CAR_Public/180521.mbx              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R


              Monday, May 21, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 101



                            Headlines


3M CO: Faces Class Action Over Hyannis Water Supply Contamination
ACCENTCARE INC: Blumenthal Nordrehaug Files Class Action
AIR CANADA: Decision to Stay Global Class Action Overturned
ALLEGIANT TRAVEL: Rosen Law Firm Files Securities Class Action
ALMOST FAMILY: Court Refuses to Enjoin $2.4-Bil. Merger

AMERICAN FIDELITY: Teachers' Class Action Goes to Federal Court
AMP: Three Law Firms Mull Shareholder Class Actions
AMP: Slater and Gordon Mulls Flammable Cladding Class Action
AMPLE HILLS: "Kiler" Suit Says Website not Blind-accessible
ANADARKO PETROLEUM: Conditional Cert. Bid in "Boykin" Partly OK'd

ANCHOR CONSTRUCTION: Construction Workers Seek Unpaid OT Wages
ARIZONA: Legislator Mulls Class Action Over Teachers' Strike
AT&T MOBILITY: Court Grants Joint Bid to Dismiss "Rodriguez"
AVINGER INC: Correction Ordered in "Banerjee" Amended Complaint
AYALON INSURANCE: Levitan Attorney Discusses Class Action Ruling

BAI BRANDS: Sued in Calif. Over "Natural" Fruit Drink Labeling
BAYER CROPSCIENCE: Neonicotinoid Class Action Proceeds in Quebec
BOFI HOLDING: 3rd Amended Securities Suit Dismissed w/ Prejudice
BRIDGEPORT HEALTH: Subclasses Certification in ERISA Suit Denied
CAMBRIDGE ANALYTICA: Gennock Files Suit for Invasion of Privacy

BLUE BUFFALO: Court Junks "Zakinov" FAC as Barred by Res Judicata
BMW OF NORTH: 9th Cir. Flips Dismissal of "Barakezyan" Suit
BRUNELLO CUCINELLI: Fischler Says Website not Blind-accessible
CAPELLA UNIVERSITY: Two Former Students File Class Action
CARTER-YOUNG INC: "Angelakopoulos" Suit Alleges FDCPA Violation

CENTRAL CARILLON: Denial of Defendant Class Upheld
CERES, CA: Court Needs Support of Settlement in "Amador"
CHIPOTLE MEXICAN: Court Dismisses "Ong" Securities Fraud Suit
CLEVELAND AVE: Court Grants Bid for Sanctions in "Hogan"
CLOUD INTERMEDIATE: English Sues for Breach of Fiduciary Duties

COMMON GROUND: Insurers' Class Action Over CSRs Can Proceed
CREDIT ONE: 7th Cir. Flips Arbitration Order in TCPA Suit
CR ENGLAND: UCSPA Claims Subject to Opt-Out Notice Requirement
CRYPTSY: Consumers' Class Action Won't Be Settled in Arbitration
DEFENDERS INC: "Archer" Suit Alleges FLSA Violation

DR PEPPER: Faces Suit Over Breach of Fiduciary Duties
EDGE THERAPEUTICS: Glancy Prongay Files Securities Class Action
EDWARD D JONES: "Anderson" Suit Alleges Securities Violations
EXPERIAN INFORMATION: Judgment on Pleadings in "Devries" Denied
EXTREME NETWORKS: Court Narrows Claims in Securities Suit

FACEBOOK INC: Finkelstein Thompson Files Privacy Class Action
FACEBOOK INC: Bennett Suit Hits Share Price Drop Ff. Data Breach
FARIS PROPERTIES: "Beyer" Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
FIRSTENERGY SOLUTIONS: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss "Schwebel"
FITBIT INC: Judge Allows $33MM Shareholder Class Suit to Proceed

FIVE BOROUGH: Fails to Pay Workers Overtime, "Stepanov" Suit Says
FMFS OF VS: Sued in N.Y. Over Failure to Properly Pay Servers
FORD MOTOR: Must Reply to 2nd Amended "Baranco" Suit
FORD MOTOR: Ct. Directs Payment of $488K for Discovery Misconduct
FORTIS HEALTHCARE: Shareholder Class Action Mulled in India

GILES COUNTY, TN: Faces Class Action Over Probation System
HBN MEDIA: "Becker" Suit Alleges TCPA Violations
HILTI INC: Court Dismisses Suit Over Electric Tools
ILUKA RESOURCES: To Defend Class Action Over 2012 Disclosures
INTEL CORP: Key Files Suit Over Defective CPUs

INTER-COAST INT'L: Court Upholds Ruling in Arbitration Dispute
INTUITIVE SURGICAL: June 8 Class Action Opt-Out Deadline Set
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Law Firms Coax Women to Have Mesh Removed
JONATHAN NEIL: Bid for Class Certification in "Brown" Terminated
JONES MOTOR: Court Tosses Class Action Over Work Comp Premiums

JPMORGAN CHASE: FX Price-Fixing Suit vs HSBC, RBS Dismissed
LAYNE CHRISTENSEN: Rigrodsky & Long Files Securities Class Action
LEGACY RESERVES: Doppelt Asserts Breach of Contract
LEPRINO FOODS: Court Narrows Claims in "Perez" Wage & Hour Suit
LNR ENTERPRISE: "Chester" Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages

MACQUARIE INFRASTRUCTURE: Bernstein Litowitz Files Class Action
MANHATTAN HELICOPTERS: CSRs Seek Unpaid OT Wages, Damages
MDL 2804: River Forest Joins Opioid Crisis Class Action
MEDICAL SOLUTIONS: Court Issues Privacy Notice Order in "Dittman"
MEDICIS PHARMA: Settles Generic Pay-for-Delay Class Action

MERCK & CO: Faces Class Action Over Zostavax Shingles Vaccine
MONSANTO COMPANY: Faces "Brickey" Suit Over Roundup(R) Product
MONSANTO COMPANY: Faces "Holstrom" Suit Over Roundup(R) Product
MYRIAD GENETICS: June 19 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
MYRIAD GENETICS: Faces Two Securities Class Actions

NEW YORK: NYPD Sued for Using Information from Sealed Cases
ORION PROJECT: "Andrews" Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
OXFORD UNIVERSITY: 1,000+ Students Join Suit Over Teacher Strikes
PACIFIC UNION: Court Dismisses "Woodside" Breach of Contract Suit
PEBO TRAVIATA: "Rubio" Suit Alleges FLSA and NYLL Violations

PENNSYLVANIA: Court Certifies Class of Pre-Sentence Inmates
PERFORMANCE MEDICAL: "Davis" Labor Suit Seeks Unpaid OT Wages
PRIDE TRANSPORT: Settlement in "Jacob" Suit Has Final Approval
PRIMANTI BROS: Settles Wage Class Action for $2.1 Million
PRIVATE MINI: "Maier" Suit Alleges FLSA Violation

PROTEIN SOLUTIONS: Class Action Mulled Following Odor Complaints
PROVIDENCE HEALTH: Court Narrows Claims in "Johnson" ERISA Suit
ROYAL DUTCH: Must Face Class Action Over Lease Bonuses
SCI DIRECT: Court Denies "Romano" Class Certification
SENATOR CONSTRUCTION: "Armijos" Suit Alleges FLSA, NYLL Breach

SHERWIN-WILLIAMS CO: "Thompson" Suit Alleges Warranty Violations
SSOS OPERATING: "Ahmed" Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid OT Wages
ST. LOUIS RAM: "McAllister" Remanded to Missouri State Court
STARBUCKS CORP: May Have to Pay "Seven Figures" if Wage Suit OK'd
TOYOTA MOTOR: Settles Class Action for $21.9 Million

UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Judge Tosses Drivers' FLSA Class Action
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Judge Stays Worker Misclassification Case
UNITED STATES: Iranians Sue Over Refugee Status Applications
UNITED STATES: Patent Owners Sue Over AIA Post-Grant Proceedings
URBIBENS BUILDERS: "Fuentes" Suit to Recover Unpaid Overtime

VENGROFF WILLIAMS: Wins Summary Judgment in "Polizois"
WAL-MART STORES: Bid to Deny "Duckworth" Class Certification OK'd
WHITING PETROLEUM: Transferred "Schindler" Suit to S.D. Texas
WORD ENTERPRISES: Summary Judgment Bid in "McFarlin" Suit Denied
YAHOO! INC: Requires Users to Give Up Right to Join Class Actions

* Canada High Court Urged to Tackle Umbrella Purchaser Claims
* Class Action Defense Spending Continues to Rise, Survey Shows
* Germany Postpones Decision to Launch Law on Class Actions
* Investor Class Actions Challenging M&A Transactions on the Rise




                            *********


3M CO: Faces Class Action Over Hyannis Water Supply Contamination
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Madeleine List, writing for Cape Cod Times, reports that two law
firms representing residents affected by the contaminated Hyannis
water supply filed a class action lawsuit against several
companies in U.S. District Court in Massachusetts seeking
compensation for those who have fallen ill or experienced other
negative effects from exposure to the water.

The lawsuit names as defendants five manufacturers of
firefighting foams containing perfluorinated chemicals PFOS and
PFOA, which are believed to have contaminated wells serving
residents in Hyannis, Hyannisport and West Hyannisport.  The
foams were previously used at the nearby Barnstable County Fire
and Rescue Training Academy.

About 200 residents have signed on to the class action suit so
far, said Louise Caro, partner at Napoli Shkolnik PLLC, the law
firm representing the plaintiffs along with the Law Offices of
Brian Cunha & Associates.

The plaintiffs are seeking the establishment of a medical
monitoring protocol, which would allow members of the class
action suit to receive medical testing for diseases potentially
connected to their exposure to the water at the defendants'
expense.

"The idea is that you shouldn't have to pay for the testing,"
Ms. Caro said.  "You shouldn't have to pay for testing for these
diseases that are attributed to the exposure."

PFOA and PFOS can accumulate in the body and lead to illnesses
years down the road, she said.  Some diseases linked to high
levels of perflouinated chemicals in the body include kidney and
testicular cancer, ulcerative colitis, preeclampsia, thyroid
disease and high cholesterol, according to the complaint.

A few plaintiffs are already experiencing some of these
illnesses, but plaintiffs don't have to be sick to join the class
action suit, Caro said.

Plaintiffs are also asking to be compensated for personal injury
as well as declining property values, according to the complaint.

A settlement was reached in a separate, related suit brought by
the town of Barnstable against Barnstable County in 2016.  Under
terms of that agreement, the county will pay the town $2.95
million to reimburse it for capital costs, including carbon
treatment systems, associated with cleanup of the contaminated
wells.

In December 2017, U.S. District Judge Denise Casper dismissed
five of eight counts brought by Barnstable County against many of
the same firefighting foam manufacturers named in the class
action lawsuit.  Judge Casper dismissed the county's claims that
the manufacturers were negligent in selling the products that led
to the contamination of soil and groundwater.

Despite the ruling in 2017, Ms. Caro said she believes her
clients have a strong case.  More information has come out
recently about what the manufacturing companies, particularly 3M,
knew about perfluorinated chemicals and when they knew it, Caro
said.

The complaint alleges that manufacturing companies conspired to
conceal the true toxic nature of PFOS and PFOA, avoided using
alternative and safer designs for firefighting foams and failed
to warn communities where the foams were being used of the
presence of PFOS and PFOA in their products.

"They did not disclose to the purchasers of the material how
dangerous it was, and I think that's going to come out more now,"
she said.  "Likely, they were deliberately vague."

In a statement, 3M denied any wrongdoing.

"3M will vigorously defend this lawsuit," the statement says.
"3M acted responsibly at all times and will defend its record of
stewardship in connection with firefighting foam."

Ms. Caro said the class action suit is still open to plaintiffs
who would like to join.  Anyone who consumed water from the
Hyannis water system on a regular basis is eligible to join the
suit, she said. [GN]


ACCENTCARE INC: Blumenthal Nordrehaug Files Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------
The San Francisco employment law lawyers at Blumenthal Nordrehaug
Bhowmik De Blouw LLP, filed a class action lawsuit against
Accentcare, Inc., alleging the company failed to pay their
non-exempt employees working in California for all their overtime
hours worked and allegedly failed to provide all legally required
meal and rest periods under California law.  The pending class
action lawsuit against Accentcare, Inc., is currently pending in
the San Francisco County Superior Court, Case No. CGC-18-565521.

The Complaint alleges that Accentcare, Inc., failed and continues
to fail to accurately calculate and pay PLAINTIFF and the other
members of the CALIFORNIA CLASS for their overtime worked.
Accentcare, Inc., compensates their employees on a non-
discretionary incentive program along with an hourly rate.
Allegedly, management and supervisors described the incentive
program to potential and new employees as part of the cornilleau
compensation package.  As a matter of law, the incentive
compensation received by PLAINTIFF and other CALIFORNIA CLASS
Members must be included in the "regular rate of pay."  The
failure to do so has allegedly resulted in a systematic
underpayment of overtime compensation to PLAINTIFF and other
CALIFORNIA CLASS Members by DEFENDANT.

The pending class action lawsuit against Accentcare, Inc., also
alleges that the company fails to have a policy or practice which
provided a full off-duty, thirty-minute uninterrupted meal break
to their California non-exempt employees.  Consequently,
employees working for the California company allegedly forfeited
meal and rest breaks without additional compensation.

For more information about the class action lawsuit against
Accentcare, Inc., call attorney Nicholas De Blouw at
(858) 952-0354.

Blumenthal Nordrehaug Bhowmik De Blouw LLP is an employment law
firm with law offices located in San Diego, San Francisco,
Sacramento, Los Angeles, and Riverside Counties. The firm has a
statewide practice of representing employees on a contingency
basis for violations involving unpaid wages, overtime pay,
discrimination, harassment, wrongful termination and other types
of illegal workplace conduct. [GN]


AIR CANADA: Decision to Stay Global Class Action Overturned
-----------------------------------------------------------
Michael McKiernan, writing for Law Times, reports that the Court
of Appeal for Ontario struck a blow for access to justice when it
allowed a global class action to proceed here, despite the fact
it involves absent foreign claimants, according to one of the
lawyers spearheading the claim.

In Airia Brands Inc. v. Air Canada, a unanimous three-judge panel
of the province's top court overturned a motion judge's decision
to stay the action as it related to the absent foreign claimants,
ruling that Ontario could assume jurisdiction over them, even
without assurances that the court's final disposition would be
recognized abroad.

Linda Visser, a partner in the class actions practice group at
Siskinds LLP in London, Ont., acts for the plaintiffs, a group of
businesses alleging price fixing in the air freight shipping
industry by a number of major airlines.

"It's very important from an access to justice point of view for
class members to be able to bring a claim in Canada, since we are
one of only a handful of countries that allows class actions,"
she says.  "Without some form of collective redress, it's
virtually impossible for parties in those countries to pursue a
claim because it's so expensive.

"The initial decision created some uncertainty in the law with
regard to the possibility of an international class, so we were
very pleased that the appeal court has clarified matters,"
Ms. Visser adds.

But defence-side lawyers say that allowing claims to proceed on
behalf of plaintiffs who have not consented and may not even be
aware of an action unfairly exposes defendants to the possibility
of double recovery.  They are pinning their hopes to a leave
application currently before the Supreme Court of Canada that
could yet result in the nation's top court weighing in on the
issue.

"It does raise fundamental issues of fairness," says
Chris Naudie -- cnaudie@osler.com -- co-chairman of the class
actions defence practice group at Osler Hoskin and Harcourt LLP.
"It's not clear why an Ontario court would want to adjudicate the
claim of an absent foreign claimant if, ultimately, it may not be
enforceable in their home jurisdiction.

"It's questionable whether it serves the objectives of the Class
Proceedings Act, but I would expect that we will see more cases
like this, which certainly raises the financial stakes for
defendants," adds Mr. Naudie, who was not involved in the appeal
court case.

The matter has its roots in the years between 2000 and 2006, when
the plaintiffs allege that a group of airlines, including Air
Canada and British Airways PLC, conspired to fix air freight
prices for shipments in and out of Canada by manipulating supply
or boosting the cost of fuel and security charges.

However, the class action ran into trouble when the defendants
challenged the court's jurisdiction over class members located
outside Canada who entered into contracts outside the country.

In August 2015, Ontario Superior Court Justice Lynne Leitch sided
with the defendants, ruling that Ontario could not assume
jurisdiction over the absent foreign claimants because they
neither had any presence in the province nor had they consented
to the claim proceeding here.

"The potential for the multiplicity of further actions by absent
foreign claimants is inconsistent with the objectives of class
proceedings and contrary to the principles of order and
fairness," Justice Leitch wrote, adding that the principle of
comity would also be offended by asserting jurisdiction in light
of her conclusion that "the court cannot reasonably expect that
its judgment will be recognized in foreign countries."

However, the appeal court panel ruled that Justice Leith erred in
her failure to apply the "real and substantial connection" test
laid out by the Supreme Court in its 2012 decision Club Resorts
Ltd. v. Van Breda to the jurisdiction question.  The court then
set its own three-part framework, establishing that jurisdiction
may be asserted over absent foreign claimants when:

   * there is a real and substantial connection between the
subject matter of the action and Ontario, and jurisdiction exists
over the representative plaintiff and defendants;

    * there are common issues between the claims of the
representative plaintiff and the absent foreign claimants;

    * procedural safeguards of adequacy of representation and
notice, as well as the right to opt out, are provided.

"In my view, this framework provides the necessary safeguards to
establish that jurisdiction properly exists and ensures the
protection of the values of order and fairness," Appeal Court
Justice Sarah Pepall wrote on behalf of the panel, before going
on to find that the foreign claimants in the air cargo case met
the test for jurisdiction.

Despite their disappointment, those on the defence side of the
bar admit they saw the appeal court reversal coming.

"I thought Justice Leitch's approach was a rational and logical
way to deal with absent foreign claimants," says Ranjan Agarwal
-- agarwalr@bennettjones.com -- a partner in the Toronto office
of Bennett Jones LLP, noting that most of the case law involving
the "real and substantial connection" test relates to defendants,
rather than plaintiffs.

"On the other hand, I wasn't surprised that the Court of Appeal
didn't want to stray too far from the existing test for
defendants and apply a different one to plaintiffs," he adds.

Still, Mr. Agarwal says the unique circumstances presented by
class actions justifies a final word from the Supreme Court.

"It's too bad if they don't take the case, because if you poll
members of the bar, you'll find there is desperation for the
Supreme Court to finally offer a comprehensive take on the
multitude of jurisdictional issues that have vexed multi-
jurisdictional class actions," he says.

"It's an interesting issue that has hallmarks of going up to the
Supreme Court," says Mr. Naudie, who also has his fingers
crossed. "Jurisdiction is a core issue and more and more claims
are including foreign class members with Canadian proceedings."

If the Supreme Court denies leave to appeal, Alexandra
Teodorescu, a litigator with Toronto firm Blaney McMurtry LLP,
says defence lawyers can console themselves with the fact that
the appeal court judgment provides a road map for future cases to
follow.

"It simplifies the framework and lets everyone know what they can
expect going forward," she says.

In addition, Teodorescu says the potential financial gains to
class from the addition of absent foreign claimants will be
tempered in many cases by the procedural burdens they bring with
them.

"There is a heavy onus on plaintiffs' counsel to get out notices,
which can be an expensive and time-consuming process," she says.
For example, the appeal court judgment notes that, following a
settlement with some of the defendants in the air cargo case, the
plaintiffs spent more than $5 million to effect notice to 310,000
people in 140 countries.

If the appeal court decision stands, Mr. Agarwal says, defendant
lawyers will need to warn their clients about the risk of double
recovery in countries that will not recognize any judgment that
results in an Ontario action.

"It's an open question as to how companies will respond to that
risk," he says.

By making common issues a part of the test for jurisdiction over
absent foreign claimants, Mr. Agarwal says, the appeal court may
have also created evidentiary issues for defendants.

"It can take lot of money and resources to marshal evidence that
narrows and addresses common issues earlier in the proceedings,
which may be too much for some defendants to bear," he explains.
"But I've learned over the last 15 years that our clients are
very good at responding to risk factors.  To the extent that this
presents a new one, they will find a way to respond.

"Only time will tell how important a decision it is," Mr. Agarwal
adds. [GN]


ALLEGIANT TRAVEL: Rosen Law Firm Files Securities Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, on April 24
disclosed that it has filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of
purchasers of the securities of Allegiant Travel Company (NASDAQ:
ALGT) from June 8, 2015 through April 13, 2018, both dates
inclusive ("Class Period").  The lawsuit seeks to recover damages
for Allegiant investors under the federal securities laws.

To join the Allegiant class action, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1325.htmlor call Phillip Kim,
Esq. or Zachary Halper, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email
pkim@rosenlegal.com or zhalper@rosenlegal.com for information on
the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A
CLASS IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU
RETAIN ONE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO
NOTHING AT THIS POINT. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) Allegiant lacked adequate systems to ensure its
aircraft were being properly maintained; (2) consequently,
Allegiant was not operating responsibly and ethically, and
providing safe working conditions for its employees; and (3) as a
result, defendants' public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times.  When the true details entered
the market, the lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to
serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than
June 25, 2018.  A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting
on behalf of other class members in directing the litigation. If
you wish to join the litigation, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1325.htmlto join the class
action.  You may also contact Phillip Kim or Zachary Halper of
Rosen Law Firm toll free at 866-767-3653 or via email at
pkim@rosenlegal.com or zhalper@rosenlegal.com.

Rosen Law Firm -- http://www.rosenlegal.com-- represents
investors throughout the globe, concentrating its practice in
securities class actions and shareholder derivative litigation.
The Rosen Law Firm was Ranked No. 1 by Institutional Shareholder
Services for number of securities class action settlements in
2017.  The firm has been ranked in the Top 3 each year since
2013. [GN]


ALMOST FAMILY: Court Refuses to Enjoin $2.4-Bil. Merger
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Kentucky, Louisville Division, denied Plaintiff's Motion for
Preliminary Injunction to preliminarily enjoin the stockholder
vote on the proposed acquisition, (Proposed Merger), of Almost
Family, Inc. by a subsidiary of LHC Group, Inc., in the case
captioned LEONARD STEIN, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. ALMOST FAMILY, INC., et al.,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 3:18-CV-129-TBR (W.D. Ky.).

In order to convince Almost Family shareholders to vote in favor
of the Proposed Merger, the Board authorized the filing of a Form
S-4 Registration Statement (S-4) with the Securities and Exchange
Commission.

In his Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that the Registration
Statement was materially incomplete and misleading, and that it
therefore violated Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 (Securities Exchange Act). It is further the
Plaintiff's contention that the materially incomplete and
misleading S-4 independently violates both Regulation G (17
C.F.R. Section 244.100) and SEC Rule 14a-9 (17 C.F.R. Sec
240.14a-9), each of which constitutes a violation of Section
14(a) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act.

The impetus of the Plaintiff's claim is that (1) the Registration
Documents omit information required by Regulation G to be
included, and (2) that the Registration Documents omit material
information, as that term is defined and explained by the Supreme
Court in TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976).

Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The first factor of the analysis inquires after the Plaintiff's
likelihood of success on the merits of the instant lawsuit. The
Sixth Circuit has made clear that, while the four-factor standard
for a preliminary injunction requires balancing by the courts, a
finding that there is simply no likelihood of success on the
merits is usually fatal.

Regulation G

Title 17 C.F.R. Section 244, also referred to as Regulation G,
provides the general rules regarding the disclosure of non-GAAP
financial metrics and their GAAP counterparts.  The parties'
difference in opinion in this case is with respect to whether the
information contained in the Registration Documents were subject
to Regulation G. Regulation G provides that whenever a
registrant, or person acting on its behalf, publicly discloses
material information that includes a non-GAAP financial measure,
the registrant must accompany that non-GAAP financial measure
with: (1) [a] presentation of the most directly comparable
financial measure calculated and presented in accordance with
[GAAP]; and (2) [a] reconciliation.

This language indicates that the non-GAAP metrics are not, in the
company's view, material, that they were provided to Guggenheim
solely for the purpose of conducting its analysis and issuing its
fairness opinion, and that the numbers are not included to
influence voting or to indicate which way shareholders should
vote.

Thus, while the Plaintiff's argument that the general rule under
Regulation G applies, Almost Family has included specific
language in its Registration Documents indicating that, under the
circumstances, they should fall under the exemption in 17 C.F.R.
244.100(d). In short, the Plaintiff has not demonstrated a strong
likelihood of success on his Regulation G argument.

Plaintiff's Materiality Argument

The Plaintiff also argues that the GAAP metrics and the values of
the line items utilized to calculate UFCF were material and
consequently, Almost Family's failure to include these items in
the Registration Documents rendered the non-GAAP metrics and the
UFCF-related figures materially misleading. Rule 14a-9 prohibits
the inclusion in a proxy statement of 'any statement which, at
the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is
made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact,
or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to
make the statements therein not false or misleading.'

Here, the explicit language, which states unequivocally that
Almost Family does not consider the non-GAAP metrics to be
material due to the inherent risks and uncertainties that come
along with such figures, seems to undercut the Plaintiff's
argument or, at the very least diminish, his likelihood of
success on the merits of this argument. Where the company itself
disclaims the materiality of such metrics before actually
disseminating the relevant voting materials to its shareholders,
it is a speculative argument that contends the terms are still
materially misleading under TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449.

This is because, before something may be materially misleading,
it must itself first be a material term. And although Almost
Family's claim in the Registration Documents that the non-GAAP
metrics were not material is likely not dispositive in and of
itself, it certainly tips the scales more in favor of the
company.

Irreparable Injury

The Plaintiff argues that the failure to disclose all material
information has long been recognized as constituting irreparable
harm, especially in the context of a merger such as this.  The
Plaintiff goes on to argue that the omitted information
identified in the Complaint and discussed here is material to
shareholders in rendering a decision regarding a proposed merger
and the failure to disclose this information cannot be remedied
through a monetary damages claim after the consummation of the
merger.

The Plaintiff's argument regarding the nondisclosure of the GAAP
metrics in the Registration Documents appears to indicate that
these numbers could potentially hold the key to this hypothetical
undervaluation of Almost Family stock. This, in the Court's view,
is insufficient to warrant its granting of the extraordinary
remedy of a preliminary injunction. The Plaintiff's complained-of
harm remains speculative at this stage and is far from certain
and great.

Finally, pursuant to the inversely proportional relationship
inherent between the first and second prongs or, as the Plaintiff
has referred to it, the sliding scale approach to the preliminary
injunction analysis, the Court notes that the Plaintiff has
failed to adduce sufficiently supported legal arguments on either
of the first two prongs to tip the scales back in his favor. This
is to say that each of the first two factors weigh, even if only
slightly, in favor of the Defendants, or at the very least not in
favor of the Plaintiff, thereby rendering the sliding scale of no
help to the Plaintiff here.

Harm to Others & The Public Interest

This Court is cognizant of the fact that, should an injunction be
granted, a knot could be thrown into the proposed $2.4 billion
merger between Almost Family and LHC; negative financial
consequences could result on both sides to both sets of
shareholders; also, the deal could simply fall apart altogether.

Conversely though, the financial consequences could be slight.
Certainly, the mere prospect of negative financial consequences
does not, and cannot, impede a judicious decision from this Court
regarding whether to issue an injunction or not, but the harm to
Almost Family and LHC shareholders is something the Court must
consider in weighing the four preliminary injunction factors.

Instead, in that case, the district court found that enjoining
the shareholder vote [would] upset the corporate governance model
and threaten to harm shareholders who stand to realize a
substantial premium on their shares. The public interest would
not be furthered by granting a preliminary injunction under these
circumstances.

A full-text copy of the District Court's March 22, 2018
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yadysqyk from Leagle.com.

Leonard Stein, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by James M. Wilson, Jr. --
jwilson@faruqilaw.com -- Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP, Kevin C. Burke --
Kevin@BurkeNeal.com -- Burke Neal PLLC, Michael D. Van Gorder --
mvangorder@faruqilaw.com -- Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP & Jamie K. Neal
-- jamie@burkeneal.com -- Burke Neal PLLC.

Almost Family, Inc., William B. Yarmuth, Steven B. Bing, Donald
G. McClinton, Tyree G. Wilburn, Jonathan D. Goldberg, W. Earl
Reed, III, Henry M. Altman, Jr. & Clifford S. Holtz, Defendants,
represented by Blake Rohrbacher -- rohrbacher@rlf.com --
Richards, Layton & Finger, PA, Cory J. Skolnick --
cskolnick@fbtlaw.com -- Frost Brown Todd LLC, Kellie R. Beckman -
- kbeckman@fbtlaw.com -- Frost Brown Todd LLC, Mitchell A. Karlan
-- mkarlan@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Thomas
C. Gleason -- tgleason@fbtlaw.com -- Frost Brown Todd LLC &
Timothy Sun -- tsun@gibsondunn.com --  Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher
LLP.


AMERICAN FIDELITY: Teachers' Class Action Goes to Federal Court
---------------------------------------------------------------
Blake Deshazo, writing for The Selma Times-Journal, reports that
a class action complaint against American Fidelity Assurance
filed on behalf of several teachers in Dallas County has made its
way to federal court.

The complaint, which was filed in February, by Birmingham
attorney Stephen Wadsworth, lists five teachers in Dallas County
and one in Montgomery County.

"It was removed from Dallas County to federal court, and it's now
in the Southern District of Alabama," Mr. Wadsworth said.

Four of the six teachers listed in the complaint can be found on
the Selma City Schools employee directory.  The complaint alleges
American Fidelity, which specializes in auto, education,
municipality and healthcare insurance, sold teachers "new
policies through a series of fraudulent statements and
omissions."

"The new policies were inferior to the old ones in that they
provided no long-term care coverage," the complaint reads.
"American Fidelity did not provide information to plaintiffs
which would have allowed them to make an informed decision under
Alabama law."

The complaint alleges nearly 500 teachers were "deceived" by
American Fidelity.  According to the complaint, when the teachers
purchased new policies that did not have long-term care, it
cancelled "$20 million worth of Fidelity Life Policies worth up
to $60 million in long-term care."

"Essentially, these policies pay off a couple of different ways.
It could pay off in terms of life insurance, or it could pay off
in terms of covering nursing home, assisted living and other
expenses like that," Mr. Wadsworth said.  "It's a life insurance
policy that could be converted to long-term care if you require
long-term care."

According to Mr. Wadsworth, the alleged fraud took place over the
last year.

"We're hoping to make the teachers whole," Mr. Wadsworth said.
"We're hoping to put them in the position they were in before the
sale, before the fraud."

The complaint states American Fidelity did not tell the teachers
purchasing new policies that it would cancel their original
policies, which included the long-term care.

"American Fidelity did not reveal to the plaintiffs that
purchasing their policy would cause the plaintiff's Fidelity Life
policies to be cancelled," the complaint reads.  "In most cases
they told them they were replacing the policies but did not
indicate on the application that it was a replacement or complete
the required replacement paperwork."

Mr. Wadsworth said it is still early in the process, and he is
hoping the complaint makes it past a motion to dismiss, so it can
move forward.

"After the motion to dismiss is decided, normally at that point,
you go into discovery. You start taking depositions.  You receive
documents.  That's the next step in litigation after a motion to
dismiss," he said.

The motion to dismiss, according to Wadsworth, was filed by
attorneys representing American Fidelity.  Phone calls to
American Fidelity seeking comment on the complaint have not been
returned.

"We're still just trying to feel out where we are and figure out
where the defendants and the judge want to go with this and how
we want to treat it," he said.

"We're committed to this case and look forward to bringing it, we
hope, to a speedy and successful resolution." [GN]


AMP: Three Law Firms Mull Shareholder Class Actions
---------------------------------------------------
Simone Ziaziaris, writing for news.com.au, reports that wealth
management giant AMP could face three shareholder class actions
after it admitted to cheating customers and lying to the
corporate regulator.

Law firms Shine Lawyers, Slater and Gordon and Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart & Sullivan are investigating class actions against AMP
on behalf of shareholders, following the scandals revealed at the
financial services royal commission.

Slater and Gordon and Shine on April 24 said AMP may have
breached continuous disclosure obligations by failing to inform
the market of the company's dealings with the Australian
Securities and Investments Commission.

Slater and Gordon head of class actions Ben Hardwick said the AMP
claim had the potential to be one of Australia's biggest investor
class actions.

"More than a billion dollars has been wiped from AMP's market cap
since these revelations were made public during the royal
commission hearings and it has left thousands of investors
reeling," Mr Hardwick said.

"We allege that this conduct was both unlawful and unethical and
reflected serious compliance problems within AMP, and the market
had a right to be informed about what they were buying into."

Quinn Emanuel on April 23 said it will file a class action
against AMP within two weeks, as it had started investigating an
action after the wealth manager's share price began falling in
March.

AMP's market value has fallen by more than $2 billion since its
executives began giving testimony to the royal commission, with
its shares down for a seventh consecutive trading session on
April 24, down 2.4 per cent at $4.07 at 1445 AEST.

The 169-year-old company has admitted it charged customers fees
for financial advice that was never delivered, and repeatedly
lied to ASIC about its behaviour.

Chief executive Craig Meller resigned on April 20, and said he
was "personally devastated" after learning of behaviour that may
yet result in criminal charges.

AMP and the nation's big four banks have already paid almost $219
million in compensation to more than 310,000 financial advice
customers charged fees for no service. [GN]


AMP: Slater and Gordon Mulls Flammable Cladding Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
Duncan Hughes, writing for The Australian Financial Review,
reports that Slater and Gordon is considering a class action on
behalf of owners and residents of apartments in Victoria with
flammable external cladding.  The law firm is already involved in
more than 25 class actions in a range of other sectors, including
against AMP.

Earlier in April a separate suit was announced, seeking
participants in a $4.2 billion class action on behalf of
apartment owners and residents.

Phil Dwyer, national president of the Builders' Collective of
Australia, a lobby group to improve buildings standards and
regulations, said additional class actions are being considered
for other defective work by developers and builders.

"Dangerous cladding has been used on buildings without fear of
any punishment by regulators," Mr Dwyer said.

Law firm Adley Burstyner and Roscon Property Services is
preparing the first round of legal actions on behalf of Victorian
owners, which is expected to roll on to NSW, non-residential
buildings, then other states and territories.

Both law firms are seeking registrations of interest to establish
whether there is enough backing to make the actions worthwhile.

They warn that many apartment owners, who each face between
$20,000 and $40,000 in repair bills, are under financial pressure
to complete the repairs, particularly elderly and first time home
buyers.

Adley Burstyner is expected to target large building companies
including Hickory Building, Hamilton Marino, LU Simon Builders
and Probuild.

A Slater and Gordon spokesman said it is considering a range of
options.

Fears about the dangers of flammable cladding have increased
since last year's Grenfell Tower fire in London that killed 70
and injured another 70.

In Melbourne, a fire in 2014 raced up 13 floors of the Lacrosse
building in Docklands in about 10 minutes, leading to the
evacuation of more than 450 people.

Apartment owners are fighting LU Simon over who should pay the
costs of replacing the cladding in the Victorian Civil &
Administrative Tribunal in a case due to start in September. It
is unclear how the class action bid will be affected by this
case.

Adley Burstyner estimate a class action seeking rectification and
compensation for losses caused by defective cladding could take
one to three years.

It is considering no-win, no-fee payment to secure outcomes for
the owners' corporation without need for a special resolution
with a 75 per cent majority which is difficult to achieve because
of detached and passive investors.

NSW has identified 1000 buildings with potentially dangerous
combustible cladding, and Victoria has drawn up a list of 1400.
[GN]


AMPLE HILLS: "Kiler" Suit Says Website not Blind-accessible
-----------------------------------------------------------
Marion Kiler, Individually and as the representative of a class
of similarly situated persons, Plaintiff, v. Ample Hills
Creamery, Inc., Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-01872 (E.D. N.Y.,
March 28, 2018), seeks preliminary and permanent injunction,
compensatory, statutory and punitive damages and fines,
prejudgment and post-judgment interest, costs and expenses of
this action together with reasonable attorneys' and expert fees
and such other and further relief under the Americans With
Disabilities Act, New York State Human Rights Law and New York
City Human Rights Law.

Ample Hills Stores provide stuffed ice cream and other related
merchandise. They also operate a website known as Amplehills.com
which provides consumers with access to an array of goods and
services offered to the public by the Ample Hills Stores,
including, the ability to view food items, the ability to
purchase food items for delivery and to obtain information about
the Store history, location and hours. Kiler browsed and intended
to purchase ice cream. Plaintiff is legally blind and claims that
Defendant's website cannot be accessed by the visually-impaired.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Dan Shaked, Esq.
      SHAKED LAW GROUP, P.C.
      44 Court St., Suite 1217
      Brooklyn, NY 11201
      Tel. (917) 373-9128
      E-mail: ShakedLawGroup@Gmail.com


ANADARKO PETROLEUM: Conditional Cert. Bid in "Boykin" Partly OK'd
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BOYD BOYKIN, Plaintiff, v. ANADARKO PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, Defendant, Civil Action No. 17-cv-02309-MSK-STV (D.
Colo.), Judge Marcia S. Krieger of the U.S. District Court for
the District of Colorado granted in part and denied in part
Boykin's Motion For Conditional Certification.

According to the Complaint, Boykin was employed by Anadarko as a
Rig Welder.  He alleges that Anadarko improperly classified him
and other Rig Welders as independent contractors, and proceeded
to pay them only straight-time wages, even when they worked in
excess of 40 hours per week.  Thus, he alleges that Anadarko
violated the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").

Boykin seeks to pursue the matter as an FLSA collective action
under 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b).  In the instant motion, he seeks
an order from the Court certifying a class of Rig Welders, and
authorizing issuance of notice and consent forms to affected
employees, allowing them to opt into the lawsuit.

Judge Krieger finds that Boykin has made a substantial showing
warranting notice to any Rig Welder, employed by Anadarko through
DT Bar Welding Services, Inc., who failed to receive overtime pay
for hours exceeding 40 in a week.  He cannot say that Boykin has
made a substantial showing that any other Rig Welder employed by
Anadarko and paid through any other service company necessarily
experienced the same circumstances.

As to Boykin's proposed notice to be sent to eligible employees,
the Judge finds several components of the proposed notice that
are unacceptable.  Most significantly, he notes that Section 6,
entitled "Your Legal Representation If You Join" and stating that
"If you choose to join this collective action lawsuit, your
attorneys will be [Mr. Boykin's counsel]" improperly abridges the
rights of opt-in claimants to select their own counsel or to
choose to represent themselves.  Similarly, the proposed consent
form, which requires all opt-in Plaintiffs to allow Boykin and
his counsel to make all decisions regarding the litigation on
their behalf also abridges their right to assert, compromise, or
proceed to trial on their own claims if they so choose.  He finds
other portions of the proposed notice and consent forms to be
misleading.

Judge Krieger attaches to the Order a form of notice and consent
form that he has approved in other cases, and has appropriately
modified to reflect the circumstances of the case.  It is the
notice and consent form the Judge approves.

The Judge adopts, the following schedule for the giving of notice
and the receipt of consents:

     a. 14 days from the date of the Order: Anadarko will produce
to Boykin's counsel the names, last-known mailing address, e-mail
addresses (if known), and dates of employment for employees
meeting the definition.

     b. 28 days from the date of the Order: Boykin's counsel will
send copies of the attached Notice and Consent Form to affected
employees.  The notice may be given by mail, e-mail, or both at
the counsel's discretion.

     c. 60 days from date of mailing of Notice: Consent forms
must be returned to Boykin's counsel.  The counsel will file all
returned consent forms within 14 days of their receipt.

Boykin requests leave to perform additional steps to contact
affected employees, including the sending of reminder e-mails and
making telephone calls.  The Judge declines to authorize such
steps prophylactically.  If Boykin concludes that mail and e-mail
notice has been substantially ineffective at reaching affected
employees, he is free to advise the Court and move for additional
appropriate relief at that time.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Krieger granted in part and
denied in part Boykin's Motion For Conditional Certification, as
set forth.  Attachments: Notice form and Consent Form - IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO Chief
Judge Marcia S. Krieger Civil Action No. 17-cv-02309-MSK-STV BOYD
BOYKIN, Plaintiff, v. ANADARKO PETROLEUM CORPORATION, Defendant.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 21, 2018 Opinion and Order
is available at https://is.gd/aYdz1E from Leagle.com.

Boyd Boykin, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Lindsay R. Itkin --
litkin@mybackwages.com -- Josephson Dunlap Law Firm, Matthew
Scott Parmet -- mparmet@brucknerburch.com -- Bruckner Burch PLLC
& Michael Andrew Josephson -- mjosephson@mybackwages.com --
Josephson Dunlap Law Firm.

Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, Defendant, represented by Patrick
Kevin Leyendecker -- kleyendecker@azalaw.com -- Ahmad Zavitsanos
Anaipakos Alavi & Zavitsanos, PC.


ANCHOR CONSTRUCTION: Construction Workers Seek Unpaid OT Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
Ronald Heiligh, Kelvin Best, Jorge Rivera, Gilberto Gomez, Jacobo
Gomez, Pedro Gomez, Daniel A. Gomez Melendez, Victor Gonzalez and
Tyrone Barnes, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly-
situated, Plaintiffs v. Anchor Construction Corp. and Florintino
Gregorio, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv- 00897 (D. Md., March 28,
2018), seeks wage difference, pre-judgment interest, interest due
on unpaid wages, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys' fees
and costs of this action and any other relief under the Maryland
Wage and Hour Law, Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law and
the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Plaintiffs are cable splicers, construction workers, laborers,
equipment operators, forepersons, flaggers and truck drivers who
earned, but did not receive all compensation due for regular time
worked and for time and one-half pay for time spent working more
than forty hours per work including double pay for time spent
working on emergency jobs, weekend jobs and evening jobs.

Anchor Construction does business as a construction contractor
working at various sites in Maryland and the District of
Columbia. Anchor is headquartered at 2254 25th Place NE,
Washington, DC 20018, and has offices in Maryland at 3005
Washington Blvd., Baltimore, MD 21230 and 2300 Beaver Road,
Landover, MD 20785. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Geoffrey M. Bohn, Esq.
      Robert A. Battey, Esq.
      BOHN & BATTEY, PLC
      P.O. Box 101685
      Arlington, VA 22210
      Tel: (703) 599-7076
      Fax: (703) 842-8089
      Email: gbohn@bohn-battey.com


ARIZONA: Legislator Mulls Class Action Over Teachers' Strike
------------------------------------------------------------
Laurie Roberts, writing for azcentral, reports that on April 24
House Majority Arizona State Representative Kelly Townsend
announced on Twitter that she's consulting with lawyers about the
possibility of a class-action lawsuit on behalf of Arizonans
impacted by a teacher strike.  She told me she's hoping to be a
plaintiff in the lawsuit, given that her son's graduation may be
delayed.

Ms. Townsend, R-Mesa, wasn't clear on who, exactly, she wants to
haul into court, but I'm pretty sure she's not planning to sue
the GOP-run Legislature.

You know, the politicians who systematically have stiffed the
schools over the last decade to the point where the state now
investing $924 less on a child's education now than it was a
decade ago?

'Is my son going to graduate?'
Ms. Townsend told azcentral's Roberts that she's heard from a
number of people who will be harmed by a strike, including her
own father and sister who have already bought airline tickets to
fly in for her son's high school graduation, which presumably
would have to be postponed.

"Is my son going to graduate? Do we need to change the tickets?
Every day that you have to wait becomes more expensive.  We don't
know."

Ms. Townsend said she's heard that some teachers are telling
their students the strike could last for a month.

"People are suffering from financial, occupational, emotional
harm . . . ,'' she said.  "People had travel plans, occupation
plans.  Some people are needing to go into the military.  There
is a wide spectrum of inconveniences."

Ms. Townsend said she'd like to be a plaintiff in the lawsuit.

"If I have standing I absolutely will."

As for who to sue, that, she says, would be up to the lawyers.
She declined to identify the law firms involved, saying there are
several working together and that an announcement would be coming
in the next day or so. [GN]


AT&T MOBILITY: Court Grants Joint Bid to Dismiss "Rodriguez"
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California granted the Joint Request for Dismissal of Class
Action Complaint and Joint Stipulation of Settlement in the case
captioned MARCO RODRIGUEZ and ADEN KHACHADOORIAN MAMORE, on
behalf of themselves, all others similarly situated, and the
general public, Plaintiffs, v. AT&T MOBILITY SERVICES, LLC., a
Delaware corporation; AT&T, a business entity of unknown form;
and DOES 1-50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 3:16-cv-04567-WHO
(N.D. Cal.).

The Court has reviewed and considered the Joint Request for
Dismissal of Class Action Complaint Pursuant to Rule 41 and the
Joint Stipulation of Settlement. The Court orders this action
dismissed without prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's March 22, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y7ogtl6s from Leagle.com.

Marco Rodriguez & Aden Khachadoorian Mamore, Plaintiffs,
represented by David Harmik Yeremian --  david@yeremianlaw.com --
David Yeremian & Associates, Inc.

AT&T Mobility Services, LLC & AT&T, Defendants, represented by
Dorothy Frances Kaslow -- dkaslow@akingump.com -- Akin Gump
Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, Liz Kathryn Bertko --
lbertko@akingump.com -- Akin Gump Strauss Hauer and Feld LLP,
Nathan J. Oleson -- noleson@akingump.com -- Akin Gump Strauss
Hauer and Feld LLP, pro hac vice & Donna Marie Mezias --
dmezias@akingump.com -- Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP.


AVINGER INC: Correction Ordered in "Banerjee" Amended Complaint
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order to Show Cause Regarding Consolidated
Amended Class Action Complaint in the case captioned  ARINDAM
BANERJEE and JOGESH HARJAI, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. AVINGER, INC., JEFFREY
M. SOINSKI, MATTHEW B. FERGUSON, DONALD A. LUCAS, JOHN B.
SIMPSON, JAMES B. MCELWEE, JAMES G. CULLEN, THOMAS J. FOGARTY,
CANACCORD GENUITY, INC., COWEN AND COMPANY LLC, OPPENHEIMER &
CO., BTIG, STEPHENS INC., AND DOES 1 through 25, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-03400-CW (N.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiffs filed an Amended Consolidated Class Action
Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws.

It appears, however, that this document was not filed within
twenty-one days after service of the November 21, 2017
Consolidated Class Action Complaint; within twenty-one days after
service of Defendants' January 26, 2018 motion to dismiss; with
the written consent of Defendants; or with leave of Court.

Accordingly, the Court directed the Plaintiffs to correct the
deficiency in the filing of the Amended Consolidated Class Action
Complaint. Otherwise, the Court will strike the Amended
Consolidated Class Action Complaint.

A full-text copy of the District Court's March 22, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y9ddnc2r from Leagle.com.

Lindsay Grotewiel, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Albert Y. Chang --
achang@bottinilaw.com -- Bottini and Bottini, Inc., Francis A.
Bottini, Jr. -- fbottini@bottinilaw.com -- Bottini & Bottini,
Inc., Yury A. Kolesnikov -- ykolesnikov@bottinilaw.com -- Bottini
and Bottini, Inc., Rhiana Swartz, Scott and Scott, Attorneys at
Law, LLP & Thomas L. Laughlin, IV, ScottScott, Attorneys at Law,
LLP, The Helmsley Building. 230 Park Avenue, 17th Floor. New
York, NY 10169.

Avinger, Inc., Jeffrey M. Soinski, Matthew B. Ferguson, Donald A.
Lucas, John B. Simpson, James B. McElwee, James G. Cullen &
Thomas J. Fogarty, Defendants, represented by Benjamin Jon Tolman
-- btolman@wsgr.com -- Wilson Sonsini Goodrich Rosati, Doru
Gavril -- dgavril@wsgr.com -- Wilson Sonsini Goodrich and Rosati
& Ignacio Evaristo Salceda -- salceda@wsgr.com -- Wilson Sonsini
Goodrich & Rosati A Professional Corporation.


AYALON INSURANCE: Levitan Attorney Discusses Class Action Ruling
----------------------------------------------------------------
Aviv Klepner, Esq. -- avivk@levitansharon.co.il -- of Levitan
Sharon & Co, in an article for Lexology, wrote that a class
action is a claim filed on behalf of a group of people, which
raises substantive questions of fact or law which are common to
all of the group's members.  A class action allows all of the
individual claims to be resolved in a single proceeding brought
by a representative plaintiff and his or her attorney.

A class action is dealt with in two stages. During the first
stage, a motion is filed with the court for the certification of
the claim as a class action.  Only if certification is granted
will the court proceed to the second stage of hearing the claim
on its merits.

Section 4(a) of the Class Action Law 2006 provides a list of
potential applicants who are entitled to file an application for
the certification of a class action.  One of the options is:

"a person who has cause of action in a claim or matter stated in
section 3(a), which raises substantive questions of fact or Law
common to all members of a group of persons -- in the name of
that group."

The supreme courts have ruled that the individual cause of action
of the representative plaintiff against a defendant is a basic
condition for the certification of a class action.  In the
absence of an individual cause of action, the motion should be
dismissed.

Motion to certify claim as a class action

In 2017 Noa Metz (the plaintiff) filed a claim and a motion to
certify the claim as a class action against Ayalon Insurance
Company Ltd (the insurer).

The plaintiff argued that in 2015 she had been involved in a car
accident at a junction.  The driver of another car had failed to
obey a stop sign, resulting in a collision which damaged the
plaintiff's car.

Since the other driver was covered under third-party liability
insurance issued by the insurer, the plaintiff approached the
insurer and demanded the payment of insurance benefits for the
property damage caused in the accident.

However, the insurer paid the plaintiff only 85% of the actual
damage and notified her that following the examination of the
parties' versions and the damaged parts of the cars involved, it
had deducted the plaintiff's contributory negligence at a rate of
15%.

Based on the above, the plaintiff argued in her claim that the
insurer automatically and arbitrarily deducted a portion of the
insurance benefits in cases of junction accidents.  The deduction
was allegedly made without examining whether the third party was
indeed negligent under the concrete circumstances of the
accident. Further, the insurer's payment notifications did not
explain the specific reasons for the deduction.

The insurer filed a detailed response to the motion to certify
the claim as a class action, raising various defence
arguments.(3)

The insurer argued, among other things, that the plaintiff had no
individual cause of action.  This was based on the fact that
following the payment of 85% of the damage claimed, the plaintiff
had negotiated with the insurer and agreed to a settlement,
according to which the insurer had paid the plaintiff an
additional 7.5% of the damage.  The insurer presented the waiver
and release form signed by the plaintiff which prevented any
further actions against the insurer.

Decision

Following the insurer's response and the disclosure of the waiver
and release form, the plaintiff decided to withdraw her claim and
the motion to certify the claim as a class action.

The parties filed a motion for withdrawal for the court's
approval, which had recently been granted.  The court ruled that
the plaintiff had admitted that it would be difficult for her to
prove an individual cause of action against the insurer, and
referred to the waiver and release form attached to the response.

The court pointed out that the insurer had raised further defence
allegations which were unrelated to the plaintiff's cause of
action.

Based on the above, the court was convinced that the proceeding
should be terminated and that no steps should be taken in order
to find a replacement representative plaintiff.  The claim was
therefore dismissed and the motion to certify the claim as a
class action was struck out with no costs. [GN]


BAI BRANDS: Sued in Calif. Over "Natural" Fruit Drink Labeling
--------------------------------------------------------------
Keller and Heckman LLP, in an article for The National Law
Review, wrote that a national putative class action lawsuit (with
proposed in-state subclass) was filed in California federal court
on April 19, 2018 against Bai Brands, LLC alleging violation of
California's Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Unfair Competition
Law, and common law, as well as the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration's (FDA) regulations.  The plaintiff alleges that
Bai Brands falsely advertised fruit drinks as 'natural' and did
not disclose malic acid, alleged to be a synthetic flavor used to
mimic fresh fruit, on front of package labeling.  (Branca v. Bai
Brands, LLC, 3:18-cv-00757).

Natural lawsuits continue to proliferate despite court ordered
stays being granted in several challenges due to pending FDA
action.  As previously covered on this blog, FDA is considering
whether to regulate the term "natural," having collected 7,687
comments in 2016 on use of the term 'natural' on human food
labeling.

Commissioner Scott Gottlieb acknowledged the lack of clarity on
the meaning of 'natural' in March 29, 2018 remarks at the
National Food Policy Conference in Washington, DC and said FDA
"will have more to say on the issue soon."  It remains to be seen
how long courts will continue to wait for FDA to act. [GN]


BAYER CROPSCIENCE: Neonicotinoid Class Action Proceeds in Quebec
----------------------------------------------------------------
Beyond Pesticides reports that a class-action lawsuit against two
manufacturers of neonicotinoid insecticides is moving ahead in
Quebec, Canada after an appeal to block the case by the Canadian
government and the chemical companies, Bayer and Syngenta, was
dismissed.  In February 2018, the case, brought by a beekeeper,
was allowed to proceed to trial by the Quebec Superior Court.

Quebec queen bee breeder, Steve Martineau, conducted tests on
water and his dead and dying bees and found traces of
neonicotinoids.  His suit alleges that Bayer and Syngenta were
negligent in the manufacture and sale of neonicotinoids in
Quebec, and are responsible for damages that he and other class
members suffered under Article 1457 of the Quebec Civil Code.
Bayer and Syngenta challenged the application on a number of
grounds including the assumption that they had manufactured the
neonicotinoids which killed Martineau's bees.  The class in this
case was authorized for all persons in Quebec who own or owned
bees in the affected area since 2006. Mr. Martineau estimates he
has lost about $20,000 a year to present due to the effects of
neonicotinoids on his bee population (Martineau v. Bayer
CropScience Inc. CALN/2018-007)

"We're suing on behalf of Quebec beekeepers whose bees were non-
productive or killed," Mr. Martineau's lawyer, Samy Elnemr said.
In addition to the Quebec class-action suit, a Canada-wide
lawsuit against neonicotinoid manufacturers is also being
prepared to be filed and will be put before the courts soon.

On February 19, 2018, the provincial government introduced new
restrictions on pesticides considered harmful to honey bees,
including neonicotinoids. Under the changes, farmers will have to
get permission from a certified agronomist before using certain
pesticides on crops.  The restricted pesticides include three
types of neonicotinoids, as well as chlorpyrifos and atrazine,
which has been banned in Europe for more than a decade. To ensure
the implementation of these new regulations goes smoothly, the
Environment Ministry will establish a monitoring committee to
oversee the process.  The province has already allocated $14
million over five years to assist farmers in reducing pesticide
risks and adapting to the new measures.  Advocates say the new
rules represent a compromise.  These chemicals may continue to be
used, but inserting agronomic experts with an eye for both the
economic and health concerns surrounding the use of highly toxic
pesticides into the process may be a strategy to significantly
reduce pesticide use.  The good news is that by also improving
recordkeeping, Quebec's strategy can be closely evaluated to
ensure the approval process is not simply a rubber stamp for
pesticide use.

Numerous scientific studies implicate neonicotinoid pesticides as
key contributors to the global decline of pollinator populations.
Research on neonicotinoids has been consistent in linking their
use to reduced learning in bees, as well as other impacts, such
as those on colony size, and reproductive success.  Studies
looking at effects on birds reports that songbirds exposed to
widely used insecticides, like neonicotinoids, fail to properly
orient themselves for migration, the first such study that adds
weight to arguments that pesticides are a likely cause in the
decline of migratory bird populations.  U.S. beekeepers lost an
unsustainable 33% of their hives between 2016 and 2017.

Neonicotinoids are also detected regularly in the nation's
waterways at concentrations that exceed acute and chronic
toxicity values for sensitive organisms.  A new report from the
U.S. Geologic Survey (USGS) finds neonicotinoid contamination of
the Great Lakes that threatens aquatic life.  The most recent
aquatic assessment for imidacloprid finds that imidacloprid
threatens the health of U.S. waterways with significant risks to
aquatic insects and cascading effects on aquatic food webs.  As a
result of risks to aquatic organisms, the Canadian pesticide
regulatory agency has recommended banning imidacloprid, a
decision on which has been delayed.  In Europe, a recent survey
finds that streams across the United Kingdom (UK) are
contaminated with neonicotinoids.  The European Commission met on
December 12 and 13, 2017 to decide on a proposal to extend the
2013 neonicotinoid ban to all outdoor crops, but this decision
was delayed. The issue is expected to be on the agenda again in
2018. [GN]


BOFI HOLDING: 3rd Amended Securities Suit Dismissed w/ Prejudice
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE BofI HOLDING, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION, Case
No. 3:15-cv-02324-GPC-KSC (S.D. Cal.), Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel of
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California
granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Third Amended Class
Action Complaint ("TAC").

In the consolidated putative securities fraud class action, the
purchasers of BofI's stock assert claims against BofI and several
corporate officers for violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  On Feb. 1, 2016, the Court
appointed Houston Municipal Employees Pension System as the Lead
Plaintiff.

On April 11, 2016, the Lead Plaintiff filed a First Amended
Complaint ("FAC").  The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
FAC on the grounds that the FAC (1) failed to identify false or
misleading statements and (2) did not plead sufficient facts
giving rise to a strong inference of scienter.

The Court noted that many of the misrepresentations alleged in
the FAC fell short of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act  (PSLRA)'s heightened standards.  It found, however, that the
FAC's allegations were insufficient to create a strong inference
of scienter on the parts of Defendants Micheletti, Grinberg,
Mosich, and Argalas, and dismissed the claims against those
defendants without prejudice.

On Nov. 25, 2016, the Lead Plaintiff filed a Second Amended
Complaint ("SAC").  The Defendants again moved to dismiss.
Again, the Court granted in part and denied in part.  Noting that
the SAC -- like the FAC -- was excessive in length, the Court
found it helpful to delineate which of the alleged
misrepresentations were actionable, and which were not.  The
Court explained that the SAC alleged actionable fraudulent or
misleading statements as to BofI's loan underwriting practices
and as to its internal controls and compliance infrastructure,
but did not sufficiently demonstrate that the Defendants'
statements about its Allowance for Loan Losses, Net
income/diluted price per share, Loan-to-Value Ratio, or
undisclosed lending partnerships are actionable under the
securities laws.

Noting that the SAC added no new allegations of scienter on the
parts of Micheletti, Grinberg, Mosich, and Argalas, the Court
again granted the motion to dismiss the Section 10(b) claims
against them.  The Court nonetheless found the new control person
allegations sufficient to state plausible Section 20(a) claims
against all the Defendants.

On Sept. 29, 2017, the Defendants filed a motion for judgment on
the pleadings in which they argued the Lead Plaintiff had not
pled with sufficient particularity that a disclosure of the
falsity of the Defendants' misrepresentations caused the Lead
Plaintiff loss.  The Court agreed and granted the motion.
Because that was the first time the Defendants argued that the
Lead Plaintiff failed to plead loss causation adequately, the
Court granted the Lead Plaintiff leave to amend.

On Dec. 22, 2017, the Lead Plaintiff filed the now-operative TAC.
As the Lead Plaintiff explains in its memorandum in opposition to
the instant motion, the TAC is intended to be responsive not only
to the Court's judgment on the pleadings ruling, but also to the
Court's earlier ruling on the Defendants' motion to dismiss the
SAC.

The Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss on Jan. 19,
2018.  They Defendants argue that the new alleged
misrepresentations in the TAC are not actionable and that the TAC
again fails to plead loss causation adequately.  The Defendants
also argue that because Section 20(a) claims require a violation
of the securities laws, the TAC's failure to state a claim of
violation of Section 10(b) requires dismissal of the Lead
Plaintiff's Section 20(a) claims.

In sum, Judge Curiel concludes that the TAC's allegations are
insufficient to meet the applicable heightened pleading
standards.  Because the TAC fails to state a plausible claim for
a violation of the securities laws, it also fails to state a
violation of Section 20(a).

This was the Lead Plaintiff's third iteration of its complaint,
and it appears that any further amendment would not survive
another motion to dismiss.  The Judge concludes that another
opportunity to amend is not warranted.  As a result, he granted
the Defendants' motion to dismiss and dismissed the Lead
Plaintiff's claims against the Defendants with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 21, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/ASr5Pw from Leagle.com.

Paul J. Grinberg, Nicholas A. Mosich, James S. Argalas & Andrew
J. Micheletti, Defendants, represented by John P. Stigi, III --
jstigi@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton.

Houston Municipal Employees Pension System, Plaintiff,
represented by Daniel P. Chiplock -- dchiplock@lchb.com -- Lieff
Cabraser
Heimann & Bernstein LLP, pro hac vice, Joy Kruse --
jkruse@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, Katherine
Collinge Lubin -- klubin@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser Heimann &
Bernstein, Michael Joseph Miarmi -- mmiarmi@lchb.com -- Lieff
Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, pro hac vice & Richard M. Heimann -
- rheimann@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser Heimann and Bernstein LLP.

BofI Holding, Inc. & Gregory Garrabrants, Defendants, represented
by Alejandro E. Moreno -- amoreno@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard,
Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP & John P. Stigi, III, Sheppard
Mullin Richter & Hampton.

John Marco, Movant, represented by John P. Stigi, III, Sheppard
Mullin Richter & Hampton & Laurence M. Rosen --
lrosen@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.


BRIDGEPORT HEALTH: Subclasses Certification in ERISA Suit Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LOCAL 1522 OF COUNCIL 4, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF
STATE COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v.
BRIDGEPORT HEALTH CARE CENTER, INC., ET AL., Defendants, Civil
Action No. 15-CV-1019 (JCH) (D. Conn.), Judge Janet C. Hall of
the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut denied
the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification.

The case arises from Defendant BHCC's alleged failure to fund
various employee benefit programs, including health and life
insurance plans and a retirement plans.  The Plaintiffs allege
that the Defendants withheld money from employee paychecks for
these benefit programs, but did not use the funds for the proper
purpose.  The Plaintiffs further allege that BHCC withheld money
from employee paychecks for union dues but did not give that
money to the union as promised.  Finally, they allege that Chaim
Stern is a fiduciary for the employee benefit plans and breached
his fiduciary duty, including by using the aforementioned payroll
deductions to pay other unrelated premiums and company
obligations.

The 27 counts in the Third Amended Complaint fall into the
following categories: (1) breach of contract claims arising from
the collective bargaining agreement between Local 1522 and BHCC
(Counts One, Two, Twelve, Sixteen, and Seventeen); (2) tort
claims including fraud, equitable estoppel, promissory estoppel,
misrepresentation, and conversion (Counts Three, Four, Ten,
Eleven, Eighteen, Nineteen, Twenty-Five, Twenty-Six, and Twenty-
Seven); (3) claims that BHCC failed to fund benefit programs
alleging violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Program ("ERISA"), title 29, section 1001 et seq. (Counts Five,
Six, Twenty, and Twenty-One); (4) claims that BHCC failed to give
required notice to plan participants alleging violations of ERISA
(Counts Thirteen, Fourteen, and Fifteen); (5) promissory estoppel
claims alleging violations of ERISA (Counts Seven, Eight, Twenty-
Two, and Twenty-Three); and (6) claims that Stern violated his
fiduciary duty alleging violations of ERISA (Counts Nine2 and
Twenty-Four).  The Plaintiffs request declaratory relief;
injunctive relief; money damages in the form of compensatory,
consequential, and punitive damages; and attorneys' fees.

The Plaintiffs have moved for class certification.  They propose
two subclasses:

     a. All employees of Bridgeport Health Care Center from Jan.
1, 2015 to the present, who are represented by Local 1522, who
receive health insurance coverage from BHCC pursuant to Article
29 of the parties' collective bargaining agreement, life
insurance or disability insurance, and/or have payments deducted
for Bridgeport Federal Credit Union, and have union dues deducted
from their paychecks.

     b. All employees of BHCC from Jan. 1, 2015 to the present,
who are represented by Local 1522 and are participants in the
BHCC pursuant to Article 33 of the parties' collective bargaining
agreement.

Both proposed subclasses are limited to employees who are
represented by the Local 1522 bargaining unit.  The Motion for
Certification is not limited to any particular claims raised by
the Plaintiffs, and the text of the Plaintiffs' Memorandum
reflects their intent to certify the class as to the 13 claims
brought by the putative representatives.

The Defendants did not respond to the Motion for Class
Certification.

On July 5, 2017, the Court issued an Order directing the parties
to inform the Court as to whether the benefits plans in question
were specific to members of the Local 1522 bargaining unit, or
whether the plans covered employees who are not affiliated with
Local 1522.  In response, on July 10, 2017, the parties filed a
Joint Stipulation stating, among other things, that the health
plan, pension plan and other employee benefit plans in question
do not cover only members of Local 1522.  Two days later, the
parties filed a Supplement to their Stipulation, emphasizing
that, while the benefits plans cover employees who are not
affiliated with Local 1522, the bargaining agreement between
Local 1522 and BHCC means that certain terms of the benefits
plans only apply to members of the Local 1522 bargaining unit.

During a discovery-related conference on Aug. 7, 2017, the Court
expressed concerns with certifying a class of some, but not all,
members of an ERISA plan, and gave the parties an opportunity to
submit responses to those concerns.  On Aug.14, 2017, the
Plaintiffs submitted a Response, in which they renewed their
argument that, because different unions may negotiate different
terms for the employee benefits in question, the proposed classes
of fewer than all plan members could be certified.

On Sept. 7, 2017, the Court issued yet another Order expressing
its concerns with certifying a class of fewer than all plan
members for ERISA claims.  It ordered the parties to produce the
terms of the benefits plans themselves, which had not previously
been provided to the court.  It also invited briefing from the
parties related to the Court's concerns about certifying the
requested classes.  The parties jointly filed the terms of the
benefits plans in question on Sept. 14, 2017.  In addition, the
Plaintiffs filed a Response to that Order on Sept. 29, 2017,
which Response contained legal argument as to the Court's stated
concerns respecting class certification.  In keeping with their
pattern of silence as to the Motion to Certify, the Defendants
did not take the opportunity to respond to the Court's concerns.

Judge Hall finds that the Third Amended Complaint and the Motion
for Certification contain a wide range of legal claims and
request a wide range of relief.  One or more of the claims and
one or more of the types of relief requested may be appropriate
for certification, and he is cognizant that district courts
generally enjoy broad discretion to "alter or modify" proposed
classes.  However, he is neither qualified nor inclined to divine
from the sprawling Third Amended Complaint which of the 13 counts
alleged by the putative class ought to be litigated as a class
action and what type of relief should be sought.  For example, a
class comprised solely of Local 1522 members may be appropriate
as to the breach of contract claims based on the collective
bargaining agreement, but whether it would be appropriately
certified as a Rule 23(b)(2) class or a Rule 23(b)(3) class would
depend on the type of relief sought, which is not clear from the
Third Amended Complaint.

What is clear, however, the Judge finds, is that the pending
Motion -- which moves for certification as to all claims and all
relief -- must be denied, as the proposed subclasses cannot be
certified under any of the Rule 23(b) types.  Therefore, he
denied without prejudice the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 21, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/9oZ66r from Leagle.com.

Local 1522 of Council 4, American Federation of State County and
Municipal Employees, Carmen Espejo, Natividade Goncalves, Marion
V Perez & Carlota Rafael, Plaintiffs, represented by J. William
Gagne, Jr. -- jwgagne@snet.net -- Law Offices of J. William
Gagne, Jr. & Associates & Kimberly Ann Cuneo, Law Offices of J.
William Gagne, Jr. & Associates.

Bridgeport Health Care Center, Inc, Defendant, represented by
Alan L. Glazner -- aglazner@lawfirm.ms -- Mandelbaum Salsburg,
pro hac vice, Eric Charles Shinaman --
shinaman@litchfieldcavo.com -- Litchfield Cavo LLP, Kathleen F.
Adams, Litchfield Cavo LLP, Melicent B. Thompson --
thompson@litchfieldcavo.com -- Litchfield Cavo LLP, Michael P.
Devlin, Berchem, Moses & Devlin, P.C. & Milanna Datlow .

Chaim Stern, Defendant, represented by Daniel B. Fitzgerald --
dfitzgerald@brodywilk.com -- Brody Wilkinson PC, Michael P.
Devlin, Berchem, Moses & Devlin, P.C. & Peter W. Till, Law Office
of Peter W. Till, pro hac vice.

Esq. Warren L. Holcomb, Movant, pro se.

R. Alexander Acosta, Movant, represented by Celeste C. Moran, U.
S. Dept. of Labor Office of the Solicitor.

Meritain Health, Inc., Interested Party, represented by Daniel R.
Maguire -- dmaguire@phillipslytle.com -- Phillips Lytle LLP,
pro hac vice, Erin C. Borek -- eborek@phillipslytle.com --
Phillips Lytle LLP, pro hac vice, Jennifer A. Beckage --
jbeckage@phillipslytle.com -- Phillips Lytle LLP, pro hac vice &
Walter J. Onacewicz, Jr., Law Offices of Nair & Levin, P.C.


CAMBRIDGE ANALYTICA: Gennock Files Suit for Invasion of Privacy
---------------------------------------------------------------
Ashley Gennock and Randy Nunez, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Cambridge Analytica
and Facebook, Inc., Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-01891, (N.D. Cal.,
March 27, 2018), seeks actual, statutory, and punitive damages,
declaratory and injunctive relief and compensatory damages
resulting from invasion of privacy and pursuant to the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 and the Stored Communications
Act.

Cambridge is privately held company that has been actively
engaged in data mining, data brokerage, and data analysis.
Facebook Inc. is a publically-traded social media company with
Mark Zuckerberg as CEO.

Plaintiffs are Facebook users. They allege that the Defendants
engaged in data mining, data brokerage, and data analysis for the
purpose of influencing the 2016 electoral process, using the
personal information of millions of Facebook users to influence
the 2016 United States presidential election. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Todd D. Carpenter, Esq.
      Brittany C. Casola, Esq.
      CARLSON LYNCH SWEET KILPELA & CARPENTER, LLP
      402 W Broadway, 29th Floor
      San Diego, CA 92101
      Phone: (619) 756-6994
      Fax: (619) 756-6991
      Email: tcarpenter@carlsonlynch.com
             bcasola@carlsonlynch.com

             - and -

      Gary F. Lynch, Esq.
      Kelly K. Iverson, Esq.
      CARLSON LYNCH SWEET KILPELA & CARPENTER, LLP
      1133 Penn Avenue, 5th Floor
      Pittsburgh, PA 15222
      Tel: (412) 322-9243
      Email: glynch@carlsonlynch.com
             kiverson@carlsonlynch.com

             - and -

      Karen Hanson Riebel, Esq.
      Katie M. Baxter-Kauf, Esq.
      LOCKRIDGE GRINDAL NAUEN P.L.L.P.
      100 Washington Ave. South, Suite 2200
      Minneapolis, MN 55401
      Email: khriebel@locklaw.com
             kmbaxter-kauf@locklaw.com

             - and -

      Arthur M. Murray, Esq.
      Caroline W. Thomas, Esq.
      MURRAY LAW FIRM
      650 Poydras Street, Suite 2150
      New Orleans, LA 70130
      Telephone: (504) 525-8100
      Facsimile: (504) 584-5249
      Email: amurray@murray-lawfirm.com
             cThomas@murray-lawfirm.com

BLUE BUFFALO: Court Junks "Zakinov" FAC as Barred by Res Judicata
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff's
first amended complaint in the case captioned VLADI ZAKINOV,
Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. BLUE BUFFALO PET PRODUCTS, INC., a Delaware
corporation, Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-01301-AJB-WVG (S.D. Cal.).

The Defendant manufactures, markets, distributes, labels, and
sells Blue Wilderness Chicken Recipe for Small Breed Adult Dogs,
Blue Freedom Grain-Free Chicken Recipe for Small Breed Adult
Dogs, and Blue Basics Grain-Free Turkey & Potato Recipe for Adult
Dogs (Contaminated Dog Foods).

The Plaintiff asserts that the Defendant intentionally
misrepresented and omitted any mention of lead in its packaging
and labels, that the Defendant knew or should have reasonably
expected that the presence of lead in its dog foods was something
an average consumer would consider when picking out food for
their dogs, and that a reasonable consumer would be misled by the
advertisements.

The In re Blue Buffalo Settlement

On June 16, 2016, the Defendant received judicial approval of a
nationwide class action settlement resolving false advertising
claims brought against it. In connection with the settlement, it
covered any person who purchased any Blue Buffalo products from
May 7, 2008, through the Preliminary Approval Date, December 18,
2015 (Settlement Class Members).

Dismissal on the Basis of Res Judicata

The Plaintiff claims that the present lawsuit is not barred by
res judicata as it focuses on the allegations that the
Defendant's Contaminated Dog Foods contain high levels of lead
and heavy metals, a topic not touched upon in the prior action.

The Ninth Circuit, in In re, Int'l Nutronics, Inc., set forth
factors for considering whether a prior action involved the same
claim or cause of action, including: (1) whether rights or
interests established in the prior judgment would be destroyed or
impaired by prosecution of the second action; (2) whether
substantially the same evidence is presented in the two actions;
(3) whether the two suits involve infringement of the same right;
and (4) whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional
nucleus of facts.

The Court notes that the rights and interests of the Blue Buffalo
settlement would be destroyed if this action were allowed to
proceed.  The settlement agreement resolved the plaintiffs'
common legal claims, provided the plaintiffs redress, as well as
released the Defendant from any and all claims.  Thus, if the
Court were to allow the Plaintiff, a member of the Settlement
Class, to now sue the Defendant, despite the settlement's broad
release language, the Court would be unraveling the settlement
and in essence rendering all of its stipulations moot.

As to the second factor, the Court agrees with the Plaintiff that
the evidence in this case would differ from In re Blue Buffalo.
In this matter, the Plaintiff alleges that the Contaminated Dog
Foods contain a high amount of toxins, heavy metals, and lead. In
the prior matter, the plaintiffs asserted that Defendant's dog
food products contained artificial ingredients and animal by-
product when their advertising stated the opposite.

Thus, this factor weighs in favor of Plaintiff.

The third factor, infringement of the same primary right, weighs
in favor of the Defendant. Under this theory, a cause of action
is (1) a primary right possessed by the plaintiff, (2) a
corresponding primary duty devolving upon the defendant, and (3)
a harm done by the defendant which consists in a breach of such
primary right and duty.

Here, both matters involve parties who purchased the Defendant's
animal food products believing in the Defendant's advertised
promise that its food was healthy, nutritious, and good for dogs.
Thus, both actions are grounded upon the same claim false
advertising.

As to the final and most important factor, the Court concludes
that the allegations in both complaints clearly arise from the
same transactional nucleus of facts. Here, both lawsuits are
predicated on the allegedly false, deceptive, and misleading
marketing of the Defendant's animal food products, and their
content. Thus, as the Plaintiff could have conveniently brought
his claims for false advertising, breach of express warranty,
breach of implied warranty, and violations of the unfair
competition law in the In re Blue Buffalo action, both matters
arise from the same transactional nucleus of facts.

In sum, the Court finds that though the evidence in the two
actions may not be identical, the rest of the essential factors
weigh in favor of finding that In re Blue Buffalo and the present
matter both involve the same claim and/or cause of action.

A full-text copy of the District Court's March 22, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y87on9xs from Leagle.com.

Vladi Zakinov, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Brian J. Robbins --
brobbins@robbinsarroyo.com -- Robbins Arroyo LLP, Charles J.
LaDuca -- charles@cuneolaw.com -- Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca LLP, pro
hac vice, Joseph C. Bourne, Gustafson Gluek PLLC, Katherine W.
Van Dyck -- kvandyck@cuneolaw.com --  Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca LLP,
pro hac vice, Rebecca A. Peterson -- rapeterson@locklaw.com --
Lockridge Grindal Nauen P.L.L.P., Robert K. Shelquist --
rkshelquist@locklaw.com -- Lockridge Grindal Nauen P.L.L.P., pro
hac vice & Steven M. McKany -- smckany@robbinsarroyo.com --
Robbins Arroyo LLP.

Blue Buffalo Pet Products, Inc, a Delaware corporation,
Defendant, represented by Celeste Marie Brecht --
cmbrecht@venable.com -- Venable, LLP & Matthew M. Gurvitz --
mmgurvitz@Venable.com -- Venable LLP.


BMW OF NORTH: 9th Cir. Flips Dismissal of "Barakezyan" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, reversed the
judgment of the trial court dismissing the Complaint with
Prejudice in the case captioned NORIK BARAKEZYAN, as an
individual, on behalf of himself, all others similarly situated,
and the general public, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BMW OF NORTH
AMERICA, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company; DOES, 1
through 100, inclusive, Defendants-Appellees, No. 16-56094 (9th
Cir.).

Norik Barakezyan appeals the dismissal with prejudice of his
class action alleging that BMW's carbon ceramic brakes (CCBs)
were defective and thereby breached BMW's express warranty and
the implied warranty of merchantibility, and violated
California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL), California Business &
Professions Code section 17200.

Barakezyan's Third Amended Complaint (TAC) sufficiently alleges
that the CCB defect constitutes a substantial safety hazard and
thereby breaches the implied warranty of merchantibility.  Taking
the allegations as true, the CCBs, when engaged, emit an
extremely loud, long, high-pitched noise, which has, on numerous
occasions, distracted Barakezyan and other BMW drivers, as well
as nearby pedestrians.

That, along with allegations that the noise is intermittent and
manifests at different mileages, meaning that the noise has the
potential to surprise, at least plausibly pleads a safety hazard,
even if the danger is somewhat less than that caused by a
malfunctioning sunroof that opens on a highway and causes a
blizzard of papers. Barakezyan need not wait for a dangerous
situation to occur to vindicate his right to a vehicle free of
substantial safety hazards.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's March 22, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y7foym6o from Leagle.com.


BRUNELLO CUCINELLI: Fischler Says Website not Blind-accessible
--------------------------------------------------------------
Brian Fischler, Individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Brunello Cucinelli USA Retail
LLC and Brunello Cucinelli, USA, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-
01846, (E.D. N.Y., March 27, 2018), seeks preliminary and
permanent injunction, compensatory, statutory and punitive
damages and fines, prejudgment and post-judgment interest, costs
and expenses of this action together with reasonable attorneys'
and expert fees and such other and further relief under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, New York State Human Rights Law
and New York City Human Rights Law.

Brunello Cucinelli owns and operates stores throughout the United
States, locations at 683 Madison Avenue, New York, New York, 379
Bleecker Street, New York, New York and 136 Greene Street, New
York, New York. They sell, at these stores, menswear, women's
wear and accessories. It also provides a website,
www.shop.brunellocucinelli.com which allows all consumers to
access the facilities and services that it offers about its
retail stores. Fischler browsed and intended to make avail of
their services. However, the Plaintiff is legally blind and
claims that Defendant's website cannot be accessed by the
visually-impaired. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Douglas B. Lipsky, Esq.
      Christopher H. Lowe, Esq.
      LIPSKY LOWE LLP
      630 Third Avenue, Fifth Floor
      New York, NY 10017-6705
      Tel: (212) 392-4772
      Fax: (212) 444-1030
      Email: doug@lipskylowe.com
             chris@lipskylowe.com


CAPELLA UNIVERSITY: Two Former Students File Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------
Josh Verges, writing for Pioneer Press, reports that two former
students say Minneapolis-based Capella University lied about how
much time and money it would take to complete an advanced degree.

Kansas resident Carolyn Wright and Debbra Kennedy of Tennessee
filed a class-action lawsuit on April 20 in U.S. District Court
in Minnesota.

Ms. Wright, who began pursuing a doctor of nursing practice in
spring 2014, said she was told it would take two years and cost
about $35,000.  But Capella's website later said the program
takes 30 months, the complaint alleges, and that figure was then
revised to 39 months.

Ms. Wright said she earned top grades and paid $53,000 before the
online school assigned her a new instructor who said she'd "have
to start all over" on her project.  She tried to fight it but
finally left for another school.

Ms. Kennedy started school in February 2014 in a doctorate of
education capstone program advertised to take three years.  The
complaint alleges Capella later said the program actually takes
45 months but that fewer than 10 students managed to finish in
that time.

Ms. Kennedy earned high grades but made little progress in her
dissertation.  With debt piling up after more than $100,000 in
tuition payments, she dropped out of the program, one-fifth of
the way toward her degree.

THE SCHOOL RESPONDS
Capella responded to the complaint with a written statement:

"We are proud of our programs and dedicated to our learners. This
suit is without merit," spokesman Mike Buttry said.

'ENDLESS ROUTINE OF HURDLES'
The complaint says the students suffered from "decreasing
resources, faculty turnover, disorganization and a lack of
oversight . . . Capella created an endless routine of hurdles and
benefitted from additional tuition payments."

And because the students took classes online, they couldn't see
that other students were having the same problems.

The complaint accuses Capella of spending heavily on marketing to
grow enrollment while neglecting education quality.

In 2009, it says, Capella spent $1,650 per student on instruction
and $4,538 per student on marketing; the school's profit was
$2,912 per student.

Missouri-based attorney Paul Lesko is behind the complaint.  He's
also suing another Minneapolis-based for-profit college, Walden
University, with similar allegations.

Capella had 37,569 students in fall 2016, three-fourths of whom
were graduate students.

The Minnesota Office of Higher Education logged 71 complaints
from Capella students from 2013-16.  All other schools generated
146 complaints. [GN]


CARTER-YOUNG INC: "Angelakopoulos" Suit Alleges FDCPA Violation
---------------------------------------------------------------
Evangelia Angelakopoulos, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Carter-Young, Inc., Case No. 9:18-
cv-80403 (S.D. Fla., March 29, 2018), seeks damages and temporary
and permanent injunctive relief pursuant to the Federal Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

The Plaintiff is a resident of Palm Beach County, Florida. The
Plaintiff is a consumer and is obligated or allegedly obligated
to pay a consumer debt.

The Defendant is a debt collector. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      John J.R. Skrandel, Esq.
      JEROME F. SKRANDEL, PL
      300 Prosperity Farms Road, Suite D
      North Palm Beach, FL 33408-5212
      Tel: (561) 863-1605
      Fax: (561) 863-1606
      E-mail: JFSPA@MSN.COM


CENTRAL CARILLON: Denial of Defendant Class Upheld
--------------------------------------------------
In the case, Central Carillon Beach Condominium Association,
Inc., et al., Petitioners, v. Pedro J. Garcia, etc., et al.,
Respondents, Case Nos. 3D17-1198, 3D17-1197 (Fla. Dist. App.),
Judge Vance E. Salter of the District Court of Appeal of Florida
for the Third District affirmed the orders denying the
Associations' motions for certification of a class of the
Defendant unit owners in their respective associations.

Central Carillon Beach Condominium is condominium with some 140
residential units and various common elements.  It is operated
and maintained by petitioner/appellant Central Carillon Beach
Condominium Association.  Similarly, 2201 Collins Avenue
Condominium has some 180 residential units and various common
elements, all operated and maintained by petitioner/appellant
2201 Collins Avenue Condominium Association.

For tax year 2015, each of the Associations filed, with the
approval of its board of directors, a single joint petition with
the Miami-Dade County Value Adjustment Board ("VAB") challenging
the  Miami-Dade County, Florida ("Appraiser")'s proposed
assessments for all of the units within the applicable
condominium building.  Such a joint petition by an association on
behalf of the unit owners is expressly authorized by a provision
within the ad valorem tax statutes, though it is subject to (1) a
determination by the property appraiser that the units are
substantially similar with respect to location, proximity to
amenities, number of rooms, living area, and condition; and (2)
notice by the association to each unit owner of a 20-day right to
opt out of inclusion in the joint petition.  These conditions
were satisfied in the present case, and the joint petitions were
heard administratively and ruled upon by the VAB.

Each Association obtained, for its respective unit owners,
substantial reductions in assessed value in the VAB decision --
approximately 20% in the case of Central Carillon, and
approximately 40% in the case of 2201 Collins Avenue.  As further
permitted by the ad valorem statutes, the Appraiser appealed
those VAB determinations to the circuit court in separate
lawsuits for each condominium.  Each lawsuit, however, named each
of the individual unit owners as a defendant; it did not sue the
applicable Association "on behalf of" all of the unit owners.

In response, each Association moved to dismiss the lawsuit and to
strike the unit owners as the Defendants.  Each Association
sought joint representation of all unit owners in its
condominium, as a Defendants' class action (joint, representative
defense, versus the joint, representative petition protesting the
assessments, as had been the case before the VAB).  The Appraiser
opposed the motions to dismiss and moved to default all of the
condominium unit owners for failing to file an individual
responsive pleading.

These motions were further briefed by the counsel and then heard
on the same day by the trial court.  The trial court entered
separate, but (appropriately) nearly identical orders in each
case, denying each Association's motion to dismiss and also
denying its motion for certification of the unit owners as a
defense class with the Association as the owners' class
representative.  These appeals followed.

Judge Salter explains that allowing an Association to represent
the interests of its hundred-plus unit owners in the Appraiser's
appeal from the VAB reductions seems eminently logical.  If a
joint petition can be pursued before the VAB, a joint defense
shouldn't be allowed in the Appraiser's appeal from the VAB's
determinations because of "Parties to a tax suit"  found in the
plain language of section 194.181.

The Judge explains that subparagraph (2) of that statute states
that the "taxpayer" will be the party defendant in an action
brought by the county property appraiser to appeal a decision of
the VAB.5 "Taxpayer" is defined in section 192.001(13) to mean
the person or other legal entity in whose name property is
assessed, including an agent of a timeshare period titleholder.
The individual condominium units at issue in the case, together
with each unit's undivided interest in the common elements, are
assessed in the name of the individual owners -- not their
Association.

In addition, the Judge notes that the condominium law, section
718.111(3), and in Rule 1.221, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure,
only addresses ad valorem taxes in one phrase: protesting ad
valorem taxes on commonly used facilities and on units.  The
Associations protested the ad valorem taxes administratively on
behalf of all units, but the lawsuits brought by the Appraiser
against the unit owners are not "protests" -- they are judicial
review proceedings in which the unit owners are the Defendants.
The specific cases in which an association may defend on behalf
of all unit owners are actions in eminent domain.

Finally, the Judge finds that the numerous cases cited by the
Associations approving collective or class representation of
condominium unit owners by their condominium association do not
involve, as the present cases do, a separate statute specifying
that each individual unit owner must be a party defendant.  The
Court's holding in these cases regarding property tax appeals
brought by a county property tax appraiser against condominium
unit owners does not dilute or qualify the continued amenability
of other types of lawsuits to the common representation of unit
owners by their association as permitted by section 718.111(3)
and Rule 1.221.

Although Judge Salter appreciates the Associations' arguments
that judicial efficiency would be better served by allowing the
Associations to represent the 140 (Central Carillon) or 180 (2201
Collins Avenue) unit owners as a defense class in the lawsuits
brought by the Appraiser, those arguments must be presented to
the Legislature rather than the courts if they are to be
effectual.  Accordingly, he affirmed the orders denying class
certification are affirmed.  The order is not final until
disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 21, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/m81bsV from Leagle.com.

Rennert Vogel Mandler & Rodriguez, P.A., and Thomas S. Ward --
tward@rvmrlaw.com -- and Jason R. Block -- jblock@rvmrlaw.com --
for petitioners.

Abigail Price-Williams, Miami-Dade County Attorney, and Jorge
Martinez-Esteve and Daija Page Lifshitz, Assistant County
Attorneys, for respondent Pedro J. Garcia.


CERES, CA: Court Needs Support of Settlement in "Amador"
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order Requiring Supplemental Submission in
Support of Stipulation and Proposed Order for Approval of
Settlement Agreement and Dismissal with Prejudice in the case
captioned JULIO AMADOR, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF CERES,
Defendants, No. 1:17-cv-00552-DAD-MJS (E.D. Cal.).

Thirty-four plaintiffs bring this action against defendant City
of Ceres with allegations that they were denied proper
compensation in violation of the Fair Labor standards Act (FLSA).

Settlement of claims under the FLSA requires court approval. The
FLSA establishes federal minimum-wage, maximum-hour, and overtime
guarantees that cannot be modified by contract. Because an
employee cannot waive claims under the FLSA, they may not be
settled without supervision of either the Secretary of Labor or a
district court.

To determine whether the proposed FLSA settlement is fair,
adequate, and reasonable, courts in this circuit have balanced
factors such as: the strength of the plaintiffs' case; the risk,
expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation;
the risk of maintaining class action status throughout the trial;
the amount offered in settlement; the extent of discovery
completed and the stage of the proceedings; the experience and
views of counsel; the presence of a governmental participant; and
the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.
Here, the parties have submitted a stipulation and proposed order
for court approval of a settlement along with the request to
dismiss the action with prejudice.

Accordingly, the parties are directed to supplement their
stipulation for approval and dismissal by way of declaration(s),
briefing or both, addressing why the proposed settlement is a
fair and reasonable resolution of a bona fide dispute, including
with respect to the attorneys' fees to be awarded.

A full-text copy of the District Court's March 22, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y8z39gpk from Leagle.com.

Julio Amador, Ross Bays, Steve Carvalho, Kari Carvalho, Jason
Coley, James Dayton, Eric Gallegos, Arthur Hively, Coey Henson,
Jeffrey Travis Hudson, Dirk Nieuwenthuis, Frederico Ortiz, Jr,
Brian Petersen, Hector Pulido, Kiashira Ruiz, Charles Rushing,
Jesus Salinas, Krandall Vandagriff, Darren Venn, Jonathan Vera,
Danny Vierra, Michael Vierra, Trinidad Viramontes, Greg Yotsuya,
Mark Anderson, Oyre Echols, Derrick Faria, Tammie Johnson, Devin
Ladd, Justin Vosbein, Shawnna Yotsuya, Lorenzo Beltran, Matthew
Berlier & Keith Griebel, Plaintiffs, represented by Gary G.
Goyette -- goyetteg@goyette-assoc.com -- Goyette & Associates,
Inc.

City of Ceres, Defendant, represented by Jesse Jeremy Maddox -
jmaddox@lcwlegal.com -- Liebert Cassidy Whitmore & Michael David
Youril -- mblacher@lcwlegal.com -- Liebert Cassidy Whitmore.


CHIPOTLE MEXICAN: Court Dismisses "Ong" Securities Fraud Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice the
Second Amended Complaint in the case captioned SUSIE ONG,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, et
al., Plaintiffs, v. CHIPOTLE MEXICAN GRILL, INC., M. STEVEN ELLS,
MONTGOMERY F. MORAN, and JOHN R. HARTUNG, Defendants, No. 16 Civ.
141 (KPF)(S.D.N.Y.).

The Plaintiffs allege, and the Defendants do not dispute, that
after a rash of food-borne illness outbreaks in late 2014 and
2015, some of which were linked to Chipotle, the value of the
Company's stock steeply declined. But while others attribute
these losses to the adverse publicity surrounding the outbreaks,
the Plaintiffs instead claim that they are due, in part or in
whole, to the Company's failure to disclose certain granular
details and attendant risks of its produce-processing and food-
safety procedures.

The Plaintiffs have brought securities fraud claims under Section
10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
Section 78j(b) and 78t(a), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder,
17 C.F.R. Section 240.10b-5.

Chipotle's Food-Safety Practices

Before the Class Period, Chipotle received its produce from a
central commissary where it was processed, prepared and tested at
least twice for pathogens before being delivered. After Chipotle
was involved in a number of food-borne illness outbreaks, the
Company disclosed that it had begun high-resolution testing of
produce as part of its remediation plan. High-resolution testing
is a form of end product testing that uses a larger number of
samples based on the timing of manufacturing or the lot size, and
it can only take place at commissaries or food factories.

Food-Borne Illness Outbreaks

In total, these outbreaks in the operative complaint include (i)
five Salmonella outbreaks; (ii) five E. Coli outbreaks; and (iii)
three Norovirus outbreaks. All of the outbreaks and the degree,
if any, to which they were connected by public health officials
to Chipotle are discussed individually in the remainder of this
section.

The December 2014 Multistate Salmonella Outbreak

The CDC found a link to four Chipotle customers, with at least
one coming from Wisconsin and the others coming from at least one
or more of the following states: Massachusetts, New Jersey, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and
Washington.

The February 2015 Multistate Salmonella Outbreak

The CDC found a link to eight Chipotle customers: four from a
combination of New York, Wisconsin and Ohio, two from Texas, and
two from Massachusetts.

The March 2015 Multistate E. Coli Outbreak

The  CDC found a link to five or six Chipotle customers from a
combination of California, Connecticut and Nevada.

Chipotle's Remedial Measures and the Market's Response

In relation to the October 2015 multistate E. coli outbreak,
Chipotle issued a press release on November 3, 2015, stating that
the Company was undertaking immediate steps to assist
investigators, as well as retaining two preeminent food safety
consulting firms to help the Company assess and improve upon its
food-safety standards. On December 4, 2015, Chipotle issued
another press release detailing the recommendations the Company
had received from its food-safety consultants, including high-
resolution testing of all fresh produce before it is shipped to
restaurants, and enhanced internal training to ensure that all
employees thoroughly understand the Company's high standards for
food safety and food handling. Also on December 4, 2015, Chipotle
issued a Form 8-K detailing the "adverse impact" of the October
2015 multistate E. coli outbreak on the Company's financial and
operating results in the fourth quarter of 2015.

The Alleged Material Misrepresentations or Omissions

The Commissary Switch Omissions

The first statement that the Plaintiffs claim is false and
misleading, contained in Chipotle's 2014 Form 10-K, reads as
follows: "Our food is prepared from scratch, with the majority
prepared in our restaurants while some is prepared with the same
fresh ingredients in larger batches in commissaries." The 2014
Form 10-K also states, "We may be at a higher risk for food-borne
illness outbreaks than some competitors due to our use of fresh
produce and meats rather than frozen, and our reliance on
employees cooking with traditional methods rather than
automation."  The Plaintiffs also allege that the following
statement was materially false and misleading: "There have been
no material changes in our risk factors since our annual report
on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2014."

The Quality Assurance Omissions

Second, the Plaintiffs allege that the following statement,
contained in Chipotle's 2014 Form 10-K, under the heading Quality
Assurance and Food Safety is materially false or misleading
the Plaintiffs also contend the Defendants had a duty to disclose
that Chipotle's late-2014 transition away from commissary produce
preparation greatly increased the risk of food-borne illness
being contracted from its produce. In addition, the Plaintiffs
tether this theory to the alleged misstatements in the Company's
Forms 10-Q.

The Traceability Omissions

Third, the Plaintiffs claim that a statement contained in
Chipotle's 2014 Form 10-K regarding the Company's use of a
variety of produce types and produce suppliers, including local
or organic produce" and farmers markets, was materially false or
misleading.
The Plaintiffs claim that the following statements in Chipotle's
November 3 and 10, 2015 press releases, respectively, were
materially false and misleading: no cause for the October 2015
multistate E. coli outbreak] has yet been identified by
investigating health officials and no cause has been established
between this issue, the October 2015 multistate E. coli outbreak
and any ingredient.

The Guidance Misstatements and Omissions

Fourth, the Plaintiffs claim that the following statements,
contained in both Chipotle press releases announcing financial
results for the first and second fiscal quarters of 2015 and
Chipotle's Forms 8-K filed April 21, 2015, and July 21, 2015,
were materially false and misleading.

The Plaintiffs allege that statements contained in both a
Chipotle press release announcing the Company's financial results
for the third fiscal quarter in 2015 and the Company's October
20, 2015 Form 8-K, were materially false and misleading. Those
statements included an estimated sales performance for 2015
identical to those in the Forms 8-K, as well as an expectation
for 2016 of low-single digit comparable restaurant sales
increases.

The Item 303 and Item 305 Omissions

Fifth, the Plaintiffs claim Chipotle's 2014 Form 10-K failed to
disclose sufficiently a discussion of the most significant
factors that make the securities speculative or risky, and that
the 10-Q Forms failed to provide any material changes from risk
factors as previously disclosed' in Chipotle's 2014 Form 10-K.

The November 2015 Press Release Misstatement

The Plaintiffs contend that a November 10, 2015 Chipotle press
release was materially false and misleading. Plaintiffs contend
that these statements were materially false and misleading when
made because they misrepresented that investigations into the
outbreak remained open and ongoing, that there remained an
ongoing public health risk and/or threat from this outbreak and
the statements omitted that Chipotle lacked a reasonable basis to
make representations on behalf of public health officials.
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Is Granted in Full

Securities Fraud Under Section 10(b), Rule 10b-5, and Section
20(a)

To prevail on a Section 10(b) or a Rule 10b-5 claim, a plaintiff
must prove [i] a material misrepresentation or omission by the
defendant; [ii] scienter; [iii] a connection between the
misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a
security; [iv] reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission;
[v] economic loss; and [vi] loss causation.

Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act provides that every person who,
directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under the
Exchange Act and its implementing regulations] shall also be
liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such
controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is
liable. A claim under Section 20(a) is thus dependent on the
validity of an underlying securities violation. Indeed, to
establish control-person liability, a plaintiff must show [i] a
primary violation by the controlled person; [ii] control of the
primary violator by the defendant"; and [iii] that the
controlling person was, in some meaningful sense, a culpable
participant in the controlled person's fraud.

Plaintiffs' Section 10(b) Claims

Commissary Switch Omissions

The Plaintiffs argue that the SAC plainly alleges that Chipotle
executives had contemporaneous knowledge of customer sicknesses,
the paragraphs of the SAC to which they cite do not sufficiently
allege, with the precision required by Rule 9 and the PSLRA, that
any Chipotle employee was aware of, or recklessly disregarded,
the illnesses associated with the newly-alleged outbreaks.
Instead, they merely discuss procedures by which customers and
officials could have reported illnesses.

Even here, the SAC does not allege that any customers or
regulators actually utilized those reporting procedures for the
newly-alleged outbreaks. The Defendants thus cannot be said to
have recklessly disregarded information to which they never had
access. In sum, the Court's previous holding still stands: The
Company's decision to transition to in-store produce production
did not change Chipotle's disclosed risk factors in a material
way. The Plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts to indicate
that Defendants should have believed otherwise.

Nor do the Plaintiffs' perfunctory allegations that the
Individual Defendants had the motive and opportunity to commit
fraud suffice to allege scienter. The parties do not dispute that
the Individual Defendants, as corporate executives, had the
opportunity to commit fraud.

The Plaintiffs' claims premised on these are therefore dismissed.

Quality Assurance Omissions

The alleged misstatements at issue are either not demonstrably
false or inactionable puffery. Portions of the alleged
misstatement provide that Chipotle's quality assurance department
establishes and monitors the Company's quality and food safety
programs, and that the Company's "training and risk management
departments develop and implement operating standards for food
quality, preparation, cleanliness and safety."

But these statements are not demonstrably false: The SAC does not
allege that Chipotle failed to undertake such endeavors, but
merely that Chipotle failed to do so adequately or that Chipotle
failed to live up to its own food safety standards or that
Chipotle's food-safety auditing system was inherently deficient.
These allegations do not conflict with the Defendants' statements
regarding the food-safety programs and procedures that Chipotle
had in place, but merely quibble with Chipotle's execution of
those programs and procedures.

The Plaintiffs' claims premised on Defendants' statements
regarding its quality-assurance procedures are dismissed.

Traceability Omissions

The Plaintiffs also claim that press release statements from
November 2015, issued shortly after the October 2015 E. coli
outbreak, and stating that a cause for the outbreak had not yet
been identified, were misleading for failing to disclose that
Chipotle's inability to trace ingredients was the reason that (i)
a cause had not and would not be identified and (ii) any
investigation into the issue would be delayed. But the cited
statements did not give rise to such a duty to disclose for much
the same reason that the Form 10-K did not trigger such a duty:
the Defendants did not purport to speak and no reasonable
investor would have understood them to speak to the intricacies
of investigating an outbreak, but only to the simple fact
(undisputed by the Plaintiffs) that no cause for the outbreak had
yet been discovered.

The Plaintiffs' claims premised on Chipotle's failure to disclose
its inability to trace ingredients back to their source are
therefore dismissed.

Item 303 and Item 305 Omissions

These claims fail for substantially the same reasons as the
claims above. Specifically, the 2014 Form 10-K, and by
incorporation the April 2015 Form 10-Q and July 2015 Form 10-Q,
provided robust risk disclosures that satisfied the requisites of
Items 303 and 503. As the Court previously held, Chipotle
provided disclosures regarding its risks that were company-
specific and related to the direct risks it uniquely faced; there
can be no argument that these were boilerplate statements
insufficient to satisfy the Company's obligations under Items 303
or 503.

And as to the Item 503 claim involving the October 2015 Form 10-
Q, it bears noting that of the eight outbreaks the Plaintiffs
allege the Defendants were under a duty to disclose, four were
never linked to a certain ingredient or supplier. The Company's
disclosure that its restaurants have been associated with
customer illness on a small number of occasions, as of October
2015, thus satisfied its duty of disclosure.

The Plaintiffs' claims based on Items 303 and 503 are therefore
dismissed.

The Guidance Misstatements and Omissions

And because these claims fail for lack of scienter, they are also
protected by the PSLRA's safe harbor for forward-looking
statements. Where an alleged misstatement is contained in a
forward-looking statement, the safe harbor shields defendants
from liability in three circumstances: A defendant is not liable
if the forward-looking statement is identified and accompanied by
meaningful cautionary language or is immaterial or the plaintiff
fails to prove that it was made with actual knowledge that it was
false or misleading. Forward-looking statements include a
statement containing a projection of income earnings per share,
or other financial items' and 'a statement of future economic
performance, including any such statement contained in a
discussion of analysis of financial condition by the management.

The safe harbor is limited, however, to forward-looking
statements; it does not apply to material omissions or
misstatements of historical fact.

The Plaintiffs' claims premised on Chipotle's financial guidance
are therefore dismissed.

November 2015 Press Release Misstatement

The Plaintiffs' allegations regarding statements made by the
Defendants and the CDC after November 10, 2015, do not establish
that Defendants knew or recklessly disregarded that any
statements made on that date may have been false. Indeed, several
of the CDC statements on which the Plaintiffs base this argument
were only published internally, and at least one of them dealt
with the investigation of an entirely different outbreak. Even if
these documents indicate that the investigation was ongoing as of
November 10, 2015, the SAC does not allege that the Defendants
were aware of them.

The Plaintiffs' claims based on Chipotle's November 10, 2015
press release are therefore dismissed. Further, because all of
the Plaintiffs' claims inadequately plead either a material
misstatement or omission, or facts giving rise to a strong
inference of scienter, the Court need not reach the issue of loss
causation.

Section 20(a) Claims

The Plaintiffs' claims under Section 10 and Rule 10b-5 fail. The
Plaintiffs' Sec 20(a) claim therefore fails, as a control person
may not be liable without a primary securities violation.

The Court has reviewed the many new allegations added by
Plaintiffs to the SAC, and concludes that they do not remedy the
fundamental problems outlined in Chipotle I. While numerous, the
new allegations fail because, broadly speaking, they are (i)
conclusory assertions, including assertions to materials the
Court may not properly consider, or (ii) allegations that add new
facts but exhibit the same pleading deficiencies. At its core,
the SAC faults the Defendants for failing to disclose duties they
did not assume; for failing to be prescient; and for presenting
accurate, but general, discussions of material risks rather than
attempting the impossible task of outlining the myriad possible
outcomes. The food-borne illness outbreaks were unfortunate, but
whatever else they might reveal about Chipotle, they do not on
this record reveal securities fraud.

Given this, the Court granted in part the Defendants' motion to
strike and granted with prejudice the Defendants' motion to
dismiss. Pursuant to the PSLRA, the Court finds that the parties
and counsel in this matter have complied with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11(b): Neither the claims nor defenses were
harassing or frivolous; all factual contentions had evidentiary
support or were reasonably based on belief or a lack of
information; and the Defendants did not affirmatively allege
improper conduct nor move for sanctions.

A full-text copy of the District Court's March 22, 2018 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybvh3v24 from
Leagle.com.

Metzler Investment GmbH, Lead Plaintiff, represented by David Avi
Rosenfeld -- drosenfeld@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman &
Dowd LLP, William H. Narwold -- bnarwold@motleyrice.com -- Motley
Rice LLC, Christopher F. Moriarty -- cmoriarty@motleyrice.com --
Motley Rice LLC, James M. Hughes -- jhughes@motleyrice.com --
Motley Rice LLC & Michael Gerard Capeci -- mcapeci@rgrdlaw.com --
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.

Construction Laborers Pension Trust of Greater St. Louis, Lead
Plaintiff, represented by David Avi Rosenfeld, Robbins Geller
Rudman & Dowd LLP & Michael Gerard Capeci, Robbins Geller Rudman
& Dowd LLP.

Susie Ong, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Joseph Alexander Hood, II,
Pomerantz LLP & Jeremy Alan Lieberman, Pomerantz LLP.

Uri Skorski, Movant, represented by Phillip C. Kim, The Rosen Law
Firm P.A.

PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS' PENSION AND RETIREMENT FUND OF CHICAGO &
Labourers' Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada, Movants,
represented by Robert Mark Roseman, Spector, Roseman & Kodroff
Willis, P.C.

The Boston Retirement System & Doug V. Fougnies, Movants,
represented by Jeremy Alan Lieberman, Pomerantz LLP.

Arkansas Teacher Retirement System, Movant, represented by Gerald
H. Silk, Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP.

Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., M. Steven Ells, Montgomery F. Moran
& John R. Hartung, Defendants, represented by Andrew Brian Clubok
-- andrew.clubok@lw.com --  Latham & Watkins LLP, Mark B.
Collier, Messner Reeves LLP, 1430 Wynkoop Street, Suite 300.
Denver, CO 80202, Nathaniel Jacob Kritzer --
nathaniel.kritzer@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Richard
William Nicholson, Jr.  -- richard.nicholson@kirkland.com --
Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Robert Anthony Gretch --
robert.gretch@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis LLP & Susan
Elisabeth Engel -- Susan.Engel@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP.


CLEVELAND AVE: Court Grants Bid for Sanctions in "Hogan"
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio, Eastern Division, granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions
in the case captioned JESSICA HOGAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
CLEVELAND AVE RESTAURANT INC., d/b/a SIRENS, et al., Defendants,
Case No. 2:15-CV-2883 (S.D. Ohio).

This matter comes before the Court on the Magistrate Judge's
Report and Recommendation, which recommended that the Court grant
in part and deny in part Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions.

This is a wage and hour lawsuit brought on behalf of a group of
bartenders and exotic dancers against a Columbus-area adult
entertainment club, Defendant Cleveland Ave Restaurant, Inc.,
known as Sirens, and individuals associated with Sirens,
including Defendants F. Sharrak, M. Sharrak, Sullivan, and
Alkammo (Sirens Defendants).

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants have engaged in
unlawful employment practices, including charging the Plaintiff
fees for exotic dances for customers, charging the Plaintiff 10%
on customer tips left on credit cards, and requiring the
Plaintiff to pay tips to non-tipped employees.  The Plaintiff
alleges that the Defendants' behavior violates the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA), Article II Section 34(a) of the Ohio
Constitution, and Section 4113.15 of the Ohio Revised Code.

The Plaintiff filed the Motion for Sanctions, seeking to impose a
variety of sanctions on the Defendants for their destruction of
the Lease Agreements and Bubblesheets and Penthouse Sheets. The
Plaintiff contends the destruction of these documents amounts to
both spoliation and a disregard of the Court's order to produce
documents related to exotic dancers.

The Court will grant the seventh sanction requested in the
Plaintiff's Motion and schedule a hearing for the Defendants and
their counsel to show cause as to why they are not in contempt of
this Court's June 28, 2016 Order.  The parties are therefore
ordered to appear before the Honorable Algenon L. Marbley and the
Defendant must show cause as to (1) why they should not be
further sanctioned; and (2) why this Court should not proceed
with a criminal contempt prosecution, pursuant to its authority
under 18 U.S.C. Section 401, for spoliation of evidence and the
Defendants' failure to follow the Court's June 27, 2016 Order.

After the show cause hearing takes place, the Court will
determine whether any further sanctions are warranted, depending
on whether the Defendants' actions were due to willfulness, bad
faith, or any fault of their own. Consistent with the Magistrate
Judge's Order awarding fees and costs, the Sirens Defendants will
bear the costs related to the hearing.

Accordingly, the Court adopts the recommendation in so far as it
awards attorney's fees and costs to Plaintiff. The Court rejects
the recommendation in so far as it conclusively limits sanctions
to only fees and costs.

The Plaintiff's Motion for Sanction is therefore granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's March 22, 2018 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9z4n4tc from
Leagle.com.

Jessica Hogan, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Biller,
Markovits, Stock & DeMarco, LLC, Andrew P. Kimble, Markovits,
Stock & DeMarco, LLC, Jennifer J. Morales, Markovits, Stock &
DeMarco, LLC, Paul M. De Marco, Markovits, Stock & DeMarco, LLC,
4200 Regent Street Suite 200. Columbus, OH 43219.& Rachel S.
Bloomekatz -- rachel@guptawessler.com -- Gupta Wessler PLLC.

Cleveland Ave Restaurant, Inc., doing business as, Chad Sullivan,
Francis Sharrak, Michael Sharrak, Dominick Alkammo & Jay Nelson,
Defendants, represented by Edward W. Hastie, III, Hastie Law
Office LLC, 1258 Grandview Ave. Suite B, Columbus, OH 43212


CLOUD INTERMEDIATE: English Sues for Breach of Fiduciary Duties
---------------------------------------------------------------
Aron English and Richard Peppe, individually and on behalf of all
similarly situated individuals v. Charles K. Narang, Paul A.
Dillahay, James P. Allen, Paul V. Lombardi, Cindy E. Moran,
Austin J. Yerks, Daniel R. Young, Cloud Intermediate Holdings,
LLC, Cloud Merger Sub, Inc., and H.I.G. Capital, LLC, Case No.
2018-0221 (Del. Ch., March 28, 2018), is brought against the
Defendants for breach of fiduciary duties.

The Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Rules
of the Court of Chancery, on behalf of themselves and all persons
who owned shares of NCI common stock at any point in time from
July 3, 2017 through August 15, 2017, excluding Defendants and
their affiliates.

The Plaintiffs were owners of NCI common stock at all relevant
times.

The Defendant Narang founded NCI's predecessor and wholly owned
subsidiary, NCI Information Systems, Inc., in 1989. Narang served
as the Chairman of the Board of NCI, and he also served as NCI's
CEO from the Company's beginning until October 1, 2015.

The Individual Defendants are members of the board of NCI.

The Defendant H.I.G. is a global private equity investment firm
with $24 billion of equity capital under management. H.I.G. is a
Delaware limited liability company and is headquartered in Miami,
FL, with its principal executive offices at 1450 Brickell Avenue,
Miami, FL.

The Defendant Parent is a Delaware limited liability company with
its headquarter is located at 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW,
Washington, DC.

The Defendant Merger Sub is a Delaware corporation and a wholly
owned subsidiary of Parent. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

      Blake A. Bennett, Esq.
      COOCH AND TAYLOR, P.A.
      The Brandywine Building
      1000 West Street,10th Floor
      Wilmington, DE 19801
      Tel: (302) 984-3800

          - and -

      W. Scott Holleman, Esq.
      Garam Choe, Esq.
      JOHNSON FISTEL, LLP
      99 Madison Avenue, 5th Floor
      New York, NY 10016
      Tel: (212) 602-1592


COMMON GROUND: Insurers' Class Action Over CSRs Can Proceed
-----------------------------------------------------------
Marlene Satter, writing for Benefits Pro, reports that score one
for the insurers: they can now present a united front in their
suit of the federal government over the termination of cost-
sharing reduction payments.

Modern Healthcare reports that Judge Margaret Sweeney of the U.S.
Court of Federal Claims has granted Wisconsin-based Common Ground
Healthcare Cooperative's request for class-action status.

The federal government had challenged the request, arguing that
insurers shouldn't get class-action status because their alleged
damages would vary; some insurers forestalled potential damage by
the cutoff of CSRs by boosting premiums to compensate for the
lost subsidies.  That in turn made the government have to fork
over higher premium tax credits.

But the judge wasn't having it, pointing out that no statute bars
insurers from raising premiums to offset the loss of CSRs.  She
also highlighted another case, the report says, in which the
court concluded that the government ending up with higher premium
tax credits to consumers doesn't reduce or eliminate its
liability for making CSR payments.

Other insurers suing the government over CSRs include South
Dakota-based Sanford Health Plan, Montana Health Co-op and Maine
Community Health Options.

While the government will probably appeal the class action
status, since it could be on the hook for billions in CSRs if it
loses in court, the move is a win for insurers, at least for now.
After the Trump administration ended CSRs in October of 2017,
many of them had tacked on premium increases to their 2018 silver
plan premiums on the Affordable Care Act exchanges to compensate
for those lost CSRs.

That action resulted in enough of an increase in the premium tax
credits available to consumers with incomes up to 400 percent of
the federal poverty level so that most exchange plan members
never got stuck with the 2018 premium hikes. [GN]


CREDIT ONE: 7th Cir. Flips Arbitration Order in TCPA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, reversed the
District Court's order granting Defendant's Motion to Compel
Arbitration in the case captioned  A.D., a minor, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-
Appellant, v. CREDIT ONE BANK, N.A., Defendant-Appellee, No. 17-
1486 (7th Cir.).

The district court granted Credit One's motion to compel
arbitration but certified for interlocutory appeal the question
whether A.D. is bound by the cardholder agreement. The Court
granted A.D.'s request for permission to appeal.

A.D., by and through her mother, Judith Serrano, brought this
putative class action under the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act. She seeks compensation for telephone calls placed by Credit
One Bank, N.A. (Credit One) to her telephone number in an effort
to collect a debt that she did not owe. After discovery, Credit
One moved to compel arbitration and to defeat A.D.'s motion for
class certification based on a cardholder agreement between
Credit One and Ms. Serrano.

Credit One submits that A.D. is bound by the cardholder agreement
as an Authorized User. The cardholder agreement provides a
mechanism for cardholders to designate other individuals as
Authorized Users of their accounts.

The district court held that because Ms. Serrano told A.D. to use
the credit card to pick up the smoothies, Ms. Serrano had made
her an authorized user of the account. The court seemingly relied
on the language from the cardholder agreement that if you allow
someone to use your Account, that person will be an Authorized
User.

The Seventh Circuit finds that neither the contract language read
as a whole nor the governing law supports these arguments. Even
if it was to accept, for the sake of argument, that the contract
creates multiple categories of Authorized Users (or authorized
users, as the arbitration clause reads), and even if someone can
become one kind of authorized user just by using the credit card,
Credit One's position cannot surmount two major stumbling blocks.

First, it is a fundamental principle of arbitration law that a
party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute
which he has not agreed so to submit.  A.D. simply did not
consent to arbitrate with Credit One.  More fundamentally, A.D.
did not have legal capacity to enter into a contractual
relationship with Credit One.  A.D. was a minor at the time of
the smoothie transaction.  Under applicable state law, minors
lack capacity to enter into contracts and can disaffirm their
obligations under contracts formed before they reach the age of
eighteen. Moreover, A.D. certainly engaged in an act of
disaffirmation by filing this lawsuit and asserting her status as
a minor.

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that A.D. formed any kind of
contractual relationship with Credit One before she reached the
age of majority, she has disaffirmed any obligation under that
contractual relationship that she might have had Credit One also
argues that A.D. has waived any argument that she does not
qualify as an Authorized User under the terms of the agreement or
that, as a minor, she has a right to disaffirm the contract.

Credit One only obliquely made such an argument at the district
court through the conclusory statement in its motion to compel
arbitration that because Ms. Serrano permitted Plaintiff A.D. to
use the card on Plaintiff's behalf. Plaintiff became an
'Authorized User.' Credit One cannot rely on waiver when it was
Credit One's burden to show that A.D. had become an Authorized
User under the cardholder agreement and was therefore subject to
the arbitration clause.

A full-text copy of the Seventh Circuit's March 22, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8xdpd26 from Leagle.com.

Noah A. Levine -- noah.levine@wilmerhale.com -- for Defendant-
Appellee.

Charles R. Messer -- messerc@cmtlaw.com -- for Defendant-
Appellee.
Mark Ankcorn, 11622 El Camino Real, Suite 100, San Diego, CA,
92130 for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Stephanie Simon -- stephanie.simon@wilmerhale.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Alan E. Schoenfeld  -- alan.schoenfeld@wilmerhale.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.


CR ENGLAND: UCSPA Claims Subject to Opt-Out Notice Requirement
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Utah,
Central Division, denied in part Defendants' Motion to Alter or
Amend the Class Certification Order in the case captioned CHARLES
ROBERTS, an individual, and KENNETH MCKAY, an individual, on
behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. C.R. ENGLAND, INC., a Utah corporation; OPPORTUNITY LEASING,
INC., a Utah corporation; and HORIZON TRUCK SALES AND LEASING,
LLC, a Utah Limited Liability Corporation, Defendants, Case No.
2:12-cv-00302-RJS-BCW (D. Utah).

The Plaintiffs assert claims against two affiliated trucking
companies, C.R. England, Inc., and Opportunity Leasing, Inc.  The
Plaintiffs claim the Defendants fraudulently induced thousands of
individuals to enroll in C.R. England's driver training schools,
then fed students misinformation to convince them to lease trucks
and become independent contractor lease operators.

The court certified a nationwide class of independent contractor
lease operators who meet certain qualifications, for claims of
fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and
unjust enrichment, and for claimed violations of the Utah
Consumer Sales Practices Act (UCSPA), Utah Business Opportunity
Disclosure Act (UBODA), and Utah Truth in Advertising Act
(UTIAA).

Notice Requirement

Under the UCSPA, class action claims are subject to an opt-in
notice requirement.  The Defendants argue this requirement
applies not only to the Plaintiffs' UCSPA claims, but to all of
the Plaintiffs' claims under Utah statutory and common law.

Shady Grove

A Supreme Court decision, Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A.
v. Allstate Insurance Company, provides the controlling authority
for determining whether Federal Rule 23 or the UCSPA opt-in
requirement applies in this case.  Shady Grove reiterates the
familiar two-step framework that applies when a federal rule and
a state law both seemingly govern. First, courts determine
whether the federal rule directly conflicts with the state law. A
direct conflict between a federal rule and state law exists if
the federal rule answers the question in dispute or put
differently, if it is sufficiently broad to control the issue
before the Court.

If there is a direct conflict, the federal rule applies as long
as it represents a valid exercise of Congress's rulemaking
authority under the Rules Enabling Act (REA). A federal rule runs
afoul of the REA if it abridges, enlarges, or modifies any
substantive right.

Application of Shady Grove'S Two-Step Analysis

Two other distinctions weigh in the opposite direction. First,
the New York statute was one of general application found in the
state procedural code, whereas the opt-in provision here is found
within the text of the USCPA itself. Second, the New York statute
expressly and unambiguously applied to claims brought under
federal law or the laws of other states. Justice Stevens thus
found it hard to see how the law could be understood as a rule
that, though procedural in form, serves the function of defining
New York's rights or remedies. Here, the opt-in provision on its
face may apply only to class actions brought under the UCSPA.

To the second point, the fact that the UCSPA opt-in provision
does not expressly and unambiguously" apply to claims under
federal law and the laws of other states is not determinative. As
an initial matter, it is not clear whether the opt-in provision
applies only to claims under the UCSPA or extends more broadly to
all related claims regardless of their source of law. If it
applies broadly, that would support the conclusion that it does
not function to define Utah's rights or remedies, for the reasons
explained by Justice Stevens in Shady Grove.

However, even if the UCSPA is construed more narrowly to impose
opt-in notice only for related claims under state law, that still
falls well short of leaving little doubt that the requirement
serves the function of defining Utah's substantive rights or
remedies.

Under Shady Grove, the Plaintiffs' UCSPA claims are subject to an
opt-out notice requirement under Rule 23. Therefore, the
Defendants' Motion to Alter or Amend the Class Certification
Order is denied in part as to the notice required for Plaintiffs'
UCSPA claims.

A full-text copy of the District Court's March 22, 2018
Memorandum Decision and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/ybsqahjk from Leagle.com.

Charles Roberts, an individual & Kenneth McKay, an Individual, on
behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by Benjamin J. Glicksman -- bjg@kravitlaw.com --
KRAVIT, HOVEL & KRAWCZYK, pro hac vice, Jason E. Greene, ANDERSON
& KARRENBERG, 50 West Broadway Ste 700. Salt Lake City, UT 84101,
Kevin P. Roddy, WILENTZ GOLDMAN & SPITZER PA, pro hac vice,
Robert S. Boulter, pro hac vice, Thomas R. Karrenberg, ANDERSON &
KARRENBERG, 50 West Broadway Ste 700. Salt Lake City, UT 84101,
Aaron H. Aizenberg, KRAVIT HOVEL & KRAWCZYK SC, pro hac vice,
Benjamin R. Prinsen -- brp@kravitlaw.com -- KRAVIT HOVEL &
KRAWCZYK SC, pro hac vice, Christopher J. Krawczyk, KRAVIT HOVEL
& KRAWCZYK SC, pro hac vice, Heather M. Sneddon, ANDERSON &
KARRENBERG, 50 West Broadway Ste 700. Salt Lake City, UT 84101,
Jon V. Harper -- jharper@jonharperlaw.com -- HARPER LAW PLC &
Stephen E. Kravit -- kravit@kravitlaw.com -- KRAVIT HOVEL &
KRAWCZYK SC, pro hac vice.

C.R. England, a Utah corporation, Defendant, represented by Drew
R. Hansen  -- dhansen@tocounsel.com -- THEODORA ORINGHER PC, pro
hac vice, James S. Jardine, RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER,  36 South
State Street, Suite 1400. P.O. Box 45385. Salt Lake City, Utah
84145-0385, .Adam Kenji Richards, RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER, 36 South
State Street, Suite 1400. P.O. Box 45385. Salt Lake City, Utah
84145-0385 Andrew S. Jick -- ajick@akingump.com -- AKIN GUMP
STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP, pro hac vice, Christopher K. Petersen,
AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP, pro hac vice, David B.
Dibble, RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER,  36 South State Street, Suite
1400. P.O. Box 45385, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385, Gregory W.
Knopp -- gknopp@akingump.com -- AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD
LLP, pro hac vice, Neal R. Marder -- nmarder@akingump.com -- AKIN
GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP, pro hac vice, Rex S. Heinke  --
rheinke@akingump.com -- AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP, pro
hac vice & Scott A. Hagen, RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER. 36 South State
Street, Suite 1400. P.O. Box 45385. Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-
0385


CRYPTSY: Consumers' Class Action Won't Be Settled in Arbitration
----------------------------------------------------------------
P.J. D'Annunzio, writing for Daily Business Review, reports that
a class action filed by consumers who were ripped off by the
owner of a cryptocurrency company will not be settled in
arbitration, a federal appeals court has ruled.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit on April 23
upheld a West Palm Beach federal judge's ruling that the case is
not subject to arbitration.

The class members are customers of Cryptsy, a company that
converted customers' bitcoin into real cash.  According to
Eleventh Circuit's per curiam opinion, founder Paul Vernon over
the course of three years converted $8 million of bitcoin into
cash, which was deposited into his bank account through a company
called Coinbase, the defendant in the class action.

Mr. Vernon fled the country after the money was in his hands.

Lead plaintiff Brandon Leidel brought claims against Coinbase for
aiding and abetting Cryptsy's breaches of its fiduciary duties,
aiding and abetting Mr. Vernon's theft of his customer's money,
negligence and unjust enrichment from collecting fees for
converting bitcoin that belonged to Cryptsy's customers but
instead ended up in Vernon's personal account.

Coinbase argued Cryptsy's receiver is bound by the arbitration
clause in the user agreements that Cryptsy, through Mr. Vernon,
entered into in 2013 and 2014 "because the receiver merely
stepped into the shoes of Cryptsy with respect to those
agreements," the opinion said.

U.S. District Judge Kenneth Marra ruled the arbitration clause in
the user agreements didn't apply because Mr. Leidel did not
assert a right to benefits under those agreements as evidenced by
the fact that Mr. Leidel had not brought a claim for breach of
contract, just tort claims.

Judge Marra subsequently denied Coinbase's motion to compel
arbitration, and the defendant appealed, arguing it was entitled
to arbitration under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.

However, the court reasoned, "Leidel does not seek to enforce the
User Agreements entered into by Vernon and Cryptsy.  Because
Defendant has failed to establish both that Leidel is relying on
a contract to assert his claims and that the scope of the
arbitration clause in that contract covers the dispute, Leidel is
not equitably estopped from avoiding the arbitration clause in
defendant's user agreements."

The case was decided by Circuit Judges William Pryor, Julie
Carnes and R. Lanier Anderson.

The class is represented by Silver Miller in Coral Springs and
the Wites Law Firm in Lighthouse Point.

"I have preached that accountability, transparency and
verification are needed in the crypto exchange space," Silver
Miller co-founder David Silver said in a statement on April 23.
"This ruling brings the plaintiffs one step closer to finding out
just what type of know your customer protocols and anti-money
laundering protections Coinbase employed and whether Coinbase
complied with state and federal statutes in that regard.
Coinbase has delayed and tried to keep discovery hidden from the
public long enough. That stops now."

Marc Wites of the Wites Law Firm said the appeal was correctly
decided, and he was eager to proceed.

The plaintiffs' "only contractual relationship was with Cryptsy.
They did not sue Coinbase for breach of contract and thus were
not bound by the arbitration agreement," Mr. Wites said.

Andrew Kemp-Gerstel -- akg@lgplaw.com -- of Liebler Gonzalez &
Portuondo in Miami represents the defendant and did not respond
to a request for comment by deadline. [GN]


DEFENDERS INC: "Archer" Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
---------------------------------------------------
Teddy Archer, Sedetric Chambliss, Ervin Desir, James Hutchinson,
Daniel Manofsky, Jesse Swanson, Andrew Walls, and Chris Woodruff,
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated v.
Defenders, Inc., Case No. 1:18-cv-00470 (D. Del., March 28,
2018), is brought against the Defendant for failure to pay
overtime in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiffs are currently or were previously employed by the
Defendant as Security Advisors.

Defenders is an Indiana corporation with corporate offices
located at 3750 Priority Way South Drive, Indianapolis, Indiana,
and upon information and belief, over 1,000 other offices located
throughout the United States, including in Delaware. The
Defendant is a provider of burglar alarm installation services.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Brian D. Long, Esq.
      RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
      300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
      Wilmington, DE 19801
      Tel: (302) 295-5310
      Fax: (302) 654-7530
      E-mail: bdl@rl-legal.com


DR PEPPER: Faces Suit Over Breach of Fiduciary Duties
-----------------------------------------------------
City of North Miami Beach General Employee's Retirement Plan and
Maitland Police Officers and Firefighters Retirement Trust, on
behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated
stockholders v. Dr Pepper Snapple Group, Inc., et al., Case No.
2018-0227 (Del. Ch., March 28, 2018), is brought against the
Defendants for breach of fiduciary duties.

The Plaintiffs alleges that the Defendants are currently
attempting to manipulate the structure of a merger in order to
deny stockholders their appraisal rights. This case involves a
straightforward corporate merger in which the target stockholders
will receive cash and end up with just 13% of the combined
entity.

City of North Miami Beach General Employees' Retirement Plan
holds and has held shares of common stock of DPSG at all times
relevant herein.

Maitland Police Officers and Firefighters Retirement Trust holds
and has held shares of common stock of DPSG, at all-time relevant
herein.

The Defendant DPSG, a Delaware corporation, is a leading
integrated brand owner, manufacturer and distributor of non-
alcoholic beverages in the United States, Mexico and the
Caribbean, and Canada with a diverse portfolio of flavored CSDs
and NCBs, including ready-to-drink teas, juices, juice drinks,
water and mixers. DPSG's common stock is listed on the New York
Stock Exchange under the symbol "DPS." DPSG's principal place of
business is located at 5301 Legacy Drive, Plano, Texas 75024.

Maple, a Delaware corporation, is Keurig's parent. Keurig is a
leading producer of specialty coffee and innovative single-serve
brewing systems, with its Keurig brewers and single-serve hot
beverages in more than 20 million homes and offices throughout
North America.

The Individual Defendants are members of the board of directors
of DPSG. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Stuart M. Grant, Esq.
      Michael J. Barry, Esq.
      Jeff A. Almeida, Esq.
      Laina M. Herbert, Esq.
      GRANT & EISENHOFER P.A.
      123 Justison Street
      Wilmington, DE 19801
      Tel: (302) 622-7000


EDGE THERAPEUTICS: Glancy Prongay Files Securities Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------------
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP ("GPM") on April 23 disclosed that it
has filed a class action lawsuit in the United States District
Court District of New Jersey, on behalf of persons and entities
that acquired Edge Therapeutics, Inc. ("Edge Therapeutics" or the
"Company") (NASDAQ: EDGE) securities between December 29, 2017
and March 27, 2018, inclusive (the "Class Period").  Edge
Therapeutics investors have until 60 days from April 23, 2018,
the date of this notice to file a lead plaintiff motion.

To obtain information or actively participate in the class
action, please visit the Edge Therapeutics page on our website at
www.glancylaw.com/case/edge-therapeutics-inc.

Investors that suffered losses on their Edge Therapeutics
investments are encouraged to contact Lesley Portnoy of GPM to
discuss their legal rights in this class action at 310-201-9150
or by email to shareholders@glancylaw.com.

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout
the Class Period, Defendants made false and/or misleading
statements, as well as failed to disclose material adverse facts
about the Company's business, operations, and prospects.
Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose: (1) that the
Company's lead product candidate EG-1962 would likely fail a
futility analysis in connection with the NEWTON 2 study; and, (2)
that, as a result of the foregoing, the Company's financial
statements and Defendants' statements about Edge's business,
operations, and prospects, were materially false and misleading
at all relevant times.

On March 28, 2018, Edge Therapeutics disclosed, "that a pre-
specified interim analysis on data from the Day 90 visit of the
first 210 subjects randomized and treated in the Phase 3 NEWTON 2
study of EG-1962 demonstrated a low probability of achieving a
statistically-significant difference compared to the standard of
care in the study's primary endpoint, if the study is fully
enrolled."  As a result, the Data Monitoring Committee
"recommended that the study be stopped based on its conclusion
that the study has a low probability of meeting its primary
endpoint."  Based on the DMC recommendation, Edge Therapeutics
stated that it has decided to discontinue the Phase 3 NEWTON 2
study.

On this news, shares of Edge Therapeutics fell $14.28 per share,
or nearly 92%, to close at $1.31 per share on March 28, 2018,
thereby injuring investors.

If you acquired shares of Edge Therapeutics during the Class
Period you have 60 days from the date of this notice to file a
lead plaintiff motion to ask the Court to appoint you as lead
plaintiff.  To be a member of the Class you need not take any
action at this time; you may retain counsel of your choice or
take no action and remain an absent member of the Class.  If you
wish to learn more about this action, or if you have any
questions concerning this announcement or your rights or
interests with respect to these matters, please contact Lesley
Portnoy, Esquire, of GPM, 1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100, Los
Angeles California 90067 at 310-201-9150, Toll-Free at 888-773-
9224, by email to shareholders@glancylaw.com, or visit our
website at www.glancylaw.com.  If you inquire by email please
include your mailing address, telephone number and number of
shares purchased. [GN]


EDWARD D JONES: "Anderson" Suit Alleges Securities Violations
-------------------------------------------------------------
Edward Anderson, Raymond Keith Corum, Jesse Worthington and
Colleen Worthington, each individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P., et al.,
Case No. 2:18-at-00404 (E.D. Calif., March 30, 2018), is brought
against the Defendants for violations of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, the Securities Act of 1933, and the fiduciary duty
laws of the states of Missouri and California.

The Plaintiffs brought the class action on behalf of themselves
and all persons who had their commission-based accounts with
Edward Jones moved into one of the Advisory Programs between
March 30, 2013 and March 30, 2018.

The Plaintiffs had assets in a commission-based account with
Edward Jones within the Class Period.

The Defendant Edward D. Jones & Co, L.P., is a Missouri Limited
Partnership headquartered in St. Louis, Missouri, is dually
registered as a broker-dealer and as an investment advisor under
federal and state securities laws. Edward D. Jones provides
brokerage and related financial services to individuals and small
businesses and is the principal operating subsidiary of the Jones
Financial Companies, L.L.L.P.

The Defendants consist of multiple, interconnected entities who
worked in concert to orchestrate the reverse churning scheme
alleged herein to generate billions in revenue for themselves by
coercing Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class to move
their commission-based accounts with Edward Jones to an Advisory
Program. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

      John Garner, Esq.
      GARNER LAW OFFICE
      109 North Marshall Avenue
      P.O. Box 908
      Willows, CA 95988
      Tel: (530) 934-3324
      Fax: (530) 934-2334
      E-mail: jrg@erglaw.net

          - and -

      Ivy T. Ngo, Esq.
      FRANKLIN D. AZAR & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
      14426 East Evans Avenue
      Aurora, CO 80014
      Tel: (303) 757-3300
      Fax: (303) 759-5203
      E-mail: ngoi@fdazar.com


EXPERIAN INFORMATION: Judgment on Pleadings in "Devries" Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California denied Defendant's Motion on the Pleading in the case
captioned SEAN GILBERT DEVRIES, Plaintiff, v. EXPERIAN
INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, INC., Defendant, Case No. 16-cv-02953-WHO
(N.D. Cal.).

Experian moves for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the
injunctive relief remedy provided by DeVries's state law claims
is pre-empted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 (FCRA) and
that the claims fail because its alleged conduct is expressly
authorized by the FCRA and supporting regulations.

Plaintiff Sean Gilbert DeVries brings this putative class action
against defendant Experian asserting federal and state law claims
arising from Experian's failure to provide consumers with an
annual free copy of their credit report. Experian is a nationwide
consumer credit reporting agency (CRA) that provides millions of
credit reports to American consumers annually.

Experian argues that the conduct alleged against it is expressly
authorized by the FCRA and supporting regulations. It relies
particularly on Section 1022.123 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, which requires that CRAs develop and implement
reasonable requirements for what information consumers have to
provide as proof of identity for purposes of obtaining their free
annual credit disclosure.

When Experian was not able to verify DeVries' identity for the
free report, it requested that DeVries provide further
identifying documentation, such as an identification card,
utility bill, and bank or insurance statement. All of the
questions asked by Experian, including the request for further
identifying documentation such as a utility bill or bank or
insurance statement, might be reasonable under Section
1022.123(b). But the regulation does not create a safe harbor for
those activities.

The reasonability of Experian's conduct will depend on many
factors, including the basis for treating paying consumers
differently than those entitled to a free report if that is what
discovery shows. That cannot be decided on the pleadings.

The Court finds that DeVries's claims under California's Unfair
Competition Law, Bus. & Prof. Code Section 17200, et seq.
("UCL"); (ii) the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civil Code
Section 1750, et seq. ("CLRA"); and (iii) California's Consumer
Credit Reporting Agency Act, Cal. Civ. Code Section 1785.1, et
seq. ("CCRAA") seeking injunctive relief are sufficiently pleaded
to withstand Experian's motion.

A full-text copy of the District Court's March 22, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ycwlppgx from Leagle.com.

Sean Gilbert DeVries, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Michael Robert
Reese  -- mreese@reesellp.com -- Reese LLP, James A. Francis --
jfrancis@consumerlawfirm.com -- Francis and Mailman, P.C., pro
hac vice, John Soumilas -- jsoumilas@consumerlawfirm.com --
Francis and Mailman, P.C., pro hac vice & Melissa S. Weiner --
weiner@halunenlaw.com -- Halunen Law.

Experian Information Solutions, Inc., an Ohio and California
corporation, Defendant, represented by John Alexander Vogt  --
javogt@jonesdaw.com -- Jones Day, Kerry Cordill Fowler --
kcfowler@jonesday.com -- Jones Day, Alexandra Alford McDonald,
Jones Day, Christopher Kevin Spiers -- cspiers@jonesday.com --
Hanson Bridgett LLP & Daniel John McLoon -- djmcloon@jonesday.com
-- Jones Day.


EXTREME NETWORKS: Court Narrows Claims in Securities Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, In re EXTREME NETWORKS, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION,
Case No. 15-cv-04883-BLF (N. D. Cal.), Judge Beth Labson Freeman
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose Division, granted in part and denied in part
the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint.

On Sept. 26, 2016, Lead Plaintiff Arkansas Teacher Retirement
System filed a Consolidated Class Action Complaint on behalf of
all investors who purchased the publicly traded common stock of
Extreme and/or exchange-traded options on such common stock
between Sept. 12, 2013, and April 9, 2015.  The Consolidated
Complaint alleged two counts: (1) violation of Section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 against all the Defendants; and
(2) violation of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act against the
Individual Defendants for liability as control persons of
Extreme.

The case is a putative class action for securities fraud brought
against Extreme and its officers Charles W. Berger, Kenneth B.
Arola, and John T. Kurtzweil.  They bring the action against the
Defendants for alleged misrepresentations regarding the success
of Extreme's post-acquisition integration with its former
competitor, Enterasys Networks, Inc., as well as developments in
Extreme's "key partnership" with Lenovo Group Ltd.  The
Defendants' positive representations to investors about the
resulting "synergies" from the Enterasys integration and benefits
of the Lenovo partnership -- including a commitment that cost
savings from these arrangements would lead to double-digit
revenue growth and a 10% operating margin by June 2015 -- caused
Extreme's stock price to rise.  Meanwhile, Extreme's stock price
dropped when Extreme reported disappointing financial results at
various points between February 2014 and the end of the Class
Period on April 9, 2015.

The Plaintiffs have filed an Amended Consolidated Class Action
Complaint alleging that the Defendants violated Section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 10b-5.  They also
assert that the Individual Defendants are liable for violations
of federal securities laws as "control persons" of Extreme,
pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. Section
78t(a).

The Court previously dismissed the Plaintiffs' Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 claim for failure to adequately plead falsity and
scienter with respect to any of the challenged statements.  The
Defendants now move to dismiss this claim in the Amended
Complaint, arguing that the pleading treads the same path as its
predecessor, and deserves a similar fate.  As before, the
Plaintiffs' allegations in the Amended Complaint fall into three
categories of statements by Defendants regarding: (1) the
Enterasys integration; (2) the partnership with Lenovo; and (3)
Extreme's "commitment" to 10% operating margins and revenue
targets.

The Court heard oral argument on the Defendants' motion to
dismiss the Amended Complaint on Dec. 14, 2017.

Because the Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged that there was
no "plan" with respect to the Enterasys integration, the 2013
statements are not adequately alleged to be false or misleading
under the PSLRA.  Rather, Judge Freeman finds that the CWs
criticize what was perhaps an ill-conceived plan that upset
Extreme's customers.  But a poorly received "plan," does not
amount to securities fraud.  Because the only two statements made
by Kurtzweil regarding the Enterasys integration fall into this
category, and the Plaintiffs fail to plead an actionable
misrepresentation or omission, the Plaintiffs have not alleged
that Kurtzweil is liable for the section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
claim.

The Judge next finds that none of the allegations in the Amended
Complaint disputes that Extreme trained Lenovo North American
reps on Extreme products, that Extreme employees sat "side-by-
side" with Lenovo people in North America and China, or that
Extreme had "airtime" with the legacy Lenovo salesforce.  These
challenged statements could still be true even if there were
problems with the Lenovo partnership, the arrangement added
little if any benefit to Extreme, and there was no "field level
activity."

The Defendants argue that Berger and Arola used the word
"commitment," which is not a word of certainty, even when viewed
in context.  Judge Freeman says the surrounding factual
allegations do not raise an inference that the Defendants had an
"obligation" to achieve these results or assured the market that
these results were "certain."  Rather, they expressed that they
were devoted to an effort to achieve these results within the
specified time frame.  She does not disrupt its prior
determination that the "commitment" statements are inactionable
puffery.

For these reasons, Judge Freeman concludes that finds that
falsity and scienter are adequately pled with respect to the
allegations set forth in paragraphs 197, 213, 209, 227, 240, 235,
254, 258, 279, and 291 as identified in Appendix A to the Amended
Complaint, and on that basis, she denied the motion to dismiss
the section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claim.

Because Kurtzweil is not alleged to have made any of the
surviving statements, the Judge granted the motion to dismiss the
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claim as to Kurtzweil only.  She
denied the motion to dismiss the section 20(a) claim against the
Individual Defendants.

She directed that the Defendants will answer the Amended
Complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 21, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/8Ep0e4 from Leagle.com.

Jui-Yang Hong, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Kenneth Joseph Black --
kennyb@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman and Dowd LLP & Shawn
A. Williams -- shawnw@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd
LLP.

Mark Kasprzak, Plaintiff, represented by Jennifer Pafiti --
jpafiti@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP & Jeremy Alan Lieberman --
jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP.

Extreme Networks, Inc., Charles W. Berger, Kenneth B. Arola &
John T. Kurtzweil, Defendants, represented by Elliot Schlesinger
Katz, Shirli Fabbri Weiss -- shirli.weiss@dlapiper.com -- DLA
Piper LLP, David Allen Priebe -- david.priebe@dlapiper.com -- DLA
Piper LLP & Diana Mariko Maltzer, DLA Piper.

William Reardon, Movant, represented by Laurence M. Rosen --
lrosen@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.

Arkansas Teacher Retirement System, Movant, represented by
Francis P. McConville -- fmcconville@labaton.com -- Labaton
Sucharow LLP, pro hac vice, Jonathan Gardner --
jgardner@labaton.com -- Labaton Sucharow LLP, pro hac vice,
Nicole Catherine Lavallee -- nlavallee@bermantabacco.com --
Berman Tabacco, Thomas A. Dubbs -- tdubbs@labaton.com -- Labaton
Sucharow LLP, Aidan Chowning Poppler --
cpoppler@bermantabacco.com -- Berman Tabacco, Carol C. Villegas -
- cvillegas@labaton.com -- Labaton Sucharow LLP, pro hac vice,
Christopher J. Keller -- ckeller@labaton.com -- Labaton Sucharow
LLP, pro hac vice, Eric J. Belfi -- ebelfi@labaton.com -- Labaton
Sucharow & Rudoff LLP, Irina Vasilchenko --
ivasilchenko@labaton.com -- Labaton Sucharow LLP, pro hac vice,
Jeffrey Dubbin -- jdubbin@labaton.com -- Labaton Sucharow LLP,
Louis J. Gottlieb -- lgottlieb@labaton.com -- Labaton Sucharow
LLP, pro hac vice, Michael Walter Stocker, Labaton Sucharow LLP,
Natalie Marie Mackiel -- nmackiel@labaton.com -- Labaton Sucharow
LLP, pro hac vice, Seth M. Jessee, Labaton Sucharow LLP, Shawn A.
Williams, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP & Wendy Tsang --
wtsang@labaton.com -- Labaton Sucharow LLP, pro hac vice.

City of Lakeland Employees Pension Plan, Movant, represented by
Brian O. O'Mara -- bomara@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman &
Dowd LLP, Kenneth Joseph Black, Robbins Geller Rudman and Dowd
LLP & Shawn A. Williams, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.


FACEBOOK INC: Finkelstein Thompson Files Privacy Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
On April 5, 2018, the law firm of Finkelstein Thompson LLP, filed
a class action lawsuit against Facebook, Inc. and Cambridge
Analytica.  The lawsuit, Labajo v. Facebook, Inc. et al.,
Case 4:18-cv-02093-KAW, alleges that in 2014, Facebook allowed a
massive data breach in which the sensitive personal information
of the plaintiff and 87 million Facebook users (including 71
million Americans) was misappropriated by Cambridge Analytica and
other entities and used for unauthorized purposes, including
attempts to influence the 2016 United States presidential
election.

Allegedly, Facebook users' data was "harvested" for Cambridge
Analytica using an app called ThisIsYourDigitalLife, misleadingly
billed as a "personality quiz"; and that when Facebook users were
tricked into using the app, Facebook allowed the app to harvest
not only those Facebook users' personal information but also the
information of their Facebook friends.  The lawsuit further
alleges that for years, Facebook has allowed hackers to use its
own search tools to "scrape" data from virtually all Facebook
users' profiles, violating their privacy and placing them at risk
for identity theft.

The lawsuit alleges Facebook falsely promised users that their
personal information would be protected when, in fact, Facebook
knew its security was inadequate to protect users' data.  It also
alleges Facebook had a policy of selling user data to third
parties and even implemented APIs to allow third-party apps to
"harvest" user information.  The lawsuit seeks relief, including
damages and compensation for class members, and injunctive relief
to protect Facebook users' personal information.

If you would like to discuss your legal rights, you may contact
Finkelstein Thompson LLP by email at
contact@finkensteinthompson.com [GN]


FACEBOOK INC: Bennett Suit Hits Share Price Drop Ff. Data Breach
----------------------------------------------------------------
Ernestine Bennett, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. Facebook, Inc., Mark
Zuckerberg, David M. Wehner and Sheryl K. Sandberg, Defendants,
Case No. 18-cv- 01868 (N.D. Cal., March 27, 2018), is a
securities fraud class action on behalf of all persons who
purchased Facebook common stock between July 6, 2017 and March
23, 2018. Plaintiff seeks redress under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.

Facebook is a social networking company that offers a number of
products and platforms that enable users to connect, share,
discover and communicate with each other. Misrepresentations made
by defendants concerning the sharing of its users' data and
compliance with its consent decree with the Federal Trade
Commission were each materially false and misleading when made
and caused its stock to trade at artificially inflated prices of
as high as $193 per share. However, defendants failed to notify
users that their user data had been improperly shared with
Cambridge Analytica and entities affiliated with Cambridge
Analytica for purposes and in ways that violated Facebook's terms
of use.

On March 19, 2018, as the investing public digested the
disclosures over the weekend, the price of Facebook common stock
plummeted, closing down more than $12 per share, or nearly 7%,
from its close of $185.09 per share on Friday, March 16, 2018, to
close at $172.56 per share on Monday, March 19, 2018, on
unusually high volume of more than 88 million shares traded,
notes the complaint.

Bennett owns Facebook shares and lost substantially. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Jason C. Davis, Esq.
      Kenneth J. Black, Esq.
      ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
      One Montgomery Street, Suite 1800
      San Francisco, CA 94104
      Telephone: (415) 288-4545
      Fax: (415) 288-4534
      Email: jdavis@rgrdlaw.com
             kennyb@rgrdlaw.com

             - and -

      Darren J. Robbins, Esq.
      Danielle S. Myers, Esq.
      ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
      655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
      San Diego, CA 92101
      Telephone: (619) 231-1058
      Fax: (619) 231-7423
      Email: darrenr@rgrdlaw.com
             dmyers@rgrdlaw.com


FARIS PROPERTIES: "Beyer" Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
-----------------------------------------------------
Jeremiah Beyer, on behalf of himself and other current and on
behalf of others similarly situated v. Faris Properties, LLC,
Case No. 3:18-cv-00139 (E.D. Tenn., March 30, 2018), is brought
against the Defendant for violation of the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant as a non-exempt,
hourly-paid employee working at the Defendant's restaurant
located in Rockwood, Roane County, Tennessee, and later at
Defendant's restaurant located in Harriman, Roane County,
Tennessee. The Plaintiff worked for Defendant from March, 2015
until October, 2017.

The Defendant operates over 30 McDonald's Franchise restaurants
in the Eastern District of Tennessee. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      James W. Friauf, Esq.
      Ariana E. L. Mansolino, Esq.
      LAW OFFICE OF JAMES W. FRIAUF, PLLC
      9724 Kingston Pike, Suite 104
      Knoxville, TN 37922
      Tel: (865) 236-0347
      Fax: (865) 512-9174
      E-mail: james@friauflaw.com

          - and -

      Mark N. Foster, Esq.
      LAW OFFICE OF MARK N. FOSTER, PLLC
      P.O. Box 869
      Madisonville, KY 42431
      Tel: (270) 213-1303
      E-mail: MFoster@MarkNFoster.com


FIRSTENERGY SOLUTIONS: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss "Schwebel"
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SCHWEBEL BAKING COMPANY, etc., Plaintiff, v.
FIRSTENERGY SOLUTIONS CORP., Defendant, Case No. 4:17CV0974 (N.D.
Ohio), Judge Benita Y. Pearson of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, denied the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for Failure to State
a Claim Upon Which Relief Can be Granted; and denied the
Defendant's Motion to Strike the Class Allegations in the
Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(1)(D).

In May 2017, Schwebel Baking filed the putative class action
alleging that the Defendant has charged the Plaintiff and all the
Class Members surcharges that the Defendant is trying to collect
from them to cover its extra expenses stemming from the extremely
cold month of January 2014 due to so-called "polar vortex"
conditions in Ohio, Illinois, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Maryland,
and New Jersey.  The Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive
relief and damages against the Defendant for breach of contract.
The Plaintiff also seeks the same relief on behalf of a class of
thousands of similarly situated business customers of the
Defendant that, like the Plaintiff, also purchased energy from
FirstEnergy Solutions pursuant to a fixed-price electricity
supply contract substantially in the form attached as Exhibit A
to the Complaint.  The Defendant is a member of the PJM
Interconnection, LLC Regional Transmission Organization ("RTO").

Under each customer's substantively identical Fixed-Rate
Agreement, the Defendant agreed to supply the Plaintiff and each
given Class Member with electricity during the contract period at
an agreed-upon and fixed-rate per kilowatt-hour.   In short, the
"Regulatory Action" section of the Agreement permitted Defendant
FES to "pass through" increased costs only if a RTO, electric
utility, governmental entity or agency, industry reliability
organization, or court imposed new or additional charges or
requirements on the Defendant, or imposed a change in the method
or procedure for determining charges or requirements that
"related to the Electricity Supply under this Agreement.

In March 2014, the Defendant sent a letter to the Plaintiff and
all the Class Members.  In the March 13, 2014 letter to the
Plaintiff, the Defendant stated that January was an extremely
cold month with temperatures reaching record lows, which resulted
in a significant increase in energy consumption.  During these
periods of time, PJM incurred extremely high ancillary costs to
purchase additional reserve generation needed to keep the bulk
electric system reliable throughout these extreme conditions.
These costs and additional charges were, in turn, invoiced by PJM
to all suppliers serving customers throughout the region.
Pursuant to their agreement with FirstEnergy Solutions, these
additional costs and charges are deemed a Pass-Through Event.  On
two occasions in the following month, Plaintiff signed two new
term sheets extending its electricity supply contract with the
Defendant.

After receiving the Defendant's letter in March 2014, the
Plaintiff was invoiced for the "pass-through" charges at issue.
The charge was separately itemized and identified in its own
section of each invoice as "RTO Expense Surcharge."  On each
invoice, the Defendant again invited the Plaintiff to resolve any
questions it might have about the Pass-Through cost before paying
it.

In October 2014, the Plaintiff advised the Defendant in writing
that Schwebel had determined that the RTO Expense Surcharge was
improper and did not qualify as a "Pass-Through Event."  In
accordance with the Agreement, the Plaintiff attempted in good
faith to resolve the dispute, but has been unable to do so.  By
filing the case at bar, the Plaintiff now seeks to recover all
improperly charged amounts previously paid by Schwebel and all
Class Members, as well as a declaration that the Defendant's
imposition of such charges on the Plaintiff and the Class Members
was improper.

Pending is the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.  It argues the
"voluntary payment doctrine" applies to bar all of the
Plaintiff's claims as a matter of law.  Also before the Court is
its Motion to Strike the allegations relating to representation
of absent persons because the allegations themselves show that no
class action can be sustained when no putative class will present
common issues for adjudication that predominate over individual
ones.

Judge Pearson concludes that only through discovery will the
Plaintiff, on behalf of itself and the class, be able to
determine whether, based on full knowledge of the underlying
facts, all of the PJM-incurred charges qualified as "pass-through
events" that the Defendant could pass on to its business
customers without breaching the Customer Supply Agreements.
Dismissal of the case is not appropriate because the Defendant
has not shown as a matter of law at this time that the Plaintiff
or other Class Members had anywhere near the kind of "full
knowledge" of the underlying facts that is a prerequisite to its
ability to "conclusively establish," a voluntary payment
affirmative defense.

In addition, the Plaintiff has alleged mistake of fact and that
the March 13, 2014 letter from the Defendant misleadingly
represented to Schwebel that all of the charges were deemed
payable pursuant to the Agreement, and it remains to be seen
whether it can prove any of these bases for circumventing the
voluntary payment argument made by the Defendant.

Given the decision on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the
Judge defers a decision on the issue of whether the class
allegations should be stricken pending further factual
development of the record relevant to class issues.

For the reasons set forth, Judge Pearson denied both the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 21, 2018 Memorandum of
Opinion and Order is available at https://is.gd/oEiblTfrom
Leagle.com.

Schwebel Baking Company, individually and on behalf of all those
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Carolyn T. Blake --
cblake@meyersroman.com -- Meyers, Roman, Friedberg & Lewis,
Geoffrey M. Johnson -- gjohnson@scott-scott.com -- Scott & Scott,
Judith S. Scolnick -- jscolnick@scott-scott.com -- Scott & Scott,
Scott R. Jacobsen , Scott & Scott, William C. Fredericks --
wfredericks@scott-scott.com -- Scott & Scott & Peter Turner --
pturner@meyersroman.com -- Meyers, Roman, Friedberg & Lewis.

Firstenergy Solutions Corp., Defendant, represented by Laura E.
Kogan -- lkogan@beneschlaw.com -- Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan &
Aronoff, Gregory J. Phillips -- gphillips@beneschlaw.com --
Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff & Nicholas J. Secco --
nsecco@beneschlaw.com -- Benesch Friedlander Coplan & Arnoff.


FITBIT INC: Judge Allows $33MM Shareholder Class Suit to Proceed
----------------------------------------------------------------
Kieren McCarthy, writing for The Register, reports that a US
federal judge has approved a $33m class-action lawsuit against
fitness tracker maker Fitbit -- but put the brakes on a massive
$8.25m lawyer award claim.

The case was brought by angry shareholders after Fitbit failed to
disclose problems with the build quality of its products which,
when revealed, caused a significant share price fall.  Given our
experience with Fitbits, the lack of decent build quality should
have been instantly obvious, but there you go.

A $33m settlement might seem like a lot but the lawyers wanted
their cut. US District Judge Susan Illston was unimpressed with
the attorneys' efforts to elicit a massive payday out of the case
by asking for 25 per cent of the award to be put into their
pockets, telling them it "might be a little rich for this case."

The judge also asked for an itemized list of their $242,402
expense claim, saying she wanted to make sure there weren't any
"filet mignon" dinners or first-class plane tickets stuck in
there.

She then called for a halt in proceedings to have a private
meeting with the lawyers about their claim.

This is far from the first time that the legal system has been
annoyed at highly paid lawyers padding class action cases and
diverting money intended for end users into their firms' pockets
-- or the pockets of their old universities or law schools.

Earlier this year, a group of 16 US state attorneys general wrote
to the Supreme Court asking it to tear up an $8.5m legal
settlement from Google -- because none of the cash will go to the
folks the class-action lawsuit was brought on behalf of.

In that case, the attorneys argued that when the settlement was
divided by the number of people impacted it equated to four cents
per user and so wasn't worth it.  And so they proposed giving the
money left after they had been paid to seven "cy pres recipients"
instead.

It just so happened that three of the seven are law schools that
the attorneys' attended -- Harvard University, Stanford
University and the Chicago-Kent College of Law -- and the
remaining four are among Google's favorite institutions who do
work that benefit the tech giant and which the company already
supplies millions to -- AARP, Carnegie Mellon University, the
MacArthur Foundation, and the World Privacy Forum.

It is an issue that it also getting worse: before 2000, there was
roughly one case involving cy pres recipients a year; since 2000,
there have been eight a year -- and the majority of them have
happened in the past decade.

In large part that is because of lawsuits against tech companies
-- who have vast global user bases in a way that few companies
ever have in the past.  But the system is being bent, and the
state attorneys general want the Supreme Court to come up with
definite rules to limit the opportunity for abuse.

What is remarkable however is that such agreements are often
approved against the actual wishes of the litigants themselves.

In the Google case, several judges as well as outside companies
that were pulled into the case by annoyed end users complained
about the arrangement, with one judge noting that the money was
going to the "usual suspects."

In the Fitbit case, there have been three objectors to the
settlement; two of which objected to the attorneys' award.

One argued the attorneys' cut was "disproportionate to the amount
of risk assumed by the attorneys" and that the more standard 15
per cent fee should be applied (providing an additional $3.3m to
those actually impacted). He also argued for a "strict
accounting" of their time and expenses.

Making a stink
A second noted that while he is "the proverbial skunk at the
garden party" in objecting to the settlement, there were a number
of significant issues with the case: not least of which was that
neither side was giving the full details of their settlement,
including that the attorneys were incentivized to push the
agreement under a quick pay provision.

But that settlement was reached after two years of litigation and
due to the large number of people involved in the class action
lawsuit, two objectors is not seen as significant enough to
derail the whole agreement.

The assumption of course is that if you don't actively complain,
you are implicitly agreeing with the settlement whereas the
reality on the ground is that virtually none of class action
litigants are even aware of the case until it is settled, let
alone its progress.

Judge Illston explicitly addressed that situation when she said
the objectors concern were not sufficient to close off the
settlement altogether and noted -- as always happens in these
case -- that those individuals always have the option to withdraw
and sue the company by themselves.  But, again, in reality, they
don't because of the huge effort and resources required.  Which
is why class action lawsuits exist in the first place.

But the judge did criticize lawyers on both sides when she noted
they hadn't even bothered to give basic details of the case and
the allegations behind it on a website that was set up to detail
the settlement -- fitbitsecuritieslitigation.com -- a requirement
for the settlement's approval.

The lawsuit claims that Fitbit made false and misleading
statements about its heart rate monitoring technology.  The
technology was inaccurate and inconsistent, the lawsuit claimed,
and as such represented a serious health risk to users.

The company argued against the claims but research appeared to
agree with the litigants -- the fitness tracker was indeed
inaccurate, and that the company knew it.  When that came out,
the company's share price dropped five per cent in a single day.
[GN]


FIVE BOROUGH: Fails to Pay Workers Overtime, "Stepanov" Suit Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Zulfiya Stepanov, individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated v. Five Borough Home Care, Inc., Case No.
161196/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., March 1, 2018), is brought against
the Defendants for failure to pay overtime compensation for all
hours worked in excess of 40 hours.

Five Borough Home Care, Inc. is primarily engaged in providing
nursing and home health aide services at the residences of its
clients. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Lloyd R. Ambinder, Esq.
      LaDonna M. Lusher, Esq.
      Milana Dostanitch, Esq.
      VIRGINIA & AMBINDER, LLP
      40 Broad Street, Seventh Floor
      New York, NY 10004
      Telephone: (212) 943-9080
      Facsimile: (212) 943-9082
      E-mail: llusher@vandallp.com

FMFS OF VS: Sued in N.Y. Over Failure to Properly Pay Servers
-------------------------------------------------------------
Shanice Willis and DaAna Queen, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated v. FMFS of VS LLC d/b/a Buffalo Wild
Wings, Case No. 703029/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., February 28, 2018),
is brought against the Defendants for failure to pay Servers at
the proper minimum wage rate for all hours worked, failure to pay
at all for the hours worked, and for failure to provide accurate
wage statements in violation of the New York Labor Law.

FMFS of VS LLC owns and operates a restaurant located at 6 Green
Acres Rd W, Valley Stream, New York 11582. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Louis Ginsberg, Esq.
      THE LAW FIRM OF LOUIS GINSBERG, P.C.
      1613 Northern Boulevard
      Roslyn, NY 11576
      Telephone: (516) 625-0105


FORD MOTOR: Must Reply to 2nd Amended "Baranco" Suit
----------------------------------------------------
In the case, DAVID BARANCO, JAMES ABBITT, HARRIET ABRUSCATO,
DONALD BROWN, DANIEL CARON, ANITA FARRELL, JOHN FURNO, JAMES
JENKIN, ROGER KINNUNEN, GARY KUBBER and MALISA NICOLAU,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, a Delaware corporation;
Defendants, Case No. 3:17-CV-03580-EMC (N.D. Cal.), Judge Edward
M. Chen of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Francisco Division, ordered that Ford is not
required to file an Answer to Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint
but will respond to the Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint in
accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(3).

On March 12, 2018, the Court entered an Order Granting In Part
and Denying In Part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs
First Amended Complaint.  Pursuant to that Order, the Plaintiffs
have 30 days to file an amended complaint.  During the Further
Case Management Conference held on March 15, 2018, the
Plaintiffs' counsel advised the Court and Ford that they will be
filing a Second Amended Class Action Complaint by April 11, 2018.

Upon stipulation of the parties, it is agreed that Ford will not
file an Answer to Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint but instead
will file a response to their Second Amended Complaint in
accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(3).  The counsel for the
Defendant attests that concurrence in the filing of the document
has been obtained from each of the other signatories.

They therefore stipulated and Judge Chen granted that Ford is not
required to file an Answer to Plaintiffs' First Amended
Complaint.  Once filed, Ford will respond to the Plaintiffs'
Second Amended Complaint in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(3).

A full-text copy of the Court's March 21, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/pwItcB from Leagle.com.

David Baranco, Plaintiff, represented by Ben Barnow --
b.barnow@barnowlaw.com -- Barnow and Associates, P.C., pro hac
vice, Erich Paul Schork -- e.schork@barnowlaw.com -- Barnow and
Associates, P.C., pro hac vice, Courtney L. Davenport --
courtney@thedavenportlawfirm.com -- The Davenport Law Firm LLC,
pro hac vice, David Christopher Wright -- dcw@mccunewright.com --
McCune Wright Arevalo, LLP, Leslie E. Hurst -- lhurst@bholaw.com
--, Blood Hurst & O'Reardon LLP, Matthew David Schelkopf --
mds@mccunewright.com -- McCuneWright LLP, pro hac vice, Richard
Lyle Coffman -- rcoffman@coffmanlawfirm.com -- The Coffman Law
Firm, pro hac vice & Timothy G. Blood -- tblood@bholaw.com --
Blood Hurst & O'Rearden, LLC.

Malisa Nicolau, James Abbitt, Daniel Caron, Gary Kubber, Roger
Kinnunen, Anita Farrell, Harriet Abruscato, James Jenkin, Donald
Brown & John Furno, Plaintiffs, represented by Ben Barnow, Barnow
and Associates, P.C., pro hac vice, Erich Paul Schork, Barnow and
Associates, P.C., pro hac vice, Leslie E. Hurst, Blood Hurst &
O'Reardon LLP, Courtney L. Davenport, The Davenport Law Firm LLC,
pro hac vice, David Christopher Wright, McCune Wright Arevalo,
LLP, Matthew David Schelkopf, McCuneWright LLP, pro hac vice &
Timothy G. Blood, Blood Hurst & O'Rearden, LLC.

Ford Motor Company, Defendant, represented by Tamara Alicia Bush
-- tbush@dykema.com -- Dykema Gossett LLP, David Matthew George -
- dgeorge@dykema.com -- Dykema Gossett PLLC, John Mark Thomas --
jthomas@dykema.com -- Dykema Gossett PLLC & Sherry Ann Rozell --
sherry.rozell@mcafeetaft.com -- McAfee and Taft, pro hac vice.


FORD MOTOR: Ct. Directs Payment of $488K for Discovery Misconduct
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
West Virginia, Huntington Division, directed Defendant Ford Motor
Company to pay sanctions for discovery misconduct in the case
captioned CHARLES JOHNSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. FORD MOTOR
COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 3:13-cv-06529 (D.W.V.).

The Court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order sanctioning
Defendant for making material misrepresentations during the
discovery process, which significantly increased the Plaintiffs'
costs of litigation. In recompense, the Court awarded the
Plaintiffs attorneys' fees and costs and expert fees and costs
attributable to Ford's discovery misconduct.

In their brief, the Plaintiffs ask for fees and costs in the
total amount of $692,225.52.

Ford counters by arguing that once duplicative, excessive, vague,
and unsupported amounts are deducted from the Plaintiffs'
request, they are entitled to an award of $223,610.97.

Attorneys' Fees

The Court has concluded that the Plaintiffs are entitled to
reimbursement of attorneys' fees for time associated with
preparing, negotiating, and arguing the source code protective
order entered in this litigation, as well as pursuing the
Plaintiffs' motion for sanctions. In addition, the Plaintiffs
seek reimbursement of travel time to and from a secured room in
Dearborn, Michigan where their counsel and experts were required
to go in order to review source code produced by Ford. According
to affidavits supplied by the Plaintiffs, the total amount of
attorneys' fees sought is $351,256.63.

After subtracting duplicative and excessive hours, and reducing
the hourly rates to reasonable amounts, Ford asserts that the
Plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys' fees in the amount of
$77,824.25.

The parties agree that when calculating an award of attorneys'
fees in this circuit, the court must follow a three-step process.
First, the court must determine a lodestar figure by multiplying
the number of reasonable hours expended times a reasonable rate.
At the second step of the process, the court must subtract from
the lodestar figure "fees for hours spent on unsuccessful claims
unrelated to successful ones. Once this calculation is completed,
the court proceeds to the third step, which consists of the court
increasing the step-two figure by some percentage of the
remaining amount, depending on the degree of success enjoyed by
the party seeking fees.

In this case, the Court need not formally proceed to the second
and third steps, because the fees and expenses are being awarded
as a discovery sanction, rather than as an award based upon a
successful resolution of the case as a whole. In addition, the
Plaintiffs have already performed step two of the process by
reducing the portion of their fee application related to the
motion for sanctions by 50% to account for the fact that they
only succeeded on one of two grounds asserted in the motion.

Therefore, the Court focuses largely upon the lodestar figure.

Reasonable Hourly Rate

To determine whether extra jurisdictional counsel are entitled to
the prevailing hourly rates in their home jurisdiction, the court
should consider the following questions: (1) did counsel provide
services that were not available in the court's jurisdiction; and
(2) did the client make a reasonable choice in hiring extra-
jurisdictional counsel, or did the client select an unreasonably
expensive attorney?

Here, the Plaintiffs seek reimbursement of fees charged by
fourteen attorneys, with hourly rates ranging from $175 to $950,
and by four paralegals billing between $115 and $275 per hour.
Half of the attorneys and half of the paralegals have extra-
jurisdictional home bases. The Plaintiffs argue that these
practitioners are entitled to the prevailing hourly rates in
their own communities, because they satisfy the two-part inquiry
set forth in National Wildlife Federation v. Hanson, 859 F.2d
313, 317 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that a fee award based on an
extra jurisdictional rate is appropriate when the complexity and
specialized nature of the case means that no attorney with the
requisite skills is available locally).

According to the Plaintiffs, the size and complexity of the
instant action required them to hire a coalition of law firms
with experience in complex class action litigation, which could
not be found exclusively in this jurisdiction. Ford counters this
argument by pointing out that a local law firm, Spilman Thomas &
Battle, PLLC, played a leadership role in the litigation and its
billings account for 40% of the fees sought by the Plaintiffs.
Thus, the instant action is not so complex that no local lawyer
is able to effectively prosecute it.

The undersigned agrees with Ford. Although the subject matter of
this case is complex, both factually and legally, the Plaintiffs
have failed to demonstrate that this jurisdiction lacks
experienced lawyers capable of successfully prosecuting the
Plaintiffs' claims. As Ford notes, one of the Plaintiffs' leading
law firms is located in Charleston, West Virginia, and the
Plaintiffs make no showing that Spilman Thomas & Battle is the
only local firm qualified to handle complex class action
litigation.

Moreover, the Plaintiffs seek reimbursement of substantial expert
fees. Given that the Plaintiffs relied heavily on experts to
navigate the technical aspects of the source code protective
order and assist in locating evidentiary support for the motion
for sanctions, the remaining tasks involved in negotiating the
protective order and pursuing the award of sanctions could have
been accomplished by a number of lawyers who regularly appear in
this Court.

The Plaintiffs offer no evidence or focused argument in this
case. In fact, the Plaintiffs provide no explanation for how they
selected counsel; no evidence that they searched other local
firms for comparable attorneys; and no corroboration that the
extra jurisdictional attorneys in this case provided a unique
service that could not be offered by less expensive and equally
available counsel. Consequently, while the instant case certainly
requires specialized skill, the Plaintiffs have not adequately
supported their request for extra jurisdictional rates.

Having determined that the prevailing market rates in the
Southern District of West Virginia should be applied, the Court
next considers the evidence submitted by the Plaintiffs to
establish the prevailing rates, as well as Ford's arguments in
opposition.  The parties are significantly at odds over the
appropriate hourly rate to apply to each attorney included in the
fee application:

                      Plaintiffs'       Ford's
                      requested       suggested
                     hourly rates    hourly rates
                     ------------    ------------
   Nathan Atkinson       $400            $300
   Sandra Burch          $135            $100
   Meg Coppley           $270            $200
   Andrew Darcy          $185            $150
   Anthony DeWitt        $550            $300
   Kelly Griffith        $260            $190
   Pamela Haynes         $115            $100
   Rebecca Hendrix       $175            $140
   Shawn Judge           $400            $225
   Amy Keller            $675            $300
   Kathy Kuryak          $165            $100
   Audrey Lebdjiri       $275            $100
   Adam Levitt           $950            $400
   Niall Paul            $500            $400
   Don Slavik            $700            $400
   John Tangren          $725            $300
   Gregory Travalio      $495            $350
   Mark Troutman         $425            $300

Bearing in mind each attorney's experience, training,
specialization, customary hourly rates, and role in the instant
action, the Court finds rates of $350, $400, and $475,
respectively, to be reasonable.

In conclusion, the Court approves the following hourly rates as
indicated below:

     Nathan Atkinson     $400
     Sandra Burch        $135
     Meg Coppley         $270
     Andrew Darcy        $185
     Anthony DeWitt      $350
     Kelly Griffith      $260
     Pamela Haynes       $115
     Rebecca Hendrix     $175
     Shawn Judge         $350
     Amy Keller          $350
     Kathy Kuryak        $115
     Audrey Lebdjiri     $140
     Adam Levitt         $550
     Niall Paul          $500
     Don Slavik          $550
     John Tangren        $400
     Greg Travalio       $475
     Mark Troutman       $400

Reasonable Number of Hours

The Plaintiffs' counsel's staffing was likely no more excessive
than lawyer staffing for the defense. The Court recalls that
three or more defense attorneys appeared at or participated in
most, if not all, court conferences. Undoubtedly, numerous
defense attorneys worked on the same matters related to the
source code protective order and Plaintiffs' motion for
sanctions.

In addition, as the Plaintiffs' argue, the time billed by their
counsel for the source code protective order and the sanctions
motion would not have been necessary at all if Ford had been
accurate and forthright at the outset about its use, disclosure,
and protection of the relevant source code. Ford's attempt to
distinguish between issues at the evidentiary hearing related to
source code protection and production is unavailing, because the
entire process surrounding production of Ford's source code would
have been shortened and streamlined if Ford had not repeatedly
and vigorously misrepresented its history of source code
disclosure.

Ford should bear in mind that the award of fees and costs in this
case does not arise ancillary to a routine Rule 37(a) discovery
motion; rather, the award here is imposed as a sanction for
Ford's discovery misconduct.

The Court finds that the lodestar amounts for each attorney
should be reduced by twenty-five percent to account for billing
duplication, billing overlap, excessive billing, insufficient
billing descriptions, and block billing. This percentage fairly
addresses Ford's legitimate concerns, while accounting for the
billing judgment already exercised by the Plaintiffs' counsel.
The only time excepted from the percentage reduction is time
charged by Mr. Slavik for work in October 2015 through June 2017
and time charged by Ms. Kuryak, because these time entries are
not duplicative, overlapping, or vague.

Having applied the approved hourly rates and deducting twenty-
five percent from the lodestar amounts, the Plaintiffs are
entitled to an award of attorneys' fees totaling $199,819.29,
which divided by law firm is as follows:

   Grant & Eisenhoffer, P.A.      $54,600.00
   DiCello Levitt & Casey, LLC    $22,374.38
   Spilman Thomas & Battle, PLLC  $75,569.91
   Slavik Law                     $44,961.25
   Bartimus Frickleton
      Robertson & Rader            $1,732.50
   Isaac Wiles
      Burkholder & Teetor, LLC       $581.25

For these reasons, the Court orders Ford to pay the Plaintiffs
the total sum of $488,028.31 as sanctions for Ford's discovery
misconduct.

A full-text copy of the District Court's March 22, 2018
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/ybk2kmk4  from Leagle.com.

Charles Johnson, Michael Antramgarza, Quintin Williams, ACA Legal
Investigations, Inc., John McGee, David H. Patton & Inez A.
Patton, Plaintiffs, represented by Adam J. Levitt --
alevitt@dlcfirm.com -- DICELLO LEVITT & CASEY, pro hac vice,
Alison K. Hurley -- ahurley@bremerandwhyte.com -- BREMER WHYTE
BROWN & O'MEARA, pro hac vice, Amy E. Keller --
akeller@dlcfirm.com -- DICELLO LEVITT & CASEY, Anne M. Tarvin,
BARTIMUS FRICKLETON ROBERTSON RADER, 11150 Overbrook Raod, #200,
Leawood, KS 66211, Benjamin L. Price -- bprice@bremerwhyte.com --
BREMER WHYTE BROWN & O'MEARA, pro hac vice.

Ford Motor Company, Defendant, represented by Andrew J. Trask --
atrask@mcguirewoods.com -- MCGUIRE WOODS, pro hac vice, Bradley
J. Schmalzer -- bschmalzer@flahertylegal.com -- FLAHERTY
SENSABAUGH & BONASSO, Brian D. Schmalzbach --
bschmalzbach@mcguirewoods.com -- MCGUIRE WOODS, pro hac vice,
Harold C. Zuckerman -- harold.zuckerman@mcafeetaft.com -- MCAFEE
& TAFT, Jeffrey A. Holmstrand, GROVE & DELK44, 1/2 Fifteenth
Street Wheeling, WV 26003


FORTIS HEALTHCARE: Shareholder Class Action Mulled in India
-----------------------------------------------------------
Keshav Sunkara, writing for VCCircle, reports that Mumbai-based
proxy advisory firm Institutional Investor Advisory Services
(IiAS) on April 24 said that the board of Fortis Healthcare Ltd
may face an Indian class-action suit if shareholders' interest is
not protected.

The IiAS report referred to the notice by institutional investors
Jupiter Asset Management and East Bridge Group calling for an
extra-ordinary general meeting (EGM) of the company to remove
four board members and appoint three new independent directors.

The investors called for the removal of board members Brian
Tempest, Harpal Singh, Sabina Vaisoha and Tejinder Singh
Shergill.

Brian Tempest was the former managing director and chief
executive officer of Ranbaxy Laboratories.  He has been a
non-executive independent director of Fortis Healthcare since
August 2011.

The report also said that the current board should refrain from
making decisions for Fortis until shareholders have voted on the
resolutions to overhaul the current board in the EGM called by
its 12.04% shareholders.

Earlier in April, The Economic Times had reported that ace
investor Rakesh Jhunjhunwala had questioned the decisions taken
by the Fortis board, given that it had been elected by the former
promoters of the company.

The IiAS report has also raised questions over the appointments
of former PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) executives Rohit Bhasin
and Deepak Kapoor, as an additional director (independent) and
the head of the expert advisory committee, respectively, given
that PwC had been the auditors of Religare group companies (part
of the same group) for a long time.

The board's decision to rope in Standard Chartered Bank to assist
the expert advisory committee and the board on the sale was also
a subject of scrutiny.

The report said Standard Chartered had been a large investor in
Fortis with a 3.05% stake through its private equity arm as on 31
March 2017.

The proxy advisory firm believes the board should run a process
that allows all potential bidders to bid within a tight time-
line.

Administering a selling process that limits the full discovery of
price, leaves investors worried that they are being short-
changed, the report said.

Fortis Healthcare has so far attracted bids from five suitors.
Radiant Life Care, a hospital chain backed by private equity firm
KKR & Co., is the latest bidder to join the race.  The other four
bidders are TPG-backed Manipal Health, Malaysia's IHH Healthcare,
China's Fosun and a consortium of Hero Enterprise Investment
Office and Burman Family Office.

The company has received binding offers only from TPG-backed
Manipal Health, IHH Healthcare and a consortium of Hero
Enterprise Investment Office and the Burman Family Office.

The report said that by allowing the expert advisory committee to
decide only on the binding offers, the board has already cut its
wings. [GN]


GILES COUNTY, TN: Faces Class Action Over Probation System
----------------------------------------------------------
Ben Hall, writing for NewsChannel5 Network, reports that a new
federal lawsuit is taking aim at private, for-profit probation
companies in Giles County.

The lawsuit claims that Giles County and the two private
probation companies it uses, PSI Probation and Community
Probation Services, have extorted money from people too poor to
pay fees associated with misdemeanor probation.

The lawsuit states that Giles County contracted with PSI
Probation and Community Probation Services to run a "user funded"
probation system.

It claims the only source of income for the probation companies
is from the fees paid to them by the people they supervise on
probation.

The lawsuit is similar to one filed in 2015 that shut down the
use of private probation in Rutherford County.

Karen McNeil is one of five people now suing Giles County and the
two private probation companies it uses -- claiming she was
repeatedly jailed for being too poor to pay supervision fees.

"I've got friends that sit in jail right now just cause they
couldn't pay their fees," Ms. McNeil said.

According to the lawsuit Ms. McNeil pled guilty to driving on a
suspended license in 2015.

She was put on probation and ordered to pay $426 in fines and
fees -- plus $45 a month to the probation company that supervised
her and $45 for each drug test.

"That's what they want to do is keep people on probation so more
money comes into probation," Ms. McNeil said.

Ms. McNeil said she paid more than double her initial fine, but
when she missed a probation appearance because she was in the
hospital, her probation officer filed a violation of probation --
and she wound up in jail.

"When you are supposed to get off they find some excuse to
violate you," Ms. McNeil said.

Ms. McNeil said she went to jail four different times over the
last three years.

She said the idea of jail terrified her so much that she paid
fees out of her disability benefits and could not afford rent or
utilities.

So she lived in a tent.

"I only get so much a month and if you couldn't pay your rent and
your light bill you can't live no where free," Ms. McNeil said.

The federal lawsuit is from Civil Rights Corps, Hughes Socol
Piers Resnick & Dym and Attorney Kyle Mothershead.

Civil Rights Corps won a $14 million settlement against
Rutherford County and its private probation company, Providence
Community Corrections, in lawsuit that was filed in 2015.

As part of that lawsuit a federal judge ordered Rutherford County
to release several inmates from its jail and the county ended its
use of for-profit probation.

PSI operates in several locations across Tennessee.

The company said it was not immediately available for comment.

The Giles County Executive was also not available to comment on
the lawsuit.

Community Probation Services did not answer calls to their
Pulaski office. [GN]


HBN MEDIA: "Becker" Suit Alleges TCPA Violations
------------------------------------------------
Cody Becker, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. HBN Media, Inc. dba Commissions, Inc., Case No. 18-
cv-60688 (S.D. Fla., March 30, 2018), is brought against the
Defendant for violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act.

The Plaintiff was a resident of Broward County, Florida.

The Defendant is a real estate technology company which markets
lead generation and customer relationship management software.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq.
      HIRALDO P.A.
      401 E. Las Olas Blvd., Ste 1400
      Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
      Tel: (954) 400-4713
      E-mail: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com


HILTI INC: Court Dismisses Suit Over Electric Tools
---------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss under the
doctrine of forum non conveniens the case captioned S & J
RENTALS, INC. d/b/a TWIN CITIES EQUIPMENT RENTALS, a California
corporation, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. HILTI, INC., an Oklahoma corporation,
Defendant, No. 2:17-cv-01492-MCE-KJN (E.D. Cal.).

S&J seeks redress on behalf of both itself and a putative class
from Hilti for alleged illegal business practices. S&J's First
Amended Complaint sets forth a single cause of action alleging
that Defendant violated California's Unfair Competition Law
(UCL), California Business and Professions Code Section 17200-
17204.

Hilti is the U.S. distributor for the TE 3000-AVR breakers, hand-
guided electric tools that are used for chiseling concrete,
masonry, asphalt, and other excavation work. S&J alleges that it
did not know when it purchased products from Hilti that the
products were equipped with a pre-programmed automatic shut off
function that causes them to shut down after a specified number
of operational hours.

Forum Non Conveniens

Under 28 U.S.C. Section 1391(b), venue is proper (1) in a
judicial district in which any defendant resides; (2) in a
judicial district in which a substantial part of the events
giving rise to the claim occurred; or (3) if no judicial district
is otherwise appropriate, in any judicial district in which any
defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction.

Hilti Did Not Waive Its Right to Enforce the Forum Selection and
Choice of Law Clauses When It Previously Argued for Transfer to
the Northern District of Oklahoma

S&J argues that Hilti waived its right to assert that the case
should be re-filed in Oklahoma state court pursuant to the forum
selection clause because it sought transfer to the Northern
District of Oklahoma.

Hilti has not acted inconsistently with the forum selection
clause at issue here. On the contrary, Hilti's sole actions with
respect to the forum selection clause have been to enforce the
clause. Although Hilti successfully advocated that the forum
selection clause contemplated either federal or state courts in
Tulsa, Oklahoma, the fact that venue in Oklahoma's federal court
was ultimately deemed improper does not preclude Hilti from
asserting the correct interpretation of the clause now.

Hilti Is Not Judicially Estopped from Asserting the Forum
Selection and Choice of Law Clauses As Grounds for Dismissal
under Forum Non Conveniens

It is true that Hilti argued previously that the case could be
brought in either federal or state court and that it is now
arguing the case must be brought in Oklahoma state court. The
difference between these two positions, however, is not the kind
of inconsistency or contradiction the doctrine of judicial
estoppel is meant to prevent. Although the two positions may
appear facially inconsistent, they are nonetheless generally
consistent in that both positions are efforts to enforce the
forum selection clause.

Moreover, the reason for Hilti's shift in position was the
Northern District of Oklahoma's ruling. That Hilti's first
attempt to enforce the clause was predicated on a flawed
interpretation thereof does not preclude another attempt that is
predicated on the correct interpretation. In light of the
Northern District of Oklahoma's ruling that the forum selection
clause refers only to Oklahoma state court, Hilti is not
judicially estopped from advocating for the enforcement of the
forum selection clause as interpreted by that court.

It Is Not Unreasonable to Enforce the Forum Selection and Choice
of Law Clauses Contracted for Because Doing So Does Not
Contravene a Strong Public Policy of California

The state of California does indeed have a strong public policy
in favor of affording its citizens effective consumer class-
action remedies. Van Slyke v. Capital One Bank, 503 F.Supp.2d
1353, 1361 (N.D. Cal. 2007). The question, therefore, is whether
enforcing the forum selection and choice of law clauses here
contravenes that public policy.

Although the Court agrees with S&J that a small business can
still technically be a consumer in that it can function as a
patron or customer of another business, it is clear that S&J is
not the same kind of consumer meant to be protected by the policy
enumerated in Van Slyke. S&J is not an individual person dealing
with a take-it-or-leave-it contract with a large bank. On the
contrary, S&J is a corporation, albeit a small one, that deals
with both the public and other businesses.

In the same way that S&J's status as a small business does not
preclude it from being a consumer neither does such status
preclude it from being a sophisticated commercial party. Indeed,
S&J deals with complex tools and equipment used in a variety of
industrial contexts. Therefore, S&J is relatively sophisticated
compared to the individual consumers in Van Slyke, and that
difference undercuts the consumer protection rationale
articulated in Van Slyke enough to compel a different conclusion.

In sum, the plain language of Section 2023(D)(3) is sufficient to
preclude this Court from concluding that enforcing the agreed
upon forum selection and choice of law clauses, which require
them to bring the case in Oklahoma state court under Oklahoma
law, contravenes a strong public policy of California. As stated
above, S&J bears a "heavy burden of proof" and must clearly show
that enforcement would be unreasonable.

Because there is a legitimate possibility that S&J qualifies
under relevant Oklahoma law, and because the rationale
buttressing Van Slyke appears distinguishable from the facts
before this Court, it is by no means clear that enforcing the
forum selection and choice of law clauses contravenes a strong
public policy of California. Because S&J has not met its burden
in that regard, enforcing the contract as agreed by the parties
is not unreasonable.

A full-text copy of the District Court's March 22, 2018
Memorandum Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7asykje
from Leagle.com.

S & J Rentals, Doing business as Twin Cities Equipment Rentals,
Plaintiff, represented by Ian James Barlow, Kershaw Cutter &
Ratinoff LLP, 401 Watt Avenue. Sacramento, CA 95864,  Jason
Charles Messenger, Richardson Richardson Boudreaux, 7447 S. Lewis
Ave. Tulsa, Oklahoma 74136, Stuart C. Talley, Kershaw, Cook &
Talley PC & William A. Kershaw, Kershaw, Cook & Talley PC., 401
Watt Avenue. Sacramento, CA 95864,

Hilti Inc, an Oklahoma Corporation, Defendant, represented by J.
Daniel Morgan, Newton O'Connor Turner & Ketchum PC, 2700 Bank of
America Center, 15 West Sixth Street, Tulsa, Oklahoma 74119-5423
& John Stuart Poulos -- John.Poulos@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis
Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith.


ILUKA RESOURCES: To Defend Class Action Over 2012 Disclosures
-------------------------------------------------------------
Esmarie Swanepoel, writing for miningweekly.com, reports that
mineral sands miner Iluka on April 24 said that it would defend
itself against a class action launched by shareholders.

The company said that a number of shareholders have launched a
class action in the Federal Court of Australia, claiming breaches
of continuous disclosure obligations, as well as misleading and
deceptive conduct relating to disclosures made by Iluka to the
market between April and July 2012.

During that time, Iluka announced the refinancing of its debt
through a series of five-year bilateral revolving credit
facilities totalling A$800-million, a well as updating the
company's production and earnings guidance for the 2012 financial
year.

Iluka on April 24 denied any liability in respect of the
allegations, telling shareholders that it would defend itself,
should the proceedings go ahead.

Although the proceedings have started, the applicant's third-
party litigation funder has not yet determined if it will
unconditionally fund the proceedings. [GN]


INTEL CORP: Key Files Suit Over Defective CPUs
----------------------------------------------
Robert S. Key, Tyler Hadfield, Laura Hutchins, Michael Hall,
Aaron Meacham, Scott Giles, Greg Pulver, Joshua Minor, Heidi
Metzger, Howard Kramer Realty, Bottone/Reiling, P.C., Kevin
Crawford, Angelo Pandazis, Maria Enik, Edward Sibert, George
Apple, Parker Banning, Ashley Price, Seren Alvarez, Ben
Richardson, Aaron Grover and Martin Hall, individually on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
Intel Corp., Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-00534 (D. Or., March 27,
2018), seeks all proper measures of monetary relief and damages,
plus interest, equitable, injunctive and declaratory relief
including restitution and disgorgement, costs of suit, including
reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses and such further relief
resulting from negligence, unjust enrichment and breach of
implied warranty, in violation of various state consumer
protection laws and the Song-Beverly Warranty Act.

Intel manufactures the central processing units (CPU) that power
most servers, laptops, desktop computers, tablets, smartphones,
and other computing devices. Said CPUs suffer from several
defects that allow hackers to access to what was supposed to be
secure data. These Defects cannot be fixed remotely via a
software update while any mitigation efforts would seriously
affect CPU performance, says the complaint. [BN]

Plaintiffs are computer owners whose units contain the defective
Intel CPUs.

Plaintiffs are represented by:

      Bonner C. Walsh, Esq.
      WALSH PLLC
      PO Box 7
      Bly, OR 97622
      Telephone: (541) 359-2827
      Facsimile: (866) 503-8206
      Email: bonner@walshpllc.com

             - and -

      Jason P. Sultzer, Esq.
      Joseph Lipari, Esq.
      Adam Gonnelli, Esq.
      THE SULTZER LAW GROUP, P.C.
      85 Civic Center Plaza, Suite 104
      Poughkeepsie, NY 12601
      Telephone: (854) 705-9460
      Facsimile: (888) 749-7747
      Email: sultzerj@thesultzerlawgroup.com

             - and -

      Akiva M. Cohen, Esq.
      KAMERMAN, UNCYK, SONIKER, & KLEIN P.C.
      1700 Broadway, 42 Floor
      New York, NY 10019
      Tel: (212) 400-4930
      Fax: (866) 221-6122
      Email: acohen@kusklaw.com

             - and -

      Jeffrey K. Brown, Esq.
      LEEDS BROWN LAW, P.C.
      One Old Country Road, Suite 347
      Carle Place, NY 11514
      Tel: (516) 873-9550
      Email: jbrown@leedsbrownlaw.com


INTER-COAST INT'L: Court Upholds Ruling in Arbitration Dispute
--------------------------------------------------------------
Vin Gurrieri, writing for Law360, reports that arbitration
agreements imposed by the operator of InterCoast Colleges on
workers who could have potentially joined a pending wage-and-hour
class action were invalid, a California appellate court ruled on
April 20, upholding a lower court's conclusion that the
agreements were "unfair" and "one-sided."

A three-judge panel for California's Second Appellate District
affirmed a ruling by Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Michelle R.
Rosenblatt that arbitration agreements that Inter-Coast
International Training Inc. told workers to sign after it was hit
with a wage-and-hour class action should not be enforced. [GN]


INTUITIVE SURGICAL: June 8 Class Action Opt-Out Deadline Set
------------------------------------------------------------
The following statement is being issued by Labaton Sucharow LLP
regarding the class action In re Intuitive Surgical Securities
Litigation, Case No. 5:13-cv-01920-EJD (N.D. Cal.).

To: All persons or entities who purchased or acquired the
publicly traded common stock of Intuitive Surgical, Inc.
("Intuitive" or the "Company") during the period from February 6,
2012 through July 18, 2013, inclusive, and who were damaged
thereby (the "Class").

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and an Order of the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California that the above-
captioned action (the "Action") has been certified to proceed as
a class action on behalf of the Class as defined above.  Please
note: at this time, there is no judgment, settlement or monetary
recovery. A trial date in this Action has not been set.

IF YOU ARE A MEMBER OF THE CLASS, YOUR RIGHTS WILL BE AFFECTED BY
THIS ACTION. A full printed Notice of Pendency of Class Action
(the "Notice") is currently being mailed to known potential Class
Members.

If you are a Class Member, you have the right to decide whether
to remain a member of the Class or to "opt-out" of it (also
called requesting exclusion).  If you want to remain a member of
the Class, you do not need to do anything at this time other than
to retain your documentation reflecting your transactions and
holdings in Intuitive common stock.  If you are a Class Member
and do not opt-out from the Class, you will be bound by the
proceedings in this Action, including all past, present, and
future orders and judgments of the Court, whether favorable or
unfavorable.  If you move, or if the Notice was mailed to an old
or incorrect address, please send the Administrator written
notification of your new address.

If you ask to be excluded from the Class, you will not be bound
by any order or judgment of the Court in this Action, however you
will not be eligible to receive a share of any money that might
be recovered for the benefit of the Class.  You will retain any
right you have to individually pursue claims, if any, that you
may have against the Defendants with respect to the claims
asserted in the Action.  Please note, if you decide to opt-out
from the Class, you may be time-barred from asserting the claims
covered by the Action by a statute of repose and your claims
could be dismissed.  To opt-out from the Class, you must submit a
written request for exclusion postmarked no later than June 8,
2018, in accordance with the instructions set forth in the full
printed Notice.  Pursuant to Rule 23(e)(4) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, it is within the Court's discretion whether
to allow a second opportunity to request exclusion from the Class
in the event there is a settlement or judgment in the Action.

Dated: April 23, 2018

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
United States District Court for the
Northern District of California [GN]


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Law Firms Coax Women to Have Mesh Removed
------------------------------------------------------------
Jack Craver, writing for Benefits Pro, reports that law firms are
hiring marketing firms to coax women into getting unnecessary and
potentially damaging surgeries.

An investigation by the New York Times sheds light on a major
push by plaintiffs attorneys to convince women with vaginal mesh
implants to get the devices removed.  If they get them removed,
they are far more likely to get a major settlement from one of
the two major implant manufacturers: Johnson & Johnson and Boston
Scientific.

In some cases, it seems, women who aren't experiencing problems
with the implants are nevertheless being convinced by aggressive
marketers that their lives are in danger and they need to have
them removed.

Lawyers who are building major class-action cases against
manufacturers hire marketing firms to seek out potential clients.
Providing crucial financing are a number of major financial
institutions, including banks, hedge funds and private equity
firms.

Firms such as Law Cash, a New York-based firm, offer patients
high-interest loans for the surgeries, which they only have to
repay if they are later awarded a settlement.

The financing companies connected the women to doctors who were
willing to quickly perform surgeries.  The Times investigation
focused on a group of surgeons in Georgia and Florida who were
funneled patients via a company, Surgical Assistance, which
served as a middle-man between the financing companies and
doctors.

Although a sizeable minority of women who receive implants
experience complications, those who get them removed are also
very likely to have negative side-effects.  The mesh bonds with
the tissue, meaning that removal is likely to cause internal
scarring.

"(S)caring a patient who has limited to no symptoms into removal
is just dangerous and irresponsible," Dr. Victor Netti, a surgeon
and complex pelvic specialist, tells the New York Times.

A number of the women who talked to the Times about getting
pressured into surgeries said that they have suffered severe
symptoms following the removal, including incontinence, severe
pain and swelling.

One woman, Jerri Plumber, is now suing Law Cash for its role in
pressuring her into what she and her primary care physician
assert was an unnecessary operation that led to permanent health
issues.

All of the entities that have been accused of unethical practices
deny that women were pressured into operations that weren't
necessary.

Reuters has also investigated law firms and others that were
pressuring patients into the surgeries. [GN]


JONATHAN NEIL: Bid for Class Certification in "Brown" Terminated
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order Setting Briefing Schedule and
Directing the Clerk to Administratively Terminate Motion to
Certify Class in the case captioned TERI BROWN, Plaintiff, v.
JONATHAN NEIL AND ASSOCIATES, INC., Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-
00675-LJO-SAB (E.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiff filed a motion to certify a class in this action.
On March 22, 2018, the parties filed a notice of settlement and
request to withdraw the motion for class certification.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to administratively terminate
the motion for class certification filed on January 12, 2018.

A full-text copy of the District Court's March 22, 2018 Order is
available https://tinyurl.com/yczod7j6 from Leagle.com.

Teri Brown, Plaintiff, represented by Ari H. Marcus --
Ari@MarcusZelman.com -- Marcus & Zelman, LLC, pro hac vice,
Yitzchak Zelman -- Yzelman@MarcusZelman.com -- Marcus & Zelman,
LLC, pro hac vice & Tammy L. Hussin -- Tammy@HussinLaw.com --
Hussin Law.

Jonathan Neil and Associates, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Christopher Michael Egan -- cegan@porterscott.com -- Porter
Scott, APC, Derek Joseph Haynes -- dhaynes@porterscott.com --
Porter Scott, PC & Lynette Mary Komar --  lkomar@porterscott.com
--  Porter Scott.


JONES MOTOR: Court Tosses Class Action Over Work Comp Premiums
--------------------------------------------------------------
Tomas Kassahun, writing for Madison - St. Clair Record, reports
that the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Illinois has dismissed a case against Jones Motor Co. Inc. and
Zurich American Insurance Co.

District Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel granted a motion to dismiss
brought by Jones Motor Co. Inc. and Zurich American Insurance Co.
on March 30 on grounds that the plaintiff "failed to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted."

Michael Daley sued on behalf of himself and class members who
were truck drivers for Jones Motor, according to the ruling.

Mr. Daley's lawsuit included claims against Jones Motor and
Zurich for civil conspiracy, violations of the Illinois Deceptive
Business Practices Act, unjust enrichment and violations of the
Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act.

According to the order, Jones Motor conspired with Zurich to
misclassify its drivers as independent contractors in order to
avoid the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act and workers'
compensation premiums.

Mr. Daley alleged Jones Motor made the drivers sign contracts,
indicating that the drivers were independent contractors and that
workers' compensation benefits would be provided by Jones Motor
to the drivers in the event they were injured on the job.

"The agreements required the drivers to purchase an 'occupational
accident policy' from Zurich and to allow Jones Motor to make a
deduction from their wages to cover the cost of the policy,"
Judge Rosenstengel wrote in the opinion.  "The deduction was
approximately $38 per week."

According to Mr. Daley, the drivers were deceived into "paying
premiums for occupational accident policies that were worthless,
or worth far less than represented, because the policies provided
coverage for work-related injuries that were already covered by
the Workers' Compensation Act."

After Jones Motor raised concerns about the jurisdiction of the
court and the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission, the
court found the argument invalid.

Judge Rosenstengel ruled that Mr. Daley can't make claims without
proving that he was an employee as defined by the Worker's
Compensation Act and that Jones Motor failed to provide him with
the benefits he was entitled to under the Act and instead
unlawfully required him to pay for the benefits himself.

"Only the Commission is empowered to make these determinations,"
the opinion stated.  "Until the Commission does so, this court is
incapable of resolving Daley's claims, and they must be dismissed
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."

Mr. Daley had argued that the Illinois Workers' Compensation
Commission can't have exclusive jurisdiction over his employment
status and entitlement to benefits because he doesn't have a
pending workers' compensation claim for a workplace injury or
death.

The court said Mr. Daley didn't explain why a pending workers'
compensation would be necessary to report a company's workers'
compensation fraud.

"Surely, an individual is not required to injure himself at work
and file a workers' compensation claim before he can report that
the company was wrongfully making him pay for his own workers'
compensation insurance?" the opinion stated. [GN]


JPMORGAN CHASE: FX Price-Fixing Suit vs HSBC, RBS Dismissed
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York granted in part and denied in part Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) the case captioned JOHN NYPL, et
al., Plaintiffs, v. JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., et al., Defendants, No.
15 Civ. 9300 (LGS)(S.D.N.Y.).

The Plaintiffs commenced this putative class action under the
Sherman Antitrust Act (Sherman Act), alleging that they paid
inflated foreign currency exchange rates caused by an alleged
conspiracy among Defendants to fix prices in the foreign exchange
(FX) or foreign currency market. The Plaintiffs allegedly
purchased foreign currency from the Defendants in the consumer
retail market. The Plaintiffs allege that there is "a mechanical,
direct correlation" between the FX benchmark rates that the
Defendants allegedly manipulated and the prices that the
Defendants charged the Plaintiffs.

Specifically, the Plaintiffs allege that the prices the
Defendants charged for foreign currency in the consumer retail
market were the benchmark rates on the day of the transaction
plus a small handling fee or commission.

A prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction requires: (1)
procedurally proper service of process, (2) a statutory basis for
personal jurisdiction that renders such service of process
effective and (3) that the exercise of personal jurisdiction
comports with constitutional due process principles.

The parties' dispute therefore concerns whether or not the
exercise of personal jurisdiction would violate constitutional
due process.

Plaintiffs assert three alternative grounds for personal
jurisdiction over each of the Foreign Defendants: (1) consent,
(2) general jurisdiction and (3) specific jurisdiction.

Consent to Jurisdiction

Defendant RBS plc noted that it had reached a settlement in a
separate class action before this Court, but this does not imply
consent to the Court's jurisdiction in this case. A party's
consent to jurisdiction in one case extends to that case alone
and in no way opens that party up to other lawsuits in the same
jurisdiction in which consent was given.

A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-
state or foreign country) corporations to hear any and all claims
against them when their affiliations with the State are so
continuous and systematic as to render them essentially at home
in the forum State.

The Plaintiffs assert without analysis that the Defendants meet
the Tyrrell standard based on admissions in the Plea Agreements
and Deferred Prosecution Agreement, and on internet advertising
accessible to consumers in the United States and New York.

The Court finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to show that any
of these Foreign the Defendants presents an exceptional case.
Based on the Foreign Defendants' sworn statements which the
Plaintiffs do not contradict the Plaintiffs cannot make a prima
facie showing of general jurisdiction over any of the Foreign
Defendants.

Specific Jurisdiction

The Plaintiffs claim without factual support that various
subsidiaries of each holding company formed a single economic
unit with their corporate parent which "enveloped their
subsidiaries into their conspiracy and that the actions of the
subsidiaries should thus be attributed to the parents." It is a
general principle of corporate law deeply ingrained in our
economic and legal systems that a parent corporation is not
liable for the acts of its subsidiaries, the Court said, citing
United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61 (1998).

The Plaintiffs do not provide sufficient facts or argument in
support of a veil-piercing or alter ego analysis. The Plaintiffs
argue that there is no basis for distinguishing between parents
and their subsidiaries because of text from their websites using
only their logo name and waiving any distinction between their
various legal entities and brick and mortar addresses. The
Plaintiffs cannot avoid HSBC's and RBS's corporate form based on
these allegations alone.

In light of this, the Plaintiffs' allegations do not make a prima
facie showing of specific jurisdiction over HSBC Holdings plc or
RBS Group plc. As the Plaintiffs have not made a prima facie
showing of personal jurisdiction over these two holding
companies, the Plaintiffs' claims against HSBC Holdings plc or
RBS Group plc are dismissed.

For these reasons, (i) the motions of BPLC, RBS plc and UBS AG to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction are denied; and (ii)
the motions of HSBC Holdings plc and RBS Group plc to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction are granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's March 22, 2018 Opinion
and Order is available https://tinyurl.com/y9eap2ng from
Leagle.com.

John Nypl, Plaintiff, represented by Lingel Hart Winters --
sawmill2@aol.com -- Lingel H. Winters Prof. Corp., pro hac vice,
Jamie Lynne Miller -- jmiller@aliotolaw.com -- Alioto Law Firm,
Joseph M. Alioto, Sr. -- jmalioto@aliotolaw.com -- Alioto Law
Firm & Theresa Driscoll Moore -- tmoore@aliotolaw.com -- Alioto
Law Firm.

JP Morgan Chase & Co., Defendant, represented by Harry Peter
Koulos  -- harry.koulos@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom LLP, Peter Edward Greene --
peter.green@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
Llp, Tansy Woan -- tansy.woan@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps,
Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Boris Bershteyn --
boris.bershteyn@skadden.com --  Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &
Flom LLP, pro hac vice, Douglas Allen Smith --
douglas.smith@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher and
Flom LLP & John Coghlan -- john.coghlan@skadden.com -- Skadden,
Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP.


LAYNE CHRISTENSEN: Rigrodsky & Long Files Securities Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Rigrodsky & Long, P.A., on April 23 disclosed that it has filed a
class action complaint in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Texas on behalf of holders of Layne
Christensen Company ("Layne") (NasdaqGS:LAYN) common stock in
connection with the proposed acquisition of Layne by Granite
Construction Incorporated and Lowercase Merger Sub Incorporated
("Granite") announced on February 14, 2018 (the "Complaint").
The Complaint, which alleges violations of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 against Layne, its Board of Directors (the
"Board"), and Granite, is captioned Witmer v. Layne Christensen
Company, Case No. 4:18-cv-01051 (S.D. Tex.).

If you wish to discuss this action or have any questions
concerning this notice or your rights or interests, please
contact plaintiff's counsel, Seth D. Rigrodsky or Gina M. Serra
at Rigrodsky & Long, P.A., 300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220,
Wilmington, DE 19801, by telephone at (888) 969-4242, by e-mail
at info@rl-legal.com, or at http://rigrodskylong.com/contact-us/.

On February 13, 2018, Layne entered into an agreement and plan of
merger (the "Merger Agreement") with Granite.  Pursuant to the
terms of the Merger Agreement, shareholders of Layne will receive
0.27 shares of Granite common stock for each share of Layne stock
they own (the "Proposed Transaction").

Among other things, the Complaint alleges that, in an attempt to
secure shareholder support for the Proposed Transaction,
defendants issued materially incomplete disclosures in a Form S-4
Registration Statement (the "Registration Statement") filed with
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.  The
Complaint alleges that the Registration Statement omits material
information with respect to, among other things, Layne's
financial projections, the analyses performed by Layne's
financial advisor, and potential conflicts of interest. The
Complaint seeks injunctive and equitable relief and damages on
behalf of holders of Layne common stock.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court
no later than June 22, 2018.  A lead plaintiff is a
representative party acting on behalf of other class members in
directing the litigation.  Any member of the proposed class may
move the Court to serve as lead plaintiff through counsel of
their choice, or may choose to do nothing and remain an absent
class member.

Rigrodsky & Long, P.A., with offices in Wilmington, Delaware,
Garden City, New York, and San Francisco, California, has
recovered hundreds of millions of dollars on behalf of investors
and achieved substantial corporate governance reforms in numerous
cases nationwide, including federal securities fraud actions,
shareholder class actions, and shareholder derivative actions.
[GN]


LEGACY RESERVES: Doppelt Asserts Breach of Contract
---------------------------------------------------
Jeffrey L. Doppelt, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Legacy Reserves LP, and Legacy
Reserves GP, LLC, and Legacy Reserves Inc., Defendants, Case No.
2018-0225, (Del. Ch., March 28, 2018), seeks to remedy the
defendants' breach of contract and breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing in connection with a proposed transaction
in which Legacy will be converted from a partnership to C-
Corporation and the preferred units of Legacy converted into
shares of common stock of the corporation.

Plaintiff is the owner of the 8.00% Series A Fixed-to-Floating
Rate Cumulative Redeemable Perpetual Preferred Units and the
8.00% Series B Fixed Fixed-to-Floating Rate Cumulative Redeemable
Perpetual Preferred Units issued by Legacy. Doppelt claims that
distributions on those units have not been declared for over two
years and that Legacy has improperly reported accumulated but
undeclared distribution amounts as guaranteed payments to the
holders of the said preferred units and that Legacy has no right
under their contract to convert the preferred units because the
conversion transaction is not a "change of control" and does not
allow the partnership to compel the holders of said preferred
units to convert those units. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Carmella P. Keener, Esq.
      ROSENTHAL, MONHAIT & GODDESS, P.A.
      919 N. Market Street, Suite 1401
      Citizens Bank Center
      Wilmington, DE 19801
      Tel: (302) 656-4433
      Email: ckeener@rmgglaw.com

             - and -

      CSS Legal Group PLLC
      1 Great Neck Road, Suite 7
      Great Neck, New York 11021
      Tel: (646) 517-4399


LEPRINO FOODS: Court Narrows Claims in "Perez" Wage & Hour Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff's
third and eighth causes of action for failure to pay overtime
wages and conversion in the case captioned JOHN PEREZ and on
behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v.
LEPRINO FOODS COMPANY, a Colorado Corporation; LEPRINO FOODS
DAIRY PRODUCTS COMPANY, a Colorado Corporation; and DOES 1-50,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 1:17-CV-00686-AWI-BAM (E.D.
Cal.).

The Plaintiff filed the instant wage and hour class action on
behalf of himself and other similarly situated non-exempt, hourly
unionized employees at the cheese processing plant operated by
Defendants Leprino Foods Company and Leprino Foods Dairy Products
Company (Leprino) in East Lemoore, California (East Lemoore
Plant).   The central factual allegation in the Plaintiff's
action is that Leprino has a practice of requiring the Plaintiff
and the putative class members to work substantial amounts of
time without pay.

The Collective Bargaining Agreement

Leprino emphasizes the following sections of the CBA:

   1. The lowest hourly wage rate for any employee provided for
in the CBA is $12.99.

   2. Employees who are required to change into and out of
uniforms will be paid a total of 14 minutes of additional
compensation for donning and doffing at the straight time rate
for each shift worked. This compensated time is not considered
hours worked.

   3. Time and one-half (1-1/2) will be paid for all hours worked
above eight (8) hours within nine and one-half (9-1/2)
consecutive hours in any one (1) day, or forty (40) hours in any
one (1) week, whichever is greater.

Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action: Failure to Pay Overtime Wages

California Labor Code Section 510 requires an employer to pay a
non-exempt employee overtime for any work in excess of eight
hours in one workday or forty hours in one workweek.

However, California Labor Code Section 514 provides that Section
510 does not apply to an employee covered by a valid collective
bargaining agreement if the agreement expressly provides for the
wages, hours of work, and working conditions of the employees,
and if the agreement provides premium wages for all overtime
hours worked and a regular hourly rate of pay for those employees
of not less than 30 percent more than the state minimum wage.

Leprino is correct that the CBA in this action meets the
requirements of Section 514 for exclusion from the grasp of
Section 510: it provides for (1) wages, hours of work, and
working conditions of the putative class members, (2) a premium
wage for all overtime worked (as appropriately defined by the
CBA), and (3) provides a regular hourly rate of at least 30% more
than the state minimum wage. The overtime requirements of Section
510 do not apply to the putative class members. As a result, the
Plaintiff's Section 510 claim fails and any right to overtime
compensation can arise only from the CBA.

Plaintiff's third cause of action will therefore be dismissed
without leave to amend.

Plaintiff's Eighth Cause of Action: Conversion

The Plaintiff's conversion cause of action is identical. The
Defendants contend that the Plaintiff's conversion claim fails
because he cannot articulate a converted sum capable of
identification and insofar as it is premised upon failure to pay
overtime wages and meal period premiums. The Court only addresses
the Defendants' first argument.

The Plaintiff's allegations make clear that precise calculation
of a specific sum of money owed is not possible. The Plaintiff,
in sum, acknowledges that no records exist from which exact
calculation of a sum converted can be drawn. All of the
Plaintiff's proposals suggest a need to recreate records that
would permit an approximation of a sum owed. Because no precise
sum capable of being ascertained is alleged, the Plaintiff's
eighth cause of action for conversation is not cognizable and
must be dismissed without leave to amend.

Accordingly, the Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted.
The Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action is dismissed without leave
to amend.  The Plaintiff's Eighth Cause of Action is dismissed
without leave to amend.  The Plaintiff's demand for injunctive
relief is dismissed without leave to amend.

A full-text copy of the District Court's March 22, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y7r7j2y4 from Leagle.com.

John Perez, and on behalf of all other similarly situated
individuals,, Plaintiff, represented by Cory Lee, The Downey Law
Firm, LLC, 9595 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 900. Beverly Hills,
California 90212.

Leprino Foods Company, A Colorado Corporation & Leprino Foods
Dairy Products Company, A Colorado Corporation, Defendants,
represented by Sandra L. Rappaport, Hanson Bridgett LLP, Daniel
Robert Lentz, Hanson Bridgett LLP, Kyle Aaron Mabe, Hanson
Bridgett LLP & Lisa M. Pooley, Hanson Bridgett LLP. 425 Market
Street, 26th Floor, San Francisco, California 94105


LNR ENTERPRISE: "Chester" Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages
------------------------------------------------------------
Dennis Chester, on his own behalf and those similarly situated v.
LNR Enterprise, LLC and Carl D. Livingston, Case No. 4:18-cv-
00076 (N.D. Ga., March 28, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid minimum
wages, overtime wages, and liquidated damages under the Fair
Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff worked as a non-exempt installation technician for
the Defendants on July 1, 2016.

The Defendants own and operate LNR, a business engaged in
transporting and distributing instrumentalities for carrying on
commerce, namely DirecTV dishes and equipment. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Andrew R. Frisch, Esq.
      MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
      600 N Pine Island Road, Suite 400
      Plantation, FL 33324
      Tel: (954) 967-5377
      Fax: (954) 327-3013
      E-mail: afrisch@forthepeople.com


MACQUARIE INFRASTRUCTURE: Bernstein Litowitz Files Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------------
Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP ("BLB&G") on April 24
disclosed that it filed a securities class action lawsuit on
behalf of its client City of Riviera Beach General Employees
Retirement System against Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation
("Macquarie" or the "Company") (NYSE: MIC), and certain of its
current and former executives (collectively, "Defendants").  The
action, which is captioned City of Riviera Beach General
Employees Retirement System v. Macquarie Infrastructure
Corporation, et al., No. 1:18-cv-03608 (S.D.N.Y.), asserts claims
under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the "Exchange Act"), 15 U.S.C. Secs. 78j(b) and 78t(a), and
SEC Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. Sec. 240.10b-5,
on behalf of investors who purchased Macquarie's stock between
February 22, 2016 to February 21, 2018, inclusive (the "Class
Period").

The Complaint alleges that, during the Class Period, Defendants
violated provisions of the Exchange Act by issuing false and
misleading press releases, filings with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC"), and statements during investor and
analyst conference calls.  Macquarie owns and operates a
portfolio of infrastructure and infrastructure-like businesses.
Macquarie's most important business segment is its International-
Matex Tank Terminals ("IMTT") business, which provides bulk
liquid storage and handling services at marine terminals in the
United States and Canada.

Throughout the Class Period, Defendants misrepresented and
concealed material risks facing the IMTT business.  Defendants
repeatedly emphasized IMTT's "very strong" performance and "high"
utilization rates.  Defendants touted Macquarie's "good
visibility" into "macroeconomic factors influencing supply and
demand" as evidence of IMTT's stability, but concealed IMTT's
dependence on heavy residual oil, the use of which had been in
decline for years.  Rather than disclose the material risk to the
Company presented by the decline in heavy residual oil products,
Defendants downplayed Macquarie's exposure to fluctuations in the
use of petroleum products.  Defendants also provided false
assurances regarding the sustainability of Macquarie's dividend.

Defendants' misrepresentations and material omissions rendered
investors unable to appreciate or assess the material risks to
IMTT of shifting commodity demands, and the resultant impact to
the Company's dividend.  When the truth regarding IMTT's
dependence on heavy residual fuel oils was finally revealed on
February 21, 2018 and Macquarie announced that it would be
slashing its dividend by 31%, the price of the Company's stock
declined significantly.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff for the Class, you must
file a motion with the Court no later than June 25, 2018, which
is the first business day on which the District Court for the
Southern District of New York is open that is 60 days after the
publication date of April 24, 2018.  Any member of the proposed
class may move the Court to serve as lead plaintiff through
counsel of their choice, or may choose to do nothing and remain a
member of the proposed class.

City of Riviera Beach General Employees Retirement System is
represented by BLB&G, a firm of over 100 attorneys with offices
in New York, California, Louisiana, and Illinois.  If you wish to
discuss this Action or have any questions concerning this notice
or your rights or interests, please contact Avi Josefson of BLB&G
at 212-554-1493, or via e-mail at avi@blbglaw.com.

Since its founding in 1983, BLB&G -- http://www.blbglaw.com--
specializes in securities fraud, corporate governance,
shareholders' rights, employment discrimination, and civil rights
litigation, among other practice areas, BLB&G prosecutes class
and private actions on behalf of institutional and individual
clients worldwide. [GN]


MANHATTAN HELICOPTERS: CSRs Seek Unpaid OT Wages, Damages
---------------------------------------------------------
Maria Engbrecht, Ruth Von Meklenburg, Evelyn Ashkenas, Sabrina
Martinez and Elga Thai, on behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Manhattan Helicopters LLC and
Itai Shoshani, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-02731, (S.D. N.Y.,
March 27, 2018), seeks unpaid compensation, liquidated damages,
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, and all other available and
appropriate relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act and New
York Labor Laws.

Manhattan Helicopters LLC is a New York corporation that owns and
operates Manhattan Helicopters located at Downtown Manhattan
Heliport 6 East River Piers New York, New York, 10004. Plaintiffs
worked as customer service representatives, working more than
forty hours per week and/or in excess of 8 hours in a workday
without being paid overtime, says the complaint. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      D. Maimon Kirschenbaum, Esq.
      Josef Nussbaum
      JOSEPH & KIRSCHENBAUM LLP
      32 Broadway, Suite 601
      New York, NY 10004
      Tel: (212) 688-5640
      Fax: (212) 688-2548


MDL 2804: River Forest Joins Opioid Crisis Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------
Steve Schering, writing for Pioneer Press, reports that River
Forest trustees have authorized the village to join a larger
class-action lawsuit targeting the manufacturers of opioids.

Trustees unanimously approved a retention agreement April 9 with
the Edelson PC law firm, which is one of three firms leading a
coordinated, multi-state opioid litigation coalition.

According to River Forest village attorney Greg Smith, multiple
lawsuits have been filed by various municipalities from across
the country against the manufacturers and distributors of high-
powered pain medications.

"Because of the public taxpayer funds that have been spent
treating overdoses, thefts, employee addictions and things that
are related to opioids, there is currently pending in the federal
court in Ohio a single, consolidated case of all these hundreds
of cases brought by different units of government," Mr. Smith
said.  "[River Forest] will be joining other area communities,
including the city of Chicago, Cook County as well as other local
communities, which have spent taxpayer funds that are hoped to be
and should be compensable from the makers of these opioids."

Village Administrator Eric Palm said expenses incurred by the
village to fight the opioid epidemic include police and fire
salaries, and costs related to the use of Narcan, which is used
to treat overdose victims.

"The involvement of police and fire dealing with overdoses is the
primary reason [for the legal action]," Mr. Palm said.  "[The
village spends money] using Narcan, training to use Narcan and
responding to other calls related to opioid use."

According to Edelson's website, hundreds of lawsuits have been
filed throughout the country against pharmaceutical manufacturers
alleging that the companies deceived physicians and consumers
about the dangers of prescription painkillers.  While Edelson is
one of three firms leading the coalition, a larger legal team,
comprised of a dozen firms spread out across the nation, agreed
to coordinate state court litigation efforts to both increase
efficiencies and speak with a unified voice.

According to Smith, the agreement is a contingency arrangement
with the Edelson law firm, which means the village will pay for
legal services only if it is awarded compensation by a court.

Smith said indications are the judge in the case is pushing for a
resolution or settlement to occur sometime this year.

Board members overwhelmingly voiced their support for the
resolution.

"I don't see any downside given the epidemic we see in our
nation," Village President Cathy Adduci said. [GN]


MEDICAL SOLUTIONS: Court Issues Privacy Notice Order in "Dittman"
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order Regarding Privacy Notice and Opt-Out
Procedure and Disclosure of Putative Class Member Contact
Information in the case captioned Bryon Dittman, an individual on
behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
MEDICAL SOLUTIONS, L.L.C.; and DOES 1 to 10 inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-01851-MCE-CKD (E.D. Cal.).

Pursuant to the privacy notice and opt-out procedure, the
Defendant will provide the third-party administrator, Phoenix
Settlement Administrators (Phoenix), the Requested Contact
Information of the Putative Class Members employed by Defendant
nationwide since January 1, 2016, who will be selected by taking
the first 920 sorted alphabetically by last name.

Phoenix will mail a privacy notice and opt-out postcard in the
form attached to the Stipulation as Exhibit A to those Putative
Class Members.

The Putative Class Members will have 30 days to opt-out by
returning a pre-addressed, postage pre-paid postcard in the form
attached to the Stipulation as Exhibit B to Phoenix.

Phoenix will release to Plaintiff's counsel the Requested Contact
Information for all individuals who do not timely opt-out.

A full-text copy of the District Court's March 22, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y8cj6koa from Leagle.com.

Bryon Dittman, Plaintiff, represented by Kye Douglas Pawlenko-
kpawlenko@helpcounsel.com -- Hayes, Pawlenko, LLP & Matthew Bryan
Hayes -- mhayes@helpcounsel.com  --  Hayes Pawlenko LLP.

Medical Solution, L.L.C., Defendant, represented by David A.
Yudelson, Koley Jessen PC, L.L.O., pro hac vice, Margaret C.
Hershiser, Koley Jessen PC, L.L.O., pro hac vice, Sarah Kroll-
Rosenbaum, Constangy Brooks Smith & Prophete & Kenneth Dawson
Sulzer, Constangy Brooks Smith & Prophete LLP.


MEDICIS PHARMA: Settles Generic Pay-for-Delay Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
Christina Davis, writing for Top Class Actions, reports that
Medicis Pharmaceutical Corp. and Impax Laboratories have agreed
to pay a total of $43 million to end a class action lawsuit
alleging they violated state antitrust and consumer protection
laws and unjust enrichment laws by agreeing not to compete with
other drug companies, keeping lower-cost generic versions of
Solodyn off the market.

Lead plaintiffs, including health insurers and consumers, alleged
in several class action lawsuits that a cheaper, generic version
of the acne medicine, Solodyn, was kept off the market as a part
of a conspiracy by drug companies to keep the costs of the drug
high.  The class action lawsuits were eventually consolidated
into multidistrict litigation (MDL).

Medicis and Impax do not admit any liability under the terms of
the class action settlement, but agreed to pay two Classes -- a
consumer and third-party payor Class -- along with attorney fees
and costs and incentive awards.

Consumer Class Members include those who purchased Solodyn
between July 23, 2009 and Feb. 25, 2018 and reside in certain
states.

Third-Party Payor Class Members include all health insurance
companies, third-party administrators, health maintenance
organizations, health and welfare plans that make payments from
their own funds, and other health benefit providers and entities
with self-funded plans that contract with a health insurer or
administrator to administer their prescription drug benefits who
purchased Solodyn between July 23, 2009 and Feb. 25, 2018 in
certain states.

The deadline to object to the Medicis settlement is May 28, 2018.
Those Class Members who want to object to the Impax settlement
have until June 18, 2018 to do so.

Who's Eligible
There are two categories of Class Members, the Consumer Class and
Third-Party Payor Class.

Class Members include those who purchased, paid and/or provided
reimbursement for some or all of 45mg, 55mg, 65mg, 80mg, 90mg,
105mg, 115mg, and/or 135mg Solodyn and/or its generic equivalent
prescription in Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming, the District of Columbia and Puerto
Rico from July 23, 2009 and Feb. 25, 2018.

Potential Award
"At this time, it is unknown how much each member of the Class
who submits a valid claim will receive. Payments will be based on
a number of factors, including the number of valid claims filed
by all members of the Class and the dollar value of each member
of the Class' purchase(s) in proportion to the total claims
filed."

Proof of Purchase
No proof of purchase necessary; however, the settlement
administrator may ask for additional proof of payment.

NOTE: If you do not qualify for this settlement do NOT file a
claim.

Remember: you are submitting your claim under penalty of perjury.
You are also harming other eligible Class Members by submitting a
fraudulent claim.  If you're unsure if you qualify, please read
the FAQ section of the Settlement Administrator's website to
ensure you meet all standards (Top Class Actions is not a
Settlement Administrator).  If you don't qualify for this
settlement, check out our database of other open class action
settlements you may be eligible for.

Claim Form Deadline
7/31/2018

Case Name
In re: Solodyn (Minocycline Hydrochloride) Antitrust Litigation,
Case No. 1:14-md-02503, in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Massachusetts

Final Hearing
7/11/2018 (Medicis)

7/18/2018 (Impax)

Settlement Website
www.SolodynCase.com

Claims Administrator
In re: Solodyn Antitrust Litigation (End-Payor Action)
c/o A.B. Data Ltd.
P.O. Box 173034
Milwaukee, WI 53217
800-332-7414
info@SolodynCase.com

Class Counsel
Michael M. Buchman
MOTLEY RICE LLC

Steve Shadowen
HILLIARD & SHADOWEN LLP

Defense Counsel
Counsel for Impax:
Steven C. Sunshine
Tara L. Reinhart
Julia K. York
Sean M. Tepe
SKADDEN ARPS SLATE MEAGHER & FLOM LLP

Counsel for Medicis:
J. Douglas Baldridge
Lisa Jose Fales
Danielle R. Foley
VENABLE LLP [GN]


MERCK & CO: Faces Class Action Over Zostavax Shingles Vaccine
-------------------------------------------------------------
Who's Affected
Zostavax Shingles Vaccine might make you sick

Did you suffer from adverse side effects from the Zostavax
shingles vaccine?

The Zostavax shingles vaccine contains a live virus which is
allegedly too potent for certain individuals.

This has resulted in an adverse shingle shot reaction for
individuals within 0 to 6 months of having the Zostavax shingles
vaccine administered.

Possible shingle vaccine side effects include:

Shingles after vaccine
Myelitis (spinal cord inflammation)
Postherpetic neuralgia (pain continuing after shingles blisters
subside)
Vision problems (blindness; eye infections; retinal damage)
Hearing loss
Autoimmune disorders (Guillain-Barre Syndrome, Chronic
Inflammatory Demyelinating, Polyneuropathy, Meniere's Disease,
etc.)
Stroke
Cardiovascular event
Congestive heart failure
Pneumonia
Bell's Palsy (facial paralysis)
Serious neurological disease/disorder
Vasculitis
Although injuries typically occur within the first 0 to 6 months
after receiving the vaccine, long-term injuries including
neurological damage have also been reported.

Filing a Zostavax lawsuit could help recover compensation for
medical expenses, lost wages, permanent disability, wrongful
death, and more.

If you or a loved one suffered from adverse side effects
following the Zostavax shingles vaccine, you may qualify to file
a Zostavax lawsuit or class action lawsuit.

Overview: Zostavax Shingles Vaccine
The Zostavax shingles vaccine is an immunization used for the
prevention of shingles in people over the age of 50.  The vaccine
contains a weakened chickenpox virus and helps the immune system
protect against the development of shingles, which is thought to
be caused by a reaction to the dormant chickenpox virus.

According to the patient information sheet released by Merck,
reported shingle vaccine side effects include headaches, local
reaction to shingles injection, fever, joint pain, muscle pain,
nausea, and chickenpox or shingles after the vaccine.

However, other more severe side effects have been reported.  The
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has received reports of
blindness, paralysis, brain damage, and death, prompting the
federal agency to issue two black box warning changes to Zostavax
labels. In 2016, the drug's warnings were expanded to include
potential vision damage caused by inflammation of the eye.

Other adverse reactions reported to FDA's Vaccine Adverse Event
Reporting System (VAERS) include gastrointestinal disorders,
rashes, arthralgia, myalgia, anaphylactic reactions, and
necrotizing retinitis.

Zostavax Lawsuits
Lawsuits regarding the Zostavax shingles vaccine have been filed
in federal and state courts alleging that the vaccine causes
serious adverse side effects.

The first Zostavax lawsuit was filed in February 2017 in a
Philadelphia court by a woman alleging that she experienced
headaches, dizziness, and blurred vision as a reaction to
shingles injection.  In the long term, she continued to suffer
from vision problems in her right eye, elevated blood pressure,
headaches, and dizziness.

The Zostavax complaint mentions the numerous reports made to the
FDA regarding adverse side effects since the vaccine's release in
2006.

The lawsuit claims that Merck failed to properly inform the
public of the risk of developing shingles and other serious side
effects from the vaccine.

"Despite this information and the potential correlation between
being administered the Zostavax vaccine and developing an
infection within a relatively short period of time, leading to
the development of shingles or varicella-zoster virus pneumonia,
Merck failed to properly address and provide this information
both to patients and the medical providers prescribing the
vaccine," the Zostavax lawsuit states.

If you or a loved one experienced an adverse shingle shot
reaction after being administered the Zostavax shingles vaccine,
you may have a legal claim.  [GN]


MONSANTO COMPANY: Faces "Brickey" Suit Over Roundup(R) Product
--------------------------------------------------------------
Gregory Brickey and Nina Brickey, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. Monsanto Company, Case No. 4:18-
cv-00333 (E.D. Miss., February 28, 2018), is an action for
damages as a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's
negligent and wrongful conduct in connection with the design,
development, manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting,
marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and sale of the
herbicide Roundup(R), containing the active ingredient
glyphosate.

Monsanto Company is a multinational agricultural biotechnology
corporation based in St. Louis, Missouri. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Seth S. Webb, Esq.
      BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
      211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
      St. Louis, MO 63102
      Telephone: (314) 222-2222
      Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
      E-mail: sethw@getbc.com


MONSANTO COMPANY: Faces "Holstrom" Suit Over Roundup(R) Product
---------------------------------------------------------------
Beverly Holstrom and Charles Holstrom, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated v. Monsanto Company, Case No.
4:18-cv-00336 (E.D. Miss., February 28, 2018), is an action for
damages as a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's
negligent and wrongful conduct in connection with the design,
development, manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting,
marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and sale of the
herbicide Roundup(R), containing the active ingredient
glyphosate.

Monsanto Company is a multinational agricultural biotechnology
corporation based in St. Louis, Missouri. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Seth S. Webb, Esq.
      BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
      211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
      St. Louis, MO 63102
      Telephone: (314) 222-2222
      Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
      E-mail: sethw@getbc.com


MYRIAD GENETICS: June 19 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
-----------------------------------------------------------
The securities litigation law firm of Brower Piven, A
Professional Corporation, on April 23 disclosed that a class
action lawsuit has been commenced in the United States District
Court for the District of Utah on behalf of purchasers of Myriad
Genetics, Inc. (NASDAQ:MYGN) ("Myriad" or the "Company")
securities during the period between August 13, 2014 and March
12, 2018, inclusive (the "Class Period").  Investors who wish to
become proactively involved in the litigation have until June 19,
2018 to seek appointment as lead plaintiff.

If you wish to choose counsel to represent you and the class, you
must apply to be appointed lead plaintiff and be selected by the
Court.  The lead plaintiff will direct the litigation and
participate in important decisions including whether to accept a
settlement for the class in the action.  The lead plaintiff will
be selected from among applicants claiming the largest loss from
investment in Myriad securities during the Class Period.  Members
of the class will be represented by the lead plaintiff and
counsel chosen by the lead plaintiff.  No class has yet been
certified in the above action.

The complaint accuses the defendants of violations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by virtue of the defendants'
failure to disclose during the Class Period that Myriad was
submitting false or otherwise improper claims for payment under
Medicare and Medicaid for the Company's hereditary cancer testing
which would subject Myriad to heightened regulatory scrutiny
and/or enforcement action, and its revenues from its hereditary
cancer testing were in part the product of improper conduct and
unlikely to be sustainable.

According to the complaint, following a March 12, 2018
announcement that the Company had received a subpoena from the
Department of Health and Human Services in connection with an
investigation into possible false or otherwise improper claims
submitted for payment under Medicare and Medicaid relating to
Myriad's hereditary cancer testing, the value of Myriad shares
declined significantly.

If you have suffered a loss in excess of $100,000 from investment
in Myriad securities purchased on or after August 13, 2014 and
held through the revelation of negative information during and/or
at the end of the Class Period and would like to learn more about
this lawsuit and your ability to participate as a lead plaintiff,
without cost or obligation to you, please contact Brower Piven
either by email at hoffman@browerpiven.com or by telephone at
(410) 415-6616.

Attorneys at Brower Piven have extensive experience in litigating
securities and other class action cases and have been advocating
for the rights of shareholders since the 1980s.  If you choose to
retain counsel, you may retain Brower Piven without financial
obligation or cost to you, or you may retain other counsel of
your choice.  You need take no action at this time to be a member
of the class. [GN]


MYRIAD GENETICS: Faces Two Securities Class Actions
---------------------------------------------------
GenomeWeb reports that two law firms have filed class action
lawsuits against Myriad Genetics on behalf of investors, alleging
that the molecular diagnostic firm failed to accurately disclose
how it billed Medicare and Medicaid for its myRisk Hereditary
Cancer test.

Pomerantz LLP filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of investors
who purchased or acquired common shares in Myriad between Aug.
13, 2014 and March 12, 2018.  The complaint alleges that during
this time, the company made false and misleading statements about
its business, operational, and compliance policies.
Specifically, Pomerantz is accusing Myriad of misleading
investors or failing to disclose that it was submitting improper
claims for payment under Medicare and Medicaid for hereditary
cancer testing; that this conduct could subject the firm to
greater regulatory scrutiny and enforcement action; that revenues
garnered for hereditary cancer testing were the result of
improper conduct and not sustainable; and that Myriad's public
statements on these matters were false.

Rosen Law firm also announced a class action lawsuit on behalf of
purchasers of securities in Myriad while making the same
allegations, though no class has yet been certified in that suit.

"We are aware of a shareholder lawsuit that was filed in the US
District Court in Utah," Myriad spokesperson Ron Rogers said in
an email to GenomeWeb.  "We believe the claims are without merit,
and the company intends to vigorously defend itself in this
matter."

The lawsuits follow Myriad's announcement on March 12 that it
received a subpoena from the US Department of Health and Human
Services' Office of Inspector General related to "an
investigation into possible false or otherwise improper claims
submitted for payment under Medicare and Medicaid."  The subpoena
covers a period starting Jan. 1, 2014 through March 12, 2018 and
involves the firm's billing practices related to its myRisk test.

The test was launched in September 2013 as a 25-gene panel, but
now gauges 28 genes associated with risk for eight hereditary
cancers. The panel always included analysis of BRCA1 and BRCA2.

The class action lawsuits suggest that the OIG's actions against
Myriad have raised questions about the extent to which Myriad had
used CPT codes 81211 and 81213 -- describing full sequencing
analysis of BRCA1/2 and duplication and deletion analysis of the
genes -- to garner Medicare payment for the myRisk panel.

CMS had issued coding edits to block labs from frequently
stacking these codes, which together amount to around $2,900 in
payments.  It seems CMS has guided companies to instead use CPT
code 81162 (describing comprehensive analysis of BRCA1/2), and
only bill CPT codes 81211 and 81213 with the use of a modifier to
indicate that separate services have been performed on different
days. Under the Protecting Access to Medicare Act, the price for
CPT Code 81162 is $2,253 in 2018, and would be reduced to $2,018
in 2019 and to $1,825 in 2020.

"When the true details entered the market, the lawsuit claims
that investors suffered damages," according to a statement from
Rosen Law firm.  Following Myriad's announcement of the subpoena,
the company's stock price fell more than 12 percent and closed at
$29.01 on March 13, Pomerantz noted.

At a meeting sponsored by financial services firm Cowen, Myriad
CEO Mark Capone said that 7 percent of its revenue for hereditary
cancer testing comes from Medicare, and provided more details
around the company's Medicare billing practices.  He explained
that when it comes to commercial payors, pricing and coding are
agreed upon in advance as part of contracts.

However, Capone said that Medicare is different in that
physicians typically order an integrated BRACAnalysis test which
assesses the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes associated breast and ovarian
cancer and then they turn to myRisk for analysis of the
additional 26 genes associated with eight hereditary cancers.
The integrated BRACAnalysis test is performed at two different
labs, one that does Sanger sequencing and another that gauges
large rearrangements. The BRCA test results are then billed using
CPT Code 81162.

It is unclear how this explanation squares with Myriad's publicly
outlined strategy of moving its hereditary cancer testing to the
myRisk panel (which includes analysis of BRCA1/2 in addition to
other genes) by mid-2015 and transitioning BRACAnalysis into a
companion diagnostic.

In a Form 10-K filed with the SEC, Myriad has stated that the
penalties for violating the federal False Claims Act could
include payment of up to three times the damages sustained by the
government, civil penalties ranging from $5,500 to $11,000 for
each false claim, and exclusion from the federal health care
programs. [GN]


NEW YORK: NYPD Sued for Using Information from Sealed Cases
-----------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Denney, writing for New York Law Journal, reports that the
New York City Police Department's practice of using information
from dismissed and sealed cases for everyday law enforcement
operations, as well as sharing the information with fellow law
enforcement agencies, violates state law, according to a suit
filed on April 24.

The Bronx Defenders and attorneys from Cleary Gottlieb Steen &
Hamilton filed the proposed class action in Manhattan Supreme
Court, alleging that the NYPD is violating a New York law passed
in 1976 that was intended to prevent stigmatization of defendants
who were charged with felonies and misdemeanors, but not
convicted.

The use of sealed information disproportionately affects black
and Hispanic defendants, the suit alleged, and the scope of the
issue is potentially expansive: from 2014 to 2016, the suit
stated, the department made 820,000 arrests in which it collected
sensitive personal information like addresses, Social Security
numbers and photographs and that more than 400,000 of those
arrests should be sealed.

In the same time frame, the suit stated, there were more than
330,000 arrests of black and Hispanic defendants that should be
sealed, compared with about 50,000 arrests of white defendants.

The information the NYPD collects is stored in several different
databases, the suit alleged, and is used for criminal
investigations and for various everyday police decisions, such as
whether or not to arrest someone who would otherwise receive a
civil summons and whether an arrestee should be labelled as a
recidivist.

Information from sealed cases is also shared with prosecutors and
sometimes the media, the suit alleged.  Information from sealed
cases might be used to shape plea agreements for defendants, the
plaintiffs alleged, but that defense attorneys are often left in
the dark as to whether or not sealed information about their
clients is being relied upon until the eve of trial.

In a news release, Jenn Rolnick Borchetta, deputy director of The
Bronx Defenders' impact litigation practice, said the NYPD's
database "marks people for life," even if they haven't been
convicted of a crime.

"The NYPD's use of sealed records violates a law that protects
privacy and the presumption of innocence.  We seek to enforce the
law and end an NYPD practice that places people of color at risk
of heightened surveillance and harsher punishment based merely on
allegations."

A spokesman for the city's Law Department said in a brief
statement that it would review the suit and respond in
litigation.

New York's sealing statute, contained within Criminal Procedure
Law Sec 160, was later expanded to include defendants convicted of
noncriminal offenses.

The statute requires law enforcement agencies to seal records of
arrests that did not result in convictions and destroy or return
photographs and fingerprints taken in the commission of those
arrests.

Law enforcement agencies are required to get a court order to
retain the information from arrests that do no ultimately turn
out a conviction, the suit alleged, but the NYPD has failed to do
so.

Over the last four years, the suit stated, the department has
made 1.1 million arrests, of which more than 750,000 were for
misdemeanors. [GN]


ORION PROJECT: "Andrews" Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
----------------------------------------------------
Tyler Andrews, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Orion Project Services Houston, LLC, Case No. 4:18-
cv-00992 (S.D. Tex., March 29, 2018), is brought against the
Defendant for violation the overtime requirements of the Fair
Labor Standards Act.

Tyler Andrews worked for Orion Project Services Houston, LLC as a
W-2 Wellsite Supervisor.

The Defendant is part of the Orion Group, "a world leader in
delivering manpower solutions to some of the world's leading blue
chip organizations." [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
      Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq.
      JOSEPHSON DUNLAP
      11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
      Houston, TX 77046
      Tel: (713) 352-1100
      Fax: (713) 352-3300
      E-mail: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
              adunlap@mybackwages.com

          - and -

      Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
      BRUCKNER BURCH PLLC
      8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
      Houston, TX 77046
      Tel: (713) 877-8788
      Fax: (713) 877-8065
      E-mail: rburch@brucknerburch.com


OXFORD UNIVERSITY: 1,000+ Students Join Suit Over Teacher Strikes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Sally Weale, writing for The Guardian, reports that more than
1,000 students have signed up to a lawsuit seeking compensation
for lost teaching hours during recent strike action by university
staff, which could cost universities millions of pounds.

Students from institutions including Oxford, Cambridge, Bristol
and Manchester have joined the case, which could become the
largest of its kind in the UK.

Fourteen days of teaching were lost to strikes on 65 campuses in
the UK in a dispute between university employers and the
University and College Union over plans to overhaul pensions
provision for hundreds of thousands of university staff including
lecturers, researchers, librarians, technicians and
administrators.

Lawyers working on the case say universities saved millions of
pounds by withholding salaries from staff who were on strike.
Although some institutions have suggested that money could be
spent on general services for students, many students say they
are entitled to direct financial compensation.

Among them is Milan Vaskovic, 27, from Ottawa in Canada, who is
in the second year of a two-year intensive law degree at the
University of Leicester, paid for out of savings and bank credit.
"We paid a certain amount for a number of lectures and as we are
not getting those lectures we should have received some sort of
adjusted tuition fee or refund," he said.

Mr. Vaskovic said there was "disarray" during the strike -- some
weeks he was supposed to have 13 lectures and received only
three. "The school and the administration knew these strikes were
happening and did very little to prepare us students.  We didn't
know which professors were part of the strike and which were not.
We were walking about like headless chickens.

"Like any service, if you don't receive it or it is of poor
quality, you should get your money back or at least some sort of
refund."

Joanna Moss, from Wellingborough, Northamptonshire, a philosophy
student at Nottingham University, pays annual fees of GBP9,250
through a student loan and estimates she lost 20 hours of
lectures as a result of the strike.  She has set up a petition
demanding a minimum of GBP300 compensation per student.  More
than 100,000 students across the country have signed petitions
protesting against the loss of lectures.

"I think it's unfair that we're paying a lot of money and not
receiving all our contact time," said Ms. Moss.  "This is such a
big thing that is being brushed to one side, and you only have to
see all of the comments from frustrated students on my petition
page to illustrate how this has impacted on them -- as it's been
pretty much a whole term."

Shimon Goldwater -- shimon.goldwater@asserson.co.uk -- a senior
solicitor at the law firm Asserson, which has set up a website
for students who want to join the group action, said: "No other
service provider would get away with charging for 25 weeks of a
service and cutting that to 22 with no price reduction.  There is
no question that universities owe students fair compensation.  If
the class action is accepted, universities would pay out millions
of pounds."

Universities UK, the umbrella organisation representing
universities, declined to comment but pointed to earlier advice
to students to go through their university's internal complaints
procedure rather than resorting to lawyers.  If a resolution
cannot be reached, complaints can be taken to the Office of the
Independent Adjudicator (OIA) in England and Wales.

Planned further strike action on campuses was suspended in
April after UCU members voted to accept an offer to reopen
negotiations with employers over their pensions. [GN]


PACIFIC UNION: Court Dismisses "Woodside" Breach of Contract Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case
captioned JOHN WOODSIDE, III v. PACIFIC UNION FINANCIAL, LLC
SECTION "F", Civil Action No. 17-12191 (E.D. La.).

John Woodside bought a home in Madisonville, Louisiana for
$170,000.  He obtained a $157,712 mortgage from American National
Mortgage Co., Inc., which was immediately sold to Pacific Union
Financial, LLC.  Pacific Union currently services the mortgage.
The mortgage agreement requires that Woodside insure his property
against any hazards, casualties, and contingencies, including
fire, for which Lender requires insurance, and against floods.
Additionally, if Woodside fails to obtain insurance, then the
Lender may do and pay whatever is necessary to protect the value
of the Property and Lender's rights in the Property, including
obtaining insurance.

Woodside brought this proposed class action lawsuit against
Pacific Union.  He alleges that Pacific Union breached the
explicit terms of the mortgage agreement, the implied covenant
for good faith and fair dealing, and its fiduciary duties when it
selected a LPI policy that was significantly more expensive than
the policy he had originally selected.

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a
party to move for dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.

Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
pleading must contain a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

To survive dismissal, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.

Mr. Woodside does not allege that Pacific Union has a right to
impose a lender-placed insurance policy.

Breach of Contract

Woodside contends that Pacific Union breached the explicit
language of the mortgage agreement, and breached the agreement's
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

The Court has already determined that simply selecting a costly
LPI policy (when the contract authorizes it and the lender
disclosed the amount to be charged), accepting commissions, and
providing (and charging for) coverage as soon as the borrower
selected coverage lapses does not constitute a breach of the
mortgage agreement. The additional claims do not persuade the
Court to find differently. It is not the lender's obligation to
obtain a LPI policy from the insurer that the lender originally
selected it is entitled to select its own insurer.

Likewise, it is not the lender's obligation to price shop for
competitive insurance policies. It is the borrower's obligation
and responsibility to obtain insurance, and to seek a price-
competitive option. But when they fail to take those steps, the
lender does not act in bad faith for not investing the time and
resources to secure the best deal for the borrower. Because
Woodside has not alleged facts that support a finding that
Pacific Union breached the contract, Pacific Union cannot as a
matter of law be acting in breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and dealing.

Fiduciary Duty

In Count II of the complaint, Woodside alleges that Pacific Union
breached its fiduciary duty and misappropriated escrow funds.
Pacific Union breached this duty by using and depleting the
escrow accounts to pay for unnecessary and duplicative insurance
to generate additional profits. Pacific Union alleges that under
Louisiana law, it does not owe the plaintiff a fiduciary duty.
Again, the Court agrees.

Louisiana law provides, "No financial institution shall be deemed
or implied to be acting as a fiduciary, or have a fiduciary
obligation or responsibility to its customers or to third parties
other than shareholders of the institution, unless there is a
written agency or trust agreement under which the financial
institution specifically agrees to act and perform in the
capacity of a fiduciary." This Section is not limited to credit
agreements and shall apply to all types of relationships to which
a financial institution may be a party.

The existence of an escrow relationship does not alter
Louisiana's statutory requirements that a fiduciary duty only
exists if explicitly created by a written agreement. Because
Woodside does not allege that Pacific Union agreed to be a
fiduciary in any written document, the plaintiff fails to allege
sufficient facts that a fiduciary relationship existed and that
Pacific Union violated it.

Accordingly, the Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted. The
plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's March 22, 2018 Order and
Reasons is available at https://tinyurl.com/yaf5rysd from
Leagle.com.

John Woodside, III, Plaintiff, represented by Korey Arthur Nelson
-- knelson@burnscharest.com --  Burns Charest LLP, Amanda K.
Klevorn -- aklevorn@burnscharest.com -- Burns Charest LLP, Emery
Lawrence Vincent, Jr., Burns Charest LLP, pro hac vice, James
Patrick DeSonier, James P. DeSonier, Attorney at Law, 450 N
Causeway Blvd Ste C, Mandeville, LA, 70448-4651 Lydia Anne Wright
--  lwright@burnscharest.com -- Burns Charest LLP, Randy Jay
Ungar, Ungar Law Firm, 365 Canal Street. Suite 2520. New Orleans,
Louisiana 70130 & Warren Tavares Burns -- wburns@burnscharest.com
-- Burns Charest LLP, pro hac vice.


PEBO TRAVIATA: "Rubio" Suit Alleges FLSA and NYLL Violations
------------------------------------------------------------
Miguel Angel Cortes Rubio, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated v. Pebo Traviata Pizza Corp. dba La Traviata
Pizzeria, Virgilio Rojas Santos, Blanca E. Perez, and Jose Luis
Perez, Case No. 1:18-cv-02820 (S.D. N.Y., March 30, 2018), seeks
to recover unpaid minimum and overtime wages pursuant to the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 and for violations of the N.Y. Labor
Law.

Miguel Angel Cortes Rubio was employed as a delivery worker at
the restaurant located at 101 West 68th Street, New York, New
York 10023.

The Defendants own, operate, or control a pizzeria, located at
101 West 68th Street, New York, New York 10023 under the name "La
Traviata Pizzerias." [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michael Faillace, Esq.
      MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
      60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
      New York, NY 10165
      Tel: (212) 317-1200
      Fax: (212) 317-1620


PENNSYLVANIA: Court Certifies Class of Pre-Sentence Inmates
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification
in the case captioned ALLEN WOODS, et al., v. SEAN MARLER, Civil
Action No. 17-4443 (E.D. Pa.).

Allen Woods and Keith Campbell, while awaiting trial at the
Federal Detention Center in Philadelphia, seek to enjoin further
enforcement of the Federal Detention Center's Visitation Policy
preventing their children under sixteen from visiting them and
declare the policy unconstitutional under the First and Fifth
Amendments.

At issue before the Court is whether it should allow the action
to proceed on behalf of a class of at least 100 absent pre-
sentence inmates.

Mr. Woods and Mr. Campbell moved to certify a Class under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) of all current and future pre-
sentence inmates at the Federal Detention Center who are unable
to see their child or children younger than sixteen years old
under the Federal Detention Center's visitation policies,
practices, and patterns.

The class period commences on October 5, 2017 and continues so
long as Warden Marler persists in the unconstitutional policies,
practices, and patterns.

Mr. Woods and Mr. Campbell satisfy the Rule 23(a) requirements.

The Class satisfies the numerosity requirement.

Mr. Woods and Mr. Campbell adduce evidence there are at least 100
pre-sentence inmates who cannot visit with their children under
sixteen because there policy only allows immediate family members
to accompany the children.  Warden Marler also stipulates the
Class meets the numerosity requirement.

The Court finds the class of at least 100 members meets the
numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a).

The Class satisfies the commonality requirement.

While the reasons each class member does not have an adequate
immediate family member to accompany their children differ
slightly, they all share the same injury. If no immediate family
member is suitable to accompany their child, their children under
sixteen cannot visit them in the Federal Detention Center.

The commonality requirement is satisfied because the proposed
class members are subject to the same visitation policy and
suffer common factual and legal injury based on the policy's
preventing them to see their children under sixteen.

The Class satisfies the typicality requirement.

The Court finds Mr. Woods' and Mr. Campbell's claims are typical
of the Class because they arise from the same practice or course
of conduct; being Warden Marler's visitation policy preventing
them from visiting with their children under the age of sixteen.

The Class is adequately represented.

Mr. Woods and Mr. Campbell are adequate class representatives.
The Court cannot identify interests of Mr. Woods or Mr. Campbell
antagonistic to the Class. Warden Marler does not explain how
these conflicts of interest are possible. We are unclear how each
pre-sentence inmate's personal circumstances as to why their
child's parent/legal guardian does not allow an immediate family
member handle visits could create a conflict with another pre-
sentence inmate's legal rights.

Mr. Woods and Mr. Campbell are adequate representatives for the
Class because they do not have interests antagonistic to the
Class.

Class counsel is qualified, experienced, and able to conduct the
proposed litigation.

These experienced attorneys are adequate as Class Counsel because
(1) Attorney Baylson is qualified, experienced, and has
represented criminal defendants in jury trials; (2) Attorney
Geffen is qualified, experienced, and has twice served as class
counsel for Rule 23(b)(2) classes;, and, (3) Attorney Davy is
qualified, experienced, and experienced in representing inmates
challenging policies in federal prisons. Warden Marler does not
challenge the adequacy of Plaintiffs' counsel.

Attorney Baylson, Attorney Geffen, and Attorney Davy and their
respective institutions will adequately represent the Class in
this litigation.

Mr. Woods and Mr. Campbell satisfy the Rule 23(b)(2)
requirements.

Warden Marler misconstrues the nature of the Class' claim and
requested relief. The Class is not requesting Warden Marler
investigate the circumstances of every pre-sentence inmate to
make sure they can visit with their children under the age of
sixteen. The Class, instead, is requesting the visitation policy
be declared unconstitutional as presently written and to then be
re-written to expand the universe of adults who may accompany
their children under sixteen.

The Class is cohesive under Rule 23(b)(2) because Warden Marler's
conduct is such that it can be enjoined or declared unlawful only
as to all of the class members or as to none of them and there
are no significant individuals interests harmed by the inability
to opt-out or creating manageability issues in the Class.

Accordingly, the Court certifies the proposed Class under Rule
23(b)(2) of all current and future pre-sentence inmates at the
Federal Detention Center in Philadelphia who, beginning on
October 5, 2017, are subject to the Defendant's visitation
policies, practices, and patterns affecting their ability to
expand the universe of responsible adults who can accompany their
children younger than sixteen on visits.

A full-text copy of the District Court's March 22, 2018
Memorandum is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8ngpgrg from
Leagle.com.

ALLEN WOODS & KEITH CAMPBELL, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL
OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiffs, represented by AMANDA M.
PASQUINI -- amanda.pasquini@dbr.com -- DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH
LLP, BENJAMIN D. GEFFEN, PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTER OF PHILA,
JAMES P. DAVY, PENNSYLVANIA INSTITUTIONAL LAW PROJECT, JORDAN P.
DIPINTO  -- jordan.dipinto@dbr.com -- DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP
& MIRA E. BAYLSON  -- mira.baylson@dbr.com -- DRINKER BIDDLE &
REATH LLP.

SEAN MARLER, IN HIS CAPACITY AS WARDEN OF THE FEDERAL DETENTION
CENTER OF PHILADELPHIA, Defendant, represented by PAUL J. KOOB,
U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE &RICHARD M. BERNSTEIN, U.S. ATTORNEY'S
OFFICE.


PERFORMANCE MEDICAL: "Davis" Labor Suit Seeks Unpaid OT Wages
-------------------------------------------------------------
Jorge Davis, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Performance Medical Services, PLLC (d/b/a
Performance Health), Marvell Scott and Sophie Soto, Defendants,
Case No. 18-cv-02743 (S.D. N.Y., March 28, 2018), seeks to
recover withheld tips and overtime wages, unpaid minimum wages,
liquidated damages and attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and New York Labor Law.

Defendants own, operate, or control sports medicine practices
where Davis was employed as an X-Ray Technician, medical
assistant and phlebotomist where he worked for Defendants in
excess of 40 hours per week without appropriate overtime
compensation for the hours that he worked, notes the complaint.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michael Faillace, Esq.
      MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
      60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
      New York, NY 10165
      Tel: (212) 317-1200
      Email: Faillace@employmentcompliance.com


PRIDE TRANSPORT: Settlement in "Jacob" Suit Has Final Approval
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LINDA JACOB and CHRISTOPHER WATSON, individuals, on
behalf of themselves, and on behalf of all persons similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. PRIDE TRANSPORT, INC., a Corporation;
Does 1 through 50, Inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 5:16-CV-06781-
BLF (N.D. Cal.), Judge Beth Labdon Freeman of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California granted the
Plaintiffs' motion for final approval of their class settlement.

On Feb. 22, 2018, the Court heard the motion by the Plaintiffs.
Having considered the Joint Stipulation of Class Action
Settlement and Release and all papers filed and proceedings had,
Judge Freeman granted the motion for final approval and the
motion for attorneys' fees and costs.

The Parties have submitted their Settlement, which the Court
preliminarily approved by its Order dated Oct. 17, 2017.  In
accordance with the Preliminary Approval Order, the Class Members
have been given notice of the terms of the Settlement and the
opportunity to comment on or object to it or to exclude
themselves from its provisions.

In the Order dated Oct. 17, 2017, the Court certified the Class
for settlement purposes, and now confirmed certification of the
Class, which is defined as in the Agreement as all current and
former truck drivers who are or were employed as truck drivers by
Defendant at any time during the period from May 31, 2012, to
Dec. 28, 2016, who performed any work in California and who were
paid on the basis of activity-based work

Pursuant to the Preliminary Approval Order, the Notice of Class
Action Settlement was sent to each class member.  No Class
Members filed written objections to the proposed settlement as
part of this notice process.

Judge Freeman ordered that the payment of the Settlement Payments
be made to the Class in accordance with the Agreement.  She
ordered that (i) the payment of $3,562.50 to the California Labor
and Workforce Development Agency; (ii) the payment of the fees
and expenses of Simpluris in administrating the settlement, in
the amount of $25,000; and (iii) the payment requested by the
Plaintiffs and the Class Counsel for an award of the Enhancement
Awards and the Class Counsel attorneys' fees and costs be paid
out of the Gross Settlement Amount in accordance with the
Agreement.

Judge Freeman entered final Judgment in the Action, as defined in
Rule 58(a)(1), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  She dismissed
with prejudice the Civil Action.  Except for the one member of
the Class (Gil Jose) who submitted a valid request for exclusion,
the Released Claims of the Class Members and the Plaintiffs are
released in accordance with the Agreement and these Class Members
are barred from prosecuting any of the Released Claims against
any Released Parties.  She ordered the parties to comply with the
terms of the Agreement.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 21, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/J99oYh from Leagle.com.

Linda Jacob, individual, on behalf of herself, and on behalf of
all persons similarly situated & Christopher Watson, individual,
on behalf of himself, and on behalf of all persons similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Aparajit Bhowmik --
aj@bamlawca.com -- Blumenthal, Nordrehaug & Bhowmik, Kyle Roald
Nordrehaug -- kyle@bamlawca.com -- Blumenthal, Nordrehaug &
Bhowmik, Norman B. Blumenthal -- norm@bamlawca.com -- Blumentha,
Nordrehaug & Bhowmik, Ruchira Piya Mukherjee -- piya@bamlawlj.com
-- Blumenthal Nordrehaug & Bhowmik & Victoria Bree Rivapalacio --
victoria@bamlawca.com -- Blumenthal, Nordrehaug and Bhowmik.

Pride Transport, Inc., Defendant, represented by Richard Howard
Rahm -- rrahm@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson & Kristin E.
Hutchins -- khutchins@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C..


PRIMANTI BROS: Settles Wage Class Action for $2.1 Million
---------------------------------------------------------
Melissa MCcart, writing for Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, reports that
Primanti Bros. -- the famous Pittsburgh-based late-night haunt
and destination for an overstuffed sandwich topped with fries --
hasn't been paying its workers their fair share.

That's the outcome of a $2.1 million wage-violation settlement in
a case that recently wrapped up in federal court; it affects 922
tipped employees who work or had worked for Primanti Bros.
between Sept. 9, 2013 and Dec. 31, 2016 at Pennsylvania locations
as well as those in other states.

Former employee Chelsea Koenig filed a class-action lawsuit in
U.S. District Court in September 2016, alleging that Primanti
Bros. didn't pay her, along with other tipped employees --
servers, bartenders and food runners -- the full minimum wage of
$7.25 for every hour worked.  The lawsuit claimed violations of
federal and state wage laws.

Ms. Koenig was employed as a bartender from May 2012 through
September 2013 at the Mt. Lebanon location, one of over 40 across
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Florida, Indiana, West Virginia, Maryland and
Michigan.

In addition to Primanti's Corp., the lawsuit names Primanti's
president and secretary David Head and corporate officers Andrew
Taub, Demetrios Patrinos, James Chu and Nicholas Nicholas, among
other defendants.

According to the final judgment, former and current tipped
employees who worked at Primanti Bros. in Pennsylvania or another
Primanti's location from Sept. 9, 2013 through Dec. 31, 2016 --
who have already filed claims -- will each receive a portion of
the settlement.  Ms. Koenig has also been awarded an additional
$5,000.

The plaintiff's lawyer, Gerald D. Wells III of Connolly Wells &
Gray, LLP in Philadelphia, said, "My co-counsel and I are pleased
that the Court granted final approval to this settlement and
appreciate that Primanti Bros. worked amicably to resolve these
claims."

Assuming no appeals are filed in the next 30 days, payments will
be mailed out this summer.  The payments come from the
settlement, minus attorney fees and reimbursement expenses.

Employees who are part of the settlement have claimed that they
are owed a total of $4.6 million, according to the settlement
agreement.  After fees, there will be a pot of $1.3 million to
distribute among employees, ranging from $3.84 to $8,170.64. Of
the 922 claimants, 673 worked in Pennsylvania.

Ms. Koenig alleged Primanti Bros. wrongfully paid employees less
than minimum wage and did not properly notify employees about how
they would be paid.

Under state and federal law, restaurants can pay employees a low
wage -- $2.83 an hour in Pennsylvania -- compared to the minimum
wage of $7.25 an hour.  Employers, however, must make up the
difference if a worker does not earn at least $7.25 an hour after
tips are added.

According to the lawsuit, Ms. Koenig said she didn't recall her
hourly wage ever having been raised above $2.83 an hour for any
day she worked at Primanti's, regardless "of how little tips she
earned or the type of work she performed."

The suit also states that Ms. Koenig spent 30 percent of her time
doing side work, such as cleaning stations, and not getting tips.
If employees spend more than 20 percent of a shift doing side
work, they are to earn the full $7.25 an hour minimum wage.

"Since we first opened our doors in the Strip District 85 years
ago, Primanti Bros. has been committed to offering excellent
career and employment opportunities for the people of Pittsburgh
and all communities that we serve," a Primanti Bros. spokesperson
said in a statement.  "We strongly believe that we have honored
that commitment at all times, including by treating and
compensating our employees fairly and consistent with the law.
We look forward to continuing to do that."

Primanti Bros. is not the first big-name restaurant in the state
that has not complied with tipping laws.  In July, Philadelphia's
award-winning Zahav, co-owned by Pittsburgh native Michael
Solomonov, settled a class-action lawsuit filed by a former
employee in which the restaurant paid 41 servers $230,000 -- the
result of servers having had to share tips with non-tipped
employees.

In New York, Shake Shack founder and hospitality spokesman Danny
Meyer settled a 2015 class-action tipping lawsuit at New York
City stalwart Gramercy Tavern for $695,000, before the restaurant
switched to no-tipping.  And one of the largest settlements in
the past decade was for $2 million for retaining service charges,
failure to pay overtime and tip pool mismanagement at Blue Hill
at Stone Barns, chef-owner Dan Barber's restaurant in upstate New
York. Over 250 employees shared the settlement.

Food and Beverage magazine reported that the U.S. Department of
Labor has found tip-credit violations in more than 1,500 cases
resulting in nearly $15.5 million in back wages over the past few
years. [GN]


PRIVATE MINI: "Maier" Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
-------------------------------------------------
Loretta Maier, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Private Mini Storage Manager, Inc., Case No. 4:18-cv-
00991 (S.D. Tex., March 29, 2018), is brought against the
Defendant for violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff was employed as property managers by the Defendant.

The Defendant operates a chain of storage warehouses and, until
recently, a chain of RV campsites throughout Texas. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Beatriz-Sosa Morris, Esq.
      SOSA-MORRIS NEUMAN
      5612 Chaucer Drive
      Houston, TX 77005
      Tel: (281) 885-8844
      Fax: (281) 885-8812
      E-mail: BSosaMorris@smnlawfirm.com


PROTEIN SOLUTIONS: Class Action Mulled Following Odor Complaints
----------------------------------------------------------------
Lisa Olliges, writing for KOAMTV, reports that as the city of
Joplin drafts an odor ordinance, a Neosho based law firm tries to
drum up support for a class action lawsuit.

Its goal is to get companies to remediate problems and compensate
residents who can't sell or rent or truly enjoy their homes

"You never know when it's gonna stink." Joyce Sherwood-May has
proven odor problems exist in her backyard.  That's also where
you can see Jasper Food Products.

"God forbid you have your windows open," exclaims Joyce.

She was the first to complain about odors and said they've been
around at least five years.  But she signed a complaint that
resulted in the Department of Natural Resources citing that
company twice just last year.

Now, she, like four thousand other Joplin residents received a
letter from Neff and Day attorneys about a possible class action
lawsuit against another industry, Protein Solutions.  Terry Neff
contends residents home values are being impacted along with the
ability to enjoy their homes.

Joyce said that's true.  "We can't use out back yard most of the
time." And she added, "My dogs come in stinking all the time."

She said complaints don't readily get answered.  "I have screamed
and hollered about this.  It does John Q.  Public no good until
the city finally decides the city has an odor problem."

In an emailed statement, Protein Solutions says: "We utilize
state-of-the-art equipment to mitigate odor and employ best
practices to ensure our plant is properly controlled.  Protein
solutions is proud to state that we operate within all state and
local regulations."

Terry Neff said the majority of complaints the law firm has
received focus on Protein Solutions but if more respondents have
concerns about other companies, there is a possibility of adding
other industries to the lawsuit.  But for now one company is the
focus of the letter campaign.

But Joyce is not alone in complaining about odors.  Cheezie's
restaurant manager, Jennifer Johnson, is worried odors offend
customers.  She's experienced bad smells herself.

Ms. Johnson said, "There was one time, I was heading towards
Rangeline.  I physically gagged. It was really bad."  She added,
"It concerns me that we've spent all this time and energy and
money on making Joplin beautiful which is great, but doesn't do a
whole lot if it smells terrible."

A Department of Natural Resources regional manager, Cindy Davies,
said other companies have been cited more than Protein Solutions.

Ms. Davies explained, "Heartland Pet Foods were cited three times
in the last couple years.

Protein Solutions has had problems in the past but we haven't
cited it since 2015."

Ms. Sherwood-May is willing to be part of a class action suit but
she's not   sure it's just one company to blame. And that's part
of the challenge for the city of Joplin as well. Health
department director Dan Pekarek said it's difficult to determine
who is the culprit of the bad smells.

Mr. Pekarek explained, "With odor it can be a bit challenging.
You have to isolate, if you can, what is the source."  He added,
"You can't just go out and say you're it.  You're gonna have to
go, we have multiple entities all in the same area.  We're gonna
have to go out and literally check around each one of those
entities to see if one of them or all of them might be violating
the city ordinance at the same time."

He also said weather has an impact. "Weather doesn't cause the
odor but certainly impacts how bad it's gonna be, where it's
gonna be.  And some of those days, how trace it."

The city uses the same nasal ranger as used by DNR to gauge odor
intensity.  If an odor can be smelled at a seven to one ratio of
air dilution, it is a violation of state law."

Mr. Pekarek drafted an odor ordinance that is being tweaked by
the city attorney and city manager to be presented to the city
council.  It mimics state DNR regulations.  Mr. Pekarek said, "We
don't want to do something that's not gonna stand up in court."

Mr. Pekarek said the city has limited enforcement capability.
Cases would go to city court where a judge's fine is usually a
maximum of five hundred dollars.  So, he urges residents to call
DNR.

"DNR doesn't want a complaint from us.  We get complaints and
we'll forward them to DNR but for that to be an official
complaint, it's supposed to come from the actual citizen."

Jennifer has complained to the city thinking that was her best
route but is willing to try another avenue.  "If the city would
post something about how to complain to the DNR, that would be
awesome."

Ms. Davies with the DNR said residents can call a local number to
file complaints and report odors for investigation.  That number
is 417- 891- 4300.

She said, "We will write up a concern and get there as quickly as
possible to investigate." And suggested citizens provide,
"Information on where they're located in conjunction with the
facility (ies) they believe are causing the issue.  It's helpful
to us if they notice a pattern of odor occurring, days of week,
times of day, are helpful to us.  If there are distinctive odors
something distinctive such as, it has burning smell or smells
like wastewater.  If there's something distinctive it can help
direct us to where its coming from." [GN]


PROVIDENCE HEALTH: Court Narrows Claims in "Johnson" ERISA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Seattle, granted in part and denied in part
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the case captioned JENNY JOHNSON,
individually and on behalf of a class of persons similarly
situated, and on behalf of the Providence Health & Service 403(b)
Value Plan, Plaintiff, v. PROVIDENCE HEALTH & SERVICES, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. C17-1779-JCC (W.D. Wash.).

The Plaintiff and other Providence employees currently unknown
(Defendants) for alleged breach of fiduciary duties pursuant to
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).  The
Plaintiff's lawsuit deals with the Defendants' management of
Providence's employer-sponsored 403(b) Value Plan (Plan).

ERISA imposes duties of loyalty and prudence on the fiduciaries
of employee pension benefit plans.  In two counts, the Plaintiff
claims that the Defendants breached their fiduciary duties to the
Plan. First, the Plaintiff asserts the Defendants breached the
duties of prudence and loyalty by offering investment options
that carried excessively high fees instead of lower-cost
alternatives (Investment Management Claims).  Second, the
Plaintiff asserts the Defendants breached the duties of prudence
and loyalty based on the recordkeeping fees paid to Fidelity,
which she asserts were excessive and unreasonable (Recordkeeping
Claims).

Defendants assert Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed pursuant
to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
Rule 12(b)(1)

Under Rule 12(b)(1), a complaint must be dismissed if the
plaintiff lacks Article III standing.

Rule 12(b)(6)

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint should be dismissed if it fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is
plausible on its face.

Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff lacks standing to assert
the majority of her Investment Management Claims because she did
not suffer a particularized injury with regard to funds in which
she never invested.

The Plaintiff counters with two standing theories. First, she
argues that the Ninth Circuit applies a standing analysis in
class actions that does not require a named plaintiff to
demonstrate the exact same injury as other class members.

Second, since the Plaintiff brings suit on behalf of the plan,
her alleged injury must simply relate to defendant's management
of the Plan as a whole.

The Defendants' arguments to the contrary deal more with the
issue of the Plaintiff's adequacy as the named-plaintiff a
question reserved for class certification than her failure to
allege a concrete, injury-in-fact. Indeed, the Defendants concede
in their opening brief that the Plaintiff has standing with
regard to investment management fees related to the Freedom Fund.

The Defendants shift their argument and suggest that the
Plaintiff lacks standing because her allegations regarding the
Freedom Fund fail to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. But the Defendant's attack on the merits of the
Plaintiff's claim represents a distinct question from the
Plaintiff's standing to assert the claims of other class members.

The Court concludes that the Plaintiff has standing to assert her
Investment Management Claims regardless of whether she personally
invested in the mutual funds held by unnamed class members.

The Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of standing is
therefore denied.

Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss -- Duty of Prudence

ERISA requires that fiduciaries act with the care, skill,
prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing
that a prudent person acting in a like capacity and familiar with
such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like
character and with a like aim. Plan fiduciaries must not only act
prudently when selecting investments but have a continuing duty
to monitor and remove imprudent ones.

To survive a motion to dismiss, an ERISA plaintiff need not
allege facts that directly address the process by which the Plan
was managed. Instead, it is enough for Plaintiff to make
circumstantial allegations that allow the Court to draw
reasonable inferences that a fiduciary's process in selecting
investments was imprudent.

Investment Management Claims (Count 1)

The Plaintiff's primary allegation in support of her Investment
Management Claims is that the Defendants selected and failed to
remove at least 17 mutual funds in a high-cost share class
(retail shares) when identical lower-cost share classes
(institutional shares) were available.

Here, the Plaintiff has made plausible allegations, that when
taken as true, allow the Court to reasonably infer that the
Defendants were imprudent in their selection and monitoring of
certain retail shares of mutual funds. This specifically includes
the Freedom Fund that the Plaintiff invested in, which in 2016
began offering institutional shares (Z6 shares) that were at
least 10 basis points less than the available K shares. The Plan
had over $176 million invested in the Freedom Fund K shares at
the end of 2016. Courts in this circuit have denied motions to
dismiss where similar allegations were made

This is not to say the Plaintiff will succeed on her claim that
the Defendants' investment management decisions were imprudent.
On a more developed record, it may well be the case that the
Defendants acted prudently in investigating and deciding not to
offer certain institutional shares of the mutual funds identified
by the Plaintiff. At the pleading stage, the Court concludes that
the Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to make her claims
plausible.

The Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Investment
Management Claims as pled in Count 1 is denied.

Recordkeeping Claims (Count 2)

The Plaintiff makes several allegations to support her claim that
the Defendants violated the duty of prudence with respect to the
compensation Fidelity received as the Plan's recordkeeper
Other allegations in the complaint regarding Fidelity's
recordkeeping compensation are either conclusory or contradicted
by judicially noticeable documents.  The Plaintiff's allegation
that Fidelity did not begin rebating revenue sharing until 2016,
is directly contradicted by the 2012 amendment to the fee
agreement that instituted such rebating.  The Plaintiff's
allegations regarding the total annual recordkeeping fees
Fidelity earned are simply incorrect when compared with the
annual fee disclosures that document those figures.

Finally, the Plaintiff's allegation that Fidelity received
revenue sharing that far exceeded a reasonable market rate is
conclusory, insofar as Plaintiff provides no facts regarding the
reasonable market rate for similar defined contribution plans.

The Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Recordkeeping
Claims as pled in Count 2 is granted.

Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss -- Duty of Loyalty

Investment Management Claims (Count 1)

The crux of the Plaintiff's breach of loyalty claims are that the
Defendants' investment management decisions benefited Fidelity at
the expense of plan participants. The Plaintiff alleges that the
Defendants' failure to select lower-cost share classes for the
Plan demonstrates that either the Defendants intentionally
refused to move the Plan to a cheaper share class, or that it
failed to consider the size and purchasing power of the Plan when
selecting share classes.

Some of the Fidelity investment products that were offered, for
example the Freedom Fund, could have benefited Fidelity in the
form of a higher expense ratio at the cost of Plan participants.
While the complaint provides no direct evidence of self-dealing
or preferential treatment for Fidelity, the inclusion and
retention of various Fidelity investment products is
circumstantial evidence that Defendants did not act with an eye
single toward beneficiaries' interests.

The Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's breach of
loyalty claim as pled in Count 1 is denied.

Recordkeeping Fees (Count 2)

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants breached the duty of
loyalty based on its recordkeeping agreement with Fidelity. The
Plaintiff relies on the same factual allegations that she offered
in support of her breach of prudence claim in count 2.

Having determined that the Plaintiff failed to plausibly allege a
breach of prudence in regard to the Defendants' recordkeeping
agreement with Fidelity, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has
failed to plausibly allege a breach of the duty of loyalty based
on the same conduct. Therefore, the Defendants' motion to dismiss
the Plaintiff's claim for breach of the duty of loyalty as pled
in Count 2 is granted. The Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend
her complaint in order to cure these deficiencies.

A full-text copy of the District Court's March 22, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yb4arzn6 from Leagle.com.

Jenny M Johnson, individually, and on behalf of a class of
persons similarly situated, and on behalf of the Providence
Health & Service 403(b) Value Plan, Plaintiff, represented by
Michael L. Murphy -- mmurphy@baileyglasser.com -- Bailey &
Glasser, LLP.

Providence Health & Services, Providence Health & Services Human
Resources Committee & John and Jane Does #1-25, Defendants,
represented by Brian D. Boyle -- bboyle@omm.com -- O'MELVENY &
MYERS, pro hac vice, Meaghan VerGow -- mvergow@omm.com --
O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP, pro hac vice & Medora A. Marisseau --
mmarisseau@karrtuttle.com --  KARR TUTTLE CAMPBELL.


ROYAL DUTCH: Must Face Class Action Over Lease Bonuses
------------------------------------------------------
Keith Goldberg, writing for Law360, reports that a Pennsylvania
federal judge on April 20 sided with landowners in a class action
alleging a Royal Dutch Shell unit failed to pay them
contractually obligated bonuses on oil and gas leases, saying the
documents exchanged between the company and landowners in
brokering the leases constituted an enforceable contract.

The case is styled WALNEY v. SWEPI LP et al, Case No. 1:13-cv-
00102 (W.D. Pa.). The case is assigned to Judge Joy Flowers
Conti.  The case was filed April 12, 2013.  [GN]


SCI DIRECT: Court Denies "Romano" Class Certification
-----------------------------------------------------
In the case, NICOLE ROMANO and JONATHAN BONO, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. SCI
DIRECT, INC.; and DOES 1-50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
2:17-cv-03537-ODW (JEM) (C.D. Cal.), Judge Otis D. Wright, II of
the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
(i) granted in part and denied in part the Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment; (ii) denied as moot the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Conditional Certification under the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA"); and (iii) denied without prejudice the Plaintiffs'
Motion for Class Certification under Rule 23(b).

Romano and Bono allege that the Defendant misclassified them, and
the national class they seek to represent, as independent
contractors rather than employees.  As a result of this
misclassification, the Plaintiffs allege they are entitled to
damages under the California Labor Code, the FLSA, and the
Private Attorney General Act ("PAGA"), and damages and injunctive
relief under California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL").

Romano filed the lawsuit in Los Angeles Superior Court on April
6, 2017, on behalf of herself and other similarly situated
employees.  The Defendant removed the case on May 10, 2017,
claiming that the Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. Section 1332(c)(1) and the Class Action Fairness Act
("CAFA").

Romano moved for leave to file an amended complaint in order to
add Bono as a class representative and Plaintiff, and the Court
granted her motion.  The Defendant moved to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim.
Instead of opposing the motion, the Plaintiffs filed a Second
Amended Complaint, thus mooting the Defendant's Motion.  The
Defendant then moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs' Second Amended
Complaint, which the Court granted with leave to amend.

On Dec. 11, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed their Third Amended
Complaint ("TAC") and alleged the following causes of action on
behalf of themselves and the putative class: (1) Unpaid overtime
wages under California Labor Code Sections 510, 1194, 1198, and
Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order No. 4; (2) Failure to
pay minimum wages under California Labor Code Sections 1194,
1194.2, and 1197.1; (3) Failure to pay all regular wages under
California Labor Code Sections 1197.1, 1199, and the Wage Order;
(4) Failure to allow or pay for meal period under California
Labor Code Sections 226.7 and 512; (5) Failure to allow or pay
for rest periods under California Labor Code Section 226.7; (6)
Waiting time penalties under California Labor Code Sections 201-
03; (7) Failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements
under California Labor Code Section 226(a); (8) Unfair business
practices under California Business and Professions Code Sections
17200, et seq.; (9) Failure to pay overtime under the FLSA, 29
U.S.C. Section 216(B); (10) a PAGA claim seeking civil penalties
for violations of California Labor Code Section 201, 202, 203,
204, 226(a), 226.7, 226.8, 510, 1197, 1198, and Sections 3, 4,
11, and 12 of the Wage Order.

On Jan. 18, 2018, the Plaintiffs moved (1) to certify a
California sub-class of current and former ISRs to pursue the
California-law claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)
and (2) for conditional certification of a nationwide class of
current and former ISRs to pursue the FLSA claims.

On Feb. 7, 2018, he Defendant moved for summary judgment on all
of the Plaintiffs' claims, arguing in the alternative that, even
if it should have classified them as employees, ISRs qualify as
"outside salespersons" who are exempt from various requirements
under California and federal law, including those mandating
overtime, minimum wage, and meal and rest breaks.  The Defendant
claims that granting its Motion for Summary Judgment would render
the Plaintiffs' class certification motions moot.  The Court
heard oral argument from both parties on all three pending
motions on March 19, 2018.

Judge Wright granted in part the Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment and finds that the Defendant has established that even
if the Plaintiffs were employees, and not independent
contractors, they would qualify under the "outside sales"
exemption of the California Labor Code and FLSA.  Accordingly, he
dismissed with prejudice the Plaintiffs' claims for minimum wage,
overtime, regular wage, meal period, rest period, and waiting
time penalties under the California Labor Code and the
Plaintiffs' overtime claim under the FLSA.  He also dismissed the
Plaintiffs' corresponding claims under the UCL and PAGA for these
alleged violations.

As to the Plaintiffs' FLSA claims, the Judge finds that the cases
the Plaintiffs cite in support of their argument are irrelevant.
And, in the other case they, Cummings v. Cenergy Int'l Servs.,
the Plaintiffs asserted their claim for declaratory relief that
the Defendant violated the FLSA under the Declaratory Judgment
Act, not the FLSA itself.  Therefore, the Judge dismissed the
Plaintiffs' FLSA claims in their entirety and denied as moot the
Plaintiffs' pending Motion for Conditional Certification under
the FLSA.

Because the Plaintiffs have not pleaded an independent cause of
action under Section 2802(a), the Judge holds they do not have a
standalone claim for a violation under Section 2802.  And even
though the outside sales exemption applies to the Plaintiffs,
their claim under Section 226(a) survives.  Neither party
addressed this possibility in their briefing, but a number of
district courts in this circuit have held that even outside sales
employees are entitled to itemized wage statements.  Therefore,
the Plaintiffs' claim for failure to provide accurate itemized
wage statements under Section 226(a) survives summary judgment.

As a result of his finding that the outside sales exemption
applies, Judge Wright holds that most of the Plaintiffs' PAGA
claims must be dismissed, because they relate to the failure to
pay overtime and minimum wage and to provide meal breaks and rest
periods.  He finds that (i) the Plaintiffs cannot proceed with a
PAGA claim under Section 2802; (ii) the Plaintiffs' PAGA claim
under Section 226.8 for willful misclassification survives
summary judgment; and (iii) the Plaintiffs' claims under Section
226(a) for failure to provide accurate wage statements survive
summary judgment.

Because the Plaintiffs' claim for inaccurate wage statements
under Section 226(a) survives summary judgment, Judge Wright
holds that the Plaintiffs may still maintain a claim under the
UCL for a violation of that statute.  They may proceed with their
UCL claim only as it relates to the Defendant's alleged violation
of Section 226(a).  He dismissed the remainder of the Plaintiffs'
UCL claims.

The Plaintiffs seek to certify a class of all persons who worked
for the Defendant in California, as an ISR, who were, at any time
within four years of the filing of the Complaint, classified as
an independent contractor.  The Plaintiffs' only remaining claims
for which they seek certification are those related to the
Defendant's failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements.

Because the Judge must find that a proposed class is both
ascertainable and numerous before granting certification, which
he cannot do at this time, he declined to address the issues of
commonality, typicality, and predominance, and denied the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, without prejudice.
Judge Wright ordered the parties to meet and confer and submit a
proposed briefing schedule for class certification no later than
April 16, 2018.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 21, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/ewSa16 from Leagle.com.

Nicole Romano, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated & Jonathan Bono, Plaintiffs, represented by Adrian
Robert Bacon -- abacon@toddflaw.com -- Law Offices of Todd
Friedman PC, Thomas Edward Wheeler -- twheeler@toddflaw.com --
Law Offices of Todd Friedman PC & Todd M. Friedman --
tfriedman@toddflaw.com -- Todd M Friedman Law Offices PC.

SCI Direct, Inc., Defendant, represented by Christopher P. Leyel,
Yoka and Smith LLP, Lonnie J. Williams, Jr. --
lonnie.williams@stinson.com -- Stinson Morrison Hecker LLP, pro
hac vice & Carrie M. Francis -- carrie.francis@stinson.com --
Stinson Leonard Street LLP.


SENATOR CONSTRUCTION: "Armijos" Suit Alleges FLSA, NYLL Breach
--------------------------------------------------------------
German Armijos, Alexander Gonzalez, Adalberto Perez, Giovanny
Manosalva, Francisco Pineda, Rafael Lopez, Omar del Razo, Luis
Caraizaca, and Patricio Toalongo, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. Senator Construction Group Inc.,
Haroon Contracting Inc. and Senator Construction Corporation, dba
Haroon Contracting Inc. and Senator Construction Group Inc. and
Atiq Rehman and Muhammad Usman, Case No. 1:18-cv-02779 (S.D.
N.Y., March 29, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid overtime
compensation and other earned wages under the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the New York Labor Law.

The Plaintiff worked as construction workers for the Defendants.

Senator Construction Group Inc. is a construction company with
its primary offices located in Manhattan, New York and Brooklyn,
New York.

The Individual Defendants are officers of the company. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Jacob Aronauer, Esq.
      THE LAW OFFICES OF JACOB ARONAUER
      225 Broadway, 3rd Floor
      New York, NY 100017
      Tel: (212) 323-6980
      E-mail: jaronauer@aronauerlaw.com


SHERWIN-WILLIAMS CO: "Thompson" Suit Alleges Warranty Violations
----------------------------------------------------------------
Sylvia Thompson, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. The Sherwin-Williams Company and The Sherwin-Williams
Manufacturing Company USA, Case No. 1:18-cv-10591 (D. Mass.,
March 28, 2018), is brought against the Defendants for breach of
express warranty and for violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants manufactured a number
of paints and coatings, which include SW Duration, SW Deckscapes,
and SW Wood Primers. Each of the Defendants, as affiliates and
joint ventures, falsely advertised them to Plaintiff and
consumers as being suitable for certain uses and superior to
other manufacturers' products.

Sylvia Thompson is a resident and citizen of the State of
Florida. She purchased Sherwin Williams products in Florida,
Massachusetts, and Maine and has standing to pursue the claims of
this class.

The Sherwin-Williams Company is an Ohio corporation with its
principal place of business in Cleveland. The Sherwin-Williams
Company is a multinational company with subsidiaries that
manufacture and market purportedly high-performance coatings,
sealants, and specialty chemicals, primarily for maintenance,
repair, and improvement applications, including Duration and
Deckscapes.

The Sherwin-Williams Manufacturing Company is a subsidiary of
Defendant The Sherwin-Williams Company and manufactures
protective paints and coatings for home and industry use. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Lisa DeBrosse Johnson, Esq.
      170 Milk St, 4th Floor
      Boston, MA 02109
      Tel: (617) 850-9065
      E-mail: Lisa@lisajohnsonlaw.com


SSOS OPERATING: "Ahmed" Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid OT Wages
-------------------------------------------------------------
Syed Owais Ahmed, Geraldine Copaus, and all others similarly
situated v. Raees A. Patoli, S.S.O.S. Operating Corp., S.S.O.S.
Investments Int'l, Inc., 1100 Alamo Operating Corp., 1420 Eastex
Freeway Operating Corp., Economy Enterprises Inc., P & J Tristar,
Inc., J & P Tristar, Inc., Raees Houston Investments, LLC, Case
No. 4:18-cv-01007 (S.D. Tex., March 31, 2018), seek to recover
unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Syed Owais Ahmed is a resident of Harris County, Texas. The
Plaintiff was an employee who worked as a gas station/convenience
store clerk owned and operated by the Defendants and their
enterprise.

Geraldine Copaus is a resident of Harris County, Texas. The
Plaintiff was an employee who worked as a gas station/convenience
store clerk owned and operated by the Defendants and their
enterprise.

The Defendant Raees A. Patoli, owns and operates several related
business establishments engaged in interstate commerce or in the
production of goods for interstate commerce. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

      Salar Ali Ahmed, Esq.
      ALI S. AHMED, P.C.
      One Arena Place
      7322 Southwest Frwy., Suite 1920
      Houston, TX 77074
      Tel: (713) 223-1300
      Fax: (713) 255-0013
      E-mail: aahmedlaw@gmail.com


ST. LOUIS RAM: "McAllister" Remanded to Missouri State Court
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RONALD McALLISTER, Plaintiff, v. THE ST. LOUIS RAMS,
LLC, Defendant, Nos. 4:16-CV-172 SNLJ, 4:16-CV-262, 4:16-CV-297,
4:16-CV-189 (E.D. Mo.), Judge Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr. of the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern
Division, remanded the case to the Circuit Court for the City of
St. Louis, Missouri, and denied as moot the Defendants' motion to
dismiss.

The Plaintiffs filed their first complaint in state court, and
the Defendant removed the case to the Court citing diversity
jurisdiction generally and, in the alternative, "minimal
diversity" under the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA").  The
Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint ("FAC") and with it a
motion to remand to state court.  The FAC attempted to clarify
that the class was comprised only of Missouri citizens, rendering
any "minimal diversity" arguments inaccurate for CAFA purposes.
He also argued that even if CAFA jurisdiction were present, then
the "local controversy exception" applied to require remand
because more than two-thirds of the Plaintiff class are Missouri
citizens.

The Defendants responded that the original petition created
minimal diversity because the class definition used the term
"Missouri resident," leaving open the possibility that a non-
Missouri citizen who was also a Missouri resident could be a
member of the class and thus provide diversity of citizenship.
They argued that the Court should not consider the FAC, which
revised the class definition to include only Missouri citizens
who were Missouri citizens at the time of the petition's filing.

The Plaintiffs replied and pointed out that the Defendants had
not met their burden of proof to establish CAFA jurisdiction
because the Defendants had not identified any person who created
minimal diversity.  The Defendants sought and received permission
to file a Sur-Reply with attached affidavits from Missouri
residents who were not Missouri citizens.  The Court did not
consider the affidavits and remanded the matter to state court,
but the Eighth Circuit subsequently instructed the Court to
consider the affidavits before reaching a ruling on the remand
issue.

On remand from the Eighth Circuit, the Plaintiffs filed a Sur-
Response urging the Court to consider its FAC definition of the
class and citing Ninth Circuit law.  The Defendants responded to
the Sur-Response.  The Court denied the motion to remand and held
that the FAC could not be considered and that minimal diversity
exists.

The Plaintiffs requested reconsideration of the Court's order
because, they say, the Court did not consider the "local
controversy exception" or the "home state exception" to CAFA
jurisdiction.  The Defendants responded that the Plaintiffs
abandoned those arguments because they had not been raised since
the Plaintiffs' very first brief on the motion to remand.  The
Plaintiffs responded that they had not abandoned those arguments;
rather, those arguments were only relevant if the Court found
"minimal diversity" under CAFA, which he disputed from the
beginning.  The Plaintiffs further note that because it was the
Defendants' burden to establish CAFA jurisdiction, the burden was
not on the Plaintiffs to prove the exceptions were effective
unless the Defendants met their burden.

The Court's Memorandum and Order held that Defendants had
established each of the three CAFA jurisdictional elements: (1)
minimal diversity among the parties (that is, any class member
and any defendant are citizens of different states); (2) at least
100 class members; and (3) an amount in controversy of more than
$5 million.  It also held that the class definition in the first
petition, not the FAC, applied because the pre-removal complaint
is the relevant document for determining whether removal was
appropriate.

The Plaintiffs argued that, in light of the Court's conclusion
that the CAFA jurisdictional elements had been established, the
Court should have applied the local controversy exception to the
facts of the case.  Under the local controversy exception, a
district court must decline to exercise jurisdiction over a class
action (1) in which more than two-thirds of the class members in
the aggregate are citizens of the state in which the action was
originally filed, (2) at least one significant defendant is a
citizen of the state in which the class action was originally
filed, (3) the principal injuries were incurred in the state in
which the action was filed, and (4) no other class action
alleging similar facts was filed in the three years prior to the
commencement of the current class action.

As the Court recognized, there appears to be no doubt that the
second, third, and fourth factors for the local controversy
exception are met in the case.  It finds that the parties'
dispute pertains to the first factor, whether more than two-
thirds of the class members are Missouri citizens.  The Court
allowed the Plaintiff jurisdictional discovery regarding state
citizenship.

The Judge says the Plaintiffs may take a random sample of
potential class members, ascertain the citizenship of each on the
date the case was removed, and extrapolate to the class as a
whole.  If the sample yields a lopsided result, the outcome is
clear without the need for more evidence.  If the result is close
to the statutory two-thirds line, then do more sampling and hire
a statistician to ensure that the larger sample produces a
reliable result.

The Plaintiffs conducted discovery and retained an expert to
submit an expert report regarding the citizenship of the proposed
class.  The Defendants hired their own expert, who submitted his
own expert report and criticized the Plaintiffs' expert's
methodology.

The Plaintiffs retained Dr. Charles Cowan as their expert in
statistics and survey design and implementation.  Dr. Cowan took
a random sample of potential class members and ascertained their
citizenship -- or domicile -- that is, where the person (1)
resides, and (2) intends to remain.  His survey asked putative
class members whether they made a relevant purchase from the
Defendants during the class period, whether they resided in
Missouri when they made their purchase and continued to reside in
Missouri through the time the case was filed, and whether they
intended to continue to live in Missouri.  He received 107
responses and determined 93 were Missouri citizens.  Thus 86.7%
of putative class members had Missouri citizenship.  Dr. Cowan
also determined this was a random and statistically significant
sample.

Judge Limbaugh will not go into the details of the parties'
statistical debates.  Although the Defendants go to great lengths
to discredit Dr. Cowan's survey, he finds Dr. Cowan's analysis
and opinion persuasive, even in the face of the Defendants'
arguments to the contrary.  Ultimately, even accepting the
Defendants' criticisms, Dr. Cowan's opinion results in finding a
Missouri citizenship rate significantly larger than two-thirds at
a 95% confidence level.

Again, the Judge finds that the Defendants do not suggest that
Dr. Cowan is not qualified as an expert in these matters, nor is
there any apparent basis for them to do so.  Dr. Cowan's opinion
easily supports that more than two-thirds of the Plaintiffs'
class comprises Missouri citizens.  The Plaintiffs' burden of
proof is by a "preponderance" -- or more than 50% -- of the
evidence.  He finds that the Plaintiffs' approach was disciplined
and reliable so as to meet this burden.

Accordingly, Judge Limbaugh remanded the case to the Circuit
Court for the City of St. Louis, Missouri and denied as moot the
Defendants' motion to dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 21, 2018 Memorandum and
Order is available at https://is.gd/b9bIb0 from Leagle.com.

Ronald McAllister, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Anthony S. Bruning --
tony@bruninglegal.com -- THE BRUNING LAW FIRM, LLC, Anthony S.
Bruning, Jr. -- aj@bruninglegal.com -- THE BRUNING LAW FIRM, LLC,
Richard S. Cornfeld -- rcornfeld@cornfeldlegal.com -- LAW OFFICE
RICHARD S. CORNFELD, Ryan L. Bruning -- ryan@bruninglegal.com --
THE BRUNING LAW FIRM, LLC, Edward Morris Roth, THE BRUNING LAW
FIRM, LLC, 555 Washington Ave, St. Louis, MO, 63#600A 101, Kevin
Paul Green -- kevin@ghalaw.com -- GOLDENBERG HELLER, PC, Mark C.
Goldenberg -- mark@ghalaw.com -- GOLDENBERG HELLER, PC & Thomas
P. Rosenfeld -- tom@ghalaw.com -- GOLDENBERG HELLER, PC.

Brad Pearlman, Plaintiff, represented by Fernando Bermudez,
BERMUDEZ LAW STL, LLC.

Envision, LLC, Robert D Bohm, Sue Bohm & Edward E. Mock,
Consolidated Filer Plaintiffs, represented by David R. Bohm --
dbohm@dmfirm.com -- DANNA MCKITRICK, P.C. & Michael Ryan Cherba -
- mcherba@dmfirm.com -- DANNA MCKITRICK, P.C.

Richard Arnold & R. McNeely Cochran, Consolidated Filer
Plaintiffs, represented by Fernando Bermudez, BERMUDEZ LAW STL,
LLC & Martin M. Green, LAW OFFICES OF MARTIN GREEN P.C.

The St. Louis Rams, LLC, A Delaware General Partnership,
Defendant, represented by Amy Elizabeth Sestric --
amy.sestric@dentons.com -- DENTONS US LLP, Anders C. Wick --
anders.wick@dentons.com -- DENTONS US LLP, pro hac vice,
Elizabeth T. Ferrick -- elizabeth.ferrick@dentons.com -- DENTONS
US LLP, Roger K. Heidenreich -- roger.heidenreich@dentons.com --
DENTONS US LLP & Stephen H. Rovak -- stephen.rovak@dentons.com --
DENTONS US LLP.

The St. Louis Rams Partnership & ITB Football Company, LLC,
Consolidated Filer Defendants, represented by Amy Elizabeth
Sestric, DENTONS US LLP, Anders C. Wick, DENTONS US LLP,
Elizabeth T. Ferrick, DENTONS US LLP & Roger K. Heidenreich,
DENTONS US LLP.

St. Louis Convention & Visitors Commission, Movant, represented
by Nicholas J. Lamb -- nlamb@thompsoncoburn.com -- THOMPSON
COBURN, LLP.

The St. Louis Rams, LLC, A Delaware General Partnership,
ThirdParty Plaintiff, represented by Amy Elizabeth Sestric,
DENTONS US LLP, Anders C. Wick, DENTONS US LLP, Elizabeth T.
Ferrick, DENTONS US LLP & Roger K. Heidenreich, DENTONS US LLP.

Regional Convention and Visitors Commission, Third Party
Defendant, represented by David A. Dick --
ddick@thompsoncoburn.com -- THOMPSON COBURN, LLP, Nicholas J.
Lamb, THOMPSON COBURN, LLP & Shaun C. Broeker --
sbroeker@thompsoncoburn.com -- THOMPSON COBURN, LLP.

The St. Louis Rams, LLC, A Delaware General Partnership, Counter
Claimant, represented by Amy Elizabeth Sestric, DENTONS US LLP,
Anders C. Wick, DENTONS US LLP, Elizabeth T. Ferrick, DENTONS US
LLP & Roger K. Heidenreich, DENTONS US LLP.

Ronald McAllister, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Counter Defendant, represented by Anthony S. Bruning,
THE BRUNING LAW FIRM, LLC, Anthony S. Bruning, Jr., THE BRUNING
LAW FIRM, LLC, Richard S. Cornfeld, LAW OFFICE RICHARD S.
CORNFELD, Ryan L. Bruning, THE BRUNING LAW FIRM, LLC, Edward
Morris Roth, THE BRUNING LAW FIRM, LLC, Kevin Paul Green,
GOLDENBERG HELLER, PC, Mark C. Goldenberg, GOLDENBERG HELLER, PC
& Thomas P. Rosenfeld, GOLDENBERG HELLER, PC.


STARBUCKS CORP: May Have to Pay "Seven Figures" if Wage Suit OK'd
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Michelle Lodge, writing for TheStreet, reports that Starbucks
Corp. could end up paying "seven figures or more," if a wage-and-
hour dispute with an ex-employee in California leads to a class
action suit involving thousands of current and former employees,
Grant Alexander, a Los Angeles attorney who represents employers
in wage-and-hour disputes, told TheStreet on April 24.

The six-year-old case of Troester v. Starbucks Corp. was set for
oral arguments on May 1 before the California Supreme Court.  If
Troester prevails, his attorney Shaun Setareh, a partner with
Setareh Law Group in Beverly Hills, told TheStreet on April 24
that he would file to certify the class of affected Starbucks
workers, which he estimates to be in the thousands, with the
Central California Court.  The plaintiff Douglas Troester, a
former shift supervisor at a Starbucks in Los Angeles County, is
suing the company for lost wages.

A ruling in favor of Mr. Troester "has the potential to open up a
whole new area of wage-and-hour disputes" for retail and other
companies throughout the state, said Alexander, a partner at the
firm Alston & Bird, who is not involved in the case.  "It's a
deep breath before the plunge. Everyone is watching to see what
the court decides."

If Mr. Troester prevails, Alexander added, many California
employers may need to assess whether they, like Starbucks, are
vulnerable and owe employees for unpaid work.

In Mr. Troester's suit, he alleges that the company required him
to clock out before completing tasks mandated by the company.
Those included a store closure procedure to transmit sales,
profit and loss and inventory data to Starbucks headquarters.  In
addition, he alleges that he routinely wasn't paid for the
required tasks of locking the store and escorting coworkers to
their cars, which he maintains the company required as part of
its safety guidelines.  The plaintiff alleges that these tasks
took four to 10 minutes daily and that during the 17 months he
worked for the company, he racked up some 12 hours and 50 minutes
of unpaid closing-shift time, which is a full day-and-half in
unpaid minimum wages.  The period covers mid-2009 to October
2010.  Mr. Setareh said that Mr. Troester could very well have
been fired had he not performed the off-the-clock tasks outlined
in the brief.

Central to the case is whether the federal Fair Labor Standard
Act's de minimis doctrine, as stated in the U.S. Supreme Court
case from 1946, Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., and Lindow
v. United States from 1984, applies to unpaid wages under
sections of the California Labor Code.  Both cases deal with
interpretation of what constitutes compensable wages for
employees. In such cases, plaintiffs claim that all work for a
company should be paid, whereas the defendants take the position
that the time and amount are so small that it can be burdensome
for employers to track it.

The back wages that Mr. Troester is claiming is small, $120.
Mr. Troester worked for Starbucks at a minimum wage of around $8
an hour.  However, if the case covered the same ground for
current and former employees of Starbucks as a class of
thousands, the settlement, interest and attorney and court fees,
add up to a high figure.

"Although Starbucks is claiming that the amount is so miniscule,
the company is nickel-and-diming hardworking Americans, while
fattening the wallets of corporate America," said Mr. Setareh.
He added that because for many American workers, an extra $100 or
so, makes a difference in whether they can feed their families,
the amount is meaningful, not minimal.

With 2,874 Starbucks in California, it has the most of the coffee
retailer's stores of any state: 2,001 are company-owned and 873
are licensed by Starbucks.

After Mr. Troester left the company, Starbucks changed its policy
and now pays employees for the tasks in dispute by Mr. Troester.
Starbucks declined to comment on why it made the policy change,
the Troester case or other company details, saying it's because
it is in the "middle of litigation." Starbucks' attorney Rex S.
Heinke, of Akin Gump in Los Angeles, declined to return a call to
TheStreet.

Mr. Troester originally filed his suit in 2012 in Los Angeles
Superior Court.  From there, Starbucks filed a motion for summary
judgment in Central California Court, which it received.
Mr. Troester appealed the summary judgment in the Ninth Circuit
Federal Court, then requested that it be heard by the California
Supreme Court, because he and his attorney don't think the de
minimus defense applies to California minimum-wage claims.

Mr. Alexander estimated that the Supreme Court could rule in 60
to 90 days. [GN]


TOYOTA MOTOR: Settles Class Action for $21.9 Million
----------------------------------------------------
Anne Bucher, writing for Top Class Actions, reports that Toyota
Motor Credit Corporation has reached a $21.9 million settlement
with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) over allegations its dealer
compensation policies resulted in certain minority groups paying
higher interest rates than white buyers without regard to their
creditworthiness.

If you are African American, Black, Asian, Native Hawaiian or
other Pacific Islander and you obtained an auto loan to purchase
a vehicle financed by Toyota Motor Credit Corporation between
Jan. 1, 2011 and Aug. 1, 2016, you may be entitled to
compensation from the interest rate discrimination class action
settlement.

The Toyota Motor Credit settlement fund was established in 2016
after an investigation by the CFPB and DOJ found that Black and
Asian/Pacific Islander buyers were charged an average of $100 to
$200 more on their loans than white buyers.  Thousands of buyers
were reportedly affected by these discriminatory dealer markups.

The investigation found that Toyota Motor Credit's discretionary
pricing and compensation policies resulted in discriminatory
outcomes.  The CFPB and DOJ did not find that Toyota Motor Credit
intentionally discriminated against Black and Asian/Pacific
Islander consumers.

Notice of the Toyota Motor Credit Corporation settlement was
mailed to eligible buyers in December 2017.

Toyota Motor Credit Corporation has neither confirmed nor denied
the allegations but agreed to establish a settlement fund and
change its policies to ensure it does not discriminate against
loan applicants in credit transactions on the basis of
characteristics like race and national origin.

"Toyota's reforms will level the playing field to ensure that all
eligible borrowers -- regardless of their race or national origin
-- can sign auto loans with fair terms and reasonable interest
rates," Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Vanita Gupta,
head of the Civil Rights Division, said.

"While dealerships deserve fair compensation for the valuable
customer service they provide, federal law protects consumers
against higher price markups simply because of what they look
like or where they come from.  We commend Toyota for crafting a
new compensation system that strikes an appropriate balance for
dealers and consumers."

Who's Eligible
You are eligible for a settlement payment under the following
conditions:

You must have received an auto loan to buy a vehicle financed by
Toyota Motor Credit Corporation between Jan. 1, 2011 and Aug. 1,
2016;

At least one buyer on the contract is African American, Black,
Asian, Native Hawaiian, or other Pacific Islander; and
The buyer must have been identified by the government as having
been overcharged by Toyota Motor Credit Corporation.

Potential Award
Varies

Proof of Purchase
If you received notice of the Toyota Motor Credit Corporation
settlement, you can submit a claim online by entering the unique
identifier listed on the letter and your Toyota Motor Credit
Account Number.

Consumers who submit the Settlement Eligibility Form must provide
either the last four digits of their Social Security number or
their Toyota Motor Credit Corporation Account Number.

NOTE: If you do not qualify for this settlement do NOT file a
claim.

Claim Form Deadline
5/8/2018

Settlement Website
https://TMCCSettlement.com

Claims Administrator
Toyota Motor Credit Corporation Settlement
Settlement Administrator
P.O. Box 3775
Portland, OR 97208-3775
Phone: 1-844-778-5953
Fax: 1-844-840-0630
info@TMCCSettlement.com [GN]


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Judge Tosses Drivers' FLSA Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
Stephen Fox, Esq. -- sfox@sheppardmullin.com -- and
Jonathan Clark, Esq. -- jclark@sheppardmullin.com -- of Sheppard
Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP, in an article for Lexology, wrote
that the ridesharing giant, Uber, secured a resounding legal win
when a federal judge dismissed a putative class action lawsuit
alleging the company violated the Fair Labor Standards Act by
failing to pay drivers overtime.  The ruling is enormously
important, not simply for Uber, but for the growing rideshare
technology industry as a whole.

Less than a decade ago, outside of calling a cab company and
hoping for the best, the notion of reliably getting from 'here to
there' via a few button presses on a cell phone was unthinkable.
Things have changed.  Uber -- the now-ubiquitous application that
allows patrons to hail various styles of ride -- has wholly
disrupted the transportation service industry.  According to the
latest estimates, over 160 thousand Uber drivers dot the roads.
Those drivers provide approximately 40 million rides each month,
and the company's 2017 valuation reached $69 billion. The term
"Uber" has become a verb (e.g., "I'll Uber there") analogous to
"just Google it" or "xerox the document."

The Lawsuit: Razak v. Uber Technologies, Inc.

As most endeavors where the customer base grows exponentially and
the company's economic value skyrockets, Uber became a ripe
target for litigation.  For example, in 2016, three individuals
brought suit against Uber in Pennsylvania state court.  The
Plaintiffs sought to certify a putative class of all persons who
provided limousine services for UberBLACK via the Uber
application in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  The matter was
quickly removed to federal court and proceeded before Judge
Michael Baylson in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Razak et
al. v. Uber Technologies, Inc., et al., Cause No. 16-573 (E.D.
Pa.).

Plaintiffs' allegations were relatively straightforward.  In
short, they alleged (i) they were non-exempt 'employees' of Uber
within the meaning of the FLSA and, accordingly, qualified for
overtime pay, and (ii) all time spent "Online" (i.e., logged into
the Uber App and capable of accepting customer rides) for
UberBLACK over 40 hours in a given week entitled them to overtime
pay. For its part, Uber positions itself as a technology-service
provider and explicitly not a transportation company.  Stated
another way, Uber views drivers as 'customers' who may use the
App to provide transportation to individuals requesting rides via
the platform.  Drivers then pay a service fee to Uber on a per-
ride basis.

Independent Contractors or Employees?

Certain procedural elements of the case are particularly
noteworthy.  Uber unsuccessfully attempted to halt the case at
the pleading stage, filing motions to dismiss on the grounds that
Plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to qualify them as
'employees' rather than 'independent contractors' and,
additionally, that Plaintiffs' allegations of time spent Online
in the Uber App were insufficient to state a claim for overtime
pay under the FLSA.  Judge Baylson denied Uber's attempts to
dismiss the case on the pleadings, but ordered expedited
discovery and subsequent briefing on the limited issue of whether
Plaintiffs' Online time qualified as compensable work time under
the FLSA.

After completing expedited discovery, Uber moved for judgment on
the sole issue of whether Plaintiffs' Online time was
compensable.  Notably, for the purposes of that motion only, Uber
assumed that the Plaintiffs qualified as 'employees' and Uber was
their 'employer' under the FLSA. Judge Baylson denied Uber's
motion, finding that the time Plaintiffs spent logged into the
Uber App could be considered "predominately for the benefit of
the employer rather than the employee." Importantly, the denial
was without prejudice to Uber's ability to refile for summary
judgment at the completion of discovery because, according to
Judge Baylson, "the compensability question . . . may be
inextricably intertwined with the threshold employee versus
independent contractor question." Consequently, the stage was set
for Uber's summary judgment motion on the issue of whether
UberBLACK drivers are, in fact, employees or independent
contractors.

The Ruling

Predictably, Uber filed for summary judgment on precisely that
issue.  The Court granted the motion and dismissed Plaintiffs'
case, finding UberBLACK drivers are independent contractors, and
therefore not within the ambit of the FLSA.

Judge Baylson applied the Third Circuit's three-decade old six-
factor test in analyzing whether Plaintiffs were independent
contractors or Uber employees.  The test-highly-similar to that
of other federal circuits -- requires the Court to ascertain:

1. The alleged employer's right to control the manner in which
the work is performed;
2. The alleged employee's opportunity for profit or loss;
3. The alleged employee's investment in equipment or materials;
4. Whether the service rendered requires a special skill;
5. The degree of permanence of the working relationship; and
6. Whether the service is integral to the alleged employer's
business.

Of the six, the Court found factors 1, 2, 3, and 5 weighed
heavily in favor of independent contractor status, while factors
4 and 6 tilted only slightly towards an employee finding.
Accordingly, the Court's ultimate conclusion that Plaintiffs were
independent contractors was not a close call. In reaching this
result, the Court found several facts critical:

   -- Drivers independently decide where to go to offer rides
while Online;
   -- Uber places no restrictions on drivers' ability to engage
in personal activities while Online;
   -- Plaintiffs did, in fact, engage in personal activities
including accepting rides from private clients, napping, smoking
cigarettes, running personal errands, and taking personal phone
calls;
   -- Uber allows drivers to simultaneously use competing
software applications to accept rides and provide transportation;
   -- Plaintiffs spent a "large portion" of their time Online not
actually completing trips for customers; and
   -- UberBLACK drivers must purchase or lease their own
vehicles.

The Court also gave substantial weight to the Service Agreement
executed between Uber and its UberBLACK drivers.  Among other
things, the Agreement provided that (i) drivers are 'independent
contractors; (ii) Uber does not and "shall not" control the
drivers' performance of their duties; (iii) drivers have the
"sole right" to determine the manner and means of utilizing the
App; and (iv) Uber has "no right" to require drivers to display
Uber signage, wear a uniform, or otherwise display any Uber
affiliation.  In short, the Court found it legally significant
that Uber's Service Agreement went "beyond merely characterizing
the extent to which Uber can control drivers [but] detail[ed] the
many ways that Uber is not entitled to control [them]."

Takeaways

Judge Baylson's order is a seminal result -- not just for Uber,
but for the entire rideshare technology industry.  Indeed, an
adverse outcome could have upended the entire space.  The
economic repercussions stemming from a legal determination that
Uber's 160,000-plus drivers are entitled to overtime simply by
being 'Online' in the App more than 40 hours a week would have
been staggering.  Further, tort liability issues arising from a
finding that this fleet of drivers are, in fact, Uber employees
could result in endless and costly litigation, all of which would
inevitably waterfall onto consumers.  And while Plaintiffs'
counsel has vowed an appeal to the Third Circuit, the odds of a
reversal are likely slim.

For their part, businesses who desire to solidify independent
contractor status should take particular heed to the language of
Uber's Service Agreement, which the Court found materially
compelling.  Indeed, far too often companies rely on boilerplate
language such as "you acknowledge you are an Independent
Contractor," that is ultimately toothless when weighed against
the reality of the parties' relationship.  On the other hand,
Uber's Agreement -- as Judge Baylson explicitly noted --
contained affirmative covenants restricting what Uber itself
could do in relation to the drivers' performance of their duties.
Consequently, in light of this recent ruling, businesses should
work with counsel to reevaluate and solidify pre-existing
independent contractor agreements that rely on impotent, uniform
language that may expose them to liability. [GN]


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Judge Stays Worker Misclassification Case
------------------------------------------------------------
Michael McKiernan, writing for Law Times, reports that worker
misclassification class actions are here to stay, according to
the growing band of employment lawyers handling cases for
plaintiffs.

In his recent decision in the matter of Heller v. Uber
Technologies Inc., Ontario Superior Court Justice Paul Perell
stayed an action by Uber drivers who claimed they should be
considered employees of the ride-sharing app's creators under
Ontario's Employment Standards Act rather than independent
contractors to the company.

Justice Perell's decision did not touch on the merits of the
claim but stayed the action in favour of arbitration under a
clause in the service agreement signed by all Uber drivers.

However, the case is just one of a number of similar matters
currently before the courts, and the drivers' counsel, Toronto
employment lawyer Lior Samfiru -- lior@stlawyers.ca -- says he
expects more to follow.

"Employee misclassification is one of the top two or three issues
coming up in my practice right now; it's unbelievably common,"
says Mr. Samfiru, co-founder of Samfiru Tumarkin LLP, adding that
Justice Perell's decision has been appealed.

Stephen Moreau -- smoreau@cavalluzzo.com -- a partner at labour
and employment law boutique Cavalluzzo LLP in Toronto, says an
increasing number of businesses are engaging workers under
agreements that describe them as independent contractors, rather
than more formal employment agreements.

He recently launched a $20-million claim against Blyth Academy on
behalf of a number of former sessional teachers at the private
school in Toronto.

The proposed class action alleges that teachers classified as
independent contractors, who were paid flat rate fees to instruct
courses, missed out on overtime, vacation pay and severance
payments, as well as a host of other protections available to
employees under the ESA, such as the right to minimum wage.

In a statement of defence, the school denies the claims, none of
which has been proved in court, and says all its workers were
properly classified.

"Employers do have to be cautious, and what this case reminds us
is that there are employers in more traditional industries trying
it out for size and calling their workers contractors," Mr.
Moreau says.

Mr. Samfiru, who advises employers as well as employees in
workplace matters, says the principals at smaller companies in
particular do not always appreciate the risks of entering
contractor relationships with their workers.

"A lot of them are trying to do the right thing, without thinking
that they are doing anything illegal, only to learn the hard way
that it's not as simple as calling someone an independent
contractor," he says.  "It's about form over substance, so if
they look and act like an employee, it doesn't matter if they're
called something else in the agreement."

Mr. Samfiru explains that when courts or labour ministry
officials are asked to decide how a worker should be classified,
the contract between the parties is not determinative, and the
ruling is made based on a number of other factors.

They include the amount of control the company exerts over the
working conditions of its contractor, such as the hours and
methods of work, as well as the level of integration between the
two.  In addition, which party provides the tools of the craft
and who bears the financial risks in the relationship will also
have an impact on how the arrangement is characterized in the
eyes of the law.

"Employers generally don't see why the contract shouldn't be
enforceable, but meanwhile, they're not withholding any taxes for
people who they maybe should be treating as employees,"
Mr. Samfiru says.  "There are substantial penalties for
misclassification and, hopefully, as these issues get more
attention, more employers will appreciate their legal
obligations."

According to Toronto employment lawyer Andrew Monkhouse, many
employers are attracted to contractor relationships with workers
by the accounting simplicity of a smaller workforce.

"In my experience, it's motivated by the tax implications, rather
than avoiding vacation pay or other ESA entitlements.  It can be
quite onerous on small businesses to do statutory deductions for
employment insurance and [the Canada Pension Plan] on a monthly
basis," he says.  "But over time, misclassification can hurt
workers."

Mr. Monkhouse says scrutiny on this type of arrangement is likely
to spike in the near future, following the passage at Queen's
Park of Bill 148, the Fair Workplaces, Better Jobs Act.  The
bill, which received Royal assent in November 2017, altered the
ESA, placing the burden on employers to prove that contractors
are not in fact employees should a dispute arise over
classification.

The new law also came with a promise to boost enforcement, with
funding provided for as many as 175 new employment standards
inspectors.

"Reversing the onus may well result in more class actions moving
forward claiming misclassification," predicts Mr. Monkhouse, who
acts for a group of document review lawyers suing Deloitte LLP in
a $400-million lawsuit alleging the accounting giant improperly
classified them as independent contractors.

Ryan Plener -- ryan-plener@hicksmorley.com -- a lawyer with the
Toronto office of management-side employment law boutique Hicks
Morley Hamilton Stewart Storie LLP, says the recent legislative
changes mean now is a good time for employers to reassess their
relationships with contractors.

"It's always important to ensure people are properly classified.
Whenever I meet with clients, one of the things I ask them to do
is to send me a copy of their contracts, so that we can review
relationships and understand whether or not they fit into the
category where they have been placed," he says.

"The government is signalling that employers should be cognizant
of their relationships and that education is important on all
sides."

Those who do move forward with claims will still have to convince
a judge that their case is worthy of certification as a class
action.

In January, Justice Perell's decision in Sondhi v. Deloitte
Management Services LP certified the document review class action
against Deloitte after accepting a replacement, more suitable
representative plaintiff than the one originally proposed.

Mr. Monkhouse says that his focus is now on formally notifying
the class of more than 400 lawyers of the certification, as well
as further document discovery before the case heads toward a
common issues trial, where the classification issue will be
settled.

In the Uber case, the drivers' action was shut down pre-
certification, though Mr. Samfiru remains hopeful that Justice
Perell's decision in that matter will be overturned on appeal.

The judge ruled that drivers were bound by an arbitration clause
in their service agreement, which requires all disputes to be
resolved by arbitration in the Netherlands and that the result
was not precluded by the ESA.  But Mr. Samfiru says it's
"practically unworkable" to expect individual Ontario drivers to
proceed with arbitration claims abroad.

"In our view, if the contract provides a remedy that is not
accessible in reality, then it has no meaning," he says.

Mr. Plener says Justice Perell's decision is a useful one for
counsel on both sides of the bar.

"Whether you're acting for employers or employees, it's helpful
to have the principle stated upfront that arbitration agreements
are not necessarily or expressly ousted by the ESA," he says.
[GN]


UNITED STATES: Iranians Sue Over Refugee Status Applications
------------------------------------------------------------
Susan Crabtree, writing for The Washington Free Beacon, reports
that nearly 100 Iranians, many of whom are either Christians or
other persecuted religious minorities, have filed a class-action
lawsuit against the U.S. government challenging the mass denials
of their applications for refugee status under an expedited U.S.
program.

The Iranian individuals and their family members applied for
refugee resettlement in the United States under the Lautenberg
Amendment, a law Congress first passed in 1989 to facilitate
refugee admission of Jews fleeing the former Soviet Union.
Lawmakers expanded the program in 2004 to include religious
minorities in Iran.

The program has admitted thousands of Iranian Christians and
other religious minorities over the past decade at a near 100
percent acceptance rate without incident, according to U.S.
lawmakers familiar with the acceptance record.  However, in
February the Department of Homeland Security denied the latest
group, who were awaiting resettlement in Vienna as required.

The DHS letters of denial did not provide the reasons behind the
decision, stating only that the applicants were being barred from
resettling in the U.S. "as a matter of discretion."

The DHS did not respond to a request for comment about the
lawsuit.

A State Department spokeswoman earlier this year did not
elaborate on why DHS had denied the group of Iranians, saying
only the "safety and security of the American people are
paramount," and that "Iranian refugee applicants under this
program are subject to the same security vetting processes that
apply to refugee applicants of other nationalities considered for
admission to the United States of America."

The news was a devastating blow to the many in the group, who had
been waiting in Vienna for nearly a year while the U.S.
government considered their cases.

Many of them now worry they will not be able to seek asylum
elsewhere, and will be forced to return back to Iran, where they
could face greater persecution for trying to emigrate to the
U.S., and possibly imprisonment and death in Iran's notoriously
harsh prisons.

The denials have raised concerns in Congress among champions of
religious freedom and the Lautenberg program, including Reps.
Randy Hultgren (R., Ill.) and James McGovern (D., Mass.), who
co-chair the bipartisan Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission.  The
commission is dedicated to advocating on behalf of persecuted
minorities around the world.

Critics said the U.S. government has mistreated the group by
inviting them to leave Iran, sell their worldly possessions, and
travel to Vienna for additional screening before admitting them
to the United States, a process which is usually perfunctory.

They also worry that high-profile denials jeopardize the
Lautenberg Program itself and the refugee status it has provided
persecuted minorities for decades.

The International Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP) at the Urban
Justice Center, along with law firm Latham & Watkins, is
representing the group of Iranians.

"The U.S. government extended a helping hand to these Iranian
Christians, Mandeans, and other persecuted religious minorities
who wanted to join their family members in the United States,
only to cruelly whip it away for no discernible reason at all,"
Mariko Hirose, IRAP's litigation director, said in a statement.
"The government's conduct betrays America's long-standing
commitment to be a beacon of religious freedom, as embodied by
the Lautenberg Amendment."

The Iranians are seeking the court's intervention to enforce the
Lautenberg Amendment so they might have the opportunity to
reunite with family members in the U.S. and have the chance to
practice their religious beliefs in the safety of the country.

Denying the Iranian individuals without stating anything beyond
it being "a matter of discretion" prevents them from requesting
DHS review and puts their lives in danger, the lawsuit charges.

The plaintiffs in the suit include U.S. citizens with family
members who were part of the group who the U.S. government
recently denied.

They include a mother who lives in San Jose, Calif. who is
seeking to reunite with her diabetic daughter and young
grandchild; a son who is eager to bring his mother and
developmentally disabled adult brother to the U.S. for better
access to treatment and caregiving support; and a widow stranded
in Vienna with her elderly father and disabled toddler, according
to the IRAP.

"The denial has had a terrible impact on me and my family," one
of the plaintiffs, who preferred to remain anonymous, said in a
statement.  "My son suffers from repeated epileptic attacks and
congenital hydrocephalus, requiring regular medical attention,
which we do not have access to here in Austria."

Under the program, U.S. residents can submit applications on
behalf of refugee applicants residing in Iran, as long as they
belong to a recognized religious minority and can prove their
membership in the persecuted group.

Applicants must pass an initial screening while they are still in
Iran. If that process is successful, the U.S. "invites" them
through a formal letter to travel to Vienna, Austria, to continue
the processing of their refugee applications from a safe
location.

The United States and Austria have a longstanding agreement that
authorities in Vienna will provide temporary refuge for the
Lautenberg program applicants. Critics of the February DHS
denials worry that agreement is now in jeopardy because the
refugees have been waiting in limbo, many for more than a year in
Vienna, running out of money for food and housing.

The White House and other "high-level officials" also have been
monitoring the plight of the group of Iranian applicants to try
to prevent their deportation back to Iran or to countries where
they face few job prospects.

Messrs. Hultgren and McGovern in late February sent a letter to
Vice President Mike Pence, asking for a clearer rationale about
DHS's denial of the group.

"After years of successful and prompt admittance of Iranian
religious minorities to the United States under the Lautenberg
program, DHS must provide Congress with details about these visa
denials," the lawmakers said.  "And whatever the reasons, we hope
the other persecuted Iranians temporarily residing in Austria
will receive prompt approvals: their safety and security should
be our top priority.  Under no circumstance should those seeking
refugee status be repatriated to Iran, where they could be
subjected to arrest and torture.  We urge our allies to engage
and offer safe harbor to these refugees." [GN]


UNITED STATES: Patent Owners Sue Over AIA Post-Grant Proceedings
----------------------------------------------------------------
In CHRISTY, INC., on behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant, Case
No. 18-657 C (Fed. Cl.), the plaintiffs seek just compensation
for the taking of investors' and patent owners' recognized patent
property rights effectuated by the United States Patent and
Trademark Office ("USPTO") and by the alleged authority of
recently created post-grant proceedings of the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act ("AIA").

The AIA created a new type of proceeding called "Inter Partes
Review" ("IPR") and the Post-Grant Review (PRG) proceedings under
which a person who is not the patent owner may petition the USPTO
to review the validity of an issued patent within nine months of
its grant or issuance of a reissue patent.  The Plaintiff tells
the Court that the post-grant proceedings created through the AIA
completely decimated the value of issued patents.  According to
the Plaintiff, as of January 2015, 77% of all patent claims
reviewed have been invalidated and, "more recently, only 4
percent of all petitions for review proceedings filed with the
Patent Trial and Appeal Board ("PTAB") end with a final written
decision in which all claims are upheld as patentable."  The
costs of these post-issuance proceedings to individual inventors
and to the economy have been "staggering," according to the
Plaintiff, estimating the damage to the economy resulting from
the creation of the IPR process alone as around $1 trillion.

"The most disturbing aspect of this, however, is the fact that
those property rights were granted, and they were later taken
away, and this was done so without the just compensation that is
required under law," the Plaintiff said.

The Plaintiff alleges that the USPTO's invalidation of the
Plaintiff's and Class member's patent claims was a taking without
just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution.  The compensation due here includes, but is not
limited to, expected royalties and other payments related to use
of the patents.

The complaint pointed out that the U.S. Supreme Court, in Oil
States Energy Services, LLC, v. Greene's Energy Group, LLC, Case
No. 16-712, acknowledged that the IPR process is "geared to be an
error correction mechanism and not a substitute for litigation,"
which, in this case, according to the Plaintiff, the USPTO should
never have collected any issuance fees or maintenance fees for
any of the patents and claims that have been invalidated in any
PGP process, and the patent owners should never have had to
defend those patents.

The case additionally seeks damages for the Defendant's breach of
contract by failing to maintain in force the subject patent
claims for the terms prescribed in the patent grants for the
relevant claims, including the recovery of attorney fees expended
defending those same patents in post-grant proceedings, any
investments made in the inventions underlying those patents, any
expected royalties or payments related to the patents, and all
fees paid to the Defendant for the issuance of those patents.

In the alternative, the case seeks to recover fees that were paid
by inventors and patent owners to the USPTO, like fees having
been exacted from the Plaintiff and Class members through the AIA
-- according to the Defendant, these patents were issued
erroneously by the USPTO in the first instance and thus all fees
should be returned to the Plaintiff and Class members.

Christy is the owner of United States Patent No. 7,082,640, that
was subject to an PGP that resulted in its claims being
invalidated and for which it was never (1) compensated with value
for the property that was taken, including, but not limited to,
for expected royalties and other payments for use of the patent,
(2) reimbursed for attorney fees spent in defending the PGP, (3)
compensated for investments spent on the subject invention that
were thought to be protected by the subject patent, or (4)
refunded for fees paid.

Members of the proposed Class are owners (or their assigns) of
those patent applications, which were deemed to include
patentable subject matter and which were issued into valid
patents and claims and were later invalidated by the PTAB, which
is part of the office of the USPTO.

Attorneys for Plaintiff and putative class members:

     James F. McDonough, III, Esq.
     Jonathan R. Miller, Esq.
     Travis E. Lynch, Esq.
     HENINGER GARRISON DAVIS, LLC
     3621 Vinings Slope, Suite 4320
     Atlanta, GA 30339
     Tel: (404) 996-0869
          (404) 996-0863
          (404) 996-0867
     Fax: (205) 547-5502
          (205) 547-5506
          (205) 547-5515
     Email: jmcdonough@hgdlawfirm.com
            jmiller@hgdlawfirm.com
            tlynch@hgdlawfirm.com

        -- and --

     Timothy C. Davis, Esq.
     W. Lewis Garrison, Jr., Esq.
     Christopher B. Hood, Esq.
     Anna M. Carroll, Esq.
     HENINGER GARRISON DAVIS, LLC
     2224 1st Avenue North
     Birmingham, AL 35203
     Tel: (205) 326-3336
     Fax: (205) 326-3332
     Email: tim@hgdlawfirm.com
            wlgarrison@hgdlawfirm.com
            chood@hgdlawfirm.com
            acarroll@hgdlawfirm.com


URBIBENS BUILDERS: "Fuentes" Suit to Recover Unpaid Overtime
------------------------------------------------------------
Cristian Josue Fuentes, and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. Urbibens Builders and Contractors Corp., Marlon
Rosales, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-21147 (S.D. Fla., March 27,
2018), requests double damages and reasonable attorney fees
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act for all overtime wages
still owing along with court costs, interest and any other
relief.

Plaintiff worked for Defendants as a construction layout person
from October 26, 2017 through March 2, 2018. Fuentes worked an
average of 60 hours a week and was paid an average of $30.00 per
hour but was never paid anything for any hours worked over 40
hours in a week. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      J.H. Zidell, Esq.
      J.H. ZIDELL, P.A.
      300 71st Street, Suite 605
      Miami Beach, FL 33141
      Tel: (305) 865-6766
      Fax: (305) 865-7167
      Email: zabogado@aol.com


VENGROFF WILLIAMS: Wins Summary Judgment in "Polizois"
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in the case
captioned FOTINI POLIZOIS, Plaintiff, v. VENGROFF WILLIAMS, INC.,
Defendant, No. 16-CV-7011 (JFB) (GRB)(E.D.N.Y.).

Polizois alleges that a debt collection letter she received from
Vengroff (Collection Letter) violates the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (FDCPA) because it fails to adequately identify the
creditor to whom the debt is owed and fails to notify her that
the stated amount owed might increase due to interest, fees, or
collection costs.

Here, the plaintiff alleges claims under FDCPA Sections 1692e,
1692g and 1692f, and specific subsections thereunder.

Section 1692e

Section 1692e establishes a general prohibition against a debt
collector's use of any false, deceptive, or misleading
representation or means in connection with the collection of any
debt.

Section 1692g(a)

Section 1692g(a) sets forth required disclosures for a debt
collector's initial communication to a consumer. As relevant
here, this section requires that the initial communication
include the amount of the debt and the name of the creditor to
whom the debt is owed.

Section 1692f

Section 1692f is a catchall provision that states that a debt
collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect
or attempt to collect any debt.

Creditor Identification

Polizois argues that the Collection Letter fails to adequately
identify Enzo as her creditor in violation of Section
1692g(a)(2)'s requirement that a debt collection letter include
"the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed."

The Court disagrees.

Here, the Collection Letter states that Vengroff is a debt
collection agency that has been engaged by the above creditor,
and the only entity identified in the Collection Letter is Enzo.
The Collection Letter additionally states that, as of 04/23/2015
ENZO CLINICAL LABS INC. has not yet received the past due amount
of $51.74, further making clear that Vengroff is attempting to
collect a debt owned by Enzo. Moreover, Enzo is identified as
Vengroff's client at both the top and bottom of the Collection
Letter. Based on these uncontroverted facts, the Court concludes
that the least sophisticated consumer, reading the Collection
Letter as whole, would be aware that Enzo is the creditor. The
Collection Letter, therefore, satisfies Section 1692g(a)(2).
The Collection Letter is not open to more than one reasonable
interpretation as to the identity of plaintiff's creditor, and
thus is not deceptive or misleading as to that fact under
Sections 1692e and 1692e(10). The Court grants summary judgment
to defendant on the claims that the Collection Letter fails to
adequately identify the plaintiff's creditor.

Amount of the Debt

The Plaintiff alleges that the Collection Letter's stated amount
owed was misleading and deceptive under FDCPA Sections 1692e,
1692e(2)(a), and 1692e(10). Specifically, the plaintiff alleges
that the Collection Letter violates these provisions because it
does not notify the plaintiff that the amount due might increase
as a result of contractual interest, fees, and/or other costs.

In response, the defendant argues that the Collection Letter was
not required to notify the plaintiff that the amount due might
increase because the agreement between Enzo and the plaintiff did
not provide for interest or late payment fees, and neither Enzo
nor Vengroff ever attempted to collect interest or late payment
fees from plaintiff.

The Plaintiff additionally alleges FDCPA violations based on the
defendant's failure to indicate that the amount due might
increase as a result of (1) collection costs (pursuant to the
invoices) and (2) prejudgment interest (pursuant to New York CPLR
Section 5001).  As noted in the plaintiffs opposition, the
defendant's motion for summary judgment does not address those
claims. At oral argument on the motion, the defendant argued that
including language regarding collection costs would have violated
Section 1692f because Enzo was not contractually or legally
entitled to collection costs from the plaintiff. The Court
requested letter briefing on whether Enzo was entitled to
collection costs.

However, the parties have not briefed the broader issue of
whether the defendant was required to notify the plaintiff that
the amount owed might increase due to collection costs under
Section 1692e (for instance, if Enzo sold the debt to a third
party who attempted to recover collection costs). The parties
have also not briefed the similar issue of whether the defendant
was required to include language regarding prejudgment interest
under Section 1692e.

Accordingly, given that the defendant did not specifically move
on those claims (or adequately brief the issues), the Court will
not determine whether summary judgment is warranted on those
claims.
The Court grants summary judgment to the defendant on (1) the
claims that the defendant failed to adequately identify Enzo as
the plaintiff's creditor, and (2) the claims that the defendant
was required to notify the plaintiff that the amount owed might
increase due to contractual interest and late payment fees.

A full-text copy of the District Court's March 22, 2018
Memorandum and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7snycsw
from Leagle.com.

Fotini Polizois, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Mitchell L. Pashkin --
mpash@verizon.net -- Vengroff Williams, Inc., Defendant,
represented by Richard J. Perr -- rperr@finemanlawfirm.com --
Fineman Krekstein & Harris, P.C..


WAL-MART STORES: Bid to Deny "Duckworth" Class Certification OK'd
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Jason E. Duckworth, Individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. WAL-MART STORES,
INC. and WAL-MART STORES EAST, L.P., Defendants, Civil No. 5:17-
cv-174-JMH (E.D. Ky.), Judge Joseph M. Hood of the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, Central Division,
Lexington, granted the Defendant's Motion to Deny Class
Certification and Strike Class Allegation from the Complaint.

The Plaintiff alleges that he purchased a Mainstays six-piece
patio set from Wal-Mart Store #571 in Georgetown, Kentucky
sometime in 2014.  He claims he assembled the set at his home
according to the exact specifications in the instruction manual.
Two years later, he alleges he was sitting in one of the chairs
when the back suddenly broke, trapped his left ring finger, and
amputated a portion of that finger as he fell to the ground.

The Plaintiff claims Wal-Mart knew or should have known that the
patio set was defective because Wal-Mart recalled a "nearly
identical" card table and chair set in January 2014.

The Plaintiff proposes two classes of Plaintiffs, the "Kentucky
Class" and the "Nationwide Class," each of whom include persons
who purchased a Mainstays six-piece patio set from Wal-Mart
through its website or in stores from May 2013 to the present.
He brings the following causes of action on behalf of the
putative class: violation of the Kentucky Consumer Protection
Act; violation of other states' consumer protection statutes;
violation of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act in 23
states (which does not include Kentucky); common law negligence;
breach of implied warranty of merchantability; and unjust
enrichment.  The Plaintiff individually asserts a common law
negligence claim and a claim for violation of the Kentucky
Product Liability Act.

The matter is before the Court on the Defendant's Motion to Deny
Class Certification and Strike Class Allegation from the
Complaint.  The Plaintiff has replied and the Defendant has
responded.

Judge Hood agrees with the Defendant that although it is early in
this proceeding, the instant motion is not premature because no
amount of discovery will alter the basic facts in the case that
preclude class certification.  He finds that the Plaintiff cannot
establish that Rule 23(a)(2)'s commonality requirement is
satisfied by the proposed class action.  Importantly, the "same
injury" requirement is not satisfied by merely showing that all
putative class members have suffered a violation of the same
provision of law.

The Judge cannot accept the Plaintiff's argument that simply
because Wal-Mart recalled a card table set in 2014, Wal-Mart
violated numerous state consumer protection and product liability
laws by selling the patio set he and all putative class members
purchased.  As in General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon,
there is a wide gap between Jason Duckworth's claim that the
patio set he purchased was defective and the selling of it
deceptive, and his claim that all others who purchased that same
patio set were deceived and sold a defective product.  His only
support for the latter claim is that Wal-Mart previously recalled
an entirely different type of table and chair set, and his own
claims are extremely fact specific based on the assembly,
storage, and use of the chair in question.  This is insufficient
to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2).

The Judge has determined that the putative class does not meet
the prerequisites of Rule 23(a)(2), thus no further inquiry is
necessary.  Accordingly, he granted the Defendant's Motion to
Deny Class Certification and Strike Class Allegation from the
Complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 21, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/LWgutI from Leagle.com.

Jason E. Duckworth, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Alex C. Davis --
alex@jonesward.com -- Jones Ward PLC, Ashton Rose Smith --
ashton@jonesward.com -- Jones Ward PLC & Jasper Duduley Ward, IV
-- jasper@jonesward.com -- Jones Ward PLC.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. & Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., Defendants,
represented by Thomas Edward Stevens -- tstevens@bdblawky.com --
Blackburn, Domene & Burchett PLLC & Jennifer Kincaid Adams --
jadams@bdblawky.com -- Blackburn, Domene & Burchett PLLC.


WHITING PETROLEUM: Transferred "Schindler" Suit to S.D. Texas
-------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit filed on April 27, 2017 captioned Craig
Schindler, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Whiting Petroleum Corp., Case No. 1:17-cv-01051 was
transferred on February 28, 2018, from the U.S. District Court
for the District of Colorado to the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Texas (Houston). The District Court Clerk
assigned Case No. 4:18-cv-00634 to the proceeding.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages and other
damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Whiting Petroleum Corp. operates an independent exploration and
production company with an oil focused asset base. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
      Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq.
      Lindsay R. Itkin, Esq.
      Jessica M. Bresler, Esq.
      JOSEPHSON DUNLAP LAW FIRM
      11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
      Houston, TX 77046
      Telephone: (713) 352-1100
      Facsimile: (713) 352-3300
      E-mail: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
              adunlap@mybackwages.com
              litkin@mybackwages.com
              jbresler@mybackwages.com

         - and -

      Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
      Matthew S. Parmet, Esq.
      BRUCKNER BURCH, P.L.L.C.
      8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
      Houston, TX 77046
      Telephone: (713) 877-8788
     Facsimile: (713) 877-8065
     E-mail: rburch@brucknerburch.com
             mparmet@brucknerburch.com

The Defendant is represented by:

      Ann Christoff Purvis, Esq.
      Maral Shoaei, Esq.
      GORDON & REES LLP
      555 17th Street, Suite 3400
      Denver, CO 80202
      Telephone: (303) 200-6894
      E-mail: apurvis@grsm.com
              mshoaei@grsm.com
         - and -

      Laurie J. Rust, Esq.
      HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP
      560 Mission Street, 25th Floor
      San Francisco, CA 94105
      Telephone: (415) 268-2000
      Facsimile: (415) 268-1999


WORD ENTERPRISES: Summary Judgment Bid in "McFarlin" Suit Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHAD McFARLIN, Plaintiff, v. THE WORD ENTERPRISES,
LLC, ET AL., Defendants, Case No. 16-cv-12536 (E.D. Mich.), Judge
Gershwin A. Drain of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan, Southern Division, denied the Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment and granted the Plaintiff's Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment.

The case involves a chain of three Hungry Howie's franchises
located in Haslett, Perry, and St. Johns, Michigan.  The
Plaintiff was a delivery driver at the Perry location from July
2015 to Sept. 1, 2016.  The Defendants required delivery drivers
at each location to use their personal vehicles to make pizza
deliveries.  They paid delivery drivers a cash wage of $5 per
hour when they were making deliveries.  They paid delivery
drivers a run charge of $.75 per delivery, and Perry drivers
received $1.75 for deliveries to Lainsburg, Michigan.  The
Delivery drivers also received tips.

In all store locations, the Defendants posted a "Minimum Wage
Notice to Tipped Employees."  This notice stated that the
Defendants would take a tip credit that was exactly the
difference between the drivers' cash wage and the Michigan
minimum wage.  In other words, they would only take just enough
tip credit to get their delivery drivers' salary to the exact
minimum wage.

On July 6, 2016, the Plaintiff filed a class action complaint
against the Defendants.  He filed his First Amended Complaint on
Sept. 19, 2017.  He alleges that throughout his time as a
delivery driver at the Perry franchise, the Defendants paid him
and similarly situated drivers the exact Michigan minimum wage.
He also alleges that the Defendants did not adequately reimburse
him and other drivers for vehicle expenses incurred while
delivering pizzas for the Defendant.  Therefore, the Defendants
actually paid the Plaintiff and similarly situated drivers below
the federal and Michigan minimum wages.  The Defendants deny
these allegations.  On Oct. 5, 2017, the Court certified the
Plaintiff's class.

On Dec. 29, 2017, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment.  The Defendants conceded summary judgment in
favor of the Plaintiff on the issue of Defendant Dittrich's
status as an employer of the Plaintiff and other delivery
drivers.  They opposed the Plaintiff's Motion on the issue of the
Defendants' application of the tip credit.  The Plaintiff replied
on Feb. 2, 2018.  The Defendants filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment on Jan. 1, 2018.  The Plaintiff opposed the Motion on
Jan. 23, 2018.  The Defendants replied on Feb. 6, 2018.

Judge Drain finds that it is uncontested that the Defendants
posted a "Minimum Wage Notice to Tipped Employees" as their
notice about the tip credit.  This notice stated that they would
take a tip credit equal to the difference between the cash wage
they paid and the minimum wage.  In other words, the Defendants
stated they would only take as much tip credit as necessary to
get delivery drivers' salaries to the exact minimum wage.  Now,
the Defendants argue that they can take a tip credit in excess of
the amount that they gave notice to their employees about to
cover employee expenses.  However, the Judge says, as the case
law illustrates, the retroactive application of a higher tip
credit does not constitute adequate notice.  Case law that exists
on this topic disfavors allowing employers to take a higher tip
credit without notice of the new amount.  The Defendants present
no contrary case law to refute this trend.  Therefore, he holds
that the Defendants cannot use tips in excess of the minimum wage
to offset unreimbursed vehicle expenses.

In conclusion, the Judge granted the Plaintiff's Motion on both
issues.  He holds that Defendant Dittrich is an employer of the
delivery drivers.  He also holds that the Defendants may not use
tips in excess of the minimum wage to cover vehicle and other
employee expenses.

As to the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, the Judge says
the record reflects that the Defendants only paid their delivery
drivers compensation equal to the exact minimum wage plus the
delivery commission each pay period.  The minimum wage salary and
the driver commission paid to the Plaintiff each week was not
earning enough to meet the minimum wage.  The Plaintiff is
entitled to compensation for vehicle expenses that were taken out
on behalf of the Defendants.

The Judge holds that the Plaintiff has brought sufficient
contradictory evidence that supports his claim of underpayment.
The Defendants cannot rely on their arguments that they can use
all tips or use tips in excess of the tip credit to meet minimum
wage requirements.  Therefore, there is a genuine factual dispute
about whether the Defendants' pay structure violated minimum wage
laws that precludes summary judgment.  In conclusion, he denied
the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 21, 2018 Opinion and Order
is available at https://is.gd/L2Gy6D from Leagle.com.

Chad McFarlin, Plaintiff, represented by Mark A. Potashnick --
markp@wp-attorneys.com -- Weinhaus & Potashnick & David M.
Blanchard -- blanchard@bwlawonline.com -- Blanchard & Walker,
PLLC.

Kevin Dittrich, The Word Enterprises, LLC, The Word Enterprises
Haslett, LLC, The Word Enterprises Lansing, LLC, The Word
Enterprises Owosso, LLC, The Word Enterprises Perry, LLC, The
Word Enterprises St. Johns, LLC & Dittrich Investments II, Inc.,
Defendants, represented by Jeffrey S. Theuer --
jstheuer@loomislaw.com -- Loomis, Ewert.

Magna Services Group, Ltd., Defendant, represented by Jeffrey S.
Theuer, Loomis, Ewert & Patrick C. Lannen --
plannen@plunkettcooney.com -- Plunkett Cooney.


YAHOO! INC: Requires Users to Give Up Right to Join Class Actions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Ina Fried, writing for Axios, reports that Verizon's Oath unit,
which includes Yahoo, AOL and other media properties, is making a
change that requires users to give up their right to be part of
class action lawsuits.  All disputes will have to be handled
through arbitration, according to its revised terms of service.

Why it matters: Yahoo, as you'll remember, has had some data
breach issues in the past.  Litigating such matters as an
individual consumer, even through arbitration, is impractical.

"Hopefully, disputes will never be an issue, but in the case of
one, this allows a third-party arbitrator to help us resolve
them," Oath says in a summary page explaining the move.  "We've
also added a class action waiver.  These provisions are an
important part of our relationship with you, so please read them
carefully."

A Yahoo representative was not immediately available to explain
the rationale for the new policy.

Why it's changing: The new dispute policy is part of broader
terms of service changes going into effect immediately for new
users and as of May 25 for existing ones.

While lots of companies are making changes ahead of that date to
comply with a new European data protection law known as GDPR, the
arbitration clause is specific for U.S. users. [GN]


* Canada High Court Urged to Tackle Umbrella Purchaser Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------
Michael McKiernan, writing for Law Times, reports that
competition lawyers are calling on the Supreme Court of Canada to
settle the intensifying debate over the viability of umbrella
purchaser claims.

A number of class actions launched across the country under s. 36
of the federal Competition Act, which provides for civil claims
by consumers who paid inflated prices as a result of conspiracies
between competitors, include umbrella purchasers among their
proposed class members.  These are individuals who bought
products from non-conspirators, but who allege they were still
overcharged as an indirect result of price fixing in the broader
marketplace for the goods or services.

Last summer, in Godfrey v. Sony Corporation, the B.C. Court of
Appeal confirmed the judgment of a lower court judge who ruled
that umbrella claims are available under s. 36, putting
jurisprudence from the province in direct opposition to the line
emerging in Ontario.

Just months before the decision from B.C.'s top court, in Shah v
LG Chem, Ltd., a unanimous three-judge panel of Ontario's
Divisional Court ruled that Superior Court Justice Paul Perell
was right to deny certification to the claims of umbrella
purchasers in an action concerning alleged global price fixing of
lithium ion batteries.

Ontario's Court of Appeal is scheduled to hear arguments in the
same case on May 7, but Nikiforos Iatrou --
niatrou@weirfoulds.com -- head of the competition law practice
group at Weir Foulds LLP, says he's already seen enough to
justify a full hearing at the Supreme Court of Canada.

"There are two divergent approaches right now on what is an
acceptable theory of damages," says Mr. Iatrou, a partner in the
firm's Toronto office.  "At this point, it seems clear that these
cases need to head up so that we know definitively whether, for
the purposes of certification, umbrella damages claims can
proceed.

"Without some direction from the Supreme Court and a unified set
of ground rules, it makes bringing and defending these class
actions far too complicated," he adds.

But Mr. Iatrou says he's hoping for a more comprehensive judgment
from the nation's top court than it delivered last time a
competition class action issue came before it -- a trilogy of
decisions in late 2013 that related to the certification of
indirect purchaser claims.

"The Supreme Court essentially allowed the indirect purchaser
claims to go forward at certification and left it up to the trial
judges to sort out which ones can be proven.  My concern is that
it will do the same with umbrella purchasers," he says.  "I
suspect that if one was litigated all the way through, plaintiffs
would not actually be able to prove all of these various types of
damages, but the difficulty is that, from a practical point of
view, we have never had a fully contested competition class
action."

In the meantime, Mr. Iatrou says, the status quo favours
plaintiffs, because without certainty over the viability of
umbrella purchaser claims, it's in their interests to tag them on
and hope for the best at certification.

"By creating a real thicket of theoretical damages claims, all
we're doing is giving plaintiff-side firms more leverage to
negotiate bigger settlements," he says.

But Bridget Moran -- bridget.moran@siskinds.com -- a lawyer with
Siskinds LLP in London, Ont., says it would be unfair to exclude
umbrella purchasers in cases of alleged price fixing.

"The theory is that if the conspiring defendants had enough
control of the market to fix prices, then it allowed their
competitors to raise prices as well.  In those circumstances,
class members who bought goods from non-defendant manufacturers
should also be able to recover the amounts they were
overcharged," she explains.

Ms. Moran's firm is part of the consortium representing the
plaintiffs in Shah, the lithium ion battery case, and is hoping
Ontario's Court of Appeal follows the example of its B.C.
counterpart once it has heard arguments in the case in April.

In his original 2015 decision in the case, Justice Perell
certified the class action, but he excluded the claims of
umbrella purchasers. The Divisional Court upheld the decision,
agreeing that they had no reasonable cause of action due to the
"indeterminate and uncircumscribed" lability to which their
inclusion would expose the defendants.

"Adding in the Umbrella Purchasers greatly expands the members of
the class, and does so by adding persons with whom the
respondents had no dealings," wrote Ontario Superior Court
Justice Ian Nordheimer on behalf of his Divisional Court
colleagues.  "Indeed, if the Umbrella Purchasers are included in
the class, it is not clear how the respondents would even know
how many such purchasers they might be found liable to."

In Godfrey, B.C.'s appeal court considered an alleged conspiracy
among the manufacturers of optical disc drives and products
containing them that resulted in higher prices between 2004 and
2010.  Writing for himself and two colleagues on the bench, B.C.
Appeal Court Justice John Savage said that he was convinced the
language of s. 36 of the Competition Act is capable of allowing
umbrella claims.

"I acknowledge there is a tension between, on the one hand,
concerns over what some may view as a very broad scope of
liability resulting in unfairness to defendants accused of price-
fixing and, on the other hand, the need to give effect to the
objectives sought by the Competition Act such as compensation,
deterrence, and behaviour modification," Justice Savage added.
"To the extent that such a tension arises in the present context,
however, I am convinced it must be resolved in favour of the
latter policy objective."

From an international point of view, Paul-Erik Veel --
pveel@litigate.com -- a partner at Toronto litigation boutique
Lenczner Slaght Royce Smith Griffin LLP, says the B.C. line of
jurisprudence fits with the European approach to umbrella
purchasers, while Ontario's more restrictive view is reflected in
the U.S., where similar claims are increasingly failing at trial.

He says he would rather see umbrella claims blocked, but he adds
he would appreciate a Supreme Court ruling on the issue.

"It's unusual with these types of cases to see such a stark and
clear divergence between courts of different provinces," Mr. Veel
says. "Although I'm sympathetic to the very valid policy goals of
the Competition Act, in my view, umbrella purchasers are a bridge
too far.

"Competition class actions are already unwieldy and cumbersome
enough and will become substantially more so with the addition of
umbrella purchasers without much benefit to consumers
ultimately," he adds. [GN]


* Class Action Defense Spending Continues to Rise, Survey Shows
---------------------------------------------------------------
The seventh annual Carlton Fields Class Action Survey confirms
that class action defense spending continues to rise -- and, in
fact, has reached its highest level since 2010.

It was the third consecutive annual rise in spending after
steadily decreasing expenditures from 2011 to 2014.  The upward
trend is expected to continue as companies across multiple
industries spent $2.24 billion defending class action lawsuits in
2017, with spending projected to reach a high of $2.39 billion in
2018.

Survey respondents reported their average spend per class action
increased substantially over the past two years, even as the
overall number of class action cases per company remained
consistent.

These and other results of the 2018 Carlton Fields Class Action
Survey were compiled from 411 interviews with general counsel,
chief legal officers, and direct reports to general counsel at
385 companies in multiple industries.

The number of companies managing class action cases rose to 59
percent in 2017 up from 53.8 percent in 2016.  Likewise, the
overall risk faced by respondent companies increased.  The
combined volume of bet-the-company and high-risk matters ticked
up to 26.2 percent in 2017.

"We see evidence of steadily increasing volume and complexity,"
said Julianna McCabe, director of Carlton Fields' Class Action
Survey and chair of the firm's National Class Actions practice
group.  "Defending class action litigation is indeed an ongoing
challenge for most American companies, testing corporate resolve
and straining corporate resources."

This year's survey found that labor and employment (particularly,
wage and hour litigation), consumer fraud, product liability, and
antitrust matters collectively accounted for two-thirds of class
action spending by respondents, with data privacy and security
matters lurking as a potential next wave in 2018.  Internet-
connected products, such as medical devices and home appliances,
are one significant source of concern associated with potential
data breach litigation in the near future.

Among additional findings:

Despite a reduction in pending labor and employment cases
compared to 2016, these matters continued to represent the
highest percentage of class actions, accounting for 24.7 percent
of all matters and 21.6 percent of all spending.  Notably, 40
percent of companies identified wage-and-hour litigation as their
greatest employment related class action threat.  Outside counsel
played a critical role in early case assessment for the fourth
consecutive year, while the number of in-house lawyers assigned
to manage class actions did not increase.  Nearly 80 percent of
companies described outside counsel's role in early case
assessment as "essential" or "substantial," up from 73 percent in
2016.  As the number of class actions continued to rise, the use
of alternative fee arrangements (AFAs) increased in 2017.  Forty-
nine percent of companies reported using AFAs, up from 35.8
percent in 2016.  Fixed fees remained the most prevalent type of
AFA among companies using them.  But companies reported increased
use of every other type of AFA from 2016 to 2017.  Most companies
reported that the current political climate in Washington, D.C.
has had no immediate impact on their management of class actions.
Conversely, 11 percent of companies reported that the political
climate impacted regulatory oversight and involvement related to
their business.

The Carlton Fields Class Action Survey is widely recognized as a
powerful resource for in-house counsel who want to manage class
actions effectively and efficiently.  Participating companies in
the 2018 survey had average annual revenue of $13.9 billion and
median annual revenue of $5.9 billion.  The surveyed companies
operate in more than 25 industries, including banking and
financial services, consumer goods, energy, high tech, insurance,
manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, professional services, and
retail.

                       About Carlton Fields

Carlton Fields -- http://www.carltonfields.com-- has more than
300 attorneys and government and financial services consultants
serving clients from offices in California, Connecticut, Florida,
Georgia, New York, and Washington, D.C.  The firm is known for
its national litigation practice, including class action defense,
trial practice, white-collar representation, and high-stakes
appeals; its insurance practice, including life and financial
lines, property and casualty, reinsurance, and title insurance;
its regulatory practice; and its handling of sophisticated
business transactions and corporate counseling for domestic and
international clients. [GN]


* Germany Postpones Decision to Launch Law on Class Actions
-----------------------------------------------------------
Daniel Delhaes and Dietmar, writing for Handelsblatt Global,
report that German diesel car owners trying to get compensated
for VW's emissions-cheating scandal have been crying out for a
change in the law to allow them to file US-style class-action
lawsuits against the auto giant.

But even though Chancellor Angela Merkel's conservatives and the
center-left Social Democrats agreed in their lengthy coalition
talks to permit such cases in future, a planned cabinet decision
to get the ball rolling has been postponed, Handelsblatt has
learned from government sources.  Ministers will now discuss the
planned legislation in early May, according to the sources.
"There's still a need for negotiation on small points," one
source said.

The SPD has been pushing for the law while the conservatives have
been reluctant to take action and still appear intent on sparing
a wave of lawsuits against the all-important auto industry, which
employs some 800,000 people.

Class-action suits refer to cases in which an entire group of
plaintiffs is represented collectively by just one member of that
group, which could be an individual or a firm.  The concept
originated in the US and has spread to other common-law
countries, and even some civil-law systems in Europe.  German law
currently makes no provision for it.

Ms. Merkel underlined her support for the auto industry when she
voiced reservations about forcing companies to introduce
expensive hardware modifications to reduce high nitrogen-oxide
emissions in diesel cars.  And her conservatives, backed by
industry associations, are the ones demanding a limit on the
number of organizations entitled to mount collective suits. They
want to avoid the US phenomenon of big law firms pursuing class-
action claims as a business model.

Despite resistance from their coalition partners, the Social
Democrats are confident the planned legislation on class-action
will come.  "We're almost ready," said SPD lawmaker Johannes
Fechner.

The new law would only allow associations to lead class-action
suits and they must have existed for at least four years.  If it
is an umbrella association, it must consist of at least 10 member
associations that are mainly involved in consumer protection.
Individual associations eligible for such lawsuits must have at
least 350 members.

The law may end up entitling only 20 institutions to launch into
class-action suits in Germany.  They include the General German
Automobile Club (ADAC) and the VZBV Federation of German Consumer
Organizations.  They'll be able to sue a company -- let's say for
the sake of argument VW -- if at least 10 consumers have credibly
shown that they were affected by the diesel scandal.

If the draft law is agreed before the summer recess, it could
still come into force as planned on November 1. [GN]


* Investor Class Actions Challenging M&A Transactions on the Rise
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Alison Frankel, writing for Reuters, reports that the single
biggest development in securities class action litigation in the
past two years is the rise of federal court suits by investors
challenging M&A transactions.

According to reports by both Cornerstone and NERA Economic
Consulting, there were nearly 200 class actions by investors
claiming to have been misled by corporate deal disclosures --
more than double the 85 M&A challenges filed in 2016 and more
than five times as many cases as investors filed in 2015. (You
know why this has happened: Delaware Chancery Court cracked down
on fee awards for plaintiffs' lawyers who obtained only
additional proxy disclosures so filings quickly shifted out of
Delaware and into federal court.)

Cornerstone's report breaks down M&A challenges by federal
circuit. Courts in the 9th Circuit saw a disproportionate share:
41 new M&A class actions were filed in the circuit in 2017, more
than in any other circuit.

The 9th Circuit's percentage of all M&A class action filings did
decrease between 2016 and 2017. In 2016, nearly 30 percent (25 of
85) of all of the M&A class action filings were in the 9th
Circuit; in 2017, the percentage fell to about 21 percent.  The
3rd Circuit was close behind, with nearly 20 percent, or 39
cases.

Ms. Frankel said "I would not be at all surprised if the 9th
Circuit widens the gap in filings this year.  If investors have
the option of suing over an M&A deal in California, Nevada or
other West Coast states, I suspect they will after a decision by
the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Varjabedian v. Emulex
Corporation (2018 WL 1882905), a shareholder challenge to Avago
Technologies' $610 million acquisition of Emulex in 2015."

9th Circuit Judges Susan Graber, Mary Murguia and Morgan Christen
split with five (five!) other federal circuits to hold that
shareholders need not allege a corporation intended to deceive
investors in issuing supposedly inadequate disclosures about a
prospective deal.

The 9th Circuit said the statute on deal disclosures, Section 14
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, requires a showing
only of negligence, not fraudulent intent (or scienter, if you
want to get technical).  "We are aware that our holding today
parts ways from our colleagues in five other circuits," wrote
Judge Murguia for the panel.  "However . . . we are persuaded
that intervening guidance from the Supreme Court compels the
conclusion that Section 14 of the Exchange Act imposes a
negligence standard."

The first decision to address the proper standard for Section 14
claims was the 2nd Circuit's ruling in Chris-Craft Industries v.
Piper Aircraft (480 F.2d 341) back in 1973.  The Chris-Craft
ruling analogized claims under Section 14 to claims of securities
fraud under Rule 10b-5. Since courts have held that investors
suing under Rule 10b-5 must show a corporation's intent to
deceive, the 2nd Circuit said, the same standard should apply to
claims under the newer-vintage law prohibiting misleading deal
disclosures.

In the decades since the Chris-Craft decision, the 3rd, 5th, 6th
and 11th Circuits have all agreed with the 2nd Circuit that
investors have to allege scienter to sue under Section 14.

The 9th Circuit, however, looked at the language of the statute
and two U.S. Supreme Court rulings -- 1976's Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder (96 S.Ct. 1375) and 1980's Aaron v. Securities and
Exchange Commission (100 S.Ct. 1945) -- to conclude those other
circuits were wrong.  The statute, the court observed, says it is
illegal for a person to make untrue statements or omit material
information about a tender offer or to engage in any fraudulent
or deceptive acts related to a tender offer.  The word "or" is
crucial, according to the 9th Circuit.  It shows that Congress
intended to proscribe two different offenses -- and only the
second offense mentions deception.

It's true that Rule 10b-5 contains the same text, the 9th Circuit
said, and the Supreme Court held in the Ernst & Ernst decision
that 10b-5 claims require allegations of fraudulent intent.  But
according to the 9th Circuit in Emulex, the Supreme Court reached
that conclusion by looking back at the statute the SEC
interpreted to draft Rule 10b-5, Section 10 of the Securities and
Exchange Act. (Going into the weeds a bit here but for that you
can blame the 9th Circuit.) That section allows the Securities
and Exchange Commission to regulate "manipulative or deceptive"
statements.

"Put simply, Rule 10b-5 requires a showing of scienter because it
is a regulation promulgated under Section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act," the 9th Circuit said in Emulex.  "This rationale regarding
Rule 10b-5 does not apply to Section 14(e), which is a statute,
not an SEC rule."

The 9th Circuit said the Supreme Court's interpretation of yet
another securities provision, Section 17 of the Securities Act of
1933, confirms its analysis.  In the Aaron case, the justices
found that Section 17, which regulates fraud in securities
offerings, requires only a showing of negligence, not intent to
deceive.  Section 14 of the 1934 Act contains almost the same
language as Section 17 of the 1933 Act, the 9th Circuit said, so
it makes sense to apply the Aaron reasoning -- despite contrary
conclusions from all of the other federal circuits.

Ms. Frankel said "I should point out that in the surge of recent
M&A challenges in federal court, motions to dismiss are seldom
actually litigated.  The vast majority of Section 14 class
actions are voluntarily dismissed by shareholders, sometimes
after negotiations in which defendants agree to additional proxy
disclosures, but almost always without much litigation.  Still,
if the Emulex decision holds up, plaintiffs' lawyers will have
additional leverage. "

"I emailed Emulex counsel Eric Landau -- elandau@jonesday.com --
of Jones Day and Avago Technologies Matthew Rawlinson --
matt.rawlinson@lw.com -- of Latham & Watkins to see if there are
plans to ask the entire 9th Circuit or the Supreme Court to take
a look at the case, considering both the circuit split and the
increasing incidence of Section 14 class actions. I didn't
immediately hear back."

Shareholder lawyer Juan Monteverde of Monteverde & Associates
presented the winning argument to the 9th Circuit in Emulex.  He
didn't respond to my email. [GN]





                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N  I N F O R M A T I O N

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