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             C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

             Wednesday, July 18, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 143

                            Headlines

1-800 CONTACTS: Loses Bid to Dismiss "Thompson" Antitrust Suit
184 FOOD CORP: Fails to Pay Minimum & Overtime Wages, Pareja Says
1832 ASSET: Faces Class Action Over Trailing Commissions
ACACIA COMMUNICATIONS: Judge Dismisses Securities Class Action
ACX PACIFIC: Court Denies Certification of 2 Subclasses

ALABAMA, USA: Court Denies Bid to Certify Class in "Yeager" Suit
ALCON RESEARCH: Fails to Pay Overtime Under FLSA, "Horne" Alleges
AMCOL SYSTEMS: Third Circuit Appeal Filed in "Magana" Class Suit
AMERICAN TRAFFIC: Pincus Sues Over Illegally Imposed 5% Surcharge
ANYTIME FITNESS: Faces "Duncan" Suit in S.D. New York

APPLE INC: SCOTUS Ruling in App Case May Impact E-Commerce Firms
APPLE INC: Faces "Rodriguez" Class Suit Over Defective Devices
AUSTRALIA: Pink Batts Scheme Class Action Reaches Final Stages
BHP: Casual Coal Mining Workers' Class Action Obtains Funding
BHP: Augusta Ventures to Fund Coal Mine Class Action

BHP: Law Firm to Spend Millions to Prosecute Mineworkers' Case
BI INC: Class of ISAP Case Specialists Conditionally Certified
BLUESTEM BRANDS: Faces Class Action Over Off-the-Clock Rule
BROOKLYN EVENTS: Faces "Duncan" Suit in S.D. New York
BUKHARA INDIAN: $515K Pre-Judgment Attachment in "Prabir" Granted

CALIFORNIA: Denial of Pre-Judgment Attorney's Fees Reversed
CAMPO'S DELI: Moves for Consolidation of 9 "Conner" Class Suits
CANADA: Responds to Bullying, Harassment Class Action v. RCMP
CAPEX OILFIELD: Jones Moves to Certify Class of Field Employees
CBOE EXCHANGE: Accused by LRI Invest Suit of Manipulating VIX

CHG EMPLOYEE: Haydel Sues Over Patient Care Nurses' Unpaid OT
CLUB AT NORTH HALTON: Obtains Favorable Ruling in Class Action
COLUMBIA PIPELINE: Faces Class Action Over TransCanada Sale
CREDIT ONE: Anderson Submits Waiver to Respond in Sup. Ct. Case
CRICKET COMMS: 4th Cir. Affirms Denial of Bid to Intervene

CU RECOVERY: Faces "Riggen" Suit Over Deceptive Debt Collection
DETROIT, MI: Judge Inks Tax Foreclosure Class Action Settlement
DEUTSCHE BANK: Statistical Sampling Use in RMBS Suit Denied
DIETZ & WATSON: Court Conditionally Certifies "Rozeboom" Class
DITECH FINANCIAL: Accused by "Perez" Suit of Violating FDCPA

EDISON INTERNATIONAL: Wilson Appeals C.D. Cal. Order to 9th Cir.
EMERGENCY COVERAGE: Court OKs $1,360 Settlement Fund in "Harbin"
EVERETT ASSOCIATION: Thomas Appeals W.D. Wash. Ruling to 9th Cir.
EXPERT GROUP: Appeals Decision in Colony Suit to Tenth Circuit
FAMOUS BOURBON: Class of Employees Certified in "Richardson" Suit

FLEX PHARMA: Federman & Sherwood Files Class Action Lawsuit
FOGO DE CHAO: Class Action Dismissed Without Prejudice
FORD MOTOR: Faces Class Action Over EcoBoost Engine Issues
FRESH THYME: Blagg Seeks to Certify Class of Workers Under FLSA
FRESHPET INC: Certification of Class Sought in "Curran" Suit

GC SERVICES: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss "O'Boyle" FDCPA Suit
GEO GROUP: Files Petition for Writ of Certiorari in "Menocal"
GODADDY.COM LLC: Ninth Circuit Appeal Filed in "Herrick" Suit
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES: Ninth Circuit Appeal Filed in "Stone" Suit
GRUBHUB HOLDINGS: Sued by Wallace for Misclassifying Drivers

GWC WARRANTY: Denial of Bid to Dismiss "Signor" Reversed
HALO TOP: Sued for Allegedly Underfilling Ice Cream Pints
HARVEY WEINSTEIN: Third Accuser Added to List of Abused Women
HYATT CORP: Mediation Moots Bid to Dismiss "Matthews"
IC SYSTEM: "Kaur" Suit Seeks Redress From Illegal Debt Collection

IDAHO: Court Dismisses Constitutional Challenge to SORA
INDIANA: Court Certifies Class of Disenfranchised Inmates
LA CABANITA MEXICAN: Fails to Pay OT to Cooks, "Martinez" Claims
LONG BEACH, CA: Patel Appeals C.D. Calif. Ruling to Ninth Circuit
LONG ISLAND RAIL: Disabled People File Discrimination Lawsuit

M3 FINANCIAL: Wins Final Approval of Settlement in "Mason" Suit
MARQUEZ BROTHERS: EEOC Lawyer May Face Sanctions, Case to Proceed
MERCK & CO: Faces TID Antitrust Suit Over Ezetimibe Drug
MIAMI-DADE EXPRESSWAY: Class Action Over Tolls Can Proceed
MICHELLE KANG YI: Tolefree Sues Over Violations of Housing Laws

MILBERG LLP: Sup. Ct. Extends Writ Filing to Aug. 6 in "Bobbitt"
NBTY: Judge Allows Ted Frank to Challenge Payments to Objectors
NCAA: Court Dismisses Poppy Livers' FLSA Suit
NESTLE WATERS: Court Dismisses Poland Spring Fraud Suit
OAKLEY INC: Faces "Duncan" Suit in S.D. New York

PARAGON: Rapper Named Defendant in Cryptocurrency Class Action
PC RICHARD: Faces "Duncan" Suit in S.D. New York
PEPSI-COLA CO: FAC in Diet Pepsi False Advertising Suit Dismissed
PEPSI-COLA CO: Second Circuit Appeal Filed in "Manuel" Class Suit
PETROBRAS: Judge Cuts Class Action Lawyers' Fees by $100MM

PHARMAVITE LLC: 9th Cir. Reverses Dismissal of "Bradach" Suit
POLARITYTE INC: Faces Securities Class Action in Utah
PRINCIPAL GLOBAL: Seeks Dismissal of 401(k) Plan Class Action
PROTHENA CORP: July 16 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
RIVERSIDE COUNTY, CA: ACLU Files Racial Discrimination Case

ROBERT FICO: Class Action Mulled Over Parliamentary Pensions
ROBERTO COIN: Faces "Duncan" Suit in S.D. New York
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS: Faces Class Action Over RAM Price-Fixing
SAN BENITO COUNTY, CA: CSA Threatens Class Action Over Fees
SAN JOSE, CA: Wallace Appeals N.D. Calif. Ruling to Ninth Circuit

SI SE PUEDE: Cline Seeks to Recover Wages, OT Pay and Expenses
SIBANYE GOLD: Rosen Law Firm Files Securities Class Action
STATE FARM: Little Rock Lawyer Continues Pursuit of Class Action
SUNOCO PIPELINE: "March" Class Suit Removed to E.D. Pennsylvania
SYNCHRONY BANK: McMullen Seeks Prelim. Nod of Class Settlement

TIEC INC: "Spasic" Suit Seeks to Recover Overtime Under FLSA
TRINITY THRU: Fails to Pay Oil Field Workers' OT, Valenzuela Says
TRINITY RESTAURANT: Whitfield Moves to Certify Class of Servers
TROTT LAW: Wins Preliminary Approval of "Martin" Class Settlement
TWININGS: Sheppard Mullin Attorneys Discuss Class Action Ruling

UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Class Action Not Subject to Arbitration
UNITED ASSOCIATION: Faces "Poe" Suit Alleging ERISA Violation
UNITED STATES: ACLU Files Amended Complaint in Immigrants Case
UNITED STATES: ICE Ordered to Halt Asylum Seeker Detention Policy
US ENVIRONMENTAL: Formica Moves to Certify Class Under FLSA

VIVINT SOLAR: Violates TCPA by Using ATDS, "Rogers" Suit Alleges
VOLKSWAGEN GROUP: Court Narrows Claims in "Deras" Suit
WOLF FIRM: Manos Appeals C.D. Cal. Decision to Ninth Circuit
YELLOW BIRD: "Pena" Suit Seeks to Recover OT Pay Under FLSA
ZACHRY CONSTRUCTION: Faces Wage Class Action in Texas

* Justice Kennedy's Retirement Won't Move Class Action Pendulum


                            *********


1-800 CONTACTS: Loses Bid to Dismiss "Thompson" Antitrust Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Utah,
Central Division, denied Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the case
captioned J. THOMPSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. 1-800 CONTACTS,
INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 2:16-CV-1183-TC (D. Utah).

The Plaintiffs, who bought contact lenses online from the
Defendants, allege that they paid artificially-inflated prices
for those contact lenses due to Defendants' anti-competitive
agreements. To recover damages, they bring this proposed class
action alleging antitrust violations of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act.

The Defendants jointly filed two motions to dismiss the claims
for failure to allege antitrust standing, failure to establish a
relevant product market, and failure to allege a single
overarching conspiracy.  In the first motion, they contend that
the Plaintiffs lack antitrust standing, fail to allege a
cognizable relevant market, and fail to allege a single
overarching conspiracy or other concerted activity barred by the
Sherman Act.  In the second motion, they focus on the statute of
limitations, asserting that claims based on purchases of contact
lenses before October 13, 2012, are time-barred.

Causation and Nature of the Injury

The Plaintiffs back up their theory of causation with multiple
allegations in the CAC. According to the Plaintiffs, the
Defendants, who together control approximately 80% of the online
retail market for contact lens sales, committed not to compete
against one another in certain critical online advertising,
thereby suppressing competition and inflating the amount
consumers paid for the online purchase of contact lenses from the
Defendants. Their allegations link the agreements to higher
prices. The Plaintiffs identify the agreements and the key
provisions, explain how the agreements work, and explain that,
under their theory, they paid overcharges and were deprived of
the total amount of truthful information about sellers of contact
lenses online and about the prices of contact lenses sold online.

Remoteness of the Harm

The Defendants further contend that the alleged injury is too
remote. According to the Defendants, the Plaintiffs allege a
downstream effect on contact lens pricing which is too far
removed from the alleged anti-competitive agreements. But the
Plaintiffs purchased the contact lenses directly from the
Defendants in the market that was allegedly restrained.  That is
sufficient to avoid dismissal.  The court finds that the
Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that they suffered an
antitrust injury as a result of the Defendants' settlement
agreements.

RELEVANT PRODUCT MARKET

Here, the Defendants target the Plaintiffs' definition of the
relevant product market, which the Plaintiffs define as the
online market for retail sales of contact lenses. According to
the Plaintiffs, because of the ease of purchasing contacts
without going to a physical store, the retail market for contact
lenses sold to customers at physical locations exists separately
from, is not an adequate substitute for, and does not restrain
prices in the online market for the sale of contact lenses.
Defendants respond that the relevant product market must include
the off-line market for retail sales of contact lenses

CONSPIRACY

Here, the Plaintiffs allege contracts in restraint of trade. They
challenge a series of bilateral agreements [between 1-800 and]
other online sellers of contact lenses. Because the Plaintiffs'
theory focuses on a series of bilateral horizontal agreements,
not an overarching conspiracy, the CAC must allege that each
agreement, standing alone, unreasonably restrains trade. The CAC
accomplishes that.

According to the CAC, the parties to each contract agreed to
terms designed to restrict each other's advertising efforts:
These agreements prohibit the parties from bidding against each
other in certain search advertising auctions, and obligate the
parties to implement certain negative keywords thereby precluding
certain competitive, truthful, and relevant online advertisement.

The Plaintiffs then allege that each Defendant benefitted from
the agreements 1-800 Contacts entered into with other Agreeing
Contact Lens Sellers by, among other things, allowing the
Defendants to charge supracompetitive prices to the detriment of
consumers and depriving the Plaintiffs of truthful information
about competing sellers of contact lenses online. And, finally,
the Plaintiffs allege the anticompetitive effects of these
agreements.

Contrary to the Defendants' contention, the CAC does allege that
each individual agreement causes anticompetitive effects. That
satisfies the concerted action requirement.

STATUTe OF LIMITATIONS

Tolling based on Fraudulent Concealment

Under this equitable tolling doctrine, the Plaintiffs must plead
that the Defendants used fraudulent means to successfully conceal
relevant information from consumers, and that the Plaintiffs did
not know or through the exercise of due diligence could not have
known that they might have a cause of action.

Fraudulent Means

The Plaintiffs assert that the Defendants' non-disclosure
provisions are affirmative acts to conceal the true nature and
anti-competitive effect of the settlement agreements. In the CAC,
they quote specific non-disclosure provisions in the Defendants'
settlement agreements. Then they add the allegation that 1-800
entered into 'substantially, similar written agreements with
other non-parties.'

The Defendants respond that a non-disclosure agreement is a
standard term in settlement agreements and is not an affirmative
act to conceal. But the non-disclosure provisions give the
Defendants a tremendous amount of discretion. The standard for
disclosure is reasonableness as the parties choose to define it.
What may constitute unreasonably-withheld consent is driven by
factors unknown to the Plaintiffs, including motivations for
including the non-disclosure provisions in the agreements. Such
information is uniquely in the hands of the Defendants.

Given that the Plaintiffs have alleged agreements to engage in
anti-competitive conduct, it is reasonable to infer that a
provision requiring the contracting parties to keep the terms of
that allegedly anti-competitive agreement private was an
affirmative act to conceal. At this stage in the litigation,
allegations identifying and quoting the non-disclosure
provisions, listing names of the parties to the agreements, and
providing dates of those agreements, satisfy the Rule 9(b)
pleading standard and establish the first element of fraudulent
concealment.

Successful Concealment

The Plaintiffs have satisfied this element as well. They allege
they did not have actual knowledge of the settlement agreements,
much less the anti-competitive nature and financial harm to
consumers such as themselves. And, they assert, as a result of
the agreements' non-disclosure provisions, they were prevented
from learning of the facts needed to commence suit against the
Defendants.

Inquiry Notice and Due Diligence element

The Defendants contend that even if the Plaintiffs did not have
actual knowledge, they are not entitled to tolling because they
had constructive knowledge of their potential claims when the
settlement agreements or the material terms of those agreements
were publicly disclosed.

The Plaintiffs respond that even though the settlement agreements
or some terms were disclosed in some public settings, including
unsealed lawsuits, that did not amount to constructive knowledge
because the information was not reasonably accessible to them as
consumers, and, even if known, the content would not allow an
average consumer to make the analytical leap that he may have
paid artificially inflated prices for contact lenses.

Here, the Plaintiffs are individual consumers who had no reason
to know about (much less understand) the antitrust implications
of the settlement agreements or the disclosed terms. It would be
unreasonable to expect a person making one, or even a few,
discrete purchases online to research the legal actions and
securities regulations involving that retailer, much less apply a
complex economic analysis to determine that the prices he paid
for their product were artificially inflated.

The information provided by the Defendants does not convince the
court that the Plaintiffs would have had ready access to the
information, much less any reasonable basis to begin
investigating their antitrust claims. Consequently, the
Plaintiffs satisfy the final prong of the fraudulent concealment
rule.

Tolling based on the FTC Action

According to the Plaintiffs, the first indication that they paid
artificially inflated prices appeared in the FTC's administrative
complaint in August 2016. But at that point, the statute was
independently tolled by 15 U.S.C. Section 16(i).

The Defendants respond that the tolling provision does not apply
because the FTC administrative action was not brought 'to
prevent, restrain, or punish violations of any of the antitrust
laws.' Rather, it was brought under Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15
U.S.C. Section 45. Although it is true that the FTC filed its
action against 1-800 under Section 5, it did so to enforce
Sherman Act Section 1. Defendants' strained interpretation of
Section 16(i) is not supported by the statutory language or case
law.

The court holds that the Plaintiffs are entitled to rely on the
statutory tolling provision.

The court denies Defendants Vision Direct, Inc., Walgreens Boots
Alliance, Inc., Walgreen Co., and Luxottica Retail North America
Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Consolidated Amended
Complaint.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 17, 2018 Order and
Memorandum Decision is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybl24ecj
from Leagle.com.

J Thompson, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated & William P. Duncanson, Individually and on Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Carl E.
Goldfarb, BOIES SCHILLER & FLEXNER, pro hac vice, Joshua D.
Wolson -- jwolson@dilworthlaw.com -- DILWORTH PAXSON LLP, pro hac
vice, Richard M. Golomb, GOLOMB & HONIK PC, Scott E. Gant, BOIES
SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP, pro hac vice, Steven M. Jodlowski --
sjodlowski@rgrdlaw.com -- ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD, pro hac
vice, Thomas R. Karrenberg -- tkarrenberg@aklaw.com -- ANDERSON &
KARRENBERG, David W. Mitchell -- davidm@rgrdlaw.com -- ROBBINS
GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP, pro hac vice, David J. Stanoch, GOLOMB
& HONIK PC, Jared D. Scott, ANDERSON & KARRENBERG, Jerry R.
DeSiderato -- JdeSiderato@dilworthlaw.com -- DILWORTH PAXSON LLP,
pro hac vice, Kenneth J. Grunfeld, GOLOMB & HONIK PC, & Melissa
Felder Zappala, BOIES SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP.

1-800 Contacts, Defendant, represented by Ashley D. Kaplan,
MUNGER TOLLES & OLSON LLP, pro hac vice, Brent O. Hatch, HATCH
JAMES & DODGE, Justin P. Raphael, MUNGER TOLLES & OLSON LLP, pro
hac vice, Lara A. Swensen, HATCH JAMES & DODGE, Robert S. Clark,
PARR BROWN GEE & LOVELESS, Shaunda L. McNeill, CLYDE SNOW &
SESSIONS, Rohit Kumar Singla, MUNGER TOLLES & OLSON LLP, pro hac
vice & Sara M. Nielson, PARR BROWN GEE & LOVELESS.

Vision Direct, Defendant, represented by Jeffrey C. Bank --
jbank@wsgr.com -- WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, pro hac vice,
Steven H. Bergman -- steven-bergman@rbmn.com -- RICHARDS BRANDT
MILLER NELSON, Chul Pak -- cpak@wsgr.com -- WILSON SONSINI
GOODRICH & ROSATI, pro hac vice, Justin A. Cohen --
jochen@wsgr.com -- WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI PC, pro hac
vice, Robert M. Corp -- rcorp@wsgr.com -- WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH
& ROSATI PC & Tyler Anne Dever, RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER NELSON.


184 FOOD CORP: Fails to Pay Minimum & Overtime Wages, Pareja Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JOSE PAREJA, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated 184 FOOD CORP. (D/B/A BRAVO SUPERMARKET F/K/A PIONEER
SUPERMARKET), 231 FOOD CORP. (D/B/A BRAVO SUPERMARKET F/K/A
PIONEER SUPERMARKET), DG 231 FOOD CORP. (D/B/A BRAVO SUPERMARKET
F/K/A PIONEER SUPERMARKET), JOHN DOE CORP. (D/B/A BRAVO
SUPERMARKET), RAFAEL MONTES DEOCA, RAFAEL MONTES DEOCA JR.,
GIOVANNI DOE, JOSE DOE, and GUSTAVO DOE, Case No. 1:18-cv-05887
(S.D.N.Y., June 29, 2018), alleges that the Plaintiff worked for
the Defendants in excess of 40 hours per week, without
appropriate minimum wage and overtime compensation for the hours
that he worked.

184 Food Corp., doing business as Bravo Supermarket, formerly
known as Pioneer Supermarket, is a domestic corporation organized
and existing under the laws of the state of New York.  231 Food
Corp., doing business as Bravo Supermarket, formerly known as
Pioneer Supermarket, is a domestic corporation organized and
existing under the laws of New York.

DG 231 Food Corp., doing business as Bravo Supermarket, formerly
known as Pioneer Supermarket, is a domestic corporation organized
and existing under the laws of New York.  John Doe Corp., doing
business as Bravo Supermarket, formerly known as Pioneer
Supermarket, is a domestic corporation organized and existing
under the laws of New York.  The Individual Defendants serve or
served as owners, managers, principals, or agents of the
Defendant Corporations and, through these corporate entities,
operate or operated the supermarket as a joint or unified
enterprise.

The Defendants own, operate, or control a supermarket, located at
184 W 231st Street, in Bronx, New York, under the name "Bravo
Supermarket," which was formerly known as "Pioneer
Supermarket."[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317-1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317-1620
          E-mail: Michael@Faillacelaw.com


1832 ASSET: Faces Class Action Over Trailing Commissions
--------------------------------------------------------
The Canadian Press reports that a proposed class action lawsuit
has been filed against Scotiabank's 1832 Asset Management LP
regarding trailing commissions paid to discount brokers on Scotia
and Dynamic mutual funds.

Siskinds LLP and Bates Barristers PC allege investors who hold
the funds in discount brokerages receive no value for the
trailing commissions paid.

The allegations have not been proven in court.

Scotiabank's 1832 is the trustee and manager of Scotia and
Dynamic mutual funds.  The bank declined to comment as the matter
was before the courts.

Siskinds and Bates Barristers say it's the second proposed class
action they have filed related to trailing commissions on mutual
funds sold through the discount brokerage channel.

A proposed class action has also been filed against TD Asset
Management Inc., the trustee and manager of TD mutual funds. [GN]


ACACIA COMMUNICATIONS: Judge Dismisses Securities Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Shearman & Sterling LLP, in an article for Lexology, reports that
on June 18, 2018, Judge William G. Young of the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed with
prejudice a putative securities class action against Acacia
Communications, Inc. (the "Company"), certain of its officers,
certain sellers of the Company's common stock in connection with
its secondary offering, and the underwriters for the Company's
secondary offering, alleging claims under Sections 11, 12(a)(2),
and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act") and
Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(the "Exchange Act"). Tharp v. Acacia Communications, Inc.,
17-cv-11504 (D. Mass June 18, 2018). Plaintiffs alleged that the
Company, which designs components used in high-speed wireless
networks, made misleading statements in the offering documents
for its secondary offering, and that the Company's stock
plummeted in mid-2017 when the true facts were disclosed.
Finding that plaintiffs' factual allegations were supported only
by conclusory statements, the Court granted the motion to dismiss
in its entirety.

Plaintiffs alleged that the offering documents for the Company's
secondary offering failed to disclose uncertainties in the China
market, difficulties facing the Company's two most important
customers, and quality control deficiencies in manufacturing. The
Court, however, rejected plaintiffs' argument that the offering
documents failed to include such information or address its
"potential impact." Rather, the Court determined that the
offering documents indeed warned of the impact of "the economic
slowdown in China," that the loss of any large customer "could
materially harm [its] business," and that outsourced
manufacturing meant that the Company "cannot directly control
[its] product delivery schedules and quality assurance." Slip op.
at 33-35.  Accordingly, the Court concluded that there was
"enough cautionary language or risk disclosure that reasonable
minds could not disagree that the challenged statements were not
misleading." Id. at 35.

The Court also found insufficient plaintiffs' claim under
Section 11 of the Securities Act for failure to disclose known
trends or uncertainties likely to have a material impact, as
required by Item 303 of Regulation S-K.  While noting that
defendants' knowledge of such trends had been adequately alleged,
the Court held that such trends were, in fact, adequately
disclosed, as the offering documents acknowledged that "changes
in general economic, industry and market conditions and trends,
including the economic slowdown in China that began in 2015"
could affect the Company's stock price. Id. at 38.

The Court separately rejected plaintiffs' argument that the
offering documents included misleading forward-looking
statements. The Court found these statements to be protected
under the Securities Act's statutory safe harbor for forward-
looking statements "accompanied by meaningful cautionary
statements." In particular, the Court highlighted that the
prospectus warned investors that the Company had "a history of
operating losses, and may not maintain or increase" profits in
light of the slowdown in China, and that "revenue growth in
recent periods may not be indicative of future growth or
performance." Id. at 40.

For similar reasons, the Court denied plaintiffs' claims under
the Exchange Act for failure to allege a material misstatement or
omission.  In particular, the Court agreed with defendants'
argument that plaintiffs failed to raise the strong inference of
scienter required by the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act. While plaintiffs attempted to plead scienter based on stock
sales by the Company's senior executives and directors, the Court
found these allegations insufficient because they failed to show
how specific sales were unusual or suspicious, such as providing
the amount of trading that the insider conducted before or after
the putative class period. Id. at 47.  The Court similarly
rejected plaintiffs' assertion that defendants knew of
uncertainties in demand in China or the sales forecast for its
largest customers, finding that the complaint failed to allege
with particularity that defendants knew or were reckless in not
knowing that any statements were false when made -- such as by
providing "internal records or witnessed discussions." Id. at 48.
Rather, the "facts indicate optimism for the future of [the
Company's] business." Id. Finding that the complaint failed to
plead a primary violation under Section 10(b), the Court
dismissed the Section 20(a) claim against the individual
defendants. [GN]


ACX PACIFIC: Court Denies Certification of 2 Subclasses
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the eastern District of
California denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification in
the case captioned MIGUeL ROJAS-CIFUeNTeS, on behalf of himself,
on behalf of all others similarly situated and in the interest of
the general public, Plaintiffs, v. ACX PACIFIC NORTHWEST INC.,
PACIFIC LEASING, LLC, JOHN M. GOMBOS, JOHN E. GOMBOS and Does 1-
20, Defendants, No. 2:14-cv-00697-JAM-CKD (e.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff Miguel Rojas-Cifuentes has alleged the Defendants
violated the Fair Labor Standards Act and state wage and hour
laws by failing to pay minimum wage; failing to pay overtime
compensation; failing to provide meal and rest breaks as a result
of donning and doffing and walking time; failing to provide
accurate itemized wage statements and failing to pay class
members statutory penalties.

The Plaintiff seeks to certify the following three subclasses:

   1. Stockton Second Meal Period & Third Rest Break Class

      All current and former non-exempt hourly employees who
worked at Defendants' Stockton, California location (Stockton
Branch) from March 14, 2010 to the present that worked at least
one shift greater than 10 hours and up to and including 12 hours.

   2. Wilmington Meal Period Class

      All current and former non-exempt hourly employees who
worked at Defendants' Wilmington, California location (Wilmington
Branch) from March 14, 2010 to the present that worked at least
one shift greater than 6 hours and either: (a) received a short
meal period (less than 30 minutes), a late meal period (after the
fifth hour of work), an unrecorded first meal period; or (b) did
not receive a second recorded meal period for shifts greater than
10 hours.

   3. Wilmington Auto-Deduct Class

      All current and former non-exempt hourly employees who
worked at the Wilmington Branch from March 14, 2010 to the
present that worked at least one shift greater than 6 hours and
had 30 minutes of pay automatically deducted for a meal period.

The Court grants the Plaintiff's motion to certify the
"Wilmington Auto-Deduct Class" subclass and denies the motion as
to the remaining two proposed subclasses.

With respect to the Stockton Second Meal Period & Third Rest
Break Class, the Plaintiff contends that the Defendants' policy
and practice of providing employees with a second meal period or
third rest break only after a shift exceeded twelve hours led to
a failure to pay the Defendants' employees break premiums, in
violation of California Labor Code Sections 226.7(b), 512,
Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order No. 8 (Wage Order 8).
The Plaintiff contends that the common questions with respect to
this subclass that are capable of resolution on a class-wide
basis include: (1) whether Defendants maintained a policy of not
providing a second meal period until the twelfth hour of work at
the Stockton Branch; (2) whether Defendants maintained a policy
at the Stockton Branch of not authorizing and permitting a third
rest period until the twelfth hour of work; and (3) whether
Defendants maintained a practice and policy during the class
period that failed to pay break period premiums to employees that
were denied break periods.  The Court finds that the Plaintiff's
conclusory allegation that rest breaks were not available because
of employees using those breaks to don and doff and walk are not
as specific as the alleged policy in Richardson. It is also
unclear how a fact-finder could resolve this allegation without
needing to conduct individual inquiries, since the Plaintiff has
not supplied any records, or analysis of any records, involving
rest periods. Finally, the Plaintiff does not provide any
authority to support a finding that his donning and doffing rest
break allegation is capable of resolution by common proof.
Because a fact-finder could not resolve the Plaintiff's claim
regarding rest breaks without engaging in myriad individual
inquiries, the Court denies certification of the Stockton Second
Meal Period & Third Rest Break subclass.

With respect to the Wilmington Meal Period Subclass, the
Plaintiff claims that the Defendants' effective policy and
practice of using an ad hoc system charging supervisors with
relieving employees for meal periods as production permits led
to: (1) employees working longer than six hours and/or ten hours
without legally compliant meal breaks; and (2) a failure to pay
Defendants' employees break premiums, in violation of California
Labor Code Sections 226.7(b), 512, Wage Order 8.  As the
Defendants point out, the time records that the Plaintiff cites
say nothing about whether an employee failed to clock out for a
meal period, or if they forgot to clock out for a meal period at
the actual start of the meal period. The time records, like those
in Ordonez, present numerous possibilities as to why certain
employees may have had a non-compliant meal break during a given
shift and the Court cannot conclude that any short, late, or
missed meal break that the plaintiff's expert identified
corresponds to a legal violation on a class-wide basis.  The
Court finds that the Defendants have rebutted the presumption
arising from the concurrence in Brinker by convincingly arguing
that their time records indicating late meal periods, no meal
periods, or short meal periods for 61.1% of shifts does not
reflect a common policy and practice capable of common resolution
on a class-wide basis.

With respect to the Wilmington Auto-Deduct Subclass, the
Plaintiff contends that the Defendants maintained an unlawful
policy and practice of automatically deducting 30 minutes of pay
from its employees' daily hours for meal periods at the
Wilmington Branch, regardless of whether employees were working
during periods of time that the operations should have ceased.
The Plaintiff asserts that this policy and practice violated the
requirements to pay an additional hour of compensation for missed
meal periods, and to provide accurate wage statements in
violation of Wage Order 8 and Cal. Labor Code Sections 201-203,
226.7, 510 and 512.

The Plaintiff asserts that the common question of fact with
respect to this subclass is whether the Defendants maintained a
policy that automatically deducted a 30 minute meal period from
workers regardless of whether they took a meal period. The
Plaintiff contends this question can be resolved on a class-wide
basis through Defendants' timekeeping records, class member
declarations, and the Defendants' 30(b)(6) testimony.

The Court agrees.

While the Defendants did not implement a computer program to
commit an auto-deduction practice, the evidence suggests they
implemented an automatic deduction practice where their human
resources employee subtracted pay from employees 100% of the
time, without any records showing meal periods were actually
taken. The Defendants may not flip Justice Werdegar's presumption
on its head and put the onus on employees to prove they have been
denied a proper meal period when there are no records of meal
periods being provided.

The Court finds that the Defendants' procedures effectively
constitute an improper auto-deduction practice.

The Court finds it can resolve on a class-wide basis whether the
Defendants maintained a policy that automatically deducted a 30
minute meal period from workers regardless of whether they took a
meal break through Defendants' timekeeping records, class member
declarations, and Defendants' 30(b)(6) testimony. the Plaintiff
has satisfied the commonality element for the Wilmington Auto-
Deduct subclass.

The Defendants argued that the Plaintiff failed to set forth any
evidence to meet his burden that a Wilmington auto-deduct
subclass would be so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable. But the Plaintiff has identified 121 employees who
had shifts reflecting a 30 minute meal period auto-deduction. A
proposed subclass of 121 employees satisfies the numerosity
requirement.

Typicality

The Plaintiff argues that, even though he did not work at the
Wilmington location, his claims are typical of the Wilmington
Auto-Deduct subclass because he has also experienced auto-
deducted meals.

The Defendants respond that because the Plaintiff worked at the
Stockton Branch, where employees were not instructed to clock in
and clock out for their meal periods, he cannot show he was
personally injured by the alleged auto-deduction practices at
Wilmington.

In addition, the Plaintiff is not tasked with showing that his
claims are the exact same as the proposed subclass, but only that
each member's claim arises from the same course of events and
that each class member will make similar legal arguments to prove
the Defendants' liability. The Plaintiff has satisfied that
burden for the Wilmington Auto-Deduct subclass here: he has
alleged injury by the Defendants' alleged auto-deduction policies
and will make similar legal arguments as other class members. The
Court finds the Plaintiff has satisfied this element for the
Wilmington Auto-Deduct subclass.

Adequacy

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff cannot satisfy the
adequacy element because he did not seek certification of any
minimum wage or overtime claims. This argument fails because
Drimmer did not involve minimum wage or overtime claims and the
Defendants have provided no other authority holding that a class-
plaintiff fails to satisfy the adequacy element by not pursuing
minimum wage or overtime claims.

Because the Plaintiff and his counsel do not have conflicts of
interest with other class members and because they have
prosecuted this action vigorously on behalf of the class and
presumably will continue to, the Court finds the Plaintiff has
satisfied the adequacy element for the Wilmington Auto-Deduct
subclass.

Predominance

The Plaintiff contends he has satisfied this element for the
Wilmington Auto-Deduct subclass because liability can be
established through employer records and representative
testimony, while damages can be established through database
analysis, statistical sampling, and selective direct evidence.

The Defendants counter that individualized inquiries would
predominate for each of the more than 100 employees that were
affected by the auto-deductions, citing Gonzalez for the
proposition that meal periods missing from time sheets do not
conclusively show missing meal periods.

The Plaintiff has presented evidence of employer's effective
auto-deduction policy and practice through employee time records.
Further, the Defendants have admitted that they have not once
reversed an auto-deduction. Accordingly, the Court finds common
questions predominate over any individual inquiries for this sub-
class and the Plaintiff has satisfied this element for the
Wilmington Auto-Deduct subclass.

Superiority

THe Defendants in this case do not claim and have not presented
any evidence that the employees are unionized. Second, the court
in Romero did not rule on whether resolving auto-deduction claims
on a class-wide basis is superior to separate individual actions.
Here, however, resolving the auto-deduction subclass on a class-
wide basis would be superior since the timesheets provide common
proof and it would be more efficient to do one large study of the
timesheets than separate individual ones.

The Defendants do not explain why or how the support the
Plaintiff has from the putative class is minimal or why that
means adjudicating the auto-deduction claims on a class-wide
basis is not superior. The Court finds the Plaintiff has
adequately shown the superiority of resolving the Wilmington
Auto-Deduct subclass's claims on a class-wide basis.

The Plaintiff has satisfied all of the Rule 23 elements for the
Wilmington Auto-Deduct subclass. His motion to certify this
subclass is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 17, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yam9whm3 from Leagle.com.

Miguel Rojas-Cifuentes, Plaintiff, represented by Hector
Rodriguez Martinez -- hectorm@themmlawfirm.com -- Mallison &
Martinez, Joseph Donald Sutton -- JSutton@TheMMLawFirm.com --
Mallison & Martinez, Marco A. Palau -- mpalau@themmlawfirm.com --
Mallison & Martinez,Stanley S. Mallison -- stanm@mallisonlaw.com
-- Mallison & Martinez & eric Sebastian Trabucco --
etrabucco@themmlawfirm.com -- Mallison & Martinez.

ACX Pacific Northwest Inc., Defendant, represented by Angel
Gomez, III -- agomez@ebglaw.com -- epstein Becker & Green, Kevin
Dennis Sullivan -- ksullivan@ebglaw.com -- epstein Becker &
Green, P.C. & Matthew Ames Goodin -- mgoodin@ebglaw.com --
epstein Becker and Green.

Pacific Leasing, LLC, John M. Gombos & John e. Gombos,
Defendants, represented by Angel Gomez, III, epstein Becker &
Green & Kevin Dennis Sullivan, epstein Becker & Green, P.C.


ALABAMA, USA: Court Denies Bid to Certify Class in "Yeager" Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. W. Keith Watkins denied the Plaintiff's motion for class
certification in the lawsuit entitled RICHARD ALLEN YEAGER,
#264071 v. HENRY BUTCH BINFORD, et al., Case No. 1:18-cv-00526-
WKW-SRW (M.D. Ala.).

Henry Butch Binford is a presiding judge in the Alabama Circuit
Court.

According to the Order, on June 8, 2018, the Magistrate Judge
filed a Recommendation to which no timely objections have been
filed.  Upon an independent review of the record and upon
consideration of the Recommendation, Judge Watkins ordered that
the Recommendation is adopted.

"Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for class
certification (Doc. # 4) is DENIED and that this case is referred
back to the Magistrate Judge for additional proceedings," Judge
Watkins ruled.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=ctu8dWEd


ALCON RESEARCH: Fails to Pay Overtime Under FLSA, "Horne" Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Mira Horne, individually and on behalf of all those similarly
situated v. Alcon Research, LTD, Case No. 4:18-cv-02255 (S.D.
Tex., July 2, 2018), alleges that the proposed class members are
hourly paid manufacturing and production employees of the
Defendant and were not paid overtime as required by the Fair
Labor Standards Act.

Alcon Research, LTD, is an entity registered in Texas and engaged
in commerce or the production of goods for commerce within the
meaning of the FLSA.  Alcon provides specialized eye products and
care.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Chris R. Miltenberger, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF CHRIS R. MILTENBERGER, PLLC
          1340 N. White Chapel, Suite 100
          Southlake, TX 76092-4322
          Telephone: (817) 416-5060
          Facsimile: (817) 416-5062
          E-mail: chris@crmlawpractice.com


AMCOL SYSTEMS: Third Circuit Appeal Filed in "Magana" Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Nicole Magana filed an appeal from a court ruling in
the lawsuit titled Nicole Magana v. Amcol Systems Inc., Case No.
1-17-cv-11541, in the U.S. District Court for the District of New
Jersey.

The nature of suit is stated as consumer credit.

The appellate case is captioned as Nicole Magana v. Amcol Systems
Inc., Case No. 18-2267, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant NICOLE MAGANA, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Joseph K. Jones, Esq.
          Benjamin J. Wolf, Esq.
          JONES, WOLF & KAPASI, LLC
          375 Passaic Avenue
          Fairfield, NJ 07004
          Telephone: (973) 227-5900
          E-mail: jkj@legaljones.com
                  bwolf@legaljones.com

Defendant-Appellee AMCOL SYSTEMS INC. is represented by:

          Peter T. Shapiro, Esq.
          LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH
          199 Water Street
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 232-1322
          E-mail: pshapiro@lbbslaw.com


AMERICAN TRAFFIC: Pincus Sues Over Illegally Imposed 5% Surcharge
-----------------------------------------------------------------
STEVEN J. PINCUS, an individual, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. AMERICAN TRAFFIC SOLUTIONS, INC., a
Kansas corporation, Case No. 9:18-cv-80864-DMM (S.D. Fla., June
29, 2018), alleges that ATS, in conjunction with numerous
municipalities and counties throughout Florida, has illegally
appropriated millions of dollars from Floridians in violation of
Florida law.

Mr. Pincus asserts ATS has illegally imposed and collected 5%
surcharge from Florida drivers on almost every single photo-
enforced red light violation serviced by the Company, amounting
to millions upon millions of ill-gotten gains, notwithstanding
the fact that ATS is paid for its services by the City of North
Miami Beach in the amount of $4,750 per camera, per month.

ATS is a Kansas corporation whose principal place of business is
located in Mesa, Arizona.  ATS claims to be the market leader in
road safety camera installations in North America, processing
more than 1 million violations every year.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bret L. Lusskin, Esq.
          20803 Biscayne Blvd., Suite 302
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Telephone: (954) 454-5841
          Facsimile: (954) 454-5844
          E-mail: blusskin@lusskinlaw.com

               - and -

          Scott D. Owens, Esq.
          SCOTT D. OWENS, P.A.
          3800 S. Ocean Dr., Suite 235
          Hollywood, FL 33019
          Telephone: (954) 589-0588
          Facsimile: (954) 337-0666
          E-mail: scott@scottdowens.com

               - and -

          Keith J. Keogh, Esq.
          KEOGH LAW, LTD.
          55 W. Monroe St., Suite 3390
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 726-1092
          Facsimile: (312) 726-1093
          E-mail: Keith@Keoghlaw.com


ANYTIME FITNESS: Faces "Duncan" Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Anytime Fitness,
LLC. The case is styled as Eugene Duncan, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Anytime Fitness,
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-06075 (S.D. N.Y., July 4, 2018).

Anytime Fitness is a 24-hour health and fitness club
headquartered in Woodbury, Minnesota. The company operates over
4,000 franchised locations in 30 countries. The gym facilities
are open 24 hours a day, 365 days out of the year.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


APPLE INC: SCOTUS Ruling in App Case May Impact E-Commerce Firms
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judy Greenwald, writing for Business Insurance, reports that the
U.S. Supreme Court's eventual ruling on the issue of whether
Apple Inc. can be subjected to class action lawsuits over the
sale of iPhone apps could have wide implications for e-commerce
firms, legal experts say.

The high court agreed to consider the January 2017 ruling by the
9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco in In Re:
Apple iPhone Antitrust Litigation, Robert Pepper et al. v. Apple
Inc., in which the court overturned a lower court ruling and said
Apple must proceed with the litigation.  The plaintiffs are
seeking treble damages under the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914.

Some experts believe the Supreme Court may overturn the 9th
Circuit ruling because the U.S. Solicitor General, which was
invited to submit a brief by the court, disagrees with the
decision.

At issue in the 9th Circuit ruling is whether consumers can be
considered indirect purchasers of the iPhone apps developed by
third parties, and therefore disqualified from pursuing class
action litigation.  Experts say other major firms, including
Amazon Inc., Google L.L.C., eBay Inc. and online travel
reservation firms, could be drawn into similar federal litigation
if the 9th Circuit ruling is upheld.

Plaintiffs in the Apple case, who say they purchased iPhones and
iPhone applications between 2007 and 2013, charge that the
Cupertino, California-based firm monopolized the iPhone app
market, according to the 9th Circuit ruling.

Apple prohibits app developers from selling iPhone apps through
channels other than its store, threatening to cut off sales by
any developer who violates its rules and iPhone owners with
voiding their warranties if they download unapproved apps,
according to the ruling.

The question before the court was whether, under a 1977 ruling by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,
consumers could only be considered indirect consumers of the
apps, and therefore barred from pursuing their litigation.  A
unanimous three-judge appellate panel held the plaintiffs were
direct consumers and could proceed.

"Apple is a distributor of the iPhone apps, selling them directly
to purchasers through its App Store," the ruling concludes.
"Because Apple is a distributor, Plaintiffs have standing under
Illinois Brick to sue Apple for allegedly monopolizing and
attempting to monopolize the sale of iPhone apps."

As the ruling notes, its decision disagrees about this issue with
a 1998 ruling by the 8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in St.
Louis in Campos v. Ticketmaster, involving concert ticket
purchasers who sued West Hollywood, California-based Ticketmaster
Corp., alleging it was a monopoly supplier.

In its amicus brief urging the Supreme Court to take the case,
the Trump administration states the 9th Circuit departs from the
high court's precedents and "in allowing respondent's
respondents' treble-damages claim to go forward, the court of
appeals rejected the Eighth Circuit's view on an important
question of federal antitrust law."

The case's significance is "the Supreme Court is going to be
looking at the way that companies actually do business" as
intermediaries in this modern economy, said Alden L. Atkins, a
partner with Vinson & Ellis L.L.P. in Washington, D.C.  "You've
got a lot of companies that are acting as intermediaries between
two people, and actually aren't selling anything, and the Supreme
Court is going to take a look at the realities of this and decide
how this case and how antitrust law applies to it," he said.

"The betting is normally, when the Supreme Court takes a case,
it's because they have a problem with the decision of the court
below," so "the Supreme Court might be inclined to reverse," but
it is hard to say how the court will rule, Mr. Atkins said.

Mr. Atkins said the ruling could affect companies including
Amazon.com Inc. and eBay Inc., which also act as intermediaries
between the product producer and consumer, and online travel
companies that sell tickets on behalf of airlines' behalf.

Bruce D. Sokler -- BDSokler@mintz.com -- a member of law firm
Mintz Levin Cohn Ferris Glovsky & Popeo P.C. in Washington, said
the case is "potentially significant, both for Apple, depending
on how it turns out, and also if the Supreme Court decides to
reassess the current rules on standing for direct and indirect
purchasers."

Apple's App Store is a "walled garden," and "those walls might be
breached." He added the ruling could apply to other companies as
well, and "I would assume that we'll see a fair number of amicus
briefs come in on both sides of the issue."

Jonathan M. Jacobson -- jjacobson@wsgr.com -- a partner with
Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati P.C. in New York, said while the
circuit conflict makes the Supreme Court's review of the issue
unsurprising, a broader issue is that while federal law prohibits
antitrust litigation again indirect purchasers, 26 states allow
it.  "Unfortunately, that is not the issue raised in the lower
courts, and so will not be part of the court's decision," he
said.

"At some point, either Congress or the courts must face this
issue because the way indirect purchase litigation is conducted
today is really a mishmash, and is creating all sorts of problems
for companies," Mr. Jacobson said. [GN]


APPLE INC: Faces "Rodriguez" Class Suit Over Defective Devices
--------------------------------------------------------------
ALEX RODRIGUEZ, et al. v. APPLE INC., Case No. 5:18-cv-03989
(N.D. Cal., July 2, 2018), is brought on behalf of the Plaintiffs
and all others similarly situated, who purchased, owned, used, or
leased one or more of Apple's devices for alleged fraudulent
misrepresentations and omissions, and other unlawful and unfair
business practices.

The term "Devices" are these products designed and marketed by
Apple for sale: the iPhone 5, iPhone 5s, iPhone 5c, iPhone SE,
iPhone 6, iPhone 6s, iPhone 6 Plus, iPhone 6s Plus, iPhone 7, and
iPhone 7 Plus, the Fourth Generation iPad, iPad Mini, iPad Air,
iPad Mini 2, Update to Fourth Generation iPad, iPad Air 2, iPad
Mini 3, iPad Mini 4, iPad Pro, 9.7-Inch iPad Pro, Fifth
Generation iPad, iPad Pro 10.5-inch and 12.9 inch models, and
Sixth Generation iPad.

After years of customer frustration and attrition, on Dec. 20,
2017, Apple admitted to one of the largest consumer frauds in
history, affecting hundreds of millions of mobile devices across
the globe, the Plaintiffs assert.  The Plaintiffs contend that
prompting the admission were reports of unexplained shutdowns of
certain Devices surfacing more than two years earlier, with
consumers complaining their Devices were suddenly shutting down
even though the batteries were more than 30% charged.  The
Plaintiffs add that complaints accelerated in the autumn of 2016
and were accompanied by reports of unexplained heating.

Apple Inc. is a corporation that was created under the laws of
the state of California, and has its principal place of business
in Cupertino, California.  Apple is the world's largest
information technology company by revenue and the world's third-
largest mobile phone manufacturer.  There are currently over one
billion Apple products in active use worldwide.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Joseph W. Cotchett, Esq.
          Mark C. Molumphy, Esq.
          COTCHETT, PITRE & MCCARTHY, LLP
          San Francisco Airport Office Center
          840 Malcolm Road, Suite 200
          Burlingame, CA 94010
          Telephone: (650) 697-6000
          Facsimile: (650) 697-0577
          E-mail: jcotchett@cpmlegal.com
                  mmolumphy@cpmlegal.com

               - and -

          Laurence D. King, Esq.
          KAPLAN FOX & KILSHEIMER LLP
          350 Sansome Street, Suite 400
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 772-4700
          Facsimile: (415) 772-4707
          E-mail: lking@kaplanfox.com

Plaintiffs Alex Rodriguez, Heidi Valle, Ida Villegas, Brandi S.
White, Tamica Gordon, Rifah Alexander, Kenyotta Smith, Judith
Thompson, Jhonjulee Ray, Aja Liana Johnson, Mary Jackson, Alvin
Davis, Michelle Martino, Kevin Browne, Brinley McGill, Sarah
Stone, Darlane M. Saracina, Beckie Erwin, Denise Bakke, Tonya
Thompson, Andrew Yashchuk, and Drew Victory are represented by:

          Daniel C. Levin, Esq.
          LEVIN SEDRAN & BERMAN
          510 Walnut Street, Suite 500
          Philadelphia, PA 19106-3697
          Telephone: (877) 882-1011
          Facsimile: (215) 592-4663
          E-mail: dlevin@lfsblaw.com

Plaintiffs Loren Haller, Jonathan David, Laura Gail Diamond,
Steven Connolly, Bryan Schell, Aisha Boyd, Irwin Darack, Linda
Sauer, Alisha Boykin, Tammy Greenfield, Natasha Bryant, John
Farris, Herman Praszkier, Lawrence Pethick, Steven Henry, Timothy
Baldwin, Kristin Hansen, Jill Klingman, Barbara Moriello, Thomas
Toth, Caren Schmidt, Jacquelyn O'Neill, Jodi Johnson, Henry
Becker, Kyle Herman, Quinn Lewis, Hanpeng Chen, Kaixuan Ni, Linda
Sonna and Sherri Yelton are represented by:

          James Vlahakis, Esq.
          SULAIMAN LAW GROUP
          2500 South Highland Ave., Suite 200
          Lombard, IL 60148
          Telephone: (312) 313-1613

Plaintiffs Daphne Bowles Rodriguez, Susan Rutan, Megan Mesloh,
Stephen Heffner, Brian Macinanti, Georgiana D'Allesandro, Aurelia
Flores, Nakul Chandra, Burim Daci, Pedro Espejo, Roman
Dubianskii, Heekyung Jo, Youngro Lee, and Kushagra Sharma are
represented by:

          Gayle M. Blatt, Esq.
          CASEY GERRY
          110 Laurel St.
          San Diego, CA 92101-1486
          Telephone: (619) 238-1811
          Facsimile: (619) 544-9232
          E-mail: gmb@cglaw.com

Plaintiff Jason Ratner is represented by:

          Phong Tran, Esq.
          JOHNSTON FISTEL
          655 West Broadway, Suite 1400
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 230-0063
          Facsimile: (619) 255-1856
          E-mail: phongt@johnsonfistel.com

Plaintiffs Brandon Farmer and Patrick DeFellippo are represented
by:

          Kathleen Herkenhoff, Esq.
          HAEGGQUIST ECK LLP
          225 Broadway, Suite 2050
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 342-8000
          Facsimile: (619) 342-7878
          E-mail: kathleenh@haelaw.com

Plaintiffs Eric Tanovan and Charlie Daily are represented by:

          Anthony Simon, Esq.
          SIMON LAW FIRM
          800 Market St., Suite 1700
          St. Louis, MO 63101
          Telephone: (855) 809-7080
          E-mail: asimon@simonlawpc.com

Plaintiffs Christopher Gautreax, Kristopher Kingston, Adam
Shapiro and Shiriam Torres are represented by:

          Stephen Rosenthal, Esq.
          PODHURST ORSECK, P.A.
          SunTrust International Center
          One S.E. 3rd Ave, Suite 2300
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 358-2800
          E-mail: srosenthal@podhurst.com

Plaintiff Angela Boykin is represented by:

          Matthew George, Esq.
          KAPLAN FOX & KILSHEIMER LLP
          350 Sansome Street, Suite 400
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 772-4700
          Facsimile: (415) 772-4707
          E-mail: mgeorge@kaplanfox.com

Plaintiffs Arisa Wakabayashi and Juliana Caceres are represented
by:

          David Straite, Esq.
          KAPLAN FOX & KILSHEIMER LLP
          850 Third Avenue, 14th Floor
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (800) 290-1952
          E-mail: dstraite@kaplanfox.com


AUSTRALIA: Pink Batts Scheme Class Action Reaches Final Stages
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Australian Associated Press reports that a class action
against the Commonwealth of Australia by more than 140 insulation
suppliers and businesses affected by the cancelled pink batts
scheme has reached its final stages.

The businesses are seeking about $150 million in damages from the
Commonwealth and say they suffered heavy losses when the program
was shut down in 2010 for safety reasons.

The Victorian Supreme Court trial began in late April, and
counsel for the businesses, Jim Delany QC, is scheduled to begin
his closing submissions on June 21.

Counsel for the federal government, Rachel Doyle SC, has
completed her submissions.

The $2.7 billion Home Insulation Program was set up in 2009 by
the Rudd government as part of a broader $42 billion economic
stimulus package.

But the program was shut down in 2010 after the deaths of four
workers in NSW and Queensland.

Before the pink batts scheme came into effect, the market for
retrofitting insulation totalled less than 70,000 homes a year.

The program promised to fit 2.2 million homes over a two-year
period, representing about a 15-fold increase in demand.

Businesses claim they suffered heavy losses when the program was
shut down for safety reasons as a result of the government's
negligence.

The plaintiffs say businesses took on staff, expanded production
and invested in new machinery and other equipment to meet demand,
but when the program was shut down about a year after it started,
some were forced into liquidation. [GN]


BHP: Casual Coal Mining Workers' Class Action Obtains Funding
-------------------------------------------------------------
Newcastle Herald reports that casual labour was first used in the
Hunter coal industry to meet short-term gaps in the workforce.

Over time, however, it grew to the point where many mines have
substantial portions of their workforce on permanent shifts, but
employed under conditions that have been legally defined as
casual.  If the old caveats about casual employment -- a better
rate of pay to cover the loss of entitlements such as sick leave
and holidays -- still applied, then the use of casuals in the
industry might not be so controversial.  But not only are casual
mineworkers -- employed at arm's length through labour hire
firms -- doing the same work as their full-time colleagues on
the same crews, they are doing so at an often substantially
lower rate of pay.

Initially, the mineworkers' union fought against the use of
casuals and the labour hire firms, but with modern industrial
relations laws giving much more flexibility to employers, it
seemed there was little the union could do to counter the
onslaught.

But now a boutique Canberra firm, Adero Law, is so certain that
the use of casual labour lacks a proper legal underpinning that
it says it has convinced a specialist litigation funder to stump
up the millions of dollars needed to run a class action to win
back the $40 million to $50 million it says that up to 1500 Mount
Arthur mineworkers have been underpaid in the past six years.

It's an extraordinary claim and as we are yet to hear anything in
the way of a meaningful response from Mount Arthur's owner BHP
and its major labour hire provider, Chandler Macleod, it is
impossible to say whether the case has legs. But it can be said
that Adero is looking at the industry as an outsider, with a
fresh pair of eyes.

Still, even if Adero lawyer Rory Markham dislikes the way that
casuals have been treated, he needs a clear and compelling legal
argument to support that sentiment.  Clearly, Adero believes it
has found those arguments, and that documents it says will be
obtained from BHP and Chandler Macleod will support it in its
quest for compensation.  There is no doubt that the man who
inspired Adero's case, former Mount Arthur mineworker
Simon Turner, has endured extraordinary difficulties since the
December 2015 accident that has effectively ended his working
life at a relatively young age.

But whether Adero can use this to turn industry employment
practice on its head is another question entirely. [GN]


BHP: Augusta Ventures to Fund Coal Mine Class Action
----------------------------------------------------
Litigation Finance Journal reports that UK and now Australia-
based litigation funder Augusta Ventures is backing a class
action claim against BHP Billiton's Mt. Arthur coal mine in New
South Wales, Australia.  BHP is alleged to have wrongfully
employed mineworkers as "casual workers," meaning their
employment terms were flexible and infrequent, when in fact the
workers were treated as full-time hires. [GN]


BHP: Law Firm to Spend Millions to Prosecute Mineworkers' Case
--------------------------------------------------------------
Ian Kirkwood, writing for Newcastle Herald, reports that the
Canberra law firm mounting a "$40 million to $50 million" class
action over the allegedly wrongful employment of "casual"
mineworkers at BHP's Mount Arthur coalmine says it will spend
millions of dollars to prosecute its case.

Lawyer Rory Markham of Canberra specialist class action law firm
Adero Law was at Beresfield Bowling Club on June 26 with injured
former Mount Arthur mineworker Simon Turner and another dozen or
so contract mineworkers from Mount Arthur and other mines in the
region.

Mr Markham acknowledged that his firm was challenging a situation
that everybody else in the coal industry -- including various
regulators and the mineworkers' union -- accepted as lawful.

But he said his firm had viewed the situation as an outsider
looking in, and convinced a hard-nosed litigation funder, Augusta
Ventures, to put up the millions of dollars needed to run the
case.

"In order to satisfy both the investors (Augusta Ventures) and to
make sure of our legal obligations, we have completed over six
months of due diligence, both of the legal arguments and probably
the most thorough analysis of underpayment ever undertaken in the
Hunter Valley," Mr Markham said.

He said the figure of $40 million to $50 million had been
calculated by looking at the money Adero believed was owed to up
to 1500 mineworkers it said had worked at Mount Arthur as
"casuals" over the past six years.

"This is not a claim we have come to lightly," Mr Markham said.

As the Newcastle Herald has reported, Adero's interest was
sparked by an approach from former Mount Arthur "casual"
mineworker Simon Turner, who was injured when an excavator shovel
hit the cabin of his truck in December 2015.

Mr Markham said Mr Turner was a "courageous" individual who had
campaigned steadfastly to uncover what Adero came to agree was a
series of harmful and unfair situations in an industry that had
come to rely so heavily on casual labour that it was creating
"perverse" outcomes.

Mr Markham said the term "casual was meant to allow for flexible
and infrequent engagement" on the job.

But it had come to a point where Mount Arthur and other mines had
significant portions of their workforces employed by labour hire
companies and defined as "casuals" despite having their rosters
set for months in advance at a time, and having to apply in
advance for leave as any full-time or part-time worker would.

Mr Markham said working under the same conditions as permanent
workers without the entitlements made a mockery of the term
"casual engagement".

Despite Mr Markham saying that some documents had been lodged
with the Federal Court on June 25 and that others were being
lodged on June 26, mining giant BHP disputed this, saying that as
far as it could tell, no documents had been filed in relation to
the Adero class action.

A BHP spokesperson said the situation remained the same as it was
in February, when the Herald first reported the likelihood of the
case. The spokesperson said that despite the passage of four
months, there had still been no formal correspondence from Adero.

Mr Markham disputed the BHP position, insisting that there had
been correspondence between Adero and the respondents to the
case, or their lawyers.

Describing the action on June 26, Mr Markham described the case
as a "closed class action" with injured former Mount Arthur
casual Simon Turner as the "lead representative".

Once all the documents were filed it would become an "open
action" covering anyone who worked as a casual at Mount Arthur in
the past six years: these people would be given the right to "opt
out" of the case should they wish.

Mr Markham said the first action would be served against labour
hire firm Chandler Macleod and against the BHP companies that
owned the Mount Arthur mine.

He said the case would be listed for "case management" where a
defence would have to be filed by the companies as to why
Mr Turner was not entitled to accident pay and why he was "said
to be a casual when he was engaged on the same roster as their
permanents".

He said this should take about 28 days, after which Adero would
"push very heavily for discovery", looking for evidence about
what BHP and Chandlers "knew about the way they engaged their
workforce".

He said Adero would be "working very heavily on getting a
mediation" and a successful outcome in the court. [GN]


BI INC: Class of ISAP Case Specialists Conditionally Certified
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the eastern District of
Pennsylvania granted Plaintiffs' Motion to Conditionally Certify
an FLSA Collective Action in the case captioned KAREL ALVAREZ &
JUAN TELLADO, Individually and on behalf of all persons similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. BI INCORPORATED, Defendant, Civil Action
No. 16-2705 (e.D. Pa.).

Named Plaintiffs Karel Alvarez and Juan Tellado are an employee
and former employee of Defendant BI Incorporated. Named
Plaintiffs claim, on behalf of themselves and other similarly
situated employees and former employees that the Defendant failed
to pay them wages and overtime compensation for certain
compensable work, in violation of the FLSA.

The Plaintiffs seek conditional certification of the following
collective:

     All current and former ISAP Case Specialists employed by BI
Incorporated who performed work in the United States between
[insert date three years prior to the date that the Court issues
an Order granting Conditional Certification but including 60 days
of agreed upon tolling]4 and the present.

The Court finds that the Plaintiffs have provided ample evidence
that ISAP Case Specialists nationwide shared the same job
responsibilities, pay, training, and management structure. As to
job responsibilities, the Plaintiffs have provided a document,
produced by the Defendant, that sets out the primary job
responsibilities of ISAP Case Specialists. Regarding pay, the
Plaintiffs have pointed to the Defendant's corporate
representatives' testimony that ISAP Case Specialists nationwide
were hourly employees eligible for overtime and subject to
uniform pay policies, such as regular pay, overtime pay and on-
call pay.
As to training, the Defendant's corporate representatives
testified that ISAP Case Specialists all receive the same
training, and were subject to the same employee handbook and
standard operating procedures, which materials the Defendant
produced in discovery.  And finally, as to how ISAP Case
Specialists were managed, the Plaintiffs provided evidence of a
uniform management structure in which ISAP Case Specialists in
each office answer to their office's ISAP Program Manager, who,
in turn, reports to one of several Regional Directors, who
answers to a nationwide ISAP director. These similar
characteristics allowed the Defendant to shift ISAP Case
Specialists from one office to another to meet staffing needs.
Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have satisfied their modest
evidentiary burden as to each of their three claims.

Accordingly, the Court grants the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Conditional Certification, and conditionally certifies the
following collective:

     All current and former ISAP Case Specialists employed by BI
Incorporated who performed work in the United States between
March 18, 2015, and the present. The parties will be directed to
meet and confer regarding the content of the notice to be sent to
the members of the collective, the appropriate method of sending
notice,7 and a deadline for additional opt-in plaintiffs to file
their written consents.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 17, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/ya9k3cdg from
Leagle.com.

KAReL ALVAREZ & JUAN TELLADO, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL
PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiffs, represented by ALEXANDRA
K. PIAZZA -- apiazza@bm.net -- BERGER & MONTAGUE, P.C., CAMILLE
FUNDORA -- cfundora@bm.net -- BERGER & MONTAGUE, P.C., SARAH
SCHALMAN-BERGEN  -- sschalman-bergen@bm.net -- BERGER & MONTAGUE
PC, SHANON J. CARSON -- scarson@bm.net -- BERGER & MONTAGUE PC,
BRUCE M. LUDWIG -- bludwig@wwdlaw.com -- WILLING, WILLIAMS &
DAVIDSON & RYAN ALLEN HANCOCK  -- rhancock@wwdlaw.com -- Willig,
Williams & Davidson.

BI INCORPORATED, Defendant, represented by PAUL C. LANTIS --
plantis@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C., ROBERT WILLIAM
PRITCHARD -- rpritchard@littler.com -- LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C. &
JOSHUA C. VAUGHN -- jvaughn@littler.com -- LITTLER MENDELSON,
P.C.


BLUESTEM BRANDS: Faces Class Action Over Off-the-Clock Rule
-----------------------------------------------------------
Business Management Daily reports that under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, employees are supposed to be compensated for all
work performed, whether they're clocked in or not.

But many employers use computer systems to track time.  What
happens if there is an unwritten rule among supervisors that
workers must come in early to set up and prepare for work before
they're allowed to log into the time-keeping system? That's a
recipe for a class-action FLSA lawsuit.

Recent case: Several former employees who worked as call center
agents for an online retailer claimed that their call center
supervisors required them to arrive well before the official
start of their shift.  They used this time to get updates and
company news as well as to log into their computer terminals.
Only then could they finally open up the time-keeping
application.  That way, the moment their shift began, calls
started coming in.

The agents claimed they were penalized if they were even one
minute late logging in and were then told to come in earlier
still.

The employees sued, and requested class-action certification.
The judge granted the motion temporarily so discovery in the case
could begin.

They will now have a chance to prove their allegations,
specifically that their supervisors had a policy requiring early
arrival. (Norris, et al. v. Bluestem Brands, et al., DC MN, 2018)
[GN]


BROOKLYN EVENTS: Faces "Duncan" Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Brooklyn Events
Center, LLC. The case is styled as Eugene Duncan, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Brooklyn
Events Center, LLC doing business as: Nassau Coliseum, Defendant,
Case No. 1:18-cv-06076 (S.D. N.Y., July 4, 2018).

Brooklyn Events Center LLC constructs, manages, and operates real
estate building. The company is based in New York. Brooklyn
Events Center LLC operates as a subsidiary of Brooklyn Arena
Holding Company LLC.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


BUKHARA INDIAN: $515K Pre-Judgment Attachment in "Prabir" Granted
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Henry Pitman of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York issued a Report and
Recommendation granting Plaintiffs' Motion for a Pre-Judgment
Attachment against defendants in the amount of $515,819.00,
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 64 and N.Y. C.P.L.R. Section 6201(3) in
the case captioned SAMUEL PRABIR, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. BUKHARA INDIAN CUISINE,
INC., d/b/a "INDIGO INDIAN BISTRO," BASERA INDIAN CUISINE, INC.,
d/b/a "BASERA RESTAURANT," ANIL KUMAR, and RENU KUMAR,
Defendants, No. 7 Civ. 3704 (AJN)(HBP)(S.D.N.Y.).

The Plaintiff commenced this action pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) and the New York Labor Law (NYLL) against
Corporate Defendants and individual defendants to recover unpaid
minimum wages, unpaid overtime premium pay, misappropriated
gratuities, spread-of-hours damages and penalties for failure to
provide wage statements and notices. The Plaintiffs brought the
action as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section
216(b) with respect to the FLSA claims and as a class action with
respect to the NYLL claims.

Under New York law, a plaintiff may obtain a pre-judgment order
of attachment upon proof that: (1) the plaintiff has stated a
cause of action for a money judgment; (2) the plaintiff has a
probability of success on the merits; (3) the defendant, with the
intent to defraud his creditors or frustrate the enforcement of a
judgment that might be rendered in plaintiff's favor, has
assigned, disposed of, encumbered, or secreted property, or
removed it from the state or is about to do any of these acts and
(4) the amount demanded from the defendant exceeds all
counterclaims known to the plaintiff.

The Plaintiffs commenced this lawsuit on May 17, 2017. Just a
month later, Anil Kumar put Indigo Indian Bistro up for sale. At
his deposition on January 25, 2018, Anil Kumar testified that the
restaurant was still up for sale, but as of now, there was no
plano close. However, Anil Kumar admitted on cross-examination at
the hearing that he had already been in contract with a buyer
prior to his deposition and that the sale of the restaurant
closed on January 26, 2018. When confronted with his prior
deposition testimony, Anil Kumar responded that maybe he made a
mistake and didn't understand the question because he takes pills
and sometimes doesn't understand certain things.

The Court finds that the sale of Indigo Indian Bistro exhibits
other badges of fraud.  First, it is telling that defendants put
the restaurant up for sale just one month after the commencement
of plaintiffs' lawsuit.  Second, Anil Kumar was clearly trying to
keep the sale of the restaurant secret as evidenced by his false,
or allegedly mistaken, deposition testimony.  Third, $35,000 of
the proceeds from the sale went directly to Anil Kumar's niece
and wife for little or no proven consideration and, Anil Kumar
was unable to account for the $25,000 he gave to an unidentified
creditor.

Like the sale of Indigo Indian Bistro, several "badges of fraud"
exist here. Renu Kumar took out this line of credit five months
after the commencement of this action, she gave the money from
the line of credit to her son and her sister-in-law, she
maintained control over the encumbered property in question and
she and Anil Kumar were once again extremely evasive and not
credible when they testified concerning the reasons for the line
of credit and the disposition of the proceeds

Sydur Rashid testified at the hearing that defendant Anil Kumar
told him "we are selling Indian Indigo because we have to show to
the court that we do not have enough money to give to Mr.
Prabir." Rashid further testified that Anil Kumar stated that he
needed to transfer his other businesses to someone else so he
could show the court he had no assets. According to Rashid, Anil
Kumar also told him that "I will even kill myself, but I am not
going to pay him a penny."

Considering the witnesses' testimony and demeanor during the
hearing, the defendants' admissions of their intent to encumber
or dispose of their assets to avoid paying plaintiffs any damages
clearly shows an intent to defraud under N.Y. C.P.L.R. Section
6201(3).

Thus, the plaintiffs have demonstrated an "intent to defraud"
sufficient for the issuance of a pre-judgment order of
attachment.

Although there is no evidence in the record that defendant Renu
Kumar had the authority to hire or fire employees at Basera
Restaurant, the three remaining Carter factors and the totality
of the circumstances weigh in favor of a finding that she had
sufficient operational control over Basera Restaurant to be
considered an employer.

Turning to the second Carter factor, Renu Kumar supervised and
controlled employee work schedules and conditions of their
employment. Rashid worked for Renu Kumar at Basera Restaurant as
a food runner and server from September 2012 until November 2017.
Rashid testified that he would speak to Renu Kumar by phone or
through text message almost daily during his employment.

As to the third and fourth Carter factors, Renu Kumar clearly
determined the method of paying employees and maintained
employment records; all parties agreed that she handled the
payroll and signed all the paychecks at Basera Restaurant. Rashid
testified that Renu Kumar left several pre-signed blank checks at
the restaurant and would either tell him how to complete and
distribute the checks, or would come to the restaurant in person
to distribute the checks to employees.

Rashid was never permitted to complete or distribute a check
without Renu Kumar's express permission, and he was always
required to send her a photograph of any distributed checks to
avoid any errors. This testimony is corroborated by multiple
photographs of checks signed by Renu Kumar that Rashid sent to
her through his cell phone. Rashid further testified that Renu
Kumar was responsible for keeping track of the leftover cash
amounts each night and for picking up the cash from the
restaurant's safe.
Defendants Anil and Renu Kumar testified that they are the
account holders of Basera Restaurant's bank account and they are
the only ones authorized to draw checks on or to withdraw cash
from that account for restaurant expenses, including payroll.
Anil Kumar testified that Renu manages the Basera Restaurant
account and maintains all financial and payroll records from
Basera. Basera Restaurant's corporate credit card bears Renu
Kumar's name on the front.

In addition to these Carter factors, the totality of the
circumstances demonstrates that Renu Kumar exercised sufficient
operational control to be classified as an employer under the
FLSA.

Thus, because the defendants disputed the plaintiffs' probability
of success only with respect to Renu Kumar's status as an
employer, the plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood to
succeed on the merits for an order of attachment.

The Magistrate, accordingly, recommends that the plaintiffs'
motion for a pre-judgment order of attachment be granted in the
amount of $515,819.00.

A full-text copy of the Magistrate Judge's May 17, 2018 Report
and Recommendation is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8rycwr8
from Leagle.com.

Samuel Prabir, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Lucas Colin Buzzard  --
lucas@jk-llp.com -- Joseph & Kirshenbaum LLP & Daniel Maimon
Kirschenbaum, Joseph, Herzfeld, Hester, & Kirschenbaum.

Mustafa Jamal Bhuiyan & Sydur Rashid, Plaintiffs, represented by
Lucas Colin Buzzard, Joseph & Kirshenbaum LLP.

Bukhara Indian Cuisine,Inc, doing business as Indigo Indian
Bistro, Basera Indian Cuisine, Inc., doing business as Basera
Restaurant, Anil Kumar & Renu Kumar, Defendants, represented by
Arthur Harvey Forman, Arthur H. Forman, esq., Benjamin Wade
Baumgartner, Gehi & Associates & Naresh M. Gehi, Law Offices of
N. M. Gehi, P.C.


CALIFORNIA: Denial of Pre-Judgment Attorney's Fees Reversed
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of California, Second District, Division
Three, reversed the judgment of the trial court denying
Plaintiffs' Motion for an Award of Pre-Judgment Attorney's Fees
in the case captioned CENTINELA FREEMAN EMERGENCY MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. DAVID MAXWELL-
JOLLY, as Director, etc., et al., Defendants and Respondents, No.
B270462 (Cal. App.).

The Plaintiffs are a collection of emergency physician medical
groups practicing in California. They filed this putative class
action against the Department of Health Care Services (the
Department), alleging the State of California's Medi-Cal
reimbursement payments do not bear a reasonable relationship to
the costs of providing emergency room care.

The Plaintiffs filed a motion for attorney fees under Code of
Civil Procedure section 1021.5 arguing that they were entitled to
compensation under the private attorney general doctrine for the
fees incurred both to obtain the writ of mandate and subsequently
to compel the Department to undertake annual reviews of Medi-
Cal's physician reimbursement rates as required by section 14079.

The Department opposed the attorney fee motion, arguing, among
other things, that it was untimely under rule 3.1702. Rule 3.1702
requires a motion for prejudgment attorney fees to be filed
within the time for filing a notice of appeal, that is, either 60
days after notice of entry of judgment is served, or 180 days
after judgment is entered.   In its supplemental brief, the
Department argued the final judgment was entered on September 14,
2012, when the clerk entered the Plaintiffs' voluntary dismissal
of the equal Protection Clause claim. The Plaintiffs maintained
that all prior orders were interlocutory and that the final
judgment had not yet been entered.

The trial court entered an order denying the Plaintiffs' motion
for attorney fees as untimely, stating, it appears that judgment
was entered in the action on September 14, 2012, when the
Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the equal Protection Clause
claim.

The trial court explained, "[a] judgment is the final
determination of the rights of the parties therein. The writ
petition was resolved on its merits on October 26, 2010. The
Supremacy Clause cause of action was resolved on its merits on
June 28, 2012. The sole remaining cause of action for violations
of the equal Protection Clause was voluntarily dismissed on
September 14, 2012. At this point, no issue was left for future
consideration except the fact of compliance or non-compliance
with the terms of the writ."

Accordingly, the judgment was final at that point.

Rule 3.1702 establishes time limits for filing a motion to claim
prejudgment attorney fees by cross-referencing the time limits
prescribed by rules 8.104 and 8.108 for filing a notice of
appeal.

The rule states in pertinent part: A notice of motion to claim
attorney's fees for services up to and including the rendition of
judgment in the trial court must be served and filed within the
time for filing a notice of appeal under rules 8.104 and 8.108.

In opposing the Plaintiffs' attorney fee motion, the Department
initially argued the final judgment was not entered until
November 10, 2014, when the trial court discharged the writ and
finally resolved all matters pending between the parties. The
Plaintiffs argued the judgment had yet to be entered, citing
Judge Jones's June 22, 2012 minute order and the parties' March
27, 2013 exchange with the trial court. The court rejected both
parties' positions, ultimately concluding a final judgment was
entered several years earlier when the Plaintiffs dismissed the
equal Protection Clause claim.

The Cal. App. holds that litigants cannot be required to guess,
at their peril, whether a series of documents in combination
trigger the duty to file a notice of appeal or, by virtue of rule
3.1702 incorporating the deadlines established by rule 8.104, the
duty to file a motion for attorney fees. Because the prior
interlocutory orders and the Plaintiffs' voluntary dismissal were
never reduced to a final judgment, the Cal. App. concludes that
judgment has not been entered and the trial court erred when it
denied the Plaintiffs' motion as untimely.

A full-text copy of the Cal. App.'s May 17, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y8z3wso2 from Leagle.com.

Boucher, Raymond P. Boucher -- ray@boucher.la -- Maria L. Weitz -
- weitz@boucher.la -- and Shehnaz Bhujwala -- bhujwala@boucher.la
-- Blood Hurst & O'Reardon, Timothy G. Blood -- tblood@bholaw.com
-- and Paula Roach Brown -- pbrown@bholaw.com -- Liner; DLA
Piper, Angela C. Agrusa -- angela.agrusa@dlapiper.com -- and
Wendy S. Dowse -- dowse@sbemp.com -- Deblase Brown eyerly and
Michael C. eyerly -- eyerly@dbelegal.com -- for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie Weng-Gutierrez, Assistant
Attorney General, Ismael A. Castro, Christine M. Murphy and Kirin
K. Gill, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendants and
Respondents.


CAMPO'S DELI: Moves for Consolidation of 9 "Conner" Class Suits
---------------------------------------------------------------
Campo's Deli @ Market, Inc., moved for an order consolidating
nine class actions:

   * MARY CONNER, et al. v. CAMPO'S DELI @ MARKET, INC.,
     Case No. 2:18-cv-00734-JHS (E.D. Pa.);

   * MARY CONNER, et al. v. LATIN QUARTER CONCEPTS,
     Case No. 18-cv-00682;

   * WALKER, et al. v. THE OYSTER HOUSE, INC.,
     Case No. 18-cv-00193;

   * KILER, et al. v. PERPETUAL POOCH, LLC, Case No. 18-cv-00420;

   * ANDERSON, et al. v. MARQUIS & CO., LLC,
     Case No. 18-cv-00421;

   * PRAZDNIK, et al. v. GRAN CAFFE GROUP, Case No. 18-cv-00565

   * PRAZDNIK, et al. v. MATTY & MERK, LLC, Case No. 18-cv-00615;

   * DICARLO, et al. v. Casmos Cafe, Inc., Case No. 18-cv-00802;
     and

   * PRAZDNIK, et al. v. RALPH'S RESTAURANT,
     Case No. 18-cv-00844.

The case caption is proposed to be established as: IN RE:
CONNER/LEE LITIGATION.

The Movant also asks the Court to appoint it as Lead Defendant
and to approve its selection of the Law Office of J. Conor
Corcoran, P.C., as Lead Counsel.

The Movant informs the Court that the cases are class actions
brought on behalf of blind individuals, represented by C.K. Lee,
Esq., of New York City, who allegedly suffered violations of
Title III of the Americans With Disabilities Act arising from the
websites of individually owned, separate Philadelphia area
restaurants owned and operated by the Defendants between
September 2017 and the present day (the "Class Period").  All of
the complaints filed in the Related Actions seek to pursue
remedies under the Americans With Disabilities Act based upon the
same conduct.

The Movant asserts that each of the complaints filed by Mr. Lee's
lawsuits in the Related Actions are identical to one another,
consisting of the exact same facts, the exact same averments, and
the exact same causes of action, which allegedly constitute Title
III violations.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=3eicEUR4

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          C.K. Lee, Esq.
          LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
          30 East 39th Street, Second Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 465-1188
          Facsimile: (212) 465-1181
          E-mail: cklee@leelitigation.com

The Movant/Lead Defendant is represented by:

          J. Conor Corcoran, Esq.
          1500 John F. Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 620
          Philadelphia, PA 19102
          Telephone: (215) 735-1135
          Facsimile: (215) 735-1175
          E-mail: conor@jccesq.com


CANADA: Responds to Bullying, Harassment Class Action v. RCMP
-------------------------------------------------------------
Dave Seglins, writing for CBC News, reports that Canada's Public
Safety Minister Ralph Goodale is facing renewed criticism over
his handling of harassment and bullying inside the RCMP, in the
wake of a new $1.1-billion class action lawsuit launched against
the force.

"He's been the public safety minister [for years] and quite
frankly done nothing," says Darryl Davies, a criminology
professor at Carleton University.

Mr. Davies, who spent more than two decades working in the
federal justice system and now teaches courses on policing in the
21st century, says he believes Canada needs to hold a public
inquiry into harassment and systemic problems inside the RCMP.

"I feel very frustrated by it, because we've had so many of these
lawsuits launched in recent years.  And you know with the
expectation that maybe things would change, that this public
safety minister would step up to the plate.  But sadly nothing
changes," Mr. Davies said.

Government responds to lawsuit

On June 22, lawyers for two veteran male RCMP officers filed a
$1.1-billion class action claim in federal court that seeks
compensation for thousands of past and present employees, male
and female, for what they claim is widespread "bullying,
harassment and intimidation."

In response, the minister of public safety issued a statement on
June 25 saying, "Harassment cannot be a part of the modern
workplace Canadians expect in the RCMP."

Mr. Goodale's office noted the appointment this spring of Brenda
Lucki as the RCMP's new commissioner.

"She is expected to lead the force through a period of
transformation that will modernize and reform its culture and its
management practices," the statement reads.

The public safety minister's staff say he is reviewing several
reports he's requested into reforming the RMCP, "carefully
examining the recommendations" and pledging "whatever action is
necessary to help all women and men feel safe and respected at
work."

Calls for civilian oversight, union

But critics argue that there have been too many reports and too
little action.

"There will be no end to these types of lawsuits.  There will be
no end to these types of stories until there is significant
structural change in the RCMP," said Pete Merrifield, a serving
RCMP sergeant who is also co-chair of the National Police
Federation.

Mr. Merrifield led the fight all the way to the Supreme Court of
Canada, winning the right for Mounties to form a union, something
that is standard for all other local police forces in Canada.

But after filing applications more than a year ago, Mr.
Merrifield accuses the federal government of delay tactics.  He
argues that RCMP officers need protection from reprisals through
a union, as well as stronger civil oversight and an "inspector
general' who is arm's-length from RCMP management and can
investigate internal corruption and harassment allegations.

"There is no one with the power and authority to investigate the
RCMP -- allegations of corruption, wrongdoing, serious
harassment, criminal activity . . . . that has the mandate," Mr.
Merrifield said. "An inspector general is much more powerful than
an ombudsman and I think a very effective tool to correct the
RCMP."

RCMP Assistant Commissioner Kevin Jones said the force is working
to enhance diversity, gender training and leadership instruction
to deal with what past commissioner Bob Paulson in 2016 called "a
culture of bullying, intimidation and general harassment."

"There is no question that in any workplace, we have conflict,"
Jones said on June 25 when asked whether the RCMP still suffers
from a toxic workplace.

He declined to comment on whether the RCMP needs a public inquiry
or some kind of overhaul to fix chronic workplace issues.

"Those are certainly outside the purview of Kevin Jones or the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police.  Those would be decisions for
politicians or possibly the minister and I can't really address
those things." [GN]


CAPEX OILFIELD: Jones Moves to Certify Class of Field Employees
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit styled JAMES JONES, individually and
on behalf of all similarly situated individuals v. CAPEX OILFIELD
SERVICES, INC., Case No. 2:18-cv-00410-EAS-KAJ (S.D. Ohio), moves
for entry of an order:

   (1) conditionally certifying the proposed collective under
       Fair Labor Standards Act;

   (2) implementing a procedure whereby Court-approved Notice of
       Plaintiff's FLSA claims is sent (via U.S. Mail, e-mail
       and/or text message) to:

       All current and former hourly field employees of Defendant
       who worked over 40 hours in any workweek that they
       attended required pre-shift meetings and/or performed
       post-shift work from April 27, 2015 and through the final
       disposition of this matter (the "216(b) Collective" or the
       "216(b) Collective Members"); and

   (3) requiring the Defendants, within 14 days of the Court's
       Order, to provide a list in electronic and importable
       format, of the names, addresses, e-mail addresses, and
       cell phone numbers of all potential opt-in plaintiffs who
       meet the 216(b) Collective definition and worked for
       Defendant at any time from April 27, 2015, through the
       present.

The Plaintiff alleges that Capex Oilfield Services, Inc., failed
to pay the Plaintiff and other similarly situated individuals
overtime compensation at a rate of at least one and one-half
their regular rates of pay for certain hours worked in excess of
40 hours in workweeks from approximately April 27, 2015, through
the present because they were not compensated for pre-shift
meetings and post-shift work.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=MwTvhPMI

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Robi J. Baishnab, Esq.
          Robert E. DeRose, Esq.
          BARKAN MEIZLISH HANDELMAN GOODIN DEROSE WENTZ, LLP
          250 E. Broad St., 10th Floor
          Columbus, OH 43215
          Telephone: (614) 221-4221
          Facsimile: (614) 744-2300
          E-mail: bderose@barkanmeizlish.com
                  rbaishnab@barkanmeizlish.com

               - and -

          Matthew J.P. Coffman, Esq.
          COFFMAN LEGAL, LLC
          1457 S. High St.
          Columbus, OH 43207
          Telephone: (614) 949-1181
          Facsimile: (614) 386-9964
          E-mail: mcoffman@mcoffmanlegal.com


CBOE EXCHANGE: Accused by LRI Invest Suit of Manipulating VIX
-------------------------------------------------------------
LRI INVEST S.A., individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. CBOE EXCHANGE, INC., CBOE GLOBAL MARKETS,
INC., CBOE FUTURES EXCHANGE, LLC, and JOHN DOES, Case No. 1:18-
cv-06007 (S.D.N.Y., July 2, 2018), is an antitrust class action
lawsuit concerning:

    (i) Volatility Index Futures or Options traded in the United
        States since January 1, 2009; and

   (ii) Volatility Index Exchange-traded products since
        January 1, 2009.

The Volatility Index is known under its ticker symbol "VIX".  VIX
is a benchmark index created by CBOE Exchange, Inc., a wholly
owned subsidiary of CBOE Global Markets, Inc.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants engaged in manipulative
conduct, which violates the Sherman Act and the Commodity
Exchange Act.  The Plaintiff seeks damages arising from the
Defendants' alleged misconduct, including treble damages as
provided by law, and injunctive relief enjoining the continuation
of the alleged manipulation.

CBOE Exchange, Inc., is a Delaware corporation with its principal
place of business in Chicago, Illinois.  CBOE Exchange is a
wholly owned subsidiary of CBOE Global Markets, Inc., which is
also a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business
in Chicago.

CBOE Futures Exchange, LLC is a Delaware limited liability
company with its principal place of business in Chicago.  The
John Doe Defendants are those financial institutions that
manipulated VIX Instruments through the collusive trading in and
posting of quotes for SPX Options during the times those S&P 500
Index option contracts trades and quotes were used in the
settlement calculation of VIX Futures and VIX Options, and,
relatedly, influenced the price of VIX Exchange-Traded
Products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Christopher F. Moriarty, Esq.
          MOTLEY RICE LLC
          28 Bridgeside Blvd.
          Mt. Pleasant, SC 29464
          Telephone: (843) 216-9000
          Facsimile: (843) 216-9450
          E-mail: cmoriarty@motleyrice.com

               - and -

          Michael M. Buchman, Esq.
          Erin C. Durba, Esq.
          Michelle C. Zolnoski, Esq.
          MOTLEY RICE LLC
          600 Third Avenue, Suite 2101
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 577-0040
          Facsimile: (212) 577-0054
          E-mail: mbuchman@motleyrice.com
                  edurba@motleyrice.com
                  mzolnoski@motleyrice.com

               - and -

          William H. Narwold, Esq.
          MOTLEY RICE LLC
          One Corporate Center
          20 Church St., 17th Floor
          Hartford, CT 06103
          Telephone: (860) 882-1681
          Facsimile: (860) 882-1682
          E-mail: bnarwold@motleyrice.com

               - and -

          Deborah M. Sturman, Esq.
          STURMAN LLC
          600 Third Avenue, Suite 2101
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 367-7017
          E-mail: sturman@sturman.ch


CHG EMPLOYEE: Haydel Sues Over Patient Care Nurses' Unpaid OT
-------------------------------------------------------------
RAQUEL HAYDEL, AMBER BENEFIELD, RUBY MOONEY, CASEY TURNER, and
STACI KNIGHT, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. CHG EMPLOYEE HOLDING LLC and CORNERSTONE HEALTHCARE
GROUP HOLDING, INC., Case No. 4:18-cv-02266 (S.D. Tex., July 2,
2018), is brought under the collective action provisions of the
Fair Labor Standards Act because the Plaintiffs and the putative
class members are similarly situated in these particulars:

   (a) they are or were hourly-paid direct patient care nurses
       subject to the Defendants' medical facility-wide policy of
       automatic pay deductions for meal periods;

   (b) they are and were required and permitted to be available
       to perform uncompensated work during those meal periods,
       and in fact did perform uncompensated work during those
       periods;

   (c) the meal periods are and were predominantly for the
       benefit of the Defendants; and

   (d) they suffered overtime wage losses as a result of
       the Defendants' failure to pay wages at the federally
       required overtime rate for these 30 minutes meal periods
       in the weeks in which the nurses worked more than 40 hours
       in a week.

CHG Employee Holding, LLC, is a Texas limited liability company,
which jointly operates Cornerstone.  Cornerstone Healthcare Group
Holding, Inc., is a Delaware corporation doing business in Texas,
which jointly operates Cornerstone.

The Defendants own and operate various medical facilities located
nationwide -- collectively referred to as "Cornerstone."[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Todd Slobin, Esq.
          Ricardo J. Prieto, Esq.
          SHELLIST LAZARZ SLOBIN LLP
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1515
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 621-2277
          Facsimile: (713) 621-0993
          E-mail: tslobin@eeoc.net
                  rprieto@eeoc.net

               - and -

          Melinda Arbuckle, Esq.
          BARON & BUDD, P.C.
          3102 Oak Lawn Avenue, Suite 1100
          Dallas, TX 75219
          Telephone: (214) 521-3605
          Facsimile: (214) 520-1181
          E-mail: marbuckl@baronbudd.com


CLUB AT NORTH HALTON: Obtains Favorable Ruling in Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Eamonn Maher, writing for Independent Free Press, reports that an
Ontario Superior Court Justice ruled in favour of the Club at
North Halton in a class-action lawsuit filed against it by a
shareholder.

Justice Benjamin Glustein ruled in a Toronto court on June 21
that the share sale programs offered by North Halton in 2015 were
not oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregarded the
interests of the class, nor did they constitute breaches of the
duty of care and fiduciary duty owed to the club by its
directors.

"North Halton submitted that there was no evidence of oppressive
or unfair conduct and that its board exercised its business
judgment in the best interests of Halton, in furtherance of its
fiduciary duty," the club said in a statement.

"The Court's decision reinforces North Halton's role as an
important community hub for Georgetown and the surrounding area."

The motion for summary judgment had been brought by Peter Noble
in 2015, claiming the legal action was based on a number of
issues, including that North Halton's current share exchange
program is "a wealth transfer machine," resulting in economic
loss to a group of 122 non-golfing and non-member shareholders,
many of whom were looking to divest their shares in the venerable
century-old club.

The class action also asked the court that the ownership
structure of the for-profit Club at North Halton, which operates
a golf course, curling and dining facilities, be dissolved and
its net assets distributed among all shareholders.

Noble said he was disappointed in the decision by Justice
Glustein, who recently assumed control of the proceedings after
Justice Edward Belobaba took a medical leave of absence.

"The central problem of the shareholder situation with the club
still remains; 50 per cent of the shareholders no longer want to
play golf at the club and want to receive their $90,000 share
value, and the remaining 50 per cent want to play golf and trap
the $20 million of the shareholder equity of those who don't
play," said Noble, a Georgetown native who now resides in B.C.

"The club has no operational plan for these shareholders to ever
receive their proper share value."

The club held a special shareholders' meeting in October 2017 to
determine whether to entertain the best two offers -- as
determined by broker-of-record Colliers International -- to sell
the land and buildings, requiring a two-thirds majority vote to
pass. [GN]


COLUMBIA PIPELINE: Faces Class Action Over TransCanada Sale
-----------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News, reported that Columbia
Pipeline Group shareholders claim in court that directors forced
a sale to TransCanada through an unfair, self-interested process,
for $25.50 a share or $13 billion.

The case is PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF MISSISSIPPI,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff, v. ROBERT C. SKAGGS, JR., STEPHEN P. SMITH, SIGMUND L.
CORNELIUS, MARTY R. KITTRELL, W. LEE NUTTER, DEBORAH S. PARKER,
TERESA A. TAYLOR, LESTER P. SILVERMAN, and TRANSCANADA
CORPORATION, Defendants, C.A. No. _____-___, filed with the Court
of Chancery of the State of Delaware.

Counsel for Plaintiff:

     Ned Weinberger, Esq.
     Thomas Curry, Esq.
     LABATON SUCHAROW LLP
     300 Delaware Ave., Suite 1340
     Wilmington, DE 19801
     Tel: (302) 573-2540

        -- and --

     Eric Belfi, Esq.
     Ira A. Schochet, Esq.
     LABATON SUCHAROW LLP
     140 Broadway
     New York, New York 10005
     Tel: (212) 907-0700
     Fax: (212) 818-0477


CREDIT ONE: Anderson Submits Waiver to Respond in Sup. Ct. Case
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff-Respondent Orrin S. Anderson submitted a waiver to
respond in the lawsuit titled Credit One Bank, N.A., Petitioner
v. Orrin S. Anderson, Respondent, Case No. 17-1652, in the
Supreme Court of United States.

On June 5, 2018, Credit One filed with the Supreme Court
petitions for writ of certiorari.  Response to the petitions was
due on July 9, 2018.

The lower court case is entitled ORRIN S. ANDERSON, ON BEHALF OF
HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED v. CREDIT ONE BANK,
N.A., Case No. 16-2496, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit.  In the Appellate Case, the Defendant
appealed the affirmation of the denial of its motion to compel
arbitration.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Judge
Rosemary S. Pooler of the Second Circuit affirmed the District
Court's order denying Credit One's motion to compel arbitration.

In October 2002, Anderson opened a credit card account with First
National Bank of Marin, a predecessor in interest to Credit One.
Anderson's cardholder agreement contained an arbitration clause.

In September 2011, Anderson's Credit One credit card account
became delinquent and it remained so until March 2012, when
Credit One "charged off" Anderson's account, reclassifying
Anderson's debt from a receivable to a loss.  In May 2012, Credit
One sold Anderson's account to a third-party debt buyer.  Credit
One then reported the charge-off and the sale of the debt to the
three major consumer credit reporting agencies Equifax, Experian,
and TransUnion.

On Jan. 31, 2014, Anderson filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy
petition in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District
of New York.  On May 6, 2014, the bankruptcy court entered an
order discharging all of Anderson's dischargeable debts and
closing his Chapter 7 case.

In September 2014, Anderson contacted Credit One and asked it to
remove the charge-off from his credit reports since the Credit
One debt had been discharged in his bankruptcy proceeding.
Credit One refused to contact the credit reporting agencies to
correct the alleged error on Anderson's credit report.  In
October 2014, Anderson moved the bankruptcy court to reopen his
case in order to pursue Credit One's alleged violations of his
discharge injunction.  In December 2014, the bankruptcy court
granted Anderson's motion to reopen.

Anderson thereafter filed an amended class action complaint in
the bankruptcy court alleging that Credit One violated 11 U.S.C.
Section 524(a)(2) by knowingly and willfully failing to update
the credit reports of the class members to signify the debts
owing to Credit One have been discharged in bankruptcy.  In
essence, Anderson alleged that Credit One refused to update the
credit reporting agencies regarding the discharged debt in an
effort to coerce payment on the discharged debt in violation of
the Section 524 discharge injunction.[BN]

Defendant-Petitioner Credit One Bank, N.A., is represented by:

          Seth P. Waxman, Esq.
          WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND DORR LLP
          1875 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
          Washington, DC 20006
          Telephone: (202) 663-6800
          E-mail: Seth.Waxman@wilmerhale.com

Plaintiff-Respondent Orrin S. Anderson is represented by:

          George Fortune Carpinello, Esq.
          BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
          30 South Pearl Street
          Albany, NY 12207
          Telephone: (518) 434-0600
          E-mail: gcarpinello@bsfllp.com


CRICKET COMMS: 4th Cir. Affirms Denial of Bid to Intervene
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, affirmed the
District Court's judgment denying Defendant Michael Scott's
Motion to Intervene in the case captioned MR. MICHAEL A. SCOTT,
Intervenor/Plaintiff, Potential Intervenor-Appellant, v. TIM
BOND, on his own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff-Appellee, and CRICKeT COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,
Defendant-Appellee, and AT&T INC, Defendant, No. 17-2288 (4th
Cir.).

Bond asserted that the merger rendered certain Cricket cellular
phones obsolete. Later that year, intervenor Michael Scott filed
a separate class action in Maryland state court arising from the
same facts, alleging a single claim against Cricket under the
federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (Warranty Act).

Bond and Cricket stipulated to amend Bond's complaint in the
district court to add an essentially identical Warranty Act
claim. Six months later, after the parties in the Bond case
notified the district court that they had reached a proposed
settlement, Scott moved to intervene in that case under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 24.

The district court denied Scott's motion as untimely, and Scott
now appeals.

Under Rule 24(a), a district court must permit an applicant to
intervene in ongoing litigation if certain conditions are met.
Thus, to intervene as a matter of right under Rule 24(a), a
movant generally must satisfy four criteria: (1) timeliness, (2)
an interest in the litigation, (3) a risk that the interest will
be impaired absent intervention, and (4) inadequate
representation of the interest by the existing parties.

Here, the Fourth Circuit finds that Scott did not attempt to
participate in any manner in the Bond case from the date Cricket
filed the Notice in November 2015 until August 2017, when Scott
sought to intervene in the proceedings. As of November 2015,
Scott knew that the Bond case involved the very conduct by
Cricket that Scott was challenging on behalf of a smaller class.
even assuming that Scott reasonably believed that his interests
were not affected by the Bond case when the Notice was filed in
November 2015, he necessarily knew that the Bond case threatened
his interests as soon as the parties in that case stipulated to
add the Warranty Act claim in February 2017.

And Scott himself stated in his brief filed in this Court that
the filing of Bond's second amended complaint was suspect. Thus,
by his own admission, Scott had reason to intervene in February
2017 when the parties in the Bond case filed their stipulation,
and yet he waited six months to do so. Moreover, Scott knew no
more about the Bond case's purported threat to his rights in
August 2017 than he knew in February 2017, because the settlement
terms were not filed with the court until November 2017.

The Fourth Circuit holds that the district court therefore had
compelling reasons to reject Scott's proffered justification for
intervening long after he was aware of perceived threats to his
interests. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit concludes that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying as
untimely Scott's motion to intervene.

A full-text copy of the Fourth Circuit's May 17, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y9qmzxw8 from Leagle.com.

ARGUED: Martin Eugene Wolf, GORDON, WOLF & CARNEY, CHTD, for
Appellant.

Charles Alan Rothfeld -- crothfeld@mayerbrown.com -- MAYER BROWN
LLP, Washington, D.C.; Cory Lev Zajdel, Z LAW, LLC, for
Appellees.

ON BRIEF: Benjamin H. Carney, GORDON, WOLF & CARNEY, CHTD, for
Appellant.

Archis A. Parasharami -- aparasharami@mayerbrown.com -- Matthew
A. Waring -- mwaring@mayerbrown.com -- MAYeR BROWN LLP,
Washington, D.C., for Appellee Cricket Communications, LLC.


CU RECOVERY: Faces "Riggen" Suit Over Deceptive Debt Collection
---------------------------------------------------------------
TIMOTHY RIGGEN, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. CU RECOVERY, INC., Case No. 1:18-cv-01243-JBM-JEH
(C.D. Ill., July 2, 2018), alleges that the Defendant violated
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by using false, deceptive,
or misleading representations or means in connection with the
collection of the Plaintiff's debt.

The Defendant is an entity, which is engaged, by use of the mails
and telephone, in the business of attempting to collect a "debt"
from the Plaintiff.  The Defendant regularly collects or attempts
to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due, or
asserted to be owed or due, another.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Russell S. Thompson, IV, Esq.
          THOMPSON CONSUMER LAW GROUP, PLLC
          5235 E. Southern Ave., D106-618
          Mesa, AZ 85206
          Telephone: (602) 388-8898
          Facsimile: (866) 317-2674
          E-mail: rthompson@ThompsonConsumerLaw.com


DETROIT, MI: Judge Inks Tax Foreclosure Class Action Settlement
---------------------------------------------------------------
Matt Reynolds, writing for Courthouse News, reported that a judge
signed off on a settlement on July 3 that lets distressed
Michiganders pay $1,000 to stay in their homes and seek exemption
from property taxes.

The American Civil Liberties Union brought the underlying case
two years ago as a class action against Detroit and Wayne County.
Accusing the city of having relied on inflated property values to
calculate nonpayment of property taxes, the ACLU said the program
led to tens of thousands of foreclosures that disproportionately
affected black communities.

Homeowners meanwhile called the process of getting a poverty
exemption overly complicated and opaque.

Now under a July 3 settlement, homeowners will avoid tax
foreclosures and remain in their homes at the cost of $1,000.  If
a homeowner cannot afford that amount, United Community Housing
Coalition will work with them on zero-interest payment plans.
The settlement also streamlines the process for owners to apply
for the poverty tax exemption program, Homeowners Property Tax
Assistance Program.

Michael Steinberg, legal director of the ACLU of Michigan, said
that the settlement would help thousands of homeowners stay above
water.  Empty properties have plagued the city for years, and
Steinberg said the city was also a winner because it would have
fewer abandoned properties to take care of.

"This agreement will hopefully mark the beginning of the end of
the worst tax foreclosure crises since the Great Depression,"
Steinberg said in prepared remarks.

Low-income homeowners who are already in tax foreclosure have
until July 13 to see if they meet the requirements of Wayne
County treasurer to qualify for relief, the ACLU said.

The Detroit City Council voted 7-0 on July 3 to go ahead with the
settlement, according to The Detroit News.  The agreement means
that over the next three years thousands of homes could be saved
from foreclosure.

Detroit Mayor Mike Duggan's aide Eli Savit said the settlement
had been months in the making and that efforts to keep homeowners
in their homes were already working.

"I think it's just a big win for everybody.  It really moves the
ball and allows us to work together to keep people in their
homes," Mr. Savit said in a phone interview on June 28.  "We're
just really happy with the outcome and we're looking forward to
moving forward together."

Under the terms of the settlement, Detroit will notify all
homeowners with residences worth less than $95,000 that they may
be eligible for relief through the Homeowners Property Tax
Assistance Program.  The city will make the process of applying
for the program easier by making forms available online at
detroitmi.gov.

For property owners whose homes are already in foreclosure, the
city has a right of first refusal to buy the houses from Wayne
County treasurer before they are put up for auction.

Owners could see their back taxes slashed by as much as 40
percent after the city agreed not to recover its portion of the
fees, the ACLU said in a news release.

Wayne County Circuit Court Chief Judge Robert Colombo signed off
on the settlement.  He had ruled that the case belonged in the
Michigan Tax Tribunal, rather than the court, but found that the
plaintiffs had stated a claim for race discrimination under
fair-housing laws.

The ACLU asked the Michigan Supreme Court to review that decision
earlier this year.

At that time, the homeowners' claim that Detroit made it unduly
burdensome for homeowners to get a poverty exemption under the
Homeowners Property Tax Assistance Program was still pending.

Six homeowners joined the MorningSide Community Organization, the
Historic Russell Woods-Sullivan Area Association and Neighbors
Building Brightmoor in the lawsuit.  The NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, and the law firm Covington and Burling also
represented the plaintiffs.


DEUTSCHE BANK: Statistical Sampling Use in RMBS Suit Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York denied Plaintiffs' Request for Permission to Proceed with
expert Discovery Using Statistical Sampling in the case captioned
BLACKROCK BALANCED CAPITAL PORTFOLIO (FI), et al., Plaintiffs, v.
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY,: et al., Defendants, No.
14-CV-9367 (JMF) (S.D.N.Y.).

In this putative class action, certificate holders in certain
residential mortgage-backed security trusts ("RMBS" or "Trusts")
bring suit against Deutsche Bank National Trust Company and
Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas (collectively, "Deutsche
Bank"), alleging breaches of contractual and statutory duties as
Indenture Trustee for the Trusts.  Specifically, the Plaintiffs
allege that Deutsche Bank violated the Trust Indenture Act of
1939 ("TIA"), 15 U.S.C. Section 77aaa et seq., and breached its
contractual duties by failing to address breaches of
representations and warranties across dozens of RMBS trusts
containing hundreds of thousands of mortgage loans.

Now pending is a motion by the Plaintiffs for leave to use
"statistical sampling evidence" in order to "assist in proving
Deutsche Bank's liability and in calculating damages."

The Court does not write on a blank slate.  The Honorable Sarah
Netburn, United States Magistrate Judge, decided the exact same
issue in two nearly identical cases, and the Honorable Katherine
Polk Failla and the Honorable Lorna G. Schofield, United States
District Judges, later affirmed her decisions.  Applying the
proportionality principle set forth in Rule 26(b)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, those Judges concluded that the
plaintiffs there could not pursue sampling evidence.  On the one
hand, "the contemplated sampling will cost hundreds of thousands,
if not millions, of dollars, will require months to conduct, and
will likely result in challenges to the admissibility of the
evidence."  On the other hand, sampling is of limited benefit
because the defendant trustees' "misconduct must be proved loan-
by-loan and trust-by-trust," and "[s]ampling cannot provide loan-
specific information as to any loan outside the sample."

The Court agrees.  Because the Plaintiffs cannot avoid the need
for loan-specific evidence, there is nothing to be gained from
allowing statistical sampling per se and much to be lost, in time
if not money.  The Plaintiffs' request for permission to proceed
with expert discovery using statistical sampling is thus denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 17, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ycue3sfd
from Leagle.com.

Blackrock Balanced Capital Portfolio & Blackrock Core Active Bond
Fund, Plaintiffs, represented by Jai Kamal Chandrasekhar --
jai@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP,
Jeroen Van Kwawegen -- jeroen@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein Litowitz
Berger & Grossmann LLP, Benjamin Galdston -- beng@blbglaw.com --
Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, Brett M. Middleton --
brettm@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP,
David R. Kaplan -- DavidK@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein Litowitz
Berger & Grossmann LLP, David R. Stickney -- davids@blbglaw.com -
- Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, Lucas e. Gilmore --
Lucas.Gilmore@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein Litowitz Berger &
Grossmann LLP, Richard David Gluck -- Rich.Gluck@blbglaw.com --
Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, Robert Steven Trisotto
-- robert.trisotto@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein Litowitz Berger &
Grossman LLP & Timothy Alan DeLange -- timothyd@blbglaw.com --
Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP.

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, Defendant, represented by
Brian A. Herman  -- brian.herman@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis
& Bockius LLP, Gregory T. Fouts -- gregory.fouts@morganlewis.com
-- Morgan Lewis & Bockius, LLP, Kevin James Biron --
kevin.biron@morganlewis.com -- Morgan Lewis & Bockius, LLP,
Michael Stephan Kraut -- michael.kraut@morganlewis.com -- Morgan,
Lewis and Bockius LLP, Susan F. DiCicco --
susan.dicicco@morganlewis.com -- Morgan Lewis & Bockius, LLP,
Bernard J. Garbutt, III -- bernard.garbutt@morganlewis.com --
Morgan, Lewis and Bockius LLP, Bryan P. Goff --
bryan.goff@morganlewis.com -- Morgan Lewis & Bockius, LLP,
Christopher James Stanley -- cstanley@jha.com -- Joseph Hage
Aaronson LLC, Cristina Ashba -- cristina.ashba@morganlewis.com --
Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP, elizabeth Allen Frohlich --
elizabeth.frohlich@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius
LLP, elizabeth Herrington -- beth.herrington@morganlewis.com --
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, pro hac vice.


DIETZ & WATSON: Court Conditionally Certifies "Rozeboom" Class
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Seattle, granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional
Collective Action Certification in the case captioned SHARON
ROZEBOOM and ANTHONY LAVALLeY, individually and on behalf of all
other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs, v. DIETZ &
WATSON, INC., Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-01266-RAJ (W.D. Wash.).

The Named Plaintiffs and the class they hope to represent were
Merchandisers for the Defendant.  The Plaintiffs claim that they
were expected to, and did, work more than forty hours per work
week. The Plaintiffs claim that the Defendant misclassified the
Merchandisers as exempt from overtime pay and therefore paid them
a salary that did not account for the overtime.

The Plaintiffs seek certification of a collective class composed
of:

     All persons who are or were employed by Dietz & Watson, Inc.
as Merchandisers, also referred to as Sales Merchandisers, or who
were in other job titles performing similar duties, working
within the United States at any time from three (3) years prior
to the filing of the initial Complaint in this action (the FLSA
Collective).

The Plaintiffs' motion is supported by their Complaint,
declarations, and a job description lifted from the Defendant's
website. each submission is consistent, and from this small
record the Plaintiffs have shown that employees hired as
Merchandisers performed the same job duties.

The Plaintiffs' showing, though minimal, is sufficient for the
Court to grant conditional certification. This is due to the
leniency with which the Court treats the motion. Though the Court
finds this decision to be a close one, the Plaintiffs have
succeeded in plainly alleging a common policy to classify
Merchandisers as exempt, thereby denying them overtime
compensation in violation of the FLSA.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 17, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y79s6bnv from Leagle.com.

Sharon Roseboom, individually and on behalf of other similarly
situated individuals & Anthony Lavalley, individually and on
behalf of other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs,
represented by Jason D. Friedman -- jfriedman@nka.com -- NICHOLS
KASTeR, PLLP, pro hac vice, Rebekah L. Bailey  -- bailey@nka.com
-- NICHOLS KASTeR, PLLP, pro hac vice & Toby James Marshall --
tmarshall@terrellmarshall.com -- TeRReLL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC.

Dietz & Watson Inc, Defendant, represented by Breanne Sheetz
Martell -- bsmartell@littler.com -- LITTLeR MeNDeLSON & Joanna
Marie Silverstein -- jsilverstein@littler.com -- LITTLeR
MeNDeLSON.


DITECH FINANCIAL: Accused by "Perez" Suit of Violating FDCPA
------------------------------------------------------------
RALPH PEREZ and ROSEMARY PEREZ, on behalf of themselves
individually and all others similarly situated v. DITECH
FINANCIAL LLC, Case No. 1:18-cv-03809 (E.D.N.Y., June 30, 2018),
is brought for damages arising from the Defendant's alleged
violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, which
prohibits debt collectors from engaging in abusive, deceptive and
unfair acts and practices.

Ditech Financial LLC is a foreign limited liability company
incorporated in Delaware.  The Company operates a business the
principal purpose of which is the collection of defaulted
consumer debts.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Novlette R. Kidd, Esq.
          FAGENSON & PUGLISI, PLLC
          450 Seventh Avenue, Suite 704
          New York, NY 10123
          Telephone: (212) 268-2128
          E-mail: Nkidd@fagensonpuglisi.com


EDISON INTERNATIONAL: Wilson Appeals C.D. Cal. Order to 9th Cir.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Cassandra Wilson filed an appeal from a court ruling in
the lawsuit titled Cassandra Wilson v. Theodore Craver, et al.,
Case No. 2:15-cv-09139-JAK-PJW, in the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California, Los Angeles.

Robert Boada and Theodore F. Craver are directors and officers of
Edison International.

The lawsuit alleges violations of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act.

The appellate case is captioned as Cassandra Wilson v. Theodore
Craver, et al., Case No. 18-55744, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by July 9, 2018;

   -- Transcript is due on August 7, 2018;

   -- Appellant Cassandra Wilson's opening brief is due on
      September 17, 2018;

   -- Appellees Robert Boada and Theodore F. Craver's answering
      brief is due on October 16, 2018; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant CASSANDRA WILSON, and all other individuals
similarly situated, is represented by:

          Samuel E. Bonderoff, Esq.
          ZAMANSKY LLC
          50 Broadway
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (212) 742-1414
          E-mail: samuel@zamansky.com

Defendants-Appellees THEODORE F. CRAVER and ROBERT BOADA are
represented by:

          Henry Weissmann, Esq.
          John M. Gildersleeve, Esq.
          Jordan X. Navarrette, Esq.
          MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP
          350 South Grand Avenue, 50th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 683-9150
          E-mail: Henry.Weissmann@mto.com
                  john.gildersleeve@mto.com
                  Jordan.Navarrette@mto.com


EMERGENCY COVERAGE: Court OKs $1,360 Settlement Fund in "Harbin"
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for eastern District of
Tennessee, Knoxville issued an Order granting Parties' Request
for Final Approval of the Class Settlement Agreement in the case
captioned DUSTIN HARBIN and JIMMY PRUITT, on behalf of themselves
and the class defined herein, Plaintiffs, v. eMeRGeNCY COVeRAGe
CORPORATION and ACCOUNT ReSOLUTION TeAM, INC., Defendants. Case
No. 3:16-CV-125. (e.D. Tenn.)

The following Settlement Class is certified pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(b)(3):

     (a) All persons sued by Defendants; (b) in the General
Session Court of Hamblen County, Tennessee; (c) that had
garnishments issued against their wages that included amounts of
post-judgment interest or fees that exceeded the amount allowed
under Tennessee state law; (d) that made payments to Defendants
as a result of the wrongful garnishments issued to their
employers by garnishment of wages or direct payment to the clerk
between March 16, 2013 and ending on April 5, 2016.

The Court finds that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and
adequate and finally approves the Agreement submitted by the
Parties, including the Release and payments by PRS. Upon the
effective Date, the Defendants will make the following payments:

   (a) The Defendants will create a class settlement fund of
$1,360.00 (Class Recovery), which the Class Administrator will
distribute among those Settlement Class Members who did not
exclude themselves (Claimants). Claimants will receive a $10.00
payment from the Class Recovery by check. The shares of any of
the Settlement Class Members who could not be located will be
donated as a cy pres award to east Tennessee Children's Hospital,
and the award will be expressly earmarked for the benefit of
infants afflicted with Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome (NAS). Checks
issued to Claimants will be void sixty days from the date of
issuance. Any checks that have not been cashed by the void date,
along with any unclaimed funds remaining in the Class Recovery,
will also be donated as a cy pres award to east Tennessee
Children's Hospital for the same purposes.

   (b) The Defendants will pay each Plaintiff $1,010.00.

   (c) The Defendants will pay into the registry of the Court the
sum of $27,500 in payment of the Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and
costs incurred in the action and due Class Counsel. Class Counsel
will not request additional fees or costs from Defendants or the
Settlement Class members.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 17, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ycepsqbv from Leagle.com.

Dustin Harbin & Jimmy Pruitt, Plaintiffs, represented by Alan C.
Lee, Alan C. Lee, Attorney, Peter A. Holland, The Holland Law
Firm, P.C., & Scott C. Borison, Legg Law Firm, LLC.

emergency Coverage Corporation & Account Resolution Team, Inc.,
Defendants, represented by John M. Lawhorn -- jlawhorn@fmsllp.com
-- Frantz, McConnell & Seymour, LLP.


EVERETT ASSOCIATION: Thomas Appeals W.D. Wash. Ruling to 9th Cir.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Deanna C. Thomas filed an appeal from a court ruling in
the lawsuit entitled Deanna Thomas v. Everett Association of
Credit, et al., Case No. 2:17-cv-00599-RSM, in the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Washington, Seattle.

The nature of suit is stated as consumer credit.

The appellate case is captioned as Deanna Thomas v. Everett
Association of Credit, et al., Case No. 18-35499, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Appellant Deanna C. Thomas' opening brief is due on
      August 6, 2018;

   -- Appellees John/Jane Does, Everett Association of Credit Men
      Inc, Royce A. Ferguson, Monica Jones, Branna Wickberg and
      Kristie Youso's answering brief is due on September 5,
      2018; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant DEANNA C. THOMAS, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Richard L. Pope, Jr., Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF RICHARD POPE
          15600 NE 8th Street, Suite B1-358
          Bellevue, WA 98008
          Telephone: (425) 829-5305
          Facsimile: (425) 526-5714
          E-mail: rp98007@gmail.com

Defendants-Appellee EVERETT ASSOCIATION OF CREDIT MEN INC. and
MONICA JONES are represented by:

          Jeffrey I. Hasson, Esq.
          HASSON LAW LLC
          9385 SW Locust Street
          Tigard, OR 97223
          Telephone: (503) 255-5352
          Facsimile: (503) 255-6124
          E-mail: hasson@hassonlawllc.com


EXPERT GROUP: Appeals Decision in Colony Suit to Tenth Circuit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Au Pair International, Inc., Expert Group
International Inc. and Go Au Pair Operations, LLC, filed an
appeal from a court ruling in the lawsuit entitled Colony
Insurance Company v. Expert Group International Inc., et al.,
Case No. 1:15-CV-02499-RPM, in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Colorado - Denver.

The lawsuit arises from insurance-related issues.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the parties
have filed appeals from court rulings in the lawsuit.

The appellate case is captioned as Colony Insurance Company v.
Expert Group International Inc., et al., Case No. 18-1238, in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Docketing statement was due June 21, 2018, for Au Pair
      International, Inc., Expert Group International Inc. and Go
      Au Pair Operations, LLC;

   -- Transcript order form was due on June 21, 2018, for Au Pair
      International, Inc., Expert Group International Inc. and Go
      Au Pair Operations, LLC;

   -- Notice of appearance was due on June 21, 2018, for Au Pair
      International, Inc., Colony Insurance Company, Expert Group
      International Inc. and Go Au Pair Operations, LLC.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee COLONY INSURANCE COMPANY is represented by:

          Larry I. Gramovot, Esq.
          GRAMOVOT & TAKACS, P.L.
          1400 Village Square Boulevard No. 3-405
          Tallahassee, FL 32312-1231
          Telephone: (850) 325-1914
          Facsimile: (866) 386-6321
          E-mail: Larry@lig-law.com

               - and -

          Aaron J. Pratt, Esq.
          Kyle P. Seedorf, Esq.
          TAYLOR ANDERSON, LLP
          1670 Broadway, Suite 900
          Denver, CO 80202
          Telephone: (303) 551-6660
          E-mail: apratt@talawfirm.com
                  kseedorf@talawfirm.com

Defendants-Appellants EXPERT GROUP INTERNATIONAL INC., DBA Expert
Au Pair; GO AU PAIR OPERATIONS, LLC, DBA American Cultural
Exchange; and AU PAIR INTERNATIONAL, INC., are represented by:

          Christopher R. Mosley, Esq.
          SHERMAN & HOWARD LLC
          633 17th Street, Suite 3000
          Denver, CO 80202
          Telephone: (303) 297-2900
          Facsimile: (303) 298-0940
          E-mail: cmosley@shermanhoward.com


FAMOUS BOURBON: Class of Employees Certified in "Richardson" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Jane Triche Milazzo grants the Motion to Conditionally
Certify FLSA Collective Action and Facilitate Notice Under 29
U.S.C. Section 216(b) filed by the Plaintiff in the lawsuit
captioned LAWRENCE RICHARDSON, ET AL. v. FAMOUS BOURBON MGMT
GROUP, INC., ET AL., Case No. 2:15-cv-05848-JTM-DEK (E.D. La.).

The conditionally certified FLSA Collective consists of:

     All persons employed by Defendants since December 2014 who
     were paid on a "day rate" basis but were not paid at a rate
     equal to or higher than the federal minimum wage rate and/or
     who were not paid at an overtime rate of one and one-half
     times their hourly rate of pay for each hour worked in
     excess of 40 per week in violation of the Fair Labor
     Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, et seq. ("FLSA").

Judge Milazzo approves the Plaintiff's proposed written notice to
all potential collective action members and opt-in forms to
potential collective action plaintiffs, with the caveat that the
time period to respond/file shall be 90 days.

Judge Milazzo also directs the Defendants to provide a list of
all the last former known addresses of all current or former
employees, who may be members of the collective class to counsel
for the Plaintiff within 30 days of the date of this Order.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=fnBazxYW


FLEX PHARMA: Federman & Sherwood Files Class Action Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Federman & Sherwood on June 26 disclosed that on June 19, 2018, a
class action lawsuit was filed in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York against Flex Pharma,
Inc. (NASDAQ:FLKS).  The complaint alleges violations of federal
securities laws, Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5, including allegations of
issuing a series of material or false misrepresentations to the
market which had the effect of artificially inflating the market
price during the Class Period, which is November 6, 2017 through
June 12, 2018.

Plaintiff seeks to recover damages on behalf of all Flex Pharma,
Inc. shareholders who purchased common stock during the Class
Period and are therefore a member of the Class as described
above. You may move the Court no later than August 20, 2018 to
serve as a lead plaintiff for the entire Class.  However, in
order to do so, you must meet certain legal requirements pursuant
to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.

If you wish to discuss this action, obtain further information
and participate in this or any other securities litigation, or
should you have any questions or concerns regarding this notice
or preservation of your rights, please contact:

          Robin Hester
          FEDERMAN & SHERWOOD
          10205 North Pennsylvania Avenue
          Oklahoma City, OK 73120
          Email to: rkh@federmanlaw.com

Or, visit the firm's website at www.federmanlaw.com [GN]


FOGO DE CHAO: Class Action Dismissed Without Prejudice
------------------------------------------------------
Notice is hereby provided to all persons who held shares of Fogo
de Chao, Inc. ("Fogo") common stock at any time during the period
from and including February 20, 2018 through April 5, 2018.

The purpose of this Notice is to inform you about developments
with respect to the putative class action lawsuit captioned
Pazral v. Fogo de Chao, Inc., et al., C.A. No. 2018-0202-JTL (the
"Action"), including the effects of these developments on Fogo
and its stockholders, the dismissal of the Action, and an
agreement that has been reached for the payment of attorneys'
fees and expenses to counsel for Plaintiff Jan Pazral
("Plaintiff") in the Action.

This matter concerned a February 20, 2018 merger agreement
between Fogo and Prime Cut Intermediate Holdings, Inc. ("Prime
Cut"). Pursuant to this agreement, Prime Cut ultimately acquired
all outstanding shares of Fogo for the right to receive $15.75
per share in cash consideration (the "Merger" or the
"Transaction"). Because Fogo's controlling stockholder, Thomas H.
Lee Partners, held approximately 60.7% of the voting common stock
in the Company and provided its written consent to the
Transaction, the Transaction was approved without a stockholder
vote.

On March 16, 2018, Fogo filed a Definitive Information Statement
(the "Information Statement") with the United States Securities
and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") on Form DEFM14C that, among
other things, described the background of the Transaction, the
fairness opinion issued in connection with the Transaction, and
certain financial projections generated by Fogo's management.

On March 22, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Verified Class Action
Complaint in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware
related to the Transaction alleging that the individual
defendants had breached their fiduciary duties by failing to
disclose material information necessary for Fogo stockholders to
determine whether to seek appraisal of their shares (the
"Action"). Immediately thereafter, counsel for the Defendants
informed counsel for the Plaintiff that Defendants intended to
moot Plaintiff's claims, and the parties negotiated the content
of certain supplemental disclosures.

On April 2, 2018, Fogo filed a Form 8-K (the "Supplemental
Disclosures") (accessible on the United States Securities and
Exchange Commission's website at https://tinyurl.com/ybdv3vdd
This form supplemented the original Information Statement to
include certain additional information which mooted Plaintiff's
claims.

On April 6, 2018, the parties in the Action jointly submitted to
the Court a Stipulated [Proposed] Order Dismissing Action as Moot
and Retaining Jurisdiction to Determine Plaintiff's Counsel's
Application for an Award of Attorneys' Fees & Reimbursement of
Expenses (the "Stipulation").  The next day, the Court granted
the Stipulation and thereby dismissed the Action with prejudice
as to Plaintiff, and without prejudice as to any absent members
of the putative class.  Pursuant to the Order, the Court retained
jurisdiction solely for the purpose of determining Plaintiff's
counsel's application for an award of attorneys' fees and
reimbursement of expenses.

Only after the Action was dismissed did the parties commence and
engage in discussions regarding a resolution of Plaintiff's
counsel's application for fees and expenses and the amount
thereof.  After negotiations, Defendants agreed to make an all-
inclusive fee and expense payment to Plaintiff's counsel in the
Action in the amount of $75,000.00 to resolve any application for
an award of attorneys' fees and expenses to be made by counsel
for Plaintiff in the Action.  This amount will be paid by Fogo.
The parties to the litigation have agreed that payment will be
made within ten (10) days of final dismissal and closure of the
Action.

CONTACT:

          Levi & Korsinsky, LLP
          Donald J. Enright, Esq.
          1101 30th Street, NW
          Suite 115
          Washington, DC 20007
          Tel: (202) 524-4290
          Fax: (866) 367-6510
          Website: http://www.zlk.com[GN]


FORD MOTOR: Faces Class Action Over EcoBoost Engine Issues
----------------------------------------------------------
Mircea Panait, writing for autoevolution, reports that Ford
continues to promote the 1.0-liter EcoBoost as one of the best
engines in its respective segment.  The numerous accolades the
mill received over the years managed to cement the status of the
three-cylinder powerplant, but if you had driven one, you know it
could be better.

The vibrations produced by the 1.0-liter turbo three-banger are
one of the issues, then there's the real-world fuel economy that
always fails to reflect the figures quoted by the automaker.  The
biggest fault of the smallest EcoBoost of them all, however, is
that some of these engines tend to fail early in the car's life.

In March 2015, British owners of cars with the 1.0-liter plant
were notified by a service action caused by the coolant hose.
The hose in question is prone to fail at high temperatures on
vehicles manufactured between October 2011 and October 2013, and
to date, more than 86 percent of those vehicles were fixed.

Before the Ford Motor Company's European division issued the
recall, owners had to pay GBP8,000 to replace the engine as a
consequence of utter and catastrophic failure.  In some cases,
vehicles have caught fire, and that's not excusable at all.

Louise O'Riordan is the owner of one such car, and when her Focus
failed, "Ford initially only agreed to partially cover the repair
costs -- up to a maximum of 60 percent."  Daily Mail reports that
it took Louise eleven weeks to convince the Blue Oval to settle
the bill in full, but the financial part was the least of her
problems.

"There are people all over the country who have experienced life-
threatening engine failure and subsequently been treated terribly
by Ford.  I have heard many stories of people's health being
affected because of the stress of trying to recover a few
thousand pounds.  That is a lot of money to anybody.  Ford is a
multi-billion pound company; it should be ashamed of itself," she
told Daily Mail.  And she has a point.

Following Louise's experience with Ford over the inherent fault
of the 1.0-liter EcoBoost, she started a Facebook page titled
Ford EcoBoost Nightmare that has garnered more than 1,900
members.  The recruitment consultant from Dunstable won't stop
here, though.  "A considerable amount of work has been done to
understand the issue, and we have in place a team of lawyers,
barristers, and experts to help support any claims we make," she
declared to the British publication.

If the class action lawsuit goes through, Ford could be GBP1
billion in the red when all is said and done.  Oh, and by the
way, the 2.3-liter EcoBoost in the Focus RS isn't without its
faults either. [GN]


FRESH THYME: Blagg Seeks to Certify Class of Workers Under FLSA
---------------------------------------------------------------
Barbara Blagg and Lola Music, the Named Plaintiffs in the lawsuit
titled Blagg, et al. v. Fresh Thyme Farmers Market, LLC (Lakes
Venture, LLC), Case No. 2:18-cv-00458-JLG-KAJ (S.D. Ohio),
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act move for entry of an
order conditionally certifying this class:

     All current and former hourly employees of Defendant who
     worked at least 38.5 in any workweek and were subject to the
     Meal Deduction Policy or otherwise performed off-the-clock
     work during the three years preceding the Court's granting
     of the instant motion.

The Plaintiffs also ask the Court to implement a procedure
whereby Court-approved Notice of Plaintiffs' FLSA claims is sent
(via U.S. Mail and e-mail) to the proposed class members.  The
Plaintiffs further ask the Court to require the Defendant to
identify all potential opt-in plaintiffs by providing a list of
the names, mailing addresses, e-mail addresses, positions, and
dates of employment of all potential opt-in plaintiffs.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=rFsWhuN4

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Robert E. DeRose, Esq.
          Jason C. Cox, Esq.
          BARKAN MEIZLISH HANDELMAN GOODIN DEROSE WENTZ, LLP
          250 E. Broad St., 10th Floor
          Columbus, OH 43215
          Telephone: (614) 221-4221
          Facsimile: (614) 744-2300
          E-mail: bderose@barkanmeizlish.com
                  jcox@barkanmeizlish.com

               - and -

          Matthew J.P. Coffman, Esq.
          COFFMAN LEGAL, LLC
          1457 S. High St.
          Columbus, OH 43207
          Telephone: (614) 949-1181
          Facsimile: (614) 386-9964
          E-mail: mcoffman@mcoffmanlegal.com

               - and -

          Daniel I. Bryant, Esq.
          BRYANT LEGAL, LLC
          1457 S. High St.
          Columbus, OH 43207
          Telephone: (614) 704-0546
          Facsimile: (614) 573-9826
          E-mail: dbryant@bryantlegalllc.com


FRESHPET INC: Certification of Class Sought in "Curran" Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The Lead Plaintiff in the lawsuit entitled GARY CURRAN,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v.
FRESHPET, INC., RICHARD THOMPSON, RICHARD KASSAR, SCOTT MORRIS
and CHARLES A. NORRIS, Case No. 2:16-cv-02263-MCA-LDW (D.N.J.),
moves for class certification in accordance with Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

A copy of the Notice of Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=N4JtJROv

The Lead Plaintiff is represented by:

          James E. Cecchi, Esq.
          Lindsey H. Taylor, Esq.
          CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C.
          5 Becker Farm Road
          Roseland, NJ 07068
          Telephone: (973) 994-1700
          E-mail: JCecchi@CarellaByrne.com
                  ltaylor@carellabyrne.com

               - and -

          Samuel H. Rudman, Esq.
          Alan I. Ellman, Esq.
          Mario C. Lattuga, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          58 South Service Road, Suite 200
          Melville, NY 11747
          Telephone: (631) 367-7100
          E-mail: srudman@rgrdlaw.com
                  aellman@rgrdlaw.com
                  MLattuga@rgrdlaw.com

               - and -

          Frank J. Johnson, Esq.
          JOHNSON FISTEL, LLP
          600 West Broadway, Suite 1540
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 230-0063
          E-mail: FrankJ@johnsonfistel.com

               - and -

          Michael I. Fistel, Jr., Esq.
          JOHNSON FISTEL, LLP
          40 Powder Springs Street
          Marietta, GA 30064
          Telephone: (770) 200-3104
          E-mail: MichaelF@johnsonfistel.com


GC SERVICES: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss "O'Boyle" FDCPA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the eastern District of
Wisconsin denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned
BARBARA O'BOYLe, Plaintiff, v. GC SeRVICeS LIMITeD PARTNeRSHIP,
Defendant, Case No. 16-C-1384 (e.D. Wis.).

Barbara O'Boyle brings this putative class action against GC
Services Limited Partnership alleging violations of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.  According to O'Boyle, GC, in an
attempt to collect a credit card debt, sent her a letter
indicating that it would assume the validity of the debt unless
she disputed it in writing within 30 days.

GC moves to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
arguing that O'Boyle lacks standing to sue because she has not
alleged that she suffered a concrete injury.

The first element of standing, and the only element at issue
here, is that the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact.
To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that she
suffered an invasion of a legally protected interest that is,
among other things, concrete.

According to GC, O'Boyle's claims arise from its alleged
violation of Section 1692g(a), which requires a debt collector to
provide a consumer with written notice of a debt in collection
containing certain disclosures, including a statement that unless
the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice,
disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the
debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector. GC argues
that, even if, as alleged, it failed to provide an accurate
version of this disclosure, O'Boyle does not seek to enforce the
procedural requirement at issue that is, she does not demand that
she receive an accurate disclosure and she does not allege any
resulting harm to her concrete interests, so she lacks standing.

O'Boyle's claims as alleged undoubtedly arise from a procedural
violation, but she alleges more than a bare procedural violation.
Indeed, she alleges that, rather than simply failing to provide a
disclosure required by the FDCPA, GC affirmatively, or at least
impliedly, misrepresented her right to dispute a debt in
collection other than in writing and thereby suggested an
artificially high barrier to raising such a dispute. As she
notes, the FDCPA expressly prohibits debt collectors from using
any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt
to collect any debt. She argues that she need not allege any
additional harm beyond that which the FDCPA proscribes.

The Court, therefore, denies GC's motion to dismiss for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction.

GC moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. GC argues that, even accepting the truth
of O'Boyle's factual allegations, her complaint does not
plausibly suggest that it violated the FDCPA by misrepresenting
her right to dispute the validity of her debt.

The court concluded that the FDCPA simply assigns lesser rights
to debtors who orally dispute a debt than to those who dispute
one in writing. For instance, an oral dispute does not require
that collection efforts cease, but it precludes the debt
collector from communicating the debtor's credit information to
others without including the fact that the debt is in dispute. As
this result is not absurd, the court was not at liberty to insert
any additional language into the statute.

Thus, the Court must presume that Congress meant what it said in
the FDCPA when it referred to disputes in writing in some
provisions but to mere disputes in others and give effect to this
difference in statutory language. As GC's motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted depends
on the Third Circuit's contrary reasoning, the Court will deny
that motion.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 17, 2018 Decision
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yc82uzgt from
Leagle.com.

Barbara O'Boyle, Plaintiff, represented by Jesse Fruchter --
jfruchter@ademilaw.com -Ademi & O'Reilly LLP, Mark A. eldridge --
meldridge@ademilaw.com -- Ademi & O'Reilly LLP, Shpetim Ademi --
sademi@ademilaw.com -- Ademi & O'Reilly LLP & John D. Blythin --
jblythin@ademilaw.com -- Ademi & O'Reilly LLP.

GC Services Limited Partnership, Defendant, represented by
William S. Helfand -- Bill.Helfand@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis
Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP.


GEO GROUP: Files Petition for Writ of Certiorari in "Menocal"
-------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant The GEO Group, Inc., files with the Supreme Court of
United States a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in the lawsuit
entitled THE GEO GROUP, INC., Petitioner v. ALEJANDRO MENOCAL,
MARCOS BRAMBILA, GRISEL XAHUENTITLA, HUGO HERNANDEZ, LOURDES
ARGUETA, JESUS GAYTAN, OLGA ALEXAKLINA, DAGOBERTO VIZGUERRA, and
DEMETRIO VALERGA, on their own behalf and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Respondents, Case No. 17-1648.

The Lower Court Case is styled ALEJANDRO MENOCAL, MARCOS
BRAMBILA, GRISEL XAHUENTITLA, HUGO HERNANDEZ, LOURDES ARGUETA,
JESUS GAYTAN, OLGA ALEXAKLINA, DAGOBERTO VIZGUERRA, and DEMETRIO
VALEGRA, on their own behalf and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees v. THE GEO GROUP, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant, and NATIONAL ADVOCACY CENTER OF THE SISTERS
OF THE GOOD SHEPHERD; NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT; NATIONAL
GUESTWORKER ALLIANCE; NATIONAL IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CENTER; NATIONAL
IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER; PANGEA LEGAL SERVICES; PUBLIC CITIZEN;
SANCTUARY FOR FAMILIES; SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER; AMERICAN
IMMIGRANTS FOR JUSTICE; ASIAN AMERICANS ADVANCING JUSTICE;
DETENTION WATCH NETWORK; HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENSE CENTER; ILLINOIS
COALITION FOR IMMIGRANT AND REFUGEE RIGHTS; JUSTICE STRATEGIES;
LEGAL AID AT WORK; HUMAN TRAFFICKING PRO BONO LEGAL CENTER;
TAHIRIH JUSTICE CENTER; ASISTA IMMIGRATION ASSISTANCE; FREEDOM
NETWORK USA, Amici Curiae, Case No. 17-1125 (10th Cir.).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Judge Scott
Matheson Jr. of the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's
certification of both the Trafficking Victims Protection Act
("TVPA") class and the unjust enrichment class.

At all times relevant to the appeal, GEO owned and operated the
Aurora Facility under contract with the U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement ("ICE").  In operating this facility, GEO
implemented two programs that form the basis for the case: (1)
the Housing Unit Sanitation Policy, which required all detainees
to clean their common living areas; and (2) the Voluntary Work
Program ("VWP"), which compensated detainees $1 a day for
performing various jobs.

While there, the Plaintiff Detainees ("Appellees") rendered
mandatory and voluntary services to GEO.  Under GEO's mandatory
policies, they cleaned their housing units' common areas.  They
also performed various jobs through a voluntary work program,
which paid them $1 a day.

The Appellees alleged that the TVPA class members were all forced
to clean the housing units for no pay and under threat of
solitary confinement as punishment for any refusal to work.  Five
of the nine named Plaintiffs and three other detainees filed
declarations further explaining that they had fulfilled their
cleaning assignments because of the Sanitation Policy's threat of
solitary confinement.

The complaint alleged that the VWP class members were all paid $1
per day for their VWP.  Five of the nine named Plaintiffs and
three other detainees who had participated in the VWP filed
declarations further describing their work.  Their jobs had
included serving food, cleaning the facilities, doing laundry,
and stripping and waxing floors.  Their hours had ranged from two
to eight hours a day, and they had all received $1 a day in
compensation.

The Appellees filed a class action complaint against GEO in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado on behalf of
current and former ICE detainees housed at the Aurora Facility.
The complaint alleged: (1) a TVPA forced labor claim based on the
Sanitation Policy, and (2) an unjust enrichment claim under
Colorado law based on the VWP.[BN]

Defendant-Petitioner The GEO Group, Inc., is represented by:

          Dana Eismeier, Esq.
          BURNS, FIGA & WILL, P.C.
          6400 S. Fiddlers Green Circle, Suite 1000
          Greenwood Village, Colorado 80111
          Telephone: (303) 796-2626
          E-mail: deismeier@bfwlaw.com

               - and -

          Mark Emery, Esq.
          NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP
          799 9th Street, NW
          Washington, DC 20001
          Telephone: (202) 662-0210
          E-mail: mark.emery@nortonrosefulbright.com

               - and -

          Charles A. Deacon, Esq.
          NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP
          300 Convent St.
          San Antonio, TX 78205
          Telephone: (210) 270-7133
          E-mail: charlie.deacon@nortonrosefulbright.com


GODADDY.COM LLC: Ninth Circuit Appeal Filed in "Herrick" Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff John Herrick filed an appeal from a court ruling in his
lawsuit styled JOHN HERRICK, individually and as the
representative of a class of similarly situated persons v.
GODADDY.COM, LLC, Case No. 2:16-cv-00254-DJH, in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Arizona, Phoenix.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
seeks to stop the Defendants' alleged practice of sending
unsolicited text messages.

Godaddy.com, LLC owns and operates an internet domain registrar
and Web hosting company with its principal place of business in
Scottsdale, Arizona.

The appellate case is captioned as JOHN HERRICK, individually and
as the representative of a class of similarly situated persons v.
GODADDY.COM, LLC, Case No. 18-16048, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- July 6, 2018 -- Transcript shall be ordered;

   -- August 6, 2018 -- Transcript shall be filed by court
      reporter;

   -- September 14, 2018 -- Appellant's opening brief and
      excerpts of record shall be served and filed pursuant to
      FRAP 31 and 9th Cir. R. 31-2.1;

   -- October 15, 2018 -- Appellee's answering brief and excerpts
      of record shall be served and filed pursuant to FRAP 31 and
      9th Cir. R. 31-2.1; and

   -- The optional appellant's reply brief shall be filed and
      served within 21 days of service of the appellee's brief,
      pursuant to FRAP 31 and 9th Cir. R. 31-2.1.[BN]


GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES: Ninth Circuit Appeal Filed in "Stone" Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Megan Stone and Christine Carosi filed an appeal from
a court ruling in their lawsuit entitled Megan Stone, et al. v.
GEICO General Insurance Company, Case No. 3:16-cv-05383-BHS, in
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington,
Tacoma.

The appellate case is captioned as Megan Stone, et al. v. GEICO
General Insurance Company, Case No. 18-35502, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the
Plaintiffs have also filed an appeal before the Ninth Circuit.
That appellate case is captioned as Megan Stone, et al. v. GEICO,
Case No. 17-80253.

Ms. Stone was involved in a hit and run car accident on May 22,
2014.  She had an automobile insurance policy with Defendant
GEICO.  She was unable to use her car for about 105 days while
GEICO investigated her claim and while her car was being
repaired.

On June 17, 2015, Ms. Stone filed a class action complaint
against GEICO in Pierce County Superior Court, claiming that
GEICO failed to pay her for "loss of use" damages.

Ms. Stone sought to certify the class of all GEICO insureds with
Washington policies issued in Washington State, where GEICO
determined the loss to be covered under the Underinsured Motorist
("UIM") coverage, and their vehicle suffered a loss requiring
repair, or the vehicle was totaled, during which time they were
without the use of their vehicle, for a day or more.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants MEGAN STONE and CHRISTINE CAROSI,
individually and as the representatives of all persons similarly
situated, are represented by:

          Stephen M. Hansen, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF STEPHEN M. HANSEN, P.S.
          1821 Dock Street, Suite 103
          Tacoma, WA 98402
          Telephone: (253) 302-5955
          E-mail: steve@stephenmhansenlaw.com

Defendant-Appellee GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY is represented
by:

          Stephanie L. Bloomfield, Esq.
          Andrea H. McNeely, Esq.
          GORDON THOMAS HONEYWELL LLP
          1201 Pacific Avenue
          Tacoma, WA 98402
          Telephone: (253) 620-6500
          Facsimile: (253) 620-6565
          E-mail: sbloomfield@gth-law.com
                  amcneely@gth-law.com

               - and -

          Joshua Grabel, Esq.
          LEWIS ROCA ROTHGERBER CHRISTIE LLP
          201 E. Washington Street
          Phoenix, AZ 85004-2595
          Telephone: (602) 262-5759
          E-mail: jgrabel@lrrc.com

               - and -

          L. Clay Selby, Esq.
          LEDGER SQUARE LAW PS
          710 Market Street
          Tacoma, WA 98402
          Telephone: (253) 327-1900
          E-mail: Clay@LedgerSquareLaw.com


GRUBHUB HOLDINGS: Sued by Wallace for Misclassifying Drivers
------------------------------------------------------------
CARMEN WALLACE and BRODERICK BRYANT, individually and on behalf
of all other similarly situated individuals v. GRUBHUB HOLDINGS
INC. and GRUBHUB INC., Case No. 1:18-cv-04538 (N.D. Ill., June
29, 2018), alleges that GrubHub has misclassified its delivery
drivers as independent contractors and, in so doing, has
committed wage and hour violations under federal and state
statutes, including the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Illinois
Minimum Wage Law, and the California Labor Code.

GrubHub Holdings Inc. and GrubHub Inc. are Delaware corporations
with their principal place of business in Chicago, Illinois.  The
Defendants run a business that provides food delivery services
throughout the country via an on demand dispatch system.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          James B. Zouras, Esq.
          Ryan Stephan, Esq.
          STEPHAN ZOURAS, LLP
          205 N. Michigan Avenue, Suite 2560
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 233-1550
          E-mail: jzouras@stephanzouras.com
                  rstephan@stephanzouras.com

               - and -

          Shannon Liss-Riordan, Esq.
          Thomas Fowler, Esq.
          LICHTEN & LISS-RIORDAN, P.C.
          729 Boylston Street, Suite 2000
          Boston, MA 02116
          Telephone: (617) 994-5800
          E-mail: sliss@llrlaw.com
                  tfowler@llrlaw.com


GWC WARRANTY: Denial of Bid to Dismiss "Signor" Reversed
--------------------------------------------------------
The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, reversed
the order denying Defendant GWC Warranty Corporation's motion to
dismiss plaintiff's class action complaint and compel arbitration
in the case captioned JOSePH SIGNOR, individually and on behalf
of others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Respondent, v.
CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant, No. A-0949-17T2 (N.J. Super.
App.).

Plaintiff Joseph Signor purchased a used 2003 Ford F-250
Superduty truck from 123 Auto Sales, LLC, in Branchville. The
Plaintiff also purchased a powertrain plus service contract from
the defendant for $916, covering the truck for 180 days or 7,500
miles.  The Plaintiff alleged the contract violated the Truth in
Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act (TCCWNA) claimed the
contract failed to make certain disclosures under the Service
Contracts Act (SCA) and thus violated the New Jersey Consumer
Fraud Act (CFA) and the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), N.J.S.A.
12A:1-101 to 12-26.  The Defendant moved to dismiss plaintiff's
complaint and compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration
provision contained in the service contract.  The judge denied
the motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff raised issues
of fact regarding whether the TCCWNA is applicable to his claims.

The motion judge concluded the arbitration provision was not
valid and enforceable because the language does not seem
unambiguous regarding class action claims. The language seems to
suggest that class actions are permitted but not in arbitration.
Furthermore, the waiver of class actions is a part of the
arbitration provision. It cannot be held to be a clear and
unambiguous waiver of the rights to bring a class action.

The Court disagrees.

The Defendant argues the arbitration clause is clear and
unambiguous because it encompasses the claims raised in the
plaintiff's complaint alleging violations of the CFA and TCCWNA.
The Defendant points to the contract provisions, which define
arbitrable claims to include those in contract, tort, or
otherwise, including statutory, common law, fraud
(misrepresentation or by omission), or other intentional tort,
property, or equitable claims.

Here, the arbitration provision broadly states disputes under
statutory and common law claims are to be arbitrated. In
addition, the contract employed broad language stating any and
all claims, disputes, or controversies of any nature whatsoever
arising out of" the service contract are subject to arbitration.
Thus, the the plaintiff's CFA and TCCWNA claims fell within the
scope of the arbitration provision.

A full-text copy of the N.J. Super.'s May 17, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yc82uzgt from Leagle.com.

Kerri e. Chewning -- kchewning@archerlaw.com -- argued the cause
for appellant (Archer & Greiner, PC, attorneys; Kerri e. Chewning
and Kate A. Sherlock -- ksherlock@archerlaw.com -- on the
briefs).

Lewis G. Adler, argued the cause for respondent (Lewis G. Adler,
Law Office of Paul DePetris, and Law Offices of Lee M. Perlman,
attorneys; Lewis G. Adler, Paul DePetris --
paul@newjerseylemon.com -- and Lee M. Perlman, on the brief).


HALO TOP: Sued for Allegedly Underfilling Ice Cream Pints
---------------------------------------------------------
Lyn Mettler, writing for Today, reports that Halo Top, the
popular ice cream brand known for its lower-calorie flavors, has
come under fire for some potentially unsavory business practices.

The brand has just been hit with another lawsuit -- the second
this year -- and this time, dissatisfied customers are alleging
that the company intentionally underfills its pints.

Earlier in June, two plaintiffs in California filed a class
action complaint in the Southern District of California, claiming
that Halo Top underfills its pints "dramatically so at times, and
as a course of business."

The suit goes on to state that, "Purchasers of the premium-priced
ice cream simply have no idea how much ice cream they will get
each and every time they buy a Halo Top 'pint.' And Halo Top has
been doing this for years."

Plaintiffs Youssif Kamal of Los Angeles and Gillian Neely of San
Diego say they have purchased Halo Top ice cream "from time to
time" within the last three years and often received less than a
full pint.  They are now claiming that they wouldn't have
purchased the product had they known they wouldn't be getting a
full pint of the dessert.

"Halo Top knows it is short-changing its customers, but refuses
to do anything about it," the complaint goes on to say.
Proposing class action status for potentially millions of people,
the complaint also describes how Halo Top focuses on eating the
whole pint in its marketing and branding and says the amount of
underfilling appears to be random and unrelated to flavor or
where the pint was purchased.  However, the suit does not specify
the extent to which the company fails to fill its containers.

The plaintiffs are seeking an unspecified amount of money for
damages.

A representative for Halo Top was not immediately available for
comment.

In May, a man sued Halo Top and its parent company Eden Creamery,
saying that the pint's label, which describes the dessert as a
low-calorie ice cream, was deceptive.  He claimed that the
product doesn't contain the amount of fat required to call itself
ice cream.

It's not uncommon for successful food brands to be sued over a
variety of issues.

In 2017, a man in Chicago claimed Dunkin' Donuts was deceiving
customers by not using real blueberries in its blueberry
doughnuts.  In August, several customers sued Poland Springs for
allegedly misleading customers about the source of its water.

Update: When reached via email, a representative for Halo Top
told TODAY Food, "We have never and would never 'underfill' our
pints. Product settling can occur from time to time due to
everything from heat fluctuations to altitude changes during
shipping and handling." [GN]


HARVEY WEINSTEIN: Third Accuser Added to List of Abused Women
-------------------------------------------------------------
Courthouse News Service reported that New York prosecutors
brought a superseding indictment on July 2 against Harvey
Weinstein, adding a third accuser to the list of women that the
disgraced Hollywood producer is said to have assaulted.  In
addition to the new count of a forcible sex act from 2006,
Weinstein is charged with raping a woman in 2013 and a 2004
criminal sexual act.


HYATT CORP: Mediation Moots Bid to Dismiss "Matthews"
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
North Carolina, Charlotte Division, denied Defendant's Motion To
Dismiss Count II Of Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in the
case captioned CARLA MATTHeWS, and all similarly situated
individuals, Plaintiffs, v. HYATT CORPORATION, Defendant, Civil
Action No. 3:17-CV-413-RJC-DCK (W.D.N.C.).

The Complaint asserts claims against Defendant Hyatt Corporation
(Hyatt) for: (1) violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
failure to pay overtime; (2) breach of contract; and (3)
violation of the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 applies to the amendment of
pleadings and allows a party to amend once as a matter of course
within 21 days after serving, or if the pleading is one to which
a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a
responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under
Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.

The Plaintiffs report that the parties have agreed to voluntarily
mediate this case on July 19, 2018; and that the Defendant does
not oppose the filing of a Second Amended Complaint, but requests
additional time to respond to the Second Amended Complaint.
Noting the parties' agreement, the Court will allow the motion to
amend and allow the Defendant additional time to file a response.
However, further extensions of the deadlines in this case are
unlikely to be allowed.

The Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint will supersede the First
Amended Complaint; therefore, the court will direct that
Defendant's Motion To Dismiss Count II Of Plaintiff's First
Amended Complaint be denied as moot.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 17, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ycmvpecv from Leagle.com.

Carla Matthews, all similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff,
represented by Charles Robert Ash, IV -- crash@sommerspc.com --
Sommers Schwartz, P.C., pro hac vice, Jesse L. Young --
young@Kreisenderle.com -- Kreis enderle Hudgins & Borsos PC, pro
hac vice & edward B. Davis -- ward.davis@belldavispitt.com --
Bell, Davis & Pitt PA.

Hyatt Corporation, an Illinois corporation, Defendant,
represented by Frederick T. Smith -- fsmith@seyfarth.com -,
Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Kara L. Goodwin -- kgoodwin@seyfarth.com --
Seyfarth Shaw LLP, pro hac vice & Noah Alan Finkel --
nfinkel@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP, pro hac vice.


IC SYSTEM: "Kaur" Suit Seeks Redress From Illegal Debt Collection
-----------------------------------------------------------------
KULDEEP KAUR, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. I. C. SYSTEM, INC., Case No. 2:18-cv-01007-LA (E.D.
Wisc., July 2, 2018), seeks redress for the Defendant's alleged
collection practices that violate the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act and the Wisconsin Consumer Act.

I. C. System, Inc., is a foreign business corporation with its
principal place of business located in St. Paul, Minnesota.  ICS
is engaged in the business of a collection agency, using the
mails and telephone to collect consumer debts originally owed to
others.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


IDAHO: Court Dismisses Constitutional Challenge to SORA
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Idaho
granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the case captioned JOHN and
JANe DOeS 1-134, Plaintiffs, v. LAWReNCe WASDeN, Attorney General
of the State of Idaho, et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:16-cv-
00429-DCN (D. Idaho).

Does 1-134, filed this lawsuit challenging the constitutionality
of Idaho's Sexual Offender Registration Notification and
Community Right-to-Know Act (SORA).  The Plaintiffs do not list
particular causes of action as to specific individuals, but
merely state that all plaintiffs suffer from a wide variety of
constitutional depravations SORA has created, from which they
request relief.  The Defendants filed the instant Motion to
Dismiss seeking outright dismissal of some of the Plaintiffs'
claims on legal and statutory grounds.

The Court finds that the Plaintiffs cannot establish a facial
challenge to SORA generally because the law has a plainly
legitimate sweep and is applicable to thousands of Idahoans who
are required to register for a time, but then in due course are
no longer required to register.  In other words, there are
numerous circumstances under which the Act is valid and
constitutional.  The Plaintiffs in this case make up the limited
group of offenders who have underlying aggravated offenses, or
who have been designated recidivists by statute, and thus must
register for life. It is only as to these individuals that the
Plaintiffs' challenges could apply. The Plaintiffs,
unfortunately, have not pleaded any specific as-applied
challenges.  Therefore, amendment is necessary for the Court to
make an appropriate determination as to those claims.

Moreover, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to meet
the first requirement of standing. As currently pleaded, the
Plaintiffs have not suffered any injury in fact. With the
exception of the Plaintiffs' twelfth cause of action, the
Plaintiffs have not tied any particular Doe to any particular
alleged harm. This is not appropriate. One cannot simply name a
large group of Plaintiffs, allege a dozen causes of actions, and
expect the Court to figure out which plaintiffs have suffered
which harms.  The Plaintiffs allege that all of them have
suffered from certain aspects of SORA generally, such as the
reporting requirements, or the negative aspects of public
registration, however, these generalizations only give the
Plaintiffs standing for facial challenges, if even that. As
currently pleaded, the Plaintiffs' do not have standing for any
as-applied challenges.  The broad allegations of the Plaintiffs'
Complaint fail as a matter of law most have already been
litigated and denied in prior cases and without any as-applied
challenges, the Court can only speculate as to what harms have
actually occurred in this case. This is one of the main reasons
the Court will dismiss with leave to amend. The Plaintiffs have
set this case up as a quasi-class action by listing 134
plaintiffs. While possibly done for emphasis, the Court instead
needs accuracy.

The Court says it has no choice but to dismiss each claim when
viewed as a facial challenge. In every situation, the Plaintiffs
have failed to demonstrate that "no set of circumstances exists
under which the Act would be valid."

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 17, 2018 Memorandum
Decision and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9s9cwru
from Leagle.com.

John and Jane Does 1-134, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel S.
Brown, Fuller Law Offices, & Greg J. Fuller --
fullerlaw@cableone.net -- FULLeR LAW OFFICeS.

Lawrence Wasden, Attorney General of the State of Idaho,
Defendant, represented by Steven Lamar Olsen, OFFICe OF THe
ATTORNeY GeNeRAL.

Kevin Kempf, Director of the Idaho Department of Correction,
Terry Kirkham, Chief Department of Correction Probation and
Parole Division, Jon Burnham, Sexual Offender Management Board,
Michael Johnston, Ph.d., Sexual Offender Management Board, Moira
Lynch, Sexual Offender Management Board, Jeffrey Betts, Sexual
Offender Management Board, erwin Sonnenberg, Sexual Offender
Management Board, Jean Fisher, Sexual Offender Management Board,
Paula Garay, Sexual Offender Management Board, Kimberly Simmons,
Sexual Offender Management Board, William Crawford, Sexual
Offender Management Board, Christina Iverson, Sexual Offender
Management Board, Ralph Powell, Colonel, Director Idaho State
Police, Matthew Thomas, Sheriff, Sexual Offender Management
Board, Stephen Bartlett, Ada County Sheriff, Lorin Nielsen,
Bannock County Sheriff, Brent T Bunn, Bear Lake County Sheriff,
Craig T Rowland, Bingham County Sheriff, Paul J Wilde, Bonneville
County Sheriff, Kiernan Donahue, Canyon County Sheriff, Michael
Haderlie, Caribou County Sheriff, Jay Heward, Cassia County
Sheriff, Rick Layher, elmore County Sheriff, David Fryar,
Franklin County Sheriff, Charles Rolland, Gem County Sheriff,
Shawn Gough, Gooding County Sheriff, Steve Anderson, Jefferson
County Sheriff, Doug McFall, Jerome County Sheriff, Lynn
Bowerman, Lemhi County Sheriff, Kevin ellis, Lincoln County
Sheriff, eric Snarr, Minidoka County Sheriff, Joe Rodriguez, Nez
Perce County Sheriff, Tom Carter, Twin Falls County Sheriff,
Patti Bolen, Valley County Sheriff, Sexual Offender Management
Board, Tony Liford, Teton County Sheriff, Jim Kacqmarek, Boise
County Sheriff, Chris Goetz, Clearwater County Sheriff, Ben
Wolfinger, Kootenai County Sheriff & Richard Skiles, Latah County
Sheriff, Defendants, represented by Clay R. Smith, OFFICe OF
ATTORNeY GeNeRAL & Steven Lamar Olsen, OFFICe OF THe ATTORNeY
GeNeRAL.


INDIANA: Court Certifies Class of Disenfranchised Inmates
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, Fort Wayne Division, granted Plaintiffs' Second Motion
to Certify Class in the case captioned DEMETRIUS BUROFF and IAN
BARNHART, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. DAVID GLADIEUX, in his official
capacity, Defendant, Case No. 1:17-CV-124-TLS (N.D. Ind.).

The Plaintiff filed this action individually and behalf of all
others similarly situated, alleging that the Defendant
systematically disenfranchised hundreds of eligible voters who
were being confined in the Allen County Jail during the 2016
general election.  The Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of
himself and all other similarly situated as members of the
following proposed class:

     All individuals held at the Allen County Jail on November 8,
2016, who on that date were U.S. citizens, residents of Indiana,
were at least eighteen years of age, were not serving a sentence
for a conviction of a felony crime, had not previously voted in
the 2016 general election, were provided neither an absentee
ballot nor transportation to a voting center, and were registered
to vote or had been denied the opportunity to vote while held in
the Allen County Jail.

The Plaintiff asserts that the jail records and voter
registration records demonstrate that over three hundred
individuals are part of the proposed class.  Given the size of
the proposed class, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has met
the numerosity requirement.  The Court also finds that the
Plaintiff has met the remaining Rule 23(a) requirements. The
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant unlawfully disenfranchised
individuals held in the Allen County Jail by denying them the
fundamental right to vote in the 2016 general election.  This is
sufficient to satisfy the commonality element.

The typically requirement requires the Plaintiff to show that the
class representative's claim is typical of the class as a whole.
Here, the alleged injury by the Plaintiff is the same harm and
based on the same wrongful course of conduct experienced by each
class member and the rights Plaintiff is asserting against the
wrongs are based on the same voting rights legal theories as
would also be advanced by putative class members. As such, the
Court finds that the Plaintiff has satisfied the typicality
requirement of Rule 23(a).

The Plaintiff argues that he can sufficiently represent the class
because he has a personal stake in the litigation, with the same
interest and the same injury as the other class members, and he
is represented by competent and experienced counsel. The Court
finds that the Plaintiff and the proposed class counsel,
Christopher C. Myers & Associates, are able to adequately
represent the members of the proposed class.

Therefore, the Plaintiff has met his burden under Rule 23(a).

Rule 23(b) Requirements

In this case, the Plaintiff seeks class certification under Rule
23(b)(3), which permits class certification where the court finds
that the questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods
for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.

A class action is superior to all other methods where it will
efficiently resolve a potentially large number of claims that
share a similar set of legal and factual issues and where the
courts could potentially be inundated with many individual cases
that seek to litigate an essential core of the same legal and
factual issues.

The superiority requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), along with
predominance, is intended to cover cases in which a class action
would achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote
uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without
sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other
undesirable results.

The Defendant offers no argument regarding Rule 23(b)
requirements, and the Court agrees with the Plaintiff that Rule
23(b)(3) is satisfied here. The case involves common sets of
facts and legal questions regarding voter disenfranchisement
allegedly suffered by the putative class members. These common
sets of facts and legal questions will predominate over any
questions affecting some, but not all, members of the class.

For these reasons, the Court certifies the following class:

     All individuals held at the Allen County Jail on November 8,
2016, who on that date were U.S. citizens, residents of Indiana,
were at least eighteen years of age, were not serving a sentence
for a conviction of a felony crime, had not previously voted in
the 2016 general election, were provided neither an absentee
ballot nor transportation to a voting center, and were registered
to vote or had been denied the opportunity to vote while held in
the Allen County Jail.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 17, 2018 Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ych6ynwo from
Leagle.com.

Ian Barnhart, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher C. Myers  --
cmyers@myers-law.com -- Christopher C Myers & Associates & David
W. Frank -- dfrank@myers-law.com -- Christopher C Myers &
Associates.

David Gladieux, in his official capacity, Defendant, represented
by J. Spencer Feighner -- jsf@hallercolvin.com -- Haller & Colvin
PC & John O. Feighner, Haller & Colvin PC.


LA CABANITA MEXICAN: Fails to Pay OT to Cooks, "Martinez" Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
VALDEMAR MARTINEZ and PEDRO RODRIGUEZ, on behalf of themselves
and all other persons similarly situated, known and unknown v. LA
CABANITA MEXICAN RESTAURANT and GRISELDA VILLASENOR,
individually, Case No. 1:18-cv-04590 (N.D. Ill., July 2, 2018),
arises under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Illinois
Minimum Wage Law for the Defendants' alleged failure to pay
overtime wages to the Plaintiffs and other similarly situated
cooks and kitchen staff.

Cabanita is an Illinois corporation.  Griselda Villasenor is an
owner of La Cabanita Mexican Restaurant.  The Defendants operate
a restaurant, La Cabanita Mexican Restaurant, located in Burr
Ridge, Illinois.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Douglas M. Werman, Esq.
          Maureen A. Salas, Esq.
          Sarah J. Arendt, Esq.
          WERMAN SALAS, P.C.
          77 West Washington, Suite 1402
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 419-1008
          E-mail: dwerman@flsalaw.com
                  msalas@flsalaw.com
                  sarendt@flsalaw.com


LONG BEACH, CA: Patel Appeals C.D. Calif. Ruling to Ninth Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Jayantibhai Patel and Daksha Patel filed an appeal
from a court ruling in their lawsuit entitled Jayantibhai Patel,
et al. v. City of Long Beach, Case No. 2:08-cv-02806-AB-GJS, in
the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California,
Los Angeles.

The appellate case is captioned as Jayantibhai Patel, et al. v.
City of Long Beach, Case No. 18-55738, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the
Plaintiffs filed an appeal from a court ruling in their lawsuit.
That appellate case is entitled as Jayantibhai Patel, et al. v.
City of Long Beach, et al., Case No. 17-55411.

The lawsuit alleges civil rights violations.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by July 11, 2018;

   -- Transcript is due on August 10, 2018;

   -- Appellants Daksha Patel and Jayantibhai Patel's opening
      brief is due on September 19, 2018;

   -- Appellee City of Long Beach's answering brief is due on
      October 19, 2018; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellant JAYANTIBHAI PATEL, DBA Princess Inn, and
DAKSHA PATEL, Individual and all others similarly situated and
Plaintiff Tenants, are represented by:

          Frank Alan Weiser, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF FRANK A. WEISER
          3460 Wilshire Boulevard
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Telephone: (213) 384-6864
          Facsimile: (213) 383-7368
          E-mail: maimons@aol.com

Defendant-Appellee CITY OF LONG BEACH, a municipal corporation,
is represented by:

          Randall Charles Fudge, Esq.
          Theodore B. Zinger, Esq.
          LONG BEACH CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
          333 W. Ocean Blvd.
          Long Beach, CA 90802
          Telephone: (562) 570-2200
          Facsimile: (562) 436-1579
          E-mail: randall.fudge@longbeach.gov
                  ted.zinger@longbeach.gov


LONG ISLAND RAIL: Disabled People File Discrimination Lawsuit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Bronx News 12 reports that a class action lawsuit was
announced on June 27 against the Long Island Rail Road and the
MTA over claims that the railroad discriminates against people
with physical disabilities.

One of the issues the lawsuit addresses is what the plaintiffs
claim to be a lack of available metal bridges to help people in
wheelchairs or motorized scooters cross over the gap between the
train and the platform.

The group says conductors are sometimes nowhere to be found when
they need to get on or off the train.  That means that they are
left stranded on the platform or stuck on the train.  Amityville
resident Raymond Harewood, who needs a walker or a motorized
scooter to get around, says it has happened to him before.  He
says it's not only a frustrating inconvenience, but it's also
demoralizing to be ignored by the train staff.

"Helpless.  Irritating.  Just imagine, you have someplace you
need to go . . . but you're not able to because of someone not
paying attention, not doing their job.  Something's got to
change," says Mr. Harewood.

The lawsuit, filed on June 10, also claims that there is not
enough time for disabled people to get on their trains at Penn
Station, especially during rush hour.

The plaintiffs are seeking some financial compensation, but they
say the main purpose of the lawsuit is to get the MTA to improve
its policies toward disabled riders.  Attorney James Bahamonde,
who is also disabled, says better training is needed for LIRR
crews.

"It's a systemic problem that happens numerous times to all
people who use wheelchairs and scooters," says Mr. Bahamonde.

Currently, six LIRR stations have no disabled access, though the
railroad says an elevator is coming to Floral Park.

News 12 reached out to the Long Island Rail Road for a comment,
but it has not yet responded. [GN]


M3 FINANCIAL: Wins Final Approval of Settlement in "Mason" Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Clerk of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois made a docket entry on June 29, 2018, in the case titled
Elaine Mason v. M3 Financial Services Inc., Case No. 1:15-cv-
04194 (N.D. Ill.), relating to a hearing held before the
Honorable Andrea R. Wood.

The minute entry states that:

   -- Plaintiff's unopposed motion for final approval of class
      action settlement is granted;

   -- Plaintiff's motion for approval of attorneys' fees, costs
      and incentive award is granted; and

   -- the case is dismissed with prejudice.

For the reasons stated on the record at the Final Approval
Hearing on May 10, 2018, the Court finds that the proposed class
settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate, and otherwise
satisfies the requirements set forth in Rule 23(e) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.  Accordingly, the Court approves the
class action settlement and the civil case is terminated.

A copy of the Notification of Docket Entry is available at no
charge at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=siGnFsMg


MARQUEZ BROTHERS: EEOC Lawyer May Face Sanctions, Case to Proceed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Vin Gurrieri, writing for Law360, reports that a California
federal judge ruled on June 26 that the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission's lawyers acted in bad faith when they
didn't disclose that two people who spurred an agency class
action had died before it was filed, saying the lawyers may be
sanctioned but that class allegations can proceed.

U.S. District Judge Anthony W. Ishii issued a multipronged order
finding in part that packaged food maker Marquez Brothers
International Inc. could be awarded sanctions resulting from the
agency pursuing damages on behalf of the two individuals.

The case is captioned U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v. Marquez Brothers International, Inc. et al, Case
No. 1:17-cv-00044 (E.D. Cal.).  The case is assigned to Judge
Anthony W. Ishii.  The case was filed January 11, 2017. [GN]


MERCK & CO: Faces TID Antitrust Suit Over Ezetimibe Drug
--------------------------------------------------------
TURLOCK IRRIGATION DISTRICT, individually and on behalf of all
those similarly situated v. MERCK & CO., INC.; MERCK SHARP &
DOHME CORP.; SCHERING-PLOUGH CORP.; SCHERING CORP.; MSP SINGAPORE
CO. LLC; GLENMARK PHARMACEUTICALS, LTD.; GLENMARK GENERICS INC.,
U.S.A.; and PAR PHARMACEUTICAL, INC., Case No. 2:18-cv-00352-MSD-
RJK (E.D. Va., June 29, 2018), accuses the Defendants of
violating antitrust, consumer protection and common laws of
various states and territories.

The complaint stems from an alleged scheme by Defendants Merck,
Glenmark and Par to make billions of dollars by delaying
competition in the cholesterol-reducing drug ezetimibe.  The
Plaintiff alleges that Merck earned handsome returns off of the
branded version of this drug, Zetia, for years.

During the Class Period, the Defendants manufactured, sold, and
shipped Zetia and generic Zetia in a continuous and uninterrupted
flow of interstate commerce, which included sales of Zetia and
its AB-rated generic equivalents, advertisement of Zetia in
media, monitoring prescriptions of Zetia by prescribers and
employment of product detailers.

Merck & Company, Inc., is a corporation organized and existing
under the laws of the state of New Jersey, with its principal
place of business in Kenilworth, New Jersey.  Merck & Company is
or was the parent company of Defendants Merck Sharp & Dohme
Corporation and MSP Singapore Company LLC.  Merck Sharp & Dohme
Corporation is a corporation organized and existing under the
laws of the state of New Jersey, and the assignee of patents
relevant to this lawsuit.

Schering-Plough Corporation was a corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the state of New Jersey, with its
principal place of business in Kenilworth, New Jersey.  Schering
Corporation was a corporation organized and existing under the
laws of the state of New Jersey, with its principal place of
business in Kenilworth.  Schering Corporation was a wholly owned
subsidiary of Schering-Plough Corporation and the original
assignee of the relevant patents.  MSP is a company organized and
existing under the laws of the state of Delaware, with its
principal place of business in Kenilworth, and was the exclusive
licensee of the relevant patents.

Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Limited is a company organized and
existing under the laws of India, with its corporate office
located in Mumbai, India.  Glenmark Generics Inc., U.S.A.,
formerly known as Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Inc., U.S.A., is a
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of
Delaware and having its principal place of business in Mahwah,
New Jersey.  Glenmark Generics is a wholly owned subsidiary of
Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Limited.

Par Pharmaceutical Inc. is a corporation organized and existing
under the laws of the state of New York and having its principal
place of business in Chestnut Ridge, New York.  Par is a wholly
owned subsidiary of Endo International plc, an Irish corporation
with its principal place of business located in Dublin,
Ireland.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ashley M. Bond, Esq.
          DUNCAN & ALLEN
          1730 Rhode Island Ave, NW, Suite 700
          Washington, DC 20036
          Telephone: (202) 289-8400
          Facsimile: (202) 289-8450
          E-mail: amb@duncanallen.com


MIAMI-DADE EXPRESSWAY: Class Action Over Tolls Can Proceed
----------------------------------------------------------
CBS Miami reports that a state appeals court on June 27 cleared
the way for a class-action lawsuit against the Miami-Dade
Expressway Authority by companies that lease trailers pulled by
tractor trucks.

The lawsuit stems from tolls that the expressway authority
charged to the trailer companies based on a system that captures
images of vehicles' rear license tags.

The companies had leased trailers to other businesses that, in
many cases, then hired tractor-truck owners to haul the trailers.

The trailer companies allege in the lawsuit that they should not
have been charged tolls, which were the responsibility of the
truck drivers, according to the June 27 ruling by a panel of the
3rd District Court of Appeal.

The plaintiffs, including Tropical Trailer Leasing, L.L.C., also
sought to "certify" the lawsuit as a class action.  A Miami-Dade
County circuit judge approved the certification, leading the
expressway authority to appeal.

In a 2-1 decision on June 27, the appellate panel allowed the
class-action lawsuit to move forward.  "The very nature of the
claim -- allegedly improper toll charges on heavily-traveled
expressways with tens of thousands of pertinent billings --
supports the adjudication of the claims as a class action," said
the 17-page majority opinion, written by Judge Vance Salter and
joined by Judge Robert Luck.

"No single trailer owner could cost-effectively maintain such an
action, seeking reimbursement for a series of charges of a few
dollars per 'Toll by Plate' billing."  But Chief Judge Leslie
Rothenberg dissented, describing as "speculative and overbroad"
the circuit-court order certifying the class action. [GN]


MICHELLE KANG YI: Tolefree Sues Over Violations of Housing Laws
---------------------------------------------------------------
Shaquala Tolefree v. Michelle Kang Yi, Daniel Kang Yi, and DOES
1-30, Case No. RG18911208 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda Cty., June
29, 2018), is brought on behalf of all persons similarly situated
and on behalf of the People of the State of California for
alleged violations of applicable housing laws, including the
Alameda Housing and Building Codes, California Civil Code and
Health and Safety Code.

Michelle Kang Yi and Daniel Kang Yi owned, controlled or managed
the housing unit that the Plaintiff resided during all relevant
periods.  The Plaintiff does not know the true names of the Doe
Defendants.  The Defendants are owners, agents or lessors of the
premises located at 1143 Coburn Ct., Apt. B, in San Leandro,
California.

Throughout her tenancy, the Plaintiff alleges that several
substantial habitability defects existed in the Subject Premises,
which rendered the Subject Premises unfit for human occupancy
under California common law and statutes.  She asserts that the
defects were due to the Defendants' failure to maintain the
Subject Premises.  The defective conditions included mold and
mildew, water intrusion into the unit, leaking plumbing,
flooding, and ceiling cave-in.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew Wolff, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF ANDREW WOLFF, PC
          1615 Broadway, 4th Floor
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone: (510) 834-3300
          Facsimile: (510) 834-3377
          E-mail: andrew@awolfflaw.com


MILBERG LLP: Sup. Ct. Extends Writ Filing to Aug. 6 in "Bobbitt"
----------------------------------------------------------------
Justice Anthony Kennedy extended the time to file a petition for
a writ of certiorari from June 20, 2018, to August 6, 2018, in
the lawsuit styled Lance Laber, Applicant v. Milberg LLP, et al.,
Case No. 17A1362, in the Supreme Court of United States.

The lower court case is styled PHILIP BOBBITT, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, et al., and LANCE
LABER, Intervenor-Plaintiff-Appellant v. MILBERG LLP, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 13-15812, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The District Court case is titled PHILIP BOBBITT, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, et al., and LANCE
LABER, Intervenor-Plaintiff v. MILBERG LLP, et al., Case No.
4:09-cv-00629-FRZ, in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Arizona, Tucson.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, in 2001,
Milberg, a national law firm specializing in class actions, filed
a lawsuit in Arizona district court against Variable Annuity Life
Insurance Company, Inc. (VALIC), for alleged securities law
violations.  In January 2004, the District Court certified a
class of plaintiffs, a significant accomplishment in any class
action litigation.

The Plaintiffs in the appeal sued Milberg for malpractice for
failing to meet the discovery requirements in the VALIC class
action.  The Plaintiffs named as defendants four law firms as
well as various lawyers who worked for them.[BN]

Plaintiff-Petitioner Lance Laber is represented by:

          Lawrence Arthur Kasten, Esq.
          LEWIS ROCA ROTHGERBER CHRISTIE LLP
          200 East Washington Street, Suite 1200
          Phoenix, AZ 85004
          Telephone: (602) 262-0228
          E-mail: lkasten@lrrc.com


NBTY: Judge Allows Ted Frank to Challenge Payments to Objectors
---------------------------------------------------------------
Amanda Bronstad, writing for The National Law Journal, reports
that class action critic Ted Frank scored a big win on June 26 in
an appeals court ruling that allowed him to challenge potential
payments to three other objectors in the case.

The ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
came in Pearson v. NBTY, a case in which retired Judge Richard
Posner famously criticized the original settlement as a "selfish
deal" between class counsel and the defendants.

Frank, of the Competitive Enterprise Institute's Center for Class
Action Fairness, wasn't challenging the new settlement this time.
Instead, acting as an objector himself, he sought to reopen the
case to address what he called "objector blackmail" -- when an
objector agrees to drop his appeal for a payout.  Although he
insisted he didn't do this, he suspected that three other
objectors did.

U.S. District Judge John Blakey of the Northern District of
Illinois' ruling last year striking Frank's request was wrong,
wrote Chief Judge Diane Wood.

"Objectors voluntarily dismissed their appeals.  At this stage we
do not know why, but there is a real risk that they did so at the
expense of the class," Judge Wood wrote.

The ruling comes as the U.S. Judicial Conference's Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure published proposed amendments to
Federal Rule 23 of Civil Procedure that would force court
approval of such objector payouts.  If Congress approves them,
the rules could come into effect this year.  The Seventh Circuit,
in the June 26 ruling, acknowledged the upcoming amendments and
its own role in failing to adequately review such objector
appeals.

"By all accounts, selfish settlements by objectors are a serious
problem," Judge Wood wrote.  "The pending amendments to Rule 23
may solve the problem prospectively, but that does nothing for
the case before us."

The ruling also comes as many in the plaintiffs' bar, including
those in the case before the Seventh Circuit, have criticized
Frank of being just another "bad faith" objector.  But Mr. Frank
has insisted his clients don't accept such payouts.  He said he
challenged the other objectors because that money should have
gone to the class.

"We want to discourage bad faith objectors," said Mr. Frank, who
was awarded $180,000 in fees in the case.  "We were getting
accused of being involved in bad faith objections, and we wanted
to demonstrate that no, we don't do that."

The case, filed in 2011, alleged that Target Corp., NBTY and
Rexall Sundown Inc. had falsely advertised the benefits of their
glucosamine dietary supplements.  But the case got notoriety for
Posner's remarks that the $2 million fee to the plaintiffs
lawyers outweighed any benefits to the class.

U.S. District Judge James Zagel of the Northern District of
Illinois approved a new settlement in 2016 that provided $3
million more to the class.  He entered final judgment and
dismissed the case -- but without prejudice to allow for
administration of the settlement payments.

Three potential class members objected to the settlement and
filed notices of appeal.  Todd Carpenter --
tcarpenter@carlsonlynch.com -- at Carlson Lynch Sweet Kilpela &
Carpenter and Jim Patterson at Patterson Law Group, both in San
Diego, represented objector Randy Nunez; John Pentz in Sudbury,
Massachusetts, and Arthur Howe of Howe LLC in Chicago represented
objector Steven Buckley; and Patrick Sweeney, the third objector,
was pro se.  They dismissed their appeals before briefing began.

"From here, the proceedings took an unusual turn," Judge Wood
wrote.  On Nov. 18, Judge Zagel dismissed the case with prejudice
at the request of the parties.

Mr. Frank filed a motion to disgorge any side settlements that
defendants may have paid to the objectors.  But after Judge Zagel
took senior status, the case was reassigned to Judge Blakey, who
struck the motion due to lack of jurisdiction.

When Mr. Frank sought to reopen the case under Federal Rule 60 of
Civil Procedure, Judge Blakey denied the motion.

Judge Blakey should have granted that motion, the Seventh Circuit
held.

"It is fine to say that individual parties must bear the
responsibility for their deliberate litigation conduct and leave
it at that," Judge Wood wrote.  "But class action cases -- with
all their inherent agency problems -- require an extra analytical
step to ensure that the interests of the class are protected.
Rule 60(b)(6) is a suitable vehicle to consider the class's
interests."

Mr. Frank said the holding, although largely case specific and
without any decision on the merits, could provide a vehicle for
challenging other objectors.

"It certainly implies there might be a remedy for the class," he
said.  "We could have completely lost, and they could have said,
'We're not even going to pretend to let you have a remedy.'"

None of the objectors or their lawyers responded to requests for
comment. [GN]


NCAA: Court Dismisses Poppy Livers' FLSA Suit
---------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the eastern District of
Pennsylvania granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the case
captioned LAWRENCE "POPPY" LIVERS, on his own behalf and on
behalf of similarly situated persons, v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, a/k/a the NCAA, and the following NCAA
Division I Member Schools as representatives of a Defendant Class
of all private and semi-public member schools that entered/enter
into Athletic Financial Aid Agreements with the Plaintiff
Collective: BUCKNELL UNIVERSITY, DREXEL UNIVERSITY, DUQUESNE
UNIVERSITY, FAIRLEIGH DICKINSON UNIVERSITY, LA SALLE UNIVERSITY,
LAFAYETTE COLLEGE, LEHIGH UNIVERSITY, MONMOUTH UNIVERSITY, RIDER
UNIVERSITY, ROBERT MORRIS UNIVERSITY, SETON HALL UNIVERSITY,
SAINT FRANCIS UNIVERSITY, SAINT JOSEPH'S UNIVERSITY, ST. PETER'S
UNIVERSITY, VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY, UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE,
PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY, UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH RUTGERS,
STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW JERSEY TEMPLE UNIVERSITY, Civil Action
No. 17-4271 (e.D. Pa.).

Plaintiff Livers alleges that Defendant National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA), Villanova University, and dozens of
other NCAA member schools, violated his right to be paid as an
employee of the Defendants, acting jointly, for his participation
on the Villanova football team as a Scholarship Athlete.  The
Plaintiff seeks to represent a putative class of individuals
termed the Scholarship Athlete Collective, comprised of all
recipients of athletic scholarships under Athletic Financial Aid
Agreements that require participation in NCAA athletics at NCAA
Division I member schools. The Plaintiff asserts a single claim
under the Minimum Wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) against all the Defendants.

Academic and athletic scholarships are both grants-in-aid
designed to assist academically eligible students in defraying
costs of attendance. Academic and athletic scholarships, as
compared with some other forms of scholarships, are not taxable
income as applied to qualified education expenses required for
enrollment and attendance.  An academic scholarship is not
compensation to prepare for and/or participate in class, and an
athletic scholarship is not compensation to prepare for and/or
participate in NCAA athletics.

Unless an FLSA violation was willful, it is subject to a two year
statute of limitations, and the Plaintiff's participation with
the Villanova football team concluded more than two years prior
to his initiating this case.  The Plaintiff responds that the
question of whether the Defendants acted willfully in violating
the FLSA is a fact intensive inquiry that is typically
inappropriate for summary judgment, much less the motion to
dismiss stage.

With regard to standing, both sets of the Defendants argue that
the Plaintiff does not have standing to pursue a claim against
schools that he did not attend.  The Defendants urge the Court to
adopt the reasoning from Berger that the Plaintiff's connection
to the NCAA and the schools he did not attend is too tenuous to
establish standing because the injury alleged is not traceable to
these defendants and cannot be redressed by them.

The Plaintiff's last season with Villanova football ended on
December 13, 2014, and this Complaint was filed on September 26,
2017, over two years later. The statute of limitations for FLSA
claims is two years, unless an FLSA violation was willful, in
which case the limitations period is extended to three years. An
FLSA violation is willful if the employer knew or showed reckless
disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by
the FLSA.

The Plaintiff has not specifically alleged facts showing reckless
disregard on behalf of either the NCAA or Villanova, with respect
to their non-payment of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff does not
allege any facts regarding any school or the NCAA having
knowledge of any potential duty to compensate the Plaintiff, or
even disregarding such a duty. Unless the Plaintiff can allege
facts that if true would be sufficient to establish that the
Defendants acted intentionally or with reckless disregard to
their obligations under the FLSA, then his claim must be
dismissed as time barred.  The Complaint falls short in this
regard.

The Complaint does not make any allegations that would overcome
the impact of the relatively straightforward FOH guidance to
schools that their student athletes are not FLSA covered
employees. Specifically, the impact of that guidance would likely
require the Court to rule that the Defendants acted reasonably in
making the judgment that they need not compensate student
athletes pursuant to the FLSA, and therefore that the Defendants
did not willfully violate the FLSA.

The Plaintiff will, however, have the opportunity to amend his
Complaint to allege additional facts, if he can, addressing
willfulness in order to attempt to overcome the time bar to his
claim. In order to be successful in this regard, the Plaintiff
will have to plead facts plausibly establishing willfulness, and
must address the FOH guidelines and allege either facts or cite
law to support the conclusion that Defendants willfully violated
the FLSA despite reliance on the FOH guidance.

Even assuming that the Plaintiff has pled facts sufficient to
establish that the Defendants willfully disregarded their
obligations under the FLSA, the Plaintiff cannot establish
standing to bring an FLSA claim against any of the the Defendant
schools that he did not attend.

The court identified four factors to be considered in evaluating
alleged employer-employee relationships in the joint employment
context:

   (1) The alleged employer's authority to hire and fire the
relevant employees;

   (2) The alleged employer's authority to promulgate work rules
and assignments and to set the employees' conditions of
employment: compensation, benefits, and work schedules, including
the rate and method of payment;

   (3) The alleged employer's involvement in day-to-day employee
supervision, including employee discipline; and

   (4) The alleged employer's actual control of employee records,
such as payroll, insurance, or taxes.

The Plaintiff clearly cannot establish that he was jointly
employed by Villanova, the NCAA, and the non-attended schools.
The non-attended schools did not have significant control over
the Plaintiff, as revealed both by reference to the four factors
outlined in In re enterprise Rent-A-Car, and by a holistic review
of the Plaintiff's relationship to those schools, taking the
allegations in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, and
considering the economic reality of the situation.

The non-attended schools did not have authority to hire or fire
the Plaintiff as a Villanova football player; they had no
authority to promulgate rules applicable to the Plaintiff or to
issue assignments for him to complete; they had no involvement
whatsoever in his day-to-day supervision; and they had no actual
control of the records relating to the Plaintiff's participation
on the Villanova football team. These schools did not even have
indirect control over the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff's FLSA claim against the Defendant schools that he
did not attend will be dismissed with prejudice.

Even if the Complaint properly alleges that Defendants Villanova
University and the NCAA acted unreasonably and therefore
willfully in interpreting their obligations under the FLSA with
respect to student athletes, and therefore the FLSA claim is not
beyond the statute of limitations, the Complaint fails to plead
an actionable FLSA claim against Villanova and the NCAA. The
primary question at issue here is whether or not the Plaintiff
falls within the definition of employee as it is understood in
the context of the FLSA, and ultimately the Court concludes that
the Complaint fails to properly state a claim that he does.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 17, 2018 Memorandum
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7xwste5 from Leagle.com.

LAWRENCE POPPY LIVERS, ON HIS OWN BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF
SIMILARLY SITUATED PERSONS, Plaintiff, represented by PAUL L.
MCDONALD, P L MCDONALD LAW LLC.


NESTLE WATERS: Court Dismisses Poland Spring Fraud Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the complaints in the case
captioned MARK J. PATANE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. NESTLE WATERS
NORTH AMERICA, INC., Defendant, No. 3:17-cv-01381 (JAM) (D.
Conn.).

The Plaintiffs allege that the marketing of Poland Spring water
is an enormous fraud.  They claim that Poland Spring water
products are fraudulently labeled and sold as spring water
despite not meeting the requirements for spring water as defined
by law.  Nestle moves to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

Nestle first argues that the plaintiffs have no standing as
required to sustain this Court's jurisdiction over the complaint.
In accordance with the Constitution's case-or-controversy
requirement, a federal court lacks jurisdiction over a lawsuit
unless a plaintiff alleges a concrete and particularized injury-
in-fact that is fairly traceable to a defendant's wrongful
conduct and redressable by a court order.

The allegations here easily suffice to meet the requirements for
constitutional standing. The Plaintiffs allege that they relied
on Nestle's representation that Poland Spring water was 100%
Natural Spring Water, and because of this reliance they paid a
higher price for Poland Spring water than they would have paid
for alternative water products.

Nestle next argues that the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction because of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  Rooker-
Feldman bars the federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over
claims brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries
caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district
court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review
and rejection of those judgments.

That class action referred to by the parties as the Ramsey action
involved a nationwide class of plaintiffs who purchased Poland
Spring water from January 1, 1996, to November 5, 2003.

Here the provision relied on by Nestle at best does no more than
ratify Nestle's future conduct (and only as to those particular
sources of sources of water it has used since 1996). The Ramsey
action involved purchasers of Poland Spring water before November
5, 2003, while the current action involves purchasers of Poland
Spring water after November 5, 2003. The agreement by a prior
class of plaintiffs in Ramsey to allow Nestle to continue some of
its conduct is precisely the kind of ratification or acquiescence
that does not meet the more demanding causation requirement for
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

The Plaintiffs' alleged injuries here are caused by Nestle's
purported ongoing, post-Ramsey course of deceptive conduct and
not by what the state court in Ramsey ordered or by what the
prior parties to the Ramsey judgment agreed. Accordingly, the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not deprive the Court of subject
matter jurisdiction over this case.

In a similar vein, Nestle argues that the plaintiffs' claims are
foreclosed by the Ramsey settlement agreement. According to
Nestle, the Ramsey settlement precludes plaintiffs' class action
for at least two reasons: (1) the Ramsey settlement agreement
expressly released Nestle from plaintiffs' claims, and (2) the
Ramsey settlement agreement triggers the rule of res judicata.
Res judicata does not apply if the wrong suffered by the
plaintiff is of a recurrent or ongoing nature. This rule applies
to a defendant's continuing course of conduct, even if related to
conduct complained of in an earlier action. In such a case the
doctrine of res judicata does not bar claims for continuing
conduct complained of in the second lawsuit that occur after
judgment has been entered in the first lawsuit. Because
plaintiffs' claims are wholly based on alleged ongoing conduct
that post-dates the Ramsey settlement, the Court concludes that
res judicata does not apply. The Ramsey settlement agreement does
not preclude this action.

Nestle argues that the plaintiffs' claims are all pre-empted by
federal law. Federal law may pre-empt state law in various ways.
Sometimes Congress expressly pre-empts state law by statute, and
other times state law may be impliedly pre-empted if Congress has
occupied an entire field or if a state law somehow conflicts with
or otherwise stands as an obstacle to the purpose of a federal
law.

Each and every one of the plaintiffs' claims are wholly FDCA-
dependent. The Plaintiffs' principal claim of fraud for
nationwide class relief refers solely to FDA regulations rather
than any provisions of state law. The Plaintiffs' breach-of-
contract claim for nationwide class relief similarly relies on
the plaintiffs' allegation that the product delivered by Nestle
was not genuine spring water, previously defined by reference
solely to FDA regulations. The Plaintiffs' various state law
claims cite specific consumer protection statutes, but each of
these generic consumer protection statutes are alleged to be
violated because of Nestle's recurring failure to comply with the
FDA's federal standard for spring water.

As if all this weren't enough, the plaintiffs' own briefing
likewise concedes that the plaintiffs' claims are based entirely
on their allegation that Defendant Nestle Water's Poland Spring
Water products are falsely advertised and sold fraudulently to
consumers because they do not comply with the FDA's 'standard of
identity' for spring water, which defines genuine spring water
and specifies the manner in which spring water must be
'collected' (or extracted) from the earth. Indeed, the plaintiffs
concede that their claims are all co-existent with the FDCA and
FDA regulations and will rise or fall based solely on whether
they can prove that Poland Spring Water fails to meet the FDA's
identity standard.
In short, despite the efforts the plaintiffs make to clothe their
claims in the garb of state law, the reality is that they are
suing solely to enforce the FDCA's federal spring water standard.
That is what Buckman and Section 337(a) do not allow.

The Court will dismiss the complaints on the ground that they are
impliedly pre-empted by Section 337(a) of the FDCA.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 17, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ydyncwjf from Leagle.com.

Mark J. Patane, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Julie Harding, Individually and on Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, Heather Harrigan, Individually and
on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Stephen S. Shapiro,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Catherine Porter, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, erica Russell, Individually and on Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, Tina Moretti, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Bridget Kopet,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Jennifer S. Cole, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Benjamin A. Fletcher, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated & Diane Bogdan,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Alexander H. Schmidt --
schmidt@whafh.com -- Alexander H. Schmidt, esq., pro hac vice,
Amanda K. Bonn -- abonn@susmangodfrey -- Susman Godfrey L.L.P,
pro hac vice, Craig A. Raabe -- craabe@ikrlaw.com -- Izard,
Kindall & Raabe LLP, Oleg elkhunovich --
oelkhunovich@susmangodfrey.com -- Susman Godfrey, pro hac vice,
Steven G. Sklaver -- ssklaver@susmangodfrey.com -- Susman
Godfrey, pro hac vice, Steven N. Williams --
swilliams@saverilawfirm.com -- Joseph Saveri Law Firm, pro hac
vice, Y. Gloria Park -- gpark@susmangodfrey.com -- Susman Godfrey
L.L.P, pro hac vice, Christopher M. Barrett --
cbarrett@ikrlaw.com -- Izard, Kindall & Raabe, LLP, Mark P.
Kindall  -- mkindall@ikrlaw.com -- Izard, Kindall & Raabe, LLP,
Robert A. Izard, Jr. -- rizard@ikrlaw.com -- Izard, Kindall &
Raabe, LLP & V. Chai Oliver Prentice --
vprentice@saverilawfirm.com -- Joseph Saveri Law Firm.

Nestle Waters North America Inc., Defendant, represented by Craig
A. Ollenschleger -- co@olss.com -- Orloff Lowenbach Stifelman &
Siegel, pro hac vice, Jeffrey M. Garrod -- jmg@olss.com -- Orloff
Lowenbach Stifelman & Siegel, Thomas B. Mayhew -- tmayhew@fbm.com
-- Farella, Braun & Martel LLP, pro hac vice & Jonathan B. Tropp
-- jbtropp@daypitney.com -- Day Pitney LLP.


OAKLEY INC: Faces "Duncan" Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Oakley, Inc. The
case is styled as Eugene Duncan, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Oakley, Inc., Defendant,
Case No. 1:18-cv-06077 (S.D. N.Y., July 4, 2018).

Oakley, Inc., based in Lake Forest, California, and a subsidiary
of Italian company Luxottica based in Milan, designs, develops
and manufactures sports performance equipment and lifestyle
pieces including sunglasses, sports visors, ski/snowboard
goggles, watches, apparel, backpacks, shoes, optical frames, and
other accessories. Most items are designed in house at their head
office, but some countries hold exclusive designs relevant to
their market. Oakley currently holds more than 600 patents for
eyewear, materials, and performance gear.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


PARAGON: Rapper Named Defendant in Cryptocurrency Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Calvin Hughes, writing for Civilized, reports that rapper The
Game has found himself in hot water after being named as a
defendant in a class action lawsuit filed against the cannabis
cryptocurrency company Paragon.

Paragon has marketed themselves as a "path towards legalization
of cannabis and a way to solve nearly every issue facing the
cannabis industry."  Their claim was that they would use
blockchain technology as a means of tracking the various stages
of cannabis production and sale.  This statement now appears to
be false and the company faces a class action lawsuit for
misleading investors.

And Compton hip hop artist the Game has been named as one of the
defendants in the suit.  This is because he had been acting as
the celebrity face of the company and is listed as a member of
Paragon's "advisory board", reports The Blast. [GN]


PC RICHARD: Faces "Duncan" Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against P.C. Richard & Son,
LLC. The case is styled as Eugene Duncan, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. P.C. Richard &
Son, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-06078 (S.D. N.Y., July 4,
2018).

P.C. Richard & Son, commonly known as simply P.C. Richard, is the
largest chain of private, family-owned appliance, television,
electronics, and mattress stores in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


PEPSI-COLA CO: FAC in Diet Pepsi False Advertising Suit Dismissed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the First Amended
Complaint in the case captioned ELIZABETH MANUEL and VIVIEN
GROSSMAN, on behalf of themselves, all others similarly situated,
and the general public, Plaintiffs, v. PEPSI-COLA COMPANY,
Defendant, No. 17 Civ. 7955 (PAE)(S.D.N.Y.).

This case involves a challenge to the use of the word "diet" in
connection with the ubiquitous soft drink Diet Pepsi. Plaintiffs
Elizabeth Manuel and Vivien Grossman bring this putative class
action against defendant Pepsi-Cola Company (PepsiCo) alleging
unfair and deceptive business practices, false advertising,
fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breaches of express and
implied warranties, all arising under New York law and all based
in whole or part on PepsiCo's use of the "diet" adjective to
describe this beverage.

The Defendants move to dismiss the FAC on four grounds: that (1)
the plaintiffs' claims, all arising under New York law, are pre-
empted by federal law; (2) the plaintiffs' claims should be
dismissed or stayed pursuant to the primary jurisdiction
doctrine; (3) the plaintiffs have failed to plead actual
deception; and (4) the plaintiffs' false advertising claim fails
to allege causation.

Pre-emption

In 1990, Congress amended the United States Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) with the Nutrition Labeling and Education
Act (NLEA). The NLEA specifically addresses use of the term
"diet" in soft drink labeling. It excludes from certain labeling
requirements (and thereby authorizes) use of the term "diet" on a
soft drink label where: (i) such claim is contained in the brand
name of such soft drink, (ii) such brand name was in use on such
soft drink before October 25, 1989, and (iii) the use of the term
'diet' was in conformity with 21 C.F.R. Section 105.66.

PepsiCo's narrow reading of false or misleading, which would
preempt state-law claims other than those alleging an inaccurate
calorie count, fails as a matter of statutory and regulatory
construction. It is contrary to the text of Section 343(a), which
broadly prohibits statements that are false or misleading in any
way not just statements that mislead in relation to other
requirements of the FDCA. It is also inconsistent with 21 C.F.R.
Section 105.66(e)(1), which, for soft drinks marketed after
October 25, 1989, requires both that the term "diet" not be false
or misleading, and that the label contain a comparative calorie
claim in compliance with the calorie content requirements of 21
C.F.R. Section 101.60.

The regulations for post-1989 diet soft drinks thus treat false
and misleading as a separate requirement from calorie content
requirements. On PepsiCo's view of pre-emption, therefore, the
term false and misleading would have different meanings as
applied to soft drinks marketed before and after 1989, allowing
manufacturers of the former but not the latter to engage in false
and misleading labeling other than as to calorie content. There
is no basis to assign to Congress such an intent.

Primary Jurisdiction

PepsiCo next contends that this Court should dismiss or stay this
case pursuant to the primary jurisdiction doctrine.  Rather, the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction is concerned with promoting
proper relationships between the courts and administrative
agencies charged with particular regulatory duties. Although
there is no bright-line test, this Circuit applies a case-by-case
analysis mindful of four factors: (1) whether the question at
issue is within the conventional experience of judges or whether
it involves technical or policy considerations within the
agency's particular field of expertise; (2) whether the question
at issue is particularly within the agency's discretion; (3)
whether there exists a substantial danger of inconsistent
rulings; and (4) whether a prior application to the agency has
been made.

As to the first factor, it is true that a scientific question
underlies this dispute: the nutritional impact of artificial
sweeteners. But at bottom, this case is far less about science
than it is about whether a label is misleading, and the
reasonable-consumer inquiry upon which the claims depend is one
to which courts are eminently well suited, even well versed.

The second factor is more equivocal. Congress has authorized the
FDA to promulgate regulations regarding diet soft drink labeling.
And because the FDA may prohibit labels that are false or
misleading in any particular, the dispute about PepsiCo's labels
might seem to be particularly within the FDA's discretion.

Similarly, as to the third factor, given that the FDA has
declined to take up the question presented here, there is no
danger of inconsistent rulings. The Second Circuit has advised
that courts should be especially solicitous in deferring to
agencies that are simultaneously contemplating the same issues.
But when the agency is not simultaneously contemplating the same
issue this factor weighs against applying the primary
jurisdiction doctrine.

Finally, for much the same reasons, the fourth factor counsels
against dismissing or staying the case. In such circumstances,
common sense dictates that even if the FDA's expertise would be
helpful, a court should not invoke primary jurisdiction when the
agency is aware of but has expressed no interest in the subject
matter of the litigation.

This Court therefore declines to invoke primary jurisdiction
here.

Merits

The Court turns now to PepsiCo's argument that the plaintiffs'
allegations must be dismissed for failure to state a claim under
Rule 12(b)(6).

Plaintiffs' Strained Interpretation of Diet

The Plaintiffs allege that PepsiCo's use of the term diet leads
consumers to reasonably believe that Diet Pepsi will assist in
weight loss, or at least healthy weight management, for example,
by not causing weight gain.  Faced with identical claims against
PepsiCo's competitors, Judges Alsup, Orrick, and Daniels have
held that no reasonable consumer would understand a soft drink
labeled as diet to be a weight-loss product.

The Court must accept the FAC's claim that the two plaintiffs,
Manuel and Grossman, drew the inference that Diet Pepsi assists
in weight loss or weight management in an absolute sense, not
merely relative to regular Pepsi. But a cause of action for false
or misleading conduct cannot rest on an unreasonable reading of
label or advertising at issue.

The FAC therefore does not adequately plead deception. Because a
reasonable consumer understands the Diet in Diet Pepsi to make at
most a relative health claim in comparison to the non-diet
variant of the same brand, a plausible claim of consumer
deception would require more. It would require credible
allegations presumably based on scientific evidence -- to the
effect that consumption of Diet Pepsi frustrates weight loss
efforts relative to commensurate consumption of regular Pepsi.
The Plaintiffs do not make any such allegation or direct the
Court to evidence that would support such an allegation.

Actual Deception

The FAC fails to state a claim for a second, independent reason:
even if reasonable consumers would understand the Diet in Diet
Pepsi to denote a weight-loss product, a product that promotes
weight loss in an absolute sense, not merely relative to regular
Pepsi, the FAC does not allege other than conclusorily that Diet
Pepsi actually frustrates weight loss for any segment of the
population. Accordingly, even adopting a broader construction of
Diet than is fairly attributed to the word Diet in Diet Pepsi,
the FAC fails to allege that this label is deceptive.

The Plaintiffs have failed to allege a causal relationship
between NNS consumption and weight gain. Without evidence of
causation, the plaintiffs cannot establish actual deception that
contrary to their expectations, plaintiffs received a beverage
whose consumption is likely to lead to weight gain.

Perhaps one day, scientific research will support such a claim.
In that event, the plaintiffs may renew their challenge. The
Plaintiffs' FAC, however, rests on too spongy a foundation for
such a theory of deception to be sustained as viably pled: The
review articles cited in the FAC do no more than queue up for
analysis by future researchers the issue whether there is a
causal relationship between NNS consumption and weight gain.
Because the FAC asserts such a relationship as an ipse dixit, it
fails to state a plausible claim of deception.

False Advertising Claims

PepsiCo argues that that claim is independently defective (1) for
failure to allege causation, in that the plaintiffs do not claim
to have seen the advertisements reprinted in the FAC, and (2) as
time-barred. These critiques might well have purchase in a case
claiming that the reprinted advertisements were themselves false
and misleading. But PepsiCo misconstrues the FAC's false
advertising claim to so allege. The FAC bases its claim under
Section 350 solely on PepsiCo's use of the term diet in
advertising its product. It does not challenge as actionable any
print or video advertisement.

The advertisements quoted in the FAC are cited for a different
purpose: to show that PepsiCo's messaging in extra-label
advertising was ostensibly consistent with the Plaintiffs'
interpretation of diet in the product's brand name. In other
words, these advertisements are offered to support the
plaintiffs' (unavailing) argument that a reasonable consumer
would view Diet Pepsi as a weight-loss product, not as the basis
for a stand-alone false advertising claim.

PepsiCo's critiques do not supply an independent basis to dismiss
the FAC's false advertising claim.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 17, 2018 Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybnhjfm8 from
Leagle.com

Elizabeth Manuel, on behalf of themselves, all others similarly
situated, and the general public & Vivien Grossman, on behalf of
themselves, all others similarly situated, and the general
public, Plaintiffs, represented by John Joseph Fitzgerald, IV,
Mayer Brown, LLP, Andrew B. Sacks, Sacks Weston Diamond, John
Kerry Weston, Sacks Weston Petrelli Diamond & Millstein LLC,
Melanie Rae Persinger -- melanie@jackfitzgeraldlaw.com -- The Law
Office of Jack Fitzgerald, Trevor Flynn  --
trevor@jackfitzgeraldlaw.com -- The Law Office of Jack
Fitzgerald, PC & Abraham Zev Wolf Melamed  --
abe@dereksmithlaw.com -- Derek Smith Law Group, PLLC.

Pepsi-Cola Company, Defendant, represented by Andrew Santo
Tulumello -- atulumello@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher, L.L.P. & Chantale Fiebig -- cfiebig@gibsondunn.com --
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP.


PEPSI-COLA CO: Second Circuit Appeal Filed in "Manuel" Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Vivien Grossman and Elizabeth Manuel filed an appeal
from the District Court's opinion and order, and judgment, both
dated May 17, 2018, entered in their lawsuit styled Manuel, et
al. v. Pepsi-Cola Company, Case No. 17-cv-7955, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
arises out of the Defendant's unlawful practice of using the term
"diet" to market Diet Pepsi because the product is sweetened with
a non-caloric artificial sweetener, aspartame acesulfame-
potassium and sucralose, which inherently and necessarily implies
it will assist in weight loss, when in fact aspartame acesulfame-
potassium and sucralose in Diet Pepsi is likely to cause weight
gain, rather than to help in weight loss or healthy weight
management.

Pepsi-Cola Company is a food, snack, and beverage corporation.

The appellate case is captioned as Manuel, et al. v. Pepsi-Cola
Company, Case No. 18-1748, in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants Elizabeth Manuel, on behalf of themselves,
and all others similarly situated, and the general public; and
Vivien Grossman, on behalf of themselves, all others similarly
situated, and the general public, are represented by:

          Abraham Melamed, Esq.
          DEREK SMITH LAW GROUP, PLLC
          1 Penn Plaza
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (303) 929-3903
          E-mail: Abe@dereksmithlaw.com

Defendant-Appellee Pepsi-Cola Company is represented by:

          Andrew S. Tulumello, Esq.
          GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
          1050 Connecticut Avenue, NW
          Washington, DC 20036
          Telephone: (202) 955-8657
          E-mail: atulumello@gibsondunn.com


PETROBRAS: Judge Cuts Class Action Lawyers' Fees by $100MM
----------------------------------------------------------
Alison Frankel, writing for Reuters, reports that Jeremy
Lieberman and his partners at the securities class action firm
Pomerantz are about $171 million richer, after U.S. District
Judge Jed Rakoff of Manhattan issued a decision on June 25
granting final approval of a $3 billion securities class action
settlement against the Brazilian energy company Petrobras and one
of its auditors.  Pomerantz, one of three lead firms in the case,
did the bulk of the work, so it's receiving the lion's share of
the total $186.5 million Judge Rakoff awarded class counsel for
obtaining an "exceptional" result in a risky case without a
foreordained outcome.

You might expect Mr. Lieberman to be a very happy man today.
He's not -- and it's not just because Judge Rakoff awarded
Petrobras class counsel nearly $100 million less than the $284.4
million they requested.

Mr. Lieberman told Ms. Frankel that what bothers him wasn't so
much the result as the process.  Ms. Frankel will explain below
how Judge Rakoff got to $186.5 million, but Mr. Lieberman's
complaint is that the judge did not honor Pomerantz's fee
agreement with its U.K. pension fund client, lead shareholder
Universities Superannuation Scheme.  When USS retained Pomerantz,
the fund rejected Pomerantz's initial fee suggestion and instead,
as class counsel recounted in their memo requesting $284.4
million in fees, brought in former U.S. pension fund official
Keith Johnson of Reinhart Boerner Van Dueren to advise the U.K.
fund on appropriate fees for its class action lawyers.  Their
eventual sliding-scale deal, which granted Pomerantz a declining
percentage of the recovery as the size of the settlement fund
increased, would have netted lead counsel 9.4 percent of the $3
billion settlement, or $284.5 million.  Judge Rakoff took that
pre-negotiated fee deal into account when he appointed USS a lead
plaintiff in the Petrobras case.

The judge, as Pomerantz and the other lead counsel acknowledged
in their fee petition, was not required to defer to USS's fee
agreement with Pomerantz.  Federal judges, after all, are
supposed to look out for the interests of all class members, not
just lead plaintiffs. But Pomerantz and the other firms argued
that Judge Rakoff should give considerable weight to the USS fee
deal, especially because it was negotiated before the litigation
began.

Pomerantz partners relied on the terms of their USS fee deal when
they made decisions about how to litigate the case, the fee memo
said.  To finance the expensive undertaking, they pledged their
personal assets to assume a crushing debt load, "in large part
informed by the ex ante fee agreement that was previously
reviewed (and commended) by (Judge Rakoff)."

But when it actually came time to award fees, the judge said
Pomerantz's pre-negotiated fee deal was "at best just one factor"
to consider in the tapestry of litigation events "that provide a
much better indication of what was the value of the attorneys'
work to the class as a whole than any before-the-fact private
agreement reached with an individual plaintiff."

Instead, as I'll explain, Judge Rakoff based his fee award on
class counsel's lodestar billings, boosted by a multiplier to
reflect the excellent result they obtained.  Judge Rakoff used
the 1.78 multiplier Pomerantz, Labaton and Motley Rice had
originally suggested, when they analyzed lodestar billings as a
cross-check on their fee request for the 9.4 percent of the
settlement, the percentage Pomerantz had negotiated with lead
shareholder USS.

Mr. Lieberman told me he's distressed at the short shrift Judge
Rakoff gave to Pomerantz's fee agreement with its client and
believes that, in the long run, disregarding such agreements
undermines the legitimacy of class actions.  Federal judges, as
the class action bar is all too aware, are pushing for more
transparency in these cases, pressing for details on
relationships between lead plaintiff candidates and their firms,
referral fees paid to firms that don't have a role in the
litigation, and dubious dismissals.  Mr. Lieberman said judges
should similarly recognize that arms-length fee agreements
between institutional investors and their lawyers enhance the
professionalism of the class action bar.

"Fee awards can't be random in high-stakes litigation.  It shows
a lack of respect for the process, to just say, 'Oh, I'll figure
it out afterwards,'" Mr. Lieberman said.  "If you want class
action work to be taken as a serious industry, you have to have a
systematic way to assure in advance how lawyers will be paid. If
we're trying to clean up the business, let's clean it up in all
ways. No more randomness at the end."

Mr. Lieberman said he believes Judge Rakoff acted with good
intentions.  He also acknowledged the inescapable truth of the
judge's point that he's awarding a tremendous amount of money to
plaintiffs' firms. (Judge Rakoff's exact words: "It is important
to also remember that we are dealing here, not just with
percentages, billable rates, and multipliers, but with very large
amounts of money in absolute terms that plaintiffs' counsel will
be receiving under any analysis.")

But he said -- and this is a legitimate point -- that
disregarding lead plaintiffs' pre-negotiated  fee agreements can
distort the way class counsel litigate a case. "I was thinking
for three years my fee agreement was going to be honored," he
said.  "The future of our firm was on the line.  We did that
because we thought our agreement with the client would be
honored."

For a contrary take, I went to the Competitive Enterprise
Institute, which filed a thought-provoking objection to the
Petrobras settlement, protesting class counsel's fee request,
among other things.  In an email responding to Mr. Lieberman's
argument, CEI lawyer Anna St. John said it's important to
remember that USS isn't the only client in this class action,
which is being settled on behalf of all Petrobras shareholders.
USS, St. John wrote, "is just one of more than 1 million
potential class members who are the clients that Pomerantz is
supposed to represent," she said in her email.  "That agreement
also does not protect those absent class members, who like in
this case, are taken advantage of when lawyers seek to recover
windfall hourly rates."

CEI's objection urged Judge Rakoff not to defer to the USS fee
agreement because the class as a whole didn't negotiate the deal
and wasn't apprised of its terms.  "If it fails to preclude a
windfall hourly rate, then it does not satisfactorily protect the
class's interests," the filing said.  "Class counsel fear that
there is no value to ex ante vetting if courts can 'simply upend
(agreements) by the subjective post hoc determinations.'  Not so;
a negotiated fee can reasonably serve as a ceiling even if it is
inappropriate to employ it as a floor."

Judge Rakoff's award of $186.5 million, as Ms. Frankel mentioned,
was based on lodestar billings by class counsel, but he used a
very unusual process to review their bills.  Rather than appoint
a special master -- presumably at the expense of class members --
to comb through the timekeeping records submitted by plaintiffs
lawyers, the judge asked defense lawyers for Petrobras and its
auditor to do it.  "The court took this step because of
defendants' intimate knowledge of various aspects of the case,
and the court's confidence was rewarded by the highly
professional way in which defendants' counsel undertook their
court-directed task," he wrote.

Defense lawyers found some hinky charges, like the seven days a
contract attorney claimed to have spent reviewing the third
amended complaint -- after the complaint had been filed.  Class
counsel voluntarily adjusted their lodestar report to eliminate
some of the questionable hours uncovered by the defense firms but
protested other supposedly inflated charges.

Judge Rakoff then waded into the time records himself.  He ended
up focusing on class counsel's $28 million in billing for foreign
contract lawyers who cannot practice in New York and nearly $100
million in bills for contract lawyers.  He shifted the foreign
lawyers' bills to a reimbursable litigation cost (which means no
multiplier) and cut contract lawyers' fees by 20 percent.  He
also imposed an additional 50 percent cut on bills by contract
lawyers acting as translators.  Those cuts brought the total
lodestar down from $159.5 million to $104.8 million.  When the
judge applied the 1.78 multiplier, the total came to the
aforementioned $186.5 million.

Judge Rakoff said any more would be a "windfall" to plaintiffs
lawyers who were already "highly incentivized to heavily litigate
this huge case regardless of the expected fee award."

Mr. Lieberman begs to differ. [GN]


PHARMAVITE LLC: 9th Cir. Reverses Dismissal of "Bradach" Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, reversed the
District Court's judgment granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
the cases captioned NOAH BRADACH, On Behalf of Himself and All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PHARMAVITe,
LLC, Defendant-Appellee, Nos. 16-56598, 17-55064 (9th Cir.).

Noah Bradach appeals from the district court's dismissal of his
class action complaint against Defendant-Appellee Pharmavite LLC.

Bradach alleges he and other consumers purchased Pharmavite's
Nature Made Vitamin e dietary supplements in reliance of the
statement Helps Maintain a Healthy Heart (Heart Health statement)
which appears on the product's label. Bradach filed a class
action lawsuit against Pharmavite contending the statement is
false and misleading and asserting Pharmavite's use of the
statement violates California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and
Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA).

The district court determined that Bradach lacked standing to
assert his claims under the CLRA and UCL because the district
court concluded that Bradach's deposition testimony and an
interrogatory response indicated that Bradach believed the Heart
Health statement was a disease claim and that Bradach's state-law
claims were therefore pre-empted by the FDCA.

The Court reviews questions of pre-emption and standing de novo.

The Ninth Circuit finds that the record does not support the
proposition that Bradach's individual claims are solely premised
on pre-empted disease claims. Bradach's testimony reflects that
he had a mixed understanding of what Pharmavite's Vitamin e
supplement would do. Bradach understood the Vitamin e product to
both maintain his heart health and prevent heart disease. Courts
have recognized that a plaintiff may have claims based on mixed
motives and have allowed claims arising in part from non-
preempted motives to move forward.

Accordingly, Bradach's claims were not pre-empted.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's May 17, 2018 Memorandum
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y6w7pmf8 from Leagle.com.


POLARITYTE INC: Faces Securities Class Action in Utah
-----------------------------------------------------
Gainey McKenna & Egleston on June 27 disclosed that a class
action lawsuit has been filed against PolarityTE, Inc.
("PolarityTE" or the "Company") (Nasdaq:COOL) in the United
States District Court for the District of Utah on behalf of a
class consisting of investors who purchased or otherwise acquired
PolarityTE securities on the open market from March 31, 2017 and
June 22, 2018, inclusive (the "Class Period"), seeking to recover
compensable damages caused by Defendants' violations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period Defendants
made false and/or misleading statements, as well as failed to
disclose material adverse facts about PolarityTE's business,
operations, and prospects.  Specifically, Defendants made false
and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose material
information pertaining to a number of topics, including: (1) the
status of Patent #14/954,335 at the time it was acquired by
PolarityTE on April 7, 2017 and the months following; (2) the
updated status of Patent #14/954,335 after its June 4, 2018 final
rejection by the U.S. Patent Trademark Office; and (3) as a
result of the foregoing, PolarityTE's publicly disseminated
financial statements were materially false and misleading. When
the true details entered the market, the lawsuit claims that
investors suffered damages.

Investors who purchased or otherwise acquired shares during the
Class Period should contact the Firm prior to the August 27, 2018
lead plaintiff motion deadline.  A lead plaintiff is a
representative party acting on behalf of other class members in
directing the litigation.  If you wish to discuss your rights or
interests regarding this class action, please contact Thomas J.
McKenna, Esq. or Gregory M. Egleston, Esq. of Gainey McKenna &
Egleston at (212) 983-1300, or via e-mail at tjmckenna@gme-
law.com or gegleston@gme-law.com

Please visit our website at http://www.gme-law.comfor more
information about the firm. [GN]


PRINCIPAL GLOBAL: Seeks Dismissal of 401(k) Plan Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
Emily Brill, writing for Law360, reports that Principal Global
Investors Trust Co. urged an Iowa federal judge to can a proposed
class action accusing the company of breaching its fiduciary
duties to 401(k) plan participants by failing to replace
allegedly underperforming target date fund investments, telling
the court the participants didn't show the investments
underperformed.

The participants should have offered stronger allegations against
the allegedly underperforming investments if they wanted their
suit to survive, Principal Global wrote in the June 25 motion to
dismiss.

The case captioned Nelsen et al v. Principal Global Investors
Trust Company et al., Case No. 4:18-cv-00115 (S.D. Iowa).  The
case is assigned to Judge Stephanie M. Rose.  The case was filed
April 16, 2018. [GN]


PROTHENA CORP: July 16 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
---------------------------------------------------------
National securities litigation law firm Glancy Prongay & Murray
LLP ("GPM") on June 26 disclosed that a class action lawsuit has
been filed on behalf of investors that purchased or otherwise
acquired the securities of Prothena Corporation plc ("Prothena"
or the "Company") (NASDAQ: PRTA) securities between October 15,
2015 and April 20, 2018, inclusive (the "Class Period"). Prothena
investors have until July 16, 2018 to file a lead plaintiff
motion.

Investors that suffered losses on their Prothena investments are
encouraged to contact Lesley Portnoy of GPM to discuss their
legal rights in this class action at 310-201-9150 or by email to
shareholders@glancylaw.com.

On October 15, 2015, Prothena disclosed its late-stage Phase 2b
"PRONTO" study and expansion of its Phase 1/2 clinical trial for
the antibody NEOD001.  On April 23, 2018, Prothena announced it
was ending development of NEOD001 after its Phase 2b PRONTO trial
failed to reach either its primary or secondary endpoints.  On
this news, shares of Prothena fell $25.34, or nearly 69%, to
close at $11.50 on April 23, 2018, thereby injuring investors.

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that, Defendants
during the Class Period violated the federal securities laws by:
(1) withholding relevant trial data showing that Prothena's
NEOD001, an antibody designed to treat amyloid light chain
amyloidosis ("AL amyloidosis"), was not an effective treatment
for AL amyloidosis; (2) making misleading comparisons of
NEOD001's "best response" rates against certain prior studies;
and (3) touting that Prothena's ongoing Phase 1/2 study of
NEOD001 provided a strong basis for late-stage Phase 2b and Phase
3 studies of NEOD001, even though the full Phase 1/2 study data
demonstrated that NEOD001 was not an effective treatment for AL
amyloidosis.

Follow us for updates on Twitter: twitter.com/GPM_LLP.

If you purchased shares of Prothena during the Class Period you
may move the Court no later than July 16, 2018 to ask the Court
to appoint you as lead plaintiff.  To be a member of the Class
you need not take any action at this time; you may retain counsel
of your choice or take no action and remain an absent member of
the Class.  If you wish to learn more about this action, or if
you have any questions concerning this announcement or your
rights or interests with respect to these matters, please contact
Lesley Portnoy, Esquire, of GPM, 1925 Century Park East, Suite
2100, Los Angeles, California 90067 at 310-201-9150, Toll-Free at
888-773-9224, by email to shareholders@glancylaw.com, or visit
our website at www.glancylaw.com.  If you inquire by email please
include your mailing address, telephone number and number of
shares purchased. [GN]


RIVERSIDE COUNTY, CA: ACLU Files Racial Discrimination Case
-----------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
Riverside County, Calif., and its Probation Department
unconstitutionally discriminate against children of color through
an "astonishingly punitive and ineffective law enforcement
program" called the Youth Accountability Team, "treating them
like criminals" for "normal, childish behavior" such as being
"defiant" or "easily persuaded by peers," the ACLU claims in a
federal class action.


ROBERT FICO: Class Action Mulled Over Parliamentary Pensions
------------------------------------------------------------
ANSA reports that the association of former MPs on June 27 sent
the House Speaker's office members an injunction warning them
they will initiate a class action lawsuit against Speaker Roberto
Fico's measure to scrap 'vitalizi' parliamentary pensions, if it
is approved.

The suit would cite civil and administrative damages which each
member of the office would be liable for, the association said.
The president of the association, Antonello Falomi, said the
legal action would be triggered if the House approves the measure
which is provisionally due to take effect on November 1. [GN]


ROBERTO COIN: Faces "Duncan" Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Roberto Coin, Inc.
The case is styled as Eugene Duncan, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Roberto Coin, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-06079 (S.D. N.Y., July 4, 2018).

Roberto Coin Inc. produces and markets jewelry. The company was
incorporated in 1995 and is based in New York, New York. Roberto
Coin Inc. operates as a subsidiary of Roberto Coin S.p.A.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS: Faces Class Action Over RAM Price-Fixing
-------------------------------------------------------------
Bryan Koenig, writing for Law360, reports that Samsung
Electronics Co., SK Hynix and Micron Technology Inc. were hit
with another proposed class action on June 26 in California
federal court accusing the companies of colluding to fix prices
on dynamic random-access memory, a key component to most
smartphone and computer functions.

DRAM purchaser John Treanor's antitrust complaint contends the
companies command a roughly 95 percent share of the worldwide
market for the technology that holds data while it's being
processed, in a market where rigorous competition and growing
production capacity had been driving prices downward.

The case is captioned Treanor v. Micron Technology Inc. et al,
Case No. 3:18-cv-03805 (N.D. Cal.).  The case was filed June 26,
2018. [GN]


SAN BENITO COUNTY, CA: CSA Threatens Class Action Over Fees
-----------------------------------------------------------
John Chadwell, writing for BenitoLink, reports that as one CSA
accuses county of incompetence and threatens lawsuit, Supervisor
Mark Medina says county is taking CSA monies and not providing
services neighborhoods have paid for.

When the San Benito County Board of Supervisors announced a May
22 public hearing on raising the annual fee for County Service
Areas (CSA) during the next fiscal year, Richard Ferreira said it
was the latest in long series of mismanagement, neglect, and
lies.

Mr. Ferreira, liaison to the county for CSA 35, said this latest
move to raise fees only adds credence to a potential class-action
lawsuit that numerous CSAs are contemplating against the county.

"Our attorney sent the county the letter notifying it of the suit
three or four months ago and they still have not responded,"
Ferreira told BenitoLink June 20.

The attorney letter was sent Feb. 23, 2018, asserting the county
was in breach of services, in that it "failed to maintain and
repair streets," as well as "failed to consistently attend to the
weed abatement on a regular basis."  The letter requested an
answer within 90 days, and that if there was no answer, ". . .
the Association is prepared to enforce its legal remedies and
will not hesitate to do so."

There are currently 31 active CSAs in the county.  A CSA is an
agreement between the county and a Homeowners' Association (HOA)
to provide certain county maintenance services that are paid for
by adding a percentage to the HOA members' property taxes.

Mr. Ferreira has been at odds with the county since 2009, trying
to get the local government to live up to its agreement with the
Union Heights HOA on the outskirts of Hollister.  As the
developer of the Union Heights subdivision, Ferreira was involved
in drafting the agreement to form CSA 35 in the mid-1990s and
knows what services are due to the CSA, and at what cost.

The agreement spells out that San Benito County pays PG&E utility
bills for two street lights out of the CSA's funds, and provides
storm drain services and improvements, mows weeds seasonally,
cleans inlets and outlets, removes trees, brush, trash, and
litter, and road maintenance, including a slurry seal every five
years.

Mr. Ferreira said everything ran smoothly while Claudette Frey
was the CSA coordinator for the county.  When Mr. Ferreira spoke
with BenitoLink, he was under the impression Frey was a full-time
coordinator.  But Frey told BenitoLink June 25 she worked in
accounting and filled in as a half-time coordinator. She said
there never has been a full-time coordinator.

According to county records Ferreira provided BenitoLink, he and
others from CSA 35 met on June 20, 2009 with Janelle Cox, then
the acting public works administrator, to discuss the services
and fees.  The agreement stated that budgets would be reviewed
and established annually and that the CSA would only be billed
for actual expenses.

In a June 26, 2009 email to the Union Heights HOA, Cox stated
that a CSA is a funding mechanism for services, and the county
would provide an estimated cost of the services each year. She
wrote that the county would be diligent in monitoring workers'
performance and expenditure tracking to ensure the work was
completed within budget.

The problem is, according to Ferreira and the records, except for
paying the PG&E bill and mowing weeds occasionally, the county
has done little to no work in CSA 35 since 2009, while paying
itself from the fund.

In one example, according to one of the county reports
Mr. Ferreira provided covering March 31, 2009 to Oct. 1, 2009,
the county public works department scheduled 86 hours of service.
However, only 9.5 hours of work were actually completed.  And the
county charged 12.5 hours for "subdivision research."
Mr. Ferreira said there's never been an explanation what that
means or why there is a need to hire a consultant to figure out
how to mow weeds or clean out storm drains.

Mr. Ferreira and Chuck Serafini, both former governing members of
the Union Heights HOA, spoke with BenitoLink on June 20 about
their concerns.

"As the developer, I set out what they were supposed to do,"
Mr. Ferreira said.  "They're supposed to do weed abatement and
they're supposed to go dig up, or rip, the retention ponds for
percolation.  They're supposed to do a slurry seal every five
years.  The last time they did a slurry seal was 2010."

Mr. Ferreira said the HOA originally discussed handling the
maintenance issues themselves.  However, Mr. Serafini said the
county enticed homeowners to form the CSA by promising their
single road could be combined with other CSA roads to get an
economy of scale for repairs.

The HOA met with Public Works in 2017 and asked for documents on
the status of CSA 35, Mr. Serafini said, though the county
continues to deduct charges every year and it is unclear how much
work was actually done.

Mr. Ferreira said he and Mr. Serafini met with Resource
Management Agency Director John Guertin, Supervisor Anthony
Botelho, and management analyst Louie Valdez (who has since left
the county payroll) on Sept. 15, 2017.

"First of all, they should fire Guertin because he can't do his
job and he lied," Mr. Ferreira said.  "When we talked about the
road, he said, 'We're too close to winter and we aren't going to
be able to get the roads done, but I guarantee we'll go out and
do the crack fill.' Nobody ever showed up."

He continued.

"To show you how ignorant these supervisors are, they have all
these public roads to take care of and if you take all the work
in the CSAs that's a big project," Mr. Ferreira said.  "You could
get a big crew, buy a lot of equipment to handle this project
because you know 50 percent of the work is guaranteed. And not
only is it guaranteed, it's fully funded.  The county has the
money and they're not utilizing it."

Mr. Ferreira said the latest feedback from the county came from
Supervisor Jerry Muenzer, who told him the county could not do
the road maintenance because Union Heights is a gated community.
This was the same rationale Mr. Muenzer used in telling the
Ridgemark HOA it could not use some of its $500,000 reserves for
road repairs.

The thing is, Mr. Ferreira and Mr. Serafini said, Union Heights
has always been a gated community and they wonder why they are
not receiving the same service they have been from the beginning
of the agreement.

Mr. Ferreira said every time he calls the county Resource
Management Agency about services, he's told they don't have
anyone to coordinate with the county service areas. He said he
has little sympathy for the county because he maintains the CSAs
are fully funded and there should be no issue in providing
services.

The two men's frustration in trying to work with a seemingly
endless number of part-time coordinators, department heads, and
supervisors was palpable.  Mr. Serafini said this is why they had
an attorney send the letter to the county.

Meanwhile, Mr. Ferreira and Mr. Serafini are waiting for someone
at the county to respond to them.

"The problem is no one has any common sense," Mr. Ferreira said.
"They're going to get into big trouble.  Unfortunately, if we get
in a big lawsuit with the county and they lose, who pays for it?
Theoretically, we're suing ourselves.  But we might have to do it
because we're trying to show these people they're wrong so we can
get it right before it comes to a lawsuit."

Mr. Ferreira and Mr. Serafini might have a champion for their
cause on the Board of Supervisors in the form of Supervisor Mark
Medina. During the June 25 special budget hearing at which each
line item of the proposed budget was brought up for discussion,
Medina quizzed RMA Director Guertin over fee increases for CSAs.

In particular, Medina wanted to know why the Dunneville-related
CSA 50 showed a large increase in fees.  He said he was told a
new CSA coordinator would be hired in a matter of months and each
CSA would have to pay a portion of that person's salary and
benefits, plus there was an estimated budget for future road
maintenance. Medina said the numbers made no sense and asked if
there is a percentage that each CSA pays.

"What you're seeing is there wasn't a CSA coordinator and we
weren't providing adequate services in the CSAs, so the actual
amount is lower than we were charging for work," Mr. Guertin
responded. "Now we're budgeting for work that's actually going to
be done because we have somebody to do it."

Medina asked Mr. Guertin what the percentage was that determines
how much each CSA pays.  Mr. Guertin said he did not know, to
which Medina responded, "We need to know."

Medina then pointed out the Dunneville CSA 50 will pay $4,200 for
its share of the future coordinator's salary and benefits.  Since
there are 31 active CSAs, he extrapolated the $4,200 by 31 for a
total of $130,200 that would be raised to pay a coordinator.

"You did not go to the CSAs and talk about this," Medina said.
"I have people calling me and asking where are these numbers
coming from."

Medina then asked Mr. Guertin why the line item concerning water
treatment for the Dunneville-related CSA 50 jumped to $39,903
from the historical amount of $21,000, an increase of $18,000.
The supervisor asked for justification for the increase, and
Mr. Guertin said he assumed it was for future work to be done.

"The problem you have is there's no communication to CSA 50,"
Medina said.  "We can't just charge these CSAs any amount we want
to.  That's what we're doing."

County Administrative Officer Ray Espinosa jumped in to explain.

"Just for clarity, this is a budget to perform work," Mr.
Espinosa said.  "We haven't charged anybody yet.  We're budgeting
so we can do the work."

Mr. Medina said he wasn't talking about road work, but salary and
benefits of $4,200, as well as supplies and labor for another
$6,300.  He still wanted to know where the numbers came from.
Mr. Guertin maintained the numbers were just an estimate of how
much work will be done.  Mr. Medina asked how the salary and
benefits were determined.  Mr. Guertin said he did not know and
that he was not familiar with that particular line item of CSA
50.

"We're taking dollars from their CSA property taxes and we're not
providing the service," Medina said.  "We're not even explaining
to them where these [expenses] are coming from."

"Just to correct you," Mr. Guertin interjected, "anything that's
charged to a CSA is for a service that was rendered to that CSA."

Medina returned to questioning how the $4,200 was being tracked.
Mr. Guertin didn't know, so Melinda Casillas, county management
analyst, took over.

"The CSA coordinator should be in place in the next couple of
months and they keep track of the work done in each CSA,"
Ms. Casillas said. "That gets allocated to each CSA just like on
the road crew."

Supervisor Jerry Muenzer said he wanted to make clear that it was
not true that San Benito County never had a CSA coordinator. He
said there has been an allocation for a half-time coordinator all
along.

"That's part of the reason, Supervisor Medina, you're feeling the
frustration, because that person did not have the time to
communicate what was going on with the individual CSAs and their
budgets," Mr. Muenzer said.  "I've tried to do that in the last
year or so to relay that information to some of my CSAs.  This is
why I lobbied for over a year to have a full-time CSA coordinator
that the CSAs are going to have to pay for so we can alleviate
this problem."

Mr. Guertin seemingly swept Mr. Muenzer's rationale aside and
said, "Communication was even worse due to the fact that that
half-time CSA coordinator position was not filled. So, the
functions of that half-time coordinator were being done by
different staff at different times and it was disjointed."

The RMA director reasoned that when the county administrative
officer or Supervisor Muenzer lent their support, their times
were not charged against the CSAs.

"Did anyone communicate this to the CSAs?" Medina asked.

"Not yet," Mr. Guertin responded.  "Communication with CSAs is
difficult."

"It's not difficult," Mr. Medina shot back. "If you're going to
take money from these people, you need to provide a service and
you're not doing that.  Now that we're going to have [a CSA
coordinator], we have to see results."

"That's the plan," Mr. Guertin said.

Calls to Mr. Guertin and county counsel Barbara Thompson after
the June 25 meeting concerning Ferreira's claims regarding the
lawsuit were not returned before publication. [GN]


SAN JOSE, CA: Wallace Appeals N.D. Calif. Ruling to Ninth Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Keith Hart, Mark Leeds and Darren Wallace filed an
appeal from a court ruling in their lawsuit entitled Darren
Wallace, et al. v. City of San Jose, Case No. 5:16-cv-04914-HRL,
in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the
Plaintiffs sue the City on behalf of a conditionally certified
collective class of certain firefighter employees, for alleged
wage/hour violations under the Fair Labor Standards Act and
California Labor Code.  The Plaintiffs' claims arise from two
types of overtime payments applicable to all class members: (1)
so-called "contractual" overtime, which has been described to the
court as pay (governed by a Memorandum of Agreement between the
City and its firefighter employees) for any hours an employee
works beyond his or her regularly scheduled shift hours; and (2)
FLSA overtime, which this court is told refers to pay for hours
an employee works beyond the maximum allowed by the applicable
FLSA threshold.

The appellate case is captioned as Darren Wallace, et al. v. City
of San Jose, Case No. 18-16083, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by July 11, 2018;

   -- Transcript is due on August 10, 2018;

   -- Appellants Keith Hart, Mark Leeds and Darren Wallace's
      opening brief is due on September 19, 2018;

   -- Appellee City of San Jose's answering brief is due on
      October 19, 2018; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants DARREN WALLACE, KEITH HART and MARK LEEDS,
and other employees similarly situated, are represented by:

          Carol Lynne Koenig, Esq.
          John A. McBride, Esq.
          Christopher E. Platten, Esq.
          WYLIE, MCBRIDE, PLATTEN & RENNER
          2125 Canoas Garden Avenue
          San Jose, CA 95125
          Telephone: (408) 979-2920
          Facsimile: (408) 979-2934
          E-mail: ckoenig@wmprlaw.com
                  jmcbride@wmprlaw.com
                  cplatten@wmprlaw.com

Defendant-Appellee CITY OF SAN JOSE is represented by:

          Matthew Wade Pritchard, Esq.
          Kathryn J. Zoglin, Esq.
          SAN JOSE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
          200 E. Santa Clara Street
          San Jose, CA 95113-1905
          Telephone: (408) 535-1205
          E-mail: Matthew.Pritchard@sanjoseca.gov
                  Katie.Zoglin@sanjoseca.gov




SI SE PUEDE: Cline Seeks to Recover Wages, OT Pay and Expenses
--------------------------------------------------------------
IRENE CLINE, LYNN CHO, DESIREE PACHECO, and ITZEL MARLENE DIAZ,
individually, on behalf of all other similarly situated persons,
on behalf of the CALIFORNIA LABOR AND WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
AGENCY, and on behalf of the STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. SI SE PUEDE
BEHAVIORAL, INC. a.k.a. SOCIALLY SIGNIFICANT PROGRAMMING FOR
BEHAVIORS, INC., a California corporation; FELICIA LOPEZ, an
individual; and DOES 1-20, Case No. RG18911378 (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Alameda Cty., July 2, 2018), seeks to recover alleged unpaid
wages, unpaid expenses, overtime and other premium wages,
liquidated and other damages, punitive damages, injunctive and
declaratory relief, penalties, interest, and attorneys' fees and
costs.

SSPBI is a California corporation with its main clinical office
in San Leandro, California.  In 2013, SSPBI informally changed
its name from Si Se Puede Behavioral, Inc., to Socially
Significant Programming for Behaviors, Inc., retaining the same
acronym.  Felicia Lopez is the owner and Executive Director of
SSPBI.  The Plaintiffs does not know the true names or capacities
of the Doe Defendants.

The Defendants are in the business of providing assistance to
young children, who are diagnosed with autism and related
developmental disabilities.  The Defendants' services include
one-on-one tutoring sessions based on Applied Behavior
Analysis.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Yosef Peretz, Esq.
          Shane Howarter, Esq.
          PERETZ & ASSOCIATES
          22 Battery Street, Suite 200
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 732-3777
          Facsimile: (415) 732-3791
          E-mail: yperetz@peretzlaw.com
                  showarter@peretzlaw.com

               - and -

          Martin M. Horowitz, Esq.
          Stephanie Rubinoff, Esq.
          HOROWITZ & RUBINOFF
          1440 Broadway, Suite 607
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone: (510) 444-7717
          E-mail: mhorowitz@h-rlegal.com
                  srubinoff@h-rlegal.com


SIBANYE GOLD: Rosen Law Firm Files Securities Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, on June 27
disclosed that it has filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of
purchasers of the securities of Sibanye Gold Limited (NYSE: SBGL)
from April 7, 2017 through June 26, 2018 (the "Class Period").
The lawsuit seeks to recover damages for Sibanye investors under
the federal securities laws.

To join the Sibanye class action, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1369.htmlor call Phillip Kim,
Esq. or Zachary Halper, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email
pkim@rosenlegal.com or zhalper@rosenlegal.com for information on
the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A
CLASS IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU
RETAIN ONE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO
NOTHING AT THIS POINT. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE.

According to the lawsuit, defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) Sibanye's culture
places short-term profits over safety; (2) consequently, almost
half of South Africa's 2018 mining fatalities occurred in Sibanye
mines; and (3) as a result, defendants' statements about
Sibanye's business, operations, and prospects were materially
false and misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis at all
relevant times. When the true details entered the market, the
lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed.  If you wish to
serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than
August 27, 2018.  A lead plaintiff is a representative party
acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation.  If you wish to join the litigation, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1369.htmlor to discuss your
rights or interests regarding this class action, please contact
Phillip Kim or Zachary Halper of Rosen Law Firm toll free at 866-
767-3653 or via email at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
zhalper@rosenlegal.com.

Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe,
concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. [GN]


STATE FARM: Little Rock Lawyer Continues Pursuit of Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
Max Brantley, writing for Arkansas Times, reports that Little
Rock lawyer Tom Thrash reports progress in his 18-year effort to
win damages for State Farm insurance policyholders who didn't get
top quality replacement parts when they made claims for vehicle
damage.

The latest is a federal judge's decision to open evidence
gathered for a trial of a RICO suit by plaintiffs represented by
Mr. Thrash and others saying State Farm engaged in corrupt
practices by funneling money to elect  Illinois Supreme Court
Chief Justice Lloyd Karmeier.  He voted in 2005 against Thrash's
plaintiffs in overturning a $1 billion judgment in a 2000 suit
against State Farm.  Justice Karmeier won the seat on the court
by defeating a lower court judge who had voted for the verdict
against State Farm.

After seeing the class action judgment overturned in 2005,
attorneys made several attempts to reinstate it, but failed.  In
2012, the racketeering suit was filed.  It alleges State Farm
found a way to secretly support Justice Karmeier's election and
thus defeat their lawsuit.  That suit goes to trial in September.
Until the recent federal court ruling, all the discovery
information had been protected.  State Farm said it would taint
the jury pool.  The plaintiffs want the information out.

Thrash filed the original suit in Little Rock, but the case moved
to Illinois.

The new case, Hale v. State Farm, is seen by Thrash as a prime
example of dark money influencing judicial races.  He believes
organizations such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce serve as
conduits for corporate money to influence court races, such as
the heavy corporate money spent two years ago and again this year
to defeat Arkansas Supreme Court Justice Courtney Goodson.

In Mr. Thrash's summary of the case, it says State Farm financed
the Illinois judge's run for the court and then misrepresented
its role in fighting to keep him on the case for his critical
vote to overturn the billion-dollar award.  He details almost $3
million in State Farm money allegedly routed through various
business organizations to benefit Justice Karmeier's election.
[GN]


SUNOCO PIPELINE: "March" Class Suit Removed to E.D. Pennsylvania
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Defendants removed on July 2, 2018, the lawsuit entitled MARY
MARCH and RUSSELL MARCH and JARED SAVITSKI, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated v. SUNOCO PIPELINE
L.P. a/k/a ENERGY TRANSFER PARTNERS L.P. and SUNOCO LOGISTICS
PARTNERS L.P., Case No. 001793, from the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:18-cv-02774-PD to
the proceeding.

The Defendants are engaged in the installation, maintenance, and
operation of an underground pipeline connecting gas drilling
operations in Western Pennsylvania with refining operations
located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  The Defendants employed
and continue to employ a process known as horizontal directional
drilling (HDD) to install the underground pipeline.

On March 15, 2018, the Plaintiffs commenced the putative class
action alleging that the Defendants' use of HDD caused
destruction of their properties, undermined the subjacent support
of their properties, and exposed them to harms and losses.

The Plaintiffs contend that "as a direct and proximate result of
the conduct of the Defendants, Plaintiffs and members of the
Class have suffered and continue to suffer a loss of quiet
enjoyment of their property and/or leaseholds," and further
contend that Plaintiffs and the members of the putative class
have suffered, or are likely to suffer in the future, physical
damage to their property and/or leaseholds, including the
following: (a) loss of the value of their investment in their
property; (b) loss of potential for future appreciation of their
home and land; (c) loss of past appreciation of the value of
their home and land; and (d) liability for the value of their
home's mortgage without a saleable property to secure and pay off
such mortgage.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Andrew T. Neuwirth, Esq.
          NEUWIRTH LAW OFFICE, LLC
          2200 Renaissance Blvd., Suite 270
          King of Prussia, PA 19406
          Telephone: (215) 259-3687
          Facsimile: (215) 253-5816
          E-mail: andrew@neuwirthlaw.com

               - and -

          Edward S. Robson, Esq.
          ROBSON & ROBSON, P.C.
          2200 Renaissance Boulevard, Suite 270
          King of Prussia, PA 19406
          Telephone: (610) 825-3009
          Facsimile: (610) 825-2620
          E-mail: erobson@robsonlaw.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Robert D. Fox, Esq.
          Neil S. Witkes, Esq.
          Nicole R. Moshang, Esq.
          Diana A. Silva, Esq.
          MANKO, GOLD, KATCHER & FOX, LLP
          401 City Avenue, Suite 901
          Bala Cynwyd, PA 19004
          Telephone: (484) 430-5700
          E-mail: rfox@mankogold.com
                  nwitkes@mankogold.com
                  nmoshang@mankogold.com
                  dsilva@mankogold.com


SYNCHRONY BANK: McMullen Seeks Prelim. Nod of Class Settlement
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit styled VALERIE McMULLEN,
individually and on behalf of others similarly situated v.
SYNCHRONY BANK, et al., Case No. 1:14-cv-01983-JEB (D.D.C.),
seeks:

   * preliminary approval of a class action settlement;
   * preliminary certification of class for settlement purposes;
   * appointment of class counsel;
   * approval of proposed class notice; and
   * schedule of final approval hearing.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=VsrmRuan

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Salvatore J. Zambri, Esq.
          Patrick M. Regan, Esq.
          Christopher J. Regan, Esq.
          REGAN ZAMBRI LONG
          1919 M Street, NW, Suite 350
          Washington, DC 20036
          Telephone: (202) 463-3030
          Facsimile: (202) 463-0667
          E-mail: szambri@reganfirm.com
                  pregan@reganfirm.com
                  cregan@reganfirm.com

               - and -

          Brendan J. Klaproth, Esq.
          Jesse C. Klaproth, Esq.
          KLAPROTH LAW PLLC
          406 5th Street NW, Suite 350
          Washington, DC 20001
          Telephone: (202) 618-2344
          Facsimile: (202) 618-4636
          E-mail: bklaproth@klaprothlaw.com
                  jklaproth@klaprothlaw.com

TIEC INC: "Spasic" Suit Seeks to Recover Overtime Under FLSA
------------------------------------------------------------
KARL SPASIC, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. TIEC, INC. and EDWARD DURANTE, Case No. 4:18-cv-02228
(S.D. Tex., June 29, 2018), seeks to recover overtime wages
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

TIEC, Inc., is a Texas corporation with its headquarters in
Harris County, Texas.  Edward Durante is the owner of TIEC.

The Defendants provide various inspection services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Clayton D. Craighead, Esq.
          THE CRAIGHEAD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          440 Louisiana, Suite 900
          Houston, TX 77002
          Telephone: (832) 798-1184
          Facsimile: (832) 553-7261
          E-mail: clayton.craighead@thetxlawfirm.com


TRINITY THRU: Fails to Pay Oil Field Workers' OT, Valenzuela Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Arcadio Valenzuela, individually and on behalf of all those
similarly situated v. Trinity Thru Tubing, LLC, Waymore Energy
Services, LLC, The Slickline Company, LLC, Kirk Yariger, Brian
Post and Wayman Winzel, Case No. 4:18-cv-02244 (S.D. Tex., July
1, 2018), alleges that the Defendants failed to pay the Plaintiff
and other hourly-paid oil field employees in accordance with the
Fair Labor Standards Act, including failure to pay proper
overtime.

Trinity is a Texas limited liability company.  Waymore is a Texas
limited liability company.  Strickline is a Texas limited
liability company.  The Individual Defendants are Texas
residents, who qualify as employers under the FLSA.

The Defendants provide operational services to the oil and gas
industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Chris R. Miltenberger, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF CHRIS R. MILTENBERGER, PLLC
          1340 N. White Chapel, Suite 100
          Southlake, TX 76092-4322
          Telephone: (817) 416-5060
          Facsimile: (817) 416-5062
          E-mail: chris@crmlawpractice.com


TRINITY RESTAURANT: Whitfield Moves to Certify Class of Servers
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit entitled MERCEDES WHITFIELD, on
behalf of herself and similarly situated employees v. TRINITY
RESTAURANT GROUP, LLC, Case No. 2:18-cv-10973-DML-EAS (E.D.
Mich.), moves for entry of an order conditionally certifying a
proposed class, pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act:

     All current and former Servers who worked for Trinity
     Restaurant Group, LLC at its IHOP restaurants at any time
     during the last three years.

Mercedes Whitfield also asks the Court to implement a procedure
whereby Court-authorized notice of the FLSA claim is sent to the
proposed class members.  The Plaintiff further asks the Court o
require the Defendant to identify all potential opt-in plaintiffs
by providing a list of all current and former Servers, who worked
for the Defendant at its IHOP restaurants at any time during the
last three years.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=WI5tWnAR

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jason S. Rathod, Esq.
          Nicholas A. Migliaccio, Esq.
          MIGLIACCIO & RATHOD LLP
          412 H St., NE, Suite 302
          Washington, DC 20002
          Telephone: (202) 470-3520
          Facsimile: (202) 800-2730
          E-mail: jrathod@classlawdc.com
                  nmigliaccio@classlawdc.com

               - and -

          Jesse L. Young, Esq.
          KREIS ENDERLE, P.C.
          8225 Moorsbridge
          P.O. Box. 4010
          Kalamazoo, MI 49003-4010
          Telephone: (269) 324-3000
          Facsimile: (269) 324-3010
          E-mail: jyoung@kehb.com

               - and -

          Peter Winebrake, Esq.
          R. Andrew Santillo, Esq.
          Mark J. Gottesfeld, Esq.
          WINEBRAKE & SANTILLO, LLC
          715 Twining Road, Suite 211
          Dresher, PA 19025
          Telephone: (215) 884-2491
          E-mail: pwinebrake@winebrakelaw.com
                  asantillo@winebrakelaw.com
                  mgottesfeld@winebrakelaw.com


TROTT LAW: Wins Preliminary Approval of "Martin" Class Settlement
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Honorable David M. Lawson grants the Plaintiffs' unopposed
motion to certify a settlement class and for preliminary approval
of the proposed settlement agreement and procedure for providing
class notice filed in the lawsuit captioned BRIAN J. MARTIN and
YAHMI NUNDLEY v. TROTT LAW, P.C. and DAVID A. TROTT, Case No.
2:15-cv-12838-DML-DRG (E.D. Mich.).

The proposed settlement agreement is preliminarily approved,
subject to objections by absent class members and except for the
determination of the attorney's fees and costs.

Pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, this settlement class is conditionally certified:

     All persons to whom Trott Law PC caused to be sent any
     version of the Trott PC Foreclosure Letter, as defined in
     the proposed settlement agreement, in connection with
     mortgages conveyed for residential real property located in
     Michigan, which was not returned as undelivered by the U.S.
     Post Office, dated from August 11, 2009, through June 29,
     2018.

The counsel of record for the Named Plaintiffs, namely attorneys
Andrew J. McGuinness, Esq., and Andrew N. Friedman, Esq., are
appointed as counsel for the designated settlement class.
Plaintiffs Brian J. Martin and Yahmi Nundley are appointed as the
class representatives.

Epiq Class Action & Claims Solutions, Inc. is approved as the
claims administrator for the settlement.  The Court further
approves the deposit of the settlement funds into an escrow
account to be held pending final disposition of all settlement
claims, or until further order of the Court.

On or before July 13, 2018, the Defendants shall provide notice
of this proposed class settlement to the appropriate state and
federal authorities.  The Defendants must file proof that they
have provided the required notice with the Court, in compliance
with the Class Action Fairness Act.

Judge Lawson directed the Plaintiffs' counsel or their designated
representative to cause notice of the proposed settlement to be
given to class members in this manner:

   (a) On or before July 13, 2018, a copy of the Notice of Class
       Action Settlement Agreement, substantially in the form
       attached as Exhibit 1-C of the Plaintiff's unopposed
       motion for preliminary approval of class settlement and
       notice, must be mailed by first-class mail, with postage
       prepaid, to each class member.  The class administrator
       shall ensure that the publication of internet
       advertisements and the creation of a claims website are
       accomplished by that same date; and

   (b) The notice to class members must explain that objections
       to, and requests to be excluded from, the class settlement
       must be filed with the Court and the parties' counsel on
       or before August 27, 2018.

The Plaintiffs' counsel shall file proof of mailing of the class
notice in conformity with this order on or before July 27, 2018.
The notice of class settlement must inform the absent class
members that Proofs of Claim and supporting documentation must be
submitted on or before August 27, 2018.

On September 6, 2018, the Plaintiffs' counsel must file a motion
for final approval of the settlement identifying absent class
members who opt out or object.  The Defendants' response, if the
motion is opposed, must be filed on or before September 13, 2018,
and the Plaintiffs' reply, if any, must be filed on or before
September 20, 2018.

A hearing shall be held on September 27, 2018, at 1:00 p.m., to
consider any objections to the settlement agreement and to
determine whether the settlement agreement should be finally
approved as having been negotiated in good faith and as being
fair, reasonable, and in the best interest of the class members.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=zyPAURvK

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Andrew J. McGuinness, Esq.
          122 S Main St., Suite 118
          P O Box 7711
          Ann Arbor, MI 48107
          Telephone: (734) 274-9374
          Facsimile: (734) 786-9935
          E-mail: drewmcg@topclasslaw.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Kathleen H. Klaus, Esq.
          MADDIN, HAUSER, ROTH & HELLER, P.C.
          28400 Northwestern Highway, 2nd Floor
          Southfield, MI 48034
          Telephone: (248) 359-7520
          Facsimile: (248) 359-7560
          E-mail: kklaus@maddinhauser.com

               - and -

          Bruce L. Segal, Esq.
          HONIGMAN MILLER SCHWARTZ AND COHN LLP
          38500 N. Woodward Avenue, Suite 100
          Bloomfield Hills, MI 48304
          Telephone: (248) 566-8482
          Facsimile: (248) 566-8483
          E-mail: bsegal@honigman.com


TWININGS: Sheppard Mullin Attorneys Discuss Class Action Ruling
---------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Guite, Esq. -- rguite@sheppardmullin.com -- and
Abby Meyer, Esq. -- ameyer@sheppardmullin.com -- of Sheppard
Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP, in an article for Lexology, wrote
that the ruling in Lanovaz v. Twinings N. Am., Inc., 2018 U.S.
App. LEXIS 15248 (9th Cir. June 6, 2018), settles what was
arguably an open issue among district courts within the Ninth
Circuit.  A plaintiff must have an intent to re-purchase a
product alleged to be falsely advertised in order to maintain an
action for injunctive relief.

Twinings' labels on its green, black, and white tea products
stated that the teas were a "Natural Source of Antioxidants".
Plaintiff Lanovaz asserted that the labels amounted to "nutrient
content claims," which are regulated by the FDA (the term
"antioxidant" is also subject to regulation).  The plaintiff
alleged that Twinings' labels did not satisfy FDA regulations,
and therefore were unlawful, misleading consumers.

Plaintiff sought injunctive relief under California's Unfair
Competition Law ("UCL"), False Advertising Law ("FAL"), and
Consumers Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA").  Twinings moved for
summary judgment, in part, because plaintiff testified that she
would not purchase a Twinings tea product again.

While the U.S. Supreme Court has long noted that Article III
standing for injunctive relief requires a showing of "real or
immediate threat that the plaintiff will be wronged again -- a
likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury,"
(City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983)), the
California Supreme Court subsequently ruled that a showing of
lost money or property was sufficient to establish statutory
standing to pursue injunctive relief under the UCL and FAL
(Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.4th 310, 336-337
(2011)).

Consequently, the district courts have split over what standard
to apply in these injunctive relief cases.  In October 2017, the
Ninth Circuit partially resolved this question, setting forth the
standard that courts should apply at the pleading stage. See
Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 873 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2017).
In reversing a motion to dismiss, the court ruled that a
previously deceived consumer may have standing to seek an
injunction against false advertising or labeling, even though the
consumer now knows or suspects that the advertising was false at
the time of the original purchase, because,

"Knowledge that the advertisement or label was false in the past
does not equate to knowledge that it will remain false in the
future.  In some cases, the threat of future harm may be the
consumer's plausible allegations that she will be unable to rely
on the product's advertising or labeling in the future, and so
will not purchase the product although she would like to. [. . .]
In other cases, the threat of future harm may be the consumer's
plausible allegations that she might purchase the product in the
future, despite the fact it was once marred by false advertising
or labeling, as she may reasonably, but incorrectly, assume the
product was improved."

Id., at 1115.

Consistent with Davidson, the district court in Lanovaz had
previously ruled that the plaintiff had standing to seek
injunctive relief. Lanovaz v. Twinings North Am., Inc., 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 119281 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2016).

On summary judgment, however, the Lanovaz court reconsidered the
issue: "numerous courts in this district have rejected the
precedents relied on by this court and reached the opposite
conclusion as to Article III standing where plaintiff does not
allege future intent to purchase the products." Id., *11-12
(citing cases).  Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment
because the undisputed evidence showed that plaintiff had no
intention to buy the product again.  Perhaps even more notably,
the Ninth Circuit affirmed this result, confirming that the
plaintiff must have evidence of intention to purchase a product
in the future to survive summary judgment when pursuing
injunctive relief in UCL, FAL, and CLRA actions. Lanovaz, 2018
U.S. App. LEXIS 15248.

Despite the Ninth Circuit's decision at the pleading stage in
Davidson, a plaintiff must have evidence of actual or imminent
injury to maintain UCL, FAL and CLRA claims.  As noted by the
Ninth Circuit, merely stating that plaintiff would "consider
buying" the offending product in the future will not suffice.
Id., *2-3. "[A] profession of an intent . . . is simply not
enough to satisfy Article III. A 'some day' intention -- without
any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any
specification of when the some day will be -- does not support a
finding of the 'actual or imminent' injury that Article III
requires." Id.  Absent such evidence, dismissal of UCL, FAL and
CLRA claims is appropriate at the summary judgment phase. [GN]


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Class Action Not Subject to Arbitration
----------------------------------------------------------
Tom Egan, writing for Lawyers Weekly, reports that a putative
class action alleging that a ride-sharing service violated G.L.c.
93A by knowingly imposing fictitious or inflated fees is not
subject to arbitration, the 1st U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has
ruled.  Defendant Uber Technologies moved to compel arbitration
under a provision in its online contract with the plaintiff
customers. [GN]


UNITED ASSOCIATION: Faces "Poe" Suit Alleging ERISA Violation
-------------------------------------------------------------
MICHAEL D. POE, RICKY R. HUGGINS, PATRICK SCHEXNIDER & all others
similarly situated (individually and on behalf of United
Association of Journeyman and Apprentices of the Plumbing and
Pipefitting Industry of the United States of America AFL-CIO
Local 198 Health and Welfare Plan) v. UNITED ASSOCIATION OF
JOURNEYMAN AND APPRENTICES OF THE PLUMPING AND PIPEFITTING
INDUSTRY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AFL-CIO LOCAL 198 HEALTH
AND WELFARE FUND, LOCAL 198 HEALTH AND WELFARE FUND BOARD OF
TRUSTEES, LOUIS L. ROBEIN III, MARIA C. CANGEMI, and ROBEIN,
URANN, SPENCER, PICARD & CANGEMI, APLC, Case No. 3:18-cv-00667-
SDD-RLB (M.D. La., July 2, 2018), alleges violations of Employee
Retirement Income Security Act and Louisiana contract law.

The lawsuit is brought over alleged breach of the terms of an
employee benefits plan for the purpose of compelling the
Defendants to reinstate the Health Reimbursement Accounts
promised, and for an accounting, recovery of damages, costs, and
attorney fees incurred as a consequence of their failure to do
so.  The Plaintiffs bring the lawsuit on behalf of those whose
HRAs the Defendants have wrongfully terminated and, thus,
withheld benefits due to them via previous employment
engagements.

United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing
and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada AFL-CIO,
Local 198, is a juridical person created and existing within the
state of Louisiana, with its principal corporate office in the
City of Baton Rouge.  Local 198 is also the sponsoring employer
and the administrator of the United Association of Journeymen and
Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the
United States and Canada AFL-CIO, Local 198 Health and Welfare
Trust Fund.  UA Local 198 Plan is a welfare benefit plan within
the meaning of ERISA.

Local 198 Health and Welfare Fund Board of Trustees is a
fiduciary and administrator within the meaning of ERISA with
respect to the UA Local 198 Plan.

Louis L. Robein, III, Esq., and Maria C. Cangemi, Esq., served as
counsel for Local 198.  Robein, Urann, Spencer, Picard & Cangemi,
APLC, is a professional limited liability company with its
principal place of business in Metairie, Louisiana.  Louis L.
Robein and Maria C. Cangemi served as partnering attorneys at
Robein Urann.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          James E. Sudduth, III, Esq.
          Kourtney L. Kech, Esq.
          SUDDUTH AND ASSOCIATES, LLC
          1109 Pithon St.
          Lake Charles, LA 70601
          Telephone: (337) 480-0101
          Facsimile: (337) 419-0507
          E-mail: james@saa.legal


UNITED STATES: ACLU Files Amended Complaint in Immigrants Case
--------------------------------------------------------------
Nathan Solis, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
parents separated from their children at the U.S.-Mexico border
were coerced by border officials into giving up their claims for
asylum and other legal protections with the promise that they
would see their children again sooner, the American Civil
Liberties Union alleged in a second amended complaint filed on
July 3 in federal court.

More than 2,000 kids have been separated from parents facing
illegal immigration charges and sent to states across the country
due to President Donald Trump's zero-tolerance immigration
policy.

The ACLU filed the class action in February, challenging the
government's separation of families seeking asylum and was
brought forth on behalf of Mrs. L, a Congolese mother and her 7-
year-old daughter who were separated thousands of miles for
months after crossing the U.S.-Mexico border in San Diego.

Now in their second amended complaint, the ACLU says U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement and U.S. Customs and Border
Protection agents use fear tactics to coerce parents with the
promise of being reunited with their children.

"The government is also using the trauma of separation to coerce
parents into giving up their asylum and protection claims in
order to be reunited with their children," according to the
complaint filed federal court.

Reunifying families is still up in the air as well, the ACLU
said.

In their complaint, the ACLU said the June 20, 2018 executive
order claimed family separations would end and the Department of
Homeland Security was directed to keep families together during
any pending "criminal improper entry or immigration proceedings."

But they allege the executive order does not contain plans for
reunifying the families who were separated before June 20 and
does not say how the federal government will return separated
children to their parents who have already been deported.

The DHS was ordered to separate families when it was necessary to
protect the child's welfare, but the executive order did not set
out how that standard would be applied, the ACLU said.

"In prior cases, the government has applied that standard in a
manner that is inconsistent with the child's best interest,
including in Ms. L's case," according to the lawsuit.

The civil rights organization is asking the court to stop the
federal government from deporting asylum seekers until they are
reunited with their children.

On June 26, U.S. District Judge Dana Sabraw in San Diego ordered
U.S. authorities to reunite families separated at the U.S. border
within 30 days.

A July 3 status conference is set to determine if the court will
need to implement and enforce the provisions of the June 26
order, including communication between federal agencies to track
separated families.


UNITED STATES: ICE Ordered to Halt Asylum Seeker Detention Policy
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Brad Kutner, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
during the first nine months of 2017, federal immigration
officials detained and held indefinitely every asylum seeker that
entered the US.

Prior to that, according to a class action suit that just won a
big victory in D.C. federal court, 90 percent of asylum seekers
were released while they navigated the complex legal process of
relocating to the United States to escape torture or persecution
in their home country.

These raw numbers helped convince U.S. District Judge James
Boasberg to issue an injunction on July 2, ordering an end to the
current detention policy and releasing several named plaintiff's
in a lawsuit seeking to permanently end the detention policy now
being enforced by Immigration and Custom Enforcement, the
Department of Homeland Security, and Attorney General Jeff
Sessions, despite longstanding federal policies encouraging the
release of asylum seekers.

"[This order] does no more than hold the Government accountable
to its own policy, which recently has been honored more in the
breach than the observance," Judge Boasberg wrote in a 38-page
opinion.

Asylum seekers have been making headlines as the Trump
administration works to roll back the number of foreign people
allowed in the country.

In this case, brought by a group of asylum seekers currently in
detention, one of which has been behind bars for over 18 months,
the plaintiffs claim the defendant federal agencies are ignoring
the "Parole Directive" order in ICE's own guidelines.

This agency directive gives power to the secretary of Homeland
Security to invoke parole authority "for individuals who are
'neither a security risk nor a risk of absconding,' and who meet
one or more of a series of conditions -- namely, 'for urgent
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit," Judge
Boasberg wrote.

The ACLU, which helped argue the case on behalf of the asylum
seekers, says the plaintiffs had all passed the "credible fear
screening" meaning they qualified for, and would likely be
granted, asylum and, in some cases, seekers were granted asylum
but still detained while the government appealed their request.

It's at this point that Judge Boasberg finds the biggest problems
with the government's current detention policy: these asylum
seekers have jumped through the required hurdles, and now the fed
should be paroling them in line with the agency's policies.

"They are not challenging the outcome of ICE's decisionmaking,
but the method by which, parole is currently being granted (or
denied)," he wrote, pointing to the Accardi doctrine, a 1954
Supreme Court decision which says agencies must follow their own
policies.  "They are correct. 'It has long been settled that a
federal agency must adhere firmly to self-adopted rules by which
the interests of others are to be regulated.'"

In a statement released by the ACLU shortly after the injunction
was issued, the group pointed to the named plaintiff,
Ansly Damus, as an example of someone who attempted to legally
seek asylum but was treated illegally and against the agency's
own policies.

"Damus committed no crime," wrote the ACLU.  "When he arrived in
the U.S., he presented himself to immigration authorities and
requested asylum.  He passed his credible fear interview and was
granted asylum by a judge . . . Despite that, he has remained
behind bars while the government appealed his grants of asylum."

"The Trump administration had put Damus behind bars indefinitely
alongside thousands of other asylum seekers like him," the
statement said.

Representatives of the agencies named as defendants in the class
action, including the Department of Homeland Security, did not
immediately respond to a request for comment.


US ENVIRONMENTAL: Formica Moves to Certify Class Under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit captioned BRENT FORMICA,
individually and on Behalf of all others similarly situated v. US
ENVIRONMENTAL, INC., Case No. 2:18-cv-00459-TJS (E.D. Pa.), moves
the Court to conditionally certify the matter as a collective
action under Fair Labor Standards Act, and to approve notice.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=w5IGYQku

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Scott E. Brady, Esq.
          Philip Bohrer, Esq.
          BOHRER BRADY, LLC
          8712 Jefferson Highway, Suite B
          Baton Rouge, LA 70809
          Telephone: (225) 925-5297
          Facsimile: (225) 231-7000
          E-mail: scott@bohrerbrady.com
                  phil@bohrerbrady.com

               - and -

          Kevin I. Lovitz, Esq.
          LOVITZ LAW FIRM
          One Liberty Place
          1650 Market Street, 36th Floor
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 735-1996
          Facsimile: (267) 319-7943
          E-mail: kevin@lovitzlaw.com


VIVINT SOLAR: Violates TCPA by Using ATDS, "Rogers" Suit Alleges
----------------------------------------------------------------
DARRELL ROGERS, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. VIVINT SOLAR, INC., a Delaware Corporation;
VIVINT SOLAR HOLDINGS, INC., a Delaware Corporation; and VIVINT
SOLAR DEVELOPER, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, Case
No. 1:18-cv-01567 (D.D.C., July 1, 2018), alleges that the
Defendants violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act by
using an automatic telephone dialing system, an artificial voice,
or a prerecorded voice when they called the Plaintiff and the
putative class members in order to promote their solar energy
business without obtaining prior express written consent.

Vivint Solar, Inc., is a Delaware corporation.  Vivint Solar,
Inc., offers distributed solar energy -- electricity generated by
a solar energy system installed at or near customers' locations -
- to residential customers.

Vivint Solar Holdings, Inc., is a Delaware corporation.  Vivint
Solar Holdings offers solar energy products to residential
customers.

Vivint Solar Developer, LLC, is a a Delaware Limited Liability
Company.  Vivint Solar Developer sells, services, and maintains
solar energy products and systems.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Shawn A. Heller, Esq.
          SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW COLLECTIVE, PL
          974 Howard Ave.
          Dunedin FL 34698
          Telephone: (202) 709-5744
          E-mail: shawn@sjlawcollective.com


VOLKSWAGEN GROUP: Court Narrows Claims in "Deras" Suit
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California granted in part and denied in part Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss the first amended complaint in the case captioned
ROSAURA DeRAS, Plaintiff, v. VOLKSWAGeN GROUP OF AMeRICA, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-05452-JST (N.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff Rosaura Deras alleges various claims against Defendant
Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. (VWGoA) based on her contention
that VW fails to warn consumers about the dangers of defective
sunroofs that might spontaneously shatter.

Deras seeks to recover on six claims for relief: (1) violation of
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA); (2) unjust enrichment; (3)
violation of California's unfair competition law (UCL); (4)
violation of the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA);
(5) violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act and (6)
fraud by omission. VW moves to dismiss all claims.

Implied Warranty Claims

VW moves to dismiss Deras's two implied warranty claims, under
the MMWA and the Song-Beverly Act, on grounds that they are
barred by the statute of limitations. Deras does not dispute that
both claims carry a four-year statute of limitations.  As VW
acknowledges, California Civil Code section 1795.5 creates an
implied warranty on the part of a distributor or retail seller of
used consumer goods.

Here, Deras may bring an implied warranty claim based on her
purchase of the vehicle not because VW was the manufacturer, but
because it sold her the vehicle.  There is no dispute that Deras
brought her claims within four years of purchasing the vehicle.
VW's motion to dismiss the implied warranty claims as time-barred
is therefore denied.

Unjust enrichment Claim

VW next argues that Deras's claim for unjust enrichment is
precluded by VW's new vehicle warranty. This Court agrees. In a
recent case alleging defective design of a Bluetooth system in
certain Acura vehicles, this Court dismissed the plaintiffs'
unjust enrichment claim because a quasi-contract action for
unjust enrichment does not lie where express binding agreements
exist and define the parties' rights.  Where, as here, Deras
alleges that a valid express contract covering the same subject
matter exists between the parties, an action in quasi-contract is
inappropriate. The unjust enrichment claim is dismissed with
prejudice.

UCL, CLRA, and Fraud by Omission Claims

VW moves to dismiss Deras's UCL, CLRA, and fraud by omission
claims based on failure to allege knowledge. It also argues that
the UCL and CLRA claims are improper claims for equitable relief
because Deras has an adequate legal remedy.

Knowledge

The parties do not dispute that the UCL, CLRA, and fraud by
omission claims require Deras to allege that VW had knowledge of
the alleged defect at the time of sale or lease.  Deras asserts
that she has alleged knowledge based on consumer complaints to
the NHTSA, internal monitoring, and prior sunroof recalls by
other vehicle manufacturers and by VW for vehicles not at issue
in this case. VW contends that these allegations are insufficient
to state a claim.

The Court agrees.

NHTSA Complaints

Deras alleges that the NHTSA received fifty-six complaints of
shattering sunroofs in Class Vehicles between December 14, 2009,
and April 11, 2017, a period of seven years and four months  and
that VW monitored NHTSA complaints.

Internal Monitoring

The Court next considers Deras's allegation that VW had an
internal monitoring system: "VW internally tracks information
regarding all sunroof failures through the collection of incident
reports and other information from drivers and dealers (through
VW's TReAD ACT eWR Reporting obligations), including complaints,
warranty claim, replacement parts data, dealings with insurance
companies, and other aggregated data sources. VW has exclusive
access to this information, including pre-release testing of
vehicle components, thus establishing that VW had knowledge very
early on about the defect."

This is insufficient to allege knowledge of a defect.

Prior Recalls

Deras alleges that VW is aware that other manufacturers 2012
whose vehicles have similarly designed panoramic sunroofs and
similar shattering problems 2012 have voluntarily initiated
safety recalls to notify drivers of the danger and repair
shattered sunroofs free of cost and that VW itself has recalled
similarly designed sunroofs with the exact same shattering
problem via a voluntary safety recall to notify drivers of the
danger and repair shattered sunroofs free of cost.

However, Deras alleges that sunroofs are made of glass that
attaches to tracks, which in turn are set within a frame attached
to the vehicle most sunroofs, including those offered by VW,
include a retractable sunshade and that the sunroofs in the Class
Vehicles all share a common design, and that common design is
defective, resulting in the sunroofs of the Class Vehicles
spontaneously shattering. Thus, Deras alleges that all of the
sunroofs at issue in this case share a similar design, and that
VW, Hyundai, and Audi have instituted prior recalls based on
similarly designed sunroofs. If true 2012 as the Court must
presume at this stage of the proceedings 2012 this would be some
evidence that VW knew of a design defect in the sunroofs of the
Class Vehicles.

Because Deras's other allegations regarding knowledge are
deficient, the Court dismisses the UCL, CLRA, and fraud by
omission claims with leave to amend.

The motion is denied as to the implied warranty claims and
granted in all other respects. The unjust enrichment claim is
dismissed with prejudice, but leave to amend is granted as to the
UCL, CLRA, and fraud by omission claims. Any amended complaint
must be filed within thirty days of the date of this order.
Failure to file a timely amended complaint will result in
dismissal of the dismissed claims with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 17, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y76ecw39 from Leagle.com.

Rosaura Deras, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiff, represented by Adam Morris Rose
-- adam@starrlaw.com -- The Law Office of Robert L. Starr, APC,
Matthew Anthony Giovannucci -- matthew@starrlaw.com -- The Law
Office Robert L. Starr, APC, Robert L. Starr --
robert@starrlaw.com -- The Law Office of Robert L. Starr, APC &
Stephen Massong Harris -- stephen@smh-legal.com -- The Law
Offices of Stephen M. Harris, APC.

Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Craig Lee Winterman  -- cwinterman@hrllp-law.com -- Herzfeld &
Rubin LLP, Gary Steven Yates -- gyates@hrllp-law.com -- Herzfeld
& Rubin LLP, Jeffrey Lance Chase -- JChase@herzfeld-rubin.com --
Herzfeld & Rufin, P.C., pro hac vice & Michael B. Gallub -
MGallub@herzfeld-rubin.com -- Herzfeld & Rubin, P.C., pro hac
vice.


WOLF FIRM: Manos Appeals C.D. Cal. Decision to Ninth Circuit
------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff John C. Manos filed an appeal from a court ruling in
his lawsuit styled JOHN MANOS, and on behalf of all similarly
situated individuals, AKA John C. Manos v. THE WOLF FIRM, A Law
Corporation; RCO LEGAL, P.S.; NORTHWEST TRUSTEE SERVICES, INC.;
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., for itself and as successor by merger
to Chase Home Finance, LLC Erroneously Sued As Chase Home
Finance-TX; WAMU ASSET ACCEPTANCE CORP; SELECT PORTFOLIO
SERVICING, INC.; CHASE HOME FINANCE-TX, Case No. 8:18-cv-00138-
JLS-JDE, in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California, Santa Ana.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the proposed
class action lawsuit was filed on January 24, 2018.

The Wolf Firm, A Law Corporation, is a full service law firm.
For over 25 years the Firm has provided a broad array of legal
and related services throughout California and nationally to
businesses in general and to members of certain specific industry
segments.

The appellate case is captioned as JOHN MANOS, and on behalf of
all similarly situated individuals, AKA John C. Manos v. THE WOLF
FIRM, A Law Corporation; RCO LEGAL, P.S.; NORTHWEST TRUSTEE
SERVICES, INC.; JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., for itself and as
successor by merger to Chase Home Finance, LLC Erroneously Sued
As Chase Home Finance-TX; WAMU ASSET ACCEPTANCE CORP; SELECT
PORTFOLIO SERVICING, INC.; CHASE HOME FINANCE-TX, Case No. 18-
55729, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- June 15, 2018 -- Mediation Questionnaire due.  If the
      registration for Appellate ECF is confirmed after this
      date, the Mediation Questionnaire is due within one day of
      receiving the e-mail from PACER confirming registration;

   -- July 9, 2018 -- Transcript shall be ordered;

   -- August 6, 2018 -- Transcript shall be filed by court
      reporter;

   -- September 17, 2018 -- Appellant's opening brief and
      excerpts of record shall be served and filed pursuant to
      FRAP 31 and 9th Cir. R. 31-2.1;

   -- October 15, 2018 -- Appellees' answering brief and excerpts
      of record shall be served and filed pursuant to FRAP 31 and
      9th Cir. R. 31-2.1; and

   -- The optional appellant's reply brief shall be filed and
      served within 21 days of service of the appellees' brief,
      pursuant to FRAP 31 and 9th Cir. R. 31-2.1.[BN]


YELLOW BIRD: "Pena" Suit Seeks to Recover OT Pay Under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------
MARTIN ALMONTE PENA, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated v. YELLOW BIRD AUTO CENTER, INC., and ANATOLY ABRAMOV,
Case No. 1:18-cv-03789 (E.D.N.Y., June 29, 2018), alleges that,
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Plaintiff is
entitled to recover from the Defendants: (a) unpaid overtime
compensation, (b) liquidated damages, (c) prejudgment and post-
judgment interest, and (d) attorneys' fees and costs.

Yellow Bird is a domestic business corporation organized under
the laws of the state of New York with a principal place of
business in Brooklyn, New York.  Anatoly Abramov is the owner,
President, and Chief Executive Officer of Yellow Bird, and is an
officer, director, manager, supervisor, and proprietor of Yellow
Bird.

The Defendants operate an auto repair business in Brooklyn, New
York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin Cilenti, Esq.
          Peter H. Cooper, Esq.
          CILENTI & COOPER PLLC
          708 Third A venue - 6th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 209-3933
          Facsimile: (212) 209-7102
          E-mail: jcilenti@jcpclaw.com
                  pcooper@jcpclaw.com


ZACHRY CONSTRUCTION: Faces Wage Class Action in Texas
-----------------------------------------------------
Kim Slowey, writing for Construction Dive, reports that the
plaintiffs in a wage violation lawsuit against Texas contractor
Zachry Construction Corp. and Odebrecht Construction on June 22
requested conditional class certification from the Houston
division of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Texas.  If granted, attorneys for the plaintiffs would be able to
notify current and former employees about the lawsuit and their
right to opt in.

Six individuals who worked for the companies on the SH 99 Grand
Parkway project in the Houston area first filed the lawsuit in
April, alleging that Zachry and Odebrecht intentionally did not
pay them overtime wage rates for work performed beyond 40 hours a
week and required them to record a maximum of eight hours worked
per day no matter how many hours they actually put in.  The
plaintiffs claim that the companies classified them as "working
foremen" and paid them a fixed rate even though their work
consisted of non-supervisory tasks like pouring concrete, driving
concrete tasks and operating other equipment.  When they were
paid for work beyond 40 hours per week, it was at the standard
"straight time" wage rate, the lawsuit alleges.

This is the third action alleging wage violations brought against
Zachry and Odebrecht as joint defendants.  Earlier suits were
filed in 2015 and 2016, according to available court records.
The 2016 case was dismissed so that the parties could resolve the
dispute in binding arbitration, and the 2015 case was dismissed
with prejudice after the parties agreed to a settlement.

Dive Insight:
Authorities are cracking down on companies who fail to pay
overtime and commit other acts of "wage theft."

Earlier in June, the Brooklyn (New York) District Attorney's
office announced that Brooklyn-based contractor The Urban Group
pleaded guilty to second-degree grand larceny for paying
immigrant workers far less than the required prevailing wage rate
for work performed at New York City schools.  The company falsely
certified to the city that it paid workers the correct amounts
but underpaid 21 workers by more than $303,000.  The company has
been debarred from performing public work in New York state as a
general contractor or subcontractor for five years and made full
restitution to the affected employees.

In May, the Manhattan DA's office charged city contractor
Parkside Construction for underpaying employees by $1.7 million
and underreporting $42 million in wages to the New York State
Insurance Fund to get out of paying $7.8 million in workers'
compensation insurance premiums it owed.  The plan left more than
500 employees without full compensation for the work they
performed. [GN]


* Justice Kennedy's Retirement Won't Move Class Action Pendulum
---------------------------------------------------------------
Perry Cooper, writing for Bloomberg BNA, reports that Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy may have been the U.S. Supreme Court's swing
vote on many important social and other issues, but his
retirement isn't likely move the pendulum on class actions.

Justice Kennedy, who announced his upcoming retirement on June
27, voted with the late Justice Antonin Scalia in Scalia's most
notable opinions limiting the class device: Wal-Mart Stores Inc.
v. Dukes, Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, and Am. Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Rest.

Class plaintiffs' advocate Jocelyn Larkin saw a glimmer of hope
after Scalia died in 2016: Kennedy authored a 6-2 pro-plaintiff
decision in Tyson Foods Inc. v. Bouaphakeo.  The ruling favored
pork processing plant workers and their use of statistical proof
to support class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.

Also in 2016, right before Scalia's death, Justice Kennedy voted
with the court's more liberal-leaning justices in Campbell-Ewald
Co. v. Gomez.  There, the court held defendants can no longer
defeat class actions by offering to pay off lead plaintiffs.

But those decisions didn't mark the beginning of a shift in
Justice Kennedy's class votes after all. As he'd done before
2016, he voted against class plaintiffs in subsequent cases.

"I'm chuckling now to myself that I even said that at the time,"
Larkin told Bloomberg Law as she reflected on Kennedy's class
action rulings June 27.  "He did vote with the liberals on those
two occasions."

Active Questioner

Prominent defense attorney John Beisner --
john.beisner@skadden.com -- told Bloomberg Law that Kennedy
"typically embraced the defendant viewpoint in his votes in major
class action-related precedents."

Justice Kennedy also joined the majority in a 1997 decision that
clamped down on the use of class actions for personal injury
claims, Mr. Beisner, partner at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &
Flom LLP in Washington, said.

"Although he was an active questioner in oral argument of some of
those cases, he very rarely authored majority opinions,
concurrences, or dissents that touched on class action issues,"
he said.

Status Quo

Plaintiffs' attorney Jason L. Lichtman told Bloomberg Law he
doesn't expect much of a change in the status quo on class
actions, at least in the short term.

"While I would be very surprised if the person were pro-consumer,
not all of the potential nominees are affirmatively dismissive of
consumer rights: Judges Hardiman and Pryor, for example, have at
least some pro-consumer opinions," Mr. Lichtman, partner at Lieff
Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP in New York, said.

He referred to Thomas M. Hardiman of the Third Circuit and
William H. Pryor Jr. of the Eleventh Circuit, two judges whom
some sources have speculated might be nominees for Justice
Kennedy's seat because they were shortlisted as Scalia's
replacement. [GN]







                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N  I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
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Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

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