CAR_Public/180501.mbx              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R


              Tuesday, May 1, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 87



                            Headlines


APPLE INC: Shegerian & Associates Files Class Action Lawsuit
ARCIMOTO INC: Faces "Switzer" and "Mendelson" Class Suits
ARIZONA: Redgrave Files Class Action
AT&T CORP: Bid to Compel Arbitration in Improper Fees Suit Denied
AT&T MOBILITY: Can Partly Arbitrate "Roberts" Suit

AUDI AG: Judge Issues Ruling on Class Action Carriage Motions
AVINGER INC: Has Deal to Settle Securities Suits for $5 Million
BARNES & NOBLE: 7th Cir. Kills Another Big Data Breach Defense
BERGEN DISCOUNT: Court Partially Dismisses Wage & Hour Suit
BERTOLLI OLIVE: Settles Class-Action Lawsuit for $7 Million

BIOAMBER INC: Continues to Defend NY Securities Class Suit
BNV HOME: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss "Tagaeva" FLSA/NYLL Suit
CALIFORNIA: Court Dismisses CDCR as Defendant in "Hammler" Suit
CANADA: Class Action Over Montreal Airport Noise Pollution Okayed
CANCER GENETICS: June 4 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set

CAPGEMINI NORTH: Subclasses in ERISA Suit Certified
CAREFUSION SOLUTIONS: Court Dismisses "Ward" Suit
CHANTICLEER HOLDINGS: Suit over Little Big Burger Deal Closed
CITIBANK NA: Suit over Interchange Fees Still Ongoing
COMMUNITY PROBATION: Faces "McNeil" Suit in M.D. Tennessee

CMSA LLC: Faces "Conner" Suit in S.D. New York
COMMUNITY SAVINGS: Overdraft Charge Class Action Ruling Upheld
COSTCO: May 14 FCRA Settlement Claims Filing Deadline Set
CV SCIENCES: Bid to Dismiss "Sallustro" Suit Still Pending
DARBY ROAD: Court Denies Dismissal of "Oxlaj" Suit Counterclaim

DISH DBS: Court to Favor Potential Class Members in "Krakauer"
DOUBLE DOWN: 4 Play Money Sites Slapped With Class Action Suits
DR PEPPER: Faruqi & Faruqi Files Securities Class Action in Del.
DUDE PRODUCTS: Faces "Hall" Suit in California Superior Court
EXPRESS SCRIPTS: Court Orders Filing of Amended "Burton" Suit

FACEBOOK INC: Class Action Over Facial Recognition Can Proceed
FAMILY DOLLAR: $45MM Settlement in "Scott" Has Final Approval
FOSTER & GARBUS: Faces "Gindoff" Suit in E.D. New York
GENON ENERGY: Suit Against Parent Company Still Ongoing
GENON ENERGY: Natural Gas Litigation Underway

GRAIN PROCESSING: Judge Hears Summary Judgment Bid in Suit
HEALTHEXTRAS: Class Action Over Allegedly Bogus Insurance Product
HEALTHPORT TECHNOLOGIES: Summary Ruling in "Ruzhinskaya" OK'd
HOT SPRINGS, AR: Court Affirms Summary Dismissal of "Houston"
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: To Appeal Baby Powder Asbestos Case Verdict

JP MORGAN: Overcharged Cryptocurrency Buyers File Class Action
JP MORGAN: Hit With Million Dollar Class Action Crypto Lawsuit
KEMPHARM INC: Iowa Class Suit Still in Preliminary Stage
KINDRED HEALTHCARE: Settles Overtime Case for $12 Million
LONGFIN CORP: Levi & Korsinsky Files Class Action Lawsuit

LOS ANGELES COUNTY, CA: Lenders Over Green Energy Program Sue
LVNV FUNDING: Court Denies Summary Judgment in "McMahon"
MAMMOTH MOUNTAIN: $3.75MM Deal in "Story" Has Final Approval
MAMMOTH MOUNTAIN: Court Enters Final Judgment in "Story" Suit
MASSAGE ENVY: 7th Cir. Upholds Dismissal of Class Action

MASTERCARD INT'L: Class Certification in Antitrust Suit Denied
MDL 2804: Somerset to Join Class Action Over Opioid Crisis
MELOUTA CORP: Faces "Singletary" Suit in E.D. New York
MILLION AMUSEMENT: Faces "Anderson" Suit in E.D. New York
MURRAY GOULBURN: Law Firm, IMF Opens Class Action Registrations

NESTLE: Bottled Water Contains Microplastics, Class Action Claims
NEW NAKATA SUSHI: Faces "Lin" Suit in E.D. New York
NEW YORK: Legal Aid Demands Rebates from NYCHA
NORFOLK SOUTHERN: Faces "Todd" Suit in D. South Carolina
NORTHSTAR LOCATION: Faces "Infante" Suit in E.D. New York

OUTCOME HEALTH: Settles TCPA Class Action Suit
PGA INC: Court Denies Dismissal of "Sinclair" Suit Counterclaim
PILGRIM'S PRIDE: "Hogan" Securities Suit Dismissed w/o Prejudice
POWERCOR: Faces Second Class Action Over St. Patrick's Day Fires
PROCTER & GAMBLE: Bid to Dismiss "Guariglia" Suit Partly Granted

PROFESSIONAL DIVERSITY: "Ramnath" Class Action Suit Concluded
PROVIDENCE, RI: To Update Speed Camera Tickets Amid Class Action
PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE: 3rd Cir. Won't Review ERISA Class Action
QUICK TRAVEL: Faces "Campos" Suit in C.D. California
RESORT MARKETING: Supplemental Notice Inked in Robocall Suit

ROADRUNNER TRANS: Securities Suit in Wisconsin Still Ongoing
ROYAL CARIBBEAN: Judge Dismisses Passengers' Harvey Claims
SAMSUNG CORP: Misled Consumers About Speed of Galaxy S4
SANTANDER SECURITIES: Quetglas Files Securities Class Action
SCOUT PETROLEUM: Count II Summary Ruling in Royalties Suit Upheld

SECURITY AMERICAS: Summary Judgment in "Hodgin" Affirmed
SHEEPSHEAD RESTAURANT: Faces "Zybtsev" Suit in E.D. New York
SIG SAUER: Faces Class Action Over Defective P320 Pistols
SLM STUDENT: Still Defends Lord Abbett Affiliated Fund Suit
SLM STUDENT: "Pope" and "Gross" Cases Consolidated

SOLID BIOSCIENCES: Vincent Wong Files Class Action
SUBARU: Faces 3rd Lawsuit Over Vehicle Engine Defects
SYNACOR INC: Rosen Law Firm Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
TAILORED BRANDS: Continues to Defend Texas Class Action Suit
TAILORED BRANDS: Still Faces "Oliver" TCPA Class Action Suit

TAILORED BRANDS: Bid to Dismiss vs. Twin Hill Suit Underway
TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET ERICSSON: Rosen Law Firm Files Lawsuit
TENET HEALTHCARE: Can Compel Arbitration in "Bhakta-Gallier" Suit
TIGER BRANDS: Still Working on Listeriosis Detection
TIGER BRANDS: Opposes Two Separate Listeriosis Class Actions

TILLY'S INC: Continues to Defend "Gonzales" Suit
TILLY'S INC: Parties Executes Settlement Agreement in "Minniti"
TILLY'S INC: Appeal in "Ward" Suit Underway
TOOTSIE ROLL: Faces Class Action Over Half-Empty Junior Mints Box
TRUE VALUE: Faces "Walker" Suit in E.D. New York

UBER TECH: 6th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of "Zawada"
UNITED STATES: ACLU of Massachusetts Files Immigration Lawsuit
VIRTRA INC: Settles Arizona Employees' Class Suits
VITAL RECOVERY: Court Certifies 2 Classes in "Magallon"
WEST END: "Easler" Settlement Agreement Awaits Court Approval

WEST VIRGINIA: Court Dismisses "Bragg" Suit
WILLBROS GROUP: Agreement in Principle Reached in Securities Suit
WIPRO LTD: "Phillips" Suit Moved to Southern District of Texas
WISCONSIN: Court Denies Flynn's Bid for Violations of TCI Deal
WRIGHT MEDICAL: Hip Replacement Device Class Action Settled

* CBA Approves Protocol for Multi-Jurisdictional Class Actions
* EU Commission Presents Class-Action Proposals for Consumers
* Quebec Court Creates "Class Action Chambers" in Montreal



                            *********


APPLE INC: Shegerian & Associates Files Class Action Lawsuit
------------------------------------------------------------
Carney Shegerian, trial lawyer and founder of the Los Angeles-
based employment discrimination firm Shegerian & Associates,
recently announced a class action lawsuit against Apple, Inc.
alleging that Apple has and continues to violate the California
Equal Pay Act and the Fair Employment and Housing Act by paying
women Experts less than it pays men for equal or similar work.

In June 2011, Shegerian & Associates client Camille Wade began
working for Apple as a specialist at the Apple Store in Los
Angeles, California, and was thereafter promoted to the position
of "Expert".  From then until January 2017, Wade was a full-time
employee, at which point she inquired about moving to a part-time
Expert position due to family matters.  Her supervisor expressed
two part-time Expert openings, and assured Wade that male Experts
who switched from full-time to part-time were able to maintain
their current pay rate.

In March 2017, Wade was offered a part-time Expert position,
however unlike male employees, her hourly rate was decreased by
$2.00 per hour from her full-time hourly rate.  She accepted the
position working at the reduced rate performing the same or
similar work to her male Expert counterparts until December 2017.

"The treatment of long time Apple Expert Camille Wade and all of
her female counterparts is not only morally wrong but is
illegal," said Carney Shegerian.  "Regardless of gender, all
employees should be treated fairly and equally."

"Apple didn't just violate Camille's legal rights, but they have
violated the rights of potentially hundreds of other female
employees.  We are urging anyone who feels they were treated
similarly to come forward and join the class action suit to bring
justice to women who were not paid the same as their male
counterparts."

Shegerian & Associates is urging other Apple employees who were
treated similarly to contact our offices to determine if they may
be eligible to join the class.

Media Contact: To arrange interviews with Carney Shegerian
employment law matters, please contact media@ShegerianLaw.com

CASE # BC-694499 [GN]


ARCIMOTO INC: Faces "Switzer" and "Mendelson" Class Suits
---------------------------------------------------------
Arcimoto, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on March 30, 2018, for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2017, that the company faces two
class action suits entitled, John R Switzer vs W.R. Hambrecht &
Co. LLC et al., and Jay Mendelson v. Arcimoto, Inc. et al.

On March 11, 2018, the company was served with a lawsuit entitled
John R Switzer vs W.R. Hambrecht & Co. LLC et al., case number:
CGC-18-564904, filed in San Francisco County Superior Court in
the State of California. In this action, the company has been
named as defendants along with its directors and certain
executive officers at the time of the completion of the company's
Regulation A offering on September 21, 2017.

The action purports to be a class action on behalf of all those
who purchased the company's common stock in its Regulation A
offering alleging violations of Section 12(a)(2) and Section 15
of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended. The plaintiff is
seeking damages in an unspecified amount to be proven at trial.

In addition, On March 28, 2018, the company was served with
another lawsuit entitled Jay Mendelson v. Arcimoto, Inc. et al.,
case number CGC-18-565324, filed in San Francisco County Superior
Court in the State of California. In this action the company had
also been named as a defendant along with its directors and
certain executive officers at the time of the completion of the
company's Regulation A offering on September 21, 2017.

The factual allegations and alleged violations are substantially
similar to the Switzer action and the plaintiff is also seeking
damages in an unspecified amount to be proven at trial.

Arcimoto said "We believe these lawsuits are without merit and we
intend to vigorously defend these actions in court."

Arcimoto's mission is to help catalyze the shift to a sustainable
transportation system. Since its incorporation in November 2007,
the company had been engaged primarily in the design and
development of ultra-efficient three-wheeled electric vehicles.


ARIZONA: Redgrave Files Class Action
------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Doug Ducey, Arizona
Governor. The case is styled as Marcie A Redgrave, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v.
Doug Ducey, Arizona Governor, Thomas J Betlach, in his official
capacity as Director of the Arizona Health Care Cost Containment
System, Arizona Department of Economic Security and Arizona
Division of Developmental Disabilities named as Arizona DES
Division of Developmental Disabilites, Defendants, Case No. 2:18-
cv-01247-DLR (D. Ariz., April 23, 2018).

Arizona, a southwestern U.S. state, is best known for the Grand
Canyon, the mile-deep chasm carved by the Colorado River.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Kaitlyn Alissa Redfield-Ortiz, Esq.
   Lubin & Enoch PC
   349 N 4th Ave.
   Phoenix, AZ 85003
   Tel: (602) 234-0008
   Fax: (602) 626-3586
   Email: kaitlyn@lubinandenoch.com

      - and -

   Nicholas Jason Enoch, Esq.
   Lubin & Enoch PC
   349 N 4th Ave
   Phoenix, AZ 85003
   Tel: (602) 234-0008
   Fax: (602) 626-3586
   Email: nick@lubinandenoch.com

      - and -

   Stanley Lubin, Esq.
   Lubin & Enoch PC
   349 N 4th Ave
   Phoenix, AZ 85003
   Tel: (602) 234-0008
   Fax: (602) 626-3586
   Email: stan@lubinandenoch.com

The Defendants are represented by:

   Cory G Walker, Esq.
   Littler Mendelson PC
   2425 E Camelback Rd., Ste. 900
   Phoenix, AZ 85016-2907
   Tel: (602) 474-3616
   Fax: (602) 957-1801
   Email: cgwalker@littler.com

      - and -

   Mark Ogden, Esq.
   Littler Mendelson PC
   2425 E Camelback Rd., Ste. 900
   Phoenix, AZ 85016-2907
   Tel: (602) 474-3601
   Fax: (602) 957-1801
   Email: mogden@littler.com


AT&T CORP: Bid to Compel Arbitration in Improper Fees Suit Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Kenneth S. Hixson of the Court of Appeals of Arkansas for
the Division IV affirmed the trial court's order denying AT&T's
motion to compel arbitration in the case, AT&T CORPORATION,
Appellant, v. CLARK COUNTY, ARKANSAS EX REL HONORABLE TROY
TUCKER, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COUNTY JUDGE OF CLARK COUNTY
ARKANSAS, INDIVIDUALLY AND O/B/O A CLASS OF SIMILARLY SITUATED
PARTIES, Appellee, Case No. CV-17-735 (Ark. App.).

Clark County received telephone service from AT&T dating back to
at least 2009.  On March 17, 2017, Clark County filed a complaint
against AT&T on behalf of Clark County and all similarly situated
counties in Arkansas that received AT&T telephone service.  In
the complaint, Clark County alleged that AT&T had collected
improper and unlawful fees from Clark County and the putative
class members.

These allegedly improper fees included 911 fees, "Arkansas
Universal Service charges," and "Special municipal charges."
According to the complaint, over the course of the past six years
Clark County had asked AT&T to provide authority for its
imposition of these fees, but AT&T never provided any
satisfactory explanation for the fees.  Clark County sought a
declaratory judgment that Clark County and the putative class
members were not subject to imposition of the fees described in
the complaint, and requested an injunction to enjoin AT&T from
continuing to collect these fees. Clark County also asked for a
judgment for all improper fees that AT&T had collected.

AT&T filed a motion to stay the proceedings and compel
arbitration.  In its motion, AT&T relied on two documents.  The
first document is labeled "AT&T ILEC Plexar."  The second
document is labeled "AT&T ILEC Business Term and Volume Discount
Plan.

Clark County filed a response to AT&T's motion to compel
arbitration, asking that the motion be denied.  Clark County
contended that AT&T failed to produce any contract between the
parties containing an arbitration agreement and that Clark County
never agreed to arbitrate any claims with AT&T.

A hearing was held on the motion to compel arbitration.  On July
11, 2017, the trial court entered an order denying AT&T's motion
to compel arbitration.

AT&T appeals from the trial court's order denying AT&T's motion
to compel arbitration of a class-action complaint brought by
Appellee Clark County, individually and on behalf of similarly
situated parties.  On appeal, AT&T argues that the trial court's
finding that a contract to arbitrate was never formed contravenes
the Federal Arbitration Act and Arkansas law.  It also argues
that the trial court erred in invalidating the arbitration
provision on the ground that it deprived Clark County of a right
under state law to sue in court or pursue state statutory
remedies.

Judge Hixson concludes, for several reasons, that AT&T failed to
produce sufficient evidence that the parties agreed to modify
their contract to include the terms of the BSA.  First, AT&T did
not offer proof that it mailed any notification of the proposed
modification to Clark County.  Moreover, the form letter provided
that if the customer did not agree to the terms of the BSA, it
must contact AT&T no later than Oct. 1, 2013.  Because AT&T did
not show that the letter was sent to Clark County at all, it
certainly failed to demonstrate that Clark County received it in
time to contemplate the alleged modification and opt out.
Finally, even had there been proof that AT&T timely sent this
notice to Clark County, the letter provided, "Effective Oct. 1,
2013, if you are a retail customer, AT&T business
telecommunications services to which you subscribe (unless you
have an applicable written agreement) will be offered under the
terms and conditions of the enclosed Business Services Agreement
("BSA")."

Again, the Judge finds that an AT&T document contains an
ambiguous phrase, "applicable written agreement."  AT&T contends
that Clark County did not have an applicable written agreement as
intended by the notice.  However, Clark County contended that it
did have applicable written agreements with AT&T in the form of
the Service Agreement and the Volume Plan, neither of which
clearly manifested its assent to the BSA.  Clark County,
therefore, concludes that the above provision would not have put
Clark County on notice that its agreement was being modified to
include the BSA.  The Judge agrees with Clark County that, based
on the terms of the AT&T notice, Clark County did not agree to a
modification of its agreements with AT&T.

Because AT&T failed to demonstrate it communicated the
arbitration clause to Clark County or that Clark County assented
to it, the Judge affirmed the trial court's order denying AT&T's
motion to compel arbitration.  Because he affirmed on this basis,
he said he needs not address the trial court's alternate finding
that the arbitration clause infringed on Clark County's state
statutory remedies.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 14, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/WF0fPn from Leagle.com.

Smith Williams & Meeks L.L.P., by: Richard Smith; and Mayer Brown
LLP, by: Kevin S. Ranlett -- kranlett@mayerbrown.com -- pro hac
vice, and Madeleine L. Hogue -- mhogue@mayerbrown.com -- pro hac
vice, for appellant.

Arnold, Batson, Turner & Turner, PA by: Dan Turner and Todd
Turner, for appellee.


AT&T MOBILITY: Can Partly Arbitrate "Roberts" Suit
--------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARCUS A. ROBERTS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. AT&T
MOBILITY LLC, Defendant, Case No. 15-cv-03418-EMC (N.D. Cal.),
Judge Edward M. Chen of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California granted the Plaintiffs' motion to
reconsider and, on reconsideration, granted in part and denied in
part AT&T's motion to compel arbitration.

The Plaintiffs initiated the putative class action suit against
AT&T, asserting statutory, tort, and warranty claims based on
AT&T's deceptive and unfair trade practice of marketing its
wireless service plans as being 'unlimited,' when in fact those
plans are subject to a number of limiting conditions [in
particular, throttling] that either are not disclosed or
inadequately disclosed to consumers.

The Court compelled arbitration with respect to the parties'
dispute, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.  Approximately a month
after the Ninth Circuit's decision, the Plaintiffs filed a motion
for leave to file a motion for reconsideration.  More
specifically, they asked the Court to reconsider its arbitration
ruling because there is a new basis not previously considered by
the Court as to why arbitration should not be compelled.  It gave
the Plaintiffs leave to file a motion to reconsider and set a
briefing schedule for the motion.

Now pending before the Court is the Plaintiffs' motion to
reconsider.  AT&T argues that the Court should not even consider
the merits of the Plaintiffs' motion because of a procedural
error on their part -- i.e., they could have raised the McGill v.
Citibank, N.A. issue earlier in the litigation but failed to do
so.

In McGill, the California Supreme Court held that an arbitration
agreement that waives the right to seek the statutory remedy of
public injunctive relief in any forum is contrary to California
public policy and therefore unenforceable.  As a final argument,
AT&T asserts that, even if the Court finds that the McGill rule
is not preempted, at most, the Court should deny arbitration as
to only one Plaintiff, Marcus A. Roberts.  According to AT&T,
James Krenn has no McGill argument because his claims for relief
are governed by Alabama law, not California law.  As for Kenneth
A. Chewey and Ashley M. Chewey, although they are California
residents, AT&T contends that, because they are no longer AT&T
customers, any request for public injunctive relief is
effectively moot.

While AT&T's argument is not without basis, Judge Chen is not
persuaded.  While the McGill issue may have been percolating at
the time the Plaintiffs opposed AT&T's motion to compel
arbitration, there had been no favorable court rulings.  In fact,
the Ninth Circuit had issued an unfavorable ruling on a related
issue -- i.e., that California's Broughton-Cruz rule, which
prohibited parties from compelling public injunctions to
arbitration, was preempted by the FAA because such a rule
disfavored arbitration.

The Judge also finds that the Plaintiffs acted with reasonable
diligence once there was a ruling favorable to them -- i.e.,
McGill.  McGill was issued while the appeal of the Court's
arbitration order was before the Ninth Circuit.  Thus, the Court
did not have jurisdiction to entertain a new argument against
arbitration until the Ninth Circuit issued a ruling on the
appeal.  Once the Ninth Circuit did issue its decision in
December 2017, the Plaintiffs filed their motion for leave to
file a motion to reconsider within approximately a month.

The Judge finds merit to AT&T's argument with respect to Mr.
Krenn.  That is, it is not clear that Alabama courts would rule
the same as California courts regarding a waiver of public
injunctive relief (in any forum).  As for the Cheweys, however,
whether they have standing to proceed on a claim for injunctive
relief (public or otherwise) is an issue separate and distinct
from the enforceability of the arbitration agreement.  AT&T does
not dispute that the Cheweys' customer agreement contained the
problematic provision above barring public injunctive relief in
any forum (arbitration or otherwise).  That renders the
arbitration agreement in its entirety --per the poison pill -- a
nullity.

The Judge says AT&T may still argue to the Court that the Cheweys
lack standing to pursue any claim for injunctive relief, but that
does not change the fact that the forum for this standing
argument is a judicial forum rather than an arbitral one.  Their
standing may be subject to further adjudication.  Given that Mr.
Roberts has standing, the Court may at this juncture properly
declare the arbitration provision unenforceable.

For these reasons, Judge Chen granted the Plaintiffs' motion to
reconsider its arbitration ruling.  On reconsideration, the Judge
amended its arbitration order and granted in part and denied in
part AT&T's motion to compel arbitration.  More specifically, he
granted the motion to compel arbitration as to Krenn but denied
the motion to compel as to Roberts and the Cheweys.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 14, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/3sJBNe from Leagle.com.

Marcus A. Roberts, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Kenneth A. Chewey, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated & Ashley M. Chewey, on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by Alexander H. Schmidt -- schmidt@whafh.com -- Wolf
Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP, pro hac vice, Daniel Morley
Kekoa Hattis, Hattis Law, Jean Sutton Martin, Law Office of Jean
Sutton Martin, pro hac vice, Nicole Diane Sugnet --
nsugnet@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP,
Patrick A. Barthle, II, Morgan and Morgan Complex Litigation
Group, pro hac vice, Roger Norton Heller -- rheller@lchb.com --
Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP & Michael W. Sobol --
msobol@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP.

James Krenn, Plaintiff, represented by Alexander H. Schmidt, Wolf
Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP, pro hac vice, Daniel Morley
Kekoa Hattis, Hattis Law, Patrick A. Barthle, II, Morgan and
Morgan Complex Litigation Group, pro hac vice & Michael W. Sobol,
Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP.

AT&T Mobility LLC, Defendant, represented by Donald M. Falk --
dfalk@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown LLP, Archis Ashok Parasharami
-- aparasharami@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown LLP, pro hac vice,
Elspeth Victoria Hansen -- elspeth.hansen@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer
Brown LLP & Kevin Ranlett -- kranlett@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer
Brown LLP, pro hac vice.


AUDI AG: Judge Issues Ruling on Class Action Carriage Motions
-------------------------------------------------------------
Julius Melnitzer, writing for The Lawyer's Daily, reports that
so, Justice Paul Perell of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice
believes that law firms seeking carriage of a class action should
hire independent counsel to argue carriage motions.

Why?

For no less noble a reason than to "introduce an element or at
least the appearance of some objectivity," Justice Perell wrote
in his recent judgment awarding carriage of a competition class
action against a group of German carmakers to Harrison Pensa LLP
and Strosberg Sutts LLP.  They were the victors in what amounted
to a pissing contest against a second group composed of Koskie
Minsky LLP, Paliare Roland Rosenberg Rothstein LLP and Siskinds
LLP.

We can't, of coarse [this is not a spelling error], have judges
using language like "pissing contest" in public reasons: it
might, after all, make it too easy for the public to understand
what's really going on.  But despite these constraints, Justice
Perell did a great job, capturing the flavour of the thing by
describing carriage motions as "a blood sport of lawyer-bashing,"
one that was "gross and not helpful."  After all, the public
perfectly well understands clients bashing lawyers and should
therefore have little difficulty making the jump to lawyers
bashing lawyers, especially with lucrative contingency fees
serving as low-hanging fruit.

It's not that competing counsel in Quenneville v. Audi AG 2018
ONSC 1530 spent all their time awash in negativity, seeking to
"badmouth their rival." On the positive side, and doubtless by
way of advancing the cause of justice, they also managed to
"extol their own virtues".  Without getting into further details,
suffice it to say that Justice Perell found it necessary to point
out that the "self-reverent testimonials" in this case "were not
a pleasure to read."

As an aside, I thought reading the judgment was kind of fun.  A
23-page peroration lambasting the whole process on which a
judgment itself is based is a lot more fun than, say, poking
around in the arcane history of the rule against perpetuities.

But what's beyond me is why it took our judiciary a mere 25 years
from the coming into force of Ontario's Class Proceedings Act to
figure out that lawyers trying to get their hands on a lucrative
retainer were unlikely to regard objectivity with reverence.
Maybe that's why carriage motions are such a mess and continue to
vex counsel and the courts.  Maybe the endless list of factors
developed by judges as the criteria for deciding carriage motions
is a desperate attempt at imposing some semblance of objectivity
on the process.  If so, it doesn't seem to have worked.

"At last count, I think the test had 19 factors and a 19-factor
test is no test at all," said veteran class action litigator Kirk
Baert -- kmbaert@kmlaw.ca -- of Koskie Minsky.  "We need to
distill the list down to three things at most in order to reduce
the cost and complexity of carriage motions."

But how likely is that to happen? This, after all, is the
profession that still largely clings to the now infamous
"billable model" that has for years used a formula that
multiplies as many hours as possible by as quickly escalating
rates as possible in order to determine fees that are "fair," to
business and consumers alike.  Having 19 factors in the mill adds
a lot more grist than three would.

To be sure, that isn't entirely fair to the plaintiff's class
action bar, who lives and dies by the contingency fee.  And
contrary to public opinion and the opinions of envious brethren
still wedded to hourly rates and cost-conscious clients, class
counsel frequently deserve every penny of their contingency fees
in the risk-heavy operating theatre in which class actions
function.  Taking risks, after all, mean class counsel have to
exercise judgment, an endangered talent disincentivized elsewhere
in the profession by dutiful adherence to the "billable model."

Still, judgment doesn't appear to have come into play when
carriage is at stake.

"Carriage battles, like war, are hell," Mr. Baert said.  "A coin
toss may be preferable to what we are currently doing."

Now, that's objective. Some might say sensible in many cases.

So bet against it happening. [GN]


AVINGER INC: Has Deal to Settle Securities Suits for $5 Million
---------------------------------------------------------------
Avinger, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on March 30, 2018, for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2017, that the Company entered
into a binding memorandum of understanding to settle the
securities class actions pending against the Company and several
of its officers and directors.

Between May 22, 2017 and May 25, 2017, three class actions were
filed in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of
San Mateo ("State Court"), against the company and certain of its
officers and directors. The underwriters of the company's IPO in
January 2015 are also named as defendants.

The actions were captioned Grotewiel v. Avinger, Inc., et al.,
No. 17-CIV-02240, Gonzalez v. Avinger, Inc., et al., No. 17-CIV-
02284, and Olberding v. Avinger, Inc., et al., No. 17-CIV-02307.

These lawsuits allege that the registration statement for our IPO
made false and misleading statements and omissions in violation
of the Securities Act of 1933. Plaintiffs seek to represent a
class of purchasers of our common stock in and/or traceable to
the Company's IPO. Plaintiffs seek, among other things,
unspecified compensatory damages, interest, costs, recission, and
attorneys' fees.

Avinger said in its Form 10-Q Report for the quarterly period
ended September 30, 2017, that on June 12, 2017, defendants
removed these actions to the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California ("Federal Court"), where they
were captioned Grotewiel v. Avinger, Inc., No. 17-cv-03400,
Gonzalez v. Avinger, Inc., No. 17-cv-03401, and Olberding v.
Avinger, Inc., No. 17-cv-03398, and where the actions were
related and assigned to the same judge.

On June 22, 2017, and June 23, 2017, plaintiffs Olberding and
Gonzalez moved to remand their cases to the State Court.
Defendants opposed these motions. On July 21, 2017, the Federal
Court granted the motions to remand the Olberding and Gonzalez
actions to the State Court. On August 9, 2017, the State Court
consolidated the Olberding and Gonzalez actions under the caption
Gonzalez v. Avinger, Inc., et al., No. 17-CIV-02284 ("State
Action").

On September 22, 2017, an amended complaint was filed in the
State Action. On October 31, 2017, the parties in the State
Action stipulated to a stay of proceedings until judgment is
entered in the federal Grotewiel action ("Federal Action").

On October 11, 2017, the Federal Court appointed a lead plaintiff
and approved the selection of a lead counsel in the Federal
Action. An amended complaint was filed in the Federal Action on
November 21, 2017.

In its Form 10-K Report, the Company said that, in order to allow
the parties to pursue mandatory alternative dispute resolution,
the parties have stipulated and the Federal Court ordered that
defendants' motion to dismiss the Federal Action will be due on
January 17, 2018, with a hearing set for May 1, 2018.

The Company and its directors believes that the foregoing
lawsuits are entirely without merit; however, in the interest of
avoiding the cost and disruption of continuing to defend against
these lawsuits, on February 8, 2018 the Company participated in a
mediation to explore whether a settlement could be reached. While
a settlement was not reached then, the parties continued
discussions and they ultimately reached agreement.

On March 19, 2018, the Company entered into a binding memorandum
of understanding to settle the securities class actions pending
against the Company and several of its officers and directors.
The settlement is for a total of $5 million and, if approved by
the court, will result in a full release of claims against all
defendants. The Company's total contribution to the settlement
fund is $1.76 million.  The settlement is subject to final
documentation, notice to class members, and approval of the
court.

Avinger, Inc. is a commercial-stage medical device company that
designs, manufactures and sells image-guided, catheter-based
systems that are used by physicians to treat patients with
peripheral artery disease, or PAD. The company is based in
Redwood City, California.


BARNES & NOBLE: 7th Cir. Kills Another Big Data Breach Defense
--------------------------------------------------------------
Alison Frankel, writing for Reuters, reports that three years
ago, the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals upended data breach
class action litigation when it ruled in Remijas v. Neiman Marcus
that consumers whose confidential information has been stolen by
hackers have constitutional standing to sue. The 7th Circuit was
the first federal appellate court to reject defense arguments
that data breach victims hadn't suffered enough of an injury to
satisfy the standing requirements the U.S. Supreme Court
established in 2013's Clapper v. Amnesty International. Neiman
Marcus proved to be a harbinger: After the 7th Circuit decision,
the 3rd, 6th, 9th and D.C. Circuits have all agreed that data
breach victims have standing to bring class actions, despite
Clapper. The 4th and 8th Circuits still aren't convinced, but the
emerging appellate consensus is that the 7th Circuit was right in
Neiman Marcus.

Will we look back three years from now and say the same thing
about a data breach decision the 7th Circuit issued on April 11?

The appeals court revived a class action against Barnes & Noble
by consumers whose debit card information was exposed in a 2012
hack, holding that the named plaintiffs adequately alleged an
injury under state consumer protection laws. Chief Judge Diane
Wood and Judges Frank Easterbrook and David Hamilton rejected
Barnes & Noble's argument that none of the supposed injuries --
lost time, impeded access to bank accounts and the cost of credit
monitoring services -- met pleading standards.

Judge Easterbrook, writing for the panel, said Barnes & Noble's
argument was just a different version of data breach defendants'
challenges to plaintiffs' constitutional standing -- and was
equally futile in the context of a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim. "This seems to us a new label for an old
error," the opinion said. "To say that the plaintiffs have
standing is to say that they have alleged injury in fact, and if
they have suffered an injury then damages are available (if
Barnes & Noble violated the statutes on which the claims
rest)...These injuries can justify money damages, just as they
support standing."

I suspect the decision is going to be controversial. Barnes &
Noble's brief to the 7th Circuit includes a long list of
decisions in which courts have tossed data breach class actions
for failure to state a claim even if plaintiffs met standing
requirements. The 8th Circuit's 2017 ruling in Kuhns v.
Scottrade, for instance, affirmed the dismissal of a class action
by plaintiffs whose confidential information was stolen by
hackers who broke into the brokerage's database. Those hackers
actually used the information to set up a fake brokerage and
illegal gambling operations, but the 8th Circuit said (among
other things) that the complaint failed to allege actual damages.
"Massive class action litigation should be based on more than
allegations of worry and inconvenience," the 8th Circuit said.

The lead plaintiffs in the Barnes & Noble class action are from
California and Illinois, so Barnes & Noble also cited rulings
from those jurisdictions that cast doubt on the adequacy of the
alleged injuries under California and Illinois consumer laws. In
2016's Dugas v. Starwood Hotels, San Diego federal judge Gonzalo
Curiel dismissed state-law claims by data breach plaintiffs,
holding that the theft of their personal information is not "a
loss of money or property." The Starwood opinion highlighted that
injury allegations sufficient to establish standing don't
necessarily state an adequate claim.

Illinois rulings, meanwhile, have explicitly said that the
purchase of credit monitoring services does not give data breach
plaintiffs a claim strong enough to survive dismissal. "There is
a subtle but important distinction between whether an injury
gives a litigant standing and whether the same injury gives rise
to a legal claim upon which relief may be granted," wrote U.S.
District Judge Elaine Bucklo of Chicago in 2014's Moyer v.
Michaels Stores. "Illinois courts have rejected the argument that
an elevated risk of identity theft constitutes actual damage
(and) Moyer's purchase of credit monitoring protection also falls
short of constituting an economic injury under Illinois law."

The 7th Circuit, obviously, was unconvinced. In the Barnes &
Noble ruling, it said lower state and federal courts were wrong
about the adequacy of an Illinois state-law claim based on the
purchase of credit monitoring (and predicted the Illinois Supreme
Court would agree). "A monthly $17 out of pocket is a form of
'actual damage'," the opinion said. "It is real and measurable;
Illinois does not require more."

And California consumer protections justify a claim based on lost
time and lost access to funds, the appeals court said. "Losing
the use of money for three days may be a trifle to some people
(though to others it may be a calamity), but a trifling loss
suffices under California law," the 7th Circuit said. "And state
courts have said that significant time and paper-work costs
incurred to rectify violations also can qualify as economic
losses."

The writer said she emailed Barnes & Noble lawyer Kenneth
Chernof, Esq. -- kenneth.chernof@arnoldporter.com -- of Arnold &
Porter Kaye Scholer and plaintiffs' lawyer Erich Schork, Esq. --
e.schork@barnowlaw.com -- of Barnow & Associates to ask about the
impact of the 7th Circuit decision, and she didn't immediately
hear back from either. [GN]


BERGEN DISCOUNT: Court Partially Dismisses Wage & Hour Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE DORIA/MEMON DISC. STORES WAGE & HOUR LITIG,
Case No. 14 Civ. 7990 (S.D. N.Y.), Judge Robert W. Sweet of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York granted
in part and denied in part the motion of Defendant Sofiya Doria,
as Administrator of the Estate of Mohammed Doria, to dismiss the
claims brought by the Plaintiffs for failure to comply with an
April 12, 2017, discovery order.

The prior proceedings and underlying allegations of this long-
lasting Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), and New York Labor Law
("NYLL") case are detailed in prior opinions of the Court.

The action was initiated by the Plaintiffs on Oct. 4, 2014.  On
May 14 and May 22, 2015, Nassoko and Agyapong filed Consents to
Sue, respectively.  On June 25, 2015, they moved for conditional
certification of their FLSA claims, which was granted on Sept.
23, 2015.  At that time, the Court also granted their leave to
file an Amended Complaint, which was filed on Dec. 17, 2015.

On March 13, 2017, the Estate Defendant moved to compel
interrogatory responses from Agyapong and Nassoko.  On April 12,
2017, the Court granted the Estate Defendant's compel motion and
ordered Agyapong and Nassoko to provide a full and complete
response, without objections to the Estate Defendant's First Set
of Interrogatories within seven days.  The Order further noted
that future unresponsiveness to discovery or noncompliance with
the Order could lead to dismissal of their claims with prejudice.

On Oct. 10, 2017, the Court granted the Plaintiffs' motion for
class certification over the Plaintiffs' NYLL claims, in addition
to a subclass bring claims under the Wage Theft Prevention Act,
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).

On Dec. 29, 2017, the Estate Defendant has moved for the
dismissal of claims brought by the Plaintiffs for failure to
comply with a April 12, 2017 Order as sanctions for failure to
comply with Court orders, either pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 37 or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).  The
Estate Defendant also seeks attorneys' fees and costs for
bringing the instant motion.

On March 2 and March 7, 2018, the parties wrote the Court to
update that Agyapong had provided interrogatory responses to the
Estate Defendant.  The parties disagreed as to whether dismissal
was still an appropriate sanction.

Judge Sweet finds that Agyapong and Nassoko have a history of
ignoring Court orders and deadlines and refusing to even
communicate with their own counsel.  Nevertheless, he says it
would be unjust to dismiss the Plaintiffs' state law claims when
they fail to comply with FLSA discovery while other Plaintiffs
who never opted in to FLSA and never had discovery obligations
imposed upon them through FLSA are not subject to dismissal.

The Judge says the Court agrees with the reasoning already
adopted by others in the circuit and concludes that, pursuant to
Rules 37(b) and 41(b), a just and appropriate sanction in such
circumstances is to dismiss only Nassoko and Agyapong's non-
classwide opt-in claims.  Nassoko and Agyapong may, however, stay
in the certified class action and maintain their classwide
claims.

Lastly, as to the Estate Defendant's request for attorneys' fees
and costs under Rule 37(b)(2)(C), the Judge explains that at this
point in the action -- with a class certified and neither
Agyapong nor Nassoko assigned as the Class Representatives --
Agyapong and Nassoko are, functionally-speaking, absent class
members who have chosen to opt-in to the FLSA action.  A further
sanction of fees and costs would discourage involvement such
action and cautions away from granting the Estate Defendant's
request.

Moreover, while not condoning the behavior of delinquent opt-in
Plaintiffs like Agyapong and Nassoko, to order such an award
against the Plaintiffs alleging minimum wage violation, on top of
the already serious sanction of dismissing some of their claims,
would amount to a "disproportionately severe sanction."

For these reasons, Judge Sweet granted in part and denied in part
the Estate Defendant's motion.  Agyapong and Nassoko's opt-in
claims are dismissed, but sanctions are denied as to the
dismissal of Agyapong and Nassoko's classwide claims and the
Estate Defendant's request for attorneys' fees and costs.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 14, 2018 Opinion and Order
is available at https://is.gd/JbZTHo from Leagle.com.

Emmanuel Agropong, Plaintiff, represented by Adam Paul Slater --
nfo@sssfirm.com -- Slater Slater Schulman LLP, Kenneth J. Katz,
Katz Melinger PLLC, Anthony R. Portesy, Slater Slater Schulman
LLP, Christopher L. Van De Water, Phillips & Associates, PLLC,
Jennifer Lynne Marlborough, Wormser, Kiely, Galef & Jacobs LLP,
Jonathan Eric Schulman, Slater Slater Schulman LLP, Nicole Deanna
Grunfeld, Katz Melinger PLLC & Rhoda Yohai Andors, Slater Slater
Schulman LLP.

Marcos Basabe, Adrian Batana & Carlos Laguna, Plaintiffs,
represented by Adam Paul Slater, Slater Slater Schulman LLP,
Kenneth J. Katz, Katz Melinger PLLC, Jennifer Lynne Marlborough,
Wormser, Kiely, Galef & Jacobs LLP, Jonathan Eric Schulman,
Slater Slater Schulman LLP, Nicole Deanna Grunfeld, Katz Melinger
PLLC & Anthony R. Portesy, Slater Slater Schulman LLP.

Yolanda Nieve, Christine Nunez, Andy Osei, Abel Pantoja, Elietzer
Pierre-Louis, Josue Pierre-Louis, Hector Rosado & Surita Suedass,
individually, Plaintiffs, represented by Adam Paul Slater, Slater
Slater Schulman LLP, Kenneth J. Katz, Katz Melinger PLLC,
Christopher Marlborough, The Marlborugh Law Firm, P.C., Jennifer
Lynne Marlborough, Wormser, Kiely, Galef & Jacobs LLP, Jonathan
Eric Schulman, Slater Slater Schulman LLP, Nicole Deanna
Grunfeld, Katz Melinger PLLC & Anthony R. Portesy, Slater Slater
Schulman LLP.

David Richardson, Daniel Rodriguez & Roberto Rodriguez,
Plaintiffs, represented by Christopher Marlborough, The
Marlborugh Law Firm, P.C., Jennifer Lynne Marlborough, Wormser,
Kiely, Galef & Jacobs LLP, Jonathan Eric Schulman, Slater Slater
Schulman LLP, Nicole Deanna Grunfeld, Katz Melinger PLLC &
Anthony R. Portesy, Slater Slater Schulman LLP.

Surita Suedass, on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Adam Paul Slater, Slater Slater
Schulman LLP, Kenneth J. Katz, Katz Melinger PLLC, Jennifer Lynne
Marlborough, Wormser, Kiely, Galef & Jacobs LLP, Jonathan Eric
Schulman, Slater Slater Schulman LLP, Nicole Deanna Grunfeld,
Katz Melinger PLLC & Anthony R. Portesy, Slater Slater Schulman
LLP.

Joseph Kofei, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher Marlborough,
The Marlborugh Law Firm, P.C., Jennifer Lynne Marlborough,
Wormser, Kiely, Galef & Jacobs LLP, Jonathan Eric Schulman,
Slater Slater Schulman LLP & Anthony R. Portesy, Slater Slater
Schulman LLP.

Sergio Recinos, Keletso Tebogo, Abdourahmane Diop Sow, Jocelyn
Mandungu, Aneessa Aziz, Maria Sara Sumano, Wilda Rodriguez,
Michael Britton, uduaghan, mamadou diallo, Pelma, recinos, Miguel
Rosendo, Joseph Kofie, Israel Uduaghan, Santiago Pelma, Ronald
Agyemang, Abdul Rahim, Salawu Khairat, Nazrol Koysor, Cusilla
Singh, Brahima Diallo, Leon Lee, James Saylor, Moussa Camara,
Santos Suazo, Noha Bayo & Pedro Ulloa, Plaintiffs, represented by
Anthony R. Portesy, Slater Slater Schulman LLP, Jonathan Eric
Schulman, Slater Slater Schulman LLP & Jennifer Lynne
Marlborough, Wormser, Kiely, Galef & Jacobs LLP.

Rosendo & Yolanda Nieves, Plaintiffs, represented by Jonathan
Eric Schulman, Slater Slater Schulman LLP & Anthony R. Portesy,
Slater Slater Schulman LLP.

Olugbenga Opesanwo, Plaintiff, represented by Anthony R. Portesy,
Slater Slater Schulman LLP & Jennifer Lynne Marlborough, Wormser,
Kiely, Galef & Jacobs LLP.

Michael Memon, also known as Iqbal Memon, Gulan Doria, also known
as Iqbal Memon, Bergen Discount Inc., Bergen Discount Plus, Inc.,
518 Willis Realty, Inc., Willis Discount Inc., Ali M. Abadi,
doing business as Willis Discount, Ziad Nassradin, ZNF 99 Cent
Discount Corp., Dollar-Rite Inc., Todo Barato Discount Inc.,
Community Dollar Plus, Inc., 167 Trading Discount Inc., 167 Primo
Trading Inc., B&S Discount Inc., 99 Cent Discount & Party Store
Inc., 99 Cent Discount, Inc., Clear Choice, Inc., John and Jane
Does 1-50, John Doe Corporations 1-20, Usman Doria, Sikander
Doria, Musajee Vawda, Morris Discount, T.A. Rainbow, Community
Discount, Willis Discount, W.P. Rainbow, 167 Trading, ZNF
Discount, Clear Choice, Dollar Majic, Good Luck Discount,
Neighborhood Discount, Todo Barato, Daisy Discount, University
Discount, Royal Discount, W.A. Rainbow, Jackie Variety Inc.,
Willis Realty Inc., Moonlite Discount Inc., Popular Discount
Inc., 675 Morris Disc. Inc., Unique Discount, Inc., New Star
Discount, Inc., Terminal Discount Inc., Royal Discount Inc., Best
Discount, Inc., Bridge Discounts, Inc., Daisy Cosmetics, Inc.,
Happy Dollar Discount, Inc., 99 Cents Amor, Inc., Salim Doria, B
& S Discount & Mike Memon, Defendants, represented by Michael K.
Chong, Law Offices of Michael K. Chong, LLC.

Mohamed Doria & Sofiya Doria, Defendants, represented by Joseph
Michael Heppt -- Joseph.Heppt@hepptlaw.com -- Law Offices of
Joseph M. Heppt & Michael K. Chong, Law Offices of Michael K.
Chong, LLC.

Thank God, ThirdParty Plaintiff, represented by Anthony R.
Portesy, Slater Slater Schulman LLP.

Angel Cartagena & Jose Castillo, ADR Providers, represented by
Anthony R. Portesy, Slater Slater Schulman LLP & Jennifer Lynne
Marlborough, Wormser, Kiely, Galef & Jacobs LLP.


BERTOLLI OLIVE: Settles Class-Action Lawsuit for $7 Million
-----------------------------------------------------------
Cathy Siegner, writing for Food Dive, reports that Deoleo USA,
the manufacturer of Bertolli olive oil, settled a class-action
lawsuit by agreeing to pay $7 million and change its packaging
and testing protocols, according to the settlement agreement.

The complaint, filed in 2014, alleged that the company
misrepresented its products by labeling them as "imported from
Italy." The seven plaintiffs also questioned whether the olive
oil could be extra virgin quality after being exposed to sunlight
and heat and then further degrading while sitting on store
shelves.

The settlement terms require Deoleo to agree not to use the phase
"imported from Italy" unless its products are only manufactured
by using olives grown and pressed in Italy. The company also will
adopt stronger testing practices to make sure its products
conform with extra virgin olive oil standards.

Dive Insight:
When it comes to food fraud, olive oil is one of most common.
Products can easily be mixed with lower-quality oil, adulterated
or deceptively labeled -- and there is plenty of money to be made
from selling supposedly premium extra-virgin olive oil at premium
prices.

According to Mother Jones, in 2010, University of California-
Davis researchers found 69% of imported extra-virgin olive oil
samples bought off the shelf didn't meet international standards
required for that labeling. To combat these challenges, some
producers are trying to increase consumer confidence in the
product. Italian producer Bellucci has developed an app to keep
track of the milling and bottling processes carried out by its
growers in Italy. Consumers can trace any bottle of the company's
extra-virgin olive oil to its point of origin.

Class-action lawsuits obviously don't help and could cast doubt
on those olive oil products that are legitimately labeled and
contain what the manufacturers claim is inside. As a result,
other olive oil manufacturers and importers also may want to keep
a closer eye on their sourcing, along with labeling and condition
during transportation and storage, in order to keep their
products as fresh as possible until they are sold.

Bertolli would be wise to shore up its reputation and win back
the loyalty of disillusioned customers. Deoleo, its Spanish
parent company, announced last summer that it planned to spend
about $25 million on relaunching and marketing in Italy and the
U.S., where it gets 60% of its profits. Perhaps some of this
money can be diverted for improving its reputation.

Fallout from this settlement could encourage more olive oil
production in California, which might mean better oversight,
higher quality, fresher products and maybe even lower prices.
It's easier to guarantee authenticity when everything is produced
on U.S. soil, and marketing campaigns touting this factor could
win over consumers.

If California producers include consumer education about the
sourcing and grades of olive oil, and possibly sponsor some in-
store tastings in select markets, the outcome may give a major
boost to the paltry 5.8% of the total U.S. consumption currently
originating from the Golden State.

Olives are high in vitamin E and are full of antioxidants and
monosaturated fat, value-adds that today's health-conscious
consumers are looking for. If domestic producers push these
health benefits -- and assure consumers that their products are
the real deal -- it might give the sector added momentum.[GN]


BIOAMBER INC: Continues to Defend NY Securities Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
BioAmber Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on March 30, 2018, for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2017, that the company continues
to defend a putative securities class action lawsuit in federal
district court in New York.

On March 18, 2017, a putative securities class action lawsuit was
filed against the company and Messrs. Huc, Orecchioni and Saucier
in federal district court in New York alleging violations of the
U.S. Exchange Act and the Securities Act. The complaint
principally alleges that the prospectus for the company's January
2017 follow-on public offering failed to disclose the
postponement of a large customer order. On June 6, 2017, the
Court appointed a lead plaintiff and lead counsel.

On August 7, 2017, the lead plaintiff filed an amended complaint.
The amended complaint names the company, and Messrs. Huc and
Saucier as defendants (Mr. Orecchioni is not named as a
defendant). The amended complaint alleges violations of the U.S.
Exchange Act. There are no U.S. Securities Act claims alleged in
the amended complaint. The amended complaint is premised on
allegedly false and misleading fourth quarter 2016 and fiscal
year 2016 revenue projections set forth in the prospectuses for
our December 2016 and January 2017 public offerings. On October
6, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended
complaint.

On December 5, 2017, the lead plaintiff filed a cross-motion for
leave to amend the amended complaint (attaching a proposed second
amended complaint). Briefing on defendants' motion to dismiss the
amended complaint and lead plaintiff's cross-motion for leave to
amend the amended complaint and related motions was completed on
March 2, 2018.

BioAmber said "We believe that the suit is without merit and
intend to continue to vigorously defend it."

BioAmber Inc. is an industrial biotechnology company producing
renewable chemicals. The company's proprietary technology
platform combines industrial biotechnology and chemical catalysis
to convert bio-based feedstocks into renewable chemicals that are
cost-competitive replacements for petroleum-derived chemicals
used in a wide variety of everyday products including plastics,
resins, paints, food additives and personal care products.


BNV HOME: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss "Tagaeva" FLSA/NYLL Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Roslynn R. Mauskopf of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of New York denied BNV's motion to dismiss the
case, NODIRA TAGAEVA; KHALIMA DEKHKANOVA; and NAZOKAT ATAKHANOVA,
Plaintiffs, v. BNV HOME CARE AGENCY, INC., Defendant, No. 16-CV-
6869 (RRM) (RLM) (E.D. N.Y.).

Plaintiffs Tagaeva, Dekhkanova, and Atakhanova bring the putative
class action against their employer BNV, alleging violations of
the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), and the New York Labor Law
("NYLL").  They seek to hold BNV liable for its failure to pay
them and other home health aides overtime between Jan. 1, 2015
and Nov. 12, 2015.

The Plaintiffs are home health aides, who were employed by BNV in
January 2015.  They allege that they worked in excess of 40 hours
per week, but did not receive one and one-half times their
regular pay as overtime compensation.  The issue before the Court
is whether the rule entitling them to overtime compensation under
the FLSA was in effect between January and November 2015.

Section 207 of the FLSA requires employers to pay their employees
overtime compensation whenever employees work more than 40 hours
per week.  However, the FLSA also provides several exemptions to
this requirement.  Relevant in the case, the FLSA exempts from
overtime eligibility any employee employed in domestic service
employment to provide companionship services for individuals who
are unable to care for themselves.  Until 2013, this exemption
applied to all home health aides employed by third parties,
unless they could show that their general housework duties
exceeded 20% of their total weekly hours.

Then, in 2013, the law changed.  After a notice and comment
period, the Department of Labor ("DOL") issued a new regulation,
which removed third-party employees from the exemption.  Under
the new DOL Regulation, home health aides are entitled to the
FLSA's minimum wage and overtime compensation guarantees when
they are employed by a third-party employer, rather than by the
person to whom they provide their services.  The Third-Party
Employer Rule was to go into effect on Jan. 1, 2015.

Before the effective date, however, a group of home health care
trade associations challenged the Third-Party Employer Rule in
the D.C. District Court, arguing that the DOL had overstepped its
rulemaking authority, Home Care Assn of Am. v. Weil ("Wel I").
In December 2014, the District Court invalidated the regulation.
The DOL appealed, and on Aug. 21, 2015, a unanimous panel of the
D.C. Circuit found that the DOL had acted within its authority,
and reversed the District Court, Home Care Ass'n of Am. v. Weil
("Weil II").

In the wake of the D.C. Circuit's Weil II opinion, the DOL
published several comments about its enforcement of the Third-
Party Employer Rule.  On Sept. 14, 2015, it issued a policy
statement alerting the public that it would not bring enforcement
actions against employers for violations of the regulations until
30 days after the date the Court of Appeals issues a mandate
making its opinion effective.  The DOL noted in the same
statement that the effective date of the Third-Party Employer
Rule remained Jan. 1, 2015.  On Oct. 27, 2015, the DOL published
another piece of guidance, identifying Nov. 12, 2015-30 days
after the mandate -- as the last day of its non-enforcement
period.

BNV claims that the rule entitling the Plaintiffs to overtime
went into effect only in November 2015, and accordingly, filed a
motion to dismiss.  The Plaintiffs argue, by contrast, that the
rule went into effect on Jan. 1, 2015.  In addition, the
Plaintiffs ask the Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over their NYLL claims.

Judge Muskopf finds that given the overwhelming presumption of
retroactivity post-James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, kilns
case presents nothing out of the ordinary when it comes to the
authority of a Court of Appeals to render null and void decisions
of the district court with which it disagrees.  The effective
date of the DOL Regulation remains Jan. 1, 2015.  That the DOL
said it would not bring enforcement actions until Nov. 12, 2015
does not change the fact that the DOL Regulation went into effect
on Jan. 1, 2015.  Indeed, it is difficult to see the unfairness
to BNV when it was given ample notice of the change in the DOL's
regulations: the changes to the rule were announced in 2013, but
were not to go into effect until 2015.  Accordingly, the Judge
finds that there is no reason to depart from the general rule
that all civil judicial decisions apply retroactively.  Weil II
therefore nullified the D.C. District Court's vacatur of the
third-party employer regulation, making the effective date Jan.
1, 2015.

Because both the federal and state labor law claims arise out of
the Plaintiffs' employment with BNV, the Court will exercise its
supplemental jurisdiction over the NYLL claims.  The Judge
explains that the NYLL overtime compensation claim turns on the
Court's analysis of the FLSA and the wage statement claims form a
smaller part of the case.  At least at this juncture, the state
law claims do not overwhelm and swallow the relatively minor
federal claims.  Finally, the Judge has not dismissed the FLSA
claims over which it has original jurisdiction, nor does the case
pose any exceptional circumstances.

For the reasons she stated, Judge Mauskopf denied BNV's motion to
dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 13, Memorandum and 2018
Order is available at https://is.gd/m6Fang from Leagle.com.

Nodira Tagaeva, Khalima Nix Dekhkanova & Nazokat R Atakhanova,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Gennadiy Naydenskiy --
naydenskiylaw@gmail.com -- Naydenskiy Law Group, P.C.

BNV Home Care Agency, Inc., also known as BNV Home Care Services,
Inc. & BNV Home Care Services, Inc., Defendants, represented by
Jed Matthew Weiss -- jweiss@coleschotz.com -- Cole Schotz & Randi
W. Kochman -- rkochman@coleschotz.com -- Cole Schotz Meisel
Forman & Leonard, P.A.


CALIFORNIA: Court Dismisses CDCR as Defendant in "Hammler" Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ALLEN HAMMLER, Plaintiff, v. DIRECTOR OF CDCR, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-1949 DB P (E.D. Cal.),
Magistrate Judge Deborah Barnes of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of California, recommended that the (i)
Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP") be
granted; (ii) Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction be
denied; (ii) Plaintiff's motion for class certification be
denied; and (iv) California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation ("CDCR") be dismissed as a Defendant.

The Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a
civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.  He
claims the Defendants have failed to provide him with safe living
conditions in violation of the Eighth Amendment.  The Plaintiff
is currently incarcerated at Kern Valley State Prison.  He states
his claims arose at California State Prison-Sacramento and all
other sensitive needs yards of the CDCR.  He names as Defendants
CDCR, the director of CDCR, and the secretary of CDCR.

The Plaintiff's complaint alleges as follows: he is a convicted
sex offender and has been a sensitive needs yard ("SNY") inmate
since 2009.  In agreeing to house on a SNY plaintiff agreed to
leave the main-line and gang politics behind and in exchange
prison officials would provide him with predatory free living
conditions.

The Plaintiff states he has been pressured by other inmates to
show them paperwork verifying his commitment offense.  He claims
that in doing so, or refusing, he has had to fight for his life
in order to escape and get out of the cell.  He further alleges
unspecified correctional officers spread information to other
inmates regarding his status as a sex offender.

The Plaintiff claims that in an effort to avoid physical
altercations with other inmates he has refused to accept
cellmates and received rules violations as a result of his
refusals.  He suffers from psychological anguish and fears being
physically assaulted.  He further claims sex offenders on SNYs
are targets of assault by gang members.

The Plaintiff requests the Defendants create a sensitive needs
yard specifically for sex offenders that excludes gang members.
Additionally, he requests a reduction in security level points
that he has received based on rules violations for refusing
housing assignments.

Before the Court are the Plaintiff's IFP motion, his complaint
for screening, his motion for a preliminary injunction, and his
motion for class certification.

The Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing
required by 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(a).  Accordingly, Magistrate
Judge Barnes granted the request to proceed in forma pauperis

The Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350
for the action.  By the Magistrate's Order, the Plaintiff will be
assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the
provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(b)(1).  By separate order,
the Court will direct the appropriate agency to collect the
initial partial filing fee from the Plaintiff's trust account and
forward it to the Clerk of the Court.  Thereafter, the Plaintiff
will be obligated for monthly payments of 20% of the preceding
month's income credited to his prison trust account.  These
payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk
of the Court each time the amount in his account exceeds $10,
until the filing fee is paid in full.

The Magistrate Judge holds that the CDCR, as a state agency, is
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity regardless of the relief
sought by the Plaintiff.  Accordingly, she will recommend CDCR be
dismissed as a Defendant.

As to the Plaintiff's claims against the Director and the
Secretary of CDCR, the Magistrate holds that the Plaintiff has
not alleged sufficient facts to support a claim that his Eighth
Amendment rights are being violated or that the Defendants
personally participated in the alleged deprivation of
constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act
to prevent them; or promulgated or "implemented a policy so
deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of
constitutional rights and is the moving force of the
constitutional violation.

As to his breach of contract claim, the Magistrate holds that the
Court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
Plaintiff's state law claims because the Plaintiff has not stated
a cognizable federal claim and the court expresses no opinion on
the merits of the claim.

The Plaintiff's declaration filed Feb. 20, 2018 detailed an
attempted stabbing and his declaration filed March 5, 2018
alleged a correctional officer informed other inmates of his
status as a sex offender. In light of these allegations,
Magistrate Judge Barnes will order the Office of the Attorney
General to contact the litigation coordinator at Kern Valley
State Prison and inform the court about what measures are being
taken to address the Plaintiff's safety concerns.  And because
the Plaintiff is proceeding in pro se in the matter he does not
have the authority to represent other inmates.  Therefore, she
will recommend his motion for class certification be denied.

Finally, the Magistrate holds that because the Plaintiff fails to
state a cognizable claim, the Plaintiff will be given the
opportunity to amend the complaint.  The Plaintiff is advised
that in an amended complaint he must clearly identify each
Defendant and the action that the Defendant took that violated
his constitutional rights.

Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Barnes granted the Plaintiff's
motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.  She says the
Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350
for the action.  The Plaintiff is assessed an initial partial
filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section
1915(b)(1).  All fees will be collected and paid in accordance
with the Court's order to the Director of the CDCR filed
concurrently with the Order.

She dismissed with leave to amend the Plaintiff's complaint.  The
Plaintiff is granted 30 days from the date of service of the
Order to file an amended complaint that complies with the
requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice.  The amended
complaint must bear the docket number assigned the case and must
be labeled First Amended Complaint.  If the Plaintiff fails to
file an amended complaint, this court may recommend dismissal of
the action.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to randomly assign the matter
to a District Judge.  The Office of the Attorney General is
instructed to: (i) contact the Kern Valley State Prison
Litigation Coordinator to determine what, if anything is
presently being done to address the Plaintiff's safety concerns;
(ii) within 20 days after the filing date of the Order, file and
serve a statement reflecting the findings of such an inquiry,
including all appropriate declarations; and (iii) the Clerk of
the Court is directed to serve a copy of the Order on Ms. Monica
Anderson, Supervising Deputy Attorney General.

Magistrate Judge Barnes recommended that the Plaintiff's motion
for preliminary injunction be denied; that the Plaintiff's motion
for class certification be denied; and the CDCR be dismissed as a
Defendant.

She says her findings and recommendations are submitted to the
United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to
the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1).  Within 14 days
after being served with these findings and recommendations, any
party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy
on all parties.  Such a document should be captioned "Objections
to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations."  Any
response to the objections will be filed and served within 14
days after service of the objections.  The parties are advised
that failure to file objections within the specified time may
waive the right to appeal the District Court's order.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 14, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/f33JIn from Leagle.com.

Allen Hammler, Plaintiff, pro se.


CANADA: Class Action Over Montreal Airport Noise Pollution Okayed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CBC News reports that a group of homeowners who live along the
flight paths of Montreal's Trudeau International Airport say
they're thrilled the class action lawsuit request they filed has
been authorized to go forward.

"The noise is intolerable," said Pierre Lachapelle, president of
the citizen group Les Pollues de Montreal-Trudeau.  "The people
have had enough."

The lawsuit targets the airport authority, the federal Ministry
of Transport and Nav Canada, the company that runs Canada's civil
air navigation service.

Mr. Lachapelle, who lives in Ahuntsic, says when a plane flies
over his home, it sounds like a home invasion.

"It fills your space -- for a short period of time -- but it's
awful.  It's awful to hear," he said.

The lawsuit was filed on behalf of residents in as many as nine
neighbourhoods who live along the airport's flight paths,
including Saint-Laurent, Ahuntsic, Saint-Michel and Villeray.

The group says the noise made by airplanes flying over their
homes is ruining their quality of life.

"During the summer, if your windows are open on a Friday evening,
planes can come as [often as] once every two minutes," said
Michel Dion, whose name is on the lawsuit alongside
Mr. Lachapelle's, on behalf of Les Pollues.

The group hasn't yet set a dollar amount for compensation.
Mr. Dion says the priority is to reduce the noise.  Still, he
says he would like to be reimbursed for the triple-pane windows
he installed in some rooms because of it.

Planes louder and flying lower: homeowner
Roger Trottier has lived in Saint-Laurent since 1994. He says he
and his wife bought their home when most flights to Montreal were
to be redirected to the Mirabel airport.

But since then, Mr. Trottier says, the planes have gotten bigger,
louder, more frequent and seem to fly at lower altitudes.

"I bought and I'm sorry to have bought because things started to
change slowly, year after year after that.  And now, we find that
we have some 60 to 70 flights between 11 p.m. and 7 a.m.,"
Mr. Trottier said.

According to airport authority Aeroports de Montreal, the highest
noise level in 2015 was 63 decibels, recorded in Dorval.

Other neighbourhoods, including Saint-Laurent, Town of Mont-
Royal, Pointe-Claire and Ahuntsic, had readings ranging from 38
decibels to 59 decibels.

The World Health Organization states people should not be exposed
to more than 55 decibels.  The Canadian standard is 65 decibels.

A 1st in Quebec, lawyer says
The class action go-ahead, granted by Justice Chantal Tremblay,
means the airport and the ministry must hand over information,
including takeoff and landing practices as well as statistics on
airplane noise.

Gerard Samet, the lawyer representing the group, said he
considers Tremblay's decision a big victory -- a first in Quebec
for an airport the size of Montreal's.

"This judgment is an extremely new development.  Before
aeronautical activities were strictly overseen by the federal
government," said.  "Now, they can no longer be ignored by
[civil] law." [GN]


CANCER GENETICS: June 4 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
----------------------------------------------------------
Safirstein Metcalf LLP, on April 11 disclosed that a class action
lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey on behalf of all persons or entities who purchased or
otherwise acquired Cancer Genetics, Inc. (NASDAQ:CGIX) ("Cancer
Genetics" or the "Company") securities between March 23, 2017 and
April 2, 2018 (the "Class Period").

If you purchased or acquired Cancer Genetics securities during
the class period, and would like more information about the
shareholder class action, please contact Safirstein Metcalf LLP
at 1-800-221-0015, or email info@SafirsteinMetcalf.com

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court
no later than June 4, 2018.   A lead plaintiff is a
representative party acting on behalf of other class members in
directing the litigation.  Any member of the putative class may
move the Court to serve as lead plaintiff through counsel of
their choice or may choose to do nothing and remain an absent
class member.

According to the complaint, the Company issued false and/or
misleading statements and/or failed to disclose information
pertinent to investors.  On April 2, 2018, the Company reported
that, following its CEO's departure, it conducted a comprehensive
review of its strategy and organization.  This led the Company to
record a bad debt expense of $4.4 million and write off $1.8
million of its accounts receivable in the fourth quarter, with a
significant portion related to collection issues with accounts
receivables recorded after 2015.  The Company also reported that,
on December 31, 2017, its "cash position and history of losses
required management to assess [its] ability to continue operating
as a going concern[.]"  Following this news, shares of Cancer
Genetics fell $0.55 per share or over 33% to close at $1.10 per
share on April 3, 2018.

                  About Safirstein Metcalf LLP

Safirstein Metcalf LLP focuses its practice on shareholder
rights.  The law firm also practices in the areas of antitrust
and consumer protection. [GN]


CAPGEMINI NORTH: Subclasses in ERISA Suit Certified
---------------------------------------------------
In the case, PRANAV BHATTACHARYA and NAVANEETHA KOOTHAPILLAI,
individually and for all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. CAPGEMINI NORTH AMERICA, INC., CAPGEMINI FINANCIAL SERVICES
USA, INC., and PETER KORNOWSKE, Defendants, Case No. 16 C 7950
(N.D. Ill.), Judge Matthew F. Kennelly of the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, granted
the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification, except as to the
claims in count 1.

Bhattacharya and Koothapillai have filed suit on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated against Capgemini
Financial Services USA, Inc. (now known as Capgemini America,
Inc.), its parent company Capgemini North America, Inc., and
Peter Kornowske, a former Capgemini Financial Services USA
employee, for alleged violations of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act ("ERISA"), as amended by the Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 ("COBRA").  The
Plaintiffs, who were employed by Capgemini Financial Services
USA, have asserted four claims arising from the Defendants'
alleged failure to comply with a number of ERISA and COBRA
requirements related to group health plans and continuation
coverage.

First, in count 1, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants,
including Kornowske, who was listed as the group health plan
administrator at the time, failed to furnish to them a copy of
the summary plan description ("SPD") for the group health
insurance plan within 90 days after they became participants, in
violation of 29 U.S.C. Section 1024(b)(1).  In count 2, they
allege that the Defendants violated 29 U.S.C. Section 1166(a)(1)
by failing to provide them written notice of their rights under
COBRA at the time of commencement of coverage under the plan.  In
count 3, they allege that the Defendants failed to notify the
plan administrator of "qualifying events" triggering eligibility
for COBRA coverage and that the Defendants, as plan
administrators themselves, failed to notify them of their right
to continuation coverage under COBRA based on the occurrence of a
qualifying event, as required by 29 U.S.C. Section 1166(a)(2) and
(4).  Lastly, in count 4, they allege that the Defendants
violated 29 U.S.C. Section 1161(a), which requires group health
plan sponsors to provide each qualified beneficiary who would
lose coverage under the plan as a result of a qualifying event
the opportunity to elect COBRA continuation coverage.

The Plaintiffs have moved for the case to be certified as a class
action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  In
their initial motion for class certification, the Plaintiffs
moved to certify the class of all current and former Indian IT
Workers who worked for the Defendants, who participated in
Capgemini's Group Health Plan together with their spouses and
covered dependents at any time from Aug. 8, 2014 to the date of
judgment in the action, and who did not receive proper COBRA
notice and subsequent coverage in violation of ERISA.

In response to the Defendants' objections that the proposed class
was overbroad and an impermissible fail-safe class, the
Plaintiffs proposed two subclass definitions in their reply
brief: (i) all current and former Indian national employees who
elected coverage under the Defendants' GHP, together with their
spouses and other covered dependents, at any time during the
relevant statutory period, who were not provided a SPD or initial
COBRA notice; and (ii) all current and former Indian national
employees who elected coverage under the Defendants' GHP,
together with their spouses and other covered dependents, at any
time during the relevant statutory period, and who were not
provided notice of COBRA continuation coverage upon the complete
loss of coverage.

The Defendants filed a surreply addressing the proposed revised
class definitions.  In addition to arguing that the proposed
subclasses do not satisfy the Rule 23 requirements for class
certification, they object to both of the proposed definitions.

Judge Kennelly agrees that the Plaintiffs' proposed definition is
overly broad.  He says it is clear that the event the Plaintiffs
are concerned with is the so-called "transfer" between Capgemini
FS and Capgemini India, which results in a loss of coverage under
Capgemini FS's group health plan.  By referring to these
"transfers" as "the complete loss of coverage" in their proposed
subclass definition, however, they inadvertently sweep into the
class all Indian nationals who lost coverage upon outright
termination from Capgemini FS.  Their reluctance to refer to the
move from Capgemini FS back to Capgemini India as a "transfer"
for purposes of the subclass definition is understandable, in
light of their position that such transfers are actually
terminations (and, thus, qualifying events that trigger
defendants' COBRA obligations).  In their attempt to avoid use of
the word "transfer," however, they have proposed a class
definition that ends up overly broad.  The Judge therefore
refines the Plaintiffs' proposed subclass definition accordingly.

The Judge also agrees with the Defendants that the vague
reference to "the relevant statutory period" in each of the two
proposed subclass definitions is problematic from an
ascertainability perspective.  The Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification initially defined the relevant time frame as being
from Aug. 8, 2014 to the date of judgment in the action.  They
explained that they selected the Aug. 8, 2014 date because they
filed the initial complaint on Aug. 8, 2016, and the statute of
limitations applicable to such COBRA claims in Illinois is two
years.  The Defendants have not contested the applicability of a
two-year statute of limitations.  Accordingly, the Judge revises
each of the proposed class definitions to include only those
claims that arose on Aug. 8, 2014 or later.

The Judge now determines whether each of these proposed
subclasses, as revised, meets the requirements of Rule 23(a) and
Rule 23(b)(3):

     a. Proposed subclass one: All current and former Indian
national employees who elected coverage under the Defendants'
group health plan, together with their spouses and other covered
dependents, from Aug. 8, 2014 to the date of judgment in the
action, who were not provided a SPD or initial COBRA notice; and

     b. Proposed subclass two: All current and former Indian
national employees who elected coverage under the Defendants'
group health plan, together with their spouses and other covered
dependents and who were not provided notice of COBRA continuation
coverage upon loss of coverage under Capgemini FS's group health
plan as a result of a transfer from Capgemini FS to Capgemini
India, from Aug. 8, 2014 to the date of judgment in the action.

The proposed class one corresponds to counts 1 and 2 of the
Plaintiffs' amended complaint, in which they allege ERISA and
COBRA notice violations at or near the time of enrollment in the
plan.  The proposed class two corresponds to counts 3 and 4 of
the complaint, pertaining to alleged COBRA violations at the time
proposed class members are "transferred" from Capgemini FS back
to Capgemini India.

Judge Kennelly denied the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification without prejudice in part (with respect to count 1)
and granted it in part (with respect to counts 2 through 4).

He certified, pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), these subclasses:

     a. Subclass one: All current and former Indian national
employees who elected coverage under the Defendants' group health
plan, together with their spouses, from Aug. 8, 2014 to the date
of judgment in the action, who were not provided written notice
of their COBRA rights at the time of commencement of coverage
under the plan; and

     b. Subclass two: All current and former Indian national
employees who elected coverage under defendants' group health
plan, together with their spouses and other covered dependents
and who were not provided notice of COBRA continuation coverage
upon loss of coverage under Capgemini FS's group health plan as a
result of a transfer from Capgemini FS to Capgemini India from
Aug. 8, 2014 to the date of judgment in the action.

He appointed Bhattacharya and Koothapillai as the class
representatives, and their current counsel as the class counsel.
He deferred ruling on the parties' pending cross-motions for
summary judgment to allow time for class members to receive
notice of the action and to avoid running afoul of the rule
against one-way intervention.  The case is set for an in-person
status hearing on March 28, 2018 at 9:30 a.m.  The Judge expects
the parties, before that date, to discuss and attempt to agree
upon a proposed class notice or notices and to work on compiling
a list of appropriate notice recipients.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 14, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/Ots7ai from Leagle.com.

Pranav Bhattacharya, Individually and for all others similarly
situated & Navaneetha Koothapillai, Plaintiffs, represented by
Catherine T. Mitchell, Stephan Zouras, LLP, James B. Zouras --
jzouras@stephanzouras.com -- Stephan Zouras, LLP & Ryan F.
Stephan -- rstephan@stephanzouras.com -- Stephan, Zouras, LLP.

Capgemini North Ameica, Inc & Capgemini Financial Services USA,
Inc, Defendants, represented by Gerald D. Silver --
gerry.silver@sandw.com -- Sullivan & Worcester Llp, Andrew David
Shapiro -- ashapiro@butlerrubin.com -- Butler, Rubin, Saltarelli
& Boyd LLP & Cheryl Tama Oblander -- ctama@agdglaw.com --
Aronberg Goldgehn Davis & Garmisa.

PETER KORNOWSKE, Defendant, represented by Gerald D. Silver,
Sullivan & Worcester Llp & Andrew David Shapiro, Butler, Rubin,
Saltarelli & Boyd LLP.


CAREFUSION SOLUTIONS: Court Dismisses "Ward" Suit
-------------------------------------------------
Judge Mary M. Johnston of the Superior Court of Delaware
dismissed without prejudice the case, STEVE WARD and FRANCIS
TRESSA, individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated persons, Plaintiffs, v. CAREFUSION SOLUTIONS, LLC,
Defendant, C.A. No. N17C-10-199 MMJ (Del. Super.).

The class action suit was brought to recover allegedly unpaid
wages and work expenses.  CareFusion licenses, sells, and leases
assorted medical devices.  CareFusion hired Ward, Tressa, and the
putative class, to service CareFusion's products pursuant to a
Maintenance and Service Agreement.  The Plaintiffs allege that
they should be classified as CareFusion's employees, not
independent contractors.  They further allege that, as employees,
Sections 510, 1194, 1198, and 2802 of the California Labor Code
entitle them to recover for CareFusion's failure to reimburse the
Plaintiffs for work-related expenses and CareFusion's failure to
pay them overtime wages.

In response, CareFusion has filed the Motion to Dismiss, arguing
that the California laws on which the Plaintiffs rely do not
apply to work performed outside of California.  The Plaintiffs
counter by arguing that California law controls, because the
Maintenance and Service Agreements designate California as the
choice of law.  Should the Court find that California law does
not apply, the Plaintiffs seek leave to amend their complaint to
add facts establishing their presence within California and to
include violations of Delaware and Pennsylvania law.

Judge Johnston finds that it appears that there is no common law
specifically analyzing California Labor Code Sections 510, 1194,
and 1198, which define and create a civil cause of action on the
basis of a failure to pay overtime or minimum wage.  The language
of these statutes does not suggest that these sections should
apply outside of California.  When considering related statutes,
California courts have demonstrated an intent to narrowly apply
its wage laws, limiting who qualifies as a wage earner of
California to a person who resides in California, receives pay in
California, and works exclusively, or principally, in California.
No part of the Labor Code and no case interpreting the Labor Code
suggests that the law should apply extraterritorially on the sole
basis of a choice-of-law clause.

Therefore, the Judge says the Motion to Dismiss must be granted,
because an employee cannot create by contract a cause of action
that California law does not provide.  The choice-of-law clauses
would govern claims that arise from the agreement itself; they
cannot create claims that exist independent of the contract.

However, the Judge says she is granting the Motion to Dismiss
without prejudice and granting Plaintiffs leave to amend the
complaint.  Though the contract is insufficient to create a cause
of action under California law, it would not be futile for the
Plaintiffs to amend the complaint to assert contract claims23 or
claims based on labor laws in states in which Plaintiffs
performed services.  The Plaintiffs therefore are entitled to
amend their Complaint as a matter of course.

Finally, the Judge says she will not address CareFusion's
Commerce Clause Argument.  CareFusion waived this argument by
raising it for the first time in its reply brief.

Judge Johnston concludes that the Plaintiffs allege causes of
action based on provisions of the California Labor Code.  A
choice-of-law clause alone is insufficient to permit them a cause
of action under the California Labor code.  Hence, she dismissed
without prejudice the Plaintiffs' Complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 13, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/vyYoyM from Leagle.com.

Daniel C. Herr, Esq. -- dherr@dherrlaw.com -- (Argued), Jack D.
McInnes, Esq. -- jack@mcinnes-law.com -- Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and the Putative Class.

Elizabeth S. Fenton, Esq. -- Elizabeth.Fenton@saul.com --
Danielle N. Petaja, Esq. -- Danielle.Petaja@saul.com -- Saul
Ewing Arnstein & Lehr LLP, Matthew J. Hank, Esq. --
mhank@littler.com --(Argued), Helga P. Spencer, Esq. --
hspencer@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson P.C., Attorneys for
Defendant CareFusion Solutions, LLC.


CHANTICLEER HOLDINGS: Suit over Little Big Burger Deal Closed
-------------------------------------------------------------
Chanticleer Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on March 30,
2018, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2017, that the class
action lawsuit related to the acquisition of Little Big Burger
has been closed.

Prior to the Company's acquisition of Little Big Burger, a class
action lawsuit was filed in Oregon by certain current and former
employees of Little Big Burger asserting that the former owners
of Little Big Burger failed to compensate employees for overtime
hours and also that an employee had been wrongfully terminated.

The plaintiffs and defendants agreed to enter into a settlement
agreement pursuant to which the former owners of Little Big
Burger will pay a gross settlement of up to $675,000, inclusive
of plaintiffs' attorney's fees of $225,000. This settlement was
approved by the court and all settlement payments were
distributed by the sellers and this matter closed prior to
September 30, 2016.

Chanticleer Holdings said "In connection with our acquisition of
Little Big Burger, the sellers agreed that the 1,619,646 shares
of the Company's common stock certain of the sellers received
from the Company and an additional $200,000 in cash would be held
in escrow until such time as the litigation was fully resolved.
The Company reflected the $675,000 settlement amount in accrued
liabilities, with an offsetting asset in other current assets, in
the accompanying consolidated balance sheets as of December 31,
2016. As of December 31, 2016, the lawsuit had been fully
resolved and all amounts paid by the sellers. Accordingly, no
amounts are reflected in the Company's balance sheets as of
December 31, 2017 or 2016.

Chanticleer Holdings, Inc. ("Chanticleer" or the "Company") is
in the business of owning, operating and franchising fast casual
dining concepts domestically and internationally. The Company was
organized October 21, 1999, under its original name, Tulvine
Systems, Inc., under the laws of the State of Delaware. On April
25, 2005, Tulvine Systems, Inc. formed a wholly-owned subsidiary,
Chanticleer Holdings, Inc., and on May 2, 2005, Tulvine Systems,
Inc. merged with, and changed its name to, Chanticleer Holdings,
Inc. The company is based in Charlotte, North Carolina.


CITIBANK NA: Suit over Interchange Fees Still Ongoing
-----------------------------------------------------
Citibank, N.A., as depositor of Citibank Credit Card Issuance
Trust said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission on March 30, 2018, for the fiscal year
ended December 31, 2017, that the company continues to defend
itself in several putative class actions related to Interchange
Fees.

Beginning in 2005, several putative class actions were filed
against Citigroup Inc. and certain of its subsidiaries, including
Citibank, N.A. (collectively Citigroup), together with Visa,
MasterCard and other banks and their affiliates, in various
federal district courts and consolidated with other related
individual cases in a multi-district litigation proceeding in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
(Interchange MDL). This proceeding is captioned IN RE PAYMENT
CARD INTERCHANGE FEE AND MERCHANT DISCOUNT ANTITRUST LITIGATION.

The plaintiffs, merchants that accept Visa and MasterCard branded
payment cards as well as membership associations that claim to
represent certain groups of merchants, allege, among other
things, that defendants have engaged in conspiracies to set the
price of interchange and merchant discount fees on credit and
debit card transactions and to restrain trade through various
Visa and MasterCard rules governing merchant conduct, all in
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and certain California
statutes. Supplemental complaints also have been filed against
defendants in the putative class actions alleging that Visa's and
MasterCard's respective initial public offerings were
anticompetitive and violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act, and
that MasterCard's initial public offering constituted a
fraudulent conveyance.

On January 14, 2014, the district court entered a final judgment
approving the terms of a class settlement providing for, among
other things, a total payment to the class of $6.05 billion; a
rebate to merchants participating in the damages class settlement
of 10 bps on interchange collected for a period of eight months
by the Visa and MasterCard networks; and changes to certain
network rules. Various objectors appealed from the final class
settlement approval order to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit.

On June 30, 2016, the Court of Appeals reversed the district
court's approval of the class settlement and remanded for further
proceedings.

In addition, following the district court's approval of the class
settlement, and during the pendency of appeals from that
approval, numerous merchants, including large national merchants,
requested exclusion from the portion of the now vacated
settlement involving a settlement class certified with respect to
damages claims for past conduct, and some of those opting out
filed complaints against Visa, MasterCard, and in some instances
one or more issuing banks. One of these suits, 7-ELEVEN, INC., ET
AL. v. VISA INC., ET AL., brought on behalf of numerous
individual merchants, names Citigroup as a defendant.


COMMUNITY PROBATION: Faces "McNeil" Suit in M.D. Tennessee
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Community Probation
Services, LLC. The case is styled as Karen McNeil, Lesley
Johnson, Tanya Mitchell, Indya Hilfort and Sonya Beard, on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v.
Community Probation Services, LLC, Community Probation Services,
L.L.C., Community Probation Services, Progressive Sentencing,
Inc., PSI-Probation II, LLC, PSI-Probation, L.L.C., Tennessee
Correctional Services, LLC, Timothy Cook, Giles County,
Tennessee, Patricia McNair, Markeyta Bledsoe and Harriet
Thompson, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-00033 (M.D. Tenn., April
23, 2018).

Community Probation Services, L.L.C. is in the Probation Office
business.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

   Chirag Badlani, Esq.
   Hughes, Socol, Piers, Resnick &Dym, Ltd.
   70 W Madison Street, Suite 4000
   Chicago, IL 60602
   Tel: (312) 580-0100
   Fax: (312) 580-1994
   Email: cbadlani@hsplegal.com

      - and -

   Elizabeth Anne Rossi, Esq.
   Civil Rights Corps
   910 17th Street NW, Suite 500
   Washington, DC 20006
   Tel: (202) 599-0953
   Fax: (202) 609-8030
   Email: elizabeth@civilrightscorps.org

      - and -

   Eric Halperin, Esq.
   Civil Rights Corps
   910 17th Street NW, Suite 500
   Washington, DC 20006
   Tel: (202) 599-0953
   Fax: (202) 609-8030
   Email: eric@civilrightscorps.org

      - and -

   Jonas Wang, Esq.
   Civil Rights Corps
   910 17th Street NW, Suite 500
   Washington, DC 20006
   Tel: (202) 599-0953
   Fax: (202) 609-8030
   Email: jonas@civilrightscorps.org

      - and -

   Kate E. Schwartz, Esq.
   Hughes, Socol, Piers, Resnick &Dym, Ltd.
   70 W Madison Street, Suite 4000
   Chicago, IL 60602
   Tel: (312) 580-0100
   Fax: (312) 580-1994
   Email: kschwartz@hsplegal.com

      - and -

   Kyle F. Mothershead, Esq.
   The Law Office of Kyle Mothershead
   414 Union Street, Suite 900
   Nashville, TN 37219
   Tel: (615) 982-8002
   Email: kyle@mothersheadlaw.com

      - and -

   Matthew J. Piers, Esq.
   Hughes, Socol, Piers, Resnick &Dym, Ltd.
   70 W Madison Street, Suite 4000
   Chicago, IL 60602
   Tel: (312) 580-0100
   Fax: (312) 580-1994
   Email: mpiers@hsplegal.com


CMSA LLC: Faces "Conner" Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against CMSA LLC. The case
is styled as Mary Conner, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CMSA LLC doing business as:
Convivial, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-03565 (S.D. N.Y., April
23, 2018).

The Defendant operates in the eating places business.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   C.K. Lee, Esq.
   Lee Litigation Group, PLLC
   30 East 39th Street
   2nd Floor
   New York, NY 10016
   Tel: (212) 465-1188
   Fax: (212) 465-1181
   Email: cklee@leelitigation.com


COMMUNITY SAVINGS: Overdraft Charge Class Action Ruling Upheld
--------------------------------------------------------------
Ian Burns, writing for The Lawyer's Daily, reports that the B.C.
Court of Appeal has upheld a class action judgment against a
number of British Columbia credit unions, saying charges they
levied for overdrafts did not fall under the Criminal Code's
provisions on overdraft charges but were in fact interest.

The decision in Bodnar v. Community Savings Credit Union 2018
BCCA 121, involves a complaint by lead plaintiffs Andrew Bodnar
and John Humphrey that the fees charged by the credit unions up
to 2004 constituted interest under s. 347 of the Code.  The Code
defines an overdraft charge as a charge not exceeding $5 for the
creation of or increase in an overdraft, and interest as the
aggregate of all charges and expenses, whether in the form of a
fee, fine, penalty, commission or other similar charge or expense
or in any other form, paid or payable for the advancing of credit
under an agreement or arrangement.

Paul Bennett of Bennett Mounteer LLP, who represented Bodnar and
Humphrey, said the class action in this case was an offshoot of
actions that began in 2003 against payday loan companies.

"We noticed those fees when we were reviewing bank statements,"
he said.  "And what happened was once we started these class
actions in 2004 all the credit unions stopped charging fees in
excess of $5."

Previously, the credit unions were charging fees ranging from $5
to $20 to recover the administrative costs incurred when
assessing overdraft requests.  Credit unions charged the fee
whether or not the overdraft was ultimately honoured.

At trial, Justice Victoria Gray found that, when a credit union
creates or increases an overdraft by honouring a member's
overdraft request, it advances credit to that member by loaning
them the amount of the requested overdraft.  She concluded the
entirety of the overdraft charge exceeding $5 constituted
interest for the purposes of s. 347 (Bodnar v. Community Savings
Credit Union 2017 BCSC 918).

The credit unions appealed, saying Justice Gray erred in ruling
the fee met the Code's definition of interest because they had
the option to decline the overdraft request.  They said the fee
was not "for" the advancing of credit, but was "for" the
assessment of whether to advance credit at all.  The class
representatives argued the intent of s. 347 is to capture all of
the true cost to the borrower of the credit obtained.

Justice Elizabeth Bennett, who authored the unanimous opinion of
the Court of Appeal, sided with the lower court's ruling.  She
said Justice Gray correctly analyzed how the arrangement operates
in concluding that the fees met the definition of interest.

"Her focus on the effect of the fee on the borrower, rather on
the intent of the lender in levying the fee, is consistent with
binding authority on the interpretation of s. 347 of the Code,"
said Justice Bennett.  "Further, because the appellant's fees
meet the definition of interest, by necessity they cannot meet
the definition of overdraft charge, which only contemplates such
fees if they are under five dollars."

The Appeal Court noted the leading case in the interpretation of
s. 347 is the Supreme Court's decision in Garland v. Consumers'
Gas Co. [1998] 3 S.C.R. 112.  In that case, Justice John Major
ruled interest as defined under s. 347 was an "extremely
comprehensive term," capturing many transactions that would not
be considered interest proper at common law or under general
accounting principles.  He said the purpose of the broad scope of
s. 347 is to "prevent creditors from avoiding the statute simply
by manipulating the form of payment exacted from their debtors."

"The thrust of the definitions of 'credit advanced' and
'interest' is to cover all possible aspects of any transaction to
ensure that the cost of using someone else's money never exceeds
the criminal rate," Justice Major said.  "Thus they focus on the
actual benefit given to the borrower and the real cost of
borrowing. The actual benefit is the real amount in the
borrower's hands minus all the penalties, commissions and other
costs incurred."

The Court of Appeal said the effect on a borrower who receives an
overdraft loan does not change because the credit union rejects
their members' overdraft requests in other cases while still
charging the same fee.

"I agree with the trial judge that this is simply a dichotomy
that flows from the credit unions' formal business choices rather
than having a bearing on the characterization of a fee levied on
a member whose overdraft is honoured," the court said.  "[Justice
Gray] concluded that s. 347 provides for a specific and broad
definition of interest, when she included the fees charged here
in that definition.  In my view, there is no error in her
approach or analysis."

The credit unions also argued that the definition of "overdraft
charge" under s. 347 does not say that if a credit union
overdraft fee exceeds $5, the exemption is not available for the
first $5.  They argued that the first $5 of any fee charged
should not be included in the term "interest."  But again the
Court of Appeal disagreed, saying the definition of an "overdraft
charge" was simply that -- a statutory definition in a piece of
legislation.  The court said that if a particular charge does
meet the definition of overdraft charge, it is "necessarily
captured by the definition of interest."

"The fees are payable for the advancing of credit," the court
said. "Because the fees all exceed five dollars, they cannot be
an overdraft charge and thus they are captured by the definition
of interest.  To accept the credit unions' submission on this
point would be to read a provision into the criminal interest
rate scheme that Parliament did not include."

The Court of Appeal ruled the fees charged by the credit unions
all exceeded $5 and thus, are not an overdraft charge as defined
in the legislation but rather captured under the definition of
interest under s. 347 of the Code.  As a result, Justice Bennett
dismissed the appeal. She was joined by Justices David Harris and
John Hunter in her reasons, which was released April 3.

Paul Bennett said the Court of Appeal's decision was "obviously
correct."

"It was a hard argument for the credit unions to advance that
[the fees] weren't interest," he said.  "But they ran with this
point that if you can get charged with the same amount when
you're not borrowing then it can't be interest when you're
borrowing."

Mr. Bennett said the provisions of s. 347 were "pretty broadly
settled" by the Supreme Court in the Garland case.

"All the courts did here was given a plain reading to that
section and not buy the argument that something is not interest
just because it can be charged when no credit is advanced," he
said.  "Had they won on that argument, then the decision would
have had great implications for a lot of people, because then you
would have seen all the banks charging much more for overdraft
fees."

Richard J. Berrow -- rberrow@fasken.com -- of Fasken Martineau
DuMoulin LLP, who represented the credit unions in the case,
declined comment.

"Our firm's practice is not to comment to the media about
decisions we're involved with," he said.  The B.C. Court of
Appeal has upheld a class action judgment against a number of
British Columbia credit unions, saying charges they levied for
overdrafts did not fall under the Criminal Code's provisions on
overdraft charges but were in fact interest. [GN]


COSTCO: May 14 FCRA Settlement Claims Filing Deadline Set
---------------------------------------------------------
ABC15 Arizona reports that if you applied to work at Costco
between Aug. 10, 2014 and April 17, 2017, or if you applied but
were denied employment based on your background report, you may
be entitled to between $25 and $175 from a class action
settlement.

Costco has agreed to pay nearly $2.5 million to end a Fair Credit
Reporting Act class action lawsuit alleging the company failed to
use proper stand-alone disclosure notices to obtain background
reports about job applicants.

The deadline to file a claim is May 14, 2018. [GN]


CV SCIENCES: Bid to Dismiss "Sallustro" Suit Still Pending
----------------------------------------------------------
CV Sciences, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on March 30, 2018, for
the fiscal year ended December 31, 2017, that motions to dismiss
a class action lawsuit by Tanya Sallustro remain pending.

On April 23, 2014, Tanya Sallustro filed a purported class action
complaint (the "Complaint") in the Southern District of New York
(the "Court") alleging securities fraud and related claims
against the Company and certain of its officers and directors and
seeking compensatory damages including litigation costs.

Ms. Sallustro alleges that between March 18 and 31, 2014, she
purchased 325 shares of the Company's common stock for a total
investment of $15,791.  The Complaint refers to Current Reports
on Form 8-K and Current Reports on Form 8-K/A filings made by the
Company on April 3, 2014 and April 14, 2014, in which the Company
amended previously disclosed sales (sales originally stated at
$1,275,000 were restated to $1,082,375 - reduction of $192,625)
and restated goodwill as $1,855,512 (previously reported at net
zero).

Additionally, the Complaint states after the filing of the
Company's Current Report on Form 8-K on April 3, 2014 and the
following press release, the Company's stock price "fell $7.30
per share, or more than 20%, to close at $25.30 per share."
Subsequent to the filing of the Complaint, six different
individuals filed a motion asking to be designated the lead
plaintiff in the litigation. On March 19, 2015, the Court issued
a ruling appointing Steve Schuck as lead plaintiff. Counsel for
Mr. Schuck filed a "consolidated amended complaint" on September
14, 2015. On December 11, 2015, the Company filed a motion to
dismiss the consolidated amended complaint. After requesting
several extensions, counsel for Mr. Schuck filed an opposition to
the motion to dismiss on March 21, 2016.

The Company's reply brief was filed on April 25, 2016. Defendant
Stuart Titus was served with the Summons & Complaint in the case
and he subsequently completed briefing his motion to dismiss,
through separate counsel. No hearing date has been set by the
Court at this time with respect to the motions to dismiss.

CV Sciences said "Management intends to vigorously defend the
allegations and an estimate of possible loss cannot be made at
this time."

CV Sciences, Inc. operates as a life science company. It operates
through two segments, Specialty Pharmaceutical and Consumer
Products. The Specialty Pharmaceutical segment focuses on
developing and commercializing novel therapeutics utilizing
synthetic Cannabidiol (CBD) to treat a range of medical
conditions. The Consumer Products segment develops, manufactures,
and markets consumer products containing plant-based CBD under
the PlusCBD brand name in various market sectors comprising
nutraceutical, beauty care, specialty foods, and vape.


DARBY ROAD: Court Denies Dismissal of "Oxlaj" Suit Counterclaim
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MELVIN OXLAJ, Plaintiff, v. DARBY ROAD PUBLIC HOUSE
& RESTAURANT, LLC, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 16-1180
(CCC)(D. N.J.), Judge Claire C. Cecchi of the U.S. District Court
for the District of New Jersey denied the Plaintiff's motion to
dismiss the Counterclaim of the Defendants.

The Defendants are the former employers of the Plaintiff, who
brings the suit on behalf of himself and other employees
similarly situated in an effort to recover allegedly-owed
overtime compensation and related damages.  The Plaintiff brought
suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and the New
Jersey State Wage and Hour Law ("NJWHL") on March 1, 2016, before
reasserting his claims in an Amended Complaint and Second Amended
Collective Action Complaint on Aug. 3, 2016 and June 30, 2017,
respectively.

On July 21, 2017, the Defendants filed an Answer to the Amended
Complaint which contained the Counterclaim now subject to the
Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss.  Their Counterclaim alleges that
the Plaintiff provided fraudulent identification documents,
including a social security card, in order to defraud Defendants
and gain employment at the Defendants' businesses.  They further
allege that, under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
("IRCA"), they were obligated to terminate the Plaintiff's
employment on discovering his fraudulent documentation, and argue
that he should be required to disgorge or otherwise return all
monies they paid to him.

On Aug. 2, 2017, Plaintiff filed the Motion to Dismiss now before
the Court.  The Defendants filed their Opposition on Aug. 22,
2017.  The Plaintiff filed his Reply Brief on September 12, 2017.

In his Motion, the Plaintiff argues the Defendants' Counterclaim
for fraud should be dismissed because the Court lacks
supplemental jurisdiction to hear this state law claim and
because the Defendants have failed to state a claim for relief
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Judge Cecchi finds that the Defendants' Counterclaim for fraud is
tied to those proofs they may offer to defend against the
Plaintiff's retaliation claim as set forth in Count IV of the
Second Amended Complaint.  The Defendants' common law fraud
claim, which addresses their alleged reasons for terminating the
Plaintiff, shares a common nucleus of operative fact with the
Plaintiff's retaliation claim under 29 U.S.C. Sections 215(a)(3),
which forms, in part, the basis for the Court's original
jurisdiction.  The Judge will accordingly assert supplemental
jurisdiction over the Defendants' Counterclaim.

The Judge also finds that although the Plaintiff contends that
the Defendants have not sufficiently pled damages, the Defendants
state that the Plaintiffs conduct was intended to mislead them so
as to gain monetary benefits to which he would not have otherwise
been entitled, and that he should be required to disgorge or
otherwise return all monies paid they to him.  The Judge finds
that at this stage of the litigation, the Defendants have
sufficiently pled damages.  Accordingly, the dismissal of the
Defendants' Counterclaim is not warranted.

For these reasons, Judge Cecchi denied the Plaintiff's Motion to
Dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 14, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/G2Y2op from Leagle.com.

SHERYL M. GOSKI, Mediator, pro se.

MELVIN OXLAJ, Plaintiff, represented by JODI J. JAFFE --
JJaffe@JaffeGlenn.com -- JAFFE GLENN LAW GROUP PA. & ANDREW I.
GLENN, JAFFE GLENN LAW GROUP PA.

DARBY ROAD PUBLIC HOUSE & RESTAURANT, LLC, doing business as,
JONATHAN COHEN, Individually, Brave Spirits, LLC, Michael
Brennan, Joseph Mortarulo & John Brandli, Defendants, represented
by ROBERT BRUCE WOODRUFF -- rbw@sp-lawyers.com -- SCHILLER &
PITTENGER, P.C.

John Brandli, Joseph Mortarulo, DARBY ROAD PUBLIC HOUSE &
RESTAURANT, LLC, Brave Spirits, LLC, JONATHAN COHEN, Individually
& Michael Brennan, Counter Claimants, represented by ROBERT BRUCE
WOODRUFF, SCHILLER & PITTENGER, P.C.

MELVIN OXLAJ, Counter Defendant, represented by JODI J. JAFFE,
JAFFE GLENN LAW GROUP PA. & ANDREW I. GLENN, JAFFE GLENN LAW
GROUP PA.


DISH DBS: Court to Favor Potential Class Members in "Krakauer"
--------------------------------------------------------------
Dish DBS Corporation said in its Form 10-K report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on March 30, 2018, for
the fiscal year ended December 31, 2017, that the Court in the
Krakauer action indicated that it will be entering judgment in
favor of approximately 11,000 of the 18,000 potential class
members whose identities, the Court found, are not subject to
reasonable dispute.

Dish DBS said "a portion of the alleged telemarketing violations
by an independent third-party retailer at issue in the FTC Action
are also the subject of a certified class action filed against
DISH Network L.L.C. in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of North Carolina (the "Krakauer Action").

Following a five-day trial, on January 19, 2017, a jury in that
case found that the independent third-party retailer was acting
as DISH Network L.L.C.'s agent when it made the 51,119 calls at
issue in that case, and that class members are eligible to
recover $400 in damages for each call made in violation of the
TCPA. On March 7, 2017, DISH Network L.L.C. filed motions with
the Court for judgment as a matter of law and, in the
alternative, for a new trial, which the Court denied on May 16,
2017. On May 22, 2017, the Court ruled that the violations were
willful and knowing, and trebled the damages award to $1,200 for
each call made in violation of TCPA.

On January 25, 2018, the Court indicated that it will be entering
judgment in favor of approximately 11,000 of the 18,000 potential
class members whose identities, the Court found, are not subject
to reasonable dispute. During the year ended December 31, 2017,
we recorded $41 million of "Litigation expense" related to the
Krakauer Action on the company's Consolidated Statements of
Operations and Comprehensive Income (Loss).  The company recorded
$20 million of "Litigation expense" related to the Krakauer
Action during the fourth quarter 2016. The company's total
accrual related to the Krakauer Action at December 31, 2017 was
$61 million and is included in "Other accrued expenses" on the
company's Consolidated Balance Sheets.

Dish DBS said "We intend to vigorously defend these cases. We
cannot predict with any degree of certainty the outcome of these
suits."

DISH DBS Corporation, through its subsidiaries, provides pay-TV
services under the DISH and Sling brands in the United States.
Its DISH branded pay-TV services include the company's licensed
Federal Communications Commission authorized direct broadcast
satellite and fixed satellite service spectrum, as well as its
owned and leased satellites, receiver systems, third-party
broadcast operations, customer service facilities, a leased fiber
optic network, and in-home service and call center operations.


DOUBLE DOWN: 4 Play Money Sites Slapped With Class Action Suits
---------------------------------------------------------------
Jon Sofen, writing for Cardschat News, reports that In Washington
State, class action lawsuits have been filed against four social
gaming sites in which the operators are alleged to have violated
state law by charging customers to compete in play money casino
games. Those followed suit on a case against online site Big Fish
Casino that had been initially dismissed back in 2015 when filed
by a player, but was then overturned by the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals in March.

How It Got This Far
Cheryl Kater, a customer of Big Fish Casino, filed a lawsuit
against the social casino in 2015, claiming she paid for play
money chips which, of course, have no monetary value to the
customer.

She lost that case at the time, but last month, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the ruling. Judge Milan D. Smith ruled
that "free play" casino chips represent a "thing of value,"
making them a violation of Washington State Revenue Code Section
9.46.0285.

In response to the court's ruling, PokerStars blocked Washington
residents from accessing its play money site to avoid any
potential legal issues.

PokerStars doesn't charge a penny to play free money poker games,
unlike Big Fish Casino, but the court has determined that virtual
casino chips represent a "thing of value," which, in turn,
constitutes gambling. And since online gambling isn't legal in
Washington State, even seemingly harmless play money casino games
are illegal.

Online Social Casinos Feel the Brunt
In response to the court's March ruling, two consumers have filed
lawsuits against four social casinos -- Double Down Interactive,
Playtika, High 5 Games, and Huuuge Games -- for violating state
law.

One of the lawsuits names Double Down Casino, an app that gives
customers a daily allotment of chips to play slot machines and
table games with the option to purchase additional play money
chips. Plaintiff Adrienne Benson says she spent approximately
$1,000 playing "free" games on Double Down. Gamemaker IGT is also
named in the suit.

"Double Down Casino games are illegal gambling games because they
are online games at which players wager things of value (the
chips) and by an element of chance (e.g., by spinning an online
slot machine) are able to obtain additional entertainment and
extend gameplay (by winning additional chips)," the lawsuit
states.

The second plaintiff, Sean Wilson, claims he lost all of $20
paying for games that he could have played for free, and is now
suing Huuuge, High 5, and Playtika (along with Caesars
Interactive Entertainment) social casinos for damages.

The conflicts between individual state rulings, often foreign
operators, and the innately murky and varying definitions of
"gambling" pretty much guarantee these won't be the last of these
social gaming lawsuits, which is not good news for the American
internet gambling landscape.[GN]


DR PEPPER: Faruqi & Faruqi Files Securities Class Action in Del.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP on April 11 disclosed that it has filed a
class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the
District of Delaware, case No. 1:18-cv-00442, on behalf of
shareholders of Dr Pepper Snapple Group, Inc. ("DPSG" or the
"Company") (NYSE: DPS) who have been harmed by DPSG's and its
board of directors' (the "Board") alleged violations of Sections
14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
"Exchange Act") in connection with  the proposed merger of the
Company with Maple Parent Holdings Corp. ("Maple"), with its
indirect subsidiary Keurig Green Mountain, Inc. ("Keurig").

On January 29, 2018, the Board caused the Company to enter into
an Agreement and Plan of Merger ("Merger Agreement"), under which
the Company's shareholders stand to receive a $103.75 cash
dividend per share, plus stock constituting 13% of the combined
company.

The complaint alleges that the preliminary proxy statement (the
"Proxy") filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") on March 8, 2018, violates Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of
the Exchange Act because it provides materially incomplete and
misleading information about the Company and the Proposed
Transaction, including information concerning the Company's
financial projections and analysis, on which the Board relied to
recommend the Proposed Merger as fair to DPSG shareholders.

If you wish to obtain information concerning this action, you can
do so by clicking here: www.faruqilaw.com/DPSnotice.

Take Action

Plaintiff is represented by Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP, a law firm with
extensive experience in prosecuting class actions, and
significant expertise in actions involving corporate fraud.
Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP, was founded in 1995 and the firm maintains
its principal office in New York City, with offices in Delaware,
California, Georgia, and Pennsylvania.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court
no later than 60 days from April 11, 2018, the date of this
notice.  Any member of the putative class may move the Court to
serve as lead plaintiff through counsel of their choice, or may
choose to do nothing and remain an absent class member.  If you
wish to discuss this action, or have any questions concerning
this notice or your rights or interests, please contact:

          Nadeem Faruqi, Esq.
          James M. Wilson, Jr., Esq.
          FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
          685 3rd Avenue, 26th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (877) 247-4292
          Telephone: (212) 983-9330
          E-mail: nfaruqi@faruqilaw.com
                  jwilson@faruqilaw.com [GN]


DUDE PRODUCTS: Faces "Hall" Suit in California Superior Court
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Dude Products Inc.
The case is styled as Cristina Hall and Robert Lawton, on behalf
of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Dude
Products Inc and Does 1-50, Defendants, Case No. CGC18566005
(Cal. Super. Ct., April 23, 2018).

Dude Products, Inc. provides personal cleansing wipes for men.
The company offers wipe, shower, and gear products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Adam Joshua Gutride, Esq.
   Gutride Safier LLP
   100 Pine St Ste 1250
   San Francisco, CA 94111
   Tel: (415) 639-9090
   Fax: (415) 449-6469
   Email: adam@gutridesafier.com


EXPRESS SCRIPTS: Court Orders Filing of Amended "Burton" Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ERICK BURTON, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated Plaintiffs, v. EXPRESS SCRIPTS, INC.,
et al., Defendants, Case No. 4:17-cv-02279-AGF (E.D. Mo.), Judge
Audrey G. Fleissig of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri, Eastern Division, ordered the Plaintiff to,
within 14 days from the date of the Memorandum and Order, file a
motion for leave to amend, and to attach to the motion his
proposed amended complaint.

The matter is before the Court on the parties' responses to the
Court's Order to Show Cause why this case, removed under the
Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"), should not be remanded for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  On March 5, 2018, the Court
granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's first
amended complaint for failure to state a claim.  The Court
dismissed the first amended complaint without prejudice, noting
that Plaintiff had filed but withdrawn a motion for leave to file
a second amended complaint, and had indicated at oral argument
that he intended to file a new motion for leave to amend in order
to limit his claims and his class definition.  The Court further
noted that the Plaintiff's admissions at oral argument regarding
the futility of his proposed nationwide class action raised
serious doubts about whether the Court ever had subject matter
jurisdiction in the case.  Therefore, the Court ordered the
parties to show cause why the case should not be remanded for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

In response, the Plaintiff states that he concurs that the Court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction.  The Defendants, on the other
hand, argue that because the Plaintiff's attempt to maintain the
suit as a class action was not frivolous, the Court had and still
has subject matter jurisdiction.  Thus, the Defendants ask that
the Court retains jurisdiction over the case, and in the event
the Plaintiff intends to offer a further proposed amendment to
the complaint, the Court should evaluate the motion for leave.

Upon careful review of the record and the parties' arguments,
Judge Fleissig concludes that the facts alleged in the original
complaint plausibly gave rise to CAFA jurisdiction at the time of
removal, which is not lost if the Plaintiff now attempts to
narrow the class definition.  Therefore, the Judge retains
jurisdiction and gave the Plaintiff 14 days to file any further
motion for leave to amend.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 13, 2018 Memorandum and
Order is available at https://is.gd/eVFJMY from Leagle.com.

Erick Burton, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Craig R. Heidemann --
craig@dhhlawfirm.com -- DOUGLAS AND HAUN & Nathan A. Duncan --
nathan@dhhlawfirm.com -- DOUGLAS AND HAUN.

Express Scripts, Inc., Defendant, represented by Dan H. Ball --
dhball@bryancave.com -- BRYAN CAVE LLP, James P. Emanuel, Jr. --
james.emanuel@bryancave.com -- BRYAN CAVE LLP, Jonathan R. Chally
-- jchally@kslaw.com -- KING AND SPALDING, LLP, pro hac vice &
Philip E. Holladay -- pholladay@kslaw.com -- KING AND SPALDING,
LLP, pro hac vice.

Express Scripts Pharmacy, Inc., Express Scripts Holding Company &
Express Scripts Specialty Distribution Services, Inc.,
Defendants, represented by Dan H. Ball, BRYAN CAVE LLP, Jonathan
R. Chally, KING AND SPALDING, LLP, pro hac vice & Philip E.
Holladay, KING AND SPALDING, LLP, pro hac vice.


FACEBOOK INC: Class Action Over Facial Recognition Can Proceed
--------------------------------------------------------------
Christopher Coble, writing for FindLaw.com, reports that not
everyone loves Facebook's suggestions when it comes to tagging
people in photos.  On top of that, those suggestions may be
illegal.  That's what we learned from a recent ruling in a class
action lawsuit filed against Facebook over its use of facial
recognition.

A federal judge in California allowed the lawsuit to proceed,
ruling that Facebook may have violated an Illinois law limiting
the collection of biometric information, but limited the
potential class of plaintiffs at the same time.  Here's a look.

Photo Tag Lawsuit

Nimesh Patel filed the lawsuit against Facebook, claiming the
company illegally harvested users' facial data for its "Photo Tag
Suggest" function, beginning in 2011.  But the Illinois Biometric
Information Privacy Act, passed in 2008, prohibits private
companies from capturing or collecting a person's biometric
identifier or biometric information without notification and
consent.

According to attorneys for the plaintiffs, the potential class of
affected Facebook users in Illinois could be up to 6 million.
And with estimated damages of $1,000 to $5,000 per person,
Facebook could be facing anywhere from $6 to $30 billion in
damages.

Class Judgment

Facebook battled the lawsuit on several fronts.  The company
argued:

   -- Its users suffered no actual harm and therefore lack
standing to sue;

   -- It cannot be sued for violating an Illinois law because its
servers (and therefore the biometric data) are not located in the
state;

   -- The class could not be certified due to differences among
scanned and digital photographs, and the way biometric data is
harvested from each; and

   -- That class certification would enable the plaintiffs to
seek an unreasonable amount of damages.

U.S. District Judge James Donato rejected all those claims,
finding that the plaintiffs suffered "intangible harm" by losing
control over their private data, most elements of the lawsuit are
"deeply rooted in Illinois," Facebook failed to offer evidence of
a substantial variation in how facial data is harvested from
digital versus film-camera photos, and that a potential judgment
of $30 billion is "not a reason to decline class certification."

Judge Donato, however, did reduce the potential number of
plaintiffs.  Mr. Patel's attorneys argued the plaintiffs should
include all Illinois residents with an uploaded Facebook photo
since 2011.  Judge Donato ruled that group was "too amorphous and
potentially over-inclusive to be certified," and instead limited
the class to Facebook users in Illinois who had their facial data
analyzed and collected by Facebook after June 7, 2011.

That number is still substantial, and Judge Donato had earlier
urged the company to settle the Illinois claims.  "Maybe it's
time for Facebook to look at all of its privacy practices," Judge
Donato said during a hearing in March, "and not just those in the
news."


FAMILY DOLLAR: $45MM Settlement in "Scott" Has Final Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LUANNA SCOTT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. FAMILY DOLLAR
STORES, INC., Defendant, Case No. 3:08-cv-00540-MOC-DSC (W.D.
N.C.), Judge Max O. Cogburn, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of North Carolina, Charlotte Division,
granted (i) the Plaintiff's Motion to Approve Attorneys' Fees &
Expenses Pursuant to the Parties' Settlement Agreement and (i)
the joint Motion for Final Approval of Settlement Agreement.

The current proceedings began nearly 15 years ago when 49 female
Store Managers and their counsel filed EEOC Charges which alleged
a pattern and practice of discriminatory wages paid to women as a
class at Family Dollar since July 2, 2002.  The Plaintiffs
alleged that Family Dollar discriminates against female Store
Managers by paying them less than men are paid for the same job
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
Equal Pay Act of 1963.  The EEOC eventually issued right-to-sue
letters which led to the filing of the case as a putative
nationwide class action.

The case was transferred to the Court from the Northern District
of Alabama in 2008 and has been vigorously litigated over the
last 10 years.  It has been a hard-fought case in which both
sides worked diligently to gather and interpret information and
to represent their clients in discovery, in litigating class
certification, in preparation for trial, and later in mediation.
The Mediator, Mark Rudy, determined and proposed the terms of
settlement once the Parties left the 2017 mediation without
reaching settlement for a second time.  The formal  mediation
proceedings took place for two days in March 2017 in San
Francisco and ended with a double-blind Mediator's proposal which
the Parties' subsequently accepted.  After reaching such an
agreement, the Parties continued to negotiate and finalize the
procedural and logistical details needed to embody and document
their agreement as well as the supporting documents (e.g., Class
Notice) for the agreement.

Judge Cogburn finds that the notice provided to Class Members,
including direct mail notice, is in accordance with the terms of
the Settlement and the Court's Preliminary Approval Order dated
Nov. 14, 2017.  Pursuant to the Preliminary Approval Order, the
Settlement Administrator appointed by the Court (Settlement
Services, Inc./Garden City Group, Inc.) gave direct notice of the
proposed settlement to the Settlement Class Members in the case.

The Plaintiff filed their Motion to Approve Attorneys' Fees &
Expenses Pursuant to the Parties' Settlement Agreement and the
parties filed their joint Motion for Final Approval of Settlement
Agreement.  On March 14, 2018, the Court held a Final Fairness
Hearing.

The Parties have agreed to a settlement that provides
comprehensive programmatic relief in addition to monetary relief
in the amount of $45 million.  Family Dollar has also agreed that
it does not object to attorneys' fees of one-third of the common
fund of $45 million ($15 million) in addition to litigation
expenses up to $1 million.  Likewise, in exchange for a timely
executed general release of all claims relating to the Named
Plaintiffs' employment at Family Dollar, Family Dollar has agreed
not to object to each of the nine Class Representatives receiving
a service payment of $10,000 and for each of the remaining Named
Plaintiffs receiving a service award of $5,000.

Judge Cogburn finds that the proposed Class Settlement, as
outlined in the Settlement Agreement and Joint Motion for Class
Settlement, is fair, adequate, and reasonable, that the notice
procedure set out in the Preliminary Order was appropriate and
followed by the Parties, and that the Settlement Class meets the
requirements of Rule 23(a), 23(b)(1)(B), and 23(b)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  He also finds that the
Plaintiffs' counsel's request for reimbursement of costs is
reasonable and awards the Plaintiffs' Counsel reimbursement for
those costs in the amount of $1 million.

For the reasons more extensively discussed in the Memorandum
supporting the notion and as discussed at the hearing, the Judge
finds that those factors all weigh in favor of approval of the
suggested award of fees.  In addition, the service payment awards
are routinely approved in class actions to encourage socially
beneficial litigation by compensating the named plaintiffs for
their expenses related to travel and other incidental costs, as
well as their personal time spent advancing the litigation on
behalf of the class and for any personal risk they undertook.

Accordingly, Judge Cogburn granted the joint Motion for Final
Approval of Settlement Agreement and the Motion for Attorneys'
Fees and Costs.  He directed the Parties and their counsel, with
assistance from the Court-appointed Settlement Administrator, to
implement the Settlement Agreement according to its terms and
provisions.

He awarded (i) the Class Counsel an attorneys' fee of $15 million
and reimbursement of costs in the amount of $1 million; and (ii)
$10,000 to each of the identified Class Representatives and
$5,000 to each of the remaining Named Plaintiffs contingent upon
each such Named Plaintiff entering into and not revoking a
general release in the form previously provided to the Court.

The Judge dismissed with prejudice the case, subject to the terms
and conditions of the Settlement Agreement.  The Clerk of the
Court will enter a Judgment consistent with the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 14, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/V5nH2K from Leagle.com.

Luanna Scott, Shunderia Garlington, Ruth Bell, Wendy Bevis,
Katherine Bracey, Ruby Brady, Marie Alice Brockway, Vickie
Clutter, Diane Conaway, Judy Corrow, Traci Davis, Carol Dinolfo,
Rebecca Dixon, Pamela Ewalt, Nancy Fehling, Teresa Fleming, Irene
Grace, Dorothy Harson, Charlene Hazelton, Shelly Hughes, Christal
J. Joslyn, Ada L. Kennedy, Margie A. Little, Carol Martin, Leanne
Maxwell, Wanda Mayfield, Doris Moody, Vanessa L. Peeples,
Veronica Perry-Preddie, Ruth Ellen Phelps, Sheila Pippin, Lana
Radosh, Michelle Rodgers, Vada Rose, Vickey Jo Scrivwer, Linda R.
Silva, Nancy Smith, Marie E. Spellissy, Judy Tidrick, Beverly L.
Triplett, Debbie Vasquez, Claire White, Bonnie Williams & Cindy
Marie Zimbrich, Plaintiffs, represented by Gregory Lawing Jones,
Greg Jones, P.A., Gregory O'Dell Wiggins, Wiggins Childs Pantazis
Fisher Goldfarb Advocates & Litigators, Robert L. Wiggins, Jr. --
rwiggins@wcqp.com -- Wiggins, Childs, Quinn & Pantazis & Rocco
Calamusa, Jr. -- rcalamusa@wigginschilds.com -- Wiggins, Childs,
Quinn & Pantazis, LLC.

Family Dollar Stores, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jason Craig
Schwartz -- jschwartz@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn & Crutcher
LLP, Adam Karl Doerr -- adoerr@robinsonbradshaw.com -- Robinson
Bradshaw & Hinson, David Calep Wright, III --
dwright@robinsonbradshaw.com -- Robinson Bradshaw & Hinson, P.
A., Michele L. Maryott -- mmaryott@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn
& Crutcher, LLP, pro hac vice, Ryan C. Stewart --
rstewart@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, pro hac
vice, Theane Evangelis -- tevangelis@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson,
Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, pro hac vice, Amanda Rae Pickens --
apickens@robinsonbradshaw.com -- Robinson Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A.
& John R. Wester -- jwester@rbh.com -- Robinson, Bradshaw &
Hinson, P. A..


FOSTER & GARBUS: Faces "Gindoff" Suit in E.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Foster & Garbus
LLP. The case is styled as Yankee Gindoff, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Foster & Garbus
LLP and John and Jane Does Numbers 1 through 10, Defendants, Case
No. 2:18-cv-02364-SJF-AKT (E.D. N.Y., April 23, 2018).

The Defendants are engaged in law firm industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Abraham Kleinman, Esq.
   Kleinman, LLC
   626 RXR Plaza
   Uniondale, NY 11556-0626
   Tel: (516) 522-2621
   Fax: (888) 522-1692
   Email: akleinman@kleinmanllc.com


GENON ENERGY: Suit Against Parent Company Still Ongoing
-------------------------------------------------------
GenOn Energy, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on March 30, 2018, for
the fiscal year ended December 31, 2017, that its parent company,
NRG continues to defend itself in a class action suit filed in
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania,
entitled, Rice v. NRG.

On April 14, 2017, plaintiffs filed a purported class action
lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania against NRG, First Energy Corporation and Matt
Canastrale Contracting, Inc.  Plaintiffs generally claim personal
injury, trespass, nuisance and property damage related to the
disposal of coal ash from GenOn's Elrama Power Plant and First
Energy's Mitchell and Hatfield Power Plants. Plaintiffs generally
seek monetary damages, medical monitoring and remediation of
their property. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on August
14, 2017.

GenOn Energy, Inc. is a wholesale power generation subsidiaries
of NRG, which is a competitive power company that produces, sells
and delivers electricity and related services, primarily in major
competitive power markets in the U.S. GenOn is an indirect wholly
owned subsidiary of NRG. GenOn was incorporated as a Delaware
corporation on August 9, 2000, under the name Reliant Energy
Unregco, Inc. The company is engaged in the ownership and
operation of power generation facilities; the trading of energy,
capacity and related products; and the transacting in and trading
of fuel and transportation services.


GENON ENERGY: Natural Gas Litigation Underway
---------------------------------------------
GenOn Energy, Inc. remains a defendant in the so-called, Natural
Gas Litigation said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on March 30, 2018, for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2017.

GenOn was party to several lawsuits filed in the aftermath of the
California energy crisis in 2000 and 2001 and relate to alleged
conduct to increase natural gas prices in violation of state
antitrust law and similar laws. All the suits have been dismissed
or settled except four, three of which are class action lawsuits,
filed on behalf of commercial and industrial purchasers of
natural gas in, respectively, the states of Kansas, Missouri, and
Wisconsin. The fourth remaining, suit was brought by a single
plaintiff in Kansas. The lawsuits seek treble or punitive
damages, restitution and/or full consideration damages.

The lawsuits also name as parties a number of energy companies
unaffiliated with GenOn.

In July 2011, the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada,
which was assigned the cases for pretrial matters, granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed all claims
against GenOn and the other defendants. The appeal reached the
U.S. Supreme Court, which on April 21, 2015, held that the
plaintiffs' state antitrust law claims are not field-preempted by
the federal Natural Gas Act and the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution and directed that the cases be remanded to the U.S.
District Court for the District of Nevada for further
proceedings.

The U.S. Supreme Court left open whether the claims were
preempted on the basis of conflict preemption. On March 30, 2017,
the court denied the plaintiffs' motions for class certification,
which the plaintiffs' appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The parties
have completed briefing of the appeal but the oral arguments have
not yet been scheduled.

In May 2016, in the single-plaintiff Kansas case, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Nevada granted the defendants'
motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff appealed the decision
to the Ninth Circuit, which on March 26, 2018 reversed the
decision. The time for filing a motion for rehearing and petition
for writ of certiorari at the Unites States Supreme Court has not
yet run.

On October 18, 2016, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Nevada entered final judgment for CenterPoint Energy Services,
Inc. in the one remaining case (the Wisconsin case) in which it
is a defendant. GenOn has agreed to indemnify CenterPoint against
certain losses relating to these lawsuits. The plaintiffs
appealed the district court's summary judgment ruling to the
Ninth Circuit, which hear oral arguments on March 16, 2018 but
has not yet ruled on the appeal.

On February 26, 2018, GenOn filed objections to the proofs of
claim filed in the Chapter 11 Cases by all of the plaintiffs in
each of the four cases. GenOn filed that same day a motion
seeking a schedule for a series of hearings to resolve the
objections and asking the bankruptcy court to estimate all of the
proofs of claim at zero dollars. The plaintiffs have objected to
the request for bankruptcy court to estimate the proofs of claim.
A hearing on whether the court will estimate the plaintiffs'
proofs of claim was scheduled for March 30, 2018.

GenOn Energy, Inc. is a wholesale power generation subsidiaries
of NRG, which is a competitive power company that produces, sells
and delivers electricity and related services, primarily in major
competitive power markets in the U.S. GenOn is an indirect wholly
owned subsidiary of NRG. GenOn was incorporated as a Delaware
corporation on August 9, 2000, under the name Reliant Energy
Unregco, Inc. The company is engaged in the ownership and
operation of power generation facilities; the trading of energy,
capacity and related products; and the transacting in and trading
of fuel and transportation services.


GRAIN PROCESSING: Judge Hears Summary Judgment Bid in Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
Sarah Ritter, writing for Quad-City Times, reports that a Scott
County District Court judge considered on April 12 whether Grain
Processing Corporation in Muscatine is allowed to release
emissions onto neighboring properties if it has claimed the right
to do so for 75 years.

Over several hours on April 12, Judge John Telleen heard
arguments in the class action lawsuit against GPC over its Oregon
Street plant's emissions. Last month, the case was moved to the
Scott County Courthouse. The first trial date is scheduled for
July 9.

More than 14,000 individuals are included, arguing the plant's
emissions are a nuisance. The Iowa Supreme Court certified the
class action last spring.

Attorney representing GPC, Mike Reck, Esq. --
mrreck@belinmccormick.com -- asked the judge for a summary
judgement to dismiss the nuisance, negligence and trespassing
claims. He argued residents do not have a right to sue now, when
the emissions have existed since GPC began operating its plant in
the 1940s.

"Parties can't sit on their hands for literally, literally,
three-quarters of a century and do nothing," Reck said. "They sat
on their hands and allowed GPC to invest millions of dollars ...
It's simply not law in Iowa that you can sit on your hands for 70
years and then claim something is a nuisance."

Reck claims GPC operates under a prescriptive easement, allowing
the plant to discharge emissions onto neighboring properties,
because it has done so since 1943, when it was established to
assist in World War II defense efforts.

In Iowa, a party claiming prescriptive easement must prove it has
used another party's property for at least 10 years, open and
notoriously, hostilely and under an expressed claim of right,
according to court documents.

Both Reck and class action counsel, led by Attorney Sarah
Siskind, Esq. -- ssiskind@lawmbg.com -- agree GPC has operated
for more than 10 years, "open and notoriously." Both parties
pointed to a line quoted in the Supreme Court opinion stating
residents would have been "living under a rock" if they did not
know about GPC's emissions.

The main argument is whether GPC has claimed the right to emit on
neighboring properties, plus whether residents were notified of
its right to do so.

Reck argued GPC has a claim of right because it has invested
millions into its facilities and acted as it had the right to
emit on neighboring properties. Siskind said the question is not
whether GPC has the right to operate its plant or release
emissions, but whether it has a right to do so "unnecessarily" or
"unreasonably."

She said by granting the summary judgement, the judge would be
granting GPC a prescriptive easement, giving them the authority
to release emissions at historic levels.

"GPC is asking the court to grant it thousands of easements,
running with the land in perpetuity ... There's no dispute GPC
has been using these properties to dispose of its noxious waste
for years," Siskind said. "But GPC never asserted it had an
easement. The grant of an easement would be unprecedented. No
Iowa court has ever granted an Iowa company the right to pollute
on a neighbor's property."

Judge Telleen said there is little case law in Iowa to offer
guidance on prescriptive easements regarding emissions. Most
cases deal with drainage districts or driveway disputes, he said.

In questioning both arguments, the judge said he was mostly
thinking about the future of GPC's emissions and the lasting
impact on the area. He also asked several questions about how the
prescriptive easement debate may affect jury instruction this
summer.

If the current motion for summary judgement is denied, Reck said
GPC plans to request further summary judgments before the July
trial. [GN]


HEALTHEXTRAS: Class Action Over Allegedly Bogus Insurance Product
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Colby Hamilton, writing for New York Law Journal, reports that a
U.S. district judge mistakenly conflated the injury requirement
to have standing with the issue of the case's merits in a suit
over allegedly illegal insurance, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit said on April 12.

The panel, composed of Circuit Judges Rosemary Pooler, Richard
Wesley and Peter Hall, vacated the March 2015 dismissal by U.S.
District Judge Paul Gardephe of a class action brought by former
holders of an accidental disability and medical expense insurance
policy. The defendants -- insurance companies, banks, and credit
card companies -- pitched the insurance to credit card holders,
even as they allegedly knew the insurance policy was bogus from
the start.

The plaintiffs claimed their HealthExtras insurance policies were
not issued by eligible entities under state law, did not have
approval from the state's Department of Insurance, and lacked
required provisions.

Gardephe dismissed the class action for lack of standing, finding
that, since none of the plaintiffs ever tried to actually use the
insurance, they couldn't establish an injury in fact.

At issue was a New York State law that requires a policy to be
enforced, even if it's illegal. The class members could have
sought to enforce the policy, then, should they have tried, but
since they didn't, there was no injury in fact, the district
court found. A mere statutory violation wasn't enough to earn
them standing.

That was the wrong call, the panel found. Regardless of the
merits of the claims, if it's a concrete injury -- in this case,
years of payments for the unused insurance policies -- caused by
the violation of a statute, it's enough to establish standing.

The panel found an additional issue with how the district court
resolved the case. No New York State court has interpreted the
insurance law at issue as precluding an insured person's ability
to bring a claim for a refund of the premiums paid for an illegal
insurance policy. The panel said reading of the so-called savings
clause of the law as such would seemingly conflict with the clear
aims of protecting consumers from bogus insurance schemes.

While noting this point meant "no criticism of a very able
District Court judge," the panel said Gardephe's "conflating the
merits questions with the standing inquiry" may have resulted in
the court failing to "give due consideration to this novel
question of state law and reached an outcome that would preclude
putative plaintiffs from seeking redress in state or federal
court."

Lackey Hershman partner Roger Mandel, Esq. -- rlm@lhlaw.net --
represented the plaintiffs on appeal. Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
Wharton & Garrison partner H. Christopher Boehning, Esq.--
cboehning@paulweiss.com -- was counsel for Federal Insurance Co.,
while Winstead PC associate Stephen Clarke, Esq. --
sclarke@winstead.com -- represented Stonebridge Life Insurance
Co. None responded to a request for comment on the decision. [GN]


HEALTHPORT TECHNOLOGIES: Summary Ruling in "Ruzhinskaya" OK'd
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TATYANA RUZHINSKAYA, as Administratrix of the Estate
of MARINA ROCHNIAK, Deceased, individually and on behalf of
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. HEALTHPORT TECHNOLOGIES,
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 14 Civ. 2921 (PAE)(S.D. N.Y.), Judge
Paul A. Engelmayer of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York granted HealthPort's motion for summary
judgment as to all three claims, and denied Ruzhinskaya's motion
for partial summary judgment.

The long-running class action, now at the summary judgment stage,
involves claims of excessive charges for medical records under a
New York statute, Public Health Law ("PHL") Section 18, which
governs access to and charges for patient medical records.
Ruzhinskaya at first brought, but then dropped, claims against
the hospital, Beth Israel Medical Center that housed the medical
records of her deceased mother, copies of which Ruzhinskaya
requested and obtained pursuant to Section 18.  Instead,
Ruzhinskaya now sues solely the release of information ("ROI")
company, HealthPort, with whom Beth Israel contracted to
photocopy and provide those records to requesters on its behalf.

The putative class action was originally brought in New York
state court in March 2014.  On April 25, 2014, HealthPort removed
the case to the Court based on the Class Action Fairness Act.  On
May 27, 2014, the Plaintiffs filed the First Amended Complaint
("FAC").

The FAC brought claims on behalf of three Plaintiffs.  Each had
sought and obtained medical records from a different New York
hospital which had contracted with Healthport to provide those
copies on its behalf.  The hospitals were (1) Beth Israel, from
whom Ruzhinskaya (through an attorney) had sought records
relating to her deceased mother, Marina Rochniak, whose estate
Ruzhinskaya serves as Administrator; (2) Mount Sinai Hospital,
from whom Plaintiff Charles Spiro had sought records; and (3)
Montefiore Hospital, from whom plaintiff Ismael Torres had sought
records. Ruzhinskaya, Spiro, and Torres sued the three hospitals,
along with Healthport, which they alleged was an ROI company in
the business of duplicating and copying documents including
medical records, in a putative class action filed on behalf of
all persons in New York State whom Healthport had charged 75
cents per page for such copies.  The Plaintiffs claimed that this
charge was excessive.  They brought claims under a New York
statute, Public Health Law ("PHL") Section 18, under New York
General Business Law ("GBL") Section 349, and for unjust
enrichment.

On Aug. 29, 2014, the Court dismissed Spiro's and Torres's claims
with prejudice as untimely, because they had been filed outside
the statute of limitations.  The Court dismissed Ruzhinskaya's
claim without prejudice for lack of standing, insofar as her
mother's personal injury law firm had been billed and paid
HealthPort's charges without, as alleged, any obligation on
Ruzhinskaya's part to compensate the firm for incurring these
charges.  The Court invited Ruzhinskaya to cure this pleading
deficiency by pleading, in an amended complaint, a duty (e.g.,
contractual) to reimburse the law firm that incurred the records
expenses.

On Sept. 10, 2014, Ruzhinskaya filed the Second Amended Complaint
("SAC"), the operative pleading in the case.  The SAC brought the
same charges against Beth Israel and against HealthPort, the
agent to whom it alleged Beth Israel had delegated its
responsibilities for filling records requests.  Curing the defect
in the FAC, Ruzhinskaya this time pled (and attached a retainer
agreement reflecting) that she had been contractually
responsible, upon settlement of the estate's personal injury
case, to pay the law firm's disbursements.

On Jan. 26, 2015, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of all
claims against Beth Israel.  This dismissal left HealthPort, Beth
Israel's agent with respect to Ruzhinskaya's records request, as
the sole Defendant.

On April 29, 2015, Ruzhinskaya moved for class certification.
Consistent with having dropped Beth Israel as a Defendant,
Ruzhinskaya sought to represent a statewide class defined to
include all patients or patient representatives who had made
requests for patient records from a healthcare provider for which
HealthPort charged 75 cents a page.

Between April and July 2015, the parties briefed that motion. On
Aug. 6, 2015, the Court heard argument.  On Nov. 9, 2015, the
Court denied the motion to certify a statewide class.  The Court,
however, authorized Ruzhinskaya to file a new motion for class
certification limited to a narrower class: of persons who had
requested records from Beth Israel for which copies HealthPort
had charged 75 cents per page.

On Nov. 23, 2015, Ruzhinskaya moved to certify a narrower class
along the lines the Court had invited: of persons who, between
March 12, 2011 and the present, had requested records from Beth
Israel whose requests had been serviced by HealthPort and who had
been charged 75 cents per page.  On Dec. 17, 2015, the Court
granted that motion.

On March 28, 2017, following unsuccessful settlement
negotiations, the Court set a trial date of June 12, 2017.  On
May 12, 2017, a conference was held to discuss the upcoming
trial.  On June 2, 2017, a conference scheduled to serve as a
final pretrial conference was held.  The next conference in the
case was held on June 30, 2017.   The Court held that, rather
than setting a new trial date, it would authorize a round of
summary judgment motions, in which HealthPort could move for
summary judgment on the ground it had newly identified and any
others, and Ruzhinskaya could move for summary judgment on any
grounds she identified.  The Court set a schedule for summary
judgment submissions.

On July 27, 2017, the parties jointly filed a statement of Joint
Stipulated Facts.

On Aug. 25, 2017, HealthPort filed a motion seeking summary
judgment on all three of Ruzhinskaya's claims, and a memorandum
of law, with the declaration of Scott R. Emery and attachments in
support.  On Oct. 4, 2017, Ruzhinskaya filed a motion for partial
summary judgment as to her claim under Section 18, a memorandum
of law in support and in opposition to HealthPort's motion,  a
Rule 56.1 statement, and the Declaration of Mathew Jasinski in
support.

On Oct. 27, 2017, HealthPort filed a Rule 56.1 counterstatement
and response to Ruzhinskaya's Rule 56.1 statement, a memorandum
of law in opposition to Ruzhinskaya's motion for partial summary
judgment and in further support of its own motion for summary
judgment, and a new declaration from Emery.  On Nov. 17, 2017,
Ruzhinskaya filed a reply memorandum of law in support of her
motion for partial summary judgment, and a second declaration by
Jasinski in support.

Judge Engelmayer resolves whether Section 18prohibit entities
other than Healthcare providers from charging above their costs
for work responding to patient information requests; and whether
HealthPort assumed duties under Section 18 with respect to the
charges it imposed by virtue of its business arrangement with
Beth Israel.

The Judge holds that, under Section 18, an entity other than a
health care provider is not liable for charging for its services
in connection with records requests more than its costs incurred.
Under Section 18(2)(e), the duty to impose no more than "costs
incurred" falls exclusively on the health care provider.  The
contrary holding -- denying a vendor the right to profit from
this line of work -- lacks support in the statutory text and
history and is unnecessary to advance the statute's purpose.  He
also holds that HealthPort did not take on a duty under Section
18 to limit its charges to requesters to its own "costs
incurred."

The Judge's holding that HealthPort did not have a duty under
Section 18 to limit its charges to its "costs incurred" is fatal
to each of Ruzhinskaya's claims, requiring that summary judgment
be entered for HealthPort.  First, in light of his holding that
Section 18(2)(e) did not impose on HealthPort a duty to charge no
higher than its costs incurred, HealthPort's imposition of an
above-cost charge to requesters did not violate the statute.
Second, there is no factual basis on which a jury could find that
HealthPort's retention of its disclosed charge for its ROI
services was unjust or offended "equity or good conscience."
Third, in light of the his holding that HealthPort was permitted
to charge above its costs, the theory of its liability under
Section 349 cannot be sustained.  HealthPort's charge was not
unlawful under Section 18 and it fully disclosed the amount of
that charge to Ruzhinskaya.

For these reasons, Judge Engelmayer granted HealthPort's motion
for summary judgment as to all three claims, and denied
Ruzhinskaya's motion for partial summary judgment.  The Clerk of
Court is respectfully directed to terminate all pending motions
and to close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 14, 2018 Opinion and Order
is available at https://is.gd/pKHrtd from Leagle.com.

Tatyana Ruzhinskaya, as Administratix of the Estate of Marina
Rochniak, Deceased, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Edward Seth
Goodman, Simonson Hess Leibowitz & Goodman, P.C., Michael Jon
Pendell -- mpendell@motleyrice.com -- Motley Rice LLC, Mathew P.
Jasinski -- mjasinski@motleyrice.com -- Motley Rice LLC, Rebecca
M. Katz -- rkatz@ktmc.com -- Motley Rice LLC, William H. Narwold
-- bnarwold@motleyrice.com -- Motley Rice LLC & Steven Lester
Hess, Simonson Hess Leibowitz & Goodman, P.C.

Healthport Technologies, LLC, Defendant, represented by Rebecca
Anne Brazzano -- Rebecca.Brazzano@ThompsonHine.com -- Thompson
Hine LLP, Alexandra Chanin -- Alexandra.Nelson@ThompsonHine.com -
- Thompson Hine LLP, pro hac vice, James Lee Defeo, Thompson Hine
LLP, James R. Lynch -- Jeremy.Campana@ThompsonHine.com -- Lynch
Daskal Emery, LLP, Kip T. Bollin -- Kip.Bollin@ThompsonHine.com -
- Thompson Hine LLP, Scott R. Emery, Lynch Daskal Emery, LLP &
Seth A. Litman -- Seth.Litman@ThompsonHine.com -- Thompson Hine
LLP, pro hac vice.


HOT SPRINGS, AR: Court Affirms Summary Dismissal of "Houston"
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, REX L. HOUSTON, JR.; KELTON R. BROWN, JR.; JOHN G.
HOMATAS; AND JIM WEST, INDIVIDUALLY AND BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND
ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED; COLLECTIVELY KNOWN AS OPPONENTS OF
ORDINANCE 6121, Appellants, v. CITY OF HOT SPRINGS, ARKANSAS,
Appellee, Case No. CV-17-807 (), Judge Raymond R. Abramson of the
U.S. Court of Appeals of Arkansas, Division II, affirmed the
summary dismissal by the Circuit Court of Garland County of the
Appellants' challenge to an ordinance passed by the City of Hot
Springs, Arkansas, that annexed to the City an unincorporated
area of Garland County known as the Enclave Study Area B.

The statutory basis for the City's annexation of Enclave B is
contained in Arkansas Code Annotated sections 14-40-302 and 14-
40-501 to -503.  On Nov. 17, 2015, the City's board of directors
passed Hot Springs Resolution No. 8793, fixing a time and date
for a public hearing to annex Enclave B.  In December 2015, all
known property owners of Enclave B were notified by certified
mail of the City's intent to annex Enclave B and informed of
their rights related thereto.  Also in December, a legal notice
was published in a newspaper with circulation in Garland County
setting out the legal description of Enclave B and announcing
that it was the intention of the City to annex Enclave B.

The City held a public hearing on Jan. 5, 2016, to consider
whether an ordinance should be passed to annex Enclave B into the
City pursuant to Resolution 8793.  On Jan. 19, 2016, the City
board of directors voted to adopt Hot Springs Ordinance No. 6121,
annexing Enclave B into the City.

The Appellants, who are landowners in Enclave B opposed to the
annexation, brought suit challenging the annexation on several
grounds.  First, they sought a declaration that the City did not
comply with the statutory requirements for such an annexation,
thereby making Ordinance 6121 void.  Second, their complaint
sought a declaration that the annexation procedure set forth in
Arkansas Code Annotated sections 14-40-501 to -504 violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.  Last, the Appellants argue that the annexation
procedure violates the Arkansas Constitution by infringing on
their rights to representation and to vote.

The original complaint in the action was filed pro se.  When the
City filed a motion for declaratory judgment and motion for
summary judgment, the Appellants retained counsel.  Thereafter,
they filed an amended and supplemental class-action complaint for
declaratory judgment, which essentially sought the same relief as
the original complaint but also sought class certification on
behalf of all persons residing in Enclave B.

The City then filed an answer to the amended complaint and
renewed its motion for declaratory judgment and motion for
summary judgment.  These motions were fully briefed, and on Nov.
2, 2016, the Appellants filed their own motion for summary
judgment asserting entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on
their claims that the City failed to comply with the statutory
requirements in its passage of Ordinance 6121, thereby seeking a
summary determination that Ordinance 6121 was void.

A hearing was held on the pending motions on Dec. 13, 2016, in
the Garland County Circuit Court.  After conducting the hearing
and reviewing the pleadings, the circuit court granted the City's
motion and denied the Appellants' motion, thereby dismissing the
Appellants' amended complaint with prejudice.  The appeal
follows.

On appeal, the Appellants argue the circuit court erred in
summarily finding that the City had complied with the statutory
requirements for annexation of Enclave B and in denying their
motion for summary judgment on those grounds.  They also argue
the annexation procedure is unconstitutional under the United
States Constitution because it violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and further that it is
unconstitutional under the equality sections of the Arkansas
Constitution.

Judge Abramson finds, among other things, that the Appellants
have no legal basis to conclude that "undertaking" of an
annexation begins with the passage of an ordinance and no basis
to contend that voiding the ordinance is the appropriate remedy
even if it does.  He agrees with the City that it is important to
note that Ordinance 6121 was not even valid until days after the
City contacted GIS.  Even if Ordinance 6121 amounted to the
City's undertaking the annexation of Enclave B, the ordinance
does nothing and is invalid before its post-enactment
publication.  Accordingly, he holds that contacting GIS within 48
hours of Ordinance 6121's passage is in accordance with the
statute.

The Appellants also argue that the Annexation Procedure
unconstitutionally violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment by denying the right to vote to those who
reside in the area to be annexed.  The Judge finds that this
argument is wholly without merit.  The City did not fail to allow
affected property owners a chance to be heard before the passage
of Ordinance6121.

Finally, the Appellants' final argument is that the annexation
procedure is unconstitutional under the equality sections of the
Arkansas Constitution.  They attempt to impose the strict-
scrutiny analysis on the statutory scheme at issue.  However, the
Judge notes that as with their previous argument, this point has
already been decided by the Arkansas Supreme Court.  The
Appellants have not asserted that the statute lacks a rational-
basis.

Judge Abramson does not believe the circuit court's grant of
summary judgment was in error.  Accordingly, he affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 14, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/R1eRwY from Leagle.com.

Dover Dixon Horne PLLC by: Todd Wooten -- twooten@ddh.law.com --
Monte D. Estes -- mdestes@ddh.law.com -- and Carl F. "Trey"
Cooper -- tcooper@ddh.law.com -- for appellants.

Brian W. Albright -- balbright@cityhs.net -- John L. Wilkerson,
and Mark R. Hayes, for appellee.


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: To Appeal Baby Powder Asbestos Case Verdict
--------------------------------------------------------------
Tina Bellon, writing for Reuters, reports that a $117 million
verdict against Johnson & Johnson and a supplier in favor of a
man who said his asbestos-related cancer was caused by long-term
use of J&J's Baby Powder could open a new front for thousands of
cases claiming the widely-used product caused cancer, legal
experts and plaintiffs lawyers said.

J&J has been battling some 6,000 cases claiming its baby powder
and Shower to Shower products cause ovarian cancer.  The $117
million verdict by a New Jersey jury, however, involved a
different form of cancer that is clearly linked to asbestos.

Plaintiffs lawyers claim that internal J&J documents seen in that
trial show that baby powder had been contaminated with asbestos.
They now plan to use the documents in upcoming ovarian cancer
trials to allege that the asbestos contamination also caused that
form of cancer.

J&J and Imerys Talc America, a unit of Imerys SA, have vowed to
appeal the New Jersey verdict and deny asbestos has ever been
present in their products or that their talc can cause any form
of cancer.

The case of Stephen Lanzo, a New Jersey resident who claimed he
developed mesothelioma after using baby powder since his birth in
1972, was the first time a jury saw the internal J&J documents
which plaintiffs claim show that J&J knew since the 1970s that
the talc in its baby powder was contaminated by asbestos during
the mining process.

J&J says the documents present no such evidence, but merely show
the company's caution.

Peter Bicks, a lawyer leading J&J's talc asbestos defense, said
that in the early 1970s, the company was looking at how it could
potentially remove asbestos from talc if the two became
intermingled in the mining process. He says no contamination was
ever found, citing decades of testing by independent laboratories
and scientists.

Mr. Bicks called the claims of a link between talc and asbestos
"junk science."

Mesothelioma, a rare and deadly form of cancer closely associated
with exposure to asbestos, affects the delicate tissue that lines
body cavities.

While the link between asbestos and mesothelioma is sufficiently
established, scientists are divided on whether asbestos exposure
can cause ovarian cancer.  Some studies have shown an association
between the two, while other studies have found no such link.

Elizabeth Burch, holder of the Charles H. Kirbo Chair of Law at
the University of Georgia, said it remained an open question
whether talc contained asbestos and that each case would turn on
the facts.

But J&J, which had $76.5 billion in sales in 2017, gives the
plaintiffs' bar an enticing new target, said Nathan Schachtman, a
lecturer at Columbia University who used to defend asbestos
cases.

Some 3,000 people are diagnosed with mesothelioma each year,
according to the American Cancer Society, a number that
Howard Erichson, a law professor at Fordham University who
specializes in mass tort litigation, called significant from a
legal standpoint.

But the roughly 22,000 women who were diagnosed with ovarian
cancer last year, according to the National Cancer Institute,
provide lawyers with a potentially much larger pool of plaintiffs
to tap.

"This is just the tip of the iceberg," said Mark Lanier, one of
the lawyers representing consumers, who said plaintiffs would
file thousands of additional mesothelioma and ovarian cancer
cases.

New Jersey-based J&J in a statement after the Lanzo verdict said
plaintiffs' attorneys had shifted their strategy to focus on
asbestos after a series of losses at trial and in court rulings
over previous allegations that the talc itself causes cancer.

Of the six ovarian cancer trials to date, juries found J&J liable
five times, but a Missouri appellate court threw out the first
verdict and a California judge tossed another.  Appeals of the
other cases are pending.

J&J in November also won the first trial over allegations that
its talc contained asbestos and caused a woman's mesothelioma.
Plaintiffs lawyers say the jury in that case did not see the
documents presented during the Lanzo trial.

But Mr. Erichson said the widespread use of J&J's consumer
products generally make the company an attractive litigation
target.

"Baby powder is as ubiquitous a product you can think of and
there are lots of people who can testify they've been exposed to
it," he said.


JP MORGAN: Overcharged Cryptocurrency Buyers File Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
David Floyd, writing for Coindesk, reports that a proposed class
action lawsuit has been filed against JPMorgan Chase, alleging
that the bank overcharged its credit card customers when they
used funds to purchase cryptocurrencies.

Brady Tucker, the plaintiff named in the April 10 complaint, said
that Chase Bank incorrectly charged him $143.30 in fees and
$20.61 in interest stemming from purchases made using his Chase
card in January and February.

Brady is being represented by Finkelstein & Krinsk LLP, a San
Diego-based law firm.

The bank was one of a number of institutions to stop allowing its
customers to make such purchases using their credit cards at the
beginning of February.

According to the complaint, prior to pulling the plug on all
purchases, the bank began treating such expenditures as "cash
advances" in January, but did so "unbeknownst to Chase's
cardholders."  Attorneys for the plaintiff alleged that Chase
Bank violated the Truth in Lending Act by not disclosing the
policy shift.

"The complete lack of fair notice to Chase's cardholders caused
them to unknowingly incur millions of dollars in cash advance
fees and sky-high interest charges on each and every crypto
purchase," the complaint says.  Chase did not charge debit card
users similar fees.

The plaintiff's lawyers -- who are seeking the return of the fees
as well as "additional statutory damages in the aggregate amount
of $1 million" -- are seeking class-action status.  While the
complaint says that the size of the class cannot be determined
prior to discovery, it argues that this group likely consists of
"hundreds or thousands of members."

A representative for JPMorgan Chase declined to comment when
reached. [GN]


JP MORGAN: Hit With Million Dollar Class Action Crypto Lawsuit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Brady Tucker et al v Chase Bank USA, filed in U.S. District
Court, Southern District of New York, 18-3155, Manhattan, was
initiated by San Diego-based law firm, Finkelstein & Krinsk LLP,
a class action specialist. Mr. Tucker of Idaho, plaintiff, claims
he incurred $143.30 in fees, and $20.61 in sudden interest
charges over five crypto transactions during late January and
early February. And while by itself it might appear trivial,
magnified by untold thousands of customers, and the numbers begin
to get substantial. Mr. Tucker also claims "upon purchasing a
cryptocurrency from Coinbase.com or another online crypto
merchant," he was saddled with cash advance fees in violation of
his original terms and conditions.

JP Morgan has been particularly aggressive when it comes to
cryptocurrency, especially bitcoin. Its, at times, curmudgeonly
CEO, Jamie Dimon, has waged a quotable war for years, referring
to cryptos as a fraud, tulip bulbs, and even calling enthusiasts
stupid, insisting he'd immediately fire an employee if he found
them dabbling in crypto. He'd later attempt to walk back some of
his harsher statements. At one point it even appeared he might
dabble in bitcoin futures. In any event, it's not beyond the
scope of things to believe JP Morgan would have a particular,
separate policy for crypto enthusiasts.

Indeed, Mr. Tucker attempted to dispute charges but JP Morgan
outright refused any consideration, he insisted. According to
Reuters, without warning the bank "stuck the plaintiff with the
bill, after the fact of his transactions, and insisted that he
pay it," the lawsuit is quoted. The suit was filed in federal
court, and accuses the bank of "charging surprise fees when it
stopped letting customers buy cryptocurrency with credit cards in
late January and began treating the purchases as cash advances."

Stupid Employees, Stupid Customers
It appears the bank charged extra fees and higher interest on
cash advances, and refused refunds once customers brought it to
their attention. Mary Jane Rogers of JP Morgan would not comment
on the case's claims, but she did say the bank halted crypto
purchases because of the associated risks. She said customers
were free to use debit cards without incurring such premiums.

"Chase silently smacked them with instant-cash-advance fees, plus
much higher interest rates than normal, and left them without any
recourse," Mr. Tucker is quoted in the complaint. Furthermore,
the lawsuit alleges JP Morgan Chase to have flagrantly usurped
the Truth in Lending Act, legislation requiring customer notice
when substantial changes are made to an account's terms. "The
lawsuit is asking for actual damages and statutory damages of $1
million," Reuters reported.

According to the complaint, "The complete lack of fair notice to
Chase's cardholders caused them to unknowingly incur millions of
dollars in cash advance fees and sky-high interest charges on
each and every crypto purchase." Mr. Tucker continued, "It
appears that in addition to firing its 'stupid' employees, Chase
elected to start fining its 'stupid' customers: unilaterally."
[GN]


KEMPHARM INC: Iowa Class Suit Still in Preliminary Stage
--------------------------------------------------------
KemPharm, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on March 30, 2018, for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2017, that the class action suit
field in the Iowa District Court is still preliminary stage and
has not yet been set for trial.

In December 2016, a class action suit was filed against the
Company in the Iowa District Court in Johnson County by a
stockholder alleging that the Company, certain of its senior
executives and directors who signed the registration statement in
connection with its IPO, and each of the investment banks that
acted as underwriters for the offering negligently issued untrue
statements of material facts and omitted to state material facts
required to be stated in the registration statement and
incorporated offering materials that the Company filed with the
SEC in support of the offering. The plaintiff does not quantify
any alleged damages in his complaint but, in addition to
attorneys' fees and costs, the plaintiff seeks to recover damages
and obtain other relief on behalf of himself and all other
persons who purchased the Company's common stock pursuant or
traceable to the offering and the registration statement and who
were allegedly damaged thereby.

In January 2017, the class action suit was removed to the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. The plaintiff
subsequently filed a motion to remand the case to the Iowa
District Court, and that motion was granted. In January 2018, the
Iowa District Court issued an order postponing all deadlines and
the setting of any schedule in the case pending a decision by the
United States Supreme Court in Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County
Employees Retirement Fund. On March 20, 2018, the Supreme Court
issued its decision in Cyan and held that state courts have
subject matter jurisdiction over putative class actions like the
one filed against the company, which assert claims arising under
the Securities Act. Accordingly, the case will proceed in Iowa
District Court.

KemPharm said "The suit against the Company is still in a
preliminary stage and has not yet been set for trial."
Accordingly, the Company is unable to predict the timing or
outcome of this litigation as of the date of this report.

KemPharm, Inc. is a specialty pharmaceutical company focused on
the discovery and development of proprietary pro drugs to treat
serious medical conditions through its Ligand Activated Therapy,
or LAT(TM), platform technology. The company utilizes its
proprietary LAT platform technology to generate improved versions
of U.S. Food and Drug Administration, or FDA, approved drugs in
the high need areas of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder,
or ADHD, pain and other central nervous system, or CNS,
disorders. The company is based in Coralville, Iowa.


KINDRED HEALTHCARE: Settles Overtime Case for $12 Million
---------------------------------------------------------
Chris Larson, writing for Louisville Business First, reports that
Kindred Healthcare Inc. will pay millions to settle a class-
action lawsuit that alleges the Louisville-based post-acute and
home health care company violate California labor laws.

The lawsuit, filed U.S. District Court's Northern District Court
of California in August 2016, claims that Kindred (NYSE: KND) and
its Gentiva Health Services home health care subsidiary failed to
pay health care workers overtime, provide meal and rest breaks,
pay the state's minimum wage, and keep accurate payroll records,
among other things, from 2012 to 2016.

Kindred will set up a $12 million settlement fund, according to a
copy of the settlement agreement.

The plaintiff who brought the case, Valerie Cashon, was an
occupational therapist with Gentiva before Kindred acquired
Gentiva in 2015.

The settlement fund will pay out no more than $3 million in
attorney fees; about $8.7 million will be paid to the class of
some 1,600 party members; and the remainder will go to other
administrative and legal fees.

The award to class members will be based on a formula established
by the settlement agreement, with an average recovery of $5,415.

Cashon will receive recovery of no more than $20,000, according
to the agreement.

The agreement states that Kindred denies all allegations but that
the company "concluded that that further proceedings in the
action would be protracted and expensive."

Requests for comment from Kindred were not returned.

The case first went to mediation on April 3, 2017, but the effort
was unsuccessful. Kindred and the plaintiff's counsel eventually
conducted successful mediation on Nov. 20, 2017.

Kindred Healthcare is in the midst of an acquisition that will
take the company to private ownership and split off the company's
home health business. Kindred's shareholders recently approved
the company's sale to a consortium made up of Humana Inc. and two
private equity firms.[GN]


LONGFIN CORP: Levi & Korsinsky Files Class Action Lawsuit
---------------------------------------------------------
The following statement is being issued by Levi & Korsinsky, LLP:

To: All persons or entities who purchased or otherwise acquired
securities of Longfin Corp. ("Longfin") (NASDAQ:LFIN) between
December 13, 2017 and April 2, 2018. You are hereby notified that
a securities class action lawsuit has been commenced in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York. To get more information go to:

http://www.zlk.com/pslra-d/longfin-corp?wire=3

or contact Joseph E. Levi, Esq. either via email at
jlevi@levikorsinsky.com or by telephone at (212) 363-7500, toll-
free: (877) 363-5972. There is no cost or obligation to you.

The complaint alleges that throughout the class period Defendants
issued materially false and/or misleading statements and/or
failed to disclose that: (i) Longfin had material weaknesses in
its operations and internal controls that hindered the Company's
profitability; (ii) Longfin did not meet the requirements for
inclusion in Russell indices; and (iii) as a result of the
foregoing, the Defendants' public statements were materially
false and misleading at all relevant times.

If you suffered a loss in Longfin you have until June 4, 2018 to
request that the Court appoint you as lead plaintiff. Your
ability to share in any recovery doesn't require that you serve
as a lead plaintiff.

         Joseph E. Levi, Esq.
         Levi & Korsinsky, LLP
         30 Broad Street -- 24th Floor
         New York, NY 10004
         Telephone: (212) 363-7500
         Toll Free: (877) 363-5972
         Fax: (212) 363-7171
         E-mail: jlevi@levikorsinsky.com [GN]


LOS ANGELES COUNTY, CA: Lenders Over Green Energy Program Sue
-------------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Khouri, writing for Los Angeles Times, reports that
attorneys representing homeowners filed lawsuits on April 12
against the Los Angeles County, alleging a county program that
funds solar panels and other energy-efficient home improvements
is a "plague" that's ruined the finances of many borrowers by
saddling them with loans they cannot afford.

The twin suits seeking class-action status were filed in Los
Angeles County Superior Court against the county, as well as
Renovate America and Renew Financial, the county's private lender
partners for the Property Assessed Clean Energy program.

The complaints say borrowers are now at risk of losing their
homes because the loans are liens on a house, lacked adequate
consumer protections, and were marketed and sold by unscrupulous
contractors that were not properly monitored.

"Many PACE participants are living hand-to-mouth to hold onto
their homes, fearful of what is yet to come," the nearly
identical suits say. They note that many of those in trouble have
low incomes, are elderly or don't speak English as their first
language.

L.A. County representatives did not respond to a request for
comment.

In a statement, Renew Financial said it couldn't comment on
pending litigation, but said it's worked with government
authorities to improve consumer protections, including new state
laws that took effect this year.

Renovate America said it similarly supported the enhanced
protections and finds "no merit in the allegations in the
complaints."

Specifically, the lawsuits allege the county and lenders have
committed financial elder abuse, while the lenders charged
inflated interest rates and broke a county contract that said
they were to provide "best in class" protections against
predatory lending and special safeguards for seniors.

While the lenders have said they checked borrowers for previous
bankruptcies or missed mortgage payments prior to approval, they
did not ask for their incomes until recently, basing approvals
largely on home equity.

The lawsuits said the county knew, or should have known, its
program would harm vulnerable homeowners and has looked the other
way as problems piled up.

The suits seek class-action status for borrowers who took out
loans between March 2015 and March 2018 and that had excessive
debt-to-income ratios or were left with very little residual
income after making their loan payments. The lawsuits said the
class size is unknown, but argued PACE has been a "disaster for
thousands of vulnerable homeowners."

The suits, brought by Irell & Manella, Public Counsel and Bet
Tzedek,Esq. ask that loans for borrowers in the class be canceled
and that homeowners be returned any money paid.

"We can't keep up with the number of complaints about this
program," said Jennifer H. Sperling, Esq., an attorney with Bet
Tzedek. "This is a systemic problem."

The class time frame was chosen because as of April 1, under a
new state law, PACE lenders must ask for a borrower's income and
make a "good faith determination" of a borrower's ability to
repay.

Another new bill mandated that PACE providers have a phone
conversation with all homeowners before they take out the loan to
ensure they understand the terms. Renew Financial has said it's
always had such calls and Renovate America said it started doing
so before the law passed.

The bills, which included other reforms as well, were signed by
Gov. Jerry Brown last year following repeated complaints over
unscrupulous contractors who market and sign people up for the
loans on tablet computers and smartphones.

"If they had let me know from Day One this is what [you are]
going to get into ... there is no way I would have signed," said
Reginald Nemore, a 58-year-old former bus driver who had to
retire after a back injury.

He took out a Renovate America loan for solar panels and attic
insulation in 2016. Nemore said before a contractor handed him a
smartphone to sign, the individual didn't explain to him exactly
how much he would be paying. He said he was told he'd qualify for
a $7,000 government check for going green, but found out it isn't
available to him.

Nemore said he wasn't told he could lose his house if he didn't
pay and only found out the true cost when paperwork arrived in
the mail after the loan was finalized. He now owes roughly $240 a
month for 25 years, even though he said he and his wife, who
suffers from multiple sclerosis, sometimes only have $50 or less
in their checking account each month.

Nemore's attorney said he and his wife only take in around $2,475
from Social Security disability payments.

"I don't want to be uprooted," Nemore said. "But I don't know if
it is going to be up to me to have that choice."

First started in 2008, PACEprograms are established by government
authorities, which allow the privately financed loans to be
repaid as line items on property tax bills. In addition to solar
panels and energy-efficient air conditioners, the loans in
California can be used for items such as low-flow toilets that
save water.

In Southern California, Los Angeles, Riverside, San Bernardino
and San Diego counties have approved PACE programs and contracted
with private lenders to fund and largely operate the efforts.

If PACE loans go unpaid, a homeowner can be foreclosed upon.
However, Renovate America and Renew Financial -- which partner
with Los Angeles County and issue loans under the Hero and
California First programs, respectively -- told The Times last
year they hadn't foreclosed on anyone for nonpayment of PACE
loans.

L.A. County said it had set up reserve funds to cover missed
borrower payments for a time, making a quick foreclosure unlikely
for those who've missed PACE payments.

Program proponents, including the lenders, have praised them as a
tool for saving energy and combating global warming. And they say
most customers have come away happy.

A recent study from the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
found PACE programs boosted the deployment of residential solar
photovoltaic systems in California cities with the program by 7%
to 12% between 2010 and 2015.

But consumer groups say contractors who serve as de-facto
mortgage brokers too often misrepresent how the financing works,
sticking people with loans they can neither understand nor
afford. And they note mortgage servicers will often cover the
PACE bills for a time and might be the ones foreclosing upon a
delinquent homeowner.

In the lawsuits filed on April 12, attorneys allege on behalf of
their clients that Renovate America and Renew Financial failed to
screen and monitor their network of contractors and encouraged
predatory lending and aggressive marketing.

Often, the suit says, contractors served as a homeowner's
"primary" source of information about the loans. Lenders told
contractors they didn't need to determine if customers could
afford the loan and rubber stamped payment to contractors,
without regard to whether they followed certain guidelines, the
lawsuits allege.

Renovate America has said it's tried to weed out bad contractors,
kicking them out when they don't follow the rules. In October,
the company announced its chief executive was stepping down and
it retained a law firm to "conduct and make public a third-party
review of practices and procedures."

In its statement on April 12, the company said a different
outside review of its loans for the Western Riverside Council of
Governments found it followed the applicable consumer protections
that the agency set up more than 99% of the time. [GN]


LVNV FUNDING: Court Denies Summary Judgment in "McMahon"
--------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SCOTT MCMAHON, on behalf of plaintiff and the
classes defined herein, Plaintiff, v. LVNV FUNDING, LLC,
RESURGENT CAPITAL SERVICES, L.P., ALEGIS GROUP, LLC, and TATE &
KIRLIN ASSOCIATES, INC., Defendants, Case No. 12 C 1410 (N.D.
Ill.), Judge Jorge Alonso of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, (i) granted in
part and denied in part the Plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment; (ii) denied the Defendants' cross-motion for summary
judgment; and (iii) denied the Plaintiff's motion to strike.

McMahon brings the case under the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act ("FDCPA") against the Defendants.

In December 2011, the Plaintiff received a letter, dated Dec. 19,
2011, from Tate & Kirlin seeking to collect a debt of $584.98
originally owed to Nicor Gas.  The letter offered "An
Opportunity: We are pleased to extend to you an offer to settle
your account in full for $233.99.  This represents a savings of
60% off your balance."

On Dec. 29, 2011, the Plaintiff sent a letter in response, in
which he requested that Tate & Kirlin verify the debt so that
they can settle it quickly.  He received a reply letter from
Resurgent, dated Jan. 13, 2012, informing him that the account
has been placed with Resurgent, and enclosing a separate
typewritten page titled "Validation of Debt," dated Jan. 12,
2012, which stated that LVNV currently owns the debt.  The
account was previously sold by Nicor Gas on or about 09-23-2011
and at that time the balance on this account was $584.98.

Although the letter did not mention it, the Plaintiff last made a
payment on the debt to Nicor Gas in 1997, and the debt was
charged off in 1998.  Nothing in the Dec. 19, 2011 or Jan. 13,
2012 communications mentioned the statute of limitations or
disclosed whether it would bar any legal action to collect the
debt in 2012.  Although aware that the statute of limitations on
the debt had expired, Resurgent placed the Plaintiff's debt with
Tate & Kirlin.  The described correspondence ensued, and in
February 2012, the Plaintiff brought the lawsuit.

The Plaintiff asserts that the correspondence he received
concerning his debt to Nicor Gas was deceptive and the Defendants
are responsible for the use of unfair or deceptive means of
collecting that debt, in violation of the FDCPA.  The Court
initially denied class certification, but the Seventh Circuit
reversed and remanded the case.

On remand, the Court certified and approved notice to the class
of (a) all individuals in Illinois (b) to whom LVNV, Resurgent or
any debt collector employed by LVNV or Resurgent (c) sent a
letter seeking to collect a debt that referred to a settlement
(d) which debt was (i) a credit card debt on which the last
payment had been made more than five years prior to the letter,
or (ii) a debt arising out of the sale of goods (including gas)
on which the last payment had been made more than four years
prior to the letter (e) which letter was sent on or after Feb.
28, 2011 and on or before March 19, 2012, (f) where the
individual after receipt of the letter, (i) made a payment, (ii)
filed suit, or (iii) responded by requesting verification or
contesting the debt.

The case is before the Court on the parties' cross-motions for
summary judgment.  The Plaintiff contends that the letter he
received from Tate & Kirlin ("McMahon letter") violates the FDCPA
on its face as a matter of law.  Even if the letter does not
violate the FDCPA on its face, according to him, it still
violates the FDCPA as a matter of law based on extrinsic
evidence, including the opinion of his expert witness, Timothy
Goldsmith, and research conducted by government agencies such as
the FTC and CFPB.  The Defendants respond, and move for summary
judgment in their favor, by arguing that the McMahon letter does
not violate the FDCPA as a matter of law.  At worst, according to
them, it falls within the category of communications that must be
proved deceptive with extrinsic evidence -- but, they argue, the
Plaintiff's extrinsic evidence of deceptiveness is insufficient
because the expert testimony he proffers is inadmissible under
the Daubert standard and the government agency reports are too
general to support a claim that any particular communication is
misleading

Also before the Court are the Defendant's motion to bar the
Plaintiff's expert from testifying, and the Plaintiff's motion to
strike.

Judge Alonso holds that McMahon v. LVNV Funding, LLC ("McMahon
I") and  Pantoja v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC require
the Court to side with the Plaintiff and rule that the McMahon
letter is deceptive as a matter of law.  He explains that Pantoja
held that a letter offering to settle a time-barred debt for a
fraction of the original amount and stating "because of the age
of your debt, we will not sue you for it," violates the FDCPA
because it does not make clear to the recipient that the law
prohibits the collector from suing to collect such an old debt.
Based on a straightforward application of that holding to the
case, the McMahon letter is deceptive as a matter of law because
the McMahon letter does not contain any unambiguous warning about
the possibility of losing the protection of the statute of
limitations by accepting the "offer" to "settle."

The Judge also holds that the McMahon Letter is misleading
because it does not make clear that a partial payment or new
promise to pay may cost the recipient the protection of the
statute of limitations.  He fails to see how the potential
applicability of the four-year statute of limitations
distinguishes this case from Pantoja.  No extrinsic evidence is
necessary to prove as much.  Because the Court has no need to
consider extrinsic evidence, he will grant the Defendants'
Daubert motion to bar the testimony of the Plaintiff's expert
Timothy Goldsmith.  Goldsmith's testimony is directed to whether
letters such as the McMahon letter are misleading, but the Court
has already determined that they are misleading as a matter of
law, so Goldsmith's testimony would not aid the trier of fact to
determine any fact in issue.

As to the Defendants' argument that even if the McMahon letter is
deceptive, the Court must grant their motion for summary
judgment, or at least deny the Plaintiff's, Judge Alonso finds
that (i) the Defendants deceptively implied that they were
generously extending the Plaintiff an offer to settle his debt,
although in fact there was nothing generous about it because the
time for enforcing their rights by filing a collection suit had
elapsed; (ii) the amount of statutory damages should be
determined by a jury after a trial; and (iii) it is not
appropriate at this time to grant summary judgment on the issue
of damages.

Finally, the Judge finds that the evidence does not conclusively
establish that the principal purpose of LVNV's business is debt
collection -- and unlike a jury, the Court may not sift through
the evidence and decide whom to believe at the summary judgment
stage.  But viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable
to the Plaintiff and drawing all reasonable inferences in his
favor, a reasonable juror could reach a verdict in favor of the
Plaintiff on the question of whether the principal purpose of
LVNV's business is debt collection.   He says he will deny the
parties' motions for summary judgment on the issue of whether
LVNV is a debt collector.

For these reasons, Judge Alonso granted in part and denied in
part the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. He granted the
motion as to whether the Defendants' dunning letters were
deceptive and misleading in violation of the FDCPA; and otherwise
denied it.  He denied the Defendants' cross-motion for summary
judgment and the Plaintiff's motion to strike.  He granted the
Defendants' Daubert motion.  The Judge set a status hearing for
April 11, 2018 at 9:30 a.m. to discuss further proceedings to
resolve the questions of damages and whether LVNV is a "debt
collector" under the FDCPA.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 14, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/JkRaMU from Leagle.com.

Scott McMahon, on behalf of plaintiff and the classes defined
herein, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel A. Edelman, Edelman,
Combs, Latturner & Goodwin LLC, Cassandra P. Miller, Edelman,
Combs, Latturner & Goodwin LLC, Cathleen M. Combs, Edelman,
Combs, Latturner & Goodwin LLC, James O. Latturner, Edelman,
Combs, Latturner & Goodwin LLC & Tiffany Nicole Hardy, Edelman,
Combs, Latturner & Goodwin LLC.

LVNV Funding, LLC, Resurgent Capital Services, L.P., Alegis
Group, LLC & Tate & Kirlin Associates, Inc., Defendants,
represented by David M. Schultz -- dschultz@hinshawlaw.com --
Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Jennifer W. Weller --
jweller@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw & Culbertson LLC, Joel David
Bertocchi -- jbertocchi@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw & Culbertson
LLP, Lindsey A.L. Conley -- lconley@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw &
Culbertson LLP & Nabil G. Foster -- nfoster@hinshawlaw.com --
Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP.


MAMMOTH MOUNTAIN: $3.75MM Deal in "Story" Has Final Approval
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PAUL STORY, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. MAMMOTH MOUNTAIN SKI AREA, LLC,
a Delaware limited-liability company, Defendant, Case No. 2:14-
CV-02422-JAM-DB (E.D. Cal.), Judge John A. Mendez of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of California granted the
Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval of Class-Action Settlement
and Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses and Service Award to
Class Representative.

In connection with preliminarily approving a class-wide
Settlement reached in the within Action, the Court scheduled a
Final Fairness Hearing for March 13, 2018.  It directed Story to
file a motion for final approval by Jan. 26, 2018.  The Court
also directed the Plaintiff to file a motion for approval of any
Attorney's Fees and Expenses, as well as any Service Award for
the Class Representative, by Jan. 26, 2018, to be heard at the
same time as the motion for final approval.

Pursuant to the Court's directive, the Plaintiff timely filed a
Motion for Final Approval of Class-Action Settlement and a Motion
for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses and Service Award to Class
Representative, both of which came on for hearing on March 13,
2018.

Having read all of the papers filed in connection therewith, as
well as all of the evidence and argument submitted with respect
to the proposed Settlement, Judge Mendez finds that the proposed
Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate.  Therefore, he
granted the Motion for Final Approval of Class-Action Settlement
is granted.

He certified a Settlement Class consisting of all the Class
Members, defined as all persons throughout the United States who,
during the Class Period, received at least one prerecorded- or
artificial-voice telephone call on their respective cellular or
landline telephones from Defendant, or from any person or entity
acting on behalf of Defendant, made for a marketing or
advertising purpose, who did not submit Requests for Exclusion
pursuant to the procedure set forth in the Settlement Agreement;
and, upon the Effective Date, all the Settlement Class Members
therefore will have released the Released Parties from the
Released Claims.

Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the Defendant has
agreed to pay $3,750,000 as the Settlement Fund.  The Settlement
Fund will be used to pay the Settlement Class Members' respective
Individual Settlement Payments, the Service Award for the Class
Representative, Class Counsel's Attorney's Fees and Expenses, and
the Settlement Administration Expenses.

After deducting the Service Award, the Attorney's Fees and
Expenses, and the Settlement Administration Expenses,
$2,641,063.40 of the Settlement Fund remains.  Under the terms of
the Settlement Agreement, this amount will be distributed pro
rata to Settlement Class Members who submitted valid Claim Forms,
with each such Settlement Class Member receiving up to $500.
Based on the $2,641,063.40 Net Settlement Fund, and pursuant to
the distribution methodology set forth in the Settlement
Agreement, the Judge finds that each Settlement Class Member
likely will receive an Individual Settlement Payment of
approximately $345.37.

All amounts remaining in the Net Settlement Fund after payment of
all Individual Settlement Payments, plus any Individual
Settlement Payments that are not redeemed within the time set
forth in the Settlement Agreement, comprise the Residual Fund.
The Residual Fund will be paid to a cy pres recipient.  The Court
also has been advised that the Parties have agreed on Public
Counsel as the cy pres recipient, an entity involved in the area
of consumer-protection law, which establishes a driving nexus
between the entity and the Settlement Class.

The Plaintiff is permitted to seek up to $5,000 from the
Settlement Fund as a Service Award, in recognition of the time
and effort that he expended in pursuing the Action and fulfilling
his obligations as the Class Representative, and of the benefits
conferred on all Class Members by the Settlement.  Judge Mendez
approved that amount as the Service Award and directed that it be
paid pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement.

The Class Counsel is permitted to seek up to 25% of the
Settlement Fund, i.e., $937,500, plus costs and expenses, as
Attorney's Fees and Expenses.  The Class Counsel has requested
$937,500 in attorney's fees and $24,436.60 in actual costs and
expenses.  The Judge approved those amounts as Attorney's Fees
and Expenses, and directed that they be paid pursuant to the
terms of the Settlement Agreement.

The Settlement Administrator is to be paid its reasonably
incurred fees and expenses from the Settlement Fund for the
Settlement Administration Expenses.  The Settlement Administrator
has requested $142,000 for its fees and expenses.  The Judge
approved up to that amount as the Settlement Administration
Expenses and directs that it be paid pursuant to the terms of the
Settlement Agreement.

The Individual Settlement Payments, the Service Award, the
Attorney's Fees and Expenses, and the Settlement Administration
Expenses will be paid pursuant to the terms of the Settlement
Agreement.  Except as otherwise provided in the Order, the Judge
ordered that the parties will bear their own costs and attorney's
fees.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 13, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/X1GVfs from Leagle.com.

Paul Story, Plaintiff, represented by Lionel Z. Glancy --
lglancy@glancylaw.com -- Mark Samuel Greenstone --
mgreenstone@glancylaw.com -- at Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP;
Abigail Ameri Zelenski -- abigail@jlglawyers.com -- David S
Zelenski -- david@jlglawyers.com -- Michael Joe Jaurigue --
michael@jlglawyers.com -- at Jaurigue Law Group.

Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability
Company, Defendant, represented by Jeffrey L. Willian --
jeffrey.willian@kirkland.com -- John Richard Edwards --
john.edwards@kirkland.com -- Jordan M. Heinz --
jordan.heinz@kirkland.com -- at Kirkland & Ellis LLP, pro hac
vice.


MAMMOTH MOUNTAIN: Court Enters Final Judgment in "Story" Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge John A. Mendez of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California entered the final judgment and dismissed
with prejudice the case, PAUL STORY, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. MAMMOTH MOUNTAIN
SKI AREA, LLC, a Delaware limited-liability company, Defendant,
Case No. 2:14-CV-02422-JAM-DB (E.D. Cal.).

Consistent with the Settlement Agreement and the Final Order, the
Judge entered the judgment as to all Settlement Class Members.
No Class Members submitted Requests for Exclusion pursuant to the
procedure set forth in the Settlement Agreement; upon the
Effective Date, all the Class Members therefore will have
released the Released Parties from the Released Claims for the
Class Period.

He dismissed the Action dismissed with prejudice.
Notwithstanding the dismissal with prejudice, the Court retains
jurisdiction relating to the administration, consummation,
enforcement, and interpretation of the Settlement Agreement, the
Final Order, the Final Judgment, and for any other necessary
purpose.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 13, 2018 Final Judgment is
available at https://is.gd/s4LrOd from Leagle.com.

Paul Story, Plaintiff, represented by Lionel Z. Glancy --
lglancy@glancylaw.com -- Mark Samuel Greenstone --
mgreenstone@glancylaw.com -- at Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP;
Abigail Ameri Zelenski -- abigail@jlglawyers.com -- David S
Zelenski -- david@jlglawyers.com -- Michael Joe Jaurigue --
michael@jlglawyers.com -- at Jaurigue Law Group.

Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability
Company, Defendant, represented by Jeffrey L. Willian --
jeffrey.willian@kirkland.com -- John Richard Edwards --
john.edwards@kirkland.com -- Jordan M. Heinz --
jordan.heinz@kirkland.com -- at Kirkland & Ellis LLP, pro hac
vice.


MASSAGE ENVY: 7th Cir. Upholds Dismissal of Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------
Lauraann Wood, writing for Law360, reports that a split Seventh
Circuit panel on April 11 upheld the dismissal of a putative
class action claiming a massage franchise advertises hourlong
massages that last only 50 minutes, saying the lower court
correctly held that the customers' suit failed to meet the
required pleading standards to advance their claims.

Kathy Haywood and Lia Holt claim that Arizona-based Massage Envy
Franchising LLC deceptively advertises hourlong massages that
last 50 minutes or shorter. [GN]


MASTERCARD INT'L: Class Certification in Antitrust Suit Denied
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, B & R SUPERMARKET, INC., d/b/a Milam's Market, GROVE
LIQUORS LLC, STROUK GROUP LLC, d/b/a Monsieur Marcel, PALERO FOOD
CORP. and CAGUEYES FOOD CORP., d/b/a Fine Fare Supermarket,
Plaintiffs, v. MASTERCARD INTERNATIONAL INC., VISA INC., VISA
U.S.A. INC., DISCOVER FINANCIAL SERVICES and AMERICAN EXPRESS,
Defendants, Case No. 17-CV-02738 (MKB)(E.D. N.Y.), Judge Margo K.
Brodie of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New
York denied the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification
without prejudice.

The Plaintiffs commenced the class action against the Defendants
in March of 2016 in the Northern District of California, alleging
violations of the Sherman Act, and state antitrust and consumer
protection laws of California, Florida, and New York.  The
Plaintiffs' claims arose out of the Defendants' process for
adopting EMV technology for card transactions in the United
States.  They allege that the Defendants violated antitrust laws
by entering into a conspiracy: (1) adopting the same policy for
shifting liability from banks to merchants ("Liability Shift")
for fraudulent charges; and (2) making the Liability Shift
effective on the same day for all four networks to prevent
merchants from steering customers to use cards with more lenient
terms.

Currently before the Court is the Plaintiffs' motion to certify a
nationwide class to include merchants who were injured as a
result of the Defendants' alleged violations of the Sherman Act,
and three subclasses to include impacted merchants located in
California, Florida, and New York, for the violations of the
respective state antitrust and consumer protection laws.

The Defendants oppose the motion for class certification on
several grounds, including that the Plaintiffs cannot satisfy:
(1) ascertainability, impliedly required by Rule 23(a); and (2)
predominance as required by Rule (23)(b)(3).

Judge Brodie finds that the Plaintiffs' liability theory is based
in part on the argument that had the Defendants not conspired to
set the Liability Shift for October 2015, each of the Defendant
would have set its own date for Liability Shift for a later time
period because there would have been competition between
Defendants.  Based on this theory, the logical end date for the
Plaintiffs' claims is the date by which the Defendants would have
imposed the Liability Shift, had they not conspired to set it for
Oct. 1, 2015.

The Plaintiffs suggest several potential dates, including: (1)
October of 2017, the date identified in Visa's plans for delaying
the Liability Shift); (2) a 13- to 15- month period after October
of 2015 based on the timeframe for which the chargeback data was
made available); (3) August of 2018, by comparing Visa's
implementation timeframe of the Liability Shift in the European
Union (E.U.) and the United States from the date Visa announced
its plans to adopt EMV in the E.U. and the United States
respectively; and (4) October of 2019, based on the four-year
statute of limitations under the Sherman Act, which was proposed
by the Plaintiffs at the hearing.  Any one of these dates could
be acceptable to make the class ascertainable, if sufficiently
substantiated.

The Judge finds that the Plaintiffs' proposal of four different
class periods, some of which appear to be completely arbitrary,
does not satisfy the Rule 23(a) implied requirement of
ascertainability.  He says the Plaintiffs appear to lack the
necessary information to satisfy this requirement at this stage
of the litigation.

Because the Plaintiffs have not satisfied the ascertainability
requirement, Judge Brodie denied, without prejudice, the
Plaintiffs' motion for certification of the nationwide class and
the state law subclasses.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 14, 2018 Memorandum & Order
is available at https://is.gd/whUgLP from Leagle.com.

B & R Supermarket, Inc., doing business as Milam's Market,
Plaintiff, represented by George C. Aguilar --
gaguilar@robbinsarroyo.com -- Robbins Arroyo LLP, Gregory E. Del
Gaizo -- gdelgaizo@robbinsarroyo.com -- Robbins Arroyo LLP, Jenny
L. Dixon -- jdixon@robbinsarroyo.com -- Robbins Arroyo LLP, pro
hac vice, John William Devine -- jdevine@devinegoodman.com --
Devine Goodman Rasco WattsFitzGerald LLP, pro hac vice, Lawrence
Dean Goodman -- lgoodman@devinegoodman.com -- Devine Goodman
Rasco WattsFitzgerald LLP, pro hac vice, Lindsey C. Herzik --
lherzik@robbinsarroyo.com -- Robbins Arroyo LLP, pro hac vice,
Michael Nicoud -- mnicoud@robbinsarroyo.com -- Robbins Arroyo
LLP, pro hac vice, Peter Barry Patterson, Jr., Law Offices of
Thomas G. Amon, Robert J. Kuntz, Jr. -- rkuntz@devinegoodman.com
-- Devine Goodman Rasco Watts-FitzGerald, LLP, pro hac vice &
Thomas G. Amon, Law Offices of Thomas G. Amon.

Grove Liquors LLC, Strouk Group LLC, doing business as Monsieur
Marcel & Palero Food Corp. and Cagueyes Food Corp., doing
business as Fine Fare Supermarket, Plaintiffs, represented by
George C. Aguilar, Robbins Arroyo LLP, Gregory E. Del Gaizo,
Robbins Arroyo LLP, Jenny L. Dixon, Robbins Arroyo LLP, pro hac
vice, John William Devine, Devine Goodman Rasco WattsFitzGerald
LLP, Lawrence Dean Goodman, Devine Goodman Rasco WattsFitzgerald
LLP, Lindsey C. Herzik, Robbins Arroyo LLP, pro hac vice, Michael
Nicoud, Robbins Arroyo LLP, pro hac vice, Peter Barry Patterson,
Jr., Law Offices of Thomas G. Amon, Robert J. Kuntz, Jr., Devine
Goodman Rasco Watts-FitzGerald, LLP & Thomas G. Amon, Law Offices
of Thomas G. Amon.

rue21, Inc., Plaintiff, pro se.

Visa Inc., Defendant, represented by Robert John Vizas --
bob.vizas@arnoldporter.com -- Arnold and Porter LLP, pro hac
vice, Karen Otto -- karen.otto@arnoldporter.com -- Arnold &
Porter LLP, pro hac vice, Laura J. Butte --
laura.butte@arnoldporter.com -- Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer, pro
hac vice, Mark R. Merley -- mark.merley@arnoldporter.com --
Arnold & Porter LLP, pro hac vice, Matthew A. Eisenstein --
matthew.eisenstein@arnoldporter.com -- Arnold & Porter Kaye
Scholer LLP, pro hac vice, Michael Adam Rubin --
michael.rubin@arnoldporter.com -- Arnold and Porter Kaye Scholer
LLP, Robert C. Mason -- robert.mason@arnoldporter.com -- Arnold &
Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Ron Ghatan --
ron.ghatan@arnoldporter.com -- Arnold & Porter LLP, Sharon D.
Mayo -- sharon.mayo@arnoldporter.com -- Arnold & Porter Kaye
Scholer LLP, pro hac vice & Stephanie Ilana Fine --
stephanie.fine@apks.com -- Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, pro
hac vice.

Visa U.S.A. Inc, Defendant, represented by Robert John Vizas,
Arnold and Porter LLP, pro hac vice, Karen Otto, Arnold & Porter
LLP, pro hac vice, Laura J. Butte, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer,
pro hac vice, Mark R. Merley, Arnold & Porter LLP, pro hac vice,
Matthew A. Eisenstein, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, pro hac
vice, Robert C. Mason, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Ron
Ghatan, Arnold & Porter LLP, Sharon D. Mayo, Arnold & Porter Kaye
Scholer LLP, pro hac vice & Stephanie Ilana Fine, Arnold & Porter
Kaye Scholer LLP, pro hac vice.

Mastercard International Incorporated, Defendant, represented by
Craig Benson -- cbenson@paulweiss.com -- Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
Wharton & Garrison LLP, Adrienne J. Lighten --
alighten@paulweiss.com -- Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton and
Garrison LLP, pro hac vice, Cheryl Ann Cauley --
ccauley@taylorpatchen.com -- Taylor & Patchen, LLP, Christopher
Tom -- ctom@paulweiss.com -- Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &
Garrison LLP, Diana Viggiano Valdivia -- dvaldivia@paulweiss.com
-- Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton, and Garrison LLP, pro hac vice,
Jessica A. Morton -- jmorton@paulweiss.com -- Paul, Weiss,
Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, pro hac vice, Kenneth A. Gallo -
- kgallo@paulweiss.com -- Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &
Garrison, LLP, pro hac vice, Melissa Alpert --
malpert@paulweiss.com -- Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison
LLP, pro hac vice, Michelle Katherine Parikh --
mparikh@paulweiss.com -- Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton and
Garrison LLP, Rosa V. Gilcrease-Garcia -- rgilcrease-
garcia@paulweiss.com -- Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison
LLP, pro hac vice & Stephen E. Taylor --
staylor@taylorpatchen.com -- Taylor & Patchen, LLP.

Discover Financial Services, Defendant, represented by Dana Lynn
Cook-Milligan -- dlcook@winston.com -- Winston and Strawn LLP,
Elizabeth P. Papez -- epapez@winston.com -- Winston and Strawn
LLP, pro hac vice, Eva W. Cole -- ewcole@winston.com -- Winston &
Strawn LLP, James Franklin Herbison -- jherbiso@winston.com --
Winston and Strawn LLP, Jeanifer Ellen Parsigian --
jparsigian@winston.com -- Winston and Strawn, Jeffrey L. Kessler
-- jkessler@winston.com -- Winston & Strawn LLP, Johanna Rae
Hudgens -- jhudgens@winston.com -- Winston & Strawn LLP, Joseph
Laurence Motto -- jmotto@winston.com -- Winston and Strawn LLP,
Kelli Lynn Lanski -- klanski@winston.com -- Winston & Strawn,
Robert Yale Sperling -- rsperling@winston.com -- Winston & Strawn
LLP, pro hac vice & Sean D. Meenan -- smeenan@winston.com --
Winston and Strawn, pro hac vice.

Bank of America N.A., Defendant, represented by Jane Petersen
Bentrott -- jbentrott@mofo.com -- Morrison Foerster LLP, pro hac
vice, Mark P. Ladner -- mladner@mofo.com -- Morrison & Foerster,
pro hac vice, Michael B. Miller -- mbmiller@mofo.com -- Morrison
& Foerster LLP, pro hac vice, Natalie Anne Fleming Nolen --
nflemingnolen@mofo.com -- Morrison and Foerster, LLP, pro hac
vice & Tiffani B. Figueroa, Morrison Foerster, pro hac vice.

Capital One Financial Corporation, Defendant, represented by D.
Bruce Hoffman -- dhoffmann@hunton.com -- Hunton and Williams LLP,
pro hac vice, John Eliot Beerbower -- jbeerbower@cravath.com --
pro hac vice, Leslie Kostyshak -- lkostyshak@hunton.com -- Hunton
amd Williams LLP, pro hac vice, Ryan A. Shores, Hunton and
Williams LLP & Susan S. Joo -- sjoo@hunton.com -- Hunton &
Williams LLP.

Chase Bank USA, National Association, Defendant, represented by
Raoul Dion Kennedy -- raoul.kennedy@skadden.com -- Skadden Arps
Slate Meagher & Flom LLP, Boris Bershteyn --
boris.bershteyn@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &
Flom LLP, pro hac vice, Evan R. Kreiner --
evan.kreiner@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
LLP, pro hac vice, Harry P. Koulos -- harry.koulos@skadden.com --
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, pro hac vice & Peter E.
Greene -- peter.greene@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom LLP, pro hac vice.

Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. & Citibank N.A., Defendants,
represented by Benjamin Robert Nagin -- BNAGIN@SIDLEY.COM --
Sidley Austin LLP, pro hac vice, David F. Graham --
DGRAHAM@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP, Jennifer
Michelle Wong, Sidley Austin LLP, pro hac vice, Melissa Colon-
Bosolet -- MCOLON-BOSOLET@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP, pro
hac vice, Paul Belonick -- PBELONICK@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin
& Peter K. Huston -- PHUSTON@SIDLEY.COM -- Latham & Watkins.


MDL 2804: Somerset to Join Class Action Over Opioid Crisis
----------------------------------------------------------
George Austin, writing for SouthCoast Today, reports that the
selectmen have given Town Administrator Richard Brown the go
ahead to have the town join a class action lawsuit against the
pharmaceutical industry for creating an epidemic with opiates.

Mr. Brown said he thinks the original lawsuit may have been
started by Greenfield and said that a number of municipalities
are filing a lawsuit against the pharmaceutical industry.

Mr.Brown said that there are a number of firms that specialize in
the type of litigation that the town would be involved in related
to opiates.  He told the selectmen that it would be worth joining
a class action lawsuit.

"It's not going to cost us anything unless there's a recovery,"
Mr. Brown said.  "We just have to spend a little time gathering
the information they will want."

Mr. Brown said he does not know the exact information that a law
firm will want for the litigation, because the town has not
signed on to a lawsuit yet, but said it would most likely include
the town services that have been used to respond to problems with
opiates.

"I think that this was a problem that was brought on by the
pharmaceutical industry that knew the risk and they continued to
push it out into the community," Mr. Brown said.

Mr. Brown got the go ahead from the selectmen to pursue the class
action lawsuit at their meeting.  He said the selectmen would
choose a firm for the class action lawsuit at their meeting
tonight. [GN]


MELOUTA CORP: Faces "Singletary" Suit in E.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Melouta Corp. The
case is styled as Wiilie Singletary, individually and on behalf
of others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Melouta Corp. doing
business as: BZ Grill, Serafim Ferdeklis and Jeff Doe,
Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-02376 (E.D. N.Y., April 23, 2018).

BZ Grill offers Greek fast food, including gyros, souvlaki &
more, in a no-frills atmosphere.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


MILLION AMUSEMENT: Faces "Anderson" Suit in E.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Million Amusement
Corporation. The case is styled as Derrick Anderson, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Million
Amusement Corporation, doing business as: Deno's Wonder Wheel,
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-02359 (E.D. N.Y., April 23, 2018).

Deno's Wonder Wheel Amusement Park is a family-owned amusement
park located at Coney Island, Brooklyn, New York City featuring 5
adult rides and 16 kiddie rides, including a dozen family rides
that parents and children can ride together.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   C.K. Lee, Esq.
   Lee Litigation Group, PLLC
   30 East 39th Street
   2nd floor
   New York, NY 10016
   Tel: (212) 465-1188
   Fax: (212) 465-1181
   Email: cklee@leelitigation.com


MURRAY GOULBURN: Law Firm, IMF Opens Class Action Registrations
---------------------------------------------------------------
Gippsland Times reports that multinational law firm Slater and
Gordon and litigation funder IMF Bentham Ltd have formally opened
registrations for a class action against Murray Goulburn Co-
operative Co Limited and its subsidiary, MG Responsible Entity
Limited.

The proposed claim is open to current and former investors who
acquired units in Murray Goulburn's listed entity MG Unit Trust
between May 29, 2015 and April 26, 2016, including through the
initial public offering in 2015.

Slater and Gordon senior associate Andrew Paull said
registrations for unit holders would be open until May 18, with
formal proceedings expected to be filed soon after that date
subject to sufficient interest.

"Thorough analysis of the recent ACCC and ASIC inquiries into
Murray Goulburn have strengthened our initial findings that
suggest the company misled the market by forecasting profits it
could never have achieved in the 2016 financial year," Mr Paull
claimed.

"We have identified significant inconsistencies between Murray
Goulburn's statements to the market regarding its likely revenue
and profits that year, and the information available to the
company's management internally.

"As a result, we now have increased confidence the 27 April 2016
profit downgrade was the result of an overly optimistic forecast,
rather than any factors beyond its control."

The proposed claim will centre around these allegations.

Once sufficient participants have joined the action, it will be
funded by IMF Bentham, and participants will not be required to
pay any fees unless the class action is successful.

Unit holders who acquired units in the MG Unit Trust at any time
between May 29, 2015 and April 26, 2016 and who suffered a loss
as the result of acquiring those units can register their
interest in the class action by visiting www.imf.com.au/mgc.

On April 9, Murray Goulbourn Co-operative Co. Limited and MG
Responsible Entity Limited, as the responsible entity of the MG
Unit Trust, released a media statement noting that "no such
action has been commenced".

MG shareholders voted overwhelmingly in favour of selling its
operating assets and liabilities to Canadian dairy giant Saputo.

The sale is expected to be concluded on May 1, with investors
receiving 80 cents a share or unit on May 15.

Murray Goulburn has retained about $235 million from the sale,
with $195 million set aside for potential retained litigation
costs. [GN]


NESTLE: Bottled Water Contains Microplastics, Class Action Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Molly Zilli, Esq., writing for Findlaw.com, reports that a class
action lawsuit filed against Nestle claims that the company
engaged in deceptive marketing because their bottled water, Pure
Life, is not so pure and contains microplastics, according to a
recent study.

Study: Nestle the Brand with Highest Contamination

The bottled water study was conducted by State University of
New York and Orb Media, a nonprofit journalism organization.
They tested more than 250 bottles of water from 11 brands and
found that 93 percent showed some level of microplastic
contamination, with Nestle's being the highest.

However, Nestle's own tests showed a much lower number.
Additionally, Orb's study cited a 2016 report on plastic in
seafood by the European Food Safety Authority which found that up
to 90 percent of microplastic particles consumed by a person can
travel through the gut without a trace.

Nestle Accused of Negligently, Recklessly Concealing Truth

According to the complaint, the lead plaintiff, Cindy Baker and
her family purchased and drank Nestle Pure Life water on multiple
occasions within the last year.  The lawsuit says Nestle
"intentionally, negligently and recklessly concealed and omitted
the truth" about the quality and purity of their bottled water.
Specifically, they contend that Nestle engaged in deceptive
marketing which misled consumers about the water's geographic
origins and health benefits.  Nestle is standing by the integrity
of their brand and is prepared to defend themselves "vigorously."
According to the Orb study, the bottled water industry is the
fastest-growing beverage market worldwide, valued at $147 billion
per year.

Lawsuit Demands Nestle Stop Sales and Pay Restitution

Because of the microplastics contamination, the lawsuit demands
that the company stop production and sales of their Nestle Pure
Life Purified drinking water and "pay full restitution to all
affected California consumers."  In total, Ms. Baker is seeking
certification of the class action, damages, restitution, and
disgorgement.

Not all illnesses and injuries caused by things we consume are
the fault of food and beverage manufacturers.  However, some are.
If you think you were harmed by a company's product, speak with
an attorney to assess the strength of your case.


NEW NAKATA SUSHI: Faces "Lin" Suit in E.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against New Nakata Sushi
Inc. The case is styled as Yaping Lin and Min Huang, individually
and on behalf all other employees similarly situated, Plaintiffs
v. New Nakata Sushi Inc., doing business as: Nakata Japanese
Fusion, Ting Fong Ho, Ting Fong Hu and "John" Zhong, Defendants,
Case No. 1:18-cv-02404 (E.D. N.Y., April 23, 2018).

The Defendants are engaged in the restaurant industry.[BN]

The Plaintiffs appear PRO SE.


NEW YORK: Legal Aid Demands Rebates from NYCHA
----------------------------------------------
Jeffrey C. Mays, writing for The New York Times, reports that it
was so cold in January in A'seelah Diamond's apartment at
Fiorentino Plaza, a public housing development in East New York,
that she, her husband and their three daughters all piled into
one bed every night to keep warm.

The radiators did not work, the carbon monoxide detector sounded
an alarm when the family turned the oven on for heat, and if they
tried to run more than one space heater at a time, the
electricity would shut off.

"The cold was unbearable," Ms. Diamond said. "My daughters would
bring the blankets from their rooms and everyone would be in the
bed like a big burrito."

During a New York City winter with the most days below freezing
since 1961, Ms. Diamond, 31, put in at least 10 requests to
repair the heat and hot water with her landlord, the New York
City Housing Authority, to no avail, she said. On Jan. 4 when the
temperature outside was 19 degrees, her apartment had no heat or
hot water.

Tenants such as Ms. Diamond and her husband, Tyrone, 30, who pay
$1,282 a month in rent, deserve a refund, according to a lawsuit
filed in State Supreme Court in Manhattan by the Legal Aid
Society. The class-action lawsuit comes after the authority
refused a demand from Legal Aid to abate from $2.5 million to $15
million in rent to tenants who were left without basic services
during heating season.

"The law is very clear, it requires they provide heat at a
certain level, and if they don't, they are subject to a claim,"
said Jennifer Levy, Esq., supervising attorney for Legal Aid's
civil reform unit.

The lawsuit comes at a time when the housing authority is under
intense scrutiny. Chairwoman Shola Olatoye announced her
resignation April 10. A group representing tenants has filed a
lawsuit against the authority and Gov. Andrew M. Cuomo recently
declared a state of emergency at Nycha and appointed a special
manager to oversee emergency repairs such as replacing the
boilers and removing lead and mold.

The potential rebate that Legal Aid is seeking is based on the
length of the outages and the average monthly rent of $509, or
$17 per day, that Nycha tenants pay. But Jasmine Blake, a
spokeswoman for the authority, said the agency is focusing its
resources elsewhere.

"Every dollar spent on a rent abatement would be one less dollar
for staff and repairs that we need to restore and maintain heat
service," Ms. Blake said.

As the authority's creaky boilers struggled to keep up with
freezing temperatures last fall and winter, 323,098 residents did
not have heat or hot water at some point between Oct. 1 and Jan.
22, according to agency data obtained by the City Council. During
the same time period, 143,000 out of more than 175,000 public
housing apartments were without heat and hot water for an average
of 48 hours, according to the housing authority.

According to the lawsuit, the housing authority closed heat
complaints before they were resolved and misled the public about
the length of the heat and hot water outages and how long it took
to repair them.

In a March 29 letter to the Legal Aid Society, Vito Mustaciuolo,
the authority's general manager, said Nycha created a roving team
to respond to repairs and partnered with other city agencies to
expedite them. Mayor Bill de Blasio has also committed $200
million from the city budget to repair the heating
infrastructure.

Lucy Newman, Esq., staff attorney at the Legal Aid civil law
reform unit, blamed the authority's inability to provide heat for
residents on poor management and staff cuts. The authority has
approximately 248 boiler maintenance workers on staff, down from
391 in 2013.

The lack of heat and hot water created havoc for Ms. Diamond, an
eligibility specialist for the city's Human Resources
Administration and her husband, a groundskeeper for the housing
authority. One daughter has asthma which was exacerbated by the
cold, Ms. Diamond said. The family had to boil water to bathe and
spent over $200 to buy space heaters, she said.

"No one in 10- to 20-degree weather should have no hot water,"
Ms. Diamond said. [GN]


NORFOLK SOUTHERN: Faces "Todd" Suit in D. South Carolina
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Norfolk Southern
Corporation. The case is styled as Sabrina Todd, Vince Osborne
and Alyssa Smith, individually and as the representatives of a
class of similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Norfolk Southern
Corporation, Defendant, Case No. 3:18-cv-01106-MGL (D. S.C.,
April 23, 2018).

Norfolk Southern Corporation is one of the nation's premier
transportation companies.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

   Russell Thomas Burke, Esq.
   McGowan Hood and Felder LLC
   1517 Hampton Street
   Columbia, SC 29201
   Tel: (803) 779-0100
   Fax: (803) 787-6400
   Email: rburke@mcgowanhood.com

      - and -

   William Jones Andrews , Jr, Esq.
   McGowan Hood and Felder LLC
   1517 Hampton Street
   Columbia, SC 29201
   Tel: (803) 779-0100
   Email: jandrews@mcgowanhood.com


NORTHSTAR LOCATION: Faces "Infante" Suit in E.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Northstar Location
Services, LLC. The case is styled as Guiseppe Infante, on behalf
of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Northstar Location Services, LLC and Navient Solutions, LLC,
Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-02385 (E.D. N.Y., April 23, 2018).

Northstar Location Services, LLC provides receivables debt
collection services to customers in the United States, Canada,
and internationally.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


OUTCOME HEALTH: Settles TCPA Class Action Suit
----------------------------------------------
Ever notice the flatscreen TVs and tablets in your doctor's
office that run different health related and wellness stories?
Many of them are provided to the providers by Outcome Health,
which installs free TVs and tablets in doctor's offices to
provide educational material to patients while they are sitting
in the waiting room.

The company makes its money by selling ads to pharmaceutical
companies, which pop-up during the educational stories. It also
offers patients the ability to receive automated daily nutrition
tips via text message. One patient agreed to the tips, but then
was inundated by them, and she tried to opt-out of the texts over
25 times. She got fed up and sued the company for violation of
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA).

The company denies violating the TCPA, but settled the case for
$2.9 million. [GN]


PGA INC: Court Denies Dismissal of "Sinclair" Suit Counterclaim
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ERIK SINCLAIR and DAVID KRALL, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. PGA
INC., Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-224-wmc (W.D. Wis.), Judge
William M. Conley of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Wisconsin denied the Plaintiff's motion to dismiss
counterclaim.

In this hybrid FLSA collective action and state labor law
putative class action, the Plaintiffs assert claims against PGA
for allegedly failing to pay overtime hours and for failing to
calculate correctly the prevailing wage, on behalf of themselves
individually and other similarly-situated employees.  In
answering the complaint, PGA also asserted a counterclaim for
unjust enrichment against Sinclair on the basis that he was
actually overpaid for hours in which he performed foreman work on
a prevailing wage project.

Material to the Defendant's counterclaim, PGA alleges that
Sinclair worked on one prevailing wage project, as well as non-
prevailing wage projects, during the course of his 11-month
employment with the Defendant.  During his time working on the
prevailing wage project, the Harvey Hall Project, Sinclair was
paid at the General Laborer rate of $37.63/hour and Sheetmetal
Worker rate of $51.21/hour.

However, the Defendant now alleges that Sinclair acted in a
capacity similar to a foreman while on that project, because he
directed PGA employees what to install and where, reviewed
blueprints, sent manpower where it needed to go, and coordinated
work on the job site so that different trade workers could
perform their work on schedule.  The Defendant further alleges
that the prevailing wage rates on the Harvey Hall Project do not
apply to the Foreman work; instead, Sinclair should have been
compensated at his $18/hour nonprevailing-wage rate for each hour
he spent performing the Foreman Work.  Finally, the Defendant
alleges that Sinclair was aware that he was being paid at the
higher rates and did not notify PGA that he was performing the
work of a foreman.  As such, the Defendant alleges that Sinclair
was overpaid for every hour that he performed the Foreman Work
instead of general labor or sheetmetal work on the Harvey Hall
Project.

Before the Court is the Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the
counterclaim for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Judge Conley finds that the Plaintiff's motion fundamentally
misses both the purpose and limitations of a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion.  While the Plaintiff may ultimately prevail -- indeed, it
seems unlikely that the Defendant will be able to prove that it
was unaware of how Sinclair was spending his time on the
prevailing wage project, or that Sinclair was somehow obligated
to inform its employer which hours he spent performing work as a
foreman -- that determination must await another day.

Because the Judge determines that the Defendant has plead a claim
for unjust enrichment and the Plaintiff's arguments go to the
underlying merits of that claim, rather than the legal
sufficiency of the pleadings, he denied the motion to dismiss
counterclaim.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 14, 2018 Opinion and Order
is available at https://is.gd/t5fzDL from Leagle.com.

Erik Sinclair, David Krall, Eric Schilling, Blaine Krohn, Douglas
P. Bannister, Wyly D. Scheibe, Dale B. Mills, Ryan W. Bergeman,
Jeremy R. Buck & Timothy J. Danley, Plaintiffs, represented by
Yingtao Ho -- yh@previant.com -- Previant, Goldberg, Uelmen,
Gratz, Miller & Brueggeman, S.C.

PGA, Inc., Defendant, represented by John H. Zawadsky --
jzawadsky@reinhartlaw.com -- Reinhart Boerner Van Deuren, SC,
Katherine Mary O'Malley -- komalley@reinhartlaw.com -- Reinhart
Boerner Van Deuren s.c. & Robert S. Driscoll --
rdriscoll@reinhartlaw.com -- Reinhart Boerner Van Deuren s.c.

PGA, Inc., Counter Claimant, represented by John H. Zawadsky,
Reinhart Boerner Van Deuren, SC, Katherine Mary O'Malley,
Reinhart Boerner Van Deuren s.c. & Robert S. Driscoll, Reinhart
Boerner Van Deuren s.c.

Erik Sinclair, Counter Defendant, represented by Yingtao Ho,
Previant, Goldberg, Uelmen, Gratz, Miller & Brueggeman, S.C.


PILGRIM'S PRIDE: "Hogan" Securities Suit Dismissed w/o Prejudice
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PATRICK HOGAN, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. PILGRIM'S PRIDE
CORPORATION, WILLIAM W. LOVETTE, individually, and FABIO SANDRI,
individually, Defendants, Civil Action No. 16-cv-02611-RBJ (D.
Colo.), Judge R. Brooke Jackson of the U.S. District Court for
the District of Colorado granted the Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss the Amended Class Action Complaint.

This is a securities class action claim brought by Lead Plaintiff
George James Fuller against the Defendants on behalf of a
purported class of investors in Pilgrim's.  According to the
second amended complaint, Pilgrim's is one of the largest
producers and sellers of chicken in the United States. Id. at 11.
Pilgrim's focuses on the production and sale of broilers, which
are chickens under the age of 13 weeks that make up 98% or more
of the chicken sold in the United States.

Pilgrim's is vertically-integrated, meaning that it owns or
controls nearly all aspects of broiler production, from breeding,
hatching, rearing, and feeding, to processing and selling.  The
market for broilers is characterized by inelastic demand, meaning
that demand does not meaningfully change when the price of the
good changes, although a change in supply will change the price
of the good.  As a result of broiler market characteristics, the
price and supply of broilers have historically followed a "boom
and bust" cycle, in which rising prices for broilers would
incentivize rising production to capitalize on higher prices --
the "boom."  The resulting oversaturation in the market would
lead to a decrease in prices, and thus a decrease in production -
- the "bust."

The Plaintiff's complaint alleges on information and belief that
beginning in 2008, after a particularly low trough in the
ordinary business cycle and following its emergence from a
bankruptcy in 2009, Pilgrim's conspired with other major players
in the United States broiler market to cut production, thereby
limiting supply and ensuring prices would stay high.  According
to the complaint, Pilgrim's and its co-conspirators conducted two
coordinated production cuts, the first between 2008 and 2009 and
the second between 2011 and 2012.  These production cuts were
achieved through various means, including reducing eggs, reducing
broiler breeder flocks, destroying chicks or eggs, temporarily or
permanently shutting down facilities, and exporting eggs or
chicks.  These coordinated cuts allegedly resulted in an
artificial stabilization in the industry even during a time of
soaring feed costs.  The complaint additionally alleges that
Pilgrim's and its co-conspirators continued to depress supply to
the United States in the period from 2013 to 2016 by increasing
broiler exports and cutting production overall.

The Plaintiff alleges that this broiler price-fixing conspiracy
was facilitated through the conspirators' use of Agri Stats, a
private reporting service that compiles detailed confidential
data on nearly all aspects of broiler production including
inventory, production, and pricing data.  According to him,
Pilgrim's and its co-conspirators had the capacity to de-
anonymize the Agri Stats data to determine which data
corresponded to which industry member, thereby allowing the
conspirators to track and coordinate their participation in the
conspiracy.  He also points to the "cliquish" nature of the
industry and numerous industry conferences and events at which
industry members may have associated to coordinate the production
cuts at issue.

The final element of Pilgrim's price-fixing conspiracy, according
to the Plaintiff, was the manipulation of the Georgia Department
of Agriculture's ("GDA") Georgia Dock Broiler pricing index, one
of the three primary indices that tracks broiler prices.  The
Georgia Dock index price was compiled by a weekly telephone call
to the top broiler producers in the state, who would report the
price they offered to companies with whom they had contracts,
such as grocery stores.  The Georgia Dock influenced prices for
roughly 25% of the entire U.S. Broiler market, but unlike the
other two primary price indices, the Georgia Dock did not require
verification of reported prices.  The Georgia Dock price was
higher than the other two primary indices "nearly every day"
between 2007 and 2016, and diverged sharply in 2011-2012 and
during the class Period.  The Plaintiff alleges that this
divergence between the Georgia Dock price index and the other two
major price indices is evidence that the broiler industry was
manipulating the index as part of the price-fixing conspiracy.

According to the complaint, this multi-pronged conspiracy to cut
production and raise broiler prices led to Pilgrim's ensuing
financial stability and success and artificially increased the
value of its securities.  The crux of the Plaintiff's complaint
is that during the Class Period between Feb. 21, 2014 and Nov.
17, 2016, the Defendants made untrue or misleading public
statements by failing to disclose the price-fixing conspiracy and
instead touting legitimate causes for Pilgrim's success.

The Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants falsely assured
investors that this stabilization was attributable to the
implementation of its legitimate business strategy over the
previous years, but this was not true.  He alleges that the
defendants' conspiracy came to light in a series of revelations
in 2016, including a private antitrust class action complaint
filed in the Northern District of Illinois containing evidence of
collusion and price-fixing between 2008 and 2016.  He also points
to a subsequent analyst report about the case and two newspaper
articles about the alleged conspiracy.  As a result of these
revelations, according to the Plaintiff, the price of Pilgrim's
securities dropped from $23.54 on Sept. 2, 2016 to $18.61 on Nov.
17, 2016 "and continued to slide" to the detriment of the
company's investors.

The Plaintiff thus raises three claims in his securities class
action complaint: two claims for violations of Section 10(b) of
the Securities and Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder against all the Defendants, and one claim for
violation of Section20(a) of the Exchange Act against defendants
Lovette (Pilgrim's Chief Executive Officer and President during
the Class Period) and Sandri (Pilgrim's Chief Financial Officer
during the Class Period).

The Defendants move to dismiss all three claims.

Because the Plaintiff did not plead the underlying antitrust
conspiracy with sufficient particularity according to the PSLRA's
requirements, Judge Jackson finds that his claims for  10
violations fail to satisfy the falsity elements.  As a result,
his remaining Section 20(a) claim against Defendants Lovette and
Sandri must also necessarily failed.  The Judge will therefore
grant Pilgrim's motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's second amended
complaint.

As a final note, the Plaintiff requested leave to amend his
complaint in response to the Defendants' motion to dismiss.  The
Judge presumes that if the Plaintiffs had additional facts to
allege at this time, they would have done so.  But the Judge does
not mean to foreclose the possibility that the Plaintiff might
obtain facts (through the antitrust case or otherwise) that would
enable him to assert a securities claim that would satisfy the
requirements of the PSLRA.  His securities case is essentially
premature but not necessarily hopeless.  Accordingly, Judge
Jackson will dismiss the case without prejudice.

For the reasons stated, the Judge granted the Defendants' motion
to dismiss the Plaintiff's second amended complaint, and
dismissed without prejudice the Plaintiff's second amended
complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 14, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/EBfdOH from Leagle.com.

Patrick Hogan, Individually and on Behalf of All Other Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jeremy Alan Lieberman --
jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP & Jeffrey Mark Villanueva
-- jeff@jmvpclaw.com -- Jeffrey M. Villanueva, P.C.

Pilgrim's Pride Corporation, William W. Lovette & Fabio Sandri,
Defendants, represented by Alex C. Myers -- amyers@lrrc.com --
Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie LLP, Caitlin C. McHugh --
cmchugh@lrrc.com -- Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie LLP, Caroline
Jane Hickey Zalka -- caroline.zalka@weil.com -- Weil Gotshal &
Manges, LLP & Jonathan D. Polkes -- jonathan.polkes@weil.com --
Weil Gotshal & Manges, LLP.

Pilgrim's Pride Investor Group, Movant, represented by Phillip C.
Kim -- pkim@rosenlegal.com -- Rosen Law Firm, P.A.

George James Fuller, Movant, represented by J. Ryan Lopatka --
j.lopatka@ksfcounsel.com -- Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC, Kim Elaine
Miller -- kim.miller@ksfcounsel.com -- Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC &
Rusty Evan Glenn -- rusty@shumanlawfirm.com -- Shuman Law Firm.


POWERCOR: Faces Second Class Action Over St. Patrick's Day Fires
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Standard reports that a second class action has been launched
against Powercor over the St Patrick's Day fires.

Maddens Lawyers filed a class action for Terang fire victims in
the Victorian Supreme Court.

It follows a similar class action against Powercor over the
Garvoc fire, lodged by Maddens on March 28.  The firm is also
likely to launch similar proceedings over the Camperdown and
Gazette fires.

Maddens Lawyers principal Brendan Pendergast said total losses
from the Terang fire were likely to be well in excess of $40
million.

Investigators found the Terang fire was caused by arcing
powerlines, causing molten material to fall on the ground,
igniting dry vegetation.

The fire began at the town's eastern entrance and spread in a
south-easterly direction, destroying more than 6500 hectares.

"A safe system of electrical distribution should be designed such
that arcing and clashing does not occur in high wind, high fire
danger circumstances," Mr Pendergast said.

"Powercor has acknowledged in the media that the Garvoc and
Terang fires were caused by electrical assets."

Mr Pendergast, who conducted public meetings with fire-affected
residents before launching the class actions, said the community
was upset that the fires had been caused by electrical assets.

"The community distress is amplified by the fact that many people
impacted were also impacted in 1983 as a result of the Ash
Wednesday fires, which were also caused by electrical events," he
said. [GN]


PROCTER & GAMBLE: Bid to Dismiss "Guariglia" Suit Partly Granted
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LISA GUARIGLIA, MICHELINE BYRNE, and MICHELE
EMANUELE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. THE PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY, and THE
PROCTER & GAMBLE DISTRIBUTING LLC, Defendants, Case No. 2:15-cv-
04307 (ADS)(SIL)(E.D. N.Y.), Judge Arthur D. Spatt of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted in
part and denied in part the Defendants' motion to dismiss the
complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), or in the alternative, to
strike the class allegations pursuant to Rule 12(b)(f).

The Plaintiffs brought the putative class action against the
Defendants on July 23, 2015.  Their case concerns the efficacy of
Tide Pods single unit dose laundry detergent.  According to
marketing materials from 2012, this "detergent," "brightener,"
and "stain remover," which features "a best-in-class film that
dissolves and works effectively in all water temperatures,"
allows the consumer to simply, "popop in," a pac and have their
clean laundry "stand out."  According to the Plaintiffs, Tide
Pods stain, rather than clean their laundry.

Each of the named Plaintiffs observed unused portions of Tide
Pods when their clothes were stained.  That is, the Tide Pods
apparently did not completely dissolve when they found that their
clothes were stained.

In the amended complaint, the Plaintiffs included excerpts from
numerous articles and websites where other individuals complained
about the pacs staining their laundry.  Many of the complaints
noted that the Tide Pods failed to dissolve.  The Defendants
responded to many of these complaints by informing the consumers
that Tide Pods should be placed in the washing machine before any
clothes are added; to not use a delicate cycle for heavy loads;
to not use a quick cycle or wash for less than thirty minutes; to
not overload washers; and to switch to a warm setting whenever
water is exceptionally cold.  P&G also often provided directions
for removing stains.  The Plaintiffs allege that neither of these
sets of directions are provided on the Tide Pods' packaging.

The Plaintiffs filed their putative class action complaint.  On
Oct. 2, 2015, before the Defendants filed a responsive pleading,
the Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint.  The Plaintiffs assert
various common law and statutory claims against the Defendants --
claims for strict products liability and negligence based on
theories of design defect, manufacturing defect, and failure to
warn; breach of warranty of merchantability; breach of warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose; violations of Florida's
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act ("FDUTPA"); violations
of Sections 349 and 350 of New York's General Business Law
("GBL"); violations of California's Unfair Competition Law
("UCL"); violations of the California Consumers Legal Remedies
Act ("CLRA"); and unjust enrichment.  The Plaintiffs seek class
certification, injunctive and declaratory relief, damages, and
costs and attorneys' fees.

On Jan. 20, 2017, the Defendants filed the instant motion to
dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), or in
the alternative, to strike the class allegations.

Judge Spatt finds that the Plaintiffs have not alleged that a
feasible alternative design exists.  Nor do they argue that any
exception to this requirement applies to their claims.
Therefore, the Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for design
defect, whether under a theory of negligence or strict liability.
Accordingly, the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs'
design defect claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) will be granted.

The Judge also finds that the Plaintiffs' manufacturing defect
claims are not plausibly alleged because they failed to allege
how the units they purchased were manufactured differently from
other Tide Pods.  That is, they do not allege that the Tide Pods
stained their clothes because of a mishap in construction, or
because of some mistake.  Instead, they seemingly contend that
all Tide Pods are defectively designed.  In that way, he does not
see any way forward for the Plaintiffs' manufacturing defect
claims.  Accordingly, the Defendants' motion to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' manufacturing defect claims will be granted.

Because the Plaintiffs never defended the failure to warn claims,
Judge Spatt concludes that the Plaintiffs have abandoned these
claims.  Accordingly, the Defendants' motion to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' claims for failure to warn pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
will be granted.

As to the Plaintiffs' merchantability claims, the Judge finds
that the number of staining instances presented by the Plaintiffs
is sufficient at the pleadings stage.  Therefore, he finds that
they have alleged sufficient facts to plausibly bring claims for
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.  Accordingly,
the Defendants' motion to dismiss those claims pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) will be denied.  As the Defendants do not raise any
other arguments in support of their motion to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' claims for breach of the implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose, that portion of their motion will be
accordingly denied.

The Judge also finds that the Plaintiffs have sufficiently
alleged that Tide Pods had a defect, and that the Defendants were
aware of it.  As those are the only two grounds upon which the
Defendants move to dismiss the Plaintiffs' statutory consumer
protection claims, that portion of their motion will be
accordingly denied.  Because he will grant leave to amend with
regard to the Plaintiffs' products liability claims, and these
claims may ultimately bear on the Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment
claims, the Judge reserves decision on whether to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claims.

The Judge further finds that the Defendants' remaining arguments
do not address issues separate and apart from the issues that
will be decided on a class certification motion, and have not
demonstrated that it would be futile to allow the Plaintiffs to
conduct discovery.  Therefore, he says the Defendants' remaining
argument are procedurally premature.  Accordingly, the
Defendants' motion to strike the class allegations pursuant to
Rule 12(f) will be denied.

Finally, the Judge finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to
adequately plead their products liability claims.  Because these
deficiencies may be cured with the addition of factual
allegations, the Plaintiffs will be given 30 days from the date
of the Order to amend their complaint.

For the stated reasons, Judge Spatt granted in part and denied in
part the Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6), or in the alternative, to strike the class
allegations pursuant to Rule 12(b)(f).  The motion is granted to
the extent that the Plaintiffs' products liability claims are
dismissed without prejudice.  The remainder of the Defendants'
motion is denied.

The Plaintiffs have 30 days from the date of the Order to cure
any deficiencies in these claims.  Additionally, the Court
reserves decision on whether to dismiss the Plaintiffs' unjust
enrichment claims until the motion to dismiss their products
liability claims is resolved.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 14, 2018 Memorandum of
Decision and Order is available at https://is.gd/gsBnmG from
Leagle.com.

Lisa Guariglia, Micheline Byrne & Michele Emanuele, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by Mark Levine -- mlevine@ssbny.com -- Stull, Stull &
Brody, Melissa Robin Emert -- memert@ssbny.com -- Stull, Stull &
Brody & Patrice L. Bishop -- pbishop@ssbla.com -- Stull, Stull &
Brody, pro hac vice.

The Procter & Gamble Company & The Procter & Gamble Distributing
LLC, Defendants, represented by Stephanie Ilana Fine --
stephanie.fine@arnoldporter.com -- Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer
LLP, pro hac vice, Susan L. Shin -- susan.shin@arnoldporter.com -
- Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP & Trenton H. Norris --
trent.norris@arnoldporter.com -- Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer
LLP, pro hac vice.


PROFESSIONAL DIVERSITY: "Ramnath" Class Action Suit Concluded
-------------------------------------------------------------
Professional Diversity Network, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report
filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on March
30, 2018, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2017, that the
putative class action entitled Gauri Ramnath, et al. v.
Professional Diversity Network, Inc., et al., has been concluded.

The Company has previously disclosed that it and its wholly-owned
subsidiary, NAPW, Inc., are parties to litigation captioned Gauri
Ramnath, et al. v. Professional Diversity Network, Inc., et al.,
No. BC604153 (Los Angeles Superior Ct.), a putative class action
filed in January 2016 alleging violations of various California
Labor Code (wage & hour) sections.

During the first quarter of 2016, the Company executed a
settlement agreement, subject to later Court approval, in which
the Company agreed in principle to pay $500,000 for a global
settlement of the class action. During the first quarter of 2016,
the Company also recorded a litigation settlement expense in the
amount of $500,000. On November 28, 2016, the Court approved the
proposed settlement. In December of 2016 the Company paid the
settlement amount in the Court's fund and the third-party
administrator began distributing payments to class members.

On August 2, 2017, the Court notified the parties that the case
is "reported as complete without the need for a further status
conference." This matter is therefore concluded and will not be
further reported.

Professional Diversity Network, Inc. operates online professional
networking communities with career resources in the United
States. The company operates through three segments: Professional
Diversity Network, National Association of Professional Women,
and Noble Voice Operations. The company is based in Chicago,
Illinois.


PROVIDENCE, RI: To Update Speed Camera Tickets Amid Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
Susan Campbell, writing for WPRI, reports that Providence will
update its speed camera tickets in the wake of a federal class-
action lawsuit, Target 12 has learned.

The suit raised questions about the language used on the summons,
alleging that "the violation notices do not specifically cite the
state's speeding laws; they only reference the law that allows
for speed cameras."

Victor Morente, a spokesperson for Mayor Jorge Elorza said in an
email, "Although we believe that the summons which were issued
clearly identify the speeding violation, we have included
language in the updated summons which may more specifically
highlight the violation the recipient has been cited for."

Mr. Morente said the updated summons will be sent in the coming
days.

The lawsuit also challenges the court that handles violations and
the $95 fine itself.

On April 10, District Judge John J. McConnell Jr. denied the
plaintiffs' request for a temporary restraining order, which
would have blocked the city from issuing any new speed camera
violations or collecting on existing tickets.

As Target 12 first reported, Providence issued more than 12,000
speed camera violations in the first 33 days of the speed camera
program, which started in January.

At least dozens of speed camera violations were dismissed in
municipal court due to errors on the tickets.

Rhode Island lawmakers first approved speed cameras in 2016 when
they passed the Automated School-Zone-Speed-Enforcement System
Act, permitting municipalities to install them within a quarter-
mile of any type of school.  The Providence City Council voted
last May to enter into a contract with Conduent State and Local
Solutions Inc. that allowed for up to 15 speed cameras to be
installed around the city.

Tickets can be issued for any vehicle caught traveling at least
11 miles per hour over the posted speed limit between 6 a.m. and
8 p.m. Monday through Saturday, according to the contract with
Conduent, the private vendor that oversees both speed cameras and
red light cameras in the city.  The cameras are also portable,
and the city's contract with Conduent allows for two to be moved
to new locations each week. [GN]


PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE: 3rd Cir. Won't Review ERISA Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Adam Lidgett, writing for Law360, reports that a panel of Third
Circuit judges on April 10 turned away Prudential Insurance Co.
of America's bid for review of a lower court's decision to
certify a subclass in an Employee Retirement Income Security Act
suit over life insurance payouts.

The panel's order denied Prudential's petition for leave to
appeal a January decision by U.S. District Judge Joseph Leeson
Jr. in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania that greenlighted a
subclass of beneficiaries of Prudential-administered life
insurance plans provided to JPMorgan Bank and Con-Way Inc.
employees.

The case is Huffman et al v. The Prudential Insurance Company Of
America Case No. 2:10-cv-05135, (E.D. Pa.).  The case is assigned
to Judge Joseph F. Leeson, Jr.  The case was filed September 30,
2010. [GN]


QUICK TRAVEL: Faces "Campos" Suit in C.D. California
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Quick Travel
Staffing, Inc. The case is styled as Consuelo Campos, as an
Individual, and on behalf of all persons similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. Quick Travel Staffing, Inc., a California
corporation, Stefan Windheuser, an individual, Belinda Pagliaro,
an individual and DOES 1 through 100, Inclusive, Defendants, Case
No. 2:18-cv-03406 (C.D. Cal., April 23, 2018).

Quick Travel Staffing, Inc. is a nurse employment agency.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


RESORT MARKETING: Supplemental Notice Inked in Robocall Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Dana Fowle, writing for FOX 5 Atlanta, reports that a FOX 5 I-
Team report on robocalls got a lot of attention a few months back
when there was an offer of getting cash from a class-action
lawsuit. Many of you signed up, but then there was radio silence
from the lawyers involved. There is a development.

Yes, we got your emails and social media messages asking what
happened to your money. It's coming. But, first, let me remind
you about the case.

A class-action lawsuit formed offering up to $900 for robocalls
received about a free cruise. According to the suit, these calls
were placed between 2009 and 2014. And the caller offered
vacations either on Carnival, Royal Caribbean or Norwegian cruise
lines.

This was back in August. Many of you went to a link, submitted
your phone number and then were told 'yes' or 'no' your phone
received this robocall. And then nothing.

Here's what's going on: The court has authorized what is called a
supplemental notice, meaning you have to jump through another
hoop to collect your money. Because so many people filed a claim
-- two million -- they suspect some of these are fraudulent.

Now, be on the look-out for a notice in your email from Charvat
v. Resort Marketing Group that says, "Recipients of this email
must submit proof of their connection to the phone numbers."

You have to prove the number is yours. And here's how you can do
that. Submit a phone bill, phone contract, your number and name
in a phone directory -- anything that proves that the number you
told the court got a cruise robocall, in fact, belongs to you.
You have until May 1, 2018, to get this done.

Check your spam folders for this email.[GN]


ROADRUNNER TRANS: Securities Suit in Wisconsin Still Ongoing
------------------------------------------------------------
Roadrunner Transportation Systems, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q
Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on March
30, 2018, for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2017, that
the company continues to defend itself in a class action suit
entitled, In re Roadrunner Transportation Systems, Inc.
Securities Litigation.

Following the Company's press release on January 30, 2017, three
putative class actions were filed in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin against the Company
and its former officers, Mark A. DiBlasi and Peter R. Armbruster.
On May 19, 2017, the Court consolidated the actions under the
caption In re Roadrunner Transportation Systems, Inc. Securities
Litigation (Case No. 17-cv-00144), and appointed Public
Employees' Retirement System as lead plaintiff.

On March 12, 2018, the lead plaintiff filed a Consolidated
Amended Complaint ("CAC") on behalf of a class of persons who
purchased the Company's common stock between March 14, 2013 and
January 30, 2017, inclusive. The CAC alleges (i) the Company and
Messrs. DiBlasi and Armbruster violated Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, and (ii) Messrs. DiBlasi and
Armbruster, the Company's former Chairman Scott Rued, HCI Equity
Partners, L.L.C., and HCI Equity Management, L.P. violated
Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, by making or causing to be
made materially false or misleading statements, or failing to
disclose material facts, regarding (a) the accuracy of the
Company's financial statements; (b) the Company's true earnings
and expenses; (c) the effectiveness of the Company's disclosure
controls and controls over financial reporting; (d) the true
nature and depth of financial risk associated with the Company's
tractor lease guaranty program; (e) the Company's leverage ratios
and compliance with its credit facilities; and (f) the value of
the goodwill the Company carried on its balance sheet. The CAC
seeks certification as a class action, compensatory damages, and
attorney's fees and costs.

Roadrunner Transportation Systems, Inc. is a leading asset-right
transportation and asset-light logistics service provider
offering a full suite of solutions. The company's Truckload
Logistics (TL) and Less-than-Truckload (LTL) segments offer
solutions including less-than-truckload, air and ground domestic
and cross-border expedite, dry van and temperature controlled
truckload logistics, and intermodal services. The company is
based in Downers Grove, Illinois.


ROYAL CARIBBEAN: Judge Dismisses Passengers' Harvey Claims
----------------------------------------------------------
Rachel Graf, writing for Law360, reports that a Florida federal
judge on April 9 dismissed a proposed class action that alleged
Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. pressured passengers to travel to
Texas for a voyage scheduled to depart while Hurricane Harvey
bore down on the state, saying the claims are barred by a waiver
included in the ticket contract.

U.S. District Judge James Lawrence King said that Nikki McIntosh,
who launched the suit, had been properly notified of the class
action waiver but that it does not prevent her from bringing
claims against the cruise line. [GN]


SAMSUNG CORP: Misled Consumers About Speed of Galaxy S4
-------------------------------------------------------
Mark Jansen, writing for Digital Trends, reports that Samsung has
been slammed by a federal judge for allegedly misleading
consumers who purchased the Samsung Galaxy S4, by fraudulently
misrepresenting the amount of power available in the device.

The statement came about as a result of a long-running legal
dispute between the Korean tech giant and a class action lawsuit,
headed by plaintiff Daniel Norcia.  Back in 2011, Mr. Norcia
filed a suit against Samsung, alleging that the capabilities of
the Galaxy S4 flagship phone had been grossly misrepresented, and
Samsung had used this to mislead customers into thinking the
phone was more powerful than competitors' phones.  Parts of the
lawsuit surrounding the available storage have since been
dropped, but the courts have upheld Norcia's complaint on the
processing power of the phone.

According to the accusation, Samsung coded the Galaxy S4's
software to detect when specific benchmarking software was being
used, and have it commit extra resources to its operation --
effectively cheating the test and providing results that could
not be replicated outside of the benchmarking app by a casual
user.  Since these benchmarks are commonly used in third-party
reviews of the device, that alleged cheating led to a false
impression of superior speed being made public.

"Samsung also knew that if it artificially boosted the
performance of its devices when running benchmarking apps,
reviewers and the public would falsely believe that the Galaxy S4
was similarly fast in real-world situations.  In reality, the
processors in the Galaxy S4 run at a lower speed and the
artificial performance boost disappears when the devices are
performing real-world tasks instead of running benchmarking apps"
states Norcia's complaint.

Samsung had previously attempted to move the case to arbitration
court by arguing the Galaxy S4's warranty specifically forbad
class actions lawsuits being brought.  Unfortunately for Samsung,
an appeals court dismissed this claim on the basis that
warranties do not impose anything on the buyer, especially when
introduced after the sale.

Speaking in a previous hearing on the case, U.S. District Judge
James Donato said: "Samsung rigged the deck, fixed the game; and
as a result of that, consumers were misled about the speed of the
phone."

The case was due to be heard in front of a U.S. magistrate judge.
[GN]


SANTANDER SECURITIES: Quetglas Files Securities Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
Quetglas Law Offices, P.S.C. ("QLO") announced that on April 9,
2018, it filed an amended securities class action lawsuit on
behalf of Jorge Ponsa-Rabell and other investors against
Santander Securities, LLC; Santander Bancorp; Santander Holdings
USA, Inc.; Banco Santander Puerto Rico; and Banco Santander S.A.
(jointly "Santander") (NYSE: SAN).  The action, which is
captioned Jorge Ponsa-Rabell, et al. vs. Santander Securites,
LLC, et al., 17-cv-02243-CCC (D. P.R.), asserts that during the
period from December 2012 through October 2013, that is from
December 1, 2012 through October 31, 2013 (the "Class Period"),
through the omission or concealment of material facts, in
violation of the federal securities laws, Santander solicited and
caused the Plaintiffs and other putative Class members (the
"Class") to purchase over $180 million worth of Puerto Rico
Municipal Bonds ("PRMBs") and $101 million worth of Puerto Rico
Closed End Funds ("PRCEFs" or "CEFs") and other Open-End Puerto
Rico Funds ("PROEFs") (collectively "PR securities"). The action
alleges that, as a result of the foregoing, Class members
sustained severe economic losses.

If you wish to serve as Lead Plaintiff for the Class, you must
file a motion with the Court no later than 60 days from today.
Accordingly, the deadline for filing a motion for appointment as
Lead Plaintiff is June 11, 2018.  Any member of the proposed
Class may move the Court by the above deadline to serve as Lead
Plaintiff through counsel of their choice, or may choose to do
nothing and remain a member of the proposed Class.

         Eric Quetglas-Jordan, Esq.
         Telephone: 787-722-0635
         Website: www.QuetglasLawPSC.com
         E-mail: QuetglasLaw@gmail.com [GN]


SCOUT PETROLEUM: Count II Summary Ruling in Royalties Suit Upheld
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHESAPEAKE APPALACHIA L.L.C., v. SCOUT PETROLEUM,
LLC; SCOUT PETROLEUM II, LP, Appellants, Case No. 17-2037 (3d
Cir.), Judge Luis Felipe Restrepo of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's Order
granting the motion of Plaintiff for summary judgment on Count
II, and denying Scout's cross-motion to dismiss the complaint.

Chesapeake entered into various oil and gas leases with
landowners in several northeastern Pennsylvania counties wherein
Chesapeake is the "Lessee," and the "Lessor" is (or originally
was) the respective landowner.  Scout subsequently purchased the
rights to several of these leases, and has been receiving
royalties from the sale of natural gas from Chesapeake pursuant
to the Leases.  The Leases include an arbitration provision.

On March 17, 2014, Scout filed an arbitration demand against
Chesapeake on behalf of itself and similarly-situated lessors,
alleging that Chesapeake paid insufficient royalties.  In its
answer to the arbitration demand, Chesapeake objected to class
arbitration on the grounds that it did not agree to resolve
disputes arising out of the Leases by class arbitration.

On April 1, 2014, Chesapeake filed this declaratory judgment
action seeking a Judgment declaring that the Leases do not permit
class arbitration.  Following the Court's affirmance of the
District Court's ruling on the question of arbitrability, the
District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Chesapeake on
the clause construction question and denied Scout's cross-motion
to dismiss.  The appeal followed.

Assuming that the class arbitration may be permitted without
express authorization in a contract, Judge Restrepo finds that
the arbitration clause does not imply the parties' intent to
authorize class arbitration.  The clause specifically authorizes
arbitration in the event of a disagreement between Lessor and
Lessee, and Scout fails to point to anything in the contract that
would suggest an implicit intent of the parties to permit the
class arbitration.

The Judge explains that the class-action arbitration changes the
nature of arbitration to such a degree that it cannot be presumed
the parties consented to it by simply agreeing to submit their
disputes to an arbitrator.  As the Supreme Court pointed out, the
crucial differences between bilateral and class arbitration are
too great for arbitrators to presume that the parties' mere
silence on the issue of the class-action arbitration constitutes
consent to resolve their disputes in class proceedings.  Here,
because the arbitration clause neither explicitly nor implicitly
authorizes class arbitration, Judge Restrepo affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 13, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/2MRehH from Leagle.com.


SECURITY AMERICAS: Summary Judgment in "Hodgin" Affirmed
--------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JANET HODGIN; MICHAEL HODGIN, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated; DIANNA MEY, individually
and on behalf of a class of all persons and entities similarly
situated; PHILIP CHARVAT, individually and on behalf of a class
of all persons and entities similarly situated, Plaintiffs-
Appellants, and JAMES G. HOUGH, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated; KERRY O'SHEA, on behalf of himself,
and all others similarly situated; GEORGE CAIN, Individually and
On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated; MERRILL PRIMACK;
STEWART MCCAW; NICHOLAS SHREDERS, on behalf of plaintiff and a
class; JONATHAN MRAUNAC; VINCENT BRIZGYS; CRAIG CUNNINGHAM;
KENNETH MOSER; BILL GARCIA; BRYAN ANTHONY REO; ANTHONY CHERTER;
BRUCE RORTY; EDITH BOWLER; KENNETH CLARK; JAMES GILES; JASON
BENNETT; SANDRA FAIRLEY; SCOTT DOLEMBA, on behalf of plaintiff
and a class; ALLEN BEAVER; DAKOTA DALTON; DIANE ELDER; MICHELLE
WAKELEY; KEITH FINKLEA; TODD C. BANK; NEWTON VAUGHN, an
individual; STEWART N. ABRAMSON; LAWRENCE TARIZZO, individually
and on behalf of all others similary situated; DARREN R. NEWHART;
BRANDON FRAZER; YVETTE CORRALEZ-ESTRADA-DIAZ; JOHN GERACI; SHANE
MEYERS; MATTHEW BARGER; JEFFERY WAGY, Plaintiffs, v. UTC FIRE &
SECURITY AMERICAS CORP., INC.; HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL,
INCORPORATED, Defendants-Appellees, and VERSATILE MARKETING
SOLUTIONS, INC., d/b/a VMS Alarms, d/b/a VMS Alliance Security,
d/b/a Alliance Home Protection; LISA HADDAD, d/b/a CCA Services
LLC, d/b/a Alarmillinois.com, d/b/a Alarmindiana.com; DOES 1-10;
HOME SECURITY SOLUTIONS, INC; JOHN AND JANE DOES 1-10; BRIAN
FABIANO; RYAN J. NEWCOMER; DOES 1-25; 2 GIG TECHNOLOGY; JASJIT,
a/k/a Jay Gotra; SECURE 1 SYSTEMS; MIKE MAVARRO; UTC FIRE AND
AMERICA'S CORPORATION; KATHY MCDONALD, a/k/a Kathy Mardaresco;
THE ALTITUDE GROUP, LLC, d/b/a Core Home Security; KEVIN BRODY;
TRAN CONSULTING GROUP, LLC; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION;
MONITRONICS INTERNATIONAL, INC.; ALLIANCE SECURITY, INC., d/b/a
AH Security, Inc, formerly doing business as Versatile Marketing
Solutions, Inc., d/b/a VMS Alarms; ALLIANCE SECURITY LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company; ISI ALARMS NC INC., a North
Carolina corporation; KEVIN KLINK; JAYSON WALLER; JASJIT GOTRA,
a/k/a Jay Gotra, individually and as an Officer of Versatile
Marketing Solutions, Inc.; ALLIANCE SECURITY; JASJIT GOTRA,
individually and as an officer of Versatile Marketing Solutions,
Inc.; VERSATILE MARKETING SOLUTIONS, INC., d/b/a VMS Alarms,
d/b/a VMS, d/b/a Alliance Security, d/b/a Alliance Home
Protection, a California corporation, Defendants,
COMPLIANCEPOINT, INC., Party-in-Interest, CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
MANUFACTURERS; SECURITY INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, Amici Supporting
Appellees, Case No. 17-1222 (4th Cir.), Judge Allyson Kay Duncan
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed
district court's order denying the Plaintiffs' Rule 56(d) motion
and granting UTC and Honeywell summary judgment.

The Plaintiffs-Appellants sued UTC and Honeywell under the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA").  Although he
Plaintiffs did not allege that UTC and Honeywell directly
violated the TCPA, they claimed that both companies were
vicariously liable for illegal calls made by telemarketers
promoting UTC and Honeywell products.

Versatile Marketing Solutions, Inc., ("VMS") was one of the
retailers that purchased UTC's home-security systems from a
distributor.  VMS sold the systems directly to consumers as part
of a security package that included a subscription to monitoring
services.  ISI Alarms NC, Inc., was a retailer.  It purchased
Honeywell products from ADI and resold them to consumers as part
of a security package that included a subscription to monitoring
services.  VMS and ISI used telemarketing to sell these packages.

On Dec. 19, 2013, the Multidistrict Litigation ("MDL") Panel
consolidated seven class-action lawsuits alleging that ISI, VMS
and other home-security retailers violated the TCPA by making
illegal telemarketing calls and transferred the consolidated case
to the Northern District of West Virginia.  On Feb. 28, 2014, the
Plaintiffs filed a Master Consolidated Complaint, which they
twice amended.  In relevant part, the Second Amended Master
Consolidated Complaint claimed that ISI and VMS violated Section
227(b) of the TCPA by making calls that used a prerecorded
message and Section 227(c) by calling numbers on the national Do-
Not-Call Registry.  It also alleged that UTC and Honeywell were
vicariously liable for these violations because the manufacturers
benefited from the calls and either authorized or ratified them.

Over the next year, the parties engaged in discovery.  Before
discovery closed, however, the district court stayed the MDL
until the Supreme Court decided two cases pending before it: one
involving class-action standing and the other involving TCPA
liability.  Those cases were decided on June 6, 2016.  Two days
later, the district court lifted the stay and scheduled a status
conference to discuss how the rest of discovery should proceed.

At the status conference, which convened on July 28, 2016, UTC
and Honeywell sought permission to file motions for summary
judgment on the ground that they were not vicariously liable for
ISI's and VMS's alleged misconduct.  The Plaintiffs objected that
such motions would unnecessarily delay the final resolution of
the case because UTC had raised and lost a similar motion before
its lawsuit was consolidated into the MDL. The court granted
UTC's and Honeywell's requests.  It also entered a scheduling
order setting the close of discovery for April 28, 2017.

On Aug. 16, 2016, UTC filed its summary-judgment motion.
Honeywell's motion followed two weeks later.  On Sept. 20, 2016,
the Plaintiffs responded to both motions and filed a declaration,
pursuant to Rule 56(d), requesting that the district court defer
ruling on summary judgment until the close of discovery.  The
Rule 56(d) declaration acknowledged that the Plaintiffs had
previously deposed UTC and Honeywell executives but claimed that
additional depositions were critical to fully exploring the
vicarious-liability issues raised in the summary judgment motions
because UTC and Honeywell had produced thousands of new documents
since their initial depositions.  According to the declaration,
additional depositions would allow effective cross-examination
regarding the new documents and would produce evidence directly
from (UTC's and Honeywell's) representatives, and not filtered
through potentially self-serving documents.

On Dec. 22, 2016, the district court denied the Plaintiffs'
request to postpone ruling on summary judgment for two reasons.
First, it found that the Plaintiffs did not attempt to schedule a
single deposition in the three months between June 8, 2016, when
the stay was lifted on the MDL, and Sept. 20, 2016, when their
responses to the summary-judgment motions were due.  It concluded
that the Plaintiffs' inaction demonstrated that the depositions
were not essential to opposing the summary-judgment motions.
Second, the district court found that the Plaintiffs' Rule 56(d)
declaration did not identify any evidence that would be sought
[in the depositions] that could create a genuine issue of
material fact.

The district court then granted summary judgment in favor of UTC
and Honeywell.  It determined that the Plaintiffs failed to
genuinely dispute that UTC and Honeywell did not authorize or
ratify VMS's and ISI's purported TCPA violations.  Therefore, the
court concluded that UTC and Honeywell were not vicariously
liable for the telemarketers' alleged misconduct as a matter of
law.

The appeal timely followed.  On appeal, the Plaintiffs challenge
the district court's denial of their Rule 56(d) motion and grant
of summary judgment in favor of UTC and Honeywell.

Judge Duncan rejected the Plaintiffs' challenges and affirmed the
district court.  To begin, she affirmed the district court's
denial of the Plaintiffs' Rule 56(d) motion to postpone a ruling
on summary judgment until the end of discovery.  She says the
district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the
Plaintiffs' Rule 56(d) motion for two reasons.

First, the Plaintiffs had a reasonable opportunity to depose UTC
and Honeywell regarding the nature of their relationship with VMS
and ISI.  The Plaintiffs' Rule 56(d) declaration acknowledged
that they had deposed both the Defendants at an earlier stage of
discovery.  Moreover, they had three months between the district
court's order lifting the stay in the consolidated case and the
deadline for their opposition to UTC's and Honeywell's summary-
judgment motions.  This gap provided Plaintiffs with a reasonable
amount of time to schedule the depositions they claim were
essential to their responses.  The Plaintiffs do not offer a
persuasive explanation for failing to do so.  Second, the
Plaintiffs' Rule 56(d) declaration does not identify any specific
information that would create a genuine dispute of material fact.
They failed to demonstrate that the information they sought to
attain in the depositions would create a genuine dispute of
material fact.

The Judge also concluded that UTC and Honeywell are entitled to
summary judgment because the Plaintiffs failed to establish a
triable issue regarding UTC's and Honeywell's ratification of the
alleged TCPA violations.  The Plaintiffs' arguments fail to
create a genuine dispute of material fact because they are
unsupported by record evidence and amount to little more than
speculative allegations.  The Plaintiffs failed to rebut the
evidence proffered by UTC and Honeywell demonstrating that they
repudiated the telemarketers' alleged TCPA violations.

Finally, the Judge held that the Plaintiffs' argument that UTC
and Honeywell benefitted from the telemarketers' alleged TCPA
violations is based entirely on conjecture.  She says this
argument fails for the simple reason that the Plaintiffs failed
to proffer any evidence supporting their allegation that illegal
telemarketing practices increased VMS's and ISI's sales of home-
security products.

In sum, Judge Duncan held that the district court did not abuse
its discretion by denying the Plaintiffs' Rule 56(d) motion to
defer ruling on summary judgment and that UTC and Honeywell were
entitled to summary judgment because there was no triable issue
regarding their purported ratification of VMS' and ISI's alleged
TCPA violations.  For these reasons, she affirmed the judgment of
the district court.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 14, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/En4nOP from Leagle.com.

ARGUED: Ryan McCune Donovan -- rdonovan@baileyglasser.com --
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellants.

Rebecca J. Wahlquist -- bwahlquist@swlaw.com -- SNELL & WILMER,
LLP, Los Angeles, California, for Appellee UTC Fire & Security
Americas Corp., Inc.

Lauri Anne Mazzuchetti -- lmazzuchetti@kelleydrye.com -- KELLEY
DRYE & WARREN, LLP, Parsippany, New Jersey, for Appellee
Honeywell International, Incorporated.

ON BRIEF: John W. Barrett -- jbarrett@baileyglasser.com --
Jonathan R. Marshall -- jmarshall@baileyglasser.com -- J. Zak
Ritchie -- zritchie@baileyglasser.com -- BAILEY & GLASSER LLP,
Charleston, West Virginia; Beth E. Terrell --
bterrell@terrellmarshall.com -- TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP, PLLC,
Seattle, Washington, for Appellants.

Glenn T. Graham -- ggraham@kelleydrye.com -- KELLEY DRYE & WARREN
LLP, Parsippany, New Jersey, for Appellee Honeywell
International, Incorporated.

Gordon H. Copland -- gordon.copland@steptoe-johnson.com --
STEPTOE & JOHNSON PLLC, Bridgeport, West Virginia, for Appellee
UTC Fire & Security Americas Corp., Inc.

Kate Comerford Todd, Steven P. Lehotsky, UNITED STATES CHAMBER
LITIGATION CENTER, Washington, D.C.; Thomas R. McCarthy --
tom@consovoymccarthy.com -- Bryan K. Weir --
bryan@consovoymccarthy.com -- CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PARK PLLC,
Arlington, Virginia, for Amici Curiae.


SHEEPSHEAD RESTAURANT: Faces "Zybtsev" Suit in E.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Sheepshead
Restaurant Associates, Inc. The case is styled as Viktor Zybtsev,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Sheepshead Restaurant Associates, Inc. and Cherry
Hill Gourmet, Inc., Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-02360 (E.D.
N.Y., April 23, 2018).

The Defendants are engaged in the restaurant business.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


SIG SAUER: Faces Class Action Over Defective P320 Pistols
---------------------------------------------------------
James Dornbrook, writing for Kansas City Business Journal,
reports that prominent plaintiffs attorney Tim Dollar seeks
class-action status for buyers of the Sig Sauer model P320
pistols.  The lawsuit argues that the guns have a defective
design that causes them to fire if dropped. [GN]


SLM STUDENT: Still Defends Lord Abbett Affiliated Fund Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
SLM Student Loan Trust 2010-1 said in its Form 10-K report filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on March 30,
2018, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2017, that Navient
Corporation is a defendant in a consolidated class action suit
captioned as, Lord Abbett Affiliated Fund, Inc., et al. v.
Navient Corporation, et al.

During the first quarter of 2016, Navient Corporation, certain
Navient officers and directors, and the underwriters of certain
Navient securities offerings were sued in three putative
securities class action lawsuits filed on behalf of certain
investors in Navient stock or Navient unsecured debt. These three
cases, which were filed in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Delaware, were consolidated by the District Court,
with Lord Abbett Funds appointed as Lead Plaintiff.

The caption of the consolidated case is Lord Abbett Affiliated
Fund, Inc., et al. v. Navient Corporation, et al. The plaintiffs
filed their amended and consolidated complaint in September 2016.

SLM Student Loan Trust 2010-1 said in its Form 10-D Report filed
for the monthly distribution period from September 1, 2017 to
September 30, 2017, that the Court ruled on its Motion to Dismiss
on September 6, 2017 and dismissed the complaint in its entirety
without prejudice.  If the plaintiffs file a further amended and
restated complaint, the Navient defendants intend to vigorously
defend against the allegations.

In its Form 10-K Report, the Company said the plaintiffs filed a
further amended and restated complaint on November 17, 2017.  The
Navient defendants intend to vigorously defend against the
allegations.


SLM STUDENT: "Pope" and "Gross" Cases Consolidated
--------------------------------------------------
SLM Student Loan Trust 2010-1 said in its Form 10-K report filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on March 30,
2018, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2017, that Navient
Corporation is a defendant in a consolidated class action suit
captioned as, Pope v. Navient Corporation, et al and Gross v.
Navient Corporation, et al.

SLM Student Loan Trust 2010-1 said in its Form 10-D Report for
the monthly distribution period from September 1, 2017 to
September 30, 2017, that during the fourth quarter of 2017,
Navient and certain Navient officers were named in a putative
class action lawsuit filed on behalf of certain investors in
Navient stock entitled Pope v. Navient Corporation, et al.

In its Form 10-K Report, SLM said Navient was also named as
defendant in the case, Gross v. Navient Corporation, et al.
These cases have been consolidated.  The Navient defendants
intend to vigorously defend against these allegations.


SOLID BIOSCIENCES: Vincent Wong Files Class Action
--------------------------------------------------
The Law Offices of Vincent Wong announce that a class action
lawsuit has been commenced in the United States District Court
for the District of Massachusetts on behalf of investors who
purchased Solid Biosciences Inc. ("Solid Biosciences ") (NASDAQ:
SLDB) securities pursuant to the January 25, 2018 initial public
offering and/or between January 25, 2018 and March 14, 2018.

Click here to learn about the case: http://www.wongesq.com/pslra-
c/solid-biosciences-inc?wire=2. There is no cost or obligation to
you.

According to the complaint, throughout the class period
Defendants issued materially false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (1) Solid Bioscience's lead drug
candidate, SGT-001, had a high likelihood of causing adverse
events in patients; (2) the company misled investors regarding
the toxicity of SGT-001; and (3) consequently, defendants'
statements in the Registration Statement regarding Solid
Biosciences' business, operations, and prospects were materially
false and/or misleading.

If you suffered a loss in Solid Biosciences you have until May
29, 2018 to request that the Court appoint you as lead plaintiff.
Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't require that you
serve as a lead plaintiff. To obtain additional information,
contact Vincent Wong, Esq. either via email vw@wongesq.com, by
telephone at 212.425.1140, or visit http://www.wongesq.com/pslra-
c/solid-biosciences-inc?wire=2.

         Vincent Wong, Esq.
         The Law Offices of Vincent Wong
         Telephone: 212.425.1140
         Fax: 866.699.3880
         E-mail: vw@wongesq.com [GN]


SUBARU: Faces 3rd Lawsuit Over Vehicle Engine Defects
-----------------------------------------------------
Molly Zilli, Esq., writing for Findlaw.com, reports that
everybody loves that new car smell. But no one loves the sound
that car makes when it's breaking down, especially if it's a
serious issue due to the manufacturer's errors.  In three recent
lawsuits, many Subaru owners are claiming they were sold vehicles
with engine defects. Subaru, of course, denies the claims and is
celebrating record sales years.

What Is Product Defect?

In a product liability lawsuit involving cars, you argue that the
vehicle was defective when you purchased it.  You also have to
show that you used your car the way it was intended to be used,
and that you suffered damages as a result of the defect.  Unlike
a negligence claim, you don't have to show that the manufacturer
was careless. Product defect cases like these are based on strict
liability.

Claims of Faulty Parts

The current lawsuits against Subaru focus on the Impreza WRX and
WRX STi vehicles.  They each describe different engine defects
and allege that Subaru hid these issues from customers.

In the lawsuits, there are a number of claims being made. In one
lawsuit, the plaintiff claims a crankshaft defect causes engine
failure in cars made between 2009 and 2014.  Another says that
metal shavings from the rotating assembly contaminate the engine
oil, causing engine failure in cars made between 2012 and 2017.
And the latest lawsuit, filed March 18, alleges that Subaru's
pistons were "improperly designed and manufactured" in cars from
2009 to 2014 because there are gaps in the piston rings which can
lead to dangerous breakdowns and expensive repairs.


SYNACOR INC: Rosen Law Firm Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, disclosed the
filing of a class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of the
securities of Synacor, Inc. (NASDAQ:SYNC) from May 4, 2016
through March 15, 2018, inclusive. The lawsuit seeks to recover
damages for Synacor investors under the federal securities laws.

To join the Synacor class action, go to
http://rosenlegal.com/cases-1320.htmlor call Phillip Kim, Esq.
or Zachary Halper, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email
pkim@rosenlegal.com or zhalper@rosenlegal.com for information on
the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A
CLASS IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU
RETAIN ONE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO
NOTHING AT THIS POINT. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE.

According to the lawsuit, defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) Synacor
was unlikely to receive significant revenues from its contract
with AT&T Inc. until 2018; and (2) as a result, Synacor's revenue
forecasts issued during the Class Period were materially false
and misleading. When the true details entered the market, the
lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to
serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than
June 4, 2018. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting
on behalf of other class members in directing the litigation. If
you wish to join the litigation, go to
http://rosenlegal.com/cases-1320.htmlor to discuss your rights
or interests regarding this class action, please contact Phillip
Kim, Esq. or Zachary Halper, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll free at
866-767-3653 or via e-mail at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
zhalper@rosenlegal.com.

         Laurence Rosen, Esq.
         Phillip Kim, Esq.
         Zachary Halper, Esq.
         The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
         275 Madison Avenue, 34th Floor
         New York, NY 10016
         Telephone: 212-686-1060
         Toll Free: 866-767-3653
         Fax: 212-202-3827
         E-mail: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
                 pkim@rosenlegal.com
                 zhalper@rosenlegal.com [GN]


TAILORED BRANDS: Continues to Defend Texas Class Action Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Tailored Brands, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on March 30, 2018, for
the fiscal year ended February 3, 2018, that the Company
continues to defend itself in a putative class action suit in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

On March 29, 2016, a putative class action lawsuit was filed
against the Company and its Chief Executive Officer, Douglas S.
Ewert, in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas (Case No. 4:16-cv-00838). The complaint
attempts to allege claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 on behalf of a putative class of
persons who purchased or otherwise acquired the Company's
securities between June 18, 2014 and December 9, 2015 (the "Class
Period").

According to the Company's Form 10-Q for the quarterly period
ended July 29, 2017, that on May 26, 2017, Lead Plaintiff
Strathclyde Pension Fund filed an Amended Complaint alleging that
during the Class Period Defendants omitted facts about the
Company's Jos. A. Bank's business, financial status, and
operations, the omission of which rendered Defendants' statements
about the Jos. A. Bank business false or misleading. The amended
complaint also named Jon W. Kimmins, the Company's former Chief
Financial Officer, and Mary Beth Blake, the Company's current
Brand President, Jos. A. Bank, as additional named defendants.

In its Form 10-K Report, the Company said that on July 28, 2017,
it filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint, which is
fully briefed.

Tailored Brands said "We believe that the claims are without
merit and are defending the lawsuit vigorously. The range of
loss, if any, is not reasonably estimable at this time. We do not
currently believe, however, that it will have a material adverse
effect on our financial position, results of operations or cash
flows."

Tailored Brands, Inc. is the leading specialty retailer of men's
tailored clothing and the largest men's formalwear provider in
the United States ("U.S.") and Canada and help men dress for work
and special occasions. The company is based in Houston, Texas.


TAILORED BRANDS: Still Faces "Oliver" TCPA Class Action Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Tailored Brands, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on March 30, 2018, for
the fiscal year ended February 3, 2018, that the court favors
plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment, in a class action
suit filed by Anthony Oliver.

On February 17, 2016, Anthony Oliver filed a putative class
action lawsuit against the company's Men's Wearhouse subsidiary
in the United States District Court for the Central District of
California (Case No. 2:16-cv-01100).  The complaint attempts to
allege claims under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. In
particular the complaint alleges that the Company sent
unsolicited text messages to cellular telephones beginning
October 1, 2013 to the present day.

Tailored Brands said in its Form 10-Q Report for the quarterly
period ended July 29, 2017, that after the Company demonstrated
that the Company had the plaintiff's permission to send him
texts, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging the
Company sent text messages exceeding the number plaintiff had
agreed to receive each week. The parties filed cross-motions for
summary judgment and the case is stayed pending the Court's
decision on those motions.

In its Form 10-K Report, the Company said that the parties filed
cross-motions for summary judgment on what constitutes a "week"
and the Court recently issued an order granting the plaintiff's
motion and denying the company's motion on what period
constitutes a "week."

Tailored Brands said "We continue to believe that the claims are
without merit and intend to defend the lawsuit vigorously. The
range of loss, if any, is not reasonably estimable at this time.
We do not currently believe, however, that it will have a
material adverse effect on our financial position, results of
operations or cash flows."

Tailored Brands, Inc. is the leading specialty retailer of men's
tailored clothing and the largest men's formalwear provider in
the United States ("U.S.") and Canada and help men dress for work
and special occasions. The company is based in Houston, Texas.


TAILORED BRANDS: Bid to Dismiss vs. Twin Hill Suit Underway
-----------------------------------------------------------
Tailored Brands, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on March 30, 2018, for
the fiscal year ended February 3, 2018, that the company's motion
to dismiss the claims made by two American Airlines employees
against the company's Twin Hill subsidiary remains pending.

Tailored Brands said in its Form 10-Q Report for the quarterly
period ended July 29, 2017, that on August 2, 2017, two American
Airlines employees filed a putative class action lawsuit against
the company's Twin Hill subsidiary in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois (Case No. 1:17-cv-
05648).

The complaint attempts to allege claims for strict liability and
negligence based on allegedly defective uniforms Twin Hill
supplied to American Airlines for its employees.

In its Form 10-K Report, the Company said that on September 28,
2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint adding nine
additional named plaintiffs and adding claims for civil battery
and intentional infliction of emotional distress. On November 17,
2017, the Company filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs'
claims.

Tailored Brands said "We believe that any lawsuit filed on the
basis of the safety of the Twin Hill uniforms supplied to
American Airlines is without merit, and we intend to contest this
action vigorously. Twin Hill has substantial and convincing
evidence of the uniforms' safety and fitness for their intended
purpose and we believe that there is no evidence linking any of
the plaintiffs' alleged injuries to our uniforms. The range of
loss, if any, is not reasonably estimable at this time. We do not
currently believe, however, that it will have a material adverse
effect on our financial position, results of operations or cash
flows."

Tailored Brands, Inc. is the leading specialty retailer of men's
tailored clothing and the largest men's formalwear provider in
the United States ("U.S.") and Canada and help men dress for work
and special occasions. The company is based in Houston, Texas.


TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET ERICSSON: Rosen Law Firm Files Lawsuit
----------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, disclosed the
filing of a class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of the
securities of Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (NASDAQ:ERIC) from
April 8, 2013 through July 17, 2017, inclusive. The lawsuit seeks
to recover damages for Ericsson investors under the federal
securities laws.

To join the Ericsson class action, go to
http://rosenlegal.com/cases-1319.htmlor call Phillip Kim, Esq.
or Zachary Halper, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email
pkim@rosenlegal.com or zhalper@rosenlegal.com for information on
the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A
CLASS IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU
RETAIN ONE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO
NOTHING AT THIS POINT. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE.

According to the lawsuit, defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1)
Ericsson prematurely recognized revenues and improperly delayed
the recognition of costs related to services contracts; and (2)
as a result, Ericsson materially overstated its revenues,
margins, and profits during the Class Period. When the true
details entered the market, the lawsuit claims that investors
suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to
serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than
June 5, 2018. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting
on behalf of other class members in directing the litigation. If
you wish to join the litigation, go to
http://rosenlegal.com/cases-1319.htmlor to discuss your rights
or interests regarding this class action, please contact Phillip
Kim, Esq. or Zachary Halper, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll free at
866-767-3653 or via e-mail at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
zhalper@rosenlegal.com.

         Laurence Rosen, Esq.
         Phillip Kim, Esq.
         Zachary Halper, Esq.
         The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
         275 Madison Avenue, 34th Floor
         New York, NY 10016
         Telephone: (212) 686-1060
         Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
         Fax: (212) 202-3827
         Website: www.rosenlegal.com
         E-mail: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
                 pkim@rosenlegal.com
                 zhalper@rosenlegal.com [GN]


TENET HEALTHCARE: Can Compel Arbitration in "Bhakta-Gallier" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SWATI BHAKTA-GALLIER, Individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. TENET HEALTHCARE
CORPORATION d/b/a CYPRESS FAIRBANKS MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant,
Civil Action No. 4:17-CV-3178 (S.D. Tex.), Judge Melinda Harmon
of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas,
Houston Division, granted the Defendant's motion to compel
arbitration, and stayed and abated the action pending resolution
of the arbitration.

Pending before the Court is Defendant's motion to compel
arbitration and stay action pending arbitration, unopposed by
Bhakta-Gallier, and United States Magistrate Judge Frances
Stacy's memorandum and recommendation that the Defendant's motion
to compel arbitration be granted and the action be stayed and
abated pending completion of arbitration.  No objections have
been filed to the Magistrate Judge's memorandum and
recommendation.

After a careful review of the record and the applicable law,
Judge Harmon finds the memorandum and recommendation is not
clearly erroneous or contrary to law.  She concurs with
Magistrate Judge Stacy's careful and thorough analysis and
accordingly adopted her memorandum and order as its own.
Therefore, the Judge granted the Defendant's motion to compel
arbitration, and that the action is stayed and abated pending
resolution of the arbitration.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 13, 2018 Opinion and Order
is available at https://is.gd/iA2tGv from Leagle.com.

Swati Bhakta-Gallier & Kimberly Rensi, Plaintiffs, represented by
Alex Mabry -- amabry@mabrylaw.com -- The Mabry Law Firm, PLLC.

Tenet Healthcare Corporation, Defendant, represented by Shira R.
Yoshor -- yoshors@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traurig LLP.


TIGER BRANDS: Still Working on Listeriosis Detection
----------------------------------------------------
Aphiwe Ngalo and Sune Payne, writing for Daily Maverick, reports
that more than a month after a recall of some Tiger Brand
products, and a shut-down of Tiger Brand facilities, the company
is still trying to get to the bottom of the deadly listeriosis
outbreak. Providing an update, Nevashnee Naicker, spokesperson
for Tiger Brands said the company has been "working to get to the
bottom of the listeria detection at our Polokwane facility and
some of our products".

Four Tiger Brand factories had been closed after Health Minister
Dr Aaron Motsoaledi announced a breakthrough in the ongoing
investigation into the source of the deadly outbreak of
listeriosis. During a briefing on March 4, Motsoaledi confirmed
that the outbreak had originated at an Enterprise factory in
Polokwane, Limpopo. Immediately following this announcement, all
polony and other cold meat products were recalled nationally from
retailers.

Enterprise falls under Tiger Brands, which then immediately
closed four facilities including an abbatoir and three
manufacturing plants.

Naicker told Daily Maverick that the company's affected
facilities will only be re-opened once all criteria had been met,
working in conjunction with the Department of Health. Tiger
Brands claims that they have virtually deconstructed the
factories and equipment as part of their investigations and as
they proceed with deep-cleaning protocols.

The company did, however, say they are unsure of the criteria
they would have to meet for government to allow them to open shop
again.

As many lives have been claimed and affected by the outbreak, two
class action lawsuits have been brought against Tiger Brands by
Richard Spoor Attorneys and LHL Attorneys.

After reports of confusion regarding the cases against them,
Tiger Brands felt it necessary to note that they are not opposed
to the class action lawsuit, but rather "before it can be
launched and pursued, a class action must be certified as such by
the court. The certification process requires the filing of an
appropriate certification application".

The company says that the two separate and competing applications
for certification of the same class action have been filed in
this matter. At this stage, Tiger Brands is opposing the
applications, because, procedurally, the same class action cannot
be certified in more than one application. The court will decide
whether it is appropriate for a class action to be certified and
if so, the terms of such certification.

After being approached by a number of people who had been
affected by listeriosis, Richard Spoor representative, Thami
Malusi says that the firm thought it made sense for them to take
on Tiger Brands. A motivating factor in this decision is knowing
that few South African law firms could take on such a big
corporation and "do it as well as they can".

To date, 110 complainants have come to Richard Spoor Attorneys
since the deadly outbreak. This comes after the attorneys made a
public appeal to those who have been affected by the deadly
listeriosis outbreak.

Referring to Tiger Brands saying they cannot have two class
action lawsuits against them simultaneously Malusi said: "If we
were to go to court, just on that issue of which of the two law
firms should bring the class action, that would take about two to
three years to do, even before we start arguing the case itself.
So it does not make sense for us to go that route."

The other option for the two law firms is to combine the class
actions. Malusi said: "It makes more sense to do that, but it
needs to be done on the basis that it makes sense for us and the
class action. We will be making a decision soon. Whatever
decision we make, it will be driven by best interest of the class
action, that is the victims."

While the cause of this particular strain of the ST6 listeriosis
outbreak is still unknown, it was confirmed by Minister
Motsoaledi in March that the outbreak originated at the
Enterprise factories of Tiger Brands inPolokwane, Limpopo.

Since the recall was announced by Minister Motsoaledi, shops
around the country have hastily removed cold meat products from
their shelves. South African sausage exports have been banned by
countries such as Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Seychelles and Mozambique
following the recall. This has cost around R100-million,
according to Niki Kruger from the Department of Trade and
Industry.

In a response to the question about what the Department of Health
has done to ensure that there is not another outbreak,
spokesperson Popo Maja told Daily Maverickthis week: "The South
African government, together with the World Health Organisation,
has established a multisectoral Incident Management Team to
respond to the outbreak. In addition to monitoring the decline in
cases since the outbreak, the team is developing a multisectoral
incident response plan whose components will contribute to
strengthening food safety."

In a statement released by Tiger Brands on its website, losses
directly associated to the recall and halt in production will
cost the company between R337-million and R377-million.

The health department had not yet responded to all queries about
an update at the time of publication. [GN]


TIGER BRANDS: Opposes Two Separate Listeriosis Class Actions
------------------------------------------------------------
Chisom Jenniffer Okoye, writing for The Citizen, reports that a
Tiger Brands spokesperson says from a law perspective, it is not
possible to have two competing class actions issued at the same
time.

Tiger Brands have not yet decided on whether they will be
opposing the looming class action lawsuits against them, but will
oppose the fact that two separate applications have been filed
against them simultaneously.

Two law firms, Richard Spoor Attorneys and LHL Attorneys, filed
separate class actions against Tiger Brands to the High Court in
Johannesburg for certification to provide monetary compensation
to the hundreds of victims and families who claim to have been
affected by listeriosis, which was traced to the Enterprise Foods
plants in Polokwane and Germiston.

Enterprise Foods is a subsidiary of Tiger Brands.

Tiger Brands spokesperson Nevashnee Naicker said: "We are
opposing the fact that two class actions were brought against us
at the same time.  Procedurally, and from a law perspective, it
is not possible to have two class actions, that are issued at the
same time and competing against one another, so we are opposing
it."

She said the company needs to wait for the court to decide what
the best option is, and that the company has reserved its right
to respond to the applications laid against them.

"We need [the courts] to decide which of the [two] class actions
should go ahead, or whether a hybrid of the two class actions
need to go ahead.  Because as a company, or any company for that
matter, [we] will not be able to face two class actions
concurrently," she said.

Mr. Naicker said the matter is a "legal administrative process"
with timelines, and confirmed that the class actions have not
been started yet as they await the court's decision. [GN]


TILLY'S INC: Continues to Defend "Gonzales" Suit
------------------------------------------------
Tilly's, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on March 30, 2018, for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2017, that the company continues
to defend a class action suit entitled, Juan Carlos Gonzales, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, v. Tilly's
Inc. et al, Superior Court of California, County of Orange, Case
No. 30-2017-00948710-CU-OE-CXC.

In October 2017, the plaintiff filed a putative class action
against the company, alleging various violations of California's
wage and hour laws. The complaint seeks class certification,
unspecified damages, unpaid wages, penalties, restitution,
interest, and attorneys' fees and costs.

In December 2017, the company filed an answer to the complaint,
denying all of the claims and asserting various defenses.
Subsequently, the company requested the plaintiff to dismiss the
class action claims based on an existing waiver in an arbitration
agreement which plaintiff signed with the company's co-defendant,
BaronHR, the staffing company that employed plaintiff to work at
the Company.

Tilly's said "We intend to defend this case vigorously."

Tilly's is a leading destination specialty retailer of casual
apparel, footwear and accessories for young men, young women,
boys and girls. The company is based in Irvine, California.


TILLY'S INC: Parties Executes Settlement Agreement in "Minniti"
---------------------------------------------------------------
Tilly's, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on March 30, 2018, for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2017, that the parties in Lauren
Minniti, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,
v. Tilly's, Inc., United States District Court, Southern District
of Florida, Case No. 0:17-cv-60237-FAM, have executed a
settlement agreement, subject to court approval.

On January 30, 2017, the plaintiff filed a putative class action
lawsuit against us, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991 (the "TCPA").

Specifically, the complaint asserts a violation of the TCPA for
allegedly sending unsolicited automated messages to the cellular
telephones of the plaintiff and others. The complaint seeks class
certification and damages of $500 per violation plus treble
damages under the TCPA.

In March 2017, the company filed its initial response to this
matter with the court. In June 2017, the parties attended a
mediation. In July 2017, the parties reached an agreement in
principle to settle this matter, subject to court approval and
the execution of a final settlement agreement. In March 2018, the
parties executed a settlement agreement, subject to court
approval.

Tilly's is a leading destination specialty retailer of casual
apparel, footwear and accessories for young men, young women,
boys and girls. The company is based in Irvine, California.


TILLY'S INC: Appeal in "Ward" Suit Underway
-------------------------------------------
Tilly's, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on March 30, 2018, for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2017, that plaintiff's reply
appellate brief in the case, Skylar Ward, on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated, v. Tilly's, Inc., Superior
Court of California, County of Los Angeles, Case No. BC595405, is
due to be filed in April 2018.

In September 2015, the plaintiff filed a putative class action
lawsuit against us alleging, among other things, various
violations of California's wage and hour laws. The complaint
sought class certification, unspecified damages, unpaid wages,
penalties, restitution, and attorneys' fees. In June 2016, the
court granted the company's demurrer to the plaintiff's complaint
on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of
action against Tilly's and dismissed the complaint.

Specifically, the court agreed with the company that the
plaintiff's cause of action for reporting-time pay fails as a
matter of law as the plaintiff and other putative class members
did not "report for work" with respect to certain shifts on which
the plaintiff's claims are based. In November 2016, the court
entered a written order sustaining the company's demurrer to the
plaintiff's complaint and dismissing all of plaintiff's causes of
action with prejudice.

In January 2017, the plaintiff filed an appeal of the order to
the California Court of Appeal. In October 2017, the plaintiff
filed her opening appellate brief, and our responding appellate
brief was filed in December 2017. Plaintiff's reply appellate
brief is currently due to be filed in April 2018.

Tilly's said "We have defended this case vigorously and will
continue to do so."

Tilly's is a leading destination specialty retailer of casual
apparel, footwear and accessories for young men, young women,
boys and girls. The company is based in Irvine, California.


TOOTSIE ROLL: Faces Class Action Over Half-Empty Junior Mints Box
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Molly Zilli, Esq., writing for Findlaw.com, reports that opening
a box of candy only to find it half full feels like a cruel joke.
It's akin to unwrapping a giant present on Christmas morning, but
discovering a lone pair of fuzzy socks enclosed within.  It's
nice and all, but not what you expected.  A similarly unhappy
customer is taking her partially-filled box of Jr. Mints to court
and suing Tootsie Roll for consumer fraud.

Junior Mints Deceptive

As the lawsuit explains, Paige Stemm went to her local Walmart
and purchased a box of Junior Mints for about a dollar. To her
frustration, the "oversized theater box" contained "nearly as
much air as candy."  The lawsuit seeks class-action status and is
suing Tootsie Roll Industries -- the makers of Junior Mints --
for "misleading, deceptive and unlawful conduct" in it's
packaging.

Slack Fill and Consumer Fraud

Lawsuits such as this are referred to as slack fill lawsuits and
are governed by federal regulation.  Slack fill is "the
difference between the actual capacity of a container and the
volume of product contained therein." Not all slack fill is bad,
though.

For example, the air pumped into your tortilla chips bag helps
minimize breakage.  At some point, however, the amount of slack
fill can tip the scales toward consumer fraud. Lawsuits have
included packaging related to candy, spices, and other food
items.  The American Bar Association reports that the number of
federal class-action slack fill lawsuits has risen from 20 in
2008 to more than 110 in 2015.

TRUE VALUE: Faces "Walker" Suit in E.D. New York
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against True Value Company.
The case is styled as Ricardo Walker, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. True Value Company,
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-02363 (E.D. N.Y., April 23, 2018).

The True Value Company is an American retailer-owned hardware
cooperative with over 4,000 independent retail locations
worldwide.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   C.K. Lee, Esq.
   Lee Litigation Group, PLLC
   30 East 39th Street
   2nd floor
   New York, NY 10016
   Tel: (212) 465-1188
   Fax: (212) 465-1181
   Email: cklee@leelitigation.com


UBER TECH: 6th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of "Zawada"
-------------------------------------------------
In the case, ARTUR ZAWADA, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UBER
TECHNOLOGIES, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 17-
1092 (6th Cir.), Judge Alice M. Batchelder of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's order
dismissing the action and compelling individual arbitration.

In April 2016, the Plaintiffs filed a purported class action
against Uber on behalf of a class of Uber drivers in Michigan.
The Plaintiffs alleged that Uber unlawfully misclassified them as
independent contractors instead of as employees, depriving them
of fair compensation.  Uber filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint, to compel arbitration, and to strike class
allegations, which the district court granted.  The Plaintiffs
timely appealed.

On appeal, the Plaintiffs argue that the Arbitration Provision is
illegal and unenforceable because the class action waiver
contained in the Arbitration Provision violates the Plaintiffs'
rights under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA").  The
National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"), as amicus curiae on
behalf of the Plaintiffs, argues that class action waivers, even
those that include opt-out provisions, violate the NLRA.  The
NLRB takes no position on whether Uber drivers are statutorily
protected "employees" under the NLRA.  Uber argues that the Court
should not consider the Plaintiffs' arguments because they raise
them for the first time on appeal.

Judge Batchelder holds that the Plaintiffs have forfeited the
issue of whether the class action waiver contained in the
Arbitration Provision violated the NLRA.  The Plaintiffs did not
litigate that issue before the district court.  Instead, they
waited until the eleventh hour to attempt to raise a new
argument, and even then, cited only a single case and provided no
developed argument.  The Plaintiffs' "Notice" was insufficient to
preserve the issue for appellate review.  Finally, the Plaintiffs
have not argued to the Court that theirs is an exceptional case
in which we must decide the issue to prevent a plain miscarriage
of justice.

The Judge concludes the Plaintiffs have expressly waived the
three arguments that they did present to the district court about
the validity and applicability of the Arbitration Provision, and
she does not consider those arguments.  Accordingly, she affirmed
the he judgment of the district court.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 14, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/uV5Quk from Leagle.com.


UNITED STATES: ACLU of Massachusetts Files Immigration Lawsuit
--------------------------------------------------------------
SAMPAN reports that the ACLU of Massachusetts on April 9
announced it has filed a class action lawsuit challenging the
Trump administration's pattern of separating married couples and
families pursuing lawful immigration status. The lawsuit has been
filed on behalf of immigrants and their U.S.-citizen spouses
whose lives have been upended by the Trump administration's
deportation machine.

Together with WilmerHale, the ACLU last night filed the class
action lawsuit against President Trump, Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) officials, Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) officials, and others in an effort to protect petitioners
from detention and deportation while they pursue the government's
pathway for obtaining lawful immigration status based on their
marriage.

"The Trump administration has relentlessly pursued detaining and
deporting as many immigrants as possible, no matter the costs to
family unity and civil rights," said Carol Rose, executive
director of the ACLU of Massachusetts.  "In all of the quotas,
the raids, and other cogs of the Trump deportation machines,
there are human beings.  There's a lot at stake here; this class
action lawsuit seeks justice for all the families -- the married
couples, the mothers, the fathers -- torn apart by this
administration.  Today, we warn Trump, again: we'll see you in
court."

The class action filing arises from incompatible actions of two
DHS agencies: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
and ICE.  In 2016, USCIS enacted regulations that allowed certain
noncitizen spouses of U.S. citizens to pursue lawful immigration
status while remaining in the United States with their families.
The express purpose of the process, according to the lawsuit, is
to protect U.S. citizens and their spouses from extended -- and
potentially indefinite -- family separation.

Although the 2016 regulations remain in effect, ICE has recently
adopted a policy and practice of detaining and seeking to remove
individuals who are pursuing this process.  In fact, ICE has
admitted that seven individuals were arrested while seeking
permanent residency at a Massachusetts or Rhode Island USCIS
office in January 2018 alone.

"The Trump administration is engaged in a widespread practice of
separating families with no legitimate immigration enforcement
purpose," said Kevin Prussia, partner at WilmerHale and president
of the ACLU of Massachusetts Board of Directors.  "This is yet
another example of a senseless ICE policy that interferes with
the right to due process and assaults our fundamental
constitutional values."

The class action lawsuit follows ACLU of Massachusetts action in
the recent case of Lilian Calderon, a mother of two who came to
the United States from Guatemala when she was three years old. In
January, Calderon appeared at a Rhode Island USCIS office with
her U.S. citizen husband for an interview designed to confirm
their marriage, the first step in the process of seeking to
become a lawful permanent resident.  Immediately after the
interview, she was abruptly detained by ICE and taken to a
detention facility in Boston where she was held -- separated from
her husband and two young children -- for nearly a month.  Though
she was released in February, she remains subject to the threat
of detention and removal despite her progress towards
legalization.

In addition to Calderon and her husband Luis Gordillo, the other
petitioners include:

   -- Lucimar de Souza and Sergio Francisco: On January 30,
Ms. de Souza and Mr. Francisco together attended their interview
to confirm their marriage for her lawful immigration status.
Immediately after the interview, and despite the approval of the
marriage petition, Ms. de Souza was detained and today remains
held at the Suffolk County House of Corrections in Boston,
separated from her husband and 10-year-old son.

   -- Sandro de Souza and Carmen Sanchez: Mr. de Souza -- a
Brazilian immigrant who has lived in the United States for more
than 20 years -- has been ordered to depart the country by April
24, despite progress on his pending application process via USCIS
and despite his history of checking in regularly with ICE.
Without the federal court's intervention, he will be forced to
leave behind his U.S. citizen wife and lawful permanent resident
son.

   -- Oscar Rivas and Celina Rivera Rivas: Mr. Rivas fled his
native El Salvador at age 18 and sought asylum in the United
States after being beaten and shot at for refusing to join a
gang.  Since his asylum case was denied, he has regularly
presented himself to ICE, appearing at every court date and
check-in required.  Ten years later, he started a family, and
filed his application for lawful immigration status.  At his
March 1 check-in with ICE, he was ordered to depart the country
by May 2.  His removal would devastate his U.S. citizen wife and
two young children.

   -- Deng Gao and Amy Chen: Mr. Gao is currently in the queue
for an interview in Boston to confirm his marriage. The couple
fears that, like others, Mr. Gao could be detained at this
interview.  Their four children -- including their newborn and
12-year-old son who requires constant care -- are particularly
dependent on him for financial support.

"In Lilian's case, the government's one hand beckoned her
forward, and its other hand grabbed her," said Steven Brown,
executive director of the ACLU of Rhode Island.  "The expansion
of her case into a class action lawsuit shows the devastating and
far-reaching impact of Trump's mass deportation agenda." [GN]


VIRTRA INC: Settles Arizona Employees' Class Suits
--------------------------------------------------
VirTra, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on March 30, 2018, for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2017, that the Arizona employees'
related class action suits have been settled.

On October 20, 2016 a former employee filed a lawsuit in the U.S.
District Court, District of Arizona against the company alleging
its failure and/or refusal to pay overtime in violation of 29
U.S.C. Sec. 201, et seq. and a claim for wrongfully withheld
wages under A.R.S. Sec. 23-350 et seq. The complaint sought
certification of class action status, declaratory relief,
damages, interest, attorneys' fees and such other relief the
Court deemed just and proper.

Additionally, two former and one current employee opted-in to the
class action. On September 18, 2017, the company entered into a
Settlement Agreement and Release of Claims with two parties and
on November 30, 2017, the Company entered into a Settlement
Agreement and Release of Claims with the remaining two parties in
the outstanding lawsuit agreeing to payments including
plaintiff's legal fees totaling $106,030 in full dismissal of all
outstanding complaints against the company.

The agreement does not constitute an admission that the company
violated any local, state or federal regulations or engaged in
any improper or unlawful conduct or wrongdoing. The U.S. District
Court of Arizona, District of Arizona approved the Joint Motion
Requesting Approval of Settlements on September 25, 2017 and
December 7, 2017, respectively, for each settlement agreement.

Virtra said "All required settlement payments were completed in
accordance with the Settlement Agreements on September 29, 2017
and December 13, 2017. Management believes that the ultimate
outcome of this matter did not have a material effect on our
earnings, cash flows, or financial position."

VirTra, Inc. develops sells and supports use of force training
and marksmanship firearms training systems and accessories for
law enforcement, military, educational or civilian use. The
company's simulators use software, hardware and content to create
uniquely effective and realistic training that does not require
live ammunition or less-than-lethal munitions, which can both
save money and provide certain training capabilities unavailable
to live fire exercises. The company is based in Tempe, Arizona.


VITAL RECOVERY: Court Certifies 2 Classes in "Magallon"
-------------------------------------------------------
In the case, FELIPE MAGALLON, Plaintiff, v. VITAL RECOVERY
SERVICES, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 16cv02971 JAH BLM (S.D. Cal.),
Judge John A. Houston of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California granted the Plaintiff's motion for class
certification and granted the Plaintiff's motion for leave to
file a First Amended Complaint ("FAC").

On Dec. 7, 2017, Magallon, filed a complaint asserting violations
of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") and the
Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("Rosenthal FDCPA")
and naming Vital as the Defendant.  The Plaintiff alleges he
received a collection notice from the Defendant on April 14,
2016, attempting to collect a debt in the amount of $23,450.21,
but the notice did not state the debt was accruing interest, the
interest rate at which it is accruing interest or the portion of
the debt that is principal and interest although the Defendant
was charging daily accruing interest on the debt.

The Defendant filed an answer on Jan. 23, 2017.  On March 3,
2017, the Hon. Barbara L. Major, U.S. Magistrate Judge, issued a
scheduling order setting deadlines for filing a motion for a
protective order, a motion to join parties or amend pleadings and
a motion for class certification.  Remaining deadlines will be
set following the Court's order on the motion for class
certification.

On July 11, 2017, the Plaintiff filed a motion to amend the
deadline for filing a motion for leave to amend.  Magistrate
Judge Major granted the unopposed motion for good cause shown.
The Plaintiff filed the pending motion for class certification on
July 14, 2017, and motion for leave to file a FAC on July 17,
2017.

The Plaintiff seeks to certify these Classes:

     a. CLASS A: All persons located in the State of California
to whom the Defendant sent, within one year before the date of
the complaint and in connection with the collection of a consumer
debt, an initial written communication that is substantially
similar or materially identical to the Defendant's April 4, 2016
Validation Notice which was not returned undelivered by the
United States Postal Service, in which the Defendant failed to
clearly state the amount of the debt in violation of 15 U.S.C.
section 1692g(a)(1).

     b. CLASS B: All persons located in the State of California
to whom Defendant sent, within one year before the date of the
complaint and in connection with the collection of a consumer
debt, an initial written communication that is substantially
similar or materially identical to the Defendant's April 4, 2016
Validation Notice which was not returned undelivered by the
United States Postal Service, in which the Defendant failed to
disclose that the debt was subject to daily accruing interest
rendering the Validation Notice deceptive, confusing, and
misleading in violation of 15 U.S.C. sections 1692e, 1692e(2)(A),
and 1692e(10).

The Defendant filed separate oppositions to the motions.  It
argues the Plaintiff fails to meet the numerosity, commonality,
predominance and superiority to support class certification
because the entire class is potentially subject to arbitration

The Plaintiff filed separate replies.  He also filed an objection
to a declaration filed by the Defendant in support of its
opposition to the motion for class certification.

Upon review of the documents, Judge Houston finds that it appears
they are unsigned and undated agreements between individuals who
agree to borrow and repay money, and LendingClub and WebBank.
Hegwood, is not an employee of LendingClub or WebBank.  His
position as a records custodian for Defendant Vital does not,
alone, provide him knowledge of the pertinent facts surrounding
Plaintiff's or any class member's participation in the agreements
or the applicability of the agreements to their accounts.  He
provides no factual support for his statement that the agreements
would apply to accounts assigned by LendingClub to Defendant
Vital.  The Judge sustains the Plaintiff's objection.  Because
there is no evidence, beyond the objectionable statements by
Hegwood, to demonstrate these agreements are applicable to the
Plaintiff or any member of the class, he will not consider the
contents of the agreement, including the arbitration clauses.

The Judge also finds that the Plaintiff meets the requirements of
Rule 23(a) and of Rule 23(b)(2) and (3).  Because, he finds
certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is not appropriate, he will
deny the Plaintiff's request for a hybrid class under Rules
23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3).

As to Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a FAC to add an
additional Defendant, Vital Solutions, the Judge finds the
Plaintiffs present a colorable claim against Vital Solutions.
Additionally, challenges to the sufficiency of the allegations
are more appropriately addressed in a motion to dismiss.
Accordingly, he will grant the Plaintiff's motion for leave to
amend.

Based on this foregoing, Judge Houston granted the Plaintiff's
motion for class certification.

The Classes will consist of:

     a. CLASS A: All persons located in the State of California
to whom the Defendant sent, within one year before the date of
the complaint and in connection with the collection of a consumer
debt, an initial written communication that is substantially
similar or materially identical to the Defendant's April 4, 2016
Validation Notice which was not returned undelivered by the
United States Postal Service, in which the Defendant failed to
clearly state the amount of the debt in violation of 15 U.S.C.
section 1692g(a)(1).

     b. CLASS B: All persons located in the State of California
to whom the Defendant sent, within one year before the date of
the complaint and in connection with the collection of a consumer
debt, an initial written communication that is substantially
similar or materially identical to the Defendant's April 4, 2016
Validation Notice which was not returned undelivered by the
United States Postal Service, in which the Defendant failed to
disclose that the debt was subject to daily accruing interest
rendering the Validation Notice deceptive, confusing, and
misleading in violation of 15 U.S.C. sections 1692e, 1692e(2)(A),
and 1692e(10).

The Judge also granted the Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a
FAC.  The Plaintiff will file the FAC attached to his motion on
or before March 29, 2017.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 14, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/NDW0Bm from Leagle.com.

Felipe Magallon, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Asil A. Mashiri, Mashiri Law
Firm A Professional Corporation & Tamim Jami -- tamim@jamilaw.com
-- The Jami Law Firm.

Vital Recovery Services, LLC, Defendant, represented by David J.
Kaminski -- kaminskid@cmtlaw.com -- Carlson and Messer, Alex A.
Wade, Carlson & Messer, LLP & Shawn Eldridge --
eldridges@cmtlaw.com -- Carlson & Messer LLP.


WEST END: "Easler" Settlement Agreement Awaits Court Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------
West End Indiana Bancshares, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report
filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on March
30, 2018, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2017, that the
Company has reached a tentative settlement agreement with the
parties in the case entitled, Audrey (Adams) Easler v. West End
Bank, S.B., which is pending court approval.

On March 15, 2017, a complaint styled Audrey (Adams) Easler v.
West End Bank, S.B., Case No. 89D02-17-3-CT-00001, Wayne County
Circuit Court, Superior II, Richmond, Indiana, was served on West
End Bank, S.B. (the "Bank"), naming it as defendant and alleging,
among other things, that the Bank sent to the plaintiff a post-
repossession notice that failed to include consumer rights
required by the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") as enacted in
Indiana, and that the Bank's process of repossession allegedly
violated the UCC.

The complaint alleges that the named plaintiff is a
representative of a class of plaintiffs and that the complaint
would become a class action law suit. The complaint asks for both
equitable relief and monetary damages. In November 2017, the
Company reached a tentative settlement agreement with the parties
which is pending court approval.

West End Indiana Bancshares said "Based on the tentative
settlement agreement, the Company has estimated the losses will
not exceed the amount to be paid by our insurance company. Should
the losses exceed the amounts covered by insurance, the Company's
maximum contribution based on the tentative settlement agreement
is $250,000."

West End Indiana Bancshares, Inc. was incorporated in the State
of Maryland in June 2011 for the purpose of becoming the savings
and loan holding company for West End Bank, S.B. (the "Bank"),
upon consummation of the mutual to stock conversion of West End
Bank, MHC, the Bank's former mutual holding company, which
occurred on January 10, 2012.


WEST VIRGINIA: Court Dismisses "Bragg" Suit
-------------------------------------------
Judge Joseph R. Goodwin of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of West Virginia, Charleston Division, withdrew
the referral of the case, ROBERT BRAGG, Plaintiff, v. JONATHAN
SWEENEY, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 2:17-cv-03693 (S.D.
W.V.) dismissed Bragg's Complaint, and denied his Motion for
Appointment of Counsel, Motion for Certification of the Class,
and Bragg's Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and
Costs.

On July 24, 2017, the Clerk's Office received and docketed a
Complaint under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, filed by Bragg, a West
Virginia state prisoner who is presently incarcerated at the
Huttonsville Correctional Center in Huttonsville, West Virginia.
Bragg's Complaint states that, on Sept. 21, 2016, in conjunction
with his arrest on controlled substance offenses, officials of
the Nicholas County Sheriff's Department seized various items of
personal property from his residence in Mt. Nebo, Nicholas
County, West Virginia.

The Complaint further indicates that the Nicholas County
officials named as the Defendants subsequently filed a Petition
for Forfeiture in the Circuit Court of Nicholas County seeking
the forfeiture of Bragg's personal property pursuant to the West
Virginia Contraband Forfeiture Act ("WVCFA") because such
property constituted monies, negotiable instruments, and vehicles
as set forth in the Act.

Bragg's Complaint asserts that the Defendants are applying a
state law to him that violates the United States Constitution,
and is therefore void and unenforceable.  The Complaint contains
two "Counts" in which Bragg claims that the WVCFA, violates the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as
applied to the State through the Fourteenth Amendment.

In Count One, Bragg alleges that the WVCFA violates the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures of property except by determination of probable cause
found by a neutral and detached person.  In Count Two, Bragg
asserts that the WVCFA violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, which prohibits the taking of private property for
public use without just compensation.  Bragg requests that the
court declares the WVCFA void and unenforceable and order an
injunction prohibiting the defendants from acting pursuant
thereto.

As the civil forfeiture proceeding is a matter of public record,
Judge Goodwin takes judicial notice of the fact that an Order of
Settlement was entered in that matter on Oct. 12, 2017.  The
Order of Settlement indicates that, on Sept. 19, 2017, Bragg
entered a guilty plea to the drug charges in Nicholas County,
pursuant to a written plea agreement, in which he also agreed to
the forfeiture of his seized assets at issue in the case.

Before the Court for initial screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
Sections 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B) and consideration of the
following motions or other requests filed by the Plaintiff: the
Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Costs, the
Motion for Appointment of Counsel, and the Motion for
Certification of the Class.

By Standing Order, the matter was referred to the Hon. Dwane L.
Tinsley, United States Magistrate Judge for submission of
proposed findings and a recommendation for disposition, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(B).  For reasons appearing to the
Court, Judge Goodwin withdrew the referral of the matter to the
Magistrate Judge.

The records from the Civil Forfeiture Proceeding make clear that
Bragg entered into a written plea agreement on Aug. 30, 2017.
Pursuant to this agreement, Bragg agreed to forfeit all items
filed in the civil forfeiture proceeding to the State of West
Virginia and the Nicholas County Sheriff's Department.  By doing
so, Bragg mooted any claim concerning the constitutionality of
the seizure thereof under the WVCFA.  Because Bragg's individual
claim is moot, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to
consider Bragg's claims for relief and his Complaint must be
dismissed.  Accordingly, the Defendants will not be served with
process and will not be required to appear or defend the matter.

Because Bragg's Complaint must be dismissed, his Motion for
Appointment of Counsel and Motion for Certification of Class must
be denied.  Judge Goodwin explains that in light of the finding
that Bragg's individual claim cannot proceed, certification of a
class as requested by Bragg is not appropriate because he cannot
meet the requirements of commonality, typicality, and fair and
adequate representation.  Consequently, Bragg has not
demonstrated that this matter is appropriate for class
certification under Rule 23.

As to Bragg's request for the Court to exercise its discretion to
appoint an attorney to represent the putative class, with Bragg
serving as the class representative, Judge Goodwin finds that
Bragg has not demonstrated a colorable individual claim or any
actionable claim on behalf of the putative class.  Consequently,
even if Bragg had stated a claim upon which relief could be
granted, appointment of counsel would not be warranted.

For these reasons, the Judge dismissed Bragg's Complaint, and
denied his Motion for Appointment of Counsel and Motion for
Certification of the Class.  He also denied Bragg's Application
to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Costs but waived the
filing fee.  He directed the Clerk to send a copy of the Order to
the Plaintiff.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 13, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/TSIj29 from Leagle.com.


WILLBROS GROUP: Agreement in Principle Reached in Securities Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Willbros Group, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on March 30, 2018, for
the fiscal year ended December 31, 2017, that the parties in a
case entitled, In re Willbros Group, Inc. Securities Litigation,
in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas,
have reached an agreement in principle.

After the Company announced it would be restating its Condensed
Consolidated Financial Statements for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2014, a complaint was filed in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas ("USDC") on
October 28, 2014 seeking class action status on behalf of
purchasers of the Company's stock and alleging damages on their
behalf arising from the matters that led to the restatement.

The original defendants in the case were the Company, its former
Chief Executive Officer, Robert R. Harl, and its former Chief
Financial Officer, Van A. Welch. On January 30, 2015, the court
named two employee retirement systems as Lead Plaintiffs. Lead
Plaintiffs filed their consolidated complaint, captioned In re
Willbros Group, Inc. Securities Litigation, on March 31, 2015,
adding as a defendant John T. McNabb, II, the former Chief
Executive Officer who had succeeded Mr. Harl, and claims
regarding the restatement of the Company's Condensed Consolidated
Financial Statements for the quarterly period ended March 31,
2014.

On June 15, 2015, Lead Plaintiffs filed a second amended
consolidated complaint, seeking unspecified damages and asserting
violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, as amended (the "Act"), based on alleged
misrepresentations and omissions in the SEC filings and other
public disclosures in 2014, primarily regarding internal
controls, the performance of the Oil & Gas segment, compliance
with debt covenants and liquidity, certain financial results and
the circumstances surrounding Mr. Harl's departure.

On July 27, 2015, the Company filed a motion to dismiss the case.
At a hearing on May 24, 2016, the court granted the motion to
dismiss in part and denied it in part. On July 22, 2016, the
Company filed an answer to the suit denying the remaining
allegations in the case, which complain of alleged
misrepresentations and omissions in violation of the Act
regarding internal controls, the performance of the Oil & Gas
segment and Mr. Harl's departure.

Willbros Group said in its Form 10-Q Report for the quarterly
period ended September 30, 2017, that on June 28, 2017, Lead
Plaintiffs filed a motion asking the Court to reconsider its
order in 2016 dismissing certain claims and allow Lead Plaintiffs
to replead two of the claims the Court has dismissed; the Company
opposes the motion. The Court heard oral argument but has not
ruled.

In its Form 10-K report, the Company said that on February 16,
2018, it reached an agreement in principle, which, if approved by
the Court, would settle all claims against the defendants and be
funded by its insurance carriers.

Willbros is a specialty energy infrastructure contractor serving
the power and oil and gas industries with offerings that
primarily include construction, maintenance and facilities
development services. The company is based in Houston, Texas.


WIPRO LTD: "Phillips" Suit Moved to Southern District of Texas
--------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Howard R. Lloyd of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California granted the Wipro's motion to
transfer the case, JAMES PHILLIPS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. WIPRO,
LTD., Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-06893-HRL (N.D. Cal.) to the
Southern District of Texas.

Phillips and Robert Saemian both worked at Wipro and say the
company favors South Asians, especially Indians.  In the
complaint, Phillips says he started at Wipro in June 2013, when
the company assigned him to a client in Denver.  A few months
later, Wipro acquired an H-1B visa for someone from India, and
this new recruit eventually took Phillips' job.  Phillips was
placed "on the bench," a kind of limbo in which he spent his time
applying for a new position within the company.  Phillips sought
out the assistance of several third party recruiters, one of whom
was based in Milpitas, California.  His efforts never resulted in
a full-time position, and he says he was repeatedly passed over
in favor of people from South Asia.  Phillips lives in Florida.

Saemian worked for Wipro between May 2014 and July 2015.  At
first, he worked from his home in Orlando, making frequent trips
to Wipro's Houston office, but the company eventually asked him
to move permanently to Texas.  Saeimian sold his house and left
for Houston, but upon arrival he was asked to train a new South
Asian person to do his job.  Two weeks later, Wipro ended
Saemian's employment. In his time with the company, Saemian
observed the company's preferential treatment of South Asians and
he complained to his manager, Richard Prime.  Saemian still lives
in Texas.

The Plaintiffs sued in the district and Wipro moved to have the
case transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Texas, specifically to Houston.  Along with the
motion, Wipro submitted a request for judicial notice containing
information comparing caseloads in the Court and in the Houston
district court.

Wipro also submitted a declaration from Saloni Sachdev, the
"Head-Function-Human Resources."  Sachdev explains that although
Wipro uses third party recruiters as part of its hiring process,
those recruiters have no authority to hire, fire, or make any
employment decisions.  He also says he reviewed company records
to try to locate people who worked in Wipro's Houston office
around the time Saemian did.  He says that of the 20 employees
who left Wipro between January and November 2015 (Saemian's
employment ended in June 2015), 17 appear to live in or near
Houston.  Prime, Saeimian's manager, is based in the United
Kingdom, but he makes frequent trips to Houston.

The Plaintiffs opposed the motion, and the Court heard arguments
from both sides at a hearing on March 13, 2018.  Turning to
whether the case should be transferred, the parties agree that
the Court should consider five factors: (1) the Plaintiff's
choice of forum; (2) convenience of the parties and the
witnesses; (3) ease of access to sources of proof; (4) local
interest in the controversy; (5) familiarity of each forum with
the applicable law; (6) relative congestion in each forum.

Magistrate Judge Lloyd finds that (i) the balance of factors
weighs against deference to the Plaintiffs' choice of forum; (ii)
Wipro has convincingly argued that Houston is a more convenient
forum for parties and witnesses; (iii) the documentary evidence
are mostly in electronic form and most of the relevant witnesses
seem to be closer to Houston than San Jose; (iv) the Houston
district court is equally familiar with the applicable law; and
(v) the parties did not identify a substantial difference in
congestion between this district and the Southern District of
Texas.

Having determined that the Plaintiff's choice of forum is
entitled to considerably less deference, and that all other
factors, on balance, either favor transfer or are neutral, the
Magistrate in the exercise of his discretion finds that a
transfer to the Southern District of Texas is warranted.
Accordingly, he granted Wipro's motion to transfer venue.  The
Clerk of the Court will transfer the case to the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Texas.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 14, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/cNQTKj from Leagle.com.

James Phillips & Robert Saemian, Plaintiffs, represented by
Daniel Lee Low -- dlow@kotchen.com -- Kotchen and Low LLP.

Wipro, Ltd., Defendant, represented by Eric Michael Lloyd --
elloyd@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP & David J. Rowland --
drowland@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP, pro hac vice.


WISCONSIN: Court Denies Flynn's Bid for Violations of TCI Deal
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KRISTINE A. FLYNN, LENDA FLOURNOY, VERNESSIA L.
PARKER, and DEBBIE ANN RAMOS, Plaintiffs, v. JAMES GREER, DR.
DAVID BURNETT, KEVIN KALLAS, M.D., BARBARA RIPANI, STEVEN MERESS,
M.D., ROBERT AHLBORG, SCOTT WALKER, GARY HAMBLIN, DEANNE SCHAUB,
and GARY ANKARLO, Defendants, Case No. 6-CV-537-JPS-JPS (E.D.
Wis.), Judge J.P. Stadtmueller of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin denied Flynn's motion relating to
alleged violations of the settlement agreement.

The class action was filed on May 1, 2006 by Plaintiffs, through
counsel, alleging deficiencies in the medical care provided to
them and other women at Taycheedah Correctional Institution,
Wisconsin's largest women's prison.  The matter was settled in
mid-2010.  The settlement involved ongoing efforts to improve
medical care at Taycheedah.  Over the subsequent years, the
parties occasionally returned to the Court to seek an amendment
to the previously-approved settlement terms.  In February 2016,
the Plaintiffs represented that the terms of the settlement
agreement had been met and they stipulated to dismissal of the
action with prejudice.  The Court adopted that stipulation.

More than a year later, Flynn filed a motion for violations by
WDOC for TCI Agreement between ACLU Counsel for the Plaintiff and
Gov. Doyle and WDOC.  Flynn, still housed at Taycheedah, lists
various complaints with the institution's provision of health
care.

Judge Stadtmueller finds that the motion must be denied for three
reasons.  First, Flynn was represented by counsel while the
action was pending, and there is no indication in any court
filings that her counsel has withdrawn from the action.  The
Court does not allow "hybrid" representation, where both counsel
and the litigants they represent file motions and pleadings with
the Court.  Second, assuming Flynn is no longer represented by
the counsel, prisoner litigants are not permitted to proceed pro
se to represent a class of other prisoners.  Third, and most
importantly, the Plaintiffs have informed the Court that the
terms of the settlement were met and stipulated to dismissal with
prejudice on that basis.  Flynn and her fellow class members
cannot rescind that representation long after the action had been
dismissed.  Accordingly, the Judge denied Flynn's motion.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 13, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/B97J7y from Leagle.com.

Kristine A Flynn, Lenda Flournoy & Debbie Ann Ramos, Plaintiffs,
represented by Laurence J. Dupuis, American Civil Liberties Union
of WI Foundation Inc., Robert L. Graham, Jenner & Block LLP,
Gabriel B. Eber, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation Inc.
National Prison Project, Genevieve J. Essig, Jenner & Block LLP &
Keri L. Holleb Hotaling, Jenner & Block LLP.

Vernessia L Parker, Plaintiff, represented by Laurence J. Dupuis,
American Civil Liberties Union of WI Foundation Inc., Gabriel B.
Eber, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation Inc. National
Prison Project & Genevieve J. Essig, Jenner & Block LLP.

James Greer, Director WDOC Bureau of Health Services, Dr David
Burnett, Medical Director BHS, Kevin Kallas, MD, Mental Health
Director BHS, Barbara Ripani, Dental Director BHS, Steven Meress,
MD, Supervising Physician TCI, Scott Walker, Gary H Hamblin,
Deanne Schaub & Gary Ankarlo, Defendants, represented by Corey F.
Finkelmeyer, Wisconsin Department of Justice Office of the
Attorney General, Francis X. Sullivan, Wisconsin Department of
Justice Office of the Attorney General, Richard Duane Harlow,
Wisconsin Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General,
Gabriel B. Eber, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation Inc.
National Prison Project & Karla Z. Keckhaver, Wisconsin
Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General.

Robert Ahlborg, Defendant, represented by Corey F. Finkelmeyer,
Wisconsin Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General,
David E. Hoel, Wisconsin Department of Justice Office of the
Attorney General, Francis X. Sullivan, Wisconsin Department of
Justice Office of the Attorney General, Karla Z. Keckhaver,
Wisconsin Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General,
Richard Duane Harlow, Wisconsin Department of Justice Office of
the Attorney General & Gabriel B. Eber, American Civil Liberties
Union Foundation Inc. National Prison Project.


WRIGHT MEDICAL: Hip Replacement Device Class Action Settled
-----------------------------------------------------------
Marc Montgomery, writing for Radio Canada International, reports
that a settlement has been reached in the Quebec class action
lawsuit against the Depuy ASR hip replacement system.

These were subject to a worldwide recall in August 2010 due to
problems with the metal on metal devices.

The settlement was reached just prior to going to trial.

The case was launched in Quebec by Kugler Kandestin on behalf of
some 600 plaintiffs who were surgically implanted with an ASR XL
Acetabular Hip System or an ASR Hip Resurfacing System ("ASR
Implant System" or "ASR Implant Systems").

The settlement of 20 million dollars is in favour of people who
were either: (i) Quebec residents at the time of receipt of the
ASR Implant System or any revision thereof; or (ii) Quebec
residents at the time of the Defendants' recall of the ASR
Implant System; or (iii) Recipients of the ASR Implant System or
any revision thereof in Quebec, who were Canadian residents at
that time, and who now reside outside of Canada.

A revision is the surgical process to remove the original device
and replace it with another.  This is usually more complex and
longer than the original operation.

The settlement will be reviewed by Quebec Superior Court in May
before it can receive final approval

This is the latest in a series of lawsuits against the Depoy ASR
system elsewhere in Canada and around the world.

For example, a class action suit in Australia was just settled
for $250 million.

OTHER LAWSUITS

The DePuy ASR is not the only hip replacement system blamed for
problems.


The Zimmer Durom acetabular metal on metal hip implant or "Durom
Cup" in Canada is a device used in hip replacement or hip
resurfacing surgery and was also the subject of a class action
suit in Canada.

The hip replacement device made by Wright Medical Group of
Memphis Tennessee, was also the subject of a national class
action. [GN]


* CBA Approves Protocol for Multi-Jurisdictional Class Actions
--------------------------------------------------------------
Theodore Stathakos, Esq. -- tstathakos@mccarthy.ca -- and
Danielle Douglas, Esq., of McCarthy Tetrault LLP, in an article
for Lexology, report that on February 15, 2018, the Canadian Bar
Association (the "CBA") approved the "Canadian Judicial Protocol
for the Management of Multi-Jurisdictional Class Actions" (the
"Protocol") as the best practice for Courts and judges managing
class proceedings in which related class actions are filed in
more than one Canadian province.  Although adoption of the
Protocol is not mandatory, the CBA is urging Canadian Courts to
implement it.  In the absence of a coordinated national class
action regime in Canada, widespread adoption of the Protocol
could result in greater coordination between class action counsel
and judges across provinces, and potentially help reduce some of
the inefficiencies, increased costs and inconsistencies that can
arise from the now commonplace occurrence of multiple overlapping
class proceedings.

Key features of the new Protocol include:

Plaintiff's counsel should post the pleadings in their action on
the CBA Class Action Database, advise the Court of any other
related action of which they are aware, and compile a
Notification List of the names and contact information of all
known counsel and judges in all related actions.

The parties can agree to allow the judge presiding over their
action to communicate and conduct joint-case management
conferences with other judges in related actions, if the judges
agree.

Parties and judges in all related actions should be notified and
given a copy of any motion to stay or dismiss proceedings based
on the existence of related actions, and of any motion for
certification if certification would involve class members in
other actions.

Some of the measures suggested in the Protocol mirror efforts
already being made by some class action judges managing related
actions to increase communication and coordination between them.
However, so far, any coordination has been ad hoc based on the
managing judge's preference.

Whether courts adopt the Protocol, and how they will apply it to
coordinate overlapping class actions, remains to be seen.  The
Protocol does not propose substantive best practices for how to
manage differences in class actions procedures between provinces.
For example, Quebec class actions are subject to an authorization
process that is somewhat different from the certification process
in common law jurisdictions, and class actions in Quebec often
proceed to authorization more quickly than parallel cases in
common law jurisdictions proceed to certification.  The Protocol
does not suggest best practices for how such cases ought to be
coordinated.

The new Protocol supplements the CBA's previously approved and
more narrow best practices focused specifically on class action
settlement approvals and the issuance of notices related to
settlement.  These best practices are now subsumed within the new
Protocol. [GN]


* EU Commission Presents Class-Action Proposals for Consumers
-------------------------------------------------------------
Deutsche Well reports that presenting a raft of proposals for its
New Deal for Consumers, the European Commission has said it aims
to strengthen citizens' rights by allowing the filing of class-
action suits.  Business organizations are not amused.

Consumers from across the European Union may in future be able to
join forces and file class-action lawsuits with a view to getting
compensation from companies that break the law.

Under a proposal made by the EU executive on April 11, consumers'
rights are to be strengthened considerably.  Calls for the EU to
introduce collective lawsuits, a tool used extensively in US
litigation, had grown after Volkswagen clients were outraged to
learn that the German car giant had cheated on emissions tests.

"In a globalized world where the big companies have a huge
advantage over individual consumers, we need to level the odds,"
EU Justice Commissioner Vera Jourova said in a statement.

Adding firepower

Brussels actually proposed two instruments. One would be for
situations in which a limited group of people suffered comparable
harm.  The second would be for low-value cases in which many
consumers suffered a small loss which would be hard to
compensate.

In the first case, consumers would be able to collectively sue
and receive compensation.

Separately, the European Commission is proposing EU-wide fines of
up to 4 percent of a company's annual turnover in each member
state for firms found guilty of widespread infringements.

"Consumer authorities will finally get teeth to punish the
cheaters," Jourova said, adding that "it cannot be cheap to
cheat."

Abusive litigation ahead?

Business organizations warned Brussels against introducing a US-
style lawsuit culture.  "EU collective redress would only enrich
law firms," argued Markus Beyrer of the BusinessEurope industry
association.

The EU executive insisted it was taking a balanced approach by
only allowing recognized consumer groups and independent public
bodies to file class-action lawsuits, thus avoiding the risk of
abusive litigation.

The proposals are part of a package of laws called New Deal for
Consumers and require the approval of EU governments and
lawmakers to come into effect. [GN]


* Quebec Court Creates "Class Action Chambers" in Montreal
----------------------------------------------------------
Pierre-Jerome Bouchard, Esq. -- pjbouchard@mccarthy.ca --and
Samuel Lepage, Esq. -- slepage@mccarthy.ca -- of McCarthy
Tetrault LLP, in an article for Lexology, report that class
actions commenced in Montreal will soon undergo a significant
procedural change.  Starting December 31, 2018, a designated team
of judges will be tasked with case managing and hearing all
applications for authorization of class action proceedings filed
in the district of Montreal, the most active district Quebec.
This structure is similar to the current structure already in
place in Ontario, under which a designated roster of class
actions judges case manage all class proceedings through
certification.

The new judicial team will be composed of 11 judges selected for
their experience and familiarity with class actions (the "Team").
These judges will hear all applications for authorization and all
preliminary motions before authorization.  If and when a class
action is authorized by one of the assigned judges from the Team,
the case will be transferred to one of the other 63 judges of the
civil division of the Superior Court for management of the merits
stage of the proceeding and the trial.  This is a change from the
current system in Quebec, under the which the same judge who
manages authorization also presides over the trial on the merits.

The judges have already been selected.  They are: Justices Andre
PREVOST, Gary D.D. MORRISON, Elise POISSON, Chantal TREMBLAY,
Chantal CORRIVEAU, Thomas M. DAVIS, Donald BISSON, Chantal
CHATELAIN, Stephen W. HAMILTON, Chantal LAMARCHE and Pierre-C.
GAGNON. Each judge will manage between 20 and 30 cases.

Ongoing class actions in Montreal will be transitioned to the new
structure between September 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018, as
follows:

   -- Any ongoing but not yet authorized case that has been
assigned to a judge who is not part of the Team will be
reassigned to a judge of the Team;

   -- Any ongoing but not yet authorized case that has been
assigned to a judge who is part of the Team will remain assigned
to the same judge until the judgment on the authorization is
rendered;

   -- Any ongoing authorized case that has been assigned to a
judge who is not part of the Team will remain assigned to the
same judge until a judgment on the merits is rendered;

   -- Any ongoing authorized case that has been assigned to a
judge who is part of the Team will be reassigned to a judge who
is not part of the Team.

Exceptions could be made if the complexity of the case requires
it.

Clients currently involved in class action proceedings filed in
the district of Montreal should check with their counsel to see
whether and how the change will affect their case.

The stated objective behind the new structure is to reduce delays
in obtaining an authorization judgment.  Specific days will be
set aside in the schedule of the judges on the Team for hearings
on authorization and related motions.  However, increasing the
speed with which class actions in Montreal get to authorization
may not be a welcome change for all.  Related class proceedings
in multiple provinces are now commonplace in Canada, and one
might ask whether the reform will affect the coordination of
multi-jurisdictional class actions.  Actions in Quebec already
typically proceed to authorization more quickly than cases get to
certification in the rest of Canada, and the anticipated
accelerating effect of the reform might further complicate the
coordination of class proceedings that involve a Quebec action.
It remains to be seen how exactly Team judges will deal with this
issue.

The new class action Chambers system may also be perceived as a
procedural response to the permissive approach to authorization
adopted by the Quebec Court of Appeal.  Recent cases such as
Charles c. Boiron Canada inc., 2016 QCCA 1716, Sibiga c. Fido
Solutions inc., 2016 QCCA 1299 and J.J. c. Oratoire Saint-Joseph
du Mont-Royal, 2017 QCCA 1460 have confirmed the QCCA's view that
judges have little discretion to refuse authorization, and ought
only weed out putative class actions at the authorization stage
if they are frivolous or have no prospect of success.  The new
procedure may be seen as a formalization of the approach,
intended to make the authorization process even quicker and more
formulaic.  Some perceive that the liberal approach to
authorization undermines defendants' rights and results in the
approval of class actions that are tenuous or unmanageable.

Nevertheless, for defendants facing class actions in Quebec,
having their case assigned to a judge with class actions
experience to manage preliminary issues and the authorization may
be a welcomed change.  The automatic transfer of the case to a
different judge for the merits stage and the trial could also be
seen as beneficial by bringing a fresh pair of eyes to the issues
raised in the class action.

Some may also argue the reforms should go further.  While there
will now be a dedicated Team of experienced class action judges
to hear and manage the authorization stage, this "specialization"
does not carry over to the merits stage, which will be presided
over by one of the other 63 judges who are not part of the
dedicated class actions Team.  However, the merits stage of a
class action can also raise complex issues specific to class
action proceedings, such as the feasibility of collective
recovery.  Adjudication of these issues might also benefit from
oversight by judges with more familiarity with class actions.
[GN]


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N  I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marion Alcestis A. Castillon, Jessenius Pulido, Noemi Irene A.
Adala, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche
Maricon Castillon-Lopez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Christopher G.
Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1525-2272.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The CAR subscription rate is $775 for six months delivered via
e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Peter A.
Chapman at 215-945-7000.



                 * * *  End of Transmission  * * *