the Court was
untimely because the Defendants were placed on notice sufficient to
trigger removal based on their Third Motion for Class
Certification, filed on Nov. 6, 2017.  The Defendants, in turn,
claim that the Third Motion for Class Certification did not provide
them sufficient notice that the aggregate amount in controversy
equals or exceeds $5 million.

Upon de novo review, Judge Seabright agrees that the filing of the
Third Motion for Class Certification was a motion from which the
Defendant could first ascertain that the Plaintiffs were alleging,
among other requirements, an amount in controversy in excess of $5
million such that the case was then subject to removal under the
CAFA.  He concludes that the filing of the Nov. 6, 2017 Third
Motion for Class Certification triggered section 1446(b)(3)'s
30-day clock.  Hence, the Defendants' Feb. 1, 2018 removal is thus
untimely.  Accordingly, he overruled the objections, adopted the
April 18 F&R, and remanded the action to State Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 10, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/ttQ4sS from Leagle.com.

Hazel Brown Bartholoma, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated & Joey Mendonca, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Brandee
J. Faria -- bjkfaria@perkinlaw.com -- Perkin & Faria, James J.
Bickerton -- bickerton@bsds.com -- Bickerton Dang LLLP, James J.
Wade -- jwade@perkinlaw.com -- Perkin and Faria LLLC, John F.
Perkin -- perkin@perkinlaw.com -- Perkin & Faria & Bridget G.
Morgan -- morgan@bsds.com -- Bickerton Dang LLLP.

Marriott Business Services, Marriott International, Inc. & Essex
House Condominium Corporation, Defendants, represented by Richard
M. Rand -- RRand@marrjones.com -- Marr Jones & Wang.


MARS INC: 9th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Mislabeling Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of the case, CHRISTINA WIRTH, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated; ADAM WAGNER, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MARS,
INC., a Delaware corporation; MARS PETCARE US, INC., a Delaware
corporation; IAMS COMPANY, an Ohio corporation,
Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 16-55280 (9th Cir.).

Mars is a marketer and distributor of canned and packaged seafood
that sources some of its products from Thailand.  The Bureau of
International Labor Affairs of the United States Department of
Labor recognizes that fish and shrimp products exported from
Thailand may be the result of forced labor.  Therefore, Mars supply
chain may include child and forced labor, but the company does not
disclose this on its labels.

Wirth argues that by not labeling its products, Mars misled
purchasers and thereby violated California's consumer protection
laws.  Specifically, Wirth brings suit under (1) California Civil
Code Sections 1750, et seq., the Consumers Legal Remedies Act
("CLRA"); (2) California's Business & Professions Code Sections
17200, et seq., the Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"); and (3)
California's Business & Professions Code Sections 17500, et seq.,
the False Advertising Law ("FAL").

The district court dismissed all of Wirth's claims.  Wirth
appeals.

Wirth argues that Mars had a duty to disclose, on its labels, the
existence of child labor in its supply chain.  But the Appellate
Court finds that the Plaintiff failed to allege that the existence
of child labor in the supply chain affects the chocolate products'
central function.  Therefore, Mars was under no duty to disclose.

The Court explains that although a claim may be stated under the
CLRA in terms constituting fraudulent omissions, to be actionable,
the omission must be contrary to a representation actually made by
the defendant, or an omission of a fact the defendant was obliged
to disclose.  Therefore, Mars did not violate the CLRA.

The UCL prohibits any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act
or practice.  Because Business & Professions Code Section 17200 is
written in the disjunctive, it establishes three varieties of
unfair competition -- acts or practices which are unlawful, or
unfair, or fraudulent.  The Plaintiff claims that Mars is liable
under all three varieties.  

However, the Court holds that Mars is not liable under the unlawful
prong because Wirth did not state a claim under the CLRA.
Likewise, Wirth cannot state a claim under the fraudulent prong
because Mars did not have a duty to disclose the forced labor.
Therefore, Wirth did not state a UCL claim.

Finally, for the purposes of the FAL, whether an advertisement is
misleading is determined by asking whether a reasonable consumer
would likely be deceived.  The Court finds that Wirth's FAL claims
fail because a failure to disclose a fact one has no affirmative
duty to disclose is not likely to deceive anyone.

For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed
by the Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 10, 2018 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/nQoOSE from Leagle.com.


MDL 2000: Court Refuses to Overrule Denial of Class Claim
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina, Anderson/Greenwood Division, denied Nathan Meinhardt's
pro se Motion to Overrule Special Master's 12/8/17 Findings and
Grant Compensation to Appellant Under the Settlement Agreement in
the case captioned In re: Building Materials Corporation of America
Asphalt Roofing Shingle Products Liability Litigation, This filing
relates to the Management File here captioned and the following
related Claim No.: 17002558, MDL No. 8:11-mn-02000-JMC (D.S.C.).

Meinhardt opened a class action claim on August 6, 2015, relating
to Timberline(R) shingles installed on his property located at
27496 Bayshore Drive, Isanti, Minnesota. As part of his claim,
Meinhardt submitted proof that he had purchased the subject
shingles.  The claims administrator denied Meinhardt's class action
claim pursuant to Section 7.12(c) of the Non-Mobile Settlement
Agreement. Meinhardt appealed this denial to the Special Master,
who dismissed the appeal. Meinhardt appealed the decision from the
Special Master, asserting that the Special Master did not comply
with a deadline to request an inspection of his roof under Section
7.16(d) of the Non-Mobile Settlement Agreement.

Meinhardt's first argument in his Reply that the terms of any
previous settlement agreement contained no restriction on future
claims, and his second argument that the cracking of shingles was
not known at the time of the previous releases, is irrelevant
because the releases specifically state that they are for "any and
all claims you may have against GAF arising out of or in connection
with the shingles involved in this claim." This statement releases
any and all claims which would include future claims, and it does
not qualify the type of claims that must be at issue in regard to
the damaged shingles.

Further, and in regard to Meinhardt's third argument that the
Non-Mobile Settlement Agreement contains no exclusion for payments
or releases made for conditions that were other than cracked
shingles, the Settlement Agreement explicitly states that it
includes any warranty claim made to GAF pursuant to the terms of
the GAF Limited Warranty or any other GAF Warranty, regardless of
whether such complaint or warranty claim identified cracking as the
basis of the complaint or warranty claim.

In addition, the GAF Class Action Settlement Agreement Information
Form authorized by the court and received by Meinhardt discloses
that the lawsuits claim a defect that might cause the roofing
shingles to prematurely fail, including cracking, splitting, or
tearing. Accordingly, the court finds that the Non-Mobile
Settlement Agreement is not limited to cracked shingles.

The court denies Meinhardt's Motion to Overrule Special Master's
12/8/17 Findings and Grant Compensation to Appellant Under the
Settlement Agreement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 25, 2018 Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9hj3bae from
Leagle.com.

Building Materials Corporation of America Asphalt Roofing Shingle
Products Liability Litigation MDL 2283, In Re, represented by David
Tulchin -- tulchind@sullcrom.com -- Sullivan and Cromwell &
Jennifer L. Mallory -- jennifer.mallory@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson
Mullins Riley and Scarborough.

John P. Linton, Special Master, represented by Pro se.

Jack Brooks, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated &
Ellen Brooks, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Shawn M. Raiter  --
sraiter@larsonking.com -- Larson King, LLP, Algernon Gibson
Solomons, III, Speights and Solomons LLC, Daniel Alvah Speights,
Speights and Solomons LLC & Thomas H. Pope, III, Pope Parker
Jenkins PA.

Angela Posey, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Brendan S. Thompson  --
brendant@cuneolaw.com -- Cuneo Gilbert and LaDuca,  Shawn M. Raiter
, Larson King, LLP & Patrick F. Madden , Berger and Montague.


MICROSOFT CORP: Labor Groups Urge Court to Revive Gender Bias Case
------------------------------------------------------------------
Erin Mulvaney, writing for Law.com, reports that labor and civil
rights groups are pressing a federal appeals court to revive a
gender discrimination class action of more than 8,000 current and
former Microsoft Corp. female employees, arguing a trial judge's
ruling, left unchecked, will create hurdles for women suing to
challenge workplace disparities.

The advocates filed an amicus brief in the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit in support of the plaintiffs, who are
challenging a Seattle federal judge's refusal to certify a class of
Microsoft engineers and IT operations professionals.

The challengers are represented by the firms Lieff Cabraser Heimann
& Bernstein; Outten & Golden; and Frank Freed Subit & Thomas.  Last
month, they filed papers in the Ninth Circuit challenging the
denial of class certification. U.S. District Judge James Robart in
June said no uniform policy and job descriptions tied together the
thousands of women across multiple states to satisfy the class.

A coalition of 32 groups, including the National Employment Law
Project, National Women's Law Center, ACLU, Lambda Legal Defense
and Education Fund, filed the amicus brief. Jocelyn Larkin of the
nonprofit Impact Fund was counsel of record on the brief, which
arrived at an early stage in the proceedings. There has been no
ruling on the merits of the Microsoft employees' claims of gender
discrimination.

The brief challenges how Judge Robart handled litigation
declarations, arguing that the judge "erected an arbitrary
numerical threshold" for such anecdotal evidence.

"Women may also be reluctant to accuse their managers of sexism
where the biased judgments that have inhibited their advancement
are subtle or undocumented. This reticence will be particularly
acute in industries, like tech, where women have traditionally been
underrepresented," Ms. Larkin wrote in the brief.

A Microsoft representative said in an email, "After three years of
litigation, the plaintiffs failed to show any legitimate basis for
why this should be a class action. The judge's decision carefully
and thoroughly applied the law and leaves no question that his
decision was correct."

The lawsuit against Microsoft was filed in 2012 and is one of
several gender bias cases that targeted the technology industry.
Other companies that have faced scrutiny include Google Inc.,
Oracle Corp., Twitter and Uber Technologies.

In the span of two weeks, judges in the Microsoft and Twitter cases
denied motions to certify the classes. Robart and the California
state judge in the Twiter case both found no common employment
practice or standard contributed to pay disparities. Both judges
drew on the 2011 U.S. Supreme Court decision Walmart v. Dukes,
which created a more rigid standard to certify a class.

Microsoft's lawyers at Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe contend the
class certification order was correctly decided and does not prove
a "death knell" for the plaintiffs lawsuit. Orrick's Lynne Hermle,
lead counsel for Microsoft, argued the "68-page opinion carefully
applied the case law" to the allegations and determined that none
of the "shifting theories of liability" satisfied class
certification requirements.

Judge Robart ruled that the anecdotal evidence in the case was not
enough to demonstrate that Microsoft operated under a general
policy of discrimination across 41 states and of workers holding
thousands of unique positions.

The amicus brief principally argued that Judge Robart applied a
"mechanical, mathematical standard" in evaluating anecdotal
evidence presented to the court. It argued that the declarations
from the workers and the evidence of hundreds of internal
complaints of gender bias should be convincing.

"Class actions allow women to challenge systemic gender
discrimination without suing their employer individually and
thereby putting their careers and workplace relationships in
jeopardy," the amicus brief argued. "This court should ensure that
the requirements for bringing such cases are not set arbitrarily
and unrealistically high, undermining their important purpose."
[GN]


MOVIEPASS: Users Waive Class Action Right Under Terms of Service
----------------------------------------------------------------
Sarah Berger and Tom Huddleston Jr, writing for CNBC, report that
it's no secret that MoviePass is facing an uncertain future -- but,
what does that mean for its customers?

The popular, but frequently troubled, start-up movie ticket
subscription service announced a new higher pricing model on July
31, as well as blackout time periods for some new release films.
This came after customers were temporarily unable to use the
service, reportedly because the company was short on money to pay
theaters for the tickets its customers were trying to reserve.
Parent company Helios and Matheson was forced to take out a $5
million emergency loan to ensure that MoviePass could afford to
keep processing payments going forward, the company said in an SEC
filing on July 27. MoviePass initially blamed the problem on
"technical issues" in posts on Twitter.

The price increase -- from a standard monthly rate of $9.95 to
$14.95 -- will reduce the amount of money the company is burning
through each month by 60 percent (MoviePass was losing more than
$21 million each month, according to a May filing), but the move is
also the latest sign that the company simply needs more money if it
wants to keep its subscription service up and running. In response
to a request for comment, a MoviePass spokesperson directed CNBC
Make It to the company's press release announcing the new pricing
plan.

Some analysts are more optimistic than others: Advisory firm
founder Eddie Yoon, told FastCompany that MoviePass may be able to
survive by "pissing a lot of people off" with changes like higher
prices. But Wedbush Securities analyst Michael Pachter told the
publication MoviePass still has "a bad business model" because the
company can't control how much it has to spend on movie tickets at
theater chains.

Parent company Helios and Matheson's stock price briefly spiked on
July 31 after the MoviePass announcement, reaching $1.81 per share,
before ultimately tumbling again to close at just 50 cents, leaving
it down by 38 percent on the day.

What it means for customers now
So, where does all this leave MoviePass subscribers, some of whom
are being charged on a month-to-month basis, while others are
locked into annual subscriptions that required an upfront payment?
CNBC Make It asked Omri Ben-Shahar, a professor at the University
of Chicago Law School who specializes in contract law and consumer
protection some of the questions on MoviePass users' minds.

What can you do about all those changes MoviePass keeps springing
on users, like higher prices and blackouts?

MoviePass's latest price change (to take effect within 30 days,
according to the company) and blackouts (some new release movies
will have limited availability during their first two weeks in
theaters) are just the latest in a string of tweaks the company has
made to the terms and conditions of its subscription plan, which
some customers have deemed a "bait and switch." In recent months,
MoviePass also suddenly announced changes such as the introduction
of "peak pricing," where users have to pay an additional fee to
book tickets to certain high-demand movies, or only allowing
subscribers to see each movie once.

The MoviePass terms of service are somewhat vague with regard to
service outages or movie blackouts. But the contract does note that
future subscription plans may include premium or "capped plans"
that could limit the movies a user sees per month, and the terms
also include a disclaimer notifying users that MoviePass "does not
promise that the site or any content, service or feature of the
site or service will be error-free or uninterrupted, or that your
use of the service or site will provide specific results."

Ben-Shahar, who looked over MoviePass' latest terms of service,
found that the company says it essentially has the right to change
or modify its service at any time in its sole discretion, including
prices "without prior notice." The law professor notes that just
because that language is in the contract, that doesn't mean
MoviePass can simply change the nature of its service dramatically,
or without limit -- courts often side against companies that change
the terms of a deal without properly notifying customers or giving
them a reasonable opportunity to drop their subscription.

"There needs to be some ability for consumers to either reject that
proposed change or to terminate the service without undue burden or
any cost," Mr. Ben-Shahar says.

Of course, MoviePass could have some protection in that case, as
users are typically made aware of changes to their plans by an
e-mail or a notification in the MoviePass app. However,
Mr. Ben-Shahar argues that, unless MoviePass gets "express, fresh
agreement from the consumer" to continue with the plan in light of
any new changes, then users might have a legal argument to end
their subscription early.

As far as how a company like MoviePass gets such an agreement from
users, that could mean that you click "I agree" to new terms of
service on a pop-up message in the app, although the MoviePass
terms of use also includes a statement suggesting that users
automatically agree to the company's terms simply by using the site
and the service. "By using the service and the site, you agree to
these terms of use. If you do not agree, do not use the service or
site," the company says on its website.

"Consumers have to have a meaningful choice, in the sense that, if
a consumer wants to say 'No, I don't want to do this,' then,
MoviePass says, 'OK, then you can't continue.' And, the consumer
has to be able to quit the service without excessive burden or
cost," Mr. Ben-Shahar says.

In reality, however, if users feel they have been denied the choice
to either agree to new terms of use or opt out of their plan
without incurring further charges, their options are fairly
limited. You can complain directly to the company's support staff
(though MoviePass' customer service is notoriously unresponsive, it
is worth noting the company did promise to issue refunds for users
affected by a service outage on July 6) or you could even try suing
the company for a refund, alleging a breach of contract or even
"bait-and-switch" fraud. However, it goes without saying that any
lawsuit could result in a lengthy, potentially expensive process
(especially if you're seeking a refund that may only be in the
range of $10, for a monthly charge, to around $90 for an annual
plan) that may or may not yield any positive results.

For what it's worth, MoviePass' terms of use include a section on
"arbitration and small claims proceedings" in which the company
claims that its contract with users gives it the right to choose to
have any legal dispute brought by a subscriber decided through an
arbitration process, instead of in court, while also claiming that
users waive their right to seek a class action.

Will users get their money back if MoviePass files for bankruptcy
or goes out of business?

Don't hold your breath.

The law professor warns that MoviePass subscribers should not hold
out too much hope for a reimbursement or some other type of
settlement payment should MoviePass eventually stop operating due
to a lack of funds. Obviously, that would mean the company had
broken its contract with its subscribers, but it would also mean
MoviePass would likely not have the money to settle its debts with
anyone, including subscribers who have time left on their plans.

"If they are going to close up shop and no money is left, then
consumers are screwed, the employees are screwed, the banks are
screwed, the investors are screwed," says Mr. Ben-Shahar.

If MoviePass files for bankruptcy, it probably wouldn't "have any
assets, and the only people who would get anything would be the
bankruptcy lawyers," Mr. Ben-Shahar says.

What about all the customer service problems?

MoviePass has an "F" rating on the Better Business Bureau (BBB).
The rating is based on 13 factors, including 1,837 complaints filed
against MoviePass and failure to respond to 72 complaints filed
against its business. It is not a BBB accredited business. To be an
accredited BBB business, the business must apply for accreditation
and is then evaluated on whether it meets BBB accreditation
standards including, "a commitment to make a good faith effort to
resolve any consumer complaints."

Among the pattern of complaints over billing and fulfillment
issues, the BBB says that a large amount of consumers have alleged
that they are not shipped their membership cards in a timely
fashion, despite being charged for the subscription service as soon
as they sign up, and are essentially ignored by MoviePass after
attempting to contact the company's customer service department.

Indeed, MoviePass customers have expressed severe frustrations over
the service's lack of customer response. On Twitter, customers
recently aired grievances over not being able to use MoviePass for
most showings of "Mission: Impossible -- Fallout," which was by far
the highest-grossing movie of the past weekend at the domestic box
office. There is even a Twitter account dubbed
"MoviePassClassAction," which is described as an account
"collecting information on MoviePass business practice for an
impending class-action suit."

The company's BBB profile is also plagued with negative customer
reviews; 269, to be exact. Meanwhile, it boasts 41 positive reviews
and one neutral review to comprise its 311 total customer reviews.

"Like many young companies, MoviePass failed to make customer
service a high enough priority, and it appears that they were not
prepared for the rapid growth that they have experienced. It's a
good cautionary tale for hungry young businesses…you absolutely
cannot skimp on customer service or you will end up with unhappy
consumers, poor ratings, and bad publicity," BBB national
spokesperson Katherine Hutt tells CNBC Make It. "It's not too late
for MoviePass to fix this, and BBB is always happy to work with
companies that want to improve their customer service."

According to law professor Ben-Shahar, while frustrating, poor
customer service alone is not cause for a lawsuit, but legitimate
complaints, like being billed for services that have not been
provided, could form the backbone of a valid legal action.

The future of MoviePass
The recent setbacks are just the latest for the start-up that have
raised serious doubts that the company could continue to survive
while offering a seemingly too-good-to-be-true subscription plan
(before the most recent price change, subscribers could see one
movie at a participating theater each day for just under $10 per
month), which fueled MoviePass' rapid jump from 20,000 users in
June 2016 to more than 3 million today.

MoviePass's major monthly losses led to concerns that MoviePass
would soon run out of money, as the company said in May that it
only had about $43 million in available funds. A lifeline in the
form of a $300 million line of credit, temporarily eased concerns,
but the recent service outages and emergency again stoked fears
that MoviePass might not be able to stay afloat much longer.

It remains to be seen how the new pricing will affect the company's
situation.

In a December interview withCNBC Make It, MoviePass CEO Mitch Lowe
was confident and enthusiastic about the potential of the service.
Lowe is known in the industry as something of a disruptor, having
served as an executive at Netflix in its early years, from 1998 to
2003, and later as president of Redbox from 2009 to 2011. Nearly
six months ago, when asked what the number one attribute leaders
need to have to invoke change within a company, he said it was
prioritization.

"You've got to understand how to prioritize what needs to get
done," Lowe told CNBC Make It. "Many, many times when you first
start out in business, you want to do everything as well as
possible and you've got to understand that some things you just
have to prioritize. You have to be able to live to fight another
day, and to live to fight another day might mean funding is the
most important."

Now, whether MoviePass will be able to fight to see another day is
one of the questions on the minds of many of its 3 million
subscribers. [GN]


NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE: 3 Ill. Cases Stayed Pending Outcome in DC Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, stayed the cases,
RENA NICHOLSON, Plaintiff, v. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC OF DELAWARE,
Defendant. JAMES K. TOLFORD, Plaintiff, v. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC
d/b/a CHAMPION MORTGAGE COMPANY, Defendant. MICHAL M. STANKIEWICZ,
Plaintiff, v. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC, Defendant, Case Nos.
17-cv-1373, 17-cv-8737, 18-cv-3075 (N.D. Ill.), pending the outcome
of the first-filed action currently pending in the D.C. District
Court.

The related actions bring putative class action claims against the
Defendant regarding its alleged practice, as a mortgage servicer,
of charging mortgage borrowers unnecessary and unreasonable
inspection fees in connection with mortgages that are purportedly
in default.

The Nicholson Action was filed in February 2017 by Nicholson
against the Defendant.  Nicholson, a homeowner residing in Chicago,
Illinois, has had a home equity conversion loan ("HECM"), also
known as a reverse mortgage, on her home since 2007.  Her reverse
mortgage was assigned to the Defendant, doing business as Champion
Mortgage Co., for servicing in 2012.  She alleges that the
Defendant, rather than adhering to these contractual requirements
for conducting inspections on mortgages in default, has developed
and used an automated process that systematically side-steps these
inspection requirements in order to maximize the fees imposed on
borrowers.

Nicholson brings claims against the Defendant for breach of
contract (Count I); unjust enrichment (Count II); and negligence in
the alternative (Count III).  She brings the action on behalf of
herself as well as a nationwide class and Illinois sub-class.  The
nationwide class is defined as all residents of the United States
of America who had a reverse mortgage serviced by Champion and
whose accounts were assessed fees for property inspections for
which the resident received no prior notice continuing through the
date of final disposition of this action.

The Tolford Action was originally filed in Illinois state court
before being removed to federal court in December 2017.  Tolford,
an Illinois resident, also brings class action claims against the
Defendant relating to its practice of assessing and collecting
allegedly unreasonable inspection fees in connection with defaulted
reverse mortgages.  Tolford brings claims against the Defendant on
behalf of himself and others similarly situated for breach of
contract (Count I); unjust enrichment in the alternative (Count
II); and violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act (Count III).

Tolford has defined two national classes and an Illinois sub-class
for purposes of his class claims.  For Count I, Tolford defines the
putative national class as all persons who (1) within ten years
prior to the filing of this foreclosure action, (2) had an FHA
and/or HECM loan with Champion that was in default, (3) occupied
the subject property during default, and (4) were charged
inspection fees by Champion while still occupying the property.
For Count II, Tolford defines the putative national class as all
persons who (1) within five years prior to the filing of this
foreclosure action, (2) had an FHA and/or HECM loan with
Championthat was in default, (3) occupied the subject property
during default, and (4) were charged inspection fees by Champion
while still occupying the property.

The Stankiewicz Action was also originally filed in Illinois state
court before being removed to federal court in April 2018.
Stankiewicz, an Illinois resident, alleges that he entered into an
FHA-insured mortgage (not a reverse mortgage) in 2009 that was
assigned to the Defendant in 2016.  A complaint for foreclosure was
filed on this mortgage in 2014.  Stankiewicz has continually
occupied the property since the mortgage was executed; however,
according to Stankiewicz, the Defendant has continually charged him
for property inspections during the foreclosure process even though
Defendant knew, or should have known, that he was occupying the
property.  Stankiewicz brings claims against Defendant on behalf of
himself and others similarly situated for breach of contract (Count
I); unjust enrichment in the alternative (Count II); and violation
of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act (Count III).

Stankiewicz has defined two national classes and an Illinois
sub-class for purposes of his class action claims.  For Count I,
Stankiewicz defines the putative national class as all persons who
(1) within ten years prior to the filing of this foreclosure
action, (2) had an FHA loan with Nationstar that was in default,
(3) occupied the subject property during default, and (4) were
charged inspection fees by Nationstar while still occupying the
property.  For Count II, Stankiewicz defines the putative national
class as all persons who (1) within five years prior to the filing
of this foreclosure action, (2) had an FHA loan with Nationstar
that was in default, (3) occupied the subject property during
default, and (4) were charged inspection fees by Nationstar while
still occupying the property.

In December 2016, before the Nicholson, Tolford, and Stankiewicz
Actions were filed, two other Plaintiffs brought an analogous class
action lawsuit against the Defendant in the Superior Court of the
District of Columbia.  The case was removed to the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia in January 2017.

The lawsuit relates to inspection fees charged in connection with
reverse mortgages serviced by the Defendant.  Specifically, the
D.C. Action Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant declared them in
default on their reverse mortgage loans specifically for failing to
return an Annual Occupancy Certification form.  According to these
Plaintiffs, this action violated the terms of their loan
agreements.  These Plaintiffs bring claims against the Defendant on
behalf of themselves and others similarly situated for breach of
contract; breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing;
violation of the D.C. Mortgage Lender and Broker Act; violation of
D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act; violation of Florida
Mortgage Lending Law; violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair
Trade Practices Act; and unjust enrichment.  

The D.C. Action Plaintiffs also define both a nationwide class and
state-specific sub-classes for their class claims.  They define
their nationwide class as follows all residents of the United
States of America who had a HECM loan serviced by Champion Mortgage
and whose loans were declared in default for failure to return an
Annual Occupancy Certification form and whose accounts were
assessed occupancy inspection fees on a monthly basis.  Since the
D.C. Action was filed, the parties have engaged in discovery and
contested discovery motion practice.

Currently before the Court are motions to stay filed by the
Defendant in the Nicholson Action, the Tolford Action [23], and the
Stankiewicz Action in favor of the D.C. Action as the first-filed
case.  Specifically, in each respective action, the Defendant
argues that these cases should be stayed because the D.C. Action
was filed first; the parties in the D.C. Action and the instant
cases are substantially similar; and the issues in the D.C. Action
and the instant cases are substantially similar.

Judge Dow concludes that a stay is appropriate in the Nicholson
Action, the Tolford Action, and the Stankiewicz Action pending the
outcome of the D.C. Action.  Staying these cases will not unduly
prejudice any Plaintiff, and a stay will potentially streamline the
issues for trial and avoid conflicting decisions in two different
courts on the same issues surrounding the Defendant's inspection
fee practices for defaulted mortgages.

For these reasons, he granted each of the Defendant's motions to
stay.  The Nicholson Action, the Tolford Action, and the
Stankiewicz Action are stayed pending the outcome of the
first-filed action currently pending in the D.C. District Court.
The parties are directed to submit status reports to the Court on
the D.C. Action every 90 days, beginning Sept. 1, 2018.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 6, 2018 Memorandum Opinion and
Order is available at https://is.gd/MZHpun from Leagle.com.

Michael M Stankiewicz, individually and as the representative of a
class of similarly situated persons, Plaintiff, represented by
Arthur C. Czaja -- arthur@czajalawoffices.com -- Law Office of
Arthur C. Czaja, Jeffrey Alan Berman -- jberman@andersonwanca.com
-- Anderson Wanca & Patrick J. Solberg --
psolberg@andersonwanca.com -- Anderson Wanca.

Nationstar Mortgage LLC, Defendant, represented by Robert Edward
Browne, Jr. -- robert.browne@troutman.com -- Troutman Sanders &
Christina Joanne Blackfor Lesko -- christina.lesko@troutman.com --
Troutman Sanders LLP.


NCAA: Langston Chosen as Sample Concussion Case
-----------------------------------------------
Jordan Larimore, writing for The Joplin Globe, reports that from
more than 100 concussion-related class-action lawsuits filed
against the National Collegiate Athletics Association, one filed by
the family of former Pittsburg State University football player
Zack Langston has been chosen as a sample case to potentially set
precedent for the others and the possibly thousands of former
athletes involved.

Ben Richman -- brichman@edelson.com -- of Edelson PC, a law firm
representing athletes who have sued the NCAA, said Langston's is
among four cases that have been selected for "active litigation"
before Judge John Lee in federal court in the Northern District of
Illinois.

Mr. Langston played at PSU from 2007 to 2010, and the lawsuit his
family first filed in U.S. District Court in 2017 alleges that his
2014 suicide was the result of neurological complications caused by
"over 100 concussions" he suffered while playing football. The suit
was transferred from the Eastern District of Kansas to the Northern
District of Illinois, where it is now part of multidistrict
litigation.

The plaintiffs and defendants each chose two cases to make up the
four of the sample class, Mr. Richman said.

"The idea is that the four sample cases would be kind of
representative of some of the issues that you could expect to see
across all of the litigation," he said. "So to avoid litigating the
same issue 100 or several hundred separate times, Judge Lee's hope
and our hope, of course, is that we can gain some efficiencies by
dealing with issues that might apply to all of the cases as a
whole."

A 'meaningful' case

The Langston family's suit, filed by Charles Marcus Langston,
Zack's father, and Danae Young, the mother of Zack Langston's
child, accuses the NCAA and Mid-America Intercollegiate Athletics
Association, the conference with which PSU is affiliated, of
negligence and wrongful death. Mr. Langston died from a
self-inflicted gunshot wound to the chest in 2014, which Mr.
Richman said was an intentional decision so as to preserve his
brain for study. Mr. Langston was posthumously diagnosed with a
severe case of chronic traumatic encephalopathy, the degenerative
brain disease caused by repeated trauma.

The suit alleges that the NCAA and MIAA "recklessly ignored" the
dangers of head injuries and "failed to institute any meaningful
methods of warning and/or protecting the student-athletes,
including the football players."

Attempts to reach the NCAA for comment were unsuccessful. MIAA
officials have previously declined to comment on the matter, citing
a league policy not to discuss pending litigation.

Mr. Langston's suit was chosen to be a sample case by the
plaintiffs, Mr. Richman said, because it is both emotionally
impactful and similar to several of the other cases filed against
the NCAA.

"From a human perspective and from kind of being representative of
what we see from players at schools across the country, his is a
story that we thought was meaningful, obviously," he said. "And
(it) needed to be pushed and something that hopefully would not
only win the day in court, which we expect it will, but will also
grab the attention of folks like yourself and others and keep that
discussion going in the public realm."

The latest developments in the litigation, Mr. Richman said, are
motions by the NCAA to dismiss some -- but not all -- of the claims
against it. A status conference on the case is set for later this
month, and the parties await a ruling from Lee on the pending
motions.

Representing more?

The Langston family's original suit was a class-action that could
represent all PSU football players who played between 1952 and 2010
and any of their spouses, parents or dependents. The class, the
suit says, could include hundreds of individuals and could ask for
more than $5 million in damages.

"The worst part is (Langston) is not alone," Mr. Richman said. "His
family is not alone. Every day, we speak to our clients and guys
who are coming to us for help. ... Sad doesn't begin to cover it in
terms of what they're all going through and how prevalent it is."

Although the Langston family's suit claims Zack Langston was told
to "shake it off" when he sustained concussions and that PSU
coaches "demanded" Langston and other players "forgo their own
self-interest and continue playing despite sustaining head
injuries," Pittsburg State is not named as a defendant in the suit,
nor are any of the coaches for whom Langston played at the time.

Mr. Richman said not suing schools individually won't prevent
former players or their families from being granted the legal
relief they are seeking.

"This isn't true of everybody or each family, but some of these
guys . . . don't want to be seen as going after their school," he
said. "They still have a lot of affection toward their school and
the guys they played with, and they're just not comfortable in
their view, kind of pursuing or attacking, as some people would
say, their schools."

Previous attempts to reach the Langston family directly have been
unsuccessful. [GN]


NEGRA COMPANIA: Faces Class Action Over October 2017 IPO
--------------------------------------------------------
Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP on Aug. 1 disclosed  that
a class action lawsuit has been filed on behalf of all persons or
entities that purchased the American Depositary Shares ("ADS") of
Loma Negra Compania Industrial Argentina Sociedad Anónima (NYSE:
LOMA) ("Loma Negra" or the "Company") If you purchased Loma Negra
ADS in or after the Company's October 31, 2017 initial public
offering ("IPO") and incurred losses on your investment, contact
Wolf Haldenstein.

All investors who have incurred losses in shares of Loma Negra
Compania Industrial Argentina Sociedad Anónima are urged to
contact the firm immediately at classmember@whafh.com or (800)
575-0735 or (212) 545-4774. You may obtain additional information
about the firm on our website, www.whafh.com.

This investigation concerns whether Loma Negra's filings with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in connection with
the IPO contained untrue statements of material fact or omitted
material information, specifically regarding the Argentine economy
slowing down and the infrastructure projects which Loma Negra
heavily depended upon being the first to be cut by the Argentine
government.

On May 13, 2018, UBS AG downgraded the company's ADS to "sell" from
"buy." UBS also lowered its twelve-month price target from $26.50
to $14.50, citing macroeconomic headwinds related to the economic
climate in Argentina and cuts to infrastructure spending by the
Argentinian government.

Subsequently, on May 23, 2018, it was reported that Argentina's
National Commission of Competition Defense was investigating
Argentina's cement companies for price-fixing.

The price of Loma Negra ADS has dropped substantially from its IPO
price of $19.00, closing at $11.24 on July 31, 2018.

Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP has extensive experience
in the prosecution of securities class actions and derivative
litigation in state and federal trial and appellate courts across
the country.  The firm has attorneys in various practice areas; and
offices in New York, Chicago and San Diego.  The reputation and
expertise of this firm in shareholder and other class litigation
has been repeatedly recognized by the courts, which have appointed
it to major positions in complex securities multi-district and
consolidated litigation.

If you wish to discuss this action or have any questions regarding
your rights and interests in this potential case, please
immediately contact Wolf Haldenstein by telephone at (800)
575-0735, via e-mail at classmember@whafh.com, or visit our website
at www.whafh.com. [GN]


NES EQUIPMENT: Tartan Challenges Bid to Dismiss Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
Darcy Reddan, writing for Law360, reports that Tartan Construction
LLC told an Illinois federal judge on July 31 that an equipment
renter's allegedly misleading and deceptive scheme caused it to pay
additional fees, claiming the statute of limitations in its
putative class action did not begin simply because it knew of the
fees but rather when it realized it had been wronged.

Tartan told the court it should deny NES Equipment Services Corp.'s
bid to dismiss the third amended complaint because the statute of
limitations was tolled for the claims relating to unjust
enrichment.

The case is styled State Mechanical Services, LLC v. NES Equipment
Service Corporation d/b/a NES Rentals et al, Case No. 1:17-cv-05950
(N.D. Ill.).  The case is assigned to Judge Honorable John Robert
Blakey.  The case was filed August 15, 2017. [GN]


NESTLE USA: 9th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Mislabeling Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of the case, MELANIE BARBER; ROBERT MALONE; ESTHER
MALONE; R. GRACE RODRIGUEZ, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. NESTLE USA, INC., a
Delaware Corporation; NESTLE PURINA PETCARE CO., A Missouri
Corporation, Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 16-55041 (9th Cir.).

Nestle is a marketer and distributor of canned and packaged seafood
that sources some of its products from Thailand. The Bureau of
International Labor Affairs of the United States Department of
Labor recognizes that fish and shrimp products exported from
Thailand may be the result of forced labor.  Therefore, Nestle
supply chain may include child and forced labor, but the company
does not disclose this on its labels.

Barber argues that by not labeling its products, Nestle misled
purchasers and thereby violated California's consumer protection
laws.  Specifically, Barber brings suit under (1) California Civil
Code Sections 1750, et seq., the Consumers Legal Remedies Act
("CLRA"); (2) California's Business & Professions Code Sections
17200, et seq., the Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"); and (3)
California's Business & Professions Code Sections 17500, et seq.,
the False Advertising Law ("FAL").

The district court dismissed all of Barber's claims.  Barber
appeals.

Barber argues that Nestle had a duty to disclose, on its labels,
the existence of child labor in its supply chain.  But the
Appellate Court finds that the Plaintiff failed to allege that the
existence of child labor in the supply chain affects the chocolate
products' central function.  Therefore, Nestle was under no duty to
disclose.

The Court explains that although a claim may be stated under the
CLRA in terms constituting fraudulent omissions, to be actionable,
the omission must be contrary to a representation actually made by
the defendant, or an omission of a fact the defendant was obliged
to disclose.  Therefore, Nestle did not violate the CLRA.

The UCL prohibits any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act
or practice.  Because Business & Professions Code Section 17200 is
written in the disjunctive, it establishes three varieties of
unfair competition -- acts or practices which are unlawful, or
unfair, or fraudulent.  The Plaintiff claims that Nestle is liable
under all three varieties.  

However, the Court holds that Nestlé is not liable under the
unlawful prong because Barber did not state a claim under the CLRA.
Likewise, Barber cannot state a claim under the fraudulent prong
because Nestlé did not have a duty to disclose the forced labor.
Therefore, Barber did not state a UCL claim.

Finally, for the purposes of the FAL, whether an advertisement is
misleading is determined by asking whether a reasonable consumer
would likely be deceived.  The Court finds that Barber's FAL claims
fail because a failure to disclose a fact one has no affirmative
duty to disclose is not likely to deceive anyone.

For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed
by the Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 10, 2018 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/QWte9M from Leagle.com.


NEW YORK UNIVERSITY: Averts Class Action Over 403(b) Plans
----------------------------------------------------------
James Comtois, writing for Pensions & Investments, reports that New
York University won a class-action lawsuit on July 31 alleging the
university mismanaged two of its 403(b) plans, violating provisions
of ERISA.

In the case, Sacerdote et al. vs. New York University, the
plaintiffs -- participants in the NYU 403(b) plans -- claimed the
university mismanaged the hiring and monitoring of record keepers
for the two defined contribution plans, which resulted in
excessively high fees.

The plaintiffs allege the university failed to properly manage the
RFP process seeking record keepers, failed to allow RFP respondents
to propose pricing for all plan assets vs. only non-annuity assets,
and had pre-determined that TIAA, which was the university's
annuity assets record keeper, was the preferred record keeper.

The plaintiffs also alleged the university failed to remove the
TIAA Real Estate Account and the CREF Stock Account as investment
options, thereby continuing to allow the plaintiffs to invest in
such funds. Finally, the suit asserted the university used
confusing and inappropriate financial benchmarks to review
performance of the two funds and they objectively underperformed,
resulting in significant losses.

All told, the plaintiffs alleged they suffered more than $358
million in total losses.

U.S. District Judge Katherine B. Forrest in New York wrote in her
final decision that the plaintiffs failed to prove "that the
(university's retirement) committee acted imprudently or that the
plans suffered losses as a result."

"Accordingly, the court finds in favor of NYU on all claims," Ms.
Forrest added.

In response to the decision, university spokesman John Beckman said
via email, "NYU maintained from the time the plaintiffs first
publicized this case that it was baseless, and the judge's finding
supports that."

The suit was filed by the law firm of Schlichter Bogard & Denton.
Since 2016, the law firm has sued many large private university
defined contribution plans, including those of Duke University,
Johns Hopkins University and Yale University.

A representative from the employee group or Schlichter Bogard &
Denton could not be immediately reached for comment. [GN]


NEW YORK: Court Won't Dismiss Inmate's Pregnancy-Bias Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Frank P. Geraci, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of New York denied the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss the case, AMY BIONDOLILLO, Individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. LIVINGSTON
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, et al., Defendants, Case No. 17-CV-6576-FPG
(W.D. N.Y.).

Biondolillo brings the putative class action, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, against Defendants
Livingston Correctional Facility, Tamara Kennedy, and the New York
State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("NYS
DOCCS").

Specifically, the Plaintiff brings the following claims, on behalf
of herself and the putative class: (1) gender discrimination under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), and the
New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL"); (2) pregnancy
discrimination under Title VII, as amended, and the NYSHRL; (3) age
discrimination under the Age Discrimination Employment Act
("ADEA"),and the NYSHRL; (4) pregnancy-related disability
discrimination under the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA"),
as amended, and the NYSHRL; (5) "other forms of discrimination"
under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983; (6) wrongful termination under Title
VII, the ADA, the ADEA, and the NYSHRL; (7) common law intentional
infliction of emotional distress; and (8) common law negligent
hiring, retention, and supervision.

The Plaintiff began employment with Livingston Correctional as a
Registered Nurse in June of 2016.  Livingston Correctional, located
in Sonyea, New York, is owned and operated by NYS DOCCS.

In December of 2016, the Plaintiff learned that she was pregnant.
Thereafter, she had pregnancy-related complications, but remained
adamant that she would continue to perform her duties as scheduled
and to the best of her abilities.  The Plaintiff called Kennedy and
informed her of the pregnancy for the first time.  During that
conversation, she told Kennedy about her pregnancy-related
difficulties and requested to reschedule her upcoming work shift
that evening.

In response, Kennedy denied the Plaintiff's request to reschedule
her shift.  Kennedy also told Plaintiff that, because of
Plaintiff's age, she did not believe Plaintiff was truly pregnant.
The Plaintiff was 42 years old at the time of the incident. Id. at
¶ 4. Due to her hospitalization and pregnancy-related
complications, the Plaintiff could not go to work on the evening of
Dec. 30, 2016.  The Plaintiff was fired as a result.

To redress these claims, the Plaintiff seeks, both individually and
on behalf of the putative class, declaratory and injunctive relief;
front pay; compensatory, nominal, and punitive damages; and
attorneys' fees and costs.

On Oct. 5, 2017, the Defendant moved to dismiss the case for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  On Nov.
6, 2017, the Plaintiff responded in opposition to that motion.  Per
the Court's Text Scheduling Order, the Defendants had 15 days from
the date of the Plaintiff's response to file a reply.  The
Defendants did not reply or request more time to do so.

The Defendants have attached as "Exhibit A" to their Motion a copy
of an email, dated Dec. 22, 2016, sent from the Plaintiff to
Kennedy, and a signed declaration from their attorney, which
certifies that "Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of
Biondolillio's Email to Kennedy.  Relying on the Email, the
Defendants assert that it clearly shows that the Plaintiff
voluntarily resigned, and that her resignation had nothing to do
with any allegation of discrimination on Dec. 30, 2016, and that
the Plaintiff's resignation before her alleged termination is
"fatal" to her Complaint.

In response, the Plaintiff argues that the Defendants' entire
opposition is premised on a single piece of extrinsic evidence that
is unequivocally inadmissible at the motion to dismiss stage, and
that this email is plainly outside the four corners of the
Complaint and, as such, should be disregarded and the Defendants'
motion should be denied.

Judge Geraci agrees with the Plaintiff that the Email should not be
considered at this time.  First, there is no indication that the
Plaintiff relied on the Email in drafting her Complaint.  Second,
the Email's content is ambiguous.  Whether the effect of the Email
was that the Plaintiff would be discontinuing work altogether or
merely reducing her hours, as the Plaintiff contends, is unclear.
Accordingly, the Judge finds that the Email is not integral to the
Complaint and review of the Defendants' Motion is constrained to
the facts alleged on the face of the Plaintiff's Complaint.

Because the Defendants' only argument for dismissal is premised on
the Court considering the Email, and he has determined that the
Email may not properly be considered at this stage, Judge Geraci
denied the Defendant's Motion.

The Defendants indicate that there are various other defenses to
the case, of which they preserve to raise at a later date if the
matter goes beyond the present motion to dismiss.  In a footnote,
they state that these defenses include but are not limited to
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
sovereign immunity, lack of personal involvement, claim/issue
preclusion, statute of limitations, and failure to exhaust.  The
Defendants do not request that the Court considers these defenses
at this juncture and, by listing them in a footnote, they do not
obligate the Court to do so.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 3, 2018 Decision and Order is
available at https://is.gd/MsLl8Z from Leagle.com.

Amy Biondolillo, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Chantal Khalil --
ckhalil@fbfglaw.com -- Finkelstein Blankinship Frei-Pearson &
Garber LLP & Jeremiah Frei-Pearson -- jfrei-pearson@fbfglaw.com --
Finkelstein Blankinship Frei-Pearson & Garber LLP.

Livingston Correctional Facility, Tamara Kennedy & New York State
Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, Defendants,
represented by J. Richard Benitez, NYS Attorney General's Office
Department of Law.


OCWEN LOAN: Court Narrows Claims in K. Henry's WVCCPA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of West
Virginia, Huntington Division, granted in part and denied in part
Defendant Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC's Motion to Dismiss in the case
captioned KIMBERLY HENRY, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC,
Defendant, Civil Action No. 3:17-1789. (S.D.W.V.)

The Plaintiff alleged that her house was destroyed by a fire in May
of 2014. Despite the house being a complete loss with no change in
equity, the Plaintiff claimed that the Defendant, who held a
mortgage on her house, refused to give her insurance company a
payoff quote until it received a property appraisal. The Plaintiff
filed this action, alleging violations of the West Virginia
Consumer Credit and Protection Act (WVCCPA) (Count I), Outrage
(Count II), Common Law Invasion of Privacy (Count III), Failure to
Investigate (Count IV), and Conversion (Count V).

The Court denies the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count One,
denies the Defendant's Motion to Disburse Funds to Plaintiff and
directs the Clerk of this Court to return those funds to the
Defendant, with any interest accrued on those funds. With respect
to the Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings the Court
denies the motion as to Counts I, III, IV, V, and the second and
third allegations in Count II. The Court grants the Defendant's
motion with respect to the first allegation in Count II and Count
VI. Having resolved all the substantive issues, the Court finds a
hearing unnecessary and denies the Defendant's Request for Hearing.


A full-text copy of the District Court's June 25, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yd8btpk9 from
Leagle.com.

Kimberly Henry, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher B. Frost --
cfrost@hamiltonburgess.com -- HAMILTON BURGESS YOUNG & POLLARD, Jed
Robert Nolan, MOUNTAIN STATE JUSTICE, INC., Jonathan R. Marshall --
jmarshall@baileyglasser.com -- BAILEY & GLASSER, Patricia M. Kipnis
-- pkipnis@baileyglasser.com -- BAILEY & GLASSER, Ralph C. Young,
HAMILTON BURGESS YOUNG & POLLARD & Steven R. Broadwater, Jr. --
sbroadwater@hamiltonburgess.com -- HAMILTON BURGESS YOUNG &
POLLARD.

Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, Defendant, represented by Jason E.
Manning -- jason.manning@troutman.com -- TROUTMAN SANDERS, John C.
Lynch -- john.lynch@troutmansanders.com -- TROUTMAN SANDERS, Massie
Payne Cooper -- massie.cooper@troutman.com -- TROUTMAN SANDERS &
Michael Christopher Litman -- mike.litman@troutman.com -- TROUTMAN
SANDERS.


OHIO: Faces Class Action Over Interstate 80 Speed Camera Tickets
----------------------------------------------------------------
Danielle Serino, writing for WKYC3, reports that speed cameras have
been a source of fierce debate for years. Now, they're the source
of a Federal class action lawsuit here in Ohio.

The suit is over speeding tickets issued on Interstate 80 to people
who allegedly weren't speeding.

We all know the dangers of driving through a construction zone. In
Youngstown, a driver killed an ODOT worker after pushing him into a
piece equipment.

It's why the speeds limits are reduced.

"I agree with that 110%. I mean, without a doubt, if you're in a
construction zone you should be going whatever the posted limit
is," said John Perfette.

But in January, Mr. Perfette was whacked with a one hundred dollar
ticket for speeding along a stretch of I-80 in Girard near
Youngstown.

"The speed zone was posted at 65 miles an hour and they were
issuing tickets for anybody going over 55," said Mr. Perfette.

While ODOT had been doing construction in the area, it finished in
early December. One 55 mile per hour sign was mistakenly left
behind. So, the tickets from Girard kept coming -- nearly 7,000 of
them.

"[The police] are supposed to know what the speed limit is," said
attorney Marc Dann. "If the Girard police doesn't know what the
speed limit is in their city, then who does?"

It's why Mr. Dann filed a class action lawsuit alleging consumer
fraud and asking for drivers to be reimbursed.

"I don't care if I put up a sign as a prank -- you know, the rival
football team put up a sign saying it was 22 miles an hour -- it
was 65 on those days," Mr. Dann said. "Girard knew or should have
known that, and they decided to charge these people anyway."

The city didn't respond to our requests for an interview but told
our sister station in Youngstown that they were just enforcing the
posted speed limit, and if anyone should be reimbursing drivers, it
should be ODOT.

ODOT says it's not their job to enforce speed limits.

"I initially sent a letter to the Girard Chief of police asking for
a reimbursement and got zero response," Mr. Perfette said.

He added that he went through the appeals process with the company
behind the cameras and was denied, which is why Mr. Dann calls this
just a cash grab.

"This community was so greedy that even when they made a mistake
and collected money they shouldn't get, they didn't give it back,"
said Mr. Dann. "And that's why we had to sue them."

At $104 to $179 dollars a ticket, Mr. Dann estimates that the city
probably brought in about a million dollars. But if drivers don't
pay, and the city sends a collection agency after them,
Mr. Dann plans to sue those companies if he wins the suit, for
violating the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

According to the Act, if you say something false to collect a debt
(like you are guilty of speeding even though you are not) --even if
you didn't know it was false -- you're liable. [GN]


P.F. CHANG'S: Esry Class Certification Bid Granted in Part
----------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled JACQUELINE ESRY, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. P.F. CHANG'S
CHINA BISTRO, INC., d/b/a P.F. CHANG'S CHINA BISTRO, the Defendant,
Case No. 4:18-cv-00156-JLH (E.D. Ark.), the J. Leon Holmes entered
an order on August 13, 2018, granting in part and denying in part
Plaintiff's motion for conditional certification.

Esry proposes that the class would include all persons whom P.F.
Chang's paid as tipped employees at any time since February 23,
2015.  The court noted that, although she does not expressly say
that the class would be nationwide, both she and the defendant have
briefed the motion as though she seeks to represent a nationwide
class.

P.F. Chang's opposes the motion for class certification. It argues
that Esry cannot represent a nationwide class because she has
failed to show that employees in other locations similarly situated
with respect to the issues present. It also argues that she cannot
represent persons other than servers at the P.F. Chang's location
in Little Rock.

On the issue of whether Esry is similarly situated to other
employees, the only evidence that Esry submits is her own
declaration. Esry describes her work and the work of other servers,
but she says nothing about tipped employees other than servers,
such as bartenders. Furthermore, she claims no specific knowledge
about servers in locations other than in Little Rock, except to say
that she was informed by the defendant that the hourly rate of
$2.63 was paid to all servers employed by the defendant.

P.F. Chang's has submitted evidence that there is no company-wide
policy or practice that servers will spend any particular amount of
time or percentage of time on non-tipped work. According to
evidence submitted by P.F. Chang's, the amount of time that tipped
employees spend on non-tipped work varies from location to location
because busier restaurants tend to use more bussers to clear and
set tables and to bring dirty dishes to the kitchen than do the
slower restaurants.

According to the Court, Esry has met the minimal requirements of
representing a collective action for servers at the Little Rock
location. She has not, however, shown that she is similarly
situated to non-servers or servers in other locations.  Esry seeks
to represent a class of employees dating back to February 23, 2015,
three years before the commencement of this action. While the Court
will permit her to seek to represent such a class, the notice
should include "a statement explaining that claims of employees who
have not worked for P.F. Chang's within the past two years may be
time-barred."


PACIFIC COAST: Court Okays Cy Press Award in Welch & Berliner Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Pacific Coast Oil Trust said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 31, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the Court authorized a
distribution of a small amount of funds that had not been
distributed to class members to a charity in the consolidated Welch
& Berliner Class Suit.

On July 1, 2014, Thomas Welch, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, filed a putative class action complaint
in the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, against
the Trust, PCEC, PCEC (GP) LLC, Pacific Coast Energy Holdings LLC,
certain executive officers of PCEC (GP) LLC and others.

The complaint asserts federal securities law claims against the
Trust and other defendants and states that the claims are made on
behalf of a class of investors who purchased or otherwise acquired
Trust securities pursuant or traceable to the registration
statement that became effective on May 2, 2012 and the prospectuses
issued thereto and the registration statement that became effective
purportedly on September 19, 2013 and the prospectuses issued
thereto.

The complaint states that the plaintiff is pursuing negligence and
strict liability claims under the Securities Act and alleges that
both such registration statements contained numerous untrue
statements of material facts and omitted material facts. The
plaintiff seeks class certification, unspecified compensatory
damages, rescission on certain of plaintiff's claims, pre-judgment
and post-judgment interest, attorneys' fees and costs and any other
relief the Court may deem just and proper.

On October 16, 2014, Ralph Berliner, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, filed a second putative class action
complaint in the Superior Court of California, County of Los
Angeles, against the Trust, PCEC, PCEC (GP) LLC, Pacific Coast
Energy Holdings LLC, certain executive officers of PCEC (GP) LLC
and others. The Berliner complaint asserts the same claims and
makes the same allegations, against the same defendants, as are
made in the Welch complaint. In November 2014, the Welch and
Berliner actions were consolidated into a single action.

On December 8, 2015, the parties agreed in principle to settle the
consolidated action. On June 12, 2017, the Court entered a final
judgment in the action approving the settlement in the amount of
$7.6 million. The settlement was paid by PCEC and its insurers and
no amounts were required to be paid by the Trust.

On May 22, 2018 the Court authorized a distribution of a small
amount of funds that had not been distributed to class members to a
charity (a cy pres award). The Court authorization concluded all
remaining matters related to the consolidated action and PCEC
expects no further matters to arise in connection with the
consolidated action.  

The Trust believes that it is fully indemnified by PCEC against any
liability or expense it might incur in connection with the
consolidated action. The approved settlement does not require any
payment from the Trust.

Pacific Coast Oil Trust (the "Trust") is a statutory trust formed
in January 2012 under the Delaware Statutory Trust Act pursuant to
a Trust Agreement (as amended, the "Trust Agreement") among Pacific
Coast Energy Company LP ("PCEC"), as trustor, The Bank of New York
Mellon Trust Company, N.A., as Trustee (the "Trustee"), and
Wilmington Trust, National Association, as Delaware Trustee (the
"Delaware Trustee"). The Trust was created to acquire and hold net
profits and royalty interests in certain oil and natural gas
properties located in California for the benefit of the Trust
unitholders.


PANATTE LLC: Time to File Class Cert Bid in D. Aikens' Suit Moved
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DELIA AIKENS, on behalf of herself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. PANATTE, LLC, LAND HOME FINANCIAL
SERVICES, INC., AND MORTGAGE DEFAULT SERVICES, LLC, Defendants,
Case No. 2:17-cv-01519-RSL (W. D. Wash.), Judge Robert S. Lasnik of
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington,
Seattle, extended the deadline for the Plaintiff to file any motion
for class certification to July 20, 2018, with a noting date of
Aug. 24, 2018.

The parties jointly requested to extend class-certification related
deadlines for purposes of their exploring a possible resolution of
the action.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 10, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/Hy7jVD from Leagle.com.

Delia Aikens, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Christopher Wieting --
chris@dclglawyers.com -- DC LAW GROUP NW LLC, Drew Davis --
drew@dclglawyers.com -- DC LAW GROUP NW LLC, Jesse S. Johnson --
jjohnson@gdrlawfirm.com -- GREENWALD DAVIDSON RADBIL PLLC, pro hac
vice, Milena Marie Vill -- milena@dclglawyers.com -- DC LAW GROUP &
Mathew J. Cunanan -- matthew@dclglawyers.com -- DC LAW GROUP NW
LLC.

Land Home Financial Services, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Michael Y. Kieval -- kieval@thewbkfirm.com -- WEINER BRODSKY KIDER
PC, pro hac vice & Andrea Delgadillo Ostrovsky --
andreao@calfoeakes.com -- CALFO EAKES & OSTROVSKY PLLC.

Mortgage Default Services, LLC, Defendant, represented by Bruce
John Blohowiak & J. Scott Miller, MILLER DEVLIN & MCLEAN.


PINDUODUO INC: Sued for Selling Fakes, Knockoffs Over Platform
--------------------------------------------------------------
Cyrus Lee, writing for ZDNet, reports that Pinduoduo, the
third-largest ecommerce website in China after Alibaba and JD.com,
is facing class-action lawsuits in the US following recent media
reports that it has been selling fakes and knock-offs over the
platform resulted in share tumbles.

Six law firms, including Rosen Law Firm, Pomerantz LLP, Law Offices
of Howard G. Smith, Faruqi & Faruqi LLP, The Schall Law Firm, and
Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman LLC, are looking to file class-action
lawsuits on behalf of individual investors who bought Pinduoduo
shares, according to a Sina news report on Aug. 4.

Pinduoduo has faced a flood of media reports in China since its
initial public offering (IPO) in New York claiming that the
platform has been actively selling low-price knock-offs with a high
resemblance to brand names of well-known products.

Law Offices of Howard G. Smith said on its website that it believes
Pinduoduo and certain executives violated federal law, which
specifically misled investors regarding its financial condition.
Pomerantz LLP said it's investigating concerns whether Pinduoduo
and its officers and/or directors have engaged in securities fraud
or other unlawful business practices.

"If you invested in Pinduoduo stock or options and would like to
discuss your legal rights, please fill out the form below. There is
no cost or obligation to you," Faruqi & Faruqi LLP said on its
website, adding that it is investigating potential claims against
Pinduoduo without elaborating.

A number of diaper products branded like "Pampois" and "Parmepas"
were sold on Pinduoduo and received warm responses from consumers
due to low prices. Pampers, the diaper brand owned by P&G, told
Chinese media that it has always maintained a zero tolerance
attitude towards the production or sale of goods that infringes IP
rights. The company will investigate the legal liability of
responsible persons, including both producers and sellers, it
added.

China's top market watchdog, the State Administration for Market
Regulation, announced that it is initiating an investigation on
Pinduoduo into its sale of counterfeit products and items that
infringe copyright.

Pinduoduo counter-attacked by saying it was under malicious attacks
following a slew of negative media reports.

The three-year-old Chinese ecommerce platform earned a $33 billion
market valuation after its stock surged more than 40 percent on its
trading debut on the Nasdaq on July 26. Pinduoduo's stock closed at
$19.07 in New York on Aug. 3, down over 30 percent since its peak
of $27.54 on the first day of trading, which is close to the $19
per share IPO price.

Founded in September 2015 by a former Google software engineer
Colin Huang, Pinduoduo's gross merchandise volume (GMV) reached
141.2 billion yuan and 66.2 billion in 2017 and the first quarter
of 2018, respectively, during which its total orders were also
registered at 4.3 billion and 1.8 billion.

For the 12 months ended March 31, active buyers on Pinduoduo
reached 295 million, while monthly active users were 103 million.
Active merchandisers also exceeded 1 million during the same
period, according to the company. [GN]


PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Appeals Decision in "Sprayberry" to 9th Cir.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, filed an appeal from
a court ruling in the lawsuit titled Trisha Sprayberry v. Portfolio
Recovery Associates, LLC, Case No. 3:17-cv-00112-SB, in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Oregon, Portland.

The nature of suit is stated as consumer credit.

The appellate case is captioned as Trisha Sprayberry v. Portfolio
Recovery Associates, LLC, Case No. 18-35689, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by September 17, 2018;

   -- Transcript is due on October 16, 2018;

   -- Appellant Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC's opening
      brief is due on November 26, 2018;

   -- Appellee Trisha Sprayberry answering brief is due on
      December 26, 2018; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee TRISHA SPRAYBERRY, on behalf of herself and
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Kelly D. Jones, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF KELLY D. JONES
          819 SE Morrison Street, Suite 255
          Portland, OR 97214
          Telephone: (503) 847-4329
          E-mail: kellydonovanjones@gmail.com

               - and -

          Bret Knewtson, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF BRET KNEWTSON
          3000 NE Stucki Avenue, Suite 230-M
          Hillsboro, OR 97124
          Telephone: (503) 846-1160
          E-mail: bknewtson@yahoo.com

Defendant-Appellant PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC, is
represented by:

          Christopher E. Hawk, Esq.
          GORDON & REES LLP
          121 SW Morrison Street
          Portland, OR 97204
          Telephone: (503) 222-1075
          E-mail: chawk@gordonrees.com


PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Ct. Won't Review Summary Ruling in FDCPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Defendant Portfolio
Recovery Associates, LLC, pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1 seeking
reconsideration of the Order and Opinion which denied in part its
motion for summary judgment in the case captioned BRACHA POLLAK and
DAVID BENELI, Plaintiffs, v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC and
JOHN DOES 1-25, Defendants, Civil Action No. 15-4025-BRM-DEA
(D.N.J.).

Pollak filed a putative class action on behalf of herself and all
U.S. Bank debtors residing in New Jersey who received LL1 Letters,
alleging PRA violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA).

PRA argues this Court committed two errors in its partial denial of
PRA's Motion for Summary Judgment. First, PRA argues the Court's
finding that PRA did not intend to and was not authorized to file a
lawsuit at the time it sent the LL1 Letter' is manifest error.
Second, PRA argues the Court erred in holding, that the safe harbor
language we are not obligated to renew this offer was contradicted
by references to possible litigation.

PRA contends the Court's finding that PRA intended to mail a LL2
Letter prior to commencing the lawsuit and that PRA never intended
to file suit at the time it mailed the LL1 Letter is factually
unsound because the Court overlooked facts or law suggesting
otherwise. Such argument is not a valid basis for a motion for
reconsideration. The term overlooked in Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) has
been consistently interpreted as referring only to facts and legal
arguments that might have reasonably resulted in a different
conclusion had they been considered. The Court did not overlook the
facts or arguments enumerated in PRA's reconsideration brief.

In fact, PRA raised the same arguments in its Motion for Summary
Judgment. Mere disagreement with the Court's findings based on the
facts does not suffice to show that the Court overlooked facts or
controlling law.

PRA argues the Court's finding that the safe harbor language we are
not obligated to renew this offer was contradicted by references to
possible litigation is equally infirm.

In essence, PRA is attempting to relitigate the issues previously
decided in the January 17, 2018 Opinion. This is not a valid basis
for a motion for reconsideration. Again, because PRA does not
assert: (1) there has been an intervening change in the controlling
law; (2) there is new evidence available that was not available
when the Court granted Defendants motions for summary judgment,
which would have dictated a different ruling; or (3) the January
17, 2018 Opinion contains a clear error of law or fact,
reconsideration as to this issue is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 25, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y9c6r3us from Leagle.com.

BRACHA POLLAK, Plaintiff, represented by ARI HILLEL MARCUS, MARCUS
ZELMAN LLC &YITZCHAK ZELMAN, Marcus Zelman, LLC.

DAVID BENELI, Plaintiff Consolidated, represented by YITZCHAK
ZELMAN, Marcus Zelman, LLC.
PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC, Defendant, represented by
AMANDA LYN GENOVESE -- amanda.genovese@troutman.com -- TROUTMAN
SANDERS LLP.


PROCTER & GAMBLE: DACA Worker Files Job Discrimination Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Alexia Fernandez Campbell, writing for Vox, reports that Daniel
Marques would probably be working as a financial adviser for a big
investment firm in New Jersey right now.

David Rodriguez might have landed an internship with Procter &
Gamble in Miami.

Sandy Vasquez might be an engineering intern in Silicon Valley.

Ruben Juarez might have snagged a finance internship in
Connecticut.

All four of them went to college and graduated with honors. And all
four of them say they were denied jobs, even though they had valid
work permits because they are part of the Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals program, known as DACA.

The Obama-era program began in 2012 and offers temporary work
authorization and deportation relief to qualified undocumented
immigrants under the age of 38 who grew up in the United States. In
January and February, two federal courts ordered the Department of
Homeland Security to continue renewing work permits for DACA
holders after President Donald Trump tried to end the program in
2017.

As the legal battle over DACA continues to wind its way through the
courts, a related legal battle is on the rise. DACA immigrants are
suing US employers for denying them jobs because they aren't
citizens. Despite presenting valid work permits from US Citizenship
and Immigration Services, recruiters at several large corporations
told them they only hire US citizens or immigrants with green
cards. Some said they only hire employees whose work permits don't
expire (DACA must be renewed every two years).

DACA workers say these actions are a form of citizenship
discrimination prohibited under the Civil Rights Act of 1866. At
least four DACA workers who were denied jobs in New York, New
Jersey, Florida, and California are suing the companies that turned
them away using that argument.

The outcome of these class-action lawsuits has huge implications
for American companies, and for the estimated 700,000 immigrants
with DACA status who are living in the United States. A verdict in
favor of the workers could force businesses to change the way they
treat job candidates enrolled in DACA, giving them the same chance
to land a job as anyone else. It would also open the door to other
groups of authorized workers who are affected by some of these
hiring restrictions: refugees, asylum holders, and victims of human
trafficking.

Federal courts say DACA workers are now a protected class
So far, DACA workers seem to have a good chance of winning. In
April, a federal judge in Florida ruled that DACA recipients are a
protected class, and allowed the lawsuit to proceed. A federal
judge in New York came to the same conclusion in the first DACA
lawsuit filed in 2014. That case was eventually settled.

The first DACA worker to file a discrimination lawsuit was a
25-year-old college graduate from Yonkers, New York. It was 2014,
and Ruben Juarez had just graduated with an undergraduate degree in
accounting. He recently had been accepted to Fordham University to
pursue a master's degree in global finance.

But a year earlier, Mr. Juarez was denied a paid internship at the
largest life insurance firm in the United States because of his
DACA status. A recruiter for Northwestern Mutual had contacted
Juarez about the internship in 2013 after receiving his resume. He
was invited to the company's offices in Connecticut with 50 other
students for an informational interview, and was later called back
for an individual meeting. After the interview, the recruiter asked
Mr. Juarez for his work papers, and he gave her his Social Security
number. Then she asked if he was a US citizen or if he had a green
card. He said he had an employment authorization document through
DACA.

Later, in an email, the recruiter told Mr. Juarez that he needed
"to be a US citizen or hold a green card" to get the internship. So
he didn't get it.

Northwestern Mutual had this policy in writing on its website,
saying that job seekers and interns needed to have US citizenship,
a green card, or a student visa. That means the company wouldn't
hire some refugees, asylum holders, and other workers, including
DACA recipients, who have other types of work permits. Lawyers for
Northwestern Mutual and other companies said that the policy had
nothing to do with a job candidate's citizenship status -- that
it's not illegal to refuse to hire someone based on their type of
work authorization.

Mr.  Juarez argued that the hiring practices violated his equal
rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1866. In his 2015 class-action
complaint, his lawyers zeroed in on the equal rights clause, known
as section 1981, which says "all persons within the jurisdiction of
the United States shall have the same right in every State and
Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by
white citizens."

The law was originally intended to ban discrimination against black
Americans and Chinese immigrants, but courts have since also
interpreted the "equal protection" clause to prohibit
discrimination based on someone's citizenship.

In Mr.  Juarez's case, lawyers for Northwestern Mutual said they
weren't discriminating against noncitizens because they hire
immigrants with green cards.

But Katherine Forrest, a federal district judge in New York,
rejected that argument, saying that a company cannot discriminate
against some authorized immigrants as long as it hires another
group of authorized immigrants.

"The policy alleged in the Complaint -- essentially, 'Legal aliens
without green cards need not apply' -- on its face discriminates
against a subclass of lawfully present aliens,"
Ms. Forrest wrote, denying the company's motion to dismiss the
lawsuit. "The important point is that the alleged policy facially
singles out a protected subclass for adverse treatment."

Northwestern Mutual appealed the denial, and the Second Circuit
Court agreed to review the judge's dismissal order. Eventually, the
company settled with Mr. Juarez. As part of the August 2015
settlement, the company agreed to create a recruitment program for
DACA workers and other immigrants with legal status. They also
agreed to pay up to $7,500 to workers they turned away as part of
the policy.

Fortune 100 companies are facing more DACA lawsuits
The Juarez case was a victory for DACA workers and has paved the
way for others to fight efforts to shut them out of the job market.
The Los Angeles-based Mexican American Legal Defense and
Educational Fund (MALDEF) has filed four similar class-action
lawsuits against Merrill Lynch (owned by Bank of America), Procter
& Gamble, and Allied Wealth Partners. This month, the nonprofit
legal group plans to file a lawsuit against a Silicon Valley cloud
computing firm called VMware, which told a DACA recipient in
January that the company only hires US citizens and immigrants with
green cards.

About 700,000 young immigrants have temporary legal status and work
permits through DACA, and many of them have graduated from college
since the program started in 2012. But as these complaints show,
they still face barriers in launching their careers and joining the
workforce.

It's unclear how many DACA workers have been barred from jobs in
the past six years. Thomas Saenz, president of MALDEF, suspects
that it happens pretty often.

"These are among the five largest and most sophisticated companies
in the country," Mr. Saenz told me, referring to the defendants in
the cases. "You would expect that if they are engaging in this
conduct, then probably much smaller companies who don't have access
to high-powered lawyers must be doing the same."

Mr. Saenz said his group is filing the lawsuits to let companies
know that discriminating against DACA workers is illegal and they
need to change their hiring policies.

In April, DACA workers snagged another small victory. A federal
judge in Miami denied Procter & Gamble's motion to dismiss a
lawsuit filed by David Rodriguez, a 27-year-old graduate from
Florida International University. That means the case has a decent
chance to go to trial, or at the very least gives Rodriguez
leverage in negotiating a settlement.

Mr. Rodriguez had submitted an application for a paid internship
with the company after meeting with recruiters at a job fair on
campus. When Mr. Rodriguez followed up about his application, the
recruiter told him that he couldn't work at the company because
they only hire applicants who "are legally authorized to work with
no restraints on the type, duration, or location of employment."

Mr. Rodriguez filed a class-action lawsuit against the Procter &
Gamble, arguing that the company was discriminating against him.
Judge Kathleen Williams denied the company's effort to dismiss the
case, stating that Mr. Rodriguez had a plausible claim.

In a statement to Vox, a spokesperson for Procter & Gamble denied
that recruiters discriminate against DACA recipients.

"At P&G, we don't discriminate. Period. We fully embrace diversity
and inclusion as do our employees who represent more than 140
different nationalities. In fact, we believe the diversity of our
workforce is a competitive advantage. We strongly deny the
allegations and look forward to defending them in court," wrote
Damon Jones, the company's vice president for global
communications.

Despite the uncertainty over the future of the DACA program, the
development in these civil cases has made one thing quite clear:
DACA recipients have the same rights as American citizens under the
law. [GN]


SOTHEBY'S INC: 9th Cir. Partly Affirms Dismissal of Royalties Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, CHUCK CLOSE; LADDIE JOHN DILL, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.
SOTHEBY'S, INC., a New York corporation, Defendant-Appellee. THE
SAM FRANCIS FOUNDATION; CHUCK CLOSE, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated; LADDIE JOHN DILL, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. CHRISTIE'S, INC., a New York corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
THE SAM FRANCIS FOUNDATION; CHUCK CLOSE, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated; LADDIE JOHN DILL, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. EBAY INC., a Delaware corporation,
Defendant-Appellee, Case Nos. 16-56234, 16-56235, 16-56252 (9th
Cir.), Judge Jay Bybee of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed in part and reverse in part the district court's
order dismissing the actions with prejudice.

The California Resale Royalties Act ("CRRA") grants artists an
unwaivable right to 5% of the proceeds on any resale of their
artwork under specified circumstances.  To that end, the CRRA
requires the seller of the artwork or the seller's agent to
withhold 5% of the resale price and pay it to the artist or, if the
artist cannot be found, to the California Arts Council.  If the
seller or the seller's agent fails to pay the 5% resale royalty,
the artist may bring an action for damages.

The Plaintiffs are artists and their successors in interest seeking
resale royalties under the CRRA from the statute's effective date
of Jan. 1, 1977, to the present.  In 2011, they filed putative
class-action complaints against Sotheby's, Christie's, and eBay,
alleging claims under the CRRA and derivative claims under
California's Unfair Competition Law.  The statute of limitations
for claims under the CRRA is three years after the date of the
relevant sale or one year after discovery of that sale, whichever
is longer.  

The Plaintiffs accordingly sought to represent two classes: (1) a
class of artists or their estates purportedly owed CRRA royalties
on sales that took place within three years of when the actions
were filed; and (2) a class of artists or their estates purportedly
owed CRRA royalties on sales that were never disclosed to the
artists and that took place more than three years before the
actions were filed -- all the way back to the CRRA's effective date
of Jan. 1, 1977.

The district court dismissed the Plaintiffs' complaints with
prejudice, holding that the CRRA's regulation of sales outside
California violated the dormant Commerce Clause and that the
offending portion of the statute was not severable.  On appeal, a
majority of the Court voted to initially hear the case en banc.
Sitting en banc, it agreed with the district court that the CRRA's
regulation of out-of-state sales violated the dormant Commerce
Clause but held that the offending provision was severable from the
remainder of the statute, such that the Plaintiffs still had
potentially viable claims respecting in-state sales.  It remanded
to the three-judge panel to consider defendants' alternative
arguments, including preemption.  The panel, in turn, remanded to
the district court for it to consider the Defendants' alternative
arguments in the first instance.

On remand, the Defendants again moved to dismiss, arguing that (1)
the CRRA is preempted; (2) the CRRA effects an unconstitutional
taking; and (3) eBay is not a seller or a seller's agent subject to
the CRRA.  In 2016, the district court granted the Defendants'
motions and dismissed the actions with prejudice, holding that the
CRRA was preempted by federal copyright law, as a matter of both
conflict and express preemption.

With respect to conflict preemption, the district court reasoned
that the first sale doctrine, codified in the 1909 Copyright Act
and reaffirmed in the 1976 Copyright Act, provides that once the
copyright owner places a copyrighted item in the stream of commerce
by selling it, he has exhausted his exclusive statutory right to
control its distribution.  In the alternative, the district court
addressed express preemption, holding that the CRRA does no more
than broaden the distribution rights granted under the Copyright
Act and is thus expressly preempted by the 1976 Act.

The issue in the case is whether the Plaintiffs' claims are
preempted by federal copyright law.  The district court held that
they are, as a matter of both express and conflict preemption.

Judge Bybee affirmed in part and reversed in part.  The Plaintiffs'
CRRA claims covered by the 1976 Copyright Act -- i.e., those
concerning sales postdating the 1976 Act's effective date of Jan.
1, 1978 - are expressly preempted by 17 U.S.C. Section 301(a).  He
therefore affirmed dismissal of those claims.

The 1909 Copyright Act, however, has no express preemption
provision.  As such, the Plaintiffs' CRRA claims covered only by
the 1909 Act -- i.e., those concerning sales that occurred between
the CRRA's effective date of Jan. 1, 1977, and the 1976 Act's
effective date of Jan. 1, 1978 -- cannot be expressly preempted.
Nor are they preempted by conflict preemption.  Accordingly, the
Judge reversed dismissal of those claims and remanded them to the
district court for further proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 6, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/I4oAck from Leagle.com.

Michael A. Bowse -- mbowse@bgrfirm.com -- (argued), Ira Bibbero --
ibibbero@bgrfirm.com -- and Eric M. George --
egeorge@bgrfirm.com -- Browne George Ross LLP, Los Angeles,
California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Angela Dunning -- adunning@cooley.com -- (argued) and John C. Dwyer
-- dwyerjc@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP, Palo Alto, California, for
Defendant-Appellee eBay Inc.

Deanne E. Maynard -- dmaynard@mofo.com -- (argued), Morrison &
Foerster LLP, Washington, D.C.; Paul T. Friedman --
pfriedman@mofo.com -- Morrison & Foerster LLP, San Francisco,
California; Howard B. Comet -- howard.comet@retired.weil.com -- and
Steven A. Reiss -- steven.reiss@weil.com -- Weil Gotshal & Manges
LLP, New York, New York; for Defendant-Appellee Sotheby's Inc.

Adam K. Lloyd -- adam.lloyd@skadden.com -- Matthew E. Delgado,
Hillary A. Hamilton -- hillary.hamilton@skadden.com -- and Jason D.
Russell -- jason.russell@skadden.com -- Meagher & Flom LLP, Los
Angeles, California, for Defendant-Appellee Christie's Inc.

Steven A. Hirsch -- shirsch@keker.com -- Keker Van Nest & Peters
LLP, San Francisco California; John J. Davis Jr., McCracken
Stemerman, San Francisco, California; for Amici Curiae California
Lawyers for the Arts and Peter Alexander.


STERN & EISENBERG: Limited Discovery in FDCPA Suit Ordered
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DEBORAH HILTON, Plaintiff, v. STERN & EISENBERG, P.C.
and STERN & EISENBERG SOUTHERN, P.C., Defendants, Case No.
1:17cv852 (M.D. N.C.), Judge Thomas D. Schroeder of the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina granted
Hilton's request for limited jurisdictional discovery.

In December of 2015, Hilton received a debt collection letter,
commonly known as a dunning letter, bearing the letterhead of both
SEPC and Stern & Eisenberg Southern, P.C. ("Southern") and which
allegedly included a "trap" in violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA").  Hilton never received, in any
communication, notice that she must make a written request to the
creditor in order to receive verification of the debt.

On September 22, 2017, Hilton filed the action against SEPC and
Southern.  SEPC moved to dismiss Hilton's claims against it for a
lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(2).  Southern did not oppose the motion to dismiss
and provided affidavits in support of a lack of personal
jurisdiction over its co-Defendant.

Hilton, contends that SEPC is subject to the Court's personal
jurisdiction.  Alternatively, she urges the Court to either deny
SEPC's motion in anticipation of her demonstrating jurisdiction at
trial or permit her to conduct limited jurisdictional discovery to
demonstrate jurisdiction.

SEPC opposes a finding of personal jurisdiction over it on the
grounds that it does not have a systematic and continuous presence
in North Carolina and, further, the letter was sent by a separate
legal entity that was not authorized to use the letterhead.

Judge Schroeder holds that Hilton has not presented sufficient
evidence to make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction.
SEPC is not headquartered or incorporated in North Carolina, and
there is no undisputed fact that would otherwise indicate that SEPC
is "at home" in North Carolina and subject to general jurisdiction.
Further, the conditions of specific jurisdiction are factually
disputed.  Hilton points out that "single or occasional acts," like
sending or authorizing the sending of a letter, can subject a party
to specific jurisdiction.  However, SEPC claims that Southern's use
of the letterhead was unauthorized and that SEPC cannot be subject
to personal jurisdiction through the actions of a third party.  If
SEPC did not authorize use of its letterhead, it is unlikely that
it had intentional contact with North Carolina such that it would
be fair to hale it into Court.

The Judge concludes that Hilton has provided sufficient evidence
which, if believed, would cast doubt on the Defendants' assertions
that Southern was not authorized to use the SEPC letterhead in this
case and that SEPC does not maintain a presence in the state.  On a
collective basis, Hilton's proffer provides a basis for personal
jurisdiction that is more than a "bare allegation."  Thus, he will
grant Hilton's request for limited jurisdictional discovery, and
SEPC may renew its motion to dismiss upon completion of the limited
discovery.

For the reasons stated, Judge Schroeder granted Hilton's request
for limited jurisdictional discovery regarding Defendant SEPC.  The
parties promptly will meet and confer in an attempt to devise a
90-day plan for discovery regarding the Court's personal
jurisdiction over SEPC.  On July 16, 2018, the parties will file a
joint report setting forth their shared and/or differing views
regarding such a discovery plan.  If the parties do not agree about
all of the material elements of the discovery plan, counsel for the
parties will appear for a hearing on the matter at 4:00 p.m. on
July 17, 2018, in Courtroom 1A of the L. Richardson Preyer United
States Courthouse in Greensboro, North Carolina.  SEPC's motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is denied without
prejudice to it being renewed following completion of Hilton's
discovery.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 6, 2018 Memorandum Order is
available at https://is.gd/5gbylB from Leagle.com.

DEBORAH HILTON, Plaintiff, represented by CRAIG M. SHAPIRO, LAW
OFFICES OF JOHN T. ORCUTT, P.C.

STEM & EISENBERG, P.C. & STEM & EISENBERG SOUTHERN, P.C.,
Defendants, represented by CHRISTOPHER J. DERRENBACHER, PATTERSON
DILTHEY, LLP.


TABLEAU SOFTWARE: Court Tosses Motion to Dismiss Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
Shareholder rights law firm Robbins Arroyo LLP is investigating
whether certain officers and directors of Tableau Software, Inc.
(NYSE: DATA) breached their fiduciary duties to shareholders.
Purchasers of Tableau filed a securities class action complaint
against the company's officers and directors for alleged violations
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 between February 5, 2015 and
February 4, 2016. According to the complaint, Tableau downplayed
competitive threats until February 4, 2016, when the company
revealed that it expected the company's 2016 first quarter revenue
growth rate to decline approximately 25% on a year-over-year basis,
finally signaling to the market the true adverse effect of
Tableau's competitors on the business. On July 2, 2018, U.S.
District Judge John G. Koeltl ordered that defendants' motion to
dismiss plaintiff's second amended complaint be closed, paving the
way for litigation to proceed.

View this press release on the firm's Shareholder Rights Blog:
https://www.robbinsarroyo.com/tableau-software-july-2018/

Tableau Shareholders Have Legal Options

Concerned shareholders who would like more information about their
rights and potential remedies can contact attorney Leonid Kandinov
at (800) 350-6003, LKandinov@robbinsarroyo.com, or via the
shareholder information form on the firm's website.

Robbins Arroyo LLP -- http://www.robbinsarroyo.com-- is a
nationally recognized leader in shareholder rights law. The firm
represents individual and institutional investors in sha reholder
derivative and securities class action lawsuits, and has helped its
clients realize more than $1 billion of value for themselves and
the companies in which they have invested. [GN]


TE CACHE: Class Action Mulled Over Delayed Wedding Photos, Videos
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CBSNewYork reports that several Tri-State couples who spent big
bucks to capture all the magical moments of their wedding say they
haven't gotten what they paid for months, even years, after their
big day.

Christina Bengal's wedding was the best day of her life, but to
this day it still manages to haunt her.

"I'm devastated, honestly this is devastating because this is
somebody we trusted with the most important day of our lives," said
Ms. Bengal.

The 42-year-old says she paid nearly $5,500 upfront to Te Cache
Photography last year.

"We spent a lot of time trying to find the perfect photographer,"
said Ms. Bengal.

She's gotten the video she was expecting, but says she hasn't seen
one picture despite her contract with company owner Fatima Avila
which promised to send everything in roughly six months.

"I received an email that she had personal problems . . . a year
has gone by and I've seen nothing," said Ms. Bengal. "I just want
memories."

Michael Kapstan of Suffern says he also paid $7,500 for his 2016
wedding. In return, she says she only got a USB flash driver with
photos, but nothing else agreed to in their contract.

"It's a betrayal, we let her in our most important day of our lives
and she just disappeared," said Mr. Kapstan. "I feel like an
idiot."

The Kapstans say they're in touch with many other couples in
similar situations.

"Now that I've talked to other people and hearing stories, it's
heartbreaking," said Ms. Bengal.

Online reviews also show a laundry list of upset clients, unable to
get a hold of the Fishkill-based Avila. She did not wish to be
recorded, but told CBS2 there is an extensive delay because of
personal issues. She added that she worked 27 weddings last year
and out of those, ten couples have what they paid for so far. The
remaining customers would have their wedding photos within the next
month, according to Ms. Avila.

The couples say if they don't get their photos or videos by the end
of this month they plan on working together to file a class action
suit against Ms. Avila. [GN]


TENNESSEE: Court Denies Certification in Inmates' Implant Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Tennessee, Cookeville Division, denied Plaintiffs' Motion to
Certify Class the case captioned CLARA MOLLY GARRETT, CHEYENE PAIGE
MABE, and TONYA GAIL QUALLS, Plaintiffs, v. SHERIFF ODDIE SHOUPE,
DONNA DANIELS, SAM BENNINGFIELD WHITE COUNTY, TN, and ANDREA FOX,
Defendants, No. 2:17-cv-0059 (M.D. Tenn.).

The Plaintiffs claim that Benningfield's Standing Order violated
the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. Specifically, the
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Shoupe and Daniels impermissibly
coerced female inmates to have the implant procedure in exchange
for jail time reduction. They seek monetary damages, injunctive
relief to have the implants removed at no cost, declaratory relief
to declare this practice unconstitutional, punitive damages and
attorneys' fees.

The Plaintiffs ask the Court to certify a class of persons who (1)
were not in custody at the time of the filing of this action, (2)
who received a Nexplanon implant in exchange for the offer of a
thirty-day reduction in jail time, (3) who received the Nexplanon
implant while incarcerated at the White County Jail at any time
during the period beginning October 9, 2016, and ending July 27,
2017.

To certify a class, the Court must be satisfied that Plaintiffs
have met the requirements of both Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 23(a) establishes four
requirements for class certification: (1) the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are
questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of those of the
class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.

Here, the Court will address first the elements of commonality and
typicality, because those issues are dispositive of this motion. To
demonstrate commonality, the Plaintiff must show that class members
have suffered the same injury.

The claims of the representative party must also be typical of the
claims of the class. The representative party must be able to
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class in order
to meet the requirements of Rule 23(a). A plaintiff's claim is
typical if it arises from the same event or practice or course that
gives rise to the claims of other class members or if it is based
on the same legal theory.

Here, the Defendants' liability for unconstitutional actions
depends on the extent of the Defendants' alleged coercion, their
alleged pressure on the Plaintiffs and others to voluntarily get
birth control implants in exchange for credits on their sentences.
There are factual allegations about that alleged coercion.  There
are no allegations that each female inmate was treated the same or
that each female inmate experienced the same alleged coercion in
the same way.  To be sure, common sense dictates otherwise.

The alleged common contention that the Defendants impermissibly
pressured and coerced the Plaintiffs into getting Nexplanon
implants cannot be determined once for all. Indeed, whether the
Defendants' actions were or were not sufficiently coercive to
transform the Plaintiffs' and the potential class members'
voluntary consent into involuntary is uniquely an issue of fact,
which may or may not have constitutional significance here.

What is impermissible coercion will depend upon the particular
circumstances of each alleged encounter with each Plaintiff and
each prospective class member. The Plaintiffs' claims may arise
from the same alleged practice as those of other potential class
members, but whether that practice was such that it
unconstitutionally made the inmate's consent involuntary requires a
look at each particular circumstance.

The Plaintiffs have not satisfied the commonality and typicality
requirements, and the Court cannot certify a class as requested.
Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify a Class will be
denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 25, 2018 Memorandum
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7xbk39y from
Leagle.com.

Clara Molly Garrett, Cheyene Paige Mabe & Tonya Gail Qualls,
Plaintiffs, represented by Andrew R. Tate , Nexus Derechos Humanos
Attorneys, Inc., Dallas S. LePierre, Nexus Derechos Humanos
Attorneys, Inc., Mario B. Williams , Nexus Derechos Humanos
Attorneys, Inc., & William H. Stover, Stover Law Group.

Sheriff Oddie Shoupe, in his individual capacity, Donna Daniels, in
her individual capacity & White County, Tennessee, Defendants,
represented by Michael T. Schmitt -- bmoore@ortalekelley.com --
Ortale, Kelley, Herbert & Crawford.

Andrea Fox, in her official capacity as Director of the White
County Health Department, Defendant, represented by Laura Elizabeth
Miller , Tennessee Attorney General's Office.


TOLL GLOBAL: Court Dismisses C. Marquez's Suit
----------------------------------------------
Judge Otis D. Wright, II, of the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California dismissed with prejudice the case,
CARLOS MARQUEZ, an individual, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. TOLL GLOBAL FORWARDING (USA)
INC., a New York corporation; TGF MANAGEMENT GROUP HOLDCO, INC., a
New Jersey corporation; INSPERITY EXPENSE MANAGEMENT, INC., a Texas
corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
2:18-cv-03054-ODW (ASx) (C.D. Cal.).

Marquez brought the putative class action against the Defendants.
He filed his complaint on Feb. 13, 2018 in Los Angeles Superior
Court.  On April 11, 2018, TGF and Insperity removed the case to
federal court.  On May 18, 2018, the Defendants moved to dismiss
the Plaintiff's case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  On June
28, 2018, the Court granted the Defendants' motion in full.

Accordingly, Judge Wright ordered that Marquez will take nothing by
his complaint against the Defendants.  He dismissed with prejudice
the action in its entirety, as to all the Defendants.  He vacated
all remaining dates and deadlines in the case.  The Clerk of the
Court will close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 3, 2018 Judgment is available
at https://is.gd/tUf9tb from Leagle.com.

Carlos Marquez, an individual and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Kevin Mahoney --
kmahoney@mahoney-law.net -- Mahoney Law Group APC & George Bernard
Singer -- gsinger@mahoney-law.net -- Mahoney Law Group.

Toll Global Forwarding USA Inc., a corporation, Defendant,
represented by Eric E. Hill -- ehill@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw
LLP.

TGF Management Group Holdco, Inc., a corporation & Insperity PEO
Services, L.P., Erroneously Sued As, Defendants, represented by
Eric E. Hill, Seyfarth Shaw LLP & William J. Dritsas --
wdritsas@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP.


TOOTSIE ROLL: Daniel Files Appeal in Junior Mints Suit to 2nd Cir.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Biola Daniel, Abel Duran and Trekeela Perkins filed an
appeal from the District Court's memorandum and order dated August
1, 2018, and the District Court's judgment dated August 2, 2018,
entered in the lawsuit entitled Daniel, et al. v. Tootsie Roll
Industries, LLC, Case No. 17-cv-7541, in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York (New York City).

The appellate case is captioned as Daniel v. Tootsie Roll
Industries, LLC, Case No. 18-2424, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on August 17, 2018, Jorge
Fitz-Gibbon, writing for Lohud, reported that a federal judge said
in court papers on August 1, it doesn't take a genius to figure out
how much candy is in a Junior Mints box.

U.S. District Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald tossed a class-action
lawsuit against the manufacturers of the chocolate-covered mint
candies, saying that a person "of ordinary intelligence" can figure
out how much candy is inside simply by reading the box.

The 44-page ruling was in response to claims by three consumers,
who claimed the packages had too much air, or "slack fill," and not
enough candy.

"We can easily conclude, as a matter of law, that the slack-fill
enclosed in the products would not mislead a reasonable consumer,
as the product boxes provide more than adequate information for a
consumer to determine the amount of product contained therein,"
Buchwald wrote in papers filed in Manhattan federal court.

The lawsuit was initially filed in October by Biola Daniel against
Tootsie Roll Industries, the Chicago-based producer of Junior
Mints.  Daniel claimed that she felt cheated after buying a
3.5-ounce package of candy for $1.49 while at a Duane Reade
pharmacy in Manhattan on Sept. 23.

She said the box "contained approximately 40 percent non-functional
slack fill."

In January, two more consumers -- Abel Duran of Queens and Trekeela
Perkins of Mississippi -- joined in the lawsuit, making similar
claims about the amount of candy contained in Junior Mints packages
they purchased.

The lawsuit claimed that other, comparable candies, such as Milk
Duds and Good & Plenty, contained significantly more candy and less
slack-fill.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants Biola Daniel, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Abel Duran and Trekeela Perkins are
represented by:

          C.K. Lee, Esq.
          LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
          30 East 39th Street
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 465-1188
          Facsimile: (212) 465-1181
          E-mail: cklee@leelitigation.com

Defendant-Appellee Tootsie Roll Industries, LLC, is represented
by:

          David William Haller, Esq.
          COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
          1 CityCenter
          850 10th Street, NW
          Washington, DC 20001
          Telephone: (212) 841-1000
          E-mail: dhaller@cov.com


TOYOTA MOTOR: Campbell Appeals D. Maryland Decision to 4th Cir.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Delphine Campbell filed an appeal from a court ruling in
her lawsuit styled Delphine Campbell v. Toyota Motor Credit
Corporation, Case No. 8:18-cv-00150-PWG, in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Maryland at Greenbelt.

The appellate case is captioned as Delphine Campbell v. Toyota
Motor Credit Corporation, Case No. 18-1951, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant DELPHINE CAMPBELL, on her own behalf and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Cory Lev Zajdel, Esq.
          Z LAW, LLC
          2345 York Road
          Timonium, MD 21093
          Telephone: (443) 213-1977
          E-mail: clz@zlawmaryland.com

Defendant-Appellee TOYOTA MOTOR CREDIT CORPORATION is represented
by:

          Christopher M. Loveland, Esq.
          SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER & HAMPTON, LLP
          2099 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
          Washington, DC 20006
          Telephone: (202) 772-5313
          E-mail: cloveland@sheppardmullin.com


TRI-UNION SEAFOODS: Dismissal of Mislabeling Suit Affirmed
----------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of the case, DONNA DE ROSA, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TRI-UNION
SEAFOODS, LLC, DBA Chicken of the Sea International, a California
corporation; TRI-UNION FROZEN PRODUCTS, INC., DBA Chicken of the
Sea Frozen Products, a Delaware corporation, Defendants-Appellees,
Case No. 16-55211 (9th Cir.).

Tri-Union is a manufacturer and distributor of canned and packaged
seafood that sources its products from Thailand. The Bureau of
International Labor Affairs of the United States Department of
Labor recognizes that fish and shrimp products exported from
Thailand may be the result of forced labor.  Therefore, Tri-Union
supply chain may include child and forced labor, but the company
does not disclose this on its labels.

De Rosa argues that by not labeling its products, Tri-Union misled
purchasers and thereby violated California's consumer protection
laws.  Specifically, De Rosa brings suit under (1) California Civil
Code Sections 1750, et seq., the Consumers Legal Remedies Act
("CLRA"); (2) California's Business & Professions Code Sections
17200, et seq., the Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"); and (3)
California's Business & Professions Code Sections 17500, et seq.,
the False Advertising Law ("FAL").

The district court dismissed all of De Rosa's claims. De Rosa
appeals.

De Rosa argues that Tri-Union had a duty to disclose, on its
labels, the existence of child labor in its supply chain.  But the
Appellate Court finds that the Plaintiff failed to allege that the
existence of child labor in the supply chain affects the chocolate
products' central function.  Therefore, Tri-Union was under no duty
to disclose.

The Court explains that although a claim may be stated under the
CLRA in terms constituting fraudulent omissions, to be actionable,
the omission must be contrary to a representation actually made by
the defendant, or an omission of a fact the defendant was obliged
to disclose.  Therefore, Tri-Union did not violate the CLRA.

The UCL prohibits any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act
or practice.  Because Business & Professions Code Section 17200 is
written in the disjunctive, it establishes three varieties of
unfair competition -- acts or practices which are unlawful, or
unfair, or fraudulent.  The Plaintiff claims that Tri-Union is
liable under all three varieties.  

However, the Court holds that Tri-Union is not liable under the
unlawful prong because De Rosa did not state a claim under the
CLRA.  Likewise, De Rosa cannot state a claim under the fraudulent
prong because Tri-Union did not have a duty to disclose the forced
labor.  Therefore, De Rosa did not state a UCL claim.

Finally, for the purposes of the FAL, whether an advertisement is
misleading is determined by asking whether a reasonable consumer
would likely be deceived.  The Court finds that De Rosa's FAL
claims fail because a failure to disclose a fact one has no
affirmative duty to disclose is not likely to deceive anyone.

For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed
by the Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 10, 2018 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/UXOAM0 from Leagle.com.


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: London Cab Drivers to Pursue Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
Jake Kanter, writing for Business Insider, reports that Uber is
facing a GBP500 million, or $650 million, class-action lawsuit from
some of its most vociferous detractors -- drivers of the iconic
London black cabs.

Thirteen trade unions and London cabbie representatives are coming
together to pursue High Court action against Uber. It's another
headache for CEO Dara Khosrowshahi in London after Uber just came
through a battle to hold on to its operating license in the British
capital.

Organizations including the Licensed Taxi Drivers' Association,
which alone has 11,000 members, claim that Uber has operated
"unlawfully" since launching in London in 2012 and had the
intention of "causing loss to the licensed taxi trade."

Put simply, the lawsuit aims to demonstrate that Uber's arrival has
directly led to a loss of earnings for London black-cab drivers.
The more drivers who join the action, the higher the loss of
earnings.

London Cabbie Group Action, which is coordinating the lawsuit, has
worked with economists to estimate that it could stack up to GBP500
million in lost revenue over the past five years. A previous
estimate put it at double this.

The law firm Mishcon de Reya, which has experience of class-action
lawsuits, or group action as they are known in the UK, will bring
the claim on behalf of the London Cabbie Group Action. Harbour
Litigation Funding is funding the dispute.

Uber declined to comment. It is understood that the company is not
clear what the basis for any legal action would be.

Uber has 40,000 drivers in London. It has agreed to be more
transparent and provide better training for drivers as part of
retaining its license in June.

"We recognize that there needs to be a level playing field between
minicabs and licensed cabs on London streets, but we believe Uber
has operated unlawfully, resulting in a loss of earnings for many
qualified licensed cab drivers," Steve McNamara, the general
secretary of the Licensed Taxi Drivers' Association, said.

Drivers of black cabs have a long history of antipathy toward their
Uber rivals.

Cab drivers have staged blockades in parts of London in protest at
Uber, while the vitriol is often most pronounced on social media,
where cabbies often post images of Uber drivers involved in
crashes.

The below post was retweeted by the Licensed Taxi Drivers'
Association over the weekend, amid claims from London cabbies that
the vehicle involved belonged to an Uber driver. [GN]


UNITED STATES: Crawford County Joins PILT Class Action
------------------------------------------------------
Keith Gushard, writing for The Meadville Tribune, reports that
Crawford County has joined a nationwide class action lawsuit filed
against the federal government in a dispute over payments in lieu
of taxes from 2015 through 2017.

County commissioners voted to join in the class action suit at
their July 28 meeting, but at this time don't know how much money
-- if any at all -- might come to Crawford County.

In December 2017, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims in Washington,
D.C., certified a case Kane County, Utah, filed against the federal
government for underpayments to county governments under the
federal Payments in Lieu of Taxes Act.

It's a federal law which requires reimbursement to county
governments for tax-exempt properties.

Kane County filed suit in 2017 against the federal government after
it had only received 99.7 percent of the money owed it in 2015,
2016 and 2017.

The notice from the U.S. Court of Federal Claims required the
county to join the suit by Sept. 14 or the county would have to
file its own separate lawsuit if it wanted to recover any money.

There are a number of federally owned properties around Crawford
County, including U.S. Army Reserve facilities in West Mead and
Greenwood townships; Woodcock Dam in Woodcock Township; post
offices in Meadville, Titusville and Cambridge Springs; and the
Erie National Wildlife Refuge in Randolph Township, according to
the Crawford County Assessment Office.

Those federally tax-exempt properties have an assessed value of
approximately $4.8 million and based the county's real estate tax
millage of 19.10 mills they would generate approximately $91,680 a
year.

Using a Tribune calculation based on the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims ruling of counties receiving only 99.7 percent of the total
owed, Crawford County could receive approximately $276 additional
for each of the three years. [GN]


UNITED STATES: Judge Denies Bond to 7 Immigrant Parents
-------------------------------------------------------
Nina Shapiro, writing for Seattle Times, reports that when
Guatemalan migrant Nanci Hernandez appeared before an immigration
judge at the Northwest Detention Center in Tacoma -- her kids
thousands of miles away at a Texas facility -- the government had
one week left to meet a court-ordered deadline to reunite families
separated after crossing the border.

With the separations sparking international outrage against
President Donald Trump's "zero-tolerance" policy, judges and
immigration officials were releasing parents on bond, here and
elsewhere, so they could rejoin their children.

But in the Tacoma court that stands out nationally for high bonds,
Judge John Odell had questions. He wanted to know if she had ever
been in the same room as the person offering to put her up in
Georgia, a friend of Hernandez's mother, according to her lawyer,
Malou Chavez of Northwest Immigrant Rights Project (NWIRP). Ms.
Hernandez had not.

Judge Odell determined she was a flight risk, and denied bond.

Ms. Hernandez got out of detention only after being transferred to
Texas. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) released her there
on her own recognizance just in time for the July 26 deadline,
allowing her to reunite with her 12-year-old daughter and
8-year-old son.

"It's arbitrary," Ms. Chavez said of Judge Odell's decision. "In
other situations, where we show the same evidence, he's granting
bonds."

Six other parents separated from their children were denied bond in
one of three courtrooms in the Tacoma detention center and in a
makeshift courtroom recently set up at the Federal Detention Center
in SeaTac, according to NWIRP.

Lawyers with clients among the roughly 60 migrant parents
transferred here in June say they also have trouble understanding
why some received $2,500 or $3,000 bonds while others had to pay
$15,000 and up before being released.

Most are now elsewhere with their kids, but not all. A judge in
SeaTac denied bond to one father on Aug. 2, according to NWIRP.
Nationwide, hundreds of families remained separated after the court
deadline.

The higher bonds set locally are far above those commonly set in at
least two other places dealing with separated parents, Texas and
Colorado, according to lawyers there. Colorado's judges typically
ordered $1,500 bonds, the minimum, said Brittany Hurley of the
Rocky Mountain Immigrant Advocacy Network.

The discrepancy reinforces a recent analysis showing Tacoma's
immigration court, along with Hartford, Connecticut's, gives out
the highest bonds in the country. The median at those two courts
was $15,000 -- twice as high as the national average.

Syracuse University's nonpartisan TRAC clearinghouse did the
analysis, looking at 39 courts that held at least 50 bond hearings
from Oct. 1 through the end of May.

"I think $10,000 or above is a ridiculous bond amount, especially
considering it has to be paid in full," said Jodi Goodwin, an
immigration lawyer in South Texas, which has seen many of the
separated family cases.

In criminal cases, unlike civil immigration-court proceedings,
those seeking release usually pay only 10 percent to a bail
bondsman, who supplies the full amount. Bail bondsmen don't usually
get involved in immigration court cases, though many migrants
arrive destitute.

"Amazing disparities"
The Tacoma court isn't always more harsh than its counterparts. It
granted bond in 50 percent of cases in the eight-month period
analyzed by TRAC, while some immigrant courts rarely granted bond
at all.

But its bond denials to parents waiting to be reunited with
children surprised several immigration lawyers.

"That a judge would deny bond is shocking and disturbing," said
Kate Lincoln-Goldfinch, an Austin, Texas, attorney.

"One of the injustices of the immigration system is that so much of
the outcome . . . depends on the judge you are assigned," she
added.

While that may also be true in criminal court, some have pointed
out the stakes are sometimes higher in immigration court, where
people can be expelled from the U.S., separated from their families
and sent back to possible persecution in their home countries.

In 2010, three law professors wrote an influential article titled
"Refugee Roulette," which looked at "amazing disparities" in asylum
grant rates even in the same city. Over a seven-year-period, one
Miami judge gave asylum to 5 percent of Colombian applicants, for
example, while another gave asylum to 88 percent.

The differences are not so pronounced within the Tacoma court, but
its overall asylum grant rate of roughly 25 percent is
significantly lower than the 47 percent rate nationwide, according
to a TRAC analysis of fiscal 2012 to 2017. (Seattle's immigration
court, which sees people already released, has a grant rate of 38
percent.)

Judge Odell and other local judges could not be reached for
comment. A regional spokesperson for the Executive Office for
Immigration Review, the branch of the Justice Department that runs
immigration courts, said its judges do not speak to the press.

"Art not a science"

As part of the executive rather than the judicial branch,
immigration courts run very differently than most state and federal
courts. Its judges lack independence and abide by policies set by
the U.S. attorney general -- a structure even the National
Association of Immigration Judges has said raises questions of
conflict-of-interest and due process.

A big factor influencing immigration judges is the position taken
by ICE, said San Francisco Judge Dana Leigh Marks, allowed to speak
to the press in her capacity as president emeritus of the
immigration judges association.

After an arrest, ICE makes an initial bond decision. A court
hearing is essentially an appeal of that decision. If ICE has
refused bond, Marks said, "it seems like a huge step to reduce the
amount to a $1,500 bond."

ICE's practices also vary by location.

"Down here, where I'm at, we're more likely to get a better bond
amount from ICE than we are from immigration judges," said Goodwin,
the south Texas lawyer. "That's not the case in other
jurisdictions."

Most parents separated from their children were caught soon after
crossing the border illegally and were subject to mandatory
detention. But many later convinced immigration officials they had
a "credible fear" of persecution in their home countries, the first
step in an asylum application. At that point, ICE can release them
if it chooses.

Texas ICE officials went back and forth on bond, but as the court
deadline for reunification neared, they generally released parents
on $1,500 or $2,500 bonds, or even on their own recognizance, said
Goodwin and Lincoln-Goldfinch.

An ICE spokesperson said bond decisions are made case by case, and
noted that agency officials in the Seattle area "released several
individuals" after they passed credible-fear interviews.

NWIRP legal director Matt Adams, who has followed the local cases
of migrant parents, says he generally saw ICE denying bonds.

Ms. Hernandez, for instance, had passed a credible-fear interview
and was still being held without bond when she went to court.

The same went for Ibis Obeida Guzman Colindres, a Honduran mom
whose 5-year-old son was taken from her about an hour after being
detained, and for El Salvadoran Blanca Orantes, separated from her
8-year-old son after crossing illegally into the U.S. and
presenting herself as an asylum-seeker at a Customs and Border
Protection station, according to a class-action lawsuit filed by
NWIRP.

A visiting Texas judge handled Ms. Orantes' case, according to Mr.
Adams, who represented the El Salvadoran. He said the judge seemed
skeptical Ms. Orantes had a valid asylum claim, despite her
credible-fear ruling.

Judges typically don't delve deeply into the merits of an asylum
case at bond hearings, said Ashley Tabaddor, president of the
immigration judges association. But they might predict the case's
likelihood of success when considering someone's incentive to show
up for future hearings.

Judges also look at someone's connections to the community, whether
they have a source of income and any criminal record,
Ms. Tabaddor said.

"I tell a lot of people it's an art not a science," she added.

She cautioned against drawing conclusions based on bond averages of
different courts. "There's just no way of comparing apples to
apples," she said. Courts in some areas might have, for example,
more detainees with criminal backgrounds than others.

She said she didn't know whether there was anything distinct about
the population at the Northwest Detention Center.

TRAC, in its analysis of bond variations, said more information is
needed to understand the reasons. But it did look at detainees of
different nationalities to see if that accounted for the variation.
It largely did not.

"What mattered the most," the analysis concluded, "was which court
ruled on their motion." [GN]


UNITED STATES: Must Resolve Own Mess on Family Separations
----------------------------------------------------------
Erin Dunne, writing for Washington Examiner, reports that at the
beginning of the week, on July 30, President Trump took credit for
reuniting families (a problem caused by his administration) saying
in a tweet, "A highly respected Federal judge on Aug. 5 stated that
the 'Trump Administration gets great credit' for reuniting illegal
families."

But Trump's work in bringing families back together is far from
over. In fact, many families are not only still separated, but some
parents have been deported without the government ever making a
record of consent to leave their children behind.

On Aug. 2, however, the administration argued that it isn't
responsible for locating deported parents who were forcibly
separated from their children when entering the U.S. based on a
zero tolerance policy on illegal immigration.

Instead of cleaning up its own mess, the government would like to
pass that burden to the American Civil Liberties Union, which is
representing separated families, the plaintiffs, in a class action
lawsuit.

The DOJ filing reads, "Plaintiffs' counsel should use their
considerable resource and their network of law firms NGO's,
volunteers, and others, together with the information that
defendants have provided (or will soon provide), to establish
contact with possible class members in foreign countries."

Earlier in the week, on Aug. 2, during a hearing with Cmdr.
Jonathan White of the U.S. Public Health Service Commissioned
Corps, the scope of the problem was made clear. According to his
testimony, the parents of more than 500 children separated from
their families are no longer in the U.S.

Making matters worse, the government also seems to have no address
on file for some of the parents they deported, based on court
filings, complicating the already difficult process of tracing down
parents abroad.

From implementing a policy of family separations, to deporting
parents with no documentation of consent to leave their children in
a foreign country, to failing to keep records on where those
parents might be found, the Trump administration has created a
mess.

The onus of bringing families back together, as ordered by a
federal judge, is their burden and their burden alone. Trump and
his administration should be grateful for the offer of the ACLU to
help with that process rather than attempting to shrug off
responsibility.

After all, as both House Speaker Paul Ryan, R-Wis., and Senate
Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., warned, family separations
have proven to be a big issue for the administration. That issue
won't go away unless children are reunited with their parents as
soon as possible. [GN]


UNITED STATES: Says Restraint Chairs Used in Immigrant Teens
------------------------------------------------------------
Josephine B. Yurcaba, writing for Bustle, reports that immigrant
teens held in U.S. detention centers allege in a new class-action
lawsuit that guards restrained them in metal chairs and forced them
to wear "spit masks" over their faces, according to The New York
Times. Immigrant teens claim the restraint chairs were used as a
form of punishment for detainees with behavioral problems.

The teens were held at the Shenandoah Valley Juvenile Center in
Virginia, which holds both Americans and undocumented immigrants
who have "emotional, behavioral, and psychological issues," The
Times reported. Undocumented immigrant teens housed at these
facilities might also have a history of violence or may be believed
to have a gang affiliation.

Bustle has reached out to the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR)
and to the Shenandoah Valley Juvenile Center for comment. Kenneth
J. Wolfe, a spokesman for the Administration for Children and
Families, which oversees ORR, told The Times that they take action
when there are claims of abuse and added:

"Our office also conducts federal monitoring visits and medical
reviews, and takes seriously the responsibility of caring for each
child."

One detainee, identified as R.B. in the lawsuit, was sent to the
Shenandoah Valley Center for "behavioral problems," The Times
reported. He alleges in the lawsuit that guards subjected him to
extreme solitary confinement, which made him so isolated and angry
that he often fought with other inmates. "They locked me in a room
that was 8x10, or maybe 8x16, for 23 hours a day, all by myself,"
he said.

Guards reportedly used mesh spit masks, which cover the entire head
and face, on teens and children whom they suspected would try to
spit on them. And teens claimed in testimony that guards also use a
metal chair chair that restrains detainees with padded straps at
their wrists, ankles, and waists.

In June, a Honduran detainee, who was 15 when he was held at the
facility, described the chair and the mask in his sworn statement,
according to the Associated Press:

"Strapped me down all the way, from your feet all the way to your
chest, you couldn't really move. . . . They have total control over
you. They also put a bag over your head. It has little holes; you
can see through it. But you feel suffocated with the bag on."

A former child-development specialist who worked at the facility
also told the Associated Press that she saw kids there with serious
injuries. And despite President Trump claiming that Border Patrol
agents are "cracking down" on gang members, Kelsey Wong, a program
director at the facility told the Associated Press the children are
not gang members, but have actually developed mental health
problems as a result of trauma they experienced in their home
countries. She told the AP:

"The youth were being screened as gang-involved individuals. And
then when they came into our care, and they were assessed by our
clinical and case management staff . . . they weren't necessarily
identified as gang-involved individuals."

Many of the children and teens also said they were treated much
differently than the white children housed at the facility. The
immigrant detainees claimed they were segregated from white
detainees, whose units reportedly had "plush chairs and video
gaming consoles," the AP reported. Although U.S. children
reportedly had a large recreation yard, some of the Latino children
alleged in statements that they weren't allowed outside for the
duration of their detainment.

Virginia Gov. Ralph Northam announced an investigation into the
Shenandoah facility after the Associated Press initially reported
allegations from detained immigrant teens in June. The
investigation is ongoing, as is the class-action lawsuit. [GN]


VIRGINIA: Court Dismisses C. Bullock's Inmate Discrimination Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, Richmond Division, dismissed the case captioned CHARLIE
BULLOCK, Plaintiff, v. DAVID CUFFLEY, et al., Defendants, Civil
Action No. 3:17CV95-HEH (E.D. Va.).

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) this Court must
dismiss any action filed by a prisoner if the Court determines the
action: (1) is frivolous or (2) fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted.

In his Complaint, Bullock alleges that the named Defendants
discriminated against him and violated his various constitutional
rights during his criminal proceedings.  Among other claims,
Bullock alleges violations of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
Bullock requests that the Court grant him relief of $75,000,000 on
his class action claims and $40,000,000 on his individual claims.

Judges are absolutely immune from suit under Section 1983 for acts
committed within their judicial discretion.

Bullock contends that Judge Jeter-Taylor and Judge Roberts violated
his due process rights. Specifically, Bullock contends that Judge
Roberts held a preliminary hearing without Bullock being present
and that he was convicted in Judge Jeter-Taylor's courtroom and the
victim didn't testify which is a violation of his due process
rights. Bullock alleges that as a result, he was wrongfully
convicted by Judge Taylor.

Bullock fails to allege that Judge Jeter-Taylor and Judge Robert's
conduct falls under either exception to judicial immunity. Bullock
does not allege that their conduct amounted to a non-judicial
action or that any of these Defendants acted in the complete
absence of all jurisdiction. Because Judge Jeter-Taylor and Judge
Roberts are entitled to judicial immunity, Bullock's claims against
them will be dismissed.

In his Complaint, Bullock faults Nickel for prosecuting him despite
the victim not taking the witness stand. Bullock fails to allege,
however, that Nickel's actions were taken outside of his role as
advocate for the Commonwealth. Therefore, Bullock's claims for
damages against Nickel will be dismissed.

Bullock also names as Defendants Kevin Shork, Bullock's privately
retained defense attorney, Brent Jackson, another privately
retained defense attorney,  Johnathan O'Connor, a court-appointed
defense attorney and John Mann, yet another defense attorney.

However, private attorneys and public defenders do not act under
color of state or federal authority when they represent defendants
in criminal proceedings.  Therefore, Bullock's claims against
Defendants Shork, Jackson, O'Connor, and Mann will be dismissed.

The Complaint will be dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 25, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/yb3hp3pv from
Leagle.com.

Charlie Bullock, Plaintiff, pro se.


VOLKSWAGEN: Sept. 1 Diesel Settlement Claims Filing Deadline
------------------------------------------------------------
Owners and lessees of Volkswagen and Audi 2.0-liter diesel vehicles
who have yet to complete a claim in the 2.0-liter class action
settlement have until September 1, 2018 to claim benefits for a
vehicle buyback or an approved emissions modification, along with
thousands of dollars in cash compensation.

In the two years since the Volkswagen "Clean Diesel" 2.0-liter
class action settlement was announced, Volkswagen has compensated
class members an aggregate amount of over $7.75 billion, and more
than 85 percent of the affected 2.0-liter diesel vehicles have been
modified or removed from the road.

The historic class action settlement, which received final approval
from Judge Charles R. Breyer in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California on October 25, 2016,
requires Volkswagen to create a funding pool of up to $10.033
billion for consumer class benefits. These benefits include vehicle
buybacks, lease terminations, and emissions modifications, along
with substantial cash payments.

"We strongly encourage eligible Volkswagen and Audi owners and
lessees who have not yet filed claims to do so immediately," said
Elizabeth Cabraser, Court-appointed Lead Counsel and chair of the
21-member Plaintiffs' Steering Committee, which negotiated the
settlement on behalf of class members. "The benefits under this
historic settlement -- for both consumers and the environment --
are too significant to pass up."

Class members who have not yet completed a claim in the 2.0-liter
Settlement Program are urged to note the following dates:

   * Sept. 1, 2018 -- 2.0-liter Settlement Claims Deadline: Class
members with eligible 2.0-liter vehicles must submit a complete and
accurate claim, including all required documents, by Sept. 1, 2018.
Class members who fail to submit a completed claim with all
required documentation by the Sept. 1, 2018 deadline will be
considered untimely and ineligible for settlement benefits.

   * Dec. 1, 2018 -- Signed Offer Letter Submission: Class members
who receive an offer letter in the 2.0-liter Settlement Program
should sign and return their offer letter to Volkswagen by no later
than Dec. 1, 2018. Class members who return their offer letters
after Dec. 1, 2018 may jeopardize their ability to claim benefits
before the 2.0-liter Settlement Program ends on Dec. 30, 2018.

   * Dec. 30, 2018 -- Deadline to Complete Buyback, Early Lease
Termination, or Approved Emissions Modification: The 2.0-liter
Settlement Program will end on Dec. 30, 2018, and class members who
are eligible for benefits must complete their selected remedy by
that date. Class members who wait until the last days of the
2.0-liter Settlement Program to schedule their closing appointment
may be unable to find an available appointment to receive benefits
from the settlement.

The above deadlines apply only to claims in the 2.0-liter class
action settlement. A separate settlement was reached in January
2017 on behalf of owners and lessees of Volkswagen, Audi, and
Porsche 3.0-Liter diesel vehicles. As of June 2018, Volkswagen has
paid over $861 million to the 3.0-Liter class members as part of
that settlement.

All class members of the Volkswagen "Clean Diesel" Marketing, Sales
Practices, and Products Liability Litigation can visit
www.VWCourtSettlement.com or call 1-844-98-CLAIM to access the
Online Claims Portal and submit a claim. [GN]


WASHINGTON: Freedom Foundation Files Class Action Over Union Fees
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Kris Maher, writing for Wall Street Journal, reports that
public-sector unions are facing steep falls in revenue and trying
to prevent the loss of members in the wake of a recent Supreme
Court ruling.

In New York, Pennsylvania and Illinois, state governments have
stopped collecting millions of dollars in agency fees following a
high court ruling banning the practice. Before the ruling, public
workers in 22 states who didn't want to join a union were often
required to pay agency fees, which cover collective bargaining
costs and can equal as much as 90% of dues paid by members.

Pennsylvania stopped collecting agency fees from 24,000 state
workers that totaled $6.6 million last year, a state official said.
The figure is expected to grow because it doesn't include workers
at municipalities across the state. In New York, which has the
highest rate of public sector union membership, the state stopped
collecting agency fees in July from 31,000 state workers which
totaled between $9 million and $10 million last year, a spokeswoman
for the New York State Comptroller said. That tally is also
expected to grow because it doesn't include local agency fees.

By one estimate, unions in New York state overall will lose $112
million in agency fees from 200,000 state and local workers, based
on what workers paid in 2016, according to the Empire Center, a
conservative think tank in Albany.

These are the first signs of how the high court's decision is
hitting union coffers. The ruling could erode the financial and
political clout of public-sector unions, in part by prompting
unions to divert funds once used for politics to the costs of
running a union. For some unions, agency fees had made up 5% or
more of revenue, and some have trimmed budgets and staff. Unions
had tried to shore up members ahead of the court decision in June.

Jessica Lapp, a 41-year-old fifth-grade teacher in Lancaster, Pa.,
has seen a bump in her pay as Pennsylvania stopped collecting about
$400 a year she paid to the Pennsylvania State Education
Association.

Ms. Lapp, who describes herself as a conservative Republican, earns
about $60,000 a year and says she opposed the politics of the union
and its parent, the National Education Association, which has
consistently backed Democratic candidates. She declined union
membership but was required to pay an agency fee.

"I feel great," said Ms. Lapp. "We're always talking to our kids
about not being a bully and here I was forced to pay something I
was morally opposed to."

David Broderic, a spokesman for PSEA, one of the state's biggest
public-sector unions, said 6,500 teachers had paid agency fees out
of 181,000 teachers in the state covered by union contracts. "We
recognize we're going to take a financial hit, but it is not a
fatal blow by any means," he said.

In its June ruling, the Supreme Court sided with Illinois
child-support worker Mark Janus and said requiring public-sector
employees to pay agency fees is unconstitutional, because
bargaining contracts with state and local governments is inherently
political.

Unions and conservative groups are wrangling over whether the
ruling means workers can immediately resign from a union and stop
paying dues.

Unions say the full union members still need to follow their
membership agreements which often permit members to resign only
during narrow time frames, they say.

Conservative groups point to the court's finding that unions are
obligated to show that workers want to be members and pay dues.
Members shouldn't have to jump through hoops to stop paying dues,
they say.

Mike Stone, a child-support worker in Olympia, Wash., has been
trying to stop paying dues to the Washington Federation of State
Employees since the court's decision in June. The union has denied
his request, he says. The catch is that he signed a union card in
March and didn't notice that he had agreed to pay dues for the next
year.

"It was very small print, and unfortunately I missed that part,"
says Mr. Stone, 35. He said he wants to recover the more than $600
taken out each year from his $44,400 salary.

On Aug. 2, the Freedom Foundation, a conservative group in Olympia,
filed a lawsuit on behalf of Mr. Stone and six other state
workers.

The lawsuit names Gov. Jay Inslee, other state officials, and the
state union as defendants. It seeks class action status.

The union declined to comment on Mr. Stone's case. A spokeswoman
for the governor, who supported the union position in the Supreme
Court case, said the state is complying with ruling and reviewing
the lawsuit.

Sue Henricksen, president of the state union, said hundreds of
workers have joined the union since the Janus ruling, more than
have expressed interest in leaving it.

In late July, professors who were union members at public
universities in Maine and Missouri were permitted by their unions
to resign immediately after attorneys with the Buckeye Institute, a
conservative group in Ohio, sent demand letters to the unions.

The court's ruling "should require unions to demonstrate that all
employees have opted in to paying dues or fees, rather than placing
this serious burden on them to opt out," said Robert Alt, chief
executive of the Buckeye Institute who represented the professors.

The Buckeye Institute sifted through 3,200 state and local union
public-sector contracts in Ohio, and its website lets union members
generate a resignation letter tailored to their union.

Dan McGrath, a 41-year-old social studies teacher in a Philadelphia
suburb, received an email a few hours after the Janus ruling from
the conservative Mackinac Center in Michigan telling him how to
stop paying dues.

"You can tell they're well-funded and well-coordinated," said Mr.
McGrath, who is president of his local union. He said his goal is
to retain all 294 members in his union, including many who signed
cards earlier this year pledging their support. [GN]


WATERSTONE FINANCIAL: 7th Circuit Appeal in Herrington Underway
---------------------------------------------------------------
Waterstone Financial, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 31, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that an appeal is pending
before the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in the case, Herrington
v. Waterstone Mortgage Corporation.

Waterstone Mortgage Corporation is a defendant in a class action
lawsuit that was filed in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Wisconsin and subsequently compelled to
arbitration before the American Arbitration Association. The
plaintiff class alleged that Waterstone Mortgage Corporation
violated certain provisions of the FLSA and failed to pay loan
officers consistent with their employment agreements.

On July 5, 2017, the arbitrator issued a Final Award finding
Waterstone Mortgage Corporation liable for unpaid minimum wages,
overtime, unreimbursed business expenses, and liquidated damages
under the FLSA. On December 8, 2017, the District Court confirmed
the award in large part, and entered a judgment against Waterstone
in the amount of $7,267,919 in damages to Claimants, $3,298,851 in
attorney fees and costs, and a $20,000 incentive fee to Plaintiff
Herrington, plus post-judgment interest.

On February 12, 2018, the District Court awarded post-arbitration
fees and costs of approximately $98,000. The judgment is currently
being appealed by Waterstone to the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, where oral argument was held on May 29, 2018.

If the judgment is upheld in full, the Company has estimated that
the award, which includes attorney's fees, costs, and interest,
could be as high as $11 million. However, Waterstone has meaningful
appellate rights and intends to rigorously defend its interests in
this matter, including arguing for complete reversal on appeal.

Waterstone Financial said, "Although the Company believes there is
a strong basis for appeal, there remains a reasonable possibility
that the Court's judgment will be affirmed in whole or in part,
with the possible range of loss from $0 to $11 million. Given the
pending appeal, we do not believe that the loss is probable at this
time, as that term is used in assessing loss contingencies.
Accordingly, in accordance with the authoritative guidance in the
evaluation of contingencies, the Company has not recorded an
accrual related to this matter."

Waterstone Financial, Inc. operates as a savings and loan company
for WaterStone Bank SSB that provides various financial services to
customers in southeastern Wisconsin. The company operates in two
segments, Community Banking and Mortgage Banking. Waterstone
Financial, Inc. was founded in 2014 and is based in Wauwatosa,
Wisconsin.


WELLS FARGO: ATM Access Fee Litigation Pending in Lower Courts
--------------------------------------------------------------
Wolf Richter, writing for WolfStreet, reports that on Aug. 3, when
no one was supposed to pay attention, Wells Fargo filed its 10-Q
quarterly report with the SEC. It's under "Note 13: Legal Actions,"
which starts on page 122 and drags on for four small-print pages.
"Note 13" contains Wells Fargo's long rap sheet of disclosed
ongoing government investigations and law suits in alphabetical
order. The new item is on page 123:

Various unnamed government agencies -- it didn't disclose how many
agencies or which agencies -- are probing a new matter related to
how the bank does business, this time its use of low-income housing
tax credits (LIHTC), which is a multi-billion-dollar business for
Wells Fargo.

Wells Fargo was exceedingly parsimonious with how much it disclosed
about this "inquiry" by unspecified "federal government agencies":

Federal government agencies have undertaken formal or informal
inquiries or investigations regarding the manner in which the
Company purchased, and negotiated the purchase of, certain federal
low income housing tax credits in connection with the financing of
low income housing developments.

That's all it said about the inquiry. But the numbers are not
inconsequential. As of June 30, the bank carried $10.4 billion in
low-income housing tax credit investments on its books.

"We invest in affordable housing projects that qualify for the
LIHTC, which is designed to promote private development of
low-income housing," it says in the section that discusses these
investments on page 99. And it adds:

"These investments generate a return mostly through realization of
federal tax credit and other tax benefits."

The LIHTC, created under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, hands out
incentives (paid for by taxpayers) to the private sector to fund
the development or rehabilitation of housing aimed at low-income
Americans. "Tax credits" means that Wells Fargo saves this amount
dollar-for-dollar on its income taxes and thus increases by that
amount its after-tax net profit.

Wells Fargo did not say what it was doing in its LIHTC business
that aroused the curiosity and/or ire of "federal government
agencies," but typically with these Wells Fargo revelations, it
starts out small and then snowballs.

So here is my summary of Wells Fargo's rap sheet of ongoing
"matters" under "Note 13: Legal Actions." These are just the
currently active investigations, scandals, and litigation listed in
its 10-Q. The stuff that has been put to bed isn't listed. You will
notice several matters with allegations of retaliation against
"former team members."

"ATM access fee litigation": Class action against Wells Fargo,
Visa, MasterCard, and other banks filed in 2011. It wound its way
to Supreme Court, which in November 2016 returned the case to lower
courts, where it is still dragging on.

"Automobile Lending Matters": This euphemism describes a scandal
that blew into the open in July 2017. Wells Fargo admitted
packaging unneeded "automobile collateral protection insurance"
(CPI) and "guaranteed automobile protection" (GAP) into hundreds of
thousands of auto loans, with customers not even knowing about it.
In many instances, the higher-than-expected payments, when set up
on automatic payment, led to accounts being overdrawn and payments
bouncing, triggering many repossessions.

The bank entered into consent orders with the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB). It has also been subjected "to formal or
informal inquiries, investigations, or examinations from federal
and state government agencies, including a multi-state attorneys
general group that is conducting an investigation into CPI and
GAP." And:

Multiple putative class action cases alleging, among other things,
unfair and deceptive practices relating to these CPI policies, have
been filed against the Company and consolidated into one
multi-district litigation in the United States District Court for
the Central District of California.

A putative class of shareholders also filed a securities fraud
class action against the Company and its executive officers
alleging material misstatements and omissions of CPI-related
information in the Company's public disclosures.

Former team members have also alleged retaliation for raising
concerns regarding automobile lending practices.

Allegations related to the CPI and GAP programs are among the
subjects of shareholder derivative lawsuits pending in federal and
state court in California.

And it's not all out in the open yet: Wells Fargo "anticipates it
may continue to identify and remediate issues related to historical
practices concerning the origination, servicing, and/or collection
of consumer automobile loans."

"Consumer Deposit Account Related Regulatory Investigation": "The
CFPB is conducting an investigation into whether customers were
unduly harmed by the Company's procedures regarding the freezing
(and, in many cases, closing) of consumer deposit accounts after
the Company detected suspected fraudulent activity (by third
parties or account holders) . . ." And this:

A former team member has brought a state court action alleging
retaliation for raising concerns about these procedures."

"Fiduciary and Custody Account Fee Calculations": The
fee-overcharging scandal at Wells Fargo's Wealth and Investment
Management (WIM) blew into the open in March 2018, and is now being
investigated by "federal government agencies." Wells Fargo "has
determined that there have been instances of incorrect fees being
applied to certain assets and accounts, resulting in both
overcharges and undercharges to customers."

"Foreign Exchange Business": The bank overcharged clients on
foreign exchange rates. This scandal blew into the open in November
2017.

Wells Fargo said: "Federal government agencies, including the
United States Department of Justice, are investigating or examining
certain activities in the Company's foreign exchange business," it
says. Wells Fargo has set aside some amounts "to remediate
customers…."

CNBC said: "The malpractice is said to be tied to the bank's
unusual policy, where traders' compensations were tied to how much
revenue they brought in."

"Inadvertent Client Information Disclosure": "In July 2017, the
Company inadvertently provided certain client information in
response to a third-party subpoena issued in a civil litigation . .
."

"Interchange Litigation Plaintiffs": This class action on behalf of
merchants, regarding the fees of Visa and MasterCard transactions,
involves Wachovia, which collapsed and was absorbed by Wells Fargo
during the Financial Crisis. The litigation has by now made its way
to the Supreme Court and back down to lower courts.

"Low Income Housing Tax Credits": The new item – see above.

"Mortgage Bankruptcy Loan Modification Litigation": This class
action dating back to the mortgage crisis alleges that "Wells Fargo
improperly and unilaterally modified the mortgages of borrowers who
were debtors in Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases . . . The amended
complaint asserts claims based on, among other things, alleged
fraud, violations of bankruptcy rules and laws, and unfair and
deceptive trade practices."

"Mortgage Interest Rate Lock Related Regulatory Investigation": In
April 2018, Wells Fargo, in consent orders with the OCC and CFPB,
agreed to pay $1 billion "in civil money penalties to the agencies"
and to remediate its affected customers. The order involves two
items: the above-mentioned auto loans and "fees for mortgage rate
lock extensions requested from September 16, 2013, through February
28, 2017." And among others:

A class action has been filed against Wells Fargo, "alleging
violations of federal and state consumer fraud statutes relating to
mortgage rate lock extension fees." And claims of retaliation:

In addition, former team members have asserted claims, including in
pending litigation, that they were terminated for raising concerns
regarding mortgage interest rate lock extension practices.

"Mortgage Related Regulatory Investigations": This dates back to
the mortgage crisis. Federal and state government agencies,
including the Department of Justice, "have been investigating or
examining" the "origination, underwriting, and securitization of
residential mortgages, including sub-prime mortgages." The new
item: Wells Fargo has agreed to pay $2.09 billion just to resolve
the Department of Justice investigation.

"OFAC Related Investigation": Wells Fargo says that "certain
foreign banks utilized a Wells Fargo software-based solution to
conduct import/export trade-related financing transactions with
countries and entities prohibited by the Office of Foreign Assets
Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury." It
has made "voluntary self-disclosures" to OFAC and is "cooperating"
with the Department of Justice.

"Order of Posting Litigation": This scandal arose because banks
posted the largest debit-card transactions first so that they'd
drain the account. Small transactions that in fact had come before
would then overdraw the account, thus triggering steep account
overdraft fees each time, which further overdrew the account. This
is an insidious trick that has proven to be immensely profitable.

The class-action law suits date back to the Financial Crisis.
Eventually, "Wells Fargo moved to compel arbitration of the claims
of unnamed class members," which the court denied in October 2016,
and the bank appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit. The new item: In May 2018, the court ruled in
Wells Fargo's favor, allowing it to "compel arbitration." But
"Plaintiffs have filed a petition for rehearing to the Eleventh
Circuit."

"RMBS Trustee Litigation":  In November 2014, a group of
institutional investors, including BlackRock, filed a class action
against Wells Fargo in "its capacity as trustee for a number of
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) trusts," alleging
that it "caused losses to investors" due to its, "among other
things, . . . alleged failure to notify and enforce repurchase
obligations of mortgage loan sellers for purported breaches of
representations and warranties, notify investors of alleged events
of default, and abide by appropriate standards of care following
alleged events of default." The situation ballooned and continues
to drag on in the courts.

"Sales Practices Matters": This is the euphemism to describe the
mega-scandal of the so-called fake accounts – or "certain
products or services provided without authorization or consent for
the time period May 1, 2002 to April 20, 2017," as Wells Fargo puts
it.

Just about everyone has been investigating this: the CFPB, the OCC,
the Department of Justice, the SEC, the Department of Labor, state
attorneys general, prosecutors' offices, and Congressional
committees. Wells Fargo has settled with some of them.  State law
whistleblower actions have been filed with the Department of Labor.
Numerous class action and single-plaintiff lawsuits are in the
works, including Sarbanes-Oxley Act complaints, plus one class
action "on behalf of team members who allege that they protested
sales-practice misconduct and/or were terminated for not meeting
sales goals."

"Seminole Tribe Trustee Litigation": More excess-fees litigation.
"The Seminole Tribe of Florida filed a complaint in Florida state
court alleging that Wells Fargo, as trustee, charged excess fees in
connection with the administration of a minor's trust and failed to
invest the assets of the trust prudently . . ."[GN]


[*] AFL, NRL Must Take More Responsibility for Players' Welfare
---------------------------------------------------------------
Sports Radio reports that Sports Minister Bridget McKenzie has
called on major codes like the AFL, NRL and Rugby Australia to take
more responsibility for the welfare of players during and after
their careers.

Her comments come in the wake of mounting pressure for the codes to
act after it was revealed the NFL has paid out $500 million from
its settlement with a class action, a decade ahead of when they
were expected to reach the mark.

"As we move forward, sports are going to have to take far more
responsibility for how they train their athletes, how they care for
their athletes throughout their entire career," Ms McKenzie told
Macquarie Sports Radio's Cam Reddin.

"Sports are a lot more aware of their duty of care than they ever
have been before. But, I'd be watching this space," she said.

Earlier, former NFL player Colin Scotts issued an emotional plea
for sports administrations to take greater action to prevent more
ex-players dying as a result of brain injuries developed after
suffering concussion.

"[Heads of sport] are not sitting here like me getting all these
phone calls from America saying all my mates are dying and going
insane. It's not going away, it's getting worse," Mr. Scotts told
Macquarie Sports Radio on Aug. 4. [GN]


[*] Education Dept's Revision of Obama-Era Rule to Hit Students
---------------------------------------------------------------
Charlotte Mostertz, writing for The Regulatory Review, reports that
the summer of 2018 marks a new phase in the Trump Administration's
attempts to roll back protections for student loan borrowers put in
place under the Obama Administration.

On the eve of the 2016 presidential election, the U.S. Department
of Education issued what is known as the "borrower defense to
repayment" rule. This regulation, which would officially take
effect in July 2017, aimed to assist student borrowers in
determining their eligibility for loan forgiveness under the Higher
Education Act and to prevent predatory institutions from taking
advantage of prospective students.

The Education Department issued its borrower defense rule partly in
response to advocacy efforts on behalf of student borrowers who,
relying on promises of career prospects from some for-profit
universities, took out large loans that they would never be able to
repay. Among other things, the rule required that struggling
educational institutions provide clear "plain-language" warnings
about poor loan repayment outcomes. It also sought to provide
clarity and guidance to student borrowers about how to obtain
relief when educational institutions had misled them about their
chances of finding a job upon graduation.

Immediately following President Donald J. Trump's inauguration,
however, the Education Department reportedly stopped approving
thousands of pending borrower defense claims filed under earlier
regulations. By July 2017, the number of outstanding claims had
apparently climbed to more than 65,000.

Last June, Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos announced that the
Education Department would postpone the effective date of the
Obama-era rule, allowing the Department to undergo a new
notice-and-comment rulemaking to revise the borrower defense
regulations yet again.

Whenever it issues rules -- including those that revise existing
ones -- the Education Department is required by law to use a
bureaucratic process known as negotiated rulemaking. Because
negotiated rulemaking can be time-intensive, the Department claimed
that 2019 would be the earliest a new rule could be issued.

Critics of Ms. DeVos have suggested that she delayed the borrower
defense rule in an effort to aid for-profit institutions. DeVos
claimed that the rule was "muddled."

Democratic attorneys general in eighteen states have sued the
Department over its decision to delay the borrower defense rule,
arguing that the delay notice constituted a "substantive rule" that
should have undergone its own notice-and-comment period in
compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). An agency
spokesperson has characterized the lawsuit as "frivolous." The
Department has argued that it has the power to delay the rule under
the APA, which allows agencies to postpone rules so long as
"justice so requires" while judicial action is pending. Here, the
Department justified its action by pointing to a pending lawsuit
filed by for-profit colleges in California.

A separate lawsuit filed by the attorneys general of Massachusetts,
New York, and Illinois last December alleged that the Education
Department violated the APA by arbitrarily and capriciously
refusing to discharge the student loan payments of borrowers who
attended Corinthian Colleges, a for-profit university accused of
predatory lending. That suit also alleged that the Department
violated the APA for failing to approve thousands of individual
claims for relief and for attempting to collect involuntary
repayments from student borrowers who attended Corinthian, despite
the Department's finding in 2016 that these students had been the
victims of fraud.

Even in the face of these legal challenges, the Trump
Administration has continued to narrow relief options for student
borrowers who signed up for what they claim were predatory loans.

Last month, the Education Department proposed a revision to the
Obama-era rule which would require students to be in default before
they can seek relief through loan forgiveness. The proposed rule
would also bar state attorneys general from filing class action
lawsuits against institutions on behalf of defrauded constituents
by replacing state standards for loan forgiveness with a uniform
federal standard. This proposed federal standard would require
student borrowers to demonstrate that their institution had
intended to deceive them, a more difficult hurdle to clear than
under rules now in place.

Previously, Ms. DeVos has apparently characterized the Obama-era
borrower defense rule as handing out "free money" to any student
borrower who "raised his or her hand" and claimed to have been
defrauded. The Department of Education explains that its proposed
policy change would aim to protect taxpayers -- who fund the relief
program -- from false claims purportedly made by student borrowers
and do a better job of balancing the needs of universities and
borrowers.

The impact of the proposed rulemaking, if adopted, would likely be
far-reaching. Over the course of the first year of the Trump
Administration, the number of student borrowers still awaiting
relief from the Department has reportedly amassed approximately
95,000. By the end of President Trump's first year in office, the
Department had ruled on about 21,500 claims, rejecting 8,600 and
awarding another 12,900 either partial or full relief. [GN]


[*] Investor Class Actions Related to Cryptocurrencies on the Rise
------------------------------------------------------------------
Kevin Scanlan, Esq. -- kscanlan@kramerlevin.com -- of Kramer Levin
Naftalis & Frankel LLP, in an article for JDSupra, reports that
after a surge in popularity and an increased interest from
regulators, virtual currencies -- also known as cryptocurrencies --
have entered into a new phase in their relatively short history,
with an increase in class actions targeting the emerging assets.

The emergence of cryptocurrency class actions comes after the
market witnessed a rapid rise in the number and value of initial
coin offerings (ICOs) in 2017, which prompted financial regulatory
agencies to ramp up their focus on virtual currencies
correspondingly. Most notably, the Chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission previously announced that cryptocurrencies may
be subject to U.S. securities laws -- an announcement that has done
little to dampen the market's enthusiasm for cryptocurrencies --
and has also secured several emergency freezes against fraudulent
ICOs in recent months.

Another emerging cryptocurrency narrative is the launch of several
class actions focused on virtual currencies and their ICOs. Perhaps
the most prominent of these is blockchain project Tezos, which
faces a series of class actions in the wake of its $232 million ICO
in 2017, while other cryptocurrencies such as Ripple are also
facing litigation from investors. Investment advisers involved with
cryptocurrency offerings and other transactions should be aware of
these class actions and monitor their progress as the courts begin
to determine how securities laws will be applied to virtual
currencies.

The first class action against Tezos was filed in California in
October 2017. It named multiple defendants, including founders
Kathleen and Arthur Breitman and Johann Gevers, the head of the
nonprofit Tezos Foundation, alleging they violated U.S. securities
law through the sale of unregistered securities, and also alleged
defendants committed securities fraud and engaged in false
advertising and unfair competition in the form of material
misrepresentations and omissions during the ICO. In April of 2018,
another class action was filed in California. Significantly, both
class actions allege violations of federal and state securities
laws, and seek rescission and compensatory damages, demonstrating
the complex nature of the risk facing cryptocurrencies that run
afoul of investors.

Similarly, fintech startup Ripple Labs Inc. is also facing a slew
of class action complaints after its XRP tokens became the world's
third-largest cryptocurrency. The first class action, filed in the
Superior Court of California, alleged the company violated state
and federal laws by offering unregistered securities to retail
investors. It further alleged that Ripple attempted -- but
ultimately failed -- to bribe digital currency exchanges Coinbase
Inc. and Gemini Trust Co. LLC in order to get them to list XRP.
Although the effort was unsuccessful, plaintiffs argue that Ripple
profited from the price increases that resulted from the rumored
potential listings. At least three class actions have been filed
against Ripple, all arguing the same general allegation that the
company violated securities laws and that XRP has the "hallmarks of
a security."

Tezos and Ripple represent only two of the cryptocurrency companies
currently facing a class action complaint. Although
cryptocurrencies and ICOs still enjoy a high level of popularity,
the increased regulatory activity and class action litigation
demonstrate they are not without risks. Advisers involved in such
products and transactions will be paying close attention as these
cases work their way through the courts. [GN]


[*] Mintz Levin Attorney Discusses Class Arbitrability Issues
-------------------------------------------------------------
Gilbert A. Samberg, Esq. -- GASamberg@mintz.com -- of Mintz, Levin,
Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C., in an article for National
Review, report that who may determine whether "class arbitration"
has been authorized by the parties to an arbitration agreement -- a
court, an arbitrator, either? Considering the nature of "class
arbitration," is this a special case of the arbitrability
delegation issue, or is this issue sui generis? And what does
exploring the issue reveal about the larger question of whether
"class arbitration" is an oxymoron?

The starting point for any analysis concerning arbitration is that
it is a creature of contract. It is what the parties to an
arbitration agreement have agreed it shall be.

It appears that SCOTUS will get to opine during its next term on
whether an arbitration agreement that says nothing about class
arbitration can be interpreted to constitute consent by the parties
to permit class arbitration. See Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, No.
17-988, 2018 WL 398496 (U.S. Apr. 30, 2018). But when will SCOTUS
specify who may decide that question?

May the class arbitrability issue be delegated to an arbitrator by
the parties to an arbitration agreement, or must it always be
decided by a court? In that regard, what is the significance of the
distinguishing factor that, unlike a determination concerning
delegation of an arbitrability issue with respect to a bilateral
arbitration, a determination concerning delegation of the class
arbitrability issue would purport to bind non-parties to (or at
least non-signatories of) the controlling arbitration agreement.
Could it? And if it could not, what are the implications concerning
"class arbitration" generally?

In general, a court presumptively is to decide gateway
arbitrability issues unless the parties to an arbitration agreement
have clearly and unmistakably manifested their intention to
delegate those issues to an arbitrator. E.g., First Options of
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995). And since First
Options, many courts have held that incorporation by reference of
institutional arbitration rules, such as those of the American
Arbitration Association ("AAA"), that provide for the arbitral
panel's authority to decide issues concerning its jurisdiction,
see, e.g., AAA Commercial Arbitration Rule 7, sufficiently
manifests the parties' intention to delegate arbitrability issues.
See, e.g., Belnap v. Iasis Healthcare, 844 F.3d 1272, 1283-84 (10th
Cir. 2017); T.Co Metals v. Dempsey Rpe & Supply, 592 F.3d 329 (2d
Cir. 2010); Qualcomm, inc. v. Nokia Corp., 466 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir.
2006); Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution Co., Ltd., 398 F.3d 205 (2d
Cir. 2005).

The AAA rules in particular also potentially give rise to a unique
situation with respect to the delegation issue as it concerns class
arbitrability. The AAA Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations
(eff. 10/8/03) ("SRCA") apply to "any dispute arising out of [a] an
agreement that provides for arbitration pursuant to any of the
rules of the [AAA] where [b] a party submits a dispute to
arbitration on behalf of or against a class or purported class . .
." SRCA 1(a). And, when applicable, the SRCA authorizes the
arbitrator to interpret the operative arbitration clause for these
purposes:

"Upon appointment, the arbitrator shall determine as a threshold
matter, in a reasoned, partial final award on the construction of
the arbitration clause, whether the applicable arbitration clause
permits the arbitration to proceed on behalf of or against a class
(the 'Clause Construction Award')." SRCA 3.

If incorporation by reference of AAA arbitration rules is
sufficient to manifest clearly and unmistakably the parties'
intention to delegate arbitrability issues to an arbitrator in the
first instance, then that conclusion arguably should obtain as well
regarding the class arbitrability issue if (i) any AAA rules are
adopted in an arbitration agreement, and (ii) one party to that
agreement purports to commence a class arbitration.

Yet, one wonders about the significance of any bilateral agreement
concerning delegation of the class arbitrability issue. First, the
non-signatory non-appearing putative class members arguably would
not be bound by such a delegation, to which they did not and
arguably could not agree. (Indeed, such putative class members
arguably are not bound by the relevant bilateral arbitration
agreement at all. Nor would a signatory of that agreement be
involuntarily contractually bound vis-a-vis such putative class
members.) Moreover, a court adjudicating the delegation issue
arguably would not have personal jurisdiction over such putative
class members.

Generally speaking, the main concern of a court considering an
arbitration agreement "is to faithfully reflect the reasonable
expectations of those who commit themselves to be bound."
Leadertex, Inc. v. Morganton Dyeing & Finishing Corp., 67 F.3d 20,
28 (2d Cir. 1995). A non-signatory has not apparently committed him
or herself to be bound by any aspect of the arbitration agreement
in question, nor has a signatory apparently made any agreement
vis-a-vis a non-signatory. (Nevertheless, an arbitration agreement
may be deemed to bind a party who did not sign it, First Options of
Chicago v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943-46 (1995), by the operation of
regular principles of state law regarding contract, agency,
estoppel, etc., e.g., Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S.Ct.
1896 (2009). But that sort of analysis typically concerns questions
of party arbitrability, not the threshold question of delegation.)

So what should be the effect of the incorporation by reference in
an arbitration agreement of arbitration rules that include a
delegation provision if one of the identified arbitration parties
-- a non-appearing putative class member -- did not sign that
agreement? Could such a non-signatory be deemed to have clearly and
unmistakably delegated the class arbitrability issue to an
arbitrator? See, "Can Arbitrability Questions Concerning a
Non-Signatory to the Arbitration Agreement be "Delegated" to an
Arbitrator?", ADR: Advice from the Trenches (June 27, 2018) [LINK].
It seems both logical and prudent for a court not to simply
postulate that an arbitration agreement binds non-signatories,
especially before determining who should decide that issue. Hence,
while the signatories of an arbitration agreement that delegates
class arbitrability issues to an arbitrator could be bound by such
a delegation, the non-party non-appearing putative class members
arguably could not.

"[A]t least where absent class members have not been required to
opt in, it is difficult to see how an Arbitrator's decision to
conduct class proceedings could bind absent class members who have
not authorized the Arbitrator to decide on a class-wide basis which
arbitration procedures are to be used." Oxford Health Plans v.
Sutter, 559 U.S. 564, 574-75 (2013) (Alito, J., concurring).

Thus, the object of a purported delegation of the class
arbitratility issue arguably could not be fully achieved.

Issues concerning class arbitrability therefore logically should be
non-delegable and for the court to determine.

In Jock v. Sterling Jewelers, 284 F.Supp.3d 566 (S.D.N.Y. 2018),
Judge Rakoff considered, among other things, issues that
illustrated the need to bind non-parties to a contract in order to
make class arbitration work. An arbitrator had issued a Class
Determination Award ("CDA") that in effect "certified" a class of
more than 70,000 absent (non-participating, non-opt-in) sex
discrimination claimant-employees, and the employer (Sterling
Jewelers) moved to vacate the CDA. Sterling argued both the
delegation issue and the merits issue concerning class
arbitrability. Regarding delegation, it argued that absent class
members had never (a) submitted to the arbitrator's authority
generally or (b) agreed to submit the class arbitrability issue in
particular to the arbitrator for determination. The question was
"whether the Arbitrator had the authority to certify a
70,000-person class because the named plaintiffs and the defendant
submitted the question of whether the [arbitration] agreement
allowed for class procedures to the Arbitrator." Jock, 284
F.Supp.3d at 570. The Second Circuit had remanded the case to Judge
Rakoff after pointing out that the District Court had not "squarely
address[ed] whether the arbitrator had the power to bind absent
class members to class arbitration given that they [the absent
members] unlike the parties here, never consented to the arbitrator
determining whether class arbitration was permissible under the
agreement in [the] first place." Id. at 569.

Notably, Sterling Jewelers itself (ad hoc) had requested the
arbitrator to resolve the class arbitration issue. The question
remained, however, whether putative class members who were not
parties to the arbitration agreement in question, and who had not
otherwise appeared in the arbitration, could be deemed to have
delegated the class arbitrability issue to the arbitrator.

Judge Rakoff held that "the Arbitrator . . . had no authority to
decide whether the [agreement in question] permitted class action
procedures for anyone other than the named parties who chose to
present her with that question and those other individuals who
chose to opt in to the proceedings before her." Jock, 284 F. Supp.
3d at 571.

"[A]rbitrators are not judges. Nowhere in the Federal Arbitration
Act does Congress confer upon these private citizens the power to
bind individuals and businesses except insofar the relevant
individuals and businesses have bound themselves." Id.

Thus, whether a delegation was effected (a) by the adoption of AAA
arbitration rules in the individual arbitration agreements between
Sterling and each of its respective employees, or (b) by way of an
ad hoc consent by Sterling and one (or more) of its contract
counterparties, still the non-party non-appearing potential class
members arguably did not agree or consent and could not be bound.
(And the court did not reach the question of whether a signatory of
the relevant arbitration agreement could be deemed bound by such an
"agreement" vis-a-vis a putative class member who unilaterally
"opted in" to the arbitration.) This latest decision in the Jock
saga is on appeal to the Second Circuit.

In 2016, the Third Circuit held, for similar reasons, that courts
are to decide whether an arbitration agreement permits class
arbitration, even if the arbitration agreement in question
incorporates the arbitration rules of the American Arbitration
Association. Chesapeake Appalachia LLC v. Scout Petroleum LLC, 809
F.3d 746, 2016 WL 53860 (3d Cir. Jan. 5, 2016). Accord, Reed
Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2013), cert.
den., 134 S.Ct. 2291 (2014); Huffman v. Hilltop Cos., 740 F.3d 391
(6th Cir. 2014). Among other things, the Third Circuit too relied
on Supreme Court Justice Alito's concurring opinion in Oxford
Health Plans LLC. v. Sutter, 133 S.Ct. 2064, 2071-72 (2013), that
"courts should be wary of concluding that the availability of
class-wide arbitration is for the arbitrator to decide, as that
decision implicates the rights of absent class members without
their consent." Chesapeake, 2015 WL 53860 at *15, quoting Opalinsky
v. Robert Half Int'l Inc., 761 F.3d 326, 333 (3rd Cir. 2014), cert.
den., 135 S.Ct. 1530 (2015). Moreover, the Chesapeake court noted
the Supreme Court's comment that "class-wide arbitration 'is not
arbitration as envisioned by the [Federal Arbitration Act].'"
Chesapeake, 2015 WL 53860 at *15, citing AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1750, 1751-53 (2011).

More recently, the Eighth Circuit ruled that the determination of
the class arbitratibility issue is for a court, not an arbitrator,
for a different reason -- "because of the fundamental differences
between bilateral and class arbitration." Catamaran Corp. v.
Towncrest Pharmacy, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 13689 (8th Cir. Jul. 28,
2017). It held that incorporation by reference of the AAA
arbitration rules was not a clear and unmistakable delegation of
that particular arbitrability issue. (However, this court implied
that an explicit delegation in an arbitration agreement of that
issue to an arbitrator would be enforced.)  In Catamaran, the
District Court had held that the incorporation by reference in the
relevant arbitration agreement of the AAA's arbitration rules
included the AAA's SRCA with its delegation provision (SRCA 3), and
therefore an arbitrator could determine the class arbitrability
issue. It had relied on "precedent analyzing bilateral
arbitration."

On appeal, the Eighth Circuit relied on its interpretations of
prior Supreme Court opinions in Stolt-Nielsen and Oxford Health,
and on the characteristics that distinguished bilateral arbitration
from class arbitration as articulated by the Supreme Court in its
decision in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion. See Catamaran, 2017 U.S.
App. LEXIS 13689 at *8-*10. The Catamaran court determined that the
question of class arbitrability "is substantive in nature and
requires judicial determination." That is, it was a threshold or
gateway issue of arbitrability, which is presumptively "for
judicial determination unless the parties clearly and unmistakably
provide otherwise." Howsam v. Dean Whitter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S.
79, 83 (2002). The appellate court then distinguished prior Eighth
Circuit decisions, which had found the incorporation of AAA
arbitration rules to be a sufficient manifestation of the parties'
intent to delegate arbitrability questions concerning bilateral
arbitration, maintaining that those courts "never grappled with the
fundamental changes in the underlying controversy that arise when
dealing with class arbitration." The Eighth Circuit court thus
opined that the authorities for the proposition that incorporation
of AAA arbitration rules sufficiently manifested agreement to
delegate the class arbitrability question to the arbitrator were
inapposite.

In sum, the current consensus is that "class arbitrability" is a
threshold "substantive" issue that is presumptively for the court
to decide. At least two questions then follow: (1) is that issue
for the court exclusively to decide (arguably yes); and (2) who
would be bound by a determination of the delegation issue in that
regard (arguably only the signatories to the governing arbitration
agreement). We look forward to SCOTUS's further elucidation of the
nature of "class arbitration." [GN]


[*] Victorian Supreme Court Fights Class Action Reform Proposal
---------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Pelly, writing for Australian Financial Review, reports
that the Victorian Supreme Court has come out strongly against a
law reform proposal to make the Federal Court a preferred class
action forum, and says it also opposes "beauty contests" for
multiple claims.

The court's submission to the Australian Law Reform Commission's
inquiry into class actions and litigation funding says it would be
"particularly unusual, if not entirely novel" for the Federal Court
to have exclusive jurisdiction for civil claims.

It said the concern in the ALRC's discussion paper that parties
would go forum shopping was misguided.

"This concern assumes that the proposals regarding competing class
actions, even if adopted nationally, can only operate in relation
to multiple proceedings in a single jurisdiction, and cannot take
account of proceedings in other courts," the Supreme Court said.

"Exclusive jurisdiction would avoid competing class actions in
different courts, but only in that limited class of case. It cannot
operate as a comprehensive solution for all types of cases that may
be brought in the Federal Court."

The Federal Court, headed by Chief Justice James Allsop and the
Victorian Supreme Court, headed by Justice Anne Ferguson, are
popular forums for class actions. A recent study by Professor Vince
Morabito of Monash University noted that from June 2014 to June
2018 the Federal Court handled 98 claims and Victoria 27. There are
currently 88 class action proceedings in the Federal Court.

The issue of competing claims came to prominence after five were
filed against AMP arising out of the Hayne Royal Commission and
three were made against tech start-up GetSwift.

The GetSwift litigation was set to be back in court on Aug. 6.
Three Federal Court judges was set to hear an appeal in Sydney
against the decision by Justice Michael Lee to permanently stay the
first two class actions filed by Corrs Chambers Westgarth and
Squire Patton Boggs and allow the last class action (filed by Phi
Finney McDonald) to proceed.

The AMP litigation is in both the Federal Court and NSW Supreme
Court, where Justice James Stevenson refused an application by four
Federal Court applicants that the proceedings in the Supreme Court
be transferred to the Federal Court. He is presiding over the first
claim to be filed (by Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan).

The ALRC has proposed legislation so the Federal Court could decide
which claim progresses in a selection hearing, which some lawyers
have called a "beauty contest". These "consolidation" hearings are
strongly supported by defendant law firms.

However, the Victorian Supreme Court said Justice Lee's decision
demonstrated "that courts currently have ample power to creatively
manage competing class actions" and that the ALRC process "runs the
risk of becoming a defacto certification model".

Delays the process
"The [ALRC] discussion paper raises the problem of the 'race to
court' and notes that there should be no 'first mover' advantage,"
the court says. "As a matter of practice, a default process of the
nature envisaged will almost inevitably foster a tendency to file
early or to put together an alternative proceeding in haste. It
also creates the prospect of a court leaving open a significant
period of time for other proceedings to be brought, which then
delays the progress of the case."

The Victorian Law Reform Commission, which released its final
report in June, has recommended the establishment of a panel,
composed of a senior judge from each jurisdiction with a class
action regime, to adjudicate on multiple actions involving the same
subject matter.

While the Victorian Supreme Court offered no opinion on this idea
in its submission to the ALRC, it said "it would be particularly
unusual, if not entirely novel, to create exclusive jurisdiction
for a particular form of proceeding in relation to one or two
pieces of legislation in which jurisdiction is otherwise shared
between state and federal courts".

The court offered no opinion on two of the ALRC's other proposals,
contingency fees for lawyers and tighter controls on litigation
funders.

It added that class actions "do not lend themselves to a single
prescriptive approach".

"The court has deliberately maintained significant flexibility in
its class action practice."

The ALRC's final report is due by December 21, 2018. [GN]


                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: ASARCO Loses Contribution Suit vs Union Pacific
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff, Asarco, LLC, in the case captioned ASARCO, LLC,
Plaintiff, v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant, Case No.
2:12-cv-00283-EJL (D. Idaho) has brought a contribution claim
against Defendant, Union Pacific Railroad Company, under section
113(f) of the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). Union Pacific argues
Asarco has no right to bring a contribution claim, denies it is
liable under CERCLA, and contends that Asarco released any
contribution claim against it in the parties' Bankruptcy
Settlement.

Having weighed and evaluated all of the evidence presented and
fully considering the legal arguments of counsel, District Judge J.
Edward Lodge entered a judgment in favor of Union Pacific.

Asarco argues it paid substantially more than its 22% proportional
share when it paid $485,429,882 to resolve its OU3 CERCLA
liabilities with the United States. Asarco's cost expert, Charles
Finch, estimates Asarco overpaid its 22% divisible share of
response costs for OU3 by at least $153 million. As such, Asarco
maintains it has a right to pursue its contribution claim in this
case against Union Pacific.

Pacific disputes the amount Asarco claims it paid, arguing Asarco
paid $482,143,000 or less. Union Pacific further contends that
Asarco failed to establish that it overpaid its proportional share
to settle its OU3 liability with the United States and, therefore,
it does not have a right to contribution under section 113(f).
Specifically, Union Pacific asserts: 1) the final cost of
remediating OU3 is not yet known and, therefore, any claim of
overpayment is speculation; 2) Asarco's payment and OU3 cost
calculations are incorrect; and 3) and Asarco's settlement payment
to the United States was less than its allocated share of liability
for OU3.

Having reviewed the evidence presented at trial, the entire record,
and the parties' arguments and briefing on this issue, the Court
concludes that Asarco has not proven by a preponderance of the
evidence that it overpaid its proportional share of liability.

Using Asarco's calculation, the settlement payment of $414,643,000
is subtracted from $451,167,649.24, which is 22% of the best
estimate of OU3 Costs, $2,050,762,042.01, resulting in an
underpayment of $36,524,649.24; that is to say, Asarco's payment of
$414,643,000 was $36,524,649.24 less than its 22% liability share
of the OU3 response costs.

Under Union Pacific's calculation, Asarco's settlement payment of
$414,643,000 is divided by the total estimated OU3 response costs
of $2,050,762,042.01 which establishes that Asarco paid only 20.21%
of its liability share; less than its 22% proportional share of
liability in OU3.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds Asarco did not pay more
than its proportional share of its liability for OU3. Asarco's
payment under the CDA Settlement was less than its apportioned 22%
liability. As such, Asarco does not have a right to recover
contribution under section 113(f). For this reason, the Court finds
in favor of Union Pacific.

Thus, Asarco has no right to bring this contribution claim under
section 113(f) of CERCLA. Further, the Court finds Union Pacific
has shown Asarco released its right to bring a contribution claim
against it in the Bankruptcy Settlement.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated July 26, 2018 is
available at https://bit.ly/2BnDDRc from Leagle.com.

Asarco LLC, a Delaware LLC, Plaintiff, represented by Gregory Evans
-- gevans@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP, pro hac vice, John
F. Kurtz , HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS AND HAWLEY LLP, Keola R. Whittaker
-- kwhitaker@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuire Woods LLP, pro hac vice,
William R. Pletcher , Integer Law Corporation, pro hac vice, Alicia
C. O'Brien -- aobrien@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuire Woods LLP, pro
hac vice, Daniel E. Mooney , HAWLEY TROXELL, Laura G. Brys --
lbrys@mcguirewoods.com --  McGuireWoods LLP, pro hac vice & Timothy
Ryan Kurtz , Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP.

Union Pacific Railroad Company, a Utah corporation, Defendant,
represented by Ausey H. Robnett, III , Lake City Law Group PLLC,
Carolyn L. McIntosh -- carolyn.mcintosh@squirepb.com -- Patton
Boggs LLP, pro hac vice, Norton A. Colvin, Jr. , Colvin, Chaney,
Saenz & Rodriguez, LLP, pro hac vice, Robert W. Lawrence , Davis
Graham & Stubbs LLP, pro hac vice, Alexander Arensberg , Squire
Patton Boggs (US) LLP, pro hac vice & Gail L. Wurtzler , Davis
Graham & Stubbs LLP, pro hac vice.

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Excess Policies Exclude Post-1971 Royal Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
Justice James T. Vaughn, Jr. of the Supreme Court of Delaware
affirms the judgment of the Superior Court for the reasons given by
it in three opinions in the appealed case Motors Liquidation
Company DIP Lenders Trust, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. Allstate
Insurance Company, et al., Defendants Below, Appellees, No. 381,
2017, (Del.),

This is an insurance coverage case involving excess general
liability policies purchased by General Motors for policy periods
spanning from the late 1960's to the mid-1980's. In 2009, General
Motors underwent bankruptcy reorganization, and as a result of that
proceeding the rights to any proceeds from the policies were
assigned to the Appellant, Motors Liquidation Company DIP Lenders
Trust ("Trust").

The issue here is whether the excess policies provide coverage for
asbestos-related and environmental claims asserted against General
Motors. In three opinions, the Superior Court determined that they
do not and granted summary judgment to the Appellees.

For more than 50 years, General Motors purchased comprehensive
products liability insurance from Royal Insurance Company. Policies
issued through 1971 were "occurrence-based," meaning the coverage
responded to injuries arising from incidents occurring within the
time at risk. The parties then negotiated Endorsement 15, which
shifted policies issued after 1971 to "claims-made" insurance which
covered occurrences reported during the policy period. Royal is not
a party to this litigation.

The excess policies involved here are ones that towered above the
Royal policies. General Motors continuously bought layers of excess
coverage that towered over the Royal policies during the time-frame
relevant to this case. These excess policies were issued by
different carriers, covering different time frames, in different
amounts, and with different attachment points. The pre-1972 excess
policies "follow-form" by adopting the terms of the underlying
Royal policy. It appears that some of the post-1971 excess policies
follow form to the underlying Royal policies, but some contain
other triggering language, such as occurrence-based language, and
some contain other language which differs from the Royal policies.

In 1977, General Motors received the first of what would become
thousands of claims from plaintiffs alleging they had sustained
personal injury from exposure to General Motors automotive products
containing asbestos. In the years that followed, more than 40,000
such claims were filed against General Motors.

From 1977 until 1993, when the Royal insurance program was
terminated, almost 2,000 asbestos suits were filed against General
Motors and tendered to Royal for handling. Royal handled these
claims on a claims-made basis. It registered these claims only to
the year in which the claim was received and paid each claim off
the Royal policy for that year. Asbestos claims made during the
period of Royal coverage are not the subject of this action.

In the early 2000's, asbestos claims against General Motors
increased dramatically. In 2004, General Motors tendered to Royal,
for defense and indemnity, 60 CDs of asbestos claims. All of those
claims were made after the Royal policy periods had expired. None
were ever submitted to General Motors or Royal during any policy
year. They are the claims for which coverage is sought in this
action. Royal denied coverage and on January 26, 2005 filed a
declaratory judgment action in the Superior Court in Delaware to
determine whether it had any obligation to General Motors under
either the pre-1972 policies or the post-1971 policies for
asbestos-related and environmental claims. Later that same day
General Motors filed a declaratory judgment action in Michigan to
determine Royal's obligations under the pre-1972 policies.

In the Michigan action, General Motors did not seek any
determination regarding the post-1971 policies. General Motors
moved for dismissal or stay of the Delaware action. The action in
Delaware was not dismissed but it was stayed in favor of the
Michigan action. The Michigan action proceeded, and in 2008 General
Motors and Royal entered into a settlement. The settlement released
all of Royal's general liability policies, both the pre-1972
policies and the post-1971 policies, from any further liability.
None of the excess general liability carriers were parties to
either the Michigan or Delaware actions, and none were involved in
the 2008 settlement.

The first Superior Court opinion in the case, dated December 31,
2013, was issued in response to two motions for partial summary
judgment filed by the Trust. In those motions the Trust argued that
all asbestos-related claims were a single occurrence and "all sums"
allocation should apply to the pre-1972 policies. The Insurers
argued that allocation should be pro rata. With regard to
occurrence, the Insurers argued that the course of dealing between
General Motors and Royal and latent ambiguity in the policies
affected the interpretation of the policy language, and they should
be permitted to conduct discovery.

The Superior Court denied both motions for summary judgment,
concluding that in order to determine whether "all sums" or "pro
rata" allocation applied, it must first determine whether Michigan
law or Delaware law applied. The court reasoned that choice of law
was not the subject of the motions, had not been fully briefed, and
any decision on choice of law was premature. As to occurrence, the
court concluded that discovery should be permitted to proceed. The
court did, however, decide that if Michigan law applied, allocation
would be pro rata under the law of that state.

The second Superior Court opinion, dated November 25, 2015, was
issued in response to a defendants' motion for summary judgment, a
cross-motion for summary judgment filed by the Trust, and a motion
filed by defendant Munich Reinsurance America, Inc. for an order
declaring that the Trust was judicially estopped from asserting
claims against the post-1971 excess policies. The 2015 opinion
addressed only the post-1971 policies. The Court found that the
asbestos-related claims at issue were not covered under any of the
post-1971 Royal claims-made policies because none of the claims
were reported to either General Motors or Royal during any
post-1971 policy period. It then reasoned that claims not covered
under the Royal post-1971 policies were not covered under the
post-1971 excess policies. Munich Reinsurance America's estoppel
motion was granted for reasons which will be discussed hereinafter.
The effect of the 2015 opinion was to grant summary judgment to all
of the post-1971 insurers.

The third Superior Court opinion, dated June 19, 2017, dealt with
seven motions of various types, but most especially a defense
motion calling for pro rata allocation under Michigan law.
policies. The court ruled that pro rata allocation applied, thus
granting the defendants' motion on that point. The effect of this
ruling was to grant summary judgment to all of the pre-1972 excess
insurers. The combined effect of the 2015 opinion and the 2017
opinion was to grant summary judgment for all defendants

The Trust makes five claims of error on appeal. The first is that
the Superior Court erred in finding that under Michigan law pro
rata allocation, not all sums, applies to the pre-1972 excess
policies. In its 2013 opinion, the Superior Court analyzed this
issue as follows: "Arco Industries Corp. v. American Motorists
Insurance Co., the current precedent in Michigan, rejected all sums
allocation in favor of time on the risk proration where continuous
property damage was covered by successive insurance policies. After
discussing and comparing five allocation methods, Arco held, we
must reject any method of allocation that would require . . .
coverage on a joint and several or 'all sums' basis, since that
method would require [indemnification] for damage occurring outside
the policy period." The Court agrees with the Superior Court'
analysis as forth in its 2013 and 2017 opinions that while Michigan
will apply all sums allocation where there is policy language
leading to that result, it applies pro rata allocation to policy
language like that contained in the policies involved in this
case.

The Trust next contends that the Superior Court erred in finding
that the Trust was judicially estopped by General Motors' prior
statements in litigation against the underlying insurer, Royal, as
to the operation of the post-1971 Royal coverage. It argues that no
court adopted or relied on these statements by General Motors, and
there can be no judicial estoppel. In its opinion granting a stay
in the 2005 litigation, the Superior Court noted that General
Motors represented to the court that "it does not seek insurance
coverage from Royal for the post-1971 policies and will not do so
in any forum with respect to the asbestos-related and environmental
claims at issue in [the Delaware] and the Michigan litigations."

The Court explains that Judicial estoppel applies when a litigant's
position "contradicts another position that the litigant previously
took and that the Court was successfully induced to adopt in a
judicial ruling." The Trust argues that the representations made in
the 2005 litigation were not accepted by the Superior Court as a
basis for its ruling, as General Motors could add the
post-1971claims by counterclaim in the Michigan action. However,
the representations were a part of the argument made by General
Motors that persuaded, or induced, the Superior Court to grant a
stay. General Motors itself admitted that it would be estopped.
Under these circumstances, a finding of judicial estoppel was
warranted. The estoppel established that the Trust was estopped
from denying that the post-1971 Royal policies were claims-made and
that claims made in separate policy periods were separate
occurrences. The ruling estopped the Trust from arguing that any of
the claims at issue in this case triggered coverage under the
post-1971 Royal policies.

The Trust's third argument is that the Superior Court erred in
holding that the judicial estoppel which it held prevented the
underlying Royal policies from being triggered also negated
coverage under the post-1971 excess insurance policies. The Court
notes that judicial estoppel was not the sole reason that the
Superior Court found that the post-1971 Royal policies were
claims-made and that each claim was a separate occurrence. The
Superior Court also determined that Endorsement 15 was intended by
the parties to convert the Royal policies from occurrence-based to
claims-made. Specifically, it found that "under the policies'
clear, negotiated language, the Royal policies are claims-made." In
a 2016 order denying reargument of its 2015 opinion, it stated that
Endorsement 15 "unambiguously converted the primary coverage from
occurrence-based to claims-made coverage, as old-GM and Royal
intended." General Motors' conduct was consistent with these
findings. The asbestos-related claims after the first in 1977 were
never aggregated by it with other asbestos-related claims. General
Motors treated each claim as a separate occurrence, tied to the
year it was reported.

The Court agrees with the Superior Court's reasoning that since the
post-1971 Royal policies were claims made and none of the claims
involved in this case were made against either General Motors or
Royal during a post-1971 policy period, none of the claims were
covered under those policies. It took notice of the fact the
policies were captioned as excess policies and repeatedly referred
to underlying insurance. Specifically, with regard to Aetna
policies for which Travelers Casualty and Surety Company is now
responsible, it analyzed a net loss provision contained in those
policies. Under the net loss provision, the excess insurance was
obligated to pay only sums "which would be covered by the terms of
the controlling underlying insurance [i.e. the primary policy], if
written without any limit of liability." The Court further agrees
with the Superior Court's conclusion that the excess policies were
not required to respond to claims which did not trigger coverage
under the primary policies.

The Trust's next argument is that the Superior Court erred by
disregarding the express triggering language found in a number of
the post-1971 excess policies, as well as policy language requiring
that those excess policies own provisions control over language in
the underlying Royal policies -- which is based upon the
occurrence-based language and other language found in some of the
post-1971 excess policies. The Superior Court reasoned that the
occurrence-based language must give way to language in the policies
having the effect of providing that the excess policies are not
obligated to respond to claims not triggered under the primary
policy, stating that "barring exceptional circumstances or policy
language not present here, higher level excess insurance policies
do not respond if the primary . . . policies have not been
triggered." The Court agrees with the Superior Court in its ruling
that any policy language requiring excess policies to respond to
claims not triggered under the primary insurance should be clear
and unambiguous, which is not present in this case.

Finally, the Trust argued that the Superior Court erred in holding
that the first claim in General Motors' asbestos products liability
occurrence, reported to General Motors during the 1977 policy year,
did not trigger coverage for the full asbestos product liability
occurrence under those excess policies that incorporate a trigger
of "occurrences which are reported" during the policy period. The
Court finds this argument premised on all of the asbestos-related
claims being a single occurrence. The Court rules that this
argument must fail for the same reason the previous argument fails
-- that claims which are excluded from coverage under the post-1971
Royal policies are not covered by the excess policies.

A copy of the Order dated July 10, 2018, is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y6vxbqmb from Leagle.com.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Meyer Couple Sues Over Exposure to Bendix Asbestos
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In IN RE: ASBESTOS LITIGATION, WILLIAM A. MEYER and DIANE MEYER,
his wife, Plaintiffs, v. 3M COMPANY; CSK AUTO, INC., Successor to
CHECKERS AUTO PARTS; HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC., f/k/a ALLIED
SIGNAL, INC., as successor in interest to THE BENDIX CORPORATION;
O'REILLY AUTOMOTIVE STORES, INC.; PFIZER, INC.; UNION CARBIDE
CORPORATION; WESTERN AUTO SUPPLY COMPANY INC., Defendants, Case No.
N18C-08-136 ASB, filed in the Superior Court for the State of
Delaware, William A. Meyer and Diane Meyer alleged that Mr. Meyer
was wrongly exposed to, inhaled, ingested, and otherwise absorbed
asbestos fibers emanating from various sources which were mixed,
mined, manufactured, distributed, sold, removed, installed, and/or
used by the Defendants including, but not limited to: Bendix
brakes.

Mr. Meyer's former employers include, but are not limited to:

   (a) Mobil Oil Service Station - Dearborn, MI, from approximately
1953 to 1953;

   (b) New construction of homes - Dearborn, MI, from approximately
1952 to 1954;

   (c) Chrysler De Soto - Detroit, MI, as a Mechanic, from
approximately 1954 to 1954;

   (d) Chevron Service Station - Tucson, AZ, as a Mechanic, from
approximately 1954 to 1955.

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

     Bartholomew J. Dalton, Esq.
     Ipek K. Medford, Esq.
     Andrew C. Dalton, Esq.
     Michael C. Dalton, Esq.
     DALTON & ASSOCIATES, P.A.
     Cool Spring Meeting House
     1106 West Tenth Street
     Wilmington, DE 19806
     Tel: (302) 652-2050
     Email: IMedford@BDaltonlaw.com

        -- and --

     Adam Balick, Esq.
     Michael Collins Smith, Esq.
     Patrick J. Smith, Esq.
     BALICK & BALICK, LLC
     711 North King Street
     Wilmington, DE 19801
     Tel: (302) 658-4265
     Email: abalick@balick.com

OF COUNSEL:

     WEITZ & LUXENBERG, P.C.
     700 Broadway
     New York, NY 10003
     Tel: (212) 558-5500


ASBESTOS UPDATE: S. Parra's Suit vs. Marsh Remanded to Bankr. Court
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The appeals case captioned THE BOGDAN LAW FIRM, as counsel for
Salvador Parra, Jr., Appellant, v. MARSH USA, INC., Appellee, No.
18-cv-1228 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y.) arises out of the long-running
bankruptcy of the Johns-Manville Corporation, once the largest
supplier of raw asbestos in the US.

Salvador Parra, Jr. brought suit in Mississippi state court against
Marsh USA, Inc., Manville's principal insurance broker. Parra
alleged that Marsh knew of the dangers of asbestos but did not
disclose them, and conspired with Manville and others to prevent
the public and the government from learning the truth. Marsh moved
to enjoin that litigation, and the bankruptcy court held that
claims like these were enjoined and channeled into the bankruptcy
as part of an order issued in 1986. Parra appealed, and the
district court remanded for consideration of whether Parra was
adequately represented during the 1986 proceedings with regard to
these types of claims, and, if he was not, whether he suffered any
prejudice. The bankruptcy court held that he was adequately
represented and, in any event, was not prejudiced because he could
recover from the trust set up as part of the bankruptcy.

Upon analysis of the facts presented, District Judge Jed S. Rakoff
reverses and holds that Parra was not adequately represented in the
1986 proceedings and was thereby prejudiced. Parra is therefore not
precluded from challenging the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to
enjoin Parra's state law case, and, on the merits, Parra succeeds
in that challenge.

On remand, the bankruptcy court found that "the Future Claims
Representative was fully aware of the terms of the injunction
against settling insurers and the types of claims that might be
enjoined," including non-derivative claims. "Future [asbestos
claimants'] rights, including whatever in personam rights they may
have had, were addressed and considered by the Future Claims
Representative who considered the proposed order to enjoin actions
against the settling insurers." The bankruptcy court's factual
findings are subject to review for clear error.

The order appointing the FCR after the 1984 Insurance Settlement
Agreement stated that the FCR represented "those persons who have
been exposed to asbestos or asbestos products mined, manufactured,
or supplied by Manville pre-petition and have manifested or will
manifest disease post-petition, and who are not otherwise
represented in these proceedings." Parra personally falls within
this category and does not contend that he did not receive due
process as to his in rem claims. But the order is vague as to
whether the FCR was authorized to represent future claimants as to
any other claims.

The record demonstrates that neither the FCR nor any other party to
the 1986 proceedings believed the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction
to enjoin independent claims against third-parties. The FCR would
thus have no reason to believe such claims were within the scope of
his representation, and so could not have provided adequate
representation on that score.

The district court also remanded to the bankruptcy court for
consideration of whether "denial of due process would have resulted
in prejudice" to Parra, noting that "the 1986 Orders resulted in
creating the Manville Trust," from which Parra "had the opportunity
to seek damages for his asbestos-related injuries." The bankruptcy
court held that the "answer clearly is no," because "there is no
dispute that Parra could submit a claim to the Manville Trust."

It is difficult to evaluate in hindsight whether the outcome would
have been any different had the FCR adequately represented future
claimants as to these claims. Marsh, however, contends that this is
the rare exception because the FCR and several objectors, in fact,
argued that the bankruptcy court did not have jurisdiction to
enjoin claims against third parties that did not relate to the
bankruptcy res, ROA 1969-70, 2027, just as an adequate
representative would have done. These objections, however, led to
the FCR's own brief and argument, clarifying that he too did not
believe that the bankruptcy judge had jurisdiction to bind future
claimants as to non-derivative claims against third parties, which
led to the June 3, 1985 letter agreement addressing those concerns.
The overwhelming evidence indicates that no one believed that the
bankruptcy court could bind future claimants as to their
nonderivative claims against third parties.

Had the FCR understood that these claims were within his mandate,
he may have lobbied harder for the explicit exclusion of such
claims from the channeling injunction or compelled Marsh to
contribute more to the Trust, which would mean that more would
remain for this plaintiff to recover. That uncertainty alone is
sufficient to find prejudice. The Court, therefore, cannot say with
fair assurance that the outcome would not have been materially
different had Parra received adequate representation.

The Court, therefore, finds that the FCR did not adequately
represent Parra as to his non-derivative claims against third
parties and that this inadequate representation was not harmless.
The bankruptcy court clearly erred in finding otherwise. Because
Parra did not receive due process, he is not estopped from
challenging the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to channel these
claims to the Manville Trust, and that challenge succeeds. Parra is
free to proceed with the Mississippi action.

Accordingly, the January 2018 Order is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion and Order dated July 25,
2018 is available at https://bit.ly/2MjX9mK from Leagle.com.

The Bogdan Law Firm, as Counsel for Salvador Parra, Jr., Appellant,
represented by Todd E. Duffy -- tduffy@duffyamedeo.com -- Duffy
Amedeo LLP.

Marsh USA, Inc., Appellee, represented by Benjamin Patrick
McCallen, Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, John A. Koepke, Jackson
Walker L.L.P, pro hac vice, Jonathan David Waisnor , Willkie Farr &
Gallagher LLP & Joseph Davis, Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP.


                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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