CAR_Public/180528.mbx              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R


              Monday, May 28, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 106



                            Headlines


ACYTEC RETIREMENT: Parties Agree to Limited Class Certification
AETNA LIFE: Bid to Strike Affirmative Defenses in "Mosser" Denied
AIR EVAC: "Chanze" Suit Moved to N.D. West Virginia
AIRSTREAM INC: Court Conditionally Certifies FLSA Collective
AMERICAN CAMPUS: Court Conditionally Certifies "Guadalupe" Class

AMERICAN REALTY: Court Dismisses Paradise Wire's Securities Suit
AMTRUST FINANCIAL: Raul Balks at Merger Deal with Evergreen
ANTHONY WAYNE: Camp Drug's Class Certification Bid Denied
ARS NATIONAL: Rottenstein Sues over Debt Collection Practices
ASSET RECOVERY: Hughes Sues over Debt Collection Practices

AUTO ZONE: Faces "Hernandez" Wage-and-Hour Suit
BANCO SANTANDER: Manipulates Mexican Bond Prices, SEPTA Says
BARCLAYS CAPITAL: Claims in 2nd Amended "Bigsby" Suit Narrowed
BKP INC: Underpays Nail Technicians, Miles Claims
BUFFALO WILD: Yelp Wins Bid to Dismiss "Meeks" TCPA Suit

BULLITT COUNTY, KY: Summary Judgment Bid in "Shadburne" Granted
BUSINESS REVENUE: Steele Sues over Debt Collection Practices
CENTERLINE COMMUNICATIONS: "Lichy" Class Conditionally Certified
CHG HEALTHCARE: "Leiber" Suit Seeks Overtime Pay under FLSA
CHURCHILL DOWNS: 9th Cir. Flips Dismissal of "Kater" Suit

CIGNA HEALTH: Bid to Dismiss Amended "Patchell" ERISA Suit OK'd
COMPUTER CREDIT: Court Dismisses "Derosa" FDCPA Suit
CONSOLIDATED HOUSEKEEPING: Perez Seeks Overtime Wages under FLSA
COVANTA LONG: Fails to Pay OT & Minimum Wages, Cardona Says
CRYSTAL CLEAR: "Lamanske" Suit Seeks Overtime Wages under FLSA

CVS PHARMACY: "Beardsall" Suit Seeks to Certify Product Classes
DIAKON LOGISTIC: Court Narrows Claims in "Johnson" Wage Suit
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: Court Certifies 3 Classes in "Garnett"
DOS REALES: Initial Approval Sought on "Olivera" Case Settlement
E & J GALLO: Court Flips Denial of Arbitration in "Arreguin"

EDIBLE ARRANGEMENTS: Court Dismisses "Rando" TCPA Suit
ELECTROLUX HOME: Compelled to Produce Docs in "Rice" Suit
ELENA'S MEXICAN: "Angel" Suit Seeks Unpaid Minimum & OT Wages
EQUIFAX INFORMATION: Filing of 4th Amended "Barnum" Suit Granted
FACEBOOK INC: Pelc Sues over Improper Access of User Data

FALCON TOWING: Lowe Seeks Overtime Compensation under FLSA
FALLS COLLECTION: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
FIDELITY INVESTMENTS: Fails to Pay Wages, Reynolds & Martinez Say
FIFTH THIRD: Early Access Cash Advance Suit Final Judgment OK'd
FINISH LINE: Miller Balks at Merger Deal with JD Sports

FIRSTGROUP AMERICA: McGinnes et al Sue over Savings Plan
FOUR SEASONS: Court Denies Bid to Decertify "Zyda" Class
FRANKLIN RESOURCES: Fernandez Seeks to Certify Class
GC SERVICES: Smith Sues over Debt Collection Practices
GREAT AMERICAN: Settlement in "Goertzen" Suit Has Final Approval

GRIECO FORD: Papa Sues over Telemarketing Text Message
HOMELAND SECURITY: Class Certification Sought in Immigrants Suit
HOMES OF OPPORTUNITY: Belmont Seeks to Certify Class
ICS CAPITAL: Mungin-Bryan Sues over Debt Collection Practices
IDAVM GROUP: "Garcia" Suit Seeks Overtime Pay under FLSA

ILG TECHNOLOGIES: "Murray" Suit Moved to S.D. Georgia
ILLINOIS: Court Denies Bid to Certify Class in "Kolton" Suit
INTERACTIVE INTELLIGENCE: Court Junks "Trahan" Securities Suit
ISOLATOR FITNESS: Halling Sues over Telemarketing Texts
JEFFERSON COUNTY, KY: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss "Healey" Suit

JPMORGAN CHASE: Bid to Dismiss Amended "Blake" RESPA Suit Granted
JUUL LABS: e-Cigarettes Deceptively Addictive, Cooper Claims
LABORATORY CORP: Court Dismisses "Sullivan" Suit
LGI HOMES: "Munson" Suit Seeks Overtime Wages under FLSA
JOHN MUIR: Court Partly Grants Bid to Dismiss "Martinez" Suit

LIFE INSURANCE: "Walker" Suit Seeks to Certify Class
LOCALITY LLC: Helzer Seeks Minimum Wage & Overtime Pay
LOS ANGELES, CA: Transient Occupancy Tax Suits Judgment Affirmed
MANATEE COUNTY, FL: Court Dismisses With Prejudice "Neal" Suit
MASTERCARD INTERNATIONAL: Scoma Seeks to Certify 2 Classes

MCMC LLC: Court Denies Class Certification of "Mauthe" Suit
MYLAN NV: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Amended Securities Suit
NEW ORLEANS, LA: Ct. Partly Amends "Fransen" Class Certification
NEWARK, NJ: Denial of Arbitration in "Torian" Suit Affirmed
NOBLE HOUSE: Ct. Dismisses Counterclaim for Attys' Fee in "Holt"

NRA GROUP: Partial Summary Judgment Bid in "Isaac" Denied
ODWALLA INC: "Wilson" Class Certification Bid Shelved
OHIO: Court Enters Report & Recommendation in "Foster" Suit
OHIO: Court Denies as Moot Bid to Stay "Foster" Suit
ORBIT-FR INC: Being Sold for Too Little, Minerva Group Says

ORLANS PC: Garland Sues over Debt Collection Practices
PALMETTO RESIDENTIAL: Simmons Seeks Overtime Pay under FLSA
PJ OPS: Edwards-Hollingsworth Suit Wins Collective Status
PORCH.COM: "Walker" Suit Moved to Eastern District of Missouri
PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: "Pounds" Suit Partly Remanded to State Court

PRIMESOURCE HEALTH: Court Okays 3rd Amended Suit in "Pfefferkorn"
R.M. GALICIA: Anderson Sues over Unsolicited Telephone Calls
SAFE HAVEN: Rodriguez Sues over Telemarketing Text Messages
SANDBOX TRANSPORTATION: "Reed" Suit Seeks Overtime Pay under FLSA
SCHLUMBERGER TECH: Court Allows Filing of 1st Amended "Martinez"

SEBASTOPOL, CA: Avendano-Ruiz Seeks to Certify Class & Subclass
SINCERE CARE: Fails to Pay Minimum Wages and OT, Pustilnik Says
STARK COLLECTION: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
STARLINE TOURS: 2nd Arbitration Award in "Ehm" Suit Affirmed
STONE CONCEPT: Weich Seeks Unpaid Wages under FLSA

STORAGE GENIUS: Pernia Seeks Overtime Wages under FLSA
TEACHERS INSURANCE: Court Narrows Claims in "Haley" ERISA Suit
TESLA MOTORS: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Stockholder Suit
TOMORROW PCS: Blank Seeks Conditional Class Certification
TOWNE PROPERTIES: Class in "Duggan" ERISA Suit Partly Certified

TOWN SPORTS: Metten Sues over Spam Text Messages
TRANS-CONTINENTAL: Parisi Sues over Unsolicited Phone Calls
TRUEACCORD CORP: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
UNITED INDUSTRIES: "Arthur" Class Certification Bid Shelved
UNITED PARCEL: "Jackson" Suit Moved to Eastern Dist. of New York

UNITED STATES: Manker Seeks to Certify Class of Navy Veterans
UNITED STATES: 14 Test Properties Named in Reservoir Suit
VERIFONE SYSTEMS: Being Sold for Too Little, Scarantino Says
WALLE CORPORATION: Court Conditionally Certifies FLSA Class
WAL-MART STORES: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss "Maestas" Suit

WARREN, MI: $750,000 Settlement Reached in Suit by NILI et al
WELLS FARGO: Court Strikes Class Claims in "Hightower" Suit
WESTERN CAB: "Reno" Suit Seeks Minimum Wages under FLSA
WILLBROS GROUP: Aug. 2 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
XOOM ENERGY: "Mirkin" Suit Moved to Eastern District of New York





                            *********


ACYTEC RETIREMENT: Parties Agree to Limited Class Certification
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled AMAN JOSEPH CLAUDET JR. individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. CYTEC
RETIREMENT PLAN, CYTEC INDUSTRIES INC., and SOLVAY USA, INC., the
Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-10027-EEF-JVM (E.D. La.), the
Parties stipulate as follows:

   1. With respect to Counts I and II in the Amended Complaint,
      the Class may be certified under Rule 23(b)(1) of the
      Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The parties do not
      stipulate to class certification of Count III, which was
      dismissed on February 21, 2018.

   2. The class shall be defined as follows:

      "all vested participants in the Cytec Retirement Plan who
      from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2013 elected a joint
      and survivor benefit option pursuant to the 1994 or 1997
      Cytec Retirement Plan and were subject to a reduction of
      monthly benefits as a result of the charges imposed due to
      the "pop-up" feature, as described in the Cytec Retirement
      Plan 2015 Voluntary Correction Program
      (and their beneficiaries, if they are deceased or
      incompetent).

   3. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class
      regarding both Counts I and II. Defendants estimate that
      the Class consists of approximately 320 individuals.

   4. This Stipulation does not waive any affirmative defenses
      the Defendants may have as to any member of the Class. Any
      waiver of affirmative defenses deemed to be made by virtue
      of this Stipulation shall be consistent with, and limited
      by, the terms of this Stipulation.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=343YDtpH

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Charles J. Stiegler, Esq.
          STIEGLER LAW FIRM LLC
          318 Harrison Ave., Suite 104
          New Orleans, LA 70124
          Telephone: (504) 267 0777
          Facsimile: (504) 513 3084
          E-mail: Charles@StieglerLawFirm.com

               - and -

          Christopher L. Williams, Esq.
          WILLIAMS LITIGATION LLC
          639 Loyola Ave., Suite 1850
          New Orleans, LA 70113
          Telephone: (504) 308 1438
          Facsimile: (504) 308 1446
          E-mail: Chris@williamslitigation.com

Counsel for Defendants:

          Tulio D. Chirinos, Esq.
          Stacey C.S. Cerrone, Esq.
          Howard Shapiro, Esq.
          Tulio D. Chirinos, Esq.
          PROSKAUER ROSE LLP
          650 Poydras Street, Suite 1800
          New Orleans, LA 70130
          Telephone: (504) 310 4088
          Facsimile: (504) 310 2022
          E-mail: scerrone@proskauer.com
                  howshapiro@proskauer.com
                  tchirinos@proskauer.com


AETNA LIFE: Bid to Strike Affirmative Defenses in "Mosser" Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, NICHOLAS D. MOSSER, Plaintiff, v. AETNA LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 4:15-cv-00430 (E.D. Tex.),
Judge Amos L. Mazzant of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas, Sherman Division, adopted the Magistrate
Judge's Report, and denied the Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Aetna
Life Insurance Company's Affirmative Defenses.

On March 9, 2017, the report of the Magistrate Judge was entered
containing proposed findings of fact and recommendations that the
Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Aetna Life Insurance Company's
Affirmative Defenses be denied.  The Plaintiff filed objections
to the report.

Judge Mazzant has made a de novo review of the objections raised
by the Plaintiff and is of the opinion that the findings and
conclusions of the Magistrate Judge are correct and the
objections are without merit as to the ultimate findings of the
Magistrate Judge.  He adopts the findings and conclusions of the
Magistrate Judge as the findings and conclusions of the Court.

The Plaintiff seeks to strike the following affirmative defenses
asserted by Aetna: (1) First and Nineteenth Affirmative Defenses
(failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted); (2)
Third Affirmative Defense (good faith and lawful business
reasons); (3) Eighth Affirmative Defense (standing); (4)
Fifteenth Affirmative Defense (agency); (5) Seventeenth
Affirmative Defense (actual knowledge and/or negligence); and (6)
Twenty-first Affirmative Defense (reservation of rights).

The Plaintiff's first point of error is that the Magistrate Judge
incorrectly applied federal law, rather than state law, in her
analysis of the sufficiency of Aetna's First and Nineteenth
Affirmative Defenses, failure to state a claim.  The Judge finds
that the Plaintiff appears to create a dispute where none exists.
To the extent that the Plaintiff suggests the Magistrate Judge
failed to apply the proper pleading standards in her analysis, he
says the Plaintiff is wrong.

The Judge holds that there is no credible argument that the
Magistrate Judge applied the incorrect standard.  Furthermore,
the Magistrate Judge agreed with the Plaintiff that failure to
state a claim is not an affirmative defense, but declined to
strike those defenses.  Thus, it appears that the Plaintiff
disagrees not with the analysis, but rather with the Magistrate
Judge's conclusion.  This does not constitute a basis for error.
The Magistrate Judge properly declined to strike Aetna's First
Affirmative Defense.  Accordingly, he finds no error in the
Magistrate Judge's conclusion that the motion to strike Aetna's
failure to state a claim defense should be denied, and he
overruled the Plaintiff's Objection.

The Magistrate Judge also properly denied Aetna's Third
Affirmative Defense explaining that while mislabeled, it informed
both the Plaintiff and the Court of facts Aetna intends to offer
in response to the elements of the Plaintiff's case, and
therefore, should not be stricken.  The Judge, therefore, finds
no error, and this Objection is likewise overruled.

The Judge next finds that the Plaintiff's lack of standing
defense is not merely a restatement of denials of certain
allegations that were made elsewhere in Aetna's answer.  Rather,
he says, the defense raises a substantive issue as to the
Plaintiff's qualifications to represent a potential class.  Based
on the foregoing, he overruled the Plaintiff's Objection to
Aetna's Eight Affirmative Defense.

Having found all of the Plaintiff's Objections are without merit,
Judge Mazzant adopted the Magistrate Judge's Report as his
opinion, and denied the Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Aetna Life
Insurance Company's Affirmative Defenses.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/NhTy84 from Leagle.com.

Nicholas D. Mosser, Plaintiff, pro se.

Nicholas D. Mosser, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Lawrence
Smith -- asmith@rolfeshenry.com -- Mosser Law PLLC & James C.
Mosser, Mosser Law PLLC.

AETNA Life Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by Jessica
F. Rosenbaum -- jessica.rosenbaum@bakerbotts.com -- Baker Botts
LLP, John Benjamin Lawrence -- john.lawrence@bakerbotts.com --
Baker Botts LLP & Earl B. Austin -- earl.austin@bakerbotts.com --
Baker Botts.

Nicholas D. Mosser, Counter Defendant, pro se.

Nicholas D. Mosser, Counter Defendant, represented by Andrew
Lawrence Smith, Mosser Law PLLC & James C. Mosser, Mosser Law
PLLC.

AETNA Life Insurance Company, Counter Claimant, represented by
Jessica F. Rosenbaum, Baker Botts LLP, John Benjamin Lawrence,
Baker Botts LLP & Earl B. Austin, Baker Botts.

AETNA Life Insurance Company, Cross Defendant, represented by
Jessica F. Rosenbaum, Baker Botts LLP, John Benjamin Lawrence,
Baker Botts LLP & Earl B. Austin, Baker Botts.


AIR EVAC: "Chanze" Suit Moved to N.D. West Virginia
---------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Troy Chanze, Sr., on his own
behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, v. Air Evac EMS, Inc., a Missouri corporation, the
Defendant, Case No. 18-C-29, was removed from the Circuit Court
of Wetzel County, West Virginia, to the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of West Virginia (Wheeling) on May 17,
2018. The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 5:18-cv-00089-
FPS to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the Hon. Senior
Judge Frederick P. Stamp, Jr.

Air Evac, operating as Air Evac Lifeteam, is the largest company
within AMGH. Air Evac is still the largest independently owned
and operated HEMS, or air ambulance provider.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James G. Bordas, Jr., Esq.
          Jason E. Causey, Esq.
          BORDAS & BORDAS, PLLC
          1358 National Rd
          Wheeling, WV 26003
          Telephone: (304) 242 8410
          Facsimile: (304) 242 3936
          E-mail: jbordas@bordaslaw.com
                  jason@bordaslaw.com

Attorneys for Defendant:

          Carte P. Goodwin, Esq.
          FROST BROWN TODD, LLC
          500 Lee Street East, Suite 401
          Charleston, WV 25301-3207
          Telephone: (304) 348 2422
          E-mail: cgoodwin@fbtlaw.com

               - and -

          Joshua L. Fuchs, Esq.
          Katelyn M. Matscherz, Esq.
          JONES DAY
          Houston, TX 77002-2712, Suite 3300
          Telephone: (832) 239 3939
          Facsimile: (832) 239 3600
          E-mail: jlfuchs@joneday.com
                  kmatscherz@jonesday.com


AIRSTREAM INC: Court Conditionally Certifies FLSA Collective
------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled SANDRA FUNK, on behalf of herself and
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. AIRSTREAM INC., et
al., the Defendants, Case No. 3:17-cv-00260-WHR-MJN (S.D. Ohio),
the Hon. Judge Walter H. Rice entered an order sustaining
Plaintiff's motion for conditional class certification and
conditionally certifying a collective Fair Labor Standards Act
class consisting of:

   "all current and former hourly, non-exempt employees of
   Defendants, who were paid by Airstream, Inc., and received any
   additional form of remuneration during any workweek beginning
   March 1, 2015, and continuing through the date of final
   disposition of this case."

The Court said, "Funk has submitted live paystubs showing that
her nondiscretionary bonuses were not included in her regular
rate of pay for purposes of overtime. In her Declaration, she
further states that Airstream calculated the overtime rate of
other non-exempt employees in a similar fashion and, in her
estimate, "hundreds, if not thousands" of these employees were
therefore undercompensated."

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=343YDtpH


AMERICAN CAMPUS: Court Conditionally Certifies "Guadalupe" Class
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled TYASIA GUADALUPE, the Plaintiff, v.
AMERICAN CAMPUS COMMUNITIES SERVICES, INC., the Defendant, Case
No. 1:16-cv-00967-SS (W.D. Tex.), the Hon. Judge Sam Sparks
entered an order conditionally certifying a Fair Labor Standards
Act collective action and approving notice to putative Plaintiffs
falling within the following class definition:

   "all persons who worked for ACC, at any time in the three
   years prior to the filing of this order, as a "Community
   Assistant," "CA," "Resident Assistant," "RA," or in any other
   job title that performed substantially the same tasks as any
   of the foregoing AND who, while working in any of the
   preceding roles (1) did not receive cash wages for all time
   worked, (2) received lodging in lieu of all or a portion of
   cash wages, OR (3) paid rent, whether discounted or otherwise,
   to lease a unit managed and/or owned by ACC, its subsidiaries,
   affiliates, and/or customers."

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=jy84N9PJ


AMERICAN REALTY: Court Dismisses Paradise Wire's Securities Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Catherine C. Blake of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Maryland granted the Defendants' motions to dismiss
the case, PARADISE WIRE & CABLE DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLAN, et
al., v. EDWARD M. WEIL, JR., et al., Civil Action No. CCB-17-132
(D. Md.).

The Plaintiffs, a putative class led by Stuart Wollman, have sued
four entities and seven individuals -- AR Global Investments, LLC
("AR Global"); American Finance Trust, Inc. ("AFIN"); American
Realty Capital-Retail Centers of America, Inc. ("RCA"); American
Capital Retail Advisor, LLC; RCA Directors Leslie Michelson,
Edward Rendell, and Edward M. Weil; Nicholas Redesca, Chief
Financial Officer of AFIN; and David Gong, Stanley R. Perla, and
Lisa D. Kabnick, directors of AFIN -- claiming one or more of
them violated provisions of the Securities and Exchange Acts,
breached duties of care and loyalty, breached their contractual
duties, and were unjustly enriched during a merger between RCA
and AFIN.

Though the case arises out of a merger between RCA and AFIN, two
non-publicly traded real estate investment trusts ("REITs"),
events leading to the filing of the complaint began with AR
Global, an asset manager that controls and manages several REITs,
including RCA and AFIN, and several advisory companies, including
RCA Advisor.  The amended complaint alleges that AR Global's
business was disrupted by the disclosure of fraud at two of its
subsidiaries, causing some affiliated REITs to sever ties with AR
Global subsidiaries.  To limit the fallout from the adverse
publicity, and to prevent other subsidiaries from terminating
their advisory agreements, AR Global initiated a plan to merge or
"roll-up" REITs bound to AR Global by weak contractual agreements
with affiliates subject to more durable contracts.  The merger
between RCA and AFIN was part of this plan.

In February 2016, AFIN sent RCA a letter expressing interest in
combining their businesses.  To consider AFIN's proposal, RCA
created a special committee comprised of independent directors
Leslie Michelson and former Gov. Edward Rendell, who then hired
BMO Capital Markets, Inc. to advise them on the possible merger.
The complaint alleges that BMO had a preexisting financial
relationship with AR Capital while it was advising RCA, and that
the agreement between the special committee and BMO incentivized
BMO to favor the merger by offering an addition $4.9 million in
fees if the merger closed.

After negotiation, the parties agreed to the following merger
terms: per share consideration to RCA shareholders of 0.385
shares of AFIN common stock and $0.95 in cash, 45 days for RCA to
shop for better deals, a clause that allowed RCA to accept a more
favorable proposal, and a two-tiered termination fee of 0.5% and
2.5% of the equity value of the transaction, the lower fee
available if RCA terminated for a superior proposal.  Notably,
the special committee did not market check the consideration for
the merger because it thought, based on market conditions, AFIN's
offer would be the best it would receive.

The merger was yet threatened, despite promising negotiations, by
provisions of RCA's charter that disfavored advisory agreements,
imposed a fiduciary duty on the RCA directors, provided
stockholders certain rights in a merger, and prevented RCA from
agreeing to transactions with affiliates (1) without a majority
vote of disinterested directors and (2) if more favorable offers
were made by unaffiliated third parties.  RCA issued a proxy in
April 2016 to eliminate these provisions.

RCA nevertheless announced, in September 2016, that it had
reached a merger agreement with AFIN for $10.26 of total
consideration per RCA share based on AFIN's estimated per share
net asset value ("NAV"), calculated in December 2015.  The
agreement was conditioned on RCA receiving stockholder approval
for the charter amendments that RCA failed to obtain in April of
2016.

Three months later, RCA issued another proxy to its shareholders
seeking approval for, among other things, the removal of certain
provisions in its charter related to merger transactions and the
merger agreement with AFIN.  The proxy relied heavily on AFIN's
estimated per share NAV of $24.17 as of Dec. 31, 2015, allegedly
taking no heed of the estimate's staleness and thus its
inaccuracy.  The Plaintiffs allege that by Dec. 31, 2016, AFIN's
NAV dropped to $23.37 per share, the NAV was based on a deflated
capitalization rate, AFIN had suffered a sizable loss in a real
estate deal, and had to pay $27.3 million in fees related to
SunTrust properties during 2016.

Notwithstanding these alleged deficiencies, shareholders approved
the merger and charter amendments on Feb. 13, 2017.  Three days
later, the merger was completed.  Over the next four months, AFIN
made five disclosures, allegedly for the first time: (1)
Michelson and Rendell joined AFIN's board of directors; (2) AFIN
disclosed that it paid a $27.3 million fee related to some of its
properties; (3) its NAV dropped to $23.37; (4) a decrease in its
rental income from the same time the year before and an
additional property related fee of $3.9 million; and (5) that it
was limiting its share repurchase program and reducing its
dividend from $1.65 per share to $1.30 per share.

The Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint in January 2017,
before the merger, which they amended in June 2017, claiming that
the Defendants violated various federal and state laws in
connection with the proxy statement and the merger.  The
complaint does not allege fraud, intentional conduct, or
recklessness as to any Defendant.  All the Defendants have moved
to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, and
Defendants AR Global and RCA Advisor also have moved to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Judge Blake finds that the Plaintiffs claim that by promulgating
a misleading proxy, pushing RCA into a merger agreement for
personal benefit, and failing to adequately assess the merits of
the merger one or more of the Defendants violated several
provisions of the Securities and Exchange Acts.  These claims
will be dismissed because the Plaintiffs fail to plausibly show
that the proxy was misleading.  The proxy sufficiently disclosed
the very risks identified by the Plaintiffs, cautioned
shareholders where necessary, and qualified its opinions such
that they would not have misled a reasonable shareholder, the
proxy did not violate SEC Rule 14a-9.

The Judge also finds that the Plaintiffs fail to meet the
threshold requirements under the Rule.  Second, even if they were
able to meet their threshold burden, they fail to plead
sufficient facts to support their allegations that the proxy
underlying the merger agreement contained misleading statements
or misleading omissions for the reasons stated in Section I.  For
all these reasons, the Plaintiffs' claims under SEC Rule 13e-3
will be dismissed.  Because the Judge will dismiss the
Plaintiffs' claims under sections 13 and 14 of the Exchange Act,
he will also dismiss their claim under section 20(a).

The Judge next finds that the proxy statement neither included
misleading statements nor omitted information necessary to keep
the proxy from becoming misleading.  Accordingly, violation of
Section 11 of the Securities Act - (Count IV) claim also will be
dismissed. Assuming, without deciding, that Weil made or
solicited offers for AFIN stock, Weil and AFIN are nonetheless
not liable under the Act.  Relying, again, on the reasons stated
in Section I, the proxy was not unlawfully misleading, and
violation of Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act - (Count V)
claim, too, will be dismissed.  And because he will dismiss the
claims brought under the Securities Act, the Judge also will
dismiss the Plaintiffs' section 15 - (Count VI) claim.
Because he will dismiss the Plaintiffs' federal claims, the Judge
will choose not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
Plaintiffs' remaining state law claims.  Accordingly, he says it
is not necessary to address the issue of personal jurisdiction.

For these reasons, Judge Blake dismissed the complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/Xz1A58 from Leagle.com.

Paradise Wire & Cable Defined Benefit Pension Plan,
Hollingsworth, Mendenhall and McFadden LLC, IG Holdings, Inc., IG
Revocable Trust, Individually on behalf of themselves an all
others similarly situated, Stuart Wollman, Dr., Sheila Rosenberg
& Rene DeMeule, Plaintiffs, represented by Daniel S. Katz --
dkatz@tydingslaw.com -- Tydings and Rosenberg LLP, Gloria Kui
Melwani -- melwani@whafh.com -- Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman
and Herz LLP, pro hac vice, Jeffrey S. Abraham --
jabraham@aftlaw.com -- Abraham Fruchter and Twersky LLP, pro hac
vice, John Bucher Isbister, Tydings and Rosenberg LLP, Lawrence
Kolker -- kolker@whafh.com -- Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman and
Herz LLP, pro hac vice & Lynda J. Grant -- lgrant@grantfirm.com -
- The Grant Lawfirm PLLC, pro hac vice.

Edward M. Weil, Jr., Defendant, represented by David L. Schwarz -
- dschwarz@kellogghansen.com -- Kellogg Huber Hansen Todd Evans
and Figel PLLC, pro hac vice, James M. Webster, III --
jwebster@kellogghansen.com -- Kellogg, Hansen, Todd, Figel &
Frederick, P.L.L.C. & Reid M. Figel -- rfigel@kellogghansen.com -
- Kellogg Huber Hansen Todd Evans and Figel PLLC, pro hac vice.

American Realty Capital Retail Advisor, LLC & Nicholas Radesca,
Defendants, represented by David L. Schwarz, Kellogg Huber Hansen
Todd Evans and Figel PLLC, pro hac vice.

David Gong, Lisa D. Kabinick & Stanley Perla, Defendants,
represented by Judith L.O. Grady -- ogradyj@pepperlaw.com --
Pepper Hamilton LLP.

Rene Paul DeMeule, Movant, represented by Donald J. Enright --
denright@zlk.com -- Levi and Korsinsky LLP.


AMTRUST FINANCIAL: Raul Balks at Merger Deal with Evergreen
-----------------------------------------------------------
TAMMY RAUL, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, v. AMTRUST FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.,
BARRY ZYSKIND, GEORGE KARFUNKEL, LEAH KARFUNKEL, DONALD T.
DECARLO, ABRAHAM GULKOWITZ, SUSAN C. FISCH, RAUL RIVERA, and
MARK SEROCK, the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-04440 (S.D.N.Y.,
May 18, 2018), seeks to enjoin the Defendants from proceeding
with a proposed merger transaction.

The Plaintiff brings this class action on behalf of the public
shareholders of AmTrust against the Company's Board of Directors
for their violations of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C., in connection with
the proposed merger of the Company in a cash transaction with
Evergreen Parent, L.P.

On March 1, 2018, AmTrust announced that the Company had entered
into an Agreement and Plan of Merger with Evergreen, a Delaware
limited partnership owned by Trident VII, L.P. and its affiliated
funds, K-Z LLC, Defendant Barry D. Zyskind, Chairman and CEO of
the Company, George Karfunkel and Leah Karfunkel, and Evergreen
Merger Sub, Inc., pursuant to which Evergreen will acquire all of
the outstanding common shares, par value $0.01 per share, of the
Company that are not currently owned or controlled by the
Karfunkel Family and its affiliates and certain related parties.
The Karfunkel Family and its affiliates and certain related
parties currently own or control approximately 55% of the
outstanding shares of Common Stock of the Company.

The Agreement provides for the merger of Merger Sub with and into
the Company, with the Company surviving the merger as a
subsidiary of Evergreen. Pursuant to the transactions
contemplated by the Merger Agreement, each outstanding share of
Common Stock of the Company will be converted into the right to
receive $13.50 per share of Common Stock in cash, without
interest and less any required withholding taxes. The Proposed
Transaction also contains restrictive deal protection devices
that preclude the Defendants from being able to adequately shop
the Company in the best interests of the shareholders. The deal
protection devices include: (i) a "no-shop" provision that
restricts the Company's ability to solicit alternative
acquisition proposals for third parties; and (ii) a termination
fee of $33 million that AmTrust must pay to Evergreen.

On April 9, 2018, the Company filed with the SEC an incomplete
and misleading Proxy Statement in connection with the Proposed
Transaction. The Proxy Statement omits material information
regarding the Proposed Transaction. Accordingly, the Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants have violated Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in connection with the Proxy
Statement.

AmTrust Financial is a New York City-based multinational property
and casualty insurance company.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Joshua M. Lifshitz, Esq.
          Edward W. Miller, Esq.
          LIFSHITZ & MILLER LLP
          821 Franklin Avenue, Suite 209
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: (516) 493 9780
          Facsimile: (516) 280 7376
          E-mail: jml@jlclasslaw.com
                  edmilleresq@aol.com


ANTHONY WAYNE: Camp Drug's Class Certification Bid Denied
---------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled CAMP DRUG STORE, INC., Individually, and as
the representative of a class of similarly-situated persons, the
Plaintiff, v. ANTHONY WAYNE THOMPSON d/b/a AmpleMedical and
AmpleMedical.com, the Defendant, Case No. 0:18-cv-61033-WPD (S.D.
Fla.), the Hon. Judge William P. Dimitrouleas denied Plaintiff's
motion for class certification as premature on procedural grounds
only; it makes no conclusions regarding the substance of the
Motion.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=QmxNC23e


ARS NATIONAL: Rottenstein Sues over Debt Collection Practices
-------------------------------------------------------------
Esther Rottenstein, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. ARS National Services, Inc.
John Does 1-25, the Defendant, Case No. 7:18-cv-04453 (S.D.N.Y.,
May 18, 2018), seeks damages and declaratory and injunctive
relief under the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act.

According to the complaint, some time prior to January 10, 2018,
an obligation was allegedly incurred to Chase Bank U.S.A., N.A.
The Chase obligation arose out of a transaction in which money,
property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the
transaction, are primarily for personal, family or household
purposes. The alleged Chase Bank U.S.A., N.A. obligation is a
"debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C. section 1692a(5).

Chase is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C. section 1692a(4).
Chase or a subsequent owner of the Chase debt contracted the
Defendant to collect the alleged debt. The Defendant collects and
attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been
incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of
creditors using the United States Postal Service, telephone and
internet.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel Kohn, Esq.
          RC Law Group, PLLC
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Telephone: (201) 282 6500


ASSET RECOVERY: Hughes Sues over Debt Collection Practices
----------------------------------------------------------
Sandra Hughes, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. Asset Recovery, Inc., John Does l-25,
the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-00595-LEK-DJS (N.D.N.Y., May 18,
2018), seeks damages and declaratory and injunctive relief under
the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act.

According to the complaint, some time prior to June 16, 2017, an
obligation was allegedly incurred to "North Country Orthopedic".
The "North Country Orthopedic" obligation arose out of a
transaction in which money, property, insurance or services,
which are the subject of the transaction, are primarily for
personal, family or household purposes. The alleged "North
Country Orthopedic" obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15
U.S.C. section 1692a(5). The Defendant collects and attempts to
collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for
personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors
using the United States Postal Services, telephone and
internet.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel Kohn, Esq.
          RC Law Group, PLLC
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Telephone: (201) 282 6500


AUTO ZONE: Faces "Hernandez" Wage-and-Hour Suit
-----------------------------------------------
MARVIN HERNANDEZ, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. AUTO ZONE, INC. a Nevada
corporation; AUTOZONERS, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company;
AUTOZONE PARTS, INC., a Nevada corporation; and DOES 1-50,
inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. 37-2018-00023753- CU-OE-NC
(Cal. Super. Ct., May 14, 2018), seeks to recover compensatory
damages, including, but not limited to wages, earnings, and other
compensation under the California Labor Code.

According to the complaint, the Defendants employ and have
employed individuals in positions as regular hourly-paid non-
exempt employees, including positions such as in-store customer
service and parts managers, assistant managers and other full and
part time positions as well as drivers.  These employees
currently work or formerly worked in non-exempt, positions and
have not been paid during the relevant liability period all of
their legal wages pursuant to the Labor Code and applicable
Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders. Any differences in job
duties or activities as between different individuals are legally
insignificant to the issues present by this action. The
Defendants have violated numerous provisions of the California
Labor Code, including failure to compensate Plaintiff and Class
Members for all hours worked despite the fact that Plaintiff and
Class Members work overtime, failure to pay a minimum wage for
all hours worked, failure to provide meal and rest periods,
failure to pay all earned wages at the conclusion of employment,
and failure to furnish paystubs accurately showing, among other
things properly itemized earnings and deductions for the total
hours worked during each pay period.

AutoZone is the largest retailer of aftermarket automotive parts
and accessories in the United States. Founded in 1979, AutoZone
has over 6,000 stores across the United States, Mexico, and
Brazil.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jacob N. Whitehead, Esq.
          WHITEHEAD EMPLOYMENT LAW
          15615 Alton Pkwy, Suite 175
          Irvine, CA 92618
          Telephone: (949) 936 4001
          Facsimile: (949) 450 1588


BANCO SANTANDER: Manipulates Mexican Bond Prices, SEPTA Says
------------------------------------------------------------
SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, on behalf of
itself and all other similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. BANCO
SANTANDER S.A., SANTANDER INVESTMENT SECURITIES, INC., SANTANDER
HOLDINGS USA, INC., BANCO SANTANDER (MEXICO) S.A. INSTITUCION DE
BANCA MULTIPLE, GRUPO FINANCIERO, SANTANDER INVESTMENT BOLSA,
SOCIEDAD DE VALORES, S.A.U., BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENTARIA,
S.A., and BBVA SECURITIES, INC., the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-
cv-04400 (S.D.N.Y., May 17, 2018), seeks to recover damages under
the Clayton Act.

This action follows in a string of investigations and actions in
which the world's largest banks conspired with one another to
manipulate key financial rates, metrics and instruments to
benefit themselves and to the detriment of their clients. The
Plaintiff, one of the nation's preeminent pension funds, holds
accounts for more than 9,000 public employees in Pennsylvania who
contribute at least 3.5% of their wages to the retirement fund.
SEPTA has been victimized by the deliberate manipulation of
pricing on Mexican Government Bonds.

Government bonds, also called sovereign bonds, are issued by
national governments to finance public projects. They are usually
structured with a promise to pay periodic interest payments and
to repay the face value on the maturity date in the denominated
currency. The terms upon which a government can sell bonds depend
on how creditworthy the market considers it to be. International
credit rating agencies will provide ratings for the bonds, but
market participants determine pricing, factoring creditworthiness
into their pricing. Competition is the cornerstone to building
fair and efficient markets for government-issued debt offerings
such as bonds: "an efficient government securities market is
characterized by a competitive market structure, low transaction
costs, low levels of fragmentation, a safe and robust
infrastructure, and a high level of heterogeneity among
participants."

Market makers in a specific market quote both a buy and a sell
price in a financial instrument or commodity held in inventory,
hoping to make a profit on the bid-offer spread. The Defendants
-- designated Market Makers in government bonds issued by the
Federal Government of Mexico -- have subverted competition in the
market for MGBs. Rather than provide a robust competitive market,
Defendants have engaged in a longstanding scheme to fix or rig
the bid-ask spread for primary and secondary MGB offerings. The
Defendants carried out this scheme by exchanging competitively
sensitive information, such as their order flow and prices at
which they intended to purchase or sell MGB, and by coordinating
their buying and selling activity in MGBs. Such actions violated
the rules of the sale process, pursuant to which bids were to be
submitted blind.

As a result of Defendants' actions, Plaintiff and other
purchasers of MGBs have been harmed by purchasing into a market
where prices and yields are set not by the intersection of supply
and demand, but by secret agreements between Defendants to fix or
set the prices at which MGBs are sold and the yields that they
offer. Defendants, some of the world's largest financial
institutions, are horizontal competitors in the market for
auctions for MGBs -- in which only Market Makers may participate
-- and in the resale market for MGBs. Rather than compete against
one another for the prices at which they bought or sold MGBs,
they coordinated to ensure that Mexico received lower than
competitive prices, and Plaintiff paid supracompetitive prices,
for MGBs. The Defendant Market Makers abused their positions as
participants in a market program that is offered by Mexico's
Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico. The MFN designated
Defendants as Market Makers in order to create a vibrant market
for MGBs where competition would allow in fair prices. Instead,
the opposite occurred.

Banco Santander, S.A., doing business as Santander Group, is a
Spanish banking group. As its name suggests, the company
originated in Santander, Spain.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation
Authority and the Proposed Classy:

          Javier Bleichmar, Esq.
          Lesley E. Weaver, Esq.
          Matthew S. Weiler, Esq.
          Emily C. Aldridge, Esq.
          BLEICHMAR FONTI & AULD LLP
          7 Times Square, 27th Floor
          New York, NY 10036
          Telephone: (212) 789 1340
          Facsimile: (212) 205 3960
          E-mail: jbleichmar@bfalaw.com
                  lweaver@bfalaw.com
                  mweiler@bfalaw.com
                  ealdridge@bfalaw.com


BARCLAYS CAPITAL: Claims in 2nd Amended "Bigsby" Suit Narrowed
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LAMAR BIGSBY, JR., KARLA FREELAND, MARIA BRANDT,
KATHLEEN MURRY, and HERMAN GRIMES, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. BARCLAYS CAPITAL
REAL ESTATE, INC., doing business as HOMEQ SERVICING, Defendant,
Case No. 14-cv-1398 (JGK) (S.D. N.Y.), Judge John G. Koeltl of
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
granted in part and denied in part the second motion by Barclays
to dismiss the Plaintiffs' Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO") claims, California unfair competition
law ("UCL") claims, California fair debt collection claims,
common law claims of fraud, conversion, and unjust enrichment,
and the California plaintiffs' breach of contract claims.

The Plaintiffs were mortgagors.  Each of them obtained at least
one mortgage serviced by HomEq and Barclays.  All of the
Plaintiffs went into default on their mortgage obligations, and
Barclays instituted foreclosure proceedings against them.  The
case deals with Barclays's conduct during those foreclosure
proceedings.

Bigsby and Freeland first filed the putative class action against
Barclays, in its capacity as successor to a mortgage-servicing
company known as HomEq, over four years ago.  Bigsby and Freeland
alleged that Barclays and HomEq defrauded mortgagors in the
assessment of foreclosure-related fees, giving rise to claims
under the RICO and related common law claims.

Barclays previously filed a motion to dismiss the complaint by
Bigsby and Freeland pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.  The Court granted that motion in part,
resulting in the dismissal of the RICO claims by Bigsby and
Freeland.

Bigsby and Freeland, now joined by California Plaintiffs Brandt,
Murry, and Grimes, then filed a Second Amended Complaint, with
leave of the Court.  The Second Amended Complaint renews the
Plaintiffs' civil RICO claims predicated on mail fraud and wire
fraud, and common law claims of breach of contract, conversion,
fraud, unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and accounting.
The Second Amended Complaint also adds statutory claims under
California's UCL, and the California Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

The claims and factual allegations in the Second Amended
Complaint are organized around three allegedly fraudulent schemes
perpetrated by Barclays in foreclosure proceedings -- a
"fraudulent foreclosure scheme," a "fee shifting scheme," and an
"inflated fees scheme."  The Plaintiffs allege that these schemes
caused them to pay the illegal amounts sought by Barclays, and
incur legal and other expenses associated with the illegal
activity.

Presently before the Court is a second motion by Barclays to
dismiss the Plaintiffs' RICO claims, California UCL claims,
California fair debt collection claims, common law claims of
fraud, conversion, and unjust enrichment, and the California
Plaintiffs' breach of contract claims.

Judge Koeltl finds that (i) Rajamin v. Deutsche Bank National
Trust Co. renders implausible the Plaintiffs' argument that the
statements in the foreclosures that the trust-assignees were the
beneficial owners of their mortgages was a misrepresentation
solely because foreclosures were initiated before the assignments
were recorded; (ii) the Second Amended Complaint does not state a
RICO claim with respect to the "fee shifting scheme"; and (iii)
Second Amended Complaint does not state a RICO claim with respect
to the "inflated fees scheme."  Accordingly, the Judge will grant
Barclays's motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' RICO claims insofar
as they arise out of the "inflated fees scheme."

Barclays moves to dismiss the Plaintiffs' common law fraud claims
for the same reasons that it seeks dismissal of the federal RICO
claims.  Accordingly, the Judge will grant Barclays's motion to
dismiss the fraud claims for the reasons explained.  And because
the Plaintiffs have pointed to no comparable case that applied
the UCL to an alleged breach of the California Rules of
Professional Conduct or any case analogous to McIntosh, he will
also grant Barclays's motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' UCL
claims.

The Judge will deny Barclays's motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs'
claims of unjust enrichment and conversion.  He says the
Plaintiffs bring quasi-contract claims under Georgia,
Massachusetts, and California law, not New York law.  Each of
those States permits pleading quasi-contract claims as
alternatives to breach of contract claims.  He will also deny
Barclays's motion to dismiss the California UCL claims, contract,
conversion, and unjust enrichment claims as time-barred.  The
Second Amended Complaint does not contain factual allegations
sufficient to establish that the California Plaintiffs should
have known of Barclays's alleged fraud before they actually did.
The California Plaintiffs did not file their claims in the case
until 2017.  Indeed, the Plaintiffs' counsel conceded at oral
argument that the California fair debt collection claims are
plainly time-barred.

Finally, Judge Koeltl finds that the Plaintiffs have named 20
John Doe Defendants.  The deadline to join new parties was Dec.
16, 2016.  Since the Plaintiffs failed to identify the John Does
by that date, and indeed still have not identified any John Does,
the Judge will therefore dismiss all claims against John Does.
And as to Barclays' move to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims for a
"constructive trust" and an "accounting" on the grounds that they
are equitable remedies rather than independent claims to relief,
the Judge holds that the Plaintiffs failed to respond to
Barclays's arguments, and therefore forfeited these claims.

Judge Koeltl has considered all of the arguments raised by the
parties.  To the extent not specifically addressed, the arguments
are either moot or without merit.  For the reasons he explained,
he granted in part and denied in part Barclays's Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss.  He granted the motion insofar all claims
against John Does are dismissed and the RICO claims, the
California UCL claims, all common law fraud claims, all
constructive trust claims, all accounting claims, and the
California fair debt collection claims against Barclays are
dismissed.  He denied Barclays's motion as to all of the unjust
enrichment claims, conversion claims, and the California breach
of contract claims.  The Clerk is directed to close the motion at
docket number 109.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Opinion and Order
is available at https://is.gd/fteayW from Leagle.com.

Lamar Bigsby, Jr., on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Joseph Karl Jones, Jones,
Wolf & Kapasi LLC, Benjamin Jarret Wolf, Jones, Wolf & Kapasi,
LLC & Paul Stewart Grobman, Paul Grobman, Esq.

Karla Freeland, Plaintiff, represented by Benjamin Jarret Wolf,
Jones, Wolf & Kapasi, LLC & Paul Stewart Grobman, Paul Grobman,
Esq.

Barclays Capital Real Estate, Inc., doing business as, Defendant,
represented by James Ellis Brandt -- james.brandt@lw.com --
Latham & Watkins LLP, Michael Andrew Watsula --
michael.watsula@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, Serrin Andrew
Turner -- serrin.turner@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP & Tracey
L. Orick, Latham & Watkins, LLP.

Maria Brandt, Herman Grimes & Kathleen Murry, ADR Providers,
represented by Benjamin Jarret Wolf, Jones, Wolf & Kapasi, LLC.


BKP INC: Underpays Nail Technicians, Miles Claims
-------------------------------------------------
LISA MILES A.K.A ELISA MARIE MILES; and those similarly situated,
the Plaintiffs, v. BKP INC.; ELLA BLISS BEAUTY BAR LLC; ELLA
BLISS BEAUTY BAR - 2, LLC; ELLA BLISS BEAUTY BAR - 3, LLC;
BROOKE VANHAVERMAAT; KELLY HUELSING; AND PETER KOCLANES, the
Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-01212 (D. Colo., May 17, 2018),
seeks to recover unpaid wages, commissions, and overtime pay
under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Colorado Wage Claim
Act.

According to the complaint, the business operation of Ella Bliss
Beauty Bar is founded on the exploitation of its workers.
Customers pay almost $80 for a manicure and a pedicure, yet out
of that almost $80, Plaintiff Lisa Miles, like other nail
technicians, would receive only $.85 cents in commission. When
Ella Bliss had offered Ms. Miles the job, it had promised to pay
her $3.90 in commission for a manicure and pedicure service. Ella
Bliss also did not pay Lisa Miles or any of the other Service
Technicians at any of its three stores any amount whatsoever for
the hours that they spent cleaning and performing other mandatory
chores. In fact, Ella Bliss did not employ janitors or a cleaning
service and relied exclusively on the unpaid labor of its nail
technicians and other Service Technicians to clean the salon.

Ella Bliss's policies and practices governing compensation,
including its failure to pay Plaintiff and its other Service
Technicians promised commissions, its failure to pay them for the
time that they spent cleaning and doing other chores, and its
failure to pay overtime, are illegal and constitute, among other
things, violations of the FLSA and the Colorado Wage Claim
Act.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mari Newman, Esq.
          Liana Orshan, Esq.
          KILLMER, LANE &NEWMAN, LLP
          543 Champa St., Suite 400
          Denver, CO 80202
          Telephone: (303) 571 1000
          Facsimile: (303) 571 1001
          E-mail: mnewman@kln-law.com
                  lorshan@kln-law.com

               - and -

          Alexander Hood, Esq.
          David Seligman, Esq.
          TOWARDS JUSTICE
          1410 High St., Suite 300
          Denver, CO 80218
          Telephone: (720) 239 2606
          Facsimile: (303) 957 2289
          E-mail: alex@towardsjustice.org
                  david@towardsjustice.org


BUFFALO WILD: Yelp Wins Bid to Dismiss "Meeks" TCPA Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARCHE MEEKS, Plaintiff, v. BUFFALO WILD WINGS,
INC., ET AL., Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-07129-YGR (N.D. Cal.),
Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California (i) granted with prejudice Yelp's
motion to dismiss, (ii) granted Wingmen's motion to transfer
venue, and (iii) declined to rule on (a) BWW's and Blazin's
motion to dismiss, and (ii) Wingmen's motion to dismiss so that a
properly venued court may hear and decide those motions.

Meeks brings the putative class action against Defendants BWW,
Blazin Wings, Inc, Yelp, Inc., Nowait, Inc., and Wingmen V, LLC,
alleging (1) negligent and (2) knowing and/or willful violations
of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA").

The Plaintiff alleges that he visited two Buffalo Wild Wings
restaurants, one located in Sherman Oaks, California in or around
July 2017, and the other located in Chino Hills, California on
Sept. 4, 2017.  On both occasions, no tables were immediately
available, and the Plaintiff provided his cellular phone number
to the hostess upon arrival so that the hostess could notify him
when his table was ready. Shortly thereafter, the Plaintiff
received a text message providing a link so that he could check
his place in line.  Subsequently, on both occasions, the
Plaintiff received another text message notifying him that his
table was ready.  Though similar, the initiating text messages
sent to the Plaintiff in July and September were not identical.

Upon information and belief, the Plaintiff alleges that the
hyperlink in the July 2017 text message directed to a website
maintained by Defendant Nowait, which advertises Nowait's app.
He alleges that in the Sept. 4, 2017 text message he received,
the Yelp app advertises itself as a restaurant and business
directory.

The Plaintiff seeks to represent two classes defined as follows:

     a. Yelp/Nowait Class: All persons within the United States
who, within the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint
and continuing to the present, received a text message from the
Defendants, or any of them, sent by means of an automatic
telephone dialing system to their cellular telephones containing
a hyperlink that directs to a website prompting them to download
the Yelp or Nowait apps.

     b. BWW Class: All persons within the United States who,
within the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint and
continuing to the present, received a text message from
Defendants, or any of them, sent by means of an automatic
telephone dialing system to their cellular telephones prompting
them to download the BWW Blazin' Rewards app.

The complaint asserts two causes of action under the TCPA against
all Defendants: one for negligent violations of the TCPA, and one
for knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA.  The Plaintiff
seeks statutory damages for each alleged negligent and
knowing/willful violation, as well as injunctive relief
prohibiting future conduct, punitive damages, and interest.

Currently before the Court are three Rule 12(b)(6) motions filed
by the Defendants, each of which seeks to dismiss both causes of
action alleged in the complaint, and Wingmen's motion to transfer
venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1404(a).

Yelp argues that the Plaintiff has failed to establish Yelp's
TCPA liability under either a direct liability theory or a
vicarious liability theory.  While the Plaintiff alleges that the
restaurants use Yelp's "platform" to send the offending text
messages, Judge Rogers finds that the Plaintiff does not allege
that Yelp decided whether, when, or to whom to send the messages.
Rather, his allegations regarding Yelp pertain to its purported
business model and the general advertising and analytics services
Yelp provides to restaurants.  Thus, the Plaintiff's allegations
fail to establish that Yelp was an active participant in
developing the messages the recipient ultimately received,
controlling the initiation of the message.

With respect to the Plaintiff's argument in his opposition that
Yelp could in any event be found vicariously liable for BWW's
sending of the text messages, the Judge agrees with Yelp that the
Plaintiff fails to allege facts to support a theory of vicarious
liability.  The Plaintiff fails to allege a traditional agency
relationship between Yelp and BWW.  He has not alleged that Yelp
had any control over BWW with respect to sending the text
messages, nor that BWW acted in any way on Yelp's behalf.
Indeed, the Judge says, the complaint shows that the restaurants
controlled whether, when, and to whom to send the text messages,
along with their content.  Thus, the complaint fails to
sufficiently allege that Yelp is vicariously liable for the
allegedly unlawful text messages.

Having carefully considered the papers submitted, the pleadings
in this action, the oral arguments held on February 27, 2018, and
for the reasons set forth below, the Court ORDERS as follows: The
Court GRANTS WITH PREJUDICE Yelp's motion to dismiss.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated on the record and in light of
plaintiff's concession at oral argument, the Court GRANTS
Wingmen's motion to transfer venue. The Court thus DECLINES to
rule on (i) BWW's and Blazin's motion to dismiss, and (ii)
Wingmen's motion to dismiss so that a properly venued court may
hear and decide those motions.

Finally, the Judge finds that the complaint affirmatively
establishes that Yelp did not initiate the text messages at issue
and that no entity acted in any way on its behalf.  Because the
Plaintiff cannot sustain a claim against Yelp without
contradicting his existing allegations, the Judge will deny the
Plaintiff's request to amend complaint should the Court grants
Yelp's motion to dismiss.

In light of this, Judge Rogers granted with prejudice Yelp's
motion to dismiss.  At the hearing on the instant motions, the
Judge weighed the relevant public and private interest factors to
determine whether a transfer of the case to the Central District
of California would be more convenient to the parties and the
witnesses and would promote the interests of justice.  He
concluded that it would deny Wingmen's venue transfer motion
unless it were ultimately to dismiss Yelp from the case, and the
Plaintiff conceded that this course of action would be
appropriate.  Accordingly, he also granted Wingmen's motion to
transfer venue to the Central District of California.

The Judge declined to rule on (i) BWW's and Blazin's motion to
dismiss, and (ii) Wingmen's motion to dismiss so that the Judge
presiding over the case can hear and decide those motions.  He
directed the Clerk to transfer the file in the case to the
Central District of California.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/WzYo0m from Leagle.com.

Marche Meeks, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Justin Kachadoorian --
justin@counselonegroup.com -- CounselOne, PC, Alexandria R.
Kachadoorian -- alexandria@counselonegroup.com -- CounselOne
Group & Anthony J. Orshansky -- anthony@counselonegroup.com --
CounselOne PC.

Buffalo Wild Wings, Inc., a Minnesota corporation & Blazin Wings,
Inc., a Minnesota corporation, Defendants, represented by Anahit
Tagvoryan -- atagvoryan@blankrome.com -- Blank Rome LLP, Harrison
Maxwell Brown -- hbrown@blankrome.com -- Blank Rome LLP & Safia
G. Hussain -- shussain@blankrome.com -- Blank Rome LLP.

Yelp Inc., a Delaware corporation & Nowait, Inc., a Delaware
corporation, Defendants, represented by Brian Adair Sutherland --
bsutherland@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP & Ashley Lynn Shively
-- ashively@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP.

Wingmen V, LLC, a Washington limited liability company,
Defendant, represented by Christine Marie Reilly --
creilly@manatt.com -- Manatt Phelps & Phillips LLP & Kristin
Emily Haule -- khaule@manatt.com -- Manatt, Phelps and Phillips,
LLP.


BULLITT COUNTY, KY: Summary Judgment Bid in "Shadburne" Granted
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TABATHA LYNN SHADBURNE, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. BULLITT COUNTY,
KENTUCKY, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 3:17-cv-130-DJH-DW
(W.D. Ky.), Judge David J. Hale of the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Kentucky, Louisville Division, (i)
granted the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, and
dismissed with prejudice Shadburne's Section 1983 claim and
dismissed without prejudice Shadburne's remaining state-law
claims; (ii) denied as moot Shadburne's motion to stay summary
judgment pending discovery, motions to supplement her response to
the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, motion in limine to
lift the protective order, motion to compel discovery, and motion
to stay the protective order; and (iii) denied as moot the
Defendants' motion to supplement their motion for summary
judgment and motion to stay discovery.

In this putative class action, Shadburne seeks to represent a
class of individuals whom Bullitt County Jailer Martha Knox
allegedly strip-searched upon admission to the Bullitt County
Jail without reasonable suspicion that they were carrying weapons
or contraband, in violation of the United States Constitution.

Shadburne was arrested on Dec. 8, 2016, on a bench warrant issued
by the Bullitt County Family Court. Prior to her arrest, the
Family Court set her bond at $350.  Shadburne alleges that upon
arriving at the Bullitt County Jail, she told the processing
officers that she had enough money on her person to post bond.
Nevertheless, the officers took her to a private room to conduct
a strip search as part of the Jail's intake policy.  After the
search, Shadburne was placed in a holding cell with another
female detainee.  Once the officers had finished processing the
other detainees in the intake queue, they processed Shadburne's
bond payment and released her.

In the action, Shadburne seeks to represent all persons arrested
for minor offenses, or no offenses at all, who were required by
the Defendants to remove their clothing for a visual inspection
on admission to the Jail despite the absence of any reasonable
suspicion that they were carrying or concealing weapons or
contraband.  Shadburne pursues damages under 42 U.S.C. Section
1983 for the Defendants' alleged unconstitutional actions.  She
also asserts two claims under Kentucky common law and seeks
declaratory judgment and permanent injunctive relief.

The Defendants move for summary judgment, arguing that
Shadburne's federal claim is foreclosed by Supreme Court
precedent.  They also move to stay discovery  and to supplement
their motion for summary judgment.   Meanwhile, Shadburne moves
to stay resolution of the Defendants' motion for summary judgment
pending discovery.  She also moves to supplement her response to
the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, to lift or stay the
protective order established in the case, and to compel
discovery.

Judge Hale finds that there is simply no ambiguity regarding the
nature of Shadburne's claims.  In the complaint, in support of
her allegations, Shadburne cites three cases, all of which pre-
date complaint asserts a claim foreclosed by Florence v. Board of
Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington, Shadburne may not
proceed with her class allegation.  Florence and two of which
were expressly or implicitly abrogated by Florence's holding.
Therefore, Shadburne's Section 1983 claim -- as it is pleaded in
her complaint -- fails as a matter of law in light of Florence.

Because Shadburne's Section 1983 claim will be dismissed, the
Judge declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her
state-law claims.  Shadburne may pursue these claims in state
court.

Because the Judge's resolution of the Defendants' motion for
summary judgment does not turn on a factual determination, no
amount of discovery would salvage Shadburne's Section 1983 claim.
The Judge will therefore deny as moot her pending discovery
motions.  Additionally, he has viewed Shadburne's proposed
supplements to her response to the Defendants' motion for summary
judgment.  The supplements are largely a rehash of arguments
already contained in her response, and at most contain facts that
are not determinative in resolving the Defendants' motion.  He
will therefore deny as moot Shadburne's motions to supplement her
response to the Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

For the reasons set forth, Judge Hale granted the Defendants'
motion for summary judgment.  He dismissed with prejudice
Shadburne's Section 1983 claim and dismissed without prejudice
Shadburne's remaining state-law claims.

The Judge denied as moot Shadburne's motion to stay summary
judgment pending discovery, motions to supplement her response to
the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, motion in limine to
lift the protective order), motion to compel discovery, and
motion to stay the protective order.  He also denied as moot the
Defendants' motion to supplement their motion for summary
judgment and motion to stay discovery.  A separate judgment will
be entered.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/MyO8FT from Leagle.com.

Tabatha Lynn Shadburne, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Gregory W. Butrum -
- lawyer@netpointe.com --s Gregory Ward Butrum, PLLC.

Bullitt County, Kentucky & Martha Knox, in her capacity as the
Bullitt County Jailer, Defendants, represented by Kristen N.
Worak -- kworak@kkhblaw.com -- Keuler Kelly Hutchins &
Blankenship, LLP & Stacey A. Blankenship --
sblankenship@kkhblaw.com -- Keuler Kelly Hutchins & Blankenship,
LLP.


BUSINESS REVENUE: Steele Sues over Debt Collection Practices
------------------------------------------------------------
Jeffrey Steele, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. Business Revenue Systems,
Inc., the Defendants, Case No. 0:18-cv-61140-WPD (S.D. Fla., May
18, 2018), seeks redress for the unlawful conduct of the
Defendant in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant violated several
provisions of section 1692e of the FDCPA including section
1692e(2), (5) and (10) by utilizing false and misleading
representations and/or deceptive means in an attempt to collect
the Consumer Debt and/or obtain information concerning Plaintiff
as well as section 1692f by using unfair or unconscionable means
to collect or attempt to collect any debt. The Defendant, by and
through the Collection Letter, wrongfully causes the least
sophisticated consumer to believe that the only way stop
Defendant's collection attempts is to pay the alleged debt. This
is a false and misleading statement. There are many ways that a
consumer can prevent a debt collector such as Defendant from
being subjected to "further collection activity" short of paying
the alleged debt as Defendant demands. The Defendant
misrepresents the law and effectively threatens consumers with
further collection efforts unless payment is tendered and
simultaneously represents that payment is the only way to stop
such efforts.

Business Revenue is a debt collection agency located in Fort
Wayne, Indiana.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jibrael S. Hindi, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF JIBRAEL S. HINDI
          110 SE 6th Street, Suite 1744
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 907 1136
          Facsimile: (855) 529 9540
          E-mail: jibrael@jibraellaw.com


CENTERLINE COMMUNICATIONS: "Lichy" Class Conditionally Certified
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANDREW LICHY, MARK BIXLER, MARK WALTERS, FREDERICK
SPEER, and RYAN NIEMEYER, Plaintiffs, v. CENTERLINE
COMMUNICATIONS LLC, JOSHUA DELMAN, and BENJAMIN DELMAN,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 15-cv-13339-ADB (D. Mass.), Judge
Allison D. Burroughs of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Massachusetts granted the Plaintiffs' motion to conditionally
certify a class.

The Plaintiffs are former employees of the Defendants who allege
that the Defendants did not pay them for all hours worked, and
for some overtime hours for which they are owed time-and-a-half
pay.  The Plaintiffs brought the action pursuant to the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), seeking to recover on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated.

Centerline is a telecommunications company that supports mobile
phone operators in the development, construction, and maintenance
of their networks, including cell phone towers.  It employs
construction crews and maintenance crews to perform field
operations.  Each named Plaintiff worked for Centerline for some
period of time from 2011 to 2015 as a tower technician, a
foreman, or both.

Since 2012 or 2013, Centerline has maintained offices and
warehouses in Chicago, Syracuse, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and
Raynham, which serve the surrounding areas.  The warehouse for
each region, also known informally by crew members as the "shop,"
typically stores the equipment that crew members use, such as
hand tools, ropes, machinery, drills, and trailers, and may also
store customer equipment, including antennas, radios, and
cabling.  Trailers are used to transport customer equipment to
the job site.

Centerline has one travel time policy that applies to all
construction and maintenance crew employees in all states.  The
policy at issue in the case was in effect from 2012 to 2015 or
2016, and was set forth in the employee handbook.  Under this
policy, Centerline paid employees for travel from the warehouse
or muster point to the job site.  Centerline did not pay
employees for the return travel from the work site to the
warehouse or muster point, however, unless the job site was more
than 130 miles from the office and the project duration was less
than a day.  Furthermore, travel time, whether to or from the job
site, was only ever compensated at the employee's regular hourly
rate, and never at the overtime rate.

In September 2014, a new "Travel Policy Procedure" document was
distributed among the Centerline management team.  The document
identified three situations in which return travel would be
compensated: (1) if the project manager in charge of the
assignment requested that the crew return to the shop, (2) if the
foreman requested an "exception" due to unusual circumstances,
such as heavy traffic or delays due to road closure; or (3) if
the distance between the warehouse and the job site was greater
than 130 miles.  If a crew member needed to do work upon return
to the warehouse, such as trash removal, the crew member could
"clock in" to be paid for the time spent doing that work, but he
or she still was not paid for the time spent making the return
trip, unless one of the three exceptions applied.

The Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in September 2015, alleging
that the Defendants violated the FLSA by failing to pay them for
the return travel time from the job site to the warehouse, and
for not paying them for travel time at the overtime rate when
they worked more than 40 hours per week.  The Defendants contend
that the FLSA does not require them to pay for travel time.

Now before the Court is the Plaintiffs' motion to conditionally
certify a class and to issue notice to similarly situated
employees pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b).

The Defendants first argue that the Plaintiffs have not
demonstrated that the two groups of employees to be included in
the proposed class, foremen and technicians, are similarly
situated, because foremen and technicians have different job
duties.  Judge Burroughs disagrees with this assessment of the
evidence, which indicates that the job duties of foremen and
technicians overlap substantially.  He finds that the Plaintiffs
have demonstrated foremen and technicians perform construction
and maintenance tasks together in a small group, which supports a
finding that they are similarly situated.

Next, the Defendants argue that the difference in the job duties
of foremen and technicians is important because of the Portal-to-
Portal Act.  The Judge says while the Defendants may be correct
that, ultimately, the two groups may be subject to different
requirements under the law, the Court is not required to make
such a determination at the conditional certification stage.

In addition, the Defendants do not contest the fact that all
foremen and technicians who would be included in the proposed
class were subject to the same written policies concerning
payment for travel time.  The Judge finds that the cases that the
Defendants cite in support of their position are clearly
distinguishable, and in fact, indicate that certification is
proper.  The Plaintiffs have demonstrated that the class members
have overlapping duties and work together in a team to perform
their assigned tasks under the same manager.  Furthermore, the
Defendants do not deny that all of the class members are subject
to a common policy concerning whether and how travel time is
paid.

Lastly, the Defendants have repeatedly hinted and suggested that
the Plaintiffs are required to provide affidavits as evidence in
support of their motion, instead of the deposition and
documentary evidence that the Plaintiffs submitted.  Judge
Burroughs says the Defendants have not explicitly argued this
point, and cite to no authority explaining why a deposition is
unacceptable and an affidavit is required.  It is not apparent to
the Court how there could be a meaningful difference, since an
affidavit and a deposition are both forms of sworn testimony.

Accordingly, Judge Burroughs granted the Plaintiff's motion to
conditionally certify the proposed class.  He ordered that the
case is conditionally certified as a collective action on behalf
of all construction crew and maintenance crew employees,
including foremen, who have worked for Centerline, Joshua Delman,
and Benjamin Delman outside of Massachusetts between Oct. 26,
2012 and April 20, 2016.

The Judge directed the Defendants to produce the names,
addresses, email addresses, and telephone numbers of the
conditionally certified collective action members to the
Plaintiffs within 14 days.  The Plaintiffs will file a proposed
form of notice to opt-in class members within 14 days.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Memorandum and
Order is available at https://is.gd/ot3YaS from Leagle.com.

Andrew Lichy, Mark Bixler, Mark Walters, Frederick Speer & Ryan
Niemeyer, Plaintiffs, represented by Hillary A. Schwab --
hillary@fairworklaw.com -- Fair Work, P.C., Alan D. Meyerson --
alan@alandavidmeyerson.com -- Law Office of Alan David Meyerson &
Rachel J. Smit, Fair Work, P.C.

Centerline Communications LLC, Joshua Delman & Benjamin Delman,
Defendants, represented by Kenneth C. Pickering --
kpickering@mirickoconnell.com -- Mirick, O'Connell, DeMallie &
Loungee, LLP.


CHG HEALTHCARE: "Leiber" Suit Seeks Overtime Pay under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------
BRANDY JO LEIBER and JORDAN LOTT, on behalf of themselves and
those similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. CHG HEALTHCARE
SERVICES, INC., a foreign for profit corporation, CHG
COMPANIES, INC., a foreign for profit corporation, CHG MEDICAL
STAFFING, INC., a foreign for profit corporation, CHG MANGEMENT,
INC., a foreign for profit corporation, COMPHEALTH ASSOCIATES,
INC., a foreign for profit corporation, and WEATHERBY LOCUMS,
INC., a domestic for profit corporation, the Defendants, Case No.
0:18-cv-61139-BB (S.D. Fla., May 18, 2018), seeks to recover
overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiffs and other current and former similarly situated
employees, are "Sales Consultant Trainee" for the Defendants who
were paid a base salary approximating $40,000 per year while
training to becoming "sales consultants." Due to the Defendants
company-wide policies and procedures the Plaintiffs were deprived
of wages for hours actually worked. Specifically, despite the
mandate of 29 C.F.R. section 541.705, that trainees for
potentially exempt positions are not themselves exempt from the
minimum hour and overtime requirements of the FLSA, the
Defendants did not compensate Plaintiffs, or those similarly
situated, for hours that they worked in a given week in excess of
40 hours. Therefore, it is Plaintiffs' contention that the
Defendants violated the FLSA by misclassifying their trainees as
FLSA exempt and further failed to account for and pay Plaintiffs
time and one-half of their prevailing hourly rate for all hours
worked over 40 in a given workweek.

CHG Healthcare provides temporary physician staffing services in
the United States.[BN]

Trial Counsel for Plaintiffs and Putative Class Members:

          Paul M. Botros, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
          600 N. Pine Island Road, Suite 400
          Plantation, FL 33324
          Telephone: (954) 327 5352
          Facsimile: (954) 327 3017
          E-mail: pbotros@forthepeople.com


CHURCHILL DOWNS: 9th Cir. Flips Dismissal of "Kater" Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHERYL KATER, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHURCHILL
DOWNS INCORPORATED, a Kentucky corporation, Defendant-Appellee,
Case No. 16-35010 (9th Cir.), Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr. of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court's dismissal of Kater's complaint.

Big Fish Casino is a game platform that functions as a virtual
casino, within which users can play various electronic casino
games, such as blackjack, poker, and slots.  Users can download
the Big Fish Casino app free of charge, and first time users
receive a set of free chips.  They then can play the games for
free using the chips that come with the app, and may purchase
additional chips to extend gameplay.  Users also earn more chips
as a reward for winning the games. If a user runs out of chips,
he or she must purchase more chips to continue playing.  A user
can purchase more virtual chips for prices ranging from $1.99 to
nearly $250.

Big Fish Casino's Terms of Use, which users must accept before
playing any games, state that virtual chips have no monetary
value and cannot be exchanged for cash or any other tangible
value.  But Big Fish Casino does contain a mechanism for
transferring chips between users, which can be utilized to "cash
out" winnings: Once a user sells her chips on a secondary "black
market" outside Big Fish Casino, she can use the app's internal
mechanism to transfer them to a purchaser.

Plaintiff-Appellant Kater alleges that Churchill Downs profits
from such transfers because it charges a transaction fee, priced
in virtual gold, for all transfers.  In other words, Kater
alleges that Churchill Downs "facilitates the process" of players
cashing out their winnings.

Kater began playing Big Fish Casino in 2013, eventually buying,
and then losing, over $1,000 worth of chips.  In 2015, Kater
brought the purported class action against Churchill Downs,
alleging: (1) violations of Washington's Recovery of Money Lost
at Gambling Act (RMLGA); (2) violations of the Washington
Consumer Protection Act; and (3) unjust enrichment.

The district court dismissed the case with prejudice, holding
that because the virtual chips are not a "thing of value," Big
Fish Casino is not illegal gambling for purposes of the RMLGA.
Kater moved for reconsideration, but the district court denied
her motion.  Kater then timely appealed.

In the appeal, Judge Smith considers whether the virtual game
platform "Big Fish Casino" constitutes illegal gambling under
Washington law.  Defendant-Appellee Churchill Downs, the game's
owner and operator, has made millions of dollars off of Big Fish
Casino.  However, despite collecting millions in revenue,
Churchill Downs, like Captain Renault in Casablanca, purports to
be shocked to find that Big Fish Casino could constitute illegal
gambling.

Judge Smith agrees with Kater's primary argument that the virtual
chips are a "thing of value" because they are a form of credit
involving extension of entertainment or a privilege of playing
Big Fish Casino without charge.  As alleged in the complaint, a
user needs these virtual chips in order to play the various games
that are included within Big Fish Casino.

The Judge is not persuaded by the reasoning of other federal
courts that have held that certain "free to play" games are not
illegal gambling.  Each case Churchill Downs cites for this
proposition involves the analysis of different state statutes,
state definitions, and games.  His conclusion here turns on
Washington statutory law, particularly its broad definition of
"thing of value," so these out of state cases are unpersuasive.
Because the virtual chips are a "thing of value," he concludes
that Big Fish Casino falls within Washington's definition of an
illegal gambling game.

Since Big Fish Casino, as alleged in the complaint, constitutes
an illegal gambling game, Kater can recover the value of the
thing so lost from Churchill Downs.  The Judge holds that Kater
has stated a cause of action under the RMLGA.  She alleges that
she lost over $1,000 worth of virtual chips while playing Big
Fish Casino, and she can recover the value of these lost chips
from Churchill Downs, as proprietor of Big Fish Casino, pursuant
to section 4.24.070.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Smith reversed the district
court's dismissal of Kater's complaint.  He remanded the matter
for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/uNbSvM from Leagle.com.

Alexander G. Tievsky (argued) -- atievsky@edelson.com -- Roger
Perlstadt -- rperlstadt@edelson.com -- and Ryan D. Andrews --
randrews@edelson.com -- Edelson PC, Chicago, Illinois, for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Matthew R. Berry (argued) -- mberry@SusmanGodfrey.com -- Susman
Godfrey L.L.P, Seattle, Washington; Robert Rivera --
RRIVERA@SusmanGodfrey.com -- Susman Godfrey L.L.P., Houston,
Texas; for Defendant-Appellee.


CIGNA HEALTH: Bid to Dismiss Amended "Patchell" ERISA Suit OK'd
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANTHONY PATCHELL, on his own behalf and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, and AMANDA PATCHELL, his wife,
Plaintiffs, v. CIGNA HEALTH AND LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, and LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Defendants, Case No. 3:17-cv-161
(W.D. Pa.), Judge Kim R. Gibson of the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania granted the Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Class Action and ERISA
Complaint.

Mr. Patchell obtained a Life Insurance Policy Company of North
America ("LINA") Disability Policy through his employer.  In
February 2010, a judge determined that Mr. Patchell is
permanently disabled.  Thereafter, Mr. Patchell began receiving
short-term disability ("STD") benefits from LINA pursuant to his
Policy.  At some unspecified point, Mr. Patchell began receiving
long-term disability ("LTD") benefits under his Policy.

Mr. Patchell's LTD benefit totaled $4,5130 per month, which
resulted in Mr. Patchell receiving a monthly check for $2,868.
Of this monthly payment, $1721.40 went to Mr. Patchell and
$1,147.60 went to Mr. Patchell's counsel as an attorney's fee.

On Jan. 7, 2016, LINA suspended all payments to Mr. Patchell
after it determined that it had overpaid him because Mr.
Patchell's monthly benefit did not take into account offsets due
to Social Security benefits received by his children.  LINA
"clawed back" these overpayments by withholding Mr. Patchell's
future LTD payments under his Policy.  Mr. Patchell had
previously disclosed his children's Social Security benefits to
LINA on a questionnaire he completed prior to receiving STD
benefits.

The Plaintiffs commenced the action on Sept. 7, 2017 by filing a
Complaint before the Court.  The Defendants filed their first
Motion to Dismiss on Nov. 13, 2017.  However, prior to a decision
on this first Motion to Dismiss, the Court granted the
Plaintiffs' request to file an Amended Complaint.

The Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint on Jan. 24, 2018.
The Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint is organized into six counts:
(1) a claim under ERISA to recover overpayment for breach of
fiduciary duty, by Mr. Patchell and Ms. Patchell; (2) a claim for
loss of consortium by Ms. Patchell; (3) a claim for ERISA
violations by the purported class of the Plaintiffs; (4) a claim
incorporating by reference Count I on behalf of the entire class
of the Plaintiffs; (5) a motion for a preliminary injunction on
behalf of Mr. Patchell; and (6) a claim seeking disgorgement of
profits by Mr. Patchell and the purported class of the
Plaintiffs.

On Feb. 9, 2018, the Defendants filed the pending Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Class Action and ERISA Complaint, and
an accompanying Memorandum of Law in support thereof.  To date
the Plaintiffs' have neither responded to nor moved for an
extension of the deadline to respond to the Defendants' Motion.

Judge Gibson finds that the Policy is integral to the Plaintiffs'
Amended Complaint.  All of the Plaintiffs' claims are based on
their central allegation that LINA improperly suspended Mr.
Patchell's LTD benefits owed to him under the Policy.  Moreover,
the Amended Complaint references Mr. Patchell's Policy on
numerous occasions.  Thus, the Policy is "integral to" the
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. Therefore, the Judge may consider
the Policy at the 12(b)(6) stage without converting the
Defendants' motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.

The Judge will grant the Defendants' motion to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary claim in its entirety.  He finds
that the Defendants (i) did not violate ERISA by failing to
reimburse the Plaintiffs for attorney's fees and costs incurred
during the administrative appeals process; (ii) did not violate
ERISA by failing to hold a II Montanile Tracing Hearing before
suspending Mr. Patchell's Lm benefits; (iii) did not violate
ERISA or the Social Security Act ("SSA") by suspending Mr.
Patchell's LID benefits by the disability benefits his dependents
are eligible to receive.

In accordance with the persuasive authority cited above, the
Judge finds that ERISA pre-empts Ms. Patchell's loss of
consortium claim.  While the Court is skeptical that Ms. Patchell
asserted a plausible claim for loss of consortium -- she alleges
that Mr. Patchell lost sexual interest in her after Defendants
improperly managed his LTD benefits, causing her to experience
decreased libidinal joy -- the Judge needs not evaluate the
plausibility of Ms. Patchell's claim because her claim clearly
"relates to" Mr. Patchell's Policy and is therefore pre-empted by
ERISA.  Accordingly, he will grant the Defendants' motion to
dismiss Ms. Patchell's claim for loss of consortium.

As he noted, the Judge will grant the Defendants' motion to
dismiss Plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty claim under ERISA
(Count I) and Ms. Patchell's loss of consortium claim (Count II).
Therefore, he will also grant the Defendants' motion to dismiss
the Plaintiffs' purported class action claims (Counts III and IV)
and disgorgement claim (Count VI), because these claims are based
on the allegations in Counts I and II.  The Judge will also grant
the Defendants' motion to dismiss Mr. Patchell's motion for a
preliminary injunction (Count V); obviously, Mr. Patchell cannot
establish a likelihood of success on the merits of claims that
the Court already dismissed.

For the reasons he stated, Judge Gibson granted the Defendants'
motion to dismiss in its entirety.  A corresponding order
follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
is available at https://is.gd/Vx5XFy from Leagle.com.

ANTHONY PATCHELL, on his own behalf and on behalf of all others
similarly situated & AMANDA PATCHELL, his wife, Plaintiffs,
represented by Terrence A. Valko -- terryvalko@yahoo.com -- Terry
Valko, Esq.

CIGNA HEALTH AND LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY & LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
OF AMERICA, Defendants, represented by Mary Pat Stahler --
marypat.stahler@morganlewis.com -- Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP,
Stephanie R. Reiss -- stephanie.reiss@morganlewis.com -- Morgan
Lewis & Bockius & Jeremy P. Blumenfeld --
jeremy.blumenfeld@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP,
pro hac vice.


COMPUTER CREDIT: Court Dismisses "Derosa" FDCPA Suit
----------------------------------------------------
Judge Joseph F. Bianco of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss
the case, DARIAN DEROSA, Plaintiff, v. COMPUTER CREDIT, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-03038-JFB-GRB (E.D. N.Y.).

Derosa brings the putative class action on behalf of himself and
other individuals similarly situated, alleging that Computer
Credit violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA").
The Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Supreme Court of the State
of New York, County of Suffolk, on May 15, 2017.  The Defendant
removed the case to the Court on May 19, 2017.  The Plaintiff's
claims arise from a letter he received from Computer Credit,
dated Dec. 11, 2015, sent in an attempt to collect a past due
debt owed to John T. Mather Memorial Hospital.

The Plaintiff alleges that he is a "consumer" and that Computer
Credit is a "debt collector," as defined by the FDCPA.  He
received a letter from Computer Credit, seeking to collect a
financial obligation plaintiff incurred primarily for personal,
family, or household purposes -- a "debt" as defined by the
FDCPA.

The Plaintiff asserts that, because of two specific omissions,
this letter violates 15 U.S.C. Sections 1692e and 1692g.  In
particular, he contends that Computer Credit failed to notify him
that: first, the "Amount Due" may increase due to reasonable
attorney's fees and court costs, and, second, the "Amount Due"
may increase due to interest pursuant to the New York Civil
Practice Law and Rules ("N.Y. C.P.L.R.") Section 5001.

With regard to the first purported omission, the Plaintiff notes
that the agreement between Derosa and the Hospital allows the
Hospital to charge Derosa, in addition to the 'Amount Due' of
$174.15, reasonable attorney's fees and court costs if there is a
default in payment of any sums due and John T. Mather Memorial
Hospital retains an attorney to prosecute a claim for unpaid
balances.  The Plaintiff further contends that Computer Credit,
as an assignee or successor-in-interest, would have a right to
charge Derosa the additional sum, and violated Sections 1692e and
1692g by failing to notify Derosa of this potential increase in
debt.

The Plaintiff's second claim, as noted above, is premised on his
argument that his debt could increase due to pre-judgment
interest, as afforded by N.Y. C.P.L.R. Section 5001.  There is no
allegation (nor does the Plaintiff argue) that, at the time the
Defendant sent the debt collection letter, his debt had been
reduced to a judgment.  The Plaintiff claims that interest,
therefore, began accruing on or before the date Computer Credit
sent the collection letter.  Relying on his argument that this
pre judgment interest would be recoverable, he claims Computer
Credit violated the FDCPA by failing to notify Derosa of this
potential increase in debt.

The Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on July 31, 2017.  It
moves to dismiss these claims, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that the letter is not false,
misleading, or deceptive, nor does the letter misrepresent the
amount of the debt.

The Plaintiff filed his memorandum in opposition to Defendant's
motion to dismiss on Sept. 7, 2017.  The Plaintiff replied on
Sept. 21, 2017.  The Court held oral argument on Oct. 17, 2017,
and reserved decision.  On Nov. 20, 2017 and Nov. 30, 2017, the
Defendant submitted notices of supplemental authority, bringing
to the Court's attention decisions relating to the pending motion
that had been issued after oral argument.

Judge Bianco concludes that not only that the disclosures the
Plaintiff argues were required in the case by the FDCPA are not
compelled by Avila v. Riexinger & Assocs., LLC, but also that
such mandated disclosures would potentially do more harm than
good.  Opening the floodgates to mandatory additional
notifications based upon future, contingent events could produce
collection notices that leave debtors unsure of the legal status
of their debt and what their next steps should be, thereby
impeding the underlying objectives of the FDCPA.  In sum, because
the attorney's fees shifting clause had not been triggered and
the debt at issue was not actually increasing at the time the
letter was received, the Judge holds that the failure to disclose
the possibility of owing future attorney's fees and costs was not
a violation of the FDCPA under Section 1692e or Section 1692g(a).

Given the legal framework under New York law, the Judge holds
that statutory interest under N.Y. C.P.L.R. Section 5001 does not
accrue on a debt until it is awarded by a court.  The obligation
to pay the interest does not exist at all under New York law
until that judgment is awarded by a court.  Thus, pre-judgment
interest under Section 5001 is not part of the debt under the
FDCPA until such an award is made by a court.  Here, there is no
allegation of such an award and, therefore, the amount of the
debt was static at the time the letter was received.  In sum, the
Judge concludes that, where there is no allegation that any legal
action has been commenced in connection with the debt, the
failure to disclose in the collection letter the possibility that
pre-judgment interest could be assessed under N.Y. C.P.L.R.
Section 5001 does not violate the FDCPA.

For these reasons, Judge Bianco granted Computer Credit's motion
to dismiss the remaining (the first, second, and fifth) causes of
action.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/lvnC9F from Leagle.com.

Darian Derosa, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Mitchell L. Pashkin.

Computer Credit, Inc., Defendant, represented by Ellen Beth
Silverman -- esilverman@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw & Cullertson &
Han Sheng Beh -- hbeh@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP.


CONSOLIDATED HOUSEKEEPING: Perez Seeks Overtime Wages under FLSA
----------------------------------------------------------------
ORLANDO PEREZ, on behalf of himself and all other similarly
situated employees, the Plaintiff, v. CONSOLIDATED HOUSEKEEPING
OF NEW JERSEY, INC. and OH'KAY CLEANING & MAINTENANCE, INC.
d/b/a/ CONSOLIDATED HOUSEKEEPING, the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-
cv-02979 (E.D.N.Y., May 18, 2018), seeks injunctive and
declaratory relief against Defendants for their unlawful actions,
compensation for their failure to pay overtime wages, and
liquidated damages, compensatory damages, pre-judgment and post-
judgment interest, and attorneys' fees and costs, pursuant to the
Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law.

The Plaintiff and the collective class worked (or currently work)
at Consolidated Housekeeping. Consolidated Housekeeping is owned
and operated by Defendants. The Plaintiff brings this action on
behalf of himself and all similarly situated current and former
non-exempt workers who elect to opt-in to this action pursuant to
the FLSA. The Plaintiff and the FLSA collective also bring this
action under the Wage Theft Prevention Act for Defendants'
failure to provide written notice of wage rates in violation of
said laws.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jacob Aronauer, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF JACOB ARONAUER
          307 225, Broadway
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 323 6980

               - and -

          Bruce Menken, Esq.
          BERANBAUM MENKEN LLP
          80 Pine Street, 33rd Floor
          New York, NY 10005
          Telephone: (212) 509 1616


COVANTA LONG: Fails to Pay OT & Minimum Wages, Cardona Says
-----------------------------------------------------------
CHRISTOPHER CARDONA, an Individual, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. COVANTA LONG BEACH
RENEWABLE ENERGY CORP.; COVANTA PROJECTS, LLC; COVANTA
STANISLAUS, INC., a California corporation and DOES 1 through
100, Inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. BC705957 (Cal. Super.
Ct., May 11, 2018), seeks to recover overtime wages and minimum
wages under the California Labor Code.

According to the complaint, the Defendants had a consistent and
uniform policy, practice and procedure of willfully failing to
pay the earned wages of Defendants' former employees, according
to amendment or proof. The Defendants willfully failed to pay the
members of the LC 203 Class their entire wages due and owing at
the time of their termination or within 72 hours of their
resignation, and failed to pay those sums for 30 days thereafter.

The Defendants' willful failure to pay wages to the members of
the LC 203 Class violates Labor Code section 203 because
Defendants knew or should have known wages were due to the
members of the LC 203 Class, but Defendants failed to pay them.
Thus, the members of the LC 203 Class are entitled to recovery
pursuant to the Labor Code.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Bruce Kokozian, Esq.
          KOKOZIAN LAW FIRM, APC
          9440 South Santa Monica Boulevard, Suite 510
          Beverly Hills, CA 90210
          Telephone: (323) 857 5900


CRYSTAL CLEAR: "Lamanske" Suit Seeks Overtime Wages under FLSA
--------------------------------------------------------------
LESLIE S. LAMANSKE, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. CRYSTAL CLEAR ENTERPRISE,
INC., the Defendant, Case No. 4:18-cv-00377-FJG (W.D. Mo., May
18, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid straight time and unpaid
overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the
Missouri Minimum Wage Law.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff and all others
similarly situated are hourly, non-exempt employees who work or
worked for Defendant, a commercial cleaning services company.
During the relevant time periods preceding this action, Defendant
improperly deducted time from employees' shifts and suffered or
permitted employees to spend time working "off the clock" without
pay. Pursuant to its company-wide policies, procedures, and
practices, Defendant: (1) automatically deducted rest periods of
short durations of time (15 minutes) from the total hours worked
by employees during their shifts, and (2) automatically deducted
meal periods (30 minutes) from the total hours worked by
employees during their shifts, when such hourly employees worked
during and/or through such meal periods, resulting in employees
performing a significant amount of compensable work without pay.
As a result, Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and other
similarly situated employees for all hours worked, including
overtime premiums for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek.

Crystal Clear was founded in 2002. The company's line of business
includes building cleaning and maintenance services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ryan L. McClelland, Esq.
          Michael J. Rahmberg, Esq.
          McCLELLAND LAW FIRM
          The Flagship Building
          200 Westwoods Drive
          Liberty, MO 64068-1170
          Telephone: (816) 781 0002
          Facsimile: (816) 781 1984
          E-mail: ryan@mcclellandlawfirm.com
                  mrahmberg@mcclellandlawfirm.com


CVS PHARMACY: "Beardsall" Suit Seeks to Certify Product Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled JENNIFER BEARDSALL, DANIEL BROWN, JENNIFER
CARLSSON, DEBORAH CARTNICK, AMY CONNOR-SLAYBAUGH, PHYLLIS
CZAPSKI, RAELEE DALLACQUA, AUTUMN DEAN, SKYE DOUCETTE,
CHRISTOPHER DRAUS, ALEXANDRA GROFFSKY, EMMA GROFFSKY, JOYCE IVY,
LA TANYA JAMES, MICHELLE JESSOP, JOY JUDGE, KATHY MELLODY, SUSAN
NAZARI, MEGAN NORSWORTHY, DEBORAH OSTRANDER, MARTINA OSLEY, DANA
PHILLIPS, THOMAS RAMON, JR., NANCY REEVES, SHELLEY WAITZMAN,
JAMILLA WANG, AND AMBER WIMBERLY, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. CVS PHARMACY,
INC., TARGET CORPORATION, WALGREEN CO., WAL-MART STORES, INC.,
and FRUIT OF THE EARTH, INC., the Defendants, Case No. 1:16-cv-
06103 (N.D. Ill.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court for an order:

   1. certifying these Classes;

      FOTE Product Class:

      "all individuals who purchased Fruit of the Earth, Inc.'s
      Aloe Vera 100% Gel in any of the following states after the
      dates listed below:

         California, June 10, 2012
         Florida, June 10, 2012
         Illinois, June 10, 2013
         Michigan, June 10, 2010
         Missouri, June 10, 2011
         New York, June 10, 2013
         North Carolina, June 10, 2012
         Ohio, June 10, 2014
         Oregon, June 10, 2015
         Texas, June 10, 2014

           and

      Walgreens Product Class:

      "all individuals who purchased Walgreens' Well-at-Walgreens
      Alcohol Free Aloe Vera Body Gel in any of the following
      states after the dates listed below:

         California, June 10, 2012
         Florida, June 10, 2012
         Illinois, June 10, 2013
         New York, June 10, 2013

   2. appointing Plaintiffs as Class representatives;

   3. appointing Plaintiffs' attorneys and firms as Class
      counsel; and

   4. directing parties to submit a proposed form of class notice
      and a notice plan within the next 21 days.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=lvgw2VAQ

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Putative Class:

          Jason J. Thompson, Esq.
          SOMMERS SCHWARTZ, P.C.
          One Towne Square, 17th Floor
          Southfield, MI 48076
          Telephone: (248) 355 0300
          E-mail: jthompson@sommerspc.com

               - and -

          Nick Suciu III, Esq.
          BARBAT, MANSOUR & SUCIU PLLC
          1644 Bracken Rd.
          Bloomfield Hills, MI 48302
          Telephone: (313) 303 3472
          E-mail: nicksuciu@bmslawyers.com

               - and -

          Katrina Carroll, Esq.
          Kyle A. Shamberg, Esq.
          LITE DePALMA GREENBERG, LLC
          212 West Hacker Drive, Suite 500
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 750 1265
          E-mail: kcarroll@litedepalma.com
                  kshamberg@litedepalma.com

               - and -

          Rachel Soffin, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN
          Complex Litigation Group
          201 North Franklin Street, 7th Floor
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 223 5505
          Facsimile: (813) 223 5402
          E-mail: RSoffin@ForThePeople.com

               - and -

          Gregory F. Coleman, Esq.
          GREG COLEMAN LAW, P.C.
          First Tennessee Plaza
          800 S. Gay Street, Suite 1100
          Knoxville, TN 37929
          Telephone: (865) 247 0090
          Facsimile: (865) 522 0049
          E-mail: greg@gregcoleman.law

               - and -

          Jonathan N. Shub, Esq.
          KOHN, SWIFT & GRAF, P.C.
          One South Broad Street, Suite 2100
          Philadelphia, PA 19107
          Telephone: (215) 238 1700
          E-mail: jshub@kohnswift.com


DIAKON LOGISTIC: Court Narrows Claims in "Johnson" Wage Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TIMOTHY JOHNSON and DARRYL MOORE, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. DIAKON
LOGISTICS, et al., Defendants, Case No. 16-cv-06776 (N.D. Ill.),
Judge Andrea R. Wood of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, Eastern Division, (i) granted in part and
denied in part Diakon's motion to dismiss; (ii) granted the
Individual Defendants' motion to dismiss; (iii) denied as moot
Diakon's motion to strike section III of the Plaintiffs' sur-
reply and the Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a response;
and (iv) denied Sears's motion to dismiss.

Johnson and Moore worked as delivery drivers for Diakon.  While
working for Diakon, the Plaintiffs preformed deliveries
exclusively for Defendants Innovel Solutions, Inc. (formerly
known as Sears Logistics Services, Inc.) and Sears Roebuck and
Co.

The Plaintiffs have brought the action on behalf of themselves as
well as a putative class of other similarly-situated drivers,
alleging that Diakon and Individual Defendants (Diakon's
President and Chairman William Jarnagin, Jr., as well as Diakon's
Vice President of Operations Todd Voda) violated the Illinois
Wage Payment and Collection Act ("IWPCA") (in particular, 820
ILCS 115/9) by making unlawful deductions from their and the
other class members' wages (Count I).  They also allege that
Diakon and Individual Defendants were unjustly enriched by
misclassifying drivers as independent contractors and thereby
evading employment-related obligations such as social security
contributions, workers' compensation coverage, and state
disability and unemployment compensation, and forcing drivers to
pay work-related expenses, such as the costs of purchasing or
leasing vehicles meeting Diakon's specifications and the costs of
operating, insuring, and maintaining those vehicles (Count II).
Finally, the Plaintiffs claim that Sears violated the IWPCA (820
ILCS 115/9) by making unlawful deductions from drivers' wages
(Count III).

Now before the Court are Diakon's motion to dismiss, Sears's
motion to dismiss, and Individual Defendants' motion to dismiss.
Also before the Court are Diakon's motion to strike section III
of the Plaintiffs' sur-reply or, in the alternative, for leave to
file a response.  Diakon asks the Court to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' claims against it under the IWPCA and for unjust
enrichment, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Sears also asks the Court to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claim
against it under the IWPCA pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).  Sears
argues that this claim must fail because the Plaintiffs do not
allege the existence of any contract or agreement between the
Plaintiffs and Sears requiring Sears to pay wages.  The
Individual Defendants have moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs'
claims against them under the IWPCA and for unjust enrichment
(Counts I and II) for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2).

Also before the Court is the Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file
a response instanter to Diakon's motion to strike.

As to Diakon's motion to dismiss, Judge Wood finds that (i) its
Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994
("FAAAA") preemption issue fails; (ii) the IWPCA does not
prohibit consented-upon deductions, hence its Truth-in-Leasing
Regulations preemption issue is unavailing; (iii) the IWPCA does
not prohibit deductions made with the express written consent of
the employee, given freely at the time the deduction is made,
hence its argument on the Plaintiffs' express consent to
deductions under the IWPCA argument is unpersuasive; (iv) that
Diakon's argument that its agreement with an entity that Johnson
owned precludes Johnson's claims under the IWPCA is not a winning
one; and (v) the SAC alleges that there is an agreement in place
between the Plaintiffs and Diakon to support the Plaintiffs'
unjust enrichment claim.

As to Sears's Motion to Dismiss, the Judge finds that the
Plaintiffs point to various factors that Sears allegedly
controlled with respect to their employment -- from setting their
daily delivery schedule and requiring contacts throughout the
workday to requiring that deductions be made from their
paychecks.  Thus, she says the Plaintiffs sufficiently plead that
Sears is a joint employer.

As to Individual Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, the Judge finds
that the SAC provides no information from which the Court could
infer any involvement of these Individual Defendants in the
Plaintiffs' agreements with and services for Diakon.  The SAC
also alleges that Diakon is a Delaware corporation with its
headquarters and principal place of business in Virginia, which
conducts business in Illinois. Thus, there is nothing to suggest
that Diakon's executives are located in Illinois.  As a result,
the allegations in the SAC are insufficient to justify the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over Individual Defendants.  As
a result, the Plaintiffs' claims against Individual Defendants
are dismissed.

For these reasons, Judge Wood granted in part and denied in part
Diakon's motion to dismiss.  The motion is granted only to the
extent that it relates to the Plaintiffs' claims for unjust
enrichment against Diakon; those claims are dismissed without
prejudice.  She also granted the Individual Defendants' motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and those claims are
also dismissed without prejudice.  The Judge denied as moot
Diakon's motion to strike section III of the Plaintiffs' sur-
reply and the Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a response.
She denied Sears's motion to dismiss.  Finally, she granted the
Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint to attempt to cure the
pleading deficiencies discussed in the Memorandum Opinion and
Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/Cl2R58 from Leagle.com.

Timothy Johnson, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Bradley S. Manewith
-- bmanewith@msiegellaw.com -- Siegel & Dolan Ltd., Harold L.
Lichten -- hlichten@llrlaw.com -- Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C.,
pro hac vice, Anne Katherine Schmidlin --
aschmidlin@msiegellaw.com -- Siegel & Dolan Ltd., Marc J. Siegel
-- msiegel@msiegellaw.com -- Siegel & Dolan Ltd. & Olena Savytska
-- osavytska@llrlaw.com -- Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C., pro hac
vice.

Darryl Moore, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Bradley S. Manewith, Siegel &
Dolan Ltd., Anne Katherine Schmidlin, Siegel & Dolan Ltd. & Marc
J. Siegel, Siegel & Dolan Ltd.

Diakon Logistics, William C Jarnagin, Jr. & Todd E Voda,
Defendants, represented by Andrew Joseph Butcher, Scopelitis,
Garvin, Light, Hanson & Feary, P.c., Charles Andrewscavage,
Scopelitis, Garvin, Light, Hanson, & Feary & Christopher C.
Heery, Scopelitis, Garvin, Light, Hanson & Feary.

Innovel Soluntions, Inc., formerly known as & Sears Roebuck And
Co., Defendants, represented by Noah A. Finkel --
nfinkel@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Cheryl A. Luce --
cluce@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP & Kara Lea Goodwin --
kgoodwin@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP.


DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: Court Certifies 3 Classes in "Garnett"
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SHONICE G. GARNETT et al., Plaintiffs, v. LAURA
ZEILINGER, Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-1757 (CRC) (D. D.C.), Judge
Christopher R. Cooper of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia granted the Plaintiffs' motion to certify two classes
of District benefits recipients.

The Plaintiffs -- recipients of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program benefits in the District of Columbia -- filed the
putative class action against the director of the District's
benefit program.  They allege several violations of the federal
requirements for administration of the program.

In August 2017, a group of D.C. residents filed suit against
Zeilinger, the Director of the District's Department of Human
Services -- which oversees the District's Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program ("SNAP") program -- alleging that the
District's administration of SNAP was deficient in several
respects.  Specifically, the Plaintiffs alleged that the District
was: (1) failing to process initial applications for benefits and
provide benefits to eligible households within the applicable
statutory time limit, in violation of the SNAP Act; (2) failing
to complete the SNAP recertification application process so as to
allow eligible households to receive benefits without a break in
service, also in violation of the SNAP Act; and (3) failing to
provide notice and an opportunity for a hearing for SNAP
applicants whose applications were not processed on time, in
violation of the SNAP Act and the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution.  They sought declaratory and injunctive relief to
correct these violations.

Simultaneously with their complaint, the Plaintiffs filed a
motion for class certification.  They sought to certify two
classes: (1) a class of residents whose SNAP benefit applications
were not processed in accordance with the timelines mandated by
statute and (2) a class of residents who did not receive their
recertification notices as required by statute and had their
benefits terminated as a consequence.

The Plaintiffs later filed a motion for a preliminary injunction,
and the Court set a parallel briefing schedule for both that
motion and the motion for class certification.  Following a
period of limited discovery related to issues raised in the
motion for a preliminary injunction, the parties completed
briefing on both motions.  The Court held a hearing on both
motions on March 19, 2018.

Judge Cooper finds that the District's primary argument against
class certification -- made with slight variations as to the
requirements of commonality, typicality, and Rule 23(b)(2) -- is
that the Plaintiffs' claims are too factually diverse and their
legal theory too broadly defined to sustain a class action.  But
the statutory scheme provides the requisite level of specificity:
it sets clear timelines for handling SNAP benefit applications
and recertification notices and clearly mandates that States
follow them.  And the Plaintiffs present a single legal theory:
the District has systemically failed to comply with the
requirements under the statute for processing SNAP benefit
applications and issuing recertification notices.  Finally, the
statute gives no indication that the reason why the District
failed to process a particular application or issue a particular
recertification notice within the relevant timeframe has any
bearing on whether it violated the statute.  Consequently, as in
the D.C. Circuit's decision in D.L. II, any factual variations
are not fatal to class certification.

The Judge's conclusion that the requirements for class
certification are met is further buttressed by the fact that
other district courts have certified similar classes in SNAP
benefit cases.  He says this is not surprising: as the D.C.
Circuit has stated, Rule 23(b)(2) exists so that parties and
courts, especially in civil rights cases like this, can avoid
piecemeal litigation when common claims arise from systemic harms
that demand injunctive relief.  Accordingly, he concludes that
the Plaintiffs have demonstrated that their proposed classes meet
the requirements for certification and will grant their motion.

However, he will certify three, rather than two, classes.
Because the statutory scheme is slightly different with regards
to the processing of recertification as opposed to initial
applications, in an abundance of caution and to avoid any
possible conflicts of interest he will subdivide the first
proposed class into two classes: one of residents whose initial
applications were not processed on time and one of residents
whose recertification applications were not processed on time.
The Judge may, of course, revisit certification or class
definitions as the litigation progresses.

For these reasons, Judge Cooper granted the Plaintiffs' Motion
for Class Certification.  He certified three classes with the
following named representatives.

     a. Class 1: Definition: All District of Columbia residents
since June 1, 2016: (1) who have applied, are applying, or will
apply for SNAP benefits, through an initial application; and (2)
who have had or will have the processing of such application
delayed beyond the timeframes mandated by law.  Class
representatives: Shonice G. Garnett, Richard Messick, Jr.

     Class 2: Definition: All District of Columbia residents
since June 1, 2016: (1) who have applied, are applying, or will
apply for SNAP benefits, through a recertification application;
and (2) who have had or will have the processing of such
application delayed beyond the timeframes mandated by law.  Class
representatives: Kathryn Harris, Linda Murph

     Class 3: Definition: All District of Columbia SNAP
recipients since June 1, 2016: (1) who have been or will be
required to submit a recertification application to maintain SNAP
benefits; (2) as to whom the Defendant has failed or will fail to
issue notice of the need to recertify; and (3) who have been or
will be terminated from participation in SNAP due to the
Defendant's failure to issue such notice.  Class representatives:
James Stanley, Roderick Gaines

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/dASwuC from Leagle.com.

SHONICE G. GARNETT, RICHARD MESSICK, JR, LINDA MURPH & BREAD FOR
THE CITY, Plaintiffs, represented by Chinh Q. Le --
cle@legalaiddc.org -- LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA, Kaitlin Welborn -- kaitlin.welborn@hoganlovells.com --
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP, pro hac vice, Marc Cohan -- cohan@nclej.org
-- NATIONAL CENTER FOR LAW AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE, pro hac vice,
Peter R. Bisio -- peter.bisio@hoganlovells.com -- HOGAN LOVELLS
US LLP, Susan Musser, HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP, pro hac vice, Travis
England, NATIONAL CENTER FOR LAW AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE, pro hac
vice, Chelsea C. Sharon -- csharon@legalaiddc.org -- LEGAL AID
SOCIETY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Emily Goldman --
emily.goldman@hoganlovells.com -- HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP, Jennifer
F. Mezey -- jmezey@legalaiddc.org -- LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA & Lance Murashige --
lance.murashige@hoganlovells.com -- HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP.

JAMES STANLEY, RODERICK GAINES & KATHRYN HARRIS, Plaintiffs,
represented by Emily Goldman, HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP, Kaitlin
Welborn, HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP, pro hac vice, Marc Cohan, NATIONAL
CENTER FOR LAW AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE, pro hac vice, Susan Musser,
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP, pro hac vice, Travis England, NATIONAL
CENTER FOR LAW AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE, pro hac vice, Lance
Murashige, HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP & Chinh Q. Le, LEGAL AID SOCIETY
OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

LAURA ZEILINGER, in her official capacity as Director of the
District of Columbia Department of Human Services, Defendant,
represented by Conrad Z. Risher, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Civil Litigation Division, Esther
Yong, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Civil Litigation Division & Fernando Amarillas, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.


DOS REALES: Initial Approval Sought on "Olivera" Case Settlement
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled ANATOLIO PENA OLIVERA and MARIA
FERNANDA MARTINEZ, individually and on behalf all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. DOS REALES, INC. and
ALVARO QUEZADA, the Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-02203-KGS (D.
Kan.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court for an order:

   1. conditionally certifying a Settlement Class of:

      "persons similarly situated, that Defendants violated the
      Fair Labor Standards Act, the Kansas Minimum Wage and
      Maximum Hours Law, and the Kansas Wage Payment Act";

   2. approving proposed class notice, and granting preliminary
      approval to the Settlement and request for attorney fees in
      this matter, along with the proposed payment for
      administration costs; and

   3. approving service awards requested totaling $1,500.00,
      which is embodied in the proposed Settlement and included
      in the request for Settlement Approval.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=VCJKuy6v

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Paul H. Mose, Esq.
          MOSE LAW LLC
          3111 Strong Avenue,
          Kansas City, Kansas 66106
          Telephone: (913) 432 4484
          Facsimile: (913) 432 4464
          E-mail: Pablo@moselaw.com

               - and -

          Mark V. Dugan, Esq.
          Heather J. Schlozman, Esq.
          DUGAN SCHLOZMAN, LLC
          8826 Santa Fe Drive, Suite, 307
          Overland Park, Kansas 66212
          Telephone: (913) 322 3528
          Facsimile: (913) 904 0213
          E-mail: mark@duganschlozman.com
                  heather@duganschlozman.com

Attorney for Defendants:

          Donald M. McLean
          3134 Woodview Ridge Dr., #304
          Kansas City, KS 66103
          Telephone: (816) 835-9954
          Facsimile: (913) 713-0065
          E-mail: dmcleanlaw@outlook.com


E & J GALLO: Court Flips Denial of Arbitration in "Arreguin"
------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Alison M. Tucher of the Court of Appeals of California for
the First District, Division Two, reversed the trial court's
order denying the Appellants' motions to compel arbitration in
the case, REFUGIO ARREGUIN Plaintiff and Respondent, v. E. & J.
GALLO WINERY, et al., Defendants and Appellants, Case No. A145553
(Cal. App.).

Appellant Star is a labor contractor that hired Respondent
Arreguin to work in a warehouse for one of its clients, Appellant
Gallo.  In applying for the job with Star, Arreguin signed an
arbitration agreement, but he later brought individual and class-
based claims against Star and Gallo in superior court.

On Aug. 5, 2013, Arreguin walked into a Star office and applied
for a job.  He was handed some paperwork, which he was told he
had to complete on-site in order to get an interview, and when he
asked a question about the papers he was told no Star employee
could assist him.  Undeterred, Arreguin filled out a Spanish-
language application form, was interviewed and asked about his
availability to work at a Gallo facility in Healdsburg, and was
hired on the spot.  Nobody in the hiring process explained
anything about arbitration to Arreguin, and he was never given a
copy of the rules mentioned in the arbitration agreement that the
company asked him to sign.  Nor was he given a copy of the
arbitration agreement or other employment paperwork as he left
the hiring office.  Arreguin worked for Star at Gallo for a
period of three months and, after leaving, filed the case.

Arreguin's complaint alleges on behalf of himself and other
hourly, non-exempt employees that Star, Gallo, and unnamed Doe
Defendants violated California wage and hour laws.  He brings
causes of action under minimum wage, overtime, and other sections
of the Labor Code, and Business & Professions Code section 17200,
et seq.  He alleges that Star and Gallo have acted as joint
employers and are jointly and severally liable as employers
because they each exercised sufficient control over the wages,
hours, working conditions, and employment status of class
members.

Star and Gallo moved to compel arbitration.  They pointed out
that Arreguin's employment application includes an arbitration
agreement that Arreguin had signed.

The trial court found that the agreement was unconscionable, and
thus unenforceable.  Addressing procedural unconscionability, the
court observed that the arbitration agreement was a pre-
employment contract involving parties of unequal bargaining
power, that it was a contract of adhesion, and that Arreguin was
never given a copy of the arbitral rules.  With regard to
substantive unconscionability, the court found that the
arbitration agreement lacks mutuality and binds only the
employee.  By written order filed June 10, 2015, the trial court
denied the motions to compel arbitration.

On June 23, 2015, both Star and Gallo appealed.

In sum, Judge Tucher concludes that (1) the agreement binds Star
as well as Arreguin even though no representative of Star signed
the document, and (2) the language of the agreement requires
Star, as well as Arreguin, to submit all employment-related
disputes to arbitration.  Because this agreement imposes mutual
obligations on employer and employee, it is not substantively
unconscionable.  The Judge therefore concludes that in spite of
the procedural unconscionability, Star may enforce this
arbitration agreement.  With her colleague on the Second District
Court of Appeal, the Judge laments that the Court's decision
continues the recent march of our nation's jurisprudence toward
eliminating the right to a jury trial (or any trial) in a large
number of civil cases by its ever-extending embrace of
arbitration.  At least to the extent that the case involves
Arreguin's individual claims against Star, she holds that the
dispute must be arbitrated.

The Judge further concludes that the availability of class claims
in arbitration is for the arbitrator to decide, and that
Arreguin's claims against Gallo must be arbitrated.  As for
Arreguin's claims against Gallo, the Judge finds that these are
arguments that Arreguin failed to make in the trial court, where
he defended Gallo's motion to compel arbitration only with the
same arguments that he deployed against Star's motion, namely
that the arbitration agreement between Star and Arreguin was
substantively and procedurally unconscionable.

Because Arreguin did not argue in the trial court that Gallo was
not entitled to enforce an agreement to which it was not a party,
Judge Tucher will not consider that argument.  Considering a new
argument for the first time on appeal is especially
inappropriate, where Arreguin challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence, rather than raising a pure point of law.  As a result,
she holds that Arreguin's claims against Gallo, like its claims
against Star, must be arbitrated.

For these reasons, Judge Tucher reversed the decision of the
trial court, and remanded the case for further proceedings in
accordance with the Opinion.  In the interests of justice, each
party is to bear its own costs on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/bJVJ01 from Leagle.com.


EDIBLE ARRANGEMENTS: Court Dismisses "Rando" TCPA Suit
------------------------------------------------------
Judge Jerome B. Simandle of the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss
the case, NICOLE RANDO, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. EDIBLE ARRANGEMENTS
INTERNATIONAL, LLC, Defendant, Civil Action No. 17-
701(JBS/AMD)(D. N.J.) for failure to state a claim under the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA").

Rando brings the putative class action against EA, alleging
violations of the TCPA based on commercial text messages EA
allegedly sent to her after, she claims, she revoked her consent
to receive such text messages.  Rando, a New Jersey resident,
consented to receive text messages from the Defendant, a
corporation headquartered in Connecticut, in December of 2016.
She alleges that the Defendant placed these text messages using
an automatic telephone dialing system ("ATDS") as defined by 47
U.S.C. Section 227(a)(1).

The Plaintiff later withdrew consent to receive further
commercial texts and notified Defendant to stop sending her
commercial text messages -- multiple times -- each time using a
reasonable method.  She alleges that the Defendant nevertheless
continued to send her text messages, and claims that these text
messages violated the CPA because they occurred after EA
impermissibly designated an exclusive means for the revocation of
consent to receive such text messages.  The Plaintiff also makes
class action allegations against the Defendant.  She pleads two
claims for relief: the first for negligent violations of TCPA,
and the second for knowing and/or willful violations of TCPA.

The Defendant, citing the declaration of Drew Sirico, Senior
Director of Marketing at EA, and the related records of the text
messages between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, notes that
every text message it sent to the Plaintiff ended with the words,
"Reply HELP for help. STOP to cancel.  It is undisputed that the
Plaintiff did not reply using the single word "STOP," but rather
sent ten separate messages containing natural language stating
her desire to stop receiving text messages instead (including,
eventually, sentence-long messages containing the word "stop," in
lowercase) on and between Dec. 8, 2016 to Jan. 12, 2017.

Before the Court is Defendant's motion to dismiss.  The Plaintiff
has filed a Response, the Defendant has filed a Reply, and both
parties have submitted letters containing supplemental authority.

The Defendant moves to dismiss on a variety of grounds.  First,
it claims that the Complaint fails to state a claim, either
because the Plaintiff does not plausibly allege that she revoked
her consent to receive automated text messages, or because she
failed to plausibly allege that the Defendant used an ATDS.
Second, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiff lacks Article III
standing.  Finally, it argues that the class allegations should
be stricken from the Complaint.

Judge Simandle understands the Plaintiff to allege the same
"concrete, albeit intangible, harm" sufficient to grant her
Article III standing under these precedents.  While the Defendant
submits that the critical difference is that, the Plaintiff
solicited these text messages, the Judge reads her Complaint to
clearly allege that, at least once she attempted to withdraw her
consent, the text messages she continued to receive were now
unwanted, unwelcome, and effectively unsolicited.  The Plaintiff
alleges that she is a person directly aggrieved by the statutory
violation she alleges, and the Judge therefore concludes that she
has Article III standing.

The Judge also concludes that, given the factual circumstances
alleged by the Plaintiff, she does not plausibly state a claim
that she used a reasonable means of revoking her consent, in part
because it cannot be fairly said that she had a reasonable
expectation that she could effectively communicate her request
for revocation to the caller in that circumstance.  Her failure
to follow the apparently clear and apparently non-burdensome opt
out instructions remains unexplained.  In sum, the Plaintiff has
not plausibly alleged that her revocation was effective.

Because the Judge has found that the Plaintiff does not plausibly
state a claim for relief under the TCPA pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6), he says he needs not address whether the Plaintiff
has failed to adequately plead that the Defendant used an ATDS.
He similarly needs not address the Defendant's argument in the
alternative that the class allegation be stricken.

Judge Simandle will nevertheless dismiss without prejudice
because such amendment does not appear to be futile in its
ability to address the deficiencies of the present pleading.  The
Plaintiff may file a motion for leave to file an amended
complaint that plausibly alleges that she revoked her consent to
be contacted using a reasonable method, under the totality of the
circumstances, taking into account the Defendant's prescribed
revocation method.  In preparing such a proposed amended
complaint, he advised the Plaintiff to be mindful of the question
of whether she had a reasonable expectation that she could
effectively communicate her request for revocation to EA via her
chosen method of revocation, instead of the sender's method of
revocation.

While the Judge does not express an opinion on the merits of the
Defendant's argument that the Complaint only alleged the use of
an ATDS in a conclusory fashion, the Plaintiff may wish to
address such allegations as well in any proposed Amended
Complaint.
For the foregoing reasons, Judge Simandle granted the Defendant's
motion to dismiss without prejudice.  The Plaintiff may file a
motion for leave to amend the complaint to address the
deficiencies noted herein within 30 days from the entry of the
Opinion and Order upon the docket.  The accompanying Order will
be entered.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/n8h0Q6 from Leagle.com.

NICOLE RANDO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by MARK W. MORRIS --
mmorris@clarklawnj.com -- CLARK LAW FIRM.

EDIBLE ARRANGEMENTS INTERNATIONAL, LLC., Defendant, represented
by JAMES S. RICHTER -- jrichter@winston.com -- WINSTON & STRAWN,
LLP & KEIYANA B. FORDHAM -- kfordham@winston.com -- WINSTON &
STRAWN LLP.


ELECTROLUX HOME: Compelled to Produce Docs in "Rice" Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ELAINE RICE, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ELECTROLUX HOME
PRODUCTS, INC., Defendant, Case No. 4:15-cv-00371 (M.D. Pa.),
Judge Matthew W. Brann of the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania granted the Plaintiff's motion to compel
as to both the requested documents and interrogatories.

The instant motion to compel arises during the course of a
products liability suit that alleges, among other causes of
action, defective design, failure to warn, and breach of warranty
claims.  The action percolated up when Ms. Rice of Havertown
Township, Delaware County, Pennsylvania allegedly touched the
handle of a hot microwave that sat above her stovetop.  The
counsel for the Plaintiff readily admits that Ms. Rice did not
require any medical treatment after touching the hot microwave.

Nevertheless, the parties have become mired in a dispute as to
whether the Defendant must produce certain documents that reside
overseas with its third-party suppliers, Sharp Appliances
Thailand Ltd. and Midea Microwave and Electrical Appliances
Manufacturing Co. Ltd.  Because the Defendant entered into
purchase agreements with those suppliers that contain explicit
litigation assistance provisions, the answer to the pending
dispute is that the Defendant must in fact turn over those
documents to the Plaintiff.

Having determined that the clear text of the Defendant's purchase
agreements grants the Defendant an adequate quantum of control,
as contemplated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34, over the
requested discovery possessed by the third-party suppliers, Judge
Brann will compel the Defendant to turn over to the Plaintiff all
requested discovery that the Plaintiff has sought in her motion.

Next, because the Defendant is correct in its assertions to the
suppliers that (redacted), the Judge recognizes for this
subsequent reason that compelling the requested discovery is the
appropriate resolution.

During oral argument on the Plaintiff's motion to compel, the
Judge, as a preliminary matter, asked several questions of
counsel pertaining to whether federal jurisdiction under the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA") has adequately been
established.  Recognizing full well the minimalist role our
Constitution contemplates for federal courts, she remains
concerned as to the ability of the claims and alleged damages
advanced herein to adequately trigger CAFA's minimal
jurisdictional prerequisites.  Nevertheless, the Court's
questioning made apparent that further factual discovery was
required before the core jurisdictional question could adequately
be answered.

Therefore, she says, the Order that will accompany the Memorandum
will detail the following procedure aimed at ensuring that
jurisdiction is appropriate in this matter.  In conjunction with
its anticipated motion for class certification, the counsel for
the Plaintiff is ordered to submit an affidavit indicating
whether, in light of the completion of its fact discovery, it
still avers that federal jurisdiction pursuant to CAFA is
appropriate in this matter.  The affidavit will briefly set forth
the facts on which counsel for the Plaintiff has relied in making
its jurisdictional averments and explain how those facts satisfy
CAFA's minimum jurisdictional prerequisites.  The Counsel for
Plaintiff will docket its affidavit as a separate docket entry so
that it is properly preserved for the record.

The Judge permitted the counsel for the Defendant to file a
response to counsel for the Plaintiff's affidavit, but no such
response is required.  With the benefit of counsel for the
Plaintiff's affidavit, the Judge will revisit the question of the
appropriateness of federal jurisdiction at that time.

Consistent with the foregoing analysis, Judge Chavez granted the
Plaintiff's motion to compel as to both the requested documents
and interrogatories.  The counsel for the parties would do well
to remember that the Court's ruling on the instant discovery
dispute is necessarily separate and distinct from any
determinations that the Judge may need to make at the class
certification stage.  Therefore, nothing in the decision should
be read as conflicting with her disillusioned impression of what
have steadily revealed themselves to be the rather trivial facts
that gave rise to the lawsuit.  An appropriate Order follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Sealed Memorandum
is available at https://is.gd/qSM1Bd from Leagle.com.

Elaine Rice, Individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Charles J. Kocher, Esq. --
ckocher@smbb.com -- Patrick Howard, Esq. -- phoward@smbb.com --
and -- Simon B. Paris, Esq. -- sparis@smbb.com -- SALTZ,
MONGELUZZI, BARRETT & BENDESKY, P.C. -- Raina C. Borrelli, Esq. -
- rborrelli@gustafsongluek.com -- Daniel E. Gustafson, Esq. --
dgustafson@gustafsongluek.com -- Jason S. Kilene, Esq. --
jkilene@gustafsongluek.com -- GUSTAFSON GLUEK PLLC -- Joseph G.
Price, Esq. -- jprice@dlplaw.com -- Paul T. Oven, Esq. --
ptoven@dlplaw.com -- and -- Sean P. McDonough, Esq. --
smcdonough@dlplaw.com -- DOUGHERTY, LEVENTHAL & PRICE, L.L.P.

Alex Kukich, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew N. Friedman, Cohen
Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Charles J. Kocher, Saltz,
Mongeluzzi, Barrett & Bendesky, P.C., Daniel E. Gustafson,
Gustafson Gluek PLLC, Raina C. Borrelli, Gustafson Gluek PLLC,
Robert J. Barton, Block & Leviton LLP, Sally M. Handmaker, Cohen
Milstein Sellers and Toll PLLC, pro hac vice, Simon B. Paris,
Saltz, Mongeluzzi, Barrett & Bendesky, P.C. & Patrick Howard,
Saltz, Mongeluzzi, Barrett & Bendesky, P.C.

Electrolux Home Products, Inc., Defendant, represented by David
R. Fine, Esq. -- david.fine@klgates.com -- David R. Osipovich,
Esq. --
david.osipovich@klgates.com -- Loly G. Tor, Esq. --
loly.tor@klgates.com -- Michael S. Nelson, Esq. --
michael.nelson@klgates.com -- and -- Patrick J. Perrone, Esq. -
patrick.perrone@klgates.com -- K&L GATES LLP.


ELENA'S MEXICAN: "Angel" Suit Seeks Unpaid Minimum & OT Wages
-------------------------------------------------------------
ELIODORA PRUDENTE ANGEL, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. JOHN DOE CORP. (D/B/A
ELENA'S MEXICAN RESTAURANT), MISAEL DIAZ, and ROSA SANCHEZ, the
Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-04254 (S.D.N.Y., May 11, 2018),
seeks to recover unpaid minimum and overtime wages pursuant to
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, and the New York Labor Law.

The Plaintiff is a former employee of Defendants which own,
operate, or control a Mexican restaurant, located at 5 W Tremont
Ave, Bronx, NY 10453. The Plaintiff worked for Defendants in
excess of 40 hours per week, without appropriate minimum wage,
overtime, and spread of hours compensation for the hours that she
worked. Rather, the Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff Prudente
appropriately for any hours worked, either at the straight rate
of pay or for any additional overtime premium. Further, the
Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff Prudente the required "spread
of hours" pay for any day in which she had to work over 10 hours
a day. Defendants' conduct extended beyond Plaintiff Prudente to
all other similarly situated employees. The Defendants maintained
a policy and practice of requiring Plaintiff Prudente and other
employees to work in excess of 40 hours per week without
providing the minimum wage and overtime compensation required by
federal and state law and regulations.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 0165
          Telephone: (212) 317 1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317 1620
          E-mail: Faillace@employmentcompliance.com


EQUIFAX INFORMATION: Filing of 4th Amended "Barnum" Suit Granted
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SHARON BARNUM, JERRY P. CABEBE, ROBERT SUSTRIK, and
all similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. EQUIFAX
INFORMATION SERVICES, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 2:16-cv-02866-RFB-
NJK (D. Nev.), Judge Richard F. Boulware, II of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Nevada granted the parties' stipulation
to the Plaintiffs' filing of their proposed Fourth Amended
Complaint.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), LR 7-1, and
LR IA 6-2, the parties have stipulated to the Plaintiffs' filing
their proposed Fourth Amended Complaint, attached to the
Stipulation as Exhibit 1, and to a seven-day extension of time
for Equifax to respond to the Fourth Amended Complaint.
Equifax's response to the Fourth Amended Complaint will be due 21
days after the filing of the stipulation.  Equifax enters into
the stipulation without waiving and while expressly reserving any
and all defenses to the Fourth Amended Complaint.

Judge Boulware instructed the Clerk of the Court to file Exhibit
1, Proposed Amended Complaint which will serve as the operative
Complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/Ghc1wR from Leagle.com.

Robert Sustrik & Sharon Barnum, Plaintiffs, represented by David
H. Krieger, Haines & Krieger, LLC, Matthew I. Knepper --
matthew.knepper@knepperclark.com -- Knepper & Clark, LLC & Miles
N. Clark -- miles.clark@knepperclark.com -- Knepper & Clark LLC.

Equifax Information Services, LLC, Defendant, represented by
Bryan Zubay -- bzubay@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding LLP, pro hac
vice, Kevin Jordan O'Brien -- kobrien@kslaw.com -- King &
Spaulding LLP, pro hac vice, Misty L. Peterson --
mpeterson@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding, pro hac vice, Zachary A.
McEntyre -- zmcentyre@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding LLP & Bradley
T. Austin -- baustin@swlaw.com -- Snell & Wilmer LLP.


FACEBOOK INC: Pelc Sues over Improper Access of User Data
---------------------------------------------------------
ELAINE PELC on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, v. Facebook, Inc., Cambridge Analytica
LLC and SCL Group, Limited, the Defendants, Case No. 5:18-cv-
02948 (N.D. Cal., May 18, 2018), seeks to enjoin the Defendants
from engaging in further negligent, deceptive, unfair, unlawful
and fraudulent business practices relating to privacy interests
protection.

Facebook operates a social media company that facilitates the
sharing of user's personal photographs, information, uniform
resource locator links, geolocation data, audio-visual media and
other data with family, friends, coworkers and other private
relations. Facebook maintains a web site and develops software
applications that facilitate that sharing of information with its
more than 2.2 billion monthly users worldwide. Facebook users
have the ability to share and restrict information based on their
own specific criteria. The company's stated mission is "to give
people the power to build community and bring the world closer
together."

CA is a privately held company focused on data mining, data
brokering, data analysis and strategic communication for use in
the electoral process. The firm has been involved in dozens of
state and federal races in the United States. In 2016 alone, CA
assisted three major presidential campaigns in the primary and
general elections, including the ultimately successful campaign
of President Donald J. Trump. SCL is a privately held behavioral
research and strategic communications firm that owns and operates
CA.

To create a Facebook account, a user must generate a personal
profile using his or her email address or phone number, first
name, last name, birthdate, and gender. Users also agree to the
Facebook terms and conditions before they are allowed to complete
their individual profile. Once a profile has been created,
Facebook encourages the users to share significant amounts of
personal information, including their name, birthdate, hometown,
phone number, address, location, interests, relationships, email
address, history of websites visited, geolocation data, photos,
and videos, amongst others. Despite statements to the contrary,
Defendants have chosen to treat Plaintiff's Personal Information
with absolute disregard. While Plaintiff's Personal Information
was supposed to be protected, controlled solely by the Plaintiff,
and used for only expressly disclosed and limited purposes, CA,
and its parent company SCL, without authorization, or by
exceeding whatever limited authorization it, or its agents, had,
improperly collected the Personal Information of up to 87 million
Facebook users, including Plaintiff. Facebook, for its part, knew
this improper data aggregation was occurring and either failed to
stop it, or actively avoided discovering such knowledge in order
to profess ignorance.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Linda M. Dardarian, Esq.
          GOLDSTEIN, BORGEN, DARDARIAN & HO
          300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone: (510) 763 9800
          Facsimile: (510) 835 1417
          E-mail: ldardarian@gbdhlegal.com

               - and -

          William H. "Hassan" Murphy III, Esq.
          MURPHY FALCON & MURPHY
          1 South Street, 23rd Floor
          Baltimore, MD 21202
          Telephone: (410) 951 8744
          Facsimile: (410) 539 6599
          E-mail: Hassan.Murphy@murphyfalcon.com

               - and -

          April Falcon Doss, Esq.
          SAUL EWING ARNSTEIN & LEHR, LLP
          500 E. Pratt Street, Suite 900
          Baltimore, MD 21202
          Telephone: (410) 332 8798
          Facsimile: (410) 332 8178
          E-mail: April.Doss@saul.com


FALCON TOWING: Lowe Seeks Overtime Compensation under FLSA
----------------------------------------------------------
PATRICK LOWE and others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v.
FALCON TOWING AND HEAVY DUTY TRANSPORTATION, INC. a Florida
corporation and WAYNE OWENSBY, individually, the Defendants, Case
No. 0:18-cv-61136-DPG (S.D. Fla., May 18, 2018), seeks to recover
overtime compensation and other relief under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants and their
representatives knew that Lowe and similarly situated employees
were working overtime, and that Federal law requires employees to
be compensated at time and one-half per hour for overtime pay.
The Defendants maintained complete control over the hours
Plaintiff worked and the pay he was to receive. In the course of
employment with Defendants, Lowe and other similarly situated
employees worked the number of hours required of them, but were
not paid time and one-half for all hours worked in excess of 40
hours during a workweek.

Falcon Towing is a licensed and bonded freight shipping and
trucking company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Charles M. Eiss, Esq.
          Lindsay M. Massillon, Esq.
          EISS MASSILLON, P.L.
          7951 SW 6th Street, Suite 308
          Plantation, FL 33324
          Telephone: (954) 914 7890
          Facsimile: (855) 423 5298
          E-mail: chuck@eissmassillon.com
                  lindsay@eissmassillon.com


FALLS COLLECTION: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled JENNIFER TORRES, Individually and on Behalf
of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. FALLS
COLLECTION SERVICE INC. d/b/a FINANCIAL CONTROL SOLUTIONS, the
Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-00740-NJ (E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiff
asks the Court to enter an order certifying proposed classes in
this case, appointing the Plaintiff as class representatives, and
appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as Class Counsel, and for such
other and further relief as the Court may deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further asks the Court to stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties
relief from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and
requirement that Plaintiff file a brief and supporting documents
in support of this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion. Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015).

As this motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense
when short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an
amended motion is filed.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=V9ZGpQWm

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482 8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482 8001
          E-mail: meldridge@ademilaw.com


FIDELITY INVESTMENTS: Fails to Pay Wages, Reynolds & Martinez Say
-----------------------------------------------------------------
BAILEY REYNOLDS and HELEN MARTINEZ on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. FIDELITY
INVESTMENTS INSTITUTIONAL OPERATIONS COMPANY, INC., and FMR, LLC,
the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-00423 (M.D.N.C., May 17, 2018),
seeks to recover damages arises out of Defendants' systemic,
company-wide failure to compensate Plaintiffs for all hours
worked, and for overtime hours worked at the appropriate overtime
rate, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the North
Carolina Wage and Hour Act, and the New Mexico Minimum Wage Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs consist of current and
former Financial Customer Associates, or similar positions, who
are compensated on an hourly basis. Throughout the relevant
period, the Defendants have maintained a corporate policy of
failing to compensate Plaintiffs for all mandatory pre-shift
work. In particular, Defendants required Plaintiffs to arrive at
work prior to their scheduled shift in order to perform a litany
of tasks necessary to perform their jobs, including booting up
computers, running several software programs, checking daily
bulletins, reviewing call schedules, checking emails, checking
callbacks, and organizing their desks. Plaintiffs only received
compensation after this work had been completed, though they were
required to perform this work in order to be prepared to answer
phone calls when their scheduled shifts began. This work was
required to be completed to be "call ready." Failure to be "call
ready," or prepared to answer phone calls when their scheduled
shifts began, could result in warnings, discipline, and
ultimately, termination.

The Defendants, through their managers, were aware that
Plaintiffs were completing this pre-shift work, and doing so
without compensation. Defendants suffered or permitted, and in
fact, required Plaintiffs to complete such pre-shift work. The
Plaintiffs routinely worked 40 hours or more per week, without
accounting for pre-shift work. When pre-shift work is included,
even those Plaintiffs who were scheduled and paid for only 40
hours per week, actually worked over 40 hours per week without
being compensated for the pre-shift work or compensated at the
overtime rate hours worked over 40 per week.

The Defendants have also maintained a corporate policy of
underpaying and failing to lawfully compensate Plaintiffs at the
appropriate overtime rates. Defendants issued quarterly "bonuses"
to Plaintiffs, based on objective, nondiscretionary metrics,
including length of employment, customer survey ratings, schedule
adherence, and idle/RAP time. Defendants, however, failed to take
into account such nondiscretionary bonuses during overtime
workweeks when calculating Plaintiffs' regular and overtime
rates. Similarly, Defendant provided additional compensation to
Plaintiffs through student loan reimbursements and fitness
reimbursements, but failed to take that compensation into account
when calculating Plaintiffs' regular and overtime rates, and thus
failed to pay overtime at the correct rate.

Fidelity Investments provides investment advisory services. The
Company offers investment products, brokerage, and trading
services to financial intermediary firms. Fidelity Investments
Institutional Operations operates worldwide.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gilda A. Hernandez, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF GILDA A. HERNANDEZ, PLLC
          1020 Southhill Drive, Ste. 130
          Cary, NC 27513
          Telephone: (919) 741 8693
          Facsimile: (919) 869 1853
          E-mail: ghernandez@gildahernandezlaw.com

               - and -

          Christine E. Webber, Esq.
          COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL, PLLC
          1100 New York Avenue, Suite 500 West
          Washington, DC 20005
          Telephone: (202) 408 4600
          Facsimile: (202) 408 4699
          E-mail: cwebber@cohenmilstein.com


FIFTH THIRD: Early Access Cash Advance Suit Final Judgment OK'd
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, In re: Fifth Third Early Access Cash Advance
Litigation, Case No. 1:12cv851 (S.D. Ohio), Judge Michael R.
Barrett of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio, Western Division, granted the Plaintiffs' Rule 54(b) Motion
for Entry of Final Judgment.

The matter is before the Court upon the Plaintiffs' Rule 54(b)
Motion for Entry of Final Judgment.  The Defendant has filed
Response in Opposition and the Plaintiffs filed a Reply.  The
Defendant was then permitted to file a Sur-Reply.

The putative class action centers on the Defendant's Early Access
Cash Advance loan program.  The program allowed customers to get
a cash advance on their next direct deposit.  The program's Terms
& Conditions and the monthly statements sent to customers stated
that the "Annual Percentage Rate" is 120%.  The Plaintiffs claim
that the APR was only 120% for advances which were repaid in 30
days.

On March 30, 2015, the Court entered an Opinion and Order
granting in part and denying in part the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss.  In that Order, the Court denied the Defendant's Motion
as to the Plaintiffs' claims for violations of the Truth in
Lending Act ("TILA"), but dismissed the Plaintiffs' remaining
seventeen claims, including their claims for breach of contract.

After that decision, the parties engaged in extensive Court-
mediated settlement discussions.  On Oct.10, 2016, the parties
entered a preliminary Memorandum of Understanding to settle the
matter.  However, subsequent discovery showed that the contract
damages were multiples higher than originally estimated.  Despite
additional rounds of settlement discussions, the Plaintiffs did
not proceed with the proposed class settlement.

The Plaintiffs explain that the contract claim damages are
exponentially higher than the potential TILA damages due to
TILA's statutory caps.  They maintain that appellate review of
the dismissed breach of contract claim would facilitate
resolution of this action.  They've represented to the Court that
if their Rule 54(b) motion is granted, they will only appeal the
Court's ruling on their contract claims, and not the dismissal of
their remaining claims.  The Defendant argues that if the
Plaintiffs are permitted to appeal now, it could result in
increased briefing and court resources if the TILA claim was
later tried, lost, and then made part of a second appeal.

To comply with Rule 54(b), Judge Barrett must follow a two-step
process: First, the district court must expressly direct the
entry of final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all the
claims or parties in a case.  Second, it must expressly determine
that there is no just reason to delay appellate review.

The Judge finds that the differences in the operative facts
necessary to give rise to the Plaintiffs' contract claims and the
TILA claim sufficiently outweigh what they have in common.  The
Plaintiffs' contract claims are based on the terms of the
agreement, and whether the Defendant breached those terms.  The
Plaintiffs claim that Defendant breached the agreement by
charging APRs in excess of 120%.

In dismissing Plaintiffs' contract claims, the Court concluded
that while the 120% APR may be misleading because not every
transaction is paid in 12 cycles, the Terms & Conditions are
unambiguous in their explanation as to the method for calculating
the APR.  The Court pointed out that the Terms & Conditions state
the transaction fee to be charged is 10% for each dollar
advanced; and also explains the APR is calculated by dividing the
transaction fee by the Advance amount and multiplying the
quotient by the number of statement cycles within a year.

Therefore, the TILA claim arises out of the required disclosures
under the statute and targets the harm to consumers.  In order to
prevail on a TILA claim for statutory damages and attorney's
fees, a consumer does not need to show that he or she suffered
actual monetary damages or that she was actually misled or
deceived.

The second requirement of Rule 54(b) requires consideration of
judicial administrative interests as well as the equities
involved.  Here, the Judge finds that the adjudicated contract
claims and unadjudicated TILA claims are independent of one
another.  There is no possibility that the need for review might
be mooted by future developments in the Court.  There is little
to no factual dispute in this case.  The Court interpreted the
Terms & Conditions and found the Defendant had not breached those
terms.  There is no possibility that the reviewing court might be
obliged to consider the same issue a second time.  The contract
claims turn on a question of law which is separate from the
requirements of TILA.  He says the issues decided in any
interlocutory appeal would be different from the issues decided
in an appeal after judgment.  With regard to set off, the parties
have not identified the presence or absence of a pending claim or
counterclaim which could result in a set-off against the judgment
made final by the district court.

Finally, as to the miscellaneous factors, the Supreme Court has
noted that the possibility of settling a claim may tip the
balance in favor of a partial final judgment under Rule 54(b).
The Judge says that while the possibility of settlement is a
consideration, Rule 54(b) certification should not be used as a
vehicle to leverage a settlement without regard to the
undesirability of piecemeal appeals.

He recognizes that the Plaintiffs have remained steadfast in
their position that the Court was incorrect in its ruling on
their breach of contract claims.  The Plaintiffs filed a Motion
for Reconsideration directed at the Court's ruling, but that
motion was dismissed as moot by the Court based on the parties'
settlement discussions.  The Court notes that if a judgment on
the breach of contract claims would facilitate the settlement of
the case, it serves efficient judicial administration by
conserving judicial time and limited litigation expenses.  The
Court concludes these factors weigh in favor of granting Rule
54(b) certification.  The Court finds no just reason for delay.

Accordingly, Judge Barrett granted the Plaintiffs' Rule 54(b)
Motion for Entry of Final Judgment.  The matter will be stayed
pending appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Opinion and Order
is available at https://is.gd/V1i7tA from Leagle.com.

Lori Laskaris & Daniel Laskaris, Plaintiffs, represented by
Alexander Phillip Owings -- apowingsattorney@gmail.com -- Owings
Law Firm, pro hac vice, Daniel Frech, Spangenberg Shibley & Liber
LLP, Jason Kyle Whittemore, Wagner, Vaughan & McLaughlin, P.A.,
pro hac vice, Kevin Michael McLaughlin, Wagner Vaughan &
McLaughlin PA, pro hac vice, Ronald Edward Johnson, Jr.,
Schachter, Hendy & Johnson, PSC, Steven A. Owings, Owings Law
Frim, pro hac vice, Matthew Wessler -- matt@guptawessler.com --
Gupta Wessler PLLC, pro hac vice, Rachel S. Bloomekatz --
rachel@guptawessler.com -- Gupta Wessler PLLC & Stuart E. Scott,
Spangenbert, Shibley & Liber, LLP.

Brian Harrison, Plaintiff, represented by Alex C. Davis --
alex@jonesward.com -- Jones Ward PLC, Daniel Frech, Spangenberg
Shibley & Liber LLP, Penny Unkraut Hendy, Schachter & Hendy,
P.S.C., Randy Ratliff -- Trust@RandyRatliff.com -- Jones Ward,
PLC, Ronald Edward Johnson, Jr., Schachter, Hendy & Johnson, PSC,
Jasper D. Ward -- jasper@jonesward.com -- Jones Ward PLC, pro hac
vice, Matthew Wessler, Guta Wessler PLLC, pro hac vice, Rachel S.
Bloomekatz, Gupta Wessler PLLC & Stuart E. Scott, Spangenbert,
Shibley & Liber, LLP.

Janet Fyock, Plaintiff, represented by Corey D. Sullivan, Carey,
Danis & Lowe, pro hac vice, Daniel Frech, Spangenberg Shibley &
Liber LLP, Francis (Casey) J. Flynn, Carey, Danis and Lowe, pro
hac vice, Penny Unkraut Hendy, Schachter & Hendy, P.S.C., Tiffany
Marko Yiatras, Carey, Danis & Lowe, pro hac vice, Matthew
Wessler, Gupta Wessler PLLC, pro hac vice, Rachel S. Bloomekatz,
Gupta Wessler PLLC & Stuart E. Scott, Spangenbert, Shibley &
Liber, LLP.

William R. Klopfenstein, On Behalf of Himself and All Others
Similarly Situated, Adam McKinney, On Behalf of Himself and All
Others Similarly Situated, Donald E. Adanich, on Behalf of
Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated & Lyn A. Adanich, on
Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Ronald Edward Johnson, Jr., Schachter,
Hendy & Johnson, PSC, Stuart E. Scott, Spangenbert, Shibley &
Liber, LLP, Ben Barnow, Barnow and Associates, P.C, pro hac vice,
Daniel Frech, Spangenberg Shibley & Liber LLP, Hassan A.
Zavareei, Tycko & Zavareei LLP, pro hac vice, Jeffrey D. Kaliel,
Tycko & Zavareei LLP, pro hac vice, Matthew Wessler, Gupta
Wessler PLLC, pro hac vice & Rachel S. Bloomekatz, Gupta Wessler
PLLC.

Fifth Third Bank, Defendant, represented by Brett A. Wall --
bwall@bakerlaw.com -- Baker & Hostetler, Garry K. Grooms, Stites
& Harbison, PLLC, John Morgan McGarvey, Morgan & Pottinger, PSC,
John T. McGarvey -- jtm@morganandpottinger.com -- Morgan &
Pottinger, PSC, John D. Parker -- jparker@bakerlaw.com -- Baker &
Hostetler, Russell K. Scott -- rks@greensfelder.com --
Greensfelder, Hemker & Gale PC, G. Karl Fanter --
kfanter@bakerlaw.com -- Baker & Hostetler, James Eugene Burke --
james.burke4@usdoj.gov  -- One E Fourth Street & William Howard
Hawkins, II -- whawkins@bakerlaw.com -- Baker Hostetler.


FINISH LINE: Miller Balks at Merger Deal with JD Sports
-------------------------------------------------------
JONATHAN M. MILLER, Individually and On Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. THE FINISH LINE, INC.,
GLENN S. LYON, TORRENCE BOONE, WILLIAM P. CARMICHAEL, RICHARD P.
CRYSTAL, FAISAL MASUD, STEPHEN GOLDSMITH, CATHERINE A. LANGHAM,
and SAMUEL M. SATO, the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-01542-SEB-
DML (S.D. Ind., May 18, 2018), seeks to enjoin a stockholder vote
on proposed merger transaction unless and until the Securities
Exchange Act violations are cured.

The Plaintiff brings this class action on behalf of the public
stockholders of The Finish Line, Inc. against Finish Line and the
members of its Board of Directors for their violations of
Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and to enjoin the vote on a proposed transaction, pursuant to
which Finish Line will be acquired by JD Sports Fashion Plc
through JD Sports' wholly-owned subsidiary Genesis Merger Sub,
Inc.

According to the complaint, on March 26, 2018, Finish Line issued
a press release announcing it had entered into an Agreement and
Plan of Merger with JD Sports, pursuant to which each of the
Company's issued and outstanding Class A common shares will be
converted into the right to receive $13.50 in cash. The Proposed
Transaction is valued at approximately $558 million. On May 7,
2018, Finish Line filed a Definitive Proxy Statement on FORM
DEFM14A with the SEC. The Proxy Statement, which recommends that
Finish Line's stockholders vote in favor of the Proposed
Transaction, omits or misrepresents material information
concerning, among other things: (i) Finish Line's financial
projections, including the financial projections relied upon by
Finish Line's financial advisors, PJ Solomon Securities, LLC and
Houlihan Lokey Capital, Inc. ("Houlihan"); (ii) the data and
inputs underlying the financial valuation analyses that support
the fairness opinions provided by PJ Solomon and Houlihan; and
(iii) potential conflicts of interest. The failure to adequately
disclose such material information constitutes a violation of
Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act as Finish Line's
stockholders need such information in order to cast a fully-
informed vote in connection with the Proposed Transaction.

In short, unless remedied, Finish Line's stockholders will be
forced to make a voting decision on the Proposed Transaction
without full disclosure of all material information concerning
the Proposed Transaction being provided to them.

Finish Line is an American retail chain that sells athletic shoes
and related apparel and accessories.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff:

          Jason A. Shartzer, Esq.
          SHARTZER LAW FIRM, LLC
          156 E. Market Street
          10th Floor, Suite 1000
          Indianapolis, IN 46204
          Telephone: (317) 969 7600
          Facsimile: (317) 969 7650

               - and -

          Richard A. Acocelli, Esq.
          WEISSLAW LLP
          1500 Broadway, 16th Floor
          New York, NY 0036
          Telephone: (212) 682 3025
          Facsimile: (212) 682 3010
          E-mail: racocelli@weisslawllp.com


FIRSTGROUP AMERICA: McGinnes et al Sue over Savings Plan
--------------------------------------------------------
Jeffrey McGinnes, Wendy Berry, Lorri Hulings, and Kathleen
Sammons, individually and as representatives of a class of
similarly situated persons, and on behalf of the FirstGroup
America, Inc. Retirement Savings Plan, the Plaintiffs, v.
FirstGroup America, Inc., Aon Hewitt Investment Consulting, Inc.,
and John Does 1-20, the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-00326-TSB
(S.D. Ohio, May 11, 2018), alleges that the Defendants breached
their fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 by engaging in a radical redesign of the
Retirement Savings Plan's investment menu that was designed to
benefit Hewitt rather than the participants and beneficiaries of
the Plan, and stubbornly adhered to this imprudent menu design in
spite of evidence that it has caused significant and ongoing
damage to the Plan.

According to the lawsuit, the Defendants removed a large number
of established funds in the Plan that were performing well (at
Hewitt's self-interested urging), and replaced them with an
unproven set of newly-launched funds from Hewitt that were
inappropriate for the Plan and had not been adopted by the
fiduciaries of any other retirement plans. In the process, the
Defendants transferred over a quarter billion dollars in Plan
assets (more than 90% of the Plan's total assets) into these new
and untested funds, and left participants with no other
meaningful investment options. The results have been disastrous.
Since these experimental funds were added to the Plan in 2013,
they have consistently underperformed their benchmarks, and have
underperformed the funds they replaced by tens of millions of
dollars. Yet, in spite of this, the Defendants have continued to
retain these funds, doubling down on their initial imprudent
decision and committing further breaches of their ongoing duties
to the Plan. See Tibble v. Edison Int'l, 135 S.Ct. 1823, 1828
(2015) ("[A] trustee has a continuing duty to monitor trust
investments and remove imprudent ones. This continuing duty
exists separate and apart from the trustee's duty to exercise
prudence in selecting investments at the outset.").

FirstGroup America, Inc. provides transportation services. The
Company offers leasing, transit contracting, management,
maintenance, and ancillary services using trucks, tractors, and
semi trailers.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Randolph H. Freking, Esq.
          FREKING MYERS & REUL
          600 Vine Street, Suite 900
          Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
          Telephone: (513) 721 1975
          Facsimile: (513) 651 2570
          E-mail: randy@fmr.law

               - and -

          Paul J. Lukas, Esq.
          Kai H. Richter, Esq.
          Carl F. Engstrom, Esq.
          Brandon McDonough, Esq.
          NICHOLS KASTER, PLLP
          4600 IDS Center
          80 S 8th Street
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 256 3200
          Facsimile: (612) 338 4878
          E-mail: lukas@nka.com
                  krichter@nka.com
                  cengstrom@nka.com
                  bmcdonough@nka.com


FOUR SEASONS: Court Denies Bid to Decertify "Zyda" Class
--------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHRISTOPHER ZYDA, On Behalf of Himself and All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. FOUR SEASONS HOTELS AND
RESORTS FOUR SEASONS HOLDINGS INC.; FOUR SEASONS HUALALAI RESORT;
HUALALAI RESIDENTIAL, LLC (dba HUALALAI REALTY); HUALALAI
INVESTORS, LLC; KAUPULEHU MAKAI VENTURE; HUALALAI DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY; HUALALAI VILLAS & HOMES; HUALALAI INVESTORS, LLC;
HUALALAI RENTAL MANAGEMENT, LLC; and DOES 1-100, Defendants,
Civil. 16-00591 LEK (D. Haw.), Judge Leslie E. Kobayashi of the
U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii denied the
Defendants' Motion to Decertify Class Action.

On Oct. 2, 2015, Zyda filed his Class Action Complaint for
Damages Declaratory and Injunctive Relief in the Circuit Court of
the Third Circuit, State of Hawai'i.  On Oct. 14, 2015, Zyda
filed his First Amended Class Action Complaint for Damages
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief.

Zyda is the owner of real property within the Hualalai Resort
community, which is located on the Island of Hawai'i.  The
Hualalai Defendants are owners, developers, and realtors for
Hualalai.  Zyda alleges the Hualalai Defendants control both the
Hualalai Resort and the Hualalai Club.  The Hualalai Defendants
retained the Four Seasons Defendants to manage the Resort, the
Club, and the hotel at the Resort.

Zyda alleges Defendants induced him and others to purchase homes
within Hualalai, as well as Club memberships, by promising that
their family members and guests would be able to enjoy the Club
and Resort facilities "without additional guest fees."  He
alleges that, after he and other members of the proposed class
had committed substantial resources, the Defendants failed to
maintain and provide adequate facilities to handle the growing
population.

Zyda alleges the Defendants continued to build homes in Hualalai
and sell new Club memberships to non-Hualalai residents, while
falsely complaining that Hualalai homeowners' guests overburden
the Resort.  Without proper cause, the Defendants discouraged
members of the proposed class from using their Club memberships
by significantly increasing fees and charges for unaccompanied
guests.

Zyda alleges the 2016 DRGFs violated representations the
Defendants made to induce sales; and were imposed to favor their
own interests regardless of the harm the 2016 DRGFs caused to the
Class members' property values and use and enjoyment of the Club
and Resort.  He alleges they continue to operate the Club and
Resort in secrecy, and fail and refuse to act openly and in good
faith with regard to the Class' rights.

Zyda brings state law claims for: violation of the Condominium
Property Act ("Count I"); violation of the Uniform Land Sales
Practices Act ("Count II"); unfair methods of competition
("UMOC") and unfair or deceptive acts or practices ("UDAP"), in
violation of Haw. Rev. Stat. Section 480-2 ("Count III");
promissory estoppel/detrimental reliance ("Count IV"); violation
of the duty of good faith and fair dealing ("Count V"); negligent
misrepresentation ("Count VI"); estoppel ("Count VII"); unjust
enrichment ("Count VIII"); organized crime, pursuant to Haw. Rev.
Stat. Chapter 842 ("Count IX"); and breach of fiduciary and other
common law duties ("Count X").

Zyda seeks: general, special, treble, and consequential damages;
attorneys' fees; punitive damages; injunctive and declaratory
relief; a court order requiring various reforms to Club policies;
and any other appropriate relief.

On Oct. 13, 2016, the state court issued its Order Granting
Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification, Filed April 26, 2016.
The Certification Order defined the Class as  all purchasers of
residential properties in the Hualalai Resort from 1995 to the
present who are members of the Hualalai Club and whose properties
are subject to a guest fee or other restriction on the use of
Hualalai Resort amenities for any family member or guest
(including rental guest) of such owner.  The law firms of Lynch
Hopper Smith, LLP and Revere & Associates LLC were appointed as
the Class Counsel.

On Nov. 1, 2016, before any class notice was approved, the
Defendants removed the case pursuant to the Class Action Fairness
Act ("CAFA").  On March 28, 2017, the Court issued its Order
Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Remand.

In the instant Motion, the Defendants argue the state court's
Certification Order does not survive removal.  Alternatively, on
Aug. 15, 2017, they filed their Motion to Decertify Class Action.
On Aug. 22, 2017, Intervenors James R. Mahoney, Ann Marie
Mahoney, Judith Runstad, H. Jon Runstad, Jonathan Seybold,
Patricia Seybold, David Keyes, Doreen Keyes, Julie Wrigley, Kevin
Reedy, Lynn Reedy, Bradley Chipps, Donna Chipps, and J. Orin
Edson filed a substantive joinder in the Motion.  The Plaintiffs
filed their memorandum in opposition on Sept. 27, 2017, and
Intervenors and the Defendants filed their respective reply
memoranda on Oct. 10, 2017.

Except as to Count I, Judge Kobayashi holds that the Class has
affirmatively demonstrated compliance with Rule 23(a) and Rule
23(b).(3).  As to Count I, the Defendants argue Zyda lacks
standing to raise claims under the Condominium Property Act
because he did not buy a condominium.  The Judge finds that the
Class has presented no evidence Zyda has standing to raise claims
under the Condominium Property Act.  Therefore, as to Count I,
Zyda is inadequate under Rule 23(a)(4) and must be dismissed as
the Class representative.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Judge denied the Defendants'
Motion to Decertify Class Action.  The Class has leave to file an
amended complaint to add new class representatives for Count I.
If they do not amend their complaint to add a class
representative with standing to assert Count I, and who can
affirmatively demonstrate compliance with the Rule 23(a)
prerequisites, before May 1, 2018, Count I will be decertified.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/88Kqi6 from Leagle.com.

Christopher Zyda, on behalf of himself and all other similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Patrick Kyle Smith, Smith Law
& Terrance M. Revere -- terry@revereandassociates.com -- Revere &
Associates, LLLC.

Four Seasons Holdings, Inc., Hualalai Residential, LLC, doing
business as Hualalai Realty, Hualalai Investors, LLC, Hualalai
Rental Management, LLC & Four Seasons Hotels Limited, Defendants,
represented by Barry A. Sullivan -- sullivan@smlhawaii.com --
Sullivan Meheula Lee, LLP, Donald M. Falk -- dfalk@mayerbrown.com
-- Mayer Brown LLP, pro hac vice, Natasha L.N. Baldauf --
baldauf@SMLhawaii.com -- Sullivan Meheula Lee, LLP & William
Meheula -- meheula@smlhawaii.com -- Sullivan Meheula Lee, LLP.

James R. Mahoney, Ann Marie Mahoney, Judith Runstad, H. Jon
Runstad, Jonathan Seybold, Patricia Seybold, David Keyes, Doreen
Keyes, Julie Wrigley, Kevin Reedy, Bradley Chipps, Donna Chipps &
J. Orin Edson, Intervenors, represented by Nickolas A. Kacprowski
-- NKacprowski@ahfi.com -- Alston Hunt Floyd & Ing.


FRANKLIN RESOURCES: Fernandez Seeks to Certify Class
----------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled NELLY F. FERNANDEZ, ETC., the Plaintiffs,
v. FRANKLIN RESOURCES, INC., ET AL., the Defendants, Case No.
4:17-cv-06409-CW (N.D. Cal.), Ms. Nelly F. Fernandez,
individually and on behalf of a class of all other similarly
situated participants, and on behalf of the Franklin Templeton
401(k) Retirement Plan, will move the Court on June 19, 2018, for
an order:

   1. certifying a class under Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 23(b)(1); and

   2. designating Plaintiff's law firms, Bailey & Glasser LLP and
      Izard Kindall & Raabe LLP as co-lead counsel, and Creitz &
      Serebin LLP as local and liaison counsel pursuant to
      Rule 23(g).

A copy of the Notice of Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=aSuQbLsL

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark P. Kindall, Esq.
          Robert A. Izard, Esq.
          IZARD KINDALL & RAABE LLP
          29 South Main Street, Suite 305
          West Hartford, CT 06107
          Telephone: (860) 493 6292
          E-mail: mkindall@ikrlaw.com
                  rizard@ikrlaw.com

               - and -

          Gregory Y. Porter, Esq.
          Mark G. Boyko, Esq.
          BAILEY & GLASSER LLP
          1054 31st Street, NW Suite230
          Washington, DC 20007
          Telephone: (202) 463 2101
          E-mail: gporter@baileyglasser.com
                  mboyko@baileyglasser.com

               - and -

          Joseph A. Creitz, Esq.
          Lisa S. Serebin, Esq.
          CREITZ & SEREBIN LLP
          100 Pine Street, Suite 1250
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 466 3090
          E-mail: joe@creitzserebin.com
                  lisa@creitzserebin.com


GC SERVICES: Smith Sues over Debt Collection Practices
------------------------------------------------------
LURLINE SMITH, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. GC SERVICES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP and
JOHN DOES 1-25, the Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-09462 (D.N.J.,
May 18, 2018), seeks damages and declaratory and injunctive
relief under the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act.

According to the complaint, some time prior to June 22, 2017, an
obligation was allegedly incurred to Department Stores National
Bank. The DSNB obligation arose out of a transactions in which
money, property, insurance or services, which are the subject of
the transaction, are primarily for personal, family or household
purposes. The alleged DSNB obligation is a "debt" as defined by
15 U.S.C. section 1692a(5).  DSNB is a "creditor" as defined by
15 U.S.C. section 1692a(4).  DSNB, or a subsequent owner of the
DSNB debt, contracted the Defendant to collect the alleged debt.
The Defendant collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or
alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household
purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal
Service, telephone and internet.

C Services is the largest privately-held outsourcing provider of
call center management and collection agency services in North
America.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yaakov Saks, Esq.
          RC LAW GROUP, PLLC
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Telephone: (201) 282 6500
          Facsimile: (201) 282 6501


GREAT AMERICAN: Settlement in "Goertzen" Suit Has Final Approval
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOYCE GOERTZEN, an individual, individually and on
behalf of herself all similarly-situated persons, by and through
her power of attorney BEVERLY KRAUS, Plaintiff, v. GREAT AMERICAN
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, and DOES 1-50, Defendants, Case No. 4:16-
cv-00240-YGR (N.D. Cal.), Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers of the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California,
Oakland Division, granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Final
Approval of Class Action Settlement.

The Plaintiff's Motion came on for hearing before the Court on
March 27, 2018.

Judge Rogers finally certified for settlement purposes the Class,
as defined in Section II.13 of the Settlement Agreement.  She
directed the Parties and their counsel to implement and
consummate the Settlement Agreement according to its terms and
provisions.

The Judge awarded the Class Counsel attorneys' fees in the amount
of $370,513.69 and expenses and costs in the amount of $20,000.
These amounts cover any and all claims for attorneys' fees,
expenses, and costs incurred by any and all the Class Counsel in
connection with the Settlement of the Action and the
administration of such Settlement.  The Class Counsel Payment
will be provided by Great American to the Class Counsel in
accordance with Sections IX.B.5 through IX.B.8 of the Settlement
Agreement upon satisfaction of the conditions set forth therein.

As a service award for participation as the Class Representative
in the Action, the Judge awarded $20,000 to Plaintiff Goertzen.
Great American will pay the service award in addition to any
benefits that the Plaintiff is entitled to receive as a Class
Member.  Great American will pay the service award within 10 days
of the Effective Date.

Judge Rogers dismissed on the merits and with prejudice the
Action (and all individual claims and Class claims presented
thereby), without fees or costs to any party except as provided
in the Settlement Agreement.    There being no just reason for
delay, she, in the interests of justice, expressly directed the
Clerk of the Court to enter the Final Order and Judgment, and
decreed that, upon entry, it be deemed a final judgment.  The
Counsel jointly to provide a final accounting/report 45 days from
the date thereof.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/2b2O86 from Leagle.com.

Joyce Goertzen, an individual, individually and on behalf of
herself and all similarly-situated persons, by and through her
power of attorney BEVERLY KRAUS, Plaintiff, represented by Ingrid
M. Evans -- ingrid@evanslaw.com  -- The Evans Law Firm.

Great American Life Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by
Robert D. Phillips, Jr. -- bo.phillips@alston.com -- Alston &
Bird, Rachel Adi Naor -- rachel.naor@alston.com -- Alston & Bird
LLP & Thomas A. Evans -- tom.evans@alston.com -- Alston & Bird
LLP.


GRIECO FORD: Papa Sues over Telemarketing Text Message
------------------------------------------------------
VINCENT PAPA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. GRIECO FORD FORT LAUDERDALE, LLC, a
Florida Limited Liability Company, the Defendant, Case No. 1:18-
cv-21897-JEM (S.D. Fla., May 11, 2018), alleges that the car
dealership buys and sells new and used vehicles; and, to promote
its services, engages in unsolicited marketing directly to
consumers' cellular telephones, harming thousands of consumers in
violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff and the Classes:

          Scott A. Edelsberg, Esq.
          Jeff Ostrow, Esq.
          Joshua R. Levine, Esq.
          KOPELOWITZ OSTROW FERGUSON WEISELBERG GILBERT
          1 W. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 500
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: 954 525 4100
          Facsimile: 954 525 4300
          E-mail: edelsberg@kolawyers.com
                  ostrow@kolawyers.com
                  levine@kolawyers.com

               - and -

          Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
          14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 400
          Miami, FL 33132
          Telephone: (305) 479 2299
          E-mail: ashamis@shamisgentile.com

               - and -

          Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq.
          HIRALDO P.A.
          401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 400 4713
          E-mail: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com


HOMELAND SECURITY: Class Certification Sought in Immigrants Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled D.A., S.K., and L.M., on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v.
Kirstjen NIELSEN, Secretary of Homeland Security; Thomas D.
HOMAN, Deputy Director and Senior Official Performing the Duties
of the Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
Matthew ALBENCE, Executive Associate Director for Enforcement and
Removal Operations, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
John TSOUKARIS, Newark Field Office Director for Enforcement and
Removal, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Jefferson B.
SESSIONS, Attorney General of the United States; and James
McHENRY, Director, Executive Office of Immigration Review; all in
their official capacities, the Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-
09214-ES-CLW (D.N.J.), the Plaintiffs will move the Court on June
18, 2018, for an Order granting Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

A copy of the Notice of Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=yhrTO9UW

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Vincent E. Gentile, Esq.
          Ingrid D. Johnson, Esq.
          Antoinette Snodgrass, Esq.
          Brendan P. McHugh, Esq.
          DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP
          105 College Road East
          Princeton, NJ 08542-0627
          Telephone: (609) 716 6500
          Facsimile: (609) 799 7000

Attorneys for Defendants:

          David Dauenheimer, Esq.
          UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
          District of New Jersey
          970 Broad Street, Suite 700
          Newark, NJ 07302


HOMES OF OPPORTUNITY: Belmont Seeks to Certify Class
----------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled Susan Belmont, on behalf of herself and
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. Homes of
Opportunity, Inc. and Lawrence A. Maniaci, the Defendants, Case
No. 4:18-cv-10854-LVP-MKM (E.D. Mich.), the Hon. Judge Linda V.
Parker entered an order:

   1. granting Plaintiff's pre-discovery motion for conditional
      certification and judicial notice on behalf of:

      "all persons who are or have been employed by Defendants
      Homes of Opportunity, Inc. and Lawrence A. Maniaci as
      Residential Services Managers and similar positions for any
      of the homes Defendants operate in Michigan from three
      years before the date of this Order to the present";

   2. directing Defendants to provide Plaintiff the name, last
      known address, telephone number and date of birth of
      putative class members in Excel format within 14 days of
      the instant Order; and

   3. directing Plaintiff to may send a Notice of Pendency of
      Fair Labor Standards Act Lawsuit and Consent to Join.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=yQErro8P


ICS CAPITAL: Mungin-Bryan Sues over Debt Collection Practices
-------------------------------------------------------------
Patricia Mungin-Bryan a/k/a Patricia E. Mungin, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. ICS
Capital, LLC and John Does 1-25, the Defendant(s), Case No. 4:18-
cv-00348 (E.D. Tex., May 11, 2018), seeks damages and declaratory
relief under the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act.

According to the complaint, some time prior to June 5, 2017, an
obligation was allegedly incurred to Continental Finance
MasterCard. The Continental obligation arose out of transactions
in which money, property, insurance or services, were the subject
of the transactions. Specifically, the Plaintiff used the
Continental credit card primarily for personal, family or
household purposes. Continental or a subsequent owner of the
Continental debt contracted with the Defendant to collect the
alleged debt. The Defendant collects and attempts to collect
debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal,
family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the
United States Postal Services, telephone and internet.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          RC LAW GROUP, PLLC
          Yaakov Saks, Esq.
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Telephone: (201) 282 6500
          Facsimile: (201) 282 6501
          E-mail: ysaks@rclawgroup.com


IDAVM GROUP: "Garcia" Suit Seeks Overtime Pay under FLSA
--------------------------------------------------------
ANDRES GARCIA, TUGSBILEGT GONGOR, and DMITRO MIKHAYLOVSKY,
individually, and on behalf of others similarly situated, the
Plaintiffs, v. IDAVM GROUP ENTERPRISES, INC., IDAVM MULTI GROUP
ENTERPRISES, INC., MARINOV IM EMPIRE, INC., MARINOV IM POWER,
INC., d/b/a Sarpino's Pizzeria and IVAN MARINOV, the Defendants,
Case No. 1:18-cv-03525 (N.D. Ill., May 18, 2018), seeks to
recover premium and overtime pay as required by the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs regularly worked more
than 40 hours per workweek but were never paid the required
premium for those overtime hours as required by the FLSA. In
addition, the Plaintiffs drove their own automobiles to deliver
pizza and other food items to Defendants' customers but were
never reimbursed for any costs associated with operating their
vehicles during these deliveries. Plaintiff-Drivers' automobile
and mileage costs were substantial, such that their actual
regular rates of pay fell below the minimum wage and violated the
FLSA's requirement that an employee earn the required minimum
wage "free and clear" of any benefits the employee -- here, the
mileage costs -- reimburses their employer.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs, Proposed Collective Action Members, and
Proposed Class Action Members:

          Thomas A. Doyle, Esq.
          WEXLER WALLACE LLP
          55 West Monroe Street, Suite 3300
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 346 2222
          E-mail: tad@wexlerwallace.com

               - and -

          Matthew L. Turner, Esq.
          Rod M. Johnston, Esq.
          SOMMERS SCHWARTZ, P.C.
          One Towne Square, 17th Floor
          Southfield, MI 48076
          Telephone: (248) 355 0300
          E-mail: mturner@sommerspc.com
                  rjohnston@sommerspc.com


ILG TECHNOLOGIES: "Murray" Suit Moved to S.D. Georgia
-----------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Lloyd Dan Murray and Jennifer
McGhan, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, v. ILG Technologies, LLC, doing
business as: ILG Information Technologies and Baris Misman,
Individually and a Sole Proprietor of ILG Information
Technologies, the Defendants, Case No. 2017-V-355, was removed
from the Superior Court of Bryan County, to the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Georgia (Savannah) on May 11,
2018. The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 4:18-cv-00110-
LGW-GRS to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge
Lisa G. Wood.[BN]

The Plaintiffs appear pro se.


ILLINOIS: Court Denies Bid to Certify Class in "Kolton" Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANTHONY D. KOLTON, S. DAVID GOLDBERG, and JEFFREY S.
SCULLEY, individually and on behalf of a class of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. MICHAEL W. FRERICHS, Treasurer
of the State of Illinois, Defendant, Case No. 16 C 3792 (N.D.
Ill.), Judge Charles P. Kocoras of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, denied the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification.

The Plaintiffs bring the class action against Frerichs,
challenging the constitutionality of a provision of the Illinois
Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act ("UPA").  Their
Amended Complaint challenges the constitutionality of the UPA,
claiming that the Act authorizes the State to take certain
private property for public use without just compensation.  They
sue the Treasurer of the State Illinois, Frerichs, in his
official capacity.

Once in his custody, Frerichs places the funds (or in the case of
tangible property, the proceeds from the sale thereof) into the
Unclaimed Property Trust Fund.  According to the Plaintiffs, the
property that is submitted to Frerichs in accordance with the Act
earns interest, dividends or other accruals, and is sometimes
held in interest-bearing accounts or instruments.  The interest
earned on unclaimed property is deposited into the General
Revenue Fund pursuant to the State Finance Act.

The Act is not an escheat statute; it is purely custodial in
nature.  In essence, the Plaintiffs allege, the Act prohibits
owners from receiving interest, dividends, or other income or
increments earned on their property while in the State's custody.
The Plaintiffs allege that the Act, by allowing the State to
retain interest and other income on unclaimed property, as well
as beneficially use the property without paying the owner,
constitutes a taking without just compensation.

The named Plaintiffs are all owners of property that is currently
in Frerichs' custody.  They allege that their property has been
used for public purposes, including by investing the property and
earning interest, and otherwise using it to fund the state's
operations and programs.  They assert that under Sections 1025/15
and 1025/20 of the Act, if they claim their property, Frerichs
will return it, but he will not compensate them for the interest
accrued and seized by the State, nor for the State's use of the
property while in its custody.

The Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalf and as a
class action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.  They
request the Court to (1) declare that the State is required to
pay just compensation for its taking of property while in its
custody and determine the proper measure of just compensation,
and (2) issue an injunction to ensure that Frerichs complies with
the Court's declaration.

The Plaintiffs now seek class certification.  They seek
certification for the class of all persons who are owners of
property in the Illinois unclaimed property program that is in
the form of money.  They contend that the proposed class
satisfies all of the requirements of Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2).
Frerichs contends that (1) the proposed class is overbroad and
presents dissimilar questions of fact and law, and (2)
controlling case law limits the Plaintiffs' claims (and the
potential class) to those involving interest-bearing accounts.

The parties agree that the proposed class meets two of the four
requirements under Rule 23(a).  Additionally, Frerichs concedes
that the Plaintiffs' counsel are competent to be class counsel
and satisfy the adequacy and fairness requirement of Rule
23(a)(4).  Judge Kocoras focuses his analysis on the remaining
requirements, commonality and typicality, which tend to merge.

The Judge is certain that the Plaintiffs' proposed class is
overly broad and would necessarily raise dissimilar questions of
law and fact.  The Plaintiffs attempted to achieve commonality by
reframing the class as those whose property was already in the
form of money when it was delivered to the State and those whose
non-cash property was sold by the Treasurer after delivery and
thus liquidated into cash.  By focusing on the form of the
property now that it is in the State's custody, the Judge says
the Plaintiffs neglect the case law that makes explicit that
property owners are only entitled to the interest on their
property if they were already earning interest on it before the
State took custody.  It would be difficult to apply this law
across-the-board to the proposed class because it would first
require a determination of whose property was previously earning
interest and whose was not.  Dissimilarities within the proposed
class are what have the potential to impede the generation of
common answers.

The Judge further finds that the Plaintiffs' proposed class may
include members whose property was previously earning interest
and those whose property was not.  This precludes commonality.
Furthermore, typicality does not exist where class
representatives have to rely on a different legal theory than the
rest of the class.

Finally, Frerichs raises a point that is worthy of short
discussion in case the Plaintiffs desire to reframe their class
and seek certification again.  Frerichs argues that any
injunctive relief sought by the proposed class must be
prospective, not retrospective.  The Judge finds that the
Plaintiffs seem to agree with Frerichs, pointing out that the
class is defined in such a way that only persons who are still
property owners under the program, i.e., those who have not yet
claimed their property or whose claims are still pending, will
benefit from declaratory and injunctive relief.

Thus, Frerichs' concern about retrospective relief should be
relieved.  Frerichs further contends that the proposed class'
right to interest should begin from the date of the injunction
going forward.  The Judge holds that such a determination is
beyond the scope of class certification and is not yet ripe for
consideration.

For these reasons, Judge Kocoras denied the Plaintiffs' Motion
for Class Certification.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
is available at https://is.gd/fMCvZw from Leagle.com.

Anthony D. Kolton & S David Goldberg, individually and on behalf
of classes of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by Terry Rose Saunders, Esq. -- tsaunders@saunders-
lawfirm.com -- THE SAUNDERS LAW FIRM; and Thomas Arthur Doyle,
Esq. -- tad@wexlerwallace.com -- Wexler Wallace LLP.

Jeffrey Sculley, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas Arthur Doyle,
Wexler Wallace LLP.

Michael W Frerichs, Treasurer of the State of Illinois,
Defendant, represented by Michael D. Arnold, Illinois Attorney
General's Office, Sarah Hughes Newman, Illinois Attorney General
& Thomas A. Ioppolo, Illinois Attorney General's Office.


INTERACTIVE INTELLIGENCE: Court Junks "Trahan" Securities Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KARL TRAHAN Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. INTERACTIVE INTELLIGENCE GROUP,
INC., DONALD E. BROWN, MITCHELL E. DANIELS, EDWARD L. HAMBURG,
MICHAEL C. HEIM, MARK E. HILL, RICHARD A. RECK, GENESYS
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LABORATORIES, INC., GIANT MERGER SUB, INC.,
GREENEDEN LUX 3 S.aR.L., GREENEDEN U.S. HOLDINGS I, LLC,
GREENEDEN U.S. HOLDINGS II, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 1:16-cv-
03161-SEB-MPB (S.D. Ind.), Judge Sarah Evans Barker of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis
Division, granted the Defendants' motions to dismiss Trahan's
Amended Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P..

Trahan was a shareholder of Interactive, an Indiana corporation,
before it was acquired in a cash-out merger by Genesys, a
California corporation.  Trahan has now filed the putative class
action, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
against both companies and Interactive's board of directors under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for issuing a false and
misleading proxy solicitation statement in connection with
Interactive's shareholders' approval of the Merger.

The Proxy Statement was filed on Oct. 4, 2016, announcing a
special shareholders' meeting on Nov. 9, 2016, for a vote on the
Merger and soliciting the shareholders' favorable proxies.  It
included a section presenting "Certain Interactive Unaudited
Prospective Financial Information," which it referred to as "the
Forecasts," and which Trahan's complaint refers to as "the
financial projections."  These consisted of certain non-public
unaudited prospective financial information prepared by
Interactive management updated in the third quarter of 2016.  The
Management Forecasts were presented to the Directors in
evaluating the Merger and to Union Square in preparing its
fairness opinion.

At the Nov. 9, 2016, special meeting, Interactive's shareholders
approved the Merger by a majority of outstanding shares.  This
lawsuit was filed immediately thereafter, on Nov. 18, 2016.  The
Merger closed on Dec. 1, 2016.  The now operative Amended
Complaint was filed on Feb. 27, 2017.

Now before the Court are motions to dismiss Trahan's Amended
Complaint, filed by the Directors, and by Interactive and
Genesys, which join the Directors' motion and argument in whole.

Judge Barker finds that Trahan faults the Directors for using the
Management Forecasts to deceive stockholders as to Interactive's
true prospects by disclosing projections only through 2018 --
regardless of whether any longer-range projections existed,
thereby concealing the fact that Interactive expected explosive
growth to occur well beyond 2018.  The truncated disclosure
implied that Interactive's business was expected to level off
after 2018.  The Judge finds these allegations sufficient to
satisfy the PSLRA's pleading standards.  However, they fail to
plausibly allege a misleading omission of material fact.  And, in
any event, they are sheltered by the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA") safe harbor.

Trahan next faults the Management Forecasts for failing to
disclose Interactive's financial projections by product line.  By
not doing so, the Directors misled stockholders about the true
nature of Interactive's prospects for growth.  That is,
Interactive's three businesses featured] markedly different
financial attributes and radically different growth profiles.
Presentation of Interactive's business as a singular, monolithic
entity conceals the markedly different prospects for each of
Interactive's business lines.  Again, the Judge finds these
allegations sufficient to satisfy the PSLRA's pleading standards,
but insufficient to plausibly allege a misleading omission of
material fact for which the Directors are not sheltered by the
PSLRA safe harbor.

Trahan next faults Union Square's DCF analysis.  For the inputs
of that analysis, Union Square estimated net cash flows using the
Management Forecasts; selected a cost-of-capital discount ranging
from 9.0% to 11.0%; and derived a terminal value upon application
of illustrative perpetuity growth rates, selected on the basis of
Union Square's professional judgment experience, ranging from
3.5% to 4.5%.  The Judge finds these allegations sufficient to
satisfy the PSLRA's pleading standards, but insufficient to
plausibly allege a material and knowingly false or misleadingly
incomplete statement of opinion for which the Directors are not
sheltered by the PSLRA safe harbor.

As to the Directors' opinions recommending the Merger, Judge
Barker holds that because Trahan has pleaded no facts permitting
a plausible inference that this opinion and its supporting reason
were not given in good faith and with a reasonable basis, this
theory must fail.   Trahan's Omnicare claim too necessarily
fails.  All of Trahan's supposed investigative defects were
patent on the face of the Proxy Statement.  It cannot, therefore,
be said that facts as to how the Directors formed their opinions
were contrary to what a reasonable investor would expect, but not
stated.

Finally, Trahan has failed to plead a plausible claim of loss
causation.  The Judge finds that Trahan has alleged no more than
a speculative possibility that he was economically injured by any
misrepresentation in connection with the Merger.  And that is not
enough.

For all these reasons, the Amended Complaint fails to state a
Section 19(a) claim.  Accordingly, the motions to dismiss are
granted as to the Section 19(a) claim.  Because she has
determined that Trahan's complaint fails to state a claim under
Section 19(a), it necessarily fails to state a claim under
Section 20(a).  Accordingly, she granted the motions to dismiss
as to the Section 20(a) claim.

Judge Barker invited the parties to submit briefing on any Rule
11(b) issues as may have arisen during the prosecution of the
case.  Final judgment will be entered in favor of the Directors,
Interactive, and Genesys once such briefing, if any, has been
received and considered.  The parties will have 21 days from the
date of the Order to submit such briefing.

Judge Barker dismissed with prejudice the Amended Complaint.
Final judgment will be entered by separate document following
receipt and consideration of any Rule 11 briefing.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/wrKKpU from Leagle.com.

KARL TRAHAN, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by David T. Wissbroecker --
DWissbroecker@rgrdlaw.com -- ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP,
pro hac vice, Eun Jin Lee -- elee@rgrdlaw.com -- ROBBINS GELLER
RUDMAN & DOWD LLP, pro hac vice & Kathleen A. Musgrave Farinas --
kf@lgkflaw.com -- GEORGE & FARINAS, LLP.

INTERACTIVE INTELLIGENCE GROUP, INC., GENESYS TELECOMMUNICATIONS
LABORATORIES, INC., GIANT MERGER SUB, INC., GREENEDEN LUX 3
S.aR.L., GREENEDEN U.S. HOLDINGS I, LLC & GREENEDEN U.S. HOLDINGS
II, LLC, Defendants, represented by John R. Maley --
john.maley@btlaw.com -- BARNES & THORNBURG LLP.

DONALD E. BROWN, MITCHELL E. DANIELS, EDWARD L. HAMBURG, MICHAEL
C. HEIM, MARK E. HILL & RICHARD A. RECK, Defendants, represented
by Daniel R. Kelley -- daniel.kelley@FaegreBD.com -- FAEGRE BAKER
DANIELS LLP, David K. Herzog -- david.herzog@FaegreBD.com --
FAEGRE BAKER DANIELS LLP, Justin R. Olson --
justin.olson@FaegreBD.com -- FAEGRE BAKER DANIELS LLP & Paul A.
Wolfla -- paul.wolfla@FaegreBD.com -- FAEGRE BAKER DANIELS LLP.


ISOLATOR FITNESS: Halling Sues over Telemarketing Texts
-------------------------------------------------------
EMMA HALLING, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. ISOLATOR FITNESS, INC., the
Defendant, Case No. 5:18-cv-02107-JFL (E.D. Pa., May 18, 2018),
seeks damages, injunctive relief, equitable relief, and any other
relief deemed just and proper arising from Defendant's violation
of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant violates the TCPA by
sending telemarketing texts to Plaintiff's telephone and the
telephones of other class members using automatic telephone
dialing systems without their prior express consent, and by
placing telemarketing texts to Plaintiff's and other class
members' cellular telephones in the absence of or after they had
withdrawn any consent for such calls.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Proposed Classes:

          James A. Hunter, Esq.
          HUNTER & KMIEC
          255 West 94th Street, No. 10M
          New York, NY 10025
          Telephone: (646) 666 0122
          Facsimile: (646) 462 3356
          E-mail: hunter@hunterkmiec.com

               - and -

          Sharon J. Carson, Esq.
          Arthur Stock, Esq.
          Lane L. Vines, Esq.
          BERGER & MONTAGUE, P.C.
          1622 Locust Street
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 875 3000
          Facsimile: (215) 875 4604
          E-mail: scarson@bm.net
                  astock@bm.net
                  lvine@bm.net


JEFFERSON COUNTY, KY: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss "Healey" Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JACOB HEALEY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. JEFFERSON
COUNTY KENTUCKY LOUISVILLE METRO GOVERNMENT, et al., Defendants,
Civil Action No. 3:17-cv-71-DJH (W.D. Ky.), Judge David J. Hale
of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky,
Louisville Division, (i) denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss
the class allegations and motion for an extension of time to file
their answer to the Plaintiffs' complaint; (ii) denied without
prejudice the Defendants' motion to strike the Plaintiffs'
attached exhibit; and (iii) granted the Plaintiffs' motion for
leave to file a second amended complaint and their request for a
status conference but denied their motion for a hearing as
premature.

Healey and Larry Louis Hibbs, Jr., bring the putative class
action against Louisville-Jefferson County Metro Government and
Director of Louisville Metro Department of Corrections Mark
Bolton, alleging violations of state law and seeking relief under
42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for alleged violations of their
constitutional rights.  The action arises from the Defendants'
alleged practice of detaining individuals past their release
dates and failing to comply with state-court orders concerning
work release and home incarceration.

The Plaintiffs' complaint depicts a troubling practice in which
the Defendants have systematically failed to comply with state
court orders pertaining to individuals' release dates, work
releases, and home incarcerations.  The complaint names as the
class representatives Healey and Hibbs.

In January 2017, the Jefferson County District Court ordered
Jacob Healey incarcerated for 72 hours with work release.
Despite the Court order, the Plaintiffs allege, Healey was not
released until he had served approximately 85 hours, none of
which included work release.  In July 2016, the Jefferson County
District Court ordered Plaintiff Hibbs, incarcerated for 30 days
with extended work release.  The Plaintiffs allege that despite
the Court order, the Defendants refused Hibbs work release for
the first 10 days of his sentence.

In support of their putative class action, the Plaintiffs claim
that the Defendants' treatment of Healey and Hibbs is
representative of an accepted, widespread practice on the part of
the Defendants, who regularly and unlawfully falsely imprison,
detain or incarcerate persons longer than ordered by the Courts
of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.  The Plaintiffs thus seek to
represent all persons who have been unlawfully falsely
imprisoned, detained or incarcerated longer than ordered by the
Courts of the Commonwealth of Kentucky within the last year.
They seek actual and punitive damages under Section 1983,
declaratory and injunctive relief, and damages under state law
for negligence, gross negligence, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.

The Defendants have moved to dismiss the class allegations
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).1 (D.N. 5).
Meanwhile, the Plaintiffs have moved for a hearing on their
motions for preliminary injunction and class certification, for
leave to file a second amended complaint, and for a status
conference.  The Plaintiffs' proposed second amended complaint
seeks to add three additional named class representatives.  The
Defendants oppose the Plaintiffs' motions for a hearing and for
leave to file a second amended complaint.  In addition, the
Defendants have moved to strike a Jefferson County District Court
order attached in support of the Plaintiff's motion for a
hearing.

Judge Hale finds that the Plaintiffs' proposed class does not
constitute an impermissible fail-safe class.  He also finds that
it is possible for the Plaintiffs to satisfy Rule 23's
prerequisites.  Because from the face of the Plaintiffs'
complaint it does not appear that it would be impossible to
certify the proposed class, the Judge will deny the Defendants'
motion to dismiss the class allegations.  With that said, he says
nothing in the order will be construed as an indication that the
Court will grant certification in the future.  The Defendants
have identified several reasons why the Plaintiffs' claims may
not be amenable to class-action treatment.

Next, the Judge finds that of the three proposed representatives,
only James Michael Jarvis, Jr. alleges unconstitutional over-
detention.  The other proposed representatives' claims arise from
the Defendants' failure to grant work release or home
incarceration.  The Defendants thus raise their previous
commonality argument in opposition to the Plaintiffs' motion.  As
discussed, although such claims are likely not typical of or
common to the claims that Healey seeks to bring on behalf of
those members alleging over-detention, the Court's power to
divide the proposed class into subclasses might alleviate this
problem.  The Judge declines to address this issue until it is
more fully briefed.  Additionally, because this issue will be
addressed at the class-certification stage, the Defendants will
not suffer prejudice or disadvantage if he allows the Plaintiffs
to include their proposed class representatives at this time.
Accordingly, the Judge will grant the Plaintiffs' motion for
leave to file a second amended complaint.

Judge Hale denies the Plaintiffs' motion for a hearing as
premature.  He reasons that the Plaintiffs have not filed a
motion for class certification or preliminary injunction -- the
latter of which is not even mentioned in their complaint.

Finally, in support of their motion for a hearing, the Plaintiffs
attach a recent order from Jefferson County District Court.  In
the order, the state-court judge requests that the Defendants in
this matter show cause as to why she should not hold them in
contempt of court for their repeated failure to comply with her
orders concerning individuals' release dates, work releases, etc.
In their response to the Plaintiffs' motion for a hearing, the
Defendants move to strike the state-court order, arguing that it
is replete with errors and does not form a basis for injunctive
relief or class certification.  In resolving the pending motions,
the Judge has not considered the attached state-court order.
Moreover, in any potential hearing on the issue of class
certification or injunctive relief, he says the Defendants may
raise many of the arguments they raise in their current motion.
He will therefore deny without prejudice the Defendants' motion
to strike the Plaintiffs' attachment.

For the reasons set forth, Judge Hale (i) denied the Defendants'
motion to dismiss the class allegations; (ii) denied without
prejudice the Defendants' motion to strike Plaintiffs'
attachment; (iii) denied as unnecessary the Defendants' motion
for an extension of time to file their answer to the Plaintiffs'
complaint; (iv) denied without prejudice the Plaintiffs' motion
for a hearing; and (v) granted the Plaintiffs' motion for leave
to file a second amended complaint and motion for a status
conference.

The Plaintiffs will have 14 days from the date of entry of the
Order within which to file an amended complaint.  The Defendants
will have 14 days thereafter in which to file their answer to the
Plaintiffs' second amended complaint.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(A), the Judge referred the matter
to U.S. Magistrate Judge Dave Whalin for resolution of all
litigation planning issues, entry of scheduling orders,
consideration of amendments thereto, and resolution of all non-
dispositive matters, including discovery issues.  Judge Whalin is
further authorized to conduct a settlement conference in the
matter at any time.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/l7zJOQ from Leagle.com.

Jacob Healey & Larry Louis Hibbs, Jr., Plaintiffs, represented by
Camille A. Bathurst -- camillebathurst@aol.com -- Belzley
Bathurst Attorneys, Gregory A. Belzley -- gbelzley@aol.com --
Belzley Bathurst Attorneys & James D. Ballinger, Ballinger Law,
PLLC.

Jefferson County Kentucky Louisville Metro Government & Mark
Bolton, in his capacity as the Director of Louisville Metro
Department of Corrections, Defendants, represented by J. Denis
Ogburn, Jefferson County Attorney.


JPMORGAN CHASE: Bid to Dismiss Amended "Blake" RESPA Suit Granted
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHRISTOPHER BLAKE and CIVIL ACTION JAMES ORKIS,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., CHASE BANK USA, N.A.,
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., and CROSS COUNTRY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants, Case No. 13-06433 (E.D. Pa.), Judge Lawrence F.
Stengel of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss the
amended complaint as untimely.

The putative class action is brought by homeowners claiming
violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
("RESPA").  The Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants carried on a
captive reinsurance scheme, through which they enjoyed kickbacks,
referrals, and fees that are prohibited by RESPA.

The Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint on Nov. 4, 2013,
asserting claims for RESPA violations and common law unjust
enrichment.  Shortly thereafter, the Defendants moved to dismiss
the Plaintiffs' RESPA claims as untimely.

Prior to receiving a disposition on the motion to dismiss, on May
22, 2014 the parties filed a joint motion to stay all proceedings
pending the Third Circuit's decision in Riddle v. Bank of America
Corp.  Riddle addressed the issue of equitable tolling with
respect to RESPA's statute of limitations.  After the Third
Circuit decided Riddle, the stay was lifted on Oct. 28, 2014.
The Judge then ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs on
the motion to dismiss.

Before the motion to dismiss was decided, however, on Feb. 19,
2015, the parties filed another joint motion to stay all
proceedings pending the Third Circuit's decision in Cunningham.
In the joint motion to stay, the parties agreed that the ultimate
resolution of the central issue in the Cunningham action, i.e.
the applicability and application of the doctrine of equitable
tolling, has a very reasonable likelihood of informing the Court
on the resolution of such matters in the case, and advancing the
ultimate disposition of the action.  Months later, during this
Cunningham stay, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
("CFPB") issued a decision in a landmark RESPA case, holding that
RESPA's statute of limitations did not bar claims for kickbacks
that occurred after the closing of home loans.

Several months after this CFPB decision, the Third Circuit
decided Cunningham.  The Plaintiffs in Cunningham were homeowners
who brought the same type the RESPA claim -- based on reinsurance
kickbacks -- that they brought in the case.  Those Plaintiffs did
not file their complaint until years after RESPA's one-year
statute of limitations had expired.  They relied on equitable
tolling to argue that their claims were timely.  The Third
Circuit expressly rejected this equitable tolling argument.  It
found that the Plaintiffs became aware of their RESPA claims much
earlier: on the date of closing when they read certain
disclosures that explained reinsurance.  The Court held that the
Cunningham Plaintiffs were not reasonably diligent in bringing
their claims, which is required of them to enjoy the doctrine of
equitable tolling based on fraudulent concealment.

The Defendants then moved to lift the stay on July 15, 2016,
which the Plaintiffs did not oppose, and the Judge ordered the
stay lifted on Feb. 17, 2017.  On July 20, 2016, the Plaintiffs
moved for leave to file an amended class action complaint and the
Defendants opposed the motion.  The Plaintiffs asserted that
their proposed RESPA claim was substantively identical to the
RESPA claim alleged in the original complaint, and that the only
difference was that they no longer relied on equitable tolling.
Instead, the Plaintiffs argued that their RESPA claims were
triggered each time a kickback payment was made under the
continuing violations doctrine.  The Plaintiffs also sought to
amend the complaint to add RICO claims.

On April 26, 2017, Judge Stengel entered an Order granting in
part and denying in part the Plaintiffs' motion to amend the
complaint.  He denied the Plaintiffs' motion to amend the
complaint to include RICO claims in Counts One and Two.  He
granted the Plaintiffs' complaint with respect to the RESPA claim
in Count Three.  He held that the Defendants violated RESPA each
time they allegedly paid an illegal kickback or fee, or made an
illegal referral, in connection with private mortgage insurance
premiums.  In other words, each violation triggered a new statute
of limitations period under the continuing violations doctrine
and the Plaintiffs' RESPA claim was timely.

On June 14, 2017, the Defendants filed the instant motion to
dismiss the amended complaint.  The Plaintiffs opposed the
Defendants' motion.  The Defendants filed a reply on Aug. 31,
2017.  The Plaintiffs then moved for leave to file a sur-reply
which the Defendants opposed.  On Jan. 23, 2018, the Defendants
filed supplemental authority in further support of their motion
to dismiss and the Plaintiff filed a response.

Judge Stengel finds that the Defendants offer no new arguments
that would convince him that the continuing violations doctrine
is inapplicable.  The Defendants merely assert the same arguments
under the veil of a different standard, which is nothing more
than a second bite at the apple. He finds that the continuing
violations doctrine applies to the Plaintiffs' RESPA claims.

The Judge then finds that, as he previously held in his opinion
deciding the Plaintiffs' motion to amend, RESPA would be violated
each and every time an unlawful fee or kickback was accepted or
delivered.  Each allegation resets RESPA's one-year statute of
limitations, regardless of the Plaintiffs' earlier notice of the
wrongdoing.

The Defendants also assert that the statute of limitations was
not tolled under the American Pipe doctrine.  The Judge finds
that although the American Pipe doctrine is applicable to the
case, the Plaintiffs' forfeited that tolling when they filed the
instant class action complaint before the final resolution of
class certification in Samp, et al. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
et al.  Therefore, the action is untimely and the Plaintiffs'
RESPA claims are dismissed.

Having dismissed the Plaintiffs' RESPA claims as untimely, the
Judge declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over their
remaining state law claims for unjust enrichment.  Accordingly,
Count Four is dismissed without prejudice.

Judge Stengel finds that the Plaintiffs' amended complaint is
untimely.  He is granted with prejudice the Defendants' motion to
Dismiss the Plaintiffs' RESPA claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
He granted without prejudice the Defendants' motion to dismiss
the Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim, and the amended
complaint is dismissed.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/FjwIu3 from Leagle.com.

CHRISTOPHER BLAKE & JAMES ORKIS, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF
ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiffs, represented by JOSEPH
H. MELTZER -- jmeltzer@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check,
LLP, TERENCE S. ZIEGLER -- tziegler@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz
Meltzer & Check, LLP & NATALIE LESSER -- nlesser@ktmc.com --
KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK, LLP.

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., CHASE BANK USA, N.A., JPMORGAN CHASE &
CO. & CROSS COUNTRY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants, represented by
ANN DESEAR WILES -- awiles@buckleysandler.com -- BUCKLEYSANDLER
LLP, MATTHEW P. PREVIN -- mprevin@buckleysandler.com -- BUCKLEY
SANDLER LLP, SAMANTHA L. SOUTHALL -- samantha.southall@bipc.com -
- BUCHANAN INGERSOLL & ROONEY PC & SAMUEL W. BRAVER --
samuel.braver@bipc.com -- GORDON & REES LLP.


JUUL LABS: e-Cigarettes Deceptively Addictive, Cooper Claims
------------------------------------------------------------
CARL COOPER, AN INDIVIDUAL, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF, THE GENERAL
PUBLIC AND THOSE SIMILARLY SITUATED, the PLAINTIFFS, v. JUUL
LABS, INC.; PAX LABS, INC.; AND DOES 1-50, the Defendant, Case
No. CGC-18-566496 (Cal. Super Ct., May 11, 2018), seeks to put an
end to JUUL's "unscrupulous" practices and provide relief to
consumers for the economic losses caused by JUUL's deceptively
addictive products.

The case arises out of Defendants' false and deceptive
advertising of JUUL e-cigarettes and JUUL pods, including their
unfair, unlawful, and fraudulent practices of marketing those
products as safe, candy-like products that are attractive to
minors and nonsmokers, when they in fact contain more potent
doses of nicotine than cigarettes, making them particularly
addictive, and without disclosing any of the myriad problems that
are likely to occur from the use of the products, including long-
term nicotine addiction; increased risk of heart disease and
stroke; changes in brain functionality that lead to increased
susceptibility to anxiety, depression and other addictions;
decreased functionality of the endocrine system; heightened risk
of cancer; and negative effects on fertility.

Released in 2015, JUUL now dominates the $3 billion e-cigarette
market in the United States, beating out established competitors
like Philip Morris. The secret to JUUL's success is simple: JUUL
e-cigarettes' patented nicotine formulation is more addictive
than anything else on the market, including the most potent
cigarettes. Instead of disclosing this material fact to
consumers, JUUL launched a multi-million dollar marketing
campaign targeting children and young adults in an effort to
brand the JUUL e-cigarette as a fashion accessory sold in
"limited edition" colors and candy-like flavors. Having
accomplished its goal of creating a massive user base of addicts
-- many of whom are children -- whose intense nicotine cravings
can only be satiated by JUUL's ultra-potent nicotine formulation,
JUUL recently rebranded itself. Gone from its website are the
youthful colors and images of glamorous young models seductively
exhaling vapor clouds. JUUL's website now pictures middle-aged
adults in workaday settings and suggests that JUUL exists solely
for the benefit of adult smokers looking for an alternative to
smoking. Defendants' attempt to distance themselves from their
wrongful conduct is superficial and does not undo the damage they
have caused, nor does it change their fundamentally unscrupulous
business model. JUUL's e-cigarettes are still as addictive as
they ever were, are still sold in candy-like flavors, and can now
be ordered with a subscription service on JUUL's website. JUUL
was and is in the business of addicting consumers to its product.
Defendants advertise JUUL e-cigarettes as "the satisfying
alternative to cigarettes." Defendants' web site at juulvapor.com
touts the JUUL e-cigarette as "the iPhone of E-cigs," thereby
framing them as a cool, fashionable item to own and use.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Adam J. Gutride, Esq.
          Seth A. Safier, Esq.
          Todd Kennedy, Esq.
          Anthony Patek, Esq.
          GUTRIDE SAFIER LLP
          100 Pine Street, Suite 1250
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 639 9090
          Facsimile: (415) 449 6469
          E-mail: adam@gutridesafier.com
                  seth@gutridesafier.com
                  todd@gutridesafier.com
                  anthony@gutridesafier.com

               - and -

          Nicholas Migliaccio, Esq.
          Jason Rathod, Esq.
          Esfand Nafisi, Esq.
          MIGLIACCIO & RATHOD LLP
          412 H Street NE, Suite 302
          Washington, D.C. 20002
          Telephone: (202) 470 3520
          E-mail: enafisi@classlawdc.com


LABORATORY CORP: Court Dismisses "Sullivan" Suit
------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHELLE SULLIVAN and HOLDEN SHERIFF, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
LABORATORY CORPORATION OF AMERICA HOLDINGS, Defendant, Case No.
1:17cv193 (M.D. N.C.), Judge Thomas D. Schroeder of the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina granted
LabCorp's motion to dismiss and denied without prejudice as moot
LabCorp's motion to strike class allegations.

LabCorp is a holding company of numerous subsidiaries that
provides laboratory testing services to healthcare recipients
internationally.  Each Plaintiff is an insured who had testing
performed by LabCorp and whose insurance did not cover some or
all of the cost.

The complaint is devoid of any allegation that either Plaintiff
ordered her testing directly from LabCorp.  Rather, at least one
allegation suggests that a referring physician ordered the tests
on behalf of her patient, and a sample LabCorp invoice for
Plaintiff Holden Sheriff states that the bill is for laboratory
services requested by his physician.  In any event, each
Plaintiff was initially invoiced the rack rate for the tests not
covered by insurance.  The Plaintiffs are expected to pay this
rate even though their insurers, or others, would have been
charged a lesser amount for the same tests.  They acknowledge
they are liable to LabCorp for some cost, but they contend they
should only have to pay the fair market value of those specific
tests which would be substantially similar to the rate the
patient's insurer would have paid had the lab services been
covered.

At no point before accepting the tests did either the Plaintiff
inquire as to the cost.  Instead, each assumed she would be
charged a reasonable amount. There is no allegation that the
Plaintiffs based their assumptions on any conduct or
representation by LabCorp.  Nor is there any indication of what
information, if any, the health care providers who ordered tests
on behalf of any Plaintiff knew about the cost and pricing
policies of LabCorp, or whether any Plaintiff had any discussion
with any provider about the same.

The Plaintiffs filed the present action on March 8, 2016. They
allege that LabCorp's practice of charging uninsured and
underinsured customers multiples over the insured pricing,
failure to disclose in advance the price of each test, and
failure to itemize invoices to show how much of each test is
covered by insurance confuse patients as to what they owe,
constitute unfair and deceptive trade practices, and lie at the
root of a national healthcare crisis.

Each Plaintiff initially seeks recovery under the North Carolina
Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("UDTPA") (Count I).
Alternatively, each seeks recovery under her own state's law:
Sullivan seeks recovery under the California Consumers Legal
Remedies Act ("CLRA")(Count III), and the California Unfair
Competition Law ("UCL")(Count IV); and Sheriff seeks recovery
under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA") (Count V).
Both the Plaintiffs also allege claims of implied contract and
unjust enrichment (Count VII), as well as common law fraud (Count
VIII).

The Plaintiffs seek to certify a national class on behalf of all
persons who were charged fees for services by LabCorp that were
in excess of the negotiated or mandated fair value market rates
established for those services between LabCorp and private or
public health insurers.  To this extent, they rely on North
Carolina's UDTPA (Count I)), as well as the law of implied
contract and unjust enrichment (Count VII) and "common law fraud"
(Count VIII), which they contend in their briefing should be that
of North Carolina, too.

The Plaintiffs also seek to bring their action on behalf of two
sub-classes for class members made up of the two states from
which they hail and under that state's law: Tennessee and
Maryland.  They seek a declaration that LabCorp has engaged in
unlawful conduct, damages, a constructive trust, an injunction,
and attorneys' fees.

LabCorp now moves to dismiss the Plaintiffs' complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and to
strike class allegations.

Judge Schroeder holds that the Plaintiffs' complaint fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  He finds that
(i) the Plaintiffs fail to state a plausible claim under the
UDTPA, even if applicable; (ii) the Plaintiffs' claim for quasi-
contract or unjust enrichment fails; (iii) the Plaintiffs have
offered no authority in North Carolina that requires a service
provider to disclose the rates it charges others with whom it has
negotiated discount, hence cannot proceed under claims styled
under North Carolina law; (iv) there is also no allegation that
LabCorp acted in a misleading way or interacted with Sullivan in
an exigent circumstance to induce her to undergo the tests; and
(v) Sheriff cannot state a claim upon which relief can be granted
under the TCPA.

The Judge further finds that no Plaintiff has moved for class
certification.  Even though Bouffard's and Scott's claims have
been dismissed as moot, their claims nevertheless are identical
to those of the remaining Plaintiffs that were dismissed on the
merits for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.  There is therefore no need to address the questions
raised by the class action allegations.  While it is doubtful
that any other class member could overcome the pleading
deficiencies inherent in the claims alleged, because the
Plaintiffs have not addressed this question, the Judge will
dismiss the action without prejudice.

Finally, the Judge finds that the Plaintiffs have not filed a
motion to amend, nor have they attached a proposed amended
complaint.  Even though it is difficult to imagine how any other
putative class member would be able to articulate a similar claim
that would avoid the fatal deficiencies of the current complaint,
the Plaintiffs have not addressed futility, nor can the Court say
it is so at this stage.  Accordingly, he will deny the
Plaintiffs' request for leave to amend, but the complaint will be
dismissed without prejudice.

For the reasons he stated, Judge Schroeder granted LabCorp's
motion to dismiss and dismissed without prejudice the Plaintiffs'
complaint.  LabCorp's motion to strike class allegations is
denied without prejudice as moot.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/hsXNgZ from Leagle.com.

MICHELLE SULLIVAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED & HOLDEN SHERIFF, INDIVIDUALLY AND BEHALF OF
ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiffs, represented by JEREMY
M. FALCONE -- jeremy.falcone@elliswinters.com -- ELLIS & WINTERS,
LLP, ROBERT C. FINKEL -- rfinkel@wolfpopper.com -- WOLF POPPER
LLP & JONATHAN DREW SASSER -- jon.sasser@elliswinters.com --
ELLIS & WINTERS, LLP.

LABORATORY CORPORATION OF AMERICA HOLDINGS, Defendant,
represented by AARON M. HEALEY -- ahealey@jonesday.com -- JONES
DAY, B. KURT COPPER -- bkcopper@jonesday.com -- JONES DAY,
CHARLES E. RAYNAL, IV -- charlesraynal@parkerpoe.com -- PARKER
POE ADAMS & BERNSTEIN LLP, HEATHER M. O'SHEA --
hoshea@jonesday.com -- JONES DAY & STEPHEN G. SOZIO --
sgsozio@jonesday.com -- JONES DAY.


LGI HOMES: "Munson" Suit Seeks Overtime Wages under FLSA
--------------------------------------------------------
CHRISTOPHER MUNSON, on behalf of himself and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. LGI HOMES
CORPORATION, LLC, the Defendant, Case No. 8:18-cv-01154-EAK-JSS
(M.D. Fla., May 11, 2018), seeks to recover overtime wages,
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff begun working for
Defendant as a licensed Real Estate Agent in April 2016, and he
worked in this capacity February 2018. The Plaintiff and the
Class worked hour in excess of 40 hours within a work week for
Defendant, and they were entitled to be compensated for these
overtime hours at rate equal to one and one-half times their
individual regular hourly rates. The Defendant failed to pay the
Plaintiff and Members of the Class an overtime premium for all of
the overtime hours that they worked, in violation of the
FLSA.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Luis A. Cabassa, Esq.
          WENZEL FENTON CABASSA, P.A.
          1110 N. Florida Avenue, Suite 300
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 224 0431
          Facsimile: (813) 229 8712
          E-mail: leabassa@wfelaw.com
                  twells@wfelaw.com


JOHN MUIR: Court Partly Grants Bid to Dismiss "Martinez" Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KAREN MARTINEZ, individually and on behalf of
similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. JOHN MUIR HEALTH,
Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-05779-CW (N.D. Cal.), Judge Claudia
Wilken of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California granted in part and denied in part the Defendant's
motion to dismiss; and denied as moot the Defendant's motion for
a more definite statement.

Martinez, on behalf of a putative class, brings the wage and hour
suit against the Defendant.  The Defendant is a non-profit
corporation operating primarily in Contra Costa County.  The
Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant as a Case Manager from
May 1, 1997 to Feb. 19, 2016.  She was an hourly-paid, non-exempt
employee earning $79.97 per hour at the time of her termination.

The Plaintiff's regular work schedule was 8:00 am to 4:30 p.m.
She alleges that, beginning in fall 2013, the Defendant
instituted cost-cutting measures that increased the employee-to-
patient ratio.  As a result, she and other employees were
required to perform numerous work duties 'off the clock' so as to
meet the new patient metrics.  She asserts that the amount of
overtime she is due for working off the clock can be calculated
using certain electronic systems used by the Defendant.  The
Plaintiff asserts that the amount of overtime she worked can be
calculated by comparing the time entries from EPIC and MIDAS with
the time entries in KRONOS.  She estimates that she was required
to work approximately 300 hours off the clock and thus is owed
approximately $30,000 in unpaid wages.

The Plaintiff alleges that, despite knowing that she and other
employees were performing work off the clock and without
compensation, the Defendant failed to prevent the performance of
such work.  She alleges that the Defendant knew that employees
such as the Plaintiff were working without compensation because
the Defendant's agents witnessed them doing so at its facility
and because its own electronic systems showed that employees were
working off the clock.

The Plaintiff also regularly worked more than five hours without
taking a meal or rest period.  The Defendant discouraged the
Plaintiff and other employees from taking meal or rest periods by
emphasizing (such as in performance reviews) that the patient is
the primary focus of the team and that employees must provide
competent, compassionate, and timely care.

The Plaintiff filed the suit on Oct. 6, 2017.  Sometime after she
filed suit, the parties scheduled a mediation to attempt to
resolve the case.  The Defendant unilaterally withdrew from the
mediation three days before the scheduled date.  Shortly
thereafter, the Defendant began calling current employees into
"interrogation sessions" where it offered "nuisance value" to
employees owed significant damages.  The Defendant presented
these employees with a letter requesting them to waive their
claims for a net sum of $1,000 per employee.  The letters do not
provide the amount of overtime owed each employee.  The Plaintiff
alleges that these letters are invalid and violate the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA").

On Nov. 17, 2017, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss.  In
lieu of filing an opposition to the Defendant's motion, the
Plaintiff filed the FAC.  The FAC alleges nine causes of action:
(1) failure to pay overtime wages in violation of the FLSA; (2)
failure to pay minimum wages for all hours worked; (3) failure to
pay overtime wages for all hours worked; (4) failure to provide
meal and rest breaks; (5) failure to provide accurate wage
statements; (6) failure to timely pay all wages due; (7) recovery
under the California Private Attorney General Act ("PAGA"); (8)
interfering with court process by failing to disclose amounts due
in negotiating individual settlements; and (9) unfair business
practices.

On Dec. 15, 2017, the Defendant again moved to dismiss the
Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6).  In the alternative, it moves for an order requiring
the Plaintiff to provide a more definite statement pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e).  The Plaintiff filed an
opposition and the Defendant filed a reply.

Judge Wilken finds that the Plaintiff has alleged sufficient
facts to nudge her claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible.  The Plaintiff explains that she is owed overtime for
the time spent inputting information into EPIC and MIDAS that
occurred after she had clocked out of KRONOS.  She further
explains that her base rate of pay was too low because it did not
include certain non-discretionary bonuses that she received.  The
Plaintiff also estimated the length of her average workweek, the
rate at which she was paid, and the amount of overtime wages she
believes she is owed, as well as numerous other supporting
details.  Accordingly, the Judge says the Plaintiff's complaint
provides the Defendant with adequate notice of her first three
causes of action.  The Plaintiff does not merely parrot the
statutory language of the FLSA, as the Defendant suggests.

The Judge next finds that the Plaintiff does allege that the
Defendant discouraged taking rest and lunch breaks by emphasizing
in performance reviews and policies that patient care should be
the priority.  The Plaintiff also alleges that the Defendant
instituted cost-cutting measures that increased the employee-to-
patient ratio, which interfered with taking rest and lunch
breaks. Making all inferences in the Plaintiff's favor, this is
sufficient to support her fourth cause of action.

With respect to the Plaintiff's fifth cause of action for failure
to provide accurate wage statements, the Judge finds that as both
parties acknowledge, this cause of action depends on the
Plaintiff's first through fourth causes of action.  Because those
claims survive, the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's
fifth claim also survives.

The Defendant challenges that the Plaintiff's sixth, seventh, and
ninth causes of action are not sufficiently plead.  As with the
Plaintiff's fifth cause of action, the parties agree that these
claims are derivative of the Plaintiff's other claims.  Again,
the Judge holds, because the Plaintiff's other claims survive,
these claims also survive.

Because the Plaintiff does not allege that she herself received
or signed an offer to settle, she lacks standing to bring the
eighth cause of action.  Thus, the eighth cause of action is
dismissed.  The Judge grants leave to amend to renew this claim
if the Plaintiff timely joins a named co-Plaintiff who suffered
the injury described in the eighth cause of action.  This
dismissal also does not preclude her from bringing a motion for
corrective action to protect the rights of potential class
members, which she appears to have done.

Finally, with respect to the first through seventh and the ninth
causes of action, the Defendant's motion for a more definite
statement pursuant to Rule 12(e) is denied for the reasons given
for denying the Defendant's motion to dismiss.  With respect to
the eighth cause of action, the Judge finds that the Defendant's
motion for a more definite statement is denied as moot.

For these reasons, Judge Wilken denied the Defendant's motion to
dismiss with respect to the first through seventh and the ninth
causes of action; and granted without prejudice with respect to
the eighth cause of action.  She granted leave to amend to renew
this claim if the Plaintiff timely joins a named co-plaintiff who
suffered the injury described in the eighth cause of action.  The
Judge denied the Defendant's motion for a more definite
statement.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/I9g9Nh from Leagle.com.

Karen Martinez, on behalf of herself and all other similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiff, represented by Joshua David
Buck, Thierman Buck, LLP, Leah Lin Jones, Thierman Buck LLP &
Mark R. Thierman, Thierman Buck, LLP.

John Muir Health, Defendant, represented by Robert G. Hulteng --
rhulteng@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C. & Lisa K. Horgan
-- lhorgan@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C.


LIFE INSURANCE: "Walker" Suit Seeks to Certify Class
----------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled JOYCE WALKER, KIM BRUCE HOWLETT, and MURIEL
SPOONER, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, v. LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE
SOUTHWEST, a Texas corporation, the Defendant, Case No. 2:10-cv-
09198-JVS-JDE (C.D. Cal.), the Plaintiffs will move the Court on
June 25, 2018, for an order granting Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification of:

   "all persons who purchased a Provider Policy or Paragon Policy
   from Life Insurance Company of the Southwest that was issued
   between September 24, 2006 and August 30, 2015, and who
   resided in California at the time the Policy was issued."

Alternatively, the Class is defined as:

   "all persons who purchased a Provider Policy or Paragon Policy
   from Life Insurance Company of the Southwest that was issued
   between September 24, 2006 and August 30, 2015, who resided in
   California at the time the Policy was issued, and who received
   an illustration on or before the date of policy application."

A copy of the Notice of Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=T87rCUVU

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Charles N. Freiberg, Esq.
          Brian P. Brosnahan, Esq.
          Daniel A. Saunders, Esq.
          Craig A. Miller, Esq.
          KASOWITZ BENSON TORRES LLP
          101 California Street, Suite 2300
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 421 6140
          Facsimile: (415) 398 5030


LOCALITY LLC: Helzer Seeks Minimum Wage & Overtime Pay
------------------------------------------------------
COLBY HELZER, on behalf of herself and all similarly situated
persons, the Plaintiff, v. LOCALITY LLC, a Colorado limited
liability company, JAMES EDWARDS and JENNIFER EDWARDS, the
Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-01215 (D. Colo., May 17, 2018),
seeks to recover damages and backpay to compensate all current
and former employees of the Defendants for violations of the
federal Fair Labor Standards Act, the Colorado Wage Claim Act,
and the Colorado Minimum Wage Act.

The FLSA, Wage Claim Act and Minimum Wage Order, which govern the
wages and hours of thousands of Colorado employees, establish a
minimum wage and address issues such as employee entitlement to
and calculation of overtime pay.

The misuse of tips and participation of non-tipped employees
invalidates Defendants' tip pool and nullifies Defendants'
entitlement to claim a tip credit against the minimum wage.
Defendants are liable for, among other things, paying a sub-
minimum wage to current and former employees and for all tips
diverted improperly.

Locality, LLC is in the computer software development
business.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brian D. Gonzales, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF
          BRIAN D. GONZALES, PLLC
          2580 East Harmony Road, Suite 201
          Fort Collins, CO 80528
          Telephone: (970) 214 0562
          E-mail: BGonzales@ColoradoWageLaw.com


LOS ANGELES, CA: Transient Occupancy Tax Suits Judgment Affirmed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, In re TRANSIENT OCCUPANCY TAX CASES, Case No.
B255223 (Cal. App.), Judge Victoria M. Chavez of the Court of
Appeals of California for the Second District, Division Two,
affirmed the trial court's order granting a motion for judgment
in favor of the OTonline travel companies ("OTCs").

The action is one of the coordinated "Transient Occupancy Tax
Cases," in which certain cities have sought to impose liability
on the OTCs for transient occupancy tax ("TOT").  In a typical
transaction, an OTC charges a transient room rental, plus a
markup, and service fees.

In this matter, Appellant City of Los Angeles ("the city")
assessed alleged unpaid TOT against the OTCs based on the full
amount of the OTCs' markup and service fees.  The OTCs filed a
petition for writ of administrative mandate, seeking reversal of
the assessments.  The OTCs argued that the language of the city's
TOT ordinance did not encompass the OTCs or their markups and
service fees.  The trial court granted a motion for judgment in
favor of the OTCs, and the city appeals.

While the city's appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided In
re Transient Occupancy Tax Cases (2016).  The Supreme Court
rejected the City of San Diego's position that charges imposed by
the OTCs constituted taxable rent under San Diego's TOT
ordinance.  The city acknowledges that the Supreme Court's
decision undermines its previous position in this litigation.
Thus, the city acknowledges the assessments, as issued in this
matter, are erroneous and unenforceable.

However, the city seeks to capitalize on the Supreme Court's
comment that, to the extent a hotel determines the OTC's markup,
such as by contractual rate parity provisions requiring the OTC
to quote and charge the customer a rate not less than what the
hotel is quoting on its own website, it effectively 'charges'
that amount.

Based on this language in the San Diego case, the city seeks, in
the appeal, to revise the assessments against the OTCs.  Because
the Supreme Court has rejected the city's position that the
entire amount of the OTCs' markup and service fees is taxable
under the TOT ordinance, the city now wants to collect only 14%
of the hotel-mandated markup for each and all merchant-model
transactions from July 7, 2004 forward.

Revision of the assessments is not procedurally appropriate at
this stage of the litigation.  The facts concerning (1) which
transactions included hotel-mandated markups; and (2) the taxable
amount of such markups, have not been established, and are
disputed.  Revised assessments against the OTCs, based upon a
portion of the OTCs' margins in certain transactions, must be
issued by the Office of Finance in the first instance.

Judge Chavez explains that the role of the Appellate Court is to
assess error in the proceedings.  She finds that the city does
not argue that the trial court committed error in its statutory
interpretation.  The city has abandoned its claims that the TOT
statute imposed liability on OTCs prior to the 2004-2005
amendments.  As to the post-2004 ordinance, the city takes the
same position as the trial court: that the statute did not change
the definition of rent, thus the fundamental calculation of TOT
did not change.  Hence, the city has not established legal error
in the trial court's decision.

Because the city has failed to show error in the proceedings, and
because there are no outstanding enforceable assessments against
the OTCs, the Judge declines to address the constitutionality of
the 2004-2005 amendments to the city's TOT ordinance.

Judge Chevez concludes that the city has failed to show that the
trial court erred in reversing the assessments issued against the
OTCs in the matter.  Accordingly, she affirmed the judgment is
affirmed.  The OTCs are awarded their costs of appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/4EW9LP  from Leagle.com.

Baron & Budd, Thomas M. Sims, Laura J. Baughman; Office of the
City Attorney and Beverly A. Cook for Appellant City of Los
Angeles.

Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, Jason D. Russell --
jason.russell@skadden.com -- and Stacy R. Horth-Neubert --
stacy.horth-neubert@skadden.com; Troygould and Daniel M. Rygorsky
-- drygorsky@troygould.com -- for Respondents Priceline.com,
Inc., Travelweb LLC, and Lowestfare.com, Inc.

Jones Day, Brian D. Hershman -- bhershman@jonesday.com -- and
Erica L. Reilley -- elreilley@jonesday.com -- for Respondents
Expedia, Inc., Hotels.com, L.P., Hotels.com GP, LLC, Hotwire,
Inc., Travelnow.com, Inc., Orbitz, LLC, Trip Network, Inc., and
Internetwork Publishing Corp.

Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Thomas M. Peterson --
thomas.peterson@morganlewis.com -- and Deborah E. Quick --
deborah.quick@morganlewis.com -- for Respondents Expedia, Inc.,
Hotels.com, L.P., Hotels.com GP, LLC, Hotwire, Inc., and
Travelnow.com, Inc.

Kelly Hart & Hallan and Brian S. Stagner --
brian.stagner@kellyhart.com -- for Respondents Travelocity.com LP
and Site59.com, LLC.


MANATEE COUNTY, FL: Court Dismisses With Prejudice "Neal" Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Steven D. Merryday of the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, dismissed without
prejudice the case, THOMAS NEAL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. RICK
WELLS, SHERIFF, MANATEE COUNTY, Defendant, Case No. 8:18-cv-466-
T-23CPT (M.D. Fla.).

Neal and the inmate population of Manatee County Jail
simultaneously filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983 as a class action.  They sue Wells, the Sheriff of
Manatee County, Florida, and allege unconstitutional conditions
of confinement at Manatee County Jail.

Judge Merryday explains that the Plaintiffs, prisoners appearing
pro se, are untrained in the law and have limited access to legal
materials and other resources.  Accordingly, they cannot
adequately protect the interests of the other prisoners in the
class.  The Plaintiffs may not proceed jointly in the case.  The
prisoners cannot -- to share the filing fee -- join in a civil
rights action.  Accordingly, the Judge dismissed without
prejudice the civil rights complaint.  The clerk must close the
case.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/xreHK2 from Leagle.com.

Inmate Population of Manatee County Jail, Plaintiff, pro se.


MASTERCARD INTERNATIONAL: Scoma Seeks to Certify 2 Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled SCOMA CHIROPRACTIC, P.A., WILLIAM P. GRESS,
and FLORENCE MUSSAT M.D., S.C., individually and as the
representatives of a class of similarly-situated persons, the
Plaintiffs, v. MASTERCARD INTERNATIONAL INC., the Defendant, Case
No. 2:16-cv-00041-UA-MRM (M.D. Fla.), the Plaintiffs ask the
Court for an order:

   1. certifying classes under Rule 23(b)(3):

      Class A

      "all persons or entities who were successfully sent a
      facsimile on or about December 18, 2015, stating "Happy
      Holiday" and inviting recipients to apply for an "Exclusive
      Doctors Club World Elite MasterCard" credit card, where the
      fax contains no "opt-out notice" explaining how to stop
      future faxes";

      Class B

      "all persons or entities who were successfully sent a
      facsimile on December 22-23, 2015, stating "Happy Holiday"
      and inviting recipients to apply for an "Exclusive Doctors
      Club World Elite MasterCard" credit card, where the fax
      contains an opt-out notice stating: "Recipient may Opt Out
      of any future faxes by emailing a request to
      OptOut@TheDrClub.com or by calling 949.202.1777"; and

   2. appointing Plaintiffs as class representatives and
      appointing the law firms of Anderson + Wanca, Warner Law
      Firm, LLC, and Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin as class
      counsel.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=uOFzTgDZ

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ryan M. Kelly, Esq.
          Ross M. Good, Esq.
          ANDERSON + WANCA
          3701 Algonquin Road, Suite 500
          Rolling Meadows, IL 60008
          Telephone: (847) 368 1500
          E-mail: rkelly@andersonwanca.com
                  rgood@andersonwanca.com

               - and -

          Daniel A. Edelman, Esq.
          Heather Kolbus, Esq.
          EDELMAN COMBS LATTURNER
          & GOODWIN
          20 S. Clark St., Suite 1500
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 739 4200
          E-mail: dedelman@edcombs.com
                  hkolobus@edcombs.com

               - and -

          Curtis C. Warner, Esq.
          WARNER LAW FIRM, LLC
          350 S. Northwest Hwy., Ste. 300
          Park Ridge, IL 60068
          Telephone: (847) 701 5290
          E-mail: cwarner@warner.legal


MCMC LLC: Court Denies Class Certification of "Mauthe" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled ROBERT W. MAUTHE, M.D., P.C., a
Pennsylvania corporation, individually and as the representative
of a class of similarly-situated persons, the Plaintiff, v. CMC
LLC, the Defendant, Case No. 5:18-cv-01901-EGS (E.D. Pa.), the
Hon. Judge Edward G. Smith entered an order denying a motion for
class certification without prejudice.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=b9m9LOKv


MYLAN NV: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Amended Securities Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge J. Paul Oetken of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York granted in part and denied in part Mylan's
motion to dismiss the case, IN RE MYLAN N.V. SECURITIES
LITIGATION, Case No. 16-CV-7926 (JPO) (S.D. N.Y.).

The case is a securities class action against the drug
manufacturer Mylan and several of its officers.  The Complaint
alleges that Mylan knowingly misclassified the EpiPen for
purposes of Medicaid rebates; that Mylan entered into
anticompetitive agreements to inflate drug prices; and that after
committing these illegal acts, Mylan made materially misleading
statements about its conduct to investors, in violation of U.S.
and Israeli securities laws.

The Plaintiffs are all purchasers of Mylan's common stock.
Plaintiff Stef Van Duppen filed an action against Mylan N.V.,
Mylan Inc., Heather Bresch, and John Sheehan on Oct. 11, 2016.
Separately, Plaintiff Landon W. Perdue filed an action against
Mylan N.V., Mylan Inc., Heather Bresch, Paul B. Campbell, Robert
J. Coury, Kenneth S. Parks, and John D. Sheehan on Oct. 13, 2016.
By Order dated Jan. 9, 2017, the Court consolidated the two cases
for pre-trial purposes, appointed the Lead Plaintiffs, and
approved the Lead Counsel

The Lead Plaintiffs subsequently filed the Amended Class Action
Complaint  asserting claims under: (1) Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. Section 78j(b), and
Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. Section 240.10b-5, against all the
Defendants; (2) Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
Section 78t(a), against the individual Defendants; and (3)
Section 1 of the Israeli Securities Law of 1968, against all the
Defendants.

The Defendants have jointly moved to dismiss all claims for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and to
dismiss claims under the Israeli Securities Law for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, for lack of personal jurisdiction,
and on forum non conveniens grounds.

As to the Plaintiffs' U.S. Securities Law Claims, Judge Oetken
finds (i) that Mylan is not liable for statements of income made
in its Forms 10-K and 10-Q; nor is it liable for failing to
disclose an "acute risk" of fines in its Forms 8-K; (ii) that
Mylan's Annual Reports are also replete with statements that
characterize the markets for Mylan's EpiPen and generic drugs as
"very competitive" and highly sensitive to price; (iii) that each
of Mylan's Form 10-K Annual Reports contained statements that,
absent a clear statement of the EpiPen rebate rate, could have
misled a reasonable investor as to the rate at which Mylan was
rebating the EpiPen; (iv) that the Plaintiffs' third set of
allegations survive only to the extent that Mylan misrepresented
its knowledge about the EpiPen's misclassification; (v) that
although the Code of Ethics was made publicly available on
Mylan's website and therefore was open for an investor to peruse,
there is no reasonable investor who would rely on such "puffery."

The Judge further finds that (i) the Plaintiffs have plausibly
alleged with particularity that the Defendants were at least
reckless with respect to their Rebate Statements and Regulatory
Risk Statements because the danger was either known to the
Defendants or so obvious that the Defendants must have been aware
of it; (ii) that whether the EpiPen was misclassified, and
whether the individual Defendants had knowledge of such
misclassification, is appropriately the subject of discovery;
(iii) that the Plaintiffs' sparse allegations of illegality
cannot give rise to a strong inference that Mylan was reckless in
its failure to disclose the existence of either the pay-for-delay
or exclusive-dealing agreements; (iv) that the Plaintiffs'
unlawful conduct allegations against Mylan are sufficient to
plausibly plead the existence of a market allocation arrangement
between Mylan and Heritage; (v) that the Plaintiffs do not
adequately plead scienter with respect to Mylan's Doxy DR market-
allocation agreement; and (vi) that having concluded that the
Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded loss causation, the Judge
defers questions about the robustness of the Plaintiffs'
selection of corrective disclosures to a later stage of
litigation, after the aid of discovery.

Finally, as to Count III, the Judge declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction.  First, the Plaintiffs' Israeli law
claim raises a complex issue of foreign law.  Specifically, their
claim calls on the Court to decide whether Israeli courts would
apply U.S. securities law or Israeli securities law to a "dual
listed" company such as Mylan.  The Plaintiffs cite three
district-level decisions by Israeli courts applying U.S. law, but
these decisions are not precedential.  He believes it better to
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, and to leave this
novel question of Israeli law to the Israeli Supreme Court to
answer in the first instance.  Furthermore, he concludes that the
case presents the kind of "exceptional circumstances" offering
compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction under Section
1367(c)(4).

For these reasons, Judge Slights granted in part and denied in
part the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Amended Class Action
Complaint.  He directed the Defendants to file an answer to the
surviving claims by two weeks from the date of the Order.  The
Clerk of Court is directed to close the motion at Docket Number
45.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Opinion and Order
is available at https://is.gd/fQ1AUP from Leagle.com.

Stef Van Duppen, Individually & Stef Van Duppen, On behalf of
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Phillip C.
Kim -- pkim@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm P.A.

Landon W. Perdue, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Consolidated Plaintiff, represented by Jeremy
Alan Lieberman -- jlieberman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP & Joseph
Alexander Hood, II -- ahood@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP.

Dan Kleinerman, Co-Lead Plaintiff's, Movant, represented by
Daniel Stephen Sommers -- dsommers@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen
Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Steven Jeffrey Toll --
stoll@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC,
Times Wang -- twang@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen Milstein Sellers &
Toll PLLC & Jeremy Alan Lieberman, Pomerantz LLP.

Vladimir Tchentsov, Movant, represented by Joseph R. Seidman --
Seidman@bernlieb.com -- Bernstein Liebhard, LLP.

Menorah Mivtachim Insurance Ltd., Menorah Mivtachim Pensions and
Gemel Ltd., Phoenix Insurance Company Ltd. & Meitav DS Provident
Funds and Pension Ltd., Movants, represented by Jeremy Alan
Lieberman, Pomerantz LLP, Austin Patrick Van -- avan@pomlaw.com -
- Pomerantz LLP & Joseph Alexander Hood, II, Pomerantz LLP.

John D. Sheehan, Defendant, represented by Sandra C. Goldstein,
Esq. -- sgoldstein@cravath.com  -- and Kevin J. Orsini, Esq. --
korsini@cravath.com -- of Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP.

Mylan N.V., Mylan, Inc., Heather Bresch, Robert J. Coury, Paul B.
Campbell, Kenneth S. Parks & John D. Sheehan, Consolidated
Defendants, represented by Sandra C. Goldstein, Cravath, Swaine &
Moore LLP, Kevin J. Orsini, Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP & Stefan
H. Atkinson, Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP.


NEW ORLEANS, LA: Ct. Partly Amends "Fransen" Class Certification
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Regina Bartholomew-Woods of the Court of Appeal of
Louisiana, Fourth Circuit, amended in part and affirmed as
amended the Nov. 24, 2015 judgment of the trial court granting
class certification, A. REMY FRANSEN, JR. AND ALLAIN F. HARDIN,
v. THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, ET AL, Case No. 2016-CA-0844 (La.
App.).

The Plaintiffs filed their original petition in 2002, challenging
City Ordinance No. 186371, which the New Orleans City Council
passed on March 5, 1998.  The Ordinance was enacted to provide
for the collection of delinquent ad valorem taxes.  In order to
encourage prompt compliance by the taxpayers affected by the
Ordinance, the Ordinance imposed a penalty of three percent of
the amount of the tax due on the day the tax became delinquent,
with interest accruing at a rate of one percent per month that
the tax and penalty went unpaid. For all delinquent taxes for
prior years not paid by April 1st of the following year, the
Ordinance imposed an additional penalty of thirty percent to
defray costs of collection if the City referred the collection of
the delinquent taxes, penalty and interest to an attorney or
collection agent.

After several more years of litigation, the district court
conducted a class certification hearing over three days, May 26
through 28, 2015.  The Plaintiffs sought to certify a class
consisting of individuals who paid the unconstitutional fees and
penalties between March 6, 1998, and May 6, 2006.

By judgment dated Nov. 24, 2015, the district court defined the
class as those persons and/or entities or their heirs, successors
or assigns, who pursuant to New Orleans City Ordinance No. 18637
were assessed city penalties and collection/penalty fees by
defendants and who paid these unconstitutional penalties and
collection/penalty fees from April 17, 2000 through Feb. 21,
2002.

The district court granted class certification as to the
Plaintiffs' claims against the Defendant.  Additionally, it
denied class certification as to Linebarger and UGSL on the issue
of excessive legal fees, and granted certification as to the
issue of Linebarger and UGSL being debt collectors.

On April 14, 2016, the district court denied the Plaintiffs
Motion to Amend and/or for New Trial.  The parties appealed the
Nov. 24, 2015 judgment of the district court, both raising
numerous assignments of error.  The Defendants submit that the
district court's judgment is inconsistent with the requirements
of La.C.C.P. art. 591.  Specifically, they suggest there no
longer exist questions of law or fact common to the members of
the class, as the Supreme Court has already determined the
Ordinance to be unconstitutional.

The Plaintiffs alternatively ask the Court to amend the judgment
of the district court to reflect the effective date of Ordinance
No. 20556 as March 6, 2002, and not Feb. 21, 2002.  They assert
that Ordinance 20556 became law on the later date, the date upon
which it was returned to the City Council Clerk.  The Plaintiffs
further appealed the April 14, 2016 judgment.

Judge Bartholomew-Woods finds that as in Jackson v. City of New
Orleans, the Plaintiffs argue that the payment-under-protest laws
should not apply to the unconstitutional penalties and fees at
issue herein.  She explains that the state Supreme Court found
such an argument to have no merit.  Here, the class is defined,
in part, temporally.  That is, only those parties who paid the
unconstitutional penalties and fees between April 17, 2000, and
Feb. 21, 2002, qualify as the class members.  The filing of the
instant lawsuit cannot interrupt the prescriptive period for
individuals who do not fall within the class definition, and none
of the proposed class representatives presented at the hearing
testified to having paid under protest, let alone having so paid
after Feb. 21, 2002.  The Judge finds these assignments of error
to be without merit.

The Judge does not find that the decision in Fransen v. City of
New Orleans, 2008-0076, 2008-0087, lessens the Plaintiffs'
ultimate burden of proof in the case, as they nonetheless bear
the burden of proving that the class members paid
unconstitutional penalties and fees and that the Defendants must
return those illegally obtained funds.  Accordingly, she finds
this assignment of error lacks merit.

AS to the Defendants' submission that the district court's
judgment is inconsistent with the requirements of La.C.C.P. art.
591, the Judge finds that the class is indeed definable, if not
yet fully defined. The district court limited the class to a
specific temporal period during which payment under protest was
not required, and the district court retains the authority to
modify the class as the case progresses to trial.

Finally, she finds that the Plaintiffs presented a valid argument
that Ordinance 20556 did not become effective until its return to
the Clerk of the City Council.  Changing the date of the judgment
to reflect this fact does not alter its substance; it merely
reflects an accurate application of Section 3-113 of the New
Orleans Home Rule Charter.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Bartholomew-Woods amended in
part and affirmed as amended the Nov. 24, 2015 judgment of the
trial court granting class certification.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/kviWVB from Leagle.com.

Allain F. Hardin, A. Remy Fransen, Jr., FRANSEN & HARDIN, P.L.C.,
814 Howard Avenue, New Orleans, LA 70113, COUNSEL FOR
PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES.

James A. Brown -- jabrown@liskow.com -- Shannon S. Holtzman --
ssholtzman@liskow.com -- LISKOW & LEWIS, APLC, 701 Poydras
Street, Suite 5000, New Orleans, LA 70139.

Lawrence Blake Jones -- jones@nola-law.com -- BLAKE JONES LAW
FIRM, 701 Poydras Street, Suite 4100, New Orleans, LA 70139. -
AND-

Errol Conley -- econley@nola-law.com -- LAW OFFICE OF ERROL B.
CONLEY, 701 Poydras Street, Suite 4100, New Orleans, LA 70139,
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS.


NEWARK, NJ: Denial of Arbitration in "Torian" Suit Affirmed
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, HALLIE TORIAN, NORHREENA THOMAS and CLIFFORD WALKER,
JR., Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. NEWARK SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant-Appellant, Case No. A-3398-16T2 (N.J. Super. App.
Div.), the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division,
affirmed the trial court's March 31, 2017 order denying the
Defendant's motion to compel teachers' aides, who are members of
a class action, to arbitrate their claim that the District did
not provide them with paid vacation leave.

The Defendant appeals from a March 31, 2017 order denying its
motion to compel.

In October 2015, a teacher's aide and two cafeteria workers, who
are employed by the District, filed a complaint on behalf of a
proposed class.  The Plaintiffs sought to represent a class
consisting of full-time and part-time employees of the District,
other than teachers.  Thus, the proposed class would include
teachers' aides, food service workers, school clerks, bus
drivers, and security personnel.  The Plaintiffs contended that
the District failed to provide them with paid vacation leave as
required by the Civil Service Act and its administrative
regulations, N.J.S.A. 11A:6-3 and -7, and N.J.A.C. 4A:6-1.1 and -
1.2.

In response, the District filed an answer and asserted various
affirmative defenses, including the defense that the claims were
subject to arbitration.  The District then moved for summary
judgment contending, among other things, that the teachers' aides
were required to arbitrate their claim. Plaintiffs filed
opposition and cross-moved to certify the class.  After hearing
oral argument, the trial court entered orders on Sept. 16, 2016,
denying the District's motion for summary judgment and granting
the plaintiffs' motion to certify the class.

The District sought to appeal the order denying it summary
judgment.  In an order dated Jan. 30, 2017, the Superior Court
dismissed the District's appeal as interlocutory because it was
appealing an order for summary judgment and not a motion to
compel arbitration.

Thereafter, in March 2017, the District filed a motion to compel
the teachers' aides to arbitrate their claim.  The various class
members are covered by different collective bargaining
agreements.  The District only contended that the CBA governing
teachers' aides required mandatory arbitration.

The trial court heard oral argument and, on March 31, 2017,
entered an order denying the District's motion.  It reasoned that
the Civil Service Act allowed plaintiffs to bring claims
regarding paid vacation leave in Superior Court, the issue of
paid vacation leave was not within the scope of the grievances
covered by the CBA, and the arbitration clause in the CBA did not
require mandatory arbitration.

The District now appeals from the March 31, 2017 order.  That
order is subject to review because it is an order denying a
motion to compel arbitration.  On appeal, the District argues
that the trial court erred in denying its motion to compel
arbitration for three reasons.  First, the District contends that
the grievance and arbitration procedures in the CBA meet the
"substantive arbitrability" standard.  Second, it argues that the
trial court did not appropriately consider the presumption in
favor of arbitration.  Finally, it asserts that the teachers'
aides did not exhaust their administrative remedies under the
CBA's grievance procedures.

The Superior Court finds that a plain reading of the CBA
establishes: (1) the decision to bring a grievance rests with the
employee and his or her union; (2) the grievance procedure is not
mandatory; and (3) the follow up arbitration procedure is not
mandatory.  In short, the teachers' aides are not required to
submit their claim for paid vacation leave to arbitration.

Having determined that the CBA provides for permissive
arbitration, but not mandatory arbitration, the Court can
summarily address the District's arguments.  The District first
argues that the question it presented was a question of
substantive arbitrability, as opposed to procedural
arbitrability.  Next, it contends that the trial court failed to
consider the public policy favoring arbitration.  Finally, the
District argues that the teachers' aides failed to exhaust their
administrative remedies.

In summary, the Court rejects the District's arguments and hold
that the CBA here did not mandate arbitration of the claim for
vacation leave by the teachers' aides.  Thus, that claim,
together with the claim of the other class members, can be
evaluated in the trial court.  Obviously, nothing in the opinion
expresses a view on the merits of those claims.  Instead, it
simply addresses where the claim will be evaluated.

Accordingly, the Superior Court affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/cQaz7k from Leagle.com.

Sandro Polledri -- spolledri@asgllaw.com -- argued the cause for
appellant (Adams Gutierrez & Lattiboudere, attorneys; Sandro
Polledri, of counsel and on the brief; Leslie F. Prentice --
lprentice@asgllaw.com -- on the brief).

Mark Pfeffer -- pfeffer@gmslaw.com -- and Elliott J. Almanza --
elliott@gmslaw.com -- argued the cause for respondents
(Goldenberg, Mackler, Sayegh, Mintz, Pfeffer, Bonchi & Gill,
attorneys; Elliott J. Almanza, on the brief).


NOBLE HOUSE: Ct. Dismisses Counterclaim for Attys' Fee in "Holt"
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KATHLEEN HOLT, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. NOBLE HOUSE HOTELS &
RESORT, LTD; and DOES 1 TO 25, Defendants. NOBLE HOUSE HOTELS &
RESORT, LTD, Counter Claimant, v. KATHLEEN HOLT, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Counter Defendant,
Case No. 17cv2246-MMA (BLM) (S.D. Cal.), Judge Michael M. Anello
of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
California granted the Plaintiff's motion to dismiss and strike
Noble House's counterclaim.

The Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, filed a putative class action Complaint against Noble
House and Doe Defendants 1 to 25 alleging causes of action for
violations of California's False Advertising Law ("FAL"),
California Business and Professions Code sections 17500, et seq.;
California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"), California Business
and Professions Code sections 17200, et seq.; and California's
Consumers Legal Remedy Act ("CLRA"), California Business and
Professions Code sections 1750.

The claims in the Plaintiff's Complaint arise out of a 3.5%
surcharge of $1.38, which was added to the balance of her bill on
Aug. 6, 2017, at Acqua California Bistro in San Diego,
California, which is owned by Noble House.  The Plaintiff alleges
that Noble House is misleading the public by advertising prices
for food and drinks in its menus and then adding the surcharge to
the balance of the bill total at checkout when it is too late to
make an informed decision about the increased total bill.  The
Plaintiff alleges Noble House purposely added this surcharge
instead of raising the prices on its menu in order to mislead and
deceive consumers into thinking that their meal would cost less
than it actually does.  Accordingly, the Plaintiff asserts causes
of action for violations of the FAL, UCL, and CLRA.

On Feb. 6, 2018, Noble House filed its Answer to the Plaintiff's
Complaint. In its Answer, Noble House substantially denied the
allegations of the Complaint, raised 21 affirmative defenses, and
asserted a counterclaim for attorneys' fees pursuant to
California Civil Code Section 1780(e).  The Plaintiff moves to
dismiss and strike the counterclaim pursuant to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 12(f).

Judge Anello explains that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
54(d)(2)(A) requires demands for attorneys' fees to be made by
motion, unless the substantive law requires those fees to be
proved at trial as an element of damages.  Here, California Civil
Code Section 1780(e) provides that the court will award costs and
attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff in litigation filed
pursuant to this section.  Reasonable attorney's fees may be
awarded to a prevailing defendant upon a finding by the court
that the plaintiff's prosecution of the action was not in good
faith.

Based upon this language, the Judge says Section 1780(e) does not
require attorneys' fees to be proved at trial as an element of
damages.  As a result, a demand for attorneys' fees pursuant to
Section 1780(e) must be made by motion and it is improper to
assert a "claim" for attorneys' fees.  As such, he will grant the
Plaintiff's motion and will dismiss with prejudice and without
leave to amend Noble House's counterclaim for attorneys' fees.
He notes that, when and if appropriate, Noble House may file a
motion for attorneys' fees pursuant to Rule 54(d)(2) and that the
Court will have jurisdiction to address such a motion.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Anello granted the Plaintiff's
motion and dismissed with prejudice Noble House's counterclaim
for attorneys' fees.  The Clerk of Court is instructed to
terminate the action as to Counter Claimant Noble House and
Counter Defendant Holt.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/htYM5s from Leagle.com.

Kathleen Holt, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Kevin Lemieux --
kevin@westcoastlitigation.com -- The Law Office of Kevin Lemieux,
APC, Yana A. Hart, Hyde & Swigart, Abbas Kazerounian, Kazerounian
Law Group, APC, Joshua B. Swigart -- josh@westcoastlitigation.com
-- Hyde & Swigart & Robert Lyman Hyde --
bob@westcoastlitigation.com -- Hyde & Swigart.

Noble House Hotels & Resort, LTD, doing business as Noble House
Hotels & Resort, LTD, LP, Defendant, represented by Darin Murl
Sands -- sandsd@lanepowell.com -- Lane Powell PC & Heidi Brooks
Bradley -- bradleyh@lanepowell.com -- Lane Powell PC.


NRA GROUP: Partial Summary Judgment Bid in "Isaac" Denied
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ALDEAN ISAAC AND JULISSA ORTIZ, Plaintiff, v. NRA
GROUP, LLC D/B/A NATIONAL RECOVERY AGENCY AND STEVEN C. KUSIC,
Defendants, Case No. 16-CV-5210 (JFB) (SIL) (E.D. N.Y.), Judge
Joseph F. Bianco of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York denied the Plaintiffs' motion for partial
summary judgment on the first cause of action, as against NRA.

The Plaintiffs bring the putative class action against NRA and
NRA's CEO, Kusic, for alleged violations of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA").  The Plaintiffs assert two
causes of action against both NRA and Kusic.  The first cause of
action alleges that debt collection letters sent by NRA to the
Plaintiffs misrepresented the amount of debt that the Plaintiffs
owed in violation of FDCPA Sections 1692g and 1692e.  The second
cause of action alleges that the Defendants violated FDCPA
Sections 1692e and 1692f because the same collection letters
falsely implied that NRA had the legal right to collect interest
and fees from the Plaintiffs.

At some unspecified time, both Isaac and Ortiz incurred debt to
Peconic Bay Medical Center.  Thereafter, Peconic assigned the
debts to NRA for collection.  NRA asserts that it sent debt
collection letters dated Aug. 20, 2015 to both the Plaintiffs.
The August 2015 letter addressed to Ortiz indicates that she owes
$1,254.93 for services rendered by Peconic on June 9, 2013, with
an account number ending in 6681.  A detachable payment slip at
the bottom of the letter states a "total due" of $1,254.93.
Ortiz does not dispute that this letter states an accurate amount
owed.

The August 2015 letter addressed to Isaac includes amounts owed
for two separate dates of service.  Specifically, it states that
Isaac owes $145.96 for services rendered by Peconic on Aug. 9,
2013, with an account number ending in 3930, and $1,139.56 for
services rendered by Peconic on Aug. 19, 2013, with an account
number ending in 0322.  A detachable payment slip at the bottom
of the letter indicates that Isaac's "total due" is $1,285.52.
Isaac does not dispute that these amounts are accurate.

NRA sent the Plaintiffs additional collection letters dated Sept.
23, 2015.  The September 2015 letter to Ortiz repeats the
information contained in the August 2015 letter: that she owes
$1,254.93 for services rendered by Peconic on June 9, 2013, with
an account number ending in 6681.  Immediately beneath that
information, however, the September 2015 letter states that Ortiz
owes the same amount -- $1,254.93 -- for services rendered by
Peconic on "00/00/00," with the same account number ending in
6681.  The detachable payment slip at the bottom of the letter
indicates that Ortiz's "total due" is $2,509.86, or double
$1,254.93.

Similarly, the September 2015 letter to Isaac repeats the
information contained in the August 2015 letter addressed to him:
that he owes $145.96 for services rendered by Peconic on Aug. 9,
2013, with an account number ending in 3930, and $1,139.56 for
services rendered by Peconic on August 19, 2013, with an account
number ending in 0322.  Immediately beneath that information, the
letter states that Isaac owes the same amount -- $145.96 -- for
services rendered by Peconic on "00/00/00," with the same account
number ending in 3930, and the same amount -- $1,139.56 -- for
services rendered by Peconic on "00/00/00," with the same account
number ending in 0322. The detachable payment slip at the bottom
of the letter indicates that Isaac's "total due" is $2,571.04.

According to NRA, the duplicate information was included in the
September 2015 letters because it was mistakenly included in an
excel spreadsheet received from Peconic Bay.  When NRA received
the spreadsheet with the duplicate information, its system
automatically processed the information and prompted the mailing
of the September 2015 letters with the duplicate charges.

The Plaintiffs filed the complaint on Sept. 19, 2016.  The
Defendants answered on Nov. 17, 2016.  The Plaintiffs moved for
summary judgment as to liability on the first cause of action
against NRA on July 28, 2017.  They've moved for summary judgment
on their claims under FDCPA Sections 1692e and 1692(g) The
Defendants opposed the motion on Aug. 31, 2017.  The Plaintiffs
replied on Sept. 15, 2017.

The Court heard oral argument on Oct. 20, 2017.  At the
conclusion of that argument, the Court held the motion in
abeyance under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 pending further
discovery into whether any putative class members inquired about
the at-issue letters or paid double the amount they owed.  On
Nov. 20, 2017, the Defendants provided that discovery in further
support of their opposition to the Plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment.

As a threshold matter, Judge Bianco concludes that the Plaintiffs
have standing to bring the instant claims.  The Defendants argue
that the Plaintiffs lack standing because they have not suffered
imminent and concrete injuries.  However, the Defendants ignore
that the FDCPA provides for liability for attempting to collect
an unlawful debt and permits the recovery of statutory damages up
to $1,000 in the absence of actual damages.  The Court has
accordingly held that actual damages are not required for
standing under the FDCPA.  Thus, that the Plaintiffs received
debt collection letters that potentially violate the FDCPA is
sufficient to establish their standing in the case.

The Judge further concludes that even the least sophisticated
consumer -- who is presumed to possess a rudimentary amount of
information about the world and a willingness to read a
collection notice with some care -- would not be misled by the
September 2015 letters.  The fact that the second charges are for
the same amounts and account numbers as the first charges makes
clear that they are duplicative.  Further, the "00/00/00" service
dates for the repetitive charges would indicate to even the least
sophisticated consumer that those charges were included in error.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Bianco denied the Plaintiffs'
motion for summary judgment on the first cause of action against
NRA.


A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Memorandum and
Order is available at https://is.gd/Syypav from Leagle.com.

Aldean Isaac & Julissa Ortiz, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Craig B.
Sanders -- csanders@sanderslawpllc.com -- Sanders Law, PLLC,
David M. Barshay, Sanders Law, PLLC, Jonathan Mark Cader --
info@aronovaassociates.com -- SANDERS LAW, PLLC & Todd D.
Muhlstock -- tmuhlstock@bakersanders.com -- The Muhlstock Law
Firm PC.

NRA Group, LLC, doing business as & Steven C. Kusic, Defendants,
represented by Hilary Felice Korman -- hkorman@blankrome.com --
Blank Rome LLP & Scott Evan Wortman -- swortman@blankrome.com --
Blank Rome LLP.

NRA Group, LLC, doing business as National Recovery Agency,
Defendant, represented by Jacquelyn Alena Dicicco --
jdicicco@blankrome.com -- Blank Rome LLP.


ODWALLA INC: "Wilson" Class Certification Bid Shelved
-----------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled Stephen Wilson, the Plaintiff, v. Odwalla,
Inc., the Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-02763-DSF-FFM (C.D. Cal.),
the Court entered an order putting the motion for class
certification under submission, according to the civil minutes.

A copy of the Civil Minutes is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=facOhUEL


OHIO: Court Enters Report & Recommendation in "Foster" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHRISTOPHER FOSTER, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF OHIO, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 1:16-cv-920 (S.D. Ohio), Magistrate
Judge Stephanie K. Bowman of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, has entered her
Report and Recommendation ("R&R") (i) granting only in part the
Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings; (ii) denying
the Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration or Relief of Order on
Issues of Injunctive Relief and Temporary Restraining Order; and
(iii) denying the Plaintiff's Motion to Amend/Correct Complaint.

The Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at the Southern
Correctional Facility ("SOCF"), filed the Section 1983 action
alleging violations of his civil rights while he was incarcerated
at the Toledo Correctional Institution ("ToCI"), as well as after
his transfer to SOCF.  The Plaintiff previously had filed three
or more cases that had been dismissed at the screening stage,
prompting initial review under 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(g), a three
strikes provision included in the Prison Litigation Reform Act
intended to prevent frivolous and/or vexatious prisoner
litigation.

The Plaintiff's current complaint alleges that while at ToCI, he
suffered poor treatment, including but not limited to the
improper disposal of his legal work and other property.  In
September 2014, he was transferred to SOCF, where he alleges that
he was subjected to racist and derogatory remarks, and was
physically assaulted by a number of officers, including
Defendants Rankin, Southworth, Neff, Parish, and John Doe, and
possibly Workman.

The Plaintiff alleges that Defendant "Dr. Ahmed Fiscal" denied
him medical care after the assault, and continues to deny him
care for a skin disease.  The original complaint contains
additional allegations regarding the Plaintiff's conditions of
confinement, as well as an attack on his conviction and sentence.
His original complaint identified the following Defendants: the
State of Ohio, ToCI, SOCF, and "several State actors" including
Warden John Coleman, a group of unnamed ToCI correctional
officers, Lt. Beiderman, Kelly Robertson, a group of unnamed
Caucasian correctional officers, CO Southworth, Rardin, Neff, T.
Parish, Cpt. Workman, Roger Wilson, Dr. Ahmed Fiscal (later
corrected to Dr. Faisal Ahmed), DWSS Cadogan, DWO Cool, WMA
Davis, Warden Morgan, CO Steve Carter, Major Warren, Ms.
Aldridge, Sgt. Bear, Sgt. Felts, O'Connor, Oppy, Hammerick, Lt.
Phillips, Nurse Coons, Danhoff, Ohio Attorney General Mike
DeWine, Assistant Attorney General Christopher Bagi, DWO
Bowerman, Lt. Copley, David Bobby, and Warden Erdos.

Based upon the Plaintiff's litigation history and number of prior
dismissals, the undersigned filed an R&R on Oct. 11, 2016
recommending that his motion to proceed in forma pauperis in the
case be denied, and that the case be dismissed unless he
immediately paid the full filing fee.

On Dec. 5, 2016, the presiding district judge rejected the Oct.
11, 2016 R&R, concluding that the Plaintiff had adequately
alleged "imminent danger" in a manner that permitted him to file
this lawsuit without prepayment of a filing fee, based upon four
separate documents that were not before the undersigned at
initial screening, but instead were filed in response to the R&R.

Based upon the rejection of the R&R dismissing the lawsuit under
28 U.S.C. Section 1915(g), the Magistrate Judge re-screened the
Plaintiff's initial complaint under 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(e).
In addition, she screened the allegations in a construed
amendment to the complaint that the Plaintiff filed on Jan. 27,
2017.  Pursuant to a second R&R filed on Feb. 28, 2017 and
adopted by the Court on April 18, 2017, the Court dismissed most
claims and the Defendants, but permitted four specific claims to
go forward, against Defendants Rardin, Southworth, Neff, Parish,
John Doe, Workman, Warden Erdos, Dyer, Bear, Dyer, and Dr. Ahmed

Initially, service was perfected only on Defendants Rardin,
Parish, Bear, Erdos and Dyer.  Defendants John Doe and Southworth
(who died in 2014) were dismissed.  Multiple motions filed by the
Plaintiff seeking default judgments against various Defendants
based upon their alleged failures to answer or otherwise respond
to his complaint were denied.  Summons was later issued to
Defendants: Neff, Workman, and Dr. Ahmed.  All the Defendants
then filed answers and/or amended answers, and moved for judgment
on the pleadings on Nov. 28, 2017.

Throughout the case, the Plaintiff has kept up a frenetic pace of
motion practice.  In an Opinion and Order filed on Nov. 2, 2017,
the Magistrate Judge warned the Plaintiff that future repetitive
and frivolous motions would be summarily denied.  The Plaintiff
filed multiple documents that were liberally construed by the
presiding district judge as objections (and supplements to
objections), all of which the Court found to be "without merit."
In overruling his objections, the presiding district judge also
cautioned him, warning him that his filings have been in
violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, and placing him on notice that
further such behavior will not be tolerated and will result in
sanctions, potentially including the summary dismissal of the
case.

Having related the relevant procedural background of the case,
Magistrate Judge Bowman turns now to the pending dispositive
motions, beginning with the Defendants' motion for judgment on
the pleadings.

The Defendants assert that they are entitled to judgment under
Rule 12(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. on grounds that in October 2014, the
Plaintiff previously filed suit in the Court of Claims based on
the same core events alleged in his federal lawsuit -- that the
Defendants used excessive force against him in September 2014
when he arrived at SOCF.  The Defendants' motion argues that all
of Plaintiff's claims in this federal case are barred by the
Leaman doctrine and/or by res judicata.  Alternatively, they
argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity.

The Magistrate Judge concludes that the Defendants are entitled
to partial judgment on two of the four claims delineated in the
case.  Among other things, because the Plaintiff's allegations in
the prior Court of Claims suit were adjudicated on the merits and
involved privies to the same parties, his attempt to bring the
same claims in the federal court under a new legal theory is
barred.

In addition to the Defendants' motion for judgment on the
pleadings, the R&R addresses two dispositive motions filed by the
Plaintiff.  The first is a motion for reconsideration or relief
on issues of injunctive relief and temporary restraining order.
The Magistrate Judge finds that despite the referral of said
motion to her, the body of the motion indicates that the
Plaintiff seeks modification of a prior R&R concerning the denial
of preliminary injunctive relief.  To the extent that the motion
renews the Plaintiff's prior requests for the same preliminary
injunctive relief, she finds no cause to reexamine her prior
recommendations in this regard, and would merely incorporate as
if restated the analysis the prior R&R, which was adopted over
the Plaintiff's objections.

Finally, as to the Plaintiff's Motion to Amend/Correct Complaint,
the Magistrate Judge holds that the motion should be denied
because the Plaintiff lacks standing to assert the constitutional
rights of other prisoners and is not permitted as a pro se
litigant to bring a class action lawsuit concerning prison
conditions.  The Plaintiff's complaint should be limited to
alleged violations of his own federal rights.

In light of the fact that the Defendants appear entitled to
judgment as a matter of law under Rule 12(c) on only some of the
Plaintiff's claims, and because the parties do not appear to have
completed discovery on the two claims on which judgment has not
been recommended, the Order filed this same date will extend
pretrial deadlines on those remaining claims.

Otherwise, and for the reasons she discussed, Magistrate Judge
Bowman recommended that the Defendants' motion for judgment on
the pleadings be granted only in part.  The motion should be
granted as to the Plaintiff's claims that various Defendants
employed excessive force against him shortly after his arrival at
SOCF in September 2014, and that, also in 2014, Dr. Ahmed was
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.  The
motion further should be granted for all claims brought against
Defendant Warden Erdos, whether in his individual or official
capacity.

She recommended that the motion should be denied as to the
Plaintiff's claim that Defendant Bear used excessive force
against him in January 2017, as well as his claim that Defendants
Bear and Dyer placed the Plaintiff in a cell that was so
deficient that its conditions violated the Eighth Amendment in
January 2017.

Magistrate Judge Bowman recommended that the Plaintiff's motion
for reconsideration or relief and motion to further amend/correct
his complaint should be denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Report &
Recommendation is available at https://is.gd/5JEfzl from
Leagle.com.

Christopher Foster, Plaintiff, pro se.

Officer Rardin, Officer Joshua Neff, Officer Parish, Steven
Workman, Sgt. Bear, Dr. Ahmed Fiscal, Warden Ron Erdos & Sgt.
Dyer, Defendants, represented by Kelly Noel Brogan, Ohio Attorney
General.


OHIO: Court Denies as Moot Bid to Stay "Foster" Suit
----------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHRISTOPHER FOSTER, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF OHIO, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 1:16-cv-920 (S.D. Ohio), Magistrate
Judge Stephanie K. Bowman of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, (i) denied as moot
the Defendants' motion to stay and Plaintiff's counter-motion
opposing a stay; and (ii) denied all other non-dispositive
motions filed by the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff is a frequent filer in the Court, both of cases and
of numerous (and lengthy) handwritten single-spaced motions
within each of those cases, including the present case.  The
Magistrate Judge has filed a Report and Recommendation that
addresses pending dispositive motions.  The additional Memorandum
Opinion and Order addresses seven currently pending non-
dispositive motions, all but one of which has been filed by the
Plaintiff.

     a. Motion to Stay Discovery and Motion to Seek Denial of
Stay of Discovery: The only non-dispositive motion filed by the
Defendants is a motion seeking to stay all discovery until the
Court's resolution of a pending motion for judgment on the
pleadings.  The discovery in the case was previously scheduled to
conclude on March 15, 2018, but does not appear to have been
completed.  The Magistrate Judge will deny the Defendants' motion
as moot in light of the R&R filed, which also clarifies the
limited claims on which discovery may proceed.  In order to
expedite the resolution of the case and provide both parties a
full and fair opportunity to complete discovery on those claims,
the Order extends the existing pretrial deadlines.  She will deny
as moot the Plaintiff's counter-motion.

     b. Motion to Supplement to Add To Respectfully Exhibited
Advisory Requested to Be Presented to Defendants To Shed Light On
Their Apparent Misinterpretation of this Good Faith Litigation -
Brief Narrative/Addition Attached - The Magistrate Judge will
deny this motion as largely redundant of the Plaintiff's motion
to seek denial of the stay of discovery.

     c. Motion for Return of Documents - The Plaintiff seeks a
free copy of the original Exhibits attached to the prisoner
affidavit, along with a copy of the action docket for the case.
In the same motion, the Plaintiff requests a copy of the docket
sheet for another one of his cases.  This motion will be denied
because in forma pauperis status does not entitle a litigant to
free copies.

     d. Motion for Entering New Evidence - Exhibits In Support of
Relief of Order on Basis of Danger and of Necessary Injunction
Proved: The Plaintiff previously has been advised that the Court
will not enter ad hoc "evidence" in the record.  The motion to
enter evidence is therefore denied.  The Magistrate Judge holds
that to the extent that the Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of
the Court's prior denial of his motion for injunctive relief, the
motion is redundant and addressed in the R&R filed.

     e. Motion for the US Marshal to Serve the Defendant on The
Class Action Claims: She will deny this motion as moot on the
basis of the R&R filed, which recommends denial of the
Plaintiff's motion to amend to add new claims and to convert the
case to a class action.

     f. Motion to Stay All Proceedings: The Plaintiff's motion
seeks a stay of this case until the Court orders him to be
transferred to another institution based upon his request of
preliminary injunctive relief (which previously has been denied).
The Magistrate Judge will deny the motion except insofar as new
pretrial deadlines are established in this order concerning the
limited claims as to which the Defendants have not been granted
judgment.  To the extent that the Plaintiff intended this motion
to once again seek preliminary injunctive relief, the motion
previously has been ruled upon by the Court and the previously
stated reasons for recommending denial of that relief are
incorporated into the R&R filed.

Accordingly, for the reasons stated and in the accompanying R&R,
Magistrate Judge Bowman denied as moot the Defendants' motion to
stay and the Plaintiff's counter-motion opposing a stay, but the
period for pretrial discovery on the limited two remaining claims
against Defendants Bear and Dyer, as to which the undersigned has
not recommended that judgment be granted, is extended until May
15, 2018, with any dispositive motions to be filed not later than
Sept. 15, 2018.  She denied all other non-dispositive motions
filed by the Plaintiff.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/CuNaio from Leagle.com.

Christopher Foster, Plaintiff, pro se.

Officer Rardin, Officer Joshua Neff, Officer Parish, Steven
Workman, Sgt. Bear, Dr. Ahmed Fiscal, Warden Ron Erdos & Sgt.
Dyer, Defendants, represented by Kelly Noel Brogan, Ohio Attorney
General.


ORBIT-FR INC: Being Sold for Too Little, Minerva Group Says
-----------------------------------------------------------
MINERVA GROUP, LP, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. ORBIT/FR, INC., PER
IVERSEN, PHILLIPE GARREAU, ARNAUD GANDOIS, DOUGLAS MERRILL,
MATT FINLAY, MICROWAVE VISION, S.A., and MVG MERGER SUB, INC.,
the Defendants, Case No. 2018-0340 (Del. Ch., May 11, 2018),
seeks remedy caused by the Defendants' misconduct in connection
with the acquisition of Orbit by its controlling stockholder,
Microwave Vision, S.A., in a going-private transaction.  The
Buyout was the product of breaches of fiduciary duty by Parent
and Orbit's Board.

Microwave and Orbit reached a deal to acquire approximately 38%
of the issued and outstanding shares of Orbit common stock that
Microwave did not already own for $3.30 per share in a going-
private transaction.  Parent was, at all relevant times, Orbit's
controlling stockholder, and the Buyout was not fair in process
or price to Orbit's minority common stockholders. The Buyout was
initiated and structured to benefit Parent to the detriment of
the Company's minority stockholders.

On March 29, 2018, the Company entered into an agreement and plan
of merger with Parent and MVG Merger Sub, Inc., a Delaware
corporation and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Parent. On April 2,
2018, Parent provided its written consent and shareholder
approval of the Buyout in lieu of a formal stockholder vote.
Pursuant to the Merger Agreement, effective April 6, 2018, Merger
Sub was merged with and into the Company, with the Company
surviving the merger as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Parent.
Orbit's Board of Directors unanimously approved the Merger on
March 29, 2018. The Board acted on the recommendation of a
special committee of the Board, which purportedly consisted of
independent directors. The Special Committee consisted of
directors Doug Merrill and Matt Finlay.

For the past several years, Orbit has not been a reporting
company under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Since 2012, it
has not filed periodic reports with the United States Securities
and Exchange Commission, and has not provided even informal
public disclosure about its operations and financial results
since year end 2016. Despite the lack of public filings, there
have been occasional and sporadic trades of the Company's common
stock over the counter. Following years of relative silence, on
April 10, 2018, Plaintiff received a written notice from Orbit
stating that the Company's controlling stockholder had
effectuated a Buyout and that the minority stockholders would be
cashed-out for $3.30 per share.

The Buyout was announced to Company stockholders on April 10,
2018, but was preceded by numerous wrongful actions by Parent and
the Board, including inadequate negotiations by a Special
Committee that facilitated Parent's efforts to acquire Orbit at
an unfair price. Under settled Delaware law, the Notice was
required to disclose all of the material facts necessary for a
reasonable stockholder to make a fully informed decision as to
whether to seek appraisal. The Notice failed to include the
required disclosures in breach of the Individual Defendants'
fiduciary duties.  The Notice was woefully deficient.

The Buyout is subject to Delaware's stringent "entire fairness"
standard of review. Parent, owner of 62% of Orbit's common stock
prior to the Buyout, was the clear, controlling stockholder of
Orbit and stood on both sides of the Buyout. Despite the
inherently coercive nature of the Buyout, Parent and the Board
failed to adequately protect the Company's stockholders through a
majority of the minority stockholder vote. Indeed, no vote was
held as Parent's self-serving written consent provided the
stockholder approval required by the Merger Agreement.

The Buyout did not reflect a fair price or fair process. Parent's
proposals fell significantly below the contemporary trading price
for the Company's common stock. Management provided projections
to the Special Committee's financial advisor that permitted that
financial advisor to find that the Company was, at most, worth
roughly half of Parent's offered price. Despite the inept
valuation performed by its financial advisor, the Special
Committee failed to say no to the Buyout, and failed to negotiate
a fair price for the minority stockholders. In addition, the
terms of the Proposed Buyout were negotiated by a Special
Committee who failed to act independently and with no practical
ability to seek an alternative transaction due, in large part, to
Parent's ownership of approximately 62% of the Company's common
stock.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Donald J. Enright, Esq.
          Elizabeth K. Tripodi, Esq.
          Brian D. Stewart, Esq.
          LEVI & KORSINSKY, LLP
          1101 30th Street, N.W., Suite 115
          Washington, DC 20007
          Telephone: (202) 524 4290
          Facsimile: (202) 337 1567
          E-mail: denright@zlk.com
                  etripodi@zlk.com
                  bstewart@zlk.com

               - and -

          Ryan M. Ernst, Esq.
          Daniel P. Murray, Esq.
          O'KELLY ERNST & JOYCE, LLC
          901 Market Street, Suite 1000
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 778 4000
          Facsimile: (302) 295 2873
          E-mail: rernst@oelegal.com
                  dmurray@oelegal.com


ORLANS PC: Garland Sues over Debt Collection Practices
------------------------------------------------------
FREDDIE GARLAND, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. ORLANS PC f/k/a ORLANS
ASSOCIATES PC and ORLANS MORAN PLLC, LINDA ORLANS, ALISON ORLANS,
JANE DOE, and JOHN DOE, the Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-11561-
VAR-RSW (E.D. Mich., May 17, 2018), seeks to enjoin Defendants
from engaging in further violations of the Regulation of
Collection Practices Act in connection with the Orlans PC
Foreclosure Letter.

According to the complaint, on May 18, 2017, Orlans PC, Linda
Orlans, Alison Orlans, Jane Doe, and John Doe caused to be sent
to Plaintiff by U.S. Mail a letter informing him that Orlans PC
had been retained by Wells Fargo Home Mortgage Inc. to foreclose
on his home that he occupied at 15307 Stout Street, Detroit,
Michigan 48223. The Plaintiff received and read this letter.

The mortgage debt referenced in the May 18, 2017, letter and the
other Orlans PC Foreclosure Letters sent to Class Members arose
out of transactions in which the money, property, insurance, or
services that are the subject of the transaction were primarily
for personal, family, or household purposes. The Orlans PC May
18, 2017, letter referenced in the preceding paragraph was titled
"Notice of Debt". The complete May 18, 2017, letter from Orlans
PC to plaintiff is referred to as the "Garland Foreclosure
Letter." The Plaintiff was confused by the Garland Foreclosure
Letter in that it appeared to be from an attorney, but was not
signed by one, and did not identify the full name of an attorney.

According to the complaint, to the extent that Defendants did not
monitor Supreme Court and other debt collection practices case
law, their failure to do so was more than merely careless in view
of the focus of Orlans PC's practice and the volume of default
services and related foreclosure proceedings the firm handles.
Notwithstanding the publication of the Kistner decision,
Defendants continued to cause the Orlans PC Foreclosure Letter,
on Orlans PC letterhead, to be sent to homeowners on information
and belief by non-attorney collection staff without meaningful
attorney review.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff and the Proposed Class:

          Andrew J. McGuinness, Esq.
          122 S Main St, Suite 118
          P O Box 7711
          Ann Arbor, MI 48107
          Telephone: (734) 274 9374
          E-mail: drewmcg@topclasslaw.com

               - and -

          Samuel G. Firebaugh, Esq.
          FIREBAUGH & ANDREWS PLLC
          38545 Ford Rd, Ste 104
          Westland, MI 48185
          Telephone: (734) 722 2999
          E-mail: samuelgfirebaugh@hotmail.com


PALMETTO RESIDENTIAL: Simmons Seeks Overtime Pay under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------
Kenneth Simmons, On Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, v. Palmetto Residential Electric LLC.,
and Patrick Edwards, individually, the Defendants, Case No. 2:18-
cv-01358-DCN (D. S.C., May 17, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid
overtime compensation, liquidated damages, and other relief under
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and the South Carolina
Payment of Wages Act.

The Defendant serves both residential and commercial markets in
South Carolina, North Carolina and Georgia. Palmetto provides
services and products for new homes such as security system
installation, alarm monitoring and whole home surge protection.
Their customers range from homeowners, small custom builders, and
nationally-known tract builders.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff was employed by the
Defendants from approximately March of 2017 until approximately
January of 2018. The Plaintiff was employed as an electrician.
Plaintiff's primary duties consisted of working in newly
constructed homes, ensuring all municipal codes were complied
with making sure the power was properly and safely distributed
throughout the home from the power source to the main circuit
breaker.

The Plaintiff had an employment agreement with Defendants that he
would be paid an hourly wage for all hours worked. The Plaintiff
worked for Defendants with the clear understanding and agreement
by Defendants, that his compensation would be consistent with all
applicable laws, including state wage laws and South Carolina
common law. The Defendants provided Plaintiff with a work van
containing materials that were needed for service jobs, such as
tools and ladders. Often Plaintiff was required to drive the van
to the shop to pick-up electrician helpers to assist with the job
assignment. Plaintiff was also required to drive them back to the
shop at the end of the day. The Defendants did not compensate
Plaintiff and the electrician helpers for this time. The
Defendants did not to compensate Plaintiff and similarly situated
electricians and for the time spent traveling from job sites to
the Defendant's principal place of business, 7360 Industry Drive
in North Charleston. The Plaintiff was often required to drive
the company van from the job site to the shop at the end of each
work day, to load and unload materials. Traveling from the job
sites to the shop was part of his principal activity.

The Plaintiff and similarly situated employees regularly worked
more than 40 hours in a workweek for the Defendants, and
Defendants failed to pay them one and one-half times their
regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 per
workweek during these workweeks.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Marybeth Mullaney, Esq.
          MULLANEY LAW
          1037-D Chuck Dawley Blvd
          Mount Pleasant, SC 29464
          Telephone (843) 588 5587
          Facsimile (843) 593 9334
          E-mail: marybeth@mullaneylaw.net


PJ OPS: Edwards-Hollingsworth Suit Wins Collective Status
---------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled CORY EDWARDS and JAMES HOLLINGSWORTH, on
behalf of themselves and those similarly situated, the
Plaintiffs, v. PJ OPS IDAHO, LLC, et al., the Defendants, Case
No. 1:17-cv-00283-DCN (D. Idaho), the Hon. Judge David C. Nye
entered an order:

   1. granting a joint motion to approve stipulated form of
      notice of collective action;

   2. conditionally certifying case as a collective action
      pursuant to 29 U.S.C. section 216(b);

      "all current and former delivery drivers employed by
      Defendant within the three years preceding the date of this
      Order."

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=nvBmwTrp


PORCH.COM: "Walker" Suit Moved to Eastern District of Missouri
--------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Eric Walker, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v.
Porch.com, Inc., the Defendant, Case No. 18SL-CC01290, was
removed from the Circuit Court, St. Louis County, Missouri, to
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri (St.
Louis) on May 17, 2018. The District Court Clerk assigned Case
No. 4:18-cv-00766-NCC to the proceeding. The case is assigned to
the Hon. Judge Noelle C. Collins.

Porch is an online website that lets users connect and review
local home improvement contractors and browse photos of home
improvement projects. The site also features advice articles.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David T. Butsch, Esq.
          BUTSCH ROBERTS & ASSOCIATES, LLC
          231 S. Bemiston, Suite 260
          Clayton, MO 63105
          Telephone: (314) 863 5700
          Facsimile: (314) 863 5711
          E-mail: butsch@butschroberts.com

Attorneys for Defendant:

          Oliver H. Thomas, Esq.
          Winthrop B. Reed, III, Esq.
          LEWIS RICE, LLC
          600 Washington Ave #2500
          St. Louis, MO 63101
          Telephone: (314) 444 7711
          Facsimile: (314) 612 7711
          E-mail: othomas@lewisrice.com
                  wreed@lewisrice.com


PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: "Pounds" Suit Partly Remanded to State Court
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IRIS POUNDS, CARLTON MILLER, VILAYUAN SAYAPHET-
TYLER, RHONDA HALL, and PIA TOWNES, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY
ASSOCIATES, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:16CV1395 (M.D. N.C.),
Judge William L. Osteen, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of North Carolina granted in part and denied in
part the Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand; (ii) denied as moot the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Expedited Determination of Motion to
Remand; and (iii) granted in part and denied in part the
Plaintiffs' Motion to Defer Time to File Federal Motion for Class
Certification.

The Plaintiffs commenced the present putative class action in
Durham County in the Superior Court Division of the General Court
of Justice of the State of North Carolina on Nov. 21, 2016,
against Defendant PRA.  The Defendant was served on Nov. 21,
2016.

The Defendant filed its NOR in the Court on Dec. 9, 2016 on the
basis of diversity jurisdiction pursuant to the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA").  In the NOR, the Defendant,
relying on the Plaintiffs' allegations and its own assertions,
alleged complete diversity of citizenship, an aggregate amount in
controversy exceeding $5 million, and a proposed class size
greater than 100 persons.  The Plaintiffs move the Court under 28
U.S.C. Section 1447(c) to remand the case on the grounds that the
Court lacks jurisdiction over the claims pursuant to the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine.

The Plaintiffs' Complaint seeks to set aside certain default
judgments obtained by PRA in North Carolina state courts, and
seeks to recover actual damages and civil penalties for alleged
violations of N.C. Gen. Stat. Sections 58-70-115(7), 58-70-130,
and 58-70-155.

PRA is a debt buyer and collection agency under North Carolina
law.  As a debt buyer, PRA is required to file certain properly
authenticated evidence with a court prior to entry of a default
judgment against a debtor.  Rule 55(b) of the North Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure also governs the entry of default
judgments.  When a plaintiff's claim is for a sum certain or for
a sum which can by computation be made certain, then the clerk
has the authority to enter a default judgment.  Absent a sum
certain, the default judgment must be entered by a judge.

Since Section 58-70-155 became effective in October 2009, PRA has
filed thousands of lawsuits in North Carolina state courts in
which it subsequently obtained default judgments.  PRA obtained
default judgments against each of the named Plaintiffs in the
action.  The Plaintiffs claim that PRA failed to satisfy the
Section 58-70-155 prerequisites that required it to file properly
authenticated business records providing an itemization of the
amount claimed to be owed.  Plaintiff Townes has additionally
filed and been granted a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the
North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside her default
judgment.

The Plaintiffs filed the action seeking relief on behalf of all
persons against whom PRA obtained a default judgment entered by a
North Carolina court in a case filed on or after Oct. 1, 2009.
On behalf of all proposed class members whose default judgments
have not yet been vacated, the Plaintiffs' first claim ("Claim
I") seeks a declaratory judgment that the default judgments
violate Section 58-70-155 (and, in some cases, Rule 55(b)(1)) and
are void, and seeks an associated injunction requiring PRA to
cease collection activity and file notices of vacatur.

On behalf of all class members, the Plaintiffs' second claim for
relief ("Claim II" or "statutory penalties claim") seeks
statutory penalties authorized by N.C. Gen. Stat. Section 58-70-
130(b).  The Plaintiffs claim that PRA violated Section 58-70-
115(7) by requesting and obtaining default judgments" that do not
conform to Section 58-70-155's prerequisites, entitling them to
statutory penalties under Section 58-70-130(b).

Similarly, the Plaintiffs' third claim for relief ("Claim III" or
"actual damages claim") seeks actual damages authorized by
Section 58-70-130 (a) in the amount PRA has collected from the
Plaintiffs' default judgments, on behalf of any proposed class
members who made post-default-judgment payments to PRA.

The matter comes before the Court on the Plaintiffs' Motion to
Remand.  PRA responded, and the Plaintiffs replied.  An oral
argument was held Oct. 5, 2017, and the parties submitted
supplemental briefing.  Also before the Court are the Plaintiffs'
Motion for Expedited Determination of Motion to Remand, and
Motion to Defer Time to File Federal Motion for Class
Certification.

PRA asserts that Exxon established a two-part test and argues
that all of the Plaintiffs' claims fail the first, "threshold"
step of the test.  Judge Osteen finds that the state court in
each of the Plaintiffs' cases made a finding that the personal
and subject matter jurisdiction requirements under state law were
met before entering the default judgment.  He also finds that the
Court does not read Thana v. Bd. of License Comm'rs's holding to
overrule its prior binding precedent that Rooker-Feldman may
apply to final judgments from lower state courts.  Courts
routinely recognize that diversity cases may implicate Rooker-
Feldman.  The Judge accordingly declines to adopt the Defendant's
threshold test.

Next, PRA argues that the Plaintiffs' characterization of their
Complaint as an independent action precludes application of
Rooker-Feldman.  The Judge finds that the cases cited by PRA were
not, as outlined by Exxon, brought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered
before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting
district court review and rejection of those judgments.
Therefore, he finds them to be of limited utility in its
analysis.  He is not persuaded to adopt PRA's proposed rule.

As to Count I, Judge Osteen holds that any statutory
interpretation the Court would have to undertake to interpret
Section 58-70-155 as jurisdictional or not would be in service of
deciding the Plaintiffs' challenge to the individual state-court
decisions, which is outside the Court's jurisdiction pursuant to
Rooker-Feldman.  As a result, except for Plaintiff Townes, he
finds that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the Plaintiffs'
Claim I.

Next, the Judge finds that the unfair practice itself results
from, at a minimum, a combination of the Defendant's conduct (the
filing of the allegedly inadequate business records) and the
state court's conduct (entering of the default judgment in the
absence of the adequate business records).  Therefore, he finds
the injuries asserted in Claim II to be caused, at least in part,
by the state-court judgments.  As a result, except with respect
to Plaintiff Townes, the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the
Plaintiffs' Claim II.

As to Count III, the Judge finds that the Plaintiffs do not seek
to recover from PRA because of PRA's licensure status or the
nature of PRA's conduct in collecting on the debts.  They
challenge the debts themselves as resulting from a judgment
allegedly entered in violation of a statute prescribing
prerequisites to entering that judgment; the damages they
estimate amount to the debt collected on the judgment because
they challenge the judgment itself.  Like in Claim II, the injury
stems from the entry of the judgment.  Because he finds that
Claim III complains of injuries caused by the state-court
judgments and invites district court review and rejection of that
judgment, he finds that, except with respect to Plaintiff Townes,
the court lacks jurisdiction to hear the Plaintiffs' Claim III.

The Plaintiffs have indeed challenged removal with their Motion
to Remand but do not challenge any of PRA's assertions as to the
threshold requirements triggering CAFA jurisdiction.  Plaintiff
Townes brings all claims on behalf of certain groups of the
proposed class, and these aggregated claims undisputedly meet
CAFA's requirements.  Therefore, the Judge concludes that it has
CAFA jurisdiction over the claims of Plaintiff Pia Townes.

For the reasons set forth, Judge Osteen finds that the Court
lacks jurisdiction over the claims of Plaintiffs Pounds, Miller,
Sayaphet-Tyler, and Hall pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
He granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs' Motion to
Remand.  He remanded the claims of Plaintiffs Pounds, Miller,
Sayaphet-Tyler, and Hall to the General Court of Justice,
Superior Court Division, Durham County, North Carolina, for
further disposition.  He denied the motion as to the claims of
Plaintiff Townes.  The Judge directed the Clerk of Court to send
a certified copy of the Memorandum Opinion and Order to the Clerk
of Superior Court in Durham County.

Judge Osteen denied as moot the Plaintiffs' Motion for Expedited
Determination of Motion to Remand.  He granted the Plaintiffs'
Motion to Defer Time to File Federal Motion for Class
Certification as to Plaintiff Townes and denied as moot as to the
remaining Plaintiffs. Plaintiff Townes will have 60 days from the
date of the Order to file any motion for class certification as
prescribed by LR 23.1 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/sRH3Vi from Leagle.com.

IRIS POUNDS, CARLTON MILLER, VILAYUAN SAYAPHET-TYLER, RHONDA HALL
& PIA TOWNES, Plaintiffs, represented by CARLENE M. MCNULTY --
carlene@ncjustice.org -- NORTH CAROLINA JUSTICE CENTER & J.
JEROME HARTZELL -- jerryhartzell@gmail.com -- HARTZELL &
WHITEMAN, L.L.P.

PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC, Defendant, represented by
JOSEPH D. HAMMOND -- joe.hammond@elliswinters.com -- ELLIS &
WINTERS, LLP & JONATHAN ARTHUR BERKELHAMMER --
jon.berkelhammer@elliswinters.com -- ELLIS & WINTERS, LLP.


PRIMESOURCE HEALTH: Court Okays 3rd Amended Suit in "Pfefferkorn"
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled Erin Pfefferkorn, et al., the Plaintiff, v.
PrimeSource Health Group LLC, et al., the Defendants, Case No.
Case: 1:17-cv-01223 (N.D. Ill.), the Hon. Judge John Robert
Blakey entered an order setting the reply date for the
Plaintiff's motion to certify class on or before May 30, 2018.

According to the docket entry made by the Clerk on May 16, 2018,
Plaintiff's motion for leave to file third amended complaint is
granted and shall be filed instanter. Response to Plaintiff's
third amended complaint shall be filed on or before May 30, 2018.
Plaintiff's motion to certify class is briefed as follows: reply
shall be filed on or before May 30, 2018. Parties shall meet and
confer regarding conditional class certification and submit
either agreed or opposing proposed order(s) to this Court's
proposed order inbox on or before June 6, 2018. Defendant's
motions to substitute counsel are granted. Defense counsel shall
discuss potential conflict with clients, and submit a report on
or before May 23, 2018, as stated in open court. Case management
conference is set for June 26, 2018 at 10:15 a.m in Courtroom
1203. Parties wishing to appear by telephone should contact the
Courtroom Deputy at least 48 hours prior to the next hearing to
set up a telephonic appearance.

A copy of the Docket Entry is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=SmM0XBgh


R.M. GALICIA: Anderson Sues over Unsolicited Telephone Calls
------------------------------------------------------------
RORY ANDERSON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. R.M. GALICIA, INC. d/b/a PROGRESSIVE
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS, and DOES 1-10, inclusive, and each of them,
the Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-03939 (C.D. Cal., May 11, 2018),
seeks to recover damages, injunctive relief, and any other
available legal or equitable remedies, resulting from the illegal
actions of the Defendant in negligently, knowingly, and/or
willfully contacting Plaintiff on his cellular telephone,
pursuant to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act and the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act.

According to the complaint, beginning in or around April of 2017,
the Defendant contacted Plaintiff on her cellular telephone
number ending in -6804, in an effort to collect an alleged debt
owed from Plaintiff. The Defendant called Plaintiff from
telephone numbers confirmed to belong to Defendant, including
without limitation (866) 767-8444. In its efforts to collect the
alleged debt owed from the Plaintiff, the Defendant used an
"automatic telephone dialing system," to place its daily calls to
Plaintiff seeking to collect an alleged debt owed.

The Defendant's calls were placed to telephone number assigned to
a The cellular telephone service for which Plaintiff incurs a
charge for incoming calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. section
227(b)(1). The Defendant did not possess Plaintiff's "prior
express consent" to receive calls using an automatic telephone
dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice on her
cellular telephone.

RM Galicia Inc. was founded in 1978. The Company's line of
business includes collection and adjustment services on claims
and other insurance related issues.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          Meghan E. George, Esq.
          Tom E. Wheeler, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: (877) 206 4741
          Facsimile: (866) 633 0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                  abacon@toddflaw.com
                  mgeorge@toddflaw.com
                  twheeler@toddflaw.com


SAFE HAVEN: Rodriguez Sues over Telemarketing Text Messages
-----------------------------------------------------------
DARIEN RODRIGUEZ, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. SAFE HAVEN SECURITY
SERVICES, INC., a Missouri corporation, the Defendant, Case No.
1:18-cv-21892-CMA (S.D. Fla., May 11, 2018), seeks statutory
damages and any other available legal or equitable remedies under
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, and seeks injunctive relief to
halt the Defendant's illegal conduct which has resulted in the
invasion of privacy, harassment, aggravation, and disruption of
the daily life of thousands of individuals.

According to the complaint, the Defendant provides security
services for homeowners. To promote its services, Defendant
engages in unsolicited marketing, harming thousands of consumers
in the process.  While the text message advertises services from
ADT Security, Plaintiff's counsel's investigation revealed that
Defendant is an authorized reseller of ADT Security, and is the
entity that transmitted the text message. Defendant's text
message was transmitted to Plaintiff's cellular telephone, and
within the time frame relevant to this action. Defendant's text
message constitutes telemarketing because it encouraged the
future purchase or investment in property, goods, or services,
i.e., Defendant's security services.

The Plaintiff received the subject text within this judicial
district and, therefore, Defendant's violation of the TCPA
occurred within this district. The Defendant caused other text
messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial
district. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant
with his express written consent to be contacted using an ATDS.
The Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 5545 Number
and is financially responsible for phone service to the 5545
Number.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff and the Classes:

          Scott A. Edelsberg, Esq.
          Jeff Ostrow, Esq.
          Joshua R. Levine, Esq.
          KOPELOWITZ OSTROW FERGUSON WEISELBERG GILBERT
          1 W. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 500
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 525 4100
          Facsimile: (954) 525 4300
          E-mail: edelsberg@kolawyers.com
                  ostrow@kolawyers.com
                  levine@kolawyers.com

               - and -

          Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
          14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 400
          Miami, FL 33132
          Telephone: (305) 479 2299
          E-mail: ashamis@shamisgentile.com

               - and -

          Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq.
          HIRALDO P.A.
          401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 400 4713
          E-mail: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com


SANDBOX TRANSPORTATION: "Reed" Suit Seeks Overtime Pay under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
LOGAN REED, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. SANDBOX TRANSPORTATION, LLC, the
Defendant, Case No. 5:18-cv-00450 (W.D. Tex., May 11, 2018),
seeks to recover all available relief, including overtime wages,
compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, and costs,
pursuant the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated who worked for Sandbox and were
paid by the hour but were not paid overtime at any time from
three years preceding the filing of the Original Complaint
through the final disposition of this matter.

The Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are those similarly
situated persons who worked for Sandbox at any time from May 11,
2015, through the final disposition of this matter, and were paid
hourly but did not receive overtime for all hours worked over 40
in each workweek. During this time, Plaintiff and the Putative
Class Members were non-exempt employees who were paid an hourly
rate and no overtime compensation. The Plaintiff and the Putative
Class Members routinely work (and worked) in excess of 40 hours
per workweek; however, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members
were not paid overtime of at least one and one-half their regular
rates for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek.

The decision by Sandbox not to pay overtime compensation to
Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members was neither reasonable
nor in good faith. Sandbox knowingly and deliberately failed to
compensate Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members overtime of
at least one and one-half their regular rates for all hours
worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek. The Plaintiff and the
Putative Class Members did not and currently do not perform work
that meets the definition of exempt work under the FLSA.[BN]

Attorneys in Charge for Plaintiff and the Putative
Class Members:

          Clif Alexander, Esq.
          Alan Clifton Gordon, Esq.
          Lauren E. Braddy, Esq.
          Carter T. Hastings
          ANDERSON ALEXANDER, PLLC
          819 N. Upper Broadway
          Corpus Christi, TX 78401
          Telephone: (361) 452 1279
          Facsimile: (361) 452 1284
          E-mail: clif@a2xlaw.com
                  lauren@a2xlaw.com
                  cgordon@a2xlaw.com
                  carter@a2xlaw.com


SCHLUMBERGER TECH: Court Allows Filing of 1st Amended "Martinez"
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SAUL MARTINEZ, JR., on Behalf of Himself and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v.
SCHLUMBERGER TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION, Defendant, Civ. No. 16-945
JCH/KRS (D. N.M.), Judge Judith C. Herrera of the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Mexico granted the Plaintiff's
Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint, and granted in
part the Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Exceed Page Limits.

Martinez is a former employee of Schlumberger, an oil field
services company.  According to the Complaint, Schlumberger
employed Martinez as a Field Engineer Trainee from approximately
January of 2014 until October of 2014, during which time he
performed non-exempt manual labor.  Martinez alleges that
Schlumberger required him, and others like him, to work more than
40 hours per week but refused to pay them overtime wages by
improperly classifying them as "exempt" employees.

Martinez asserts claims against Schlumberger for violations of
the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and the New Mexico Minimum
Wage Act ("NMMWA").  He seeks to assert a nationwide collective
action for the FLSA claim, and a New Mexico class action for the
NMMWA claim.

Martinez seeks leave to file a first amended complaint that would
broaden his collective and class actions.  While his original
Complaint was brought on behalf of "Field Engineer Trainees" in
the "Well Services Segment," he wishes to amend his complaint to
also include all workers employed as "Field Engineer Trainees" or
"Field Specialist Trainees" in either the Well Services Segment
or the Wireline Segment.  Schlumberger opposes the motion to
amend on the grounds that it seeks to expand the alleged classes
to include job positions Plaintiff never has held in divisions
where Plaintiff has never worked.  It argues that it would be
futile to permit this expansion because Martinez can neither
represent the expanded class he proposes nor meet the
certification requirements of the FLSA and Rule 23.

Martinez filed a reply in support of his motion for leave to
amend that is 16 pages in length, which exceeds the 12-page limit
imposed by the Local Rules.  Attached to the reply are two
complete, unhighlighted depositions totaling almost 200 pages --
well in excess of the 50 page limit for exhibits imposed by our
Local Rules.  Martinez did not request permission to exceed these
page limits before he filed his reply, but rather filed the reply
first and then, one day later, filed his Motion for Leave to
Exceed Page Limit.  Schlumberger opposes the motion to extend the
page limits.

Judge Herrera will grant the motion to extend page limits in
part.  He will accept Martinez's overlong reply brief on this
occasion only.  Having given this one chance, he will not
overlook any further violations of the Local Rules by the
Plaintiff.  However, the motion to extend the page limit for the
exhibits is denied, there being no valid reason for the Court to
consider those depositions in their entirety.  He will consider
only those pages specifically cited in the reply brief; the
remainder of the pages are stricken.

With respect to the Motion for Leave to Amend, based on the
record before the Court at this time, the Judge cannot conclude
at this stage that the proposed amendment would be futile.
Martinez has made substantial allegations that the groups of
employees included in his putative class were together the
victims of a single policy by Schlumberger to misclassify certain
employees as exempt.  Even if the current record contained
evidence to contradict that allegation -- which it does not --
this is not the proper stage at which to resolve such disputes.
It may be that Martinez's attempt to certify a collective action
will ultimately fail.  However, at this stage he has done enough
to win leave to amend, particularly in light of the policy in
favor of liberally granting such motions.

In addition, Schlumberger argues that Martinez's claims cannot
be, as a matter of law, typical of the new groups of employees
that he seeks to add because he did not work in the Wireline
Segment, nor did he work as a Field Specialist Trainee.  For the
same reasons, it asserts that Martinez cannot fairly and
adequately represent the interests of the new groups of employees
he seeks to add.  The Judge says it would have been helpful to
Schlumberger's argument if it had explained in its response the
difference between a Field Specialist Trainee and a Field
Engineer Trainee, or had distinguished between the Wireline and
Well Services Segments.

Without the benefit of such explanation, the Judge is at a loss
to evaluate Schlumberger's contention that Martinez cannot
possibly properly represent these employees.  Similarly,
Schlumberger states in conclusory fashion that the proposed
expansion of the class also poses significant manageability
concerns due to the significant overlap of these proposed groups
with class and collective actions currently pending in other
jurisdictions.  In the absence of any specific information on
this point, he concludes that this concern is premature at this
stage and can be addressed when Martinez moves for class
certification.

In sum, Judge Herrera concludes that the motion for leave to
amend should be granted.  Schlumberger is free to reassert its
arguments at the class certification stage.  Therefore, he
granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiff's Motion for
Leave to Exceed Page Limits as described.  He granted the
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint.
The Plaintiff must file his amended complaint no later than 10
days after entry of the Memorandum Opinion and Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/evn5FB from Leagle.com.

Saul Martinez, Jr., on Behalf of Himself and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel M.
Faber -- dan@danielfaber.com -- Law Office of Daniel Faber & Don
Foty -- DFoty@kennedyhodges.com -- Kennedy Hodges, LLP, pro hac
vice.

Schlumberger Technology Corporation, Defendant, represented by
Heather D. Hearne -- hdh@kullmanlaw.com -- The Kullman Firm,
P.L.C., Jeffrey L. Lowry -- jlowry@rodey.com -- Rodey, Dickason,
Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A., Martin J. Regimbal --
mjr@kullmanlaw.com -- The Kullman Firm, PLC, Robert Lombardi --
rpl@kullmanlaw.com -- The Kullman Firm, pro hac vice & Samuel
Zurik -- sz@kullmanlaw.com -- The Kullman Firm, P.L.C., pro hac
vice.


SEBASTOPOL, CA: Avendano-Ruiz Seeks to Certify Class & Subclass
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled NAHUM AVENDANO-RUIZ, the Plaintiff, v. CITY
OF SEBASTOPOL, et al., the Defendants, Case No. 3:15-cv-03371-RS
(N.D. Cal.), the Plaintiff will move the Court on June 21, 2018,
for an order certifying this action to proceed as a class action
pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Plaintiff proposes these class and sub-class:

   Proposed Class:

   "Persons whose vehicles were seized by the Sebastopol Police
   Department without a warrant and under the purported authority
   of Cal. Veh. Code section 14602.6, at any time from July 21,
   2013, up through the present, where (a) the vehicle's driver
   was issued a citation for driving without a valid license
   (Cal. Veh. Code section 12500), (b) the driver had one or more
   prior section 12500 convictions, and (c) the driver was not
   driving on a suspended, revoked or restricted driver's
   license, driving while intoxicated or arrested or cited for
   any dangerous driving offense."

   Proposed Sub-Class:

   "Persons within the Proposed Class above who reclaimed their
   vehicles following the impound period."

A copy of the Notice of Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=Ld9ELQ5X

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Alicia Roman, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF ALICIA ROMAN
          719 Orchard Street
          Santa Rosa, CA 95404
          Telephone: (707) 526 4100
          Facsimile: (707) 573 1094
          E-mail: aliciaromanlaw@yahoo.com

               - and -

          Donald W. Cook, Esq.
          ATTORNEY AT LAW
          3435 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 2910
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Telephone: (213) 252 9444
          Facsimile: (213) 252 0091
          E-mail: manncook@earthlink.net


SINCERE CARE: Fails to Pay Minimum Wages and OT, Pustilnik Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
BORIS PUSTILNIK, individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated who were employed by SINCERE CARE AGENCY, INC.
and ADVANCE HOME CARE, LLC d/b/a SINCERE CARE, along with other
affiliated entities, the Plaintiffs, v. SINCERE CARE AGENCY, INC.
and ADVANCE HOME CARE, LLC d/b/a SINCERE CARE, and/or any other
related entities, the Defendants, Case No. 154444/2018 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct., May 11, 2018), seeks to recover minimum wages and overtime
compensation pursuant to the New York Labor Law.

The Plaintiff and a putative class of individuals who are
citizens of the State of New York and are presently or were
formerly employed by the Defendants) to provide personal care,
assistance, health-related tasks and other home care services to
Defendants' clients within the State of New York.

Beginning in April 2012, continuing through the present, the
Defendants have maintained a policy and practice of requiring
Plaintiffs to regularly work in excess of ten hours per day,
without providing the proper hourly compensation for all hours
worked, including failing to pay the lawful minimum wage rate,
overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours
in any given week, and "spread of hours" compensation.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Lloyd R. Ambinder, Esq.
          LaDonna M. Lusher, Esq.
          Milana Dostanitch, Esq.
          VIRGINIA & AMBINDER, LLP
          40 Broad Street, Seventh Floor
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (212) 943 9080
          Facsimile: (212) 943 9082
          E-mail: llusher@vandallp.com

               - and -

          Gennadiy Naydenskiy, Esq.
          NAYDENSKIY LAW FIRM LLC
          281 Summerhill Rd, Suite 210
          East Brunswick, NJ, 08816
          Telephone: (800) 789 9396
          Facsimile: (866) 261 5478
          E-mail: naydenskiylaw@gmail.com


STARK COLLECTION: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled HOWARD BRUCHHAUSER, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. THE
STARK COLLECTION AGENCY INC., the Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-
00741-NJ (E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an
order certifying proposed classes in this case, appointing the
Plaintiff as class representative, and appointing Ademi &
O'Reilly, LLP as Class Counsel, and for such other and further
relief as the Court may deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further asks that the Court to stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties
relief from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and
requirement that Plaintiff file a brief and supporting documents
in support of this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion. Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015).

As this motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense
when short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an
amended motion is filed.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=scib0DxM

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482 8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482 8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


STARLINE TOURS: 2nd Arbitration Award in "Ehm" Suit Affirmed
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, EHM PRODUCTIONS, INC., Plaintiff and Respondent, v.
STARLINE TOURS OF HOLLYWOOD, INC., Defendant and Appellant, Case
No. B281594 (Cal. App.), Judge Victoria M. Chavez of the Court of
Appeals of California for the Second District, Division Two,
affirmed the trial court's judgment confirming the second
arbitration award.

In August 2012, the Appellant and the Respondent entered into a
written contractual agreement captioned "TMZ-Starline Tour Bus
Agreement."  The agreement solidified the parties' intent to run
a TMZ branded, multi-media Hollywood bus tour in Southern
California.

In December 2012, several bus drivers filed a putative class
action against the Appellant alleging that it had violated
certain wage and hour laws.  The named Plaintiffs sought to
represent all similarly situated employees regardless of whether
they worked in connection with the TMZ tour or one of appellant's
other tours.  On June 14, 2013, the putative class action
complaint was amended to add TMZ Productions, Inc. as a
Defendant.

The Respondent tendered its defense to the Appellant.  The
Appellant responded that it had no duty to indemnify TMZ
Productions, but offered to indemnify under certain conditions.

In August 2013, the Respondent retained counsel to represent
respondent and TMZ Productions.  Between June 2013 and January
2014, the Respondent voluntarily agreed with the Plaintiffs in
the underlying lawsuit to be added as a Defendant in order to
secure the dismissal of TMZ Productions.  The Plaintiffs added
the Respondent as a Defendant in January 2014 and voluntarily
dismissed TMZ Productions in April 2014.

On June 2, 2014, the Respondent filed a demand for arbitration,
alleging breach of contract by the Appellant arising from its
refusal to defend the Respondent in the underlying lawsuit.  The
Respondent sought a declaration that the Appellant was required
to defend TMZ Productions and the Respondent.  The Respondent
sought an award of its costs and fees incurred through Jan. 31,
2015, and a declaration that the Appellant is required to pay the
Respondent's reasonable attorney fees as they are incurred going
forward.

On June 8, 2015, the arbitrator issued a "partial final award."
The arbitrator found that the Appellant was obligated to defend
TMZ Productions and the Respondent in the underlying lawsuit.
The arbitrator ordered the Appellant to pay respondent $185,725
for its attorney fees and $15,836.83 for its costs incurred in
the underlying action through Jan. 31, 2015. The arbitrator
further ordered the Appellant to pay the Respondent's reasonable
attorney fees and costs in the underlying action going forward.

The Appellant appealed the award under the JAMS Optional Appeal
Procedure, as permitted in the parties' agreement.  The appellate
panel affirmed the arbitrator's partial final award in its
entirety.  The determination of costs on appeal was reserved for
further decision.

On May 9, 2016, the Respondent filed a petition to confirm the
partial final award in Superior Court.  Starline opposed the
petition on numerous grounds.  On June 21, 2016, the trial court
granted the petition, ordering the Respondent to give notice and
prepare and serve a proposed order.  The Appellant objected to
the proposed order.  The court held a hearing on July 27, 2016.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court signed an amended
judgment confirming the arbitration award.

On Aug. 26, 2016, the Appellant filed an appeal from the
judgment.  On Oct. 4, 2017, the Appellate Court filed an opinion
affirming the judgment in full.

On May 12, 2016, three days after the Respondent filed its
petition to confirm the partial final award, the JAMS appellate
panel issued its "Final Award on Appeal" (cost award),
determining the Respondent's costs for the JAMS appeal.  The cost
award granted the Respondent $41,429.92 in costs.

On Aug. 22, 2016, the Respondent petitioned for confirmation of
the cost award.  The Appellant opposed the petition, arguing,
among other things, that the Respondent waived its right to
obtain confirmation of the cost award by failing to present it
for confirmation prior to the entry of the first judgment.

The trial court rejected the Appellant's arguments and entered a
judgment confirming the cost award on Jan. 23, 2017.  The court
ordered the Appellant to pay the Respondent $41,429.92 in
accordance with the cost award.  The Appellant filed a timely
notice of appeal of the cost award on March 20, 2017.

Judge Chavez finds that the Appellant has failed to show that the
one final judgment rule precludes confirmation of the cost award.
The Appellant has failed to provide legal support for its
argument that the one final judgment rule precludes confirmation
of the cost award in the matter.  When presented with a petition
to confirm an arbitration award, the court's role is to confirm,
correct, or vacate the award, or dismiss the petition entirely.
As an incremental award permitted under Hightower v. Superior
Court, the cost award was subject to confirmation, unless the
court found that the award was subject to dismissal or vacation
under section 1286.2.  The Judge says the petition was not
subject to dismissal, and the Appellant does not suggest on
appeal that the order should be vacated pursuant to section
1286.2.  Thus, the trial court properly confirmed the award.  No
error occurred.

The Judge also finds that the principles of waiver and estoppel
do not preclude confirmation of the cost award.  He says the
Appellant cites several cases as examples of situations where an
arbitration award and subsequent cost award were presented
simultaneously to the trial court for confirmation.  What the
Appellant fails to provide is legal authority requiring this
procedure, or suggesting that a winning party in arbitration is
not entitled to confirmation of a fee award unless it is
presented to the trial court simultaneously with the substantive
arbitration award.  Under the circumstances, the Judge declines
to apply the doctrines of waiver or estoppel to reverse the trial
court judgment.

For these reasons, Judge Chavez affirmed the judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/IhEqUT from Leagle.com.

Lex Opus, Mohammed K. Ghods, Jeremy A. Rhyne --
jrhyne@lexopusfirm.com -- and Lori Speak for Defendant and
Appellant.

Boies Schiller Flexner, Linda M. Burrow -- lburrow@bsfllp.com --
and Cameron J. Johnson -- cjohnson@bsfllp.com -- for Plaintiff
and Respondent.


STONE CONCEPT: Weich Seeks Unpaid Wages under FLSA
--------------------------------------------------
Adam Weich, other similarly-situated individuals, the
Plaintiff(s), v. Stone Concept Miami, Inc., and Hamid Sarrafi,
the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-21894-FAM (S.D. Fla., May 11,
2018), seeks to recover money damages for unpaid wages pursuant
to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants employed Plaintiff as
an assistant journeyman employee by Stone Concept Miami, Inc.,
and Hamid Sarrafi. While employed, the Defendants failed to pay
the Plaintiff for 17 pay periods.  The Plaintiff also is owed
5.5 hours of overtime and has not been compensated for any hours
over 40.

The Plaintiff was paid an average of $23.00 an hour starting on
or about January 2018 through and continuing through April 30,
2018, but was not paid for any hours that he worked in excess of
40 hours per week. The Plaintiff was required to work in excess
of 40 hours per week with no provisions for overtime wages.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Franklin Antonio Jara, Esq.
          JARA & ASSOCIATES, P.A.
          10271 Sunset Drive, Suite 103
          Miami, FL 33173
          Telephone: (305) 372 0290
          Facsimile: (305) 675 0383
          E-mail: info@jaralaw.com


STORAGE GENIUS: Pernia Seeks Overtime Wages under FLSA
------------------------------------------------------
JOSE L. PERNIA, and other similarly-situated individuals, the
Plaintiff, v. THE STORAGE GENIUS, INC., and GERSON CALDERON,
individually, the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-21974-DPG (S.D.
Fla., May 17, 2018), seeks to recover money damages for unpaid
overtime wages, and retaliation under the laws of the United
States and the Fair Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff was a non-exempt, full-
time employee working more than 40 hours in a week period. The
Plaintiff was paid a wage rate of $11.00 an hour. While employed
with the Defendants, the Plaintiff worked regularly 6 days per
week from Monday to Saturday, and from 7:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.,
which represents 10 hours daily or 60 hours weekly. Plaintiff has
already deducted 6 hours corresponding to 1 hour of lunch break
daily. In addition, during the relevant period of employment,
Plaintiff worked for many weeks in projects located out of State.
During those periods, Plaintiff worked weeks of 68 and 70 hours
weekly. Those hours are not included in this complaint pending
proper discovery.

The Plaintiff worked under the supervision of GERSON CALDERON and
other supervisors. The Plaintiff worked in excess of 40 hours
weekly regularly. However, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff
overtime hours at the rate of time and a half his regular rate.
Plaintiff was paid for all his working hours, but at his regular
rate.

Storage Genius is located in Miami, Florida. This organization
primarily operates in the general warehousing and storage
business/industry within the motor freight transportation
sector.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Zandro E. Palma, Esq.
          9100 S. Dadeland Blvd., Suite 1500
          Miami, FL 33156
          Telephone: (305) 446 1500
          Facsimile: (305) 446 1502
          E-mail: zep@thepalmalawgroup.com


TEACHERS INSURANCE: Court Narrows Claims in "Haley" ERISA Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge J. Paul Oetken of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York granted in part and denied in part the
Defendant moves to dismiss the case, MELISSA HALEY, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v.
TEACHERS INSURANCE ANNUITY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, Defendant,
Case No. 17-CV-855 (JPO) (S.D. N.Y.).

Haley brings the putative class action against Defendant Teachers
Insurance and Annuity Association of America ("TIAA"), alleging
that TIAA breached its fiduciary duty to the Washington
University Retirement Savings Plan under section 404(a) of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), and
engaged in prohibited transactions in violation of sections
406(a)(1) and 406(b), 29 U.S.C. Secs. 1106(a)(1), 1106(b).  The
Plaintiff seeks monetary and equitable relief under ERISA.

Haley is an employee of Washington University and a participant
in the Washington University Retirement Savings Plan, an employee
pension benefit plan regulated by ERISA.  Defendant TIAA is an
insurance company that provides financial services to employee
benefit plans, including the Plan.

The Plan offers participants the opportunity to take out a loan
against a portion of their retirement accounts.  Washington
University, the Plan Administrator, contracted with two outside
vendors, TIAA and Vanguard, to administer these participant
loans.  The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant has discretion
to set the variable interest rate that participants pay on their
loans and the interest rate that participants earn on their
collateral.

The Plaintiff alleges that TIAA's retirement loan process is
anomalous: Usually, loans are made directly from the
participant's retirement account, with no transfer of funds to
the loan vendor's general account, and interest rates on
participant loans are typically fixed.  TIAA retains for itself
the difference, or "spread," between (a) the loan interest rate
paid by participants and (b) the interest rate received by
participants as investment income from the Traditional Annuity.

The Plaintiff took out four separate participant loans: (1) in
2011, she took out a loan for $1,612.01, which carried an
interest rate of 4.42%; (2) in 2013, she took out a $1,000 loan,
with a 4.22% interest rate; (3) in 2014, she took out an $8,500
loan, with a variable interest rate currently set at 4.44%; and
(4) in 2015, she took a $7,500 loan, with a variable interest
rate currently set at 4.17%.  She has fully repaid the first and
second loans, and she is in the process of repaying the third and
fourth.

The Plaintiff filed the putative class action in February 2017,
claiming that he Defendant's administration of retirement loans
to Plan participants violates ERISA.  Counts I through IV allege
that TIAA itself violated its duties as an ERISA fiduciary,
whereas Count V alleges that TIAA is liable as a nonfiduciary for
breaches by the Plan Administrator.  TIAA has moved to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state
a claim.

Judge Oetken finds that TIAA's failure to identify an appropriate
baseline for evaluating whether the Plaintiff was in fact injured
distinguishes the case from Fishman Haygood Phelps Walmsley
Willis & Swanson, L.L.P. v. State St. Corp.  In that case, even
the plaintiff's expert agreed with the conclusion that the
hypothetical investments would have been outperformed by the
actual investments made by the defendants.  Without more
persuasive evidence that its fees did not actually injure the
Plaintiff, the Defendant cannot shift the burden to the Plaintiff
to come forward with evidence of her own to demonstrate the
existence of standing at the motion-to-dismiss phase.  TIAA's
Rule 12(b)(1) motion is therefore denied.

The Judge next finds that TIAA may have had some discretion to
raise its own compensation by effectively increasing the
"spread," but the Plaintiff fails to allege that TIAA ever
exercised such discretion, to the Plaintiff's detriment or
otherwise.  Under Pegram v. Herdrich's functional nexus
requirement, the Plaintiff cannot establish that TIAA acted as an
ERISA fiduciary.  Counts I through IV, which are all asserted
against TIAA as a fiduciary, must be dismissed.

He also finds that the Plaintiff's equitable relief claim
survives if she has adequately alleged that "plan assets" were
transferred to TIAA as loan collateral.  ERISA provides no
explicit definition of plan assets.  With respect to participant
contributions, however, the Department of Labor regulations
provide that the assets of the plan include amounts (other than
union dues) that a participant or beneficiary pays to an
employer, or amounts that a participant has withheld from his
wages by an employer, for contribution to the plan.  Here, the
collateral was drawn from the Plaintiff's contributions;
therefore, the funds were "plan assets" under the relevant
regulation, and the Plaintiff has adequately alleged that the
transfer of these assets to a party in interest was a prohibited
transaction under ERISA Section 406(a)(1)(D).

Finally, in light of the early stage of the litigation, and the
fact that the Plaintiff has not yet filed any amended complaint,
the Court also cannot conclude that amendment would result in
undue delay or prejudice.  He granted leave to amend as to Count
V.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Oetken granted in part and
denied in part TIAA's motion dismiss.  Only Count V survives the
motion to dismiss.  The Plaintiff may file an amended complaint,
provided that she does so within 30 days.  The Clerk of Court is
directed to close the motion at Docket Number 20.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Opinion and Order
is available at https://is.gd/dRLvum from Leagle.com.

Melissa Haley, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Ellen Noteware --
enoteware@bm.net -- Berger & Montague, P.C., Michael C. McKay --
mmckay@schneiderwallace.com -- Schneider Wallace Cottrell Konecky
LLP, Shanon Jude Carson, Berger & Montague, P.C., Todd S. Collins
-- tcollins@bm.net -- Berger & Montague, P.C. & John Joseph
Nestico -- jnestico@schneiderwallace.com -- Schneider Wallace
Cottrell Konecky Wotkyns LLC.

Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America, Defendant,
represented by Jaime A. Santos -- jsantos@goodwinlaw.com --
Goodwin Procter, LLP, James O. Fleckner --
jfleckner@goodwinlaw.com -- Goodwin, Procter, L.L.P., Michael K.
Isenman -- misenman@goodwinlaw.com -- Goodwin Procter, LLP &
Valerie A. Haggans -- vhaggans@goodwinlaw.com -- Goodwin Procter,
LLP.


TESLA MOTORS: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Stockholder Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Joseph R. Slights, III of the Court of Chancery of Delaware
denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss the case, IN RE TESLA
MOTORS, INC. STOCKHOLDER LITIGATION, Consolidated C.A. No. 12711-
VCS (Del. Ch.).

Tesla acquired SolarCity Corp. in 2016.  Following the
announcement of the proposed transaction, Tesla stockholders
filed several derivative and putative class action lawsuits in
the Court alleging that the Tesla board of directors and Elon
Musk as a conflicted controller breached their fiduciary duties
by approving the Acquisition for the benefit of SolarCity
stakeholders and to the detriment of Tesla stockholders.

While it was not required to do so under Delaware law, the Board
submitted the Acquisition to Tesla stockholders for approval.  A
majority voted in favor of the transaction.  Following the
stockholder vote, the Defendants moved to dismiss the now-
consolidated complaint under Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC
("Corwin").

The Plaintiffs oppose the motion, in part, on the ground that
Corwin does not apply because the Acquisition involved a
conflicted controlling stockholder (Musk).  Musk, Tesla's
Chairman and CEO, owns less than a majority of Tesla's
outstanding voting stock.  According to the Defendants, the
Plaintiffs have failed to plead facts that would support a
reasonable inference that Musk, as a minority blockholder,
exercised either control over Tesla generally or control over
Tesla's Board during its consideration and approval of the
Acquisition.

The question addressed before the Court is whether the Plaintiffs
have adequately pled that Musk is a controlling stockholder of
Tesla.  After carefully reviewing the operative complaint, in a
close call, Judge Slights concludes it is reasonably conceivable
that Musk, as a controlling stockholder, controlled the Tesla
Board in connection with the Acquisition.

The Judge finds that whether Musk has regularly exercised control
over Tesla's Board, or whether he did so only with respect to the
Acquisition, is not entirely clear from the Complaint.  For
purposes of his decision on the motion, however, that distinction
does not matter.  At the very least, the Complaint pleads
sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that Musk
exercised his influence as a controlling stockholder with respect
to the Acquisition.

Specifically, the combination of well-pled facts relating to
Musk's voting influence, his domination of the Board during the
process leading up to the Acquisition against the backdrop of his
extraordinary influence within the Company generally, the Board
level conflicts that diminished the Board's resistance to Musk's
influence, and the Company's and Musk's own acknowledgements of
his outsized influence, all told, satisfy the Plaintiffs' burden
to plead that Musk's status as a Tesla controlling stockholder is
reasonably conceivable.  The facts developed in discovery may
well demonstrate otherwise.  But the Plaintiffs have secured a
right to pursue that discovery by adequately pleading their
breach of fiduciary duty claims and the ab initio inapplicability
of Corwin.

As to Tesla's certificate of incorporation which contains an
exculpation provision as authorized by 8 Del. C. Section
102(b)(7), Judge Slights finds that the Defendants have not
raised an exculpation argument, except as to the disclosure
claim.  And that "argument" consists of a passing reference in a
footnote in their Opening Brief.  Issues not properly briefed are
deemed waived.  And failure to raise a legal issue in the above-
the-line text of a brief generally constitutes waiver of that
issue.  Accordingly, he deems the issue of exculpation waived for
purposes of the motion and decline to decide whether each
director is entitled to exculpation at this time.  He says the
Defendants may raise the issue in summary judgment motion
practice should the undisputed facts support a finding of
exculpation.

For these reasons, Judge Slights denied the Defendants' motion to
dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
is available at https://is.gd/4T8XuS from Leagle.com.

Jay W. Eisenhofer Esquire -- jeisenhofer@gelaw.com -- and James
J. Sabella Esquire --  jsabella@gelaw.com -- of Grant &
Eisenhofer P.A., Wilmington, Delaware; Michael Hanrahan, Esquire
-- mhanrahan@prickett.com -- Paul A. Fioravanti Jr., Esquire --
pafioravanti@prickett.com -- and Samuel L. Closic Esquire --
slclosic@prickett.com -- of Prickett, Jones & Elliott, P.A.,
Wilmington, Delaware; Ned Weinberger Esquire --
nweinberger@labaton.com -- Ryan T. Keating Esquire --
rkeating@morrisjames.com -- and Thomas Curry Esquire --
tcurry@labaton.com -- of Labaton Sucharow LLP, Wilmington,
Delaware; Joel Friedlander Esquire --
jfriedlander@friedlandergorris.com -- and Jeffrey M. Gorris
Esquire -- jgorris@friedlandergorris.com -- of Friedlander &
Gorris, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware; Justin S. Brooks Esquire --
jbrooks@gbblegal.com -- of Guttman, Buschner & Brooks PLLC,
Wilmington, Delaware; Randall J. Baron, Esquire --
randyb@rgrdlaw.com -- David T. Wissbroecker Esquire --
DWissbroecker@rgrdlaw.com -- and Maxwell R. Huffman Esquire, of
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, San Diego, California; Lee D.
Rudy, Esquire -- lrudy@ktmc.com -- Eric L. Zagar, Esquire --
ezagar@ktmc.com -- Robin Winchester Esquire --
rwinchester@ktmc.com -- and Kristen L. Ross Esquire --
kross@ktmc.com -- of Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Radnor,
Pennsylvania; and Mark Lebovitch Esquire -- markl@blbglaw.com --
and Jeroen van Kwawegen, Esquire -- jeroen@blbglaw.com -- of
Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, New York, New York,
Attorneys for Plaintiffs.

David E. Ross, Esquire -- dross@ramllp.com -- Garrett B. Moritz
Esquire -- gmoritz@ramllp.com -- and Benjamin Z. Grossberg
Esquire -- bgrossberg@ramllp.com -- of Ross Aronstam & Moritz
LLP, Wilmington, Delaware and William Savitt, Esquire --
WDSavitt@wlrk.com -- Graham W. Meli, Esquire -- GWMeli@wlrk.com -
- Steven Winter Esquire -- SWinter@wlrk.com -- and David E. Kirk
Esquire -- DEKirk@wlrk.com -- of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz,
New York, New York, Attorneys for Defendants.


TOMORROW PCS: Blank Seeks Conditional Class Certification
---------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled LINDSAY BLANK, on behalf of herself and
other persons similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. TOMORROW PCS,
LLC, et al, the Defendants, Case No. 2:16-cv-11092-MVL-DEK (E.D.
La.), the Plaintiff moves for conditional class certification,
judicial notice, and for disclosure of the names and addresses of
potential "opt-in" plaintiffs.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Roberto Luis Costales, Esq.
          William H. Beaumont, Esq.
          Emily A. Westermeier, Esq.
          BEAUMONT COSTALES LLC
          3801 Canal Street, Suite 207
          New Orleans, LA 70119
          Telephone: (504) 534 5005
          E-mail: eaw@beaumontcostales.com

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=4wE8ztY0


TOWNE PROPERTIES: Class in "Duggan" ERISA Suit Partly Certified
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Connie J. Duggan, Plaintiff, v. Towne Properties
Group Health Plan, et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:15cv623 (S.D.
Ohio), Judge Michael R. Barrett of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, granted in part
and denied in part the Plaintiff's Motion for Class
Certification.

The Plaintiff filed a putative class action claiming Defendant
Towne Properties, plan administrator and an ERISA fiduciary,
failed to provide the plan documents to participants as required
by ERISA and its regulations; and Defendant MedBen, also an ERISA
fiduciary, failed to provide ERISA-compliant notice of its
adverse benefit determinations to participants of plans it
administers.

The Plaintiff seeks an order under Federal Rule Civil Procedure
23(b)(2) and 23(c) certifying two classes for equitable relief
under ERISA Section 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. Section 1132(a)(3):

     a. Injunction Class (MedBen Only): All current and past
participants in any ERISA-governed employee welfare benefit plan
for which MedBen serves as third-party administrator.

     b. Equitable Remedy Class: All participants in any ERISA-
governed employee welfare benefit plan for which MedBen acted to
adjudicate claims for benefits and issued at least one
notification of an adverse benefit determination during the class
period, Sept. 25, 2009 to present.

Towne Properties does not oppose certification of the Equitable
Remedy Class; and has agreed in the future to distribute plan
documents to plan participants as required by ERISA.  MedBen
argues that the class certification is not proper because (1)
MedBen is not a fiduciary under ERISA; and (2) the Plaintiff has
not met the requirements for class certification under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

MedBen explains that the Benefit Management Agreement expressly
provides that MedBen is not a fiduciary and the customer, as plan
administrator, has sole discretionary authority over the plan.
In Briscoe v. Fine, the Sixth Circuit held that a third-party
administrator does not act as a fiduciary merely by determining
benefits eligibility and processing claims.  The court noted that
under its service agreement, the third-party administrator was
responsible for determining eligibility for benefits, processing
claims, and assisting plan administrator in producing reports
required by law.   However, the agreement provided that the
employer retained final authority to determine whether a claim
should be paid and was the entity to which dissatisfied employees
were instructed to direct their appeal.

Judge Barrett finds little to distinguish the functions performed
by MedBen from the third-party administrator in Briscoe.
Accordingly, MedBen was not acting as an ERISA fiduciary when it
allegedly failed to provide the Plaintiff with an ERISA-compliant
adverse benefit determination notice.  Because the Judge has
concluded that MedBen was not acting as fiduciary under ERISA, it
is unnecessary for him to address the Plaintiff's arguments with
regard to the requirements for class certification under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Barrett denied the Plaintiff's
Motion for Class Certification as to MedBen; but granted as to
Towne Properties and the Equitable Remedy Class.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Opinion and Order
is available at https://is.gd/5AYMij from Leagle.com.

Connie J. Duggan, Plaintiff, represented by William Henry
Blessing -- bill@blessing-attorneys.com.

Towne Properties Group Health Plan & Towne Properties Asset
Management Co., Inc., Defendants, represented by Douglas R.
Dennis -- ddennis@fbtlaw.com -- Frost Brown Todd LLC.

Medical Benefits Administrators, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Rodney Alan Holaday -- raholaday@vorys.com -- Vorys, Sater,
Seymour and Pease LLP, Brent Darnell Craft -- bdcraft@vorys.com -
- Vorys Sater Seymour & Pease LLP, Martha Brewer Motley, Vorys,
Sater, Seymour & Pease LLP & Steven A. Chang -- sachang@vorys.com
-- Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease.


TOWN SPORTS: Metten Sues over Spam Text Messages
------------------------------------------------
LOIS METTEN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. TOWN SPORTS INTERNATIONAL, LLC, and
TOWN SPORTS INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS, INC. d//b/a NEW YORK SPORTS
CLUBS, BOSTON SPORTS CLUBS, WASHINGTON SPORTS CLUBS and
PHILADELPHIA SPORTS CLUBS, the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-
04226-ALC (S.D.N.Y., May 11, 2018), seeks to recover damages
caused by the Defendants' violations of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.

The Defendants own and operate health and fitness facilities in
New York, Boston, Washington D.C., and Philadelphia, doing
business as New York Sports Clubs, Boston Sports Clubs,
Washington Sports Clubs, and Philadelphia Sports Clubs,
respectively.  They claim to have "the largest gym network in the
Northeast." See https://www.newyorksportsclubs.com/about-us (last
visited May 9, 2018).

The Defendants advertise their gyms through bulk SMS messaging,
with software provided by CallFire, Inc. The software has the
capacity to store and dial telephone numbers en masse.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Proposed Class:

          Joseph A. Fitapelli, Esq.
          Frank J. Mazzaferrov, Esq.
          FITAPELLI & SCHAFFER, LLP
          28 Liberty Street, 30th Floor
          New York, NY 10005
          Telephone: (212) 300-0375
          Facsimile: (212) 481-1333
          E-mail: jfitapelli@fslawfirm.com
                  fmazzaferro@fslawfirm.com

               - and -

          Beth E. Terrell, Esq.
          Adrienne D. McEntee, Esq.
          TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC
          936 North 34th Street, Suite 300
          Seattle, WA 98103-8869
          Telephone: (206) 816 6603
          Facsimile: (206) 319 5450
          E-mail: bterrell@terrellmarshall.com
                  amcentee@terrellmarshall.com


TRANS-CONTINENTAL: Parisi Sues over Unsolicited Phone Calls
-----------------------------------------------------------
TOMMY PARISI, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. TRANS-CONTINENTAL CREDIT & COLLECTION
CORP., and DOES 1-10, inclusive, and each of them, the Defendant,
Case No. 3:18-cv-02924 (N.D. Cal., May 17, 2018), seeks damages,
injunctive relief, and any other available legal or equitable
remedies, resulting from the illegal actions of Defendant in
negligently, knowingly, and/or willfully contacting Plaintiff no
Plaintiff's cellular telephone, pursuant to the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act.

Beginning in or around September of 2017, the Defendant contacted
Plaintiff on his cellular telephone number ending in -9495, in an
effort to collect an alleged debt owed from Plaintiff. The
Defendant called Plaintiff from telephone numbers confirmed to
belong to Defendant, including without limitation (914) 421-3168.

The Plaintiff requested for Defendant to stop calling Plaintiff
during one of the initial calls from Defendant. Despite this,
Defendant continued to call Plaintiff. In its efforts to collect
the alleged debt owed from Plaintiff, Defendant used an
"automatic telephone dialing system," as defined by 47 U.S.C.
section 227(a)(1) to place its daily calls to Plaintiff seeking
to collect an alleged debt owed.

Defendant's calls constituted calls that were not for emergency
purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. section 227(b)(1)(A).
Defendant's calls were placed to telephone number assigned to a
cellular telephone service for which Plaintiff incurs a charge
for incoming calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. section 227(b)(1). The
Defendant did not possess Plaintiff's "prior express consent" to
receive calls using an automatic telephone dialing system or an
artificial or prerecorded voice on his cellular telephone
pursuant to 47 U.S.C. section 227(b)(1)(A).

Trans-Continental was founded in 1973. The company's line of
business includes collection and adjustment services on
claims.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          Meghan E. George, Esq.
          Tom E. Wheeler, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: 877 206 4741
          Facsimile: 866 633 0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                  abacon@toddflaw.com
                  mgeorge@toddflaw.com
                  twheeler@toddflaw.com


TRUEACCORD CORP: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled TROY NORTON, Individually and on Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. TRUEACCORD CORP,
and LVNV FUNDING LLC, the Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-00742
(E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order
certifying proposed classes in this case, appointing the
Plaintiff as class representative, and appointing Ademi &
O'Reilly, LLP as Class Counsel, and for such other and further
relief as the Court may deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further asks that the Court to stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties
relief from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and
requirement that Plaintiff file a brief and supporting documents
in support of this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion. Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015).

As this motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense
when short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an
amended motion is filed.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=swSFMhCc

The Plaintiff is represented by:


          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482 8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482 8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


UNITED INDUSTRIES: "Arthur" Class Certification Bid Shelved
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled GREGORY ARTHUR, the Plaintiff, v. UNITED
INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, the Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-06983-
CAS-SK (C.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Christina A. Snyder entered an
order taking Plaintiff's motion for class certification and to
appoint class counsel under submission, according to the civil
minutes.

A copy of the Civil Minutes Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=Mgq9UBOm


The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Houchin
          820 N San Vicente Blvd 69942
          West Hollywood, CA 90069
          Telephone: (818) 314 0558
          Facsimile: (310) 860 1343
          E-mail: 187pc@sbcglobal.net

The Defendant is represented by:

          Ronie Schmelz, Esq.
          Tucker Ellis LLP
          515 S Flower St Fl 42
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 430 3375
          Facsimile: (213) 430 3409


UNITED PARCEL: "Jackson" Suit Moved to Eastern Dist. of New York
----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Jarrell Jackson, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v.
United Parcel Service General Services, Inc., doing business as:
UPS, the Defendant, Case No. 604296/2018, was removed from the
Supreme Court of the State of NY, County of Nassau, to the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Central
Islip) on May 11, 2018. The District Court Clerk assigned Case
No. 2:18-cv-02815-ADS-AYS to the proceeding. The case is assigned
to the Hon. Judge Arthur D. Spatt.

United Parcel is an American multinational package delivery
company engaging in forwarding and logistics business provides
services in more than 175 countries and territories
worldwide.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark C. Gaylord, Esq.
          BOUKLAS GAYLORD LLP
          400 Jericho Turnpike, Suite 226
          Jericho, NY 11753
          Telephone: (516) 742 4949
          Facsimile: (516) 742 1977
          E-mail: mark@bglawny.com

Attorneys for Defendant:

          Gregory Scott Tabakman, Esq.
          Day Pitney LLP, Esq.
          Jefferson Road
          Parsippany, NJ 07054
          Telephone: (973) 966 8020
          Facsimile: (973) 273 4594
          E-mail: gtabakman@daypitney.com


UNITED STATES: Manker Seeks to Certify Class of Navy Veterans
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled TYSON MANKER, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, and NATIONAL VETERANS COUNCIL FOR
LEGAL REDRESS, on behalf of itself, its members, and all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. RICHARD V. SPENCER,
Secretary of the Navy, the Defendant, Case No. 3:18-cv-00372-CSH
(D. Conn.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to certify a class
consisting of:

   "all Navy, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps, and Marine Corps
   Reserve veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan Era who: (a) were
   discharged with less than honorable discharges (b) have not
   received discharge upgrades to Honorable; (c) have diagnoses
   of PTSD, TBI, or PTSD-related conditions, or records
   documenting one or more symptoms of PTSD, TBI or PTSD-related
   conditions at the time of discharge, attributable to their
   military service."

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=KWG1rCfr

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Susan J. Kohlmann, Esq.
          Jeremy M. Creelan, Esq.
          Jeremy H. Ershow, Esq.
          Jessica A. Martinez, Esq.
          Matthew J. Wilkins, Esq.
          JENNER & BLOCK LLP
          919 Third Avenue
          New York, NY 10022-3908
          Telephone: (212) 891 1678
          E-mail: jcreelan@jenner.com

               - and -

          Samantha G. Peltz, Esq.
          Jonathan B. Petkun, Esq.
          Westley A. Resendes, Esq.
          Helen E. White, Esq.
          Aaron Wenzloff, Esq.
          Michael J. Wishnie, Esq.
          VETERANS LEGAL SERVICES CLINIC
          JEROME N. FRANK LEGAL SERVICES ORG.
          YALE LAW SCHOOL
          P.O. Box 209090
          New Haven, CT 06520-9090
          Telephone: (203) 432 4800
          E-mail: michael.wishnie@ylsclinics.org


UNITED STATES: 14 Test Properties Named in Reservoir Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
Judge Susan G. Braden of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims has
entered an order designating 14 properties as test properties in
the case, IN RE DOWNSTREAM ADDICKS AND BARKER (TEXAS) FLOOD-
CONTROL RESERVOIRS. THIS DOCUMENT APPLIES TO: ALL DOWNSTREAM
CASES, Sub-Master No. 17-9002L (Fed. Cl.).

On March 1, 2018, the Court convened a telephone status
conference, wherein the parties were directed to file, on or
before April 12, 2018, a joint status report with a final list of
test property selections, together with a short statement of why
each was selected, the proponent, and whether the property owner
is an individual plaintiff or a member of a proposed class
action.

On March 22, 2018, the parties filed a Joint Status Report
Regarding Test Property Selection identifying seventeen potential
test properties, but informing the court that the parties had not
reached an agreement as to: (1) the number of test properties;
and (2) the inclusion of Memorial SMC Investment 2013 LP. ECF No.
76 at 1-2.

On March 27, 2018, the Court convened a telephone status
conference, wherein it discussed the parties' test property
selections and concerns about the potential discovery issues that
may or may not arise concerning Memorial SMC Investment 2013 LP.

Based on the March 22, 2018 Joint Status Report and the March 27,
2018 telephone status conference, Judge Braden designated these
14 properties test properties in the case: Aldred, Val 835
Thornvine Ln., Houston, TX 77079 Proposed Residential Class Azar,
Philip 3 Magnolia Bend Dr., Houston, TX 77024 Individual
Residential Beyoglu, Gokhan 107 Warrenton Dr., Houston, TX 77024
Proposed Residential and Jana Class Cutts, Paul and Dana 311 Blue
Willow Dr., Houston, TX 77042 Individual Residential Godejord,
Arnstein 14334 Heatherfield Dr., Houston, TX 77079 Proposed
Residential and Inga Class Good Resources 760 Memorial Mews St.
#4, Houston, TX 77079 Individual Commercial LLC Ho, Becky 419
West Sam Houston Parkway North, Houston, Proposed Residential TX
77024 Class Hollis, Wayne JR 14914 River Forest Dr., Houston, TX
77079 Proposed Residential and Peggy Class Memorial SMC 777 South
Mayde Creek Dr., Houston, TX 77079 Individual Commercial
Investment 2013 LP Apartment Milton, Virginia and 850 Silvergate
Dr., Houston, TX 77079 Proposed Residential Arnold Class Shipos,
Jennifer 931 Bayou Parkway, Houston, TX 77077 Individual
Residential Silverman, Peter and 12515 Westerly Ln., Houston, TX
77077 Individual Residential Zhennia Stahl, Tim 265 Chimney Rock,
Houston, TX 77024 Proposed Residential Class Welling, Shawn 5731
Logan Ln., Houston, TX 77007 Proposed Commercial Class.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/dIQZjl from Leagle.com.

IN RE DOWNSTREAM ADDICKS AND BARKER (TEXAS) FLOOD-CONTROL
RESERVOIRS, Plaintiff, represented by David Charles Frederick --
dfrederick@kellogghansen.com -- Kellogg, Hansen, et al, Derek
Heath Potts -- dpotts@potts-law.com -- Potts Law Firm, LLP, Jack
Edward McGehee -- jmcgehee@lawtx.com -- McGehee, Chang, Barnes,
Landgraf, Rand P. Nolen, Fleming, Nolen & Jez, L.L.P., Richard
Warren Mithoff, Jr. -- rmithoff@mithofflaw.com -- Mithoff Law,
William S. Consovoy -- will@consovoymccarthy.com -- Consovoy
McCarthy Park PLLC, Allen Craig Eiland -- ceiland@eilandlaw.com -
- The Law Offices of A. Craig Eiland, P.C., Anthony Glenn Buzbee,
The Buzbee Law Firm, Benjamin Russell Roberts, Pinkerton Law
Firm, PLLC., Bryant Steven Banes -- bbanes@nhblaw.com -- Neel,
Hooper & Banes, PC, Charles W. Irvine -- charles@irvineconner.com
-- Irvine & Conner, LLC, Christopher Stephen Johns, Johns, Marrs,
Ellis & Hodge LLP, Clayton A. Clark, Clark, Love & Hutson, G.P.,
Dax Frank Garza, Dax F. Garza, PC, Don C. Griffin, Vinson &
Elkins LLP, Edward Blizzard, Blizzard & Nabers, LLP, Edwin
Armistead Easterby, Williams Kherkher Hart Boundas, LLP, Emery
Lawrence Vincent, Jr., Burns Charest LLP, Eric Reed Nowak,
Harrell & Nowak, Eric Jonathan Rhine, Spagnoletti & Co., Gary J.
Siller -- gary.siller@strasburger.com -- Strasburger & Price LLP
(HS), Howard L. Nations, Nations Law Firm, Ian P. Cloud --
icloud@robinscloud.com -- Robins Cloud LLP, Ian Heath Gershengorn
-- igershengorn@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block, LLP, Jared R.
Woodfill, Woodfill Law Firm, P.C., Jason A. Itkin, Arnold &
Itkin, LLP, Jay Edelson -- jedelson@edelson.com -- Edelson PC,
Jeffrey L. Raizner, Raizner Slania LLP, John Scott Black, Daly &
Black, P.C., John Clinton Schumacher -- jschumacher@lockelord.com
-- Locke Lord LLP, Kurt B. Arnold, Arnold & Itkin, LLP, Luke
Joseph Ellis, Johns, Marrs, Ellis & Hodge LLP, Manuel E. Solis,
Law Offices of Manuel Solis, Michael C. Falick --
mfalick@rothfelderfalick.com -- Rothfelder & Falick, L.L.P.,
Minh-Tam Tammy Tran, Tammy Tran Law Firm, Noah Michael Wexler,
Arnold & Itkin, LLP, Rene Michelle Sigman --
rsigman@MerlinLawGroup.com -- Merlin Law Group, Riley L. Burnett,
Jr., Burnett Law Firm, Spencer G. Markle, Markle-De La Cruz, LLP,
Steven John Mitby, Ahmad Zavitsanos, et al., Timothy Micah
Dortch, Potts Law Firm, LLC, Todd B. Denenberg -- tdenenberg@dt-
law.com -- Denenberg Tuffley PLLC, Vuk Vujasinovic, VB Attorneys
& William Fred Hagans -- whagans@hagans.law.com -- Hagans
Montgomery & Rustay, P.C.

USA, Defendant, represented by Jacqueline Camille Brown, U.S.
Department of Justice.


VERIFONE SYSTEMS: Being Sold for Too Little, Scarantino Says
------------------------------------------------------------
RICHARD SCARANTINO, On Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, v. VERIFONE SYSTEMS, INC., ROBERT W.
ALSPAUGH, KAREN AUSTIN, RONALD BLACK, PAUL GALANT, ALEX W. HART,
ROBERT B. HENSKE, LARRY A. KLANE, JONATHAN I. SCHWARTZ, JANE J.
THOMPSON, and ROWAN M. TROLLOPE, the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-
cv-00752-UNA (D. Del., May 17, 2018), seeks to enjoin Defendants
and all persons acting in concert with them from proceeding with,
consummating, or closing a proposed merger transaction, and in
the event the Defendants consummate the Proposed Transaction,
rescinding it and setting it aside or awarding rescissory
damages.

This action stems from a proposed transaction announced on April
9, 2018, pursuant to which VeriFone Systems, Inc. will be
acquired by affiliates of an investor group led by the private
equity investment firm Francisco Partners. On April 9, 2018,
VeriFone's Board of Directors caused the Company to enter into an
agreement and plan of merger with Vertex Holdco LLC and Vertex
Merger Sub LLC. Pursuant to the terms of the Merger Agreement, if
the Proposed Transaction is approved by VeriFone's shareholders
and completed, VeriFone shareholders will receive $23.04 in cash
for each share of VeriFone common stock they own. On May 7, 2018,
the Defendants filed a proxy statement with the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission in connection with the
Proposed Transaction. The Proxy Statement omits material
information with respect to the Proposed Transaction, which
renders the Proxy Statement false and misleading. Accordingly,
the Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated Sections 14(a) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in connection with
the Proxy Statement.

Verifone is an American multinational corporation headquartered
in San Jose, California, that provides technology for electronic
payment transactions and value-added services at the point-of-
sale.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brian D. Long, Esq.
          Gina M. Serra, Esq.
          RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
          300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 295 5310
          Facsimile: (302) 654 7530
          E-mail: bdl@rl-legal.com
                  gms@rl-legal.com

               - and -

          Richard A. Maniskas, Esq.
          RM LAW, P.C.
          1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300
          Berwyn, PA 19312
          Telephone: (484) 324 6800
          Facsimile: (484) 631 1305
          E-mail: rm@maniskas.com


WALLE CORPORATION: Court Conditionally Certifies FLSA Class
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled BRIDGET BRUMFIELD, on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. WALLE
CORPORATION, the Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-08440-JCZ-JCW (E.D.
La.), the Court entered an order on May 14, 2018:

   1. conditionally certifying Fair Labor Standards Act
      Collective Action Class of:

      "all persons who worked for Defendant since May 2015, who
      were paid by the hour at different rates of pay for
      different shifts that they worked for Defendant, but who
      were not paid overtime based upon their averaged rate of
      pay"

   2. directing Defendant to provide the names and addresses for
      the Putative Class Members no later than 14 days following
      the Court's granting of the Order for Conditional
      Certification;

   3. directing Plaintiff's counsel to distribute the Notice and
      Consent forms to the Putative Class Members within 14 days
      from receipt of the Putative Class Members' contact
      information;

   4. directing Plaintiff's counsel to send the Putative Class
      Members an initial Notice and Consent form by regular First
      Class Mail; and

   5. directing Plaintiff's Counsel to provide Defendant's
      Counsel with copies of the signed consent forms on a
      regular, rolling basis as they are received and Plaintiff's
      Counsel shall file signed consent forms with the Court
      within 14 days of receipt;

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=DAH8FemU


WAL-MART STORES: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss "Maestas" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LARRY MAESTAS, Plaintiff, v. WAL-MART STORES, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 2:16-cv-02597-KJM-KJN (E.D. Cal.), Judge
Kimberly J. Mueller of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California denied Wal-Mart's motion to dismiss one of
the Plaintiff's claims and to strike both proposed class
allegations.

The Plaintiff purchased his EverStart Maxx car battery from a
California Wal-Mart store in late 2013.  Although the Battery
came with a three-year replacement warranty and the option of a
"core deposit" refund, Wal-Mart refused to honor either benefit
because the Plaintiff's name appeared in an internal fraud
database.

The Plaintiff was included on this fraud list based on
allegations that he tried to use a bad check at a Colorado Wal-
Mart store in 2000, 13 years before he bought the Battery.  When
he attempted to obtain his refund or replacement, a Wal-Mart
employee told him the store's rules barring him from obtaining
refunds or warranties apply not just to the Battery, but to "any"
Wal-Mart products the Plaintiff buys while his name remains on
the fraud list. Wal-Mart never warned the Plaintiff before he
bought the Battery that he was ineligible for advertised refunds
and warranties.

The Plaintiff proposes bringing his claims on behalf of two
classes of California consumers whose names also appear in Wal-
Mart's fraud database.  He makes four claims, alleging violations
of California's False Advertising Law, Unfair Competition Law,
and Consumer Legal Remedies Act.

The Plaintiff asserts his claims on behalf of two proposed
consumer classes: A "Refund Class" which consists of all
consumers who purchased a Wal-Mart product in California and were
on Wal-Mart's internal fraud database; and a narrower "Warranty
Class," which mirrors the Refund Class but is limited to include
only those who purchased EverStart Maxx car batteries.

Wal-Mart seeks to dismiss the Plaintiff's third claim, an
unlawful competition claim pled on behalf of the Refund Class,
and seeks to strike both class allegations.

Judge Mueller finds that to the extent the Plaintiff's third
claim derives from an allegedly unfair business practice, Rule
8(a) governs and the Plaintiff has pled sufficient details to
withstand dismissal.  The Plaintiff has alleged an unfair
business practice with reasonable particularity sufficient to
withstand dismissal.  Whether the identified practice is actually
unfair is a question of fact which requires consideration and
weighing of evidence from both sides and which usually cannot be
decided at pleading.  Wal-Mart's motion to dismiss the
Plaintiff's unfair competition allegations from the third claim
is denied.

To the extent the Plaintiff's third claim derives from an
allegedly fraudulent business practice, the Judge finds that Rule
9(b)'s heightened pleading standard applies, but the Plaintiff
nonetheless meets it.

In sum, the Plaintiff has pled all required elements for a fraud-
based unlawful competition claim and has included the "who, what,
when where and how" Rule 9(b) requires: Wal-Mart (who)
misrepresented that products came with a return or refund policy
(what), on its contracts and receipts (where), when he tried to
get a Battery refund in November 2015 and up until now (when),
and Wal-Mart denied the Plaintiff's right to the promised refund
or replacement despite these representations because he appeared
in the fraud database (how).  The Plaintiff has thus included
allegations specific enough to give defendants notice of the
particular misconduct so that they can defend against the charge
and not just deny that they have done anything wrong.  Wal-Mart's
motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's fraudulent-practice allegations
in the third claim is denied.

The Judge disagrees with the Wal-Mart's contention that because
the proposed Refund Class includes consumers who bought products
other than the Battery plaintiff purchased, the Plaintiff has not
suffered an injury similar enough to his proposed class members
to confer class standing.  He says even if Wal-Mart's return and
refund policy varies across product lines, the injury as pled is
sufficiently uniform across class members to confer standing: All
class members were allegedly exposed to a uniform policy that no
matter what product they buy, Wal-Mart will not honor its
Warranty or Refund guarantees because their names are included in
an internal fraud database.  The Plaintiff's alleged injury is
sufficiently similar to those of other consumers within the
Refund Class to confer class standing at this early stage.  Wal-
Mart's motion to dismiss is denied in full.

Finally, the Judge finds that the Plaintiff's class allegations
are well-defined enough to proceed beyond the pleading stage and
are not so redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous as
to warrant striking before class certification proceedings.
Unlike the nationwide class Plaintiff initially proposed, his
current proposed classes are geographically restricted to
California, and are further restricted to only those California
consumers whose names appear on a list of consumers that
purportedly tried to defraud Wal-Mart.  At this stage, the
Plaintiff has satisfactorily outlined concerns common to all
class members, and discovery remains open several more months
during which evidence can be developed that may impact class
certification proceedings.  The Judge denied Wal-Mart's motion to
strike the class allegations.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/MhXNUO from Leagle.com.

Larry Maestas, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas Edward Wheeler --
twheeler@toddflaw.com -- Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman & Todd
M. Friedman -- tfriedman@toddflaw.com -- Law Offices of Todd M.
Friedman, P.C.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, Defendant,
represented by Eugene Lee Hahm -- eugene.hahm@ltlattorneys.com --
LTL Attorneys LLP, James M. Lee -- james.lee@ltlattorneys.com --
LTL Attorneys LLP & Jennifer S. Jung, LTL Attorneys LLP.


WARREN, MI: $750,000 Settlement Reached in Suit by NILI et al
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled NILI 2011, LLC, EETBL, LLC & INVESTMENT
REALTY SERVICES, LLC D/B/A SBYC GARNER, LLC, the Plaintiffs, v.
CITY OF WARREN, the Defendant, Case No. 2:15-cv-13392-GAD-RSW
(E.D. Mich.), the Parties ask the Court to certify the Settlement
Class:

   "all persons and entities who paid rental registration and
   inspection fees to the City of Warren pursuant to the
   ordinance permitting searches without a warrant; and

   "all person and entities that currently own or at one time
   owned any parcel or real property located within the City of
   Warren for the purpose or renting or leasing a residual
   structure or multiple family unit on that property who or
   which has been issued a civil infraction for failing to obtain
   a certificate of the IPMC and the City Code, at any time since
   September 28, 2009 and through the date of final judgment."

The City of Warren has agreed to establish a $750,000 settlement
fund, which will be used in significant part to pay the claims of
the Settlement Class members who are entitled to participate in
the distribution of the settlement proceeds pursuant to the
Settlement Agreement.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=XCRcb5rb

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Mark K. Wasvary, Esq.
          MARK K. WASVARY PC
          2401W. Big Beaver Rd., Suite 100
          Troy, MI 48084
          Telephone: (248) 649 5667

               - and -

          Aaron D. Cox, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF AARON D. COX, PLLC
          23380 Goddard Rd.
          Taylor, MI 48180
          Telephone: (734 287 3664)

Attorneys for Defendant:

          John J. Gillooly, Esq.
          GARAN, LUCOW, MILLER P.C.
          1155 Brewery parl Blvd., Ste 200
          Detroit, MI 48207
          Telephone: (313) 446 5501


WELLS FARGO: Court Strikes Class Claims in "Hightower" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, FRANK HIGHTOWER and CHAMICKA POLLOCK, on behalf of
themselves and all other similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs,
v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Defendant, Civil Action No. 17-04119
(E.D. Pa.), Judge Geral Austin McHugh of the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted Wells Fargo's
motion to bar Pollock's claims as to Pollock and dismissed with
prejudice her Title VII claims; and (ii) granted without
prejudice Wells Fargo's motion to strike Hightower's class action
allegations.

The matter is putative class action brought on behalf of current
and former African American employees of the Defendant.
Plaintiffs Hightower and Pollock allege that the Defendant has
engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination in the
compensation and promotion of African American employees in mid-
to upper-level management positions.

The Plaintiffs stand on different procedural footings.  Mr.
Hightower timely filed the action after exhausting his
administrative remedies and receiving a right-to-sue letter from
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").  Ms.
Pollock also pursued administrative remedies, but failed to bring
suit within the allotted 90 days after she received her right-to-
sue letter.  She seeks to surmount that obstacle by
"piggybacking" on Hightower's claim.

Wells Fargo seeks to bar Pollock's claims as untimely, and to
strike Hightower's class action claims as beyond the scope of his
EEOC charge and otherwise not certifiable under Rule 23.

Judge McHugh finds that Pollock presented her individualized
allegations to the EEOC well before Hightower lodged his charge.
In fact, the EEOC had completed its investigation and issued its
right-to-sue letter to Pollock in March 2016, some eight months
before Hightower even filed his charge with the EEOC.  Given that
timeline, the Pollock investigation cannot be deemed to have been
subsumed within the Hightower investigation, because the former
was already complete.  Moreover, the 90-day window in which Ms.
Pollock had to bring suit had expired before Hightower filed his
charge, and as a result, she no longer had a viable claim with
which to "piggyback."  Her Title VII claims are therefore
untimely, and must be dismissed.

As to the scope of Hightower's charge, the Judge finds that
charge specifically states that other Blacks/African-Americans
were treated unfavorably and denied promotional and salary
advancement.  The charge plainly provides notice that Hightower
was alleging class-based issues relating to both pay and
promotion.  Hightower's EEOC charge is therefore sufficient to
support the Amended Complaint's full sweep of class allegations.

To plead a class-based discrimination case after Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Dukes, a plaintiff must identify, with some degree of
precision, policies or systemic behavior that uniformly affects
the proposed class members.  The Judge finds that the complaint
fails to do so, and as currently pleaded, is internally
inconsistent in ways that make the case unlikely to be eligible
for class certification.  He will therefore strike the
Plaintiffs' class allegations in Counts I and II under Rule
23(d)(1)(D), albeit without prejudice.

Judge McHugh also finds that though the Plaintiffs' pattern or
practice allegations may overlap with their individual claims,
the Amended Complaint sets forth factual allegations that
encompass a broader pattern of behavior.  Making all inferences
in the Plaintiffs' favor, and reviewing the Defendant's motion
under the standards set out in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, he says the Plaintiffs have
sufficiently alleged a pattern or practice claim against the
Defendant.  The Judge therefore denied the Defendant's motion to
dismiss these claims.

Finally, the Defendant has also moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs'
disparate impact claims, and the Plaintiffs have not opposed the
Defendant on this point.  The Judge therefore dismissed, again
without prejudice, the disparate impact claims.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 28, 2018 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/mStWU3 from Leagle.com.

FRANK HIGHTOWER, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHER SIMILARLY
SITUATED & CHAMICKA POLLOCK, Plaintiffs, represented by ZAKIA E.
MOORE -- zmoore@mccain-law.com -- MCCAIN LAW PC.

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Defendant, represented by MICHAEL
BURKHARDT -- michael.burkhardt@morganlewis.com -- MORGAN LEWIS
AND BOCKIUS LLP, WONHO JOHN LEE -- w.john.lee@morganlewis.com --
MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS & A. KLAIR FITZPATRICK, ANAPOL WEISS.


WESTERN CAB: "Reno" Suit Seeks Minimum Wages under FLSA
-------------------------------------------------------
MICHAEL RENO, Individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. WESTERN CAB COMPANY, HELEN TOBMAN
MARTIN, MARILYN TOBMAN MORAN, JANIE TOBMAN MOORE, MARTHA SARVER
and "John Does" name fictitious, actual name and number unknown,
et al., the Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-00840-APG-NJK (D. Nev.,
May 9, 2018), seeks relief pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards
Act for the Defendants' failure to pay minimum wages as required
by 29 U.S.C. section 201-218 et. seq.

The action is brought on behalf of taxi drivers employed by the
Defendants after March 23, 2018, who have been required to have
their tips subjected to an improper use by the Defendants in
violation of the FLSA.  The Defendants also failed to pay minimum
wages to the plaintiff and the putative class, and forced the
individual plaintiff and those similarly situated to pay for the
gasoline needed to fuel Western Cab's taxicabs. Those payments
for fuel were not reimbursed, at all, by the Defendants, or only
partially reimbursed by the Defendants, and after the cost of
making those payments is considered the individual plaintiff and
those similarly situated were earning less than $7.25 an hour in
wages during some weeks of their employment.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Leon Greenberg, Esq.
          Dana Sniegocki, Esq.
          LEON GREENBERG PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
          2965 South Jones Blvd, Suite E3
          Las Vegas, NV 89146
          Telephone: (702) 383 6085
          Facsimile: (702) 385 1827
          E-mail: leongreenberg@overtimelaw.com
                  dana@overtimelaw.com


WILLBROS GROUP: Aug. 2 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
------------------------------------------------------
The following statement is being issued by Robbins Geller Rudman
& Dowd LLP regarding the Willbros Group, Inc. Securities
Litigation:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION

In re WILLBROS GROUP, INC. SECURITIES

Master File No. 4:14-cv-03084-KPE LITIGATION

This Document Relates To:

ALL ACTIONS.
CLASS ACTION

SUMMARY NOTICE

TO:

ALL PERSONS WHO PURCHASED OR OTHERWISE ACQUIRED WILLBROS GROUP,
INC. ("WILLBROS") COMMON STOCK DURING THE PERIOD FROM FEBRUARY
28, 2014, THROUGH AND INCLUDING MARCH 17, 2015 (THE "SETTLEMENT
CLASS")

PLEASE READ THIS NOTICE CAREFULLY. YOUR RIGHTS WILL BE AFFECTED
BY A CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT PENDING IN THIS COURT.

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and an Order of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas, that the
above-captioned action (the "Action") has been certified as a
class action on behalf of the Settlement Class, except for
certain persons and entities who are excluded from the Settlement
Class by definition as set forth in the full printed Notice of
Proposed Settlement of Class Action (the "Notice").

YOU ARE ALSO NOTIFIED that Lead Plaintiffs in the Action, Wayne
County Employees' Retirement System and City of Roseville
Employees' Retirement System, on behalf of themselves and the
other members of the Settlement Class, have reached a proposed
settlement of the Action with defendants Willbros, Randy R. Harl,
Van A. Welch, and John T. McNabb (collectively, "Defendants") for
the sum of $10,000,000 in cash (the "Settlement").  If the
Settlement is approved, it will resolve all claims in the Action.

A hearing will be held on August 2, 2018, at 2:00 p.m. CT, before
the Honorable Keith P. Ellison at the U.S. Courthouse, 515 Rusk
Avenue, Houston, TX 77002, for the purpose of determining: (1)
whether the proposed Settlement should be approved by the Court
as fair, reasonable and adequate; (2) whether, thereafter, this
Action should be dismissed with prejudice against the Defendants
as set forth in the Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement dated
April 13, 2018; (3) whether the Plan of Allocation of Settlement
proceeds is fair, reasonable and adequate and therefore should be
approved; and (4) the reasonableness of the application of Lead
Counsel for the payment of attorneys' fees and expenses incurred
in connection with this Action, together with interest thereon
(which request may include a request for reimbursement of Lead
Plaintiffs' reasonable costs and expenses pursuant to the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995).

IF YOU PURCHASED OR ACQUIRED WILLBROS COMMON STOCK DURING THE
PERIOD FROM FEBRUARY 28, 2014, THROUGH AND INCLUDING MARCH 17,
2015 (THE "SETTLEMENT CLASS PERIOD"), YOUR RIGHTS MAY BE AFFECTED
BY THIS ACTION AND THE SETTLEMENT THEREOF. If you have not
received a detailed Notice as referred to above and a copy of the
Proof of Claim and Release form, you may obtain copies by writing
to Willbros Securities Settlement, Claims Administrator, c/o
Gilardi & Co. LLC, P.O. Box 404055, Louisville, KY 40233-4055, or
by downloading this information at
www.WillbrosSecuritiesLitigation.com

If you are a Settlement Class Member, in order to share in the
distribution of the Net Settlement Fund, you must submit a Proof
of Claim and Release online at
www.WillbrosSecuritiesLitigation.com by September 6, 2018, or by
mail postmarked no later than September 6, 2018, establishing
that you are entitled to a recovery.  You will be bound by any
judgment rendered in the Action unless you request to be
excluded, in writing, postmarked by September 6, 2018.

If you purchased or otherwise acquired Willbros common stock
during the Settlement Class Period and you desire to be excluded
from the Settlement Class, you must submit a request for
exclusion such that it is postmarked no later than July 12, 2018,
in the manner and form explained in the detailed Notice referred
to above.  All members of the Settlement Class who do not validly
request exclusion from the Settlement Class will be bound by any
judgments or orders entered in the Action pursuant to the
Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement.

Any objection to any aspect of the Settlement must be filed with
the Clerk of the Court and also delivered by hand or First-Class
Mail to each of the following addresses such that it is received
no later than July 12, 2018:

COURT:

          CLERK OF THE COURT
          UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
          UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE
          515 Rusk Avenue
          Houston, TX 77002

LEAD COUNSEL:

          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          ELLEN GUSIKOFF STEWART
          655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
          San Diego, CA 92101

DEFENDANTS' COUNSEL:
          BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.
          AMY PHARR HEFLEY
          One Shell Plaza
          910 Louisiana Street
          Houston, TX 77002

PLEASE DO NOT CONTACT THE COURT OR THE CLERK'S OFFICE REGARDING
THIS NOTICE.

DATED: April 18, 2018

BY ORDER OF THE COURT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS


XOOM ENERGY: "Mirkin" Suit Moved to Eastern District of New York
----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Susanna Mirkin and Boris Mirkin,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, v. XOOM Energy, LLC and XOOM Energy New York, LLC, the
Defendant, Case No. 507892/2018, was removed from the New York
State Supreme Court County of Kings, to the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of New York (Brooklyn) on May 17, 2018.
The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:18-cv-02949 to the
proceeding.

XOOM Energy is a North Carolina-based utility retailer, offering
natural gas and electricity services to commercial and
residential customers in deregulated energy markets in North
America.[BN]

The Plaintiffs appear pro se.

Attorneys for Defendants:

          Zane Christian Riester, Esq.
          MCCARTER & ENGLISH
          Four Gateway Center
          100 Mulberry St
          Newark, NJ 07102
          Telephone: (973) 622 4444
          Facsimile: (973) 624 7070
          E-mail: zriester@mccarter.com


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