CAR_Public/180813.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Monday, August 13, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 161

                            Headlines

A AND I MEDICAL: Echelon Refuses to Cover Claims in Saleh Suit
ACADIA PHARMA: Robbins Geller Files Class Action
ACT II JEWELRY: Menz Appeals Ruling in West Suit to 7th Circuit
AGENTRA LLC: Made Unsolicited Calls, Gallion Suit Alleges
AIR EVAC: Bid to Move Class Action to County Court Tossed

ALAMEDA COUNTY, CA: C. Turano's Suit Dismissed
ALLIED INTERSTATE: Obtains Favorable Ruling in FDCPA Class Action
ALLTRAN FINANCIAL: Klotsche Files Suit Alleging FDCPA Violation
AMERICAN CAMPUS: Settlement in Student Housing Suit Has Final OK
ARIZONA: Permanent Injunction Entered in Driver's Licenses Suit

AUSTRALIA: Wilsons Creek Residents Sue Over Telstra Tower
AVENTURA DANCE: Sued by Fenwick Over Unsolicited Telemarketing
BASF SE: Emma Chemicals Alleges Price-Fixing of Diisocyanate
BEHR DAYTON: Groundwater Contamination Case Ruling Affirmed
BETTA BURGER: Seeks to Hire Bach Law Offices as Attorney

CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT: Court Dismisses M. Cabral's ITFA Suit
CALIFORNIA TEACHERS: 9th Cir. Denies Bid to Add AAE as Plaintiff
CANADA: Faces Class Action Over Orkambi Coverage
CANADA: Inmate Sues Over Attorney-Client Privilege Violation
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT: Sued by Kupczyk for Illegal Debt Collection

CAPITAL ONE AUTO: Scott Suit Alleges Violation of RISA
CARRIBEAN CRUISE: Sears Awaits Ruling in Robocall Settlement
CAVALRY PORTFOLIO: Obtains Stay in One of Two TCPA Class Actions
CHINA AGRITECH: SCOTUS Upholds Dismissal of Successively Filed Suit
COCA-COLA CO: 3rd Cir. Affirms Summary Judgment in "Enslin" Suit

COLISEUM BAR: Court Conditionally Certifies Class of Employees
COMCAST CABLE: Can Send C. Zacher's TCPA Suit to Arbitration
COMCAST CABLE: Can't Compel Arbitration of R. Chacon's TCPA Suit
CONRAD CREDIT: Debt Collection Violates FDCPA, Hochstasser Says
CREDIT MANAGEMENT: Appeals Decision in Bassett Suit to 8th Cir.

CREDIT ONE: Can Compel Arbitration of J. Croucier's TCPA Suit
DANELL CUSTOM: Billing Records Can Be Filed Partly Under Seal
DENKA PERFORMANCE: Removes Butler Suit to E.D. Louisiana
DIET WORKS: Faces Fraud Class Action in New Jersey
DOLGEN LLC: Partial Summary Judgment Bid in "Fielding" Granted

DOWNTOWN TOWING: Petraglia Seeks to Recover OT Pay Under FLSA
DR PEPPER: Appeals Cert. Order in Fitzhenry-Russell to 9th Cir.
DR PEPPER: Fletcher Sues Over Ginger Ale's Deceptive Labeling
EPIC SYSTEMS: Employees May File Individual Unpaid OT Claims
ERICSSON INC: J. Nguyen's Wage & Hour Suit Remains in Dist. Court

ESTRELLA PROVIDER: Underpays Home Care Providers, Barcena Alleges
EVOLUTION WIRELESS: Grey Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
EXPERIAN INFORMATION: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss FCRA Suit
EXPRESS SCRIPTS: Wolfe Seeks to Halt Sale to Cigna
FALCON SUBSIDIARY: $595K Settlement in THNs' Suit Has Prelim OK

FILTREX SERVICE: Wilson Action Seeks Unpaid Overtime Premium
FLUOR CORP: Isenberg Suit Seeks to Recover Wages Under FLSA
FOSTER PREMIER: Court Dismisses Suit Over Document Fees
FREEDOM FINANCIAL: Can't Arbitrate D. Beerman's TCPA Suit
GC SERVICES: Collection Practices Violate FDCPA, Fleenor Claims

GILBERT ROZON: To Appeal Sexual Assault Class Action Dismissal
GIRARD, OH: Faces Class Action Over Traffic Camera Tickets
GOLDEN STATE OVERNIGHT: Quijada Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages
GOOGLE LLC: Court Narrows Claims in AdTrader's Suit
HEARST COMMUNICATIONS: Settles Class Action for $50MM

HODES PARKING: Underpays Valet Workers, Escobar Suit Alleges
HOUSTON HOSPITALITY: Doesn't Pay OT to Door Hosts, Shapiro Claims
HUAWEI DEVICE: Stay of Nexus 6P Products Liability Suit Lifted
INTEREXCHANGE INC: Summary Judgment Bids in Antitrust Suit Junked
KINCAID INC: Fails to Pay OT Wages Under FLSA, Portillo Says

KNORR-BREMSE AG: Baldassano Sues over No-Poach Agreements
KNORR-BREMSE AG: Marietta Files Suit Over No-Poach Conspiracy
KOHL'S DEPARTMENT: S. Collins' Wage Suit Moved to E.D. Wis.
KUSHNER COS: Judge Allows Tenants' Class Action to Proceed
L'OREAL USA: Faces Hubbard Suit Over Use of Consumer Reports

LANG PHARMA: Settles Class Action Over Co-Q10 Supplements
LOST DOG: Classes in FLSA Suit Have Prelim Certification
MARTIN-BROWER CO: Deal in J. Titus' Labor Suit Has Final Approval
MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL: Oct. 25 Settlement Approval Hearing Set
MCLANE COMPANY: Magistrate Suggests Dismissal of FCRA Suit

MDL 2493: Meloy Appeals Decision in TCPA MDL to 4th Cir.
MDL 2665: Court Unseals Class Certification Pleadings
MDL 2785: Court Compels Humana to Comply with Subpoena
MID PENN: Board of Directors Faces Class Action Over Merger
MIDLAND FUNDING: 8th Cir. Partly Reverses Dismissal of FDCPA Suit

MIDLAND FUNDING: K. Smith's Suit Remanded to Ark. State Court
MONTANA: Court Enters Final Judgment in Prison Conditions Suit
MORGANS HOTEL: Faces Luis Seirra Suit in S.D. Florida
NESTLE: Court Dismisses Class Action Over Bottled Spring Water
NEW ZEALAND: Bella Vista Residents Sue Tauranga City Council

NHL: Ex-Players Won't Appeal Class Action Dismissal
NUVASIVE INC: Class Settlement in B. Mauss's Suit Has Prelim OK
OAKHURST DAIRY: $5MM Settlement in Drivers' Suit Has Final Approval
OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY: Sued over Sports Team Doctor's Conduct
OHIO STATE: Conducts Investigation Amid Sex Abuse Class Action

ORNUA FOODS: Myers-Taylor Files Class Suit Over False Advertising
PA FIRE RECOVERY: LaMonaca Suit Asserts FDCPA Violation
PAREXEL INT'L: Subpoena on Western in Wage Suit Partly Quashed
PARK GROVE: Court Dismisses S. Hullinger's FCRA Suit
PETCO ANIMAL: Job Applicants' Class Has Prelim Certification

PHOENIX FINANCIAL: Haider Seeks to Recover Damages Under FDCPA
PIER 1 IMPORTS: Deal in J. Pedraza's Suit Has Final Approval
POLARITYTE INC: Faces Lawi Securities Suit Over Share Price Drop
PORTLAND, OR: ACLU Files Class Action Over "Kettling" Tactic
PRO CUSTOM: Loses Bid to Dismiss S. Sedhom's Wage Suit

PURDUE PHARMA: Court Defers Ruling on Pa. Cities' Bid to Remand
QUINN MEDICAL: Must Produce Fax Transmission Logs in TCPA Suit
RELIN GOLDSTEIN: Violates FDCPA, Henriquez Suit Says
RESPOND POWER: Court Dismisses B. Gillis' Class Claims
RIPPLE LABS: Borden Ladner Attorney Discusses Class Action

SAKS & CO: Court Grants Final Approval of Class Settlement
SANTA FE NATURAL: Pontusson Files Suit Over Deceptive Marketing
SCHUMACHER AUTOMOTIVE: Faces Eisenband Suit for TCPA Violation
SEARS HOLDINGS: DeFranza Suit Seeks to Stop Unsolicited Calls
SEARS ROEBUCK: Faces Bui Suit Over Defective Water Heaters

SKYWEST AIRLINES: Underpays Ramp Agents, Barnes Suit Alleges
SNOOZE HIC LLC: Doesn't Pay Wages to Servers, Amador-Stewart Says
SNYDER LAW FIRM: Court Dismisses K. Toepper's FDCPA Suit
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES: Underpays Ramp Supervisors, Battles et al. Say
TOLL GLOBAL: C. Marquez's Wage Suit Remains in District Court

TOTOTLAN INC: Refuses to Pay Overtime Wages, Hernandez Says
TOYOTA MOTOR: 9th Circuit Appeal Filed in Heber Class Suit
TRANS1 INC: Nov. 19 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
TRIANGLE CAPITAL: Kent Sues over Barings Merger Deal Disclosures
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: Faces Gross Suit over Disney Merger

UNITED STATES: D.C. Court Grants TRO Against Asylum Seeker Removal
UNITED STATES: Sheridan County Vote to Join PILT Class Action
UNITEDHEALTHCARE INSURANCE: Wrongfully Denied Healthcare Claims
US BANK: Underpays Mortgage Brokers, Loud Suit Alleges
WEBSTAURANT STORE: TRO Bid in FLSA Suit Partly Granted

WELLS FARGO: Murphy Appeals Ruling in Jabbari Suit to 9th Cir.
WHOLE FOODS: Order for Interlocutory Appeal in "Molock" Certified
WISCONSIN: Settlement in Juvenile Inmates' Suit Has Prelim Approval
ZICAM LLC: Oct. 3 Class Action Settlement Claims Filing Deadline
ZIMMER BIOMET: Underpays Sales Associate, Karl Suit Alleges

[*] Ballard Spahr Attorneys Discuss FDCPA Class Action
[*] US-Style Class Action Procedure on the Cards for Scotland

                            *********

A AND I MEDICAL: Echelon Refuses to Cover Claims in Saleh Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
ECHELON PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY v. A AND I MEDICAL
TRANSPORTATION, INC., and IZZLDIN SALEH, IBRAHIM TAWALBEH and
ELIZABETH MCKITTRICK, Case No. 2018CH08661 (Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook
Cty., July 11, 2018), alleges that an underlying class action
lawsuit is not covered by a certain policy and that Echelon has no
duty to defend Defendants A&I, Ibrahim Tawalbeh and Elizabeth
McKittrick.

Echelon is a duly authorized Illinois insurance company doing
business in the state of Illinois, and was licensed to write
policies of liability insurance in Illinois.  Echelon issued policy
No. EGL0007041 to named insured A&I for the policy period March 5,
2017, to March 5, 2018.  The Policy has a $1 million per occurrence
and general aggregate limit.

A&I is an Illinois corporation with its headquarters in the City of
Palos Hills, County of Cook, Illinois.  A&I provides medical
transportation for patients across Chicagoland.  Ibrahim Tawalbeh
is one of the owners of A&I.  Elizabeth McKittrick is the President
of A&I.

Izzldin Saleh (the "Underlying Plaintiff") is a resident of the
state of Illinois and the plaintiff in an underlying case and is a
necessary but nominal party to this action.

Mr. Saleh, on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated
persons, filed suit against A&I, Tawalbeh and Mckittrick, in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
(the "Lawsuit").  The Lawsuit is captioned "Complaint for Wage
Theft and Retaliatory Discharge."

Echelon denied that the Lawsuit was covered under the Policy and
denied that Defendants were entitled to a defense or
indemnification under the Policy with respect to the Lawsuit.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David E. Schroeder, Esq.
          TRIBLER ORPETT & MEYER, P.C.
          225 West Washington, Suite 2550
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 201-6400
          E-mail: deschroeder@tribler.com


ACADIA PHARMA: Robbins Geller Files Class Action
------------------------------------------------
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP on July 24 disclosed that a class
action has been commenced on behalf of purchasers of ACADIA
Pharmaceuticals Inc. (NASDAQ:ACAD) securities during the period
between April 29, 2016 and July 9, 2018 (the "Class Period"). This
action was filed in the Southern District of California and is
captioned Stone v. ACADIA Pharmaceuticals Inc., et al., No.
18-cv-01672.

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 permits any
investor who purchased ACADIA securities during the Class Period to
seek appointment as lead plaintiff. A lead plaintiff acts on behalf
of all other class members in directing the litigation. The lead
plaintiff can select a law firm of its choice. An investor's
ability to share in any potential future recovery is not dependent
upon serving as lead plaintiff. If you wish to serve as lead
plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than 60 days from July
20, 2018. If you wish to discuss this action or have any questions
concerning this notice or your rights or interests, please contact
plaintiff's counsel, Darren Robbins of Robbins Geller at
800/449-4900 or 619/231-1058, or via e-mail at djr@rgrdlaw.com. You
can view a copy of the complaint as filed at
http://www.rgrdlaw.com/cases/acadiapharm/.

The complaint charges ACADIA and certain of its officers with
violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. ACADIA is a
biopharmaceutical company focused on the development and
commercialization of innovative medicines to address unmet medical
needs in central nervous system disorders. ACADIA's product
opportunities include its novel drug NUPLAZID (pimavanserin), which
was approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") on
April 29, 2016 for the treatment of hallucinations and delusions
associated with Parkinson's disease psychosis. NUPLAZID became
available in the United States in May 2016.

The complaint alleges that during the Class Period, defendants made
false and misleading statements and/or failed to disclose adverse
information regarding ACADIA's business and prospects, including
that medical professionals had expressed significant concern that
NUPLAZID had been approved too quickly, based on inadequate
evidence that the drug was safe or effective, and that a large
number of adverse events had been reported to the FDA for patients
who were using NUPLAZID. As a result of defendants' false
statements and/or omissions, ACADIA securities traded at
artificially inflated prices during the Class Period.

On April 9, 2018, CNN issued a report claiming that medical
professionals, including physicians, researchers and other experts,
had expressed significant concern that NUPLAZID was approved too
quickly, based on inadequate evidence that the drug was safe or
effective. The CNN report also called attention to a large number
of adverse events (often deaths) reported to the FDA for patients
who were using NUPLAZID. On this news, the Company's share price
declined $5.03 per share, or 23.4%, to close at $16.50 per share on
April 9, 2018. On April 25, 2018, CNN reported that the FDA was
re-examining the safety of NUPLAZID. On this news, the Company's
share price fell $4.27 per share, or 21.9%, to close at $15.20 per
share on April 25, 2018.

Then, on July 9, 2018, the Southern Investigative Reporting
Foundation issued a report, entitled "Acadia Pharmaceuticals: This
Is Not a Pharmaceuticals Company," alleging that ACADIA "has
accomplished its growth in ways that have attracted intense
regulatory scrutiny for other drug companies," including
"dispensing wads of cash to doctors to incentivize prescription
writing and downplaying mounting reports of patient deaths." On
this news, the Company's share price again dropped $1.21 per share,
or 6.8%, to close at $16.63 per share on July 9, 2018.

Plaintiff seeks to recover damages on behalf of all purchasers of
ACADIA securities during the Class Period (the "Class").

Robbins Geller -- http://www.rgrdlaw.com-- is one of the world's
leading law firms representing investors in securities litigation.
With 200 lawyers in 10 offices, Robbins Geller has obtained many of
the largest securities class action recoveries in history. For five
consecutive years, ISS Securities Class Action Services has ranked
the Firm in its annual SCAS Top 50 Report as one of the top law
firms in both amount recovered for shareholders and total number of
class action settlements. Robbins Geller attorneys have helped
shape the securities laws and recovered tens of billions of dollars
on behalf of aggrieved victims. Beyond securing financial
recoveries for defrauded investors, Robbins Geller also specializes
in implementing corporate governance reforms, helping to improve
the financial markets for investors worldwide. [GN]

ACT II JEWELRY: Menz Appeals Ruling in West Suit to 7th Circuit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Cara Menz filed an appeal from a court ruling in the lawsuit titled
CYNTHIA WEST, et al. v. ACT II JEWELRY, LLC d/b/a LIA SOPHIA, et
al., Case No. 1:15-cv-05569, in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Plaintiffs
purchased pieces of jewelry from Lia Sophia for personal use.  The
Plaintiffs contend that although Lia Sophia continues to operate
its business in an on-line e-commerce operation, Lia Sophia refuses
to honor the Lifetime Guarantee.  The Plaintiffs also contend that
Lia Sophia induced its Sales Advisors to continue to sell and
purchase additional products and to recruit other Sales Advisors
during 2014, when Lia Sophia allegedly knew that it was not going
to honor the Lifetime
Guarantee.

The Plaintiffs include in their complaint breach of contract claims
brought by Hollander against Lia Sophia and KEC (Count I), claims
brought under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act (ICFA) brought by Hollander (Count II), state law
common law fraud claims brought by Hollander (Count III), unjust
enrichment claims brought by Hollander (Count IV), ICFA claims
brought by West (Count V), state law common law fraud claims
brought by West (Count VI), and unjust enrichment claims brought by
West (Count VII).

The appellate case is captioned as Cynthia West, et al. v. Cara
Menz, et al., Case No. 18-2502, in the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that the
Appellant's brief is due on or before August 20, 2018, for Cara
Menz.

Appellant CARA MENZ, of Redwood Falls, Minnesota, appears pro
se.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees CYNTHIA WEST, KRISTINE HOLLANDER, JENNIFER
ZIMMERMAN, MARY ROMAN and MARIE ESPOSITO, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, are represented by:

          Joseph Siprut, Esq.
          SIPRUT PC
          17 N. State Street
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 236-0000
          Facsimile: (312) 546-9963
          E-mail: jsiprut@siprut.com

Defendants-Appellees ACT II JEWELRY, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability corporation d/b/a LIA SOPHIA, and VICTOR K. KIAM, III,
are represented by:

          Eric Samore, Esq.
          SMITHAMUNDSEN, LLC
          150 N. Michigan Avenue
          Chicago, IL 60601-7621
          Telephone: (312) 894-3200
          E-mail: esamore@salawus.com


AGENTRA LLC: Made Unsolicited Calls, Gallion Suit Alleges
---------------------------------------------------------
STEVE GALLION, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. AGENTRA, LLC, and Does 1 through 10,
Defendants, Case No. 5:18-cv-01487-PSG-SHK (C.D. Cal., July 13,
2018) alleges that the Defendants made unsolicited calls in
violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

Agentra, LLC operates as an insurance agent. It offers life and
health insurance products. The company was incorporated in 2010 and
is based in Plano, Texas. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          Meghan E. George, Esq.
          Tom E. Wheeler, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: 877-206-4741
          Facsimile: 866-633-0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@ toddflaw.com
                  abacon@ toddflaw.com
                  mgeorge@toddflaw.com
                  twheeler@toddflaw.com


AIR EVAC: Bid to Move Class Action to County Court Tossed
---------------------------------------------------------
Joyce Hanson, writing for Law360, reports that a West Virginia
federal judge rejected on July 23 a proposed class's bid to move to
county court a lawsuit alleging that Air Evac EMS Inc. overcharged
for transporting medical patients, ruling that the air ambulance
company met its burden to establish jurisdiction under the U.S.
Class Action Fairness Act.

Senior U.S. District Judge Frederick P. Stamp Jr. said the
breach-of-implied-contract suit led by named plaintiff Troy Chanze
Sr., a patient transported by Air Evac to a West Virginia hospital,
can stay in federal court. [GN]


ALAMEDA COUNTY, CA: C. Turano's Suit Dismissed
----------------------------------------------
In the case, CYNTHIA N. TURANO, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-06953-KAW (N.D. Cal.), Magistrate
Judge Kandis A. Westmore of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California (i) granted Oakland Defendants'
motion to dismiss, (ii) granted Alameda Defendants' motion to
dismiss, and (iii) denied the Plaintiff's motion for leave to
amend.

On Dec. 5, 2017, Turano filed the instant class action, bringing
constitutional and various state claims related to her experience
while in the custody of Defendant Alameda County Sheriff's Office.
The Plaintiff also brought an individual action based on wrongful
arrest by Defendant Oakland Police Department.

On Dec. 25, 2016, at 1:21 p.m., the Plaintiff's husband, Edward J.
Turano, called the Oakland Police Department, claiming that the
Plaintiff had violated a temporary restraining order by taking a
camera that he stated belonged to him.  Mr. Turano stated that the
Plaintiff still resided in the house, and did not report any
physical contact or violence.

On Dec. 26, 2016, around 1:00 a.m., Defendants Duran, Adaya, and
Tloyao responded to Mr. Turano's call.  The officers interviewed
Mr. Turano, who asserted that he was being harassed by the
Plaintiff, that the Plaintiff had used his camera without
permission that afternoon, and that the Plaintiff had violated a
domestic violence restraining order by coming within three feet of
him.  The officers were informed that the camera had been returned
by 2:30 p.m.

At the time of the officers' arrival, the Plaintiff was asleep in
her bedroom.  The officers woke the Plaintiff up, handcuffed her,
and arrested her for violating the restraining order.  The
Plaintiff was taken to Santa Rita Jail, where she was transferred
into the custody of Defendant Alameda County Sheriff's Office.
Around 9:30 a.m., the Plaintiff was discharged, and she was given a
bus ticket and BART ticket.  Prior to her discharge, the Plaintiff
never saw the cells cleaned.  She took public transportation back
in her wet, visibly blood-stained clothing.

On Dec. 5, 2017, the Plaintiff filed the instant suit.  On Jan. 21,
2018, she filed her first amended complaint, asserting the
following claims: (1) violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment; (2) violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause; (3) violation of
the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and
seizure; (4) false imprisonment; (5) the California Bane Act; and
(6) negligence.  

The third, fourth, and fifth claims are brought against the Oakland
Defendants only; although not clear, it appears the first and
second claims are brought against the Alameda Defendants only, as
they concern allegations related to when the Plaintiff was in Santa
Rita jail.  The negligence claim is brought against both the
Oakland Defendants and Alameda Defendants.  Additionally, again
while it is unclear, it appears that the first, second, and
possibly sixth claim (with respect to the Alameda Defendants) are
brought as a class action, on behalf of all female arrestees placed
in the custody of the Alameda County Sheriff's Office from Dec. 26,
2016 to the filing date of the lawsuit.

Notably, the Plaintiff asserts in her lawsuit that approximately
six months prior to the Dec. 25, 2016 event, Defendants County of
Alameda and Alameda County Sheriff's Office settled a case with
"similar allegations" regarding the conditions of confinement and
failure to provide feminine hygiene products.  The Defendants
purportedly agreed to adopt policies and practices to remedy the
complaints.  The Plaintiff did not, however, explain what these
agreed to policies and practices entailed.

Pending before the Court are: (1) the motion to dismiss filed by
Defendants City of Oakland, Oakland Police Department, J. Adaya, J.
Durant, and Ryan Paul Tloyao ("Oakland Defendants"); (2) the motion
to dismiss filed by Defendants County of Alameda and Alameda County
Sheriff's office, Gregory J. Ahren, Brett Keteles, Tom Madigan, and
D. Skoldqvist ("Alameda Defendants"); and (3) the Plaintiff's
motion for leave to amend the complaint.

With respect to Oakland Defendants' motion to dismiss, Magistrate
Judge Westmore finds that the Fourth Amendment and false
imprisonment claims must be dismissed because, as alleged, there
was probable cause to arrest.  She also finds that further
amendment is futile.  Even if the Plaintiff asserts that she did
not, in fact, violate the restraining order and that the officers
did not see her do so, such allegations are insufficient to show no
probable cause in light of Mr. Turano's statement to the police
that the Plaintiff did violate the restraining order, thus
triggering the requirement to arrest per California Penal Code
Section 836(c)(1).  She therefore finds that leave to amend is not
appropriate.

For the same reasons the Section 1983 claims must be dismissed, so
must the Bane Act claim.  As she has discussed, the operative
complaint fails to allege an unlawful arrest or false imprisonment
claim because, as pled, the Oakland Defendants had probable cause
to arrest Plaintiff for violating the restraining order.  Thus, the
Plaintiff has failed to establish that there was interference or
attempted interference with a state or federal constitutional or
legal right.  

Because the Plaintiff has failed to establish a Fourth Amendment
violation or false imprisonment claim because she cannot
demonstrate that her arrest was made without probable cause, and
the City of Oakland is not responsible for the conditions of
Plaintiff's jail cell, the Judge dismissed without leave to amend
the negligence claim.

The Judge finds that the Plaintiff cannot amend the complaint to
establish that the Oakland Defendants lacked probable cause to
arrest.  As all of her claims against the Oakland Defendants are
based on her arrest, the Magistrate Judge concludes that amendment
is futile.  Therefore, she denied the Plaintiff's motion to amend.

As to Alameda Defendants' motion to dismiss, the Magistrate Judge
finds that (i) the Plaintiff is not required to plead facts
demonstrating subjective intent to punish; (ii) the Plaintiff has
adequately alleged a Fourteenth Amendment cruel and unusual
punishment claim based on conditions of confinement; (iii) the
Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts demonstrating that the
Alameda Defendants acted with discriminatory intent; (iv) the
Plaintiff fails to give the Alameda Defendants sufficient notice of
what specific facts her negligence claim is based on; and (v) the
Plaintiff has failed to adequately plead Monell liability.
Plaintiff, however, is given leave to amend but is given leave to
amend.

Finally, the Alameda Defendants argue that they have immunity
against the Plaintiff's negligence claim under various provisions
of the California Government Code.  The Magistrate Judge says she
needs not decide this issue because the Plaintiff's negligence
claim is not adequately pled and must be dismissed for that
reason.

For the reasons she stated, Magistrate Judge Westmore (i) granted
Oakland Defendants' motion to dismiss without leave to amend; (ii)
denied the Plaintiff's motion to amend -- which was directed only
at the claims against the Oakland Defendants -- because amendment
is futile; and (iii) granted Alameda Defendants' motion to dismiss
with leave to amend.  While the Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts
for a Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claim, she has
not sufficiently pled facts establishing liability as to any of the
named Defendants.  The Plaintiff may file an amended complaint
within 30 days of the date of the Order, consistent with the
Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 20, 2018 Order is available at
https://bit.ly/2LNrp90 from Leagle.com.

Cynthia N Turano, Plaintiff, represented by Yolanda Huang --
yhuang.law@gmail.com -- Attorney at Law.

County of Alameda, Alameda County Sheriff's Office, Gregory J.
Ahern, Brett Keteles, Tom Madigan & D Skoldqvist, Defendants,
represented by Gregory B. Thomas -- gthomas@bjg.com -- Boornazian,
Jensen Garthe.

City Of Oakland, J Durant, J Adaya & Ryan Paul Tloyao, Defendants,
represented by Colin Troy Bowen -- cbowen@oaklandcityattorney.org
-- Oakland City Attorney Litigation, Jamilah A. Jefferson --
jamilah.jefferson@stanfordalumni.org -- Oakland City Attorney's
Office & Otis McGee, Jr. -- mcgeejr@oaklandcityattorney.org --
Oakland City Attorney.

Oakland Police Department, Defendant, represented by Colin Troy
Bowen, Oakland City Attorney Litigation & Otis McGee, Jr., Oakland
City Attorney.

ALLIED INTERSTATE: Obtains Favorable Ruling in FDCPA Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Alison Frankel, writing for Reuters, reports that you have to give
creativity points to Reed Smith, defense counsel for a debt
collection outfit called Allied Interstate. After the U.S. Supreme
Court and 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals stymied Allied's
strategy to end a 2013 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act class
action by paying the lead plaintiff his full potential damages,
Reed Smith came up with an alternative argument: The plaintiff's
refusal to accept Allied's offer made him an unsuitable candidate
to lead the class action because he's not a typical class member.
His "unique circumstances as the only member of the putative class
to have been compensated for his claim have irreparably compromised
his role as lead plaintiff in this litigation," Reed Smith argued
in a brief opposing class certification.

Somehow, U.S. District Judge Katherine Forrest of Manhattan bought
it. Earlier in July, Judge Forrest denied lead plaintiff Gilberto
Franco's motion for class certification. The judge said Mr. Franco
hadn't explained why he rejected Allied's offer, leaving her with
doubts about his ability to represent the interests of the class.

"Absent a factual record from plaintiff setting forth his rationale
and expected conduct in light of past behavior, the court is left
with the distinct possibilities that: (1) this litigation is
entirely lawyer-driven; and/or (2) that while the claims plaintiff
has asserted would be satisfied by monetary relief, this particular
plaintiff does not plan on agreeing to a monetary settlement,"
Judge Forrest wrote. "If plaintiff is willing to forgo recovery on
his own behalf, there is no telling how many potential class
members he is willing to prejudice for the 'greater good.' Assuming
for the moment that there are 1,000 potential class members, would
plaintiff (and his counsel) accept an offer that makes 750 of those
class members whole? How about 500? And what if the proposed offer
made all class members whole, but did not provide for attorneys'
fees and costs?"

The judge rejected arguments by Mr. Franco's lawyers at Stern
Thomasson that Allied's strategy was a gimmick that "would permit
all defendants to unilaterally make class actions impossible by
simply mailing a check for a paltry sum and avoid class liability
and significantly higher amounts of class damages." Judge Forrest
discounted that concern, calling it "speculative" and "not based in
any facts tethered to this case."

"I don't think it's so speculative -- and lawyers at Stern
Thomasson don't either. On July 24, Andrew Thomasson told me his
client will be filing a request for interlocutory appeal at the 2nd
Circuit," Ms. Frankel said.

"I hope the appeals court allows it. The facts of this particular
case are idiosyncratic, and clearly Judge Forrest thought there was
reason to question the motives of the named plaintiff and his
lawyers. But her reasoning give class action defendants a way to
kill class actions using a variation of the technique shot down in
the Supreme Court's 2016 decision in Campbell-Ewald v. Gomez.
Already, a TCPA class action defendant, ZocDoc, has cited Judge
Forrest's decision in a 2nd Circuit appeal of class certification.
If the judge's Allied decision stands, ZocDoc will be the first in
a long line."

The Allied class action actually predates the Supreme Court's
Campbell-Ewald case. It was filed back in June 2013. A few months
later, using a then-common defense tactic to end class actions by
offering full judgments to lead plaintiffs, Allied said it would
pay Gilberto Franco $1,501, plus reasonable fees. After he rejected
the offer, Allied argued its offer had mooted the case. Judge
Forrest dismissed the class action in 2014.

The 2nd Circuit revived it in 2015, holding that Franco's claim was
not mooted by Allied's offer because there was no entry of judgment
against the debt collector. Allied went back to the drawing board
and proposed that Judge Forrest enter a $1,501 judgment for Franco
and then dismiss the case. (Allied's filing came on the same day
the 2nd Circuit issued its mandate.) She obliged in November 2015.

Mr. Franco's lawyers went back to the 2nd Circuit. While the
appeals court had the case, the Supreme Court ruled in
Campbell-Ewald that an unaccepted offer of judgment to a lead class
action plaintiff does not moot the case, which remains alive as
long as the plaintiff has "a concrete interest, however small, in
the litigation's outcome." The Supreme Court left open the
possibility that a case might be mooted if a class action defendant
actually tendered payment to a recalcitrant lead plaintiff but the
2nd Circuit slammed that door shut in 2017's Geismann v. ZocDoc.

Under Campbell-Ewald and Geismann precedent, the 2nd Circuit said
in a summary order last April, Franco's claims are not moot.
"Allied Interstate's attempts to circumvent this clear precedent
are unavailing," the court said. "We see no meritorious grounds for
distinguishing Geismann."

With the class action revived for a second time, Allied's lawyers
at Reed Smith came up with the new argument that the class couldn't
be certified because Mr. Franco doesn't represent classwide
interests. As if to drive that point home, the defendant actually
sent a check for more than $2,750 to
Mr. Franco's lawyers. "This amount is almost triple what plaintiff
could have hoped to recover on his individual claim," Allied
argued. "Regardless of whether this event moots plaintiff's claim
as a matter of law, the fact remains that plaintiff claim has been
fully compensated. This economic reality demonstrates that
plaintiff -- who has been compensated in excess of the amount of
his claim -- is neither a typical nor an adequate representative of
the putative class, which may contain members who have not been so
compensated. Mr. Franco's unique circumstances as the only member
of the putative class to have been compensated for his claim have
irreparably compromised his role as lead plaintiff in this
litigation."

Mr. Franco's lawyers, who pointed out that they refused to accept
Allied's check, said nothing about the case required an individual
inquiry. In an accompanying declaration, Franco lawyer Andrew
Thomasson said, among other things, that Allied's offer didn't
satisfy Mr. Franco's claim because it did not include any classwide
relief or fees and costs for plaintiffs' counsel. (Class lawyers in
the Campbell-Ewald case at the Supreme Court made the same
argument.) In addition, Stern Thomasson asked Judge Forrest for
permission to supplement the record if she had additional questions
about Franco's suitability.

"Instead, Judge Forrest denied class certification because, she
ruled, Franco hadn't explained his motive for refusing Allied's
offer. I haven't previously seen a judge call on a prospective lead
plaintiff to explain the decision not to accept a settlement offer,
and, frankly, I'm not sure that a plaintiff could offer an
explanation, assuming he or she consulted with lawyers on the
offer, without compromising attorney-client privilege," Ms. Frankel
said.

The judge ordered Allied and Franco to propose a schedule for the
resolution of Franco's individual claims, which raises additional
complication about Franco's standing to appeal Judge Forrest's
class certification ruling if the 2nd Circuit declines to grant an
interlocutory appeal. That's all the more reason for the appeals
court to take this case now.

Ms. Frankel emailed Allied counsel Casey Laffey of Reed Smith but
didn't hear back.  [GN]

ALLTRAN FINANCIAL: Klotsche Files Suit Alleging FDCPA Violation
---------------------------------------------------------------
LAUREN A. KLOTSCHE, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED v. ALLTRAN FINANCIAL, LP, Case No. 2:18-cv-04008-SJF-ARL
(E.D.N.Y., July 12, 2018), alleges that the Defendant's debt
collection letters violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Alltran is a Texas Limited Partnership and a New York Foreign
Limited Partnership.  Alltran possesses a license from the New York
City Department of Consumer Affairs to operate as a "Debt
Collection Agency."[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mitchell L. Pashkin, Esq.
          775 Park Avenue, Suite 255
          Huntington, NY 11743
          Telephone: (631) 335-1107
          E-mail: mpash@verizon.net


AMERICAN CAMPUS: Settlement in Student Housing Suit Has Final OK
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BRIAN FELLOWS, on his own behalf and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN CAMPUS
COMMUNITIES SERVICES, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No.
4:16-cv-01611-JAR (E.D. Mo.), Judge John A. Ross of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern
Division, granted the Plaintiff's motion for final approval of the
proposed class action settlement, and for an award of attorneys'
fees and expenses for the Class Counsel.

Fellows brings the case on behalf of a class of all those similarly
situated with respect to the Defendants' alleged marketing
practices with respect to their student-focused housing located in
Columbia, Missouri.  The Plaintiff's case stems from the
Defendants' alleged conduct in the marketing of their lease rates
for their apartment units.

Specifically, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants advertised
"monthly" lease rates for their apartment units that are lower than
the actual monthly rate charged to their student tenants in their
lease agreements.  He alleged this marketing was deceptive, and
asserted claims pursuant to the Missouri Merchandising Practices
Act, and for unjust enrichment.  In the wake of the filing of the
case, the Defendants changed the manner in which their market their
properties, replacing the "monthly" verbiage to instead refer to
"installment" payments.

The proposed Settlement's details are contained in the Notice of
Settlement signed by the parties, which was submitted to the Court
on Jan. 30, 2018, and incorporated into the Court's Preliminary
Approval Orders.

The Settlement Class is defined as any and all persons who entered
into a residential lease with ACC (collectively and individually,
the Defendants and all of their respective past, present, and
future affiliates, parents, subsidiaries, sister companies, and all
of their respective past, present and future officials, agents,
employees, representatives, shareholders, partners, members,
directors, officers, insurers, reinsurers, predecessors,
successors, heirs, assigns, and attorneys) for housing located in
the State of Missouri where: (1) the lease contract was not based
on a standard calendar month occupancy, (2) the person paid ACC the
full monthly advertised rate for the first month when occupancy
began (and the eleven subsequent months), and (3) the person was
not permitted to occupy some portion of the first month when
occupancy began without paying an additional amount to do so but
nonetheless paid rent at the advertised monthly rate.  The
Settlement Class will refer to persons who entered into this new
lease who occupied the property after Nov. 1, 20121 through the
date that ACC sold the properties on Nov. 15, 2016.

The Court previously preliminarily approved the Settlement of the
action on behalf of a Class on Feb. 2, 2018, which approval was
later amended on March 6, 2018.  The Notice issued per the Notice
Plan approved by the Court, and the Class Members were afforded the
opportunity to submit claims, opt out of the Settlement, or object
to the Settlement.

The matter now comes before the Court for final approval and for
approval of attorneys' fees and a service award for the Class
Representative.

Judge Ross finds that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and in
the best interests of the Class.  He further finds that the Class,
which was preliminarily certified for settlement purposes, should
now be finally certified for Settlement.  Finally, he concludes
that the award of attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of
$125,000 is appropriate, and that the Service Award of $5,000 is
appropriate.

Consistent with the foregoing, Judge Ross approved the Settlement.
He granted the Plaintiff's motion for final approval of class
action settlement and motion for attorneys' fees.  The Defendant
will pay $275,000 into a fund for the benefit of the Class.  Signal
Interactive Media, LLC will distribute the Settlement proceeds
consistent with the Settlement Agreement.  The Defendant will also
pay $125,000 to the Class Counsel as attorneys' fees and costs, and
$5,000 to the Class Representative Brian Fellows as a Service
Award.

All payments due to be made by the Defendant pursuant to the
Settlement Agreement will be made within 30 days of the Order.  The
matter is dismissed with prejudice; and the Clerk is directed to
enter judgment consistent with the foregoing.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 20, 2018 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://bit.ly/2vazpGL from Leagle.com.

Brian Fellows, on his own behalf and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by James J. Rosemergy,
CAREY AND DANIS & Jeffrey J. Lowe -- jlowe@careydanis.com -- CAREY
AND DANIS.

American Campus Communities Services, Inc., Defendant, represented
by Deborah J. Campbell -- deborah.campbell@dentons.com -- DENTONS
US LLP, Leanna Marie Anderson -- leanna.anderson@dentons.com --
DENTONS US LLP & Alice Marie Aten -- alice.aten@dentons.com --
DENTONS US LLP.

ARIZONA: Permanent Injunction Entered in Driver's Licenses Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Lucrecia Rivas Valenzuela, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Doug
Ducey, et al., Defendants, Case No. CV-16-03072-PHX-DGC (D. Ariz.),
Judge David G. Campbell of the U.S. District Court for the Distirct
of Arizona (i) denied the Defendants' motion to amend the class
definition; (ii) granted the Defendants' motion for summary
judgment on behalf of Gov. Ducey; (iii) granted the Plaintiffs'
motion for summary judgment; (iv) granted the Plaintiffs' motion to
seal; and (v) entered a permanent injunction.

The class action challenges Arizona's policy of denying driver's
licenses, or requiring additional documentation before issuing
licenses, to noncitizens with federally issued Employment
Authorization Documents ("EADs") containing the code "(c)(14)."

On Dec. 6, 2017, the Court certified the class, under Rule
23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of all
noncitizens holding (EADs) coded (c)(14) who are being denied or
will be denied the ability to present their EADs alone as
sufficient proof of federally authorized presence in order to
obtain an Arizona driver's license, as a result of the Defendants'
2013 and 2017 policies and related practices pursuant to Executive
Order 2012-06, Arizona Department of Transportation ("ADOT") Policy
16.1.4, and ADOT Policy 16.1.4's implementation.

The Defendants have filed a motion to amend the class definition,
and the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment.  The
Court heard oral argument on June 13, 2018.

The Defendants seek to narrow the class definition to (c)(14) EAD
holders who are Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA") derivative
beneficiaries and Unonimmigrant visa ("U-visa") applicants.  They
argue that including all (c)(14) EAD holders in the class is
improper because they are not all treated alike.  The named
Plaintiffs may obtain licenses by providing additional documents,
but, the Defendants assert, other (c)(14) EAD holders cannot obtain
licenses.  The Defendants argue that the named Plaintiffs cannot
represent these other (c)(14) holders because they suffer a
distinct injury.

They ask the Court to modify the class definition by adding the
following italicized language: All noncitizens holding (EADs) coded
(c)(14) by receiving relief under either the VAWA or U-visa
programs who are being denied or will be denied the ability to
present their EADs alone as sufficient proof of federally
authorized presence in order to obtain an Arizona driver's license,
as a result of the Defendants' 2013 and 2017 policies and related
practices pursuant to Executive Order 2012-06, ADOT Policy 16.1.4,
and ADOT Policy 16.1.4's implementation.

Judge Campbell will deny the Defendants' motion to amend the class
definition.  He finds that as persons subject to the challenged
policy, the named Plaintiffs have claims typical of the class
despite the differing bases under which each class member obtained
a (c)(14) EAD.  There is no conflict among class members'
interests, and no one disputes the qualifications of the
Plaintiffs' counsel.  A class under Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate
because the Plaintiffs seek uniform relief from a practice
applicable to all of them, and a single injunction or declaratory
judgment would provide relief to each member of the class.  The
Judge also cannot conclude that changes based on litigation tactics
provide a legitimate ground for subdividing the class.  Accepting
such maneuvering would permit the Defendants to defeat the purposes
of Rule 23.

The Judge will grant summary judgment in favor of Gov. Ducey.  He
finds that the policy changes from 2013 forward do not appear to
have resulted from the Executive Order, and the Plaintiffs provide
no evidence of any other involvement in the policy changes by the
Governor's office.  Thus, even construing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the Plaintiffs, it does not show that the
Governor or the Executive Order required ADOT to declare that
(c)(14) EAD holders are ineligible for licenses (or eligible if
they present additional documents).  Gov. Ducey's general duty to
enforce Arizona law, and his general oversight of ADOT, are not
sufficient to connect him to the enforcement of ADOT's policy with
respect to (c)(14) EAD holders.

The Defendants also characterize the Plaintiffs' preemption claim
as attacking mere documentary burdens on (c)(14) holders, and argue
that these documentary requirements are not classifications.  But
the policy the Plaintiffs attack, according to the Judge, is the
three-part test and the Defendants' implementation of that test
(through ADOT's Policy and MVD policies and practices) with respect
to (c)(14) EAD holders.  The Defendants' (c)(14) policies are based
on the very test the Ninth Circuit found preempted in the Dream Act
case.  The Defendants present no evidence or argument that
application of the test to deferred action recipients with (c)(14)
EADs is any more appropriate than was its application to deferred
action recipients holding (c)(33) EADs.  The Court is bound by the
Ninth Circuit's decision in the Dream Act case.  Hence, the Judge
holds that the Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on their
Supremacy Clause claim.

The Judge declines to reach the merits of the Plaintiffs' Equal
Protection claim.  Given the formidable Equal Protection concerns
raised by Arizona's policy, he instead based his decision on the
Supremacy Clause.

The Plaintiffs seek (1) a permanent injunction prohibiting the
Defendants from implementing or enforcing Arizona's
unconstitutional policy and practice of denying deferred action
recipients with (c)(14)-coded (EADs) the ability to present their
EADs alone to establish authorized presence to qualify for driver's
licenses and state identification cards; and (2) a declaration
making it clear that the Defendants' policies and practices,
including Executive Order 2012-06, ADOT Policy 16.1.4, and
Arizona's criteria for federally authorized presence, violate both
the Supremacy Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.

Judge Campbell holds that the government cannot suffer harm from an
injunction that merely ends an unlawful practice.  And the public
has little interest in the Defendants continuing a policy that
violates the Supremacy Clause.  Because the Court certified a class
of (c)(14) EAD holders under Rule 23, the injunction will grant
relief to the entire class.

Given that the Ninth Circuit already instructed Defendants in the
Dream Act case that their three-part test for authorized presence
violates the Supremacy Clause, but the Defendants nonetheless
continued to rely on the test (and indeed seem to still believe in
its validity), the Judge agrees with the Plaintiffs that
declaratory relief will serve a useful purpose in finally putting
this issue to rest and giving Plaintiffs relief from the
uncertainty that gave rise to the Dream Act case and now this case.
But he also agrees with the Defendants that the declaration the
Plaintiffs request is broader than necessary.  Particularly, the
declaration should not address the Executive Order or the
Governor's office because the Plaintiffs have not established a
link between the unlawful (c)(14) policy and the Governor or
Executive Order.  And the declaration will not address the alleged
Equal Protection violation because the Court does not reach the
issue.

Finally, the Plaintiffs move to seal portions of their statement of
facts in support of summary judgment, exhibits in support of
summary judgment, the Defendants' reply in support of summary
judgment and response to the Plaintiffs' cross-motion, and the
Defendants' response to the Plaintiffs' statement of facts.  The
Judge has reviewed the stipulations and redacted materials, and is
satisfied with the parties' resolution.  The submitted materials
redact certain sensitive identifying or personal information about
the Plaintiffs, but leave unredacted the Plaintiffs' names and
other information that has previously been disclosed in public
filings or hearings.  He will order the sealing of the documents
pursuant to the stipulations.

For these reasons, Judge Campbell (i) denied the Defendants' motion
to amend the class definition; (ii) granted the Defendants' motion
for summary judgment with respect to Gov. Ducey and denied as to
the remaining Defendants; (iii) granted the Plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment, declaratory relief, and a permanent injunction;
and (iv) granted the Plaintiffs' motion to seal.

Pursuant to the parties' stipulations, the Clerk is directed to
file under seal Docs. 167, 168, 178, and 179.  The redacted
documents attached to the stipulations and filed separately (Docs.
176, 182, 186, 187, 188, 189) will remain in the public docket.

The Judge declared that ADOT and MVD's policy and practice of
treating noncitizens holding (c)(14)-coded EADs differently than
other EAD holders is preempted under the Supremacy Clause of the
U.S. Constitution.  The Defendants, their officials, agents,
employees, assigns, and all persons acting in concert or
participating with them are permanently enjoined from implementing
or enforcing a policy or practice of denying deferred action
recipients with (c)(14)-coded EADs the ability to present their
EADs alone to establish authorized presence for purposes of
qualifying for Arizona driver's licenses.

The Clerk will terminate the action.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 20, 2018 Order is available at
https://bit.ly/2MbNvhC from Leagle.com.

Lucrecia Rivas Valenzuela & Marcos Gonzalez, Plaintiffs,
represented by Alvaro M. Huerta, National Immigration Law Center,
Daniel R. Ortega, Jr., Ortega Law Firm PC, Esther H. Sung --
sung@nilc.org -- National Immigration Law Center, Jessica R.
Hanson, National Immigration Law Center, Julia Alejandra Gomez
Hernandez, MALDEF, Karen Cassandra Tumlin -- tumlin@nilc.org --
National Immigration Law Center, Nicholas David Espiritu --
espiritu@nilc.org -- National Immigration Law Center, Nora A.
Preciado -- preciado@nilc.org -- National Immigration Law Center &
Tanya Broder -- broder@nilc.org -- National Immigration Law
Center.

Isabel Aceituno Lopez, Araceli Franco Gonzalez & Maria Del Carmen
Palafox, Plaintiffs, represented by Alvaro M. Huerta, National
Immigration Law Center, Daniel R. Ortega, Jr., Ortega Law Firm PC,
Esther H. Sung, National Immigration Law Center, Jessica R. Hanson,
National Immigration Law Center, Julia Alejandra Gomez Hernandez,
MALDEF, Karen Cassandra Tumlin, National Immigration Law Center,
Nicholas David Espiritu, National Immigration Law Center, Nora A.
Preciado, National Immigration Law Center & Tanya Br

Doug Ducey, Governor of the State of Arizona, in his official
capacity, John S Halikowski, Director of the Arizona Department of
Transportation, in his official capacity & Eric Jorgenson, Director
of the Motor Vehicle Division of the Arizona Department of
Transportation, in His official capacity, Defendants, represented
by Doug C. Northup -- dnorthup@fclaw.com -- Fennemore Craig PC &
Sean Thomas Hood -- shood@fclaw.com -- Fennemore Craig PC.

AUSTRALIA: Wilsons Creek Residents Sue Over Telstra Tower
---------------------------------------------------------
Asian Shand, writing for Echo Net Daily, reports that a nationwide
class action is being filed against government and industry for
harmful exposure to electromagnetic radiation (EMR) by Wilsons
Creek locals over the development application for a Telstra
microwave tower in their valley.

The effects of electromagnetic radiation (EMR) is a contentious
issue for many; those who have sought to avoid EMR towers for
health reasons have been vilified.

However, there is an increasing body of scientific literature that
is now challenging the safety of EMR, and Oceania Radiofrequency
Scientific Advisory Association (ORSAA) is a group of concerned
scientists from a range of disciplines that have been bringing this
material together.

Locally, this is coming to a head around the proposed 35m Telstra
microwave tower in Wilsons Creek with locals and other concerned
community members forming the Environment and Community Safe from
Radiation Association (ECSRA).

ECSRA told The Echo they are now in the process of filing a
nationwide class action against the government and industry, 'for
failing to protect the citizens of Australia against exposure to
harmful EMR from consumer products and industrial facilities such
as mobile phone towers, and for forcing, without public consent, a
potential carcinogen onto all Australians.'

And they have some impressive backing, with barrister Raymond
Broomhall from former Justice Michael Kirby's chambers coming on
board to run the case.

One local resident of 26 years, Barbara Cummings, told The Echo
that she will have to consider selling her home if the Wilsons
Creek tower goes ahead.

300m from home
'The apex of the tower will be directly in line with our house,
only 300m away' said Barbara. 'My husband already has cancer and we
don't need this as well.'

According to Victor Leach from ORSAA, 'There is published evidence
in the scientific literature reporting increased prevalence of
adverse neurobehavioural symptoms and/or cancer in populations
living at distances of less than 500 metres from base stations.'

Sufficient evidence
'Experts such as oncologist Professor Lennart Hardell (at Örebro
University Hospital in Örebro, Sweden) now consider there is
sufficient evidence for radiofrequency (RF) radiation to be
classified as a human Group 1 carcinogen according to the
International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) definition. It
is currently classified as a group 2B as a "possible" human
carcinogen.'

ECSRA have pointed out that there are already a number of towers
throughout the Byron Shire and say that that 'the imminent 5G
rollout, which is an integral part of the government/telco black
spot program, requires one tower approximately every two to twelve
houses.'[GN]

AVENTURA DANCE: Sued by Fenwick Over Unsolicited Telemarketing
--------------------------------------------------------------
JALINE FENWICK, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. AVENTURA DANCE CRUISE, LLC, Case No. 0:18-cv-61587-BB
(S.D. Fla., July 11, 2018), alleges that in violation of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, the Defendant engages in
unsolicited telemarketing directed towards prospective customers
with no regard for consumers' privacy rights.

Aventura Dance Cruise, LLC, is a Florida limited liability company
with its principal address in Aventura, Florida.  The Defendant
promotes itself as the world's largest Latin dance cruise.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq.
          HIRALDO P.A.
          401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 400-4713
          E-mail: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com


BASF SE: Emma Chemicals Alleges Price-Fixing of Diisocyanate
------------------------------------------------------------
EMMA CHEMICALS CO., INC., individually and on behalf of all those
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. BASF SE; BASF CORP.; BAYER AG;
BAYER CORP.; BAYER MATERIALSCIENCE LLC; COVESTRO LLC; DOW CHEMICAL
CO.; HUNTSMAN INTERNATIONAL LLC; HUNTSMAN CORP.; MITSUI CHEMICALS
AMERICA, INC.; MITSUI CHEMICALS, INC.; MITSUI CHEMICALS & SKC
POLYURETHANES, INC.; MCNS POLYURETHANES USA INC. WANHUA CHEMICAL
(AMERICA) CO. LTD.; WANHUA CHEMICAL GROUP CO., LTD., Defendants,
Case No. 2:18-cv-02958-GJP (E.D. Pa., July 16, 2018) alleges
violation of the Sherman Act, and the Clayton Act.

The Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that the Defendants
conspired to violate federal antitrust laws by fixing, raising and
maintaining the prices of methylene diphenyl diisocyanate ("MDI")
and toluene diisocyanate ("TDI") in the United States.

The Defendants collectively carried out their plan to reverse the
oversupply in the MDI and TDI markets by permanently closing and
temporarily suspending operations of certain MDI and TDI
manufacturing plants located around the world, as well as operating
plants at reduced capacity. Prior to the conspiracy, plant-related
issues were rare, with only eight incidents reported during the
years 2012-15. Thereafter, however, the Defendants reported at
least nine plant closures or production limitations that resulted
in reduced supply of MDI and TDI in 2016, at least 15 plant
closures or production limitations in 2017, and at least eight
plant closures or production limitations thus far in 2018. This
sudden incidence of plant closures and production limitations among
all major manufacturers and sellers of MDI and TDI products is
unprecedented and cannot be explained by mere coincidence. Rather,
it is the result of an illegal agreement among the Defendants.

As a result of the Defendants' conspiracy, TDI and MDI prices have
reached unprecedented high levels. The Defendants' conspiracy has
resulted in a minimum millions of dollars in overcharges for MDI
and TDI purchasers.

BASF SE operates as a chemical company worldwide. It operates
through five segments: Chemicals, Performance Products, Functional
Materials & Solutions, Agricultural Solutions, and Oil & Gas. BASF
SE was founded in 1865 and is headquartered in Ludwigshafen am
Rhein, Germany. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Linda P. Nussbaum, Esq.
          Bart D. Cohen, Esq.
          Fred T. Isquith, Jr., Esq.
          NUSSBAUM LAW GROUP, P.C.
          1211 Avenue of the Americas, 40th Floor
          New York, NY 10036-8718
          Telephone: (917) 438-9102
          E-mail: lnussbaum@nussbaumpc.com
                  bcohen@nussbaumpc.com
                  fisquith@nussbaumpc.com


BEHR DAYTON: Groundwater Contamination Case Ruling Affirmed
-----------------------------------------------------------
Janet, Janet & Suggs on July 24 disclosed that in a unanimous
opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
has affirmed a lower court's decision to permit a lawsuit filed by
Dayton, Ohio residents for toxic groundwater contamination to
proceed as a class action. The ruling helps ensure that plaintiffs
who consolidate in a single lawsuit a large number of claims that
are economically infeasible to resolve in numerous separate
lawsuits, will remain able to isolate and efficiently resolve key
issues in complex cases.

"The Sixth Circuit rightly concluded that the district court
appropriately certified key issues in this case for class-wide
resolution," said Howard A. Janet -- hjanet@JJSjustice.com --
managing partner of Janet, Janet & Suggs, LLC. "This preserves the
right of our clients, who are primarily low-income, to present
their claims to a jury. The ruling also ensures the parties will
not have to litigate the same complex legal and scientific issues
hundreds of times, which would be a tremendous waste of scarce
judicial resources." Janet, Janet & Suggs, LLC is the class action
law firm that serves as lead counsel for Plaintiffs.

The underlying lawsuit concerns contamination of the McCook Field
neighborhood over many years by two large underground toxic plumes
containing known and probable human carcinogens. The neighborhood
is now a Superfund site. Thirty named plaintiffs, representing
owners of approximately 540 residential properties, filed suit in
2008 against Chrysler Motors LLC, Behr Dayton Thermal Products,
LLC, Behr America, Inc. (which acquired Chrysler after its
bankruptcy), and Aramark Uniform & Career Apparel, Inc. Plaintiffs
allege that degreasing operations at a Chrysler automotive plant
and dry cleaning operations at an Aramark facility created two
overlapping toxic plumes, which Defendants knew about but failed to
remediate for many years. As a result, hazardous vapors have risen
(and continue to rise) from the plumes into Plaintiffs' homes,
endangering their health and vastly diminishing their property
values. Toxic vapors in the McCook Field neighborhood are so severe
that Dayton authorities closed a local elementary school for safety
concerns. The plumes also have the potential to contaminate
Dayton's entire water supply. (The vapors that the plumes emit
contain trichloroethylene ("TCE"), which, according to the EPA, "is
carcinogenic to people through all routes of exposure"; and
tetrachloroethylene ("PCE," a/k/a "PERC"), which the U.S. EPA
classifies as "likely to be carcinogenic to humans.")

After extensive, costly document discovery and depositions,
Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification in 2015. The
motion asked the district court to permit a jury to decide, on a
class-wide basis, whether Defendants were liable for the
contamination (pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(3)). Plaintiffs requested in the alternative that a jury be
allowed to resolve, on a class-wide basis, seven key issues in the
case (pursuant to Rule 23(c)(4)). These issues, which are central
to the claims of every class member, include the responsibility of
each Defendant for the plumes, whether it was foreseeable that
Defendants' activities would create the plumes and harm the
Plaintiffs, and whether Defendants negligently failed to stop and
remediate the contamination.

Judge Walter H. Rice, of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio, denied class certification under Rule
23(b)(3) as to the entire issue of liability, finding that common
questions did not predominate over individual ones. But the court
granted class certification under Rule 23(c)(4) on the seven
important, common issues Plaintiffs identified. Defendants appealed
the district court's Rule 23(c)(4) certification of issue classes.
Defendants contended that appellate courts are divided on whether a
court may certify a Rule 23(c)(4) issue class if it finds that
common question do not predominate over individual ones as to the
entire issue of liability. Defendants argued that the Sixth Circuit
should adopt the "narrow view" in this alleged debate, and hold
that the district court abused its discretion by certifying issue
classes under Rule 23(c)(4) after it had denied certification of
the issue of liability as a whole.

A unanimous panel of the Sixth Circuit disagreed, and affirmed the
district court's order. Writing for the panel, Judge Jane Stranch
emphasized the wide discretion of a district court on whether to
certify a class. The panel agreed with the "broad view" of issue
certification—the majority position among federal appellate
courts. The broad view "permits utilizing Rule 23(c)(4) even where
predominance has not been satisfied for the cause of action as a
whole." Under the broad view, courts analyze whether the
predominance requirement has been met as to each common issue,
rather than as to the entire issue of liability. "Because each
issue may be resolved with common proof," the court held, "and
because individualized inquiries do not outweigh common questions,
the seven issue classes that the district court certified satisfy
Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement."

The Sixth Circuit also held that litigating the seven issues on a
class-wide basis was a superior method of resolving the case when
compared with the alternative—hundreds of separate lawsuits
concerning the same fundamental issues. Judge Stranch observed that
"the properties are in a low-income neighborhood, meaning that
class members might not otherwise be able to pursue their claims.
Even if the class members brought suit individually, the seven
certified issues would need to be addressed in each of their
cases." Thus, "[r]esolving the issues in one fell swoop would
conserve the resources of both the court and the parties."

The opinion casts doubt on the extent of the division among federal
appellate courts on the question of whether the "broad view" or
"narrow view" is correct. The court observed that "any potency the
narrow view once held [in the Fifth Circuit, where the narrow view
originated] has dwindled," and that the Eleventh Circuit has given
only "tenuous" support to the narrow view. The court also rejected
as premature Defendants' argument that litigating the case as an
issues class action violated the Seventh Amendment right to a
jury.

"This ruling is a key victory on the path to obtaining full justice
for our disadvantaged clients, who have suffered the severe
negative effects of contamination of their neighborhood by
carcinogens over many years," said Patrick A. Thronson of Janet,
Janet & Suggs, LLC, who co-authored the brief submitted on behalf
of Plaintiffs. "It is also a positive, meaningful development in
class action law as a whole. The decision will help ensure that
other plaintiffs and defendants remain able to efficiently resolve
key discrete issues in complex cases, saving litigants and courts
time and money."

The lawsuit is captioned Terry Martin, et al. v. Behr Dayton
Thermal Products, LLC, et al., case no. 3:08-cv-00326 in the
district court, and case no. 17-3663 in the Sixth Circuit.

                 About Janet, Janet & Suggs, LLC

Janet, Janet, and Suggs, LLC (JJS) -- http://www.JJSjustice.com--
represents plaintiffs in complex, high stakes litigation in class
action, environmental contamination, medical malpractice, sexual
abuse, fraudulent business practices, product liability, qui tam,
and Federal Tort Claims Act cases.  The firm has successfully
resolved claims against some of the nation's largest corporations,
including Honeywell, BP America, The Johns Hopkins Hospital, Penn
State University, DuPont, Dow Corning, Baxter Healthcare, Bayer,
Wyeth, and the Mayo Clinic, among many others.

JJS has won verdicts and negotiated settlements that collectively
exceed $1 billion, working alone or in collaboration with other
firms. The class action lawyers at JJS achieved a $190 million
settlement in a class action lawsuit against Johns Hopkins Hospital
for sexual misconduct by a physician, a $19.5 million settlement in
a class action lawsuit against BP America and ARCO for mining
contamination in Nevada, and a $10 million settlement in a New
Jersey class action lawsuit against Honeywell International for
toxic hexavalent chromium contamination. Headquartered in
Baltimore, Maryland the firm has a national practice, with offices
in nine states. [GN]

BETTA BURGER: Seeks to Hire Bach Law Offices as Attorney
--------------------------------------------------------
Betta Burger Group, LLC – Series B, seeks authority from the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois to employ
Bach Law Offices, Inc., as attorney to the Debtor.

Betta Burger requires Bach Law Offices to:

   a. assist and represent the Debtor in matters concerning
      negotiations with creditors;

   b. prepare a plan and disclosures statement;

   c. examine and resolve claims filed against the estate;

   d. prepare and prosecute adversary matters; and

   e. represent the Debtor in matters before the Bankruptcy
      Court.

Bach Law Offices will be paid at the hourly rate of $425.

As of the petition date no funds have been tendered to Bach Law
Offices.  However, the Law Offices of Schneider & Stone is holding
funds in the amount of $7,215.01 as a retainer for three cases
(Betta Burger Group, LLC – Case No. 18-18403; Betta Burger Group,
LLC - Series A – Case No. 18-18394; and Betta Burger Group, LLC -
Series B – Case No. 18-18397).

Bach Law Offices will also be reimbursed for reasonable
out-of-pocket expenses incurred.

Paul M. Bach, partner of Bach Law Offices, Inc., assured the Court
that the firm is a "disinterested person" as the term is defined in
Section 101(14) of the Bankruptcy Code and does not represent any
interest adverse to the Debtor and its estates.

Bach Law Offices can be reached at:

     Paul M. Bach, Esq.
     BACH LAW OFFICES, INC.
     Paul M. Bach, Esq.
     Penelope N. Bach, Esq.
     P.O. Box 1285
     Northbrook, IL 60065
     Tel: (847) 564 0808

          About Betta Burger Group, LLC – Series B

Betta Burger Group, LLC – Series B, filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
petition (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Case No. 18-18397) on June 28, 2018.
The Debtor hired Bach Law Offices, Inc., as counsel.


CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT: Court Dismisses M. Cabral's ITFA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Nevada granted
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned MARGARITA CABRAL,
et al., Plaintiffs, v. CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT CORPORATION, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-02841-APG-VCF (D. Nev.).

The Plaintiffs allege the hotels charge overnight guests a
mandatory per-night resort fee that includes payment for Internet
access. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants applied the Clark
County Combined Transient Lodging Tax to the entire amount of the
resort fee, including that portion that covers Internet access. The
plaintiffs assert this violates the Internet Tax Freedom Act
(ITFA), a federal statute that precludes States and their political
subdivisions from taxing Internet access.

The plaintiffs bring a class action complaint and assert claims for
(1) violation of ITFA, (2) violation of Clark County Code Section
4.08.005 for failing to refund over-collection of the Lodging Tax,
(3) violation of the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act, (4)
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (5) money
had and received, (6) conversion, (7) unjust enrichment, and (8)
declaratory judgment. The plaintiffs seek injunctive relief,
declaratory relief, and damages.

The defendants move to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing
the Tax Injunction Act (TIA) bars the plaintiffs' claims in federal
court.

The Lodging Tax

Clark County Code Chapter 4.08 sets forth the Lodging Tax, which is
a tax on revenue derived from short-term room rentals for dwelling,
lodging, or sleeping purposes, such as hotel rooms. The tax applies
to rent, which means the amount charged for a sleeping room/space
in a transient lodging establishment, valued in money, whether
received in money or otherwise, including charges that would
normally be part of an all inclusive room rate, such as late
check-out fees, cancellation fees, and the like.

TIA

The TIA provides that a federal district court shall not enjoin,
suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax
under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be
had in the courts of such State.

The Lodging Tax is a Tax under the TIA

Federal law determines whether an assessment qualifies as a tax for
purposes of the TIA  Wright v. Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 911 (9th
Cir. 2000). To determine whether an assessment is a tax, the Court
consider: (1) the entity that imposes the assessment; (2) the
parties upon whom the assessment is imposed; and (3) whether the
assessment is expended for general public purposes, or used for the
regulation or benefit of the parties upon whom the assessment is
imposed.

The Lodging Tax is a tax within the TIA's meaning.

This Suit Seeks to Enjoin, Restrain, or Suspend the Assessment,
Levy, or Collection of the Lodging Tax

The plaintiffs contend their suit does not stop collection of the
Lodging Tax because they do not challenge that tax or any state or
local rule. Rather, they contend, they are challenging the
defendants' unilateral decision to bundle the Internet access into
the resort fee and to then apply the tax to the entire resort fee.

The plaintiffs argue that their suit is consistent with Clark
County's interpretation of the Lodging Tax, as Clark County
identifies non-mandatory Internet access fees as non-taxable and
has advised operators not to comingle taxable and non-taxable
revenues in the same account. However, that involves disputes on
the merits of whether the defendants are properly applying the
Lodging Tax and whether their conduct violates the ITFA. Those are
questions for the state court to resolve.

Plaintiffs Have a Plain, Speed, and Efficient State Law Remedy

The TIA bars federal jurisdiction only if there is a plain, speedy
and efficient remedy in the state courts.

The defendants identify two potential state law remedies. First,
the defendants suggest the plaintiffs could request a refund under
the Clark County Code's refund procedures.
Alternatively, the defendants argue the plaintiffs could bring
these same claims in state court. The plaintiffs assert they could
not bring a refund claim because under the Code, only operators,
who are the taxpayers, may assert a refund claim. They also appear
to assert their claims would be rejected in state court because
they are not the taxpayers, the operators are.

That remedy is plain, particularly given that all but one of the
plaintiffs' claims in the complaint arise under Nevada state law.
Although the plaintiffs suggest Nevada may not allow them to pursue
their claims because they are not the taxpayer, they cite no law in
support of that argument except for an unpublished decision from
another state. The plaintiffs have not cited a case in which the
Nevada courts refused to hear a claim similar to the plaintiffs'
claims. They thus have not given [me] any convincing reason to
doubt that the Nevada courts will entertain their claims, including
the federal issue of whether the defendants' conduct violates the
ITFA. The plaintiffs therefore have not met their burden of showing
there is no plain remedy in state court.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 11, 2018 Order is
available https://tinyurl.com/yccaswg5 from Leagle.com.

Margarita Cabral, Dustin Chapman, Edmond David, Buffy Haugh, Cathy
Gravile, Gina Marinelli, Eric Marmion, Ashley McGowan, Todd Miller,
Maritza Rivas, Diane Sommer, Susan Unger, Dan Unger, Andra
Verstraete, Stephanie Cohen & Ryan Courtney, Plaintiffs,
represented by Bradley Scott Schrager , Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro,
Schulman & Rabkin, Michael C. Dell'Angelo -- mdellangelo@bm.net --
Berger & Montague, P.C., pro hac vice, R. Bryant McCulley --
bmcculley@mcculleymccluer.com -- McCulley McCluer PLLC, pro hac
vice & Don Springmeyer , Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman and
Rabkin, LLP.

Caesars Entertainment Corporation, Caesars Entertainment Operating
Company, Inc., Caesars Entertainment Resort Properties, LLC,
Caesars Entertainment Resort Properties Holdco LLC, Caesars
Enterprise Services, LLC, Caesars Growth Bally's LV, LLC, Caesars
Growth Properties Holdings, LLC, Caesars Growth Properties Parent,
LLC, Caesars Growth Partners, LLC, Caesars Growth Quad LLC, Caesars
Growth PH, LLC, Caesars World, LLC, Caesars Palace Corporation,
Desert Palace, LLC, doing business as Caesars Palace, Flamingo Las
Vegas Operating Company, LLC, doing business as Flamingo Las Vegas,
Harrahs Las Vegas, LLC, doing business as Harrah's Casino Hotel Las
Vegas, Parball Newco, LLC, doing business as Bally's Las Vegas,
PHWLV, LLC, doing business as Planet Hollywood Resort & Casino, Rio
Properties, LLC, doing business as Rio All-Suite Hotel & Casino,
3535 LV NEWCO, LLC, doing business as Linq Hotel and Casino & Paris
Las Vegas Operating Company, LLC, doing business as Paris Las
Vegas, Defendants, represented by John D. Tennert --
bmcculley@mcculleymccluer.com -- Fennemore Craig, P.C..

CALIFORNIA TEACHERS: 9th Cir. Denies Bid to Add AAE as Plaintiff
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, denied
Plaintiffs' motion to add the Association of American Educators
(AAE) to their suit as an organizational Plaintiff under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 21 in the case captioned APRIL BAIN;
BHAVINI BHAKTA; CLARE SOBETSKI, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.
CALIFORNIA TEACHERS ASSOCIATION; NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION;
CALIFORNIA FEDERATION OF TEACHERS; AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS;
UNITED TEACHERS LOS ANGELES; UNITED TEACHERS OF RICHMOND CTA/NEA;
RAMON CORTINES, in his capacity as Superintendent of Los Angeles
Unified School District; BRUCE HARTER, in his capacity as
Superintendent of West Contra Costa Unified School District; DAVID
VANNASDALL, in his capacity as Superintendent of Arcadia Unified
School District, Defendants-Appellees, No. 16-55768 (9th Cir.).

The Plaintiffs-Appellants are public school teachers in California
who were, at the time they filed their lawsuit, members of the
Defendants-Appellees public sector teachers' Unions. The Plaintiffs
claim that their Unions' requirement that they pay a fee to support
the Unions' political and ideological activities violates their
constitutional right to free speech.
The Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief in the form of (1) a
declaration that California's agency shop laws, collective
bargaining laws, and the CBAs entered into the by the Unions
violate their constitutional rights; (2) a declaration that those
laws and CBAs coerce teachers into funding the Unions' political
activities in violation of their constitutional rights; and (3) a
declaration that those laws and CBAs violate the Plaintiffs'
constitutional rights by forcing school superintendents to deduct
from teachers' paychecks dues that support the Unions'
non-chargeable activities.

The Plaintiffs also seek an injunction (1) barring the Unions from
denying Union membership or any of its privileges based on a
teacher's refusal to pay the non-chargeable fee; and (2) barring
school superintendents from deducting the non-chargeable fee from
Union members' pay-checks.  Finally, the Plaintiffs seek such
additional or different relief as the district court deems just and
proper, including an award of reasonable attorneys' fees and the
costs of this action.

The Unions filed a motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint
(SAC) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which the
district court granted with prejudice. The court rejected the
Plaintiffs' argument that the Unions' internal membership rules
requiring their members to pay the non-chargeable fee constitute
state action. The court found unpersuasive the Plaintiffs' theory
that the choice teachers face between the benefits of union
membership and the lack of benefits of non-member status is a
product of state action because the coercion that California
teachers experience could not exist without the State.

To the contrary, the court found that because the Unions could
decide, without any intervention by the State, not to require their
members to pay non-chargeable fees, Plaintiffs challenged only a
private decision by the Unions.

The review a district court's grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim de novo. A motion under Rule
12(b)(6) should be granted only if it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief,' construing the complaint in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff.

For the sake of completeness, the Ninth Circuit proceeds to
consider whether AAE satisfies the criteria for Rule 21 joinder,
notwithstanding our holding that the appeal is moot. A party may
join a lawsuit on appeal under Rule 21 when the party seeking
joinder [1] requests the same remedy as the original party and [2]
offers the same reasons for that remedy and [3] earlier joinder
would not have affected the course of the litigation.

AAE satisfies the first factor because both it and the Plaintiffs
seek the same declaratory and injunctive relief. While the
Plaintiffs also seek restitution in their post-merits briefing, as
explained in Part IV.A, the Court do not credit this eleventh-hour
plea to convert a matter that was always about securing prospective
equitable relief into a claim for money damages. However, AAE fails
to carry its burden on the second and third factors. AAE has not
shown that it seeks relief for the same reasons as the original
Plaintiffs and, as a consequence, joining AAE presents a
considerable risk of prejudice to the Unions in their chosen
defense.

AAE's interests and those of the Unions diverge in a crucial way:
AAE seeks to out-compete the Unions, whereas the Plaintiffs
continue to support their Unions. Indeed, AAE characterizes its
mission as providing an alternative to the partisan politics of the
teacher labor unions. AAE has also acknowledged that its affiliates
and affiliates of public sector teachers' unions compete for
membership dues dollars, because as a practical matter both
organizations offer similar benefits and one would not expect
teachers to pay two sets of dues for similar benefits.

In other words, join AAE, not the Unions. Driving home the point,
AAE recently stated that there is a direct conflict between AAE's
mission and collective bargaining by the Unions, and that it
objects on policy grounds to the positions taken by teachers'
unions in the collective-bargaining process and outside of that
process. The Plaintiffs, by contrast, value their unions, in
particular the support their Unions provide in "negotiating with
their employers" through collective bargaining.

In sum, because AAE's interests in pursuing this appeal diverge
from those of the original Plaintiffs, the risk of prejudice to the
Unions of adding AAE as a party to the Plaintiffs' action is acute.
AAE therefore cannot satisfy the three-part test for joining a
party under Rule 21.

In both the district court and in their merits briefing on appeal,
the Plaintiffs were the only plaintiffs to this suit. But the
Plaintiffs resigned their Union memberships during the pendency of
their appeal, thereby mooting the appeal and depriving the Ninth
Circuit of jurisdiction. Now, at the eleventh hour, the Plaintiffs
seek to add a new party, AAE, to their action. Adding a new party
on appeal is rarely done, however, and is particularly ill-advised,
indeed, the Court hold it to be erroneous as a matter of law when
used to resurrect a moot case.

And even if mootness were not an insurmountable barrier to
considering a Rule 21 motion, the Court would still deny the motion
because AAE fails to satisfy the criteria for Rule 21 joinder.
Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Plaintiffs' appeal and remands
to the district court with instructions to dismiss the case without
vacating its judgment.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's June 11, 2018 Opinion is
available https://tinyurl.com/yby6gt8c from Leagle.com.

Joshua S. Lipshutz -- jlipshutz@gibsondunn.com -- (argued), Gibson
Dunn & Crutcher LLP, San Francisco, California; Theodore J.
Boutrous Jr. -- tboutrous@gibsondunn.com -- Marcellus McRae --
mmcrae@gibsondunn.com -- and Samuel Eckman --
seckman@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Los Angeles,
California; Kyle Hawkins , Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Dallas,
Texas; Michael R. Huston , Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Washington,
D.C.; for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Eric A. Harrington (argued), Jason Walta , and Alice O'Brien ,
National Education Association, for Defendants-Appellees.

CANADA: Faces Class Action Over Orkambi Coverage
------------------------------------------------
Katie DeRosa, writing for Times Colonist, reports that a University
of Victoria student with a rare strain of cystic fibrosis is one of
the lead plaintiffs in a class-action lawsuit against the B.C.
government, the federal government and two drug- approval bodies
for failing to provide coverage for Orkambi under public drug
plans.

Lilia Zaharieva, a 31-year-old Saanich woman, and Melissa Verleg, a
34-year-old mother of two in Vernon, are seeking $60 million
damages as a result of what they allege are flawed drug-approval
processes that have led the provincial government to refuse to
cover the $250,000-a-year medication Orkambi.

The lawsuit alleges the decision not to fund the drug infringes on
patients' Charter of Rights to health, access to care and equal
treatment.

Ms. Zaharieva and Ms. Verleg both have a strain of cystic fibrosis
called Double Delta F508 and they say Orkambi increases their lung
capacity and lengthens their lifespan.

"I see this step as an unfortunate last resort," Ms. Zaharieva told
the Times Colonist after a news conference in Vancouver.

"I've been trying to meet with [Health Minister] Adrian Dix, I've
held rallies, I've had people send letters. I see this as necessary
in terms of making the kind of change that would make this
medication available to everyone who needs it."

Their lawyer, Chris MacLeod, who is also the chair of the Canadian
Cystic Fibrosis Treatment Council, said there are more than 200
people in B.C. with the specific genetic mutation. Some patients
who take Orkambi, manufactured by Vertex Pharmaceuticals, are
covered by their private insurance plans.

Ms. Zaharieva was on her last week's supply of Orkambi in March
when she found out that Vertex would provide the drug for free
under compassionate coverage. The coverage is temporary, however,
and Ms. Zaharieva has no idea how long it will last. Ms. Verleg has
been without Orkambi since February and said her lung capacity has
declined dramatically.

The two drug approval bodies named in the lawsuit are the Canadian
Agency for Drugs and Technologies in Health (CADTH), which assess
whether a medication should be covered by provincial drug plans,
and the Pan Canadian Pharmaceutical Alliance (pCPA), which
negotiates prices for publicly covered drugs on behalf of the
provinces and territories.

Despite being approved by Health Canada, CADTH and B.C.'s Drug
Benefit Council recommended against coverage of Orkambi because of
insufficient clinical evidence and its high price tag.

Mr. MacLeod said the CADTH drug-approval process is opaque and
discriminates against patients with rare diseases.

As well as damages, the lawsuit requests an injunction compelling
the B.C. government to cover Orkambi under Pharmacare.

The lawsuit was filed on July 24 and has not yet been served, Mr.
MacLeod said.

The Healthy Ministry said in a statement that since the matter will
soon be before the courts, it cannot comment on the specific
details of this case.

The ministry did say: "British Columbia is fully committed to an
evidence-based process which includes consideration of
recommendations by the Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies
in Health (CADTH) on a drug's clinical efficacy and cost
effectiveness, followed by a review by the provincial Drug Benefit
Council.

"While Health Canada provides federal market authorization to sell
a drug -- this approval does not mean that the drug has been
analyzed by Health Canada as being effective or cost-efficient. It
is simply an initial first step that means that the drug is able to
move forward in the review process, because it is safe as a
placebo.

"Once Health Canada approves a drug to be sold, the manufacturer
submits it to the Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies in
Health (CADTH) for the drug to be considered for potential coverage
by provincial drug plans. This process ensures that important drug
listing decisions are based on evidence-based, clinical analysis
involving patient groups and are not the result of political
lobbying."

The Health Ministry said the cost for funding Orkambi for about 120
patients in B.C. would be $85.5 million over three years. It also
said the price of Orkambi in Canada is under investigation by the
Patented Medicines Price Review Board, Canada's drug pricing
watchdog.

Orkambi is publicly covered in Ireland, the United States, Germany
and France.

CADTH is in the middle of a third review on Orkambi, initiated
after pressure from the B.C. government to revise its submission
process which allowed Vertex to submit additional clinical data to
support the drug's effectiveness.

When asked why the lawsuit is being launched before the third
review is complete, Mr. MacLeod said: "Because time, in our view,
has run out." [GN]

CANADA: Inmate Sues Over Attorney-Client Privilege Violation
------------------------------------------------------------
Darryl Greer, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that a
prison inmate claims in a proposed class action that the Canadian
government systematically records privileged communications between
prisoners and their lawyers in federal institutions.

Adrian Philip filed the action against the Attorney General of
Canada in Federal Court, claiming the Canadian government breached
inmates' privacy rights and rights under the country's
constitution. He's imprisoned at Collins Bay Institution, a federal
prison in Kingston, Ontario.

Mr. Philip claims the Correctional Service of Canada intrudes upon
inmates' privacy rights "by listening to, recording, and divulging
to their parties the contents of private telephone conversations
between inmates and their respective lawyers."

"Nothing is more likely to have a 'chilling' effect  upon the frank
and free exchange and disclosure of confidences, which should
characterize the relationship between inmate and counsel, than
knowledge that what has been said will be listened to or recorded
by some third person, divulged to other parties, or used against
the inmate," the claim states.

Mr. Philip claims he was charged with more crimes while already in
jail, which limited his access to the institution's telephone
system "exclusively for the purposes" of privileged conversations
with his lawyers. He claims he learned that staff at the prison had
listened to and recorded his calls in August 2017, and used the
information to prosecute him for additional offences.

In a phone interview with Courthouse News, Mr. Philip's lawyer
Rajinder Sahota, with Acheson Sweeney Foley Sahota, was reluctant
to elaborate on the lawsuit's specifics, such as how his client
found out about the recordings.

"At this stage we're in the early days. The pleadings themselves
set out the crux of the factual argument that we're making. We
didn't really hold back," he said. "What I can tell you is that the
concerns that are raised are systemic, they're widespread, and they
exist from coast-to-coast in all federal correctional
institutions."

Mr. Sahota said he didn't have numbers to estimate the potential
size of the class, but said it's "going to be a substantial number"
given the scope of the case and time frame because as far as his
firm knows, "it's never been any other way."

"It struck us as something that attacks the very core of our legal
system and the integrity of our legal system is put into question
when this type of conduct occurs," Mr. Sahota said. "But the fact
that solicitor-client conversations are being recorded,
particularly when the government is aware that those kind of
conversations are occurring given the way the process has been set
up by the government to record all conversations and have inmates
indicate who they are calling and for what purpose, that's what
strikes this as particularly egregious."

Philip seeks class certification and a declaration that the
Canadian government breached its duties of care and fiduciary
duties to inmates as well as their privacy rights and rights under
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and damages exceeding
$50,000.

A Correctional Service of Canada spokeswoman pointed to the
agency's policy that says "calls between inmates and privileged
correspondents are normally confidential. They may however be
subject to interception" if certain conditions under corrections
regulations and directives are met. [GN]

CAPITAL MANAGEMENT: Sued by Kupczyk for Illegal Debt Collection
---------------------------------------------------------------
ESTER KUPCZYK on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated
consumers v. CAPITAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, L.P., Case No.
1:18-cv-03909-ARR-SMG (E.D.N.Y., July 6, 2018), alleges that the
Defendant's collection practices violate the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Capital Management, with its principal place of business located
within Buffalo, New York, is regularly engaged, for profit, in the
collection of allegedly owed consumer debts.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Maxim Maximov, Esq.
          MAXIM MAXIMOV, LLP
          1701 Avenue P
          Brooklyn, NY 11229
          Telephone: (718) 395-3459
          Facsimile: (718) 408-9570
          E-mail: m@maximovlaw.com


CAPITAL ONE AUTO: Scott Suit Alleges Violation of RISA
------------------------------------------------------
Almond Scott, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Capital One Auto Finance, Defendant, Case
No. CV18900672 (Ohio Com. Pleas, Cuyahoga Cty., July 13, 2018)
alleges violation of the Retail Installment Sales Act and the Ohio
Uniform Commercial Code.

The Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that the Defendant finances
high rate auto loans for Ohio consumers by taking assignment of
retail installment sales agreements from Ohio car dealers. Upon
repossession, the Defendant sends its borrowers form notices which
expressly misstates and violate their statutory rights.

Capital One Auto Finance, Inc. provides vehicle financing. The
company offers auto finance products and agent banking auto finance
programs to buy the motorcycles. It also provides direct mail and
online vehicle finance. Capital One Auto Finance, Inc. offers
services through a network of dealers. The company was founded in
1995 and is based in Plano, Texas. As of July 16, 1998, Capital One
Auto Finance, Inc. operates as a subsidiary of Capital One, N.A.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ronald I. Frederick, Esq.
          Michael L. Berler, Esq.
          Michael L. Fine, Esq.
          FREDERICK & BERLER LLC
          767 E 185th Street
          Cleveland, OH 44119
          Telephone: (216) 502-1055
          Facsimile: (216) 566-9400
          E-mail: ronf@clevelandconsumerlaw.com
                 mike@clevelandconsumerlaw.com
                 michaelf@clevelandconsumerlaw.com


CARRIBEAN CRUISE: Sears Awaits Ruling in Robocall Settlement
------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Channick, writing for Chicago Tribune, reports that
struggling retailer Sears has a lot on the line in a
multimillion-dollar class-action settlement over unwanted robocalls
offering free Caribbean cruises.

A federal judge in Chicago was expected to decide whether Sears is
entitled to as much as $6 million for thousands of sales calls
received by its employees from Caribbean Cruise Line nearly seven
years ago. The bulk of the Sears claim was initially denied for
missing a filing deadline.

Caribbean agreed in late 2016 to pay between $56 million and $76
million to settle the class-action lawsuit alleging the company and
its co-defendants made millions of unwanted robocalls offering the
free cruise trips in violation of the federal Telephone Consumer
Protection Act. Individual class members are to be paid up to $500
per call received, according to the settlement.

Learning of the settlement by "word of mouth" days before a Feb. 1,
2017, filing deadline, Sears put in an initial claim for 18
robocalls received by its employees and requested a 60-day
extension to find more. After subpoenaing phone records from
Verizon, Sprint and AT&T, Sears filed amended claims for 12,424
qualifying robocalls from Caribbean between Aug. 1, 2011, and Aug.
31, 2012, the period covered by the settlement.

A settlement administrator said Sears was too late and denied the
amended claims. The company appealed the decision to U.S. District
Judge Matthew Kennelly, who said Monday he would issue a written
ruling on the request for review within the next seven to 10 days.

At $500 for each robocall, his ruling could mean the difference
between a payout of thousands or millions of dollars for Sears.

Howard Riefs, a spokesman for Hoffman Estates-based Sears Holdings
Corp., declined to comment on July 24 beyond the court filings.

The money might be something of a windfall for Sears, which has
been closing stores and laying off employees amid slumping sales.
Sears closed its last Chicago store earlier in July and is closing
dozens more across the U.S.

Most of the claimants in the Caribbean Cruise Line class-action
suit do not fall under a corporate umbrella.

Filed in 2012, the lawsuit was brought by Chicago-area residents
Grant Birchmeier and Stephen Parkes, who alleged that Fort
Lauderdale, Fla.-based Caribbean illegally contacted them multiple
times on their cellphones. The settlement class includes consumers
who received one or more of the automated phone calls offering a
free cruise in exchange for taking a political survey.

The lawsuit called the survey a "scam" and a "marketing tool with
no legitimate political basis."

The settlement was approved in April 2017, but the claims are still
being finalized and, in some cases, challenged before Caribbean
writes the checks. A larger number of approved claims could push
the payout to the higher end of the agreed-upon settlement.

The Federal Communications Commission revised its rules in 2012 to
require telemarketers to obtain prior written consent from
consumers before robocalling them, to no longer allow an
"established business relationship" as an exemption, and to provide
an "opt-out" mechanism during each robocall.

While Sears is seeking payment in the Caribbean settlement, the
retailer allegedly has been blitzing consumers this year with
unwanted robocalls itself, according to a lawsuit filed in July in
federal court in Chicago.

The lawsuit, which is seeking class-action status, alleges that
Sears made "unsolicited, autodialed calls to consumers without
their consent" to pitch Sears Home Services, in violation of the
same federal law.

Mr. Riefs declined to comment on the lawsuit against Sears. [GN]

CAVALRY PORTFOLIO: Obtains Stay in One of Two TCPA Class Actions
----------------------------------------------------------------
Artin Betpera, Esq. -- artin.betpera@wbd-us.com -- of Womble Bond
Dickinson (US) LLP, in an article for National Law Review, wrote
that Cavalry Portfolio Services is defending two nearly-identical
putative TCPA class actions in California, and recently obtained a
stay in one of those cases, pending a forthcoming ruling on ATDS
functionality in the other.

In Krejci v. Cavalry Portfolio Servs., No. 3:16-cv-0211-JAH-WVG,
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122904 (S.D. Cal. July 17, 2018), Cavalry
moved for a stay of the action until the court in the related case
of Horton v. Calvary Portfolio Services, LLC, 13-cv-0307-JAH (WVG)
(S.D. Cal.) rules on the parties' cross-motions for summary
judgment concerning whether the Aspect dialing system used by
Cavalry "is an ATDS within the meaning of the TCPA."  Krejci, supra
at *5.

Judge John A. Houston of the Southern District of California
granted Cavalry's motion, finding a stay was appropriate for three
reasons: (1) Plaintiff had failed to demonstrate any potential harm
that would result from a limited stay; (2) Cavalry's burden in
having to litigate the same issue over again; and (3) "a
determination as to whether or not Cavalry's Aspect system
qualifies as an ATDS," in Horton would have a "substantial impact"
on the Krejci case.

This was a prudent exercise of discretion by Judge Houston, and his
ruling illustrates the importance of every unpublished District
Court decision on key issues like ATDS functionality.  As we've
covered on the Ramble in past episodes, every one of these lower
court decisions has the potential to cause significant ripples
throughout TCPAland.  And that's part of what makes this place
special.

Oral argument on the Horton cross-summary judgment motions is
scheduled for August 13, 2018.  We wait on the edge of our seats to
provide you with our reporting and analysis on this next upcoming
episode in the ATDS functionality saga. [GN]

CHINA AGRITECH: SCOTUS Upholds Dismissal of Successively Filed Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the decision of the
Court of Appeals reversing the District Court's dismissal of the
securities fraud action against China Agritech, Inc.

The question presented before the Supreme Court: Upon denial of
class certification, may a putative class member, in lieu of
promptly joining an existing suit or promptly filing an individual
action, commence a class action anew beyond the time allowed by the
applicable statute of limitations?

The case is the third class action brought on behalf of purchasers
of petitioner China Agritech's common stock, alleging violations of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  In short, the successive
complaints each make materially identical allegations that China
Agritech engaged in fraud and misleading business practices,
causing the company's stock price to plummet when several reports
brought the misconduct to light.

Respondent Michael Resh, who had not sought lead plaintiff status
in either the Dean (Dean complaint) or Smyth (Smyth complaint)
proceedings and was represented by counsel who had not appeared in
the earlier actions, filed the present suit on June 30, 2014,
styling it a class action a year and a half after the statute of
limitations expired. The other respondents moved to intervene,
seeking designation as lead plaintiffs; together with Resh, they
filed an amended complaint.

The District Court dismissed the class complaint as untimely,
holding that the Dean and Smyth actions did not toll the time to
initiate class claims.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, permitting
future class action named plaintiffs, who were unnamed class
members in previously uncertified classes, to avail themselves of
American Pipe, American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538
(1974), tolling, the court reasoned, would advance the policy
objectives that led the Supreme Court to permit tolling in the
first place.

Applying American Pipe tolling to successive class actions, the
Ninth Circuit added, would cause no unfair surprise to defendants
and would promote economy of litigation by reducing incentives for
filing protective class suits during the pendency of an initial
certification motion.

American Pipe established that the commencement of the original
class suit tolls the running of the statute of limitations for all
purported members of the class who make timely motions to intervene
after the court has found the suit inappropriate for class action
status.

Between dozens and hundreds of class plaintiffs filed protective
individual claims while class-certification motions were pending in
securities cases and the statute of repose was about to run out,
placing a permanent bar against their claims. But none of the
plaintiffs appears to have filed a protective class action even
though, if the statute of repose expired and the pending
class-certification motions were denied, there would be no further
opportunity to assert class claims.

Nor do the incentives of class-action practice suggest that many
more plaintiffs will file protective class claims as a result of
the Supreme Court's holding. Any plaintiff whose individual claim
is worth litigating on its own rests secure in the knowledge that
she can avail herself of American Pipe tolling if certification is
denied to a first putative class. The plaintiff who seeks to
preserve the ability to lead the class whether because her claim is
too small to make an individual suit worthwhile or because of an
attendant financial benefit has every reason to file a class action
early, and little reason to wait in the wings, giving another
plaintiff first shot at representation.

A multiplicity of class-action filings is not necessarily needless.
Indeed, multiple filings may aid a district court in determining,
early on, whether class treatment is warranted, and if so, which of
the contenders would be the best representative. And sooner rather
than later filings are just what Rule 23 encourages. Multiple
timely filings might not line up neatly; they could be filed in
different districts, at different times perhaps when briefing on
class certification has already begun or on behalf of only
partially overlapping classes. But district courts have ample tools
at their disposal to manage the suits, including the ability to
stay, consolidate, or transfer proceedings. District courts are
increasingly familiar with overseeing such complex cases, given the
surge in multidistrict litigation. The Federal Rules provide a
range of mechanisms to aid courts in this endeavor. What the Rules
do not offer is a reason to permit plaintiffs to exhume failed
class actions by filing new, untimely class claims.

The watchwords of American Pipe are efficiency and economy of
litigation, a principal purpose of Rule 23 as well. Extending
American Pipe tolling to successive class actions does not serve
that purpose. The contrary rule, allowing no tolling for
out-of-time class actions, will propel putative class
representatives to file suit well within the limitation period and
seek certification promptly.

For all these reasons, it is the rule the Supreme Court adopts:
Time to file a class action falls outside the bounds of American
Pipe.

Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The case is CHINA AGRITECH, INC., Petitioner, v. MICHAEL H. RESH,
ET AL., No. 17-432 (U.S.).

A full-text copy of the Supreme Court's June 11, 2018 Opinion is
available    https://tinyurl.com/ybyfmk4a  from Leagle.com
Seth Alben Aronson , O'Melveny & Myers LLP, saronson@omm.com,
Attorneys for Petitioner, China Agritech, Inc.
Charles Eric Coleman , Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP,
Charles.Coleman@lewisbrisbois.com, Attorneys for Respondent,
Charles Law.
David C. Frederick , Kellogg, Hansen, Todd, Figel & Frederick,
dfrederick@kellogghansen.com., Attorneys for Respondent, William
Schoenke, Heroca Holding, B.V. and Ninella Beheer, B.V.
Matthew Moylan Guiney , Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz, LLP,
guiney@whafh.com, Attorneys for Respondent, William Schoenke,
Heroca Holding, B.V. and Ninella Beheer, B.V.
George Edward Anhang , Cooley LLP, GAnhang@Cooley.com, for
Washington Legal Foundation.
Max W. Berger , Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP,
MWB@blbglaw.com, for National Conference on Public Employee
Retirement Systems.
Andrew Nathan Goldfarb , Zuckerman Spaeder LLP,
agoldfarb@zuckerman.com, for Retired Federal Judges.
Deepak Gupta , Gupta Wessler PLLC, deepak@guptawessler.com, for
American Association for Justice, et al.
Lewis Jeffrey Liman , Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP,
lliman@cgsh.com, for Securities Industry and Financial Markets
Association.
Lumen N. Mulligan , University of Kansas School of Law,
lumen@ku.edu, for Law Professors.
Scott Lawrence Nelson , Public Citizen Litigation Group,
snelson@citizen.org, for Public Citizen, Inc.
Julie Nepveu , AARP Foundation Litigation, jnepveu@aarp.org, for
AARP and AARP Foundation.
Mark Andrew Perry , Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP,
mperry@gibsondunn.com, for Chamber of Commerce of the United States
of America, et al.
Joseph Marc Sellers , Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC,
jsellers@cohenmilstein.com, for Plaintiffs in Post-Dukes Successor
Class Actions.
Robert Latane Wise , Bowman and Brooke LLP,
rob.wise@bowmanandbrooke.com, for DRI — The Voice of the Defense
Bar.
Susan E. Burnett , Bowman and Brooke LLP,
susan.burnett@bowmanandbrooke.com, for DRI — The Voice of the
Defense Bar.
Lyle Roberts , Cooley LLP, lroberts@cooley.com, for Washington
Legal Foundation

COCA-COLA CO: 3rd Cir. Affirms Summary Judgment in "Enslin" Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, SHANE E. ENSLIN, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, v. THE COCA-COLA COMPANY; COCA COLA
REFRESHMENTS USA, INC.; COCA-COLA ENTERPRISES, INC.; KEYSTONE
COCA-COLA AND BOTTLING AND DISTRIBUTION CORPORATION; KEYSTONE
COCA-COLA BOTTLING CO.; KEYSTONE COCA-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY, INC.;
KEYSTONE COCA-COLA BOTTLING CORPORATION; THOMAS WILLIAM ROGERS,
III; DOE DEFENDANTS 1-50; ABC CORPORATIONS 1-50; XYZ PARTNERSHIPS
AND ASSOCIATIONS, Shane E. Enslin, Appellant in No. 17-3153 The
Coca-Cola Company; Coca Cola Refreshments USA, Inc., Coca-Cola
Enterprises, Inc., Keystone Coca-Cola and Bottling and Distribution
Corporation; Keystone Coca-Cola Bottling Company, Keystone
Coca-Cola Bottling Company, Inc., Keystone Coca-Cola Bottling
Corporation, Appellants in No. 17-3256, Case Nos. 17-3153, 17-3256
(3d Cir.), Judge Thomas Michael Hardiman of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit (a) affirmed the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania's order (i) granting
summary judgment for Coca-Cola; (ii) denial of Enslin's motion for
class certification notwithstanding a default judgment in his favor
against Rogers; and (b) dismissed Coca-Cola's cross-appeal as
moot.

Enslin began his career as a Coca-Cola service technician in 1996
when he went to work for Keystone Coca-Cola, which was then an
independent bottler and distributor of Coca-Cola products.  In
2001, Keystone was acquired by Coca-Cola Enterprises, so Enslin and
others had to complete new employment paperwork.  Those forms asked
for each employee's address, telephone number, social security
number, and driver's license number.  Enslin worked for Coca-Cola
Enterprises for several years after the Keystone acquisition, but
left the company in 2007.

Coca-Cola alerted Enslin and the other affected employees of the
breach.  The company attempted to recover the stolen computers, but
Rogers had given some of the laptops away, and Coca-Cola cannot
definitively say it found them all.  Sometime after Enslin learned
of the breach, his accounts with several internet retailers were
compromised and used to make unauthorized purchases.  Enslin does
not know who accessed his accounts or how they did so.  He did not
have to pay any of the fraudulent charges.

After the compromise of his retail accounts, Enslin filed the
putative class action against Coca-Cola and Rogers in the District
Court.  He asserted claims under Pennsylvania law for breach of
contract, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, unjust
enrichment, bailment, and conspiracy, as well as a claim under the
federal Drivers Privacy Protection Act.  Rogers did not appear, but
Coca-Cola did and moved to dismiss Enslin' complaint for failure to
state a claim.  The District Court held that Enslin had adequately
pleaded claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, but
otherwise granted Coca-Cola's motion and dismissed the rest of
Enslin's complaint.

Following discovery, Coca-Cola and Enslin filed cross-motions for
summary judgment.  Enslin also moved to certify a class and to
amend his complaint.  Coca-Cola sought judgment with respect to
Enslin's contract claims on the theory that they were preempted by
federal labor law.  Although the Court rejected that preemption
argument, it nevertheless granted summary judgment for Coca-Cola on
other grounds, denied Enslin's motion to amend, and denied his
motion for class certification as moot.  Enslin moved for
reconsideration with respect to the District Court's summary
judgment, which the Court denied in a comprehensive opinion.

Meanwhile, over the course of nearly three years of litigation,
Rogers never appeared to defend against Enslin's claims.  So
shortly after entering summary judgment in favor of Coca-Cola, the
District Court entered a default judgment against Rogers for $17
(the amount it cost Enslin to buy checks for the new checking
account he opened after his retail accounts were compromised).
That judgment ran in Enslin's favor only, since the District Court
had previously rejected Enslin's request to enter judgment against
Rogers on a classwide basis.  Enslin and Coca-Cola filed timely
notices of appeal.

Enslin's appeal presents four issues.  He challenges: (1) the
summary judgment on his contract claims; (2) the dismissal of his
negligence claim; (3) the denial of his motion to amend his
complaint to replead a claim under the Drivers Privacy Protection
Act; and (4) the dismissal of his motion for class certification as
moot with respect to Rogers.

Judge Hardiman finds that all of the damages that Enslin seeks flow
from the compromise of his retail accounts rather than directly
from Rogers' theft of his personal information.  But he provides no
evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that his
accounts were compromised because information was gleaned from the
stolen laptops.  So breach or no breach, Enslin's contract claims
fail because he cannot show he was damaged as a result of
Coca-Cola's conduct.  The Judge will affirm the District Court's
summary judgment as well as its order denying Enslin's motion for
reconsideration for that reason.

Turning to Enslin's negligence claim, the Judge cannot say the
Court abused its discretion in dismissing his negligence claim with
prejudice.  Enslin did not -- and still does not -- propose any
amendment that would overcome his failure to plead a non-economic
loss.  Enslin's other attempt to revive his negligence claim fares
no better.  Enslin asks the Court to certify to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court two questions concerning the continued viability of
the economic loss doctrine in the data breach context.  The Judge
declines to do so because certification would be futile.  A claim
for negligence, like a claim for breach of contract, requires proof
of causation, and he Court has already explained that Enslin cannot
meet that burden.  Because certification would only "delay these
proceedings" without affecting the outcome of the case, the Judge
will deny Enslin's motion.

Enslin's third argument involves the Drivers Privacy Protection Act
("DPPA").  The District Court dismissed Enslin's DPPA claim for
failure to plead a "knowing disclosure."  It later denied Enslin's
motion for leave to replead his DPPA claim, holding that the
request was untimely and futile.  Judge Hardinman will affirm
because Enslin's proposed DPPA claim would have been time-barred.
Even assuming that it was an unlawful disclosure for purposes of
the DPPA, it still occurred more than four years before Enslin
filed the suit on Nov. 12, 2014.

Finally, Enslin claims the District Court erred when it denied his
belated request to certify a class based on an entirely new theory
of liability.  The Judge disagrees.  Enslin had never in nearly
three years of litigation pleaded that Coca-Cola could be held
vicariously liable.  The District Court did not abuse its
discretion by refusing to entertain Enslin's request to, in effect,
reboot the case after summary judgment had already been granted.

Because he will affirm the District Court's summary judgment, the
Judge says he needs not consider whether it could or should have
reached the same result based on federal labor law.  Accordingly,
he will dismiss Coca-Cola's cross-appeal as moot.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Hardiman affirmed the orders of
the District Court, denied Enslin's motion to certify a question of
law to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and dismissed Coca-Cola's
cross-appeal as moot.

A full-text copy of the Third Circuit's June 20, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://bit.ly/2O56Z8o from Leagle.com.

COLISEUM BAR: Court Conditionally Certifies Class of Employees
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division, granting Plaintiffs' Motion for
Conditional Class Certification in the case captioned JANE DOES 1,
2 and 3, individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. THE COLISEUM BAR & GRILL, INC., ABCDE
OPERATING, LLC d/b/a The Penthouse Club, M & M ZIN ENTERPRISES,
INC., JOHNI SEEMA, AND ALAN MARKOVITZ, Defendants, Civil Case No.
17-12212 (E.D. Mich.).

This lawsuit arises from the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and
the Michigan Minimum Wage Law (MWL). The Plaintiffs allege
Defendants misclassified them and similarly situated workers as
independent contractors to circumvent the protections of federal
and state wage laws.

The Plaintiffs request a collective action class defined as:

     All exotic dancers, shot girls, bouncers, DJs and any other
individuals who worked for the Defendants and were misclassified by
Defendants as independent contractors at any time in the past three
years.

The Plaintiffs allege that all of the the Plaintiffs and potential
class members are exotic dancers, shot girls, bouncers, DJs, and
any other individual who worked for the Clubs within the last three
years. According to the Plaintiffs, they all suffered from the
Defendants' uniform policy of not paying wages to their employees.
  

The Defendants argue that any other employee is vague, and the work
hours, locations, and duties of bouncers, waitresses, and shot
girls are vastly different from exotic dancers.

The Plaintiffs provide declarations from the Plaintiffs and a
number of opt-in Plaintiffs attesting to the Defendants' policy of
not paying wages. The declarations are from former and current
exotic dancers, a shot girl/waitress, and a DJ. Each declarant
worked at the Clubs at various times spanning from 2007 through
2017, working 7 to 8 hour shifts, three or more times a week.

All of the dancers, including a former waitress and shot girl were
required to check out with the DJ at the end of their shift or at
closing to pay tip-outs. The DJ also stated that he was required to
tip-out. The Defendants argue that the alleged tip-outs are
specific to the dancers and undermine any showing that the
Plaintiffs are similarly situated to other employees. Although the
dancers were specific about how their tip-outs were allocated, the
allocation of the tip-outs are irrelevant to determining if the
Plaintiffs are similarly situated to the class members.

Therefore, for purposes of conditional certification, the Court
finds that the Plaintiffs are similarly situated to the putative
class members.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 16, 2018 Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y992tbpu from
Leagle.com.

Jane Doe - 1, Jane Doe - 2 & Jane Doe - 3, Plaintiffs, represented
by Beth M. Rivers -- brivers@pittlawpc.com -- Pitt, Dowty, Megan
Bonanni -- mbonanni@pittlawpc.com -- Pitt, McGehee & Jennifer
Lossia McManus , Fagan McManus, P.C.

ABCDE Operating, LLC, d/b/a The Penthouse Club & Alan Markovitz,
Defendants, represented by Andrew J. Bean , Jay A. Schwartz ,
Schwartz Law Firm & Mary A. Mahoney , Schwartz Law Firm.

The Coliseum Bar & Grill, Inc. a Michigan corporation & Johni
Seema, Defendants, represented by Joseph N. Ejbeh , O'Reilly
Rancilio, P.C., Nina M. Paolini-Lotarski , O'Reilly Rancilio, P.C.
& Paul B. Addis , APA LAW OFFICE, PLLC.

M & M Zin Enterprises, Inc., Defendant, represented by Andrew J.
Bean & Jay A. Schwartz , Schwartz Law Firm.

COMCAST CABLE: Can Send C. Zacher's TCPA Suit to Arbitration
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHASON ZACHER, Plaintiff, v. COMCAST CABLE
COMMUNICATIONS LLC, Defendant, Case No. 17 CV 7256 (N.D. Ill.),
Judge Ronald A. Guzman of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, Eastern Division, granted the Defendant's
motion to compel arbitration.

Zacher, alleges in the putative class action that Comcast violated
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA"), when it called his
cellular telephone in August 2017, looking for the account holder
for a specific address.  

Comcast moves to compel arbitration and stay the action on the
basis that Zacher previously entered into a Subscriber Agreement
with Comcast that requires arbitration of the parties' disputes.

In support of its motion, Comcast submits the declaration of Nicole
Patel, a Comcast Director of Regulatory Compliance, who states that
Comcast's business records reflect that Zacher is listed as a
contact for a Comcast account that was opened in August 2011 and
registered to Alpha Epsilon Pi.

In response to Comcast's motion, Zacher submits a declaration in
which he states that he set up his Comcast service himself, so a
Comcast service technician never provided him with a professional
installation.  He denies that he was "provided a copy" of the
Subscriber Agreement and says that he never agreed to its terms and
first became aware of the existence of the arbitration clause when
Comcast filed its motion to compel arbitration.

In reply, Comcast argues that because it routinely provides a copy
of the Subscriber Agreement to all subscribers, regardless of
whether they install their own service or have a Comcast technician
install the service, Zacher's averments are insufficient to raise a
genuine issue of fact as to whether the parties entered into a
contract.

Judge Guzman finds that Comcast has presented evidence through
Patel's declarations that Comcast mailed Zacher a self-install kit
for the Normal Road account and that Comcast's routine business
practice at the relevant time was to provide customers with a hard
copy of the Subscriber Agreement in the self-install kit.  Zacher's
general denial that he "was provided" with the Subscriber Agreement
"as part of the set-up" of service is not enough to overcome this
presumption.  The FAA does not require agreements to be signed,
only written.  Accordingly, Comcast has shown that the parties
entered into an enforceable written agreement to arbitrate.

In addition, the Judge also finds that there is clear evidence that
the parties agreed to arbitrate the issue of whether the dispute is
within the scope of their arbitration agreement.  Zacher's citation
to Granite Rock is unavailing because it is taken out of context
and fails to acknowledge the qualifier that immediately follows the
quoted statement -- where there is no provision validly committing
formation or applicability issues to an arbitrator.  It is clear
from the Court's discussion in Granite Rock that a court must
resolve issues of an arbitration clause's scope unless the parties
have clearly and unmistakably delegated those issues to an
arbitrator.  Zacher and Comcast clearly and unmistakably did so.
Therefore, the Judge will compel arbitration, and the scope issue
can be raised before the arbitrator.

For these reasons, Judge Guzman granted the Defendant's motion to
compel arbitration.  The arbitration will proceed.  Therefore, the
lawsuit is administratively dismissed without prejudice subject to
full reinstatement, if requested by either party, upon completion
of the required arbitration.  The civil case terminated.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 20, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://bit.ly/2LJQ3HV from Leagle.com.

Chason Zacher, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by David Louis Gerbie --
info@mcgpc.com -- Mcguire Law, P.c.

Comcast Cable Communications, LLC, Defendant, represented by
Bradley Joseph Andreozzi -- bradley.andreozzi@dbr.com -- Drinker
Biddle & Reath LLP & Matthew M. Morrissey --
matthew.morrissey@dbr.com -- Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP.

COMCAST CABLE: Can't Compel Arbitration of R. Chacon's TCPA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ROLANDO CHACON, Plaintiff, v. COMCAST CABLE
COMMUNICATIONS MANAGEMENT, LLC AND DOES 1-10, Defendants, Case No.
17 CV 8434 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Ronald A. Guzman of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division,
denied the Defendant's motion to compel arbitration and stay
litigation.

Chacon alleges in the putative class action that Comcast violated
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA"), when it repeatedly
called him in February and March 2017, asking for someone named
Luke Johns or Luke Johnson.

Comcast moves to compel arbitration and stay this action on the
basis that Chacon entered into a Subscriber Agreement with Comcast
that requires arbitration of the parties' disputes.  In support of
its motion, Comcast submits the declaration of Nicole Patel, a
Comcast Director of Regulatory Compliance, who states that
Comcast's business records reflect that Chacon subscribed to
Comcast's Xfinity cable service for an apartment on South Harding
Avenue in Chicago in late January 2015, and Chacon then received
and paid for service in connection with his Comcast account until
his service was disconnected in November 2016.  Patel states that
Comcast's regular business practice since prior to 2015 is for its
installation technicians to provide Comcast's Subscriber Agreement
to customers in connection with the installation and for the
technicians to direct customers to read and accept the Subscriber
Agreement when activating service.

In response to Comcast's motion, Chacon submits a declaration in
which he states that he previously had Comcast's Xfinity service,
but no longer has an active Comcast account; he has no recollection
that the Comcast installation technician who installed his service
provided him with a Subscriber Agreement; he never signed or agreed
to anything similar to the Subscriber Agreement attached to Patel's
declaration; the telephone calls he received from Comcast did not
relate to his previous Comcast Xfinity service, but to someone
named Luke Johns or Luke Johnson; and he does not know anyone by
those names.

In reply, Comcast argues that Chacon's statement that he does not
recall being provided with the Subscriber Agreement is insufficient
to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether it was provided to
him, but to avoid any doubt, Comcast submits a supplemental
declaration from Patel.   

Comcast contends that Chacon's claims "fall squarely" within its
scope because Chacon's allegations that Comcast called his phone
are indisputably related to an 'aspect' of his 'relationship' with
Comcast.  Comcast does not further explain how this is so.  In
response, Chacon asserts that they are not because the calls had
nothing to do with the service Comcast had provided to him; the
calls were not even intended for Chacon, but for a different
individual who is a stranger to Chacon, and thus pertained to that
individual's relationship with Comcast, not Chacon's.

Judge Guzman agrees with Chacon.  The Plaintiff alleges in the case
that Comcast violated the TCPA by repeatedly making phone calls to
him that were intended for another person.  That is not a dispute
regarding an aspect of Chacon's relationship with Comcast (which
was a contractual relationship), so it does not fall within the
plain language of the arbitration provision in the Subscriber
Agreement.  Because arbitration agreements are contracts, a party
cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he
has not agreed so to submit.

The Judge holds that the circumstances in the case stand in
contrast to situations in which the Plaintiff subscribed to the
Defendant's service, terminated that service, and subsequently
received calls from the Defendant that pertained to the parties'
relationship, such as calls attempting to collect an outstanding
debt for the previous service.  Chacon did not agree to arbitrate
disputes that do not concern an aspect of his relationship with
Comcast, so the Judge will not compel arbitration.

In its reply brief, Comcast asserts that the issue of whether the
dispute lies within the scope of the arbitration provision raises
an issue for the arbitrator, not the Court, to decide, because the
parties agreed to arbitrate even "gateway" questions of
arbitrability.  But Comcast raises the issue for the first time in
its reply brief, so the Judge will not consider the argument.

For these reasons, Judge Guzman denied the Defendant's motion to
compel arbitration and stay litigation.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 20, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://bit.ly/2MbbNsl from Leagle.com.

Rolando Chacon, Plaintiff, represented by Alex Jacob Levin, The Law
Offices Of Todd M. Friedman, P.c., Todd M. Friedman, Law Offices of
Todd M. Friedman & David B. Levin, Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman,
P.C.

Comcast Cable Communications, LLC, Defendant, represented by
Bradley Joseph Andreozzi -- bradley.andreozzi@dbr.com -- Drinker
Biddle & Reath LLP & Matthew M. Morrissey --
matthew.morrissey@dbr.com -- Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP.

CONRAD CREDIT: Debt Collection Violates FDCPA, Hochstasser Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
Matthew Hochstasser, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. Conrad Credit Corporation, and John Does
1-25, Case No. 2:18-cv-04024 (E.D.N.Y., July 12, 2018), alleges
that the Defendants' debt collection efforts attempted and directed
towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Conrad Credit Corporation is a "debt collector" as the phrase is
defined and used in the FDCPA with an address in Escondido,
California.  The Defendant is a company that uses the mail,
telephone, and facsimile and regularly engages in business the
principal purpose of which is to attempt to collect debts alleged
to be due another.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel Kohn, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Telephone: (201) 282-6500
          Facsimile: (201) 282-6501
          E-mail: dkohn@steinsakslegal.com


CREDIT MANAGEMENT: Appeals Decision in Bassett Suit to 8th Cir.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Credit Management Services, Inc. and Jason Morledge
filed an appeal from a court ruling in the lawsuit styled Kelly
Bassett v. Credit Management Services Inc., et al., Case No.
8:17-cv-00069-JFB, in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Nebraska - Omaha.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on July 5, 2018, the Hon.
Joseph F. Bataillon entered an order on June 28, 2018:

   1. certifying a class of:

      "(i) all persons with addresses in Nebraska; (ii) to whom
      defendant CMS sent or served, or caused to be sent or
      served, between March 1, 2016, and July 31, 2016, a county
      court collection complaint in the form of (iii) in an
      attempt to collect an alleged unpaid medical account; (iv)
      that requested an award of statutory attorneys' fees and/or
      prejudgment interest pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. section
      25-1801";

   2. appointing the law firms of Horwitz, Horwitz, and Car and
      Reinbrecht as class counsel;

   3. denying Plaintiff's motion to exclude expert testimony
      consistent with this order; and

   4. denying Defendants' motion for a hearing.

The appellate case is captioned as Credit Management Services Inc.,
et al. v. Kelly Bassett, Case No. 18-8007, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Respondent Kelly Bassett, individually and as heir and
Personal Representative of the Estate of James M. Bassett, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, is
represented by:

          Owen Randolph Bragg, Esq.
          HORWITZ, HORWITZ & ASSOC.
          25 E. Washington Street, Suite 900
          Chicago, IL 60602-0000
          Telephone: (312) 372-8822
          Facsimile: (312) 372-1673
          E-mail: rand@horwitzlaw.com

               - and -

          Pamela A. Car, Esq.
          William L. Reinbrecht, Esq.
          CAR & REINBRECHT, P.C., LLO
          8720 Frederick Street, Suite 105
          Omaha, NE 68124-0000
          Telephone: (402) 391-8484
          Facsimile: (402) 391-1103
          E-mail: pacar@cox.net
                  billr205@gmail.com

Defendants-Petitioners Credit Management Services, Inc., and Jason
Morledge are represented by:

          Jessica Lee Prom Klander, Esq.
          BASSFORD REMELE
          100 S. Fifth Street, Suite 1500
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 376-1615
          E-mail: jklander@bassford.com

               - and -

          Christopher R. Morris, Esq.
          BASSFORD REMELE
          33 S. Sixth Street, Suite 3800
          Minneapolis, MN 55402-3707
          Telephone: (612) 333-3000
          E-mail: cmorris@bassford.com


CREDIT ONE: Can Compel Arbitration of J. Croucier's TCPA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California granted Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration in the
case captioned JESSE CROUCIER, Plaintiff, v. CREDIT ONE BANK, N.A.,
et al., Defendant, Case No. 18cv20-MMA (JMA) (S.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff Jesse Croucier brings this action against Defendant
Credit One Bank, N.A. (Credit One) alleging causes of action for:
(1) violations of California's Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, California Civil Code (2) violations of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act and (3) violations of
California's Unfair Competition Law, California Business and
Professional Code.

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) permits a party aggrieved by the
alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under
a written agreement for arbitration to petition any United States
District Court for an order directing that arbitration proceed in
the manner provided for in the arbitration agreement. Upon a
showing that a party has failed to comply with a valid arbitration
agreement, the district court must issue an order compelling
arbitration.

While the Plaintiff alleges Credit One's regular business practice
is to collect upon defaulted debts from multiple consumers through
the use of phone calls to California Citizens' cellphones using
ATDS and/or Recorded voice, this conduct does not violate the
statutes the Plaintiff invokes when consumers have consented to
such contact, as Credit One's customers do via the Cardholder
Agreement. The Plaintiff does attach the modifying phrase, as part
of Credit One's regular business practice, to at least one
allegation of unlawful conduct direct toward the Plaintiff, but as
the court observed in Wright, such vague, generalized allegations
do not request public relief.

Even if the Plaintiff had specifically alleged a regular practice
of continuing ATDS collection calls after revocation of consent,
the putative class affected by the alleged conduct would be limited
to a small group of individuals similarly situated to the
plaintiff. The class would consist of (1) Credit One customers, (2)
who failed to make timely payments, (3) expressly revoked consent
to receive ATDS calls, and (4) continued to receive such calls.
Relief benefiting this particularized group stands in contrast to
the public relief requested in McGill Cal. 5th at 955, which sought
to enjoin Citibank from engaging in unlawfully deceptive marketing
practices directed at the general public.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 11, 2018 Order is
available https://tinyurl.com/yabpopum from Leagle.com.

Jesse Croucier, Plaintiff, represented by Ahren A. Tiller --
ahren.tiller@blc-sd.com -- BLC Law Center, APC.

Credit One Bank, N.A., Defendant, represented by Brett B. Goodman
-- bgoodman@yumollp.com -- Yu Mohandesi LLP.

DANELL CUSTOM: Billing Records Can Be Filed Partly Under Seal
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, FRANCISCO RODRIGUEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DANELL
CUSTOM HARVESTING, LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No.
1:16-cv-01848-SAB (E.D. Cal.), Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone of
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California
granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs' motion to file
billing records under seal.

On June 8, 2018, the Plaintiffs' filed an unopposed motion for
final approval of a class action settlement in the matter.  They
also submitted billing records for in camera review.

On June 11, 2018, an order issued requiring the Plaintiffs to file
the billing records in the public record or submit a request to
seal.  The Plaintiffs were advised that they must show compelling
reasons to file documents under seal in this instance.  

On June 13, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed a request to file the
billing records under seal.  They seek to seal the records on the
ground that they are protected by attorney-client privilege and are
attorney work product.

Magistrate Judge Boone finds that the Plaintiffs' request to file
the billing records under seal is overbroad as a cursory review of
the records shows that they contain the general nature of the
services performed which is not entitled to either attorney client
privilege or protected by the work product doctrine.  Even where
the records contain the purpose of communication with class members
or potential class members, such as for obtaining factual
background or to obtain forms or documents, it is not clear how
this would reveal litigation strategy.  He says there are certain
entries that include researching certain areas of law that would
fall within the exception identified in Clarke v. Am. Commerce Nat.
Bank, but these limited entries could be redacted to protect any
privileged information.

Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Boone granted in part and denied in
part the Plaintiffs' request to file billing records under seal.
The Plaintiffs' will (i) redact only those limited portions of the
billing records that reveal the motive of the client in seeking
representation, litigation strategy, or the specific nature of the
services provided, such as researching particular areas of law;
(ii) file the redacted copy of the billing records within 10 days
from the date of entry of the Order; (iii) file the unredacted
copies of the billing records under seal within 10 days from the
date of entry of the Order; and (iv) file the request to seal
documents upon receipt of the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 19, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/kw2xUW from Leagle.com.

Francisco Rodriguez, Jesus Hernandez Infante, Marco Garcia, Juan
Manuel Bravo, Estela Patino, Jose F. Orozco & Antonio Ortiz,
Plaintiffs, represented by Enrique Martinez, Law Offices of John E.
Hill.

Danell Custom Harvesting, LLC, a California Company, Rance Danell,
Eric Danell, David Danell & Justin Danell, Def endants, represented
by Howard A. Sagaser -- has@sw2law.com -- Sagaser, Watkins &
Wieland, PC, Ian Blade Wieland -- ian@sw2law.com -- Sagaser,
Watkins & Wieland, PC & William M. Woolman -- bill@sw2law.com --
Sagaser, Watkins & Wieland PC.

DENKA PERFORMANCE: Removes Butler Suit to E.D. Louisiana
--------------------------------------------------------
The Defendants in the case of JUANEA L BUTLER, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. DENKA
PERFORMANCE ELASTOMER LLC; E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY;
LOUISIANA STATE, THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HOSPITALS;
LOUISIANA STATE THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Defendants, filed a notice to remove the lawsuit from the Judicial
District Court of the State of Louisiana, Parish of St. John the
Baptist, (Case No. 72327) to the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana and assigned Case No.
2:18-cv-06685-MLCF-KWR (E.D. La., July 13, 2018). The case is
assigned to Judge Martin L.C. Feldman and referred to Magistrate
Judge Karen Wells Roby.

Denka Performance Elastomer LLC manufactures and sells chloroprene
rubber. The company is based in the United States. Denka
Performance Elastomer LLC operates as a subsidiary of Denki Kagaku
Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Danny Dustin Russell, Esq.
          RUSSELL LAW FIRM, LLC
          733 E. Airport Ave, Suite 201
          Baton Rouge, LA 70806
          Telephone: (225) 307-0088
          E-mail: danny@dannyrusselllaw.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          James Conner Percy, Esq.
          JONES WALKER (BATON ROUGE)
          8555 United Plaza Blvd., 5th Floor
          Baton Rouge, LA 70809
          Telephone: (225) 248-2130
          E-mail: jpercy@joneswalker.com

               - and -

          Brett S. Venn, Esq.
          JONES WALKER (NEW ORLEANS)
          201 St. Charles Ave., 50th Floor
          New Orleans, LA 70170
          Telephone: (504) 582-8116
          E-mail: bvenn@joneswalker.com

               - and -

          Justin J. Marocco, Esq.
          JONES WALKER (BATON ROUGE)
          8555 United Plaza Blvd., 5th Floor
          Baton Rouge, LA 70809
          Telephone: (225) 248-2415
          E-mail: jmarocco@joneswalker.com

               - and -

          Michael A. Chernekoff, Esq.
          JONES WALKER (HOUSTON)
          811 Main Street, Suite 2900
          Houston, TX 77002
          Telephone: (713) 437-1827
          E-mail: mchernekoff@joneswalker.com

               - and -

          Michael R. Rhea, Esq.
          JONES WALKER
          8555 United Plaza Blvd., 5th Floor
          Baton Rouge, LA 70809
          Telephone: (225) 248-2190
          E-mail: mrhea@joneswalker.com

               - and -

          Deborah DeRoche Kuchler, Esq.
          Joshua Doguet, Esq.
          KUCHLER POLK WEINER, LLC (NEW ORLEANS)
          1615 Poydras St., Suite 1300
          New Orleans, LA 70112
          Telephone: (504) 592-0691
          E-mail: dkuchler@kuchlerpolk.com
                  jdoguet@kuchlerpolk.com

               - and -

          Bradley H Weidenhammer, Esq.
          Kevin T Van Wart, Esq.
          Rebecca C Fitzpatrick, Esq.
          Stanley M Wash, Esq.
          KIRKLAND & ELLIS, LLP (CHICAGO)
          300 North LaSalle Street
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Telephone: (312) 862-2000
          E-mail: bradley.weidenhammer@kirkland.com
                  kevin.vanwart@kirkland.com
                  rebecca.fitzpatrick@kirkland.com
                  stan.wash@kirkland.com

               - and -

          Sarah E. Iiams, Esq.
          KUCHLER POLK SCHELL WEINER & RICHESON, L.L.C.
          1615 Poydras Street, Suite 1300
          New Orleans, LA 70112
          Telephone: (504) 592-0691
          Facsimile: (504) 592-0696
          E-mail: siiams@kuchlerpolk.com


DIET WORKS: Faces Fraud Class Action in New Jersey
--------------------------------------------------
Karen Kidd, writing for Legal Newsline, reports that three diet
supplement companies defending themselves against allegations of
fraud and other charges told a federal judge in New Jersey July 19
that plaintiffs are barred from prevailing in the case because they
can't prove injury or loss and that their claims are "de minimis,"
or trivial.

In their 21-page answer filed July 19 in U.S. District Court for
New Jersey, Diet Works, VitaQuest Intl. and Windmill Health
Products listed 22 separate defenses denying that plaintiffs in the
class action are entitled relief.

"Plaintiffs' claims are barred, in whole or in part, because
neither she nor any putative class member suffered any cognizable
injury or loss," the answer said. "Further, plaintiffs and the
putative class' alleged damages are de minimis, and/or are too
speculative, and/or are too remote, and/or are impossible to prove
and/or allocate."

The defendant companies asked U.S. District Court Judge Madeline
Cox Arleo to dismiss the case with prejudice and to award
defendants "reasonable attorneys' fees, interest, cost of suit and
other relief as the court deems just."

The defendant companies in the case filed their answer and separate
defenses in response to the consolidated amended class complaint by
plaintiffs Jacqueline Greek, Joyce Puccio, Renee Shoaf and Pamela
Parra. Greek filed the original complaint in the case last summer,
following her purchase of Garcinia Cambogia in 2015, alleging false
claims about how much hydroxycitric acid is present in its Diet
Works Garcinia Cambogia supplement.

Plaintiffs in the case allege the companies commit at least five
false and misleading claims in marketing Garcinia Cambogia,
including "healthy weight management," "promotes weight loss,"
"inhibits fat production," "suppresses carbohydrate cravings," and
that it is "the all-natural way to help reduce your appetite, burn
more calories and suppress carbohydrate cravings to make losing
weight faster and easier than ever!"

The plaintiffs claim marketing of Garcinia Cambogia violates the
New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act and Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection and breaches express and implied
warranties under Pennsylvania and New Jersey law.  

Judge Arleo issued an opinion in April, following a defense motion
to dismiss, in which she dismissed three of the plaintiffs' nine
counts but granted leave for those counts to be repleaded.

In their answer, the defendants describe Windmill as a New Jersey
limited liability company based in West Caldwell that is a wholly
owned subsidiary of Iron Horse, which is itself a wholly owned
subsidiary of Generic LLC, owned by Keith Frankel. The answer also
described VitaQuest as a wholly owned subsidiary of Vitaquest
International Holdings, which is itself a wholly owned subsidiary
of Vitaquest Investments Inc. and Bonjoint LLC, the latter being a
wholly owned subsidiary of CK Life Sciences.

Both Windmill and VitaQuest maintain their principal place of
business on Henderson Drive in West Caldwell, according to the
answer.

The answer was filed on behalf of the defendant companies by
attorneys Shawn L. Kelly and Jonathan D. Henry, partner and senior
managing associate with Dentons US in Short Hills, New Jersey. [GN]

DOLGEN LLC: Partial Summary Judgment Bid in "Fielding" Granted
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge John A. Gibney, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division, granted the
Defendant's motion for partial summary judgement in the case,
ELLEANA FIELDING, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated Plaintiffs, v. DOLGEN, LLC t/a DOLGENCORP, LLC and
BLUECROSS BLUESHIELD OF TENNESSEE, INC., Defendants, Civil Action
No. 3:17-cv-561-JAG (E.D. Va.).

Fielding brings a purported class action against her former
employer, Dollar General for failure to pay retail managers
overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") by improperly
classifying the managers as exempt employees.  She also claims that
Dollar General and Blue Cross Blue Shield failed to provide her
with notice of her right to continued health insurance following
her termination.

Dollar General moved to compel arbitration, and the Court
determined that the Federal Arbitration Act entitled her to a jury
trial on the issue of whether Fielding actually entered into the
purported arbitration agreement.  The parties conducted discovery
on the issue, and the Court granted the Defendant leave to file for
summary judgment.

Fielding began work as a manager with Dollar General on Aug. 2,
2014.  All Dollar General employees have access to an employee
portal called DGme, by using a unique employee ID and password.
Within the portal, employees may view certain information including
Dollar General's Arbitration Agreement.  

Once an employee accessed the agreement, they had the option to
review the Agreement, print the American Arbitration Agreement
("AAA") rules, and review and print the opt-out form to opt out of
the Agreement.  The Agreement stated that the employee had the
ability to opt out of the agreement, but must do so by filing out
the electronic opt-out form.  It said that failure to opt out would
result in the employee being bound to the terms of the Agreement.


After an employee reviewed the agreement, the DGme portal provided
the employee with the option to either (1) opt out at that time or
(2) to take 30 days to review the agreement and decide.  The
employee had to choose the opt-out now option or the 30-day review
option and then type in his or her name as a signature.

Dollar General's electronic records indicate that Fielding viewed
the Agreement through the DGme portal on Aug. 5, 2014.  She chose
the 30-day review option and typed in her name.  She looked at the
Agreement again on Aug. 22, 2014, and again chose the 30-day review
option and typed in her name as her electronic signature.

Fielding says that she was very busy in her first weeks and months
of employment and that she does not recall seeing the Agreement in
her DGme portal.  In her opposition to the motion for summary
judgment, Fielding makes the unsupported assertion that she never
signed nor submitted an executed arbitration agreement through the
DGme portal or otherwise, but also says that she was "swamped"
during that time period and she cleared any and all alerts on DGme
as quickly as possible with the minimum of attention so she could
focus on her operational duties.  Fielding points out that the
screen shots of the DGme portal submitted by Dollar General
differed from the screen shots she actually saw, but she does not
contest the veracity of the electronic records showing that she
chose and signed the 30-day review option and that the option said
that failure to opt out would result in her being bound by the
Agreement's terms.

Judge Gibney finds that the undisputed facts show that Fielding
signed the 30-day review provision on her DGme portal, and that her
signature, along with her failure to opt-out of the arbitration
agreement within 30 days, bound her to the terms of the Agreement.
He therefore granted the motion for partial summary judgment.  The
Court will enter an appropriate Order.  The Clerk is directed to
send a copy of the Opinion to all the counsel of record.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 19, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/AgWtas from Leagle.com.

Elleana Fielding, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by James Richard Theuer --
jim@theuerlaw.com -- James R. Theuer, PLLC.

Dolgen, LLC, trading as Dolgencorp, LLC, Defendant, represented by
Joel Steven Allen, Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP, pro hac vice,
Melissa M. Hensley -- mhensley@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods
LLP, pro hac vice, Sara Beth Hall -- sbhall@mcguirewoods.com --
McGuireWoods LLP, pro hac vice & Summer Laine Speight --
sspeight@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP.

BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee, Defendant, represented by Edwin
Ford Stephens -- estephens@cblaw.com -- Christian & Barton LLP.

DOWNTOWN TOWING: Petraglia Seeks to Recover OT Pay Under FLSA
-------------------------------------------------------------
GIOVANNA PETRAGLIA, and all others similarly situated v. DOWNTOWN
TOWING COMPANY, a Florida Corporation, TIMOTHY RYAN DEL ROSAL,
individually, BRANDON RAY DEL ROSAL, individually, and ZACHARY
ROBERT DEL ROSAL, individually, Case No. 1:18-cv-22733-DPG (S.D.
Fla., July 6, 2018), seeks to recover monetary damages, liquidated
damages, interests, costs and attorney's fees for the Defendants'
alleged willful violations of overtime wages under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

Downtown Towing is a Florida corporation, which regularly conducted
business within the Southern District of Florida as a tow truck
company.  The Individual Defendants are "employers" as defined in
the FLSA, as they have operational control over the Defendant
corporation.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel T. Feld, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL T. FELD, P.A.
          2847 Hollywood Blvd.
          Hollywood, FL 33020
          Telephone: (954) 361-8383
          E-mail: DanielFeld.Esq@gmail.com

               - and -

          Isaac Mamane, Esq.
          MAMANE LAW LLC
          10800 Biscayne Blvd., Suite 350A
          Miami, FL 33161
          Telephone (305) 773-6661
          E-mail: mamane@gmail.com


DR PEPPER: Appeals Cert. Order in Fitzhenry-Russell to 9th Cir.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Dr. Pepper Snapple Group, Inc. and Dr. Pepper/Seven Up,
Inc., filed an appeal from the District Court's class certification
order entered in the lawsuit styled Jackie Fitzhenry-Russell, et
al. v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Group, Inc., et al., Case No.
5:17-cv-00564-NC, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, San Jose.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Hon.
Nathanael M. Cousins entered an order:

   1. granting Plaintiffs' class certification motion, and
      certifying a class of:

      "all persons who, between December 28, 2012 and the
      present, purchased any Canada Dry Ginger Ale products in
      the state of California";

   2. appointing Fitzhenry-Russell and Margaryan as class
      representatives;

   3. appointing Gutride Safier LLP and the Margarian Law Firm as
      class counsel.

The appellate case is captioned as DR PEPPER SNAPPLE GROUP, INC.
AND DR PEPPER/SEVEN UP, INC., Defendants-Petitioners v. JACKIE
FITZHENRY-RUSSELL AND GEGHAM MARGARYAN, INDIVIDUALS, ON BEHALF OF
THEMSELVES, THE GENERAL PUBLIC AND THOSE SIMILARLY SITUATED,
Plaintiffs-Respondents, Case No. 18-80081, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Respondents JACKIE FITZHENRY-RUSSELL and GEGHAM
MARGARYAN, Individuals, on behalf of themselves, the general public
and those similarly situated, are represented by:

          Adam Joshua Gutride, Esq.
          Seth Adam Safier, Esq.
          Kristen G. Simplicio, Esq.
          GUTRIDE SAFIER LLP
          835 Douglass Street
          San Francisco, CA 94114
          Telephone: (415) 271-6469
          E-mail: adam@gutridesafier.com
                  seth@gutridesafier.com
                  Kristen@gutridesafier.com

               - and -

          Matthew Thomas McCrary, Esq.
          GUTRIDE SAFIER LLP
          265 Franklin Street
          Boston, MA 02110
          Telephone: (415) 639-9090
          E-mail: matt@gutridesafier.com

Defendants-Petitioners DR. PEPPER SNAPPLE GROUP, INC., and DR.
PEPPER/SEVEN UP, INC., are represented by:

          Van Beckwith, Esq.
          BAKER BOTTS LLP
          2001 Ross Avenue
          Dallas, TX 75201-2980
          Telephone: (214) 953-6505
          E-mail: van.beckwith@bakerbotts.com

               - and -

          Evan Young, Esq.
          BAKER BOTTS LLP
          98 San Jacinto Blvd., Suite 1500
          Austin, TX 78701
          Telephone: (512) 322-2554
          E-mail: evan.young@bakerbotts.com

               - and -

          Ariel D. House, Esq.
          Jonathan A. Shapiro, Esq.
          BAKER BOTTS LLP
          101 California Street, Suite 3600
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 291-6200
          Facsimile: (415) 291-6225
          E-mail: ariel.house@bakerbotts.com
                  jonathan.shapiro@bakerbotts.com


DR PEPPER: Fletcher Sues Over Ginger Ale's Deceptive Labeling
-------------------------------------------------------------
JULIE FLETCHER, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. DR. PEPPER SNAPPLE GROUP, INC., DR. PEPPER/SEVEN UP,
INC., Case No. 1:18-cv-00766 (W.D.N.Y., July 11, 2018), concerns
DPSG's alleged false and deceptive labeling, advertising,
marketing, and sale of the soft drink, Canada Dry Ginger Ale, as
"MADE FROM REAL GINGER."

Dr. Pepper Snapple Group, Inc., is a corporation existing under the
laws of the state of Delaware, having its principal place of
business in Plano, Texas.  Dr. Pepper/Seven Up, Inc., is a
corporation existing under the laws of the state of Delaware,
having its principal place of business in Plano.  It is a wholly
owned subsidiary of Dr. Pepper Snapple Group, Inc.

DPSG manufactures, distributes, markets, advertises, and sells soft
drinks in the United States under several brand names, including
"Canada Dry."[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael J. DeBenedictis, Esq.
          DEBENEDICTIS & DEBENEDICTIS LLC
          20 Brace Road, Suite 350
          Cherry Hill, NJ 08034
          Telephone: (856) 795-2101
          E-mail: mjd@debenedictislaw.com

               - and -

          Seth Safier, Esq.
          Matthew T. McCrary, Esq.
          GUTRIDE SAFIER LLP
          100 Pine Street, Suite 1250
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 336-6545
          E-mail: seth@gutridesafier.com
                  matt@gutridesafier.com


EPIC SYSTEMS: Employees May File Individual Unpaid OT Claims
------------------------------------------------------------
Kate Monica, writing for EHR Intelligence, reports that up to 1,500
quality assurance and technical writers at Epic Systems may file
wage and working hours claims through individual arbitration after
the health IT company won a major Supreme Court labor law case that
barred employees from filing a class action lawsuit over the
disputes.

The ongoing cases involve unpaid overtime claims for salaried
employees dating back to 2012, according to a report from WKOW.

Habush, Habush, & Rottier attorney Breanne Snapp --
bsnapp@habush.com -- represented the Epic employees in the October
2017 Supreme Court case. She told WKOW reporters the workers will
continue to push for compensation as individuals rather than as a
group.

The case was brought to trial by technical writer Jacob Lewis.
Lewis alleged Epic failed to compensate him and other technical
writers appropriately for overtime pay and filed a complaint
against Epic in federal court. However, Epic motioned to dismiss
the lawsuit and compel individual arbitration since Lewis had
signed an arbitration agreement when he was first hired at Epic.

Employees sign arbitration agreements in order to work at Epic
Systems. Workers consent to losing the ability to pursue
work-related claims through class or collective action.

In May 2018, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Epic Systems in a
5-4 decision.

In the majority opinion, Justice Neil Gorsuch stated the employees
could not file a class action lawsuit against their employer over
individual wage and working hours claims because they signed
arbitration agreements upon gaining employment at Epic.

In light of the Supreme Court ruling, Epic Systems employees may
now pursue their wage and working hour complaints individually, Ms.
Snapp told WKOW.

"Instead of the cases being resolved efficiently in one class
action trial, we may have a thousand arbitrations instead," she
said.

While many workers who filed overtime claims against the health IT
company still work for Epic Systems, several hundred have likely
left for other opportunities, according to Ms. Snapp.

"Workers have begun filing unpaid overtime claims individually,
some going back to 2015, but none have yet been paid," she said.

Epic will pay for the individual arbitration and most of the filing
fees, according to WKOW.

In 2014, Epic settled a similar overtime case that ultimately cost
the health IT company about $5.4 million.

Epic has not responded to a request for comment from WKOW.

Beyond requiring Epic employees to file over a thousand individual
arbitrations, Epic v. Lewis may also have big implications for
workers' rights to file class action lawsuits.

The case centered on whether the National Labor Relations Act
permits employers to wave employees' rights to pursue claims in a
class action or collective action lawsuit in arbitration
agreements.

"Should employees and employers be allowed to agree that any
disputes between them will be resolved through one-on-one
arbitration?" stated Justice Gorsuch in the majority opinion. "Or
should employees always be permitted to bring their claims in class
or collective actions, no matter what they agreed with their
employers?"

Epic Systems and its co-petitioners argued the arbitration waiver
did not violate the National Labor Relations Act and is protected
under the Federal Arbitration Act.

In agreement with Epic, Justice Gorsuch stated the National Labor
Relations Act "secures to employees the rights to organize unions
and bargain collectively, but it says nothing about how judges and
arbitrators must try legal disputes that leave the workplace and
enter the courtroom or arbitral forum."

"Far from conflicting, the Arbitration Act and the NLRA have long
enjoyed separate spheres of influence and neither permits this
Court to declare the parties' agreements unlawful," he continued.

The court's decision could make it more difficult for employees to
address workplace complaints in class action lawsuits in the
future. [GN]

ERICSSON INC: J. Nguyen's Wage & Hour Suit Remains in Dist. Court
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose Division, denied Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand
the case captioned JOHN NGUYEN, Plaintiff, v. ERICSSON, INC., et
al., Defendants, Case No. 5:17-cv-06453-EJD (N.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiff filed a class action complaint in Santa Clara
Superior Court against the Defendants claiming violations of
California wage and hour laws, including failure to pay all wages
owed, failure to pay overtime, failure to provide rest and meal
breaks, failure to provide accurate wage stubs, and failure to
provide employee files upon request.  The Defendant 4G removed the
action to this Court under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section
1332(a) and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1441(a).

The Plaintiff moves to remand the putative class action to Superior
Court of Santa Clara pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1447(c) on the
basis that Defendant 4G has failed to show the requisite subject
matter jurisdiction over the claims.

Defendant 4G claims that the case was properly removed to federal
court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. First, Defendant 4G
contends that Defendant Michael Wilcox is a sham defendant who
cannot be held personally liable for the alleged wage and hour
violations. Second, Defendant 4G contends that the amount in
controversy is more likely than not over $75,000.  

A person can only be liable for violations of California Labor
Code, and therefore can only have a viable California Labor Code
claim brought against him or her, if the person is an owner,
director, officer or managing agent of the employer. Here,
Plaintiff seeks to hold Wilcox liable as a managing agent.

As a preliminary matter, the allegations in the complaint fail to
establish that Wilcox was a managing agent of the employer, as
required by California Labor Code section 558.1(b).
THe Plaintiff alleges that at the time he reported to Wilcox, the
Plaintiff was employed by Networkers or 4G, and that these
companies contracted to provide workers to Ericsson.  Wilcox was
employed by Ericsson, not Networkers or 4G. The Plaintiff does not
allege that Wilcox was the managing agent of Networkers or 4G. On
this basis alone, there is no possibility that Wilcox can be held
liable under California Labor Code section 558.1(b).

The Plaintiff claims that Wilcox oversaw the location where the
Plaintiff worked and supervised the daily work of employees. These
allegations fail to show that Wilcox had substantial discretionary
authority over a significant aspect of Ericsson's business or that
Wilcox had broad and unlimited authority. Nor are there allegations
from which to infer that Wilcox's decisions created corporate
policy. Therefore, Wilcox is a sham defendant and his citizenship
will be disregarded for purposes of determining diversity
jurisdiction.

The Plaintiff is a citizen of California and Defendants 4G,
Networks, and Ericsson are citizens of Texas. Diversity of
citizenship has been satisfied.

The Plaintiff contends that Defendant 4G has not shown that the
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.

Defendant 4G estimates that the Plaintiff placed at least $58,690
in controversy, exclusive of attorney fees. Defendant 4G made
calculations for the four-year-period the Plaintiff claims based on
one missed meal per workday, one missed break per workday, one hour
of overtime per week in the given period, and associated penalties.
This calculation is comparable to the amount in controversy
calculations that were accepted by the court in Giannini v.
Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., No. C 12-77 CW, 2012 WL1535196,
at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2012).

Defendant 4G also included $30,000 in attorney fees in calculating
the amount in controversy. This estimate is based on a rate of $300
per hour, which is more conservative than the rates applied in
Zoom, multiplied by 100, which is a conservative estimate of
anticipated attorney hours considering the scope and complexity of
the Plaintiff's claims.

Defendant 4G has established that the amount in controversy is more
likely than not over $75,000, and the Plaintiff has not disputed
4G's calculations. Therefore, the Court finds that the amount in
controversy necessary for subject matter jurisdiction has been
satisfied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 11, 2018 Order is
available https://tinyurl.com/y9yeh8r7 from Leagle.com.

John Nguyen, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Velton --
dvelton@vzfirm.com -- Velton Zegelman, Huy Ngoc Tran --
Huy@JAWLawGroup.com -- Justice at Work Law Group, Kevin R. Allen --
kallen@vzfirm.com -- Velton Zegelman PC, Kevin Robert Allen , Allen
Attorney Group & Tomas Eduardo Margain , Justice at Work Law Group,
84 W Santa Clara,

Ericsson, Inc. & 4G Project People, Inc., Defendants, represented
by Claire A. Hoffmann -- clairehoffmann@gbgllp.com -- Grube Brown
and Geidt LLP, E. Jeffrey Grube, Esq. -- jeffgrube@gbgllp.com --
Grube Brown & Geidt LLP & Elizabeth Alexandra Brown --
lisabrown@gbgllp.com -- Grube Brown & Geidt LLP.

ESTRELLA PROVIDER: Underpays Home Care Providers, Barcena Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Maria Teresa Barcena, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Estrella Provider Services, LLC;
Jose C. Gonzalez; and Jose A. Martinez, Defendants, Case No.
5:18-cv-00103 (S.D. Tex., July 13, 2018) is an action against the
Defendants to recover unpaid wages, overtime pay, liquidated
damages, attorney's fees and costs.

Ms. Barcena was employed by the Defendants as home care provider
from January 2016 to June 2017.

Estrella Provider Services, LLC is a Texas corporation whose
principal place of business is in Laredo, Webb County, Texas and
which may be served with process by serving its registered agent,
Jose Gonzalez, 3820 Cedar Ave., Laredo, Texas 78041. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lakshmi Ramakrishnan, Esq.
          TEXAS RIOGRANDE LEGAL AID, INC.
          301 S. Texas Ave.
          Mercedes, TX 78570
          Telephone: (956) 447-4850
          Facsimile: (956) 825-7035
          E-mail: lramakrishnan@trla.org


EVOLUTION WIRELESS: Grey Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ANGELIA GREY, Individually, and on behalf of herself and others
similarly situated v. EVOLUTION WIRELESS, INC., d/b/a metroPCS, a
Rhode Island Corporation, Case No. 3:18-cv-00290 (E.D. Tenn.,
July 12, 2018), is brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act on
behalf of all current and former hourly-paid Store Managers and
Team Leaders of Evolution for "off-the-clock" unpaid straight time,
minimum wage and overtime compensation.

Headquartered in East Providence, Rhode Island, Evolution Wireless,
Inc., is a Rhode Island Corporation that does business as a
cellular telephone service business.  Specifically, the Defendant
is a distributor or authorized dealer of metroPCS prepaid cellular
telephones.  The Defendant operates storefronts in Tennessee,
Georgia, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Nebraska and others.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gordon E. Jackson, Esq.
          James L. Holt, Jr., Esq.
          J. Russ Bryant, Esq.
          Paula R. Jackson, Esq.
          JACKSON, SHIELDS, YEISER & HOLT
          262 German Oak Drive
          Memphis, TN 38018
          Telephone: (901) 754-8001
          Facsimile: (901) 754-8524
          E-mail: gjackson@jsyc.com
                  jholt@jsyc.com
                  rbryant@jsyc.com
                  pjackson@jsyc.com


EXPERIAN INFORMATION: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss FCRA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TERRACE ELLIS, Plaintiff, v. EXPERIAN INFORMATION
SOLUTIONS, INC., Defendant, Case No. 17-CV-07092-LHK (N.D. Cal.),
Judge Lucy H. Koh of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, San Jose Division, denied the Defendant's
motion to dismiss or to strike class allegations.

Ellis brings the putative class action against the Defendant
related to its allegedly inaccurate credit reports.

In 2011, Michael Dreher brought a putative class action against the
Defendant in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia.  In his complaint, Mr. Dreher alleged that in 2010, while
Mr. Dreher was undergoing a background check for a security
clearance, the federal government discovered he was associated with
a delinquent credit card account that had been taken out by Mr.
Dreher's cousin in Mr. Dreher's name.  To clear up the matter, Mr.
Dreher requested a credit report from the Defendant.  Subsequently,
Mr. Dreher received a series of credit reports from the Defendant,
each of which listed a delinquent account under the names Advanta
Bank or Advanta Credit Cards.

However, unbeknownst to Mr. Dreher, Advanta had been shut down by
the Utah Department of Financial Institutions since earlier in
2010, and an entity called CardWorks, Inc. had been appointed as
servicer of Advanta's portfolio.  Even though Advanta had been
defunct since early 2010, the Defendant continued to list the
Advanta name, and not CardWorks, for all Advanta accounts on
Defendant's credit reports, which explains why Mr. Dreher received
credit reports from the Defendant that listed a delinquent account
under the Advanta name.

Mr. Dreher's complaint against the Defendant asserted that the
Defendant's listing of Advanta instead of CardWorks on credit
reports amounted to a violation of 15 U.S.C. Section 1681g(a)(2),
which requires consumer reporting agencies to clearly and
accurately disclose the sources of the information listed on credit
reports.  

Mr. Dreher sought to pursue this Section 1681g(a)(2) claim on
behalf of a class composed of all persons who (1) requested a
credit report from the Defendant on or after Aug. 1, 2010; and (2)
received a document in response that identified Advanta as the only
source of information.  The U.S. Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia certified the class on May 30, 2013.

Thereafter, the Defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground
that Mr. Dreher lacked Article III standing to assert a Section
1681g(a)(2) claim against the Defendant, but the district court
disagreed with the Defendant and found that Mr. Dreher had
standing.  Then, in lieu of holding a jury trial on the class
claim, the parties stipulated to an award of $170 in statutory
damages for each class member.  On Aug. 26, 2015, the district
court entered final judgment in favor of Mr. Dreher and the Dreher
class in the amount of $170 per class member, totaling over $11.7
million.

The Defendant then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, arguing that the district court erred in finding
that Mr. Dreher had Article III standing to pursue the class claim
for violation of 15 U.S.C. Section 1681g(a)(2).  The Fourth Circuit
agreed with the Defendant.  As a result, it eld that Mr. Dreher had
alleged a mere statutory violation divorced from any real world
effect and therefore lacked standing to pursue a Section
1681g(a)(2) claim against the Defendant based on its listing of
Advanta instead of CardWorks on credit reports.  Accordingly, the
Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded
with instructions to dismiss the case "on jurisdictional grounds."


On Dec. 13, 2017, about seven months after the Fourth Circuit's
Dreher decision was issued, the Plaintiff filed the instant action
against the Defendant in the Court.  Like Mr. Dreher in the Dreher
case, the Plaintiff alleges that (1) she requested credit reports
from the Defendant; (2) those credit reports listed an Advanta
account that had an outstanding balance; and (3) at the time,
Advanta had already been "shut down," and CardWorks had been hired
to service those Advanta accounts going forward.  However, unlike
Mr. Dreher, the Plaintiff also alleges that over the course of
years, in her efforts to resolve and end the continued reporting of
an Advanta Bank credit card tradeline in her credit reports, the
Plaintiff spent hours of her time researching the history of
Advanta and drafting, filing, and defending numerous pleadings that
incorrectly named Advanta as the Defendant, without knowing and
being able to identify the actual source of the inaccurate 'Advanta
Bank' tradeline in her credit reports.

The Plaintiff asserts three causes of action against the Defendant.
The Plaintiff's first cause of action is asserted on behalf of a
putative class and is identical to the class claim that Mr. Dreher
asserted against the Defendant in Dreher: violation of 15 U.S.C.
Section 1681g(a)(2) based on the Defendant's identification of
Advanta instead of CardWorks in the Defendant's credit reports.
Also similarly to Dreher, the Plaintiff seeks to assert Count One
on behalf of a class composed of all persons who (1) requested a
credit report from the Defendant between Sept. 11, 2011, through
the present; and (2) received a disclosure in response that
included a tradeline with the name 'Advanta Bank' or 'Advanta
Credit Cards,' but that did not identify Cardworks as a source of
the information for the Advanta Bank or Advanta Credit Cards
tradeline.  However, the Plaintiff also states that she was a
member of the class that was certified in Dreher, and that she did
not opt out of the Dreher class.  

The Plaintiff's second and third causes of action are for
violations of 15 U.S.C. Section 1681e(b) and California Civil Code
Section 1785.14, respectively, and are both asserted as individual
claims.

On Feb. 12, 2018, the Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss
Count One of the Plaintiff's complaint or to strike the Plaintiff's
class allegations.  It moves to strike the class action allegations
pertaining to Count One because it is clear that no such class
action is possible.  The Defendant argues that the Court should
strike the Plaintiff's class allegations because the Plaintiff will
not be able to satisfy the typicality requirement of Rule 23(a) or
the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b).  The Plaintiff opposed
the Defendant's motion on April 11, 2018, and the Defendant filed a
reply on April 25, 2018.

Judge Koh finds that because Mr. Dreher was the sole named
plaintiff and was found to lack standing to assert the class claim
in Dreher, the district court never had jurisdiction over the
matter, and therefore never had jurisdiction to certify the Dreher
class.  The Judge concludes that the Plaintiff is not bound by the
Fourth Circuit's determination regarding Mr. Dreher's lack of
standing even though a class was certified in Dreher and the
Plaintiff did not opt out of that class.  Accordingly, she denies
the Defendant's motion to dismiss Count One.

Turning to the Defendant's motion to strike class allegations,
although the Defendant appears to raise some potentially serious
issues with respect to the Plaintiff's proposed class, the Judge
finds it more appropriate for the Defendant to raise these issues
in the Defendant's opposition to the Plaintiff's motion for class
certification.  This provides both parties the opportunity to
further develop their arguments and engage in discovery.  The Court
and other courts in the district have similarly declined to address
challenges to a putative class's ability to satisfy Rule 23 at the
pleading stage.  Accordingly, she denies the Defendant's motion to
strike the Plaintiff's class allegations.

For these reasons, Judge Koh denied the Defendant's motion to
dismiss or to strike the class allegations.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 19, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/0PhJLR from Leagle.com.

Terrace Ellis, Plaintiff, represented by Leonard Anthony Bennett --
lenbennett@clalegal.com -- Consumer Litigation Associates, P.C.,
Annick Marie Persinger -- apersinger@tzlegal.com -- Tycko &
Zavareei LLP & Craig Carley Marchiando -- craig@clalegal.com --
Consumer Litigation Associates.

Experian Information Solutions, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Daniel John McLoon -- djmcloon@jonesday.com -- Jones Day, Jeffrey
Rabkin -- jrabkin@jonesday.com -- Jones Day & William Vincent
O'Reilly -- woreilly@jonesday.com -- Jones Day.

EXPRESS SCRIPTS: Wolfe Seeks to Halt Sale to Cigna
--------------------------------------------------
Robert Wolfe, and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
Express Scripts Holding Company, George Paz, Timothy Wentworth,
Maura C. Breen, William J. Delaney, Elder Granger, Nicholas J.
Lahowchic, Kathleen M. Mazzarella, Thomas P. Mac Mahon, Frank
Mergenthaler, Woodrow A. Myers Jr., Roderick A. Palmore, William L.
Roper and Seymour Sternberg, Defendants, Case 18-cv-01111 (D. Del.,
July 27, 2018) seeks to enjoin defendants and all persons acting in
concert with them from proceeding with, consummating, or closing
the acquisition of Express Scripts by Cigna Corporation, rescinding
it and setting it aside or awarding rescissory damages in the event
defendants consummate the merger.  The plaintiff also seeks costs
of this action, including reasonable allowance for attorneys' and
experts' fees and such other and further relief under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Express Scripts stockholders will receive 0.2434 of a share of New
Cigna common stock and $48.75 in cash for each Express Scripts
common share held. The proposed transaction is valued at
approximately $54 billion, excluding debt.

The registration statement, which recommends that Express Scripts
stockholders vote in favor of the Proposed Transaction, omits
Express Scripts' and Cigna's financial projections, relied upon by
the former's financial advisors, Centerview Partners LLC and Lazard
Freres & Co. LLC in connection with the rendering of their fairness
opinions, notes the complaint.

Express Scripts is an independent pharmacy benefit management
company located at One Express Way, St. Louis, Missouri 63121.
Cigna is a global health service company that provides medical,
pharmacy, behavioral, dental, disability, life and accident
insurance and related products and services. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Blake A. Bennett, Esq.
      COOCH AND TAYLOR, P.A.
      The Brandywine Building
      1000 West Street, 10th Floor
      Wilmington, DE 19801
      Tel: (302) 984-3800
      Email: bbennett@coochtaylor.com

            - and -

      Juan E. Monteverde, Esq.
      MONTEVERDE & ASSOCIATES PC
      The Empire State Building
      350 Fifth Avenue, 59th Floor
      New York, NY 10118
      Telephone: (212) 971-1341
      Email: jmonteverde@monteverdelaw.com


FALCON SUBSIDIARY: $595K Settlement in THNs' Suit Has Prelim OK
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JANET SHAULIS, and JEWEL ARLENE KEY, individually and
on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals Plaintiffs,
v. FALCON SUBSIDIARY LLC, a Delaware limited liability company,
d/b/a Axispoint Health, Defendant, Civil Action No.
18-cv-00293-CMA-NYW (D. Colo.), Judge Christine M. Arguello of the
U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado granted the
Parties' Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Collective/Class
Action Settlement, Certifying Class for Purpose of Settlement,
Directing Notice to the Class, and Scheduling Final Approval
Hearing.

The Judge preliminarily certified the class of all current and
former hourly Telehealth Nurses ("THNs") (a home-based nurse who
field patient calls) who work or have worked for Falcon, doing
business as AxisPoint Health, at any time from Feb. 6, 2015 (for
all THNs employed in states other than California) and from Feb. 6,
2014 (for all THNs employed in California), through the date on
which she granted preliminary approval of the Settlement.

She appointed the named Plaintiffs as the representatives for the
Settlement Class, and appointed Sommers Schwartz, P.C. as the Class
Counsel for the Plaintiffs and the Settlement Class.

The Plaintiffs and the Class Counsel have presented to the Court a
proposed Class Notice.  The Judge finds that such forms satisfy the
requirements of Rule 23 as it fairly and adequately: (a) describes
the terms and effect of the Settlement Agreement, the Settlement
and the Plan of Allocation; (b) notifies the Settlement Class: that
the California Claims Payments (totaling $12,000) will be paid out
of the Total Settlement Amount; that the Class Counsel will seek
attorneys' fees from the Global Settlement Fund up to one-third of
the $595,000 Total Settlement Amount; that reimbursement of
litigation expenses from the Total Settlement Amount will be sought
up to $15,000; that payment of Settlement Administration expenses
from the Total Settlement Amount in an amount not to exceed
$23,000; and that Named Plaintiff incentive awards will be sought
from the Total Settlement Amount in an amount not to exceed a
cumulative amount of $15,000 for the Named Plaintiffs for their
service in such capacities; (c) gives notice to the Settlement
Class of the time and place of the Fairness Hearing; and (d)
describes how the recipients of the Class Notice may object to any
of the relief requested or request to exclude themselves from the
settlement.  

The Plaintiffs and the Class Counsel have proposed first class mail
to communicate the notice to members of the Settlement Class, and
the Judge finds that such proposed manner is the best notice
practicable under the circumstances.  By no later than the date set
forth in the schedule, the Settlement Administrator will cause the
proposed Class Notice, to be sent to the last known e-mail address
of each member of the Settlement Class for whom the Settlement
Administrator has a valid e-mail address.

The Judge has reviewed the Class Counsel's Joint Motion and
supporting affidavit, and preliminarily approved their request for
an award of fees in the amount of $198,333.33, litigation expenses
in an amount not to exceed $15,000, and settlement administration
expenses not to exceed $23,000, as fair and reasonable.  Further,
upon consideration of the relevant authorities, she preliminarily
approved the proposed Named Plaintiff incentive awards in an
aggregate amount of $15,000 as fair and reasonable.

Any member of the Settlement Class who wishes to object to the
fairness, reasonableness or adequacy of the Settlement, or to any
term of the Settlement Agreement may file an objection.  The
addresses for filing objections with the Court and service on
counsel are as follows: SOMMERS SCHWARTZ, P.C. Kevin J. Stoops One
Towne Square, Suite 1700 Southfield, MI 48076 Telephone:
(248)355-0300 kstoops@sommerspc.com Upon Defense Counsel at:
MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY LLP Chris C. Scheithauer 4 Park Plaza, Suite
1700 Irvine, California 92614 (949) 757-7163 cscheithaeur@mwe.com
Upon Settlement Administrator at: SIMPLURIS INC. P.O. Box 26170
Santa Ana, California 92799 Fax: (714) 223-5067.

The Counsel will file their Motion for Final Approval and
Attorneys' Fees no later than the date set forth in the schedule.


The Judge established these deadlines:

     a. Entry of Preliminary Approval Order - June 19, 2018

     b. Defendant to provide the Settlement Administrator with
Class Member addresses and Class Member data for Class Notice to be
mailed - July 6, 2018

     c. Deadline for the Settlement Administrator to mail Class
Notice Packet - July 20, 2018 (Mailing Date)

     d. Deadline for Class Members to mail Elections Not to
Participate in Settlement and Objections - Sept. 3, 2018

     e. Deadline for filing Final Approval Motion and Motion for
Fees and Costs - Sept. 14, 2018

     f. Deadline for Settlement Administrator to rovide Parties
with report identifying all Participating Class Members - Sept. 17,
2018

     g. Deadline for Class Member Objections to Attorneys' Fee
Motion - Sept. 21, 2018  

     h. Deadline for Parties to file response to objections - Sept.
24, 2018

     i. Final Approval Hearing - Sept. 25, 2018 at 2:00 p.m.

     j. Deadline for Settlement Funding - Within 14 days of entry
of Final Approval Order

     k. Deadline for Settlement Administrator to Issue payments to
Participating Class Members, Named Plaintiff Incentive Awards, and
Class Counsel's Fees and Litigation Expenses - Within 7 days of
receiving Settlement Funding

A full-text copy of the Court's June 19, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/1TEHox from Leagle.com.

anet Shaulis & Jewel Arlene Key, individually and on behalf of all
other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs, represented by
Kevin Jay Stoops -- kstoops@sommerspc.com -- Sommers Schwartz, PC.

Falcon Subsidiary LLC, a Delaware limited liability company,
Defendant, represented by Christopher Charles Scheithauer --
cscheithauer@mwe.com -- McDermott Will & Emery, LLP, Erin McAlpin
Eiselein -- eeiselein@bhfs.com -- Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck,
LLP & Martine Tariot Wells -- mwells@bhfs.com -- Brownstein Hyatt
Farber Schreck, LLP.

FILTREX SERVICE: Wilson Action Seeks Unpaid Overtime Premium
------------------------------------------------------------
Scott Avery Wilson, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. Filtrex Service Group, Inc. and Christopher
Blount, Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-00491, (E.D. Ark., July 27,
2018), seeks monetary damages, liquidated damages, prejudgment
interest, costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees as a result
of failure to pay lawful overtime compensation for hours worked in
excess of forty hours per week under the Fair Labor Standards Act
and the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act.

Filtrex Service Group provides commercial, retail and restaurant
industries HVAC/R asset tracking, coil cleaning and maintenance,
energy management and equipment evaluations. Wilson was employed by
Defendants as a technician from March of 2018 until July of 2018.
He regularly worked in excess of forty hours per week without being
paid overtime premium, says the complaint. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Josh Sanford, Esq.
      Chris Burks, Esq.
      Daniel Ford, Esq.
      SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
      One Financial Center
      650 S. Shackleford Road, Suite 411
      Little Rock, AR 72211
      Telephone: (501) 221-0088
      Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
      Email: josh@sanfordlawfirm.com
             chris@sanfordlawfirm.com
             daniel@sanfordlawfirm.com


FLUOR CORP: Isenberg Suit Seeks to Recover Wages Under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------
DAVID ISENBERG, ERNIE NOBLES, JIMMY REYNA and TIM JOHNSON,
Individually, and on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated v. FLUOR CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation, and FD
SERVICES, INC., a Delaware Corporation, Case No. 4:18-cv-02407
(S.D. Tex., July 12, 2018), seeks to recover alleged unpaid
straight time wages, unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated
damages, unlawfully withheld wages, statutory penalties, attorneys'
fees and costs, and other damages owed pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

Fluor Corporation is a Delaware Corporation with its corporate
headquarters located in Irving, Texas.  According to its Web site,
"[F]lour Corporation is a global engineering, procurement,
fabrication, construction and maintenance company that designs,
builds, and maintains capital-efficient facilities for its clients
on six continents."

Fluor Daniel Services Corporation is a Delaware Corporation and is
a wholly owned subsidiary of Fluor Corporation.  Fluor Daniel
Services Corporation is the construction management arm of Fluor
Corporation.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          J. Derek Braziel, Esq.
          Travis Gasper, Esq.
          LEE & BRAZIEL, L.L.P.
          1801 N. Lamar Street, Suite 325
          Dallas, TX 75202
          Telephone: (214) 749-1400
          Facsimile: (214) 749-1010
          E-mail: jdbraziel@l-b-law.com
                  gasper@l-b-law.com

               - and -

          Gordon E. Jackson, Esq.
          James L. Holt, Jr., Esq.
          J. Russ Bryant, Esq.
          Paula R. Jackson, Esq.
          JACKSON, SHIELDS, YEISER & HOLT
          262 German Oak Drive
          Memphis, TN 38018
          Telephone: (901) 754-8001
          Facsimile: (901) 754-8524
          E-mail: gjackson@jsyc.com
                  jholt@jsyc.com
                  rbryant@jsyc.com
                  pjackson@jsyc.com


FOSTER PREMIER: Court Dismisses Suit Over Document Fees
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned JOHN MURPHY, CECIL MATHEW, and NIRUPA MATHEW,
Plaintiffs, v. FOSTER PREMIER, INC., HOMEWISE SERVICE CORP., INC.,
and NEXTLEVEL ASSOC. SOLUTIONS, INC., Defendants, No. 17 CV 8114
(N.D. Ill.).

When plaintiffs John Murphy and Cecil and Nirupa Mathew decided to
sell their units, they visited Foster Premier's website to obtain
the necessary documents. Foster Premier's website immediately
redirected them to HomeWise's website, where the plaintiffs paid
for electronic copies of the documents. The Plaintiffs brought this
lawsuit, alleging that the fees HomeWise charged were excessive and
in violation of Illinois statutory and common law.

The Plaintiffs allege that the defendants charged excessive fees
for providing disclosure documents in violation of the Condominium
Property Act, the Common Interest Community Association Act, and
the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act. The Plaintiffs also bring claims
for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, inducing breach
of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, and unjust enrichment.

The Condo Act and the Common Interest Community Act

The Condo Act provides that an owner selling his unit shall obtain
from the Board of Managers and shall make available for inspection
to the prospective purchaser, upon demand, various disclosure
documents. A reasonable fee covering the direct out-of-pocket cost
of providing such information and copying may be charged by the
association or its Board of Managers to the unit seller for
providing such information.

The Common Interest Community Act is slightly different in that it
provides that for the resale of any unit, the board shall make
available for inspection to the prospective purchaser, upon demand,
certain disclosure documents.

The Act seeks to streamline and regulate the different parties and
processes related to condo operations. Plaintiffs, as condo owners
and sellers, therefore fall within a class for whose benefit the
statute was enacted. But the particular injury suffered here is not
one that the statute was designed to prevent. The goal of Section
22.1 was to increase disclosure. And though the legislature
clarified that an association could charge reasonable costs for
providing those documents, excessive fees is not the injury the Act
was designed to prevent. Limiting costs may be consistent with the
purpose of the Act, but it is not what motivated the legislature.

The Plaintiffs point to no additional features of the similar
Common Interest Community Act that would justify a different
outcome. And under the Common Interest Community Act, even assuming
plaintiffs had a private right of action, they have not adequately
alleged a violation. Unlike the Condo Act, the Common Interest
Community Act requires that the board, not the seller, make
disclosure documents available to prospective purchasers.
Plaintiffs assert that they purchased the documents themselves,
which is not contemplated by the Act. As a result, plaintiffs have
failed to state a claim under either the Condo Act or the Common
Interest Community Act.

Illinois Consumer Fraud Act

To state an ICFA claim a plaintiff must allege (1) a deceptive or
unfair practice occurred; (2) the defendant intended for the
plaintiff to rely on the deception or unfair practice; (3) the act
occurred in the course of conduct involving trade or commerce; (4)
the plaintiff sustained actual damages; and (5) those damages were
proximately caused by the defendant's wrongful conduct.

To be deemed unfair, the injury alleged must also be substantial,
not be outweighed by any countervailing benefit, and be an injury
that the consumers themselves could not have reasonably avoided.
Small personal injuries can still be substantial if they cause a
large loss to the public in the aggregate. Plaintiffs allege that
they each suffered around $300 in damages and that the class as a
whole lost over $1.5 million. And for the reasons discussed above,
plaintiffs have also adequately alleged that they could not have
reasonably avoided the injury. It is not clear from plaintiffs'
allegations, however, that their injury was not outweighed by a
countervailing benefit.

Under the Condo and Common Interest Community Acts, property
associations have thirty days to turn over requested documents.
Defendants argue, and plaintiffs do not address, that sellers pay
more to HomeWise in exchange for getting the documents more quickly
which can be necessary if a seller is looking to sell her home
immediately.  

The Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged that the defendants'
practices were sufficiently unfair to support a consumer-fraud-act
claim.

Aiding and Abetting and Inducement of Breach of Fiduciary Duty

To state a claim for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary
duty, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant aided a party who
performed a wrongful, injury-causing act, that the defendant was
aware of its role at the time it provided the assistance, and that
the defendant knowingly and substantially assisted in the
violation.

Condo associations owe individual unit owners a fiduciary duty.
But the plaintiffs have not alleged facts indicating that the
plaintiffs' condo association breached that duty. The Plaintiffs
allege that without the source of revenue generated from the
document-disclosure charges, Foster Premier would likely have to
charge the association more for its services. As a result, the
plaintiffs have not alleged that the association was unfairly
profiting at the expense of the unit owners. Rather, as the
plaintiffs' claim is currently plead, the associations made a
reasonable choice to delegate their responsibilities to a
management agency. That the plaintiffs disagree with that choice is
not enough to allege that it constituted a breach of fiduciary
duty.

Because they have not alleged an underlying breach by the
association, the plaintiffs have not stated claims against
defendants for aiding and abetting or inducement of that breach.
Civil Conspiracy and Unjust Enrichment

Both the civil conspiracy and unjust enrichment claims are
dependent on the survival of plaintiffs' other claims. The elements
of civil conspiracy are: (1) a combination of two or more persons,
(2) for the purpose of accomplishing by some concerted action
either an unlawful purpose, or a lawful purpose through unlawful
means, (3) in furtherance of which one of the conspirators
committed an overt tortious or unlawful act.   

Because the plaintiffs have not adequately alleged that defendants
committed an overt tortious or unlawful act, their claim for civil
conspiracy is dismissed.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 16, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yd3uty43 from
Leagle.com.

John Murphy, Cecil Matthew & Nirupa Matthew, Plaintiffs,
represented by David J. Fish , The Fish Law Firm, P.C., Charles
Robert Watkins , Guin Stokes & Evans, LLC, John C. Kunze , The Fish
Law Firm, John R. Wylie , BarrettWylie, LLC, Kimberly A. Hilton ,
The Fish Law Firm, P.C., & Stephen Sotelo , The Law Office of
Thomas J. Homer, P.C.

Foster/Premier, Inc., Defendant, represented by Mark T. Schmidt --
jbarbrow@schmidtbarbrow.com -- Schmidt & Barbrow, P.C.

HomeWise Service Corp., Inc., Defendant, represented by Philip M.
Oliss , Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP.

NextLevel Association Solutions, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Philip M. Oliss , Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP, Clair Christine
Pena , Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP, pro hac vice & Eleanor Hagan ,
Squire Patton Boggs, pro hac vice.

FREEDOM FINANCIAL: Can't Arbitrate D. Beerman's TCPA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California denied Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration in the
case captioned DANIEL BERMAN, Plaintiff, v. FREEDOM FINANCIAL
NETWORK, LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-01060-DMR (N.D.
Cal.).

In this putative class action, named plaintiff Daniel Berman
alleges that Freedom Financial Network, LLC, and its subsidiary,
Freedom Debt Relief, LLC, violated the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act (TCPA), by using automatic telephone dialing systems
to place telemarketing phone calls and text messages to him and the
putative class members without their consent. Specifically, Berman
alleges that on February 14, 2018, he received a text message and
phone call from (409) 359-9066, advertising Defendants' debt relief
services.

In this case, factual disputes exist as to whether Berman or an
individual acting on his behalf consented to the terms and
conditions at issue. Although the Defendants state that the
individual who registered Berman's phone number on the APC website
agreed to be bound by the terms and conditions, Berman denies
having visited the website or having authorized anyone to do so on
his behalf. He also denies using the name, email address, mailing
address, or birthdate associated with the individual who registered
his phone number, and denies authorizing anyone to use that
information on his behalf.

In light of Berman's numerous and unequivocal denials, and
resolving all reasonable doubts in Berman's favor, the Defendants
have failed to show the absence of a genuine issue of fact
regarding whether Berman agreed to the terms and conditions,
including the arbitration provision. As the Defendants have not met
their burden to show the existence of an agreement to arbitrate by
a preponderance of the evidence, the motion to compel arbitration
must be denied.

In their reply, the Defendants argue that Berman should be
compelled to arbitrate his claims based on equitable estoppel.
Without addressing the applicable standards for equitable estoppel,
Defendants contend that someone registered Berman's phone number
and consented in writing to receive phone calls and text messages
at that number.

Therefore, they argue, Berman cannot equitably be allowed to avoid
the clear arbitration commitment binding his telephone number to
the Terms and Conditions. The sole case they cite, Grigson v.
Creative Artists Agency L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 527-28 (5th Cir.
2000), does not support their position. Under Grigson, a
non-signatory to an arbitration agreement may compel arbitration
under a theory of equitable estoppel under certain circumstances.
Such a theory does not apply here, where there are disputed facts
about whether the parties actually formed an agreement to
arbitrate.

Accordinvly, the Defendants' motion to compel arbitration and to
stay the case pending arbitration is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 11, 2018 Order is
available  https://tinyurl.com/yba6f6cn from Leagle.com.

Daniel Berman, Plaintiff, represented by Anthony I. Paronich --
anthony@broderick-law.com -- Broderick & Paronich, P.C., pro hac
vice, Matthew Passi McCue , The Law Office of Matthew P. McCue, pro
hac vice & Jon Bernhard Fougner.

Freedom Financial Network, LLC, Defendant, represented by Jay
Thomas Ramsey -- jramsey@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard Mullin
Richter and Hampton LLP, Jonah Sampson Van Zandt --
jvz@severson.com -- Severson and Werson & Robert James Guite --
rguite@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton
LLP.

Freedom Debt Relief, LLC, Defendant, represented by Jay Thomas
Ramsey , Sheppard Mullin Richter and Hampton LLP & Jonah Sampson
Van Zandt , Severson and Werson.

GC SERVICES: Collection Practices Violate FDCPA, Fleenor Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
ROBERT FLEENOR and MARIA WOLF, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated v. GC SERVICES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Case
No. 2:18-cv-01055-PP (E.D. Wisc., July 10, 2018), seeks redress for
the Defendant's collection practices that allegedly violate the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the Wisconsin Consumer Act.

GC Services Limited Partnership is a foreign limited partnership
with its principal offices located in Houston, Texas.  GCS is a
collection agency, using the mails and telephone to collect
consumer debts originally owed to others.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com



GILBERT ROZON: To Appeal Sexual Assault Class Action Dismissal
--------------------------------------------------------------
Presse Canadienne reports that Gilbert Rozon wants to appeal a
judgment that authorized a class-action lawsuit against him by a
group of women who say they were sexually assaulted by the Just for
Laughs founder.

In the motion Mr. Rozon filed with the Quebec Court of Appeals in
early July, he says Justice Donald Bisson, who authorized the suit,
wanted to denounce acts of sexual violence.

"A laudable objective, certainly, but unrelated to the
authorization of this class-action lawsuit," the application says.
Mr. Rozon's motion will be heard on Aug. 15.

The women seeking action, who call themselves "Les Courageuses,"
are accusing the 63-year-old of sexual violence and are asking for
damages of more than $10 million. According to the women,
Mr. Rozon assaulted at least 20 victims over a 34-year period from
1982 to 2016, which he denies. Patricia Tulsane, the group's
spokesperson, is the only woman who was come forward publicly.

The class-action suit was authorized on May 22.

The allegations brought forward by the group have not been proven
in court, nor have any criminal charges been laid against
Mr. Rozon.

In his motion to appeal, Mr. Rozon says the decision to allow the
lawsuit misinterpreted the facts of the case and did not abide by
the criteria required to launch a class-action lawsuit, which is
only allowed under certain conditions. If it were not for those
faults, Mr. Rozon's motion says, the lawsuit would not have been
authorized.

The decision to allow the lawsuit to move forward is considered
unprecedented because it targets one individual, not an institution
as most sexual assault class-action suits have in the past. In
those cases, the victims were often children, which meant there was
a presumption of lack of consent as the people involved were
legally unable to say yes.

In this case, Mr. Rozon argues that the lack of consent cannot be
assumed, and that each case needed to be looked at individually. He
also argues there is no link between the women involved in the
lawsuit.

He also insists that Justice Bisson was influenced by "outside
social considerations" while analyzing the facts of the case,
simply because it has to do with sexual violence.

In his May decision, Justice Bisson wrote that "class-action
lawsuits have been demonstrably effective in sexual violence cases
as it permits access to justice for hundreds of victims in
Quebec."

He also wrote that if the action were not authorized, a number of
the victims would probably be deprived of their right to sue.

Mr. Rozon resigned from his position at Just for Laughs after the
allegations were made public in October. [GN]

GIRARD, OH: Faces Class Action Over Traffic Camera Tickets
----------------------------------------------------------
Ed Runyan, writing for The Vindicator, reports that the attorneys
who filed suit in Trumbull County Common Pleas Court seeking return
of money paid for purportedly erroneous speeding tickets issued
seven months ago in Girard told a judge why the suit should be
certified a class action.

Dann Law of Cleveland and Zimmerman Law of Chicago told Judge
Andrew Logan the case meets the requirements under law to be a
class action, meaning a suit that automatically represents all of
the individuals affected unless they opt out.

The suit alleges drivers were cited from traffic cameras when
traveling westbound on Interstate 80 for speeds above 55 mph even
though the speed limit was 65 mph at the time because construction
in the westbound lane had ended.

The suit seeks a declaration the citations issued to drivers during
that period are invalid, that the six people filing the suit should
be designated representatives of all the class members, and that
the Dann and Zimmerman law firms be designated as legal counsel for
the class.

The suit should be a class action because the people who sued the
city only paid about $150 each for their tickets, and "hundreds, if
not thousands, of citations were issued" during the month of the
allegedly erroneous citations, the suit says.

"Class certification is crucial in this case because the citation
can have a far-reaching consequence for an individual far beyond
the amount of the fine, yet the amounts paid are not large enough
to merit individual" lawsuits, the filing says.

Recovery of $150 is not enough incentive for an individual or law
firm to file suit, but a class action "solves this problem by
aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into
something worth someone's [usually an attorney's] labor," the
filing says, quoting from a 1997 U.S. Supreme Court decision.

The filing says Marc Dann is managing partner of Dann Law and also
a partner in the Oregon Consumer Law Center in Portland, Ore.,
which both specialize in representing clients who have been harmed
by banks, debt collectors and other financial predators.

Zimmerman Law has a focus on class-action litigation, such as the
$62 million recovery for a nationwide class of consumers who
purchased products advertised to reduce cellulite, the firm's
biography says. [GN]

GOLDEN STATE OVERNIGHT: Quijada Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages
-------------------------------------------------------
Noe Quijada, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Golden State Overnight Delivery Service,
Inc., a California Corporation and Does 1 through 1oo, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 18-CV-332129 (Cal. Super., July 27, 2018),
seeks unpaid minimum wages and interest thereon; statutory
penalties for failure to provide accurate wage statements and
failure to maintain time-keeping records; injunctive relief and
other equitable relief; and reasonable attorney's fees, costs and
interest under California Labor Code, Unfair Competition Law and
applicable Industrial Wage Orders.

Golden State Overnight Delivery Service offers parcel and freight
delivery services where Quijada was paid piece rate wage based on
the number of packages he delivered. Multiple packages were
strapped together (typically around four packages) and only counted
as one package. Quijada also claims that he was not given accurate
itemized earnings statements showing their nonproductive time and
wages for their nonproductive time. Defendant knowingly and
intentionally failed to maintain accurate time records as required
by California law, says the Court.

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michael H. Kim, Esq., Esq.
      Jamielee F. Martinez, Esq.
      Adam K. Tanouye, Esq.
      MICHAEL H. KIM, P.C.
      475 El Camino Real, Suite 309
      Millbrae, CA 94030
      Telephone: (65o) 697-8899
      Facsimile: (65o) 697-8896

GOOGLE LLC: Court Narrows Claims in AdTrader's Suit
---------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose Division, granted Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss certain claims in Plaintiffs' first amended complaint in
the case captioned ADTRADER, INC., ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. GOOGLE
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-07082-BLF (N.D. Cal.).

This action involves purported unlawful conduct by Defendant Google
LLC in relation to its online advertisement marketplace services.
Plaintiff Specialized Collections Bureau, Inc. (SCB) used AdWords
to advertise its business on the Internet and some of its
advertisement impressions came from AdX publisher websites. The
Plaintiffs allege that Google has refused to pay AdX website
publishers their accrued revenues, claiming that it would return
that money to advertisers because of some purported violation of
Google's policy by those publishers.

Second Cause of Action: Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing

Google argues that AdTrader's second cause of action relies on a
hodgepodge of theories, including allegations that Google, inter
ala: (1) arbitrarily withheld amounts in AdTrader's publisher
account, but did not terminate AdTrader's client accounts; (2)
failed to provide AdTrader a meaningful appeal after termination.

AdTrader responds that the second cause of action is adequately
alleged reasons, inter alia: Google (1) disabled AdTrader's AdX
account and withheld earnings but never disabled AdTrader's client
accounts; (2) refused to provide reasons for withholding the
earnings and did not provide a meaningful appeal process.

The Court finds that the FAC does not adequately plead the second
cause of action. The implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing's application is limited to assuring compliance with the
express terms of the contract, and cannot be extended to create
obligations not contemplated by the contract. However, as pled, the
FAC's allegations attempt to add obligations that do not expressly
appear in the agreements referenced in the FAC. As such, the
allegations which Plaintiffs rely on do not support a claim for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

The Court therefore grants Google's motion to dismiss the second
cause of action with leave to amend.

Third Cause of Action: Breach of the Implied Duty to Perform with
Reasonable Care

Google argues that the third cause of action is duplicative of
AdTrader's claim for breach of contract because those two claims
rely on the same allegations. Google also contends that the third
cause of action improperly attempts to transmute the breach of
contract claim into a tort claim.  

AdTrader responds that Google's arguments fail because California
law recognizes that a breach of the implied duty to perform with
reasonable care constitutes a tort claim. In AdTrader's view, its
claim for breach of implied duty to perform with reasonable care is
broader in scope than the breach of contract claim.

During the hearing, counsel for AdTrader indicated that California
Civil Jury Instructions (CACI) 328 titled Breach of Implied Duty to
Perform with Reasonable Care" supports AdTrader's position.
However, a review of CACI shows that a claim for breach of implied
duty to perform with reasonable care permits contract remedies
rather than tort remedies. In addition, AdTrader has not pointed to
any case where the court awarded tort damages for a breach of
implied duty to perform with reasonable care.

The Court agrees with Google's argument that AdTrader cannot rely
on a claim for breach of implied duty to perform with reasonable
care to recover tort damages. The FAC alleges that this claim is
asserted as a tort claim. Accordingly, Google's motion to dismiss
the third cause of action is granted with leave to amend in part
and without leave to amend in part.
The dismissal is without leave to amend insofar as AdTrader
intended to pursue that claim as a tort claim.

Fourth Cause of Action: Intentional Interference with Contract
(Apart from DingIt

Google argues that AdTrader fails to sufficiently allege that
Google caused an actual breach of contract or disruption between
AdTrader and over two hundred AdTrader clients and fails to allege
damages resulting from the breach or disruption.

Here, the FAC alleges that AdTrader had contractual relationships
with over two hundred web publishers. However, the FAC does not
plead sufficient factual allegations that show that Google
purportedly interfered with a specific contract for each web
publisher. Thus, the FAC fails to plead the specific breach with
respect to a particular publisher.

The Court therefore grants Google's motion to dismiss the fourth
cause of action apart from DingIt with leave to amend.

Fifth Cause of Action: Intentional Interference with Prospective
Economic Advantage (Apart from DingIt)

The Court finds that the fifth cause of action fails for the same
reasons discussed above for the fourth cause of action. Similar to
an intentional interference with contract claim, a plaintiff must
adequately allege actual disruption of an economic relationship
between the plaintiff and a third party in order to state a claim
for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage.  


Here, however, the FAC merely lumps allegations regarding more than
two hundred web publishers without pleading factual allegations as
to the specific relationship between AdTrader and each publisher.

The Court GRANTS Google's motion to dismiss the fifth cause of
action apart from DingIt with leave to amend.

Sixth Cause of Action: Declaratory Relief

The FAC's sixth cause of action seeks declaratory judgment that the
Limitation of Liability provision of AdTrader's Google Services
Agreement is unconscionable.

Google first argues that the Limitation of Liability provision is
not procedurally unconscionable on the grounds that the FAC alleges
that other advertising platforms exist. AdTrader responds that
courts have held that it is inappropriate to dismiss a claim of
unconscionability at the pleading stage in light of Cal. Civ. Code
Section 1670.5.

The Court finds that AdTrader has sufficiently alleged at least a
degree of procedural unconscionability. As AdTrader points out, the
FAC alleges that the Limitation of Liability provision is presented
as a take-it-or-leave-it provision. The FAC also pleads that Google
has a virtual monopoly in the field of on-line advertising, and
anyone who wishes to monetize their websites through advertising
has to use AdX. Those allegations allow a reasonable inference to
be drawn that the Limitation of Liability provision constitutes a
term over which a party of lesser bargaining power had no
opportunity to negotiate and thus reflects procedural
unconscionability to at least some degree.

The Court denies Google's motion to dismiss the sixth cause of
action.

Seventh Cause of Action: Fraud

Google argues that Plaintiffs do not allege that Google made any
false representations concerning AdWords or AdX and fail to satisfy
the particularity requirement under Rule 9(b) to assert their fraud
claim.

Plaintiffs respond that they adequately alleged the falsity of
Google's statements because the FAC pleads that AdTrader's AdWords
invoices showed that Google had not issued the refunds and that SCB
never received full refunds for invalid activity on SCB's
advertisements placed on an AdX publisher website.

The Court agrees with Google's arguments that the fraud claim is
not sufficiently pled. A plaintiff asserting fraud "must state with
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud.

Here, the FAC references at least three distinct agreements: (1)
AdX Buyer Agreement dated March 2014; (2) DBM Agreement dated March
2016 and (3) AdWords Agreement dated February 2013. While the FAC
alleges that Google made various representations about offline
analysis of invalid clicks and refunding advertisers for those
clicks, the FAC generally does not adequately plead when a certain
representation was made, how that representation related to which
of the three agreements, and how Plaintiffs relied on a specific
representation in relation to the three agreements. For these
reasons, the particularity of the circumstances concerning the
alleged fraud cannot be discerned.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim based on
fraud. Google's motion to dismiss the seventh cause of action is
granted with leave to amend.

Eighth Cause of Action: Negligent Misrepresentation

Google asserts that Plaintiffs' negligent misrepresentation claim
is deficient for similar reasons discussed for their fraud claim.
Likewise, Plaintiffs disagree based on their arguments presented in
support of the fraud claim.

While the elements of negligent misrepresentation is similar to
those as fraud, a plaintiff asserting a negligent misrepresentation
claim needs to show that the defendant had no reasonable grounds to
believe the representation was true rather than that the defendant
knew the representation was false. This distinction does not affect
the Court's analysis discussed for the Plaintiffs' fraud claim, and
thus the Court finds that the negligent misrepresentation claim is
also deficient.

The Court therefore grants Google's motion to dismiss the eighth
cause of action with leave to amend.

Tenth Cause of Action: Breach of Contract

Google argues that Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim fails
because there is no contract term which calls for advertiser
refunds..

The Plaintiffs counter that they have stated a claim under
"theories of implied terms or contract modification despite the
lack of such express language."

The Court finds that Plaintiffs' tenth cause of action is
deficient. As Google argues, the FAC does not sufficiently allege
which terms of the agreement(s) at issue have been breached. While
Plaintiffs assert that the AdX Buyer Agreement, DBM Agreement, and
AdWords Agreement contain ambiguous terms, the FAC does not contain
those allegations

The Court grants Google's motion to dismiss the tenth cause of
action with leave to amend.

Eleventh Cause of Action: Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing

Google asserts that Plaintiffs cannot rely on the implied covenant
to subject Google to additional obligations that are absent in a
contract.

The Plaintiffs are correct that a breach of contract is not a
prerequisite to a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. Like the second cause of action, as pled,
the FAC attempts to add new obligations that do not expressly
appear in the parties' agreements. Plaintiffs may not rely on new
obligations to assert a claim for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.

The Court therefore grants Google's motion to dismiss the eleventh
cause of action with leave to amend.

Twelfth Cause of Action: Breach of Implied Duty to Perform with
Reasonable Care

Plaintiffs allege the twelfth cause of action as a tort claim. The
parties raise similar arguments which were discussed for the third
cause of action. For the same reasons, the Court concludes that
Plaintiffs cannot rely on a breach of implied duty to perform with
reasonable care to assert a tort claim. Accordingly, Google's
motion to dismiss the twelfth cause of action is granted with leave
to amend in part and without leave to amend in part.

Thirteenth Cause of Action: Unjust Enrichment

Google contends that Plaintiffs may not bring a claim for unjust
enrichment where an enforceable, binding agreement exists to define
the rights of the parties.

The Plaintiffs respond that an unjust enrichment claim does not lie
when there is contract governing the specific subject matter in
dispute not whenever there is a contract between the parties.

The Court rejects the Plaintiffs' argument that they may bring an
alternative unjust enrichment claim so long as Google's agreements
do not require it to provide refunds for invalid activity. The
Plaintiffs' narrow view of subject matter would essentially permit
Plaintiffs to rewrite a contract to add a nonexistent contract
term. The subject matter of the parties' agreement is Google's
advertisement services, and thus the Plaintiffs must allege in the
alternative that the parties do not have an enforceable contract
pertaining to Google's advertisement services in order to plead an
unjust enrichment claim.  Because the FAC does not do so, the
thirteenth cause of action fails.

The Court grants Google's motion to dismiss the thirteenth cause of
action with leave to amend.

Fourteenth Cause of Action: Violation of California's Unfair
Competition Law

Google argues that the Plaintiffs lack standing to assert a claim
under California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL) on the grounds that
they did not bring this case for the public in general or
individual consumers.

The Plaintiffs respond that Google's practice of refusing to
provide credits for invalid activity was based on contrary
representations distributed widely to individual and business
consumers seeking to advertise online.

The Court is unpersuaded by the Plaintiffs' arguments. Where a UCL
action is based on contracts not involving either the public in
general or individual consumers who are parties to the contract, a
corporate plaintiff may not rely on the UCL for the relief it
seeks. The FAC does not contain adequate factual allegations
showing that the named the Plaintiffs are not sophisticated
corporate plaintiffs. In fact, the FAC suggests the opposite.

The Court GRANTS Google's motion to dismiss the fourteenth cause of
action with leave to amend.

Fifteenth Cause of Action: Violation of the New York General
Business Law Section 349

Google contends that the Plaintiffs' claim under the New York
General Business Law Section 349 fails because selling
advertisements is not a consumer-oriented act.

To state a claim under Section 349, a plaintiff must allege (1) a
deceptive consumer-oriented act or practice which is misleading in
a material respect, and (2) injury resulting from such act.

Here, the FAC merely alleges that "Google's deceptive acts and
practices were consumer-oriented in that they were based on
representations that were distributed widely on the Internet and
directed at thousands of individuals and small businesses looking
to engage in online advertising."  The Court finds that the FAC's
allegations are insufficient to adequately plead that "the gravamen
of the complaint is harm to a business as opposed to the public at
large."

The Court grants Google's motion to dismiss the fifteenth cause of
action with leave to amend.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 13, 2018 Order is
available at  https://tinyurl.com/y9kqmxt9 from Leagle.com.

AdTrader, Inc., Plaintiff, represented by Mark Weylin Poe --
mpoe@gawpoe.com -- Gaw & Poe LLP, Samuel S. Song --
ssong@gawpoe.com -- Gaw & Poe LLP, Victor Meng -- vmeng@gawpoe.com
-- Gaw & Poe LLP & Randolph Gaw -- rgaw-@gawpoe.com -- Gaw & Poe
LLP.

Specialized Collections Bureau, Inc. & Fresh Break Ltd.,
Plaintiffs, represented by Samuel S. Song , Gaw & Poe LLP &
Randolph Gaw , Gaw & Poe LLP.

Classic and Food EOOD, LML CONSULT Ltd. & Ad Crunch Ltd.,
Plaintiffs, represented by Samuel S. Song , Gaw & Poe LLP &
Randolph Gaw , Gaw & Poe LLP.

Google LLC, Defendant, represented by Jeffrey Gutkin --
jgutkin@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP, Michael Graham Rhodes --
rhodesmg@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP, Audrey Jane Mott-Smith --
amottsmith@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP & Kyle Christopher Wong --
kwong@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP.

HEARST COMMUNICATIONS: Settles Class Action for $50MM
-----------------------------------------------------
The Global Legal Post reports that New York media giant Hearst
Communications has agreed to pay $50 million to settle a
subscription data lawsuit.

Hearst was accused of selling its magazine subscribers'
subscription histories, reading habits, age, race, religion,
charitable donations, political affiliations, income bracket,
shopping habits and other personal data to third parties, including
data-mining companies without their consent.

Violation

The media giant, which owns titles including Harper's Bazaar, Elle,
Cosmo, Marie Claire, Good Housekeeping, and Esquire, was sued in
November 2015 in a New York federal court by Good Housekeeping
Michigan subscriber Josephine James Edwards. Ms Edwards launched a
class action suit alleging Hearst illegally granted third party
"data mining" companies to access Hearst's database of subscriber
information without the permission of subscribers in violation of
the Michigan state Video Rental Privacy Act, which prohibits the
sharing of personal information provided by consumers about their
purchasing, renting or borrowing of materials that might provide
details about their identity and interests without consent from the
individual consumers.

Bombarded

In her complaint, she stated "Hearst's subscribers are completely
unaware that Hearst is selling their personal information on the
open market." Ms Edwards claimed Hearst does not obtain consent
causing subscribers to be 'bombarded, by unwanted offers and scams.
Her case is one of a number of similar state lawsuits, and is three
times bigger than a previous $16.38 million settlement from
Consumer Reports. [GN]

HODES PARKING: Underpays Valet Workers, Escobar Suit Alleges
------------------------------------------------------------
MIGUEL ESCOBAR, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. HODES PARKING, INC., and Does 1-50,
Defendants, Case No. BC713756 (Cal. Super., July 13, 2018) is an
action against the Defendants for unpaid regular hours, overtime
hours, minimum wages, wages for missed meal and rest periods.

Mr. Escobar was employed by the Defendants as valet worker from
April 2016 to July 21, 2017.

Hodes Parking, Inc. offers car parking and garage services. The
company is based in Beverly Hills, California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Nazo Koulloukian, Esq.
          KOUL LAW FIRM
          3435 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1710
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Telephone: (213) 761-5484
          E-mail: nazo@koullaw.com


HOUSTON HOSPITALITY: Doesn't Pay OT to Door Hosts, Shapiro Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JOSHUA SHAPIRO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. HOUSTON HOSPITALITY, LLC; STONE HOSPITALITY,
LLC; 1159 WESTERN HOSPITALITY, LLC; MARK HOUSTON; JONNIE HOUSTON;
PLOENPIDH HOUSTON; and Does 1-50, Defendants, Case No. BC713761
(Cal. Super., July 13, 2018) is an action against the Defendants
for unpaid regular hours, overtime hours, minimum wages, wages for
missed meal and rest periods.

Mr. Shapiro was employed by the Defendants as door host from
February 2011 to 2017.

Houston Hospitality, LLC is a California limited liability company
d/b/a Bronson Bar, Black Rabbit Rose, Good Times at Davey Wayne's,
Pour Vous, Dirty Laundry, Harvard & Stone, Piano Bar, No Vacancy,
La Descarga, King King, Madame Siam, Break Room 86, The Cabin, and
The Speek, with its principal place of business at Los Angeles,
California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Caleb Marker, Esq.
          Hannah B. Fernandez, Esq.
          ZIMMERMAN REED, LLP
          2381 Rosecrans Avenue, Suite 328
          Telephone: (877) 500-8780
          Facsimile: (877) 500-8781


HUAWEI DEVICE: Stay of Nexus 6P Products Liability Suit Lifted
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Beth Labson Freeman of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California, San Jose Division, granted the
Plaintiffs' request to lift the discovery stay in the case, In re
NEXUS 6P PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION, Case No. 17-cv-02185-BLF
(N.D. Cal.).

The case is a putative consumer class action against Defendants
Huawei Device USA, Inc. and Google, LLC, regarding severe defects
in Nexus 6P smartphones.

On Aug. 18, 2017, the Court granted the Defendants' motion to stay
discovery until the hearing on their motions to dismiss the
Consolidated Amended Complaint.  In particular, the Court noted
that Huawei raised a personal jurisdiction argument that was
potentially dispositive of the entire case as to Huawei.  It
further noted that Google's motion to dismiss could be potentially
dispositive of the express warranty claims, which in turn would
limit the scope of discovery.  At the hearing on the motions to
dismiss, the Court continued the discovery stay until further
notice.

On March 5, 2018, the Court ruled on the Defendants' motions to
dismiss the Consolidated Amended Complaint.  On May 10, 2018, the
Plaintiffs filed a Second Consolidated Amended Complaint ("SAC").
The SAC pleads a single nationwide class and alleges seven claims
for relief.  Although the Court granted with leave to amend
Huawei's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction,
Huawei has now withdrawn its personal jurisdiction defense.  On
June 14, 2018, the Defendants moved to dismiss the SAC.  No
discovery has occurred to date.

The Plaintiffs now move to lift the stay of discovery immediately,
pointing out that Huawei no longer has a personal jurisdiction
defense to dispose of the action, and the discovery stay will
needlessly delay the resolution of the litigation on the merits.
The Defendants oppose, arguing that the SAC remains overreaching
and unwieldy, and continuing the discovery stay until the pleadings
are settled will not prejudice the Plaintiffs.

Judge Freeman finds that the Defendants' pending motions to dismiss
do not appear to be potentially case dispositive or even
dispositive on the issue at which discovery is directed.  She says
the Defendants focus on a choice of law issue regarding whether the
Plaintiffs can bring their claims on behalf of a nationwide class,
but they have a persuasive argument that such class issues are
premature at the pleading stage.  Otherwise, the Defendants'
arguments challenge a wide variety of specific allegations in the
complaint that do not amount to "good cause" or a "strong showing"
as to why discovery should be denied.  Without determining the
merits of the Defendants' motions at this time, the Judge envisions
that while some modifications to the pleadings may be necessary, it
appears that the case may move forward.

In addition, the Judge finds that the pending motions to dismiss
address the sufficiency of the allegations and thus they can be
decided without discovery.  However, the Defendants must prevail on
both prongs to justify a protective order, and if either prong of
this test is not established, discovery proceeds.  Because she is
not satisfied that the Defendants' motions are potentially
dispositive of the case as to either Google or Huawei, the Judge
declines to exercise its discretion to continue the discovery stay.


The circumstances that existed on Aug. 18, 2017 when the Court
entered what it deemed a "limited" discovery stay no longer exist.
The Court has provided significant guidance to the parties in an
88-page opinion on the state of the pleadings, which resulted in a
narrowed set of claims against the Defendants on behalf of a single
nationwide class.  After a 10-month stay of discovery and trial set
for 2020, there is no good cause to continue the discovery stay.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Freeman granted the Plaintiffs'
motion to lift the discovery stay in its entirety. The Court will
issue a revised Case Schedule in a separate order.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 19, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/csag3i from Leagle.com.

Jonathan Makcharoenwoodhi & Edward Beheler, Plaintiffs, represented
by Adam E. Polk -- aep@girardgibbs.com -- Girard Gibbs LLP, Andrew
William Ferich -- AndrewFerich@chimicles.com -- Chimicles and
Tikellis LLP, pro hac vice, Benjamin F. Johns --
benjohns@chimicles.com -- Chimicles & Tikellis LLP, pro hac vice,
Jessica Linn Titler-Lingle, Chimicles and Tikellis LLP, Jordan S.
Elias -- je@girardgibbs.com -- Girard Gibbs LLP & Cory Steven Fein
-- cory@coryfeinlaw.com -- Attorney at Law.

Brian Christensen, Plaintiff, represented by Simon Seiver Grille --
sg@girardgibbs.com -- Girard Gibbs LLP, Adam E. Polk, Girard Gibbs
LLP, Andrew William Ferich, Chimicles and Tikellis LLP, Benjamin F.
Johns, Chimicles & Tikellis LLP, Daniel C. Girard --
dcg@girardgibbs.com -- Girard Gibbs LLP, Jessica Linn
Titler-Lingle, Chimicles and Tikellis LLP & Jordan S. Elias, Girard
Gibbs LLP.

Paul Servodio, Yuriy Davydov, Kenneth Johnston, Anthony Martorello,
Rebecca Harrison, James Poore, Jr., Justin Leone, Taylor Jones,
Alex Gorbatchev & Zachary Himes, Plaintiffs, represented by Adam E.
Polk, Girard Gibbs LLP, Jordan S. Elias, Girard Gibbs LLP &
Benjamin F. Johns, Chimicles & Tikellis LLP.

Huawei Device USA, Inc., Defendant, represented by Simon J. Frankel
-- sfrankel@cov.com -- Covington & Burling LLP & Lindsey Catherine
Barnhart, Covington Burling LLP.

Google LLC, Defendant, represented by Joshua H. Lerner --
jlerner@durietangri.com -- Durie Tangri LLP, Catherine Y. Kim --
ckim@durietangri.com -- Durie Tangri LLP, Eugene Novikov --
enovikov@durietangri.com -- Durie Tangri LLP & Ragesh K. Tangri --
rtangri@durietangri.com -- Durie Tangri LLP.

INTEREXCHANGE INC: Summary Judgment Bids in Antitrust Suit Junked
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOHANA PAOLA BELTRAN, LUSAPHO HLATSHANENI, BEAUDETTE
DEETLEFS, ALEXANDRA IVETTE GONZALEZ, JULIANE HARNING, NICOLE
MAPLEDORAM, LAURA MEJIA JIMENEZ, SARAH CAROLINE AZUELA RASCON,
CAMILA GABRIELA PEREZ REYES, CATHY CARAMELO, and LINDA ELIZABETH,
Plaintiffs, v. INTEREXCHANGE, INC., USAUPAIR, INC., GREATAUPAIR,
LLC, EXPERT GROUP INTERNATIONAL INC., d/b/a Expert AuPair,
EURAUPAIR INTERCULTURAL CHILD CARE PROGRAMS, CULTURAL HOMESTAY
INTERNATIONAL, CULTURAL CARE, INC., d/b/a Cultural Care Au Pair,
AUPAIRCARE INC., AU PAIR INTERNATIONAL, INC., APF GLOBAL EXCHANGE,
NFP, d/b/a/Aupair Foundation, AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR FOREIGN STUDY,
d/b/a Au Pair in America, AMERICAN CULTURAL EXCHANGE, LLC, d/b/a
GoAuPair, AGENT AU PAIR, A.P.E.X. AMERICAN PROFESSIONAL EXCHANGE,
LLC, d/b/a ProAuPair, 20/20 CARE EXCHANGE, INC., d/b/a The
International Au Pair Exchange, ASSOCIATES IN CULTURAL EXCHANGE,
d/b/a GoAuPair, and GOAUPAIR OPERATIONS, LLC, d/b/a GoAuPair,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 14-cv-03074-CMA-KMT (D. Colo.), Judge
Christine M. Arguello of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Colorado denied the parties' competing Motions for Summary
Judgment.

Most of the Motions for Summary Judgment in this antitrust action
were filed on Feb. 16, 2018.  Various Defendants responded to the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on March 16, 2018.  The
Plaintiffs replied in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment
on April 13, 2018.  With the Court's permission, Defendants
American Cultural and GoAuPair filed a Joint Sur-Reply in
opposition to the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on May 3,
2018.

The Plaintiffs responded to all the Defendants' Motions for Summary
Judgment in a consolidated Response on March 17, 2018.  Certain
Defendants jointly replied in support of their Motions for Summary
Judgment on April 13, 2018.

Upon review of the parties' numerous, lengthy briefings and the
evidence referenced therein, Judge Arguello determines that genuine
issues of material fact preclude the Court from granting any of the
Motions to Summary Judgment.

Among the numerous genuine issues of material fact: (i) whether an
anti-competitive conspiracy existed among and between the
Defendants to fix au pairs' stipends at $195.75; (ii) whether
increased competition in the au pair services market would change
the market structure and increase au pairs' wages; (iii) whether
RICO Defendants engaged in racketeering activity, such as wire
fraud, by conveying false wage information to au pairs; (iv)
whether the Defendants are joint employers of au pairs; and (v)
whether the federal government intended for the statutes and
regulations governing the au pair program to preempt state and
local regulations.  As such, no party is entitled to summary
judgment.

Accordingly, Judge Arguello denied all Motions for Summary
Judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 19, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/8omANQ from Leagle.com.

Johana Paola Beltran, Lusapho Hlatshaneni, Beaudette Deetlefs &
Alexandra Ivette Gonzalez, and those similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Byron Pacheco -- bpacheco@bsfllp.com --
Boies Schiller & Flexner, LLP, Dawn Smalls -- dsmalls@bsfllp.com --
Boies Schiller & Flexner, LLP, Joshua James Libling --
jlibling@bsfllp.com -- Boies Schiller & Flexner, LLP, Juan Pablo
Valdivieso -- jvaldivieso@bsfllp.com -- Boies Schiller & Flexner,
LLP, Matthew Lane Schwartz -- mlschwartz@BSFLLP.com -- Boies
Schiller & Flexner, LLP, Peter Murray Skinner --
pskinner@bsfllp.com -- Boies Schiller & Flexner, LLP, Randall Wade
Jackson -- rjackson@bsfllp.com -- Boies Schiller & Flexner, LLP,
Sabria Alexandria McElroy -- smcelroy@bsfllp.com -- Boies Schiller
& Flexner, LLP, Sean Phillips Rodriguez -- srodriguez@bsfllp.com --
Boies Schiller & Flexner, LLP, Sigrid Stone McCawley --
smccawley@bsfllp.com -- Boies Schiller &
Flexner, LLP & Alexander Neville Hood -- info@towardsjustice.org --
Towards Justice.

Juliane Harning, Nicole Mapledoram, and those similarly situated,
Laura Mejia Jimenez & Sarah Carolina Azuela Rascon, Plaintiffs,
represented by Byron Pacheco, Boies Schiller & Flexner, LLP, Dawn
Smalls, Boies Schiller & Flexner, LLP, Joshua James Libling, Boies
Schiller & Flexner, LLP, Juan Pablo Valdivieso, Boies Schiller &
Flexner, LLP, Matthew Lane Schwartz, Boies Schiller & Flexner, LLP,
Peter Murray Skinner, Boies Schiller & Flexner, LLP, Sean Phillips
Rodriguez, Boies Schiller & Flexner, LLP & Alexander Neville Hood,
Towards Justice.

Camila Gabriela Perez Reyes, Cathy Caramelo & Linda Elizabeth,
Plaintiffs, represented by Byron Pacheco, Boies Schiller & Flexner,
LLP, Joshua James Libling, Boies Schiller & Flexner, LLP, Sean
Phillips Rodriguez, Boies Schiller & Flexner, LLP, Alexander
Neville Hood, Towards Justice & Dawn Smalls, Boies Schiller &
Flexner, LLP.

InterExchange, Inc., Defendant, represented by Brooke A. Colaizzi
-- bcolaizzi@shermanhoward.com -- Sherman & Howard, L.L.C., Raymond
Myles Deeny -- rdeeny@shermanhoward.com -- Sherman & Howard,
L.L.C., Alyssa Lauren Levy -- alevy@shermanhoward.com -- Sherman &
Howard, L.L.C., Heather Fox Vickles -- hvickles@shermanhoward.com
-- Sherman & Howard, L.L.C. & Joseph H. Hunt --
jhunt@shermanhoward.com -- Sherman & Howard, L.L.C.

USAuPair, INC, Defendant, represented by Chanda Marie Feldkamp --
cfeldkamp@kellywalkerlaw.com -- Kelly & Walker, LLC & William James
Kelly, III -- wkelly@kellywalkerlaw.com -- Kelly & Walker, LLC.

GreatAuPair, LLC, Defendant, represented by Martin Jose Estevao --
mestevao@armstrongte -- Armstrong Teasdale, LLP, Meshach Yustine
Rhoades -- mrhoades@armstrongteasdale.com -- Armstrong Teasdale,
LLP & Vance Orlando Knapp -- vknapp@armstrongteasdale.com ---
Armstrong Teasdale, LLP.

Expert Group International, Inc, doing business as, Defendant,
represented by Bogdan Enica, Bogdan Enica, Attorney at Law.

EuRaupair InterCultural Child Care Programs, Defendant, represented
by David Meschke -- dmeschke@bhfs.com -- Brownstein
Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP & Martha Louise Fitzgerald --
mfitzgerald@bhfs.com -- Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP.

Cultural Homestay International, Defendant, represented by Adam A.
Hubbard -- aahubbard@hollandhart.com -- Holland & Hart, LLP, James
Edward Hartley -- jhartley@hollandhart.com -- Holland & Hart, LLP &
Jonathan S. Bender -- jsbender@hollandhart.com -- Holland & Hart,
LLP.

Cultural Care, Inc., doing business as, Defendant, represented by
Diane Rebecca Hazel -- dhazel@lrrc.com -- Lewis Roca Rothgerber
Christie LLP, James Michael Lyons -- jlyons@lrrc.com -- Lewis Roca
Rothgerber Christie LLP, Jessica Lynn Fuller -- jfuller@lrrc.com --
Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie LLP, Joan A. Lukey --
joan.lukey@choate.com -- Choate, Hall & Stewart, LLP, Justin J.
Wolosz --  jwolosz@choate.com -- Choate, Hall & Stewart, LLP, Kevin
Patrick O'Keefe -- kokeefe@choate.com -- Choate Hall & Stewart,
LLP, Lyndsey Marie Kruzer -- lkruzer@choate.com -- Choate, Hall &
Stewart, LLP, Michael T. Gass -- mgass@choate.com -- Choate, Hall &
Stewart, LLP, Robert M. Buchanan, Jr. -- rbuchanan@choate.com --
Choate, Hall & Stewart, LLP & Samuel Newland Rudman --
srudman@choate.com --
Choate Hall & Stewart, LLP.

AuPairCare, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jennifer Arnett
Roehrich -- jarnett-roehrich@grsm.com -- Gordon & Rees LLP, Nathan
Andrew Huey -- nhuey@grsm.com -- Gordon & Rees LLP, Peggy E. Kozal
-- pkozal@grsm.com -- Gordon & Rees LLP & Thomas Baker Quinn --
tquinn@grsm.com -- Gordon & Rees, LLP.

Au Pair International, Inc. & American Cultural Exchange, LLC,
doing business as, Defendants, represented by Brett Michelle Mull
-- mull@wtotrial.com -- Wheeler Trigg O'Donnell, LLP, Brian Alan
Birenbach -- brian@rietzlawfirm.com -- Rietz Law Firm, LLC, Kathryn
A. Reilly -- reilly@wtotrial.com -- Wheeler Trigg O'Donnell, LLP,
Natalie Elizabeth West -- west@wtotrial.com -- Wheeler Trigg
O'Donnell, LLP & Victor William Scarpato, III --
scarpato@wtotrial.com -- Wheeler Trigg O'Donnell, LLP.

APF Global Exchange, NFP, doing business as, Defendant, represented
by Susan M. Schaecher -- sschaecher@fisherphillips.com -- Fisher &
Phillips, LLP.

KINCAID INC: Fails to Pay OT Wages Under FLSA, Portillo Says
------------------------------------------------------------
ALONDRA PORTILLO, and all others similarly situated under 29 U.S.C.
216 (b) v. KINCAID, INC., CAMPUZANO MIDLOTHIAN, L.L.C., CAMPUZANO
CEDAR HILL, L.L.C., and BRIAN HARDING, Case No. 3:18-cv-01759-C
(N.D. Tex., July 6, 2018), alleges that the Defendants willfully
and intentionally refused to pay the Plaintiff overtime wages as
required by the Fair Labor Standards Act

Kincaid, Inc., is a company that regularly transacts business
within Dallas County. Campuzano Midlothian, L.L.C. is a company
that regularly transacts business within Ellis County and Dallas
County.  Campuzano Cedar Hill, L.L.C. is a company that regularly
transacts business within Dallas County.  Brian Harding is a
corporate officer, owner or manager of the Defendant Companies.

The Defendant Companies are joint enterprises as the related
activities between them, performed through unified operation and/or
common control, are being done for a common business purpose.  The
Defendant Companies operate various "Campuzano" Mexican
restaurants.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          J.H. Zidell, Esq.
          Robert L. Manteuffel, Esq.
          Joshua A. Petersen, Esq.
          J.H. ZIDELL, P.C.
          6310 LBJ Freeway, Suite 112
          Dallas, TX 75240
          Telephone: (972) 233-2264
          Facsimile: (972) 386-7610
          E-mail: zabogado@aol.com
                  rlmanteuffel@sbcglobal.net
                  josh.a.petersen@gmail.com


KNORR-BREMSE AG: Baldassano Sues over No-Poach Agreements
---------------------------------------------------------
STEPHEN BALDASSANO, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. KNORR-BREMSE AG; KNORR BRAKE
COMPANY; NEW YORK AIR BRAKE COMPANY; WESTINGHOUSE AIR BRAKE
TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; and FAIVELEY TRANSPORT NORTH AMERICA INC,
Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-00916-CRE (W.D. Pa., July 13, 2018)
alleges that the No-Poach Agreements of the Defendants violated the
Sherman Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants entered into No-Poach
Agreements wherein they conspired with each other to eliminate
competition between themselves for employees. These agreements were
executed and enforced by senior company executives and implemented
throughout the companies' U.S. subsidiaries. The No-Poach
Agreements were not reasonably necessary to any separate,
legitimate business transaction or legitimate collaboration between
the companies and disrupted the normal bargaining and price-setting
mechanisms that apply in the labor market.

Knorr-Bremse Aktiengesellschaft develops, produces, markets, and
services braking systems for rail and commercial vehicles. The
Company provides entrance, windscreen wiper, driver assistance, and
power supply systems, as well as platform screen doors and
torsional vibration dampers. Knorr-Bremse serves customers
worldwide. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joel R. Hurt, Esq.
          Ruairi McDonnell, Esq.
          FEINSTEIN DOYLE PAYNE & KRAVEC, LLC
          429 Fourth Avenue, Suite 1300
          Pittsburgh, PA 15219
          Telephone: (412) 281-8400
          Facsimile: (412) 281-1007
          E-mail: jhurt@fdpklaw.com

               - and -

          Craig L. Briskin, Esq.
          MEHRI & SKALET, PLLC
          1250 Connecticut Ave. N.W., Suite 300
          Washington, DC 20036
          Telephone: (202) 822-5100
          Facsimile: (202) 822-4997
          E-mail: cbriskin@findjustic.com

               - and -

          Samuel J. Strauss, Esq.
          TURKE & STRAUSS, LLP
          613 Williamson Street, Suite 201
          Madison, WI 53703
          Telephone: (608) 237-1775
          Facsimile: (608) 509-4423
          E-mail: sam@turkestrauss.com


KNORR-BREMSE AG: Marietta Files Suit Over No-Poach Conspiracy
-------------------------------------------------------------
KORY MARIETTA individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. KNORR-BREMSE AG; KNORR BRAKE COMPANY; NEW YORK AIR
BRAKE CORPORATION; WESTINGHOUSE AIR BRAKE TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION;
and FAIVELEY TRANSPORT NORTH AMERICA INC., Case No. 2:18-cv-00882
(W.D. Pa., July 6, 2018), challenges under the Sherman Act unlawful
agreements between three of the world's largest rail equipment
suppliers to restrain competition in the labor market in which they
compete for employees.

Specifically, the Plaintiff alleges, the Defendants and certain of
their subsidiaries, collectively agreed not to solicit, recruit, or
hire each other's employees without prior approval, or otherwise
compete for employees (collectively, the "No-Poach Agreements" or
the "No-Poach Conspiracy").

Knorr-Bremse AG is a privately-owned German company with its
headquarters in Munich, Germany.  Knorr is a global leader in the
development, manufacture, and sale of equipment for rail and
commercial vehicle systems.

Knorr Brake Company is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Knorr
incorporated in Delaware with its headquarters in Westminster,
Maryland.  KBC manufactures train control, HVAC, braking, and door
systems used on passenger rail vehicles.

New York Air Brake Corporation is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Knorr incorporated in Delaware with its headquarters in Watertown,
New York.  New York Air Brake manufactures railway air brakes and
other rail equipment used on freight trains.

Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation is a Delaware
corporation with its headquarters in Wilmerding, Pennsylvania.
Wabtec is a publicly-held company.  With over 100 subsidiaries
globally, Wabtec is the world's largest provider of rail equipment
and services with global sales of $3.9 billion in 2017.  Wabtec is
an industry leader in the freight and passenger rail segments of
the rail equipment industry, manufacturing and servicing products
such as brake systems, positive train control systems, and new
locomotives.

Faiveley Transport North America, formerly a subsidiary of Faiveley
Transport S.A., is now a wholly owned subsidiary of Wabtec, and is
a New York corporation headquartered in Greenville, South Carolina.
On November 30, 2016, Wabtec acquired majority ownership of
Faiveley Transport S.A., which had been a French societe anonyme
based in Gennevilliers, France.  Faiveley develops, manufactures,
and sells passenger and freight rail equipment to customers in
Europe, Asia, and North America, including the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joel R. Hurt, Esq.
          FEINSTEIN DOYLE PAYNE & KRAVEC, LLC
          429 Fourth Avenue
          Law & Finance Building, Suite 1300
          Pittsburgh, PA 15219
          Telephone: (412) 281-8400
          Facsimile: (412) 281-1007
          E-mail: jhurt@fdpklaw.com

               - and -

          John C. Evans, Esq.
          JCEVANS LAW, P.C.
          436 7th Avenue
          Koppers Building, The 26th Floor
          Pittsburgh, PA 15219
          Telephone: (412) 642-2300
          Facsimile: (412) 642-2309
          E-mail: jcevans@jcevanslaw.com

               - and -

          Hollis Salzman, Esq.
          Kellie Lerner, Esq.
          ROBINS KAPLAN LLP
          399 Park Avenue, Suite 3600
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 980-7400
          Facsimile: (212) 980-7499
          E-mail: hsalzman@robinskaplan.com
                  klerner@robinskaplan.com

               - and -

          Thomas J. Undlin, Esq.
          ROBINS KAPLAN LLP
          800 LaSalle Avenue, Suite 2800
          Minneapolis, MN 55
          Telephone: (612) 349-8500
          Facsimile: (612) 339-4181
          E-mail: tundlin@robinskaplan.com

               - and -

          Tai S. Milder, Esq.
          Aaron M. Sheanin, Esq.
          ROBINS KAPLAN LLP
          2440 West El Camino Real, Suite 100
          Mountain View, CA 94040
          Telephone: (650) 784-4024
          Facsimile: (650) 784-4041
          E-mail: tmilder@robinskaplan.com
                  asheanin@robinskaplan.com


KOHL'S DEPARTMENT: S. Collins' Wage Suit Moved to E.D. Wis.
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
granted Defendant's Motion to Transfer Venue in the case captioned
STACY COLLINS, individually and on behalf of other similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiffs, v. KOHL'S DEPARTMENT STORES,
INC., and KOHL'S CORPORATION, Defendants, No. 3:18-cv-00065
(VAB)(D. Conn.).  The case is transferred to the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, Milwaukee
Division.

Kohl's allegedly hired Ms. Collins to work in its store in Enfield,
Connecticut. After going through management training, Ms. Collins
allegedly was assigned to be the Children, Footwear and Home
Assistant Store Manager. Kohl's allegedly transferred Ms. Collins
to its store in Manchester, Connecticut, where she also worked as
the Children, Footwear and Home Assistant Store Manager until
approximately July 2015.  Ms. Collins alleges that Kohl's
classifies the Assistant Store Managers ("ASMs") as exempt from
overtime, and that it pays them a weekly salary with no overtime
compensation for working more than forty hours in a week.

The Court first must consider whether the action sought to be
transferred is one that 'might have been brought' in the transferee
court. Kohl's argues that this case could have been brought in the
Eastern District of Wisconsin because its principal place of
business is there. Ms. Collins does not dispute that the case could
have been filed there. The Court agrees and finds that the Eastern
District of Wisconsin would have been a proper venue for this
case.

The Court must next determine whether the transfer promotes
convenience and justice. The following factors inform that
analysis: (1) the plaintiff's choice of forum; (2) the convenience
of witnesses; (3) the location of relevant documents and relative
ease of access to sources of proof; (4) the convenience of parties;
(5) the locus of operative facts; (6) the availability of process
to compel the attendance of unwilling witnesses; and (7) the
relative means of the parties.

Ms. Collins's Choice of Forum

Ms. Collins argues that courts generally give substantial
consideration' to a plaintiff's choice of forum. In support of this
argument, she cites Kalapos, which, however, involved an individual
plaintiff, MAK Marketing, Inc., not a putative class or collective
action.  Although ordinarily, a plaintiff's choice of forum is
given great weight' in the analysis required by Section 1404(a),
when the plaintiff brings a class action rather than an individual
action, her choice of forum is entitled to less weight Another case
cited by Ms. Collins is a putative collective action, and the Court
did give great weight to the plaintiff's choice of forum.  In light
of these cases and arguments, the Court gives some weight, but not
substantial weight, to Ms. Collins's choice of venue.

The Convenience of the Witnesses

If this case were limited to the operations of Kohl's in the State
of Connecticut, then this argument would strongly favor this case
remaining in the District of Connecticut. This case, however, is
not limited to Connecticut. In addition to seeking to represent all
ASMs in the State of Connecticut, through her claim under the
Connecticut Wage Act, Ms. Collins also seeks to represent ASMs all
over the country through her claim under the Fair Labor Standards
Act. And, the operative facts with respect to these class members
are not likely to be in Connecticut or even the Northeast, because
the overwhelming number of Kohl's stores are located elsewhere.
The vast presence of Kohl's stores outside of the District of
Connecticut and hence, the vast presence of class members outside
of the District of Connecticut, thus significantly favors transfer
to Wisconsin.

The Locus of Operative Facts

At this point in the case, the Assistant Store Managers are located
in the Northeast and have hired counsel from the Northeast. The
locus of operative facts attached to those individuals thus far is
closer to Connecticut than Wisconsin. But, Ms. Collins has not
chosen to bring a class and collective action to represent Kohl's
Assistant Store Managers in just Connecticut, or even just the
Northeast. Ms. Collins instead has brought a nation-wide lawsuit
and therefore the locus of operative facts will be Kohl's stores
all across the country.   Indeed, as alleged by Ms. Collins, Kohl's
has stores in forty-nine of this country's fifty states.  As a
result, this factor significantly favors transfer.

The Availability of Process to Compel the Attendance of Unwilling
Witnesses

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(c)(1)(A), a subpoena may
command a person to attend a trial, hearing, or deposition only as
follows: A within 100 miles of where the person resides, is
employed, or regularly transacts business in person. Kohl's has
asserted in Ms. Hart's Declaration that at least one third-party,
the former Director of Human Resources Operations and Human
Resources Compliance, has knowledge related to the case and may
need to be served with a subpoena, and that her last known address
was within 100 miles of Menomonee Falls, Wisconsin.  The Court
finds that this factor weighs slightly in favor of transfer because
the only third-party witness that the parties have identified who
may need to be commanded to testify by subpoena is likely living in
Wisconsin.

The Relative Means of the Parties

The Court finds these factors the forum's familiarity and the
interests of justice to be neutral. While Ms. Collins correctly
notes that transfer may delay the case in the short run, given the
span of the case, it may be more efficient to litigate in a
district with a less congested docket. Still, this Court has the
authority to appropriately pace cases on its docket.  The Court
therefore does not find that these factors necessarily weigh in
favor of transfer. In addition, both courts are familiar with and
have an interest in the administration of federal law. These
factors therefore are neutral.

Whether Transfer Promotes Convenience and Justice

Ms. Collins's choice of forum slightly disfavors transfer. The
location of documents weighs only slightly in favor of transfer.
The convenience for the parties, however, weighs in favor of
transfer. The availability of compulsory process weighs slightly in
favor of transfer. The relative means of the parties weighs
slightly against transfer. The forum's familiarity with the
governing law and the interests of justice factors are neutral.
Most critically, the convenience of the witnesses and the locus of
operative facts, often cited as the two most important factors in
the Court's analysis of whether to transfer a case, both weigh
significantly in favor of transfer.  

Considering all of these factors together, the Court exercises its
discretion and thus finds that the interests of convenience and
justice favor transfer The motion to transfer venue to the Eastern
District of Wisconsin therefore is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 11, 2018 Order is
available https://tinyurl.com/y8pddlu5 from Leagle.com.

Stacy Collins, individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiff, represented by Gary Edward Phelan
-- gphelan@mitchellandsheahan.com -- Mitchell & Sheahan, P.C.,
Richard Eugene Hayber -- rhayber@hayberlawfirm.com -- The Hayber
Law Firm LLC, Michael T. Petela, Jr. , The Hayber Law Firm, LLC,
Peter Delano -- pdelano@llrlaw.com -- Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C.
& Shannon Liss-Riordan -- sliss@llrlaw.com -- Lichten &
Liss-Riordan, P.C.

Kohl's Dept Stores, Inc & Kohl's Corporation, Defendants,
represented by Bonnie Keane DelGobbo -- bdelgobbo@bakerlaw.com --
Baker & Hostetler LLP, pro hac vice, Joel Griswold --
jcgriswold@bakerlaw.com -- Baker & Hostetler, LLP & Saima Z. Sheikh
-- ssheikh@bakerlaw.com -- Baker & Hostetler LLP.

KUSHNER COS: Judge Allows Tenants' Class Action to Proceed
----------------------------------------------------------
Alec MacGillis, writing for ProPublica, reports that a Maryland
judge is allowing a class action lawsuit against Jared Kushner's
family real estate company to proceed, in a ruling that denies most
of the company's arguments to dismiss the case over its treatment
of tenants at large apartment complexes in the Baltimore area.

The lawsuit, filed last September in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City, alleges that the Kushner Companies' real estate
management arm, Westminster Management, has been improperly
inflating payments owed by tenants by charging them late fees that
are often baseless and in excess of state laws limiting them to 5
percent of rent. The suit also claims that Westminster was making
some tenants pay so-called court fees that are not actually
approved by any court. The suit alleges that the late fees and
court fees set in motion a vicious churning cycle in which rent
payments are partly put toward the fees instead of the actual rent
owed, thus deeming the tenant once again "late" on his or her rent
payment, leading to yet more late fees and court fees. Tenants are
pressured to pay the snowballing bills with immediate threat of
eviction, the suit alleges.

The lawsuit followed a May 2017 article co-published by ProPublica
and The New York Times Magazine that described the highly
aggressive legal tactics used by Kushner Companies to pursue
tenants and former tenants at 15 apartment complexes in the
Baltimore area.

The company's motion to dismiss the lawsuit was heard on July 18 by
Barry Williams, the same judge who presided over the cases against
the six police officers involved in the arrest and transport of
Freddie Gray, the 25-year-old Baltimore man who suffered fatal
injuries after being taken into custody in 2015. None of the six
officers was convicted.

In his ruling, Judge Williams denied the bulk of the company's
motion to dismiss the case, including its argument that too much
time had passed since the events the suit described.
Judge Williams also rejected for now, deeming it premature, the
company's argument that each tenant's situation is too unique for
the group to constitute a single class.

Judge Williams did grant a couple of points in the company's
motion. Most notably, he granted the company's motion to dismiss
the count of the lawsuit alleging that the company's treatment of
tenants represented a breach of contract.

Andrew Freeman, a lawyer representing the tenants, said dismissing
the breach of contract count had little practical effect, given
that this count provided no damages beyond what the tenants would
recover under the separate claim that the company's late fees
exceeded state limits.

Mr. Freeman cheered the ruling overall. "We are very pleased that
Judge Williams recognized that plaintiffs have a claim for a
violation of Maryland's laws that protect tenants from excessive
late fees and forbid landlords from threatening tenants with
eviction for those not paying those fees, and that he refused to
dismiss our class action allegations," he said. "We look forward to
proceeding with the case on behalf of the many hundreds, if not
thousands, of Westminster Management's tenants who have been
victimized by those illegal fees."

Michael Blumenfeld, a lawyer representing the Kushner Companies,
said the company was pleased that Williams had limited the lawsuit
on a few points, and indicated that the company still plans to
challenge the assertion that the tenants make up a single class.
"Kushner Companies looks forward to presenting these issues to the
court soon," he said. The company declined to comment on the merits
of the lawsuit at the time it was filed, but did respond to
questions about its tactics for the May 2017 article, saying that
its approach to pursuing tenants was in line with industry
practices and that it had a fiduciary duty to its partners to
collect all money owed by current and former tenants.

The lawsuit now moves to the discovery stage. A hearing on the
tenants' claim to class certification could happen as soon as
September.

In November, Kushner Companies and related corporate entities named
in the suit sought to have the case transferred from state court to
federal court, which would spare the company from having to face a
jury drawn only from Baltimore. To prevail on such grounds, the
company had to show that none of its ownership partners were
Maryland residents. The company requested that its list of partners
be sealed from view, citing the "politically-motivated innuendo"
that could result from the high degree of media interest in Jared
Kushner, President Donald Trump's son-in-law and senior White House
adviser, who has recused himself from a role in the family
companies.

The request to shield the partners' identities was challenged by
ProPublica, the Baltimore Sun, the Washington Post, the Associated
Press, and Baltimore TV station WMAR-TV. In January, a federal
judge ruled against the request to seal the partners' identities.
As a result, the company opted to keep the case in state court
after all.

Kushner Companies is also facing a separate lawsuit filed by
tenants in New York, alleging a whole other set of behaviors in
that much different real estate market: that it used harassing
tactics to drive them out of their apartments in order to charge
higher rent. The company has called that suit "totally without
merit." [GN]

L'OREAL USA: Faces Hubbard Suit Over Use of Consumer Reports
------------------------------------------------------------
DEBORAH HUBBARD, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. L'OREAL USA, INC., and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,
Case No. CGC-18-567952 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco Cty., July
10, 2018), arises from L'Oreal's alleged acquisition and use of
consumer and/or investigative consumer reports as those terms are
defined by the Fair Credit Reporting Act, as well as the
Defendant's practice of conducting background checks on the
Plaintiff and other prospective, current and former employees.

L'Oreal USA, Inc., is a Delaware corporation headquartered in New
York City.  The Plaintiff is unaware of the true names or
capacities of the Doe Defendants.

L'Oreal is one of the world's largest cosmetics manufacturers.  The
Company's cosmetic line includes brand names, such as L'Oreal,
L'Oreal Professionnel, Maybelline, Ralph Lauren Fragrances, and
Giorgio Armani Parfums.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lionel Z. Glancy, Esq.
          Marc L. Godino, Esq.
          Danielle L. Manning, Esq.
          GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
          1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 201-9150
          Facsimile: (310) 201-9160
          E-mail: lglancy@glancylaw.com
                  mgodino@glancylaw.com
                  dmanning@glancylaw.com

               - and -

          Mark S. Greenstone, Esq.
          GREENSTONE LAW APC
          1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 201-9156
          Facsimile: (310) 201-9160
          E-mail: mgreenstone@greenstonelaw.com

               - and -

          Thomas D. Rutledge, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS D. RUTLEDGE
          500 West Harbor Drive, Suite 1113
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 886-7224
          Facsimile: (619) 259-5455
          E-mail: thomasrutledgelaw@gmail.com

               - and -

          Brian R. Short, Esq.
          SHORTLEGAL, APC
          350 10th Avenue, Suite 1000
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 272-0720
          Facsimile: (619) 839-3129
          E-mail: brian@shortlegal.com



LANG PHARMA: Settles Class Action Over Co-Q10 Supplements
---------------------------------------------------------
A proposed settlement has been reached in a class action lawsuit
involving Lang Pharma Nutrition, Inc., a manufacturer of CoQ-10
supplements, and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., CVS Pharmacy, Inc.,
Walgreen Company, and Meijer Distribution, Inc, retailers.  The
settlement establishes a $1,306,000 fund of cash and product
credits.

On July 6th, 2018, California Superior Court Judge Joel R. Wohlfeil
preliminarily approved a settlement of a lawsuit between the above
defendants and purchasers of certain Co-Q10 supplements.  The
lawsuit alleged that Defendants violated certain laws by
misleadingly labeling or falsely advertising their CoQ-10
supplements as being more effective than they are and has having
greater absorption rates then they do.  Defendants deny the
allegations and any wrongdoing and maintain that the products are
effective and achieve the stated absorption rates.  The Court did
not rule in favor of Plaintiffs or Defendants.  Instead, because of
the complexity and uncertainty of litigation, the parties
compromised and negotiated and agreed to a proposed settlement in
order to avoid the expense and risks of continuing with the
lawsuit.

The proposed class settlement provides $1,306,000 in relief.  This
relief will be comprised of three parts: (1) $656,000 cash fund;
(2) $650,000 in products credits; and (3) mandatory disclosures on
the product labels.

Class members, who purchased certain Lang Pharma Nutrition CoQ-10
supplements at Wal-Mart, CVS, Walgreens, and Meijer stores between
July 1, 2013 and July 24, 2018, may be eligible for a partial
refund or product credits under the settlement terms and are
advised to carefully read the Class Notice as their legal rights
may be affected whether they act or not.  The covered products are
listed below:

   -- Wal-Mart's Equate Clinical Strength High Absorption CoQ-10
100 mg;
   -- CVS/Pharmacy Ultra CoQ-10 100 mg;
   -- CVS/Health Ultra CoQ-10 100 mg;
   -- CVS/Pharmacy Enhanced Absorption Formula CoQ-10 100 mg;
   -- CVS/Health Enhanced Absorption Formula CoQ-10 100 mg;
   -- Walgreens Well at Walgreens CoQ-10 Enhanced Absorption
Formula 100 mg
   -- Walgreens Well at Walgreens CoQ-10 Enhanced Absorption
Formula 200 mg;
   -- Meijer's Ultra CoQ-10 100 mg ("Meijer Ultra CoQ-10").

Class Members who file a valid claim form must choose between a
partial cash refund of $3.50 or a product credit valued at $12.50
that may be used at a designated Lang Pharma website within 60
days.  The amount of the cash refund and the product credit are
estimates and may increase or decrease depending on the number of
valid claims made by class members.  Claims can be submitted online
at the class website www.Q10Settlement.com.  Claims must be
submitted by September 4, 2018.

Class members may request to be excluded from the class ("opt out"
of the settlement), comment on the settlement, or object to the
settlement, but must do so by September 4, 2018.  Class members who
do nothing will not receive any payment but will bound by the
Court's decision.

Your rights and options -- and the deadlines to exercise them --
are only summarized in this press release. It is only a summary of
the full class action settlement.  A Detailed Notice describes, in
full, how to file a claim, object, or exclude yourself, and
provides other important information.  For more information and to
obtain a Long Form Notice, claim form, or other documents, visit
www.Q10Settlement.com, call toll-free 1-866-532-6710, or write to:
Q10 Settlement Class Action Administrator, c/o Classaura Class
Action Administration, 1718 Peachtree St #1080, Atlanta, GA 30309.
[GN]

LOST DOG: Classes in FLSA Suit Have Prelim Certification
--------------------------------------------------------
In the case, VICTOR DIAZ, on his own behalf and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. LOST DOG PIZZA, LLC,
DANIEL WARREN LYNCH, and JEFF SMOKEVITCH, Defendant, Civil Action
No. 17-cv-2228-WJM-NYW (D. Colo.), Judge William J. Martinez of the
U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado granted in part
and denied in part the parties' Joint Motion to Adopt Parties'
Stipulation of Preliminary Certification of a Fair Labor Standards
Act Section 216(b) Class and Certification of a Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 Class and for Court-Authorized Notice to Class
Members.

The action is brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"),
and the Colorado Minimum Wage Act.  As alleged in the Complaint,
the Plaintiff and the other members of the proposed class were
hourly employees at the Defendants' Brown Dog Pizza restaurant in
Telluride, Colorado.

The Plaintiff worked for the Defendants from approximately 2009
through April 2017.  He alleges the Defendants refused to pay him
and other members of the proposed class overtime for hours worked
beyond forty each workweek and beyond twelve each workday, in
violation of the FLSA and the Wage Act.  The Plaintiff alleges that
the Defendants subjected not only himself, but all their hourly
employees to a common policy of refusing to pay overtime wages for
hours worked beyond forty each workweek and beyond 12 each workday.
Further, he alleges that upon separation, the Defendants did not
pay him all of his earned, vested and determinable wages, and
failed to pay other employees all of their earned and vested wages
upon termination, as is required under the Wage Act.

As set out in the present Joint Motion, and in the parties' related
filings, since the case was filed in September 2017, the parties
have been working to negotiate a settlement agreement.  Thus they
have jointly stipulated to the preliminary FLSA and Rule 23 class
certification and notice procedure, as proposed in the Joint
Motion, and represent that at the end of the proposed notice and
opt-in/opt-out period, the parties will have the benefit of full
information as to potential damage and intend to negotiate the
monetary terms of settlement upon receipt of that information.  The
parties represent that upon agreement to terms of settlement, they
will submit their settlement agreement to the Court for approval,
to be followed by a final fairness hearing.

The parties have stipulated to the following class definitions:

     (1) As to the Plaintiff's Wage Act class action claims, a
class defined as all hourly employees who worked at Brown Dog Pizza
on or after Sept. 14, 2015 and who were not paid overtime wages for
overtime hours worked.

     (2) As to the Plaintiff's FLSA collective action claims, a
group defined as all hourly employees who worked at Brown Dog Pizza
on or after Sept. 14, 2014 and who were not paid overtime wages for
overtime hours worked.

The parties jointly propose a two-part notice procedure for the
FLSA opt-in and Rule 23 opt-out classes.  First, the parties
propose (and have agreed to) a 45-day opt-in period during which
potential FLSA class members may return their opt-in forms.  The
parties have also proposed (and agreed to) proposed Notice and
Opt-In Forms.  Second, the parties propose that after the close of
the 45-day opt-in period, a designated Class Administrator will
issue a Rule 23 class (i.e., the opt-out class) Notice, in the Form
proposed and agreed by the parties.

Having reviewed the record and being fully advised, Judge Martinez
agrees with the parties' conclusion that the class certification is
appropriate under Rule 23(b)(3).  As to Rule 23, and given the
parties' stipulation and joint motion, he also finds that
preliminary certification of the proposed FLSA class is warranted
under the comparatively lenient standard for preliminary
certification and notice of an FLSA collective action.
Accordingly, the parties' present Motion will be granted in part in
that the Judge will approve the proposed FLSA Notice and opt-in
Consent to Join form, subject to the Court's modifications.  Per
the parties' representations and requests, all Notices and written
communications with potential class members will be made in both
the English and Spanish languages.

Given the lack of information regarding the anticipated settlement,
the Judge cannot give its preliminary approval to a non-consummated
settlement agreement at this time, and therefore also cannot
approve the parties' proposed Rule 23 Notice.  The parties' present
Motion will be denied in part without prejudice to refiling as to
the parties' proposed Rule 23 class notice on the Wage Act claim,
and he will set out a procedure for the anticipated filing,
preliminary approval, and final approval of a settlement
agreement.

For the reasons, Judge Martinez granted in part the parties' Joint
Motion.  He conditionally certified as a collective action under 29
U.S.C. Section 216(b), with the collective action members eligible
to opt-in to the Plaintiff's Second Claim for Relief defined as all
hourly employees who worked at Brown Dog Pizza on or after Sept.
14, 2014 and who were not paid overtime wages for overtime hours
worked.  He also certified the class, as to the Plaintiff's First
and Third Claims for Relief, defined as all hourly employees who
worked at Brown Dog Pizza on or after Sept. 14, 2015 and who were
not paid overtime wages for overtime hours worked.

Plaintiff Victor Diaz is approved as the class representative; and
Brandt Milstein, Milstein Law Office, 1123 Spruce Street, Suite
200, Boulder, CO 80302, as the class counsel.

Judge Martinez approved as modified the form of the FLSA opt-in
Notice and Consent to Join, and subject to incorporation of the
edits reflected in the first attachment to the Order.  

The parties will effect notice to potential conditional action
members as follows:

     a. No later than June 25, 2018, the Plaintiff will file a
notice docketing a Spanish language translation of the
Court-approved Notice and Consent to Join Form.

     b. No later than July 2, 2018, the Plaintiff will mail the
final FLSA Notice and Consent to Join Form, incorporating the
Court's modifications, in both English and Spanish, to all
potential collective action members via first-class U.S. Mail.
Further, the Plaintiff will file a Notice of Completion of Mailing
notifying the Court when this mailing has been completed, and this
mailing will identify the parties' selected Class Administrator.

     c. Consistent with the parties' stipulations, the Defendants
will include a copy of the FLSA Notice and Consent to Join forms in
English and Spanish in the pay envelopes of all putative class
members who currently work for the Defendants, and will post copies
of the Notice and Consent to Join form, in English and Spanish, in
areas readily and routinely available for review by potential class
members.

The Potential FLSA collective action participants will have until
Aug. 17, 2018 to return the Consent to Join Form.  No later than
Aug. 31, 2018, assuming a settlement agreement on the Wage Act
claim has been finalized, the parties will file a copy of that
settlement agreement together with a motion for its preliminary
approval and proposed class notice form.  This filing must include
the anticipated amount to be paid to each Rule 23 Wage Act class
member.  If no settlement agreement has been finalized, the parties
will instead file a status report.

Upon receipt of a Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement,
the Court will determine whether to approve the anticipated
settlement and, as needed, approve notice of the Rule 23 class
certification and settlement, and set a final fairness hearing and
related deadlines for filing objections and a request for final
approval.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 19, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/6Mpysl from Leagle.com.

Victor Diaz, on his own behalf and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Brandt Powers
Milstein -- brandt@milsteinlawoffice.com -- Milstein Law Office.

Lost Dog Pizza, LLC, Daniel Warren Lynch & Jeff Smokevitch,
Defendants, represented by Juli Elizabeth Lapin -- juli@rwolaw.com
-- Robinson Waters & O'Dorisio, P.C..

MARTIN-BROWER CO: Deal in J. Titus' Labor Suit Has Final Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JUSTIN TITUS, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. THE MARTIN-BROWER COMPANY, LLC;
and DOES 1-100 inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
2:17-cv-00558-JAM-GGH (E.D. Cal.), Judge John A. Mendez of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of California granted final
approval of the parties' Class Action Settlement Agreement, and the
Plaintiff's Motion for Fees and Costs.

For the purpose of settlement, the Judge finally certified the
class of all persons who have been employed by the Defendant as a
non-exempt truck driver at its facility in Stockton, California at
any time during the period from March 15, 2013 through Feb. 27,
2018.

He finally appointed Plaintiff Justin Titus as the Class
Representative; and Craig J. Ackermann and Avi Kreitenberg of
Ackermann & Tilajef, P.C., and Robert J. Wasserman of Mayall Hurley
P.C. as the counsel for the Class.  He also confirmed the
appointment of Atticus Administration, LLC as the Settlement
Administrator.

The Class Representative Service award of $7,500 is granted to the
Plaintiff.  The Class Representative Service Award will be paid to
Plaintiff in accordance with the terms of the Settlement.

Judge Mendez also granted the Plaintiff's motion for attorneys'
fees and costs in the amount of $98,250 in fees and costs in the
amount of $2,899.49.  The attorneys' fees and costs will be paid by
the Defendant to the Class Counsel in accordance with the terms of
the Settlement.  He also ordered the Defendant to separately pay
the $7,000 in mediation fee to the Class Counsel.

He granted final approval of the $5,761 designated for payment to
Atticus, and ordered the Parties to make the payment to the
Settlement Administrator in accordance with the Settlement.

The Judge approved the allocation of $10,000 of the Settlement as
payment for penalties under the California Labor Code Private
Attorney Generals Act ("PAGA"), and further approved of payment of
$7,500 to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency for its
portion of the PAGA penalties pursuant to Cal. Labor Code sections
2698-2699.

In the event that a Settlement check cannot be delivered to a Class
Member, or a Class Member does not cash a Settlement checks after
the events and deadlines set forth in Section 3.8(B) of the
Settlement, then the Settlement Administrator will redistribute the
amount associated with the checks to the State of California's
Unclaimed Wages Fund, administered by the DLSE.

Final Judgment is entered based on the Parties' settlement
agreement.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 19, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/0dNwr6 from Leagle.com.

Justin Titus, Plaintiff, represented by Craig Justin Ackermann,
Ackermann & Tilajef, P.C., Nicholas John Scardigli --
nscardigli@mayallaw.com -- Mayall Hurley, PC, Robert Joshua
Wasserman -- rwasserman@mayallaw.com -- Mayall Hurley, PC, Vladimir
Joseph Kozina -- vjkozinaj@mayallaw.com -- Mayall Hurley, P.C. &
William J. Gorham, III -- wgorham@mayallaw.com -- Mayall Hurley,
PC.

Martin-Brower Company, LLC, Defendant, represented by Reiko Linda
Furuta -- rfuruta@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP & David D.
Jacobson -- djacobson@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP.

MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL: Oct. 25 Settlement Approval Hearing Set
-------------------------------------------------------------
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS
ANGELES- SPRING STREET COURT

If you are or were a Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company
policyholder of certain participating individual term life
policies, or the beneficiary, you are part of a class action
settlement.

IMPORTANT- PLEASE READ THIS NOTICE CAREFULLY THIS NOTICE RELATES TO
A CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT AND, IF YOU ARE A SETTLEMENT CLASS MEMBER,
CONTAINS IMPORTANT INFORMATION

A California State Court authorized this notice. You are not being
sued.

This is not a solicitation from a lawyer.

A settlement has been reached in a class action lawsuit against
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company ("MassMutual").  The
lawsuit alleges that MassMutual breached contractual obligations
under certain term insurance contracts to annually determine if
they contributed to divisible surplus and, if so, whether dividends
were owed.  MassMutual denies all of the allegations, contends it
made the annual determinations, and contends the term
policies never earned dividends.

You are included in the settlement if you are a current or former
MassMutual participating term policyholder, or if such policyholder
is deceased, the beneficiary under such policy, of a participating
term life insurance contract that was issued or remained in force
on or after January 1, 1996.

Please read this notice carefully. Your legal rights are affected
whether you act or don't act.

THIS TABLE SUMMARIZES YOUR LEGAL RIGHTS AND OPTIONS UNDER THE
SETTLEMENT

EXCLUDE YOURSELF BY SEPTEMBER 14, 2018

Write to the Settlement Administrator if you'd like to exclude
yourself from the settlement.  You will retain any rights you
currently have, if any, to pursue claims against MassMutual about
the allegations in this case.

OBJECT BY SEPTEMBER 14, 2018

Write to the Settlement Administrator if you don't like the
settlement to explain why you object.

ATTEND A HEARING

Ask to speak in Court about the fairness of the settlement.

DO NOTHING

You will give up your rights to sue MassMutual about the
allegations in this case, but will still receive the settlement
benefits.

BASIC INFORMATION
1. What is this notice and why should I read it?
A court authorized this notice to let you know about a proposed
class settlement of a lawsuit called Chavez v. Massachusetts Mutual
Life Insurance Company, No. BC435321 (the "Action") pending in the
Superior Court of the State of California.  This notice describes
the settlement. Please read this notice carefully to determine
whether you wish to participate in the settlement.  Your rights and
options—and the deadlines to exercise them -- are explained in
this notice.  Please understand that if you are a Settlement Class
Member, your legal rights are affected regardless of whether you
act.

2. What is a class action lawsuit?
A class action is a lawsuit in which one or more plaintiffs -- in
this case, Christina Chavez (the "Plaintiff") -- sue on behalf of a
group of people who allegedly have similar claims.  After the
Parties agreed to settle, the Court granted preliminary approval of
the settlement and preliminarily determined that the case should be
treated as a class action for settlement
purposes.  Among other things, preliminary approval permits
Settlement Class Members to exclude themselves from the Settlement
Class and to voice their support of or objection to the settlement
before the Court makes a final decision whether to approve the
settlement.  In a class action, the court resolves the issues for
all class members, except those who exclude themselves from the
class.

THE CLAIMS IN THE LAWSUIT AND THE SETTLEMENT

3. What is this lawsuit about?
Plaintiff filed a class action complaint against MassMutual on
behalf of a class of participating term policyholders, alleging
that MassMutual breached contractual obligations to annually
determine if participating term policies contributed to divisible
surplus and, if so, whether they earned dividends.  A more complete
description of what Plaintiff alleges is in the Second Amended
Complaint, which is available on the Settlement Website at
www.CHAVEZMMTERMSETTLEMENT.com.  MassMutual denies Plaintiff's
claims. MassMutual claims it annually determined that the policies
did not contribute to divisible surplus and, thus, were not owed
dividends.  MassMutual's answer to the allegations in the complaint
is available on the Settlement Website at
www.CHAVEZMMTERMSETTLEMENT.com.  MassMutual is settling the Action
solely to avoid the expense, inconvenience, delay, risk, and
disruption of litigation.

4. Why is there a settlement?
After eight years of litigation, a jury trial was held on the
claims of one subclass of MassMutual participating term
policyholders in what is known as a bellwether trial.  The jury
found that, although MassMutual had not performed an annual
determination, no dividends were owed to term policyholders.  Both
sides then agreed to settle to avoid the cost, delay, and risk of
any additional trials or appeals, and to provide current and former
policyholders substantial benefits. (See Question 6.) Plaintiff and
Class Counsel think the settlement is in the best interests for
everyone who owned a participating MassMutual term policy covered
by the settlement.

WHO'S INCLUDED IN THE SETTLEMENT?
5. How do I know if I am a Settlement Class Member?
The Court decided that everyone who fits this description is a
Settlement Class Member: All current and former MassMutual
individual participating term policyholders, and if such
policyholders are deceased, the beneficiaries under such policies,
of participating term life insurance contracts that were issued or
remained in force on or after January 1, 1996.  The MassMutual
participating term policies include: Adjustable Premium Term 70
(APT70) (aka 89 Series Adjustable Premium Term; policy form
404-1C-8900); Adjustable Premium Term 80 (APT80) (aka 89 Series
Adjustable Premium Term; policy form 404-1A8900); Term 10 (T10)
(aka 93 Series Term 10; policy form 406-9300); Enhanced Term 10
(ET10) (aka 93 Series Enhanced Term 10; policy form 406-9300);
Adjustable Premium Term 70 (APT70) (aka 93 Series Adjustable
Premium Term; policy form 404-NY-9300); Adjustable Premium Term 80
(APT80) (aka 93 Series Adjustable Premium Term; policy form
404-9300); Term 5 (T5) (aka 98 Series Term 5; policy form
404-9300); Term 10 (T10) (aka 98 Series Term 10; policy form
404-9300); Term 10 Guaranteed (T20G) (aka 98 Series Term 10
Guaranteed; policy form 404-9300); Term 15 (T15) (aka 98 Series
Term 15; policy form 404-9300); Term 20 (T20) (aka 98 Series Term
20; policy form 404-9300); Term 5 (T5) (aka 99 Series Term 5;
policy form 404-9300); Term 10 Guaranteed (T10G) (aka 99 Series
Term 5; policy form 404-9300); Term 15 (T15) (aka 99 Series Term
15; policy form 404-9300); Term 20 (T20) (aka 99 Series Term 20;
policy form 404-9300); Adjustable Premium Term 80 (APT80-99) (aka
99 Series Adjustable Premium Term; policy form 404-9300); Term 20
Guaranteed (T20G) (aka 99 Series Term 20 Guaranteed; policy form
404-9300); Term 5 Guaranteed (T5G) (aka 2004 Series Term 5
Guaranteed; policy form 404-9300 T5G); Term 10 Guaranteed (T10G)
(aka 2004 Series Term 10 Guaranteed; policy form 404-9300 T10G);
Term 20 Guaranteed (T20G) (aka 2004 Series Term 20 Guaranteed;
policy form 404-9300 T20G); Term 30 Guaranteed (T30G) (aka 2004
Series Term 30 Guaranteed; policy form 404-9300 T30G); Term 5
Guaranteed (T5G) (aka 2005 Series Term 5 Guaranteed; policy form
408-2005 5G); Term 10 Guaranteed (T10G) (aka 2005 Series Term 10
Guaranteed; policy form 408-2005 10G); Term 20 Guaranteed (T20G)
(aka 2005 Series Term 20 Guaranteed; policy form 408-2005 20G);
Term 30 Guaranteed (T30G) (aka 2005 Series Term 30 Guaranteed;
policy form 408-2005 30G); Convertible Annual Renewable Term
(ART06) (aka 2006 Series ART; policy form 410-2006); Vantage
Term-Annually Renewable Term (VTART) (aka 2010 Series Adjustable
Premium Term; policy form TL-2009 VTART); Vantage Term 10 (VT10)
(aka 2010 Series Term 10 Guaranteed; policy form TL-2009 VT10);
Vantage Term 20 (VT20) (aka 2010 Series Term 20 Guaranteed; policy
form TL-2009 VT20).

Excluded from the Settlement Class are: (1) the Honorable Maren E.
Nelson of the Superior Court of the State of California for the
County of Los Angeles (or other judge presiding over the Action
through which this matter is presented for settlement) and court
personnel employed in Judge Nelson's or such other Judge's chambers
or courtroom; (2) any officer or director of MassMutual identified
in MassMutual's Annual Statement who properly execute and file a
timely Request For Exclusion; (3) the legal representatives,
successors, or assigns of any such excluded persons (but only in
their capacity as legal representative, successor, or assign); and
(4) those persons, as identified by the Court in a Final Settlement
Approval Order, who fit within the definition of the Settlement
Class, but who timely submit a Request for Exclusion and thereby
opt out of this Settlement as provided for in Section 3.7 of the
Settlement Agreement.  If you meet the class definition, and are
not excluded, you are a Settlement Class Member.

THE SETTLEMENT BENEFITS

6. What does the settlement provide?
The settlement requires MassMutual to make annual determinations
for at least ten years for each participating term policy covered
by the settlement.  MassMutual will implement additional practices
to perform annual calculations to determine whether term policies
contributed to divisible surplus and, if so, whether dividends are
owed.  MassMutual also will be required to prepare actuarial
memoranda that summarize its calculations and determinations.
MassMutual also has agreed to pay the full administrative costs of
the settlement, including for notice.  The Settlement Class will
not incur any fees or costs to receive these benefits.

THE LAWYERS REPRESENTING YOU
7. Who represents the Settlement Class?
The Court has appointed the law firm of Gianelli & Morris, A Law
Corporation, as Class Counsel.  You will not be charged for these
lawyers.  If you want to be represented by your own lawyer, you may
hire one at your own expense.  In addition, the Court appointed
Plaintiff Christina Chavez to serve as the Class Representative.
She is also a Settlement Class Member.

8. How will the lawyers be paid?
From the beginning of the case, which was filed in April 2010, to
the present, Class Counsel have not received any payment for their
services in prosecuting the case or obtaining the settlement on
behalf of the Settlement Class, nor have they been reimbursed for
any out-of-pocket expenses.  The Settlement Class Members will not
have to pay anything toward the fees or expenses of Class Counsel,
which Class Counsel waived to secure the benefits of the
settlement for the Settlement Class.

YOUR RIGHTS AND OPTIONS
9. What is the effect of final approval of the settlement? If the
Court grants final approval of the settlement, a final order and
judgment will be entered in the Action.  All members of the
Settlement Class will release and forever discharge MassMutual and
each of the Released Parties from any and all Released Class Claims
(as defined in the Settlement Agreement), including Unknown Claims.
Please refer to Sections 1.6, 1.13 to 1.15, 1.24, and 5.2 of the
Settlement Agreement, reproduced in Appendix A, for a full
description of the claims and persons that will be released.  The
Settlement Agreement is available at
www.CHAVEZMMTERMSETTLEMENT.com.

Any and all members of the Settlement Class who do not exclude
themselves will not be permitted to assert Released Claims in any
other litigation against MassMutual or the other persons and
entities covered by the release.  If you do not wish to be a
Settlement Class Member, you must timely exclude yourself.  If the
settlement is not approved, the case will proceed as if no
settlement had been attempted or reached.  In that event, there is
no assurance that a class would be certified for litigation
purposes or that members of any certified class will recover the
same or better benefits than provided for under the settlement, or
anything at all.

The settlement of this lawsuit and the releases do not change any
of your contractual rights under the express terms of your existing
term life insurance policy(ies) for death benefits, including any
supplemental benefits such as waiver of premium or accidental death
benefits.

10. What happens if I do nothing at all?
If you do nothing, you will release any claims you may have against
MassMutual or the Released Parties concerning the conduct Plaintiff
alleges in her complaint, though you will receive the benefits of
the settlement. (See Question No. 13.)

11. How do I get out of the settlement?
To exclude yourself from the Settlement Class, you must send a
letter saying that you "wish to be excluded from the Settlement
Class in Chavez v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company, No.
BC435321"; include your name and address, and your signature. Your
Request For Exclusion must be postmarked no later than September
14, 2018, and sent to the Settlement Administrator at the following
address: Chavez v. MassMutual Settlement Administrator, P.O. Box
2005, Chanhassen, MN 55317-2005.

12. What happens if I exclude myself from this settlement?
If you exclude yourself from the Settlement Class, you cannot
object to the settlement.  You will not be legally bound by
anything that happens in the Action.

13. If I don't exclude myself, can I sue MassMutual for the same
thing later?
No. Unless you exclude yourself, you give up any right to sue
MassMutual for the claims being resolved by this settlement.

14. How do I object to the settlement?
If you do not exclude yourself from the Settlement Class, you can
object to the settlement if you don't like any part of it. If you
object, you must give the reasons why you think the Court should
not approve the settlement.  The Court will consider your views.
Your objection to the settlement must be postmarked no later than
September 14, 2018, and sent to the Settlement Administrator at the
following address: Chavez v. MassMutual Settlement Administrator,
P.O. Box 2005, Chanhassen, MN 55317-2005.

The objection must be in writing and include the case name Chavez
v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company, No. BC435321; also
include your (a) name, (b) address, (c) a statement that you are a
Settlement Class Member, (d) the specific grounds for the objection
(including all arguments, citations, and evidence supporting the
objection), (e) all documents or writings that you desire the Court
to consider (including all copies of any documents relied upon in
the objection), (f) your signature, and (g) a notice of intention
to appear at the Final Approval Hearing (if applicable).  The Court
will consider all properly filed comments from Settlement Class
Members. If you do not provide notice of intention to appear at the
Final Approval Hearing, you or your attorney may nonetheless appear
at the Final Approval Hearing.

15. What's the difference between objecting and excluding myself
from the settlement?
Objecting means telling the Court what you don't like about the
settlement.  You can object only if you stay in the Settlement
Class.  Excluding yourself from the Settlement Class is telling the
Court that you don't want to be part of the Settlement Class.  If
you exclude yourself, you have no basis to object because the case
no longer affects you.

THE COURT'S FINAL APPROVAL HEARING
16. When and where will the Court hold a hearing on the fairness of
the settlement?
A Final Approval Hearing has been set for October 25, 2018 at 9:00
a.m., before The Honorable Maren E. Nelson at 312 North Spring
Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012 in Courtroom 17.  At the hearing, the
Court will hear any comments, objections, and arguments concerning
the fairness of the proposed settlement. You do not need to attend
this hearing. You also do not need
to attend to have an objection considered by the Court. (See
Question No. 17.) Note: The date and time of the Final Approval
Hearing are subject to change by Court Order, but any changes will
be posted at www.CHAVEZMMTERMSETTLEMENT.com and the toll-free
settlement number at 1-800-419-3248.

17. Do I have to come to the Final Approval Hearing?
No. Class Counsel will answer any questions the Court may have. But
you are welcome to come at your own expense.  If you send an
objection, you don't have to come to Court to talk about it.  As
long as any written objection you choose to make was filed and
mailed to the Settlement Administrator on time and meets the other
criteria described in the settlement (see Question No. 14), the
Court will consider it. You may also pay another lawyer to attend,
but you don't have to.

18. May I speak at the Final Approval Hearing?
If you do not exclude yourself from the Settlement Class, you may
speak at the Final Approval Hearing concerning any part of the
proposed settlement. (See Question No. 14.)

GETTING MORE INFORMATION
19. Where can I get additional information?
This notice provides only a summary of the matters relating to the
settlement. For more detailed information, you may wish to review
the Settlement Agreement. You can view the Settlement Agreement and
get more information at www.CHAVEZMMTERMSETTLEMENT.com. You also
can get more information by contacting the Settlement Administrator
at Chavez v. MassMutual Settlement Administrator, P.O. Box 2005,
Chanhassen, MN 55317-2005, toll-free at 1-800-419-3248, or by email
at info@CHAVEZMMTERMSETTLEMENT.com.

In addition, the Settlement Agreement and all other pleadings and
papers filed in the case are available for inspection and copying
during regular business hours at the Civil Clerk's office located
at 111 N. Hill Street, Room 112, Los Angeles, CA
90012.

PLEASE DO NOT CONTACT THE COURT, THE JUDGE, OR THE DEFENDANT
MASSMUTUAL WITH QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SETTLEMENT.

MCLANE COMPANY: Magistrate Suggests Dismissal of FCRA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Andrew W. Austin of the United States District
Court for the Western District of Texas, Austin Division, issued a
Report and Recommendation granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in
the case captioned SAMMY SHELTON, et al., v. McLANE COMPANY, INC.,
et al., No. 1:17-CV-888-SS-AWA (W.D. Tex.).

The Plaintiffs filed this putative class action suit against McLane
Company, Inc. and McLane Foodservice, Inc., for violations of the
Fair Credit Reporting Act. The Employees allege that, when
completing applications for employment with McLane, they each
signed an authorization for McLane to obtain a pre-employment
background check on them, which also allegedly included a release
of liability.

The Court will address McLane's argument that the pending claims
are barred by the statute of limitations.

Statute of Limitations

The First Amended Complaint, the Employees contend: the Defendants
routinely conduct background checks on all of its job applicants as
part of a standard screening process. the Defendants also conduct
background checks on existing employees from time-to-time.

McLane argues that all of the plaintiffs' potential claims under
the FCRA are barred by the FCRA's statute of limitations.

A plaintiff asserting a claim under Section 1681b must bring suit
not later than the earlier of  (1) 2 years after the date of
discovery by the plaintiff of the violation that is the basis for
such liability; or (2) 5 years after the date on which the
violation that is the basis for such liability occurs.

The evidence is that McLane only obtained background checks on each
of the Employees prior to their being hired by the company. McLane
Foodservice obtained any pre-hire background checks on Plaintiffs
before their respective dates of employment listed above. The most
recently hired of the named plaintiffs was hired in 2008. This
means that even applying the longer five-year limitations period
the latest any of the Employees could have brought suit for
violations under Section 1681b(b)(2)(A) on the basis of background
checks procured by McLane would have been in 2013. The suit was
filed in 2017, and thus all of the Employees' claims are barred by
the statute of limitations.

The Magistrate recommends that the District Court grant the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 16, 2018 Report and
Recommendation is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybelj5zr from
Leagle.com.

Carnett Brewer, Duane Harris, Sammy Shelton & Thomas Cathey,
Plaintiffs, represented by Aashish Y. Desai --
aashish@desai-law.com -- Desai Law Firm, P.C.

McLane Company, Inc. & McLane Foodservice, Inc., Defendants,
represented by Rod Fliegel -- rfliegel@littler.com -- Littler
Mendelson, P.C. & Sherry L. Travers -- stravers@littler.com

MDL 2493: Meloy Appeals Decision in TCPA MDL to 4th Cir.
--------------------------------------------------------
Party-in-Interest Geneva Meloy filed an appeal from a court ruling
in the multidistrict litigation entitled In re: MONITRONICS
INTERNATIONAL, INC., TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT LITIGATION,
MDL No. 1:13-md-02493-JPB-JES, in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of West Virginia at Clarksburg.

The appellate case is captioned as Geneva Meloy v. Monitronics
International, Inc., Case No. 18-1770, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Judge Allyson
Kay Duncan of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the District Court's order denying the Plaintiffs' Rule
56(d) motion and granting UTC and Honeywell summary judgment.

The Plaintiffs-Appellants sued UTC and Honeywell under the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA").  Although the
Plaintiffs did not allege that UTC and Honeywell directly violated
the TCPA, they claimed that both companies were vicariously liable
for illegal calls made by telemarketers promoting UTC and Honeywell
products.

On Dec. 19, 2013, the Multidistrict Litigation ("MDL") Panel
consolidated seven class-action lawsuits alleging that ISI, VMS and
other home-security retailers violated the TCPA by making illegal
telemarketing calls and transferred the consolidated case to the
Northern District of West Virginia.  On Feb. 28, 2014, the
Plaintiffs filed a Master Consolidated Complaint, which they twice
amended.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Fee or application to proceed as indigent is due on
      August 10, 2018;

   -- Informal Opening Brief is due on August 6, 2018; and

   -- Informal response brief, if any, is due 14 days after
      informal opening brief is filed.

Party-in-Interest-Appellant GENEVA MELOY, of Kent, Ohio, appears
pro se.[BN]

Defendant-Appellee MONITRONICS INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Texas
corporation, is represented by:

          Courtney Blair Amelung, Esq.
          Toyja E. Kelley, Esq.
          TYDINGS & ROSENBERG, LLP
          1 East Pratt Street
          Baltimore, MD 21202
          Telephone: (410) 752-9700
          Facsimile: (410) 727-5460
          E-mail: camelung@tydingslaw.com
                  tkelley@tydingslaw.com

               - and -

          Scott W. Atherton, Esq.
          Terence Michael Mullen, Esq.
          ATHERTON LAW GROUP, P.A.
          224 Datura Street
          West Palm Beach, FL 33401
          Telephone: (561) 293-2530
          E-mail: Scott@AthertonLG.com
                  Terence@AthertonLG.com

               - and -

          Albert M. Bower, Esq.
          Yesha Hoeppner, Esq.
          Eric L. Samore, Esq.
          SMITH AMUNDSEN, LLC
          150 North Michigan Avenue
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 894 3210
          E-mail: ABower@salawus.com
                  Yhoeppner@salawus.com
                  esamore@salawus.com

               - and -

          Margaret Carlson, Esq.
          CULP & DYER, LLP
          1990 Wittington Place
          Farmers Branch, TX 75234
          Telephone: (972) 277-3612
          E-mail: pcarlson@cdhllp.com

               - and -

          Benjamin Dyer, Esq.
          CULP & DYER, LLP
          222 East Mckinney Street
          Denton, TX 76201
          Telephone: (940) 484-2236
          E-mail: bdyer@cdhllp.com

               - and -

          John G. Farnan, Esq.
          Monica L. Frantz, Esq.
          WESTON HURD LLP
          1301 East Ninth Street
          Cleveland, OH 44114-1862
          Telephone: (216) 241-6602
          E-mail: jfarnan@westonhurd.com
                  mfrantz@westonhurd.com

               - and -

          John Goldmark, Esq.
          Kenneth E. Payson, Esq.
          Ashley Lauren Watkins, Esq.
          DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP
          1201 3rd Avenue
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 757-8068
          E-mail: johngoldmark@dwt.com
                  kenpayson@dwt.com
                  ashleywatkins@dwt.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey Anthony Grove, Esq.
          Jeffrey Alan Holmstrand, Esq.
          GROVE, HOLMSTRAND & DELK, PLLC
          44 1/2 15th Street
          Wheeling, WV 26003
          Telephone: (304) 905-1961
          Facsimile: (304) 230-6610
          E-mail: jholmstrand@fsblaw.com

               - and -

          Richard Benjamin Harper, Esq.
          BAKER BOTTS LLP
          30 Rockefeller Plaza
          New York, NY 10112
          Telephone: (212) 408-2675
          E-mail: richard.harper@bakerbotts.com

               - and -

          Hubert Kim, Esq.
          Frederick W. Kosmo, Jr., Esq.
          Meryl Colle Maneker, Esq.
          WILSON TURNER KOSMO LLP
          550 West C Street
          San Diego, CA 92101-3532
          Telephone: (619) 236-9600
          E-mail: hkim@wilsonturnerkosmo.com
                  fkosmo@wilsonturnerkosmo.com
                  mmaneker@wilsonturnerkosmo.com

               - and -

          James Allen Maines, Esq.
          HOLLAND & KNIGHT, LLC
          1180 West Peachtree Street
          Atlanta, GA 30309-3400
          Telephone: (404) 817-8500
          E-mail: allen.maines@hklaw.com

               - and -

          Diane Babb Maughan, Esq.
          Crawford S. McGivaren, Jr., Esq.
          CABANISS, JOHNSTON, GARDNER, DUMAS & O'NEAL LLP
          1900 1st National Southern Natural Bldg
          Birmingham, AL 35203-0000
          Telephone: (205) 716-5241
          E-mail: dbm@cabaniss.com
                  csm@cabaniss.com

Defendants-Appellees VERSATILE MARKETING SOLUTIONS, INC., d/b/a VMS
Alarms, d/b/a VMS, d/b/a Alliance Security, d/b/a Alliance Home
Protection, a California corporation; ALLIANCE SECURITY, INC.,
d/b/a AH Security, Inc, f/k/a Versatile Marketing Solutions, Inc.,
d/b/a VMS Alarms; JASJIT GOTRA, a/k/a Jay Gotra, individually and
as an Officer of Versatile Marketing Solutions, Inc.; and ALLIANCE
SECURITY LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, are represented
by:

          Niall Anthony Paul, Esq.
          John R. Teare, Jr., Esq.
          SPILMAN, THOMAS & BATTLE, PLLC
          Spilman Center
          300 Kanawha Boulevard, East
          P. O. Box 273
          Charleston, WV 25321-0273
          Telephone: (304) 340-3874
          E-mail: npaul@spilmanlaw.com
                  jteare@spilmanlaw.com

               - and -

          Christina Suzanne Terek, Esq.
          SPILMAN, THOMAS & BATTLE, PLLC
          1233 Main Street
          P. O. Box 831
          Wheeling, WV 26003-0000
          Telephone: (304) 230-6950
          Facsimile: (304) 230-6951
          E-mail: cterek@spilmanlaw.com

               - and -

          Sumner D. Widdoes, Esq.
          GIBBS, GIDEN, LOCHER, TURNER & SENET, LLP
          1880 Century Park East
          Los Angeles, CA 90067-3039
          Telephone: (310) 552-3400
          E-mail: swiddoes@gibbsgiden.com

Defendant-Appellee ALLIANCE SECURITY, INC., d/b/a AH Security,
Inc., f/k/a Versatile Marketing Solutions, Inc., d/b/a VMS Alarms,
is represented by:

          Debra Lee Allen, Esq.
          SPILMAN, THOMAS & BATTLE, PLLC
          P. O. Box 615
          Morgantown, WV 26507-0615
          Telephone: (304) 291-7920
          E-mail: dhovatter@spilmanlaw.com

               - and -

          Chad Gottlieb, Esq.
          DARROWEVERETT LLP
          450 NE 5th Street
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 278-8355
          E-mail: cgottlieb@darroweverett.com

               - and -

          Kevin S. Peterson, Esq.
          PETERSON PALETTA BALICE PLC
          5510 Cascade Road, SE
          Grand Rapids, MI 49546
          Telephone: (616) 957-3540
          E-mail: kevin@petersandpeterspa.com

Defendants-Appellees ALLIANCE SECURITY, INC., d/b/a AH Security,
Inc., f/k/a Versatile Marketing Solutions, Inc., d/b/a VMS Alarms;
and JASJIT GOTRA, a/k/a Jay Gotra, individually and as an Officer
of Versatile Marketing Solutions, Inc., are represented by:

          Shaun E. Swiger, Esq.
          FOLEY & MANSFIELD PLLP
          300 South Grand Avenue
          Los Angeles, CA 90017
          Telephone: (213) 283-2100
          E-mail: sswiger@foleymansfield.com

Defendants-Appellees KEVIN KLINK and JAYSON WALLER are represented
by:

          Harry F. Bell, Jr., Esq.
          BELL LAW FIRM
          P. O. Box 1723
          Charleston, WV 25326-1723
          Telephone: (304) 345-1700
          Facsimile: (304) 345-1715
          E-mail: hfbell@belllaw.com

Defendant-Appellee ALLIANCE SECURITY is represented by:

          James V. Coutts, Esq.
          HARRIS, MARTIN, JONES, P.A.
          49 Music Square, West
          Nashville, TN 37203
          Telephone: (615) 321-5400
          E-mail: jcoutts6110@gmail.com

               - and -

          Louise Marcus, Esq.
          MARCUS LAW OFFICE
          33 College Hill Road
          Warwick, RI 02886
          Telephone: (401) 331-3300
          E-mail: lmarcus@verizon.net

               - and -

          John R. Teare, Jr., Esq.
          SPILMAN, THOMAS & BATTLE, PLLC
          Spilman Center
          300 Kanawha Boulevard, East
          P. O. Box 273
          Charleston, WV 25321-0273
          Telephone: (304) 340-3800
          E-mail: jteare@spilmanlaw.com


MDL 2665: Court Unseals Class Certification Pleadings
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court, District of Columbia, granted in
part and denied in part Plaintiffs' Motion to Unseal Opening Class
Certification Papers in the case captioned IN RE: McCORMICK &
COMPANY, INC., PEPPER PRODUCTS MARKETING AND SALES PRACTICES
LITIGATION. This Document Relates to: ALL CONSUMER CASES, MDL
Docket No. 2665, Misc. No. 15-1825 (ESH)(D.D.C.).

The Plaintiffs, who are purchasers of defendant McCormick's black
pepper, allege in their complaint that the defendants had a
statutory duty to refrain from unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in the promotion and sale of McCormick black pepper or
store-branded black pepper and that they violated this duty by
selling black pepper in non-transparent containers containing
non-functional slack-fill.

The Plaintiffs moved to certify three multistate classes under the
consumer protection and unjust enrichment laws of more than thirty
states and the District of Columbia, claiming that McCormick and
Wal-Mart violated these laws when they knowingly sold black pepper
in non-transparent containers containing non-functional slack fill,
intending to minimize or eliminate consumers' ability to notice the
reduced quantity of pepper by maintaining the same price and
container size.

The Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Unseal Opening Class Certification
Papers, arguing that the defendants' confidentiality designations
as to materials produced during discovery are overly broad, and
since defendants have failed to justify these designations, all
documents should be unsealed and un-redacted in full.

Under United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293 (D.C. Cir. 1980),
courts consider six factors that may act to overcome the
presumption in favor of public access to judicial proceedings:
(1) the need for public access to the documents at issue; (2) the
extent of previous public access to the documents; (3) the fact
that someone has objected to disclosure, and the identity of that
person; (4) the strength of any property and privacy interests
asserted; (5) the possibility of prejudice to those opposing
disclosure; and (6) the purposes for which the documents were
introduced during the judicial proceedings.

The plaintiffs moved to unseal the class certification pleadings
either through their motion to unseal or by opposing defendants'
motions to seal. The Plaintiffs also oppose Wal-Mart's motion to
file under seal its opposition to the motion to unseal.
The Hubbard factors weigh heavily in favor of unsealing each of
these pleadings.

The Defendants make only conclusory arguments about the proprietary
nature of the redacted information in the class certification
pleadings. To carry their burden under Hubbard, defendants must
specifically identify the commercially sensitive information
contained in the redactions and explain why its disclosure would
harm their competitive standing.

Here, the defendants fail to specifically identify commercially
sensitive information, but instead, they make overbroad requests to
maintain information in confidence that is relevant to the Court's
decision-making, and which should therefore be presumptively
accessible to the public.

Based on the record before it, the Court concludes that the Hubbard
factors favor disclosure of the class certification pleadings. The
first factor is the need for public access to the documents at
issue. Pleadings are the clearest expression of relevant evidence
and argumentation on any given disputed issue and necessarily
influence a Court's decision.  The second factor considers prior
public access.  Some redacted information is already available
through the Court's prior opinion. For example, the motion for
class certification quotes extensively from previously disclosed
language.  The Defendants make no effort to distinguish what is
publicly available from what is not. So, factors one and two weigh
in favor of disclosure. By virtue of defendants' opposition to the
motion to unseal and various motions to seal, the third factor,
which considers the identity of a party objecting to disclosure,
weighs in favor of closure.  

Hubbard's fourth factor considers the strength of the property and
privacy interests asserted in the class certification papers,  and
points in favor of disclosure in large part because neither
defendant gives any reason why particular redactions in the
pleadings are necessary. The fifth considers whether disclosure of
the documents will lead to prejudice in future litigation to the
party seeking the seal. Wal-Mart does not address this factor and
McCormick argues that it favors McCormick "because there is no
prejudice to Plaintiffs." The correct question is whether the
defendants will be prejudiced in future litigation if the class
certification pleadings are unsealed. Nothing suggests the
defendants will be prejudiced.

The sixth factor looks to the purposes for which the documents were
introduced during the judicial proceedings. Though documents
obtained through discovery are afforded a stronger presumption of
privacy, briefing relating to a potentially dispositive motion that
is intended to play a crucial role in a court's analysis should be
accessible to the public unless an overriding privacy interest
controls.  Accordingly, the fourth, fifth, and sixth factors weigh
in favor of disclosing the parties' class certification briefing in
full.
Given the weight of the Hubbard factors and the defendants' failure
to identify any specific information in the pleadings that might
cause them competitive harm, the Court will unseal the class
certification pleadings.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 11, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion is available  https://tinyurl.com/y7t3lwad from
Leagle.com.

RHONDA DUPLER, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew N. Friedman --
afriedman@cohenmilstein.com -- COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL PLLC,
Elizabeth A. Fegan -- beth@hbsslaw.com -- HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL
SHAPIRO, LLP & Jeffrey I. Carton -- jcarton@denleacarton.com --
DENLEA & CARTON LLP.

HOLLY MARSH, Plaintiff, represented by Michael T. Fraser --
mfraser@saxongilmore.com -- FRASER LAW FIRM, P.C. & Elizabeth A.
Fegan -- beth@hbsslaw.com -- HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO, LLP.

MCCORMICK & COMPANY, INC., Defendant, represented by David H.
Bamberger -- david.bamberger@dlapiper.com -- DLA PIPER LLP & Edward
S. Scheideman -- edward.scheideman@dlapiper.com -- DLA PIPER LLP.

WAL-MART STORES, INC., Defendant, represented by Andrew G. Klevorn
-- andrew.klevorn@kattenlaw.com -- KATTEN MUCHIN ROSENMAN LLP.

PUBLIX SUPER MARKETS, INC., Defendant, represented by David H.
Bamberger , DLA PIPER LLP.

MDL 2785: Court Compels Humana to Comply with Subpoena
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Kansas
granting Class Plaintiffs' Amended Motion to Compel Compliance with
Subpoena Directed to Non-Party Humana, Inc,  in the case captioned
IN RE: EpiPen (Epinephrine Injection, USP) Marketing, Sales
Practices and Antitrust Litigation. This Document Applies to All
Cases, MDL No. 2785, Case No. 17-md-2785-DDC-TJJ (D. Kan.).

The Plaintiffs served a Rule 45 subpoena on Humana. Under Rule
45(d)(2)(b), Humana's deadline for objections was 14 days after
service of the subpoena. Counsel for Humana contacted the
Plaintiffs' counsel to request an extension of the response and
production deadlines. Plaintiffs agreed to an extension as long as
Humana committed to begin producing responsive materials. Humana
served its objections and counsel conferred five days later.

The Plaintiffs assert this Court has jurisdiction to decide this
motion, while Humana contends the motion should be heard in the
Western District of Kentucky, the district that includes the place
for compliance.

In issuing a subpoena, a party must take reasonable steps to avoid
imposing undue burden or expense on a person subject to the
subpoena. Non-parties responding to Rule 45 subpoenas generally
receive heightened protection from discovery abuses.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 governs both motions to compel
compliance with and motions to quash a subpoena served on a
non-party. Under Rule 45(d)(2)(B), if the entity commanded to
produce documents serves written objections to the subpoena, the
serving party may seek compliance by filing a motion to compel
production of the documents. If the non-party wishes to challenge
the subpoena, it does so by filing a motion to quash.

The Plaintiffs assert that as the MDL transferee court, this Court
has jurisdiction to rule on their motion to compel. Humana
disagrees and although it does not say so directly, hints that the
authorities Plaintiffs cite are no longer good law after the 2013
amendment to Rule 45.

The basis for ruling that an MDL transferee court has authority to
rule on a motion to compel in this situation (where a Rule 45
subpoena is issued by the MDL court but compliance is sought in
another district) is not Rule 45 or Rule 37. Instead, courts find
authority in 28 U.S.C. Section 1407, the statute authorizing the
MDL Panel to transfer civil actions involving one or more common
questions of fact for coordinated pre-trial proceedings. Section
1407(b) expressly empowers an MDL court to exercise the powers of a
district judge in any district for the purpose of conducting
pre-trial depositions. The statute's remedial purpose of
eliminating the potential for conflicting contemporaneous pretrial
rulings would be frustrated if the MDL court could not entertain
motions to compel.

In this case, the Class Plaintiffs have served subpoenas on
numerous non-parties, each containing the same requests. To enable
this Court to fully exercise its power under Section 1407, it is
necessary to assume enforcement powers in relation to these
subpoenas. Doing so is also consistent with the transfer order in
this case wherein the MDL panel noted that centralization will
eliminate duplicative discovery and prevent inconsistent pre-trial
rulings. As the Court presiding over the MDL, this Court has
authority to decide the motion to compel.

The Complaint's allegations make relevant a number of topics for
discovery, including the epinephrine auto-injector (EAI) market,
EAI device coverage and formulary placement or exclusion, usage,
claims, consumer costs, demand and competitive conditions, and
EAI-related payments and costs along the distribution and
pharmaceutical supply chain. As Plaintiffs describe it, relevant
discovery subjects also include documents and information related
to EAI manufacturer marketing, educational and presentation
materials, concerning their and competitor EAI devices as it is
alleged that Mylan engaged in a massive misinformation campaign
concerning EpiPen and competitor EAIs directed at the healthcare
industry and consumers.

Given the Plaintiffs' allegations, the Court finds relevant the
categories of requests included in the Plaintiffs' subpoena. As the
Plaintiffs describe their requests, they include: (i) rebate and
formulary information, including agreements, communications and
other deliberative materials relating to those agreements; and (ii)
documents concerning consideration paid or received related to the
marketing, distribution, or sale of any EAI Drug Device.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 11, 2018 Memorandum
and Order is available https://tinyurl.com/ybvjrrxx from
Leagle.com.

All Plaintiffs, In Re, represented by Lynn Lincoln Sarko --
lsarko@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback, pro hac vice, Paul J.
Geller -- Rgeller@rgrdlaw.com -- Robins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP,
pro hac vice, Rex A. Sharp -- rsharp@midwest-law.com -- Rex A.
Sharp, PA, Ryan C. Hudson -- rhudson@midwest-law.com -- Rex A.
Sharp, PA & Warren T. Burns -- wburns@burnscharest.com -- Burns
Charest LLP, pro hac vice.

Mylan N.V., Defendant, represented by Adam K. Levin --
adam.levin@​hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells US LLP, pro hac
vice, Benjamin Frederick Holt -- benjamin.holt@​hoganlovells.com
-- Hogan Lovells US LLP, Brian C. Fries -- bfries@lathropgage.com
-- Lathrop Gage LLP, Brian R. Richichi --
brian.richichi@​hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells US LLP, Carolyn
Anne DeLone -- carrie.delone@​hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells
US LLP, Chad E. Blomberg -- cblomberg@lathropgage.com -- Lathrop
Gage, LLP.

MID PENN: Board of Directors Faces Class Action Over Merger
-----------------------------------------------------------
Shelby White, writing for Central Penn Business Journal, reports
that members of Mid Penn Bancorp, Inc. and First Priority Financial
Corp.'s boards of directors are facing a class-action lawsuit over
a proposed merger between the two banks.

The banks announced in January that they planned to merge, with
First Priority being folded into Mid Penn.

The lawsuit was filed by First Priority shareholder Paul Parshall
in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County, according to a
Securities and Exchange Commission filing made by Mid Penn. The
suit states class claims on behalf of all First Priority
shareholders.

Mr. Parshall could not be reached for comment. In a lawsuit
Mr. Parshall filed last year against Royal Bancshares of
Pennsylvania Inc., he was represented by attorneys at Delaware firm
Rigrodsky & Long P.A., which has pursued other merger-related
lawsuits.

The merging banks dismissed the suit.

"Mid Penn and First Priority believe that the lawsuit is without
merit as there are substantial legal and factual defenses to the
claims asserted and intend to vigorously defend the lawsuit," Mid
Penn said in its Securities and Exchange Commission filing.

Representatives from Mid Penn declined to comment further. First
Priority officials were not immediately available for comment.

The suit comes as mergers, often a target for legal action, are
attracting fewer lawsuits.

The rate of mergers-and-acquisitions litigation has declined in
recent years, according to a recent Cornerstone Research study. The
average number of lawsuits per deal in both 2017 and 2016 was 2.8
-- the lowest average in 10 years, the study said.

According to Mid Penn's SEC filing, Mr. Parshall's suit alleges
that First Priority directors breached their fiduciary duty through
misstatements and omissions in a joint proxy statement Mid Penn and
First Priority filed June 19 with the Securities and Exchange
Commission.

It also claims that the merger consideration is "inadequate,"
meaning that the agreement is unfair.

Additionally, the suit contends that Mid Penn aided and abetted the
First Priority directors' alleged breaches of fiduciary duty.

The lawsuit seeks to stop the merger, or if it is completed,
rescission or revocation of the merger, rescissory damages,
unspecified damages and costs of the lawsuit, including attorneys'
and experts' fees.

Rescissory damages are awarded when courts find that a merger is
completed at an unfair price. They are also a possible remedy for a
breach of the duty of loyalty -- including cases where directors of
a corporation have put their personal interests above those of the
stockholders'. The damages are determined by the fair value of the
plaintiffs' stocks minus any amount already received in the merger,
according to the Washington University Law Review.

Headquartered in Millersburg, Mid Penn has assets of approximately
$1.4 billion and 29 branches in Cumberland, Dauphin, Fayette,
Lancaster, Luzerne, Northumberland, Schuylkill and Westmoreland
counties.

According to its most recent earnings report, Mid Penn had net
income of $1 million in the first quarter of 2018, down from $2
million in its first quarter of 2017. Results included nearly $1.7
million in expenses stemming from the bank's acquisition of The
Scottdale Bank & Trust Co., which closed in January, and the
pending merger with First Priority.

First Priority is headquartered in Malvern and has approximately
$615 million in assets. The bank has seven locations in Chester,
Berks, Montgomery and Bucks counties. According to its most recent
earnings report, First Priority had net income of $762,000 in the
first quarter of 2018, down from $782,000 in the first quarter of
2017. [GN]

MIDLAND FUNDING: 8th Cir. Partly Reverses Dismissal of FDCPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, reversed the
District Court's judgment granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned David Coyne, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Midland Funding LLC;
Midland Credit Management, Inc., Defendants, Messerli & Kramer
P.A., Defendant-Appellee, No. 17-2826, (8th Cir.).

Coyne filed a putative class action against Midland Funding and the
two debt collectors under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,
claiming they used a false, deceptive, or misleading representation
or means,  and an unfair or unconscionable means, in attempting to
collect the credit-card debt when they told him, among other
things, that he owed interest on the debt's principal balance.

When Midland Funding and the debt collectors moved the district
court to dismiss the amended complaint for failing to state a
claim, the district court granted the motion and dismissed the
action on the ground that Coyne failed to allege that any statement
in the collection letters was not only false but materially so.

The district court explained why some of the statements Coyne had
contested did not violate the FDCPA, but it did not discuss whether
he had pleaded a claim based on the charging and attempted
collection of compound interest that state law did not allow.

The Court reviews de novo a district court's dismissal of a
complaint for failing to state a claim, accepting the factual
allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff.

Whether Coyne stated a FDCPA claim when he alleged that since the
debt's principal balance included contractual interest and since
compounded interest upon interest was not expressly authorized by
the agreement creating the debt, the interest on the principal
balance that Messerli's letter tried to collect, and said that he
owed, was compound interest in violation of Minn. Stat. Section
334.01

It is undisputed that Minnesota law governs Coyne's alleged
credit-card debt. Minn. Stat. Section 334.01(1) provides that in
the computation of interest upon any instrument or agreement,
interest shall not be compounded unless there is a contract to pay
such interest.

Messerli argues that it did not violate the FDCPA since the amount
of interest stated in its letter to Coyne was contractually
authorized.

Since the amended complaint and the documents it necessarily
embraces do not indicate the interest rates that apply to the debt,
we have no occasion to consider Messerli's argument that a debt
collector may try to collect compound interest which state law does
not allow without materially violating the FDCPA so long as the
total amount of interest sought does not exceed the maximum amount
permitted under the debtor's contract. Messerli contends the
district court held that requesting less interest than the amount
owed does not materially violate the FDCPA, but that is simply not
correct. Nothing in the district court's orders granting the motion
to dismiss and denying Coyne leave to file a motion to reconsider
supports Messerli's representation.

At oral argument, Messerli further asserted that the district court
had correctly noted that its letter to Coyne was not a collection
letter, but Messerli errs again: The district court did not make
that observation, and it was not even in a position at the pleading
stage to do so since that observation would have conflicted not
only with the allegations in the amended complaint, but also with
the declaration printed on the letter's face that it is from a debt
collector and is an attempt to collect a debt.

The Court reverses the judgment of the district court only as to
Coyne's claim against Messerli that it violated 15 U.S.C. Sections
1692e and 1692f when it attempted to collect, and represented he
owed, compound interest on the debt in violation of Minnesota law.
The Court remands the case for further proceedings on that claim.

A full-text copy of the Eighth Circuit's July 16, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yanxcfym from Leagle.com.

Russell S. Ponessa , for Defendant-Not Party.

Derrick Neal Weber , for Defendant-Appellee.

Margaret Ann Santos , for Defendant-Not Party.

Anthony Patrick Chester , for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Robert L. Hyde , for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Joshua B. Swigart , for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Seyed Abbas Kazerounian , for Plaintiff-Appellant.

MIDLAND FUNDING: K. Smith's Suit Remanded to Ark. State Court
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Timothy L. Brooks of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Arkansas, Harrison Division, remanded the case, KANDIS
K. SMITH, Plaintiff, v. MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC and MIDLAND CREDIT
MANAGEMENT, INC., Defendants, Case No. 3:18-CV-03044 (W.D. Ark.),
to the Circuit Court of Carroll County, Arkansas, for further
disposition.

The Defendants removed the instant matter to the Court from the
Circuit Court of Carroll County, Arkansas, on April 19, 2018.  The
notice of removal stated that the basis for federal jurisdiction
was complete diversity of citizenship, plus an amount in
controversy exceeding $75,000.

The Complaint filed in state court asserted a single cause of
action for violations of the Arkansas Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, and requested statutory damages of up to $1,000 per
Defendant (for a total of $2,000) and reasonable attorney's fees
and costs.  The Complaint did not disclose a claim for actual
damages suffered by the Plaintiff as a result of the Defendants'
allegedly deceptive acts in attempting to collect an old debt.

Now pending before the Court are the Plaintiff's Motion to Remand
and the Brief in Support.  The Defendants have filed a collective
Response in Opposition to remand.  In the Motion, the Plaintiff
asserts that amount in controversy is, at most, $2,000 in statutory
damages, plus a reasonable amount of attorney's fees and costs.
Although she brings her case in the form of a putative class
action, the amount in controversy for purposes of establishing
federal jurisdiction may only be measured as to her individual
claims, and cannot be aggregated with the claims of any putative
class members.  Accordingly, the Plaintiff argues that it is
implausible to assume, as the Defendants have, that the amount of
attorney's fees attributable to her individual case will exceed
$73,000 and meet the jurisdictional minimum.

The Defendants respond, first, that the Motion to Remand is
premature, and they ask for time to conduct jurisdictional
discovery into the issue of the amount in controversy.  The Court
rejects this request because the amount of statutory damages
demanded by the Plaintiff is a set, capped amount, and no amount of
jurisdictional discovery will shed light on the issue of what a
potential, reasonable attorney's fee will be as to Plaintiff's
individual claim.  Next, they contend that it is quite plausible
that the Plaintiff will be awarded attorney's fees and costs in
excess of $73,000 on her individual claim.  In support of this
argument, they cite the Court to an unreported case from the Middle
District of Florida called Baez v. LTD Financial Services, L.P.

In Baez, the district court certified a class consisting of 33,993
persons who alleged that the defendant collection company violated
the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.  After a jury
trial, class counsel on behalf of all class members petitioned the
court for a collective attorney's fee of $186,450.  As of yet, the
court has deferred ruling on the petition for fees until after the
appellate court has ruled on the merits.  Not to be deterred, the
Defendants in the case at bar argue that Baez and the instant case
are so similar that this Court may find that the future award of
fees in the case will, to a legal certainty, and notwithstanding
Plaintiff's protestations to the contrary, exceed $73,000.

Judge Brooks finds that the Defendants have failed to establish
that the minimum amount in controversy has been met and that the
Court should continue to exert subject matter jurisdiction in the
case.  Assuming without deciding that the minimum amount in
controversy may be calculated by estimating the potential future
attorney's fee that would be awarded at the end of the litigation,
the Judge finds that a fee in excess of $73,000 is wildly
disproportionate to the Plaintiff's claimed damages capped at
$2,000, and is not supported by the outcome in Baez.  The class
attorneys in Baez made a request for fees for $186,450 on behalf of
the entire class.  The class in Baez exceeded 30,000 members.  

The Eighth Circuit has previously held that fees cannot be
aggregated to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement and must
be determined on a pro rata basis.  Therefore, even if the Judge
were to estimate a pro rata fee in the Baez case, based on the
aggregate fee demand and the number of class members, there is no
plausible way that the pro rata fee would approach $1,000, let
alone $73,000.  The Defendants have therefore failed to meet their
burden of proof that the amount in controversy in this case exceeds
$75,000.

Accordingly, as it appears to a legal certainty that the claim at
issue is for far less than the jurisdictional amount, Judge Brooks
granted the Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, and directed the Clerk of
Court to immediately remand the matter to the Circuit Court of
Carroll County, Arkansas, for further disposition.  The Judge
declined the Defendants' alternative request to condition remand
upon the Plaintiff and her counsel signing a binding stipulation as
to the potential award of attorney's fees and costs.

The Judge mooted the Motion to Certify Questions to the Arkansas
Supreme Court in view of the Court's lack of jurisdiction over this
case and decision to remand the matter to state court.  He
preserved the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for the state court.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 19, 2018 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/7CNYoS from Leagle.com.

Kandis K. Smith, on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Corey D. McGaha --
cmcgaha@crowdermcgaha.com -- Crowder McGaha, LLP, Daniel Turner --
Dan@arnoldbatsonturner.com -- Arnold, Batson, Turner & Turner,
P.A., Todd M. Turner -- todd@abtt.us -- Arnold, Batson, Turner &
Turner, P.A. & William Thomas Crowder -- wcrowder@crowdermcgaha.com
-- CROWDER MCGAHA LLP.

Midland Funding, LLC & Midland Credit Management, Inc., Defendants,
represented by Jason B. Tompkins -- jtompkins@balch.com -- Balch
Bingham LLP & Michael N. Shannon -- mshannon@qgtlaw.com --
Quattlebaum, Grooms, Tull & Burrow PLLC.

MONTANA: Court Enters Final Judgment in Prison Conditions Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN THE MATTER OF LITIGATION RELATING TO CONDITIONS OF
CONFINEMENT AT MONTANA STATE PRISON. THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO:
Terry LANGFORD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Gov. Steve BULLOCK, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. CV 93-46-H-JCL (D. Mont.), Magistrate Judge
Jeremiah C. Lynch of the U.S. District Court for the Distirct of
Montana, Helena Division, entered Judgment in accordance with the
Class Action Settlement Agreement signed by the parties on Feb. 23,
2018, and gave final approval of the settlement reflected therein.

On June 19, 2018, the parties filed their consent to the Magistrate
Judge's authority over the lawsuit.  Therefore, the Court's
Findings and Recommendation entered June 18, 2018 is withdrawn.

Further, based upon the parties' revised Class Action Settlement
Agreement, the parties' Joint Motion for Final Approval of Revised
Class Action Settlement, and the hearing conducted on June 8, 2018,
the Magistrate Judge overruled the objections to the Class Action
Settlement Agreement filed in the case.  She entered Judgment in
accordance with the Settlement Agreement signed by the parties on
Feb. 23, 2018, and gave final approval of the settlement reflected
therein.

If necessary, the Magistrate Judge will appoint a Special Master
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(a)(1)(B) to address unresolved fees
and expense issues.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 19, 2018 Order and Judgment is
available at https://is.gd/9daS3Y from Leagle.com.

Terry Langford, James E. Ball, James Peterschick, Jeff J.
Delaphiano, Trueman LeRoy Conrad, Anthel LaVan Brown, Dan Mason &
Rudy Meissner, on behalf of themselves and all others presently
incarcerated or who will in the future be incarcerated at the
Montana State Prison,, Plaintiffs, represented by Amy F. Robertson,
CIVIL RIGHTS EDUCATION AND ENFORCEMENT CENTER, pro hac vice, Eric
G. Balaban, NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT & Alexander H. Rate --
alex@kugelmanlaw.com -- RATE LAW OFFICE.

Marc Racicot, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of
Montana,, Rick Day, in his official capacity as Director,
Department of Corrections and Human Services, James "Mickey&qu
Gamble, in his official capacity as the Administrator of the
Corrections Division of the Montana Department of Corrections and
Human Services,, Mike Mahoney, in his official capacity as Deputy
Warden, Montana State Prison, & State of Montana, Department of
Corrections, Defendants, represented by Colleen E. Ambrose, MONTANA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS.

MORGANS HOTEL: Faces Luis Seirra Suit in S.D. Florida
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Morgans Hotel Group
Co., LLC. The case is captioned as LUIS SIERRA, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. MORGANS HOTEL
GROUP CO., LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-22800-FAM (S.D. Fla.,
July 12, 2018). The lawsuit alleges violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act. The case is assigned to Judge Federico A.
Moreno.

Morgans Hotel Group Co., LLC, an integrated lifestyle hospitality
company, owns, develops, operates, and licenses boutique hotels.
The company was founded in 1983 and is headquartered in New York,
New York. As of November 30, 2016, Morgans Hotel Group Co. operates
as a subsidiary of SBE Entertainment Group, LLC. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jessica Lynn Kerr, Esq.
          JESSICA L KERR PA
          200 SE 6th Street, Suite 504
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 282-1858
          Facsimile: (844) 786-3694
          E-mail: service@advocacypa.com


NESTLE: Court Dismisses Class Action Over Bottled Spring Water
--------------------------------------------------------------
John Breslin, writing for Legal Newsline, reports that a lawsuit
claiming Nestle bottled water produced and distributed as "100
percent spring water" is a fraud has been dismissed by a court
because federal law preempts any action citing state statutes.

The class action, filed in the U.S. District Court of Connecticut,
claimed that the company named its product Poland Spring even
though it contained "not one drop . . . from a water source that
complies with the Food and Drug Administration definition of
'spring water,'" according to the complaint.

But the action failed in the District of Connecticut because any
state action is preempted by the federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics
Act (FDCA), which gives the Federal Drug Administration sole power
to take such a false advertising case, the court ruled
May 17.

The FDCA prohibits private actions for violations and under the
Act, states have to use identical language if writing their own
statutes.

While the plaintiffs, initially 11 residents of the Northeast but
joined by others, have been told they can amend and refile, it is a
strategy that is unlikely to work, according to
Lawrence Weinstein, an advertising law expert with the Proskauer
Rose legal firm.

Mr. Weinstein cautioned that this is a very narrow ruling that
relates specifically to the regulations covering spring water.

"Unless overturned it may spell the death knell for (private)
lawsuits over spring water, but that is a minuscule number of
cases," Mr. Weinstein told Legal Newsline.

The attorney described preemption as not a favored defense in many
cases, that it is "entirely fact-dependent, and by looking
carefully at the facts and the statutory language of the applicable
federal law."

"But it is an Interesting reminder to practitioners that sometimes
the doctrine of preemption is available," Weinstein said.

District Judge Jeffrey Alker Meyer made it clear his ruling was not
a judgment on the underlying claims.

"Although I reject many of Nestle's arguments, I agree with Nestle
that plaintiffs' claims are all preempted by federal law," he wrote
in the order granting the motion to dismiss.

Alexander Schmidt, a lawyer for the plaintiffs, revised the claims
in a filing June 15.

Under federal law, spring water must be sourced from underground
with a "natural force causing the water to flow to the surface,"
the ruling states. [GN]

NEW ZEALAND: Bella Vista Residents Sue Tauranga City Council
------------------------------------------------------------
Scott Yeoman, writing for nzherald.co.nz, reports that an Auckland
lawyer who filed a class action on behalf of Bella Vista residents
in Tauranga says the city council has been slower than expected to
front up with an offer.

Tauranga City Council was served with the legal proceedings late on
June 1. Five days later, councillors unanimously voted in principle
to buy the 21 Bella Vista Homes which were part of the failed
subdivision at The Lakes.

The council said on June 6 that it would look to begin negotiations
with the homeowners to achieve full and final settlement. [GN]


NHL: Ex-Players Won't Appeal Class Action Dismissal
---------------------------------------------------
Rick Westhead, writing for TSN, reports that a lawyer for former
players who have filed lawsuits against the National Hockey League
said plaintiffs in the case would not appeal a judge's July 13
decision to deny the players' motion to proceed as a class action.

It will now be up to players to pursue their own claims against the
league, said Michael Cashman, a Minnesota lawyer for former NHL
players including Joe Murphy.

"There's no more hiding in the back room," Mr. Cashman said in an
interview on July 24. "Players need to be aware that if they want
to seek any relief they are going to have to file their own case."

Mr. Cashman said the several dozen plaintiffs lawyers who have
worked on the case support a request made by an attorney
representing the family of deceased NHL player Steve Montador to
proceed with their lawsuit against the league as soon as possible,
using the case as a potential bellwether.

"The Montadors have got a strong case, more so than someone who's
saying I have symptoms and I don't know what I'm going to have,"
Mr. Cashman said. "Montador is a different situation and there's no
reason why they should delay."

Montador's family filed a lawsuit against the league in December
2015. Montador played for six NHL teams and died in February 2015
at the age of 35 of an undisclosed cause at his home in
Mississauga, Ont. A post-mortem exam found that he was suffering
from chronic traumatic encephalopathy, or CTE, a degenerative brain
disease that's been linked to repeated brain trauma.

Montador played 641 games with Calgary, Florida, Anaheim, Boston,
Buffalo and Chicago and was involved in 69 NHL fights, according to
his family's lawsuit. He suffered at least three concussions in six
months in 2003, at least four in nine months in 2010 and at least
four in a three-month period in 2012, the lawsuit alleges.

The lawsuit also claims Montador suffered from significant memory
issues, sleeping problems, chronic pain, a substance abuse problem,
photosensitivity, mood and behavioural changes, anxiety and
depression.

A status hearing to decide what will happen next in the NHL lawsuit
is expected to take place in the next few weeks.

The NHL's legal issues related to concussions date back to at least
November 2013, when a group of former players first filed a
proposed class-action lawsuit against the NHL. The players argued
that the league failed to keep them reasonably safe and did not
provide them with important medical information about the long-term
ramifications of brain injuries.

If U.S. District Judge Susan Nelson had approved the case as a
class action, all 5,000 retired NHL players, as well as some
families of former players who have died, would have automatically
become plaintiffs in the case.

Now, with the class-action status denied, players will have to come
forward individually to pursue their cases. It's possible that
players will be required to file cases in the U.S. states where
they now live, Mr. Cashman said.

"Players also need to understand that there's a statute of
limitations that may now be running," he said. "It works
differently from state to state but generally plaintiffs have a
limited period of time to file a lawsuit after they knew or ought
to have known that they have a potential claim. When there's a
class-action decision pending, that time tolling is put on hold.
With this decision, it moves ahead."

Mr. Cashman said that lawyers who begin individual lawsuits against
NHL teams or the league itself would have access to information and
material already obtained in connection with the proposed
class-action lawsuit in Minnesota.

"What's really important is that here's action by players who
believe they have a case," Mr. Cashman said.

While more than 4,000 former NFL players joined a class-action
lawsuit against the NFL, fewer than 200 former NHL players joined
the NHL concussion lawsuit. Mr. Cashman said he's still trying to
understand why more former NHL players haven't been willing to join
the lawsuit.

Mr. Cashman said prospective clients have told him they're worried
that they wouldn't be invited to alumni events if they joined the
lawsuit against the NHL.

"These guys are afraid," he said. "In football, players aren't in
the NFL system until they are drafted by an NFL team after college.
That's different in hockey where you have to develop skating and
stickhandling skills and players are sent away at 14 to play junior
hockey and they are totally indoctrinated, told [to] 'listen to
your coach. Do whatever he says.' In the NFL, that doesn't
happen."

"Also it seems like in Canada, it's more like you take your lumps
and do it yourself for better or worse. In the U.S., people exposed
to more media, especially in the past 20 or 30 years and you've got
rights for just about everything and people are trained to pursue
them."

An NHL spokesman did not respond to an email requesting comment.
[GN]

NUVASIVE INC: Class Settlement in B. Mauss's Suit Has Prelim OK
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminarily Approval of
Class Action Settlement in the case captioned BRAD MAUSS and DANIEL
POPOV, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. NUVASIVE, INC.; ALEXIS V. LUKIANOV; and MICHAEL J.
LAMBERT, Defendants, Case No. 13cv2005 JM (JLB)(S.D. Cal.)

The Court granted the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification,
appointing Plaintiffs Brad Mauss and Daniel Popov as Class
Representatives, appointing Lead Counsel Pomerantz as Class Counsel
and Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP as Liaison Counsel, and certifying
the following class:

     All persons other than the Defendants who purchased or
otherwise acquired NuVasive securities between October 22, 2008 and
July 30, 2013, inclusive, and who were damaged thereby. Excluded
from the Class are any parties who are or have been the Defendants
in this litigation, the present and former officers and directors
of NuVasive and any subsidiary thereof, members of their immediate
families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors or
assigns and any entity in which any current or former Defendant has
or had a controlling interest.

The Court preliminarily approves the Settlement and the proposed
Plan of Allocation as fair, reasonable and adequate, pending a
final settlement and fairness hearing.  The Court preliminarily
finds that the proposed Settlement should be approved as: (i) the
result of serious, extensive arm's-length and non-collusive
negotiations; (ii) falling within a range of reasonableness
warranting final approval; (iii) having no obvious deficiencies;
(iv) not improperly granting preferential treatment to the
Plaintiffs or segments of the Class; and (v) warranting notice of
the proposed Settlement at the Settlement Hearing

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 11, 2018 Order is
available  https://tinyurl.com/y8375j27 from Leagle.com.

Brad Mauss, Individually and on Behalf of All Other Persons
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Adam G. Kurtz --
agkurtz@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice, Emma Gilmore --
egilmore@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice, Jennifer Pafiti
-- jpafiti@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, Justin Solomon Nematzadeh
-- jnematzadeh@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice, Lionel Z.
Glancy -- lglancy@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP,
Louis Ludwig -- lcludwig@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice,
Michael M. Goldberg , Goldberg Law PC, Michele S. Carino --
mcarino@carinolaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP &Jeremy A. Lieberman --
jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice.

Nuvasive, Inc. & Michael J. Lambert, Defendants, represented by
Kellin Maurine Chatfield -- kellin.chatfield@dlapiper.com -- DLA
Piper LLP, Robert W. Brownlie --robert.brownlie@dlapiper.com -- DLA
Piper LLP & Noah A. Katsell -- noah.katsell@dlapiper.com -- DLA
Piper LLP.

Alexis V. Lukianov, Defendant, represented by Raymond Winters
Stockstill -- beaustockstill@paulhastings.com -- Paul Hastings LLP.

OAKHURST DAIRY: $5MM Settlement in Drivers' Suit Has Final Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHRISTOPHER O'CONNOR, et al., Plaintiffs, v. OAKHURST
DAIRY, et al., Defendants, Case No. 2:14-00192-NT (D. Me.), Judge
Nancy Torresen of the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine
granted (i) the final settlement of all claims in the matter, (i)
the service award to the five Named Plaintiffs, and (iii) the
requested attorneys' fees and costs.

The case concerns claims by Oakhurst Route Sales Drivers who
pursued their claims for unpaid wages, other damages, costs, and
attorneys' fees, on their own behalf and on behalf of other Route
Sales Drivers assigned to an Oakhurst location in Maine between May
5, 2008 and Aug. 29, 2012.

In May 2014, the Plaintiffs filed suit against Oakhurst and Dairy
Farmers of America, Inc.  Summary judgment was granted for the
Defendants on the Plaintiffs' state law claims based on the
statutory interpretation of a Maine law exemption to overtime.
That judgment was reversed on appeal, and the parties conducted
substantial discovery including depositions of all the five Named
Plaintiffs.  

The Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification, and the
Defendants filed a motion to decline supplemental jurisdiction.
The parties mediated the Plaintiffs' claims and separately
participated in a judicial settlement conference, and they agreed
to settle their dispute in advance of trial.

The total amount of the settlement in the case is $5 million
(although the Defendants have agreed to pay the employer share of
wage-related taxes for payments made to Settlement Class Members
under the Settlement Agreement).  According to the Plaintiffs'
damages expert, the $5 million settlement represents more than 90%
of the $5,452,686.93 in total alleged overtime damages for the 122
Settlement Class Members.  If the settlement is approved, the
Settlement Class Members will receive, on average, more than
$26,000 each; more than 20 will receive greater than $50,000 each;
and none will receive less than $100.

The Class Counsel has proposed, and the Defendants do not object
to, service payments to the five Named Plaintiffs in the following
amounts: Chris O'Connor ($15,000); James Adam Cox ($12,000); Robert
McNally ($10,000); Kevin O'Connor ($6,500); and Michael Fraser
($6,500).  The Plaintiffs' counsel has requested one third of the
$5 million settlement amount in attorneys' fees or $1,666,666.67,
and $50,000 in expenses.

In March 2018, Judge Torresen authorized the Plaintiffs to
circulate notices of the proposed settlement to potential class
members.  On March 30, 2018, the Settlement Administrator sent
notice of the proposed settlement to the 122 class members.  No
objections have been filed, and no class member has opted out of
the settlement.  No objections were voiced by any class member at
the Final Fairness Hearing on June 13, 2018.

Judge Torresen concludes that: (1) the settlement is fair,
reasonable, and adequate; (2) that the attorney fees and expenses
requested by the Class Counsel are reasonable; and (3) the service
awards to the five Named Plaintiffs are warranted and reasonable.

For these reasons, she approved the final settlement of all claims
in the matter and the plan of distribution, including the service
award to the five Named Plaintiffs.  She also granted the motion
for attorneys' fees and costs.  She further granted the parties'
motion to certify the Action as a class action for settlement
purposes only.

The Judge denied as moot any pending motions not resolved in the
order.  She further ordered that the parties will report to her on
the distribution and any settlement funds remaining for cy pres
distribution by Oct. 15, 2018.

She dismissed with prejudice the case on the merits.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 19, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/gB7IH6 from Leagle.com.

CHRISTOPHER OCONNOR, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, KEVIN OCONNOR, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, JAMES ADAM COX, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, MICHAEL FRASER, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated & ROBERT MCNALLY, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented
by CAROL GARVAN -- cgarvan@johnsonwebbert.com -- JOHNSON WEBBERT &
YOUNG LLP, JEFFREY NEIL YOUNG -- jyoung@johnsonwebbert.com --
JOHNSON WEBBERT & YOUNG LLP & DAVID G. WEBBERT --
dwebbert@johnsonwebbert.com -- JOHNSON WEBBERT & YOUNG LLP.

OAKHURST DAIRY, Defendant, represented by JENNIFER K. OLDVADER --
jennifer.oldvader@ogletreedeakins.com -- OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH,
SMOAK & STEWART, PC, pro hac vice, PATRICK F. HULLA --
patrick.hulla@ogletreedeakins.com -- OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK
& STEWART, PC, pro hac vice, DANIELLE Y. VANDERZANDEN --
dani.vanderzanden@ogletreedeakins.com -- OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH,
SMOAK & STEWART, P.C., DAVID L. SCHENBERG --
david.schenberg@ogletreedeakins.com -- OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH,
SMOAK & STEWART, P.C. & FREDERICK B. FINBERG --
rfinberg@thebennettlawfirm.com -- THE BENNETT LAW FIRM.

DAIRY FARMERS OF AMERICA INC, Defendant, represented by PATRICK F.
HULLA, OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, PC, pro hac vice,
DANIELLE Y. VANDERZANDEN, OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART,
P.C., DAVID L. SCHENBERG, OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART,
P.C., FREDERICK B. FINBERG, THE BENNETT LAW FIRM & JENNIFER K.
OLDVADER -- jennifer.oldvader@ogletreedeakins.com -- OGLETREE,
DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, PC.

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY: Sued over Sports Team Doctor's Conduct
-------------------------------------------------------------
John Doe 1, John Doe 2, John Doe 3, John Doe 4, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. The Ohio
State University, Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-00692-MHW-EPD (S.D.
Ohio, July 16, 2018) alleges that the Defendant failed to take
appropriate action against the misconduct of one of its professors
despite being repeatedly informed.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs were sexually assaulted,
molested, and harassed by Dr. Richard Strauss, the sports team
doctor and assistant professor of the Defendant. As the complaints
against Dr. Strauss mounted, the Defendant held hearing on the
spring of 1997. However, the Defendant took no legal or
disciplinary action against Dr. Strauss after the hearing. Dr.
Strauss quietly retired from his position after the hearing.

The Ohio State University is an educational institution that offers
undergraduate, graduate, and research programs in the fields of
business, social sciences, law, medicine, and public affairs. The
Ohio State University was formerly known as Ohio Agricultural And
Mechanical College and changed its name to The Ohio State
University in January, 1878. The Ohio State University was founded
in 1870 and is based in Columbus, Ohio. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Simina Vourlis, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF SIMINA VOURLIS
          856 Pullman Way
          Columbus, OH 43212
          Telephone: (614) 487-5900
          Facsimile: (614) 487-5901 fax
          E-mail: svourlis@vourlislaw.com

               - and -

          Rex A. Sharp, Esq.
          Ryan C. Hudson, Esq.
          Scott B. Goodger, Esq.
          Larkin Walsh, Esq.
          REX A. SHARP, P.A.
          5301 W. 75 th Street
          Prairie Village, KS 66208
          Telephone: (913) 901-0505
          Facsimile: (913) 901-0419 fax
          E-mail: rsharp@midwest-law.com
                  rhudson@midwest-law.com
                  sgoodger@midwest-law.com
                  lwalsh@midwest-law.com

               - and -

          Robert Allard, Esq.
          CORSIGLIA, MCMAHON AND ALLARD, LLP
          96 North Third Street, Suite 620
          San Jose, CA 95112
          Telephone: (408) 289-1417
          Facsimile: (408) 289-8127 fax
          E-mail: rallard@cmalaw.net

               - and -

          Jonathan Little, Esq.
          SAEED AND LITTLE, LLP
          1433 N. Meridian St.
          Indianapolis, IN 46202
          Telephone: 317-721-9214
          E-mail: jon@sllawfirm.com

               - and -

          Stephen Estey, Esq.
          ESTEY & BOMBERGER LLP
          2869 India Street
          San Diego, CA 92103
          Telephone: 619-295-0035
          Facsimile: 619-295-0172 fax
          E-mail: steve@estey-bomberger.com


OHIO STATE: Conducts Investigation Amid Sex Abuse Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Juliet Macur, writing for The New York Times, reports that
investigators working on behalf of Ohio State University are
digging through decades of records to piece together what might
have happened decades ago, when Dr. Richard H. Strauss was a team
doctor and, according to recent accounts, engaged in some form of
sexual misconduct with more than 100 former students.

That misconduct occurred from 1979 to 1997, those former students
have said. But Ohio State's sex abuse crisis and its apparent
failure to provide abused athletes with an adequate support system
may have extended to more-recent years.

Eszter Pryor, a former diver who trained with the Ohio State
University Diving Club as a teenager, discussed in an interview on
July 23 an abusive relationship that she had in 2014, when she was
16, with a 28-year-old diving coach at the university, where the
diving club trained. She said she felt stuck in the relationship
because there was no athlete advocate she could call and no way to
report the abuse without repercussions.

Ms. Pryor, 21, filed a federal class-action lawsuit in which she
claims that the assistant coach, Will Bohonyi, forced her to have
sex with him starting in 2014. She is suing Mr. Bohonyi, U.S.A.
Diving and the Ohio State University Diving Club over the sexual
abuse she said she endured. A criminal investigation is also
continuing.

"Everybody liked him and so I thought what he was doing was just
normal," Ms. Pryor said on July 23 in her first public interview.
"I didn't think he was being serious at first, but then I didn't
know how to stop him."

A spokesman for Ohio State University noted in an email that the
university had put Mr. Bohonyi on administrative leave on the same
day it learned of the accusations in August 2014 and then
immediately opened an investigation. Later that month, the
university notified county children services, the Ohio State
University police and U.S.A. Diving.

"The university does not tolerate sexual misconduct of any kind,"
the spokesman said.

Mr. Bohonyi and U.S.A. Diving did not immediately respond to
requests for comment.

Ms. Pryor's case is yet another story to emerge amid a litany of
recent sexual abuse scandals involving universities and the
apparent mismanagement of abuse accusations. Those cases include
Dr. Larry Nassar's molestation of more than 200 girls and women
while practicing at Michigan State, and recent accusations at the
University of Southern California that a longtime gynecologist at
the university's student health center, Dr. George Tyndall,
sexually abused hundreds of patients for decades despite many
warnings of his inappropriate behavior.

In the cases at Michigan State and at U.S.C., as well as in the
case of Dr. Strauss at Ohio State, officials appeared to have
received complaints about sexual abuse long before they decided to
take action.

Congress has been investigating just what went wrong in the Nassar
case. On July 24 it will hold yet another hearing on how to prevent
sexual abuse in amateur sports, with Michigan State's interim
president, John Engler, as one witness. On the eve of that hearing,
Ms. Pryor said that while lawmakers and officials with the public
universities might be eager to talk about how they can protect
future athletes from abuse, "if they continue to hide the problem
and protect themselves from bad publicity, they are just as bad as
the perpetrator."

Lawyers representing plaintiffs in these cases say they believe
there will be more victims speaking out in the coming months about
their experiences at other universities.

"If you look at this dynamic of these cases, it's like what
happened in the Catholic Church," said John C. Manly, a lawyer who
represents more than 150 plaintiffs in each of the Nassar and
Tyndall cases. "The church abuse stories started with a trickle,
but what really broke it open was the abuse in Boston. I think the
Larry Nassar case is academia's and sports' Boston Archdiocese. So,
I hope I'm wrong, but I think this is just the beginning."

Audry Nafziger, a sex crimes prosecutor in the district attorney's
office of Ventura County, Calif., has spent years of her career --
including more than 100 cases, she estimated --trying to persuade
witnesses in sex crimes cases to testify in court.

She never expected to be the victim herself, however.

Ms. Nafziger was a law student at U.S.C. in the early 1990s when
she saw Dr. Tyndall at the student health center. He gave her an
incorrect diagnosis of genital warts, groped her, took photos of
her vagina and spoke of his sexual conquests, Ms. Nafziger said in
an interview on July 21. She was so disturbed by the experience
that for all these years she kept her medical charts from her two
visits with him. Yet she didn't come forward with accusations at
the time, she said, both out of embarrassment and fear of losing
her spot in law school for "rocking the boat."

When she saw Dr. Tyndall on the news, she realized that she, too,
had been abused by him. "Predators hide in these large institutions
because it's a perfect place for them," she said, adding that these
institutions should institute safeguards and carefully examine each
allegation. The institutions should also have enough people
involved, she said, so that one person can't hide the abuse.

Ms. Pryor didn't know who to turn to for help when Mr. Bohonyi
began paying special attention to her in 2014. He began sending her
text messages, including one that said, "I'm interested in a girl
whose name begins with the letter 'e.'" She said he subsequently
sent her a text message with a photo of his genitals and asked her
to reciprocate, which she did.

She said she felt forced to do what he asked because he was in a
position of authority and had power over her diving career. She
competed in the trials for the United States Olympic team when she
was 13. She worried that a criticism of a coach would derail her
Olympic goals.

Those messages from Mr. Bohonyi turned into one-on-one meetings, as
well as oral and vaginal sex in his car on the Ohio State campus,
Ms. Pryor said. The first time they had sex, she was 16, she said.
He was 28.

After weeks of abuse, a teammate of Ms. Pryor's found out about the
relationship after seeing photos of the two of them on her phone.
Eventually, Mr. Bohonyi's fellow coaches found out. Ms. Pryor told
her parents about it, she said, which is how Ohio State eventually
was notified.

Mr. Bohonyi was fired on August 29, 2014, about two weeks after
Ohio State began its investigation. U.S.A. Diving was notified but
did not place Mr. Bohonyi on its public banned coaches list until
early 2015. He was the first person on the list, Ms. Pryor said,
because the list didn't exist beforehand.

She said she decided to contact law enforcement herself this
January because she learned that Mr. Bohonyi was still coaching. By
then, she had dropped out of Penn State University, where she had
been on the diving team. She said she developed an eating disorder
and refused treatment, and left school because of it.

Ms. Nafziger, the California prosecutor, said Congress could go as
far as withdrawing funding from universities that fail to
adequately investigate accusations of sexual abuse. For so many
years, U.S.C. failed to stop Dr. Tyndall when it easily could have,
she said, and it could have used more incentive to do the right
thing.

"Women complained in writing before he put his hands all over me,"
she said, referring to Dr. Tyndall's abuse. "You have to have an
audience that's willing to believe and see what's happening."

Whatever the universities do to address this abuse problem, Ms.
Nafziger said, "they're going to have to change the way they do
business." [GN]

ORNUA FOODS: Myers-Taylor Files Class Suit Over False Advertising
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Dyami Myers-Taylor, an individual on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated and the general public v. Ornua Foods
North America, Inc.; Ornua Co-operative Limited; and DOES 1 through
25, inclusive, Case No. 3:18-cv-01538-H-MDD (S.D. Cal., July 6,
2018), is brought on behalf of consumers, who were allegedly misled
into purchasing Kerrygold Products due to false and misleading
advertising.

The Kerrygold Products include: Salted Butter, Unsalted Butter,
Naturally Softer Pure Irish Butter, Garlic & Herb Butter, Reduced
Fat Irish Butter, Irish Butter With Canola Oil, which are
manufactured, packaged, marketed, advertised, distributed and sold
by the Defendants through supermarket chains and retail stores in
California and throughout the United States.

Mr. Myers-Taylor contends that he and the Proposed Class would not
have purchased or paid a price premium for the Kerrygold Products
had they known that the representations, "Milk From Grass-fed
Cows", "Made with milk from grass-fed cows not treated with rBST or
other growth hormones", "All Natural", and "100% Pure and Natural"
were false, deceptive and/or misleading.

Ornua Foods North America, Inc., is an New York corporation with
its headquarters in Evanston, Illinois.  Ornua Co-operative Limited
is an Irish corporation with its headquarters in Dublin, Ireland.
The true names and capacities of the Doe Defendants are unknown to
the Plaintiff at this time.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Reuben D. Nathan, Esq.
          NATHAN & ASSOCIATES, APC
          600 W Broadway, Suite 700
          San Diego, CA 92101-3370
          Telephone: (619) 272-7014
          Facsimile: (619) 330-1819
          E-mail: rnathan@nathanlawpractice.com

               - and -

          Ross Cornell, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF ROSS CORNELL APC
          111 W. Ocean Blvd., Suite 400
          Long Beach, CA 90802
          Telephone: (562) 612-1708
          Facsimile: (562) 394-9556
          E-mail: ross.law@me.com


PA FIRE RECOVERY: LaMonaca Suit Asserts FDCPA Violation
-------------------------------------------------------
VINCENT A. LAMONACA, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. PA FIRE RECOVERY SERVICE, Case No. 1:18-cv-11419
(D.N.J., July 6, 2018), alleges that the Defendant's debt
collection practices violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act.

PA Fire Recovery Service is located in Macungie, Pennsylvania.
Recovery regularly engages in the collection of consumer debt
through the use of the mails.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James A. Francis, Esq.
          David A. Searles, Esq.
          FRANCIS & MAILMAN, P.C.
          Land Title Building, Suite 1902
          100 South Broad Street
          Philadelphia, PA 19110
          Telephone: (215) 735-8600
          E-mail: jfrancis@consumerlawfirm.com
                  dsearles@consumerlawfirm.com


PAREXEL INT'L: Subpoena on Western in Wage Suit Partly Quashed
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SCHOULEE CONES, an individual on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated, and DEXTER PASIS, and individual on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
PAREXEL INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION and PAREXEL INTERNATIONAL, LLC,
Defendants, Case No. 16cv3084 L (BGS) (S.D. Cal.), Magistrate Judge
Bernard G. Skomal of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California granted in part Cones' motion to quash the
subpoena served on Western & Southern Life Insurance Co. by the
Defendants.

The Plaintiff is one of two named Plaintiffs in the case pursing
wage and hour claims on behalf of a putative class.  She alleges
that she, and others employed by the Defendants, were misclassified
as exempt from overtime compensation and denied meal and rest
periods and properly itemized wage statements.

The Defendants served Western with a subpoena seeking the
deposition transcript of Cones, and changes made by Cones to the
deposition transcript, along with all deposition exhibits, taken in
Schoulee Cones v. Western and Southern Life Insurance Company,
United States District Court, Southern District of California, Case
No. 3:17-cv-00925-W-SKC.  The Western case was brought by the
Plaintiff against Western for failing to pay a medical claim that
arose years after she left her employment with Parexel.  Her
Complaint in that action alleged that in denying coverage, Western
had claimed the Plaintiff falsely denied having been diagnosed with
a stroke.  There is no dispute that the deposition transcript
covers the Plaintiff's medical history because the claims in that
case involved her medical history.  The case has since settled.

The Plaintiff moves to quash the subpoena arguing it seeks private
medical information that is irrelevant to the claims in this wage
and hour case.  The Defendants oppose the Motion, arguing the
Plaintiff has waived her privacy rights in her medical information
and that her deposition testimony regarding her medical condition
is relevant.  More specifically, they assert her medical history is
relevant to her adequacy to serve as a class representative.
Additionally, the Defendants argue her credibility is potentially
undermined both by Western's claim that the Plaintiff made false
representations in procuring insurance and the Plaintiff seeking
expedited proceedings in the Western case based on her medical
condition, but not doing so in the case.

Magistrate Judge Skomal agrees that a plaintiff can waive their
privacy right in their medical history by putting that medical
history at issue in a case or when it is directly relevant to the
litigation.  In the case, there is no waiver based on the
Plaintiff's claims.  The Plaintiff's wage and hours claims do not
put her medical history at issue.  She is not seeking damages for
any emotional distress or any asserting any claims that result in
any physical injury or disability that might out her medical
history at issue.  

The Defendants primarily argue the Plaintiff has put her medical
history at issue by seeking to represent a class.  They do not cite
any authority from the Ninth Circuit or any district courts finding
waiver of a plaintiff's privacy rights in their medical history
based on a plaintiff seeking to serve as a class representative.
Nor have they cited any authority indicating that seeking to
represent a class is alone a basis to inquire into a plaintiff's
health at all, absent some history of delays or other issues in the
case as a result of a plaintiff's health issues.  As to the scope
of the waiver, even assuming the Plaintiff has put her health at
issue by seeking to represent a class, any waiver on that basis is
not broad enough to encompass the entirety of the Plaintiff's
deposition in another case that includes medical history well
beyond the area put at issue by adequacy, i.e. prosecute the case.


As to the Plaintiff's deposition testimony in the Western case, the
Plaintiff concedes that if she had described her job duties at
Parexel in the deposition, her statements might be relevant.  She
then denies she did.  The Defendants dispute this and seek to file
a sur-reply indicating that the counsel for Western has indicated
that the transcript contains approximately 10 pages of transcript
in which Parexel is referenced.  

Although it seems unlikely, these two things are not necessarily
contradictory, the Magistrate Judge finds.  He says the Plaintiff's
deposition transcript could include information about her
employment at Parexel without discussing her job duties.
Regardless, the Defendants are not entitled to the entire
transcript demanded in the subpoena on this basis.  The sur-reply
they seek to file would also not resolve this issue.  The
Defendants would just file a sur-reply that would only provide
information about a conversation with another attorney about the
substance of Plaintiff's testimony that concern her employment and
job duties at Parexel.

Given the Plaintiff's testimony about her employment at Parexel
might be relevant to her claims in this case, the Plaintiff will
provide the Defendants with a redacted copy of her deposition
transcript in the Western case that discloses the portions of her
testimony that address in any way her employment with Parexel.  If
there is no testimony regarding Parexel, the Plaintiff's counsel
will provide the Defendants with a declaration to that effect.

For these reasons, Magistrate Judge Skomal granted in part the
Plaintiff's Motion to Quash as set forth above.  He denid the Ex
Parte Request to File a Sur-Reply.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 20, 2018 Order is available at
https://bit.ly/2M8rqAC from Leagle.com.

Schoulee Cones, an individual, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated & Dexter Pasis, an individual, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented
by James M. Treglio, Keegan & Baker LLP & Patrick N. Keegan --
pkeegan@keeganbaker.com -- Keegan & Baker, LLP.

Parexel International Corporation, a Massachusetts corporation
licensed to do business in the State of California & Parexel
International, LLC, a Massachusetts limited liability company
licensed to do business in the State of California, Defendants,
represented by Diana Tabacopoulos -- dtabacopoulos@seyfarth.com --
Seyfarth Shaw LLP & Michael Warner Kopp -- mkopp@seyfarth.com --
Seyfarth Shaw LLP.

PARK GROVE: Court Dismisses S. Hullinger's FCRA Suit
----------------------------------------------------
Judge Pamela L. Reeves of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Tennessee, Knoxville, granted the Defendants' motion to
dismiss the case, SUSAN HULLINGER, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated. Plaintiff, v. PARK GROVE INN, INC., et
al., Defendants, Case No. 3:17-cv-00400 (E.D. Tenn.).

The Plaintiff brings the class action against Park Grove, alleging
the Defendant violated the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions
Act ("FACTA") by printing the first six and last four digits of her
credit card number, as well as the expiration date, on her
receipt.

On Sept. 10, 2015, Hullinger made a purchase at Park Grove using
her credit card.  The receipt for the purchase displayed the first
six and the last four digits of the credit card account number as
well as the expiration date of the credit card.

On Sept. 6, 2017, Hullinger filed suit alleging that Park Grove
violated FACTA which prohibits printing more than the last five
digits of a credit card number or the expiration date on a receipt.
She alleges she was subjected to a heightened risk of identity
theft and that her private information was exposed as a result of
this FACTA violation.  Hullinger demands statutory damages,
punitive damages, costs, and attorney fees.

The Defendant moves for dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, stating that the Plaintiff has not alleged an injury
in fact and lacks standing to pursue her claim.

Judge Reeves finds that the Plaintiff has not alleged a concrete
injury sufficient to warrant Article III standing because she does
not allege that another copy of the receipt exists; that her
receipt was lost or stolen; that she was the victim of identity
theft; or even that another person has viewed the receipt.  Nor did
the Plaintiff allege that any risk of harm is real, not conjectural
or hypothetical, given that she could shred the receipt along with
any remaining risk of disclosure. Allegations of "possible future
injury" are not sufficient to satisfy Article III.  Allegations of
future harm at some indefinite time cannot be an actual or imminent
injury.  Instead, a threatened injury must be impending.  Thus, the
Plaintiff has failed to carry her burden of demonstrating an injury
in fact for this FACTA violation.

The case presents a perfect example of a procedural violation that
may result in no harm, in contrast to the examples of statutory
violations that constitute concrete injuries in and of themselves.
FACTA arose from a desire to prevent identity theft that can occur
when cardholders' private financial information, such as a
cardholder's complete credit card number, is exposed on
electronically printed payment receipts.  That is not the case
here.  

When a case is dismissed for lack of federal subject matter
jurisdiction, Article III deprives federal courts of the power to
dismiss the case with prejudice.  As a result, when a case is
dismissed for lack of Article III standing, that disposition cannot
be entered with prejudice, and instead must be dismissed without
prejudice.

Based on the foregoing analysis, Judge Reeves must join the
numerous courts outside of the circuit holding that a plaintiff
does not have standing to pursue a FACTA claim absent an allegation
of actual harm or a material risk of harm.  The Plaintiff's alleged
injury is precisely the type of abstract injury that Spokeo, Inc.
v. Robins held was insufficient to satisfy the requirement of
concreteness.  Accordingly, she granted the Defendants' motion to
dismiss and dismissed without prejudice the Complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 19, 2018 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/8ktxpq from Leagle.com.

Susan Hullinger, Plaintiff, represented by Patrick M. Barrett, III
-- pbarrett@barrettlawofficetn.com -- Barrett Law Office, PLLC.

Park Grove Inn, Inc., doing business as Park Grove Inn, Defendant,
represented by Jamie Ballinger Holden --
jballinger@bakerdonelson.com -- Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell
& Berkowitz, PC.

PETCO ANIMAL: Job Applicants' Class Has Prelim Certification
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California granted Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion Seeking Provisional
Class Certification in the case captioned JACKLYN FEIST,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; and
ANGELICA ZIMMER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. PETCO ANIMAL SUPPLIES, INC., Defendant,
Case No. 3:16-cv-1369-H-RNB (S.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant obtained and reviewed
consumer reports detailing their financial histories after the
Plaintiffs applied for jobs at the Defendant's stores, without
first providing the Plaintiffs the notice required by the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). Zimmer was hired by a Petco store and
worked there for roughly five months. Feist was not hired,
allegedly because of adverse information on her consumer report.

The class includes all individuals who applied for jobs at Petco
stores during the class period, and for whom Petco reviewed
consumer reports. The subclass includes those members of the
Disclosure Class who were subject to an adverse employment action
as a result of the information contained in their consumer
reports.

The numerosity prerequisite is met if "the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable." Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(a)(1). Plaintiffs estimate that the Disclosure Class exceeds
37,000 members, while the Adverse Action Subclass contains roughly
52 members.
Accordingly, the proposed classes meet the numerosity prerequisite
in this case.  

The commonality prerequisite is met if there are "questions of law
or fact common to the class.  Here, whether Defendant provided the
proposed class members adequate FCRA notice implicates numerous
common questions of law and fact.  Accordingly, the commonality
prerequisite is met.

Typicality requires that the claims or defenses of the
representative parties be typical of the claims or defenses of the
class.  Here, Zimmer suffered the same alleged injury as the
Disclosure Class (Petco reviewed her consumer report without
providing adequate FCRA notice), while Feist suffered the same
alleged injury as the Adverse Action Subclass her offer of
employment was rescinded because of the information contained in
her consumer report, and she was not given an opportunity to
correct any false information in the report.
The Court accordingly finds the typicality requirement satisfied.

Adequacy of representation under Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the
class representative be able to fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class. Representation is adequate if the plaintiff
and class counsel (1) do not have any conflicts of interest with
other class members and (2) will prosecute the action vigorously on
behalf of the class.  

Here, there do not appear to be any conflicts of interest between
Plaintiffs and the absent class members. Plaintiffs and their
counsel have vigorously prosecuted the interests of the class, and
class counsel has extensive experience in complex class action
litigation.  
Accordingly, Plaintiffs and their counsel are adequate
representatives of the proposed class. For the foregoing reasons,
Plaintiffs have met all of the requirements of Rule 23(a).

Here, the significant common issue in this case is whether
Defendant provided adequate FCRA notice to the class members before
obtaining their consumer reports. Moreover, the legal remedies for
the class members and subclass members are the same monetary
damages, which differ only based on whether adverse action was
taken as a result of the information in the class members' consumer
reports.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the issues common to the
proposed class are significant and predominate over individual
issues.  

The superiority inquiry requires determination of whether
objectives of the particular class action procedure will be
achieved in the particular case. Here, there is no evidence that
absent class members wish to pursue their claims individually.
Moreover, any class member who wants to pursue an individual claim
may elect not to participate in the settlement agreement.
Accordingly, the superiority requirement is met here.

The Plaintiff has satisfied the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).
Thus, the Court grants preliminary certification to the proposed
class.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 11, 2018 Order is
available https://tinyurl.com/yc4a4s9g from Leagle.com.

Jacklyn Feist, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated & Angelica Zimmer, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Marc L.
Godino -- mgodino@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP &
Mark S. Greenstone -- mgreenstone@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay &
Murray LLP.

Petco Animal Supplies, Inc., Defendant, represented by Frederick
William Kosmo, Jr. -- fkosmo@wilsonturnerkosmo.com -- Wilson Turner
Kosmo LLP, Marissa L. Lyftogt -- mlyftogt@wilsonturnerkosmo.com --
Wilson Turner Kosmo LLP, Hali M. Anderson --
handerson@wilsonturnerkosmo.com -- Wilson Turner Kosmo LLP &
Loleena Ansari May -- lmay@wilsonturnerkosmo.com -- Wilson Turner
Kosmo.

PHOENIX FINANCIAL: Haider Seeks to Recover Damages Under FDCPA
--------------------------------------------------------------
Abdul W. Haider, individually and on behalf of all those similarly
situated v. Phoenix Financial Services LLC, Case No. 7:18-cv-06242
(S.D.N.Y., July 10, 2018), seeks to recover damages and attorneys'
fees and costs arising from the Company's alleged violations of the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Phoenix Financial Services LLC is an Indiana Limited Liability
Company with a principal place of business in Marion County,
Indiana.  Phoenix is regularly engaged, for profit, in the
collection of debts allegedly owed by consumers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
          BARSHAY SANDERS, PLLC
          100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: (516) 203-7600
          Facsimile: (516) 706-5055
          E-mail: csanders@barshaysanders.com


PIER 1 IMPORTS: Deal in J. Pedraza's Suit Has Final Approval
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JENNIFER PEDRAZA, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. PIER 1 IMPORTS (U.S.),
INC.; and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
8:16-cv-01447-JLS (DFM) (C.D. Cal.), Judge Josephine L. Staton of
the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
granted final approval of the Joint Stipulation of Class Action
Settlement and Release of Claims.

Pursuant to the Preliminary Approval Order, dated Nov. 30, 2017,
the appointed Settlement Administrator, Simpluris, mailed a Notice
of Settlement to all the known Class Members.  In response to the
Notice, no Class Members objected to the Settlement and 67 Class
Members requested exclusion from the Settlement.

After finding that the Settlement offers significant monetary
recovery to all the Settlement Class Members and that such recovery
is fair, adequate and reasonable when balanced against further
litigation related to liability and damages issues, Judge Staton
ordered the Settlement Administrator to distribute the Individual
Settlement Payments to the Class Members in accordance with the
provisions of the Settlement.

For purposes of the Judgment and for the Settlement only, the Judge
certified the Class as defined in the Settlement Agreement.

For purposes of this Final Approval Order and the Settlement only,
she confirmed the appointment of Plaintiff Jennifer Pedraza as the
class representatives for the Class.  Further, she finally approved
the Class Representative Enhancement Award, as fair and reasonable,
to the Plaintiff in the amount of $3,500.  She ordered the
Settlement Administrator to distribute the Class Representative
Enhancement Award to the Plaintiff in accordance with the
provisions of the Settlement.

The Judge also confirmed the appointment of Kashif Haque, Samuel A.
Wong, Jessica L. Campbell, Ali S. Carlsen and Shelly D. Song of
Aegis Law Firm, PC, as the Class Counsel for the Class.  Further,
she finally approved a Class Counsel Fees Award, as fair and
reasonable, not to exceed $225,000.

The Judge approved approved a Class Counsel Costs Award, as fair
and reasonable, in the amount of $19,655.42.

For purposes of the Final Approval Order and the Settlement only,
Judge Staton confirmed the appointment of Simpluris, Inc. as the
Settlement Administrator to administer the Settlement of the matter
as more specifically set forth in the Settlement Agreement and
further finally approved Settlement Administration Costs, as fair
and reasonable, of $65,000.

After Settlement administration has been completed in accordance
with the Settlement Agreement, and in no event later than 260 days
after the Effective Date, the Plaintiff will file a report with the
Court certifying compliance with the terms of the Settlement.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 19, 2018 Judgment is available
at https://is.gd/L64S9h from Leagle.com.

Jennifer Pedraza, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Ali Sarah Carlsen,
Aegis Law Firm PC, Kashif Haque -- khaque@aegislawfirm.com -- Aegis
Law Firm PC, Da Hye Song -- song@aegislawfirm.com -- Aegis Law
Firm, Jessica L. Campbell, Aegis Law Firm PC & Samuel A. Wong --
swong@aegislawfirm.com -- Aegis Law Firm PC.

Pier 1 Imports U.S. Inc, Defendant, represented by Emily E.
Schroeder -- eschroeder@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP & Aaron
Robert Lubeley -- alubeley@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP.

POLARITYTE INC: Faces Lawi Securities Suit Over Share Price Drop
----------------------------------------------------------------
YEDID LAWI, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. POLARITYTE, INC., DENVER LOUGH, and JEFF DYER, Case No.
2:18-cv-00541-PMW (D. Utah, July 6, 2018), seeks to recover
compensable damages caused by the Defendants' alleged violations of
the federal securities laws and to pursue remedies under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

On April 7, 2017, PolarityTE announced the closing of a transaction
through which the Company purchased Dr. Denver Lough's pending
Patent #14/954,335 in exchange for over $104 million of PolarityTE
stock.  Just one week prior to the closing of the transaction, on
March 31, 2017, Dr. Lough received a notice of non-final rejection
of the Patent by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO").
On June 4, 2018, the USPTO issued a final rejection for the
Patent.

In June 2018, Citron Research published a report exposing the
Defendants' failure to disclose the USPTO's March 31, 2017 notice
of non-final rejection of the Patent and highlighting the USPTO's
June 4, 2018 final rejection of the Patent.  On this news,
PolarityTE's share price fell $10.59, or 27.3%, to close at $28.14
on June 26, 2018, according to the complaint.

PolarityTE is incorporated in Delaware, and its principal executive
offices are located in Salt Lake City, Utah.  The Individual
Defendants are directors and officers of the Company.

PolarityTE purports to be a commercial-stage biotechnology and
regenerative biomaterials company focused on discovering, designing
and developing a range of regenerative tissue products and
biomaterials for the fields of medicine, biomedical engineering and
material sciences.  The Company's key development is SkinTE, which
is intended to be used by physicians or other appropriate
healthcare providers for homologous uses of skin
tissues/integument.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jon V. Harper, Esq.
          HARPER LAW, PLC
          P.O. Box 581468
          Salt Lake City, UT 84158
          Telephone: (801) 910-4357
          E-mail: jharper@jonharperlaw.com

               - and -

          Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
          J. Alexander Hood II, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 661-1100
          Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
          E-mail: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                  ahood@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          Patrick V. Dahlstrom, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          Ten South La Salle Street, Suite 3505
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 377-1181
          Facsimile: (312) 377-1184
          E-mail: pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          Corey D. Holzer, Esq.
          HOLZER & HOLZER, LLC
          1200 Ashwood Parkway, Suite 410
          Atlanta, GA 30338
          Telephone: (770) 392-0090
          Facsimile: (770) 392-0029
          E-mail: cholzer@holzerlaw.com


PORTLAND, OR: ACLU Files Class Action Over "Kettling" Tactic
------------------------------------------------------------
Gordon R. Friedman, writing for The Oregonian/OregonLive, reports
that the city of Portland is seeking a reporter's declaration under
oath for its defense in a civil rights lawsuit, a move generally
viewed by the press as a strongarm tactic given laws that protect
journalists from testifying about their work.

If freelance reporter Mike Bivins refuses to sign the declaration,
he may face a subpoena to testify in court, he said in an interview
on July 23.

Mr. Bivins said he was told of a possible subpoena during a phone
call with the lead city attorney in the case, Naomi Sheffield. "She
said, 'I don't want this to come off as threatening but we might
seek a subpoena if you don't want to sign the declaration,'" Mr.
Bivins said.

The city is interested in five tweets Mr. Bivins posted during a
June 4, 2017 protest in downtown Portland. The tweets include Mr.
Bivins' account of what may be illegal or rowdy activity by
protesters.

Mr. Bivins published articles for Willamette Week and Al Jazeera
about the protest, during which police allegedly corralled hundreds
of protesters and demanded their IDs. The tactic, called
"kettling," led the American Civil Liberities Union to file a class
action suit in federal court against Mayor Ted Wheeler and more
than 50 police officers.

Mr. Bivins provided The Oregonian/OregonLive messages from
Sheffield seeking his under-oath statement.

"I have reviewed your Twitter feed, including the photographs,
comments, and video that you have posted relating to that event,"
Sheffield wrote on July 20. "We would appreciate it if you would be
willing to sign a declaration stating under oath, that certain
video, photographs and comments are an accurate depiction or
description of the events as you perceived them on June 4, 2017."

Duane Bosworth, a Portland attorney who has defended journalists
against government subpoena requests, said in his view Oregon's
media "shield law" would likely protect Mr. Bivins from being
forced to testify. Shield laws protect reporters' privilege to not
testify about information they gather or their sources. The Oregon
shield law is perhaps the strongest in the nation, said Bosworth,
who occasionally represents The Oregonian/OregonLive.

Mr. Bivins said he does not intend to sign a declaration in order
to "not appear like I'm on one side or another." He said the ACLU
approached him about joining their lawsuit against the city, but he
declined.

If a judge were to issue a subpoena, Mr. Bivins said he would
consult with an attorney before deciding whether to testify or not.
People under subpoena who refuse to testify can be jailed for
contempt of court.

"That'd be crazy if they did" issue a subpoena, Mr. Bivins said.

Mr. Bosworth said governments can chill reporters' ability to
gather news and make sources by issuing subpoena threats.

"If a person is speaking to a reporter and knows that information
could be provided to the cops that would dry up those
conversations," Mr. Bosworth said. He said what "no reporter wants"
is to appear to take sides, or worse, be compelled to do so by the
government. [GN]

PRO CUSTOM: Loses Bid to Dismiss S. Sedhom's Wage Suit
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District New York
denied Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the case captioned STEPHANIE
SEDHOM, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. PRO CUSTOM SOLAR LLC, Defendant(s), No.
2:17-cv-07559 (ADS)(AYS)(E.D.N.Y.).

Pro Custom is a New Jersey limited liability company that provides
solar energy to building owners in New York State. The Plaintiff
was employed by the Defendant as a manual worker. The Plaintiff
worked seventy to eighty hours a week, over the course of six to
seven days per week, and, allegedly, was not compensated at an
overtime rate when she worked more than forty hours a week. She was
paid on a biweekly basis.

The Defendant contends that the Plaintiff's complaint must be
dismissed because it seeks liquidated damages and CPLR 901
precludes class action claims for statutory violations that include
penalties unless the statute expressly permits otherwise.

The Plaintiff argues that since the case has been removed to
federal court, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply rather
than the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules.

The Supreme Court has explicitly held Section 901 does not apply to
federal class actions in Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 130 S.Ct. 1431, 176 L. Ed. 2d 311
(2010). In Shady Grove, the Court was presented with the question
of whether C.P.L.R. 901 precludes plaintiffs from bringing class
actions in federal court where the suit seeks to recover a penalty
As here, the plaintiff had not yet sought an order certifying the
class. Instead, the question was whether the case could proceed as
a class action.

Apparently, the Defendant misapprehends the ruling in Shady Grove.
First, contrary to the Defendant's assertion, the plaintiff in
Shady Grove brought its claims pursuant to a New York statute, not
a federal statute.

Second, the Court dealt with the question of whether the case could
proceed as a putative class action, not whether the class should be
certified.

Finally, the Defendant is incorrect that Shady Grove does not
address whether plaintiffs may pursue a class action and seek
statutory penalties when the very statutes it relies upon to make
the claim forbids such damages. Shady Grove in fact does exactly
that. The Supreme Court held that Rule 23 governs as to whether a
plaintiff may maintain a class action suit despite the limitation
of CPLR 901.

Therefore, because the Supreme Court has explicitly held that N.Y.
C.P.L.R. Section 901 does not govern whether putative class actions
may be maintained in federal court, the Plaintiff's complaint need
not be dismissed because it seeks liquidated damages. Rule 23
controls, and it does not have any of the requirements of N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 901.

As N.Y. C.P.L.R. Section 901 does not control here because the
Defendant removed this action to federal court, and that is the
sole basis upon which the Defendant moves, the Defendant's motion
to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 16, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7js86kr from
Leagle.com.

Stephanie Sedhom, Individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Abdul Karim Hassan ,
Abdul Hassan Law Group.

Pro Custom Solar LLC, Defendant, represented by Michael J. Marotte
-- mjm@spsk.com -- Schenck, Price, Smith & King LLP & John Patrick
Campbell -- jpc@spsk.com -- Schenck Price Smith & King.

PURDUE PHARMA: Court Defers Ruling on Pa. Cities' Bid to Remand
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania denied Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand the case captioned
THE CITY OF NEW CASTLE; CITY OF ALIQUIPPA; and UNION TOWNSHIP, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. PURDUE PHARMA L.P.; PURDUE PHARMA, INC.; THE PURDUE FREDERICK
COMPANY, INC.; TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC.; CEPHALON, INC.;
JOHNSON & JOHNSON; JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.;
ORTHO-McNEIL-JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. N/K/A JANSSEN
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.; JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICA, INC. N/K/A JANSSEN
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.; ENDO HEALTH SOLUTIONS INC.; and ALLERGAN
PLC, Defendants, Civil Action No. 18-1472 (E.D. Pa.).

In the Class Action Complaint, the Plaintiffs purport to assert
claims on behalf of themselves and as a class action on behalf of
all political subdivisions, municipalities, cities, townships and
counties in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania who incurred damages
as a result of the Defendants' marketing of prescription opioids.
The Complaint asserts the following three causes of action against
all the Defendants: (1) consumer fraud-deceptive practices (2)
public nuisance; and (3) unjust enrichment.

Teva Defendants seek entry of a stay of this case in light of the
conditional transfer order issued by the Opiate MDL Panel to help
ensure uniform treatment of related issues, avoid piecemeal
litigation, and conserve judicial resources. They argue that
entering a stay will allow the MDL court to resolve Plaintiffs'
remand motion along with several other remand motions in actions
likewise removed under Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) and the MDL
court has stated that it will address remand motions in the
coordinated proceeding.

The Plaintiffs argue that a stay is entirely inappropriate as the
Plaintiff's Motion to Remand involves the only class action brought
by the municipalities of Pennsylvania against Pennsylvania
Defendants in the Opiate Litigation which makes it uniquely
different than any other potential remand motion before the MDL.

First, the Court finds that entering the stay is likely to promote
judicial efficiency and consistency in decision making, especially
since the Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand raises issues likely to
arise in other cases pending in the Opiate MDL transferee court. In
fact, as pointed out by Teva Defendants, two remand motions in
other actions now pending in the Opiate MDL argue the specific
question of whether remand is required under CAFA's Local
Controversy Exception.

Second, regarding the balance of harm to the parties, the
possibility of a slight delay in the action suffered by Plaintiffs
is outweighed by the possible prejudice that Teva Defendants will
suffer of potentially inconsistent rulings by individual federal
courts and duplicative litigation. In light of the conditional
transfer of this case to the Opiate MDL, it appears that a decision
regarding the transfer will be made soon.

Third, it appears that the duration of the requested stay is
unknown, but it will most likely be short since the JPML is set to
make a transfer determination in the near future.

The Court will defer adjudicating the Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand
on the merits by denying it without prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 16, 2018 Memorandum
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8yps2wj from Leagle.com.

THE CITY OF NEW CASTLE, CITY OF ALIQUIPPA & UNION TOWNSHIP, ON
BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiffs,
represented by DANIEL C. LEVIN -- dlevin@lfsblaw.com -- LEVIN
SEDRAN & BERMAN.

PURDUE PHARMA, L.P., PURDUE PHARMA, INC. & THE PURDUE FREDERICK
COMPANY, INC., Defendants, represented by JUDY LEE LEONE --
judy.leone@dechert.com -- DECHERT LLP.

TEVA PHARMACEUTCIALS USA, INC. & CEPHALON, INC., Defendants,
represented by HARVEY BARTLE, IV -- harvey.bartle@morganlewis.com
-- MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP & STEVEN A. REED --
steven.reed@morganlewis.com -- MORGAN LEWIS.

JOHNSON & JOHNSON, JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.,
ORTHO-MCNEIL-JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., other & JANSSEN
PHARMACEUTICA, INC., other, Defendants, represented by DAVID F.
ABERNETHY -- david.abernethy dbr.com -- DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP
& REBECCA TRELA -- rebecca.trela dbr.com -- DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH
LLP.

ENDO HEALTH SOLUTIONS INC., Defendant, represented by MAHNU V.
DAVAR -- Mahnu.Davar@apks.com -- ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP.

ALLERGAN PLC, Defendant, represented by DANIEL T. BRIER --
dbrier@mbklaw.com -- MYERS, BRIER & KELLY, JENNIFER G. LEVY --
jennifer.levy@kirkland.com -- KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP & SUZANNE P.
CONABOY -- sconaboy@mbklaw.com -- MYERS BIER & KELLY, LLP.

QUINN MEDICAL: Must Produce Fax Transmission Logs in TCPA Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio,
Eastern Division, granted Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production
in the case captioned PROGRESSIVE HEALTH AND REHAB CORP.,
Plaintiff, v. QUINN MEDICAL, INC., Defendant, Civil Action No.
2:17-cv-58 (S.D. Ohio).

The Plaintiff, Progressive Health and Rehab Corp., filed this
putative class action against Defendant, Quinn Medical, Inc., under
the junk fax provision of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of
1991, as amended by the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005 (TCPA). The
Defendant violated the TCPA when it mass-faxed unsolicited
advertisements to the Plaintiff and others.

The Plaintiff seeks an order compelling the Defendant to produce
fax transmission logs that identify the fax numbers of each
successful recipient for 26 at-issue fax broadcasts.
The Plaintiff maintains that the Court should compel production of
the transmission logs because they contain information that its
expert needs to complete his report.

The Defendant asserts that the information the Plaintiff seeks to
obtain through production of the transmission logs lacks relevance
at the pre-certification stage.

The Plaintiff represents that its expert will use the information
contained in the transmission logs, such as how many advertisements
were sent, to whom the advertisements were sent, and how many
transmissions were successful to answer questions the Court posed
in its December 4, 2017 Order. The Court agrees that the
information contained in the at-issue transmission logs could bear
on the Rule 23(a) requirements of numerosity, commonality, and
typicality, as well as predominance and implied ascertainability
requirements in Rule 23(b)(3).

The Defendant's objection to production of the transmission logs
based upon privacy concerns and its speculation that the
Plaintiff's counsel might use the information to solicit new
clients fail to persuade the Court to reach a different conclusion.
As the Plaintiff points out, the Defendant's concerns are addressed
by the Court's entry of the parties' stipulated Confidentiality
Agreement and Order.

The Defendant's proposed alternatives redaction of all but four
digits of the number and/or utilization of a statistical sampling
fall short. The Court acknowledges that statistical sampling could
be an efficient approach to investigate the validity of the
Defendant's defenses. But this does not lead the Court to conclude
that production of the transmission logs is unnecessary because
both statistical sampling and redaction of all but four digits
would prevent the Plaintiff's expert from ascertaining how many
successful faxes were sent to unique numbers and whether the
Defendant faxed substantially similar faxes to the same list of
recipients, information that could bear the Rule 23(a) and (b)(3)
requirements.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 11, 2018 Opinion and
Order is available https://tinyurl.com/y8o9msae from Leagle.com.

Progressive Health and Rehab Corp., Plaintiff, represented by
Robert E. DeRose, II -- bderose@barkanmeizlish.com -- Barkan
Meizlish Handelman Goodin DeRose Wentz, LLP, Brian J. Wanca --
bwanca@andersonwanca.com -- Anderson + Wanca, pro hac vice, Ross M.
Good -- rgood@andersonwanca.com -- Anderson + Wanca, pro hac vice &
Ryan M. Kelly -- rkelly@andersonwanca.com -- Anderson + Wanca, pro
hac vice.

Quinn Medical Inc., Defendant, represented by David B. Shaver ,
Surdyk, Dowd & Turner Co., L.P.A., David M. Schultz , Hinshaw &
Culbertson, pro hac vice, Jeffrey Charles Turner , Surdk Dowd &
Turner Co., L.P.A. & John Paul Ryan -- jryan@hinshawlaw.com --
Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, pro hac vice.

RELIN GOLDSTEIN: Violates FDCPA, Henriquez Suit Says
----------------------------------------------------
Juan R. Henriquez, Jr., individually and on behalf of all those
similarly situated v. Relin, Goldstein & Crane, LLP, Case No.
2:18-cv-03965 (E.D.N.Y., July 10, 2018), accuses the Defendant of
violating the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, which prohibits a
debt collector from using any false, deceptive, or misleading
representation or means in connection with the collection of any
debt.

Relin, Goldstein & Crane, LLP, is a New York Limited Liability
Partnership with a principal place of business in Monroe County,
New York.  The Company is regularly engaged, for profit, in the
collection of debts allegedly owed by consumers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
          BARSHAY SANDERS, PLLC
          100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: (516) 203-7600
          Facsimile: (516) 706-5055
          E-mail: csanders@barshaysanders.com


RESPOND POWER: Court Dismisses B. Gillis' Class Claims
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Class Claim in
the case captioned BARBARA GILLIS; THOMAS GILLIS; SCOTT McCLELLAND;
KIMBERLY McCLELLAND; INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiffs, v. RESPOND POWER, LLC, Defendant,
Civil Action No. 14-3856 (E.D. Pa.).

Counts I and II of the Plaintiffs' First Amended Class Action
Complaint are dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 16, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y7fujgbh from Leagle.com.

BARBARA GILLIS, THOMAS GILLIS, SCOTT R. & KIMBERLY A. MCCLELLAND,
INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
Plaintiffs, represented by CHARLES J. KOCHER -- SALTZ MONGELUZZI
BARRETT & BENDESKY PC, MICHAEL D. DONOVAN -- DONOVAN LITIGATION
GROUP, LLC, PATRICK HOWARD -- SALTZ MONGELUZZI BARRETT & BENDESKY &
SIMON BAHNE PARIS -- SALTZ MONGELUZZI BARRETT & BENDESKY, P.C.

RESPOND POWER, LLC, Defendant, represented by DAVID R. KING --
dking@herrick.com -- HERRICK FEINSTEIN LLP, KATHLEEN H. ROBINSON --
hrobinson@herrick.com -- HERRICK FEINSTEIN LLP & RONALD J. LEVINE
-- rlevine@herrick.com -- HERRICK FEINSTEIN LLP.

RIPPLE LABS: Borden Ladner Attorney Discusses Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
Melissa Smith, Esq., and Sinem Ersoy, Esq., of Borden Ladner
Gervais LLP, in an article for Lexology, wrote that the proceeding
is filed as a class action on behalf of Ripple owners, believed to
be in the thousands by the plaintiff, and could have potential
implications for other crypto-asset issuers and owners.

The question as to whether crypto-assets should be classified as
securities has been widely discussed both in Canada and the United
States, with the Canadian Securities Administrators ("CSA")
recently publishing guidance on this point in CSA Staff Notice
46-308 -- Securities Law Implications for Offerings and Tokens.
Now, thanks to a class action lawsuit launched against Ripple Labs,
the United States federal court also has a chance to weigh in on
this issue. Coffey v Ripple Labs Inc., is a class action lawsuit
filed by Ryan Coffey in May of this year in which it is alleged
that Ripple Labs' XRP tokens constitute securities and, as such,
their unregistered sale violates state and federal securities laws.
The proceeding is filed as a class action on behalf of Ripple
owners, believed to be in the thousands by the plaintiff, and could
have potential implications for other crypto-asset issuers and
owners.

The Facts

Ripple, a currency exchange network that is ranked in the top three
by market capital, uses XRP tokens as its native currency. Unlike
some other crypto-assets, XRP tokens are created by Ripple, not
mined. Out of the 100 billion XRP tokens created at the protocol's
establishment, a little over 8 billion are held by Ripple, slightly
over 39 billion are distributed, and close to 53 billion are held
in escrow. It is important to note that the "distributed" XRP token
figure includes the 20 billion retained by the creators at the
project's inception, as well as pending business development
agreements. Ripple's protocol doesn't allow for any additional XRP
tokens to be created.

This centralization of tokens is one of the biggest criticisms
against Ripple from the crypto-community. The statement of claim
from Coffey asserts that "the XRP Ledger relies on trusted nodes
operated by Ripple Labs to verify the legitimacy of transactions
and maintain agreement on the network" and that "the trusted nodes
are either selected or controlled by Ripple Labs itself". One of
the most attractive features of Blockchain and crypto-assets for
many users and investors is the fact that they are decentralized,
which minimizes the risk of data manipulation and promotes openness
in transactions. Risks associated with third party intermediaries
are still present in Ripple and its payment protocol.

Despite other allegations against Ripple by Coffey (including a
never-ending ICO, corruption and attempted bribery of popular
cryptocurrency exchanges), the question at the heart of the claim
is whether the XRP token should be classified as a security. Due to
the differing characteristics of crypto-assets, it is hard to
classify the entire class of assets as a currency, a security or
other traditional financial instruments. One end of the spectrum
has cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin, which are used mainly to store
and transfer value over a decentralized peer-to-peer network
without a need for an intermediary, such as a bank. On the other
end of the spectrum, Blockchain tokens sold through the DAO, a
digital decentralized autonomous organization, functioned very
differently. The DAO was essentially a crowdfunded and investor
directed venture capital fund, where token holders made collective
decisions on investments and would share in the upside of DAO
funded enterprises. The DAO token sales were all classified as
securities by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
as early as July 2017. In the Securities Enforcement Forum West
2018, the panel covering cryptocurrencies and ICOs agreed that as
long as the SEC and other regulators continue to treat token
issuances as securities offerings, the number of investor class
actions inevitably will increase. Many crypto-assets (especially
tokens) display characteristics of both classic currencies and
securities, which is why some jurisdictions, including Canadian
ones, use a case-by-case analysis to determine the classification
of these digital assets. However, this can cause confusion and
uncertainty in the marketplace amongst both ICO issuers and
investors.

The Howey Test

While the technology behind crypto-assets is a new one, the
question of whether an instrument constitutes a security is not. In
the United States, section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933
includes an "investment contract" as the definition of a security.
The leading case from the U.S. Supreme Court is Securities and
Exchange Commission v W J Howey Co(1946), which introduced the test
to determine whether an instrument can be classified as an
"investment contract". The test, known as the Howey Test, states
that "a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests
his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits
solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party, it being
immaterial whether the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by
formal certificates or by nominal interests in the physical assets
employed in the enterprise" will be deemed to be an investment
contract and therefore a security.

The complaint by Coffey is premised on the argument that the Howey
Test is met because "the success of the XRP Ledger, and the profits
the Class reasonably expected to derive from investing in XRP are
dependent solely on the technical, entrepreneurial, and managerial
efforts of Defendants and their agents and employees" and that the
XRP scheme is built upon "structured agreements so that their
partners' compensation is tied to appreciation of XRP — just as
companies often do with shares to ensure that their interests are
aligned". According to the Howey Test, whether XRP constitutes a
security is based on whether the profits arise solely from the
efforts of the promoter or a third party. However, the SEC report
on the classification of DAO tokens as securities took a less
stringent route and found it was the "undeniably significant"
efforts of the DAO Curators that was essential to the success and
profitability of these investments and, as such, these tokens
should be classified as securities.

The case against Ripple is not the only claim that examines this
issue. Other cases filed against ICO issuers in the U.S. include:

   -- In re Tezos Securities Litigation, Nos.
17-cv-06779,17-cv-06829, 17-cv-07095 - claiming unregistered sale
of Tezos tokens

   -- Rensel v. Centra Tech Inc., No. 17-cv-24500 - claiming
Centra's ICO constituted an unregistered offering and sale of
securities

   -- Hodges v. Monkey Capital, LLC, No. 17-cv-81370 - claiming
fraudulently issuing securities ahead of the ICO

   -- Balestra v. ATBCOIN, LLC, No. 17-10001 - claiming ATBCoin
issued unregistered securities

   -- Stormsmedia, LLC v. Giga Watt, Inc., No. 17-cv-00438 -
claiming violation of the Securities Act by issuing unregistered
securities

   -- Moss v. Giga Watt, Inc., No. 18-cv-00100 - claiming violation
of the Securities Act by issuing unregistered securities

Implications for Canada

The decisions in these lawsuits will impact the Canadian
crypto-market. While not binding, Canadian courts and regulators
often look to their American counterparts in order to have a
cohesive market. The term "investment contract" is also used in the
definition of a security in Canada and, like the U.S., the term is
undefined in most provinces (Manitoba and Québec have a definition
for investment contracts in their respective securities acts).

In Canada, the two main tests to determine a security's existence
are adapted and modified from their U.S. counterparts. The first
test in Canada is derived from the Howey Test and requires a common
enterprise in which the expectation of profits flow from the
"undeniably significant" efforts of persons other than the
investor. The second test is an adaptation of the risk capital test
from Hawaii v Hawaii Market Center (1971). This test looks at the
risks of an enterprise over which the offeree exercises no control
and whether the investment is induced by representations of profits
by the offeror. However, while these tests can be used to find the
existence of a security, the Supreme Court of Canada has taken a
broader approach and found that an instrument can constitute a
security even if the two tests are ineffective. Given the broad
definition of a security in Canada, if XRP tokens are found to be a
security in the U.S., it is likely that they will be classified as
a security in Canada as well.

Even if XRP tokens are classified as a security by the United
States federal court or the SEC, this decision may not be
conclusive on how to classify other crypto-assets. The differences
between XRP tokens and other crypto-assets, including
decentralization and the business practices of Ripple, are
significant ones. Other assets would have to be evaluated on their
own merits. As such, while a decision in the case against Ripple
will be important for the crypto-community, each token needs to be
considered in light of its own circumstances. Even with the
recently provided guidance from the securities regulatory bodies,
an influx of lawsuits against crypto-companies can be expected in
order to provide a greater level of certainty. [GN]

SAKS & CO: Court Grants Final Approval of Class Settlement
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California granted Final Approval of Class Settlement Agreement in
the case captioned JAREL BROWN, an individual, on behalf of himself
and others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SAKS & COMPANY, LLC a
Delaware Limited Liability Corporation, and DOES 1 thru 50,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-04210 (SJO)(C.D. Cal.).

Pursuant to the Preliminary Approval Order, the appointed
Settlement Administrator, Simpluris, Inc., mailed a Notice of
Settlement to all known Class Members by First Class U.S. Mail. The
Notice of Settlement fairly and adequately informed Class Members
of the terms of the proposed Settlement and the benefits available
to Class Members there-under. The Notice of Settlement further
informed Class Members of the pendency of the Action, of the
proposed Settlement, of their right to receive their share of the
Settlement, of the scope and effect of the Settlement's Released
Claims, of the preliminary Court approval of the proposed
Settlement, of the exclusion and objection timing and procedures,
of the date of the Final Approval Hearing and of the right to
appear in connection with the Final Approval Hearing.

For purposes of this Order and this Settlement only, the Court
confirms the appointment of Plaintiff Jarel Brown as the class
representative for the Class. Further, the Court approves a Service
Award to Plaintiff in the amount of Seven Thousand Dollars
($7,000). The Court orders the Settlement Administrator to
distribute the Service Award to the Plaintiff in accordance with
the provisions of the Settlement.

For purposes of this Order and this Settlement only, the Court
confirms the appointment of Craig J. Ackermann of Ackermann &
Tilajef, P.C.; Jonathan Melmed of Melmed Law Group, P.C.; and David
Winston of Winston Law Group, P.C., as Class Counsel.

Further, the Court finally approves a Class Counsel Fees Award, as
fair and reasonable, not to exceed 25% of the Total Settlement
Amount or One Hundred Fifty-Nine Thousand, Seven Hundred Dollars
($159,700), which will be distributed as 1/3 Ackermann & Tilajef,
P.C.; 1/3 to Melmed Law Group, P.C.; and 1/3 to Winston Law Group,
P.C. As well, the Court finally approves a Class Counsel Costs
Award, as fair and reasonable, not to exceed Eight Thousand, Seven
Hundred and Seven Dollars and Fifty-Six Cents ($8,707.56), which
will be distributed as Five Thousand, Four Hundred and Twenty-Two
Dollars and Seventeen Cents ($5,422.17) to Ackermann & Tilajef,
P.C.; One Thousand, Four Hundred and Nineteen Dollars and Fifty-Two
Cents ($1,419.52) to Melmed Law Group, P.C.; and One Thousand,
Eight Hundred and Sixty-Five Dollars and Eighty-Seven Cents
($1,865.87) to Winston Law Group, P.C.

The Court finally approves Settlement Administration Costs of
Ten-Thousand Five-Hundred Dollars ($10,500) as fair and
reasonable.

A full-text copy of the District Court’s July 16, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y9heudq6 from Leagle.com

Jarel Brown, an individual, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Craig J. Ackermann -
cja@ackermanntilajef.com - Ackermann and Tilajef PC, David S.
Winston - david@employmentlitigators.com  - Winston Law Group PC &
Jonathan Melmed - jm@melmedlaw.com - Melmed Law Group PC.

Saks and Company, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liablity Corporation,
Defendant, represented by Dawn S. Fonseca - dfonseca@littler.com -
Littler Mendelson PC, Julie A. Dunne -  jdunne@littler.com -
Littler Mendelson PC & Ruth N. Dapper  - rdapper@littler.com -
Littler Mendelson PC


SANTA FE NATURAL: Pontusson Files Suit Over Deceptive Marketing
---------------------------------------------------------------
CLIVE PONTUSSON, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. SANTA FE NATURAL TOBACCO COMPANY, INC., REYNOLDS
AMERICAN INC., and R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, Case No.
1:18-cv-00594-LCB-LPA (M.D.N.C., July 6, 2018), seeks redress for
the Defendants' alleged deceptive marketing of their "Natural
American Spirit" brand cigarettes as "Natural" and
"Additive-Free."

Santa Fe Natural Tobacco Company, Inc., is a New Mexico corporation
whose principal place of business is in Santa Fe, New Mexico.
Reynolds American Inc. is a North Carolina corporation whose
principal place of business is in Winston-Salem, North Carolina.
SFNT is an operating subsidiary of Reynolds.

R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company is a North Carolina corporation whose
principal place of business is in Winston-Salem, North Carolina.
Like SFNT, RJR is an operating subsidiary of Reynolds.

The Defendants sell Natural American Spirit cigarettes in
differently-colored packs, all of which the Defendants uniformly
and prominently label and advertise with representations that the
cigarettes are "Natural" and "100% Additive-Free."[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joel R. Rhine, Esq.
          RHINE LAW FIRM, PC
          1612 Military Cutoff Rd, Suite 300
          Wilmington, NC 28403
          Telephone: (910) 772-9960
          Facsimile: (910) 772-9062
          E-mail: jrr@rhinelawfirm.com

               - and -

          Scott P. Schlesinger, Esq.
          Jonathan R. Gdanski, Esq.
          Jeffrey L. Haberman, Esq.
          SCHLESINGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
          1212 SE 3rd Avenue
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33316
          Telephone: (954) 467-8800
          Facsimile: (954) 320-9509
          E-mail: scott@schlesingerlaw.com
                  jgdanski@schlesingerlaw.com
                  jhaberman@schlesingerlaw.com

               - and -

          Melissa Wolchansky, Esq.
          Amy E. Boyle, Esq.
          HALUNEN LAW
          1650 IDS Center 80 South 8th Street
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 605-4098
          Facsimile: (612) 605-4099
          E-mail: wolchansky@halunenlaw.com
                  boyle@halunenlaw.com

               - and -

          Caleb Marker, Esq.
          ZIMMERMAN REED, LLP
          2381 Rosecrans Avenue, Suite 328
          Manhattan Beach, CA 90254
          Telephone: (877) 500-8780
          E-mail: caleb.marker@zimmreed.com

               - and -

          Hart L. Robinovitch, Esq.
          14646 N. Kierland Blvd., Suite 145
          Scottsdale, AZ 85254
          Telephone: (800) 493-2827
          E-mail: hart.robinovitch@zimmreed.com

               - and -

          Charles J. LaDuca, Esq.
          CUNEO GILBERT & LADUCA, LLP
          8120 Woodmont Avenue - Suite 810
          Bethesda, MD 20814
          Telephone: (202) 789-3960
          Facsimile: (202) 789-1813
          E-mail: charles@cuneolaw.com

               - and -

          Samuel J. Strauss, Esq.
          TURK & STRAUSS LLP
          613 Williamson Street, #201
          Madison, WI 53703
          Telephone: (608) 237-1775
          Facsimile: (608) 509-4423
          E-mail: sam@turkestrauss.com

               - and -

          D. Greg Blankinship, Esq.
          FINKELSTEIN, BLANKINSHIP, FREI-PEARSON & GARBER, LLP
          445 Hamilton Avenue - Suite 605
          White Plains, NY 10605
          Telephone: (914) 298-3281
          Facsimile: (914) 824-1561
          E-mail: gblankinship@fbfglaw.com
                  jfrei-pearson@fbfglaw.com
                  tgarber@fbfglaw.com

               - and -

          Daniel L. Warshaw, Esq.
          Alexander R. Safyan, Esq.
          PEARSON, SIMON & WARSHAW, LLP
          15165 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 400
          Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
          Telephone: (818) 788-8300
          Facsimile: (818) 788-8104
          E-mail: dwarshaw@pswlaw.com
                  asafyan@pswlaw.com

               - and -

          James W. Gustafson, Esq.
          SEARCY, DENNEY, SCAROLA, BARNHART & SHIPLEY, P.A.
          517 N. Calhoun St.
          Tallahassee, FL 32301
          Telephone: (850) 224-7600
          Facsimile: (561) 383-9454
          E-mail: jwg@searcylaw.com

               - and -

          Michael R. Reese, Esq.
          REESE LLP
          100 West 93rd Street, 16th Floor
          New York, NY 10025
          Telephone: (212) 643-0500
          Facsimile: (212) 253-4272
          E-mail: mreese@reesellp.com

               - and -

          Matthew D. Schultz, Esq.
          LEVIN, PAPANTONIO, THOMAS, MITCHELL,
          RAFFERTY & PROCTOR, P.A.
          316 S. Baylen St., Suite 600
          Pensacola, FL 32502
          Telephone: (850) 435-7140
          Facsimile: (850) 436-7141
          E-mail: mschultz@levinlaw.com

               - and -

          Ronald A. Marron, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF RONALD A. MARRON
          651 Arroyo Drive
          San Diego, CA 92103
          Telephone: (619) 696-9006
          Facsimile: (619) 564-6665
          E-mail: ron@consumersadvocates.com


SCHUMACHER AUTOMOTIVE: Faces Eisenband Suit for TCPA Violation
--------------------------------------------------------------
JERRY EISENBAND, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. SCHUMACHER AUTOMOTIVE, INC., a Florida Corporation,
Case No. 9:18-cv-80911-BB (S.D. Fla., July 11, 2018), accuses the
Defendant of violating the Telephone Consumer Protection Act by
engaging in unsolicited telemarketing directed towards prospective
customers with no regard for their privacy rights.

Schumacher is a Florida corporation whose principal office is
located in Lake Park, Florida.  Schumacher directs, markets, and
provides its business activities, which is vehicle dealership,
throughout the state of Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq.
          HIRALDO P.A.
          401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 400-4713
          E-mail: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com


SEARS HOLDINGS: DeFranza Suit Seeks to Stop Unsolicited Calls
-------------------------------------------------------------
JOHN DEFRANZA, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. SEARS HOLDINGS CORPORATION, Case No. 1:18-cv-04739
(N.D. Ill., July 10, 2018), seeks to stop Sears from allegedly
violating the Telephone Consumer Protection Act by making
unsolicited, autodialed calls to consumers without their consent,
including calls to consumers, who have registered their telephone
numbers on the National Do Not Call registry, and to obtain
injunctive and monetary relief for all persons harmed by Sears's
conduct.

Sears is located in Hoffman Estates, Illinois.  Sears is one of the
largest department store chains in the U.S.  As of Feb. 3, 2018,
Sears had more than 1,000 locations.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Stefan Coleman, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF STEFAN COLEMAN, P.A.
          1072 Madison Ave. #1
          Lakewood, NJ 08701
          Telephone: (877) 333-9427
          Facsimile: (888) 498-8946
          E-mail: law@stefancoleman.com


SEARS ROEBUCK: Faces Bui Suit Over Defective Water Heaters
----------------------------------------------------------
JON D. BUI, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated
v. SEARS, ROEBUCK, & CO., SEARS HOLDING CORP., and KCD IP, LLC,
Case No. 5:18-cv-04121-SVK (N.D. Cal., July 11, 2018), arises from
alleged defect in water heaters sold by the Defendants.

Despite Sears' claim that its Kenmore products are among the most
trusted in the United States, Sears designed, manufactured,
marketed, and sold water heaters that have a material and serious
defect, Mr. Bui alleges.  Specifically, gas water heaters outfitted
with Honeywell WV8840 gas valves manufactured from 2010 to 2012
("Class Water Heaters") leak due to erosion of the gas valve's
plastic sensors.  The plastic temperature sensors erode or
otherwise deteriorate such that a pin-sized hole (or holes) form in
the sensors.  As a result, water leaks from an affected water
heater's sensor to the surrounding premises.  The water flow will
not stop until the water supply is shut off, the water is drained
from the water heater, and the sensor is replaced (hereinafter,
"The Defect").

Sears Holdings Corporation is a Delaware corporation with its
principal place of business located in Hoffman Estates, Illinois.
Sears Holdings Corporation is the parent company for Sears and
Kmart, as well as other national retailers.

Sears, Roebuck and Company is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Sears
Holdings Corporation, with its principal place of business located
in Hoffman Estates.  Sears Roebuck offers its products and services
through more than 1,320 Sears-branded and affiliated stores in the
United States and Canada.

KCD IP, LLC, is a Delaware limited liability company with its
principal place of business located in Hoffman Estates.  KCD is a
special purpose entity created by Sears Holdings for securitization
purposes that owns Sears' house brands, including Kenmore,
Craftsman, and Diehard.

Sears designs, manufactures, sells, and markets a wide range of
home products.  One of its key proprietary brands is Kenmore, which
Sears refers to as "among the most trusted and preferred brands in
the U.S."[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Crystal Foley, Esq.
          SIMMONS HANLY CONROY LLC
          100 N. Pacific Coast Highway, Suite 1350
          El Segundo, CA 90245
          Telephone: (310) 322-3555
          Facsimile: (310) 322-3655
          E-mail: cfoley@simmonsfirm.com

               - and -

          Paul J. Hanly, Jr., Esq.
          Mitchell M. Breit, Esq.
          SIMMONS HANLY CONROY LLC
          112 Madison Avenue
          New York, NY 10016-7416
          Telephone: (212) 784-6400
          Facsimile: (212) 213-5949
          E-mail: phanly@simmonsfirm.com
                  mbreit@simmonsfirm.com

               - and -

          Gregory F. Coleman, Esq.
          Mark E. Silvey, Esq.
          Adam A. Edwards, Esq.
          Lisa A. White, Esq.
          GREG COLEMAN LAW PC
          First Tennessee Plaza
          800 S. Gay Street, Suite 1100
          Knoxville, TN 37929
          Telephone: (865) 247-0080
          Facsimile: (865) 522-0049
          E-mail: greg@gregcolemanlaw.com
                  mark@gregcolemanlaw.com
                  adam@gregcolemanlaw.com
                  lisa@gregcolemanlaw.com


SKYWEST AIRLINES: Underpays Ramp Agents, Barnes Suit Alleges
------------------------------------------------------------
JEREMY BARNES, and CORYELL ROSS, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. SKYWEST AIRLINES, INC.,
and SKYWEST, INC., Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-04182-JCS (N.D.
Cal., July 12, 2018) is an action against the Defendants for unpaid
regular hours, overtime hours, minimum wages, wages for missed meal
and rest periods.

Mr. Ross was employed by the Defendants as ramp agent from the year
2013 to 2017.

Mr. Barnes was employed by the Defendants as ramp agent from the
year 2014 to 2016.

SkyWest Airlines, Inc. operates as an airline company that provides
air services in North America. The company was founded in 1972 and
is based in St. George, Utah. SkyWest Airlines, Inc. operates as a
subsidiary of SkyWest Inc. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Laurence D. King, Esq.
          Matthew B. George, Esq.
          Mario M. Choi, Esq.
          KAPLAN FOX & KILSHEIMER LLP
          350 Sansome Street, Suite 400
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 772-4700
          Facsimile: (415) 772-4707
          E-mail: lking@kaplanfox.com
                  mgeorge@kaplanfox.com
                  mchoi@kaplanfox.com


SNOOZE HIC LLC: Doesn't Pay Wages to Servers, Amador-Stewart Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
TRINITY AMADOR-STEWART, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff vs. SNOOZE HIC LLC, and DOES 1
through 100, Defendants, Case No. 18CV1604 LAB MDD (S.D. Cal., July
16, 2018) seeks to recover unpaid wages, unpaid compensation for
missed meal and rest periods, unpaid overtime, interest, attorney's
fees and costs.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as server.

Snooze Hic LLC is a Colorado corporation engaged in the restaurant
business. The company is located at Denver, Colorado. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel D. Bodell Esq.
          BODELL LAW GROUP
          11455 El Camino Real, Suite 480
          San Diego, CA 92130
          Telephone: (858) 461-4699
          Facsimile: (858) 461-4703


SNYDER LAW FIRM: Court Dismisses K. Toepper's FDCPA Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Kathleen Toepper, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Law Office of Richard Snyder,
Bruce Jackman, Richard W. Snyder, and Ben Bridge Jeweler, Inc.,
Defendants, Civil No. 17-4190 (JNE/KMM) (D. Minn.), Judge Joan N.
Ericksen of the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota
granted LORS Defendants' motion to dismiss all claims against
them.

Toepper filed the putative class action alleging that Law Office of
Richard Snyder ("LORS"), Jackman, and Snyder ("LORS Defendants"),
violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") and the
automatic stay of a bankruptcy proceeding.  Toepper also asserts
claims for automatic stay violations against Defendant Ben Bridge.

Around Sept. 14, 2016, Toepper incurred a debt with Ben Bridge when
she purchased a gold chain and gold earrings.  On Dec. 6, 2016,
Toepper filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in the District of
Minnesota.  Ben Bridge retained LORS, who then sent three letters
concerning the debt to Toepper's bankruptcy attorney.  These three
letters are the basis for all the claims against LORS Defendants.

On March 7, 2017, Toepper's debts were discharged in bankruptcy.
On Sept. 8, 2017, Toepper filed the putative class action against
LORS Defendants and Ben Bridge.  In her Amended Complaint, she
alleges that the letters violated the FDCPA and the automatic stay
provision of the United States Bankruptcy Code.  Toepper asserts
eight FDCPA claims, with each claim directed at more than one of
the LORS Defendants.  Toepper has not yet moved for class
certification.  

LORS Defendants move to dismiss all claims against them under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.  Toepper opposes the
motion.

Judge Ericksen concludes that Toepper fails to state claims to
relief under the FDCPA.  He dismisses these claims under Rule
12(b)(6).  He finds that (i) Toepper fails to state a claim to
relief under Section 1692d because it is thus unclear how LORS
Defendants violated Section 1692d; (ii) Toepper offers insufficient
facts to establish that it was false and deceptive in violation of
Section 1692e for LORS Defendants to assert in the letters that
Toepper incurred her debt by fraud; (iii) there is no factual basis
for finding that the letters misrepresented the debt as collectible
outside of bankruptcy proceedings; (iv) it is speculative to
conclude that threatened legal action is unintended if not pursued;
(v) Toepper fails to provide factual allegations to support her
Section 1692e(10) claims; (vi) Section 1692e(11) is inapplicable to
the letters sent by LORS Defendants to Toepper's bankruptcy
attorney, who is not a "consumer"; (vii) Toepper fails to plead
facts plausibly demonstrating unfairness or unconscionability in
violation of Section 1692f; and (viii) Section 1692g is
inapplicable to the letters because they were communications with a
non-consumer lawyer.

Finally, as to Toepper's claim that LORS Defendants willfully
violated the automatic stay provision when they sent the three
letters, the Judge finds that Toepper provides insufficient facts
to state a claim to relief for stay violations.  He says it is not
a violation of the stay for a creditor to advise a debtor's counsel
that he will take any action that he legally may take under the
Code.  Bankruptcy law allows the creditor to file an adversary
complaint and assert that fraud renders the debt nondischargeable.
It was not therefore a violation of the automatic stay for LORS
Defendants to advise Toepper's bankruptcy attorney of these
possible actions.  He dismisses these claims under Rule 12(b)(6).

Based on this, Judge Ericksen granted LORS Defendants' motion to
dismiss.  He dismissed with prejudice the action against LORS,
Jackman, and Snyder.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 20, 2018 Order is available at
https://bit.ly/2KgLO0M from Leagle.com.

Kathleen Toepper, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Mark L. Vavreck , Gonko &
Vavreck, PLLC & Thomas J. Lyons, Jr. , Consumer Justice Center
P.A.

Law Office of Richard Snyder, Bruce Jackman, individually, Richard
W. Snyder, individually & Ben Bridge Jeweler, Inc., Defendants,
represented by Bradley R. Armstrong -- dley.Armstrong@lawmoss.com
-- Moss & Barnett, PA & Sarah E. Doerr -- Sarah.Doerr@lawmoss.com
--  Moss & Barnett, PA.

SOUTHWEST AIRLINES: Underpays Ramp Supervisors, Battles et al. Say
------------------------------------------------------------------
JEFF BATTLES, LEROME THOMAS, STEVEN SPENCER, individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. SOUTHWEST
AIRLINES CO., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-04822 (N.D. Ill.,July 13,
2018) is an action against the Defendants for unpaid regular hours,
overtime hours, minimum wages, wages for missed meal and rest
periods.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants as ramp
supervisors.

Southwest Airlines Co. operates a passenger airline that provides
scheduled air transportation services in the United States and
near-international markets. Southwest Airlines Co. was founded in
1967 and is based in Dallas, Texas. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ryan F. Stephan, Esq.
          Haley R. Jenkins, Esq.
          STEPHAN ZOURAS, LLP
          205 N. Michigan Avenue, Suite 2560
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312)233-1550
          Facsimile: (312) 233-1560


TOLL GLOBAL: C. Marquez's Wage Suit Remains in District Court
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CARLOS MARQUEZ, an individual and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. TOLL GLOBAL FORWARDING
(USA) INC., a New York corporation; TGF MANAGEMENT GROUP HOLDCO,
INC., a New Jersey corporation; INSPERITY EXPENSE MANAGEMENT, INC.,
a Texas corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants,
Case No. 2:18-cv-03054-ODW (ASx) (C.D. Cal.), Judge Otis D. Wright,
II, of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California denied the Plaintiff's Motion to Remand.

Marquez brought the putative class action against the Defendants.
He filed his Complaint on Feb. 13, 2018 in Los Angeles Superior
Court alleging seven causes of action: (1) Recovery of Unpaid
Minimum Wage and Overtime; (2) Meal Period Violations; (3) Rest
Period Violations; (4) Unpaid Wages During Employment; (5) Failure
to Pay Wages Due at Separation of Employment; (6) Failure to Issue
Accurate Itemized Wage Statements; and (7) Unfair Business
Practices.

The Plaintiff brought a class action against Defendants on behalf
of himself and the class he seeks to represent.  The Plaintiff
Class consists of all non-exempt, hourly-paid employees currently
and/or formally employed by the Defendants during a period
beginning four years prior to the filing of the complaint and
running through the date of final judgment in the case.

The Plaintiff is a citizen of California.  Toll is a New York
corporation.  TGF is a New Jersey corporation.  Insperity is a
Texas corporation.  The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants
employed the Plaintiff Class during the relevant period, failed to
pay those persons for all hours worked, including minimum wage and
overtime premiums, failed to provide meal and rest periods or pay
penalties in lieu thereof, and failed to pay wages upon ending of
employment.  The Plaintiff also alleges that each of the Defendant
was the employer, owner, shareholder and/or alter ego of the
remaining the Defendants, and was acting with the express and
implied permission, consent, and knowledge of the other Defendants.
Furthermore he alleges that the Defendants approved and authorized
all unlawful acts described in the Complaint.

The Plaintiff does not allege a specific number of violations, nor
a specific amount of damages.  He only alleges that the aggregate
claims are below the $5 million threshold for federal jurisdiction.


On April 11, 2018, TGF and Insperity removed the case, claiming
federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"),
or alternatively under the Labor Management Relations Act.  The
Plaintiff moved to remand on May 24, 2018.

The parties do not dispute that the Plaintiff Class is made of more
than 100 individuals and that the parties are minimally diverse as
required by Section 1332(d)(2).  Thus, the only issue is whether
the Defendants have demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence
that the AIC is greater than $5 million.  Judge Wright holds that
the Defendants have met their burden, and the Court has
jurisdiction under CAFA.

The Defendants initially calculated the amount owed in penalties
for missed meal and rest period violations at $6,327,883.  This is
based on a 100% violation rate, or one meal period violation and
one rest period violation per shift.  The Plaintiff, in arguing
against the 100% rate relies heavily on Garibay v. Archstone
Communities, LLC and Ibarra v. Manheim Investments, Inc.

However, the Judge finds that the Plaintiff alleges no other rate
that would be more accurate, and submits no evidence discrediting
the 100% rate.  As hte Plaintiff has submitted no evidence of any
other rate, the Judge has only the Defendants' calculations to
consider.  Additionally, the Plaintiff as the "master of the claim"
could have alleged fact-specific allegations to narrow the possible
violation rate or penalties sought, keeping them below the
threshold, but chose not to.  Furthermore, he finds that the
amount in controversy ("AIC") surpasses the jurisdictional
threshold even when a substantially lower rate of violation is
assumed.

The Defendants similarly calculate the AIC for unpaid overtime
wages assuming a violation rate of 100% and that class members were
forced to work through a meal break every shift.  However, this
claim is largely dependent on the frequency of the meal and rest
break violations alleged above.  If the Judge applies the same
logic and finds that allegations of "often" working through a break
calls for a 50% violation rate, the amount initially calculated by
the Defendants should be halved as well, yielding an AIC of
$1,055,524.50.

The Defendants estimate penalties for failure to provide accurate
wage statements at $635,450.  The Plaintiff does not contest this
figure.

Finally, the Defendant calculates $520,934 for the AIC in penalties
for failure to pay wages of terminated or resigned employees from a
calculation of 112 employees who resigned or were terminated during
the relevant period.  The Plaintiff takes issue with the assumption
that all 112 employees were not paid their wages at the time of
separation, but again the Plaintiff fails to suggest a different
number of employees who were denied wages, and provides no evidence
to counter the Defendants' assumptions.  Furthermore, even if the
Judge assumes arguendo that the 50% violation rate used above
applies to the waiting time penalties, it will not make a
difference on the jurisdictional question as the Defendants will
still have crossed the $5 million threshold -- $3,163,941 (meal and
rest break violations) + $1,055,524.50 (unpaid overtime) + $635,450
(inaccurate wage statements) + $260,467 (half of the Defendants'
initially calculated waiting time penalties) = $5,115,382.50.

Additionally, this calculation does not include attorney's fees,
which the Plaintiff demands in the Complaint.  The Defendants
calculate attorney's fees as 25% of the total AIC.  The Plaintiff
does not contest this calculation.  Twenty-five per cent of the sum
of the claims ($5,115,382.50) yields fees of $1,278,845.62.  This
results in a total AIC of $6,394,228.12, which is well above the $5
million threshold.

As the AIC exceeds the jurisdictional threshold under CAFA, and all
other jurisdictional requirements are met, federal jurisdiction
exists over this claim.  Judge Wright therefore denied the
Plaintiff's Motion to Remand.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 19, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/hL4HrA from Leagle.com.

Carlos Marquez, an individual and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Kevin Mahoney --
kmahoney@mahoney-law.net -- Mahoney Law Group APC & George Bernard
Singer -- gsinger@mahoney-law.net -- Mahoney Law Group.

Toll Global Forwarding USA Inc., a corporation, Defendant,
represented by Eric E. Hill -- ehill@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw
LLP.

TGF Management Group Holdco, Inc., a corporation & Insperity PEO
Services, L.P., Erroneously Sued As Insperity Expense Management,
Inc., Defendants, represented by Eric E. Hill, Seyfarth Shaw LLP &
William J. Dritsas -- wdritsas@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP.

TOTOTLAN INC: Refuses to Pay Overtime Wages, Hernandez Says
-----------------------------------------------------------
CISMAI HERNANDEZ and JORGE HERNANDEZ on their own behalf and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. TOTOTLAN, INC., TOTOTLAN
2, INC., TOTOTLAN 3, INC., TOTOTLAN, LLC, and MIGUEL TORO, Case No.
1:18-cv-01776-MSK (D. Colo., July 12, 2018), alleges that the
Defendants refused to pay their employees overtime wages for
overtime hours worked and refused to provide their employees with
rest periods as required by law.

Tototlan, Inc., is a registered Colorado corporation, which has a
principal street address in Aurora, Colorado.  Tototlan 2, Inc., is
a registered Colorado corporation, which has a principal street
address in Castle Rock, Colorado.  Tototlan 3, Inc., is a
registered Colorado corporation, which has a principal street
address in Elizabeth, Colorado.  Tototlan, LLC, is a registered
Colorado limited liability company with a principal street address
in Elizabeth.

The Corporate Defendants do business under the trade name
"Guadalajara Family Mexican Restaurant."  Miguel Toro is an owner
and manager of the Guadalajara Family Mexican Restaurants.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Brandt Milstein, Esq.
          MILSTEIN LAW OFFICE
          1123 Spruce Street
          Boulder, CO 80302
          Telephone: (303) 440-8780
          Facsimile: (303) 957-5754
          E-mail: brandt@milsteinlawoffice.com


TOYOTA MOTOR: 9th Circuit Appeal Filed in Heber Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the case captioned Albert Heber, et al. v. Toyota
Motor Corporation, et al., Case No. 8:16-cv-01525-AG-JCG, pending
in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California,
Santa Ana, took an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Plaintiff Al
Heber says rodents -- in this case squirrels -- are gnawing away at
the wiring inside his Toyota pickup truck.

The soy-based coating used to protect wires from the elements is
actually attracting the rodents, he says.  The issue is causing
displays on his truck to malfunction, including the fuel gauge,
anti-lock brakes, four-wheel drive and check engine light.  They're
recurring problems he says Toyota will not cover under his
warranty.

The appellate case is captioned as Albert Heber, et al. v. Toyota
Motor Corporation, et al., Case No. 18-55935.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by August 10, 2018;

   -- Transcript is due on September 10, 2018;

   -- Appellants Raymond Bennett, Stephen Bowling, Heidi Browder,
      Leslie Cochrane, James Donoghue, Sheila Faulkner, Jennifer
      Grammer, Albert Heber, David Johns, Heather Johns, Joseph
      Lesko, Kim Lesko, Cole Michaelis, Shannon Michealis,
      Melanie Munns, Jody Pla, Penny Porter, Douglas Powell,
      Matthew Siffermann, Janice Toler and Bobby York's opening
      brief is due on October 19, 2018;

   -- Appellees Toyota Motor Corporation and Toyota Motor Sales,
      U.S.A., Inc.'s answering brief is due on November 19, 2018;
      and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants Raymond Bennett, Stephen Bowling, Heidi
Browder, Leslie Cochrane, James Donoghue, Sheila Faulkner, Jennifer
Grammer, Albert Heber, David Johns, Heather Johns, Joseph Lesko,
Kim Lesko, Cole Michaelis, Shannon Michealis, Melanie Munns, Jody
Pla, Penny Porter, Douglas Powell, Matthew Siffermann, Janice Toler
and Bobby York are represented by:

          Jerusalem F. Beligan, Esq.
          Brian D. Chase, Esq.
          BISNAR CHASE
          1301 Dove Street
          Newport Beach, CA 92660
          Telephone: (949) 752-2999
          E-mail: jbeligan@bisnarchase.com
                  bchase@bisnarchase.com

               - and -

          Brian S. Kabateck, Esq.
          KABATECK BROWN & KELLNER, LLP
          644 South Figueroa Street
          Los Angeles, CA 90017
          Telephone: (213) 217-5000
          E-mail: bsk@kbklawyers.com

Defendants-Appellees TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INC., and TOYOTA
MOTOR CORPORATION are represented by:

          Frank C. Rothrock, Esq.
          Naoki Stephen Kaneko, Esq.
          SHOOK HARDY & BACON LLP
          5 Park Plaza
          Irvine, CA 92614-2546
          Telephone: (949) 475-1500
          E-mail: frothrock@shb.com
                  nkaneko@shb.com

               - and -

          Amir Nassihi, Esq.
          SHOOK, HARDY & BACON LLP
          One Montgomery Tower, Suite 2700
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 544-1900
          E-mail: anassihi@shb.com


TRANS1 INC: Nov. 19 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
---------------------------------------------------
The following statement is being issued by Pomerantz LLP in regard
to a proposed class action settlement.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
No. 7:12-CV-00023-D

PHILLIP J. SINGER, Individually and on Behalf of All Other :
Persons Similarly Situated

Plaintiff:

v.

TRANS1 INC., KENNETH REALI, JOSEPH P. SLATTERY, RICHARD :
RANDALL, and MICHAEL LUETKEMEYER,

Defendants.

NOTICE OF PENDENCY AND PROPOSED SETTLEMENT OF CLASS ACTION

TO: ALL PERSONS OR ENTITIES WHO PURCHASED OR OTHERWISE ACQUIRED THE
SECURITIES OF BAXANO SURGICAL, INC. F/K/A TRANS1, INC.1 ("TRANS1")
BETWEEN FEBRUARY 23, 2009 AND OCTOBER 17, 2011, BOTH DATES
INCLUSIVE.

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and an Order of the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina, Southern Division, that
a hearing will be held on November 19, 2018, at 2:00 p.m. before
the Honorable James C. Dever III, Chief United States District
Judge of Eastern District of North Carolina at the United States
courthouse, 310 New Bern Avenue, Raleigh, North Carolina 27611 for
the purpose of determining: (1) whether the proposed Settlement of
the claims in the above-captioned Action for consideration
including the sum of three million two hundred fifty thousand
($3,250,000.00) in U.S. dollars ("USD") (the "Settlement Amount")
should be approved by the Court as fair, reasonable, and adequate;
(2) whether the Plan of Allocation is fair and reasonable, and
should be approved; (3) whether Lead Counsel's application for an
award of attorneys' fees of up to 30% plus interest of the
Settlement Amount, reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses of not
more than seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000.00), and a
compensatory award for Plaintiff of not more than three thousand
dollars ($3,000.00), all to be paid from the Settlement Fund,
should be approved; and (4) whether this Action should be dismissed
with prejudice against the Defendants, as set forth in the
Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement dated May 18, 2018 (the
"Stipulation") filed with the Court.

You are receiving this Notice because the Court has certified a
class of investors for settlement purposes only ("Settlement
Class") and you may be a member of the certified class ("Settlement
Class Member"). The proposed Settlement Class will consist of all
Persons who purchased or acquired TranS1 securities (including
through the exercise of warrants or options) between February 23,
2009 and October 17, 2011, both dates inclusive (the "Class
Period") who were allegedly damaged thereby. Excluded from the
Settlement Class are (i) the Defendants; (ii) the officers and
directors of TranS1 during the Class Period; (iii) members of the
immediate families of the Individual Defendants and the officers
and directors of TranS1 during the Class Period; (iv) any entity in
which any Defendant had a controlling interest during the Class
Period; and (v) the successors, heirs, and assigns of any such
excluded Person. Also excluded from the Settlement Class are those
Persons who timely and validly seek exclusion from the Settlement
Class.

If you purchased TranS1 securities during the Class Period, your
rights may be affected by this Action and the Settlement thereof,
including the release and extinguishment of claims you may possess
relating to your ownership interest in TranS1 securities. If you
have not received a detailed Notice of Proposed Settlement of Class
Action, Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses, and Settlement
Fairness Hearing ("Notice") and a copy of the Proof of Claim and
Release Form, you may obtain copies by contacting the Claims
Administrator at:

          Singer v. TranS1, Inc., et al.
          c/o Epiq Class Action & Claims Solutions, Inc.
          PO Box 5270
          Portland, OR 97208-5270

This case has been litigated since January 24, 2012. Plaintiff
alleges, that in violation of the U.S. federal securities laws,
TranS1's securities were inflated during the Class Period.
Plaintiff alleges, among other things, that the Defendants made
false and/or misleading statements and/or omissions during the
Class Period regarding TranS1's reimbursement policies and
compliance with federal healthcare fraud and abuse laws, including
the Federal False Claims Act. Plaintiff further alleges that
partial disclosures and events revealed Defendants' fraud, thereby
injuring Plaintiff and the Settlement Class of investors.
Defendants deny these allegations. The Settlement will resolve the
lawsuit and claims as to the Defendants and the Released Parties.
Plaintiff and the Settlement Class are represented by Lead Counsel
who may be reached by contacting: Jeremy A. Lieberman, Pomerantz
LLP, 600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10016 (212)
661-1100.

If you are a Settlement Class Member, in order to share in the
distribution of the Net Settlement Fund, you must submit a Proof of
Claim and Release Form postmarked no later than January 2, 2019,
establishing that you are entitled to recovery. Unless you submit a
written exclusion request, you will be bound by any Judgment
rendered in the Action whether or not you make a claim.

If you want to be excluded from the Settlement Class, you must
submit to the Claims Administrator a request for exclusion, in
accordance with the procedures set forth in the Notice, so that it
is received no later than October 29, 2018. If you decide to
exclude yourself from the Settlement Class, and wish to file your
own individual lawsuit, Defendants may argue that you face a time
bar under applicable statutes of limitation or repose, risks that
you should discuss with an appropriate legal advisor. All members
of the Settlement Class who have not requested exclusion from the
Settlement Class will be bound by any Judgment entered in the
Action pursuant to the Stipulation.

If you are a Settlement Class Member and do not exclude yourself,
you can object to the Settlement, Plan of Allocation, or Lead
Counsel's request for an award of attorneys' fees and reimbursement
of expenses and compensatory award to Plaintiff in the manner and
form explained in the detailed Notice and received no later than
October 29, 2018.

Any questions regarding the Settlement should be directed to Lead
Counsel for the Settlement Class.

PLEASE DO NOT CONTACT THE COURT, THE CLERK'S OFFICE, THE
DEFENDANTS, OR DEFENDANTS' COUNSEL REGARDING THIS NOTICE.

DATED: February 23, 2018           
BY ORDER OF THE COURT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
1 On November 12, 2014, Baxano Surgical, Inc. petitioned for
bankruptcy relief in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Delaware. On July 24, 2015, the bankruptcy court
confirmed Baxano's bankruptcy plan, which provided for the
dissolution of Baxano upon the effective date of the plan. The plan
went into effect on August 10, 2015. [GN]

TRIANGLE CAPITAL: Kent Sues over Barings Merger Deal Disclosures
----------------------------------------------------------------
MICHAEL KENT, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. TRIANGLE CAPITAL CORPORATION; E. ASTON
POOLE; STEVEN C. LILLY; W. MCCOMB DUNWOODY; MARK M. GAMBILL;
BENJAMIN S. GOLDSTEIN; MARK F. MULHERN; SIMON B. RICH, JR.; and
GARLAND S. TUCKER, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-02137-ELH (D. Md.,
July 12, 2018) alleges violation of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.

According to the complaint, on April 3, 2018, the Defendant
Triangle Capital's Board of Directors entered into an Asset
Purchase Agreement with an affiliate, Benefit Street Partners
L.L.C., and a Stock Purchase and Transaction Agreement with Barings
LLC.

On June 1, 2018, the Defendants filed a proxy statement with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in connection with the
proposed transactions.

The Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that the proxy statement
fails to disclose the Defendant's projected cash flows; fails to
disclose the potential conflict of interest of their investment
banker; and fails to disclose material information regarding the
background of the proposed transactions, in violation of the
Securities Exchange Act.

Triangle Capital Corporation is a business development company
specializing in private equity and mezzanine investments. Triangle
Capital Corporation was incorporated on October 10, 2006 and is
based in Raleigh, North Carolina. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Thomas J. Minton, Esq.
          GOLDMAN & MINTON, P.C.
          3600 Clipper Mill Rd., Suite 201
          Baltimore, MD 21211
          Telephone: (410) 783-7575
          E-mail: tminton@charmcitylegal.com

               - and -

          RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
          300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 295-5310

               - and –

          RM LAW, P.C.
          1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300
          Berwyn, PA 19312
          Telephone: (484) 324-6800


TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: Faces Gross Suit over Disney Merger
---------------------------------------------------------
MELVIN GROSS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY FOX, INC.; RUPERT
MURDOCH; LACHLAN K. MURDOCH; CHASE CAREY; SIR RODERICK I.
EDDINGTON; DELPHINE ARNAULT; JAMES W. BREYER; DAVID DEVOE; VIET
DINH; JAMES MURDOCH; JACQUES NASSER; ROBERT SILBERMAN; and TIDJANE
THIAM, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-01046-UNA (D. Del., July 16,
2018) is an action against the Defendants and the members of its
Board of Directors for their violations of the Securities Exchange
Act. The Plaintiff also seeks to enjoin the vote on a proposed
transaction, pursuant to which, after spinning off certain of their
businesses into a newly listed company ("New Fox"), the Defendants
will be acquired by The Walt Disney Company ("Disney") through TWDC
Holdco 613 Corp. ("New Disney"), WDC Merger Enterprises I, Inc.
("Delta Sub") and WDC Merger Enterprises II, Inc. ("Wax Sub").

According to the complaint, on June 20, 2018, the Defendants and
Disney issued a joint press release announcing they had entered
into an Amended and Restated Agreement and Plan of Merger.  Under
the terms of the Merger Agreement, stockholders of the Defendants
will receive $38 per share, with the election to receive their
consideration, on a value equalized basis, in the form of cash or
stock, subject to 50/50 proration and further subject to adjustment
for certain tax liabilities.  The Proposed Transaction is valued at
$71.3 billion in cash and stock. Following the completion of the
Proposed Transaction, assuming the tax adjustment amount is zero,
the Defendants' stockholders will own approximately 17-20% and
Disney stockholders will own approximately 80% to 83% of the
combined company.

On June 28, 2018, the Defendants filed a Proxy Statement with the
SEC. The Proxy Statement, which recommends that the Defendants
stockholders vote in favor of the Proposed Transaction, omits or
misrepresents material information concerning, among other things:
(i) the Defendants' financial projections, including the financial
projections relied upon by the Defendants' financial advisors,
Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC and Centerview Partners LLC, in their
financial analyses; (ii) the data and inputs underlying the
financial valuation analyses that support the fairness opinions
provided by Goldman and Centerview; and (iii) Goldman's potential
conflicts of interest. The failure to adequately disclose such
material information constitutes a violation of Sections 14(a) and
20(a) of the Exchange Act as the Defendants' stockholders need such
information in order to make a fully-informed voting or appraisal
decision in connection with the Proposed Transaction.

Unless remedied, the Defendants' public stockholders will be forced
to make a voting or appraisal decision on the Proposed Transaction
without full disclosure of all material information concerning the
Proposed Transaction being provided to them.

Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc., together with its subsidiaries,
operates as a diversified media and entertainment company primarily
in the United States, the United Kingdom, Continental Europe, Asia,
and Latin AmericaThe company was formerly known as News
Corporation. Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. was founded in 1922 and
is headquartered in New York, New York. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ryan M. Ernst, Esq.
          Daniel P. Murray, Esq.
          O'KELLY ERNST & JOYCE, LLC
          901 N. Market St., Suite 1000
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 778-4000
          Facsimile: (302) 295-2873
          E-mail: rernst@oelegal.com
                 dmurray@oelegal.com

               - and -

          Richard A. Acocelli, Esq.
          Michael A. Rogovin, Esq.
          Kelly C. Keenan, Esq.
          WEISSLAW LLP
          1500 Broadway, 16th Floor
          New York, NY 10036
          Telephone: (212) 682-3025
          Facsimile: (212) 682-3010

               - and -

          Melissa A. Fortunato, Esq.
          BRAGAR EAGEL & SQUIRE, P.C.
          885 Third Avenue, Suite 3040
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 308-5858
          Facsimile: (212) 486-0462
          E-mail: fortunato@bespc.com


UNITED STATES: D.C. Court Grants TRO Against Asylum Seeker Removal
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court, District of Columbia, granted
Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order in the case
captioned M.G.U., et al., Plaintiffs, v. KIRSTJEN NIELSEN, et al.,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 18-1458 (PLF)(D.D.C.).

Plaintiff E.F. and her nine-year-old son fled threats of violence
in Guatemala to pursue asylum in the United States. After crossing
the U.S.-Mexico border on May 14, 2018, they were initially
detained together, but then forcibly separated the next day and
detained in facilities hundreds of miles apart. Ms. E.F. has not
seen her son since then.

At the hearing, counsel for Ms. E.F. orally moved for an order
prohibiting the defendants from removing Ms. E.F. from the United
States without her son prior to the Court's decision on her
preliminary injunction motion.

Counsel for the defendants explained that if the immigration judge
were to affirm the negative credible fear determination and deny
Ms. E.F.'s asylum application, she would be subject to a final
order of removal.

The order of removal would leave her at risk of being immediately
removed from the United States without her son before this Court
has an opportunity to resolve the pending motion for a preliminary
injunction.

What deeply troubles the Court at this stage is the risk that Ms.
E.F. will be removed from the United States without her young son
and without her valid consent to be removed without her son, before
the Court has an opportunity to rule on her preliminary injunction
motion seeking immediate reunification with him. The recent
representations made by the United States in the class action
pending before Judge Dana M. Sabraw in federal court in San Diego
only heighten this concern.   

Immediate reunification will be impossible if Ms. E.F. is removed
from the United States while her son remains detained here. And the
defendants have declined to commit to keeping Ms. E.F. in the
United States until after the Court rules on the preliminary
injunction motion.

In light of the urgent need to preserve the status quo until after
the Court has made a determination on the merits of Ms. E.F.'s
preliminary injunction motion, the Court will construe her lawyer's
oral motion for an order that she not be removed from the country
before she is reunited with her son, as a motion for a temporary
restraining order. And upon consideration of the arguments made by
counsel in their briefs and in open court, as well as the entire
record in this case, the Court will grant Ms. E.F.'s motion for a
temporary restraining order.

The purpose of a temporary restraining order is to preserve the
status quo for a limited period of time until the Court has an
opportunity to pass on the merits of the demand for a preliminary
injunction. While the Court must still consider the traditional
four-part test for injunctive relief even at the temporary
restraining order stage, the short duration of such an order and
the imminence of the harm may justify the grant of a temporary
restraining order to preserve the status quo.

The Defendants and their officers, agents, servants, employees,
attorneys, and all those who are in active concert or participation
with them, are temporarily restrained from removing from the United
States plaintiff E.F. until further order of this Court.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 16, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybey8we3 from
Leagle.com.

M. G. U., E. F. & A. P. F., Plaintiffs, represented by David J.
Ball -- dball@paulweiss.com -- PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON &
GARRISON LLP, Jerome William , TEXAS RIOGRANDE LEGAL AID, INC,
Amanda Chisholm , TEXAS RIOGRANDE LEGAL AID, INC, pro hac vice,
Anand Sithian -- asithian@paulweiss.com -- PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,
WHARTON & GARRISON LLP, pro hac vice, Katherine kelly Fell --
kfell@paulweiss.com -- PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON
LLP, pro hac vice, Meredith Arfa -- marfa@paulweiss.com -- PAUL,
WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP, Peter E. McGraw , TEXAS
RIOGRANDE LEGAL AID, INC, pro hac vice & Steven Herzog --
sherzog@paulweiss.com -- PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON
LLP, pro hac vice.

KIRSTJEN NIELSEN, THOMAS HOMAN, DANIEL A. BIBLE, RODNEY S. SCOTT,
KEVIN K. MCALEENAN, MANUEL PADILLA, JR., SCOTT LLOYD, ALEX AZAR,
ROBERT L. BOATRIGHT, WILLIAM JOYCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. CUSTOMS
AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES &
U.S. OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, Defendants, represented by
Jeremy S. Simon , U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA,Nicole Newcomb Murley , U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil
Division/Off. of Immig. Litigation & Sarah B. Fabian , U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

UNITED STATES: Sheridan County Vote to Join PILT Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Illiano, writing for The Sheridan Press, reports that
Sheridan county commissioners on July 17 voted to join a
class-action lawsuit against the federal government to recover
payments in lieu of taxes the county is owed.

The federal government provides PILT to local governments that
maintain federal lands. Governments cannot collect property taxes
on federal lands within their boundaries and PILT are designed to
help local governments provide services like firefighting, police
presence, schools and road maintenance to those lands.

The lawsuit began in 2017 in Kane County, Utah, after Congress did
not appropriate enough money to fully fund its PILT obligations in
fiscal years 2015, 2016 and 2017. Last December, a court ruled in
favor of Kane County and certified the lawsuit as a class action.

Since then, hundreds of counties from 48 states have joined the
lawsuit.

Deputy County Attorney Clint Beaver said Sheridan County can join
the class action lawsuit at no cost or risk.

"In my experience this is somewhat unique, but I would say there is
a very, very high likelihood of success," Beaver said. "Basically,
the case is already won."

County administrative director Renee Obermueller said Sheridan
County is owed about $37,000 in PILT payments from that three-year
period.

Commissioner Bob Rolston explained while Sheridan County receives a
relatively small amount in PILT payments, other counties are
reliant on the federal funding.

"You take counties like that county down in Utah, [PILT payments]
keep them going," Mr. Rolston said. "I think the fact that other
counties are tying on to help them in this class-action suit is a
very good thing."

Commissioner Terry Cram added that Sheridan County could also use
the $37,000 it is owed.

PILT payments were fully funded in 2018 and, in total, Wyoming
counties received about $32 million in federal funding.

Natrona County received the largest PILT payment at $3.6 million.

According to the county budget, Sheridan County received about $1.1
million in PILT payments during the last fiscal year. [GN]

UNITEDHEALTHCARE INSURANCE: Wrongfully Denied Healthcare Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
K.H.B. by and through his father, K.D.B., individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
UNITEDHEALTHCARE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, Case No.
3:18-cv-04175-JSC (N.D. Cal., July 12, 2018) is an action against
the Defendant for its alleged failure to comply with the terms of
its insured plans, specifically the Defendant's denial of coverage
for programs that treat documented mental illnesses and substance
use disorders.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff suffers from a variety of
mental illnesses, including major depressive disorder, suicide
ideation, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and drug use.
After his second suicide attempt, he sought and received treatment
for his illnesses at Elements Wilderness Program, a licensed
outdoor and behavioral therapy program located in Huntington, Utah.
Elements Wilderness is a fully licensed and statutorily authorized
by the State of Utah to provide an organized program of mental
health services to youths age 13-17 years in an outdoor setting.

The Plaintiff is enrolled in the Defendant's plan which expressly
covers mental health and substance abuse conditions. The plan
independently provides coverage for "all Medically Necessary
treatment" for a "Serious Emotional Disturbance" for an enrolled
dependent child, such as the Plaintiff, who suffers from, inter
alia, "risk of suicide. The plan further provides "all Medically
Necessary treatment" for a participant or beneficiary with a
"Severe Mental Illness" which includes a diagnosis of "major
depressive disorders."

Despite the fact that three separate coverage provisions in the
plan promised coverage for the Plaintiff's treatment at Elements
Wilderness, the Defendant excluded coverage based on the reason
that such claims are not available under the Plaintiff's plan.

UnitedHealthcare Insurance Company provides insurance services. The
Company offers vision, critical illness, short term health, dental,
medicaid, and term life insurance, as well as business plans and
group retiree benefits. UnitedHealthcare Insurance serves customers
in the United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Eleanor Hamburger, Esq.
          Richard E. Spoonemore, Esq.
          SIRIANNI YOUTZ
          SPOONEMORE HAMBURGER
          701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2560
          Seattle, WA 98104
          Telephone: (206) 223-0303
          Facsimile: (206) 223-0246
          E-mail: ele@sylaw.com
                  rspoonemore@sylaw.com

               - and -

          Jordan Lewis, Esq.
          JORDAN LEWIS, P.A.
          4473 N.E. 11th Avenue
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33334
          Telephone: (954) 616-8995
          Facsimile: (954) 206-0374
          E-mail: jordan@jml-lawfirm.com

               - and -

          Nina Wasow, Esq.
          Catha Worthman, Esq.
          FEINBERG JACKSON WORTHMAN
          & WASOW, LLP
          2030 Addison Street, Suite 500
          Berkeley, CA 94704
          Telephone: (510) 269-7998
          Facsimile: (510) 269-7994
          E-mail: nina@feinbergjackson.com
                  catha@feinbergjackson.com


US BANK: Underpays Mortgage Brokers, Loud Suit Alleges
------------------------------------------------------
James Loud, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. U.S. Bank National Association, and Does 1
through 10, Defendants, Case No. 8:18-cv-01235 (C.D. Cal., July 13,
2018) is an action against the Defendants for unpaid regular hours,
overtime hours, minimum wages, wages for missed meal and rest
periods.

Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as mortgage broker and
loan originator from May 2015 to March 2018.

U.S. Bank National Association provides commercial banking services
for individuals, businesses, and institutions. U.S. Bank National
Association was formerly known as Firstar Bank, National
Association and changed its name to U.S. Bank National Association
in August, 2001. The company was founded in 1863 and is based in
Cincinnati, Ohio. It has banking and ATMs locations in the United
States and internationally. U.S. Bank National Association operates
as a subsidiary of U.S. Bancorp. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joshua H. Haffner, Esq.
          Graham G. Lambert, Esq.
          HAFFNER LAW PC
          445 South Figueroa Street, Suite 2325
          Los Angeles, CA 90017
          Telephone: (213) 514-5681
          Facsimile: (213) 514-5682
          E-mail:jhh@haffnerlawyers.com
                 gl@haffnerlawyers.com

               - and -

          Paul Stevens, Esq.
          STEVENS, L.C.
          700 S. Flower Street, Suite 660
          Los Angeles, CA 90017
          Telephone: (213) 270-1211
          Facsimile: (213) 270-1223
          E-mail: pstevens@stevenslc.com


WEBSTAURANT STORE: TRO Bid in FLSA Suit Partly Granted
------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BRITTANY ROGERS, on behalf of Herself and All Others
Similarly-situated, Plaintiff, v. THE WEBSTAURANT STORE, INC.,
Defendant, Civil Action No. 4:18-CV-00074-JHM (W.D. Ky.), Judge
Joseph H. McKinley, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Kentucky, Owensboro Division, granted in part and
denied in part the Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order and Injunction.

On May 14, 2018, Rogers, filed a civil action against Webstaurant,
alleging that Webstaurant failed to pay overtime compensation to
Rogers and others similarly situated in violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA").  Rogers was employed by Webstaurant at the
customer support facility in Madisonville, Kentucky, from April 13,
2015 to Dec. 19, 2017, as a customer support specialist.

Rogers alleges Webstaurant engaged in three practices that deprived
her and similarly situated employees overtime pay under the FLSA:
(1) failing to pay employees for time worked in excess of forty
hours per week and for which Webstaurant knew the employee was
working because the employee was logged in to Webstaurant's
customer support or similar computer system, which records log-in
and log-out times; (2) failing to pay employees for time worked
(and intentionally not recorded by Webstaurant) by employees
preliminary to and after logging in to Webstaurant's customer
support system, including time opening the facility, preparing the
workstation, and logging in, time logging out, closing the
workstation, preparing the facility for closing, and time attending
training sessions and other meetings; and (3) requiring employees
under "performance improvement plans" to perform additional work
relating to those plans outside of such employees'
regularly-scheduled five eight-hour shifts per week, but not paying
employees for such work.

Webstaurant filed an answer denying that it failed to pay the
overtime compensation.  On June 13, 2018, the Plaintiff filed a
Motion for Conditional Certification, Expedited Discovery, and
Court-Authorized Notice.

On June 14, 2018, the Plaintiff filed an Emergency Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order prohibiting the Defendant from
communicating with putative class members about FLSA claims and
attempting to purport to settle FLSA claims, and filed a
supplemental memorandum for TRO.  Specifically, the Plaintiff seeks
an injunction ordering the Defendant: (A) to cease and desist from
communicating with the putative class members about the action or
the members' FLSA rights in any way other than to send an email;
(B) to send an email to all of the recipients of both of the
Defendant's emails referenced; (C) to file with the Court a
certificate that it has sent such email, along with the email
addresses to which such email was sent, to which the May 25 email
from Groff was sent and to which the June 11 email was sent; and
(D) to cease and desist from accepting or delivering purported
proposed waivers of rights to pursue claims against The WEBstaurant
Store, Inc. under the FLSA, including the purported proposed
waivers delivered June 13, 2018.

At the hearing, the Plaintiff further requested an expedited
briefing schedule for the conditional class certification motion, a
list of all employees that executed the Waiver and Release, and
attorney's fees incurred in filing the current motion.

On June 15, 2018, the Defendant filed a response, arguing that the
Plaintiff lacks standing to move for a Temporary Restraining Order.
Additionally, it contends that it has not engaged in any improper
communications with its own employees and did not convey any false
or misleading information regarding this litigation.  Webstaurant
maintains that Groff's communication was benign, alerting his
employees that Rogers or her attorney may be contacting them to
join in the suit against Webstaurant, and affirmatively conveyed
that employees would not be retaliated against for making claims
against the company in good faith.  Webstaurant argues that it has
engaged in no such action to coerce or retaliate against its
employees.

Judge McKinley rejected the Defendant's argument that the Plaintiff
lacks standing to bring the current motion.  He explains that
courts have consistently recognized that the district court's Rule
23(d) authority and FLSA authority extends to communications
between counsel and prospective class members.  Further, the law
reflects that a named plaintiff in a collective action certainly
has an interest in what current and former employees are being told
about the claims and what they are being required to sign to the
extent it affects the FLSA claim.

The Judge finds that the Defendant's communications with its
employees after the filing of the FLSA claim are misleading.  As
discussed in the hearing, while the May 25, 2018 email was not
terribly misleading, it did omit some important details about the
Plaintiff's action.  Plus, while the email promised the Company
would never retaliate against anyone bringing claims against the
company in good faith, one could reasonably infer from the email
that the Company believes the Plaintiff's claim were not made in
good faith.  Thus, one is left to wonder about possible
retaliation.  However, it is the June 11, 2018 email, when viewed
in light of the Waiver and Release that is misleading and improper
and causes the most concern.

Therefore, in an effort to alleviate the misleading and coercive
communications, the Judge ordered the Defendant to send a
corrective email to all employees who received the previous emails.
This corrective email will be sent by June 21, 2018, by 3:00 p.m.
(CDT).  The Defendant will file a certification on June 22, 2018,
confirming compliance with the Order.

He did not enjoin the Defendant from paying the compensation
offered to those employees that executed the Waiver and Release.
However, as outlined in the corrective email, the acceptance of
compensation, and the execution of the Waiver and Release, will not
prevent any employee from joining the collective action if it is
certified.

Additionally, the Company is prohibited from issuing any further
company-wide communications pertaining to the action without prior
approval of the Court.  Finally, in considering the Court's
obligation to tailor its order in the least restrictive manner, the
Judge denied the Plaintiff's motion to prevent any future contact
by the Defendant with putative class members.  The Defendant may
continue to conduct fact-finding investigations with its current
employees in an effort to address the current motion for
conditional certification and its defense of the action.
Additionally, the Order is in no way intended to interfere with the
Defendant's ability to communicate with its employees about other
business matters.

The Judge denied the Plaintiff's request for expedited briefing
with respect to the conditional certification motion currently
pending.  He likewise denied the Plaintiff's motion for attorney's
fees for bringing the motion.  Finally, he granted the Plaintiff's
motion to compel the Defendant to provide a list of all employees
who have executed the Waiver and Release.  On July 20, 2018, the
Defendant will provide this information to the Plaintiff's
counsel.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 20, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://bit.ly/2OEneKq from Leagle.com.

Brittany Rogers, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly-situated, Plaintiff, represented by Mark N. Foster --
MFoster@MarkNFoster.com.

The Webstaurant Store, Inc., Defendant, represented by Courtney L.
Graham -- cgraham@strauselawgroup.com -- Strause Law Group, PLLC,
Randall S. Strause -- rstrause@strauselawgroup.com -- Strause Law
Group, PLLC & Parker M. Wornall --
pwornall@strauselawgroup.com -- Strause Law Group, PLLC.

WELLS FARGO: Murphy Appeals Ruling in Jabbari Suit to 9th Cir.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Objector Mike Murphy filed an appeal from a court ruling in the
lawsuit titled Shahriar Jabbari, et al. v. Wells Fargo & Company,
et al., Case No. 3:15-cv-02159-VC, in the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California, San Francisco.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Wells Fargo
will pay $142 million to settle class action claims that it
secretly opened credit cards and unauthorized accounts in
customers' names going back to 2002.

The bank was hit hard by the discovery that its staff opened
millions of bank accounts and credit cards for customers without
their consent in an effort to meet internal sales goals.

Lead Plaintiff Shahriar Jabbari sued Wells Fargo in May 2015,
claiming it encouraged employees to use fraudulent and deceptive
tactics to persuade customers to open fee-generating accounts by
misrepresenting them or not informing them at all.

The appellate case is captioned as Shahriar Jabbari, et al. v.
Wells Fargo & Company, et al., Case No. 18-16284, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by August 8, 2018;

   -- Transcript is due on September 7, 2018;

   -- Appellant Mike Murphy's opening brief is due on October 17,
      2018;

   -- Appellees Kaylee Heffelfinger, Shahriar Jabbari, Wells
      Fargo & Company and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s answering
      brief is due on November 19, 2018; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Objector-Appellant MIKE MURPHY is represented by:

          Steven Bradley Scow, Esq.
          KOCH & SCOW, LLC
          11500 S. Eastern Ave., Suite 210
          Henderson, NV 89052
          Telephone: (702) 318-5040
          E-mail: sscow@kochscow.com

Plaintiffs-Appellees SHAHRIAR JABBARI and KAYLEE HEFFELFINGER, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, are
represented by:

          Gretchen Freeman Cappio, Esq.
          Benjamin Gould, Esq.
          Derek W. Loeser, Esq.
          Daniel Parke Mensher, Esq.
          Lynn Lincoln Sarko, Esq.
          KELLER ROHRBACK LLP
          1201 Third Avenue, Suite 3200
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 623-1900
          E-mail: gcappio@kellerrohrback.com
                  bgould@kellerrohrback.com
                  dloeser@kellerrohrback.com
                  dmensher@kellerrohrback.com
                  lsarko@kellerrohrback.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey Greg Lewis, Esq.
          KELLER ROHRBACK LLP
          300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone: (510) 463-3900
          E-mail: jlewis@kellerrohrback.com

               - and -

          Matthew J. Preusch, Esq.
          KELLER ROHRBACK LLP
          1129 State Street, Suite 8
          Santa Barbara, CA 93101
          Telephone: (805) 456-1496
          Facsimile: (805) 456-1497
          E-mail: mpreusch@kellerrohrback.com

Defendants-Appellees WELLS FARGO & COMPANY and WELLS FARGO BANK,
N.A., are represented by:

          Manuel Francisco Cachan, Esq.
          Bart H. Williams, Esq.
          PROSKAUER ROSE LLP
          2049 Century Park East
          Los Angeles, CA 90067-3206
          Telephone: (310) 284-4568
          E-mail: manuel.cachan@mto.com
                  bart.williams@mto.com

               - and -

          Erin J. Cox, Esq.
          Eric P. Tuttle, Esq.
          MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP
          350 South Grand Avenue, 50th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 683-9575
          E-mail: erin.cox@mto.com
                  Eric.Tuttle@mto.com

               - and -

          Jeslyn A. Everitt, Esq.
          David H. Fry, Esq.
          MUNGER TOLLES & OLSON, LLP
          560 Mission Street, 27th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Telephone: (415) 512-4040
          E-mail: jeslyn.everitt@mto.com
                  david.fry@mto.com


WHOLE FOODS: Order for Interlocutory Appeal in "Molock" Certified
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
granted Defendant's Motion to Certify Order for Interlocutory
Appeal in the case captioned MICHAEL MOLOCK, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
WHOLE FOODS MARKET GROUP, INC., Defendant,
CaseNo.16-cv-02483(APM)(D.D.C.).

The Plaintiffs, who are current and former employees of WFMG,
allege that WFMG abused the Gainsharing program on a nationwide
scale by shifting labor costs to store departments that were
underperforming, thus reducing or negating the bonuses that would
have been owed to employees in an over-performing department. The
Plaintiffs' claims arise solely under District of Columbia or state
law.

WFMG now urges this court to certify its March 15, 2018 order for
interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b) to allow the
D.C. Circuit to weigh in on whether the jurisdictional limits
proscribed in Bristol-Myers Squibb extend to unnamed, nonresident
members of a putative nationwide class in federal court.

Under 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b), the certification of an order for
interlocutory appeal is appropriate when (1) the order involves a
controlling question of law; (2) a substantial ground for
difference of opinion concerning the ruling exists; and (3) an
immediate appeal would materially advance the litigation.

Here, whether Bristol-Myers Squibb applies to claims of unnamed,
nationwide putative class members in a federal court is a threshold
jurisdictional question. If this court's decision is correct, the
court may exercise specific jurisdiction over the claims of
thousands of unnamed, nonresident putative class members. On the
other hand, if the court is wrong and it lacks specific
jurisdiction over such claims, this court could not entertain a
nationwide class action and the most Plaintiffs could seek to
certify is a District of Columbia class.

The difference in scope of these two scenarios need not be
belabored. Quite obviously, a nationwide class action would place
far greater demands on this court and the Defendant than would a
case that goes forward with only a geographically limited class.
For that reason, the order from which the Defendant seeks
interlocutory review involves a controlling question of law.

The Plaintiffs' counsel conceded that, in order to establish a
class consisting of current and former WFMG employees, and
presumably to determine damages, he might demand more than a
decade's worth of payroll records from well over two hundred Whole
Foods grocery stores operated by WFMG. Furthermore, counsel stated
that it is his belief that the Gainsharing program abuse goes
beyond WFMG and infects other Whole Foods operating companies. WFMG
is one of multiple companies that operate Whole Foods grocery
stores throughout the country. WFMG's stores are located primarily
on the eastern seaboard.  

The Plaintiffs' counsel intends to take discovery that will show
that abuse of the Gainsharing program was sanctioned at the highest
corporate levels and was commonplace throughout the country. If the
Plaintiffs can make such a showing, counsel explained, they intend
to amend the complaint to add the other operating companies, so
that the Plaintiffs can certify a true nationwide class that covers
the current and former employees of every Whole Foods store in the
country. See id. at 22-23. There are nearly 500 such stores.

Thus, if the Plaintiffs succeed in their plan, they will ask for
discovery concerning nearly 500 Whole Foods grocery stores and the
thousands of people employed in those stores. The potential time
and expense of obtaining such discovery is staggering.

On the other hand, if the court is wrong about Bristol-Myers
Squibb, this case becomes simpler and discovery far more
manageable. The Plaintiffs could not certify in this district court
a class of all WFMG employees, let alone a true nationwide class.
At most, the Plaintiffs would be able to certify a District of
Columbia class, consisting of employees who worked in the
District's five Whole Foods stores operated by WFMG. In addition,
if a nationwide class action cannot be brought here, the court will
not face the potential of grappling with the laws of the 43 states
in which Whole Foods does business. The court would rather avoid
such a morass if it is in fact wrong about Bristol-Myers Squibb's
application in this matter.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 11, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion is available https://tinyurl.com/y7uwsft6 from Leagle.com.

MICHAEL MOLOCK & RANDAL KUCZOR, Plaintiffs, represented by
Christopher J. Regan -- cregan@reganfirm.com -- REGAN ZAMBRI &
LONG, PLLC & Salvatore J. Zambri -- szambri@reganfirm.com -- REGAN
ZAMBRI & LONG, PLLC.

CARL BOWENS, JON PACE, SARAH STRICKLAND, JOSE FUENTES & CHRISTOPHER
MILNER, Plaintiffs, represented by Christopher J. Regan , REGAN
ZAMBRI & LONG, PLLC.

WHOLE FOODS MARKET, INC., Defendant, represented by Gregory J.
Casas -- casasg@gtlaw.com -- GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP & David E.
Sellinger -- sellingerd@gtlaw.com -- GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP.

WHOLE FOODS MARKET GROUP, INC., Defendant, represented by Gregory
J. Casas , GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP, David E. Sellinger , GREENBERG
TRAURIG, LLP & John H. Hempfling, II , WHOLE FOODS MARKET CENTRAL
OFFICE, pro hac vice.

WISCONSIN: Settlement in Juvenile Inmates' Suit Has Prelim Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, J.J., et. al., Plaintiffs, v. Jon E. Litscher, et.
al., Defendants, Case No. 17-CV-47 (W.D. Wis.), Judge James D.
Petersen of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin granted the parties' Joint Motion for Preliminary
Approval of Class Action Settlement.

Judge Petersen granted preliminary approval to the Proposed
Settlement Agreement, finding it to be sufficiently fair,
reasonable, and adequate for the purpose of such preliminary
approval.  

He also approved the Notice to the Class.  Within 10 days of the
entry of the Order, the Defendants will (a) post at least one copy
of the Notice to the Class and the Proposed Settlement Agreement on
every bulletin board in the common areas of all housing units at
the Lincoln Hills School for Boys and Copper Lake School for Girls
("LHS/CLS"); (b) hand-deliver one copy of the Notice to the Class
and the Proposed Settlement Agreement to each youth housed in room
confinement; (c) send by first class mail one copy of the Notice to
the Class and the Proposed Settlement Agreement to the parent or
legal guardian of each youth incarcerated at LHS/CLS; and d) for
youth no longer in custody but who were confined at Lincoln Hills
School for Boys or Copper Lake School for Girls at anytime from
Sept. 18, 2017 through the present, send by first class mail one
copy of the Notice to the Class and the Proposed Settlement
Agreement to the last known address of both the youth and the
parent/guardian.  Within 15 days of the entry of the Order, the
Defendants and/or their agents will prepare and submit to the Class
Counsel a declaration of compliance with the provision.

Objections to the Proposed Settlement Agreement must be made in
writing and must be received by the Plaintiffs' counsel no later
than 30 days after the entry of the Order.

The Judge directed the Plaintiffs and/or the Parties to jointly
submit a Motion for Final Approval of the Settlement within 45 days
of the entry of the Order.  The Court will hold a Fairness Hearing
on Sept. 13, 2018 at 9:00 a.m.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 20, 2018 Order is available at
https://bit.ly/2O59Zla from Leagle.com.

J. J., By and through his next friend Sakeena Jackson, K. D., By
and through her next friends John Levy and Meranda Davis, C. M., By
and through his next friend Toinette Ducksworth, R. N., By and
through his next friend Gloria Norwood, M.S., By and through his
next friend Jolene Waupekanay, A.V., By and through his next friend
Veronica Rocha-Montejano, M.R., By and through his next friend
Autumn Rodgers, S.K., By and through her next friend Thomas Korn,
A.P., By and through her next friend Louise Plaskey, C.B., By and
through his next friend and grandmother, Flossie Johnson & D.P., By
and through her mother and next friend, Earnestine Perry,
Plaintiffs,

represented by Emily Logan Stedman, Quarles & Brady, Jessica R.
Feierman -- jfeierman@jlc.org -- Juvenile Law Center, Karen U.
Lindell, Juvenile Law Center, Karyn L. Rotker , ACLU of Wisconsin
Foundation, Inc., Laurence J. Dupuis -- ldupuis@aclu-wi.org -- Aclu
Of Wisconsin Foundation, Inc., Marsha L. Levick, Juvenile Law
Center, Matthew J. Splitek -- matthew.splitek@quarles.com --
Quarles & Brady LLP, Rachel Anne Graham --
rachel.graham@quarles.com -- Quarles & Brady LLP, Asma Imtiazali
Kadri, American Civil Liberties Union of Wisconsin Foundation,
Katherine E. Burdick, Juvenile Law Center, R. Timothy Muth, Aclu Of
Wisconsin Foundation, Inc. & Zachary T. Eastburn --
zachary.eastburn@quarles.com -- Quarles and Brady LLP.

Jon E. Litscher, Secretary, Wisconsin Department of Corrections,
John D. Paquin, Administrator, Juvenile Division of Corrections, WI
Dept. of Corrections, Wendy A. Peterson, Superintendent, Lincoln
Hills School for Boys & Copper Lake School for Girls & Brian
Gustke, Director of Security, Lincoln Hills School for Boys &
Copper Lake School for Girls, Defendants, represented by Benjamin
Andrew Sparks , Crivello Carlson, S.C. & Samuel C. Hall, Jr. --
shall@crivellocarlson.com -- Crivello Carlson, S.C.

The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, The Wisconsin State Journal, The
Associated Press, The Wisconsin Newspaper Association & The
Wisconsin Freedom of Information Council, Intervenors, represented
by Dustin Brett Brown -- dbrown@gklaw.com -- Godfrey & Kahn, S.C..

ZICAM LLC: Oct. 3 Class Action Settlement Claims Filing Deadline
----------------------------------------------------------------
Brittany Anas, writing for Simplemost, reports that what's worse
than going to the grocery store hungry? Going to the drugstore when
you've got a cold. With sniffles, a sore throat and popping ears,
you bring home a haul of pricey cold medicines -- and it adds
insult to injury (err, cold) when those pills and syrups don't
actually deliver on their promises of fast relief.

Nodding your head in agreement? You could be eligible for up to
$57.65 if you've purchased some of Zicam's popular cold relief
products in the last seven years -- even if you don't have receipts
to prove it.

According to a class-action lawsuit, Zicam has made false and
misleading claims about the effectiveness of some of its products.
Zicam, though, denies the claims.

To be eligible, you need to live in the United States and have
purchased the following Zicam products between Feb. 15, 2011, to
June 5, 2018: RapidMelts Ultra, Oral Mist, Ultra Crystals,
Liqui-Lozenges, Lozenges Ultra, Soft Chews, Medicated Fruit Drops
and Chewables.

The form, which can be filed online or sent by mail, will ask you
to note how many of the products you purchased and the location of
your purchases.

The payments will be made out of a $16 million settlement fund. The
RapidMelts Original product is valued at $11.53, so if you
purchased five of those, you could be eligible for $57.65. However,
your payment will be adjusted based on the number of claims that
are submitted, potentially increasing or decreasing the amount you
receive.

If you purchased six or more of the Zicam products covered in the
settlement, and you do happen to have your receipts or proof or
purchase (like packaging), you can submit that documentation for
additional reimbursement.

The deadline to file a claim is Oct. 3, 2018.

Oh, and if you're looking for some tips for how to beat a cold here
are the secrets of people who never get sick, how doctors and
nurses fend off colds and flu viruses and the foods nutritionists
eat when they get sick. [GN]

ZIMMER BIOMET: Underpays Sales Associate, Karl Suit Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------
JAMES KARL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. ZIMMER BIOMET HOLDINGS, INC.; ZIMMER US,
INC.; BIOMET U.S. RECONSTRUCTION, LLC; BIOMET BIOLOGICS, LLC; and
BIOMET, INC., Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-04176-JCS (N.D. Cal.,
July 12, 2018) is an action against the Defendants for unpaid
regular hours, overtime hours, minimum wages, wages for missed meal
and rest periods.

Mr. Karl was employed by the Defendants as sales associate.

Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc., together with its subsidiaries,
designs, manufactures, and markets musculoskeletal healthcare
products and solutions in the Americas, Europe, the Middle East,
Africa, and the Asia Pacific. The company was formerly known as
Zimmer Holdings, Inc. and changed its name to Zimmer Biomet
Holdings, Inc. in June 2015. Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc. was
founded in 1927 and is headquartered in Warsaw, Indiana. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jason Lohr, Esq.
          Alec Segarich, Esq.
          LOHR RIPAMONTI & SEGARICH LLP
          140 Geary Street, 4th Fl.
          San Francisco, CA 94108
          Telephone: (415) 683-7266
          Facsimile: (415) 683-7267
          E-mail: jason.lohr@lrllp.com
                  alec.segarich@lrllp.com

               - and –

          Denis Kenny, Esq.
          SCHERER SMITH & KENNY  LLP
          140 Geary Street, 7th Fl.
          San Francisco, CA 94108
          Telephone: (415) 433-1099
          Facsimile: (415) 433-9434
          E-mail: denis@sfcounsel.com


[*] Ballard Spahr Attorneys Discuss FDCPA Class Action
------------------------------------------------------
Daniel C. Fanaselle, Esq. -- fanaselled@ballardspahr.com -- and
Joel A. Tasca, Esq. -- tasca@ballardspahr.com -- of Ballard Spahr
LLP, in an article for National Review, wrote that in a recent
decision, a federal court in the Southern District of New York
(SDNY) dismissed a putative class action complaint alleging, among
other things, that a mortgage servicer violated the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) by charging improper property
inspection fees after the mortgagors defaulted on their mortgage
loans. The plaintiffs claimed that the charges were "excessive,"
"[un]reasonable," and "[in]appropriate," and alleged that they were
frequently assessed when property inspections had not been
conducted. Thus, the plaintiffs argued that the servicer "knowingly
misrepresented" the charges as "lawful," "reasonable,"
"legitimate," and "proper," when it "knew that the inspections were
not necessary to maintain or protect the properties."

While the court found that the defendant was not a "debt
collector," it held that the claim would fail even if the servicer
were subject to the FDCPA because the terms of the mortgage
agreements expressly permitted the lender to charge property
inspection fees in the event of a default. Therefore, the servicer
could only be found liable if the FDCPA imposed a duty to disclose
"that the fees were not reasonable and Plaintiffs were therefore
not obligated to pay." The court held that the FDCPA imposes no
such duty, and found persuasive the reasoning in another recent
decision from the SDNY, which addressed the same argument (that the
defendant "fail[ed] to disclose that the assessed [property
inspection] fees were unnecessary") in the context of a civil RICO
claim. In that case, the court found that the plaintiff was unable
to satisfy RICO's misrepresentation requirement because, as with
the recent case, the underlying mortgage agreement "explicitly
authorize[d] property inspections." Accordingly, the claim was
governed by the terms of the mortgage and plaintiff's dispute of
those terms – and if meritorious, the defendant's "failure to
'concede breach of contract liability'" -- did not "create
additional causes of action." Applying this reasoning, the court
concluded that the defendant did not make any false or misleading
statements regarding the property inspection fees, because it
"label[ed] them for what they were" -- and the plaintiffs' belief
that the fees were excessive or unreasonable -- even if justified
-- did not render them actionable under the FDCPA.

The court's findings (while largely dicta) are notable because,
despite numerous recent appellate court decisions involving
post-default fees, few courts have specifically addressed "whether
charging mortgagors for allegedly unreasonable . . . fees in the
event of default . . . amounts to an FDCPA violation." By affirming
that that the terms of the mortgage control, the court clarified
that mortgage servicers (even if they qualify as "debt collectors")
do not run afoul of the FDCPA by assessing default-related fees and
costs that are permitted under the terms of the mortgage -- even if
the consumer finds them to be "excessive" or "unreasonable."
Notably, however, the court left open the possibility of a viable
FDCPA claim based on "concealed or inflated" property inspection
fees. And while the distinction between "excessive" and "inflated"
fees may be debatable, the latter term seems (at least under this
court's reasoning) to suggests an element of scienter or
willfulness on the part of the servicer. This comports with the
court's reference to the standard applied under RICO and suggests
the fee assessed by the servicer must misrepresent -- rather than
merely misapply -- the terms of the mortgage. [GN]

[*] US-Style Class Action Procedure on the Cards for Scotland
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Scotsman reports that a new American-style class action
procedure is on the cards for Scotland following the passing of the
Civil Litigation (Expenses and Group Proceedings)(Scotland) Act
2018 by MSPs in May. The Act means that financial institutions and
businesses may be exposed to large collective legal claims in
future rather than just claims by individual litigants.

A class action is a legal procedure enabling a group or class of
people with related legal claims to bring their claim to court
together in one action. Class action litigation has been a feature
of the American legal system for some time with damages, in some
prominent cases, running to billions of dollars.

In Scotland however, historically there's been no class action
procedure. Instead, the normal approach is for related cases to be
sisted (otherwise known as paused) whilst an individual "test case"
proceeds. Alternatively, the court issues bespoke orders in cases
with similar facts to control how they progress. These approaches
however can be problematic. Firstly, a suitable case requires to be
selected from the actions raised as the test case. Secondly,
parties to related cases need to decide whether to negotiate a
settlement on the basis of the judgment in the test case or proceed
independently in light of that decision. The uncertain approach of
the court and the potential for repeat legal costs has led to
claims of this nature being relatively few in number in Scotland.
In introducing a special class action procedure -- referred to as
"group procedure" in the legislation
-- the Act is likely to bring about an increase in future "mass"
litigation. Such actions will become more feasible financially
under the new rules as legal costs will be spread across the group
of litigants rather than borne by an individual. In terms of the
new procedure itself the detailed rules as to how it will operate
will be developed by the Scottish Civil Justice Council over the
coming months. However, the Act sets out the parameters within
which these rules will work. The new group procedure will only be
available in the Court of Session, and therefore for claims in
excess of GBP100,000, and there must be a minimum of two
claimants.

The permission of the court will be required in order to bring the
group action. Permission will only be granted if the claims made
raise issues of fact or law which are "the same as, similar or
related to each other". "All reasonable efforts" will also need to
be made to notify potential claimants within the specified class.
Guidance from the court will be required as to what these concepts
are to mean in practice.

Finally, the legislation does not limit the type of claim that can
be made in group proceedings. Commonly such claims relate to
product liability, shareholder and financial services disputes,
large-scale accidents and employee rights, although it's possible
that the final court rules may restrict these categories.

One important preliminary question which is not addressed in the
Act, and which will require to be considered by the Scottish Civil
Justice Council, is whether the new procedure is to be "opt-in" or
"opt-out" or a hybrid regime.

An "opt-in" procedure would allow individual litigants to keep
their claims separate from the class unless they opt-in to the
group action. On the other hand an "opt-out" approach would require
any claimant who doesn't wish to be bound by the decision of the
group action to positively opt-out and take their own action.

Nevertheless, whilst with the opt-in regime the claimant numbers
will be clear, the size of the potential claimant group in an
opt-out approach may not. For that reason large defenders are
likely to prefer an opt-in approach as it should make negotiating
settlement of such claims, if necessary, much easier. We'll need to
wait until the new rules are published to assess the full impact of
the new procedure on business in Scotland. However there's no doubt
that in whatever their final form the group proceedings rules will
have a significant bearing on how mass claims are litigated in
future. Financial institutions and large companies in Scotland
should monitor these developments very closely. [GN]


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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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