CAR_Public/180607.mbx              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R


             Thursday, June 7, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 114



                            Headlines


101 MOBILITY: Faces "Burbon" Suit in S.D. New York
61 PA. STATUTE: Faces "Thompson" Suit in W.D. Pennsylvania
ACACIA COMMUNICATIONS: Amended Consolidated Complaint Filed
ADTALEM GLOBAL: Bid to Dismiss Third Amended Complaint Underway
ADTALEM GLOBAL: Court Dismisses Robinson-Brown Suit

ADTALEM GLOBAL: Faces "Versetto" Suit in Illinois
ADTALEM GLOBAL: Bid to Dismiss "Petrizzo" Suit Granted
AMAZING LASH: Faces "Burbon" Suit in S.D. New York
AMERIGAS PROPANE: $800K "Jarrell" Settlement Has Final Approval
APPLE INC: Class Certification in iPhone 6 Suit Denied

APPLE INC: Hit With Class Suit Over Switch Keyboard Failures
AT&T INC: Appeal in DirectTV's NFL Ticket Package Suit Underway
ATLANTA, GA: Faces "Lawson" Suit in N.D. Georgia
AVANGRID INC: Bid to Dismiss LDC Gas Transportation Suit Underway
BANK OF HAWAII: Wins Partial Summary Judgment in "Smith"

BANNER HEALTH: Ariz. App. Affirms Injunction in "Ansley" Suit
BENNY'S BURRITOS: Court Approves "Tapia" Settlement
BERNARDAUD NA: Faces "Olsen" Suit in S.D. New York
BLACKROCK INC: Faces "Burbon" Suit in S.D. New York
BLUE APRON: IPO-Related Class Suit Underway

BROOME COUNTY, NY: Court Certifies Class of Juvenile Inmates
CALIBER HOME: Eleventh Circuit Appeal Filed in "Hunt" Class Suit
CANADA: Judge Approves $800MM Sixties Scoop Settlement Offer
CEMEX SAB: Glancy Prongay Files Securities Class Action
CEMEX SAB: Pawar Law Group Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit

CEMEX SAB: Rosen Law Firm Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
CIGNA CORP: Continues to Defend "Amara" Pension Plan Suit
CIGNA CORP: Continues to Defend "Franco" Suit
COLORADO: Denial of "Sutton" Class Certification Recommended
COMPLETE BUILDING: Faces FCCI Insurance Suit in D. South Carolina

CONSOL ENERGY: Pennsylvania Coal Named as Defendant in "Casey"
CORECIVIC INC: Court Won't Consolidate "Gonzalez" and "Owino"
CVS PHARMACY: Zimmerman Law Compelled to Produce Docs in "Worth"
DHL EXPRESS: Faces "Burbon" Suit in S.D. New York
DICK'S SPORTING: To Provide Social Security Nos. in "Greer"

DOONEY & BOURKE: Faces "Conner" Suit in S.D. New York
DWWNVJHF LLC: Court Approves Stipulation Dismissing "Christy"
EDWARD D. JONES: Faces "Burbon" Suit in S.D. New York
EMERSON ELECTRIC: Ct. Issues Oral Argument Questions in "Creech"
EQT PRODUCTION: Faces "Starkey" Suit in N.D. West Virginia

FACEBOOK INC: Wins Summary Judgment in "Gullen" Suit
FACEBOOK INC: B.C. Court Clears Way for "Douez" Class Action
FACEBOOK INC: Judge OKs Class Notice Plan in Privacy Suit
FERRAGAMO USA: Faces "Fischler" Suit in S.D. New York
FIRST PENN-PACIFIC: "Iwanski" Suit Underway in E.D. Pa.

FLINT, MI: LAD's Bid to Dismiss Partly Denied
FLOORCOVERINGS INT'L: Faces "Burbon" Suit in S.D. New York
FLORIDA: Court Dismisses "Vargas" Suit
GENERAL REVENUE: Faces "Shakarova" Suit in E.D. New York
GEORGIA: Magistrate Recommends Dismissal of "Martinez" Suit

GERARD ROOF: Faces "Dios" Suit in C.D. California
GRIDSUM HOLDING: Klein Law Firm Files Securities Class Action
HAIN CELESTIAL: Claims in "Davis" Product Liability Suit Narrowed
HARDINGE INC: Merger-Related Suits Filed in New York
HCP INC: Bid to Dismiss Boynton Beach Firefighters' Suit Underway

HIGHGATE HOTELS: Faces "Olsen" Suit in S.D. New York
HOMETEAM INSPECTION: Faces "Burbon" Suit in S.D. New York
INNERWORKINGS INC: Bronstein Gewirtz Files Securities Class Suit
INNERWORKINGS INC: Gainey McKenna Files Securities Action Lawsuit
INNERWORKINGS INC: Pomerantz Law Firm Files Securities Class Suit

INNERWORKINGS INC: Bernstein Liebhard Files Securities Fraud Suit
INT'L COFFEE: Demurrer Ruling in Second Amended "Davis" Affirmed
INTEL CORP: "East" Stayed Pending Transfer Ruling in MDL 2828
JAGUAR LAND: Court Denies Prelim Approval of "Majdipour" Deal
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Court Issues Protective Order in "Elkies"

KIKOUSA INC: Faces "Burbon" Suit in S.D. New York
KITCHENAID: Faces "Bodley" Suit in W.D. Michigan
KOBE STEEL: Wolf Popper to Lead in Securities Suit
KOHL'S DEPARTMENT: "Waters" Remanded to Calif. State Court
KULICKE & SOFFA: Kaskela Law Files Securities Class Suit

KULICKE AND SOFFA: Rosen Law Firm Files Class Action Lawsuit
LEGETT & PLATT: Court Certifies 2 Subclasses in "Morales"
LINCOLN NATIONAL: Continues to Defend 2017 COI Rate Litigation
LIVANOVA PLC: Asks 3rd Cir. to Flip Class Certification Order
LYFT: Faces Another Class Action Lawsuit Over Driver Pay

MATSU FUSION: Faces "Zhao" Suit in S.D. New York
MDL 2323: Court Awards $112MM in Attorney's Fees, Costs
MESSERLI & KRAMER: Court Allows Filing of FAC in "Jenkins"
MULTICARE HEALTH SYSTEM: Faces Lawsuit Over Hepatitis C Outbreak
NEW MEXICO: Special Master's Report in "Hatten-Gonzalez" Modified

NEW YORK: "Krooks" Suit Brought Before New York Supreme Court
NORMANDINS: Court Grants Final Approval of "Brinker" Settlement
NWAN INC: Court Dismisses "Dickerson" MMWA" Suit
OASIS DAY: Faces "Burbon" Suit in S.D. New York
OWENS CORNING: Denial of "Gonzalez" Class Certification Affirmed

PDC ENERGY: Amended Complaint Filed in "Dufresne" Case
PHILADELPHIA, PA: Denial of Petition for Contempt Vacated
PHILIPPE NORTH: Settlement in "Sandoval" Suit Has Prelim Approval
PHILLIPS & COHEN: Faces "Maschi" Suit in E.D. New York
PHOENIX CLOSURES: "Sutherlin" FLSA Suit Remains in S.D. Ind.

PLANTAIN PRODUCTS: Faces "Pottish" Suit in C.D. California
PRE-EMPLOYMENT INC: Faces "Griffin" Suit in M.D. Florida
PROGRESS RESIDENTIAL: Ct. Conditionally Certifies "Freeman" Class
PURE BARRE: Faces "Burbon" Suit in S.D. New York
RESTORATION 1: Faces "Burbon" Suit in S.D. New York

RETAIL FOOD: Phi Finney Joins Trio of Firms Probing Class Suits
ROSCON PROPERTY: Cladding Class Action Builds Numbers for Case
ROYAL ADMINISTRATION: Summary Judgment in "Jones" Affirmed
SAFEMARK SYSTEMS: Court Denies Class Certification in TCPA Suit
SAKS AND LORD: Faces Customer Data Breach Class Action

SAREPTA THERAPEUTICS: Dismissal of FAC in "Kader" Affirmed
SCRUB INC: Another Class Action Suit Filed Under Biometrics Law
SELIP & STYLIANOU: Faces "Millard" Suit in W.D. New York
SENTRY CREDIT: Court Dismisses FAC in "Garretson" FDCA Suit
SHAMROCK FOODS: Settlement in "Chavez" Has Final Approval

SLEEP NUMBER: "Spade" Class Action Still Ongoing
SPA CASTLE: Faces "Burbon" Suit in S.D. New York
SPERIAN ENERGY: Faces "Corsale" Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania
ST. ELIZABETH MEDICAL: Court Dismisses Counterclaim in "Boden"
SYMANTEC CORP: Johnson Fistel Investigates Potential Claims

TACOMA SCREW: Settlement in "Viesse" FCRA Suit Has Final Approval
TRINITY LOGISTICS: Dismissal of Individual Claims Recommended
U-HAUL CO.: Faces "Newman" Suit in S.D. New York
UBS SECURITIES: Faces "Burbon" Suit in S.D. New York
UNIT CORP: Class Certification Bid Pending in Panola ISD Case

UNIT CORP: Continues to Defend Cockerell Oil Properties' Suit
UNIT CORP: Chieftain Suit over Natural Gas Royalties Pending
UNITED STATES: Dismissal of "Lyons" Recommended
UNITED STATES: Seeks Ninth Circuit Review of Ruling in "Wagafe"
UNITED STATES: Fourth Circuit Appeal Filed in "Diaz" Class Suit

UNITED STATES: Dismissal of "Donelson" NEPA Suit Affirmed
UTAH: Drug Safe Utah Files Class Action v. Leut. Gov.
VEP HEALTHCARE: Settlement in "Hunt" FLSA Suit Has Final Approval
VINCE LLC: Faces "Fischler" Suit in S.D. New York
VISALUS INC: Court Narrows Claims in "Byrd" Securities Fraud Suit

WELLS FARGO: Faces "Leramo" Suit in California Superior Court
WERNER ENTERPRISES: $500,000 Awarded for Attorney's Fees
WOODHOUSE SPAS: Faces "Burbon" Suit in S.D. New York
XEROX STATE: "Kendrick" Suit Remanded to Calif. State Court
YRC WORLDWIDE: Faces "Burbon" Suit in S.D. New York






                            *********


101 MOBILITY: Faces "Burbon" Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against 101 Mobility, LLC.
The case is styled as Luc Burbon, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. 101 Mobility, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-04779 (S.D. N.Y., May 30, 2018).

101 Mobility sells, installs, and services stairlifts, platform
lifts, stair lifts, wheelchair ramps, patient lifts, and offers
free home assessments.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


61 PA. STATUTE: Faces "Thompson" Suit in W.D. Pennsylvania
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against 61 PA. STATUTE
SECTION 331.21 (1941). The case is styled as William G. Thompson
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. 61 PA. STATUTE
SECTION 331.21 (1941), Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-00687-MPK
(W.D. Penn, May 24, 2018).

61 PA. STATUTE SECTION 331.21 (1941) is a statute of
Pennsylvania.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


ACACIA COMMUNICATIONS: Amended Consolidated Complaint Filed
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Tharp v. Acacia Communications, Inc. et al., Case
No. 1:17-cv-11504 (D. Mass., August 14, 2017), an Amended
Complaint Consolidated Amended Verified Shareholder Derivative
Complaint was filed May 30, 2018, against defendants Mehrdad
Givehchi, Acacia Communications, Inc., Christian Rasmussen,
Bhupendra C. Shah, Vincent T. Roche, Benny P. Mikkelsen, John
Ritchie, Eric A. Swanson, Murugesan Shanmugaraj, Stan J. Reiss,
Peter Y. Chung, John F. Gavin, Francis J. Murphy, filed by
plaintiffs Karen Colgan, Sarah Farah-Franco, Russell Gourley.

Acacia Communications, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended March 31, 2018, that in August and September 2017,
three purported securities class action complaints were filed in
the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts against the Company and certain of its executive
officers (Murugesan Shanmugaraj and John Gavin).

The complaints are captioned Tharp v. Acacia Communications,
Inc., et al., Case No. 1:17-cv-11504 (D. Mass.), filed August 14,
2017; Zhang v. Acacia Communications, Inc., et al., Case No.
1:17-cv-11518 (D. Mass.), filed August 16, 2017; and Kebler v.
Acacia Communications, Inc., et al., Case No. 1:17-cv-11695 (D.
Mass.), filed September 7, 2017. Each complaint purports to be
brought on behalf of an alleged class of those who purchased the
Company's securities between August 11, 2016 and July 13, 2017,
and alleges that the defendants violated Sections 10(b) and/or
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder by making allegedly false and/or
misleading statements regarding, among other matters, demand for
the Company's products, the Company's financial guidance, and/or
the Company's quality control process as it relates to the
Quality Issue. Each complaint seeks, among other relief,
unspecified compensatory damages, attorneys' fees, and costs.

On October 13, 2017, a fourth purported securities class action
complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts against the Company, certain of its
directors and executive officers (Murugesan Shanmugaraj, John
Gavin, Francis Murphy, Eric Swanson, Peter Chung, Benny
Mikkelsen, Stan Reiss, John Ritchie, Vincent Roche, Mehrdad
Givehchi, John LoMedico, Bhupendra Shah and Christian Rasmussen),
certain persons or entities that sold the Company's common stock
in the Company's October 2016 follow-on public offering, and the
underwriters of such offering, captioned Rollhaus v. Acacia
Communications, Inc., et al., Case No. 17-cv-11988 (D. Mass).

The complaint purports to be brought on behalf of an alleged
class of those who purchased the Company's common stock pursuant
to or traceable to the follow-on offering, and alleges that the
defendants violated Sections 11, 12(a)(2) and/or 15 of the
Securities Act of 1933 by making allegedly false and/or
misleading statements regarding, among other matters, demand for
the Company's products, the Company's financial guidance, and/or
the Company's quality control process as it relates to the
Quality Issue. The complaint seeks, among other relief,
unspecified compensatory damages, rescission, attorneys' fees,
and costs.

On November 7, 2017, the court consolidated these four securities
class actions (under docket number 1:17-cv-11504). On November 9,
2017, the court appointed lead plaintiffs for the consolidated
action. Lead plaintiffs filed a consolidated amended class action
complaint on January 8, 2018.

The amended complaint makes allegations similar to those in the
original four complaints, against the same defendants, and
alleges that some or all of the defendants violated Sections 11,
12(a)(2) and/or 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 and Sections
10(b) and/or 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.

All defendants filed motions to dismiss the consolidated amended
complaint on February 9, 2018. The court held a hearing on the
motions to dismiss on March 29, 2018, afforded the plaintiffs an
additional 30 days to file a motion for leave to file a further
amended complaint, and took the motions to dismiss under
advisement.

On April 30, 2018, plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to amend
the complaint. The proposed amended complaint makes allegations
similar to those in the consolidated amended complaint, asserts
claims against the Company, certain of its directors and
executive officers (Murugesan Shanmugaraj, John Gavin, Francis
Murphy, Eric Swanson, Peter Chung, Benny Mikkelsen, Stan Reiss,
John Ritchie and Vincent Roche), certain entities that sold the
Company's common stock in its October 2016 follow-on public
offering, and the underwriters of such offering, and alleges that
some or all of the defendants violated Sections 11, 12(a)(2)
and/or 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 and Sections 10(b) and/or
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder.

Defendants' responses to plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend
were due on May 14, 2018.

Acacia Communications, Inc. develops, manufactures, and sells
high-speed coherent optical interconnect products in the
Americas, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and the Asia Pacific
region. The company is based in Maynard, Massachusetts.


ADTALEM GLOBAL: Bid to Dismiss Third Amended Complaint Underway
---------------------------------------------------------------
Adtalem Global Education Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended March 31, 2018, that the Adtalem parties have moved
to dismiss the third amended complaint in a securities class
action lawsuit.

On May 13, 2016, a putative class action lawsuit was filed by the
Pension Trust Fund for Operating Engineers, individually and on
behalf of others similarly situated, against Adtalem, Daniel
Hamburger, Richard M. Gunst, and Timothy J. Wiggins in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The
complaint was filed on behalf of a putative class of persons who
purchased Adtalem common stock between February 4, 2011 and
January 27, 2016.

The complaint cites the ED January 2016 Notice and a civil
complaint (the "FTC lawsuit") filed by the U.S. Federal Trade
Commission on January 27, 2016 against Adtalem, DeVry University,
Inc., and DeVry/New York Inc. (collectively, the "Adtalem
Parties"), which was resolved with the FTC in 2017, that alleged
that certain of DeVry University's advertising claims were false
or misleading or unsubstantiated at the time they were made in
violation of Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as
the basis for claims that defendants made false or misleading
statements regarding DeVry University's graduate employment rate
and the earnings of DeVry University graduates relative to the
graduates of other universities and colleges.

As a result of these alleged false or misleading statements, the
plaintiff alleged that defendants overstated Adtalem's growth,
revenue and earnings potential and made false or misleading
statements about Adtalem's business, operations and prospects.
The plaintiff alleged direct liability against all defendants for
violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act
and asserted liability against the individual defendants pursuant
to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. The plaintiff sought
monetary damages, interest, attorneys' fees, costs and other
unspecified relief.

On July 13, 2016, the Utah Retirement System ("URS") moved for
appointment as lead plaintiff and approval of its selection of
counsel, which was not opposed by the Pension Trust Fund for
Operating Engineers and URS was appointed as lead plaintiff on
August 24, 2016. URS filed a second amended complaint ("SAC") on
December 23, 2016. The SAC sought to represent a putative class
of persons who purchased Adtalem common stock between August 26,
2011 and January 27, 2016 and names an additional individual
defendant, Patrick J. Unzicker. Like the original complaint, the
SAC asserted claims against all defendants for alleged violations
of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act and asserted
liability against the individual defendants pursuant to Section
20(a) of the Exchange Act for alleged material misstatements or
omissions regarding DeVry University graduate outcomes.

On January 27, 2017, defendants moved to dismiss the SAC, which
was granted on December 6, 2017 without prejudice. The plaintiffs
filed a Third Amended Complaint ("TAC") on January 29, 2018. The
Adtalem parties moved to dismiss the TAC on March 30, 2018.

Adtalem Global Education Inc. owns and manages higher education
institution. The Institution offers undergraduate and graduate
programs in healthcare, law, business management, engineering and
technology, sciences, liberal and media arts, and nursing.
Adtalem Global Education serves students worldwide. The company
is based in Chicago, Illinois.


ADTALEM GLOBAL: Court Dismisses Robinson-Brown Suit
---------------------------------------------------
Adtalem Global Education Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended March 31, 2018, that the plaintiffs did not file an
amended complaint and the court entered an order dismissing the
lawsuit by T'Lani Robinson and Robby Brown without prejudice.

On or about June 21, 2016, T'Lani Robinson and Robby Brown filed
an arbitration demand with the American Arbitration Association
in Chicago, seeking to represent a putative class of students who
received a DeVry University education from January 1, 2008 until
April 8, 2016 (the "Putative Class Period").

Following Adtalem's filing of a declaratory judgment action in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois seeking, among other things, an order declaring that
federal court is the appropriate venue for this putative class
action, on September 12, 2016, Robinson and Brown voluntarily
withdrew their demand for arbitration. On September 20, 2016,
Robinson and Brown answered the declaratory judgement action and
filed a putative class action counterclaim, individually and on
behalf of others similarly situated, against Adtalem Inc., DeVry
University, Inc., and DeVry/New York, Inc. in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.

The counterclaim asserted causes of action for breach of
contract, misrepresentation, concealment, negligence, violations
of the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, the
Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and
the Illinois Private Business and Vocational Schools Act,
conversion, unjust enrichment, and declaratory relief. The
plaintiffs sought monetary, declaratory, injunctive, and other
unspecified relief.

On November 4, 2016, following a stipulated dismissal of the
declaratory action, the Adtalem Parties moved to dismiss the
counterclaim after which plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew it. On
December 2, 2016, Robinson and Brown filed an amended complaint
adding two additional named plaintiffs. The amended complaint
purports to assert nationwide class claims under the above-
referenced Illinois statutes and common law theories on behalf of
those who, during the Putative Class Period, (i) enrolled in
DeVry University; (ii) financed their education with DeVry
University with direct loans administered by ED; or (iii) entered
into an enrollment agreement with DeVry University and otherwise
paid for a DeVry University education.

The amended complaint also seeks to represent a fourth class of
individuals residing in, or enrolled in a DeVry University campus
located in, California during the Putative Class Period bringing
claims under the California Business and Profession Code. In
addition to the claims previously asserted as described above,
the amended complaint adds a claim for breach of fiduciary duty
owed students in administering Title IV funds.

A motion to dismiss the amended complaint was filed by the
Adtalem Parties and granted by the Court, without prejudice, on
February 12, 2018. The Court granted plaintiffs leave to file an
amended complaint by April 12, 2018. The plaintiffs did not file
an amended complaint by such date and the court entered an order
on April 13, 2018 dismissing the case without prejudice.

Adtalem Global Education Inc. owns and manages higher education
institution. The Institution offers undergraduate and graduate
programs in healthcare, law, business management, engineering and
technology, sciences, liberal and media arts, and nursing.
Adtalem Global Education serves students worldwide. The company
is based in Chicago, Illinois.


ADTALEM GLOBAL: Faces "Versetto" Suit in Illinois
-------------------------------------------------
Adtalem Global Education Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended March 31, 2018, that the company is defending
against a putative class action suit filed by Nicole Versetto in
the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, Chancery Division.

On April 13, 2018, a putative class action lawsuit was filed by
Nicole Versetto, individually and on behalf of other similarly
situated, against Adtalem and DeVry University, Inc. in the
Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, Chancery Division. The
complaint was filed on behalf of herself and three separate
classes of similarly situated individuals who were citizens of
the State of Illinois who purchased or paid for a DeVry
University program between January 1, 2008 and April 8, 2016.

The plaintiffs claim that defendants made false or misleading
statements regarding DeVry University's graduate employment rate
and asserts causes of action under the Illinois Uniform Deceptive
Trade Practices Act, Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Trade
Practices Act, and Illinois Private Business and Vocational
Schools Act, and claims of breach of contract, fraudulent
misrepresentation, concealment, negligence, breach of fiduciary
duty, conversion, unjust enrichment, and declaratory relief as to
violations of state law. The plaintiffs seek compensatory,
exemplary, punitive, treble, and statutory penalties and damages,
including pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, in addition to
restitution, declaratory and injunctive relief, and attorneys'
fees.

Adtalem Global Education Inc. owns and manages higher education
institution. The Institution offers undergraduate and graduate
programs in healthcare, law, business management, engineering and
technology, sciences, liberal and media arts, and nursing.
Adtalem Global Education serves students worldwide. The company
is based in Chicago, Illinois.


ADTALEM GLOBAL: Bid to Dismiss "Petrizzo" Suit Granted
------------------------------------------------------
Adtalem Global Education Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended March 31, 2018, that the Petrizzo case has been
dismissed without prejudice.

On October 14, 2016, a putative class action lawsuit was filed by
Debbie Petrizzo and five other former DeVry University students,
individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, against
the Adtalem Parties in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois (the "Petrizzo Case"). The
complaint was filed on behalf of a putative class of persons
consisting of those who enrolled in and/or attended classes at
DeVry University from at least 2002 through the present and who
were unable to find employment within their chosen field of study
within six months of graduation. Citing the FTC lawsuit, the
plaintiffs claimed that defendants made false or misleading
statements regarding DeVry University's graduate employment rate
and asserted claims for unjust enrichment and violations of six
different states' consumer fraud, unlawful trade practices, and
consumer protection laws. The plaintiffs seek monetary,
declaratory, injunctive, and other unspecified relief.

On October 28, 2016, a putative class action lawsuit was filed by
Jairo Jara and eleven others, individually and on behalf of
others similarly situated, against the Adtalem Parties in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois (the "Jara Case"). The individual plaintiffs claim to
have graduated from DeVry University in 2001 or later and sought
to proceed on behalf of a putative class of persons consisting of
those who obtained a degree from DeVry University and who were
unable to find employment within their chosen field of study
within six months of graduation.

Citing the FTC lawsuit, the plaintiffs claimed that defendants
made false or misleading statements regarding DeVry University's
graduate employment rate and asserted claims for unjust
enrichment and violations of ten different states' consumer
fraud, unlawful trade practices, and consumer protection laws.
The plaintiffs seek monetary, declaratory, injunctive, and other
unspecified relief.

By Order dated November 28, 2016, the district court ordered the
Petrizzo and Jara Cases be consolidated under the Petrizzo
caption for all further purposes. On December 5, 2016, plaintiffs
filed an amended consolidated complaint on behalf of 38
individual plaintiffs and others similarly situated. The amended
consolidated complaint seeks to bring claims on behalf of the
named individuals and a putative nationwide class of individuals
for unjust enrichment and alleged violations of the Illinois
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act and the Illinois
Private Businesses and Vocational Schools Act of 2012.

In addition, it purports to assert causes of action on behalf of
certain of the named individuals and 15 individual state-specific
putative classes for alleged violations of 15 different states'
consumer fraud, unlawful trade practices, and consumer protection
laws. Finally, it seeks to bring individual claims under Georgia
state law on behalf of certain named plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs seek monetary, declaratory, injunctive, and other
unspecified relief. A motion to dismiss the amended complaint was
filed by the Adtalem Parties and granted by the Court, without
prejudice, on February 12, 2018. Because the case was dismissed
without prejudice, the plaintiffs can re-file the action.

Adtalem Global Education Inc. owns and manages higher education
institution. The Institution offers undergraduate and graduate
programs in healthcare, law, business management, engineering and
technology, sciences, liberal and media arts, and nursing.
Adtalem Global Education serves students worldwide. The company
is based in Chicago, Illinois.


AMAZING LASH: Faces "Burbon" Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Amazing Lash Studio
Franchise, LLC. The case is styled as Luc Burbon, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Amazing
Lash Studio Franchise, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-04733
(S.D. N.Y., May 29, 2018).

Amazing Lash Studio Franchise, LLC manufactures beauty care
products, including mascara, cleanser, and eyelash extensions,
etc. It owns and operates as an eyelash extension salon. The
company was founded in 2010 and is based in Scottsdale,
Arizona.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


AMERIGAS PROPANE: $800K "Jarrell" Settlement Has Final Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California granted Final Approval of Class Action Settlement in
the case captioned JIMMIE JARRELL, Plaintiff, v. AMERIGAS
PROPANE, INC., Defendant, Case No. 16-cv-01481-JST (N.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff Jimmie Jarrell brings this wage and hour class action
against Defendant AmeriGas Propane, Inc., on behalf of himself
and other individuals who are or have been employed by AmeriGas
as service technicians. The alleged violations concern meal and
rest periods, payment for on-call time and travel time, vacation
pay, and accuracy of wage statements.

The settlement provides for a common fund of $800,000, including:
(1) payouts to class members; (2) attorneys' fees of not more
than $266,640 (33.33% of the common fund); (3) litigation costs
and expenses not to exceed $35,000; (4) settlement administration
costs, estimated to be $20,000; (5) an incentive award to
Jarrell, not to exceed $10,000; (6) a $30,000 payment to the
California Labor Workforce Development Agency; and (7) payroll
taxes.

Adequacy of Notice

The Court approved the parties' proposed notice procedures when
it granted preliminary approval. Rust Consulting, Inc., the
settlement administrator, timely mailed the Court-approved
notices to 283 class members, 120 of which were current employees
at the time of preliminary approval. Fifteen of these notices
were returned as undeliverable, but Rust was able to locate more
current addresses for ten class members and re-mailed the class
notice to those addresses. Of those ten notices, two were
returned as undeliverable.

Thus, seven out of 283 class members, or approximately 2.5% of
the class, did not receive a class notice. Rust also established
a toll-free telephone number for class members to call with
questions about the settlement, as well as a website providing
information about the proposed settlement.

The Court finds that the parties have provided adequate notice to
class members.

Fairness, Adequacy, and Reasonableness

The Court finds no reason to alter either of these conclusions
now that class members have had been provided notice and an
opportunity to be heard, and the settlement is before the Court
for final approval. The reaction of the class was overwhelmingly
positive. No objections were received, and only three class
members, or approximately 1% of the class, opted out.

In addition, approximately 47% of former employee class members
(77 out of 163) submitted a claim form. When combined with the
120 current employee class members who will receive a payout,
this means that 197 out of 283 class members, or nearly 70%, will
receive a payout. The average recovery per class member will be
over $4000 before fees, and nearly $2500 after fees.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 5, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ycarf7j9 from Leagle.com.

Jimmie Jarell, an individual, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Chaim Shaun Setareh
-- shaun@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group, Alice A. Kim,
Setareh Law Group, Howard Scott Leviant -- scott@setareh.com --
Setareh Law Group & Thomas Alistair Segal --
Thomas@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group.

Amerigas Propane, Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation, Defendant,
represented by Joseph Daniel Lee -- joseph.lee.mto.com -- Munger
Tolles & Olson LLP, Aaron D. Pennekamp -- Aaron.Pennekamp@mto.com
-- Munger, Tolles and Olson LLP & Malcolm A. Heinicke --
Malcolm.Heinicke@mto.com -- Munger Tolles & Olson LLP.


APPLE INC: Class Certification in iPhone 6 Suit Denied
------------------------------------------------------
Stephen Silver, writing for AppleInsider, reports that in a
ruling issued, District Judge Lucy H. Koh denied two separate
motions from the plaintiffs to be certified as a class in the
case, as well as an additional motion for injunctive relief. The
suit alleges Apple failed to disclose an iPhone 6 and 6 Plus
design defect that caused touchscreen problems, a minor
controversy later dubbed "touch disease."

In the case of Davidson et al v. Apple, Inc., Judge Koh ruled
that the plaintiffs had failed to meet the preponderance
requirement to be certified as a class, because "adjudication of
the certified issues would not advance the resolution of the
underlying case," and because the "plaintiffs' perfunctory
request for Rule 23(c)(4) certification fails to show why
certification would materially advance the litigation as a
whole."

The original suit, which claimed that Apple knew about the "touch
disease" defect prior to the release of the iPhone 6 and 6 Plus,
was filed in 2016, with more law firms joining the suit later
that year.

Koh is the same judge who has presided over various Apple-related
cases in the past, including its long-running litigation with
Samsung; she is frequently assigned such cases for jurisdictional
reasons.

In a purportedly unrelated action, the government seized
aftermarket iPhone parts from Jessa Jones, a prominent figure in
the right to repair community. Jones is a repair shop owner who
helped to pinpoint "touch disease" at the time of the iPhone 6's
release; she has been frequently quoted in the media on the
topic.

According to Motherboard Jones, who had given a deposition in the
Davidson case, had iPhone screens and other parts seized from her
by Customs and Border Patrol agents. The parts, which are a gray
market amalgamation of refurbished screens with an authentic
Apple flex cable, are deemed counterfeit and therefore cannot be
imported or sold in the U.S.

A fairly common occurrence in the independent repair business,
critics claim parts seizures are used by Apple and other
companies exert control over the repair market.

At question is what constitutes a counterfeit part. In the case
of Jones' shipment, the flex cables on the hybrid iPhone screens
bore an Apple logo, thus making resale in the U.S. impermissible.
According to a letter Jones received from the CBP, the government
shares that view.

"Customs and Border Protection Regulations provide that any
article imported into the United States bearing a counterfeit
trademark shall be seized and, in the absence of the written
consent of the trademark owner, forfeited for violation of the
Customs laws," the agency wrote.

Jones and others argue the action is not sufficiently backed by
trademark laws; the screens are typically not marketed as
"genuine" Apple parts, nor is the tiny logo visible to the
consumer following repair.

Jones believes she was targeted by Apple for her contributions to
the class action suit, but a CBP official denies those claims,
the report said.

Apple has been waging an ongoing battle with right to repair
advocates who are fighting for legal precedent to fix their own
devices without the help of authorized Apple repair centers. Such
authority would require Apple to supply third parties with
authentic parts, manuals, tools and other material necessary to
perform repairs on its devices.

In April, Apple was defeated in Norwegian court after attempting
to stop an independent repair shop owner from using "counterfeit"
iPhone 6 and 6S screens sourced from the Chinese gray market.
Like similar cases in the U.S., Apple's argument hinged on logos
that appeared on the refurbished components.[GN]


APPLE INC: Hit With Class Suit Over Switch Keyboard Failures
------------------------------------------------------------
Mikey Campbell, writing for AppleInsider, reports that a class
action lawsuit filed in federal court on May 11 takes Apple to
task over an allegedly flawed keyboard design deployed in MacBook
models from 2015, claiming the company knew about the defect at
or before the product's launch.

Lodged in the Northern District Court of California, the
complaint levels multiple claims targeting MacBook models
manufactured from 2015 and MacBook Pro models produced from 2016.
Both laptops feature the company's butterfly keyboard mechanism,
an ultra low-profile switch advertised as both more responsive
and robust than traditional scissor-type components.

According to the filing, "thousands" of MacBook and MacBook Pro
owners have experienced some type of failure with Apple's
butterfly keyboard, thus rendering the machine useless.
Specifically, the suit claims the design is such that small
amounts of dust or debris impede normal switch behavior, causing
keystrokes to go unregistered.

In extreme cases, the key fails, forcing owners to take their
laptop in for service at a Genius Bar or authorized Apple repair
facility, a trip that could cost hundreds of dollars if the
machine is out of warranty.

One named plaintiff, Zixuan Rao, purchased a new 15-inch MacBook
Pro in January and began to experience problems with the laptop's
"B" key about a month later. After attempting to clean out the
key on his own, Rao ultimately sought help from the Apple store
in April. Representatives were unable to fix the issue and
suggested repair under Apple's gratis one-year warranty.

Not able to wait the one week it would take to fix the machine,
and unconvinced that a repair would permanently solve the issue,
Rao declined the offer and purchased an external keyboard.

A second named plaintiff, Kyle Barbaro, went through a similar
experience with his 2016 MacBook Pro. Unlike Rao, Barbaro opted
to fix unresponsive space bar and caps lock keys through Apple's
repair process, which worked for a few weeks before space bar
failed a second time.

Barbaro returned to his local Apple store, but the Genius Bar
representative was unable to solve the issue using conventional
tools. As Barbaro's MacBook Pro was at this point out of
warranty, he was told it would cost more than $700 to repair. He
decided not to pursue the costly fix.

The suit also cites numerous complaints users posted online,
including Apple's own Community Support forums.

Apple introduced the butterfly mechanism with its 12-inch MacBook
in 2015. Touting the new hardware technology onstage, SVP of
Worldwide Marketing Phil Schiller characterized the keyboard as
"much more precise, and accurate. In fact it is four times more
stable than that scissor mechanism."

Butterfly mechanism switches made their way to Apple's
professional laptop lineup with the redesigned MacBook Pro in
2016. A second-generation design, the keyboard was advertised as
being more responsive and comfortable than the previous version.

An AppleInsider investigation into the issue, collecting data
from Genius Bar locations and authorized third-party shops to
find the 2016 MacBook Pro's keyboard failed roughly twice as
often in its first year of use as 2014 and 2015 MacBook Pro
models with scissor-type switches. Current 2017 model year
versions fair a bit better, though the model has not been
available for a full year.

Shortly after the report, a Change.org petition -- cited in the
class action -- called on Apple to recall all MacBooks with
butterfly switch keyboards, saying the hardware design is
inherently flawed. The petition garnered 17,000 signatures in
just over a week.

Apple has in some ways acknowledged the problem, though not
directly. For example, support documents detail a method of
cleaning the keyboard with a can of compressed air, a technique
that rarely works, according to those who have experienced
serious complications.

Plaintiffs assert breach of express warranty, breach of covenant
of good faith, breach of the implied warranty, violation of the
Magnuson-Moss and Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Acts, violation
of the California Unfair Competition Law, violation of
California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act and fraudulent
concealment.

The suit seeks damages, legal fees and demands Apple not only
publicly disclose the keyboard design flaw, but pay to remedy or
replace defective units. The latter demand includes reimbursement
for the purchase of replacement laptops. [GN]


AT&T INC: Appeal in DirectTV's NFL Ticket Package Suit Underway
---------------------------------------------------------------
AT&T Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended March 31,
2018, that plaintiffs' appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit in the complaint related to the NFL Sunday
Ticket package remains pending.

More than two dozen putative class actions were filed in the U.S.
District Courts for the Central District of California and the
Southern District of New York against DIRECTV and the National
Football League (NFL). These cases were brought by residential
and commercial DIRECTV subscribers that have purchased NFL SUNDAY
TICKET.

The plaintiffs allege that (i) the 32 NFL teams have unlawfully
agreed not to compete with each other in the market for
nationally televised NFL football games and instead have "pooled"
their broadcasts and assigned to the NFL the exclusive right to
market them; and (ii) the NFL and DIRECTV have entered into an
unlawful exclusive distribution agreement that allows DIRECTV to
charge "supra-competitive" prices for the NFL SUNDAY TICKET
package. The complaints seek unspecified treble damages and
attorneys' fees along with injunctive relief.

The first complaint, Abrahamian v. National Football League,
Inc., et al., was served in June 2015. In December 2015, the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred the cases
outside the Central District of California to that court for
consolidation and management of pre-trial proceedings. The
company vigorously disputes the allegations the complaints have
asserted.

In August 2016, DIRECTV filed a motion to compel arbitration and
the NFL defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint.

AT&T said in its Form 10-Q Report for the quarterly period ended
September 30, 2017, that in June 2017, the court granted the NFL
defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint without leave to
amend, finding that: (1) the plaintiffs did not plead a viable
market; (2) the plaintiffs did not plead facts supporting the
contention that the exclusive agreement between the NFL and
DIRECTV harms competition; (3) the claims failed to overcome the
fact that the NFL and its teams must cooperate to sell
broadcasts; and (4) the plaintiffs do not have standing to
challenge the horizontal agreement among the NFL and the teams.
In light of the order granting the motion to dismiss, the court
denied DIRECTV's motion to compel arbitration as moot. In July
2017, plaintiffs filed an appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, which is pending.

In its recent SEC report, AT&T said, "We anticipate that,
following the briefing, the oral argument will occur in the fall
of 2018."

AT&T provides wireless services in robustly competitive markets,
but is subject to substantial governmental regulation. Wireless
communications providers must obtain licenses from the FCC to
provide communications services at specified spectrum frequencies
within specified geographic areas and must comply with the FCC
rules and policies governing the use of the spectrum. While
wireless communications providers' prices and offerings are
generally not subject to state regulation, states sometimes
attempt to regulate or legislate various aspects of wireless
services, such as in the area of consumer protection. The company
is based in Dallas, Texas.


ATLANTA, GA: Faces "Lawson" Suit in N.D. Georgia
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against City of Atlanta,
Georgia. The case is styled as Laurel Lawson, James Curtis and
James Turner, on behalf of themselves and other similarly-
situated persons, Plaintiffs v. City of Atlanta, Georgia,
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-02484-SCJ (N.D. Ga., May 24, 2018).

Atlanta is the capital of the U.S. state of Georgia. It played an
important part in both the Civil War and the 1960s Civil Rights
Movement. Atlanta History Center chronicles the city's past, and
the Martin Luther King Jr. National Historic Site is dedicated to
the African-American leader's life and times. Downtown,
Centennial Olympic Park, built for the 1996 Olympics, encompasses
the massive Georgia Aquarium.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

   Allan Leroy Parks, Jr., Esq.
   Parks Chesin & Walbert, P.C.-Atl
   75 Fourteenth Street, N.E., Suite 2600
   Atlanta, GA 30309
   Tel: (404) 873-8000
   Fax: (404) 873-8050
   Email: lparks@pcwlawfirm.com

      - and -

   Andrew Yancey Coffman, Esq.
   Parks Chesin & Walbert
   75 Fourteenth Street, N.E.
   26th Floor
   Atlanta, GA 30309
   Tel: (404) 873-8000
   Fax: (404) 873-8050
   Email: acoffman@pcwlawfirm.com

      - and -

   James Daniel Cole, Esq.
   Parks Chesin & Walbert, P.C.-Atl
   75 Fourteenth Street, N.E., Suite 2600
   Atlanta, GA 30309
   Tel: (404) 873-8000
   Fax: (404) 873-8050
   Email: dcole@pcwlawfirm.com

      - and -

   James E. Radford, Esq.
   Radford & Keebaugh, LLC
   315 W. Ponce de Leon Avenue, Suite 1080
   Decatur, GA 30030
   Tel: (678) 271-0302
   Email: james@decaturlegal.com

      - and -

   Regan E. Keebaugh, Esq.
   Radford & Keebaugh, LLC
   315 W. Ponce de Leon Avenue, Suite 1080
   Decatur, GA 30030
   Tel: (678) 271-0300
   Fax: (678) 271-0311
   Email: regan@decaturlegal.com


AVANGRID INC: Bid to Dismiss LDC Gas Transportation Suit Underway
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Avangrid, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
March 31, 2018, that the company's motion to dismiss all of the
claims in a class action suit regarding LDC Gas Transportation
Service on Algonquin Gas Transmission remains pending.

On November 16, 2017, a class action lawsuit was filed in the
U.S. District Court in Massachusetts on behalf of customers in
New England against the Company and Eversource alleging that
certain of their respective subsidiaries that take gas
transportation service over the Algonquin Gas Transmission, AGT,
which for AVANGRID would be its indirect subsidiaries SCG and
CNG, engaged in pipeline capacity scheduling practices on AGT
that resulted in artificially increased electricity prices in New
England.

These allegations were based on the conclusions of a White Paper
issued by the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), an environmental
advocacy organization, on October 10, 2017, purporting to analyze
the relationship between the New England electricity market and
the New England local gas distribution companies.

The plaintiffs assert claims under federal antitrust law, state
antitrust, unfair competition and consumer protection laws, and
under the common law of unjust enrichment. They seek damages,
disgorgement, restitution, injunctive relief, and attorney fees
and costs.

The Company filed a Motion to Dismiss all of the claims on
January 29, 2018. On February 27, 2018, the FERC released the
results of a FERC staff inquiry into the pipeline capacity
scheduling practices on the AGT. The inquiry arose out of the
allegations made by the EDF in its White Paper. FERC announced
that, based on an extensive review of public and non-public data,
it had determined that the EDF study was flawed and led to
incorrect conclusions. FERC also stated that the staff inquiry
revealed no evidence of anticompetitive withholding of natural
gas pipeline capacity on the AGT and that it would take no
further action on the matter.

On March 28, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a consolidated amended
complaint, repeating the prior claims, except omitting the common
law claim of unjust enrichment. On April 27, 2018, the Company
filed a Motion to Dismiss all of the claims based on federal
preemption and lack of any evidence of antitrust behavior,
citing, among other reasons, the results of the FERC staff
inquiry conclusion. Nevertheless, we cannot predict the outcome
of this class action lawsuit.

Avangrid, Inc. is a leading sustainable energy company with
approximately $31 billion in assets and operations in 26 states.
Avangrid, Inc. has two primary lines of business, Avangrid
Networks and Avangrid Renewables. The company is based in Orange,
Connecticut.


BANK OF HAWAII: Wins Partial Summary Judgment in "Smith"
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii
granted in part and denied in part Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment in the case captioned RODNEY SMITH, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. BANK OF
HAWAII, Defendant, Civ. No. 16-00513 JMS-RLP (D. Haw.).

The Plaintiff challenges Defendant Bank of Hawaii's (BOH)
imposition of overdraft fees specifically its use of an
available-balance method rather than a ledger-balance method for
assessing the sufficiency of funds in customer accounts to cover
transactions. Smith contends that BOH's practice violates its
Agreements with members, including the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. And he asserts claims based on unjust
enrichment, Money Had and Received, and violations of the
Electronic Fund Transfers Act (EFTA) and Hawaii Revised Statutes
(HRS) Chapter 480.

Individual and class actions for damages for failure to comply
with the EFTA may be brought within one year from the date of the
occurrence of the violation. BOH contends that this period begins
to run as soon as the first fee is charged after an alleged
failure to obtain proper authorization. And it contends that
because Smith incurred his first overdraft fee more than a year
before he filed suit, his EFTA claim is completely barred.
Smith counters that each wrongly imposed overdraft charge
constitutes a separate violation, "involving its own statutory
period."

No circuit court has resolved this question, the Court noted.
BOH relies on a Sixth Circuit case, Wike v. Vertrue, Inc., 566
F.3d 590, 591-92 (6th Cir. 2009), involving monthly charges to a
debit card that were preauthorized by the cardholder verbally,
but not in writing as the EFTA requires.  There, the question was
whether the statute of limitations was triggered when the
transfers were arranged (thirteen months before suit was filed),
or five weeks later, when the transfers began. Finding that the
plaintiff was not injured until a transfer was made, the court
concluded that the one-year limitations period began when the
first recurring transfer took place. Because all of the transfers
had been made within the one-year period, however, the court was
not called upon to determine whether, had the first transfer been
made outside that window, all claims based on later transfers
would have been barred.

The plaintiff in O'Brien v. Landers, 2011 WL 221865 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 24, 2011), signed a gym membership agreement in which the
gym reserved the absolute right to increase member dues, and he
signed an electronic fund transfer authorization stating "I
authorize my bank to make my payments by the method indicated
below and post it to my account. Besides debiting the monthly
dues, however, the gym twice initiated transfers for one-time
fees, the second of which the plaintiff challenged in the suit."
In finding plaintiff had stated a claim under the EFTA, the court
noted that the charge "was not covered by the plain terms of the
original contract, and therefore was outside the scope of
plaintiff's preauthorization."

Accordingly, because Smith has asserted an improper overdraft fee
was charged within one year of the day he filed his Complaint,
BOH is not entitled to summary judgment on Smith's EFTA claim.
Claims based on overdraft fees imposed outside the one-year
limit, however, are barred.

BOH next contends that the Agreement's one-year contractual
limitation period encompasses each of the claims alleged in
Plaintiff's FAC, including the state-law claims, and that it
"bars recovery of overdraft fees incurred before September 9,
2015."  Smith argues that the limitation period is
unconscionable, and therefore unenforceable.

Under Hawaii law, unconscionability is recognized as a general
contract defense. Recent Hawaii decisions have defined
unconscionability as encompassing two principles: one-sidedness
and unfair surprise, which are also characterized as procedural
and substantive unconscionability.

Procedural unconscionability, or unfair surprise, focuses on the
process by which the allegedly offensive terms found their way
into the agreement.

Substantive unconscionability focuses on the one-sidedness of the
agreement and entails an analysis of the substance of the bargain
to determine whether the terms are unreasonably favorable to the
party against whom unconscionability is urged.

Although a one-year period is significantly shorter than the
applicable statutes of limitation, the contractual period is not
so short as to effectively abrogate a plaintiff's right to sue.
This is especially true where the Agreement's limitation period
is not tied to the event giving rise to the action but begins to
run one year after the cause of action accrues. The Hawaii
Supreme Court has long defined the word accrue in statutes of
limitation to mean the point at which the plaintiff knew or
should have known of a cause of action. Construing the
Agreement's one-year limitation period as incorporating Hawaii's
discovery rule, the provision is not substantively
unconscionable.

The Agreement's provision limiting actions to within one year
from the date a claim accrues is thus applicable to Smith's
state-law claims.

BOH has asked the Court to determine that Smith's claims based on
overdraft fees occurring earlier than September 9, 2015 are time-
barred.  Smith contends that, even if the court were to find the
Agreement's limitation period valid, the discovery rule and
equitable tolling apply to all of Plaintiff's state and federal
law claims throughout the class periods.

Under Hawaii's discovery rule, a limitation period does not begin
to run until a plaintiff knows or has reason to know the basis of
an action.  The record shows that at least one overdraft fee was
charged (despite a positive ledger balance) within one year of
the filing of the original complaint. Statement of Account
September 22, 2015.

Therefore, BOH is not entitled to summary judgment on the FAC in
its entirety, and the court denies summary judgment as to any
overdraft fees charged on or after September 9, 2015. But summary
judgment is granted in favor of BOH as to any fees charged before
that date.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 5, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ycrnpr7a from Leagle.com.

Rodney Smith, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Margery S. Bronster --
mbronster@bfrhawaii.com -- Bronster Fujichaku Robbins, Melinda M.
Weaver -- mweaver@bfrhawaii.com -- Bronster Fujichaku Robbins,
Richard D. McCune -rdm@mccunewright.com -- McCuneWright, LLP, pro
hac vice, Robert M. Hatch -- rhatch@bfrhawaii.com -- Bronster
Fujichaku Robbins & Taras Kick -- taras@kicklawfirm.com -- The
Kick Law Firm, APC, pro hac vice.

Bank of Hawaii, Defendant, represented by Andrew J. Demko --
andrew.demko@kattenlaw.com -Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP, pro hac
vice, Kristin L. Holland -- Kholland@ahfi.com -- Alston Hunt
Floyd & Ing, Nickolas A. Kacprowski -nkacprowski@ahfi.com --
Alston Hunt Floyd & Ing, Paul Alston -- palston@ahfi.com --
Alston Hunt Floyd & Ing & Stuart M. Richter --
stuart.richter@kattenlaw.com -- Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP, pro
hac vice.

BANNER HEALTH: Ariz. App. Affirms Injunction in "Ansley" Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, WALTER ANSLEY, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross-
Appellants, v. BANNER HEALTH NETWORK, et al.,
Defendants/Appellants/Cross-Appellees, Case No. 1 CA-CV 17-0075
(Ariz. App.), Judge Diane M. Johnsen of the Court of Appeals of
Arizona, Division One, reversed the superior court's entry of
summary judgment in favor of the Hospitals on the Patients' claim
for breach of contract and affirmed the injunction the superior
court entered.

Banner Health Network and several other hospitals separately
contracted with the Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System
("AHCCCS") to serve AHCCCS members.  In those contracts, the
Hospitals agreed to accept payment from AHCCCS at rates below
their customary charges and not to bill members for the balance.

The Plaintiffs in the case are a class of AHCCCS members
("Patients") who received settlements or damage awards from
third-party tortfeasors for the injuries that required medical
treatment.  The Patients sued to enjoin the Hospitals from
enforcing liens on their tort recoveries for the balance between
what AHCCCS paid and the Hospitals' customary charges.

The Hospitals recorded their liens pursuant to two statutes,
Arizona Revised Statutes ("ARS") sections 33-931 (2018) and 36-
2903.01(G)(4) (2018).  The former is a general statute allowing a
health-care provider to file a lien for its customary charges
against a patient's tort recovery.  The latter specifically
applies when a hospital has served an AHCCCS member and allows
that hospital to collect any unpaid portion of its bill from
other third-party payors or in situations in which the general
medical-lien statute applies.

The Patients alleged federal Medicaid law preempts the Arizona
lien statutes in cases such as theirs, and sought an injunction
barring the Hospitals from recording liens on their tort
recoveries.  They argued the liens constitute impermissible
balance billing, a term describing a health-care provider's
effort to collect from a patient the difference in the amount
paid by Medicaid, or a state plan like AHCCCS, and the amount the
provider typically charges.

Early in the litigation, the superior court dismissed a group of
the Plaintiffs who had settled their lien claims with the
Hospitals and entered partial final judgment as to those
plaintiffs pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).
Those Plaintiffs appealed, arguing their settlements lacked
consideration because the Hospitals' liens were preempted by
federal law.  The Court accepted that argument, Abbott v. Banner
Health Network, but the supreme court reversed.  The supreme
court ruled the settlements were valid and made "fairly and in
good faith" because the validity of the Hospitals' lien rights
was not settled under Arizona law.

Meanwhile, the superior court certified the remaining Plaintiffs
as a class, and both sides moved for summary judgment on the
preemption issue.  The superior court ruled in favor of the
Patients on their claim for a declaratory judgment under the
Supremacy Clause that when a hospital has accepted payment from
AHCCCS for treating a patient, a federal regulation preempts the
hospital's state-law right to a lien on the patient's tort
recovery for the balance between what AHCCCS paid and the
hospital's customary charges.

The Court then enjoined the Hospitals from filing or asserting
any lien or claim against a patient's personal injury recovery,
after having received any payment from AHCCCS for the same
patient's care.  It granted summary judgment to the Hospitals,
however, on the Patients' third-party-beneficiary claim, which
alleged the Hospitals breached their contracts with AHCCCS by
imposing the liens.  Finally, the superior court awarded
attorney's fees to the Patients under the private attorney
general doctrine and denied both sides' motions for new trial.

The Hospitals appealed the preemption ruling and injunction, and
the Patients cross-appealed the judgment against them on their
contract claim.

Judge Johnsen holds that the Patients are third-party
beneficiaries of the contracts the Hospitals entered with AHCCCS
to provide medical services to AHCCCS members.  She further holds
that those contracts required the Hospitals to comply with
federal law, including 42 C.F.R. Section 447.15, which preempts
A.R.S. Sections 33-931 and 36-2903.01(G)(4) to the extent those
statutes allow a health-care provider that has accepted payment
from AHCCCS to impose a lien on a patient's tort recovery for the
balance between the AHCCCS payment and the provider's customary
rates.

Accordingly, the Judge reversed the superior court's entry of
summary judgment in favor of the Hospitals on the Patients' claim
for breach of contract and direct entry of judgment in the
Patients' favor on that claim.  On this basis, and without
addressing the judgment the superior court entered on the
Patients' claim for declaratory relief under the Supremacy
Clause, the Judge affirmed the injunction the superior court
entered.  She remanded the attorney's fees award and direct the
superior court to reconsider whether the Patients are entitled to
receive the full amount of the fees incurred in the superior
court in connection with the Abbott case.  Finally, she awarded
the Patients their costs on appeal and their attorney's fees
pursuant to A.R.S. Sections 12-341.01(A), contingent upon
compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21.

A copy of the Court's April 3, 2018 Opinion is available at
https://bit.ly/2qX9LmT from Leagle.com.

Levenbaum Trachtenberg, PLC, Phoenix, By Geoffrey M.
Trachtenberg, Justin Henry Co-Counsel for
Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

The Entrekin Law Firm, Phoenix, By B. Lance Entrekin Co-Counsel
for Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

Gammage & Burnham, PLC, Phoenix, By Richard B. Burnham --
rburnham@gblaw.com -- Cameron C. Artigue, Christopher L. Hering
Counsel for Defendants/Appellants/Cross-Appellees.


BENNY'S BURRITOS: Court Approves "Tapia" Settlement
---------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANDRES FUENTES TAPIA et al., Plaintiffs, v. BENNY'S
BURRITOS, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 16 Civ. 6957 (HBP)
(S.D. N.Y.), Judge Henry Pitman of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York granted the parties' joint
application to approve their settlement.

The Plaintiffs allege that they were employed as dishwashers,
cooks, porters and delivery workers at several Blockheads and
Benny's Burritos restaurants that were owned and operated by the
Defendants.  They further allege that they worked in excess of
20% of their workday performing non-tipped work and should,
therefore, not have been compensated as "tipped employees."

The Plaintiffs bring the action under the Fair Labor Standards
Act ("FLSA"), and the New York Labor Law ("NYLL"), and seek to
recover unpaid full minimum wage and overtime premium pay.  They
also assert claims based on the Defendants' alleged failure to
provide certain wage notices and statements as required by the
NYLL.  The Plaintiffs estimate they are owed $73,515 in unpaid
wages and could potentially collect $182,030 in total damages.
The Plaintiffs commenced the action as a collective action, but
reached a settlement before conditional certification.

Judge Pitman held a lengthy settlement conference on May 10, 2017
that was attended by the parties and their counsel.  After a
protracted discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the
parties' respective positions, the parties agreed to resolve the
dispute for a total settlement of $110,000.  This $110,000 is to
be paid over a period of three installments.  The Agreement also
provides that the Plaintiffs' counsel will receive $36,666.67 --
one third of the overall settlement -- for attorneys' fees and
costs.

The amount claimed by each Plaintiff and the net amount that will
be received by each Plaintiff after deduction of legal fees and
costs are as follows:

     Net Length of     Plaintiff    Claimed Amt.  Settlement Amt.
      Employment

      89 weeks      Cesar Granados    $30,544.85       $7,772.58

      172 weeks    Jaime Guadarrama   $27,416.10       $7,907.31
                       De Jesus

      139 weeks      Ruben Perez      $25,781.66      $13,898.42

      256 weeks     Javier Flores     $52,608.56      $28,825.96
                       Segundo

      204 weeks      Jose Sontay      $33,032.36      $11,611.22

      50 weeks  Andres Fuentes Tapia  $12,646.50       $3,317.84

Judge Pitman finds that the approval of the settlement is
appropriate.  First, the Plaintiffs' net settlement -- $73,333.33
after attorneys' fees and costs -- represents approximately 40%
of their total alleged damages and is only $12,921.86 less than
the Defendants' estimate of what the Plaintiffs could recover
after trial if they were to prevail on every claim.  This
percentage is reasonable.  Moreover, he suggested the overall
settlement amount of $110,000 to the parties during the May 10,
2017 settlement conference as the amount he felt was a just and
fair settlement.

Second, the settlement will entirely avoid the expense and
aggravation of litigation.  The main factual dispute is whether
or not the plaintiffs were tipped employees.  Discovery on this
issue would have led to protracted and costly litigation likely
involving the depositions of all six plaintiffs and their direct
supervisors. The settlement avoids the necessity of conducting
these depositions.

Third, the settlement will enable the Plaintiffs to avoid the
risk of litigation.  If the action had not settled, the
Plaintiffs would have had to have established not only what hours
they worked and the amount they were paid by the Defendants, but
also that they worked in excess of 20% of their workday
performing non-tipped work in order to be entitled to full
minimum wage pay.

Fourth, because the Judge presided over the settlement conference
that immediately preceded the Plaintiffs' acceptance of the
settlement, he knows that the settlement is the product of arm's-
length bargaining between experienced counsel.  Both counsel
represented their clients zealously at the settlement conference.

Fifth, there are no factors here that suggest the existence of
fraud.  The material terms of the settlement were reached at the
settlement conference. The total settlement amount was suggested
by me as a fair and reasonable amount after a two-hour
negotiation with the parties.  This fact further negates the
possibility of fraud or collusion.

The allocation of the net settlement between the Plaintiffs is
also fair, the Judge finds.  According to the Agreement, each
Plaintiff will receive between 25% and 54% of his initial amount
claimed.  He says this bears a rational relationship to the
amount claimed by each Plaintiff.  Finally, the settlement
agreement provides that 33.3% of the settlement fund will be paid
to the Plaintiffs' counsel as contingency fees.  Contingency fees
of one-third in FLSA cases are routinely approved in the Circuit.

Accordingly, for all these reasons, Judge Pitman approves the
settlement in the matter.  In light of the settlement, the action
is dismissed with prejudice and without costs.  The Clerk is
respectfully requested to mark the matter closed.

A copy of the Court's April 3, 2018 Opinion and Order is
available at https://bit.ly/2HrFQ0v from Leagle.com.

Andres Fuentes Tapia, individually, Andres Fuentes Tapia, on
behalf of others similarly situated, Cesar Granados,
individually, Cesar Granados, on behalf of others similarly
situated, Jaime Guadarrama de Jesus, individually, Jaime
Guadarrama de Jesus, on behalf of others similarly situated, Jose
Sontay, individually, Jose Sontay, on behalf of others similarly
situated, Ruben Perez, individually, Ruben Perez, on behalf of
others similarly situated, Javier Flores Segundo, individually &
Javier Flores Segundo, on behalf of others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Shawn Raymond Clark --
sclark@faillacelaw.com -- Michael Faillace & Associates, P.C. &
Michael Antonio Faillace -- Michael@Faillacelaw.com -- Michael
Faillace & Associates, P.C.

Benny's Burritos, Inc., doing business as Benny's Burritos, Egg
White, Inc., doing business as Blockheads, 954 Second Corp.,
doing business as Blockheads, Kiosk 50 Corp., doing business as
Blockheads, Donald Sofer & Kenneth Sofer, Defendants, represented
by Alexander Wilde Leonard -- aleonard@foxrothschild.com -- Fox
Rothschild, LLP & Carolyn Diane Richmond --
crichmond@foxrothschild.com -- Fox Rothschild, LLP.


BERNARDAUD NA: Faces "Olsen" Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Bernardaud NA, Inc.
The case is styled as Thomas J. Olsen, individually and on behalf
of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Bernardaud
NA, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-04693 (S.D. N.Y., May 28,
2018).

Bernardaud NA Inc. was founded in 1980. The company's line of
business includes the wholesale distribution of home furnishings
and housewares.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Christopher Howard Lowe, Esq.
   Lipsky Lowe LLP
   630 Third Avenue
   New York, NY 10017-6705
   Tel: (212) 392-4772
   Fax: (212) 444-1030
   Email: chris@lipskylowe.com


BLACKROCK INC: Faces "Burbon" Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Blackrock, Inc. The
case is styled as Luc Burbon, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Blackrock, Inc., Defendant, Case
No. 1:18-cv-04632 (S.D. N.Y., May 24, 2018).

BlackRock, Inc. is an American global investment management
corporation based in New York City.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


BLUE APRON: IPO-Related Class Suit Underway
-------------------------------------------
A consolidated securities class action lawsuit remains pending
against Blue Apron Holdings, Inc., the Company said in its Form
10-Q Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission for
the quarterly period ended March 31, 2018.

Blue Apron said in its Form 10-Q Report for the quarterly period
ended September 30, 2017, that the company is facing several
putative class action lawsuits alleging federal securities law
violations in connection with its IPO -- two in the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of New York and one in the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey.  These purported
class actions were filed in August 2017 against the Company,
certain current and former officers and directors, and certain
underwriters of the Company's IPO.  A stipulation entered in all
of these pending actions provides that a consolidated class
action complaint will be filed after a lead plaintiff is
appointed. The Company said it was in the preliminary stages of
reviewing the allegations made in the complaints and, as a
result, is unable to provide any assurances as to the ultimate
outcome of these lawsuits or that an adverse resolution of these
lawsuits would not have a material adverse effect on the
Company's consolidated financial position or results of
operations.

In its recent SEC report, Blue Apron said an amended complaint
alleges that the Company and certain current and former officers
and directors made material misstatements or omissions in the
Company's registration statement and prospectus that caused the
stock price to drop.  Pursuant to a stipulation entered by the
parties, defendants had until May 21, 2018 to move against or
otherwise respond to the amended complaint.

The Company is currently reviewing the allegations made in the
amended complaint and, as a result, is unable to provide any
assurances as to the ultimate outcome of this lawsuit or that an
adverse resolution of this lawsuit would not have a material
adverse effect on the Company's consolidated financial position
or results of operations.

Blue Apron creates incredible experiences. Founded in 2012, the
company is building a consumer lifestyle brand that symbolizes
the emotional human connections that are formed through the
cooking experiences the company creates. The company is based in
New York.


BROOME COUNTY, NY: Court Certifies Class of Juvenile Inmates
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, A.T., a minor, by and through his parent and natural
guardian Shakeema Tillman, and B.C., a minor, by and through
Kristi Cochardo, Plaintiffs, v. DAVID HARDER, Broome County
Sheriff, in his official capacity, MARK SMOLINSKY, Jail
Administrator of the Broome County Correctional Facility, in his
official capacity, and KEVIN MOORE, Deputy Administrator, in his
official capacity, Defendants, Case No. 9:17-CV-817 (N.D. N.Y.),
Judge David N. Hurd of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of New York (i) granted the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification and the Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction; and (ii) dismissed without prejudice the official-
capacity claim against Deputy Administrator Moore.

Named Plaintiffs A.T. and B.C. seek declaratory and injunctive
relief on behalf of themselves and a proposed class of fellow 16-
and 17-year-olds who have been or will be held in some form of
solitary confinement at the Broome County Correctional Facility.
The Broome County Jail is operated by the Defendants, each of
whom is sued in their official capacity.

The Plaintiffs' first amended complaint asserts five claims.  In
the first and second causes of action, they assert 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983 claims alleging the Defendants routinely place
juveniles in solitary confinement and then deny them access to
educational opportunities in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.

In their third cause of action, they assert a claim under the
Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act ("IDEA") alleging
a subclass of juveniles placed in solitary confinement are being
denied the special education and related support services to
which they are entitled under the statute.

In the Plaintiffs' fourth and fifth causes of action, they assert
claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 alleging a separate subclass of
qualifying juveniles are being denied access to certain programs,
services, and benefits without first receiving the individualized
assessment mandated by these federal laws.

The Plaintiffs have moved for class certification under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23.  They have also moved for a
preliminary injunction under Rule 65.  The Defendants oppose both
requests.  The parties have exchanged limited discovery on an
expedited basis and the motions were fully briefed in advance of
oral argument, which was heard on March 23, 2018 in Utica, New
York.  The decision was reserved.

Judge Hurd holds that the Plaintiffs have affirmatively
demonstrated compliance with Rule 23's requirements and therefore
the motion for class certification will be granted.  The
Plaintiffs have also shown a substantial likelihood of success on
the merits of their claims and demonstrated that the other
relevant factors weigh in their favor.  Accordingly, their
request for a preliminary injunction will also be granted.

Therefore, the Judge granted the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification and the Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction.  He dismissed without prejudice the official-capacity
claim against Deputy Administrator Moore.

The Defendants, their agents, servants, employees, and officers,
and all other persons in active concert or participation with
them and who receive actual notice of the preliminary injunction,
by personal service or otherwise, are immediately enjoined and
restrained, pending the final determination of the action, from
imposing 23-hour disciplinary isolation on juveniles at the
Broome County Jail.  They will immediately only lock juveniles in
their cells for disciplinary purposes if the juvenile poses an
immediate threat to the safety or security of the facility and
only after less restrictive measures have been employed and found
inadequate to address the particular threat at issue.

Under no circumstances will a juvenile be locked in their cell
for greater than four hours for disciplinary purposes.  If a
juvenile remains an immediate threat to the safety and security
of the facility after four hours, a psychiatrist will be
consulted and a plan put in place to ensure the juvenile's safe
return to the general juvenile population.

The Defendants will immediately ensure all juveniles have access
to at least three hours of educational instruction each day as
well as any IDEA-mandated special education and related services.
If a juvenile with a mental health or intellectual disability
will potentially lose access to the benefits, services, and
programs offered at the facility as a result of the disciplinary
process, the Defendants will ensure mental health staff will
perform an individualized assessment of the juvenile as soon as
possible.  This assessment will at minimum include: (a) a review
of the individual's mental health needs; (b) a determination
regarding whether any reasonable modifications can be made to
eliminate future risk; (c) a determination regarding whether the
individual with a disability continues to pose a risk; and (d)
whether placement in segregation is medically appropriate.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 4, 2018 Memorandum-Decision
and Order is available at https://bit.ly/2jh6Y3J from Leagle.com.

A. T., a minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian
Shakeema Tillman & B. C., a minor, by and through Kristi
Cochardo, Plaintiffs, represented by Joshua T. Cotter --
jcotter@lscny.org -- Legal Services of Central New York, George
B. Haddad, Legal Services of Central New York, Inc., Samuel C.
Young -- samyoung@lscny.org -- Legal Services of Central New York
& Susan M. Young -- syoung@lscny.org -- Legal Services of Central
New York.

Suzanne O. Galbato, Mediator (Mandatory Program), pro se.

David Harder, Broome County Sheriff, in his official capacity,
Mark Smolinsky, Jail Administrator of the Broome County
Correctional Facility, in his official capacity & Kevin Moore,
Deputy Administrator, in his official capacity, Defendants,
represented by Robert G. Behnke, Broome County Attorney's Office.


CALIBER HOME: Eleventh Circuit Appeal Filed in "Hunt" Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Mark Donald Hunt filed an appeal from a court ruling in
the lawsuit titled Mark Hunt v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc., Case
No. 0:17-cv-61658-UU, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Florida.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
was initiated on August 17, 2017.

Caliber Home is an Irving, Texas-based home mortgage originator
and servicer established in 2013 by the merger of Caliber Funding
and Vericrest Financial.  The firm is owned by affiliates of
private equity fund manager Lone Star Funds.

The nature of suit is stated as "Other Personal Injury."

The appellate case is captioned as Mark Hunt v. Caliber Home
Loans, Inc., Case No. 18-11498, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- The appellant's brief was due on or before May 21, 2018;

   -- The appendix is due no later than 7 days from the filing of
      the appellant's brief; and

   -- Appellee's Certificate of Interested Persons was due on or
      before May 7, 2018, as to Appellee Caliber Home Loans,
      Inc.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant MARK DONALD HUNT, individually, and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Jonathan Harris Kline, Esq.
          JONATHAN KLINE, PA
          2761 Executive Park Dr.
          Weston, FL 33331
          Telephone: (954) 888-4646
          E-mail: Jonathan.Kline@JKLawFL.com

Defendant-Appellee CALIBER HOME LOANS, INC., is represented by:

          Sara F. Holladay-Tobias, Esq.
          Emily Y. Rottmann, Esq.
          MCGUIREWOODS, LLP
          50 N Laura St., Suite 3300
          Jacksonville, FL 32202
          Telephone: (904) 798-3200
          Facsimile: (904) 360-6317
          E-mail: stobias@mcguirewoods.com
                  erottmann@mcguirewoods.com

               - and -

          Brian E. Pumphrey, Esq.
          MCGUIREWOODS LLP
          Gateway Plaza
          800 E Canal St.
          Richmond, VA 23219
          Telephone: (804) 775-1000
          Facsimile: (804) 775-1061
          E-mail: bpumphrey@mcguirewoods.com


CANADA: Judge Approves $800MM Sixties Scoop Settlement Offer
------------------------------------------------------------
Matthew Olson, writing for The Star Phoenix, reports that after
two days of hearings in Saskatoon, a judge has approved the $800-
million settlement offer for Sixties Scoop survivors.

Federal judge Michel Shore said he spent a year reading and
analyzing documents related to the settlement and gave a lot of
thought to the submissions at the hearings on May 10 and May11,
before announcing his approval on May 11 afternoon.

Survivor Maggie-Blue Waters, the named plaintiff in the Sixties
Scoop class action lawsuit from Saskatchewan, said she was
pleased with the decision and said she felt the judge had heard
the people who spoke at the hearings.

"That means they heard us. That means they heard our voices. That
means all of the suffering, all of the work, is for the good,"
she said. "We can move forward. We can heal. Our ancestors are
happy."

She said, however, the hearings process was just the beginning
for many survivors.

"I'm understanding the tension, and I have great compassion for
my fellow survivors that are feeling anger, frustration and
anxiety," she said. "For many of them, this is their very first
time to speak to this."

Not everyone was pleased.

Anna McArthur Parent, a board member with Sixties Scoop
Indigenous Society of Saskatchewan, said the settlement is being
pushed through too quickly.

"As a matter of fact, through the judge's actions, throughout all
day yesterday and this morning, we could tell that he was not an
unbiased judge He already had made his mind up and this was a
done deal before the settlement hearings."

Some people don't even know if the Sixties Scoop applies to them,
or how to find out, McArthur Parent said.

"Time should have been spent to give an explanation and a full
understanding of what the Sixties Scoop is really about, and
whether or not they qualify or don't qualify, and to find out
whether or not their best interest is to support this or not. We
don't have time to do that," she said.

Peter Van Name, a Sixties Scoop survivor who was taken away from
his parents at birth and adopted into a home in New Jersey, said
his concern is that Indigenous children are still being taken
from their families today -- and he would give any settlement
money up to actually have children returned to their families.

"Every city's got a child welfare program where they actually go
and take kids today. They probably apprehended more children
today," he said. "It keeps on going. It's a vicious cycle that
keeps on going, intergenerational, from Indian Residential
schools to us and now our kids."

The second day of the hearings focused mostly on the $75 million
in legal fees that were negotiated alongside the $800-million
settlement offer. Survivors and advocates in attendance listened
to lawyers argue for and against the legal fee payout for more
than three hours on May 11 morning.

Shore began the day's proceedings by speaking directly to the
audience and thanking the survivors for coming forward to object.

"What hurts a human being who is a judge also is that stories
have to be told in their entirety, not in three minutes, and
that's understandable," Shore said, referencing the three-minute
time limit given to each objector.

Shore and some of the lawyers present implied during the hearings
that it could take a long time for another agreement to be
reached if the offer fell through.

British Columbia lawyer David Klein, Esq. --
info@callkleinlawyers.com -- suggested in the proceedings that
payouts to eligible claimants could occur as quickly as next year
if the settlement went through.

"My expectation, a realistic expectation, is that cheques would
probably flow toward the end of the summer, sometime in the fall
of 2019," Klein told Shore. [GN]


CEMEX SAB: Glancy Prongay Files Securities Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP ("GPM") announces that a class action
lawsuit has been filed on behalf of investors that purchased or
otherwise acquired the securities of CEMEX, S.A.B. de C.V.
("CEMEX" or the "Company") (NYSE: CX) between August 14, 2014 and
March 13, 2018, inclusive (the "Class Period"). CEMEX investors
have until May 15, 2018 to file a lead plaintiff motion.

To obtain information or actively participate in the class
action, please visit CEMEX page on our website at
www.glancylaw.com/case/cemex-sab-de-cv. Investors that suffered
losses on their CEMEX investments are encouraged to contact
Lesley Portnoy of GPM to discuss their legal rights in this class
action at 310-201-9150 or by email to shareholders@glancylaw.com.

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout
the Class Period defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) Cemex executives
had engaged in an unlawful bribery scheme in connection with
Cemex's business dealings in Colombia; (2) discovery of the
foregoing conduct would likely subject Cemex to heightened
regulatory scrutiny and potential criminal sanctions; (3) Cemex
lacked adequate internal controls over financial reporting; and
(4) as a result, Cemex's public statements were materially false
and misleading at all relevant times.

Follow us for updates on Twitter: twitter.com/GPM_LLP.

If you purchased shares of CEMEX during the Class Period you may
move the Court no later than May 15, 2018 to ask the Court to
appoint you as lead plaintiff. To be a member of the Class you
need not take any action at this time; you may retain counsel of
your choice or take no action and remain an absent member of the
Class.

         Lesley Portnoy, Esq.
         Glancy Prongay and Murray LLP
         Los Angeles
         Telephone: 310-201-9150
                  888-773-9224
         Email: shareholders@glancylaw.com
               lportnoy@glancylaw.com [GN]


CEMEX SAB: Pawar Law Group Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Pawar Law Group disclosed that a class action lawsuit has been
filed on behalf of shareholders who purchased shares of Cemex,
S.A.B. de C.V. (NYSE: CX) from August 14, 2014 through March 13,
2018, both dates inclusive ("Class Period"). The lawsuit seeks to
recover damages for Cemex investors under the federal securities
laws.

To join the Cemex class action, go to
http://pawarlawgroup.com/cases/cemex-s-a-b-de-c-v/or call Vik
Pawar, Esq. toll-free at 888-589-9804 or email
vik@pawarlawgroup.com for information on the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A
CLASS IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU
RETAIN ONE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO
NOTHING AT THIS POINT. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE.

According to the lawsuit, throughout the Class Period defendants
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) Cemex executives had engaged in an unlawful bribery
scheme in connection with Cemex's business dealings in Colombia;
(2) discovery of the foregoing conduct would likely subject Cemex
to heightened regulatory scrutiny and potential criminal
sanctions; (3) Cemex lacked adequate internal controls over
financial reporting; and (4) as a result, Cemex's public
statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant
times. When the true details entered the market, the lawsuit
claims that investors suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to
serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than
May 15, 2018. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting
on behalf of other class members in directing the litigation. If
you wish to join the litigation, go to
http://pawarlawgroup.com/cases/cemex-s-a-b-de-c-v/or to discuss
your rights or interests regarding this class action.

         Vik Pawar, Esq.
         Telephone: (917) 261-2277
         Toll Free: 888-589-9804
         Fax: (212) -571-0938
         Email: vik@pawarlawgroup.com [GN]


CEMEX SAB: Rosen Law Firm Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, disclosed the
filing of a class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of the
securities of Cemex, S.A.B. de C.V. (NYSE:CX) from August 14,
2014 through March 13, 2018, both dates inclusive ("Class
Period"). The lawsuit seeks to recover damages for Cemex
investors under the federal securities laws.

To join the Cemex class action, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1341.htmlor call Phillip Kim,
Esq. or Zachary Halper, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email
pkim@rosenlegal.com or zhalper@rosenlegal.com for information on
the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A
CLASS IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU
RETAIN ONE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO
NOTHING AT THIS POINT. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE.

According to the lawsuit, throughout the Class Period defendants
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) Cemex executives had engaged in an unlawful bribery
scheme in connection with Cemex's business dealings in Colombia;
(2) discovery of the foregoing conduct would likely subject Cemex
to heightened regulatory scrutiny and potential criminal
sanctions; (3) Cemex lacked adequate internal controls over
financial reporting; and (4) as a result, Cemex's public
statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant
times. When the true details entered the market, the lawsuit
claims that investors suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to
serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than
May 15, 2018. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting
on behalf of other class members in directing the litigation.

         Phillip Kim, Esq.
         Zachary Halper, Esq.
         The Rosen Law Firm
         Toll free: 866-767-3653
         Email: pkim@rosenlegal.com
                zhalper@rosenlegal.com [GN]


CIGNA CORP: Continues to Defend "Amara" Pension Plan Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
Cigna Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
March 31, 2018, that the company continues to defend itself in
Amara cash balance pension plan litigation.

In December 2001, Janice Amara filed a class action lawsuit in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut against
Cigna Corporation and the Cigna Pension Plan (the "Plan") on
behalf of herself and other similarly situated Plan participants
affected by the 1998 conversion to a cash balance formula. The
plaintiffs allege various violations of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), including that the Plan's
cash balance formula discriminates against older employees; that
the conversion resulted in a wear-away period (when the pre-
conversion accrued benefit exceeded the post-conversion benefit);
and that the Plan communications contained inaccurate or
inadequate disclosures about these conditions.

In 2008, the District Court (1) affirmed the Company's right to
convert to a cash balance plan prospectively beginning in 1998;
(2) found for plaintiffs on the disclosure claim only; and (3)
required the Company to pay pre-1998 benefits under the pre-
conversion traditional annuity formula and post-1997 benefits
under the post-conversion cash balance formula. From 2008 through
2015, this case has undergone a series of court proceedings that
resulted in the original District Court order being largely
upheld. In 2015, the Company submitted to the District Court its
proposed method for calculating the additional pension benefits
due to class members and plaintiffs responded in August 2015.

In January 2016, the District Court ordered the method of
calculating the additional pension benefits due to class members.
The court order left several aspects of the calculation of
additional plan benefits open to interpretation. From that time
through the present, both parties have disputed various aspects
of the Court's interpretation and the Court has attempted to
clarify. On July 14, 2017, the Court issued a ruling clarifying
certain aspects of the January 2016 order. The Plaintiffs filed a
motion for reconsideration of the July 14, 2017 ruling that was
denied by the Court on November 7, 2017.

The Company's reserve for this litigation is adequate at March
31, 2018, based on calculations consistent with the Company's
interpretation of the latest guidance from the Court. Due to the
continuing inability of the parties to agree on the details of
calculating the pension benefits, the final timing of the
resolution of this matter remains uncertain. Once these issues
are resolved, the Plan will be amended to comply with the
District Court's orders and the benefits will begin to be paid.

Cigna Health Corporation provides managed medical, pharmacy, and
dental care insurance. The company offers integrated indemnity
and group life and health insurance for employees. The company is
based in Bloomfield, Connecticut.


CIGNA CORP: Continues to Defend "Franco" Suit
---------------------------------------------
Cigna Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
March 31, 2018, that the Company continues to defend against the
case, Franco v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Company, et
al.

In April 2004, the Company was sued in a number of putative
nationwide class actions alleging that the Company improperly
underpaid claims for out-of-network providers through the use of
data provided by Ingenix, Inc., a subsidiary of one of the
Company's competitors.

These actions were consolidated into Franco v. Connecticut
General Life Insurance Company, et al., pending in the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey. The consolidated
amended complaint, filed in 2009 on behalf of subscribers, health
care providers and various medical associations, asserted claims
related to benefits and disclosure under ERISA, the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") Act, the Sherman
Antitrust Act and New Jersey state law and seeks recovery for
alleged underpayments from 1998 through the present. Other major
health insurers have been the subject of, or have settled,
similar litigation.

In September 2011, the District Court (1) dismissed all claims by
the health care provider and medical association plaintiffs for
lack of standing; and (2) dismissed the antitrust claims, the New
Jersey state law claims and the ERISA disclosure claim. In
January 2013 and again in April 2014, the District Court denied
separate motions by the plaintiffs to certify a nationwide class
of subscriber plaintiffs. The Third Circuit denied plaintiffs'
request for an immediate appeal of the January 2013 ruling.

As a result, the case is proceeding on behalf of the named
plaintiffs only. In June 2014, the District Court granted the
Company's motion for summary judgment to terminate all claims,
and denied the plaintiffs' partial motion for summary judgment.
In July 2014, the plaintiffs appealed all of the District Court's
decisions in favor of the Company, including the class
certification decision, to the Third Circuit.  On May 2, 2016,
the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's decisions denying
class certification for the claims asserted by members, the
granting of summary judgment on the individual plaintiffs'
claims, as well as the dismissal of the antitrust claims.
However, the Third Circuit also reversed the earlier dismissal of
the providers' ERISA claims.

The Company will continue to vigorously defend its position.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Cigna Health Corporation provides managed medical, pharmacy, and
dental care insurance. The company offers integrated indemnity
and group life and health insurance for employees. The company is
based in Bloomfield, Connecticut.


COLORADO: Denial of "Sutton" Class Certification Recommended
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOSHUA LAMONT SUTTON, Plaintiff, v. LT. HYDENTHAL,
LT. RILEY, MR. CELLA, SGT. TAYLOR, MRS. SANTOS, and MRS. MILLER,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 17-cv-02191-RM-MJW (D. Col.),
Magistrate Judge Michael J. Watanabe of the U.S. District Court
for the District of Colorado recommended that the Plaintiff's
Declared Motion for Class Action Certification - Due to Pending
Motion for Counsel be denied.

The case is before the Court pursuant to an Order Referring Case
entered by Judge Raymond P. Moore on Feb. 12, 2018.  Now before
the Court is the Plaintiff's Declared Motion for Class Action
Certification - Due to Pending Motion for Counsel.  The
Defendants have not filed a response.  Judge Moore referred the
subject motion to the Magistrate Judge on Feb. 26, 2018.

The Court has carefully considered the motion.  It has taken
judicial notice of the Court's file and has considered the
applicable Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and case law.

The Plaintiff seeks to certify a class action regarding the
allegedly unlawful conduct that occurred while he was
incarcerated at the Arrowhead Correctional Center.  His Second
Amended Complaint asserts two claims for relief: (1) the Section
1983 claims asserted against Defendants Hydenthal, Riley, Taylor,
Santos and Miller, in their individual capacities, for violation
of his rights under the First Amendment free exercise clause, the
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause, and for
unconstitutional retaliation; and, (2) the Section 1983 claims
asserted against Defendant Cella, in his individual capacity, for
unconstitutional retaliation.

Magistrate Judge Watanabe finds that the Plaintiff has not met
his burden under Rule 23.  Indeed, he failed to establish the
first prerequisite.  He say in order to meet the numerosity
requirement, the Plaintiff needed to only define the class
adequately and then establish that the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impractical.  In neither his Second
Amended Complaint nor the subject motion does the Plaintiff even
allege, much less establish, the number of inmates, Muslim or
otherwise, that were affected by the allegedly unconstitutional
conduct. He therefore cannot demonstrate that the joinder of
these inmates is impracticable.

Because the Plaintiff has not met the very first threshold
requirement, the Magistrate Judge declines to consider whether he
has established the commonality, typicality, and representational
requirements.

Wherefore, he recommended that the Plaintiff's Declared Motion
for Class Action Certification - Due to Pending Motion for
Counsel be denied.  Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(C)
and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2), the parties have  14 days after
service of the recommendation to serve and file specific written
objections to the recommendation with the District Judge assigned
to the case.  A party may respond to another party's objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy.  The District
Judge needs not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general
objections.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 4, 2018 Report and
Recommendation is available at https://bit.ly/2r9RFyg from
Leagle.com.

Joshua Lamont Sutton, Plaintiff, pro se.

TO THE CASE MANAGER/INMATE COORDINATOR OF: Joshua Lamont Sutton
#96416, Interested Party, pro se.


COMPLETE BUILDING: Faces FCCI Insurance Suit in D. South Carolina
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Complete Building
Corporation. The case is styled as FCCI Insurance Company,
Plaintiff v. Complete Building Corporation, Palmetto Pointe at
Peas Island Condominium Property Owners Association Inc and Jack
Love, individually, on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-01458-MBS (D. S.C., May 29, 2018).

Complete Building Corporation provides building and construction
services. The Company offers design, preconstruction, site
supervision, general contracting, construction management, and
value engineering services. Complete Building serves customers in
the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   William James Flynn, Esq.
   Goodman McGuffey LLP
   1320 Main Street, Suite 300
   Columbia, SC 29201
   Tel: (803) 470-5016
   Fax: (855) 642-5952
   Email: jflynn@GM-LLP.com


CONSOL ENERGY: Pennsylvania Coal Named as Defendant in "Casey"
--------------------------------------------------------------
Consol Energy Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
March 31, 2018, that CONSOL Pennsylvania Coal Company, LLC has
been added as defendant in a class action lawsuit.

A class action lawsuit was filed on August 23, 2017 on behalf of
two nonunion retired coal miners against CCC, COK, CONSOL
Buchanan Mining Co., LLC and Kurt Salvatori in West Virginia
Federal Court alleging ERISA violations in the termination of
retiree health care benefits. Filed by the same lawyers who filed
the Fitzwater litigation, and raising nearly identical claims,
the Plaintiffs contend they relied to their detriment on oral
promises of "lifetime health benefits" allegedly made by various
members of management during Plaintiffs' employment and that they
were not provided with copies of Summary Plan Documents clearly
reserving to the Company the right to modify or terminate the
Retiree Health and Welfare Plan.

Plaintiffs request that retiree health benefits be reinstated for
them and their dependents and seek to represent a class of all
nonunion retirees of any ParentCo subsidiary that operated or
employed individuals in McDowell or Mercer Counties, West
Virginia, or Buchanan or Tazewell Counties, Virginia whose
retiree welfare benefits were terminated.

On December 1, 2017, the trial court judge in Fitzwater signed an
order to consolidate Fitzwater with Casey. The Casey complaint
was amended on March 1, 2018 to add new plaintiffs, add defendant
CONSOL Pennsylvania Coal Company, LLC and eliminate defendant
CONSOL Buchanan Mining Co., LLC in an attempt to expand the class
of retirees.

Consol Energy Inc. is a leading, low-cost producer of high-
quality bituminous coal, focused on the extraction and
preparation of coal in the Appalachian Basin due to the company's
ability to efficiently produce and deliver large volumes of high-
quality coal at competitive prices, the strategic location of its
mines, and the industry experience of its management team. The
company is based in Canonsburg, Pennsylvania.


CORECIVIC INC: Court Won't Consolidate "Gonzalez" and "Owino"
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CARLOS GONZALEZ, JUAN JOSE MERINO-RODAS, MARIBEL
GUTIERREZ-DUARTE, and JENNYE PAGOADA-LOPEZ, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
CORECIVIC, INC., Defendant, Case No. 17-CV-2573 JLS (NLS) (S.D.
Cal.), Judge Janis L. Sammartino of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of California (i) denied the Gonzalez
Plaintiffs' Motion to Consolidate, and (ii) stayed the case
pending the outcome of the Owino Plaintiffs' future class
certification.

The Court permitted the plaintiffs in a related matter, Owino v.
CoreCivic, 17-CV-1112, to intervene for the limited purpose of
filing an opposition to the Gonzalez Plaintiffs' Motion to
Consolidate the two class actions.  Accordingly, the Owino
Plaintiffs filed a Response in Opposition, as did the Defendant,
to the Gonzalez Plaintiffs' Motion.  The Gonzalez Plaintiffs
filed a Reply in Support of their Motion.

The case involves two related class actions.  On May 31, 2017,
Owino Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against the
Defendant in the Court.  The Owino Plaintiffs are former civil
immigration detainees and allege they were paid $1 a day for
labor while they were interred at the Defendant's Otay Mesa
Detention Facility.  They also allege that other detainees were
forced to work for no pay.  Owino Plaintiffs seek to certify a
class of all civil immigration detainees who performed Forced
Labor uncompensated work for CoreCivic at any Detention Facility
owned or operated by it between Nov. 2, 2004 to the applicable
opt-out date, inclusive.

On Dec. 27, 2017, the Gonzalez Plaintiffs filed a second putative
class action lawsuit against the Defendant in the Southern
District.  The case was transferred from Judge Anthony J.
Battaglia's calendar to the Court pursuant to Civil Local Rule
40.1.  The Gonzalez Plaintiffs, like the Owino Plaintiffs, are
former civil immigration detainees housed at the Defendant's Otay
Mesa facility.  They allege that they received $1 or $1.50 a day
for their labor at the detention facility.  The Gonzales
Plaintiffs seek to certify classes, including all civil
immigration detainees who performed work for CoreCivic at the
Otay Mesa Detention Center in the Work Program within the past 10
years.

The Gonzalez Plaintiffs argue that their action involves common
questions of law and fact such that consolidation of their action
with the Owino action would be appropriate.  Both the Owino
Plaintiffs and the Defendant argue that the Court should exercise
its discretion to dismiss, rather than consolidate, the Gonzalez
action because the Gonzalez action is duplicative of the Owino
action.  In response, the Gonzalez Plaintiffs argue that
dismissal of their action would be inappropriate because the two
actions are not duplicative.

Judge Sammartino finds that agrees with the Owino Plaintiffs and
the Defendant.  Both cases arise from the same transactional
nucleus of fact.  Both cases argue that the Defendant is not
following California minimum wage laws and both cases argue that
the Defendant coerces its detainees to participate in a work
program at its Otay Mesa detention facility.  Both cases bring
similar causes of action and request similar relief.  Indeed, the
entire bases for the Gonzalez Plaintiffs' Motion of Consolidation
are the common questions of law and fact.  The test is not, as
the Gonzalez Plaintiffs suggest, whether the two cases are
exactly identical.  The test is transactional.  Here, it is
clearly met -- the facts are duplicative.

The Judge also finds that the Owino Plaintiffs have not been
certified as a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.
Instead, Owino is a proposed class action.  He agrees with the
Gonzalez Plaintiffs that the Owino action cannot bind nonparties,
like the Gonzalez Plaintiffs.  Because the Owino action does not
have preclusive effect against the Gonzalez Plaintiffs, the
claim-splitting rule must also fail.  The Judge finds that
dismissing the Gonzalez action is not appropriate at this time,
given the early stage of the Owino action and that its class has
not been certified.

The Judge is under no illusion as to the stakes of the Motion.
The Gonzalez Plaintiffs filed a nearly identical cause of action
as the Owino Plaintiffs, seek to consolidate the cases, and wrest
control of interim class counsel from the Owino Plaintiffs.  The
Owino Plaintiffs and the Defendant seek to dismiss the later-
filed action as duplicative to send a strong message against
copy-cat filings.  The truth lies somewhere in between.  Thus, he
exercises his discretion to chart a course between the two
positions.  He will stay the case pending the outcome of the
Owino Plaintiffs' future class certification.  At such a time,
the Gonzalez Plaintiffs may request appropriate relief from the
stay.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 4, 2018 Order is available
at https://bit.ly/2Kq0M62 from Leagle.com.

Carlos Gonzalez, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Juan Jose Merino-Rodas, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Maribel Gutierrez-
Canchola, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Gladys Carrera-Duarte, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated & Jennye Pagoada-Lopez,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Daniel Henry Charest --
dcharest@burnscharest.com -- Burns Charest LLP, pro hac vice,
Korey Arthur Nelson -- knelson@burnscharest.com -- Burns Charest
LLP, pro hac vice, Lydia A. Wright -- lwright@burnscharest.com --
Burns Charest LLP, pro hac vice, Matthew Robert Freda, Law Office
of R. Andrew Free, pro hac vice, Nicole Elizabeth Ramos, Seccion
Jardines, Playas de Tijuana, pro hac vice, Robert R. Ahdoot --
RAhdoot@ahdootwolfson.com -- Ahdoot and Wolfson APC, Robert
Andrew Free, Law Office of R. Andrew Free, pro hac vice, Tina
Wolfson -- twolfson@ahdootwolfson.com -- Ahdoot and Wolfson PC,
Vanessa Tamara Shakib -- vshakib@ahdootwolfson.com -- Ahdoot and
Wolfson PC, Warren Tavares Burns --  wburns@burnscharest.com --
Burns Charest LLP, pro hac vice & William B. Thompson --
wthompson@burnscharest.com -- Burns Charest LLP.

Sylvester Owino & Jonathan Gomez, Intervenor Plaintiffs,
represented by Robert L. Teel -- contact@universaljustice.org --
Law Office of Robert L. Teel, Eileen Regina Ridley --
eridley@foley.com -- Foley and Lardner LLP & Nicholas J. Fox --
nfox@foley.com -- Foley & Lardner, LLP.

CoreCivic, Inc., Defendant, represented by Ashlee Beth Fletcher ,
Struck Love Bojanowski & Acedo, PLC, pro hac vice, Daniel P.
Struck -- dstruck@strucklove.com -- Struck Love Bojanowski &
Acedo, PLC, pro hac vice, Ethan H. Nelson --
ethannelsonesq@gmail.com -- Law Office of Ethan H. Nelson,
Nicholas D. Acedo -- nacedo@strucklove.com -- Struck Love
Bojanowski & Acedo, PLC, pro hac vice & Rachel Love --
rlove@strucklove.com -- Struck Love Bojanowski & Acedo, PLC, pro
hac vice.


CVS PHARMACY: Zimmerman Law Compelled to Produce Docs in "Worth"
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, JEFFREY WORTH and ROBERT BURNS on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CVS
PHARMACY, INC., Defendant. MARIO ALIANO, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CVS PHARMACY, INC.,
Defendant, Case Nos. 16-CV-0498 (FB) (SMG), 16-CV-2624 (FB) (SMG)
(E.D. N.Y.), Magistrate Judge Steven M. Gold of the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of New York granted Worth
Plaintiffs' motion to compel the production of documents
responsive to a subpoena served on Zimmerman Law Offices by April
17, 2018.

Zimmerman Law Office is ordered to produce documents reflecting
(1) any amounts Zimmerman billed Mr. Aliano for representation in
Ortega, (2) the number of hours of legal services it provided in
Ortega, and (3) the date and amount of any payments Mr. Aliano
paid to the Zimmerman firm for its services in Ortega.

Intervenor Plaintiffs Worth and Burns ("Worth plaintiffs") move
to compel the production of documents responsive to a subpoena
served on Zimmerman Law Offices, the counsel for Aliano
("Plaintiff").  The requested documents relate to Aliano's
pending motion for preliminary approval of a class settlement
and, more specifically, they concern the Worth Plaintiffs'
objections to that motion.

The Court held a conference on Oct. 23, 2017, at which attorneys
for Aliano, Defendant CVS, and the Worth Plaintiffs were present.
At the conference the parties discussed, among other things, the
Worth Plaintiffs' argument that Aliano may not have standing to
pursue the action.

After hearing argument on Aliano's pending motion and the Worth
Plaintiffs' objections to it, the Magistrate Judge allowed the
Worth Plaintiffs to obtain discovery related to questions about
Aliano's standing.  In addition, the Magistrate Judge afforded
the parties the opportunity to file additional briefing or other
material for the Court's consideration in connection with the
pending motions.

In several of their earlier submissions, the Worth Plaintiffs
have raised concerns about Aliano's relationship with his
counsel, Zimmerman.  In addition to the cases in which Aliano has
served as a plaintiff and been represented by Zimmerman, the
Worth Plaintiffs have identified at least one case in which
Zimmerman defended Aliano in a lawsuit: an action arising under
the Fair Labor Standards Act and filed in the Northern District
of Illinois, Ortega v. Due Fratelli, Inc. & Mario Aliano, 14-CV-
6669 (Ortega).

The Worth Plaintiffs, apparently reasoning that a financial
relationship between Zimmerman and Aliano might bear upon
Aliano's suitability as a class representative, asked Aliano at
his deposition about whether he paid Zimmerman to represent him
in Ortega.  Aliano testified that he could not remember whether
he had a retainer agreement with Zimmerman, whether he paid for
Zimmerman's representation on an hourly basis, or whether he paid
Zimmerman anything at all.

Among the other documents they sought pursuant to the Court's
Dec. 15, 2017 order, the Worth Plaintiffs served a subpoena on
Zimmerman demanding all documents reflecting any payments between
it and Mario Aliano related to its representation of Mr. Aliano
in the matter, or any other matter.  In the present motion, the
Worth Plaintiffs have narrowed their request, and now ask the
Court to order the Zimmerman firm to produce documents reflecting
any amounts the Zimmerman firm billed Mr. Aliano for
representation in Ortega, the number of hours and nature of the
services it provided, and the date and amount of any payments Mr.
Aliano rendered for the Zimmerman firm's services.

Zimmerman contends that the documents sought by the Worth
Plaintiffs are beyond the scope of discovery.

Magistrate Judge Gold finds Zimmerman's contention unpersuasive.
He explains that it is true that a number of courts have
addressed the question of whether fee arrangements between named
plaintiffs and class counsel are discoverable, and that most have
denied motions to compel documents relating to those
arrangements.  These cases are distinguishable, though, in that
they each involve efforts to discover the fee arrangements
between the class counsel and the class representatives in the
class action itself, and not in an unrelated action.

Moreover, he says, none of these cases, and none of the others on
which Zimmerman relies, have articulated a categorical rule
against the type of discovery the Worth Plaintiffs seek.  To the
contrary, each recognizes the possibility that a party may take
discovery of fee arrangements if that party makes a sufficient
showing of relevance.

The Magistrate Judge holds that the Worth Plaintiffs have made a
sufficient showing to warrant the discovery they seek.  The Worth
plaintiffs have identified a civil litigation brought against
Aliano in which he was represented by Zimmerman.  The action
proceeded for a substantial period of time, involved multiple
court appearances, and required Zimmerman to submit opposition to
a motion for summary judgment.  Accordingly, Zimmerman's
representation in that action either resulted in significant fees
being billed, or reflects a relationship between Zimmerman and
Aliano that led Zimmerman to handle the matter without charge.
The Worth Plaintiffs attempted to learn about the fee arrangement
between Zimmerman and Aliano at Aliano's deposition, but Aliano
testified that he did not remember anything about it.

Aliano's suitability as a class representative would be called
into question if Aliano is so closely associated with Zimmerman
that Zimmerman would defend him without charge, or if Aliano owes
Zimmerman substantial funds for legal services rendered but has
not paid his bill.

As these holdings demonstrate, financial relationships between a
putative class representative and a proposed lead counsel are
appropriately examined where there is a specific factual basis
for doing so.  Here, where Zimmerman represented Aliano when he
was sued for wage and hour violations, and where Aliano has
testified that he recalls nothing about his fee arrangement with
Zimmerman, a specific factual basis for the discovery sought has
been established.  The Magistrate Judge notes as well that it
should be a relatively simple and inexpensive exercise for the
Zimmerman firm to access its own recent financial records and
respond to the subpoena at issue.

For all these reasons, Magistrate Judge Gold granted the Worth
Plaintiffs' motion to the following extent: by April 17, 2018,
Zimmerman Law Office is ordered to produce documents reflecting
(1) any amounts Zimmerman billed Mr. Aliano for representation in
Ortega, (2) the number of hours of legal services it provided in
Ortega, and (3) the date and amount of any payments Mr. Aliano
paid to the Zimmerman firm for its services in Ortega.  If, in
light of the Order, the Worth Plaintiffs wish to supplement or
amend their submissions in connection with the pending motion for
preliminary approval, they may do so within two weeks of
receiving Zimmerman's production.  Any reply Zimmerman wishes to
make is due one week thereafter.

A copy of the Court's April 3, 2018 Order is available at
https://bit.ly/2HL6IYN from Leagle.com.

Truth In Advertising, Inc., Movant, represented by Sean Michael
Fisher -- sfisher@bswlaw.com -- Brenner Saltzman & Wallman LLP.

Mario Aliano, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Amelia Susan Newton --
anewton@srcattorneys.com -- Zimmerman Law Offices, P.C., Jordan
Rudnick, Zimmerman Law Offices, P.C., Matthew C. De Re, Zimmerman
Law Offices, P.c., Thomas A. Zimmerman , Zimmerman Law Offices,
P.C., Thomas A. Zimmerman, Zimmerman Law Offices, P.C., pro hac
vice & Sharon Harris, Zimmerman Law Offices, P.C.

Jeff Worth & Robert Burns, Intervenor Plaintiffs, represented by
Craig L. Briskin -- cbriskin@findjustice.com -- Mehri & Skalet,
PLLC & Michael Robert Reese , Reese LLP.

CVS Pharmacy Inc., a Rhode Island Corporation, Defendant,
represented by John Robert Robertson --
robby.robertson@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells US LLP,
Courtney Lynne Colligan -- courtney.colligan@hoganlovells.com --
Hogan Lovells LLP & Frank Thomas Spano, Polsinelli PC.


DHL EXPRESS: Faces "Burbon" Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against DHL Express (USA),
Inc. The case is styled as Luc Burbon, on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. DHL Express (USA),
Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-04787 (S.D. N.Y., May 30,
2018).

DHL Express (USA), Inc., doing business as DHL Express, provides
international express, air and ocean freight, road and rail
transportation, contract logistics, warehousing and distribution,
and international mail services to customers in the United States
and internationally. Its express services include shipping,
tracking, export, import, optional, and small business solutions;
and logistics services include freight transportation,
warehousing and distribution, customs, security and insurance,
and supply chain solutions. The company also provides online
shipment management solutions in Qatar.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


DICK'S SPORTING: To Provide Social Security Nos. in "Greer"
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JIMMY GREER, individually, and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. DICK'S SPORTING GOODS, INC., a
Delaware corporation; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,
Defendants, Case Nos. 2:15-cv-01063-KJM-CKD, 34-2015-00176790
(E.D. Cal.), Judge Kimberly J. Mueller of the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of California has entered an order
directing the Defendant to only provide social security numbers
as needed to the class action administrator ("CPT") for the
purpose of running a "skip trace."

On March 15, 2018, the Court issued an order requiring the
Defendant to provide class information, including the social
security numbers of past and current employees of the Defendant,
to the CPT.  The Parties have met and conferred, and out of
deference to the protection of employee privacy, the Plaintiff
and his attorneys have confirmed that they will not receive or
review any social security numbers pertaining to the class.

The CPT has stated that the CPT does not need employee social
security numbers in order to mail out class notice; and would
only use social security numbers for the purpose of running a
"skip trace" if mail is determined to be undeliverable.

Therefore, the parties agreed and stipulate, and Judge Mueller
approved, that the Defendant will only provide social security
numbers as needed to the CPT for the purpose of running a "skip
trace."  They The Parties agree that neither the Defendant nor
the CPT, will not disclose any of the class social security
numbers to the Plaintiff or his counsel.

A copy of the Court's April 3, 2018 Order is available at
https://bit.ly/2vIKHot from Leagle.com.

Jimmy Greer, Plaintiff, represented by Melissa Grant --
melissa.grant@capstonelawyers.com -- Capstone Law APC, Robert J.
Drexler -- Robert.Drexler@Capstonelawyers.com -- Capstone Law
APC, Bevin Elaine Allen Pike -- Bevin.Pike@capstonelawyers.com --
Capstone Law APC & Jonathan Sing Lee --
Jonathan.Lee@capstonelawyers.com -- Capstone Law APC.

Dick's Sporting Goods, Inc., Defendant, represented by Paul S.
Cowie -- pcowie@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard Mullin, Africa
Reanne Swafford -- rswafford-harris@sheppardmullin.com --
Sheppard Mullin Richter, et al. & Caryn F. Horner --
chorner@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton
LLP.


DOONEY & BOURKE: Faces "Conner" Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Dooney & Bourke,
Inc. The case is styled as Mary Conner, individually and as the
representative of a class of similarly situated persons,
Plaintiff v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-
04708 (S.D. N.Y., May 29, 2018).

Dooney & Bourke is a company specializing in fashion accessories,
such as handbags, iPod cases, luggage, bracelets, watches, and
briefcases, as well as a limited clothing line, which includes
sweaters, shoes, jackets, and scarves.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Dan Shaked, Esq.
   Shaked Law Group P.C.
   44 Court Street, Suite 1217
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 373-9128
   Fax: (718) 504-7555
   Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com


DWWNVJHF LLC: Court Approves Stipulation Dismissing "Christy"
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Nevada
approved the stipulation dismissing the case captioned DUANE
CHRISTY, Plaintiff, v. DWWNVJHF, LLC d/b/a DAVID WILSON'S TOYOTA
OF LAS VEGAS, DAVID WILSON'S TOYOTA OF LAS VEGAS AND JOHN DOES 1
THROUGH 10, Inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-00227-APG-VCF
(D. Nev.).

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 5, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y85ty699 from Leagle.com.

Duane Christy, Plaintiff, represented by Armand Fried.

DWWNVJHF, doing business as David Wilson's Toyota of Las Vegas &
David Wilson's Toyota of Las Vegas, Defendants, represented by
Ryan J. Lorenz -- rlorenz@clarkhill.com -- Clark Hill PLC.


EDWARD D. JONES: Faces "Burbon" Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Edward D. Jones &
Co., L.P. The case is styled as Luc Burbon, on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Edward D. Jones &
Co., L.P., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-04634 (S.D. N.Y., May 24,
2018).

Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P., since 1995 simplified as Edward
Jones, is a financial services firm headquartered in Des Peres,
Missouri, United States and serves investment clients in the U.S.
and Canada, through its branch network of more than 14,000
locations and currently has relationships with nearly 7 million
clients and $1 trillion in assets under management worldwide.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


EMERSON ELECTRIC: Ct. Issues Oral Argument Questions in "Creech"
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio, Western Division, issued Propose Questions for Oral
Argument scheduled on Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification
in the case captioned ERNEST McCOWN CREECH, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. EMERSON ELECTRIC
CO., et al., Defendants, Case No. 3:15-cv-14 (S.D. Ohio).

The Defendants argue that, under Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v.
Superior Court of California, 137 S.Ct. 1773 (2017), the Court
lacks personal jurisdiction over claims of non-resident class
members.  In response, the Plaintiff argues that the Defendants
have waived any challenges to personal jurisdiction, and are
barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel from asserting this
argument.

One of the major issues appears to be whether the Missouri
Merchandising Practices Act applies extraterritorially.
Certification of a nationwide consumer protection class hinges on
this issue.

The Defendants suggest that more than half of the proposed class
members are completely unaffected by the defect in the
thermostats and, accordingly, would obtain no benefit from any
injunctive relief ordered by the Court.

In the event the Court does not certify a nationwide consumer
protection class, the Plaintiffs ask the Court to certify an
alternative multi-state consumer protection class. The Defendants
argue, however, that, as a resident of North Carolina, the
Plaintiff is not a member of that alternative multi-state
consumer protection class.

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff waived the ability to
pursue class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) by failing to
respond to the Defendants' argument, in the previous Motion to
Strike Class Allegations, that damage claims predominated.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 5, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yag287qu
from Leagle.com.

Ernest Creech, Plaintiff, represented by Robert R. Sparks --
rrsparks@strausstroy.com -- Strauss Troy Co., LPA, Jonathan B.
Cohen -- jcohen@forthepeople.com -- Morgan & Morgan Complex
Litigation Group, pro hac vice, Marisa Kendra Glassman, Moran &
Morgan Complex Litigation Group, pro hac vice & Rachel Soffin,
Morgan & Morgan Complex Litigation Group, pro hac vice.

White-Rodgers, Defendant, represented by Timothy G. Pepper --
pepper@taftlaw.com -- TAFT STETTINIUS & HOLLISTER LLP & Patrick
D. McVey, Fox Rothschild LLP, pro hac vice.

Emerson Electric Co., Defendant, represented by Timothy G. Pepper
- pepper@taftlaw.com -- TAFT STETTINIUS & HOLLISTER LLP.


EQT PRODUCTION: Faces "Starkey" Suit in N.D. West Virginia
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against EQT Production
Company. The case is styled as John S. Starkey and all other
persons and entities similarly situated, Plaintiff v. EQT
Production Company and Stone Energy Corporation, Defendants, Case
No. 5:18-cv-00094-JPB (N.D. W.V., May 24, 2018).

EQT Production Company produces, drills, explores, sells, and
develops oil and natural gas. The company owns and operates
approximately 3.4 million acres in production in Kentucky, West
Virginia, Virginia, and Pennsylvania and 13,000 miles of
pipeline.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Christopher J. Regan, Esq.
   Bordas & Bordas, PLLC
   1358 National Rd
   Wheeling, WV 26003
   Tel: (304) 242-8410
   Fax: (304) 242-3936
   Email: cregan@bordaslaw.com

      - and -

   James G. Bordas, Jr., Esq.
   Bordas & Bordas, PLLC
   1358 National Rd
   Wheeling, WV 26003
   Tel: (304) 242-8410
   Fax: (304) 242-3936
   Email: jbordas@bordaslaw.com

      - and -

   Jeremy M McGraw, Esq.
   Bordas & Bordas
   1358 National Road
   Wheeling, WV 26003
   Tel: (304) 242-8410
   Email: jeremy@bordaslaw.com


FACEBOOK INC: Wins Summary Judgment in "Gullen" Suit
----------------------------------------------------
In the case, FREDERICK WILLIAM GULLEN, Plaintiff, v. FACEBOOK,
INC., Defendant, Case No. 3:16-cv-00937-JD (N.D. Cal.), Judge
James Donato of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California granted Facebook's motion for summary judgment as
to Gullen.

In the putative class action, Plaintiff Gullen alleges that the
Defendant violated the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act
by collecting his biometric identifiers without notice or
consent.  Facebook has moved for summary judgment on a number of
grounds and in the companion case In re Facebook Biometric
Privacy Litigation.

In a "supplemental brief" directed entirely to Gullen's case,
Facebook says that his claims are based on a single photograph
uploaded to an organizational, as opposed to personal, page, and
that Facebook did not use its facial recognition technology for
that page.  Since Gullen has not raised any genuine dispute about
this fact, Judge Donato granted the motion on this ground.  The
Judge does not reach any of Facebook's other arguments in the
supplemental brief or other summary judgment papers.

The Judge explains that the dispositive material facts in the
matter are straightforward, and Gullen has not shown that they
are in dispute.  Gullen concedes that he has identified only two
photos of himself on Facebook.  One was taken in Pennsylvania and
uploaded in Michigan.  The other was uploaded to an
organizational account -- a Facebook page run by an organization,
rather than an individual.  At the summary judgment hearing,
Gullen confirmed that his claims are based solely on the
organizational page photograph.

The record shows that Facebook does not use facial recognition
technology on photos uploaded to organizational accounts.
Facebook submitted a declaration from software engineer Omry
Yadan stating that facial recognition is not performed on photos
that are posted on business or other organization Facebook Pages.
While Gullen criticizes the declaration as self-serving, he
offers no facts or evidence to call that statement into question.
Gullen says that much of Mr. Yadan's declaration directly
contradicts his earlier testimony, but that is a purely
conclusory assertion, and Gullen never explains which part of
Yadan's declaration may be subject to genuine dispute.

Judge Donato holds that this state of the record is enough to
terminate Gullen's claims, and his suggestion that summary
judgment should be deferred to allow for more discovery is
unavailing.  Gullen professes surprise at Yadan's declaration,
and says he would like to re-open Yadan's deposition to ask him
about the organizational page practices and require him to
identify the specific source code supporting his testimony.  The
problem with this request is that by December 2016, Facebook had
already produced documents stating that Facebook does not apply
facial recognition to photographs uploaded to the Facebook
organizational pages.  Gullen had ample opportunity to conduct
discovery on organizational pages, and he has not shown that the
discovery he now seeks was in any way unavailable to him in the
normal course of litigation.

Even so, the record does not indicate that Yadan said anything
inconsistent or untruthful about Facebook's practices for
organizational pages.  Yadan testified during his deposition that
not all photos uploaded to Facebook undergo facial recognition.
Even giving Gullen every benefit of the doubt, the excerpt again
does not inherently contradict the Yadan declaration or other
evidence in the record with respect to Facebook's organizational
page practices.

On the record before the Court, Gullen has failed to show that a
genuine dispute exists as to whether Facebook runs facial
recognition on photos uploaded to organizational pages.
Therefore, Judge Donato granted Facebook's motion for summary
judgment as to Gullen.

A copy of the Court's April 3, 2018 Order is available at
https://bit.ly/2Kf03o2 from Leagle.com.

Frederick William Gullen, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Albert Y. Chang --
achang@bottinilaw.com -- Bottini and Bottini, Inc., David Philip
Milian -- dmilian@careyrodriguez.com -- Carey Rodriguez Milian
Gonya LLP, pro hac vice, Francis A. Bottini, Jr. --
fbottini@bottinilaw.com -- Bottini & Bottini, Inc. & Frank S.
Hedin -- fhedin@careyrodriguez.com -- Hedin Hall LLP.

Facebook, Inc., Defendant, represented by Archis Ashok
Parasharami -- aparasharami@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown LLP,
pro hac vice, Lauren R. Goldman -- lrgoldman@mayerbrown.com --
Mayer Brown Llp, pro hac vice, Matthew David Provance --
mprovance@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown LLP, pro hac vice,
Michael E. Rayfield -- mrayfield@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown
LLP, pro hac vice, Vincent Connelly -- vconnelly@mayerbrown.com -
- Mayer Brown LLP, pro hac vice & John Nadolenco --
jnadolenco@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown LLP.

Clayton P. Zellmer, Interested Party, represented by Albert Y.
Chang, Bottini and Bottini, Inc.


FACEBOOK INC: B.C. Court Clears Way for "Douez" Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
Jason Proctor, writing for CBC News, reports that a Vancouver
woman says she's thrilled B.C.'s Court of Appeal has removed a
final legal hurdle in her years-long struggle to launch a
privacy-related class action lawsuit against Facebook.

Debbie Douez first filed a claim in B.C. Supreme Court in 2012
alleging the social media giant had violated B.C.'s privacy laws
by using her image -- and those of others -- through its now-
defunct "sponsored stories" program.

The case has travelled all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada
and back.

B.C.'s appeal court dismissed an appeal by Facebook claiming the
terms of the proposed suit were vague and that the class action
process itself was not the best to pursue Douez's concerns.

She says recent revelations about the misuse of the data Facebook
collects from users have only served to heighten the issues at
play.

"It's wonderful timing, because I think it will help people
understand how potentially dangerous it is to have our data out
there," she said.

"This is the one judgment I've been waiting for six years. So I
can finally breathe -- but it's a sigh of relief -- and go: 'Ok,
here we go now. Now we can begin.'"

'Quasi-constitutional privacy rights'

Sponsored stories appeared as part of Facebook's content from
January 2011 to May 2014.

According to the judgment, a "sponsored story, like other
advertisements, would appear on a member's news feed."

"The advertisement was accompanied by a statement that a member
(whose name and profile picture were shown) liked the product,
service, or entity advertised," the decision read.

"A sponsored story would only appear on the news feeds of the
friends of the member whose endorsement was used."

Facebook didn't pay for the endorsements or advise members that
their 'likes' were being used.

Douez claims the use of her image and name in a sponsored story
is a violation of B.C.'s Privacy Act, which says consent is
needed to use the "name or portrait" of another person for
advertising or promotion.

The case climbed to the Supreme Court of Canada over the issue of
jurisdiction: Facebook argued that the case would best be heard
in California, where the company has its head office.

But Canada's top court found a need to deal with "quasi-
constitutional privacy rights" in the province where class
members live. The judges also cited the "grossly uneven
bargaining power" between the parties.

What is a 'real name' anyway?
In the latest appeal, Facebook argued that certain terms of the
class definition were vague. At one point, the company argued
that talking about "real" names was difficult in a forum where
people frequently use nicknames.

The company also claimed that the issue of consent could not be
determined on a class-wide basis.

But the appeal court said "much of the experience of Facebook
users is common," including the way terms of use are presented
and the way settings and new programs are communicated.

The appeal court's ruling means the class action lawsuit will now
return to B.C. Supreme Court to deal with notice requirements and
any other outstanding aspects of the certification.

The class action definition reached by the appeal court applies
to:

"All British Columbia resident "natural persons who were Members
of Facebook at any time in the period from January 1, 2011, to
May 30, 2014, and:

(a) who at any time during this period were registered with
Facebook using their real name, or had a profile picture that
included an identifiable self-image, or both; and
(b) whose real name, identifiable portrait, or both were used by
Facebook in a Sponsored Story.

'No one else knows'
Douez says the wording means that pretty much any British
Columbian who used Facebook at the time will be included, unless
they opt out.

She says the lower courts have also previously determined the
best way of notifying people: through Facebook.

"Because they're only ones who know who's been affected by the
advertising campaign," she said. "No one else knows."

Facebook made its initial public offering in the same year Douez
first filed.

The company's shares have been rocked by recent revelations about
privacy breaches during the run-up to the 2016 presidential
election involving the use of Facebook data to build
psychological profiles of voters.

But, they returned to pre-scandal levels.

A previous class action lawsuit over sponsored stories resulted
in a $20 million settlement in the United States. The company
dropped the program the following year.

According to the appeal court ruling, Facebook has not filed a
response to Douez' claim.

But the decision says the company "will allege that Facebook
members consented to the use of their names and portraits in
advertising as a result of their acceptance of the social
network's terms of use, as well as by other online actions they
performed."[GN]




FACEBOOK INC: Judge OKs Class Notice Plan in Privacy Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
Nicholas Iovino, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports
that a federal judge on May 14 refused to delay notifying up to 6
million Facebook users about a $30 billion privacy suit against
the social network unless it can prove completing the task in
nine days would be "literally impossible."

"I want to see a detailed explanation from the engineer who knows
this who says it's literally impossible to post a jewel notice
with less than two weeks notice," U.S. District Judge James
Donato said in court Monday.

Lawyers for a class of up to 6 million Facebook users in Illinois
asked the court to make the social network notify the class
through emails, newsfeed posts, and "jewel" notifications, or
Facebook alerts.

A Facebook lawyer argued requiring both newsfeed posts and jewel
notices would be redundant and unnecessary. Donato disagreed.

"They may be duplicative, but our goal here is to give notice,
and it's reasonable in my view to do that," Donato said.

The judge is trying to streamline class notification and deciding
pretrial evidentiary motions before a jury trial set to start on
July 9.

Facebook is accused of collecting and storing the facial geometry
of users for its "Photo Tag Suggest" function, launched in 2011,
without permission from users and in violation of a 2008 Illinois
privacy law.

On May 14, both sides argued over which users should be notified
about the lawsuit. Donato said a person who uploaded photos while
visiting Illinois or stopping at O'Hare International Airport in
Chicago shouldn't necessarily be included in the class or
informed about the suit.

"Let's be common sensical about this," Donato said. "It's an
Illinois state law for Illinois state people. If you're passing
through O'Hare or Peoria, you're not an Illinois person."

Facebook can figure out how long its users spent in Illinois
based on IP addresses and other data used to pinpoint users'
locations for advertising purposes, according to Facebook's
lawyer Archis Parasharami, Esq. -- aparasharami@mayerbrown.com --
of Mayer Brown in Washington.

Plaintiffs' attorney Shawn Williams, Esq. -- shawnw@grdlaw.com --
of Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd in San Francisco, suggested that
users who stayed in Illinois for at least one month should be
notified about the suit. Parasharami, in turn, asked for a six-
month residency requirement.

Both sides compromised on notifying users who lived in Illinois
for at least 60 consecutive days starting on June 7, 2011, when
Facebook launched its "Photo Tag Suggest" function.

Donato emphasizes that this requirement is only for class
notification, not guaranteeing those individuals the right to
receive money from Facebook if the social network is found
liable.

"This is notice. This is not writing checks," Donato said. "It's
okay to cast a wider net for notice."

Establishing eligibility for claims for compensation will be
handled at a later stage, the judge added.

Donato ordered Facebook to send out class notifications by May
30, a timeline Facebook described as potentially impossible to
meet.

The judge directed Facebook to submit declarations by engineers
under penalty of perjury by 5 p.m. on May 22, specifically
outlining why it would be technically impossible to meet the
deadline.

"I find it hard to believe that Facebok can't do a jewel notice
with less than two weeks' notice," Donato said. "I'll need to see
some proof."

Both sides are expected back in court on June 14 to argue
Facebook's motion to stay the case pending the outcome its appeal
challenging Donato's decision to grant class certification in
April. A pretrial conference is scheduled for June 21.

Donato refused to rule out the possibility that Facebook could
have to pay up to $30 billion in damages if a jury finds it
violated the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act by
harvesting users' facial data without consent.


FERRAGAMO USA: Faces "Fischler" Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Ferragamo U S A
Inc. The case is styled as Brian Fischler, individually and on
behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Ferragamo U S A Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-04610 (S.D.
N.Y., May 24, 2018).

Ferragamo USA, Inc. engages in the sale and distribution of
Salvatore Ferragamo products like shoes, women's ready-to-wear
apparel and accessories in North America. Ferragamo USA, Inc. was
formerly known as Moda Imports, Inc. and changed its name in May
1976. The company was founded in 1950 and is headquartered in New
York, New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Douglas Brian Lipsky, Esq.
   Lipsky Lowe LLP
   630 Third Avenue Fifth Floor
   New York, NY 10017
   Tel: (212) 392-4772
   Fax: (212) 444-1030
   Email: doug@lipskylowe.com


FIRST PENN-PACIFIC: "Iwanski" Suit Underway in E.D. Pa.
-------------------------------------------------------
First Penn-Pacific Life Insurance Company is facing a putative
class action suit entitled, Iwanski v. First Penn-Pacific Life
Insurance Company, Lincoln National Corporation said in its Form
10-Q Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission for
the quarterly period ended March 31, 2018.

Iwanski v. First Penn-Pacific Life Insurance Company ("FPP"), No.
2:18-cv-01573 filed in the U.S. District Court for the District
Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania is a putative class
action that was filed April 13, 2018. Plaintiff alleges that
defendant FPP breached the terms of his life insurance policy by
deducting non-guaranteed cost of insurance charges in excess of
what is permitted by the policies.

Plaintiff seeks to represent all owners of universal life
insurance policies issued by FPP containing non-guaranteed cost
of insurance provisions that are similar to those of Plaintiff's
policy and seeks damages on their behalf. Breach of contract is
the only cause of action asserted.

Lincoln National said, "We dispute the allegations and will
vigorously defend this matter."

Lincoln National Corporation, through its subsidiaries, operates
multiple insurance and retirement businesses in the United
States. It operates through four segments: Annuities, Retirement
Plan Services, Life Insurance, and Group Protection. The company
is based in Radnor, Pennsylvania.


FLINT, MI: LAD's Bid to Dismiss Partly Denied
---------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division, denied in part Defendant Leo A. Daly
Company's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned In re Flint Water
Cases, This Order Relates To: ALL CASES. No. 5:16-cv-10444-JEL-
MKM (E.D. Mich.).

The Plaintiffs state in their complaint the Court has
jurisdiction over LAD and Lockwood, Andrews & Newnam, P.C. and
Lockwood, Andrews & Newnam, Inc. (LAN) because each of them have
personally availed themselves of the benefits and protections of
the State of Michigan. Further, these defendants are alleged to
have conducted business and committed torts in Michigan, by
themselves and their agents and/or alter egos, which caused the
Plaintiffs to suffer severe personal and property injuries in
Michigan.

Under an Employee Leasing Agreement, which LAD and LAN entered
into on March 1, 2004, LAD leased certain of its employees
(Staff), to be designated by LAN, to LAN to perform such work and
for such periods of time as are specified by Lessee from time to
time to meet Lessee's staffing needs.

The Plaintiffs allege that specific personal jurisdiction exists
over LAD based on LAD's contacts with Michigan, and that either
general or specific jurisdiction exists over LAD based on the
theory that LAN is operating as LAD's alter ego. Because specific
personal jurisdiction exists over LAD based on its own activities
within Michigan, the Court will not reach the issue of whether
LAN is LAD's alter ego.

For specific personal jurisdiction to exist, the plaintiffs must
satisfy two factors: Michigan's long-arm statute, and
constitutional due process.

Michigan's long-arm statute states: "The existence of any of the
following relationships between a corporation or his agent and
the state shall constitute a sufficient basis of jurisdiction to
enable the courts of record of this state to exercise limited
personal jurisdiction over such corporation and to enable such
courts to render personal judgments against such corporation
arising out of the act or acts which creates any of the following
relationships, inter alia: (1) The transaction of any business
within the state. (2) The doing or causing any act to be done, or
consequences to occur, in the state, resulting in an action for
tort."

The Agreement contractually obligated LAD to lease to LAN every
employee LAN needed in exchange for any and all revenue LAN
gained from the actions those employees performed. LAN has
multiple offices in Michigan, and entered into a long-term
contract under which it performed years of work for the City of
Flint. LAD also insured its employees against routine risks those
employees faced in performing that work. LAD purposely and
routinely sent its leased employees to Michigan to perform work
that would, in turn, create profit for LAD. The object of LAD's
sending its employees to Michigan was to have "ongoing, far-
reaching consequences" in the engineering market in Michigan.

The cause of action arises from the engineering work LAD's
employees performed in Michigan. Each cause of action relates to
actions LAD's employees took while providing engineering services
for LAN to the City of Flint. The second part of the Southern
Machine test is satisfied.

Finally, it is reasonable to exercise personal jurisdiction over
LAD. As LAD has stated, it has performed other work in Michigan,
which means it has some presence in the state. All of the events
underlying plaintiffs' claims took place in Michigan, and
virtually all of the evidence is located in Michigan. If the
plaintiffs' allegations are true, LAD's employees performed work
from 2013 until at least 2015 on the exact water system transfer
that caused plaintiffs' injuries, and LAD derived substantial
benefits from that work.

Accordingly, LAD's motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction and to dismiss for failure to state a claim is
denied in part on the grounds that personal jurisdiction exists
over LAD.

The remainder of the motion seeking dismissal for failure to
state a claim will be heard on the date and time set for hearing
of all motions to dismiss in this consolidated class action.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 5, 2018 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y97y5oot from
Leagle.com.

Rhonda Kelso, individually, and as next friend of minor child,
K.E.K, Tiantha Williams, individually and as next friend of minor
child TW, Barbara Davis, Darrell Davis, EPCO Sales, LLC & Marilyn
Bryson, Plaintiffs, represented by David J. Shea --
david.shea@sadplaw.com -- Shea Aiello, PLLC, Deborah A. LaBelle,
Esther Berezofsky, Berezofsky Law Group, LLC.

Woodland Falls Corporate Center, Hunter Shkolnik, Napoli Shkolnik
Law PLLC, Jayson E. Blake -- jeblake@mcalpinepc.com -- McAlpine
PC, John McNeill Broaddus, Weitz & Luxenberg PC, Jordan W.
Connors -- jconnors@susmangodfrey.com -- Susman Godfrey L.L.P.,
Mark L. McAlpine -- mlmcalpine@mcalpinepc.com -- McAlpine &
McAlpine, Paul F. Novak, Weitz & Luxenberg, P.C., Peretz
Bronstein  -- peretz@bgandg.com -, Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman
LLC, Emmy L. Levens -- elevens@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen
Milstein Sellers and Toll PLLC & Jessica B. Weiner --
jweiner@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC.

RICHARD D SNYDER, GOV, Defendant, represented by Eugene Driker,
Barris, Sott, Margaret A. Bettenhausen, Michigan Department of
Attorney General, Morley Witus, Barris, Sott, Denn & Driker,
PLLC, Nathan A. Gambill, Michigan Department of Attorney General,
Richard S. Kuhl, Assistant Attorney General Environment, Natural
Resources, and Agricultural Division, Todd R. Mendel, Barris,
Sott & Zachary C. Larsen, Michigan Department of Attorney
General.
State of Michigan & Michigan Department of Environmental Quality,
Defendants, represented by Margaret A. Bettenhausen, Michigan
Department of Attorney General, Nathan A. Gambill, Michigan
Department of Attorney General, Richard S. Kuhl, Assistant
Attorney General Environment, Natural Resources, and Agricultural
Division & Zachary C. Larsen, Michigan Department of Attorney
General.


FLOORCOVERINGS INT'L: Faces "Burbon" Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Floorcoverings
International, Ltd. The case is styled as Luc Burbon, on behalf
of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Floorcoverings International, Ltd., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-
04785 (S.D. N.Y., May 30, 2018).

Floor Coverings International, Ltd. provides flooring design and
installation services in North America. The company offers
various floor coverings, which include rugs, hardwood, vinyl,
tiles, hardwood flooring, carpet, stone, cork, bamboo, green
flooring, and rubber flooring products, as well as eco-flooring
options, including renewable/sustainable hardwood and natural
linoleum products. It also provides bathroom, bedroom, and
kitchen floor coverings. The company was founded in 1998 and is
based in Smyrna, Georgia.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


FLORIDA: Court Dismisses "Vargas" Suit
--------------------------------------
Judge Robert N. Scola, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Florida dismissed without prejudice the
case, Eduardo Arrechavaleta Vargas, Plaintiff, v. State of
Florida, Defendant, Civil Action No. 18-21101-Civ-Scola (S.D.
Fla.), and denied as moot Mr. Vargas' motion for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis.

Mr. Vargas, who is proceeding pro se, has not paid the required
filing fee.  His complaint is entitled, "Petition for Special
Equitable Relief from Judgment and Sentence."  He claims that he
exhausted all remedies at law, citing to case numbers associated
with his state criminal proceedings in the Criminal Division of
the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida in and of Miami-Dade
County, the Third District Court of Appeals, and the Florida
Supreme Court, and that these courts have refused to grant him
relief based on Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.170(l) and
3.850, which he believes has resulted in irreparable damages and
injuries.

His civil cover sheet states that he is asserting a torts claim
for other personal injury, would like to bring his case as a
class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and that
his action arises under 28 U.S.C. Section 1391.

Judge Scola finds that the independent review of the state court
records Mr. Vargas cites to in his complaint, indicate that Mr.
Vargas pled guilty to a motor vehicle license/registration
counterfeiting charge, for which he was sentenced to one day of
probation, upon the state trial court's order to stay and
withhold adjudication.  Mr. Vargas appealed to the Third DCA,
which dismissed his appeal because he did not file a motion to
withdraw his plea in the trial court.  He then appealed his case
to the Supreme Court, which denied him relief because he failed
to timely file his notice of appeal.

Now, Mr. Vargas attempts to bring a case in federal court, but
his complaint does not state a proper basis for relief or explain
why he is entitled to relief, even considering his complaint
under the "less stringent standards" afforded to pro se
litigants.  As a result, the Judge holds, Mr. Vargas' complaint
fails to state a claim.  This alone serves as a basis to dismiss
the complaint under Section 1915(e).

It appears from the Court's review of the available state courts'
records, however, that perhaps Mr. Vargas is attempting to
collaterally attack his state court conviction and in particular,
his guilty plea.  If that is the case, then the applicable
statute for Mr. Vargas to seek relief under is 28 U.S.C. Section
2254.  Mr. Vargas' complaint, however, the Judge says, is due to
be dismissed even if the Court construes Mr. Vargas's complaint
as an effort to bring a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
under Section 2254 for multiple reasons.

For one, the state trial court docket states that Mr. Vargas was
released from custody on March 24, 2017, which would preclude Mr.
Vargas from bringing a Section 2254 petition since the statute
requires that a petitioner seeking habeas relief be "in custody."
And, even assuming Mr. Vargas were in custody, if he's attempting
to take issue with his guilty plea, then the Court cannot yet
review his claim because the state courts' records also indicate
that Mr. Vargas failed to exhaust his state remedies as required
by Section 2254(b)(1)(A).

Accordingly, Judge Scola dismissed without prejudice Mr. Vargas's
complaint, and denied as moot his motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis.  The Clerk of Court will close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 4, 2018 Order is available
at https://bit.ly/2HDfi8r from Leagle.com.

Eduardo Arrechavaleta Vargas, Plaintiff, pro se.


GENERAL REVENUE: Faces "Shakarova" Suit in E.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against General Revenue
Corporation. The case is styled as Tamara Shakarova, on behalf of
herself and all other similarly situated consumers, Plaintiff v.
General Revenue Corporation, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-03141
(E.D. N.Y., May 29, 2018).

General Revenue Corporation is a United States debt-recovery
organization that specializes in the recovery of defaulted
student loans and consumer loans.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Maxim Maximov, Esq.
   Maxim Maximov, LLP
   1701 Avenue P
   Brooklyn, NY 11229
   Tel: (718) 395-3459
   Fax: (718) 408-9570
   Email: m@maximovlaw.com


GEORGIA: Magistrate Recommends Dismissal of "Martinez" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, HARLEM MARTINEZ, Plaintiff, v. WARDEN HILTON HILL;
GREG DOZIER; ASSISTANT WARDEN RICK STONE; and LIBRARIAN L.
WALKER, Defendants, Civil Action No. 5:17-cv-119 (S.D. Ga.),
Magistrate Judge R. Stan Baker of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Georgia, Waycross Division, recommended that
the Court (i) dismisses the Plaintiff's access to the courts,
conspiracy, class action, and preliminary injunctive relief
claims against the Defendants; (ii) denies the Plaintiff leave to
appeal in forma pauperis as to these claims; and (iii) directs
the United States Marshal to serve the Defendants with a copy of
the Plaintiff's Complaint and the Order.

The Plaintiff, who is currently housed at Coffee Correctional
Facility in Nicholls, Georgia, filed a Complaint pursuant to 42
U.S.C. Section 1983 contesting certain conditions of his
confinement.  He has also filed a Motion for injunctive relief.
The Court has permitted the Plaintiff to proceed in forma
pauperis.

The Plaintiff asserts the Defendants have enforced and encouraged
an illegal unwritten policy, custom, and practice of denying
Hispanic prisoners adequate access to legal materials because
there is only one book in the prison's library containing both
English and Spanish languages.  He maintains the Defendants acted
purposefully and maliciously to discriminate and conspire against
him and all other Spanish-speaking inmates by denying these
inmates access to the courts.

The Plaintiff contends he looked for other inmates who are
bilingual to help him file a habeas corpus action, but he learned
that another inmate's advice was misleading after the Northern
District of Georgia court dismissed his state habeas petition
based on failure to exhaust state court remedies.  He also
contends he was able to reinstate his state habeas proceedings,
yet he had difficulty during the evidentiary hearing explaining
his position to the judge in response to the respondent's motion
for a more definite statement.  According to the Plaintiff, the
judge has hinted at dismissing his renewed petition due to his
inadequate filing and in court discussions.  The Plaintiff
asserts his lack of access to law books written in Spanish has
hindered and frustrated his efforts to collaterally attack his
conviction.

The Plaintiff attempts to bring a class action suit on behalf of
all Spanish-speaking inmates.  In addition, he seeks a
preliminary and permanent injunction against the Defendants so
that they will cease the discriminatory actions and denial of
adequate access to the courts.

Magistrate Judge Baker finds that the Plaintiff does not allege
enough in his Complaint to plausibly satisfy the actual injury
prerequisite to set forth a plausible access to courts claim.
The Plaintiff fails to allege that the Defendants' purported
unwritten policy in having only one book in the prison's law
library written in Spanish has prevented him from missing any
court-imposed deadlines, and he does not provide any information
as to any specific claims he was pursuing or whether any such
claims were non-frivolous legal claims.

While the Court is not unsympathetic to the Plaintiff if he has
difficulty with or an inability to speak and understand English,
the Magistrate Judge finds that the Plaintiff has failed to
allege facts indicating his difficulty is due to the Defendants'
alleged policy or any action they have taken and that his
difficulty is due to the Defendants' alleged policy.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff's access to the courts claim against
the Defendants should be dismissed for this reason.

For his conspiracy claim, the Magistrate Judge finds that the
Plaintiff does not set forth any facts indicating the Defendants
reached an understanding or agreement to violate his rights.
Instead, the Plaintiff makes the conclusory statement that the
Defendants conspired together to violate his rights by denying
him access to books written in Spanish . Even at the frivolity
stage, the Plaintiff fails to set forth sufficient facts which
would render his conspiracy allegations "plausible".
Accordingly, the Court should dismiss the Plaintiff's conspiracy
claim.

As the Plaintiff cannot represent the interests of other
prisoners, the Court should dismiss any putative class action
claims.

Because the Plaintiff has not shown that he has satisfied the
prerequisites in order to be entitled to preliminary injunctive
relief, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the Court should
dismiss the Plaintiff's requests for preliminary injunctive
relief.  Specifically, at this early stage, the Plaintiff has not
shown the likelihood of success on the merits of his claims or
that injunctive relief is necessary to prevent irreparable
injury.  This is not to say that he will not eventually be able
to obtain injunctive relief.  Rather, the Court will not
interfere at this time on the facts before it.

Based on the analysis of the Plaintiff's action, the Magistrate
Judge finds no non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal, and an
appeal would not be taken in good faith.  Thus, he recommends
that the Court should deny the Plaintiff in forma pauperis status
on appeal as to any dismissed claims.

For these reasons, Magistrate Judge Baker recommended that the
Court should dismiss the Plaintiff's access to the courts,
conspiracy, class action, and preliminary injunctive relief
claims against Defendants.  Additionally, the Court should deny
the Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis as to these
claims.

The Magistrate Judge ordered that any party seeking to object to
the Report and Recommendation to file specific written objections
within 14 days of the date on which the Report and Recommendation
is entered.  Any objections asserting that the Magistrate Judge
failed to address any contention raised in the Complaint must
also be included.  He directed the Clerk of Court to serve a copy
of the Report and Recommendation upon the Plaintiff.

As stated, the Plaintiff states a colorable equal protection
claim against Defendants Hall, Stone, Walker, and Dozier.
Consequently, a copy of his Complaint, and a copy of the Order
will be served upon those Defendants by the United States Marshal
without prepayment of cost.

Because the Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the
Magistrate Judge directed that service be effected by the United
States Marshal.  The Defendants are granted leave of court to
take the deposition of the Plaintiff upon oral examination.  They
are further advised that the Court's standard 140-day discovery
period will commence upon the filing of the last answer.

In the event that they take the deposition of any other person,
the Defendants are ordered to comply with the requirements of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30.  As the Plaintiff will likely
not be in attendance for such a deposition, the Defendants will
notify the Plaintiff of the deposition and advise him that he may
serve on them, in a sealed envelope, within 10 days of the notice
of deposition, written questions the Plaintiff wishes to propound
to the witness, if any.  The Defendants will present such
questions to the witness seriatim during the deposition.

The Magistrate Judge also directed the Plaintiff to serve upon
the Defendants a copy of every further pleading or other document
submitted for consideration by the Court.  The Plaintiff will
include with the original paper to be filed with the Clerk of
Court a certificate stating the date on which a true and correct
copy of any document was mailed to the Defendants or their
counsel.

The Magistrate Judge reminded the Plaintiff that he has the
responsibility for pursuing the case.  The discovery period in
the case will expire 140 days after the filing of the last
answer.  Interrogatories are not to contain more than 25
questions.  If he does not press his case forward, the court may
dismiss it for want of prosecution.

In addition, it is the Plaintiff's duty to cooperate fully in any
discovery which the Defendants may initiate.  Upon no less than
five days' notice of the scheduled deposition date, the Plaintiff
will appear and permit his deposition to be taken and will
answer, under oath or solemn affirmation, any question which
seeks information relevant to the subject matter of the pending
action.

Under the Court's Local Rules, a party opposing a motion to
dismiss will file and serve his response to the motion within 14
days of its service.  The Plaintiff's response to a motion for
summary judgment must be filed within 21 days after service of
the motion.  Should the Defendants file a motion for summary
judgment, the Plaintiff is advised that he will have the burden
of establishing the existence of a genuine dispute as to any
material fact in the case.  Should the Defendants' motion for
summary judgment be supported by affidavit, the Plaintiff must
file counter-affidavits if he desires to contest the Defendants'
statement of the facts.  Should he fail to file, any factual
assertions made in the Defendants' affidavits will be accepted as
true and summary judgment may be entered against him pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.

A copy of the Court's April 3, 2018 Order is available at
https://bit.ly/2HruR2R from Leagle.com.

Harlem Martinez, Plaintiff, pro se.


GERARD ROOF: Faces "Dios" Suit in C.D. California
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Gerard Roof
Products, LLC. The case is styled as Ricardo Vergel De Dios,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Gerard Roof Products, LLC, Boral Roofing LLC, Boral
Industries, Inc., Headwaters Incorporated, Metrotile
Manufacturing, LLC and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, Defendants,
Case No. 5:18-cv-01163 (C.D. Cal., May 30, 2018).

Gerard Roof Products, LLC manufactures stone coated steel metal
roofing systems. It offers stone coated steel metal roofing
tiles, roof tile profiles, and galvalume steel shingles. The
company also provides custom order manufacturing services. In
addition, it provides contractor training programs, as well as
installation guides. The company is based in Mesquite, Texas. It
has site locations in Brea, California; Mesquite, Texas; Kansas
City, Missouri; Leesburg, Florida; and Ontario, Canada. Gerard
Roof Products, LLC operates as a subsidiary of Headwaters
Incorporated.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


GRIDSUM HOLDING: Klein Law Firm Files Securities Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Klein Law Firm announces that a class action complaint has
been filed on behalf of shareholders of Gridsum Holding Inc.
(NASDAQ:GSUM). The action, which was filed in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleges
that the Company violated federal securities laws.

In particular, the complaint alleges that throughout the Class
Period, defendants made materially false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that (i) Gridsum lacked
effective internal control over financial reporting; (ii)
consequently, Gridsum's financial statements were inaccurate and
misleading, and did not fairly present, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company;
and (iii) as a result of the foregoing, Gridsum's public
statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant
times.

Shareholders have until June 25, 2018 to petition the court for
lead plaintiff status. Your ability to share in any recovery does
not require that you serve as lead plaintiff. You may choose to
be an absent class member.

         Joseph Klein, Esq.
         The Klein Law Firm
         Telephone: 212-616-4899
         Fax: 347-558-9665
         Website: www.kleinstocklaw.com
         Email: joseph@dknlegal.com [GN]


HAIN CELESTIAL: Claims in "Davis" Product Liability Suit Narrowed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Allyne R. Ross of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York granted in part and denied in part the
Defendants' motion to dismiss the case, JOSH DAVIS, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. THE
HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP, INC; and HAIN BLUEPRINT, INC., Defendants,
Case No. 17-cv-5191-ARR-RML (E.D. N.Y.).

Davis brings the putative class action against Celestial and
BluePrint, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, seeking monetary and injunctive relief.  He alleges
that the Defendants, which manufacture and sell juice, have
engaged in deceptive product labeling in violation of N.Y.
General Business Law sections 349 and 350.  The Plaintiff also
brings claims for fraudulent misrepresentation and unjust
enrichment based on the same alleged conduct.

BluePrint -- a wholly owned subsidiary of Celestial Group --
manufactures personal-sized juices and sells them to third-party
sellers and directly to consumers.  The two BluePrint product
lines at issue in this case are their "BluePrint Cold Pressed"
juices and their "BluePrint Organic" juices.

The Plaintiff bought two BluePrint beverages in 2016.  First, he
bought a juice from the Cold-Pressed Line for roughly $7.99 at a
local store.  The front label said beet, apple, carrot, lemon,
ginger and raw.  The side label listed the ingredients as organic
apple, organic carrot, organic beet, filtered water, organic
lemon and organic ginger.  The Plaintiff alleges that the label
led him to believe that the product was cold-pressed and raw,
and--because beet was listed first on the front label and because
the beverage itself was red--that the drink was predominantly
made of beet juice.  Second, he purchased a juice from the
Organic Line, titled Lemon Yay, for roughly $2.99 at a local
store.  The back label stated that the beverage was crafted with
cold pressed juice.  He contends that he relied on these
representations in purchasing both drinks.

The Plaintiff filed the operative complaint in December 2017.
The complaint brings claims for (1) deceptive commercial
practices and false advertising in violation of N.Y. General
Business Law sections 349 and 350; (2) fraudulent
misrepresentation; and (3) unjust enrichment.  Specifically, he
alleges that labels would mislead a reasonable consumer and that
he, in fact, was misled.  Further, he alleges that the Defendants
had an affirmative duty to disclose that the Products were
processed and that their definition of a raw product excludes
products which are fresh.  Finally, he alleges that the
Defendants improperly obtained profits that they must disgorge to
the Plaintiff and the class members.

The Plaintiff's proposed class is all consumers in all states who
purchased any Products bearing any of the actionable
representations during the statute of limitation periods.

In January 2018, the Defendants filed their motion to dismiss.
They argue principally that the complaint fails to state a claim
under Rule 12(b)(6).  They also argue that the Plaintiff's unjust
enrichment claim must be dismissed as duplicative of the other
claims in the complaint.  According to them, an unjust enrichment
claim is not available under New York law where it simply
duplicates a conventional contract or tort claim.  Lastly, the
Defendants argue that the Plaintiff lacks standing to seek
injunctive relief, because there is no danger that he will be
deceived by their alleged misrepresentations again in the future.

Judge Ross finds that the Plaintiff's claim under N.Y. General
Business Law sections 349 and 350 (i) regarding the Cold-Pressed
Line may not proceed on the theory that the labels misleadingly
create the impression that the juice was not processed after
being cold pressed; (ii) regarding the Cold-Pressed Line may
therefore proceed under the heat-treated lemon juice theory;
(iii) regarding the Organic Line may proceed under "crafted with
cold pressed juice" theory.

The Judge next finds that the Plaintiff's claim for deceptive
practices and false advertising cannot survive on the
predominance of ingredients theory.  A reasonable consumer acting
reasonably under the circumstances would not understand the front
label to be listing the ingredients from most to least
predominant.  Consumers are accustomed to seeing a product's
ingredients listed by weight under the nutrition facts.  The
ingredient lists thus clarify that the premium ingredients are
not the most predominant ingredients. No reasonable consumer
could have been misled in light of this clarifying language.

Because the Plaintiff has made no allegation of scienter in his
complaint, nor does he make any argument on this topic in his
opposition to the Defendants' motion to dismiss, the Plaintiff's
fraudulent misrepresentation claim must be dismissed.  The Judge
finds that the closest the Plaintiff comes to alleging fraudulent
intent is his assertion that the Defendants knew that other juice
products more accurately represented their products.  But even
taking the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff,
that is not nearly enough to conclude that the Defendants had the
requisite scienter for fraudulent misrepresentation.

The Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim is no different from his
claims for false advertising or fraudulent misrepresentation.  It
must therefore be dismissed.  To the extent that the Plaintiff
was deceived by the Defendants' products, he is now aware of the
truth and will not be harmed again in the same way.  He therefore
lacks standing to seek an injunction.

For the reasons he stated, Judge Ross granted in part and denied
in part the Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim.  Their motion is granted with regard to the Plaintiff's
fraudulent misrepresentation and unjust enrichment claims, as
well as the Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief.  In
addition, their motion is granted with regard to the Plaintiff's
N.Y. General Business Law claims as to his high-pressure-
processing and predominance-of-ingredients theories.  It is
denied with regard to the Plaintiff's N.Y. General Business Law
claims as to his heat-treated-lemon-juice theories.

A copy of the Court's April 3, 2018 Opinion and Order is
available at https://bit.ly/2HLZhR0 from Leagle.com.

Josh Davis, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Joshua Levin-Epstein --
joshua@levinepstein.com -- Levin-Epstein & Associates.

The Hain Celestial Group, Inc. & Hain Blueprint, Inc.,
Defendants, represented by Kenneth K. Lee -- klee@jenner.com --
Jenner & Block.


HARDINGE INC: Merger-Related Suits Filed in New York
----------------------------------------------------
Hardinge Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
March 31, 2018, that the company is facing purported class action
suits related to merger.

On April 4, 2018, a purported class action complaint relating to
the Merger was filed in the United States District Court for the
Western District of New York on behalf of a putative class of
Hardinge's public shareholders (the "federal case"). The
complaint in the federal case alleges that Hardinge and its
directors breached federal securities laws by failing to disclose
material information in the preliminary form of the 2018 proxy
statement filed on February 13, 2018.

In addition, on April 16, 2018, a purported class action
complaint relating to the Merger was filed in the Supreme Court
of the State of New York, County of Chemung (the "state case").
The complaint in the state case alleges that Hardinge and its
directors breached their fiduciary duties by entering into the
Merger Agreement and by failing to disclose allegedly material
information in connection with the Merger. The complaints seek,
among other things, injunctive relief preventing the consummation
of the merger, damages and an award of plaintiff's expenses and
attorneys' fees.

Hardinge "We believe that the claims asserted are without merit."

Hardinge Inc. supplies high precision computer controlled
metalcutting turning machines, grinding machines, vertical and
horizontal machining centers, and repair parts related to those
machines. The Company also engineers and supplies high precision,
standard and specialty workholding devices, and other machine
tool accessories. The company is based in Elmira, New York.


HCP INC: Bid to Dismiss Boynton Beach Firefighters' Suit Underway
-----------------------------------------------------------------
HCP Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended March 31,
2018, that the defendants' motion to dismiss the case, Boynton
Beach Firefighters' Pension Fund v. HCP, Inc., et al., remains
pending.

On May 9, 2016, a purported stockholder of the Company filed a
putative class action complaint, Boynton Beach Firefighters'
Pension Fund v. HCP, Inc., et al., Case No. 3:16-cv-01106-JJH, in
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio against
the Company, certain of its officers, HCR ManorCare, Inc.
("HCRMC"), and certain of its officers, asserting violations of
the federal securities laws.

The suit asserts claims under sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act")
and alleges that the Company made certain false or misleading
statements relating to the value of and risks concerning its
investment in HCRMC by allegedly failing to disclose that HCRMC
had engaged in billing fraud, as alleged by the U.S. Department
of Justice in a pending suit against HCRMC arising from the False
Claims Act. The plaintiff in the suit demands compensatory
damages (in an unspecified amount), costs and expenses (including
attorneys' fees and expert fees), and equitable, injunctive, or
other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

On November 28, 2017, the Court appointed Societe Generale
Securities GmbH (SGSS Germany) and the City of Birmingham
Retirement and Relief Systems (Birmingham) as Co-Lead Plaintiffs
in the class action. Co-Lead Plaintiffs filed a consolidated
Amended Complaint on February 28, 2018. Defendants filed their
motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint on March 30, 2018.

On May 21, 2018, a Reply in support of the Motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim was filed:

     -- Steven M. Cavanaugh, HCR ManorCare, Inc., Paul Ormond;
        and

     -- HCP, Inc., Darren A. Kowalske, Lauralee E. Martin, and
        Timothy Schoen.

The Company believes the suit to be without merit and intends to
vigorously defend against it.

HCP, Inc., a Standard & Poor's ("S&P") 500 company, invests
primarily in real estate serving the healthcare industry in the
United States. The company is a Maryland corporation organized in
1985 and qualify as a self-administered REIT. The company is
based in Irvine, California.


HIGHGATE HOTELS: Faces "Olsen" Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Highgate Hotels,
L.P. The case is styled as Thomas J. Olsen, individually and on
behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Highgate Hotels, L.P. doing business as: The Knickerbocker,
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-04695 (S.D. N.Y., May 28, 2018).

The Defendant is a 4-star hotel in New York, NY.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Christopher Howard Lowe, Esq.
   Lipsky Lowe LLP
   630 Third Avenue
   New York, NY 10017-6705
   Tel: (212) 392-4772
   Fax: (212) 444-1030
   Email: chris@lipskylowe.com


HOMETEAM INSPECTION: Faces "Burbon" Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Hometeam Inspection
Service, Inc. The case is styled as Luc Burbon, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Hometeam
Inspection Service, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-04783
(S.D. N.Y., May 30, 2018).

Hometeam Inspection Service, Inc. offers property inspector
services in St Louis, MO.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


INNERWORKINGS INC: Bronstein Gewirtz Files Securities Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC, notifies investors that a
class action lawsuit has been filed against InnerWorkings, Inc.
("InnerWorkings" or the "Company") (NASDAQ:  INWK) and certain of
its officers, on behalf of shareholders who purchased or
otherwise acquired InnerWorkings securities between August 11,
2015 through May 7, 2018, both dates inclusive (the "Class
Period"). Such investors are encouraged to join this case by
visiting the firm's site: http://www.bgandg.com/inwk.

This class action seeks to recover damages against Defendants for
alleged violations of the federal securities laws under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period,
Defendants made materially false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (1) InnerWorkings' financial
statements for the fiscal years ending December 31, 2017, 2016,
and 2015 as well as all interim periods contained errors that
required restating; and (2) InnerWorkings' financial statements
were materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to
review a copy of the Complaint you can visit the firm's site:
http://www.bgandg.com/inwk or you may contact Peretz Bronstein,
Esq. or his Investor Relations Analyst, Yael Hurwitz of
Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC at 212-697-6484. If you
suffered a loss in InnerWorkings you have until July 9, 2018 to
request that the Court appoint you as lead plaintiff.  Your
ability to share in any recovery doesn't require that you serve
as a lead plaintiff.

         Peretz Bronstein, Esq.
         Yael Hurwitz, Esq.
         Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC
         Telephone: 212-697-6484
         Email: peretz@bgandg.com GN]


INNERWORKINGS INC: Gainey McKenna Files Securities Action Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Gainey McKenna & Egleston disclosed that a class action lawsuit
has been filed against InnerWorkings, Inc. ("InnerWorkings" or
the "Company") (Nasdaq:INWK) in the United States District Court
for the Central District of California on behalf of a class
consisting of investors who purchased or otherwise acquired
InnerWorkings securities on the open market from August 11, 2015
through May 7, 2018, inclusive (the "Class Period"), seeking to
recover compensable damages caused by Defendants' violations of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The Complaint alleges that Defendants made materially false and
misleading statements regarding the Company's business,
operational and compliance policies. Specifically, Defendants
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) the Company's financial statements for the fiscal years
ending December 31, 2017, 2016, and 2015 as well as all interim
periods contained errors that required restating; and (ii) as a
result, the Company's public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times.

On May 7, 2018, the Company "announced that it is postponing the
release of its first quarter 2018 financial results and
conference call due to errors in its historical financial
statements identified during the course of its first quarter
financial reporting close process."  The Company advised
investors that it "will be restating its financial statements for
the years ended December 31, 2017, 2016, and 2015, and all
interim periods within those years."  On its preliminary
assessment, the Company estimated an aggregate impact that
includes a decrease in income before income taxes of $2.5 - $4.5
million for the year ended December 31, 2017, and a decrease in
income before income taxes of $1.5 - $2.5 million for the year
ended December 31, 2016.

Investors who purchased or otherwise acquired shares during the
Class Period should contact the Firm prior to the July 9, 2018
lead plaintiff motion deadline.  A lead plaintiff is a
representative party acting on behalf of other class members in
directing the litigation.

         Thomas J. McKenna, Esq.
         Gregory M. Egleston, Esq.
         Gainey McKenna & Egleston
         Telephone: (212) 983-1300
         Email: tjmckenna@gme-law.com
                gegleston@gme-law.com [GN]


INNERWORKINGS INC: Pomerantz Law Firm Files Securities Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP disclosed that a class action lawsuit has been
filed against InnerWorkings, Inc. ("InnerWorkings" or the
"Company") (NASDAQ:INWK) and certain of its officers.  The class
action, filed in United States District Court, Central District
of California, is on behalf of a class consisting of investors
who purchased or otherwise acquired securities of InnerWorkings
between August 11, 2015 through May 7, 2018, both dates inclusive
(the "Class Period"). Plaintiff seeks to recover compensable
damages caused by Defendants' violations of the federal
securities laws and to pursue remedies under Sections 10(b) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act")
and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.

If you are a shareholder who purchased InnerWorkings securities
between August 11, 2015, and May 7, 2018, both dates inclusive,
you have until July 9, 2018, to ask the Court to appoint you as
Lead Plaintiff for the class.  A copy of the Complaint can be
obtained at www.pomerantzlaw.com.   To discuss this action,
contact Robert S. Willoughby at rswilloughby@pomlaw.com or
888.476.6529 (or 888.4-POMLAW), toll-free, Ext. 9980. Those who
inquire by e-mail are encouraged to include their mailing
address, telephone number, and the number of shares purchased.

InnerWorkings, Inc. provides print procurement solutions to
corporate clients in the United States. The Company utilizes its
proprietary software applications and database to create
solutions that store, analyze, and track the production
capabilities of its supplier networks, as well as quote and price
data for bids and print jobs.

The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period,
Defendants made materially false and misleading statements
regarding the Company's business, operational and compliance
policies. Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i) InnerWorkings'
financial statements for the fiscal years ending December 31,
2017, 2016, and 2015 as well as all interim periods contained
errors that required restating; and (ii) as a result,
InnerWorkings' public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times.

On May 7, 2018, post-market, InnerWorkings "announced that it is
postponing the release of its first quarter 2018 financial
results and conference call due to errors in its historical
financial statements identified during the course of its first
quarter financial reporting close process."  InnerWorkings
advised investors that it "will be restating its financial
statements for the years ended December 31, 2017, 2016, and 2015,
and all interim periods within those years."  On its preliminary
assessment, InnerWorkings estimated an aggregate impact that
includes a decrease in income before income taxes of $2.5 - $4.5
million for the year ended December 31, 2017, and a decrease in
income before income taxes of $1.5 - $2.5 million for the year
ended December 31, 2016.

On this news, InnerWorkings' share price fell $0.62, or 6.4%, to
close at $9.06 on May 8, 2018.

         Robert S. Willoughby, Esq.
         Pomerantz LLP
         Telephone: 888-476-6529 Ext. 9980
         Email: rswilloughby@pomlaw.com [GN]


INNERWORKINGS INC: Bernstein Liebhard Files Securities Fraud Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Shareholder rights law firm Bernstein Liebhard LLP is
investigating "potential securities fraud claims on behalf of
shareholders of InnerWorkings Inc."

On May 7, InnerWorkings revealed that it would restate its
financial statements for fiscal years ending Dec. 31 2017, 2016
and 2015, along with all interim periods within those time
frames. The company advised anyone who purchased InnerWorkings
securities or has information on the matter to visit the
company's shareholder page, or contact Daniel Sadeh, Esq. --
dsadeh@bernlieb.com

Today, Bernstein Liebhard announced that a class-action lawsuit
has been filed on behalf of those who purchased or acquired
InnerWorkings securities between Aug. 11, 2015 and May 7, 2018,
when the news of the incorrect financial reports broke.

From the press release:

According to the lawsuit, throughout the Class Period Defendants
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) InnerWorkings' financial statements for the fiscal
years ending December 31, 2017, 2016, and 2015 as well as all
interim periods contained errors that required restating; and (2)
InnerWorkings' financial statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times.

"Accordingly, investors should no longer rely upon the company's
previously issued financial statements for these periods, any
earnings releases or other communications relating to these
periods, or projections estimates for any future periods," the
statement from May 7 said.

InnerWorkings stock took a hit as a result of the news. On May 7,
stock closed at $9.68. Following the release, it went as low as
$8.45.

In a separate press release, the company said it would postpone
the release of its first quarter 2018 financial results due to
the factual errors in financial statements, and said that the
issues were due to "recording a portion of costs of goods sold in
the wrong period."

For more information, visit www.inwk.com. [GN]


INT'L COFFEE: Demurrer Ruling in Second Amended "Davis" Affirmed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JACOB R. DAVIS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v.
INTERNATIONAL COFFEE AND TEA, LLC, Defendant and Respondent, Case
No. E066700 (Cal. App.), Judge Richard T. Fields of the Court of
Appeals of California, Fourth District, Division Two, affirmed
the trial court's judgment sustaining International Coffee's
demurrer to the second amended complaint ("SAC") without leave to
amend.

Plaintiff and Appellant Davis brings the putative class action
against his former employer, the Defendant and Respondent,
International Coffee, on the theory that the company's tip-
pooling policy violates Labor Code section 351.

International Coffee operates retail stores under the name Coffee
Bean and Tea Leaf.  Davis worked as a server at a store in Rancho
Cucamonga.  Customers at the stores may leave tips in a "tip
jar."  At the close of business each day, a shift supervisor
collects the tips in the jar.  The supervisor then places the
tips in a deposit box in the store safe.

International Coffee does not require supervisors to count the
amount of tip money collected each day.  Nor does it require them
to count or segregate the tips collected during each of the three
daily shifts.  Instead, at the end of each week, the supervisor
counts the tips collected throughout the week and distributes the
tips to tip-eligible employees.  Thus, the supervisors commingle
the tip money from 21 different shifts.  Each tip-eligible
employee receives a pro rata share of the tips based on the
number of hours he or she worked that week.

Davis believes certain business days and certain shifts collect
more tips than others.  By failing to count and segregate the
tips left on those more profitable days and shifts, International
Coffee is taking tips from the employees who worked those days
and shifts and giving them to employees who worked the less
profitable days and shifts.

Davis seeks an accounting and injunctive relief requiring
International Coffee to collect, record, and distribute tips on a
shift-by-shift basis.  He also seeks monetary relief consisting
of the tip money earned by some employees but distributed to
other employees.  The SAC alleges seven causes of action.  The
first is styled an action for accounting, damages, and injunctive
relief.  The remaining causes of action allege a constructive
trust; conversion or trespass to chattel; violations of the
unfair competition law; a Private Attorney General Act ("PAGA")
claim; class action status; and a failure to provide accurate
wage statements.

International Coffee demurred to the first through sixth causes
of action, arguing that Davis based each cause of action on a
violation of section 351, which prevents employers from taking
tips intended for employees.  It asserted its policy of pooling
and distributing tips weekly on a pro rata basis did not violate
section 351, and several published decisions had validated the
practice of tip pooling.  Additionally, it argued, Davis was not
entitled to an accounting because he could not establish any
balance was due to him, nor could he establish a constructive
trust, conversion, or trespass to chattel, since International
Coffee had not wrongfully retained, converted, or intentionally
interfered with any of his personal property.

Davis acknowledged in opposition that tip pooling in general does
not violate section 351, so long as it is fair and reasonable.
But, he argued, International Coffee's specific policy involves
taking tips from some employees who earned them and
redistributing them to others who did not earn them, which is
unfair and unreasonable.  He also asserted that if the court
sustained the demurrer, it should grant him leave to amend the
SAC.

Judge Fields finds that because the facts as alleged do not
amount to a taking of employees' property by International Coffee
within the meaning of section 351, the SAC does not state facts
sufficient to support Davis' causes of action.  Conversion and
trespass to chattel both require that the Defendant interfere
with the Plaintiff's ownership of or right to possess the subject
property.  He explains that a constructive trust is technically
an equitable remedy, not a substantive claim for relief, to
compel the return of property to the rightful owner.  A cause of
action for accounting requires a showing that some balance is due
the Plaintiff that can only be ascertained by an accounting.  In
all four cases, the theory of relief presupposes some sort of
wrongful taking of the Plaintiff's property.  As he has
discussed, section 351 does not support the theory that weekly
tip pooling constitutes an unlawful taking.  Accordingly, he
finds that the trial court did not err in sustaining
International Coffee's demurrer.

Davis asserts the tip-pooling policy is also actionable because
it is not fair and reasonable.  Essentially, Davis wants the
Court to create a cause of action for unfair and unreasonable tip
pooling, and requests that it reverses the judgment with
directions to permit him to amend the SAC.  The Judge declines to
do so.  He finds that Davis' remedy lies with the Legislature,
which may create a cause of action for unfair and unreasonable
tip pooling, if it is so inclined.  Davis has not shown a
reasonable possibility he can cure the defects in the SAC.  He
has not explained how he would amend it at all, either in the
trial court or before the Court.  Hence, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in sustaining the demurrer without leave to
amend.

For these reasons, Judge Fields affirmed the trial court's
judgment and ordered that International Coffee will recover its
costs on appeal.

A copy of the Court's April 3, 2018 Opinion is available at
https://bit.ly/2r03lCD from Leagle.com.

Osborn Law and Daniel A. Osborn -- INFO@THEOSBORNLAWGROUP.COM --
for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Littler Mendelson, Keith A. Jacoby -- kjacoby@littler.com -- and
Rachael Lavi -- rlavi@littler.com -- for Defendant and
Respondent.


INTEL CORP: "East" Stayed Pending Transfer Ruling in MDL 2828
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Edward M. Chen of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, San Francisco Division, stayed the case,
ANDREW EAST on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. INTEL CORPORATION, Defendant, Case No.
3:18-cv-01733-EMC (N.D. Cal.) pending resolution of the Motion
for Transfer of Actions Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1407 for
Coordinated or Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings filed on Jan. 8,
2018 before the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (Case
MDL No. 2828).

East filed his Complaint on March 20, 2018.  The Defendant's
response to the Complaint is due on April 17, 2018.  The MDL
Motion was filed on Jan. 8, 2018.  The MDL Motion identifies five
putative class action suits filed between Jan. 3 and 8, 2018,
which it contends are based on common issues of law and fact, and
32 additional putative class action suits relating to the same
subject matter have been filed in multiple jurisdictions.

In the interest of avoiding unnecessary burden upon the Court and
the parties, the parties agree that the case should be stayed
pending resolution of the MDL Motion.

Therefore, all the parties, by and through their counsel,
stipulated and respectfully requested, and Judge Chen granted to
stay the action until resolution of the MDL Motion, and the
deadline for the Defendant to answer, move, or otherwise plead be
moved to 45 days after the stay is lifted.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 4, 2018 Order is available
at https://bit.ly/2rchSv0 from Leagle.com.

Andrew East, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Joshua Haakon Watson, Clayeo
C. Arnold, A Professional Law Corporation.

Intel Corporation, Defendant, represented by Miriam Kim --
Miriam.Kim@mto.com -- Munger, Tolles & Olson & Allison Marie Day
-- Allison.Day@mto.com -- Munger Tolles and Olson LLP.


JAGUAR LAND: Court Denies Prelim Approval of "Majdipour" Deal
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SIMON MAJDIPOUR, PAMELA AUSTIN, BRIAN FUCHS, CHARLES
MANIS, JASON MANOWITZ, and MARVINA ROBINSON, individually, and on
behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs,
v. JAGUAR LAND ROVER NORTH AMERICA, LLC, Defendant, Civ. No. 12-
cv-07849 (WHW) (CLW) (D. N.J.), Judge William H. Walls of the
U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey denied the
Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary approval of a settlement
agreement, conditional class certification, approval of class
notice procedures, and the scheduling of a final fairness
hearing.

The matter arises from the Plaintiffs' class action complaint
against the Defendant regarding alleged defects in the model-year
2003 to 2006 Land Rover Range Rover vehicle.  The Plaintiffs are
owners of Class Vehicles who allege that, at the time of
purchase, their vehicles were equipped with defective electronic
air suspension systems.  They allege that this defect causes a
loss of air pressure in the suspension system that renders the
vehicle unable to drive in a straight line and can cause the
driver to lose control of the vehicle

The named Plaintiffs bring claims on behalf of themselves, a
nationwide class of individuals who leased or purchased Class
Vehicles, and sub-classes of owners and/or lessees who purchased
a Class Vehicle in California, New York, and Florida.  The action
was initiated by Plaintiff Majdipour, individually and on behalf
of a proposed class of similarly situated individuals.  Majdipour
amended the complaint to add Austin on April 17, 2013.

The First Amended Complaint alleged a total of eight claims
against JLRNA, including violations of the New Jersey Consumer
Fraud Act ("NJFCA"); breach of express warranty; common law
fraud; breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing; unjust
enrichment; breach of the implied warranty of merchantability;
violation of California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act; and
violation of California Business and Professional Code Section
17200.

The Defendant moved to dismiss the FAC on May 8, 2013.  On Oct.
9, 2013, the Court (a) granted the motion to dismiss the NJCFA
claims; (b) granted the motion to dismiss the breach of express
warranty claim; (c) denied the motion to dismiss the common law
fraud claim; (d) denied the motion to dismiss the breach of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing claim; (e) granted the motion
to dismiss the unjust enrichment claim; (f) denied the motion to
dismiss the implied warranty of merchantability claim; and (g)
denied the motion to dismiss the California consumer fraud
claims.

The Plaintiffs filed the SAC on Aug. 11, 2014.  The SAC added
Plaintiffs Manowitz, Manis, Fuchs, and Robinson.  In the SAC, the
new Plaintiffs asserted three claims: violation of consumer
protection statutes; common law fraud; and breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing.  The SAC also added new claims by
the existing Plaintiffs for failure to recall or retrofit.

On March 18, 2015, the Court denied the Defendant's motion to
dismiss the new Plaintiffs' common law fraud claims, and granted
the Defendant's motion to dismiss all other new claims in the
SAC.  Consequently, the remaining claims allege common law fraud,
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability, and violation of California
consumer-protection statutes.

On June 19, 2017, the Plaintiffs announced that they and the
Defendant had agreed to a settlement.  Under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(e), the Plaintiffs now move for preliminary
approval of a settlement agreement, conditional class
certification, approval of class notice procedures, and the
scheduling of a final fairness hearing.

The parties' settlement agreement defines the proposed settlement
class to include all current and former owners or lessees of
Model Year 2003 through Model Year 2006 Land Rover Range Rover
vehicles who were the registered owners or lessees of such
vehicles on or before the date of the Agreement to the extent
that such registrations were in the District of Columbia or one
of the 50 states of the United States, except that the following
are excluded: (i) vehicles owned or leased by judicial personnel
assigned to the Majdipour lawsuit and (ii) persons, if any, who
prior to the date of the preliminary approval, settled with and
released JLRNA or any other Releasee from any of the released
claims as set forth in a later subsection.

The Settlement Agreement appoints all the six named Plaintiffs as
the Class Representatives.

In consideration, the Defendant agrees to reimburse Class Members
for certain out-of-pocket expenses incurred for front air spring
replacement.  Specifically, the Class Members would be reimbursed
for the lesser of either the amount actually paid to replace the
spring, or an amount determined by the Settlement Agreement based
on the vehicles' mileage and the length of ownership.  The
applicable year and mileage ranges set out in the Settlement
Agreement are:

     Year     Mileage Range   Maximum Reimbursement

      5     50,001 to 62,500      $500
      6     62,501 to 75,000      $250
      7     75,001 to 87,500      $125
      8     87,501 to 100,000     $100

To qualify for a particular Maximum Reimbursement, a Class
Vehicle must have, at the time of the front air spring
replacement, both (1) been in service for less than the
applicable number of years and (2) been driven for less than the
maximum number of miles within the applicable mileage band.

The parties have not specified the total dollar value of the
settlement because the total amount paid out by the Defendant
will depend on the number and nature of claims submitted by Class
members, but the Plaintiffs' counsel estimated at oral argument
on Oct. 12, 2017 that the settlement's total value is
approximately $6.2 million.

The Settlement Agreement provides a process by which the Class
Members can submit claims for reimbursement, and describes a
program, paid for by the Defendant, to notify the Class Members
of the settlement and allow them to opt-out/object to the terms
of the settlement if the Court grants preliminary approval.

Under the Settlement Agreement, the Defendant agrees to pay the
Class Counsel $1.3 million in attorneys' fees and up to $75,000
for costs and expenses.  The Defendant agrees not to oppose this
amount.  The Plaintiffs' counsel intends to seek $1.3 million in
fees and $75,000 in costs.  The Defendant also agrees to pay
Class Representatives a one-time payment in the aggregate amount
of $16,000, distributed as follows: $5,000 to Majdipour, $3,000
to Austin, and $2,000 each to Fuchs, Manis, Manowitz, and
Robinson.

Judge Walls finds that the standards for preliminary approval are
not met in the case.  He says the settlement terms do not appear
to be fair, reasonable, and adequate.  As to the Class Members
within the year and mileage range, the eligible reimbursement
appears unusually low.  The Plaintiffs have not addressed why
such a minimal amount of reimbursement for many the Class Members
would be reasonable, or why it is fair to require the Class
Members to release claims against the Defendant even if they are
ineligible for any compensation under the Settlement Agreement.

The Judge holds that whatever difficulties the Class Members may
face in litigating the case, the Court cannot accept as
reasonable such a significant difference between the compensation
available under the Settlement Agreement and the actual cost of
repair without some evidence of why it is appropriate.  Because
the Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence as to why the
Settlement Agreement provides proportionally minimal
reimbursement to the Class Members, and because some of the Class
Members would be ineligible for any reimbursement at all under
its terms, the Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the terms of
the terms of the settlement are "fair, reasonable, and adequate.

As the motion is will be denied, the Judge will not determine
whether the requirements of conditional class certification under
Rule 23(a) and 23(b) are met.

For the reasons he stated, Judge Walls denied the Plaintiffs'
Motion for Preliminary Approval of Proposed Class Action
Settlement is denied.  An appropriate order follows.

A copy of the Court's April 3, 2018 Opinion is available at
https://bit.ly/2HYlsRA from Leagle.com.

SIMON MAJDIPOUR, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF A CLASS OF
SIMILARLY SITUATED INDIVIDUALS, Pamela Austin, Brian Fuchs,
Marvina Robinson, Charles Manis & Jason Manowitz, Plaintiffs,
represented by MATTHEW ROSS MENDELSOHN --
mmendelsohn@mazieslater.com -- MAZIE SLATER KATZ & FREEMAN LLC &
ADAM M. EPSTEIN -- aepstein@mazieslater.com --, MAZIE SLATER KATZ
& FREEMAN LLC.

JAGUAR LAND ROVER NORTH AMERICA, LLC, Defendant, represented by
BRIAN D. SULLIVAN -- bsullivan@foxrothschild.com -- FOX
ROTHSCHILD LLP.


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Court Issues Protective Order in "Elkies"
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California issued a Stipulated Protective Order in the case
captioned RONY ELKIES et al.; Plaintiffs, v. JOHNSON & JOHNSON
SERVICES, INC., et al, Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-7320-GW
(JEMx) (C.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiffs have brought a class action complaint against the
Defendants challenging the labeling and marketing of Infant's
Tylenol under the California consumer protection statutes.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 5, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y8wkoj5n from Leagle.com.

Rony Elkies, individually and on behalf of all others situated &
Danielle Alfandry, individually and on behalf of all others
situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Gillian L. Wade --
gwade@milsteinadelman.com -- Milstein Jackson Fairchild and Wade
LLP, Andrew Whitman -- twhitman@allenmatkin.com -- Milstein
Jackson Fairchild and Wade LLP, Noel J. Nudelman, Heideman
Nudelman and Kalik PC, pro hac vice, Richard D. Heideman,
Heideman Nudelman and Kalik PC, pro hac vice, Sara D. Avila --
savila@mjfwlaw.com -- Milstein Jackson Fairchild and Wade LLP
&Tracy R. Kalik, Heideman Nudelman and Kalik PC, pro hac vice.

Johnson and Johnson Services, Inc, a New Jersey limited liablity
company & Johnson and Johnson Consumer Inc., a New Jersey limited
liability company, Defendants, represented by Joseph R. O'Connor
-- joconnor@omm.com -- O'Melveny and Myers LLP, Matthew D. Powers
-- mpowers@omm.com -- O'Melveny and Myers LLP & Richard Blair
Goetz -- rgoetz@omm.com -- O'Melveny and Myers LLP.


KIKOUSA INC: Faces "Burbon" Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against KikoUsa, Inc. The
case is styled as Luc Burbon, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. KikoUsa, Inc. doing business as:
Kiko Milano, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-04729 (S.D. N.Y.,
May 29, 2018).

KIKO Milano is a leading Italian cosmetics brand.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


KITCHENAID: Faces "Bodley" Suit in W.D. Michigan
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against KitchenAid, Inc.
The case is styled as James Bodley and Kyle Matson, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
KitchenAid, Inc. and Whirlpool Corporation, Defendants, Case No.
1:18-cv-00594-RJJ-PJG (W.D. Mich., May 29, 2018).

KitchenAid, Inc. manufactures and sells kitchen appliances for
customers in the United States and internationally. It offers
major appliances, such as black stainless steel appliances,
cooktops, wall ovens, refrigerators, undercounter refrigerators,
ranges, microwaves, dishwashers, disposers and compactors,
warming drawers, hoods and vents, grills, water filters, and
accessories.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

   David Michael Birka-White, Esq.
   Birka-White Law Offices
   178 E. Prospect Avenue
   Danville, CA 94526
   Tel: (925) 362-9999
   Fax: (925) 362-9970

      - and -

   Mindy Monhai Wong, Esq.
   Birka-White Law Offices
   178 E. Prospect Avenue
   Danville, CA 94526
   Tel: (925) 362-9999
   Fax: (925) 362-9970

      - and -

   N.Scott Carpenter, Esq.
   Carpenter & Schumacher, P.C.
   2701 Dallas Parkway, Suite 570
   Plano, TX 75093
   Tel: (972) 403-1133
   Fax: (972) 403-0311

      - and -

   Rebecca Elizabeth Bell-Stanton, Esq.
   Carpenter & Schumacher, P.C.
   2701 N. Dallas Parkway, Suite 570
   Plano, TX 75093
   Tel: (972) 403-1133
   Fax: (972) 403-0311


KOBE STEEL: Wolf Popper to Lead in Securities Suit
--------------------------------------------------
In the case, DANIEL AUDE, Individually and On Behalf: of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. KOBE STEEL, LTD., HIROYA
KAWASAKI YOSHINORI ONOE, AKIRA KANEKO, AND NAOTO UMEHARA,
Defendants, Case No. 17-CV-10085 (VSB)(S.D. N.Y.), Judge Vernon
S. Broderick of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York granted Aude's motion for appointment as the Lead
Plaintiff and for approval of his selection of the Lead Counsel.

Kobe Steel is one of Japan's largest steel manufacturers and a
major supplier of aluminum and copper products.  On May 29, 2013,
at the beginning of the Class Period, Kobe Steel launched a new
business plan that purported to reduce, among other things,
quality error costs.  During the Class Period, it continually
made statements emphasizing its compliance with corporate laws
and rules, its focus on maintaining a culture of high ethical
standards and corporate governance, and its commitment to product
safety.

Beginning on Oct. 8, 2017, the public became aware of information
regarding Kobe Steel's products and safety practices that caused
its ADR price to tumble, including that: (i) certain Kobe Steel
products did not comply with product specifications and data in
inspection certificates had been improperly written; (ii) Kobe
Steel had fabricated data on components used in a variety of
products that were used by major manufacturers; (iii) the data
fabrication scandal extended to its core business of selling
steel to numerous international companies; and (iv) there was an
investigation into Kobe Steel's wrongdoing and that the number of
impacted customers exceeded 400.

The price of Kobe Steel ADRs fell from $5.92 on October 8, 2017
to $3.55 on Oct. 13, 2017, resulting in significant losses for
investors, including Aude.  On Dec. 26, 2017, the Plaintiff
commenced the instant action by filing a complaint against Kobe
Steel alleging that its statements during the Class Period were
materially false and misleading because it had falsified data on
many of its products and sold products that failed quality
control tests.

On the same day that the Plaintiff filed his Complaint, the
counsel for Plaintiff published a notice in Global Newswire
announcing the initiation of the securities class action.  The
Notice informed shareholders that if they had purchased or
acquired Kobe Steel ADRs during the Class Period, they would have
until Feb. 26, 2018 to file a motion to be appointed the Lead
Plaintiff.

On Feb. 26, 2018, the date specified on the Notice, Aude file his
motion requesting appointment of the Lead Plaintiff and the Lead
Counsel, with a supporting memorandum and declaration.  Aude
filed a response in further support of his motion on March 12,
2018.  No other member of the putative class filed a motion to be
appointed the Lead Plaintiff.

Because Aude filed a timely motion, has the largest financial
interest, otherwise meets the requirements of Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, satisfies the typicality and
adequacy requirements, and no party has rebutted this status,
Judge Broderick appointed him as the Lead Plaintiff.

Having reviewed Aude's Memorandum of Law, as well as the Finkel
Declaration and the firm resume attached as Exhibit D to the
Finkel Declaration, the Judge finds that Wolf Popper is well
qualified to serve as the Lead Counsel in the instant case.  The
attorneys at Wolf Popper have had substantial experience with
securities litigations as well as securities fraud class actions.
Therefore, Judge Broderick approved Aude's selection and
appointed Wolf Popper as the Lead Counsel.

The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to terminate the
pending motion.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 4, 2018 Opinion and Order
is available at https://bit.ly/2jiEWFc from Leagle.com.

Daniel Aude, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Robert Craig Finkel --
rfinkel@wolfpopper.com -- Wolf Popper LLP.

Kobe Steel, Ltd., Defendant, represented by Douglas H. Flaum --
douglasflaum@paulhastings.com -- Paul Hastings LLP & Kevin Paul
Broughel -- kevinbroughel@paulhastings.com -- Paul Hastings LLP.


KOHL'S DEPARTMENT: "Waters" Remanded to Calif. State Court
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CRYSTAL WATERS, an individual, and TONY VALENTI, an
individual, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. KOHL'S DEPARTMENT STORES, INC., a
corporation; and DOES 1-100, Defendants, Case No. 2:18-CV-00328-
ODW-AFM (C.D. Cal.), Judge Otis D. Wright, II of the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California (i) granted
the Plaintiffs' motion to remand; and (ii) denied the Plaintiffs'
request for attorney's fees and costs.

Kohl's is a nationwide department store chain with 116 stores in
the State of California.  From time to time, Kohl's implements a
rewards program in which customers receive Kohl's Cash coupons
when they purchase items from Kohl's.  For every $50 a customer
spends at Kohl's, he or she earns $10 in "Kohl's Cash."  The
customer may then use the Kohl's Cash for a future purchase, and
the value of the Kohl's Cash will be deducted from the total
amount owed.

The dispute arises because in the four years prior to the filing
of the Complaint, customers used Kohl's Cash to purchase products
in conjunction with percent-off discount coupons that Kohl's also
offered.  The Plaintiffs are regular shoppers at Kohl's who
engaged in such transactions.  To calculate the amount owed on
these purchases, Kohl's would first apply the Kohl's Cash to the
total purchase price, and then apply the percent-off discount to
the amount that remained.

The Plaintiffs object to this practice and assert that Kohl's
should treat Kohl's Cash like actual cash.  This, they claim,
would require Kohl's to first apply the percent-off discount to
the total purchase price, and then apply the Kohl's Cash to the
remaining amount.

The putative class action lawsuit is brought by Plaintiffs Waters
and Valenti against Defendant Kohl's.  On Feb. 15, 2017, the
Plaintiffs filed their initial Complaint in state court.  Kohl's
subsequently removed the case to the Court ("Waters I").  On June
28, 2017, the Court remanded the case to the Los Angeles Superior
Court.

Four months after remand, Kohl's removed the case a second time.
Kohl's simultaneously provided to the Court, under seal,
sensitive sales data -- data that, according to Kohl's, took
considerable effort to procure -- in support of its amount-in-
controversy allegation.  In those papers was the figure Kohl's
refused to provide in Waters I: the actual Average Percent
Discount.

The Plaintiffs filed the pending remand motion on Jan. 29, 2018.
They maintain that the Waters I Remand Order forecloses
successive removal attempts in the absence of a new factual basis
or a change in circumstances.  Kohl's argues that either the
continued accrual of putative damages, or its own analysis of its
internal sales data, or both, constitute a change in
circumstances that entitles it to successive removal.

Judge Wright finds that successive removal is barred when the
Defendant had the ability to allege federal jurisdiction at the
first removal, but did not.  Since the only thing stopping Kohl's
from successfully alleging CAFA jurisdiction at the first removal
was its own refusal to analyze its own sales data, the Judge
concludes that Kohl's has not shown that successive removal is
appropriate.  Because he finds that successive removal is
improper in this instance, he granted the Plaintiffs' Motion to
Remand.

With respect to the Plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees, the
Judge decides to give Kohl's the benefit of the doubt.
Successive removal cases from the Circuit illustrate that the
line between mere new evidence and a truly new factual basis can
be blurry.  He finds that it was not objectively unreasonable for
Kohl's to assert that additional damages and internal sales
calculations provided a new factual basis for successive removal.
He, therefore, denied the Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees
and costs.

He noted notes that Kohl's has stated an intent to continue
attempting to remove the action, should the Plaintiffs win this
motion.  With the issuance of the Order, the counsel for Kohl's
now knows that, should it attempt to remove a third time, it must
be able to demonstrate that Kohl's is in a genuinely different
position to plead federal jurisdiction than it was during its
first two attempts.  The Court will likely find further attempts
at removal that do not meet this standard to be objectively
unreasonable.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 4, 2018 Order is available
at https://bit.ly/2jhifAZ from Leagle.com.

Crystal Waters, an individual, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated & Tony Valenti, an individual, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by Jordan S. Esensten -- jesensten@esenstenlaw.com --
Esensten Law & Robert L. Esensten, Esensten Law.

Kohl s Department Stores, Inc., a corporation, Defendant,
represented by Jeffrey S. Jacobson, Kelley Drye and Warren LLP,
pro hac vice, Lauri A. Mazzuchetti -- lmazzuchetti@kelleydrye.com
-- Kelley Drye and Warren LLP, pro hac vice & Sarah E. Diamond --
sdiamond@kelleydrye.com -- Kelley Drye and Warren LLP.


KULICKE & SOFFA: Kaskela Law Files Securities Class Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
Kaskela Law LLC disclosed that a shareholder class action lawsuit
has been filed against Kulicke & Soffa Industries, Inc. on behalf
of purchasers of the Company's securities between November 16,
2017 and May 10, 2018, inclusive (the "Class Period").

IMPORTANT DEADLINE:  Investors who purchased Kulicke & Soffa
securities during the Class Period may, no later than July 10,
2018, seek to be appointed as a lead plaintiff representative of
the investor class.  Kulicke & Soffa investors are encouraged to
visit www.kaskelalaw.com/case/kulicke-soffa for additional
information about this action.

On May 10, 2018, Kulicke & Soffa disclosed that it had "learned
of certain unauthorized transactions by a senior finance employee
of the Company."  Additionally, the Company disclosed that it has
"undertaken an investigation of these transactions with the
assistance of outside advisors," and that that Company's
"previously issued consolidated financial statements for the
fiscal year ended September 30, 2017 can no longer be relied upon
due to the misstated warranty accruals made in prior periods."

Following this news, shares of the Company's stock declined $1.80
per share, or over 7.5%, to close on May 11, 2018 at $21.99, on
heavy trading volume.

The shareholder class action complaint alleges that Kulicke &
Soffa and certain of its senior executive officers made false and
misleading statements and/or failed to disclose to investors
that: (i) Kulicke and Soffa's consolidated financial statements
for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2017 could no longer be
relied upon due to misstated warranty accruals; and (ii) as a
result, defendants' public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times.  The complaint further alleges
that, as a result of the foregoing, investors purchased Kulicke &
Soffa's securities at artificially inflated prices during the
Class Period and sustained investment losses following the
Company's May 10, 2018 disclosures.

         D. Seamus Kaskela, Esq.
         Kaskela Law LLC
         Email: skaskela@kaskelalaw.com [GN]


KULICKE AND SOFFA: Rosen Law Firm Files Class Action Lawsuit
------------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, announces it
has filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of the
securities of Kulicke and Soffa Industries, Inc. (NASDAQ: KLIC)
from November 16, 2017 through May 10, 2018, both dates inclusive
("Class Period"). The lawsuit seeks to recover damages for
Kulicke and Soffa investors under the federal securities laws.

To join the Kulicke and Soffa class action, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1342.htmlor call Phillip Kim,
Esq. or Zachary Halper, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email
pkim@rosenlegal.com or zhalper@rosenlegal.com for information on
the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A
CLASS IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU
RETAIN ONE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO
NOTHING AT THIS POINT. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE.

According to the lawsuit, throughout the Class Period defendants
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) Kulicke and Soffa's consolidated financial statements
for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2017 could no longer be
relied upon due to misstated warranty accruals; and (2) as a
result, Defendants' public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to
serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than
July 10, 2018. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting
on behalf of other class members in directing the litigation. If
you wish to join the litigation, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1342.html.

                  Laurence Rosen, Esq.
                  Phillip Kim, Esq.
                  Zachary Halper, Esq.
                  The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
                  Telephone: (212) 686-1060
                  Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
                  Fax: (212) 202-3827
                  Website: www.rosenlegal.com
                  Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
                         pkim@rosenlegal.com
                         zhalper@rosenlegal.com [GN]


LEGETT & PLATT: Court Certifies 2 Subclasses in "Morales"
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs' Motion
for Class Certification in the case captioned Edgar Morales,
Salvador Magana, and Matthew Bagu, on behalf of themselves, the
State of California, and all other similarly situated
individuals, Plaintiffs, v. Leggett & Platt Incorporated, a
Missouri Corporation, et al., Defendants, No. 2:15-cv-01911-JAM-
EFB (E.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC), seeking to
proceed under the California Labor Code Private Attorneys General
Act (PAGA) and alleging that the Defendants violated state wage
and hour laws by failing to pay minimum wage; failing to pay
overtime compensation; failing to provide meal and rest breaks;
unlawfully deducting wages of employees; knowingly and
intentionally failing to maintain and provide accurate wage
statements; failing to produce or permit inspection of records;
failing to timely pay wages due at termination; and failing to
indemnify employees for work expenses. The Plaintiffs also
alleged that the Defendants violated California's Unfair
Competition Law (UCL).

The Plaintiffs seek to certify the following five subclasses:

The Revision Zone Class

All nonexempt hourly employees who worked at the Tracy Branch
between April 28, 2011 and November 14, 2014 and whose time was
recorded using the Amano timekeeping system and experienced time
shaving as a result of the Revision Zone programming in the Amano
timekeeping system.

Doubletime Class

All non-exempt hourly employees who have worked at the
Defendants' Ontario location (the Ontario Branch) and the Tracy
Branch between April 28, 2011 and the present and had a shift of
more than eight hours on a seventh consecutive workday in a
workweek.

30 Minute Auto-Deduction Class

All non-exempt hourly employees who have worked at the Tracy
Branch, and all factory non-exempt hourly employees who have
worked at the Ontario Branch between April 28, 2011 and the
present who had 30 minutes of pay automatically deducted for meal
periods without a corresponding time entry showing that an unpaid
meal period was recorded.

Meal Period Premium Class

All factory non-exempt hourly employees who (1) have worked at
the Ontario and Tracy Branches between April 28, 2011 and the
present, (2) have recorded untimely or short meal periods during
shifts greater than six hours, or have worked more than 10 hours
without recording a second meal period, and (3) have not received
a meal period premium.

Uniform Deduction Class

All non-exempt employees who worked at the Ontario and Tracy
Branches between April 28, 2011 and the present and had
deductions on their wage statements (appearing in payroll as code
870) for maintenance of their work uniform.

Numerosity

Numerosity requires that the class be so numerous that joinder of
all members is impracticable. The Defendants do not challenge the
Plaintiffs' satisfaction of this requirement for any of the
purported classes and the Court finds the Plaintiffs satisfy the
numerosity requirement for all five purported subclasses.

The Revision Zone Class

The Plaintiffs contend that the Defendants' policy and practice
of shaving up to 15 minutes of compensable work time using the
Amano timekeeping system led to a failure to pay the Defendants'
employees for all the time they worked, in violation of
California Labor Code Section 1197, case law, and Wage Order 1.
Mem.

The Plaintiffs contend that the common question of fact to this
class is whether the Defendants failed to compensate class
members "at the minimum wage for all hours worked" and that this
question can be answered by looking at the Defendants' Person
Most Knowledgeable ("PMK") testimony and an analysis of the
Defendants' payroll and timekeeping records.

In contrast, the Defendants have provided declarations from
several employees stating that they do not perform compensable
work during the shaved time, and instead clock in and then wait
for a paid safety meeting to start at the beginning of their
shift.

The Revision Zone's class contention that the Defendants failed
to compensate class members at the minimum wage for all hours
worked cannot be resolved without an individual inquiry into
whether each class member performed compensable work in the time
between when they clocked in and the start of their shift. So the
Court cannot, and does not, grant class certification as to this
subclass.

The Doubletime Class

The Plaintiffs contend that the Defendants' policy and practice
through their Amano timekeeping system of not providing for
doubletime premium pay (Doubletime Pay) after the 12th hour in a
workday means that every shift over eight hours on the seventh
consecutive workday in a workweek violates Cal. Labor Code
Section 510 and Wage Order 1.

The Plaintiffs contend that determining which employees were
improperly denied Doubletime Pay can be ascertained by reviewing
the Amano time records and payroll.  The Defendants counter that
it would be difficult for the Court to ascertain which
individuals worked on a seventh consecutive workday in a workweek
and, of those, which worked more than 8 hours and, of those, who
was not paid at the rate of twice the regular rate of pay.

Here, the Court does not need to make a legal determination
before ascertaining class members. The Court can determine which
individual class members were affected by the Defendants' policy
of not paying Doubletime Pay by looking at the Defendants' PMK
testimony, the Amano time records, and payroll data. No
individual employee testimony would be needed.

Accordingly, the Court finds the Plaintiffs have satisfied this
element for this subclass.

Plaintiffs assert that a common question of fact for the
Doubletime Class is whether the Defendants maintained a policy
that failed to provide workers with Doubletime Pay when required.
The Defendants argue that there is conflicting testimony about
how their Doubletime Pay policies applied to individual
employees.
The Court finds the Plaintiffs have satisfied this element since
their class-wide contention that the Defendants maintained a
policy that failed to provide workers with Doubletime Pay is
capable of class-wide resolution by examining the Defendants' PMK
testimony, the Amano time records, and payroll.

The Plaintiffs argue that the named Plaintiffs' claims are
typical of the rest of this class because they involve the same
type of injury caused by the Defendants' standardized policy of
not adequately providing Doubletime Pay.

The Defendants counter that the Plaintiffs' reliance on their own
testimony and the testimony of one putative class member as proof
of company-wide practices is insufficient to establish
typicality.
The Plaintiffs and class-members who suffered from the
Defendants' alleged standardized policy of not providing
Doubletime Pay would use the Defendants' time and payroll records
and make similar legal arguments in their attempt to prove the
Defendants' liability. The Court finds the Plaintiffs have
satisfied the typicality element as to this subclass.

The Plaintiffs claim that common questions of fact predominate
over individual questions for this subclass because the claim
could be adjudicated through a payroll redo complying with
California law, in light of the Defendants' PMK testimony,
documents produced during discovery, the Plaintiffs' expert
analysis and class members' declarations.

The Defendants also argue that the Doubletime Class asserts
violations of the California waiting time law, which requires an
inquiry into whether the Defendants were willful.

The Court finds that common questions of law and fact whether the
Defendants violated California labor laws and the Wage Order by
failing to provide Doubletime Pay predominate over individual
inquiries. Given that the Defendants concede the Plaintiffs have
satisfied the remaining Rule 23 elements of numerosity, adequacy,
and superiority, the Court grants the Plaintiffs' motion for
class certification as to the Doubletime Class.

30 Minute Auto-Deduction Class

The Plaintiffs claim the Defendants' policy of automatically
deducting 30 minutes of pay from employees for meal periods
without a corresponding time entry showing that an unpaid meal
period was recorded violates Wage Order 1 and Cal. Lab. Code
Section 510, 512, and 226.

The Plaintiffs claim that all employees who experienced auto-
deductions can be ascertained by review of the Defendants'
records. The Defendants contend the 30 Minute Auto-Deduction
Class is not ascertainable because individual inquiries are
required to determine which employees had 30 minutes
automatically deducted for meal periods, which did not have a
corresponding time entry, and which did not receive the meal
period as required.  Determining whether individual employees
that received auto-deductions actually received meal breaks may
be difficult. But the Defendants' failure to keep records of meal
breaks being taken results in a presumption that meal breaks were
not given.
The Court finds that it would not have to engage in possibly
difficult individual inquiries to decipher who should be a part
of this subclass and therefore the Plaintiffs have satisfied this
element.

Commonality

The Plaintiffs argue that a common issue of fact for this class
is whether the Defendants maintained a policy of automatically
deducting 30 minutes of time from shifts lasting at least 6 hours
without supporting records.

The Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the
commonality element because their written policies are to provide
meal periods and any inconsistencies in how meal periods are
taken depend on each individual employee's circumstances.

The Defendant's PMK testimony and the Defendants' payroll and
timekeeping data can resolve the common issue of fact for this
class whether the Defendants' maintained a policy of
automatically deducting 30 minutes of time from shifts lasting at
least 6 hours without supporting records of meal periods being
taken. The Court finds the Plaintiffs have satisfied this
element.

Typicality

The Plaintiffs argue that their claims are typical of the rest of
this class because they involve the same type of injury caused by
the same standardized policy of the Defendants automatically
deducting 30 minutes of time from shifts lasting at least 6 hours
without supporting records of meal periods being taken.

The Defendants counter that the Plaintiffs' reliance on their own
testimony and the testimony of one putative class member as proof
of company-wide practices is insufficient to establish
typicality.
The Plaintiffs and subclass members who suffered from the
Defendants' standardized auto-deduction policy incurred the same
injury and would make similar legal arguments to prove the
Defendants' liability. The Court finds the Plaintiffs have
satisfied this element.

Predominance

The Plaintiffs argue that common questions of fact predominate
over individual questions for this subclass because the claim can
be resolved through examining the Defendants' PMK testimony,
documents produced during discovery, the Plaintiffs' expert
analysis and class members' declarations.

At the hearing, the Defendants argued that the court should
instead apply Villa, 2012 WL 5503550 and Blackwell, 245 F.R.D. at
461, where courts found plaintiffs did not satisfy the
predominance element.  In Villa, the plaintiffs could not satisfy
the predominance requirement for the meal and rest classes
because the plaintiff's single declaration was not enough to show
that the employer had an unlawful uniform policy.

Because the Court can use the Defendants' payroll and time
records to determine whether the Defendants had an unlawful auto-
deduction policy, the Court finds that common questions of law
and fact predominate over individual inquiries for this class.

The Meal Period Premium Class

The Plaintiffs seek to certify this subclass based on the
Defendants employing an ad hoc system of providing meal periods
where supervisors or leads are responsible for relieving workers
for meal breaks, as production permits.

The Plaintiffs argue that the common question of fact here is
whether the Defendants maintained a policy that failed to pay
meal period premiums to workers who had a short (less than 30-
minutes), late (after the fifth hour of work), or missed meal
period.  The Defendants respond that in cases like this,
individual inquiry is necessary to determine if a meal break was
denied, since an employer's duty to pay an employee a meal period
premium is only triggered when the employer fails to provide' a
meal period.
Because determining whether and why employees may not have taken
meal periods is an individualized inquiry and because there is
conflicting testimony about the Defendants' policies and the
application thereof, the Court finds the Plaintiffs have not
shown that this subclass satisfies the commonality element.
Accordingly, the Court denies certification of this subclass.

The Uniform Deduction Class

The Plaintiffs contend that the Defendants' policy of deducting
sums for maintenance of uniforms results in inaccurate wage
statements and unlawful withholding of wages or deduction from
wages for employees who have separated from Defendants, in
violation of California Labor Code Sections 203, 2802(a), and/or
221 and 224.

Labor Code Sections 2802(a) states that an employer shall
indemnify his or her employee for all necessary expenditures or
losses incurred by the employee in direct consequence of the
discharge of his or her duties. Wage Order 1 states that when
uniforms are required by the employer to be worn by the employee
as a condition of employment, such uniforms shall be provided and
maintained by the employer.

In response to the Plaintiffs' contention, the Defendants provide
undisputed evidence that uniforms were not required at either the
Tracy Branch or Ontario Branch and that any employee who wore a
uniform did so voluntarily.

Because the Plaintiffs have neither alleged nor produced evidence
of any legal violations as to this subclass, the Plaintiffs'
motion to certify the Uniform Deduction Class is denied.

For these reasons, the Court grants the Plaintiffs' motion to
certify the two subclasses identified by the Plaintiffs as the
Doubletime Class and the 30 Minute Auto-Deduction Class. The
Court denies the Plaintiffs' motion to certify any of the other
proposed subclasses.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 5, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y7aza2f5 from Leagle.com.

Edgar Morales, on behalf of themselves, the State of California,
and all other similarly situated individuals, Salvador Magana, on
behalf of themselves, the State of California, and all other
similarly situated individuals & Matthew Bagu, on behalf of
themselves, the State of California, and all other similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiffs, represented by Joseph Donald
Sutton -- JSutton@TheMMLawFirm.com -- Mallison & Martinez, Marco
A. Palau -- mpalau@themmlawfirm.com -- Mallison & Martinez,
Stanley S. Mallison -- stanm@mallisonlaw.com -- Mallison &
Martinez & Eric Sebastian Trabucco -- etrabucco@themmlawfirm.com
-- Mallison & Martinez.

Leggett & Platt Incorporated, a Missouri Corporation & L&P
Financial Services Co., a Delaware corporation, Defendants,
represented by Carrie A. McAtee -- cmcatee@shb.com -- Shook Hardy
& Bacon, LLP, pro hac vice, William C. Martucci --
wmartucci@shb.com -- Shook Hardy and Bacon, pro hac vice & Tammy
Beth Webb -- tbwebb@shb.com -- Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P..


LINCOLN NATIONAL: Continues to Defend 2017 COI Rate Litigation
--------------------------------------------------------------
Lincoln National Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended March 31, 2018, that the company continues to defend
itself  in a consolidated case captioned as, In re: Lincoln
National 2017 COI Rate Litigation.

Tutor v. Lincoln National Corporation and The Lincoln National
Life Insurance Company, No. 2:17-cv-04150, filed in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, is a
putative class action filed on September 18, 2017.

In March 2018, the Tutor case was consolidated with a newly-filed
matter captioned Trinchero, et al. v. Lincoln National
Corporation and The Lincoln National Life Insurance Company,
filed in the same court, No. 18-cv-00765. The consolidated case
is captioned In re: Lincoln National 2017 COI Rate Litigation,
Master File No. 17-cv-04150. Plaintiffs own universal life
insurance policies originally issued by former Jefferson-Pilot
(now LNL).

Plaintiffs allege that LNL and LNC breached the terms of
policyholders' contracts by increasing non-guaranteed cost of
insurance rates beginning in 2017. Plaintiffs seek to represent
classes of policyholders and seek damages on their behalf.

Lincoln National said, "We are vigorously defending this matter."

Lincoln National Corporation, through its subsidiaries, operates
multiple insurance and retirement businesses in the United
States. It operates through four segments: Annuities, Retirement
Plan Services, Life Insurance, and Group Protection. The company
is based in Radnor, Pennsylvania.


LIVANOVA PLC: Asks 3rd Cir. to Flip Class Certification Order
-------------------------------------------------------------
LivaNova PLC said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
March 31, 2018, that the company has filed a petition for
permission to appeal a class certification order to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

The Company is currently involved in litigation involving its 3T
device. The litigation includes a class action complaint in the
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania,
federal multi-district litigation in the U.S. District Court for
the Middle District of Pennsylvania and cases in various state
courts and jurisdictions outside the U.S.

As of May 1, 2018, the company is involved in approximately 115
claims worldwide, with the majority of the claims in various
federal or state courts throughout the United States. The
complaints generally seek damages and other relief based on
theories of strict liability, negligence, breach of express and
implied warranties, failure to warn, design and manufacturing
defect, fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation/concealment,
unjust enrichment, and violations of various state consumer
protection statutes.

The class action consists of all Pennsylvania residents who
underwent open heart surgery at WellSpan York Hospital and Penn
State Milton S. Hershey Medical Center between 2011 and 2015 and
who currently are asymptomatic for NTM infection. Members of the
class seek declaratory relief that the 3T devices are defective
and unsafe for intended uses, medical monitoring, damages, and
attorneys' fees. LivaNova has filed a petition for permission to
appeal the class certification order with the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.

LivaNova said, "We have not recognized an expense related to
damages in connection with these matters because any potential
loss is not currently probable or reasonably estimable. In
addition, we cannot reasonably estimate a range of potential
loss, if any, that may result from these matters."

LivaNova PLC is a public limited company organized under the laws
of England and Wales, headquartered in London, United Kingdom.
The company is a global medical device company focused on the
development and delivery of important therapeutic solutions for
the benefit of patients, healthcare professionals and healthcare
systems throughout the world.


LYFT: Faces Another Class Action Lawsuit Over Driver Pay
--------------------------------------------------------
Jon Fingas, writing for Engadget, reports that Lyft isn't done
grappling with lawsuits over driver pay. A newly filed class
action suit from California resident Fernando Villasenor alleges
that Lyft played tricks with fare distribution to misrepresent
the drivers' share and unfairly pour their lost income back into
the company. Villasenor's attorney, Larry Peluso, Esq. --
pelusolaw@gmail.com -- asserted that Lyft performed "sleight-of-
hand" by setting fares relative to average taxi prices without
letting drivers know what those taxi rates were. The drivers may
have thought Lyft was taking a 20 percent cut when it was
actually taking 43 percent.

The company dropped its commission approach on April 9th and
raised fares precisely to avoid liability from lawsuits like
this, according to the attorney.

The suit would represent all US drivers who'd signed up no later
than April 8th, 2018, and would look for both restitution for
drivers as well as damages. Many California lawsuits take
advantage of the state's Private Attorneys General Act to reclaim
lost wages, but that won't apply to this case. Peluso told
Gizmodo that he's avoiding PAGA for now as those cases using the
Act typically send more money to the government. Drivers in a
recent Uber settlement involving PAGA received as little as 15
cents.

Lyft declined to comment to Engadget on the lawsuit. However, it
comes mere days after a California court ruled that companies who
classify workers as independent contractors have to prove that
these workers are running their own businesses. That may prove
crucial to the case. Peluso cited the ruling in the lawsuit,
claiming that Lyft can't prove its drivers are contractors and
thus that these workers deserve the same protections as
employees.
[GN]


MATSU FUSION: Faces "Zhao" Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Matsu Fusion
Restaurant, Inc. The case is styled as Chen Zhao, Jinquan Yin and
Letian Zhu, on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. Matsu Fusion Restaurant, Inc. doing
business as: Matsu Sushi and Yi Chang Chen also known as: Gary
Chen, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-04734 (S.D. N.Y., May 29,
2018).

Matsu Sushi restaurant has been offering prepared sushi in New
York City since 2004.[BN]

The Plaintiffs appear PRO SE.


MDL 2323: Court Awards $112MM in Attorney's Fees, Costs
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania issued a Memorandum awarding $112 million in
Attorney's Fees and Costs in the case captioned IN RE: NATIONAL
FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS' CONCUSSION INJURY LITIGATION, Kevin
Turner and Shawn Wooden, on behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. National Football League and
NFL Properties, LLC, successor-in-interest to NFL Properties,
Inc., Defendants, THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: ALL ACTIONS, No.
2:12-md-02323-AB, MDL No. 2323 (E.D. Pa.).

Co-Lead Class Counsel filed a fee petition, on behalf of the
entire Class Counsel, seeking the full $112.5 million provided
for by the Settlement Agreement for reasonable expenses and
attorneys' fees. The petition filed by Co-Lead Class Counsel also
seeks the 5% holdback of each Monetary Award to pay for costs and
fees associated with implementing the Settlement.  In response to
Co-Lead Class Counsel's petition, more than 20 objections were
filed, with most of the concerns relating to the 5% holdback
request.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h) states that a court may
award reasonable attorney's fees that are authorized by law or by
the parties' agreement. Thus, a thorough judicial review of fee
applications is required in all class action settlements.
Here, the Parties agreed that the NFL would pay up to $112.5
million in expenses and fees without objection, and Class Counsel
has requested that exact amount.

Class Counsel has requested $106,817,220.62 in attorneys' fees,
which represents approximately 11% of the value of the Settlement
Agreement, and and $5,682,779.38 in costs.  The Court awards
Class Counsel the requested amount.

Percentage-of-Recovery

To determine if the percentage chosen is reasonable, a court must
apply the factors found in Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223
F.3d 190, 195 n.1 (3d Cir. 2000) and Prudential, 148 F.3d at 338-
40, which are: Size of the fund created and the number of persons
benefitted.

There are more than 20,000 Class Members registered to
participate in this Settlement.  As of April 5, more than 369
claims have been approved worth over $400 million.

An updated analysis was provided in April 2017, which accounted
for additional data on registration rates. Initially, the
Monetary Award Fund was valued at $950 million. The revised
estimate places the value at over $1.2 billion due to higher than
expected registration. Importantly, any risk that the Fund is
undervalued by the actuarial estimates is borne by the NFL.
Therefore, if the level of injury or participation rate is higher
than predicted, the value to Class Members will increase
accordingly.
Presence or absence of substantial objections by members of the
class to the settlement terms and/or fees requested by counsel

There are approximately twenty objections to Class Counsel's fee
petition. The vast majority of these objections relate to Class
Counsel's request for a 5% holdback of Monetary Awards to pay for
implementation work. Those objections have been considered, and
the Court is reserving decision on Class Counsel's request for a
5% holdback. Thus, many of the concerns raised by the objectors
will be addressed at a later date.

Overall, the response to both the Settlement Agreement and to
Class Counsel's fee petition has been largely positive. This
factor weighs in favor of granting the requested fee award.

Skill and efficiency of the attorneys involved

Co-Lead Class Counsel Christopher Seeger has spent decades
litigating mass torts, class actions, and multidistrict
litigations. Co-Lead Class Counsel Sol Weiss, Subclass Counsel
Arnold Levin and Dianne Nast, and Class Counsel Gene Locks and
Steven Marks possess similar credentials laintiffs' appellate
counsel, Professor Samuel Issacharoff possesses similarly
impressive credentials and showed great skill in shepherding the
settlement through the Third Circuit appeal and petitions for
certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.

This factor weighs heavily in Class Counsel's favor.

Complexity and duration of the litigation

Class Counsel mastered the intricacies of this case, creating
matrices that maximized Class Member similarities and minimized
differences. This allowed for the formation of the Class despite
player differences, and it allowed for the relatively quick
resolution of this complicated case so that impaired Class
Members could receive compensation and access to treatment as
quickly as possible.

The duration of this case, from filing to the effective date, was
about five years. During that time Class Counsel billed more than
50,000 hours. Additionally, Class Counsel will continue to bill
hours as the Settlement is implemented over the next 65 years.
This factor weighs in Class Counsel's favor.

Risk of nonpayment

The fifth factor is an assessment of the financial health of the
defendant and the likelihood that it will be able to satisfy a
successful judgment against it. The financial solvency of the NFL
was not an obstacle in this litigation.

Amount of time devoted to the case by plaintiffs' counsel

Class Counsel has submitted summaries detailing the litigation
that required more than 50,000 hours of work.

The litigation in this case would not have reached a settlement
within such a short period of time if it were not for the
intensive preparation by Class Counsel prior to and during
negotiations. As Class Counsel explained, those efforts included
researching Plaintiffs' claims, developing information about the
Class, contesting the NFL Parties' threshold preemption motions,
consulting with numerous experts (including medical, economic,
and actuarial), exchanging reams of information with the NFL
Parties, extensive and spirited mediation, and defending the
Settlement at three judicial levels.

This factor favors approval of the fee application.

Awards in similar cases

Class Counsel has provided extensive citation to cases both in
and outside this district that present similar percentage rates
for comparison. Additionally, Class Counsel has provided a study
by Professor Brian T. Fitzpatrick, which notes that the average
fee award for class settlements is 13.7% nationwide with a median
of 9.5%. The 11% award here compares favorably to similar cases,
thus this factor favors approval.

Value of benefits attributable to the efforts of Class Counsel
relative to the efforts of other groups, such as government
agencies conducting investigations

This litigation required Class Counsel to reinvent the
Plaintiff's position by conducting new research, developing
experts, and briefing issues without the benefit of previous
successful lawsuits.

Some objectors note that certain congressional hearings aided
Class Counsel. While those proceedings undoubtedly provided some
of the foundation for this litigation, the impact was limited.
Overall, this factor strongly supports granting the requested
fee.

Percentage fee that would have been negotiated had the case been
subject to a private contingent fee arrangement at the time
counsel was retained

The Court have considered the overall fees that are properly paid
to all attorneys involved in this litigation. The Court
determined that a 33% overall contingent fee rate for both Class
Counsel and IRPAs combined is reasonable. To achieve the 33%
overall rate, the Court presumptively capped IRPA fees at 22%. In
light of that determination, Class Counsel's 11% award is
reasonable under this factor.

Any innovative terms of settlement

Recognizing that CTE is an impairment that could not be diagnosed
in a living player, the Settlement creatively implements a system
to compensate cognitive symptoms associated with CTE instead. CTE
inflicts symptoms compensated by Levels 1.5 and 2 Neurocognitive
Impairment and is strongly associated with the other Qualifying
Diagnoses in the Settlement.

Without these innovative terms, a settlement might not have been
possible under current Supreme Court precedent. This factor
weighs heavily in Class Counsel's favor.

It is clear that under a percentage-of-recovery analysis the 11%
award of $106,817,220.62 million is reasonable.

Lodestar Crosscheck

Once the percentage-of-recovery factors are considered, a
lodestar cross-check is used to check the valuation. The lodestar
award is calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably
worked on a client's case by a reasonable hourly billing rate.

Here, blending the rates of all partners, associates, and
paralegals produces an average rate of $623.05 per hour. Using
this blended average, The Court have calculated that Class
Counsel's combined lodestar is $36,073,348.90.

To calculate the multiplier, the Court must divide the fee award,
$106,817,220.62, by the lodestar amount $36,073,348.90. This
results in a lodestar multiplier of 2.96, well within the norm
for this Circuit, which has noted that multipliers ranging from
one to four are frequently awarded. Considering the risk
undertaken by Class Counsel and their extraordinary work in this
litigation, the Court conclude that a multiplier of 2.96 provides
strong additional support for approving the requested fee award.

The Court conclude that Co-lead Counsel's petition for award of
attorneys' fees and reimbursement of expenses for Class Counsel
will be granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 5, 2018 Memorandum
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9csd8r2 from Leagle.com.

PERRY GOLKIN, Special Master, pro se.

WENDELL E. PRITCHETT, Special Master, pro se.

JO-ANN M. VERRIER, Special Master, pro se.

CLAIMS ADMINISTRATOR, Adminstrator, represented by ORRAN L.
BROWN, BROWNGREER PLC.

ARIZONA CARDINALS FOOTBALL CLUB LLC, Movant, represented by
ALEXANDRA M. WALSH -- awalsh@wilkinsonwalsh.com -- PAUL WEISS
RIFKIND WHARTON & GARRISON, LLP, BETH A. WILKINSON --
bwilkinson@wilkinsonwalsh.com -- PAUL WEISS RIFKIND WHARTON &
GARRISON LLP, BRAD S. KARP -- bkarp@paulweiss.com -- PAUL WEISS
RIFKIND WHARTON & GARRISON LLP, BRUCE BIRENBOIM --
bbirenboim@paulweiss.com -- PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON &
GARRISON, LLP & CASEY O. HOUSLEY -- c.housley@swrsllp.com --
SANDERS AND WARREN LLP.

JOHN LORENTZ, Movant, represented by MICHAEL H. MOIRANO  --
mmoirano@mgklaw.com -- MOIRANO GORMAN KENNY LLC & RON A. COHEN .
THE LOCKS LAW FIRM, Movant, represented by DAVID D. LANGFITT,
LOCKS LAW FIRM.


MESSERLI & KRAMER: Court Allows Filing of FAC in "Jenkins"
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LEE A. JENKINS, Plaintiff, v. MESSERLI & KRAMER,
P.A., Defendant, Case No. 8:17CV207 (D. Neb.), Judge Susan M.
Bazis of the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska
granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File First Amended
Complaint.

The action involves allegations that he Defendant violated the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and the Nebraska Consumer
Protection Act.  The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant sent
him an unsigned letter threatening to file a lawsuit in the event
an alleged debt was not paid.  He maintains that a judgment had
already been taken on that debt.  Thus, he contends that in
attempting to collect the alleged debt, the Defendant made false
representations as to the character, amount, or legal status of
the debt; threatened to take an action that cannot be legally
taken; and made a false representation that the unsigned letter
was from an attorney.

The Plaintiff now wishes to amend his Complaint to include a
request that the matter be certified as a class action.  The
proposed amended complaint alleges that the Defendant violated
the FDCPA and Nebraska Consumer Protection Act by routinely
sending letters, similar to the one sent to him, to other
consumers.  The Defendant opposes the motion, arguing that there
are no facts to support a class action.  It argues that the
letter sent to the Plaintiff was the result of a bona fide error,
and that the Plaintiff has no evidence that similar, unsigned
letters were sent to other consumers.

Having reviewed the matter, Judge Bazis will allow the Plaintiff
to file an amended complaint.  She finds that amendment will not
prejudice the Defendant.  The action was filed on June 15, 2017
and discovery is in its early stages.  She says a planning
conference has not been held, a final progression order has not
been issued, and a trial date has not been set.  Thus, the filing
of an amended complaint will not necessitate modifying any case
progression deadlines.

Moreover, the Judge finds that it is not readily apparent that
amendment would be futile or that the amendment asserts clearly
frivolous claims.  The parties have offered divergent facts.  The
Plaintiff asserts that the Defendant sends letters such as the
one at issue routinely, while the latter maintains that the
letter was the result of a one-time error.  The Judge will not
resolve factual disputes through a motion to amend.  Therefore,
amendment will be permitted.

For these reasons, Judge Bazis granted the Plaintiff's Motion for
Leave to File First Amended Complaint.  The Plaintiff will file
his amended complaint by April 5, 2018.  The Defendant will file
an answer by April 19, 2018.

A telephonic planning conference was held on May 3, 2018, at
10:00 a.m.  The telephone conference instructions are found at
Filing No. 13.  In advance of the conference, the parties will
confer and submit jointly proposed case progression deadlines to
the Court via email at bazis@ned.uscourts.gov

A copy of the Court's April 3, 2018 Order is available at
https://bit.ly/2qXZbMF from Leagle.com.

Lee A. Jenkins, Plaintiff, represented by O. Randolph Bragg ,
HORWITZ, HORWITZ LAW FIRM, Pamela A. Car -- pacar@cox.net -- CAR,
REINBRECHT LAW FIRM & William L. Reinbrecht, CAR, REINBRECHT LAW
FIRM.

Messerli & Kramer, P.A., Defendant, represented by Derrick N.
Weber -- dweber@messerlikramer.com -- MESSERLI, KRAMER LAW FIRM &
Katie D. Figgins -- kfiggins@messerlikramer.com -- MESSERLI,
KRAMER LAW FIRM.


MULTICARE HEALTH SYSTEM: Faces Lawsuit Over Hepatitis C Outbreak
----------------------------------------------------------------
Sean  Robinson, writing for The News Tribune, reports that
lawsuits are starting to pile up in the wake of a recent
hepatitis C scare at Puyallup's Good Samaritan Hospital.

On May 11, attorneys filed a class action in Pierce County
Superior Court, accusing the MultiCare Health System of breaching
its duty of care to 2,600 Good Samaritan patients who were
potentially exposed to or infected by the hepatitis C virus. It's
the second legal action tied to the outbreak.

Asked for comment, MultiCare spokeswoman Marce Edwards replied
with an emailed statement:

"We have not been served with any lawsuit related to this
incident therefore we cannot comment. However, our focus remains
on making sure every patient potentially exposed is tested and
any who are infected are treated. So far, nearly 1,200 people
have been screened. We encourage the other 1,450 people who
received letters from us to visit one of our lab locations, which
can be found at multicare.org/safety-alert."

The plaintiff in the suit, listed by the initials M.N., was
treated in the hospital's emergency department on Dec. 25 of last
year, the suit states. She received a letter from the hospital on
April 27, indicating that she might have been exposed to
hepatitis C and recommending testing.

The woman agreed to testing. The results were negative for
hepatitis C, hepatitis B and HIV, the lawsuit states. But
attorneys Cari Laufenberg, Esq. -- claufenberg@kellerrohrback.com
-- and Joe Sauder, Esq. -- jgs@mccunewright.com -- contend that
the woman will likely face re-testing and cannot be certain
whether she has contracted the virus.

"There's a latency period," Laufenberg said. "She will not have a
true understanding of the state of her health until the latency
period has passed."

Added Sauder, "The hospital is notifying people that they may be
asked to come back for a second round."

The lawsuit contends that patients who were asked to undergo
testing suffered damages whether they contracted the virus or
not. They endured worry and stress, inconvenience and distraction
and the "physical invasion and other effects of the testing
process," according to the complaint.

The lawsuit also references Cora Weberg, the 31-year-old nurse
linked to the outbreak by hospital officials, who described her
as the "common denominator" between the two patients initially
identified when the outbreak was announced on April 30. She no
longer works at the hospital.

Weberg was arrested by Puyallup police and released one day later
without charges. The state Nursing Commission suspended her
license in connection with the incident, noting that she admitted
taking leftover drugs after dosing patients with pain
medications.

Weberg spoke publicly after her release. She said she took the
drugs to aid in unsuccessful suicide attempts. She said she never
used needles on patients that she had previously used on herself,
and she denied that she is a carrier of hepatitis C.

To date, analysis by experts from the Tacoma-Pierce County Health
Department in conjunction with the Centers for Disease Control
and prevention have linked the first two patients identified in
the outbreak and found that they contracted the virus from the
same source. However, analysts haven't established the same
genetic link to Weberg.

Nevertheless, the class action names Weberg as the source of the
exposure, saying she infected patients with needles she'd used on
herself.

"That's based upon information and belief," Sauder said.

To date, M.N. is the only plaintiff in the suit, and the
theoretical representative of a class of patients who could join
the case.

"The very definitive information that the hospital has already
provided heightens the concern," Laufenberg said. "It's a very
scary situation."[GN]


NEW MEXICO: Special Master's Report in "Hatten-Gonzalez" Modified
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico
issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order sustaining in part and
overruling in part Special Master's Report in the case captioned
DEBRA HATTEN-GONZALES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BRENT EARNEST,
Secretary of the New Mexico Human Services Department, Defendant,
Civ. No. 88-0385 KG/CG (D.N.M.).

The Special Master made several Findings.

First, the Special Master found that, although the Defendant has
historically not met the requirements of the Consent Decree,
court orders, or federal law, there were times when the Defendant
complied with part of the United States Department of
Agriculture's Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) regulations. FNS
actually had, in the past, awarded enhanced funding bonus money
for HSD's performance in the areas of timeliness and Quality
Control accuracy, areas corresponding to a section of the Consent
Decree.

Second, the Special Master found that the Defendant's current
executive management team experiences difficulties in managing
the ISD program in a positive manner. The Special Master
acknowledged that the current Defendant, appointed in December
2014, and the previous Deputy Cabinet Secretary, appointed in
January 2015 with his tenure ending in December 2017, inherited
an ISD program with a history of failure related to the Consent
Decree and execution of the program requirements and during times
of major operational change (Affordable Care Act and ASPEN
implementation).

The Special Master then came to several conclusions as a result
of his Findings. First, he concluded that the Defendant is not in
full compliance with the Consent Decree, court orders, and
federal law.  Second, the Special Master concluded that despite
limited progress by the ISD program management, instituting a
receivership, at this time, would not result in immediate
resolution of the ISD program deficiencies.

The Special Master then made the following nine Recommendations,
inter alia:

   1. Remove from any position that directly or indirectly
impacts ISD Field Operations: Assistant General Counselor, Former
Deputy Cabinet Secretary, Income Support Director, Field
Operations Deputy Director, and a Regional Operations Manager.
After the changes are implemented, an assessment of County
Directors and Line Managers will be completed to determine
additional changes required.Implementation Timeframe: 45 Calendar
Days from the order

   2. Revise the Consent Decree to give recognition to the parts
that have been completed, update requirements, close the class
(if allowed by law) and dismiss all court orders, in which the
requirements have been met.

The Plaintiffs object to the statements in the background portion
of the Report regarding the class definition to the extent they
mean that this case can never end. The Plaintiffs note that a
class definition of present and future applicants is common in
cases involving administration of public benefits programs and
has been consistently upheld by Courts.

The Plaintiffs' advocate and counsel has extended the scope of
the Consent Decree to include all SNAP and Medicaid programmatic
changes made by the agency and federal oversight agencies.  The
Plaintiffs' advocate, through a network of ISD employee
confidential informants keeps tabs on the ISD operation and
program issues. The Plaintiffs usually do not bring the issues
identified to the immediate attention of the Defendant due to an
inherent lack of trust between the parties.

The Plaintiffs object to the background portion of the Report
describing their counsel's monitoring of this case. The
Plaintiffs specifically deny that their counsel have extended the
scope of the Consent Decree and, instead, contend that counsel
monitor the Consent Decree as the Court has interpreted it
through the years.

The Court, nonetheless, agrees with the Special Master's key
concern about the inherent lack of trust between the parties. As
the Court personally observed over the last four years, this lack
of trust, communication, and cooperation between counsel has
hamstrung timely progress toward compliance with the Consent
Decree, court orders, and federal law. For these reasons, the
Court overrules the Plaintiffs' objection concerning the
description of counsel's monitoring to the extent it relates to
immaterial statements and the Special Master's finding of lack of
trust.

Finding that neither party filed a motion or sought relief from
the court to demonstrate improvement or movement towards a
resolution of the Consent Decree when FNS awarded Defendant
enhanced funding bonus money for timeliness and quality control
accuracy.

The Plaintiffs object to the Finding regarding the past award of
FNS enhanced funding bonus money by pointing out that the Court
has not considered Defendant's receipt of performance bonuses as
evidence of compliance with the Consent Decree.

The Special Master simply notes that when the Defendant received
such money neither party acknowledged, through the filing of a
motion, Defendant's improvement or movement towards a resolution
of the Consent Decree.

The Court, therefore, overrules the Plaintiffs' objection
regarding the Special Master's mention of awards of FNS enhanced
funding bonus money.

The Plaintiffs object to the statement in the Conclusion that
there is no evidence of immediate and irreparable harm to the
class members.

The Court held that when eligible individuals do not receive food
assistance, it puts pressure on other entities and state programs
such as food banks and shelters, and family members and friends
to provide for the individuals the SNAP program is meant to
assist. Plaintiffs also cite other cases wherein courts have
granted preliminary injunctions after having found irreparable
harm to persons denied subsistence benefits.

The Court agrees with this objection to the statement concerning
lack of irreparable harm and so sustains it.

The Defendant raises objections in his response to the Report,
but also, in his Motion to Modify, seeks an Order modifying the
Special Master's report to for the reasons outlined in HSD's
objections.

The Court does not construe these objections as requests to
modify the Report. Instead, the Court simply will determine
whether to sustain or overrule those objections. To the extent
the "Notes Regarding Other Recommendations" suggest modifications
to the Special Master's Recommendations, the Court will address
those suggestions as proposed modifications to the
Recommendations. The Court begins its analysis with Defendant's
objections.

The Defendant objects to the following statement in the Findings:
the Deputy Cabinet Secretary is responsible for administration of
the ISD program. Defendant contends that the ISD director is
responsible for administering ISD programs while the Deputy
Cabinet Secretary only has supervisory responsibility over the
ISD director.

The Special Master found that the former Deputy Cabinet Secretary
was, in fact, involved in administering ISD programs. Indeed, the
record shows that although the former Deputy Cabinet Secretary
began his appointment in January 2015, he was the acting ISD
director from August 2016 to June 2017.

The Court overrules the Defendant's first objection.

Accordingly, the objections to the Special Master's Report are
sustained, in part, and overruled, in part; and the Motion to
Modify the Special Master's Report is granted, in part, and
denied, in part.

The parties must meet the following deadlines, inter alia:

   a. the parties will revise the Consent Decree to reflect the
parts that have been completed, update requirements, and dismiss
all moot court orders. Implementation Timeframe: 30 days from the
date of the entry of this Memorandum Opinion and Order.

   b. the Defendant will implement an unbiased case review
process to assist in validating whether the ISD program is
meeting the requirements of the Consent Decree. The case review
process will include: (1) an independent random selection of the
case sample;(2) a case sample that includes all case action
types; and (3) an independent dispute resolution process.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 5, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yagyc9f4
from Leagle.com.

Debra Hatten-Gonzales, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Yohalem --
jbyohalem@gmail.com -- Daniel Yohalem Attorney at Law, Gail J.
Evans -- gail@nmpovertylaw.org -- NM Center on Law and Poverty,
Jane Yohalem, Law Office of Jane B Yohalem, Maria T. Griego, NM
Center on Law and Poverty, Sovereign Hager, New Mexico Center on
Law and Poverty & Adrianne R. Turner, NM Center on Law and
Poverty.

Brent Earnest, Secretary of the New Mexico Human Services
Department, Defendant, represented by Christopher P. Collins, New
Mexico Human Services Dept., Jessica M. Hernandez, Kennedy,
Hernandez & Associates, P.C., Natalie A. Campbell, New Mexico
Human Services Department, Paul J. Kennedy, Kennedy, Hernandez &
Associates, PC & George F. Heidke, Jr., State of New Mexico Human
Services Department.


NEW YORK: "Krooks" Suit Brought Before New York Supreme Court
-------------------------------------------------------------
The class action styled as Bernard A. Krooks and Robin Krooks as
Guardians of the Person and Property of Max Krooks, and all
persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Kerry A. Delaney,
Howard A. Zucker and Samuel D. Roberts, Defendants, Case No.
58518/2018 (N.Y., May 29, 2018).

Kerry A. Delaney is the Acting Commissioner of the New York State
Office for People with Developmental Disabilities.  Howard A.
Zucker is the Commissioner of Health for New York State, while
Samuel D. Roberts is the Commissioner of the Office of Temporary
and Disability Assistance.

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

   Ryan Joseph Byrnes, Esq.
   399 Knollwood Rd
   White Plains, NY 10603-1931


NORMANDINS: Court Grants Final Approval of "Brinker" Settlement
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ALAN BRINKER, AUSTIN RUGG, and ANA SANDERS,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. NORMANDIN'S, a California corporation, d/b/a
NORMANDIN CHRYSLER JEEP DODGE RAM, and ONECOMMAND, INC.,
Defendants, Case No. 5:14-cv-03007-EJD-HRL (N.D. Cal.), Judge
Edward J. Davila of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, San Jose Division, granted in part the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement
and the Class Counsel's Motion for an Award of Fees, Costs, and
Class Representative Service Awards.

On Oct. 5, 2017, the Parties filed the Settlement Agreement and
Release which sets for the terms and conditions of the settlement
and release of certain claims against the Defendant.  The
Plaintiffs and the Class Counsel have filed motions, pursuant to
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for orders
finally approving the Agreement, which will dismiss the Action
with prejudice, and granting the Class Counsel's request for an
award of fees and costs, and service awards to the Plaintiffs.

The Court preliminary approved the Settlement on Nov. 16, 2017
and the Class Notice was given to Settlement Class Members
pursuant to that Preliminary Approval Order.

The Court held the Fairness Hearing on March 29, 2018.  Upon
consideration of all the papers filed in support of the
Settlement, and all exhibits thereto, Judge Davila finds that the
Settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable to the Settlement
Class, within the authority of the parties, and the result of
extensive arm's length negotiations with the guidance of an
experienced mediator.

Pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and for the purposes of Settlement only, the
Settlement Class is certified as all persons who owned one or
more of the 8,313 cellular telephone numbers to which calls were
placed by OneCommand on Normandin's behalf on or after Oct. 16,
2013, through the alleged use of any automatic telephone dialing
system or with an artificial or prerecorded voice, which calls
allegedly were not made for emergency purposes or with the
recipient's prior express consent.

The Judge appointed the Named Plaintiffs as the Class
Representatives, and the attorneys at Terrell Marshall Law Group
PLLC as the Class Counsel.  He finally approved the Settlement
and dismissed with prejudice the Action, the Released Claims, and
the Released Parties, and adjudged that the Released Claims are
released against the Released Parties.

Judge Davila approved the payment of attorneys' fees and costs to
the Class Counsel in the amount of $150,000.  He also approved
the payment of service awards to the Named Plaintiffs in the
amount of $7,500 for Plaintiff Brinker, and $1,000 each for
Plaintiffs Rugg and Sanders.  The Defendants will pay these
amounts pursuant to the terms of the Agreement.

The Clerk of the Court is ordered to enter the Final Approval
Order and close the file.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 4, 2018 Order is available
at https://bit.ly/2KoXzUf from Leagle.com.

Alan Brinker, Plaintiff, represented by Beth E. Terrell --
bterrell@terrellmarshall.com -- Terrell Marshall Law Group PLLC,
Adrienne McEntee -- amcentee@terrellmarshall.com -- Terrell
Marshall Daudt and Willie PLLC, Allyson Janay Ferguson --
jferguson@terrellmarshall.com -- Terrell Marshall Law Group PLLC,
pro hac vice, Kathryn A. Williams -- roblin@williamslaw.com --
Williamson & Williams, Mary Bondy Reiten --
mreiten@terrellmarshall.com -- Terrell Marshall Law Group PLLC
&Roblin John Williamson -- kim@williamslaw.com -- Williamson &
Williams.

Austin Rugg & Ana Sanders, Plaintiffs, represented by Adrienne
McEntee, Terrell Marshall Daudt and Willie PLLC & Beth E.
Terrell, Terrell Marshall Law Group PLLC.

Normandin's, a California corporation, Defendant, represented by
Andrew Stearns -- AStearns@RobardsStearns.com -- Robards &
Stearns.

Onecommand, Inc., Defendant, represented by  Sean P. Flynn --
sflynn@grsm.com -- Gordon & Rees, LLP, Steven Charles Coffaro --
steve.coffaro@kmklaw.com -- Keating Muething and Klekamp PLL &
Daniel Scott Kubasak -- dkubasak@grsm.com -- Gordon & Rees.

Normandin's, a California corporation, Cross-claimant,
represented by Andrew Stearns, Robards & Stearns.


NWAN INC: Court Dismisses "Dickerson" MMWA" Suit
------------------------------------------------
Judge David G. Campbell of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Arizona dismissed without prejudice the case, Paul
Dickerson and Ma Riza Dickerson, Plaintiffs, v. NWAN Incorporated
and Superstition Springs MID LLC, Defendants, Case No. CV-17-
01899-PHX-DGC (D. Ariz.), for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.

The Plaintiffs purchased a Dodge Ram truck from Superstition.
The truck was covered by a "Warranty Forever" limited powertrain
warranty administered by NWAN.  The warranty required the
Plaintiffs to have all maintenance on the vehicle performed at
Superstition or seek pre-authorization to have the service
performed elsewhere.  The Plaintiffs' claim for a covered repair
was denied and their warranty was voided because they failed to
comply with this requirement.  They allege that the pre-
authorization requirement violates the MMWA's anti-tying
provision.

The sued Superstition and NWAN, for intentional interference with
contract and violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.  On
Feb. 7, 2018, the Court dismissed the intentional interference
claim and dismissed NWAN as a Defendant.  The Court also ordered
the parties to submit briefs addressing the Court's subject
matter jurisdiction.

The Plaintiffs' amended complaint asserts the Class Action
Fairness Act ("CAFA") as the sole basis for the Court's
jurisdiction.  The amended complaint contains two classes and two
subclasses.  The broadest class definition includes (a) all
persons (b) who purchased a warranty issued on forms provided by
defendant NWAN (c) which contains service requirements similar to
those in Exhibits A and B (d) which warranty is still in force,
or would be but for the voiding of the warranty for noncompliance
with the service requirements.

Superstition submitted evidence with its brief and argued that
the Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the amount-in-controversy
requirement under the CAFA.  The Court ordered supplemental
briefing on this issue, which the parties submitted.
Superstition also requests attorneys' fees.

Judge Campbell holds that despite the Defendant's specific
assertion -- supported by affidavits -- that the $5 million
threshold has not been met, the Plaintiffs provide no basis for
the Court to reasonably estimate the class size or quantify the
amount of damages.  The Judge says he will not engage in
speculation untethered to any concrete allegations or evidence,
nor blindly accept the Plaintiffs' assertion that the amount in
controversy requirement is satisfied.  The Plaintiffs have not
shown that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction.  And
because Superstition provides no basis for its attorneys' fees
request, the Judge will deny the request.

For these reasons, Judge Campbell dismissed the case without
prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  The Clerk
will terminate the action.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 4, 2018 Order is available
at https://bit.ly/2jgqFbO from Leagle.com.

Paul Dickerson, on behalf of plaintiffs and the class members
described herein, Plaintiff, represented by Cassandra P. Miller -
- cmiller@edcombs.com -- Edelman Combs Latturner & Goodwin LLC,
Hyung Sik Choi -- hyung@choiandfabian.com -- Choi & Fabian PLC &
Veronika Fabian, Choi & Fabian PLC.

Ma Riza Dickerson, on behalf of plaintiffs and the class members
described herein, Plaintiff, represented by Cassandra P. Miller,
Edelman Combs Latturner & Goodwin LLC, Daniel A. Edelman, Edelman
Combs Latturner & Goodwin LLC, Hyung Sik Choi, Choi & Fabian PLC
& Veronika Fabian, Choi & Fabian PLC.

Superstition Springs MID LLC, doing business as, Defendant,
represented by Brett Steven Krantz -- BK@KJK.COM -- Kohrman
Jackson & Krantz LLP, Sean Patrick Malone -- SPM@KJK.COM --
Kohrman Jackson & Krantz LLP & Jeffrey S. Leonard --
jeffrey.leonard@sackstierney.com -- Sacks Tierney PA.


OASIS DAY: Faces "Burbon" Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Oasis Day Spa, Inc.
The case is styled as Luc Burbon, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Oasis Day Spa, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-04732 (S.D. N.Y., May 29, 2018).

Oasis Day Spa is a New York City Day Spa founded in 1998 that
provides services such as waxing, massage therapy, Swedish
massage, facials, and prenatal massage. The company also has an
offsite massage and pop-up massage program that services the New
York metropolitan area and most major US cities.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


OWENS CORNING: Denial of "Gonzalez" Class Certification Affirmed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JAIME GONZALEZ; PATRICIA WRIGHT; KEVIN WEST; GERALD
BOEHM; EDWARD MAAG; DIANE MAAG, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Appellants, v. OWENS CORNING; OWENS
CORNING SALES LLC, Case No. 16-2653 (3d Cir.), Judge Thomas
Hardiman of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
affirmed the District Court's order denying the Plaintiffs'
motion for class certification.

The appeal involves a putative class action brought by consumers
in four states who alleged that Appellees Owens Corning sold
defective roof shingles and misrepresented the shingles' expected
useful life.  The Appellants challenge an order of the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania denying
class certification.

In 2009, Appellants Wright and West filed suit in the District
Court under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on
behalf of a proposed nationwide class of individuals who "owned,
own, or acquired" structures on which certain Owens Corning-
manufactured roofing shingles are or have been installed since
1986.  Wright and West claimed that Oakridge shingles -- an Owens
Corning brand of fiberglass asphalt roofing shingles -- are
plagued by design flaws that result in cracking, curling and
degranulation and will eventually fail, causing property damage,
and costing consumers substantial removal and replacement costs.

The District Court entered summary judgment in favor of Owens
Corning, finding that Wright and West's claims had been
discharged in bankruptcy by the 2006 confirmation of Owens
Corning's reorganization plan.  The Third Circuit partially
reversed, concluding that the claims were not discharged.  After
the case was remanded to the District Court, Appellants Gonzalez,
Boehm, and Edward and Diane Maag (together with Wright and West)
filed three similar suits in district courts in other states,
which were then transferred to the Western District of
Pennsylvania and consolidated with Wright and West's case.

The Plaintiffs are homeowners from Pennsylvania, Illinois, Texas,
and California, on whose roofs Oakridge shingles were installed
prior to 2006.  They allege that their shingles have not
performed as promised because they were manufactured in
accordance with defective design specifications.  Of the named
Plaintiffs, three reported property damage and two had their
roofs reshingled.  The shingles were all subject to warranties of
25 years or more, which the Plaintiffs argue amounted to
affirmative representations about the shingles' expected useful
life.

The Plaintiffs proffer the Four-State Class as either a money
damages class under Rule 23(b)(3) or an issue class under Rule
23(c)(4).  They define the class as all individuals and entities
that own a building or structure physically located in the states
of California, Illinois, Pennsylvania, or Texas on which Owens
Corning's Oakridge-brand shingles were installed from 1992
through 2012, and where those shingles manifested any cracking,
degranulation, fragmentation, or deterioration during the
warranty coverage period.

The Plaintiffs propose that the Nationwide Class proceed under
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) or Rule 23(b)(2), and that it include all
individuals and entities that own a building or structure
physically located in the United States on which Owens Corning's
Oakridge-brand shingles are currently installed, where those
shingles were purchased on or before September 26, 2006.  Through
the Nationwide Class, the Plaintiffs seek to mitigate what they
perceive is a risk of inconsistent judgments resulting from the
procedural history of the case prior to the consolidation of
Wright and West's action with those brought by the other named
Plaintiffs.

The Plaintiffs moved for certification of the Four-State and
Nationwide Classes.  On March 31, 2016, the District Court denied
the Plaintiffs' motion.  With respect to the Four-State Class,
the District Court concluded that the Plaintiffs had not met
their burden under Rule 23(b)(3) to show that questions of law or
fact common to class members predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, nor was it persuaded that
certifying a class under Rule 23(c)(4) to decide issues of
liability was appropriate.  The District Court concluded that the
Nationwide Class could not satisfy the commonality requirement of
Rule 23(a) because the only common question it presented was not
justiciable.

The Plaintiffs filed a timely petition for Rule 23(f) review,
which the Appellate Court granted.  They argue that the District
Court denied certification of the Nationwide Class based on an
erroneous understanding of the requirements for justiciability
under Article III of the Constitution, and that its denial of
certification of the Four-State Class was, among other errors,
improperly grounded in its assessment of the merits, as forbidden
by the Supreme Court in Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement
Plans and Trust Funds.

Judge Hardiman concludes that the sole common question the
Nationwide Class asked the District Court to answer was not
justiciable under Article III.  The District Court rightly
concluded that the Plaintiffs could not satisfy the commonality
requirement of Rule 23(a) and therefore did not err when it
denied their motion to certify the Nationwide Class.

Turning next to the District Court's decision regarding the Four-
State Class, the Judge finds, among other things, instead of
alleging a defect common to the class that might be proved by
classwide evidence, the Plaintiffs invite the Court to equate the
existence of a defect with the mere possibility that one might
exist.  He finds no support in Rule 23 or caselaw for class
certification on such a speculative basis.  Far from abusing its
discretion, the District Court properly concluded that the
Plaintiffs' novel reformulation of the concept of a product
defect could not be permitted to work an end run around the
requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).  In addition, he finds that the
Plaintiffs cannot identify what is defective about their
shingles, let alone how the unidentified defect is susceptible to
proof common to all class members.  Accordingly, he cannot
conclude that the District Court's denial of certification of the
Four-State Class under Rule 23(c)(4) was an abuse of discretion.

Therefore, Judge Hardiman agrees with the District Court that the
Nationwide Class cannot satisfy Rule 23(a)'s commonality
requirement because the only common question it poses can be
answered only by way of an advisory opinion, which is forbidden
by Article III.  As he explains, because he agrees with the
District Court that the Four-State Class cannot satisfy Rule
23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement, he needs not discuss the
other requirements of Rule 23 as they relate to the Four-State
Class.  Finally, the District Court's conclusion that a Rule
23(c)(4) issue class is not an appropriate vehicle for the Four-
State Class was not an abuse of discretion.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 4, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://bit.ly/2JAAcWg from Leagle.com.

Robert H. Klonoff -- klonoff@lclark.edu -- [Argued], Jordan D.
Schnitzer Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School, 10015
Southwest Terwilliger Boulevard, Portland, OR 97219.

Charles E. Schaffer -- cschaffer@lfsblaw.com -- Levin Sedran &
Berman, 510 Walnut Street, Suite 500, Philadelphia, PA 19106.

Shanon J. Carson -- scarson@bm.net -- Lawrence Deutsch , Berger &
Montague, 1622 Locust Street, Philadelphia, PA 19103.

Charles J. LaDuca -- charlesl@cuneolaw.com -- Cuneo Gilbert &
LaDuca LLP, 8120 Woodmont Avenue, Suite 810, Bethesda, MD 20814.

Michael A. McShane, Audet & Partners, 711 Van Ness Avenue, Suite
500, San Francisco, CA 94102.

Robert K. Shelquist --rkshelquist@locklaw.com -- Lockridge
Grindal Nauen PLLP, 100 Washington Avenue South, Suite 2200,
Minneapolis, MN 55401, Attorneys for Appellants.

Carter G. Phillips -- CPHILLIPS@SIDLEY.COM -- [Argued], Sidley
Austin, 1501 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005.

Kara L. McCall -- KMCCALL@SIDLEY.COM -- T. Robert Scarborough --
TSCARBOROUGH@SIDLEY.CO -- Tacy F. Flint -- TFLINT@SIDLEY.COM --
Elizabeth M. Chiarello -- ECHIARELLO@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin
LLP, One South Dearborn Street, Chicago, IL 60603.

Arthur H. Stroyd, Jr., Del Sole Cavanaugh Stroyd, Three PPG
Place, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15222, Attorneys for Appellees.

Allan P. Ides, Simona Grossi, Loyola Law School, 919 Albany
Street, Los Angeles, CA 90015.

Michael J. Quirk -- mquirk@wcblegal.com -- Williams Cuker &
Berezofsky, 1515 Market Street, Suite 1300, Philadelphia, PA
19102, Attorneys for Appellants' Amici Curiae.


PDC ENERGY: Amended Complaint Filed in "Dufresne" Case
------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Dufresne et al v. PDC Energy, Inc. et al., Case No.
1:17-cv-03079 (D. Colo.), A Verified First Amended Complaint was
filed April 26, 2017, against defendants Bart R. Brookman, Jr,
Lance A. Lauck, PDC Energy, Inc., Rockies Region 2006 LP, Rockies
Region 2007 LP, Jeffrey C. Swoveland, Anthony J. Crisafio, David
C. Parke, by plaintiffs Michael A. Gaffey, Robert R. Dufresne,
and Jeffrey Schulein.

Judge R Brooke Jackson presides over the case.

PDC Energy, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
March 31, 2018, that in December 2017, the company received an
action entitled Dufresne, et al. v. PDC Energy, et al., filed in
the United States District Court for the District of Colorado.
The complaint states that it is a derivative action brought by a
number of limited partner investors seeking to assert claims on
behalf of our two affiliated partnerships, Rockies Region 2006 LP
and Rockies Region 2007 LP, against PDC and includes claims for
breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract.

The plaintiffs also included claims against two of the company's
senior officers for alleged breach of fiduciary duty. The lawsuit
accuses PDC, as the managing general partner of the two
partnerships, of, among other things, failing to maximize the
productivity of the partnerships' crude oil and natural gas
wells. The company filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit on
February 1, 2018, on the grounds that the complaint is deficient,
including because the plaintiffs failed to allege that PDC
refused a demand to take action on their claims. On March 14,
2018, the motion was denied as moot by the court because the
plaintiffs requested leave to amend their complaint.

In late April 2018, the plaintiffs filed an amendment to their
complaint.  Such amendment primarily alleges additional facts to
support the plaintiffs' claims and purports to add direct class
action claims in addition to the original derivative claims. The
amendment also adds three new individual defendants, all of which
are independent members of our Board of Directors.

PDC Energy said, "We are currently unable to estimate any
potential damages as a result of this lawsuit."

PDC Energy, Inc., an independent exploration and production
company, acquires, explores for, develops, and produces crude
oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids in the United States.
The company's operations are primarily located in the Wattenberg
Field in Colorado and the Delaware Basin in Texas. The company is
based in Denver, Colorado.


PHILADELPHIA, PA: Denial of Petition for Contempt Vacated
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, John Doe, et al., individually and on behalf of all
persons similarly situated, Appellant, v. City of Philadelphia,
Mayor Michael A. Nutter, Philadelphia Police Department, Gun
Permit Unit of the Philadelphia Police Department, Philadelphia
License and Inspection Board of Review, and Philadelphia Office
of Innovation and Technology, Case No. 990 C.D. 2017 (Pa. Cmmw.),
Judge Kevin Brobson of the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania (i)
vacated the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia
County, dated May 30, 2017, denying the Appellant's petition for
contempt related to a court-approved settlement agreement; and
(ii) remanded the case for further proceedings.

On Dec. 31, 2012, the Appellant, on behalf of himself and other
similarly situated individuals, commenced a class action against
the City of Philadelphia, Mayor Michael A. Nutter, the
Philadelphia Police Department ("PPD"), the Gun Permit Unit of
the PPD, the Philadelphia License and Inspection Board of Review
("L&I Board"), and the Philadelphia Office of Innovation and
Technology, setting forth causes of action for violations of
Section 6111 of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act of 1995
(Act) and breach of confidentiality/invasion of privacy.

The Appellant alleged that the Appellees violated Section 6111 of
the Act by improperly disclosing confidential information
regarding Philadelphia residents who appealed the denial or
revocation of their Pennsylvania licenses to carry firearms
("LTCF") to the L&I Board.  The Appellant sought injunctive
relief to enjoin the Appellees from further disclosing such
confidential information, as well as statutory and other damages,
attorneys' fees, and costs.  Sometime thereafter, the parties
entered into the Settlement Agreement.

Thereafter, on Sept. 16, 2016, the Appellant filed the Petition,
alleging that the Appellees violated the Settlement Agreement and
the trial court's Oct. 29, 2014 order by: (1) disclosing
confidential LTCF information through (a) the use of un-enveloped
postcards, (b) the use of a sign-in sheet at the Gun Permit Unit,
and (c) calling out the applicant's/licensee's name in the
waiting room and then having discussions with such
applicant/licensee in an open carousel located in the waiting
room of the Gun Permit Unit; (2) failing to train members of the
PPD, the Gun Permit Unit, and the L&I Board; (3) failing to
provide the LTCF Notice with any notice to an LTCF applicant
regarding the granting, denial, or revocation of an applicant's
LTCF; (4) requiring LTCF applicants to provide references and
refusing to accept applications that do not contain such
references; and (5) failing to issue LTCFs within 45 days.

The trial court did not issue a rule to show cause in connection
with the Appellant's Petition.  The Appellees did not file an
answer to Appellant's Petition.  Rather, on Sept. 30, 2016, the
Appellees filed an unverified brief in opposition to the
Appellant's Petition.

The trial court held a hearing on Appellant's Petition on April
20, 2017.  On May 30, 2017, the trial court issued an order
denying the Appellant's Petition.

The Appellant appealed the trial court's decision to this Court.
On appeal, the Appellant argues: (1) the trial court abused its
discretion, committed an error of law, or violated the
Appellant's constitutional rights by refusing to issue a rule to
show cause in connection with his Petition; (2) the trial court
abused its discretion, committed an error of law, or violated the
Appellant's constitutional rights by denying him an opportunity
to engage in discovery relative to the Petition; (3) the trial
court abused its discretion, committed an error of law, or
violated his constitutional rights by refusing to enforce the
subpoena issued to Lt. Lisa King; and (4) the trial court abused
its discretion, committed an error of law, or violated his
constitutional rights by denying his Petition.

Judge Brobson finds that In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial
court suggests that the Appellant's argument regarding the trial
court's failure to enforce the subpoena issued to Lt. King is
moot because, after the trial court indicated that it would take
the matter under advisement, the Appellant did nothing further to
object or request a continuance so that enforcement proceedings
could be pursued.  The Judge disagrees saying that it was not
necessary for the Appellant's counsel to object any further or to
further request that the trial court enforce the subpoena.  Even
though the trial court took no further action with respect to the
enforcement of the subpoena after it indicated that it would take
the matter under advisement, the trial court's actions -- i.e.,
denying the Appellant's Petition without permitting him to obtain
the requested documents and holding a further evidentiary hearing
thereafter -- suggest that the trial court implicitly denied the
request.

The trial court's Rule 1925(a) opinion, however, does not set
forth the reasons why the trial court decided not to enforce the
subpoena.  The Judge, therefore, cannot discern from the record
before us whether the trial court erred.  Nonetheless, he notes
that given his decision to remand the matter to the trial court,
this issue is now moot.  On remand, however, if the trial court
decides not to enforce a subpoena properly served by one of the
parties, the trial court should set forth the reasons for its
decision on the record or in an opinion.

For all of these reasons, a remand is necessary to afford the
Appellant the process to which he is entitled under the
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure and the Philadelphia Civil
Rules.  Accordingly, Judge Brobson vacated the trial court's
order and remanded the matter to the trial court for further
proceedings.  On remand, the trial court is directed to issue a
rule to show cause, specifically setting forth the process and
procedure that it will follow to decide the Appellant's Petition,
which may include permitting the Appellant to engage in discovery
and/or holding a new evidentiary hearing after a verified answer
has been filed.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 4, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://bit.ly/2Ft3pAe from Leagle.com.


PHILIPPE NORTH: Settlement in "Sandoval" Suit Has Prelim Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, OSCAR SANDOVAL, et al., on behalf of themselves and
on behalf of other similarly-situated individuals, Plaintiffs, v.
PHILIPPE NORTH AMERICAN RESTAURANTS, LLC, et al., Defendants,
Case No. 16-CV-615 (VSB)(SN)(S.D. N.Y.), Judge Vernon S.
Broderick of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York the Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for an order (1)
granting preliminary approval of the proposed class and
collective action Settlement Agreement and Release reached by the
parties in the action; (2) conditionally certifying the proposed
class; (3) approving the proposed notice of settlement; and (4)
appointing the class counsel.

The Plaintiffs brought the action alleging that the Defendants
violated the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the New York Labor
Law.

On May 12, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion seeking
preliminary settlement approval, conditional certification of the
proposed class, approval of the proposed notice of settlement,
and appointment of Wigdor LLP as the class counsel.  They filed a
memorandum of law in support of their motion, as well as the
Declaration of David E. Gottlieb on the same date.

On Aug. 31, 2017, Judge Broderick denied the Plaintiffs'
unopposed motion because Section 5.1(E) of the proposed
Settlement Agreement contained an overbroad general release.  The
parties jointly moved for reconsideration on Sept. 14, 2017,
which the Judge also denied because it did not meet the standards
for granting such a motion.

On Jan. 10, 2018, the parties submitted a joint letter informing
the Judge that they had reached an agreement to strike the
general release language contained in Section 5.1(E) such that it
has no force or effect.  The Stipulation provides that it will be
an addendum to the Settlement Agreement.  The parties requested
that he so orders the Stipulation and renewed their request for
preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement, which, apart
from the addition of the Stipulation, was identical to the
settlement agreement submitted with the Plaintiffs' original
motion.  On Feb. 20, 2018, the Plaintiffs submitted a letter
inquiring whether the Judge needed any additional information
with regard to their unopposed motion.

Having reviewed the Plaintiff's submissions, including the
proposed Settlement Agreement and Stipulation, Judge Broderick
granted the parties' joint request.  The Broderick concludes that
the Settlement Agreement and Stipulation are the result of
substantial investigative efforts, arm's length negotiations, and
the assistance of a neutral mediator, and that terms are within
the range of possible settlement approval.  The parties'
Stipulation to strike the general release contained in Section
5.1(E) cures the defect identified in his previous order.  As
such, he preliminarily approved the Settlement Agreement.

The Judge provisionally certified for settlement purposes the
"Settlement Class" under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)
described as all tipped service employees including servers,
bartenders, bussers, and runners, who worked at the Defendants'
locations of Philippe Restaurants between Jan. 27, 2010 and April
21, 2017.

In addition, he appointed the Plaintiff's counsel, Wigdor LLP,
and in particular David E. Gottlieb, as the class counsel; and
approved the Class Notice.

Within 15 days after the entry of the Order, the Defendants will
provide the Claims Administrator and the Class Counsel the Class
List.  Within 30 days after the entry of the Order (or later as
may be necessary to resolve any disputes regarding the Class
List), he directed the Claims Administrator to mail the Proposed
Notice to each Class Member via First Class Mail (postage
prepaid) through the United States Postal Service.  The Proposed
Class will have 45 days after the date the Proposed Notice is
mailed to submit a claim form, opt-out of, or object to the
Agreement.

The Judge will hold a fairness hearing on July 19, 2018 at 11:30
a.m.  No later than 14 days prior to the fairness hearing, the
Claims Administrator will certify jointly to the Class Counsel
and to the Defendants' counsel: (a) a list of all the Class
Members; (b) a list of all the Class Members who filed timely
objections; and (c) a list of all the Class Members who requested
to opt-out of the settlement at any time during the opt-out
period.  The Claims Administrator also will provide Class Counsel
and Defendants' counsel with an updated address list for all
Class Members.

No later than 14 days prior to the fairness hearing, Judge
Broderick ordered that the Plaintiffs will submit a Motion for
Final Order and Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice.  After the
fairness hearing, if he grants the Motion for Final Order and
Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice, he will issue an Order
Granting Final Approval.  If no party appeals his Order Granting
Final Approval, the Final Effective Date of the Agreement will be
30 days after he enters an Order Granting Final Approval.

Within five days of after entry of the Order, the Defendants will
make payment of $250,000 into an escrow account established and
administered by the Claims Administrator.  Within five days after
the Final Effective Date, the Claims Administrator will inform
the Defendants of the total amount necessary to fund the
Settlement Account.

Within 15 days of the Final Effective Date, the Defendants will
deposit sufficient funds to cover the Settlement Checks into the
escrow account established and administered by the Claims
Administrator.  The Claims Administrator will disburse the
settlement checks to the Proposed Class, the Court-approved
attorneys' fees and costs, and the Court-approved enhancement
awards fees within 14 days after the payment is made into the
escrow account.  The Parties will abide by all terms of the
Agreement, including, but not limited to, those terms addressing
the timing and method of the Defendants' payments into a
settlement fund, and disbursal of same by the Claims
Administrator to the Proposed Class.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 4, 2018 Opinion and Order
is available at https://bit.ly/2vXYxn7 from Leagle.com.

Oscar Sandoval, on behalf of himself and on behalf of other
similarly-situated individuals, Juan Aca, on behalf of himself
and on behalf of other similarly-situated individuals, Elmer
Bonilla, on behalf of himself and on behalf of other similarly-
situated individuals, Felix Maldonado Diaz, on behalf of himself
and on behalf of other similarly-situated individuals, Enrique
Flores, on behalf of himself and on behalf of other similarly-
situated individuals, Kerry Nohoth Hernandez-Rodriguez, on behalf
of himself and on behalf of other similarly-situated individuals,
Pablo Lainez, on behalf of himself and on behalf of other
similarly-situated individuals, Jose Luis Maldonado Lopez, on
behalf of himself and on behalf of other similarly-situated
individuals, Kihel Noureddine, on behalf of himself and on behalf
of other similarly-situated individuals, Ignacio Quijano-Aviles,
on behalf of himself and on behalf of other similarly-situated
individuals, Angel Quito, on behalf of himself and on behalf of
other similarly-situated individuals, Leonardo Ramon, on behalf
of himself and on behalf of other similarly-situated individuals,
Flavio Soto, on behalf of himself and on behalf of other
similarly-situated individuals, Filiberto Villalba, on behalf of
himself and on behalf of other similarly-situated individuals,
Edwin Zevallos, on behalf of himself and on behalf of other
similarly-situated individuals, Freddy Zevallos, on behalf of
himself and on behalf of other similarly-situated individuals,
Edvin Chavez, on behalf of himself and on behalf of other
similarly-situated individuals, Martin Lopez, on behalf of
himself and on behalf of other similarly-situated individuals,
Edin Muratvoc, on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated individuals, Juan Carlos Navarrete-Rodriguez, on behalf
of themselves and others similarly situated individuals, Esteban
Aca, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated
individuals, Henrique Castillo, on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated individuals, Alexandru Dobrin, on
behalf of themselves and others similarly situated individuals,
Daniele Perugini, on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated individuals & Diego Arce, Plaintiffs, represented by
David Evan Gottlieb -- dgottlieb@wigdorlaw.com -- Wigdor LLP.

Dave 60 NYC, Inc., Philippe NYC I LLC, Philippe Chow East Hampton
LLC, Merchants Hospitality, Inc., Philippe Chow Holdings LLC,
Philippe Chow Mgmt LLC, Philippe Equities LLC, Philippe Chow &
Joseph Goldsmith, Defendants, represented by Jamie Scott Felsen,
Milman Labuda Law Group, PLLC.


PHILLIPS & COHEN: Faces "Maschi" Suit in E.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Phillips & Cohen
Associates, Ltd. The case is styled as Keith L. Maschi,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Phillips & Cohen Associates, Ltd., Defendant, Case
No. 2:18-cv-03070 (E.D. N.Y., May 24, 2018).

Phillips & Cohen Associates, Ltd. is a debt collection agency in
Wilmington, Delaware.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


PHOENIX CLOSURES: "Sutherlin" FLSA Suit Remains in S.D. Ind.
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Terre Haute Division, denied Defendant's Motion to
Change Venue in the case captioned JOSEPH R. SUTHERLIN,
individually and on behalf of others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. PHOENIX CLOSURES, INC., Defendant, No. 2:17-cv-
00489-RLM-DLP (S.D. Ind.).

The Plaintiffs are opt-in members of a putative Fair Labor
Standard Act (FLSA) collective action and, thus far, are the only
five Plaintiffs who have signed on. The Plaintiffs allege that
the Defendant, Phoenix Closures, Inc., employed each of them at
its Greencastle, Indiana facility. The Plaintiffs further allege
that Phoenix misclassified each plaintiff as an exempt, salaried
employee during the relevant period when they should have been
treated as non-exempt and therefore entitled to overtime pay for
the hours they worked in excess of forty hours a week.

Thus far, five plaintiffs have opted in to the present collective
action, all of whom live within the Southern District of Indiana
and, more specifically, within the Terre Haute division. These
five individuals have, by signing on, affirmatively represented
that the present district is convenient for them and,
accordingly, this court gives significant deference to that
decision. Should any other plaintiffs in the Defendant's three
other facilities decide to participate, they will have the choice
to either opt-in to this existing case or pursue their own action
in a more convenient district.

The Plaintiffs argue that the situs of material events occurred
in Indiana because the named Plaintiffs worked and were
compensated there. Since the payments were actually issued to
individuals in Indiana, this information is material to the
potential amount of damages. At this point, they allege, the only
Plaintiffs are located in Indiana, with any participation from
other districts being speculative.

The Defendant argues that this factor weighs in favor of transfer
because company-wide documents, such as those maintained by the
human resources and payroll departments, are maintained at the
corporate headquarters in Illinois.

The physical location and the physical site of records is a
holdover from a time when businesses kept important records,
including payroll records, in paper and the difficulty of
physically accessing the paper documents and the burden of
transporting them across jurisdictions.

Each side prefers its home forum, and while each side would be
burdened by litigating in its non-preferred forum, the burden
would not be particularly great given the ease of travel between
the two forums. Neither side has demonstrated that its burden
will substantially outweigh the other's if it does not get its
choice of forum. It appears that each side's witnesses are
located in its preferred forum. This is not a case of a district
on the west coast seeking transfer to a district on the east
coast; the two districts in question here are three hours apart
when traveling by car. As mentioned earlier, the Court returns to
the notion that merely shifting the inconvenience from one party
to the other is not justification enough to warrant transfer.

In addition to considering the parties' private interests, this
Court must also consider the public interest, which includes 1)
docket congestion of the respective court dockets; 2) prospects
for a speedy trial; and 3) the courts' familiarity with the
applicable law.

While the Defendant would target the total filings, civil
filings, and weighted filings as conclusive evidence of the
advantage of the Northern District of Illinois, the Court would
draw the parties' attention to a few other statistics noted in
the Judicial Caseload Profile, namely the time from filing to
disposition for civil cases, the time from filing to trial in
civil cases, and the number and percent of civil cases over 3
years old.

With regard to each court's relative familiarity with the
applicable law, the Court finds that factor to be neutral, as
both courts will be equally familiar with the FLSA. The
Plaintiffs bring one state law claim under the Indiana Wage
Claims Statute, which only slightly leans in favor of the
Plaintiffs' position, as both courts would be able to apply
Indiana law adequately.

The balancing of factors for this case creates a very close call
which, consequently, does not convince the Court that transfer is
warranted and, therefore, this Court denies the Defendant's
Motion to Change Venue.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 5, 2018Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yapvnr3c from Leagle.com.

JOSEPH R. SUTHERLIN, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Robert F. Hunt --
hunt@huntlawfirm.net -- HUNT HASSLER LORENZ & KONDRAS LLP, Robert
J. Hunt, LAW OFFICE OF ROBERT J. HUNT LLC & Robert Peter Kondras,
Jr. -- kondras@huntlawfirm.net -- HUNT HASSLER KONDRAS & MILLER
LLP.

PHOENIX CLOSURES, INC., Defendant, represented by Bradley J.
Wombles  -- bwombles@ncs-law.com -- NORRIS CHOPLIN & SCHROEDER,
Irving Gelewitz -- igeslewitz@muchshelist.com -- MUCH SHELIST PC,
Melinda Morales -- mmorales@muchshelist.com -- MUCH SHELIST, PC,
pro hac vice & Peter A. Schroeder -- pschroeder@ncs-law.com --
NORRIS CHOPLIN & SCHROEDER LLP.


PLANTAIN PRODUCTS: Faces "Pottish" Suit in C.D. California
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Plantain Products
Company. The case is styled as Dallas Pottish, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Plantain
Products Company, a Florida corporation and DOES 1 through 10,
inclsuive, Defendants, Case No. 8:18-cv-00904 (C.D. Cal., May 24,
2018).

Plantain Products Company was founded in 1963. The company's line
of business includes manufacturing prepared foods and
miscellaneous food specialties.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


PRE-EMPLOYMENT INC: Faces "Griffin" Suit in M.D. Florida
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Pre-Employment,
Inc. a Domestic For-Profit Corporation. The case is styled as
Brice Griffin, on his own behalf and on behalf of all similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiff v. Pre-Employment, Inc. a
Domestic For-Profit Corporation, Defendant, Case No. 8:18-cv-
01251-RAL-AAS (M.D. Fla., May 24, 2018).

Pre-Employment, Inc. is an employment center in San Antonio,
Texas.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Andrew Ross Frisch, Esq.
   Morgan & Morgan, PA
   600 N Pine Island Rd, Suite 400
   Plantation, FL 33324
   Tel: (954) 318-0268
   Fax: (954) 333-3515
   Email: afrisch@forthepeople.com

      - and -

   C. Ryan Morgan, Esq.
   Morgan & Morgan, PA
   20 N Orange Ave Ste 1600
   Orlando, FL 32801-4624
   Tel: (407) 420-1414
   Fax: (407) 245-3401
   Email: rmorgan@forthepeople.com

      - and -

   Marc Reed Edelman, Esq.
   Morgan & Morgan, PA
   One Tampa City Center, Ste 700
   201 N Franklin Street
   Tampa, FL 33602-5157
   Tel: (813) 223-5505
   Fax: (813) 257-0572
   Email: MEdelman@forthepeople.com


PROGRESS RESIDENTIAL: Ct. Conditionally Certifies "Freeman" Class
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KRISTAL FREEMAN, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. PROGRESS RESIDENTIAL
PROPERTY MANAGER, LLC, Defendant, Civil Action No. 3:16-CV-00356
(S.D. Tex.), Magistrate Judge Andrew M. Edison of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Galveston
Division, granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for FLSA Conditional
Certification and Class Notice under 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b).

Progress is one of the largest providers of single family rental
homes in the United States, with properties available across the
country.  Freeman brought the lawsuit against Progress for
alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), on
behalf of herself and similarly situated onsite leasing agents.

Freeman claims that Progress required Freeman and other onsite
leasing agents nationwide to work in excess of 40 hours per
workweek without any overtime compensation.  Two additional
former Progress employees, Theresa Sands and Nature Carney-
Francis, have filed Notices of Consent, opting-into the case.
The Plaintiffs seek conditional certification of all of Progress'
current and former onsite leasing agents so that they can provide
nationwide notice of the lawsuit.

In support of their Motion, the Plaintiffs have submitted
declarations stating that they worked for Progress as onsite
leasing agents in either the Greater Houston and/or Dallas areas.
Freeman says she worked for Progress from June 2016 through
October 2016; Sands claims she worked for Progress from November
2015 through November 2016; and Carney-Francis contends she
worked for Progress from November 2014 to July 2016.  Progress
acknowledges that Freeman, Sands and Carney-Francis all worked as
onsite leasing agents, but disputes the exact dates Carney-
Francis worked for the company.

The one thing the parties agree on is that the primary function
of an onsite leasing agent is to sell leases for single family
homes. Other than that, the parties fundamentally disagree about
the role of onsite leasing agents.  The Plaintiffs contend that
onsite leasing agents were required to perform a great deal of
paperwork each day and spend several hours each day on the
telephone.  They further claim that all onsite leasing agents
routinely worked in excess of 40 hours per week, including
working through lunch, before and after regular business hours
and on weekends.  According to them, all onsite leasing agents
were paid on a salary plus commission basis with no overtime pay,
with Progress misclassifying onsite leasing agents as exempt
under the FLSA.  Importantly, they contend that onsite leasing
agents at Progress performed the same or similar job duties at
all of Progress' locations.

Progress, on the other hand, claims that the onsite leasing agent
position has changed considerably over time, with onsite leasing
agents today spending much more time tracking performance and
managing sales with mobile systems than those onsite leasing
agents employed prior to 2017.  It notes that the company moved
from paper applications to online applications in late 2015,
meaning that onsite leasing agents today spend much less time on
paperwork than their colleagues did a few years ago.

Progress also argues that the assignment of homes has changed
over time within the Houston market, resulting in onsite leasing
agents today spending less time in the homes to make sales than
their counterparts from a few years ago.  Finally, it contends
that, starting in 2017, the company rolled out its "Let Yourself
In" option by which prospects can register online and gain access
to a rental property without being accompanied by an onsite
leasing agent.  According to Progress, this means that the job
functions of onsite leasing agents today varies considerably from
the job functions of onsite leasing agents a few years ago when
onsite leasing agents spent a significant amount of time showing
rental properties.

Magistrate Judge Edison finds that (i) the Plaintiffs have
provided more than sufficient proof that other aggrieved
individuals exist, especially since their burden is so low at
this stage; (ii) the duties of class members are sufficiently
similar for purposes of conditional certification; and (iii) even
if the Plaintiffs had to show that aggrieved individuals want to
join the lawsuit, the evidence proffered by them satisfies the
lenient conditional certification standard with regard to the
third element -- showing that others are interested in opting in
the lawsuit.

Magistrate Judge holds that the Plaintiffs have made a sufficient
showing at this preliminary stage to warrant the issuance of
notice, to permit full discovery, and to allow the Court to
conduct a more rigorous analysis at the final decertification
stage when it has the benefit of more information.  As such, he
granted the Plaintiffs' Motion.  He ordered the counsel for the
Plaintiffs and Progress to confer and agree, if possible, upon
the content of proposed notice.

A copy of the Court's April 3, 2018 Memorandum Opinion and Order
is available at https://bit.ly/2Kd1e7r from Leagle.com.

Kristal Freeman, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Rhonda Hunter
Wills, Wills Law Firm, PLLC.

Progress Residential Property Manager, LLC, Defendant,
represented by William R. Stukenberg --
illiam.Stukenberg@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis LLP, Jeffrey
A. Bernick -- rey.Bernick@jacksonlewis.com -- & Pamela Banks
Linberg -- LinbergP@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis LLP.


PURE BARRE: Faces "Burbon" Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Pure Barre LLC. The
case is styled as Luc Burbon, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Pure Barre LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 1:18-cv-04781 (S.D. N.Y., May 30, 2018).

Pure Barre, LLC owns and operates fitness centers in the United
States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


RESTORATION 1: Faces "Burbon" Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Restoration 1
Franchise Holding LLC. The case is styled as Luc Burbon, on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Restoration 1 Franchise Holding LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-
04728 (S.D. N.Y., May 29, 2018).

Restoration 1 Franchise Holding, LLC operates as a holding
company. The Company, through its subsidiaries, provides
construction related professional services. Restoration 1
Franchise Holding offers water, commercial, storm, and mold
damage restoration services, as well as carpet cleaning services.
Restoration 1 Franchise Holding serves customers in the United
States and Canada.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


RETAIL FOOD: Phi Finney Joins Trio of Firms Probing Class Suits
---------------------------------------------------------------
Paris Faint, writing for Business News Australia, reports that
Phi Finney McDonald has become the third law firm to target a
class action against Retail Food Group (ASX: RFG) following a
string of damning revelations in February which wiped more than
$550 million from the company's market capitalisation.

The firm announced it will be investigating the class action
against RFG for engaging in misleading and deceptive conduct and
breaching its continuous disclosure obligations to the ASX.

Phi Finney McDonald joins Maurice Blackburn and Bannister Law as
the trio of firms that are currently investigating a class action
against RFG.

Earlier this year, a report by Fairfax media surfaced that RFG
had been maintaining an exploitative business model from June
2015 up until the company went into a trading halt on 28 February
2018.

According to Maurice Blackburn, the company then failed to inform
the market of its "true state of affairs".

Phi Finney McDonald's class action will allege that from at least
April 2017, RFG failed to disclose financial risks associated
with its franchise model and deteriorating franchise networks,
which include the Pizza Capers, Donut King and Brumby's brands.

The firm will also argue that RFG misled its investors regarding
the company's financial position when it released a profit
guidance in August 2017 that lacked reasonable grounds.

Phi Finney McDonald director Tim Finney, Esq. says shareholders
are "right to be angry about RFG's conduct" and that his firm is
seeking compensation on behalf of those who have suffered
substantial loss and damage as a result.

"RFG's board knew about the critical defects in the franchise
model and the financial crisis afflicting many of its franchise
networks for some time," says Finney.

"However, RFG investors were only made aware of these issues
because of media reports released in December 2017.

"Even after that time, RFG continued to deny that there was any
structural dysfunction within its franchise model. RFG didn't
properly come clean about the serious difficulties its franchise
networks were facing until March 2018.

"By concealing these serious issues from the market, RFG caused
its shares to trade at an artificially inflated price."

Phi Finney McDonald's proposed class action is backed by
litigation funder IMF Bentham.

IMF's investment manager Matt Kennedy, Esq. --
mkennedy@tatebywater.com -- says that following close examination
of RFG's conduct, his team considers that investors have "strong
grounds" to seek compensation for their losses.

It's been a busy week for Phi Finney McDonald after it officially
launched a class action in the Federal Court against financial
services giant AMP.

AMP is also under fire from a further two class actions, one
brought by Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan in the Supreme Court
of New South Wales and the other currently still under
investigation by Slater and Gordon.[GN]


ROSCON PROPERTY: Cladding Class Action Builds Numbers for Case
--------------------------------------------------------------
Tim Boreham, writing for WA Today, reports that the law firm
planning the country's first class action over combustible
building cladding is confident of getting enough apartment owners
to launch a case, despite the traditional apathy faced by
managers of owner (or body) corporate structures.

Adley Burstyner principal David Burstyner, Esq. --
dburstyner@sladen.com.au -- said while the Melbourne firm was
still seeking body corporate and individuals owners to join the
action, enough of them had expressed interest to support a viable
case.

"There is no scientific or magic number about it but yes we have
enough interest," Mr Burstyner said. "We are not new to class
actions and so we have a good feel about those that will take off
and those that won't."

Run in conjunction with Roscon Property Services, a class action
will be aimed at recovering cost from the builders of the towers
in question, after a court case year deemed owners to be
responsible for replacing the potentially deadly material.

The issue was highlighted by a multi-level blaze at the Lacrosse
building in Melbourne's Docklands precinct in 2014 and then by
the Grenfell Tower tragedy in London that killed 71 people.

Following safety audits, several local councils have sent letters
to owners corporations demanding rectification.
"The building is a danger to the life, safety or health of the
members of the public or any person using the building," one
letter reads.

Building Industry Reform Group president Phil Dwyer said owners
should not be held responsible, given their apartments should
have complied with building and fire regulations on settlement.

"It's morally corrupt to put the onus on property owners,'' he
said.

But a class action faces several obstacles, one of them being the
large number of potential defendants (builders) involved.

Another is that the interests of the individual owners and the
body corporate structures differ.

In the case of the owners, it's about seeking compensation for
the diminished value of their property.

In the case of the body corporate, it's about recouping funds for
the actual rectification, which has been estimated at between
$40,000 and $60,000 per apartment.

The enduring problem with owner corporates is that many owners do
not participate in decision making, which leaves the managers
hamstrung in terms of making decisions.

The problem is thought to be even more widespread in NSW, with at
least one Sydney law firm also mulling a class action.

However the complexities around the cladding issue have proved
too much for even class action veteran Slater & Gordon.

"We are looking into the legal rights of lots of different
parties but we are not investigating a class action," a
spokeswoman for the firm said.

In Victoria, body corporate require at least 75 per cent of
member owners to approve a legal action, but Mr Burstyner said
his firm has devised a legal mechanism to circumvent this
requirement.

He said owners corporation secretaries were "pulling their hair
out" over low owner involvement.

"They can't do anything because they bump up against the 75 per
cent requirement and there are too many passive owners," he said.

"The ones we have spoken to are certainly interested in
participating ... and they have found it extremely helpful we
have a solution."

Mr Burstyner said it was a "freak of nature" that the Lacrosse
fire did not result in deaths. Despite that, owners -- many of
whom are absentee -- were reluctant to act or assumed the
government would come to the rescue.

"People instinctively think the problem can't be as big as it is,
that is human nature," he said. "For a large proportion it goes
straight into the too hard basket and nothing happens."

Chaired by former premier Ted Baillieu and former deputy premier
John Thwaites, the Victorian Cladding Taskforce identified 1369
buildings with the suspect panels. But of these, 579 had not been
built and 129 were partly constructed.[GN]


ROYAL ADMINISTRATION: Summary Judgment in "Jones" Affirmed
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHARLES A. JONES; JOSH WATSON, on behalf of
themselves and all similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs-
Appellants, v. ROYAL ADMINISTRATION SERVICES, INC., Defendant-
Appellee, and ALL AMERICAN AUTO PROTECTION, INC.; HAROUT
PAMBUCKCHYAN; RAFFI SADEJYAN; JASON GARCIA, Defendan, Case No.
15-17328 (9th Cir.), Judge Norman Randy Smith of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
order granting Royal's motion for summary judgment.

Jones and Watson seek to hold Royal liable for several telephone
calls made in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
("TCPA") by telemarketers employed by All American Auto
Protection, Inc. ("AAAP").

Royal sells vehicle service contracts ("VSC") through automobile
dealers and through about 20 different marketing vendors.  These
marketing vendors sell Royal's VSCs through direct mail or
telemarketing.  In October 2011, Royal entered into a marketing
agreement with AAAP which contained authorized sales and
marketing methodologies with which AAAP was required to comply.
The agreement expressly excluded from these methodologies any act
or omission that violates applicable state or Federal law,
including but not limited to robo-calling.

Royal assigned Clayton Churchill to be the "agent of record" for
the AAAP account.  During Royal Pres. Richard McCabe's visits,
AAAP's officials (Harout Pambuchchyan, Raffi Sadejyan, and Jason
Garcia) provided assurances that the telemarketers were dialing
customers one at a time and that they were complying with the "Do
Not Call list."

The Appellants are individuals living in Reno, Nevada, whose
cellular telephone numbers are registered on the national do-not-
call registry.  Jones asserts that he received four calls on his
cellular telephone from AAAP in March 2014.  Watson asserts that
he received four calls to his cellular telephone from AAAP in
April and May of 2014.  Jones and Watson believe AAAP placed the
calls using an "automatic telephone dialing system."

In April 2014, Jones filed a class-action law suit against AAAP,
Pambuckchyan, Sadejyan, and Garcia, asserting one claim for
violation of the TCPA.  AAAP was originally represented by the
counsel and filed an answer and a motion to dismiss.  However,
AAAP's attorneys all moved to withdraw after AAAP terminated its
attorneys due to an anticipated bankruptcy action by AAAP.  The
district court granted the motions to withdraw.  On Jan. 8, 2015,
after the district court and AAAP's former attorneys had
repeatedly advised the company that it was obligated to defend
the action through the licensed counsel, the district court
entered default against AAAP, because it had failed to otherwise
defend the action.

Thereafter, the district court granted Jones leave to file an
amended complaint.  In the First Amended Complaint, Jones added
Watson as a Plaintiff and Royal as a Defendant.  The First
Amended Complaint asserted that Royal was liable for AAAP's calls
that were made in violation of the TCPA and the federal
regulations implementing the TCPA.  On June 17, 2015, Royal filed
a motion for summary judgment.  On Nov. 24, 2015, the district
court granted the motion and entered judgment in favor of Royal.
The appeal followed.

On appeal, Jones and Watson do not address apparent authority or
ratification.  Though a broad range of agency theories may form
the basis for a principal's liability for the actions of an
agent, Jones and Watson limit their appeal to two theories.

First, they assert that AAAP telemarketers were Royal's agents
acting within their actual authority in placing the unlawful
calls.  Any claim that AAAP had actual authority to place the
calls is precluded by the express language in Royal's contract
with AAAP expressly prohibiting telemarketing methods that would
violate state or federal law, including laws governing robocalls.
Second, they assert that Royal had sufficient authority to
control the manner and means of AAAP's telemarketing activity
that it may be held vicariously liable as if it were the employer
of the AAAP telemarketers.

Judge Smith finds that Jones and Watson identify no record
evidence contradicting this limitation on AAAP's authority.
Instead, they assert that the case fits the analogy made in
Birchmeier v. Carribean Cruise Line, Inc., in which "A, a well-
heeled entity stands next to B, an impecunious defendant, and
directs B to place unsolicited, prerecorded calls to consumers on
their cell phones."  The Judge says the opposite is true here.
Royal expressly prohibited AAAP from employing these marketing
tools.  And AAAP's impecuniosity and unresponsiveness are
immaterial to the issue of actual authority.  Accordingly, he
rejects the actual authority theory.

Next, the Judge finds that it is clear that Royal did not have
enough authority to control the AAAP telemarketers' work to hold
Royal vicariously liable as if it were an employer of the AAAP
telemarketers.  AAAP was its own independent business that sold
VSCs for multiple companies without the direct supervision of a
Royal employee.  AAAP provided its own equipment, set its own
hours, and only received payment if one of its telemarketers
actually made a sale.  Finally, although Royal had some control
over AAAP's telemarketers, it did not specifically control the
calls at issue in this case, because the telemarketers never
attempted to sell a Royal VSC during those calls.  Because AAAP's
telemarketers were not subject to the requisite level of control,
Jones and Watson cannot establish vicarious liability under a
'manner and means' control theory.

Judge Smith concludes that AAAP's telemarketers did not have
actual authority to place the unlawful calls, and Royal exercised
insufficient control over the manner and means of the work to
establish vicarious liability under the asserted theory.  Because
Royal cannot be held liable for the calls under either theory
argued on appeal, it was proper for the district court to grant
Royal's motion for summary judgment.  Accordingly, he affirmed.
A full-text copy of the Court's April 4, 2018 Order and Amended
Opinion is available at https://bit.ly/2KoVQyf from Leagle.com.

Matthew Righetti (argued), John Glugoski, and Michael Righetti,
Righetti Glugoski P.C., San Francisco, California, for
Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Richard I. Dreitzer -- richard.dreitzer@wilsonelser.com --
(argued) and Donald P. Paradiso --
donald.paradiso@wilsonelser.com -- Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman
& Dicker LLP, Las Vegas, Nevada, for Defendant-Appellee.


SAFEMARK SYSTEMS: Court Denies Class Certification in TCPA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida, Orlando Division, denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification in the case captioned GORSS MOTELS, INC. and E & G,
INC., Plaintiffs, v. SAFEMARK SYSTEMS, LP, Defendant, Case No.
6:16-cv-01638-Orl-31DCI (M.D. Fla.).

Gorss and E&G are, respectively, former and current franchisees
of Wyndham Hotel Group (Wyndham). They bring this putative class
action against Safemark regarding faxes sent by or on behalf of
Safemark in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of
1991 (TCPA).

The Plaintiffs allege that Safemark violated the TCPA by sending
the 2013 and 2015 Faxes to Plaintiffs and other similarly-
situated entities. Pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3),
Plaintiffs seek an order certifying the following two classes:

Class A - 2013 Faxes

     All persons or entities successfully sent one or more
facsimiles on or about September 4, 2013, and September 6, 2013,
stating Free month (average value $500 per 100 rooms, Free
Battery replacement every 18 months for initial term of contract
(3 times), and 1 Free Safe for Office.

Class B - 2015 Fax

     All persons or entities successfully sent a facsimile on or
about December 1, 2015, stating Attention owners and hotel
employees: Increase Cash Flow at NO COST! and Learn more today at
Safemark.com.

Here, Safemark contends that common issues do not predominate
because determining whether putative class members consented to
receiving the faxes would require a series of individual factual
determinations.

The Court agrees.

Safemark has produced evidence showing that the Plaintiffs
entered into franchise agreements, wherein they agreed that their
franchisors and its affiliates could offer them assistance with
purchasing items used at or in their facilities. In addition to
executing their respective franchise agreements, the Plaintiffs
provided their fax information to their respective franchisors
several times during the course of their franchise relationships.
Safemark has also submitted unrefuted evidence that that many
recipients of the faxes are, or were, Safemark customers, whose
numbers were provided directly by the customer.

Therefore, it is possible indeed, likely that the Court will also
be required to conduct individual inquiries into whether each
class member provided fax numbers and consented to receiving fax
advertisement from Safemark during the course of their business
dealings.

Furthermore, if, as Safemark claims, many franchisees provided
Safemark with their contact information while attending one of
Wyndham's franchisee conferences, the Court will also need to
individually determine whether each class member provided its fax
information to Safemark in this manner.

Because the issues of consent cannot be resolved without
individualized inquiry, the Court finds that common issues of
fact do not predominate and that class certification is
inappropriate.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 5, 2018Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ycacgxqn from Leagle.com.

Gorss Motels, Inc., a Connecticut corporation, individually and
as the representative of a class of similarly-situated persons &
E & G, Inc., a West Virginia corporation, individually and as the
representatives of a class of similarly-situated persons,
Plaintiffs, represented by Ryan M. Kelly --
rkelley@andersonwanca.com -- Anderson & Wanca & Ross M. Good --
rgood@andersonwanca.com -- Anderson & Wanca, pro hac vice.

Safemark Systems, LP, Defendant, represented by Amy Leigh Baker -
- amy.baker@wilsonelser.com -- Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman
& Dicker, LLP & Joseph L. Francoeur --
joseph.francoeur@wilsonelser.com -- Wilson Elser LLP, pro hac
vice.


SAKS AND LORD: Faces Customer Data Breach Class Action
------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that a
federal class action claims Saks and Lord & Taylor allowed a data
breach to expose customers' credit card numbers with personally
identifiable information, from May 1, 2017, until May 23, 2018.

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

     David A. Straite, Esq.
     Ralph E. Labaton, Esq.
     KAPLAN FOX & KILSHEIMER LLP
     850 Third Avenue
     New York, NY 10022
     Tel: 212.687.1980
     Fax: 212.687.7714
     Email: dstraite@kaplanfox.com
            rlabaton@kaplanfox.com

        -- and --

     Laurence D. King, Esq.
     KAPLAN FOX & KILSHEIMER LLP
     350 Sansome Street, Suite 400
     San Francisco, CA 94104
     Tel: 415.772.4700
     Fax: 415.772.4707
     Email: lking@kaplanfox.com


SAREPTA THERAPEUTICS: Dismissal of FAC in "Kader" Affirmed
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, WILLIAM KADER, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated; MORAD GHODOOSHIM; ROGER LAM; LAXMIKANT
CHUDASAMA, Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. SAREPTA THERAPEUTICS, INC.;
CHRISTOPHER GARABEDIAN; EDWARD M. KAYE, M.D., Defendants,
Appellees, Case No. 17-1139 (1st Cir.), Judge Juan R. Torruella
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the
district court's dismissal of the Plaintiffs' First Amended
Complaint ("FAC") for failure to state a claim, and denial of
leave to file their Proposed Second Amended Complaint ("PSAC").

The Plaintiffs sought to represent a class of purchasers of
securities that Sarepta issued between April 21, 2014, and Oct.
27, 2014.  The Plaintiffs brought securities fraud claims against
Sarepta, Sarepta's CEO, Garabedian, and Sarepta's Chief
Scientific Officer, Kaye).  According to them, the Defendants
knowingly or recklessly misled investors about their target date
for submitting an application to the United States Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") for approval of the drug eteplirsen.

The Plaintiffs filed the FAC on March 20, 2015, alleging two
counts: (1) that all of the Defendants violated section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") Rule 10b-5; and (2) that Garabedian and Kaye
violated section 20(a) of the Exchange Act.  In broad terms, the
Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendants, in discussing their
intention to file an NDA in 2014, fraudulently misrepresented the
FDA's communications to them concerning Sarepta's dystrophin
data.

The Defendants moved to dismiss the FAC for failure to state a
claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  The district court granted
that motion on April 5, 2016.  It concluded that the FAC did not
allege sufficient facts to plausibly suggest that the Defendants
made affirmatively misleading statements, or that they omitted
information needed to make their statements not misleading.  It
also held that the FAC similarly lacked facts supporting an
inference of scienter on the part of Sarepta's executives as to
the allegedly misleading nature of any of their statements or
omissions.

The Plaintiffs then filed a motion for leave to amend the FAC,
attaching the PSAC to that motion.  The PSAC, unlike the FAC,
contained allegations involving the Briefing Document.  The
Briefing Document, according to the Plaintiffs, demonstrated that
the FDA had communicated to Sarepta a "plethora of concerns"
about Sarepta's data before and during the Class Period.  It
also, said the Plaintiffs, illustrated that the Defendants had
misrepresented Study 201/202 as "blinded."

On Jan. 6, 2017, the district court denied the Plaintiffs' motion
for leave to amend.  Specifically, it held that the Plaintiffs
had delayed unduly in moving to amend, and that, in any event,
the PSAC was futile because it also failed to state a claim.

The Plaintiffs now appeal the district court's orders denying
them leave to file the PSAC and dismissing their claims with
prejudice.  They contend that the district court erred in
dismissing the FAC for failure to state a claim.

Judge Torruella finds that the FAC is bereft of allegations that
Sarepta was financially on the ropes, or that it would shutter
its doors unless it padded earnings by deceiving investors.  It
may be so that this offering generated revenue that proved useful
to Sarepta in its "race for FDA approval," so to secure the
"first-mover advantage."  Yet, the Judge says, that alone cannot
bear the weight of an inference of scienter that is "at least as
compelling" as any other.  Therefore, because the Plaintiffs did
not adequately plead scienter in the FAC, he holds that district
court did not err in dismissing the FAC for failure to state a
claim.

Turning to the Plaintiffs' arguments that the district court
should have granted them leave under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) to
file the PSAC, the Judge is unmoved by the Plaintiffs' arguments
concerning their belief that the FAC adequately stated a claim.
Regardless of whether or not they intentionally sandbagged their
claims, the fact remains that despite having three months to do
so, they did not move to amend until after the district court
dismissed the FAC.  And while the Plaintiffs characterize this
period of time as relatively short, the Court has previously
upheld denials of leave to amend on undue delay grounds after a
comparable amount of time.

The Judge also rejects the Plaintiffs' argument that moving to
amend post-dismissal is desirable from the perspective of
judicial economy.  But he finds that the Plaintiffs have it
exactly backwards -- their methodology would lead to delays,
inefficiencies, and wasted work.  It may be so that the
Plaintiffs did not move to amend at an earlier juncture because
they believed that further information relevant to their claims
may have been coming down the pike amid the FDA's consideration
of the eteplirsen NDA.  But that is not so much an argument
against the district court's denial of their motion for leave to
amend as it is a suggestion that the Plaintiffs perhaps jumped
the gun in filing the FAC.  Accordingly, he concludes that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to
amend on undue delay grounds.

For these reasons, Judge Torruella concludes that the FAC failed
to state a claim, and even assuming that the PSAC did not also
suffer from that deficiency, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in ruling that the Plaintiffs moved to file it with
undue delay.  Therefore, he affirmed the district court's
judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 4, 2018 Order is available
at https://bit.ly/2r9QLlm from Leagle.com.

Kara M. Wolke -- kwolke@glancylaw.com -- with whom Robert V.
Prongay -- rprongay@glancylaw.com -- Jonathan M. Rotter , Glancy
Prongay & Murray LLP, Jason M. Leviton -- jason@blockesq.com --
and Block & Leviton LLP were on brief, for appellants.

Christopher G. Green -- christopher.green@ropesgray.com -- with
whom Mark D. Vaughn -- mark.vaughn@ropesgray.com -- Christopher
C. Boots -- Christopher.Boots@ropesgray.com -- Cassandra A.
LaRussa -- Cassandra.LaRussa@ropesgray.com -- and Ropes & Gray
LLP, were on brief, for appellees.


SCRUB INC: Another Class Action Suit Filed Under Biometrics Law
---------------------------------------------------------------
Find Biometrics reports that the latest major lawsuit under
Illinois' biometric privacy law could be taking shape.

The lawsuit has been filed by an employee of Scrub, Inc., a
Chicago-based cleaning company, and revolves around the company's
use of a fingerprint-based punch clock. According to a report
from Cook County Record, the plaintiff, Shavonne Norman, says
that Scrub, Inc. did not obtain her written consent concerning
the use of her biometric data -- a violation of the Illinois
Biometric Information Privacy Act -- and is seeking damages of
$5,000 for each BIPA violation as well as monetary damages and
other compensation.

Illinois is one of just a few states that have implemented
privacy legislation specifically concerning biometric
information, and major companies like Facebook and Google are
alleged to have run afoul of it. Indeed, a federal judge recently
cleared the way for class action proceedings against Facebook
over its use of automated face-tagging technology as a result of
a lawsuit filed in Illinois.

Norman's suit is also class action, and may be the first high-
profile case involving biometric time and attendance tracking
systems, which have been on the rise around the world thanks to
their ability to reliably match employees to their clocking in
and out for work.[GN]


SELIP & STYLIANOU: Faces "Millard" Suit in W.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Selip & Stylianou
LLP. The case is styled as David Millard, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Selip &
Stylianou LLP, a New York LLP, Defendant, Case No. 6:18-cv-06385-
DGL (W.D. N.Y., May 24, 2018).

Selip & Stylianou, LLP operates as a law firm in in Woodbury, New
York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Alexander Jerome Douglas, Esq.
   Douglas Firm, P.C.
   36 West Main Street, Suite 500
   Rochester, NY 14614
   Tel: (585) 703-9783
   Email: alex@lawroc.com


SENTRY CREDIT: Court Dismisses FAC in "Garretson" FDCA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ERIC GARRETSON, Plaintiff, v. SENTRY CREDIT, INC.,
and JH PORTFOLIO DEBT EQUITIES, LLC, Defendants, Civil Action No.
5:17-cv-04171 (S.D. W.V.), Judge Irene C. Berger of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia,
Beckley Division, (i) granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to
File Surreply in Opposition to the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
First Amended Complaint; and (ii) granted Defendants' Sentry
Credit, Inc. and JH Portfolio Debt Equities, LLC's Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Individual and Class Action
Complaint.

Garretson seeks to bring the case against Defendants Sentry and
JHP on his own behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly
situated West Virginia consumers.  Synchrony Bank sold Mr.
Garretson's credit card accounts to JHP after they were "charged
off."  Sentry, on behalf of JHP, sent Mr. Garretson debt
collection letters offering to settle the debt for less than the
total amount due.  Both letters are dated Nov. 18, 2016.  One
lists an amount due of $3,877.61, consisting entirely of
principal with no interest or other costs, and offers to settle
for a lump sum of $2,326.57 or for three payments of $1,034.03
each.  The other lists a balance of $1,462.74, also consisting
entirely of principal with no interest or other costs, and offers
to settle for a lump sum of $731.37 or for three payments of
$341.31.  Both letters invite the Plaintiff to "call today for
flexible repayment terms."

The letters contain the following language: "If, as a result of
the settlement, the amount forgiven or canceled on this debt
equals or exceeds $600, the IRS may require the creditor to
report the amount forgiven or canceled on a form 1099-C. You may
receive this form for the year in which the settlement is
completed. If you would like advice about the potential tax
consequences that may result from this settlement, my client
recommends that you consult a tax professional of your choosing.
My client does not make any representations about the tax
consequences that this settlement may have for you or any
reporting requirement that may be imposed."

Mr. Garretson alleges that this warning was purposely confusing
and misleading because there was no requirement that Sentry or
JHP issue a 1099-C for forgiven debt, and even if those
regulations did apply, the warning did not accurately state the
requirements of the regulations.  He further alleges that he was,
in fact, confused by the 1099-C warning and felt pressure to pay
the whole debt rather than accept a settlement that may be
reported to the IRS.

The Plaintiff's amended complaint asserts the following causes of
action: Count I - Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA");
Count II - West Virginia Consumer Credit Protection Act
("WVCCPA"); and the Class Allegations.  The Plaintiff seeks
statutory and actual damages, as well as attorneys' fees and
costs.

Before the Court are (i) the Defendants' Sentry Credit, Inc. and
JH Portfolio Debt Equities, LLC's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's
First Amended Individual and Class Action Complaint; (ii) Sentry
Credit, Inc. and JH Portfolio Equities, LLC's Memorandum of Law
in Support of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended
Individual and Class Action Complaint; (iii) the Plaintiff's
Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss First
Amended Complaint; and (iv) Defendants Sentry Credit, Inc.'s and
JH Portfolio Debt Equities, LLC's Reply to Plaintiff's Response
to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.  Also before the Court are (ii)
the Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Surreply in Opposition
to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint; (ii)
the attached Plaintiff's Surreply in Opposition to Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint; and (iii) the
Plaintiff's First Amended Individual and Class Action Complaint.

The Defendants assert that the case must be dismissed because the
1099-C warning in the collection letters is not misleading or
threatening, but is, in fact, an accurate, if abbreviated and
generalized, statement of the law regarding discharged debt.
They further note that regardless of whether the creditor is
required to report the discharge by way of a 1099-C, the debtor
may be required to report the discharge as income.  The
Defendants assert that there are no binding precedential
decisions on the issue, but the courts that have considered
similar language have found no violations where the language
regarding tax consequences was conditional and accurate.

Judge Berger finds that the Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File
Surreply in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss First
Amended Complaint contains discussion of recently decided cases.
She finds it appropriate to consider the sur-reply, and the
motion for leave to file a sur-reply will therefore be granted.

The Judge next explains that the FDCPA bars debt collectors from
using any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means
in connection with the collection of any debt.  Under the facts
presented in the instant case, the Judge finds that the
challenged language is not misleading or deceptive.  The language
used in the 1099-C warning is accurate and does not contain the
potential to mislead that was present in Balon v. Enhanced
Recovery Co.  In short, the letters correctly put the borrower on
notice that the creditor might be required to report the debt
forgiveness to the IRS if the amount forgiven is $600 or greater.

She also finds the premise of the Plaintiff's argument regarding
the misleading or coercive nature and intent of the 1099-C
warning to be unconvincing.  The Plaintiff suggests that the
warning is intended to pressure the Plaintiff to pay the full
amount of the debt to avoid any IRS involvement.  However, the
notice was included in a letter offering to settle the debt for a
reduced amount.  If the Defendants wanted to insist on full
payment, they could insist on full payment without the rather
convoluted approach of offering a settlement but coercing
consumers to decline it by referencing the possibility that debt
forgiveness could be taxable.  It seems more likely that the
Defendants included the 1099-C notice so that consumers would not
be blindsided by receiving a 1099-C, and perhaps an unexpected
tax bill.

For the same reasons that she finds the motion to dismiss should
be granted as to the FDCPA claim, the Judge finds that the WVCCPA
claim must also be dismissed.  Although the legal standards are
slightly different, the Plaintiff would need to demonstrate that
the challenged 1099-C warning was misleading or deceptive to
prevail under either statute.  Because she has found that the
language is not misleading or deceptive, the Defendants' motion
to dismiss should be granted.

Wherefore, after thorough review and careful consideration, Judge
Berger granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Surreply
in Opposition to the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss First Amended
Complaint; and granted Defendants' Sentry Credit, Inc. and JH
Portfolio Debt Equities, LLC's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's
First Amended Individual and Class Action Complaint.  She
directed the Clerk to send a certified copy of this Order to
counsel of record and to any unrepresented party.

A copy of the Court's April 3, 2018 Memorandum Opinion and Order
is available at https://bit.ly/2HMjk1L from Leagle.com.

Eric Garretson, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher B. Frost --
cfrost@hamiltonburgess.com -- HAMILTON BURGESS YOUNG & POLLARD,
Jonathan R. Marshall -- jmarshall@baileyglasser.com -- BAILEY &
GLASSER, Patricia M. Kipnis -- pkipnis@baileyglasser.com --
BAILEY & GLASSER, Ralph C. Young -- ryoung@hamiltonburgess.com --
HAMILTON BURGESS YOUNG & POLLARD, Raymond S. Franks, II --
rfranks@baileyglasser.com -- BAILEY & GLASSER & Steven R.
Broadwater, Jr. -- sbroadwater@hamiltonburgess.com -- HAMILTON
BURGESS YOUNG & POLLARD.

Sentry Credit, Inc. & JH Portfolio Debt Equities, LLC,
Defendants, represented by Albert C. Dunn, Jr. --
adunn@baileywyant.com -- BAILEY & WYANT.


SHAMROCK FOODS: Settlement in "Chavez" Has Final Approval
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MIGUEL CHAVEZ, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SHAMROCK FOODS COMPANY,
an Arizona Corporation, and DOES 1 to 10, Defendant, Case No.
5:17-cv-00731-SVW-AFM (C.D. Cal.), Judge Stephen V. Wilson of the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
granted the Plaintiff's unopposed Motion for Final Approval of
Class Action Settlement, and the Plaintiff's Motion for
Attorneys' Fees and Costs.

The Judge finally approved the Settlement of the action, as
embodied in the terms of the Settlement, as fair, reasonable,
adequate and consistent and in compliance with all applicable
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and any
other applicable law, and in the best interests of the Parties
and the Class Members.

For the purpose of settlement, he finally certified the class of
all persons who have been employed by the Defendant in California
as Account Executives, Outside Sales Representatives and/or in
similar sales job capacity and who received a flat rate
reimbursement for automobile-related business expenses, in an
amount less than $800 per month, at any time between March 13,
2013 through Dec. 31, 2018.

The Judge appointed Plaintiff Chavez as the Class Representative,
and Craig J. Ackermann and Avi Kreitenberg of Ackermann &
Tilajef, P.C., and Jonathan Melmed of Melmed Law Group P.C. as
the counsel for the Class.  He previously appointed CPT Group,
Inc. as the Settlement Administrator.

He granted the Plaintiff's and the Class Counsel's request for an
award of Attorneys' Fees in the amount of $87,500 and costs in
the amount of $20,000.  The award, and the attorneys' fees and
costs will be paid by the Defendant to the Class Counsel in
accordance with the terms of the Settlement.

The $8,750 designated for payment to CPT Group, Inc., the
Settlement Administrator, is fair and reasonable.  He granted
final approval of, and ordered the Parties to make the payment to
the Settlement Administrator in accordance with the Settlement.

The Judge also approved the allocation of $5,000 of the
Settlement as payment for penalties under the California Labor
Code Private Attorney Generals Act ("PAGA"), and further approved
of payment of $3,750 to the Labor and Workforce Development
Agency for its portion of the PAGA penalties pursuant to Cal.
Labor Code sections 2698-2699.

In the event that a Settlement check cannot be delivered to a
Class Member, or a Class Member does not cash a Settlement checks
after the events and deadlines set forth in Section 7 of the
Settlement, Judge Wilson ordered that the Settlement
Administrator will redistribute the amount associated with the
checks as follows: 25% to the California State Treasury for the
Trial Court Improvement and Modernization Fund, 25% to the
California State Treasury for the Equal Access Fund of the
Judicial Branch, and 50% to the Legal Aid Society of Los Angeles
pursuant to Code of California Civil Procedure Section 384.

He entered the Final Judgment in the matter based on entry of
final approval of the parties' Class Action Settlement.

A copy of the Court's April 3, 2018 Order is available at
https://bit.ly/2KgrttM from Leagle.com.

Miguel Chavez, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Craig J. Ackermann --
cja@ackermanntilajef.com -- Ackermann and Tilajef PC & Jonathan
Melmed -- JM@MELMEDLAW.COM -- Melmed Law Group PC.

Shamrock Foods Company, an Arizona Corporation, Defendant,
represented by Benedict Ehigie Idemundia --
bidemundia@selmanlaw.com -- Selman Breitman LLP, Kara M. Maciel -
- kmaciel@connmaciel.com -- Conn Maciel Carey PLLC, pro hac vice
& Andrew J. Sommer -- asommer@connmaciel.com -- Conn Maciel Carey
LLP.


SLEEP NUMBER: "Spade" Class Action Still Ongoing
------------------------------------------------
Sleep Number Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period
ended March 31, 2018, that the company continues to defend a
purported class action suit filed by David and Katina Spade.

On January 12, 2015, Plaintiffs David and Katina Spade commenced
a purported class action lawsuit in New Jersey state court
against Sleep Number alleging that Sleep Number violated New
Jersey consumer statutes by failing to provide to purchasing
consumers certain disclosures required by the New Jersey
Furniture Regulations. It is undisputed that plaintiffs suffered
no actual damages or in any way relied upon or were impacted by
the alleged omissions.

Nonetheless, on behalf of a purported class of New Jersey
purchasers of Sleep Number beds and bases, plaintiffs seek to
recover a $100 statutory fine for each alleged omission, along
with attorneys' fees and costs. Sleep Number removed the case to
the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey,
which subsequently granted Sleep Number's motion to dismiss.

Formerly known as Select Comfort Corporation, the Company said in
its Form 10-Q Report for the quarterly period ended September 30,
2017, that "Plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, which has certified two questions
of law to the New Jersey Supreme Court relating to whether
plaintiffs who have suffered no actual injury may bring claims.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has accepted the certified questions
and oral arguments are expected to be heard in the near future."

In its recent SEC report, Select said the New Jersey Supreme
Court accepted the certified questions and on April 16, 2018,
ruled in the company' favor on one of the two questions, holding
that a consumer only has standing to bring a claim under the
relevant statute if the consumer has been harmed by the
defendant's conduct.

Sleep Number said, "As a result, we expect that the Third Circuit
will uphold the lower Court's dismissal of the case."

Sleep Number Corporation designs, manufactures, and markets a
line of air bed mattresses. The Company provides a variety of
beds, bedding, pillows, mattress pads and layers, sheets, duvets,
bed skirts, bases, furniture, bed accessories, and kids blankets.
The company is based in Minneapolis, Minnesota.


SPA CASTLE: Faces "Burbon" Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Spa Castle, Inc.
The case is styled as Luc Burbon, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Spa Castle, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-04730 (S.D. N.Y., May 29, 2018).

SpA Castle Inc. was founded in 2007. The company's line of
business includes operating health clubs, spas, and other
physical fitness facilities.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


SPERIAN ENERGY: Faces "Corsale" Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Sperian Energy
Corporation. The case is styled as John Corsale, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Sperian
Energy Corporation, Defendant, Case No. 5:18-cv-02194-JFL (E.D.
Penn, May 24, 2018).

Sperian Energy Corp. provides retail energy. It caters to both,
residential and commercial customers. The company was founded in
2011 and is based in Houston, Texas. Sperian Energy Corp.
operates as a subsidiary of Sackett National Holdings, Inc.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   JONATHAN SHUB, Esq.
   KOHN SWIFT & GRAF PC
   1600 MARKET ST SUITE 2500
   PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103
   Tel: (215) 238-1700
   Fax: (215) 238-1968
   Email: jshub@kohnswift.com


ST. ELIZABETH MEDICAL: Court Dismisses Counterclaim in "Boden"
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DOLORES JANE BODEN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ST.
ELIZABETH MEDICAL CENTER, INC., et al., Defendants, Civil Action
No. 16-49-DLB-CJS (E.D. Ky.), Judge David L. Bunning of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, Northern
Division, Covington, (i) granted in part and denied in part
Former Committee Members' Motion to Dismiss; and (ii) granted the
Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss Defendants' Counterclaim.

St. Elizabeth is a non-profit hospital system headquartered in
Edgewood, Kenton County, Kentucky, that provides primary and
advanced care physicians to Northern Kentucky, Ohio, and Indiana.
It sponsors the St. Elizabeth Medical Center Employees' Pension
Plan, which is an employee pension benefit plan within the
meaning of ERISA Section 3(35), 29 U.S.C. Section 1002(35).  The
Plan's named fiduciary is St. Elizabeth Medical Center Employees'
Pension Plan Administrative Committee.  The Plaintiffs allege
that the Committee is comprised entirely of members of the St.
Elizabeth board of trustees, who are named as individual
Defendants in the action.  Certain Individual Defendants, Garren
Colvin, Randall Foltz, Nathan Van Laningham, Chris Carle, Glenn
Loomis, Daniel Rutterer, and Sarah Giolando ("Former Committee
Members") ended their tenure on the Committee before the filing
of the Amended Complaint.

According to Plaintiffs Boden, Jeanine Godsey, and Patricia
Schaeffer, St. Elizabeth established the Plan in 1966 to provide
for its employees' retirement income.  These Plaintiffs are
current and former employees of St. Elizabeth.

On March 17, 2016, the Plaintiffs filed the putative class action
against the Defendants.  Approximately one year into the
litigation, the Court stayed the action pending a decision from
the United States Supreme Court regarding ERISA's exemption for
church plans in Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton.
Following the Supreme Court's decision, and with the permission
of the Court, the Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on Aug.
1, 2017.

The Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint alleges that the Defendants
have violated their duties as fiduciaries or sponsors of the
Plan.  Specifically, they've alleged seven counts against the
Defendants.  Count One seeks a declaration that the Plan is not a
church plan and is pled against all the Defendants.  Counts Two
(violation of reporting and disclosure obligations), Five (breach
of fiduciary obligations under ERISA), and Six (breach of
fiduciary obligations under state law) are pled against all the
Defendants as fiduciaries of the Plan.  Counts Three (failure to
provide minimum funding), Four (failure to establish the Plan
through a written instrument), and Seven (breach of contract) are
pled against St. Elizabeth.  The Plaintiffs bring these claims
under ERISA Section 502(a)(3),3 502(a)(1)(A), and 502(a)(2).

In their Prayer for Relief, the Plaintiffs request the following:
(1) certification of the action as a class action; (2) a
declaration that the Plan is an employee-benefit plan, a defined
benefit pension plan subject to ERISA, and is not an ERISA-exempt
church plan; (3) an order requiring the Defendants to bring the
Plan into compliance with ERISA; (4) an order requiring
Defendants to make the Plan whole for past contributions that
should have been made pursuant to ERISA, to pay interest and
investment income on these payments, and to disgorge any profits
accumulated as a result of the fiduciary breaches; (5) an order
granting a preliminary and permanent injunction removing the
Defendants from the Committee and appointing independent
fiduciaries in their place; (6) an order requiring Defendants to
pay $110 per day to each Plaintiff and Class Member for failing
to send them a funding notice; (7) declaratory and injunctive
relief to enjoin the Defendants from further violating ERISA; (8)
any other equitable or monetary relief the Court deems
appropriate under ERISA Section 502(a); (9) an order requiring
St. Elizabeth to fund the Plan in accordance with the Plan
Document; (10) an award of attorneys' fees and expenses; and (11)
any other relief the Court determines is just and proper.

Alongside their Answer, the Defendants filed a Counterclaim for
Declaratory Judgment, asking the Court to declare that the Plan
is a "church plan" within the definition found in ERISA Section
3(33), and is therefore exempt from ERISA's requirements.  The
Former Committee Members then filed a Motion to Dismiss them from
the case under Rule 12(b)(6).  While responding to the Former
Committee Members Motion to Dismiss, the Plaintiffs also filed
Motion to Dismiss Defendants' Counterclaim.

Judge Bunning granted in part and denied in part Former Committee
Members' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Counts Two,
Three, Four, Six, and Seven, and denied as to Count One and Count
Five.

Providing no legal support and little persuasive argument, the
Former Committee Members request that the Court dismisses Count
One suggesting that any liability they might have if the Court
were to declare the Plan a church plan would be under specific
statutes, which are separate stand-alone claims for relief.  The
Judge finds that the Plaintiffs' argument in opposition to
dismissing Count One is equally unsupported by legal citation or
analysis.  According to them, their request for "redress" will
include redressing violations that took place while the former
Committee Memberswere on the Committee, such as the failure to
send proper Plan disclosures.  Accepting the allegations in the
Amended Complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences
in the Plaintiffs' favor, the Judge declines to find that this
Count should be dismissed.

Turning to Count Five, the Plaintiffs have alleged that a
significantly underfunded pension plan has created the imminent
risk of loss of benefits to the participants.  Judge Bunning
finds that these allegations sufficiently support the inference
that the actual risk of default has been enhanced.  Accordingly,
he says the Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged standing for
Count Five, and the Former Committee Members' Motion to Dismiss
this Count should be denied.

Judge Bunning granted the Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss
Defendants' Counterclaim and dismissed the Defendants'
Counterclaim.  He has considered the Grand Trunk factors, and
decides to exercise its jurisdiction over the Defendants'
Counterclaim.  Having exercised jurisdiction, however, the Judge
finds that the Counterclaim is a mirror-image of the Plaintiffs'
claim for declaratory relief, serves no useful purpose, and
should be dismissed.  Through their affirmative defense, and in
opposition to the Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, the Defendants
will be able to raise and fully litigate their argument that the
Plan is not a church plan.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 4, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://bit.ly/2HDMZLm from Leagle.com.

Dolores Jane Boden, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Jeanine Godsey, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated & Patricia Schaefer, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by Donna Siegel Moffa -- dmoffa@ktmc.com -- Kessler
Topaz Meltzer & Check LLP, pro hac vice, Douglas P. Needham --
dneedham@ikrlaw.com -- Izard Kindall & Raabe LLP, pro hac vice,
Erik David Peterson -- edp@austinmehr.com -- Mehr Fairbanks &
Peterson Trial Lawyers, PLLC, Julie Siebert-Johnson --
jsjohnson@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check LLP, pro hac
vice, Mark K. Gyandoh -- mgyandoh@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz
Meltzer & Check LLP, pro hac vice, Mark P. Kindall --
mkindall@ikrlaw.com -- Izard Kindall & Raabe LLP, pro hac vice &
Robert A. Izard -- rizard@ikrlaw.com -- Izard Kindall & Raabe
LLP, pro hac vice.

St. Elizabeth Medical Center, Inc., The St. Elizabeth Medical
Center Employees' Pension Plan Administrative Committee & John
Does, Defendants, represented by Christopher B. Markus --
cmarkus@dbllaw.com -- Dressman Benzinger LaVelle P.S.C., Mark D.
Guilfoyle -- mguilfoyle@dbllaw.com -- Dressman Benzinger LaVelle
P.S.C., Mark R. Hervey & Richard G. Meyer -- rmeyer@dbllaw.com --
Dressman Benzinger LaVelle P.S.C.

John Dubis, Martin Oscadal, Garren Colvin, Randall Foltz,
Marianne Tait, Nathan Van Laningham, Chris Carle, Daniel
Rutterer, M.D., Robert Pritchard, M.D., Robert Tracy, M.D.,
Patrick Burns, M.D., Bruno Giacomuzzi, Sarah Giolando, Lori
Baldwin-Ritchey, Gary Blank & Glenn Loomis, M.D., Defendants,
represented by Richard G. Meyer, Dressman Benzinger LaVelle
P.S.C. & Mark D. Guilfoyle, Dressman Benzinger LaVelle P.S.C.

Marianne Tait, Chris Carle, Randall Foltz, Robert Pritchard,
M.D., Robert Tracy, M.D., Lori Baldwin-Ritchey, Bruno Giacomuzzi,
Garren Colvin, Martin Oscadal, Daniel Rutterer, M.D., Gary Blank,
Patrick Burns, M.D., John Dubis, Sarah Giolando, Glenn Loomis,
M.D. & Nathan Van Laningham, Counter Claimants, represented by
Mark D. Guilfoyle, Dressman Benzinger LaVelle P.S.C.

The St. Elizabeth Medical Center Employees' Pension Plan
Administrative Committee, John Does & St. Elizabeth Medical
Center, Inc., Counter Claimants, represented by Christopher B.
Markus, Dressman Benzinger LaVelle P.S.C., Mark D. Guilfoyle,
Dressman Benzinger LaVelle P.S.C., Mark R. Hervey & Richard G.
Meyer, Dressman Benzinger LaVelle P.S.C.

Dolores Jane Boden, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Jeanine Godsey, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated & Patricia Schaefer, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Counter Defendants,
represented by Donna Siegel Moffa, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check
LLP, Douglas P. Needham, Izard Kindall & Raabe LLP, Erik David
Peterson, Mehr Fairbanks & Peterson Trial Lawyers, PLLC, Julie
Siebert-Johnson, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check LLP, Mark K.
Gyandoh, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check LLP, Mark P. Kindall,
Izard Kindall & Raabe LLP & Robert A. Izard, Izard Kindall &
Raabe LLP.


SYMANTEC CORP: Johnson Fistel Investigates Potential Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------
Shareholder Rights Law Firm Johnson Fistel, LLP is investigating
potential claims against Symantec Corporation (NASDAQ: SYMC)
("Symantec"). Symantec provides cybersecurity solutions
worldwide. The investigation concerns whether Symantec and senior
officers issued false and misleading statements to investors and
thus violated the federal securities laws.

On May 10, 2018, after the markets closed, Symantec announced it
was investigating concerns raised by a former employee. The
Company has retained independent counsel and notified the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission. The disclosure followed the
Company's first-quarter earnings report. On May 11, 2018, shares
of Symantec are down over 25% in pre-market trading.

If you have information that could assist in this investigation,
including former employees and others, and are interested in
learning more about the investigation or your legal rights and
remedies, please contact Jim Baker (jimb@johnsonfistel.com) by
email or by phone at 619-814-4471. If you email, please include
your phone number.

         Jim Baker, Esq.
         Johnson Fistel, LLP
         Telephone: 619-814-4471
         Email: jimb@johnsonfistel.com [GN]


TACOMA SCREW: Settlement in "Viesse" FCRA Suit Has Final Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ALBERT VIESSE, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. TACOMA SCREW PRODUCTS, INC.,
and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. C16-1026-
JCC (W.D. Wash.), Judge John C. Coughenour of the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Washington, Seattle, granted
the Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for final approval of the class
action settlement, approval of the attorney fee and expense
award, and approval of the incentive payment.

The Court previously reviewed the Stipulated Settlement Agreement
and Release in the matter.  On Dec. 27, 2017, it entered an order
granting the Plaintiff's motion for preliminary approval of the
Settlement.

The Plaintiff now moves for final approval of the Settlement.
The Plaintiff and his counsel have also moved for an award of
attorney fees and the incentive payment to the class
representative, as provided for in the Settlement.  The Court
held a fairness hearing on April 3, 2018.

Having duly considered all submissions and arguments presented,
Judge Coughenour granted final approval of the proposed
settlement upon the terms and conditions set forth in the
Agreement.  He certified for settlement purposes only the
settlement class defined as all consumers (as defined by FACTA)
to whom TSP provided, at any time during the period July 1, 2014
to July 14, 2016, an electronically printed receipt at the point
of a sale or transaction at any TSP store, on which receipt was
printed the expiration date of the consumer's credit card or
debit card.

He appointed Plaintiff Viesse as the Class Representative for the
Settlement Class; attorneys Chant Yedalian of Chant & Company, a
Professional Law Corporation, and James A. Sturdevant as the
Class Counsel for the Settlement Class; and Atticus
Administration, LLC as the Settlement Administrator.

Judge Coughenour directed the Parties and the Settlement
Administrator to effectuate all terms of the Settlement.

He awarded $150,000 in attorney fees to the Class Counsel (to be
allocated among the Class Counsel according to the Class
Counsel's existing agreement with one another).  He also awarded
$5,000 to the Class Representative, Viesse, as an incentive
(service) award to compensate him for his service as the
representative of the Settlement Class.  TSP will make payment of
this award to the Class Representative pursuant to the terms of
the Agreement.

The parties bear their own fees and costs.

A copy of the Court's April 3, 2018 Judgment and Final Order is
available at https://bit.ly/2vK5dFh from Leagle.com.

Albert Viesse, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Chant Yedalian --
chant@chant.mobi -- CHANT & COMPANY, pro hac vice & James A.
Sturdevant -- jsturdevant@sturdevantlaw.com

Tacoma Screw Products Inc, Defendant, represented by Bradley
Bishop Jones -- bjones@gth-law.com -- GORDON THOMAS HONEYWELL LLP
& Stephanie L. Bloomfield, -- sbloomfield@gth-law.com -- GORDON
THOMAS HONEYWELL LLP.


TRINITY LOGISTICS: Dismissal of Individual Claims Recommended
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JANE DOE, Plaintiff, v. TRINITY LOGISTICS, INC., a
Delaware corporation, PINKERTON CONSULTING AND INVESTIGATIONS, a
Delaware limited liability company, Defendants, C.A. No. 17-53-
RGA-MPT (D. Del.), Chief Magistrate Judge Mary Pat Thynge of the
U.S. District Court for the Delaware has entered her Report and
Recommendation that (i) the Defendants' motions to dismiss and/or
strike class claims be denied; (ii) Trinity's motion to dismiss
the individual claim be granted; and (iii) the Plaintiff's motion
to strike Pinkerton's motion to join motion to dismiss, or in the
alternative, deny motion and construe as a reply be denied.

Trinity, a privately-held for profit Delaware corporation founded
in 1990 as a third-party logistics company, specializes in
freight management and supply chain solutions.  As defined by 15
U.S.C. Section 1681a(f), Pinkerton is a consumer reporting agency
("CRA") that sells, furnishes, and uses consumer reports and
services in this jurisdiction.  Trinity delegates the
determination of an applicant's employability to Pinkerton, who
applies Trinity's criteria to the applicant's consumer report
after creating it.  Pinkerton operates a large database of public
records and related employment histories as a nationwide CRA.

The Plaintiff contends she applied for a job at Trinity on or
about Aug. 6, 2016.  She completed an employment application,
consumer report authorization, and release form.  She was
contacted through email and by telephone by a Trinity employee,
Hilary Wright, who offered her a job around Aug. 22, 2016.  The
employment offer was for a full-time position, starting on Sept.
12, 2016, at $12 per hour.  The Plaintiff accepted that day.

Trinity obtained an employment-purposed consumer report regarding
her from Pinkerton on Aug. 25, 2016.  On Aug. 26, Pinkerton
furnished the Plaintiff's consumer report to Trinity through its
standard procedures.  The Plaintiff asserts Pinkerton, acting as
Trinity's agent and the party responsible for making the actual
hiring decision for Trinity, flagged the report as containing a
criminal record, by marking it "Flagged Order."  She also
maintains that Trinity and/or Pinkerton used the consumer report
it obtained and/or created to take an adverse-employment action
against her without informing her.

Under its contract with Trinity, Pinkerton applied Trinity's pre-
defined hiring criteria, and coded her as ineligible for
employment.  The Plaintiff asserts she was not provided a copy of
the report containing a criminal record, a Summary of Rights
under the Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), or notified
that she would not be hired.  She further alleges Pinkerton's
coding of the report as "Flagged Order" constituted an adverse
action by Pinkerton and Trinity, which was based upon a "hit"
regarding criminal records attributed to the Plaintiff that were
furnished in her consumer report by Pinkerton.  The report
included an inaccurate criminal record from Maryland, expunged
four years before the report, and additional unadjudicated
misdemeanor charges that should not have appeared in the report,
because they predated the report by more than seven years.

On Aug. 26, 2016, Wright called the Plaintiff, informing her that
Trinity had obtained a background screening which noted a
criminal conviction and charging information.  She explained that
the conviction was improperly reported because it had been
expunged in 2012.  After speaking to a company director, Wright
contacted her terminating her employment.  The Plaintiff alleges
the termination is an adverse action as defined in FCRA because
Trinity did not supply her with a required copy of the
employment-purposed consumer report or notice that it had
obtained a report that was likely to adversely impact her
employment.

On Aug. 29, 2016, the Plaintiff contacted Wright, claiming she
had not received a "pre-adverse action letter" prior to her
termination from employment.  On Aug. 31, 2016, Trinity sent the
Plaintiff an email entitled, "Pre-Adverse Action Letter."

The Plaintiff claims to have called Pinkerton on Aug. 31, 2016,
advising that the consumer report supplied to Trinity was
inaccurate and resulted in an adverse impact on her employment.
A week later, on Sept. 7, 2016, Trinity emailed the Plaintiff
which contained a "Final Adverse Action letter."  On the same
date, Pinkerton's manager of the dispute department called the
Plaintiff and advised that Pinkerton's records showed she had no
criminal convictions.  On Sept. 8, 2016, Pinkerton mailed the
Plaintiff a reinvestigation notice of the disputed information
contained in her employment-purposed consumer report.

Trinity allegedly certified to Pinkerton that it had a
permissible purpose to obtain the Plaintiff's consumer report
with the knowledge that Pinkerton expressly disclaimed the
accuracy of its reports.  Due to Trinity's actions and inactions,
the Plaintiff claims to have suffered various injuries including
loss of income and other economic losses, humiliation, damage to
her reputation, emotional distress, deprivation of
congressionally-mandated information, and invasion of her
privacy.

As a result of Trinity's conduct, the Class allegedly suffered a
deprivation of congressionally-mandated information; the loss of
an opportunity to correct or explain information in their
consumer reports before any adverse action was taken; and were
fraudulently induced to authorize the use of consumer reports for
employment purposes, which reports expressly disclaimed accuracy.

Due to Pinkerton's actions and inactions, the Plaintiff claims to
have sustained similar injuries as alleged against Trinity.  The
Class contends to have suffered a deprivation of congressionally-
mandated information and the loss of an opportunity to correct or
explain information in their consumer reports before an adverse
action occurred.

Plaintiff Jane Doe, individually and on behalf of all other
similarly situated individuals, brought the action against
Trinity and Pinkerton.  In her complaint, the Plaintiff alleges
the Defendants violated the FCRA by failing to provide a pre-
adverse action notice, as required by 15 U.S.C. Section
1681b(b)(3)(A)(i) and 1681b(b)(3)(A)(ii) by failing to provide a
copy of the consumer report (Count I) and by failing to provide
the Summary of Rights (Count II).

The Plaintiff further alleges Pinkerton violated Section
1681(k)(a)(1) for failure to provide an "at the time" notice
(Count III), Section 1681c(a) for obsolete information (Count
IV), Section 1681e(a) for providing an employment-purposed
consumer report without a permissible purpose (Count VI), and
Section 1681e(b) for failure to ensure maximum possible accuracy
(Count VII).  Additionally, the Plaintiff claims Trinity violated
Section 1681b(f) for obtaining or using an employment-purposed
consumer report without a permissible purpose (Count V).

Currently before the Court are, (i) Pinkerton's individual motion
to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6); (ii) Trinity's motion to dismiss
and/or to strike the class claims; and (iii) Pinkerton's motion
to join in part and oppose in part Trinity's motion to dismiss.
Also before the Court, is the Plaintiff's motion to strike
Pinkerton's joinder motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, to
deny the motion and construe it as a reply.

The Plaintiff brings the action on behalf of the Notice Class, of
which she is a member, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and
23(b).  The Plaintiff is seeking certification of the class of
individuals defined as all natural persons residing in the United
States (including all territories and other political
subdivisions of the United States), (a) who were employees of
Trinity or who applied for an employment position with Trinity
(b) as a part of this application process were the subject of a
consumer report used by Trinity and/or Pinkerton on or after Aug.
26, 2016, and through the pendency of this action (c) where that
consumer report contained an item that would disqualify the
person from such position under Trinity's hiring policies, (d)
which consumer was not then approved or hired for the position,
(e) and to whom Trinity did not provide a copy of the consumer
report and other disclosures as required by 15 U.S.C. Sections
1681b(b)(3)(A)(i) and (ii) at least five business days before the
date the employment decision was made.

Chief Magistrate Judge Thynge finds that the Class has satisfied
the requirements under Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3).

With respect to Count V, the Chief Magistrate Judge explains that
when the Plaintiff applied for the job at Trinity, she completed
a consumer report authorization and release form.  Trinity
purchased an employment-purposed consumer report about the
Plaintiff from Pinkerton, which Pinkerton completed on Aug. 26,
2016 consistent with its standard procedures.  Pinkerton then
furnished the report to Trinity, and on Sept. 8, 2016, Pinkerton
sent the Plaintiff a reinvestigation of disputed information
contained in her employment-purposed consumer report via U.S.
Mail.  The second report acknowledged that the initial report was
inaccurate, but this new report contained accurate information.
There were no criminal charges or convictions on the Plaintiff's
record in the new report.  As a result, based on the Plaintiff's
second amended complaint, she fails to state a claim against
Trinity, for a violation of 15 U.S.C. Section 1681b(f) because
she authorized the use of the report for such purposes.

Finally, as to Pinkerton's 0pposition to Trinity's motion to
dismiss, the Chief Magistrate Judge explains that Pinkerton's
motion to join and opposition was a response to Trinity's motion
to dismiss and meets local rules.  All parties entered into a
joint stipulation stating that the parties to the lawsuit
stipulate and agree that all parties will have until Sept. 18,
2017 to respond to defense motions to dismiss the Plaintiff's
second amended complaint.  Pinkerton met the deadline agreed upon
in filing its motion to dismiss, which the Plaintiff answered and
Pinkerton replied.  Similarly, Trinity filed its motion to
dismiss, Pinkerton responded, and Trinity filed a reply.
Pinkerton concedes that its response to Trinity's motion should
have been titled "Answer to Trinity's Motion to Dismiss," rather
than "motion to join in part and oppose in part."  In any event,
the Chief Magistrate Judge says, Pinkerton's motion clearly was a
response to Trinity's motion to dismiss.

For these reasons, Chief Magistrate Judge Thynge recommended that
(i) the Defendants' motions to dismiss and/or strike class claims
be denied; (ii) Trinity's motion to dismiss the individual claim
be granted; and (iii) the Plaintiff's motion to strike
Pinkerton's motion to join motion to dismiss, or in the
alternative, deny motion and construe as a reply be denied.

The Report and Recommendation is filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
Section 636(b)(1)(B), FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(1), and D. DEL. LR
72.1.  The parties may serve and file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy of the Report and
Recommendation.  Objections and responses are limited to 10 pages
each.

The Chief Magistrate Judge directed the parties to the Court's
Standing Order in Non-Pro Se matters for Objections Filed under
FED. R. CIV. P. 72, dated Oct. 9, 2013, a copy of which is
available on the Court's website, www.ded.uscourts.gov.

A copy of the Court's April 3, 2018 Report and Recommendation is
available at https://bit.ly/2qZPGLT from Leagle.com.

Jane Doe, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Mary F. Higgins, Law Office
of Mary Higgins & Susan M. Rotkis -- susan@clalegal.com -- pro
hac vice.

Trinity Logistics, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, Defendant, pro
se.

Pinkerton Consulting and Investigations, LLC, a Delaware Limited
Liability Company, Defendant, represented by Melissa Lynn Rhoads
-- m.rhoads@tighecottrell.com -- Tighe & Cottrell, P.A..


U-HAUL CO.: Faces "Newman" Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against U-Haul Co. of New
York and Vermont, Inc. The case is styled as Seth Newman, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
U-Haul Co. of New York and Vermont, Inc., U-Haul International,
Inc. and Amerco, Defendants, Case No. 7:18-cv-04751 (S.D. N.Y.,
May 30, 2018).

U-Haul Co. of New York and Vermont, Inc. provides rental
services. The Company specializes in renting trucks and trailers,
as well as offers storage, damage cover, shipping, and boxes and
packaging supplies. U-Haul Co. of New York and Vermont serves
customers in North America.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   C.K. Lee, Esq.
   Lee Litigation Group, PLLC
   30 East 39th Street
   2nd Floor
   New York, NY 10016
   Tel: (212) 465-1188
   Fax: (212) 465-1181
   Email: cklee@leelitigation.com


UBS SECURITIES: Faces "Burbon" Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against UBS Securities LLC.
The case is styled as Luc Burbon, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. UBS Securities LLC, UBS
Financial Services Inc. and UBS Asset Management (US) Inc.,
Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-04786 (S.D. N.Y., May 30, 2018).

UBS Securities LLC is a brokerage firm. It was founded in March
1978 and is based in New York, New York. UBS Securities LLC
operates as a subsidiary of UBS Americas Inc. and UBS Americas
Holding LLC.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


UNIT CORP: Class Certification Bid Pending in Panola ISD Case
-------------------------------------------------------------
Unit Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
March 31, 2018, that the motion for class certification in the
case, Panola Independent School District No. 4, et al. v. Unit
Petroleum Company, No. CJ-07-215, District Court of Latimer
County, Oklahoma, is still pending

Panola Independent School District No. 4, Michael Kilpatrick,
Gwen Grego, Carla Lessel, Thelma Christine Pate, Juanita
Golightly, Melody Culberson, and Charlotte Abernathy are the
Plaintiffs and are royalty owners in oil and gas drilling and
spacing units for which the company's exploration segment
distributes royalty. The Plaintiffs' central allegation is that
the company's exploration segment has underpaid royalty
obligations by deducting post-production costs or marketing
related fees. Plaintiffs sought to pursue the case as a class
action on behalf of persons who receive royalty from us for our
Oklahoma production.

Unit Corp. said, "We have asserted several defenses including
that the deductions are permitted under Oklahoma law. We have
also asserted that the case should not be tried as a class action
due to the materially different circumstances that determine
what, if any, deductions are taken for each lease."

On December 16, 2009, the trial court entered its order
certifying the class. On May 11, 2012 the court of civil appeals
reversed the trial court's order certifying the class. The
Plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari and on
October 8, 2012, the Plaintiff's petition was denied. On January
22, 2013, the Plaintiffs filed a second request to certify a
class of royalty owners slightly smaller than their first
attempt. Since then, the Plaintiffs have further amended their
proposed class to just include royalty owners entitled to
royalties under certain leases in Latimer, Le Flore, and
Pittsburg Counties, Oklahoma. In July 2014, a second class
certification hearing was held where, besides the defenses
described above, the company argued that the amended class
definition is still deficient under the court of civil appeals
opinion reversing the initial class certification. Closing
arguments were held on December 2, 2014. There is no timetable
for when the court will issue its ruling. The merits of
Plaintiffs' claims will remain stayed while class certification
issues are pending.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Unit Corp. engages in onshore contract drilling of oil and gas
wells (for its own account as well as for other companies),
exploration and production of oil and gas, and the gathering and
transportation of natural gas primarily in the U.S. It also
explores, develops, acquires, and produces oil and natural gas,
and buys, sells, gathers, processes, and treats natural gas. The
company is based in Tulsa, Oklahoma.


UNIT CORP: Continues to Defend Cockerell Oil Properties' Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Unit Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
March 31, 2018, that the company continues to vigorously defend
against each of the pending claims in the case, Cockerell Oil
Properties, Ltd., v. Unit Petroleum Company, No. 16-cv-135-JHP,
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Oklahoma.

On March 11, 2016, a putative class action lawsuit was filed
against Unit Petroleum Company styled Cockerell Oil Properties,
Ltd., v. Unit Petroleum Company in LeFlore County, Oklahoma. The
company removed the case to federal court in the Eastern District
of Oklahoma. The plaintiff alleges that Unit Petroleum wrongfully
failed to pay interest with respect to untimely royalty payments
under Oklahoma's Production Revenue Standards Act.

The lawsuit seeks actual and punitive damages, an accounting,
disgorgement, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees. Plaintiff
is seeking relief on behalf of royalty owners in the company's
Oklahoma wells.

Unit Corp. said, "We have asserted several defenses including
that the case cannot be properly certified as a class action
because of the wide variety of circumstances that determine
whether a royalty payment was timely made or has accrued interest
under Oklahoma law. At this point, the court has not taken any
action on the issue of class certification."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Unit Corp. engages in onshore contract drilling of oil and gas
wells (for its own account as well as for other companies),
exploration and production of oil and gas, and the gathering and
transportation of natural gas primarily in the U.S. It also
explores, develops, acquires, and produces oil and natural gas,
and buys, sells, gathers, processes, and treats natural gas. The
company is based in Tulsa, Oklahoma.


UNIT CORP: Chieftain Suit over Natural Gas Royalties Pending
------------------------------------------------------------
Unit Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
March 31, 2018, that the company continues to defend itself in
the case, Chieftain Royalty Company v. Unit Petroleum Company,
No. CJ-16-230, District Court of LeFlore County, Oklahoma.

On November 3, 2016, a putative class action lawsuit was filed
against Unit Petroleum Company styled Chieftain Royalty Company
v. Unit Petroleum Company in LeFlore County, Oklahoma. Plaintiff
alleges that Unit Petroleum breached its duty to pay royalties on
natural gas used for fuel off the lease premises. The lawsuit
seeks actual and punitive damages, an accounting, injunctive
relief, and attorney's fees. Plaintiff is seeking relief on
behalf of Oklahoma citizens who are or were royalty owners in the
company's Oklahoma wells.

The company filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that the
claims asserted by the Plaintiff and the putative class are
barred because they have already been asserted by the putative
class in the Panola lawsuit and are subject to its reversal of
class certification. The court denied the company's motion to
dismiss and the company has asked the court to certify its order
so that it can be immediately appealed. That issue is still
pending before the court.

Unit Corp. said, "If we do not ultimately prevail on our claim of
issue preclusion, we have several other defenses, including that
the case cannot be properly certified as a class action because
of the wide variety of circumstances that determine whether a
royalty payment was wrongfully withheld. At this point, the issue
of class certification has not been set before the court."

Unit Corp. engages in onshore contract drilling of oil and gas
wells (for its own account as well as for other companies),
exploration and production of oil and gas, and the gathering and
transportation of natural gas primarily in the U.S. It also
explores, develops, acquires, and produces oil and natural gas,
and buys, sells, gathers, processes, and treats natural gas. The
company is based in Tulsa, Oklahoma.


UNITED STATES: Dismissal of "Lyons" Recommended
-----------------------------------------------
In the case, VICTOR LYONS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-02262-JAD-NJK
(D. Nev.), Magistrate Judge Nancy J. Koppe of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Nevada (i) denied the Plaintiff's
motion for appointment of counsel and (ii) recommended that the
case be dismissed without prejudice.

Scott is proceeding in the action pro se and requested authority
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915 to proceed in forma pauperis.
On Oct. 10, 2017, the Court granted the Plaintiff's application,
and screened the Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
Section 1915.  The Court dismissed the Plaintiff's complaint with
leave to amend.  It identified numerous deficiencies in the
Plaintiff's complaint, and provided him with an opportunity to
cure those defects.

Pending before the Court is the Plaintiff's amended complaint and
motion for appointment of counsel.

The Plaintiff submits a variety of grievances against multiple
branches of the United States government, including the United
States itself, related to his military service during the Vietnam
War.  Specifically, the Court construes the Plaintiff's
allegations to stem from issues in obtaining medical treatment
from the Department of Veterans Affairs ("VA") and his
disagreement with the VA's denial of a disability rating for his
alleged post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD").

The Plaintiff's amended complaint alleges violations of Service-
Connected Disability provisions of Title 38, USC, Veterans'
Benefits.  In essence, he disagrees with the VA's Phoenix
Regional Office's decision denying service-connection for his
alleged PTSD.  He alleges that the denial, in part, was a result
of the VA's failure to provide him with copies of his military
records.

Magistrate Judge Koppe holds that the Court does not have
jurisdiction over the Plaintiff's Veterans benefits-related
claim.  He finds that the Plaintiff filed a claim with the VA on
Oct. 16, 2013, seeking, in part, to re-open his claim for a
determination of service-connection for his alleged PTSD.  As
part of the Plaintiff's claim, he included various medical
records of treatments provided by the VA and Tuba City Regional
Health.  On May 12, 2015, the VA's Phoenix Regional Office
declined to re-open the Plaintiff's claim regarding his alleged
PTSD because he did not submit the required new and material
evidence and, based on the existing evidence submitted, service
connection for PTSD remained denied based on the absence of a
verifiable military combat stressor.  He says the Plaintiff fails
to allege in his amended complaint that he has completely
exhausted the administrative remedies available through the VJRA
system as required.

Because the Plaintiff fails a second time to demonstrate that the
United States has waived its sovereign immunity, he has not borne
his burden of demonstrating that the Court has jurisdiction over
the instant case.

Finally, the Magistrate Judge finds that the Court previously
addressed the Plaintiff's attempt to file his complaint as a
class action, with the Plaintiff representing the class pro se.
Nonetheless, the Plaintiff's amended complaint again attempts to
assert a class action.  The Plaintiff argues that he is entitled
to appointment of counsel under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(g).  He
misunderstands that rule, however, which provides that once the
Court has determined that a case may proceed as a class action,
it also orders that one of the attorneys already appearing in the
case as a representative of a named plaintiff is appointed to
represent the entire class.  Hence, she says the Plaintiff is not
entitled to appointment of counsel, and he cannot bring his case
as a class action.

Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Koppe denied the Plaintiff's motion
for appointment of counsel and recommended that the case be
dismissed without prejudice.

A copy of the Court's April 3, 2018 Order is available at
https://bit.ly/2vFEbii from Leagle.com.

Victor Lyons, Plaintiff, pro se.

Roger Scott, Plaintiff, pro se.


UNITED STATES: Seeks Ninth Circuit Review of Ruling in "Wagafe"
--------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Donald J. Trump, et al., filed an appeal from a court
ruling in the lawsuit entitled ABDIQAFAR WAGAFE, et al., on
behalf of themselves and others similarly situated v. DONALD
TRUMP, President of the United States, et al., Case No. 2:17-cv-
00094-RAJ, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Seattle.

The Respondent is the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington, Seattle.

The appellate case is captioned as Donald Trump, et al. v. USDC-
WAWSE, Case No. 18-71171, in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the District
Court granted the Plaintiffs' motion to certify two classes: a
Naturalization Class and an Adjustment Class.  The parties have
since been engaged in discovery.  The parties have attempted to
resolve their discovery disputes without court intervention but
have reached an impasse.

The Plaintiffs seek, and the Government refuses to provide,
discovery in four discrete areas: (1) information to allow
Plaintiffs to identify potential class members and why Named
Plaintiffs were subjected to Controlled Application Review and
Resolution Program ("CARRP"); (2) responsive documents despite
their classified status, or a privilege log in lieu of the
documents; (3) documents related to two Executive Orders; and (4)
documents outside the scope of national applicability.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Real Parties in Interest are ABDIQAFAR WAGAFE, MEHDI
OSTADHASSAN, HANIN OMAR BENGEZI, MUSHTAQ ABED JIHAD and SAJEEL
MANZOOR, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated,
are represented by:

          Matt Adams, Esq.
          Glenda Melinda Aldana Madrid, Esq.
          NORTHWEST IMMIGRANT RIGHTS PROJECT
          615 Second Avenue
          Seattle, WA 98104
          Telephone: (206) 957-8611
          E-mail: matt@nwirp.org
                  glenda@nwirp.org

               - and -

          Sameer Ahmed, Esq.
          Jennifer Lee Pasquarella, Esq.
          ACLU FOUNDATION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
          1313 West Eighth Street
          Los Angeles, CA 90017
          Telephone: (213) 977-5284
          E-mail: sahmed@aclusocal.org
                  jpasquarella@aclusocal.org

               - and -

          Emily Chiang, Esq.
          ACLU OF WASHINGTON
          901 Fifth Avenue
          Seattle, WA 98164
          Telephone: (206) 624-2184
          E-mail: echiang@aclu-wa.org

               - and -

          Lee P. Gelernt, Esq.
          Hugh Handeyside, Esq.
          Hina Shamsi, Esq.
          ACLU-AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION
          125 Broad Street
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (212) 549-2616
          E-mail: lgelernt@aclu.org
                  hhandeyside@aclu.org
                  hshamsi@aclu.org

               - and -

          Nicholas Peter Gellert, Esq.
          David A. Perez, Esq.
          Harry H. Schneider, Jr., Esq.
          PERKINS COIE LLP
          1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 359-8680
          E-mail: NGellert@perkinscoie.com
                  DPerez@perkinscoie.com
                  hschneider@perkinscoie.com

               - and -

          Kristin Macleod-Ball, Esq.
          Trina A. Realmuto, Esq.
          AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL
          100 Summer Street, 23rd Floor
          Boston, MA 02110
          Telephone: (857) 305-3722
          E-mail: kmacleodball@immcouncil.org
                  trealmuto@immcouncil.org

               - and -

          Stacy Tolchin, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF STACY TOLCHIN
          634 S. Spring Street
          Los Angeles, CA 90014
          Telephone: (213) 622-7450
          E-mail: stacy@tolchinimmigration.com

Defendants-Petitioners DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United
States; U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES; KIRSTJEN
NIELSEN; L. FRANCIS CISSNA, in his official capacity as Director
of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; MATTHEW D. EMRICH,
in his official capacity as Associate Director of the Fraud
Detection and National Security Directorate of U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services; and DANIEL RENAUD, in his official
capacity as Associate Director of the Field Operations
Directorate of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, are
represented by:

          Timothy Michael Belsan, Esq.
          Joseph Carilli, Jr., Esq.
          Edward S. White, Esq.
          DOJ - U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
          P.O. Box 868
          Ben Franklin Station
          Washington, DC 20044
          Telephone: (202) 532-4596
          Facsimile: (202) 305-7000
          E-mail: timothy.m.belsan@usdoj.gov
                  joseph.f.carilli2@usdoj.gov
                  edward.s.white@usdoj.gov

               - and -

          August E. Flentje, Esq.
          Chad Readler, Esq.
          DOJ - U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
          950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
          Washington, DC 20530
          Telephone: (202) 514-1278
          E-mail: august.flentje@usdoj.gov
                  chad.a.readler@usdoj.gov

               - and -

          Annette L. Hayes, Esq.
          Brian Kipnis, Esq.
          DOJ - OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY
          700 Stewart Street
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 553-7970
          E-mail: Annette.Hayes@usdoj.gov
                  Brian.Kipnis@usdoj.gov

               - and -

          Christopher W. Hollis, Esq.
          Aaron R. Petty, Esq.
          DOJ - U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
          P.O. Box 878
          Benjamin Franklin Station
          Washington, DC 20044
          Telephone: (202) 305-0899
          E-mail: christopher.hollis@usdoj.gov
                  Aaron.R.Petty@usdoj.gov


UNITED STATES: Fourth Circuit Appeal Filed in "Diaz" Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Russell Hott and Jefferson B. Sessions, III, filed an
appeal from a court ruling in the lawsuit styled Rogelio Cabrera
Diaz, et al. v. Russell Hott, et al., Case No. 1:17-cv-01405-LMB-
MSN, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia at Alexandria.

The nature of suit is stated as "Habeas Corpus - Alien
Detainees."

The appellate case is captioned as Rogelio Cabrera Diaz, et al.
v. Russell Hott, et al., Case No. 18-6419, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that Habeas
Immigration Case Initial forms are due within 14 days.[BN]

Petitioners-Appellees ROGELIO AMILCAR CABRERA DIAZ, JENNRY
FRANCISCO MORAN BARRERA and RODOLFO EUDUARDO RIVERA FLAMENCO, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, are
represented by:

          Rachel Colleen McFarland, Esq.
          LEGAL AID JUSTICE CENTER
          1000 Preston Avenue
          Charlottesville, VA 22903
          Telephone: (434) 529-1813
          E-mail: rmcfarland@justice4all.org

               - and -

          Simon Yehuda Sandoval-Moshenberg, Esq.
          LEGAL AID JUSTICE CENTER
          6066 Leesburg Pike
          Falls Church, VA 22041
          Telephone: (703) 720-5605
          E-mail: simon@justice4all.org

Petitioner-Appellee ROGELIO AMILCAR CABRERA DIAZ is represented
by:

          Mark Alastair Stevens, Esq.
          MURRAY OSORIO PLLC
          4103 Chain Bridge Road
          Fairfax, VA 22030
          Telephone: (703) 352-2399

Petitioners-Appellees ROGELIO AMILCAR CABRERA DIAZ and JENNRY
FRANCISCO MORAN BARRERA are represented by:

          James Reyes, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF JAMES REYES PLLC
          9252B Mosby Street
          Manassas, VA 20110
          Telephone: (571) 358-9088
          E-mail: jreyes@jamesreyeslaw.com

Respondents-Appellants RUSSELL HOTT, Field Office Director, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS
III, Attorney General, are represented by:

          R. Trent McCotter, Esq.
          OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
          2100 Jamieson Avenue
          Alexandria, VA 22314-5194
          Telephone: (703) 299-3845
          E-mail: trent.mccotter@usdoj.gov


UNITED STATES: Dismissal of "Donelson" NEPA Suit Affirmed
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, affirmed the
dismissal of the case captioned MARTHA DONELSON, JOHN FRIEND, on
behalf of themselves and on behalf of all similarly situated
persons, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Through the Department of the Interior and its Agency, the Bureau
of Indian Affairs; DEVON ENERGY PRODUCTION COMPANY, L.P.;
CHAPARRAL ENERGY, LLC; SPYGLASS ENERGY GROUP, LLC; ENCANA OIL &
GAS (USA), INC.; PERFORMANCE ENERGY RESOURCES, LLC; CEJA
CORPORATION; CEP MID-CONTINENT, LLC; LINN ENERGY HOLDINGS, LLC;
SULLIVAN & COMPANY, LLC; REVARD OIL & GAS PROPERTIES, INC.; BLACK
LAVA RESOURCES, LLC; B & G OIL COMPANY; ORION EXPLORATION, LLC;
NADEL AND GUSSMAN, LLC; SHORT OIL, LLC; RAM ENERGY RESOURCES,
INC.; MARCO OIL COMPANY, LLC; BGI RESOURCES, LLC; HALCON
RESOURCES CORPORATION; OSAGE ENERGY RESOURCES, LLC; THE LINK OIL
COMPANY; TOOMEY OIL COMPANY, INC.; KAISER-FRANCIS ANADARKO, LLC;
WELLCO ENERGY, INC.; CARDINAL RIVER ENERGY I LP, previously named
as Cardinal River Energy, LP; LAMAMCO DRILLING, INC., previously
named as Lamamco Drilling, LLC and Lammamco Drilling, LLC; HELMER
OIL CORP, and all other lessees and operators and operators who
have obtained a concession agreement, lease or drilling permit
approved by the BIA in Osage County in violation of NEPA
previously named as Helmer Oil Corp., Defendants-Appellees, No.
16-5174 (10th Cir.).

Martha Donelson and John Friend filed this putative class action
against the United States through the Department of the Interior
(DOI) and Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), along with multiple oil
and gas companies. They claim that numerous regulatory approvals
related to oil and gas operations in Osage County, Oklahoma, were
issued in violation of the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA).

The district court dismissed the action concluding that
jurisdiction was lacking under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) because the plaintiffs advanced a programmatic challenge.
Because the plaintiffs' claims against the oil and gas companies
rest on the success of their NEPA claims, the district court
dismissed them as well, declining to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the state claims.

The district court denied the Osage Minerals Council's motion to
intervene as moot. After the court entered judgment, the
plaintiffs filed a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(b),
arguing that the court had misapprehended their claims. They also
submitted a motion to file a Second Amended Complaint. The
district court denied both motions in minute orders. Plaintiffs
timely appealed.

The Plaintiffs do not claim that they were personally injured by
all of the approvals issued across Osage County challenged in the
complaint. Instead, the plaintiffs contend that absent putative
class members have been affected by those other agency actions.
But even in class actions, the named plaintiffs must possess
standing.

In this case, however, the Court concludes that the question
presented is properly characterized as one of standing. The
plaintiffs have the burden of identifying specific federal
conduct and explaining how it is final agency action. This
requirement focuses litigation on the specific agency action by
which a plaintiff claims to be "adversely affected or aggrieved.
Each specific final agency action should be treated as giving
rise to an independent claim, and thus named plaintiffs must
allege that each challenged action has caused some injury to
them. As the Supreme Court has held, in a somewhat different
context, a litigant cannot by virtue of his standing to challenge
one government action, challenge other governmental actions that
did not injure him.  To the contrary, if the right to complain of
one administrative deficiency automatically conferred the right
to complain of all administrative deficiencies, any citizen
aggrieved in one respect could bring the whole structure of state
administration before the courts for review.

The Court concludes that the named plaintiffs lack standing to
pursue most of their claims, and that they failed to identify any
specific final agency action as to claims for which they might
possess standing. Accordingly the Court affirms the district
court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

A full-text copy of the Tenth Circuit's April 5, 2018 Order and
Judgment is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybfw6gkv from
Leagle.com.


UTAH: Drug Safe Utah Files Class Action v. Leut. Gov.
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Spencer J. Cox in
his official capacity as Lieutenant Governor of Utah. The case is
styled as Coalition for a Safe and Healthy Utah doing business
as: Drug Safe Utah, a Utah non-profit corporation, Bruce H.
Wooley, Arthur Brown and Bruce Rigby resident and taxpayer of
Utah, and parent and grandparent of Utah residents, on behalf of
those similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Spencer J. Cox
in his official capacity as Lieutenant Governor of Utah and
Curtis Koch, the County Clerk of Davis County, Utah, in his
official capacity, Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-00405-EJF (D.
Utah, May 24, 2018).

The Defendants are government representatives.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are presented by:

   Blake T. Ostler, Esq.
   OSTLER MOSS & THOMPSON PLLC
   57 W 200 S STE 350
   SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101
   Tel: (801) 575-5000
   Email: supes00@gmail.com

      - and -

   Tyler J. Moss, Esq.
   OSTLER MOSS & THOMPSON
   57 W 200 S STE 350
   SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101
   Tel: (801) 575-5000
   Email: tylermoss22@gmail.com

The Defendants are represented by:

   David N. Wolf, UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE (160-6-140856)
   LITIGATION UNIT
   160 E 300 S 6TH FL
   PO BOX 140856
   SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84114-0856
   Tel: (801) 366-0100
   Email: dnwolf@agutah.gov

      - and -

   Andrew Dymek, UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE (160-6-140856)
   LITIGATION UNIT
   160 E 300 S 6TH FL
   PO BOX 140856
   SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84114-0856
   Tel: (801) 366-0100
   Email: adymek@agutah.gov

      - and -

   Scott D. Cheney, UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE (160-6-140856)
   LITIGATION UNIT
   160 E 300 S 6TH FL
   PO BOX 140856
   SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84114-0856
   Tel: (801) 366-0100
   Email: scheney@agutah.gov


VEP HEALTHCARE: Settlement in "Hunt" FLSA Suit Has Final Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, EMILY HUNT, on behalf of herself, all others
similarly situated, and on behalf of the general public,
Plaintiff, v. VEP HEALTHCARE, INC., a corporation; and DOES 1
through 100, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 3:16-CV-04790-VC
(N.D. Cal.), Judge Vince Chhabria of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California granted the Plaintiff's
Motion for Final Approval of Class/Collective Action Settlement;
Award of Attorneys' Fees, Costs, Class/Collective Service Award
Payment, Claims Administration Expenses; and Entering Judgment.

The matter came on for hearing on March 15, 2018 at 10:00 a.m. on
the Plaintiff's Motion.  Having received and considered the
Plaintiff's motion and supplemental briefs, the Joint Stipulation
and Settlement Agreement, the supporting papers filed by the
Parties, and the evidence and argument received by the Court in
conjunction with the Motion for Final Approval of Class and
Collective Action Settlement, Judge Chhabria granted final
approval of the Settlement.

Solely for the purpose of settlement, he certified a California
Class of all individuals employed by VEP Healthcare, Inc. as
Physician's Assistants in the state of California who were
eligible to receive productivity pay from April 6, 2011 to May
15, 2017.

The Judge will issue a separate order governing the attorneys'
fees and the class/collective counsel's remaining duties
following final approval.  He approved (i) the Class/Collective
Representative Enhancement/General Release Payment to Plaintiff
Hunt, in the amount of $10,000; and (ii) the Settlement
Administration costs in the amount of $34,000 and ordered paid to
CPT Group, Inc.

Judge Chhabria entered the final judgment in the case in
accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement, Order
Granting Preliminary Approval, and the Order.  The Order will
constitute a final judgment.  The Parties will bear their own
costs and attorneys' fees except as otherwise provided by the
Settlement Agreement and the Order.

A copy of the Court's April 3, 2018 Order is available at
https://bit.ly/2JoCYhk from Leagle.com.

Emily Hunt, Plaintiff, represented by William David Turley --
bturley@turleylawfirm.com -- The Turley Law Firm, APLC, David
Thomas Mara -- dmara@turleylawfirm.com -- The Turley Law Firm,
APLC, Jill Marie Vecchi -- jvecchi@turleylawfirm.com -- The
Turley & Mara Law Firm, APLC & Katharine McCall --
khmccall22@gmail.com -- The Turley Law Firm, APLC.

VEP Healthcare, Inc., Defendant, represented by Hannibal Paul
Odisho -- hodisho@aghwlaw.com -- Allen, Glaessner, Hazelwood &
Werth LLP & Steven Douglas Werth -- swerth@aghwlaw.com -- Allen,
Glaessner & Werth, LLP.


VINCE LLC: Faces "Fischler" Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Vince, LLC. The
case is styled as Brian Fischler, individually and on behalf of
all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Vince, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-04697 (S.D. N.Y., May 29, 2018).

Vince, LLC operates as a clothing company. It offers men's and
women's wear sweaters, shearling coats, leather jackets, luxe
leggings, dresses, silk blouses, denims, and shoes. The company
was founded in 2002 and is headquartered in New York, New York.
Vince, LLC operates as a subsidiary of Apparel Holding Corp.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Douglas Brian Lipsky, Esq.
   Lipsky Lowe LLP
   630 Third Avenue Fifth Floor
   New York, NY 10017
   Tel: (212) 392-4772
   Fax: (212) 444-1030
   Email: doug@lipskylowe.com


VISALUS INC: Court Narrows Claims in "Byrd" Securities Fraud Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division, granted in part and denied in part
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint
in the case captioned CAPRECE BYRD, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
VISALUS, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-12626 (E.D.
Mich.).

The Plaintiffs claim that the the Defendants defrauded them into
purchasing equity in Defendant ViSalus, Inc.  In the First
Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs have brought the following
claims:

   -- Violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (the Exchange Act) and Rules 10b-5(a)-(c), 17 C.F.R.
Section 240.10b-5(a)-(c) against all Defendants;

   -- Violation of Sections 12(a)(1) and (a)(2) of the Exchange
Act against all of the Defendants except for Reynolds and Ashley
Sarnicola;

   -- Violation of Section 509(2) of the Michigan Uniform
Securities Act (MUSA), Mich. Comp. Laws Section 451.2509(2)
against all Defendants;

   -- Violation of Sections 501, 502, and 509(3) of the MUSA,
Mich. Comp. Laws Sections 451.2051, 2502, and 2509(3) against all
Defendants;

   -- Violation of Sections 403(1), 509(5), 509(6), and 509(7) of
the MUSA, Mich. Comp. Laws Sections 451.2502, 2403(1), 2509(5),
and 2509(6) against all Defendants; and

   -- Statutory and common law conversion against Defendants
ViSalus, Nick Sarnicola, Blair, and Mallen.

In Count I of the First Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs bring
multiple securities fraud claims under Section 10(b) and Rules
10b-5(a), (b), and (c) of the Exchange Act.

The ViSalus Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss all of
these claims because (1) the units in the Plan offered to the
Plaintiffs were not securities, (2) even if the units were
securities, the alleged misrepresentations or omissions were not
made in connection with the purchase or sale of the units, (3)
the Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pleaded that they relied on
any misstatements or omissions, and (4) Plaintiffs have not
sufficiently pleaded a scheme to defraud under Rules 10b-5(a) and
(c).

The Court concludes that the Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded
that units in the Plan are securities and that the alleged
misstatements or omissions were made in connection with the
purchase of a security. But it agrees with the ViSalus Defendants
that the Plaintiffs' Rule 10b-5(b) claim fails because the
Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged that they relied on a
particular misrepresentation made by any of these Defendants. The
Court also agrees with the ViSalus Defendants that the
Plaintiffs' Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) claims fail because Plaintiffs
have not sufficiently alleged a scheme to defraud separate and
apart from the ViSalus Defendants' alleged misrepresentations.

The Court will therefore dismiss the Plaintiffs' Section 10b and
Rule 10b-5 claims and grant Plaintiffs leave to amend these
claims in a Second Amended Complaint.

The ViSalus Defendants first assert that the Court should dismiss
all of the Plaintiffs' securities-fraud claims because (1) those
claims require that the plaintiff has purchased a security, (2)
the security  that Plaintiffs have identified here are units in
the Plan, and (3) units in the Plan are not securities.

In United States Securities and Exchange Commission v. Zada, 787
F.3d 375, 380 (6th Cir. 2015), a court first determines whether
the instrument at issue is expressly identified as a security in
15 U.S.C. Section 77b(a)(1). If the instrument does appear in
that list, then it is presumptively a security. A defendant may
rebut this presumption by showing that the instrument bears a
family resemblance to a list of instruments that are not
securities.

The Court first concludes that units in the Plan are
presumptively securities under Zada. One of the instruments
listed in 15 U.S.C. Section 77b(a)(1) is stock, and the
Plaintiffs plausibly allege that units in the Plan are stock.

The Court next concludes that the ViSalus Defendants have not
rebutted the Zada presumption that units in the Plan are
securities.

Here, the Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that they wanted to
obtain the equity the ViSalus Defendants were promoting so that
they could become shareholders in ViSalus, "provide for their
families for years to come," and receive the dividend payments
that the ViSalus Defendants promised. The Plaintiffs have
therefore plausibly alleged that they were motivated by an
investment purpose.

The ViSalus Defendants next argue that even if units in the Plan
were securities, the Plaintiffs' securities-fraud claims still
fail because the Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged that
the ViSalus Defendants made a false statement or omission in
connection with the purchase or sale of the units.

The Plaintiffs plausibly allege that the transaction at issue
here was a purchase. The Exchange Act broadly defines the terms
buy and purchase to include any contract to buy, purchase, or
otherwise acquire, and it defines the terms sale and sell to
include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of.

Thus, the Court concludes that the Plaintiffs have plausibly
alleged that they purchased units in the Plan as that term is
defined in the Exchange Act.

Rule 10b-5(b) makes it is unlawful, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security, to make any untrue statement of
a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.

To state a claim under this rule, a plaintiff must plead and
prove: (1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the
defendant, (2) scienter, (3) a connection between the
misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a
security, (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission,
and (5) loss causation.

The ViSalus Defendants maintain that, with one exception,
Plaintiffs' Rule 10b-5(b) claims fail because Plaintiffs have not
adequately pled reliance on specific statements or omissions by
the ViSalus Defendants.

The Court agrees.

Here, the Plaintiffs, except for Watts, have not sufficiently
pleaded that they relied on any specific statements or omissions
from the ViSalus Defendants that led to their investment in the
Plan. Indeed, most of the named Plaintiffs appear to allege that
they relied upon and were persuaded to invest in the Plan as a
result of personal pitches they heard from Owens and his
associate Johnson, not from the ViSalus Defendants. And while the
First Amended Complaint is replete with references and quotes
from various ViSalus promotional videos and other statements made
by the ViSalus Defendants, the Plaintiffs have not specifically
pleaded, among other things: Which Plaintiffs saw which specific
videos (if any), When each Plaintiff watched each specific video
(whether it was before or after they decided to invest in the
Plan); or Which statements made by which the Defendant
specifically persuaded which Plaintiff(s) to invest in the Plan.

Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) make it illegal to to employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud and to engage in any act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.

To state a claim based on conduct that violates Rule 10b-5(a) and
(c), a plaintiff must allege that a defendant (1) committed a
deceptive or manipulative act, (2) with scienter, that (3) the
act affected the market for securities or was otherwise in
connection with their purchase or sale, and that (4) defendants'
actions caused the plaintiffs' injuries.

The Plaintiffs next maintain that the entire March to Equity
program was a bait and switch fraudulent device designed to raise
money that the Defendants could not raise from real equity
markets. But the Plaintiffs' Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) claims are
inextricably linked to the ViSalus Defendants' alleged
misstatements about the Plan. Indeed, the Plaintiffs argue in
response to the motion to dismiss that the ViSalus Defendants
promised ownership rights in ViSalus and reneged on that promise.
Thus, the Plaintiffs' own description of their claims reveals
that their injuries stemmed from statements and promises that the
ViSalus Defendants made, not from a separate course of conduct.
Plaintiffs have therefore failed to plead a viable scheme
liability claim.

In Count III of the First Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs
allege that all of the ViSalus Defendants violated Section 509(2)
of the MUSA when they offered and/or sold unregistered
securities.  The Plaintiffs acknowledge that this claim is
parallel to the claims under Section 12 and that this claim
stands if the Section 12 claim stands.

For the same reasons that the Court dismissed the Plaintiffs'
Section 12 claims against each of the ViSalus Defendants except
for the ViSalus, it will do the same with the Plaintiffs' claim
under Section 509(2) of the MUSA.

In Count V of the First Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs claim
that the ViSalus Defendants violated Sections 403(1), 509(5), and
509(6) of the MUSA when they provided fraudulent investment
advice.

Section 509(5) of the MUSA provides that a person acting as an
investment adviser or investment adviser representative that
provides investment advice for compensation in violation of
section 403(1), 404(1), or 5063 is liable to the client.
The Plaintiffs insist that the ViSalus Defendants did act as
investment advisers because when they promoted the Plan, they
advised the Plaintiffs and others to invest in the Plan. But the
Plaintiffs do not allege that they paid for any such advice or
that the ViSalus Defendants received compensation in any respect
for that advice. Instead, the Plaintiffs allege that they paid
for the equity in the Plan, or paid for ViSalus products, not any
advice that the ViSalus Defendants may have been offering.  And
the Plaintiffs have not identified any authority under which the
ViSalus Defendants could be deemed investment advisers under the
facts that the Plaintiffs have pleaded here.

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' investment-adviser claims under the
MUSA fail to state a cognizable claim.

In Counts IV and V of the First Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs
bring claims under various provisions of the MUSA. In Count IV,
the Plaintiffs bring claims under Sections 501, 502, and 509(3)
of the MUSA. In Count V, in addition to the investment adviser
claims, the Plaintiffs purport to bring claims under four
additional sub-sections of Section 509 the MUSA. The Court will
not permit the Plaintiffs to lump numerous alleged violations of
different statutes and statutory sub-sections in a single count.
Finally, in Count VI of the First Amended Complaint, the
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants ViSalus, Nick Sarnicola, Blair,
and Mallen are liable for common law and statutory conversion.
The Plaintiffs' conversion claims are not sufficiently pleaded
against Nick Sarnicola, Blair, and Mallen. Plaintiffs have,
however, sufficiently pleaded their conversion claims against
ViSalus.

Common law conversion under Michigan law involves any distinct
act of dominion wrongfully exerted over another person's personal
property in denial of or inconsistent with his rights therein.
In Kerrigan v. ViSalus, Inc., 112 F.Supp.3d 580, 615-16 (E.D.
Mich. 2015), this Court held that plaintiff promoters did not
state a sufficient common-law conversion claim for the conversion
of money against individual defendants (including Nick Sarnicola,
Blair, and Mallen) because, among other things, Plaintiffs [did]
not allege that any of those Defendants received the specific
money that Plaintiffs had paid to ViSalus.

The Plaintiffs here fare no better against Nick Sarnicola, Blair,
and Mallen than did the plaintiffs in Kerrigan. Accordingly, the
Plaintiffs have failed to state viable common-law conversion
claim against Nick Sarnicola, Blair, and Mallen.

Michigan's statutory conversion law allows for a plaintiff to
recover treble damages where the plaintiff is damaged by another
person's stealing or embezzling property or converting roperty to
the other person's own use. This requires a plaintiff to plead
that the defendant employed the converted property for some
purpose personal to the defendant's interests.

Here, the Plaintiffs have not pleaded any facts that could tend
to establish that Nick Sarnicola, Blair, or Mallen used
Plaintiffs' money for their personal interests. Indeed, as
explained above, Plaintiffs have pleaded that they paid ViSalus
for the units in the Plan, not Nick Sarnicola, Blair, or Mallen.

Accordingy, the ViSalus Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted
in part and denied in part as follows:

   -- With the exception of Plaintiff Watts' Rule 10b-5(b) claim
against Defendants Mallen and ViSalus, Counts I, II, IV, and V
are dismissed against all of the ViSalus Defendants;

   -- Count III is dismissed against all of the ViSalus
Defendants except for ViSalus; and

   -- Count VI is dismissed against Defendants Nick Sarnicola,
Blair, and Mallen only.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 5, 2018 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7lfo9bc from
Leagle.com.

Caprece Byrd, Bryant Watts & Renae White, Plaintiffs, represented
by Brent Caldwell bcaldwell@pfalawfirm.com -- Pregeg Faucett &
Abbott PLLC, Mark R. Miller -- mrm@wexlerwallace.com -- Wexler
Wallace, Matthew J.M. Prebeg -- mprebeg@pfalawfirm.com -- Prebeg,
Faucett & Abbott PLLC, Patrick E. Cafferty --
PCafferty@CaffertyClobes.com -- Cafferty Clobes Meriwether &
Sprengel LLP & Andrew Kochanowski -- akochanowski@sommerspc.com -
- Sommers Schwartz, P.C.

Dr Frank McWhorter, Connie Bates, Laura Herl & Eric J Harris Jr,
Plaintiffs, represented by Mark R. Miller, Wexler Wallace,
Patrick E. Cafferty, Cafferty Clobes Meriwether & Sprengel LLP
&Andrew Kochanowski, Sommers Schwartz, P.C.

VISALUS, INC., Nick Sarnicola, Ashley Sarnicola, Blake Mallen,
Ryan Blair, Todd Goergen & Gary J. Reynolds, Defendants,
represented by Andrew Clark  -- aclark@honigman.com -- Honigman,
Miller, Schwartz & Cohn, LLP, Brian A. Howie --
brian.howie@quarles.com -- Quarles & Brady LLP, Edward A. Salanga
-- esalanga@quarles.com -- Quarles & Brady LLP, Kevin D. Quigley
-- kevin.quigley@quarles.com -- Quarles & Brady LLP, Michael S.
Catlett -- michael.catlett@quarles.com -- Quarles & Brady LLP &
Nicholas B. Gorga -- ngorga@honigman -- Honigman, Miller.


WELLS FARGO: Faces "Leramo" Suit in California Superior Court
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A. The case is styled as Olusegun B. Leramo, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. and First American Title Insurance Company,
Defendants, Case No. BCV-18-101259 (Cal. Super. Ct., May 30,
2018).

Wells Fargo & Company is an American multinational financial
services company headquartered in San Francisco, California, with
central offices throughout the country.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Francisco J. Aldana, Esq.
   Law Offices of Francisco J. Aldana
   3033 5th Avenue, Suite 201
   San Diego, CA 92103
   Tel: 619 236-8355
   Fax: 619 374-7056


WERNER ENTERPRISES: $500,000 Awarded for Attorney's Fees
--------------------------------------------------------
Werner Enterprises, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period
ended March 31, 2018, that the court has awarded $0.5 million to
the plaintiffs for attorney fees and costs in a class action suit
filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska.

The company is involved in class action litigation in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Nebraska, in which the
plaintiffs allege that the company owe drivers for unpaid wages
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the Nebraska Wage
Payment and Collection Act and that the company failed to pay
minimum wage per hour for drivers in its student driver training
program, related to short break time and sleeper berth time.

The period covered by this class action suit is August 2008
through March 2014. The case was tried to a jury in May 2017,
resulting in a verdict of $0.8 million in plaintiffs' favor on
the short break matter and a verdict in our favor on the sleeper
berth matter.

As a result of various post-trial motions, the court has awarded
$0.5 million to the plaintiffs for attorney fees and costs. As of
March 31, 2018, the company had accrued for the jury's award,
attorney fees and costs in the short break matter and had not
accrued for the sleeper berth matter.

Werner operates in the truckload and logistics sectors of the
transportation industry. The company is based in Omaha, Nebraska.


WOODHOUSE SPAS: Faces "Burbon" Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Woodhouse Spas,
Corporation. The case is styled as Luc Burbon, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. The
Woodhouse Spas, Corporation, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-04731
(S.D. N.Y., May 29, 2018).

The Woodhouse Spas, Corporation is a day spa in Victoria,
Texas.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


XEROX STATE: "Kendrick" Suit Remanded to Calif. State Court
-----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Richard Seeborg of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California granted the Plaintiffs' motion to remand
the case, SUMATRA KENDRICK, et al., Plaintiffs, v. XEROX STATE
AND LOCAL SOLUTIONS, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-
00213-RS(N.D. Cal.).

Plaintiffs Kendrick and Michelle Kelly filed the putative class
action in San Francisco Superior Court.  The operative complaint
asserts state law claims against Defendants Bay Area Toll
Authority, Golden Gate Bridge Highway and Transportation
District, and Conduent State and Local Solutions, Inc., formerly
known as Xerox State & Local Solutions.  At issue is toll
collection on the Golden Gate Bridge and other Bay Area bridges
and the alleged attendant disclosure of consumers' personally
identifiable information.

Conduent removed the action to the Court pursuant to the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA"), contending that the amount
in controversy can be reasonably estimated to exceed the $5
million threshold for jurisdiction under CAFA.

The Plaintiffs seek remand under three theories: (1) Conduent
failed to establish the amount in controversy is sufficient; (2)
even if the amount in controversy does meet the jurisdictional
requirement, remand is appropriate under at least one exception
to CAFA jurisdiction; and (3) removal is precluded under Section
1332(d)(5) because the primary defendants are state actors.  In
addition to remand, the Plaintiffs seek an award of attorney's
fees incurred as a result of removal.

Judge Seeborg finds that despite Conduent's reasonable reliance
upon the complaint's prayer for relief in assuming a damages
floor of $2,500 per class member, the lack of relationship
between its estimate of the class size and the class definition
calls into question the reasonableness of Conduent's
calculations.  That being said, the Plaintiffs have offered no
evidentiary support suggesting a lower number of class members,
and indeed claim on the face of their complaint that the size of
the putative class is hundreds of thousands (if not millions).
Thus, while the erroneous class definition used in the Wilson
Declaration renders those calculations flawed, Conduent is
entitled to assume, based on the allegations in the complaint,
that class membership consists of at least 100,000 individuals.
With a damages estimate of $2,500 per class member, the amount in
controversy in this case is well over the $5 million threshold.

The Judge also finds that there is no question that Conduent
would face substantial liability should class members prevail on
their claims.  Conduent is incorporated in New York and has its
principal place of business in Texas.  Because the Plaintiffs
have submitted no evidence showing that Conduent is in fact a
citizen of California, they fail to meet their burden of
demonstrating the applicability of the home state controversy
exception.

As the parties claiming CAFA jurisdiction, the Defendants bear
the burden of establishing the satisfaction of Section
1332(d)(5)'s requirements.  Because they have not satisfied that
burden, Section 1332(d)(5)'s jurisdictional requirements appear
to be lacking and thus, removal was improper.

Finally, the Judge finds that although removal appears to have
been improper, the Defendants' stated grounds for removal were
not objectively unreasonable.  Therefore, the Plaintiffs' request
for attorney's fees is will be denied.

In sum, Judge Seeborg holds that although the Plaintiffs'
arguments regarding the amount in controversy and exceptions to
CAFA jurisdiction fail, the Defendants have not carried their
burden of satisfying the jurisdictional requirements of Section
1332(d)(5).  Therefore, he granted the Plaintiffs' motion to
remand and denied their request for attorney's fees.

A copy of the Court's April 3, 2018 Order is available at
https://bit.ly/2HOufYI from Leagle.com.

Sumatra Kendrick, an individual & Michelle Kelly, an individual
and on behalf of herself and those similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Blake Joseph Lindemann --
Blake@lawbl.com -- Lindemann Law Firm, APC, Ben Travis --
ben@coastlaw.com -- Coast Law Group LLP, Daren M. Schlecter --
Daren M. Schlecter -- Law Office of Daren M. Schlecter, APC,
Helen I. Zeldes -- helen@coastlaw.com -- Coast Law Group LLC,
Michael J. Flannery -- mflannery@cuneolaw.com -- Cuneo Gilbert &
LaDuca, LLP, pro hac vice, Michael Andrew McShane, Audet &
Partners LLP & S. Clinton Woods, Audet & Partners, LLP.

Xerox State and Local Solutions, Inc. & Conduent State and Local
Solutions, Inc., Defendants, represented by Rebecca Kim Kimura --
rkimura@lkclaw.com -- Lafayette & Kumagai LLP, Barbara Louise
Lyons, Lafayette & Kumagai LLP & Gary T. Lafayette --
glafayette@lkclaw.com -- Lafayette & Kumagai LLP.

Bay Area Toll Authority, a California public corporation & Golden
Gate Bridge, Highway and Transportation District, a California
Public Corporation, Defendants, represented by Samantha D. Wolff,
Hanson Bridgett LLP.


YRC WORLDWIDE: Faces "Burbon" Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against YRC Worldwide Inc.
The case is styled as Luc Burbon, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. YRC Worldwide Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-04788 (S.D. N.Y., May 30, 2018).

YRC Worldwide Inc. is an American holding company of freight
shipping brands YRC Freight, YRC Reimer, New Penn, Holland and
Reddaway.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.







                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N  I N F O R M A T I O N

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