CAR_Public/180605.mbx              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R


              Tuesday, June 5, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 112



                            Headlines


8POINT3 ENERGY: "Davis" Wants to Enjoin Sale to Capital Dynamics
ALBERTSON'S LLC: Settlement in "Diaz" Has Final Approval
ALPHA HOME: Fails to Pay OT to Home Health Aides, "McCann" Claims
AMARA HOME: Accused by "Purse" of Not Paying Overtime Under FLSA
ARIZONA: Arpaio Held Liable for Racially Discriminatory Policing

ARKEMA INC: Court Certifies 2 Subclasses in "Carter" ERISA Suit
ARKEMA INC: Appeals Cert. Order in "Carter" Suit to Sixth Circuit
AVEO PHARMA: Class Action Management Hearing Scheduled for August
BANCO SANTANDER: Manipulates Price of Mexican Gov't Bonds
BAY AREA CREDIT: Faces "Sacknievich" Suit in E.D. New York

BITCONNECT: "Kline" Suit Transferred From M.D. to S.D. Florida
BOOST MOBILE: Blank Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages Under FLSA
CALIFORNIA: Ringgold Wants More Time to File Writ of Certiorari
CBV COLLECTIONS: Faces "Gammons" Suit in N.D. Georgia
CHICAGO BEAR: NFL Dropped as Defendant in "Beckman"

CHILDREN'S PLACE: "Rael" Stayed Pending Resolution in Hyundai
CLARITY SERVICES: Ninth Circuit Appeal Filed in "Benton" Suit
COMMERCEHUB: Shareholder Class Action Over Merger Withdrawn
CORONA REGIONAL: Fisher Phillips Attorneys Discuss Ruling
DANIEL LEPKE: Appeal from Denial of "Connelly" Class Cert Allowed

DANIEL LEPKE: Court Denies Certification of 3 "Connelly" Classes
DCN AUTOMOTIVE: Denial of Arbitration in "Haynes" Reversed
DELIVERY FINANCIAL: Faces "Dupont" Suit in Arizona
DEREK LAM: Faces "Conner" Suit Over Blind-Inaccessible Web Site
DISH NETWORK: Plans to Appeal Verdict in Telemarketing Case

DUOYUAN PRINTING: Piper Jaffray Appeals Ruling in "Perry" Suit
DYNAMEX OPERATIONS: Ct. Embraced Worker-Friendly Classification
EAGLE ROAD: Faces Pawnee Nation Suit in N.D. Oklahoma
EL MIRADOR: Court Approves $224K FLSA Class Action Settlement
EQUIFAX INFORMATION: Faces "Hampton" Suit in N.D. Georgia

ESPERION THERAPEUTICS: July 6 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
EVENKO: Faces Class Action Over Exorbitant Ticketing Fees
EXXON MOBIL: Court Dismisses Amended "Fentress" ERISA Suit
FACEBOOK INC: Appeals BIPA Class Action Certification Ruling
FACEBOOK INC: Koskie Minsky Commences $2-Bil. Data Misuse Suit

FAIRMOUNT SANTROL: Gainey McKenna Files Securities Class Action
FANN FARMS: "Hernandez-Campos" Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages
FERDINAND MARCOS: Human Rights Victims Lose Summary Bid
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS: "Caffey" Challenges Debt Collection Practices
FIRSTSOURCE ADVANTAGE: Faces "Alawoya" Suit in S.D. Texas

G. GENERAL: Faces "Zalaya" Suit in S.D. New York
GOLD KEY: Faces "Lowenbein" Suit in S.D. New York
GOOGLE INC: Supreme Court to Address Use of Cy Pres Relief
HALYARD HEALTH: Court Dismisses "Jackson" Stockholder Suit
HAND AND STONE: Faces "Kiler" Suit in E.D. New York

HAYNES INVESTMENTS: "Gibbs" Suit Moved From Virginia to Texas
HOUSTON TEXANS: Former Cheerleader Files Class Action
HOWARD LEE: Faces "Payeur" Suit in Maine
HUDSON SEAFOOD: Bid Extend Time to Reply to Judgment Offer Denied
ILLINOIS: Court Strikes "Oden" Class Certification Bid

INNOVATION COMPOUNDING: Faces "Scoma" Suit Over TCPA Violations
INTUIT INC: Judge Dismisses 2 Claims in Amended Class Action
J&I THAI: Fails to Pay Minimum and Other Wages, "Moreira" Claims
JOSHUA BAKER: Faces "ZM" Suit in South Carolina
JOURNELLE LLC: Sued by Conner Over Blind-Inaccessible Web Site

JUDGE LAW FIRM: Accused by "Betech" Class Suit of Violating FDCPA
KC ECONOMIC: Court Dismisses "Exford" Suit Without Prejudice
KOI GROUP: Faces "Conner" Suit in S.D. New York
LA TRATTORIA: Baten Seeks to Recover Minimum and Overtime Wages
LABOR READY: 9th Cir. Affirms $6.4MM Wage-and-Hour Settlement

LAFAYETTE STEEL: Galindo Sues Over Badly Paid Operators & Riggers
LENDINGCLUB CORP: July 2 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
LYONS DOUGHTY: Violates Fair Debt Collection Act, "Gross" Alleges
MDL 2804: Judge Orders Disclosure of Litigation Funding Deals
MDL 2827: "Neilan" Suit Consolidated in Device Performance MDL

MDL 2785: Court Compels Production of Sanofi Rebates Information
MERCEDES-BENZ USA: Bid to Remand "Garick" to State Court Denied
METAL TECHNOLOGIES: Held Liable for $101K to "Weil" Class
METAL TECHNOLOGIES: Summary Judgment Bid in "Kolish" Partly OK'd
MOLESKINE AMERICA: Sued by Marett Over Blind-Accessible Web Site

MORRISON & FOERSTER: Faces Pregnancy Discrimination Class Action
MULESOFT INC: Faces "DeBonis" Suit Challenging Sale to Salesforce
MULLOOLY JEFFREY: Judgment on Pleadings in "Timoshenko" Granted
MZ WALLACE: Faces "Marett" Suit Over Blind-Accessible Web Site
NEW YORK: Court Denies Class Certification Bid in "Calvo"

NISSAN: Court Dismisses Few Claims in Sentra Transmission Suit
NORTH AMERICAN POWER: Settlement in "Edwards" Has Prelim Approval
OCWEN LOAN: Faces "Eisenberg" Suit in C.D. California
OXNARD, CA: Mayoral Candidate Files Class Action Over Sewer Fees
PACIFIC GAS: Must Face Claims Related to Wine Country Wildfires

PER MAR SECURITY: Court Certifies 2 Classes in "Bessy" Suit
PETER WASTNEY: Class Action Mulled Over Dodgy Towbars
RALPH MURDY: Wins Bid to Dismiss FAC in "Price" Suit
RECEIVABLES MANAGEMENT: Faces "Martin" Suit in New Jersey
RELX INC: Fails to Pay Proper OT Under FLSA, "Oliver" Suit Says

RESORT MARKETING: Claim Verification Period Extended
RODAN + FIELDS: Faces Class Action Over Lash Boost Product
S.C. JOHNSONS: Court Won't Dismiss Suit Over False SPF Rating
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS: Arbitration Bid Partly OK'd in Galaxy Suit
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS: Bid to Dismiss Galaxy Marketing Suit Granted

SAN GABRIEL: Background Check-Related Claims Sent to Arbitration
SCHOTT NYC CORP: Faces "Olsen" Suit in E.D. New York
SEALIFT INC: Cross-Bid to Cut $33MM Security in "Dziennik" Denied
SEAMORE'S ON ICE: Faces "Kiler" Suit in E.D. New York
SEASONS 52: Settles Age-Bias Class Action for $2.85-Mil.

SENTRY LIFE: Faces "Emerson" Suit in W.D. Wisconsin
SETERUS INC: Faces Class Action Over Illegal Mortgage Fees
SHANGHAI ORIGINAL: Court Grants Decertification Bid in "Jin"
SILVER STAR: Faces "Rivera" Suit in S.D. New York
SMITH KING: Stanko Appeals Order and Judgment to Eighth Circuit

SPECTRANETICS CORP: Court Dismisses "Ellis" Securities Fraud Suit
STATE FARM: Tenth Circuit Appeal Filed in "Mischek" Class Suit
STEARNS PRODUCTS: Partly Grants Bid to Dismiss "Petrosino" Suit
SUPER 8 WORLDWIDE: Faces "Crosson" Suit in E.D. New York
TAMPA BAY: Faces "Thomas" Suit in M.D. Florida

TEMPOE LLC: Can Compel Arbitration of "Garcia" TCCWNA Claim
TIBET PHARMACEUTICALS: Downs Appeals Obasi Suit Order to 3rd Cir.
TITLE SOURCE: Court Certifies External Staff Appraiser Class
TOUGH MUDDER: Arbitration Provision Valid, Appeals Court Rules
TOYOTA FINANCIAL: Access Fees Suit Remains in NJ Dist. Court

TOYOTA MOTOR SALES: Bid to Move "Espineli" to C.D. Cal. Denied
TRAMO AT HOME: "Fundora" Suit Seeks to Recover Overtime Wages
TRION WORLDS: Denial of Arbitration in "Van Fleet" Affirmed
UBER: Christensen Represents Plaintiffs in Discrimination Suit
UFCW UNION: Nagel Sues Local 653 Over Loss of 30-and-Out Benefit

UNILEVER UNITED: PepsiCo Wins Dismissal of Mislabeling Suit
UNITED COLLECTION: Faces "Hochauser" Suit in S.D. New York
UNITED STATES: Court Certifies Pregnant UCs Class in "Garza"
UNITED STATES: Robinson Files Writ of Certiorari to Supreme Court
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN: Students Sue Over Tyndall Sexual Abuses

URBAN EDGE: Faces "Sigmon" Suit in South Carolina
VALEANT PHARMA: Safirstein Metcalf Shareholder Opt-Out Lawsuit
VINO'S INC: Fails to Pay Minimum Wages Under FLSA, "Allen" Claims
VITAMIN SHOPPE: Court Partly Grants Bid to Dismiss "Ferrari" Suit
VOLKSWAGEN: Judge Refuses to Dismiss Warranty Claim

WALGREEN CO: Court Certifies Class in Securities Fraud Suit
WATERBURY, CT: Ct. Denies Prelim Injunction Bid in "Lagnese" Suit
WELLS FARGO: Court Won't Dismiss Caller ID Spoofing Suit
WELLS FARGO: Settles Consumer Protection Law Violations for $1BB
WELLS FARGO: July 7 Fake Account Settlement Opt-Out Deadline Set

WR GRACE: Bid to Dismiss Class Certification Denial Appeal OK'd
WYNN LAS VEGAS: Faces Federal Class Action
XUELIAN BIAN: Court Narrows Claims in Freeze-Out-Merger Suit
ZILLOW INC: Averts Class Action Over Home Value "Zestimates"
ZIMMERMANN USA: Crosson Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Web Site

* Class Action Litigation Spending on the Rise, Survey Shows
* Polsinelli Attorney Discusses Class Action Defense Strategy





                            *********


8POINT3 ENERGY: "Davis" Wants to Enjoin Sale to Capital Dynamics
----------------------------------------------------------------
EVAN DAVIS, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. 8POINT3 ENERGY PARTNERS LP, CHARLES D. BOYNTON, ALEX
BRADLEY, NATALIE F. JACKSON, THOMAS C. O'CONNOR, NORMAN J.
SZYDLOWSKI, MARK R. WIDMAR, and MICHAEL W. YACKIRA, Case No.
5:18-cv-02267-BLF (N.D. Cal., April 16, 2018), seeks to enjoin
the Defendants from proceeding with the proposed sale
transaction, and in the event that the Proposed Transaction is
consummated, seeks to recover damages from the Defendants for
their violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

On February 5, 2018, 8point3 Energy Partners LP ("8point3" or the
"Partnership") entered into an Agreement and Plan of Merger with
CD Clean Energy and Infrastructure V JV, LLC, an investment fund
managed by Capital Dynamics, Inc., and certain other co-investors
(collectively, "Capital Dynamics"), pursuant to which Capital
Dynamics will acquire 8point3 through an acquisition of 8point3
General Partner, LLC (the "General Partner"), which manages the
8point3 partnership, all of the outstanding Class A shares in
8point3 and all of the outstanding common and subordinated units
and incentive distribution rights in 8point3 Operating Company,
LLC ("OpCo"), 8point3's operating company (the "Proposed
Transaction").

Pursuant to the Proposed Transaction, 8point3's Class A
shareholders, First Solar, Inc. ("First Solar") and SunPower
Corporation ("SunPower" and, together with First Solar, the
"Sponsors"), as holders of common and subordinated units in OpCo,
will receive $12.35 per share or per unit in cash, plus a preset
daily amount representing cash expected to be generated from
December 1, 2017, through closing less any distributions received
after the execution of the Merger Agreement and prior to closing
(the "Merger Consideration").

8point3 is a Delaware limited partnership with its principal
executive offices located in San Jose, California.  The
Individual Defendants are directors and officers of the Company.
8point3 is a limited partnership formed by First Solar and
SunPower with the purpose of owning, operating, and acquiring
solar energy generation projects.

First Solar is a global provider of comprehensive photovoltaic
solar systems, with use its advanced module and system
technology.  First Solar develops, finances, engineers,
constructs and operates solar assets, with over 10GW installed
worldwide.  First Solar's states that its integrated power plant
solutions deliver an economically attractive alternative to
fossil-fuel electricity generation.

SunPower designs, manufactures and delivers solar panel systems
targeted towards residential consumers, businesses, government
entities and utility providers.  SunPower has offices in North
and South America, Europe, Australia, Africa and Asia.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Marc G. Reich, Esq.
          Adam T. Hoover, Esq.
          REICH RADCLIFFE & HOOVER LLP
          4675 MacArthur Court, Suite 550
          Newport Beach, CA 92660
          Telephone: (949) 975-0512
          Facsimile: (949) 208-2839
          E-mail: mgr@reichradcliffe.com
                  adhoover@reichradcliffe.com

               - and -

          Joshua M. Lifshitz, Esq.
          LIFSHITZ & MILLER LLP
          821 Franklin Ave., Suite 209
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: (516) 493-9780
          Facsimile: (516) 280-7376
          E-mail: jml@jlclasslaw.com


ALBERTSON'S LLC: Settlement in "Diaz" Has Final Approval
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California granted Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval of the
Class Action Settlement, Attorney Fees, Costs and Class
Representative Enhancement in the case captioned ANTONIO DIAZ, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. ALBERTSON'S LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; and
DOES 1 to 100, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. CV 16-257 DSF
(JEMx) (C.D. Cal.).

The Court grants final approval to the settlement and finds that
it is fair, reasonable, and adequate, and in the best interests
of the settlement Class Members as a whole. The Court directs
that the settlement be effected in accordance with the Amended
Class Action Settlement Agreement and Joint Stipulation and the
following terms and conditions.

It is ordered that a Class Representative Enhancement of $15,000
for the Class Representative, Plaintiff Antonio Diaz, is fair and
reasonable, and is to be paid from the common fund.

It is ordered further that the attorneys fee request of $470,186,
$32,713.73 as costs of litigation, and $20,000 as costs for the
Claims Administrator fees are fair and reasonable, and are to be
paid from the common fund.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 2, 2018 Order and
Judgment is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9v6lt2y from
Leagle.com.

Antonio Diaz, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Gregg Lander --
lander@kbarnes.com -- Law Offices of Kevin T. Barnes & Kevin T.
Barnes -- barnes@kbarnes.com -- Kevin T. Barnes Law Offices.

Albertson's LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, Defendant,
represented by Jonathan P. Slowik -- jpslowik@akingump.com --
Akin Gump Strauss Hauer and Feld LLP & Gary M. McLaughlin --
gmclaughlin@akingump.com -- Akin Gump Strauss Hauer and Feld LLP.


ALPHA HOME: Fails to Pay OT to Home Health Aides, "McCann" Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CHANTELLE MCCANN, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. ALPHA HOME HEALTH AGENCY, LLC, Case No. 1:18-cv-
00894-DAP (N.D. Ohio, April 19, 2018), arises from the
Defendant's alleged practices and policies of not paying its non-
exempt home health aides, including the Plaintiff, overtime
compensation at the rate of one and one-half times their regular
rates of pay for the hours they worked over 40 each workweek, in
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Ohio Minimum
Fair Wage Standards Act.

Alpha Home is a limited liability company, organized and existing
under the laws of the state of Ohio.  The Company is in the home
health care business.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lori M. Griffin, Esq.
          Anthony J. Lazzaro, Esq.
          Chastity L. Christy, Esq.
          THE LAZZARO LAW FIRM, LLC
          920 Rockefeller Building
          614 W. Superior Avenue
          Cleveland, OH 44113
          Telephone: (216) 696-5000
          Facsimile: (216) 696-7005
          E-mail: lori@lazzarolawfirm.com
                  anthony@lazzarolawfirm.com
                  chastity@lazzarolawfirm.com


AMARA HOME: Accused by "Purse" of Not Paying Overtime Under FLSA
----------------------------------------------------------------
LA'SHAUNA PURSE, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. AMARA HOME CARE SERVICES, INC., MARGARET O. OGBUJI
and LINUS OGBUJI, Case No. 1:18-cv-00898-CAB (N.D. Ohio, April
19, 2018), arises from the Defendants' alleged practices and
policies of not paying their non-exempt home health aides,
including the Plaintiff, overtime compensation at the rate of one
and one-half times their regular rates of pay for the hours they
worked over 40 each workweek, in violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act.

Amara Home Care Services, Inc., was a corporation, organized and
existing under the laws of the state of Ohio and maintained its
principal place of business in Cuyahoga County, Ohio.  Margaret
O. Ogbuji was Amara's President and Treasurer and has
approximately a 60% ownership share in Amara.  Linus Ogbuji was
Amara's Vice President and Secretary, and has approximately a 40%
ownership share in Amara.

The Defendants are in the home health care business.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lori M. Griffin, Esq.
          Anthony J. Lazzaro, Esq.
          Chastity L. Christy, Esq.
          THE LAZZARO LAW FIRM, LLC
          920 Rockefeller Building
          614 W. Superior Avenue
          Cleveland, OH 44113
          Telephone: (216) 696-5000
          Facsimile: (216) 696-7005
          E-mail: anthony@lazzarolawfirm.com
                  chastity@lazzarolawfirm.com
                  lori@lazzarolawfirm.com


ARIZONA: Arpaio Held Liable for Racially Discriminatory Policing
----------------------------------------------------------------
Claire Caulfield, writing for KJZZ91.5, reports that in a
decision released on May 7, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
found Maricopa County can be held liable for the "racially
discriminatory policing policies" of former sheriff Joe Arpaio.

Mr. Arpaio has been named in a number of lawsuits and class
action settlements through the years.  The United States
Government sued Mr. Arpaio for civil rights violations and the
courts found that "under Arpaio's leadership, the Maricopa County
Sheriff's Officer routinely targeted Latino drivers and
passengers for pretextual traffic stops aimed at detecting
violations of federal immigration law."

Melendres v. Arpaio, a high-profile class action lawsuit brought
by Latino drivers and passengers, found that Mr. Arpaio's
policies violated their Fourth and 14th Amendment rights.

Maricopa County was named as defendant in those cases, but the
county and current Sheriff Paul Penzone argued any discriminatory
policies were just those of Mr. Arpaio's office, not the county.

However, the court found that, under Arizona's constitution,
"with respect to law enforcement matters, sheriffs in Arizona act
as final policymakers for their respective counties."

Litigation and settlements resulting from Mr. Arpaio's 24 years
as Maricopa County sheriff have cost Arizona taxpayers about $140
million. [GN]


ARKEMA INC: Court Certifies 2 Subclasses in "Carter" ERISA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Kentucky, Louisville Division, granted Plaintiffs' Motion for
Class Certification in the case captioned ROGER D. CARTER, EDDIE
DEAN HEWITT, DAVID WAYNE WARREN, RICKY LYNN WOODS, and a class
others similarly situated Plaintiffs, v. ARKEMA, INC., and ARKEMA
INC. RETIREMENT BENEFITS PLAN, Defendants, Civil Action No. 3:13-
CV-1241-JHM (W.D. Ky.).

The plaintiffs were employed at the company's Carrollton,
Kentucky, facility, which was sold to Arkema's corporate
predecessor, Atochem North America.  The Plaintiffs filed suit
against the Defendants asserting that amendments to the Arkema
Plan violate the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA) because they unlawfully deprived the plaintiffs of
certain rights they had accrued as M & T Chemicals employees. The
amended complaint contains four counts, only two of which are
relevant to the present motion for class certification.

The plaintiffs moved for class certification on both Counts I and
II, asking the Court to certify the following two subclasses:

   (1) All participants in the Arkema, Inc. Retirement Benefits
Plan, at any time from January 1, 1988 to the present, who were
employed by Arkema, Inc. or its predecessors at Arkema's
Carrollton, Kentucky plant, and whose initial service dates were
adjusted to the first day of the month next following their
attainment of 25 years of age.

   (2) All participants in the Arkema, Inc. Retirement Benefits
Plan, at any time from January 1, 1988 to the present, who were
employed by Arkema, Inc. or its predecessors at Arkema's
Carrollton, Kentucky plant, and who are eligible (or may become
eligible) for the Rule of 85 due to termination of employment
after reaching the age of 55 and 30 years of service.

ADJUSTED SERVICE DATE SUBCLASS

Rule 23(a) Requirements

Numerosity

The Court finds that 75 potential subclass members is sufficient
to meet Rule 23(a)(1)'s numerosity requirement; while there
appear to be few issues with identifying which employees qualify
as subclass members, the number of potential subclass members
makes joinder impracticable, as it would impede the Court's
ability to efficiently manage the case.

Commonality

The Court finds that this injury meets the commonality
requirement. The potential subclass members were systematically
denied a particular benefit: years of service that were attained
before their 25th birthdays. Further, this denial uniformly
resulted in the same injury: reduced retirement benefits.
Thus, the Court finds that the commonality requirement has been
met.

Typicality

The Court finds the typicality requirement to be met. The claims
of the plaintiffs are the same as those that will be asserted on
behalf of the subclass; all claims arise from the defendants'
amendment of the benefits plan, and each seeks to recover
benefits that were denied based upon the defendants' failure to
credit each retiree with the correct years of service. Thus, the
claims of the representatives are typical of those that belonging
to subclass members.

Adequacy of Representation
The plaintiffs have shown that they will vigorously prosecute the
case on behalf of the subclass throughout this litigation. From
its inception, the plaintiffs' action has sought class-wide
relief, and counsel for the plaintiffs has already prevailed on
their motion for summary judgment as to liability on Count I
pertaining to this subclass.

Thus, the Court finds that both the named plaintiffs and counsel
will adequately represent the subclass.

RULE OF 85 SUBCLASS

Rule 23(a) Requirements

Numerosity

The defendants argue that the numerosity requirement has not been
met in this case since the Rule of 85 subclass actually only
contains 38 individuals, as opposed to the plaintiffs' original
assertion that it contained 75.

In their reply, the plaintiffs do not contest that this subclass
only contains 38 individuals, but it argues that this number is
still sufficient to meet the numerosity requirement. While 38
members is not so large as to create a presumption that joinder
would be impracticable, it is still large enough for the Court to
conclude that the numerosity requirement has been met. As the
plaintiffs point out, there is a relaxed numerosity approach for
subclasses.

Commonality

The Court finds that the commonality requirement has also been
met. Each potential subclass member suffered the same injury when
they were denied early retirement benefits, even though they had
met the requirements of the Rule of 85 that were outlined in the
pre-amendment plans

Typicality

The Court also concludes that the typicality requirement has been
met. The defendants do not argue that there is any difference
between the claims of the named representatives and those of the
potential class members, and the Court finds that the claims of
the two named plaintiffs who are being permitted to act as class
representatives on this claim are typical of those of the
subclass.

Adequacy of Representation.

The defendants argue that the class representatives have
different interests from those subclass members who receive
annuity payments. Because the lump sum plaintiffs will only seek
a one-time payment to supplement their already-received
retirement benefits, this puts them in conflict with the subclass
members who have elected to receive an annuity and have an
interest in ensuring that the benefit plan remains funded into
the future so that they may continue to receive yearly payments
under the reformed plan.

However, the defendants simply mention this as a potential
conflict without offering any substantive evidence that there are
legitimate concerns among either subclass members or the
defendants regarding the funding of annuity payments into the
future. A conflict must not be speculative if the Court is to
rely on it in denying class certification, and the alleged
conflict in this case rises only to the level of speculation.

Thus, the Court will not refuse to certify the subclass on this
ground.

RULE 23 COMPLIANCE

In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B), the Court defines
the two certified subclasses as follows:

     Subclass 1: All participants in the Arkema, Inc. Retirement
Benefits Plan, at any time from January 1, 1988 to the present,
who were employed by Arkema, Inc. or its predecessors at Arkema's
Carrollton, Kentucky plant, and whose initial service dates were
adjusted to the first day of the month next following their
attainment of 25 years of age.

     Subclass 2: All participants in the Arkema, Inc. Retirement
Benefits Plan, at any time from January 1, 1988 to the present,
who were employed by Arkema, Inc. or its predecessors at Arkema's
Carrollton, Kentucky plant, and who are eligible (or may become
eligible) for the Rule of 85 due to termination of employment
after reaching the age of 55 and 30 years of service.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 2, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybx52bjj
from Leagle.com.

Roger D. Carter, and a class of others similarly situated, Eddie
Dean Hewitt, and a class of others similarly situated, David
Wayne Warren, and a class of others similarly situated & Ricky
Lynn Woods, and a class of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by Alison M. Messex, Priddy Cutler Naake & Meade,
PLLC & David L. Leightty, Priddy Cutler Naake & Meade, PLLC.

Arkema, Inc & Arkema Inc. Retirement Benefits Plan, Defendants,
represented by Bart L. Greenwald -- bgreenwald@dgelaw.com --
Duncan Galloway Egan Greenwald, PLLC, Matthew V. DelDuca --
delducam@pepperlaw.com -- Pepper Hamilton LLP & William Gibson,
Pepper Hamilton LLC.


ARKEMA INC: Appeals Cert. Order in "Carter" Suit to Sixth Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Arkema Inc. Retirement Benefits Plan and Arkema, Inc.,
filed an appeal from the District Court's Memorandum Opinion and
Order entered on April 3, 2018, in the lawsuit titled ROGER D.
CARTER, EDDIE DEAN HEWITT, DAVID WAYNE WARREN, RICKY LYNN WOODS,
and a class others similarly situated v. ARKEMA, INC., and ARKEMA
INC. RETIREMENT BENEFITS PLAN, Case No. 3:13-cv-01241-JHM-CHL
(W.D. Ky.).

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on April 10, 2018, the
Hon. Judge Joseph H. McKinley entered an order granting
certification of two subclasses:

     "[1] all participants in the Arkema, Inc. Retirement
     Benefits Plan, at any time from January 1, 1988 to the
     present, who were employed by Arkema, Inc. or its
     predecessors at Arkema's Carrollton, Kentucky plant, and
     whose initial service dates were "adjusted" to the first day
     of the month next following their attainment of 25 years of
     age"; and

     "[2] all participants in the Arkema, Inc. Retirement
     Benefits Plan, at any time from January 1, 1988 to the
     present, who were employed by Arkema, Inc. or its
     predecessors at Arkema's Carrollton, Kentucky plant, and who
     are eligible (or may become eligible) for the Rule of 85 due
     to termination of employment after reaching the age of 55
     and 30 years of service".

The appellate case is captioned as In re: Arkema, Inc., et al.,
Case No. 18-502, in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit.

The Defendant-Petitioners want the Appellate Court to determine
whether the District Court abused its discretion by including
"all participants in the Plan" "at any time" as of January 1,
1988 in the definition of the Adjusted Service Date subclass and
the Rule of 85 subclass without performing a rigorous analysis to
support its conclusion.

The Defendant-Petitioners argue that the definition of the
subclasses certified by the District Court are overbroad and
include as class members participants in a different pension plan
than the Named Plaintiffs.

Accordingly, the Defendant-Petitioners ask the Appellate Court to
either (a) issue an order vacating the District Court's April 3,
2018 Order and remanding the matter back to the District Court
for a proper analysis of whether salaried employees are properly
a part of the definition of the subclasses or, in the
alternative, (b) establish a briefing schedule to allow the
parties to more thoroughly brief the issues addressed in this
petition for appeal.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Respondents ROGER D. CARTER, and a class of others
similarly situated; EDDIE DEAN HEWITT, and a class of others
similarly situated; DAVID WAYNE WARREN, and a class of others
similarly situated; and RICKY LYNN WOODS are represented by:

          David L. Leightty, Esq.
          Alison M. Messex, Esq.
          PRIDDY, CUTLER, NAAKE & MEADE, PLLC
          2303 River Road, Suite 300
          Louisville, KY 40206
          Telephone: (502) 632-5292
          E-mail: dleightty@earthlink.net
                  amessex@pcnmlaw.com

Defendants-Petitioners ARKEMA, INC., and ARKEMA INC. RETIREMENT
BENEFITS PLAN are represented by:

          Bart L. Greenwald, Esq.
          DUNCAN GALLOWAY EGAN GREENWALD PLLC
          9750 Ormsby Station Road, Suite 210
          Louisville, KY 40202
          Telephone: (502) 614-6974
          E-mail: bgreenwald@dgeglaw.com

               - and -

          Matthew V. DelDuca, Esq.
          PEPPER HAMILTON LLP
          301 Carnegie Center, Suite 400
          Princeton, NJ 08543-5276
          Telephone: (609) 452-0808
          Facsimile: (609) 452-1147
          E-mail: delducam@pepperlaw.com


AVEO PHARMA: Class Action Management Hearing Scheduled for August
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Weekly reports that Aveo is taking the post Four Corners
class action fight to its protagonist Levitt Robinson and its
New York litigation funder Galactic Litigation Partners LLC.

Aveo is asking the courts to require them to stump up $1.8
million on top of the $180,000 they have already had to deposit
to show they have the cash to pay Aveo's costs if they lose.

Aveo has also briefed Arnold Bloch Lieber lawyer Leon Zwier. The
Australian describes him as "the man . . . who is loved by his
clients and feared -- even hated at times -- by his opponents.  .
. . His fans laud his brilliant legal mind and his trademark
aggressive advocacy".

The case has been running in the courts since last August and
will be back again for a management hearing this August.  It is
expected to run to 2019. [GN]


BANCO SANTANDER: Manipulates Price of Mexican Gov't Bonds
---------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News, reports that in a
federal antitrust class action, the Boston Retirement System
claims Banco Santander and dozens of co-conspirators, including
JPMorgan Chase and Citigroup, manipulated the price of Mexican
government bonds.

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Scott Martin, Esq.
     Michael Hausfeld, Esq.
     Michael Lehman, Esq.
     HAUSFELD LLP
     33 Whitehall Street, 14th Floor
     New York, NY 10004
     Tel: (646) 357-1100
     Email: smartin@hausfeld.com
     mhausfeld@hausfeldllp.com
     mlehmann@hausfeld.com

        -- and --

     Fred Taylor Isquith, Esq.
     Regina M. Calcaterra, Esq.
     Thomas H. Burt, Esq.
     Betsy S. Manifold, Esq.
     WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER
        FREEMAN & HERZ LLP
     270 Madison Avenue
     New York, NY 10016
     Tel: (212) 545-4600
     Email: isquith@whafh.com
            calcaterra@whafh.com
            burt@whafh.com
            manifold@whafh.com

        -- and --

     Ernesto B. Duhne, Esq.
     Ivan C. Szymanski, Esq.
     SANTAMARINA Y STETA SC
     Edificio Omega
     Mexico City, Ciudad de Mexico
     Mexico 11560
     Tel: +52 55 5279 5441


BAY AREA CREDIT: Faces "Sacknievich" Suit in E.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Bay Area Credit
Service Inc. The case is styled as Deborah Sacknievich,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Bay Area Credit Service Inc. and Pendrick Capital
Partners II, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-02970 (E.D. N.Y.,
May 18, 2018).

Bay Area Credit Service, Inc. operates a debt collection agency.
The Company offers services from early-age collections to post
charge-off collections including bankruptcy, deceased, and legal
processing, as well as provides electronic collection and letter
services. Bay Area Credit Service serves customers in the United
States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
   Sanders Law, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 281-7601
   Email: csanders@sanderslawpllc.com


BITCONNECT: "Kline" Suit Transferred From M.D. to S.D. Florida
--------------------------------------------------------------
The lawsuit styled ANDREW KLINE, DUSTY SHOWERS, LENA HUNA, and
CHARLES MABRA, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated v. BITCONNECT, BITCONNECT LTD, BITCONNECT INTERNATIONAL
PLC, BITCONNECT TRADING LTD, GLENN ARCARO, RYAN MAASEN, JOSHUA
JEPPESEN, AND JOHN DOES 1-20, Case No. 8:18-cv-00319, was
transferred on April 18, 2018, from the U.S. District Court for
the Middle District of Florida to the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Florida (West Palm Beach).

The Southern District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 9:18-cv-
80512-DMM to the proceeding.

The Plaintiffs bring the action against the Defendants relating
to a putative cryptocurrency platform called BitConnect that has
been revealed to have been a fraud.

BitConnect, BitConnect LTD, BitConnect International PLC and
BitConnect Trading LTD (collectively "BitConnect") are all parts
of the same foreign scam that conducts its business on the
Internet, principally by means of a Web site accessible at
http://www.bitconnect.co/,according to the complaint.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Joshua H. Eggnatz, Esq.
          Michael James Pascucci, Esq.
          EGGNATZ PASCUCCI, P.A.
          5400 S. University Drive, Suite 417
          Davie, FL 33328
          Telephone: (954) 889-3359
          Facsimile: (954) 889-5913
          E-mail: JEggnatz@JusticeEarned.com
                  mpascucci@ELPLawyers.com

               - and -

          Michael J. Klein, Esq.
          STULL, STULL & BRODY
          6 East 45th Street
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 687-7230
          Facsimile: (212) 490-2022
          E-mail: mklein@ssbny.com

Defendant Glenn Arcaro is represented by:

          Carl E. Volz, Esq.
          Desiree Moore, Esq.
          Nicole Claire Mueller, Esq.
          K&L GATES, LLP
          70 W Madison Street, Suite 3100
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 372-1121
          E-mail: Carl.Volz@klgates.com
                  desiree.moore@klgates.com
                  nicole.mueller@klgates.com

               - and -

          Carol Celeiro Lumpkin, Esq.
          K&L GATES LLP
          200 South Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 3900
          Miami, FL 33131-2399
          Telephone: (305) 539-3300
          Facsimile: (305) 358-7095
          E-mail: carol.lumpkin@klgates.com

Defendant Ryan Maasen is represented by:

          Ryan K. Stumphauzer, Esq.
          STUMPHAUZER & SLOMAN, PLLC
          One SE Third Ave., Suite 1820
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 371-9686
          Facsimile: (305) 371-9687
          E-mail: rstumphauzer@sslawyers.com


BOOST MOBILE: Blank Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages Under FLSA
------------------------------------------------------------
LINDSAY BLANK, on behalf of herself and other persons similarly
situated v. BOOST MOBILE, LLC, LAPLACE WIRELESS COMMUNICATION
CORP., SUSU WIRELESS INC., RMR WIRELESS INC., CITY WIRELESS INC.,
R & A WIRELESS INC., MIKE ODEH, and RAED ODEH, Case No. 2:18-cv-
03984-NJB-DEK (E.D. La., April 16, 2018), seeks to recover from
the Defendants alleged unpaid wages, interest, liquidated
damages, and attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

Boost Mobile, LLC, is a nationwide cell phone service provider
that specializes in offering prepaid cell phone plans.  Boot
Mobile also sells cell phones and cell phone accessories.

Laplace Wireless Communication Corp. is a domestic corporation
organized under the laws of Louisiana with its principal place of
business in Laplace, Louisiana.  Susu Wireless Inc. is a domestic
corporation organized under the laws of Louisiana with its
principal place of business in Laplace.

RMR Wireless Inc. is a domestic corporation organized under the
laws of Louisiana with its principal place of business in
Destrehan, Louisiana.  City Wireless Inc. is a domestic
corporation organized under the laws of Louisiana with its
principal place of business in Kenner, Louisiana.  R & A Wireless
is a domestic corporation organized under the laws of Louisiana
with its principal place of business in Gramercy, Louisiana.

Laplace Wireless, Susu Wireless, RMR Wireless, City Wireless, and
R&A Wireless are all "Boost Mobile Premier" authorized dealers,
are all owned and operated by Defendants Mike Odeh and Raed Odeh,
all share common employees and management, and are operated for a
common business purpose.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Roberto Luis Costales, Esq.
          William H. Beaumont, Esq.
          Emily A. Westermeier, Esq.
          BEAUMONT COSTALES LLC
          3801 Canal Street, Suite 207
          New Orleans, LA 70119
          Telephone: (504) 534-5005
          E-mail: rlc@beaumontcostales.com
                  whb@beaumontcostales.com
                  eaw@beaumontcostales.com


CALIFORNIA: Ringgold Wants More Time to File Writ of Certiorari
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Nina Ringgold and Justin Ringgold-Lockhart submitted
to Justice Anthony Kennedy an application to extend the time to
file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the lawsuit styled
Nina Ringgold, et al., Applicants v. Myer Sankary, et al., Case
No. 17A1141, in the Supreme Court of United States.

Petitioners Nina Ringgold in her capacity as named trustee of the
Aubry Family Living Trust, Named Trustee of the Aubry Family
Testamentary Trust, and Named Executor of the Will of Robert
Aubry; and Justin Ringgold-Lockhart in his capacity as within the
class of beneficiaries in the Trust Instrument Article VI A
(5)c), petition for review following the October 24, 2017 Order
of the Acting Administrative Justice of the Second Appellate
District in Myer Sankary, et al. v. Nina Ringgold, et al., Case
No. B279276.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the federal
class action alleges that a section of a bill proposed in a state
Senate bill unconstitutionally prohibits citizens from taking
legal action against judges.

Lead plaintiff Nina Ringgold, filing for herself and on behalf of
her clients, claims that Section 5 of Senate Bill X2 11, which
was filed in February 2012, "purports to grant retroactive
immunity notwithstanding the United States Constitution or
federal law, and in disregard of whether the relief sought by the
aggrieved person is under the United States Constitution or
federal law, and it purports to amend or revise the California
Constitution without the required constitutional procedures."

Ms. Ringgold claims, among other things, there is a
"constitutional conflict and dispute between state and local
agencies and the Commission on Judicial Performance, which
prohibit the plaintiffs and citizens of the State of California
from taking action to preserve their legal and constitutional
rights."

In addition to the Application, the Petitioners also filed these
exhibits:

   1. Exhibit 1 is the judgment of the California Supreme Court
      dated January 24, 2018. (Cal. Sup. Ct. Case No. S245760);

   2. Exhibit 2 is the Petition for Review filed in the
      California Supreme Court on December 1, 2017. (Cal. Sup.
      Ct. Case No. S245760); and

   3. Exhibit 3 is the Appellants' Opening Brief filed in the
      related voting rights case filed in the United States Court
      of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on April 4, 2018. (USCA
      9th Cir. Case No. 17-16269).[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Nina R. Ringgold, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF NINA R. RINGGOLD
          9420 Reseda Blvd. #361
          Northridge, CA 91324
          Telephone: (818) 773-2409
          E-mail: nrringgold@aol.com

Defendant-Respondent Myer Sankary is represented by:

          Andrea Lynn Rice, Esq.
          3420 Ocean Park Blvd., Suite 3030
          Santa Monica, CA 90405
          Telephone: (310) 450-6789
          Facsimile: (310) 806-9304
          E-mail: alriceesq@aol.com


CBV COLLECTIONS: Faces "Gammons" Suit in N.D. Georgia
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against CBV Collections,
Inc. The case is styled as Shamikki Gammons, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CBV
Collections, Inc. and John Does 1 - 25, Defendants, Case No.
1:18-cv-02256-MLB-LTW (N.D. Ga., May 17, 2018).

CBV Collections, Inc. is a collection agency located in Albany,
Georgia, and serves the Central and South Georgia areas.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jonathan Braxton Mason, Esq.
   Mason Law Group, LLC - GA
   1100 Peachtree Street, NE, Suite 200
   Atlanta, GA 30309
   Tel: (404) 920-8040
   Fax: (404) 920-8039
   Email: jmason@atlshowbizlaw.com


CHICAGO BEAR: NFL Dropped as Defendant in "Beckman"
---------------------------------------------------
In the case, RUSSELL BECKMAN, Plaintiff, v. CHICAGO BEAR FOOTBALL
CLUB, INC., and NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, Defendants, Case No. 17
C 4551 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Joan B. Gottschall of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division,
granted in par and denied in part the Defendants' motion to
dismiss the case and strike Beckman's class action allegations.

The case about a fan's efforts to wear the gear of the team he
supports arises under the First Amendment's free speech clause.
Beckman has sued the Bears and the National Football Association.
He represents himself.  On Dec. 18, 2016, the Bears' staff
allegedly denied Beckman entry into a Bears' pre-game experience
at Soldier Field in Chicago because he was wearing Green Bay
Packers (the Bears' opponent that day) clothing.  Beckman seeks
injunctive relief and Court filing and service fees associated
with the lawsuit.

The Defendants move under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.  They also move to strike Beckman's
class action allegations.

Judge Gottschall finds that neither Beckman's complaint nor the
statements of his response to the pending motion establish that
his injury is fairly traceable to the NFL.  The Judge says the
Court does not have the details of the NFL's constitution, by-
laws, policies, or practices before it, however, and making a
decision on redressability turns out to be unnecessary because
even if Beckman's response is seen favorably to him, he still
does not show that his injury can be fairly traced to the NFL.
Beckman stresses that the Bears must follow NFL rules, but he
does not identify any NFL rule, policy, or anything else that
required, or even encouraged, the Bears to adopt the policy he
challenges.  The NFL therefore stands in a position not unlike a
state governor when a state law's constitutionality is
challenged.  The NFL must accordingly be dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.

As to the First Amendment claim, the Judge finds neither argument
persuasive at this procedural stage.  The Bears argue that the
First Amendment claim alleged in Beckman's complaint fails to
state a claim for two reasons.  First, as the Bears argue,
Beckman is challenging their purely private conduct; the
complaint, Operating Agreement, and other exhibits do not cross
the threshold from private to state action.  Alternatively, the
Defendants maintain that the playing field is a nonpublic forum,
and so the policy prohibiting opposing team apparel during the
PWFCE is a reasonable, viewpoint neutral speech restriction.  An
examination of the complaint and Operating Agreement reveals
language that can be reasonably read as giving CPD the right to
approve all PSL programs like the one at issue here.  And the
policy does not appear to be viewpoint neutral because it allows
season ticket holders to wear Bears gear.

Taken together, the complaint and the Operating Agreement rise to
the level of a plausible claim that the CPD and the Bears'
operations are enmeshed enough to find a state action in the
Bears' administration of PSL programs.  Particularly because the
inquiry is fact-intensive and no discovery has occurred, the
Judge emphasizes that it determines only that Beckman has
satisfied federal pleading requirements.

In addition, the Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim of state
action.  That means that the Court must presume that the Bears'
seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the
State (here the CPD)] itself.  So while the Bears acting purely
privately could exclude PSL holders wearing the other team's gear
from the PWFCE, the complaint states a claim that the CPD cannot,
via the Bears, do the same thing any more than it could keep
anyone wearing green (or not wearing green) out of Solder Field
on St. Patrick's Day.

Finally, Beckman concedes in his response that a pro se litigant
can't represent a class because a class needs competent counsel
to get anywhere, and so the Judge deems the class allegations
withdrawn.  She will provide Beckman with an opportunity to amend
his complaint.  Any amended complaint should not include class
allegations.

For the she reasons stated, Judge Gottschall granted in part and
denied in part the Defendants' motion to dismiss and strike.  The
complaint against the NFL is dismissed without prejudice for lack
of standing, and Beckman's class action allegations are
withdrawn.  Beckman may file an amended complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 30, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://goo.gl/vWvcKA from Leagle.com.

Russell Beckman, and any other similarly situated individual,
Plaintiff, Pro Se.

Chicago Bear Football Club Inc, a Delaware Corporation & National
Football League, an unincorporated association, Defendants,
represented by John N. Scholnick -- john.scholnick@dlapiper.com -
- DLA Piper LLP & Michael K. Molzberger --
mmolzberger@schiffhardin.com -- Schiff Hardin.


CHILDREN'S PLACE: "Rael" Stayed Pending Resolution in Hyundai
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California granted Parties' Joint Request for Temporary Stay of
the case captioned MONICA RAEL and ALYSSA HEDRICK, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. THE
CHILDREN'S PLACE, INC., a DELAWARE corporation, and DOES 1-50,
inclusive, Defendant, Case No. 3:16-cv-00370-GPC-JMA (S.D. Cal.),
Pending Resolution of the Petition for Rehearing En Banc in In re
Hyundai & Kia Fuel Economy Litigation, 881 F.3d 679 (9th Cir.
2018).

In Hyundai, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court
committed legal error by failing to determine whether California
law could apply to all plaintiffs in the nationwide class, or
whether the court had to apply the law of each state, and if so,
whether variations in state law defeated predominance before
certifying a nationwide class.

Here, the Court finds that there is little risk of harm to the
putative class or the Parties if the stay is granted now as the
Parties jointly assert that class relief will not change based on
the timing for approval in this settlement. The parties are at
serious risk of a hardship if the Motion for Preliminary Approval
motion is approved at this stage as the Defendant could bear the
substantial costs of a nationwide class, while not being certain
what standard applies when the Court hears the Plaintiffs' motion
for final approval. Most importantly, the stay promotes judicial
economy as it would provide the Court with clarity on the
standards applicable in this nationwide settlement.

Accordingly, the Court stays the case pending the Ninth Circuit's
decision on the petitions for rehearing en banc in Hyundai.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 2, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y7fq7fk9 from Leagle.com.

Monica Rael, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Brittany Courtney Casola --
bcasola@carlsonlynch.com -- Carlson Lynch Sweet Kilpela &
Carpenter LLP & Todd D. Carpenter -- tcarpenter@carlsonlynch.com
-- Carlson Lynch Sweet Kilpela & Carpenter, LLP.

Alyssa Hedrick, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Todd D. Carpenter, Carlson
Lynch Sweet Kilpela & Carpenter, LLP.

The Children's Place, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendant,
represented by Michelle C. Doolin -- doolinmc@cooley.com --
Cooley LLP & Darcie Tilly -- dtilly@cooley.com -- Cooley Godward
Kronish.


CLARITY SERVICES: Ninth Circuit Appeal Filed in "Benton" Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Joyce Benton filed an appeal from a court ruling in the
lawsuit titled Joyce Benton v. Clarity Services, Inc., Case No.
3:16-cv-06583-MMC, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, San Francisco.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant to have violated the Fair
Credit Reporting Act by disclosing the consumer reports to
persons or entities that did not have a permissible purpose to
obtain such consumer reports, and which the Defendant did not
have reason to believe had a permissible purpose to obtain such
consumer reports.

The appellate case is captioned as Joyce Benton v. Clarity
Services, Inc., Case No. 18-15670, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by May 18, 2018;

   -- Transcript is due on June 18, 2018;

   -- Appellant Joyce Benton's opening brief is due on July 27,
      2018;

   -- Appellee Clarity Services, Inc.'s answering brief is due on
      August 27, 2018; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant JOYCE BENTON, individually and on behalf of
all persons similarly situated, is represented by:

          Christian Schreiber, Esq.
          OLIVIER SCHREIBER & CHAO LLP
          201 Filbert Street, Suite 201
          San Francisco, CA 94133
          Telephone: (415) 484-0980
          E-mail: christian@osclegal.com

               - and -

          Mark A. Chavez, Esq.
          CHAVEZ & GERTLER LLP
          42 Miller Avenue
          Mill Valley, CA 94941
          Telephone: (415) 381-5599
          E-mail: mark@chavezgertler.com

               - and -

          James McIntyre Pietz, Esq.
          PIETZ LAW OFFICE
          429 Forbes Avenue
          Allegheny Building
          Pittsburgh, PA 15219
          Telephone: (412) 288-4333
          E-mail: jpietz@fdpklaw.com

Defendant-Appellee CLARITY SERVICES, INC., is represented by:

          Ronald I. Raether, Esq.
          TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP
          5 Park Plaza, Suite 1400
          Irvine, CA 92614-2545
          Telephone: (949) 622-2722
          Facsimile: (949) 622-2739
          E-mail: Ronald.Raether@troutmansanders.com


COMMERCEHUB: Shareholder Class Action Over Merger Withdrawn
-----------------------------------------------------------
Chelsea Diana, writing for Albany Business Review, reports that a
shareholder class action lawsuit against CommerceHub was
withdrawn after the public company filed new documents related to
its $1.1 billion acquisition.

Shareholder Brian Gordon filed a lawsuit against CommerceHub and
its board of directors in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of New York.  The lawsuit alleged CommerceHub
failed to disclose information that is necessary for shareholders
to "assess the fairness of the proposed merger," including
incomplete information about financial projections for the
company, the sale process leading up to the merger and other
matters.

CommerceHub (Nasdaq: CHUBA), headquartered in Albany, is being
acquired by the private equity firms GTCR and Sycamore Partners
in an all-cash deal estimated to be around $1.1 billion.

The plaintiff, Mr. Gordon, was looking to delay the shareholder
vote, scheduled for May 18, until more information is provided,
or recover damages if the vote is approved.  He is represented by
Faruqi & Faruqi LLP of Manhattan.

In response, CommerceHub has filed new information about the
acquisition in its proxy.  Mr. Gordon has agreed to withdraw the
lawsuit with prejudice, which means he is not allowed to bring
the same lawsuit against CommerceHub at a later date.

In the new document filed on May 7, CommerceHub said that the
company "believes that the lawsuit is without merit and that no
further disclosure is required."  However, "to eliminate the
burden, expense and uncertainties resulting from the pending
litigation and without admitting any wrongdoing," CommerceHub
filed new documents related to the acquisition.

CommerceHub uses a cloud-based platform that allows retailers to
list their products online and ship them to customers directly
from manufacturers.  CommerceHub's 11,600 customers, including
Walmart, L.L. Bean and QVC, use the platform to support drop-
shipping, which connects retailers to a network of suppliers for
faster, cheaper shipping.

CommerceHub had $111.1 million in revenue in 2017, an 11 percent
increase from $100.6 million in 2016.  Net income was $9.9
million in 2017.

CEO Frank Poore founded the company in 1997 with Richard Jones,
chief technology officer, while they were at University at
Albany.  The company has been bought and sold several times, and
went public in 2016 after spinning-off from Liberty Media.  Since
then, its share price has ranged from a low of $12.72 to a high
price of $24.53.

Companywide, CommerceHub has more than 300 employees in Albany,
Seattle and Hertford, England. [GN]


CORONA REGIONAL: Fisher Phillips Attorneys Discuss Ruling
---------------------------------------------------------
Brandy Cody, Esq. -- bcody@fisherphillips.com -- and Richard
Meneghello, Esq. -- rmeneghello@fisherphillips.com -- of Fisher
Phillips, in an article for JDSupra, wrote that the 9th Circuit
Court of Appeals has lowered the bar when it comes to the type of
evidence plaintiffs need to present in order to have their claims
certified as a class action.  The federal appeals court panel
ruled that courts are permitted to certify class actions based on
evidence that is not even admissible at trial.  The May 3 ruling
will make it easier for class claimants to advance their claims
against employers, and should spur employers and their defense
counsel to adjust their litigation strategy accordingly.

Here are three things you need to know about the Sali v. Corona
Regional Medical Center decision.

1. The Evidence Supporting The Class Action Was Not Your Typical
Evidence.

Marilyn Sali and Deborah Spriggs used to work as Registered
Nurses (RNs) for Corona Regional Medical Center. They allege
their former employer did not comply with California wage and
hour law and filed a lawsuit seeking to recover unpaid wages on
behalf of themselves and an entire class worth of other current
and former employees.

When someone files such a lawsuit, the court does not
automatically grant them the right to proceed as a class action.
Instead, the plaintiffs must present evidence sufficient to
convince the court to certify the class.  In federal class
actions, the court requires them to prove at least four elements,
including "typicality" -- that the injuries allegedly inflicted
by the employer are similar to the injuries of the putative class
members.

In Sali's and Spriggs's case, their attorneys filed a sworn
declaration from one of their own paralegals as evidence to
support the typicality element.  The paralegal said he reviewed
time and payroll records to determine whether they were fully
compensated under Corona's pay practices, including conducting a
spot check of random timesheets, to conclude that each plaintiff
was regularly undercompensated. He put his findings into an Excel
spreadsheet and submitted these findings as evidence to support
their claims.

Not surprisingly, the lower court rejected this evidence and
denied class certification because the paralegal's declaration
contained no evidence based on personal knowledge of the facts,
offered improper opinion testimony, and was more akin to expert
witness testimony.  The lower court judge also noted that the
plaintiffs' submissions contained no sworn testimony from Sali or
Spriggs. But in somewhat of a surprising decision, the 9th
Circuit reversed the lower court's ruling and breathed new life
into the class action proceeding.

2. New Standard: Inadmissibility Alone Shouldn't Block Class
Certification Proceedings.

The 9th Circuit panel rejected the reasoning of the lower court
and said that Sali and Spriggs should be able to proceed with
their class certification process because the paralegal's
"evidence" should not have been ignored.  The appeals court said
that it does not believe a "mini-trial" should take place at the
class certification stage, and therefore lower courts should not
apply "the formal strictures of trial to such an early stage of
litigation."

After all, the appeals court said, the evidence a plaintiff might
need to prove a class's case often lies in the possession of the
employer, and the only way for a plaintiff to get their hands on
it is through the discovery process -- which can only take place
properly after class certification.  "Limiting class-
certification-stage proof to admissible evidence," the appeals
court said, "risks terminating actions before a putative class
may gather crucial admissible evidence."

The appeals court set a new standard for lower courts throughout
its jurisdiction: inadmissibility alone is not a proper basis to
reject evidence submitted in support of class certification.
Instead, lower courts can consider any material sufficient to
form a reasonable judgment about the certification elements,
regardless of its admissibility at trial.

3. Employers Can Find A Few Silver Linings In The Decision.
This is a difficult decision for employers to swallow, not only
because it will make it easier for plaintiffs to survive class
certification proceedings, but also because it might make it more
likely that such lawsuits will be filed in the first place.
However, there are four silver linings available to somewhat ease
the pain:

   * The appeals court acknowledged that the process for
certifying a class still requires the trial court to "conduct a
rigorous analysis" to determine certification status.  Plaintiffs
should not be able to stroll into court without having done some
sufficient level of work and receive the OK from a trial court to
proceed with a class action.

   * The appeals court also said that lower courts need to set
some standards when examining evidence submitted by plaintiffs.
Although they should not dismiss evidence out of hand solely
because of admissibility, they can consider "whether the
plaintiff's proof is, or will likely lead to, admissible
evidence." In fact, if expert testimony is submitted as evidence,
lower courts should still follow the familiar Daubert standards
established by the Supreme Court.

   * The appeals court reminded litigants that any certification
ruling is preliminary in nature, meaning employers always have
another bite at the apple to seek denial of class status should
the plaintiff's evidence not pan out. The court cited to the
language of the civil procedure rules, which specifically state
that class certification orders "may be altered or amended before
final judgment," and pointed out that any such orders are
"inherently tentative" and "limited."

   * Finally, not all employers will find themselves stuck under
this new standard. The May 3 ruling only applies to employers in
the 9th Circuit's jurisdiction (California, Washington, Nevada,
Arizona, Oregon, Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, and Montana), joining the
8th Circuit (covering Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota) as having previously
ruled in such an expansive manner. Meanwhile, the appeals court
specifically noted that the 5th Circuit disagrees with this
position, meaning employers in Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi
have no such worries. Moreover, appeals courts for the 7th
Circuit (which oversees federal courts in Illinois, Indiana, and
Wisconsin) and 3rd Circuit (New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and
Delaware) have suggested that a higher admissibility standard
should be applied.  If there's any good news about this patchwork
of conflicting legal standards, it's that the May 3 decision
might make it more likely that the Supreme Court will step in and
resolve the matter -- perhaps overruling the 9th Circuit.

Unless and until that happens, however, employers need to be
prepared to defend against class certification proceedings
knowing that this new standard makes it easier for employees to
get their foot in the door. [GN]


DANIEL LEPKE: Appeal from Denial of "Connelly" Class Cert Allowed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TIMOTHY CONNELLY, et al. Individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Petitioners, v.
DANIEL LEPKE TRUCKING ET AL, Defendant-Respondent, Case No. 15-
cv-308 (7th Cir.), Judge James D. Peterson of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit granted the Plaintiffs' petition
for leave to appeal the March 30, 2018, decision and order of the
Western District of Wisconsin, denying their motion for Rule 23
class certification.

The Plaintiffs allege violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA").  Specifically, that the Defendants failed to count some
of their work hours as time worked, and failed to pay them
overtime pay whenever they worked more than 40 hours that were
counted as time worked. The Plaintiffs also argued that the same
practices of the Defendants also violated, and therefore entitled
them to additional remedies under Wisconsin law including
straight time pay, statutory overtime pay, and contractual
overtime pay.

The Plaintiffs requested that the District Court certify three
separate classes: (1) Class of the Defendants' drivers who did
not receive separate hourly pay for all hours worked before their
trucks were loaded for the first time, and after their trucks
were unloaded for the final time (Straight time class); (2) Class
of the Defendants' employees who during a workweek worked more
than 40 hours and did not work across state lines during the four
months preceding said workweek (Statutory overtime pay class);
and (3) Class of the Defendants' drivers who during a work week
worked more than 40 hours regardless of whether they worked
across state lines during the four months preceding said workweek
(Contractual overtime pay class).

The Defendants concede that there are 47 members to the proposed
classes; while the District Court similarly assumed that the
class started at 47 members.  In opposition to the Plaintiffs'
motion for class certification, the Defendants filed with the
Court identical statements signed by 30 of their employees, who
are included in the class of 47 proposed by the Plaintiffs.  They
submitted a single declaration in opposition to the Plaintiffs'
motion for class certification, which was from their owner Ruth
Lepke.  The Lepke Declaration did not provide any explanation as
to the circumstances under which the employee statements of their
intent to opt-out were obtained.

The Court granted the Plaintiffs' motion for conditional
certification after a stipulation by the parties, while no timely
motion for decertification of the FLSA class was filed by the
Defendants.

Judge Peterson finds that the District Court erred by excluding
from the class persons who were subject to the Defendants'
uniform policies, based upon its belief as to their likelihood of
opting out of the class.  He says the Court should grant
interlocutory appeal to clarify the issue of how the "class" for
Rule 23(a) purposes should be defined.  In addition, the Court
should grant the petition for interlocutory appeal, and clarify
the question of whether a district court may deny class
certification by predicting whether class members would opt out
of the lawsuit, and then excluding from the class certification
process otherwise appropriate class members whom it predicts
would opt-out of the class certification process.

Finally, the Judge says the Court should clarify the class
certification law by making clear that expression of interest to
opt-out of the lawsuit should be based upon those interests
expressed in a neutral, court supervised opt-out procedure,
rather than through a potentially coercive procedure orchestrated
by the employer.

For the stated reasons, Judge Peterson holds that the Court of
Appeals should grant the petition for interlocutory appeal, and
finds that the District Court erred by permitting 30 class
members to opt out of the class certification process (as opposed
to opt out of a certified class), based upon documents that may
have been signed under coercive circumstances.  Indeed, the
Appellate Court has identified the one way intervention problem
that would be created if following the denial of class
certification the Plaintiff prevails on the merits, and the class
certification denial is then reversed on appeal.  Granting the
petition for interlocutory appeal is the only way to provide
class members with an opportunity to opt out of the lawsuit
before the District Court has reached a decision on the merits of
the lawsuit.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 30, 2018 Order is available
at https://goo.gl/MPNqsP from Leagle.com.

Yingtao Ho (SBN 1045418), THE PREVIANT LAW FIRM, S.C., 310 W
Wisconsin Ave, #100MW, Milwaukee, WI 53203, Telephone: (414)271-
4500, Fax: (414)271-6308, Attorneys for Plaintiffs.

Yingtao Ho, Previant, Goldberg, Uelmen, Gratz, Miller &
Brueggeman, S.C., 1555 N. RiverCenter Drive, S. 202, P. O. Box
12993, Milwaukee, Wi 53212, for Plaintiff Timothy Connelly.

Yingtao Ho, for Plaintiff David Winchell.

Richard A. Westley, Westley Law Offices, S.C., 7633 Ganser Way,
Suite 100, Madison, WI 53719, for Defendant Dan Lepke Trucking
LLC.

Richard A. Westley, for Defendant Lepke Trucking & Excavating
LLC.


DANIEL LEPKE: Court Denies Certification of 3 "Connelly" Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TIMOTHY CONNELLY, DAVID WINCHELL, RAYMOND SCHLICHT,
and RODNEY SCHLICHT, Plaintiffs, v. DAN LEPKE TRUCKING LLC and
LEPKE TRUCKING & EXCAVATING LLC, Defendants, Case No. 15-cv-308-
jdp (W.D. Wis.), Judge James D. Peterson of the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Wisconsin denied the
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification of the state law
claims.

Plaintiffs Connelly, Winchell, Schlicht, and Schlicht were truck
drivers for Defendants Dan Lepke Trucking and Lepke Trucking &
Excavating.  They contend that the Defendants failed to pay them
in accordance with the Fair Labor Standards Act and state law.
The Court granted the parties' joint motion to conditionally
certify the Plaintiffs' FLSA claims as to drivers who worked for
the Defendants on or after May 21, 2012.

Now before the Court is the Plaintiffs' motion under Rule 23 to
certify these three classes as to the state law claims:

     (1) drivers who did not receive separate hourly pay for all
hours worked before their trucks were loaded for the first time
and after their trucks were unloaded for the final time;

     (2) employees who worked more than 40 hours in a workweek
and did not work across state lines during the four months
preceding that workweek;

     (3) drivers who worked more than 40 hours in a workweek
regardless whether they worked across state lines during the four
months preceding that workweek.

Judge Peterson concludes that the Plaintiffs have failed to show
that the proposed class is so numerous that joinder is
impracticable.  It follows from this conclusion that they should
have an opportunity to join other interested employees under Rule
20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  The only wrinkle is
that the Plaintiffs recently filed a motion for summary judgment,
even though the deadline for doing so is not until May 7.
Obviously, if the Plaintiffs add more employees to the case, it
could affect the scope of their summary judgment motion.

Accordingly, the Judge will give the Plaintiffs an opportunity to
inform the Court whether they want an opportunity to join more
Plaintiffs.  If they do, the court will set a deadline for filing
an amended complaint and deny their summary judgment motion
without prejudice to their renewing it after they file an amended
complaint.

Accordingly, Judge Peterson denied the Plaintiffs' motion for
class certification.  He gave the Plaintiffs until April 6, 2018,
to inform the Court whether they want an opportunity to join more
Plaintiffs.  Until then, briefing on the Plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment is stayed.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 30, 2018 Opinion and Order
is available at https://goo.gl/hb5Bv2 from Leagle.com.

Timothy Connelly & David Winchell, Plaintiffs, represented by
Yingtao Ho -- yh@previant.com -- Previant, Goldberg, Uelmen,
Gratz, Miller & Brueggeman, S.C.

Dan Lepke Trucking LLC, Lepke Trucking & Excavating LLC & Daniel
Lepke, Defendants, represented by Richard A. Westley, Westley Law
Offices, S.C..


DCN AUTOMOTIVE: Denial of Arbitration in "Haynes" Reversed
----------------------------------------------------------
The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, reversed
the District Court's Order denying Defendant DCN Automotive
Limited Liability Company t/a Brad Benson Hyundai's motion to
dismiss plaintiff's complaint and to compel plaintiff to
arbitrate his claims individually and not as a class action in
the case captioned LARRY L. HAYNES, On Behalf of Himself and
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. DCN
AUTOMOTIVE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, t/a BRAD BENSON HYUNDAI,
Defendant-Appellant, No. A-4593-16T4 (N.J. Super. App. Div.).

The Plaintiff alleged DCN is an auto dealership in Monmouth
Junction that is engaged in the sale of motor vehicles. According
to the complaint, plaintiff saw an advertisement on the Internet,
which indicated that a certain vehicle was for sale at DCN, for a
specific price.  The Plaintiff further alleges the $1,000 he was
paid for the trade-in car was credited towards the $10,000 down
payment. The Plaintiff also signed a retail installment sales
contract (RISC) to finance the balance of the purchase, at an
annual interest rate of 14.89 percent. The Plaintiff claims the
RISC stated that the total sales price, including the down
payment, the amount financed, and the finance charges, was
$40,444.40.

The Plaintiff claims that after he had a chance to read the
documents, he realized he had been charged $5000 for the tire and
wheel protection plan (TWPP), and $2,300 for the service charge
(SC). He alleges he was charged $2246 more for the car than the
advertised and agreed-upon price. He called DCN and spoke with an
employee to complain. He said he wanted to cancel the contracts
for the TWPP and SC.

The Plaintiff thus alleges he sustained ascertainable losses
consisting of: (1) the difference between the advertised price of
the car and the base price of the car, as well as the interest
that had accrued on the difference; (2) the purchase price of the
TWPP and the SC and the associated sales taxes; (3) the interest
that accrued and was paid on the TWPP and SC before those
agreements were cancelled; and (4) the attorney's fees plaintiff
incurred when he retained counsel.

The Plaintiff asserted claims under the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA),
N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to-206. He alleges DCN is subject to the
regulations governing motor vehicle advertising practices (MVAP),
N.J.A.C. 13:45A-26A.1 to-10. He claims DCN's Internet
advertisements are advertisements under the CFA and the MVAP
regulations.

DCN filed a motion in the trial court to dismiss the complaint
and to compel plaintiff to submit his individual claim to
arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause in plaintiff's
purchase agreement.

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the New Jersey Arbitration
Act (NJAA), reflect federal and state policies that favor
arbitration of disputes. Indeed, the FAA pre-empts state laws
that single out and invalidate arbitration agreements. Therefore,
a court cannot subject an arbitration agreement to more
burdensome requirements than' other contractual provisions.

The Superior Court is convinced that the trial court erred by
finding that the arbitration clause at issue is ambiguous and
unenforceable.  The introduction and conclusion to the
arbitration clause state in capital letters that the agreement
limits "YOUR RIGHTS, INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO MAINTAIN A COURT
ACTION." The clause states without qualification that the parties
agree to arbitrate any claim, dispute, or controversy, including
all statutory claims that may arise out of or relating to the
sale or lease identified in this agreement. The arbitration
clause makes clear that the parties agree they are waiving their
right to maintain other available resolution processes, such as a
court action.

The arbitration clause further provides that the parties agree
that they are waiving the right to pursue claims arising under
the agreement as a class action arbitration, or to have an
arbitration under the agreement consolidated with any other
arbitration or proceeding. This section of the arbitration clause
does not state that the parties are waiving the right to pursue a
class action in court; however, there is no need to do so. The
agreement clearly and unequivocally states that by agreeing to
arbitration, the parties waive their rights to maintain an action
in court.

Here, by contrast, the Court have only one arbitration clause,
that has no alleged source of confusion other than the class
action arbitration provision, which we find is clear in the
context of this single, uncomplicated, internally-consistent
arbitration clause. Therefore, the Court conclude the trial court
erred by dismissing with prejudice DNC's motion to enforce. The
court erred by refusing to enforce the arbitration clause and
allowing plaintiff to maintain his class action in court.
Reversed and remanded to the trial court for entry of an order
dismissing plaintiff's complaint without prejudice, and requiring
plaintiff to arbitrate his claim against DCN individually and not
as part of a class action arbitration.

A full-text copy of the Superior Court's April 2, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y7s8wrn6 from Leagle.com.

Rosaria A. Suriano -- rsuriano@bracheichler.com -- argued the
cause for appellant (Brach Eichler LLC, attorneys; Rosaria A.
Suriano, of counsel and on the briefs; David J. Klein --
dklein@bracheichler.com -- on the briefs).

Matthew S. Oorbeek -- moorbeek@wolflawfirm.net -- argued the
cause for respondent (The Wolf Law Firm, LLC, attorneys; Matthew
S. Oorbeek, on the brief).


DELIVERY FINANCIAL: Faces "Dupont" Suit in Arizona
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Delivery Financial
Services LLC. The case is styled as Lawrence Dupont, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Delivery Financial Services LLC, Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-
01498-DLR (D. Ariz., May 17, 2018).

Delivery Financial Services, LLC (DFS) is a nationwide account
receivables management company headquartered in Phoenix,
Arizona.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
   Marcus & Zelman LLC
   701 Cookman Ave., Ste. 300
   Asbury Park, NJ 07712
   Tel: (732) 695-3282
   Fax: (732) 298-6256
   Email: yzelman@marcuszelman.com


DEREK LAM: Faces "Conner" Suit Over Blind-Inaccessible Web Site
---------------------------------------------------------------
MARY CONNER, Individually and as the representative of a class of
similarly situated persons v. DEREK LAM INTERNATIONAL, LLC, Case
No. 1:18-cv-03243 (S.D.N.Y., April 13, 2018), is brought against
Derek Lam for its alleged failure to design, construct, maintain,
and operate its Web site -- http://www.Dereklam.com/-- to be
fully accessible to and independently usable by the Plaintiff and
other blind or visually-impaired persons.

Derek Lam International, LLC, is a Delaware Foreign Limited
Liability Company doing business in New York.  The Defendant owns
and operates Derek Lam Stores.

Derek Lam Stores provide to the public goods and services, such
as swimsuits, clothing, shoes, and accessories, amongst other
products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Dan Shaked, Esq.
          SHAKED LAW GROUP, P.C.
          44 Court Street, Suite 1217
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Telephone: (917) 373-9128
          Facsimile: (718) 504-7555
          E-mail: ShakedLawGroup@Gmail.com


DISH NETWORK: Plans to Appeal Verdict in Telemarketing Case
-----------------------------------------------------------
Sara Randazzo, writing for The Wall Street Journal, reports that
West Virginia attorney John Barrett really wants his clients to
know he won a $61 million verdict against Dish Network Corp. on
their behalf after a company contractor badgered people with
marketing phone calls.

There is just one hitch: His clients keep hanging up when he
calls to convey the good news.

You May Be Eligible For a Cash Award -- No, Really, Wait, Don't
Hang Up

One woman said "that's ridiculous" and hurried off the phone when
told that every unwanted Dish call is now worth $1,200.

There was the voice mailbox that said, "This is not a real phone,
it is a fake phone, and if you know me, call me on my regular
number." Some people thought they were being sued.  Others hung
up before law firm staff could spit out the basics.

Taking a page from the telemarketing playbook, Mr. Barrett and
his colleagues at law firm Bailey & Glasser LLP have called
hundreds of people, many on nights and weekends, to tell them
they could be eligible for a slice of the judgment.

"I do see the irony of a bunch of lawyers calling people who have
been bombarded with telemarketing calls," says Mr. Barrett, who
co-led a trial team with partner Brian Glasser.

Last year the pair won a $20.4 million jury verdict against Dish
in a class action claiming the satellite provider called people
on the national do-not-call list.

The judge later tripled the verdict.

That means 18,066 people who received calls from Dish several
years ago are in line for between $2,400 and $30,000 apiece,
before attorneys' fees and expenses are paid.

Dish plans to appeal the verdict and argues it shouldn't be
responsible for actions of the contractor that made the calls.
Dish said in a court filing it told the contractor to stop
contacting do-not-call-list numbers and any calls made to the
contrary "violated Dish's express instructions."

U.S. mailboxes are littered with postcards alerting consumers to
class-action settlements over false marketing claims or privacy
violations, though many offer at most a few dollars or a coupon.
But there is real money to be had in the Dish case, if it
survives an appeal.

Massachusetts resident Douglas Pierce remembers getting a letter
in the mail about the Dish verdict in November but "I thought it
was something similar to those Publishers Clearing House you get
in the mail all the time: 'You might be a winner!'"

The 64-year-old has had the same landline telephone number since
1984 and reckons he gets between 10 and 20 telemarketing calls
daily.  On the day after Christmas as he cleared out his
answering machine -- "I go through and click delete, delete,
delete" -- he said he heard a message from Mr. Barrett and
remembered that mailer he had thrown away.

He called the law office back, and learned he could get up to
$18,000.

Mr. Barrett personally called the man in line for the most cash,
85-year-old retiree Keith Skriver in Arizona, who received 25
Dish calls now worth $30,000.

When Mr. Skriver heard the voice mail, he said he called a lawyer
friend in Detroit to do some research.

"When anybody tells you something, you're going to win, or
whatever . . . you treat it with care these days," Mr. Skriver
said. "Not like in the old days."

His friend called back after looking up the case and "said go
ahead," Mr. Skriver said.

Dish Network Corp. plans to appeal the verdict in the
telemarketing case.

So he called back the law firm and signed up. If the money
eventually comes, great. But if not, "I don't need to go to Paris
anymore," he said.

Under the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act,
telemarketing calls aren't just annoying, but sometimes illegal.
Companies decry TCPA lawsuits as plaintiffs-lawyer shakedowns; a
lawyer for Dish said at trial, "the plaintiff is trying to seek a
windfall for a phone call."

North Carolina jurors disagreed in a rare trial over the
telemarketing law, finding in January 2017 that Dish should be
liable for its contractor's improper calls.

The judge overseeing the trial chided Dish's characterization of
the calls as a "minor nuisance" and "inconvenience," writing that
the "description has left out 'illegal,' not to mention
'infuriating.'"

At the trial, plaintiff Thomas Krakauer, a 75-year-old retired
science museum director in North Carolina, testified that he
wanted to bring the lawsuit because "if no efforts are taken to
enforce this, wealthy telemarketers are free to continue to make
calls forever."  He is in line for $6,000 from 5 calls he got,
plus an incentive award for being involved in the litigation.

The court issued a final judgment in early April, kicking off
Dish's ability to appeal.

In a typical class action, paper or email notices are all that a
consumer can hope to get as notification they have some money
coming to them.  Calling plaintiffs is extremely uncommon and
often cost-prohibitive, said Cameron Azari, a class-action
notifications expert at legal-services company Epiq.

Mr. Azari said clients have been tempted to send texts in TCPA
cases but they've ultimately decided, "ehh, maybe we don't want
to do the thing the company is being sued for."

Mr. Barrett said they hit the phones when, six weeks after
letters went out, they had less than an 8% response rate.
Response rates in class actions vary, but that was lower than
they expected. He started making calls himself to find out why
people weren't returning forms that came with their letters--and
found out many thought it was too good to be true.

Sue Polston, a Bailey & Glasser paralegal in St. Louis recruited
to make calls to around 150 class members in-between her other
work, said she has never undertaken a phone campaign like this in
her more than 30 years at law firms and in the federal court
system. Patience has been the key.

"I had a gentleman just bound and determined this was a hoax,"
she recalled.  "I said, ask me all your questions, see if you'll
believe me."

It took almost 30 minutes, but by the end, she said he agreed to
turn in the form, concluding: "I guess you're legitimate."


DUOYUAN PRINTING: Piper Jaffray Appeals Ruling in "Perry" Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Piper Jaffray & Co. and Roth Capital Partners, LLC, filed an
appeal from the District Court's memorandum decision and order
entered on March 6, 2018, on Perry, et al. v. Duoyuan Printing,
Inc., et al., Case No. 10-cv-7235, in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York (New York City).

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Sept. 20, 2010, a
plaintiff filed a purported class action naming the Company, its
Chairman and certain present and former senior executives and
members of the Company's Audit Committee as defendants, asserting
claims for certain violations of the securities laws and seeking
unspecified damages.  The complaint asserts claims on behalf of a
purported class of persons and entities, who purchased shares of
the Company's common stock at allegedly artificially high prices
during the period between November 6, 2009, and September 13,
2010, and who suffered damages as a result of such purchases.

The appellate case is captioned as Perry, et al. v. Duoyuan
Printing, Inc., et al., Case No. 18-990, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees Richard Pearson Joseph E. Sciarro; Jeff
Perry, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated;
and Scott P. Cole, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, are represented by:

          Phillip C. Kim, Esq.
          THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
          275 Madison Avenue
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 686-1060
          Facsimile: (212) 202-3827
          E-mail: pkim@rosenlegal.com

Defendant-Appellees Duoyuan Printing, Inc., Wenhua Guo, Xiqing
Diao, Christopher P. Holbert, Lianjun Cai and Punan Xie are
represented by:

          Mary H. Tolbert, Esq.
          CROWE & DUNLEVY, P.C.
          20 North Broadway Avenue
          Oklahoma City, OK 73102
          Telephone: (405) 235-7700
          E-mail: molly.tolbert@crowedunlevy.com

Defendant-Appellee William D. Suh is represented by:

          Joseph De Simone, Esq.
          MAYER BROWN LLP
          1221 Avenue of the Americas
          New York, NY 10020
          Telephone: (212) 506-2500
          Facsimile: (212) 849-5559
          E-mail: jdesimone@mayerbrown.com

Defendant-Appellee Frazer, LLP, is represented by:

          Lawrence A. Steckman, Esq.
          LESTER SCHWAB KATZ & DWYER, LLP
          100 Wall Street
          New York, NY 10005
          Telephone: (212) 341-4379
          E-mail: lsteckman@lskdnylaw.com

Defendants-Appellants Piper Jaffray & Co. and Roth Capital
Partners, LLC, are represented by:

          Terri Combs, Esq.
          FAEGRE BAKER DANIELS LLP
          801 Grand Avenue, 33rd Floor
          Des Moines, IA 50309-8011
          Telephone: (515) 248-9000
          Facsimile: (515) 248-9010
          E-mail: terri.combs@FaegreBD.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey P. Justman, Esq.
          FAEGRE BAKER DANIELS LLP
          2200 Wells Fargo Center
          90 South 7th Street
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 766-8862
          Facsimile: (612) 766-1600
          E-mail: jeff.justman@FaegreBD.com


DYNAMEX OPERATIONS: Ct. Embraced Worker-Friendly Classification
---------------------------------------------------------------
Erin Mulvaney, writing for Law.com, reports that the California
Supreme Court adopted a new worker-friendly standard on April 30
to determine a central question for gig economy companies whose
business models depend on classifying workers as independent
contractors rather than employees.

The court, ruling in the case Dynamex Operations West v. Superior
Court, embraced a more rigid test than the current, looser
standard for determining whether a worker is an employee or a
contractor.  The closely watched case presents significant
implications for worker classification in the gig economy.  Cases
in state courts were paused in anticipation of the ruling.

Altshuler Berzon attorney Michael Rubin --
mrubin@altshulerberzon.com -- who filed an amicus brief in the
case in support of the workers, said the opinion "provides needed
clarity to worker and employers alike, slicing through decades of
confusing and inconsistent case law to focus on the key practical
inquiry: where the worker 'would ordinarily be viewed as working
in the hiring business.'"

He added, "The result will be sweeping reclassification of
workers throughout the state, including in the gig economy where
much of the litigation has recently focused."

A team from Littler Mendelson and McDermott Will & Emery
represented Dynamex.  Attorneys for the company did not
immediately respond to a request for comment.

In the wage-and-hour class action, a Dynamex delivery driver
named Charles Lee claimed he and his fellow workers were
misclassified as independent contractors.  At oral arguments, the
lawyers in the case were asked to argue about whether California
should abandon its current test for determining who is an
employee or adopt a more worker-friendly standard.

Worker classification is a central issue in the gig economy.
Many large companies, including Uber Technologies Inc. and Lyft
Inc., are built on the backs of independent contractors.
Employees, under the federal labor structure, are guaranteed
collective bargaining rights, health care benefits and worker
compensation. Gig companies contend their workforce enjoys more
flexibility, setting hours and pace on their own.

Judges across the country have grappled in recent years with
worker classification in the sharing economy.  Grubhub prevailed
in a trial over this issue of misclassification last year.  The
court sided with the company and found that the driver was an
independent contractor.  With that case now on appeal, it will
now be governed by the new standard set in Dynamex.

"In recent years, the relevant regulatory agencies of both the
federal and state governments have declared that the
misclassification of workers as independent contractors rather
than employees is a very serious problem, depriving federal and
state governments of billions of dollars in tax revenue and
millions of workers of the labor law protections to which they
are entitled," the California Supreme Court said.

Mr. Rubin said there are likely hundreds of other
misclassification cases pending that will be affected by the
decision, including many in the gig economy.

The decision falls only under California law, but it follows a
New Jersey Supreme Court decision.  Several other states have
more worker-friendly tests, in different forms, to determine how
to classify an employee.  Mr. Rubin predicted that more states
are likely to follow suit, following the California decision.

"As the federal government increasingly abandons its past
commitment to protecting workplace rights, the states are
stepping up to fill the gaps," Mr. Rubin said.

Dynamex argued that the current standard, in place since 1989,
should be used.  The older standard is a multifactor test that
focuses mostly on whether the employer has control in the way the
worker performs.  It considers various other factors, including
the worker's skill, the method of payment and the nature of the
business.

The lawyers for the workers successfully urged the California
Supreme Court to embrace a so-called "ABC test," which is used in
New Jersey and Massachusetts.

That test requires the employer to establish three factors to
show a worker is an independent contractor:  "that the worker is
free from the control and direction of the hirer in connection
with the performance of the work, both under the contract for the
performance of such work; that the worker performs work that is
outside the usual course of the hiring entity's business; and
that the worker is customarily engaged in an independently
established trade, occupation or business of the same nature as
the work performed for the hiring entity."

The Supreme Court wrote: "It bears emphasis that in order to
establish that a worker is an independent contractor under the
ABC standard, the hiring entity is required to establish the
existence of each of the three parts of the ABC standard."

The plaintiffs were represented by A. Mark Pope of Pope, Berger,
Williams & Reynolds and Kevin Ruf -- kruf@glancylaw.com -- of
Glancy Prongay & Murray.

'This could ruin the gig economy'
Fisher & Phillips partner Richard Meneghello --
rmeneghello@fisherphillips.com -- said the "ABC" test "makes it
very difficult, if not impossible, for your average gig company
to label its workers as contractors."  He wrote in a blog post
that the "ABC" test essentially presumes an individual in
question is an employee unless the employer proves three specific
criteria.

Mr. Meneghello said the requirements would be nearly impossible
for gig economy companies to comply with if they want to keep
their workers classified as independent contractors.

"This could ruin the gig economy as we know it.  After all, a
great many of those providing services for gig companies --
taking advantage of their idle capacity so they can fill a
specific need and make some extra money -- are handling these
jobs as side hustles," Mr. Meneghello said.  "They are not
running an independently established trade, occupation,
profession or business.  And moreover, how would a gig economy
business confirm that their workers are meeting these standards?"

California companies, leading in the gig workforce model, should
be thinking about the Dynamex case and any consequences, a team
from Paul Hastings said in a recent blog post.  In anticipation
of the ruling, the lawyers recommended that companies look
closely at worker relationships and to "take steps to assess
their potential risk."


EAGLE ROAD: Faces Pawnee Nation Suit in N.D. Oklahoma
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Eagle Road Oil LLC.
The case is styled as Pawnee Nation of Oklahoma, its own behalf
and on behalf of its tribal members similarly situated, Plaintiff
v. Eagle Road Oil LLC, Cummings Oil Company and John Doe sued as
Does 1 through 25, Defendants, Case No. 4:18-cv-00263-JED-JFJ
(N.D. Okla., May 17, 2018).

Eagle Road Oil Llc is a Private Exploration & Production company
operating in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Curt Douglas Marshall, Esq.
   Weitz & Luxenberg, PC
   700 BROADWAY
   NEW YORK, NY 10003
   Tel: (212) 558-5500
   Fax: (212) 344-5461
   Email: cmarshall@weitzlux.com

      - and -

   Curtis Muskrat Bruehl, Esq.
   Bruehl Law Firm PLLC
   14005 N EASTERN AVE
   EDMOND, OK 73013
   Tel: (405) 938-3434
   Fax: (405) 509-6268
   Email: cbruehl@bruehllaw.com

      - and -

   Scott Emory Poynter, Esq.
   Poynter Law Group
   440 W CAPITOL AVE STE 2910
   LITTLE ROCK, AR 72201
   Tel: (501) 251-1587
   Fax: (501) 244-2614
   Email: scott@poynterlawgroup.com


EL MIRADOR: Court Approves $224K FLSA Class Action Settlement
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico
granted Parties' Second Motion for Approval of Proposed
Settlement in the case captioned MARGARET J. LOPEZ, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. EL
MIRADOR, INCORPORATED, and LOUIS PEREA, Defendants, No. CV16-
01257RB-KBM (D.N.J.).

Citing 29 C.F.R. Section 552.109(a), plaintiff Margaret Lopez
brought this action on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated to recover unpaid overtime wages that defendants (El
Mirador) allegedly failed to pay.

The parties presented evidence that different courts have
disagreed over when Section 552.109(a) became effective, and that
there is no controlling precedent to bind this Court.  There is a
bona fide dispute about Section 552.109(a)'s effective date.
Fair and equitable settlement

Moving to the question of whether the settlement comports with
the FLSA's policy goals, the Court looks to (i) the notice given
to the putative class members, (ii) the transparency of the
settlement, (iii) the proposed service award to the class
representative, and (iv) the liquidated damages provision.

El Mirador will post the notice in conspicuous areas of several
offices and has retained Rust Consulting, Inc., as Settlement
Administrator. A Director at Rust, Justin Parks, has created a
notice plan that aims to successfully deliver notices to 80% of
potential class members. According to the notice plan, Rust will
use a mailing list prepared by the parties to mail the Class
Notice via First Class mail. The mailing list will be updated
through the National Change of Address Database, which contains
any change-of-address requests filed with the U.S. Postal
Service.
If there are any notices that are returned as undeliverable, Rust
will perform address traces which utilize the class member's
name, previous address, and Social Security number to find an
updated address. If necessary, Rust will also use any reasonably
available means such as social media, email or other internet
searches to find a class member's address.

The Court is satisfied that the parties have planned for timely,
accurate, and informative distribution of notice to the parties.
Transparency of settlement

The parties originally asked for the settlement to be filed under
seal, but the Court stated that any final settlement should not
be confidential given the legislative purpose and policy goals of
the FLSA. Heeding the Court, the parties have not asked for the
new proposed settlement to be sealed.

The parties have proposed to pay the class representative,
Margaret Lopez, a service award of $2,500. Due to Ms. Lopez's
initiative in enforcing her and similarly-situated workers'
rights, and given Ms. Lopez's voluntary assumption of fiduciary
responsibility to the class and her assumption of risk in being
the face of the complaint against El Mirador, the Court finds the
$2,500 award to be fair and reasonable.

The Court rejected the parties' last settlement agreement in
large part due to the lack of liquidated damages for unpaid wages
during the undisputed period. Responding to the Court's concern,
the parties have provided for full liquidated damages for all
wages owed during the undisputed period, increasing the payment
to the class by $63,650.46.

In whole, the parties have assuaged the Court's previous
concerns, and the new proposed settlement is fair and equitable
to all parties and comports with the FLSA's policy objectives.

Multiplying the 205.75 hours worked by the customary billing rate
for plaintiff's counsel -- $50 per hour for the legal assistant,
and $325 and $350 per hour for the two attorneys -- yields a
total lodestar fee of $63,460. This lodestar fee has been
significantly reduced to $37,000, a sum that is less than the 35%
contingency fee that Ms. Lopez agreed to. Additionally, the
proposed $37,000 award makes up only about 16.51% of the gross
settlement fund. The proposed fee compares well to fees that
other courts in the Tenth Circuit have approved in FLSA cases.

Looking to the performance of class counsel, counsel was able to
obtain a gross settlement amount of $224,153.42 for approximately
300 putative plaintiffs, with the settlement including 60% of
alleged overtime wages during the disputed period, 100% of
alleged overtime wages during the undisputed period, and 100% of
possible liquidated damages for unpaid wages during the
undisputed period. Plaintiff's counsel was essentially able to
obtain the best possible result for the undisputed period, and
then, during the period with a real dispute about whether the
plaintiffs could recover any wages, plaintiff's counsel was able
to secure the majority of those disputed wages. This result is
comparable to those approved by other courts in this Circuit.

The Court approves final certification of the collective action.
The Court also approves the proposed settlement, with its
attendant attorneys' fee, deadlines, notice to parties, and
service award to class representative.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 2, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8hvx3tb
from Leagle.com.

Margaret J. Lopez, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Brian Kinsley,
Crumley Roberts, Scott E. Brady -- scott@bohrerbrady.com --
Bohrer Brady, LLC & Philip Bohrer -- phil@bohrerbrady.com --
Bohrer Brady, LLC.

El Mirador, Inc. & Louis Perea, Defendants, represented by Andrea
K. Robeda -- Andrea.Robeda@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis P.C.
& Victor P. Montoya -- montoyav@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis
LLP.


EQUIFAX INFORMATION: Faces "Hampton" Suit in N.D. Georgia
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Equifax Information
Services, LLC. The case is styled as Lesha Hampton, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Equifax Information Services, LLC, Berkshire Hills Bancorp, Inc.
doing business as: Berkshire Bank and John Does 1 - 25,
Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-02258-CAP-AJB (N.D. Ga., May 17,
2018).

Equifax Information Services LLC provides data solutions. The
Company offers financial, consumer and commercial data, and
analytical solutions.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jonathan Braxton Mason, Esq.
   Mason Law Group, LLC - GA
   1100 Peachtree Street, NE, Suite 200
   Atlanta, GA 30309
   Tel: (404) 920-8040
   Fax: (404) 920-8039
   Email: jmason@atlshowbizlaw.com


ESPERION THERAPEUTICS: July 6 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
----------------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP on May 7 disclosed that a class action lawsuit has
been filed against Esperion Therapeutics, Inc. ("Esperion" or the
"Company") (NASDAQ:ESPR) and certain of its officers.  The class
action, filed in United States District Court, Eastern District
of Michigan, and docketed under 18-cv-11438, is on behalf of a
class consisting of investors who purchased or otherwise acquired
Esperion securities between February 22, 2017 and May 1, 2018,
both dates inclusive (the "Class Period"), seeking to recover
damages caused by Defendants' violations of the federal
securities laws and to pursue remedies under Sections 10(b) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act")
and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, against the Company and
certain of its top officials.

If you are a shareholder who purchased Esperion securities
between February 22, 2017, and May 1, 2018, both dates inclusive,
you have until July 6, 2018, to ask the Court to appoint you as
Lead Plaintiff for the class.  A copy of the Complaint can be
obtained at www.pomerantzlaw.com.  To discuss this action,
contact Robert S. Willoughby at rswilloughby@pomlaw.com or
888.476.6529 (or 888.4-POMLAW), toll-free, Ext. 9980. Those who
inquire by e-mail are encouraged to include their mailing
address, telephone number, and the number of shares purchased.

Esperion is a biopharmaceutical company that is primarily focused
on the research and development of oral and small molecule
therapies for the treatment of patients with elevated levels of
low-density lipoprotein cholesterol and other cardio metabolic
risk factors.  Bempedoic acid and its lead product candidate, the
bempedoic acid / ezetimibe combination pill, are targeted
therapies focused on reducing elevated LDL-C levels in patients
with hypercholesterolemia.  The Company owns the exclude
worldwide rights to bempedoic acid.

The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period,
Defendants made materially false and misleading statements
regarding the Company's business, operational and compliance
policies. Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i) Esperion's
cholesterol-lowering medication, bempedoic acid, entailed serious
undisclosed safety risks, including death; and (ii) as a result
of the foregoing, Esperion's public statements were materially
false and misleading at all relevant times.

On May 2, 2018, Esperion announced results from its second
pivotal Phase 3 study for its cholesterol-lowering medication.
Esperion reported that while the trial met the primary endpoint
of safety and tolerability and the key efficacy endpoint, there
were 13 deaths in the treatment group compared to only two in the
control group.

On this news, Esperion's share price fell $24.75, or 35.10%, to
close at $45.75 on May 2, 2018.

With offices in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Paris, The
Pomerantz Firm -- http://www.pomerantzlaw.com-- concentrates its
practice in the areas of corporate, securities, and antitrust
class litigation.  Founded by the late Abraham L. Pomerantz,
known as the dean of the class action bar, the Pomerantz Firm
pioneered the field of securities class actions.  Today, more
than 80 years later, the Pomerantz Firm continues in the
tradition he established, fighting for the rights of the victims
of securities fraud, breaches of fiduciary duty, and corporate
misconduct.  The Firm has recovered numerous multimillion-dollar
damages awards on behalf of class members. [GN]


EVENKO: Faces Class Action Over Exorbitant Ticketing Fees
---------------------------------------------------------
T'Cha Dunlevy, writing for Montreal Gazette, reports that
frustrated by exorbitant ticketing fees for events at the Bell
Centre? You're not alone.  A class-action lawsuit has been filed
against Evenko, alleging the promoter charges disproportionately
high service fees for tickets to its events.

Lawyer Jeffrey Orenstein -- jorenstein@clg.org -- of Consumer Law
Group filed the suit on May 3, on behalf of M. Sidel, against
L'arena des Canadiens Inc., which owns and operates the website
evenko.com.

The suit targets the $5-$7.50 "Electronic Ticket" fee, "Will Call
-- box office pickup" fee, "Mobile Ticket" fee and "Ticketless"
fee that Evenko charges, alleging that the cost to the company
for such services is minimal.

Evenko is the "only player in the industry that charges consumers
a Service Fee and then on top of that (the above noted fees),"
according to the suit.

"Our client had purchased tickets to Elton John (in 2018),"
Mr. Orenstein told the Montreal Gazette.  "She was given two
options for a delivery method.  One was electronic delivery,
which basically means an email with PDF version of the tickets;
the second is by mail, which is $5.75 (per ticket) -- we're not
contesting that; I understand that when you're sending by mail,
there are stamps, you've got to print the tickets and put them in
an envelope.

"But the electronic ticket delivery is also $5.75, and that is
our contention.  This is computer generated and costs nothing.
Therefore, you should not be charging.  Add to that, if it's
close to the event, they won't give you the mail option, there's
only the will-call option. You can go to the box office and pick
up your tickets, and again it's $5.75, when the only cost is the
paper and the printer.

"The other two options are mobile delivery, where they charge $5
to send tickets to a mobile app; and ticketless, where they allow
you to just use your credit card, and no ticket.  For all of
these, they charge $5 to $7.50."

Evenko's competitors don't charge a ticket-delivery fee on top of
a regular service fee, according to the suit, which uses Place
des Arts as an example, noting that concertgoers can receive
tickets by email or pick up tickets at that venue at no extra
charge.

"That, we believe, is evidence that it does not cost (Evenko)
anything," Mr. Orenstein said.  "When you talk about an
electronic-delivery fee, none of their competitors charge that,
and they don't charge extra at will call. (Evenko is) doing
something different than their competitors . . . and they're the
only ones in the primary market doing that."

The suit claims that such fees are a "cash-cow" for Evenko, and
requests punitive damages of $15 per Class Member per purchase.
The suit also asks that such fees be declared "exploitation" and
"abusive" and that they be discontinued in the future.

"There's a clause in the Consumer Protection Act where it says
that if there's a gross disproportion between what it costs a
merchant and what they charge the consumer, it's considered
exploitation and abusive," Mr. Orenstein said, "and it allows the
courts to return the money or reduce the amount of the fee."

In 2016 alone, Evenko held 1,224 events, according to the claim.
As of May 7, 393 people had joined the class-action suit via the
Consumer Law Group website, clg.org.

Mr. Orenstein expects that the claim could move relatively
quickly once the case is authorized and a judge appointed.

"I don't expect that many facts will be in dispute," he said.
"Assuming our facts are not in dispute, it's mostly a legal
question."

Asked about the case, Evenko media representative Philip Vanden
Brande responded with a statement, saying, "We would like to
affirm, first of all, that the addition of fees for the ticketing
service is a common practice in the entertainment industry, as
much in Quebec as in the rest of Canada and North America.
Moreover, we make sure to comply with applicable laws at all
times.

"The case is now in the hands of our lawyers and we won't comment
any further."

AT A GLANCE

For more information or to join the class action lawsuit against
Evenko for ticket delivery fees, visit clg.org [GN]


EXXON MOBIL: Court Dismisses Amended "Fentress" ERISA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BOBBY D. FENTRESS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. EXXON
MOBIL CORPORATION, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 4:16-CV-
3484 (S.D. Tex.), Judge Keith P. Ellison of the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division,
granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Amended Class
Action Complaint.

The Plaintiffs are current and former employees of Exxon who were
participants in and beneficiaries of the Exxon Mobil Savings Plan
("Plan") and who were invested in Exxon company stock during the
period of Nov. 1, 2015 through Oct. 28, 2016.  The Defendants are
Exxon and senior corporate officers of Exxon who were fiduciaries
of the Plan during the Class Period.  The Plaintiffs allege that
the Defendants knew or should have known that Exxon's stock had
become artificially inflated in value due to fraud and
misrepresentation, thus making Exxon stock an imprudent
investment under ERISA and damaging the Plan and those Plan
participants who bought or held stock.

The Plan is an employee stock ownership plan and a defined
contribution benefit plan sponsored by Exxon.  Eligible employees
can contribute up to 25% of their compensation to the Plan, and
Exxon will make a matching contribution of 6%.  During the Class
Period, the Plan was managed by Trustee Defendants Beth Casteel,
Suzanne McCarron, Malcolm Farrant, Daniel Lyons, and Len Fox, all
of whom were appointed by Exxon.  Exxon stock represented the
single largest holding of the Plan, approximately $10 billion.
The Plaintiffs allege that the Plan purchased at least $800
million in Exxon stock during the Class Period.

Exxon is a publicly-traded, multinational oil and gas company.
The Plaintiffs allege that Exxon made materially false and
misleading statements throughout the Class Period when Exxon
highlighted its strong business model, transparency, and
reporting integrity, especially with regard to its oil and gas
reserves.  They allege the public statements were materially
false and misleading when made because they failed to disclose:
(1) that Exxon's own internally generated reports concerning
climate change recognized the environmental risks caused by
climate change; (2) that, given the risks associated with climate
change, Exxon would not be able to extract all of the hydrocarbon
reserves Exxon claimed to have and it therefore should have
written down those reserves as "stranded"; and (3) that Exxon
used an inaccurate "price of carbon" in evaluating the value of
its future oil and gas reserves.

According to Plaintiffs, Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") reporting rules require "proved" reserves to be oil and
gas that is economically producible based on a backward looking
12-month price average; other reserves are "stranded."

During 2014, oil prices fell by nearly 50%.  Exxon's competitors
all reported impaired reserves; Exxon did not.  On Oct. 28, 2016,
before trading opened, Exxon disclosed that it might need to
write down nearly 20% of its oil and gas assets if energy prices
remained low for the rest of 2016, and that 4.6 billion barrels
of reserves may need to be written down or were not profitable.
Exxon share prices fell more than $2.

The Plaintiffs allege three alternative actions that Trustee
Defendants should have taken.  First, they allege the Trustee
Defendants should have made, or caused others to make, corrective
disclosures regarding the valuation of Exxon's oil and gas
reserves.  They allege that the longer a fraud persists, the more
harm there will be, so earlier corrective disclosures would lead
to a milder stock price correction.  Second, the Plaintiffs
allege that the Trustee Defendants should have halted all new
investments or contributions to Exxon stock.  Third, the
Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants should have invested a small
but significant portion of the Plan's holdings into a low-cost
hedging product.

The Plaintiffs bring two claims: (1) failure to prudently and
loyally manage the Plan's assets pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Sections
1104(a)(1)(D) and 1109(a), and (2) failure of Exxon, as an
appointing fiduciary, to monitor or remove the individual
fiduciaries.

The Defendants have filed a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss,
urging the Court to dismiss the Amended Complaint with prejudice
because it does not meet the heightened pleading standard the
Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit have set out for ERISA breach of
fiduciary duties actions.  They argue that the Amended Complaint
also fails to allege the existence of material information Exxon
misrepresented/failed to disclose or that Exxon had a duty to
monitor, which it failed.

Judge Ellison granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the
Amended Class Action Complaint.  He finds that while Exxon's
decades-long misinformation campaign about the causes and effects
of climate change should not be understated, the Amended
Complaint provides no plausible reason to believe that the risks
posed by climate change were not incorporated into the Exxon
stock price.  The misrepresentation the Plaintiffs allege is of
the monetary value of the reserves: the Plaintiffs allege that
Exxon materially overstates the value of its reserves. Without
more information, the SEC regulations argument that Exxon raised
appears to be a non sequitur.

The Judge also finds the Plaintiffs plausibly allege that Exxon
knew about climate change and the way that the oil and gas
industry contributed to it.  But they have not plausibly linked
the realities of climate change to future health of an oil and
gas company, especially as it relates to the Class Period.  As to
the Defendants' knowledge and misstatements, the Judge finds that
even if there were sufficient allegations of Trustee Defendants'
knowledge, the Plaintiffs' duty-of-prudence claim must include a
sufficiently alleged alternative action.

Judge Ellison finds that the Plaintiffs have not sufficiently
alleged that earlier corrective disclosures are so clearly
beneficial that a prudent fiduciary could not conclude that it
would be more likely to harm the fund than to help it.  Also,
nothing in the pleadings suggests that the analysis of halting
stock purchases would be different than in Whitley v. BP or Singh
v. RadioShack.  He says investing in a hedging product is not so
clearly beneficial that a prudent fiduciary could not conclude
that it would be more likely to harm the fund than to help it.

Finally, the Judge explains that a Plan description from 2012
states that Exxon appoints Plan fiduciaries.  The Plaintiffs
argue that Exxon had the discretion to appoint new fiduciaries
when these fiduciaries were not taking action.  No other facts
about Exxon's role, discretionary or otherwise, with respect to
the Plan are alleged.  The Amended Complaint does not reference
any individuals at Exxon who would be doing the appointing.  Most
convincingly, even if the Court were to adopt a theory requiring
the appointing entity to monitor the fiduciaries, because there
has been no sufficiently-alleged breach of duty by the appointed
fiduciaries, the claim fails.

Judge Ellison wishes to emphasize what the instant Memorandum &
Order does not decide.  It does not decide whether Exxon or any
of its affiliates engaged in false advertising, concealed
negative financial or environmental information, or contributed
to climate change.  He decides only the issues raised by
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Amended Class Action Complaint
in this ERISA action.

Although the complaint being evaluated is an "amended" complaint,
it is the first complaint that has been tested by a motion to
dismiss and analyzed by the Court in the case.  If the Plaintiffs
wish to amend and cure the defects in the Amended Complaint, they
must do so by April 30, 2018.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 30, 2018 Memorandum and
Order is available at https://goo.gl/g8kD4v from Leagle.com.

Bobby D. Fentress, and all other individuals similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Edward H. Glenn, Jr. --
eglenn@zamansky.com -- Zamanksy LLC, Jacob H. Zamansky --
jake@zamansky.com -- Zamansky LLC, Justin Sauerwald, Zamansky
LLC, Samuel E. Bonderoff -- samuel@zamansky.com -- Zamansky LLC &
J. Hampton Skelton -- hskelton@skeltonwoody.com -- Skelton Woody.

Kevin Conroy, Azmi Attia & Mark Barr, Plaintiffs, represented by
Samuel E. Bonderoff, Zamansky LLC.

Exxon Mobil Corporation, Defendant, represented by Daniel Kramer
-- dkramer@paulweiss.com -- Paul Weiss et al, Daniel J. Toal --
dtoal@paulweiss.com -- Paul Weiss et al, Gregory Laufer --
glaufer@paulweiss.com -- Paul Weiss Rifkind, pro hac vice,
Jonathan H. Hurwitz -- jhurwitz@paulweiss.com -- Paul Weiss et
al, Theodore V. Wells, Jr. -- twells@paulweiss.com -- Paul Weiss
et al, Daniel H. Gold -- daniel.gold@haynesboone.com -- Haynes
and Boone LLP, Mark Ryan Trachtenberg --
mark.trachtenberg@haynesboone.com -- Haynes and Boone, LLP & Nina
Cortell -- nina.cortell@haynesboone.com -- Haynes and Boone LLP.

Bradley William Corson, Neil Chapman & D. G. Wascom, Defendants,
represented by Daniel Kramer, Paul Weiss et al.

Suzanne McCarron, Defendant, represented by Daniel Kramer, Paul
Weiss et al, Daniel H. Gold, Haynes and Boone LLP, Mark Ryan
Trachtenberg, Haynes and Boone, LLP & Nina Cortell, Haynes and
Boone LLP.

Malcolm Farrant, Defendant, represented by Daniel Kramer, Paul
Weiss et al & Mark Ryan Trachtenberg, Haynes and Boone, LLP.

Beth Casteel, Daniel Lyons & Len Fox, Defendants, represented by
Daniel Kramer, Paul Weiss et al, Daniel H. Gold, Haynes and Boone
LLP & Nina Cortell, Haynes and Boone LLP.


FACEBOOK INC: Appeals BIPA Class Action Certification Ruling
------------------------------------------------------------
Chris Burt, writing for BiometicUpdate.com, reports that Facebook
is appealing the decision by U.S. District Court Judge James
Donato that complainants in a lawsuit filed against the company
under Illinois' Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA) can
certify their suit as a class action, which would include all
residents of the state with "faceprints" stored by the company
since 2011, MediaPost reports.

The company has filed a sealed petition with the 9th Circuit
Court of Appeals to begin the appeal process.

BIPA, which requires explicit notification and consent for
biometric data collection, allows for damages of up to $5,000 per
user.  Judge Donato has previously ruled that by collecting the
data, Facebook harmed user's property interests, setting a trial
date of July 9, though he has also thrown out a similar suit
brought by a non-user who appeared in a photo uploaded to
Facebook.

Judge Donato allowed the suit to proceed with class action
certification in April, ruling that the harm to user property
interests created a consistent degree of liability, and rejecting
Facebook's assertion that injuries would have to be individually
determined for each user.

Illinois legislators are considering amending BIPA to provide
broad exemptions. [GN]


FACEBOOK INC: Koskie Minsky Commences $2-Bil. Data Misuse Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Law Times reports that a Toronto law firm is leading a global
class action against Facebook for what it alleges is the misuse
of its users' personal information.  Koskie Minsky LLP has
announced it has begun a $2-billion claim, based on allegations
that Facebook was aware its users' personal data could easily be
accessed by third parties through the social media platform.  It
comes in the wake of the Cambridge Analytica breach, where data
collected through Facebook was allegedly used to influence voters
in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

The claim was filed on behalf of users worldwide, whom the firm
says may have had data accessed by third-party organizations
without their permission.  Robert Gain, an associate for Koskie
Minsky, says the personal misuse of information resulted in
political gain for some.

"[B]ringing a class action forward, that puts these issues front
and centre, raises awareness, contributes to behaviour
modification and shines a light on these very important privacy
issues," he says.

The notice of action for the suit was issued on April 25. [GN]


FAIRMOUNT SANTROL: Gainey McKenna Files Securities Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------------
Gainey McKenna & Egleston on May 8 disclosed that it has filed a
class action lawsuit against Fairmount Santrol Holdings Inc. and
other defendants ("Fairmount" or the "Company") (NYSE:FMSA) in
the United States District Court for the District of Delaware on
behalf of a class consisting of our client and the other public
stockholders of Fairmount who have been harmed by Fairmount and
its board of directors (the "Board") in connection with alleged
violations of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") pertaining to the proposed
acquisition of the Company by SCR-Sibelco NV ("Sibelco").

Under the terms of the merger agreement (the "Merger Agreement")
Sibelco will own, directly or indirectly, approximately 65% of
the shares of the combined company's common stock and Fairmount
stockholders, including holders of certain Fairmount equity
awards, immediately prior to the effective time, will own the
remaining approximately 35% of the outstanding shares.  The
Complaint alleges that the Board authorized the filing of a
materially incomplete and misleading Registration Statement on
form S-4/A (the "Proxy") with the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC"), in violation of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of
the Exchange Act.  In particular, the Complaint alleges that the
Proxy contains materially incomplete and misleading information
concerning: (i) financial projections for both companies; (ii)
the valuation analyses performed by interested parties in support
of the proposed acquisition; (iii) information relating to the
background of the proposed acquisition; and (iv) potential
conflicts of interest faced by interested parties.

Investors who purchased or otherwise acquired shares during the
Class Period should contact the Firm prior to the July 1, 2018
lead plaintiff motion deadline.  A lead plaintiff is a
representative party acting on behalf of other class members in
directing the litigation.  If you wish to discuss your rights or
interests regarding this class action, please contact Thomas J.
McKenna, Esq. or Gregory M. Egleston, Esq. of Gainey McKenna &
Egleston at (212) 983-1300, or via e-mail at tjmckenna@gme-
law.com or gegleston@gme-law.com.

Please visit our website at http://www.gme-law.comfor more
information about the firm. [GN]


FANN FARMS: "Hernandez-Campos" Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JAIME HERNANDEZ-CAMPOS and LEODEGARIO CRUZ-TREJO, on behalf of
themselves and all other similarly situated persons v. FANN
FARMS, INC., WILLIAM KENNETH FANN, KENNETH A. FANN, TERESA W.
FANN, and FRANCISCO VALADEZ, JR., Case No. 5:18-cv-00162-BO
(E.D.N.C., April 17, 2018), seeks to recover alleged unpaid wages
and liquidated damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiffs are citizens of Mexico, who were jointly employed
by the Defendants pursuant to H-2A visas.  They are migrant
farmworkers, who were employed through the H-2A program to
perform various agricultural duties related to the sweet potato
growing and harvesting operation of Fann Farms in or around
Salemburg, North Carolina.

Fann Farms, Inc., is a for profit, closely held corporation that
is organized under the laws of the state of North Carolina, for
the purpose of, among others, producing and marketing tobacco,
sweet potatoes and other agricultural products within and without
North Carolina.

The Individual Fann Defendants are officers, part-owners and co-
operators of Fann Farms.  Francisco Valadez, Jr., is a resident
and does business in Smithfield, North Carolina.  Mr. Valadez
employed and furnished to the Fann Defendants the Plaintiffs and
the members of the proposed class.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Robert J. Willis, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF ROBERT J. WILLIS, P.A.
          P.O. Box 1828
          Pittsboro, NC 27312
          Telephone: (919) 821-9031
          Facsimile: (919) 821-1764
          E-mail: rwillis@rjwillis-law.com


FERDINAND MARCOS: Human Rights Victims Lose Summary Bid
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York denied the Class Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary
judgment against the Republic in the case captioned DISTRICT
ATTORNEY OF NEW YORK COUNTY, Plaintiff, v. THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, et al., Defendants, No. 14 Civ. 890 (KPF)
(S.D.N.Y.).

The parties to this interpleader all claim ownership over certain
property purchased with funds that Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos
allegedly misappropriated during Mr. Marcos's presidency of the
Philippines (Interpleader Property).  The property at issue
includes approximately $15 million in cash and seized funds from
several bank accounts; Claude Monet's L'Eglise et La Seine a
Vetheuil and Alfred Sisley's Langland Bay (and other paintings);
and sundry personal items (including jewelry, carpets, pens,
boxes, and a jade and wooden screen).

The District Attorney for New York County (DANY) seized the
contested assets during its criminal investigation and
prosecution of Vilma Bautista, a confidante and personal
secretary of Imelda Marcos.  The DANY, an innocent stakeholder
with no claim of ownership to the Interpleader Property,
transferred the property to the Court so that the rightful owner
or owners could be determined.  Among the claimants are: the
Republic of the Philippines (Republic); a class of human rights
victims led by Jose Duran, who are judgment creditors against
Imelda Marcos (Class Plaintiffs); Vilma Bautista, who in addition
to serving as Imelda Marcos's personal aide during the relevant
time period also worked for the Philippine government from 1966
until 1986, including as a Foreign Service Officer for the
Philippine Mission to the United Nations; and the Golden Budha
Corporation along with the Estate of Roger Roxas (Roxas).

Roxas was not the only victim of the Marcos regime that brought
suit following Mr. Marcos's removal from power.  Shortly after
Mr. Marcos fled to Hawaii, human rights victims and their
families brought actions against Mr. Marcos seeking damages for
torture, summary execution, and disappearance.

In 2011, the Class obtained a second judgment which they seek to
enforce in the instant action in the amount of $353,600,000. Both
the 1995 and 2011 judgments have been transferred to and
registered in the Southern District of New York.

Here, the DANY filed the interpleader action under 28 U.S.C.
Section 1335(a), according to which district courts have original
jurisdiction of any civil action of interpleader involving money
or property of the value of $500 or more and where two or more
adverse claimants are of diverse citizenship.  This interpleader
involves parties that are citizens of the State of New York and
of the Republic of the Philippines, and the amount in controversy
far exceeds $500.  The Court may therefore exercise subject
matter jurisdiction.

The Court remains unpersuaded that Class Plaintiffs have standing
to bring this motion.  The Class Plaintiffs had not offered any
basis for concluding that a levy filed by a party in connection
with a state court action confers standing on that party in
federal court to move to dismiss claims in which the party was
not named.

In their motion for summary judgment, the Class Plaintiffs assert
that the Court's January 20, 2016 decision, questioning the
standing of one interpleader defendant to attack the claims of
another, was limited to Rule 12 motions. The Court does not share
Class Plaintiffs' view. To be sure, the Court stated that it was
concerned about Class Plaintiffs' standing to file a motion to
dismiss given the state of the pleadings.

The Class Plaintiffs have failed to assuage any of the Court's
concerns regarding standing. For this reason, the Court continues
to question the Class Plaintiffs' standing to file dispositive
motions, including this motion for summary judgment. Still, the
Court proceeds to address the Class Plaintiffs' substantive
claims that (i) the Republic lacks standing to bring most of its
cross-claims, and (ii) all of the cross-claims are time-barred
under the relevant statutes of limitations.

The Court rejects both claims on their merits.

The Republic Has Standing to Bring Each Cause of Action

The Class Plaintiffs seek summary judgment on seven of the
Republic's eight causes of action, arguing that those claims must
be dismissed for lack of standing because the Republic is not the
owner of the paintings or the proceeds therefrom.  But the Class
Plaintiffs' argument fails for a more fundamental reason: the
Court cannot conclude at this juncture that Mrs. Marcos, and not
the Republic, owned and possessed the paintings when purchased
and subsequently displayed at the townhouse in New York City. The
fact that Mrs. Marcos was First Lady of the Philippines at the
time of the purchase raises genuine disputes as to whether she
owned and possessed the paintings in her personal capacity, or if
she did so in her capacity as a public servant.

The Republic's claim that Mrs. Marcos paid for the paintings with
public funds means that this Court cannot conclude that Mrs.
Marcos ever owned the paintings. And the record creates genuine
questions of material fact on this point.  The Sales Report for
Monet's L'Eglise et La Seine a Vetheuil and Sisley's Langland Bay
lists the purchaser's address as Study Room, Malacanang Palace,
Manila, Philippines, and the paintings were delivered to the
Philippines' London Embassy.  The Consignment Note is addressed
to Madame Marcos, Malacanang Palace, Manila, Philippines.

Similarly, the Sales Report for Monet's Water Lily painting
indicates that it was sold to the First Lady of the Philippines.
And, during the Marcos presidency, the artwork was displayed at a
townhouse in New York City that was owned by the Republic.  The
question of ownership would persist even if Mrs. Marcos had
physical possession over the paintings, and is captured, rather
poignantly, by the dual status of the townhouse in which the
paintings were displayed: The property served as both the
Philippine Consulate and as one of Mrs. Marcos's private
residences.

On this record, the Court cannot find that, at the time of
purchase or at any time thereafter, the paintings were properly
owned and possessed by Mrs. Marcos rather than by the Republic.
The fact that Mrs. Marcos was a public figure, who allegedly
misused public funds to purchase paintings delivered to the
Philippine Embassy in London and displayed at the Philippine
Consulate in New York, raises genuine disputes of fact as to the
paintings' ownership. Even if the Class Plaintiffs had construed
New York law correctly which they have not lingering questions
surrounding ownership of the paintings preclude any finding that
the Republic lacks standing to bring the contested causes of
action.

A full-text copy of the District Court's March 29, 2018 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7kvgcdw from
Leagle.com.

Robert M. Romano, Esq., Special Master, pro se.

The Republic of the Philippines, Interpleader Defendant,
represented by Bradley Drew Simon -- bradsimon@simonlawyers.com -
- Simon & Partners LLP, J. Evan Shapiro --
eshapiro@simonlawyers.com -- Simon & Partners LLP, Salvador
Enriquez Tuy, Jr., Prado & Tuy -- pradotuy@att.net -- LLP &
Terrence James Johnson --terryjohnson@simonlawyers.com -- Simon &
Partners LLP.

Jose Duran, on his behalf, Interpleader Defendant, represented by
Philip S. Raible -- phil@raynerrowe.com -- Rayner Rowe LLP.

Jose Duran, as representative of a class of judgment creditors of
the estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda Marcos, and Ferdinand
R. Marcos, Interpleader Defendant, represented by Philip S.
Raible, Rayner Rowe LLP & Robert Alan Swift --
rswift@kohnswift.com -- Kohn, Swift, & Graf, P.C.

Vilma Bautista, Interpleader Defendant, represented by Jude
Roberto Cardenas -- roberto@jrc-esq.com -- Cardenas & Associates.

Ester Navalaksana & Leonor Hernandez, Interpleader Defendants,
represented by Cesar De Castro, The Law Firm of Cesar de Castro,
P.C. & Valerie Alice Gotlib, The Law Firm of Cesar de Castro,
P.C.
Jeana Roxas, Jeana Roxas as Personal Representative of the Estate
of Roger Roxas, Interpleader Defendant, represented by Daniel J.
Brown, Reiss Sheppe LLP, & William E. Baker, Jr. --
wbaker@lawbaker.com -- Baker & Baker, Apc.

Jose Duran, as representative of a class of judgment creditors of
the estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda Marcos, and Ferdinand
R. Marcos, Interpleader Defendant, represented by Philip S.
Raible, Rayner Rowe LLP & Robert Alan Swift, Kohn, Swift, & Graf,
P.C.
Vilma Bautista, Interpleader Defendant, represented by Jude
Roberto Cardenas, Cardenas & Associates.


FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS: "Caffey" Challenges Debt Collection Practices
-----------------------------------------------------------------
SHANDA CAFFEY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS SERVICES TEAM, INC., Case No.
3:18-cv-00090-DMB-RP (N.D. Miss., April 16, 2018), is brought on
behalf of a class of Mississippi consumers seeking redress for
the Defendant's alleged actions of using an unfair and
unconscionable means to collect a debt, in violation of the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act.

Financial Accounts Services Team, Inc., is a collection agency
with its principal office located in Knoxville, Tennessee.  The
Defendant is a company that uses the mail, telephone, or
facsimile in a business the principal purpose of which is the
collection of debts, or that regularly collects or attempts to
collect debts alleged to be due another.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Christopher E. Kittell, Esq.
          KITTELL LAW FIRM
          P.O. Box 568
          2464 Church Street, Suite A
          Hernando, MS 38632
          Telephone: (662) 298-3456
          Facsimile: (855) 896-8772
          E-mail: ckittell@kittell-law.com


FIRSTSOURCE ADVANTAGE: Faces "Alawoya" Suit in S.D. Texas
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Firstsource
Advantage, LLC. The case is styled as Bolaji Alawoya,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Firstsource Advantage, LLC, LVNV Funding, LLC and
John Does 1-25, Defendants, Case No. 4:18-cv-01623 (S.D. Tex.,
May 18, 2018).

Firstsource Advantage, LLC offers collections and recovery
solutions. It provides debt recovery services for credit card
issuers, retail banking and mortgage. Firstsource Advantage, LLC
was formerly known as Firstsource LLC and changed its name in
February, 2007. The company was founded in 1995 and is based in
Amherst, New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jonathan David Kandelshein, Esq.
   The Law Office of Jonathan Kandelshein
   18208 Preston Rd
   Ste D-9 No. 256
   Dallas, TX 75252
   Tel: (646) 753-0149
   Email: Jonathan.kandelshein@gmail.com


G. GENERAL: Faces "Zalaya" Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against G. General
Construction, LLC. The case is styled as Henry Elias Coreas
Zelaya and Jennifer Portillo Reyes, on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. G. General Construction, LLC, doing
business as: G. General Construction, LLC and Gilmar Valadares,
Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-04473 (S.D. N.Y., May 21, 2018).

G. General Construction, LLC has over 40 years of experience of
siding, painting, insurance work and more to the Olympia WA
area.[BN]

The Plaintiffs appear PRO SE.


GOLD KEY: Faces "Lowenbein" Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Gold Key Credit,
Inc. The case is styled as Boruch Lowenbein, on behalf of himself
and all other similarly situated consumers, Plaintiff v. Gold Key
Credit, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-02976 (S.D. N.Y., May
18, 2018).

Gold Key Credit, Inc. is a business management consultant in
Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


GOOGLE INC: Supreme Court to Address Use of Cy Pres Relief
----------------------------------------------------------
Wystan Ackerman, Esq. -- wackerman@rc.com -- of Robinson+Cole, in
an article for JDSupra, wrote that the Supreme Court recently
granted review in a case that involves whether, or in what
circumstances, cy pres relief may be used in class action
settlements. In Frank v. Gaos, No. 17-961, the Court will review
the Ninth Circuit's decision in In re Google Referrer Header
Privacy Litig., 869 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 2017).  The question
presented in the petition for certiorari is: "Whether, or in what
circumstances, a cy pres award of class action proceeds that
provides no direct relief to class members supports class
certification and comports with the requirement that a settlement
binding class members must be 'fair, reasonable, and adequate.'"

The case involves claims under the Stored Communications Act and
various state common law claims, alleging that Google violated
users' privacy rights by disclosing the search terms used to
owners of websites.  The district court approved a settlement
that called for Google to provide a disclosure of how it shares
users' search terms, and for an $8.5 million settlement fund.
$5.3 million of the settlement fund would be distributed to six
cy pres recipients, non-profit organizations that would use the
funds to promote Internet privacy, and the remaining $3.2 million
would go to attorneys' fees, administrative costs and incentive
payments for the named plaintiffs.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed.
It explained that cy pres-only settlements are "the exception,
not the rule," but that they are appropriate where the settlement
is "non-distributable" because it would not be feasible to
distribute money to individual class members.  Here, the class
size is estimated at 129 million class members, who would be
entitled to 4 cents each, and the cost of sending out the
payments would exceed the benefit.  The objectors argued that
there should be a lottery system whereby some class members would
receive say $5 or $10, and that if the settlement was
nondistributable, the court should instead rule that the
superiority requirement for class certification was not
satisfied.  The Ninth Circuit found that the district court's
rejection of these arguments and approval of the settlement was
not an abuse of discretion.

The objectors also argued that the cy pres recipients were
inappropriate because Google had previously donated to some of
them, three of them previously received funds in other Google
class settlements, and three of them were affiliated with class
counsel's alma maters.  The Ninth Circuit rejected these
contentions, noting that the organizations had a strong nexus to
the interests of the class, Google had previously donated to
hundreds of organizations, there was no fraud or collusion, and
the mere fact that class counsel graduated from schools that had
connections to some of the organizations did not warrant
rejecting the settlement.  The Ninth Circuit also found the
attorneys' fees reasonable because they were 25% of the
settlement fund and consistent with a lodestar calculation.

Judge Wallace wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part.  He dissented only on the issue involving the
relationships between the cy pres recipients and the alma maters
of class counsel, concluding that the district court should have
looked into that issue further.  He wrote that "I would vacate
the district court's approval of the class settlement, and remand
with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing, examine class
counsel under oath, and determine whether class counsel's prior
affiliation with the cy pres recipients played any role in their
selection as beneficiaries." Id. at 748 (Wallace, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).  In my view, requiring such a
hearing could present substantial concerns about the protection
of the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine --
ultimately it is the clients on both sides who are making
settlement decisions, and examining counsel as to their thinking
(or their advice to their client) behind such decisions seems
problematic, although that may not be something the Supreme Court
addresses in this case.

From a defense perspective, this case may present a challenge
with respect to what position industry organizations may wish to
take in amicus briefs.  If the Court were to rule that cases
where settlements would be "non-distributable" do not satisfy the
superiority requirement and should never be certified class
actions at all, defendants might welcome that result.  But how
would such a rule be applied, and where would the line be drawn?
In most cases like this, one might be able to calculate a
theoretical class recovery (e.g., with punitive damages) that
might, in theory, be large enough to be distributable, although
such an amount is very unlikely to be awarded.  If a "non-
distributable" settlement means only that the settlement is
rejected and the parties are forced to continue to litigate, that
forces defendants to incur large litigation expenses and risk in
cases that they would prefer to resolve.  The reality is that
there needs to be a route to settling cases like this when
appropriate.  To the extent the Court is granting certiorari to
provide some guidance around when to use cy pres relief and how
to do it, that may be welcomed by both sides, provided the Court
does not make it unduly difficult to satisfy whatever criteria
are ultimately adopted. [GN]


HALYARD HEALTH: Court Dismisses "Jackson" Stockholder Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RONALD JACKSON, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. HALYARD HEALTH, INC.,
ROBERT E. ABERNATHY, STEVEN E. VOSKUIL, KIMBERLY-CLARK
CORPORATION, THOMAS J. FALK, and MARK A. BUTHMAN, Defendants,
Case No. 16-CV-05093-LTS (S.D. N.Y.), Judge Laura Taylor Swain of
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (i)
granted the Defendants' motions to dismiss the Corrected Amended
Class Action Complaint; and denied as moot the Plaintiff's motion
to strike certain documents.

Halyard sells health and healthcare supplies and solutions around
the world, including the MicroCool Breathable High Performance
Surgical Gown, a product intended to protect healthcare providers
from contact with highly infectious diseases like hepatitis, HIV
and Ebola.  MicroCool was manufactured, marketed, and sold first
by Kimberly-Clark, from mid-2011 until the spin-off, and then by
Halyard, from October 2014 up through the time of the initiation
of the action.  Mr. Abernathy served at all relevant times as
Halyard's CEO, and Mr. Voskuil served at all relevant times as
Halyard's CFO.  Mr. Falk served at all relevant times as
Kimberly-Clark's Executive Chairman and CEO, and Mr. Buthman
served as Kimberly-Clark's CFO from 2003 to 2015.

The Plaintiff alleges that he acquired Halyard securities at
artificially inflated prices during the Class Period and was
damaged upon the revelation of certain alleged corrective
disclosures.  According to him, many MicroCool gowns failed to
meet the standards required to meet the AAMI Level 4 standard
during ASTM F1671 tests of numerous random samples taken from
multiple separate manufacturing lots of the gowns.  He further
alleges that, during the Class Period and prior to the spinoff of
Halyard, Mr. Falk received $67,036,901 in proceeds from his sales
of Kimberly-Clark stock, and Mr. Buthman received $8,802,174 in
proceeds from his sales of Kimberly-Clark stock, sales that were
abnormal as compared to previous sales of Kimberly-Clark stock by
those individuals.

The Plaintiff alleges that, throughout the Class Period, the
Defendants publicly represented on Halyard and Kimberly-Clark's
websites, in publicly disseminated marketing materials, and on
product labeling that MicroCool provided an AAMI Level 4 standard
of protection amidst a global outbreak of the Ebola virus in
2014.

The Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated, brings the putative federal securities class
action against the Defendants on behalf of a proposed class
consisting of all persons other than the Defendants who: (1)
purchased or otherwise acquired Kimberly-Clark securities on or
after Aug. 8, 2014 and subsequently received Halyard securities
pursuant to Kimberly-Clark's spinoff of Halyard, effective as of
Oct. 31, 2014; and/or (2) purchased or otherwise acquired Halyard
securities between Oct. 21, 2014 and April 29, 2016, both dates
inclusive, seeking to recover damages, allegedly caused by the
Defendants' violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated under
Section 10(b).

In Count I, the Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants are liable
for violating Section 10(b), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder, by making various untrue statements of material
facts, omitting to state material facts and that, in so doing,
they acted knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth.
In Count II, he asserts that the Individual Defendants are liable
under Section 20(a).

Before the Court are two motions to dismiss the remaining two
counts of the Corrected Amended Class Action Complaint ("CACAC"),
one filed by the Halyard Defendants and one filed by the
Kimberly-Clark Defendants, as well as a motion by the Plaintiff
to strike two exhibits filed in connection with the Halyard
Defendants' motion.  Both the Halyard Defendants and the
Kimberly-Clark Defendants argue that Count I should be dismissed
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
because Plaintiff has failed to plead an actionable misstatement
or omission, a strong inference of scienter, and an adequate
allegation of loss causation.  The Plaintiff now moves to strike
the Challenged Exhibits, and any references to those exhibits
contained in the Halyard Defendants' brief, to the extent they
are offered for the truth of the matter asserted.

Judge Swain has reviewed thoroughly all of the parties'
submissions.  As she finds that the Plaintiff has failed to pled
adequately that each of the Defendants acted with scienter, a
necessary element to maintain a private damages action under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and the Court can dismiss a
complaint based on the Plaintiff's failure to plead scienter
alone, she will begin -- and end -- the Count I analysis with an
examination of the Plaintiff's scienter allegations.  Given that
the Plaintiffs' scienter allegations are inadequate, the CACAC
fails to meet the Rule 9(b) and PSLRA pleading standards and
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Therefore, it is unnecessary to examine the remaining elements of
their Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claim.  Count I will,
accordingly, be dismissed.

Because the Plaintiff has not stated a claim under Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 with respect to the Defendants, Count II will,
accordingly, be dismissed.  The Judge finds that in the absence
of plausible pleading of a primary violation, the Plaintiff
cannot state a claim under Section 20(a).

Because the Judge's analysis does not rely on those Challenged
Documents, she obviates the need to consider them.  The
Plaintiffs' motion to strike will therefore be denied as moot.

For the following reasons, Judge Swain granted in their entirety
the Defendants' motions to dismiss, and denied as moot the
Plaintiff's motion to strike in light of the disposition of the
Defendants' motions to dismiss.
A full-text copy of the Court's March 30, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://goo.gl/1AHpTP from Leagle.com.

Ronald Jackson, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Lead Plaintiff, represented by Emma Gilmore -
- egilmore@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, Jennifer Banner Sobers --
jbsobers@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, Joseph Alexander Hood, II -
- ahood@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, Marc Ian Gross --
migross@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, Tamar Aliza Weinrib --
taweinrib@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP & Jeremy Alan Lieberman --
jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP.

Kai Chiu, Movant, represented by Phillip C. Kim --
pkim@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm P.A.

Halyard Health, Inc., Robert E. Abernathy & Steven E. Voskuil,
Defendants, represented by Brett D. Jaffe --
brett.jaffe@alston.com -- Alston & Bird, LLP, Elizabeth Gingold
Clark -- elizabeth.clark@alston.com -- Alston & Bird LLP, John
Allen Jordak, Jr., Alston & Bird LLP & John L. Latham --
john.latham@alston.com -- Alston & Bird LLP.

Kimberly-Clark Corporation, Thomas J. Falk & Mark A. Buthman,
Defendants, represented by Christopher Y. Lee --
CHRIS.LEE@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin, LLP, Eamon Paul Joyce --
EJOYCE@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP, Francesca Eva Brody --
FBRODY@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP & James Wallace Ducayet --
JDUCAYET@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin, LLP.


HAND AND STONE: Faces "Kiler" Suit in E.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Hand and Stone
Franchise Corp. The case is styled as Marion Kiler, individually
and as the representative of a class of similarly situated
persons, Plaintiff v. Hand and Stone Franchise Corp. doing
business as: Hand & Stone Massage and Facial Spa, Defendant, Case
No. 1:18-cv-02986 (E.D. N.Y., May 21, 2018).

Hand & Stone offers professional Massage, Facial and Hair Removal
services tailored to your individual needs.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Dan Shaked, Esq.
   Shaked Law Group, P.C.
   44 Court Street, Suite 1217
   Brooklyn, NY 11217
   Tel: (917) 373-9128
   Fax: (718) 504-7555
   Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com


HAYNES INVESTMENTS: "Gibbs" Suit Moved From Virginia to Texas
-------------------------------------------------------------
The lawsuit styled DARLENE GIBBS, STEPHANIE EDWARDS, LULA
WILLIAMS, PATRICK INSCHO, and LAWRENCE MWETHUKU, on behalf of
themselves and all individuals similarly situated v. HAYNES
INVESTMENTS, LLC, L. STEPHEN HAYNES, SOVEREIGN BUSINESS
SOLUTIONS, LLC, VICTORY PARK CAPITAL ADVISORS, LLC, VICTORY PARK
MANAGEMENT, LLC, SCOTT ZEMNICK, JEFFREY SCHNEIDER, AND THOMAS
WELCH, Case No. 3:18-cv-00048, was transferred on April 19, 2018,
from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas
(Dallas).

The Texas District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:18-cv-00988-N-
BT to the proceeding.

The case involves a rent-a-tribe enterprise funded and partially
operated by Haynes Investments and Victory Park, according to the
complaint.  Through an association with Think Finance, Inc., and
several other companies, the Defendants provided the capital used
to make high-interest loans to consumers in the name of Plain
Green, LLC, and Great Plains Lending, LLC -- two entities formed
by Native American tribes.

Although tribal entities were held out as the actual lender of
these internet loans, Haynes Investments and Victory Park
provided the capital used to fund the illegal loans and, in
return, generated large profits from their investment in the
schemes, the Plaintiffs allege.  Haynes Investments and Victory
Park used the profits to continue to expand the portfolios of
Plain Green and Great Plains -- resulting in the unlawful
collection of more than $69.4 million dollars from Virginia
consumers in the last four years alone, the Plaintiffs assert.
Based on the Defendants' conduct, the Plaintiffs allege
violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Kristi C. Kelly, Esq.
          Andrew J. Guzzo, Esq.
          Casey S. Nash, Esq.
          KELLY & CRANDALL, PLC
          3925 Chain Bridge Road, Suite 202
          Fairfax, VA 22030
          Telephone: (703) 424-7572
          Facsimile: (703) 591-0167
          E-mail: kkelly@kellyandcrandall.com
                  aguzzo@kellyandcrandall.com
                  casey@kellyandcrandall.com

               - and -

          Leonard A. Bennett, Esq.
          Craig C. Marchiando, Esq.
          Elizabeth W. Hanes, Esq.
          CONSUMER LITIGATION ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          763 J. Clyde Morris Blvd., Suite 1-A
          Newport News, VA 23601
          Telephone: (757) 930-3660
          Facsimile: (757) 930-3662
          E-mail: lenbennett@clalegal.com
                  craig@clalegal.com
                  elizabeth@clalegal.com

               - and -

          James W. Speer, Esq.
          VIRGINIA POVERTY LAW CENTER
          919 E. Main Street, Suite 610
          Richmond, VA 23219
          Telephone: (804) 782-9430
          Facsimile: (804) 649-0974
          E-mail: jay@vplc.org

The Defendants are represented by:

          Ashley Partin Peterson, Esq.
          Bryan Alan Fratkin, Esq.
          MCGUIREWOODS LLP (RICHMOND)
          Gateway Plaza
          800 East Canal Street
          Richmond, VA 23219
          Telephone: (804) 775-1190
          Facsimile: (804) 698-2091
          E-mail: apeterson@mcguirewoods.com
                  bfratkin@mcguirewoods.com

               - and -

          Aaron Harvey Marks, Esq.
          Ross Lee Weiner, Esq.
          KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
          601 Lexington Ave.
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 446-4856
          Facsimile: (212) 446-4900
          E-mail: aaron.marks@kirland.com
                  ross.weiner@kirkland.com


HOUSTON TEXANS: Former Cheerleader Files Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------
Cameron Langford, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported
that the Houston Texans stiff its cheerleaders for the hours they
spend in the gym and at official team events, and fires them for
complaining about the squad's weight-shaming coach, a former
cheerleader claims in a federal class action.

Lead plaintiff P.G.G. sued the team and its cheerleading coach
Altovise Gary on May 21 in federal court, on behalf of all
current and former Texans cheerleaders who were paid less than
minimum wage and not paid overtime.

The proposed class is represented by Bruse Loyd with Jones,
Gillaspia and Loyd.

Despite the seeming glamour of shimmying in sequins on the
sidelines of NFL games, NFL cheerleaders are typically paid no
more than $7.25 per hour, the federal minimum wage.

The Texans are the latest team to be hit with a cheerleader wage
lawsuit, following similar complaints filed by cheerleaders for
the Oakland Raiders, Cincinnati Bengals, Tampa Bay Buccaneers and
the New York Jets.

P.G.G. was a Texans cheerleader from April 2017 until April this
year, when she says she was cut from the squad for banding
together with several teammates to protest the policies of "Coach
Alto," who ridicules cheerleaders about their weight.

"During the 2017 football season, Coach Alto told one cheerleader
that she had 'belly jelly' and she was a 'chunky cheek' . . .
Coach Alto walked up to a cheerleader and poked her face, asking
her if she had gained her 'freshman 15,' saying she looked like
she 'ate a plate of salt,'" the complaint states.

P.G.G. says the job required her to be on-call 24/7, as she had
to respond to her coach's emails within 10 minutes, spend hours
in the gym each week, get spray tans before every game and team
event, sign thousands of calendars and constantly send messages
on her team-owned Twitter account during the NFL season and off-
season.

The Texans did not pay her for this work.  The team also stiffed
her for numerous events she had to attend, and the time she spent
traveling around the state to these events, never paying her
overtime when her hours exceeded 40 in a week, she says.

Coach Alto constantly pressured the team to keep their
waistlines' trim, and bullied those who did not meet her
standards, P.G.G. says.

She says that before a game during the 2017 season, Coach Alto
duct-taped a teammate's stomach skin under her shorts.

"Coach Alto then brought that cheerleader in front of the rest of
the squad and showed them how much 'better it looks.' At the next
practice Coach Alto pulled out a roll of duct tape and asked said
cheerleader if she needed it," the complaint states.

Incensed that a cheerleader missed a step during a dance,
scissors-wielding Coach Alto stormed into the cheerleaders'
locker room after a game last season and popped hundreds of
balloons, P.G.G. says.

She says she and several teammates were targeted by Coach Alto
after airing their concerns about her antics to human resources.

"For example, after one cheerleader reported Coach Alto to human
resources, Coach Alto moved her to the back of every dance and
consistently and aggressively harassed her, although she was
arguably the squad's best dancer," the lawsuit states.

P.G.G. says Coach Alto's retaliation culminated with her and
fellow outspoken teammates being cut from the squad in the last
round of auditions in April.

She seeks a declaration that the Texans' pay practices violate
the Fair Labor Standards Act, and wants the team ordered to pay
her overtime and for her off-the-clock work.  She also made a
wrongful termination claim under state law.

A Texans spokeswoman said its cheerleaders generally enjoy the
job, but it is always changing its policies to address concerns
about their working conditions.

"We are proud of the cheerleader program and have had hundreds of
women participate and enjoy their experience while making a
positive impact in the local community.  We are constantly
evaluating our procedures and will continue to make adjustments
as needed to make the program enjoyable for everyone," Amy Palcic
said in a statement.


HOWARD LEE: Faces "Payeur" Suit in Maine
----------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Howard Lee Schiff
PC. The case is styled as Sharon Payeur, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Howard Lee
Schiff PC and Portfolio Recovery Associates, Defendants, Case No.
2:18-cv-00205-JAW (D. Maine, May 21, 2018).

Howard Lee Schiff PC is engaged in collections law and commercial
litigation, in Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire,
Rhode Island, and Vermont.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   TERRIE HARMAN, Esq.
   WATSON, BOSEN, HARMAN, VENCI & LEMIRE, PA
   75 CONGRESS STREET, SUITE 211
   PORTSMOUTH, NH
   Tel: (603) 431-0666
   Email: th@tharman.net


HUDSON SEAFOOD: Bid Extend Time to Reply to Judgment Offer Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Lydia Carlock and Nicolas Fabrizio, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
Hudson Seafood Corporation d/b/a Hudson's Seafood House on the
Docks; and John Doe 1-10, individually, Defendant, Civil Action
No. 9:18-cv-590-RMG (D. S.C.), Judge Richard Mark Gergel of the
U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina, Beaufort
Division, denied the Plaintiffs' motion for an extension of time
to respond to the Defendants' Rule 68 Offer of Judgment.

Carlock and Fabrizio filed the action on March 1, 2018, as a
Collective Action under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"),
and as a Rule 23 Class Action for violation of the South Carolina
Payment of Wages Act ("SCPWA").  On March 14, 2018, the counsel
for the Defendants sent a Rule 68 Offer of Judgment and checks to
both the named Plaintiffs purporting to fully compensate them for
any claim they may have against the Defendants.

Pursuant to Rule 68, the Plaintiffs' deadline to respond is April
2, 2018.  On March 23, 2018, the counsel for the Plaintiffs
requested, via email, a 14-day extension to respond to the Offer;
on that date, the counsel for the Defendants responded via email
that he could not consent to the requested extension.

Before the Court is the Plaintiffs' motion for an extension of
time of 14 days to respond to the Defendants' Rule 68 Offer of
Judgment.  The Defendants have filed a response in opposition.

Judge Gergel holds that the Plaintiffs have failed to show good
cause under Rule 6(b) for the Court to extend the 14-day period
provided under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  The
Plaintiffs argue that they have shown good cause for an extension
because their request is based on their counsels' need to
research fully the issue of the Plaintiffs' duties as Class
Representatives under both the FLSA Collective Action and Rule 23
Class Action, after receiving the Defendants' Rule 68 Offer of
Judgment, and then advising the Plaintiffs' of their rights and
duties.  The need to conduct additional research about this
foreseeable issue falls short of the good cause needed for the
Court to extend the fourteen-day acceptance period set forth in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

For these reasons, Judge Gergel denied the Plaintiffs' motion for
an extension of time to respond to the Defendants' Rule 68 Offer
of Judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 30, 2018 Order and Opinion
is available at https://goo.gl/JFft9J from Leagle.com.

Lydia Carlock, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Bruce E. Miller --
bmiller@brucemillerlaw.com -- Bruce E. Miller Law Office &
Elisabeth Anne Germain -- bgermain@brucemillerlaw.com -- Bruce E.
Miller Law Office.

Nicolas Fabrizio, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Bruce E. Miller,
Bruce E. Miller Law Office.

Hudson Seafood Corporation, doing business as Hudson's Seafood
House on the Docks & John Doe 1-10, individually, Defendants,
represented by James Keith Gilliam -- jgilliam@mcnair.net --
McNair Law Firm.


ILLINOIS: Court Strikes "Oden" Class Certification Bid
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Illinois issued a Memorandum and Order setting case management in
the case captioned CHRISTOPHER W. ODEN, DARYL HAMPTON, JASON
NIELSON, RANDALL PETERSON, TIMOTHY LOGHRY, SR., JOSEPH STOTERAU,
CHRISTIAN IGLESIAS, JASON SMITH, EARNEST HALL, CRAIG ARMSTRONG,
BRAD MONKMAN, BENJAMIN WINTERS, JEFFERY BROTHERS, OLLIE BROWN,
DANIEL HAMMER, ROY PARRY, GREGORY ROBINSON, SHANE ELDER, RANDALL
CAUSEY, DAVID HARPER, MICHAEL SNYDER, SCOTT SULLIVAN, CHRISTOPHER
HARRIS, JONATHAN VIDLAK, DAVID HOFFARTH, PERNELL JONES,
CHRISTOPHER BAILY, MATTHEW SISNEROS, JACK GRUBB, JERALD SIMS,
CONNER WEBB, TERRELL CLEGGETT, MARTIN VAN DEURZEN, JAMES SAY,
CORY CUNNINGHAM, DARRELL STEWART, BRENT BAILY, JACOB HOBART,
ISAAC JOHNSON, REGINALD THURMOND, JASON DUNLAP, JOHN PELTZ, and
TED DURAN, Plaintiffs, v. WILLIAM B. TRUE, DONALD S. BOYCE, JEFF
SESSIONS, and MARK INCH, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-600-MJR (S.D.
Ill.).

The Complaint names 43 individuals as plaintiffs who, according
to the Complaint, are incarcerated at the United States
Penitentiary in Marion, Illinois. The Complaint sets forth claims
against four defendants and alleges that the Defendants subjected
the Plaintiffs to unconstitutional conditions of confinement in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

While the Complaint was submitted with a page with each of the
Plaintiffs' signatures, it is unclear whether the purported
Plaintiffs intended for their signatures to signal their Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11 certifications to the court,
subjecting them to potential sanctions, or if this is simply a
list of the intended plaintiffs and their signatures.

Because it is unclear whether each of the Plaintiffs, other than
Oden, have complied with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, the
Court will order each plaintiff wishing to proceed in this
action, other than Plaintiff Oden, to submit a properly signed
complaint, along with their Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
or filing fee, or risk dismissal from the action.

If the Plaintiffs desire to continue this litigation as a group,
any proposed amended complaint, motion, or other document filed
on behalf of multiple plaintiffs must be signed by each of the
plaintiffs.

Plaintiff Oden has filed a motion on behalf of all of the
plaintiffs seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) and
seeking the appointment of counsel. This Motion is stricken
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a), as Plaintiff
Oden attempted to sign this document on behalf of all of the
plaintiffs, and a non-attorney cannot file or sign papers for
another litigant.

Plaintiff Oden also filed Motion for Class Certification, which
is also stricken pursuant to Rule 11(a). Notably, even absent the
Rule 11 violation, this Motion would not survive.

A full-text copy of the District Court's March 29, 2018
Memorandum and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybh4vd2l
from Leagle.com.

Christopher W. Oden, Plaintiff, pro se.

Daryl Hampton, Plaintiff, pro se.

Jason Nielson, Plaintiff, pro se.

Randall Peterson, Plaintiff, pro se.

Timothy Loghry, Sr., Plaintiff, pro se.

Joseph Stoterau, Plaintiff, pro se.

Christian Iglesias, Plaintiff, pro se.

Jason Smith, Plaintiff, pro se.

Earnest Hall, Plaintiff, pro se.


INNOVATION COMPOUNDING: Faces "Scoma" Suit Over TCPA Violations
---------------------------------------------------------------
SCOMA CHIROPRACTIC, P.A., a Florida corporation, individually and
as the representative of a class of similarly-situated persons v.
INNOVATION COMPOUNDING, INC., a Georgia corporation, Case No.
2:18-cv-00256-SPC-MRM (M.D. Fla., April 19, 2018), challenges the
Defendant's alleged practice of sending unsolicited facsimiles,
in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991.

Innovation Compounding, Inc., is a Georgia corporation based in
Kennesaw, Georgia.  The Company is a compounding pharmacy that
supports prescribers, patients, and prescriptions in the United
States.  The Company specializes in the preparation of
medications by mixing raw ingredients.  The Company offers
medications in the areas of women's health, allergy testing and
treatment, men's health, nutrition therapy, skin care and
dermatology, pain management, and weight loss management.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ryan M. Kelly, Esq.
          ANDERSON + WANCA
          3701 Algonquin Road, Suite 500
          Rolling Meadows, IL 60008
          Telephone: (847) 368-1500
          Facsimile: (847) 368-1501
          E-mail: rkelly@andersonwanca.com


INTUIT INC: Judge Dismisses 2 Claims in Amended Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News, reports that a federal
judge on May 15 dismissed two of three claims (negligence and
aiding and abetting) in an amended class action accusing Intuit
of using lax security systems in its TurboTax tax preparation
software that allowed fraudsters to open fake accounts and file
fraudulent state and federal returns in victims' names.


J&I THAI: Fails to Pay Minimum and Other Wages, "Moreira" Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
JUAN C. MOREIRA, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated v. J&I THAI INC. (D/B/A LITTLE BASIL THAI RESTAURANT),
NORAPOL YOUNGPHITAK, SUPOJ PORNPITAKSUK, and KAO DOE, Case No.
1:18-cv-03261 (S.D.N.Y., April 13, 2018), alleges that the
Plaintiff worked for the Defendants without appropriate minimum
wage and spread of hours compensation for the hours that he
worked.

J&I Thai Inc. is a domestic corporation organized and existing
under the laws of the state of New York.  The Individual
Defendants serve or served as owners, managers, principals, or
agents of the Defendant Corporation.[BN]

The Defendants own, operate, or control a Thai restaurant,
located in the Kips Bay section of Manhattan in New York City
under the name "Little Basil Thai Restaurant."

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE &ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317-1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317-1620
          E-mail: Faillace@employmentcompliance.com


JOSHUA BAKER: Faces "ZM" Suit in South Carolina
-----------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Joshua Baker. The
case is styled as Z M, a minor under the age of eighteen through
his parent Ashley Manley for themselves and on behalf of a class
of those similarly situated on behalf of Ashley Manley, Plaintiff
v. Joshua Baker in his official capacity as Director of South
Carolina Department of Health and Human Services SCDHSS,
Defendant, Case No. 3:18-cv-01370-JMC (D. S.C., May 18, 2018).

Joshua Baker serves as Director of South Carolina Department of
Health and Human Services SCDHSS.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   J Derrick Jackson, Esq.
   Tobias G Ward Jr Law Firm
   PO Box 50124
   Columbia, SC 29250
   Tel: (803) 708-4200
   Email: dj@tobywardlaw.com

      - and -

   Tobias Gavin Ward , Jr, Esq.
   Tobias G Ward Jr Law Firm
   PO Box 50124
   Columbia, SC 29250
   Tel: (803) 708-4200
   Fax: (803) 403-8754
   Email: tw@tobywardlaw.com


JOURNELLE LLC: Sued by Conner Over Blind-Inaccessible Web Site
--------------------------------------------------------------
MARY CONNER, Individually and as the representative of a class of
similarly situated persons v. JOURNELLE, LLC, Case No. 1:18-cv-
03240 (S.D.N.Y., April 13, 2018), accuses the Defendant of
failing to design, construct, maintain, and operate their Web
site -- http://www.Journelle.com/-- to be fully accessible to
and independently usable by the Plaintiff and other blind or
visually-impaired persons.

Journelle, LLC, is a Delaware Foreign Limited Liability Company
doing business in New York.  The Defendant owns and operates
Journelle Stores, which are located in New York State.

Journelle is a designer lingerie company.  Journelle Stores
provide goods and services, such as bras, underwear, loungewear,
and accessories, amongst other products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Dan Shaked, Esq.
          SHAKED LAW GROUP, P.C.
          44 Court Street, Suite 1217
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Telephone: (917) 373-9128
          Facsimile: (718) 504-7555
          E-mail: ShakedLawGroup@Gmail.com


JUDGE LAW FIRM: Accused by "Betech" Class Suit of Violating FDCPA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
AVIVA BETECH, on behalf of herself and similarly situated class
members v. THE JUDGE LAW FIRM, ALC and THE GRANDE NORTH AT SANTA
FE PLACE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, Case No. 3:18-cv-00729-L-MDD
(S.D. Cal., April 13, 2018), alleges violations of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act and the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Specifically, the case arises out of allegedly delinquent
financial obligations owed by Ms. Betech to Grande North in
relation to homeowners assessment and property-related ("HOA")
fees.

In 2010, Grande North sued Betech for unpaid HOA fees in a San
Diego Superior Court (37-2010-00104118-CL-BC-CTL).  At some
point, this alleged debt was assigned, placed, or otherwise
transferred to JLF -- Grande North's counsel in the matter -- for
collection.  Grande North won the superior court case and then
instructed JLF to file two memorandums of costs after judgment:
one in 2013 and one in 2016.  In addition, Grande North
instructed JLF to send Betech a collection letter outlining Ms.
Betech's alleged debt.

The Plaintiff alleges that the letter she received from the
defendants "threatened" to charge her for additional
correspondence and collection costs not yet accrued.

JLF is a professional corporation -- a law firm -- organized and
existing under the laws of the state of California, with its
place of business in the City of Irvine in California.  JLF
regularly operates within the county of San Diego, collecting
consumer debts and filing hundreds of lawsuits, including the one
against Ms. Betech in the San Diego Superior Court.

Grande North is a homeowners association organized and existing
under the laws of California.  Grande North regularly operates
within the county of San Diego to maintain properties within the
county, and pursue HOA debts, through litigation if
necessary.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph Samo, Esq.
          SAMO LAW GROUP
          2221 Camino Del Rio South, #305
          San Diego, CA 92108
          Telephone: (619) 672-1741
          Facsimile: (619) 393-0293
          E-mail: joseph@samolaw.com


KC ECONOMIC: Court Dismisses "Exford" Suit Without Prejudice
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KEYLA EXFORD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. KC ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 3:17-CV-340-WKW
(M.D. Ala.), Judge W. Keith Watkins of the U.S. District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama, Eastern Division, sustained
the Defendants' objections; rejected the Magistrate Judge's
Recommendation; granted the Defendants' Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction; denied as moot
McGregor's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a
Claim upon Which Relief Can Be Granted; and dismissed the case
without prejudice.

The Plaintiffs brought the action to enforce a class-action
judgment entered by the Court in an earlier action, Weekes-Walker
v. Macon County Greyhound Park, Inc., 3:10-CV-895-WKW, which was
brought under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification
Act, also known as the WARN Act.  But the Plaintiffs did not
bring the present action against the Defendant in that earlier
action, Macon County Greyhound Park, Inc. ("MCGP").  Instead,
they brought it against Defendants KC Economic Development LLC
("KCED") and Milton McGregor in an effort to enforce the WARN Act
judgment against them as successors in interest to MCGP.

The Plaintiffs' complaint asserts that the Court has subject-
matter jurisdiction in the action -- which, again, seeks to
enforce a prior federal-court judgment in a labor law case --
under 28 U.S.C. Section 1331 based on the federal common law
doctrine of successor liability in the area of federal employment
law recognized by the Eleventh Circuit in Hatfield v. A+
Nursetemps, Inc.  The Hatfield court held that successor
liability is appropriate in suits to enforce federal labor or
employment laws to prohibit employers who violated those laws
from avoiding liability by selling, or otherwise disposing of,
their assets and dissolving, and the acquirer likewise does not
assume liability in its purchase.

On Nov. 30, 2017, the Magistrate Judge filed a Recommendation
that the Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction pursuant Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and Mr. McGregor's motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim against him upon which relief can be granted
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) be denied.  In doing so, the Magistrate
Judge also discharged an earlier order that the Plaintiffs show
cause why the action should not be dismissed for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction.  The Defendants timely filed objections, to
which the Plaintiffs responded.

Judge Watkins finds, as the Defendants note in their objections,
that the Plaintiffs appear to have overlooked the procedural
posture of the Hatfield litigation at the time the Eleventh
Circuit issued its unpublished opinion.  The Hatfield plaintiffs
obtained a judgment against the Hatfield defendant, just as the
Plaintiffs obtained a judgment against MCGP.  But unlike the
Plaintiffs, the Hatfield plaintiffs did not bring a new action to
enforce that judgment against the Hatfield defendant's successors
in interest.  Instead, they moved -- in the original action -- to
implead the successors in interest pursuant Rule 69 of the
Federal Rules of Procedure, a motion the district court granted.

So while Hatfield supports Plaintiffs' assertion that the
Defendants may be held liable for the judgment against MCGP,
Hatfield offers no support for the Plaintiffs' assertion that the
Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a separate action that
seeks to enforce a judgment from another action against the
Defendants.

Admittedly, the Plaintiffs have also cited a few cases that
allowed a freestanding action for a claim against a successor in
interest.  But the courts in those cases did not directly address
subject-matter jurisdiction, much less explain why Peacock did
not apply.  Those cases thus merely imply that a federal court
has subject-matter jurisdiction in the situation presented in
this case. Such an implication is not particularly persuasive,
especially when compared to the explicit holdings to the contrary
in Peacock and Ellis.

In short, the Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden of
establishing that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over
the new action to enforce a judgment from a separate case.
Whether the Plaintiffs are able to file a Rule 69 motion in that
case is a question not before the Court.

Because the Plaintiffs have not shown that this court has
subject-matter jurisdiction, Judge Watkins sustained the
Defendants' objections, rejected the Recommendation, granted the
Defendants' Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, denied as moot Mr.
McGregor's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and dismissed the
case without prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 30, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://goo.gl/bEhmG4 from Leagle.com.

Keyla Exford, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Ritchie L. Stalnaker, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated & Mona Thomas, on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by John
Michael Segrest, The Segrest Law Firm & Philip Dale Segrest, Sr.,
The Segrest Law Firm.

KC Economic Development LLC, Defendant, represented by James
David Martin -- martin@copelandfranco.com -- Copeland Franco
Screws & Gill PA & Robert David Segall, Copeland Franco Screws &
Gill.

Milton E. McGregor, Defendant, represented by Benjamin Joseph
Espy, Melton Espy & Williams, PC, Joseph Cleodus Espy, III,
Melton Espy & Williams, PC & William Martin Espy, Melton Espy &
Williams, PC.


KOI GROUP: Faces "Conner" Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Koi Group, Inc. The
case is styled as Mary Conner, individually and as the
representative of a class of similarly situated persons,
Plaintiff v. Koi Group, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-04469
(S.D. N.Y., May 21, 2018).

The nature of suit is stated as Civil Rights - Amer w/
Disabilities - Other.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


LA TRATTORIA: Baten Seeks to Recover Minimum and Overtime Wages
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fernando Baten, on behalf of himself and all other persons
similarly situated v. ABC Corp. d/b/a La Trattoria, Fady
Tawadrous, Samy Tawadrous, and John Does #1-10, Case No. 1:18-cv-
03248 (S.D.N.Y., April 13, 2018), alleges that pursuant to the
Fair Labor Standards Act, the Plaintiff and the class are
entitled to compensation for wages paid at less than the
statutory minimum wage, unpaid wages for overtime work for which
they did not receive overtime premium pay, and liquidated
damages.

ABC Corp., doing business as La Trattoria, is a New York
corporation whose corporate name is unknown to Mr. Baten but
which does business under the name La Trattoria, with a principal
place of business at 844 Second Avenue, in New York City.  The
Individual Defendants are owners or part owners and principal of
La Trattoria.  The Doe Defendants represent the other owners,
officers, directors, members, and/or managing agents of La
Trattoria, whose identities are unknown at this time.

The Defendants owned and operated a pizzeria known as La
Trattoria in Manhattan.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David Stein, Esq.
          SAMUEL & STEIN
          38 West 32nd Street, Suite 1110
          New York, NY 10001
          Telephone: (212) 563-9884
          E-mail: dstein@samuelandstein.com


LABOR READY: 9th Cir. Affirms $6.4MM Wage-and-Hour Settlement
-------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
the Ninth Circuit affirmed a $6.4 million settlement of a wage-
and-hour class action against Labor Ready Southwest, 27 percent
of which will go to attorneys' fees.


LAFAYETTE STEEL: Galindo Sues Over Badly Paid Operators & Riggers
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JUAN GALINDO, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. LAFAYETTE STEEL ERECTOR, INC. d/b/a LSE CRANE AND
TRANSPORTATION, Case No. 7:18-cv-00069 (W.D. Tex., April 17,
2018), alleges that Lafayette Steel has violated the Fair Labor
Standards Act by failing to pay its operators and riggers in
accordance with the guarantees and protections of the FLSA.

Specifically, the Defendant pays its operators and riggers a "per
diem" that it pays on an hourly basis as a scheme to avoid paying
overtime on all of Plaintiffs' wages, Mr. Galindo contends.

Lafayette Steel Erector, Inc., is a foreign corporation that is
authorized to do and is doing business in Texas.  The Defendant
does business as LSE Crane and Transportation and maintains its
principal office in Lafayette, Louisiana.

Lafayette Steel is an oilfield services company that provides
staffed crane rentals throughout the Permian Basin, including in
Midland County and Ector County.  Along with the crane, the
Defendant provides personnel to operate the crane, including
operators and riggers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel A. Verrett, Esq.
          MORELAND LAW FIRM, P.C.
          The Commissioners House at Heritage Square
          2901 Bee Cave Road, Box L
          Austin, TX 78746
          Telephone: (512) 782-0567
          Facsimile: (512) 782-0605
          E-mail: daniel@morelandlaw.com

               - and -

          Edmond S. Moreland, Jr., Esq.
          MORELAND LAW FIRM, P.C.
          700 West Summit Drive
          Wimberley, TX 78676
          Telephone: (512) 782-0567
          Facsimile: (512) 782-0605
          E-mail: edmond@morelandlaw.com


LENDINGCLUB CORP: July 2 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
-----------------------------------------------------------
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP alerts investors in LendingClub
Corporation (NYSE:LC) to the July 2, 2018 Lead Plaintiff deadline
in the securities class action pending in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California.  If you
purchased or otherwise acquired securities of LendingClub between
February 28, 2015 and April 25, 2018 and suffered losses contact
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP.  For more information visit:

https://www.hbsslaw.com/cases/LC

or contact Reed Kathrein, who is leading the firm's
investigation, by calling 510-725-3000 or emailing

LC@hbsslaw.com.

On April 25, 2018 the Federal Trade Commission charged
LendingClub with falsely promising consumers they would receive a
loan with "no hidden fees," when, in actuality, the company
deducted hundreds or even thousands of dollars in hidden up-front
fees from the loans.

This news drove the price of LendingClub shares down $0.49, or
about 15%, to close at $2.77 that day.

"We're focused on evidence unearthed by the FTC, including
internal compliance reviews apparently citing the concealment of
the fee as a significant problem for consumers," said Hagens
Berman partner Reed Kathrein.

Whistleblowers:  Persons with non-public information regarding
LendingClub should consider their options to help in the
investigation or take advantage of the SEC Whistleblower program.
Under the new program, whistleblowers who provide original
information may receive rewards totaling up to 30 percent of any
successful recovery made by the SEC.  For more information, call
Reed Kathrein at 510-725-3000 or email LC@hbsslaw.com.

                      About Hagens Berman

Hagens Berman -- http://www.hbsslaw.com-- is a national
investor-rights law firm headquartered in Seattle, Washington
with 70+ attorneys in 11 offices across the country.  The Firm
represents investors, whistleblowers, workers and consumers in
complex litigation. [GN]


LYONS DOUGHTY: Violates Fair Debt Collection Act, "Gross" Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------------
GLENN D. GROSS, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated v. LYONS, DOUGHTY & VELDHUIS, P.C., Case No. 1:18-cv-
07963 (D.N.J., April 17, 2018), is brought for the benefit of New
Jersey consumers, who have been the subject of the Defendant's
debt collection efforts, which allegedly violate the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Lyons, Doughty & Veldhuis, P.C., is a professional corporation
with its principal office in Mt. Laurel, in Burlington County,
New Jersey.  The Defendant is an entity engaged, by use of the
mails and telephone, in the business of attempting to collect a
"debt" from the Plaintiff.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Seth Asher Nadler, Esq.
          IMBESI LAW P.C.
          450 Seventh Avenue, 14th Floor
          New York, NY 10123
          Telephone: (800) 976-6462
          Facsimile: (212) 658-9177
          E-mail: seth@lawicm.com

               - and -

          Jesse S. Johnson, Esq.
          GREENWALD DAVIDSON RADBIL PLLC
          5550 Glades Road, Suite 500
          Boca Raton, FL 33431
          Telephone: (561) 826-5477
          Facsimile: (561) 961-5684
          E-mail: jjohnson@gdrlawfirm.com


MDL 2804: Judge Orders Disclosure of Litigation Funding Deals
-------------------------------------------------------------
Roy Strom, writing for Law.com, reports that as founders of one
of the first and biggest litigation funding companies, the trio
behind what was once Gerchen Keller Capital (GKC) became known
for bringing financial innovation to a staid profession's books.

Now, they're taking on the opioid crisis by putting a new twist
on an en vogue type of litigation: Suing manufacturers and
distributors for allegedly causing higher insurance premiums.

Adam Gerchen, Ashley Keller and Travis Lenkner quietly launched
Keller Lenkner, a plaintiff-side litigation firm, earlier this
year following their departure from daily operations at Burford
Capital Ltd., which purchased GKC for $160 million in late 2016.

Keller Lenkner was listed as counsel on five class action suits
that seek to hold opioid manufacturers liable for the increased
cost of private health insurance caused by opioids and the
misleading marketing that makers of such drugs allegedly engaged
in, all of which is part of a national addiction crisis that the
suits claim has caused more than 350,000 deaths since 1999.

Opioid makers are now facing a deluge of litigation.  Cities,
counties across the country and numerous Native American tribes
have filed some 400 suits against manufacturers of drugs such as
OxyContin, as well as drug distributors and pharmacies.

Mr. Lenkner said the suits his firm filed represent the first to
seek damages from the epidemic's alleged impact on private
insurance premiums.  The suits name 18 corporate defendants
ranging from some of the largest pharmaceutical companies to drug
distribution giants.

The complaints, filed in California, Illinois, Massachusetts, New
Jersey and New York, assert that private insurance claims rose
3,200 percent nationwide between 2007 and 2014, and that in 2015
the cost of care for insured patients with opioid dependency was
550 percent higher than for the average insured patient.

"The economic harm created by the opioid epidemic is not limited
to the government," Mr. Lenkner said.  "And study upon study
shows very large numbers -- in the billions of dollars -- of
annual costs to private health insurance and privately paid
health care as a result of the epidemic."

Keller Lenkner is joined in the suits by national co-counsel from
two other firms: The well-known, Chicago-based class action firm
Edelson and Consovoy McCarthy Park, a litigation boutique co-
founded in 2014 by two former Wiley Rein partners.

Mr. Lenkner would not comment on whether his firm is using a
litigation funder or some other financing vehicle to back the
cases.  He said that the three founders of GKC were the equity
partners in Keller Lenkner, and that, like other plaintiff firms,
they would not comment on how they finance their business.

Judges have largely avoided requiring the disclosure of third-
party litigation finance deals, although last month the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce successfully backed a groundbreaking
Wisconsin law requiring such disclosures.

On April 30, in the multidistrict litigation overseeing more than
600 opioid complaints across the country, U.S. District Judge Dan
Polster in Cleveland ordered any plaintiffs with third-party
litigation finance deals to submit to his chambers a description
of the deals.

Judge Polster said the lawyers and their financiers must attest
that the deals do not create a conflict of interest or "give to
the lender any control over litigation strategy or settlement
decisions." He noted that any nonconforming deals would be deemed
unenforceable and could lead to sanctions.  Judge Polster also
said he would not allow discovery by defendants into the deals
"absent extraordinary circumstances."

Litigation funders have long said their agreements do not grant
them any control over settlement decisions.

Mr. Lenkner said their firm specifically represents plaintiffs in
large, complex litigation where there are "significant damages"
at stake.

"These cases have all of those hallmarks," Mr. Lenkner said.
"And that's the sort of thing you'll see from us going forward."


MDL 2827: "Neilan" Suit Consolidated in Device Performance MDL
--------------------------------------------------------------
The lawsuit titled SEAN NEILAN, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. APPLE INC., a California
corporation, Case No. 1:17-cv-09296, was transferred on April 18,
2018, from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California (San Jose).

The California District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 5:18-cv-
02319-EJD to the proceeding.

The lawsuit is consolidated in the multidistrict litigation
entitled In Re: Apple Inc. Device Performance Litigation, MDL No.
5:18-md-02827-EJD.

To induce consumers to purchase newer model iPhones, Apple
purposefully throttled the processing speed of iPhone 6, iPhone 6
Plus, iPhone 6S, iPhone 6S Plus, iPhone SE, iPhone 7 and iPhone 7
Plus ("Affected iPhones"), intentionally making the phones
unnecessarily slow at ordinary tasks like opening apps, updating
apps, loading webpages, and responding to inputs like scrolling
and swiping, according to the complaint.

The Plaintiff alleges that Apple purposefully planted software
designed to inhibit the performance of older model iPhones after
new iPhone models were introduced as part of a strategy to induce
its customers to purchase newer iPhones.  He asserts that the
slowness is tied, at least in part, to diminishing battery
condition, which is a function of the iPhone's age and use, the
quality of design and manufacturing, and external conditions such
as temperature.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ben Barnow, Esq.
          Erich P. Schork, Esq.
          Jeffrey D. Blake, Esq.
          Anthony L. Parkhill, Esq.
          BARNOW AND ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          One N. LaSalle Street, Suite 4600
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 621-2000
          Facsimile: (312) 641-5504
          E-mail: b.barnow@barnowlaw.com
                  e.schork@barnowlaw.com
                  j.blake@barnowlaw.com
                  aparkhill@barnowlaw.com

               - and -

          Aron D. Robinson, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF ARON D. ROBINSON
          180 W. Washington Street, Suite 700
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 857-9050
          Facsimile: (312) 857-9054
          E-mail: adroblaw@aol.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          David C. Scott, Esq.
          SAN DIEGO CITY ATTORNEY
          CIVIL LITIGATION DIVISION
          1200 Third Ave., Suite 1100
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 533-5800
          Facsimile: (619) 533-5856
          E-mail: DCScott@sandiego.gov


MDL 2785: Court Compels Production of Sanofi Rebates Information
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Kansas
granted in part and denied in part The Mylan Defendants' Motion
to Compel Discovery from Plaintiffs in the case captioned IN RE:
EpiPen (Epinephrine Injection, USP) Marketing, Sales Practices
and Antitrust Litigation. (This Document Applies to All Cases),
MDL No 2785, Case No. 17-md-2785-DDC-TJJ (D. Ks.).

Mylan seeks an order requiring Plaintiff Sanofi-Aventis U.S.,
LLC, to (1) produce information on rebates Sanofi offered
pharmacy benefit managers and third-party payors on branded
pharmaceuticals that Sanofi sold in the United States, in
response to Request No. 24 in Mylan's First Set of Document
Requests to Sanofi and Interrogatory Nos. 15 and 16 in Mylan's
First Set of Interrogatories to Sanofi, and (2) identify the
formularies Sanofi alleges excluded its Auvi-Q(R) device by
reason of Mylan's conduct, in response to Interrogatory No. 2.

Mylan argues it is entitled to show that its EpiPen(R) rebates
were pro-competitive and common in the pharmaceutical industry
when Auvi-Q(R) was being sold. To that end, Mylan propounded
three discovery requests seeking information on rebates Sanofi
has paid.

Sanofi argues that Mylan's requests are overbroad and not
proportional to the needs of this case. Sanofi points out it has
provided discovery showing rebates Sanofi was forced to offer on
other products to get Auvi-Q(R) access to the market, and
contends that an appropriate limit is other pharmaceutical
products where Sanofi had most of the sales in a given drug
class.

Mylan has significantly narrowed its original request by
proposing that Sanofi produce rebate documents for twelve
products it sold in the United States between 2012 and 2016.28
Mylan argues the proposal would provide relevant information
concerning the structure and circumstances of the industry, as
well as discovery of the rebate agreements Sanofi claims
constitute lawful, pro-competitive competition.

With respect to four of the named Sanofi products, the Court is
able to discern from other submissions the likely reason Mylan
included them is that each is the subject of one or more
government investigations relating to pricing and trade
practices.
The Court finds Mylan has sufficiently shown it is entitled to
limited additional discovery into Sanofi's rebate practices
beyond what Sanofi has produced. The Court grants Mylan's motion
to compel in part and will require Sanofi to produce documents
relating to rebates it has offered for Apidra, Lantus, Soliqua,
and Toujeo.

Mylan complains that Sanofi has answered only half of
Interrogatory 2 by identifying which Payors excluded Auvi-Q(R),
but not which Payors did so because of Mylan's conduct.

In its response, Sanofi describes the responsive documents it has
produced, including a sworn narrative by a Sanofi business person
detailing numerous third-party payors who did not cover Auvi-Q(R)
due to Mylan's conduct.

The Court finds Sanofi has demonstrated its good faith compliance
with the discovery request, and denies Mylan's motion to compel
regarding Interrogatory 2.

Based on this, the Court grants in part and denies in part The
Mylan Defendants' Motion to Compel Discovery from Plaintiffs.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 2, 2018 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y975aa6k from
Leagle.com.

All Plaintiffs, Plaintiff, represented by Lynn Lincoln Sarko,
Keller Rohrback, pro hac vice, Paul J. Geller, Robins Geller
Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac vice, Rex A. Sharp, Rex A. Sharp, PA,
Ryan C. Hudson, Rex A. Sharp, PA & Warren T. Burns, Burns Charest
LLP, pro hac vice.

Mylan N.V., Defendant, represented by Adam K. Levin, Hogan
Lovells US LLP, pro hac vice, Benjamin Frederick Holt, Hogan
Lovells US LLP, Brian C. Fries, Lathrop Gage LLP, Carolyn Anne
DeLone, Hogan Lovells US LLP, Daniel Thomas Graham, Clark Hill,
PLC, pro hac vice, David M. Foster, Hogan Lovells US LLP, pro hac
vice, James Moloney, Lathrop Gage LLP, John Robert Robertson,
Hogan Lovells US LLP, Jon Myer Talotta, Hogan Lovells US LLP,
Justin Bernick, Kathryn M. Ali, Hogan Lovells US LLP, pro hac
vice & Timothy Robert Herman, Clark Hill, PLC, pro hac vice.


MERCEDES-BENZ USA: Bid to Remand "Garick" to State Court Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RICHARD K. GARICK, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC,
Defendant, Civil Action No. 17-cv-12042-IT (D. Mass.), Judge
Indira Talwani of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts denied the Plaintiff's Motion to Remand to State
Court.

Garick filed a putative class-action Complaint in state court
against the Defendant, alleging unfair and deceptive business
practices, fraud and deceit, and breach of warranty claims
arising out of the Plaintiff's purchase of a defective Mercedes-
Benz vehicle.

The Defendant removed the case, invoking federal jurisdiction
under the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA").

In 2005, the Plaintiff purchased a 2003 Mercedes-Benz 320C 4-
matic wagon from a Mercedes-Benz USA authorized dealer. On March
24, 2006, the Defendant issued a Dealer Technical Bulletin
("DTB") to its authorized dealers that identified issues with the
radiator and transmission systems in some Mercedes-Benz vehicles.
The Plaintiff alleges the DTB acknowledged that certain Mercedes-
Benz models equipped with a radiator manufactured and/or supplied
by Valeo were defective.  He alleges that his 320C 4-matic wagon
was equipped with one of the Valeo radiators at issue in the DTB.
The Defendant has not recalled the affected vehicles, has not
offered free repairs or replacements to its customers, and has
not reimbursed customers for costs incurred as a result of the
defect.

The Plaintiff alleges that costs of repairing the defect and the
damage it causes can be exorbitant, and consumers will be
required to pay thousands of dollars.  He filed his Complaint as
a putative class action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all
others similarly situated who own or lease certain defective
model year 2004 or earlier Mercedes-Benz C-Class and CLK Class
vehicles designed, manufactured, distributed, sold and/or leased
by defendant.

Later, the Complaint defines the proposed class somewhat
differently as all consumers who purchased or leased a model year
2004 or earlier C Class or CLK Class Mercedes-Benz vehicle.  The
Plaintiff believes that there are thousands of Class members.
The Complaint seeks damages in an amount to be determined at
trial, as well as double or triple damages, and attorneys' fees.

The Defendant promptly removed the action to federal court.  The
Defendant's Notice of Removal of Civil Action stated, in support
of CAFA's amount-in-controversy requirement, that: (1) the
Complaint sought double or treble damages; (2) the Plaintiff made
a pre-litigation $50 million demand for settlement; (3) roughly
385,000 vehicles fit into the Complaint's definition of "Class
Vehicles," meaning the $5 million threshold would be satisfied
even if each putative class member is entitled to only $13; (4)
the Complaint alleges "thousands of dollars" of damages per
vehicle; (5) the requested injunctive relief would cause
Defendant to suffer financial loss; and (6) the Complaint seeks
attorneys' fees and costs.

After the case was removed, the Plaintiff filed a Motion to
Remand to State Court.  His sole argument in support of remand is
that the Defendant has failed to meet its burden to show that
CAFA's amount-in-controversy requirement in 28 U.S.C. Section
1332(d)(2) is satisfied.

Judge Talwani finds that in model years 2003 and 2004, 12,345
such vehicles were sold in the United States.  Subtracting out
the 5,556 vehicles in these categories that were manufactured
after Sept. 1, 2003, and therefore, according to the Defendant,
were not subject to the DTB, leaves 6,789 model year 2003 and
2004 vehicles in the above three vehicle classes with Valeo
radiators subject to the DTB.  Although the Judge provided the
Plaintiff with the opportunity to respond to the Defendant's
supplemental materials, the Plaintiff did not do so.

In addition, the Judge finds that the determination of the amount
in controversy at this stage is not an exact science.  Numerous
yet unknown variables will determine the size of the putative
class.  Some of the 6,789 vehicles above may be excluded from the
class for various reasons.  But assuming just $2,000 of damages
per vehicle, two-thirds (4,289) of the 6,789 vehicles Defendant
identified would need to be outside the alleged class, even
before considering how many other C and CLK Class vehicles came
equipped with the allegedly defective Valeo radiators.  This is
not likely.  Accordingly, she concludes the Defendant has shown a
"reasonable probability" -- that is, that it is more likely than
not -- that more than $5 million is in dispute.

For these reasons, Judge Talwani denied the Plaintiff's Motion to
Remand to State Court.  Then Plaintiff will file any opposition
to the Defendant's pending Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike
Plaintiff's Nationwide Class Allegations within 14 days.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 30, 2018 Memorandum and
Order is available at https://goo.gl/NbwutA from Leagle.com.

Richard K. Garick, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Joshua N. Garick --
Joshua@GarickLaw.com -- Law Offices of Joshua N. Garick, P.C.

Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, Defendant, represented by Eric J. Knapp -
- eric.knapp@squirepb.com -- Squire Patton Boggs (US), LLP, pro
hac vice, Peter M. Durney -- PDurney@CornellGollub.com -- Cornell
& Gollub, Christopher J. Hurst -- churst@cornellgollub.com --
Cornell & Gollub, Scott J. Carr -- scott.carr@squirepb.com --
Squire Patton Boggs (US), LLP, pro hac vice & Troy M. Yoshino --
troy.yoshino@squirepb.com -- Squire Patton Boggs (US), LLP, pro
hac vice.


METAL TECHNOLOGIES: Held Liable for $101K to "Weil" Class
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BRIAN A. WEIL, MELISSA D. FULK, Plaintiffs, v. METAL
TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Defendant, Case No. 2:15-cv-00016-JMS-MPB
(S.D. Ind.), Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson of the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Indiana, Terre Haute Division, held
Metal Technologies liable to the Plaintiff class, Ms. Fulk, and
Mr. Weil to the extent indicated by her Order.

Metal Technologies is an automobile parts manufacturer located in
Bloomfield, Indiana.  Manufacturing employees work one of three
shifts: first shift, from 7:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m.; second shift,
from 3:00 p.m. to 11:30 p.m.; or third shift, from 11:00 p.m. to
7:30 a.m.  The shifts overlap by 30 minutes, and during that
overlapping time, employees are relieved of their duties by the
next shift's employees.  They use the remaining time to clean up
their work areas and exchange information about the previous
shift.  At the time that the Plaintiffs were employed by Metal
Technologies, each shift's production supervisor held a meeting
for all shift employees during the overlapping shift time.

Ms. Fulk worked for Metal Technologies from Aug. 4, 2014 through
Dec. 31, 2014, when she voluntarily resigned her employment.  Mr.
Weil worked for Metal Technologies from Nov. 5, 2014 through Dec.
8, 2014, when his employment was involuntarily terminated.
In their initial Complaint, the Plaintiffs alleged putative class
and collective action claims for violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA"), the Indiana Wage Collections Act
("IWCA"), and the Indiana Wage Payment Statute ("IWPS").  They
later filed a Motion to Certify a Combined Class Action and FLSA
Collective Action and the operative First Amended Complaint.

Under the FLSA, the Court conditionally certified the sub-class
of present and former hourly paid Metal Technologies employees
who worked at any time from Jan. 20, 2012 to the present and who,
as shown by Metal Technologies' time and pay roll records, were
not timely paid regular wages or overtime compensation on one or
more occasion for time worked.

Under Rule 23 and the IWPS, the Court certified the following two
sub-classes:

     a. Hourly paid employees from Metal Technologies who
presently work there or voluntarily terminated their employment,
who worked at any time from Jan. 20, 2013 to the present and who,
as shown by Metal Technologies' time and pay roll records, were
not timely paid regular wages on one or more occasion for time
worked.

     b. Hourly paid employees from Metal Technologies who
presently work there or voluntarily terminated their employment,
who worked at any time from Jan. 20, 2013 to the present and who,
as shown by Metal Technologies' pay roll records, were not timely
paid regular wages on one or more occasions based upon wage
deductions taken by Metal Technologies to cover costs for work
uniforms.

The parties then filed cross-motions for partial summary
judgment, which the Court denied on all but one claim.  The Court
granted summary judgment to the Plaintiff class on a portion of
the class wage deduction claims involving deductions taken for
clothing rental.  It granted summary judgment on the issue of
liability regarding those wage deductions, but only as to the
period from Jan. 20, 2013 through April 10, 2016.  The Court also
granted Metal Technologies' Motion to Decertify two of the
certified subclasses--those involving unpaid wages based on
time--rounding under the FLSA and IWPS.

Following decertification, Mr. Weil and Ms. Fulk proceeded with
their claims individually.  Remaining for resolution at trial,
therefore, were the following claims: (i) the  class damages
under Ind. Code Section 22-2-6-2 resulting from the unlawful wage
deductions taken for clothing rental from Jan. 20, 2013 through
April 10, 2016; (ii) the class claim under Ind. Code Section 22-
2-6-2 for deductions taken for clothing rental from April 11,
2016 onward, and the amount of any resulting damages; (iii) Mr.
Weil's individual claim under Ind. Code Section 22-2-6-2 for wage
deductions taken for clothing rental, and any resulting damages;
(iv) Mr. Weil's individual claim for a one-time deduction of $63,
notated as OF, and any resulting damages; (v) Ms. Fulk's
individual claims for violation of the FLSA and the IWPS for
unpaid wages, and any resulting damages; and (vi) Mr. Weil's
individual claims for violation of the FLSA and IWCA for unpaid
wages, and any resulting damages.

The Court conducted a bench trial in this action on Jan. 30,
2018.

Regarding clothing rental wage deductions taken between Jan. 20,
2013 and April 10, 2016, Judge Magnus-Stinson finds that two
issues remained for resolution at trial: the amount of damages
for the claims raised by the Plaintiff class, and Mr. Weil's
individual clothing deduction claim.  For the class claims, she
concludes that the Plaintiff class is owed $93,152.58 in damages
arising from the improper deduction of wages for clothing rental
taken between Jan. 20, 2013 and April 10, 2016.  For Mr. Weil's
individual claim, the Judge concludes that Metal Technologies'
wage deduction failed to comply with Ind. Code Section 22-2-6-2,
and the Plaintiff class is owed $8,102.04 in damages under the
IWPS.  For Mr. Weil's Obama Fee deduction, she will award him $63
in damages as to this claim.  As to Ms. Fulk's FLSA and IWPS wage
claims, the Judge finds that in the aggregate, Ms. Fulk is owed
$42.99 under the FLSA and IWPS for unpaid wages.  Trebled, Ms.
Fulk is owed $128.97 in damages for this claim.  Finally, with
respect to Mr. Weil's FLSA and IWCA wage claims, she finds that
Mr. Weil is entitled to treble damages for the wage claims raised
under both the IWCA.  Mr. Weil is owed .07 hours in unpaid wages
at the rate of $11 per hour, and therefore Mr. Weil is owed $.77
in unpaid wages under the IWCA.  Trebled, Mr. Weil is owed $2.31
in damages for this claim.

For the reasons she detailed, Judge Magnus-Stinson concludes that
Metal Technologies is liable to the Plaintiff class, Ms. Fulk,
and Mr. Weil to the extent indicated by the Court's order.  The
amount of Metal Technologies' liability to the class and the
Plaintiffs is as follows:

     a. She awarded the Plaintiff class $93,152.58 in damages
arising from the improper deduction of wages for clothing rental
taken between Jan. 20, 2013 and April 10, 2016.

     b. She awarded the Plaintiff class $8,102.04 in damages
arising from the improper deduction of wages for clothing rental
taken from April 11, 2016 forward.

     c. She awarded Mr. Weil $129.30 in damages arising from the
improper deduction of wages for clothing rental.

     d. She awarded Mr. Weil $63.00 in damages arising from the
improper OF deduction.

     e. She awarded Ms. Fulk $128.97 in damages resulting from
Metal Technologies' failure to pay wages earned, in violation of
the FLSA and IWPS.

     f. She awarded Mr. Weil $2.31 in damages resulting from
Metal Technologies' failure to pay wages earned, in violation of
the IWCA.

Pursuant to Ind. Code Section 22-2-5-2, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h),
and the FLSA, the Plaintiffs' counsel is entitled to an award of
reasonable attorney's fees and costs.  Ms. Fulk may also be
entitled to an incentive award for serving as the Lead Plaintiff
for the class.  The Judge ordered the Plaintiffs' counsel to file
with the Court his petition for attorney's fees and a bill of
costs, as well as any request for an incentive award, within 14
days of the issuance of the Order.  Final judgment will issue
after the fees and costs are resolved.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 30, 2018 Order is available
at https://goo.gl/jA9Nvq from Leagle.com.

BRIAN A. WEIL & MELISSA D. FULK, Plaintiffs, represented by Jacob
H. Miller, HUNT HASSLER LORENZ KONDRAS LLP, Robert F. Hunt, HUNT
HASSLER LORENZ & KONDRAS LLP & Robert Peter Kondras, Jr., HUNT
HASSLER KONDRAS & MILLER LLP.

METAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Defendant, represented by Melissa K.
Taft -- Melissa.Taft@jacksonlewis.com -- JACKSON LEWIS P.C. &
Michael W. Padgett -- PadgettM@jacksonlewis.com -- JACKSON LEWIS
P.C.


METAL TECHNOLOGIES: Summary Judgment Bid in "Kolish" Partly OK'd
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, FANNIE M. KOLISH, KEVIN GRAVES, Plaintiffs, v. METAL
TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Defendant, Case No. 2:16-cv-00145-JMS-MJD
(S.D. Ind.), Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson of the District Court for
the Southern District of Indiana, Terre Haute Division, granted
in part and denied in part the Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment.

The case is related to the pending matter Weil v. Metal
Technologies, Inc., 2016 WL 286396 (S.D. lnd. 2016), and arose as
a result of the Court's treatment of class and collective action
certification in Weil.  Generally, Weil involves a series of
claims raised by employees of Metal Technologies for unpaid wages
and wage deductions.  One proposed subclass in Weil was comprised
of employees whom Metal Technologies had allegedly failed to
compensate or had allegedly undercompensated for work performed
during meal breaks.

The Court denied class certification to that Weil subclass,
concluding that the named Plaintiffs were not adequate class
representatives.  Ms. Kolish and Mr. Graves then filed their
Complaint in this case, raising a class and collective action
lawsuit limited to the meal break claims.  The Plaintiffs filed a
Motion to Certify a Combined Class Action and FLSA Collective
Action, which the Court denied.

The Plaintiffs then proceeded individually against Metal
Technologies and filed the operative First Amended Complaint.
The First Amended Complaint alleges violations in addition to
unpaid lunch breaks, including several of the claims previously
raised in Weil.  They challenge Metal Technologies' timekeeping
and payroll practices -- namely, that Metal Technologies pays
employees based on their scheduled shift times, not based on
their time-clock punches, and that Metal Technologies
automatically deducts a 30-minute lunch break, regardless of
employees' clock-outs and clock-ins.

The First Amended Complaint alleges (1) failure to pay overtime
wages as required by the FLSA; and (2) violation of the IWPS,
including unpaid wages, illegally rounded wages, and unpaid wages
for shortened or missed lunch breaks.  Presently pending before
the Court is Metal Technologies' Motion for Summary Judgment.
Metal Technologies argues that the Plaintiffs have presented no
evidence establishing that they performed work for which they
were not compensated.

Judge Magnus-Stinson finds that the Plaintiffs' claims fall into
two categories: those involving unpaid meal breaks, and those
involving time-rounding at the beginning and end of their shifts.

While Metal Technologies correctly points out that the time card
entries alone do not necessarily establish constructive knowledge
on the part of the employer, other facts about the physical
working environment in the facility support the existence of a
genuine dispute on this issue.  Ms. Conrad testified that
employees on the same shift took their meal breaks at the same
time, and that supervisors monitored meal breaks.  Multiple
individuals testified that employees would generally take their
meal breaks in the break room, and employees would use time
clocks located in the break room for clocking out and back in
after lunch.  These facts, the Judge says, taken together, are
sufficient to establish a genuine dispute as to whether anyone
from Metal Technologies was aware that Mr. Graves took shortened
meal breaks in order to perform work.  Therefore, as to Mr.
Graves' claim regarding unpaid meal breaks, she will deny Metal
Technologies' Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Judge will deny Metal Technologies' Motion for Summary
Judgment as to Ms. Kolish's meal breaks that lasted between five
and twenty minutes.  She will grant the Motion as to meal breaks
lasting between one and four minutes.  She concludes that Ms.
Kolish has failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether she was working, or whether Metal Technologies
had actual or constructive knowledge of her working, during meal
breaks that lasted between one and four minutes.

As a final note regarding both Mr. Graves' and Ms. Kolish's meal
break claims, while she ultimately concluded in the related Weil
case that the meal breaks at issue there were not compensable,
the Judge did so based on the specific evidence adduced at trial.
Likewise, she bases her conclusions on the specific evidence
proffered by the parties in the record.

The Judge will grant Metal Technologies' Motion for Summary
Judgment as to Ms. Kolish's beginning and end-of-shift rounding
claims.  Ms. Kolish must provide some evidence to establish that
she was working during times for which she claims compensation.
Ms. Kolish appears to concede that (excluding the lunch claims)
she was paid wages covering her entire shift, and she never
worked beyond her scheduled shift.  There is therefore no genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether Ms. Kolish performed work
before or after her scheduled shift time for which she was not
compensated.

The Judge concludes that no genuine dispute of material fact
exists as to whether Mr. Graves performed compensable work while
clocked in before and after his scheduled shifts.  She will grant
Metal Technologies' Motion for Summary Judgment, as to this
claim.  Finally, to the extent that she has granted summary
judgment on Plaintiffs' FLSA claims, the Judge will also grant
summary judgment on the "derivative" IWPS claims.

For the reasons she described, Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson granted
in part and denied in part the Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment as follows: (i) she granted the Motion as to the
Plaintiffs' claims regarding Plaintiffs' pre-shift early clock-
ins and post-shift late clock-outs; (ii) she denied Motion as to
Mr. Graves' claims regarding unpaid meal breaks; (ii) she denied
the Motion as to Ms. Kolish's claims regarding unpaid meal breaks
lasting five minutes or longer, and GRANTS the Motion as to Ms.
Kolish's claims regarding unpaid meal breaks of one to four
minutes; and (iv) she granted the Motion regarding the
Plaintiffs' derivative IWPS claims, to the same extent that it is
granted as to the Plaintiffs' FLSA claims.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 30, 2018 Order is available
at https://goo.gl/kNb5HE from Leagle.com.

FANNIE M. KOLISH, Plaintiff, represented by Robert F. Hunt, HUNT
HASSLER LORENZ & KONDRAS LLP & Robert Peter Kondras, Jr., HUNT
HASSLER KONDRAS & MILLER LLP.

KEVIN GRAVES, Plaintiff, represented by Robert Peter Kondras,
Jr., HUNT HASSLER KONDRAS & MILLER LLP.

METAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Defendant, represented by Melissa K.
Taft -- Melissa.Taft@jacksonlewis.com -- JACKSON LEWIS P.C. &
Michael W. Padgett -- PadgettM@jacksonlewis.com -- JACKSON LEWIS
P.C.


MOLESKINE AMERICA: Sued by Marett Over Blind-Accessible Web Site
----------------------------------------------------------------
LUCIA MARETT, Individually and as the representative of a class
of similarly situated persons v. MOLESKINE AMERICA, INC., Case
No. 1:18-cv-03395 (S.D.N.Y., April 18, 2018), alleges that the
Defendant fails to design, construct, maintain, and operate its
Web Site -- http://www.Moleskine.com/-- to be fully accessible
to and independently usable by the Plaintiff and other blind or
visually-impaired persons.

Moleskine America, Inc., is a New York Domestic Business
Corporation with a principal place of business located in New
York City.  The Defendant owns and operates Moleskine Stores.
Moleskine Stores provide to the public goods, such as notebooks,
planners, writing utensils, and accessories, amongst other
products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Dan Shaked, Esq.
          SHAKED LAW GROUP, P.C.
          44 Court Street, Suite 1217
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Telephone: (917) 373-9128
          Facsimile: (718) 504-7555
          E-mail: ShakedLawGroup@Gmail.com


MORRISON & FOERSTER: Faces Pregnancy Discrimination Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
Scott Flaherty, writing for The American Lawyer, reports that
even as Morrison & Foerster's alleged treatment of pregnant women
and recent mothers faced scrutiny in a lawsuit, many large law
firms have continued a march toward ever-expanding leave policies
and support programs for new parents.

On May 1, for example, Schiff Hardin announced a new "Ramp
Up/Down" policy, which allows a lawyer to qualify for a 20
percent reduction in their hours requirement -- without any pay
reduction -- in the month before and after their parental leave
period.  The reduced hours program comes on top of other
benefits, such as 18 weeks of paid parental leave that Schiff
Hardin offers to primary caregivers.

"This policy is about promoting work-life balance and retaining
working parents," said Amanda Schermer MacVey, a Washington,
D.C.-based partner at Schiff Hardin who is also a member of the
firm's diversity committee and chair of a subcommittee on gender
diversity.  "Schiff doesn't want the pressure associated with
that adjustment period to lead a working parent to question their
future at the firm."

Ms. MacVey added that beyond the impact on the firm's lawyers,
the new program should also help ease transitions for firm
clients.  Allowing expecting parents to reduce their workload
well in advance of their time off creates time to get other
lawyers up to speed on client matters and an opportunity to
introduce any new lawyers on a team to the client.

But Ms. MacVey and others in the legal industry acknowledged that
a new policy or program is only one piece of the puzzle for
supporting new parents: a firm also has to signal from its
highest level that the policies are there for a reason, namely
that those eligible for them should use them.  That top-down
messaging, according to people in the industry, can help avoid
situations in which junior lawyers feel like they'll be left
behind if they take time off or drop their hours.

As at Schiff Hardin, a ramp-up program is also in the works at
Reed Smith, according to Casey Ryan, a Pittsburgh-based partner
who also serves as global head of legal personnel at the firm --
a role that puts her among the firm's senior management team. Ms.
Ryan said the firm plans to formally announce the program in May,
although she's already spoken to associates about it.

Under the Reed Smith ramp up, Ms. Ryan said, attorneys who take
eight weeks or more of leave can qualify, when they return, for a
reduction in their billable hour requirements.  The first month
back, the reduction can be as much as 40 percent, then up to 30
percent for the second month back, 20 percent for the third month
back, and 10 percent for the fourth month after the leave period
ends.

Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe also has an on-ramp period as part
of its family leave program, which has a number of other
components as well, such as 22 weeks of paid time off for primary
caregivers and a donation to a tax-advantaged 529 college savings
account.

Beyond those reduced hour programs for parents, Reed Smith and
Schiff Hardin have embraced other programs aimed at supporting
lawyers with new children.  The firms both offer Mindful Return,
an online course created by a Dentons lawyer that coaches
professionals on coming back to work after taking leave to care
for a child.

Reed Smith and Schiff Hardin also both offer to cover the costs
of shipping breast milk through a company called Milk Stork,
which allows women who are breastfeeding to pump and ship milk
back to their homes if they're out-of-town for work.  Other
firms, including Latham & Watkins, have rolled out similar
programs in recent years, and many major law firms have taken
other steps to expand their paid parental leave policies.

"Investing in our lawyers when they're going through an exciting,
but challenging, time of their life -- it's part of the firm
culture," said Ms. Ryan of Reed Smith.

In these types of programs, Ms. Ryan, Schiff Hardin's MacVey, and
others in the legal industry said they see benefits for both new
parents looking to stay on their career track and for the firms,
themselves.  For the firms, they said, there are clear upsides
for retaining talented young lawyers and, because attorneys often
have contacts at other large law firms, a good parental leave
program can serve as a way of attracting lateral hires.

"Looking at a firm and seeing that they take these things
seriously makes a difference," said Ms. Ryan.

Kate Reder Sheikh, a managing director at Major, Lindsey & Africa
who focuses on associate recruitment, had a similar take.

"The way that people treat their employees is incredibly salient
in how people make decisions about their careers," she said.

In addition to formal policies, Reed Smith, Schiff Hardin and
other firms, such as Jackson Lewis, have found other ways of
supporting new parents, including through new mothers or parents
groups that fall under the ambit of the firm's diversity and
inclusion committees.

At Reed Smith, according to Ms. Ryan, there's a group called
"Returners," open to women and men at the firm.  It establishes a
liaison in each U.S. office -- typically someone who's taken a
leave period and came back to work afterward.  That person is
meant to serve as a resource for others in that office who have
made a recent transition back into working life.

Schiff Hardin, meanwhile, has a "New Moms" group that allows
mothers at the firm to share tips on transitioning back to work
after maternity leave, and which has influenced decisions at the
management level.  In the April 30 announcement about the ramp-up
policy, the firm said discussions with the New Moms group led to
the new parental leave program, as well as the firm's offerings
of the Milk Stork and Mindful Return programs.

At Jackson Lewis, a group called "Practicing and Parenting" that
started in the firm's Orange County, California, office is now
rolling out to other offices, according to principal Alison
Lynch, who helped start the group.  Ms, Lynch, who became an
equity principal at the firm soon after she returned from a five-
month family leave that followed the birth of her second child,
said the group meets quarterly and discusses issues such as time
management, work-life balance, and tips for career advancement
during the early stages of parenthood.

"We don't want to see people who think, just because they've
become a parent, you can't do this job," said Ms. Lynch.

But even as many firms offer more generous parental leave
policies and support for new parents, there are sometimes
challenges where the policies meet the reality of life in a large
law firm.  It's one thing to have a policy in place, but that
doesn't necessarily translate into an associate or young partner
feeling comfortable enough to take full advantage of those
benefits, especially if they're paired with a more senior partner
who takes a dim view of a person who has taken time off or comes
back to work on a reduced schedule.

In some respects, those types of issues emerged in the context of
the pregnancy discrimination lawsuit lodged against MoFo on
April 30.  A putative class action filed by three unnamed female
associates at the firm alleged that, even though the firm offers
20 weeks of paid parental leave for primary caregivers, the
female associates still faced undue pressure, reduced
opportunities and lower pay once they came back from maternity
leave.

"At MoFo, the mommy track is a dead end," the suit said.

Following the suit, MoFo issued a statement rejecting the claims,
saying the firm "has a long and proven track record of supporting
and advancing our associates as they return from maternity
leave," and that "we vigorously dispute this claim and are
confident that the firm will be vindicated."

Setting the MoFo lawsuit and discrimination allegations aside,
many firms have grown cognizant of the potential for a disconnect
between a policy that's on the books and how it's actually used
or implemented.  Bridging that divide often means ensuring that
both junior lawyers and their more senior counterparts recognize
that the policies and the programs aren't just window dressing,
according to people in the industry.

Major Lindsey's Sheikh, for one, said firms would do well to have
those policies in place, but also to set a tone from the top that
the programs are meant to be used without penalty.  Doing so can
pay dividends for the firm in the long-run, she said, because the
way a firm approaches new parents can weigh heavily on how a
junior lawyer views her or his own firm, or how that person views
the possibility of making a lateral move to a new firm.  All of
that can help a firm draw in and keep top talent.

"We all understand that running a law firm is a business . . .
but I actually think it will enhance their bottom line to the
extent that they keep moving in this positive direction of
treating employees the way they want to be treated," said
Ms. Sheikh.  "These are real, live issues for associates."


MULESOFT INC: Faces "DeBonis" Suit Challenging Sale to Salesforce
-----------------------------------------------------------------
PAUL S. DEBONIS v. MULESOFT, INC., GREG SCHOTT, MARCUS RYU, MARK
BURTON, MICHAEL CAPELLAS, STEVEN COLLINS, YVONNE WASSENAAR, GARY
LITTLE, RAVI MHATRE, and ANN WINBLAD, Case No. 4:18-cv-02259-PJH
(N.D. Cal., April 16, 2018), is brought on behalf of the public
stockholders of MuleSoft seeking to enjoin the expiration of a
tender offer on a proposed transaction, pursuant to which
MuleSoft will be acquired by salesforce.com, inc., through its
wholly owned subsidiary Malbec Acquisition Corp. ("Offeror").

On March 20, 2018, MuleSoft and Salesforce issued a joint press
release announcing that they had entered into an Agreement and
Plan of Merger to sell MuleSoft to Salesforce.  Pursuant to the
terms of the Merger Agreement, Offeror commenced a tender offer
on April 2, 2018, to purchase all of the outstanding shares of
MuleSoft common stock for consideration in the form of: (i) $36
in cash; and (ii) 0.0711 shares of Salesforce common stock.
Accordingly, the Offer Price has an implied value of $44.89 per
share of MuleSoft common stock.  The Proposed Transaction is
valued at approximately $6.5 billion.

The Tender Offer commenced on April 2, 2018 and was set to expire
at 11:59 p.m. New York City Time, on May 1, 2018.

MuleSoft is a Delaware corporation with its principal executive
offices located in San Francisco, California.  The Individual
Defendants are directors and officers of the Company.

MuleSoft is a provider of one of the world's leading platforms
for building application networks.  With its API-led approach to
connectivity, MuleSoft's industry-leading Anypoint Platform(TM)
is enabling more than 1,200 organizations in approximately 60
countries to build application networks.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Juan E. Monteverde, Esq.
          Miles D. Schreiner, Esq.
          MONTEVERDE & ASSOCIATES PC
          The Empire State Building
          350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 4405
          New York, NY 10118
          Telephone: (212) 971-1341
          Facsimile: (212) 202-7880
          E-mail: jmonteverde@monteverdelaw.com
                  mschreiner@monteverdelaw.com

               - and -

          David E. Bower, Esq.
          MONTEVERDE & ASSOCIATES PC
          600 Corporate Pointe, Suite 1170
          Culver City, CA 90230
          Telephone: (310) 446-6652
          Facsimile: (212) 202-7880
          E-mail: dbower@monteverdelaw.com


MULLOOLY JEFFREY: Judgment on Pleadings in "Timoshenko" Granted
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, OKSANA TIMOSHENKO, on behalf of herself and all
other similarly situated consumers Plaintiff, v. MULLOOLY,
JEFFREY, ROONEY & FLYNN, LLP, Defendant, Case No. 17-CV-4472
(E.D. N.Y.), Judge I. Leo Glasser of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of New York granted the Defendant's motion
for judgment on the pleadings.

Timoshenko brings the putative class action against the Defendant
alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
("FDCPA").  Specifically, Timoshenko alleges that Defendant
violated Section 1692e of the FDCPA, which prohibits the use of
false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in
connection with the collection of any debt.

The Defendant is a debt-collection firm located in Syosset, New
York.  Timoshenko is a citizen of New York who resides in the
Eastern District of New York.  On July 11, 2017, the Defendant
sent Timoshenko a letter regarding a debt she owed (and,
presumably, still owes) Velocity Investments, LLC.

Timoshenko alleges that letter's language was false, misleading,
and deceptive -- in violation of Section 1692e of the FDCPA --
because it could reasonably be read to have two or more meanings
concerning the actual balance due.  More specifically, she
alleges that the Collection Letter was unclear regarding the
amount due because it failed to indicate whether the amount
listed already included interest or fees and because it failed to
provide sufficient information regarding the interest or fees
that might apply going forward.  She also alleges that the
Defendant purposefully fails to provide additional information
regarding interest and fees in order to induce payments that
would not otherwise be made if consumers had full information.

Timoshenko filed her complaint on July 28, 2017.  On Aug. 9,
2017, the Defendant's counsel contacted the Plaintiff's counsel
Igor Litvak and advised him that the Collection Letter did not
violate the FDCPA because the language at issue conforms to the
safe-harbor language endorsed by the Second Circuit in Avila v.
Riexinger & Associates, LLC.  And indeed the language in the
Collection Letter does conform to the safe-harbor provision
endorsed in Avila.

The Defendant's counsel also advised Litvak that the two post-
Avila cases cited in the complaint -- Carlin v. Davidson Fink
LLP, and Balke v. Alliance One Receivables Management, Inc. --
did not involve collection letters containing the Avila
safeharbor language.  In light of these facts, the Defendant's
counsel asked Litvak to confirm that Timoshenko would be
dismissing the case.  Instead, Litvak responded with an email (i)
saying he saw "no merit" in the argument that Carlin and Balke
did not concern letters containing the Avila safe-harbor language
and (ii) making clear that Timoshenko would not be dismissing the
case.

On Aug. 18, 2017, the Defendant filed its answer to the
complaint, and contemporaneously filed a motion for (i) judgment
on the pleadings, under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and (ii) attorneys' fees and costs, under Section
1692k(a)(3) of the FDCPA.

Judge Glasser finds that the Collection Letter does not contain
any false, deceptive, or misleading representations, even viewed
from the perspective of the hypothetical "least sophisticated
consumer," and the Plaintiff's protestations to the contrary do
not withstand scrutiny.  He says he needs not parse the
Collection Letter in any great detail, however, nor Timoshenko's
facially implausible allegations, because the Avila safe harbor
plainly applies and is dispositive of the case.  Timoshenko
should not have filed the action in the first place, and Litvak,
once directed to Avila by the Defendant's counsel, should have
advised his client to dismiss the lawsuit.  Since they instead
pressed on, forcing the Defendant to file an answer and the
motion, the only real questions facing the Court are whether it
should award the Defendant attorneys' fees or otherwise sanction
Timoshenko or her counsel.

The Judge concludes that a great virtue of judicially designed or
endorsed safe harbors is that they provide certainty -- for
economic actors, for prospective litigants, and for courts.  This
certainty redounds to the benefit of the public in many ways, not
least through the deterrence of frivolous lawsuits and the
concomitant conservation of judicial resources.  Lawsuits such as
this frustrate these goals, wasting courts' time and draining
blameless defendants of money that could be better spent
elsewhere.  For the reasons he discussed, the Judge granted the
Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted;
denied its request for attorney's fees under 15 U.S.C. Section
1692k(a)(3)d; and ordered the Plaintiff's counsel Litvak to show
cause within seven days why he should not be sanctioned for his
apparent violation of Rule 11(b)(2).

A full-text copy of the Court's March 30, 2018 Memorandum and
Order is available at https://goo.gl/XYEUoh from Leagle.com.

Oksana Timoshenko, on behalf of herself and all other similarly
situated consumers, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel C. Cohen,
Cohen & Mizrahi LLP & Igor B. Litvak, The Law Office of Igor
Litvak.

Mullooly, Jefferson, Rooney & Flynn LLP, Defendant, represented
by Robert L. Arleo -- RArleoESq@gmail.com -- Robert L. Arleo,
Esq..


MZ WALLACE: Faces "Marett" Suit Over Blind-Accessible Web Site
--------------------------------------------------------------
LUCIA MARETT, Individually and as the representative of a class
of similarly situated persons v. MZ WALLACE, INC., Case No. 1:18-
cv-03393 (S.D.N.Y., April 18, 2018), accuses the Defendant of
failing to design, construct, maintain, and operate its Web site
-- http://www.Mzwallace.com/-- to be fully accessible to and
independently usable by the Plaintiff and other blind or
visually-impaired persons.

MZ Wallace, Inc., is a New York Domestic Business Corporation
with a principal place of business located in New York City.  The
Defendant owns and operates MZ Wallace Stores.  MZ Wallace Stores
provide goods and services, such as handbags and accessories,
amongst other products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Dan Shaked, Esq.
          SHAKED LAW GROUP, P.C.
          44 Court Street, Suite 1217
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Telephone: (917) 373-9128
          Facsimile: (718) 504-7555
          E-mail: ShakedLawGroup@Gmail.com


NEW YORK: Court Denies Class Certification Bid in "Calvo"
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York denied Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Class Certification in
the case captioned SUSAN CALVO, JOHN PETERS PROFESSIONAL
LIMOUSINES, INC., JACKLYN RESTREPO, PEDRO CAMACHO, EAMON YUEL and
YONG ZHANG individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, MEERA JOSHI, DAVID
YASSKY, and RAYMOND SCANLON, Defendants, No. 14-CV-7246 (VEC)
(S.D.N.Y.).

This case involves the former policy and practice of Defendant
City of New York to seize vehicles that were suspected of being
used illegally as vehicles for hire without a warrant and prior
to a hearing. After this Court decided that the City's practice
was unconstitutional as applied to so-called first time
violators, Plaintiffs sought class certification, which was
denied without prejudice because Plaintiffs failed to propose a
class defined in such a way that everyone within it had standing.

The Plaintiffs' new proposed class includes all registered owners
of straight plate vehicles seized for alleged first-time
violations of New York City Administrative Code Section 19-506
from September 8, 2011 to the present who were operating the
vehicle at the time of the seizure, or who retrieved the vehicle
personally or through an agent by paying towing and storage fees.

The Court held that the Plaintiffs' Proposed Class fails to
satisfy Rule 23.  The Defendants challenge the adequacy of each
of the named Plaintiffs, pointing to issues of unique defenses to
and circumstances of their seizures, failures to comply with
discovery requests, lack of familiarity with the Complaint, and
questionable credibility as evidenced by deposition testimony.

The Plaintiffs dispute and attempt to rebut these assertions,
contending, inter alia, that the named Plaintiffs need not be
perfect, that they are free of conflicts of interest, that they
raised legitimate discovery objections while cooperating overall
with discovery demands, and that they are sufficiently familiar
with the case.

The Court finds that the Proposed Class fails to satisfy Rule
23(b)(3) because individual issues predominate.  In addition to
satisfying Rule 23(a), a class action must fall within one of the
types of class actions identified in Rule 23(b).  The Plaintiffs
contend that certification of a class is appropriate under Rule
23(b)(3), which requires that the court find that the questions
of law or fact common to class members predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy.

Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement tests whether proposed
classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by
representation.

The Court agrees with the Defendants that individual questions
predominate. The Defendants have presented persuasive evidence
that the Court will have to wade through possibly fraudulent and
forged documents to determine whether any given person in the
seizure records, on which the Plaintiffs intend to rely, truly
belongs in the class.

For example, if the proposed class were certified, the Court
would have to assess whether a person's purported first-time
violation were truly his first, as there is evidence that some
individuals were playing a shell game in which corporate forms
and substance-less transfers of registration were used to hide
true ownership of a vehicle.  The Court would have to assess the
validity of third-party authorizations for any registered owner
who authorized another person to retrieve his vehicle, as the
Defendants have presented credible evidence that some
authorizations were forged.
The Court would have to assess individual bank records of
registered owners who purportedly underwrote the cost of
reclaiming the vehicle. The Court would have to assess on a case-
by-case basis whether a purported class member who retrieved his
vehicle after his first violation but abandoned the vehicle after
a subsequent violation is a true owner or a straw owner of the
vehicle. And the Court would also have to address any unique
circumstances of a particular seizure that might remove an
individual from the class, namely whether a vehicle was seized
for purposes other than a first-time violation of Section 19-506.

Because the Court finds that common questions do not predominate
as required by Rule 23(b)(3), it denies the Plaintiffs' motion
for class certification, and does not reach the question of
superiority under Rule 23(b)(3).

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 2, 2018 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7324svo from
Leagle.com.

Susan Calvo, John Peters Professional Limousines, Inc., Jacklyn
Restrepo, Pedro Camacho, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated & Yong Zhang, Plaintiffs, represented by
Daniel Lee Ackman, Daniel L. Ackman, Esq., Andrew M. St. Laurent
-- andrew@sc-harris.com -- Harris, O'Brien, St. Laurent &
Chaudhry LLP, Jonathan Andrew Harris -- andrew@harrislawny.com --
Harris, O'Brien, St. Laurent & Chaudhry LLP & Joseph Terence
Gallagher -- jgallagher@sc-harris.com -- Harris, St. Laurent &
Chaudhry LLP.

The City Of New York, Meera Joshi, David Yassky & Raymond
Scanlon, Defendants, represented by Karen Beth Selvin, New York
City Law Department & Angelie Thomas, New York City Law
Department.


NISSAN: Court Dismisses Few Claims in Sentra Transmission Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that a
federal judge dismissed only a few claims on May 16 in a class
action accusing Nissan of selling 2013-17 Sentras with defective
transmissions.


NORTH AMERICAN POWER: Settlement in "Edwards" Has Prelim Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PAUL EDWARDS, GERRY WENDROVSKY, SANDRA DESROSIERS,
and LINDA SOFFRON, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. NORTH AMERICAN POWER & GAS,
LLC, Defendants, Case No. 3:14-cv-01714 (VAB) (D. Conn.), Judge
Victor A. Bolden of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Connecticut granted the Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary
settlement approval.

Edwards, on behalf of himself and all persons similarly situated,
filed the initial Class Action Complaint in the case on Nov. 18,
2014.  The case is one of several class actions pending in the
District and throughout the country, alleging that the Defendant
falsely advertised low rates in order to induce customers into
switching their energy provider.

The Plaintiffs claim that NAPG expressly breached its contracts
with class members, as well as the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, by allegedly advertising its variable rates would
fluctuate with the market but failing to do so.  Additionally,
several of the Plaintiffs allege violations of the Connecticut
Unfair Trade Practices Act ("CUTPA") on behalf of a putative sub-
class.

Following settlement discussions between the parties in the
action and those pending elsewhere, the parties have reached a
settlement under which they intend to resolve five cases
involving NAPG's alleged misrepresentations.  The proposed
settlement would involve the claims of class members in eleven
states for breach of contract and alleged violation of state
consumer protection laws.  After notifying the Court of the
proposed settlement, the Plaintiffs moved for preliminary
approval on Jan. 16, 2018.

The Plaintiffs' motion seeks the following: (1) preliminary
certification of a class under 23(b)(3) for settlement purposes;
(2) preliminary approval of the Settlement; (3) authorization to
disseminate the proposed Class Notice to members of the
Settlement Class; and (4) a date and time for the Final Fairness
Hearing.

The settlement seeks to resolve five separate cases: Edwards v.
North American Power & Gas, No. 3:14-cv-01724 (D. Conn. filed
Nov. 18, 2014); Arcaro v. North American Power & Gas, LLC, No.
3:16-cv01921-WWE (D. Conn. filed Oct. 31, 2016); Tully v. North
American Power & Gas, LLC, No. 15-cv-00469-WWE (D. Conn. filed
March 31, 2015); Fritz v. North American Power & Gas, LLC, No.
3:14-cv-0634-WWE (D. Conn. filed May 6, 2014); and Zahn v. North
American Power & Gas, LLC, No. 14-cv-8370 (N.D. Ill., filed Feb.
20, 2015).   The class period is defined as between Feb. 20, 2012
through June 5, 2017.

The agreement provides that NAPG customers who properly file a
claim will be given $.00351 per kilowatt hour if they are
variable rate customers receiving electric supply or $.0195 per
therm if they receive natural gas supply, with a minimum benefit
of $2.  The total benefit, however, payable by NAPG will be
subject to a $16,053,000 cap. In the event that the value of the
Benefits claimed exceeds $16,053,000, the Benefit payable to each
NAPG Variable Rate Customer will be reduced pro rata based on the
individual's electric supply and/or natural gas supply use while
on a variable rate plan.  The Named plaintiffs would receive up
to $5,000 as the class representatives, and the attorney's fees
would be capped at $3,699,000

Upon reviewing the Settlement Agreement, all the filings
submitted in connection with the motion, the information
presented at the hearing, Judge Bolden finds that or the purposes
of preliminary approval, that the proposed settlement, as set
forth in the Parties' Settlement Agreement, is fair, reasonable,
adequate, and in the best interest of the class.  He further
finds that the Settlement Agreement was entered into at arm's
length by highly experienced counsel.  He therefore preliminarily
approved the proposed Settlement.

The Judge conditionally certifies a settlement class defined as
all persons who at any time from Feb. 20, 2012 to June 5, 2017
were customers of NAPG and paid NAPG variable rates for
electricity and/or natural gas in Connecticut, Illinois,
Maryland, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Georgia or Texas.

He appointed Paul Edwards, Gerry Wendrovsky, Sandra Desrosiers,
Linda Soffron, David Fritz, John Arcaro, Michael Tully, and Peggy
Zahn as the Representatives of the Settlement Class; and D. Greg
Blankinship and Todd S. Garber of Finkelstein, Blankinship, Frei-
Pearson & Garber, LLP, Robert Izard, Craig Raabe and Seth Klein
of Izard Kindall & Raabe LLP, Matthew R. Mendelsohn of Mazie
Slater Katz & Freeman, LLC, and Matthew D. Schelkopf of McCune
Wright Arevalo LLP to act as the Class Counsel to the Settlement
Class.

He approved, as to form and content, the Short Form Notice and
Long Form Notice.  Additionally, the Judge approved the following
schedule for dissemination of the Class Notice, requesting
exclusion from the Settlement Class, or objecting to the
Settlement, submitting papers in connection with Final Approval,
and the Final Approval Hearing:

Within 21 days after entry of Defendant will provide names and
addresses of Settlement Order Preliminarily Approving Class
Members to the Settlement Administrator.

the Settlement Within 30 days after entry of The Settlement
Administrator will mail the Short Form Order Preliminarily
Approving Notice to all Settlement Class Members.

the Settlement Within 30 days after entry The Settlement
Administrator will cause the Settlement of Order Preliminarily
Agreement, this Order, and a copy of the Long Form Notice
Approving the Settlement to be posted on the website created
pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, as set forth in the Short
Form Notice Upon mailing of Class Period begins.

Notice 45 days after mailing of Plaintiffs will file a motion for
final approval of settlement, Class Notice and an application for
the award of attorneys' fees, costs, and enhancement awards for
named plaintiffs.

The Settlement Administrator will cause any such motions to be
posted on the Settlement website 60 days after mailing of Class
Deadline for Settlement Class Members to submit Valid Notice
Claims.

     i. Opt-Out Date: Deadline for Settlement Class Members to
opt-out of Settlement.

     ii. Objection Date: Deadline for Settlement Class Members to
object to terms of Settlement and to advise the parties and the
Court of intent to appear at Final Approval Hearing.

     iii. Deadline for the Settlement Administrator to provide
counsel with affidavit of mailing of Short Form Notice - 67 days
after mailing of Class Notice

     iv. Deadline for the Settlement Administrator to provide
counsel e a list of all Class members who returned a timely
request to opt-out of the Settlement (as described in the Class
Notice) - 67 days after mailing of Class Notice

     v. The Class Counsel will serve and file an affidavit of the
Class Settlement Administrator declaring compliance with the
Notice provisions of this Order and CAFA notice requirements - At
least 21 days prior to Final Approval Hearing

     vi. The Plaintiff will file responses to any objections --
At least 7 days prior to the Final Approval Hearing

     vii. Service of notice required under 28 U.S.C. Section
1715(b) -- 90 days after earliest date for entry of order finally
approving Settlement Agreement

Judge Bolden approved Heffler Claims Group as the Settlement
Administrator, with the responsibilities set forth in the
Settlement Agreement.  The Court will hold a Final Approval
Hearing on Aug. 1, 2018, at 10 a.m.  Finally, he stayed all
proceedings in the Court other than those proceedings necessary
to carry out or enforce the terms and conditions of the
Settlement, until the Effective Date of the Settlement has
occurred.  Additionally, he prohibited and/or enjoined any other
person or counsel from representing or prosecuting any claims on
behalf of the Class in any other Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 30, 2018 Ruling and Order
is available at https://goo.gl/h6Mmeg from Leagle.com.

Paul T. Edwards, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Robert A. Izard, Jr. --
rizard@ikrlaw.com -- Izard, Kindall & Raabe, LLP-CT, Craig A.
Raabe -- craabe@ikrlaw.com -- Izard, Kindall & Raabe LLP & Seth
R. Klein -- sklein@ikrlaw.com -- Izard Kindall & Raabe.

Gerry Wendrovsky, Linda Soffron & Sandra Desrosiers, Plaintiffs,
represented by Craig A. Raabe , Izard, Kindall & Raabe LLP & Seth
R. Klein , Izard Kindall & Raabe.

North American Power & Gas, LLC, Defendant, represented by Greil
Roberts -- groberts@gordonrees.com -- Gordon & Rees LLP & William
E. Murray -- wmurray@gordonrees.com -- Gordon & Rees LLP.


OCWEN LOAN: Faces "Eisenberg" Suit in C.D. California
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Ocwen Loan
Servicing LLC. The case is styled as Kathleen Angel Eisenberg,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v Southwest Business Corporation, a Texas corporation,
Movant/Defendant, Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company, Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-04157 (C.D. Cal.,
May 17, 2018).

Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC offers and services residential
mortgage loans. Its loan servicing includes customer service,
collections, investor accounting, escrow, loss mitigation,
foreclosure, and property disposition. The company services
mortgage backed securitized and unsecuritized loans and
securities. The company was founded in 1988 and is based in West
Palm Beach, Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


OXNARD, CA: Mayoral Candidate Files Class Action Over Sewer Fees
----------------------------------------------------------------
Wendy Leung, writing for VC Star, reports that there is a new
chapter in the legal maneuverings between the city of Oxnard and
the organizer of the City Council recall.

Aaron Starr, a mayoral candidate in the recent special election,
filed a new lawsuit against the city over wastewater rates.  The
class action lawsuit claims that the sewer rates billed to
residents following the passage of Measure M were "collected
illegally."

The complaint filed by Starr and Oxnard resident Nancy Pedersen
calls on the city to refund customers who paid wastewater fees
from December 2016 to July 2017.

In the 2016 election, Oxnard voters passed Measure M, an
initiative written by Starr to repeal a series of wastewater rate
increases that begin with a 35 percent hike.  The city sued Starr
over the legality of the ballot initiative.  Ventura County
Superior Court Judge Rocky Baio is expected to make a decision on
the Measure M lawsuit.

After the 2016 election, Judge Baio granted the city a Measure M
stay, meaning the rates would not be repealed until a decision is
reached on the case.  In other words, rates that should have been
repealed in December 2016 because of Measure M did not get
repealed.

Last July, new wastewater increases were approved by the City
Council that superseded prior rate increases.  If Judge Baio
rules in Starr's favor on Measure M, the city would have to pay
back ratepayers a portion of the rates from December 2016 to July
2017.  The seven-month period is the time when the rates would
have been repealed to the time when the council set new rates.

City Attorney Stephen Fischer said the latest lawsuit is
premature.

"We're awaiting the ruling from Judge Baio.  That would dictate
what comes next," Mr. Fischer said.

Rachele Rickert, one of the attorneys representing Starr and
Pedersen, said it was "prudent" to file the lawsuit now.

"We want to preserve the rights of the class," she said.

As of May 7, the city has yet to be served the lawsuit.  A date
for a case management conference is scheduled for Sept. 21.

The complaint states: "Aaron Starr and Nancy Pedersen, on behalf
of themselves and all other similarly situated city of Oxnard
wastewater customers, seek damages from defendant in connection
with its improper collection and retention of excessive
wastewater utility fees and charges from Dec 16, 2016 and July 1,
2017."

Mayor Tim Flynn said it is not yet known whether the city will
have to issue a refund.

"A judge makes a ruling and then it'll be determined if what is
filed now is necessary," Mr. Flynn said.  "If the judge rules
against (Starr,) then it'll be determined if what is filed now is
necessary.  If the judge rules against him, the current complaint
is invalid."

The lawsuit was filed April 26, five days before the recall
election initiated by Starr.

In response to the City Council raising wastewater rates
following Measure M, Starr led a campaign to recall the mayor and
three council members.  The four officials survived the recall
election, according to the latest unofficial results.

The city lawsuit over Measure M and the latest class action
complaint are not the only court matters between the two parties.

Mr. Starr is also suing the city over an infrastructure use fee,
which is money taken out of the utility funds to pay for public
safety and street improvements.  That case has not yet gone to
trial.

Before the special election, Mr. Starr sued Mr. Flynn for lying
on his candidate statement.  Mr. Flynn was ordered by a judge to
change his statement regarding the state of the city's finances.

Mr. Flynn said he was not surprised to learn about the latest
lawsuit.

"To me, it's no different than the recall election," Mr. Flynn
said. "(Starr) has his agenda.  He wants his agenda to be first
and he'll use whatever means necessary to accomplish that." [GN]


PACIFIC GAS: Must Face Claims Related to Wine Country Wildfires
---------------------------------------------------------------
Nicholas Iovino, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported
that Pacific Gas and Electric must face claims that its power
lines sparked at least some of the Wine Country wildfires that
killed 44 people and caused billions of dollars in damage last
fall, a California judge ruled on May 21.

San Francisco Superior Court Judge Curtis Karnow overruled PG&E's
demurrers, or objections to claims alleged in dozens of lawsuits
filed by individuals, insurance companies and three California
counties.

PG&E argued the plaintiffs could not use a legal concept called
inverse condemnation to hold it liable for property damage.
Under that state law concept, a public entity such as a utility
company can be held liable if its equipment is found to be a
substantial cause of property damage, regardless of whether the
entity acted negligently.

Because there is no guarantee PG&E can pass on fire damage costs
to ratepayers, the utility argued it cannot be considered a
public entity and therefore is not subject to inverse
condemnation.

Judge Karnow rejected that argument, finding the state's public
utility regulator could still let PG&E pass fire damage costs on
to ratepayers if PG&E was found to be a "prudent manager" and not
at fault or negligent in maintaining its power lines.

Accepting PG&E's argument would mean that a private utility
company could never be subject to inverse condemnation, Judge
Karnow said.  That claim is directly contradicted by the 2012
California appellate ruling Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v.
Southern California Edison Co., in which a power company was held
liable for electrical damage to telephone lines, the judge
concluded.

Judge Karnow also dismissed PG&E's arguments that applying
inverse condemnation in this case would violate PG&E's due
process rights and go against the Takings Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.

"It is not arbitrary or irrational to require a privately owned
public utility, which has been granted monopoly or quasi-monopoly
status by the state and which is authorized to pass on its costs
to ratepayers upon satisfying a prudent manager standard, to pay
property owners for damages caused by its instrumentalities,"
Judge Karnow wrote in his 10-page ruling.

Judge Karnow also denied PG&E's request to immediately appeal his
ruling, finding the case must still proceed on other claims that
involve the same evidence "whether inverse condemnation is
involved or not."

PG&E said in an emailed statement that it continues to believe
that inverse condemnation, as applied to a privately owned
utility, is a "flawed legal doctrine that is bad for
Californians."

The California wildfires raged for 23 days in October 2017 and
destroyed more than 21,000 homes and 2,800 businesses.  They
caused at least $9.4 billion in damage, according to the state's
Department of Insurance.

The North Bay fires scorched about 245,000 acres across several
counties in Northern California.

Cal Fire has yet to determine a cause for the approximately 250
wildfires that broke out last October, but Santa Rosa city
investigators found PG&E power lines ignited at least two small
fires on Oct. 8.

PG&E announced in March that it will turn off electricity in
wildfire-prone areas when wind and other factors make the rapid
spread of flames more likely.

PG&E spokesman Air Vanrenen said the company remains committed to
public safety and supporting recovery efforts in the North Bay.

"The safety of our customers, their families and the communities
we serve is our most important job," Mr. Vanrenen said in an
email.  "The loss of life, homes and businesses in these
extraordinary wildfires is simply heartbreaking, and we remain
focused on helping the North Bay communities recover and
rebuild."


PER MAR SECURITY: Court Certifies 2 Classes in "Bessy" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANTONE BESSY and KANASHA WOODS, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. PER
MAR SECURITY AND RESEARCH CORP., Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-034-
wmc (W.D. Wis.), Judge William M. Conley of the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, granted the
Plaintiffs' motion for conditional certification.

Plaintiffs Bessy and Woods allege that their former employer Per
Mar Security and Research Corp violated the Fair Labor Standards
Act ("FLSA") and Wisconsin wage and hour statutes by failing to
properly pay for overtime work.  They seek to pursue a collective
action under the FLSA and a Rule 23 class action for their state
law claims.

Before the Court is the Plaintiffs' motion for conditional
certification of the FLSA collective action.

For the reasons that follow, the court will grant plaintiffs'
motion for conditional certification of the following two FLSA
collection actions: (1) a class of all Per Mar employees pursing
a claim based on defendant's method for calculating the rate of
pay during overtime hours; and (2) a class of Wisconsin employees
only pursuing a claim based on Per Mar's alleged under-reporting
of hours worked.

The Plaintiffs are both former Special Events employees for Per
Mar Security and Research Corp's Milwaukee branch.  Per Mar
provides security services to business and residential customers,
including security systems and securities guards, located
throughout the Midwest, with 23 branch locations in thirteen
states.  It has five branch offices in Wisconsin that provide
security guard services: Eau Claire, Green Bay, Madison,
Milwaukee and Wausau.  Per Mar provides two types of security
services, permanent uniformed security guards and special event
officers.

The Plaintiffs were both special event officers. Employees who
perform services at special events are required to record their
hours worked on a paper sign-in sheet.  The Defendant contends,
however, that each branch uses paper timesheets for special
events, but the form of those timesheets vary from branch to
branch.

The Plaintiffs pursue two FLSA claims.  First, they claim that
the Defendant improperly calculates their overtime compensation
by using the rate based on the work being performed at the time
of the overtime, rather than a blended rate (or the average
straight time wage rate) for the entire work week.  For this
claim, the Plaintiff collected examples of underpayment of
overtime wages because of this alleged improper method of
calculating overtime compensation from each of Per Mar's five
Wisconsin branches. Plaintiff, however, seeks to certify a
collective action conditionally that covers all of Per Mar's
branches, in part because Per Mar has failed to abide by the
parties' agreement to produce time cards for all of its branches.

Second, they allege that the Defendant violated the FLSA by
adopting an unwritten policy of having supervisors undercount or
under-report employees' hours, thus depriving them of overtime
pay.  For this collective action, the Plaintiffs seek to cover
only Per Mar's employees at its Wisconsin branches, having
collected evidence from at least six employees, including
Plaintiff Bessy, of supervisors completing employees' time cards
in three of Per Mar's branches.

Judge Conley finds a sufficient basis to certify a nationwide
class based on Per Mar's payroll supervisor's declaration,
averring that the department, located at its corporate
headquarters, is responsible for ensuring the accurate
computation and processing of payroll for all Per Mar employees,
and a reasonable inference that in light of this centralized
process, the same method for calculating overtime is used.  He is
satisfied that plaintiff has met the modest showing necessary for
conditional certification, but the Defendant, of course, is free
to renew this challenge at the decertification stage, provided it
has evidence to suggest that the overtime calculation claim is
specific to Wisconsin employees.

Finding that the Plaintiff has made a "a modest factual showing"
that they and other Per Mar employees were subject to the same
overtime pay calculation policy, the Judge will certify
conditionally a nationwide collective action concerning Per Mar's
method for calculating the overtime rate of pay, conditioned with
the understanding that it is on the Plaintiffs gathering just
that -- greater proof.

The Judge will conditionally certify a collective action of
Wisconsin employees only who were allegedly subjected to an
unofficial policy of under-reporting hours by Per Mar.  Bessy's
declaration as to his own experience of underreporting of hours
worked, coupled with a reasonable inference based on the
placement of other employees' names above Bessy's in the
pertinent time records who reported for work at the same time or
earlier than he, as well as review of paystubs reflecting pay for
less than the hours apparently worked, is sufficient to meet the
modest standard for conditionally certifying an FLSA test.

Finally, while the language in the notice states that "the
lawsuit alleges" -- thus reflecting the Plaintiffs' position --
the Judge agrees with the Defendant that the notice should at
least acknowledge that, at times, the method used by Per Mar, the
so-called "type of work" rate, could result in a higher pay rate
than if Per Mar had calculated the rate using a blended average.
As such, the he agrees with the Defendant that its proposed
description of the Plaintiff's claim is more accurate and
complete.  Accordingly, the Plaintiffs are directed to adopt the
language provided in the Defendant's opposition brief at pages
25-26.

For these reasons, Judge Conley granted the Plaintiffs' motion
for conditional certification of FLSA collective actions.  He
certifies the following two collective actions:

     a. All persons who have been or are currently employed by
the Defendant as special events employees at any nationwide
location at any time during the past three years; and

     b. All persons who have been or are currently employed by
defendant as special events employees in the state of Wisconsin
at any time during the past three years.

On or before April 9, 2018, the Defendant will produce to the
Plaintiff an electronic list of names and addresses of all
employees who fall within the scope of the collective actions,
specifically identifying which employees are Wisconsin employees.
On or before April 9, 2018, the Plaintiffs will file two versions
of the notice, consistent with the Opinion: the first describing
both collective actions to be sent to Wisconsin employees, and
the second describing just the method of calculating overtime
rate of pay to be sent to non-Wisconsin employees.  On or before
April 16, 2018, the Plaintiffs' counsel is directed to mail the
notices to the collective action members.  Those members will
have 60 days from the date of mailing to opt-in to the collective
actions.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 30, 2018 Opinion and Order
is available at https://goo.gl/CaLQHr from Leagle.com.

Antone Bessy & Kanasha Woods, Plaintiffs, represented by Nathan
Dane Eisenberg -- nde@previant.com -- The Previant Law Firm, S.C.
& Yingtao Ho -- yh@previant.com -- Previant, Goldberg, Uelmen,
Gratz, Miller & Brueggeman, S.C.

Per Mar Security and Research Corp., Defendant, represented by
Alan E. Seneczko -- alseneczko@wesselssherman.com -- Wessels
Sherman Joerg Liszka Laverty Seneczko P.C. & Peter Edward Hansen
-- pehansen@wesselssherman.com -- Wessels, Sherman, Joerg,
Liszka, Laverty, Seneczko, PC.


PETER WASTNEY: Class Action Mulled Over Dodgy Towbars
-----------------------------------------------------
Chris Hutching, writing for Stuff, reports that NZTA has ordered
owners of more than 800 trucks to stop using towbars certified by
Wastney Engineering in Nelson, meaning they cannot tow trailers
behind them.

Road Transport Association NZ chief executive Dennis Robertson
said it was a great relief that NZTA was putting together a
programme for certification and repair as quickly as it had.

"They've written to all the affected truck owners or phoned them
and arranged for a time for inspection when it will be decided
what repairs may be needed," Mr. Robertson said.

Most of the trucks were in the South Island, in the
Nelson/Marlborough area and on the West Coast.

The cost of certification was usually about $500 and the cost of
repairs could be considerably more.

"It's a great relief for some operators.  Some of them are in
rural areas and it happens to be a peak time for them with gypsy
day coming up when dairy farmers move a lot of stock.  Without
being able to use their trailers there have been delays for some
customers," Robertson said.

Road Transport Forum chief executive Ken Shirley lashed out at
NZTA for failing to keep on top of the problem and said his group
was also considering a class legal action against Peter Wastney
Engineering, "but I suspect the well will be dry", he said.

Some businesses would have absorbed the costs of delays, he said.

The Transport Agency was working closely with the Heavy Vehicle
Engineers group at Engineering New Zealand to provide support to
ensure that inspections, re-certifications and repairs can be
completed as quickly as possible.

"This will include temporarily relocating additional engineers
qualified certifiers at temporary sites in Blenheim, Nelson,
Greymouth and Westport to fast-track inspections and re-
certifications in order to minimise disruption for industry.

"We'll be working together with Engineering New Zealand's HVE
group, the Road Transport Forum and the Truck-Trailer
Manufacturers Federation to help meet demand and get these
vehicles safely back on the road as soon as possible," NZTA said.

"While there is no legal liability to do so, in order to minimise
interruption the Transport Agency will cover the cost of the re-
certification and, where necessary, repair or replacement of
towing connections."

NZTA also recommended that owners stop using any vehicles with
parts certified by Peter Wastney Engineering, and also gave
definitions of the main towing components.

A towbar is fitted to a heavy vehicle (truck, bus, campervan etc)
and is used to tow a light vehicle, usually a trailer or another
light vehicle no greater than 3500 kilogrammes.

A drawbeam is fitted to a heavy vehicle or truck and is used to
tow a heavy trailer with a gross vehicle mass exceeding 3500kg.

A drawbar is fitted to a heavy trailer with a mass exceeding
3500kg

NZTA recommended removal of towbars or drawbeams by unbolting
them unless welded, or welding a plate over the mounting hole so
another towball cannot be bolted on.

"Removing the towball or tow coupling only is not an acceptable
method of rendering a towbar or drawbeam inoperable." [GN]


RALPH MURDY: Wins Bid to Dismiss FAC in "Price" Suit
----------------------------------------------------
In the case, WILLIAM PRICE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. RALPH M.
MURDY, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. GLR-17-736 (D. Md.),
Judge George L. Russell, III of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Maryland (i) granted the Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike
New Argument, and Murdy's Motion to Dismiss the First Amended
Complaint or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment and
Request for a Hearing; and (ii) granted in part and denied in
part Samuel Spicer's Motion to Dismiss the First Amended
Complaint or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment and
Request for a Hearing, and the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify
Legal Question to the Court of Appeals.

Defendant Auto Smart, LLC is an automobile dealership located in
Harford County, Maryland.  It refers its customers to Spicer for
financing when they buy its motor vehicles.  Once Auto Smart and
the customer agree on a purchase price, the customer enters into
a loan agreement with Spicer to provide financing for buying the
vehicle.  It accepts payments on the loans on behalf of Spicer.
While servicing the loans, Spicer assesses compound interest,
even though the financing agreements did not include any language
allowing the assessment of such interest.  When a borrower
defaults on one of his loans, Spicer repossesses the vehicle, and
then Spicer and Auto Smart refer the loan to Murdy for
collection.  Murdy then files lawsuits on Spicer's behalf in
Maryland state court to collect on the defaulted loans.

The Prices purchased three motor vehicles from Auto Smart, and
entered into loans with Spicer to finance the purchase of each
vehicle.  At an unspecified date, Spicer, through his agent Auto
Smart, repossessed the 1996 Ford.  Auto Smart then resold the
vehicle to another customer and did not credit the sale amount to
Mr. Price's outstanding loan balance.  Spicer also did not
provide Mr. Price with any pre-sale or post-sale repossession
notices.

In 2012 or 2013, Spicer referred Mr. Price's Installment Note for
the 1996 Ford to TCA for collection.  On March 4, 2013, Murdy
filed a debt collection suit against Mr. Price on Spicer's behalf
in the Circuit Court for Harford County, Maryland.  Spicer sued
Mr. Price for a $5,567.63 principal balance, $430.86 in interest,
$1,320.00 in late fees, and $556.76 in attorney's fees.  Spicer
and Murdy requested that judgment be entered against Mr. Price in
2015.

Chovan purchased two motor vehicles (a Chevrolet Cavalier and a
1999 Ford Escort) from Auto Smart, and entered into loans with
Spicer to finance the purchase of each vehicle.  At an
unspecified date, Spicer, through his agent Auto Smart,
repossessed the 1999 Ford Escort.  Auto Smart then resold the
vehicle to another customer and did not credit the sale amount to
Chovan's outstanding loan balance.  Spicer also did not provide
Chovan with any pre-sale or post-sale repossession notices.  In
2012 or 2013, Spicer referred Chovan's debt to Murdy for
collection.  On Feb. 18, 2015. Murdy filed suit against Chovan.
Spicer sued Chovan for a $26,786.69 principal balance and
$2,678.67 in attorney's fees.

On March 17, 2017, the Plaintiffs sued Murdy, Spicer, and Auto
Smart.  On May 19, 2017, Murdy filed his Motion to Dismiss the
Original Complaint.  Spicer filed his Motion to Dismiss the
Original Complaint on June 22, 2017.

On July 6, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Class
Action Complaint, alleging the following counts: (1) violations
of Maryland Consumer Loan Law ("MCLL")(Count I); violations of
the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Practices Act
("MCDCA")(Count II); (3) violations of 8 U.S.C. Section 1962(a)
(2018) the Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations ("RICO")
Act (Count III); violations of RICO 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(c)
(Count IV); and violations of RICO 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(d)
(Count V).

On Aug. 4, 2017, both Murdy and Spicer filed Motions to Dismiss
the First Amended Complaint or, in the Alternative, Motion for
Summary Judgment and Request for Hearing.  The Plaintiffs filed a
combined Response to Murdy's and Spicer's Motions on Aug. 25,
2017.  On Sept. 8, 2017, Murdy and Spicer filed separate Replies.

On Sept. 29, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Certify Legal
Question to the Court of Appeals.  On Oct. 2, 2017, the
Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Strike Spicer's Reply in Response to
Motion.  On Oct. 12, 2017, Murdy filed a Response to the
Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Legal Question.  On Oct. 13, 2017,
Spicer filed a combined Response in Opposition to the Plaintiffs'
Motion to Certify Legal Question and Motion to Strike.  The
Plaintiffs filed separate Replies in support of the Motion to
Certify Legal Question and Motion to Strike on Oct. 24, 2017.

On Dec. 15, 2017, the Court issued an Order that the Plaintiffs
show cause why Auto Smart, having not been served, should not be
dismissed from the case.  Because the Court did not receive a
response to the Show Cause Order, the Court dismissed Auto Smart
from the case on Jan. 5, 2018.

The Plaintiffs request that the Court certifies these questions
to the Maryland Court of Appeals regarding the MCLL: (i) whether
an advance of money with a principal balance less than $6,000
entered into between Party A and Party B to finance the purchase
of a motor vehicle from Party C is a loan under the MCLL; and
(ii) whether the MCLL Section 12-302's licensing requirement is
another specialty subject to Maryland's 12-year limitations
period under Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. 5-102(a)(6).

Judge Russell will deny the Plaintiffs' request as to the first
question and granted their as to the second question.  With
respect to the Plaintiffs' MCLL claims, Judge Russell finds that
whether Spicer retained a security interest in the vehicles is of
no consequence.  Further, in the state court filings Spicer
states that he privately finances customers for the dealership
Auto Smart, LLC of Aberdeen.  The Defendant purchased automobile
and financed through Spicer.  These statements from Spicer that
he "financed" the Plaintiffs' automobile purchases is further
evidence that these transactions are loans.  Because he concludes
that these transactions are loans, he further concludes that
Spicer had to be licensed under the MCLL to enter into them.  As
a result, the Court will deny the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify
Question as to the first question.

As to statute of limitations, Mr. Price took out three loans from
Spicer, the last of which was signed on March 23, 2009.  If the
three-year statute of limitation applies, it passed in March 23,
2012.  Similarly, Chovan took out his loan from Spicer on Nov. 1,
2006.  If the three-year statute of limitations applies, it
passed on Nov. 1, 2009.  Put simply, if the statute of
limitations is three years, the Plaintiffs' MCLL claims would be
time-barred.  The answer to which statute of limitations applies
to the MCLL -- three years or 12 years -- not only "may be
determinative of an issue," it would conclusively determine
whether the Plaintiffs can even bring their MCLL claims.  There
is also no controlling appellate decision addressing this issue.
Accordingly, the Judge will certify the Plaintiffs' second
question to the Court of Appeals of Maryland.  He will file a
separate Certification Order.

The Judge concludes that the transactions at issue are loans
under the MCLL, and therefore Spicer was required to be licensed.
Because Spicer does not address the Plaintiffs' specific
allegations that he violated the MCLL in failing to obtain a
license, failing to provide any notices related to repossession
of cars, and charging and collecting compound interest, these
claims against Spicer remain.

With respect to the MCDCA Claims, Judge Russell holds that the
Plaintiffs' MCDCA claims based on Spicer and Murdy's attempts to
collect a debt that occurred more than three years prior to the
filing of their Complaint are time-barred.  But Chovan's claim
related to the 2015 lawsuit against him and the Plaintiffs'
claims that Spicer and Murdy attempted to collect debt from them
in 2014 and 2015 fall within the three-year statute of
limitations. All of Plaintiffs' MCDCA claims will be dismissed,
however, because they fail to allege that Spicer and Murdy acted
with requisite knowledge.

For these reasons, Judge granted the Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike
New Argument, construed as a motion for leave to file a surreply.
He also granted Murdy's Motion to Dismiss the First Amended
Complaint or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment and
Request for a Hearing.  The Judge granted in part and denied in
part Spicer's Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint or,
in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment and Request for a
Hearing; and the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Legal Question to
the Court of Appeals.  He denied as moot Murdy's Motion to
Dismiss Complaint or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary
Judgment and Request for Hearing; and Spicer's Motion to Dismiss
Complaint or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment and
Request for Hearing.  A separate Order follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 30, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
is available at https://goo.gl/9tPvBz from Leagle.com.

William Price, Deborah Price & Frank P. Chovan, on their own
behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Cory L. Zajdel, Z Law LLC.

Samuel Spicer, Defendant, represented by Andrew Kevin O. Connell
-- aoconnell@tandllaw.com -- Thomas & Libowitz, P.A.


RECEIVABLES MANAGEMENT: Faces "Martin" Suit in New Jersey
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Receivables
Management Systems. The case is styled as Danielle Martin,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Receivables Management Systems, Defendant, Case No.
1:18-cv-09359-RMB-KMW (D. N.J., May 17, 2018).

Receivables Management Systems (RMS) is a third party service
provider with over twenty-five years of collections
experience.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   ARI HILLEL MARCUS, Esq.
   MARCUS ZELMAN LLC
   701 COOKMAN AVENUE, SUITE 300
   ASBURY PARK, NJ 07712
   Tel: (732) 695-3282
   Fax: (732) 298-6256
   Email: ari@marcuszelman.com

      - and -

   YITZCHAK ZELMAN, Esq.
   Marcus Zelman, LLC
   701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
   Asbury Park, NJ 07712
   Tel: (347) 526-4093
   Fax: (732) 298-6256
   Email: yzelman@marcuszelman.com


RELX INC: Fails to Pay Proper OT Under FLSA, "Oliver" Suit Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
TENOLA OLIVER, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. RELX INC. D/B/A LEXISNEXIS, Case No. 3:18-cv-00127-
TMR (S.D. Ohio, April 18, 2018), arises from the Defendant's
alleged practices and policies of misclassifying the Plaintiff
and other similarly-situated employees as "exempt," and not
paying them overtime compensation at the rate of one and one-half
times their regular rates of pay for the hours they worked over
40 each workweek, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

RELX Inc., doing business as LexisNexis, is a foreign
corporation, organized and existing under the laws of the state
of Massachusetts, licensed to conduct business in the state of
Ohio.  LexisNexis provides legal, regulatory, and business
information and analytics to its customers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lori M. Griffin, Esq.
          Anthony J. Lazzaro, Esq.
          Chastity L. Christy, Esq.
          THE LAZZARO LAW FIRM, LLC
          920 Rockefeller Building
          614 W. Superior Avenue
          Cleveland, OH 44113
          Telephone: (216) 696-5000
          Facsimile: (216) 696-7005
          E-mail: anthony@lazzarolawfirm.com
                  chastity@lazzarolawfirm.com
                  lori@lazzarolawfirm.com


RESORT MARKETING: Claim Verification Period Extended
----------------------------------------------------
According to Snopes' David Mikkelson, back in August 2017 Snopes
reported news that an ongoing class action lawsuit meant anyone
who received an automated telemarketing phone call from certain
cruise companies between 2009 and 2014 could receive
compensation.

The class-action lawsuit offered up to $900 to persons who
received robocalls placed between 2009 and 2014 offering free
cruises on the Carnival, Royal Caribbean or Norwegian cruise
lines.  Many people who had received such calls followed the
correct procedure to report themselves as legitimate claimants,
but heard nothing afterwards and received no payment.

Apparently, upwards of two million people filed claims, many of
which are suspected to be fraudulent.  Accordingly, the court has
authorized a supplemental notice which requires claimants to
supply additional information supporting their claims.

Those who filed claims should be on the lookout for emailed
notices from Charvat v. Resort Marketing Group.  Those notices
inform claimants that the verification period has been extended
until 31 May 2018, and that "even if you previously submitted a
claim, you must submit additional documentation sufficient to
show or explain your ownership, use or subscription of the phone
number relating to your claim in order to receive money from this
settlement":

Such documentation might include (but would not be limited to) a
phone bill or a copy of a relevant page of a phone directory.  A
satisfactory submission could also include any other type of
documentation that confirms or explains the connection of the
claimant to the number at issue in a manner that can be
independently confirmed upon further inquiry by the Parties or
the Settlement Administrator. [GN]


RODAN + FIELDS: Faces Class Action Over Lash Boost Product
----------------------------------------------------------
Alana Laflore, writing for fox4kc.com, reports that a class
action lawsuit claims skincare company Rodan + Fields failed to
inform buyers of side effects in its popular Lash Boost product.

The product contains isopropyl cloprostenate, which is used to
treat glaucoma.  Attorneys say the side effects of the ingredient
include eyelid drooping, eye pain and tearing and darkening of
skin and iris.

Lash Boost is available without a prescription from the multi-
level marketing company.  Cosmetic products such as Lash Boost
can be marketed without FDA approval.

The lawsuit claims, "Consumers of Lash Boost throughout
California and New York, have experienced serious side effects .
. .  But instead of disclosing the harmful side effects and risks
associated with use of Lash Boost, and letting consumers decide
if Lash Boost is worth the risk, Rodan + Fields omitted them and
thus engaged in fraudulent, unfair, and unlawful marketing
practices."

"We would like to confirm/reassure you that we stand by our
product, which is safe and marketed properly," Rodan + Fields
said in response to one user's Facebook post. [GN]


S.C. JOHNSONS: Court Won't Dismiss Suit Over False SPF Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned LAURA CARROL et al, Individually and on Behalf
of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. S.C. JOHNSONS &
SON, Inc. and VMG PARTNERS, LLC, Defendants, No. 17-cv-05828
(N.D. Ill.).

Plaintiffs Laura Carroll, Katherine Exo, Armand Ryden, and
Katharine Shaffer ("Plaintiffs") bring this putative class action
against Defendant S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. ("Johnson" or
"Plaintiff") and VMG Partners, LLC, for allegedly marketing the
Babyganics mineral-based sunscreens with a false Sun Protection
Factor ("SPF") rating.  Lauran Carroll and Katherine Exo are
citizens of Illinois and residents of Cook County, Armand Ryden
is a citizen of California, Katharine Shaffer is a citizen of
Washington, and Defendant is a privately-held Wisconsin
corporation.

The Plaintiffs allege: breach of warranty (Count I) on behalf of
a nationwide class and subclasses; breach of implied contract and
violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
(Count II) on behalf of a nationwide class and subclasses;
disgorgement/restitution (Count III) on behalf of a nationwide
class and subclasses; violation of California Unfair Competition
Law (Count IV) on behalf of the California Subclass; violation of
California Consumers Legal Remedies Act (Count V) on behalf of
the California Subclass; violation of Illinois Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices (Count VI) on behalf of the Illinois
Subclass; and violation of Washington Unfair Business Practices
(Count VII) on behalf of the Washington Subclass. On July 26,
2016, Defendant purchased the entire Babyganics line of products
from VMG Partners, LLC. On October 26, 2017, the Plaintiffs
voluntarily dismissed their claims solely against Defendant VMG
Partners, LLC without prejudice.

The Defendant argues that the entire Complaint fails because the
Plaintiffs are pre-empted from relying on the Consumer Reports
test results.  The Defendant's argument for dismissal based on
federal pre-emption is properly addressed under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).

The Plaintiffs do not dispute the Defendant's assertion that the
Consumer Reports' testing does not strictly adhere to the FDA's
detailed testing protocol. However, the Plaintiffs do not seek to
use the Consumer Report test results as the basis for their
allegations that the Products do not have a SPF rating of 50+ and
therefore are improperly labeled and marketed. Rather, as
repeated in their Response, the Plaintiffs allege that the basis
for their claims is the independent testing they conducted which
established that the SPF rating of the Products is actually 30 or
less.
Moreover, the Plaintiffs allege that their independent testing
complies with the standard that federal regulators adhere to in
determining whether a product label accurately states the
product's SPF rating. In sum, the Plaintiff's claims do not rely
on the Consumer Reports test results, as argued by the
Defendants.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that at this stage of the
proceeding, the Plaintiff's claims are not preempted under the
FDCA.

The Defendant also argues that the Plaintiffs have failed to
sufficiently alleged the details of their independent testing and
that they are required to attach those test results to the
Complaint.

Here, the Plaintiff alleges that it conducted FDA compliant
independent testing on the Lotion and the Spray; that the results
of these independent tests showed that these two products have an
SPF rating of 30 or less; and, the Defendant currently markets
these two sunscreens as having a SPF rating of 50+. Based on the
Complaint, the Defendant is on notice as to what specific
products are at issue, the alleged fault of these two products,
and the alleged conduct of the Defendant to which the Plaintiff
complains, i.e. improper marketing.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff have alleged sufficient details
regarding the independent testing of the Products to overcome the
Defendant's motion to dismiss.

Next, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs lack standing to
pursue injunctive relief.  Here, the Plaintiff alleges that the
Defendant continues to manufacture, distribute, and deceptively
label and advertise the Products as having a 50+ SPF rating when
Plaintiffs' alleged test results indicate a much lower SPF. These
allegations are sufficient to plead standing for injunctive
relief. Moreover, the Plaintiffs' allegations are also
distinguishable from Camasta, where the plaintiff asserted a
conclusory allegation that there was a substantial danger that
defendant's wrongful retail practices would continue.
Accordingly, the Court rejects the Defendant's argument that the
Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief must be dismissed at this
early stage in the proceedings.

Next, the Defendant argues that claims relating to the Spray
should be dismissed for lack of standing because none of the
named the Plaintiffs purchased it. The Court disagrees. Standing
is the threshold question in every federal case, determining the
power of the court to entertain the suit.

Here, the Plaintiff has standing to pursue a claim on both the
Lotion and the Spray because they have alleged that the Products
are substantially similar products, with no material differences
relevant to the claims brought. Both Products are mineral-based
sunscreens in the Defendant's Babyganic product line. The
Plaintiffs allege both products are marketed the same way, have
near identical packaging, and are both marketed with a SPF rating
of 50+. The issue with the Products stem from the Plaintiffs'
testing results, which allegedly demonstrated that the SPF level
of the Products is 30 or less. Thus, the injury suffered by
consumers of both products would be purchasing sunscreen that
contains less SPF protection than what the product is marketed to
have. Based on the Complaint, the only difference between the
products is how the sunscreen is dispensed from the container in
different forms, either as a lotion or spray. The Defendant fails
to show how this difference is material for the purpose of the
Plaintiffs' claims. Accordingly, the Products as described in the
complaint, are substantially similar, giving the Plaintiffs
standing to bring claims based on both of the products.

The Defendant asks the Court to strike or dismiss the Plaintiffs'
proposed nationwide warranty, implied contract/implied covenant,
and unjust enrichment classes at the pleading stage because of
variation in the law from state to state.

Other courts in this district have denied motions to dismiss or
strike a plaintiff's class claims prior to the plaintiff's motion
to certify the class or before a full briefing on the issue is
completed. Accordingly, the Court denies the Defendant's request
to strike or dismiss the Plaintiffs' nationwide class claims as
premature.

Next, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiff's breach of implied
contract and violation of the implied covenant of food faith and
fair dealing claim is duplicative and inconsistent with their
breach of warranty claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2) permits The
Plaintiffs to set out two or more claims in the alternative. A
party may state as many separate claims or defenses as it has
regardless of consistency.

Here, the Plaintiffs separately plead their claims for breach of
implied contract and violation of the implied covenant of food
faith and fair dealing claim.

Accordingly, the Court rejects the Defendant's argument.

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff cannot bring a standalone
unjust enrichment claims and thus it should be dismissed. There
is no cause of action in California for unjust enrichment.

Here, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant enticed them to
buy the Products by falsely labeling them with a 50+ SPF rating
and that, as a result, the Defendant was unjustly enriched. The
Defendant has failed to show that Plaintiffs claim of unjust
enrichment must fail as a matter of California law. Accordingly,
the Plaintiffs' have sufficiently pleaded a claim for unjust
enrichment under California law.

A full-text copy of the District Court's March 29, 2018 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8b9vymh from
Leagle.com.

Laura Carroll, Katherine Exo, Armand Ryden & Katharine Shaffer,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Carl V. Malmstrom --
malmstrom@whafh.com -- Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLC,
Theodore Beloyeannis Bell -- tbell@whafh.com -- Wolf Haldenstein
Adler Freeman & Herz LLC & Janine L. Pollack -- pollack@whafh.com
-- Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz Llp, pro hac vice.
S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc., Defendant, represented by Amy J.
Laurendeau -- alaurendeau@omm.com -- O'melveny & Myers Llp,
Matthew J. Smock -- Matthew.j.smock@gamial.com -- O'melveny &
Myers Ll & Brook R. Long -- blong@winston.com -- Winston & Strawn
LLP.

VMG Partners, LLC, Defendant, represented by Amit Rana --
rana@braunhagey.com -- BraunHagey and Borden LLP, pro hac vice,
Matthew B. Borden -- borden@braunhagey.com -- BraunHagey and
Borden LLP, pro hac vice, Melissa Ammann Carrington --
mcarrington@bradleyriley.com -- Bradley Riley Jacobs PC & Todd
Clark Jacobs -- tjacobs@bradleyriley.com -- Bradley Riley Jacobs
PC.


SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS: Arbitration Bid Partly OK'd in Galaxy Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE SAMSUNG GALAXY SMARTPHONE MARKETING AND SALES
PRACTICES LITIGATION, Case No. 16-cv-06391-BLF (N.D. Cal.), Judge
Beth Labson Freeman of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, San Jose Division, granted Samsung's
Motion to Compel Arbitration, Dismiss Plaintiffs' Class Claims,
and Stay All Proceeding.

In the putative class action, consumers contend that certain
models of the Samsung Galaxy smartphone have the propensity to
overheat, often to volatile levels.  Specifically, the Plaintiffs
allege that their smartphones are prone to explode or burst into
flames.  They assert claims for violations of state consumer-
protection laws and unjust enrichment against Samsung.

In October 2016, Samsung recalled the Samsung Galaxy Note7 after
reports that numerous devices had exploded and burst into flames.
The Plaintiffs own at least one of six other models of Samsung
phones -- the Galaxy S7, the Galaxy S7 Edge, the Galaxy S6, the
Galaxy S6 Edge, the Galaxy S6 Edge+, and the Galaxy Note5.

Plaintiffs commenced the putative class action on Nov. 2, 2016
and filed the operative First Amended Complaint on Aug. 3, 2017.
The Plaintiffs hail from California, Massachusetts, or Maryland
and seek to represent three statewide classes, which encompass
all consumers who reside in and purchased one of the relevant
Samsung phones in California, Massachusetts, and Maryland,
respectively.

The Plaintiffs bring six causes of action: (1) violation of
California's Unfair Competition Law on behalf of the California
class, (2) violation of California's False Advertising Law on
behalf of the California class, (3) violation of California's
Consumers Legal Remedies Act on behalf of the California class,
(4) violation of Maryland's Consumer Protection Act on behalf of
the Maryland class, (5) violation of Massachusetts Regulation of
Business Practices for Consumers Protection on behalf of the
Massachusetts class, and (6) unjust enrichment on behalf of all
classes.

In September 2017, Samsung moved to compel arbitration on the
ground that the Plaintiffs assented to, and did not opt out of,
an arbitration clause that appeared either in a guidebook
included in the box with their phones or on Samsung's website.
The analysis of assent hinges on what information was presented
and how that information was presented to each individual
Plaintiff -- including the box, guidebook, and website.  Samsung
also requests that the Court dismiss the class-action claims of
all the Plaintiffs compelled to arbitrate and stay all
proceedings in the litigation pending arbitration.  The
Plaintiffs filed an opposition, and Samsung filed a reply.

Judge Freeman finds that Plaintiff Holzworth agreed to arbitrate
under Massachusetts law.  Accordingly, she will grant Samsung's
motion to compel arbitration as to Plaintiff Holzworth.  As to
Plaintiffs Atebar, Esther Vega, Kouyoumdjian, and Raymond, she
finds that on a page titled "Legal Information" in the guidebook,
the consumer is informed that important legal information is
available on the phone or on samsung.com and instructed to read
it before using the mobile device.  It would not take much for
the consumer to discover the scope of the arbitration provision.
The language cited above tells the consumer exactly where to
look: the section dealing with dispute resolution and
arbitration.  Therefore, the Judge will grant Samsung's motion to
compel arbitration as to Plaintiffs Atebar (as to the S7), Esther
Vega, Kouyoumdjian, and Raymond.

As to Plaintiff Dee, the Judge finds that although opening the
guidebook would have revealed the language that the consumer
accepts the guidebook's terms by using the device, a reasonable
person had no fair notice that he should read the "Important
Information" guidebook for binding terms and conditions before
using the phone.  Despite the first page's reference to
arbitration, she holds that Samsung's external packaging
disclosure and in-the-box Warranty Guide are insufficient to put
a reasonable consumer on notice of the arbitration provision or
the contractual nature of the purchase-and-usage transaction.
For the reasons stated above, the Judge agrees and therefore will
deny Samsung's motion to compel arbitration as to Plaintiff Dee.

As the Judge has already concluded, the directions at issue are
sufficient to put a reasonable person on notice about the
arbitration provision.  Accordingly, she will grant Samsung's
motion to compel arbitration as to Plaintiff Martin.  Plaintiff
Martin purchased an S6 Edge+.

Plaintiffs Anguiano, Hernandez, Pirverdian, Salmasian, and
Sanchez purchased either an S6 or an S6 Edge.  As to these
remaining Plaintiffs, Judge Freeman says she needs not do any
analytical heavy lifting.  Samsung concedes that these Plaintiffs
did not form an agreement to arbitrate.  In light of that
concession, she will deny Samsung's motion to compel arbitration
as to these Plaintiffs.

Plaintiff Atebar purchased a Note5 and Plaintiff Jesus Vega came
into possession of a Note5.  The Note5 guidebook fares no better.
The guidebook's title -- "Health & Safety and Warranty Guide" --
is unhelpful.  Although the cover asks the consumer to read the
guidebook before using the device, no reference is made to
contractual promises on behalf of the consumer.  Accordingly, she
will deny Samsung's motion to compel arbitration as to Plaintiffs
Atebar (as to the Note5) and Jesus Vega.

Since the maze of instructions in Plaintiff Robison's guidebook
provides nowhere near the same level of clarity, the Judge will
deny Samsung's motion to compel arbitration as to Plaintiff
Robison.

The Plaintiffs do not contest that the Plaintiffs whose phones
are subject to arbitration cannot sustain their class-action
claims.  Accordingly, the Judge Will grant Samsung's motion to
dismiss the class-action claims of Plaintiffs Martin, Atebar (as
to the S7), Esther Vega, Holzworth, Kouyoumdjian, and Raymond.

And because the Plaintiffs do not dispute that the Court should
stay all proceedings if it orders arbitration as to any
Plaintiff, she will stay the action pending the completion of
arbitration.

For these reasons, Judge Freeman granted Samsung's motion to
compel arbitration and to dismiss class-action claims as to
Plaintiffs Martin, Atebar (as to the S7), Esther Vega, Holzworth,
Kouyoumdjian, and Raymond.  She denied Samsung's motion to compel
arbitration and to dismiss class-action claims as to Plaintiffs
Atebar (as to the Note5), Jesus Vega, Anguiano, Hernandez,
Robison, Pirverdian, Salmasian, Dee, and Sanchez.  She also
granted Samsung's motion to stay all proceedings pending the
outcome of arbitration.  Within seven days of the resolution of
the arbitration, the parties will file a joint status report
advising the Court of the resolution of the matter and any
further action required by the Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 30, 2018 Order is available
at https://goo.gl/N4EKqX from Leagle.com.

Demetrius Martin, Omar Atebar, Esther Vega & Jesus Vega,
Plaintiffs, represented by Niall Padraic McCarthy --
nmccarthy@cpmlegal.com -- Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP,
Crystal Lee Matter -- cmatter@stonebargerlaw.com -- Stonebarger
Law APC, Eric James Buescher -- ebuescher@cpmlegal.com --
Cotchett Pitre and McCarthy, LLP, Gene J. Stonebarger --
gstonebarger@stonebargerlaw.com -- Stonebarger Law, APC, Richard
David Lambert -- rlambert@stonebargerlaw.com -- Stonebarger Law &
Anne Marie Murphy -- amurphy@cpmlegal.com -- Cotchett, Pitre &
McCarthy, LLP.

Lizett Anguiano, Plaintiff, represented by Anne Marie Murphy,
Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP & Derek G. Howard --
derek@derekhowardlaw.com -- Derek G. Howard Law Firm, Inc.

Tomas Hernandez & Greg Robison, Plaintiffs, represented by Alyssa
M. Williams -- awilliams@cglaw.com -- Casey Gerry Schenk
Francavilla Blatt and Penfield LLP, Anne Marie Murphy --
amurphy@cpmlegal.com -- Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP, Ethan
Thomas Litney -- elitney@cglaw.com -- Casey Gerry Schenk
Francavilla Blatt and Penfield, LLP, Gayle Meryl Blatt --
gmb@cglaw.com -- Casey Gerry Schenk Francavilla Blatt & Penfield
LLP & Jeremy Keith Robinson, Casey Gerry Schenk Francavilla Blatt
and Penfield.

Francisco Soto, Plaintiff, represented by Anne Marie Murphy,
Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP, Crystal L. Matter  Stonebarger
Law, APC, Eric James Buescher, Cotchett Pitre and McCarthy, LLP,
Gene J. Stonebarger, Stonebarger Law, APC, Niall Padraic
McCarthy, Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP & Richard David
Lambert, Stonebarger Law.

Eric Pirverdian, Tomig Salmasian & Michael Kouyoumdjian,
Plaintiffs, represented by Dimitrios Vasiliou Korovilas --
dimitri@wukolaw.com -- Wucetich Korovilas LLP, Jason Matthew
Wucetich -- jason@wukolaw.com -- Wucetich Korovilas LLP & Anne
Marie Murphy, Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP.

Jesus Sanchez, Plaintiff, represented by John Michael Montevideo
-- john@montevideo.law.com -- Montevideo Law, PC & Anne Marie
Murphy, Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP.

Dior Dee & Cory Raymond, Plaintiffs, represented by James Richard
Patterson -- jim@pattersonlawgroup.com -- Patterson Law Group,
APC & Anne Marie Murphy, Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP.

Dale Holzworth, Sr., Plaintiff, represented by Anne Marie Murphy,
Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP, Crystal Lee Matter, Stonebarger
Law APC, Eric James Buescher, Cotchett Pitre and McCarthy, LLP,
Gene J. Stonebarger, Stonebarger Law, APC, Joseph J. Siprut --
jsiprut@siprut.com -- Siprut PC, Ke Liu -- kliu@siprut.com --
Siprut PC, pro hac vice, Niall Padraic McCarthy, Cotchett, Pitre
& McCarthy, LLP, Richard David Lambert, Stonebarger Law & Todd L.
McLawhorn -- tmclawhorn@siprut.com -- Siprut PC, pro hac vice.

Plaintiffs and the Class, Plaintiff, represented by Anne Marie
Murphy, Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP.

Samsung Electronics America, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Daniel B. Asimow -- daniel.asimow@arnoldporter.com -- Arnold &
Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Kenneth Lee Chernof --
kenneth.chernof@arnoldporter.com -- Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer
LLP, Elisabeth Susan Theodore --
elisabeth.theodore@arnoldporter.com -- Arnold and Porter Kaye
Scholer LLP, pro hac vice & Robert J. Katerberg --
robert.katerberg@arnoldporter.com -- Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer
LLP, pro hac vice.

Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd, Defendant, represented by Daniel B.
Asimow, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP & Kenneth Lee Chernof,
Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP.


SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS: Bid to Dismiss Galaxy Marketing Suit Granted
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE SAMSUNG GALAXY SMARTPHONE MARKETING AND SALES
PRACTICES LITIGATION, Case No. 16-cv-06391-BLF (N.D. Cal.), Judge
Beth Labson Freeman of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, San Jose Division, granted Samsung's
Motion to Dismiss with leave to amend.

In the putative consumer class action, the Plaintiffs assert
claims against Samsung for alleged defects in their phones. In a
separate order, the Court concludes that certain Plaintiffs
agreed to arbitrate their dispute with Samsung.  Here, Judge
Freeman addresses Samsung's Motion to Dismiss the First Amended
Consolidated Class Action Complaint for the Plaintiffs whose
phones are not subject to arbitration.

Four phones are at issue -- the Galaxy S7, the Galaxy S6, the
Galaxy S6 Edge, and the Galaxy Note5.  In the First Amended
Consolidated Class Action Complaint ("FAC"), the Plaintiffs
allege that these phones pose a risk of overheating, fire and
explosion based in part on Samsung's recall of the Samsung Galaxy
Note7.  The Plaintiffs bring causes of action for violations of
California, Massachusetts, and Maryland consumer-protection laws
as well as unjust enrichment.

Samsung moved to compel arbitration on the ground that the
Plaintiffs assented to an arbitration clause.  In a concurrently
filed order, the Court concludes that the phones of the
Massachusetts Plaintiff and some of the California Plaintiffs are
subject to arbitration, and the Court grants a stay of the
proceedings pending arbitration.

Here, Judge Freeman addresses Samsung's motion to dismiss as to
the remaining Plaintiffs -- namely, Maryland Plaintiff Robison
and California Plaintiffs Atebar (as to the Note5), Jesus Vega,
Anguiano, Hernandez, Pirverdian, Salmasian, Dee, and Sanchez.
The Court held a hearing on March 29, 2018.

The Judge finds that the FAC does not plead that the overheating
defect interfered with Plaintiff Jesus Vega's phone service but
that is all that Plaintiff Jesus Vega paid for.  Instead, as the
Plaintiffs appear to acknowledge in their opposition, the phone
purchaser (Plaintiff Atebar) is the appropriate person to pursue
claims that the Note5 is defective.  Accordingly, she will grant
Samsung's motion to dismiss Plaintiff Jesus Vega's claims.

As to the Plaintiffs' second claim, the Judge finds that no
Plaintiff adequately establishes standing to seek injunctive
relief.  Their allegations do not fit within either of those
categories or otherwise provide that they Plaintiffs suffered an
actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical threat of
future harm.  Accordingly, the she will Samsung's motion to
dismiss on this ground.

Next, the Judge finds that the Plaintiffs have not sufficiently
alleged that Samsung was aware of a defect at the time of sale to
survive the motion to dismiss.  Accordingly, she will grant
Samsung's motion to dismiss the consumer-protection claims.

Finally, the Plaintiffs' claim for unjust enrichment is also
deficient because they do not identify the applicable law.
Accordingly, she will grant Samsung's motion to dismiss
Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim.

For these reasons, Judge Freeman granted with leave to amend
Samsung's motion to dismiss as to Plaintiffs Atebar (as to the
Note5), Jesus Vega, Anguiano, Hernandez, Robison, Pirverdian,
Salmasian, Dee, and Sanchez.  If the Plaintiffs wish to amend
their claims, they must file an amended complaint within 30 days
of the termination of the stay pending arbitration.  Failure to
meet the deadline to file an amended complaint or failure to cure
the deficiencies identified in this Order will result in a
dismissal of the Plaintiffs' claims with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 30, 2018 Order is available
at https://goo.gl/qTNNqM from Leagle.com.

Demetrius Martin, Omar Atebar, Esther Vega & Jesus Vega,
Plaintiffs, represented by Niall Padraic McCarthy --
nmccarthy@cpmlegal.com -- Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP,
Crystal Lee Matter -- cmatter@stonebargerlaw.com -- Stonebarger
Law APC, Eric James Buescher -- ebuescher@cpmlegal.com --
Cotchett Pitre and McCarthy, LLP, Gene J. Stonebarger --
gstonebarger@stonebargerlaw.com -- Stonebarger Law, APC, Richard
David Lambert -- rlambert@stonebargerlaw.com -- Stonebarger Law &
Anne Marie Murphy -- amurphy@cpmlegal.com -- Cotchett, Pitre &
McCarthy, LLP.

Lizett Anguiano, Plaintiff, represented by Anne Marie Murphy,
Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP & Derek G. Howard --
derek@derekhowardlaw.com -- Derek G. Howard Law Firm, Inc.

Tomas Hernandez & Greg Robison, Plaintiffs, represented by Alyssa
M. Williams -- awilliams@cglaw.com -- Casey Gerry Schenk
Francavilla Blatt and Penfield LLP, Anne Marie Murphy --
amurphy@cpmlegal.com -- Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP, Ethan
Thomas Litney -- elitney@cglaw.com -- Casey Gerry Schenk
Francavilla Blatt and Penfield, LLP, Gayle Meryl Blatt --
gmb@cglaw.com -- Casey Gerry Schenk Francavilla Blatt & Penfield
LLP & Jeremy Keith Robinson, Casey Gerry Schenk Francavilla Blatt
and Penfield.

Francisco Soto, Plaintiff, represented by Anne Marie Murphy,
Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP, Crystal L. Matter  Stonebarger
Law, APC, Eric James Buescher, Cotchett Pitre and McCarthy, LLP,
Gene J. Stonebarger, Stonebarger Law, APC, Niall Padraic
McCarthy, Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP & Richard David
Lambert, Stonebarger Law.

Eric Pirverdian, Tomig Salmasian & Michael Kouyoumdjian,
Plaintiffs, represented by Dimitrios Vasiliou Korovilas --
dimitri@wukolaw.com -- Wucetich Korovilas LLP, Jason Matthew
Wucetich -- jason@wukolaw.com -- Wucetich Korovilas LLP & Anne
Marie Murphy, Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP.

Jesus Sanchez, Plaintiff, represented by John Michael Montevideo
-- john@montevideo.law.com -- Montevideo Law, PC & Anne Marie
Murphy, Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP.

Dior Dee & Cory Raymond, Plaintiffs, represented by James Richard
Patterson -- jim@pattersonlawgroup.com -- Patterson Law Group,
APC & Anne Marie Murphy, Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP.

Dale Holzworth, Sr., Plaintiff, represented by Anne Marie Murphy,
Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP, Crystal Lee Matter, Stonebarger
Law APC, Eric James Buescher, Cotchett Pitre and McCarthy, LLP,
Gene J. Stonebarger, Stonebarger Law, APC, Joseph J. Siprut --
jsiprut@siprut.com -- Siprut PC, Ke Liu -- kliu@siprut.com --
Siprut PC, pro hac vice, Niall Padraic McCarthy, Cotchett, Pitre
& McCarthy, LLP, Richard David Lambert, Stonebarger Law & Todd L.
McLawhorn -- tmclawhorn@siprut.com -- Siprut PC, pro hac vice.

Plaintiffs and the Class, Plaintiff, represented by Anne Marie
Murphy, Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP.

Samsung Electronics America, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Daniel B. Asimow -- daniel.asimow@arnoldporter.com -- Arnold &
Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Kenneth Lee Chernof --
kenneth.chernof@arnoldporter.com -- Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer
LLP, Elisabeth Susan Theodore --
elisabeth.theodore@arnoldporter.com -- Arnold and Porter Kaye
Scholer LLP, pro hac vice & Robert J. Katerberg --
robert.katerberg@arnoldporter.com -- Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer
LLP, pro hac vice.

Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd, Defendant, represented by Daniel B.
Asimow, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP & Kenneth Lee Chernof,
Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP.


SAN GABRIEL: Background Check-Related Claims Sent to Arbitration
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose Division, granted in part and denied in part
Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration in the case captioned
DEANNA HERNANDEZ, Plaintiff, v. SAN GABRIEL TEMPORARY STAFFING
SERVICES, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 17-CV-05847-LHK (N.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiff alleges that when she was employed by the
Defendant, the Defendant committed a number of wage and hour
violations against the Plaintiff and other employees.
Specifically, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant (1) failed
to provide her and all other similarly situated individuals with
meal periods; (2) failed to provide them with rest periods; (3)
failed to pay premium wages for missed meal and/or rest periods;
(4) failed to pay them for all hours worked; (5) failed to
reimburse them for all necessary business expenses; (6) failed to
provide them with accurate written wage statements; and (7)
failed to timely pay them all of their final wages following
separation of employment.

In her opposition to the Defendant's motion to compel
arbitration, the Plaintiff argues that her individual and class
background check-related claims the first four causes of action
listed in her complaint should not be compelled to arbitration
because the arbitration provision by its terms does not apply to
those claims.

The Plaintiff's first four causes of action assert that Defendant
violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), the California
Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (ICRAA), and the
California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (CCRAA) by
requesting or procuring investigative consumer reports and
consumer credit reports on the Plaintiff and other employees
without providing proper disclosures and summaries of rights.

The Plaintiff argues that the motion to compel arbitration of
these background check-related claims must be denied because
there was never any agreement between the Plaintiff and the
Defendant to arbitrate these claims.

However, the Plaintiff premises her contention that the
Defendant's alleged violations of FCRA, ICRAA, and CCRAA against
the Plaintiff occurred before the arbitration agreement was in
effect on her assertion that the Plaintiff signed the Agreement
on December 27, 2016.  That assertion is belied by the record.

Specifically, although one of the Defendant's declarants,
District Manager Johni Jennings, stated that he witnessed the
Plaintiff initial and sign the Agreement, the copy of the
Agreement submitted into the record plainly indicates that the
Plaintiff denoted on the Agreement that the date on which the
Plaintiff signed the Agreement was December 14, 2016.

Thus, the Court grants the Defendant's motion to compel
arbitration of the Plaintiff's individual background check-
related claims.

The Plaintiff argues that because the choice-of-law provision of
the Agreement specifically provides that the Agreement is
governed by California law, the Court should apply California law
to determine whether the Agreement delegated all arbitrability
issues including whether the Plaintiff's class wage and hour
claims are arbitrable to the arbitrator.

The Plaintiff argues that because the choice-of-law provision of
the Agreement specifically provides that the Agreement is
governed by California law, the Court should apply California law
to determine whether the Agreement delegated all arbitrability
issues including whether the Plaintiff's class wage and hour
claims are arbitrable to the arbitrator.

The Agreement's choice-of-law provision does not clearly and
unmistakably show that California arbitrability law should apply
because it states only that this Agreement shall be governed by
the laws of the State of California, without regard to that
state's conflict-of-laws rules.

In Cape Flattery, 647 F.3d at 921, the Ninth Circuit held that
similar language a provision that any dispute arising under this
Agreement shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the
English Arbitration Act 1996 was ambiguous concerning whether
English law also applies to determine whether a given dispute is
arbitrable in the first place.

Accordingly, because the Court determines that the Agreement in
the instant case fails to provide clear and unmistakable proof
that the parties agreed to delegate arbitrability, the Court
concludes that it, and not an arbitrator, must decide whether the
Plaintiff's class wage and hour claims are arbitrable.

The Plaintiff argues that if the Court must decide whether the
Plaintiff's class wage and hour claims are arbitrable, the Court
should order that the arbitration of the Plaintiff's wage and
hour claims should be on a class wide basis because the
arbitration provision by its terms affirmatively permits class
arbitration.

In the instant case, the Court disagrees with the Plaintiff's
view that the arbitration provision at issue affirmatively
permits class arbitration. Instead, the Court finds that there is
no contractual basis for concluding that the parties agreed to
permit class arbitration because there is no indication that the
parties reached any agreement on the issue of class arbitration.
Neither party has submitted any evidence extrinsic to the terms
of the Agreement indicating that the parties expected or intended
class arbitration to be authorized.

Further, there is no indication from the contractual language
that the parties reached any sort of agreement on class
arbitrability. Indeed, in addition to not mentioning class
proceedings, the terms of the arbitration provision focus
exclusively on only two parties, Employee (Plaintiff) and Company
(Defendant).

The Court finds that class arbitration of the Plaintiff's wage
and hour claims is not permitted by the arbitration provision in
the Agreement because there is no contractual basis for
concluding that the parties agreed to authorize it.

The Court (1) grants the Defendant's motion to compel arbitration
of the Plaintiff's individual background check-related claims;
(2) grants the Defendant's request to strike the Plaintiff's
background check-related class claims; and (3) stays the
remainder of the Plaintiff's action pending the United States
Supreme Court's resolution of Ernst & Young LLP v. Morris.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 2, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yb6tbxfr from Leagle.com.

Deanna Hernandez, Plaintiff, represented by Scott Leviant --
scott@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group, Shaun Setareh --
shaun@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group & Chaim Shaun Setareh,
Setareh Law Group.

San Gabriel Temporary Staffing Services, LLC, Defendant,
represented by Fraser Angus McAlpine --
Fraser.McAlpine@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis P.C. &
Stephanie TaiHsin Yang -- Stephanie.Yang@jacksonlewis.com --
Jackson Lewis P.C.


SCHOTT NYC CORP: Faces "Olsen" Suit in E.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Schott NYC Corp.
The case is styled as Thomas J. Olsen, individually and on behalf
of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Schott NYC
Corp., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-02952 (E.D. N.Y., May 18,
2018).

Schott Nyc Corp. was founded in 2003. The company's line of
business includes the manufacturing of leather and sheep-lined
clothing.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Christopher Howard Lowe, Esq.
   Lipsky Lowe LLP
   630 Third Avenue
   New York, NY 10017
   Tel: (212) 392-4772
   Fax: (212) 444-1030
   Email: chris@lipskylowe.com


SEALIFT INC: Cross-Bid to Cut $33MM Security in "Dziennik" Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, SYLVESTER DZIENNIK; MIECZYSLAW KIERSZTYN; FERDYNAND
KOBIEROSKI, individually and on behalf of all persons similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. SEALIFT, INC.; SEALIFT HOLDINGS, INC.;
FORTUNE MARITIME, INC.; SAGAMORE SHIPPING, INC.; VICTORY
MARITIME, INC., Defendants. JOSEF FELSKOWSKI, Plaintiff, v.
SEALIFT, INC.; SAGAMORE SHIPPING, INC., Defendants, Case Nos. 05-
CV-4659 (DLI)(JO), 04-CV-1244 (DLI)(JO)(E.D. N.Y.), Judge Dora L.
Irizarry of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
New York denied (i) the Plaintiffs' motion for an order
increasing the $33 million security and liens against various
vessels and an escrow account owned by the Defendants, as set by
an Order dated May 10, 2013; and (ii) the Defendants' cross-
motion to decrease the security and liens.

On May 11, 2017, the Class Plaintiffs, moved for an order
increasing the $33 million security and liens against various
vessels and an escrow account owned by the Defendants, as set by
an Order dated May 10, 2013.  The Defendants oppose Class the
Plaintiffs' motion, and have cross-moved to decrease the security
and liens.

Judge Irizarry is not persuaded that either the May 4th Order or
the September 30th Order indicates that the Plaintiffs' claims
may entitle them to liens significantly less than, or
significantly more than $33 million.  The Judge says the May 4th
Order simply permitted the transfer of a lien against an
inadvertently sold vessel to a new vessel in the Defendants'
fleet, an action that the Court has routinely permitted.  The
Order did not change in any way the value of the Class
Plaintiffs' claims.  While the September 30th Order determined
which period applied for the defense of laches, the Court held
that genuine issues of material fact remain as to the defense of
laches, and did not determine whether the parties met their
respective burdens under the doctrine of laches.  Accordingly,
absent a decision on whether the doctrine of laches applies, the
Judge cannot conclude that the Class Plaintiffs' claims entitle
them to significantly more or less than $33 million.

The Judge is equally unpersuaded by the Class Plaintiffs'
contention that the security and liens should be increased
because of accumulated prejudgment interest.  As the Class
Plaintiffs acknowledge, awarding prejudgment interest is
ultimately within the discretion of the court.  The Court has not
issued any "Order, Decision or Ruling" determining the
applicability of prejudgment interest or the applicable rate of
any prejudgment interest.

Finally, the Judge is not convinced that the Defendants are
entitled to transfer the liens against the escrow account to the
Defendants' vessels, the SSG EDWARD A. CARTER JR. and the LTC
JOHN U.D. PAGE.  Notably, the Court denied the Defendants'
previous request for this relief in its May 10th Order, and the
Defendants have offered no additional justification for
revisiting that decision at this juncture.  Accordingly, the
Judge finds no reason to adjust the security and liens as
currently in place.  The Class Plaintiffs' motion to increase the
security and liens, and the Defendants' cross-motion to decrease
the security and liens, or transfer the liens against the escrow
account to other vessels, are both denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 30, 2018 Summary Order is
available at https://goo.gl/YcqeYU from Leagle.com.

Josef Felskowski, Plaintiff, represented by Ralph J. Mellusi,
Tabak Mellusi & Shisha & Richard J. Dodson --
jerry@dodsonhooks.com -- Dodson, Hooks & Frederick, APLC.

Sealift, Inc. & Sagamore Shipping, Inc., Defendants, represented
by Gordon S. Arnott -- garnott@hillbetts.com -- Hill, Betts &
Nash LLP & Gregory W. O'Neill -- goneill@hillbetts.com -- Hill,
Betts, & Nash, LLP..


SEAMORE'S ON ICE: Faces "Kiler" Suit in E.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Seamore's on Ice,
LLC. The case is styled as Marion Kiler, individually and as the
representative of a class of similarly situated persons,
Plaintiff v. Seamore's on Ice, LLC doing business as: Seamore's,
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-02987 (E.D. N.Y., May 21, 2018).

The Defendant is a Seafood Restaurant located in 390 Broome St,
New York, NY.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


SEASONS 52: Settles Age-Bias Class Action for $2.85-Mil.
--------------------------------------------------------
Erin Mulvaney, writing for Daily Business Review, reports that
the national restaurant chain Seasons 52 has agreed to pay $2.85
million to resolve claims it unfairly discriminated against job
applicants over the age of 40, the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission said on May 3.

Courts of appeals are split on whether companies can be held
liable for discriminating against older job seekers based on age.
Seasons 52, represented by Seyfarth and Akerman, did not admit
wrongdoing in the EEOC settlement.


SENTRY LIFE: Faces "Emerson" Suit in W.D. Wisconsin
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Sentry Life
Insurance Company. The case is styled as Anneliese Emerson, on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Sentry Life Insurance Company, Defendant, Case No. 3:18-cv-00379
(W.D. Wis., May 18, 2018).

Sentry Life Insurance Company provides insurance services. The
company provides individual life insurance, annuities, pensions,
employee benefits programs and retirement savings plans for
businesses and individuals. The company was incorporated in 1958
and is based in Stevens Point, Wisconsin. Sentry Life Insurance
Company operates as a subsidiary of Sentry Insurance Pool.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Thomas William Kyle, Esq.
   Hupy and Abraham, S.C.
   111 E Kilbourn Ave, Suite 1100
   Milwaukee, WI 53202
   Tel: (414) 223-4800 x9082
   Fax: (414) 271-3374 x5290
   Email: tkyle@hupy.com


SETERUS INC: Faces Class Action Over Illegal Mortgage Fees
----------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that a
$5 million federal class action claims that Seterus, a mortgage
servicer, charges illegal fees for paying online.

Plaintiff's counsel:

     John E. Norris, Esq.
     Dargan M. Ware, Esq.
     DAVIS & NORRIS, LLP
     2154 Highland Ave. S.
     Birmingham, AL 35205
     Telephone: (205) 930-9900
     Facsimile: (205) 930-9989
     Email: jnorris@davisnorris.com
            dware@davisnorris.com

        -- and --

     Andrew Wheeler-Berliner, Esq.
     THE BERLINER FIRM
     4000 Third Ave. South, Ste 109
     Birmingham, AL 35205
     Telephone: 205.765.7324
     Email: Andrew@theberlinerfirm.com


SHANGHAI ORIGINAL: Court Grants Decertification Bid in "Jin"
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York granted Defendant's Motion to Decertify the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) Collective Action Conditionally Certified in
the case captioned Jianmin Jin and Chunyou Xie, on behalf of
themselves and other similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Shanghai
Original, Inc.; East Brother Corp.; Always Good Brothers, Inc.;
Shanghai City Corp.; Shanghai Duplicate Corp.; Kiu Sang Si a/k/a
Joseph Si; Mimi Si; Yiu Fai Fong; Tun Yee Lam; and Solomon C
Liou, Defendants, No. 16-cv-5633 (ARR)(JO)(E.D.N.Y.).

The defendants have moved to decertify the FLSA collective action
conditionally certified by Magistrate Judge Orenstein as to
workers at the Midtown and Flushing (but not Chinatown) locations
of Joe's Shanghai.

The two named plaintiffs, along with nine opt-in plaintiffs,
bring claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and New
York Labor Law (NYLL) for violations of state and federal minimum
wage and overtime laws by Joe's Shanghai restaurant, which has
locations in Midtown Manhattan, Chinatown, and Flushing, Queens.
The named plaintiffs both worked at the Flushing location, while
the opt-in plaintiffs, with one exception, worked in Midtown or
Chinatown.

The collective action will be decertified because none of the
opt-in plaintiffs are similarly situated to the named plaintiffs.

The FLSA requires employers to pay workers a minimum wage of
$7.25 an hour as well as overtime of one and one-half times their
regular rate for each hour worked in excess of forty hours in a
week. In the case of tipped employees, the FLSA permits employers
to take a tip credit up to 50% of the minimum wage except that
the credit `may not exceed the value of the tips actually
received by the employee.

Courts in the Second Circuit typically take a two-step approach
to certifying collective actions.

The first step involves the court making an initial determination
to send notice to potential opt-in plaintiffs who may be
similarly situated to the named plaintiffs with respect to
whether a FLSA violation has occurred. District courts may send
this notice after plaintiffs make a modest factual showing' that
they and potential opt-in plaintiffs together were victims of a
common policy or plan that violated the law.

Then, at the second step, the district court will, on a fuller
record, determine whether the plaintiffs who have opted in are in
fact similarly situated' to the named plaintiffs. The collective
action may be de-certified if the record reveals that they are
not, and the opt-in plaintiffs' claims may be dismissed without
prejudice.

At this second stage, a district court must apply heightened
scrutiny in determining whether Plaintiffs are similarly situated
for the purposes of the FLSA.

The Midtown opt-in plaintiffs are not similarly situated to the
named plaintiffs because the Midtown and Flushing locations had
separate management, ownership, and employment policies.

In this case, the factual record developed by discovery shows
that there is no uniform employment policy or practice across the
Midtown and Flushing locations, and that these locations do not
share common ownership or management. Indeed, the FLSA claims of
the Midtown opt-in plaintiffs are entirely distinct from the
claims of the named Flushing plaintiffs. Workers at the Flushing
location alleged that they were paid a flat rate that was less
than minimum wage plus overtime, while workers at the Midtown
location acknowledged that they were paid minimum wage and
overtime, but claimed that they did some unpaid labor during meal
breaks.

The plaintiffs therefore cannot even meet the showing required to
certify a conditional collective action, let alone satisfy the
more demanding showing required at the stage of final
certification.

The two named plaintiffs alleged that they were paid an illegally
low flat rate while working at the Flushing location. One of the
named plaintiffs did not appear for his deposition, but the other
testified consistently at his deposition. Further, although the
defendants claim that they paid the Flushing employees at least
minimum wage and overtime, they have lost the payroll records
that would prove this.

The plaintiffs nonetheless argue for final collective action
certification because the three locations of Joe's Shanghai are
(a) in a single state, (b) show signs of shared management such
as a single website and similar menus, and (c) the restaurants
had a common practice of failing to pay employees for all hours
worked.
But that all three locations of Joe's Shanghai are in New York is
not a factor that supports final collective action certification;
at best, it does not support decertification. And defining the
unlawful employment policy as failing to pay employees for all
hours worked, is far too abstract to show that the plaintiffs are
similarly situated. Paying employees an unlawfully low flat rate
is not the same thing as generally complying with minimum wage
and overtime laws but sometimes failing to pay employees for the
work they do on an as-needed basis during meal breaks.

In sum, the factual record developed in discovery including the
deposition testimony of the opt-in plaintiffs shows that the
Midtown and Flushing locations of Joe's Shanghai did not share a
common unlawful employment policy and were in fact separately
owned and managed. For this reason, the Court finds that the
Midtown opt-in plaintiffs are not similarly situated to the named
plaintiffs and decertify the collective action as to the
following opt-in plaintiffs: Huer Huang, Hui Zhen Huang, Lian Qin
Lu, Juan Li, Guo Chang, and Hui Qiu Chen.

The Court, therefore dismiss these individuals' claims without
prejudice to their re-filing in a separate suit or suits.

Xin He and Huihua Zhai are not similarly situated to the named
plaintiffs

Xin He, unlike any of the other opt-in plaintiffs, worked at the
Flushing location. But his deposition testimony shows that,
although he may have a NYLL claim, he most likely does not have a
FLSA claim for the time he worked at this location. He testified
that he worked as a cook from July 2015 to April 2016, earning
first $3,000 and then $3,200 a month, for 64.25 hours of work per
week. Even accounting for overtime, this amounts to more than the
minimum wage.

While Xin He stated that he received a flat monthly rate from the
Flushing location, he may have simply thought of his compensation
in terms of the total amount of money he received every month. He
also described his pay at Midtown as a flat rate, but later
admitted that payroll records showed that he was making $13.30 an
hour there. He also denied knowing anything about the minimum
wage or overtime pay. And when asked about his payroll records
from Chinatown and Midtown, he denied paying any attention to the
hourly wage, overtime wage, or number of hours listed on it, or
knowing how his pay was calculated, but acknowledged that he
received the correct amount of pay.

Huihua Zhai, on the other hand, has a similar claim to the named
plaintiffs: he claims that he was paid a flat rate of $200 a
week, regardless of how much he worked. Zhai Decl. This amounts
to less than the federal minimum wage of $7.25 an hour.
Nonetheless, the three factors discussed in DeSilva all weigh in
favor of dismissing his claims without prejudice.

First, because Zhai worked at the Midtown location, he was
subject to a different employment policy by a separately managed
and owned restaurant than the named plaintiffs. In other words,
there are disparate factual and employment settings. Second, the
defense to his claims will be individual to him. Since he was a
tipped employee, under federal law he could be paid as little as
half the minimum wage as long as he received enough in tips to
bring him up to at least $7.25 an hour.

For these reasons, the Court will also dismiss the claims of Xin
He and Huihua Zhai without prejudice. The defendants' motion for
collective action decertification is therefore granted in its
entirety.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 2, 2018 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7hn2kr3 from
Leagle.com.

Jianmin Jin, on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated & Chunyou Xie, on behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Kibum Byun, Troy
Law, PLLC & John Troy, Troy & Associates, PLLC.

Hui Zhen Huang, Huer Huang, Huiqiu Chen, Juan Li, Lianqin Lu,
Jian Ying Lin & Guo Chang Su, Plaintiffs, represented by John
Troy, Troy & Associates, PLLC.

Shanghai Original, Inc., doing business as Joe's Shanghai, East
Brother Corp, doing business as Joe's Shanghai, Shanghai City
Corp, doing business as Joe's Shanghai, Shanghai Duplicate Corp,
doing business as Joe's Shanghai, Kiu Sang Si, also known as
Joseph Si, Yiu Fai Fong & Tun Yee Lam, Defendants, represented by
David B. Horowitz, Fong & Wong, P.C., Fiona M. Dutta, Fong &
Wong, P.C. & Robert W. Wong, Fong & Wong, P.C.


SILVER STAR: Faces "Rivera" Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Silver Star
Cleaners Inc. The case is styled as Maria Nieves Romero Rivera,
on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Silver Star
Cleaners Inc. doing business as: Silverstar Cleaners, Hyung Nam
Jo also known as: Mr. Willy, Mee S Lim also known as: Mee S Jo,
Han S Kim, Ok Im Kim and Michelle Doe, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-
cv-04427 (S.D. N.Y., May 18, 2018).

Located in Manhattan, New York, Silver Star Cleaners Inc. offers
dry cleaning services.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


SMITH KING: Stanko Appeals Order and Judgment to Eighth Circuit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Rudy Butch Stanko filed an appeal from the District
Court's Memorandum and Order and Judgment, both entered on
March 29, 2018, in the lawsuit titled Rudy Stanko, et al. v.
Brandi Bosselman, et al., Case No. 8:17-cv-03151-JFB, in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Nebraska - Omaha.

The nature of suit is stated as "Other Civil Rights."

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
was initiated in the Sheridan County District Court (Case No. CI-
17-00053).  The lawsuit was removed on November 15, 2017, to the
District Court.

The appellate case is captioned as Rudy Stanko, et al. v. Brandi
Bosselman, et al., Case No. 18-1828, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

Plaintiff-Appellant Rudy Butch Stanko, and similarly situated tax
payers in Sheridan county appears pro se.[BN]

Defendant-Appellee Brandi Bosselman, individually and in her
official capacity as an officer of Bosselman Pump & Pantry, Inc.,
is represented by:

          Sheila A. Bentzen, Esq.
          Daniel E. Klaus, Esq.
          REMBOLT LUDTKE LLP
          Suite 300, 3 Landmark Centre
          1128 Lincoln Mall
          Lincoln, NE 68508
          Telephone: (402) 475-5100
          Facsimile: (402) 475-5087
          E-mail: sbentzen@remboltlawfirm.com
                  dklaus@remboltlawfirm.com

Defendants-Appellees Smith, King, and Simmons, P.C., now known as
King, Simmons and Conn; Jamine Simmons, individually and in her
official capacity as a county attorney and also as a private
lawyer in officer of the Smith, King, and Simmons law firm, kna
King, Simmons and Conn; Aaron Conn, individually and in his
official capacity as a deputy county attorney and as a private
lawyer in the named law firm or office; and James McCave,
individually and in his official capacity as a deputy county
attorney and as a private lawyer in the law office or firm
representing the Town of Hay Springs, etc., are represented by:

          Steven W. Olsen, Esq.
          SIMMONS OLSEN LAW FIRM, P.C.
          1502 Second Avenue
          Scottsbluff, NE 69361-0000
          Telephone: (308) 632-3811
          Facsimile: (308) 635-0907
          E-mail: solsen@simmonsolsen.com

Defendants-Appellees Jamine Simmons, individually and in her
official capacity as a county attorney and also as a private
lawyer in officer of the Smith, King, and Simmons law firm, kna
King, Simmons and Conn; Aaron Conn, individually and in his
official capacity as a deputy county attorney and as a private
lawyer in the named law firm or office; James McCave,
individually and in his official capacity as a deputy county
attorney and as a private lawyer in the law office or firm
representing the Town of Hay Springs, etc.; Office of Sheridan
County Commissioners; Loren Paul, individually and in his
official capacity as a Sheridan County commissioner; Jack
Anderson, individually and in his official capacity as a Sheridan
County commissioner; James Krotz, individually and in his
official capacity as a Sheridan County commissioner; and Clay
Heath, individually and in his official capacity as a policeman
for the City of Gordon,  are represented by:

          Philip O. Cusic, Esq.
          Robert S. Keith, Esq.
          ENGLES, KETCHAM LAW FIRM
          1350 Woodmen Tower
          1700 Farnam Street
          Omaha, NE 68102-0000
          Telephone: (402) 348-0900
          Facsimile: (402) 348-0904
          E-mail: pcusic@ekoklaw.com
                  rkeith@ekoklaw.com

Defendant-Appellee State of Nebraska, Sheridan County Attorney's
Office - Attorney General, is represented by:

          Danielle Jones, Esq.
          ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
          2115 State Capitol
          P.O. Box 98920
          Lincoln, NE 68509-0000
          Telephone: (402) 471-2682
          Facsimile: (402) 471-4725
          E-mail: danielle.jones@nebraska.gov


SPECTRANETICS CORP: Court Dismisses "Ellis" Securities Fraud Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado
granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Class
Action Complaint for Violations of Federal Securities Laws in the
case captioned MICHAEL ELLIS, ALLEN J. WIESENFELD, and PETER
TUCKER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. THE SPECTRANETICS CORPORATION, SCOTT
DRAKE, and GUY A. CHILDS, Defendants, Civil Action No. 15-cv-
01857-KLM (D. Colo.).

The Plaintiffs assert that during the Class Period, the
Defendants filed false and misleading financial documents and
made false and misleading statements to investors regarding the
Company's product sales and growth, which in turn pushed the
Company's stock price to levels never before reached since the
Company went public in 1992.  The Plaintiffs further assert that
the Defendants engaged in channel-stuffing to create the facade
of "a strongly growing business" and that the Company recognized
sales and revenue in violation of GAAP and its own policies.

The Plaintiffs assert a claim for violation of Section10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder,
and a claim for violation of Section 20(a) of the Act.

Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)

Under the Reform Act, a private complaint that alleges a
violation of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 there-
under must first specify each statement alleged to have been
misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is
misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or
omission is made on information and belief, must state with
particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.

Second, in order to show that the defendant acted with the
requisite state of mind for securities fraud cases, scienter, the
complaint must also, with respect to each act or omission alleged
to violate the 1934 Act, state with particularity facts giving
rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the
required state of mind.

Scienter

A strong inference of scienter means a conclusion logically based
upon particular facts that would convince a reasonable person
that the defendant knew a statement was false or misleading.

To establish scienter in a securities fraud case alleging non-
disclosure of potentially material facts, the plaintiff must
demonstrate:(1) the defendant knew of the potentially material
fact, and (2) the defendant knew that failure to reveal the
potentially material fact would likely mislead investors.

The Plaintiffs allege in the First Amended Complaint that the
defendants made materially false statements and issued false
financial reports between February 27, 2014 and July 23, 2015 in
violation of: (1) section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (1934 Act) and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, 17 C.F.R. Sect6ion
240.10b-5; and (2) section 20 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. section
78t(a).

To state a claim under Rule 10b-5 for securities fraud, a
complaint must contain allegations addressing five elements: (1)
the defendant made an untrue or misleading statement of material
fact, or failed to state a material fact necessary to make
statements not misleading; (2) the statement complained of was
made in connection with the purchase or sale of securities; (3)
the defendant acted with scienter, that is, with intent to
defraud or recklessness; (4) the plaintiff relied on the
misleading statements; and (5) the plaintiff suffered damages as
a result of his reliance.

To state a prima facie case of control person liability under
Section 20(a) of the Act, plaintiffs must allege: (1) a primary
violation of the securities laws and (2) control over the primary
violator by the alleged controlling person.

The crux of the Plaintiffs' theory is that the Defendants knew or
recklessly disregarded that their quarter-end bulk sales on heavy
discount were ultimately unsustainable and knew of but ignored
risks to sales posed by the introduction of a competing product,
drug-coated balloons, to the market.

A careful reading of the cleverly-drafted First Amended Complaint
makes clear that the overwhelming majority of allegations of
fraud depend on assertions that Defendants failed to disclose to
investors large amounts of quarter-end bulk sales to customers,
deep quarter-end volume discounts to customers, extended payment
terms, permitted returns of products, including expired products,
employee concerns and the risk posed by a competing product.

It goes without saying that the First Amended Complaint cannot
create a strong inference of the state of mind necessary to show
securities fraud without sufficiently alleging that Drake and
Childs knew or should have known of all of these problems.

But behind the First Amended Complaint's dense curtain of
allegations relating to Spectranetics' products, business
practices, finances, financial reporting and projections,
Plaintiffs make very few particularized allegations about what
the executives themselves knew during the relevant time frame. At
best, the totality of the allegations regarding the Defendants'
conduct which bear on their state of mind leaves more questions
about their intent than answers.

The Plaintiffs' allegations about recklessness are overwhelmingly
conclusory. For example, they assert that because the Defendants
knew that the market was rapidly adopting DCBs and other
technological advances were being made rapidly, that the
Defendants recklessly disregarded that the amount of product that
ultimately may need to be returned was unknown and could be
larger than expected.

The Plaintiffs assert in connection with the fourth quarter of
2013 and overall fiscal year 2013 that the Defendants recklessly
failed to disclose that the company was reliant upon an illicit
channel stuffing scheme to meet its revenue targets, growth
targets, and market expectations, and that the company's sales
and accounting practices resulted in improper revenue recognition
in violation of both GAAP and its own stated policies and
procedures.

The Plaintiffs make essentially the same assertion regarding
recklessness in connection with the first quarter of 2014, the
second quarter of 2014, the third quarter of 2014, the fourth
quarter of 2014 and guidance regarding fiscal year 2015 and the
first quarter of 2015. These conclusory allegations of
recklessness do nothing to advance facts demonstrating that
conduct. The Plaintiffs' statements made specifically about
Defendants Drake and Childs' conduct are equally weak.

For example, they conclusory state that Defendant Drake
recklessly failed to disclose that the company's sales practices
created a material risk in that artificially inflated sales
caused customer inventory levels for key products to pile up and
that the Defendants' practice of pushing bulk sales at quarter-
end to meet revenue guidance was unsustainable and out of line
with actual demand and would reasonably be expected to have a
material unfavorable impact on revenues.

They further allege, for example, that Childs' statement that
ordering pattern in OBLs caused softness in atherectomy sales was
reckless in light of his knowledge that those patterns were
actually driven by the Company's own aggressive bulk sale
discounting practice, but they fail to connect the dots by
sufficiently alleging particularized facts to show that Childs
knew about the extent of that practice.

These and other statements and allegations of fact made in
connection with those statements simply do not show the level of
recklessness required to show scienter. Simply stated, even if
the First Amended Complaint gives rise to some plausible
inference of scienter, it is not the strong inference required by
the PSLRA.

Hence, the Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims must be dismissed.

Because the Plaintiffs have failed to allege a primary violation
of the securities laws, their Section 20(a) claim is also not
viable. Durango Metals, 144 F.3d at 1305. In addition the
Plaintiffs failed to make an argument that their First Amended
Complaint could be further amended to correct any deficiencies.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 2, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y6wjw83v from Leagle.com.

Michael Ellis, Individually and on Behalf of All Other Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Robert Vincent Prongay --
rprongay@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Rusty Evan
Glenn -- rusty@shumanlawfirm.com -- Shuman Law Firm, Kara M.
Wolke -- kwolke@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP &
Kip Brian Shuman -- kip@shumanlawfirm.com -- Shuman Law Firm.

Allen J. Wiesenfeld & Peter Tucker, Plaintiffs, represented by
Kara M. Wolke, Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP & Robert Vincent
Prongay, Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP.

Spectranetics Corporation, The, Scott Drake & Guy A. Childs,
Defendants, represented by Alex C. Myers -- amyers@lrrc.com --
Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie LLP, Frederick J. Baumann --
fbauman@lrrc.com -- Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie LLP, Michael
James Lohnes -- michael.lohnes@kattenlaw.com -- Katten Muchin
Rosenman, LLP & Richard H. Zelichov --
richard.zelichov@kattenlaw.com -- Katten Muchin Rosenman, LLP.


STATE FARM: Tenth Circuit Appeal Filed in "Mischek" Class Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Patricia Mischek and Skuya Christensen filed an appeal
from a court ruling in their lawsuit entitled Mischek, et al. v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Case Nos. 1:16-
CV-03208-PAB-MLC and 1:17-CV-00041-PAB-MLC, in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Colorado - Denver.

The lawsuit arose from insurance-related disputes.

The appellate case is captioned as Mischek, et al. v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Case No. 18-1156, in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Docketing statement was due on May 2, 2018, for Skuya
      Christensen and Patricia Mischek;

   -- Transcript order form was due on May 2, 2018, for Skuya
      Christensen and Patricia Mischek;

   -- Notice of appearance was due on May 2, 2018, for Skuya
      Christensen, Patricia Mischek and State Farm Mutual
      Automobile Insurance Company.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant PATRICIA MISCHEK, individually and on behalf
of all persons similarly situated, is represented by:

          J. Kyle Bachus, Esq.
          Darin L. Schanker, Esq.
          Claire Felice Soto, Esq.
          BACHUS & SCHANKER LLC
          1899 Wynkoop Street, Suite 700
          Denver, CO 80202
          Telephone: (866) 795-0696
          E-mail: Kyle.Bachus@ColoradoLaw.net
                  dschanker@coloradolaw.net
                  claire.soto@coloradolaw.net

               - and -

          Gregory A. Gold, Esq.
          GOLD LAW FIRM
          7375 East Orchard Road, Suite 300
          Greenwood Village, CO 80111
          Telephone: (303) 694-2666
          E-mail: greg@thegoldlawfirm.net

               - and -

          Michael Justin Rosenberg, Esq.
          LEVIN SITCOFF PC
          1512 Larimer Street, Suite 650
          Denver, CO 80202
          Telephone: (303) 575-9390

Plaintiff-Appellant SKUYA CHRISTENSEN, individually and on behalf
of all persons similarly situated, is represented by:

          Franklin D. Azar, Esq.
          Patricia A. Meester, Esq.
          Jonathan Steven Parrott, Esq.
          Keith R. Scranton, Esq.
          FRANKLIN D. AZAR & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          14426 East Evans Avenue
          Aurora, CO 80014-0000
          Telephone: (303) 757-3300
          E-mail: azarf@fdazar.com
                  meesterp@fdazar.com
                  parrottj@fdazar.com
                  scrantonk@fdazar.com

               - and -

          Tonya L. Melnichenko, Esq.
          FRANKLIN D. AZAR & ASSOCIATES
          5536 Library Lane
          Colorado Springs, CO 80918-0000
          Telephone: (719) 527-8000
          E-mail: melnichenkot@fdazar.com

               - and -

          Bradley A. Levin, Esq.
          Susan S. Minamizono, Esq.
          Nelson Andrew Waneka, Esq.
          LEVIN SITCOFF PC
          1512 Larimer Street, Suite 650
          Denver, CO 80202
          Telephone: (303) 575-9390
          E-mail: bal@levinsitcoff.com
                  ssm@levinsitcoff.com
                  naw@levinsitcoff.com

Defendant-Appellee STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a foreign corporation, is represented by:

          Sheryl Anderson, Esq.
          Lawrence Michael Brooks, Jr.
          Andrew Lavin, Esq.
          WELLS ANDERSON & RACE LLC
          1700 Broadway, Suite 1020
          Denver, CO 80290
          Telephone: (303) 830-1212
          E-mail: sanderson@warllc.com
                  mbrooks@warllc.com
                  dlavin@warllc.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey Scott Crowe, Esq.
          Frank Falzetta, Esq.
          SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP
          333 South Hope Street, 43rd Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 620-1780
          E-mail: jcrowe@sheppardmullin.com
                  ffalzetta@sheppardmullin.com


STEARNS PRODUCTS: Partly Grants Bid to Dismiss "Petrosino" Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ELIZABETH PETROSINO, individually on behalf of
herself and others similarly situated Plaintiff, v. STEARN'S
PRODUCTS, INC. D/B/A DERAE, Defendants, Case No. 16-cv-7735 (NSR)
(S.D. N.Y.), Judge Nelson S. Roman of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York granted in part and denied in
part the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with leave to amend, and
denied the Defendant's Motion to Stay.

Petrosino, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated,
commenced the action against Stearn's, bringing claims sounding
in: (1) violation of New York General Business Law ("GBL")
Section 349; (2) violation of GBL Section 350; (3) breach of
express warranty; (4) violation of state consumer protection
statutes; and (5) injunctive relief.

The Plaintiff commenced the putative class action suit on Aug.
31, 2016, in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County
of Dutchess, claiming that the Defendant allegedly uses deceptive
and misleading labeling on their cosmetic products. The Defendant
removed this action on Oct. 3, 2016 pursuant to the Class Action
Fairness Act ("CAFA").  On Dec. 1, 2016, the Plaintiff filed an
Amended Complaint seeking injunctive relief, punitive damages and
claiming violations of GBL Sections 349 and 350, breach of
express warranty, and violations of the consumer protection
statues of all 50 states.

Stearn's produces and markets a line of cosmetic products
throughout the United States.  The packaging and labels of the
cosmetics bear a mark with the word "natural" surrounded by the
phrases "cruelty free," "paraben-free" and "100% vegan."  The
word "natural", Plaintiff asserts, appears in a prominent
location on the labels and packages of all the products.  She
purchased three of the Defendant's products in New York: (1) the
Derma-e Anti-Wrinkle Vitamin A Retinyl Palmitate Cräme; (2) the
Derma-e Firming DMAE Moisturizer; and (3) the Derma-e Hydrating
Night Creme.

The Plaintiff asserts that the word "natural," as used by the
Defendant on the labels and packaging of their cosmetic products,
is misleading.  Despite the use of the word "natural," many of
the Defendants products contain a combination of 22 synthetic
and/or artificial ingredients.

Further, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant capitalized on
consumer's concerns by marketing their products as being natural
when, in fact, they contain a number of synthetic ingredients.
If it had not been for the representation on the labels and
packaging, the Plaintiff and the class members would not have
been willing to purchase the product at that the "premium price."

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant's deceptive
representation and omission are material because a reasonable
person would attach importance to such information and would be
induced to act upon such information in making purchasing
decisions.  She and class members reasonably relied to their
detriment on the Defendant's misleading representations and
omissions.  Further, these false, misleading, and deceptive
misrepresentations and omissions are likely to continue to
deceive and mislead reasonable consumers and the general public.
Notwithstanding, the Plaintiff would purchase the Products again
if the ingredients were changed so that they indeed were
"Natural."

The "natural" mark, Plaintiff alleges, appears on all of the
cosmetic products within the Defendant's "product portfolio"
subject to the suit.  Further, she alleges that the three
products she purchased are substantially and sufficiently similar
to the rest of the Defendant's cosmetic products that she did not
purchase.  The product's similarity, she posits, authorizes her
to bring this class action suit on behalf of those similarly
situated because the Defendant's customers were uniformly
impacted by the Defendant's purportedly misleading labeling.

The Plaintiff claims that she and the alleged class suffered
injuries as a result of the representation and omission.
Specifically that they: (1) paid a sum of money for Products that
were not what the Defendant represented; (2) paid a premium price
for Products that were not what the Defendant represented; (3)
were deprived of the benefit of the bargain because the Products
they purchased were different from what the Defendant warranted;
and (4) were deprived of the benefit of the bargain because the
Products they purchased had less value than what the Defendant
represented.

Judge Roman finds that although not necessary, the conditional
statement sufficiently conveys the Plaintiff's intention of
purchasing the Defendant's products once the Defendant changes
the ingredients so that the product is not mislabeled.  The fact
that the Plaintiff would continue to purchase the Products in the
future if the misleading labeling is corrected is sufficient to
demonstrate an intent to purchase products in the future that
subjects them to future harm.  Thus, the Plaintiff has standing
to seek injunctive relief.  Since the parties do not dispute the
Plaintiff's Article III standing, the Judge defers consideration
of the class standing question to the class certification stage.

The Judge finds that the Plaintiff properly pleaded that the
Defendant committed a deceptive act by labeling their products
"natural" despite having synthetic ingredients.  Here, a
reasonable consumer acting reasonably very well could be misled
because they could conclude that the "natural" label on the
cosmetics means that they are made with all natural products.
The Plaintiff also alleges that the Defendant placed the label
on their products despite knowing that they contained synthetic
ingredients.  The Judge says these asserted allegations are
sufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
because if accepted as true, would suggest that a reasonable
consumer acting reasonably would be misled by the term "natural"
on a product's label, despite the product containing synthetic
ingredient.  The Defendant's motion will be denied.

With respect to breach of express warranty claim, the Judge finds
that the Plaintiffs failed to allege any facts supporting the
allegation that that she notified the Defendant of the alleged
breach within a reasonable time after its discovery.  Proper
factual allegations should, at least, include the date and method
by which Plaintiff afforded such notice to the Defendant.  The
Defendant's motion to dismiss will be granted without prejudice.
The Plaintiff is granted leave to amend in order to repair this
deficiency.

The Defendant's motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's prayer for
punitive damages pursuant to GBL Section 349 will be denied.  The
Judge finds that the Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to
support a claim for punitive damages at this stage and the text
of GBL Section 349, as well the related jurisprudential
interpretations, permits, at a minimum, limited punitive damages.

Finally, as to Motion to Stay all the remaining claims pursuant
to the primary jurisdiction doctrine, Judge Roman will deny the
Motion because the primary jurisdiction doctrine does not bar the
Court from entertaining the present case.  Among other things,
determining whether a reasonable consumer acting reasonably would
find the term "natural" deceptive when a product contains both
natural and synthetic ingredients is a question the Court and
Jury are well suited to entertain.  The FDA also has discretion
to determine whether a label is misleading.  Accordingly, as most
factors weight against applying the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, the Judge declines to stay the instant case.

For these reasons, Judge Roman denied in part and granted in part
without prejudice the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, and with
leave to amend the breach of express warranty claim in conformity
with the Opinion.  The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested
to terminate the motions at ECF Numbers 33 & 34.

The Judge directed the Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint in
conformity with the above on or before April 20, 2018.  Failure
to timely file an Amended Complaint will result in the dismissal
of the breach of express warranty claim.  The Defendant will
answer or seek a pre-motion conference on any potential motions
to dismiss by May 11, 2018.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 30, 2018 Opinion and Order
is available at https://goo.gl/1QqLZb from Leagle.com.

Elizabeth Petrosino, individually on behalf of herself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jason P. Sultzer --
ultzerj@thesultzerlawgroup.com -- The Sultzer Law Group PC,
Joseph Lipari -- liparij@thesultzerlawgroup.com -- The Sultzer
Law Group, P.C. & Melissa S. Weiner -- weiner@halunenlaw.com --
Halunen Law, pro hac vice.

Stearn's Products, Inc., doing business as, Defendant,
represented by Scott Walter Reynolds --
scott.reynolds@chaffetzlindsey.com -- Chaffetz Lindsey LLP,
Angela L. Diesch, Diesch Forrest Apc, pro hac vice & Joshua
Dillon Anders -- joshua.anders@chaffetzlindsey.com -- Chaffetz
Lindsey LLP.


SUPER 8 WORLDWIDE: Faces "Crosson" Suit in E.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Super 8 Worldwide,
Inc. The case is styled as Aretha Crosson, on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Super 8
Worldwide, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-02938 (E.D. N.Y.,
May 17, 2018).

Super 8 Worldwide, formerly Super 8 Motels, is the world's
largest budget hotel chain, with hotels in the United States,
Canada and China. The company is a subsidiary of Wyndham
Worldwide, formerly a part of Cendant.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   C.K. Lee, Esq.
   Lee Litigation Group, PLLC
   30 East 39th Street
   2nd floor
   New York, NY 10016
   Tel: (212) 465-1188
   Fax: (212) 465-1181
   Email: cklee@leelitigation.com


TAMPA BAY: Faces "Thomas" Suit in M.D. Florida
----------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Tampa Bay Rays
Baseball LTD. The case is styled as James Thomas, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Tampa Bay Rays Baseball LTD, a Florida limited partnership,
Defendant, Case No. 8:18-cv-01187-EAK-AEP (M.D. Fla., May 17,
2018).

Tampa Bay Rays Baseball Ltd. operates a league baseball team. The
Company focuses on promoting professional and semiprofessional
athletic clubs and events.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Benjamin W. Raslavich, Esq.
   Kuhn Raslavich, P.A.
   2124 W. Kennedy Blvd., Suite B
   Tampa, FL 33606
   Tel: (813) 422-7782
   Fax: (813) 422-7783
   Email: ben@theKRfirm.com

      - and -

   Joseph J. Siprut, Esq.
   Siprut PC
   17 N. State St., Suite 1600
   Chicago, Fl 60602-3294
   Tel: (312) 236-0000
   Fax: (312) 546-9963
   Email: jsiprut@siprut.com

      - and -

   Ke Liu, Esq.
   Siprut PC
   17 North State Street, Suite 1600
   Chicago, Il 60602
   Tel: (312) 236-0000
   Fax: (312) 878-1342


TEMPOE LLC: Can Compel Arbitration of "Garcia" TCCWNA Claim
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
granted Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration pursuant to the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in the case captioned ALICIA GARCIA
and PRISCILA DOMINGUEZ, on behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. TEMPOE, LLC, et al.,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 17-2106 (SDW)(LDW) (D.N.J.).

In the course of purchasing furniture, Plaintiffs Alicia Garcia
and Priscila Dominguez entered into Consumer Lease Agreements
with TEMPOE.  Upon learning that they had entered into allegedly
usurious rent-to-own contracts, the Plaintiffs ceased making
payments.  They allege that the Defendant thereafter imposed
improper fees, interest, and/or finance charges before selling
and assigning the Plaintiffs' accounts to third-party debt
collectors.

The Complaint alleges violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud
Act (CFA) (Count I) and of the Truth-in-Consumer Contract,
Warranty and Notice Act (TCCWNA) (Count II).

The Plaintiffs argue that the Agreements are unconscionable and
violate public policy because they contain waivers of their
statutory rights to mandatory treble damages, potential punitive
damages, and one-way fee shifting, as provided under the CFA
and/or TCCWNA. However, the Third Circuit has held that waivers
of state law rights in an arbitration agreement cannot be
asserted to avoid the arbitration agreed to therein.

Rather, the party challenging the validity of such waivers must
present her challenge to the arbitrator, who will determine the
validity and enforceability of the waiver of asserted state law
rights. In light of Peacock, the Court need not decide whether
Plaintiffs waived their statutory rights under the CFA and
TCCWNA, or whether such waivers are enforceable; those
determinations are reserved for the arbitrator.

A full-text copy of the District Court's March 29, 2018 Opinion
is available at  https://tinyurl.com/yamansgm from Leagle.com.

ALICIA GARCIA, On behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated & PRISCILA DOMINGUEZ, On behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by HENRY PAUL WOLFE,
THE WOLF LAW FIRM, LLC & YONGMOON KIM, Kim Law Firm LLC.

TEMPOE, LLC, Defendant, represented by KATE ELIZABETH JANUKOWICZ,
GIBBONS PC &MICHAEL R. MCDONALD, GIBBONS, PC.


TIBET PHARMACEUTICALS: Downs Appeals Obasi Suit Order to 3rd Cir.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants L. McCarthy Downs, III, and Hayden Zou filed an appeal
from a court ruling in the lawsuit styled Obasi Investment Ltd.,
et al. v. Tibet Pharmaceuticals Inc., et al., Case No. 2-14-cv-
03620, in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey.

The appellate case is captioned as Obasi Investment Ltd., et al.
v. Tibet Pharmaceuticals Inc., et al., Case No. 18-1849, in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on April 6, 2018, the
Appellants filed an appeal from a court decision in the case.
That appellate case is titled Obasi Investment Ltd., et al. v.
Tibet Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al., Case No. 18-8017 (3rd Cir.).

Tibet Pharmaceuticals, Inc., formerly Shangri-La Tibetan
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., incorporated on December 22, 2009, is a
specialty pharmaceutical company focusing on the research,
development, manufacturing and marketing of Tibetan medicines.
The Company sells both prescription and over-the-counter
traditional Tibetan medicines.  The Company sells its products
principally to distributors in People's Republic of China, who in
turn sell them to hospitals, hospital pharmacies and retail
pharmacies.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees OBASI INVESTMENT LTD., ROBIN JOACHIM
DARTELL, LIXIN WU and SEAN CARITHERS, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, are represented by:

          Keith R. Lorenze, Esq.
          ROSEN LAW FIRM
          101 Greenwood Avenue, Suite 440
          Jenkintown, PA 19046
          Telephone: (215) 600-2817
          E-mail: klorenze@rosenlegal.com

Defendant-Appellee STERNE AGEE GROUP INC. is represented by:

          Richard J. Davis, Esq.
          MAYNARD COOPER & GALE PC
          1901 6th Avenue North
          2400 Regions, Harbert Plaza
          Birmingham, AL 35203
          Telephone: (205) 254-1000
          E-mail: rdavis@maynardcooper.com

Defendant-Appellant HAYDEN ZOU is represented by:

          Justin J. Gunnell, Esq.
          Michael P. Tremonte, Esq.
          SHER TREMONTE LLP
          90 Broad Street, 23rd Floor
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (212) 202-2600
          E-mail: jgunnell@shertremonte.com
                  mtremonte@shertremonte.com

Defendant-Appellant L. MCCARTHY DOWNS, III, is represented by:

          A. Neil Hartzell, Esq.
          LECLAIRRYAN
          One International Place, Suite 1110
          Boston, MA 02110
          Telephone: (617) 502-8209
          E-mail: neil.hartzell@leclairryan.com

               - and -

          Carmon M. Popler, Esq.
          Leclairryan
          1818 Market Street, 26th Floor
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 383-0912
          E-mail: carmon.popler@leclairryan.com

Defendant-Appellee ACQUAVELLA CHIARELLI SHUSTER BERKOWER & CO LLP
is represented by:

          Nicole B. Liebman, Esq.
          Michael R. McAndrew, Esq.
          WILSON ELSER MOSKOWITZ EDELMAN & DICKER LLP
          200 Campus Drive, 4th Floor
          Florham Park, NJ 07932
          Telephone: (973) 624-0800
          E-mail: nicole.liebman@wilsonelser.com
                  michael.mcandrew@wilsonelser.com


TITLE SOURCE: Court Certifies External Staff Appraiser Class
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs' Motion
for Class Certification in the case captioned SOM SWAMY, on
behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. TITLE SOURCE, INC., Defendant, No. C 17-01175 WHA
(N.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiff moves for conditional certification of a FLSA
collective action and for class certification under FRCP
23(b)(3).

From 2013 to 2017, plaintiff Som Swamy worked as a Title Source
appraiser in the San Francisco Bay Area. Swamy did not keep track
of the hours he worked. He testified during his deposition,
however, that there were some weeks where he worked more than 40
hours.

Numerosity

Under FRCP 23(a)(1), numerosity is satisfied by showing that
joinder of all members is impracticable. There are at least 48
individuals that fall within the definition of the California
Class. As Title Source does not dispute, numerosity is
demonstrated here.

Typicality

Typicality under FRCP 23(a)(3) is shown when the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims
or defenses of the class.

Title Source first argues that typicality is not met because
Swamy's wife and daughter would (in limited circumstances) assist
him with aspects of his work such as answering the phone or
filling out parts of appraisal forms. Title Source also cites to
declarations of appraisers who Title Source characterizes as
diametrically opposed to Swamy's views regarding his role as an
appraiser. Title Source fails to explain, however, how either
issue makes Swamy uniquely vulnerable to atypical defenses.

Adequacy.

Swamy and his counsel will adequately represent the class. FRCP
23(a)(4) requires that the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class. This prerequisite
has two parts: (1) that the proposed representative plaintiff and
his counsel do not have any conflicts of interest with the
proposed class; and (2) that they will prosecute this action
vigorously on behalf of the class.

Nothing in the record indicates that Swamy or his counsel would
have a conflict with other potential class members. Furthermore,
both Swamy and his counsel have vigorously prosecuted this action
on behalf of the California Class, and nothing in the record
suggests that they will not continue to do so.

Commonality and Predominance

Failure to Reimburse Necessary Expenditures.

Section 2802 of the California Labor Code requires employers to
indemnify its employees for work related expenses. The elements
of a claim under Section 2802 are: (1) the employee made
expenditures or incurred losses; (2) the expenditures or losses
were incurred in direct consequence of the employee's discharge
of his or her duties, or obedience to the directions of the
employer; and (3) the expenditures or losses were reasonable and
necessary. In addition, the employer must either know or have
reason to know that the employee has incurred the expense.

Swamy's damages model provides for damages equal to (1) the
number of miles driven by appraisers at the IRS reimbursement
rate, (2) home internet at the lowest cost plan identified by
Swamy's expert, and (3) cell phone use at $85 per month. With
respect to the number of miles driven by appraisers, Swamy
proposes a damages model based on the most efficient route that
could have been taken to reach the properties inspected on a
particular day.

Title Source objects that this methodology limits putative class
members' damages to those appraisers who used a personal vehicle
(as opposed to public transportation) and ignores the actual
costs incurred and distances traveled. But Swamy need not prove
his damages with exact proof at the class certification stage.
However, decertification of the class may be proper.

Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized Wage Statements.

Section 226(a) of the California Labor Code requires employers to
provide accurate itemized wage statements that show, among other
things, (1) gross wages earned, (2) total hours worked by the
employee and] (3) the number of piece-rate units earned and any
applicable piece rate if the employee is paid on a piece-rate
basis.

In Boyd v. Bank of America Corp., 300 F.R.D. 431, 442-43 (C.D.
Cal. 2014) (Judge David Carter), the district court certified a
class of residential appraisers in connection with similar wage-
and-hour claims. The plaintiffs had presented common policies and
procedures regulating the conduct of the appraisers employed by
the defendant, including standardized job descriptions,
compensation policies, and guidelines by which employees were to
complete appraisals. In light of such policies, common questions
regarding the appraisers' proper classification predominated. So
too here.

On this point, Title Source attempts to distinguish Boyd on the
ground that its staff appraisers performed other work in addition
to residential appraisals, such as assisting in software design
and testing, reviewing protocols of outside, non-employee
appraisers, and participating in pilot programs, beta testing,
and the development of propriety software. Title Source does not
dispute, however, that these additional duties and
responsibilities were uniformly imposed on members of the
putative class.

While these differences may be relevant to the determination of
whether class members were properly classified as exempt, they do
not render class certification inappropriate.

Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation

Swamy also alleges that Title Source failed to pay overtime
compensation in violation of Section 510 of the California Labor
Code. Section 510 generally provides: "Eight hours of labor
constitutes a day's work. Any work in excess of eight hours in
one workday and any work in excess of 40 hours in any one
workweek and the first eight hours worked on the seventh day of
work in any one workweek shall be compensated at the rate of no
less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for an
employee."

To succeed on this claim, however, Swamy must show that he and
other class members worked in excess of eight hours a day or in
excess of 40 hours a week. Swamy concedes that he has no record
of the hours he actually worked. He instead suggests that
testimony of staff appraisers be used as the sole means of
determining whether class members worked overtime. Such testimony
is the exact opposite of common proof.

Swamy spills much ink arguing that certification is proper
because he heart of the case is the classification challenge and
Title Source's asserted administrative and professional exemption
defenses will stand or fall with respect to the entire class. To
this end, Swamy again points to Boyd, where the plaintiff's
overtime claim was certified. In Boyd, however, the plaintiffs
had shown and the defendant did not dispute that members of the
putative class had regularly worked overtime.

Swamy still fails to provide a common method of proving that such
employees are entitled to overtime pay.

This order accordingly finds that Swamy has not identified a
common method of proof on a class-wide basis for his overtime
claim, and common questions on this claim would not predominate.
Class certification of this claim and Swamy's derivative claim
for unfair competition is accordingly denied.

Superiority

Class certification is appropriate only if class resolution is
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy.

Title Source argues that resolution of the proposed class's
claims would be derailed by individualized inquiries. These
concerns have been addressed above. Despite the high value of the
claims at issue in this case, a single proceeding in this forum
is preferable and more efficient than individual proceedings. A
class action would therefore be superior to individual actions
for the adjudication of Swamy's expense reimbursement, wage
statement, and derivative Section 17200 claims.

Swamy's motion for class certification is granted in part and
denied in part. The following class is certified:

     All persons employed by Title Source as an External Staff
Appraiser in California at any time from March 7, 2013, through
the present.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 2, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yae3qeck from Leagle.com.

Som Swamy, on Behalf of Himself and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Lorrie T. Peeters -
- lpeeters@caffarelli.com -- Caffarelli & Associates Ltd., Don J.
Foty -- DFoty@kennedyhodges.com -- Kennedy Hodges, LLP, pro hac
vice, Galvin B. Kennedy -- Gkennedy@kennedyhodges.com -- Kennedy
Hodges, LLP & William Marshall Hogg, Kennedy Hodges, LLP.

Title Source, Incorporated, Defendant, represented by James
Milton Nelson -- nelson@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traurig LLP, Adil
Mansoor Khan -- khanad@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traurig, LLP,
Jeffrey B. Morganroth -- jmorganroth@morganrothlaw.com --
Morganroth and Morganroth PLLC, Lindsay Erin Hutner --
hutnerl@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Mark David Kemple --
kemplem@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traurig, Michelle L. DuCharme --
ducharmem@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traruig, LLP & Peter S. Wahby
wahbyp@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traurig, LLP.


TOUGH MUDDER: Arbitration Provision Valid, Appeals Court Rules
--------------------------------------------------------------
Dorothy Atkins, writing for Law360, reports that a Massachusetts
appeals court panel affirmed on May 7 a trial court's ruling that
forced a putative class of Tough Mudder Inc. participants to
arbitrate their suit alleging the obstacle course event planner
wrongly refused to reimburse them after moving an event from
Massachusetts to Maine, finding that the company's arbitration
provision is valid.

In a 12-page order, a unanimous three-justice panel said nothing
in Tough Mudder's seven-page contract with "Mudderella Boston"
participants suggests that the arbitration provision in it was
procedurally unconscionable. [GN]


TOYOTA FINANCIAL: Access Fees Suit Remains in NJ Dist. Court
------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion of the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey issued a Report and
Recommendation denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand the case
captioned CHRISTINE A. BOYLE, Plaintiff, v. TOYOTA FINANCIAL
SERVICES, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 2:17-cv-10730-ES-
SCM (D.N.J.).

This is a class action arising out of Toyota Motor's alleged
collection of impermissible access fees, after it repossessed
cars.  According to the Complaint, Toyota Motor required Ms.
Boyle to pay fees to access personal goods from her vehicle,
which was allegedly a deceptive business practice and/or improper
repossession.

Ms. Boyle alleges that Toyota Motor's removal petition is void
because it is untimely, and because Toyota Motor failed to serve
their co-defendants with the removal petition. Additionally, Ms.
Boyle contends that Toyota Motor did not meet its burden to
remove under the Class Action Fairness Act.

The record reveals no evidence that Mr. Sullivan held any of
those managerial positions or that he was otherwise authorized by
appointment or by law to receive service on behalf of the
corporation. Nor is there any indication that Mr. Sullivan may
have been in charge of the registered office of the corporation
or the principal place of business of the corporation in Iowa or
that the Iowa address was one of those locations. Finally, there
is no showing that Toyota Motor had no place of business in Iowa
such that service on any employee of the corporation within Iowa
would suffice. Consequently, the Court finds that Ms. Boyle's
certified mailing to Toyota Financial did not constitute proper
service as to Toyota Motor.

In response to this motion, Toyota Motor filed a declaration
explaining their calculations. Toyota Motor conducted an
investigation and estimates that it repossessed and charged
access fees to approximately 8,294 New Jersey residents. Ms.
Boyle is seeking damages based on violations of the New Jersey
Consumer Fraud Act and the New Jersey Uniform Commercial Code.
Should she prevail, she and her fellow class members would be
entitled to treble damages, attorneys' fees, filing fees,
reasonable costs, and punitive damages.

Toyota Motor offers detailed calculations to show that the
recoverable amount for each plaintiff equals at least $910.
Therefore, by multiplying that amount with the estimated class of
8,294 members, the amount in controversy is more than $7,500,000
million, thereby satisfying the $5,000,000 amount in controversy
requirement. Ms. Boyle has not objected to these calculations.
Taken together, Toyota Motor has met its burden to establish
subject matter jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act
and properly removed this case.

A full-text copy of the District Court's March 29, 2018 Report
and Recommendation is available at https://tinyurl.com/ycschdzv
from Leagle.com.

CHRISTINE A. BOYLE, individually and on behalf of those similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by JONATHAN RUDNICK --
jonr@cartonandrudnick.com -- CARTON & RUDNICK.

TOYOTA FINANCIAL SERVICE, Defendant, represented by CHRISTINE
NICOLE WALZ -- Christine.Walz@hklaw.com -- HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP &
JOHN M. TORIELLO -- John.Toriello@hklaw.com -- HOLLAND & KNIGHT,
LLP.


TOYOTA MOTOR SALES: Bid to Move "Espineli" to C.D. Cal. Denied
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MELINDA ESPINELI AND MOHOMMAD MOGHADDAM,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. TOYOTAL MOTOR SALES U.S.A., INC., a California
Corporation; TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION, a Japanese Corporation;
and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive., Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-
00698-KJM-CKD (E.D. Cal.), Judge Kimberly J. Mueller of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of California denied the
Defendants' motion to transfer the class action to the Central
District of California to be consolidated with a case filed there
styled Heber v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., or in the
alternative, to stay the action until Heber is resolved.

Heber is a class action filed in August 2016 in the Central
District of California in which the plaintiffs allege certain
Toyota vehicles were defectively designed because Toyota used
soy-based wiring insulation that attracts rodents, with the
result that the rodents chew through the wiring.  The action
includes 21 named plaintiffs from thirteen states, including
California, who seek to certify state sub-classes consisting of
persons who own or lease or previously owned or leased a "Class
Vehicle."  The list of "Class Vehicles" includes 15 Toyota
vehicle models spanning various years from 2008 to present.  The
California plaintiffs assert eight claims: breach of express and
implied warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") and
the California Song-Beverly Act; violation of the California
Consumer Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA") and Unfair Competition Law
("UCL"); common-law fraud; and violation of the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act.  The Defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs'
Fourth Amended Complaint is now pending before the Heber court.

The Plaintiffs filed the action in the Court on March 31, 2017.
The Defendants filed the motion to transfer or stay proceedings
on Aug. 14, 2017.  The Plaintiffs filed an opposition on Oct. 20,
2017, and the Defendants replied on Oct. 27, 2017.

Toyota is a vehicle manufacturer and parent company of Lexus. The
putative class action arises from one central claim: the
Plaintiffs allege the Defendants used soy-based wire coating in
the engine control wiring harness of their Lexus vehicles, which
attracted rodents that chewed on the wiring, causing damage to
the vehicles.  They Plaintiffs assert Lexus vehicles can lose
functionality and safety features when wires in the engine
control wiring harness are damaged by rodents, which poses a
safety risk to both class members and the public at large.

The putative class includes all persons in California who
currently own or lease, or who have owned or leased, any Lexus
RX, GX, ES and LS model vehicle with model years 2007-2017, and
the putative sub-class includes owners and lessors of the same
models of vehicles who submitted their Vehicle for repairs under
the Vehicle's warranty for damage related to rodent infestation
and incurred out-of-pocket expenses for such repairs after Lexus'
refusal to cover repairs under the Vehicle's warranty.

The Plaintiffs assert four claims including: violation of the
CLRA; violation of the UCL; breach of implied warranty under the
California Song-Beverly Act; and breach of express warranty, on
behalf of the proposed subclass.

Judge Mueller finds that the Defendants' supplemental authority
is in the form of a recent decision by a fellow judge,
transferring an Eastern District case to the Central District.
The case is distinguishable from the case at bar because the
plaintiffs indicated the nationwide class of defective Nissan
vehicle owners in that case would be amended after discovery to
specifically include the vehicle owners identified in the Central
District case.  Here, there is no indication the very narrowly
defined class will be amended, and the Plaintiffs have signalled
they have no plans to seek such an amendment.

Even if the first-to-file rule was satisfied, fairness and equity
compels the Court's maintaining the case in the district.  Both
named Plaintiffs in the action purchased their Lexus from Lexus
of Roseville in Roseville, California.  Although the class may
include California Plaintiffs outside the Eastern District, for
the class representatives and named Plaintiffs in the action, who
will bear the primary burden of assisting with litigation of the
case, the purchase of the vehicle, the issuance of the Lexus
warranty, and the actions at issue all occurred in the Eastern
District.  Additionally, even if the case were transferred to the
Central District, there is no guarantee it would be consolidated
with the Heber action, and thus, no guarantee of any efficiency
gained through transfer.

Because both the Plaintiffs reside in the Eastern District and
purchased their Lexus vehicles in the Eastern District, there is
no indication of improper forum shopping.  Moreover, the
Plaintiffs are not putative class members in the Heber action
because the Heber action does not include owners of Lexus
vehicles.  The relevant 1404 factors weigh against transfer.

For these reasons, Judge Mueller denied the Defendants' motion to
transfer or stay the case.  The Court will turn next to the
pending motion to dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 30, 2018 Order is available
at https://goo.gl/xuEfEB from Leagle.com.

Melinda Espineli & Mohammad Moghaddam, Plaintiffs, represented by
Stuart C. Talley, Kershaw, Cook & Talley PC, Gregory Lawrence
Bentley, Bentley & More LLP & William A. Kershaw, Kershaw, Cook &
Talley PC.

Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., Defendant, represented by Amir
M. Nassihi -- anassihi@shb.com -- Shook Hardy and Bacon LLP.


TRAMO AT HOME: "Fundora" Suit Seeks to Recover Overtime Wages
-------------------------------------------------------------
ROLANDO R. FUNDORA and other similarly-situated individuals v.
TRAMO AT HOME MIAMI INC., and MARCO BARISONE, individually, Case
No. 1:18-cv-21505-CMA (S.D. Fla., April 17, 2018), seeks to
recover alleged unpaid overtime wages accumulated during all his
time of employment, liquidated damages and any other relief as
allowable by law.

Tramo At Home Miami Inc. is a Florida corporation, which has
business in Miami-Dade County, Florida.  Marco Barisone is the
owner/partner/director, and manager of the Defendant Corporation.

Tramo At Home is an importer, and distributor of Italian
furniture, appliances and home furnishings.  The Defendant also
provides logistic services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Zandro E. Palma, Esq.
          ZANDRO E. PALMA, P.A.
          9100 S. Dadeland Blvd., Suite 1500
          Miami, FL 33156
          Telephone: (305) 446-1500
          Facsimile: (305) 446-1502
          E-mail: zep@thepalmalawgroup.com


TRION WORLDS: Denial of Arbitration in "Van Fleet" Affirmed
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of California, First District, Division
Five, affirmed the Trial Court's Order Denying the Petition to
Compel Arbitration in the case captioned AARON VAN FLEET, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. TRION WORLDS, INC., Defendant and
Appellant, No. A148989 (Cal. App.).

The Court considered whether the parties agreed to arbitrate
their dispute relating to a computer game called ArcheAge.

Aaron Van Fleet, Paul Ovberg, and James Longfield (collectively,
plaintiffs) sued Trion Worlds, Inc. (Trion) asserting causes of
action based on alleged misrepresentations regarding discounts
that would be available within ArcheAge, and alleging other
aspects of ArcheAge constitute an illegal lottery.

Upon remand, Trion petitioned the trial court to compel
arbitration, arguing the parties entered into a valid arbitration
agreement, and the asserted claims fell within its scope.  The
Plaintiffs opposed the petition, arguing they did not agree to
arbitrate their claims and, if the arbitration clause did apply,
it was unconscionable.

The court denied the petition finding there is no existing
agreement to arbitration between these parties, as it was
superseded by an agreement to adjudicate all causes of action in
court. Alternatively, the arbitration provision in conjunction
with agreement terms is procedurally and substantively
unconscionable. Trion appeals the order denying its petition to
compel arbitration.

Trion faults the trial court for framing its analysis as one of
existence rather than harmonization. Trion contends there is no
dispute as to the existence of the Terms of Use and its
arbitration provision, but rather a question of how that
arbitration provision can be harmonized with the EULA's venue-
selection clause a harmonization question that must acknowledge,
as the parties did, that the EULA incorporates the Terms of Use.

When deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain
matter, including arbitrability, courts generally should apply
ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of
contracts. Arbitration is therefore a matter of contract. The
Cal. App. applies general California contract law to determine
whether the parties formed a valid agreement to arbitrate their
dispute.

Under both federal and state law, the threshold question
presented by a petition to compel arbitration is whether there is
an agreement to arbitrate.

When addressing the threshold question of whether the parties
agreed to arbitrate their dispute, which relates to purchases
associated with the ArcheAge game, the Terms of Use provides the
Cal. App. must start with the ArcheAge EULA. It does not provide
for arbitration. Based on the clear language of the applicable
agreements, the agreement to litigate any state law cause of
action relating to the ArcheAge EULA in San Mateo County
supersedes the agreement to arbitrate other kinds of disputes.
Trion cannot satisfy its burden of proving the existence of a
valid agreement to arbitrate this dispute.

Here, the plaintiffs allege they each set up Trion accounts and
played ArcheAge. Accordingly, the plaintiffs acknowledge they
agreed to both the ArcheAge EULA and the Terms of Use.
Nonetheless, the key to resolving this petition to compel
arbitration is the parties' agreement that in the event of a
conflict or inconsistency, the ArcheAge EULA supersedes the Terms
of Use.

Based on this explicit language, the Cal. App. cannot conclude
there was an agreement to arbitrate this dispute.

Trion's proposed harmonization fails because it starts with the
Terms of Use, and reads the ArcheAge EULA against its backdrop.
This strained interpretation ignores the clear and explicit
language of the Terms of Use, which provides it is in addition
to, and does not replace or supplant, any applicable Game EULA.
Since the ArcheAge EULA does not provide for arbitration, the
Cal. App. cannot avoid the conclusion there is a conflict or
inconsistency between it and the Terms of Use.

In the event of a conflict or inconsistency, the terms and
conditions of the Game EULA shall supersede any such terms and
conditions of the Terms of Use. The trial court considered the
correct question, and correctly concluded that no agreement to
arbitrate this dispute exists.

A full-text copy of the Cal. App.'s April 2, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y9yuc7v9 from Leagle.com


UBER: Christensen Represents Plaintiffs in Discrimination Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Miriam Rozen, writing for American Lawyer, reports that good
plaintiffs lawyers have always known how to seize a moment and
capitalize on a trend.

But when it comes to Jeanne Christensen, who has represented
women suing Fox News, The Weinstein Co., and hedge fund
billionaire Steve Cohen over the past year, it's not just about
riding a wave of sexual abuse, harassment and discrimination
allegations.

Ms. Christensen, the sole female partner at New York's Wigdor LLP
and the lead lawyer in a proposed class action claiming Uber
Technologies Inc. failed to protect "countless" female customers
from rape and assault, said she has experienced discrimination
firsthand.  And she has been pursuing claims against Uber since
2015, long before accusations against Harvey Weinstein launched
the #MeToo movement.

"I had been thinking about Uber for a long time.  One day, I
literally got up and realized this is a class action case," she
said.  "If you are going to be a litigator, you have to [be]
willing to put a new type of claim, you can't be afraid to put it
out there.  That was something I already knew about and about how
bad the problem was, and how much it was covered up."

Uber has denied the claims in the proposed class action and is
being defended by Perkins Coie.  The plaintiffs filed an amended
complaint in March in federal court in Oakland.

"The allegations brought forth in this case are important to us
and we take them very seriously," the company said in a
statement.

Ms. Christensen started practicing in 1992, after graduating from
the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.
Before launching her own firm, she said she was turned down while
applying for law firm jobs because she was pregnant.  Since
coming to Wigdor in 2014, despite name partner Douglas Wigdor's
high-profile, she said she has worked hard to win credit for her
own role on cases.

"I work very hard at it," Ms.  Christensen said.  "I don't think
anyone would describe me as abrasive, but I don't think meekly.

Those efforts have helped to raise her profile dramatically over
the past year, and Christensen said she's become a go-to female
legal expert for reporters delivering stories about harassment
allegations.

The New Yorker staff writer Sheelah Kolhatkar, NBC's Megyn Kelly
and CNN's Wolf Blitzer have all recently given Christensen a
platform. (Only Michael Avenatti, Stormy Daniels' omnipresent
lawyer, may be able to claim more airtime.)

During an interview with CNN about the Uber case, Christensen
noted her prior experience suing Uber on behalf of individual
women, saying "Uber has done a miraculous job of keeping the
story quiet."  With her proposed class action, she is taking her
fight against Uber to a new, much more public level.

"We're not simply going to file cases so Uber pays women and
their lawyers money to be quiet about it, and that was a
conscious decision that we made," she told CNN.

Female plaintiffs have been drawn to Ms. Christensen, who has
filed 25 employment discrimination cases in federal court since
2010 against hospitals, restaurants and financial services
companies, among other defendants.  Her former clients and even
lawyers who previously opposed her have recommended her,
Ms.  Christensen said.

But her own gender has also been a factor, she said. "They are
calling me because they don't want to call a male lawyer,"
Ms.  Christensen said.  "I don't want to say that is the No. 1
reason, because then it makes it seem like I haven't done
anything. But some women are looking for a woman lawyer when in
the past they may have sought the counsel of a man."

She also sees a deficit of female lawyers handling sexual assault
and harassment cases, particularly for plaintiffs who are not
high-profile or top executives. "There are very few women in this
space," Ms.  Christensen said.

Her own experience with sex-related discrimination has helped her
relate to clients, she said.  "I don't need someone to tell me
what it is like to be discriminated against about pregnancies,"
she said.  "That comes through.  There is just no substitute for
that." [GN]


UFCW UNION: Nagel Sues Local 653 Over Loss of 30-and-Out Benefit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Matthew Nagel, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 653,
Case No. 0:18-cv-01053 (D. Minn., April 19, 2018), alleges that
by withholding material details about the loss of the 30-and-out
benefit, the Defendant engaged in arbitrary, discriminatory, and
bad faith conduct that prejudiced members in jeopardy of losing
that benefit.

United Food and Commercial Workers Union, District Local 653 (the
Local) is a labor organization with its primary place of business
in Brooklyn Center, Minnesota.  The Local is the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent for all meat and food market employees
employed by Supervalu Cub Foods, Kowalski's Foods, and certain
independent grocers located in and around the Minneapolis
metropolitan area.

Under prior collective bargaining agreements with Supervalu and
the independent grocers, certain Local members had a "30-and-out"
pension benefit, which allowed those Local members to take full
retirement pension benefits after completing thirty years of
qualifying employment service, Mr. Nagel says.  He asserts that
during negotiations with Supervalu and the independent grocers in
February 2018, the Local agreed to proposed collective bargaining
agreement that bargained away the 30-and-out benefit for certain
members.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Shawn J. Wanta, Esq.
          Scott A. Moriarity, Esq.
          BAILLON THOME JOZWIAK & WANTA LLP
          100 South Fifth Street, Suite 1200
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 252-3570
          E-mail: sjwanta@baillonthome.com
                  samoriarity@baillonthome.com


UNILEVER UNITED: PepsiCo Wins Dismissal of Mislabeling Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose Division, granted Defendant's PepsiCo,
Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss all of the claims and causes of action
in Plaintiff Amy Maxwell's Third Amended Complaint (TAC) relating
to Pepsi's carbonated soft drinks in the case captioned AMY
MAXWELL, Plaintiff, v. UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC., et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 5:12-cv-01736-EJD (N.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiff alleges a single theory of liability: that PepsiCo
engaged in unlawful food labeling practices by failing to
disclose the presence of chemical preservatives, artificial
flavorings, or artificial added colors.  In the allegedly
offending products, phosphoric acid and citric acid appear in the
list of ingredients on the side of the can, but the can does not
otherwise give any indication that the Pepsi products contain
artificial preservatives or flavors.

All of the Plaintiff's claims are premised on her contention
that, by listing phosphoric acid and citric acid as ingredients
on the Pepsi can label but not identifying them as artificial
flavors and/or preservatives, Pepsi is unlawfully and
misleadingly mislabeled.  The Plaintiff claims that Defendants
violate California's False Advertising Law.

PepsiCo argues that the Plaintiff again failed to adequately
allege that the non-purchased products are substantially similar.

The Court disagrees.

The TAC alleges that the non-purchased products have the same
basic ingredients, differing only in flavour, and the same label
claims as the Purchased regular Pepsi product. It also makes
specific allegations as to phosphoric acid and citric acid, the
alleged misleading statements at issue here. Taken as true and
construed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, this is
sufficient.

PepsiCo argues that the Plaintiff failed to plead actual reliance
as to any of her claims because she did not identify the
particular statements she allegedly relied upon.  The Court
agrees.  The TAC alleges: "The following unlawful and misleading
language appears on the label of Pepsi as an ingredient:
phosphoric acid and citric acid which are not identified as
providing artificial preservatives and/or flavors."

The TAC fails to explain how the Plaintiff could have read the
words phosphoric acid and citric acid or otherwise read the Pepsi
label and been lead to believe that Pepsi did not contain
artificial flavors. This theory becomes even more attenuated when
viewed in context: colas like Pepsi are artificial products and
have been familiar to the public as such for decades. In
addition, the ingredients list identifies at least one other
artificially sounding flavor: Caramel Color.

As such, the Plaintiff's theory that she read the words
phosphoric acid and citric acid and concluded that Pepsi did not
contain artificial ingredients simply is not plausible under
either Rule 8(a) or Rule 9(b).

Because the Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege reliance
and reliance is a necessary element of all of Plaintiff's claims,
Plaintiff's claims are dismissed.

A full-text copy of the District Court's March 29, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yd6vydr8 from Leagle.com.

Amy Maxwell, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Ananda N. Chaudhuri --
achaudhuri@fleischmanlawfirm.com -- Fleischman Law Firm, Ben F.
Pierce Gore -- pgore@prattattorneys.com -- Pratt & Associates,
Carol Nelkin, Nelkin, Nelkin & Krock, PC, Charles F. Barrett --
cbarrett@nealharwell.com -- Neal & Harwell, PLC.

Unilever United States, Inc., Defendant, represented by William
Francis Tarantino -- wtarantino@mofo.com -- Morrison & Foerster
LLP, Alexandra Eve Laks -- alaks@mofo.com -- Morrison and
Foerster LLP, Claudia Maria Vetesi -- cvetesi@mofo.com --
Morrison & Foerster LLP, Daniel W. Nelson --
dnelson@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn and Crutcher LLP & William
Lewis Stern -- wstern@mofo.com -- Morrison & Foerster LLP.

PEPSICO, Inc., Defendant, represented by Daniel W. Nelson --
dnelson@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn and Crutcher LLP, pro hac
vice, William Francis Tarantino -- wtarantino@mofo.com --
Morrison & Foerster LLP, Claudia Maria Vetesi -- cvetesi@mofo.com
-- Morrison & Foerster LLP, Timothy William Loose --
tloose@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP & William
Lewis Stern -- wstern@mofo.com -- Morrison & Foerster LLP.


UNITED COLLECTION: Faces "Hochauser" Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against United Collection
Bureau, Inc. The case is styled as Yochanan Hochauser,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. United Collection Bureau, Inc. and John Does 1-25,
Defendants, Case No. 7:18-cv-04454 (S.D. N.Y., May 18, 2018).

United Collection Bureau, Inc. provides debt collection services
for companies (government, healthcare, utility, financial
service, communication, and student markets) and individuals in
the United States. United Collection Bureau, Inc. was formerly
known as UCB, Inc. and changed its name to United Collection
Bureau, Inc. in August 1979. The company was founded in 1959 and
is based in Toledo, Ohio.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


UNITED STATES: Court Certifies Pregnant UCs Class in "Garza"
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ROCHELLE GARZA, as guardian ad litem to
unaccompanied minor J.D., on behalf of herself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ERIC D. HARGAN, et al.,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 17-cv-02122 (TSC) (D. D.C.), Judge
Tanya S. Chutkan of the U.S. District Court for the District of
District of Columbia granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification and the Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction.

Garza, on behalf of a putative class of unaccompanied,
undocumented minors, has sued Hargan, Acting Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services, Stephen Wagner, Acting
Assistant Secretary of the Administration for Children and
Families, and E. Scott Lloyd, Director of the Office of Refugee
Resettlement, alleging that the Defendants have violated the
minors' constitutional rights by preventing them from terminating
their pregnancies or otherwise availing themselves of the full
panoply of legally available reproductive healthcare services
while in federal custody.

Pending before the Court are the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification and Motion for a Preliminary Injunction.  They seek
to form a class that would include all pregnant UCs who are or
will be in federal custody and, accordingly, are or will be
subject to ORR's policies or practices.  The Named Plaintiffs
include four female UCs -- Jane Doe (J.D.), Jane Roe (J.R.), Jane
Poe (J.P.), and Jane Moe (J.M.) -- each of whom has at some point
been both pregnant and in the Office of Refugee Resettlement
("ORR") custody since the Plaintiffs filed the case in October
2017.

The Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants' policies amount to a
series of obstacles and restrictions designed to coerce and
control all UCs' pregnancy decisions to ensure that they carry
their pregnancies to term while in ORR custody, such that
pregnant UCs are: (1) deprived of comprehensive and unbiased
options counseling in favor of coercive counseling designed more
to influence their decision-making than to meet their medical
needs; (2) denied the power to decide for themselves whether to
involve their parents in their pregnancy decision-making by a
system of disclosure and parental consent requirements that
cannot be bypassed; and (3) stripped of their right to make
autonomous decisions about whether and when to become a parent by
ORR's retention of an ultimate veto power over abortion access,
which is exercised as a de facto ban on abortion.  They
Plaintiffs allege that these obstacles and restrictions violate
the First and Fifth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and seek
to preliminarily enjoin the Defendants from further enforcing the
terms of the above policy, pattern, or set of practices.

Having reviewed the parties' filings (including the briefs of
amici curiae), the record, and the relevant case law, Judge
Chutkan finds that the proposed class meets  Rule 23(a)'s and
Rule 23(b)(2)'s requirements.  She granted the Plaintiffs' Motion
for Class Certification.  The relevant class is defined as all
pregnant, unaccompanied immigrant minor children (UCs) who are or
will be in the legal custody of the federal government.

While ORR and its Director are certainly entitled to maintain an
interest in fetal life, and even to prefer that pregnant UCs in
ORR custody choose one course over the other, ORR may not create
or implement any policy that strips UCs of their right to make
their own reproductive choices.  Accordingly, the Judge granted
the Plaintiffs' motion for a class-wide preliminary injunction.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 30, 2018 Order is available
at https://goo.gl/8aYuHd from Leagle.com.

ROCHELLE GARZA, As guardian ad litem to unaccompanied minor J.D.,
on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff,
represented by Arthur B. Spitzer -- aspitzer@acludc.org --
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Daniel Mach -- dmach@aclu.org -- AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
FOUNDATION, Scott Michelman -- smichelman@acludc.org -- AMERICAN
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA & Brigitte
Amiri -- bamiri@aclu.org -- AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
FOUNDATION, pro hac vice.

JANE ROE & JANE POE, Plaintiffs, represented by Arthur B.
Spitzer, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA & Brigitte Amiri, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
FOUNDATION.

JANE MOE, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Arthur B. Spitzer, AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA & Brigitte Amiri,
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, pro hac vice.

ERIC HARGAN, Acting Secretary, Health and Human Services,
Defendant, represented by Ernesto Horacio Molina, Jr., U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Office of Immigration Litigation, Appellate
Section, Joseph Anton Darrow, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil
Division, Office of Immigration Litigation, Sabatino Fioravante
Leo, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Office of Immigration
Litigation Appellate Section, Woei-Tyng Daniel Shieh, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & Michael Christopher Heyse, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

STEPHEN WAGNER, Acting Assistant Secretary, Administration for
Children and Families, in his official and individual capacity &
SCOTT LLOYD, Director, Office of Refugee Resettlement, in his
official and individual capacity, Defendants, represented by
Ernesto Horacio Molina, Jr., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Office of
Immigration Litigation, Appellate Section, Joseph Anton Darrow,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Division, Office of Immigration
Litigation, Sabatino Fioravante Leo , UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE Office of Immigration Litigation Appellate Section,
William S. Consovoy -- will@consovoymccarthy.com -- CONSOVOY
MCCARTHY PARK PLLC, Woei-Tyng Daniel Shieh, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, Caroline Asley Cook -- caroline@consovoymccarthy.com --
CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PARK PLLC, pro hac vice, Michael Christopher
Heyse, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Michael H. Park --
park@consovoymccarthy.com -- CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PARK PLLC, pro hac
vice & Patrick Neilson Strawbridge --
Patrick@consovoymccarthy.com -- CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PARK LLC, pro
hac vice.

STATE OF TEXAS, STATE OF ARKANSAS, STATE OF LOUISIANA, STATE OF
MICHIGAN, STATE OF NEBRASKA, STATE OF OHIO, STATE OF OKLAHOMA,
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, STATE OF MISSOURI, STATE OF WEST
VIRGINIA, COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY & MATTHEW G. BEVIN, Governor,
Amicuss, represented by Scott A. Keller, OFFICE OF THE TEXAS
ATTORNEY GENERAL.


UNITED STATES: Robinson Files Writ of Certiorari to Supreme Court
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs William Robinson, et al., filed with the Supreme Court
of United States a petition for a writ of certiorari in their
lawsuit entitled William Robinson, et al. v. Jefferson B.
Sessions, III, Attorney General, et al., Case No. 17-1448.

Response to the Petition was due on May 21, 2018.

The question presented to the Supreme Court is:

   Whether the Petitioners have standing to assert that the
   statutory disqualifications for the purchase of a firearm
   found at 18 U.S.C. Section922(g)(1)-(9) serve as the
   limitation for the databases and records that may be searched
   by the Respondents during a NICS background check?

In 1993, the Brady Act mandated the creation of a computerized
system for presale background checks with the objective to match
the customer's identity to specified disqualifying records that
would prohibit the attempted purchase of a firearm at a
federally-licensed dealer.  This system, known as the "NICS
background check," or "NICS," launched in 1998.

The Petitioners are individuals and organizations of individuals,
who provided their personal information through federally-
licensed dealers to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives/Federal Bureau of Investigation for the specific and
limited purpose of the NICS background check.  The Petitioners
were not notified, nor did they provide consent, for their
private information to be compared against any database unrelated
to disqualifying factors at federal law.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the
Plaintiffs filed an appeal from a District Court decision and
order dated April 10, 2017, in the lawsuit styled Robinson, et
al. v. Sessions, et al., Case No. 15-cv-6765 (W.D.N.Y.).  That
appellate case is captioned as Robinson, et al. v. Sessions, et
al., Case No. 17-1427, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit.[BN]

The Plaintiffs-Petitioners William Robinson, et al., are
represented by:

          Paloma Appolonia Capanna, Esq.
          633 Lake Road
          Webster, NY 14580
          Telephone: (585) 377-7260
          E-mail: pcapanna@law-policy.com

Defendants-Respondents Jefferson B. Sessions, III, Attorney
General, et al., are represented by:

          Noel J. Francisco, Esq.
          SOLICITOR GENERAL
          UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
          950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
          Washington, DC 20530-0001
          Telephone: (202) 514-2203
          E-mail: Noel.Francisco@usdoj.gov


UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN: Students Sue Over Tyndall Sexual Abuses
---------------------------------------------------------------
Courthouse News Service reported that four University of Southern
California students sued the university and its gynecologist
George Tyndall in Los Angeles County court on May 21, claiming
USC ignored Tyndall's "sexually abusive behavior dating back to
at least the year 2000" at the university health clinic.


URBAN EDGE: Faces "Sigmon" Suit in South Carolina
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Urban Edge
Properties. The case is styled as Ted Sigmon, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Urban Edge
Properties and Urban Edge Properties LP, Defendants, Case No.
2:18-cv-01354-DCN (D. S.C., May 17, 2018).

Urban Edge Properties is a NYSE listed real estate investment
trust focused on managing, acquiring, developing, and
redeveloping retail real estate in urban communities, primarily
in the New York metropolitan region.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Gregory A DeLuca, Esq.
   DeLuca and Maucher
   PO Box 9
   Goose Creek, SC 29445
   Tel: (943) 572-1711
   Fax: (843) 572-1285
   Email: greg@delucamaucher.com

      - and -

   James L Ward, Jr, Esq.
   McGowan Hood and Felder LLC
   321 Wingo Way, Suite 103
   Mt Pleasant, SC 29464
   Tel: (843) 388-7202
   Fax: (843) 388-3194
   Email: jward@mcgowanhood.com


VALEANT PHARMA: Safirstein Metcalf Shareholder Opt-Out Lawsuit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Safirstein Metcalf LLP and HGT Law remind investors that a
shareholder "opt-out" lawsuit ("Lawsuit") has been filed on
behalf of a group of retail investors ("Investors") against
Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. ("Valeant") and its
senior officers for violations of federal securities laws and
invite investors to contact the firms.

Previously, on June 24, 2016, a class action complaint was filed
in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, on
behalf of a class consisting of all purchasers of the common
stock of Valeant ("Class Action").  More than twenty lawsuits
have been filed on behalf of institutional investors who have
decided to opt out of the Class Action to directly pursue their
own claims.  To date, the Lawsuit commenced by Safirstein Metcalf
LLP and HGT Law is the only opt-out lawsuit that has been filed
on behalf of retail investors.

The complaint was filed by Safirstein Metcalf LLP and HGT Law on
behalf of the Investors.

If you purchased Valeant common stock during the period from
January 4, 2013 through March 15, 2016 and suffered losses of
more than $200,000, then you may wish to consider opting out of
the existing class action and joining the Lawsuit. A number of
large institutional investors such as T. Rowe Price, Blackrock
and Prudential Insurance Company have already opted out of the
class action.  If you would like to learn about the options
available to you, please call 1-800-221-0015, email
info@SafirsteinMetcalf.com or visit
www.valeantshareholderlitigation.com

Company: Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc.
Exchange: NYSE
Ticker: VRX
Class Period: 01/04/2013 -- 03/15/2016

             About Safirstein Metcalf LLP and HGT Law

Safirstein Metcalf LLP focuses its practice on shareholder
rights.  The law firm also practices in the areas of antitrust
and consumer protection.  All of the Firm's legal endeavors are
rooted in its core mission: provide investor and consumer
protection.

HGT Law is a boutique commercial litigation firm based in
New York.  The firm focuses on representing investors in
securities litigation and corporate governance/derivative
litigation. [GN]


VINO'S INC: Fails to Pay Minimum Wages Under FLSA, "Allen" Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
HANNAH ALLEN, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. VINO'S, INC. and CHRIS NEW, Case No. 4:18-cv-00262-JM
(E.D. Ark., April 17, 2018), is brought for declaratory judgment,
monetary damages, liquidated damages, prejudgment interest,
attorney's fee and costs, as a result of Vino's alleged failure
to pay the Plaintiff and all others similarly situated minimum
wages as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
Arkansas Minimum Wage Act.

Vino's is a domestic for-profit corporation that owns and
operates a restaurant and brewery in Little Rock, Arkansas.
Chris New is an individual and was the General Manager of Vino's
at times material to this Complaint.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joshua West, Esq.
          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          One Financial Center
          650 South Shackleford Road, Suite 411
          Little Rock, AR 72211
          Telephone: (501) 221-0088
          Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
          E-mail: west@sanfordlawfirm.com
                  josh@sanfordlawfirm.com


VITAMIN SHOPPE: Court Partly Grants Bid to Dismiss "Ferrari" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RICHARD FERRARI, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. VITAMIN SHOPPE, INC.,
Defendant, Civil Action No. 17-10475-GAO (D. Mass.), Judge George
A. O'Toole of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts granted in part and denied in part Vitamin Shoppe's
motion to dismiss the claims on the merits under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and to strike the class action claims.

Ferrari has filed the putative class action against Vitamin
Shoppe, alleging state common law and statutory claims related to
Vitamin Shoppe's sale of three glutamine containing dietary
supplements under the "BodyTech" brand name.  These claims are
based on Ferrari's contention that glutamine supplementation has
been scientifically proven to be ineffective and that Vitamin
Shoppe's label claims suggesting otherwise are objectively false
and misleading to consumers.

Ferrari, a Massachusetts resident, purchased Vitamin Shoppe's
"BodyTech"-brand "Creatine & Glutamine with Beta-Alanine"
supplement from a Vitamin Shoppe store in Peabody, Massachusetts
in September of 2015 and December of 2016.  He purchased this
product after reading and relying on the product label, which
stated in relevant part, "glutamine helps support muscle growth
and recovery."

Ferrari alleges that this purchase was made in reliance on
Vitamin Shoppe's promises of providing 'Anti-Catabolic,' 'Muscle
Growth,' 'Muscle Endurance,' and 'Muscle Recovery Benefits.'
This is presumably a reference to the statements made on the
labels of two other Vitamin Shoppe products that also contained
glutamine, BodyTech Glutamine and BodyTech BCAA & Glutamine.
Though the complaint does not allege that Ferrari purchased
either of those products or ever read or relied on their label
statements, those label statements claim that glutamine has been
shown to possess Anti-Catabolic properties to help preserve
muscle, and that the intense exercise can deplete glutamine
stores, however, supplemental glutamine is thought to replenish
these stores allowing for enhanced recovery

Ferrari now claims that the cited label statements are false and
misleading because the ingestion of these products does
absolutely nothing for the recovery from exercise, recovery of
muscle tissue, or ability to decrease muscle-wasting.  Ferrari
alleges that numerous scientific studies have proven that the use
of glutamine supplements provide no additional benefits to the
body.

The complaint supports the contention by citing and summarizing
nine studies in which researchers assessed potential muscular and
physiological effects of glutamine supplementation under various
test conditions and found it to provide no measurable benefits.
He alleges that he would not have purchased the supplement had he
known that glutamine supplementation would not provide additional
benefits, and that Vitamin Shoppe's intentional misleading
representations consequently caused him to buy products that were
useless.  He seeks actual and punitive damages.

Advancing this theory on behalf of a putative class action,
Ferrari asserts various claims against Vitamin Shoppe under
Massachusetts common and statutory law.  He purports to bring the
claims individually and on behalf of all consumers who purchased
any of these three BodyTech products.

Currently pending before the Court is Vitamin Shoppe's motion to
dismiss the claims on the merits under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) and to strike the class action claims.

Because the complaint does not allege that Ferrari ever purchased
the Glutamine & BCAA or Glutamine supplements or read and relied
on their label statements, Judge O'Toole holds that the Plaintiff
has not alleged that he suffered an actual injury-in-fact.  His
hypothetical claims concerning the products are accordingly
dismissed for lack of standing.  His remaining claims are limited
to those pertaining to the Creatine & Glutamine with Beta-Alanine
product and its label statement: "Glutamine helps support muscle
growth and recovery."

The Judge further holds that Ferrari has adequately pled the
"who, what, where, and when" of the allegedly misleading
representations.  The Plaintiff has plausibly alleged claims that
the label statement of the product he did buy, Creatine &
Glutamine with Beta-Alanine, and so those successfully survive
scrutiny under Rule 12(b)(6).  The Judge declines to address
issues of class certification at this stage of the litigation.
So much of the motion as seeks to strike the class allegations is
denied without prejudice.

For the reasons stated, Judge O'Toole granted Vitamin Shoppe's
Motion to Dismiss and to Strike Class Action Claims insofar as
the claims concerning products not purchased by Ferrari are
stricken, but denied with respect to the Creatine & Glutamine
with Beta-Alanine product.  He denied without prejudice Vitamin
Shoppe's motion to strike the class action allegations.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 30, 2018 Opinion and Order
is available at https://goo.gl/y4DC8J from Leagle.com.

Richard Ferrari, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Beatrice O. Yakubu
, Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP, pro hac vice, Charles J. LaDuca,
Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP, pro hac vice, Charles E. Schaffer --
cschaffer@lfsblaw.com -- Levin Sedran & Berman, Nick Suciu, III -
- nicksuciu@bmslawyers.com -- Barbat, Mansour & Suciu PLLC, pro
hac vice & Erica C. Mirabella.

Vitamin Shoppe, Inc., Defendant, represented by Andrea C. Kramer
-- andrea@kramerfrohlich.com -- Kramer Frohlich LLC, Caroline E.
Oks -- coks@gibbonslaw.com -- Gibbons P.C., pro hac vice,
Jennifer Marino Thibodaux, Gibbons P.C., pro hac vice, Michael R.
McDonald -- mmcdonald@gibbonslaw.com -- Gibbons P.C., pro hac
vice & Julie A. Frohlich -- julie@kramerfrohlich.com -- Kramer
Frohlich LLC.


VOLKSWAGEN: Judge Refuses to Dismiss Warranty Claim
---------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that a
federal judge refused on May 17 to dismiss a warranty claim
concerning Volkswagen sunroofs that "spontaneously explode."  The
class must amend fraud, unfair-competition and consumer-
protection claims, but the judge dismissed an unjust-enrichment
claim with prejudice.


WALGREEN CO: Court Certifies Class in Securities Fraud Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, certified a class in the case
captioned WASHTENAW COUNTY EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs, v. WALGREEN CO., GREGORY D. WASSON, and WADE
MIQUELON, Defendants, Case No. 15-cv-3187 (N.D. Ill.).

Industriens Pensionforsikring A/S, acting as lead plaintiff on
behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, brings this
class action against defendants Walgreen Co. (Walgreens), former
Walgreens CEO Gregory D. Wasson, and former Walgreens CFO Wade
Miquelon, alleging violations of sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Walgreens issued its third quarter report and withdrew its FY
2016 earnings targets, attributing the decision to Step 2
considerations and current business performance. Walgreens also
made reference to experiencing generic drug price inflation and
reimbursement pressures, although its statements could be taken
as downplaying the actual significance of those trends. Walgreens
disclosed the extent of the resulting EBIT shortfall, attributing
it primarily to rapid and pronounced generic drug cost inflation"
and unfavorable contract terms. The August 6th disclosures caused
Walgreens stock to plummet over 14% in a single day and gave rise
to the present litigation.

Although the defendants concede that the plaintiffs satisfy the
numerosity and commonality requirements of Rule 23(a), they
contend that the plaintiffs cannot satisfy Rule 23(a)'s
requirements because Industriens is not a typical or adequate
class representative.  Under Rule 23(a)(3), a class
representative's claim must by typical of the claims or defenses
of the class.  A class representative's injuries need not be
identical to those of the class, but they must arise from the
same common events, practices, or conduct and must be based on
the same legal theory. Typicality is based on the plaintiff's
legal theory and the defendant's conduct, and does not depend on
the particularized defenses that the defendant may have against
certain class members.

Here, the defendants assert that, because Industriens cannot
establish trade timing, it cannot establish the typicality of its
claims or the adequacy of its representation of the class. As
previously noted, Amgen recognizes that arguments challenging
trade-timing are relevant to the typicality and adequacy
inquiries required by Rule 23(a). Amgen, however, requires only
an initial showing of trade-timing, and this Court has determined
that such a showing has been made. Although the defendants'
arguments regarding trade-timing raise a valid concern which will
likely need to be revisited once the merits of that issue are
decided, this Court perceives no evidence presently before it
capable of establishing that Industriens does not satisfy the
typicality or adequacy requirements.

The Court accordingly holds that the plaintiffs have demonstrated
that class certification is warranted under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23.

A full-text copy of the District Court's March 29, 2018
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yblfb7ao from Leagle.com.

Washtenaw County Employees' Retirement System, Individually and
on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff,
represented by Frank Anthony Richter, Robbins Geller Rudman &
Dowd & James E. Barz, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.

Walgreen Co., Defendant, represented by Amy Curtner Andrews --
AANDREWS@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP, Elizabeth Y. Austin --
LAUSTIN@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP, James Wallace Ducayet --
JDUCAYET@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP, John M. Skakun, III --
JSKAKUN@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin Llp, Kristen R. Seeger --
KSEEGER@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP & Jacqueline Marie
Pruitt, Sidley Austin LLP.

Gregory D. Wasson, Defendant, represented by Thomas B. Quinn --
tquinn@rshc-law.com -- Riley Safer Holmes & Cancila LLP & Eli
Joseph Litoff elitoff@rshc-law.com -- Riley Safer Holmes &
Cancila LLP.

Wade Miquelon, Defendant, represented by Caz Hashemi --
chashemi@wsgr.com -- Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Evan L.
Seite -- eseite@wsgr.com -- Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, pro
hac vice, Jessica L. Snorgrass -- jsnorgrass@wsgr.com -- Wilson
Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, pro hac vice, Laurence Harvey Levine &
Stephen B. Strain -- sstrain@wsgr.com -- Wilson Sonsini Goodrich
& Rosati, pro hac vice.


WATERBURY, CT: Ct. Denies Prelim Injunction Bid in "Lagnese" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GLORIANNA LAGNESE; REBOUND HOUNDS RES-Q INC., DONALD
J. ANDERSON, JR.; individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF WATERBURY; TOWN OF
MANCHESTER; TOWN OF SOUTHINGTON; individually and on behalf of
all 169 municipalities in the State of Connecticut, Defendants,
Civil No. 3:15-cv-975(AWT)(D. Conn.), Judge Alvin W. Thompson of
the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut denied
the Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and
provisional class certification.

Plaintiffs Lagnese, Rebound Hounds and Anderson, individually and
on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, bring the
action against the Defendants, individually and on behalf of all
169 similarly situated municipalities in the State of
Connecticut, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief related to
the seizure and impoundment of the Plaintiffs' dogs.

The Plaintiffs bring four claims.  The first claim is a claim
that Connecticut General Statutes Section 22-358(c) is
unconstitutional on its face.  They allege, in the First Count,
that it fails to define any method of assessing the severity of
an alleged dog bite or attack, or the circumstances of the bite
or attack, in order to determine whether any enforcement is
appropriate and if so, whether and when the issuance of a
restraint order is proper as opposed to issuing a disposal order.

The Plaintiffs' second claim is that Connecticut General Statutes
Section 22-358(c) is unconstitutional as applied.  They allege,
also in the First Count, that The statute is unconstitutional as
applied because the Connecticut Uniform Administrative Procedures
Act ("UAPA") requires the Commissioner of Agriculture to
promulgate regulations for the enforcement of CGS Section 22-
358(c) by the Defendants' ACOs, and the Commissioner of
Agriculture has never promulgated any rules, policies,
procedures, guidelines, practices or regulations regarding the
enforcement of CGS Section 22-358(c).

Their third claim is a claim for a violation of their Fourth
Amendment rights.  They allege, in the Second Count that the
seizure of the Plaintiffs' dogs is unreasonable because there
exists no explicit statutory authority to hold the dog beyond the
14-day rabies quarantine period, and the disposal order forms
provided by the State Department of Agriculture and utilized by
the defendants' ACOs specifically contemplate the dog will be
returned to the possession of the owner.

By seizing their dogs without a warrant and retaining possession
of such dogs for over a year after the expiration of the 14-day
Rabies Quarantine period incident to the defendants' enforcement
of CGS Section 22-358(c), and without providing them with the
necessary due process, including an opportunity to contest the
validity of the seizure and retention, the Defendants violated
their rights under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

The Plaintiffs' fourth claim is a procedural due process claim.
They allege, in the Third Count that the Defendants' enforcement
of the statute in the manner has resulted in a meaningful
interference and deprivation of the Plaintiffs' property, their
dogs, without any process and is violative of the procedural due
process requirements of the 14th Amendment to the US
Constitution.
The Defendants' enforcement of the statute against all the
Plaintiffs has not provided them with timely notice and an
opportunity for a hearing or any other review of the decision to
seize and retain, such that the Plaintiffs' deprivation of their
property, their dogs, without process, has occurred and continues
to occur, thus violating the Plaintiffs' rights under the 14th
Amendment.

Plaintiff Lagnese's dog, Rose, was seized by the City of
Waterbury on April 20, 2014 after a bite incident where the
complainant was not on the premises of Rose's owner or keeper.
Plaintiff Rebound Hounds's dog, Yeezy, was seized by the Town of
Manchester on December 23, 2014 after a bite incident where the
complainant was not on the premises of Yeezy's owner or keeper.
Plaintiff Anderson's dog, Bubba, was seized by the Town of
Southington on May 23, 2015 after a bite incident where the
complainant was not on the premises of Bubba's owner or keeper.

The Commissioner testified that in determining whether to affirm,
modify or revoke a disposal order, he looks at the entire record,
including the nature of the bite or attack, where the bite or
attack occurred, the extent of the injuries, and (if it is in the
record) the history of the animal.  The Commissioner testified
that he has modified orders personally, based on the record and
the evidence before him.  He also testified that in four
instances he has revoked a disposal order, rebutting the
assertion by the plaintiffs that such disposal orders are never
overturned in cases involving biting.

The Commissioner testified that parties are able to file motions,
including motions to expedite the hearing and/or to determine
whether there is probable cause to hold the dog pending the
hearing and/or decision.

The Plaintiffs request that the Court provisionally certify two
classes: (i) a FRCP23(b)(2) Plaintiff class consisting of the
owners of all dogs currently facing execution under a disposal
order pursuant to the enforcement of CGS 22-358(c), along with
such dogs which may hereinafter become subject to execution under
such orders; and (ii) a Defendant FRCP 23(b)(2) class consisting
of the 169 municipalities in the State of Connecticut authorized
to order the execution of dogs pursuant to their enforcement of
CGS Section 22-358.

As to first claim, Judge Thompson finds that the plaintiffs have
not shown how requiring animal control officers, who are required
to complete a training course and are provided guidance from the
Department of Agriculture on an ongoing basis, to exercise their
discretion and judgment in making a decision as to what type of
enforcement, if any, is appropriate does more to authorize or
encourage arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement than various
other laws that must be enforced by individuals performing a
discretionary function (e.g., police officers deciding whether to
arrest someone).  He concludes that the Plaintiffs have not met
their burden of establishing either a likelihood of success on
the merits or that there are sufficiently serious questions going
to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a
balance of hardships tipping decidedly in their favor.

For the second claim, the Judge concludes the Department of
Agriculture is not involved in any of the steps contemplated by
Section 22-358(c) prior to the step where a person requests a
hearing before the Commissioner.  Thus it is not apparent how the
Department of Agriculture was required by Section 4-167 to adopt
regulations with respect to those steps.

With respect to the third claim, the Judge finds that a disposal
order was issued prior to the expiration of the 14-day rabies
quarantine period with respect to the dog of each of the named
Plaintiffs, so after the issuance of these orders it was proper
for each Defendant to continue to hold the dog during the
pendency of the appeal.  As to the second point, the Commissioner
testified that during the appeal process a dog owner has not only
the right to appeal the disposal order or seek revocation of the
order, but also the right to file motions, including a motion
addressed to the continued retention of the dog pending
disposition of the appeal by the Commissioner.

As to the fourth claim, he holds that in light of the testimony
of the Commissioner about inter alia, the hearing process, the
Plaintiffs have not raised sufficiently serious questions as to
whether state law provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy.

Finally, as the class certification motion, the Judge finds that
the Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they and each class
member are "literally interchangeable."  The data submitted they
submitted reflects that some of the dogs whose owners would be in
the proposed class were seized as the result of biting when the
complainant was on the premises of the owner or keeper and some
were not, and for some the information is unknown.  It is also
unknown as to some whether the dogs were held after 14 days
elapsed and whether a disposal order was issued.  It appears that
in some instances the owner and the Department of Agriculture
engaged in mediation, and that in some instances the owner
withdrew the appeal.  Given these variations, he concludes that
the Plaintiffs have not adequately addressed the question of
whether they would be subject to many case-specific defenses.  In
light of this, he does not address Rule 23(a)(1) or (4) or Rule
23(b)(2).

Accordingly, Judge Tompsin denied the Plaintiff's motion for a
preliminary injunction and provisional class certification.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 30, 2018 Order is available
at https://goo.gl/GRYD1z from Leagle.com.

Glorianna Lagnese, individually and on behalf of all other
persons similarly situated, Rebound Hounds Res-Q, Inc.,
individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated & Donald J. Anderson, Jr., individually and on behalf of
all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by
Richard Bruce Rosenthal, Richard Bruce Rosenthal, Esq. & Thompson
G. Page, Law Offices of Thompson Gould Page, LLC.

Kim Miller, Intervenor Plaintiff, represented by Kenneth James
Krayeske -- attorney@kenkrayeske.com -- Kenneth J. Krayeske Law
Offices.

City of Waterbury, individually and on behalf of all 169
municipalities in the State of Connecticut, Defendant,
represented by Dawn E. DeSantis, City of Waterbury Corporation
Counsel, Joseph A. Mengacci, Corporation Counsel's Office & Linda
T. Wihbey, Corporation Counsel's Office.

Town of Manchester, individually and on behalf of all 169
municipalities in the State of Connecticut, Defendant,
represented by Beatrice S. Jordan, Howd & Ludorf, Kristan M.
Maccini -- kmaccini@hl-law.com -- Howd & Ludorf, LLC, Thomas R.
Gerarde -- tgerarde@hl-law.com -- Howd & Ludorf & Winifred B.
Gibbons, Howd & Ludorf, LLC.

Town of Southington, individually and on behalf of all 169
municipalities in the State of Connecticut, Defendant,
represented by A. Alan Sheffy -- tsheffy@smddlaw.com -- Sheffy
Mazzaccaro DePaolo & Dunham.


WELLS FARGO: Court Won't Dismiss Caller ID Spoofing Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned CS WANG & ASSOCIATE, SAT NARAYAN dba EXPRESS
HAULING, ROBERT MEYER dba MANGIA NOSH, and TASIR TAYEH dba
CHIEF'S MARKET, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., FIFTH
THIRD BANK, FIRST DATA MERCHANT SERVICES LLC, VANTIV, INC.,
NATIONAL PROCESSING COMPANY, INTERNATIONAL PAYMENT SERVICES, LLC
dba ELITEPAY GLOBAL and dba PRIMEPAY GLOBAL, BRIAN BENTLEY,
ANDREW BENTLEY, ADAM BENTLEY, IRONWOOD FINANCIAL, LLC dba
IRONWOOD PAYMENTS, DEWITT LOVELACE and JOHN LEWIS, Defendants,
No. 16 C 11223 (N.D. Ill.).

The Plaintiffs launched this putative class action against a
dozen different defendants for alleged violations of the
California Invasion of Privacy Act (CIPA), Cal. Penal Code
Section 630 et seq. Their claim is, in essence, that two of the
defendant corporations, International Payment Services, LLC (IPS)
and Ironwood Financial, LLC (Ironwood), secretly recorded them
during telemarketing calls. IPS and Ironwood made these calls in
the attempt to sell credit and debit card payment processing
services and hardware to the Plaintiffs on behalf of fellow
Defendants Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.; First Data Merchant Services
LLC; Fifth Third Bank; Vantiv, Inc.; and National Processing
Company (NPC).

According to Plaintiffs, IPS's telemarketers were required to
follow a set script on all of their calls: they would introduce
themselves and IPS the same way, describe the products and
services on offer, and tell call recipients that IPS was with
Wells Fargo. These scripts apparently did not include a request
for permission to record the call, or even an acknowledgement
that the call would be recorded. Plaintiffs allege that Wells
Fargo reviewed and approved the contents of IPS's sales script.
IPS also utilized Caller ID Spoofing: the practice of masking a
caller's true phone number and instead displaying a local phone
number.

The Defendants' Standing Objections

Article III Standing

A motion to dismiss brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) challenges the court's subject-matter jurisdiction.

The Plaintiffs claim that they suffered two injuries as a result
of the alleged non-consensual recordings: they say that the
practice itself violated their privacy, and that subsequently
sharing and storing the recordings on cloud-based computer
systems created a risk of data breach.

The Defendants argue that these injuries are merely technical
violations and are not sufficiently concrete or particularized to
give rise to standing after Spokeo. In Spokeo, the Supreme Court
stated that a plaintiff does not automatically satisfy the
injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a
statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to
vindicate that right. Article III standing requires a concrete
injury even in the context of a statutory violation.

The court concludes that the Plaintiffs have suffered a
sufficiently concrete injury by alleging a violation of their
right to privacy. Invasion of privacy is actionable at common law
and the type of injury alleged here arises from the exact same
type of violation that CIPA prohibits: recording telephone
communications without consent. Penal Code Section 630 (declaring
the Legislature's intent to protect the right of privacy of the
people of California from the threat posed by the continual and
increasing use of eavesdropping devices and techniques.

It is also telling, though not dispositive, that CIPA gives
injured persons the right to sue for either statutory damages or
triple the amount of actual damages sustained. The same provision
explicitly states that it is not a necessary prerequisite to an
action pursuant to this section that the plaintiff has suffered,
or be threatened with, actual damages.

This court concludes that the Plaintiffs' alleged injury caused
by the alleged violation of privacy constitutes an injury in
fact, and that the Plaintiffs have standing to sue. The court
notes, however, that this conclusion extends only to the alleged
violation of privacy, not to the Plaintiffs' alternate theory
that the Defendants' practice of storing the recordings in cloud-
based computer systems accessible by the internet created a risk
of data breach.

Statutory Standing

The Defendants also join together to assert that the Plaintiffs,
as businesses, lack statutory standing to sue for relief under
CIPA. They assert that businesses do not have personal privacy
rights that others can violate, and therefore cannot sue for
relief under CIPA. The term statutory standing, is disfavored by
the Supreme Court, and the Defendants' argument is really just an
objection under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The Defendants argue that to assert a claim under CIPA, the
plaintiff must assert a violation of some privacy right of an
individual.

In the court's view, this argument misses the point. The
Plaintiffs are suing under CIPA, not the common law of
California. Although a corporation may not pursue a common law
action for invasion of privacy, it may bring an action for
violation of the Privacy Act. Section 632 of CIPA explicitly
states that corporations, partnerships, and other legal entities
are persons who may be held liable for surreptitiously recording
confidential communications. CIPA's remaining sections do not
define the term person at all, but this court sees no reason to
conclude that the definition of the term that applies to
perpetrators of CIPA offenses should not also apply to the
victims.

Objections Based on the Failure to Allege Conduct Prohibited by
CIPA

The Defendants have all joined in asserting several further
objections to the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. The Defendants
argue that the Plaintiffs have not alleged conduct prohibited by
either CIPA Section 632 or 632.7, and therefore seek dismissal of
all counts based on FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).

Failure to allege that the Section 632 calls were confidential
Section 632 of CIPA only prohibits the non-consensual recording
of confidential communications.

In Kearney, 39 Cal. 4th at 118, 137 P.3d at 930; Raffin, 2017 WL
131745, the Court conclude that CIPA prohibits a defendant from
recording a telephone conversation without first informing the
parties to the conversation that the conversation is being
recorded.

The Plaintiffs allege that no such warning was given here. They
allege that the Defendants' standard telemarketing script did not
contain a warning, and that they never personally received one.
This is enough to state a claim under section 632. The Defendants
cite to cases that suggest that a warning is merely sufficient,
not strictly necessary, to establish an objectively reasonable
expectation that a given conversation is not being recorded, but
most of those cases involve calls where the recorded party had
received a prior warning or had given prior consent which the
courts found to carry over to future communications.

The Defendants also argue that the Plaintiffs' phone
conversations could have been overheard by third parties standing
nearby which would eliminate any reasonable expectation of
privacy with respect to the call. But this is mere speculation.
Nothing in the Plaintiffs' allegations suggests that the
Plaintiffs should have or would have expected to be recorded or
overheard by anyone. The court concludes that, at the very least,
the baseline assumption in situations where the recorded party
does not initiate the call, does not have a prior relationship
with the caller, and does not receive a warning at the outset of
the call, is that it is reasonable for a party to expect that its
conversation is not being recorded.

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff
must allege 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.

Failure to allege that the Section 632.7 calls involved the
required equipment

This court declines to dismiss the complaint on this basis. In
Flanagan v. Flanagan, 27 Cal.4th 766, 41 P.3d 575 (2002), the
California Supreme Court stated that section 632.7 covers any
intentional interception or recording of a communication
involving a cellular phone or a cordless phone.

The Plaintiffs allege that they received the telemarketing calls
on cellular and cordless phones; it is entirely plausible that
the calls originate from another cell phone, a cordless phone, or
a landline phone as the statute requires.

A full-text copy of the District Court's March 29, 2018
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y9cms5nw from Leagle.com.

Taysir Tayeh dba Chief's Market, Robert Meyer dba Mangia Nosh, CS
Wang & Associate & Sat Narayan dba Express Hauling, Plaintiffs,
represented by Jessica Cherry Chavin, Myron M. Cherry &
Associates, Llc & Myron Milton Cherry, Myron M. Cherry &
Associate.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. & First Data Merchant Services, LLC,
Defendants, represented by Anthony C. Porcelli --
aporcelli@polsinelli.com -- POLSINELLI PC, Claire E. Brennan --
cbrennan@polsiselli.com -- Polsinelli PC, John Wellington
Peterson -- jwpeterson@polsinelli.com -- Polsinelli P.C., pro hac
vice & Matthew S. Knoop -- mknoop@polsinelli.com -- Polsinelli
PC, pro hac vice.


WELLS FARGO: Settles Consumer Protection Law Violations for $1BB
----------------------------------------------------------------
ALM reports that Wells Fargo & Co. has formally settled for $1
billion allegations the San Francisco-based bank violated
consumer protection laws in administering a mandatory insurance
program tied to auto loans and assessing certain improper
mortgage fees.  The bank agreed to pay $1 billion to the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau and $500 million to the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency.  The consumer bureau said it
credited the $500 million penalty to the satisfaction of the
larger fine. The OCC said its penalty "reflects a number of
factors, including the bank's failure to develop and implement an
effective enterprise risk management program to detect and
prevent the unsafe or unsound practices, and the scope and
duration of the practices." Wells Fargo executives had earlier
told investors the bank was negotiating a settlement with the two
agencies.  The bank has paid out hundreds of millions of dollars
in recent years -- to federal regulators and to resolve class
actions -- stemming from a sham-accounts scandal in which
employees opened new accounts without customer authorization.  In
2016, the bank paid $100 million to the CFPB to resolve claims
tied to the accounts scandal. That amount had marked the largest
penalty in the agency's history until now. Timothy Sloan, the
Wells Fargo president and chief executive officer, said in a
statement on April 20:

"For more than a year and a half, we have made progress on
strengthening operational processes, internal controls,
compliance and oversight, and delivering on our promise to review
all of our practices and make things right for our customers.
While we have more work to do, these orders affirm that we share
the same priorities with our regulators and that we are committed
to working with them as we deliver our commitments with focus,
accountability, and transparency. Our customers deserve only the
best from Wells Fargo, and we are committed to delivering that."

The CFPB said in a statement:

"The Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (Bureau) announced a
settlement with Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. in a coordinated action
with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).  As
described in the consent order, the Bureau found that Wells Fargo
violated the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA) in the way
it administered a mandatory insurance program related to its auto
loans.  The Bureau also found that Wells Fargo violated the CFPA
in how it charged certain borrowers for mortgage interest rate-
lock extensions.  Under the terms of the consent orders, Wells
Fargo will remediate harmed consumers and undertake certain
activities related to its risk management and compliance
management.  The Bureau assessed a $1 billion penalty against the
bank and credited the $500 million penalty collected by the OCC
toward the satisfaction of its fine."


WELLS FARGO: July 7 Fake Account Settlement Opt-Out Deadline Set
----------------------------------------------------------------
Aine Cain, writing for Business Insider, reports that Wells Fargo
might owe you money.

The bank is currently undergoing a class action settlement over
the roughly 3.5 million unauthorized accounts its employees
opened in the name of unsuspecting clients from 2009 to 2016.
Wells Fargo is due to shell out $142 million to those affected by
the scandal, some of whom were hit with fraudulent fees and
dinged credit scores.

The bank has also sent out a number of statements about the class
action settlement to clients.

"If you believe Wells Fargo opened a checking, savings, credit
card, or line of credit account for you without your permission,
or if you purchased identity theft protection from us, you may be
entitled to compensation from this fund," reads a statement
emailed to customers on April 20.  "If you submit a claim, you
may be eligible for reimbursement of fees, compensation for
potential impact on your credit, and an additional cash payment
based on any money remaining in the fund after benefits and costs
are paid out."

How to file a claim with Wells Fargo over fraudulent accounts
People who are ready to file a claim can do so on the class
settlement's website.

A Wells Fargo spokesperson told Business Insider that customers
with specific questions about accounts can visit their local
Wells Fargo or give 1-800-869-3557 -- the bank's customer service
line -- a ring at any time.  The Wells Fargo Unauthorized
Accounts Settlement website also has a number: 1-866-431-8549.
The bank spokesperson added that the bank is maintaining a
database of closed accounts going all the way back to May 2002.

Rief Kanan, the director of The Business Institute at the State
University of New York at New Paltz, told Business Insider said
his best advice for Wells Fargo customers affected by the
fraudulent accounts would be to contact the bank.

"My suspicion would be that they are bending over backwards for
customers -- to make sure a customer knows all of the details of
their accounts and what to do in order to close unauthorized
accounts, and how to get restitution if there's any restitution
necessary," he told Business Insider.

Mr. Kanan added that Wells Fargo is especially inclined to
restore its pre-scandal reputation, which, he said was "squeaky
clean" for a "behemoth bank."

Wells Fargo customers have until July 7 to file a claim
Wells Fargo customers who had unauthorized accounts opened in
their names should have already received notifications -- and in
some cases financial compensation -- from the bank.  Customers
who have already received a payment can still file a claim as
part of the class action settlement.

The bank has extended the deadline to take part in the settlement
to July 7, 2018.  For affected customers who wish to exclude
themselves from the settlement in order to file their own suit
against Wells Fargo, the deadline to get out of the class action
settlement is May 14, 2018.

Affected clients who file a claim will receive compensation based
on the financial impact the scandal had on your life, according
to NPR.

USA Today reported that the bank previously refunded $3.7 million
to customers from September 2016 and July 2017, in compensation
for "bank account fees charged on unauthorized accounts and lines
of credit." The New York Times reported that the bank will also
pay $1 billion to federal regulators over its practices regarding
auto insurance and mortgages.

Check your credit report for unauthorized accounts if you haven't
already

If you aren't sure whether unauthorized accounts were opened in
your name, you can click over to the The Federal Trade
Commission's annual credit report website.  It allows you to
obtain a credit report from Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion.
You can check the report for fraudulent accounts.

Mr. Kanan said that it's impossible to say whether or not other
major banks could be sitting on similar fraudulent activities.

"If major banks didn't take a look inside their operations and
say, 'Could this be going on in our organization?' they've made a
bad mistake," Mr. Kanan said.  "It's the kind of thing where if
you're the CEO of Bank of America and you witness what happened
to Wells Fargo, you go to your senior people and say, 'Ladies and
gentlemen, could this be going on in our organization? If so,
let's make sure it's stopped and remedied immediately.' I would
be surprised if that conversation didn't go on in the C-suites."
[GN]


WR GRACE: Bid to Dismiss Class Certification Denial Appeal OK'd
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, In re W.R. GRACE & CO., et al., Chapter 11, Debtors,
ANDERSON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, Appellant, v. In re W.R. GRACE & CO.,
et al., Appellees, Civ. No. 16-799-LPS (D. Del.), Judge Leonard
P. Stark of the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware
granted the Appellees' Motion to Dismiss the Appellant's appeal
of the Bankruptcy Court's: (a) May 29, 2008 order denying the
Appellant's motion for class certification; and (b) Aug. 25, 2016
order denying the Appellant's motion to alter or amend the 2008
Order denying class certification.

AMH is a South Carolina hospital.  Grace manufactures chemicals
and construction materials.  In 1992, AMH filed a nationwide
class action lawsuit against Grace in South Carolina state court.
The lawsuit alleged that the Appellant and other putative class
members had suffered asbestos-related property damage arising
from the Appellees' asbestos-containing building materials.

In 2001, while the state court litigation was ongoing, Grace
filed for Chapter 11 protection in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Delaware.  In the course of the bankruptcy, AMH
filed three proofs of claim against Grace: (1) a worldwide
putative class claim, (2) a statewide putative class claim, and
(3) an individual claim.

AMH eventually moved for class certification.  In the 2008 Order,
the Bankruptcy Court denied the motion.  AMH's request for leave
to appeal the 2008 Order was denied by this Court and its effort
to appeal this Court's decision was dismissed by the Court of
Appeals for lack of jurisdiction.

Grace later filed a proposed Plan of Reorganization, which
included procedures for the treatment of property damage claims,
including AMH's claims.  The Appellant challenged the Plan on
several grounds but not on the grounds it seeks to press on
appeal now (i.e., that the Plan places AMH's class action claims
on "inactive" status until after AMH proceeds with its individual
claim against Grace).  The Bankruptcy Court, the Court and the
Third Circuit rejected all of those challenges.  The Appellees
exited bankruptcy on Feb. 3, 2014, when the Plan became
effective.

Rather than pursue its individual property damage claim according
to the procedures outlined in the Plan, AMH filed a motion to
alter or amend the 2008 Order denying class certification.  The
Bankruptcy Court issued the 2016 Order denying the motion.  AMH
then noticed its appeal to the Court, which Grace has moved to
dismiss.

Judge Stark agrees with Grace that it must dismiss the appeal
because it is an interlocutory appeal and AMH has neither sought
-- nor could meet its burden to obtain -- permissive review of
the Bankruptcy Court's interlocutory order.  Orders granting or
denying class certification are inherently interlocutory, and not
immediately reviewable under 28 U.S.C. Section 1291, which
provides for appeals from final decisions.

The Judge says the 2008 Order is plainly interlocutory, as the
Court already held in denying the Appellant's earlier attempt to
appeal it.  The 2016 Order, labeled by AMH as a "motion to alter
or amend," cannot have transformed an inherently interlocutory
order into a final order -- otherwise, any interlocutory order
could be so (easily) transformed, entirely undermining the final
order rule. action certification).  The Judge also finds that AMH
has not met its burden to show that interlocutory appeal is
warranted, for reasons including the absence of a controlling
question of law and of any exceptional circumstances.

The Judge further agrees with Grace that a separate, independent
ground for dismissing the appeal is that it is barred by the
confirmed Plan.  The Plan requires AMH to litigate its individual
claim to final judgment before it can appeal the denial of class
certification.  AMH has not yet litigated its individual claim.
Therefore, its appeal of the denial of class certification is
premature -- and an improper collateral attack on the Plan -- and
must, for this reason as well, be denied.

Accordingly, Judge Stark dismissed AMH's appeal.  The Clerk of
Court is directed to close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 30, 2018 Memorandum Order
is available at https://goo.gl/jyHxqP from Leagle.com.

W.R. Grace & Co et al., Debtor, represented by James E. O'Neill,
III -- joneill@pszjlaw.com -- Pachulski, Stang, Ziehl & Jones,
LLP.

Anderson Memorial Hospital, Appellant, represented by Theodore J.
Tacconelli -- ttacconelli@ferryjoseph.com -- Ferry Joseph, P.A.

W.R. Grace & Co., Appellee, represented by Laura Davis Jones --
ljones@pszjlaw.com -- Pachulski, Stang, Ziehl & Jones, LLP &
James E. O'Neill, III, Pachulski, Stang, Ziehl & Jones, LLP.


WYNN LAS VEGAS: Faces Federal Class Action
------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that
Wynn Las Vegas casino illegally forces employees to kick back to
management a percentage of their tips, an estimated class of 500
workers says in a federal class action.

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

     Leon Greenberg, Esq.
     A Professional Corporation
     2965 South Jones Boulevard #E-3
     Las Vegas, Nevada 89146
     Tel: (702) 383-6085
     Fax: (702) 385-1827

        -- and --

     Mark R. Thierman, Esq.
     THIERMAN LAW FIRM
     7287 Lakeside Drive
     Reno, NV 89511
     Telephone (775) 284-1500

        -- and --

     James P. Kemp, Esq.
     Kemp & Kemp, Attorneys At Law
     7435 West Azure Drive, Suite 110
     Las Vegas, NV 89130
     Telephone (702) 258-1183

        -- and --

     Robin Potter, Esq.
     111 E. Wacker Drive, Suite 2600
     Chicago, IL 60601
     Phone: (312) 861-1800


XUELIAN BIAN: Court Narrows Claims in Freeze-Out-Merger Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida, Miami Division, granted in part and denied in part
Sidley Austen LLP filed a motion to dismiss the Seigmund
Defendant's claims in the case captioned FREDERICK SIEGMUND,
Plaintiff, v. XUELIAN BIAN, WEI GUAN, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, SHANGHAI
YINLING ASSET MANAGEMENT, CO., LTD., LEADING FIRST CAPITAL
LIMITED, and LEADING WORLD CORPORATION, Defendants, Case No. 16-
62506-CIV-MORENO (S.D. Fla.).

This is a securities class action alleging violations of state
and federal law in connection with Linkwell Corporation's 2014
go-private merger (Freeze-Out Merger).  Frederick Siegmund, the
Class Representative, argues that the Defendants engaged in a
deceptive scheme designed to help two Linkwell Directors avoid
liability for prior self-dealing and fraudulently deprive
Linkwell shareholders of their stock for less than fair value.

According to Siegmund, the Freeze-Out Merger was undertaken on
behalf of and for the benefit of Defendants Xuelian and Wei to:
(a) extinguish the valuable claims asserted against them in a
previously filed derivative action (Siegmund v. Bian, et al., No
12-cv-62539 (S.D. Fla.)); and (b) directly acquire for Xuelian,
Wei, and their affiliates total control of the Company's
disinfectant business in China.

Siegmund's First Amended Complaint names six Defendants and
includes the following four counts: (I) violation of Section
10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5;
(II) breach of fiduciary duty; (III) aiding and abetting breach
of fiduciary duty; and (IV) civil conspiracy.

In its motion to dismiss, Sidley first contends that Siegmund has
failed to state a claim for securities fraud under Rule 10b-5.
Second, Sidley argues that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction
over Sidley on Siegmund's state law claims in Counts III and IV.
Third, Sidley maintains that even if the Court has jurisdiction,
Counts III and IV fail to state claims for relief.

COUNT I: SECURITIES FRAUD

Siegmund contends that Sidley acted deceptively in two ways.
First, Sidley failed to notify Siegmund of the Freeze-Out Merger
despite having a duty to do so.  Second, Sidley engaged in sham
settlement negotiations to further conceal from Siegmund the
pending Freeze-Out Merger.

No Duty to Disclose - Rule 10b-5(b)

First, Sidley served as counsel for Linkwell, Xuelian, and Wei.
It is axiomatic that a lawyer will not reveal information
relating to the representation of a client. Based on this
precept, Sidley had no duty to inform Siegmund of the deal, and
indeed, had an obligation not to make such a disclosure. Courts
addressing similar situations have therefore held that lawyers
have privileges not to disclose information about clients

Second, Sidley did not have an attorney-client relationship or
even a relationship of trust and confidence with Siegmund.

Third, Florida's statutory notice requirements did not obligate
Sidley to inform Siegmund of the Freeze-Out Merger.

Sidley did not have a duty to notify Siegmund of the Freeze-Out
Merger. Siegmund therefore cannot state an omissions claim under
Subsection (b) of Rule 10b-5.

Deceptive Act - Rule 10b-5(a) & (c)

To state a scheme liability claim based on allegations that
multiple defendants collectively acted in violation of Rule 10b-
5, Siegmund must show that each defendant committed a
manipulative or deceptive act in furtherance of the scheme.

Based on these allegations, Sidley's actions had the principal
purpose and effect of creating a false appearance of fact, the
absence of a merger. Taken in context, they suggest Sidley
engaged in this misleading course of conduct to keep the Freeze-
Out Merger under wraps. This perpetuated its plan to deprive
Siegmund of his Linkwell shares and help Xuelian and Wei avoid
liability for their alleged self-dealing during the 2012 Reverse
Merger.

Accordingly, Siegmund has pled with particularity facts
establishing that Sidley committed a deceptive or manipulative
act in furtherance of the alleged scheme.

Pleading Scienter

To state a securities fraud claim under Rule 10b-5, Siegmund must
plead with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference
that Sidley acted with a mental state embracing intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud.

Siegmund pleads with particularity sufficient factual allegations
to establish that Sidley acted with the requisite intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud. The Amended Complaint alleges
that Sidley represented Linkwell, Xuelian, and Wei in the
Derivative Action and that Linkwell had authorized Sidley to
negotiate a partial settlement of that Action on its behalf At
the same time, Sidley also was advising and assisting Xuelian and
Wei with the Freeze-Out Merger. Indeed, Sidley attorneys advising
on the Freeze-Out Merger and the Derivative Action corresponded
with each other on litigation strategy and the status of the
`going private merger

Thus, Siegmund's Amended Complaint establishes Sidley's scienter.

Pleading Reliance and Causation

Sidley contends that this Court must dismiss Siegmund's Rule 10b-
5 claim because he fails to establish the elements of reliance
and causation.

Siegmund can satisfy the reliance and causation requirements in
several ways: (i) establishing a rebuttable presumption of
reliance based on an omission of material fact by one with a duty
to disclose; (ii) pleading facts showing that he directly relied
on Sidley's deceptive conduct and that this reliance caused his
harm.

First, Siegmund fails to allege facts giving rise to a rebuttable
presumption of reliance. In Affiliated Ute, the Supreme Court
created a rebuttable presumption of reliance where a Plaintiff
establishes an omission of material fact by one with a duty to
disclose.

Second, Siegmund fails to show that he relied on Sidley's deceit
and that this reliance brought about his loss. Nothing in the
Amended Complaint indicates Siegmund knew about the Freeze-Out
Merger or had even the slightest suspicion of a deal before the
September settlement talks with Sidley.

Siegmund has not carried his heavy burden in showing that he in
fact relied upon Sidley's own deceptive conduct. He likewise
fails to show that Sidley's deception caused his alleged harm.
Siegmund's Amended Complaint therefore fails to state a claim
against Sidley as a primary violator of Rule 10b-5.

COUNTS III-IV: PERSONAL JURISDICTION

Personal Jurisdiction Standard

In addition to its motion to dismiss Count I for failure to state
a claim, Sidley filed a motion to dismiss Counts III (aiding and
abetting breach of fiduciary duty) and IV (civil conspiracy) for
lack of personal jurisdiction.

Siegmund argues that this Court has personal jurisdiction over
Xuelian and Wei because they engaged in conduct, and authorized
Sidley to engage in certain conduct, that amounted to a breach of
their fiduciary duties to Linkwell and its shareholders.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim Against Xuelian and Wei

Siegmund pleads facts establishing that Xuelian and Wei breached
their fiduciary obligations by utilizing their control of the
corporation to their own advantage as against the minority
stockholders. Xuelian and Wei purportedly engaged in self-dealing
as part of the 2012 Reverse Merger and the 2014 Freeze-Out
Merger.

To facilitate the Freeze-Out Merger, they authorized Sidley to
form a Florida-based merger subsidiary, file documents with the
Florida Secretary of State, and undertake deceptive conduct to
deprive Linkwell's shareholders of their standing to pursue the
Derivative Action in the Southern District of Florida.

Finally, Siegmund alleges that Xuelian and Wei participated on
one side of the deal by voting, or causing their affiliates to
vote, enough shares to unilaterally approve the forced sale of
Linkwell's stock, and on the other side of the deal by purchasing
that stock for less than fair value.

Taken as true, Siegmund's allegations reflect Xuelian's and Wei's
violation of their fiduciary obligation as Directors of Linkwell
to exercise diligence and good faith to protect the interests of
the company. Accordingly, Siegmund has stated a valid claim that
Xuelian and Wei breached their fiduciary duties to Linkwell and
its shareholders.

As Directors of a Florida corporation who, at minimum, authorized
a transaction involving Florida entities, facilitated by a
Florida investment vehicle, and designed to avoid liability in a
Florida lawsuit, Xuelian and Wei must have foreseen the
possibility of being haled into a Florida court. They can hardly
claim that it is unfair or unjust for them to answer in Florida
for harm they allegedly caused in the state.

Furthermore, Florida has a strong interest in providing a forum
to obtain relief for harm caused by defendants who engaged in
misconduct while availing themselves of the advantages of state's
corporate form. As a shareholder of a Florida corporation,
Siegmund should not have to travel half a world away to pursue
his claim against former directors of that Florida corporation.
Accordingly, Siegmund has established a sufficient connection
with the forum such that exerting jurisdiction over Xuelian and
Wei does not violate notions of fair play and substantial
justice.  The Court therefore has personal jurisdiction over
Xuelian and Wei on Siegmund's breach of fiduciary duty claim.

Personal Jurisdiction Over Sidley Under the Long-Arm Statute and
United States Constitution

First, courts in this district hold that those who conspire to
breach a fiduciary duty or aid and abet a breach of fiduciary
duty and, in doing so, harm a Florida corporation are subject to
personal jurisdiction in Florida under the long-arm statute.

Second, this Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over
Sidley on Counts III and IV does not violate the Due Process
Clause of the United States Constitution. By assisting Xuelian's
and Wei's breaches of fiduciary duties, Sidley allegedly
undertook acts that were directed at Florida and harmed a Florida
corporation.

In short, Florida's long-arm statute provides for personal
jurisdiction over Sidley with respect to Siegmund's state law
claims, and this Court's exercise of that jurisdiction comports
with the Constitution. Accordingly, Sidley's motion to dismiss
Counts III and IV of Siegmund's Amended Complaint for lack of
personal jurisdiction is denied.

COUNT III: AIDING AND ABETTING BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

To state a claim for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary
duty, a plaintiff must establish the following: (i) the primary
wrongdoer had a fiduciary duty; (ii) the primary wrongdoer
breached that fiduciary duty; (iii) the aider and abettor had
knowledge of the breach; and (iv) the aider and abettor
substantially assisted or encouraged the wrongdoing.

Siegmund sufficiently alleges that Xuelian and Wei owed, and
breached, fiduciary duties to Linkwell and its shareholders. He
also pled facts establishing that Sidley provided substantial
assistance in furtherance of Xuelian's and Wei's breaches.
Although Sidley had no duty to notify Siegmund of the Freeze-Out
Merger, the Amended Complaint details Sidley's "high conscious
intent and its conscious and specific motivation" to help Xuelian
and Wei breach their fiduciary duties and avoid liability for
those breaches. Siegmund's allegations that Sidley designed and
implemented the Freeze-Out Merger, determined the lowball merger
consideration, and engaged in sham settlement negotiations
establish Sidley's high conscious intent to aid Xuelian's and
Wei's breaches of their fiduciary duties.

Sidley's motion to dismiss Count III for failure to state a claim
is denied.

COUNT IV -- CIVIL CONSPIRACY

To plead a claim for civil conspiracy under Florida law, a
plaintiff must establish the following four elements: (1) an
agreement between two or more parties (2) to do an unlawful act
by unlawful means, (3) the committing of an overt act in
pursuance of the conspiracy, and (4) damage to the plaintiff as a
result of the act.

Siegmund has sufficiently pled his claim against Sidley for
aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty. That independent
claim provides the requisite basis for Siegmund's civil
conspiracy claim. Siegmund has also alleged that Sidley agreed to
help Xuelian and Wei breach their fiduciary duties and avoid
liability for their unlawful conduct. Siegmund's Amended
Complaint therefore states an actionable civil conspiracy claim.
Accordingly, Sidley's motion to dismiss Count IV for failure to
state a claim is denied.

The Court ruled: (1) Sidley's motion to dismiss Count I
(securities fraud under Rule 10b-5) is granted; Count I as
against Sidley is dismissed with prejudice; (2) Sidley's motion
to dismiss Count III, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary
duty, is denied; and (3) Sidley's motion to dismiss Count IV
(civil conspiracy) is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 2, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y994zb6a from Leagle.com.

Frederick Siegmund, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Charles J. Hecht --
hecht@whafh.com -- Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz, LLP,
pro hac vice, Malcolm T. Brown -- brown@whath.com -- Wolf
Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz, LLP, pro hac vice & Michael
Alan Fischler, Fischler & Friedman, PA.

Xuelian Bian & Wei Guan, Defendants, represented by Stephen Carey
Villeneuve -- Carey.Villeneuve@bipc.com -- Buchanan Ingersoll &
Rooney.

Sidley Austin LLP, Defendant, represented by Louise McAlpin --
louise.mcalpin@hklaw.com -- Holland & Knight & Tracy Ann Nichols
-- tracy.nichols@hklaw.com -- Holland & Knight.


ZILLOW INC: Averts Class Action Over Home Value "Zestimates"
------------------------------------------------------------
Diana Novak Jones, writing for Law360, reports that real estate
website Zillow Inc. escaped a proposed class action over its home
value "Zestimates" on May 7 after an Illinois federal judge said
there was no evidence supporting the class's claims it was duped
by numbers into hiring the site's preferred brokers.

U.S. District Judge Amy St. Eve granted Zillow's motion to
dismiss the second iteration of the proposed class action
accusing the site of using artificially low estimates of the
value of listed homes to funnel the sellers to certain real
estate agents. [GN]


ZIMMERMANN USA: Crosson Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Web Site
-------------------------------------------------------------
ARETHA CROSSON, Individually and as the representative of a class
of similarly situated persons v. ZIMMERMANN (USA), INC., Case No.
1:18-cv-02230-FB-SJB (E.D.N.Y., April 16, 2018), is brought
against Zimmermann for its alleged failure to design, construct,
maintain, and operate its Web site --
http://www.Zimmermannwear.com/-- to be fully accessible to and
independently usable by the Plaintiff and other blind or
visually-impaired persons.

Zimmermann (USA), Inc., is a New York Domestic Business
Corporation with a principal place of business located in New
York City.  The Defendant owns and operates Zimmermann Stores.
Zimmermann Stores provide to the public goods, such as ready to
wear clothing, swimsuits, and accessories, amongst other
products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Dan Shaked, Esq.
          SHAKED LAW GROUP, P.C.
          44 Court Street, Suite 1217
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Telephone: (917) 373-9128
          Facsimile: (718) 504-7555
          E-mail: ShakedLawGroup@Gmail.com


* Class Action Litigation Spending on the Rise, Survey Shows
------------------------------------------------------------
Stephanie Forshee, writing for Corporate Counsel, reports that
class action litigation spending is on the rise, according to a
new survey, and legal departments need to strategize to manage
these types of lawsuits.

The 2018 Carlton Fields Class Action Survey, which draws on
insight from about 400 in-house counsel across various
industries, showed the number of respondent companies facing
class actions rose to 59 percent in 2017, up from 53.8 percent
the year prior.

Collectively, companies spent more than $2.2 billion defending
class action lawsuits last year, according to the survey, which
indicated these suits comprised 11.4 percent of all litigation in
the United States.

The most common types of class actions were in the labor and
employment space, which accounted for 21.6 percent of class
action spending.  The next highest number of class actions were
related to consumer fraud, which accounted for 18.9 percent.

Meanwhile, companies also saw an increase in products liability
and antitrust class actions last year.

Though the workload is up, most companies are still relying on
roughly the same number of in-house attorneys to work on class
actions as they had to handle these matters previously.  The
companies included in the survey relied on fewer than four in-
house attorneys for that type of work--which was actually a
slight drop in staffing from previous years.

"As a result, reliance on outside counsel increased, as did the
number of hours that each dedicated in-house attorney spent
managing class actions," the survey noted.

The survey said that most companies continued to rely on early
case assessment, with 78.2 percent of companies considering
outside counsel's involvement in early case assessment to be
substantial or essential, up from 73.1 percent the year prior.

As for what is requested of outside counsel in early case
assessment, 71.7 percent are being asked to examine case facts,
39.6 percent are asked to calculate potential exposure, and 26.4
percent each are being asked to develop strategy and determine
the likelihood of certification.

Another 15.1 percent of companies reported they are asking
outside counsel to estimate the cost of litigation, and 11.3
percent are being tasked with document gathering and review and
considering the jurisdiction and jury, respectively.

And, according to the survey, fewer companies are relying solely
on one individual to achieve positive class action outcomes.
About 51.6 percent of companies assigned one individual to a
class action last year, which is down from 62.2 percent in 2016.
The main benefit for holding one individual accountable is
consistency in approach, respondents said.

"Although companies report an increased volume and complexity of
pending class actions, their class action defense philosophies
remained relatively steady," the survey stated.

About 11.3 percent of companies reported they have a "defend at
all costs" philosophy, down slightly from 13.2 percent the
previous year.  The "defend at the right cost/assess each case
separately" philosophy was also down from 43.4 percent to 39.6
percent.  Meanwhile, 20.8 percent reported taking "an aggressive
stance," compared to 17 percent in 2016.  And the "go low," or
lowest cost strategy, was also up from 26.4 percent in 2016 to
28.3 percent.


* Polsinelli Attorney Discusses Class Action Defense Strategy
-------------------------------------------------------------
Mit Winter, Esq. -- mwinter@polsinelli.com -- of Polsinelli, in
an article for JDSupra, wrote that class actions often are
lengthy and costly undertakings for defendants, and the discovery
process can demand the most significant amount of resources.
When discovery on class certification issues is then followed by
merits discovery, it can seem as if the process never ends.
There are, however, alternative strategies to get to the ultimate
goal of a successful resolution.  In cases where threshold
factual or legal issues on the merits of the underlying claims
may determine the viability of a class claim, a defendant should
consider reversing the usual order of class action discovery and
seek an initial discovery period on the merits issues.  Doing so
could quickly end a case before class certification issues are
even considered. Defendants have used this strategy in a number
of class action cases, thus allowing the defendant to end the
case prior to the burden and cost of full-blown class discovery.

Typical Class Action Defense Strategy Attempts to Limit the Scope
of Precertification Discovery to Class Certification Issues

In most instances, a defendant facing a class action seeks to
ensure that a plaintiff's precertification discovery is limited
to what is necessary to permit the court to make an informed
decision on whether a case should be certified as a class action.
There are a number of tactics a defendant can use to do this.
For example, the defendant can argue that a plaintiff's discovery
requests are not proportional to the needs of the case and for
the court to make the class certification decision.  The recent
amendments to Rule 26 added a proportionality standard to the
discovery process, which requires an assessment of, among other
things, the importance of the requested discovery in resolving
the issues in the case and whether the burden or expense of the
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.  These factors
may limit the scope of precertification discovery as the expense
to a defendant will usually far exceed the amount of a named
plaintiff's claims.

Defendants also often ask courts to bifurcate discovery so that
discovery into certification issues takes place first, and
discovery into issues related to the merits of the claims only
occurs if a class is certified.  While there is not always a
bright line between the two types of discovery, discovery into
certification issues relates to the requirements of Rule 23 and
tests whether the claims and defenses are susceptible to class-
wide proof.  Discovery into the merits pertains to the strength
or weaknesses of the claims or defenses and tests whether they
are likely to succeed.  Recent Supreme Court precedent has given
lower courts more leeway into considering the merits of the
claims at the class certification stage, making it harder to
argue that class discovery cannot touch on any merits issues.
But courts sometimes still will agree to bifurcate discovery in
this manner based on the rationale that class certification
discovery should be straightforward and distinguishable
from merits discovery.

Each of these strategies attempts to limit a defendant's
discovery burden in the hope that a class is never certified
and that discovery into the merits of the plaintiff's claims can
be avoided. In many cases, this is a sound strategy.

When A Favorable Case Dispositive Factual Issue Exists, Seek To
Limit Discovery to that Issue

In certain cases, it can be advantageous for a defendant to flip
the order of class action discovery so that discovery into class
certification issues is avoided altogether.  This is a viable
tactic when a plaintiff's legal claims contain favorable
threshold factual issues.  Discovery on just these threshold
issues can result in summary judgment for the defendant
before class issues are even addressed.

A good example of this strategy is Hager v. Vertrue, Inc.,
2011 WL 4501046 (D. Mass. 2011).  There, the plaintiff filed a
putative class action alleging that the defendants violated
Massachusetts' unfair competition statue when she was deceived
into enrolling into a membership program that was marketed on the
defendants' website.  During the initial scheduling conference,
one of the defendants argued that discovery should be phased,
with the first phase focusing on the merits of the plaintiff's
claims, rather than issues related to class certification.  The
defendant supported its argument by predicting that it would be
able to defeat the plaintiff's claim on summary judgment after
the completion of the first phase of discovery.  After the court
agreed to the phased discovery, evidence gathered during the
merits discovery phase showed that the plaintiff had failed to
read the webpage that she claimed was deceiving.  As a result, in
addition to determining that the marketing of the program at
issue was not deceptive, the court found that the plaintiff was
unable to demonstrate causation and granted the defendants'
motion for summary judgment.  The court then held that, because
the plaintiff's claims were unsuccessful, there was no need to
consider whether a class should be certified.

The approach has also gained approval in the circuit courts
of appeal. In In re Bayer Healthcare, 752 F.3d 1065 (6th
Cir. 2014), plaintiffs filed a putative class action alleging
that the defendants made misrepresentations in their
advertisements for flea and tick collars.  During the case
management conference, both parties agreed that the case would be
determined by the issue of whether the defendants could produce
studies that substantiated their advertising claims.  As a
result, the court limited the initial discovery to that threshold
issue. Ultimately, and before any other discovery took place, the
district court granted summary judgment for the defendant after
it was able to produce evidence that supported its advertising
claims.  The Sixth Circuit subsequently affirmed the decision.

Additional instances where defendants have used this strategy are
Physicians Healthsource, Inc. v. Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
2014 WL 413534 (D.N.J. 2014), Loreaux v. ACB Receivable
Management, Inc., 2015 WL 5032052 (D. N.J. 2015) and Degutis v.
Financial Freedom, LLC (M.D. Fla. 2013).  In Physicians
Healthsource, the plaintiff brought a Telephone Consumer
Protection Act ("TCPA") claim that presented the threshold issue
of whether faxes sent by the defendant were informational and,
therefore, not actionable under the TCPA.  Upon request from the
defendant, the court bifurcated discovery so that the first phase
would focus on discovery related to whether the faxes were
informational or advertisements.  During the second phase of
discovery, the parties would conduct discovery on all other
matters, including class certification issues. But before the
second phase of discovery, the defendant would be allowed to file
a motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether the faxes
were informational.  The court based this decision on its finding
that conducting discovery in this manner had the "potential to
save the parties and the Court from the substantial costs and
burdens associated with whole scale class action discovery."

In Loreaux, the plaintiff brought a putative class action under
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") alleging
that a debt collection letter sent by the defendant listing an
"amount due" different than the "Amount Owed" was false,
deceptive or misleading.  Shortly after discovery began, the
defendant asked the court to limit discovery to plaintiff's
claim that the letter was false, deceptive, or misleading under
the FDCPA.  The defendant argued that the claim involved a
narrow, potentially dispositive issue that was distinct from
class discovery and that if its motion for summary judgment
on the issue is granted it would dispose of the entire action,
maximizing efficiencies and cost savings by rendering class
discovery unnecessary.  The court agreed and granted the
defendant's motion to bifurcate discovery.

Finally, in Degutis, the plaintiff filed a putative class action
alleging that the defendants violated Florida's deceptive and
unfair trade statute by forcing the plaintiff and other Florida
homeowners to purchase their flood insurance when they were
already covered by an existing policy with flood insurance.
Before discovery began, the defendants filed a motion seeking a
phased discovery schedule where discovery would first address the
merits of the claim allowing plaintiff's claim to be tested on
summary judgment before class discovery.  Noting that a trial
court has discretion to permit pre-certification discovery as it
sees fit, the court held that phasing discovery as requested by
the defendant was appropriate and stayed class discovery until
after it ruled on the defendant's motion for summary judgment.

Conclusion
As demonstrated by the cases described, when faced with a class
action, a defendant should determine whether the plaintiff's
claim contains any threshold factual issues that could be
favorably addressed during discovery.  In those cases, the
defendant should consider seeking to limit initial discovery to
those issues and request the ability to seek summary judgment
before class discovery.  Doing so is a unique way to short
circuit a class action and to avoid the time and expense of full
scale class action discovery. [GN]







                            *********


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