CAR_Public/180514.mbx              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R


               Monday, May 14, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 96



                            Headlines


8POINT3 ENERGY: Initial Case Conference in "Davis" on Aug. 3
AJ BOGGS: Shared Medical Records Info, Class Action Says
AON HEWITT: Court Dismisses "Scott" ERISA Suit
ARAKELIAN ENTERPRISES: Apartment Owners Sue over Waste Collection
ARCH COAL: Stiffs Workers for Overtime, Class Action Claims

ASUS COMPUTER: Carlotti Sues over Laptop Power Defects
AT&T CORP: Underpays Call Center Agents, Mosley-Lovings Says
AVENUE 81: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, "Tiffany" Suit Claims
AXA EQUITABLE: Second Circuit Flips Dismissal of "O'Donnell" Suit
B.J.D. INC: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, "McGrew" Suit Alleges

BANK OF AMERICA: Court Orders "Mendez" to File More Briefing
BAY AREA REGIONAL: Termination Violates WARN Act, Hood Says
BILLNET SOLUTIONS: "Velez" Suit Moved to S.D. Florida
CA RESTAURANT: "Ellis" Suit Seeks Minimum & OT Wages under FLSA
CAPITAL ONE: Charges Bank Fees on its Own ATMs, Class Action Says

CAREFUSION SOLUTIONS: "Ward" Suit Moved to District of Delaware
CITIBANK NA: 9th Cir. Affirms "Nichols" Dismissal
CITIZENS DISABILITY: Made Unsolicited Calls, "Alberts" Suit Says
CLOUD CATERING: Unlawfully Retained Tips, "Robinson" Suit Says
CODE REBEL: $1-Mil. "Springer" Suit Settlement Has Final Approval

CONVERGENT OUTSOURCING: "Clermont" Suit Moved to E.D.N.Y.
CORONA REGIONAL: 9th Cir. Affirms $15K Deposition-Related Costs
CORPORATE SECURITY: Harbor Seeks Unpaid Wages under Labor Code
CORRIGAN MOVING: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, "Oliver" Suit Says
CREDIT SUISSE: Qiu Sues over Plunge of XIV Notes

CREDIT SUISSE: Saxena White to Lead Securities Suit
CROWN CORK: Court Grants Dismissal of ERISA Suit in "Cannon"
DAIRYAMERICA INC: Discovery in "Carlin" Suit Underway
DYNAMIC RECOVERY: Thompson Sues over Debt Collection Practices
ELDORADO COMMUNITY: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, "Campbell" Alleges

EXTRA MILE PAINTING: "Morales" Suit Seeks Overtime Pay under FLSA
FAA SERRAMONTE: Violates Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Luu Says
FAIRMOUNT SANTROL: Scarantino Balks at Unimin Merger Deal
FEDERAL WARRANTY: Court Denies Dismissal of "Woturski" Suit
FIDELITY FINANCIAL: Cox Sues over Debt Collection Practices

FINANCIAL RECOVERY: Court Grants Summary Judgment in "Church"
FIRST CENTURY BANCORP: "Humphrey" Suit Moved to N.D. Ohio
FISHBONE SAFETY: Court Compels Arbitration in "Green"
FRITO-LAY: "Allred" Suit Stays in S.D. Cal. Federal Court
G6 HOSPITALITY: "Kennedy" Suit Referred to Mediation

GALARDI SOUTH: Judge Narrows Claims in Exotic Dancers' Suit
GEORGIA: "Baker" Class Suit over Prisoner Rights Tossed
GOLD STANDARD: Burger Sues over Use of Biometric Identifiers
GUARANTEED RATE: Underpays Loan Processors, "Turng" Suit Says
HER IMPORTS: Motley Sues over Autodialed SMS Text Messages

HILTON WORLDWIDE: Court Sets Deadlines for Settlement in "Elder"
HOPELE OF FORT LAUDERDALE: Forensic Examination in "Ramos" Denied
INNOVATIVE HEALTH: Must Defend Against "Northrup" Amended Suit
INTEGRATED MAIL: "Roberts" Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages under FLSA
INTERNATIONAL CULINARY: Blind Can't Access Website, Kiler Says

IQOR HOLDINGS: Bid to Decertify "Shoots" FLSA Class Granted
JACOBSON FISH: "Krau" Suit Seeks Unpaid Back Wages under FLSA
JENNY CRAIG: Faces "Bloom" Suit over Spam Text
JOHN DOES: CBOE Seeks to Quash Subpoena without Prejudice
KEVIN MASON: 2nd Amended Suit Filed in "Ali" RICO Suit

KRISPY KREME: Sells Maple doughnuts w/o Maples, Class Action Says
LCS ENTERPRISES: Court OKs $65K Wage & Hour Suit Settlement
LDWB LLC: "Hoff" Suit Seeks Minimum Wage under FLSA
LENDINGCLUB CORP: Veal Sues over Share Price Drop
LINCOLNSHIRE FISKER: Ct. Dismisses "Steel" Securities Fraud Suit

MACY'S WEST: Fails to Pay Wages, Salazar Says
MASSAGE ENVY: Seventh Circuit Affirms Dismissal of "Haywood" Suit
MDL 2591: $1.5-Bil. Accord in MIR 162 Corn Suit Has Initial OK
MDL 2777: Court Narrows Claims in EcoDiesel Marketing Suit
METRO DINER: "Fiumano" Suit Has Conditional Class Certification

MILLENNIUM HEALTH: Mauthe Sues over Webinar Ads
MVM INTERNATIONAL: Underpays Guantanamo Staff, "Hurst" Suit Says
NEW ENGLAND AUTO: Dababneh Files Wage-and-Hour Suit
NORNAT MANAGEMENT: "Cortes" Suit Seeks Overtime Wages under FLSA
OPTIMAL ENERGY: "Mantooth" Suit Seeks Overtime Pay under FLSA

PARALLON ENTERPRISES: Buford Seeks Minimum & Overtime Wages
PIZZA VENTURE: Underpays Delivery Drivers, Pennington Says
RANDALL'S FOOD: "Ramirez" Suit Seeks Overtime Wages under FLSA
RAYMOND JAMES: "Kampert" Suit Transferred to M.D. Florida
REGIONS FINANCIAL: Underpays Loan Originators, Ratchford Claims

REILY FOODS: Dumont Says Hazelnut Creme Coffee Label Misleading
RODENBURG LLP: Carroll & Smith Sue over Debt Collection Practices
ROSAS TAMALES: "Zuniga" Suit Seeks Overtime Wages under FLSA
ROSS STORES: Morrison Sues over Deceptive Thread Counts in Linen
ROYAL CARIBBEAN: Wins Dismissal of Amended "McIntosh" Suit

SALVATION ARMY: McElhanon Seeks Minimum & OT Wages under FLSA
SEAWORLD ENTERTAINMENT: Government May Intervene in "Baker" Suit
SHELBY HEALTHCARE: "Williams" Suit Moved to E.D. Arkansas
SIGNAL FINANCE: "Rodero" Suit Seeks OT Compensation under FLSA
SPIRIT CLOTHING: Fails to Pay Minimum Wage & OT, Spearman Says

ST. JOSEPH, IN: Court Trims Claims "Taghon" Suit
SUPERIOR NUT: Roberts Sues over Use of Biometric Identifiers
SWIFT TRANSPORTATION: Initial Approval of "Slack" Accord Vacated
TARGET CORPORATION: "De La Cruz" Suit Moved to S.D. California
TESLA MOTORS: Faces Class Action From Workers in California

THERANOS INC: Court Narrows Claims in Suit Over Edison Devices
TOMMY HILFIGER: Class Claims False Discount Advertisements
TOWN OF WARWICK: "Semprivivo" Class Action Underway
TRADER JOE'S: "Wong" Suit Moved to Southern Dist. of California
TREMONT TOWING: "Valdez" Suit Seeks Unpaid OT Wages under FLSA

TRUMP UNIVERSITY: Judge Signs Off on $25-Mil. Settlement
ULTA BEAUTY: Devries Sues over Mislabeled Beauty Products
UNCLE PAUL'S: "Sapon" Suit Seeks Minimum & OT Wages under FLSA
UNITED STATES: Judge Allows Men to Challenge Male-Only Draft
UNITED STATES: "Stewart" Medicaid Suit Stays in D.C. Court

UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO: "Axelrod" Suit Moved to D. New Mexico
VIACOM INTERNATIONAL: Burbon Agrees to Drop Class Suit
VOLVO CARS: "Laurens" Suit Transferred to District of New Jersey
WAL-MART STORES: Faces Class Action From Accused Shoplifters
WAL-MART STORES: Faces Suit Over Song-Beverly Act Violations

WEYERHAEUSER CO: Infinity's Bid to Quash Subpoena Partly Denied
WINDHAM PROFESSIONALS: Defending Against "James" Suit
ZEP INC: "Chun" Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages under Labor Code



                            *********


8POINT3 ENERGY: Initial Case Conference in "Davis" on Aug. 3
------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Susan Illston has ruled that the case, Evan Davis,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. 8point3 Energy Partners LP, Charles D. Boynton, Alex
Bradley, Natalie F. Jackson, Thomas C. O'Connor, Norman J.
Szydlowski, Mark R. Widmar, and Michael W. Yackira, Defendants,
Case No. 3:18-cv-02267 (N.D. Cal., April 16, 2018), is related to
these lawsuits:

     18-cv-01989-SI
     18-cv-2549 WHA
     18-cv-2195 SI
     18-cv-2275 HRL

Also, on April 25, 2018, the Clerk of Court entered a Notice
indicating that the Initial Case Management Conferences has been
scheduled to occur on Friday, August 3, 2018. The Joint Case
Management Conference Statements shall be filed one week prior to
the conferences.  The Initial Case Management Conference will be
held at 2:30 p.m. in San Francisco, Courtroom 01, 17th Floor.

The lawsuit seeks to enjoin the Defendants from proceeding with a
proposed merger transaction, and in the event that the Proposed
Transaction is consummated, to recover damages from the
Defendants for their violations of the Securities Exchange Act.

8point3 Energy Partners LP (NASDAQ: CAFD) on Feb. 5 announced it
has entered into an Agreement and Plan of Merger and Purchase
Agreement with CD Clean Energy and Infrastructure V JV, LLC, an
investment fund managed by Capital Dynamics, Inc., and certain
other co-investors, pursuant to which Capital Dynamics will
acquire 8point3 through an acquisition of 8point3 General
Partner, LLC, the general partner of the Partnership, all of the
outstanding Class A shares in the Partnership and all of the
outstanding common and subordinated units and incentive
distribution rights in 8point3 Operating Company, LLC, the
Partnership's operating company.

The Partnership's Class A shareholders and First Solar, Inc.
(NASDAQ: FSLR) and SunPower Corporation (NASDAQ: SPWR), as
holders of common and subordinated units in OpCo, will receive
$12.35 per share or per unit in cash, plus a preset daily amount
representing cash expected to be generated from December 1, 2017
through closing less any distributions received after the
execution of the Merger Agreement and prior to closing.  No
consideration will be received by First Solar and SunPower -- as
Sponsors -- for the incentive distribution rights and the GP
Transfer.

According to 8point3's press statement:

     -- The Proposed Transactions represent about $977 million
        in equity value and about $1.7 billion in enterprise
        value;

     -- The deal is the culmination of an extensive and
        competitive marketing process with more than 130 parties
        contacted;

     -- Committed debt financing secured by Capital Dynamics
        enhances certainty of closing the Proposed Transactions;

     -- The Proposed Transactions unanimously approved by the
        Conflicts Committee of the Board of Directors of 8point3
        and approved by the Board of Directors of the General
        Partner as well as the Boards of Directors of First Solar
        and SunPower; and

     -- The Proposed Transactions expected to close in second
        fiscal quarter or third fiscal quarter of 2018

The Plaintiff contends that the price offered to shareholders as
Merger Consideration severely undervalues 8point3.  For instance,
on February 2, 2018, the Friday before the announcement of the
Proposed Transaction, 8point3's shares closed at $14.29, nearly
$2 more than the consideration contemplated by the Proposed
Transaction.  As recently as January 8, 2018, 8point3's shares
were trading at $15.90, nearly 30% more than that offered to
shareholders in connection with the Proposed Transaction.

8point3 Energy Partners LP, together with its subsidiaries,
acquires, owns, and operates solar energy generation projects in
the United States. The company was founded in 2015 and is based
in San Jose, California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

           Adam T. Hoover, Esq.
           Marc G. Reich, Esq.
           REICH RADCLIFFE & HOOVER LLP
           4675 MacArthur Court, Suite 550
           Newport Beach, CA 92660
           Telephone: (949) 975-0512
           Facsimile: (949) 208-2839
           E-mail: adhoover@reichradcliffe.com
                   mgr@reichradcliffe.com

                - and -

           Joshua M. Lifshitz, Esq.
           LIFSHITZ & MILLER LLP
           821 Franklin Ave., Suite 209
           Garden City, NY 11530
           Telephone: (516) 493-9780
           Facsimile: (516) 280-7376
           E-mail: jml@jlclasslaw.com


AJ BOGGS: Shared Medical Records Info, Class Action Says
--------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News, reports that a class
action claims A.J. Boggs & Co., which administered California's
AIDS Drug Assistance Program, allowed unauthorized third parties
to learn the HIV-positive status of 93 program participants, in
S.F. Superior Court.

The case is A. DOE, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff(s), v. A.J. BOGGS & COMPANY,
Defendant, Case No. CGC-18-565456, filed with the Superior Court
of the State of California for the County of San Francisco.

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

     Lawrence S. Gordon, Esq.
     COZEN O'CONNOR
     101 Montgomery Street, Suite 1400
     San Francisco, CA 94104
     Tel: 415-644-0914
     Fax: 415-644-0978
     Email: lgordon@cozen.com

        -- and --

     Anthony Pinggera, Esq.
     LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATION FUND, INC.
     4221 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 280
     Los Angeles, CA 90010
     Tel: 213-382-7600
     Email: apinggera@lambdalegal.org

        -- and --

     Scott Schoettes, Esq.
     Jamie A. Gilksberg, Esq.
     LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATION FUND, INC.
     105 West Adams, 26th Floor
     Chicago, IL 60603-6208
     Tel: 312-663-4413
     Email: sschoettes@lambdalegal.org
            jgliksberg@lambdalegal.org


AON HEWITT: Court Dismisses "Scott" ERISA Suit
----------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, granted the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss the case captioned CHERYL SCOTT, on behalf of herself,
the Caterpillar 401(k) Retirement Plan, and all similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. AON HEWITT FINANCIAL, ADVISORS, LLC et
al., Defendants, No. 17 C 679 (N.D. Ill.).

Plaintiff Cheryl Scott brings this putative class action on
behalf of herself and other similarly situated individuals who
are participants in the Caterpillar 401(k) Retirement Plan
against Defendants Hewitt Associates, LLC, and Aon Hewitt
Financial Advisors, LLC.  Scott alleges causes of action under
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29
U.S.C. Section 1001 et seq., in connection with services provided
by Defendants Hewitt and AFA to participants in the Plan who have
chosen to use the automated investment advisory services offered
by Caterpillar.  Scott alleges that Defendants Hewitt and AFA
breached their fiduciary duties to her and other Plan
participants by receiving excessive fees in relation to the
alleged services they provided.  Scott also claims that by
receiving excessive fees, both Hewitt and AFA engaged in
transactions prohibited by ERISA.  Alternatively, Scott argues
that Hewitt and AFA are liable as non-fiduciaries for knowingly
participating in and/or receiving benefits from certain
transactions prohibited by ERISA.

In Count I of her complaint, Scott alleges that Defendants Hewitt
and AFA breached their fiduciary duties to her and other Plan
participants and beneficiaries in violation of ERISA. In Counts
II and III, Scott alleges that Hewitt and AFA engaged in various
prohibited transactions in violation of ERISA. In Count IV, Scott
alleges that even if Hewitt and AFA are not fiduciaries, they are
liable as non-fiduciaries for their involvement in prohibited
transactions because they knowingly received improper payments
from fiduciaries of the Plan.

Count I: Fiduciary Duty

To be an ERISA fiduciary, a party must be named as a fiduciary in
the plan or meet ERISA's functional definition:

     "A person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the
extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or
discretionary control respecting management of such plan or
exercises any authority or control respecting management or
disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders investment advice for
a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to
any moneys or other property of such plan, or (iii) he has any
discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the
administration of such plan."

Scott Fails to State a Claim that Hewitt Is a Fiduciary

The Defendants argue that Scott fails to allege Hewitt was a
fiduciary for purposes of the conduct she challenges and that
Scott does not, and cannot, allege that Hewitt assumed any
discretionary authority or engaged in any discretionary
activities that caused it to become a functional fiduciary of the
Plan.  Scott argues that Hewitt acted as a fiduciary because it
purportedly exercised control over Caterpillar's retention of
Financial Engines under the Financial Engines Program.

In light of the language of the Hewitt/Financial Engines Master
Service Agreement, and nothing to the contrary in the record
except Scott's bald allegations of control, the Court concludes
Caterpillar had sole authority to select and hire Financial
Engines, and it is not plausible on this record that Hewitt had
any final authority or control over the selection and hiring of
Financial Engines.  Scott does not allege any additional facts
supporting a reasonable inference that Hewitt exercised final
authority over Caterpillar's engagement of Financial Engines,
that Hewitt gave Caterpillar no choice but to accept Financial
Engines, or that Financial Engines hired Hewitt on the Plan's
behalf.  If Caterpillar believed, as Scott alleges, that the fee-
sharing arrangement between Hewitt and Financial Engines would
inflate the price of the investment services provided by
Financial Engines, Caterpillar had the authority to decline to
engage Financial Engines and not offer its investment services to
Plan participants.

Even construing the facts in her favor, as the Court must do at
the motion to dismiss stage, nowhere in her complaint does Scott
allege any facts to support a claim that Hewitt provided
individualized investment advice to the Plan on a regular basis
pursuant to a mutual agreement that its advice would serve as a
primary basis for the Plan's investment decisions. There is
nothing to indicate, other than Scott's bare and conclusory
allegations, that Hewitt exercised discretionary authority over
the Plan or its assets, and those bare and conclusory allegations
are not enough to survive a motion to dismiss.

Accordingly, for all of these reasons, the Court is not persuaded
by any of Scott's arguments in support of her claims that Hewitt
is a fiduciary or has a fiduciary duty to her and the Plan
participants. Therefore, the claims in Count I against Hewitt are
dismissed.

Scott Fails to State a Claim that AFA Is a Fiduciary for Purposes
of Negotiating its Compensation or Hiring a Subcontractor

The Defendants argue that Scott fails to state a claim for breach
of fiduciary duty against AFA because she does not challenges any
conduct by AFA related to the investment advice it provided.
It is not disputed that AFA is a fiduciary to the Plan for the
purpose of providing investment advice to the Plan participants,
but that does not make AFA a fiduciary for all purposes.  An
entity is a fiduciary to the extent it exercises discretionary
authority or control over the management or administration of a
plan or its assets. ERISA's regulations provide that an entity,
like AFA in this case, which is a fiduciary for the limited
purpose of providing investment advice shall not be deemed to be
a fiduciary regarding any assets of the plan or IRA with respect
to which such person does not have any discretionary authority,
discretionary control or discretionary responsibility, does not
exercise any authority or control, does not render investment
advice for a fee or other compensation, and does not have any
authority or responsibility to render such investment advice.

In order to state a claim that a service provider to an ERISA-
governed plan breached a fiduciary duty by charging plan
participants excessive fees, a plaintiff first must plead facts
demonstrating that the provider owed a fiduciary duty to those
participants.

Scott alleges that AFA breached its fiduciary duties by receiving
an excessive fee from Caterpillar. However, it is well-
established that a service provider who negotiates its own
compensation with a plan fiduciary at arm's length is not a
fiduciary for that purpose.  Courts have held that a fiduciary's
negotiation of its own compensation is a non-fiduciary act as a
matter of law.

In this case, AFA is a fiduciary only for the purpose of
providing investment advice. AFA, therefore, only can be liable
for breach of fiduciary duty to the extent that it engaged in
misconduct in carrying out its sole fiduciary function, which is
rendering investment advice. See McCaffree Financial Corp. v.
Principal Life Ins. Corp., 811 F.3d 998, 1003-1004 (8th Cir.
2016). AFA did not have any fiduciary duty to Plan participants
during its arms-length negotiations with Caterpillar regarding
its compensation or when AFA hired Financial Engines as a
subadvisor, and nowhere in her complaint does Scott complain that
AFA breached its fiduciary duties by rendering defective
investment advice.

For all of these reasons, Scott fails to state a claim for breach
of fiduciary duty against AFA, and Count I against AFA is
dismissed. Again, the dismissal is without prejudice, and Scott
is given leave to file an amended complaint, if she wishes to do
so, that is consistent with the Court's Memorandum Opinion and
Order.

Count II: Prohibited Transactions under ERISA Section
406(a)(1)(C)

In Count II, Scott asserts that the Defendants Hewitt and AFA
engaged in prohibited transactions in violation of ERISA by
receiving compensation in connection with Financial Engines'
services to the Plan and their participants that was excessive
and unreasonable. To state a claim under Section 406(a)(1)(C), a
plaintiff must allege that the transaction in question was
between the plan and a party in interest. In addition, a
plaintiff also must allege that a plan fiduciary caused the plan
to engage in the allegedly unlawful transaction.

Scott Fails to State a Section 406(a)(1)(C) Claim against Hewitt

The Defendants argue that Count II should be dismissed against
Hewitt because Scott does not allege that the disputed
transaction was between Hewitt and the Plan or that a fiduciary
caused the Plan to engage in a prohibited transaction, both of
which are required to state a claim for a prohibited transaction
under Section 406(a)(1)(C).

In order to state a claim based on a prohibited transaction under
Section 406(a)(1)(C) against Hewitt, Scott is required to plead
adequate facts to establish that Hewitt is a Plan fiduciary.

The court in Chendes (Chendes v. Xerox HR Solutions, LLC, 2017 WL
4698970 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 19, 2017).) similarly rejected
substantially identical claims and dismissed the plaintiff's
prohibited transaction claims after concluding that the
challenged transaction lacked the requisite involvement of a plan
fiduciary and use of plan assets. Relying on Hecker, the court
concluded that the payments from Financial Engines to the records
keeper in that case did not constitute plan assets. Hecker, 556
F.3d at 584.
The plaintiff in Chendes, like Scott in this case, also had not
cited any authority holding that funds paid by a plan to a
service provider continue to be plan assets after the transfer.
The Chendes court concluded that plaintiffs fail to present any
meaningful way that a court could draw a line representing where
plan assets, once lawfully paid as fees to a service provider
under terms of a negotiated agreement, would cease to be plan
assets. This Court agrees and similarly rejects the arguments in
this case.

For all of these reasons, Scott fails to state a claim that
Hewitt engaged in a prohibited transaction in violation of ERISA
and Count II is dismissed against Hewitt. Again, the dismissal is
without prejudice with the same caveat as stated earlier in this
Memorandum Opinion and Order.

Scott Fails to State a Section 406(a)(1)(C) Claim against AFA

Scott also argues that AFA violated ERISA Section 406(a)(1)(C)
and engaged in a prohibited transaction by charging and accepting
excessive fees for the investment advice it provided to the Plan
participants. In response, the Defendants argue that Scott fails
to state a claim because she does not adequately allege that the
total compensation paid by the Plan for the bundle of investment
advisory services provided under the AFA Program was
unreasonable.
Section 406(a) of ERISA prohibits plan fiduciaries from causing a
plan to engage in many types of transactions with a party in
interest, including the furnishing of goods, services, or
facilities between the plan and a party in interest, which is at
issue in this case. Section 406, however, is subject to both
statutory and administrative exemptions.

In particular, Section 408(b) of ERISA enumerates specific
transactions exempted from the prohibitions of Section 406
statutory exemptions, while Section 408(a) gives the Secretary of
Labor broad authority to create additional exemptions provided
they are in the interests of and protective of the rights of plan
participants and beneficiaries administrative exemptions.

The Defendants contend that the transactions Scott challenges in
her complaint are covered by an exemption, and therefore, Count
II against AFA is defective. Scott, however, argues that the
Court should not dismiss Count II against AFA because the Section
408 exemption is an affirmative defense, and she does not need to
plead the absence of the exemption to the prohibited transaction.
The Court recognizes that ordinarily a plaintiff need not
anticipate and attempt to plead around affirmative defenses.

The relevant question at the motion to dismiss stage is not
whether the plaintiff ultimately will prevail on the merits of
her claim but whether the complaint is sufficient to cross the
federal pleading threshold. The question then becomes what is
reasonable compensation and, in this case, whether Scott's
conclusory allegation that the compensation at issue constitutes
excessive and unreasonable compensation is enough to raise the
right to relief above the speculative level" as set forth in
Twombly.

The Court concludes that Scott's allegations are not sufficient
to raise the right to relief above the speculative level at this
point without more.

Count II is dismissed against AFA.

Scott Fails To State A Section 406(b)(3) Claim Against AFA

The Defendants argue that Scott's ERISA Section 406(b)(3) claim
against AFA fails because Scott does not allege that AFA received
any consideration from a party dealing with the Plan. To engage
in a Section 406(b)(3) prohibited transaction, a party must
receive consideration for its own personal account from a party
dealing with the Plan.

Scott Fails To State A Section 406(b)(3) Claim Against AFA

The Defendants argue that Scott's ERISA Section 406(b)(3) claim
against AFA fails because Scott does not allege that AFA received
any consideration from a party dealing with the Plan. To engage
in a Section 406(b)(3) prohibited transaction, a party must
receive consideration for its own personal account from a party
dealing with the Plan.

Fees that the Plan and its participants pay to AFA for investment
advisory services cannot give rise to a Section 406(b)(3) claim
because a service provider cannot be held liable for merely
accepting previously bargained-for fixed compensation that was
not prohibited at the time of the bargain. The disputed
transaction is AFA's payment for its work; there is no payment
from Financial Engines to AFA. Scott failure to allege that AFA
as a fiduciary received consideration from another party dealing
with the Plan defeats her Section 406(b)(3) claim against AFA.

Count III against AFA is dismissed.

Count IV: Non-Fiduciary Liability

To state a Section 502(a)(3) claim for non-fiduciary
participation in a prohibited transaction, a plaintiff must
allege that (1) a prohibited transaction occurred, and (2) the
defendant knowingly participated in that prohibited transaction.
In this case, Scott alleges that Defendants Hewitt and AFA
received improper payments from Financial Engines, which they
knew or should have known violated sections 406(a) and 406(b) of
ERISA.

The factual predicate of Scott's non-fiduciary liability claim in
Count IV, however, is based on the same allegations that support
her prohibited transaction claims in Counts II and III.

The Court has concluded that Scott has failed to allege
sufficient facts to support her claims that Hewitt and AFA's
transactions with Financial Engines are prohibited transactions.
Therefore, Scott also fails to state any claim for non-fiduciary
liability pursuant to ERISA Section 502(a)(3) based on those same
predicate transactions, and Count IV is dismissed. The dismissal
again is without prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's March 19, 2018
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y8b45h3j from Leagle.com.

Cheryl Scott, on behalf of herself, the Caterpillar 401(k)
Retirement Plan, and all similarly situated, Plaintiff,
represented by Eli Johnson Kay-Oliphant, Massey & Gail LLP, 50 E
Washington St Ste 400, Chicago, IL 60602-2100,  Ellen T. Noteware
-- enoteware@bm.net -- Berger & Montague, P.C., pro hac vice,
Suyash Agrawal, Massey & Gail LLP, 50 E Washington St Ste 400,
Chicago, IL 60602-2100, Todd Collins -- tcollins@bm.ney.com --
Berger & Montaque, P.C., pro hac vice, Garrett W. Wotkyns --
gwotkyns@schneiderwallace.com -- Schneider Wallace Cottrell
Konecky LLP, pro hac vice, James A. Bloom --
jbloom@schneiderwallace.com -- Schneider Wallace Cottrell Konecky
Wotkyns, LLP, pro hac vice, John J. Nestico --
jnestico@schneiderwallace.com -- Schneider Wallace Cottrell
Konecky Wotkyns, LLP, pro hac vice, Kyle G. Bates --
kbates@schneiderwallace.com -- Scheider Wallace Cottrell Konecky
Wotkyns, LLP, pro hac vice, Shanon J. Carson, Berger & Montague,
P.c. & Todd M. Schneider -- tschneider@schneiderwallace.com --
Schneider Wallace Cottrell Brayton Konecky LLP, pro hac vice.

Aon Hewit Financial Advisors, LLC & Hewitt Associates, LLC, doing
business as, Defendants, represented by Craig Christopher Martin
-- cmartin@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block LLP, Amanda S. Amert --
aamert@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block LLP & Brienne M. Letourneau -
- bletourneau@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block LLP.


ARAKELIAN ENTERPRISES: Apartment Owners Sue over Waste Collection
-----------------------------------------------------------------
APARTMENT OWNERS ASSOCIATION OF CALIFORNIA, INC., JASBIR DHILLON,
GARY GILLMAN, ANITA HAEGGSTROM, R.M.B. ADVANCE GERMAN CAR
SPECIALTIES, CORP., and JULIO MATUS, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. ARAKELIAN
ENTERPRISES, INC.; CONSOLIDATED DISPOSAL SERVICES, LLC; CALMET
SERVICES, INC.; UNIVERSAL WASTE SYSTEMS, INC.; USA WASTE OF
CALIFORNIA, INC.; and DOES 1 through 50; inclusive, the
Defendants, Case No. BC705056 (Cal Super. Ct., May 4, 2018),
seeks to enjoin the Defendants from continuing to engage in an
alleged waste collection conspiracy.

According to the complaint, the Defendants are all waste haulers,
who in or about late 2016 or early 2017 entered into exclusive
franchise agreements with the City of Los Angeles to provide
waste collection services for commercial establishments and
multifamily dwellings within specified "franchise zones."  Those
exclusive franchises -- which give the Defendants the exclusive
right to provide and charge for waste collection services in
their respective zones and which have terms of up to 20 years --
are part of a franchise program called "recycLA." Prior to
recycLA, commercial establishments and multifamily dwellings
could select from any City-permitted waste hauler, who would
compete for business based on service and price. With recycLA,
the City moved to an exclusive franchise system by: (i) requiring
that all commercial establishments and multifamily dwellings
subscribe to and pay for waste collection services; (ii)
providing that the City may award exclusive franchise agreements
for the provision of waste collection services to commercial
establishments and multifamily dwellings; and (iii) making it
unlawful for anyone to provide collection services to commercial
establishments or multifamily dwellings unless the person has a
written franchise agreement with the City.

Any system that provides private companies with the exclusive
right to provide government-mandated services, is particularly
vulnerable to abuse.  According to the Complaint, that
possibility has been realized by: (i) Defendants who, during
secret pricing negotiations with staff members of the Los Angeles
Board of Sanitation misrepresented cost and performance data used
to establish rates by failing to account for the profits provided
from fees for "extra services" at rates bearing no relation
to actual costs of providing such services; and (ii) Defendants
who misrepresent to their customers that they are required to
charge the rates provided in their franchise agreements with the
City when in fact those rates are maximums and Defendants are
free to charge less.

The results of the Defendants' scheme and its effect on
Plaintiffs and other members of the Class are clear: under
recycLA tenants and property owners throughout Los Angles have
been stunned by trash-collection bills which have increased --
from one month to the next -- by 300%, 600%, or more. Indeed, at
least one property owner suffered an increase of 1,900%. Clearly,
something is fundamentally wrong.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants knowingly and willfully
acted in concert, conspired and agreed together among themselves,
and entered into a combination and systemized campaign of
activity, to inter alia damage Plaintiffs and the Class and to
otherwise consciously and/or recklessly act in derogation of the
rights of Plaintiffs and the Class, and the trust reposed by
Plaintiffs and the Class in each of the Defendants, the acts
being negligently and/or intentionally inflicted. This
conspiracy, and Defendants' concerted actions, were such that, to
the information and belief of Plaintiffs and the Class, and to
all appearances.  The Defendants, represented a unified body so
that the actions of one Defendant were accomplished in concert
with, and with knowledge, ratification, authorization and
approval of each of the other Defendants.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mike Arias, Esq.
          Arnold C. Wang, Esq.
          Alfredo Torrijos, Esq.
          ARIAS SANGUINETTI WANG & TORRIJOS, LLP
          6701 Center Drive West, 14th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90045
          Telephone: (310) 844 9696
          Facsimile: (310) 861 0168

               - and -

          Carolin K. Shining, Esq.
          SHINING LAW FIRM
          21550 Oxnard Street, Suite 630
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: (310) 490 4383
          Facsimile: (310) 872 5039

               - and -

          Larry A. Peluso, Esq.
          PELUSO LAW GROUP, PC
          350 Forest Avenue No. 4313
          Laguna Beach, CA 92652
          Telephone: (310) 593 1821


ARCH COAL: Stiffs Workers for Overtime, Class Action Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that
Arch Coal workers claim in a federal class action in West
Virginia that the company stiffs them for overtime, saying they
must "work for free."

The case is ORMAND R. BROOKS, individually and on behalf of
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ARCH COAL, INC.,
Defendant, Civil Action No. 5:18-cv-00523 (S.D. W. Va.).

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Mark Goldner, Esq.
     Maria W. Hughes, Esq.
     HUGHES & GOLDNER, PLLC
     10 Hale Street, Second Floor
     Charleston, WV 25301
     Tel: (304) 400-4816
     Fax: (304) 205-7729
     Email: mark@wvemploymentrights.com
            maria@wvemploymentrights.com


ASUS COMPUTER: Carlotti Sues over Laptop Power Defects
------------------------------------------------------
JOSEPH CARLOTTI, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. ASUS COMPUTER INTERNATIONAL
(NORTH AMERICA) INC.; ASUSTEK COMPUTER INC., and DOES 1-50, the
Defendant, Case No. RG18903641 (Cal. Super. Ct., May 4, 2018),
seeks redress for the Defendants' breaches of express and implied
warranties and violations of consumer protection law.

This consumer class action arises from misrepresentations and a
defect affecting all ASUS ROG Strix GL502VS and GL502VSK laptops
which were jointly designed, manufactured, marketed, warranted,
distributed and sold by Defendants. Marketed as portable laptops
with a powerful graphical processor suited for gaming and video
editing, the Laptops contain a uniform defect, which causes: (1)
the Laptops' battery to drain during use, even when the Laptop is
connected to an electrical outlet; (2) significant reductions in
computational performance when low on battery power, or when the
battery is re moved, even if the Laptop is connected to an
electrical outlet; and (3) accelerated degradation of the
Laptops' batteries.

As a result of consumer complaints from owners of the Laptops
which suffered from the Power Defect, Defendants distributed at
least two software updates, either of which remedied the Power
Defect. Defendants also repeatedly promised -- and then failed to
deliver -- a permanent hardware fix for the Power Defect,
apparently because they found prohibitive the cost of providing
laptops that performed as represented.

Warranty repairs related to the Power Defect have proven useless
because Defendants replace defective components with identical
and equally defective components. The Power Defect renders the
Laptops unfit and unusable for their ordinary pur pose for use in
gaming or video editing, well within their reasonable expected
lifespans. Defendants also misrepresented the nature of the
Laptops' cooling systems, which are a material feature of the
Laptops. Because the powerful components in the Laptops generate
significant heat, complex cooling solutions are required to
prevent overheating and component damage. Defendants represented
that the Laptops' possessed two independent/cooling systems for
Laptops' computational processing unit and graphics processing
unit. The Defendants further represented that this independent
cooling system "maximizes cooling efficiency" to give the Laptops
"stability required for intense gaming sessions. "These
representations were false in two regards: First, the Laptops'
cooling system is not independent; the same copper tubes that
draw heat away from the GPU are used to draw heat from the CPU.
Second, the Laptops' cooling system does not give Laptops the
stability required for intense gaming sessions. To the contrary,
the Laptops run much hotter than competing Laptops using the same
processors. As a result, the Laptops' suffer from reduced
durability and performance.

As a direct and proximate result of the Power Defect, Defendants'
misrepresentations concerning the Laptops' cooling system, and
Defendants' unfair and deceptive practices, the Plaintiff, and
those similarly situated, have suffered injury in fact and
incurred damages, such as diminished use, durability and
performance of the Laptops and diminished battery durability and
battery life of the Laptops' batteries.

AsusTek Computer is a Taiwanese multinational computer and phone
hardware and electronics company headquartered in Beitou
District, Taipei, Taiwan.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Adam J. Gutride, Esq.
          Seth A. Safier, Esq.
          Marie A. McCrary, Esq.
          Anthony J. Patek, Esq.
          GUTRIDE SAFIER LLP
          100 Pine Street, Suite 1250
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 271 6469
          Facsimile: (415) 449 6469

               - and -

          Nicholas Migliaccio, Esq.
          Jason Rathod, Esq.
          Esfand Nafisi, Esq.
          MIGLIACCIO & RATHOD LLP
          412 H Street NE, Suite 302
          Washington, D.C. 20002


AT&T CORP: Underpays Call Center Agents, Mosley-Lovings Says
------------------------------------------------------------
TAMMY MOSLEY-LOVINGS, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. AT&T CORP.; AT&T INC.; and
SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE L.P., a/k/a AT&T COMMUNICATIONS OF
TEXAS, LLC, a/k/a AT&T SOUTHWEST, AT&T SERVICES, INC., and
DIRECTTV LLC, the Defendant, Case No. 3:18-cv-01145-B (N.D. Tex.,
May 4, 2018), seeks to recover damages caused by the Defendants'
failure to pay for all time worked by Plaintiffs and the putative
class, depriving these employees of their earned straight time
and overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

As of the filing date of the Complaint, approximately 130 call
center employees have consented to participate in this action.
The Defendants allegedly operated under a scheme and practice to
deprive Plaintiffs and the collective class of overtime
compensation and thereby increase Defendants' earnings and
ultimately Defendants' profits. The Plaintiff and the putative
class members also were not paid a bona fide regular rate of pay
for straight time hours worked when those hours were not tracked
and accounted for, but were worked by these individuals.

While working for the Defendants, the Plaintiff and members of
the putative class were subject to the control of Defendants and
engaged in activities that were not undertaken for their own
convenience, that were necessary for the performance of their
duties for Defendants, and that were integral and indispensable
to their principal activities. Despite this, the Plaintiff and
other members of the collective class regularly were permitted or
required to work "off the clock that entitled them to
compensation therefore. Defendants' rounding practices violated
the overtime provisions of the FLSA because Defendants did not
pay the overtime wages for all work performed by Plaintiff and
the similarly-situated employees.

The Defendants' action to not pay overtime or premium pay for all
hours worked over 40 in a week and their failure to keep accurate
payroll records was willful in that Defendants knew that the FLSA
required them to pay one and one-half times the regular rate for
all hours worked over 40 in a workweek and Defendants knew that
the FLSA required them to maintain true and accurate records. As
a direct and proximate result thereof, the Plaintiff and
similarly situated call-center employees are due unpaid overtime
and liquidated damages.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          J. Derek Braziel, Esq.
          Travis Gasper, Esq.
          LEE & BRAZIEL, L.L.P.
          www.overtimelawyer.com
          1801 N. Lamar St. Suite 325
          Dallas, TX 75202
          Telephone: (214) 749 1400
          Facsimile: (214) 749 1010
          E-mail: jdbraziel@l-b-law.com
                  gasper@l-b-law.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey Grant Brown, Esq.
          JEFFREY GRANT BROWN, P.C.
          221 North La Salle Street, Suite 1414
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 789 9700

               - and -

          Glen J. Dunn, Jr., Esq.
          GLEN J. DUNN & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
          221 North La Salle Street, Suite 1414
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 546 5056


AVENUE 81: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, "Tiffany" Suit Claims
------------------------------------------------------------
Jake Tiffany, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Avenue 81 d/b/a Leadpages, Defendant, Case
No. 18CV0732MMAJMA (S.D. Cal., April 16, 2018) seeks to stops the
Defendant's practice of sending unsolicited text messages and
prerecorded messages to cellular telephones without the
recipient's prior express written consent.

Avenue 81 Inc., doing business as Leadpages, develops web-based
applications that help businesses grow. The company was founded
in 2008 and is based in Minneapolis, Minnesota. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

         Yana A. Hart, Esq.
         Joshua B. Swigart, Esq.
         HYDE & SWIGART, APC
         2221 Camino Del Rio South, Suite 101
         San Diego, CA 92108-3551
         Telephone: (619) 233-7770
         Facsimile: (619) 297-1022
         E-mail: yana@westcoastlitigation.com
                 josh@westcoastlitigation.com

               - and -

          Abbas Kazerounian, Esq.
          KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC
          245 Fischer Avenue, Suite D1
          Costa Mesa, CA 92626
          Telephone: (800) 400-6808
          Facsimile: (800) 520-5523
          E-mail: ak@kazlg.com


AXA EQUITABLE: Second Circuit Flips Dismissal of "O'Donnell" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Barrington D. Parker of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed the judgment of the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York dismissing a class action
lawsuit against Axa Equitable Life Insurance Company, concluding
that the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998
("SLUSA") precluded the suit.

The appellate case is, RICHARD O'DONNELL, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AXA
EQUITABLE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee, Case No.
17-1085-cv (2d Cir.).

A variable annuity policy holder brought a putative class action
in state court alleging a breach of contract by an insurance
company when it introduced a volatility management strategy to
the policies without full compliance with state law.

In November 2008, O'Donnell purchased a variable deferred annuity
policy from AXA.  The policy that O'Donnell purchased allowed him
to allocate his premiums among various investment options with
different risk-reward characteristics.  In 2009 AXA introduced a
volatility management strategy designed to tactically manage
equity exposure to Standard & Poor's 500 companies based on the
level of volatility in the market.  This strategy, labeled the
AXA Tactical Manager Strategy, ("ATM Strategy") reduced AXA's
risks by using derivatives to hedge its own equity exposure to
market volatility at the expense of the variable annuity
policyholders who purchased their policies, in part, for the
opportunity to benefit from market volatility.

In 2011, the DFS began investigating AXA's implementation of the
ATM Strategy and, specifically, whether AXA had properly
disclosed to the DFS the scope of the changes.  Following its
investigation, the DFS concluded that AXA failed to adequately
inform it that it was implementing its ATM Strategy in a manner
that substantially changed its variable annuity products.  In
March 2014, AXA settled with the DFS.  It entered into a Consent
Order in which, among other things, the DFS found that AXA
violated New York Insurance Law section 4240(e) by filing the
plans of operation without adequately informing and explaining to
the Department the significance of the changes to the insurance
product.  The DFS noted that it approved the filings because it
was led to believe the changes were simply routine additions of
funds.  The DFS concluded that had it been aware of the changes,
it may have required that the existing policyholders
affirmatively opt in to the ATM Strategy.

After the entry of the Consent Order, many Plaintiffs, including
O'Donnell, brought putative class action suits.  O'Donnell
initiated the action in Connecticut state court.  He alleged a
breach of contract claim premised on AXA's alleged failure to
comply with the terms of the policies that AXA had sold to
O'Donnell and other members of the putative class.  Specifically,
O'Donnell alleged that, in violation of Section 4240, AXA
breached the terms of the policy when it implemented the ATM
Strategy without obtaining prior approval.  O'Donnell purported
to sue on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated
variable annuity policyholders who allocated funds into separate
accounts which implemented the ATM Strategy.

Citing, among other things, the alleged misrepresentations to the
DFS, AXA removed the action to federal court (the District of
Connecticut), where it successfully moved, over O'Donnell's
objections, to transfer the case to the Southern District of New
York.  There, O'Donnell moved to remand the action to state court
and AXA cross-moved to dismiss the complaint as precluded by
SLUSA.

The District Court held that the putative class action complaint
was precluded by SLUSA and dismissed the action.  In doing so,
the District Court construed the contract claim as being
essentially the same as the claim that it disposed of in a
similar action, Zweiman v. AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co.  In the
Zweiman action, as here, the plaintiff premised a breach of
contract claim on the assertion that AXA breached by implementing
a material change to the variable annuity policy without
obtaining prior approval from state regulators.  In both actions,
despite the plaintiffs' framing, the District Court interpreted
the complaints as alleging a "misrepresentation or omission" on
the part of AXA in connection with a decision to hold securities
and concluded that SLUSA applied.  The appeal followed.

Judge Parker explains that the SLUSA precludes the Plaintiffs
from bringing certain class actions in state court that allege
fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of nationally
traded securities.  In this putative class action, O'Donnell sues
on behalf of himself and other variable annuity holders as
customers of Defendant-Appellee AXA.  O'Donnell alleges that AXA
implemented a volatility management strategy for its variable
annuity policies in breach of its contractual duties to him and
the other variable annuity holders.  If SLUSA is applicable, then
O'Donnell would be barred from maintaining the class action in
state court and the action would be removable to federal court
where it must be dismissed.

In seeking state regulatory approval for the implementation of
the volatility management strategy, AXA was charged with
misleading the New York State Department of Financial Services
("DFS"), and eventually reached a settlement with that
department.  On this ground, the Appellee removed the action to
federal court, arguing -- solely for the purpose of SLUSA removal
and dismissal -- that O'Donnell's breach of contract action
depends on a misrepresentation (AXA's alleged misrepresentation
to the New York state regulator).  In this vein, AXA argues, the
alleged misrepresentation was made in connection with the
purchase or sale of a SLUSA-covered security, and, thus, SLUSA
preclusion applies.  The action was eventually transferred to the
District Court which dismissed it.

On the appeal, the Court is asked to determine whether a putative
class action complaint is precluded by SLUSA where the alleged
misrepresentation was made to a state regulator and unknown to
the holders of the security.

Judge Parker explains that under SLUSA, covered class actions
that allege state law securities fraud in connection with the
purchase or sale of covered securities are removable to federal
court where they there must be dismissed.  Here, there is no
dispute that the complaint meets three of SLUSA's requirements:
(1) the action is a "covered class action," (2) the action is
based on state common law, and (3) the action involves a "covered
security."  Thus, the dispute before him involves the fourth
requirement: whether the complaint alleges a misrepresentation or
omission of material fact in connection with the purchase or sale
of a security.

This inquiry breaks down into two parts, both of which are
required for preclusion under SLUSA: (i) whether the complaint
alleges a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact, and
(ii) if so, whether the misrepresentation or omission was made in
connection with the purchase or sale of a SLUSA-covered security.

The Judge concludes that the alleged misrepresentation was not
made in connection with the purchase or sale of a SLUSA-covered
security.  Because he concludes that part two of this inquiry was
not met, he needs not reach the first one.

The Judge sees no link between the misrepresentation (to a
regulator) and the inaction of a securities holder following
misrepresentations of which the holder was unaware.  He concludes
that the misrepresentation could not have been made in connection
with the purchase or sale of a covered security because the
misrepresentation could not have been material to a decision by
one or more individuals to buy or sell a covered security, for
the simple reason that it was unknown to them.  In other words,
there is no plausible allegation in the complaint that any
decision to hold a security occurred that was related in any way
to AXA's disclosures to the DFS.

He notes that the implementation of the ATM strategy was
disclosed publicly in a May 2009 prospectus and in an August 2009
supplement.  AXA's argument, however, turns on the failure to
disclose changes to the DFS and not on these public disclosures.
Here, there is no allegation (or a reasonable inference) that, in
these later disclosures, AXA misled O'Donnell or the market more
generally or that the market was aware of AXA's misrepresentation
to the DFS.

For the forgoing reasons, Judge Parker reversed the judgment of
the District Court and remanded with instructions to remand the
case to Connecticut state court.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 10, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/USb2BQ from Leagle.com.

JOEL C. FEFFER -- jcfeffer@hfesq.com -- AND DANIELLA QUITT --
dquitt@hfesq.com -- Harwood Feffer LLP, New York, NY, for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

JAY B. KASNER -- jkasner@skadden.com -- AND KURT WM. HEMR --
kurt.hemr@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
LLP, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellee.


B.J.D. INC: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, "McGrew" Suit Alleges
------------------------------------------------------------
Alma McGrew, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. B.J.D., Inc., and Does 1 through 100,
Defendants, Case No. BC702064 (Cal. Super., Los Angeles Cty.,
April 16, 2018) is an action against the Defendants for unpaid
regular hours, overtime hours, minimum wages, wages for missed
meal and rest periods.

Ms. McGrew was employed by the Defendants as a non-exempt
employee in California.

B.J.D., Inc. is a California corporation engaged in the business
of manufacturing clothes/apparels. The Company was founded in
1985 in Los Angeles California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Melissa M. Kurata, Esq.
          Michael Nourmand, Esq.
          James A. De Sario, Esq.
          THE NOURMAND LAW FIRM, APC
          8822 West Olympic Boulevard
          Beverly Hills, CA 90211
          Telephone (310) 553-3600
          Facsimile (310) 553-3603


BANK OF AMERICA: Court Orders "Mendez" to File More Briefing
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order for Parties to Prepare for March 21,
2018 Hearing in the case captioned LORI A. MENDEZ, Plaintiff, v.
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Defendant. Case No. 1:17-cv-01509-LJO-
SAB.(E.D. Cal.)

Plaintiff Lori A. Mendez filed the action against Defendant Bank
of America, N.A., on November 9, 2017.  Currently pending before
the Court is Defendant's motion to dismiss.

The Court required the parties to submit supplemental briefing
regarding whether American Pipe tolling would apply to the claims
in this action under California law.  The parties both argued
that American Pipe would apply to the claims. However, in Clemens
v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2008), the
Ninth Circuit held that the rule of American Pipe which allows
tolling within the federal court system in federal question class
actions does not mandate cross-jurisdictional tolling as a matter
of state procedure.

Therefore, the Ninth Circuit found that the filing of a class
action in another jurisdiction did not toll the statute of
limitations on the plaintiff's fraud claim under California law.

Accordingly, the parties will be prepared to address at the
hearing whether the Plaintiff's conduct in filing the action
would be considered reasonable and good faith in applying
California's equitable tolling doctrine.

A full-text copy of the District Court's March 19, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y7oops4j from Leagle.com.

Lori A. Mendez, Plaintiff, represented by Caitlyn C. Prichard --
cpritchard@awkolaw.com -- Aylstock Witkin Kreis & Overhotlz,
PLLC, pro hac vice & Sin-Ting Mary Liu -- mliu@awkolaw.com --
Aylstock, Witkin, Kreis & Overholtz PLLC.

Bank of America, N.A., Defendant, represented by Adam Frederick
Summerfield -- asummerfield@mcguirewoods.com -- Mcguirewoods LLP.


BAY AREA REGIONAL: Termination Violates WARN Act, Hood Says
-----------------------------------------------------------
SANDRA HOOD and HARRY BOWERS on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. BAY AREA REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER, LLC and MEDISTAR SLN GP, LLC, the Defendants,
Case No. 4:18-cv-01461 (S.D. Tex., May 7, 2018), seeks to recover
damages in the amount of 60 days' pay and Employee Retirement
Income Security Act benefits by reason of Defendants' violation
of the Plaintiff's rights under the Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification Act of 1988.

The Defendants violated the WARN Act by failing to give the
Plaintiffs and the other similarly situated employees of the
Defendants at least 60 days' advance written notice of
termination, as required by the WARN Act. As a consequence, the
Plaintiffs and the Other Similarly Situated Employees of the
Defendants are entitled under the WARN Act to recover from the
Defendants their wages and ERISA benefits for 60 days, none of
which has been paid.

Bay Area Regional is a diversified, integrated multi-specialty
health care delivery system.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Carolyn Carollo, Esq.
          SNOW SPENCE GREEN LLP
          2929 Allen Parkway # 2800
          Houston, TX 77019
          Telephone: (713) 335 4800
          Facsimile: (713) 335 4848
          E-mail: carolyncarollo@snowspencelaw.com

               - and -

          Stuart J. Miller, Esq.
          LANKENAU & MILLER, LLP
          132 Nassau Street, Suite 1100
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 581 5005
          Facsimile: (212) 581 2122

               - and -

          Mary E. Olsen, Esq.
          M. Vance McCrary
          210 S. Washington Avenue
          Mobile, AL 36602
          Telephone: (251) 433 8100
          Facsimile: (251) 433 8181

               - and -

          Cooperating Counsel for
          THE NLG MAURICE AND JANE SUGAR
          LAW CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND
          SOCIAL JUSTICE, a non-profit law firm
          4605 Cass Ave.
          Detroit, MH 48201
          Telephone: (313) 993 4505


BILLNET SOLUTIONS: "Velez" Suit Moved to S.D. Florida
-----------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled JULIETTE VELEZ and MARIANELA
MUNIZ, and all other similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v.
BILLNET SOLUTIONS CORPORATION; DIEGO MEDINA TORRES, individually
MICHELLE FARIAS, individually; CARLOS SUAREZ, individually;
JESSICA FUENTES, individually; and ANDRES VELEZ, individually,
the Defendants, Case No. 18-008495-CA-01, was removed from the
11th Judicial Circuit, to the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Florida (Miami) on May 7, 2018. The District
Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:18-cv-21828-JEM to the
proceeding. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Jose E.
Martinez.

Billnet Solutions Corp. is a medical billing company, located in
Miami, Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Jorge Freddy Perera, Esq.
          PERERA BARNHART
          12555 Orange Drive, Second Floor
          Davie, FL 33330
          Telephone: (786) 485 5232
          Facsimile: (786) 485 1519
          E-mail: freddy@pererabarnhart.com

Attorneys for Defendants:

          Senen Daniel Garcia, II, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF SENEN GARCIA PA
          2665 S. Bayshore Drive, Suite 220
          Miami, FL 33133
          Telephone: (305) 606 6139
          Facsimile: (305) 856 0622
          E-mail: senen@sgarcialaw.com

               - and -

          Virginia Lee Perez, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF VIRGINIA LEE PEREZ
          2525 Ponce de Leon Boulevard, Suite 300
          Coral Gables, FL 33134
          Telephone: (305) 791 1529
          Facsimile: (305) 647 2722
          E-mail: virginia@vperezlaw.com


CA RESTAURANT: "Ellis" Suit Seeks Minimum & OT Wages under FLSA
---------------------------------------------------------------
CARTER ELLIS, 10529 Richard Drive, Parma, OH 44256 and
MADISON ELLIS 4825 Grafton Rd. Brunswick, OH 44212 On behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v.
CA RESTAURANT GROUP, LLC d/b/a SQUARE 22 RESTAURANT AND BAR c/o
Statutory Agent 1932 Service Corp. 1301 E. 9th Street Cleveland,
OH 44114 and DAN STROEMPLE 13485 Pearl Rd. Strongsville, OH 44136
and MICHAEL CATANZARITE 13485 Pearl Rd. Strongsville, OH 44136,
the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-01058 (N.D. Ohio, May 7, 2018),
seeks to recover minimum wage and overtime pay under the Fair
Labor Standards Act.

The Defendants own and operate Square 22 Restaurant and Bar
located in the Westwood Commons in downtown Strongsville, Ohio.
The Defendants have employed approximately 20 full and part-time
tipped wait staff during the relevant period, including servers,
bussers and bartenders.

Mr. Carter Ellis has been employed by Defendants since about June
2017 to the present as a tipped employee. Ms. Madison Ellis has
been employed by Defendants since about October 2017 to the
present as a tipped employee.

The Defendants were prohibited from taking a tip credit when they
failed to inform their tipped employees of the provisions of the
tip-credit subsection of the FLSA. The Defendants violated the
FLSA by allegedly paying their employees subminimum wages without
informing them of the tip-credit provisions of the FLSA.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kevin M. McDermott II, Esq.
          Joseph F. Scott, Esq.
          Ryan A. Winters, Esq.
          Kevin M. McDermott II, Esq.
          SCOTT & WINTERS LAW FIRM, LLC
          The Caxton Building
          812 Huron Rd. E., Suite 490
          Cleveland, OH 44115
          Telephone: (216) 912 2221
          Facsimile: (216) 350 6313
          E-mail: jscott@ohiowagelawyers.com
                  rwinters@ohiowagelawyers.com
                  kmcdermott@ohiowagelawyers.com


CAPITAL ONE: Charges Bank Fees on its Own ATMs, Class Action Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that a
federal class action claims Capital One bank charges fees on
balance inquiries on its own ATMs, though it promises they are
free, and charges two fees on balance inquiries and cash
withdrawals on out-of-network ATMs.

The case is JACOB FIGUEROA, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, vs. CAPITAL ONE, N.A., and Does 1-
100, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. _____ (S.D. Calif.).

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

     Todd D. Carpenter, Esq.
     Britanny C. Casola, Esq.
     CARLSON LYNCH SWEET KILPELA & CARPENTER, LLP
     1350 Columbia Street, Ste. 603
     San Diego, CA 92101
     Tel: 619-762-1900
     Fax: 619-756-6991
     Email: tcarpenter@carlsonlynch.com
       bcasola@carlsonlynch.com

        -- and --

     Edwin J. Kilpela, Esq.
     CARLSON LYNCH SWEET KILPELA & CARPENTER, LLP
     1133 Penn Avenue, 5th Floor
     Pittsburgh, PA 15222
     Tel: 412-322-9243
     Fax: 412-231-0246
     Email: ekilpela@carlsonlynch.com


CAREFUSION SOLUTIONS: "Ward" Suit Moved to District of Delaware
---------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Steve Ward and Francis Tressa,
Individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated
persons, the Plaintiffs, v. CareFusion Solutions, LLC, the
Defendant, Case No. N17C-10-00199 MMJ, was removed from the
Delaware Superior Court, to the U.S. District Court for the
District of Delaware (Wilmington) on May 7, 2018. The District
Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:18-cv-00688-UNA.

CareFusion Solutions manufactures surgical and medical equipment.
The Company offers skin cleanser, surgical hand scrubs, trays,
and brushes.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel Charles Herr, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL C. HERR LLC
          1225 North King Street, Suite 1000
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 483 7060
          Facsimile: (302) 483 7065
          E-mail: DHerr@dherrlaw.com

Attorneys for Defendant:

          Elizabeth S. Fenton, Esq.
          Danielle Nicole Petaja, Esq.
          SAUL EWING LLP
          222 Delaware Ave No. 1200
          P.O. Box 1266
          Wilmington, DE 19899
          Telephone: (302) 421 6824
          Facsimile: (302) 421 6813
          E-mail: efenton@saul.com
                  danielle.petaja@saul.com


CITIBANK NA: 9th Cir. Affirms "Nichols" Dismissal
-------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the District Court's judgment granting Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment in the case captioned SHIRLEY NICHOLS,
Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITIBANK, N.A., et al., Defendants-
Appellees, No. 16-56042 (9th Cir.).

Plaintiff-Appellant Shirley Nichols appeals the district court's
order granting summary judgment on her class action claims in
favor of Defendants-Appellees.

Nichols argues that the district court erred in determining that
the class action settlement release in Raniere v. Citigroup Ins.,
No. 1:11-cv-2448-RWS (S.D.N.Y.), barred Nichols's present claims.

A settlement agreement may preclude a party from bringing a
related claim in the future even though the claim was not
presented and might not have been presentable in the class
action, but only where the released claim is based on the
identical factual predicate as that underlying the claims in the
settled class action.  Hesse v. Sprint Corp., 598 F.3d 581, 590
(9th Cir. 2010).

Nichols fails to distinguish the factual predicates of her
present claims from the factual predicate of Raniere even though
she focuses her present claims narrowly on a specific method
whereby Citibank miscalculated the base wages used to compute the
overtime wages owed to non-exempt employees. While Raniere
covered a broader range of alleged misconduct that included the
misclassification of employees as exempt from overtime, both the
settlement in Raniere and Nichols's present claims are predicated
on allegations that Citibank failed to pay and accurately
disclose or compute wages for the purpose of calculating overtime
payments to employees properly classified as non-exempt.
Accordingly, the Raniere settlement release and Nichols's present
claims are based on the same factual predicate.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's March 19, 2018 Memorandum
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y83ar8al from Leagle.com.


CITIZENS DISABILITY: Made Unsolicited Calls, "Alberts" Suit Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
Julie Alberts, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Citizens Disability, LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 1:18-cv-00427-JTN-ESC (W.D. Mich., April 16, 2018), alleges
that the Defendant made unauthorized text messages and calls
using an automatic telephone dialing system to the cellular
telephone numbers of the Plaintiff and the other members of the
Class without their prior express written consent.

Citizens Disability, LLC offers social justice advocacy services.
The company provides social security disability solutions.
Citizens Disability, LLC was founded in 2010 and is based in
Waltham, Massachusetts. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Priya Bali, Esq.
          LYNGKLIP & ASSOCIATES
          CONSUMER LAW CENTER, PLC
          24500 Northwestern Hwy, Ste 206
          Southfield MI 48075
          Telephone: (248) 208-8864
          E-mail: Priya@MichiganConsumerlaw.com

               - and -

          B. Thomas Golden, Esq.
          GOLDEN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
          2186 West Main Street
          P.O. Box 9
          Lowell, MI 49331
          Telephone: (616) 897-2900
          E-mail: btg@bthomasagolden.com


CLOUD CATERING: Unlawfully Retained Tips, "Robinson" Suit Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
BARRY ROBINSON and VINCENT SETTECASI, individually and on behalf
of others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. K of NEW YORK,
LLC d/b/a CLOUD CATERING; WILLIAM KEH; JEAN KEH; DARRELL
SPRINGER; and any other related entities, the Defendants, Case
No. 154209/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., May 7, 2018), seeks to recover
unlawfully retained tips and gratuities under New York Labor Law.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs were in fact only paid
a flat shift rate when they worked at Defendants' catered events
and did not receive their portion of the Mandatory Charge. The
Plaintiffs were paid a flat rate per hour regardless of the
number of hours he worked during that shift. The Defendants have
allegedly engaged in a policy and practice of failing to pay the
Mandatory Charge to Plaintiff.[BN]

Attorneys for the Named Plaintiff & the Putative Class:

          Jeffrey K. Brown, Esq.
          LEEDS BROWN LAW, P.C.
          One Old Country Road, Suite 347
          Carle Place, NY 11514
          Telephone: (516) 873 9550


CODE REBEL: $1-Mil. "Springer" Suit Settlement Has Final Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Robert Springer, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Code Rebel
Corporation, et al., Defendants, Case No. 16-cv-3492 (AJN)
(S.D.N.Y.), Judge Alison J. Nathan of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York granted the Plaintiffs' Motion
for Final Approval of the Class Action Settlement and their
Application for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Expenses and
Incentive Award for Class Representatives.

A hearing was held on March 2, 2018, during which time the Court
heard the Plaintiffs' Motion.

The Court on June 28, 2017, entered an Order of Preliminary
Approval approving notice to the Class, establishing deadlines
for objections, and preliminarily approving the Settlement.

Having considered the written submissions of the parties, held a
final fairness hearing, and considered the arguments offered at
the final fairness hearing, Judge Nathan ordered that the Class
is finally certified and the Settlement is finally approved.

The Class is defined as all persons, entities, or legal
beneficiaries or participants in any entities who purchased or
otherwise acquired Code Rebel securities from the date of its
initial public stock offering on or about May 19, 2015, to May
12, 2017.

The Judge appointed William Tran and Adrian Ybarra as the Lead
Plaintiffs in the action; and the Rosen Law Firm, P.A., and
Pomerantz LLP, as the co-Lead Counsel.

He awarded the Class Counsel an attorneys' fee award of one-third
of the $1 million cash settlement, plus accrued interest,
expenses of $13,107.67, and compensatory awards to the Lead
Plaintiffs Tran and Ybarra of $1,000 each.

The Order resolves Docket Numbers 72 and 74.  The Court will
separately enter a final judgment and order of dismissal.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 10, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/NgJUPG from Leagle.com.

William Tran, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated & Adrian Ybarra, Individually and On Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Lead Plaintiffs, represented by
Phillip C. Kim -- pkim@rosenlegal.com -- at The Rosen Law Firm
P.A.; Jeremy Alan Lieberman -- jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Joseph
Alexander Hood, II -- ahood@pomlaw.com -- Justin Solomon
Nematzadeh -- jnematzadeh@pomlaw.com -- at Pomerantz LLP.

Robert Springer, individually & Robert Springer, on behalf of
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Phillip C.
Kim, The Rosen Law Firm P.A.

George Torres, Movant, represented by Matthew Moylan Guiney --
guiney@whafh.com -- at Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP.

Afaq Shaik, Movant, represented by Lesley Frank Portnoy --
lportnoy@glancylaw.com -- at Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP.

Larry Strowbridge, Movant, represented by Adam M. Apton --
aapton@zlk.com -- at Levi & Korsinsky LLP.

Arben Kryeziu, Defendant, represented by Justin Blake Singer --
justin@dfmklaw.com -- at Feuerstein Kulick LLP.

Reid Dabney, Defendant, represented by Donald W. Hawthorne --
dhawthorne@axinn.com -- Felix John Gilman -- fgilman@axinn.com --
at Axinn, Veltrop & Harkrider, LLP.


CONVERGENT OUTSOURCING: "Clermont" Suit Moved to E.D.N.Y.
---------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned as JEAN CLERMONT, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. CONVERGENT
OUTSOURCING, INC. AND NATIONAL COLLEGIATE, the Defendants, the
National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-3 removes the action
from Queens County Supreme Court, State of New York to the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The
Eastern District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:18-cv-02691-AMD-
RER to the proceeding.[BN]

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-3:

          Aaron R. Easley, Esq.
          SESSIONS FISHMAN NATHAN & ISRAEL
          3 Cross Creek Drive
          Flemington, NJ 08822
          Telephone: (908) 237 1660
          Facsimile: (908) 237 1663
          E-mail: aealsey@sessions.legal


CORONA REGIONAL: 9th Cir. Affirms $15K Deposition-Related Costs
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned MARLYN SALI, on behalf of themselves, all
others situated and the general public; DEBORAH SPRIGGS, on
behalf of themselves, all others situated and the general public;
BISNAR CHASE, LLP, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CORONA REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER; UHS OF DELAWARE INC., Defendants-Appellees, No.
15-56389 (9th Cir.), the question is whether Rule 45 is the
exclusive mechanism for compelling a nonparty to appear at a
deposition and obtaining sanctions for noncompliance.

Marlyn Sali and Deborah Spriggs are registered nurses who
instituted a class action against their former employer, Corona
Regional Medical Center, and its corporate parent, UHS of
Delaware Inc., for alleged violations of wage and hour laws.

The Defendants sought to depose Falkenhagen and Drogin in advance
of the April 16, 2015 deadline for filing the opposition to class
certification.  After an unproductive email exchange, in which
the parties' counsel dickered over fees, defendants subpoenaed
Falkenhagen to be deposed on March 30, 2015.  The Plaintiffs
interposed various objections, which defendants dismissed as
insufficient to prevent a subpoenaed deposition from moving
forward. On the scheduled day of the deposition, neither
Falkenhagen nor plaintiffs' counsel showed up.

The Defendants then applied ex parte to compel Falkenhagen's and
Drogin's depositions on April 9 and 10, respectively.  In an
order dated April 7, 2015, the magistrate judge denied the
request, finding that defendants were not without fault in
creating the circumstances because they inexcusably waited to
arrange the depositions.

The Plaintiffs are, however, instructed to produce Falkenhagen
for deposition on April 13. The Defendants subpoenaed him for
that date.

Once again, Falkenhagen and plaintiffs' counsel failed to appear
at the deposition.  The Defendants moved for sanctions under Rule
37. The magistrate judge found that plaintiffs weren't
substantially justified in disobeying the order to produce
Falkenhagen for deposition and sanctioned counsel $15,112 for
defendants' costs associated with the deposition and motion for
sanctions.

When counsel didn't pay, the district court entered a contempt
judgment, from which plaintiffs and their counsel appeal.

The magistrate judge ordered Sali to produce Falkenhagen for
deposition on April 13, 2015, an order under Rule 37(a) to
cooperate in discovery. There's no evidence that plaintiffs made
any effort to secure Falkenhagen's attendance at the deposition,
after counsel affirmatively represented to the court and opposing
counsel that Falkenhagen would be available for deposition on
April 13. To the contrary, plaintiffs' counsel went on vacation
for a week knowing there was a pending ex parte application to
compel the deposition but making no provision for responding to
the court's ruling. Counsel didn't even read the order until
after the time for the deposition had passed.

There was no justification for plaintiffs' failure to attempt to
comply with the court's order. Accordingly, the court had
authority under Rule 37(b)(2)(A) to issue further just orders in
the nature of sanctions, including ordering the payment of
expenses unless the failure was substantially justified or other
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. Here, the award
of defendants' deposition-related costs wasn't unjust. Rather, it
was the mildest of the possible Rule 37 sanctions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the District Court's judgment imposing Deposition-Related Costs.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's March 19, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yc6f9bnn from Leagle.com.

Jerusalem F. Beligan -- jbeligan@bisnarchase.com -- (argued) and
Brian D. Chase -- bchase@bisnarchase.com -- Bisnar Chase LLP
Newport Beach, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Christina H. Hayes -- chayes@littler.com -- (argued), Khatereh
Sage Fahimi -- sfahimi@littler.com -- and Stacey E. James --
sjames@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson P.C., San Diego,
California, for Defendants-Appellees.


CORPORATE SECURITY: Harbor Seeks Unpaid Wages under Labor Code
--------------------------------------------------------------
LA VERNE HARBOR, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. CORPORATE SECURITY SERVICE,
INC., and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, the Defendants, Case No.
CGC-18-566295 (Ca. Super. Ct., May 4, 2018), seeks to recover
unpaid regular and overtime wages including unpaid compensation
for meal and/or rest period violations, interest, reimbursement
of business expenses, liquidated damages and other penalties,
injunctive and other equitable relief, and reasonable attorneys'
fees and costs under the California Labor Code.

According to the complaint, the Defendant has had a consistent
policy of (1) permitting, encouraging and/or requiring Plaintiff
to work in excess of eight hours per day and/or in excess of
40 hours per week without paying him overtime compensation as
required by California's wage and hour laws, (2) unlawfully
denying Plaintiff and Class Members statutorily-mandated meal and
rest periods, (3) willfully failing to provide Plaintiff and
Class Members with accurate semimonthly itemized wage statements
reflecting the total number of hours each worked, the applicable
deductions, and the applicable hourly rates in effect during the
pay period, and (4) willfully failing to pay compensation in a
prompt and timely manner to Plaintiff and those Class Members
whose employment with Defendant has terminated.

The Defendant operates a security service within California for
which Representative Plaintiff worked as a Security Officer. The
Representative Plaintiff is informed and believes and, on that
basis, alleges that, within the Class Period, Defendant employed
hundreds of individuals in California in recent years to perform
security services, employment positions which did not, and
currently do not, meet any known test for exemption from the
payment of overtime wages arid/or the entitlement to meal or rest
periods.

Despite actual knowledge of these facts and legal mandates,
Defendant has and continues to enjoy an advantage over its
competition and a resultant disadvantage to its workers by
electing not to pay all wages due (regular and overtime wages,
missed meal and rest period compensation) and/or all penalties
dues (including "waiting time" penalties) to its California based
patrol officers and/or security guards/officers. Representative
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's officers knew of these facts
and legal mandates yet, nonetheless, repeatedly authorized and/or
ratified the violation of the laws cited.

Corporate Security Services provides businesses, law firms, and
government agencies with an "on-call" security team to resolve
business security issues.[BN]

Attorneys for Representative Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class:

          Scott Edward Cole, Esq.
          Andrew Weaver, Esq.
          SCOTT COLE & ASSOCIATES, APC
          Web: www.scafaw.com
          1970 Broadway, Ninth Floor
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone: (510) 891 9800
          Facsimile: (510) 891 7030
          E-mail: scole@scalaw.com
                  aweaver@scalaw.com


CORRIGAN MOVING: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, "Oliver" Suit Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
Jordan Oliver and Jordan Petkus, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Corrigan Moving
Systems-Grand Rapids, Inc.; Brandon Kress; Kenneth Pelty; and
David P. Corrigan, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-00421 (W.D.
Mich., April 16, 2018), is brought against the Defendants for
failure to pay overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

Mr. Oliver was employed by the Defendants as a helper from the
year 2007 to the year 2018.

Corrigan Moving Systems-Grand Rapids, Inc. is a Michigan
corporation with its principal place of business located in Grand
Rapids, Michigan. Defendant is a subsidiary of, wholly owned and
operated by, and/or an agent of Unigroup, Inc. d/b/a United Van
Lines, Inc. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

         Robert Anthony Alvarez, Esq.
         AVANTI LAW GROUP, P.L.L.C.
         600 28th Street, SW
         Wyoming, MI 49509
         Telephone: (616) 257-6807
         E-mail: ralvarez@avantilaw.com


CREDIT SUISSE: Qiu Sues over Plunge of XIV Notes
------------------------------------------------
SHAOLEI QIU, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. CREDIT SUISSE GROUP AG and JANUS
INDEX & CALCULATION SERVICES LLC, the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-
cv-04045 (S.D.N.Y., May 4, 2018), is a securities class action on
behalf of the Plaintiff and all other similarly situated
investors who purchased or otherwise acquired Credit Suisse Group
AG's VelocityShares Daily Inverse VIX Short Term Exchange Traded
Notes from January 29, 2018 through February 5, 2018.  The XIV
Notes traded on the NASDAQ under the ticker symbol XIV.

According to the complaint, the Defendants made
misrepresentations and omissions of material facts and engaged in
a fraudulent course of business in violation of Section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. sections 78j(b) and
78t(a)) and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the SEC (17
C.F.R. section 240.10b-5) in connection with their failure to
accurately calculate and report Intraday Indicative Values for
the XIV Notes, resulting in the XIV Notes trading at artificially
inflated prices during the Class Period. When Defendants'
fraudulent course of conduct came to an end on February 5, 2018,
the value of the XIV Notes collapsed, causing Plaintiff and the
Class to suffer substantial losses.

According to the lawsuit, the Defendants made untrue statements
of material fact, and omitted to disclose material facts, that
were intended to and did: (i) deceive the investing public,
including Plaintiff; and (ii) artificially inflate and maintain
the market price of the XIV Notes. Plaintiff and the Class
purchased XIV Notes based on Defendants' false and misleading
statements and the artificially inflated prices of the XIV Notes.
The Defendants knew or recklessly disregarded that their
statements concerning the XIV Notes' true value were false and
misleading. Defendants' actions and inactions with respect to
disseminating inaccurate Intraday Indicative Values, failure to
provide accurate and updated Intraday Indicative Values, and
otherwise, constitute an act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.

The Plaintiff and similarly situated investors were injured
because the risks that materialized were risks of which Plaintiff
was unaware (but of which Defendants were aware), and Plaintiff's
losses were caused by drops in market prices of XIV Notes (and
the resultant liquidation) due to materialization of risks
concealed by Defendants.

Credit Suisse Group is a Swiss multinational investment bank and
financial services company based in ZĂ…rich. As the second largest
bank in Switzerland, it is considered a "Bulge Bracket Bank"
along with fellow Swiss competitor, UBS.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Christopher J. Gray, Esq.
          Michael J. Giarusso, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF CHRISTOPHER J. GRAY, P.C.
          360 Lexington Avenue, 14th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 838 3221
          Facsimile: (212) 937 3139

               - and -

          James J. Eccleston, Esq.
          Stephany D. McLaughlin, Esq.
          ECCLESTON LAW, LLC
          55 W. Monroe, Suite 610
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 332 0000
          Facsimile: (312) 332 0003


CREDIT SUISSE: Saxena White to Lead Securities Suit
---------------------------------------------------
On December 22, 2017, the City of Birmingham Firemen's and
Policemen's Supplemental Pension System ("FPSPS") filed a suit
under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. Sections 78j(b) and 78tt(a), on behalf of a putative class
of all individuals or entities that acquired Credit Suisse Group
AG American Depository Receipts ("Credit Suisse ADRs") between
March 20, 2015 and February 3, 2016.

On the same day, FPSPS published a notice of the pending
litigation.  Pursuant to the PSLRA, motions for appointment as
lead plaintiff were therefore due by February 20, 2018.  On that
day, two motions were filed: the motion before the court and a
motion on behalf of the City of Daytona Beach Police & Fire
Pension Fund.  On March 6, 2018, Daytona Beach filed a notice of
non-opposition to the Institutional Investors' motion.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York granted the Plaintiffs' Motion Seeking Appointment of Co-
Lead Plaintiffs and Appointment of Their Chosen Lead Counsel in
the case captioned CITY OF BIRMINGHAM FIREMEN'S AND POLICEMEN'S
SUPPLEMENTAL PENSION SYSTEM, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CREDIT SUISSE GROUP AG
et al., Defendants, No. 17-cv-10014 (RJS)(S.D.N.Y.).

The City of Birmingham Retirement and Relief System, Westchester
Putnam Counties Heavy & Highway Laborers Local 60 Benefit Funds,
Teamsters Local 456 Pension and Annuity Funds, and the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local No. 710 Pension Plan
(together, the Institutional Investors) seeking (1) appointment
as co-lead plaintiffs and (2) appointment of their chosen counsel
as lead counsel.

LEAD PLAINTIFFS

Under the procedures set out by the PSLRA, a district court shall
appoint as lead plaintiff the member or members of the purported
plaintiff class that the Court determines to be most capable of
adequately representing the interests of class members.

The Institutional Investors satisfied the first requirement of 15
U.S.C. Section 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I), making a motion in
response to a notice, when they moved for appointment as lead
plaintiffs.  Second, the Institutional Investors have the largest
financial interest of any plaintiff or group of plaintiffs
seeking to represent the class.  Third, the Institutional
Investors have made a sufficient preliminary showing that they
can satisfy the relevant requirements of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23.

The Institutional Investors also satisfy the adequacy
requirement.  The Institutional Investors' substantial losses
provide a sufficient incentive to vigorously litigate this case,
there are no indicia of conflicts between the Institutional
Investors and the putative class, and the Institutional
Investors' chosen counsel appear to be experienced in the realm
of PSLRA class-action litigation. And, the Institutional
Investors' status as a group is no barrier to appointment as lead
plaintiff.

As the statute makes clear, groups of plaintiffs are specifically
permitted by the PSLRA to be appointed lead plaintiff. Further,
although some courts in this District have looked with disfavor
on groups whose members have no common connection other than
their lawyers.

Because the Institutional Investors have, to this point,
satisfied all of the PSLRA requirements, the Court appoints the
Institutional Investors as lead plaintiffs.

LEAD COUNSEL

The PSLRA provides that the lead plaintiffs shall, subject to the
approval of the court, select and retain counsel to represent the
class.

Here, the Institutional Investors have chosen Saxena White and
Cohen Milstein to serve as co-lead counsel. As evidenced by the
firm resumes submitted in support of the Institutional Investors'
motion, both firms have substantial experience in PSRLA
litigation. The Court is not concerned that the Institutional
Investors' chosen firms will fail to protect the putative class's
interests. Accordingly, the Court approves the Institutional
Investors' choice of Saxena White and Cohen Milsten as co-lead
counsel for the putative class.

Institutional Investors' motion for appointment as lead
plaintiffs is granted.  Saxena White, P.A. and Cohen Milstein
Sellers & Toll PLLC will serve as co-lead counsel for the
putative class.

A full-text copy of the District Court's March 19, 2018 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7r72dte from
Leagle.com.

City of Birmingham Retirement and Relief System, Westchester
Putnam Counties Heavy and Highway Laborers Local 60 Benefit Funds
& Teamsters Local 456 Pension and Annuity Funds, Lead Plaintiffs,
represented by Joseph E. White, III -- Jwhite@saxenawhite.com --
Saxena White P.A., Kenneth Mark Rehnsk -- rehns@cohenmilstein.com
-- Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC & Steven B. Singer --
ssinger@saxenawhite.com -- Saxena White P.A.

International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local No. 710 Pension
Plan, Lead Plaintiff, represented by Carol V. Gilden --
cgilden@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC &
Steven B. Singer, Saxena White P.A.

City of Birmingham Firemen's and Policemen's Supplemental Pension
System, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Steven B. Singer, Saxena
White P.A.

City of Daytona Beach Police & Fire Pension Fund, Movant,
represented by Nancy A. Kulesa -- nkulesa@zlk.com -- Levi &
Korsinsky LLP.

Credit Suisse Group AG, Defendant, represented by David George
Januszewski -- djanuszewski@cahill.com -- Cahill Gordon & Reindel
LLP, Herbert Scott Washer -- hwasher@cahill.com --  Cahill Gordon
& Reindel LLP & Sarah Penny Windle  --  windls@cahill.com --
Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP.


CROWN CORK: Court Grants Dismissal of ERISA Suit in "Cannon"
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio, Western Division, granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the
case captioned Vernon Cannon, Plaintiff, v. Crown Cork & Seal
Company, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-0003 (N.D. Ohio).

Plaintiff Vernon Cannon was an employee of Defendant Crown Cork &
Seal Company, Inc.  Cannon's final day of active employment with
Crown was March 23, 2012.  Three years later, on May 7, 2015,
Cannon applied for disability retirement benefits with Crown.  On
January 21, 2016, Crown denied the application.

Cannon alleges that Crown's interpretation of the term Severance
from Service Date articulated in the letter does not comply with
the definition of the term contained in the Crown Cork & Seal
Co., Inc. Pension Plan (Plan).

ERISA

To excuse exhaustion on grounds of futility, a plaintiff must
show that 'it is certain that his claim will be denied on appeal,
not merely that he doubts that an appeal will result in a
different decision.'  The futility exception applies only when
the plaintiff's suit is directed to the legality of a plan, not
to a mere interpretation of it.

Here, Cannon's claim under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 does not claim a statutory violation, but
rather challenges the denial of benefits based upon the terms of
the contract. To excuse his failure to exhaust his administrative
remedies, Cannon claims that appeal would have been futile.

Based upon a plain reading of Paragraph 24, Cannon is alleging
futility based upon the interpretation of the plan. Contrary to
Cannon's allegations in Paragraph 25, neither Fallick nor
Constantino permit application of the futility exception to cases
challenging the plan administrator's interpretation of the plan.
Because Cannon challenges the interpretation of the plan rather
than the legality, exhaustion is not excused by reason of
futility and Cannon's ERISA claim must be dismissed as a matter
of law.

RICO

Here, Cannon claims that Crown made material misrepresentations
in a letter mailed to him on January 21, 2016.  Specifically,
Cannon states that Crown knowingly falsely defined Severance from
Service Date in a scheme to deny disability retirement benefits.
The letter at issue states, "To be eligible for Disability
Retirement, an employee must submit an application prior to their
severance from service date. Under the provisions of the Crown
Cork & Seal Co., Inc. Pension Plan, employees represented by the
USWA Local 87-3 at the Toledo Plant accrue service until the one
year anniversary of the date they ceased being actively employed
for any reason."

Contrary to Cannon's allegation, simply rephrasing the definition
does not constitute a misrepresentation, let alone one
intentionally made in a scheme to defraud. Characterizing a first
anniversary as a one year anniversary is not a misrepresentation.
Nor is "ceased being actively employed a misrepresentation of
absence."  Because Cannon has failed to establish that the letter
contained a misrepresentation, his allegation of mail fraud as a
racketeering activity must fail.

Even if Cannon had established that Crown plausibly committed an
act of racketeering activity in mailing him the letter, one
letter would qualify as only one act of racketeering activity,
not a pattern. To constitute a pattern of racketeering activity,
there must be at least two acts of racketeering activity.
Although Cannon claims that up to 1,000 others received similar
letters, he fails to state who these other proposed plaintiffs
are, when they received any alleged letters, or the content of
such letters. To infer from one letter that multiple acts of mail
fraud occurred would violate Rule 9(b)'s particularity
requirement.

Therefore, the Court finds that Cannon has failed to establish
that Crown plausibly violated RICO by engaging in a pattern of
racketeering activity and dismiss the claim, accordingly.

Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc.'s motion to dismiss is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's March 19, 2018
Memorandum Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8n8er7c
from Leagle.com.

Vernon Cannon, individually and as class action representative on
behalf of all other Plaintiffs similarly situated., Plaintiff,
represented by Michael D. Portnoy. 1070 Commerce Dr, Perrysburg,
OH 43551, USA.

Crown Cork & Seal Company, Inc., Defendant, represented by Dustin
M. Dow -- ddow@bakerlaw.com -- Baker & Hostetler, Gilbert P.
Brosky -- gbrosky@bakerlaw.com -- Baker & Hostetler & Gregory V.
Mersol -- gmersol@bakerlaw.com -- Baker & Hostetler.


DAIRYAMERICA INC: Discovery in "Carlin" Suit Underway
-----------------------------------------------------
The case, GERALD CARLIN, JOHN RAHM, PAUL ROZWADOWSKI and DIANA
WOLFE, individually and on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. DAIRYAMERICA, INC., and
CALIFORNIA DAIRIES, INC., Defendants, Case No. 1:09 CV 00430-AWI
(EPG) (E.D. Cal.), remains pending.

The case was filed March 6, 2009, and later dismissed.  It was
re-opened on Aug 7, 2012.

The parties engaged in a further mediation with Robert A. Meyer
at JAMS on Feb. 5, 2018.  They continue to diligently and in good
faith discuss a potential settlement of the case.

On Feb. 27, 2018, the Court approved the parties' request to stay
the litigation for 45 days and modify the scheduling order in
order to allow them to fully focus their efforts on the potential
settlement of the case and avoid the substantial expense of
potentially unnecessary discovery and motion practice.

The Plaintiffs have since made a settlement demand to the
Defendants, and the parties have agreed, pursuant to Mr. Meyer's
advice and suggestion, to set April 24, 2018 as the deadline for
the Defendants to respond to that demand so as to provide
sufficient time for the two Defendants, their respective Boards
of Directors, and the implicated insurers and their counsel, to
conduct the necessary reviews and approval processes, if and as
needed, in order to fully respond to the demand.

The parties have agreed, and request the Court's approval, to
modify the case schedule solely to extend the interim April 12,
2018 deadlines for 1) completion of document productions; and 2)
DairyAmerica to file a Request for Reconsideration by the
District Court of the Magistrate Judge's Ruling Granting
Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel.  Those two deadlines would be
extended to May 1, 2018.  The parties are sensitive to the
Court's previous instruction that it was not inclined to move the
schedule in the case and therefore wish to emphasize that all of
the other existing deadlines in the case would remain unchanged.

As a further showing of good faith and diligence, the parties
agree, in the event that the case does not settle, to schedule 8
to 10 depositions in the month of May 2018.  The parties believe
and agree that the interests of efficiency, economy, and
expediency would be best served by modifying the case schedule in
two limited respects, as requested.

Therefore, the parties stipulated -- and Magistrate Judge Erica
P. Grosjean approved -- that (i) the deadline for the parties to
complete document productions be extended to May 1; and (ii) the
deadline for DairyAmerica to file a Request for Reconsideration
by the District Court of the Magistrate Judge's Ruling Granting
Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel be extended to May 1.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 10, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/3Qhqmk from Leagle.com.

Gerald Carlin, individually and on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, John Rahm, individually and on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated & Paul
Rozwadowski, individually and on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by A. Chowning
Poppler -- apoppler@bermantabacco.com -- Berman Tabacco, Anthony
David Phillips -- aphillips@bermandevalerio.com -- Berman
DeValerio, Benjamin Doyle Brown -- bbrown@cohenmilstein.com --
Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Brent W. Johnson, Cohen
Milstein Hausfeld and Toll PLLC, 1100 New York Avenue, NW. Suite
500, West Tower. Washington, DC 20005, pro hac vice, Cari C.
Laufenberg -- claufenberg@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback
L.L.P., pro hac vice, Christopher Heffelfinger --
cheffelfinger@bermantabacco.com -- Berman Tabacco, George F.
Farah, Cohen Milstein Hausfeld and Toll PLLC, 1100 New York
Avenue, NW. Suite 500, West Tower. Washington, DC 20005, pro hac
vice, Juli E. Farris -- jfarris@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller
Rohrback LLP, Justin N. Saif -- jsaif@bermandevalerio.com --
Berman DeValerio, pro hac vice, Leslie M. Kroeger, Cohen Milstein
Sellers & Toll PLLC, 1100 New York Avenue, NW. Suite 500, West
Tower. Washington, DC 20005, pro hac vice & Ryan McDevitt --
rmcdevitt@kellerrohrback.c0, -- Keller Rohrback L.L.P., pro hac
vice.

Diana Wolfe, Plaintiff, represented by A. Chowning Poppler,
Berman Tabacco, Anthony David Phillips, Berman DeValerio,
Benjamin Doyle Brown , Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Brent
W. Johnson, Cohen Milstein Hausfeld and Toll PLLC, pro hac vice,
Cari C. Laufenberg, Keller Rohrback L.L.P., pro hac vice,
Christopher Heffelfinger, Berman Tabacco, George F. Farah, Cohen
Milstein Hausfeld and Toll PLLC, pro hac vice, Juli E. Farris,
Keller Rohrback LLP, Justin N. Saif , Berman DeValerio, pro hac
vice & Ryan McDevitt, Keller Rohrback L.L.P., pro hac vice.

DairyAmerica, Inc., Defendant, represented by Charles M. English,
Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, pro hac vice, E. John Steren --
esteren@ebglaw.com -- Ober Kaler, pro  hac vice, Joseph Michael
Marchini -- jmm@bmj-law.com -- Baker, Manock & Jensen, Wendy M.
Yoviene -- wyoviene@bakerdonelson -- Ober Kaler, pro hac vice,
Allison Ann Davis -- allisondavis@dwt.com -- Davis Wright
Tremaine LLP, Joy G. Kim -- joykim@dwt.com -- Davis Wright
Tremaine LLP & Sanjay Mohan Nangia --  sanjaynangia@dwt.com --
Davis Wright Tremaine LLP.

California Dairies, Inc., Defendant, represented by Lawrence
Michael Cirelli -- lcirelli@hansonbridgett.com -- Hanson
Bridgett, Shannon Marie Nessier, Hanson Bridgett LLP & Megan
Oliver Thompson, Hanson Bridgett LLP.

Bimemiller Candice, Non-Party Candice Bimemiller, Unknown,
represented by Edward Zusman, Markun Zusman Freniere & Compton
LLP.

James Rehberg & Ronald Hayek, ThirdParty Plaintiffs, represented
by J. Barton Goplerud, Hudson Law Firm, pro hac vice & Jon A.
Tostrud, Tostrud Law Group, P.C.

Michael K. Schugg, ThirdParty Plaintiff, represented by J. Barton
Goplerud, Hudson Law Firm, pro hac vice & Juli E. Farris, Keller
Rohrback LLP.

Timothy L. Rawlings, ThirdParty Plaintiff, represented by J.
Barton Goplerud, Hudson Law Firm, pro hac vice, Juli E. Farris,
Keller Rohrback LLP, Mark A. Griffin, Keller Rohrback LLP, pro
hac vice & Raymond J. Farrow, Keller Rohrback LLP, pro hac vice.

Land O' Lakes, Inc., Amicus, represented by Gregory M. Schweizer
-- gschweizer@eimerstahl.com -- Eimer Stahl LLP, pro hac vice,
Scott C. Solberg --ssolberg@eimerstahl.com -- Eimer Stahl LLP,
pro hac vice & Seth D. Hilton -- sethhilton@stoel.com -- Stoel
Rives LLP.

California Farmers Union & California Dairy Campaign, Amicuss,
represented by Daniel Bennett Harris .

Lani Ellingsworth, Movant, represented by Darin M. Dalmat --
dmdalmat@jamhoff.com -- James & Hoffman, P.C. & Glenn Rothner,
Rothner, Segall & Greenstone.


DYNAMIC RECOVERY: Thompson Sues over Debt Collection Practices
--------------------------------------------------------------
Lamont V. Thompson, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Dynamic Recovery Solutions LLC,
and PYOD LLC, Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-00963-D (N.D. Tex.,
April 16, 2018), seeks to stop the Defendant's unfair and
unconscionable means to collect a debt. The case is assigned to
Judge Sidney A Fitzwater.

With more than 50 combined years in the accounts receivables
industry, the managing partners founded Dynamic in 2008. Dynamic
Recovery Solutions LLC -- https://www.gotodrs.com/ -- are
professionally staffed to provide nationwide consumer and
commercial collection services to organizations including
Banking, Student Loans, Heath Care, Retail, Telecommunications,
Utilities, Legal, and Real Estate. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Nathan Charles Volheim, Esq.
          Ahmad Tayseer Sulaiman, Esq.
          Eric Donald Coleman, Esq.
          Mohammed Omar Badwan, Esq.
          Taxiarchis Hatzidimitriadis, Esq.
          SULAIMAN LAW GROUP LTD
          2500 South Highland Avenue, Suite 200
          Lombard, IL 60148
          Telephone: (630) 568-3056
          Facsimile: (630) 575-8188
          E-mail: nvolheim@sulaimanlaw.com
                  ahmad.sulaiman@sulaimanlaw.com
                  ecoleman@sulaimanlaw.com
                  mbadwan@sulaimanlaw.com
                  thatz@sulaimanlaw.com


ELDORADO COMMUNITY: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, "Campbell" Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Tomi Campbell, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Eldorado Community Service Center;
American Health Services LLC; Inglewood Medical and Mental
Health; Seanjay R. Sharma; Stan Sharma; Sean Sharma; Pramesh
Sharma; Gareth Lea; and Does 1 through 50, Defendants, Case No.
37-2018-00018850-CU-OE-CTL (Cal. Super., San Diego Cty., April
16, 2018) is an action against the Defendants for unpaid regular
hours, overtime hours, minimum wages, wages for missed meal and
rest periods.

The Plaintiff Campbell was employed by the Defendants as an
hourly nonexempt employee in California. The Plaintiff was
terminated by the Defendants on January 4, 2018.

Eldorado Community Service Center is a California nonprofit
corporation doing business in California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Thomas D. Rutledge, Esq.
          500 West Harbor Drive, Suite 1113
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 886-7224
          Facsimile: (619) 259-5455


EXTRA MILE PAINTING: "Morales" Suit Seeks Overtime Pay under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
GONZALO MORALES, on behalf of himself and all other employees
similarly situated, known and unknown, the Plaintiff, v. EXTRA
MILE PAINTING COMPANY, an Illinois corporation, and JAMES
FAIRBANKS, individually, the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-03210
(N.D. Ill., May 4, 2018), seeks to recover damages the Fair Labor
Standards Act, as a result of the Defendants' failure to pay the
Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees of the
Defendants time and one-half compensation for the overtime in
excess of 40 in any given week hours they worked.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff was employed by the
Defendants as a painter from March 1, 2016 through October 31,
2016, and again from June 26, 2017 through August 18, 2017.
During the entire course/s of the Plaintiff's employment by the
Defendants, the Defendants paid the Plaintiff on an hourly basis
-- in other words, the Plaintiff's compensation would increase
and decrease, from week to week in direct correlation to the
number of hours he worked. The number of hours that the Plaintiff
worked each week throughout his employment by the Defendants
fluctuated from week to week and the amount of Plaintiff's
compensation fluctuated in tandem from week to week.

Typically, the Plaintiff worked at least 46 hours per week during
the periods of his employment by the Defendants; but the
Plaintiff often worked as many as 60 hours per week for the
Defendants. During the course of their employment by the
Defendants, the Plaintiff and the Collective Class were/are not
exempt from the overtime wage and minimum wage provisions of the
FLSA, by virtue of the fact that the Defendants paid them on an
hourly basis, among other reasons.

The FLSA required the Defendants to pay the Plaintiff for his
overtime in excess of 40 in a given week hours "at a rate not
less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he was
employed." Therefore the Defendants should have paid the
Plaintiff an overtime premium of $7.00 for each overtime hour
that he worked, but they did not. In this manner the Defendants
violated the FLSA's maximum hour provisions. It follows that the
Defendants shorted the Plaintiff an average of $70.00 per week
($7.00 x 10 overtime hours = $70.00).[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Paul Luka, Esq.
          MENDOZA LAW, P.C.
          120 S. State Street, Suite 400
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 508 6010
          E-mail: paul@alexmendozalaw.com


FAA SERRAMONTE: Violates Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Luu Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
LONG NGOC T. LUU, an individual, and on behalf of himself, and
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. FAA SERRAMONTE
H, INC., an active California corporation, dba HONDA OF
SERRAMONTE; AARON CORNEJO, an individual; OMAR BAREKZAI, an
individual; YANG WANG, an individual; WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, an active US corporation, and DOES 1 through 500,
inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. 18CIV02310 (Cal. Super. Ct.,
May 7, 2018), seeks to recover damages caused by Defendants'
violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants have violated, and
continue to violate, the CLRA by (a) packing payments; (b)
trading rate for product; (c) charging more than advertised
price; (d) failing to accurately disclose the agreed upon value
of trade-in vehicles. The Defendants have an illegal pattern and
practice of the above outlined acts. The Defendants concealed
from Plaintiff accurate information concerning these
representations. The Plaintiff has suffered harm as a result of
these violations.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Louis A. Liberty, Esq.
          LOUIS LIBERTY & ASSOCIATES PLC
          553 Pilgrim Drive, Suite A
          Foster City, CA 94404
          Telephone: (650) 341 0300
          E-mail: lou@carlawyer.com


FAIRMOUNT SANTROL: Scarantino Balks at Unimin Merger Deal
---------------------------------------------------------
RICHARD SCARANTINO, Individually and On Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. FAIRMOUNT SANTROL HOLDINGS
INC., WILLIAM E. CONWAY, JENNIFFER D. DECKARD, MICHAEL G. FISCH,
CHARLES D. FOWLER, STEPHEN J. HADDEN, MICHAEL C. KEARNEY, WILLIAM
P. KELLY, MATTHEW F. LEBARON, MICHAEL E. SAND, and LAWRENCE N.
SCHULTZ, the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-01047 (N.D. Ohio, May
4, 2018), seeks to enjoin the Defendants and all persons acting
in concert with them from proceeding with, consummating, or
closing a proposed merger transaction, and in the event the
Defendants consummate the proposed transaction, rescinding it and
setting it aside or awarding rescissory damages.

This action stems from a proposed transaction announced on
December 12, 2017, pursuant to which Fairmount Santrol Holdings
Inc. will be acquired by Unimin Corporation, a wholly-owned
subsidiary of SCR-Sibelco NV, Bison Merger Sub, Inc., and Bison
Merger Sub I, LLC.  On December 11, 2017, Fairmount's Board of
Directors caused the Company to enter into an agreement and plan
of merger with the Buyers. Pursuant to the terms of the Merger
Agreement, Fairmount shareholders will receive a number of shares
of the combined company's common stock that will result in
Fairmount shareholders owning only approximately 35% of the
combined company, and cash equal to a total of $170,000,000, or
approximately $0.74 per share.

On April 26, 2018, the Defendants filed a definitive proxy
statement with the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission in connection with the Proposed Transaction. The Proxy
Statement omits material information with respect to the Proposed
Transaction, which renders the Proxy Statement false and
misleading. Accordingly, the plaintiff alleges herein that
defendants violated Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 in connection with the Proxy Statement.

Fairmount Santrol, together with its subsidiaries, provides sand-
based proppant solutions for exploration and production
companies.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John C. Camillus, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF JOHN C. CAMILLUS, LLC
          P.O. Box 141410
          Columbus, OH 43214
          Telephone: (614) 558 7254
          E-mail: jcamillus@camilluslaw.com

               - and -

          RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
          300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 295 5310

               - and -

          RM LAW, P.C.
          1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300
          Berwyn, PA 19312
          Telephone: (484) 324 6800


FEDERAL WARRANTY: Court Denies Dismissal of "Woturski" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and granted Plaintiff's
Motion to Remand to State Court in the case captioned ROSE M.
WOTURSKI, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. FEDERAL WARRANTY SERVICE CORPORATION,
Defendant, No. 1:17-cv-4309 (NLH/KMW)(D.N.J.).

On August 19, 2014, the Plaintiff purchased an appliance from
Johnson's Appliances & Bedding.  The Plaintiff also purchased an
accompanying service contract.  The Complaint is in three counts.
The first two counts allege the service contract contains terms
that violated the Service Contract Act (SCA).  Although there is
apparently no private right of action under the SCA, the Truth-
in-Consumer Contract Warranty and Notice Act (TCCWNA) prohibits a
consumer contract that violates any clearly established legal
right of a consumer or responsibility of a seller under state or
federal law.

The Defendant argues this Court should maintain jurisdiction over
this matter, ultimately to dismiss it, based on its own standing
to assert a defense to the Plaintiff's attempt to assert its
claims in court.

The Defendant argues it has its own Article III interest in
compelling the Plaintiff to arbitrate her claims based on
provisions in the consumer contract that forms the basis for the
Plaintiff's claims.  The Defendant argues this Court has Article
III jurisdiction over the Defendant's motion to compel
arbitration of those claims.

The cases the Defendant cites in support of its Article III
interest in enforcing the "arbitration rights that exist separate
and apart from the claims to be arbitrated" both dealt with a
plaintiff who filed suit to compel arbitration. This is not such
a case.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff, by her own admission, lacks
Article III standing to assert her TCCWNA claims in federal
court.  Her failure to allege a concrete injury-in-fact deprives
this Court of subject matter jurisdiction. Any further
adjudication of the rights and obligations of the parties by this
Court would violate the long standing constitutional limits on
the power of this Court.

The Plaintiff's claims of a technical violation of New Jersey
consumer laws, alleged violations which she admits have caused
her no harm, and her demand for statutory damages for such
violations, should be heard in the state court where they were
originally filed.  Accordingly, this matter will be remanded
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1447.

A full-text copy of the District Court's March 19, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybjdhv44 from Leagle.com.

ROSE M WOTURSKI, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by  LEWIS G. ADLER --
lewisadler@verizon.net -- LAW OFFICE OF LEWIS ADLER.

FEDERAL WARRANTY SERVICE CORPORATION, Defendant, represented by
JOHN R. VALES -- john.vales@dentons.com -- Dentons US LLP.


FIDELITY FINANCIAL: Cox Sues over Debt Collection Practices
-----------------------------------------------------------
Jennifer Cox, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Fidelity Financial Services, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1-18-cv-01604-TCB-WEJ (N.D. Ga., April 16,
2018), seeks to stop the Defendant unfair and unconscionable
means to collect debt. The case is assigned to Judge Timothy C.
Batten, Sr. and referred to Judge Walter E. Johnson.

Fidelity Financial Services, Inc. --
https://fidelityfinancialservices.com/ -- is a commercial
collection agency dedicated to helping organizations improve
financial performance, collect bad debt and get your accounts
receivables back on track. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Marques J. Carter, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF MARQUES J. CARTER
          Suite 100, 3400 Chapel Hill Road
          Douglasville, GA 30135
          Telephone: (888) 332-7252
          Facsimile: (866) 842-3303
          E-mail: mcarter@consumerlawinfo.com


FINANCIAL RECOVERY: Court Grants Summary Judgment in "Church"
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of New
York granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in the case
captioned MARY ROZZI CHURCH, Plaintiff, v. FINANCIAL RECOVERY
SERVICES, INC., Defendant, Case # 16-CV-6391-FPG (W.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiff Mary Rozzi Church brings this putative class action
against Defendant Financial Recovery Services (FRS) for an
alleged violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA).  Specifically, the Plaintiff claims that the Defendant
violated Section 1692e(10) of the FDCPA by sending a form
collection letter that used false representation or deceptive
means to collect or attempt to collect a debt.

The Defendant explained: "FRS' initial motion for summary
judgment was fully briefed on November 10, 2016, when Plaintiff
filed her sur-reply.  Since that time, FRS has filed three
notices of supplemental authority.  While the core facts in
support of FRS' motion remain the same, FRS submits this renewed
motion/cross motion to fully set forth the arguments and
supplemental authority.  This memorandum therefore is FRS'
opposition memorandum to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment
and is its initial memorandum with regard to its renewed
motion/cross motion for summary judgment."

Here, the Defendant concedes the lack of any new facts, but
points to supplemental authority to support consideration of its
Renewed Motion/Cross-Motion.  The Court notes that, prior to
filing that second summary judgment motion, the Defendant had
already attempted to bring the referenced cases to the Court's
attention through its multiple Notices of Supplemental Authority.
As a matter of procedure, the proper method for the Defendant to
seek review of new case law would have been for it to move for
leave to file the supplemental authority.  Nevertheless, the
Court recognizes that additional case law has emerged since the
filing of the Defendant's original motion.

Section 1692e instructs that a debt collector may not use any
false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in
connection with the collection of any debt. The statute's non-
exhaustive list of examples includes the use of any false
representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to
collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer.
The Plaintiff argues that the language in the Defendant's letter
falls within this description.

The only difference between those statements and the instant
language is the Defendant's inclusion of the word offers. These
settlement offers may have tax consequences. The Plaintiff
attributes significance to this difference she argues that the
Defendant's statement is false because unaccepted settlement
offers cannot possibly cause the consumer to incur any tax
consequence. Notably, she does not afford the same significance
to the language immediately following the sentence at issue,
which reads: "We recommend that you consult independent tax
counsel of your own choosing if you desire advice about any tax
consequences which may result from this settlement. The offers of
settlement in this letter are merely offers to resolve your
account for less than the balance due."

While the Plaintiff acknowledges this supplementary explanation,
she dismisses its effect by suggesting that, if anything, the
second sentence makes the letter even more confounding.
Specifically, she takes issue with the fact that, instead of more
accurately saying 'potential settlement, the Defendant refers to
this settlement' as if the Defendant had already reached a
settlement agreement with the consumer. On its face, that
interpretation simply ignores the rest of the paragraph, which
expressly instructs that the offers of settlement in this letter
are merely offers to resolve your account for less than the
balance due.

In sum, the issue boils down to the effect of the term offers. To
be sure, its inclusion is as the Plaintiff suggests likely the
product of sloppy drafting. But the Plaintiff cannot attribute
special significance to an extraneous term while simultaneously
shielding the sentence from any supplementary explanation. Such a
reading would result in the sort of hyper-technical and
unreasonable interpretation that the least-sophisticated-consumer
standard, while protective, cannot be stretched to permit.

Rather, when read in full, the Defendant's collection letter
would convey to even the least sophisticated consumer that
potential tax consequences would only attach once an offer has
been accepted. Therefore, as a matter of law, the language in the
Defendant's form collection letter does not violate Section
1692e(10).

A full-text copy of the District Court's March 19, 2018 Decision
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8av4ko2 from
Leagle.com.

Mary Rozzi Church, an individual, on behalf of herself and those
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Alexander Jerome
Douglas, Douglas Firm, P.C.

Financial Recovery Services, Inc., a Minnesota corporation,
Defendant, represented by David George Peltan, Peltan Law, PLLC,
128 Church St, East Aurora, NY 14052, Michael Thomas Etmund --
Mike.Etmund@lawmoss.com -- Moss & Barnett & Matthew P. Kostolnik
-- matt.kostolnik@lawmoss.com -- Moss & Barnett, pro hac vice.


FIRST CENTURY BANCORP: "Humphrey" Suit Moved to N.D. Ohio
---------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Amber Humphrey, formerly known
as: Amber Horvath on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. First Century Bancorp and Stored
Value Cards, Inc., doing business as: Numi Financial, the
Defendant, Case No. 18CV194935, was removed from the Court of
Common Pleas for Lorain County, Ohio, to the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio (Cleveland) on May 7, 2018. The
District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:18-cv-01050 to the
proceeding.

First Century operates as a bank holding company for First
Century Bank, National Association that provides various retail
and commercial banking.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew B. Ameer, Esq.
          LARIBEE & HERTRICK
          325 North Broadway Street
          Medina, OH 44256
          Telephone: (330) 725 0531
          Facsimile: (330) 725 0666
          E-mail: mameer@laribee-hertrick.com

               - and -

          Matthew A. Dooley, Esq.
          Ryan M. Gembala, Esq.
          Stephen M. Bosak, Esq.
          O'TOOLE MCLAUGHLIN DOOLEY & PECORA
          5455 Detroit Road
          Sheffield Village, OH 44054
          Telephone: (440) 930 4001
          Facsimile: (440) 934 7208
          E-mail: mdooley@omdplaw.com
                  rgembala@omdplaw.com
                  sbosak@omdplaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants:

          David D. Yeagley, Esq.
          Jeffrey S. Dunlap, Esq.
          Michael J. Charlillo, Esq.
          ULMER & BERNE-CLEVELAND
          1100 Skylight Office Tower
          1660 West Second Street
          Cleveland, OH 44113
          Telephone: (216) 583 7216
          Facsimile: (216) 583 7217
          E-mail: dyeagley@ulmer.com
                  jdunlap@ulmer.com
                  mcharlillo@ulmer.com


FISHBONE SAFETY: Court Compels Arbitration in "Green"
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado
granted Defendants William S. Cain and BSC Interest, LLC's
Conditional Motion to Compel Arbitration as to Michael Green and
Charles Young in the case captioned MICHAEL GREEN, on behalf of
himself and all similarly situated persons, Plaintiff, v.
FISHBONE SAFETY SOLUTIONS, LTD., a Texas limited partnership,
WILLIAM S. CAIN, BSC INTEREST, LLC, a Texas limited liability
company, and NOBLE ENERGY, INC., a Delaware corporation,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 16-cv-01594-PAB-KMT (D. Colo.).

The Plaintiff alleges that defendants Fishbone Safety Solutions,
Ltd. (Fishbone), William S. Cain (Cain), BSC Interest, LLC (BSC),
and Noble Energy, Inc. (Noble) violated the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) and state labor laws by failing to pay him and other
similarly situated individuals overtime.

Motions to Compel Arbitration

The Federal Aviation Administration provides that a written
provision in any contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.

Defendant Cain's Motion to Compel as to Green and Young

Green

The Court's order is also determinative of Cain's ability to
compel arbitration of Green's claims. Cain was not a signatory to
the arbitration agreement between Green and Fishbone. However,
Green asserts liability against Cain under the theory that Cain
owns and operates Fishbone Safety Solutions, Ltd., and,
therefore, is jointly and severally liable for the violations
alleged. This Court previously concluded, on the basis of similar
allegations treating Fishbone and Noble as a single entity, that
Green's claims against Noble were sufficiently intertwined with
his employment relationship with Fishbone for plaintiff to be
equitably estopped from avoiding arbitration as to Noble, even
though Noble was not a signatory to the arbitration agreement.
Green's claims against Cain must proceed by way of individual
arbitration. This Court previously concluded that Green's
arbitration agreement with Fishbone does not authorize class
arbitration. Because the same agreement governs the arbitrability
of Green's claims against Cain, the Court's prior holding is
determinative.

Young

Cain also moves to compel arbitration of Young's claims on the
basis of Young's arbitration agreement with Fishbone. Cain
asserts two grounds for its motion: (1) Young's agreement
expressly requires arbitration of claims against Fishbone's
partners, parents and subsidiaries and affiliated companies; and
(2) Young's claims against Cain are sufficiently intertwined with
his claims against Fishbone that he should be equitably estopped
from pursuing his claims against Cain in court.

Young's arbitration agreement expressly applies to disputes with
Fishbone's partners, parents and subsidiaries and affiliated
companies.  In Hawthorne Townhomes, L.P., the Texas Court of
Appeals held, based on similar contract language, that the
general partner of one of the signatories to an arbitration
agreement was an intended third-party beneficiary of the
agreement and thus entitled to compel arbitration. Applying this
reasoning here, BSC  and Cain, as an agent of BSC are entitled to
compel arbitration as the third-party beneficiaries of Young's
agreement with Fishbone.
The Court finds that Young's claims against Cain are subject to
arbitration.

A full-text copy of the District Court's March 19, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yaltcpq8 from Leagle.com.

Michael Green, on behalf of himself and all similarly situated
persons, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel S. Brome --
dbrone@nka.com -- Nichols Kaster, PLLP, David Hollis Seligman --
david@towardsjustice.org -- Towards Justice, Matthew Carl Helland
-- helland@nka.com -- Nichols Kaster, PLLP & Brian David Gonzales
-- Bgonzales@ColoradoTriaILaw -- Brian D. Gonzales, PLLC.

Fishbone Safety Solutions, Ltd., a Texas limited partnership &
William S. Cain, Defendants, represented by Andrew Wilson Reed,
Fiddler & Associates, P.C. & Gregory Scott Fiddler, Fiddler &
Associates, P.C., 1004 Congress St Ste 300, Houston, TX 77002-
1763.


FRITO-LAY: "Allred" Suit Stays in S.D. Cal. Federal Court
---------------------------------------------------------
Judge Janis L. Sammartino of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California denied the Plaintiffs' Motion to
Remand the case, BARRY ALLRED and MANDY C. ALLRED, on behalf of
themselves, all others similarly situated, and the general
public, Plaintiffs, v. FRITO-LAY NORTH AMERICA, INC. and FRITO-
LAY, INC., Defendants, Case No. 17-CV-1345 JLS (BGS) (S.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint in state court.
The Defendants removed the case to federal court.  The Plaintiffs
bring causes of action under: (1) the Consumer Legal Remedies
Act; (2) Unfair Competition Law (unlawful prong); (3) Unfair
Competition Law (unfair prong); (4) False Advertising Law; (5)
Breach of Express Warranties; and (6) Breach of Implied
Warranties.

In broad summary, the Plaintiffs allege the Defendants
manufacture and sell "Salt and Vinegar Flavored Potato Chips."
They allege the label of the Product violates California law in
various ways.

They seek to represent a class of consumers defined as all
consumers who purchased the Product from a retailer within the
state of California for personal, family, or household purposes,
and not for resale, at any time during the period six years prior
to the filing of the Complaint and continuing until the Class is
certified.

Judge Sammartino finds the issue at hand is whether the amount in
controversy is sufficient under CAFA.  The Complaint does not
state a specific amount requested.

In support of removal, the Defendants assert Frito-Lay's gross
revenues from sales of the Product in California in each of 2014,
2015, and 2016 alone were well in excess of $5 million.  The
Defendants attached a sworn declaration from Frito-Lay Senior
Director of Finance Connie Faulkner.  Ms. Faulkner declares that
she reviewed Frito-Lay's records and found that the company's
gross revenues from sales of the Product in California were well
in excess of $5 million in each of 2014, 2015, and 2016 alone,
and that Frito-Lay's net revenues from sales of the Product in
California were also well in excess of $5 million in each of
2014, 2015, and 2016 alone.

The Judge finds that the Plaintiffs clearly state throughout
their Complaint that they intend to seek full restitution of the
purchase price of the Product.  The fact that the Complaint
ambiguously also refers to the premium charged by the Defendants,
and that the Plaintiffs now declare they will not be seeking a
full refund, is unavailing.  The Judge finds that the Defendants
have carried their burden to show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, their amount in controversy calculations are valid.
The amount presented by them is well in excess of the statutory
requirement.  Accordingly, he denied the Plaintiffs' Motion to
Remand.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 10, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/wLduOv from Leagle.com.

Barry Allred, on behalf of themselves, and all other similarly
situated, and the general public & Mandy C Allred, on behalf of
themselves, and all others similarly situated, and the general
public, Plaintiffs, represented by David Elliot --
davidelliot@elliotlawfirm.com -- The Elliott Law Firm, Ronald
Marron -- ron@consumersadvocates.com -- Law Office of Ronald
Marron & Michael Houchin, Law Offices of Ronald A. Marron.

Frito-Lay North America, Inc., a Delaware corporation & Frito-
Lay, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendants, represented by
Andrew S. Tulumello -- atulumello@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn &
Crutcher LLP & Christopher Chorba -- cchorba@gibsondunn.com --
Gibson Dunn & Crutcher.


G6 HOSPITALITY: "Kennedy" Suit Referred to Mediation
----------------------------------------------------
In the case, Patricia Kennedy, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. G6 Hospitality Property,
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 9:18-cv-80142-DMM (S.D. Fla., Feb. 8,
2018), the Defendant filed its Answer and Affirmative Defenses to
the Complaint on April 18, 2018.

Judge Donald M. Middlebrooks on March 8, 2018, referring the case
to Magistrate Judge Dave Lee Brannon for a Scheduling Order.
Judge Middlebrooks also set a Jury Trial for October 1 at 9:00
a.m. in West Palm Beach Division.

A Status Conference is set for September 26 before Judge
Middlebrooks.

Also on March 9, Magistrate Judge Brannon entered an order
referring the case to Mediation.  Magistrate Judge Brannon also
this timeline:

     Status Conference        9/26/2018 0:15 PM before Judge
                              Middlebrooks

     Jury Trial               10/1/2018 09:00 AM before Judge
                              Middlebrooks

     Calendar Call            9/26/2018 01:15 PM before Judge
                              Middlebrooks

     Amended Pleadings        4/2/2018

     Discovery due            6/25/2018

     Joinder of Parties due   4/2/2018

     In Limine Motions due    7/16/2018

     Dispositive Motions due  7/16/2018

     Motions due              7/16/2018

     Pretrial Stipulation     9/4/2018

The lawsuit alleges the Defendant's violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act.  The Plaintiff alleged in the complaint
that the Defendant's website failed to comply with Title III of
the ADA, 42 U.S.C., Section 12181, and 28 C.F.R. Section
36.302(e), as a result, the Plaintiff was deprived of the goods,
services ,features, facilities, benefits, advantages, and
accommodations of the property available to the general public.

G6 Hospitality LLC owns, operates, and franchises economy lodging
locations in the United States and Canada. It also provides
various support services for its franchisees, including property
management; call center; distribution, marketing, and sales
programs; procurement; training; and in-house technical
expertise. The company was founded in 1985 and is based in
Carrollton, Texas. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Althea M. Campbell, Esq.
          210 N. University Drive, Suite 504
          Coral Springs, FL 33071
          Telephone: (954) 717-1646
          E-mail: amcimmlaw@aol.com

               - and -

          Thomas B. Bacon, Esq.
          644 North Mc Donald St.
          Mt. Dora, FL 32757
          Telephone: (954) 478-7811
          E-mail: tbb@thomasbaconlaw.com


GALARDI SOUTH: Judge Narrows Claims in Exotic Dancers' Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JASZMANN ESPINOZA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. GALARDI
SOUTH ENTERPRISES, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 14-21244-
CIV-GOODMAN (S.D. Fla.), Magistrate Judge Jonathan Goodman of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Miami
Division, granted in part and denied in part the Defendants'
motion for partial summary judgment against the Plaintiffs.

The Plaintiffs are dancers at the King of Diamonds gentleman's
club ("KODs") who are suing the Defendants for, among other
things, minimum wage and overtime violations arising from their
work at KODs.  The Plaintiffs' lawsuit was brought under the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and Florida law.

In the Plaintiffs' operative pleading, they asserted the
following counts: (1) declaratory relief for both the alleged
federal and state law violations; (2) FLSA (minimum wage
violations); (3) Article X (minimum wage violations); (4) FMWA
(minimum wage violations); (5) FLSA (overtime violations); (6)
FLSA (retaliation); (7) Article X (retaliation); (8) FMWA
(retaliation); and (9) fraudulent transfer under the Florida
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("FUFTA").

The Court previously granted conditional certification of an FLSA
collective action against the Defendants, and granted the class
certification of the Plaintiffs' state law claims.

In their partial summary judgment motion, the Defendants asserted
that (1) the Plaintiffs are estopped from claiming that they are
employees based on inconsistent positions asserted in IRS tax
filings; (2) Plaintiffs Jordan Hargraves and Saaiba Fox cannot
prove that they worked more than 40 hours in a given week; (3)
the Plaintiffs' statutory FMWA claims fail because of
procedurally defective notice; (4) the Plaintiffs' constitutional
Article X claims fail because they are dependent on the statutory
claims; (5) alternatively, the Court should decline supplemental
jurisdiction over the state law claims; and (6) the Plaintiffs
failed to join necessary parties to assert a FUFTA claim.  The
Defendants also claim that Ms. Galardi, as trustee of the Trust,
and the Trust have not been properly served, and that GSE, GSEC,
and LVA have objected to personal jurisdiction.

Magistrate Judge Goodman held that there are only two Defendants
left in the lawsuit, Fly Low and Ms. Galardi.  This is because
the parties have stipulated to the voluntary dismissal without
prejudice of all claims against GSEC and GSE, and those two
Defendants are therefore no longer in the case.

Given the stipulation, GSEC and GSE are dropped as Defendants in
the case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21.  In
addition, in a previous partial summary judgment Order on the
Defendants' joint-employer status, the Magistrate Judge held that
MBJG, the Trust, JEG, and LVA were not the Plaintiffs' employers
and dismissed them from the case.

According to the Magistrate Judge, if the Trust were still in the
lawsuit -- which it is not -- then the Defendants' lack of
service argument would fail because the Court has previously
denied the Trust's motion to dismiss for lack of service.  The
Defendants' personal jurisdiction objections for GSE, GSEC, and
LVA are moot because these Defendants are no longer in the case.
Finally, in the Plaintiffs' response to the Defendants' summary
judgment motion, the Magistrate Judge said the Plaintiffs posed
no opposition to the Court granting summary judgment in favor of
the Defendants on their FUFTA claim.

The Magistrate Judge held that the Defendants' estoppel argument
transforms one factor that may be considered in the independent
contractor/employee analysis into a case-dispositive issue.  The
motive underlying this argument is clear; the Defendants admitted
that they would not otherwise be able to obtain summary judgment
on the independent contractor/employee analysis.  However, FLSA
case law bars the Defendants from bypassing this inquiry through
estoppel based on tax filings that may or may not be based on
correct information.  Thus, the Magistrate Judge denied the
Defendants' summary judgment motion as to estoppel.

According to the Magistrate Judge, at this stage, the Plaintiffs'
FLSA claims are not barred by their previous IRS filings.  The
Defendants are free to introduce evidence about the tax filings
and argue that they are powerful evidence that the Plaintiffs are
independent contractors.  But the Plaintiffs may, of course,
argue to the contrary.

Turning to the overtime claim, the Magistrate Judge said he
cannot grant summary judgment in favor of the Defendants based on
speculations and assumptions.  Rather, the Defendants must
present some evidence that the other Plaintiffs also did not work
40 hours, which did not occur.  Thus, the Magistrate Judge
granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants as to Count 5
of the Plaintiffs' Substituted Second Amended Complaint for Ms.
Hargraves and Ms. Fox only.  Count 5 for the rest of the
Plaintiffs will go to trial.

With respect to the Defendants' arguments as to the state law
claims, Magistrate Judge Goodman said there is disagreement among
Florida federal district courts about whether there is an
independent cause of action under Article X for unpaid wages,
and, if so, whether that action is subject to the FMWA's pre-suit
notice requirements.

The Magistrate Judge declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the state law claims asserted in Counts 1,10 3,
4, 7, and 8, and dismissed the FMWA and Article X claims without
prejudice.  This decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction at
this stage, in effect, rescinds in part the Court's previous
Order on the Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Rule 23 Class
Certification of State Law Minimum Wage Claims and dismisses the
class.  However, the Magistrate Judge pointed out that the FMWA
and Article X claims are dismissed without prejudice.  He said
the Plaintiffs may file an action reasserting those claims
against the Defendants in state court.

Finally, the Magistrate Judge granted summary judgment in favor
of the Defendants and against the Plaintiffs as to Count 9.  The
motion was not substantively opposed, the Defendants' arguments
were convincing, and the Plaintiffs' effort to avoid responding
-- by simply saying that they consent to a without-prejudice
dismissal of one count, without seeking leave of Court for the
filing of yet another amended complaint -- was procedurally
flawed and of no force or effect.

Magistrate Judge Goodman granted in part and denied in part the
Defendants' summary judgment motion.  He denied the motion
concerning the Defendants' estoppel argument, which seeks summary
judgment on FLSA claims under Counts 1, 2, 5, and 6.  He granted
summary judgment in favor of the Defendants as to Count 5 for Ms.
Hargraves and Ms. Fox's FLSA overtime claims only and denied as
to Count 5 for the remaining Plaintiffs, whose claims may proceed
to trial.

The Magistrate Judge also granted the Defendants' summary
judgment motion as to their jurisdictional argument, and declined
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over some of the state law
claims -- Counts 1, 3, 4, 7, and 8.  As a result, these counts,
with the exception of Count 1 regarding its non-state law
assertions, are dismissed without prejudice.  As a result, he did
not decide the merits of these state law claims.

Because he declined supplemental jurisdiction over these state
law claims, the Magistrate Judge rescinded the Court's previous
Order in part, and the class is dismissed without prejudice.

Finally, he granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants
as to Count 9.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 10, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/yqTyjm from Leagle.com.

Jaszmann Espinoza, Seleta Stanton, Tiffany Thompson, Douganna
Ballard & Janice Bailey, and all persons similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Harlan S. Miller, Parks, Chesin &
Walbert, P.C., pro hac vice & Dana Mason Gallup, Gallup Auerbach.

Galardi South Enterprises, Inc., Galardi South Enterprise
Consulting, Inc., Fly Low Inc., doing business as King of
Diamonds, Teri Galardi, individually & Dennis Willliams,
Defendants, represented by Dean Richard Fuchs --
d.fuchs@swtwlaw.com -- Schulten, Ward & Turner, LLP, pro hac
vice, Susan Kastan Murphey, Schulten, Ward, & Turner, LLP, pro
hac vice & Stephen Whitfield Brown, Schulten Ward & Turner, LLP.

LVA Management & Consulting, Inc., Teri Galardi, as Trustee of
the JEG Family Trust u/a/d/ 11/1/06, Jack E. Galardi, LLC, MBJG
Investment Corp. & JEG Family Turst, Defendants, represented by
Dean Richard Fuchs, Schulten, Ward & Turner, LLP & Stephen
Whitfield Brown, Schulten Ward & Turner, LLP.

AQFC, LLC, Kodrenyc, LLC & AK'N Eli, LLC, Defendants, represented
by Joshua R. Kon, Stok Folk + Kon & Stephen Whitfield Brown,
Schulten Ward & Turner, LLP.

Akinyele Adams, Nitty'N AK Corp. & Rick Taylor, Defendants,
represented by Stephen Whitfield Brown, Schulten Ward & Turner,
LLP.

State of Florida, Defendant, represented by Stephanie A. Daniel,
Attorney General Office Department of Legal Affairs.


GEORGIA: "Baker" Class Suit over Prisoner Rights Tossed
-------------------------------------------------------
Judge Tilman E. Self, III of the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Georgia, Macon Division, dismissed without
prejudice he case, RODERICK DOUGLASS BAKER, Plaintiff, v. STATE
OF GEORGIA, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 5:18-cv-12-TES-
TQL (M.D. Ga.).

Pro se Plaintiff Baker, an inmate incarcerated in Autry State
Prison in Pelham, Georgia, filed a civil rights complaint under
42 U.S.C. Section 1983.  Along with his Complaint, the Plaintiff
filed a motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the
filing fee.

On Jan. 29, 2018, the U.S. Magistrate Judge granted the Plaintiff
leave to6 proceed in forma pauperis and ordered Plaintiff to pay
an initial partial filing fee of $3.11.  Additionally, the
Magistrate Judge noted that the Plaintiff's Complaint purported
to be a class action based on a complaint filed in a separate
case by another inmate.

According to Judge Self, prisoner plaintiffs who are proceeding
pro se and in forma pauperis may not join together as plaintiffs
in a single lawsuit.  Further, the Plaintiff's Complaint did not
state a claim for relief, and the Magistrate Judge ordered the
Plaintiff to recast his Complaint, asserting only such claims as
are personal to him.  The Magistrate Judge gave him 21 days to
comply with the order and cautioned him that his failure to
comply could result in the dismissal of the action.

Thereafter, the Plaintiff failed to pay the initial partial
filing fee or file a recast complaint.  Thus, on March 2, 2018,
the Magistrate Judge issued an order to show cause, directing the
Plaintiff to show why the case should not be dismissed for
failure to comply with order directing him to pay the initial
partial filing fee and file a recast complaint.  The Plaintiff
had 21 days to respond to the show cause order and the Magistrate
Judge once again warned him that his failure to respond would
result in the dismissal of his Complaint.  To date, the Plaintiff
has yet to respond to the order to show cause and failed to
comply with the Magistrate Judge's Order directing payment of the
initial partial filing fee as well as the filing of a recast
complaint.

Because the Plaintiff failed to otherwise respond to the
Magistrate Judge's orders, Judge Self dismissed without prejudice
his complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 10, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/Is9aTo from Leagle.com.

Roderick Douglass Baker, Plaintiff, pro se.


GOLD STANDARD: Burger Sues over Use of Biometric Identifiers
------------------------------------------------------------
MATT BURGER, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly
situated individuals, the Plaintiff, v. GOLD STANDARD
ENTERPRISES, INC. d/b/a Binny's Beverage Depot, an Illinois
corporation, the Defendant, Case No. 2018CH05904 (Ill. Cir. Ct.,
Cook Cty., May 7, 2018), seeks to stop Defendant's unlawful
collection, use, storage, and dissemination of individuals'
biometric identifiers and/or biometric information in violation
of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, and to obtain
redress for all persons injured by its conduct.

This case concerns the misuse of individuals' biometric
identifiers and/or biometric information by a retailer of adult
beverages, which is capturing, converting, using, storing and
disseminating its workers' biometric information without lawful
consent. The Defendant does this through the use of biometric
scanning devices and associated software technology which capture
a person's fingerprint information derived from their
fingerprints to authenticate the identity of such persons in the
future. New technology now allows consumers to pay their bills,
secure financial accounts, and purchase physical goods, all with
their biometric information, which is often a fingerprint.
Unfortunately, along with the increased utility of biometric
technology, so too has come grave privacy risks associated with
the dissemination and unregulated collection of biometric --
information, with the risk of such harms greatly magnified by the
unregulated collection of biometric information. Indeed, the
permanent and irreplaceable nature of one's biometrics makes the
illegal collection of the same a significant public problem with
far-reaching consequences, including irreversible identify theft
and potential financial ruin.

The Defendant's practice of collecting fingerprints from all of
its workers without legal consent is unlawful and a serious
invasion of its workers' right to privacy concerning their
biometrics. The Defendant failed to bargain honestly with its
workers in good faith at the outset of their employment
relationships by failing to disclose the unlawful nature of the
timetracking system in which they would be required to
participate; failed to obtain the necessary consent to
disseminate its workers biometrics to third parties; knowingly
caused the diminution in value of its workers' biometrics through
the repeated dissemination and exposure of such information to
third parties; failed to maintain a lawful biometric storage
program that deletes workers' information in the proscribed
period; failed to provide the required disclosures to inform its
workers that it was collecting their biometrics; and failed to
inform them of how long it intended to keep this highly-sensitive
information.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Myles McGuire
          William Kingston
          MCGUIRE LAW, P.C.
          55-W. Wacker Drive,9th Fl.
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 893 7002
          E-mail: mmcguire@mcgpc.com
                  wkingston@mcgpc.com


GUARANTEED RATE: Underpays Loan Processors, "Turng" Suit Says
-------------------------------------------------------------
CHUN PING TURNG, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. GUARANTEED RATE, INC.
And DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, the Defendant, Case No.
4:18-cv-02642-KAW (N.D. Cal., May 4, 2018), seeks legal relief to
redress unlawful violations of Plaintiff's rights under the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938, of their lawful wages.

The Defendants are in the business of selling loans to consumers.
The FLSA Action is brought on behalf of all persons in the United
States who have been, are and/or will be employed by Defendants
as loan officers, loan originators, mortgage professionals, loan
processors, who worked during the period three years prior to the
date that this lawsuit was filed through the date of judgment.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff and the other
California class members were entitled to receive premium wages
for overtime compensation based on a regular rate that includes
commission and/or bonus wages and that neither Plaintiff nor the
California class were receiving all minimum wages due and owing
under the law for overtime hours worked.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew Righetti, Esq.
          Michael Righetti, Esq.
          RIGHETTI GLUGOSKI, P.C.
          456 Montgomery Street, Suite 1400
          San Francisco, CA 94101
          Telephone: (415) 983 0900
          Facsimile: (415) 397 9005
          E-mail: matt@righettilaw.com
                  jglugoski@righettilaw.com
                  mike@righettilaw.com

               - and -

          Reuben D. Nathan, Esq.
          NATHAN & ASSOCIATES, APC
          600 W. Broadway, Suite 700
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: 619 272 7014
          Facsimile: 619 330 1819
          E-mail: rnathan@nathanlawpractice.com


HER IMPORTS: Motley Sues over Autodialed SMS Text Messages
----------------------------------------------------------
SHARON MOTLEY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. HER IMPORTS, the Defendant, Case No.
1:18-cv-00517 (W.D.N.Y., May 7, 2018), seeks legal and equitable
remedies resulting from the illegal actions of Her Imports, in
negligently, knowingly, or willfully transmitting unsolicited,
autodialed SMS text messages, en masse, to Plaintiff's cellular
telephone and the cellular telephones of numerous other
individuals across the country, in violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act.

According to the complaint, the source of each of the unsolicited
SMS text messages sent by Defendant to the 6672 Number was
"21010", which is an SMS short code leased by Defendant or
Defendant's agent(s) or affiliate(s) and is used for operating
Defendant's text message marketing program. The Plaintiff became
distracted and aggravated as a result of receiving each of
Defendant's unsolicited SMS text messages. Because Plaintiff is
alerted by her cellular device, by auditory or visual means,
whenever she receives an SMS text message, each unsolicited SMS
text message that Defendant transmitted to, and was received by,
Plaintiff's cellular device intruded upon Plaintiff's seclusion.

Her Imports offers top quality Brazilian, Peruvian, Malaysian,
and Mongolian hair weaves and extensions.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Tina Wolfson, Esq.
          Robert Ahdoot, Esq.
          AHDOOT & WOLFSON, PC
          10728 Lindbrook Dr. Los Angeles, CA 90024
          Telephone: (310) 474 9111
          Facsimile: (310) 474 8585
          E-mail: twolfson@ahdootwolfson.com
                  rahdoot@ahdootwolfson.com

               - and -

          Frank S. Hedin, Esq.
          David W. Hall, Esq.
          HEDIN HALL LLP
          Four Embarcadero Center, Suite 1400
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 766 3534
          Facsimile: (415) 402 0058
          E-mail: fhedin@hedinhall.com
                  dhall@hedinhall.com


HILTON WORLDWIDE: Court Sets Deadlines for Settlement in "Elder"
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order setting Deadlines In Light of
Settlement in the case captioned TIMOTHY ELDER, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. HILTON
WORLDWIDE HOLDINGS, INC. and HILTON GRAND VACATIONS COMPANY,
INC., Defendant, Case No. 3:16-cv-00278 (N.D. Cal.).

The parties participated in a settlement conference with Judge
Spero on February 8, 2018 and a settlement in principle was
reached.  The parties have agreed to prepare a formal settlement
agreement whereby they intend to resolve the entire action as to
all parties and have agreed to move for preliminary approval of
the settlement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's March 19, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ycyvypch from Leagle.com.

Timothy Elder, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jana Eisinger --
jeisinger@eisingerlawfirm.com -- Law Office of Jana Eisinger,
PLLC, Lawrence Timothy Fisher -- ltfisher@bursor.com -- Bursor &
Fisher, P.A., Blair E. Reed, Bursor and Fisher, P.A. & Joel
Dashiell Smith -- jsmith@bursor.com -- Bursor & Fisher, P.A.

Hilton Worldwide Holdings, Inc. & Hilton Grand Vacations Company,
Inc., Defendants, represented by Angela Christine Agrusa --
angela.agrusa@dlapiper.com -- DLA Piper LLP & David Brian Farkas
-- david.farkas@dlapiper.com -- DLA Piper LLP.


HOPELE OF FORT LAUDERDALE: Forensic Examination in "Ramos" Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida denied Defendant's Motion to Compel Forensic Examination
of Plaintiff's Cellular Phone in the case captioned KATIRIA
RAMOS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. HOPELE OF FORT LAUDERDALE, LLC d/b/a
PANDORA@GALLERIA, a Florida limited liability company, and
PANDORA JEWELRY, LLC, a Maryland limited liability company,
Defendants, Case No. 17-62100-CIV-MORENO/SELTZER (S.D. Fla.).

The Telephone Consumer Protection Act prohibits the use of an
automatic telephone dialing system to 'make any call to any
telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service.'  The
prohibition applies to text message calls as well as voice calls.
The cellular phone on which the Plaintiff allegedly received text
messages from the Defendants is the focus of Hopele's motion.

Hopele seeks a forensic examination because the text messages
received by the Plaintiff were deleted. Yet, the Plaintiff's
deletion of the actual text messages does not appear to be
relevant to any claim or defense in this case.  Hopele has
admitted in its interrogatory answers (interrogatory no. 8) that
it "communicated with Plaintiff through the www.eztexting.com
platform on the following dates: June 16, 2016, July 7, 2016, and
October 19, 2017."

Furthermore, Hopele produced a call log that shows the
Plaintiff's phone number receiving a text on October 19, 2017.
Thus, the transmitting of the text messages (and their receipt by
the Plaintiff) on October 19, 2017 is not a disputed fact. A
forensic examination, therefore, is not required to establish (or
refute) that Hopele sent or the Plaintiff received the text
messages at issue.

Hopele argues that a forensic examination is likely to yield
evidence regarding whether the Plaintiff is similarly situated to
other putative class members and whether her alleged damages
would be the same and therefore, whether the class is
ascertainable.  However, Hopele makes no showing of the relevance
to a class determination of whether the named Plaintiff opened or
clicked on the message or purposefully deleted the message. At
this time, issues related to the putative class do not compel a
forensic examination of the Plaintiff's cell phone.

Finally, in its reply memorandum, Hopele argues that a forensic
examination will clear up the confusion regarding the Plaintiff's
late disclosure of eight other text messages received by the
Plaintiff. The Court notes that those eight text messages are not
alleged in the Complaint and, therefore, at this moment, are not
relevant to the claims or defenses in the case.

In sum, the Court finds that Hopele's request for a forensic
examination of the Plaintiff's cell phone is not tailored to
obtain information that is relevant to any claim or defense in
this case. Furthermore, the proposed forensic examination is not
proportional to the needs of the case or to Plaintiff's privacy
concerns.  For these reasons, the Court ordered that the
Defendant's Motion to Compel Forensic Examination of Plaintiff's
Cell Phone is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's March 19, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yb4xevcr from Leagle.com.

Katiria Ramos, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Manuel Santiago Hiraldo --
mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com -- Hiraldo P.A., Angelica Marie Gentile -
- agentile@shamisgentile.com -- Shamis & Gentile, P.A., Jeffrey
Miles Ostrow -- ostrow@kolawyers.com -- Kopelowitz Ostrow PA &
Scott Adam Edelsberg  -- edelsberg@kolawyers.com -- Kopelowitz
Ostrow.

Hopele of Fort Lauderdale, LLC, a Florida limited liability
company, Defendant, represented by Jeffrey Benjamin Pertnoy --
jeffrey.pertnoy@akerman.com -- Akerman LLP & Stacy Jaye Rodriguez
-- stacy.rodriguez@akerman.com Akerman Senterfitt.


INNOVATIVE HEALTH: Must Defend Against "Northrup" Amended Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOHN NORTHRUP, individually and on behalf of a class
of similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. Innovative
Health Insurance Partners, LLC; CyberX Group, LLC; David E.
Lindsey; and Independent Truckers Group, Inc., Defendants, Case
No. 8:17-cv-1890-T-36JSS (M.D. Fla.), Judge Charlene Edwards
Honeywell of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Florida, Tampa Division, denied the Defendant's dismiss the
Second Amended Complaint.

Northrup, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
filed the action under the TCPA against Defendants, Innovative
Health Insurance Partners, LLC ("IHIP"), CyberX Group, LLC
("CyberX"), David E. Lindsey ("Lindsey"), and Independent
Truckers Group, Inc. ("ITG").  IHIP, CyberX, and ITG are among
several entities owned, controlled, or related to Lindsey.

ITG sells insurance and other services to trucking companies
throughout the country.  Northrup alleges that ITG relies on IHIP
to manage its healthcare product.  IHIP then created an unlawful
text messaging campaign to advertise its product and contracted
with CyberX to send the text messages.  Northrup further alleges
that the corporate Defendants are alter egos of Lindsey and
accordingly, the Defendants are all liable for the unlawful
messages based on principles of agency, vicarious liability, and
fraud.

Northrup contends that beginning around 2015, Defendants began a
bulk marketing campaign by sending Short Message Service ("SMS")
text messages advertising their product directly to the cell
phones of potential clients.  On June 30, 2017, Northrup received
one such message.  When Northrup asked how they obtained his
phone number, the representative ended the call.  Northrup's cell
phone number is part of the 813 area code, which covers Tampa,
Florida and the surrounding area.  He further alleges that he did
not consent to receive this solicitation, sent from an automatic
telephone dialing system ("ATDS").

The Plaintiff filed a two-count Second Amended Complaint against
the Defendants alleging negligent violations of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA") (Count I) and intentional
violations of the TCPA (Count II).  The Defendants move to
dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, alleging lack of personal
jurisdiction and improper venue.

Judge Honeywell noted that the Defendants do not dispute the
allegation that the text message was sent to a phone with a
Florida area code, and Northrup's uncontroverted declaration
establishes that it was received in Florida.  He pointed out that
Florida's long-arm statute is, thus, satisfied as to a TCPA claim
that arises from a non-resident Defendant making a telephonic
communication into Florida.  Further, the Defendants do nothing
to refute Northrup's allegations that each of the Defendant is
responsible for the message under well-established principles of
agency and that the corporate entities are alter egos of Lindsey.

Moreover, the Judge held that the Court's exercise of
jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  The
Defendants had minimum contacts with Florida by sending text
messages into the state directly or through their agents or alter
egos.  The Defendants should have reasonably anticipated that
sending the allegedly TCPA-violating text messages to a Florida
cell phone number would cause harm in Florida.  Here, it is
undisputed that the Plaintiff was in Florida when he received,
opened, and read the text message.  Therefore, the exercise of
jurisdiction over the Defendants does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.  As such, personal
jurisdiction is proper over each of the Defendant, venue is
proper under 28 U.S.C. Section 1391(b)(2), and he finds no reason
to allow the Defendants any additional jurisdictional discovery.

Accordingly, Judge Honeywell denied the Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 10, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/2SOaz6 from Leagle.com.

John Northrup, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Cory S. Fein --
cory@coryfeinlaw.com -- Cory Fein Law Firm, pro hac vice & Seth
Lehrman, Farmer, Jaffe, Weissing, Edwards, Fistos & Lehrman, PL.

Independent Truckers Group, Inc., Defendant, represented by David
J. De Piano -- ddepiano@sbwh.law -- Shapiro, Blasi, Wasserman &
Hermann, PA & William S. Richmond -- BRICHMOND@PCRFIRM.COM --
Platt Cheema Richmond LLC, pro hac vice.

David E Lindsey, Defendant, represented by David J. De Piano,
Shapiro, Blasi, Wasserman & Hermann, PA & William S. Richmond,
Platt Cheema Richmond LLC.

Innovative Health Insurance Partners, LLC & CyberX Group, LLC,
Defendants, represented by William S. Richmond, Platt Cheema
Richmond LLC.


INTEGRATED MAIL: "Roberts" Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages under FLSA
-------------------------------------------------------------
Joseph Roberts, On behalf of Himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs v. Integrated Mail Industries, Inc., the
Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-00699 (E.D. Wisc., May 4, 2018),
seeks redress for Integrated Mail's failure to pay legally
required compensation to the Plaintiffs under the Fair Labor
Standards Act and Wisconsin law.

The Defendant maintains a facility of over 200,000 square feet in
Milwaukee, Wisconsin. When the Plaintiffs report to the Milwaukee
Facility for work, they are required to punch a time clock,
before walking from the time clock to their work stations. After
punching the time clock, it would take the Plaintiffs between 20
seconds and 90 seconds to walk from the time clock to their work
stations.  At the end of the workday, the Plaintiffs are required
to walk from their work stations to the time clock, and then
punch out at the time clock. It would take the Plaintiffs between
20 seconds and 90 seconds to walk from their work areas to the
time clock.

According to the lawsuit, time clock punches, which Integrated
Mail would review to compute the number of hours worked by each
employee during each workweek, sometimes showed that the
Plaintiffs punched back in after lunch less than 30 minutes after
they punched out for lunch. Integrated Mail would deduct the
actual lunch break time from the Plaintiffs' work time,
regardless of whether its duration was 30 minutes, longer than 30
minutes, or shorter than 30 minutes; but would not deduct from
the Plaintiffs' work time their walking time between the time
clock and their work station immediately before and after their
time card punches.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yingtao Ho, Esq.
          Nathan Eisenberg, Esq.
          THE PREVIANT LAW FIRM S.C.
          310 W. Wisconsin Avenue, Suite 100MW
          Milwaukee, WI 53203
          Telephone: (414) 271 4500
          Facsimile: (414) 271 6308
          E-mail: yh@previant.com


INTERNATIONAL CULINARY: Blind Can't Access Website, Kiler Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
MARION KILER, Individually and as the representative of a class
of similarly situated persons, the Plaintiff, v. INTERNATIONAL
CULINARY CENTER, LLC, the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-02688
(E.D.N.Y. Fla., May 7, 2018), seeks permanent injunction to cause
a change in ICC's policies, practices, and procedures so that the
Defendant's website will become and remain accessible to blind
and visually-impaired consumers, and seeks compensatory damages
to compensate Class members for having been subjected to unlawful
discrimination.

The Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person who
requires screen-reading software to read website content using
his computer.

The Plaintiff contends the Defendant is denying blind and
visually impaired persons with equal access to the goods and
services ICC provides to their non-disabled customers through
http//:www.Internationalculinarycenter.com/

The International Culinary Center was founded as The French
Culinary Institute by Dorothy Cann Hamilton in 1984 and has
campuses in New York City and the San Francisco Bay Area.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Class:

          Dan Shaked, Esq.
          SHAKED LAW GROUP, P.C.
          44 Court Street, Suite 1217
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Telephone: (917) 373 9128
          Facsimile: (718) 504 7555


IQOR HOLDINGS: Bid to Decertify "Shoots" FLSA Class Granted
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Paris Shoots, Jonathan Bell, Maxwell Case Turner,
Tammy Hope, Phillipp Ostrovsky, Brenda Brandt, Anissa Sanders,
Najai McCutcheon, and Michael Chavez, on behalf of themselves,
the Proposed Rule 23 Classes, and others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. iQor Holdings US Inc., Defendant, Case No. 15-cv-
563 (SRN/SER) (D. Minn.), Judge Susan Richard Nelson of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Minnesota (i) granted in part
and denied in part the Defendant's Motion for Decertification of
the Conditionally Certified Class under the Fair Labor Standards
Act, and (ii) denied the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.

The lawsuit arises from the Plaintiffs' employment as call center
workers, or contact center agents ("CCAs" or "agents"), for iQor.
In their Fourth Amended Class Action Complaint ("FAC"), the named
Plaintiffs, all current or former employees of iQor, seek to
represent a class and collective of CCAs.  In particular, they
assert Rule 23 state-law claims under the laws of Minnesota, New
York, Ohio, Arizona, Colorado, North Carolina, South Carolina,
and California seeking to recover unpaid wages, and a nationwide
collective action claim for unpaid overtime wages pursuant to the
Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").  The Plaintiffs also assert a
California class action for failure to provide itemized wage
statements and for violation of California's Unfair Competition
Law ("UCL").  Finally, the Plaintiffs assert a class action for
violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

In October 2015, the Court granted the Plaintiffs' motion to
conditionally certify the FLSA collective action and denied the
Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.  Specifically,
under the FLSA, the Court conditionally certified a collective
for all current or former iQor contact center agents who used
TimeQey for timekeeping purposes at any time during the relevant
period, that is, the three years prior to the commencement of the
action, and who worked more than 40 hours during any workweek in
that period.

Approximately 3,500 individuals opted into the FLSA collective
action.  The parties have completed fact discovery.  The
Plaintiffs now move for class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P.
23.  They request that the Court appoint them as the class
representatives and their counsel as the class counsel, for these
classes:

     a. Minnesota Class: All individuals employed by iQor as
Contact Center Agents or other similar job titles in Minnesota
who used TimeQey for timekeeping purposes at any time from Jan.
21, 2012 to Dec. 31, 2014.

     b. Arizona Class: All individuals employed by iQor as
Contact Center Agents or other or similar job titles in Arizona
who used TimeQey for timekeeping purposes at any time from April
3, 2014 to Dec. 31, 2014.

     c. California Class: All individuals employed by iQor as
Contact Center Agents or other similar job titles in California
who used TimeQey for timekeeping purposes at any time since Feb.
21, 2013 to Dec. 31, 2014.

     d. Colorado Class: All individuals employed by iQor as
Contact Center Agents or other similar job titles in Colorado who
used TimeQey for timekeeping purposes at any time from April 3,
2012 to Dec. 21, 2014.

     e. New York Class: All individuals employed by iQor as
Contact Center Agents or other similar job titles in New York who
used TimeQey for timekeeping purposes at any time from April 3,
2009 to Dec. 31, 2014.

     f. North Carolina Class: All individuals employed by iQor as
Contact Center Agents or other similar job titles in North
Carolina who used TimeQey for timekeeping purposes at any time
from April 3, 2013 to Dec. 31, 2014.

     g. Ohio Class: All individuals employed by iQor as Contact
Center Agents or other similar job titles in Ohio who used
TimeQey for timekeeping purposes at any time from April 3, 2007
to Dec. 31, 2014.

     h. South Carolina Class: All individuals employed by iQor as
Contact Center Agents or other similar job titles in South
Carolina who used TimeQey for timekeeping purposes at any time
from April 3, 2012 to Dec. 31, 2014.

On Aug. 18, 2017, iQor filed the motion seeking decertification
of the conditionally certified FLSA class.  In support of its
motion for decertification, iQor argued that the Plaintiffs
cannot show that the members of the conditionally certified FLSA
overtime class are "similarly situated," because multiple
individual inquiries are required to fairly adjudicate the
claims.

Judge Nelson said the Plaintiffs have not demonstrated
predominance as to their state law claims.  Proving their claims
will involve the application of varying laws of different states,
including three California specific claims unique to a California
sub-class.  She foresaw many manageability problems with the
proposed class action, including jury confusion, which would
create difficulties in proceeding with the Plaintiffs' claims in
a unified action.  She also found that because the applicable law
of the eight states varies, a class action is not the superior
method for resolving the Plaintiffs' state law claims.

Because she found the requirements of predominance and
superiority under Rule 23(b) are not met, the Judge said it is
unnecessary to address the remaining Rule 23(a) requirements.
She denied the Plaintiffs' motion.

Turning to the Defendant's Motion to Decertify the Conditional
FLSA Class, the Judge said the FLSA Plaintiffs are similarly
situated for purposes of pursuing their claims in a collective
action, with the exception of claims for breaks over 20 minutes
in length, for which decertification is granted.  And to the
extent that the question presents a close call, concerns for the
purposes of the FLSA as a remedial statute tip the balance
decidedly against decertification.

In sum, Judge Nelson declined to certify the Plaintiffs' state
law claims under Rule 23 because the requirements of predominance
and superiority are not met.  Given the differences in the
applicable state laws, she finds that resolving these claims in a
single class action would likely present significant case
management difficulties.  And as to iQor's decertification
motion, it is generally denied.  However, the Judge iQor's motion
in part as to the Plaintiffs' claims based on unpaid break time
greater than 20 minutes, which are decertified.

Accordingly, Judge Nelson (i) granted in part and denied in part
the Defendant's Motion for Decertification of the Conditionally
Certified Class under the Fair Labor Standards Act; and (ii)
denied the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification Pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.

The Order is filed under seal.  Within 14 days of the date of the
Order, the Judge ordered the parties to show cause as to why the
Order should remain under seal, and if so, which portions of the
Order should remain sealed and for how long.  The parties will
file briefs, under seal, each no longer than seven pages, on this
subject.  Each party will also file, again under seal, a copy of
the Order showing its proposed redactions.  If the parties agree
on these issues, they may file under seal a joint brief and/or
proposed Redacted order.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 10, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/uAZX6S from Leagle.com.

Paris Shoots, on behalf of themselves, the Proposed Rule 23
Classes, and others similarly situated, Jonathan Bell, on behalf
of themselves, the Proposed Rule 23 Classes, and others similarly
situated, Maxwell Turner, on behalf of themselves, the Proposed
Rule 23 Classes, and others similarly situated, Tammy Hope, on
behalf of themselves, the Proposed Rule 23 Classes, and others
similarly situated, Phillipp Ostrovsky, on behalf of themselves,
the Proposed Rule 23 Classes, and others similarly situated,
Brenda Brandt, on behalf of themselves, the Proposed Rule 23
Classes, and others similarly situated, Anissa Sanders, on behalf
of themselves, the Proposed Rule 23 Classes, and others similarly
situated, Najai McCutcheon, on behalf of themselves, the Proposed
Rule 23 Classes, and others similarly situated & Michael Chavez,
on behalf of themselves, the Proposed Rule 23 Classes, and others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Brian T. Rochel --
rochel@teskemicko.com -- Teske, Katz, Kitzer & Rochel, PLLP, Carl
F. Engstrom -- cengstrom@nka.com -- Nichols Kaster, PLLP, Marisa
C. Katz -- katz@tkkrlaw.com -- Teske, Katz, Kitzer & Rochel,
PLLP, Rachhana T. Srey -- srey@nka.com -- Nichols Kaster, PLLP,
Robert L. Schug -- schug@nka.com -- Nichols Kaster PLLP & Vildan
A. Teske -- teske@teskemicko.com -- Teske, Katz, Kitzer & Rochel,
PLLP.

iQor Holdings US, Inc., Defendant, represented by represented by
Brian T. Benkstein -- brian.benkstein@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson
Lewis P.C., Gina K. Janeiro -- janeirog@jacksonlewis.com --
Jackson Lewis P.C., Robert James Lee -- roblee@quinnemanuel.com -
- Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, pro hac vice, Shon
Morgan -- shonmorgan@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn Emanuel Urquhart &
Sullivan, LLP, pro hac vice & Viola Trebicka --
violatrebicka@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn Emanuel Urquhart &
Sullivan, LLP, pro hac vice.


JACOBSON FISH: "Krau" Suit Seeks Unpaid Back Wages under FLSA
-------------------------------------------------------------
STACEY KRAU, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated,
the Plaintiff, v. JACOBSON FISH MARKET & RESTAURANT, INC., d/b/a
PREMIERE MEAT & SEAFOOD, a Florida for Profit Corporation, JACOB
KANDAH, individually And SAMEER KANDAH, Individually, the
Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-00610-BJD-PDB (M.D. Fla., May 7,
2018), seeks to recover unpaid back wages and liquidated damages
under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, from January 3, 2015 to January 13,
2018, the Defendants failed to compensate the Plaintiff at a rate
of one and one-half times the Plaintiff's regular rate for all
hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a single workweek. Rather
the Defendants paid the Plaintiff only her regular rate for hours
over 40.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Paul M. Botros, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN
          600 N. Pine Island Road, Suite 400
          Plantation, FL 33324
          Telephone: (954) 318 0268
          Facsimile: (954) 327 3013
          E-mail: pbtros@forthepeople.com


JENNY CRAIG: Faces "Bloom" Suit over Spam Text
----------------------------------------------
ZOEY BLOOM, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. JENNY CRAIG, INC., a foreign
corporation, the Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-21820-KMM (S.D.
Fla., May 7, 2018), seeks injunctive relief to halt the
Defendant's illegal conduct which has resulted in the invasion of
privacy, harassment, aggravation, and disruption of the daily
life of thousands of individuals, pursuant to the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act.

According to the complaint, on March 6, 2018 and April 10, 2018,
the Defendant sent telemarketing text messages to the Plaintiff's
cellular telephone number ending in 5868.  The Defendant's text
messages were transmitted to the Plaintiff's cellular telephone,
and within the time frame relevant to this action.

The Defendant's text messages constitute telemarketing because
they encouraged the future purchase or investment in property,
goods, or services, i.e., the Defendant's weight loss services.
The number (631)-230-1229 that transmitted the text message is
operated by or on behalf of the Defendant.

Jenny Craig, Inc., often known simply as Jenny Craig, is an
American weight loss, weight management, and nutrition
company.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff and the Class:

          Scott A. Edelsberg, Esq.
          Jeff Ostrow, Esq.
          Joshua R. Levine, Esq.
          KOPELOWITZ OSTROW FERGUSON WEISELBERG GILBERT
          1 W. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 500
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 525 4100
          Facsimile: (954) 525 4300
          E-mail: edelsberg@kolawyers.com
                  ostrow@kolawyers.com
                  levine@kolawyers.com

               - and -

          Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
          14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 400
          Miami, FL 33132
          Telephone: 305-479-2299
          E-mail: ashamis@shamisgentile.com

               - and -

          Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq.
          HIRALDO P.A.
          401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 400 4713
          E-mail: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com


JOHN DOES: CBOE Seeks to Quash Subpoena without Prejudice
---------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned as DAVID SAMUEL, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. JOHN
DOES, the Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-03190 (N.D. Ill., May 4,
2018), CBOE Global Markets, Inc., a non-party, moves the Court
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(d)(3) for an order
quashing the subpoena for documents served on it by Plaintiff in
connection with a lawsuit filed in the Southern District of New
York.

Samuel issued a subpoena to Cboe in connection with the action
captioned David Samuel v. John Does, No. 1:18-cv-01593, pending
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York. Cboe, through its subsidiaries, is the publisher of a
measure known as the Cboe Volatility Index or "VIX," and operates
the Cboe Exchange and Cboe Futures Exchange, which are exchanges
for trading certain VIX-linked derivative products. In addition
to publishing the VIX, Cboe also employs a process for
determining the final settlement value of its expiring derivative
products that is known as the Special Opening Quotation ("SOQ").

The underlying, principal case is a class action lawsuit alleging
that John Doe defendants colluded with each other to manipulate
the settlement value of the VIX in order to affect the settlement
prices of derivative products linked to the VIX, in violation of
the Sherman Act. Cboe has not been named as a defendant in the
underlying lawsuit. However, the Subpoena seeks a variety of
transaction information from Cboe that Samuel asserts is
necessary to identify John Doe entities named as defendants in
his complaint.

Samuel's lawsuit is only 1 of 18 lawsuits filed to date in the
Northern District of Illinois and the Southern District of New
York that are the subject of a pending motion before the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ("JPML") for transfer and
coordination or consolidation. The lawsuits contain common or
similar allegations concerning manipulation of the VIX,
manipulation of the settlement process for VIX derivatives traded
at Cboe entities, and/or manipulation of other volatility related
financial products. Cboe has been named as a defendant in eleven
of those actions, but plaintiffs in the remaining seven cases
have either served or sought to serve Cboe with a subpoena, or
allege that they will seek to serve a subpoena or seek discovery
from Cboe to identify John Doe defendants. The JPML has scheduled
oral argument for May 31, 2018, and Cboe expects a decision will
issue in early June.[BN]

Counsel for Respondent Cboe Global Markets, Inc.:

          Reid J. Schar, Esq.
          Gregory M. Boyle, Esq.
          JENNER & BLOCK LLP
          353 N. Clark Street
          Chicago, IL 60654-3456
          Telephone: (312) 222 9350
          E-mail: rschar@jenner.com
                  gboyle@jenner.com


KEVIN MASON: 2nd Amended Suit Filed in "Ali" RICO Suit
------------------------------------------------------
A Second Amended Complaint was filed on May 2, 2018, against all
Defendants in the case, Matthew Ali, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Kevin Mason, P.A.;
GM Law Firm, LLC; Kevin P. Mason; Chantel L. Grant; Stuart E.
Goldberg; John and Jane Doe; and XYZ Business Entity, Defendants,
Case No. 2:18-cv-01110-CBM-FFM (C.D. Cal., Feb. 8, 2018).

The lawsuit alleges violation of the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act. The case is assigned to Judge Consuelo
B Marshall, and referred to Judge Frederick F Mumm.

GM Law Firm, LLC is engaged in the legal practice in Consumer law
and debt resolution. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel Ray Gamez, Esq.
          GAMEZ LAW FIRM PC
          501 West Broadway Suite 800
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (858) 217-5051
          E-mail: daniel@gamezlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Macy D Hanson, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF MACY D HANSON PLLC
          102 First Choice Drive
          Madison, MS 39110
          Telephone: (601) 853-9521
          Facsimile: (601) 853-9327
          E-mail: macy@macyhanson.com


KRISPY KREME: Sells Maple doughnuts w/o Maples, Class Action Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that a
federal class action claims Krispy Kreme sells "maple" and
"blueberry" doughnuts that do not contain any maple syrup or
blueberries.

The case is IRINA AGAJANYAN, as an individual, on behalf of
herself, all others similarly situated, and the general public,
Plaintiff, vs. KRISPY KREME DOUGHNUT CORPORATION, a North
Carolina Corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,
Defendants, Case. No. _______ (C.D. Calif.).

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

     Hovanes Margarian, Esq.
     THE MARGARIAN LAW FIRM
     801 North Brand Boulevard, Suite 210
     Glendale, CA 91203
     Tel: (818) 553-1000
     Fax: (818) 553-1005
     Email: hovanes@margarianlaw.com


LCS ENTERPRISES: Court OKs $65K Wage & Hour Suit Settlement
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York granted Parties' Joint Application to Approve Settlement in
the case captioned ORGE BILBAO, Plaintiff, v. LCS ENTERPRISES,
INC., et al., Defendants, No. 17 Civ. 6744 (HBP)(S.D.N.Y.).

The Plaintiff is the live-in superintendent of a forty-seven unit
rental building located in upper Manhattan.  The Defendants
acknowledge that the plaintiff was a long-time employee, and
admit that there may have been some failures to pay overtime
premium pay, but they dispute the amount of damages claimed by
the plaintiff.

The parties and their counsel participated in a day-long
mediation session with Court appointed mediator Epifanio
Castillo, Esq., on December 17, 2017 at which they agreed to
resolve this matter for the sum of $65,000.00 to be paid in six
monthly installments.  The settlement also contemplated that the
plaintiff would retire at the end of January 2018 after almost 30
years of service and relocate to New Jersey to live with his
family.  The Plaintiff will receive $42,784.00 of the settlement;
the balance will be paid to his attorneys to cover out-of-pocket
costs and attorney's fees of one-third of the net settlement
amount.

Court approval of a settlement under the Fair Labor Standards Act
is appropriate when the settlement is reached as a result of
contested litigation to resolve bona fide disputes, according to
Johnson v. Brennan, No. 10 Civ. 4712, 2011 WL 4357376 at *12
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2011). If the proposed settlement reflects a
reasonable compromise over contested issues, the court should
approve the settlement.

First, even after deduction of legal fees and costs, the
plaintiff will receive more than 100% of his claimed unpaid wages
and unpaid overtime premium pay. Given the risks of litigation,
this settlement figure is clearly reasonable.

Second, the settlement will entirely avoid the burden, expense
and aggravation of litigation. No depositions have taken place
yet. If the case were to proceed, several depositions would need
to be taken. The settlement avoids the necessity of conducting
this discovery.

Third, the settlement will enable plaintiffs to avoid the risks
of litigation.

Fourth, the amount of the settlement and the fact that the
settlement was reached at a mediation presided over by a Court-
appointed mediator provides assurance that the settlement was not
the product of collusion.

Fifth, there are no factors here that suggest the existence of
fraud. The settlement was reached after a mediation before the
Court, further negating the possibility of fraud or collusion.

Finally, the plaintiff's counsel will receive one third of the
settlement proceeds, exclusive of counsel's out-of-pocket costs,
for contingency fees. Contingency fees of one-third in FLSA cases
are routinely approved in this Circuit.

A full-text copy of the District Court's March 19, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yb65jt3q from Leagle.com.

Jorge Bilbao, Plaintiff, represented by Peter Hans Cooper,
Cilenti & Cooper, P.L.L.C., 708 Third Avenue, 6th Flr New York,
NY 10017

L C S Enterprises, Inc., Heights Real Estate Co., George Huang,
individually & Regina Huang, individually, Defendants,
represented by Robert I. Gosseen, Gallagher Gosseen Faller &
Crowle,1050 Franklin AvenueSuite 400Garden City, NY 11530- 2902


LDWB LLC: "Hoff" Suit Seeks Minimum Wage under FLSA
----------------------------------------------------
MASON HOFF, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, v. LDWB, LLC; LDWB #2, LLC; THE LONESOME
DOVE WESTERN BISTRO, LTD.; and LDWB KNOX, LLC, the Defendants,
Case No. 1:18-cv-00378-LY (W.D. Tex., May 7, 2018), seeks to
recover minimum wage under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Defendants operate restaurants in Austin and Fort Worth,
Texas and Knoxville, Tennessee. The restaurants are called The
Lonesome Dove Western Bistro. Each of these individual
restaurants has an annual gross volume of sales made or business
done of not less than $500,000 (exclusive of excise taxes).

The Defendants utilize shared management among its Austin, Fort
Worth, and Knoxville locations. Hoff worked as a server for
Lonesome Dove from approximately June 2015 until January 2018. He
typically worked approximately thirty hours per week. Lonesome
Dove availed itself of the "tip credit" for Hoff and all of its
servers. Specifically, Lonesome Dove paid Hoff and its other
servers $2.13 per hour at all relevant times. Lonesome Dove then
purported to apply at least a $5.12 per hour tip credit to Hoff's
and its other server's hourly wage.

Lonesome Dove's servers, including Hoff, waited on customers,
took food and drink orders, answered questions regarding the
menu, removed dinnerware from the tables, and did other tasks as
necessary to serve Lonesome Dove's customers.

Hoff and his fellow servers at Lonesome Dove handle and sell
food, alcoholic beverages, and non-alcoholic beverages that have
been moved in or produced for commerce as defined by 29 U.S.C.
section 203(b). They also handle and otherwise worked on cleaning
equipment, trash bags, and toilet paper.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel A. Verrett, Esq.
          Edmond S. Moreland, Jr., Esq.
          MORELAND LAW FIRM, P.C.
          The Commissioners House at Heritage Square
          2901 Bee Cave Road, Box L
          Austin, TX 78746
          Telephone: (512) 782 0567
          Facsimile: (512) 782 0605
          E-mail: daniel@morelandlaw.com
                  edmond@morelandlaw.com


LENDINGCLUB CORP: Veal Sues over Share Price Drop
-------------------------------------------------
MATTHEW VEAL, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. LENDINGCLUB CORPORATION, RENAUD
LAPLANCHE, SCOTT SANBORN, CARRIE L. DOLAN, BRADLEY COLEMAN, and
THOMAS W. CASEY, the Defendants, Case No. 5:18-cv-02599-BLF (N.D.
Cal., May 2, 2018), seeks to recover compensable damages caused
by the Defendants' violations of the federal securities laws and
to pursue remedies under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder.

The Plaintiff brings this action as a class action on behalf of a
Class, consisting of all those who purchased or otherwise
acquired the publicly traded securities of LendingClub during the
Class Period; and were damaged upon the revelation of the alleged
corrective disclosures.

According to the complaint, on February 22, 2018, LendingClub
filed its annual report on Form 10-K for the year ended December
31, 2017 with the SEC which provided the Company's annual
financial results and position. The 2017 10-K was signed by
Defendants Sanborn and Casey. The 2017 10-K contained signed SOX
certifications by Defendants Sanborn and Casey attesting to the
accuracy of financial reporting, the disclosure of any material
changes to the Company's internal control over financial
reporting and the disclosure of all fraud. The 2017 10-K stated
that the Company had a detailed privacy policy which complied
with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.

Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (1) LendingClub falsely promised
consumers they would receive a loan with "no hidden fees"; (2)
LendingClub's privacy policy did not comply with the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act; (3) consequently, the foregoing conduct would subject
LendingClub's business practices to heightened regulatory
scrutiny by the Federal Trade Commission; and (4) as a result,
Defendants' public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times.

On April 25, 2018, the FTC announced in a press release that it
had filed a complaint against LendingClub alleging violations of,
inter alia, the FTC Act for falsely promising consumers they
would receive a loan with "no hidden fees[,]" and the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act for failing to provide customers with a clear
and conspicuous privacy notice so that each customer could
reasonably be expected to receive actual notice. The FTC
Complaint alleges the Company was acting in violation of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act due to, inter alia, its failure to deliver
the initial privacy notice so that each customer could reasonably
be expected to receive actual notice.

On this news, shares of LendingClub fell $.49 per share, or over
15% from its previous closing price to close at $2.77 per share
on April 25, 2018, damaging investors.  As a result of
Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the precipitous
decline in the market value of the Company's securities,
Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered significant
losses and damages.

LendingClub operates an online marketplace platform that connects
borrowers and investors in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Laurence M. Rosen, Esq. (SBN 219683)
          THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
          355 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2450
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 785 2610
          Facsimile: (213) 226 4684
          E-mail: lrosen@rosenlegal.com


LINCOLNSHIRE FISKER: Ct. Dismisses "Steel" Securities Fraud Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned ORGONE CAPITAL III, LLC, DAVID BURNIDGE,
LINCOLNSHIRE FISKER, LLC, KENNETH A. STEEL, JR., and ROBERT F.
STEEL, individually and on behalf of a class of all those
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. KEITH DAUBENSPECK, PETER
McDONNELL, KLEINER PERKINS CAUFIELD & BYERS, RAY LANE, and JOHN
DOERR, Defendants, No. 16 C 10849 (N.D. Ill.).

The Plaintiffs in this case were investors in the now-defunct
electric car manufacturer Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc.
Fisker, once the darling of venture capital firms and the U.S.
Department of Energy, managed to manufacture and sell its cars
for less than a year before shutting down operations in August
2012.  After failing to find a buyer, Fisker filed for bankruptcy
in the District of Delaware on November 22, 2013.  An explosion
of litigation in courts around the country followed.

The named Plaintiffs, all Illinois residents or Delaware
companies domiciled in Illinois, launched this suit on behalf of
a putative class of investors who purchased Fisker securities
through Advanced Equities Inc. ("AEI"), an Illinois-based
investment firm, between 2009 and 2012.  The Plaintiffs claim
that Fisker's controlling shareholder, Kleiner Perkins Caufield &
Byers, a California venture capital firm, committed securities
fraud by misleading prospective investors in order to save its
investment -- and its reputation -- with infusions of outside
cash. Plaintiffs allege that Kleiner Perkins and its managing
partners, Ray Lane and John Doerr (together, the "KP
Defendants"), exercised control of Fisker's board of directors to
retain AEI to market Fisker's stock.  The Plaintiffs allege that
the KP Defendants, through AEI and its principal officers,
Defendants Keith Daubenspeck and Peter McDonnell, raised over
$800 million by issuing misleading information regarding Fisker's
financial health and production capabilities, and concealing the
fact that the federal government froze Fisker's access to a
valuable loan from the Department of Energy.

This is the second time the court addresses motions to dismiss by
the Defendants and the Court said "it will also be the last."
This court granted the Defendants' first Motions to Dismiss [44,
49] without prejudice on the basis that the Plaintiff's original
Class Action Complaint [1-1] was barred by the three-year statute
of limitations in the Illinois Securities Law ("ISL"), see 815
ILCS 5/1 et seq. See Orgone Capital III, LLC v. Daubenspeck, No.
16-CV-10849, 2017 WL 3087730, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 20, 2017).
The Plaintiffs filed an Amended Class Action Complaint [82] on
August 10, 2017, and the Defendants again filed motions to
dismiss the amended complaint and for judgment on the pleadings.
For the reasons stated below, the Defendants' Motions [85, 90]
are granted and this case is dismissed with prejudice.

The ISL's three-year limitations period applies to all actions
brought for relief under this Section or upon or because of any
of the matters for which relief is granted by this Section.
Illinois also has a residual five-year statute of limitations for
all civil actions not otherwise provided for.

Interpreting the ISL, the California district judge explicitly
rejected the plaintiff's tortured and recursive reasoning that
because New York substantive law governed the dispute, an action
under the ISL would be barred and therefore the residual five-
year limitations should apply. Instead, the court endorsed the
more logical reading offered by the Illinois Appellate Court: the
ISL's three-year statute of limitations applies when the conduct
giving rise to the fraud claim is conduct that is also covered by
the ISL. Tregenza, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 110, 678 N.E.2d at 15).

The Plaintiffs argue that this view is incorrect, and that the
ISL's limitations period applies only when the ISL 'itself'
provides a remedy to a plaintiff.

In support of their position, the Plaintiffs cite Carpenter v.
Exelon Enterprises Co., 399 Ill.App.3d 330, 927 N.E.2d 768 (1st
Dist. 2010), which distinguishes the Seventh Circuit's opinion in
Klein v. George G. Kerasotes Corp., 500 F.3d. 669 (7th Cir.
2007), and states that the ISL's statute of limitations does not
cover common law damages claims for breach of fiduciary duty
brought by sellers of securities. Carpenter, 399 Ill. App. 3d at
341, 927 N.E.2d at 777.

To the extent these decisions conflict, however, it is irrelevant
to the Plaintiffs' case: the Plaintiffs are indisputably
purchasers of securities, not sellers, and the ISL's statute of
limitations therefore applies. The Plaintiffs also cite Wert v.
Cohn, No. 12-CV-219, 2017 WL 3838098 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 2017),
to support their argument, but Wert is even less helpful. The
plaintiff's claims in that case did not arise out of the sale of
securities. 2017 WL 3838098 at *11. Rather, the judge noted that
the case instead involved misrepresentations that allegedly
persuaded the plaintiffs to retain their stock. None of the cases
cited by the Plaintiff contradict the Defendants' core assertion
that the ISL's statute of limitations governs common law actions
falling within the category of matters encompassed by the ISL.
The court notes that finding the presence of foreign substantive
law dispositive as to which Illinois statute of limitations
applies in a dispute would simply encourage forum shopping by any
stockholder who failed to bring suit in the appropriate state in
a timely manner. The Defendants point out that the statute of
limitations for securities actions in Delaware is also three
years. The Plaintiffs' argument is, in effect, that while
investors suing in Delaware under Delaware law are subject to a
three-year statute of limitations, and investors suing in
Illinois under Illinois law are subject to a three-year statute
of limitations, investors suing in Illinois under Delaware law
must be afforded a five-year statute of limitations.

The Plaintiffs only hope at avoiding the limitations period in
either state was by creating a mismatch between the substantive
law of Delaware and the procedural law of Illinois and arguing
that they should be rewarded for their delay and subsequent forum
shopping. Three years is already an age in the stock market.

The Statute of Limitations has Expired

The ISL's limitations period begins to run upon the earlier of:
(1) the date upon which the party bringing the action has actual
knowledge of the alleged violation of this Act; or(2) the date
upon which the party bringing the action has notice of facts
which in the exercise of reasonable diligence would lead to
actual knowledge of the alleged violation of this Act.

The court dismissed the original complaint because it was
implausible that the Plaintiffs would not be on notice of the
potential claims based on the PrivCo Report, congressional
hearings, and Weidner Complaint all of which were available and
widely publicized prior to October 2013. To remedy their
complaint, the court instructed the Plaintiffs to "expressly
contradict the court's conclusion about the dates that they
learned of the facts that would lead them to their claims. The
Plaintiffs have not done so, and the court stands by its earlier
conclusion.

Defendants' Motions to Dismiss and Motions for Judgment on the
Pleadings are granted. This case is dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's March 19, 2018
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yc4xltlc from Leagle.com.

Orgone Capital III, LLC, David Burnidge, Lincolnshire Fisker,
LLC, Kenneth A. Steel, Jr. & Robert F. Steel, Individually and on
behalf of a class of all those similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by Barbara A. Podell, Berger & Montague, P.C.,
Bethany R. Turke, Wexler Wallace Llp, Bryan D. Pasciak, Wexler
Wallace Llp, Fran Lisa Rudich, Klafter Olsen & Lesser Llp, pro
hac vice, Jeffrey A. Klafter, Klafter Olsen & Lesser LLP, pro hac
vice, Kenneth A. Wexler, Wexler Wallace LLP, Kurt B. Olsen,
Klafter Olsen & Lesser LLP, pro hac vice, Mark Richard Miller,
Wexler Wallace LLP, Norman M. Monhait, Rosenthal, Monhait &
Goddess, P.A., P. Bradford Deleeuw, Rosenthal, Monhait & Goddess,
P.A. & Todd Collins, Berger & Montaque, P.C.

Keith Daubenspeck, Defendant, represented by M. Duncan Grant,
Pepper Hamilton LLP, pro hac vice, Christopher B. Chuff, Pepper
Hamilton LLP, pro hac vice, Jeffrey A Rossman, Freeborn & Peters
LLP & Julian Clifford Wierenga, Freeborn & Peters, LLP.


MACY'S WEST: Fails to Pay Wages, Salazar Says
---------------------------------------------
ROSA SALAZAR, individually and on behalf of other persons
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. MACY'S WEST STORES, INC.,
an active Ohio corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, the Defendant,
Case No. BC705055 (Cal. Super. Ct., May 4, 2018), seeks minimum
wages for all hours worked and compensation for overtime work
under the California Labor Code.

The Defendant had a consistent policy of requiring its employees,
including Plaintiff, to work through meal periods or work without
a meal period for at least five hours of a shift and failing to
pay such employee one hour of pay at the employees' regular rate
of compensation for each workday that the meal period was not
provided or as required by California state wage and hour laws.
Defendants also engaged in the unlawful practice of combining
meal breaks with rest breaks.

The Defendant had a consistent policy of failing to allow its
employees, including Plaintiff, rest periods for at least ten
(10) minutes per four hours, or a major fraction thereof, and
failing to pay such employees one (1) hour of pay at their
regular rate of compensation for each workday that the rest
period is not provided, or other compensation, as required by
California state and wage and hour laws.

The Defendant knowingly provided inaccurate wage statements to
its employees, including Plaintiff, that did not correctly
include the number of hours worked, including overtime hours, or
compensation for meal periods not provided and rest period not
authorized or permitted as required by California state wage and
hour laws. The Defendant had a consistent policy of failing to
pay its employees, including Plaintiff, all wages due at the
termination or separation, in violation of California state wage
and hour laws.

Macy's West operates department stores. The company offers
clothing, footwear, bedding, furniture, jewelry, beauty products,
and house wares.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Zorik Mooradian, Esq.
          Haik Hacopiart, Esq.
          Nanor C. Kamberian, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF ZORIK MOORADIAN
          5023 N. Parkway Calabasas
          Calabasas, CA 91302
          Telephone: (818) 876 9627
          Facsimile: (888) 783 1030
          E-mail: zorik@mooradianlaw.com
                  haik@mooradianlaw.com
                  nanot@inooradiarilaw.com


MASSAGE ENVY: Seventh Circuit Affirms Dismissal of "Haywood" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KATHY HAYWOOD and LIA HOLT, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.
MASSAGE ENVY FRANCHISING, LLC, Defendant-Appellee, Case No.
17-2402 (7th Cir.), Judge William Joseph Bauer of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
order granting Massage Envy's motion to dismiss under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

Massage Envy is a franchisor based in Scottsdale, Arizona, that
grants licenses to independently owned and operated entities for
use of its name, trademark, and standardized business operations.
Haywood is an Illinois resident and Holt is a Missouri resident.
Massage Envy has multiple franchise locations in both states that
offer massages and other related services.

On Nov. 16, 2016, Haywood and Holt filed their first amended
complaint which is the subject of Massage Envy's motion to
dismiss and the appeal.  It alleges that Massage Envy violated
numerous provisions of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act ("ICFA"), and the Missouri Merchandising
Practices Act ("MMPA"), when it offered and sold what it stated
were one-hour massages or massage sessions that provided no more
than 50 minutes of massage time.

The complaint explains how Massage Envy advertised massage
services on its website between May 2007 and September 2016.  It
focuses primarily on the advertisement on the website's homepage
for an "Introductory 1-hour Massage Session*" at the price of
$50.  Clicking the asterisk after the word "Session" led the user
to a separate web page that did not contain information about the
length of a massage.  However, at the bottom of the homepage
there was a link that stated "*View pricing and promotional
details."  That link led to a separate page with a number of
disclaimers.  One disclaimer titled "Session" explained that a
session includes massage or facial and time for consultation and
dressing.  The complaint alleges that the multiple asterisks
confused the average consumer and that Massage Envy deceptively
hid the disclosures where they were "nearly impossible" to find.

On behalf of Haywood and all other similarly situated Illinois
residents, the complaint alleges counts of Affirmative Deception,
Material Omissions of Fact, and Unfair Practices in violation of
the IFCA.  It alleges the same three counts in violation of the
MMPA on behalf of Holt and all other similarly situated Missouri
residents.  Massage Envy moved to dismiss the complaint arguing
both a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a
claim on which relief may be granted.

On June 9, 2017, the district court granted Massage Envy's motion
and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.  The court first held
that Haywood and Holt had standing, rejecting Massage Envy's
argument that they had not pleaded a cognizable injury that was
fairly traceable to Massage Envy.  However, when analyzing the
requirements for pleading damages under the IFCA and the MMPA,
the court held that both Haywood and Holt's allegations failed to
meet the standards set forth by those statutes and the
corresponding case law.  The court also found that Holt's claims
did not meet the heightened pleading standard required under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), as she did not allege a
time or a place for the fraudulent conduct, nor did she state
particularly how she was deceived.

Haywood and Holt timely appealed.

Judge Bauer held that Haywood cannot obtain relief based on her
second visit to Massage Envy because after her first visit, she
cannot plausibly allege that she was deceived regarding the
length of the massage.  Even had Haywood adequately pleaded
actual damages, her allegations fail to establish the requisite
causation.  There is no allegation in the complaint that her
belief about the length of the massage caused Haywood to make the
appointment.  To the contrary, the only reasonable and plausible
inference is that only the receipt of a gift card caused her to
book a massage; the alleged deceptive representations did not
influence that decision.

According to the Court, the Plaintiff's failure to cite a
specific deceptive representation that caused her to pay for
something she did not receive is particularly problematic in
light of Rule 9(b)'s heightened standard.  She cannot, based on
these allegations, establish that Massage Envy's alleged
deception was the but-for cause of her injury, and her claims
fail as a result.

Turning to Holt's MMPA claims, the Judge holds that Holt's
allegations fail to state a claim under the MMPA with the
particularity required under Rule 9(b).  For that reason, the
district court did not err in dismissing her claims, the Appeals
Court held.  The Judge said Holt completely fails to allege that
a deceptive representation from Massage Envy caused her to suffer
an ascertainable loss of money.  She does not state what, if
anything, she saw or did not see on the Massage Envy website that
led her to believe she was paying for one hour of massage time.
It is also notable that she does not state how much, if anything,
she paid for her massage.

Moreover, as was the case for Haywood, she fails to plead any
causation.  There is no indication that it was Massage Envy's
deceptive advertisement that led her to book a massage at one of
its locations.  Accordingly, the allegations do not support the
conclusion that Massage Envy caused her to suffer an
ascertainable loss of money.

In light of his analysis, Judge Bauer found it reasonable to
conclude that the district court believed Haywood and Holt would
not be able to cure the problems in their complaint.  Without a
request for leave to do so, nor any indication to the court how
they might accomplish that goal, the district court did not abuse
its discretion in dismissing the complaint with prejudice.  Judge
Bauer affirmed the district court's order.

Judge Diane S. Sykes, on the other hand, dissented the district
court's order.  She held that the complaint survives scrutiny
under Rules 9(b) and 12(b)(6), and the case should have been
allowed to move forward.  The Plaintiff's claims aren't worth
much, and she's skeptical that the case is appropriate for class
certification.  But the complaint states claims for relief under
Illinois and Missouri law and should not have been dismissed.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 10, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/fxTnc7 from Leagle.com.

Richard Steven Cornfeld -- rcornfeld@cornfeldlegal.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Brian Wolfman -- wolfmanb@law.georgetown.edu -- for Plaintiff-
Appellant.

Joseph E. Collins -- jcollins@foxrothschild.com -- for Defendant-
Appellee.

Amit R. Vora, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Luanne Sacks -- lsacks@srclaw.com -- for Defendant-Appellee.

Cynthia Ann Ricketts -- ricketts@srclaw.com -- for Defendant-
Appellee.

Ryan L. Bruning, for Plaintiff-Appellant.


MDL 2591: $1.5-Bil. Accord in MIR 162 Corn Suit Has Initial OK
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: SYNGENTA AG MIR 162 CORN LITIGATION. This
Document Relates to All Cases Except: Louis Dreyfus Co. Grains
Merchandising LLC v. Syngenta AG, et al., No. 16-2788. Trans
Coastal Supply Co., Inc. v. Syngenta AG, et al., No. 14-2637. The
Delong Co., Inc. v. Syngenta AG, et al., No. 17-2614 Agribase
Int'l Inc. v. Syngenta AG, et al., No. 15-2279, MDL No. 2591,
Case No. 14-md-2591-JWL (D. Kan.), Judge John W. Lungstrum of the
U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas (i) granted the
Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary settlement approval and
related relief; (ii) denied the motion by the Toups/Coffman
Plaintiffs for certain relief, joined by the Hossley-Embry
Plaintiffs; (iii) granted the parties' joint motion for a stay
and injunction; and (iv) granted the parties' joint motion for
leave to file the walk away agreement under seal.

In 2016, the Court and several others with related cases
appointed a special master for purposes of settlement.  On Aug.
9, 2017, it Court appointed a Plaintiffs' Settlement Negotiation
Committee ("PNC") to work towards a settlement with Syngenta.  On
Sept. 25, 2017, the PNC executed a term sheet with Syngenta
providing for a total settlement amount of $1.51 billion.  Over
the next several months, with the help of the special master and
with oversight by the various courts, the PNC negotiated with
Syngenta the terms of a final settlement agreement, which the
parties executed on Feb. 26, 2018.

The Agreement's terms include the following: In exchange for
releases of claims based on the sale and marketing of Viptera and
Duracade, Syngenta will pay a total of $1.51 billion, with two
initial deposits totaling $400 million and the remainder
deposited within 30 days after final court approval (or by April
1, 2019, if later).  Syngenta has no right of reversion of any of
that amount.  The Agreement is contingent on certification of a
nationwide settlement class, consisting of four subclasses
generally consisting of corn producers who did not purchase
Viptera or Duracade; corn producers who did purchase one of those
products; grain handling facilities (except for certain excluded
exporters); and ethanol producers.  The Agreement sets out the
allocation of the settlement fund among the members of the four
subclasses; a claims procedure; an opt-out procedure; and a
notice plan.

After execution of the Agreement and with leave of the Court, the
Plaintiffs filed a fourth amended master class action complaint.
By that complaint, the Plaintiffs seek certification of the same
nationwide class and subclasses, asserting class claims based on
the federal Lanham Act and certain Minnesota statutes.  In
addition and in the alternative, they also assert negligence and
other state-law causes of action, on behalf of statewide classes,
under the laws of various states.

Through the appointed lead counsel, the Plaintiffs move for
preliminary approval of the Agreement and for provisional
certification of settlement class and subclasses; appointment of
the representative Plaintiffs for the subclasses; appointment of
the class counsel; preliminary approval of the settlement and the
claims procedures and the notice plan, and permission to
disseminate the notice; appointment of the notice and claims
administrator; appointment of special masters to oversee the
settlement and claims procedures; and the imposition of
particular deadlines and a setting for the hearing on final
approval of the settlement.

Prior to the Plaintiffs' filing of the motion for preliminary
settlement approval, Toups filed a motion seeking delay of
consideration of the motion for preliminary approval; appointment
to the PNC; and discovery of the term sheet and other
information.  Toups claims in the motion to represent over 9,000
individual producer Plaintiffs and to have filed the most
individual producer cases in the federal MDL.  Toups also filed a
response in opposition to the motion for preliminary approval (in
which the Hossley-Embry Plaintiffs joined).  No other party has
opposed the motion for preliminary approval.

On April 5, 2018, after the motions had been fully briefed, the
Court conducted a hearing on these four motions.

The Plaintiffs and Syngenta jointly move to stay the MDL
litigation, vacate all deadlines, and enjoin all putative
Settlement Class members from pursuing any related claims against
Syngenta pending completion of the final approval process by the
Court.  They further jointly move for leave to file under seal
(with restricted access) the walk away agreement that is part of
the settlement agreement (which agreement sets thresholds for
opt-outs that allow Syngenta to walk away from the settlement
Agreement).

Judge Lungstrum held that the standards for preliminary approval
of the settlement have been met easily in the case.  He concluded
that the requirements of Rule 23 are satisfied for each of the
proposed subclasses (producers who did not purchase Viptera or
Duracade, producers who did, grain handlers, ethanol producers).
The class members are numerous -- corn producers number in the
thousands, and the Plaintiffs estimate there to be over 1,500
grain handlers and over 180 ethanol producers.  The same common
questions of fact and law identified by the Court in its previous
certification order may be found here as well, and the proposed
plaintiff representatives are typical and adequate.  As confirmed
by the trial of the Kansas class claims, the common questions
predominate, and class treatment is superior to individual
treatment (especially in this settlement context).

The Judge held that the proposed settlement falls within the
range of reasonable settlements that the Court could approve at a
final settlement hearing, and he found Toups' objections to
preliminary approval to lack merit.  Accordingly, he granted the
motion for preliminary approval, the specific terms of which will
be set forth in the Court's separate order.

Because the Plaintiffs have established that their proposed
administrator is sufficiently experienced and can meet the
demands of the notice and claims processes, the Judge granted the
request for that appointment.  He held that the Plaintiffs'
proposed schedule, modified at the motion hearing, is reasonable,
and the proposed dates will be incorporated in the Court's
separate order.  He also granted the Plaintiffs' requests for
appointment of the class counsel, the class representatives, and
the special masters, as set forth in the Court's separate order.

The Judge agreed that, once preliminary approval is granted,
litigation in the MDL should be stayed with all deadlines
vacated.  He further agreed that litigation of related claims
should be enjoined as requested by the Plaintiffs.  Accordingly,
he granted the joint motion for a stay and injunction, and the
terms of the stay and injunction will be set forth in a separate
order issued by the Court.

The Judge also granted the joint motion for leave to file the
walk away agreement under seal, and leave will be granted by
separate order of the Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 10, 2018 Memorandum and
Order is available at https://is.gd/E8bOMI from Leagle.com.

All Plaintiffs, represented by Don M. Downing --
ddowning@grgpc.com -- Gray, Ritter & Graham, PC, pro hac vice,
Patrick J. Stueve -- stueve@stuevesiegel.com -- Stueve Siegel
Hanson LLP, Richard L. Coffman, The Coffman Law Firm, Scott A.
Powell -- scott@hwnn.com -- Hare Wynn Newell & Newton, pro hac
vice & William B. Chaney -- wchaney@grayreed.com -- Gray Reed &
McGraw, LLP, pro hac vice.

All Defendants, represented by Michael D. Jones --
michael.jones@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis, pro hac vice &
Thomas P. Schult -- tschult@berkowitzoliver.com -- Berkowitz
Oliver Williams Shaw & Eisenbrandt, LLP.

Ellen K. Reisman, Special Master, represented by Ellen K. Reisman
-- tschult@berkowitzoliver.com -- Reisman Karron Greene LLP.

Stracener Farming Company, Plaintiff, represented by Clark W.
Mason -- clark@clarkmason.com -- Clark Mason Attorneys, pro hac
vice, James J. Thompson, Jr. --  JT@JimThompsonLaw.com -- pro hac
vice, Jerry Obe Kelly, Kelly Law Firm, PA, pro hac vice, John
Paul Byrd -- wwinfo@paulbyrdlawfirm.com -- Paul Byrd Law Firm,
PLLC, pro hac vice, Martin J. Phipps -- mphipps@phippscavazos.com
-- Phipps Anderson Deacon LLP, Mikal C. Watts --
mcwatts@wattsguerra.com -- Watts Guerra, LLP & Nolan E. Awbrey,
Riley Jackson, PC, pro hac vice.

David Stracener, Plaintiff, represented by Clark W. Mason, Clark
Mason Attorneys, pro hac vice, James J. Thompson, Jr., pro hac
vice, Jerry Obe Kelly, Kelly Law Firm, PA, pro hac vice, John
Paul Byrd, Paul Byrd Law Firm, PLLC, pro hac vice, Martin J.
Phipps, Phipps Anderson Deacon LLP, Mikal C. Watts, Watts Guerra,
LLP & Nolan E. Awbrey, Riley Jackson, PC, pro hac vice.

Larry Petit, Plaintiff, represented by Clark W. Mason, Clark
Mason Attorneys, pro hac vice, James J. Thompson, Jr., pro hac
vice, Jerry Obe Kelly, Kelly Law Firm, PA, pro hac vice, John
Paul Byrd, Paul Byrd Law Firm, PLLC, pro hac vice, Martin J.
Phipps, Phipps Anderson Deacon LLP, Mikal C. Watts, Watts Guerra,
LLP & Nolan E. Awbrey, Riley Jackson, PC, pro hac vice.

Trans Coastal Supply Company Inc., Plaintiff, represented by
Jayne Conroy -- JConroy@simmonsfirm.com -- Simmons Hanly Conroy,
Martin J. Phipps, Phipps Anderson Deacon LLP, Mikal C. Watts,
Watts Guerra, LLP, Patrick J. Stueve, Stueve Siegel Hanson LLP,
Paul J. Hanly -- phanly@simmonsfirm.com -- Jr., Simmons Hanly
Conroy, Sarah Burns, Simmons Hanly Conroy & William B. Chaney --
wchaney@grayreed.com -- Gray Reed & McGraw, LLP.

Luke Claas, Plaintiff, represented by Adam J. Levitt --
wchaney@grayreed.com -- Grant & Eisenhofer, PA, pro hac vice,
Edmund S. Aronowitz, Grant & Eisenhofer, PA, pro hac vice, J.
Brett Milbourn -- BMILBOURN@WBSVLAW.COM -- Walters Bender
Strohbehn & Vaughan, PC, James J. Pizzirusso, Hausfeld LLP, pro
hac vice, Martin J. Phipps, Phipps Anderson Deacon LLP, Mikal C.
Watts, Watts Guerra, LLP, Paul D. Lundberg --
paul@lundberglawfirm.com -- Lundberg Law Firm, PLC, pro hac vice
& Thomas V. Bender -- TBENDER@WBSVLAW.COM -- Walters Bender
Strohbehn & Vaughan, PC.

Meinke Farms, Plaintiff, represented by Adam J. Levitt, Grant &
Eisenhofer, PA, pro hac vice, Edmund S. Aronowitz, Grant &
Eisenhofer, PA, pro hac vice, J. Brett Milbourn, Walters Bender
Strohbehn & Vaughan, PC, James J. Pizzirusso, Hausfeld LLP, pro
hac vice, Martin J. Phipps, Phipps Anderson Deacon LLP, Mikal C.
Watts, Watts Guerra, LLP, Paul D. Lundberg, Lundberg Law Firm,
PLC, pro hac vice & Thomas V. Bender, Walters Bender Strohbehn &
Vaughan, PC.

Cargill International SA, Defendant, represented by Clifford M.
Greene -- cgreene@greeneespel.com -- Greene Espel PLLP, Erin
Sindberg Porter -- esindbergporter@greeneespel.com -- Greene
Espel PLLP, Janine W. Kimble, Greene Espel PLLP, John W. Ursu --
jursu@greeneespel.com -- Greene Espel PLLP, Martin J. Phipps,
Phipps Anderson Deacon LLP, Mikal C. Watts, Watts Guerra, LLP &
X. Kevin Zhao -- kzhao@greeneespel.com -- Greene Espel PLLP.

Syngenta Biotechnology, Inc., Third Party Plaintiff, represented
by D. Scott Aberson -- scott.aberson@maslon.com -- Maslon Edelman
Borman & Brand, LLP, David S. Chipman, CASA of Shawnee County,
pro hac vice, Edwin J.U. -- edwin.u@kirkland.com -- Kirkland &
Ellis, Michael D. Jones -- michael.jones@kirkland.com -- Kirkland
& Ellis, Patrick F. Philbin -- patrick.philbin@kirkland.com --
Kirkland & Ellis & Thomas P. Schult --
tschult@berkowitzoliver.com -- Berkowitz Oliver Williams Shaw &
Eisenbrandt, LLP.

Syngenta Corporation, Third Party Plaintiff, represented by David
S. Chipman, CASA of Shawnee County, pro hac vice.

Syngenta Seeds, Inc., Third Party Plaintiff, represented by David
S. Chipman, CASA of Shawnee County, pro hac vice.

Cargill International SA, Defendant, represented by Clifford M.
Greene, Greene Espel PLLP, Erin Sindberg Porter, Greene Espel
PLLP, Janine W. Kimble, Greene Espel PLLP, John W. Ursu, Greene
Espel PLLP, Martin J. Phipps, Phipps Anderson Deacon LLP, Mikal
C. Watts, Watts Guerra, LLP & X. Kevin Zhao, Greene Espel PLLP.


MDL 2777: Court Narrows Claims in EcoDiesel Marketing Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California granted in part and denied in part Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss the case captioned IN RE CHRYSLER-DODGE-JEEP ECODIESEL
MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION,
Case No. 17-md-02777-EMC (N.D. Cal.).

Private Plaintiffs are individuals or companies who purchased
certain trucks marketed under the Jeep and Ram 1500 model names.
More specifically, these trucks (2014-2016 models) had diesel
engines that were branded "EcoDiesel." The Plaintiffs have
brought class action claims against (1) the manufacturers of the
cars and their chief executive (the FCA Defendants); (2) the
companies who manufactured the EcoDiesel engines (the VM Motoring
Defendants); and (3) the companies who supplied the electronic
diesel control ("EDC") units that were used to control the
emissions from the engines (the Bosch Defendants). The gist of
Plaintiffs' complaint is that Defendants concealed the fact that
they had installed "defeat devices" in the Plaintiffs' cars --
i.e., devices that reduced the effectiveness of the emissions
control system under conditions which may reasonably be expected
to be encountered in normal vehicle operation and use. In other
words, the Plaintiffs contend that the vehicles emit excessive
emissions under normal driving conditions and that the vehicles
are in fact not eco-friendly. Based on that allegation, the
Plaintiffs have brought (1) fraud-based claims and (2) warranty-
based claims.

Currently pending before the Court are two motions to dismiss:
one brought by the FCA and VM Defendants and the other brought by
the Bosch Defendants.

Economic Loss Doctrine

According to the Defendants, the consumer protection claim under
North Carolina law must be dismissed because it is barred by the
economic loss doctrine. The doctrine prohibits recovery for
economic loss in tort.

The rationale for the economic loss rule is that the sale of
goods is accomplished by contract. To give a party a remedy in
tort, where the defect in the product damages the actual product,
would permit the party to ignore and avoid the rights and
remedies granted or imposed by the parties' contract. However,
where a defective product causes damage to property other than
the product itself, losses attributable to the defective product
are recoverable in tort rather than contract.

However, in In re MyFord Touch Consumer Litig., 46 F.Supp.3d 936,
967 (N.D. Cal. 2014), this Court previously held that the
economic loss doctrine is not a bar to a statutory consumer
protection claim.  MyFord held that North Carolina's consumer
protection statute gives rise to a duty independent of the
contract and therefore should not be barred by the economic loss
rule.

WARRANTY CLAIMS

In addition to the fraud-on-consumer claims, the Plaintiffs have
brought claims for breach of warranty. The Plaintiffs' warranty
claims are as follows: (1) breach of express warranty under state
law; (2) breach of implied warranty under state law; and (3)
breach of written and implied warranties under federal law, a
violation of the MMWA.

State Law Warranty Claims: Pre-emption

The Defendants argue that the state law warranty claims (both
express and implied) should be dismissed because of pre-emption.
Based on the factual predicate of the warranty claims, the Court
agrees with the Defendants that there is pre-emption more
specifically, that the warranty claims are expressly pre-empted
by the CAA.  In so holding, the Court finds Caterpillar, 2015
U.S. Dist. 98784, and VW Va., 94 Va. Cir. at 189, persuasive
authority.

In Caterpillar, the plaintiffs sued a diesel engine manufacturer,
asserting that the emissions control system used in the engine
was defective and rendered their vehicles inoperative on account
of repeated and endemic engine failure, deratings, i.e., decrease
of engine horsepower and speed, and shutdowns.

According to the plaintiffs, the emission control system known as
CRS was unable to maintain reliable thermal management of exhaust
temperatures as required to achieve regeneration under all
operating conditions and applications. As a result, the CRS's
protective measures frequently and repeatedly render[ed] the
vehicles inoperable and require[d] remediation by authorized
Caterpillar technicians using proprietary Caterpillar equipment
and methods. The plaintiffs' claims included claims for breach of
warranty.

The defendant argued, inter alia, that the warranty claims were
preempted by the CAA Section 209(a)).

Here, the relief sought in each of the injunctive counts, Lemon
law claims, warranty claims, and public nuisance claims directly
relates to enforcement of emissions standards because the basis
for the breach or nuisance is violation of the federal emissions
standards. In other words, the legal duty that was the predicate
of these claims was compliance with CAA emissions standards.
Indeed, unlike the claims of fraud and deception, noncompliance
with the CAA emissions standards constitutes the breach-of-
warranty claim.

The Plaintiffs argue that, in the instant case, the warranties
were voluntarily adopted and therefore their warranty claims are
really based on contract. But that argument has no force for the
express warranty claim because that claim is based on a
Performance Warranty" and a Defect Warranty, both of which as
alleged in the FAC are required by federal law.

The Court finds that the Plaintiffs' reliance on Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504 (1992), is unavailing. There, the
Supreme Court did note that a manufacturer's liability for breach
of an express warranty derives from, and is measured by, the
terms of that warranty. Accordingly, the 'requirements' imposed
by an express warranty claim are not 'imposed under State law the
language used in the pre-emption provision at issue, but rather
imposed by the warrantor.'

But in the instant case, the warranties at issue are required by
federal law. And a finding of violation of a CAA emissions
standard necessarily results in a breach of warranty without any
intervening independent and volitional conduct, deceit and
misrepresentation by the Defendants.

As for the implied warranty claims, the Plaintiffs' voluntariness
argument is irrelevant because the voluntariness question applies
to express warranties only, the Court held.  In other words, a
defendant can voluntarily adopt only an express warranty. Implied
warranties obtain irrespective of a defendant's volition. The
problem for the Plaintiffs is that their implied warranty claims
are entirely predicated on compliance with federal emissions
standards (EPA or CARB).

Breach of the implied warranty is synonymous with violation of
federal emissions standards, and thus, this amounts to direct
enforcement of federal emissions standards pre-empted by the CAA.
Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Plaintiffs' state law
warranty claims (both express and implied) based on express pre-
emption.

Federal MMWA Warranty Claim

The Defendants take the position that, if the state warranty
claims are preempted, then the federal warranty claim must be
dismissed as well, not because of preemption per se but because
the federal warranty claim is ultimately based on state law.
The Defendants' position is problematic, the Court said.

The MMWA provides in relevant part that a consumer who is damaged
by the failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to
comply with any obligation under a written warranty or implied
warranty may bring suit for damages and other legal and equitable
relief. Admittedly, if a plaintiff cannot state a claim for
breach of warranty under state law, then it makes sense that the
plaintiff cannot state a MMWA claim either.

However, in the instant case, there is no contention that the
Plaintiffs have failed to state a substantive claim for breach of
warranty under state law; rather, the only challenge that the
Defendants have made to the state warranty claims is that such
claims are preempted. Pre-emption is a question entirely
independent of the merits of breach of warranty claims. The
Defendants have cited no case holding that MMWA's effective
incorporation by reference to state warranty claims is meant to
refer to anything other than the merits of such claims.

Absent case authority so holding, the Court is not persuaded that
a finding of CAA pre-emption should vitiate a MMWA claim. After
all, the MMWA is a federal law and its incorporation of state law
to create a federal cause of action would, if anything, counsel
against pre-emption, at least in the absence of a clear
congressional directive.

Accordingly, although the Court finds pre-emption of the state
claims for breach of warranty, express and implied, there is no
reason why the MMWA warranty claim cannot continue at this
juncture.

The Court grants in part and denies in part the Defendants'
motions to dismiss.

A full-text copy of the District Court's March 15, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y6w56paf from Leagle.com.

Jose Chavez, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jessica Thompson, Hagens
Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Shana E. Scarlett -- shanas@hbsslaw.com
-- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Steve W. Berman --
steve@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac
vice, E. Powell Miller -- epm@millerlawpc.com -- The Miller Law
Firm, P.C., James E. Cecchi -- jcecchi@carellabyrne.com --
Carella Byrne Cecchi Olstein Brody & Agnello, P.C., Jeffrey Scott
Goldenberg -- jgoldenberg@gs-legal.com -- Goldenberg Schneider,
LPA, Lindsey H. Taylor, Carella Byrne, 5 Becker Farm Road.
Roseland, NJ 07068.  Peter B. Fredman --
peter@peterfredmanlaw.com -- Law Office of Peter Fredman & Sharon
S. Almonrode -- ssa@millerlawpc.com -- The Miller Law Firm, P.C.

Fiat Chrysler Automobiles N.V., Defendant, represented by Amie
Adelia Vague -- avague@lightfootlaw.com -- Lightfoot Franklin &
White, Kyle Allen Niemi -- niemik@sullcrom.com -- Sullivan and
Cromwell LLP, Robert J. Giuffra, Jr. -- giuffrar@sullcrom.com --
Sullivan and Cromwell LLP, Samuel H. Franklin --
sfranklin@lightfootlaw.com -- Lightfoot Franklin & White LLC,
Wesley B. Gilchrist -- wgilchrist@lightfootlaw.com -- Lightfoot
Franklin & White LLC & William B. Monahan, Esq. --
monahanw@sullcrom.com -- Sullivan & Cromwell, pro hac vice.


METRO DINER: "Fiumano" Suit Has Conditional Class Certification
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOSEPH FIUMANO, for himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. METRO DINER MANAGEMENT LLC, et al.,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 17-465 (E.D. Pa.), Judge Anita B.
Brody of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania granted in part and denied in part Mr. Fiumano's
motion for the conditional certification of the matter as an Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA") collective action.

Mr. Fiumano, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, brings the collective action and class action lawsuit
against the Defendants for alleged violations of the FLSA (Counts
I & II), the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act of 1968 ("PMWA")
(Count III), and the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law
("PWPCL") (Count IV).

The Defendants own and operate a chain of 30 Metro Diner
restaurants in eight states that employ approximately 1,450
servers.  Mr. Fiumano worked full-time as a Server in the
Defendants' restaurants in Altamonte Springs, Florida and
Bensalem, Pennsylvania, for a period of approximately 18 months,
concluding in March 2017.

On March 8, 2017, Mr. Fiumano filed a four-count Amended
Collective and Class Action Complaint.  In Count I, Mr. Fiumano
claims that Metro Diner violates the FLSA by paying their Servers
the "tip credit" minimum wage while requiring or allowing Servers
to perform: (1) non-tipped tasks unrelated to their tipped
occupation, and (2) non-tipped tasks that although related to
their tipped occupation, exceed 20% of their work hours in any
workweek.  In Count II, Mr. Fiumano asserts that Metro Diner
violates the FLSA by distributing funds from the mandatory tip
pool to Bussers, Hosts, non-tipped kitchen staff, managers and
supervisors, and also by allowing the "house" to retain tip pool
funds.  In Count III, Mr. Fiumano asserts that the aforementioned
tip pool distribution violates the PMWA.  Finally, in Count IV,
he asserts that Metro Diner violates the PWPCL by requiring
Servers to incur wage deductions related to the purchase of their
required uniform shirts and by requiring Servers to attend work-
related meetings, without paying wages for the time spent in
those meetings.

Mr. Fiumano seeks the conditional certification of the case as a
collective action and for the authorization of his proposed
notice to a collective action class comprised of all persons who
have worked as a Metro Diner Server during any workweek in the
past three years

Mr. Fiumano asserts that he and the proposed class were similarly
subject to two overarching Metro Diner policies, practices and
procedures that correspondingly give rise to his two FLSA claims
(Counts I & II of the Amended Complaint):

     1. Mr. Fiumano claims that Metro Diner requires Servers to
        spend a substantial amount of time performing non-tipped
        sidework, for which they receive the "tip credit" minimum
        wage.  He asserts that this sidework includes tasks
        unrelated to serving and tasks that although related to
        serving, occupy more than 20% of Servers' hours each
        workweek.

     2. Mr. Fiumano claims that Metro Diner requires Servers to
        pay 2% of their daily sales into a tip pool designated
        for Hosts and Bussers, and that it "appears" that non-
        tipped kitchen staff, managers or the "house" also
        periodically receive funds from the mandatory tip pool.

Metro Diner opposes conditional certification.  Metro Diner also
opposes the inclusion of Servers who work at franchised locations
in the proposed class, and objects to aspects of Mr. Fiumano's
proposed notice.

Judge Brody ruled that at this stage of the case, Mr. Fiumano
need only make a modest factual showing to show a factual nexus
between the manner in which the employer's alleged policy
affected him or her and the manner in which it affected the
proposed collective action members.  Mr. Fiumano, by putting
forth evidence of Metro Diner's standardized policies and
practices regarding the nature and amount of sidework performed
by Servers, has done so.  Accordingly, the Judge said the
collective action will be conditionally certified as to Count I.

By putting forth facts demonstrating that Metro Diner has a
policy of distributing proceeds from the mandatory tip pool to
Hosts and Bussers, the Judge held that Mr. Fiumano has made the
required modest factual showing of demonstrating a factual nexus
between the manner in which the alleged policy affected him and
the manner in which it affected the proposed class of Servers.
Metro Diner may raise the issue of the legality of Hosts and
Bussers' participation in the tip pool following the close of
discovery at summary judgment.  The Judge granted conditional
certification as to this portion of Count II.

Because Mr. Fiumano has failed to provide any evidence that he
was ever affected by such a policy, he has failed to provide a
modest factual showing demonstrating a factual nexus between the
manner in which the alleged policy affected him and the manner in
which it affected the proposed class of Servers, the Judge denied
conditional certification as to this portion of Count II.

As to the proposed class definition, the Judge said Mr. Fiumano
has not identified which Metro Diner locations are franchised,
the relationship of the Metro Diner franchises to the Defendants,
or evidence that Metro Diner franchises are subject to the same
policies and procedures as corporate-owned locations.  Therefore,
presently, Mr. Fiumano has not made the requisite modest factual
showing at this time, demonstrating a factual nexus between the
manner in which Metro Diner's alleged policies affected him and
the manner in which it affected Servers in franchised locations.

As to the proposed Notice, consistent with a district court's
discretion to monitor the preparation and distribution of the
notice, the Judge denied without prejudice the authorization of
the sending of Court-approved notice.  A separate order will
follow detailing the content of further briefing on the issue,
and associated deadlines.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 10, 2018 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/M5EE13 from Leagle.com.

JOSEPH FIUMANO, FOR HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
Plaintiff, represented by DAVID J. COHEN --
dcohen@stephanzouras.com -- STEPHAN ZOURAS LLP, HALEY R JENKINS,
STEPHAN ZOURAS, LLP, JAMES B. ZOURAS, STEPHAN ZOURAS LLP & RYAN
F. STEPHAN, STEPHAN ZOURAS LLP.

METRO DINER MANAGEMENT LLC, METRO SERVICES LLC, CONSUL
HOSPITALITY GROUP LLC, JOHN DAVOLI, SR. & MARK DAVOLI,
Defendants, represented by ANDREA MERYL KIRSHENBAUM --
akirshenbaum@postschell.com -- POST & SCHELL PC, CHRISTOPHER C.
JOHNSON -- cjohnson@johnsonjackson.com -- JOHNSON JACKSON LLC,
KEVIN D. JOHNSON -- kjohnson@johnsonjackson.com -- JOHNSON
JACKSON LLC & DAVID E. RENNER -- drenner@postschell.com -- Post &
Schell, P.C.

MD ORIGINAL LLC, Defendant, represented by KEVIN D. JOHNSON,
JOHNSON JACKSON LLC & ANDREA MERYL KIRSHENBAUM, POST & SCHELL PC.


MILLENNIUM HEALTH: Mauthe Sues over Webinar Ads
-----------------------------------------------
ROBERT W. MAUTHE, M.D., P.C., individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. MILLENNIUM HEALTH
LLC, the Defendant, Case No. 18-1903 (E.D. Pa., May 7, 2018),
seeks to recover statutory damages, injunctive relief,
compensation and attorney fees under the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.

The Plaintiff brings this action against Defendant on behalf of a
class of all persons or entities that Defendant sent one or more
telephone facsimile messages offering registration for a
"webinar".  The Defendant's webinars serve as a pretext for
promoting the commercial availability and quality of Defendant's
products and services; specifically, its prescription drug
monitoring products and services. The Defendant's unsolicited
faxes damaged Plaintiff and the other class members. Unsolicited
faxes tie up the telephone lines, prevent fax machines from
receiving authorized faxes, prevent their use for authorized
outgoing faxes, cause undue wear and tear on the recipients' fax
machines, and require additional labor to attempt to discern the
source and purpose of the unsolicited message. The recipient of a
"junk" fax transmission loses the use of its fax machine, and
many lose their paper and ink toner in printing the fax. Such an
unsolicited fax interrupts the recipient's privacy. A junk fax
wastes the recipient's valuable time that would have been spent
on something else.

Millennium Health provides personalized medicine counsel and
targeted health solutions. More than just a drug test laboratory,
we are a total solution provider.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Richard Shenkan, Esq.
          SHENKAN INJURY LAWYERS, LLC
          P.O. Box 7255
          New Castle, PA 16107
          Telephone: (412) 716 5800
          Facsimile: (888) 769 1774
          E-mail: rshenkan@shenkanlaw.com

               - and -

          Phillip A. Bock, Esq.
          BOCK, HATCH, LEWIS & OPPENHEIM, LLC
          134 N. La Salle St., Ste. 1000
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 658 5500
          Facsimile: (312) 658 5555
          E-mail: phil@classlawyers.com


MVM INTERNATIONAL: Underpays Guantanamo Staff, "Hurst" Suit Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
REGINA ANN HURST, on behalf of herself and other similarly-
situated, the Plaintiff, v. MVM INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, INC.,
a foreign profit corporation, aka MVM, INC., the Defendant, Case
No. 2:18-cv-14168-RLR (S.D. Fla., May 4, 2018), seeks for unpaid
overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff currently resides in Saint Lucie County, Florida.
The Defendant is awarded contracts throughout the United States
as well as the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
to provide its services. The Plaintiff worked for Defendant at
the detention center for the United States Naval Base at
Guantanamo Bay. The Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff the
mandatory wages as required under state and federal law.

The Plaintiff regularly worked over 40 hours in a given work
week. The Plaintiff is a non-exempt employee under the FLSA. The
Plaintiff was not paid time and one half her hourly rate for all
her hours worked over 40 in a work week.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jupiter Gardens, Esq.
          Cathleen Scott, Esq.
          250 South Central Boulevard, Suite 104-A
          SCOTT WAGNER & ASSOCIATES, P.A.
          www.ScottWagnerLaw.com
          Jupiter, FL 33458
          Telephone: (561) 653 0008
          Facsimile: (561) 653 0020
          E-mail: CScott@scottwagnerlaw.com
                  mail@scottwagnerlaw.com


NEW ENGLAND AUTO: Dababneh Files Wage-and-Hour Suit
---------------------------------------------------
SAMIR S. DABABNEH, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. NEW ENGLAND AUTO MAX, INC. d/b/a AUTO
MAX PREOWNED, HOW ARD WILNER and GAIL WILNER, the Defendants,
Case No. 18-1300 (Mass. Super. Ct., May 4, 2018), seeks to
recover overtime pay under the Minimum Fair Wage Act.

The case is a civil action brought by Mr. Dababneh pursuant to
the Wage Act, Mass. Gen. Laws and the Minimum Fair Wage Act for
Defendants' failure to pay Mr. Dababneh one and one-half times
his regular rate of pay -- i.e., one and one-half times the
prevailing minimum wage for employees paid on a one hundred
percent (100%) commission basis -- for (i) all hours worked over
40 during each 7 day workweek and/or (ii) all hours worked on
each Sunday.

New England Auto Max, Inc. operates as an automobile dealer.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward C. Cumbo, Esq.
          Robert Richardson, Esq.
          RICHARDSON & CUMBO, LLP
          225 Franklin Street, 26th Floor
          Boston, MA 02110
          Telephone: (617) 217 2779
          Facsimile: (888) 512 1599
          E-mail: e.cumbo@c-llp.com
                  r.richardson@rc-llp.com


NORNAT MANAGEMENT: "Cortes" Suit Seeks Overtime Wages under FLSA
----------------------------------------------------------------
ALICIA ORTEGA CORTES, on behalf of herself and all other persons
similarly situated, known and unknown, the Plaintiff, v. NORNAT
MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., NORNAT, IV, INC., NORNAT VI, INC., and
OSCAR PERRETTA, individually the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-
03200 (N.D. Ill., May 4, 2018), seeks to recover overtime wages
under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Illinois Minimum Wage
Law.

According to the complaint, during one or more individual work
weeks during the prior three years, Plaintiff and other
similarly-situated hourly employees worked for Defendants in
excess of 40 hours per week but were not paid overtime at a rate
of one and one-half times their regular rates of pay.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Douglas M. Werman, Esq.
          Maureen A. Salas, Esq.
          Sarah J. Arendt, Esq.
          Werman Salas, P.C.
          77 West Washington, Suite 1402
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 419 1008
          E-mail: sarendt@flsalaw.com
                  msalas@flsalaw.com
                  dwerman@flsalaw.com


OPTIMAL ENERGY: "Mantooth" Suit Seeks Overtime Pay under FLSA
-------------------------------------------------------------
NICHOLAS MANTOOTH, on Behalf of Himself and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. OPTIMAL ENERGY
RESOURCES, INC., the Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-00094-CSM
(D.N.D., May 7, 2018), seeks to recover overtime pay under the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant required Plaintiff to
work more than 40 hours in a workweek without overtime
compensation. The Defendant misclassified Plaintiff and other
similarly situated workers throughout the United States as exempt
from overtime under the FLSA.

Optimal Energy is in the business planning and organizing
services business.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John Neuman, Esq.
          SOSA-MORRIS NEUMAN PLLC
          5612 Chaucer Drive
          Houston, TX 77005
          Telephone: (281) 885 8630
          Facsimile: (281) 885 8813
          E-mail: jneuman@smnlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Leo F.J. Wilking, Esq.
          WILKING LAW FIRM, PLLC
          P.O. Box 3085
          Fargo, ND 58108 3085
          Telephone: (701) 356 6812
          Facsimile: (701) 478 7612
          E-mail: lwilking@wilkinglaw.com


PARALLON ENTERPRISES: Buford Seeks Minimum & Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------
LAURA BUFORD, individually and on behalf of all persons similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. PARALLON ENTERPRISES, LLC, a
Tennessee corporation; and DOES 1 through 10 inclusive, the
Defendant, Case No. RG189003741 (Cal. Super. Ct., May 7, 2018),
seeks to recover minimum wage and overtime wages under the
California Labor Code.

The Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to provide all meal
and rest breaks, nor were they paid meal or rest break premiums
in lieu of the failure by Defendants to provide all meal and rest
breaks in strict accordance to California law. For example, the
Plaintiff other similarly situated members, were told on at least
one occasion that they could not leave the premises, thus
precluding proper meal and rest breaks in strict accordance to
California law.

The Defendant did not add up all renumeration due and owing to
Plaintiff and other 2011 class members, and properly divide by
the proper divisor of total hours worked. This precluded proper
calculation of due and owing overtime rates, and thus, precluded
proper payment of overtime. Amongst other known reasons, despite
instructing Plaintiff and similarly situated to remain on the
premises, and despite actual and/or constructive knowledge that
Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees were forced to
remain on the premises, Defendants still deducted meal periods as
though Plaintiff and others were not subject to employer
control.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Zachary Crosner, Esq.
          Michael Crosner, Esq.
          Alfredo Nava, Esq.
          CROSNER LEGAL, P.C.
          411433 N. Camden Drive, Ste. 400
          Beverly Hills, CA 90210
          Telephone: (310) 496 5818
          Facsimile: (310) 510 6429
          E-mail: zach@crosnerlegal.com
                  mike@crosnerlegal.com
                  alfredo@crosnerlegal.com


PIZZA VENTURE: Underpays Delivery Drivers, Pennington Says
----------------------------------------------------------
MARTHA PENNINGTON, individually and on behalf of similarly
situated persons, the Plaintiff, v. PIZZA VENTURE OF TUCSON LLC,
PIZZA VENTURE OF SAN ANTONIO, L.L.C., PIZZA VENTURE OF WEST
TEXAS, L.L.C., and CLARK MANDIGO, the Defendants, Case No. 4:18-
cv-00236-JGZ (D. Ariz., May 5, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid
minimum and overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act and
the Arizona Employment Practices and Working Conditions law.

According to the complaint, the Defendants operate numerous Papa
John's franchise stores. The Defendants employ delivery drivers
who use their own automobiles to deliver pizza and other food
items to their customers. However, instead of reimbursing
delivery drivers for the reasonably approximate costs of the
business use of their vehicles, Defendants use a flawed method to
determine reimbursement rates that provides such an unreasonably
low rate beneath any reasonable approximation of the expenses
they incur that the drivers' unreimbursed expenses cause their
wages to fall below the federal minimum wage during some or all
workweeks.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Matthew Haynie, Esq.
          Jay Forester, Esq.
          FORESTER HAYNIE PLLC
          1701 N. Market St., No. 210
          Dallas, TX 75202
          Telephone: (214) 210 2100
          E-mail: matthew@foresterhaynie.com
                  jay@foresterhaynie.com


RANDALL'S FOOD: "Ramirez" Suit Seeks Overtime Wages under FLSA
--------------------------------------------------------------
FIDENCIO RAMIREZ, the Plaintiff, v. RANDALL'S FOOD MARKETS, INC.
and RANDALL'S FOOD AND DRUGS, LP, the Defendants, Case No. 4:18-
cv-01426 (S.D. Tex., May 4, 2018), seeks to recover overtime
wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff worked for Defendants
for approximately 22 years. His last day of employment with
Defendants was on or around March 27, 2018. From May 1, 2017
until March 27, 2018, the Plaintiff worked as the Deli Manager
for Defendants at their store located at 12312 Barker Cypress
Rd., Houston, Texas 77429. The Defendants were supposed to pay
Plaintiff at the rate of either $17.00 or $17.50 an hour for each
hour up to 40 each week and either $25.50 or $26.25 an hour for
each hour worked over 40 each week.

The Defendants' Store Manager at the Barker Cypress location
imposed a "no overtime" rule on Plaintiff while simultaneously
subjecting him to unattainable performance goals. As a result,
Plaintiff often worked off the clock before his scheduled shift
time, during his "lunch break," and after his scheduled shift
time. The Plaintiff estimates he worked off the clock
approximately four to five hours a week.

The Defendants knew or should have known Plaintiff regularly
worked off the clock without pay. The Plaintiff clocked out for a
lunch break each day because he was required by rule to do so.
Defendants' Store Manager regularly witnessed Plaintiff working
during the timeframe that he was clocked out for his lunch break.
The Plaintiff also told Defendants' Store Manager, on numerous
occasions, that he was working without pay during his lunch break
in order to perform all of the work required in the Deli.

Randalls operates 43 supermarkets in Texas, with 27 stores around
the Houston area and 16 stores around the Austin area, under the
Randalls and Flagship Randalls banners.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Dennis A. Clifford, Esq.
          THE CLIFFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          712 Main Street, Suite 900
          Houston, TX 77002
          Telephone: (713) 999 1833
          Facsimile: (866) 232 0999
          E-mail: dennis@cliffordemploymentlaw.com


RAYMOND JAMES: "Kampert" Suit Transferred to M.D. Florida
---------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled DUSTIN KAMPERT, Individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v.
RAYMOND JAMES FINANCIAL, INC., the Defendant, Case No. 6:17-cv-
01036, was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the
District of Oregon, to the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Florida (Tampa) on May 4, 2018. The District Court
Clerk assigned Case No. 8:18-cv-01090-EAK-AAS to the proceeding.
The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Elizabeth A. Kovachevich.

The Plaintiff brings this action against the Defendant for
violations of the Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act. The
Defendant operates national and international financial-services
business aimed at consumers, and maintains offices within and
outside the United States. Raymond uses consumers such as
Kampert, as financial advisers or registered representatives to
buy and sell Raymond James' securities to other consumers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin M. Baxter, Esq.
          BAXTER & BAXTER LLP
          8835 S.W. Canyon Lane, Suite 130
          Portland, OR 97225
          Telephone (503) 297 9031
          Facsimile (503) 291 9172
          E-mail: justin@baxterlaw.com

               - and -

          Leonard A. Bennett, Esq.
          Elizabeth W. Hanes, Esq.
          Craig C. Marchiando, Esq.
          CONSUMER LITIGATION ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          763 J. Clyde Morris Blvd., Suite 1-A
          Newport News, VA 23601
          Telephone: (757) 930 3660
          Facsimile: (757) 930 3662
          E-mail: lenbennett@clalegal.com
                  Elizabeth@clalegal.com
                  craig@clalegal.com

               - and -

          Scott A. Surovell, Esq.
          SUROVELL ISAACS PETERSEN & LEVY PLC
          4010 University Drive, Suite 200
          Fairfax, VA 22030
          Telephone: (703) 251 5400
          Facsimile: (703) 591 9285
          E-mail: ssurovell@siplfirm.com

               - and -

          Kristi Cahoon Kelly, Esq.
          Andrew J. Guzzo, Esq.
          KELLY & CRANDALL PLC
          4084 University Drive, Suite 202A
          Fairfax, VA 22030
          Telephone: (703) 424 7572
          Facsimile: (703) 591 0167
          E-mail: kkelly@kellyandcrandall.com
                  aguzzo@kellyandcrandall.com

Attorneys for Raymond James Financial Services, Inc.:

          Kennon H. Scott, Esq.
          Timothy W. Snider, Esq.
          STOEL RIVES LLP
          760 S.W. Ninth Ave., Suite 3000
          Portland, OR 97205
          Telephone: (503) 294 9328
          Facsimile: (503) 220 2480
          E-mail: kennon.scott@stoel.com
                  timothy.snider@stoel.com


REGIONS FINANCIAL: Underpays Loan Originators, Ratchford Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
SUE RATCHFORD, the Plaintiff, v. REGIONS FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
REGIONS BANK, a subsidiary of REGION FINANCIAL CORPORATION, the
Defendants, Case No. 4:18-cv-00103-HLM (N.D. Ga., May 4, 2018),
seeks to recover unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated
damages, reasonable expenses of litigation and attorneys' fees,
under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff was formerly employed by the Defendants as a
Mortgage Loan Originator (MLO). Ratchford began her employment
for Defendants on or about June 5, 1995, and worked for them
until her separation on or about November 9, 2015. The Plaintiff
worked in Defendants' Whitfield County, Georgia office. The
Plaintiff is a resident of Whitfield County, Georgia. With one
exception, Ratchford was regularly denied overtime compensation
during the term of her employment.

This action recommences the claims Ratchford originally asserted
in a pending action in the Gainesville Division of this Court,
Civil Action No. 2:17-cv-30100-RWS. On May 22, 2017, Ratchford
filed suit, along with four other plaintiffs, against these
Defendants. In that suit, the Plaintiffs, individually and on
behalf of others similarly situated, asserted a claim for
violation of the FLSA due to Defendants' failure to pay overtime
compensation.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Roy E. Barnes, Esq.
          J. Cameron Tribble, Esq.
          BARNES LAW GROUP, LLC
          31 Atlanta Street
          Marietta, Ga. 30060
          Telephone: (770) 227 6375
          Facsimile: (770) 227 6373
          E-mail: roy@barneslawgroup.com
                  ctribble@barneslawgroup.com

               - and -

          R. Leslie Waycaster, Jr., Esq.
          Timothy H. Allred, Esq.
          R. LESLIE WAYCASTER, JR P.C.
          130 W. King Street
          Dalton, GA 30720
          Telephone: (706) 226 0100
          E-mail: leslie@waycaster-law.com
                  tim@waycaster-law.com


REILY FOODS: Dumont Says Hazelnut Creme Coffee Label Misleading
---------------------------------------------------------------
KATHY DUMONT, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the PLAINTIFF, v. REILY FOODS COMPANY and NEW ENGLAND
COFFEE COMPANY, the DEFENDANTS, Case No. 1:18-cv-10907 (D. Mass.,
May 7, 2018), seeks to recover seeks injunctive and declaratory
relief to ensure that the Defendants properly label their coffees
and to prevent the Defendant from making the same misleading
claims in the future.

This is a class action brought on behalf of Plaintiff and a
nationwide class of consumers who purchased certain New England
Coffee Company coffees. The Plaintiff purchased NECC's Hazelnut
Creme Coffee. The front of the package prominently described the
coffee as Hazelnut Cream and indicated only that it was a medium
blend with a rich nutty flavor leaving the Plaintiff and fellow
consumers to reasonably believe that the coffee contained enough
of its characterizing ingredient (i.e. hazelnut) to provide it
with the promised flavor. In truth, however, the Hazelnut Creme
Coffee contains none of its characterizing ingredient, and
instead is both artificially and naturally flavored.

By law, any food which is expected to contain its characterizing
ingredient, but does not, and instead is flavored, must make that
disclosure to consumers on the front of its packaging. Failure to
do so misleads reasonable consumers into believing they are
purchasing an item with qualities it does not have, and is in
clear violation of the law.

By letter dated July 28, 2017, Ms. Dumont made a formal demand
pursuant to Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 93A, Section 9
requesting that NECC cease this deceptive practice and agree to
appropriately remunerate Ms. Dumont and the class she seeks to
represent. On August 22, 2017, Ms. Dumont's counsel received a
response from Reily claiming that they strictly comply with all
food labeling laws and regulations and that Ms. Dumont has no
claim.

The Defendants' labeling of its Coffees is allegedly misleading
to consumers and injunctive relief is necessary to ensure the
cessation of this practice. Even if Defendants elect to cure the
labeling violations alleged in this complaint, they are not
presently enjoined from re-engaging in the alleged deceptive
conduct.

Reily Foods Company is the primary division of Wm. B. Reily &
Company Inc. and specializes in selling food and beverages.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John Longo, Esq.
          CITADEL CONSUMER LITIGATION, PC
          996 Smith Street, Suite 101
          Providence, RI 02908
          Telephone: (401) 383 7550
          Facsimile: (401) 537 9185
          E-mail: jtlongo@citadelpc.com

               - and -

          Michael D. Braun, Esq.
          BRAUN LAW GROUP, P.C.
          10680 West Pico Boulevard, Suite 280
          Los Angeles, CA 90064
          Telephone: 310-836-6000
          E-mail: mdb@braunlawgroup.com

               - and -

          Andrew S. Kierstead, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF ANDREW KIERSTEAD
          1001 SW 5th Avenue, Suite 1100
          Portland, OR 97204
          Telephone (508) 224 6246
          Facsimile (508) 224 4356
          E-Mail: ajkier@aol.com

               - and -

          Peter N. Wasylyk, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF PETER N. WASYLYK
          1307 Chalkstone Avenue
          Providence, RI 02908
          Telephone (401) 831 7730
          Facsimile (401) 861 6064
          E-mail: pnwlaw@aol.com


RODENBURG LLP: Carroll & Smith Sue over Debt Collection Practices
-----------------------------------------------------------------
MONTY G. CARROLL, JR. and LAWRENCE D. SMITH, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v.
RODENBURG LLP, the Defendant, Case No. 3:18-cv-00093-DLH-ARS
(D.N.D., May 7, 2018), seeks to recover actual damages incurred
as a result of Defendant's violation of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

The case is a class action brought under the FDCPA for the
benefit of Montana, Wyoming, and North Dakota consumers who have
been the subject of debt collection efforts by Rodenburg LLP. On
or about November 7, 2017, the Defendant sent an initial written
communication to Smith in connection with the collection of his
respective Debt On or about November 10, 2017, the Defendant sent
an initial written communication to Carroll in connection with
the collection of his respective Debt. Aside from their
respective dates, addressees, signatories, and associated debts
and file numbers, the November 7 and 10, 2017 written
communications are materially identical.

The November 7 and 10, 2017 communications were the first
communications Plaintiffs received from Defendant in connection
with the Debts. The Plaintiffs did not receive any additional
written communications from Defendant within five days of their
respective November 7 and 10, 2017 communications. The November
7, 2017 communication advised Carroll that Defendant represented
SoFi Lending Corp., and that Carroll owed $47,553.06. Meanwhile,
the November 10, 2017 communication advised Smith that Defendant
represented Discover Bank, and that Smith owed $1,500.08.

The November 7 and 10, 2017 communications then advised
Plaintiffs of their right to dispute the validity of the Debts
within thirty days after receiving the communication, adding that
"[i]f you don't dispute it within that period, we'll assume that
it's valid. If you do dispute it-by notifying our office in
writing to that effect-we will, as required by the law, obtain
and mail to you verification of the debt or, if the debt has been
reduced to judgment, a copy of the judgment."

Next, the November 7 and 10, 2017 communications added, "[I]f,
within the same period, you request in writing the name and
address of the original creditor, if the original creditor is
different from the current creditor, we will furnish you with
that information too."

The Defendant is a law firm based in Fargo, North Dakota.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiffs and the proposed class:

          Jesse S. Johnson, Esq.
          GREENWALD DAVIDSON RADBIL PLLC
          5550 Glades Road, Suite 500
          Boca Raton, FL 33431
          Telephone: (561) 826 5477
          Facsimile: (561) 961 5684
          E-mail: jjohnson@gdrlawfirm.com


ROSAS TAMALES: "Zuniga" Suit Seeks Overtime Wages under FLSA
------------------------------------------------------------
ELVIRA ZUNIGA on behalf of herself and on behalf of all persons
similarly situated known and unknown, the Plaintiff, v. ROSAS
TAMALES, INC. MARIA R. GOMEZ, individually, and ALBERTO SOLANO,
individually, the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-03181 (N.D. Ill.,
May 4, 2018), seeks to recover overtime wages under the Fair
Labor Standards Act and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law.

According to the complaint, the Defendants committed and continue
to commit wage theft by failing to pay overtime wages to their
employees. The Defendants operate two restaurants in Chicago,
Illinois, specializing in tamales. The Plaintiff Elvira Zuniga
was employed by Defendants from 2013 until June 2017 as a cook/
preparer. The Plaintiff Elvira Zuniga worked for Defendants
preparing tamales which included preparing the dough for the
tamales, assembling the tamales, and storing the tamales.

As a cook/preparer, the Plaintiff and similarly situated
employees were paid piece-rates in exchange for work performed
for Defendants. The Plaintiff was paid $1.20 for every pound of
tamales she prepared. The Defendants typically required Plaintiff
to prepare 100 pounds of tamales per shift and her shifts were
typically 10 hours from 6 a.m. to 4 p.m. During the Christmas and
Thanksgiving holidays Defendants required Plaintiff to prepare up
to 160 pounds of tamales in a 14 hour shift. During the three
years prior to the filing of this lawsuit, the Plaintiff and
similarly situated employees routinely worked in excess of 40
hours per week as part of their regular job duties.

Despite working more than 40 hours per week, the Defendants
failed to pay Plaintiff and similarly situated employees overtime
compensation as required by the FLSA and IMWL. The Defendants
have employed and continue to employ other individuals as cooks/
preparers who performed and continue to perform the same or
similar job duties under the same pay provisions as
Plaintiff.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Carlos G. Becerra, Esq.
          BECERRA LAW GROUP, LLC
          11 E. Adams St., Suite 1401
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 957 9005
          Facsimile: (888) 826 5848
          E-mail: cbecerra@law-rb.com


ROSS STORES: Morrison Sues over Deceptive Thread Counts in Linen
----------------------------------------------------------------
DOMINIQUE MORRISON, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. ROSS STORES, INC., AQ
TEXTILES LLC, CREATIVE TEXTILE MILLS PRIVATE LIMITED, the
Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-02671-EDL (N.D. Cal., May 7, 2018),
seeks redress from the Defendants' deceptive acts and
unconscionable business practices designed to deceive and mislead
consumers into believing that the Defendants' bedding and linen
products had higher thread counts than they really have and as
such were of better qualify, softer and more comfortable for
sleeping than products with lesser thread counts.  In purchasing
bedding and linen products, the Plaintiff and the Class received
less than what was promised by the Defendants due to the
improperly inflated thread counts represented on bedding and
linen labels sold by the Defendants.

Members of the bedding and linen products industry including the
Defendants consistently communicate to consumers that higher
thread count sheets are of better quality, softer, and more
comfortable for sleeping. As a result, consumers purchasing
bedding and linen products use thread count as a primary
indicator of the quality of the sheets offered for sale, and pay
higher prices for higher thread count bedsheets and linens.

As part of a scheme to make their bedding and linen products more
attractive, boost sales, and increase profits, the Defendants
departed from well-established and long-standing industry
standards governing the calculation and advertisement of thread
counts and inflated the thread counts on the labels of the
products it marketed, distributed and/or sold.

The inflated thread counts induced the Plaintiff and other
members of the Class to purchase their products when Plaintiff
and other members of the Class would not have purchased them, or
would only have paid a lower price for the product if they had
known the actual thread counts at the time of purchase.

Ross is an American chain of "off-price" department stores
headquartered in Dublin, California, officially operating under
the brandname, Ross Dress for Less. It is the largest off-priced
retailer in the U.S.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          S. Clinton Woods, Esq.
          Michael McShane, Esq.
          AUDET & PARTNERS, LLP
          711 Van Ness Avenue, Suite 500
          San Francisco, CA 94102
          Telephone: (415) 568 2555
          Facsimile: (415) 568 2556
          E-mail: cwoods@audetlaw.com
                  mmcshane@audetlaw.com

               - and -

          Jack Landskroner, Esq.
          LANDSKRONER GRIECO MERRIMAN, LLC
          1360 W 9th St No. 200
          Cleveland, OH 44113
          Telephone: (888) 570 3609
          E-mail: Jack@lgmlegal.com

               - and -

          Bruce W. Steckler, Esq.
          Stuart L. Cochran, Esq.
          L. Kirstine Rogers, Esq.
          STECKLER GRESHAM COCHRAN PLLC
          12720 Hillcrest Road, Suite 1045
          Dallas, TX 75230
          Telephone: (972) 387 4040
          E-mail: bruce@stecklerlaw.com
                  stuart@stecklerlaw.com
                  krogers@stecklerlaw.com

               - and -

          Erica Mirabella, Esq.
          MIRABELLA LAW LLC
          132 Boylston St. 5th Floor
          Boston, MA 02116
          Telephone: (855) 505 5342
          E-mail: erica@mirabellallc.com

               - and -

          Charles LaDuca, Esq.
          Brendan S. Thompson, Esq.
          Jennifer E. Kelly, Esq.
          CUNEO GILBERT & LADUCA LLP
          4725 Wisconsin Avenue, NW, Suite 200
          Washington, DC 20016
          Telephone: (202) 789 3960
          Facsimile: (202) 789 1813
          E-mail: charles@cuneolaw.com
                  jkelly@cuneolaw.com
                  brendant@cuneolaw.com

               - and -

          Charles Schaffer, Esq.
          LEVIN SEDRAN & BERMAN
          510 Walnut Street, Suite 500
          Philadelphia, PA 19106
          Telephone: (877) 882 1011
          Facsimile: (215) 592 4663
          E-mail: cschaffer@lfsblaw.com


ROYAL CARIBBEAN: Wins Dismissal of Amended "McIntosh" Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, NIKKI McIntosh, on her own behalf and on behalf of
all other similarly situated passengers scheduled to have been
aboard the M/V Liberty of the Seas, Plaintiffs, v. ROYAL
CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD., Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-23575-KING-
TORRES (S.D. Fla.), Judge James Lawrence King of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Miami
division, granted the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's
Amended Complaint.

The Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial
alleges injuries suffered as a result of allegedly being put in
harm's way while Texas was in a state of emergency due to
Hurricane Harvey.  Specifically, the Plaintiff alleges claims for
negligence (Count I) and negligent infliction of emotional
distress (count II).  The Plaintiff seeks to maintain the lawsuit
as a class action on behalf all other similarly situated
passengers scheduled to have been aboard the MAT Liberty of the
Seas.

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff cannot maintain the
lawsuit as a class action due to the parties' class action waiver
provision.

The Plaintiff responds that the class action waiver is void as
against public policy pursuant to 46 U.S.C. Section 30509.  The
Plaintiff also argues more generally that the class action waiver
provision is unenforceable as unconscionable.

The Plaintiff concedes that general maritime law applies to
cases, such as this one, alleging torts committed on navigable
waters.  Under general maritime law, a term or condition of a
cruise ticket contract is enforceable once it is reasonably
communicated to the passenger.

Judge King held that it is well-established that parties can
agree to class action waivers.  Given the uncontroverted
evidence, the class action waiver was reasonably communicated to
the Plaintiff and is, therefore, enforceable.

According to Judge King, the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is
granted.  Should she elect to do so, the Judge ordered that the
Plaintiff may file a First Amended Complaint within 20 days of
the date of the Order.  The First Amended Complaint will set
forth claims only in the Plaintiff's individual capacity and will
not contain class action allegations.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 10, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/eZPHuO from Leagle.com.

Nikki McIntosh, on her own behalf and on behalf of all other
similarly situated passengers scheduled to have been aboard the
M/V Liberty of the Seas, Plaintiff, represented by Marc E. Weiner
-- mweiner@lipcon.com -- Lipcon, Margulies, Alsina, Winkleman,
P.A. & Michael A. Winkleman -- mwinkleman@lipcon.com -- Lipcon
Margulies Alsina & Winkleman.

Royal Caribbean Cruises LTD., on her own behalf and on behalf of
all other similarly situated passengers scheduled to have been
aboard the M/V Liberty of the Seas, Defendant, represented by
Scott Daniel Ponce -- Scott.Ponce@hklaw.com -- Holland & Knight.


SALVATION ARMY: McElhanon Seeks Minimum & OT Wages under FLSA
-------------------------------------------------------------
MARY MCELHANON, individually, and on behalf of others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. SALVATION ARMY, the Defendant, Case
No. 4:18-cv-01457 (S.D. Tex., May 7, 2018), seeks to recover
unpaid minimum and overtime wages, in addition to liquidated
damages, fees and costs, and any other remedies under the Fair
Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff and similarly situated hourly-paid, on-site
Directors employed by Defendant were victims of Defendant's
common unlawful policies in violation of the FLSA, including:

     a. prohibiting On-Site Directors from reporting work hours
        in excess of 40 in a workweek, thus forcing them to work
        off the clock and depriving them of overtime compensation
        for time spent performing duties such as routine office
        work and responding to tenants' building maintenance
        issues; and

     b. calculating On-Site Directors' overtime rates of pay
        without factoring in the value of the housing they
        receive from Defendant as part of their compensation.

As a result, there were many weeks in which Plaintiff and other
putative Collective members did not receive compensation
calculated at time-and-a-half (1.5) of their regular rate of pay
for all hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek, in violation
of the FLSA.

The Defendant is an international charitable organization
structured in a quasi-military fashion, which provides charity
shops, operating shelters for the homeless and disaster relief
and humanitarian aid to developing countries.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          650 S. Shackleford, Suite 411
          Little Rock, AR 72211
          Telephone: (501) 221 0088
          Facsimile: (888) 787 2040
          E-mail: josh@sanfordlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Jason T. Brown, Esq.
          Nicholas Conlonv, Esq.
          JTB LAW GROUP, LLC
          155 2nd St., Suite 4
          Jersey City, NJ 07302
          Telephone: (877) 561 0000
          Facsimile: (855) 582 5297
          E-mail: jtb@jtblawgroup.com
                  nicholasconlon@jtblawgroup.com


SEAWORLD ENTERTAINMENT: Government May Intervene in "Baker" Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LOU BAKER, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SEAWORLD
ENTERTAINMENT, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 14cv2129-MMA
(AGS) (S.D. Cal.), Judge Michael M. Anello of the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of California granted the
government's motion to intervene and to extend the partial stay
of discovery.

The Plaintiffs commenced the class action against the Defendants
in September 2014, alleging violations of federal securities
laws.  On Aug. 25, 2017, the United States filed an unopposed
motion to intervene for the limited purpose of partially staying
discovery through Nov. 30, 2017, which the Court granted.

On Nov. 30, 2017, the United States filed a second unopposed
motion to intervene for the limited purpose of extending the
partial stay of discovery in the case through April 2, 2018,
which the Court granted.  The United States has filed a third
unopposed motion to intervene for the limited purpose of
extending the partial stay of discovery.

On June 23, 2017, Defendant SeaWorld submitted a Form 8-K to the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission which disclosed an
investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice concerning
disclosures and public statements made by SeaWorld and certain
executives and/or individuals on or before August 2014, including
those regarding the impact of the 'Blackfish' documentary, and
trading in the Company's securities.

Discovery is currently ongoing in the action, with a fact
discovery cutoff date of Sept. 28, 2018.  The United States filed
the instant motion in order to intervene and extend the partial
stay of discovery for another two-month period.  Specifically,
the government requests the Court stay the depositions of seven
individuals in this case through June 1, 2018.

On April 3, 2018, the Court issued an Order requesting that the
United States submit a supporting declaration of counsel in
connection with the government's motion to intervene and to
extend the partial stay of discovery.  On April 6, 2018, the
United States filed an ex parte motion to file the declaration of
Mark J. Cipolletti under seal, which the Court granted.

Judge Anello finds that permissive intervention is appropriate
for the same reasons articulated in the Court's previous two
orders.  First, the United States' motion is timely because
discovery is ongoing.  Second, the United States does not assert
a new claim based on state law; thus, the Court has independent
grounds for jurisdiction.  Third, the civil action and the
criminal investigation clearly involve common questions of law
and fact, as the Department of Justice is investigating the same
disclosures and public statements made by SeaWorld and its
executives which form the basis of the civil complaint.  Fourth,
the parties' rights will not be unduly delayed or prejudiced if
the Court permits the United States to intervene for the limited
purpose of extending the stay of depositions.  The requested
partial stay is not indefinite.

Thus, in considering all of the relevant factors, the Judge
concludes, in its discretion, that the United States may
intervene to extend the partial stay of discovery.  Accordingly,
he will grant the government's motion to intervene for the
limited purpose of extending the partial stay of discovery in the
civil action.

As to the United States motion to extend the partial stay of
civil discovery in the action in light of the ongoing criminal
investigation, the Judge holds that Keating v. Office of Thrift
Supervision factors weigh in favor of extending the temporary and
partial stay of discovery.  First, the parties do not oppose
extending the partial stay.  Further, the nature of the criminal
investigation and the subject matter of the civil action are
substantially similar.  Finally, the government has a strong
interest in protecting and maintaining the integrity of its
criminal investigation, and a stay would prevent premature
disclosure of criminal discovery materials.

In considering the relevant factors, the Judge finds that
extending the partial stay of discovery is appropriate at this
time.  Accordingly, he granted the United States' motion to
extend the partial stay of discovery through June 1, 2018.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Anello granted the government's
motion to intervene and to extend the partial stay of discovery.
As such, the depositions of James Atchison, Daniel B. Brown,
James Heaney, Frederick Douglas Jacobs, William Joshua Powers,
Kelly Repass, and Marc G. Swanson may not be noticed nor taken,
nor any subpoenas for such purpose be served, through June 1,
2018.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 10, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/ItNBTi from Leagle.com.

Lou Baker, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Ethan Thomas Boyer --
eboyer@noonanlance.com -- Noonan Lance Boyer & Banach LLP,
Gregory M. Castaldo -- gcastaldo@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz
Meltzer & Check LLP, pro hac vice, Joshua E. D'Ancona --
jdancona@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check LLP, pro hac
vice, Joshua A. Materese -- jmaterese@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz
Meltzer & Check LLP, pro hac vice, Laurence M. Rosen --
lrosen@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm, P.A., Megan Koneski,
Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check LLP, pro hac vice & Michael K.
Yarnoff -- myarnoff@kehoelawfirm.com -- Kessler Topaz Meltzer &
Check LLP, pro hac vice.

Pensionskassen for Borne-Og UngdomspAedagoger, Plaintiff,
represented by Bradley E. Beckworth -- bbeckworth@nixlaw.co --
Nix Patterson & Roach LLP, pro hac vice, David J. Noonan --
dnoonan@noonanlance.com -- Noonan Lance Boyer & Banach LLP, Eli
R. Greenstein -- egreenstein@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz Meltzer &
Check, LLP, Ethan Thomas Boyer -- eboyer@noonanlance.com --
Noonan Lance Boyer & Banach LLP, Gregory M. Castaldo, Kessler
Topaz Meltzer & Check LLP, pro hac vice, Joshua E. D'Ancona,
Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check LLP, pro hac vice, Joshua A.
Materese, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check LLP, pro hac vice, Megan
Koneski, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check LLP, pro hac vice &
Michael K. Yarnoff, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check LLP, pro hac
vice.

Arkansas Public Employees Retirement System, Plaintiff,
represented by Bradley E. Beckworth, Nix Patterson & Roach LLP,
pro hac vice, Cody L. Hill -- codyhill@nixlaw.com -- Nix
Patterson & Roach LLP, pro hac vice, David J. Noonan, Noonan
Lance Boyer & Banach LLP, Eli R. Greenstein, Kessler Topaz
Meltzer & Check, LLP, Ethan Thomas Boyer, Noonan Lance Boyer &
Banach LLP, Gregory M. Castaldo, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check
LLP, pro hac vice, Jeffrey J. Angelovich --
jangelovich@nixlaw.com -- Nix Patterson & Roach LLP, pro hac
vice, Joshua E. D'Ancona, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check LLP, pro
hac vice, Joshua A. Materese, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check LLP,
pro hac vice, Lloyd Nolan Duck, III , Nix, Patterson & Roach,
LLP, pro hac vice, Megan Koneski, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check
LLP, pro hac vice, Michael K. Yarnoff, Kessler Topaz Meltzer &
Check LLP, pro hac vice & Susan Whatley -- swhatley@nixlaw.com --
Nix Patterson & Roach, LLP, pro hac vice.

United States of America, Intervenor Plaintiff, represented by
Mark John Cipolletti, United States Department of Justice &
Michael John Rinaldi, U.S. Department of Justice.

Seaworld Entertainment, Inc., James M Heaney, Marc Swanson & The
Blackstone Group L.P., Defendants, represented by Chet A.
Kronenberg -- ckronenberg@stblaw.com -- Simpson Thacher and
Bartlett LLP, Dean Michael McGee -- dean.mcgee@stblaw.com --
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, pro hac vice, Janet Gochman --
jgochman@stblaw.com -- Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, pro hac
vice, Jonathan K. Youngwood -- jyoungwood@stblaw.com -- Simpson
Thacher & Bartlett LLP, pro hac vice & Meredith Karp --
meredith.karp@stblaw.com -- Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, pro
hac vice.

James Atchison, Defendant, represented by Michael Joseph Diver --
michael.diver@kattenlaw.com -- Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP, pro
hac vice, Michael J. Lohnes -- michael.lohnes@kattenlaw.com --
Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP, pro hac vice, Richard H. Zelichov --
richard.zelichov@kattenlaw.com -- Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP, Gil
M. Soffer -- gil.soffer@kattenlaw.com -- Katten Muchin Rosenman
LLP & Jason Yuegin Kelly -- jason.kelly@kattenlaw.com -- Katten
Muchin Rosenman LLP.

The Blackstone Group, L.P., Defendant, represented by Dean
Michael McGee, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, pro hac vice.

The Oklahoma City Employee Retirement System & Pembroke Pines
Firefighters and Police Officers Pension Fund, ThirdParty
Plaintiffs, represented by Jeffrey Almeida -- jalmeida@gelaw.com
-- Grant & Eisenhofer P.A., pro hac vice & Timothy G. Blood --
tblood@bholaw.com -- Blood Hurst & O'Reardon, LLP.


SHELBY HEALTHCARE: "Williams" Suit Moved to E.D. Arkansas
---------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Karley Williams, Individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v.
Shelby County Healthcare Corporation, doing business as: Regional
Medical Center and doing business as: Regional One Health, and
Avectus Healthcare Solutions LLC, Case No. CV-18-00084, was
removed from the Phillips County Circuit Court, to the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas (Helena) on
May 7, 2018. The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:18-cv-
00070-JM to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the Hon.
Judge James M. Moody Jr.

Shelby County Health Care Corporation provides a variety of
health care services to the residents of Memphis, Tennessee, and
surrounding regions.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brandon W. Lacy, Esq.
          LACY LAW FIRM
          630 S. Main Street
          Jonesboro, AR 72401
          Telephone: (870) 277 1144
          E-mail: brandon@lacylawfirm.com

               - and -

          Donald E. Knapp , Jr., Esq.
          KNAPP LEWIS
          Post Office Box 630
          Helena, AR 72342
          Telephone: (870) 338 3100
          Facsimile: (870) 338 3101
          E-mail: Donald@theknappfirm.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey Owen Scriber, Esq.
          324 South Main
          Jonesboro, AR 72401
          Telephone: (870) 336 0155
          Facsimile: (870) 934 8887
          E-mail: scriberfirm@gmail.com

Attorneys for Shelby County Healthcare Corporation:

          John I. Houseal, Jr., Esq.
          GLANKLER BROWN, PLLC
          6000 Poplar Avenue, Suite 400
          Memphis, TN 38119-3955
          Telephone: (901) 525 1322
          Facsimile: (901) 761 1332
          E-mail: jhouseal@glankler.com

               - and -

          John Irving Houseal, III, Esq.
          EASLEY & HOUSEAL, PLLC
          Post Office Box 1115
          Forrest City, AR 72336-1115
          Telephone: (870) 633 1447
          Facsimile: (870) 633 1687
          E-mail: john@ehtriallawyers.com

Attorneys for Avectus Healthcare Solutions LLC:

          Jeffrey W. Puryear, Esq.
          Mark Alan Mayfield, Esq.
          Ryan M. Wilson, Esq.
          WOMACK PHELPS PURYEAR MAYFIELD & MCNEIL, P.A.
          Post Office Box 3077
          Jonesboro, AR 72403-3077
          Telephone: (870) 932 0900
          Facsimile: (870) 932 2553
          E-mail: jpuryear@wpmfirm.com
                  mmayfield@wpmfirm.com
                  rwilson@wpmfirm.com


SIGNAL FINANCE: "Rodero" Suit Seeks OT Compensation under FLSA
--------------------------------------------------------------
ESTRELLA RODERO, and JOSHUA E. RODERO and other similarly-
situated individuals, the Plaintiff(s), v. SIGNAL FINANCE COMPANY
LLC, MIAMI FUNERAL SERVICES & CREMATORIES, INC. a/k/a "NATIONAL
FUNERAL HOMES," a/k/a "AUXILIADORA FUNERARIA NACIONAL,"
FIRST CUBAN FINANCIAL INC, HILBERT I. MOHABIR a/k/a "RAFAIY
ALKHALIFA," a/k/a "RAFAEL MOHABIR," a/k/a "SHEIK RAFAYI
AL-KHALIFA," DAYANA SOSA and ROBERTO J. CANO, individually, the
Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-21807-CMA (S.D. Fla., May 6, 2018),
seeks to recover overtime compensation, liquidated damages, and
the costs and reasonably attorney's fees under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

According to the complaint, while employed by Defendants, the
Plaintiff worked more than 40 hours every week period without
receiving proper compensation for overtime hours. During the
relevant period of employment, the Plaintiff had a very irregular
schedule, but she worked 6 days per week, most of the time. From
2015 to 2017, the Plaintiff worked different schedules and she
was paid at different rates. The Defendant failed to pay
Plaintiff at the rate of time and a half her regular rate for
every hour in excess of 40, in violation of Section 7 (a) of the
FLSA of 1938.[BN]

Attorney for Plaintiffs:

          Zandro E. Palma, Esq.
          ZANDRO E. PALMA, P.A.
          9100 S. Dadeland Blvd., Suite 1500
          Miami, FL 33156
          Telephone: (305) 446 1500
          Facsimile: (305) 446 1502
          E-mail: zep@thepalmalawgroup.com


SPIRIT CLOTHING: Fails to Pay Minimum Wage & OT, Spearman Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
LORETTA SPEARMAN, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, and as representatives of other aggrieved
employees, the Plaintiff, v. SPIRIT CLOTHING COMPANY, a
California Corporation; SPIRIT ACTIVEWEAR, an unknown entity; and
DOES 1 through 250, inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. BC705059
(Cal. Super. Ct., May 7, 2018), seeks to recover minimum wage and
unpaid overtime pay under the California Labor Code.

Spirit is a clothing company that takes designs from companies,
like Disney and Fanatics, and produces clothing for those
companies to meet certain specifications. The Defendants have a
pattern and practice of willfully misclassifying employees as
independent contractors and underreporting overtime and other
wages on paystubs, if any paystubs are provided at all. In fact,
after Plaintiffs termination Defendants admitted she was
misclassified.

The Plaintiff was required to work at Defendants' location, use
Defendant's computer, desk, phones and email, work the hours
dictated by Defendant and on the projects determined by
Defendants. She was also required to clock in at the start of the
day, out at the end of the day and record meal periods. Despite
the complete control over Plaintiff, she was misclassified as an
independent contractor, in violation of California Labor Code.
Her wages were paid through a "vendor" check that only included 8
hours per day (despite working longer) without withholding and
without providing an itemized wage statement containing the
required items including, but not limited to, hours worked, gross
and net pay, and hourly rate etc. The same was true of other
Class members.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gary R. Carlin, Esq.
          Brent S. Buchsbaum, Esq.
          Laurel N. Haag, Esq.
          Ian M. Silvers, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF CARLIN & BUCHSBAUM LLP
          555 East Ocean Boulevard, Suite 818
          Long Beach, CA 90802
          Telephone: (562) 432 8933
          Facsimile: (562) 435 1656
          E-mail: gary@carlinbuchsbaum.com
                  brent@carlinbuchsbaum.com
                  laurel@carlinbuchsbaum.com
                  ian@carlinbuchsbaum.com


ST. JOSEPH, IN: Court Trims Claims "Taghon" Suit
------------------------------------------------
In the case, STEPHEN EDWARD TAGHON, JR. et al., Plaintiffs, v.
DEPUTY BLAIR, et al., Defendants, Cause No. 3:17-CV-559 JD (N.D.
Ind.), Judge Jon E. DeGuilio of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division, granted the
Plaintiff leave to proceed against Kylie Blair, Deputy Kiljoe,
Deputy VanVynkt, and Deputy Rayl in their individual capacities
for compensatory and punitive damages for retaliating against him
by issuing false conduct reports for his complaining about the
conditions of the jail in June and July of 2017, in violation of
the First Amendment.  The Judge dismissed (i) all other claims;
and St. Joseph County Jail Prisoners, Belinda Schroeder, St.
Joseph County Jail, Julie Lawson, Michael Grzegorek, Sgt. Fisher,
Deputy Brothers, and Dean Heath from the case.

The Plaintiff, a pro se prisoner, was originally granted leave to
proceed against Deputy Blair and an unnamed Classification
Supervisor at the St. Joseph County Jail for retaliating against
him by issuing false conduct reports for his complaining about
the conditions of the jail.  Taghon then requested leave to amend
his complaint to correctly identify a misidentified Defendant,
and add and revise additional supporting facts and claims to his
original complaint.

In his amended complaint, Taghon added to his claim that he was
issued a false conduct report in retaliation for his complaining
about safety and security issues at the jail.  However, he did
not stop there.  His amended complaint includes many other
parties and claims, which the Court must address.

To start, Taghon named as a co-plaintiff "St. Joseph County Jail
Prisoners" and asks to have the case certified as a class action.
Judge DeGuilio declined.  He explains that under Fed.R.Civ.P.
Rule 23(a)(4), a class representative must fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.  A litigant may bring his own
claims to federal court without counsel, but not the claims of
others.  This is so because the competence of a layman is clearly
too limited to allow him to risk the rights of others.

Next, in addition to amending the retaliation claim he is
proceeding on, Taghon included a number of unrelated claims in
his amended complaint, including suing unnamed Defendants for
housing him in the J6-Unit in the summer of 2016; suing Warden
Julie Lawson, Sheriff Michael Grzegorek and the St. Joseph County
Jail for not reporting various crimes within the jail to the
local prosecutor; and complaining that the housing units at the
jail are racially imbalanced.

The Judge finds that these claims are not dependant upon, or
related to, the other as they involve different Defendants,
different incidents that took place on separate dates, and
involve different sets of operative facts.  Thus, all of these
claims do not belong in the same lawsuit.  He will select the
claim that Taghon is proceeding on -- retaliation based on his
reporting safety conditions at the jail in June and July of 2017
-- and will dismiss the remaining unrelated claims.  He says
Taghon may raise those unrelated claims in different lawsuits,
but not in this one.

Now that the claim has been selected, the Judge must screen it
under 28 U.S.C. Section 1915A.  He must review a prisoner
complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious,
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief.

He finds that Taghon's complaint to prison officials about
conditions at the jail, if true, constitutes protected speech.
Based on the allegations contained in the complaint, the
Defendants collectively made the decision to falsely charge him
with disciplinary infractions based on his protected speech.
Though further fact finding may reveal that these four deputies
decided to charge him with these disciplinary offenses for some
permissible reason, Taghon has adequately plead his retaliation
claim.

The Judge directed the clerk and the United States Marshals
Service to issue and serve process on Deputy Kiljoe, Deputy
VanVynkt, and Deputy Rayl with a copy of the Order and the
amended complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(d) at the
St. Joseph County Sheriff's Department.

The Judge ordered, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1997e(g)(2),
Kylie Blair, Deputy Kiljoe, Deputy VanVynkt, and Deputy Rayl to
respond, as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only to the claim for which the
Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in the screening
order.  He lifted the stay in the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 10, 2018 Opinion and Order
is available at https://is.gd/jKjPMt from Leagle.com.

Stephen Edward Taghon, Jr, Plaintiff, pro se.

Kylie Blair, Jail Deputy, St Joseph County Jail, Defendant,
represented by Peter J. Agostino -- agostino@aaklaw.com --
Anderson Agostino & Keller PC & Stephanie L. Nemeth --
nemeth@aaklaw.com -- Anderson Agostino & Keller PC.


SUPERIOR NUT: Roberts Sues over Use of Biometric Identifiers
------------------------------------------------------------
LAQUANDRIA ROBERTS, individually and on behalf of similarly
situated individuals, the Plaintiff, v. SUPERIOR NUT AND CANDY
CO., INC., an Illinois corporation, the Defendants, Case No.
2018CH05903 (Ill, Cir. Ct., Cook County, May 7, 2018), seeks to
stop the Defendant's capture, collection, use, and storage of
individuals' biometric identifiers and/or biometric information
in violation of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act,
and to obtain redress for all persons injured by their conduct.

This case is about a provider of nuts and candy capturing,
collecting, storing, and using Plaintiffs and other workers'
biometric identifiers and/or biometric information without regard
to BIPA and the concrete privacy rights and pecuniary interests
Illinois' BIPA protects Defendant does this in the form of finger
scans which capture a person's fingerprint and uses that to
identify that same person in the future.

The Defendant's practice of collecting fingerprints from its
workers, regardless of their employment history, is unlawful and
a serious invasion of its workers' right to privacy concerning
their biometric information.  The Defendant failed to provide the
required disclosures to inform its workers that it was collecting
their biometric identifiers and failed to inform them of how long
it intended to keep this highly sensitive information. To the
extent the Defendant is still retaining Plaintiffs and other
similarly situated individuals' biometric information, such
retention is an unlawful and continuing infringement of Plaintiff
and the putative Classes' right to privacy regarding their
biometric identifiers and biometric information. Unlike a Social
Security number, which can be changed, no amount of time or money
can compensate Plaintiff, and other similarly situated
individuals, if their fingerprints are compromised by the lax
procedures through which Defendant capture, collect, store and
use its workers' biometrics, and Plaintiff would not have
provided her fingerprint to Defendant had she known that
Defendant would retain such information for an indefinite period
without her consent.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Myles McGuire, Esq.
          William P. Kingston, Esq.
          MCGUIRE LAW, P.C.
          55 W. Wacker Drive, 9th Fl.
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 893 7002
          Facsimile: (312) 275 7895
          E-mail: mmcguire@mcgpc.com
                  wkingston@mcgpc.com


SWIFT TRANSPORTATION: Initial Approval of "Slack" Accord Vacated
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TROY SLACK, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SWIFT
TRANSPORTATION CO. OF ARIZONA, LLC, Defendant, Case No. C11-5843
BHS (W.D. Wash.), Judge Benjamin H. Settle of the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Washington, Tacoma, vacated the
Court's order granting the Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary
approval of class action settlement, and denied the parties'
motions to enforce as moot.

On Oct. 10, 2017, the Court granted the Plaintiffs' motion for
preliminary approval of class action settlement.  On Dec. 7,
2017, the Court entered an order establishing a briefing schedule
to address an issue regarding the scope of the class settlement.
On Dec. 21, the parties filed opening briefs.  On Jan. 8, 2018,
the parties filed responses.  On March 20, it held a hearing on
the motions.

The Court certified the class as all current and former Swift
employee designated drivers who were assigned by Swift to a
Washington position and/or terminal after July 18, 2008 who were
paid by the mile and worked in excess of forty hours in a week.
The Court subsequently substituted the word "dedicated" for
"designated."

The Court approved class notice that provided that for purposes
of the class action, dedicated driver means any current or former
employee driver who, at any time after July 18, 2008, was
assigned by Swift to a terminal and/or customer facility
physically located in the state of Washington and, during that
assignment, drove routes for a single specified customer account.
The Court also ordered Swift to produce information to identify
the potential class members.

Based on this information, Swift produced an initial class list
of 2,764 potential class members.  Swift's attorney conceded that
the list potentially included up to 1,200 drivers who may have
exclusively been over-the-road drivers.  Swift's expert, Angela
Sabbe, determined that 1,482 drivers were paid during the class
period in at least one of the mileage-paid, dedicated driver
position codes.

Relevant to the instant issue, it is undisputed that within the
drivers that Ms. Sabbe excluded could be drivers with overtime
claims based on occasional or sporadic assignments.  This
possibility exists because the class was set up to exclude
drivers that were exclusively over-the-road.  If an over-the-road
driver worked an occasional shift on a dedicated account and
worked over 40 hours, then that driver may have a claim for
unpaid overtime.  It is unclear how many of these potential
claims exist.

Second, the Plaintiffs' attorneys negotiated the settlement on
behalf of the 1,482 drivers in Ms. Sabbe's final list.  The
attorney conceded at the hearing that she did not negotiate on
behalf of any occasional or sporadic driver that Ms. Sabbe
excluded.  It is possible that some class members were not given
due regard by the negotiating parties.  The list of potential
claimants was narrowed through specific pay codes used by Swift.
In doing so, the parties may have excluded drivers with claims
that worked only occasionally or sporadically.  This error, the
Judge held, not only affects the rights of these drivers, but may
also reduce the amount of other overtime class members' claims.
Thus, the proposed settlement contains an obvious deficiency that
is fatal to preliminary approval.  Accordingly, Judge Settle
vacated its order granting the Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary
approval, and denied the parties' motions as moot.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 10, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/svmQj1 from Leagle.com.

Troy Slack, Jacob Grismer, Richard Erickson, Scott Praye,
individually, and as putative class representatives, Gary H
Roberts, individually, and as Putative Class Representatives,
Robert P Ulrich, individually, and as Putative Class
Representatives, Henry M Ledesma, individually, and as Putative
Class Representatives, Timothy Helmick, individually, and as
Putative Class Representatives, Dennis Stuber, individually, and
as Putative Class Representatives, Eric Dublinski, individually,
and as Putative Class Representatives & Sean P Forney,
individually, and as Putative Class Representatives, Plaintiffs,
represented by Deborah M. Nelson, NELSON BOYD PLLC, J. Farrest
Taylor, THE COCHRAN FIRM, PC, pro hac vice, Jeffrey D. Boyd,
NELSON BOYD PLLC, Jeniphr A.E. Breckenridge --
jeniphr@hbsslaw.com -- HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP, Joseph D.
Lane, THE COCHRAN FIRM, PC, pro hac vice, Robert J. Camp --
rcamp@wigginschilds.com -- WIGGINS, CHILDS, QUINN & PANTAZIS,
LLC, pro hac vice, Robert F. Lopez -- robl@hbsslaw.com -- HAGENS
BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP, Steve W. Berman -- steve@hbsslaw.com --
HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP & Thomas E. Loeser --
toml@hbsslaw.com -- HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP.

Swift Transportation Co. of Arizona, LLC, doing business as,
Defendant, represented by David W. Wiley --
dwiley@williamskastner.com -- WILLIAMS KASTNER, Jeffery M. Wells
-- jwells@williamskastner.com -- WILLIAMS KASTNER, Sean E.M.
Moore -- smoore@williamskastner.com -- WILLIAMS KASTNER & Sheryl
D.J. Willert -- swillert@williamskastner.com -- WILLIAMS KASTNER.


TARGET CORPORATION: "De La Cruz" Suit Moved to S.D. California
--------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Armando De La Cruz, Individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff,
v. Target Corporation and DOES 1 - 100, Inclusive, Case No.
37-02018-00011389-CU-OE-CTL, was removed from the Superior Court
of California, County of San Diego, to District Court for the
Southern District of California (San Diego) on May 4, 2018. The
District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:18-cv-00867-DMS-WVG to
the proceeding. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Dana M.
Sabraw.

Target is the second-largest discount store retailer in the
United States, behind Walmart, and a component of the S&P 500
Index.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Cody Robert Kennedy, Esq.
          MARLIN & SALTZMAN
          29800 Agoura Rd, Suite 210
          Agoura Hills, CA 91301
          Telephone: (818) 991 8080
          Facsimile: (818) 991 8081
          E-mail: ckennedy@marlinsaltzman.com

Attorneys for Target Corporation:

          Matthew B. Riley, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C
          501 West Broadway, Suite 900
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 232 0441
          Facsimile: (619) 924 2744
          E-mail: mriley@littler.com


TESLA MOTORS: Faces Class Action From Workers in California
-----------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for the Courthouse News Service, reports
that  Tesla Motors stiffs workers for overtime and violates other
labor laws, a class action claims in Alameda County Court.

Attorneys for Plaintiff Dorley Nezbeth-Altimore:
Jocelyn Burton, Esq.
Scott Nakama, Esq.
BURTON EMPLOYMENT LAW
1939 Harrison Street, Suite 400
Oakland, CA 94612
Tel: (510) 350-7025
Fax: (510) 473-3672
Email: jburton@burtonemploymentlaw.com
       snakama@burtonemploymentlaw.com


THERANOS INC: Court Narrows Claims in Suit Over Edison Devices
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, In re Arizona THERANOS, INC., Litigation, Case No.
2:16-cv-2138-HRH, Consolidated with No. 2:16-cv-2373-HRH, No.
2:16-cv-2660-HRH., 2:16-cv-2775-HRH, 2:16-cv-3599-HRH (D. Ariz.),
Judge H. Russel Holland of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Arizona granted in part and denied in part the
Defendants' request to dismiss the Plaintiffs' second amended
consolidated class action complaint ("SAC").

Plaintiffs are A.R., B.B., B.P., D.L., L.M., M.P., R.C., R.G.,
S.J., and S.L.  Plaintiff A.R. is alleged to be a resident of
California.  The other Plaintiffs are alleged to be residents of
Arizona.  The Defendants are Theranos; Elizabeth Holmes; Ramesh
Balwani; Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc.; and Walgreen Arizona
Drug Co.  In 2003, Theranos was founded by Holmes.  Balwani was
the President and CEO of Theranos until he resigned in 2016.

Theranos initially focused on development of a hand-held device
that would use a tiny needle to obtain a small drop of blood for
analysis.  By 2008, the project had grown into attempting to
develop what is now known as the 'Edison' device.  The Edison
device was supposedly able to take a few drops of blood from a
patient's finger placed into a 'nanotainer' capsule, and reliably
conduct hundreds of blood tests, all outside a lab.  However, the
project did not apparently get that far because the blood drawn
from clients such as the Plaintiffs was actually tested at
laboratories.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Theranos Defendants knew that the
Edison technology was still in development and not ready-for-
market, and that none of the testing services were reliable or
certified, but that in 2012, Theranos entered into a partnership
agreement with Walgreens, under which Walgreens invested $140
million in Theranos, and agreed to place and operate clinics,
which it called 'Wellness Centers,' at Walgreen Pharmacies in
Arizona and California.  Through the Wellness Centers, Walgreens,
along with Theranos, sold blood and other clinical testing
services to individuals.  The Plaintiffs allege that Walgreens
entered into this agreement with Theranos even though Walgreens
was aware of numerous serious red flags about the blood tests
that put it on notice about the unreliability of the tests.

The Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Walgreens and Theranos
knowingly and intentionally concealed vital information from
consumers, their doctors, and the public at large, including that
the Edison tiny blood technology was, throughout the time the
tiny blood draws were being administered, still in-development,
not ready-for-market, and nowhere near in a position to serve the
purpose of providing reliable blood test results.  They further
allege that Walgreens and Theranos embarked on a pervasive
promotional campaign that misrepresented and clearly portrayed
the 'tiny' blood tests as being market-ready and serving the
purpose of providing reliable blood test results.

As for non-Edison tests, the Plaintiffs allege that Defendants
concealed material information about the unreliability of all of
the testing services, and about the grossly deficient nature of
the testing facilities and equipment.  They further allege that
Walgreens and Theranos made pervasive misrepresentations,
including through their broad marketing campaign, falsely touting
the non-Edison blood tests as meeting the highest standards of
reliability, being industry-leading in quality, and being
developed and validated under, and compliant with federal
guidelines.

The Plaintiffs allege that in 2016, after the Center for Medicare
and Medicaid Services cited Theranos's Newark, California lab for
numerous deficiencies, Theranos voided all blood-testing results
from the Edison devices.  They further allege that numerous
additional test results have now been voided or belatedly
'corrected' by Theranos.  Holmes and Balwani have been banned
from owning or operating a blood-testing business for at least
two years and Theranos's license to operate a blood lab in
California has been revoked.

In their first amended complaint, the Plaintiffs asserted
seventeen causes of action and sought damages and injunctive
relief.  The Defendants moved to dismiss all 17 causes of action,
and the Court granted the motions in part and denied the motions
in part.  The Plaintiffs were given leave to amend as to a number
of the dismissed claims.

The Plaintiffs timely filed their SAC in which they assert 14
causes of action: (i) Arizona Consumer Fraud Act ("CFA") and
Common Law Fraud Claims (First and Second Causes of Action); (ii)
battery and medical battery claims (Third and Fourteenth Causes
of Action); (iii) negligence claims against Theranos and
Walgreens (Fourth Cause of Action); (iv) negligent
misrepresentation claims against Walgreens and Theranos (Fifth
Cause of Action); (v) breach of contract claims against Walgreens
and Theranos (Sixth Cause of Action); (vi)  unjust enrichment
claims against all the Defendants (Seventh Cause of Action);
(vii) aiding and abetting claims are asserted against Walgreens
(Eighth Cause of Action); (viii) RICO claims against all the
Defendants (Ninth Cause of Action); and (ix) California Statutory
Consumer Protection Claims (Tenth through Thirteenth Causes of
Action).

Pursuant to Rules 9(b) and 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Defendants now move to dismiss all of the claims
asserted in the Plaintiffs' SAC.

Judge Holland granted in part and denied in part the Defendants'
motions to dismiss.  He granted the motions to dismiss as to:

     (i) the CFA and common law fraud claims in the First and
         Second Causes of Action based on affirmative
         misrepresentations which are asserted against Walgreens
         by Plaintiffs A.R., B.P., D.L., L.M., M.P., R.C., R.G.,
         S.J., and S.L.;

    (ii) the CFA and common law fraud claims in the First and
         Second Causes of Action based on affirmative
         misrepresentations which are asserted against Theranos
         by Plaintiffs L.M., and R.G.;

   (iii) the common law fraud claim in the Second Cause of Action
         based on affirmative misrepresentations which is
         asserted against Theranos by pPaintiff A.R.;

    (iv) the negligent misrepresentation claims in the Fifth
         Cause of Action asserted against Walgreens by Plaintiffs
         A.R., B.P., D.L., L.M., M.P., R.C., R.G., S.J., and
         S.L.;

     (v) the negligent misrepresentation claims in the Fifth
         Cause of Action asserted against Theranos by Plaintiffs
         A.R., L.M., and R.G.;

    (vi) the Plaintiffs' RICO mail fraud claims in the Ninth
         Cause of Action asserted against all the Defendants; and

   (vii) A.R.'s statutory claims in the Tenth through Thirteen
         Causes of Action based on affirmative misrepresentations
         which are asserted against Walgreens and Theranos.

These claims are dismissed with prejudice.  The Judge denied the
Plaintiffs leave to amend as to these claims.

Judge Holland denied the motions as to:

     (i) the Plaintiffs' CFA and common law fraud claims in the
         First and Second Causes of Action based on omissions
         which are asserted against all the Defendants;

    (ii) the CFA and common law fraud claims in the First and
         Second Causes of Action based on affirmative
         misrepresentations which are asserted against Walgreens
         by B.B.;

   (iii) the CFA and common law fraud claims in the First and
         Second Causes of Action based on affirmative
         misrepresentations which are asserted against Theranos
         by Plaintiffs B.B., B.P., D.L., M.P., R.C., S.J., and
         S.L.;

    (iv) the battery and medical battery claims in the Third and
         Fourteenth Causes of Action asserted against Walgreens
         and Theranos by Plaintiffs B.P., R.C., and S.J.;

     (v) Plaintiffs' negligence claims in the Fourth Cause of
         Action asserted against Walgreens and Theranos;

    (vi) B.B.'s negligent misrepresentation claim in the Fifth
         Cause of Action asserted against Walgreens;

   (vii) the negligent misrepresentations claims in the Fifth
         Cause of Action asserted against Theranos by Plaintiffs
         B.B., B.P., D.L., M.P., R.C., S.J., and S.L.;

  (viii) the Plaintiffs' breach of contract claims in the Sixth
         Cause of Action asserted against Walgreens and Theranos;

    (ix) the Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claims in the Seventh
         Cause of Action asserted against all the Defendants;

     (x) the Plaintiffs' aiding and abetting claims in the Eighth
         Cause of Action asserted against Walgreens;

    (xi) the Plaintiffs' RICO wire fraud claims in the Ninth
         Cause of Action asserted against all the Defendants; and

   (xii) A.R.'s statutory claims in the Tenth through Thirteen
         Causes of Action based on omissions which are asserted
         against all the Defendants.

The Judge held, among other things, that:

     (i) the Edison Plaintiffs have pled plausible affirmative
         misrepresentation fraud claims against Theranos;

    (ii) the Edison Plaintiffs have stated plausible battery and
         medical battery claims against Theranos;

   (iii) the non-Edison Plaintiffs' negligence claims against
         Theranos are plausible;

    (iv) the Plaintiffs have adequately alleged a duty as to
         their negligent misrepresentation claims; and

     (v) the Plaintiffs' breach of contract claims against
         Theranos are also plausible.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 10, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/c2o23D from Leagle.com.

R.C., individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Consol Plaintiff, represented by Gretchen Freeman
Cappio -- acappio@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback LLP, Lynn
Lincoln Sarko -- lsarko@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback
LLP, pro hac vice, Mark D. Samson -- msamson@kellerrohrback.com
-- Keller Rohrback LLP, Ron Kilgard --
rkilgard@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback LLP, T. David
Copley -- dcopley@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback LLP,
Geoffrey A. Munroe -- gam@classlawgroup.com -- Girard Gibbs LLP,
Melissa A. Gardner -- mgardner@lchb.com --  Lieff Cabraser
Heimann & Bernstein LLP & Steven A. Lopez --
sal@classlawgroup.com -- Girard Gibbs LLP & Roger N. Heller --
rheller@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP.

B.P., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated &
D.L., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Consol Plaintiffs, represented by Mark D. Samson, Keller Rohrback
LLP, Michael Walter Sobol -- msobol@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser
Heimann & Bernstein LLP, Roger N. Heller, Lieff Cabraser Heimann
& Bernstein LLP, T. David Copley, Keller Rohrback LLP, Geoffrey
A. Munroe, Girard Gibbs LLP, Melissa A. Gardner, Liff Cabraser
Heimann & Bernstein LLP & Steven A. Lopez, Girard Gibbs LLP.

M.P., R.G., L.M., S.J. & A.R., Consol Plaintiffs, represented by
Melissa A. Gardner, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP, Roger
N. Heller, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP & T. David
Copley, Keller Rohrback LLP.

S.L., individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Consol Plaintiff, represented by Hart Lawrence
Robinovitch -- hart.robinovitch@zimmreed.com -- Zimmerman Reed
PLLP, Laurence D. King -- lking@kaplanfox.com -- Kaplan Fox &
Kilsheimer LLP, Linda M. Fong -- fong@kaplanfox.com -- Kaplan Fox
& Kilsheimer LLP, Melissa A. Gardner,  Lieff Cabraser Heimann &
Bernstein LLP, Roger N. Heller, Lieff Cabraser Heimann &
Bernstein LLP & T. David Copley, Keller Rohrback LLP.

Bobbie Brown, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Consol Plaintiff, represented by Laurence D. King,
Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP, Linda M. Fong, Kaplan Fox &
Kilsheimer LLP, Melissa A. Gardner, Lieff Cabraser Heimann &
Bernstein LLP, Roger N. Heller, Lieff Cabraser Heimann &
Bernstein LLP & T. David Copley, Keller Rohrback LLP.

Theranos Incorporated, a California Corporation, Defendant,
represented by Christopher Thomas Casamassima --
chris.casamassima@wilmerhale.com -- Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale
& Dorr LLP, Dan W. Goldfine -- dgoldfine@lrrc.com -- Lewis Roca
Rothgerber Christie LLP, Katie Moran --
katie.moran@wilmerhale.com -- Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr
LLP, Matthew Benedetto -- matthew.benedetto@wilmerhale.com --
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, Michael Mugmon --
michael.mugmon@wilmerhale.com -- Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale &
Dorr LLP & Lindsey Christine Herzog -- lherzog@lrrc.com -- Lewis
Roca Rothgerber Christie LLP.

Walgreens Boots Alliance Incorporated, a Delaware Corporation &
Walgreen Arizona Drug Company, Defendants, represented by Dan W.
Goldfine, Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie LLP - Phoenix Office,
Christopher Thomas Casamassima, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale &
Dorr LLP & Lindsey Christine Herzog , Lewis Roca Rothgerber
Christie LLP - Phoenix Office.

Elizabeth Holmes, a California resident, Defendant, represented
by Allison Suzanne Davidson -- adavidson@cooley.com -- Cooley
LLP, Jacqueline B. Kort -- jkort@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP, John
Charles Dwyer -- dwyerjc@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP, Patrick Edward
Gibbs -- pgibbs@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP, Stephen C. Neal --
nealsc@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP, Kathleen H. Goodhart --
kgoodhart@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP & Sean Eskovitz --
seskovitz@wilkinsonwalsh.com --  Wilkinson Walsh & Eskovitz LLP.

Ramesh Balwani, also known as Sonny Balwani, Defendant,
represented by Benjamin J. Byer -- benbyer.dwt.com -- Davis
Wright Tremaine LLP, Stephen M. Rummage -- steve.rummage@dwt.com
-- Davis Wright Tremaine LLP & Sean Eskovitz, Wilkinson Walsh &
Eskovitz LLP.


TOMMY HILFIGER: Class Claims False Discount Advertisements
----------------------------------------------------------
A class claims Tommy Hilfiger Wholesale advertises false
discounts in its outlet stores, in San Diego Superior Court.

Attorneys for Plaintiff Miguel Olmedo and Siobhan Morrow:

     Todd D. Carpenter, Esq.
     Brittany C. Casola, Esq.
     CARLSON LYNCH SWEET KILPELA & CARPENTER LLP
     1350 Columbia Street, Ste. 603
     San Diego, CA 92101
     Tel: 619-762-1900
     Fax: 619-756-6991
     Email: tcarpenter@carlsonlynch.com
            bcasola@carlsonlynch.com


TOWN OF WARWICK: "Semprivivo" Class Action Underway
---------------------------------------------------
The Town Board of the Town of Warwick is facing a class action
lawsuit by Christopher Semprivivo.  The case is captioned,
Christopher Semprivivo, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Town Board of Town of Warwick,
New York; Town of Warwick, New York; Town of Warwick Board Of
Assessment, Defendants, Case No. 1620/2018 (N.Y. Sup., Feb. 8,
2018). The case is assigned to Judge Maria Vazquez-Doles.

The Plaintiff has filed a motion seeking relief in accordance
with Article 78.

Warwick is a town in the southwest part of Orange County, New
York, in the United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Antonucci Law Office
     12 Public Sq.
     Watertown, NY 13601
     Telephone: (315) 788-7300


TRADER JOE'S: "Wong" Suit Moved to Southern Dist. of California
---------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Serena Wong on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. Trader Joe's
Company; T.A.C.T. Holding, Inc.; and DOE Defendants 1-5, the
Defendants, Case No. 37-02018-00014504CU-B, was removed from the
Superior Court of California, County of San Diego, to the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of California (San
Diego) on May 4, 2018. The District Court Clerk assigned Case No.
3:18-cv-00869-JLS-JLB to the proceeding. The case is assigned to
the Hon. Judge Janis L. Sammartino.

Trader Joe's is an American chain of grocery stores based in
Monrovia, California, owned by a German private equity family
trust. By 2015, it was a competitor in "fresh format" grocery
stores in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ronald Marron, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF RONALD MARRON
          651 Arroyo Drive
          San Diego, CA 92103
          Telephone: (619) 696 9006
          Facsimile: (619) 564 6665
          E-mail: ron@consumersadvocates.com

Attorneys for Defendants:

          Dawn Sestito, Esq.
          O'MELVENY & MYERS
          400 South Hope Street, Suite 1050
          Los Angeles, CA 90071-2899
          Telephone: (213) 430 6000
          E-mail: dsestito@omm.com


TREMONT TOWING: "Valdez" Suit Seeks Unpaid OT Wages under FLSA
--------------------------------------------------------------
ALAIN VALDEZ, individually, and on behalf of all similarly
situated persons, the Plaintiff, v. TREMONT TOWING, INC., a
Florida profit corporation; CHRISTIE ASHENOFF, individually;
KEITH MENIN, individually; and MANNY E. DIAZ, JR., individually,
the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-21777-DPG (S.D. Fla., May 4,
2018), seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages, and an additional
equal amount as liquidated damages, and reasonable attorney's
fees and costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff was a non-exempt
employee of Defendants who was not paid overtime in direct
violation of the FLSA within the past three years. The Plaintiff
was not paid the required statutory minimum wage for hours worked
during any work week. Additionally, Defendants improperly
withheld amounts from Plaintiff's wages in violation of the FLSA.
The Plaintiff and other similarly situated persons employed or
formerly employed by Defendants were consistently required to
work more than 40 hours a week without proper overtime
compensation pursuant to the FLSA. The Defendants willfully and
intentionally failed to pay the compensation required by the
FLSA.

Tremont Towing is a licensed and bonded freight shipping and
trucking company running freight hauling business from Miami
Beach, Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Miguel Armenteros, Esq.
          Ariella J. Gutman, Esq.
          PERLMAN, BAJANDAS, YEVOLI & ALBRIGHT, P.L.
          283 Catalonia Avenue, Suite 200
          Coral Gables, FL 33134
          Telephone: (305) 377 0086
          Facsimile: (305) 377 0781
          E-mail: miguel@pbyalaw.com
                  eservicemia@pbyalaw.com


TRUMP UNIVERSITY: Judge Signs Off on $25-Mil. Settlement
--------------------------------------------------------
Courthouse News Service reports that a federal judge on April 9
signed off at last on the $25 million settlement of class actions
against President Donald Trump and his now-defunct Trump
University real estate, putting a bow on consumer fraud claims
that dogged the president since 2010.

The cases are SONNY LOW, J.R. EVERETT and JOHN BROWN, on Behalf
of Themselves and All Others Similarly, Plaintiffs, vs. TRUMP
UNIVERSITY, LLC, a New York Limited Liability Company and DONALD
J. TRUMP, Defendants; and ART COHEN, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, vs. DONALD J.
TRUMP, Defendant, No. 3:10-cv-0940-GPC(WVG), No. 3:13-cv-02519-
GPC-WVG (S.D. Calif.).


ULTA BEAUTY: Devries Sues over Mislabeled Beauty Products
---------------------------------------------------------
Meghan Devries, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Ulta Beauty, Inc., Defendant,
Case No. 2018CH1723 (Ill Cir., Cook Cty., Feb. 8, 2018) is an
action brought against the Defendant's failure to label its
beauty products as being repacked or previously used.

The Plaintiff alleged in the complaint that the Defendant has a
routine practice of repackaging and resealing beauty products
that have previously been purchased, used, and returned by
Defendant's customers, before returning those used products to
its shelves to be purchased by other consumers.

Ulta Beauty, Inc. operates as a beauty retailer in the United
States. The company was formerly known as Ulta Salon, Cosmetics &
Fragrance, Inc. and changed its name to Ulta Beauty, Inc. in
January 2017. Ulta Beauty, Inc. was founded in 1990 and is based
in Bolingbrook, Illinois. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Thomas A. Zimmerman, Jr., Esq.
          Sharon A. Harris, Esq.
          Matthew C. De Re, Esq.
          Nickolas J. Hagman, Esq.
          Maebetty Kirby, Esq.
          ZIMMERMAN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
          77 W. Washington Street, Suite 1220
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 440-0020
          Facsimile: (312) 440-4180
          E-mail: tom@attorneyzim.com
                  sharon@attorneysim.com
                  matt@attorneyzim.com
                  nick@attorneyzim.com
                  maebetty@attorneyzim.com


UNCLE PAUL'S: "Sapon" Suit Seeks Minimum & OT Wages under FLSA
--------------------------------------------------------------
EDGAR SAPON, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. UNCLE PAUL'S PIZZA & CAFE INC. (D/B/A
UNCLE PAUL'S PIZZA), NN PIZZA CORP. (D/B/A PIZZA FACTORY), PASKO
PAUL NICAI , DINO REDZIC (A.K.A. ABIDIN) , NATALIA MOURGA, NEAT
KRKUTI, BENNY DOE, and LEO DOE, the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-
04026 (S.D.N.Y., May 4, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid minimum
and overtime wages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938 and the New York Labor Law.

The Defendants own, operate, or control two pizzerias, located at
70 Vanderbilt Ave, New York, NY 10017 under the name "Uncle
Paul's Pizza" and at 30-30 47th Avenue No. 140, Queens, NY 11101
under the name "Pizza Factory". The Plaintiff Sapon was employed
as a cook at Defendants' restaurants. The Plaintiff Sapon worked
for Defendants in excess of 40 hours per week, without
appropriate minimum wage, overtime, and spread of hours
compensation for the hours that he worked.

Rather, the Defendants failed to maintain accurate recordkeeping
of the hours worked, failed to pay Plaintiff Sapon appropriately
for any hours worked, either at the straight rate of pay or for
any additional overtime premium. Further, Defendants failed to
pay Plaintiff Sapon the required "spread of hours" pay for any
day in which he had to work over 10 hours a day. Furthermore, the
Defendants repeatedly failed to pay Plaintiff Sapon wages on a
timely basis. Defendants' conduct extended beyond Plaintiff Sapon
to all other similarly situated employees. The Defendants
maintained a policy and practice of requiring Plaintiff Sapon and
other employees to work in excess of 40 hours per week without
providing the minimum wage and overtime compensation required by
federal and state law and regulations.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Michael Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317 1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317 1620
          E-mail: Faillace@employmentcompliance.com


UNITED STATES: Judge Allows Men to Challenge Male-Only Draft
------------------------------------------------------------
Cameron Langford, writing for Courthouse News Services, reported
that the National Coalition for Men can proceed with its class
action lawsuit challenging the government's men-only mandate for
registering for the military draft, a federal judge ruled on
April 6.

Although the U.S. military is now an all-volunteer force, to stay
prepared for a major war the Military Select Service Act requires
men age 18 to 25 to register with the Select Service System.

The government held its last draft, for the Vietnam War, in 1973.

All men, including undocumented immigrants, who do not register
and keep their contact information current can be sentenced to
five years in prison, fined up to $250,000 and be disqualified
from federal financial aid and citizenship, though no man has
been prosecuted for failing to register since the 1980s.

The National Coalition for Men, represented by Marc Angelucci in
Los Angeles, sued the Select Service System in April 2013,
claiming the male-only draft registration rule is
unconstitutional gender discrimination. The Pentagon in January
2013 lifted a ban on women serving in front-line combat
positions.

The coalition seeks an injunction ordering the government to make
both men and women register for the draft.

As of February there were 213,851 women in the military, about 16
percent of the 1.3 million total members, according to the
Department of Defense.

U.S. District Judge Gray Miller on April 6 denied the
government's motion to dismiss the coalition's class action.

The government claimed the coalition's co-plaintiffs, James
Lesmeister and Anthony Davis, lack standing, as neither has been
drafted, nor are they at risk of being prosecuted, because they
have registered for the draft.

"Regardless, both have a continuing obligation to update SSS with
changes to their information. That obligation, paired with the
requirement to register with SSS, constitutes an injury
sufficient for Article III standing," Miller wrote.

In its dismissal motion, the government said the challengers are
trying to intrude on Congress's authority to oversee military
affairs, and their claims are precluded by the U.S. Supreme Court
1981 ruling in Rostker v. Goldberg, involving men who made
similar sex-discrimination arguments about draft-registration
rules. Justices Byron White wrote a dissent, joined by Justice
William Brennan, who also joined a separate dissent by Justice
Thurgood Marshall.

The 6-3 majority in Rostker held that because women were excluded
from combat, there was no need to draft them, so the male-only
rule was constitutional.

But Miller ruled that the coalition has made a viable gender
discrimination claim under the Fifth Amendment's equal protection
clause, due to the military's new policy of letting women fight
on the front lines.

"Regarding Rostker's holding that the male-only draft did not
violate the Constitution, the factual circumstances of this case
are different. . . . Now, women can serve in combat roles,"
Miller, a George W. Bush appointee, wrote in an 8-page order.

The coalition filed the lawsuit in April 2013 in the Central
District of California. U.S. District Judge Dale S. Fischer
dismissed it, but the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.
Fischer again nixed the coalition's claims in November 2016,
finding it lacked standing since its only co-plaintiff, James
Lesmeister, was not a coalition member.

Fischer transferred the case to the Southern District of Texas
because Lesmeister lives near Houston.

The coalition filed an amended complaint in August 2017, adding
class claims and its member Anthony Davis as a plaintiff. Judge
Miller found the addition of Davis was enough for the coalition
to establish "associational standing."

The coalition, founded in 1977, is based in San Diego,
California. It helped bring a lawsuit in 1985 against Hancock
International Airport in Syracuse, New York, for having diaper-
changing tables only in the airport's women's restrooms.

Settlement of that case led to the placement of changing tables
in men's bathrooms throughout the United States, the coalition
says on its website.

Its attorney, Marc Angelucci,Esq. is vice president of its board.
He started its Los Angeles chapter in 2001.

Angelucci said in a statement April 8 the coalition is pleased
with Miller's order. But he said its goal is not necessarily to
force the government to make women sign up for the draft.

"NCFM takes no position on whether the best approach is to end
mandatory draft registration or to require both men and women to
register. Nor does NCFM take any position as to whether women
should be in combat, as the draft can include noncombat
positions. As a men's rights organization, NCFM's concern is with
the unconstitutional sex discrimination against men. How to
resolve the illegality is up to the federal government," he said.

The Department of Justice did not respond on April 8 to an email
seeking comment on Miller's order.


UNITED STATES: "Stewart" Medicaid Suit Stays in D.C. Court
----------------------------------------------------------
Judge James E. Boasberg of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia denied the Defendants' motion to transfer
the case, RONNIE MAURICE STEWART, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ALEX M.
AZAR II, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 18-152 (JEB) (D.
D.C.), to the Eastern District of Kentucky pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
Section 1404(a).

The Plaintiffs are 16 Kentucky Medicaid enrollees who brought the
action under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"),
challenging the federal government's approval of a new Kentucky
Medicaid program, Kentucky HEALTH.

Kentucky, like all other states and the District of Columbia,
participates in Medicaid.  After the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act ("ACA") went into effect, the state broadened
Medicaid to include the expansion population.  On Aug. 24, 2016,
Gov. Matt Bevin submitted an application to Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services ("CMS") requesting a Section 1115 waiver to
implement an experimental project, Helping to Engage and Achieve
Long Term Health, or Kentucky HEALTH.  The project as approved
transforms the state's Medicaid program to include commercial
market health insurance features, including a deductible account,
an incentive and savings account, and a requirement that
enrollees pay premiums on a sliding scale.  It also predicates
Medicaid eligibility for most of the expansion population on
workforce participation or community service.

Prior to submitting the application, Kentucky's Department for
Medicaid Services held three public hearings and conducted two
public-comment periods.  Throughout this process, the state and
CMS were engaged in continued negotiations regarding the
program's terms.  CMS also opened a federal public-comment period
on Kentucky HEALTH.  On Jan. 12, 2018, CMS notified the
Governor's office that the application had been approved.

Two weeks later, the Plaintiffs brought the nine-count suit
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of themselves
and a statewide proposed class of all residents of Kentucky who
are enrolled in the Kentucky Medicaid program on or after Jan.
12, 2018.  The Complaint alleges that the Defendants violated the
Constitution and the Administrative Procedures Act by both
sending the January 11 letter to state Medicaid directors and by
approving Kentucky HEALTH.

Soon thereafter, the Defendants filed the Motion to Transfer,
asking the Court to send the case to Kentucky, specifically the
Frankfort Docket of the Central Division of the Eastern District
of that state.  On March 30, 2018, the Court granted Kentucky's
Motion for Intervention.

Judge Boasberg held that the Defendants have not carried their
burden to show how Kentucky is a more convenient place for this
APA case, and the Enrollees further accuse the Government of
blatant forum shopping by asking to transfer the case to a
particular division.  Kentucky has two federal districts,
comprising 10 different dockets, but the Government specifically
asked that the case be transferred to Frankfort, which has only
one judge.  Although the Judge did find the Government's request
unduly restrictive, given that the Plaintiffs are geographically
dispersed throughout the state, and the underlying situs of the
case expands beyond Frankfort County, he declined to assign such
nefarious motives to the Government's venue choice.  This
preference, however, does not overcome the requisite deference.

Because this is an APA case, the Judge held that the convenience
of witnesses and the ease of access to sources of proof are not
likely to be relevant.  The Government concedes that judicial
review of the merits will be limited to the administrative record
and there will be no discovery or trial, but argues that
discovery into standing or class discovery would take place in
Kentucky.  The Judge said he cannot foresee how the proposed
class would require discovery, but, even if it did, this would
only be a feather on the scale in favor of transfer.  On balance,
then, the private-interest factors tip in favor of keeping the
case in D.C.

As to the public-interest factors, Judge Boasberg said resolving
the case will require statutory interpretation, a task any
federal court is competent to undertake.  If anything, the Court
has more experience with APA cases, which would weigh against
transfer.  The caseload disparity between the two courts,
moreover, is not great enough to have an effect on the transfer
analysis.  Absent a showing that either court's docket is
"substantially more congested" than the other, the judicial
economy factor weighs neither for nor against transfer.

Finally, because he finds that if the case is of national, rather
than local significance, the local interest factor tips sharply
against transfer.  The federal decision-making happened in the
District by D.C.-based officials, and the waiver program affects
all states.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 10, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
is available at https://is.gd/O16J9f from Leagle.com.

Ronnie Maurice Stewart, Glassie Mae Kasey, Lakin Branham, Shanna
Ballinger, Dave Kobersmith, William Bennett, Shawna Nicole
Mccomas, Alexa Hatcher, Michael Woods, Kimberly Withers, Katelyn
Allen, Amanda Spears, David Roode, Sheila Marlene Penney &
Quenton Radford, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Catherine A. McKee --
mckee@healhtlaw.org -- NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, Devi M. Rao
-- DRao@jenner.com -- JENNER & BLOCK LLP, Ian Heath Gershengorn
-- IGershengorn@jenner.com -- JENNER & BLOCK LLP, Lauren J. Hartz
--  LHartz@jenner.com -- JENNER & BLOCK LLP, Natacha Y. Lam --
NLam@jenner.com -- JENNER & BLOCK LLP, Samuel Jacobson --
SJacobson@jenner.com -- JENNER & BLOCK LLP, Thomas J. Perrelli --
TPerrelli@jenner.com -- JENNER & BLOCK LLP & Jane Perkins --
perkins@healthlaw.org -- NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM.

ERIC HARGAN, in his official capacity as Acting Secretary of the
United States Department of Health and Human Services, SEEMA
VERMA, in her official capacity as Administrator of the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services, DEMETRIOS L. KOUZOUKAS, in
his official capacity as Principal Deputy Administrator for the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, BRIAN NEALE, in his
official capacity as Director of the Center for Medicaid and CHIP
Services, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES &
CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, Defendants,
represented by Deepthy Kishore, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil
Division, Federal Programs Branch.

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, ex rel. Matthew G. Bevin, Governor,
Intervenor Defendant, represented by Matthew Franklin Kuhn,
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR OF KENTUCKY.

Scholars Amici, Amicus, represented by Edward T. Waters --
ewaters@ftlf.com -- FELDESMAN TUCKER LEIFER FIDELL LLP.

AARP, AARP FOUNDATION, Justice in Aging, National Academy of
Elder Law Attorneys & Disability Rights Education and Defense
Fund, Amicuss, represented by Lisa Schiavo Blatt --
lisa.blatt@arnoldporter.com -- ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP.


UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO: "Axelrod" Suit Moved to D. New Mexico
---------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Melissa Axelrod, Gail Houston,
and Julie Shigekuni, On behalf of themselves and other employees
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. Board of Regents of the
University of New Mexico, the Defendant, Case No. 18cv01760, was
removed from the Second Judicial District Court, to the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Mexico - (Albuquerque) on
May 4, 2018. The case is assigned to the Hon. Magistrate Judge
Laura Fashing. The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:18-
cv-00427-LF-GBW to the proceeding.

The University of New Mexico is a public research university in
Albuquerque, New Mexico. It is New Mexico's flagship research
institution.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          David L. Plotsky, Esq.
          PLOTSKY & DOUGHERTY, P.C.
          122 Girard SE
          Albuquerque, NM 87106
          Telephone: (505) 268 0095
          Facsimile: (505) 266 9585
          E-mail: plotlaw@verizon.net

Attorneys for Defendant:

          Quentin Smith, Esq.
          Jeremiah L Ritchie, Esq.
          SHEEHAN & SHEEHAN, P.A.
          6001 Indian School Road, NE, Suite 400
          P.O. Box 271
          Albuquerque, NM 87103
          Telephone: (505) 247 0411
          Facsimile: (505) 842 8890
          E-mail: qs@sheehansheehan.com
                  jlr@sheehansheehan.com


VIACOM INTERNATIONAL: Burbon Agrees to Drop Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------
The parties in the case captioned as Luc Burbon, individually and
on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Viacom International Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-01119-GBD
(S.D.N.Y., Feb. 8, 2018), have entered a Stipulation and Order of
Voluntary Dismissal.

The Plaintiff agreed to voluntarily dismiss, with prejudice, his
complaint against Viacom pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with the parties to bear
responsibility for their respective fees and costs.

Judge George B. Daniels approved the Stipulation on April 18,
2018.

An Initial Conference was initially set for April 19 before Judge
Daniels, and Viacom had until May 7 to file its answer to the
complaint.  Those dates were mooted as a result of the
Stipulation.

Viacom International Inc. operates as an entertainment content
company. The company was formerly known as New Viacom
International Corp. and it changed its name to Viacom
International Inc. in January, 2006. The company was incorporated
in 2005 and is based in New York, New York. Viacom International
Inc. operates as a subsidiary of Viacom, Inc. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Dana Lauren Gottlieb, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Telephone: (917) 796-7437
          Facsimile: (212) 982-6284
          E-mail:danalgottlieb@aol.com


VOLVO CARS: "Laurens" Suit Transferred to District of New Jersey
----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Xavier Laurens and Khadija
Laurens, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. VOLVO CARS OF NORTH AMERICA LLC, a
Delaware limited liability corporation and Volvo Car USA, LLC, a
Delaware limited liability corporation, the Defendants, Case No.
1:16-cv-04507, was transferred from the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois, to the U.S. District Court for
the District of New Jersey (Newark) on May 4, 2018. The District
Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:18-cv-08798 to the proceeding.

Volvo Cars provides marketing, sales, distribution, parts
service, and training support for Volvo brand passenger cars in
United States.[BN]

Attorneys for Volvo Car USA, LLC:

          Jennifer L. Ilkka, Esq.
          REED SMITH - CHICAGO
          10 South Wacker Drive, Suite 4000
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 207 2407
          Facsimile: (312) 207 6400


WAL-MART STORES: Faces Class Action From Accused Shoplifters
------------------------------------------------------------
Maria Dinzeo, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that
Retailers across the nation are being sued for using a
"corrective education" program that is tantamount to extortion, a
class of accused shoplifters claim in federal court.

The Utah-based Corrective Education Company calls it restorative
justice. But the three lead plaintiffs, anonymously named in the
complaint, call it a shakedown.

"Defendants are not small-time Mafia thugs," the lawsuit says.
"They do not break kneecaps; they do not torch storefronts. Many
of the nation's leading corporations number are among the
Retailer Defendants. The individual defendants include graduates
of the Harvard Business School, the University of Oxford, and
Brigham Young University. But despite their glittering
credentials, Defendants are all participants in a long-running,
highly profitable extortion scheme that has extracted millions of
dollars from thousands of poor, desperate people across the
country. And RICO applies, with equal force, to street hoodlums
and Harvard MBAs alike."

One plaintiff, identified as Jane Doe from Loganville, Georgia,
was detained at a Walmart in September 2017 after buying supplies
for her child's birthday party. Walmart's loss prevention
personnel accused her of stealing hotdog buns and a case of
water. Under threat of being reported to the police, Doe agreed
to participate in the CEC program.

She was shown a CEC video promoting its six to eight hour
education course designed to teach "life skills" and "make
positive behavior changes." And she would need to pay for the
program; either through a $400 upfront payment, or through a
payment plan comprising a $50 upfront payment and monthly
payments totaling $500.

The class action complaint lists Bloomingdale's, DSW, Walmart
Inc., Kroger, Abercrombie & Fitch, and CEC founders Darrell
Huntsman, Glen Bingham, Brian Ashton, and executives Jeffrey
Mitchell, Jeff Powers, Chris Cotrell, Richard Haddrill, Tim
Hickey and Jeff Stringer as defendants.

"This case is intended to prove that we are all equal under the
law," said Joel Fleming,Esq. class attorney and partner with
Block & Leviton. "Our country's racketeering and extortion laws
apply with equal force whether you're a common street hoodlum or
one of the Harvard MBAs who founded CEC. We're trying to stop
these illegal shakedowns and get compensation for victims."

About 20,000 people are known to have gone through the CEC
program since 2015.

Hilliard, Florida resident Mary Moe was detained at a
Jacksonville, Florida Walmart in November 2017, accused of
stealing snacks and hygiene products. She also agreed to
participate in the CEC program after watching one of their
videos, as did John Roe, accused of stealing a tri-ball hitch
from a Texas Walmart in January 2017. While Roe agreed to
participate in CEC under threat of being reported to the police,
he hasn't been able to make his payments and his account has been
sent to collections.

Founded in 2010, CEC touts itself as "the leading provider of
restorative justice education," saving first-time shoplifters
from a criminal record while teaching them to make better life
choices.

The lawsuit quotes a script CEC used between 2013 and 2016 that
admonishes viewers: "Once again, when you complete the resolution
program, no charges will be filed, you will not have to go to
jail, and you won't have to pay any criminal fines. Most
importantly, you will not have a criminal record and you will
avoid the cost of civil demands. However, if you fail to comply
with the requirements of this program, if you don't complete it,
your case will be submitted to the police and they may issue a
warrant for your arrest. This will happen only if don't complete
the program."

While Fleming noted that this is the first class action of its
kind, San Francisco City Attorney Dennis Herrera,Esq. sued to
block the company from contracting with retailers, seeking civil
penalties and restitution for extortion and false imprisonment.
In 2017, the city won an injunction, with state court Judge
Harold Kahn finding the CEC program runs afoul of California
extortion laws.

"This is textbook extortion under California law, and has been so
declared for at least 125 years," Kahn wrote in his ruling last
year.

CEC representatives did not respond to an email seeking comment
on April 9.

The plaintiffs seek statutory and punitive damages for
racketeering. They are represented by Fleming and Jacob
Walker,Esq. with Block & Leviton in Boston.


WAL-MART STORES: Faces Suit Over Song-Beverly Act Violations
------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for the Courthouse News Service, reports
that cameras at Walmart self-checkout counters illegally collect
personal information, including eye and hair colors and facial
features, in violation of the Song-Beverly Act, a class action
claims in San Diego Superior Court.

Attorneys for Plaintiff Joseph Carlos Valezquez:

     Todd D. Carpenter, Esq.
     Brittany C. Casola, Esq.
     CARLSON LYNCH SWEET KILPELA & CARPENTER LLP
     1350 Columbia Street, Ste. 603
     San Diego, CA 92101
     Tel: 619-762-1900
     Fax: 619-756-6991
     Email: tcarpenter@carlsonlynch.com
            bcasola@carlsonlynch.com

        -- and --

     Jeffrey D. Kaliel, Esq.
     Sophia Gold, Esq.
     KALIEL PLLC
     1875 Connecticut Avenue NW, 10th Floor
     Washington, DC 20009
     Tel: 202-350-4783
     Email: jkaliel@kalielpllc.com
            sgold@kalielpllc.com


WEYERHAEUSER CO: Infinity's Bid to Quash Subpoena Partly Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, INFINITY HOME COLLECTION, Movant, v. JAMAL COLEMAN,
and SHEENA COLEMAN, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Respondents/Plaintiffs, v. WEYERHAEUSER
COMPANY, Defendant, Misc. Action No. 17-mc-00200-MSK-MEH (D.
Colo.), Magistrate Judge Michael E. Hegarty of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Colorado denied, in part, and denied,
as moot in part, Infinity's Motion to Quash Plaintiffs Jamal
Coleman and Sheena Coleman's Subpoena.

On Aug. 4, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint
against Weyerhaeuser in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Delaware.  Weyerhaeuser produces and sells joists, which are
installed in homes and other structures.  The Plaintiffs allege
Weyerhaeuser attempted to enhance the fire protection of its TJI
joists by coating them with "Flak Jacket Protection."  However,
according to the Plaintiffs, the Flak Jacket Protection contains
a formaldehyde-based resin, which emits excessive levels of
noxious and toxic gases.  These gases allegedly render homes
unhabitable.

Based on these allegations, the Plaintiffs assert claims for: (1)
breach of express warranty, (2) breach of implied warranty of
merchantability, (3) violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act,
(4) negligence, (5) negligent failure to warn, (6) violation of
the Delaware Consumer Fraud Act, (7) unjust enrichment, and (8)
declaratory relief.  They assert these claims on behalf of
themselves and all individuals and entities who own or have
signed contracts to purchase homes in which Weyerhaeuser's joists
are installed.

On Nov. 20, 2017, Magistrate Judge Sherry Fallon issued a
Scheduling Order.  This order sets Aug. 1, 2018 as the deadline
for a class certification motion.  Additionally, the order states
that the parties will prioritize discovery relating to class
certification issues.

On Nov. 29, 2017, the Plaintiffs served a subpoena on Infinity --
one of the 35 entities that constructed homes with the allegedly
defective joists.  The subpoena contains 18 requests for
documents.  On Dec. 14, Infinity filed the present Motion to
Quash Subpoena in this District.  Infinity contends the subpoena
impermissibly seeks merits-related discovery, does not allow a
reasonable time to comply, seeks disclosure of privileged
information, subjects it to undue burden, and impermissibly asks
for information in Weyerhaeuser's possession.

The Plaintiffs' response brief notes that the parties have
narrowed the scope of the subpoena to six requests.  The
Plaintiffs argue these requests seek relevant and non-burdensome
information.

The Plaintiffs' sixth request seeks all documents constituting or
relating to communications (written, email, oral or otherwise)
between You and any other individual or entity regarding the TJI
Joists, including, without limitation, any governmental entity,
realtor, real estate agent, prospective homebuyer, insurance
company, bank, mortgage lender, contractor, subcontractor,
vendor, inspection company, testing company, engineer, architect,
builder, customer, customer's lawyer or representative, etc.

Their ninth request asks for documents sufficient to show the
first date on which Weyerhaeuser notified one of any problems
with the TJI Joists.  The eleventh request seeks all documents
constituting or relating to its efforts to notify its customers
and/or contractors and/or subcontractors about the problems with
the TJI Joists.

The Plaintiffs' twelfth request seeks documents sufficient to
identify the location and identity of all homes or other
structures that it built that contain or contained the TJI
Joists, as well as the identity of any person(s) or entity(ies)
who attended a showing, made an offer on, purchased, entered into
a contract to purchase, or resided in any such home or structure,
and their contact information.

Request 16 asks for copies of all purchase and sale agreements
with homeowners, home purchasers or prospective purchasers for
any home or other structure in which the TJI Joists were ever
installed.  This Request includes all purchase and sale
agreements regarding the sale of homes both pre- and post-
remediation.  Finally, Request 17 seeks all documents discussing
the effect of the TJI Joists or the effect of remediation of the
TJI Joists on home value(s).

After the Plaintiffs filed their brief, Infinity partially
responded to the remaining requests.  However, the Plaintiffs
still believe that Infinity's production was inadequate.

Magistrate Judge Hegarty finds that the Plaintiffs' (i) sixth
request is relevant to class certification and the merits of the
Plaintiffs' class claims; (ii) request number nine does not
subject Infinity to an undue burden; (iii) eleventh request is
relevant to class certification, because it seeks information
regarding the date each potential class member became aware of
the defect; (iv) twelfth request merely asks Infinity to produce
certain individuals' names, and Infinity possesses this
information, thus it will not be difficult to produce; (v)
request sixteen is relevant to class certification because the
purchase and sale agreements list the selling price of each house
that contains the joists, which will help establish how the
joists affected home values; and (vi) request seventeen has been
complied by Infinity by certifying that it has no responsive
documents.

In sum, Magistrate Judge Hegarty finds that Infinity must respond
to subpoena requests six, nine, eleven, twelve, and sixteen to
the extent it has not already done so.  Because Infinity complied
with request seventeen, Infinity's motion is moot as to this
request.  Accordingly, Magistrate Judge denied in part and denied
as moot in part Infinity's Motion to Quash Subpoena.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 10, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/nPcsJ1 from Leagle.com.

Jamal Coleman & Sheena Coleman, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Robert
David Lantz -- rlantz@cp2law.com -- Coan Payton & Payne, LLC,
Eleanor Michelle Drake -- emdrake@bm.net -- Berger & Montague,
PC, Joe Christopherson Hashmall -- jhashmall@bm.net -- Berger &
Montague, PC & Lawrence D. Deutsch -- ldeutsch@bm.net -- Berger &
Montague, PC.

Infinity Home Collection, Interested Party, represented by Robert
David Lantz, Coan Payton & Payne, LLC.


WINDHAM PROFESSIONALS: Defending Against "James" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
The case, Melissa James, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Windham Professionals, Inc., and
Does 1-25, Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-01865-ES-SCM (D.N.J.,
Feb. 8, 2018), which seeks to stop the Defendant's unfair and
unconscionable means to collect a debt, remains pending.

Windham Professionals, Inc. provides accounts receivable
management and customer care services. It offers consolidated
education, repayment, and financial literacy services for higher
education organizations to manage the student loan process;
business-to-business services, such as portfolio management,
recovery, attorney/pre-litigation, back office process
management, and account management; and business-to-consumer
services in the areas of customer payment, accounts receivable,
and customer experience. The company serves insurance, business
services, and education sectors in the United States. Windham
Professionals, Inc. was founded in 1982 and is based in Salem,
New Hampshire with additional offices in the United States.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

           Joseph K. Jones, Esq.
           JONES, WOLF & KAPASI, LLC
           375 Passaic Avenue, Suite 100
           Fairfield, NJ 07004
           Telephone: (973) 227-5900
           Facsimile: (973) 244-0019
           E-mail: jkj@legaljones.com


ZEP INC: "Chun" Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages under Labor Code
--------------------------------------------------------
JEFF FULLER, an individual; RANDALL CHUN, an individual; on
behalf of themselves and other persons similarly situated, the
Plaintiffs, v. ZEP, INC., a Delaware corporation; ACUITY
SPECIALTY PRODUCTS, INC., and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, the
Defendants, the Plaintiff, Case No. 3:18-cv-02672 (N.D. Cal., May
7, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid wages under the California
Labor Code.

The Plaintiffs and those similarly situated are or were employed
by Defendants as Employees and Outside Salespersons and were
denied proper compensation as required by state and federal law.
The Class is made up of each and every person who has worked for
Defendants in California and the United States as an Outside
Sales Representative within four years of the filing of this
action. During the Class Period, the Defendants failed to pay
wages/commissions to Plaintiffs and each member of the putative
classes as required by federal and state law. Further, the
Defendants have engaged in an unlawful policy and practice of
taking accounts and commissions obtained by salespersons in
violation of both the written contract that all salespersons
signed and applicable law.

ZEP has a history of engaging in unlawful conduct with regard to
its outside salespersons. At the time these accounts were
obtained, each representative was never informed that the
accounts or the commissions generated from these accounts could
be taken from them unilaterally by Defendants. In fact,
Plaintiffs and the current and former employees they seek to
represent were informed in writing that such commissions would be
earned when payment was made by the customer.

The representatives were also promised in writing that any
changes to any commission program could only be applied
"prospectively". In other words, any new accounts obtained after
a modification to the agreement could be made, but any new
commission plan would not be effective retroactively, i.e., to
accounts that had been obtained prior to any modification of the
plan.

However, in direct contradiction with those written promises,
beginning in approximately 2017, ZEP began unilaterally and
surreptitiously taking accounts/commissions obtained by their
outside salespersons. Effective April 1, 2018, ZEP placed a
policy in writing in which it acknowledged that it would began
taking accounts/commissions from these sales persons. Simply
stated, such conduct by the Company violates the law.

Zep Inc. produces and markets cleaning and maintenance chemicals,
and related products and services for the commercial, industrial,
and institutional markets in North America and Europe.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Alejandro P. Gutierrez, Esq.
          HATHAWAY, PERRETT, WEBSTER, POWERS,
          CHRISMAN & GUTIERREZ, APC
          5450 Telegraph Road, Suite 200
          Ventura, CA 93006-3577
          Telephone: (805) 644 7111
          Facsimile: (805) 644 8296
          E-mail: agutierrez@hathawaylawfirm.com

               - and -

          Daniel J. Palay, Esq.
          Brian D. Hefelfinger, Esq.
          PALAY HEFELFINGER, APC
          1484 E. Main Street, Suite 105-B
          Ventura, CA 93001
          Telephone: (805) 628 8220
          Facsimile: (805) 765 8600
          E-mail: djp@calemploymentcounsel.com
                  bdh@calemploymentcounsel.com









                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N  I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marion Alcestis A. Castillon, Jessenius Pulido, Noemi Irene A.
Adala, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche
Maricon Castillon-Lopez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Christopher G.
Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1525-2272.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The CAR subscription rate is $775 for six months delivered via
e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Peter A.
Chapman at 215-945-7000.



                 * * *  End of Transmission  * * *